Court Opinion

ID: 9375623
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-28 15:05:50.213128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:00.469087
License: Public Domain

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Sherwood R. Wescott, AG No. 2,
September Term, 2022.

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE — SANCTION — SUSPENSION

The Court suspended for 60 days an attorney who (1) failed to prepare for hearings and to
communicate with or provide meaningful legal services to a client during the course of
representation; and (2) charged an unreasonable fee, the unearned portion of which he
failed to keep in a separate trust account during the representation and failed to return upon
termination of the representation. The attorney’s conduct violated Maryland Attorneys’
Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1 (Competence), 1.4 (Communication), 1.5 (Fees), 1.15
(Safekeeping Property), 1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation), and 8.4
(Misconduct).
Circuit Court for Wicomico County
Case No. C-22-CV-22-000085
Argued: December 6, 2022

                                                                     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

                                                                             MARYLAND*

                                                                               AG No. 2

                                                                         September Term, 2022
                                                                ______________________________________

                                                                ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION
                                                                        OF MARYLAND

                                                                                   v.

                                                                       SHERWOOD R. WESCOTT
                                                                ______________________________________

                                                                          Fader, C.J.,
                                                                          Watts,
                                                                          Hotten,
                                                                          Booth,
                                                                          Biran,
                                                                          Gould,
                                                                          Eaves,

                                                                                  JJ.
                                                                ______________________________________
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials
Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this             Opinion by Fader, C.J.
document is authentic.
                                                                ______________________________________
                 2023-02-28 09:32-05:00
                                                                          Filed: February 28, 2023
Gregory Hilton, Clerk

* At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional
amendment changing the name of the Court of Appeals of Maryland to the Supreme Court
of Maryland. The name change took effect on December 14, 2022.
       The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (the “Commission”), acting

through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against

Sherwood R. Wescott, a member of the Bar of this State, arising out of his representation

of Antrell L. Johnson. Mr. Johnson’s mother, Cynthia Johnson, retained Mr. Wescott to

represent her son and paid Mr. Wescott’s fees.

       The Commission alleged that Mr. Wescott violated the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules

of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) as a result of his: (1) failure to keep Mr. Johnson

reasonably informed about the status of his case, prepare Mr. Johnson for his hearings, and

perform meaningful legal services in furtherance of Mr. Johnson’s defense; (2) improper

collection of a nonrefundable flat fee; (3) failure to deposit fees in an attorney trust account;

and (4) failure to return unearned fees upon the termination of the representation. The

Commission asserted that Mr. Wescott’s conduct violated MARPC 1.1 (Competence)

(Rule 19-301.1), MARPC 1.4 (Communication) (Rule 19-301.4), MARPC 1.5 (Fees) (Rule

19-301.5), MARPC 1.15 (Safekeeping Property) (Rule 19-301.15), MARPC 1.16

(Declining or Terminating Representation) (Rule 19-301.16), and MARPC 8.4

(Misconduct) (Rule 19-308.4).1

       1
        Effective July 1, 2016, the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct,
which employed the numbering format of the American Bar Association Model Rules,
were renamed the MARPC and recodified without substantive modification in Title 19,
Chapter 300 of the Maryland Rules. For ease of reference and comparison with our prior
opinions and those of other courts, we will refer to the MARPC rules using the numbering
of the model rules, as permitted by Rule 19-300.1(22) and as identified in the paragraph to
which this footnote is appended.
       The hearing judge assigned to this matter found by clear and convincing evidence

that Mr. Wescott had committed all the violations alleged by the Commission. The hearing

judge also determined the existence of six aggravating and two mitigating factors. Neither

party filed exceptions. Bar Counsel recommended the sanction of a 60-day suspension

from the practice of law. We will adopt the hearing judge’s findings of fact, concur with

the hearing judge’s conclusions of law in all respects but one, and agree with Bar Counsel’s

sanction recommendation.

