Court Opinion

ID: 9377354
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-07 18:02:28.742729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:13.649706
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                       IN RE DELINQUENCY OF A.S.

                             No. 1 CA-JV 22-0237
                               FILED 3-7-2023

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                             No. JV605703
           The Honorable Keelan J. Bodow, Judge Pro Tempore

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Czop Law Firm PLLC, Higley
By Steven Czop
Counsel for Appellant

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Philip Casey Grove
Counsel for Appellee
                     IN RE DELINQUENCY OF A.S.
                         Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the court, in which
Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Anni Hill Foster joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1           A.S. appeals the juvenile court’s ruling adjudicating him
delinquent of an aggravated assault and disorderly conduct. For the
following reasons, we affirm.

                FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2             On a summer night in 2021 in Gilbert, Arizona, 14-year-old
A.S. and his friends arrived at a teenage house party uninvited. Separately,
A.I. arrived with his friends and cousins who were invited. During the
party, A.I. heard that someone was looking for him. He went outside where
A.S. and his friends were waiting. A.S. knew A.I. because A.I. had dated his
older sister. The fight began with a verbal altercation between A.S. and
another boy against A.I. Then A.S. pushed A.I., and another boy punched
him in the face. A.I. ran inside the house; the group followed him and
continued to punch and kick him. He was then “grabbed and slammed to
the ground,” but because he was facing down, he did not see who was
attacking him. They let up after someone said that the police were coming.
When they stopped and left the house, A.I. grabbed a kitchen knife for
protection and walked outside; he watched the group get into their cars and
leave.

¶3             A.I. later went home with injuries to his face and body. He
went to the doctor for his injuries. The State petitioned for the delinquency
of A.S., alleging that he committed aggravated assault, a class 6 felony, and
disorderly conduct, a class 1 misdemeanor. He was released on certain
conditions and ordered to undergo drug testing. He tested positive for
marijuana multiple times. He had no prior delinquency adjudication.

¶4             A.S.’s probation officer reported that A.S. struggled with
school attendance and grades. He had lived with his mother and father on
alternate weeks but not since he had a physical altercation with his father.
A.S. later alternated living with his mother and aunt. He did not maintain
consistent contact with his probation officer or consistently participate in

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                      IN RE DELINQUENCY OF A.S.
                          Decision of the Court

drug testing. The year before, A.S.’s mother was almost killed by her
ex-boyfriend, who shot her friend dead and then shot at her; the incident
affected the family. The Department of Child Safety later petitioned for
A.S.’s dependency.

¶5            The court held an adjudication hearing on the delinquency
petition before the initial dependency hearing. A.S., A.I., A.I.’s cousin, and
the teenager hosting the party, all testified. The court found A.S. delinquent
as charged, and the court directly proceeded to disposition that same day.
The court stated that it had reviewed the exhibits and notes from testimony
and thought “about the matter very carefully.” The juvenile probation
officer then updated the court about A.S.’s positive drug tests and
performance at school and recommended probation and treatment
programs for him. She then asked the court to clarify whether it meant to
adjudicate A.S. on a designated or undesignated class 6 felony on the
aggravated assault charge. The court replied that it adjudicated A.S.
delinquent on a designated class 6 felony. The State agreed with the
probation officer’s recommendation.

¶6            A.S.’s counsel then requested that the court designate the
aggravated assault offense as a misdemeanor. After an exchange with A.S.’s
counsel, the court noted that, although it had the discretion to designate the
offense as a misdemeanor or leave it undesignated, it was choosing to
designate the offense as a class 6 felony.

¶7           The court then ordered A.S. to participate in treatment
programs and short-term probation, noting that A.S. was not complying
with court orders, although he had “a lot going on.” A.S. timely appealed.

                               DISCUSSION

¶8             A.S. argues that the court abused its discretion in not
considering its ability to designate the offense as a misdemeanor or even
knowing it had the ability to do so. “The juvenile court has broad discretion
to determine the proper disposition of a delinquent juvenile,” In re Thomas
D., 231 Ariz. 29, 31 ¶ 9 (App. 2012), including the designation of his offense
as a felony, see A.R.S. § 13–604(A). An abuse of discretion occurs if the court
misapplies the law or a legal principle. Thomas, 231 Ariz. at 31 ¶ 9. “In
reviewing the juvenile court’s adjudication of delinquency, we review the
evidence and resolve all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
upholding its judgment.” In re C.D., 240 Ariz. 239, 242 ¶ 13 (App. 2016)
(quoting In re Jessi W., 214 Ariz. 334, 336 ¶ 11 (App. 2007)).

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                      IN RE DELINQUENCY OF A.S.
                          Decision of the Court

¶9            The juvenile court has discretion to designate a class 6 felony
as a class 1 misdemeanor:

       [I]f a person is convicted of any class 6 felony not involving a
       dangerous offense and if the court, having regard to the
       nature and circumstances of the crime and to the history and
       character of the defendant, is of the opinion that it would be
       unduly harsh to sentence the defendant for a felony, the court
       may enter judgment of conviction for a class 1 misdemeanor
       and make disposition accordingly or may place the defendant
       on probation in accordance with chapter 9 of this title and
       refrain from designating the offense as a felony or
       misdemeanor until the probation is terminated. The offense
       shall be treated as a misdemeanor for all purposes until such
       time as the court may actually enter an order designating the
       offense a misdemeanor or a felony.

