Court Opinion

ID: 9377895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-09 00:02:14.243777+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:17.725651
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/8/23 Regos v. Reed CA2/3

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 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION THREE

 JOHN REGOS et al.,                                           B316267

      Plaintiffs and Appellants,                              (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. BC710184)
      v.

 JACKIE LYNN REED,

      Defendant and Respondent.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Wendy Chang, Judge. Reversed.
      Nordstrom, Steele, Nicolette and Blythe, Alan K. Nicolette
for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
      Derryberry & Associates, Alexander L. Massari for
Defendant and Respondent.
             _______________________________________
                       INTRODUCTION
      This appeal raises the question of whether the wife of a
deceased attorney has the right to continue to receive annuity
payments in fulfillment of an attorney fees award that her
husband procured in excess of the court’s jurisdiction. Despite
the passage of time, we conclude the answer is no.
       FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      The facts necessary to resolve this matter are not in
dispute.
      1. Underlying case of Regos v. Ransom
      In 2003, Mary Louise Ebanal1 (then Regos) was separating
from her partner Victor Ransom. With her minor children John
Regos, Jr. and Jenifer2 Regos, she went to the family home to
remove her belongings. John Regos, Sr., who was her ex-husband
and the father of her two children, assisted her. Ransom
appeared and threatened Ebanal and John Regos, Jr. with a gun.
When Regos Sr. approached, Ransom shot and killed him.
Ransom is currently in prison for that murder.
      Ebanal became the sole source of support for herself and
her children. While working as a limo driver, she met attorney
Brian Reed. Reed offered to represent her and her children in a
wrongful death action against Ransom. Ebanal had no money to
pay Reed for his services, and Reed told her that they would work
that out later. Ebanal knew that Reed was not representing

1 This name is spelled in various ways in the record. Because it
is spelled “Ebanal” by appellants on appeal, we use that spelling.
2This name is also spelled differently in various parts of the
record. Because it is spelled “Jenifer” by appellants on appeal,
we use that spelling.

                                 2
them for free. However, there was no written fee agreement for
legal services between Reed and Ebanal or her children.
       In 2003, Ebanal, John Regos Jr. and Jenifer Regos (the
Regos plaintiffs) filed a wrongful death action against Ransom.
Reed represented the plaintiffs. The complaint stated claims
against Ransom for wrongful death, negligence, intentional
infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of
emotional distress.3 The complaint sought compensatory and
punitive damages, but did not seek attorney fees, or set forth any
statutory basis for attorney fees.
       Ransom defaulted in that action. Reed prepared a default
judgment packet and proposed judgment against Ransom. The
only evidence offered in support of the proposed judgment were
declarations by each plaintiff. Nothing was presented that
related to Reed’s entitlement to fees.
       In 2004, the trial judge held a default prove-up and
according to the resulting minute order, awarded the following:
(a) compensatory damages of $1 million to each minor plaintiff
and $350,000 to Ebanal; (b) punitive damages of $100,000 to
John Regos, Jr., $75,000 to Jenifer Regos, and $50,000 to Ebanal;
(c) restitution; and (d) $524.50 for “costs plus attorney fees.”
       Reed then submitted a proposed judgment. The judgment
included the following language: “the Court finds that counsel for
the Plaintiffs shall receive 25 [percent] of all sums received by
each minor as and for attorneys’ fees and an amount equal to 33
1/3 [percent] plus costs from all amounts received by Mary Louise
Regos, as an individual.”

3A fifth claim against the County of Los Angeles for failure to
provide police services was dismissed after demurrer.

