Court Opinion

ID: 9576064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:20:26.962235+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:57:16.059898
License: Public Domain

WINDES, Justice
(specially concurring).
I concur in the result declared by the majority but prefer to briefly set forth my reasons for such result. I agree with the, majority that the legality of primary elec-., tions for Congress is a matter of state and not Federal concern. Newberry v. United *103States, 256 U.S. 232 41 S.Ct. 469, 65 L.Ed. 913. The problem for solution is whether the legislature has made provision for contesting such primary elections. My view is that the history of legislation on the subject provides the answer.
When Arizona was admitted to statehood and its constitution adopted, the legislature was directed to enact a direct primary law providing for the nomination of all candidates for elective offices, including representatives in Congress. Art. 7, section 10, Arizona Constitution. The first legislature of the state enacted a direct primary law which included nominations for Congress. The 1913 Code, Title 12, Chapter XIV, confers the right and prescribes the procedure for contesting a general election and the last section of this chapter (section 3070) reads:
“Primary elections may be contested in the same manner and within the same time as provided in this chapter for county elections.”
Clearly this section confers the right to contest as to any and all primary candidates. No exception is made as to nominations for Congress. Section 3041 of the 1913 Code provided as follows:
“All contests arising out of such primary elections shall be settled and decided in the same manner as is now or may hereafter be by law provided for general elections.”
This • section provided the procedure -“for settling and deciding all primary elections. It is clear that the 1913 Code conferred the right and prescribed the procedure for contesting all primary elections which of course would necessarily include congressional candidates.
This dispute is engendered by some slight subsequent changes by the legislature. If these changes reflect an intention on the part of the legislature to eliminate the right to contest all primary elections, respondent was correct in her ruling dismissing -the contest. On the other hand, if no such intention is evident, the lower court erred.
•The first change occurred in the 1928 Code, fifteen years subsequent to the original enactment. Of importance is that the 1928 Code eliminated section 3070 and the word “all” in section 3041 of the 1913 Code. We have held that when a word, a phrase or a paragraph of the 1913 Code was omitted in the 1928 Code we will presume no change was intended in the substantive law unless such change was the only conclusion which could be drawn. In re Sullivan’s Estate, 38 Ariz. 387, 300 P. 193, 195. Therein we said:
“ * * * It is well known that it was the object of the code commissioner and the Legislature in preparing the Revised Code of 1928 to change the legal meaning of the existing law as little as possible, but, as stated in the *104preface to the official edition of said Code, ‘to reduce in language’ and to avoid redundancy. Chapter 35, Session Laws 1925. We should therefore presume that when a word, a phrase, or a paragraph from the 1913 Code is omitted- from the Code of 1928, the intent is rather to simplify the language without changing the meaning, than to make a material alteration in the substance of the law itself. Of course, if the only conclusion which can be drawn from the new language is that it was intended to change the legal effect of the statute, the latest expression of the will of the Legislature must prevail, but where two meanings can be given, we should assume rather that one which leaves the law as it was originally than the one which changes the legal effect of the statute as well as its phraseology.”
Candidates for Congress in the primary election are subject to the same laws as state or county candidates concerning the manner of being nominated and the purity of such primary elections. It is inconceivable that by the minor deletions heretofore mentioned the legislature intended to exempt congressional candidates from the penalties provided in these laws. It is difficult for me to attribute to the legislature the unreasonable intent to prescribe how these candidates can legally be nominated and eliminate the right theretofore given to question the legality of the nomination. We should presume otherwise. The only reasonable conclusion which can be drawn from the aforementioned deletions is that the legislature did not intend such an important substantive change.
The alternative writ of mandamus should be made peremptory.