Court Opinion

ID: 9363654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-17 14:08:55.55366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:33.018439
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                      San Antonio, Texas
                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                         No. 04-22-00162-CV

                         TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
                                      Appellant

                                                 v.

                                     Martha Theresa ZABROKY,
                                              Appellee

                         From the County Court at Law, Kerr County, Texas
                                     Trial Court No. 21716C
                             Honorable Susan Harris, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Sitting:          Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
                  Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
                  Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: January 11, 2023

REVERSED AND RENDERED

           The Texas Department of Public Safety (the “Department”) appeals from the county

court’s order reversing an administrative decision to suspend Martha Theresa Zabroky’s driving

privileges. We reverse the county court’s order and render judgment affirming the administrative

decision.

                                           BACKGROUND

           On August 24, 2019, Zabroky was arrested for driving while intoxicated, her driver’s

license was confiscated, and a Notice of Suspension of her driving privileges was issued. On
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August 30, 2019, Zabroky served the Department with a Request for Telephonic Hearing before

an administrative law judge and a Request for Production of Documents for the hearing. On

February 19, 2020, the Department issued a notice setting a May 6, 2020 hearing before an

administrative law judge. On December 3, 2021, Zabroky filed a Motion to Dismiss for Want of

Prosecution. Almost a week later, the Department finally responded to Zabroky’s discovery

request. The case was eventually heard on December 14, 2021 at a telephonic hearing before an

administrative law judge. During the hearing, Zabroky urged her motion to dismiss arguing the

Department failed to prosecute the case for over two and one-half years and failed to timely

respond to her discovery request. The Department contended the State Office of Administrative

Hearings (“SOAH”) continued the case because of the COVID pandemic and the Department does

not determine when cases are set. The trial court denied Zabroky’s motion to dismiss and heard

the case on the merits. On December 16, 2021, the judge signed an Administrative Decision,

which stated, in part, as follows: “The single continuance in this matter was initiated by SOAH in

response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Defendant [Zabroky] has been authorized to drive while the

case was pending, so Defendant has not been unduly prejudiced by the delay. For these reasons,

Defendant’s motion [to dismiss] was denied.” Furthermore, based on the following findings, the

administrative judge authorized the Department to suspend Zabroky’s driving privileges for ninety

days:

        1. On August 24, 2019, there was reasonable suspicion to stop or detain Defendant
        in that a certified peace officer was dispatched to a minor traffic collision involving
        Defendant, in the area of 425 Water St, Kerrville, Kerr County, Texas.
        2. On the same date, probable cause to arrest Defendant existed in that there was
        probable cause to believe Defendant was operating a motor vehicle in a public place
        while intoxicated, because in addition to the facts in No. 1, Defendant had the odor
        of alcoholic beverage emitting from her breath and person; had bloodshot eyes; had
        difficulty speaking and slurred speech; and had swaying balance. Defendant
        exhibited six clues of intoxication during the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test, five
        clues of intoxication during the walk and turn test, and two clues of intoxication
        during the one leg stand test.

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       3. Defendant was properly asked to submit a specimen [sic] breath or blood.
       4. Defendant was operating a motor vehicle in a public place in Kerr County,
       Texas, with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 grams or greater of alcohol per 210
       liters of breath.

       Zabroky timely appealed the order to the county court and the matter was heard on

February 14, 2022 at a bench trial.         On February 15, 2022, the trial court reversed the

administrative decision and ordered that the Department “shall not suspend Zabroky’s driver’s

license . . ., or, otherwise, shall reinstate said license if it has been suspended.” This appeal by the

Department ensued.

                                             ANALYSIS

       In an appeal from an agency’s final order, both the trial court and this court must review

the agency’s decision under the “substantial evidence” rule codified in section 2001.174 of the

Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”). Under this rule, we must reverse or remand an agency

decision “if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative

findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:”

       (A) in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision;
       (B) in excess of the agency’s statutory authority;
       (C) made through unlawful procedure;
       (D) affected by other error of law;
       (E) not reasonably supported by substantial evidence considering the reliable and
       probative evidence in the record as a whole; or
       (F) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
       unwarranted exercise of discretion.

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2001.174(2).

       On appeal, the Department asserts Zabroky’s substantial rights were not prejudiced

because she retained her driving privileges until the administrative decision was issued. Zabroky

counters that the question is not whether her rights were prejudiced before the administrative

decision was rendered but, rather, whether they were prejudiced because the decision, findings, or

conclusions were inaccurate or inappropriate for any of the reasons set forth in section

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2011.174(2)(A-F). Zabroky contends the administrative judge’s decision to deny the motion to

dismiss prejudiced her substantial rights because “it was in violation of statute, arbitrary or

capricious, an abuse of discretion, [a] clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion, and/or

unsupported by substantial evidence.” We focus our analysis on only the issue of whether

Zabroky’s substantial rights were prejudiced by the failure to grant the motion to dismiss because

that issue is dispositive.

