Court Opinion

ID: 9927150
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 15:01:35.355478+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:04.817257
License: Public Domain

Rel: January 26, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

         SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                             OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024

                                _________________________

                                      SC-2023-0395
                                _________________________

       Ex parte Triad of Alabama, LLC, d/b/a Flowers Hospital

                    PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

                    (In re: Voncille Askew and Don Askew

                                                  v.

             Triad of Alabama, LLC, d/b/a Flowers Hospital)

                    (Houston Circuit Court: CV-22-900177)

SELLERS, Justice.

       Triad of Alabama, LLC, d/b/a Flowers Hospital, the defendant

below in a pending personal-injury action, petitions this Court for a writ
SC-2023-0395

of mandamus directing the Houston Circuit Court to vacate its order

granting a motion filed by the plaintiffs, Voncille Askew and Don Askew,

striking Triad's affirmative defense under what the parties refer to as the

Alabama        COVID-19        Immunity        Act      ("the     ACIA"),

Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-790 et seq. For the reasons set forth below, we

grant the petition and issue the writ.

                          Factual Background

     Around      August     16,    2021,     Triad     began     providing

monoclonal-antibody-infusion therapy at Flowers Hospital to patients

infected with Coronavirus, which is commonly referred to as COVID-19.

See, e.g., § 6-5-791(a)(4), Ala. Code 1975. According to Triad, it directed

those patients to enter the hospital through a preexisting entrance

designated as "Infusion entry" to help isolate those patients infected with

COVID-19 from the hospital's general population. According to the

Askews, that entrance had been created as part of a 2014 construction

project and had been frequently used since its creation as an entrance

and an exit for both hospital patients and employees. Furthermore,

according to the Askews, neither the entrance nor the small, concrete

ramp leading up to it had been modified since their creation.

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     Around September 21, 2021, Voncille Askew was diagnosed with

COVID-19,       and     her      physician      scheduled      her     for

monoclonal-antibody-infusion therapy at the hospital on the following

day. At approximately 12:30 p.m. on September 22, 2021, Voncille

proceeded through the "Infusion entry" for her appointment. After

undergoing therapy for approximately two hours, Voncille was

discharged and instructed to leave through the same "Infusion entry."

According to the Askews, as Voncille exited, her foot caught the edge of

the concrete ramp, causing her to fall and sustain serious injuries.

                           Procedural History

     On May 10, 2022, the Askews sued Triad, alleging claims of

negligence, negligence per se, wantonness, and loss of consortium. In its

answers to both the complaint and the second amended complaint, Triad

raised the affirmative defense of civil immunity under the ACIA. On

February 16, 2023, the Askews moved to strike Triad's affirmative

defense, averring that the immunity provisions of the ACIA had no

applicability to their claims. Specifically, the Askews asserted that

because their "claims ar[o]se from the hospital's negligence in

maintaining a safe premises and [its] failure to comply with key safety

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codes," such claims were not "health emergency claims" for which Triad,

even as a covered entity under the ACIA, could be accorded immunity

under § 6-5-792(a), Ala. Code 1975. Moreover, the Askews contended

that, because "[n]o health care services or treatment were being

performed on or provided to [Voncille] at the time of her fall," Triad was

not entitled to immunity under § 6-5-794(a), Ala. Code 1975.

     On March 7, 2023, Triad responded to the Askews' motion to strike,

arguing that, pursuant to the plain text of §§ 6-5-792 and 6-5-794, it was

entitled to immunity under both provisions. Nevertheless, on April 20,

2023, the trial court entered an order granting the Askews' motion to

strike without having conducted a hearing and without explaining its

rationale for granting the motion. Consequently, Triad petitioned this

Court for a writ of mandamus. After ordering answers and briefs, we held

oral argument on November 1, 2023.

                           Standard of Review

     The standard for granting mandamus relief is well established:

          "The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary legal
     remedy. Therefore, this Court will not grant mandamus relief
     unless the petitioner shows: (1) a clear legal right to the order
     sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the trial court to perform,
     accompanied by its refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another

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     adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of
     the Court."

Ex parte Davis, 930 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala. 2005) (citations omitted).

Moreover, this Court has recognized that "[a] trial court's disallowance of

a party's affirmative defense is reviewable by a petition for a writ of

mandamus." Ex parte Buffalo Rock Co., 941 So. 2d 273, 277 (Ala. 2006)

(citing Ex parte Neely Truck Line, Inc., 588 So. 2d 484 (Ala. Civ. App.

