Court Opinion

ID: 9386400
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-12 15:03:55.851118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:06.066515
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                             FOURTH DISTRICT

             WILLIAM THAYER and LOUISE A. JEFFERSON,
                           Appellants,

                                     v.

                           GARY HAWTHORN,
                               Appellee.

                              No. 4D22-244

                             [April 12, 2023]

  Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm
Beach County; Sarah Willis, Judge; L.T. Case No. 50-2017-CP-003545-
XXXX-NB.

   Peter A. Sachs, Kelly G. Nugent, and Alexander L. Brams of Jones
Foster P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellants.

   Brett C. Barner, Anya M. Van Veen, and Robb W. Armstrong of Barner
& Barner, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, for appellee.

WARNER, J.

   In this case, we consider whether a spouse waived her homestead rights
to her home, when she executed a warranty deed conveying the property
to herself and her husband as tenants in common. The trial court found
that she had waived her homestead rights to her husband’s one-half
interest, making his interest freely devisable and passing to his heirs when
he predeceased his wife. We reverse, concluding that the warranty deed’s
language did not waive the spouse’s homestead rights as required by
section 732.702, Florida Statutes (2002).

   Doris and James Hawthorn were married in July of 1978, until James’
presumed death in July of 2014. Doris and James had no children
together, but Doris had five children from a previous relationship,
including appellants. Doris’ surviving children are all adults.
    Doris originally owned the property herself in fee simple. In 1987, she
quitclaimed the property to herself and James as joint tenants with rights
of survivorship.

   In 2002, as part of estate planning, Doris and James executed a
warranty deed conveying one half of the property to each of their revocable
trusts. According to the deed, Doris and James were the grantors, and
they were also each grantees, as the trustees of their individual trusts.
The deed acknowledged that as trustees they had “full power and authority
to protect, conserve, sell, lease, encumber or otherwise to manage and
dispose of the real property described herein, with each trustee having an
undivided one-half Interest as tenant in common.” The operative words of
conveyance were as follows:

      That said grantor, for and in consideration of the sum of TEN
      ($10.00) DOLLARS, and other good and valuable
      consideration to said grantor in hand paid by said grantee,
      the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, has granted,
      bargained and sold to the said grantee, and grantee’s heirs
      and assigns forever . . . .

   Their trusts provided that each trust would be for the surviving
spouse’s benefit. After the surviving spouse’s death, Doris’ trust was to be
disbursed to her children. James’ trust initially was to be fully disbursed
to appellee but was amended in 2009, with Doris’ knowledge, to leave
seventy percent to appellee—James’ brother—and thirty percent to Doris’
children.

   James disappeared in 2014 and was never found. He was declared
presumptively dead in 2017. James was survived by appellee and no lineal
descendants. Doris died in July 2018, survived by her children.

   After Doris’ death, appellee filed a petition to determine the homestead
status of James’ half of the property. Appellee’s petition asserted that
James was free to devise his one-half interest because Doris waived her
homestead rights to his half via the warranty deed, and the house and
0.25 acres of the Property were exempt homestead property.

   Appellants filed an answer and a counter-petition to determine the
property’s homestead status. Appellants argued that James’ attempted
devise of his share of the homestead pursuant to his trust failed, because
Doris never waived her constitutionally protected homestead rights in the
property. At James’ death, the property could only be devised to Doris.

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Appellants also argued that Doris’ exempt portion constituted the home
and the entire contiguous 0.695 acres because she owned the property
before it was incorporated into the municipality of Jupiter.

   Answering appellants’ counter-petition, appellee raised the affirmative
defense of waiver, arguing that Doris waived her homestead rights in the
property by executing the 2002 warranty deed conveying half the property
into Doris’ and James’ respective trusts.

