Court Opinion

ID: 9530527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:00:37.165562+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:08.613844
License: Public Domain

STRUCKMEYER, Justice
(concurring).
The solution to the problem raised by the appeal lies in the application of simple, fundamental principles of law. The employer here, by. written agreement, made the Union its agent to furnish potential *252workmen. The sentence, “The Contractor shall notify the Union immediately when such employees are hired” (Paragraph B, Article II, Master Agreement), clearly imports that workmen furnished by the Union are not employees until accepted at the job site. The same conclusion is forced by paragraph B, Article IX, Master Agreement, providing that “Unions may furnish forms when referring employees for hiring * * (Emphasis supplied.) Posey simply was not hired as an employee until accepted at the job site.
The further question then is: what effect must be given the arrangement (“Special Working Rules”, Appendix A, Master Agreement) for travel allowance and transportation to be paid to the potential employee for going from Phoenix, Arizona, to the job site in order to present himself for hiring? The answer to this question is plain and wholly dispositive of the case. The offer of Merritt-Chapman & Scott to compensate workmen for travel to the job site is not in itself a contract and cannot be raised to the dignity of a unilateral contract until acceptance by. substantial performance. 1, Corbin on Contracts, 144, § 49. Posey never reached the job site nor presented himself for hiring, and hence, in my opinion, under no possible consideration of the law and the facts could it be found that Merritt-Chapman & Scott was contractually obligated to him.
However, if it be assumed that performance by Posey was substantial and therefore sufficient to create a firm obligation to-pay him travel allowance and transportation, there is still to be faced the insurmountable hurdle that the contract is not one for employment — that is, one which creates the status of master and servant.
“Contracts for the rendition of services ordinarily result in one of three general classifications — such contracts may create a partnership, that of an independent contractor, or that of master and servant * * *. By considering the elements of these three general classifications, we eliminate those that do not fit the facts and thus determine the correct relationship created by the contracts.” United States v. Wholesale Oil Co., 10 Cir., 154 F.2d 745, 747.
A.R.S. §§ 23-902, subd. C of the Workmen’s Compensation Act provides:
“A person engaged in work for another, and who while so engaged is independent of the employer in the execution of the work and not subject to the rule or control of the person for whom the work is done, but is engaged only in the performance of a definite job or piece of work, and is subordinate to the employer only in effecting a result in accordance with the employer’s-design, is an independent contractor * * *”
*253This section has been construed numerous times. The test has been held to be whether the alleged employer retains control over the method of reaching the required result or whether his control is limited to the result reached, leaving the method to the other party. Barker v. General Petroleum Corp., 72 Ariz. 187, 232 P.2d 390, modified 72 Ariz. 238, 233 P.2d 449; Industrial Commission v. Navajo County, 64 Ariz. 172, 167 P.2d 113; Industrial Commission v. Byrne, 62 Ariz. 132, 155 P.2d 784.
Workmen leaving Phoenix to present themselves at the job site for hiring were not in any way under the control of Merritt-Chapman & Scott. No control was exercised over either the manner or the method by which they reached the job site. They were at liberty to travel by airplane, bus, automobile or other means of conveyance, and by any route, direct or circuitous.
I am of the opinion that the award of the Industrial Commission must be affirmed.