                                    BACKGROUND

       When no exceptions are filed, this Court may accept a hearing judge’s factual

findings as established. Rule 19-740(b)(2)(A). We choose to do so here. Accordingly, we

treat as established the following facts, which the hearing judge found to have been proved

by clear and convincing evidence.

       Mr. Wescott’s Representation of Antrell L. Johnson

       Mr. Johnson was charged with kidnapping and related crimes in the District Court

of Maryland for Wicomico County on March 14, 2020. On April 15, Ms. Johnson retained

Mr. Wescott to represent her son. The retainer agreement Mr. Westcott provided to

Ms. Johnson called for a flat fee of $15,000 to be paid in installments of $3,500 every 90

days. The agreement further provided that: (1) the entire fee would be considered earned

in full when Mr. Wescott entered his “formal appearance” in the case; (2) the flat fee was

“immediately payable to [Mr. Wescott] no matter the amount of installment payments

and/or fee paid”; (3) the “fees are non-refundable and considered as immediate work

                                             2
performed and not subject to hourly charges”; and (4) the “fees are not subject to attorney

client-trust accounts and can be collected by the attorney immediately.”

       Mr. Wescott did not explain the retainer agreement, including its fees provisions, to

either Ms. or Mr. Johnson. Ms. Johnson signed the retainer agreement and ultimately paid

Mr. Wescott a total of $7,000 between April and September 2020. Mr. Wescott did not

deposit any of those funds in an attorney trust account at any time.

       On April 15, 2020, Mr. Wescott entered his appearance on behalf of Mr. Johnson.

Without informing Mr. Johnson, Mr. Wescott then arranged for another attorney,

Purcell S. Luke, to assist with Mr. Johnson’s representation. On April 16, Mr. Luke filed

a motion requesting a bond review hearing, which took place remotely on April 20. Neither

Mr. Wescott nor Mr. Luke prepared Mr. Johnson in advance of the hearing, which was

attended by Messrs. Luke and Johnson but not Mr. Wescott. The court ordered that

Mr. Johnson continue to be held without bond.

       On June 18, the court held a remote preliminary hearing. Although Mr. Wescott

attended that hearing with Mr. Johnson, he failed to prepare Mr. Johnson for it. At the

conclusion of the hearing, the court found probable cause and continued Mr. Johnson’s

detention without bond.

       On July 17, the Wicomico County State’s Attorney’s Office filed a criminal

information transferring Mr. Johnson’s case to the Circuit Court for Wicomico County. In

lieu of attending the initial appearance hearing scheduled for August 7, Mr. Wescott filed

a line entering his appearance. On August 10, Mr. Wescott filed preliminary papers,

                                             3
including a standard request for discovery; a motion asserting standard, mandatory

defenses; and a request for a jury trial.

       Throughout the representation, Mr. Wescott visited Mr. Johnson in the detention

center only once, for approximately 15 to 20 minutes. During that meeting, Mr. Wescott

briefly discussed the charges with Mr. Johnson but did not discuss other aspects of the case.

Apart from that visit, Mr. Wescott spoke to Mr. Johnson only one other time, while on a

three-way call with Ms. Johnson. Mr. Wescott failed to answer or return subsequent calls.

       On or about October 20, a dissatisfied Mr. Johnson terminated Mr. Wescott’s

representation. Mr. Wescott promptly filed a motion to strike his appearance, which the

court granted following a hearing.

       The Office of the Public Defender entered its appearance on behalf of Mr. Johnson

on December 14. At a bond review hearing on January 29, 2021, the court ordered

Mr. Johnson to be released from detention on pretrial supervision. On July 8, 2021, the

State entered a nolle prosequi on all counts.

       Mr. Wescott did not return any portion of the fee he had collected to either Ms. or

Mr. Johnson.