                                3
       The judgment was signed and filed on November 22, 2004.
Reed timely advised the plaintiffs of the terms of the judgment
and they did not express disagreement. The judgment was
renewed by Reed on November 21, 2014.
       2. The annuity and enforcement of the
          judgment
       The only asset that Ransom possessed from which he could
pay the judgment was a monthly annuity that he had been
awarded prior to the events leading to the wrongful death action.
Prior to their separation, Ebanal and Ransom had been in an
auto accident. The resolution of that case resulted in a
structured settlement whereby Ransom was to receive a $2,000
monthly annuity payment for the rest of his life.
       After the judgment in Regos was entered, the court
approved a stipulation between the Regos plaintiffs and Farmers
New World Life and Farmers Services Company (collectively,
Farmers) to permit the Regos plaintiffs to enforce their judgment
through Ransom’s $2,000 monthly annuity payment. That
stipulation was entered into by Reed on behalf of the Regos
plaintiffs and by an attorney who represented Farmers. None of
the plaintiffs signed that stipulation.
       Paragraph 2 of that stipulation and order was altered by
interlineation. The original language read as follows:
“Intervenors/Defendants will pay the $2,000 monthly payments
by check payable to Brian E. Reed, John Louis Regos, Jr., Mary
Louise Regos, individually and as guardian ad litem, for Jenifer
Louise Regos and shall mail the check to Brian E. Reed.”
       The interlineation struck out the names of the payees and
replaced the payee with “Brian E. Reed Trust Account.” It
further added a sentence at the end of that paragraph as follows:

                                4
“Mr. Reed will then distribute the sums received to the plaintiffs
and shall receive his attorney’s fees from each payment.” Only
the attorneys initialed the interlineations. The stipulation was
signed as an order of the court on September 22, 2005.
       Reed timely advised the Regos plaintiffs of this
arrangement and they did not express disagreement with it.
       3. The current dispute and interpleader
       For more than 12 years thereafter, Farmers sent the $2,000
monthly annuity check to Reed, and Reed deducted $500 from
each such payment, passing the remainder on to the Regos
plaintiffs.4
       Reed died in March 2017.5
       After Reed’s death, his widow, Jackie Lynn Reed, wrote to
Farmers to inform them that her husband had died. Unable to
cash the checks made out to her husband’s trust account, she
returned three of the garnishment checks that had been received
after her husband’s death and sought reissuance of the checks in
her name. Farmers declined to do so without proof of her
entitlement as a successor or a court order. Farmers also
declined to pay any amount directly to the Regos plaintiffs.

4It is undisputed that Reed took a flat 25 percent of the monthly
annuity, despite the judgment’s provision that he was entitled to
take 33.3 percent of the proceeds that were received by one of the
three plaintiffs; namely, Ebanal.
5 The parties also stipulated that Reed was on inactive status as
of November 2015. Although the Regos plaintiffs argued that
this made him ineligible for further attorney fee payments as of
that time, the trial court rejected this argument, finding that he
fully earned his fee award when he performed the services in the
Regos v. Ransom case in 2004 and 2005.

                                5
       In June 2018, the three Regos plaintiffs (all of whom were
now adults) filed a complaint for declaratory relief against Jackie
Lynn Reed and Farmers as well as damages for conversion
against Farmers. They claimed that the entirety of the $2,000
annuity payments should now be paid to them and that Jackie
Lynn Reed had no right to payments as her husband’s successor.
They did not challenge or seek to disgorge the payments that had
already been made to attorney Reed. They sought relief in the
form of “a declaration of the parties’ respective duties, rights, and
responsibilities concerning the $2000/month Ransom annuity
payments” and “modification of the September 22, 2005 [o]rder to
require that the $2000/month Ransom annuity payments be
made directly to [p]laintiffs.”
       Farmers then filed a cross-complaint in interpleader
against the Regos plaintiffs and Jackie Lynn Reed. Farmers
admitted that it owed $2,000 per month but alleged that the
cross-defendants’ respective claims were adverse and conflicted
with the 2005 Stipulation and Order requiring the check to be
made payable to the Brian Reed trust account.
       Reed then filed her cross-complaint against the Regos
plaintiffs, alleging a single cause of action for declaratory relief.
In that cross-complaint, Jackie Lynn Reed asserted her right to
25 percent of all sums awarded to each minor and 33 1/3 percent
of the sums awarded to Mary Louise Regos, for a total of
$685,250 in attorney fees. After providing credits for sums paid
to Reed pursuant to the stipulation in the amount of $500/month,
she claimed to still be owed “more than $600,000.” She sought in
her prayer for relief that each future annuity payment of $2,000
be awarded in its entirety to her husband’s estate until that debt
was satisfied.

