Court Opinion

ID: 9372149
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-17 23:03:07.177819+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:33.338490
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/17/23 TIAA Commercial Finance v. Love Freightways CA2/4
             NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

         IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION FOUR

 TIAA COMMERCIAL FINANCE,                                             B310379
 INC.,                                                                (Los Angeles County
                                                                       Super. Ct. No. VC065860)
           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 LOVE FREIGHTWAYS, INC., et al.,

           Defendants and Appellants.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Olivia Rosales, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.
         Law Offices of Akudinobi & Ikonte and Chijioke O. Ikonte for
Defendants and Appellants Nemanja Lovre and Ana Maksimovic.
         Hemar, Rousso & Heald and J. Alexandra Rhim for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
      Defendants Nemanja Lovre and Ana Maksimovic appeal from the
judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
plaintiff TIAA Commercial Finance, Inc. (TIAA) on its claims for breach of
written agreement, account stated, unjust enrichment, open book account,
and breach of guaranty.1 The genesis of the dispute is the failure of
defendant Love Freightways, Inc. (Freightways), which is not a party to this
appeal,2 to pay its commercial loan obligation to TIAA, whose predecessor in
interest financed Freightways’ purchase of a fleet of commercial trucks. In
addition to prevailing on claims based on Freightway’s loan and security
agreement, TIAA prevailed on its cause of action against Maksimovic for
breach of the separate Continuing Guaranty agreement she signed wherein
she guaranteed the performance and payment of Freightways’ obligations
under the loan agreement.
      On appeal, Lovre and Maksimovic contend the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment against them because (1) Freightways was
fraudulently induced into entering the loan and security agreement by false
representations regarding the working condition of the trucks; and (2) TIAA
failed to produce any evidence demonstrating Lovre’s individual liability
under any causes of action against him. We agree with Lovre that TIAA
failed to carry its initial burden on summary judgment demonstrating Lovre’s

1      Ana Maksimovic’s last name is sometimes spelled Marksinovic in both
the trial and appellate briefs. For consistency’s sake, we use the name
Maksimovic. Although the original plaintiff was TIAA’s predecessor
Everbank Commercial Finance, Inc. (Everbank), the court approved the
change of plaintiffs’ name to TIAA.

2     Although summary judgment was granted against defendant
Freightways, judgment was not entered against it due to a bankruptcy stay.

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individual liability, and thus we reverse the summary judgment entered
against him. For the same reasons, we reverse the summary judgment on
the second and third causes of action against Maksimovic; however, as to the
fifth cause of action for breach of the Guaranty, we find Maksimovic forfeited
any claim of error as to the grant of summary judgment against her. We
affirm the grant of summary judgment on this fifth cause of action and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1.    TIAA’s Complaint
      TIAA alleged that its predecessor in interest, GE Capital Commercial
(GE), and Freightways entered into an October 18, 2013 Loan and Security
Agreement (hereinafter the Agreement) to finance Freightways’ purchase of
three commercial trucks. Simultaneously, Freightways’ president,
Maksimovic, personally executed a “Continuing Guaranty” wherein she
unconditionally guaranteed all of Freightways’ liabilities under the
Agreement. GE subsequently sold and assigned its rights, title, and interest
in the Agreement and the trucks themselves to TIAA’s predecessor. Around
January 2016, the defendants (Freightways, Lovre, and Maksimovic)
breached the terms of the Agreement by failing to make monthly installment
payments then due and owing. After receiving no payment from
Freightways, Lovre, or Maksimovic, TIAA filed this action seeking the
principal sum together with accrued interest, continuing interest at 18

                                      3
percent per annum, and reasonable attorney fees in accordance with the
terms of the Agreement.3
      The complaint alleged five causes of action: (1) breach of written
agreement against Freightways; (2) account stated against all three
defendants; (3) unjust enrichment against all three defendants; (4) open book
account against Freightways; and (5) breach of guaranty against Maksimovic.

