Court Opinion

ID: 9692345
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:52:08.891264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:34.153499
License: Public Domain

HARVEY HUDSON, Justice,
concurring.
In his first point of error, appellant directly challenges the trial court’s implied holding that under the facts presented here the police had reasonable suspicion to conduct a “pat down” search for weapons. In his second and third points of error, appellant makes a related attack by challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s implied finding that the police had reasonable suspicion to search for weapons.
I join the majority in concluding that appellant consented to the search, and thus agree that the first point of error is without merit. Moreover, I have no quarrel with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s implied finding that the police had reasonable suspicion to search for weapons. I write separately only because appellant was not entitled, in my view, to have the issue of reasonable suspicion presented to the jury.
A trial court is not required to give an Article 38.23 instruction where the objection to the evidence requires a legal, rather than a factual determination. Crunk v. State, 934 S.W.2d 788, 794 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. ref'd). Here, appellant did not challenge the credibility of the police officers or dispute their *239testimony regarding the various circumstances observed by or represented to them. Rather, appellant offered exculpatory explanations for his behavior and challenged the correctness of the information relayed to officers by the ticket agents. In determining the existence of reasonable suspicion, an objective standard is utilized: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of seizure or search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate. Garcia v. State, 3 S.W.3d 227, 233 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999), aff'd, 43 S.W.3d 527 (Tex.Crim.App.2001). Because no fact issue was raised by appellant, he was not entitled to an Article 38.23 instruction. Moreover, the legal issue regarding the existence of reasonable suspicion was solely for the court, not the jury, to resolve. Accordingly, appellant should not be heard to complain that the jury’s determination of reasonable suspicion was not supported by the evidence.
With these observations, I concur in the judgment of the court.