Court Opinion

ID: 9906012
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 19:02:32.09873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:03.930202
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/30/23 P. v. Ward CA1/1
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                         A164678
 v.
 MICHAEL WALLACE WARD,                                                   (Contra Costa Super. Ct.
                                                                         No. 5-200140-2)
           Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Michael Wallace Ward was convicted of crimes related to an
altercation with his wife, Jane Doe. On appeal, he argues the convictions
must be reversed because the prosecutor committed prejudicial error by
suggesting to the jury in closing argument that Doe’s absence from the trial
was Ward’s fault and pointed to his guilt. We affirm.
                                                    I.
                                          FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
                                               BACKGROUND
         We describe the facts of the underlying incident only briefly because
they are not directly relevant to the claims Ward raises on appeal. On
January 6, 2020, Doe called 911 and requested that police be sent to her
Brentwood home because Ward had allegedly violated a protective order.
When police arrived, Doe was crying in the front yard of the residence,
“hysterical and emotionally distraught,” and her forearms were swollen and

                                                               1
bruised. She told an officer she was “scared” and nervous, because Ward had
“got[ten] physical,” threw her to the ground, and hit her with a stool.
Another officer located Ward in a nearby field and arrested him.
      While in jail, Ward had several recorded telephone calls with Doe. The
prosecution pointed to these calls as evidence that Ward pressured Doe to
(1) minimize the cause and extent of the injury to one of her arms and
(2) avoid testifying at trial or change her story. As to the arm, there was an
issue about whether Ward bruised or broke it. In one call, Doe exclaimed to
Ward, “[Y]ou broke my fucking—uuh,” at which point Ward interrupted,
reminding Doe that their call was being recorded. In another call, as Doe
was telling Ward about some of the difficulties she had recently experienced,
she said, “I couldn’t physically do it! Because I had a broken arm, I was
fuckin’ going through my situation in my stomach and [. . . .]” Ward again
interrupted and exclaimed, “Stop. Stop. You’re on a fuckin’ recorded line you
stupid ass!” Doe told Ward in another call that she obtained a note from her
doctor saying her arm was not broken.
      As to whether Ward discouraged Doe from testifying or encouraged her
to change her story, evidence was introduced that in one call Ward asked
Doe, “[D]o you still wanna do this?,” and said, “[S]o my attorney doesn’t want
you to show up. . . . But she can’t tell you that.” When Doe started to suggest
there might be witnesses who would be even worse for him, Ward interjected,
“Not worse than seeing a cast on your arm.” Another time, Ward told Doe, “If
I go to trial I have the right to face my accuser, . . . so if the victim shows up
to trial, . . . and doesn’t have the same statement as they did before,
whatever, like you know what I mean? I could beat this.” In a different call,
referring to the charges against him, Ward said, “I have to beat it. . . . I’ll
beat it no matter what because if it looks like I’m not gonna fuckin’ beat it

                                         2
your ass can get up on that stand and be like ‘the whole thing was fuckin’
self-inflicted and fuck—you know what I’m sayin’ [’]? . . . Like if you would’ve
done that shit already I’d have been home. But I’m fuckin scared, I’ve been
fuckin’ scared to death to say anything over the fuckin’ phone, you know what
I mean?”
      Ward was charged with three felonies—assault with a deadly weapon,
corporal injury of a spouse after a prior conviction, and dissuading a witness
by force or threat—and two misdemeanors, resisting a peace officer and
disobeying a court order.1 In connection with the assault and corporal-injury
charges, it was alleged that Ward personally inflicted great bodily injury
under circumstances involving domestic violence, and in connection with the
corporal-injury charge it was also alleged that he personally used a deadly
weapon.2 Finally, Ward was alleged to have a prior conviction for a serious
felony.3
      Doe did not appear at trial, but the prosecution introduced statements
she made in her 911 call, during her interactions with police officers, and
during a visit to an urgent care facility. Transcripts of portions of the
recorded phone calls between Ward and Doe while Ward was in jail were also

      1 The charges were brought under Penal Code sections 245,

subdivision (a)(1) (assault with a deadly weapon), 273.5, subdivision (f)(1)
(corporal injury), 136.1, subdivision (c)(1) (dissuading a witness), 148,
subdivision (a)(1) (resisting a peace officer), and 166, subdivision (a)(4)
(disobeying a court order). All further statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
      2 These allegations were made under sections 12022.7, subdivision (e)

(infliction of great bodily injury), and 12022, subdivision (b)(1) (use of deadly
weapon).
      3 The prior-conviction allegation was made under sections 667,

subdivisions (a)(1), (d), and (e), and 1170.12, subdivisions (b) and (c), based on
a 2008 conviction for assault under section 245, subdivision (a)(1).

