Court Opinion

ID: 9898083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:28:22.102675+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:09.853943
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

GERALD C. CLEMENS, as trustee of
The John and Jean Roden Revocable    No. 84399-1-I
Trust,
                                     DIVISION ONE
     Appellant/Cross-Respondent,
                                     UNPUBLISHED OPINION
     v.

PETER VRINCEANU and ELENA
VRINCEANU, a married couple,

     Respondents/Cross-Appellants,

     and

CLIFFORD J. JARREAU and ERIKA L.
JARREAU, a married couple;
CHELSEA WALKER, an unmarried
person, and RYAN BAHM, an
unmarried person; ROBERT C.
MORGAN and DEANNA L. MORGAN,
a married couple; MAHMOUD
GHOFRANI AND SEYEDEHNEGAR
NIROMAND HOSSEINI, a married
couple; ANKIT AWASTHI and SONIKA
SONI, a married couple; NANCY R.
LITTLE, an unmarried person, and
TYLER D. KRISTOVICH, an unmarried
person; KARLEN LIE, an unmarried
person, and THANET RANGARATNA
and ACCARIMA SRIMUANG, a
married couple; RASHIDA ANJUM and
IRSHAD AMJAD, a married couple;
DOUGLAS R. SCHROTH, an
unmarried person; MYRLINO HUFANA
and MARITESS HUFANA, a married
couple; HOWARD P. SNOW and
MOLLY L. SNOW, a married couple;
MIN SUG KONG and CHUNG WON
No. 84399-1-I/2

LEE, a married couple; HOANG
INVESTMENTS, LLC, a Washington
limited liability company; CHARLES S.
TAULBEE, an unmarried person;
CHRISTOPHER W. VAN HORNE, an
unmarried person; YING CUI, an
unmarried person; ANGELA CLARE
THAIN, a married person; MARC T.
RITTENHOUSE and SHANA N.
RITTENHOUSE, a married couple;
JONATHAN WILLIAM LAVERING and
JING LAVERING, a married couple;
DALIBOR VAVREK and GENA E.
VAVREK, a married couple; CATALIN
V. POPA and CLAUDIA POPA, a
married couple; JACH INVESTMENT
GROUP LLC, a Washington limited
liability company; BENTLEY MAKKAR,
an unmarried person, and
JASKEERAT SINGH MAKKAR, an
unmarried person; WILLAIM S. FINE
and MARY L. FINE, a married couple;
LEORA M. CLEMANS, an unmarried
person; DERRIN M. WATSON and
KALI E. WATSON, a married couple;
NICHOLAS D. RAVAGNI, an
unmarried person; AYUSH
CHATURVEDI and ADRIANA IOANA
OLARU, a married couple; WELLES
HOFFMANN and KARTIN HOFFMAN,
a married couple; DEN VAN HUYNH
and LACH THI NGUYEN, a married
couple; IRVING Y ZHANG, a married
person; ROMIT GIRDHAR and
GAYATRI WATWE, a married couple;
KARINE AGADZHANOVA, an
unmarried person; ALAN CHUNG and
WAI KUEN FANICA FAN, a married
couple; MARY PATRICIA GERGEN,
an unmarried person; JEREMY DE
SOUZA and NORA DE SOUSA, a
married couple; HELEN K. TAYLOR,
an unmarried person; REYES
CAMINO, an unmarried person;
TIFFANI CARL, an unmarried person;
MAKSIM SUDZILOUSKI and

