Court Opinion

ID: 9612126
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:05:13.957921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:29.691030
License: Public Domain

PHELPS, Justice,
with whom UDALL, J., concurs (dissenting).
The majority opinion is practically barren of the material facts in this case. We therefore believe it essential to an intelligent solution of the issues here presented to relate them succinctly.
At approximately one o’clock, a. m. on May 9, 1952, plaintiff Pauline Bryan was driving her car north on Seventh Street in the city of Phoenix and while crossing the Southern Pacific Company’s switching tracks her car was struck by a string of six gondola cars which were then being “kicked” easterly across Seventh Street on a switching track for delivery to the Santa Fe Railway Company. These six cars before being disconnected from the train constituted the easternmost end of a train of 26 cars. The method employed in making the switch was that usually followed by the Railroad.
The foreman stood at a point 80 to 120 feet west of Seventh Street and south of the track on which the switching movement was being made. A switchman was placed on the Seventh Street railroad crossing for the purpose of protecting those who might be traveling thereon and to signal the foreman when in his opinion it was safe to kick the cars across Seventh Street. He gave the safety signal to the foreman who in turn signaled the engineer. The engine *265at that time was near Third Street nearly four blocks west of Seventh Street. Upon receiving the signal from the foreman the engineer began the eastern movement of the train. At the time the switchman gave the safety signal for the switching movement he saw the plaintiff’s headlights coming north on South Seventh Street approximately two blocks south of the railroad tracks. There were no other automobiles in sight on Seventh Street either north or south at the time. According to the testimony of the foreman Richards, switchman Yates was standing in the middle of Seventh Street when he gave Richards the safety signal. We will more fully discuss the facts in the body of this dissent.
As we understand the majority opinion this judgment is being reversed primarily upon the grounds that the court should have instructed the jury on “wanton negligence”. The opinion also states that it was error for the court to refuse to instruct the jury upon the effect of the rules and regulations of the Southern Pacific Company in determining the question of whether defendant was negligent.
First, we desire to observe that although this court as well as the majority of other courts in the country have recognized wantonness as belonging in °the field of negligence, it requires no profoundness of thought to discern that the term “wanton negligence” constitutes a contradiction. As an abstract proposition of law, wanton misconduct is positive in character while negligence is negative. Wanton misconduct under the law warrants the imposition of punitive damages against the actor in an action by the injured person as a result of such wanton misconduct. Damages for an injury resulting from negligence is limited to compensatory damages. See 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, Sec. 48.
In Barry v. Southern Pac. Co., 64 Ariz. 116, 166 P.2d 825, 828, we quoted with approval the definition of wanton negligence from the Restatement of the Law, Torts, vol. 2, section 500, which reads as follows:
“ ‘The actor’s conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he intentionally does an act or fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize that the actor’s conduct not only creates an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the other but also involves a high degree of probability that substantial harm will result to him.’ [Citing cases.]”
The case of Scott v. Scott, 75 Ariz. 116, 252 P.2d 571, 575, written by Justice La Prade has this to say about “wanton negligence” :
“ * * * Wanton negligence is highly potent, and when it is present it fairly proclaims itself in no uncertain terms. It is 'in the air’, so to speak. It is flagrant and evinces a lawless and • destructive spirit. [Citing case.] As we view the evidence the jury might *266well have found defendant Murphy • guilty of simple negligence of any or all of the acts complained of, but his so-called acts of negligence had none of the attributes of wantonness as heretofore more specifically defined in the cases above referred to.”
For the purpose of further emphasizing the' error of the majority of the court in reversing the judgment of the trial court ■in this case we will concede arguendo that technically it .was error for the trial court to refuse plaintiff’s requested instruction on “wanton negligence”.- Even assuming that the trial court erred in its refusal to instruct on “wanton. negligence”, it is manifestly the duty of this court now to consider and ^determine the question of whether the failure of the trial court to give plaintiff’s instruction on “wanton negligence” constitutes reversible error. This requires an examination of the evidence in the. case bearing upon that subject..
^The-defendant pleaded contributory negligence and the jury was instructed upon that question. The jury found for the defendant and in doing s.o it had to find either that the defendant was not guilty of any negligence or that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.
