Court Opinion

ID: 9711950
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:42:47.305875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:08.622628
License: Public Domain

*458CHASANOW, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the Per Curiam opinion of the Court, but, since the Court is reversing McCallum’s conviction because the judge erroneously failed to instruct the jury that mens rea is necessary to convict for driving while suspended, I believe we should for the guidance of the trial court elaborate on the mens rea that would be necessary to convict.
The Court of Special Appeals defined mens rea with a quote from Judge Learned Hand:
“Ordinarily one is not guilty of a crime unless he is aware of the existence of all those facts which make his conduct criminal. That awareness is all that is meant by the mens rea, the ‘criminal intent,’ necessary to guilt, as distinct from the additional specific intent required in certain instances ... and even this general intent is not always necessary.”
McCallum v. State, 81 Md.App. 403, 410 n. 2, 567 A.2d 967, 970 n. 2 (1990), quoting Clark and Marshall, A Treatise on the Law of Crimes, § 5.01 at 268 (7th ed. 1967), in turn United States v. Crimmins, 123 F.2d 271, 272 (2nd Cir. 1941). The mens rea that we are concerned with is “knowledge” rather than “intent.” Unquestionably McCallum intended to drive. The issue is whether McCallum had “knowledge” that his driving privileges were suspended, and thus, his mental state must be assessed.
There is more than one mental state that may constitute “knowledge.” The first and highest form of “knowledge” is actual knowledge, that is, an actual awareness or an actual belief that a fact exists. A second form of “knowledge” is what has often been called “deliberate ignorance” or “willful blindness.” R. Perkins, Criminal Law, Ch. 7, § 4 at 687 (1957). The latter form of “knowledge” exists where a person believes that it is probable that something is a fact, but deliberately shuts his or her eyes or avoids making reasonable inquiry with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth. See 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, § 3.5 at 307 (1986), and author*459ities cited therein. In United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951, 96 S.Ct. 3173, 49 L.Ed.2d 1188 (1976), the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the deliberate ignorance or willful blindness form of knowledge has been accepted by leading commentators in the United States and in England. The opinion quoted from Professor Glanville Williams’ Criminal Law: The General Part, § 57 at 157, 159 (2d ed. 1961), as follows:
“To the requirement of actual knowledge there is one strictly limited exception____ [T]he rule is that if a party has his suspicion aroused but then deliberately omits to make further enquiries, because he wishes to remain in ignorance, he is deemed to have knowledge---- The rule that wilful blindness is equivalent to knowledge is essential, and is found throughout the criminal law.”
Id. at 700. The doctrine of “deliberate ignorance” or “willful blindness” has become well recognized in the federal courts and has been applied in a variety of criminal prosecutions. For example, in U.S. v. Feroz, 848 F.2d 359 (2d Cir.1988) (per curiam), the defendant was charged with importing heroin into the United States. The heroin was found in a secret compartment in an attache case that the defendant was carrying. A deliberate ignorance instruction was proper when defendant claimed he was unaware of the contraband and that the attache case, which appeared to be empty, was given to him two hours before his flight. In U.S. v. Hiland, 909 F.2d 1114 (8th Cir.1990), a deliberate ignorance instruction was proper in a prosecution for fraudulently marketing an unapproved and misbranded drug where two defendants took no action to investigate or consult the F.D.A. despite indications that the drug that they were marketing was dangerous; and in U.S. v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 39 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 847, 107 S.Ct. 166, 93 L.Ed.2d 104 (1986), a deliberate ignorance instruction was proper where defendant, who was an attorney charged with aiding and abetting income tax evasion, received shopping bags full of cash from a co-defendant and claimed he relied on the representation that the cash was *460attributable to the sale of a schooner and was “legal.” One author has pointed out that “the Courts of Appeals in all of the circuits have either expressed acceptance of the [deliberate ignorance] doctrine or adopted some form of deliberate ignorance instruction.” Chesnut, United States v. Alvarado: Reflections on a Jewell, 19 Golden Gate U.L.Rev. 47, 56 (1989).
The Court of Special Appeals recognized the principle behind deliberate ignorance in Greenway v. State, 8 Md. App. 194, 197, 259 A.2d 89, 92 (1969). Judge Orth writing for the intermediate appellate court stated that, “a person may be found to have knowledge under the recognized rule of law,” if he “with an unlawful purpose in mind ... deliberately ‘shuts his eyes’ to avoid knowing what would otherwise be obvious to view.”
Many states do not require mens rea to convict of driving while one’s license is suspended. In states where mens rea is required, there are at least implications that the deliberate ignorance doctrine could be used to establish mens rea. In Jeffcoat v. State, 689 P.2d 308 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982), the Court of Appeals of Alaska held that the offense of driving while suspended required proof of mens rea. The court implied that it might recognize deliberate ignorance as a form of knowledge when it stated:
“Obviously, the state need not affirmatively prove actual notice in each case. When evidence produced at trial indicates that the defendant had cause to believe that his license would be suspended, compliance by the state with [the notice requirement] may give rise to an inference that the defendant’s failure to receive actual notice was the result of intentional or unreasonable conduct on his part which was calculated to avoid receipt of notice of his license suspension.”
Id. at 313 n. 4. See also Alexander v. State, 712 P.2d 416 (Alaska Ct.App.1986). In City of Albuquerque v. Juarez, 93 N.M. 188, 598 P.2d 650 (1979), the Court of Appeals of New Mexico held that knowledge of suspension was required for a conviction of driving while suspended, but *461implied that showing willful or voluntary avoidance of notice would be sufficient. The court stated:
“[S]ome degree of wilful or voluntary avoidance of notice is necessary when notice has not been received____
The prosecution prevails on the notice issue when it shows (1) delivery and acknowledged receipt by the licensee; or (2) inability to notify because of voluntary avoidance by the licensee.”
Id., 598 P.2d at 653. See also State v. Barber, 24 Conn. Supp. 346, 190 A.2d 497 (1962).
Deliberate ignorance requires a conscious purpose to avoid enlightenment; a showing of mere negligence or mistake is not sufficient. Also, “deliberate ignorance” is a form, of knowledge, not a substitute for knowledge. Therefore, if McCallum actually believed that his driver’s license was not suspended, he could not be guilty of the offense.
I believe McCallum would have the required mens rea in the instant case if he was deliberately ignorant of his suspension. Deliberate ignorance should be established if McCallum believed it was probable that his license was suspended and if he deliberately avoided contact with the MVA to evade notice. For example, the trier of fact could find that: 1) based on his failure to pay district court fines and failure to appear in court, McCallum knew that it was probable that his license was suspended; 2) McCallum failed to fulfill his obligation to keep MVA apprised of his current address,1 or that he failed to contact MVA after learning that for several months his mail was destroyed, and 3) McCallum deliberately avoided contact with MVA to avoid receiving notice of the suspension of his driver’s license. These findings should justify a conclusion that McCallum’s intentional avoidance of notice of his suspension satisfied the mens rea requirement and was the equivalent of actual knowledge of his suspension. Chief Judge *462Murphy has authorized me to state that he joins in this opinion.

. Md.Code (1984, 1987 Repl.Vol., 1990 Cum.Supp.), Transportation Article, § 16-116(a) requires a licensed driver to notify the MVA within thirty days of moving from the address shown on the license.