Court Opinion

ID: 9852084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:24:05.1031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:21.765001
License: Public Domain

WYNN, Judge
dissenting.
Notwithstanding what may be a laudable judicial desire to avoid direct appeals of felony probation violations to superior court as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1347 (2002), the change in that statute is a task for our General Assembly, not the judiciary. Indeed, in two separate bills aimed at changing the law to allow for direct appeal of felony violations to the Court of Appeals, the General Assembly failed to make the changes to Section 15A-1347 that the majority seeks to make today by judicial fiat. See H.B. 1085, 2001 Reg. Sess., N.C. Gen. Assem.; S.B. 819, 2001 Reg. Sess., N.C. Gen. Assem. Neither this Court nor our Supreme Court is empowered — particularly in light of express legislative inaction — to rewrite the laws of this State, including the law duly enacted by our legislature and codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1347.
With clear and unequivocal language, Section 15A-1347 is the sole statute authorizing an appeal of the revocation of a probationary judgment by the district court. In pertinent part, Section 15A-1347 provides:
When a district court judge, as a result of a finding of a violation of probation, activates a sentence or imposes special probation, the defendant may appeal to the superior court for a de novo revocation hearing.
Furthermore, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-271(b) (2002) provides that: “Appeals by the State or the defendant from the district court [in criminal actions] are to the superior court.”
The indisputable purport of the foregoing statutes is that appeal to this Court under the circumstances sub judice would be proper *661only after activation of a suspended probationary sentence by the superior court upon de novo review following appeal of the revocation of said probationary sentence by the district court. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-1347, 7A-271(b); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-26 (2002) (establishing appellate jurisdiction of Court of Appeals); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27 (2002) (delineating appeals of right from the trial court division.).
In short, as in State v. Killian, 25 N.C. App. 224, 225, 212 S.E.2d 419, 420 (1975)—dismissing a criminal appeal from a district court judgment because the “constitutional and statutory structure of our General Court of Justice” directs that “appeals in criminal causes [from the district court] must go first to the superior court” — defendant’s “appeal, ex mero motu, [must be] dismissed.” Id.; see also State v. Golden, 40 N.C. App. 37, 40, 251 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1979) (“No appeal lies to [The] Court [of Appeals] from an order or judgment entered in a criminal action in the District Court.”).
While I join with my colleagues in recognizing the merits of rewriting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1347, we are but judges not legislators. I believe we must follow the statute. Therefore, I am compelled to respectfully dissent.