Court Opinion

ID: 9574517
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:05:40.196179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:40.319055
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(specially concurring).
A jury trial must be fair for it is a determination of the basic rights afforded under our State and Federal Constitutions.
Was the conduct before us so clearly prejudicial that it constituted prejudicial error depriving Ravellette of a fair trial?
There were repeated warnings by the trial judge to trial counsel concerning violations of the order in limine. As a result of questions propounded by counsel, the jury heard evidence which the trial court had forbidden to be heard. This Court should not condone repeated transgressions.
Lapasinskas v. Quick, 17 Mich.App. 733, 170 N.W.2d 318 (1969), is heavily relied upon by this Court, as an authority, in reviewing the propriety of the trial court’s decision to not grant a mistrial. This ease is 25 years old and is in the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court of Michigan is the highest court in that state. In reading that case, it appears that the Lapasinskas Court has a different scope of review than the highest court of this state has previously adopted. It has adopted: “Once the question is asked, the harm is done.” Lapasinskas, 170 N.W.2d at 319. South Dakota has no such rule. Lapasinskas, at 320-321, elaborates more fully on the “once the question is asked, the harm is done” rule by expressing further:
We have no way of knowing whether the defendants’ injection of this issue influenced the jury or whether the trial judge’s cautionary instruction in fact removed any effect adverse to plaintiffs claim. [Citations omitted.] We cannot say that the verdict in this case might not have been different had this prejudicial issue not been adverted to by the defendants. (Emphasis supplied mine.)
Regarding the scope of review on motions for mistrial, the law is well settled in South Dakota; such a motion is committed to the discretion of the trial court. This Court will reverse a trial court’s ruling only where that discretion is “clearly abused.” State v. Farley, 290 N.W.2d 491, 494 (S.D.1980). Accord State v. Michalek, 407 N.W.2d 815, 818 (S.D.1987). Thus, on the scope of review in regard to motions for mistrial, there exists precedent in this Court. It is the duty of a court of last resort to abide by its former decisions and not to vary, change, or depart from them unless it is convinced former decisions were wrongly decided. I would abide in our own decisions which are governing precedent.
Applying precedent, it appears this case should be reversed.
“Prejudicial error” is error which in all probability must have produced some effect upon the jury’s verdict and is harmful to the substantial rights of the party assigning it.
Michalek, 407 N.W.2d at 818. Michalek draws on precedent of 30 years ago: State v. Reddington, 80 S.D. 390, 125 N.W.2d 58 (1963).
As factually detailed by Circuit Judge Bradshaw, the forbidden evidence, heard by the jury, produced some effect upon the jury’s verdict.
*431In all other matters, I outright concur in the majority opinion.