Court Opinion

ID: 9776819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:45:58.548849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:43.030037
License: Public Domain

MIRABAL, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
In the December 2, 1974 divorce decree, appellant was ordered to pay $121.00 per month in child support. By October 1985, appellant had built up an arrearage of $9,885.00, and appellee moved for contempt. The May 6, 1986 “Settlement and Release” agreement between the parties recites in part:
WHEREAS, the parties understand and agree that the claims asserted between them are doubtful and disputed and have settled such disputes by compromise to avoid litigation and to buy peace;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the payment of the sum of $2,850.00 by HOUSON D. WILLIAMS, JR. to SHERRY YVONNE (WILLIAMS) BAILES, payable in full upon the execution of this agreement, and for the further consideration of the agreement of HOUSON D. WILLIAMS, JR. to an Agreed Order Modifying Prior Order whereby the Decree of Divorce of December 2, 1974 shall be modified in certain respects, including increasing the support payment by HOUSON D. WILLIAMS, JR. for the use, benefit and support of AMY DIANE WILLIAMS to the amount of $325.00 per month for eighteen (18) months from and after the 1st day of April, 1986 and thereafter in the amount of $350.00 per month until the said child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years or is otherwise emancipated, SHERRY YVONNE (WILLIAMS) BAILES does hereby RELEASE AND DISCHARGE HOUSON D. WILLIAMS, JR., his heirs, successors, assigns, administrators, and legal representatives of and from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, causes of action, or suits in equity or any liability of whatsoever kind or nature arising from the obligation of HOUSON D. WILLIAMS, JR. for the payment of child support for the use, benefit and support of AMY DIANE WILLIAMS, a minor child for the period from and after December 2, 197.4 to March 31, 1986.
SHERRY YVONNE (WILLIAMS) BAILES simultaneously by these presents does hereby authorize and direct her attorney to execute and deliver for entry such instruments as may be necessary to obtain dismissal of the Motion for Contempt for failure to pay child support above mentioned, with prejudice to her ever refiling the same for any claim for child support for the period between December 2, 197j and March 31, 1986, and taxing the costs of the filing of said Motion against the said SHERRY YVONNE (WILLIAMS) BAILES.
(Emphasis added.)
The trial court entered an “Agreed Order Modifying Prior Order,” and dismissed the contempt action, in accordance with the parties’ agreement.
Effectively, the parties agreed to a payout of the accrued arrearage over a period of 36 months; the sum total of the payments agreed on approximates the total of the amount of the arrearage added to the normal $121.00 per month child support payments.
It is uncontested that appellant made the agreed-on payments until November 1987; accordingly, taking into account the $2,850.00 paid by appellant at the time the settlement agreement was signed, he paid a total of $6,630.00 on the arrearage through October 1987.
*532In August 1988, appellee filed a Motion for Contempt alleging not only that appellant had failed to make $350 per month payments since November 1987, but also that appellant had failed to make child support payments in the amount of $121 per month for 92 months between December 16, 1971/. and January 16, 1985, totalling $9,185.00.
The trial court’s judgment, and our af-firmance, allows appellee to “have her cake and eat it too.” The majority holds that, since the “Settlement and Release” agreement was void, appellee can have the May 1986 “Agreed Order Modifying Prior Order” enforced as though there was no agreed pay-out of the prior arrearage. According to our ruling, appellee was entitled to collect $325 per month from April 1, 1986 through September 1, 1987, $350 per month from and after October 1,1987, plus $121 per month for the period prior to April 1986.
The trial court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which recited in part:
FINDINGS OF FACT
9. In October, 1985, Petitioner filed a Motion for Contempt for Failure to Pay Child Support and a Motion to Modify to increase child support.
10. Child support arrearage in October, 1985, totaled $9,885.00.
11. Petitioner and Respondent entered into a settlement and release agreement on May 6, 1986.
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13. The settlement and release agreement was approved by the parties, but was not approved by the Court.
14. Petitioner dismissed her contempt action on May 13, 1986.
15. An Agreed Order Modifying Prior Order was entered May 13, 1986.
16. Respondent paid the child support ordered in the Agreed Order Modifying Prior Order until November of 1987 when the child began residing in his residence.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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2. The settlement and release agreement executed by the parties is void for one or more of the following reasons:
a. It is against public policy;
b. The parties cannot reduce the amount of child support arrearage;
c. There was no court approval of the agreement;
d. Failure of consideration in that Respondent promised to pay what he already owed.
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6. After having due regard to the rights of each party, and considering the issues referred to in Conclusion of Law Number 2, and all other factors to be considered under the laws of the State of Texas;
