Court Opinion

ID: 9373162
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:03:08.298598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:39.888785
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     BYRON L. THOMPSON,                               DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                          DA-0752-15-0590-I-1

                  v.

     UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,                    DATE: December 16, 2022
                   Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           M. Jermaine Watson, Esquire, Dallas, Texas, for the appellant.

           Theresa M. Gegen, Esquire, Dallas, Texas, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                        FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     affirmed his removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the
     following circumstances:      the initial decision contains erroneous findings of
     material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and ad ministrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
     administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
     decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
     discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
     material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.        Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).            After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly modified to
     address an additional consideration in the penalty determination, we AFFIRM the
     initial decision, still sustaining the removal.

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant was employed as a Custodian until the agency removed him,
     effective July 30, 2015, based on one charge of unacceptable conduct, in which
     the agency alleged that, on May 28, 2015, the appellant assaulted a member of the
     public (hereinafter, the “individual”).    Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6 at 18.
     According to the supporting narrative, after being notified that the individual was
     disturbing customers, the appellant entered the lobby, took the individual’s
     belongings, “pitched” or “threw” them outside, and pushed the individual as he
     exited out the door. Id. at 24-25. The narrative then stated that the appellant
     briefly reentered the facility to hand a supervisor his badge, reexited the facility,
     and pushed the individual to the ground, injuring his knee. Id. The physical
     altercation was witnessed by at least two Postal Service employees and one
     customer, who captured part of the altercation on video using her cellular phone.
     Id.
¶3         The appellant filed a Board appeal, disputing the penalty and raising
     disability discrimination affirmative defenses. IAF, Tabs 1, 13. The appellant
                                                                                       3

     argued that the deciding official failed to properly weigh the relevant Douglas
     factors and that the penalty of removal was beyond the bounds of reasonableness.
     IAF, Tab 1 at 10-14. In support, he alleged that the deciding official erred by not
     considering as significant mitigating factors: (1) that he was provoked by the
     individual’s use of racial slurs and epithets toward him as the individual passed
     by him to exit; (2) his post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); (3) the lack of
     serious injury to the individual; (4) the fact that he was not criminally charged or
     cited for his conduct; and (5) his 18-year length of service with no prior
     discipline. Id. at 8, 13-14. He further claimed that he was not on notice of the
     relevant Employee and Labor Relations policies 665.16 and 665.24 about
     “Behavior and Personal Habits” and “Violent and/or Threatening Behavior.” Id.
     at 14, 26-27. Finally, he alleged that, contrary to the deciding official’s finding,
     he could be rehabilitated because further medical treatment had helped him
     manage his PTSD. Id. at 14. He also provided discharge and progress notes from
     his treatment at the Dallas Veterans Medical Center from November 2015 in
     support of his claims that he had PTSD and that his mental condition significantly
     impacted his behavior. IAF, Tab 13 at 9-18.
¶4        After holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative judge
     issued an initial decision affirming the appellant’s removal and denying his
     affirmative defenses of disability discrimination and denial of reasonable
     accommodation. IAF, Tab 1 at 2, Tab 19, Initial Decision (ID) at 2, 13, 15-16,
     23. The administrative judge found that the agency proved the charge, there was
     a nexus between the sustained charge and the efficiency of the service, and the
     penalty of removal was reasonable.      ID at 10, 16, 23.    As for the penalty in
     particular, the administrative judge agreed with the deciding official’s
     determination that the appellant’s unjustified, intentional, and unprovoked
     physical assault on a member of the public was serious misconduct that directly
     related to his job duties. ID at 17-21. He also found that the deciding official
     determined that the appellant’s misconduct was aggravated by the fact that it was
                                                                                        4

