Court Opinion

ID: 9865973
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 23:58:06.716598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:08:29.871344
License: Public Domain

Merits.
The ó^acre tract involved herein is a rectangular strip measuring 208.71 feet, east and west, and 1,460.97 feet, north and south, and adjoins on its east side the lands correctly described in the deed from M. A. and Lee Johnson to T. IT. Gibson, dated March 19, 1901. At that date the right of way of the K. C. S. Railway traversed diagonally the northern end of the tract, leaving a triangular shaped parcel thereof on its east side, not exceeding an acre. Several years thereafter Gibson granted a right of way for a highway across the tract parallel to and adjoining the railway on its west side.
We are convinced from the record that M. A. Johnson intended to sell to Gibson the ó^acre tract in 1901, as contended by plaintiffs, and that its omission from the deed was purely inadvertent. Reason and circumstances point to this as being a correct inference; none points otherwise. M. A. Johnson acquired the ó^acre tract in one deed, while the other lands were acquired by him and Lee Johnson in another deed. Evidently the person drafting the deed to Gibson had before him only the deed to the larger tract.
It is shown that Gibson closed a trade with the Johnsons for all of the lands, with crops thereon, in August, 1900, but execution of deed was delayed' until the following March. Gibson was then in possession as tenant. All of the lands were under one inclosure, except the small triangular piece in the northeast corner of the 6^2-acre tract east of railway. This small tract is now, and has been for'many years, open land. It lay between the Gibson residence and the railroad and highway, and was used as a lawn and outlet to these roads. It had never been cultivated, but was, during all the years, openly and freely used by the Gibsons and their tenants as a part and parcel of the land on which the residence stood. Possession thereof was open, complete, and uninterrupted.
A review of all the evidence bearing upon the question of possession of that part of the tract west of the railroad, ex-eluding the part given for highway purposes, is unnecessary. We have read it closely, and have no hesitancy in saying it decidedly preponderates in favor of plaintiffs’ contention that they and the deceased, Gibson, possessed same continuously and uninterruptedly, as owners, for more than 30 years. Johnson lived near the land until his death in November, 1925, and, so far as the record discloses, never challenged the right of the Gibsons to use, cultivate, and possess the land as was done by them. This possession was open and notorious. Had Johnson thought the land belonged to him, he would doubtless have pursued a different attitude toward it. His Attitude clearly supports the contention that he intended to sell to Gibson all the land owned by him in that body; and this, being true, supports plaintiffs’ contention that they and the elder Gibson possessed as owners.
Defendant’s own testimony supports plaintiffs’ contention. He says:
“Q. Has the Gibsons ever farmed, to your knowledge, any part of the land there west of the railroad? A. Someone has cultivated it practically every year, more one year than another.
“Q. You know who it was? A. Sam Zylks lived there awhile.
“Q. Mrs. Gibson never lived on it or' farmed it to your knowledge? A. No, sir,, not on the west — never any house on it.
“Q. Do you remember when the fence-they testified to about was put up? A., No, sir, I could not say.
“Q. About how long would you say?' A. I do not know.
“Q. Can you approximate the date— five, ten or twelve years, or what? A. The one next to the railroad has been there-fifteen years, I am sure. * * *
“Q. Now, with reference to the property west of the railroad, do you say that Allie Zylks is cultivating that property? A. I do not know that I have ever seen anyone working in it. I would pass along, and see that it was being cultivated.
“Q. Been cultivated practically every year since you have known it? A. Yes, sir, -I am sure that Allie Zylks cultivates *751it, but I have not seen him cultivating it.
“Q. I will ask you if you did not know it as the Gibson property? A. Well, up to a short time before I bought, I think it was called the Gibson property.”
The two Zylks referred to by defendant were brothers of Mrs. Gibson and tenants of the Gibsons. It will also be noted that defendant, until a short time before he bought the land at tax sale, understood it belonged to the Gibsons. He says he thought it was called the “Gibson property.”
