Court Opinion

ID: 9532711
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:24:11.544311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:49.468342
License: Public Domain

MOELLER, Justice,
Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I do so because I believe the trial court’s unequal division of the home is contrary to Arizona case law, to Arizona statutory law, and to basic principles of fairness and equity. In my view, the court of appeals correctly held that the case should be remanded with instructions for a substantially equal distribution. Mr. Toth chose to make a gift of one-half of the house to Mrs. *223Toth.1 Having chosen to make a gift, Mr. Toth seeks the help of the domestic relations court to compel Mrs. Toth to give it back. The majority opinion permits the trial court to order her to give it back despite established Arizona law prohibiting an unequal division for any of the reasons relied upon by the trial court.
A.R.S. § 25-318(A) (“the statute”) does permit the trial court to divide joint tenancy property “equitably” rather than “equally.” If the legislature intended by this statute to permit courts to order the disgorgement of gifts, it did not say so. Doubtless, the 1973 enactment of the statute 2 permitting equitable division of jointly held property was in recognition of the fact that married couples commonly use community funds to acquire joint tenancy property. In dissolution actions prior to enactment of the statute in 1973, courts could not order the parties to divest themselves of title to their separate property, and their interest in joint tenancy property was separate property. Becchelli v. Becchelli 109 Ariz. 229, 233, 508 P.2d 59, 63 (1973); see also, Schwartz v. Schwartz, 52 Ariz. 105, 109, 79 P.2d 501, 503 (1938) (holding that a divorce court is without jurisdiction to award either party the separate property of the other). The statute' was intended to alleviate some practical problems by permitting joint tenancy property to be divided equitably, but not necessarily in kind. As the Valladee case, infra, makes clear, the statute was never intended to convert property held in joint tenancy into community property. The statute only contemplates a significantly unequal distribution in cases of “excessive or abnormal expenditures, destruction, concealment or fraudulent disposition” of the property. A.R.S. § 25-318(A). None of the statutory elements permitting an unequal division are present here. What then justifies an unequal division? The trial court supported its unequal division of the property with the following findings:
All the money used to purchase the residence located at 2303 North 76th Street was the sole and separate property of the Petitioner/Husband, Anthony Toth. The Respondent/Wife, Gloria Toth, did not contribute any money toward the purchase of the residence. The Respondent/Wife, Gloria Toth, did sell her former residence and is now receiving monthly payments from said sale.
* * *
The parties lived together as husband and wife for only two weeks. For one additional week, Petitioner/ Husband, Anthony Toth, lived in a separate room in the marital residence. After approximately three weeks, Petitioner/Husband moved out of the marital residence and has lived in a separate residence since that time.
Petitioner/Husband, Anthony Toth, expected that the parties would each make a good faith effort to live together as husband and wife for the rest of their lives. No evidence has been presented that Respondent/Wife, Gloria Toth, made a good faith effort to create a viable marriage.
THE COURT FINDS that the facts and circumstances of this case indicate that this was a marriage of extremely short duration. Respondent/Wife contributed nothing economically either toward the purchase of the marital residence or toward the necessary expenses of utilities and taxes on the residence since its purchase, even though she has remained in the residence since January of 1994....
THE COURT FURTHER FINDS it would be unjust enrichment and a windfall to Respondent/Wife to award her an equal disposition of the value of the marital resi*224dence. While this Court may not set aside a transaction merely because one of the parties to a marriage contract may have been imprudent or made a poor bargain, nonetheless, the Court must make an equitable disposition pursuant to A.R.S. sec. 25-318(A).
Any reasonable reading of these findings compels the conclusion that the trial judge made the unequal division because of some perceived fault on Mrs. Toth’s part and to reimburse Mr. Toth because he paid for the house out of his separate funds. Under Arizona law, neither reason authorizes an unequal division of the joint tenancy property.
In Valladee v. Valladee, 149 Ariz. 304, 306-07, 718 P.2d 206, 208-09 (App.1986), the trial court ordered a substantially unequal distribution of jointly held property to reimburse the husband for the expenditure of his separate funds in acquiring the properties. The court of appeals,. Division One, overturned the unequal distribution, finding it inequitable as a matter of law for two reasons. It first discussed the concept of joint tenancy:
First, while § 25-318(A) makes jointly held property susceptible to the same equitable division as community property, we do not believe it eliminates the distinctions between the two forms of ownership. Arizona has long recognized that the general rules of joint tenancy apply between husband and wife. Thus, some consideration must be given to the general principles of joint tenancy law when dividing jointly held property under § 25-318(A).
