Court Opinion

ID: 9704613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:41:12.470568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:03.604980
License: Public Domain

POLLOCK, J.,
dissenting.
The issue in this case is whether New Jersey’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions is tolled by the filing of a complaint in a court having no colorable jurisdiction over the subject matter of the controversy.
Plaintiff’s decedent was ifijured in an automobile accident on April 17, 1975, and died on May 19, 1975. On April 14, 1977, three days before the expiration of the statute of limitations affecting survival claims, plaintiff filed a complaint in the United States District Court setting forth wrongful death and survival claims.
Alleging diversity of citizenship as a basis for jurisdiction, the complaint stated that plaintiff was a resident of New Jersey, defendant Westfield Centre Service was a New Jersey corporation, and defendant Chrysler Corporation was a Delaware corporation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. On its face, the complaint demonstrated a lack of diversity. The District Court judge issued an order to show cause on April 28, 1977, and dismissed the complaint on May 11, 1977, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
*196Plaintiff filed a complaint asserting the same causes of action in the Superior Court on May 9,1977, 22 days after the statute of limitations had run as to the survival claims. On defendants’ motion, that court dismissed the survival action because it was barred by the statute of limitations. Galligan v. Westfield Centre Service, Inc., 166 N.J.Super. 392 (Law Div.1979). The Appellate Division unanimously denied plaintiff’s motion for leave to appeal.
The majority reverses the decision of the Appellate Division and holds that the filing of the action in the United States District Court tolls the statute of limitations even though there was no diversity of citizenship between plaintiff and defendant Westfield Centre Service. I respectfully dissent.
This case is controlled by fundamental principles of federal jurisdiction, statutory construction, and separation of powers. The United States District Courts gre courts of limited jurisdiction. See U.S.Const. Art. III. They have only whatever jurisdiction is conferred by Congress. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449, 12 L.Ed. 1147, 1151 (1850). Congress conferred jurisdiction on United States District Courts over cases where the parties are of diverse citizenship in 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Under that statute, the citizenship of each plaintiff must be different from the citizenship of each defendant. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch.) 267, 2 L.Ed. 435 (1806). That is, there must be complete diversity between the plaintiff and defendants.
As the majority recognizes, the complaint showed a “patent lack of diversity” and indicated ignorance of “the rudiments of federal court jurisdiction.” I agree. The filing of the complaint in the federal district court amounted to no more than a blur on the record. There never was a cause of action pending in a court of competent jurisdiction.
The relevant statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, provides that every action for injuries “shall be commenced within 2 years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued.” The words of the statute are clear and do not provide *197for an exception. There is no legislative history suggesting that the Legislature ever contemplated tolling the statute where an action is instituted in a court with no subject matter jurisdiction.
In general, the majority opinion suggests policy reasons that might persuade a legislature to enact a “saving statute”. In many states, legislatures have enacted saving statutes that allow a plaintiff whose case has been dismissed otherwise than on the merits to pursue the action even though the statute of limitations has run. See generally Annotation, 6 A.L.R.3d 1043 (1966). However, the New Jersey Legislature has not enacted a saving statute. The majority cites no case or other authority justifying amending the statute by judicial, rather than legislative, action.
No case cited by the majority holds that the statute is tolled by filing a complaint in a court without subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, the majority relies on cases where an action was commenced in a court competent to hear or transfer the case. For example in Kaczmarek v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 77 N.J. 329 (1978), plaintiff alleged the Turnpike Authority committed an unfair labor practice in firing him. The New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-1 et seq., had a six-month statute of limitations. Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Superior Court within six months of discharge. However, he did not file an action with the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) until after six months. The trial court dismissed the action because it should have been filed with PERC within six months. This Court reversed, reasoning that the Superior Court had the power to transfer the action to PERC and that the trial judge erred in not exercising that power. 77 N.J. at 343-344. The Court also concluded that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, plaintiff was “prevented” from filing within time and that the policies of the Act would not be served by enforcing the limitation. Id. at 337-340.
*198In the present case, the United States District Court never had jurisdiction of the action, and even if that court had jurisdiction, it did not have the power to transfer the action to the state courts. No statute authorizes a federal court to transfer such an action to state courts. See White v. Commercial Std. Fire & Marine Co., 450 F.2d 785, 786 (5th Cir. 1971). A federal court may not transfer an action commenced in that court to a state court. A federal court may remand an action to a state court only if the action was commenced in the state court and then removed to a federal court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1447 et seq. See, e. g., Edward Hansen, Inc. v. Kearny Post Office Assocs., 166 N.J.Super. 161 (Ch.Div.1979).
The majority also relies on this Court’s decision in White v. Violent Crimes Compensation Board, 76 N.J. 368 (1978). That case involved a period of limitations that was a substantive condition of the right to compensation of a victim of a violent crime. Plaintiff was the victim of a “brutal criminal assault and rape”. Id. at 370. The majority noted the “humanitarian” purpose of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. 52:4B-1, id. at 381, and concluded that the period of limitations should be tolled because of the “victim’s crime induced incapacity” during that period. Id. at 384. There is no suggestion that the statute of limitations involved in this case is designed to accommodate similar substantive concerns.
The original action in Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 85 S.Ct. 1050, 13 L.Ed.2d 941 (1965), was filed in a state court of competent jurisdiction. That action was dismissed because of improper venue. A subsequent action was filed in a federal district court. The United States Supreme Court held that the subsequent action was not barred by the statute of limitations. In Nichols v. Canoga Industries, 83 Cal.App.3d 956, 148 Cal.Rptr. 459 (Ct.App.1978), a complaint was filed in a United States District Court asserting a claim under federal securities law and a pendent state claim for breach of contract under state law. That action was dismissed because the statute *199of limitations had run on the federal securities law claims. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a complaint asserting the breach of contract action in a state court. That court held the filing of the action in the United States District Court tolled the statute of limitations on the breach of contract action. Although the United States District Court initially had subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims and the pendent state claims, the court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the state claims once the federal action was dismissed. Both Nichols and Burnett are distinguishable because the original actions in those cases were filed in courts with subject matter jurisdiction.
The other cases on which the majority relies also are distinguishable: Tevis v. Tevis, 79 N.J. 422 (1979) (interspousal immunity did not prevent cause of action from accruing); Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267 (1973) (cause of action does not accrue until it is “discovered”); Farrell v. Votator Div. of Chemetron Corp., 62 N.J. 111 (1973) (amendment of complaint to name previously unknown defendant after statute has run is proper); Kyle v. Green Acres at Verona, Inc., 44 N.J. 100 (1965) (insanity may toll the statute of limitations); Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434 (1961) (discovery rule).
Justice Holmes, on whom the majority relies, described the proper role of a court in reviewing legislation. He wrote: “I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions.” Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221, 37 S.Ct. 524, 531, 61 L.Ed. 1086, 1100 (1916) (dissenting). A court may fill in the gaps in legislation. However, a court should not usurp the legislative function. In this case, that principle means that this Court should not undertake to amend the statute of limitations by judicial fiat.
Respect for the Legislature as a co-equal branch of government compels deference to its legislative judgment and applica*200tion of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 as enacted. The New Jersey Legislature, unlike legislatures in some other jurisdictions, has not provided for the tolling of a statute of limitations where an action for personal injuries is dismissed without determination on the merits. Accordingly, I would affirm the Appellate Division.
Justice CLIFFORD joins in this dissenting opinion.
For reversal and remandment — Justices SULLIVAN, PASHMAN and HANDLER — 3.
For affirmance — Justices CLIFFORD and POLLOCK — 2.