       Procedural History

       Ms. Johnson filed a complaint with the Commission on December 14, 2020. After

an investigation, the Commission, through Bar Counsel, filed a petition for disciplinary or

remedial action on March 16, 2022. The hearing judge assigned by this Court conducted

a hearing at which Ms. and Mr. Johnson and Mr. Wescott testified. The hearing judge then

                                                4
issued a written opinion making findings of fact, which are consistent with the recitation

above, and conclusions of law, including that Mr. Wescott violated:

      • MARPC 1.1 (Competence), when he failed to prepare Mr. Johnson for
        two hearings and failed to deposit and maintain unearned fees in his
        attorney trust account.

      • MARPC 1.4 (Communication), “when he: (1) failed to properly explain
        the retainer agreement to Mr. Johnson; (2) failed to inform Mr. Johnson
        that Mr. Luke would be assisting him with the representation and would
        be appearing in his place at the bond review hearing; and (3) failed to
        keep Mr. Johnson reasonably informed about the status of his case.”

      • MARPC 1.5 (Fees), when he: (1) charged a fee that, though it may have
        been reasonable at the start of representation, became unreasonable
        because “[m]ost of the legal services [he] claims to have performed on
        behalf of Mr. Johnson were either completely unsubstantiated or provided
        absolutely no value to Mr. Johnson’s defense” and (2) “charg[ed] an
        improper nonrefundable flat fee.”

      • MARPC 1.15 (Safekeeping Property), when he failed to: (1) deposit fees
        in his attorney trust account until they were earned; (2) obtain informed
        consent in writing to deposit the fees elsewhere; and (3) explain the risks
        of, or alternatives to, not placing fees in his attorney trust account.

      • MARPC 1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation), “when he
        failed to provide Ms. Johnson and Mr. Johnson with a refund of the
        unearned portion of the fee.”

      • MARPC 8.4(a) and (d) (Misconduct), when he “failed to perform any
        meaningful legal services in furtherance of Mr. Johnson’s defense” and
        violated other rules of professional conduct.

      Neither party filed exceptions to any aspect of the hearing judge’s findings of facts

or conclusions of law.

                                            5
                                      DISCUSSION

I.     THE HEARING JUDGE’S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE SUPPORTED BY
       CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

       As noted, when there are no exceptions filed, we may treat the hearing judge’s

factual findings as established. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Maiden, 480 Md. 1, 6

(2022); see also Rule 19-740(b)(2)(A).        However, we review the hearing judge’s

conclusions of law without deference, Rule 19-740(b)(1), and independently determine

whether Bar Counsel established a violation of the rules by clear and convincing evidence,

see Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Silbiger, 478 Md. 607, 617 (2022).

       Based upon our independent review of the record, we agree that the Commission

established multiple violations of the MARPC by clear and convincing evidence.

Mr. Wescott’s conduct underlying those violations generally falls into two categories:

(1) failures in his representation of Mr. Johnson; and (2) violations relating to the fee he

charged and partially collected. We address each category in turn.

       A.     Mr. Wescott Violated Multiple Rules of Professional Conduct by
              Failing to Prepare and to Communicate with, or Provide
              Meaningful Legal Services to, Mr. Johnson.

       The hearing judge concluded that Mr. Wescott violated multiple rules of

professional conduct by failing to: (1) prepare Mr. Johnson for hearings; (2) adequately

explain the retainer agreement to Ms. or Mr. Johnson, communicate with Mr. Johnson

about his case, or inform him that another attorney would be assisting in the case; and

(3) generally perform meaningful legal services in furtherance of Mr. Johnson’s defense.

                                             6
      An attorney must provide a client with competent representation, which “requires

the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the

representation.” MARPC 1.1. Representation is not competent if an attorney fails to

“adequately prepare a client and communicate viable options to that client in advance of

trial.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Yi, 470 Md. 464, 491 (2020); see also Attorney

Grievance Comm’n v. Ficker, 399 Md. 445, 450 (2007).

      Mr. Wescott failed to provide competent representation when he did not prepare

Mr. Johnson for, or inform him about the nature and purpose of, the hearings on April 20

and June 18, 2020. In doing so, Mr. Wescott violated MARPC 1.1.