2.    TIAA’s Motion for Summary Judgment
      TIAA moved for summary judgment against all three defendants.
TIAA argued that the evidence it proffered (the Agreement, Continuing
Guaranty, and a declaration by Annette McGovern, a senior litigation
manager for TIAA) established that there was “no triable issue of material
fact as to the Complaint . . . . It is undisputed that Freightways executed the
Agreement and breached its terms. It is likewise undisputed that
[Maksimovic] entered [into] the Continuing Guaranty and has breached its
terms.” TIAA specified the exact amount owing on all five causes of action
totaled $253,673.93 for unpaid principal, interest, and fees. TIAA contended
that Maksimovic, as guarantor of the loan, was jointly and severally liable for
the full amount. Further, TIAA argued all “Defendants” (defined as
including all three named defendants) were jointly and severally liable for
the full sum; they had received the benefit of credit to purchase the trucks
and been unjustly enriched by enjoying the use of the trucks without making
the agreed upon payment. McGovern requested a judgment in the amount of

3      After TIAA filed the complaint, Freightways and Lovre filed a cross-
complaint against TIAA’s predecessor, GE, and the third party who sold the
trucks to Freightways. Freightways and Lovre filed a request to dismiss
their cross-complaint without prejudice on July 27, 2021.

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$253,673.93 against defendants plus reasonable attorney fees as
contemplated in the Agreement.

                             a.    The Agreement
      Pursuant to the Agreement, GE (and its assignees), the “Lender,”
agreed to loan Freightways, the “Debtor,” $244,139.50 for the purchase of
three commercial tractor trucks. Freightways agreed to pay GE “principal
plus pre-computed interest and any administrative fees set forth below (the
‘Total Amount’) of $304,800.00 in 60 installments.” GE was directed to
disburse $244,139.50 to Yancey Truck Centers LLC as payment for the
trucks. To secure full payment and performance on the debt by Freightways,
the Agreement provided that GE (and its assignees) would hold a first
priority security interest in the trucks. Two signatures appear on the
Agreement, the first being an individual “Authorized Signer” for GE; the
second being Maksimovic, who was identified as the President of
Freightways. The Agreement also set forth various terms and conditions
under separate headings (Equipment, Security Interest, Account
Management and Payment Processing, Performance by Lender, Default and
Remedies, Prepayment, and Assignment and General Provisions).
      Section 1.1 of the Agreement provided in all capital lettering: “Lender
makes no representations or warranties, express or implied, as to the quality,
workmanship, design, merchantability, suitability, or fitness of the
equipment for any particular purpose, or any other representation or
warranty whatsoever, express or implied.” Also appearing in all capital
lettering in Section 7.4 was a provision wherein the parties agreed that
“[t]his written agreement represents the final agreement between the parties
and may not be contradicted by evidence of prior, contemporaneous, or

                                       5
subsequent oral agreements of the parties. There are no unwritten oral
agreements between the parties.” Further, a section entitled “Delivery and
Acceptance of Equipment” included the following provision: “Debtor’s
obligations and liabilities to Lender are absolute and unconditional under all
circumstances and regardless of any failure of operation . . . of any item of
Equipment . . . [¶] On October 18, 2013, the Equipment being purchased
with the proceeds of this Agreement was delivered to Debtor . . . ; the
Equipment was inspected by Debtor and found to be in satisfactory condition
in all respects and delivery was unconditionally accepted by Debtor.”

                        b.    The Continuing Guaranty
      In the Continuing Guaranty, Maksimovic agreed to be a guarantor who
“hereby unconditionally guarantee[s] to [TIAA that Freightways] shall
promptly and fully perform, pay and discharge all of its present and future
liabilities, obligations and indebtedness to [TIAA]. . . . This Guaranty is an
absolute and unconditional guarantee of payment and not of collectability.
The liability of each Guarantor hereunder is not conditional or contingent
upon the genuineness, validity, sufficiency or enforceability of the
Indebtedness or any instruments [or] agreements . . . related thereto.”
Maksimovic guaranteed to “pay on demand the entire Indebtedness and all
losses . . . and expenses which may be suffered by [TIAA] by reason of
[Freightways’] default” under Freightways’ written agreement. Maksimovic
also agreed that “this Guaranty shall not be discharged or affected by any
circumstances which constitute a legal or equitable discharge of a Guarantor
or surety, . . . such Guarantor will not avail itself of any defense whatsoever
which [Freightways] may have against [TIAA].” Maksimovic executed the
Continuing Guaranty on October 18, 2013.

