Court Opinion

ID: 9810004
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:38:18.355341+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:19.648683
License: Public Domain

*719Clark, C. J.,
dissenting. This is a petition to rehear this canse and reverse onr opinion filed therein, 132 N. C., 510, 95 Am. St. Rep,, 641. That opinion is itself a precedent and to be set aside, like any other precedent, only upon good cause shown. We have had the benefit of full and able argument upon both hearings, and diligent re-examination of the argument and the authorities shows that our former decision is in accord withour own precedents and those to be found elsefhere.
The complaint alleges that on April 6, 1900, “the plaintiff being a passenger on said defendant road” was injured by the derailment of the car in which he was riding, caused by the negligent construction of the road-bed and the negligent failure of the defendant to provide sufficient crew for said train, and its negligent failure to use such air-brakes and other machinery as were necessary to the safe and proper operation of said road. There is no allegation of willful and wanton injury nor proof of such. The complaint alleges that “the plaintiff yfas a passenger on said railroad for compensation, * * * the defendant having contracted and agreed to carry the plaintiff between said stations for a valuable consideration,” and for a negligent breach of such contract of safe carriage this action is brought.
The plaintiff testified that he was editor of a newspaper; that when called on by the conductor for his fare he told him he had a pass for 1899 and showed it to him; that in 1899 he had made a contract with the defendant to publish its time-table in his paper as consideration for the pass, and the defendant had agreed to continue the contract and renew the contract; that he told the conductor he would pay the regular fare if he wanted it, but the conductor accepted his statement and took him as a passenger without payment of fare or ticket, on the strength of the alleged renewal by the company of the contract of 1899. Such contract was illegal *720and is forbidden under the authority of the law-maldng power in this State under a penalty of “not less than one thousand dollars nor more than five thousand dollars” against the company, and this not being a valid but an illegal transaction the plaintiff cannot be accessory to and participate in such act and then ask a court of justice to give him damages for the defendant’s negligence in executing such illicit arrangement.
The General Assembly has declared that public policy forbids discrimination in the exercise of their quasi-public duties by common carriers, and as was said by us in this case, 132 N. C., at page 512, “nothing could be more clearly a discrimination than the ground upon which the plaintiff asked for and received free passage on this occasion, to-wit, that for the year previous he had advertised the schedule of the defendant company in his paper and had received therefor a free pass over its line for the previous year and that this contract had been renewed for the year current. It does not appear what was the value of the advertising done, charging for the space at the same rates as would be charged others; but let it be what it may, it could not amount exactly 'neither more nor less’ to the value of a free pass to travel ad libitum an unstipulated number of miles over the defendant’s road. Besides, it was an illegal discrimination to sell the plaintiff transportation on credit and not payable in money.” We need not repeat the discussion and construction of this statute as laid down in the able and exhaustive opinion of Mr. Justice Montgomery in State v. Railroad, 122 N. C., 1052, 41 L. R. A., 246, and in the very able opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in that case, in which he referred to evidence of $250,000 of free transportation being given away annually in this State, the cost of which was necessarily considered in fixing the rate charged the unprivileged many. That opinion and subsequent ones have been long *721published, and the Legislature has not seen fit to change the statute by making editors “a privileged class” who can ride free or on credit, with rates unknown, and thus have the cost of their transportation added to the price of transportation charged the public at large. One ground for this legislation is that discrimination in rates gives these corporations improper weight and influence, and this applies with as much force at least to discriminations and favors to editors as to others. The Court in Greenleaf v. Bank, 133 N. C., 292, held that lawyers and judges were not a privileged class, and we cannot hold that editors are, unless the General Assembly shall give them special privileges as to free or reduced transportation which is forbidden to the public generally.