1991)).

     When a motion to strike an affirmative defense seeks "a dispositive

ruling on the basis of evidence outside the pleadings, we construe it as a

motion seeking the entry of a partial summary judgment."1 Ex parte

Teal, 336 So. 3d 165, 167 n.3 (Ala. 2021) (citing Rule 56(a), Ala. R. Civ.

P.). Because the order striking Triad's affirmative defense amounted to a

partial summary judgment and because no genuine issues of material

fact are in dispute, the standard of review is as follows:

           " 'An order granting or denying a summary judgment is
     reviewed de novo, applying the same standard as the trial
     court applied. American Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v.
     Underwood, 886 So. 2d 807, 811 (Ala. 2004). In addition,
     "[t]his court reviews de novo a trial court's interpretation of a
     statute, because only a question of law is presented." Scott

     1Included in support of the Askews' motion to strike were excerpts

from a deposition of Triad's COO, Matthew Blevins.

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     Bridge Co. v. Wright, 883 So. 2d 1221, 1223 (Ala. 2003).
     Where, as here, the facts of a case are essentially undisputed,
     this Court must determine whether the trial court misapplied
     the law to the undisputed facts, applying a de novo standard
     of review. Carter v. City of Haleyville, 669 So. 2d 812, 815
     (Ala. 1995). Here, in reviewing the ... summary judgment
     when the facts are undisputed, we review de novo the trial
     court's interpretation of statutory language and our previous
     caselaw on a controlling question of law.' "

McKinney v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 33 So. 3d 1203, 1206 (Ala.

2009) (quoting Continental Nat'l Indem. Co. v. Fields, 926 So. 2d 1033,

1034-35 (Ala. 2005)).

                               Discussion

     I. Lack of Another Adequate Remedy

     Triad contends that, "[b]ecause one of the purposes of immunity is

to spare a defendant from the demands associated with defending a

drawn-out lawsuit, a defendant wrongfully denied immunity protection

has no adequate remedy on appeal if the case is erroneously permitted to

go to trial." Petition at 25. This is so, Triad avers, even though it would

not be entitled to immunity as to the wantonness claim against it, and

thus would still have to litigate that claim, see § 6-5-792(b) and § 6-5-

794(a), noting that this Court has previously granted mandamus relief to

a defendant, determining that that defendant was entitled to State-agent

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immunity as to the claims against her even though the case would

proceed on the claims against the other defendants. See Ex parte Mestas,

371 So. 3d 220, 221-22 (Ala. 2022).

     Although we agree with Triad that it lacks another adequate

remedy, we do not agree with its rationale. A review of our precedents

reveals considerable tension between the immunity exception in our

mandamus jurisprudence, see, e.g., Ex parte Purvis, 689 So. 2d 794, 795

(Ala. 1996), and the broader concept that mandamus relief is appropriate

to permit a disallowed affirmative defense only when that affirmative

defense, if successful, would be determinative of the entire action against

a particular defendant, see, e.g., Ex parte Tahsin Indus. Corp., U.S.A., 4

So. 3d 1121, 1123-24 (Ala. 2008).

           A. The Immunity Exception in Our Mandamus Jurisprudence

     This Court has long held that "the general rule is that denial of a

summary-judgment motion is not immediately reviewable by an

appellate court." Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705, 708 (Ala. 2002). There

exists an important exception, however: The "denial of a motion for a

summary judgment grounded on a claim of immunity is immediately

reviewable by a petition for a writ of mandamus." Id. (citing Ex parte

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Purvis, 689 So. 2d at 795) (emphasis added). Although this Court initially

created this exception to apply to claims of sovereign (or State) immunity,

see Ex parte Purvis, 689 So. 2d at 795, we have since expanded the

applicability of the exception to claims of State-agent immunity, see, e.g.,

Ex parte Rizk, 791 So. 2d 911, 912 (Ala. 2000), qualified immunity, see,

e.g., Ex parte Sawyer, 876 So. 2d 433, 439 (Ala. 2003), municipal

substantive immunity, see, e.g., Ex parte City of Muscle Shoals, [Ms. SC-

2022-0524, Mar. 31, 2023] __ So. 3d __, __ (Ala. 2023), and statutory

immunity, see, e.g., Ex parte Dixon Mills Volunteer Fire Dep't, 181 So.