A.R.S. § 13–604(A) (emphasis added). “The statute, by its terms, confers
discretion upon the court with respect to the ultimate designation of the
offense. . . .” State v. Smith, 166 Ariz. 118, 119 (App. 1990) (criminal appeal;
referring to A.R.S. § 13–702, the predecessor to A.R.S. § 13–604). Although
set forth in Arizona Revised Statutes Title 13, the criminal code, and
textually directed at “convictions,” not delinquency adjudications, a
juvenile court has discretion under A.R.S. § 13–604(A) in addressing class 6
delinquency adjudications. State v. Lee, 236 Ariz. 377, 384 ¶¶ 22–23 (App.
2014).

¶10             Here, the court acknowledged and used its discretion to
designate the offense as a felony. At the disposition hearing, the court
denied A.S.’s counsel’s request to designate the offense as a misdemeanor.
It explained that the offense was to be “treated as a misdemeanor, unless
and until designated” as a misdemeanor or felony, and that it was “making
a finding that the offense in the petition was shown and that was charged
as a [c]lass 6.” A.S.’s counsel explained that his “family circumstances” and
“history or lack thereof in the courts” made this “clearly a case” to designate
the offense as a misdemeanor. The court responded that it was not making
a finding that it wanted the offense “to be undesignated at this point, so it
[would] be, again designated as a felony.” After his counsel asked for
clarification, the court stated that it “could potentially make a finding that
the offense that was committed was a [c]lass 6 undesignated . . . [b]ut [was]
not doing that.” Instead, it was “choosing to find” that A.S. committed a
class 6 designated felony. In exercising its discretion, the court had the
entire record before it, including the probation officer’s reports about A.S.’s

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                      IN RE DELINQUENCY OF A.S.
                          Decision of the Court

family life, schooling, and compliance with court orders. The ruling even
stated that the court “carefully reviewed [its] notes from testimony as well
as the exhibits.” The court, therefore, understood that it could designate the
offense as a misdemeanor. The court acted within its discretion and did not
err.

¶11            A.S. relies on In re R.E., 241 Ariz. 359 (App. 2017), to argue
that the record is unclear whether the juvenile court knew it could designate
the offense as a misdemeanor because it only considered a “designated”
and “undesignated” felony. R.E. is inapposite. There, this court remanded
for a new disposition hearing because the court erroneously stated on the
record that it had no discretion to order the juvenile on standard probation.
Id. at 361–62 ¶¶ 12, 15. Instead, it placed him on juvenile intensive probation
because the court believed it was “’mandatory’ when a juvenile had
multiple felony adjudications.” Id. at 360 ¶ 4. This was true for juveniles 14
years old or older, but R.E. was 13. Id. at 362 ¶ 15. Here, the record shows
that the juvenile court clearly knew and properly applied its discretionary
authority in A.S.’s disposition. Even after A.S.’s counsel questioned
whether the offense could be designated as a misdemeanor, the court
stated, “I think I could potentially make a finding that the offense that was
committed was a Class 6 undesignated . . . [b]ut I am not doing that.” The
trial court is presumed to know the law and apply it accordingly. State v.
Williams, 220 Ariz. 331, 334 ¶ 9 (2008).

¶12            A.S. also argues that the “nature and circumstances” of his
offense—that the duration of the assault was short, A.S. was not the first to
attack A.I., and A.S.’s involvement in A.I.’s injuries was “minimal”—and
his “history and character” as a first-time felony offender do not render the
court’s felony designation appropriate. But the court had before it not only
the evidence that A.S. points to, but also evidence of his positive drug tests,
school grades and attendance issues, lack of contact with his probation
officer, and family circumstances. The court stated on the record that it
considered the exhibits and testimony and thought “about the matter very
carefully” in making its findings. See Fuentes v. Fuentes, 209 Ariz. 51, 55 ¶ 18
(App. 2004) (stating that we presume that the court fully considered the
evidence in the record in issuing the ruling, even if the ruling does not detail
the relevant evidence considered). While the trial court is not “free to reach
any conclusion it wishes,” the appellate court will not substitute its
judgment, even with opposing equitable and factual considerations. State v.
Smith, 166 Ariz. 118, 120 (App. 1990) (quoting State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281,
296 (1983), superseded by statute on other grounds).

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                      IN RE DELINQUENCY OF A.S.
                          Decision of the Court

¶13            A.S. correctly points out that a disposition after an
adjudication of delinquency functions to rehabilitate and not punish
juveniles. See In re Kristen C., 193 Ariz. 562, 563 ¶ 8 (App. 1999). The court
did not lose sight of that goal, ordering short-term probation and treatment
services because A.S. had not followed all court orders. It told A.S. that
while he had made “some efforts” to follow orders, A.S. still was not doing
what was requested of him. The court even noted that the goal was to have
him “in a place and a situation where [he was] not going to get in any
trouble in the future.”

¶14           A.S. argues last that the court did not consider whether the
State wanted to designate the offense as a felony or leave it undesignated
before making its determination. But A.R.S. § 13–604(A) requires that the
court needed only consider the “nature and circumstances of the crime”
and “the history and character” of A.S., which we already found that it did
here. See supra ¶ 12. A.S. has shown no abuse of discretion.

                              CONCLUSION

¶15           For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

                          AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                          FILED: AA

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