Id. at 309, 718 P.2d at 211 (citation omitted). Under joint tenancy rules, “the legal consequence of holding property jointly is that each spouse takes an undivided separate property interest in one-half of the property.” Id. (citation omitted). Additionally, although a tenant has a right to contribution from the co-tenants for expenditures and obligations of the property, that right does not begin until the properties are held in joint tenancy. Therefore, under the law of joint tenancy, one spouse has no right of contribution from the other spouse for the funds he or she expended before the property was held in joint tenancy. Berger v. Berger, 140 Ariz. 156, 161-62, 680 P.2d 1217, 1222-23 (App.1983).
The Valladee court next focused on the gift aspect of the ease, which was identical to the situation here. It held that the trial court’s reimbursement scheme conflicted with the presumption of a gift. “The gift to the wife of an interest in the property clearly encompasses any monies spent in the past by husband to acquire it. Thus, to award husband reimbursement here for the sole reason that he used his own funds to acquire the joint properties is, without more, inconsistent and inequitable.” Id. at 310, 718 P.2d at 212 (footnote omitted).
joint tenancy property is not identical to community property. Community property “rests on the assumption that the two spouses worked together to accumulate property for the community, each contributing in pecuniary or other ways.” See maj. op. at 221, 946 P.2d at 903. Joint tenancy property, however, rests on no such assumption. In a marriage, when joint tenancy property is purchased with the separate funds of one spouse, one-half of the property is a presumed gift. Becchelli, 109 Ariz. at 232-33, 508 P.2d at 62-63; Valladee, 149 Ariz. at 308-09, 718 P.2d at 210-11. In the instant case, we have more than a presumed gift: we have an acknowledged intended, completed gift. Division Two of the court of appeals in Whitmore v. Mitchell, 152 Ariz. 425, 427, 733 P.2d 310, 312 (App.1987), like Division One in Valladee, also held that jointly held property may not be unequally divided for the purpose of reimbursing the party who supplied the purchase price.
I am unpersuaded by the majority’s effort to distinguish Valladee and Whitmore on the ground that in those cases the unequal division was based “solely” on principles of reimbursement. See maj. op. at 221-222, 946 P.2d at 903-904. It is true, that the courts used the word “solely” because in those cases the desire to reimburse the gifting party was the only reason advanced in support of the unequal division. But I read those cases as holding that reimbursement is an improper consideration and will not support an unequal distribution. Reimbursement clearly motivated the trial court here to unequally divide the property and that inequitable division should not be permitted to stand.
*225It is also clear from the trial court’s findings that the unequal division was based, in part, on the trial court’s perception that Mrs. Toth was more at fault than Mr. Toth for the failure of the marriage. I find nothing in the record that supports that view, but even if it is well-founded, it- is not a permissible reason for an unequal division. The statute upon which the majority relies to support the unequal division expressly precludes consideration of fault. See A.R.S. § 25-318(A) (“[The court] shall ... divide the community, joint tenancy and other property held in common equitably ... without regard to marital misconduct.”) Similarly, Arizona case law precludes consideration of fault in making a property allocation. Lee v. Lee, 133 Ariz. 118, 121, 649 P.2d 997, 1000 (App.1982)(holding that the court should ordinarily attempt “a substantially equal division which neither rewards nor punishes either party”); see also Styers v. Superior Ct., 161 Ariz. 477, 479, 779 P.2d 352, 354 (App.1989); Biddulph v. Biddulph, 147 Ariz. 571, 573, 711 P.2d 1244, 1246 (App.1985). Indeed, consideration-of fault in the division of marital property is precluded on constitutional grounds. Hatch v. Hatch, 113 Ariz. 130, 132-34, 547 P.2d 1044, 1046-48 (1976).
The majority readily acknowledges that fault, even if it exists, cannot support an unequal division. Maj. op. at 222-223, 946 P.2d at 904-905. The majority also acknowledges that the trial court used language indicating fault, but the majority concludes that it is “unclear” whether the trial court relied upon its finding of fault in dividing the property and concludes that “it may be that the [trial] court did not use” the finding. Id. The majority refers to other evidence before the trial court that it believes might justify the trial court’s disparate distribution. See maj. op. at 223, 946 P.2d at 905. I fail to find the trial court’s comments concerning Mrs. Toth’s fault to be as antiseptic as does the majority. Since the only issue being addressed was division of the property, I rely on the language used by the trial court in dividing the property. I find no justification to speculate, as does the majority, that the trial court might have intended to rely on other unreferred-to evidence.
