Court Opinion

ID: 9392119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-04 14:06:01.194665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:44.506872
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13338

               COMMONWEALTH   vs.   NICHOLAS DESIDERIO.

        Worcester.       February 8, 2023. – May 4, 2023.

 Present:   Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt,
                           & Georges, JJ.

Armed Home Invasion.   Robbery. Joint Enterprise. Evidence,
     Joint venturer.   Practice, Criminal, Instructions to jury.

     Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on March 3, 2015.

    The cases were tried before Richard T. Tucker, J.

     After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.

     MarySita Miles for the defendant.
     Nathaniel R. Beaudoin, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.

    LOWY, J.    A jury in the Superior Court convicted the

defendant, Nicholas Desiderio, of one count of armed home

invasion and three counts of armed robbery while masked.      The

indictments were based on a theory of joint venture.      The jury,
                                                                     2

however, were not instructed that, to convict the defendant of

those charges on a joint venture theory, the Commonwealth was

required to prove that the defendant knew that at least one

coventurer was armed (for the count of armed home invasion), and

that at least one coventurer was both armed and masked (for the

counts of armed robbery while masked).   Those instructions were

required.   See Commonwealth v. Bolling, 462 Mass. 440, 450

(2012).

    The issue in this appeal is whether the failure to instruct

the jury of these requirements created a substantial risk of a

miscarriage of justice.   To decide whether an error creates a

substantial risk of a miscarriage justice, we must determine "if

we have a serious doubt whether the result of the trial might

have been different had the error not been made."   Commonwealth

v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002), S.C., 444 Mass. 72 (2005),

quoting Commonwealth v. LeFave, 430 Mass. 169, 174 (1999).      In

making this determination, we consider four factors, where

applicable:   "[(1)] the strength of the Commonwealth's case,

[(2)] the nature of the error, [(3)] the significance of the

error in the context of the trial, and [(4)] the possibility

that the absence of an objection was the result of a reasonable

tactical decision."   Azar, supra.

    Although we recently have analyzed the question of

substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice where an element of
                                                                    3

a crime has been omitted from the jury instructions by

determining whether "the evidence was 'so overwhelming' that

'there is no likelihood that the omitted instruction materially

influenced the jury's verdict[],'" Commonwealth v. Silvelo, 486

Mass. 13, 17-18 (2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Lutskov, 480

Mass. 575, 581 (2018), we now recognize that this formulation

confuses rather than accurately reflects the necessary

considerations of the substantial risk analysis in this context.

    As in all contexts, where an element of the crime charged

has been omitted from the jury instructions, the factors for

determining whether there was a substantial risk of a

miscarriage of justice remain the focus of the analysis.     The

factors applicable to circumstances where an element has been

omitted in particular, however, and the manner in which they

should be considered, are captured in the standard we

articulated in Azar:   whether the presence of the omitted

element was an ineluctable inference from the evidence at trial.

See Azar, 435 Mass. at 687.   This standard, although undoubtedly

high, is best understood as an explanation of the applicable

substantial risk factors, and not a deviation from their

application.   Where an element of a crime is omitted from the

instructions, the jury are erroneously excused from applying the

facts, as they find them, to that element.   This creates a risk

of conviction in circumstances where the Commonwealth failed to
                                                                     4

meet its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to the

missing element.   Our substantial risk of a miscarriage of

justice analysis in these circumstances thus must be

correspondingly exacting.

     Because, in this case, the defendant's knowledge that the

coventurers were armed or masked cannot be ineluctably inferred

from the evidence at trial, the instructional error leaves us

with a serious doubt whether the result of the trial might have

been different had the jury been correctly instructed.     We

therefore conclude that the error created a substantial risk of

a miscarriage of justice.   As a result, we reduce the

defendant's convictions of armed robbery while masked to unarmed

robbery, and we vacate the judgment on the conviction of armed

home invasion and set aside the verdict.

