Court Opinion

ID: 9522847
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:32:49.571179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:04.263004
License: Public Domain

Johnson, J.,
¶ 40. dissenting. I cannot agree with the majority that the district court acted within its discretion in concluding that a mentally retarded defendant with the cognitive facilities of a young child was competent to stand trial. The evidence before the court at the competency hearing plainly demonstrated that defendant’s severely limited memory and abstract-reasoning functions would most likely prevent him from following the proceedings, consulting with his attorney, or otherwise engaging in a defense against the charges. Indeed, defendant’s inability to participate in his defense became apparent in the ensuing proceedings, as evidenced by both his attorney’s and the district court’s fruitless efforts to inform of him of what was taking place. In my view, the court ignored defendant’s cognitive limitations, which were made apparent by the undisputed testimony of defendant’s expert, the concessions of the State’s expert, the court’s own colloquy with defendant, and defense counsel’s ongoing unsuccessful efforts to communicate effectively with defendant concerning a defense against the charges. Instead, the court relied almost exclusively on the opinion of a prosecution expert who focused primarily on mental illness rather than mental retardation. This was an abuse of discretion.
¶41. A detailed review of the record is necessary to demonstrate the district court’s abuse of discretion in this case. At the competence hearing held late in 2005, the State’s expert, forensic psychiatrist Dr. Jonathan Weker, concluded, based on an interview with defendant lasting between two and one-half and three hours, that although defendant “clearly . . . presented with limited intellect,” he was aware of the severity of the charges against him, had a rational working relationship with his attorney, and understood the adversarial nature of a criminal trial. Dr. Weker also testified that, given defendant’s intellectual limitations, it would be important during the criminal proceedings to use basic vocabulary and to provide an opportunity for either defendant’s attorney or a cognitive facilitator to check in with defendant on a regular basis to make sure that he was following the proceedings.
¶ 42. When asked during direct examination why he had not administered any formal psychological tests in evaluating defend*181ant’s competence to stand trial, Dr. Weker responded first that he “was not trained to administer tests of that nature,” and second that “psychological testing can be useful, but in and of itself, [is] not determinative.” During cross-examination, Dr. Weker stated that mental retardation could be a basis for incompetence
if the Defendant seemed completely incapable of understanding what a trial is, for instance, if he or she couldn’t understand that it was a process for determining guilt or innocence with respect to a charge, if they were incapable of understanding that it was an adversarial process with ... a neutral fact finder, if they were incapable of . . . remembering or being reminded of what the events were that they were being charged for and if they were completely incapable of being . . . educable, if you will, about the things that they may not know.
When pressed about whether defendant would be able to keep up with the testimony and participate in his defense at trial, Dr. Weker explained that the accommodations he recommended should allow defendant to do so.
¶ 43. Defendant’s expert, clinical psychologist Dr. Patricia Stone, conducted six psychological tests examining defendant’s cognitive abilities. The tests indicated that defendant’s IQ fell in the first percentile of the population, and that he was able to complete various cognitive tasks somewhere on the level of a child between the ages of four and eleven, depending on the task. Based on these tests and other information, Dr. Stone opined that defendant’s mental retardation, coupled with his severe cognitive, language, and memory limitations, made him incompetent to stand trial. According to Dr. Stone, given his severely impaired memory and his inability to engage in abstract reasoning, defendant would not be able to process information fast enough at trial to aid his attorney in his defense, even with the accommodations recommended by Dr. Weker. Dr. Stone also stated that defendant would most likely indicate to his attorney or cognitive facilitator that he understood what was going on when in fact he did not understand.
¶ 44. Following Dr. Stone’s testimony, Dr. Weker conceded during cross-examination that defendant would probably not do well at spontaneously initiating a dialogue with his attorney in the event he did not understand what was happening at trial. Al*182though Dr. Weker thought that defendant would be able to do so if prompted on a regular basis, he acknowledged the possibility that defendant would not realize he had missed something and thus might indicate that he understood everything when in fact he had not. Dr. Weker also acknowledged that defendant (1) might not be able to respond when asked about a witness’s testimony because of his lack of ability to retain information; (2) would not be able to sustain his attention for a full day of trial without hourly breaks; (3) would have an even reduced attention span and memory capacity during the stress of a trial; (4) would not be able to understand some of the arguments that the State would make against him; and (5) to some degree, would not be able to testify on his own behalf because of his limited understanding of abstract concepts and his problems with memory and focus. In sum, Dr. Weker agreed with Dr. Stone that defendant’s deficient verbal and abstract reasoning skills “could interfere with his ability to understand and function competently within the legal system.”
