Court Opinion

ID: 9458574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:56:03.078854+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:49.018827
License: Public Domain

HASTINGS, Senior Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
The issue in this case is whether Manpower Administration Order 14-69, issued by the Department of Labor, and the subcontract between the Milwaukee County Community Relations-Social Development Commission and the Wisconsin State Employment Service executed pursuant to that order, provide for sufficient “resident participation” as required by Title I-B of the Economic Opportunity Act.1
I agree with the majority that resident participation, which is required by 42 U.S.C.A. § 2739(d), does not mean resident control or veto power over policy making. I also agree that section 2739 (d) establishes two distinct modes for resident participation, namely, participation by local residents in “the planning, conduct, and evaluation of the comprehensive work and training program and its components” and, in addition, participation through maximum employment of area residents in the operation of the programs. My disagreement stems from the majority’s conclusion that MAO 14-69 and the proposed contract with WSES do not satisfy the requirements of section 2739(d).
Section 2739(d) requires: “The prime sponsor [CR-SDC] and delegate agencies [under the proposed contract WSES] shall provide for participation of residents of the area and members of the groups served in the planning, conduct, and evaluation of the comprehensive work and training program and its components. Such persons shall be provided maximum employment opportunity in the conduct of the component programs, including opportunity for further occupational training and career advancement.”
The Department of Labor’s order, MAO 14-69 is intended to implement the above requirements and provides, inter alia, that: “In conducting the manpower services, the employment service [WSES] shall employ subprofessionals— including the poor — in the planning, conducting and evaluation phases.” The proposed contract with WSES requires, in addition, that: “No less than 50% of contractor’s staff employed in the performance of this contract, (excluding job coaches) shall be residents of the target area served by the Concentrated Employment Program funds under this contract * * I agree with the district court below that the above provisions satisfy the requirements of section 2739(d), in that they provide maximum employment for residents of the target area served by the CEP program, as well as meaningful resident participation in the planning, conduct and evaluation of the program.
In interpreting section 2739(d) and the Department of Labor’s implementing *317order and proposed contract we should be mindful that it is the Department of Labor which is charged with administering the CEP program under the Economic Opportunity Act.2 I feel that the majority has read the MAO 14-69 requirements for resident participation too narrowly and has failed to give due regard to the discretion vested in the Department of Labor. We should not presume that the Department of Labor, in derogation of the Economic Opportunity Act, would strictly construe MAO 14-69 to merely require resident participation by the equivalent of clerks and typists. Until such construction is placed upon MAO 14-69, there has been no cognizable violation of section 2739(d).
Of course, as the district court pointed out, should WSES fail to provide meaningful resident participation as required by the Economic Opportunity Act and as interpreted by the courts, then its contract would be subject to termination under MAO 14-69 and it would be subject to judicial action by concerned target area residents.
With deference, I do not understand how the majority, notwithstanding its finding that MAO 14-69 and the proposed contract are inadequate under the Economic Opportunity Act, can nevertheless suggest that the order’s validity can be sustained if WSES’s present actions are in compliance with the Act. To me the validity of the order and of the proposed contract depend upon their adequacy under the Economic Opportunity Act and are questions of law. In my judgment, the question of present or future compliance with the requirements of the Act by WSES, if it ever arises, is the subject of another lawsuit.
In sum, it is my view that the district court properly determined the issues presented by the pleadings on summary judgment, and I would affirm upon the authority of its well considered opinion reported at 323 F.Supp. 291 (D.C., 1970).

. Abbreviations used in the dissent correspond to those used by the majority.

. Although the Economic Opportunity Act vests in the Office of Economic Opportunity and its director authority to administer the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2941, et seq., the Department of Labor is authorized to administer part of Title I-B of the Economic Opportunity Act (in particular the CEP program) under a Memorandum of Agreement, dated April 12, 1968, and the formal Delegation of Authority between the Department of Labor and the Office of Economic Opportunity. 33 Fed.Reg. 15139.