Court Opinion

ID: 9493906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:23:08.53535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:06.001790
License: Public Domain

SEYMOUR, District Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I respectfully dissent to the extent the majority concludes that the False Claims Act (FCA) claim is arbitrable. The FCA claim does not arise pursuant to the Arrangement and consequently is not subject to the arbitration provision at issue. See United States v. Boeing Co., 73 F.Supp.2d 897, 910-11 (S.D.Ohio 1999) (claims under FCA do not arise pursuant to a contract) (citing cases).
Because the FCA claim does not arise out of the Arrangement, I believe the court must look to the language of the controlling statute to determine whether the FCA claim may be submitted to arbitration. As in any case turning on statutory interpretation, our goal is to ascertain the intent of Congress. See Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 35, 110 S.Ct. 929, 108 L.Ed.2d 23 (1990). To accomplish this goal, we begin by looking at the language of the statute. Adams v. Dole, 927 F.2d 771, 774 (4th Cir.1991). If the language is plain and unambiguous, we look no further. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989).
The FCA imposes civil liability upon, any person who:
(1) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government ... a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;
(2) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or sued, a false record for statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government;
*326(3) conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid;
(4) has possession, custody, or control of property or money used, or to be used, by the Government and, intended to defraud the Government or willfully to conceal the property, delivers, or causes to be delivered, less property than the amount for which the person receives a certificate or receipt;
(5) authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of property used, or to be used, by the Government and, intended to defraud the Government, makes or delivers the receipt without completely knowing that the information on the receipt is true;
(6) knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt, public property from an officer or employee of the Government ...; or
(7) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government.
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
The FCA further provides that:
[t]he Attorney General diligently shall investigate a violation under 3729 of this title. If the Attorney General finds that a person violated or is violating section 3729, the Attorney General may bring a civil action under this section against that person.
Id. § 3730(a).
In addition, a private person may bring a civil action for violation of § 3729 on behalf of the person and the government, and in the name of the government. Id. § 3730(b). Notwithstanding a private party’s right to bring a qui tarn action,
the Government may elect to pursue its claims through any alternate remedy available to the Government, including any administrative proceeding to determine a civil money penalty. If any such alternate remedy is pursued in another proceeding, the person initiating the action shall have the same rights in such proceeding as such person would have had if the action had continued under [the qui tarn section]....
Id. § 3730(c)(5).
A plain reading of these provisions reveals that Congress has granted the Attorney General authority to elect arbitration at his or her discretion, at least in cases wherein a private party has initiated the action.
In this case, the Attorney General elected to pursue the FCA claim against Bankers through a civil action. Assuming, for purposes of discussion, that the Attorney General possesses the authority to arbitrate FCA claims outside of qui tam actions, the Attorney General has declined to make such an election with respect to the FCA claim against Bankers. Bankers has no corresponding right under the FCA to seek arbitration. I would affirm the trial judge as to this issue.*
However, I agree with the majority’s view that FAA principles should extend to arbitration agreements involving federal agencies. Thus, I concur that the arbitration clause at issue should be construed as mandatory despite the permissive nature *327of its wording. The majority’s interpretation of the arbitration clause in question properly places Bankers, a private party that has contracted with the government, on the same footing as a private party that has contracted with another private party. Accordingly, the causes of action brought on behalf of FIA should be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the terms of the Arrangement. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 84 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985) (requiring bifurcation of arbitrable claims when a motion to compel arbitration is made).
I would affirm in part and reverse in part.

 Moreover, the doctrine of sovereign immunity prohibits the court from compelling the Attorney General to elect arbitration of the FCA claim. See United States v. Murdock Machine & Engineering Co., 81 F.3d 922, 931-32 (10th Cir.1996) (in the absence of governmental consent, the court lacks jurisdiction to " 'restrain the government from acting, or to compel it to act’ ") (quoting Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949)).