¶ 45. Following Dr. Weker’s testimony, the district court engaged defendant in a colloquy, presumably to assess his competence to stand trial. After defendant described his relationship with his attorney as “a friendship,” the colloquy went as follows:
Q: Do you know if the charges against you are serious or not serious?
A: Not serious.
Q: Excuse me?
A: Not serious.
Q: Okay. Do you know what habitual offender is?
A: No.
Q: Do you know what the Judge does?
A: Find out if the person is guilty or not guilty.
Q: Do you know what a jury is?
A: Where people have a decision to make to see who — if they’re not guilty or guilty.
Q: Do you know what a jury trial is?
A: What’s that, sir?
*183Q: A jury trial?
A: No, I don’t.
Q: Have you ever had a jury trial?
A: No, sir.
Q: Have you ever been in adult court before on other charges?
A: I’m not sure if I have.
Q: Okay, now you spent some time in jail; is that right?
A: Yes.
Q: And do you recall what that was for?
A: I’ve been in like for five years.
Q: Hm-hmm.
A: Maxed out last year.
Q: Mr. Beaudoin, do you know what it means to plead guilty?
A: If you find a person if he’s guilty or not.
Q: Mr. Beaudoin, do you understand that a child said that you touched her, that you touched her private parts?
A: I don’t remember, recall that, sir.
Q: You don’t recall that?
A: No, I was drinking that night —
Q: But I don’t want you to tell me what you remember from that particular occasion, but do you know that’s why you’re in court?
A: Yeah.
Q: You understand that a little girl said that you touched her in her private parts?
A: I don’t remember that.
Q: You don’t remember what?
A: What happened.
*184Q: What happened. Okay. Let’s see — we’ll consider the evidence closed.
¶ 46. This colloquy, together with Dr. Weker’s testimony and written report, apparently convinced the district court that defendant was competent to stand trial, as indicated in the court’s written decision filed three days following the completion of the competence hearing. After recounting defendant’s criminal history and his previous competence evaluations, the court noted that, despite defendant’s limited intelligence, there was no evidence that he had grossly distorted thinking or was not oriented to person, place, and time. The court further noted that defendant was aware of the charges against him, the function of a trial, and the potential penalties for the crime charged. The court then indicated that it was persuaded by Dr. Weker’s opinion, stating that defendant’s experience in the criminal court system bolstered its conclusion. The court explained in the two paragraphs dedicated to its conclusions of law that Dr. Weker had vast experience, had focused his evaluation specifically on the issue of competence, and had concurred with the more recent prior competence evaluations of defendant. The court, however, acknowledged defendant’s significant mental deficiencies and thus agreed with Dr. Weker’s assessment that defendant “should have accommodations to insure the utmost fairness.”
¶ 47. This assessment cannot withstand scrutiny, notwithstanding the discretion that the district court is afforded in making competence determinations. See State v. Tribble, 2005 VT 132, ¶ 10, 179 Vt. 235, 892 A.2d 232 (noting that competence determination will not be overturned “if it is supported by the court’s findings, and if the findings in turn are supported by credible evidence and are not clearly erroneous”). The evidence at the competence hearing did not, and could not, support a conclusion that defendant had “ ‘sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding’ ” of the proceedings against him. Id. (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)). On the contrary, the evidence demonstrated that defendant’s extremely limited cognitive faculties and memory functions would significantly impair his ability to follow the criminal proceedings and confer with his attorney concerning his defense.
