Court Opinion

ID: 9672134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:49:31.746924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:14.477056
License: Public Domain

KINKEADE, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would hold that the jury’s finding that Lorillard was grossly negligent is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust.
Regarding gross negligence, the Supreme Court of Texas has said:
Gross negligence, to be the ground for exemplary damages, should be that entire want of care which would raise the belief that the act or omission complained of was the result of a conscious indifference to the right or welfare of the person or persons to be affected by it.
Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 920 (Tex.1981). The supreme court added that the terms “gross negligence” and “heedless and reckless disregard” are synonymous terms and illustrated that syn-onymity with the following definition of “heedless and reckless disregard”: “[M]ore than momentary thoughtlessness, inadvertence, of error of judgment. It means such an entire want of care as to indicate that the act or omission in question was the result of conscious indifference to the rights, welfare, or safety of the persons affected by it.” Burk Royalty Co., 616 S.W.2d at 920 (emphasis added). Finally, elaborating upon the term, “such an entire want of care,” the supreme court said:
In testing the jury finding of gross negligence, the phrase “entire want of care” must be understood in the context of the whole sentence. The jury is not simplistically instructed that it must find an “entire want of care,” but "... such an entire want of care as ... shows the act or omission was the result of conscious indifference....” If more than one act or omission is alleged and evidence produced to support them, the phrase “acts or omissions” should be used. The essence of gross negligence is not the neglect which must, of course, exist. What lifts ordinary negligence into gross negligence is the mental attitude of the defendant; that is what justifies the penal nature of the imposition of exemplary damages. The plaintiff must show that the defendant was consciously, i.e., knowingly, indifferent to his rights, welfare and safety. In other words, the plaintiff must show that the defendant knew about the peril, but his acts or omissions demonstrated that he didn’t care. Such conduct can be active or passive in nature.
Burk Royalty Co., 616 S.W.2d at 922.
The supreme court has stated the test for factual sufficiency as follows:
The question requires the Court of ... Appeals, in the exercise of its peculiar powers under the constitution and [the] Texas Rules of Civil Procedure ..., to consider and weigh all of the evidence in the case and to set aside the verdict and remand the cause for a new trial, if it thus concludes that the verdict is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust — this, regardless of whether the record contains some “evidence of probative force” in support of the verdict.... The evidence supporting the verdict is to be weighed along with the other evidence in the case, including that which is contrary to the verdict.
... It is in effect an erroneous ruling of law that the existence of “any evidence of probative force” in support of the verdict determines that the verdict is *614not “contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence.”
In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 664-65, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (1951).
The record reveals that when Lorillard hired Johnson in late 1978, it obtained a driving record on Johnson for the five preceding years, which revealed one citation for an improper turn, two citations for speeding, and two citations for automobile accidents. Lorillard requested no other driving record. From 1978 through mid-December 1982, Johnson did not recall any citations for moving violations. Davis produced evidence that Johnson received speeding tickets on December 12,1982, and October 30, 1984. Johnson testified that Lorillard did not ask him about his driving record or traffic violations after Lorillard hired him until the time of the accident in question.
Walsh, who did not personally appear before the jury but whose deposition testimony was apparently read to the jury, stated that he checked to see if an employee had a driver’s license on a yearly basis. Walsh also said that Lorillard’s accident review committee reviews an employee’s driving record after an accident and that Johnson’s driving record had never been reviewed; this suggests that from late 1978 until December 28, 1984, the date of the accident in question, Johnson had not been involved in an accident involving a company vehicle. The majority states that Walsh gave Johnson a half-hour driving test four times a year. Finally, after the accident in question, Lorillard still employs Johnson and still permits Johnson to use a car.
Although there is some evidence of probative force to support the verdict, in my view, the jury finding is manifestly unjust. Whether Lorillard still entrusts Johnson with a car is not relevant to whether Loril-lard was grossly negligent in entrusting the car to Johnson in December 1984. Given the fact that (1) Lorillard reviewed Johnson’s driving record before employing him, (2) Lorillard required Johnson to take a driving test four times a year, (3) Lorillard annually checked to see that Johnson had a valid driver’s license, and (4) Lorillard reviews an employee’s driving record after an accident illustrate to me that the jury’s finding that Lorillard was consciously indifferent to the rights and welfare of others and has exhibited an entire want of care is clearly wrong or the result of passion, prejudice, or improper motive. Swinney v. Winters, 532 S.W.2d 396, 406 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.). I will not speculate on what prompted the jury to find Lorillard grossly negligent, I simply state that the jury’s finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to shock the conscience. Accordingly, I would sustain Lor-illard’s point of error five, reverse the judgment of the trial court, and remand the cause for a new trial.
Regarding point of error one, Lorillard argues that the trial court erred in submitting jury question four because it imper-missibly commented on the weight of the evidence by assuming that Johnson was reckless. Although I am troubled with the submission of the question and instruction on Lorillard’s negligence, I agree with the majority that point of error one should be overruled. However, because my reasoning for overruling point of error one is different than the majority’s, I state my reasoning below.
Jury question four asks, “Did the negligence, if any, of Lorillard proximately cause the occurrence in question?” This question does not comment on the weight of the evidence and does not assume that Johnson was reckless. Lorillard’s argument, when focused on the jury question itself, has no merit.
However, Lorillard’s argument in its brief does not focus on the jury question; rather, Lorillard’s argument focuses on the accompanying instruction, which states:
As to Lorillard, “negligence” means its entrusting a vehicle to a reckless driver if the entruster knew or should have known that the driver was reckless. Such negligence is a proximate cause of a collision if the negligence of the driver to whom the vehicle was entrusted is a proximate cause of the collision.
*615At trial, Lorillard objected to the jury question and not to the accompanying instruction. Where a trial court gives a definition or an instruction in connection with a special issue and a party is not satisfied with the instruction or definition given, in order to preserve error, a party must object to the instruction or definition “specifically and clearly pointing out wherein it is claimed the given instruction or definition is insufficient or is in error. It is not necessary for the objecting party to tender with his objection a substantially correct instruction or definition.” Yellow Cab & Baggage Co. v. Green, 154 Tex. 330, 333, 277 S.W.2d 92, 93 (1955); TEX.R.CIV.P. 274. Therefore, because Lorillard did not object to the instruction, it waived the error, if any.
Lorillard also argues that the trial court erred in failing to define “reckless.” When the court’s charge contains no instruction or definition, the complaining party must accompany his specific and clear objections to such omission with a substantially correct definition or instruction. Yellow Cab & Baggage Co., 277 S.W.2d at 93; TEX.R. CIV.P. 278. Because Lorillard failed to submit a definition of “reckless” in substantially correct form, Lorillard waived this error, if any.
In its brief, Lorillard also argues that the trial court erred by failing to submit a separate question on whether Johnson was a reckless driver, which Lorillard contends was an essential element of Davis’s claim of negligent entrustment. Lorillard did not raise this issue at trial; therefore, because Davis submitted and the jury found an element of Davis’s ground of recovery, “such omitted element or elements shall be deemed found by the court in such manner as to support to judgment.” TEX.R.CIV.P. 279. This argument is without merit.
Lorillard has attempted to stretch its objection to the jury question to cover possible infirmities in the jury instruction, the failure to define “reckless,” and the omission of an element of Davis’s cause of action. As explained above, Lorillard has not procedurally preserved its error on those issues. In my opinion, the majority's discussion of the broad-form submission of jury questions is unnecessary. I would not address the issue of whether the question and instruction are proper under current practice and would leave that issue for another occasion when the complained-of error is properly preserved.