     Background.   We recite the relevant facts adduced at trial

to establish the defendant's guilt as a coventurer.

     1.   The home invasion.   On the evening of January 5, 2014,

the homeowner, his daughter, and her boyfriend, who was visiting

for the evening, were all in the home.     The homeowner (victim)1

went to bed at approximately 9 P.M., as he did most nights,

after all the doors to his home were locked.     Not long after

     1 We recognize that the daughter and her boyfriend were also
victims, but we refer to them by their relational titles to
avoid confusion.
                                                                    5

9 P.M., two masked men entered the home:   a shorter, heavy-set

man with "Hispanic, African-American kind of complexion" and a

tall, Caucasian man.2   The taller man carried a gun, and the

shorter, heavier-set man carried a ten to twelve inch crowbar.

It is undisputed that neither man was the defendant.

     The two men first entered the daughter's bedroom, where the

daughter and her boyfriend were watching television.    The men

carried two zip ties.   They tied the boyfriend's hands behind

his back with one of the zip ties, and then whispered to each

other.   The daughter heard one say, "Just go duct tape her," and

the men proceeded to tie the daughter's hands behind her back

with duct tape.   The men also placed duct tape over the mouths

of the daughter and her boyfriend.   The men forced both to lie

on the floor and placed a blanket over their heads.    They asked

the daughter where her father was, but they did not ask about

her mother, who was deceased.

     The men next went to the victim's bedroom.   The heavier-set

man jostled the victim awake and flipped him over in bed.    He

tied the victim's hands behind his back with the second zip tie.

The men pulled the victim out of bed and pushed him down the

hallway toward the living room where there was a stone chimney.

     2 The man with the darker complexion did not have his face
fully covered by the mask, and while the lighter-complexioned
man had a "full-fledged mask" on, the skin under his eyes was
visible.
                                                                     6

A picture that ordinarily hung on the chimney to hide a safe

that was installed there had already been removed.    The safe was

exposed.    At the taller gunman's insistence, the victim provided

the men with the combination to unlock the safe.    Unable to open

the safe, the men freed the victim's hands so that he could

input the combination.    Once the safe was unlocked, the heavier-

set man with the crowbar again bound the victim's hands, this

time using duct tape.    Meanwhile, the taller man filled a

pillowcase with the safe's contents, which included $50,000 in

cash in one hundred dollar bills, and numerous pieces of jewelry

belonging to the victim, his daughters, and his deceased wife.

The men also took "a couple hundred" dollars from the victim's

wallet, as well as the victim's father's Purple Heart and other

military medals from a chest inside the victim's bedroom.

     After emptying the safe, the men led the victim to his

daughter's bedroom, where the daughter and her boyfriend

remained hand-bound on the floor.    The men forced the victim to

get on the floor, and they put the blanket over his head as

well.   The men asked if there was any more money or drugs in the

house, and "ransack[ed]" the room, checking drawers and the

mattress.    They then left with the cell phones of all three.

After hearing the men leave, the boyfriend slipped his right

hand loose from the zip tie and freed the victim.    The boyfriend

next went to the window and saw the two men get into the front
                                                                     7

and rear passenger seats of a waiting vehicle.     The vehicle was

driven away, and the boyfriend found a telephone and dialed 911.

Police were dispatched to the house at 9:52 P.M.     When police

arrived, no signs of forced entry were detected.

    2.   Evidence connecting the defendant.     The defendant and

the victim met around 2009, while the defendant was dating the

daughter of the victim's cousin.    The defendant began to work

for the victim's home construction business, and he did so for

approximately three years until the victim scaled back his

business in 2012 due to health issues.    During that time, the

defendant was "like a family member" to the victim and often

frequented the victim's home.    Indeed, the defendant became

"very familiar" with the victim's home.    The defendant knew that

the victim had a safe inside the stone chimney hidden behind a

framed picture and that the victim kept large amounts of cash in

this safe.   Further, the defendant knew that the victim's wife

was deceased and that he lived with one of his daughters.

