Court Opinion

ID: 9819467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:25:59.362012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:27.844158
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. Based upon the record here, summary judgment was not appropriate. I cannot find as a matter of law that Liddle’s actions were a discretionary policy determination subject to section 2 — 201 immunity. Liddle’s actions here were discretionary, for Courson refers us to no statute, rule, regulation, or similar provision of law that would have compelled Liddle to take a different course of action on these facts. However, simply saying that Liddle’s actions were discretionary does not end the matter. We noted in Courson that not every discretionary action taken by a public employee is immunized by section 2 — 201 of the Act. Only acts or omissions in determining policy are immunized. Courson, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 757, 704 N.E.2d at 451. When determining whether an employee’s activity constitutes the determination of policy, both the position of the employee and the type of action must be considered. Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 341, 692 N.E.2d at 1181. Thus, policy decisions are defined as: “ ‘[TJhose decisions which require the municipality to balance competing interests and to make a judgment call as to what solution will best serve each of those interests.’ ” Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 342, 692 N.E.2d at 1181, quoting West v. Kirkham, 147 Ill. 2d 1, 11, 588 N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (1992). One of the purposes of tort immunity is to inhibit judicial second-guessing of the executive function. West, 147 Ill. 2d at 12, 588 N.E.2d at 1109. Thus, where the decision-making process requires the special expertise of a governmental unit or involves the weighing of broad governmental objectives, immunity is more likely to be found available. See Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 343, 692 N.E.2d at 1182 (City of Chicago fire marshal’s decisions constituted policy); West, 147 Ill. 2d at 11, 588 N.E.2d at 1109 (municipal traffic planner’s decisions constituted policy). On the other hand, where the activity in question does not constitute a “uniquely governmental function” courts have held immunity unavailable (see Courson, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 757, 704 N.E.2d at 451); likewise, where objective standards for measuring conduct exist. Similarly, decisions regarding property maintenance might not be regarded as policy decisions. See Capps v. Belleville School District No. 201, 313 Ill. App. 3d 710, 715, 730 N.E.2d 81, 86 (2000) (whether to put railing on an accessability ramp, install lighting, and warn of a drop-off were maintenance decisions (in contrast to policy decisions)), overruled sub silentio by Harrison, 197 Ill. 2d 466, 758 N.E.2d 848. I conclude that immunity is not available in this case because Liddle was not determining policy in removing the safety guard from the wood saw. I recognize Liddle testified that he was given near-plenary authority over the operation of his shop class, and Courson has offered no evidence to refute this. I therefore accord that testimony its due weight. But, balanced against this is another fact — Liddle was a teacher. He did not occupy an executive or administrative position in the school district. His role was therefore less like that of the fire marshal in Harinek or the traffic planner in West. Further, Liddle’s specific action in removing the safety guard also is not a policy decision subject to immunity. That decision was not one requiring the unique expertise of some governmental unit. The use of power tools generally and wood saws specifically is a commonplace activity, for which objective standards of safety exist. Thus we need not be concerned that we are impinging upon the exclusive province of a coordinate branch of government or that immunity is necessary to safeguard that branch’s expertise. Again, this distinguishes Liddle’s actions from those of the fire marshal in Harinek or the traffic planner in West. Moreover, the removal of a malfunctioning safety guard from such equipment is better characterized as a maintenance decision, not a policy planning one similar to that found in Capps. Therefore, I would reverse the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the District. I also disagree with the majority’s holding and would find that the intentional removal of the safety shield constitutes a failure to maintain property and, therefore, respectfully dissent. Section 3 — 102(a) of the Act imposes on a school district the duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain its property. 745 ILCS 10/3 — 102(a) (West 2000). Liddle testified that the saw’s safety shield was not functioning properly. Instead of having the saw repaired so that the safety shield functioned properly, Liddle simply removed the safety shield. He, therefore, breached his duty to exercise reasonable care to maintain the saw, and this breach of duty does not fall within the immunity of section 2 — 201.1 would, therefore, reverse the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the District.