The trial court also found and relied upon the obvious: that this was a short marriage. The trial court obviously blamed Mrs. Toth for the brevity of the marriage. I find no authority for the proposition that a spouse must remain married for a certain number of years before her right to retain a gift vests, nor has the majority or Mr. Toth cited any. The marriage was as short for Mrs. Toth as it was for Mr. Toth. Because fault cannot be considered, I find no relevance to the length of the marriage.
Under Arizona case law, equitable division has been interpreted to mean a substantially equal division “unless some sound reason exists for a contrary result.” Valladee, 149 Ariz. at 309, 718 P.2d at 211 (citations omitted). Length of marriage has never been held to constitute a “sound reason” to divide joint tenancy property other than substantially equally. Cases in which our courts have upheld unequal distributions have dealt with the factors given in A.R.S. § 25-318 that the court may legitimately consider. See Martin v. Martin, 156 Ariz. 452, 454-55, 457-58, 752 P.2d 1038, 1040-41, 1043-44 (1988) (court upheld giving wife sum of money to reimburse her for improper dissipation of community assets by husband); Hrudka v. Hrudka, 186 Ariz. 84, 93-94, 919 P.2d 179, 188-89 (App.1995) (court upheld husband receiving more assets than wife because trial court found waste on wife’s part where wife transferred, concealed, and sold substantial assets in violation of a trial court order); Kosidlo v. Kosidlo, 125 Ariz. 32, 607 P.2d 15 (App.1979), disapproved on other grounds, 125 Ariz. 18, 607 P.2d 1 (trial court justified in concluding that equity favored distributing greater share of community assets to wife where husband refused to use checking account, insisted on cash transactions, secreted large amounts of cash, and evaded questions about community assets); Lindsay v. Lindsay, 115 Ariz. 322, 565 P.2d 199 (App.1977) (court directed trial court to award sum of money to wife representing her share of community’s interest in an aircraft where her husband secretly sold aircraft during dissolution proceedings and lost the proceeds in gambling).
Factors permitting unequal distribution of joint tenancy property should be limited to *226those enumerated - in A.R.S. § 25-318(A), which should not be expanded to include perceptions of fault or evaluations of the length of the marriage. No § 25-318 factor exists here. Under the majority’s length-of-marriage test, how long is long enough? The majority opinion states that gifts of joint tenancy property “are made in expectation of a permanent relationship, but if cut short, fully subject to equitable divestment under the statute.” Maj. op. at 220, 946 P.2d at 902. Under this approach, joint tenancy property can always be divided unequally in any dissolution because the relationship, by definition, turned out not to be permanent. Such a result is totally at variance with Arizona law as it has existed to date. There are very few valid reasons to divide joint tenancy property unequally, because each spouse has a vested separate property interest in one-half of the property and A.R.S. § 25-318 does not change that well-established tenet.
In summary, no proper reason supports an order requiring Mrs. Toth to return the gift Mr. Toth chose to make. The court of appeals correctly concluded that a substantially equal division should have been ordered. The remand should be limited to ordering an equal division.
ZLAKET, C.J., concurs.

. Arizona law establishes that when Mr. Toth used his separate funds to purchase the home in joint tenancy, he presumptively made a gift of one-half of the home to Mrs. Toth. Becchelli v. Becchelli, 109 Ariz. 229, 232-33, 508 P.2d 59, 62-63 (1973); Valladee v. Valladee, 149 Ariz. 304, 308-09, 718 P.2d 206, 210-11 (App.1986). In the trial court, Mr. Toth made an unsuccessful attempt to rebut the presumption. In this court, Mr. Toth frankly admitted that he intended to make a gift to Mrs. Toth.

. A.R.S. § 25-318 was enacted by Laws 1973, Ch. 139, § 2. Former § 25-318, enacted as part of the 1956 revision to Article 2 of Title 25, amended by Laws 1962, Ch. 45, § 1 and relating to division of. property, was repealed by Laws 1973, Ch. 139, § 1.