Court Opinion

ID: 9747030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:53:30.340538+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:19.450424
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
KLEIN, J.:
¶ 1 Whether or not it is necessary to specifically address the so-called “medical malpractice crisis” in voir dire, I do not believe the official record in this matter is sufficient to hold that plaintiffs were prejudiced during the voir dire process. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 2 Even if the “medical malpractice crisis” should be addressed in voir dire, the actual voir dire process was not transcribed. All that we have is a comment made after the jury was selected indicating that the judge might have refused to ask certain specific questions related to the issue submitted by plaintiffs’ counsel. I do not believe there was error in prohibiting asking those specific questions in the manner in which they were framed. There is no showing that the area could not have been explored by less slanted questions, and in fact, some jurors were excused when a bias concerning medical malpractice cases was shown.
¶ 3 Essentially, we do not know what happened during voir dire. The notes of testimony do not begin until November 17, 2003,6 after the jury had been selected. After explaining to the court the reasons why he wanted the questions asked, the trial judge replied:
The Court: So, basically, you are placing an objection on the record because I would not allow these questions to be read?
Mr. Daniels: Yes, please.
(N.T. 11/17/03, p. 3.)
¶ 4 Certainly an inference may be drawn that the trial court had at least informally told counsel he could not ask the questions at issue. However, given the specific process in question, I do not believe that it is evident that Plaintiffs’ counsel obtained a ruling, formal or informal, directly from the court prior to jury selection.
¶ 5 Even if we proceed on the assumption that counsel was told in no uncertain terms that he could not ask questions 27, 28, 29, and 30 prior to jury selection and the notes of testimony of November 17 are merely a formalization of that prior event, the problem is not solved. The questions, as submitted, are improper. They are blunt instruments which are purportedly being asked to obtain specific information.7 At least one of the questions, number 30, reveals an inherent bias, referring to the “so-called” medical malpractice crisis. Counsel might as well have submitted a question referring to “defendants who just arbitrarily refuse to pay claims.” Thus, I would find no error in denying permission to ask these specific questions.8
*145¶ 6 My disagreement with the majority lies primarily in my belief it is impossible to determine the particular facts presented, or not presented, in this specific case.
¶ 7 The majority states in footnote 2 of its opinion:
Plaintiffs registered their formal objection to the denial by the trial court of their right to have these questions submitted to the jury just prior to the start of trial. See N.T. Voir Dire Objections, 11/17/03, at 2-3 (a proceeding held in open court out of the presence of the jury). It is evident from statements made by Plaintiffs’ attorney and the court that the questions had been timely submitted and had been rejected prior to the start of the jury selection process.
¶ 8 However, from the record, it is impossible to determine exactly what happened during the jury selection process. We do not know whether plaintiffs counsel preserved his right to inquire about the so-called “medical malpractice crisis” in less biased terms. We do know the subject came up in individual voir dire. Since there is no record of the day of the voir dire, we do not know if counsel requested that the judge otherwise allow him to cover the area of the “medical malpractice crisis,” or even requested to create a record to show that nothing about the medical malpractice crisis could be addressed in voir dire. All we know is that after the jury was selected there was an objection noted that indicated that certain specific questions were not permitted by the trial. This is not enough of a record to justify reversal.9
¶ 9 There is nothing on the official record to determine what counsel did beyond submitting objectionable questions to explore the “medical malpractice crisis” issue.10 If counsel believed the issue to be of sufficient merit, counsel should know that the official record must include the relevant testimony/evidence that allows for appellate review. See Pa.R.A.P. 2152. If the official record does not sufficiently reflect what transpired, the issue will generally be deemed waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101. Here, all that is noted is that the particular questions might have been prohibited by the trial judge. Because there was no contemporaneous record made during the jury selection we have only supposition.
¶ 10 There are a multitude of ways to investigate potential bias because of the “medical malpractice crisis” without asking those specific questions. For example, the majority noted the solution offered by Utah in Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96 (Utah Ct.App.1993). After denying Barrett permission to ask 11 questions regarding tort-reform, the Utah Court of Appeals determined the trial court should have taken it upon itself to ask questions on the *146subject. Then the questions could have been asked in a neutral manner.
¶ 11 This leads back to the inadequacy of the official record. Because we have no clear indication of record what happened, we do not know for certain if such solution was proposed and rejected by Capoferri. We do not know if Capoferri wanted these specific questions asked of the jury panel and no others. We do not know to what extent the questions denied could have been worked into follow-up questions.11 Rather, all we have is the agreement of counsel that he objects because the court would not allow “these questions to be read.” See N.T. 11/17/03 at 3 (emphasis added).
¶ 12 I note during argument before our Court counsel stated he was not allowed to make the formal objection on the record until voir dire was completed. Even if true,12 this still does not relieve counsel from the obligation of insuring a complete record is transmitted for our review. See Pa.R.A.P. 1921. Counsel could have described the prior proceedings on the record on November 17. Counsel could have had voir dire taken down by the court reporter and transcribed. Counsel could have made use of Pa.R.A.P. 1923 or 1924 and entered a statement in absence of transcript or agreed statement of record into the official record.13 Because none of these options was taken, the record on this issue is incomplete. Because the record is incomplete, I do not believe we are in a position to grant relief on the issue.
¶ 13 If we do not accept the inference that the Capoferri’s jury questions were ruled on prior to jury selection, then the objection is clearly untimely and the issue should be deemed waived. One of the primary objectives of making an objection is to give the trial court the opportunity to correct the mistake. Once the jury has been selected (and because we do not have any notes of testimony, we do not even know if the jury had been sworn in) it is too late to complain about the selection process. See Commonwealth v. Freeman, 573 Pa. 532, 827 A.2d 385, 396 (2003) (timely objection required to allow trial court remediation of error). It is improper to wait until the entire jury is selected, and then, reflecting that one does not like the composition of the jury as finally selected, retroactively object that questions were not permitted. That should be considered a waiver of any objections, since the judge could have been contacted during the voir dire, not after the jury was selected. If for some reason the judge was not available in this case, that should have been placed on the record. It was not.
¶ 14 It also is questionable whether it would have been an abuse of discretion for the trial judge, who has the flavor of the courtroom, to prohibit specific questions about “tort reform” or a “medical malpractice crisis.” The standard questions cover a number of areas where possible bias is *147explored. It appears counsel was permitted to question the potential jurors individually. Areas of possible prejudice could have been covered further in that way. Again, we just do not know what happened during the voir dire.
¶ 15 Because I believe we do not have a sufficient record to determine whether the objection was timely or whether there were other means available to explore the subject matter,14 I am constrained to dissent.