Either (1) the plaintiff, having produced no ticket nor paying cash for his transportation, was on the train without authority of any contract, in which case, by all the authorities, he was entitled to what is known as “ordinary care,” and hence can recover no damages unless there was willful and wanton injury, which in this case is neither alleged nor shown (Pierce v. Railroad, 124 N. C., 83, 44 L. R. A., 316; Cook v. Railroad, 128 N. C., 333; Lewis v. Railroad, 132 N. C., 382; Higley v. Gilmer (Mont.), 35 Am. Rep., 450; Hendryx v. Railroad, 45 Kan., at page 379, and cases there cited; Railroad v. Burnseed (Miss.), 35 Am. St. Rep., 656; Railroad v. Mehlsack (Ill.), 19 Am. St. Rep., 17; Reary v. Railroad (La.), 8 Am. St. Rep., 497; Railroad v. Mecham, 91 Tenn., 428; Whitehead v. Railroad, 99 Mo., 263, 6 L. R. A., 409), for neither the conductor nor the company could give legal assent to his riding contrary to law without payment of fare and his condition was that of a trespasser, not being a passenger.
Or (2) the plaintiff, as he alleges in his complaint, sues for injuries sustained by breach of the contract of safe car*722riage caused by negligence of the defendant, and one of bis prayers for instruction is based upon the theory that the plaintiff was a passenger for hire and compensation. In such case the rule is thus stated, 1 Sutherland Damages, section 5 (3 Ed.): “It may be assumed as an undisputed principle that no action will lie to recover a demand or a supposed claim for damages if to establish it the plaintiff requires aid from an illegal transaction, or is under the necessity of showing and depending in any degree upon an illegal agreement to which he was a party”' — citing numerous cases. Judge Sutherland further says that “a bank is not liable for failure to perform its contract to lend or advance money to be used in speculating in futures (Moss v. Bank, 102 Ga., 808). The sender of a telegram relating to a gambling contract in stocks cannot invoke such contract or the loss or gain resulting from it to measure the damages sustained in consequence of its non-delivery (Morris v. Telegraph Co., 94 Me., 423).” In Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns, 439, Chancellor Walworth says, at page 486: “The plaintiff must recover upon his own merit, and if he has none, or if he discloses the case founded upon illegal dealing and founded on an intercourse prohibited by law he ought not to be heard, whatever the demerits of the defendant may be. There is to my mind something monstrous in the proposition that a court of law ought to carry into effect a contract founded on a breach of law. It is encouraging disobedience and giving to disloyalty its unhallowed fruits. There is no such mischievous doctrine to be deduced from the books.” In Bowman v. Phillips (Kansas), 13 Am. St. Rep., 202, 3 L. R. A., 631, it is held: “The courts will not enforce illegal contracts nor any supposed rights founded thereon, but will leave the parties and those in pari delicio where they find them.” In Oscanyan v. Arms Company, 103 U. S., 261, an action for damages for breach of contract, the Court held that when such con*723tract is void, because against public policy or in violation of law, the Court will nonsuit the plaintiff. In Phalen v. Clark (Conn.), 10 Am. Rep., 253, the Court held: “Where the plaintiff requires any aid from an illegal transaction to establish his demand .he must fail.”
