Court Opinion

ID: 9951904
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 15:02:54.277754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:43:23.194105
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

       IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.W.

                              No. 1 CA-JV 23-0202
                               FILED 3-19-2024

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                             No. JS520409
           The Honorable Sigmund G. Popko, Judge Pro Tempore

                                   AFFIRMED

                                    COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Jamie R. Heller
Counsel for Appellant, Jason M.

Barreda Law, PLLC, Gilbert
By Joshua A. Barreda, Bonnie Platter
Counsel for Appellee
            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.W.
                        Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

C A M P B E L L, Judge:

¶1            Father appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating his
parental rights based on abandonment and the child’s best interests. See
A.R.S. §§ 8-531(1), -533(B)(1). Because the court correctly applied the law
and its order is factually supported by trial evidence, we affirm.

                             BACKGROUND

¶2            Brian1 was born to Mother and Father in early April 2015.
Mother and Father had a longtime on-and-off relationship but were neither
a couple nor living together at the time of Brian’s birth.

¶3           For the first few months, Mother and Father took turns caring
for Brian under an informal arrangement. By August 2015, Mother and
Father were arguing about the parenting schedule and paternity. Then, on
August 13, 2015, Father fatally shot his girlfriend’s husband after he entered
Father’s house. The husband was talking on the phone with Mother when
he was shot.

¶4           The state did not immediately bring charges. According to
Father, he was alone at his house when the husband entered uninvited,
wielding a knife. Mother told police that, on the phone, she heard Father
and the husband exchange a greeting. She then heard a loud noise, followed
by Father and a female talking about cleaning up blood.

¶5            In the months following the shooting, Father, who had not
been arrested or charged with any crime, repeatedly asked Mother to see
Brian and sent her a money order. But Mother refused. By at least January
2016, Father had stopped reaching out to Mother or Brian.

¶6            Father retained a criminal defense attorney in October 2015.2
Father then directed Mother to communicate through his attorney only. For

1      We use a pseudonym for the child.
2      Father waived the attorney-client privilege at the termination trial.

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            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.W.
                        Decision of the Court

the next six years, that attorney represented Father in connection with the
shooting. In late 2016, Father’s girlfriend was indicted for her husband’s
murder, and Father was indicted for evidence tampering. The State later
dismissed that indictment and indicted both Father and his girlfriend for
first-degree murder in early 2017 (and again in 2018). In November 2021,
the case finally went to trial, where Mother testified for two days. At the
conclusion of the trial, Father was acquitted.

¶7             During the course of Father’s criminal representation, Father
repeatedly told his attorney that he wanted to see Brian. The attorney, who
believed that any contact with Brian necessarily would involve contact with
Mother, consistently advised him not to have contact with Mother because
it could compromise his criminal case. The attorney believed that any pre-
indictment contact could be misconstrued as a threat or bribe, and that it
would be futile to seek modification of orders prohibiting witness contact.
According to Father, his attorney did at some point refer him to a family
law attorney, but Father could not remember what that attorney said.
Father concluded that he had to “make the hardest decision of my life” and
forgo seeing Brian because he perceived no other option given that he
potentially faced the death penalty or life in prison. Father admitted that
his choice to not see Brian was voluntary.

¶8            In accord with his decision, Father ceased all efforts to
preserve his relationship with Brian after January 2016. Over the next six
years, Father—who was out of custody for all but about five weeks—took
no action to parent or support Brian.

¶9            It was not until after Father was acquitted in the criminal case
that he began taking steps to establish a relationship with Brian. He did so
by hiring a family law attorney and filing a family court action in March
2022 seeking to establish paternity, become Brian’s primary residential
parent with sole legal decision-making authority, and limit Mother to
supervised parenting time.

¶10            In July 2022, Mother initiated this juvenile court action
seeking termination of Father’s parental rights based on abandonment and
Brian’s best interests under A.R.S. §§ 8-531(1) and -533(B)(1). Father entered
a denial, and the matter proceeded to a four-day trial.

