Court Opinion

ID: 9605721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:41:10.702877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:29.225469
License: Public Domain

Gunter, Justice,
dissenting.
Appellees, corporate users of electrical power, contested before the Georgia Public Service Commission a rate increase sought by Georgia Power Company, the appellant. The commission entered an order granting a rate increase to the appellant, the appellees exhausted their procedural remedies before the commission, and the appellees then brought an action in superior court against the commission and the appellant which sought to enjoin the commission from enforcing its rate order and which sought to enjoin the appellant from charging the increased rates.
The appellant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint of the appellees for failure to state a claim. The trial judge overruled this motion, holding that appellees’ complaint did state a claim for relief, but he certified his judgment for interlocutory appeal to this court.
The sole issue in this appeal is whether consumers of electricity supplied by a public utility have "standing” to enjoin the enforcement and collection of rates established by the Georgia Public Service Commission on the ground that such rates are not just and reasonable. Appellant contends that this issue is one of first impression in this state.
The Georgia Constitution (Code Ann. § 2-2401) provides: "The power and authority of regulating . . . charges of public utilities for their services, . . . and requiring reasonable and just . . . charges of public utilities, are hereby conferred upon the General Assembly, whose duty it shall be to pass laws ... to prohibit... public utilities from charging other than just and reasonable rates ...”
The Georgia Constitution further provides: "There shall be a Public Service Commission for the regulation of utilities, vested with the jurisdiction, powers and duties now provided by law or that may hereafter be prescribed by the General Assembly, not inconsistent with other provisions of this Constitution.” Code Ann. § 2-2703.
*570In City of Atlanta v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 149 Ga. 405 (100 SE 439) (1919), this court stated the case at p. 406: "At the conclusion of an elaborate hearing the commission granted an increase in the gas rates; and the present suit is brought by the City of Atlanta and its citizens against the Railroad Commission of Georgia and the Atlanta Gas Light Company, to enjoin, as void, the order thus promulgated by the commission. The trial judge, after hearing evidence, decided in effect that the challenged order was not unreasonable and void, and refused an injunction.” Then on page 407 this court ruled: "It will thus be seen that the legislature has conferred on the railroad commissioners the power and authority to make just and reasonable gas rates. Orders of the railroad commission fixing rates are presumed to be valid, just and reasonable. The courts may inquire into the validity of rates prescribed by the railroad commission; and where such rates are attacked in the courts for one cause or another, such, for instance, as that the railroad commission is without authority to make them, or that they are not just and reasonable, the burden is upon the plaintiff, or attacking party, to show that the rates are void [cites omitted].”
In City of Atlanta v. Georgia R. & Power Co., 149 Ga. 411 (100 SE 442) (1919), this court said at page 413: "It thus appears that the legislature conferred on the railroad commissioners the power to make schedules of 'just and reasonable rates of charges’ for service by electric light and power companies.” At page 421 of the opinion the court held: "Under the pleadings and the evidence, the judge was authorized to hold that the order increasing the rates was not shown to be unreasonable or unjust or void on any ground of attack. Under such circumstances there was no error in refusing an injunction.”
It is clear to me that these two cases, decided by this court in 1919, established the principle that customers of gas and electric public utilities regulated by the Georgia Public Service Commission have "standing” to attack Commission rate orders in the courts on the ground that they are "other than just and reasonable”, a measurement or yardstick mandated by Art. IV, Sec. I, *571Par. I (Code Ann. § 2-2401) of the Georgia Constitution.
Georgia’s Constitution plainly states that it is the duty of the General Assembly to prohibit public utilities from charging other than just and reasonable rates. This Constitutional language, as I read it, means that utility consumers can attack rates established by the Commission in the courts as being "unjust and unreasonable,” and such an attack raises a constitutional issue under the Georgia Constitution.
Established rates may be "unjust and unreasonable” to a public utility; and that amounts to constitutional confiscation under the Georgia Constitution. Established rates may be "unjust and unreasonable” to all customers or a particular class or group of customers of a public utility; and that amounts to constitutional extortion under the Georgia Constitution. We recently said: "We think that effective judicial review requires the commission to provide clear findings by a well-defined method or standard in reaching its conclusion as to what is a just and reasonable utility rate. Regardless of the method or standard employed by the commission, there remains the need for some means of testing the end result of the commission’s action.” Georgia Power Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Commission, 231 Ga. 339, 342 (201 SE2d 423).
It is my view that judicial review is just as appropriate and necessary in "constitutional extortion cases” brought by utility customers as it is in "constitutional confiscation” cases brought by regulated utilities. I believe that Georgia’s Constitution on this subject is unique in that it places a duty upon the General Assembly to enact statutes to prohibit "public utilities from charging other than just and reasonable rates.”
I would therefore hold that the appellees have "standing” in the trial court, and that their complaint stated a claim, that claim being that the rate order attacked was "constitutionally extortionate” under the Georgia Constitution. And whether a rate order is just and reasonable or unjust and unreasonable, in constitutional terms, is an issue for initial decision in the trial court.
I would adhere to the language and ruling, as I interpret that decision, laid down by this court fifty-five *572years ago in City of Atlanta v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., supra.
I respectfully dissent.