Court Opinion

ID: 9678158
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:13:05.652932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:02.276504
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTIONS FOR REHEARING
All parties have files motions for rehearing. In Wendt’s motion for rehearing, the first eight points complain of our holding with regard to the allocation of peremptory challenges.
In our opinion, we found no error in the alignment of the parties, but we found the trial court erred in awarding Wendt twelve peremptory challenges, and Medina and Shamrock each six such challenges. In Patterson Dental Co. v. Dunn, 592 S.W.2d 914, 920 (Tex.1979), the Supreme Court held that the extent to which “equalizing” is allowed is dependent upon several factors, including: the circumstances of the case, information available to the trial court at the time it awards the challenges, the extent and degree of antagonism, whether the parties collaborate in selecting the jurors to be struck, and other considerations to promote the ends of justice and prevent unequal advantage. The discretion of the trial court in allocating strikes is not unbridled.
We believe that the information before the trial court when it made its allocation clearly showed an abuse of its discretion. Wendt and Medina had discussed the profile of a good juror for both of them. Medina’s insurance company had refused coverage. Medina contended throughout that the real controversy was between Wendt and Diamond Shamrock. Although Wendt did not negate Medina’s negligence in his voir dire, his position was clear that Diamond’s dangerous insecticide killed his bull. The information before the trial court at the time it made its allocation showed little or no real antagonism between Medina and *771Wendt. It was apparent from the beginning that neither defendant attributed any negligence to Wendt. The only issue which the two defendants could have been aligned on was damages. However, Medina did not ever discuss damages before the jury on voir dire.
It is the duty of the trial judge, upon proper motion, to equalize the number of challenges so that no litigant or side is given an unfair advantage. See Tex.R.Civ.P. 233. The “equalization” should be consistent with the facts known to the trial court at the time it makes its allocation. This process is particularly critical in multiparty litigation where the degree of antagonism between one defendant and the plaintiff is significantly less than the antagonism between the plaintiff and another defendant. The rule has been consistently used to “equalize” plaintiffs strikes with that of the defendant’s in multi-party cases. The true intent of the rule, however, is to promote the ends of justice and ensure that no litigant is given unfair advantage regardless of whether the litigant is plaintiff or defendant.
In this case, the allocation did result in an unfair advantage for both Wendt and Medina. Wendt was given twice as many strikes as Diamond Shamrock. The information known to the trial judge at the time it made its allocation showed little or no real antagonism between Wendt and Medina. The end result, when reviewed from Diamond Shamrock’s point of view, was an allocation of peremptory challenges of a ratio of nearly three to one against it.
In its motion for rehearing, Wendt cites Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 594 S.W.2d 496 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, affirmed in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 453 U.S. 473, 101 S.Ct. 2870, 69 L.Ed.2d 784 (1982)) as authority for the proposition that an equalization of strikes similar to the one in this case was not an abuse of discretion. In Mobil, the jury voir dire was not part of the record. The court held that the record before it did not reflect harm in the jury selection process. Appellant also urges that this opinion is in conflict with our opinion in Scurlock Oil Co. v. Smithwick, 701 S.W.2d 4 (Tex.App.1985), rev’d on other grounds, 29 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 449 (1986). We first note that in its opinion, the Supreme Court reviewed the apportionment of preemptory challenges in Smithwick and, while coming to the same conclusion as this Court, did so for different reasons. The facts in this case are distinguishable from Smithwick and our decision here is consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling. We have considered the other matters raised in Wendt’s points of error one through eight and find them to be without merit. Wendt’s points of error one through eight in his motion for rehearing are overruled.
In Wendt’s point of error number nine on rehearing and Medina’s first point on rehearing, it is contended that we erred in reversing the trial court’s judgment awarding Medina Valley indemnity against Shamrock. Shamrock also contends, in its first point of error on rehearing, that we should have held that the trial court erred in awarding Medina indemnity against Shamrock.
The judgment of the trial court grants indemnity against Diamond Shamrock for all sums for which Medina was held liable to Wendt. Generally, when one party appeals from a judgment, a reversal as to that party will not justify a reversal as to the other nonappealing party, but such rule does not apply where the respective rights of the appealing and nonappealing parties are so interwoven or dependent on each other as to require a reversal of the entire judgment. Turner, Collie & Braden, Inc. v. Brookhollow, 642 S.W.2d 160 (Tex.1982). We hold that the liability of Medina and Shamrock are so interwoven so as to require a reversal as to both parties in this case.
The judgment of the trial court is REVERSED and the cause REMANDED for a new trial.