                                  6
       The claims against Farmers were resolved and Farmers
was dismissed from the litigation, still waiting for instructions on
whom to pay the interpleaded funds.
       The matter came on for bench trial in June 2021 as
between the Regos plaintiffs and Jackie Lynn Reed. No live
testimony was taken; the parties submitted stipulated facts,
testimonial evidence by way of declarations, and referred to or
incorporated prior declarations filed in either this case or in the
prior Regos action which the court accepted into evidence.
       The trial court ruled in favor of Jackie Lynn Reed. It found
that although there was no written attorney fee agreement that
would support an award of contingency fees, the court during the
default action must have intended to award the fees to Reed on a
quantum meruit basis. The court further concluded that even if
the prior judge had no legal authority to make the award, the
judgment should have been timely challenged by means of a
motion for reconsideration, motion to vacate, or an appeal.
Finally, the court concluded that the 13-year delay between the
date of the default judgment and the date the Regos plaintiffs
filed their complaint was “fatal” to their claims under the
doctrine of laches.
       This appeal followed.
                           DISCUSSION
    A. Standard of review
       This case involves the interplay between various methods
of challenging a judgment, entitlement to attorney fees in the
absence of a written agreement, and the equitable doctrines of
laches.
       We agree with appellants that the standard of review here
is de novo. (International Engine Parts, Inc. v. Fedderson & Co.

                                 7
(1995) 9 Cal.4th 606, 611 [where the relevant facts are not in
dispute, we review the application of law to those facts as a
question of law, and hence, de novo]; Bakersfield Elementary
Teachers Assn. v. Bakersfield City School Dist. (2006) 145
Cal.App.4th 1260, 1274 [“Laches is a question of fact for the trial
court, but may be decided as a matter of law where, as here, the
relevant facts are undisputed”].)6
    B. The Regos plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory
       relief
             1. That portion of the 2004 judgment
                regarding attorney fees is void because
                the court lacked jurisdiction
       The Regos plaintiffs’ fundamental argument on appeal, as
it was below, is that the original award of attorney fees in the
2004 judgment was void because the court had no jurisdiction to
make that award. As the fee award was void, they contend, the
subsequent stipulation and order that purported to grant
attorney Reed the ability to receive his attorney’s fees from each
payment was also void.
       We agree. The California Supreme Court has consistently
held that a judgment is void to the extent that a court lacks
jurisdiction. (In re Marriage of Goddard (2004) 33 Cal.4th 49, 56
[a judgment is void when the court “lack[s] fundamental

6 Respondent does not dispute that this is the proper standard of
review. (Cf. Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 656
[“appellant must present each point separately in the opening
brief under an appropriate heading, showing the nature of the
question to be presented and the point to be made; otherwise, the
point will be forfeited”].)

                                 8
authority over the subject matter, question presented, or party”];
Armstrong v. Armstrong (1976) 15 Cal.3d 942, 950 [“Collateral
attack is proper to contest lack of personal or subject matter
jurisdiction or the granting of relief which the court has no power
to grant”]; Olivera v. Grace (1942) 19 Cal.2d 570, 574 [“a court
has inherent power, apart from statute, to correct its records by
vacating a judgment which is void on its face, for such a
judgment is a nullity and may be ignored”].)7
      The jurisdictional error in this case was to provide relief to
a nonparty (attorney Reed) regarding a matter that was never
put to it (the fee award).
      “ ‘A judgment in favor of a person who is not a party to the
action is obviously beyond the authority of the court’ and hence is
void.” (Moore v. Kaufman (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 604, 615; 2
Witkin, Cal. Procedure (6th ed. 2022) Jurisdiction, § 331, p. 937.)
      In Overell v. Overell (1937) 18 Cal.App.2d 499 (Overell), a
very similar fact pattern to the case at bar was presented. In a
quiet title action, a judgment was entered which included a

7 The Regos plaintiffs contend that the award of attorney fees was
a clerical error that can be corrected nunc pro tunc. We disagree.
“ ‘The distinction between clerical error and judicial error is
“whether the error was made in rendering the judgment, or in
recording the judgment rendered.” ’ ” (Ukegawa Brothers v.
Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1314,
1318.) Here, it appears from the minute order that the judge did
render a decision for “costs plus attorney fees.” The judgment
then fleshed out in more detail the fees that were owed. Thus, we
find the case of Estate of Goldberg (1938) 10 Cal.2d 709, 715–716,
cited by Ebanal, inapplicable. Instead, however, we find the
error to have been a judicial one that led to a partially void
judgment.