In Welch v. Aesson, 6 Gray, 505, it is said: “It may be assumed as an undisputed doctrine that no action will lie to recover a claim for damages if, to establish it, the plaintiff requires aid from an illegal transaction or is under the necessity of showing or in any manner depending upon the illegal act to which he is a party.” In Pullman v. Transportation Co., 171 U. S., at page 150, Mr. Justice Beckham quotes with approval from Lord Mansfield in Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowper, 341, decided in 1775: “The objection that a contract is immoral or illegal * * * sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed, but it is founded on general principles of public policy. * * * The principle of public policy is this: Ex dodo malo non oritur actio. No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act.” It can make no difference whether the action is to recover upon such contract to enforce specific performance or (as here) to recover damages for breach thereof. The precise point here presented has been three times passed upon in this Cburt, not only in the case here sought to be reversed, 132 N. C., 510, but in two other eases. In Smith v. Turner, 63 N. C., 522, it was held that where a soldier contracted with a railroad for transportation to Johnston’s army and was injured en route by negligence of the company he could not recover damages (though there the contract was legal when made), Reade, J., saying that the contract being illegal (in the purview of the Court trying the action) the parties were in pari delicto,” and the Court “would consult its dignity and not *724interfere in their dispute.” Exactly the same decision was made in Wallace v. Cannon, 38 Ga., 199, 95 Am. Dec., 385; Martin v. Wallace, 40 Ga., 52; Redd v. Railroad, 48 Ga., 102; Railroad v. Redd, 54 Ga., 33; in all which the Court held, as in 40 Ga., 55: “While so engaged the parties were in pari delicto and the courts * * * cannot lend their aid to assist either in the case of injury sustained by the negligence or misconduct of the other.” Another case in this State is Waters v. Railroad, 110 N. C., 338, 16 L. R. A., 834, where the Court held (at page 342) that where the illegal purpose of the shipper or passenger enters into the consideration of the contract of transportation the railroad is exempt from liability for negligence, meaning evidently that the Court will not take jurisdiction of such controversies. Here both parties participated in the illegal purpose of transporting the plaintiff, contrary to law, without payment of fare, and as in the above cases “while so engaged the parties were in pari delicto and the courts cannot lend their aid to assist either in the case of injury sustained by the negligence or misconduct of the other.”
It is immaterial whether the plaintiff had in his pocket a free pass from the president of the railroad company or was allowed by the conductor to ride illegally, without payment of fare, in consideration of the plaintiff’s statement that the company had promised to renew the pass. The conductor, no more than the president, could give the plaintiff the legal right to ride free, unless the plaintiff came within one of the excepted classes entitled to that privilege, as railroad employees and officials, charity cases and the like. It was an illegal contract equally whether made by the conductor or the president. Whether the conductor had the legal right to bind the company by his action so as to subject it to the penalty denounced by the statute is not before us. But if he had not, then the plaintiff had no claim to a contract of passage *725on that ground, and comes under the first- head above, not being a passenger, and could only recover for willful and wanton injury.
The point here presented is well settled in the text-books and by decisions in other States, that the plaintiff cannot recover when he is negligently injured while on the train without any valid contract of carriage, i. e., when he is a licensee or trespasser. In such cases he can only recover if wantonly and willfully injured, or, as it is sometimes styled, for gross negligence, which is the synonym for “willful and wanton injury” in those cases. Black Law Diet., “Passenger,” says that a passenger is “One who has taken his place in a public conveyance by virtue of a contract for the purpose of being transported from one place to another on the payment of fare or its equivalent, Bricker v. Railroad, 132 Pa., 1, 19 Am. St. Rep., 585; and a carrier is not liable to one who rides by stealth, Railroad v. Michie, 83 Ill., 427; or who is a trespasser, Meahlhauser v. Railroad, 91 Mo., 322 ; although invited to ride by an employee of tire carrier, Railroad v. Campbell, 76 Texas, 174; nor a voluntary assistant to an express messenger or mail clerk, Railroad v. Nichols (Karr), 12 Am. Rep., 475; or a newsboy permitted to ride free, Flower v. Railroad, 69 Pa., 210, 8 Am. Rep., 257; Snyder v. Railroad, 60 Mo., 413.” Certainly the plaintiff, who was on this train by an arrangement denounced by the statute under a penalty of “not less than $1,000' nor more than $5,000 fine,” is not in so good a situation as those above named as barred of recovery.
Hutchison on Carriers, section 555, says: “To be entitled to the right of a passenger, the plaintiff who sues for an injury occasioned by the negligence of the company must have been lawfully upon its train,” and that if sued for the injury it can defend upon the ground that the plaintiff had induced the servants of the company to carry him upon a ticket on *726which he had no right to ride. 2 Minor’s Wood Railways (2 Ed.), 1213, instances among persons not entitled to recover for negligent injuries one 'who, contrary to the rules, gets on a freight train, even with the assent of the conductor, and pays no fare, or a trespasser upon a regular passenger train.” If the assent of the conductor does not make him a passenger when riding contrary to the rules of the company, such assent cannot set aside a statute forbidding the plaintiff to ride without paying fare. 3 Elliott Railroads, section 1255, says: “A railroad company owes trespassers no contract duty. Indeed, it owes them no duty except not to willfully injure them.” 1 Fetter Passengers, section 240, uses almost the same language: “The only duty due by a railroad company to one who. is an intruder or trespasser on its trains is to refrain from wantonly, willfully or intentionally injuring him. It is not liable for an injury caused by the mistake, inadvertence or negligence of its employees.” 2 Shear. & Red. Neg., section 489, holds that “one who by collusion with a. servant of the carrier rides without intending to. pay fare * * * does not bring him into contract relation with the company so as to make it liable to him as a passenger.” To the same purport, Thomp.. Carriers, 43. Booth Street Railways, section 326, says: “The duty of a common carrier does not extend to the personal safety of one who is not actually a passenger,” and the same work at section 365: “Newsboys who enter street cars for the purpose of selling papers are not passengers, but mere licensees who assume all the risks of ordinary negligence on the part of the company’s servants.” Certainly the newsboys who are legally on the car, ■with the assent of the company, cannot have greater rights than this plaintiff, who was riding without payment of fare in violation of law. Bishop Non-Contract Law, section 60, says: “If the negligent running of a railroad train injures one who is on it without right he can recover nothing.” 2 *727Jaggarcl Torts, 1081, says: “When no consideration is paid, though the plaintiff was aboard the train by the invitation or request of defendant’s employees, he cannot recover for negligence,” citing numerous oases.
All the above are based upon the idea that no one can recover for negligent injuries unless a passenger, and that no one is a passenger unless there is a legal contract, express or implied, a legal obligation to convey him. The above citations from text-books are amply sustained by authorities, among which: “A railroad company owes no duty to a trespasser on its trains except to abstain from wantonly or maliciously injuring him.” Railroad v. Harris, 71 Miss., 74. “One who is allowed by the conductor to ride as an assistant express messenger without paying fare, under a misapprehension of the conductor that he need not pay, cannot recover damages for injuries sustained by negligence of the carrier.” Railroad v. Nichols, 8 Kansas, 505. In the very interesting opinion by Judge Valentine, he says: “The conductor did not attempt. tO' confer upon the plaintiff any right to ride upon that train, but simply left the plaintiff with the right which he supposed the plaintiff already had, independent of any authority from himself” — the same facts as in this case, though under our statute the conductor could confer no right to ride free when the company itself was prohibited by statute from doing so. In Railroad v. Meachem, 91 Tenn., 428, it is held that the company is not liable for injuries sustained by a trespasser or intruder upon its trains “except to refrain from wilfully, wantonly or intentionally injuring him,” and defines a trespasser as one who rides without payment of fare or authorized invitation. In Railroad v. Beggs, 85 Ill., 84, 28 Am. Rep., 613, the same ruling as to non-liability was made as to one riding illegally upon a free pass which had been issued to another person, and this has been cited and affirmed in Railroad v. Mehlsack, 131 Ill., 61. *728The pass there used was not more illegal than the pass which the plaintiff in this ease presented. Eaton v. Railroad, 57 N. Y.; 382, 15 Am. Rep., 513, held that one not lawfully upon the train, as one riding upon a freight train, could not recover for negligent injuries though upon the train by the invitation of the conductor. In Railroad v. Campbell, 76 Texas, 174, it was held that one injured negligently while riding on a freight train could not recover because unlaw-fuly there; and the same ruling was made, and on the same ground, as to one injured while riding upon the engine by permission of the engineer. Railroad v. Michie, 83 Ill., 427. The plaintiff in the present case was not lawfully upon the train, it being forbidden by law to carry him without prepayment of fare, and neither the conductor nor the company had authority to- receive him on the train without it. In Condran v. Railroad, 67 Fed. Rep., 522, 28 L. R. A., 749, it is held that one who wrongfully evades payment of fare cannot recover for injuries unless wantonly and willfully inflicted.