                                        3
admitted into evidence. At the close of the prosecution’s case, the trial court
granted Ward’s motion for an acquittal on the count of dissuading a witness
by force or threat.
      During closing arguments, Ward’s trial counsel first raised Doe’s
absence from trial. In her closing argument, defense counsel said that
several of the counts and related enhancements “rest solely on the out-of-
court statements of [Doe], notwithstanding that she was never called here by
the prosecution to testify as a witness in this case.” Counsel continued,
“[S]hould the prosecutor get up here in rebuttal . . . and argue that it was . . .
Ward’s responsibility to secure [Doe] as a witness in this case, please do not
fall for that fallacy, because it is the prosecution . . . that has the burden of
proof, and thus the only burden of producing witnesses that [the prosecutor]
relies upon for her case.”
      Defense counsel spent much of the rest of her closing argument trying
to convince the jurors that they should discredit Doe’s statements. Counsel
argued that the evidence showed that Doe made untruthful and inconsistent
statements regarding alcohol consumption on the night of the incident and
showed “manipulation and deceit” by writing fraudulent checks on her former
mother-in-law’s checking account. In trying to convince the jurors to discount
Ward’s remarks to Doe encouraging Doe to avoid trial, counsel said, “[I]t is
understandable, in my view, that anyone who is wrongly charged with a
crime or with certain allegations who knew that their accuser had admitted
to lying about certain things, it is understandable that that person wouldn’t
want the accuser—” The prosecutor interrupted with an objection, which the
trial court sustained.
      During her rebuttal argument, the prosecutor made the remarks that
Ward challenges on appeal. Responding ironically to defense counsel’s

                                         4
attempt to discredit Doe, the prosecutor stated, “[Doe] is lying to all of you
because she drinks and because her ex-mother-in-law was mad at her one
time during some divorce proceedings, because that—that’s what makes
[Doe] a bad person, and you shouldn’t believe her. No wonder she doesn’t
want to be here. . . . No wonder [Doe] is not here after what the defendant
put her through, after what the defendant said in those jail calls. No wonder
she is not here.”
      Defense counsel objected without providing a specific basis, and the
trial court sustained the objection. After closing arguments were over,
defense counsel asked that the jury be admonished regarding the prosecutor’s
comments and submitted a written proposed admonishment. The proposed
admonishment did not identify the prosecutor’s allegedly improper remarks
or explain why they were allegedly improper, other than providing a string
cite to a half-dozen cases. The proposed admonishment stated:
            “Members of the jury, the prosecutor in closing remarks
      and rebuttal made certain uncalled[-]for insinuations about the
      defendant, his counsel, and the state of the evidence as to [Doe].
      I want you to know that the prosecutor has absolutely no
      evidence to present to you [to] back up these insinuations. The
      prosecutor’s improper remarks amount to an attempt to prejudice
      you against the defendant. Were you to believe these
      unwarranted insinuations, and convict the defendant on the basis
      of them, I would have to declare a mistrial. Therefore, you must
      disregard these improper, unsupported remarks.”
      In rejecting the proposed admonishment, the trial court ruled as
follows:
            “[W]hen both attorneys gave their arguments, there were
      objections from the other side, some of which were sustained,
      some of which were overruled.

                                        5
            “The current state of the record regarding the request
      leaves me in the position of not being able to identify any specific
      argument[s] as to which the instruction . . . would apply.

            “I do note that the jury has been told a number of times
      that nothing that the attorneys say is evidence, and that if their
      comments under the law conflict with my instructions, they must
      follow my instructions. There was nothing in [the prosecutor’s]
      argument, either initial closing or rebuttal argument, that in any
      way disparaged defense counsel. In rebuttal, in particular, [the
      prosecutor] responded to arguments that she believed had been
      raised, but in no way was there any form of personal attack.

            “At this point, given the lack of specificity, the fact that the
      objections were sustained when appropriate, I don’t find that it’s
      appropriate to give the curative instruction that’s been
      requested.”
      The jury found Ward not guilty of assault with a deadly weapon, but it
found him guilty of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury
(§ 245, subd. (a)(4)), a felony, and the remaining three charges.4 The jury also
found true the allegations that he inflicted great bodily injury in connection
with the assault and corporal injury of a spouse, but it found not true the
allegation that he used a deadly weapon during the latter offense.
      The trial court found that Ward had a prior conviction for a serious
felony and struck the finding under section 1385. The court then sentenced
him to eight years in prison, composed of the upper term of five years for
corporal injury to a spouse and a consecutive term of three years for inflicting
great bodily injury during that offense. The court also imposed and stayed

      4 The trial court concluded that it had to instruct on assault with force

likely to produce great bodily injury as a lesser included offense of the
charged assault. Although assault with force likely to produce great bodily
injury is not a lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon
(People v. Pack (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 218, 222), Ward does not claim that the
court erred by instructing the jury on the uncharged offense.