                                 9
provision that plaintiff’s attorney was entitled to 25 percent of
the amounts recovered on behalf of the plaintiff as well as 25
percent of some other items of property.
       The court agreed with the client that this provision was
void, noting: “The judgment purports to adjudicate and establish
the rights of the attorney under the agreement as against his
client. This, of course, could have been done only after the trial of
an action in which the parties to the agreement had been given
an opportunity to present their respective demands and . . .
defenses. . . . It could not be done ex parte nor in a summary
manner. . . . One who is not originally a party can become a party
only by order of court upon proper application. [Citation.] A
judgment must be confined to matters which have been placed in
issue by the parties and those which are necessarily involved.”
(Overell, supra, 18 Cal.App.2d at pp. 502–503.) The court
concluded that while any fee dispute could undoubtedly have
been resolved in a separate action, there was nothing in the
judgment roll to show “even remotely, that the court had
jurisdiction to render any judgment as between [client] and her
attorney.” (Id. at p. 503; accord Wong v. Superior Court (1966)
246 Cal.App.2d 541, 546 [“Attorney Wong is not a party to the
action. ‘It is the general rule that a judgment may not be entered
either for or against a person who is not a party to the
proceeding, and any judgment which does so is void to that
extent.’ ”]; Moore v. Kaufman, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at pp. 614–
616 [judgment requiring attorney to pay other party’s attorney
fees was void where attorney was not a party to the action and in
the absence of statutory authority].)
       In Bandy v. Mt. Diablo Unified School Dist. (1976) 56
Cal.App.3d 230, a discharged attorney filed a motion for attorney

                                 10
fees and a lien for fees and costs advanced in his former client’s
underlying case. After a hearing, the court granted the
attorney’s motion. On appeal, the court reversed, finding that an
attorney’s lien against the prospective recovery of a client upon
his claim “must be enforced . . . in an independent action by the
attorney against the client and the attorney has no right to
intervene in the main action to which he is not a party.” (Id. at
p. 234.) The court found that the judgment granting the attorney
fees made in the main action was therefore void. (Ibid.)
       Here, attorney Reed was not a party to this action, nor did
he ever file any motion or petition for attorney fees – even
assuming that he had a statutory basis to do so. As in Overell,
the judgment is void to the extent it “purports to adjudicate and
establish the rights of the attorney under the agreement as
against his client” without notice and an opportunity for both
parties to present their respective demands and defenses.
(Overell, supra, 18 Cal.App.2d at p. 502.) “Due process of law
does not permit an attorney to step out of his fiduciary role
temporarily and obtain a judgment for his own benefit against his
client.” (Wong v. Superior Court, supra, 246 Cal.App.2d at
p. 549.)
       In addition to lacking jurisdiction over a nonparty, the
court also lacked jurisdiction over the issue of the distribution of
the proceeds between plaintiffs and their lawyer.
       In Plaza Hollister Ltd. Partnership v. County of San Benito
(1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1, the court held that a judgment is void
when the court grants relief beyond its authority to grant. There,
the judgment was found void because the trial court had no
power to grant relief as to any tax payment for which there was
not a timely claim for refund. (Id. at p. 36; see also Heidary v.

                                11
Yadollahi (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 857, 862–864 [judgment void
when the court had no power to order entry of default when
defendants failed to appear for trial despite being served].)
       In the context of default judgments, Code of Civil Procedure
section 580 provides that the “relief granted to the plaintiff, if
there is no answer, cannot exceed that demanded in the
complaint . . . [or in a statement of damages].” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 580.) A default judgment entered in violation of that statute is
void “ ‘because it is beyond the court’s jurisdiction to enter.’ ”
(Machado v. Myers (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 779, 798.)
       Relying on Code of Civil Procedure section 580, our
Supreme Court has held that a judgment was void where, among
other things, it awarded $2,500 in attorney fees where attorney
fees were not included in the prayer for relief. (Becker v. S.P.V.
Construction Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 489, 491, 495.)
       Many cases have come to the same conclusion. (Burtnett v.
King (1949) 33 Cal.2d 805, 807 [judgment void where court
“wholly lacked jurisdiction to render a judgment affecting the
community property, for there was no demand for such relief”];
see also Swycaffer v. Swycaffer (1955) 44 Cal.2d 689, 693 [default
judgment that exceeds the demand or gives relief where no
demand is made therefor is void].)
       Moreover, if the judgment is only partially void, and the
void part is severable, that part alone may be collaterally
attacked, and the remainder will remain effective. (Becker v.
S.P.V. Construction Co., supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 495 [remanding
case to the trial court with directions to modify the judgment by
striking the attorney fees].)
       Here, there was no basis for attorney fees set forth in the
prayer for relief, the request for default, and no motion or