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                         c.   McGovern’s Declaration
     In her declaration, McGovern summarized the secured loan transaction
between Freightways and TIAA’s predecessor in interest, including the
execution of the Agreement and Continuing Guaranty. McGovern stated that
despite TIAA’s full performance under the Agreement, on approximately
January 10, 2016, and continuing thereafter, Freightways breached the
terms of the Agreement by failing to make required monthly payments and
refusing to make any further payments. TIAA had recovered and resold one
of the three commercial trucks for a sum that TIAA credited against the
amounts owing by Freightways. Thereafter, around June 2016, TIAA
learned that the two remaining trucks had been sold and reregistered to
another trucking company, and released to unknown third parties.
Reconveyances of the trucks to third parties “rendered [them] valueless as
collateral” under the Agreement.
     Per the terms of the Agreement, TIAA accelerated the balance due and
demanded prompt payment from “Defendant.”4 After crediting the sale of the
one commercial truck that TIAA recovered, McGovern stated that TIAA was
owed $253,673.93 for outstanding principal, accrued and accelerated interest,
and a termination fee.

3.   Filings in Opposition to TIAA’s Motion
     In opposition to TIAA’s motion for summary judgment, Freightways,
Lovre, and Maksimovic jointly filed a response to TIAA’s separate statement

4    The designation “Defendant” is not defined in McGovern’s declaration,
though the term appears to refer only to Freightways.

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of undisputed facts, supported by a declaration by Lovre. Defendants did not
initially file a memorandum of points and authorities.

          a.    Response to TIAA’s Statement of Undisputed Facts5
      In their response, Freightways, Lovre, and Maksimovic conceded that
the following facts were undisputed: (1) Freightways entered into the
Agreement with GE on or about October 18, 2013, to finance three
commercial trucks; (2) GE assigned the Agreement to TIAA; (3) Maksimovic
executed the Continuing Guaranty for all of Freightways’s liabilities;
(4) Freightways received and accepted the trucks; (5) TIAA recovered and
resold one truck but could not recover the two other trucks; (6) Freightways,
Lovre, and Maksimovic received and used the trucks without fully paying for
them; and (7) a total sum of $253,673.93 (computed by totaling the
outstanding amounts due less all credit) remained unpaid.
      Defendants disputed the following facts: (1) TIAA performed all of the
terms and conditions of the Agreement; (2) Freightways breached the terms
of the Agreement by not making monthly payments due and owing; and
(3) all three defendants were indebted to TIAA in the sum of $253,673.93.
Defendants cited to Lovre’s declaration to dispute these facts.

                          b.    Declaration of Lovre
      Lovre declared that he is the owner of Freightways and was responsible
for “all the decisions for the purchase and finance of the trucks.” Lovre
negotiated the purchase and financing with George Cortes, an individual who

5    The appellant’s appendix does not include the initial statement of
undisputed facts filed by TIAA.

                                       8
held himself out as a representative of the seller (Navistar) and the “in-house
finance company for Navistar” (GE). Cortes represented that “Navistar
provides the equipment, GE provides the money,” and Freightways’ only
option was to finance the purchase through GE. When discussing the
condition of the trucks with Lovre, Cortes stated that the trucks were
“‘excellent vehicle[s] that will last for years without giving any problems.’”
Cortes did not inform Lovre that the trucks had been returned by previous
owners due to having defective engines. Freightways made payments on the
trucks until discovering they had defective engines.6 Lovre notified GE and
protested making any further payments. Lovre “would not have entered into
the financing agreement” if he knew about the defects in each truck.

4.    TIAA’s Reply in Support of Motion
      In reply, TIAA argued that while it had not received any written
opposition to its summary judgment motion, it construed the documents filed
by defendants as raising the defense that “because the trucks did not perform
as [defendants] expected them to perform,” defendants “should not have to
make repayment.” In response, TIAA pointed to the express disclaimers
appearing in Section 1.1 of the Agreement disclaiming any representation
regarding the merchantability or condition of each truck.
      Section 1.1 of the Agreement provided in all capital lettering: “Lender
makes no representations or warranties, express or implied, as to the quality,
workmanship, design, merchantability, suitability, or fitness of the
equipment for any particular purpose, or any other representation or

6     Lovre listed numerous incidents between 2013 and 2014 wherein the
trucks either broke down or were otherwise inoperable.

