Court Opinion

ID: 9668471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:15:58.747256+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:51:02.501998
License: Public Domain

RANDALL, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. To obtain a reversal of a trial court’s suppression ruling in a criminal case, the state must show clearly and unequivocally that the trial court erred in its judgment and that the error will have a critical impact on the outcome of the trial. State v. Joon Kyu Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 547 (Minn.1987). Here the trial court’s ruling will have a critical impact. That is not disputed. The state, however, has not shown clearly and unequivocally that the trial court erred in excluding evidence the police obtained from Wills’s safe.
First, I disagree that our review of the pretrial order is de novo. The majority relies on a standard of review for cases where facts are not in dispute. See State v. Othoudt, 482 N.W.2d 218, 221 (Minn.1992) (de novo review where facts are not in dispute and the trial court’s decision is a question of law). That standard is more appropriate where the parties stipulate to facts, and the facts truly are not in dispute.
Here the facts are not uniformly accepted by the parties, particularly on the key factual issue of whether Wills was merely a visitor to Holmes’ apartment or a bona fide part-time occupant. On disputed facts, the trial court is in the best position to weigh relevant factors and evidence. But even under a de novo standard of review, I conclude the trial court came to the proper legal conclusion.
As stated, one factual issue to be resolved is the extent to which Wills resided in Holmes’ apartment. The less connection he had to the house, the less probable cause the police would have that he was connected to criminal activity. Guests in othérs’ homes have expectations of privacy with respect to their belongings and thus are protected by the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Robertson, 833 F.2d 777, 783 (9th Cir.1987) (holding search of visitor’s backpack illegal); see generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 4.10(b) (1987 & Supp.1995). The limitation on the police to search personal effects of visitors comes into effect when the police know or should know that the effects belong to a visitor. State v. Thomas, 818 S.W.2d 350, 360 (Tenn.Crim.App.1991), appeal denied, (Tenn. Sept. 9, 1991). Absent some indication that the person named in the warrant or the visitor concealed in the container the contraband or some other item sought in the warrant, the police should seize the visitor’s container, if seizure was justified, and seek a warrant if the police have probable cause to search the container. Id.; LaFave, § 4.10(b) (Supp.1995) at 108.
We only know that Wills stayed at Holmes’s apartment occasionally. The record is unclear regarding the extent to which he stayed there. We do not know if he was an irregular visitor, a regular visitor but only in day time hours, if he periodically spent nights there or if he regularly spent nights there.
We do know from the record that the safe belonged to Wills and we do know the police concede that fact. We also know from the record that the police by their questioning became aware that Wills, not Holmes, owned the safe and they came to this knowledge well before it was opened. Further, the police concede that Wills was not named in the warrant, and that they had no prior information when they entered the apartment that Wills had done anything illegal or was in any way a suspect. Both sides agree Holmes and only Holmes was the target of the warrant and the search.
Even after executing the warrant in Holmes’ apartment, the police officers still had no probable cause to believe there was *513contraband in Wills’ safe. In fact, they did not even find any contraband or other evidence of a crime in the Holmes’ apartment which was the target. There is no indication, much less any claim, that Wills or Holmes had time to stash contraband in the safe when the police arrived.
The police started with a perfectly valid search warrant allowing them entry into Holmes’ apartment. They had a clear and proper avenue open to them when they came into the information that the safe belonged to Wills who just happened to be there at the time. They would have been within them rights in securing the safe and then relaying all the information they had to a trial judge and most likely the same trial judge who authorized the initial warrant for Holmes’ apartment. That trial judge could have made an independent decision whether to authorize the searching of the safe. Then we would have an answer through the proper channels.
If the judge decided there was no probable cause as to the safe, the police would have to get more information and try again, 'or not search it. If the judge found they had enough probable cause, looking at the totality of the facts, they could properly search the safe, and Wills would be left with a pretrial suppression hearing.
Instead the police opted to expand the search on their own rather than proceeding through legal channels. According to Wills the police coerced him into giving them the combination. The police read Wills a Miranda warning. They then continued to question him about the safe, even after Wills asked to speak with an attorney. Finally, after threatening to open the safe by force, Wills gave the police the combination.;
This ease is similar to cases where the warrant authorizes the search of “other individuals present” on the premises (but weaker even because the warrant did not mention “other individuals present”). In these eases, there must be “a sufficient nexus between the criminal activity, the place of the activity, and the persons in the place.” State v. Otis, 487 N.W.2d 928, 930 (Minn.App.1992), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 30, 1992); accord State v. Anderson, 415 N.W.2d 57, 60-61 (Minn.App.1987). Here, the only nexus was that Wills was present when the police executed the warrant. As stated, there was no indication in the warrant that Wills (or anyone else) was suspected of criminal activity, except for Holmes. Once the police arrived, they found no evidence linking Wills to criminal activity until they coerced him into giving them the safe combination. There was no nexus authorizing an arrest or the warrant-less search of the safe.
The majority’s reliance on Acevedo should be limited. The rationale in Acevedo is applicable only to automobiles, which being inherently mobile, have always been subject to less stringent requirements than dwellings. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569-572, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 1985-86, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991).
The officers should have secured the safe and sought a warrant to open the safe. The officers’ actions come close to the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of general warrants. I would affirm the trial court’s suppression order.