    After the defendant had left the victim's employ, the

victim's health improved, and he purchased a two-family house to

remodel and sell.   The victim learned that the defendant was

displeased with his living situation, and he offered to allow

the defendant to live in the second-story apartment of the two-

family house in exchange for the defendant's assistance with

remodeling and maintenance.     The defendant agreed.   The
                                                                   8

relationship, however, broke down in the summer of 2013 when the

victim sold the house and informed the defendant that he needed

to find another place to live.   The defendant refused to leave

and "threatened" the victim by stating, "If you weren't such an

old, you know, SOB, I'd kick the shit out of you."   The victim

retained counsel and paid the defendant a sum of money, after

which the defendant agreed to vacate the premises.   The victim

and the defendant had minimal contact following that dispute.

     Around the time of the home invasion on January 5, 2014,

the defendant and Timothy Lavin shared three telephone calls and

one text message.   At the time, the defendant and Lavin had

known each other for twelve to thirteen years.   There was

considerable testimony at trial that Lavin matched the

description of the tall, Caucasian gunman involved in the

invasion.   The first call was placed from Lavin's cell phone at

9:08 P.M.   It connected to the defendant's cell phone at

9:09 P.M., and it lasted fifteen seconds on the defendant's cell

phone.3   The second call was placed at 9:15 P.M., and it lasted

twenty-two seconds on the defendant's cell phone.    At 9:33 P.M.,

Lavin sent a text message to the defendant that went unanswered.

The third call was placed at 9:48 P.M., and it lasted seven

     3 There was some discrepancy between the length of the
telephone calls registered to Lavin's and the defendant's cell
phones due to the time it took to connect to the defendant's
cell phone and for the defendant to answer.
                                                                   9

seconds on the defendant's cell phone.   Each of the three calls

connected to a cell tower that was less than one mile from the

victim's home.

     On January 22, just over two weeks after the home invasion,

Lavin, who had a suspended license, was observed by police

driving a BMW motor vehicle.4   Lavin was known to have an

inconsistent work history and money issues, and investigation by

police revealed that he had purchased the BMW six days earlier,

on January 16, for $3,700 in cash.   The BMW was registered to

Lavin's longtime friend, Gerald Bates.   Lavin was arrested that

day for operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license, and

his bail was set for an amount between $1,500 and $2,000.    Lavin

paid most of his bail with a "bundle of hundred dollar bills"

that he had on his person.   The defendant and his girlfriend

drove to the police station, and his girlfriend went inside and

paid the remaining amount while the defendant waited in the car.

     Eight days later, police executed a search warrant at

Lavin's residence.   Inside the residence, police discovered a

mask, a firearm, and two locked safes.   One of the safes

contained $2,700 in cash, and inside the other, multiple pieces

of jewelry were found.   Among the jewelry recovered, the victim

and his daughter identified the victim's high school class ring,

     4 Lavin stipulated at trial that his license was suspended
on that date and that he had notice of the suspension.
                                                                  10

the victim's wedding ring, the victim's deceased wife's watch

and rings, and a necklace given to the daughter by her

grandparents for graduating high school.

     3.     Procedural history.   A grand jury indicted the

defendant on one count of armed home invasion and three counts

of armed robbery while masked.5     The defendant's cases were

joined with Lavin's for trial.6     At trial, the Commonwealth

proceeded against the defendant under a theory of joint venture,

contending that the defendant provided the coventurers with the

necessary information to execute the home invasion and robbery

and that he acted as the getaway driver.

