Court Opinion

ID: 9379722
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-16 14:04:48.053287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:16.671340
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13308

   DORCHESTER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY   vs.   LEONARD MIVILLE &
                             others.1

          Norfolk.     January 4, 2023. – March 16, 2023.

    Present:    Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Kafker, Wendlandt,
                           & Georges, JJ.

Insurance, Homeowner's insurance, Construction of policy,
     Insurer's obligation to defend, Coverage. Declaratory
     Relief. Words, "Physical abuse."

     Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
June 19, 2017.

     The case was heard by Rosemary Connolly, J., on a motion
for summary judgment.

     After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.

     Ryan P. Gilday for Leonard Miville.
     John P. Graceffa (Lawrence M. Slotnick also present) for
the plaintiff.

    1   Kim Brengle, Laurence Brengle, and William Brengle.
                                                                   2

    LOWY, J.      Once again, we are presented with the question

whether, under the terms of a homeowners' insurance policy,

certain conduct by an insured constitutes "physical abuse"

thereby precluding coverage under a policy exclusion exempting

coverage for "[b]odily injury . . . arising out of sexual

molestation, corporal punishment or physical or mental abuse."

In Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co. v. Krusell, 485 Mass. 431, 439-440

(2020) (Krusell), we concluded that the term "physical abuse" as

used in an identical policy exclusion -- commonly referred to as

the abuse and molestation exclusion -- was ambiguous.

Interpreting the exclusion through the lens of an objectively

reasonable insured, we concluded that "physical abuse" applies

"to a limited subset of physically harmful treatment, where the

treatment is characterized by an 'abusive' quality such as a

misuse of power or, perhaps, conduct so extreme as to indicate

an abuser's disposition towards inflicting pain and suffering."

Id. at 446.   Because the conduct in that case –- a single push

by the insured –- contained no such "abusive" quality, we held

that the abuse and molestation exclusion did not preclude

coverage.   Id.

    In this case, the insured, William Brengle, initiated an

unprovoked attack on Leonard Miville by punching him in the head

and repeatedly kicking him after he had fallen, causing Miville

to sustain serious injuries.     In this action for declaratory
                                                                      3

relief, Dorchester Mutual Insurance Company (Dorchester Mutual)

filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that, under the

terms of a homeowners' insurance policy it issued to Brengle's

parents, the abuse and molestation exclusion exempted coverage

for claims arising out of the incident because the conduct

constituted "physical abuse" under our holding in Krusell, 485

Mass. at 446.   A judge in the Superior Court agreed and granted

summary judgment in favor of Dorchester Mutual.

    We conclude that the term "physical abuse," in the context

of the abuse and molestation exclusion, requires an imbalance or

misuse of power attendant to the physically harmful conduct.

Because the attack here was not achieved by capitalizing on or

exploiting an imbalance of power, it does not fall within the

meaning of "physical abuse" as it is used in the abuse and

molestation exclusion.    Therefore, the abuse and molestation

exclusion does not exempt coverage in these circumstances, and

the summary judgment in favor of Dorchester Mutual on this basis

is reversed.

    Background.   1.     Underlying incident.   The following facts

are undisputed.   At approximately 5:45 A.M. on November 22,

2016, Miville, age sixty-one, parked his truck outside the home

of his girlfriend, Jennifer Barrett, to drive her to work.       When

Barrett did not answer her telephone, Miville got out of his

truck and walked to her front door.    Brengle, age thirty, lived
                                                                     4

with his parents in the home next to Barrett's and was outside

on his front porch when Miville arrived.    After receiving no

response when he knocked on Barrett's front door, Miville stood

on the sidewalk between the two homes looking up to Barrett's

bedroom window.   Brengle stood on the side of his porch and

yelled at Miville, "F you, what are you doing here?"    Miville

responded that he was Barrett's boyfriend and that he and

Brengle had met previously.    Brengle, however, continued yelling

at Miville, ordering him to leave the area and calling him evil.

    Miville told Brengle to "keep it down" so he would not wake

the neighbors.    Suddenly, Brengle jumped off the porch and

punched Miville in the "left eye and cheek."    Miville fell to

the ground, hitting his head on the sidewalk.    Brengle proceeded

to kick Miville in the jaw, clavicle, and leg.    Miville recalled

asking Brengle to stop, but at some point, he lost consciousness

and next remembered awaking to the police asking him questions.

    Miville sustained serious injuries, including a fractured

cheek and orbital bone.    Brengle was charged with assault and

battery on a person sixty years of age or older, and assault and

battery by means of a dangerous weapon (shod foot) on a person

age sixty or older; he later pleaded guilty to those charges.

    2.   The policy.    Dorchester Mutual issued a homeowners'

insurance policy to Brengle's parents for the period of April

25, 2016, through April 25, 2017.    The policy provided personal
                                                                     5

liability coverage for claims "brought against an 'insured' for

damages because of 'bodily injury' or 'property damage' caused

by an 'occurrence' to which this coverage applies."      "Insured"

is defined by the policy as the policyholders and the "residents

of [the policyholders'] household who are . . . relatives."2

"Occurrence" is defined as "an accident, . . . which results,

during the policy period, in:     . . . '[b]odily injury.'"

     The policy contained multiple exclusions from personal

liability coverage, including the abuse and molestation

exclusion, which excluded coverage for "'[b]odily injury' . . .

arising out of sexual molestation, corporal punishment or

physical or mental abuse."      "Physical abuse" is not defined in

the policy.

     3.    Prior proceedings.   After the incident, Miville sent a

claim letter to Dorchester Mutual seeking coverage under

Brengle's parents' homeowners' insurance policy for the injuries

he sustained.   Dorchester Mutual denied coverage.     Thereafter,

Miville commenced an action against Brengle and his parents,

asserting claims of negligence and assault and battery against

Brengle and negligent supervision claims against Brengle's

parents.

     2 It is undisputed that Brengle was an insured under the
policy.
                                                                     6

     Dorchester Mutual commenced this action seeking a judgment

declaring that, under the terms of the policy, it had no duty to

defend or indemnify Brengle or his parents for the personal

injury claims brought against them by Miville.3    Dorchester

Mutual filed the present motion for summary judgment, asserting

that Brengle's conduct constituted "physical abuse" under the

terms of the abuse and molestation exclusion.     Thus, Dorchester

Mutual argued, Miville's injuries were not covered by the

policy, and it had no duty to defend or indemnify Brengle or his

parents.   The judge agreed and granted judgment in Dorchester

Mutual's favor.   Miville appealed.

     In an unpublished memorandum and order pursuant to its rule

23.0, a panel of the Appeals Court reversed, concluding that the

incident did not amount to "physical abuse" under Krusell, 485

Mass. at 446, because it lacked the necessary "'abusive'

quality" and, therefore, fell outside the policy exclusion.      See

Dorchester Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brengle, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 1133

     3 Dorchester Mutual's original complaint sought a
declaration that coverage was barred for the claims against
Brengle under two policy exclusions: (1) the intentional acts
exclusion and (2) the abuse and molestation exclusion.
Dorchester Mutual subsequently amended its complaint to include
Brengle's parents as defendants. The amended complaint sought a
declaration that coverage was precluded for the claims against
Brengle's parents under the abuse and molestation exclusion. On
summary judgment, only the abuse and molestation exclusion was
at issue. We therefore express no opinion in this appeal on the
applicability of the intentional acts exclusion to Miville's
claims against Brengle.
                                                                       7

(2022).     We allowed Dorchester Mutual's application for further

appellate review.

    Discussion.      1.   Standard of review.   "The standard of

review of a grant of summary judgment is whether, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all

material facts have been established and the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law."       Krusell, 485 Mass. at

435, quoting Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass.

117, 120 (1991).     "We review decisions allowing summary judgment

de novo."     Krusell, supra.

    2.      Interpretation of insurance policies.   "The

interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law."

City Fuel Corp. v. National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 446 Mass.

638, 640 (2006).     "Like all contracts, an insurance policy is to

be construed according to the fair and reasonable meaning of its

words."     Id.   We consider the language of an insurance policy as

a whole, "without according special emphasis to any particular

part over another," Surabian Realty Co. v. NGM Ins. Co., 462

Mass. 715, 718 (2012), and where possible, giving meaning and

effect to every word, see Masonic Temple Ass'n of Quincy v.

Patel, 489 Mass. 549, 554 (2022) (Patel).

    "If free from ambiguity, an exclusionary clause, like all

other provisions of an insurance contract, must be given its

usual and ordinary meaning."      Hakim v. Massachusetts Insurers'
                                                                   8

Insolvency Fund, 424 Mass. 275, 281 (1997).    However, "[a]ny

ambiguities in the language of an insurance contract are

interpreted against the insurer who used them and in favor of

the insured."   Allmerica Fin. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at

Lloyd's, London, 449 Mass. 621, 628 (2007).   "This rule of

construction applies with particular force to exclusionary

provisions."    Id., quoting Hakim, supra at 282.

    While "[a]n insured bears the initial burden of proving

that the claimed loss falls within the coverage of the insurance

policy," once that burden has been met, "the burden then shifts

to the insurer to show that a separate exclusion to coverage is

applicable to the particular circumstances of the case."

Boazova v. Safety Ins. Co., 462 Mass. 346, 351 (2012).     "When in

doubt as to the proper meaning of a term in an insurance policy,

we 'consider what an objectively reasonable insured, reading the

relevant policy language, would expect to be covered.'"

Krusell, 485 Mass. at 437, quoting Metropolitan Prop. & Cas.

Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 460 Mass. 352, 362 (2011).

    3.   Interpretation of "physical abuse" in abuse and

molestation exclusion.    In Krusell, 485 Mass. at 432-433, we

were called to interpret the term "physical abuse," in an

identical abuse and molestation exclusion, to determine whether

the exclusion precluded coverage where a twenty-three year old
                                                                    9

insured pushed a sixty-two year old man, causing the latter to

fall and sustain serious, permanent injuries.

    Guided by our principles of interpretation, we first

considered whether the words "physical abuse," as used together

in the policy, were ambiguous.   Although it was clear that the

term "physical" referred to "of or pertaining to the body,"

Krusell, 485 Mass. at 438, quoting Webster's New Universal

Unabridged Dictionary 1461 (2003), the plain meaning of "abuse,"

and varying courts' interpretations of the term, revealed that

it was susceptible to two diverging meanings:    the first,

connoting "any conduct whatsoever that causes physical harm,"

and the second, contemplating "a subset of physically harmful

conduct characterized by an 'abusive' quality, such as an

imbalance of power."   Krusell, supra at 439.   See Citation Ins.

Co. v. Gomez, 426 Mass. 379, 381 (1998) ("A term is ambiguous

only if it is susceptible of more than one meaning and

reasonably intelligent persons would differ as to which meaning

is the proper one").

    Concluding that the term "physical abuse" was ambiguous, we

turned to the insured's reasonable expectations as to coverage,

looking specifically to the language of the policy, the history

of abuse and molestation exclusions, and cases, statutes, and

regulations in which conduct had or had not been characterized

as "abuse."   Krusell, 485 Mass. at 440-446.    These sources led
                                                                    10

us to conclude that "a reasonable insured would interpret

'physical abuse' to apply only to a limited subset of physically

harmful treatment, where the treatment is characterized by an

'abusive' quality such as a misuse of power or, perhaps, conduct

so extreme as to indicate an abuser's disposition towards

inflicting pain and suffering."     Id. at 446.

    In this case, both parties agree that, because "physical

abuse" is not defined by the policy, our conclusion in Krusell,

485 Mass. at 446, as to how a reasonable insured would interpret

"physical abuse" within the meaning of the abuse and molestation

exclusion controls.     They disagree on the application of that

interpretation to these facts.

    Miville argues that the incident here was not "physical

abuse" because there was no power imbalance between Brengle and

himself, and the incident was not "so extreme" as to reflect

Brengle's disposition to inflict pain and suffering.     Krusell,

485 Mass. at 446.     Dorchester Mutual, however, contends that the

incident possessed both "abusive" qualities mentioned in

Krusell, supra.     Specifically, Dorchester Mutual maintains that,

because Brengle was thirty years old and Miville was over sixty

years old at the time of the incident, this age difference

coupled with Miville's "advancing years" demonstrated a physical

power imbalance between the two.     Additionally, Dorchester

Mutual argues that the incident was both violent and unprovoked,
                                                                    11

such that Brengle's disposition to inflict pain and suffering

can be inferred from his conduct.

    a.   Policy language.   In Krusell, 485 Mass. at 440-446, we

considered an imbalance or misuse of power to be the

distinguishing feature that transforms physically harmful

conduct to "physical abuse."    Beginning with the language of the

policy, we reasoned that an interpretation of "physical abuse"

as any physically harmful conduct, as opposed to conduct with an

abusive quality like a misuse of power, would render superfluous

the terms "sexual molestation" and "corporal punishment," as

both are forms of physically harmful conduct.    Id. at 440.      See

Patel, 489 Mass. at 554 ("if possible, 'every word in a policy

should be given meaning'" [citation omitted]).    Moreover, we

observed that a broad interpretation of "physical abuse"

seemingly would encompass accidental conduct causing physical

harm, which would undermine the basic purpose of purchasing a

homeowners' insurance policy.   See Krusell, supra.    See also

Worcester Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marnell, 398 Mass. 240, 245 (1986)

("Clearly, the manifest design of homeowners' insurance is to

protect homeowners from risks associated with the home and

activities related to the home").

    Most persuasive of an interpretation requiring an element

of power, however, is the term's location within the policy --

the primary source from which a reasonable insured would glean
                                                                  12

its meaning.    Immediately preceding the term "physical abuse" in

the abuse and molestation exclusion are the terms "sexual

molestation" and "corporal punishment."    As we observed,

"[w]ords are, at least in part, defined by the company they

keep."   Krusell, 485 Mass. at 440.   Although "sexual

molestation" and "corporal punishment" are not defined by the

policy, both forms of conduct generally involve an imbalance or

exploitation of power between the perpetrator and the victim.

See Black's Law Dictionary 1204 (11th ed. 2019) (defining

"molestation" as "[t]he act of making unwanted and indecent

advances to or on someone, esp[ecially] for sexual

gratification"); Webster's Third New International Dictionary

510 (2002) (defining "corporal punishment" as "punishment

administered by an adult [as a parent or a teacher] to the body

of a child ranging in severity from a slap to a spanking").     See

also Commonwealth v. Dorvil, 472 Mass. 1, 9, 10 n.3 (2015)

(discussing corporal punishment in context of parent physically

disciplining child); Commonwealth v. Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 227

(1986) ("sexual molestation" where doctor entered homes of young

patients, injected them with Valium, and sexually assaulted them

while they were "physically and mentally unable to express

resistance").

    While the term "physical abuse" divorced from context may

be susceptible to multiple interpretations, under the
                                                                   13

interpretive principle of noscitur a sociis, its meaning in the

policy is limited by the terms it accompanies.4   See People for

the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Department of Agric.

Resources, 477 Mass. 280, 287 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v.

Hamilton, 459 Mass. 422, 432 (2011) ("the canon of noscitur a

sociis . . . counsels that 'ordinarily the coupling of words

denotes an intention that they should be understood in the same

general sense'"); Commonwealth v. Gallant, 453 Mass. 535, 542

(2009), quoting H.J. Alperin & L.D. Shubow, Summary of Basic Law

§ 19.10, at 846 (3d ed. 1996) ("The principle of noscitur a

sociis . . . suggests 'that a word gains meaning from others

with which it is associated'"); Cluff v. Mutual Benefit Life

Ins. Co., 13 Allen 308, 316 (1866), S.C., 99 Mass. 317 (1868)

(applying maxim of noscitur a sociis to interpretation of

insurance policy).   Thus, looking solely at the language of the

policy, it appears evident that "physical abuse," like "sexual

molestation" and "corporal punishment," refers to conduct

achieved by capitalizing on or exploiting an imbalance of power.

     4 Noscitur a sociis means "it is known by its associates"
(citation omitted). People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals, Inc. v. Department of Agric. Resources, 477 Mass. 280,
287 (2017). This canon of construction is a broader formulation
of the canon of ejusdem generis, which means "of the same kind
or class" (citation omitted). Id. See Commonwealth v. Gallant,
453 Mass. 535, 542 (2009).
                                                                       14

    b.   History of abuse and molestation exclusion.     This more

narrow interpretation of physical abuse requiring a power

element is supported further by the context in which the abuse

and molestation exclusion originated.     In the early 1980s, a

surge of sexual abuse claims arose against clergy members within

the Roman Catholic Church.     See Bartley, The Liability Insurance

Regulation of Religious Institutions After the Catholic Church

Sexual Abuse Scandal, 16 Conn. Ins. L.J. 505, 505-510 (2010).

Litigation surrounding insurance coverage for these and other

similar claims soon erupted.    See id. at 517-529.   See also

Swisher & Mason, Liability Insurance Coverage for Clergy Sexual

Abuse Claims, 17 Conn. Ins. L.J. 355, 360, 368-375 (2010).        A

majority of States, including Massachusetts, determined that

sexual abuse claims brought against an accused abuser were not

covered by the terms of an accused's liability policy that

excluded coverage for expected or intended bodily injury.        See

Worcester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day Sch., Inc., 408 Mass. 393,

398 n.6, 401-403 (1990), and cases cited ("intent to injure may

be inferred from the intentional commission of an inherently

injurious act such as forcible sexual abuse").

    Many victims, then, also sought recovery from the

organizations responsible for employing or supervising those

accused of sexual abuse under theories of negligent supervision

or negligent hiring.   See Krusell, 485 Mass. at 441, citing
                                                                   15

Bartley, 16 Conn. Ins. L.J., at 517-518, 530.     "Because the

basis for such claims was the negligent conduct of a third

party, rather than the intentional conduct of the alleged

abuser, existing policy exclusions for intentional acts were

insufficient to shield insurers from coverage obligations."

Krusell, supra.     It was against this backdrop that insurance

companies included abuse and molestation exclusions in their

policies.

    In 1987, the Insurance Services Office, Inc., promulgated

the abuse and molestation exclusion as a form endorsement for

insurers to include in their general liability policies as a

means to preclude coverage for all claims arising out of abuse

or molestation.     See Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Field, 670 F.3d

93, 97 (1st Cir. 2012).     The exclusion was to be "used with

'[o]rganizations that have care or custody of others -- schools,

hospitals, nursing homes, day care centers, etc.'"     Id., quoting

Harper vs. Gulf Ins. Co., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. 01-CV-201-J (D.

Wyo. Dec. 20, 2002).     See D.S. Malecki & D.D. Thamann,

Commercial General Liability Coverage Guide 203 (11th ed. 2015)

("This [abuse and molestation exclusion] endorsement is utilized

by underwriters in those instances where the possibility of

abuse and molestation is relatively high, such as day care

centers, pre-school institutions, juvenile centers, and

municipalities").     Relying on the abuse and molestation
                                                                     16

exclusion, insurers repeatedly and successfully have fended off

claims from "medical or therapeutic care providers, health care

centers, summer camps, schools and preschools, job training

programs, churches, and the like" facing allegations of

negligence in allowing those in their care, custody, or control

to have been abused or molested.    Valley Forge Ins. Co., supra

at 98, and cases cited.

       In sum, the origin of the abuse and molestation exclusion

is particularly telling.     In adopting this exclusion, insurers'

"rationale was to shield themselves from liability for abuse or

molestation claims where they unexpectedly could not rely upon

the intentional acts exclusion to preclude coverage" due to

theories by which these claims were brought as a result of the

institutional nature in which they arose.5      Krusell, 485 Mass. at

443.

       c.   Cases, statutes, and regulations.   Our review of cases,

statutes, and regulations in Krusell, 485 Mass. 443-446, also

       In Krusell, we also noted a second set of circumstances in
       5

which the abuse and molestation exclusion is often relied on by
insurers due to the inadequacy of the intentional acts
exclusion: specifically, "where a claim generally would be
brought directly against an abuser, but the abuser is deemed
incapable of intentional conduct by virtue of a mental disease
or defect." Krusell, 485 Mass. at 441-442. "Even though,
ordinarily, abuse is intentional conduct, in such a situation
the abuser's inability to act with intent renders the
intentional acts exclusion inapplicable." Id. at 442. Again,
we do not address the applicability of the intentional acts
exclusion to the conduct in this case. See note 2, supra.
                                                                  17

demonstrated that an element of power was key to physical abuse.

We specifically noted that cases where insurers successfully

have relied on the abuse and molestation exclusion to exempt

coverage for "'physical abuse' generally involve[d] more than

mere physical harm."6   Id. at 443 & 445 n.23.   By contrast, cases

where the exclusion did not exempt coverage distinguished

violent conduct lacking an exploitation of power from "physical

abuse."   Id. at 444.   See, e.g., Riley v. Maison Orleans II,

Inc., 829 So. 2d 479, 491 (La. Ct. App. 2002) ("Physical abuse,

as opposed to simple assault, is generally the act of a person

     6 Although, in Krusell, we relied on Merrimack Mut. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Ramsey, 117 Conn. App. 769, 772-773 (2009), and
Miglino v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 174 So. 3d 479, 481-
482 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015), as example cases where the
conduct constituted "physical abuse" because the claims involved
domestic violence, which we noted "often involves an imbalance
of power," Krusell, 485 Mass. at 443-444, upon reflection, it is
not clear that the conduct in those cases would fall within the
interpretation we afford the term "physical abuse," as it is
properly understood within the meaning of the abuse and
molestation exclusion. Rather, it appears that both
jurisdictions interpret "physical abuse" more broadly than we
do. Indeed, we specifically recognized in Krusell, supra at
439, that, contrary to our interpretation of the term, the court
in Miglino, supra at 481, considered "physical abuse" to be any
"physical . . . maltreatment." Further, in Merrimack Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., supra at 773, the court's conclusion that the stabbing
between romantic partners "clearly constituted physical abuse
within the language of the policy" focused on the conduct
involved, and not the imbalance of power. And, as discussed
infra, the Appellate Court of Connecticut later concluded in
General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Okeke, 182 Conn. App. 83, 99, 101-103
(2018), that a fifteen year old's act of stabbing his elderly
neighbor was "physical abuse" within the meaning of the abuse
and molestation exclusion, treating Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., as dispositive.
                                                                  18

in control, dominance, or authority who misuses his [or her]

position to harm or mistreat a person over whom he [or she]

exercises such control.   The act of one nursing home resident

attacking a fellow resident is not abuse because the element of

control is lacking").

    To be sure, in a footnote in Krusell, we acknowledged a

second line of "cases where insurers successfully relied upon an

abuse and molestation exclusion" to preclude coverage based on

"conduct that implies that the abuser is cruel or inhumane, that

is, disposed to inflict pain or suffering."   Krusell, 485 Mass.

at 444 n.22, citing Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. American Cent. Ins.

Co., 739 So. 2d 1078, 1080-1082 (Ala. 1999); General Ins. Co. of

Am. v. Okeke, 182 Conn. App. 83, 101-103 (2018) (Okeke).   This

footnote apparently led to our statement in dicta that a

reasonable insured would interpret "physical abuse" to apply to

a limited subset of physically harmful conduct, "such as . . .

perhaps, conduct so extreme as to indicate an abuser's

disposition towards inflicting pain and suffering" (emphasis

added).   Krusell, supra at 446.

    It is worthy of note, however, that in at least one of

those cases, there was a discernible misuse of power in carrying

out the "physical abuse."   In Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 739 So. 2d

at 1080-1082, it was alleged that leaders of a fraternity forced

a fraternity pledge to "dig a ditch and jump into it after it
                                                                   19

had been filled with water, urine, feces, dinner leftovers, and

vomit"; receive "paddlings to his buttocks"; be "pushed and

kicked, often into walls, pits, and trash cans"; and "'run[] the

gauntlet,' during which the pledges were pushed, kicked, and hit

as they ran down a hallway and down a flight of stairs."    While

an element of power was not as prominent in Okeke, 182 Conn.

App. at 90, 100-101, where the conduct involved a fifteen year

old insured attacking, beating, and stabbing his elderly female

neighbor inside her residence, that court's interpretation of

the term "physical abuse" expressly differs from our own.

Contrary to our view, the court in Okeke concluded that the

conduct there could not "plausibly be considered anything other

than 'physical abuse,'" specifically rejecting the argument that

the term "physical abuse," as used in an abuse and molestation

exclusion, was ambiguous.   See id.

    Statutes and regulations in the Commonwealth confirm that

the term "physical abuse" implies an imbalance or misuse of

power.   Our review of those sources in Krusell revealed that

"[t]he term routinely has been applied to conduct causing harm

to a vulnerable type of victim, where the alleged abuser may be

responsible for the vulnerable individual's care."   Krusell, 485

Mass. at 445.   See, e.g., G. L. c. 265, § 13K (a 1/2) (abuse of

elder); G. L. c. 265, § 23 (rape and abuse of child).   See also

103 Code Mass. Regs § 491.13 (2017) (grievance process for abuse
                                                                   20

of inmates in correctional facility); 105 Code Mass. Regs

§ 155.003 (2017) (defining abuse of medical patients or

residents in context of long-term care facilities); 118 Code

Mass. Regs § 2.02 (2021) (defining abuse of persons with

disabilities).

    We therefore clarify that, for conduct to constitute

"physical abuse" as a reasonable insured would understand the

term when reading the language of the abuse and molestation

exclusion and the policy as a whole, the conduct must involve an

imbalance or misuse of power in addition to being physically

harmful.   Although we suggested in Krusell, 485 Mass. at 446,

that perhaps there might be circumstances where the extremity of

conduct may itself render physically harmful conduct "abusive,"

our examination of the policy language and other relevant

sources leads us to conclude that a reasonable insured would

interpret extreme physically harmful conduct to constitute

"physical abuse" only where it also embraces a power component.

    d.     Application.   Here, although Brengle's attack on

Miville was unprovoked and inexplicable, it did not involve an

exploitation or misuse of power.    Dorchester Mutual's argument

that, due to the thirty-one year age gap between Brengle and

Miville and Miville's "advancing years," there was a physical

power imbalance that rendered the attack "physical abuse" is

unavailing.   Indeed, a starker age gap existed in Krusell, where
                                                                21

the insured was twenty-three years old and the victim was sixty-

two years old, and we had little trouble concluding that no

"'abusive' quality" such as a "misuse of power" existed.

Krusell, 485 Mass. at 433, 446.   As a result, a reasonable

insured would not expect the abuse and molestation exclusion to

preclude coverage for the incident here.

    Conclusion.   The summary judgment in favor of Dorchester

Mutual is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                   So ordered.