In Railroad v. Berry, 53 Kan., 112 (42 Am. St. Rep., 278), it is held that one riding upon a railroad train merely by permission of the conductor and Avithout payment of fare cannot recover for personal injuries like a passenger; affirming Railroad v. Wheeler, 35 Kan., 185. In McVeety v. Railroad (Minn.), 11 L. R. A., 174, 22 Am. St. Rep., 728, it is held that one “avIio knoAvingly induces the conductor of a railway company to carry him without charge” cannot recover as a passenger. In Williams v. Railroad, 19 So. Rep., 90 (Miss., 1895), it Avas held that one illegally riding free by consent of the conductor could not recover, and the same Avas held in Railroad v. McAfee, 71 Miss., 70 (1893), as to one riding free by collusion with the railroad creAV and was beaten by them; the latter case is put on the ground of *729in pari delicto that be had “participated in the violation of duty.”
One riding on a train illegally, for instance, contrary to a rule of the company known to him though with permission of the conductor, cannot recover for injuries sustained by negligence. Purple v. Railroad, 114 Fed. Rep., 123, 57 L. R. A., 700; Railroad v. Campbell, 76 Texas, 174; Greenfield v. Railroad (Mich.), 95 N. W., 546 (March, 1903). “The only duty a common carrier owes to one not a passenger is not to injure him wantonly.” Hendryx v. Railroad, 25 Pac., 893. “One riding on a railway train free of charge by invitation and permission of the conductor is not a passenger so as to entitle him to recover for injuries received.” Stallcup v. Railroad, 16 Ind. App., 584 (1897) ; and there are numerous other decisions to the same effect.

The bed-rock principle deduced from all the decisions and text writers is that an action for injuries for negligence of a common carrier is an action of tort arising on contract and can never be sustained except when there is a breach of a legal and valid contract of safe carriage, that as to lorls not arising out of contract recovery can only be had when the injury was inflicted wantonly and willfully.

This is sound in principle and well settled, if any principle can be settled by precedent.
Taking it in the most favorable light for the plaintiff, he was riding on an extension of an illegal pass. That being so, upon the authorities in our State and those from other States and text writers above cited, the plaintiff cannot recover damages sustained by the negligent breach of such illegal contract of carriage. There are other authorities to the same purport. In Massachusetts, where traveling on the Lord’s Day except from necessity, or for purposes of charity, was made illegal, it was held in an opinion by that eminent lawyer, Shaw, C. J., in Bosworth v. Swansey, 10 *730Metc., 363, 43 Am. Dec., 441, that one so traveling illegally could, not recover damages caused by a defect in the highway, and to the same purport is Conolly v. Boston, 117 Mass., 64, 19 Am. Rep., 316, and Davis v. Somerville, 128 Mass., 594, 35 Am. Rep., 399 (1880). The same was held as to recovery of damages sustained by negligence of a street ear company by one traveling thereon on Sunday (Stanton v. Railroad, 14 Allen, 485); and as to one negligently injured at a railroad crossing while illegally traveling along the public road on Sunday. Smith v. Railroad, 120 Mass., 492, 21 Am. Rep., 538. In Gregg v. Wyman, 58 Mass., 322, it was held that the owner of a horse who let him for driving on Sunday, against the statute, could not recover damages for the death of the horse by immoderate driving, because the parties were m pari delicto, the Court saying its conclusion “is fully sustained by numerous decisions both in England and the various States of the Union,” many of which it cites, and the same is held in Way v. Foster, 83 Mass., 408, and Parker v. Latner, 60 Me., 529, 11 Am. Rep., 210. In Lyons v. Desotelle, 124 Mass., 387, it was held that one traveling on the Lord’s Day in violation of the statute, and who had fastened his horse at the side of the road, could not invoke the aid of the courts to recover damages for injuries to his horse caused by the negligent act of another in driving against it. In McGrath v. Merwin, 112 Mass., 467, 17 Am. Rep., 119, it was held that