      MARPC 1.4 separately provides, in relevant part, that:

      (a) An attorney shall:

      (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which
      the client’s informed consent, as defined in Rule 19-301.0 (f) (1.0), is required by
      these Rules;

      (2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; [and]

      (3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information[.]

                                                ***

      (b) An attorney shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit
      the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

When a client makes a reasonable request for information, an attorney must promptly

respond or, if a prompt response is not feasible, “acknowledge receipt of the request and

advise the client when a response may be expected.” MARPC 1.4 cmt. 4. “Client

telephone calls should be promptly returned or acknowledged.” Id.; see also Attorney

                                            7
Grievance Comm’n v. Proctor, 479 Md. 650, 683 (2022) (“MARPC 1.4 can be violated if

a client has made several ‘reasonable requests for information, which may include a general

status update or for documents pertaining to the case[,]’ to no avail.” (quoting Attorney

Grievance Comm’n v. Planta, 467 Md. 319, 349 (2020))).

       Mr. Wescott failed to adequately communicate with Mr. Johnson throughout the

representation. Specifically, Mr. Wescott did not: (1) properly explain the retainer

agreement to Ms. or Mr. Johnson; (2) tell Mr. Johnson about Mr. Luke’s participation in

the case, including his presence at the bond review hearing in place of Mr. Wescott; or

(3) keep Mr. Johnson informed about the status of his case. Mr. Wescott met with

Mr. Johnson in person only once for 15 to 20 minutes, near the beginning of the

representation. Mr. Wescott also spoke to Mr. Johnson on the telephone only once and did

not return subsequent calls. Mr. Wescott’s conduct violated MARPC 1.4.

       In committing those violations of MARPC 1.1 and 1.4, Mr. Wescott also necessarily

violated MARPC 8.4(a), which provides that it is misconduct to “violate or attempt to

violate the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct[.]” See Attorney Grievance

Comm’n v. Moawad, 475 Md. 424, 479 (2021) (“This Court has noted that when a

respondent has violated multiple Rules of Professional Conduct, he or she has ‘necessarily

violated M[A]RPC 8.4(a) as well[.]’” (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gallagher,

371 Md. 673, 710-11 (2002))).

                                            8
      B.     Mr. Wescott Violated Multiple Rules of Professional Conduct by
             Charging an Unreasonable Fee, Failing to Keep Unearned Fees in
             a Separate Account, and Failing to Refund Unearned Fees upon
             Termination of Representation.

      The second category of violations the hearing judge found relates to the fees

Mr. Wescott charged Ms. and Mr. Johnson. Specifically, the hearing judge concluded, and

we agree, that Mr. Wescott engaged in professional misconduct by: (1) charging an

unreasonable fee (MARPC 1.5); (2) failing to deposit Ms. Johnson’s payments into an

attorney trust account until the fees were earned or expenses incurred, or to obtain

informed, written consent to do otherwise (MARPC 1.1 and 1.15); and (3) failing to refund

unearned fees upon termination of the representation (MARPC 1.16).

      As relevant here, Rule 1.5(a) provides:

      (a) An attorney shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable
      fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in
      determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:

      (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved,
      and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;

      (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular
      employment will preclude other employment of the attorney;

      (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;

      (4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

      (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;

      (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

      (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney or attorneys performing
      the services; and

      (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

                                             9
       The problems with the fees charged by Mr. Wescott stem largely from the structure

of the fee arrangement. As noted, the retainer agreement Ms. Johnson signed called for a

flat fee of $15,000, paid in installments, that, without regard to the amount of work he

performed, would: (1) be earned in full at the moment he entered his appearance, which

he did the day he was retained; (2) be nonrefundable; and (3) not need to be placed in an

attorney trust account. Pursuant to that arrangement, Mr. Westcott collected $7,000 before

his representation was terminated and did not deposit any of it in his attorney trust account.

The hearing judge found that Mr. Westcott performed very little work and, nonetheless,

did not refund any of the money.