The cases are. legion wherein this court has - held that under the circumstances here th’é appellate court must view the evidence iri • an overall light most favorable to sustaining;' the verdict and judgment of the trial- court. This is mandatory upon us under the circumstances of this case in determining the issue of whether Or not the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to instruct the jury upon “wanton negligence.”
The plaintiff testifies that she had stopped at the “Seven Seas” where she worked five-or six days a week as a waitress. This was some time after 12 o’clock midnight. She stopped again at what she termed “Frenchy’s Joint” to eat something. She stated that as she approached the Southern Pacific tracks on Seventh Street she slowed down to almost a stop, looked and didn’t see any train and that the wigwag signal at South Seventh Street showed no indication of the presence of a train. She stated she was going 10 to IS mph as -she proceeded across the tracks; that she-did not see any activity in the yard; that she did not see any lights except one “setting east, it seemed to be still down there.” She saw no lights west. She “supposed” the street light was on. In other words, she didn’t know whether it was or not. . She said further that.she was looking back and forth to the right and to the left all the time and that she did not see any train until the corner of the car was about two feet from her car. She was then asked the question:
“Q. Was any signal given to you by anyone at the side of the road or anywhere around to warn. you. of the operation of a train over those tracks ?
A. No.”
*267’This one question and answer is the only-evidence upon which the .majority base ' their opinion that this case must be reversed.’ That the switchman Yates was standing'in the middle of Seventh Street at the- time she approached the tracks was ■ established beyond all reasonable doubt. Her own witness, Mr. Sumner, an employee of the Santa Fe Railway Company who did not -know the switchman, testified that he saw him .there with a lighted lantern and that:when he first saw him he was moving to the, side of the street and that if he hadnff. moved it appeared to him that plaintiff’s apto would have struck him. Yates testiijed that he waved his lantern frantically. in an effort to stop plaintiff before she reached the switching tracks and finally had; to run to the side of the road to prevent ,her from running him down with- ■ her. .automobile, thus corroborating the statement of her witness Sumner.
Richards, the foreman, testified that he received the signal from Yates informing him that it was safe to kick the cars across Seventh Street at that time and that at the tirrife he’gave the signal, Yates was standing in the middle of Seventh Street south of the switching .tracks.
Under the rule laid down in Southern Pac. Co. v. Fisher, 35 Ariz. 87, 274 P. 779, and Southern Pac. Co. v. Shults, 37 Ariz. 142, 290 P. 152, it was the duty of plaintiff to look and listen before crossing the railroad tracks which are themselves a warning of danger. If she had looked she could have seen the electric lantern frantically waved by the switchman Yates in an effort to stop her. Instead, she almost ran over him as testified to both by Yates and her own witness Sumner.
Notwithstanding the fact that switchman Yates was located on Seventh Street equipped with the standard switchman electric lantern seen by both Richards and the Santa Fe employee, Mr. Sumner, plaintiff states that she saw no lights anywhere except a stationary light down east of Seventh Street somewhere. The inference is that she didn’t even see the street light located at the south side of the Southern Pacific tracks and which it was testified would cast its rays.of light so that trains would be clearly visible halfway , to Sixth Street when being moved on the. switching tracks. The evidence is further to the effect that there were no obstructions which prevented the plaintiff from seeing this string of cars. We said in the case of Morenci Southern Ry. Co. v. Monsour, 21 Ariz. 148, 185 P. 938, 940, in prescribing the duties of a railroad company at a dangerous crossing that:
"* * * At common law, the duty is to adequately Warn, not in any particular way, but by any means that are effective. It might be by watchman or automatic signals, or by whistling or by ringing a bell, or by all of these combined, but when the evidence shows that two or more of these were actually employed in a given instance, as here, *268and an instruction that, if the jury find that one of these was not employed, the defendant is guilty of negligence per se is erroneous because the jury might be satisfied that the signal ignored in the instruction was not only given, but was sufficient warning to all persons exercising due care. ?{i ijc
The trial judge sits as a 13th juror in the trial of cases in this jurisdiction. He is also authorized by decisions of this court to weigh the evidence on motion for a new trial. General Petroleum Corp. v. Barker, 77 Ariz. 235, 244, 269 P.2d 729. A motion for a new trial was made in this case and denied by the trial court. We respectfully submit that considering the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict and judgment of the superior court, there is not a semblance of evidence tending to establish wantonness on the part of the Railroad Company. Certainly it is not so “highly potent” that “it fairly proclaims itself in no uncertain terms” nor is it “in the air” or “flagrant” to the extent that it “evinces a lawless and destructive spirit” as defined in Scott v. Scott, supra, and in our opinion, if the verdict and judgment of the court had been for the plaintiff it would have been the duty of the trial judge upon a motion for a new trial to set the judgment and verdict aside upon ground that there was no evidence to support it.
It is obvious from its verdict that no member of the jury believed the plaintiff’s testimony when she stated that the switch-man did not attempt to flag her down or that she saw no warning lights whatever before reaching a position of danger, and it is incredible to us that anyone could believe such testimony.
The switchman was placed there for the express purpose of protecting the public against the hazard of “kicking”, these cars across Seventh Street. It was his absolute duty both to his employer and to the people of the state of Arizona to do just exactly what he testified he did do, and it is difficult to believe that there exists a man with soul so dead that he would deliberately stand inert and permit any human being to drive into a position of danger which but for the grace of God would have resulted in inevitable death. There was testimony that intoxicating liquor was smelled on the breath of plaintiff at the time the case was being investigated. This could have been the reason she saw no lights, and was unable to state positively that the street light just south of the tracks was or was not shining at the time.
The majority opinion opens wide the door for alleging wanton negligence in every personal injury action and on the slightest evidence in support thereof, compel the trial judge to instruct the jury thereon which will effectually deprive a defendant of the defense of contributory negligence.
*269One of the assignments of error was to the effect that the trial court improperly-denied plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial because of the misconduct of counsel for defendants. Specifically the matter complained of arose out of a question propounded to Pauline Bryan relative to the cost of repairing her car, which she stated amounted to some $900.38. She was then asked:
“Q. Actually you only had to pay $50, isn’t that correct?” An appropriate objection was made to this question. It is now contended that this reference to insurance, if it be such, constituted prejudicial misconduct in that it was calculated to indicate to the jury she carried insurance. We have held that where such a matter is intentionally injected by plaintiff it is prejudicial and warrants the declaration of a mistrial. However, we have never had occasion to decide the question whether the same rule applies when the matter of plaintiff carrying insurance is brought out by the defendant. The majority opinion concludes with the statement that “it is unnecessary to determine whether the line of examination undertaken by counsel for defendant was prejudicial”, which we submit is the only issue presented under the assignment.
Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that the question was not answered by the witness, and without any ruling thereon by the court as to its competency- — apparently it was subsequently withdrawn in chambers— the majority now use this query as a springboard to launch into a lengthy dissertation whether a subrogee is or is not the real party in interest, a necessary party, or a proper party; whether the rule compelling joinder applies or whether there may be a splitting of the causes of action. It is our view that the pronouncements made in the majority opinion are dicta inasmuch as such questions are actually not before us for decision. Furthermore it is significant that counsel for plaintiffs did not then consider their objection serious enough to request an instruction or an admonition to disregard the reference, nor did they deem it serious enough to ask for a mistrial. This of itself is sufficient for us to refuse to consider the objection on appeal. See, City Transfer Co. v. Johnson, 72 Ariz. 293, 233 P.2d 1078 and cases therein cited; Jacob v. Miner, 67 Ariz. 109, 191 P.2d 734; Bruno v. San Xavier Rock & Sand Co., 76 Ariz. 250, 263 P.2d 308.
Plaintiffs requested an instruction advising the jury of the rules and regulations of the defendant railroad company governing the kicking or dropping of cars over a public crossing. The trial court, without outlining its reasons therefor, refused the proffered instruction (Pltf. No. 3). The majority opinion now holds that there were several defects therein which “justified the trial court’s refusal to give it.” With this statement we concur.
The majority having reached this conclusion we think it was wholly unnecessary *270and improper for the court to go out of its way by entering into an academic discussion whether a proper instruction — had one been submitted — was relevant to the issue of defendants’ negligence. Concededly there is a sharp division of authority on this question. We refrain from committing ourselves at this time as to which line of authority should be followed.
We are firmly of the view that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.