        Under Section 2001.174(2), one of the conditions that must be satisfied is that the agency’s

challenged “findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions” must prejudice Zabroky’s substantial

rights. See Dyer v. Tex. Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, 646 S.W.3d 498, 514 (Tex. 2022). Therefore,

even if we were to conclude the administrative judge erred by denying Zabroky’s motion to dismiss

for want of prosecution under subsections A through F of section 2001.174(2), we must also

determine whether her substantial rights were prejudiced by the decision. Zabroky had the burden

on this issue. See Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Gonzalez, 555 S.W.3d 714, 717 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (“Gonzalez also has not shown that the ruling granting a

continuance prejudiced his substantial rights.”); Lone Star R.V. Sales, Inc. v. Motor Vehicle Bd. of

the Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 49 S.W.3d 492, 500 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.) (“Even if we

were to find, however, that the Board engaged in an unlawful procedure, the task at hand is to

determine whether Lone Star’s substantial rights were prejudiced by the Board’s consideration of

the exceptions.”); Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Cortinas, 996 S.W.2d 885, 889-90 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (concluding arresting officer’s failure to timely comply with

directive to send notice to the Department did not prejudice driver’s substantial rights and

Department’s failure to show compliance or to produce criminal complaint at administrative

hearing did not substantially prejudice driver’s rights); Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Cantu, 944

S.W.2d 493, 496 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ) (“Moreover, assuming the

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address contained in the Notice of Hearing letter was deceptive and misled Cantu into a ‘hearing

by ambush’ as he claims, Cantu failed to establish that the alleged deception prejudiced his

substantial rights.”); United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Vandygriff, 594 S.W.2d 163, 172 (Tex. Civ.

App.—Austin 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“We construe this to mean that, in order to complain, United

Savings must show some right that is subjected to harm because of the agency’s action.”).

       In her petition for appeal from the administrative decision, Zabroky made no substantive

argument, but merely quoted from section 2001.174(2). At the hearing before the county court on

her petition, Zabroky’s counsel stated he was “not really arguing whether there was reasonable

suspicion to detain Ms. Zabroky or probable cause to arrest.” Instead, Zabroky focused solely on

the administrative judge’s refusal to dismiss the case for want of prosecution and the Department’s

delay in responding to discovery. Counsel argued as follows:

           The only other thing under the rules which I mentioned at the end of the petition
       under grounds for appeal, is that the Court would have to think – would have to
       find that a substantial right was prejudiced. And we think that exists here. I mean,
       not only, you know, was this matter – would it have been a dispositive matter, but,
       you know, we believe that due process is implicated, due course of law is
       implicated.

           Ms. Zabroky’s just, you know, right to a – her right to her day in court is
           implicated. . . .

       Zabroky did not testify at the hearing before the county court. Neither at the hearing before

the county court nor on appeal to this court, does she explain how she was prejudiced by the delay,

how her due process rights were violated, or how she was denied her right to her day in court.

Therefore, we conclude Zabroky did not satisfy her burden to show her substantial rights were

prejudiced. See Gonzalez, 555 S.W.3d at 717 (concluding record did not show Gonzalez’s

substantial rights were prejudiced by the ruling granting an oral motion for continuance and county

court erred in reversing the administrative decision because “Gonzalez [did] not, for example,

assert that the continuance deprived him of evidence or meritorious defenses that he otherwise

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would have presented. He [did] not claim that he was prejudiced by the Department’s discovery

mistake or its late production of the correct offense report. . . . In the interim, Gonzalez neither

brought the Department’s mistake to its attention, nor did he seek relief from the administrative

law judge. Gonzalez cannot complain that his substantial rights were prejudiced by a continuance

granted to cure a discovery error that could have been remedied pre-trial had Gonzalez requested

it.”); Lone Star R.V. Sales, 49 S.W.3d at 500 (“Lone Star does not point to a single argument that

it was not permitted to fully make either in its own exceptions or in argument to the Board. Finding

that the purpose of the rules—to ensure a fair, just, and effective adjudication of the parties’

rights—was served, and that no prejudice to Lone Star’s substantial rights occurred, we overrule

its first three issues.”); Vandygriff, 594 S.W.2d at 172 (“United Savings has shown no harm to

itself by the delay of one year. The decision to allow the name change will not be influenced by

the decision to make it effective one year from rendition of the order. . . . Even if the

Commissioner exceeded his statutory authority, we find no substantial rights of United Savings

prejudiced by the Commissioner’s delay of the effective date of the order.”).

                                         CONCLUSION

       We reverse the county court’s February 15, 2022 Order that reversed the administrative

decision and render judgment affirming the December 16, 2021 Administrative Decision

authorizing suspension of Zabroky’s driving privileges.

                                                  Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

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