       This Court has held that “[a] fee that is reasonable at the outset of a representation

can become unreasonable if the lawyer fails to earn it.” Yi, 470 Md. at 496; see Attorney

Grievance Comm’n v. Colton-Bell, 434 Md. 553, 566-67 (2013) (concluding that a

nonrefundable fee obtained for unperformed work was unreasonable under MARPC 1.5).

Here, the hearing judge concluded that Mr. Wescott’s $15,000 flat fee was not

unreasonable for the services expected to be performed, but that the scant services he

actually performed rendered unreasonable both the agreed fee and the $7,000 he was

actually paid. We agree. According to the hearing judge’s findings of fact, which we have

adopted, Mr. Wescott filed an initial appearance and standard pretrial motions, met briefly

with Mr. Johnson once and spoke briefly with him a second time, attended one court

hearing, had another lawyer attend another hearing on his behalf, and could not substantiate

doing any other work on the case. Under the circumstances, we agree with the hearing

                                             10
judge that the $7,000 fee Mr. Wescott collected from Ms. Johnson was unreasonable and

violated MARPC 1.5(a).

       A lawyer’s general obligation to safeguard client property and to deposit unearned

client funds in an attorney trust account is set forth in MARPC 1.15. As relevant here,

MARPC 1.15(a) and (c) require an attorney to “hold property of clients or third persons

that is in an attorney’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the

attorney’s own property” and deposit unearned funds into an attorney trust account

“[u]nless the client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to a different

arrangement[.]” “We have stated that, ‘an attorney must communicate the risks associated

with a fee arrangement that varies from the standard escrow arrangement,’ and Rule 1.15

is violated when ‘neither the retainer agreement, nor the Respondent personally, explained

the material risks associated with entering into an “earned upon receipt” fee agreement[.]’”

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gracey, 448 Md. 1, 23 (2016) (internal brackets omitted)

(quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Chapman, 430 Md. 238, 277 (2013)).

       Here, although Mr. Wescott’s retainer agreement stated that the fees he charged

would not be “subject to attorney client-trust accounts and can be collected by the attorney

immediately,” the hearing judge found that Mr. Wescott did not explain that provision or

the risks associated with it to Ms. or Mr. Johnson. As a result, Ms. Johnson could not

provide informed consent and Mr. Wescott’s failure to deposit the funds he received from

her into his trust account violated MARPC 1.15(a) and (c). We have also previously held

that the failure to maintain unearned funds in a separate trust account, at least when it can

be attributed to a lack of competence rather than intentional misconduct, is a violation of

                                             11
MARPC 1.1. See Silbiger, 478 Md. at 625 (“The failure to maintain funds received on

behalf of a client in a trust account demonstrates incompetence.” (quoting Attorney

Grievance Comm’n v. Blatt, 463 Md. 679, 699 (2019))); see also Attorney Grievance

Comm’n v. Brooks, 476 Md. 97, 132 (2021).

      Rule 1.16(d) provides that, upon termination of representation, an attorney has a

duty to “refund[] any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or

incurred.” Considering our conclusion that Mr. Wescott did not earn the $7,000 fee that

he collected from Ms. Johnson and did not return any portion of that fee to her after his

representation was terminated, Mr. Wescott violated Rule 1.16(d).

      Finally, we turn to the hearing judge’s conclusion that Mr. Wescott’s conduct

violated MARPC 8.4(d), which states that “[i]t is professional misconduct for an attorney

to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]” MARPC

8.4(d) is violated when an attorney’s behavior “bring[s] the legal profession into

disrepute[.]” Proctor, 479 Md. at 690 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Plank, 453

Md. 446, 465 (2017)). The hearing judge identified two bases of support for the conclusion

that Mr. Wescott violated MARPC 8.4(d). We concur with one but not the other.