3d 325, 327, 331 (Ala. 2015) (granting in part a mandamus petition based

on a claim of immunity under the Volunteer Service Act); Ex parte Tenax

Corp., 228 So. 3d 387, 390-91 (Ala. 2017) (granting a mandamus petition

premised on a claim of immunity under the exclusive-remedy provisions

of the Workers' Compensation Act); Ex parte City of Muscle Shoals, 257

So. 3d 850, 852, 854 (Ala. 2018) (granting a mandamus petition based on

a claim of municipal immunity under § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975).

     Notably, we have reviewed by mandamus petition an order denying

a motion for a summary judgment premised on an immunity defense even

though that immunity defense, if successful, would not have resolved the

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action in its entirety against the petitioner. For example, in Ex parte

Kelley, 296 So. 3d 822, 826 (Ala. 2019), the petitioners sought mandamus

relief from orders denying their motions for a summary judgment

predicated on claims of parental immunity. This Court granted their

petitions on the basis of parental immunity insofar as the "wrongful-

death claims against [them] [we]re based on allegations of negligence,"

notwithstanding the fact that the wrongful-death claims against them

founded on allegations of wantonness would remain to be litigated. Id. at

834. Thus far, however, we have granted mandamus relief in this manner

only in the context of orders denying a motion for a summary judgment.

When petitioners have requested mandamus relief from a trial court's

order merely disallowing their affirmative defenses, however, we have

employed a different approach.

           B. Mandamus Relief for the Disallowance of Affirmative
              Defenses

     As mentioned previously, this Court has acknowledged that "[a]

trial court's disallowance of a party's affirmative defense is reviewable by

a petition for a writ of mandamus." Ex parte Buffalo Rock Co., 941 So. 2d

at 277. Thus, we permit mandamus review when a trial court either

refuses a defendant's request to amend his or her pleadings to assert an

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affirmative defense, see, e.g., Ex parte Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 858 So.

2d 950, 952 (Ala. 2003), or -- as relevant here -- when a trial court grants

a plaintiff's motion to strike a defendant's affirmative defense, see, e.g.,

Ex parte Gadsden Country Club, 14 So. 3d 830, 832 (Ala. 2009).

Although, in the context of a trial court's disallowing a party's affirmative

defense, we have typically required that that affirmative defense, if

successful, be determinative of the entire action against a particular

defendant in order to support granting mandamus relief, see, e.g., Ex

parte TruckMax, Inc. [Ms. SC-2022-0957, Feb. 17, 2023] __ So. 3d __, __

(Ala. 2023), the importance of addressing questions of immunity does not

change depending on the context of how those questions are presented.

Thus, we conclude that Triad has no other adequate remedy at law and

is entitled to mandamus review.

     II. Clear Legal Right

     There are two immunity provisions relevant here: § 6-5-792(a) and

§ 6-5-794(a). Triad states that it is insulated from liability under both

sections of the ACIA; the Askews believe that neither section is applicable

to Triad.

            A. Immunity Under § 6-5-792

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     The ACIA provides, in relevant part, that "a covered entity[2] shall

not be liable for any damages, injury, or death suffered by any person or

entity as a result of, or in connection with, a health emergency claim that

results from any act or omission of the covered entity." § 6-5-792(a). The

ACIA further defines a "health emergency claim" as follows:

     "Any claim that arises from or is related to Coronavirus. All
     such claims, no matter how denominated, shall be considered
     a health emergency claim for purposes of [the ACIA]. The
     term includes, but is not limited to, any cause of action that is
     related in any manner to either or both of the following:

                 "a. The actual, alleged, or feared exposure to
           or contraction of Coronavirus from the premises of
           a covered entity or otherwise related to or arising
           from its operations, products, or services provided
           on or off-premises.

                 "b. The covered entity's efforts to prevent or
           delay the spread of Coronavirus, including, but not
           limited to, any of the following:

     2A   covered entity includes, among other things, "[a] health care
provider." § 6-5-791(a)(5)b., Ala. Code 1975. Included within the ACIA's
definition of "health care provider" is "[a]ny health care provider as that
term is defined in ... Section 6-5-481(1)-(8)[, Ala. Code
1975]." § 6-5-791(a)(11)a. Thus, a health-care provider encompasses
"[s]uch institutions as are defined in Section 22-21-21[, Ala. Code 1975,]
as hospitals." § 6-5-481(7). The reference to § 22-21-21 in § 6-5-481(7)
appears to be a typographical error; it further appears that the correct
reference should be to § 22-21-20(1), Ala. Code 1975. Section 22-21-20(1)
defines hospitals as "[g]eneral and specialized hospitals." Therefore, and
as both parties agree, Triad, which operates Flowers Hospital, is a
covered entity for purposes of the ACIA.