                                12
petition for attorney fees was ever filed. Accordingly, the court
awarded relief in excess of its jurisdiction.
       For all these reasons, we agree with the Regos plaintiffs
that the portion of the judgment awarding a percentage to Reed
was void.
             2. The attorney fee award cannot be
                 justified as a determination of quantum
                 meruit
       The trial court concluded that even though there was no
request made for attorney fees in the Regos v. Ransom matter,
and no evidence of how much the attorney should have received
in the absence of any written contingency agreement, the
provision in the judgment was a valid “quantum meruit finding”
by the original Regos v. Ransom judge, as he “was in the best
position to determine the value [of] that work.” Upon closer
examination, this conclusion does not withstand scrutiny for the
same reasons as described above.
       The general principles applicable to enforcement of an
attorney’s fee in the absence of a written agreement are not in
dispute. “Except as attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by
statute, the measure and mode of compensation . . . is left to the
agreement, express or implied, of the parties.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1021.)
       California law sets forth several requirements for an
attorney to represent a client on a contingency fee basis. As
relevant here, Business and Professions Code section 6147,
subdivision (a) requires that the contract be in writing; that it
include a statement of the contingency fee rate that the attorney
and client have agreed on; that it state how disbursement and
costs will affect the client’s recovery; and that it states that the

                                13
fee is not set by law but is negotiable between the attorney and
the client. (Ibid.) Failure to comply with any provision of this
section renders the agreement voidable8 at the option of the
client, and the attorney shall thereupon be entitled to collect a
reasonable fee. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6147, subd. (b).)9
       However, while it is true that an attorney is entitled to
quantum meruit in the absence of a valid written contingency fee
agreement, that dispute must be squarely raised and adjudicated,
and cannot be decided sub silentio by approving a default
judgment in which the issue was never mentioned in any
pleadings.
       “[W]hen legal services have been provided without a valid
written fee agreement, the attorney may recover the reasonable
value of the services she performed in the action pursuant to a
common count for quantum meruit.” (Leighton v. Forster (2017) 8

8Voidable is distinct from void: A voidable act may be rendered
null at the option of the wronged party, but is not void until so
entered. (Depner v. Joseph Zukin Blouses (1936) 13 Cal.App.2d
124, 127; White Dragon Productions, Inc. v. Performance
Guarantees, Inc. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 163, 172 [same].)
9 There is no statute of limitations or other “timeliness
component” for a client who seeks to void an agreement that fails
to comply with section 6147. (O&C Creditors Group, LLC v.
Stephens & Stephens XII, LLC (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 546, 576.)
It may be voided before or after services are provided. (Alderman
v. Hamilton (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1033, 1038 [clients waived
their right to void the entire contract by agreeing to pay the
contingency relating to one part of their case but exercised their
right to void it when they denied that the contract was
enforceable and refused to pay any more to attorney for a
different issue].)