      First, the hearing judge identified the cumulative effect of Mr. Wescott’s violations

of MARPC 1.1, 1.4, 1.5, 1.15, 1.16, and 8.4(a) as constituting a violation of MARPC

8.4(d). This Court has previously found a violation of MARPC 8.4(d) when an attorney

has engaged in multiple violations including, among other misconduct, providing

incompetent representation, failing to adequately communicate with clients, and

mismanaging client funds or property. See, e.g., Brooks, 476 Md. at 138-39 (holding that

                                           12
an attorney who made numerous errors administering an estate, did not communicate with

the client, and failed to deposit unearned fees into an attorney trust account violated Rule

8.4(d)); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mitchell, 445 Md. 241, 262-63 (2015) (holding

that the failure to perform competently and diligently, expedite litigation, and adequately

communicate with the client violated Rule 8.4(d)); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.

Shephard, 444 Md. 299, 336 (2015) (concluding that an attorney’s failure to deposit and

manage unearned client fees in an attorney trust account “adversely affected the public’s

perception of the legal profession”). We agree with the hearing judge’s conclusion that,

under the circumstances presented, the cumulative effect of Mr. Wescott’s other violations

brought the legal profession into disrepute and, therefore, constitutes a violation of

MARPC 8.4(d).

       Second, pointing to Mr. Johnson’s release on pretrial supervision after he terminated

Mr. Wescott’s representation and the eventual nol pros of the charges, the hearing judge

implied that Mr. Wescott’s violations caused Mr. Johnson to remain incarcerated longer

than he should have. We find no support in the record for that conclusion. No evidence

was introduced at the hearing to suggest that Mr. Wescott’s failings led any judicial officer

to deny pretrial release in a circumstance in which that officer would otherwise have

approved it. In the absence of evidentiary support, we will not speculate about the reasons

why Mr. Johnson’s new counsel was successful in obtaining his pretrial release.

II.    THE APPROPRIATE SANCTION IS A 60-DAY SUSPENSION.

       “The purpose of a sanction in an attorney discipline case is not so much to punish

the attorney as ‘to protect the public and the public’s confidence in the legal profession.’”

                                             13
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Collins, 469 Md. 134, 149 (2020) (quoting Attorney

Grievance Comm’n v. Greenleaf, 438 Md. 151, 163 (2014)). “We will assess the individual

circumstances, inclusive of any mitigating or aggravating factors, of each case in order to

determine a sanction commensurate to the violations committed.” Proctor, 479 Md. at

690.

       A.     Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

       Aggravating factors are factors that “militate in favor of a more severe sanction.”

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bonner, 477 Md. 576, 608 (2022) (quoting Attorney

Grievance Comm’n v. Miller, 467 Md. 176, 233 (2020)); see also Attorney Grievance

Comm’n v. O’Neill, 477 Md. 632, 656-57 (2022) (providing a list of recognized

aggravating factors). Here, the hearing judge found clear and convincing evidence of six

aggravating factors. Combining two factors, the hearing judge found that Mr. Wescott

(1) “demonstrated a pattern of misconduct and [(2) committed] multiple offenses” when

he “violated multiple Rules over the span of several months.” Third, the hearing judge

found that Mr. Wescott, having been admitted to the Maryland Bar in 2001, had

“substantial experience in the practice of law.” Fourth, because Mr. Wescott maintained

throughout the disciplinary proceedings that he earned his entire fee and was not required

to deposit Ms. Johnson’s funds in a trust account, the hearing judge determined that

Mr. Wescott “has refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct.” For the

same reason, and because Mr. Wescott did not return any portion of the fee he collected,

the hearing judge also concluded that Mr. Wescott displayed “indifference to making

restitution.” Finally, the hearing judge found that Mr. Johnson was a “vulnerable victim”

                                            14
because he has a learning disability that limits his comprehension and communication

skills. Cf. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McLaughlin, 456 Md. 172, 205 (2017) (finding

that an elderly woman diagnosed with dementia was a vulnerable victim); Attorney

Grievance Comm’n v. Whitehead, 405 Md. 240, 263 (2008) (finding that a disabled adult

under a conservatorship was a vulnerable victim). Mr. Wescott filed no exceptions to the

hearing judge’s findings concerning aggravating factors. We conclude that the record

supports the hearing judge’s findings on all six aggravating factors, for the reasons

articulated by the hearing judge, by clear and convincing evidence.

       “[T]he existence of mitigating factors tends to lessen or reduce the sanction an

attorney may face.” Moawad, 475 Md. at 486 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.

Smith-Scott, 469 Md. 281, 365 (2020)); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. White, 480

Md. 319, 385-86 (2022) (providing a list of recognized mitigating factors). The hearing

judge found two mitigating factors: (1) this is the first disciplinary complaint against

Mr. Wescott; and (2) Mr. Wescott has not attempted to collect the remaining $8,000 he

alleges was due under the representation agreement. We find that the record supports the

hearing judge’s findings on both mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence.

       B.     The Sanction

       The Commission recommends that Mr. Wescott be suspended from the practice of

law for 60 days. In support of that recommendation, the Commission observes that this

Court has imposed a range of sanctions from a reprimand to an indefinite suspension for

violations involving incompetence and neglect of client matters, but has “generally

suspended lawyers who for the first time have been found to have violated rules relating to

                                            15
competency[.]”    Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56, 98 (2000).

Specifically, the Commission looks to three cases involving similar violations to those

found here, in which the Court administered: (1) a 30-day suspension (Attorney Grievance

Comm’n v. Tauber, 421 Md. 415 (2011)); (2) a 60-day suspension (Collins, 469 Md. 134);

and (3) a 90-day suspension (Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ugwuonye, 405 Md. 351

(2008)).

       In Tauber, we concluded that a 30-day suspension was the appropriate sanction for

an attorney who did not deposit unearned funds into an attorney trust account due to his

ignorance of the MARPC. 421 Md. at 429-30. In Collins, we concluded that a 60-day

suspension was appropriate when an attorney failed to communicate with her client, act

with diligence, comply with discovery rules, or prepare her client for trial. 469 Md. at 153.

Although there was only one client matter at issue and the attorney had not been disciplined

before, we found that the aggravating factors of her substantial experience and her

unwillingness to take responsibility for her misconduct merited a 60-day suspension. Id.

at 150, 153. In Ugwuonye, we concluded that a 90-day suspension was the appropriate

sanction for an attorney who failed to act competently in two client matters. 405 Md. at

373, 375. First, in an employment discrimination suit, the attorney failed to communicate

with a client or respond to requests from the court while remaining the attorney of record,

resulting in the dismissal of the case. Id. at 355, 365-66. Second, the attorney took a

meritless case, charged an unreasonable fee, deposited unearned funds into his operating

account instead of a trust account, and failed to return the unearned portion of the fee upon

termination of the representation. Id. at 367.

                                             16
       Mr. Wescott filed no written position with respect to sanction. At oral argument, he

argued that a suspension was unwarranted but did not cite any analogous cases or other

authorities in support of his position.

       We agree with the Commission that the severity of the MARPC violations and the

mitigating and aggravating factors found render this case most similar to Collins. Unlike

Tauber, which dealt only with the mishandling of client funds and no issues of incompetent

representation, Mr. Wescott also violated MARPC 1.1 and 1.4 when he failed to perform

meaningful legal services and to adequately communicate with his client. And unlike

Ugwuonye, Mr. Wescott’s misconduct occurred in only one case, his conduct was not

demonstrated to have prejudiced his client’s case, and he timely withdrew from

representation upon the client’s request. Accordingly, we agree with the Commission that

the appropriate sanction is a definite suspension for 60 days. The suspension shall begin

30 days after the date on which this opinion is filed.

                                                  IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT
                                                  SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED
                                                  BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT,
                                                  INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL
                                                  TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO
                                                  MARYLAND RULE 19-709(d), FOR
                                                  WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS
                                                  ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE
                                                  ATTORNEY           GRIEVANCE
                                                  COMMISSION            AGAINST
                                                  SHERWOOD R. WESCOTT.

                                             17