Court Opinion

ID: 9945331
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 18:10:50.409757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:26.898794
License: Public Domain

J-S02043-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  GERREN LEE FOULKES                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 468 EDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 25, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division
                     at No(s): CP-46-CR-006793-2021

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                      FILED FEBRUARY 27, 2024

       Gerren Lee Foulkes appeals from the October 25, 2022 aggregate

judgment of sentence of 4½ to 10 years’ imprisonment imposed after a jury

found him guilty of aggravated assault of a child under the age of six,

endangering the welfare of children (“EWOC”), and simple assault.1       After

careful review, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

       The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of

this case as follows:

              The events underlying [Appellant’s] convictions arose
              on February 10, 2021, at the apartment of N.J. in
              Pottstown, Montgomery County. N.J. resided there
              with her three children, including E.T. who was born
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(8), 4304(a)(1), and 2701(a)(1), respectively.
J-S02043-24

          on July 3, 2019.       [Appellant] also lived at the
          apartment on occasion, as he and N.J. had been
          “casually dating” for the past few months.

          [Appellant] left the apartment that morning and was
          away much of the day, while N.J. and E.T. spent the
          day alone in the apartment. [Appellant] eventually
          returned and N.J. said she wanted to go out to buy
          cigarettes. [Appellant] told her to go and leave E.T.
          with him. N.J. then placed E.T in a toddler chair in
          front of the television with a snack and left
          the apartment.

          While N.J. was out, [Appellant] telephoned her to ask
          her to pick up a bag of cosmetics for him. N.J. drove
          to where [Appellant] had directed her, but [Appellant]
          then called her back and told her to return to the
          apartment because another person was bringing the
          cosmetics bag to him.

          N.J. returned to the apartment, having been gone for
          a total of approximately 20 minutes. Her friend, Joann
          Auman, arrived at the apartment at the same time,
          having previously made plans to meet up with N.J.
          The two found [Appellant] standing outside of the
          apartment building smoking a cigarette and speaking
          with someone who was sitting in a vehicle.
          [Appellant] appeared “very antsy and pacey.”

          N.J. and Auman went into the apartment and saw E.T.
          still sitting in his chair, but he did not seem himself.
          The child appeared scared and N.J. noticed that he
          was strapped into his chair, which he had not been
          when she had left. While she was trying to figure out
          what was wrong with the child, she received a
          telephone call from [Appellant], who had not returned
          with her inside the apartment and who asked if she
          was okay. She responded that she was “fine,” and
          ended the call quickly because she was focused on the
          child. She then found a bright red mark on the back
          of E.T.’s head and telephoned [Appellant], who denied
          knowing what she was talking about and said he was
          on his way back to the apartment. In the interim, N.J.
          observed a giant lump on E.T.’s forehead.

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              When [Appellant] returned to the apartment, he was
              sweating, his eyes were bulging and he kept denying
              that he did anything to E.T. N.J. began to yell at
              [Appellant] and told him to leave. She then took E.T.
              to a local hospital and, from there, the child was
              transported to Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia
              (“CHOP”).

              [Appellant] subsequently fled the area, but he and
              N.J. began communicating again in June 2021, with
              [Appellant] using an application that prevents
              tracking. He was apprehended in California on July
              25, 2021.

              [Appellant] was charged with aggravated assault of a
              victim less than 13, aggravated assault of a victim less
              than 6, [EWOC], and simple assault. Prior to trial he
              filed a motion in limine to preclude Anish Raj, M.D.,
              who had examined E.T. at CHOP, from offering expert
              testimony on behalf of the Commonwealth regarding
              the cause of the injuries he had observed. This court
              denied the motion without prejudice to further rulings
              at the time of Dr. Raj’s testimony.

Trial court opinion, 4/18/23 at 1-4 (citations to notes of testimony and

footnotes omitted).

       On August 1, 2022, Appellant proceeded to a jury trial before the

Honorable Steven T. O’Neill. Following a three-day trial, Appellant was found

guilty of aggravated assault of a child under the age of six, EWOC, and simple

assault.2    On November 2, 2022, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence

motion, seeking modification of his sentence and challenging the weight of the

____________________________________________

2 The Commonwealth withdraw the charge of aggravated assault of a child

under the age of 13.

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evidence and the trial court’s decision to allow Dr. Raj to testify as an expert.

The trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion on January 12, 2023.

      This timely appeal followed on February 9, 2023. On February 28, 2023,

the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal, in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).           Appellant

filed his timely Rule 1925(b) statement on March 19, 2023, and the trial court

filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on April 18, 2023.

      Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

            I.     Did the trial court err in allowing Dr. Anish Raj
                   to testify as an expert in the field of child abuse
                   pediatrics when proper notice was not given to
                   [Appellant’s] counsel of such expert testimony
                   and when the testimony of the expert relied
                   upon the statements of another witness (the
                   victim’s mother) who demonstrated that she
                   was less than credible during the trial in this
                   matter, and over the verbal objection before
                   and during trial, as well as the filing of two
                   motions in limine by Appellant’s counsel?