one injured by the negligence of the defendant while clearing out a wheel-pit, though gratuitously and as an act of kindness, on the Lord’s Day, could not recover damages, because participating at the time the injury was sustained in an act in violation of law. In Wallace v. Navigation Co., 134 Mass., 95, 45 Am. Rep., 301, it was held that one sailing his yacht on Sunday in violation of the statute could not recover damages for being negligently run into by a steamboat, because he was there in vio*731lation of law, as the plaintiff was in this case. These decisions were uniform in that State till changed by statute as to injuries from common carriers (Laws 1877, chapter 232), which provides that the general statute, chapter 84, section 2, “prohibiting travel on the Lord’s Day shall not constitute a defense to an action against a common carrier of passengers for any tort suffered by a person so traveling.” There is no statute in North Carolina taking away from common carriers the defense of in pari delicto in case of one traveling on a free pass. The defendant relied on Carroll v. Railroad, 58 N. Y., 126, 17 Am. Rep., 221, where it was held that the plaintiff, injured on a ferry boat while traveling on Sunday contrary to the statute, could recover, but the Court put its decision on the ground (page 132) that if the plaintiff was going in a case of necessity or charity he was not traveling illegally, and as the defendant had the right to carry him and to enforce payment of the fare, if the illegal purpose of the plaintiff was unknown to the defendant, the latter made a valid contract of carriage and was liable for negligence in executing it. Here the plaintiff solicited the illegal carriage by saying his pass had been renewed, and the conductor acted upon it. Both parties knew of the illegality.
In Smith v. Rollins, 11 R. I., 464, 23 Am. Rep., 509, where a livery-stable keeper let his horse for driving on Sunday contrary to the statute, and the other party drove to a different place and brought the horse back damaged, it was held that the plaintiff could not recover, the Court saying (page 472) : “If the tort cannot be made to appear without proof of the contract, certainlv the contract can hardly be considered immaterial, or as not affecting the liability of the defendant, even though it may not be a part of the cause of action.” In Holcombe v. Damby, 51 Vt., 428, the Court says (page 435), affirming previous cases: “It has been repeatedly held in this State that if a party sustain injury *732by reason of the insufficiency in the highway while such party is traveling in violation of the statute, he cannot recover of the town for such injury.” In Lord v. Chadbourne, 42 Me., 429, 66 Am. Dec., 290, it was.held that the plaintiff could not recover damages for the alleged seizure of his whiskey if he was keeping it for sale in violation of law.
Among many cases holding that a jDarty participating in an illegal act cannot obtain from the Court relief for an illegal act or neglect of the other party, if such conduct of the defendant cannot be shown without showing the precedent conduct of the plaintiff, in violation of law, are Light Co. v. Veal, 145 Ind., 506, which held that a county treasurer loaning out county funds contrary to law cannot maintain an action to recover them back. Haggerty v. Ice Co., 143 Mo., 238, 65 Am. St. Rep., 647, 40 L. R. A., 157, holds that where it is contrary to law to have game in possession during the “close season,” one who has deposited game in violation of the statute with a cold, storage company “cannot recover damages for violation of the contract or for negligence in its performance,” the Court saying the complaint shows “that the plaintiff contracted with the defendant corporation for the coimnission of a misdemeanor. * * * The law will not stultify itself by promoting on the one hand what it prohibits on the other, and will for this reason leave the parties to the suit where it finds them, unsanctioned by its favor and unaided by its process.” That case is identical in principle with this, the plaintiff having committed no misdemeanor but having procured the defendant to contract to do an indictable act, as in this case.