                                14
Cal.App.5th 467, 490.) There is a two-year statute of limitations,
which commences on either the date the last payment was made
toward the attorney fees, or the last date that the attorney
performed services in the case. (Ibid.) A claim for quantum
meruit is considered an action at law, not in equity. (Chodos v.
Borman (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 76, 97.) The parties to a
quantum meruit claim have a right to a jury trial. (Jogani v.
Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 901, 907.)
       For that reason, disputes as to the appropriate amount
owed under quantum meruit involve cases between the attorney
and the client. (See, e.g., Wiley v. Silsbee (1934) 1 Cal.App.2d
520, 521–522 [in case brought by attorney against former client,
attorney was entitled to quantum meruit even though their
contract was void as against public policy]; Iverson, Yoakum,
Papiano & Hatch v. Berwald (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 990, 996 [in
case brought by attorney against former client, contract was
unenforceable because not in writing; an action will lie upon a
common count for quantum meruit and two year statute of
limitations applies].)
       Jackie Lynn Reed argues first, that attorney Reed was
entitled to recover fees under a quantum meruit analysis, and
second, that the case of Flannery v. Prentice (2001) 26 Cal.4th
572 (Flannery) provides a basis to hold that the clients here
should not able to cut off the attorney’s fee award despite the lack
of a written fee agreement.
       As to the first argument, as noted above, Reed was
certainly entitled to seek his fees in quantum meruit by filing an
action and supporting his claim with appropriate evidence.
(Mardirossian & Associates, Inc. v. Ersoff (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th

                                15
257, 272 [setting forth factors to be considered in awarding fees
in quantum meruit action].) He did not do so.
       As for Flannery, the case is inapposite. In that case, the
California Supreme Court held that, in the absence of an
enforceable agreement to the contrary, any attorney fees obtained
under Government Code section 12965 (the Fair Employment
and Housing Act) belong to the attorney, not the client. In that
case, a client brought an action against her attorneys seeking a
judicial declaration that she was entitled to the statutory
attorney fee awarded in an earlier action. (Flannery, supra, 26
Cal.4th at p. 576.) In the earlier action, a motion for statutory
attorney fees had been filed in the original action for employment
discrimination on the grounds of both Government Code section
12965 as well as Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, which
resulted in a fee award payable by the defendant. (Flannery, at
p. 576; see also Flannery v. California Highway Patrol (1998) 61
Cal.App.4th 629, 632 [“Plaintiff moved for attorney fees and
expenses”].) The fees were then put at issue in a subsequent case
brought by client against the attorney. (Flannery v. California
Highway Patrol, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 632.) The only
dispute in that second action was whether the fees belonged to
the client or the attorney in the absence of an agreement.
       Here, by contrast, there was no attorney’s fee award
requested in the underlying action, nor was there ever a
proceeding between attorney and client in which the issue of
division of the proceeds or entitlement to fees was ever litigated
(until these declaratory relief actions were filed). Again, while
Reed surely would have had a strong case for quantum meruit

                               16
had he ever filed one, he did not.10 The trial court below erred by
finding that the fee award could stand despite this fundamental
flaw.
    C. The Regos plaintiffs’ challenge was not
       untimely
    Respondent’s brief comes close to conceding the impropriety of
the initial fee award but leans heavily on the trial court’s finding
that any challenge is time-barred. We disagree.
          1. A challenge to a void judgment can be
              brought at any time
       As the lower court held, the Regos plaintiffs’ attack on the
2004 judgment was brought long after the statutory periods set
forth in many if not all modes of direct attack, whether a motion
for reconsideration (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008 [10 days]); a motion
to vacate for relief from default (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (b)
[six months]; but see § 473, subd. (d))11; or an appeal (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.104 [generally 60 days].)

10The Regos plaintiffs are not seeking return of the
approximately $80,000 received by Reed prior to his death. As
the matter is not presented to us, we do not opine as to attorney
Reed’s estate’s ability to obtain a quantum meruit award or what
that amount might be.
11 Some courts have held that a motion brought under Code of
Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d), which provides that
the court may “on motion of either party after notice to the other
party, set aside any void judgment or order” may be brought after
the normal six-month period set forth in subdivision (b) where a
judgment was void because the court lacked jurisdiction. (Sindler
v. Brennan (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1353.)