     witnessed by at least one postal customer, that no alternative sanction was
     available, and that the appellant had no potential for rehabilitation in light of the
     seriousness of his misconduct. ID at 18. The administrative judge further found
     that the deciding official properly considered the appellant’s 18-year work
     history, lack of disciplinary record, and remorse as mitigating factors, and the
     appellant’s PTSD as only a minor mitigating factor, given his failure to show a
     causal connection between his PTSD and the second physical assault .              ID
     at 18, 21-22.   Thus, the administrative judge found no basis to disturb the
     agency’s decision because the deciding official weighed all of the relevant
     Douglas factors and the penalty of removal was within the bounds of
     reasonableness. ID at 23.
¶5         The appellant has filed a petition for review, arguing that the administrative
     judge erred in deferring to the agency’s chosen penalty of removal because the
     deciding official improperly weighed some and failed to consider other Douglas
     factors and erred in finding that the penalty of removal did not exceed the bounds
     of reasonableness. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 4, 6-9. The appellant
     has not challenged, and we discern no error with, the administrative judge’s
     findings that the agency proved the charge and nexus and that the appellant did
     not meet his burden of proving his affirmative defenses. The agency has filed a
     response. PFR File, Tab 3.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶6         In determining an appropriate penalty, an agency must review relevant
     mitigating factors, also known as the “Douglas factors,” pursuant to Douglas v.
     Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981). The Board gives due
     deference to the agency’s discretion in exercising its managerial function of
     maintaining employee discipline and efficiency. See Davis v. U.S. Postal Service,
     120 M.S.P.R. 457, ¶ 6 (2013). Thus, the Board will modify a penalty only if it
     finds that the agency failed to weigh the relevant factors or that the penalty the
                                                                                        5

     agency imposed clearly exceeded the bounds of reasonableness.          Id.   For the
     reasons discussed below, we find that the appellant has not provided a basis for
     disturbing the administrative judge’s affirmance of his removal.

     The appellant has not shown that his PTSD diagnosis was a significant mitigating
     factor.
¶7         The appellant argues that the deciding official should have considered his
     PTSD a significant mitigating factor and that the administrative judge erred in
     finding otherwise. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7-9. In particular, he alleges that he should
     not have been disadvantaged by the lack of medical documentation, as the agency
     failed to request it. Id. at 8. Second, he claims that his PTSD caused him to feel
     threatened by the individual’s “racially charged comments” and explained why he
     engaged and pushed the individual. Id. He further claims that designating the
     first push as defensive and the second one as aggressive because he took off his
     badge in between obviates the true nature of the situation and the impact that his
     PTSD had on the entire continuum of events that transpired within a matter of
     seconds.   Id. Finally, the appellant argues that he has rehabilitation potential
     because he has controlled his PTSD, as evidenced by the fact that he had no other
     altercations, despite having PTSD since 2005, and he was cleared to return to
     work in December 2015. Id. at 8-9.
¶8         Even if the appellant is unsuccessful in proving his disability discrimination
     affirmative defense, as here, ID at 13, 15-16, the underlying condition may
     nonetheless be relevant to a Douglas factor analysis if it is a causative factor in
     the charged misconduct, Walsh v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 627, 638-39
     (1997). As the appellant argued that his PTSD was connected to his removal, he
     must provide sufficient evidence of a causal relationship between his medical
     condition and the charged misconduct. Gustave-Schmidt v. Department of Labor,
     87 M.S.P.R. 667, ¶ 17 (2001). If shown, his medical condition may be entitled to
     significant weight as a mitigating factor. Id.
                                                                                       6

¶9         The administrative judge credited the appellant’s testimony and found that
      the appellant only pushed the individual because the individual passed closely by
      and made racially derogatory statements toward the appellant as he exited. ID
      at 5-6. The administrative judge also found that subsequent to the first push, the
      appellant followed the individual outside and yelled at him in an aggressive tone,
      while the individual stood several feet from the appellant, unmoving with his
      hands at his side; the appellant then quickly approached and opened the facility
      doors to hand a supervisor his badge; and “swiftly pivot[ed]” toward and “without
      hesitation” approached the individual, extended his hands and “violently” struck
      the individual “with enough force to knock him to the ground.” ID at 6-8. He
      further found that the individual did not charge the appellant, as the appellant
      contended, and he only raised his arm into a defensive position immediately
      before being struck by the appellant.       Id.   In making those findings, the
      administrative judge credited the video and the testimony and statements of the
      three witnesses over the appellant’s version of events, and we discern no reason
      to disturb those findings. ID at 6-9; see Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d
      1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the Board must defer to an
      administrative judge’s credibility determinations when they are based, explicitly
      or implicitly, on observing the demeanor of witnesses testifying at a h earing, and
      may overturn such determinations only when it has “sufficien tly sound” reasons
      for doing so); Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 106 (1997) (finding
      no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findings when she considered the
      evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions
      on issues of credibility); Broughton v. Department of Health & Human Services,
      33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same).
¶10        To the extent that the deciding official and the administrative judge did not
      afford any mitigating weight to the appellant’s allegation that he was provoked by
      the individual’s use of racial slurs, this was error. The deciding official and the
      administrative judge should have considered the appellant’s allegation in this
                                                                                          7

