Court Opinion

ID: 9747160
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:59:13.042952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:32.677171
License: Public Domain

Reiber, J.,
¶ 25. concurring and dissenting. I concur in the Court’s holding that the decision of the Water Resources Board to reclassify the Lake Bomoseen Wetland is a rulemaking rather than an adjudicative proceeding. I do not agree, however, that this conclusion necessarily disposes of the ultimate question of whether the decision is appealable. The right to “a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws” is of constitutional dimension in Vermont. Vt. Const, ch. I, art. 4. The Legislature may, to be sure, define and limit the legal remedies available to litigants, but where — as here — we interpret a statute to bar virtually all right of judicial access and review, the evidence of such an intent should be clear, conclusive, and unambiguous. This is not such a case. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 26. Unlike other decisions of the Water Resources Board (WRB), such as those dealing with stream reclassifications and discharge permits, the chapter governing wetlands classifications contains no express provision affording a right to judicial review. Cf. 10 V.S.A. § 1270 (granting persons aggrieved by decisions of WRB under subchapter dealing with stream classifications and waste permits appeal to Supreme Court). The Vermont Wetland Rules promulgated by the WRB specifically provide, however, that administrative wetlands reclassifications “may be reviewed by the applicable court as provided for in Rule 75 of the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure.” Vermont Wetland Rules § 9, 6 Code of Vermont Rules 12 004 056-30 (2002) [hereinafter VWR]. Under the Administrative Procedure Act, these rules were reviewed by a legislative committee authorized to object on the grounds that they were beyond the WRB’s authority or contrary to the Legislature’s intent. 3 V.S.A. § 842(b). There is no evidence of such an objection, however, and VWR § 9 authorizing appeal of wetlands reclassifications to the superior court under Rule 75 has remained in effect since its enactment.
¶ 27. While the committee’s acquiescence in the rule may not prove an intent to endorse its substantive terms, see 3 V.S.A. § 842(b) (clarifying that committee’s failure to object “is not an implied legislative authorization of its substantive or procedural lawfulness”), the fact remains that VWR § 9 providing for judicial review of wetlands reclassifications triggered no apparent legislative red flags, adverse comment, or reservations. One may question, to be sure, whether the *387committee was actually aware that the VWR § 9 provided a right to judicial review where the statutory scheme was otherwise silent. If we are to be realistic, however, one must also question whether the absence of an express statutory right to judicial review in the chapter governing wetlands classifications was a conscious legislative choice or merely an inadvertent oversight. If the Legislature had actually intended to bar judicial review of wetlands reclassifications it could easily have expressed that intent in a clear and straightforward manner — as it has elsewhere — by simply stating that the WRB’s wetland classification decisions are final and are not subject to judicial appeal. See, e.g., 32 V.S.A. § 5929(b)(3) (providing that decisions of emergency board granting or denying new jobs tax credit certification “shall be final, and shall not be subject to administrative or judicial appeal”); id. § 5930a(g) (providing that decisions of Vermont Economic Progress Council granting or denying applications for economic incentives “shall be final and not subject to judicial review”). The Legislature failed to do so. Confronted with this combination of administrative mandate and legislative silence, I am prepared, at the least, to find evidence of ambiguity.
¶ 28. When the right to appeal may fairly be characterized as ambiguous, courts are generally loathe to deny such a right, even when the governing statute is silent. Our decision in Vincent v. Vermont State Retirement Board, 148 Vt. 531, 536 A.2d 925 (1987), is instructive in this regard. There, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking judicial review of a Retirement Board decision offsetting plaintiff’s workers’ compensation benefits against his disability retirement benefits. The Board argued that the court lacked jurisdiction, noting that the statute afforded plaintiff no express right to judicial review. We rejected the argument, however, observing that the Legislature could have explicitly denied judicial review (citing a former section of the workers’ compensation law which provided that “decisions of the board shall be final”), but “did not express such an intent in the legislation establishing the Vermont state retirement system.” Id. at 533-34, 536 A.2d at 927-28. Citing Chapter I, Article 4 of the Vermont Constitution that “[ejvery person within this state ought to find a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs which one may receive in his person, property or character,” we expressed “hesitation] to interpret arguably ambiguous legislation as foreclosing judicial review of administrative agency decisions.” Id. at 534 n.2, 536 A.2d at 927 n.2. Accordingly, we held that the Board decision was subject to review. Id. at 534,536 A.2d at 928.
*388¶ 29. Here, the statute is similarly silent on the subject of judicial' review of wetlands reclassifications. Unlike Vincent, however, the agency authorized to interpret and apply the statute has explicitly authorized judicial review, and the Legislature has not seen fit to overrule that decision. Although an agency may not, of course, exceed the powers expressly granted or necessarily implied by the enabling legislation, “we generally defer to interpretations of enabling legislation by an administrative agency.” Perry v. Med. Practice Bd., 169 Vt. 399, 403, 737 A.2d 900, 903 (1999); see also Dutton v. Dep’t of Soc. Welfare, 168 Vt. 281, 284, 721 A.2d 109, 111 (1998) (noting that “where a statute is silent as to a specific issue, we will defer to an agency’s interpretation” if based on permissible construction). Furthermore, while questions of judicial review may not lie within the precise expertise of the WRB, we note again that VWR § 9 was at least subject to legislative oversight, and has not been questioned or overruled. See Town of Killington v. State, 172 Vt, 182, 194, 776 A.2d 395, 404 (2001) (citing United Hosp. Ctr., Inc. v. Richardson, 757 F.2d 1445, 1451 (4th Cir. 1985), that administrative regulations presented to legislative oversight committee by the administering agency “without disapproval are entitled to considerable weight as expressive of legislative purpose”).
¶ 30. Under these circumstances, therefore, I agree with the Court’s observation in Vincent that we should be “hesitant to interpret” ambiguous legislation as “foreclosing judicial review.” Vincent, 148 Vt. at 534 n.2, 536 A.2d at 927 n.2 To be sure, Vincent involved a traditionally adjudicative decision rather than — as in this case — a rulemaking or quasi-legislative determination. This fact alone does not, however, preclude judicial review. Indeed, the Legislature has provided for appeals to this Court from stream reclassifications, which — as we held in Stratton — are also quasi-legislative in nature. In re Stratton Corp., 157 Vt. 436, 445, 600 A.2d 297, 302 (1991); see 10 V.S.A. § 1270 (providing for appeals of stream reclassifications to Supreme Court). Furthermore, we may be assured that any possible error in interpreting the statute to allow for judicial review of wetlands reclassifications may be addressed through legislative amendment or clarification.
¶ 31. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court judgment dismissing the complaint, and hold that the Association is entitled to judicial review to determine whether the WRB’s decision was a clear and arbitrary abuse of authority. More specifically, the question for the trial court on remand — should it reach the issue — would be whether the WRB committed a clear and manifest abuse of its statutory duty *389by reclassifying the Lake Bomoseen Wetland based on criteria which the Association claims do not adequately distinguish Class One from Class Two wetlands, in violation of its due process rights.5
¶ 82.1 am authorized to state that Retired Chief Justice Allen joins in this dissent.

 Of course, the trial court would not need to address this question unless it determines that the Association had standing to bring the claim.