¶11           Mother testified that Brian has good relationships with her,
his eighteen-year-old half-sister, his maternal grandmother, and Mother’s
fiancée, whom Mother had known for seven years and been in a
relationship with for two years. Mother explained that Brian does not know

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            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.W.
                        Decision of the Court

Father and is unaware of the biological connection. She explained that Brian
has a parent-child type of relationship with her fiancée, who is willing to
adopt him “right now at this moment.” In a social study completed in early
2023, the evaluator concluded that Brian appeared to have close
relationships with Mother, his half-sister, and his maternal grandmother,
and noted that the half-sister thought highly of Mother’s fiancée but was
scared of Father because she remembered him as angry and aggressive. The
evaluator recommended termination of Father’s rights.

¶12            In a detailed ruling, the juvenile court terminated Father’s
parental rights to Brian, finding that Mother proved abandonment and that
termination was in Brian’s best interests under A.R.S. §§ 8-531(1) and
-533(B)(1). Father timely appealed.

                               DISCUSSION

¶13           A parent’s right to custody and control of his or her own child,
while fundamental, is not absolute. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196
Ariz. 246, 248, ¶¶ 11–12 (2000). The juvenile court may terminate the
parental relationship where (1) clear and convincing evidence shows the
existence of a statutory termination ground under A.R.S. § 8-533, and (2) a
preponderance of the evidence shows that termination is in the child’s best
interests. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 281–82, 288, ¶¶ 7, 41 (2005).

¶14           We must accept the juvenile court’s factual findings if
supported by reasonable evidence and inferences, and we must affirm the
court’s legal conclusions unless they are clearly erroneous. Brionna J. v.
Dep’t of Child Safety, 533 P.3d 202, 209–10, ¶¶ 30–31 (2023). We do not
reweigh the evidence. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43,
47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004). We review questions of statutory interpretation and
application de novo, looking first to plain and unambiguous statutory
language. Id. at ¶ 9.

   I.     Abandonment

¶15            Father first challenges the juvenile court’s finding that he
abandoned Brian. Abandonment is a ground for termination under A.R.S.
§ 8-533(B)(1). A.R.S. § 8-531(1) defines abandonment as “the failure of a
parent to provide reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with
the child, including providing normal supervision”—with “only minimal
efforts to support and communicate with the child” constituting
abandonment. A.R.S. § 8-531(1) further provides that the parent’s “[f]ailure
to maintain a normal parental relationship with the child without just cause

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            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.W.
                        Decision of the Court

for a period of six months constitutes prima facie evidence of
abandonment.”

¶16             A.R.S. § 8-531(1) measures abandonment based on conduct,
not intent. Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249–50, ¶ 18. When the circumstances
preclude the parent from “exercising traditional methods of bonding with
his [or her] child, he [or she] must act persistently to establish the
relationship however possible and must vigorously assert his [or her] legal
rights to the extent necessary.” Id. at 250, ¶ 22 (citation omitted). In other
words, the parent must “do something, because conduct speaks louder than
words or subjective intent.” Id. (citation omitted). Even when a court order
precludes or limits the parent’s contact with the child, it is incumbent on
the parent take some lawful action to maintain the relationship. See In re
Pima Cnty. Severance Action No. S-1607, 147 Ariz. 237, 239 (1985) (noting that
though father testified his visitation rights were restricted, he had
stipulated to the dismissal of his petition to show cause why he should not
have reasonable visitation rights); In re C.R., 256 Ariz. 170, 174, ¶ 18 (App.
2023) (holding that abandonment finding was supported by father’s failure
to contest mother’s order of protection or seek its modification to permit
him to contact the children); see also Calvin B. v. Brittany B., 232 Ariz. 292,
298, ¶¶ 27, 29 (App. 2013) (noting that father consistently tried to have
contact with child, including by violating order of protection by texting
mother to try to arrange visitation). Further, the fact that the parent may
have to make difficult choices does not provide an automatic defense for
inaction—even when the choice is between pursuing the parental
relationship or following the advice of counsel to avoid risking criminal
liability. Cf. Minh T. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 202 Ariz. 76, 77–80, ¶¶ 1, 7,
10, 15–17 (App. 2001) (affirming severance where parents charged with
murder of one child followed criminal counsel’s advice to refuse to
participate in reunification services for remaining children).

