Court Opinion

ID: 9472509
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:02:57.47001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:59.299604
License: Public Domain

ROSS, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
For the reasons set forth in Judge Arnold’s opinion ante at 3, our recent decision in Erickson Transport Corp. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 737 F.2d 775 (8th Cir.1984), governs the disposition of this case. One panel of this court is not at liberty to overrule another panel; only the court sitting en banc has that authority. On this basis I concur with the judgment in this case, although I write separately to express my reservations regarding our earlier Erickson opinion.
While it is true that courts should not “rubber-stamp * * * administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy underlying a statute,” Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 439, 444, 78 L.Ed.2d 195 (1983) (citation omitted), it is equally well established that great deference should be accorded administrative agencies’ interpretations and applications of their enabling statutes. Id. See Illinois Terminal Railroad Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 671 F.2d 1214, 1216-17 (8th Cir.1982). Deference is presumptively afforded the agencies in these cases; therefore, the scope of review is narrow. See Federal Election Commission v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U.S. 27, 102 S.Ct. 38, 45, 70 L.Ed.2d 23 (1981).
In this case, the Commission found that bulk restrictions were inimical to the policy of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 to “promote competitive and efficient transportation services in order to * * * allow the most productive use of equipment and energy resources.” 49 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(C) (West Pamphlet 1984). The Act provides:
(i)(l) Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this subsection, the Commission shall—
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(B) implement, by regulation, procedures to process expeditiously applications of individual motor carriers of property seeking removal of operating restrictions in order to—
* * * ^ ¥ *
(iv) eliminate unreasonable or excessively narrow territorial limitations; or
(v) eliminate any other unreasonable restriction that the Commission deems to be wasteful of fuel, inefficient, or contrary to the public interest.
49 U.S.C. § 10922(i)(l) (West Pamphlet 1984) (emphasis added). The Commission’s proposed policy regarding bulk restrictions is arguably consistent with section 10922(i)(l)(B)(v). The agency is uniquely qualified to make these types of policy *1099decisions, because it possesses the necessary expertise. Given the deferential standard of review which should be employed when reviewing these matters, I would affirm the grant of authority in this case. However, this court’s earlier Erickson opinion has already resolved this issue, therefore, I must concur with the judgment in this case.