Court Opinion

ID: 9696525
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:50:38.045069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:23.261440
License: Public Domain

SIMONETT, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The decisionmaking process advances along a continuum. Board members confer with others in various combinations, either casually or at appointed times, sometimes simply to be educated and sometimes to apply what they have learned to matters requiring collegial action. I should not think that all discussions along this continuum come within the proscription of the open meeting law, though the line is not easily drawn. To say, for example, that a board member may never talk to another board member outside of a duly called meeting about something that foreseeably could require board action in the future is unrealistic and chills speech unnecessarily and perhaps unconstitutionally. On the other hand, to allow exceptions to the open meeting law raises the fear that the exceptions will be abused, particularly since only the board members can say what they did or did not do at a closed gathering.
It is true that Little and Tompkins, the commentators quoted in the majority opinion, “opt for a law that opens governmental decision making except as explicitly closed.” But this has to be read in the context of their article. The authors also say, “In the face of an all-is-open statute with no exceptions, difficult problems can be placed upon governmental bodies.” See Little & Tompkins, Open Government Laws: An Insider’s View, 53 N.C.L.Rev. 451, 457 (1974). Thus, in their proposed model law, in addition to certain exceptions, the authors provide, for example, that “[njothing herein shall make illegal informal discussions, either in person or telephonically, between members of public bodies for the purpose of obtaining facts and opinions provided that there is no in*9tention of violating [the law] * * *.” Id. at 485.
Minn.Stat. § 471.705 (1982), on its face, is an “all-is-open” statute with no exceptions except those engrafted by this court in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. The Housing and Redevelopment Authority, 310 Minn. 313, 251 N.W.2d 620 (1976), and the recent labor negotiations strategy meeting exception. It is evident, however, from the statutory history that the legislature, rather than try, as in some states, to draft language to cover all conceivable situations, chose to enact a simple statute in direct language with the expectation that situations at the remote end of the decisionmaking continuum would be subject to judicial interpretation in a particular factual setting.1 Thus, in Channel 10, Inc. v. Independent School District No. 709, 298 Minn. 306, 215 N.W.2d 814 (1974), this court suggests that the open meeting law might be judicially construed to allow for exceptions in keeping with legislative intent but that this court would not do so except in a factual setting presented by litigants.
In my view, if board members meet with administrators or others for background information and general study, and specific district problems are mentioned, if at all, only in an illustrative sense, this kind of gathering is not a meeting as contemplated by Minn.Stat. § 471.705 (1982). The seminar-type discussion that takes place at such a meeting is not the kind that ordinarily and appropriately occurs at an open public meeting. See Little & Tompkins, id. at 485. Nor is it the type of discussion that impairs the public’s right of input in the decision-making process, since it occurs at such a remote stage of that process. Neither is it the type of discussion that impairs the public’s right “to become fully informed concerning board decisions,” nor is it the kind of discussion that lends itself to “improper influences.” See Lindahl v. Independent School District No. 306, 270 Minn. 164, 167, 133 N.W.2d 23, 26 (1965).
I would affirm the trial court’s ruling that the Sunwood Inn seminar did not violate the open meeting law. That seminar was attended by eight administrators plus high school principals, plus the school board members. It was more a meeting of administrators to which board members were invited than a board meeting to which administrators were invited. The Sunwood agenda was general and educational in context. The school board was not meeting as a board to transact public business. On the other hand, it seems to me the Alexandria seminar is different. Only four administrators were in attendance with the board. Among other things, the Area Learning Center was discussed at Alexandria, a matter of more than background interest at the time. Also, some of the matters on the agenda would appear to have a bearing on teacher contract negotiations then in progress. As to the Alexandria seminar, I do not think that the trial court’s finding that “[t]he seminar was not directed toward resolving specific problems of the school district” is sustainable under the evidence. There were items on the Alexandria agenda that went beyond the customary background and educational content presented at an administrative seminar and which appropriately would appear on the agenda of an open public meeting. As to the Alexandria seminar, therefore, I join the majority to reverse.

. Thus, in the House floor debate on May 18, 1973, in response to an inquiry if a meeting of city council members with their legislators to review legislation would be covered, the bill’s author replied, “I would say no, but I guess I am not a judge and couldn’t make that decision.” Later, in response to another inquiry as to whether a DFL or I-R caucus meeting of the Minneapolis City Council would be covered, the bill’s author answered, “[I]t is my understanding that it would not. There is no business conducted at caucuses and the bill is not intended to cover caucuses.” See Respondents’ Brief, Appendix, A-16, A-23.