     During the main jury charge, in accordance with

Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 466 (2009), the judge

instructed the jury that, to find the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt of the crimes charged under a theory of joint

venture, the Commonwealth was required to prove that the

defendant knowingly participated in the commission of the

offenses and shared or had the requisite intent for the

offenses.    However, the judge did not instruct the jury that, to

prove that the defendant shared the intent required for those

     5 The defendant also was indicted on one count of
conspiracy, which was dismissed at the Commonwealth's request.

     6 The shorter, heavy-set man involved in the home invasion
was never identified or charged.
                                                                  11

crimes, the Commonwealth needed to prove that the defendant knew

that at least one coventurer was armed, for the charge of armed

home invasion, and that at least one coventurer was armed and

masked, for the charges of armed robbery while masked.   See

Commonwealth v. Buth, 480 Mass. 113, 116, cert. denied, 139 S.

Ct. 607 (2018) (under joint venture theory, "[w]here . . . an

element of the offense is that the perpetrator is armed, the

Commonwealth must prove that the defendant knew that at least

one coventurer was armed"); Commonwealth v. Quinones, 78 Mass.

App. Ct. 215, 219 (2010) ("To support a conviction on the charge

of armed robbery while masked, the Commonwealth, proceeding on a

joint venture theory of the defendant's guilt, had the burden of

proving that the defendant knew that the principal perpetrators

of the robbery . . . would be both armed and masked").   The

defendant did not object to the jury instructions.   The jury

convicted him of all four counts.

    The defendant appealed.   The Appeals Court, in a divided

opinion, concluded that the failure to instruct the jury that

the Commonwealth was required to prove that the defendant knew

that his coventurers were armed and masked created a substantial

risk of a miscarriage of justice because, pursuant to the

standard we articulated in Silvelo, 486 Mass. at 18, "the

evidence . . . was not 'so overwhelming' that 'there is no

likelihood that the omitted instruction materially influenced
                                                                    12

the jury's verdict[].'"7   Commonwealth v. Lavin, 101 Mass. App.

Ct. 278, 279 (2022).    We allowed the Commonwealth's application

for further appellate review, limited to the issue whether the

failure to instruct the jury on the Commonwealth's burden to

prove that the defendant knew that one of the coventurers was

armed and masked created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of

justice.

     Discussion.   1.   Standard of review.   Because the defendant

did not object to the erroneous jury instructions, we review the

case to determine whether the instructional error created a

substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.    See Bolling, 462

Mass. at 452.   "The substantial risk standard requires us to

determine 'if we have a serious doubt whether the result of the

trial might have been different had the error not been made.'"

Azar, 435 Mass. at 687, quoting LeFave, 430 Mass. at 174.     In

conducting this analysis, we are guided by four factors:     "[w]e

consider [(1)] the strength of the Commonwealth's case, [(2)]

the nature of the error, [(3)] the significance of the error in

the context of the trial, and [(4)] the possibility that the

     7 The Appeals Court, at the Commonwealth's request, reduced
the defendant's convictions of armed robbery while masked to
unarmed robbery and remanded for resentencing of those charges,
but vacated the defendant's conviction of armed home invasion,
leaving to the Commonwealth the decision whether to retry the
defendant on that charge. See Commonwealth v. Lavin, 101 Mass.
App. Ct. 278, 301 (2022).
                                                                    13

absence of an objection was the result of a reasonable tactical

decision."   Azar, supra.   See Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430 Mass.

8, 13 (1999) (setting forth factors applicable to standard of

review for unpreserved errors in noncapital cases).    See also

Commonwealth v. Randolph, 438 Mass. 290, 298 (2002)

(articulating formulation as series of questions).

    We previously have addressed the particular suitability of

the substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice standard to

situations where the elements of a crime are stated erroneously

or are omitted from the jury instructions.    See Silvelo, 486

Mass. at 17 n.7, quoting Azar, 435 Mass. at 687.    In Azar, where

the judge provided an erroneous definition of the "so-called

third prong of malice" in a murder trial, which lowered the

Commonwealth's burden of proof, we surveyed cases where the same

error had or had not required reversal.    See Azar, supra at 682,

687-688, and cases cited.   We deduced from those cases that a

new trial is not required where the evidence at trial did not

permit a finding of lesser proof than what is required under the

third prong of malice -- the erroneously stated element.    Id. at

687-688.   We therefore stated that the proper question in such

circumstances is "whether the evidence required the jurors to

find [the omitted or erroneously stated element, had it been

correctly stated]."   Id. at 688.   In other words, where the

presence of the omitted or erroneously stated element, "as it is
                                                                   14

