Court Opinion

ID: 9558762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:16:31.327141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:34.575368
License: Public Domain

DEITS, J.,
dissenting.
Because the majority’s opinion is contrary to the language of the pertinent statute, ORS 137.123, and is inconsistent with decisions of this court, I dissent.
The majority correctly states that ORS 137.122 was repealed by implication when section 12 of Ballot Measure 10, codified at ORS 137.123, was passed by the voters in 1986. DeAngelo v. Schiedler, 306 Or 91, 99-100 n 5, 757 P2d 1355 (1988). Subsection (6) of ORS 137.122 provided that the court had to make specific findings on the record as to its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences:
“Whenever the court imposes a consecutive sentence under this section, it shall state its reasons for doing so and make all required special findings on the record at the time of sentencing.”
ORS 137.123 does not include that requirement. The deletion of the findings requirement of subsection (6) was the only major change made by the adoption of ORS 137.123. Despite the elimination of the findings requirement, the majority concludes that findings on the record are still required when consecutive sentences are imposed.
In reaching its conclusion, the majority relies on the language of subsection (4) of ORS 137.123 that consecutive sentences may only be imposed if the trial court “finds” that the statutory conditions have been met. The majority’s reading might be reasonable were it not for the history of the statutes. Essentially, the majority reads back into the statute exactly what was taken out and makes the change in the statute meaningless.
The majority attempts to explain its disregard of the history by concluding that the findings requirement of subsection (6) was quite different than the findings requirement that it now reads into subsection (4). It reasons that the requirement of subsection (6) that the court state its reasons for *563imposing consecutive sentence and make all findings on the record had nothing to do with whether a consecutive sentence was authorized by the statute; rather, it merely required an explanation of why the court was imposing consecutive sentences. However, that is really a distinction without a difference. Clearly, the purpose of the statement of reasons and findings required by subsection (6) was to show that the imposition of the sentence came within the court’s authority under ORS 137.123(4). Presumably, the findings required by the majority’s reading of subsection (4) would serve exactly the same purpose.
My conclusion is supported by decisions of this court that hold that, without the findings requirement of subsection (6), the statute does not require a trial court to make findings on the record. In State v. Franske, 92 Or App 353, 758 P2d 418, rev den 307 Or 77 (1988), the defendant argued that ORS 137.122 required the trial court to state, on the record, its specific reasons for imposing consecutive sentences. We rejected that argument:
“Because the requirement of ORS 137.122(6) that a trial court state its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences was impliedly repealed by ORS 137.123, the trial court did not err in failing to do so.” 92 Or App at 354. (Citation omitted.)
See also State v. Aguilar, 96 Or App 506, 510, 773 P2d 17, rev den 308 Or 315 (1989). The majority attempts to distinguish Franske by characterizing it as holding only that ORS 137.123 impliedly repealed ORS 137.122. In Franske, however, we specified that the findings requirement of ORS 137.122(6) had been impliedly repealed and that the trial court did not err in failing to make findings. Nothing has happened since our holding in Franske to revive the requirement of ORS 137.122(6). In addition, the language of subsection (4), on which the majority relies, was included in both ORS 137.122 and ORS 137.123 and was in effect at the time when Franske and Aguilar were decided. Nevertheless, in those cases we concluded that it was not error for the trial court to fail to state its reasons, on the record, for imposing consecutive sentences. The rationale of Franske is directly applicable in this case.
I would hold that ORS 137.123 requires that the court determine that the requirements of subsections (4) (a) and (b) *564are met before imposing consecutive sentences but that it is not required to make findings on the record concerning those requirements.1 Accordingly, I dissent.
Joseph, C. J., and Warren and Riggs, JJ., join in this dissent.

 In view of the majority’s disposition of this case, it is unnecessary to address the scope of our review of the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences.