Court Opinion

ID: 9901419
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 19:02:16.773344+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:32.539801
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/21/23 Victoria R. v. Bar-Lev CA4/1

                    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 VICTORIA R.,                                                         D080206

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. 37-2021-
                                                                      00031657-CU-HR-EC
 NAOMI YAEL BAR-LEV,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Sharon L. Kalemkiarian, Judge. Affirmed.
         Naomi Yael Bar-Lev, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
         Victoria R., in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                      MEMORANDUM OPINION1
         Naomi Yael Bar-Lev appeals from the trial court’s January 3, 2022
order granting a one-year civil harassment restraining order for Victoria R.
and her minor son C.R. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6.) Bar-Lev is the

1    We resolve this case by memorandum opinion pursuant to California
Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1.
longtime girlfriend of Chris R., Victoria’s former husband. Chris and Victoria
have two children, A.R. and C.R. There are four appeals currently pending in

this court involving these same parties.2
      Bar-Lev is appearing in propria persona as she did in the trial court.
Although self-represented, we may not excuse Bar-Lev from following the
rules of appellate procedure. (See Stover v. Bruntz (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 19,
31 [“ ‘as is the case with attorneys, [self-represented] litigants must follow
correct rules of procedure’ ”]; accord Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th
1229, 1247 (Nwosu) [a self-represented party “ ‘is to be treated like any other
party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other
litigants and attorneys’ ”].)
      A trial court’s judgment or order is presumed correct and it is the
appellant’s burden to affirmatively show error on appeal. (Denham v.
Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [“ ‘All intendments and presumptions
are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and
error must be affirmatively shown.’ ”]; accord Jameson v. Desta (2018)
5 Cal.5th 594, 608−609.) To make this showing, the appellant must present
meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to facts in the record and
authority to support the claim of error. (Multani v. Witkin & Neal (2013)

215 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1457; see Cal. Rules of Court,3 rule 8.204(a)(1)(C)
[briefs must “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to

2       See D080144 (A.R. v. Bar-Lev, case No. 37-2021-00030596-CU-HR-EC
[civil restraining order protecting A.R. from Bar-Lev]); D080337 (Chris R. v.
Victoria R., case No. D540635 [Chris’s appeal from denial of his petition for a
domestic violence restraining order against Victoria]); and D080340 (A.R. v.
Chris R., case No. 21FDV03545E [Chris’s appeal from order denying domestic
violence restraining order against daughter A.R.]).

3     All further “rule” references are to the Rules of Court.
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the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears”];
id., (a)(1)(B) [briefs must state each “point under a separate heading or
subheading . . . and support each point by argument and, if possible, by
citation of authority”].)
      In addition, the appellant’s factual summary must be limited to
“significant facts . . . in the record” (rule 8.204(a)(2)(C); CIT
Group/Equipment Financing, Inc. v. Super DVD, Inc. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th
537, 539, fn. 1 [“it is well established that a reviewing court may not give any
consideration to alleged facts that are outside of the record on appeal”]) and
must include “ ‘ “all the material evidence on the point and not merely [his or
her] own evidence” ’ ” (Nwosu, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246).
      Bar-Lev’s opening and reply briefs fail to satisfy these procedural
requirements. Her statement of facts does not include citations to the record
and contains substantial legal argument. It is also decidedly one-sided,
omitting the facts relied on by the trial court when it found by clear and
convincing evidence that Bar-Lev was disturbing Victoria’s peace. Further
still, Bar-Lev’s arguments are not supported by citations to any legal
authority to support her claims, and several of those claims⎯ against the
trial judge and court staff, law enforcement, and the City of San
Diego⎯appear to have little if anything to do with the issues in this case.
Consequently, we conclude Bar-Lev’s arguments are forfeited. (See Keyes v.
Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 655 [an argument is forfeited if an
appellant fails to “present[ ] legal authority on each point made and factual
analysis, supported by appropriate citations to the material facts in the
record”]; accord Nelson v. Avondale Homeowners Assn. (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862 [“ ‘When an appellant fails to raise a point, or
asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to

                                          3
authority, we treat the point as waived.’ ”]; Mountain Lion Coalition v. Fish
& Game Com. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1043, 1051, fn. 9 [“[I]f the record is
inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of
the trial court should be affirmed.”].)
      Bar-Lev also failed to raise in the trial court arguments she makes on
appeal, including for the first time in her reply brief. These are separate
grounds to support forfeiture. (See Greenwich S.F., LLC v. Wong (2010)
190 Cal.App.4th 739, 767 [failure to raise an issue in the trial court forfeits
the claim of error on appeal].) As explained in Neighbours v. Buzz Oates
Enterprises (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 325, 335, footnote 8, “ ‘[o]bvious
considerations of fairness in argument demand that the appellant present all
of his [or her] points in the opening brief. To withhold a point until the
closing brief would deprive the respondent of his [or her] opportunity to
answer it or require the effort and delay of an additional brief by permission.
Hence the rule is that points raised in the reply brief for the first time will
not be considered, unless good reason is shown for failure to present them
before.’ ”
      Lastly, Bar-Lev’s arguments show a misunderstanding of our role as an
appellate court. We do not reweigh the evidence or reassess witness
credibility, and make new findings more favorable to the appellant when a
trial court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. (See Reynaud v.
Technicolor Creative Services USA, Inc. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1015
(Reynaud) [“ ‘Where findings of fact are challenged on a civil appeal, we are
bound by the “elementary, but often overlooked principle of law, that . . . the
power of an appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to
whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,” to
support the findings below.’ ”].)

                                          4
      Here, the trial court credited Victoria’s testimony and received myriad
exhibits (as stated in the court minutes), finding clear and convincing
evidence that Bar-Lev had harassed Victoria and disturbed her peace. (See
Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6, subd. (b)(3) [defining “[h]arassment” as “unlawful
violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of
conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or
harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose”].) The court
acknowledged Bar-Lev’s First Amendment rights but found her posts on
social media about Victoria “went beyond” those rights and were
“defamatory.” We conclude these findings are supported by substantial

evidence; and for this separate reason we reject Bar-Lev’s claims of error.4
(See Reynaud, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1015.)
                                DISPOSITION
      The trial court’s January 3, 2022 order is affirmed.

                                                              DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

IRION, J.

4      In light of our decision, we deny Bar-Lev’s March 22, 2023 motion to
augment the record to the extent we deferred ruling on certain requests, as
set forth in our April 12, 2023 order.
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