                                        6
the upper term of four years for the assault and a consecutive term of three
years for inflicting great bodily injury during that offense. Finally, it
imposed terms of 180 days in jail for both misdemeanors, to run concurrently
with each other and the prison term.
                                        II.
                                  DISCUSSION
       Ward contends that the prosecutor’s remarks in closing argument
constituted prejudicial prosecutorial error, because they inflamed the jury
into believing Doe’s absence was his fault and indicated he was guilty. We
are not persuaded.
       A.    The Governing Legal Standards
       “A prosecutor’s conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the
federal Constitution when it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make
the conviction a denial of due process. Conduct by a prosecutor that does not
render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is [nonetheless] prosecutorial
misconduct under state law . . . if it involves the use of deceptive or
reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the trial court or the
jury.” (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 44.) Although the claim is
sometimes referred to as “prosecutorial misconduct,” it is more accurately
referred to as “prosecutorial error” since no showing of bad faith is required
to establish the error. (See People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1
(Hill).)
       “ ‘ “ ‘[A] prosecutor is given wide latitude during argument. The
argument may be vigorous as long as it amounts to fair comment on the
evidence, which can include reasonable inferences, or deductions to be drawn
therefrom.’ ” ’ ” (Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 819.) To succeed on appeal, a
defendant who challenges a prosecutor’s remarks in closing “must show that,
‘[i]n the context of the whole argument and the instructions’ [citation], there

                                        7
was ‘a reasonable likelihood the jury understood or applied the complained-of
comments in an improper or erroneous manner.’ ” (People v. Centeno (2014)
60 Cal.4th 659, 667.) “ ‘In conducting this inquiry, we “do not lightly infer”
that the jury drew the most damaging rather than the least damaging
meaning from the prosecutor’s statements.’ ” (Ibid.)
      B.    The Prosecutor’s Remarks in Closing Argument Did Not
            Constitute Prosecutorial Error and Were Not Prejudicial.
      We are not persuaded that the prosecutor’s remarks constituted
prejudicial prosecutorial error. Initially, Ward forfeited most, if not all, of his
appellate arguments. A claim of prosecutorial error involving comments
before the jury is generally forfeited unless the defendant “make[s] a timely
objection, make[s] known the basis of [the] objection, and ask[s] the trial
court to admonish the jury.” (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 553.)
Here, both at the time of her objections and when she proposed the
admonishment, Ward’s trial counsel failed to identify either the actual
statements to which she objected or the specific basis of her objection. The
proposed admonishment in particular referred only to “certain uncalled[-]for
insinuations.” This was insufficient to permit the trial court to ascertain
what was supposedly wrong with the prosecutor’s argument and, in turn, to
determine whether the purported error could be cured.
      Even if we assumed that Ward’s appellate arguments were properly
preserved, we would reject them on their merits. To begin with, the only part
of the prosecutor’s argument that appears objectionable on its face was the
remark that Doe “doesn’t want to be here.” This remark is objectionable
because it referred to evidence not in the record, i.e., Doe’s mental state in
not attending the trial. The remaining comments, however, were all
connected to evidence or facts of which the jury was aware and from which
reasonable inferences could be argued. These comments included the

                                         8
accurate statement that Doe was not at the trial; the ironic remarks about
Doe’s credibility; and the statements suggesting Doe did not appear at trial
because of the defense’s attempts to impugn her credibility and Ward’s
behavior toward her.
      While the last of these remarks may have insinuated that Doe’s
absence from the trial was Ward’s fault, the insinuation was not baseless,
given the evidence. (See Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 819.) In any event, we
hardly think there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood or
misapplied the prosecutor’s statements, much less that they rendered the
trial against Ward fundamentally unfair. (People v. Centeno, supra,
60 Cal.4th at p. 667; People v. Morales, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 44.) Notably,
the jury was instructed that the attorneys’ arguments were not evidence, and
that it should “not let bias, sympathy, prejudice or public opinion influence
[its] assessment of the evidence or [its] decision.” We must “presume that
jurors follow instructions not to be swayed by sympathy or prejudice.”
(People v. Daveggio and Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 861–862.)
      Finally, even if there were error, it was not prejudicial. Reversal for
prosecutorial error is proper only if the defendant can demonstrate a
reasonable probability of obtaining a more favorable result absent the error.
(People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 29.) Ward cannot satisfy this standard
given the substantial, and largely unchallenged, evidence presented against
him on the charges of which he was convicted. (See People v. Lima (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 468, 481.)
                                      III.
                                  DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                       9
                                            _________________________
                                            Humes, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Banke, J.

_________________________
Getty, J.*

      *Judge of the Superior Court of the County of Solano, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

People v. Ward A164678

                                       10