¶48. On the one hand, Dr. Stone presented the results of six tests establishing the cognitive limitations that would prevent *185defendant from meeting the above competence standard. On the other hand, Dr. Weker relied on his experience and based his competence evaluation on a single, limited conversation with defendant. Dr. Weker’s report appears to give significant weight to defendant’s lack of distorted thinking and his orientation to time and place, even though defendant is a person with mental retardation, not a mental illness. During his testimony, Dr. Weker also suggested that a mentally retarded individual would be incompetent to stand trial only if he were completely incapable of understanding the adversary process in a criminal trial. That is not the standard for incompetence to stand trial. Rather, the standard is whether the defendant has a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him and can reasonably and rationally consult with his attorney concerning his defense. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975). Notwithstanding his conclusion that defendant was competent to stand trial, Dr. Weker himself conceded during cross-examination that defendant might not be able to follow court proceedings, understand arguments against him, testify on his own behalf, confer with his attorney about prior testimony due to his limited memory, or apprise his attorney of his inability to understand what was going on. This is not a competent defendant under the accepted standard.
¶ 49. In its brief conclusions regarding defendant’s competence, the district court merely recited Dr. Weker’s opinion and stated that it found the opinion persuasive because it was consistent with recent prior competence evaluations of defendant. The court paid little heed to Dr. Stone’s conclusions or opinion, stating only that accommodations to defendant would ensure a fair trial. Nor did the court mention its colloquy with defendant, which plainly confirmed expert testimony recognizing defendant’s limited cognitive abilities, including his limited capacity to retain information or reason abstractly. See United States v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217, 1233 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that the “district court’s own observations of the defendant’s demeanor during the proceedings are relevant to the court’s [competence] determination”). Indeed, the colloquy unequivocally demonstrated defendant’s severely limited understanding of the proceedings against him. In my view, given the state of the evidence presented to the court at this juncture, the court abused its discretion by finding defendant competent to stand trial.
¶ 50. But even if the evidence were such that the district court could defer its competence determination until it had the oppor*186tunity to observe defendant interact with his attorney, defendant’s subsequent conduct and the assertions of defense counsel at pretrial proceedings amply demonstrated that the concerns expressed at the competence hearing were well-founded and that defendant was in fact incapable of consulting with his attorney and participating in his defense. At the outset of the March 2006 motion hearing in which the victim’s relatives and an investigating police officer testified concerning what the victim had told them about the alleged assault, defendant’s attorney expressed her continued belief that defendant was incompetent to stand trial. She stated that despite her persistent efforts to explain to defendant the purpose of that day’s hearing, he did not understand what was going on and he was unable to comprehend potential defense strategies and possible outcomes in the case. Nevertheless, the court (a different judge from the one who presided over the competence hearing) allowed the testimony after confirming that defendant knew who the witnesses were and then informing defendant that the witnesses were going to tell the court what the victim told them he had done to her.
¶ 51. Not far into the first witness’s testimony, defense counsel asked the court to allow her to confer with her client to make sure that he had understood the testimony. Following the conference, defense counsel reported that defendant could not keep up with the testimony and was unable to tell her what he had just heard. At that point, the court addressed defendant directly in an effort to explain in simple terms what the witness’s testimony had been. During the ensuing colloquy, defense counsel’s explicit concern that defendant might make damaging admissions became a reality when, shortly after the court began relaying the witness’s testimony to him, he blurted out, • i£Yeah, that’s what happened.” The court assured defense counsel that “nothing will be used against him,” but defendant’s eagerness to agree with the judge was apparent. The court then went into a lengthy summary of the testimony that the witness had provided.
¶ 52. For the remainder of the hearing, defense counsel periodically reported that defendant was not following the proceedings, and the court periodically summarized the previous testimony for defendant. At one point, defendant responded in the negative when the court asked if he had any questions regarding its summary of the testimony, but defendant’s attorney reported, based on her conference with defendant, that he did not appear to *187understand what had been related to him concerning that testimony. At another point, when defense counsel reported that defendant had told her that he did not understand the “big words,” the court merely acknowledged the comment and proceeded with the testimony. When counsel explained that defendant might be telling the court that he understood when in fact he did not, the court acknowledged that possibility, but stated that it wanted to create “a record of a simple, slow story being presented.”
