Court Opinion

ID: 9524747
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:56:46.086374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:11:40.550128
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE GEOMETER, specially concurring: While I concur in the result reached by the majority, I write separately for the following reasons. First, I do not believe that the majority’s interpretation of People v. DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d 239 (1998), is as straightforward as the majority concludes. Second, although the majority does not explicitly say so, the effect of its ruling in this case is to overrule our recent decision in People v. Hart, 338 Ill. App. 3d 983 (2003). I believe such a step is unnecessary given DiVincenzo’s ambiguity and that the evidence clearly shows that the State intentionally misled the grand juries. In DiVincenzo, our supreme court stated that “[t]he due process rights of a defendant may be violated if the prosecutor deliberately or intentionally misleads the grand jury, uses known perjured or false testimony, or presents other deceptive or inaccurate evidence.” DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d at 257. The supreme court cited three cases for this proposition: United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757, 759-62 (2d Cir. 1983), People v. J.H., 136 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (1990), and People v. Barton, 190 Ill. App. 3d 701, 708-09 (1989). The majority, relying on the above-quoted statement from DiVincenzo, as well as language from Hogan, concludes that “the State’s presentation of deceptive evidence denied defendant due process, regardless whether the deception was intentional.” 368 Ill. App. 3d at 696. Of course, the majority’s statement implicitly overrules language in Hart that “there must be, at the very least, intent on the part of some State actor to materially mislead the grand jury in order to give rise to a violation of due process.” Hart, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 991. Admittedly, the language the majority cites from Hogan can be read to support its conclusion that the deception need not be intentional. See Hogan, 712 F.2d at 762. However, the majority fails to acknowledge contrary language in J.H. and Barton (the other two cases referenced in DiVincenzo) suggesting that intent is required. For instance, in J.H., our supreme court stated: “[The] presentation of *** supposedly tainted testimony before [a] grand jury could not have undermined the integrity of the judicial process where other, untainted evidence connected [the] defendant to the crime, where *** the grand jury could consider evidence so tainted in deciding whether to indict defendant, and where the evidence *** was not so clearly inadmissible that the prosecutor perpetrated a fraud on the grand jury in presenting it for consideration, knowing that it would not be admissible at trial. A prosecutor should not be inhibited in his presentation of a case to a grand jury by fear of dismissal due to his erroneous, but honest, appraisal of the admissibility of certain evidence for trial purposes.” (Former emphasis in original; latter emphasis added.) J.H., 136 Ill. 2d at 13. Likewise, the Barton court stated, “[t]he cases are consistent that the due process rights of a defendant are violated, if the grand jury is deliberately or intentionally misled by the prosecutor.” Barton, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 709. These cases stand for the proposition that intent is required in order for a defendant to show a violation of due process arising from grand jury proceedings. I also point out that the language used by the supreme court in DiVincenzo is itself less than clear. For instance, does the. phrase “deliberately or intentionally” apply to all three grounds that follow? Or does “deliberately or intentionally” apply only to the phrase “misleads the grand jury”? Because I believe that DiVincenzo is ambiguous on the issue of intent, I do not join in the majority’s attempt to implicitly overrule Hart. Moreover, I do not even find it necessary to address the issue of intent in this context. The majority bases its conclusion on the State’s presentation of deceptive evidence. However, it is undisputed that a defendant’s due process may be violated if the prosecutor “deliberately or intentionally misleads the grand jury.” DiVincenzo, 183 Ill. 2d at 257; J.H., 136 Ill. 2d at 13. It is on this basis — intentionally misleading the grand juries — that I would affirm the decision of the trial court. The following evidence unequivocally demonstrates intent on the part of the State to mislead the grand juries. Officer Cress appeared before the first grand jury on September 22, 2004. At that time, he explicitly stated that he was present on August 30, 2004, when defendant was observed making several hand-to-hand transactions with other individuals. In fact, it became apparent at the November 12, 2004, hearing on defendant’s motion to quash his arrest and suppress the evidence seized that Officer Cress was not a part of the law-enforcement team who observed defendant on the date in question and that the officers who were present were unable to determine what was exchanged. Nevertheless, as the majority states, during his appearance before the second grand jury on December 29, 2004, Officer Cress “certainly testified as if he were conveying his personal observations rather than those of someone else.” 368 Ill. App. 3d at 695. At a subsequent hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss count III of the indictment, the State admitted that Officer Cress was not present at the surveillance and that his testimony was based on the review of another officer’s report. The majority acknowledges that “a strong case could be made that the prosecutor deliberately or intentionally misled the grand juries into thinking that they were hearing eyewitness testimony when they were actually hearing hearsay.” 368 Ill. App. 3d at 695-96. Nevertheless, the majority stops short of concluding that the State intended to materially mislead the grand juries, determining that “the trial court did not resolve that issue.” 368 Ill. App. 3d at 696. While the trial court did not expressly find that the State intended to materially mislead the grand juries, its comments in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss count III of the indictment lead me to believe that the court implicitly made such a finding. Notably, the court remarked: “When the State gets in a position and they are leading their witness before the Grand Jury, as the [sic] typically do, they can essentially set officers up who are there trying to testify about particular matters by asking and looking for yes or no questions and put them in a box and having them do this. Some of that is before this court.” The court went on to recognize that Officer Cress did not observe the acts about which he testified before the grand juries, and it noted that the officer who testified at the hearing on defendant’s motion to quash and suppress (and who actually witnessed the conduct for which defendant was indicted) contradicted Officer Cress’s testimony. Therefore, while I concur with the majority’s decision that defendant has suffered a prejudicial denial of due process, I do so not on the basis that Officer Cress’s testimony was deceptive, but because the State intentionally misled the grand juries.