      regard under Douglas factor 11, “mitigating circumstances surrounding the
      offense, such as . . . malice or provocation on the part of others involved in the
      matter.” Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 305. For purposes of our analysis, we credit the
      appellant’s statements on this issue, and we make clear that the racial slurs and
      behavior described by the appellant are unacceptable. We therefore modify the
      initial decision to clarify that the appellant’s contention that he was provoked by
      the individual’s use of racial slurs is a mitigating factor. However, as further
      explained below, this offensive language does not justify the appellant’s violent
      actions under the circumstances here.
¶11         The facts show that the appellant had an opportunity to retreat and avoid the
      second confrontation when he reentered the facility to hand over his badge.
      Therefore, while the individual’s use of racial slurs was offensive and should be
      considered as a mitigating factor, it was insufficient to relieve the appellant of his
      obligation to retreat when possible to avoid a physical confrontation, even if the
      events occurred in a short period of time.      See Harris v. U.S. Postal Service,
      100 M.S.P.R. 613, ¶ 14 (2005) (finding that a customer’s offensive, profane, and
      racially derogatory verbal abuse was not sufficient provocation to justify the
      appellant’s violent reaction, especially given that the appellant had an opportunity
      to retreat and avoid the physical confrontation). The appellant argues that Harris
      is distinguishable because there the appellant was a supervisor and held to a
      higher standard.   PFR File, Tab 1 at 9.      We disagree.     The presence of that
      additional aggravating factor does not alter the separate finding that provocation
      does not justify violence if the appellant had an opportunity to retreat. Harris,
      100 M.S.P.R. 613, ¶¶ 14, 17. As the administrative judge found, that aspect of
      the holding is applicable regardless of the appellant’s position. ID at 19.
¶12         We also agree with the administrative judge’s finding that after returning
      outside, the appellant, not the individual, acted aggressively without provocation
      and was not justified in using any physical force, as the individual had not
      initiated any physical contact. See Fuller v. Department of the Navy, 60 M.S.P.R.
                                                                                         8

      187, 190 (1993) (observing that to support a self-defense claim, an appellant must
      prove by preponderant evidence that she used only as much force as was
      reasonably necessary to be free of the contact), aff’d, 40 F.3d 1250 (Fed. Cir.
      1994) (Table); cf. Andrus v. Internal Revenue Service, 14 M.S.P.R. 500, 502
      (1983) (finding that an employee’s taunts of “what are you going to do about it?”
      and continued movement towards the appellant were sufficient to provoke a
      physical response).    Consequently, the appellant has shown no error in the
      administrative judge’s treatment of the second assault as aggressive, rather than
      as defensive.    Thus, for the appellant’s PTSD to significantly mitigate the
      severity of the second assault, he must show that it was causally connected to his
      aggressive conduct. We find that the appellant has made no such showing.
¶13         The limited medical documentation provided did not elaborate on the status
      of the appellant’s PTSD at the relevant period or draw a causal connection
      between his PTSD and the charged misconduct. IAF, Tab 13 at 13-19. Thus,
      even if it supports his contention that his PTSD caused him to respond more
      defensively than a person without PTSD would have and was exacerbated by
      being asked to perform duties outside of his craft and duty station, ID at 11; IAF,
      Tab 18, Hearing Recording, 1:22:00-1:33:08, 1:50:41-1:56:02, 2:09:46-2:10:55
      (testimony of the appellant); see Hamilton v. U.S. Postal Service, 84 M.S.P.R.
      635, ¶¶ 17, 20-22 (1999) (finding the appellant’s uncontroverted testimony that
      the unexcused absences for which he was charged were due to his medical
      condition was sufficient to show a causal connection between the two), it does not
      explain the appellant’s decision not to retreat when the opportunity presented
      itself or prove a causal connection between his PTSD and verb al harassment,
      pursuit, and second push, in which he was the unprovoked aggressor, see
      Gustave-Schmidt, 87 M.S.P.R. 667, ¶ 17 (finding that the appellant’s medical
      evidence showing that her medical conditions negatively affected her ability to
      perform her job duties was entitled only limited weight, as it did not establish that
      those conditions contributed to the charged intentional misconduct).             We
                                                                                         9

      therefore agree with the administrative judge that the appellant’s medical
      condition was a minor, as opposed to a significant, mitigating factor. ID at 22.
¶14         Finally, the appellant’s decision to seek treatment for his PTSD may
      indicate a potential for rehabilitation.   See Hamilton, 84 M.S.P.R. 635, ¶ 19
      (observing that an appellant’s action in seeking treatment for his medical
      condition indicates a potential for rehabilitation). However, as noted above, he
      did not show that his PTSD was causally connected to the second physical assault
      and, therefore, recovery from or management of his PTSD is not necessarily
      indicative of rehabilitation potential as to that misconduct.    Moreover, as the
      administrative judge found, there is no indication that the appellant completed the
      recommended course of treatment. ID at 22; IAF, Tab 13 at 9. Accordingly, we
      agree with the administrative judge’s determination that the appellant’s PTSD
      should not be afforded significant mitigating weight.

