Court Opinion

ID: 9624524
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:06:49.698608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:48.712873
License: Public Domain

ADAMS, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I agree with Honey that the trial court erred by denying its motion for summary judgment because the property reverted to it under OCGA § 22-2-85 when Georgia Power failed to use the easement for the purpose for which it was taken. In relevant part that section provides: “ Whenever the condemnor ceases using the property taken for the purpose of conducting his business, the property shall revert to the person from whom taken, his heirs or assigns.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The majority accepts Georgia Power’s argument that it has not permanently ceased using or abandoned the easement because it at some point cleared the easement, maintained the easement by keeping it clear, continuously monitored the easement by both ground inspections and aerial flyovers and used the easement in its planning process. However, this ignores the undisputed evidence here that Georgia Power has never used the easement for the purpose for which it was acquired and thus has never used the easement in “conducting its business” since no electric transmission lines or any other structure used to transmit electricity have ever been constructed on the property. As our Supreme Court has noted, “only such rights as are prayed for in the [condemnation] petition and as are reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the easement are vested in the condemnor.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Prescott v. Barton, 220 Ga. 313, 314 (138 SE2d 651) (1964). In this case, the affidavit attached to the condemnation petition averred that it was necessary to obtain the easement
for the purpose of locating and constructing thereon, maintaining and operating an electric transmission line to extend from Georgia Power Company’s Plant Vogtle located in *47Burke County, Georgia to Georgia Power Company’s existing Klondike Substation located in DeKalb County, Georgia for the purpose of transmitting electric power and current for serving the members of the public.
And Georgia Power admitted the easement “was acquired for the purpose of locating and constructing thereon, maintaining and operating an electric transmission line. ...” That is the purpose for which the easement was acquired — no other purpose. Thus, Georgia Power has never used the easement for the purpose of “conducting its business” under OCGA § 22-2-85.
Despite the clear evidence that the easement has never been used for the condemned purpose, the majority relies heavily on the fact that Georgia Power introduced evidence that it has “projected” that the easement may be needed in the future. But that evidence shows only a possibility that the easement may be used to construct electric transmission lines at some future indefinite time.
Because of these undisputed facts — that the easement has never been used for the condemned purpose and the evidence shows only a possibility that the condemnor may use the easement for the condemned purpose in the future, I do not agree with the majority that the “test” it derives from City of Atlanta v. Fulton County, 210 Ga. 784 (82 SE2d 850) (1954) is strictly applicable here. In that case the condemnor originally used the condemned property for the condemned purpose but then subsequently ceased using the property for that purpose. Thus the relevant inquiry in that case properly focused on the future use of the property. However, in considering the issue of reversion under the circumstances of the present case, I think the relevant inquiry must focus both on how much time has elapsed since the condemnor acquired the easement but failed to use it for the condemned purpose and what the evidence shows concerning future use of the property. As to these issues, the record shows that at the time the complaint was filed, over 20 years had elapsed since the property was condemned and there was only an indefinite possibility that the property would be used for the condemned purpose in the future. Contrary to Georgia Power’s argument, I find these facts show more than a “mere delay” in Georgia Power’s use of the property for the condemned purpose. I agree with Honey that this evidence was sufficient to establish as a matter of law that the property reverted to it under OCGA § 22-2-85. See H. E. Rogers v. City of Knoxville, 40 Tenn. App. 170, 180 (289 SW2d 868) (1955).3
Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s order denying *48Honey’s motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment to Georgia Power. And because I believe the trial court should have granted Honey summary judgment on this basis, I do not find it necessary to consider Honey’s argument that the trial court also erred by impermissibly weighing the evidence and granting summary judgment to Georgia Power on the issue of whether Georgia Power abandoned the condemned property.
Decided March 28, 2008
Reconsideration denied April 11, 2008
Greer, Stansfield & Turner, W. Dan Greer, Robert H. Stans field, for appellant.
Ballard, Stephenson & Waters, William M. Waters, Troutman Sanders, Douglas A. Henderson, Lynette E. Smith, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Barnes joins in this dissent.

 See also recently enacted OCGA § 22-3-162, which is effective for electric transmission line easements acquired on or after July 1, 2004. That Code section provides that construction *48of an electric transmission line must be commenced within either 12 or 15 years from the date of acquisition, depending on its capacity or location, or the owner of the property across which the easement passes may require the utility to pay additional compensation or reconvey the easement. And OCGA § 22-1-2 (c) (1), applicable to petitions for condemnation filed after April 4, 2006, Ga. L. 2006, p. 39, § 25, provides in part that property owners may obtain a recon-veyance of condemned property or additional compensation if the condemned property is not put to public use within five years.