                                        2
No. 84399-1-I/3

SVETLANA SUDZILOUSKAYA, a
married couple; CHANG GUO and
LAIYA JOY LUBBEN, a married
couple; JOHN M. HANSON and
SYLVIA F. HANSON, a married
couple; JJ ZOU and LINGQING ZOU,
a married couple; MARCO S.
NAKAYAMA, an unmarried person;
JOHN CORRING and EMILY
CORRING, a married couple; KEN
MANSON, as Personal Representative
of the Estate of Beatrice Manson;
COLIN LYTEL, an unmarried person;
ROBERT A. JOHNSON and LINDA R.
JOHNSON, a married couple;
MARGRET A. SODERSTROM and
ROBERT A. PURDY, JR., a married
couple; RONALD J. GRANT, an
unmarried person; EVA CSIBA, an
unmarried person; RONGJI GUAN and
GUANGMEI KE, a married couple;
MICHAEL W. SARGENT and
STEPHANIE J. SARGENT, a married
couple; VINCE F. KAELIN, JR, a
married person; JENEE L. HAMILTON,
an unmarried person; LIAN JANG, a
married person, TAM TIEU, a married
person, and SON K. TIEU, an
unmarried person; VY THI PHAM and
HOANG V. NGUYEN, a married
couple; QIAN LI and RUI MA, a
married couple; MICHALE MUTH, and
JOYANNE WALKER, a married
couple; ANINDITA KAR and KAUSHIK
SARKAR, a married couple; FA
QUIANG TANG, an unmarried person;
RICARDO MACIAS TAMEZ and
MELISA SALAS SAENZ, a married
couple; NITYA NAMBIAR and
SNEHITH YENDAL, a married couple;
and ALAN S. JEWETT and SUSAN E.
JEWETT, a married couple,

                  Defendants.

                                  3
No. 84399-1-I/4

          BIRK, J. — The trial court as factfinder determined that a Bellevue property,

which we refer to as “Tract A,” is subject to a restrictive covenant prohibiting its

development or use for any purpose other than recreation. Gerald Clemens, who

owns Tract A in his capacity as trustee, appeals. Peter and Elena Vrinceanu,

whose property adjoins Tract A, cross-appeal. They argue the trial court erred by

concluding they do not have a right to recreate on Tract A and by quieting title to

Tract A in Clemens. Finding no error, we affirm.

                                             I

          In September 2020, Clemens filed a complaint to quiet title in a parcel of

property in Bellevue. The parcel is Tract A of “Leawood Addition,” which was

platted in 1959.       As shown in Figure 1 below, the text “RESERVED FOR

RECREATION” appears on Tract A as it is depicted on the Leawood Addition plat

(Plat).

                                   Figure 1: Plat Excerpt

                                             4
No. 84399-1-I/5

       Clemens sought to establish legal ownership to Tract A. He also sought a

declaration that the Plat did not convey to other Leawood Addition lot owners,

whom he named as defendants, the “right to use Tract A for recreational purposes

or any other possessory or nonpossessory interests in Tract A.”           A group of

defendants (the Jarreau Defendants) counterclaimed for declarations that “the

owner of Tract A . . . may not use Tract A for any purpose other than recreation”

and that the Plat “conveys to all owners of lots in Leawood Addition . . . the right to

use Tract A for recreational purposes, and that this right runs with the land as an

easement, covenant, and/or plat restriction.”

       The matter proceeded to a bench trial. The trial court determined that

Clemens held fee title to Tract A as trustee of the John Roden Irrevocable Spousal

Trust, and it quieted title in him. The court also determined that “Tract A is subject

to a restrictive covenant requiring that it be limited to recreational use” and “may

only be used or developed in a manner consistent with a recreational purpose.” It

determined further that “[t]he covenant that restricts the manner in which Tract A

may be used and/or developed does not confer upon the Defendants a right to use

the land.” Clemens appeals, and Peter and ElenaVrinceanu, who own a Leawood

Addition lot that adjoins Tract A and were among the Jarreau Defendants, cross-

appeal.

                                          5
No. 84399-1-I/6

                                         II

       Clemens argues the trial court erred in determining that the “RESERVED

FOR RECREATION” plat notation is a restrictive covenant enforceable against him

by other Leawood Addition lot owners. We disagree.1

       “After a trial court has weighed the evidence in a bench trial, appellate

review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the findings

of fact and, if so, whether the findings support the conclusions of law.” Keever &

Assocs., Inc. v. Randall, 129 Wn. App. 733, 737, 119 P.3d 926 (2005). “Substantial

evidence is evidence sufficient to persuade a fair-minded person of the truth of the

asserted premise.” Id. “If that standard is satisfied, we will not substitute our

judgment for that of the trial court even though we may have resolved disputed

facts differently.” Id. We consider all evidence and draw all reasonable inferences

in the light most favorable to the factfinder’s decision. See Gorman v. Pierce

County, 176 Wn. App. 63, 87, 307 P.3d 795 (2013).