                                 17
       However, the court below erred when it concluded that
because those statutory periods had passed, it lacked the power
to vacate or change a judgment issued by another trial court.
“When a court lacks jurisdiction in a fundamental sense, an
ensuing judgment is void, and ‘thus vulnerable to direct or
collateral attack at any time.’ ”12 (People v. American Contractors
Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 660; Plaza Hollister Ltd.
Partnership v. County of San Benito, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at
p. 19 [“ ‘a judgment or order which is void on its face, and which

12 For purposes of this appeal, we need not delve into the complex
distinction between a collateral or direct attack on a judgment,
referred to by one commentator as “one of the most obscure areas
of procedural law.” (Comment, The Value of the Distinction
Between Direct and Collateral Attacks on Judgments (1957) 66
Yale L.J. 526.) Suffice it to say that under California law, a
direct attack is a proceeding instituted for the specific purpose of
vacating or reversing a judgment such as by a motion for new
trial or appeal; it is the only method for attacking a judgment
which, no matter how erroneous it may be, was within the
jurisdiction of the court. (8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (6th ed. 2022)
Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, §§ 1–2, pp. 584–585.)
       By contrast, a collateral attack is made not in a proceeding
brought for the specific purpose of attacking the judgment, but in
some other proceeding in which the judgment comes up only
incidentally; in such a proceeding the judgment may be
challenged only if it is so completely invalid as to require no
ordinary review to annul it. (8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (6th ed.
2022) Attack on Judgment in Trial Court, §§ 6–7, pp. 590–591.)
“A motion to vacate or set aside the judgment, if made after the
statutory time has elapsed for direct attack by motion, or if made
on grounds or under a procedure not authorized by the statutes
governing direct attack, is a collateral attack.” (Id. at § 8,
pp. 592–593.)

                                18
requires only an inspection of the judgment-roll or record to show
its invalidity, may be set aside on motion, at any time after its
entry, by the court which rendered the judgment or made the
order’ ”];13 Wells Fargo & Co. v. City and County of San Francisco
(1944) 25 Cal.2d 37, 40 [“a motion to vacate a judgment, made
after the expiration of the six-month period allowed in section
473 of the Code of Civil Procedure for a motion to set aside a
default judgment, is governed by the rules applicable to collateral
attack. [Citations.] In the absence of extrinsic fraud or mistake
[citation] a judgment so attacked cannot be set aside unless it is
void on its face”].)
       Given the viability of challenging a void judgment as
described above, the cases cited by the court are simply not on
point. (In re Alberto (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 421, 426–427 [one
judge should not correct another judge’s prejudgment orders];
Elsea v. Saberi (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 625, 630–631 [one judge
should not grant motion to set aside default judgment when a
prior judge had already rejected an prior request to set it aside,
alleging the same basis for relief, which was then pending on
appeal at the time the second motion was filed]; Church of
Scientology v. Armstrong (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1060, 1070 [trial
court erred in vacating, on its own motion, a prior judge’s order
sealing the record, during the proceedings].)

13The judgment roll in a civil action where judgment was entered
by default, as occurred here, is defined as: the summons, proof of
service, complaint, the request for entry of default, and the
judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 670, subd. (a).)

                                19
      Here, we conclude that the attorney’s fee portion of the
judgment is void on the face of the record (i.e., by reference to
who the parties were and what relief was sought as set forth in
the judgment roll) and hence could be challenged at any time.
          2. The court erred in concluding that laches
               barred relief for the Regos plaintiffs
      The trial court here held that “the thirteen-year delay
Plaintiffs waited to assert their objections is fatal to their current
claims. . . . Laches may be found where there is 1) an omission to
assert a right; 2) a delay in assertion of that right for some
applicable period, and 3) circumstances which would cause
prejudice to an adverse party if assertion of the right is
permitted. (Stafford v. Ballinger (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 289,
296.) All elements are met in this matter. Plaintiffs accepted the
payment arrangements under the 2004 Judgment and the
Stipulation and refrained from asserting their objections for 13
years.”
      The affirmative defense of laches requires “unreasonable
delay in bringing suit ‘plus either acquiescence in the act about
which plaintiff complains or prejudice to the defendant resulting
from the delay.’ ” (Miller v. Eisenhower Medical Center (1980) 27
Cal.3d 614, 624.)14

14Although some cases omit the word “unreasonable” when
stating the delay prong, analysis of those cases shows that the
delay was in fact found to be unreasonable. In Stafford, for
example, the party who delayed filing a claim had both full
knowledge that the other part refused to complete the sale (the
basis for his claim) and also had no disability; thus, the court
held there was no reason not to enforce the statute of limitations.
(Stafford v. Ballinger, supra, 199 Cal.App.2d at p. 295.)