To acquire title to lands through possession of 30 years, neither title or good faith on the part of the possessor is necessary. Article 3499 of the Civil Code. In the case at bar, good faith on the part of the possessors is amply shown.
To enable one to acquire title to real estate by 30 years’ possession, it is necessary that such possession be continuous and uninterrupted during the period, and, in addition, it .must be public, unequivocal, and as owner. Civil Code, art. 3500. Plaintiffs’ case meets all of these requirements.
It is unnecessary to the perfection of a title, based upon 30 years’ possession as owner, that the corporeal possession once begun shall continue unbroken every day of the period. If there has been no interruption (such as to stop the current of prescription), the possession, once begun, may “be preserved by external and public signs, announcing the possessor’s intention to preserve the possession of the thing, as the keeping up of roads and levees, the payment of taxes, and other similar acts.” Civ. Code, art. 3501.
The record does not disclose that the land in question was assessed to M. A. Johnson subsequent to his deed to Gibson in 1901, except for the year 1925, under which it was sold to defendant. If it had been so assessed, it is safe to assume that proof thereof would have been submitted. It would have been unnatural for him to pay taxes thereon and allow Gibson to use it. It is probable the tax assessor checked the records, found the land standing in Johnson’s name, and made the assessment to him in 1925. Tax notice was sent by registered mail to Johnson at proper post office address. He was then dead. It was not returned to the tax collector. Jewell Johnson testified that the notice was delivered to her. She is a niece of M. A. Johnson, but not his only heir. He left no descendants. She claims Johnson instituted her as his sole heir in his last will and testament. The will, if it ever existed, was not probated, nor was it produced on trial. Without being probated, it was without effect. Therefore notices of the assessment of the property, delinquency of tax thereunder, and of advertisement of sale therefor, were not served on all the heirs of the tax debt- or. This being true, the tax sale ab initio was null and void, and remains so unless cured by the 3-year prescription provided in section 11 of article 10 of the Constitution of 1921. Fennimore et al. v. Boatner, 112 La. 1080, 36 So. 860.
No proceedings were instituted to annul the tax deed prior to filing present suit in June, 1934, and over 3 years have elapsed since registry of that deed.
It has been repeatedly held that, so long as the owner or tax debtor of property sold for taxes remains in possession thereof, the current of the constitutional prescription is suspended. Bozeman v. Crichton Co., 16 La. App. 483, 134 So. 293, and cases there cited.
Therefore, if M. A. Johnson’s heirs had been in the physical possession of the land when it was sold for taxes, and since, certainly they could, even to the present time, successfully attack the sale because of lack of notices mentioned above. And, since we have found that Johnson intended to sell the land to Gibson in 1901 and that Gibson and his widow and heirs were in possession thereof as owners at the time of, and since, the tax sale, and their title thereto is no longer inchoate, but perfect, we are of the opinion plaintiffs are in position to attack the tax sale on any ground and avail themselves of the same means to have it declared a nullity as would be theirs had they been the owners thereof under-title of record.
The facts of the Bozeman Case, supra, are very much similar to those of the case at bar. The land involved in that case at date of tax sale belonged to the heirs of Hattie Lester Mitchell, deceased wife of Balem Mitchell, and the Crichton Company. There was no evidence of the heirs’ title of record. The land sold for taxes of 1922, in the name of Balem Mitchell, to T. A. Glass. Mitchell, after his wife’s death, but before the tax sale, sold the entire property to Crichton Company, which went into and held possession when the tax sale occurred. No notice was given to this comoany of delin*752quency of tax nor of the sale of the land. It was held that the tax sale was a nullity for' failure to give notices to the record owner and that the Mitchell heirs could avail themselves of the nullity. And so we hold in the present case that plaintiffs may do likewise. It is unnecessary to pass on other phases of the attack on the tax sale to defendant.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.