      The appellant has shown no error in the deciding official’s analysis of the
      remaining relevant Douglas factors.
¶15         The appellant argues that the deciding official failed to consider the fact
      that he was not criminally charged or prosecuted, he only pushed the individual,
      and the individual suffered only minor injuries to his knee. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7.
      The Board has found mitigation of a removal to a suspension appropriate in a
      charge of physical assault on a coworker if the following elements are
      met: (1) no serious injury resulted from the physical altercation ; (2) no weapons
      were used; (3) the employee had a history of satisfactory performance; (4) the
      agency did not rely upon a prior disciplinary record in selecting the penalty; and
      (5) there was an element of provocation present. Faucher v. U.S. Postal Service,
      41 M.S.P.R. 336, 339 (1989) (finding a 60-day suspension, not removal, the
      maximum reasonable penalty when all 5 of these circumstances were present).
      However, Faucher is inapplicable to this appeal because the appellant’s
      misconduct involved a member of the public, not a coworker; therefore, those
      considerations are insufficient to mitigate the penalty here.
                                                                                        10

¶16         The appellant further claimed that the deciding official did not consider the
      fact that the individual was not a postal customer, that the individual was causing
      a disturbance to customers prior to the altercation, and that he displayed violent,
      unstable behavior later that evening at the hospital where he was seeking
      treatment for his knee. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7. The appellant has not shown how
      the individual’s nonviolent conduct before the incident and behavior later that
      evening alters the findings as to the appellant’s culpability or mitigate s the
      severity of his physical assault. Cf. Horn v U.S. Postal Service, 10 M.S.P.R. 420,
      422-23 (1982) (finding that the appellant’s physical response was warranted when
      the coworker had threatened him with physical violence 3 weeks before the
      altercation, and the coworker had a long history of violent behavior and
      dangerous propensities that placed the appellant and other employees in fear) .
¶17         The appellant also argues that the deciding official assigned too much
      weight to the fact that at least one postal customer witnessed the altercation and
      that he came into contact with the public in the performance of his duties. PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 7. We discern no error with the deciding official’s decision to
      consider the public nature of the altercation as an aggravating factor.           See
      Balouris v. U.S. Postal Service, 107 M.S.P.R. 574, ¶ 7 (2008) (identifying as
      relevant to the Douglas factor analysis the fact that the altercation took place
      while the appellant was on duty and in uniform, and occurred on the s treet in
      front of the facility where the incident could be observed by the public) , aff’d,
      No. 2008-3147 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Moreover, although the appellant emphasizes
      that not all of his duties involved interactions with the public, he does not dispute
      the administrative judge’s finding that he has some interacti ons with customers
      because he was responsible for cleaning the public areas of the station. PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 7; ID at 2. Thus, the public nature of the appellant’s position and the
      altercation are relevant to his type of employment and the notoriety of his offense
      and were properly considered by the deciding official.
                                                                                           11

¶18         Accordingly, we find that the administrative judge did not err in deferring
      to the agency’s chosen penalty of removal. We therefore deny the appellant’s
      petition for review and affirm the initial decision.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 2
            The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
      Board’s final decision in this matter.     5 U.S.C. § 1201.113. You may obtain
      review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
      your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
      forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
      summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
      provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
      the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
      regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to see k review of
      this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
      claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
      within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by you r
      chosen forum.
            Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
      below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
      about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
      should contact that forum for more information.

            (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
      judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
      Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court

      2
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        12

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving    a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).                 If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
                                                                                13

you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                              131 M Street, N.E.
                                Suite 5SW12G
                          Washington, D.C. 20507
                                                                                     14

      (3) Judicial    review     pursuant    to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Boar d’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 3   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                U.S. Court of Appeals
                                for the Federal Circuit
                               717 Madison Place, N.W.
                               Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

3
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                             15

      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.