Court Opinion

ID: 9793636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:50:54.114883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:19.731851
License: Public Domain

PER CURIAM:
The defendant was charged and convicted of second degree murder (Sec. 76-5-203, Utah Code Annotated 1953)1 for the death *61of her 19 month old son, Troy, whose brother was named Travis, in a trial to the court, sitting without a jury.
This case is unique in that defense counsel conceded substantially all of the gruesome facts condensed below. The only defense was a psychotic behavioral personality-
Defendant was married to a service man in March, 1975, and the twins were born the next May. He was assigned to an isolated air base in Alaska, and went there about nine months later, in January, 1976. Testimony at the trial suggested that after he left, defendant’s mental problems, which an expert psychiatrist testified she had, increased to plague her with some sort of uncontrollable disposition to shun.and neglect the infants; and although she contended that she fed them until the death of one and near-death of the other, the following facts belie her contention and make questionable her credibility.
She constantly neglected and mistreated the twins leaving them unattended during the day and many times all night long, leading to progressive emaciation and malnutrition, so that Troy, at 19 months and at the time of his death, weighed but 14.5 pounds, had a total lack of body fat, serious dehydration, a severe diaper rash, sloughing of the skin, bleeding, and heavily infected lungs, suggesting the cause of death. The child was found dead, and naked, on a sofa on December 15, 1976. His dying brother, Travis, recovered rapidly under the care of a physician.
During the time her husband left and the time of the death of the child, the defendant worked, associated with others day and night, frequented a service men’s club, slept regularly once or twice a week with one service man and others, appeared to be kind and loving, no one noticing anything abnormal about her.
Her own counsel, in its brief conceded that:
She did not do housework, she allowed the home in which she lived to become disheveled, cluttered, and eventually in a condition in which no human being would, under normal circumstances, live. The twin boys grew weak from lack of attention, nutrition, and care. They did not grow in a normal manner, nor did they progress intellectually or physically as other children of a similar age. By November of 1976, the children had grown emaciated from lack of food and proper care, and had begun to evidence symptoms of malnutrition and dehydration.
Counsel for the State’s brief added some evidence supported in the record to the effect that:
The house was filthy. Clothes and garbage covered the floors. There was spoiled food and dirty diapers throughout the house. The trash, garbage and unused food and so forth started at an angle up to the walls to a height of about three feet. In the babies’ bedroom 200-300 dirty diapers were in the cribs and on the floor, and hundreds or thousands of flies were present. The bathtub had approximately 2 inches of human feces in it and the toilet and sink were soiled in the same manner. Pornographic magazines were found throughout the house. The odor was overwhelming.
A child specialist called by the defense concluded that the above was symptomatic of a perpetrated child neglect syndrome from which the twins became victims. Other defense witnesses said defendant at times was very contentious, but also was kind and considerate to her children, which seems to be inconsistent under the facts. A social worker with a master’s degree said she was suffering from severe depression while her husband was away and that her relationship with another individual caused some emotional problems until she gradually became totally unaware of the situation and circumstances of her children. A psychiatrist said she was suffering from a severe, psychotic depression of a chronic type — this after an interview of between 15 and 45 minutes, without any clinical tests, *62and that she did not know what to do for her children, i. e., was helpless.
On the other hand, an expert pediatrician and physician, called by the State, said that parents who neglect their children typically exhibit symptoms of depression, isolation and stress, though strangers may not detect such symptoms. Not even her mother noticed any change in behavior prior to Troy’s death. Nor did her male friends with whom she had been sleeping while her husband was away. Her own testimony that she regularly fed the children through October, 1976, and never left the children alone until the middle of November, and that she did feed them until the 10th or 12th of December, does not square with the hard, undenied facts above, resulting in Troy’s death, nor with the fact that she permitted no one in the house after May or June, 1976 — not even her father and mother whom she watched from the window, refusing to answer the door, but later telling them she had been asleep in the basement.
The trial court said, “the testimony of Wheelwright (psychiatrist) and Payne (mental health worker) is grossly inconsistent with the evidence. The court cannot accept them. The court finds no convincing evidence of hallucinations, ... of depression, . . . irresistible impulse, . inability to move oneself independently.”