                                    11
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                      "1. Testing.

                     "2.     Monitoring,      collecting,
                reporting, tracking, tracing, disclosing,
                or investigating exposures or other
                information.

                     "3.    Using    or   supplying
                precautionary equipment or supplies
                such     as    personal   protective
                equipment."

§ 6-5-791(a)(13), Ala. Code 1975.

     The parties disagree as to the meaning and scope of the above

language. Triad argues that because Voncille was at the hospital to be

treated for COVID-19, the Askews' negligence claims "arise[] from or

[are] related to Coronavirus," and resulted from Triad's actions, and,

thus, that those claims were health emergency claims for which it cannot

be liable. The Askews view this section much more narrowly. They

contend that health emergency claims are only those that either relate to

exposure to or contraction of COVID-19 or arise from a covered entity's

efforts to prevent or delay the spread of the virus. Furthermore, they

opine that any other reading of this section would render §§ 6-5-792(a)

and 6-5-794(a) redundant.

                1. The Scope of § 6-5-792(a)

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     Incorporating the definition of "health emergency claim" into the

language of § 6-5-792(a) results in the following unambiguous text: "[A]

covered entity shall not be liable for any damages, injury, or death

suffered by any person or entity as a result of, or in connection with, [any

claim that arises from or is related to Coronavirus] that results from any

act or omission of the covered entity." Both sides agree that Triad was

providing monoclonal-antibody-infusion therapy to COVID-19 patients.

Both sides further agree that Triad directed those patients seeking that

treatment to enter and exit through an entrance designated "Infusion

entry." Accordingly, both sides agree that Triad directed Voncille, in

order to receive that treatment, to enter and exit through the "Infusion

entry." Finally, both sides agree that Voncille fell and sustained injuries

after exiting through the "Infusion entry." Factually, then, Voncille

suffered an injury in connection with her seeking treatment for

COVID-19 when Triad directed her to enter and exit through a specific

entrance       devoted      exclusively      for     patients       seeking

monoclonal-antibody-infusion therapy for COVID-19.

     The Askews believe that we cannot reach this conclusion for two

reasons. First, they assert that this conclusion relies on too broad an

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interpretation of the language "[a]ny claim that arises from or is related

to Coronavirus." § 6-5-791(a)(13). Instead, they aver that the only claims

for which a covered entity may be immune are those claims -- or causes

of actions that bear resemblance to those claims -- that are expressly

listed under the ACIA's definition of "health emergency claim."

Therefore, because, according to the Askews, their negligence claims bear

"striking   dissimilarity   to"   the        types   of   claims   described   in

§ 6-5-791(a)(13)a.-b., Triad cannot be immune as to those claims. Askews'

brief at 7. What the Askews are asking us to do, in so many words, is

apply the rule of ejusdem generis to the statute. Under that rule, "where

general words or phrases follow or precede a specific list of classes of

persons or things, the general word or phrase is interpreted to be of the

same nature or class as those named in the specific list." Ex parte

Mitchell, 989 So. 2d 1083, 1091 (Ala. 2008) (citing Ex parte McLeod, 718

So. 2d 682 (Ala. 1997)). However, that rule applies only "if the provision

in question does not express a contrary intent." Cintech Indus. Coatings,

Inc. v. Bennett Indus., Inc., 85 F.3d 1198, 1202 (6th Cir. 1996). As noted

earlier, the language preceding the specific examples contained in § 6-5-

791(a)(13)a.-b. states that a health emergency claim "includes, but is not

                                        14
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limited to," those listed examples. § 6-5-791(a)(13). "Numerous courts

have found that the use of the words 'includ[es], but [is] not limited to,'

as appear in this clause, reflect such a contrary intent." Cintech Indus.

Coatings, 85 F.3d at 1202. Therefore, we reject the Askews' invitation to

use the rule of ejusdem generis to narrow our interpretation of the ACIA,

and we recognize the sweeping breadth of the language in 6-5-791(a)(13)

as expressing the intent of the legislature to grant immunity for "[a]ny

claim that arises from or is related to Coronavirus." The statute imposes

no limitations on the chain of causation or on the relation between a claim

and Coronavirus outside of those limitations inherent to the words

"arises from" or "is related to."