¶17           Father does not dispute that sufficient evidence created a
presumption under A.R.S. § 8-531(1) that he abandoned Brian: Father
consciously failed to maintain any relationship with the child for more than
six years. Father argues, however, that the termination should be reversed
because he rebutted the abandonment presumption by showing “just
cause” under the statute. We reject Father’s argument.

¶18           To the extent Father believes he presented a “just cause”
showing as an exception to abandonment, he is mistaken—by the terms of
the statute, a “just cause” showing is merely a rebuttal to a time-based
presumption of abandonment. See A.R.S. § 8-531(1). Further, reasonable
evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that Father failed to show

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            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.W.
                        Decision of the Court

“just cause” for his decision to forgo the parental relationship. Father failed
to pursue legal action to establish his parental rights and obligations for six
years, choosing to follow the advice of his criminal counsel, whom he knew
did not practice family or juvenile law.

¶19            Following his counsel’s advice does not excuse Father’s
inaction. See Minh T., 202 Ariz. at 78, 80, ¶¶ 7, 16. Father had to do something
if he wanted to preserve the parental relationship, and instead he chose to
do nothing. He made no meaningful effort to find a way to see or support
Brian, directly or indirectly, with or without contact with Mother. Father’s
claims that it would have been futile to initiate a family court case or seek
modification of his release conditions (if that was even necessary for access
to Brian, who was neither a victim nor a witness) are entirely speculative.
Even after meeting with a family law attorney, he never tried to establish
paternity, obtain visitation, or provide any financial or other support for
Brian. The juvenile court did not err by finding that Mother proved
abandonment under A.R.S. §§ 8-531(1) and -533(B)(1) by clear and
convincing evidence.

   II.     Best Interests

¶20             Father next challenges the juvenile court’s finding that
termination was in Brian’s best interests. The best-interests inquiry focuses
on the interests of the child, not the parent, with the primary concern being
the child’s interest in stability and security. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety,
245 Ariz. 146, 150, ¶ 12 (2018). Termination serves the child’s best interests
if it will benefit the child or if the denial of termination will harm the child.
Id. at ¶ 13. The court is to consider the totality of the circumstances. Id.
Relevant factors may include whether the child’s needs are being met,
Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 194 Ariz. 376, 377, ¶ 5 (App. 1998), and,
even in private termination cases, the child’s prospects for adoption,
Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4–5, ¶¶ 16–17 (2016). While
abandonment does not itself create a presumption that termination will
serve the child’s best interests, the consequences of abandonment should be
considered. See id. at ¶¶ 14, 20; see also Steven M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 254
Ariz. 426, 431, ¶ 16 (App. 2023) (affirming best-interests determination
where, inter alia, evidence showed that children could be traumatized by
contact with father because they did not think of him as their father and did
not want to see him).

¶21          Father contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that a
plan for Mother’s fiancée to adopt Brian was “sufficiently in place and is
not ‘too speculative.’” We hold that reasonable evidence supported the

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           IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO B.W.
                       Decision of the Court

court’s finding. Evidence showed that Mother and her fiancée had a long-
term relationship. Evidence also showed that Mother’s fiancée had a
positive, parent-like relationship with Brian and wanted to adopt him.
Father points out the fiancée was never interviewed, and that no inquiry
was made into his eligibility to adopt Brian under A.R.S. § 8-105. But the
evidence was sufficient to show at least the prospect of adoption.

¶22           Moreover, setting aside questions of adoption, the court
reasonably found that termination was in Brian’s best interests because
introducing Father into his life would “damage [Brian]’s stability and
security.” Evidence showed that Brian’s needs were being met by Mother
and that Father had voluntarily made himself a complete stranger to the
child, who knew nothing of him and was already eight years old at the time
of the termination.

¶23           Father asserts that Mother is an untrustworthy person who
wronged him. But even if that is true, the juvenile court was not compelled
to conclude that Mother’s conduct or character regarding Father meant that
termination was not in Brian’s best interests.

                             CONCLUSION

¶24        The juvenile court did not err by finding that Father
abandoned Brian and that termination was in Brian’s best interests. We
affirm.

                           AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                           FILED: AA

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