Court Opinion

ID: 9711976
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:43:33.032913+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:08.906122
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE CLARK, specially concurring: I concur in the decision and judgment of the majority, and write separately only to address Justice Simon’s dissenting opinion. The dissent argues that People v. Robinson (1979), 79 Ill. 2d 147, neither conflicts with People v. Smith (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 622, nor does it “provide[ ] a reliable guideline for the cases now before us, for it involved a different kind of conflict.” (121 Ill. 2d at 50 (Simon, J., dissenting).) In so arguing the dissent maintains that the conflicts presented in Robinson were “per se” or “imputed,” whereas the conflicts considered by the court in Smith and Terry were actual. I disagree with the dissent’s assertion that the conflicts in Smith and Terry were actual rather than “per se,” and find the dissent’s interpretation of the interrelationship between Smith and Robinson simply erroneous. I suggest that, in order for the dissent to have reached its conclusion, the dissent has distorted the definitions of “per se” and actual conflicts of interest in an effort to find Robinson inapplicable to the instant case. A review of this court’s decisions involving attorney conflicts of interest reveals a clear distinction between “per se” and actual conflicts. Where a rule of “per se” conflict has been adopted, allegations of prejudice and proof of prejudice are unnecessary. (See People v. Fife (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 418; People v. Coslet (1977), 67 Ill. 2d 127; People v. Stoval (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 109.) In each of these instances, the conflict itself vitiated any requirement that evidence be presented to demonstrate that prejudice did occur. On the other hand, “[wjhere a ‘per se’ conflict of interest is not established, it is the defendant’s burden to show an actual conflict of interest and to demonstrate prejudice.” (People v. Free (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 154, 169; see also People v. Miller (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 454.) To demonstrate prejudice does not mean that a defendant has to prove the allegations of ineffectiveness of counsel; rather, the defendant must demonstrate that he would be prejudiced by the denial of his request for the appointment of private counsel. As the majority correctly notes, the court in People v. Smith (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 622, adopted a rule of “per se” violation in cases where an assistant public defender asserts the incompetency of another assistant public defender from the same office. In so holding, the Smith court accordingly refused to consider the merits of defendant’s petition because, on its face, the defendant’s mere conclusory allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel automatically entitled defendant to counsel other than the public defender. The defendant there was not required to prove an actual conflict of interest, i.e., that the new public defender could not adequately represent him. Clearly, the dissent’s assertion here that Smith involved an actual conflict rather than a “per se” conflict is simply wrong. The dissent has obviously misinterpreted the holding in Smith. Throughout the years, this court has steadily retreated from the harsh consequences resulting from the Smith decision. Beginning with Robinson, the court has repeatedly held that disqualification of one assistant public defender due to a conflict of interest will not necessarily disqualify all members of the public defender’s office. (See, e.g., People v. Miller (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 454; People v. Walton (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 197.) Today’s decision is a natural and logical extension of Robinson, which requires that the decision in Smith no longer be followed. The court’s decision today does nothing to emasculate the fundamental principle that “[t]he right to the effective assistance of counsel is a fundamental right and entitles the person represented to the undivided loyalty of counsel.” (People v. Stoval (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 109, 111.) Our decision merely lays to rest any notion that a defendant has an automatic right to nonpublic defender counsel simply by making a bare allegation of ineffectiveness of counsel in a post-conviction petition. The mere likelihood of a conflict is no longer determinative; the defendant must set forth in his petition sufficient facts to demonstrate the existence of an actual conflict to be entitled to alternative counsel. In the absence of an evidentiary record of conflict, one should not be created based on mere speculation. See People v. Berland (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 286, 301. Furthermore, the appointment of outside counsel every time there is a bare allegation of ineffectiveness on the part of the public defender’s office could invite claims of incompetency of counsel by petitioners who, for reasons only self-serving, want counsel other than from the public defender’s office. Such a per se rule would provide defendants with a vehicle for obtaining a “second bite of the apple,” believing that if they have non-public defender counsel, their convictions could possibly be reversed. As Justice Webber wisely observed in his dissent in People v. Walton (1978), 66 Ill. App. 3d 913, 916: “That rule [“per se” conflict of interest rule enunciated in Smith], unless carefully controlled, will become nothing less than a Declaration of Indulgences to every criminal defendant who is dissatisfied with the result of his trial and appeal and seeks to fasten the blame upon his lawyer.” The dissent further argues that the majority’s decision in this case will create problems for the lower courts because we fail to offer further guidance regarding the rule that a “case by case inquiry should be conducted to determine whether any circumstances peculiar to the case indicate the presence of an actual conflict of interest.” (People v. Robinson (1979), 79 Ill. 2d 147.) The dissent’s argument is erroneous. The very nature of a “case by case” inquiry dictates against the imposition of fixed standards in determining the presence of an actual conflict. Further, the dissent fails to recognize that the court in Robinson specifically held that “the decisions of the Supreme Court and this court (see Glasser v. United States (1942), 315 U.S. 60, 86 L. Ed. 680, 62 S. Ct. 457; Holloway v. Arkansas (1978), 435 U.S. 475, 55 L. Ed. 2d 426, 98 S. Ct. 1173; People v. Stoval (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 109; People v. Kester (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 162; People v. Berland (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 286; People v. Vriner (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 329) furnish guidance adequate to avoid conflicts of interest which will impede the furnishing of effective assistance of counsel.” Robinson, 79 Ill. 2d at 159-60. In the instant case, defendants’ pro se petitions assert nothing more than “ineffective assistance of counsel,” without providing any factual basis to support such an allegation. The dissent is critical of the majority’s failure to make any determination as to the existence of any actual conflict in this case. Again, the dissent’s argument is erroneous. Obviously, without the existence of a factual basis to support defendants’ assertion of incompetency, we cannot determine whether there is even a likelihood of any conflict under these circumstances. The underlying innuendo in the dissent’s argument is that loyalty to one’s office is more important than loyalty to one’s client. I respectfully suggest that my colleague’s thinking is out of step not only with the established view of this court (see People v. Robinson (1979), 79 Ill. 2d 147), but with what appears to be the established view of the United States Supreme Court as well. For example, in Branti v. Finkel (1980), 445 U.S. 507, 519, 63 L. Ed. 2d 574, 584, 100 S. Ct. 1287, 1295, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he primary, if not the only, responsibility of an assistant public defender is to represent individual citizens in controversy with the State.” (Emphasis added.) The majority in Branti cited with approval its earlier statement in Ferri v. Ackerman (1979), 444 U.S. 193, 204, 62 L. Ed. 2d 355, 363, 100 S. Ct. 402, 409, wherein the Court, in commenting on the duties of counsel appointed to represent indigent defendants in Federal criminal proceedings, stated: “His principal responsibility is to serve the undivided interests of his client. Indeed, an indispensable element of the effective performance of his responsibilities is the ability to act independently of the Government and to oppose it in adversary litigation.” (Emphasis added.) The dissent in effect suggests that an assistant public defender is primarily interested in keeping his job by staying in the good graces of his superiors, and thus is only incidentally concerned with providing his client with the most effective representation possible. This flawed logic serves to undercut the integrity and dedicated efforts of the many fíne members of the public defender offices throughout this State. I suggest that the dissent has underestimated the extent of the professional and personal commitment made by these outstanding public servants in their quest to provide indigent defendants with the most effective representation possible. For these reasons I concur in the judgment of the court. WARD, RYAN and MILLER, JJ., join in this special concurrence.