Court Opinion

ID: 9655330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:06:36.165874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:17.786010
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing
PER CURIAM.
In its motion for rehearing and its suggestions, the Commission seeks to raise and argue questions concerning the merits of the controversy which would properly be presented for its decision in the hearing required by Sec. 227.240. (Such as where in the right of way the Water Company’s pipes should be located and whether these pipes in their present location would become traffic hazards on the reconstructed highway.) Such questions are not before us in this case.
The question for our decision herein is whether the Circuit Court of St. Louis County has any jurisdiction in the Water Company case and not what kind of rulings it should make if it has jurisdiction. The question of its jurisdiction depends on whether Sec. 227.240 requires “legal rights, duties or privileges” of the Water 'Company “to be determined after a hearing,” before the Commission acting as an administrative body. Sec. 536.010. If so it is a “contested case” before the Commission in its capacity as an administrative agency, to which the hearing and review provisions of Chapter 536 are applicable, and is not a matter of policy being considered by the Commission in its legislative capacity.
This does not mean as the Commission suggests that the Circuit Court may decide the question of where in the right of way the Water Company pipes should be located. “Our constitutional provision, Sec. 22, Art. V, ‘does not mean that the reviewing court may substitute its own judgment on the evidence for that of the administrative tribunal. But it does authorize it to decide whether such tribunal could have reasonably made its findings, and reached its result, upon consideration of all of the evidence before it; and to set aside decisions clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.’ * * * ‘The Commission is the fact-finding body, and the Court examines the evidence not to make findings for the Commission but to ascertain whether its findings are properly supported.’ ” Michler v. Krey Packing Co., 363 Mo. 707, 253 S.W.2d 136, 141-142.) In this kind of a case, to make its decision the Commission must exercise its discretion on the facts found by it; and “the court shall not substitute its discretion for discretion legally vested in the agency.” Sec. 536.140, subd. 5.
The Commission claims that this case involves only future plans, facts, needs and' safety for the reconstructed highway; and it claims our opinion assumes that this case involves only a particular party in a particular situation based on past facts, that is as to where the pipes should have been in the past. Neither claim is correct. The facts that the Water Company has its pipes in a particular location, and that they had been so located with the approval of the Commission, are facts to be considered, as is also the right of the Water Company to have its pipes in the right of way somewhere. Likewise to be considered is the effect of the pipes as now located on the construction, maintenance and use of the planned reconstruction. However, whether the new plans for the reconstructed highway are necessary and proper are matters solely for the determination of the Commission and no issue concerning them is involved in the hearing required by Sec. 227.240 or subject to judicial review. The question for determination of the Commission in the required hearing is whether the reconstruction of the highway in accord-*787anee with these plans makes it necessary to move these pipes to the proposed new location to prevent interference with the construction, maintenance or use of the reconstructed highway. Judicial review would be limited toi the determination of whether, on all the evidence produced at the hearing, the Commission could reasonably have made findings which would show that the pipes in their present location would interfere with the construction, maintenance or use of the reconstructed highway and which would make it reasonable to require their removal to the proposed new location. Sec. S36 intends that these issues be raised by the Commission in the notice to the necessary parties required by Sec. 536.067 (which supplements Sec. 227.240J and that the hearing be conducted as provided by Sec. 536.077 so that the Commission’s evidence, plans and matters of which it takes official notice would be in the record as well as the evidence of the opposing parties to be affected by the orders determining the íSt sues involved.
The Commission further says it has never been given authority to hold ju-dical or quasi-judicial hearings. However, all administrative agencies are given that authority by the provisions of Chapter 536 (see Sec. 536.010(1), which applies to the determination of all cases that must be classified as contested cases under Sec. 536.010 (3).) The Commission also says it has no power of subpoena or to compel the production of any book or paper but it has overlooked Sec. 536.077. It also says the record in this case is inadequate for judicial review, which seems to be true, but that is because the Commission did not hold the kind of hearing required by Sec. 536.-070; and the trial court certainly has authority to remand the case so that such a hearing could be held. We cannot in this proceeding in prohibition direct the judgment the trial court should enter; but, if the trial court does not enter a proper judgment, the Commission may appeal and we would then have before us a case in which we could do so.