   The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. Appellee
argued that Doris and James had waived their respective homestead rights
in the other spouse’s one-half interest by executing the warranty deed.
Appellee argued that section 732.702, Florida Statutes (2002), provided
that a surviving spouse may waive his or her right to homestead property
wholly or partially by written contract signed in the presence of two
subscribing witnesses before or after entering a marriage, and that a
waiver of “all rights” or equivalent language is a waiver of homestead
rights. Appellee also relied on an affidavit and deposition of Doris and
James’ estate planning attorney who testified that they had intended to
waive their homestead interests.

   Appellants argued that Doris never waived her homestead rights in
James’ one-half interest. The warranty deed did not contain operative
language, such as conveying “all rights,” to waive Doris’ homestead rights,
and there was no other documentary evidence in the form required under
section 732.702(1) to waive Doris’ rights.

   The competing motions were brought to a hearing. At the hearing,
appellants argued additionally that the warranty deed tracked the
language of section 689.02(1), Florida Statutes (2002). They contended
that if that language was sufficient to waive homestead rights, then every
warranty deed would act as a waiver of homestead rights. Appellee
responded that the precatory language was not in the statute, i.e., that the
trustees had “full power and authority to protect, conserve, sell, lease,
encumber or otherwise to manage and dispose of the real property
described herein.”     Regardless, appellee argued the warranty deed
demonstrated both spouses’ intent to waive their homestead rights.

  After the hearing, the trial court issued an order granting final
summary judgment in favor of appellee. The trial court found that
pursuant to section 732.702 and this Court’s holding in Stone v. Stone,
157 So. 3d 295 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), Doris and James had waived their
own homestead rights in the other spouse’s one-half interest in the

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property. Alternatively, the court found that based upon the affidavits
from the estate planning attorney, there was no dispute that Doris
intended to waive her homestead rights in the half of the property
transferred to James’ trust. The court also determined that James’ portion
of the homestead was 0.25 acres. After the court denied a motion for
rehearing, appellants filed this appeal.

   Appellate courts review a trial court’s entry of summary judgment de
novo. United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lauderhill Med. Ctr. LLC, 350 So. 3d 754,
756 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022). Summary judgment is appropriate where the
movant shows there are no genuine disputes as to any material facts and
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fla. R. Civ. P.
1.510(a).

   The question presented in this appeal is whether the 2002 warranty
deed waived Doris’ and James’ homestead rights in each other’s one-half
interest in the property. We conclude that the language of the deed was
insufficient to waive homestead.

   The Florida Constitution provides that a homestead is generally not
devisable:

      The homestead shall not be subject to devise if the owner is
      survived by spouse or minor child, except the homestead may
      be devised to the owner’s spouse if there be no minor child.
      The owner of homestead real estate, joined by the spouse if
      married, may alienate the homestead by mortgage, sale or gift
      and, if married, may by deed transfer the title to an estate by
      the entirety with the spouse. If the owner or spouse is
      incompetent, the method of alienation or encumbrance shall
      be as provided by law.

Art. X, § 4(c), Fla. Const.

   However, Florida law allows spouses to waive all types of spousal rights,
including rights to the homestead. Section 732.702 provides:

      The rights of a surviving spouse to . . . homestead . . . , may
      be waived, wholly or partly, before or after marriage, by a
      written contract, agreement, or waiver, signed by the waiving
      party in the presence of two subscribing witnesses. . . . Unless
      the waiver provides to the contrary, a waiver of “all rights,” or
      equivalent language, in the property or estate of a present or

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      prospective spouse . . . , is a waiver of all rights to . . .
      homestead . . . , by the waiving party in the property of the
      other and a renunciation by the waiving party of all benefits
      that would otherwise pass to the waiving party from the other
      by intestate succession or by the provisions of any will
      executed before the written contract, agreement, or waiver.

§ 732.702(1), Fla. Stat. (2002).

   The trial court relied on Stone to conclude that the warranty deed was
sufficient to waive homestead rights. Stone, however, is distinguishable.

