Court Opinion

ID: 9569470
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:14:06.014492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:59:00.906572
License: Public Domain

Scholfield, C.J.
(dissenting)—The majority opinion acknowledges that Johnson was properly advised of his constitutional rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966), and that questioning of him by the detective ceased when he requested an attorney. It is undisputed that pur*687suant to his request, arrangements were made for Johnson to speak with an attorney—a public defender—on the telephone. It was after his conversation with the attorney that Johnson made incriminating statements which were admitted against him.
The majority holds Johnson's confession inadmissible because the record is unclear as to whether a promise of leniency was made before or after Johnson requested counsel. The majority reasons that the police are prohibited from making a promise of leniency after the defendant is provided the assistance of counsel because this would amount to interrogation.
I must respectfully dissent because of my view that Miranda v. Arizona, supra, does not prohibit custodial interrogation of a defendant after he has been fully advised of his constitutional rights and has been provided the assistance of counsel.
The United States Supreme Court has said more than once that custodial interrogation of the defendant must cease until assistance of an attorney has been provided. If he requests counsel, "the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." Miranda, at 474.
We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 101 S. Ct. 1880 (1981).
In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297, 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980), the Court referred to the "undisputed right" under Miranda to remain silent and to be free of interrogation "until he had consulted with a lawyer." (Footnote omitted.)
The majority cites no cases from the United States Supreme Court or the Supreme Court of Washington holding that a police officer cannot interrogate a defendant after *688he has been fully advised of his Miranda rights and has been provided with the assistance of counsel. Miranda refers to counsel being "present," but there is nothing in Miranda or in any Supreme Court cases following Miranda holding that being provided with the assistance of counsel over the telephone does not meet the requirement of the "presence" of counsel, in the context in which it is used in Miranda.
After counsel had been provided, the only issue is whether the confession was voluntary. While the trial court did not enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by CrR 3.5, the trial judge did specifically discuss the subject of coercion in his decision and specifically found on the record that no coercion or improper influence was asserted against Johnson prior to or during the confession, which was reduced to writing and signed by Johnson. Based upon this discussion by the trial judge in his decision, it is obvious that had a finding expressed in terms of voluntariness been entered, the court would have found the confession voluntary.
Under these circumstances, the confession should not be suppressed. It was given after proper advisement of rights pursuant to Miranda and assistance of counsel had been provided. The judgment should be affirmed.