The Commission cites cases concerning its authority to locate highways, such as Castilo v. State Highway Commission of Missouri, 312 Mo. 244, 279 S.W. 673, and Selecman v. Matthews, 321 Mo. 1047, 15 S.W.2d 788, 63 A.L.R. 512; concerning its authority to build' interstate bridges, State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Sevier, 339 Mo. 479, 97 S.W.2d 427; and concerning its authority to determine the amount and time of payment of a refund for a bridge taken over by the Commission. State ex rel. Kansas City, Mo. v. State Highway Commission, 349 Mo. 865, 163 S.W.2d 948. In the latter case we did by mandamus require the Commission to determine the amount of the refund but held that questions of time and manner of use of its funds were wholly within its discretion. These cases involved general legislative and policy matters, committed entirely to' the discretion and judgment of the Commission, which we stated in our opinion herein were not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act or to judicial review. They have no bearing whatever on the determination of the kind of hearing required under Sec. 227.240 and the procedure applicable thereto.
The Commission further says we have held the Legislature could amend Sec. 22, Art. V, of the Constitution, V.A.M.S. “so as to expand the word ‘rights’ to mean and include the words ‘or duties or privileges/ and thereby expanded the exception to the separation of powers required by Art. II.” As we pointed out in our opinion, the first part of Sec. 22 (concluding with “as provided by law”) authorizes the Legislature to provide direct review of the administrative actions mentioned, “that is review by an appeal which is a continuation of the same case, rather than making it necessary to commence a new action (such as mandamus, certiorari, declaratory judgment or injunction) to get review.” (This could even be a direct appeal to an appellate court instead of going through the circuit *788court.) This part of Sec. 22 is not self-enforcing and even the rest of Sec. 22 con-concerning scope of review, which is self-enforcing, fixes minimum standards only. See Wood v. Wagner Electric Corp., 355 Mo. 670, 197 S.W.2d 647, 649; State ex rel. Leggett v. Jensen, Mo.Sup., 318 S.W.2d 353, 358; also see discussion in Eberle v. Plato Consolidated School District No. C-5, Mo.Sup., 313 S.W.2d 1, 3; also see Procedure Before and Review of Missouri Administrative Agencies—Shewmaker, 37 V.A.M.S., pp. 145, 157, 164, showing that the term "private rights” was used in a very broad sense. Thus the part of Sec. 22 relied on by the Commission is a grant of authority to the Legislature to provide more direct judicial action through appeals from administrative tribunals; and is, as the Commission suggests, an exception to Article II. It certainly cannot be construed as a restriction to prevent the Legislature, as it has done in Chapter 536, from providing by a kind of statutory certiorari in the circuit courts (Secs. 536.110, 536.120, 536.130, 536.140) for review of administrative decisions which involve legal duties or privileges; especially since this kind of review has long been approved for actions of the Public Service Commission which are legislative in nature rather than judicial or quasi-judicial or concern the granting of certificates of convenience and necessity which certainly are in the nature of privileges rather than rights. (See the many cases cited West’s Missouri Digest under Automobiles @^84, in which there has been such review of orders refusing, revoking or modifying certificates of convenience and necessity; see also procedure for judicial review of revocation or denial of licenses to sell liquor, provided by Sec. 311.700, which certainly cannot be anything more than a privilege.) It should also be noted that even the broadest powers given the Commission by Sec. 29, Art. IV, of the Constitution are “subject to limitations and conditions imposed by law as to the manner and means of exercising such authority.” We, therefore, hold that the authorization of judicial review of administrative decisions determining legal duties or privileges, provided by Chapter 536, is not unconstitutional.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.