   In Stone, as in this case, spouses had transferred their homestead to
themselves as tenants in common and subsequently transferred their
interests into their own trusts. 157 So. 3d at 297. The deed’s language
splitting the property into tenancy in common interests stated that the
spouse “grants, bargains, sells, aliens, remises, releases, conveys, and
confirms” the property “together with all the tenements, hereditaments,
and appurtenances thereto belonging or in anywise appertaining.” Id. at
304 (emphasis added). Without citation, this court concluded that this
language was sufficient to waive homestead rights under the statute. Id.

   While one may question whether the language in Stone was sufficiently
specific to waive homestead, it is still more specific than the deed’s
language in this case. The Stone deed released the property and also
conveyed the property “together with all . . . hereditaments.” Id. A
hereditament is “[a]ny property that can be inherited; anything that passes
by intestacy.” Hereditament, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). The
language thus conveyed the spouse’s inheritance interest in the property,
and this would include her constitutional right to the inheritance of the
homestead. Moreover, the deed released the spouse’s rights in the
property. The warranty deed here contains no language of release or of
conveyance of a hereditament. The grantor simply “granted, bargained
and sold” the property to the grantee. This is insufficient to constitute a
written waiver of homestead rights as required by section 732.702(1).

   Stone generated concern as to what language in a deed would constitute
a waiver of homestead rights. See Jeffrey S. Goethe & Jeffrey A. Baskies,
Homestead Planning Under Florida’s New “Safe Harbor” Statute, 93 Fla. B.
J. 36 (May/June 2019). To provide guidance, the Legislature enacted
section 732.7025, Florida Statutes (2018), providing that a deed
containing certain language would constitute a waiver of the homestead
rights:

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      (1) A spouse waives his or her rights as a surviving spouse
      with respect to the devise restrictions under s. 4(c), Art. X of
      the State Constitution if the following or substantially similar
      language is included in a deed:

      “By executing or joining this deed, I intend to waive homestead
      rights that would otherwise prevent my spouse from devising
      the homestead property described in this deed to someone
      other than me.”

While this statutory provision does not apply in this case, it is illustrative
of the point that language waiving a constitutional right must be able to
be clearly understood as waiving the right. Similarly, in Merli v. Merli, 332
So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022), in discussing the waiver of rights in a
marital settlement agreement, we stated, “[p]ursuant to the plain language
of section 732.702 and the partial marital settlement agreement, neither
the decedent nor the wife explicitly waived their right to an elective share,
intestate share, pretermitted share, homestead, exempt property, family
allowance, or preference as personal representative.”          Id. at 1022
(emphasis added). Here, James and Doris’ warranty deed does not contain
language clearly evincing a waiver of the homestead right.

    Because the statute requires that a spouse execute a written waiver in
front of subscribing witnesses, and we have concluded that the deed is not
a waiver, external evidence such as the estate planning attorney’s
testimony cannot correct the deed. The statute requires the waiver to be
in writing. Allowing parol evidence to supplement the writing not only
would violate the statute, but it would also wreak havoc on land transfers.
If one could go behind a deed to determine whether homestead protection
had been waived, title examiners could not rely on the recorded deeds to
determine whether or not interests remained in property. That, of course,
is why the Legislature provided definitive waiver language for inclusion in
deeds as a “safe harbor” for conveyances of homestead.

   The trial court also found that James’ interest in the property was 0.25,
which he could devise. We do not reach the issue of whether a homestead
can be divided in such a manner, because by our ruling Doris became the
owner of James’ homestead interest and thus Doris owned the entire
homestead estate at the time of her death.

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                              Conclusion

   The Florida Constitution protects the homestead upon the death of an
owner by precluding its devise when there is a spouse. Homestead rights
may be waived in accordance with the statutory provisions of section
732.702(1), Florida Statutes (2002). In this case, we conclude the
warranty deed did not waive homestead, because it lacked language
specifically releasing inheritance rights. We reverse the final summary
judgment in favor of appellee. On remand, the court shall enter summary
judgment in favor of appellants.

  Reversed and remanded with instructions.

GERBER and LEVINE, JJ., concur.

                          *        *         *

  Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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