Upon similar grounds, in Ketchum v. Greenbaum, 61 Mo., 110, it was held that the plaintiff could not recover a prize drawn on a lottery ticket, uj)holding the maxim in pari delicto potior est conditio defendenlis el possidentis — not that the defendant has right on his side but because the Court *733will help neither party to an illegal transaction. In Youngblood v. Trust Co., 95 Ala., 521, 36 Am. St. Rep., 245, 20 L. R. A., 58, it was lield: “No rights can spring from or be rested upon an act in the performance of which a criminal penalty is incurred, and all contracts which are made in violation of a penal statute are absolutely void.” In Brewing Co. v. Wall, 98 Mich., 158, it was held that a liquor dealer doing business in violation of the statute could not recover damages for violation of a contract by a company to make him its exclusive agent in that locality. The plea that he could legally buy, though he could not legally sell, was overruled on the ground that he was buying to illegally sell. In Kelly v. Courter, 1 Okla., 277, it was held that a tenant selling liquor in violation of law could not recover damages to such liquor caused by the failure of the landlord to supply ice as agreed, the Court resting its decision upon a citation from Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U. S., 146, that the law will not lend its aid where the contract “appears to have been entered into by both the contracting parties for the express purpose of carrying into effect that which is prohibited by the law of the land, Broom’s Leg. Max., 108” — which was the case in this transaction now before the Court. The Oklahoma Court neatly sums up thus: "The principle to be extracted from all the cases is that the law will not lend its support to a claim founded upon its violationMany cases to like purport could be added, but it is useless to multiply authorities upon a principle so well settled in the law and in reason.
The same general principle that no action can be sustained if based in anywise upon an illegal contract which must be put in evidence — ex turpi causa actio non oritur — is supported by all the precedents in this Court in which a contract was necessarily alleged as in this case. Basket v. Moss, 115 N. C., 448, 44 Am. St. Rep., 463; 48 L. R. A., 842; Burbage v. Windley, 108 N. C., 357, 12 L. R. A., 409; *734Pucket v. Alexander, 102 N. C., 95, 3 L. R. A., 43; Griffin v. Hasty, 94 N. C., 438; Covington v. Threadgill, 88 N. C., 186; King v. Winants, 71 N. C., 469, 17 Am. Rep., 11; Whitaker v. Bond, 63 N. C., 290; Carter v. Greenwood, 58 N. C., 410; McRae, v. Railroad, 58 N. C., 395; Ingram v. Ingram, 49 N. C., 188; Ramsay v. Woodard, 48 N. C., 508; Allison v. Norwood, 44 N. C., 414; Sharp v. Farmer, 20 N. C., 122, and “there are others.” The plaintiff cannot recover for negligence without showing he was on the train tinder a valid contract of carriage, and the contract he shows is one against public policy and makes at least one of the parties indictable. Whether the other party is not also indictable as an accessory in procuring such violation of law is an interesting question, but not now before us.
The plaintiff’s allegation is that he was on the train by virtue of his contract for a free pass. Such transaction being a discrimination, as above shown, the penalty denounced by the statute upon the common carrier for such violation of law is a fine “not less than one thousand dollars nor more than five thousand dollars,” and the penalty of the law upon the other party is that, if negligently injured during such illegal transportation, he cannot recover in the courts, since he must put forward such illegal transaction as the basis of his action. If his own act was not indictable, he procured an act by the defendant which was a misdemeanor and obtained transportation thereby.
A court of equity will not interfere with a contract, if it be illegal and against State policy, where the contractors are in pari delicto. Taylor v. McMillan, 123 N. C., 393, citing Grimes v. Hoyt, 55 N. C., 271. If there was no contract of carriage the plaintiff had no rights as a passenger, but only the right to be protected against willful and wanton injury, which is not alleged here. If he had any contract, it was *735one void under our decisions, being forbidden by statute and against public policy, and be is in no better condition.
The decisions in some courts as to persons injured while riding upon legal free passes are not authority in favor of plaintiff, who aslced and accepted free transportation illegally. The conductor had no right to receive him as a passenger, and plaintiff was fixed with knowledge of the law, and is in no condition to ask the Court for damages not inflicted willfully and wantonly.
The former judgment of this Court ordering a new trial should be affirmed and the petition to rehear dismissed upon at least two other grounds not heretofore discussed, because not deemed necessary.