            II.    Did the trial court err in denying Appellant’s
                   post-sentence motion when the evidence was
                   not sufficient to convict the Appellant[?]
                   Specifically, no evidence was presented that
                   [Appellant] had ever laid hands upon the child
                   and the lack of credibility of two witnesses and
                   the subsequent reliance upon N.J.’s statements
                   by Dr. Raj led to convictions that were wholly
                   based upon unreliable and insufficient facts to
                   find that Appellant committed these crimes
                   beyond a reasonable doubt?

            III.   Did the trial court err in imposing consecutive
                   sentences on Appellant for two separate
                   charges when the same course of conduct was
                   the underlying basis for both charges[?] The

                                      -4-
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                   Court failed to reference any of the mitigating
                   factors as found by the pre-sentence
                   investigation, including the lack of ongoing
                   injury to the child and Appellant’s employment
                   and parenting history?

Appellant’s brief at 7 (extraneous capitalization and internal quotation marks

omitted).

      Appellant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing

Dr. Raj to offer his expert opinion in the field of child abuse pediatrics because

his medical diagnosis relied, in part, on statements from the victim’s mother,

N.J., whom Appellant claims was not credible.         Id. at 16.    This claim is

meritless.

             [I]n cases involving the admission of expert testimony
             . . . the admission of expert testimony is a matter left
             largely to the discretion of the trial court, and its
             rulings thereon will not be reversed absent an abuse
             of discretion. An expert’s testimony is admissible
             when it is based on facts of record and will not cause
             confusion or prejudice.

Commonwealth v. Huggins, 68 A.3d 962, 966 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citation

omitted), appeal denied, 80 A.3d 775 (Pa. 2013).

      A witness who “is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,

training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if their

knowledge is “beyond that possessed by the average layperson,” the

knowledge “will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to

determine a fact in issue,” and “the expert’s methodology is generally

accepted in the relevant field.” Pa.R.E. 702.

                                      -5-
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       Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial

court in permitting Dr. Raj to rely, in part, on statements made by the victim’s

mother, in formulating his expert opinion on whether E.T. was the victim of

child abuse.3      The record reflects that Dr. Raj, a board-certified doctor

specializing in child abuse pediatrics at CHOP, testified about his extensive

qualifications and experience in the field of child abuse pediatrics. Notes of

testimony, 8/2/22 at 145-152. Dr Raj also testified at length with regard to

the information he relied upon in forming his expert opinion, and ultimately,

how the types of injuries E.T. sustained demonstrated a high concern “for

inflicted trauma … caused by someone else.” Id. at 160-165. Dr. Raj noted

that he personally examined E.T. at CHOP and, in so doing, reviewed the

child’s available medical records, a CT scan of his head, and received an oral

medical history of E.T. from his mother. Id. at 165-166. At trial, the trial

court instructed the jury that they remained the sole triers of Dr. Raj’s

credibility, and that when evaluating the weight of his testimony they should

consider the source and reliability of the information upon which he bases his

opinion. Id. at 155-156.

       It is well settled in this Commonwealth that medical experts may rely

on statements made to them for the purposes of formulating their medical

____________________________________________

3 Appellant concedes in his brief that Dr. Raj qualifies as an expert in the field
of child abuse pediatrics. See Appellant’s brief at 20.

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opinion. “[A] medical expert may base his opinion upon facts which are in the

record and reports of others which are not in medicine but customarily relied

upon in practicing medicine, including the observations of lay persons.”

Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 615 A.2d 1337, 1343 (Pa.Super. 1992)

(citation omitted). The jury in this matter, as fact-finder, was entitled to

believe all, part, or none of Dr. Raj’s expert medical testimony. See Gunn v.

Grossman, 748 A.2d 1235, 1240 (Pa.Super. 2000) (stating, “the fact-finder

is free to accept or reject the credibility of both expert and lay witnesses, and

to believe all, part or none of the evidence.” (citations omitted)), appeal

denied, 764 A.2d 1070 (Pa. 2000).           Based on the foregoing, we find

Appellant’s challenge to the admission of Dr. Raj’s expert testimony must fail.

      Appellant next argues that the Commonwealth presented insufficient

evidence to sustain his convictions for aggravated assault of a child under the

age of six, EWOC, and simple assault. Appellant’s brief at 26.

            In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must
            determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and
            all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in
            the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as
            verdict winner, is sufficient to prove every element of
            the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.           As an
            appellate court, we may not re-weigh the evidence
            and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-
            finder. Any question of doubt is for the fact-finder
            unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that
            as a matter of law no probability of fact can be drawn
            from the combined circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 988 A.2d 669, 670 (Pa.Super. 2009) (citations

omitted), appeal denied, 4 A.3d 1054 (Pa. 2010).

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      Preliminarily, we observe that “[i]n order to preserve a challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, an appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement

must state with specificity the element or elements upon which the

appellant alleges that the evidence was insufficient.”    Commonwealth v.