. The official record did not initially contain any notes of testimony. In response to an order by this Court, belatedly they were attached. It is now clear that the voir dire itself was not transcribed.

. The juror questionnaire contains general questions seeking general responses. Questions seeking specific information need to be so tailored. Questions such as were proposed by plaintiffs could produce a "blurt-out" answer that could taint the entire panel.

.The majority has similar reservations, at least, about the questions, stating: "However, in concluding as we have, we do not necessar*145ily endorse questions proffered by Plaintiffs.” (Majority Opinion at-Pa.-, 893 A.2d at 143.)

. It is likely that the jury was selected on the Friday before the Monday trial starts. In this case that would mean the jury was selected on November 14, 2003, three days before the relevant objection was formally lodged. It appears that the judge was not present for the voir dire, and that it was conducted by counsel or by a member of the judge’s staff or the court staff. In this circumstance, usually the judge is available if there is a disagreement over a particular question that cannot be resolved. Therefore, the lawyer should have the opportunity to have a judicial ruling on a question before the entire jury is selected. If plaintiff’s counsel did not object to the preclusion of alternate means to explore the “medical malpractice” issue other than by his questions, he has waived this issue. Without a record, we cannot tell.

. We note that we cannot remand to the trial court for additional findings by the trial judge, as she is no longer on the bench.

.We do know that to some extent the information sought was elicited in follow-up questioning, as counsel admitted such in the record we do have. Counsel stated to the court: "And, as a matter of fact, during the course of our individual voir dire of the jury, separate and apart from the rest of the group, quite by accident, quite by accident, because they identified their occupation, and that led to another question, in fact, evidenced prejudice.” See N.T. 11/17/03 at 3.

. I do not mean to question counsel’s veracity. This is simply recognition that statements made during argument are not evidence and are not a part of the official record.

. Capoferri's second issue, an evidential question, suffers a similar fate. We are asked to review the trial court's ruling admitting certain evidence without having the benefit of the notes of testimony.

. If the state of the record is such that I cannot even determine whether the objection was timely, this too supports my conclusion that the record is insufficient to make a substantive ruling.