       In Johnson v. Mt. Baker Park Presbyterian Church, 113 Wash. 458, 465-66,

194 P. 536 (1920), a plat restricted a parcel to residential use, and despite having

notice of this together with the original platter’s intent to establish a residential

development so restricted, the parcel’s owner, like Clemens here, argued that

because the restriction did not appear on the owner’s deed, the owner could put

       1 Before trial, Clemens moved for summary judgment, arguing that Tract A

is not subject to a covenant limiting its use to recreation as a matter of law. The
trial court denied the motion, and Clemens assigns error to that denial. But
Clemens does not raise any arguments in support of that assignment of error other
than the ones we reject below. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed infra,
Clemens does not show the trial court erred by denying summary judgment.

                                         6
No. 84399-1-I/7

the parcel to a different use. The court enforced the restriction appearing on the

plat. We reach the same conclusion.

                                         A

      “Restrictive covenants are enforceable promises relating to the use of land.”

Viking Props., Inc. v. Holm, 155 Wn.2d 112, 119, 118 P.3d 322 (2005), abrogated

on other grounds by Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wn.2d 682, 702, 704, 451 P.3d

694 (2019). “The court’s primary objective in interpreting restrictive covenants is

to determine the intent of the parties.” Riss v. Angel, 131 Wn.2d 612, 621, 934

P.2d 669 (1997).     “The relevant intent . . . is that of those establishing the

covenants.” Id. In determining that intent, courts “give covenant language ‘its

ordinary and common use’ and will not construe a term in such a way ‘so as to

defeat its plain and obvious meaning.’ ” Wilkinson v. Chiwawa Cmtys. Ass’n, 180

Wn.2d 241, 250, 327 P.3d 614 (2014) (quoting Mains Farm Homeowners Ass’n v.

Worthington, 121 Wn.2d 810, 816, 854 P.2d 1072 (1993)). Courts may “look to

the surrounding circumstances of the original parties to determine the meaning of

specific words and terms used in the covenants.” Hollis v. Garwall, Inc., 137 Wn.2d

683, 696, 974 P.2d 836 (1999).

      By concluding that Tract A was subject to a restrictive covenant limiting its

use to recreation, the trial court impliedly found that the original parties to the

covenant intended it to be so. This finding is supported by substantial evidence.

There was evidence that on February 3, 1958, before Leawood Addition was

platted, William and Pauline Price entered into a contract to sell Ray Shapley, Inc.

(RSI) the land that now constitutes Leawood Addition (Price-RSI contract). The

                                         7
No. 84399-1-I/8

same day, the Prices conveyed what would later become Lots 1 and 2 of Block 1

of Leawood Addition to RSI in partial fulfillment of the Price-RSI contract, and about

a year later, RSI began placing advertisements in the Seattle Times for “residential

lots” or “homesites” in Leawood Addition describing a “recreation area” or

“recreational area.”

       In August 1959, “G. Ray Shapley – President,” “Harold T. Shapley –

Secretary,” the Prices, and a representative of Lincoln First Federal Savings and

Loan Association executed and recorded the Plat. The Plat bears RSI’s seal, and

the notary’s acknowledgment indicates that the Shapleys signed the Plat as

officers of “[RSI], a Washington Corporation, that executed the within instrument.”

The Plat designates five blocks with numbered parcels. Tract A is the only parcel

identified by a letter. It bears the designation “RESERVED FOR RECREATION,”

and it is the only lot on the Plat with that designation.

       In March 1960, RSI placed a series of advertisements in the Seattle Times

for   lots   in   Leawood   Addition,   which    it   described   as   “[a]   [p]lanned

[s]ubdivision . . . [c]omplete with one acre recreation area.”

       Viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision, the foregoing

evidence supports an enterprise between the Prices and RSI to plat and market

Leawood Addition for residential development.               The “RESERVED FOR

RECREATION” plat notation is unambiguous and supports the enterprise’s intent

to restrict Tract A to recreational use. Furthermore, a reasonable inference from

                                           8
No. 84399-1-I/9

the Seattle Times advertisements is that RSI, not only as a party to the Plat2 but

also as owner of two lots that would benefit from the restriction and a contract

purchaser with an interest in the remaining lots, understood the plat notation to

mean that Tract A would be reserved for recreational use for the benefit of other

Leawood Addition lots.       Substantial evidence supports that the original

covenanting parties—the Prices and RSI—intended via the plat notation to restrict

Tract A’s use to recreation. This finding supports the conclusion that the plat

notation was an enforceable restrictive covenant.

                                        B

       Clemens contends the plat notation was not an enforceable covenant for a

number of reasons. He first argues, quoting 17 William B. Stoebuck & John W.

Weaver, Washington Practice: Real Estate: Property Law § 3.2, at 125 (2d ed.

2004), that “ ‘[a] landowner cannot by himself place a running covenant on his own

land, for the same reason that one cannot make a contract with himself or create

an easement on his own land.’ ”      But when the Plat was executed with the

restriction on the use of Tract A, some of the benefitted lots in Leawood Addition

were owned by the Prices, while others were owned by RSI, which also had an

interest in other benefitted lots as a contract purchaser under the Price-RSI

contract.

       2 Clemens asserts that RSI was not a party to the Plat.
                                                             But a reasonable
inference from the notary acknowledgment and RSI’s seal on the Plat is that the
Shapleys signed on behalf of RSI.

                                        9
No. 84399-1-I/10

       Clemens also argues that the restriction on Tract A had to appear in a

declaration of covenants or in a deed to take effect. This argument is without merit.

Although a covenant “is often recorded as a declaration of covenants . . . or is set

forth as a restriction contained in the deed transferring an interest in the

property, . . . [it] may also be contained on the face of [a] subdivision plat.” Hollis,

137 Wn.2d at 691.

       Next, Clemens relies on Riverview Community Group v. Spencer &

Livingston, 181 Wn.2d 888, 337 P.3d 1076 (2014), to argue that there was no

enforceable contract.     The relevant issue in Riverview was whether a plat

identifying a golf course created an equitable covenant limiting use of the at-issue

property to a golf course. Id. at 897-98. After recognizing that “words on the face

of a plat . . . can establish an equitable covenant limiting the use of land,” the court

held that there were issues of fact as to whether the words “golf course” on a plat

did so under the circumstances. Id. at 897, 899. Clemens points out that one of

those circumstances was that the at-issue property was in fact developed into a

golf course complex, whereas here, Tract A remains undeveloped. But nothing in

Riverview suggests that actual development of the property was determinative.

Furthermore, the golf course example is of limited relevance here, where the Plat

does not identify a specific amenity like a golf course but instead uses the broader

term “recreation,” which, as the trial court determined, “can occur on ‘undeveloped’

land.” Riverview does not support reversal.

                                          10
No. 84399-1-I/11

                                           C

       Clemens next argues that the Seattle Times advertisements should not

have been admitted into evidence.          Relying on Hollis, Clemens asserts the

advertisements were irrelevant because they were “probative, at most, of the

subjective intent of the minority of original Plattors.”

       Hollis held that courts can consider extrinsic evidence in construing a

covenant. 137 Wn.2d at 696. It also held, however, that an affidavit from one of

10 original subdividers calling one party’s interpretation of a covenant “ ‘not true’ ”

was inadmissible because it was “the unilateral and subjective intent of 1 of 10 of

the original contracting parties.” Id. at 696, 698. But unlike the after-the-fact

affidavit in Hollis, the advertisements at issue here were placed shortly before and

after execution of the Plat and, thus, were part of the circumstances surrounding

the Plat’s execution.     The real estate contract, the Plat, and the fact of the

advertising support the inference that the advertisements reflected the intent of the

Price-RSI enterprise. Cf. Thorstad v. Fed. Way Water & Sewer Dist., 73 Wn. App.