                                        9
warranty whatsoever, express or implied.” TIAA also pointed to the provision in
the Agreement that “Debtor’s obligations and liabilities to Lender are absolute

and unconditional under all circumstances and regardless of any failure of
operation or Debtor’s loss of possession of any item of Equipment.” Given the
clear and conspicuous language of the disclaimers, TIAA argued that “any
claims by [defendants] that they are not indebted to [TIAA] because the
vehicles . . . did not perform as hoped, are irrelevant.”

5.    Subsequent Declaration by Defendants’ Trial Counsel
      The day before the court held a hearing on TIAA’s motion for summary
judgment, counsel for defendants filed a declaration informing the court that
he had mistakenly filed a second copy of Lovre’s declaration in place of
defendants’ opposition to TIAA’s motion for summary judgment. Counsel
attached to his declaration the written opposition. In the opposition,
defendants argued that Cortes, an “agent” for the seller and financing
company, had misrepresented the condition of the trucks during his
discussions with Lovre. Given these misrepresentations, defendants argued
that GE had fraudulently induced Freightways to enter into the contract.
Citing Civil Code section 1567, which provides that an apparent consent to a
contract when obtained through fraud “is not real or free,” defendants
concluded that “[t]riable issues of fact exist as to . . . whether consent was
fraudulently procured. . . . [¶] Also, there is no basis for summary judgment
against [Lovre]. [TIAA] has failed to set forth the basis for liability of Lovre
who acted on behalf of a corporate entity.”

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6.    The Summary Judgment Ruling and Subsequent Judgment
      At the hearing on TIAA’s motion for summary judgment, the court
stated that it would consider the written opposition, while untimely filed, in
the interests of justice and judicial efficiency. Proceeding to the arguments
raised in the opposition, the court rejected the fraudulent inducement
defense, reasoning that the disclaimers appearing in the Agreement provided
that TIAA had made no representations “as to the quality, workmanship,
design, merchantability, suitability, or fitness of the equipment . . . or any
other representation or warranty whatsoever, express or implied.” After
finding several facts undisputed (i.e., the parties entered into a contract,
defendants received and accepted the trucks, and defendants made monthly
payments until the time of default), the court granted TIAA’s motion for
summary judgment.
      Thereafter, the court entered judgment on October 14, 2020, for TIAA
and against defendants Lovre and Maksimovic in the amount of $253,673.93.

                                 DISCUSSION
      On appeal and in their opposition to the motion for summary judgment,
appellants made two arguments: (1) no evidence was presented establishing
Lovre’s individual liability on the causes of action against him; and (2) the
Agreement was procured by fraud and therefore voidable.

1.    TIAA Failed to Set Forth a Prima Facie Showing of Lovre’s Liability
      Lovre contends that TIAA failed to meet its initial burden of proof at
the summary judgment stage to show that there was no triable issue of
material fact as to his individual liability on any cause of action asserted
against him. We agree.

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      A motion for summary judgment is properly granted only when “all the
papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “The moving party bears the initial
burden to make a prima facie showing that no triable issue of material fact
exists. [Citation.] If this burden is met, the party opposing the motion bears
the burden of showing the existence of disputed facts.” (Sosa v. CashCall,
Inc. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 42, 47 (Sosa), citing Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield
Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Courts ‘“construe the moving party’s
affidavits strictly, construe the opponent’s affidavits liberally, and resolve
doubts about the propriety of granting the motion in favor of the party
opposing it.”’ [Citation.]” (Sosa, at p. 47.) We review a grant of summary
judgment de novo and decide independently whether the facts not subject to
triable dispute warrant judgment for the moving party or a determination a
cause of action has no merit as a matter of law. (Hartford Casualty Ins. Co.
v. Swift Distribution, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 277, 286; Schachter v. Citigroup,
Inc. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 610, 618.)
      The complaint names Lovre as a defendant in the second cause of
action for account stated and the third cause of action for unjust enrichment.
A cause of action for an account stated requires proof of an executory contract
or agreement “‘based on prior transactions between the parties, that the
items of an account are true and that the balance struck is due and owing.’
[Citation.] ‘[A]n element essential to render the account stated is that it
receive the assent of both parties, but the assent of the party sought to be
charged may be implied from his conduct.’ [Citation.] For example, ‘[w]hen a
statement is rendered to a debtor and no reply is made in a reasonable time,
the law implies an agreement that the account is correct as rendered.’

