Court Opinion

ID: 9849262
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:37:20.64545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:11.674186
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
dissenting in part.
1. The majority opinion concludes that this court need not “engage in an esoteric discussion of exactly how much similarity must exist between a prior and subsequent incident in order for the former to qualify as admissible evidence of a landowner’s prior knowledge in a suit based upon the latter.” That conclusion frankly baffles this writer.
In this case, the appellants moved for summary judgment, relying primarily upon the intervening criminal act doctrine, and the appellee opposed that motion with her tender of evidence of 17 prior criminal incidents that had occurred in the same apartment complex over approximately three years up to the appellee’s rape. The appellants moved to strike each and every one of those prior incidents on the basis that they did not satisfy the substantial similarity requirement. See McCoy v. Gay, 165 Ga. App. 590 (302 SE2d 130) (1983). The trial court, however, denied that motion and considered all of the evidence of prior crimes in making its decision on the appellants’ motion for summary judgment.
It seems rudimentary that where (a) a party objects to the admissibility of certain evidence before the trial court on a summary judgment motion, (b) the trial court considers that evidence but grants a certificate of immediate review so that appellate review may be had *683on its ruling, and (c) this court grants the application for interlocutory appeal precisely for the purpose of reviewing that evidentiary ruling (as well as the denial of summary judgment), then this court should consider that issue. If the evidence is inadmissible, it is just as inadmissible at the summary judgment level as it would be at trial. The majority opinion correctly cites Jackson v. Troup County, 70 Ga. App. 58 (27 SE2d 343) (1943) for the proposition that where evidence is objected to as a whole, and some of it is admissible and some of it is not, it is not error to overrule a motion to exclude the evidence as a whole. However, that is not the situation in this case at all. Both litigants here meticulously, even arduously, delineated each prior crime, drawing similarities and dissimilarities. Certainly the appellants objected to all of the prior crimes, but they attacked (and the appellee supported) each piece of evidence individually. It is difficult to conceive of a more suitable and specific approach. The majority opinion in effect establishes a requirement of filing separate motions to strike for each prior incident. Surely that defies any sensible notion of judicial economy and procedure.
After this case has been “in the belly of’ this court for over six months,1 we regurgitate it, providing absolutely no guidance or clarification for the litigants and the court below. “[T]he bottom is knocked out of the case. It is a tub with only staves and hoops, and will hold nothing.” Scroggins v. State, 55 Ga. 380, 382 (1875) (J. Bleckley). In declining to review the evidentiary ruling, this court has unabashedly abdicated its responsibility to the bench and bar below. The majority’s concoction could be argued as proof that this court, while shying away from esoteric discussions, boldly participates in short-sighted appellate court “punt, pass, and kick” competitions.
2. While agreeing that the trial court properly denied summary judgment for the appellants, this writer is equally convinced that the trial court erred in considering all of the tendered evidence of crimes that were committed at the apartment complex over the 3-year period prior to the appellee’s horrible attack. Evidence of prior crimes may be admitted to show the landlord’s awareness of the dangerous condition only if the other crimes are substantially similar to the actual criminal act which precipitated the litigation in this case. McCoy v. Gay, supra at 592.
Since the appellee’s complaint primarily concerned the lack of a security device on the sliding glass door to prevent a forced entry, the most important point of comparison between the various prior crimes and that of the appellee’s rape was the place and mode of entry. Only three of the prior crimes identified the sliding glass door as the point *684of entry, and only two of those specifically involved a forced entry. Most of the other prior crimes involved burglaries with entry through the front door or a window. One even involved burrowing through the ceiling of an apartment. Under McCoy v. Gay, supra, only the evidence of the two prior crimes involving forced entry through the sliding glass door would be admissible, and the trial court erred in not excluding the others.
The appellants also contend that even these two prior crimes involving forced entry through a sliding door are not substantially similar to the instant case because they occurred in ground level apartments rather than in a second floor apartment. However, while these two prior crimes certainly do not address the foreseeability of gaining access to the balcony of the appellee’s second floor apartment (and while a determination that such access was reasonably foreseeable is necessary for the appellee to recover), they still are relevant to show the appellants’ awareness of the insecurity of the sliding glass doors. (This awareness, of course, was also demonstrated by the fact that the appellants had installed charley bars on the sliding glass doors of all ground level apartments.)
The primary basis for summary judgment asserted by the appellants was that this particular criminal act, whereby the rapist gained access to the balcony, which was 9 to 10 feet above the ground, by standing upon an air conditioning unit and then using a gutter drain to climb up the brick wall, was extraordinary and not reasonably foreseeable. The evidence of record, however, precludes a finding as a matter of law that gaining access to the balcony of the appellee’s apartment was unforeseeable. Photographs of the scene and testimony reveal that immediately below the balcony was an air conditioning unit, standing upon which an adult could reach or could almost reach the balcony. The appellants’ emphatic denial of any foreseeable need of installing charley bars on the sliding glass doors of second (and even third) level apartments was somewhat contradicted by their willingness and policy to equip those doors with such security devices upon the request of the tenant, and the fact that charley bars had actually been installed on the sliding glass doors of some upper level apartments. Under these circumstances, the question of reasonable foreseeability was most appropriate for jury resolution. Lay v. Munford, Inc., 235 Ga. 340 (219 SE2d 416) (1975).
3. In summary, as discussed above, the trial court correctly denied summary judgment for the appellants. However, this writer vehemently disagrees with the majority’s conclusion that this court need not review the trial court’s evidentiary ruling on the admissibility of the evidence of prior crimes tendered by the appellee in opposition to the appellants’ motion for summary judgment. It requires no prophet to anticipate the reappearance of this case before this court after it *685proceeds to trial. Let this court then not be heard vainly dispairing over any unanswered prayer that “[f]rom having to wade through such another nauseating mess, may the good Lord deliver us.” Mewborn v. Weitzer, 15 Ga. App. 668, 670-671 (84 SE 141) (1914).
Decided July 16, 1985
Rehearing denied July 31, 1985
Charles M. Goetz, Jr., George M. Geeslin, for appellants.
Guy J. Notte, for appellee.
I respectfully dissent.

 Wilkinson & Wilson v. Chew, 54 Ga. 603 (1875).