638, 643, 870 P.2d 1046 (1994) (“To determine contracting parties’ intent, a court

may consider extrinsic evidence, such as circumstances leading to execution of

the agreement and conduct after execution of the agreement, to declare the

meaning of what was written.” (emphasis added)).

       Clemens also asserts that the advertisements were inadmissible hearsay.

But as the trial court recognized, the advertisements were not hearsay to the extent

offered to show the intent of the original covenanting parties. This is because they

were probative of that intent regardless whether there was, in fact, a recreation

                                           11
No. 84399-1-I/12

area in Leawood Addition. See ER 801(c) (“ ‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than

one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in

evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”); Betts v. Betts, 3 Wn. App. 53,

61, 473 P.2d 403 (1970) (statement that circumstantially indicates a state of mind,

regardless of its truth, is not hearsay).

       Clemens does not show the trial court erred in admitting or considering the

RSI advertisements as evidence of the original parties’ intent.

                                            D

       Finally, Clemens asserts that even if the plat notation was an enforceable

covenant between the original parties, the trial court erred by determining it was a

“running” covenant that can be enforced against Clemens by current Leawood

Addition lot owners. We disagree.

       Where, as here, the covenant at issue is enforceable in equity based on

notice of the covenant rather than incorporation in a deed, it will run if, in addition

to being enforceable between the original parties, (1) it touches and concerns the

land, (2) the original parties intended to bind successors, (3) there is vertical privity,

and (4) there is notice of the covenant. See 1515-1519 Lakeview Blvd. Condo.

Ass’n v. Apt. Sales Corp., 102 Wn. App. 599, 604, 9 P.3d 879 (2000) (setting forth

the elements for a running real covenant and noting that a running equitable

covenant “requires all of the . . . elements [for a real covenant to run] except

horizontal privity”), rev’d in part on other grounds, 146 Wn.2d 194, 43 P.3d 1233

(2002); see also Hollis, 137 Wn.2d at 691 (“Where enforceability of a covenant is

based, in part, on actual or constructive notice of a restriction, rather than on

                                            12
No. 84399-1-I/13

incorporation of the restriction in a deed, the covenant is generally considered an

equitable [one].”).3

       Clemens does not dispute he had notice of the covenant but asserts it did

not run because there is no evidence the original parties intended to bind their

successors. But an intent to bind successors can be inferred if a covenant touches

and concerns the land, 1515-1519 Lakeview Blvd. Condo. Ass’n, 102 Wn. App. at

605, and a covenant limiting a property’s use touches and concerns the land.

Hollis, 137 Wn.2d at 692. Furthermore, RSI’s advertising is additional evidence

the original parties intended to bind their successors. When the Prices later

conveyed their remaining interest in Leawood Addition to the assignee of RSI’s

interest in the Price-RSI contract, Marvin Mohl, the deed stated it was “subject to

any . . . encumbrances arising after” February 3, 1958, the date of the Price-RSI

contract. The covenant burdening Tract A was one such encumbrance. Deeds

conveying the Prices’ lots to Mohl now owned by the parties described the

properties by reference to the Plat, incorporating “all its contents.” Kelly v. W.

Seattle Land & Improvement Co., 4 Wash. 194, 197, 29 P. 1054 (1892) (where

deed described property according to a recorded plat, “the plat and all its contents

became a part of the conveyance, as though it had been incorporated into it”). 4

       3 Although the trial court did not specify which type of covenant it determined

existed here, “we may affirm a trial court on any proper theory.” Yakima Asphalt
Paving Co. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Transp., 45 Wn. App. 663, 665, 726 P.2d 1021
(1986); cf. Lake Limerick Country Club. v. Hunt Mfg. Homes, Inc., 120 Wn. App.
246, 254, 94 P.3d 295 (2004) (observing that Washington courts generally have
not distinguished between real and equitable covenants).
       4 Presented with comparable facts, a court in another state concluded: “The

weight of authority supports a holding that equitable servitudes may be created by