¶ 53. There was more of the same at a June 2006 evidentiary hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress statements defendant had made to police. Once again, at the outset of the hearing, defense counsel informed the court that her interactions with defendant had led her to conclude that he was incapable of understanding what was going on in the proceedings or helping her with his defense, irrespective of the accommodations recommended by the State’s expert and the previous judge. During the hearing, at which an investigating officer testified, defense counsel informed the court that defendant did not understand the testimony and thus could not consult with her about the testimony. Defense counsel further explained that when she asked defendant whether he understood, he would say yes, but was unable to repeat the testimony in any meaningful way, which confirmed the experts’ previous concerns regarding passive acquiescence. When defense counsel stated that she did not see the point in having any more conferences with a defendant who obviously did not understand what was going on, the court merely stated that it would continue to give her the opportunity to confer periodically with defendant.
¶ 54. During the jury draw and trial, at which a third judge presided, defense counsel again renewed her objection to the original competence ruling, stating that, with or without accommodations such as allowing her or a cognitive facilitator to consult periodically with defendant, defendant was simply incapable of participating in the trial and his defense. The court acknowledged the objection and proceeded with the trial. The court stated that it was relying on the decision of the judge who had presided over the competence hearing, and that it had also listened to the audiotape of defendant’s interview with the police, which seemed to indicate that he was competent then.
¶ 55. Even assuming that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding defendant competent following the compe*188tence hearing, I would hold that, in light of what transpired at the proceedings between the competence hearing and trial, the district court was obligated to reevaluate defendant’s competence. There was no suggestion of malingering on defendant’s part, and yet the judges at the pretrial and trial proceedings accepted unquestioningly the initial competency ruling rather than probe defense counsel’s legitimate concerns regarding defendant’s inability to understand the proceedings and participate in his defense. Cf. State v. Thompson, 167 Vt. 383, 387, 708 A.2d 192, 194 (1998) (stating that it was imperative for the court at a plea hearing to assure itself that defendant understood what rights he was waiving, in light of “defense counsel’s continuing difficulty in communicating with his client, and the close question over whether defendant was competent to stand trial”).
¶ 56. The majority states that there were no changed circumstances from the competence hearing to trial in terms of defendant’s competence, but the changed circumstance was the apparent inability of defendant to consult with his attorney and participate in his defense. Defendant’s level of competence undoubtedly did not change, but the transparency of his level of incompetence and its impact on his ability to participate in his defense did. In any event, as I stated in a previous dissent, the salient issue is not whether there are changed circumstances, but rather whether the facts in front of the trial court at any given time during the criminal proceedings are sufficient to cast doubt on defendant’s competence to stand trial. See State v. Lockwood, 160 Vt. 547, 575, 632 A.2d 655, 671 (1993) (Johnson, J., dissenting) (stating that trial court was obligated to revisit previous competence determination after defense counsel “had expressed her inability to work with defendant in formulating a defense because of his cognitive deficiencies”).
¶ 57. Plainly, the trial court gave little weight to the explicit concerns raised by defense counsel and confirmed by defendant’s actions. This was an abuse of discretion under the circumstances. Because the “ability of defendants to consult and interact appropriately with their defense attorneys lies at the heart of the incompetency standard,” the defendant’s attorney “may well be the single most important witness on that dimension of incompetency.” Am. Bar Ass’n Standards for Criminal Justice § 7-4.8 cmt. at 7-211 (2d ed. 1986 supp.); see United States ex rel. Roth v. Zelker, 455 F.2d 1105, 1108 (2d Cir. 1972) (“The opinion of a *189defendant’s attorney as to his [client’s] ability to understand the nature of the proceedings and to cooperate in the preparation of his defense, is indeed significant and probative.”). In this case, the trial court essentially ignored mounting evidence, including statements from defendant’s attorney, that previous concerns raised by experts about defendant’s potential inability to consult with his attorney and participate in his defense were well-founded.
¶ 58. In short, the evidence at the initial competence hearing demonstrated that defendant was incompetent to stand trial, and defendant’s lack of competence became even more apparent during the ensuing criminal proceedings. Therefore, while I agree with the majority that the lewdness proscribed by 13 V.S.A. § 2632(a)(8) is not a lesser-included offense of lewd or lascivious conduct with a child proscribed by 13 Y.S.A. § 2602, I would not reach that issue because I would reverse the trial court’s competence determination.
¶ 59. I am authorized to state that Justice Skoglund joins this dissent.