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D. Respondent is in contempt of court for failure to pay child support as ordered in the Decree of Divorce which was modified by the Agreed Order Modifying Prior Order;
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2) Respondent is in arrears as of November 18, 1988 in the amount of $7,202.00.
In his first point of error, appellant complains that the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that the “Settlement and Release” agreement was void and unenforceable. I agree.
It appears that no reported Texas case has addressed the precise question of whether former spouses can validly compromise and settle a claim for accrued and unpaid child support, without first reducing the arrearages to judgment and obtaining court approval of the settlement agreement.
The majority opinion holds that the “Settlement and Release” agreement is void because it was signed by the parties prior to the child support arrearages being reduced to judgment under § 14.41(a) of the Texas Family Code. The majority relies on dicta in Adair v. Martin to the effect that unpaid child support is not a “debt” prior to its reduction to judgment, 595 S.W.2d *533513, 515 (Tex.1980), and therefore the majority holds that the parties had no authority to reduce or modify child support arrear-ages by agreement.
I consider it relevant that, in the present case, the parties did not “reduce or modify” the amount of arrearages; rather, they provided for a manner of payment of the full amount of the arrearages over a period of time.
I also consider it relevant that after the 1980 Supreme Court decision in Adair v. Martin, the legislature amended § 14.41(a) of the Texas Family Code, effective January 1, 1987, as follows (italicized portion indicates additions to the old statute in effect at the time of Adair):1
(a) Judgment for Arrearages. A periodic child support payment not timely made shall constitute a final judgment for the amount due and owing. On the motion of an obligee or obligor, after notice and hearing, the court shall confirm the amount of child support in arrears and shall render judgment against an obligor for any amount of child support unpaid and owing. The judgment rendered by the court may be subject to a counterclaim or offset as provided by Subsection (c) of this section. The judgment may be enforced by any means available for the enforcement of judgments for debts.
In my opinion, this amendment to § 14.41(a) simply clarified the existing legislative intent; I do not believe that it caused any substantive change in the rights of parties with regard to support arrearages. The legislature has made it clear that each accrued child support payment becomes a separate final judgment.
It is true that, as appellee argues, a court has no authority to reduce or modify the amount of child support arrearages. Tex.Fam.Code Ann. §§ 14.40(d), 14.41(d) (Vernon 1986). However, I believe that the parties — a “judgment creditor” and a “judgment debtor” — have the right to settle and compromise a child support arrear-age debt, as any other judgment debt.
This view is in accord with the rulings in other states that uphold settlement and release agreements between former spouses for accrued child support. See, e.g., Andersen v. Andersen, 89 Idaho 551, 407 P.2d 304, 307 (1965); Brannock v. Brannock, 104 N.M. 416, 722 P.2d 667, 670 (N.M.Ct.App.1985), aff'd, 104 N.M. 385, 722 P.2d 636 (N.M.1986); Miller v. Miller, 29 Or.App. 723, 565 P.2d 382, 385 (Oregon Ct.App.1977); Hartman v. Smith, 100 Wash.2d 766, 674 P.2d 176, 178 (1984). These out-of-state cases treat delinquent support payments as a debt owed to the former wife/managing conservator since she has already used her own funds to pay for the support of the children. Therefore, the eases cited provide that the former wife may, for sufficient consideration, release the former husband from the obligation to make support payments previously owing.
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that the trial court incorrectly concluded that the “Settlement and Release” agreement is “void [because] (a) it is against public policy; (b) the parties cannot reduce the amount of child support arrearage; and (c) there was no court approval of the agreement.”
I would further hold that the trial court’s fourth stated reason for concluding the agreement is void, that “[there was a] failure of consideration in that Respondent promised to pay what he already owed,” is incorrect. Appellant/respondent specifically denied that he owed all the amounts appellee claimed; the settlement of a contested lawsuit is in itself sufficient consideration to uphold a settlement agreement. Schuh v. Schuh, 453 S.W.2d 203, 204 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1970, no writ).
I would sustain appellant’s point of error one, reverse the trial court’s judgment, and *534remand this cause to the trial court for reconsideration of the respective claims of the parties in light of their rights and obligations under the May 6, 1986 “Settlement and Release” agreement.

. The statute in effect at the time of Adair was former Tex.Fam.Code Ann. § 14.09(c) [ch. 543, § 1, 1973 Tex.Gen.Laws 1411, 1426]. Section 14.09(c) was repealed by ch. 232, § 14, 1985 Tex.Gen.Laws 1158, 1170. Former section 14.-41(a), enacted within the same bill [ch. 232, § 9, 1985 Tex.Gen.Laws 1158, 1163], contained language similar to that of former § 14.09(c), with minor textual and substantive differences not relevant to this appeal. Section 14.41(a) was amended by ch. 10, § 6, 2nd Called Sess.1986, Tex.Gen.Laws 15, 17, effective January 1, 1987.