                                         13
No. 84399-1-I/14

       Clemens also argues that vertical privity is absent for three reasons, none

of which are persuasive.      First, Clemens points out that the warranty deed

conveying the Prices’ interest in Leawood Addition—including Tract A—to Mohl

“EXCEPT[ED] all easements, restrictions, and reservations of record.” He asserts

this language “extinguish[ed] any reservation on Tract A (and vertical privity) going

forward.” But Clemens provides no analysis or authority to support this assertion,

and as Clemens himself later acknowledges, the “exception” in the deed was likely

just an exception from title warranties. See 9 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY §

82.14, at 736 (3d Thomas ed. 2011) (observing, with regard to drafting warranty

deeds, that “[t]he use of the phrases ‘subject to’ or ‘except’ must be approached

with caution” and that “the ‘except’ clause can create ambiguities as to whether the

‘except’ language creates a technical exception or whether it is merely a limitation

on the title warranties”). Also, as discussed, that deed expressly stated it was

subject to all encumbrances arising after February 3, 1958. Clemens does not

show the trial court erred inasmuch as it was unpersuaded that the covenant

burdening Tract A was extinguished when the Prices conveyed Tract A to Mohl.5

restrictions noted on a plat with reference to which lots are sold.” Stracener v.
Bailey, 737 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) (citing Tallmadge v. E. River
Bank, 26 N.Y. 105 (1862); Simpson v. Mikkelsen, 196 Ill. 575, 63 N.E. 1036 (1902);
Freeman v. Island Heights Hotel & Improvement Co., 75 N.J. Eq. 491, 72 A. 974
(1909); Williams Realty Co. v. Robey, 175 Md. 532, 2 A.2d 683 (1938)).
         5 Clemens also argues that because Mohl at one point acquired most if not

all of the lots comprising Leawood Addition, any covenant created by the Plat was
extinguished under the merger doctrine, which “recognizes the principle that ‘one
cannot have an easement[ or covenant] in one’s own property.’ ” Schlager v.
Bellport, 118 Wn. App. 536, 539 & n.3, 76 P.3d 778 (2003) (quoting Radovich v.
Nuzhat, 104 Wn. App. 800, 805, 16 P.3d 687 (2001)). But Clemens did not argue
merger below. See Wingert v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 146 Wn.2d 841, 853, 50

                                         14
No. 84399-1-I/15

         Second, Clemens argues that because the covenant was never recorded,

it was extinguished by a 1973 tax foreclosure of Tract A. This argument lacks

merit.    Clemens is correct that a restrictive covenant does not survive a tax

foreclosure sale unless it was “established of record” prior to the year for which the

tax was foreclosed. Former RCW 84.64.460 (1961); City of Olympia v. Palzer, 107

Wn.2d 225, 232, 728 P.2d 135 (1986). But the Plat was recorded in 1959, and the

taxes for which Tract A was foreclosed were for 1962.           Accordingly, the tax

foreclosure did not extinguish the restrictive covenant appearing on the face of the

Plat.6

         Third, Clemens argues that the covenant was extinguished by a 1980 quiet

title action in which title to Tract A was quieted in Chris and Cathy Palzer. But

Clemens cites no authority for the proposition that a judgment quieting title

extinguishes an otherwise enforceable covenant arising from a plat, much less that

it does so where, as here, the judgment quieted title based on a theory of adverse

possession without any specific reference to the covenant.

         Clemens does not establish that the trial court erred by concluding that

Tract A is subject to an enforceable covenant restricting its use to recreation.

P.3d 256 (2002) (appellate court generally will not consider arguments not raised
in the trial court). Even if he had, Washington courts do not favor merger and will
not compel it when the parties do not intend for it or when it would be adverse to
the interests of the common owner. WT Props., LLC v. Leganieds, LLC, 195 Wn.
App. 344, 350, 382 P.3d 31 (2016). The record includes evidence that Mohl also
marketed lots in Leawood Addition with reference to a recreational area.
        6 In light of this conclusion and also because title to Tract A was quieted in

1980 as discussed infra, we need not reach the Vrinceanus’ argument that there
is no evidence Tract A was actually foreclosed.