Defendant asserts one point on appeal, the thrust of which is that the trial judge substituted his own and different judgment for that of expert, unrefuted psychiatric testimony to the effect that defendant did not know what she was doing because of psychotic depression of a chronic type — the trial judge finding that she was a thrill-seeking criminal.
Sec. 76-5-203 (footnote 1 supra), has several subdivisions. The first is where one “intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another.” The prosecutor in his argument, conceded that the facts would not support the charge under that section, whether right or wrong; hence that section will not be considered in this opinion. As to the next two sections (“b” and “c”), we think the record reflects a fact situation proper for determination by a jury, and the trial court here, acting as such arbiter of the facts, was justified in finding guilt, particularly under subsection “c”.
Defense counsel indulges in a lengthy dissertation about the historical changes in statutes, concerning what is “malice,” comparing manslaughter and murder legislation that leads to some kind of conclusion that 76-5 — 203 doesn’t mean “depraved indifference” but something different and greater than “negligent” or “reckless,” which requires a higher degree of proof. He seems to be suggesting that in this case defendant was simply negligent, or careless, or reckless; and that consequently there was insufficient evidence to reflect “depraved indifference.” The trial court thought otherwise, and it is this Court’s problem to determine whether the “facts” show “guilt” under the wording of the statute, failing which, the trial court would be arbitrary or capricious and that the rule should be that the trial court must accept the expert testimony. Defense counsel cites People v. Lynch, 47 Mich.App. 8, 208 N.W.2d 656 (1973), as the leading case on the subject — a case of starvation of a child, where the Michigan court reversed because the trial court excluded expert testimony. It is suggested that the case is not pertinent at all here, because expert testimony was admitted and is the very basis for this appeal. Other cases cited by the defense are neither convincing nor compelling, because generally they concede that if there was malice, the conviction would be affirmed. Defense counsel seems to ignore the rule that “malice” may be “express” or “implied,” as pointed out by the State, and as reflected in State v. Kelsey, Utah, 532 P.2d 1001 (1975) where a 3½ year old child was severely beaten and died; and in Pallis v. State, 123 Ala. 12, 26 So. 339 (1899) a case of exposure wherein it was stated:
For example, if from an infant of tender years, the person under obligation to provide for it wilfully withholds needful food . . . thereof the child dies, he commits murder.
*63See also People v. Burden, 72 Cal.App.3d 603, 140 Cal.Rptr. 282 (1977)—starvation of a 5 month old child; Gibson v. State, 476 P.2d 362 (Okl.Cr.1971)—prisoner grabbing steering wheel of sheriff’s car, under a “depraved mind” statute; State v. Hokenson, 96 Idaho 283, 527 P.2d 487 (1974)—killing a policeman when bomb went off, under “circumstances manifesting indifference to life”; State v. Draves, 18 Or.App. 248, 524 P.2d 1225 (1974)—reckless shooting into a crowd; Wagner v. State, 76 Wis.2d 30, 250 N.W.2d 331 (1977)—drag-racing under “depraved mind” statute; State v. Day, Utah, 572 P.2d 703 (1977)—“depraved indifference” statute, saying it is a fact for the jury; and a good many other cases to like effect.
Defendant’s discussion as to the meaning of the language of the statute is academic and tends to obfuscate the normal interpretation of familiar words, and there appears to be nothing ambiguous or uncertain in the language, particularly that in “c”. The believable facts in this case fit the proscription of that subsection;2 and this all seems to be emphasized by the fact that the trial court obviously was not impressed by the expert testimony offered by the defense in the light of other and more convincing evidence. There was nothing in the record here that indicates the trial court’s finding of guilt was offensive to any construction of the words in the statute or was provoked by any unusual circumstances requiring the application of any other statute to the facts of this case, justifying defendant’s “relief sought on appeal” to the effect that the conviction should be changed from second degree murder to either “manslaughter” or “negligent homicide.”
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
MAUGHAN, J., concurs in result.

. 76-5-203. Murder in the second degree.— (1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the second degree if the actor:
(a) Intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another; or
(b) Intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, he commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of another; or
*61(c) Acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engaged in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby causes the death of another; or ... .

. State v. Day, 572 P.2d 703 (Utah 1977); Model Penal Code Tent. Draft # 9; Commonwealth v. Hall, 322 Mass. 523, 78 N.E.2d 644 (1948).