correctly understood, can be 'ineluctably inferred' from the

evidence," a new trial is not necessary.   Id., quoting

Commonwealth v. Vizcarrondo, 427 Mass. 392, 397 (1998), S.C.,

431 Mass. 360 (2000).

      More recently, in Silvelo, 486 Mass. at 17, where the judge

omitted from the jury instructions an essential element of the

crime of possession of a loaded firearm, and the defendant

failed to object, we similarly applied the substantial risk of a

miscarriage of justice standard.   There, we stated that our

consideration in this context was "to determine whether the

evidence was 'so overwhelming' that 'there is no likelihood that

the omitted instruction materially influenced the jury's

verdict[].'"   Id. at 17-18, quoting Lutskov, 480 Mass. at 581.

In so stating, we specifically acknowledged that "this

formulation diverge[d] from Azar, 435 Mass. at 688, under which

we analyzed whether the 'evidence required the jury to [have

found]' or to have 'ineluctably inferred' that the Commonwealth

carried its burden of proving the omitted element beyond a

reasonable doubt."   Silvelo, supra at 18 n.9.   We nevertheless

emphasized that, in using this particular formulation, we did

not "intend this semantic difference in language to change the

stringency of the standard announced in Azar."   Id.   We meant

it.
                                                                    15

     The reason the substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice

standard is stringent in this context is not because we apply a

different test to this type of error from the one we apply to

others.    In all noncapital cases,8 where a defendant has waived a

claim of error, our review is limited to the substantial risk of

a miscarriage of justice standard, which "calls for us to decide

if we have a serious doubt whether the result of the trial might

have been different had the error not been made."9    LeFave, 430

Mass. at 174-175 & n.6.    However, in making this determination,

we must consider the relevant factors applicable to the

substantial risk analysis, including the nature of the error and

its significance in the context of the evidence presented at

trial.    See Alphas, 430 Mass. at 13.   Omitting an element from

the jury instructions is an error of constitutional dimension,

see Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1999), that poses

a significant risk that the jury will convict the defendant on

     8 In capital cases, we review claims of unpreserved error
for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
Commonwealth v. Duke, 489 Mass. 649, 659 (2022).

     9 We also have said that "[a]n error creates a substantial
risk of a miscarriage of justice unless we are persuaded that it
did not 'materially influence[]' the guilty verdict." Alphas,
430 Mass. at 13, quoting Commonwealth v. Freeman, 352 Mass. 556,
564 (1967). The two explanations produce the same result: "An
error may be said to have materially influenced the verdict only
if we are left with 'a serious doubt [as to] whether the result
of the trial might have been different had the error not been
made'" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Horne, 476 Mass.
222, 228 (2017).
                                                                    16

proof less than what is required for the crime charged.     See

Azar, 435 Mass. at 688-689.    And on appeal, "our role is not to

sit as a second jury."    Id. at 689.   Thus, in order for us not

to have serious doubt that the defendant's guilt has been fairly

adjudicated, such that the error did not create a substantial

risk of miscarriage of justice, we must analyze the evidence

pertaining to that element with an exacting lens.     See id. at

687-688.

    This substantial risk analysis contemplates whether the

evidence addressing the omitted or erroneously stated element

was overwhelming or uncontested at trial.     Compare Lutskov, 480

Mass. at 581 (omitted instruction on Commonwealth's burden to

prove defendant's age created no substantial risk of miscarriage

of justice where evidence of age was "so overwhelming that [it]

was not a contested issue at trial"), with Bolling, 462 Mass. at

450-452 (omitted instruction on Commonwealth's burden to prove

defendant knew coventurer was armed created substantial risk of

miscarriage of justice where evidence of defendant's knowledge

that one coventurer was armed "was not overwhelming" and was

contested at trial).     Cf. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S.