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[Citation.]” (Professional Collection Consultants v. Lauron (2017) 8
Cal.App.5th 958, 968; accord, Gardner v. Watson (1915) 170 Cal. 570, 574
[when an account stated is “‘assented to, either expressly or impliedly, it
becomes a new contract’”].)
      As for the cause of action for unjust enrichment, there is a split in
authority on whether such a discrete cause of action exists. (See Ghirardo v.
Antonioli (1996) 14 Cal.4th 39, 50, 52, 53–55 [recognizing split in authority];
compare Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1370
[“‘[T]here is no cause of action in California for unjust enrichment’”] with
Lyles v. Sangadeo-Patel (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 759, 769 [recognizing unjust
enrichment as a cause of action].) Even if not “strictly speaking, a theory of
recovery,” unjust enrichment may be asserted whenever a person “‘acquires a
benefit which may not justly be retained,’” in which case the court shall order
the “‘return [of] either the thing or its equivalent to the aggrieved party so as
not to be unjustly enriched.’ [Citation.]” (Prakashpalan v. Engstrom,
Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1132; see O’Grady v.
Merchant Exchange Productions, Inc. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 771, 781 [unjust
enrichment is “‘synonymous with restitution’”]; Rutherford Holdings, LLC v.
Plaza Del Rey (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 221, 231 [unjust enrichment “‘is not a
cause of action,’” but a general principle underlying “a quasi-contract claim
seeking restitution”].)
      Strictly construing the motion for summary judgment and its
supporting evidence in this case, we conclude that TIAA has failed to set
forth a prima facie showing that Lovre is individually liable on either the
cause of action for account stated or under an unjust enrichment theory. (See
Sosa, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 47.) As Lovre correctly identifies, his name
does not appear in TIAA’s memorandum of points and authorities in support

                                       13
of its motion for summary judgment, nor does his name appear in TIAA’s
separate statement of undisputed facts. The evidence set forth in the
separate statement establishes only that Freightways received and accepted
the commercial trucks; that Freightways made monthly payments in accord
with the monthly payments then due and owing until it failed to make any
such payment; and that “Defendants” did not object to the amounts due.7
These facts do not demonstrate that Lovre personally assented to the
monthly bills received by Freightways, or that he was unjustly enriched at
TIAA’s expense.
      Resisting this conclusion, TIAA argues that Lovre’s declaration (filed in
opposition to TIAA’s motion for summary judgment), sets forth a prima facie
showing of Lovre’s individual liability as the owner of Freightways who
handled negotiations for the purchase and financing of the trucks.8 From
these isolated statements, TIAA contends that Lovre is personally liable on

7     TIAA did not define “Defendants” in its separate statement. It did
define “Defendants” in its memorandum of points and authorities as
including only “Freightways and Ana [Maksimovic].” Although the
declaration of Annette McGovern in support of TIAA’s motion for summary
judgment defined “Defendants” to include Freightways, Maksimovic, and
Lovre, in that declaration McGovern vaguely referred to a singular
“Defendant” in stating, “Plaintiff sent monthly billing statements to
Defendant and at no time did Defendant object to the amounts due in the
monthly statements.” The monthly billing statements attached to
McGovern’s declaration are addressed to Freightways; Lovre’s name does not
appear in any billing statement.

8     TIAA identifies the following portion of Lovre’s declaration: “I am the
owner of [Freightways]. I was responsible for all the decisions for the
purchase and finance of the trucks that is the subject matter of this litigation.
I handled the negotiations for the purchase and financing of the trucks that is
the subject of the litigation.”