                                 20
       However, laches does not apply when a judgment is void.
In an action seeking to vacate a judgment which is void for lack of
jurisdiction of the court to enter it, the judgment is “for all
purposes a nullity” in that regard. (City of Los Angeles v. Morgan
(1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 726, 732.) Accordingly, “neither laches nor
the ordinary statutes of limitation may be invoked as a defense.”
(Ibid.) “Prejudice is not a factor” when a challenged order is void.
(Sindler v. Brennan, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 1354; see also
Sugimoto v. Exportadora de Sal, S.A. de C.V. (1991) 233
Cal.App.3d 165, 170 [“Prejudice is irrelevant to the issue of
jurisdiction”].)
       Since we conclude that this judgment was in fact void,
laches may not be invoked as a defense at all, regardless of any
prejudice.
       Even if laches were a defense in this case, though, the
finding of laches could not be upheld. While some cases define
unreasonable delay as delay which results in prejudice (see
George v. Shams-Shirazi (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 134, 142), most
focus either implicitly or explicitly on whether a party’s delay was
otherwise justifiable or not attributable to that party. (See, e.g.,
Potter v. Contra Costa Realty Co. (1934) 220 Cal. 31, 34 [delay in
asserting rights justified when the defaulting party represented
he would make good his default]; Highland Springs Conference &
Training Center v. City of Banning (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 267,
286, fn. 5 [comment in Restatement of Judgments § 129 subd. (b)
explains that establishing a defense of laches requires not merely
a “ ‘lapse of time’ ” but a showing that the party seeking relief has
been “ ‘unreasonable in his delay after learning the facts’ ”].)
       When the delay is due to the conduct of another party – in
particular, the opposing party in the litigation – the party

                                 21
causing the delay cannot take advantage of its own conduct by
raising the defense of laches. (See Bakersfield Elementary
Teachers Assn. v. Bakersfield City School Dist., supra, 145
Cal.App.4th at p. 1275 [“The District may not now complain the
temporary employees waited too long to assert a right the District
misled them into believing they had already given up. [Footnote.]
‘One who comes into equity must come with clean hands.’ ”].)
       Laches is even less likely to apply when a party was
prevented from learning all the relevant facts by a fiduciary, such
as one’s attorney. “[A] fiduciary has a duty to make a full and
fair disclosure of all facts which materially affect the rights and
interest of the parties, and, where a fiduciary relationship exists,
facts which would ordinarily require investigation may not excite
suspicion.” (Bennett v. Hibernia Bank (1956) 47 Cal.2d 540, 559–
560.) In such a case, “a plaintiff need not disprove that an earlier
discovery could have been made upon a diligent inquiry but need
show only that he made an actual discovery of hitherto unknown
information within the statutory period before filing the action.”
(Id. at p. 563; see also Hudson v. Foster (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th
640, 667 [“A plaintiff who has no duty to inquire because of a
fiduciary relationship does not need to show that he or she could
not have discovered the facts earlier with a diligent inquiry”].)
       Attorney Reed was a fiduciary of the Regos plaintiffs.
Given his duty to make a full and fair disclosure of all facts which
materially affected his client’s rights, the Regos plaintiffs are not
obligated to prove that they could have earlier discovered that
the attorney’s fee award was void. They brought their action
within 15 months after Reed passed away and once his widow
made known her position on her entitlement to the attorney fees,
presumably with advice from a new attorney. Thus, even if

                                 22
laches were a defense to an attack on a void judgment, the court
erred in finding that laches should bar the plaintiffs’ claims in
the unusual circumstances presented here.

                                23
                           DISPOSITION
       The judgment is reversed with directions to enter judgment
in favor of John Louis Regos, Jr., Jenifer Regos, and Mary Louise
Ebanal on the first cause of action of their complaint against
Jackie Lynn Reed, including the declaration that they alone are
entitled to receive 100 percent of the $2,000 monthly annuity
payments since the date of Brian Reed’s death and going forward,
and against Jackie Lynn Reed on her cross-complaint. The court
is further ordered to modify the September 22, 2005 order to
provide payment directly to appellants. The appellants are
entitled to their costs on appeal.

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                RICHARDSON (ANNE K.), J.*
WE CONCUR:

     LAVIN, Acting P.J.

     EGERTON, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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