461, 470 (1997) (unpreserved error of omitted instruction on

materiality in perjury prosecution created no "miscarriage of

justice" where "evidence supporting materiality was
                                                                     17

'overwhelming,'" and "[m]ateriality was essentially

uncontroverted at trial" [citation omitted]).

    Thus, in providing another articulation of how we analyze

substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice in the omitted

element context in Silvelo, 486 Mass. at 17-18, we asked

"whether the evidence was 'so overwhelming' that 'there is no

likelihood that the omitted instruction materially influenced

the jury's verdict[]'" (citation omitted).   We now acknowledge

that this articulation of the standard is flawed.     It is so, in

part, because it mirrors our prior explanation of the standard

for analyzing harmless error -- the standard applicable to

preserved constitutional error.   See Commonwealth v. Castano,

478 Mass. 75, 82 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Dagraca, 447

Mass. 546, 555 (2006) ("an error may be harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt where the Commonwealth's evidence is so

'overwhelming' that it 'nullif[ies] any effect the erroneously

admitted [evidence] might have had on the jury or the

verdict'").   But more so, this formulation poses a question

that, in most cases, is extremely difficult to answer:     whether,

because the evidence was "so overwhelming," there is no

likelihood, theoretical or otherwise, that the error materially

influenced the verdict.   Silvelo, supra.

    Our review of unpreserved errors is not whether there is

any risk of a miscarriage of justice, but rather, it is whether
                                                                  18

that risk is a substantial one.   See Azar, 435 Mass. at 676,

quoting LeFave, 430 Mass. at 175 ("society's justified interest

in finality . . . has long been implicit, and sometimes

explicit, in our announcements that any late-arriving issue will

prevail only if the issue presents a substantial risk of a

miscarriage of justice").   See also Commonwealth v. Russell, 439

Mass. 340, 351 (2003) ("As the terminology implies, a

'substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice' refers to a risk

that has some genuine substance to it.   That standard does not

encompass an abstract, theoretical possibility of a miscarriage

of justice, utterly divorced from the case as it was

tried. . . .   [If] the only risk identified is one that is

totally removed from or at odds with that 'context,' we may rest

assured that the error did not give rise to a substantial risk

of a miscarriage of justice").

    To be sure, whether the Commonwealth's evidence is

"overwhelming," let alone "so overwhelming," is certainly a

consideration in the substantial risk calculus as a general

matter.   It is, however, one part of that analysis.   See Alphas,

430 Mass. at 13.   The analysis of substantial risk of a

miscarriage of justice must consider the four factors as they

apply to the individual circumstances of each case.     But not all

of the factors will be applicable in every case, and the way

that they apply may vary depending on the particular
                                                                  19

circumstances.   Where the nature of the error is omitting an

element from the jury instructions, specifically, our assessment

of the strength of the Commonwealth's evidence must focus on the

evidence addressing the element that was stated erroneously or

omitted from the jury instructions.

     In this case, notably, the Commonwealth does not argue that

the fourth factor -- whether it can be inferred that the

defendant's failure to object to the erroneous jury instructions

was a reasonable tactical decision -- is applicable.   See

Alphas, 430 Mass. at 13.   Nor can we now contemplate a case

where the failure to object to jury instructions relieving the

Commonwealth of its burden to prove a necessary element beyond a

reasonable doubt would be the result of a reasonable tactical

decision.10   See Bolling, 462 Mass. at 452 ("it seems unlikely

that the failure to request the instruction was a reasonable

     10We note that the circumstances here are distinguishable
from those where a defendant strategically declines to request
an instruction on the elements of a lesser included offense.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Glover, 459 Mass. 836, 844 (2011)
(reasonable strategic decision not to request instruction on
voluntary manslaughter so as to proceed solely on theory of
self-defense). But see id. at 843 n.8 ("However, where defense
counsel's strategic decision not to request an instruction on a
lesser included offense . . . is manifestly unreasonable, a
judge may need to exercise the inherent authority to give the
instruction sua sponte to protect the case from the risk of
reversal on appeal"). We also note that a judge may always
provide an instruction on a lesser included offense that is
warranted from the evidence, regardless of whether the defendant
or the Commonwealth objects. See Commonwealth v. Russell, 470
Mass. 464, 480 (2015).
                                                                  20

