Court Opinion

ID: 9480582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:52:03.001816+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:46.416871
License: Public Domain

RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the decision that this conviction must be reversed because defendant Teague did not testify.
Of course Teague had a right to testify, just as he had a right to call witnesses and present any other relevant evidence. A criminal defendant has numerous constitutional due process rights in the defense of his criminal charge. But counsel is charged with the responsibility of protecting these rights, and making the decision as to whether they should be exercised. The only thing unique about the defendant as a witness is that he does not have to testify.
*762If the decision as to whether a defendant should testify or put on any other relevant evidence does not fall within the general definition of trial tactics, however, it is hard to see what would be trial tactics. The very reason there has developed the profession of trial attorney is the need for persons trained in trial tactics to represent people who do not have the knowledge to defend themselves.
Trial tactics are the office of the one charged with the representation of the defendant and the presentation of the case. If the defendant represents himself, well and good, he can make these decisions, but if he is represented by an attorney, then the attorney must make the tough decisions concerning trial tactics. The question of whether a defendant should testify can not be appropriately addressed as a single item of evidence. Each piece of evidence affects the other. A defendant’s testimony may require a complete adjustment in the tactics of the defense. To turn that decision over to the defendant absolutely in many cases would remove from counsel the entire strategy of the defense.
The record clearly shows that the public defender made a proper, professional, responsible decision in deciding that Teague should not testify. She took his request seriously, tried him out as a witness, and concluded he would hurt, not help his case. There is nothing in this record to reflect that this was not a perfectly sound decision. On the contrary, the evidence supports an objective decision that Teague would indeed hurt his own case by taking the stand.
I would affirm the trial court’s denial of a new trial on the reasoning of the specially concurring opinion which I joined in Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071, 1072-73 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 439 U.S. 1004, 99 S.Ct. 617, 58 L.Ed.2d 680 (1978), excerpted as follows:
The real question in this case is not whether the right to testify is a personal or fundamental right; rather, it involves the proper allocation of authority between the attorney and his client. The defendant, of course, has the authority in the first instance to accept or reject court-appointed representation. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). If he decides to accept an attorney, the defendant has necessarily delegated important decision making authority to his attorney. The scope of the delegation does not turn on the importance of the decision — the attorney frequently makes judgments affecting the very life of the defendant. The question here is twofold: who is in a better position to judge trial strategy and who is in a better position to ensure the best interests of the defendant.3 This court’s history is filled with the recognition of the value of an attorney. No one could seriously contend that a defendant is in a better position to dictate trial strategy than his attorney. Moreover, a court-appointed attorney owes a duty to society to see that his client is given the best possible defense within the law. No attorney could discharge this duty if he must yield to the personal demands of his client.
In my judgment, the district court made the exact inquiry necessary in a case of this kind: was counsel ineffective for having failed to put the defendant on the stand. The record fully supports the decision that she was not. The judicial system has now had enough experience to know that had the lawyer let the defendant testify, the argument on this phase of the litigation would be that counsel who puts on evidence that is known will be prejudicial to a defendant is ineffective. The foreseeable result of this decision is that now numerous convicted defendants will argue that he or she should have been permitted to testify, the right not having been properly *763waived by the defendant personally. Assuming the correctness of the decision that the defendant should not testify, retrials will be destined for but one result, the prosecution’s evidence being strengthened by the defendant’s own testimony, absent intervening circumstances which might make the prosecution more difficult at the new trial. It goes without saying that at the second trial, the defendant could not be compelled to testify, should he suddenly realize that his counsel was indeed correct.
The defendant’s right to decide whether to testify, whatever its source, is in clear conflict with the constitutional right to be represented by counsel. Having chosen to be represented by counsel, defendant has delegated to counsel his right to run the trial, make tactical decisions, and determine what evidence should be presented to the jury.
This Circuit has just had a Conference of judges and representative lawyers with a single theme addressing the need for professionalism in the conduct of attorneys. As the system struggles with this concept, it is counterproductive to reverse the result of a trial where the trial attorney has conducted herself in an exemplary professional way.
I concur in the other decisions made by the Court in this case, and would affirm the convictions.

 The same cannot be said for the decision to plead guilty or not guilty — a decision that goes to the very existence of a trial. To deny the defendant control over this decision could be tantamount to denying the defendant a trial. Here, of course, there is a trial and the decision made by the attorney goes merely to strategy. The decision to waive a defendant’s right to testify is viewed as part of trial tactics in more than a dozen decisions. Comment, Due Process . v. Defense Counsel’s Unilateral Waiver of the Defendant’s Right to Testify, 3 Hastings Const. L.Q. 517, 529 (1976).