                  2. Potential Overlap    Between    §§   6-5-792(a)   and
                     6-5-794(a)

      Second, the Askews appear to contest a broad interpretation of

§ 6-5-791(a)(13) on the ground that such an interpretation would make

the immunity under § 6-5-792(a) so far reaching in the context of health-

care providers as to render immunity under § 6-5-794(a) superfluous.

Essentially, the Askews ask us to forgo a plain-language interpretation

of the ACIA and to instead rely on the rule against surplusage -- a canon

of statutory interpretation that "cautions against needlessly reading a

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statute in a way that renders ... certain [provisions] superfluous," Barton

v. United States Att'y Gen., 904 F.3d 1294, 1300 (11th Cir. 2018) -- to

narrow the scope of claims as to which a health-care provider is immune.

However, "the usual 'preference' for 'avoiding surplusage constructions is

not absolute' and ... 'applying the rule against surplusage is, absent other

indications,   inappropriate'   when     it   would   make   an   otherwise

unambiguous statute ambiguous." Id. at 1301 (quoting Lamie v. United

States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004), citing in turn Chickasaw Nation v.

United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001)). Even assuming, for the sake of

argument, that our interpretation of §§ 6-5-791(a)(13) and 6-5-792(a)

renders § 6-5-794(a) superfluous, when "faced with a choice between a

plain-text reading that renders a [provision] superfluous and an

interpretation that gives every [provision] independent meaning but, in

the doing, muddies up the statute," we " 'should prefer the plain meaning

since that approach respects the words of [our legislature].' " Id. (quoting

Lamie, 540 U.S. at 536). Therefore, we also reject the Askews' invitation

to employ the rule against surplusage to narrow our interpretation of the

ACIA.

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     Accordingly, the plain language of §§ 6-5-791(a)(13) and 6-5-792(a)

mandate Triad's entitlement to immunity as to the Askews' negligence

claims.

              B. Immunity Under § 6-5-794(a)

     Because we resolve this dispute under § 6-5-792(a), we pretermit

discussion of the question whether Triad is entitled to immunity under

§ 6-5-794(a).

                                Conclusion

     For the foregoing reasons, we grant Triad's mandamus petition and

issue the writ; the trial court is directed to vacate its order striking

Triad's affirmative defense under the ACIA.

     PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

     Mendheim, J., concurs.

     Parker, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Bryan, and Stewart, JJ., concur in

the result.

     Mitchell, J., concurs in the result, with opinion.

     Cook, J., recuses himself.

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MITCHELL, Justice (concurring in the result).

     Although Triad of Alabama, LLC, d/b/a Flowers Hospital is entitled

to mandamus relief, I disagree with material parts of the main opinion's

reasoning. In particular, I believe that the adequate-remedy element of

our mandamus test is satisfied on immunity grounds only, thus obviating

the need to analyze affirmative-defense grounds. And while I agree that

Triad has a clear legal right to immunity on Voncille and Don Askews'

negligence claims under what the parties refer to as the Alabama

COVID-19 Immunity Act ("the ACIA"), §§ 6-5-790 to -799, Ala. Code

1975, I believe we must acknowledge that the statutory phrase "arises

from or is related to" imposes meaningful limitations on what claims are

covered by immunity.      § 6-5-791(a)(13), Ala. Code 1975. For these

reasons, I concur in the result only.

                            Adequate Remedy

     Unlike the main opinion, I see no tension between our Court's

mandamus jurisprudence on immunity and the striking of affirmative

defenses. Our Court recognizes the denial of immunity as a standalone

reason for seeking mandamus relief, so the procedural posture in which

an immunity issue comes to us does not matter. See, e.g., Ex parte

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Purvis, 689 So. 2d 794, 795 (Ala. 1996) (granting mandamus review on

the denial of a motion to dismiss on immunity grounds); Ex parte Smith,

327 So. 3d 184, 187 (Ala. 2020) (granting mandamus review on the denial

of a summary-judgment motion on immunity grounds). That's because

"a defendant wrongfully denied immunity protection has no adequate

remedy if the case is erroneously permitted to go to trial," Ex parte

Kelley, 296 So. 3d 822, 826 (Ala. 2019); indeed, the whole point of

immunity is to "spare a defendant from … defending" against the claim

at issue. Id. And, as the main opinion recognizes, the solicitude our

Court gives to immunity is not limited to State or State-agent immunity;

it extends to all kinds of common-law and statutory immunity. See, e.g.,

id. (parental immunity); Ex parte Johnson, [Ms. SC-2023-0251, Dec. 15,

2023] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2023) (self-defense immunity); Ex parte Tenax

Corp., 228 So. 3d 387 (Ala. 2017) (Workers' Compensation Act immunity);

Ex parte Dixon Mills Volunteer Fire Dep't, 181 So. 3d 325 (Ala. 2015)

(Volunteer Service Act immunity).