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the second and third causes of action because he “either directed or failed to
take action to prevent Freightways from” defaulting on the Agreement.
      TIAA has forfeited this argument because it never asserted this theory
of liability in its briefing to the trial court. (See G & W Warren’s, Inc. v.
Dabney (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 565, 571–572 [respondent forfeited new legal
theory purporting to hold individual liable as principal to purchase
documents]; Magallanes de Valle v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 914, 924 [possible theories not fully presented to the trial
court cannot be asserted for first time on appeal from summary judgment].)
Moreover, TIAA’s argument is perfunctorily raised without any relevant legal
authorities. (See Sweeney v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd.
(2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 1093, 1149 [respondent forfeited argument by raising
it without supporting evidence or relevant law]; People v. Freeman (1994) 8
Cal.4th 450, 482, fn. 2 [reviewing courts “discuss those arguments that are
sufficiently developed to be cognizable. To the extent [a litigant]
perfunctorily asserts other claims, without development . . . , they are not
properly made, and are rejected on that basis”].)9

9      The two cases cited by TIAA in support of its conclusion that Lovre
should be held personally responsible on causes of action for account stated
and unjust enrichment are acutely inapposite. Neither of those cases
purported to address imputing liability on causes of action based on the
contract or quasi-contract principles applicable in this case, as opposed to tort
principles. (See Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1986) 42 Cal.3d
490, 504 (Frances T.) [“Directors are jointly liable with the corporation and
may be joined as defendants if they personally directed or participated in the
tortious conduct”], italics added; PMC, Inc. v. Kadisha (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th
1368, 1380 [“As the Supreme Court held in Frances T., supra, 42 Cal.3d at
pages 508–509, ‘To maintain a tort claim against a director in his or her
personal capacity, a plaintiff must first show that the director specifically
authorized, directed or participated in the allegedly tortious conduct

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      Accordingly, the judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against Lovre is
reversed.

2.    Maksimovic’s Liability
      TIAA named Maksimovic as a defendant in the second cause of action
for account stated, the third cause of action for unjust enrichment, and the
fifth cause of action for breach of the Guaranty. However, the same
infirmities in TIAA’s summary judgment showing as to Lovre require
reversal of the judgment against Maksimovic on the causes of action for
account stated and unjust enrichment. TIAA failed to allege any facts to
support holding Maksimovic personally liable on these two claims and thus
failed to carry its burden.
      By contrast, with respect to the remaining fifth cause of action against
Maksimovic for breach of the Guaranty, in its moving papers TIAA made a
prima facie showing that no triable issue of material fact exists. “A lender is
entitled to judgment on a breach of guaranty claim based upon undisputed
evidence that (1) there is a valid guaranty, (2) the borrower has defaulted,
and (3) the guarantor failed to perform under the guaranty.” (Gray1 CPB,
LLC v. Kolokotronis (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 480, 486.) TIAA having proffered
evidence to satisfy each of these elements, the burden shifted to Maksimovic

[citation]; or . . . they negligently failed to take or order appropriate action to
avoid the harm’”], italics added.) As the Supreme Court recognized in
Frances T., the standards set forth in these cases are distinct from the
standards used to impute liability on contract-based causes of action. (See
Frances T., at p. 504 [“This liability does not depend on the same grounds as
‘piercing the corporate veil,’ on account of inadequate capitalization for
instance, but rather on the officer or director’s personal participation or
specific authorization of the tortious act”].)

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to demonstrate a triable issue as to her liability for breach of the Guaranty.
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1); S.B.C.C., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 383, 388.) However, neither the
briefs filed on her behalf in this court, nor any of the briefs or the declaration
submitted in the trial court in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment, mention Maksimovic’s name or the Continuing Guaranty in any
legal discussion, much less demonstrate any triable issues as to her liability
for breach of the Guaranty.
      “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court
judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an
appellant to demonstrate, . . . that the trial court committed an error that
justifies reversal of the judgment. [Citations.] ‘This is not only a general
principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine
of reversible error.’ [Citations.]” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594,
608–609.) An appellant’s burden “‘includes the obligation to present
argument and legal authority on each point raised. This requires more than
simply stating a bare assertion that the judgment, or part of it, is erroneous
and leaving it to the appellate court to figure out why; it is not the appellate
court’s role to construct theories or arguments that would undermine the
judgment. . . .’ [Citation.]” (Lee v. Kim (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 705, 721 (Lee);
accord, Hewlett–Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 506, 565;
Niko v. Foreman (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 344, 368.) This rule is the same
when an appellate court conducts a de novo review of an appeal following the
grant of summary judgment. (Vasquez v. Department of Pesticide Regulation
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 672, 685; see Villalobos v. City of Santa Maria (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 383, 388 [“‘“it is the appellant’s responsibility . . . to point out
the triable issues the appellant claims are present by citation to the record