Freeman, 128 A.3d 1231, 1248 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citations omitted;

emphasis added).     Where a 1925(b) statement raises a challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting a particular conviction and “does not

specify the allegedly unproven elements[,] ... the sufficiency issue is waived

[on appeal].” Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d 1252, 1257 (Pa.Super.

2008).

      In the instant case, Appellant submitted a timely Rule 1925(b)

statement containing three issues, which included a blanket challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. However, Appellant

failed to even specify the convictions he is challenging on appeal, let alone

identify any element of any of the crimes he was convicted which allegedly

were not supported by sufficient evidence.      See Appellant’s Rule 1925(b)

statement, 3/19/23 at ¶ 2. The trial court found that Appellant waived his

sufficiency claims on this basis. Trial court opinion, 4/18/23 at 8-9.

      We emphasize that requiring “[s]uch specificity is of particular

importance in cases where, as here, the appellant was convicted of multiple

crimes each of which contains numerous elements that the Commonwealth

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.”       Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981

                                     -8-
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A.2d 274, 281 (Pa.Super. 2009), appeal denied, 3 A.3d 670 (Pa. 2010).

Accordingly, as Appellant failed to provide any specific detail in his concise

statement for his sufficiency claims to allow for proper review, we agree with

the trial court that this issue is waived.

      In his final claim, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its

discretion in sentencing him to consecutive sentences for aggravated assault

of a child under six and EWOC and by failing to consider numerous mitigating

factors identified in the pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”) report. Appellant’s

brief at 36.

      Our standard of review in assessing whether a trial court has erred in

fashioning a sentence is well settled. “Sentencing is a matter vested in the

sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed

on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Zirkle,

107 A.3d 127, 132 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 117

A.3d 297 (Pa. 2015). Appellant must “establish, by reference to the record,

that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a

manifestly unreasonable decision.” Commonwealth v. Bullock, 170 A.3d

1109, 1123 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 184 A.3d

944 (Pa. 2018).

      Where an appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence,

as is the case here, the right to appellate review is not absolute.

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Commonwealth v. Conte, 198 A.3d 1169, 1173 (Pa.Super. 2018), appeal

denied, 206 A.3d 1029 (Pa. 2019). On the contrary, an appellant challenging

the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction

by satisfying the following four-part test:

            (1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether
            appellant preserved his issue; (3) whether appellant’s
            brief includes a concise statement of the reasons
            relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the
            discretionary aspects of sentence; and (4) whether
            the concise statement raises a substantial question
            that the sentence is appropriate under the sentencing
            code.

Commonwealth v. Carrillo-Diaz, 64 A.3d 722, 725 (Pa.Super. 2013)

(citations omitted).

      Instantly, the record reveals that Appellant filed a timely notice of

appeal and preserved his claim in a post-sentence motion. Appellant has also

included a statement in his brief that comports with the requirements of

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f).     See Appellant’s brief at 15.    Accordingly, we must

determine whether Appellant has raised a substantial question.

      “The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.”      Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d

932, 935 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 76 A.3d 538

(Pa. 2013). “A substantial question exists only when appellant advances a

colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either:

(1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or

(2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing

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process.”   Commonwealth v. Glass, 50 A.3d 720, 727 (Pa.Super. 2012)

(citation omitted), appeal denied, 63 A.3d 774 (Pa. 2013).

      Here, Appellant baldly contends that the trial court’s imposition of

consecutive sentences “was prejudicial on its face” and that the court should

have referenced “the positive aspects of the [PSI report] in fashioning the

sentence in this case[.]” Appellant’s brief at 15, 36.

      This Court has recognized that “claims premised on imposition of

consecutive sentences do not raise a substantial question for our review.”

Commonwealth v. Radecki, 180 A.3d 441, 468 (Pa.Super. 2018).                   “A

court’s exercise of discretion in imposing a sentence concurrently or

consecutively   does    not   ordinarily    raise   a   substantial   question[.]”

Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 769 (Pa.Super. 2015) (en

banc), appeal denied, 126 A.3d 1282 (Pa. 2015).            Likewise, “a claim of

inadequate consideration of mitigating factors does not raise a substantial

question for our review.” Commonwealth v. Crawford, 257 A.3d 75, 79

(Pa.Super. 2021) (citations omitted); see also Caldwell, 117 A.3d at 769

(Pa.Super. 2015) (holding that, “ordinarily, a claim that the sentencing court

failed to consider or accord proper weight to a specific sentencing factor does

not raise a substantial question.”).

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       Based on the foregoing, we find that Appellant’s argument fails to raise

a substantial question, and, therefore, he has not preserved his challenge to

the discretionary aspects of sentencing.4

       Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the October 25,

2022 judgment of sentence.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 2/27/2024

____________________________________________

4  Even if Appellant had raised a substantial question for this Court's
consideration, we would find no abuse of discretion. The record reflects that
the trial court indicated that it thoroughly reviewed the PSI report in this
matter. See notes of testimony, 10/25/22 at 26-27; see also trial court
opinion, 4/18/23 at 12. Where the trial court has the benefit of a PSI report,
“we shall . . . presume that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant
information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those
considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v.
Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 761 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted), appeal
denied, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014).

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