Court Opinion

ID: 9776587
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:39:35.166949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:39.838206
License: Public Domain

VANCE, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons expressed in my dissenting opinion in Edwardson v. Edwardson, Ky., 798 S.W.2d 941 (1990), rendered on this date. As I indicated therein, the long-established public policy of this state forbids enforcement of antenuptial agreements which look to future separation and divorce. This policy, if it is to be changed, should be changed by the General Assembly and not this court. The majority opinion recognizes that the General Assembly by enacting K.R.S. 403.190(2)(d) has not legislatively changed the long-established public policy which prohibits antenuptial agreements which look to the division of property in the event of a future divorce.
It expressed a belief, however, that the General Assembly was responding to significant changes in the expectations of the parties to the marital contract and in the attitude of society toward divorce, and therefore the opinions of Florida, California, and Colorado courts cited more accurately reflect public policy toward divorce and antenuptial contracts today than does Stratton v. Wilson, 170 Ky. 61, 185 S.W. 522 (1916).
The opinions of the courts in Florida, California, and Colorado reflect the public policy of those states, but they reflect the public policy of Kentucky not one bit. The public policy of this state is determined by the General Assembly and, in any given case, if the General Assembly has not declared a public policy, it is left to the court to do so. Once a public policy has been declared by the court, it should remain in effect until the legislature declares otherwise. Of course, the judiciary has the raw power to reverse public policy previously declared by it, but it should be reluctant to do so in cases of judicially declared policy which has become long-established precedent.
In any case, the majority opinion recognizes that K.R.S. 403.190(2)(d) does not overrule the public policy established by Stratton v. Wilson, supra. In my opinion, K.R.S. 403.190(2)(d) does not have the slightest bearing upon Stratton v. Wilson. It merely provides that marital property means all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage except,
“(d) property excluded by valid agreement of the parties.”
The act is effective only as to conditions which existed at the time it was enacted and thereafter. It was not given retroactive effect. When K.R.S. 403.190(2)(d) was enacted, an antenuptial agreement looking forward to divorce or separation was not a valid agreement, and therefore subsection (d) would not apply to it.
Furthermore, subsection (d) of the act only applies to property and has no application at all to maintenance which is often the subject of antenuptial agreements.
I, therefore, believe that K.R.S. 403.-190(2)(d) has no application at all to ante-nuptial agreements which look toward divorce or separation and that it does not at all reflect any change in the public policy created by Stratton v. Wilson, supra.
WINTERSHEIMER, J., joins in this dissent.