     Because we have recognized that immunity is a "well established"

and independent ground for mandamus review, we need not address the

circumstances in which the striking of an affirmative defense might also

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justify such review. Ex parte Gulf Health Hosps., Inc., 321 So. 3d 629,

632 (Ala. 2020). Therefore, in my view, immunity by itself is a sufficient

ground for mandamus review here.

                            Clear Legal Right

     Whether Triad has a clear legal right to mandamus rests on the

ordinary meaning of the phrase "arises from or is related to" as found in

the ACIA. § 6-5-791(a)(13). If the Askews' claim "arises from or is related

to Coronavirus," id., then it is a "health emergency claim" and Triad

would be entitled to immunity.      § 6-5-792(a), Ala. Code 1975.      The

disagreement I have with the main opinion is that it does not indicate

whether there is any real limit to what claims may be covered by

immunity. As I see it -- and as our cases suggest -- the phrase "arises

from or is related to" incorporates substantive limitations; I believe we

must acknowledge those limitations here.

     We have previously encountered phrases similar to "arises from or

is related to" in our contract-law jurisprudence. In the context of a jury-

trial-waiver provision, we have held that the terms " 'arising from' or

'arising under' cover[] only claims requiring a reference to the terms of

the contract." Ex parte AIG Baker Orange Beach Wharf, L.L.C., 49 So.

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3d 1198, 1203 (Ala. 2010). But adding the phrase "is related to" broadens

contracts to cover a wider range of circumstances. See Ex parte Cupps,

782 So. 2d 772, 776 (Ala. 2000); see also Beaver Constr. Co. v. Lakehouse,

L.L.C., 742 So. 2d 159, 165 (Ala. 1999) (noting that " 'relating-to'

language" is "relatively broad").

     We have dealt with similar phrasing in arbitration clauses. In that

context, to rein in the far-reaching implications of those words, our Court

has held that " 'there must be some legal and logical nexus' between the

dispute and the arbitration provision." State v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 1

So. 3d 1, 9 (Ala. 2008) (quoting Kenworth of Dothan, Inc. v. Bruner-Wells

Trucking, Inc., 745 So. 2d 271, 275 (Ala. 1999)). In other words, the

phrase "arises from or is related to" incorporates a causal link, which a

reasonable reader would understand to track traditional notions of

foreseeability.

     Applying these lessons from our cases interpreting contracts, I

believe that the phrase "arises from or is related to" in the ACIA carries

with it limitations that foreclose immunity for extremely remote or

attenuated claims. § 6-5-791(a)(13). That is, for a claim to qualify as a

"health emergency claim," it must have some reasonably apparent " 'legal

                                    21
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and logical nexus ' " with Coronavirus. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 1 So. 3d at

9. Here, the Askews' claims have easily satisfied that test. As the main

opinion explains, Triad's decision to designate the relevant entrance for

use by Coronavirus patients to mitigate the spread of the illness directly

led to Voncille Askew's use of the entrance and her subsequent injury and

lawsuit. Thus, the Askews' claims have an obvious " 'legal and logical

nexus ' " with Coronavirus, id., and qualify as "health emergency claims."

§ 6-5-791(a)(13).   Accordingly, Triad is entitled to immunity on the

Askews' negligence claims. § 6-5-792(a).

     Interpreting the ACIA without an eye to those limitations is

dangerous. As Justice Scalia once noted, the phrase "relate to" is so broad

that applying it "according to its terms [is] a project doomed to failure,

since, as many a curbstone philosopher has observed, everything is

related to everything else." California Div. of Lab. Standards Enf't v.

Dillingham Constr. N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 335 (1997) (Scalia, J.,

concurring). Those limitations are especially important here. Almost

every claim made since March 2020 can be traced back to Coronavirus

given that the virus and the governmental response affected the entire

world for the better part of three years.

                                    22
SC-2023-0395

                                  ***

     For these reasons, I concur only in the result granting the petition

and issuing the writ of mandamus.

                                    23