Court Opinion

ID: 9404614
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-23 16:09:54.047236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:15.815183
License: Public Domain

J-S10031-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 HOZAY ANGELO ROYAL                      :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 1250 EDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 18, 2022
           In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
            Criminal Division at No.: CP-46-CR-0000580-2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                            FILED JUNE 23, 2023

      Appellant Hozay Angelo Royal pro se appeals from the April 18, 2022

order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County (“PCRA court”),

which dismissed his petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. Upon review, we affirm.

      The facts and procedural history of this case are undisputed.        As

recounted by the PCRA court:

      On October 10, 2019, [Appellant] stole merchandise in the
      amount of $150.00 from the Macy’s Department Store in King of
      Prussia, Pa. On October 1, 2021, [Appellant] entered into a
      negotiated guilty plea in which he pled guilty to one (1) count of
      retail theft[, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3929(a)(1)]. That same date, as part
      of the plea agreement, the court imposed a sentence of two (2)
      years of probation. [The court directed that the probationary
      sentence commence on January 30, 2020 and was to run
      concurrent to a sentence imposed under Montgomery County
      Docket Number 5423-2018, which related to another retail theft
J-S10031-23

        conviction.1 Appellant] did not file any timely post-sentence
        motions or a notice of appeal.

        On December 29, 2021, [Appellant] filed an untimely post-
        sentence motion “for a new trial on the ground of after-discovered
        evidence.” Considering [his] judgment of sentence had already
        become final on November 1, 2021, the court recognized the post-
        sentence motion as a [timely, first] PCRA petition.

         ....

        On January 5, 2022, the court appointed PCRA counsel. On
        January 9, 2022, [Appellant] filed a “Second Supplement to Post-
        Sentence Motion for a New Trial on the Ground of After Discovered
        Evidence.” On March 2, 2022, counsel filed a “no-merit” letter in
        accordance with Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927
        (1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super.
        1988), together with a petition for leave to withdraw appearance
        as court appointed counsel for [Appellant]. On March 16, 2022,
        the court filed its notice of intent pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1)
        of its intention to dismiss [Appellant’s] PCRA petition filed
        December 29, 2021 without a hearing (“Rule 907 Notice”). That
        same date, the court granted PCRA counsel’s petition for leave to
        withdraw appearance. . . . On April 6, 2022, [Appellant] filed a
        response to the court’s Rule 907 Notice. On April 18, 2022, the
        court dismissed [Appellant’s] PCRA petition without an evidentiary
        hearing. On May 3, 2022, [Appellant] filed a timely notice of
        appeal.[2]

PCRA Court Opinion, 7/1/22, at 1-2 (footnotes and unnecessary capitalizations

omitted).

____________________________________________

1   See N.T., Guilty Plea, 10/1/22, at 49, 56-57.
2The PCRA court did not direct Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement
of errors complained of on appeal.

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J-S10031-23

       On appeal,3 Appellant claims only that the PCRA court erred “in

accepting a guilty plea when it did not have jurisdiction or authority to

adjudicate the case[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 2.

       Preliminarily, we note that the PCRA court properly treated Appellant’s

untimely post-sentence motion—filed nearly two months after his judgment

of sentence became final—as one falling under the PCRA. The plain language

of the PCRA provides that “[t]he [PCRA] shall be the sole means of obtaining

collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory

remedies for the same purpose.”            42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542.        Cognizant of the

stated purpose of the PCRA, we have held that any petition filed after an

appellant’s judgment of sentence becomes final must be treated as a PCRA

petition   where     the   PCRA     provides     for   a   potential   remedy.     See

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“all motions

filed after a judgment of sentence is final are to be construed as PCRA

petitions”) (citation omitted).       Accordingly, the PCRA court did not err in

treating as a PCRA petition Appellant’s untimely post-sentence motion.

       We now must consider whether Appellant is eligible for relief under the

PCRA, before we may review the merits of this case. To be eligible for relief

under the PCRA, a petitioner must either be “currently serving a sentence of

____________________________________________

3“In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA court’s
determination ‘is supported by the record and free of legal error.’”
Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 803 (Pa. 2014) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Rainey, 928 A.2d 215, 223 (Pa. 2007)).

                                           -3-
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imprisonment, probation or parole for the crime,” “awaiting execution of a

sentence of death for the crime,” or “serving a sentence which must expire

before the person may commence serving the disputed sentence.”               42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(i)-(iii).

      Our Supreme Court and this Court consistently have interpreted Section

9543(a) to require that a PCRA petitioner be serving a sentence while relief is

being sought. Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 699 A.2d 718, 720 (Pa. 1997);

Commonwealth v. Martin, 832 A.2d 1141, 1143 (Pa. Super. 2003). As our

Supreme Court explained in Ahlborn, the denial of relief for a petitioner who

has finished serving his sentence is required by the plain language of the PCRA

statute.   Ahlborn, 699 A.2d at 720.       Indeed, to be eligible for relief, a

petitioner must be currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation,

or parole. Id. To grant relief at a time when an appellant is not currently

serving such a sentence would be to ignore the language of the PCRA. Id.

      Moreover, we have explained that “the [PCRA] preclude[s] relief for

those petitioners whose sentences have expired, regardless of the collateral

consequences of their sentence.” Commonwealth v. Fisher, 703 A.2d 714,

716 (Pa. Super. 1997). It is well settled that the PCRA court loses jurisdiction

the moment an appellant’s sentence expires.          See Commonwealth v.

Turner, 80 A.3d 754, 769 (Pa. 2013) (holding that when a petitioner’s

sentence expires while his PCRA petition is pending before the PCRA court,

the PCRA court loses jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the petition).

                                     -4-
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      Here, based upon our review of the record, we agree with the PCRA

court’s and the Commonwealth’s analysis that Appellant’s sentence of two

years’ probation expired on January 30, 2022. As a result, he does not meet

any of the foregoing eligibility requirements outlined in Section 9543(a) of the

PCRA. Thus, consistent with Ahlborn, he is ineligible for collateral relief and

we, accordingly, do not have jurisdiction over this appeal.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/23/2023

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