Court Opinion

ID: 9448190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:25:08.582335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:19.191531
License: Public Domain

DANAHER, Circuit Judge
(concurring in the result).
I quite agree that we should not reverse the District Court’s order insofar as it set aside a ruling by the Superintendent of Insurance refusing to grant to Silverman a license as a life insurance general agent. I concur in the treatment of the factual background for that conclusion. I wish only to expand and be more specific with reference to my colleagues’ treatment of the procedural problem as it seems to appear on this record.
It is fundamental that an insurance agent’s license, once issued and acted upon, may not be suspended or revoked without procedural and substantive due process of law. Jordan v. United Insurance Co. of America, 110 U.S.App. D.C. 112, 289 F.2d 778.1
Congress has provided the basis upon which due process shall be accorded to one charged on any of various grounds, including specifically, as here, a charge that one has “shown himself untrustworthy or incompetent to act as a life insurance general agent.” D.C.Code, § 35-426 (Supp. VIII 1960). The Superintendent is to make an investigation. He shall provide an opportunity for the general agent to be fully heard and to present evidence in his own behalf. The Superintendent at “any hearing provided by this section” shall have authority to administer oaths to witnesses. The general agent may appeal within thirty days *919after “the revocation or suspension of license or the refusal of the Superintendent to grant a license.”3 Thereafter, pursuant to D.C.Code § 35-427 (1951), the general agent may seek review in the District Court.
Thus is the general agent to be afforded his rights. On the other hand, D.C. Code, § 35-425 (1951) makes no provision for a hearing, or for the swearing of witnesses or other requirements for the making of a record.2
3 The section deals generally with the requirements for the original issuance of a license, which, once issued, is renewable from year to year unless earlier “revoked or suspended”4 by the Superintendent, or unless the company shall terminate the authority of its general agent. The Superintendent testified that licenses are renewed automatically unless he rules otherwise in a given case. For nearly 15 years, Silverman’s license was automatically so renewed, not on his application, but upon the representations of his principal, the life insurance company.
The Superintendent notified the company under date of April 15, 1959, that if “you reappoint him, I will set the matter down for a formal hearing at which a record will be made of sworn testimony and documentary evidence.” 5
Silverman did not then seek equitable relief to protect his status, although his complaint, much later filed, contained appropriate allegations to raise an issue as to automatic renewal of his license, as in previous years. He did not in time ask the court, pendente lite, to prevent a “contrary ruling by the Superintendent” before the. expiration date of the license and before he could be given the hearing provided for in section 426.6 Instead, he let the license year expire, and then filed a new application dated June 15, 1959. Thereafter the hearing was noticed to commence on July 14, 1959 at which Silverman was to be permitted to appear and show cause why a general agent’s license should be issued.
So it was that Silverman’s appeal under section 427 was related to “the refusal of the Superintendent to grant a license,” as provided in section 426, and in that posture the District Court action went forward.
I have noted my views that the record may show my understanding of the procedural aspects by which the statutory scheme is to be and here was given effect.7

. That principle has likewise been deemed to apply to the Superintendent’s refusal to renew under D.C.Code, § 35-1340 (1951). Columbia Auto Loan v. Jordan, 1952, 90 U.S.App.D.C. 222, 196 F.2d 568; cf. Atlantic Insurance Agency v. Jordan, 1955, 97 U.S.App.D.C. 184, 229 F.2d 758, which gave rise to the 1958 amendments, note 2 infra.

. The District Commissioners approved the amendments sought in S. 1040, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. for the express purpose of bringing related sections of the Life Insurance Act into conformity with corresponding sections applicable to the business of fire and casualty insurance. See P.L. 85-334, 72 Stat. 19 (195S). And see S.Rep.No.1110, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).

. Cf. Jordan v. American Eagle Eire Ins. Co., 1948, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 192, 198, 169 F.2d 281, 287.

. With proceedings as to suspension or revocation pursuant to § 426 as noted, supra.

. He could so have acted only pursuant to § 426 supra.

. Compare D.C.Code, § 35-1339 (Supp. VIII 1960) expressly providing a ten day period within which an applicant may seek a stay in court of the Superintendent’s refusal to renew.

. The joint appendix (291) contains an earlier notice to show cause correctly issued pursuant to “Sec. 35-426,” as it states, and which is otherwise entirely compatible with the statutory plan.