tactical decision because requiring the jury to make an

additional finding about the defendant's state of mind before

convicting him could not have prejudiced his case"); Azar, 435

Mass. at 689 ("there is no reasonable tactical basis for a

failure to object to a mistaken and unfavorable [to the

defendant] definition of an element of the crime").

       Accordingly, where an element that the Commonwealth is

required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt is omitted from the

jury instructions, our analysis of substantial risk of a

miscarriage of justice is limited to considering the three

remaining factors, which focus on the strength of the

Commonwealth's evidence in light of the nature of the error and

its significance in the context of the trial.     These factors are

all captured by the standard articulated in Azar, 435 Mass. at

688.    We therefore clarify today that, to determine whether a

substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice is created by the

omission of a required element from the jury instructions, the

question is, as we said in Azar, supra, whether the presence of

the omitted element was an ineluctable, or inescapable,

inference from the evidence presented at trial.    In light of the

nature and significance of this type of error, only when the

answer to that question is "yes," in this context, will the

error not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.

In other contexts, of course, the substantial risk determination
                                                                   21

will depend on the circumstances of each case, considering the

applicable factors.   See Alphas, 430 Mass. at 13.

     2.   Application.   To prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

the defendant was guilty of armed home invasion and armed

robbery while masked under a theory of joint venture, the

Commonwealth was respectively required to prove that the

defendant knew that one coventurer was armed, and that one

coventurer was both armed and masked.   We therefore must

determine whether the presence of these elements was an

ineluctable inference from the evidence at trial.11    Because, as

to either element, we conclude it was not, we are left with a

serious doubt whether the result of the trial might have been

different had the instructional error not been made.

     There was no direct evidence that the defendant knew that

the coventurers were armed or masked.   This is "not

determinative," however, because a defendant's knowledge that a

coventurer is armed or masked may be proved by circumstantial

     11The Commonwealth's argument that this standard should not
apply in this case because the requirements of joint venture are
not elements of the underlying crimes is unavailing. While
"joint venture is neither a crime nor an element of a crime,"
Commonwealth v. Fluellen, 456 Mass. 517, 522 (2010), the
perpetrator being armed is an element of both underlying crimes
in this case. See G. L. c. 265, §§ 17, 18C. Thus, to convict
the defendant of those crimes under a joint venture theory, the
Commonwealth needed to prove that the defendant knew that one
coventurer was armed. See Buth, 480 Mass. at 116. The same is
true of the preparator being masked for the charge of armed
robbery while masked. See Quinones, 78 Mass. App. Ct. at 219.
                                                                  22

evidence.   See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 432 Mass. 746, 762 (2000).

The Commonwealth directs our attention to nine pieces of

circumstantial evidence that it asserts should leave us with no

serious doubt that the defendant's guilt as a coventurer was

fairly adjudicated.

