Court Opinion

ID: 9784530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:47:32.264753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:55.839211
License: Public Domain

HANNAH, C.J., dissenting. I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that Larry Taylor’s testimony of two unrelated subsequent robberies offered to explain the nature of his relationship with Smith is admissible under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 404(b) as evidence corroborating Smith’s involvement in the shooting of Kamya. I disagree. The purpose of introducing the testimony about the two robberies was to present the jury with evidence that Smith was a criminal. No one who has pondered this problem can fail to realize that often when evidence of other offenses is offered, for example to corroborate the testimony of a material witness, relevance for that purpose is being used as a peg upon which to hang the dirty linen of the defendant, so that the jury may determine what sort of man it is upon whose acts they are to render a verdict. Julius Stone, Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46 Harv. L.Rev. 954, 983 (1933). We ought to guard against the admission of “a piece of damning prejudice” on a subsidiary issue. Id. This court in Akins v. State, 330 Ark. 228, 235, 955 S.W.2d 483 (1997), in discussing Rule 404(b) expressed the concern that compels me to dissent now: We have, however, zealously guarded the rights of accused persons to have the State’s evidence strictly confined to the issues surrounding the offense charged to ensure that no one is convicted because he has committed offenses other than that for which he is on trial or because he is of bad character and addicted to crime. That is not to say that evidence could not be relevant to prove the charged crime even though it also coincidentally reveals another unrelated crime. See Banks v. State, 2009 Ark. 483, 11, 347 S.W.3d 31, 38 (Hannah, C.J., concurring). In such a case, an analysis under Arkansas Rule of Evidence 403 is carried out to determine whether the evidence, though relevant, still must be excluded based on prejudicial harm. Id. at 13, 347 S.W.3d at 38. In the present case, the testimony at issue casts no direct light whatever on the charged crime. It is ostensibly offered to explain the close criminal relationship between Taylor and Smith so that the jury could infer that Smith was telling the truth to Taylor when he confessed. First, relevance was minuscule. Second, prejudicial harm grossly outweighs any slight probative value. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Smith failed to sufficiently develop the issue of prejudicial harm. He raised it below and argued it on appeal. Rule 404(b), and its common-law predecessors, once excluded the evidence that the Rule now largely admits. That alone ought to give us cause to pause and consider the legal principles that underlie the Rule. We ought to carefully consider the effect of such evidence on the presumption of innocence. “The presumed effect of such evidence is to predispose the minds of the jurors to believe the accused guilty and thus effectively to strip him of the presumption of innocence.” Commonwealth v. Aguado, 760 A.2d 1181 (Pa.Super.Ct.2000) (quoting Commonwealth v. Spruill, 480 Pa. 601, 391 A.2d 1048, 1049-50 (1978)). The United States Supreme Court has stated that although “the particular phrase ‘presumption of innocence’ — or any form of words — may not be constitutionally mandated, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment must be held to safeguard ‘against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485-86, 98 S.Ct. 1930, 56 L.Ed.2d 468 (1978) (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501. 503, 96 S.Ct. 1691. 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976)). “[A] finding of guilty should rest upon proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused committed the exact offense for which he is being tried.” Leaks v. State, 339 Ark. 348, 358, 5 S.W.3d 448, 454 (1999) (quoting Simmons v. State, 233 Ark. 616, 619, 346 S.W.2d 197, 199 (1961)). Smith was effectually stripped of the presumption of innocence. I would reverse and remand this case for a new trial.