                                        17
and any supporting authority”’”].) As such, whenever an appellant “‘“fails to
raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and
citations to authority, we treat the point as [forfeited].”’ [Citations.]” (Lee, at
p. 721; see Rubio v. CIA Wheel Group (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 82, 105 [an
appellant must “‘not only cite to valid legal authority, but also explain how it
applies in his case’”; the appellate court should not speculate about which
issues he intended to raise].)
      In her pleadings opposing summary judgment and her appellate briefs,
Maksimovic focuses only on alleged oral warranties as to the good working
condition of the trucks made by an agent, George Cortez, who jointly
represented the lender and the seller of the trucks. Her sole contention is
that the Agreement was voidable because Freightways was fraudulently
induced to enter the Agreement by Cortez’s misrepresentations. (See Brown
v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 938, 958 [“[a] contract
fraudulently induced is voidable”].) Only after we notified the parties
following the completion of their briefing that it appeared Maksimovic had
forfeited her contentions on appeal did she articulate a theory that the
alleged fraudulent inducement of the underlying Agreement between TIAA
and Freightways not only rendered that Agreement voidable, but also
eliminated any liability for Maksimovic’s failure to perform the separate
Guaranty. Her belated and conclusory argument in this regard is insufficient
to raise a triable issue, and we deem it forfeited. Moreover, Maksimovic
failed to address the effect of the express and unambiguous waivers in the
Guaranty of any right to rely on defenses to performance of the underlying
Agreement. In unconditionally guaranteeing payment of Freightways’ debt
to TIAA, Maksimovic agreed that her liability as a guarantor was “not
conditional or contingent upon the genuineness, validity, sufficiency or

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enforceability of the Indebtedness or any instruments, agreements, or chattel
paper related thereto,” and agreed that “this Guaranty shall not be
discharged or affected by any circumstances which constitute a legal or
equitable discharge of a Guarantor or surety, . . . such Guarantor will not
avail itself of any defense whatsoever which [Freightways] may have against
[TIAA].” (Italics added.)
      As discussed above, this court’s role is not to construct theories or
arguments that would undermine the judgment. (Lee, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th
at p. 721.) Thus, it is not appropriate for us to try to construct arguments for
Maksimovic as to why her express waivers of defenses, including a defense of
fraudulent inducement, may not be effective.10 We thus affirm the grant of
summary judgment against Maksimovic on the claim for breach of the
Guaranty.

10     Even assuming Maksimovic could rely on defenses to the validity or
enforceability of the Agreement to argue that the Guaranty was likewise
unenforceable, she also fails to adequately address the trial court’s conclusion
that the defense of fraudulent inducement based on oral warranties by Cortez
was foreclosed by the Agreement’s express and conspicuous written
disclaimers of any warranties as to the trucks’ condition. (See Com. Code,
§§ 2202 [“Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the
parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the
parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as
are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior
agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement”]; 2316, subd. (1) [“Words
or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or
conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever
reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this
division on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2202) negation or limitation is
inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable”].)

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                               DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed as to the fifth cause of action against
Maksimovic and in favor of TIAA. The judgment against Maksimovic and
Lovre on the second and third causes of action is reversed. The matter is
remanded to the trial court with directions to enter a new order denying the
motion for summary judgment as to Maksimovic and Lovre on these two
causes of action, and to conduct further proceedings on the causes of action
remaining against Lovre and Maksimovic. Each party shall bear their own
costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                           STONE, J.*
      We concur:

      CURREY, Acting P. J.

      COLLINS, J.

*Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
 Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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