    This circumstantial evidence includes (1) evidence

suggesting that the defendant told the coventurers intimate

details about the victim's home, such as the location of the

safe, indicated by the removal of the picture from the chimney;

(2) evidence suggesting that the defendant knew and told the

coventurers that the victim kept large amounts of cash in the

safe; (3) evidence suggesting that the defendant told the

coventurers that only two people would be in the home, such as

them having brought only two zip ties; (4) evidence suggesting

that the defendant told the coventurers that the victim's wife

was deceased, such as the coventurers not asking the daughter

where her mother was; (5) evidence that the defendant had a

motive to seek revenge and steal money from the victim due to

their animosity arising out of the defendant's living

arrangement in the summer of 2013; (6) evidence that the

defendant and Lavin communicated via cell phone on the night of

the home invasion; (7) historical cell site location information

(CSLI) evidence placing the defendant in the vicinity of the

home invasion at the time it occurred; (8) evidence that the
                                                                   23

defendant and his girlfriend drove to the police station to pay

Lavin's bail, but the defendant stayed in the car, inferably to

avoid police connecting him with Lavin; and (9) evidence that

the defendant and Lavin had a close relationship.

     There is no question that the coalescence of this

circumstantial evidence told a powerful and persuasive story

that the defendant was substantially involved in the home

invasion and subsequent robbery.    It did not, however, require

the jury to find that the defendant knew that his coventurers

were armed and masked during the commission of those crimes.

See Azar, 435 Mass. at 688.   While the evidence suggesting that

the defendant assisted with orchestrating the crimes and acted

as the getaway driver may have been sufficient for the jury to

infer that the defendant possessed the requisite knowledge, see

Commonwealth v. Netto, 438 Mass. 686, 703 (2003), such

inferences were hardly ineluctable.12

     At trial, there was no evidence -- direct or circumstantial

-- that one of the coventurers conspicuously possessed a weapon

or a mask around the defendant.    The most forceful evidence that

the defendant knew that the coventurers were armed and masked

was the evidence that placed him in the vicinity of the home on

     12For sufficiency purposes, "[i]nferences must be
reasonable, but they do not have to be inescapable." Netto, 438
Mass. at 703. The same is not true of our calculus here.
                                                                  24

the night in question and suggested that he drove the getaway

vehicle.   However, as the Commonwealth has acknowledged, to

adjudicate the defendant guilty as a coventurer, the jury were

not required to find that the defendant participated in the

crimes by driving the getaway vehicle.   Given the other evidence

of his participation, and the defendant's vehement challenges to

the accuracy of the CSLI evidence placing him near the victim's

home that night,13 it is not readily apparent that the jury did

so find.   Even if the jury did find that the defendant was the

getaway driver, although it would have been permissible for them

to infer the defendant's knowledge from this fact, see

Commonwealth v. Cannon, 449 Mass. 462, 470-471 (2007), the

absence of evidence that the coventurers exhibited weapons or

masks when leaving or entering the vehicle could also have led

the jury to reach the opposite inference.

     In short, while the evidence that the defendant knew that

the coventurers were armed and masked during the home invasion

     13Specifically, on cross-examination of the State police
trooper who testified for the Commonwealth about the defendant's
CSLI, the defendant elicited testimony that historical CSLI such
as that used in this case is the least accurate method to
identify the location of a cell phone. The trooper further
testified on cross-examination that a cell site tower may have a
range of five or more miles, and that cell phones do not always
connect to the cell tower to which they are physically closest.
In closing, the defendant relied heavily on this testimony to
undermine the Commonwealth's position that the defendant's CSLI
placed him in the vicinity of the victim's home at the time of
the crimes.
                                                                     25

and robbery was certainly sufficient, and from that evidence the

jury were more than entitled to draw those inferences, we cannot

say that the inferences were ineluctable.   Without proper

instruction informing the jury that the Commonwealth was

required to prove the defendant's knowledge of those two

particulars beyond a reasonable doubt, we are left with a

serious doubt whether the outcome of the trial would have been

different had the instructional error not been made.     The error

therefore created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of

justice.

    Conclusion.   Consistent with the Commonwealth's request in

the Appeals Court, the defendant's convictions of armed robbery

while masked are reduced to unarmed robbery, and the matter is

remanded to the Superior Court for resentencing of those

offenses.   The judgment on the defendant's conviction of armed

home invasion is vacated and the verdict is set aside.

                                    So ordered.