                                         15
No. 84399-1-I/16

                                          III

       In their cross-appeal, the Vrinceanus argue the trial court erred by

determining they do not have a right to use Tract A.           They point to nothing

indicating an intent to grant any interest in Tract A to owners of other parcels. They

rely on the trial court’s finding of fact 4, stating, “Historic newspaper advertisements

reference a recreational area in Leawood.” But that finding does not mandate a

conclusion that other lot owners have a right to use Tract A. See Johnson, 113

Wash. at 464 (neighboring owners enforcing plat restriction had no interest or

easement in burdened parcel). The Vrinceanus also argue that the subdivision

statute in effect when the Plat was executed required municipalities to, when

deciding whether to approve a plat, “see that appropriate provision is made in the

plat . . . for streets and other public ways, parks, and playgrounds.” LAWS OF 1951,

ch. 195, § 2. But this does not imply a requirement for particular plats to designate

particular parks or playgrounds on particular terms. The Vrinceanus point to no

evidence that “[t]he [P]lat was created to meet the requirements of the platting

statute then in effect,” much less that the Plat would not have been approved

absent a grant to other lot owners of a right to use Tract A. Cf. Rainier View Ct.

Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Zenker, 157 Wn. App. 710, 722-23, 238 P.3d 1217

(2010) (concluding residents of all three phases of a subdivision had the right to

use a park located in “Phase I” where a hearing examiner’s findings and

conclusions demonstrated that without a shared community park, the design for

Phase I would not have been approved).

                                          16
No. 84399-1-I/17

       In any case, the Vrinceanus’ assertion that the trial court should have found

that the original parties to the Plat intended not only to restrict Tract A to

recreational use but also to grant other lot owners the right to use Tract A asks us

to reevaluate the evidence and find it more persuasive than the trial court did. We

do not do so. See Snyder v. Haynes, 152 Wn. App. 774, 779, 217 P.3d 787 (2009)

(“We defer to the trial court’s determinations on the persuasiveness of the

evidence.”); State v. Living Essentials, LLC, 8 Wn. App. 2d 1, 15, 436 P.3d 857

(2019) (“Reviewing courts will not reweigh the evidence . . . on appeal.”).

                                         IV

       The Vrinceanus also argue the trial court erred by quieting title to Tract A in

Clemens, who claimed ownership through mesne conveyances and also based on

color of title to vacant and unoccupied land. See RCW 7.28.080 (“Every person

having color of title made in good faith to vacant and unoccupied land, who shall

pay all taxes legally assessed thereon for seven successive years, he or she shall

be deemed and adjudged to be the legal owner of said vacant and unoccupied

land to the extent and according to the purport of his or her paper title.”). In

support, the Vrinceanus refer to the “Restatement of the Case” section of their

opening brief. But they do not explain what aspect of their restatement reveals an

error on the trial court’s part. They do not argue that Tract A, whose “character”

the trial court found “has not changed over time,” is not vacant and unoccupied.

And the record includes evidence that (1) in 1980, title to Tract A was quieted in

Chris and Cathy Palzer, husband and wife; (2) in 1993, Cathy Palzer conveyed

Tract A, as her separate property, to John and Jean Roden; (3) in 2020, John and

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No. 84399-1-I/18

Jean Roden conveyed Tract A to Clemens as trustee of the John and Jean Roden

Revocable Trust; and (4) in 2021, Clemens, as trustee of the John and Jean Roden

Revocable Trust, conveyed Tract A to himself, as trustee of the John Roden

Irrevocable Spousal Trust. The record also includes evidence that the Rodens—

then Clemens as trustee—continuously paid property taxes on Tract A for more

than seven years. The Vrinceanus do not establish that the trial court erred by

concluding, under either theory pleaded by Clemens, that he “holds fee title to

Tract A in his capacity as trustee of the John Roden Irrevocable Spousal Trust.”

      We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

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