Jones, a witness for the defendant, testified that he sent the plaintiff the pass as a gratuity, upon his application; that he paid nothing for it; that there was no contract to publish the time-table, and that he made no agreement to renew the pass when it expired. The defendant asked the Court to charge “that there is no evidence to support the plaintiff’s allegation (in the complaint) that he was traveling on the defendant’s road, on the occasion complained of, as a passenger for hire or compensation.” It was error to refuse this, for whether the plaintiff’s or the defendant’s testimony was correct, whether the pass had been renewed or not, the plaintiff was not a “passenger for hire or compensation.” State v. Railroad Co., 122 N. C., 1052, 41 L. R. A., 246.
The defendant also excepted properly to this charge of the Court: “If when the plaintiff was called on for his fare he produced to the conductor the pass which has been exhibited in evidence and the conductor accepted it, the plaintiff was a passenger on the train.” The pass on its face had expired and there was no testimony that it had been renewed. The Judge does not add the proviso “if - it had been renewed,” and if it had not been, certainly it could not make him a *736passenger. On the contrary, if the plaintiff’s own evidence was true that a pass was issued in consideration of publishing the time-table, and further that the defendant had agreed to renew it, this being an agreement to make a contract forbidden by our statute against discrimination, the plaintiff was equally not a passenger. In any aspect this instruction was erroneous.
The point here presented has been admirably discussed by Sanborn, U. S. Circuit Judge, in the recent case, above cited, of Purple v. Railroad, 114 Fed., 123 ; 57 L. R. A., 700, which holds: “One who, knowing that a conductor has no authority to grant free transportation, rides upon a train under an arrangement, or tacit understanding, with the conductor that he shall ride free, is not a passenger, but a mere trespasser to whom the only duty of the company is to abstain from willful or reckless injury; that a contract of carriage is indispensable to a recovery and that the implied contract from plaintiff being on the train was conclusively negatived upon showing the illegal agreement to transport without payment of fare.” To same purport Condran v. Railroad, 28 L. R. A., 749; Railroad v. Mehlsack, 131 Ill., 64; Railroad v. Beggs, 85 Ill., 84; Railroad v. Michie, 83 Ill., 431; Railroad v. Brooks, 81 Ill., 250; McVeety v. Railroad, 45 Minn., 269, 11 L. R. A., 174; Robertson v. Railroad, 22 Barb., 91; Railroad v. Campbell, 76 Tex., 175; Prince v. Railroad, 64 Tex., 146 ; Way v. Railroad, 64 Iowa, 48 ; S. C., 73 Iowa, 463 ; Hendryx v. Railroad, 45 Kans., 377; Railroad v. Whipple, 39 Kans., 531; Railroad v. Gantz, 38 Kans., 608; Railroad v. Nichols, 8 Kans., 505, 12 Am. Rep., 475.
Here the plaintiff was fixed with notice in law that neither the company nor the conductor could transport him without payment of fare. In McGraw v. Railroad, 135 N. C., 264, at this term, it was held that though one had a ticket he cannot recover for willful expulsion if the conductor erro*737neously but reasonably supposed be bad no ticket. A for-tiori,, tbe plaintiff cannot recover when be bad no ticket, which tbe conductor knew, and there was no force used, but merely negligence is averred. In Duncan v. Railroad, 113 Fed., 508 (1902), tbe Court says, on this very point, of tbe plaintiff being injured while riding on a pass illegally contrary to tbe interstate commerce prohibition (of which ours is a verbation copy), “Of course if tbe foundation of tbe right against a common carrier were contract, it would be apparent that, under familiar maxims of tbe law, no action would lie, because even though tbe plaintiff is not subject to any penalty imposed by tbe interstate commerce statute, be would be in pari delicto. Indeed, be would be tbe party especially enjoying tbe benefit of tire combination in violation of law.” Here tbe complaint bases tbe action, and necessarily so, upon breach of tbe contract of safe carriage.
MONTGOMERY, J. I concur in tbe dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice.