Court Opinion

ID: 9883468
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 01:43:15.860511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:23.636503
License: Public Domain

Connor, Judge
(concurring in result only):
I would hold the contract clear and unambiguous as a matter of law and reverse the jury’s verdict on that basis.
I do not believe a controversy is automatically shielded from civil review simply because a church is a party. I agree with the majority that Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed. (2d) 151 (1976), sets out the analytical framework in which we must proceed. However, I disagree with their interpretation of Serbian and furthermore believe the facts of our case to be quite distinguishable from those in Serbian.
Serbian involved a thirteen-year battle over the organization of a Diocese. In that case the core of the controversy concerned matters of doctrine and faith. The dispute centered around control of the Diocese and the defrocking of a Bishop. The Bishop, by virtue of his position within the church, was the principal officer of a property-holding corporation. Property disputes were completely incidental to the central issue of who controlled the Diocese. The U.S. Supreme Court held delving into religious issues under these circumstances impermissibly violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
*425Serbian prohibits “extensive inquiry . . . into religious law and polity,” id at 708, 96 S.Ct. at 2380, where “the resolution of religious controversies . . . incidentally affect[s] civil rights.” Id. at 710, 96 S.Ct. at 2381 (Emphasis added). In other words, if the controversy is “quintessentially religious,” the civil courts must accept the decision of the highest authority of a hierarchical church as final.
However, our case presents the converse situation. Resolution of the controversy here, which has at its heart a civil dispute, requires the application of neutral principles of contract law, and very little inquiry into religious law. We are not asked to engage in an extensive inquiry into the religious law of the Church of God. We have not analyzed the procedural and substantive organization of the Church. We have not questioned the decision of the church judicatory on the ecclesiastical determination to revoke Pearson’s ministry. We must determine only the narrow question of the effect of the revocation of Pearson’s ministry upon his contractual rights under his Pension Plan.
I would find the contract provisions clear and unambiguous as a matter of law. Black v. Freeman, 274 S.C. 272, 262 S.E. (2d) 879 (1980) (where the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous as a matter of law, construction is for the court rather than the jury). Courts must enforce contracts “regardless of [their] wisdom or folly, apparent unreasonableness, or the parties’ failure to guard their rights carefully.” Jordan v. Security Group, Inc., 311 S.C. 227, 230, 428 S.E. (2d) 705, 707 (1993). Moreover, courts must look at entire agreements, harmonizing provisions where possible. Popocar Enterprises v. McGowan, 300 S.C. 178, 386 S.E. (2d) 795 (Ct. Appl 1989). A “[m]ere lack of clarity on casual reading is not the standard for determining whether a contract is afflicted with ambiguity.” Gamble, Givens & Moody v. Moise, 288 S.C. 210, 215, 341 S.E. (2d) 147, 150 (Ct. App. 1986) (citation ommitted).
The contract here clearly and unambiguously provides for forfeiture of one’s pension upon revocation of one’s ministry. As the majority states, Paragraph 19 of S62 of the Minutes provides ministers whose ministries have been revoked shall “cease to draw compensation from the fund.” Moreover, various provisions under S60 define disciplinary procedures for disorderly ministers, and separate paragraphs govern differ*426ent offenses. Paragraph 1, which governs the offense of adultery or fornication, provides for the revocation of a minister’s license upon a finding of adultery.
Pearson confessed he committed adultery and the church revoked his license. Pearson admits (1) he was licensed in the Ministry of the Church of God and (2) his license to participate in that ministry was revoked. However, he argues once he retired his ministry ceased and, therefore, his ministry could not be revoked. Yet he concedes he maintained his license as an ordained minister even after retirement. Furthermore, he admits after retirement he remained on the Church’s rolls as an ordained minister, made monthly minister reports to the national body, and performed many of the duties of an active minster. Therefore, he basically continued to pursue a ministry in the Church of God after retirement. The trial judge should have directed a verdict in favor of the Church of God, finding as a matter of law the contract clearly and unambiguously allowed the church to terminate Pearson’s pension payments because his ministry had been revoked.
I would reverse the verdict on this basis.