Court Opinion

ID: 9884212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:47:49.630961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:36.579952
License: Public Domain

WOZNIAK, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Less than two months ago, this court held in West Bend Mutual Insurance Co. v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co., 372 N.W.2d 438 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), that a passenger’s act of grabbing the steering wheel of a moving car, causing the car to swerve out of control and go off the road, was not “operation” of the vehicle within the context of an exclusionary clause in a homeowner’s insurance policy. Today, the majority holds that a passenger’s act of pushing down on the driver’s foot on the accelerator, causing the car to lurch forward, constitutes “physical control” for purposes of the implied consent statute, Minn.Stat. § 169.123, subd. 2 (1984).
I submit that these two cases cannot be reconciled. The majority attempts to distinguish West Bend on the ground that exclusionary clauses in insurance policies are to be interpreted narrowly against the insurer, whereas the implied consent laws are to be interpreted liberally in favor of the public interest. This distinction is not without merit and would be helpful in a close case. It is not sufficient, however, to overcome the fundamental logical inconsistency between West Bend and today’s decision. I note that both cases are civil matters.
It appears that we are to have two lines of caselaw for factual situations like this: *568one in the context of insurance and one in the context of implied consent. This kind of inconsistent caselaw is of no assistance to the Minnesota practitioner.
I would not depart from our decision in West Bend. What appellant was doing in this ease cannot reasonably be construed as being in “physical control” of an automobile. What he was doing was interfering with the driver’s control. See West Bend, 372 N.W.2d at 441. Had appellant interfered with the driver’s control by poking him in the ribs or by spilling hot coffee on him, I doubt that the majority would have reached the same result today. Cf. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. White, 60 Or.App. 666, 655 P.2d 599 (1982) (Gillette, J., concurring) (rev. denied, 294 Or. 569, 660 P.2d 683 (1983)).
Most disturbing, however, is that, under the rationale of this case, if the driver had also been charged and refused the test, or had taken the test and registered in excess of .10, both driver and passenger could have their licenses revoked under the implied consent statute, or be charged with D.W.I., based upon physical control of one automobile at the same time. I must reject this logic.