Court Opinion

ID: 9414820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 17:01:06.173463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:44.989841
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                No. 22-10044

             Plaintiff-Appellee,            D.C. No.
                                         4:19-cr-02615-
 v.                                       CKJ-DTF-1

JOSHUA WILLIAM SCHEU,
                                           OPINION
             Defendant-Appellant.

      Appeal from the United States District Court
               for the District of Arizona
      Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding

        Argued and Submitted February 7, 2023
                  Phoenix, Arizona

                  Filed August 2, 2023

  Before: Michael Daly Hawkins, Susan P. Graber, and
           Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges.

               Opinion by Judge Hawkins
2                          USA V. SCHEU

                          SUMMARY *

                         Criminal Law

   The panel affirmed a sentence for two counts of
aggravated sexual abuse of a child in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2241(c), 2246(2), & 1152, in a case in which the district
court applied a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G.
§ 2A3.1(b)(5) because “the victim was abducted.”
    The panel wrote that whether it evaluates the plain
meaning of the term “abducted” as it appears in the
Guideline itself, or considers “abducted” to be ambiguous
and looks to the definition in the Guidelines’ commentary,
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, cmt. n.1(A) (2004), it would reach the
same conclusion: the victim was “abducted” when the
defendant forced her from the roadside where he
encountered her into a nearby cornfield to perpetrate the
sexual assault.

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                        USA V. SCHEU                        3

                        COUNSEL

J. Ryan Moore (argued), Assistant Federal Public Defender;
Jon M. Sands, Federal Public Defender; Federal Public
Defender’s Office for the District of Arizona; Tucson,
Arizona; for Defendant-Appellant.
Shelley K.G. Clemens (argued) and Corey J. Mantei,
Assistant United States Attorneys; Christina M. Cabanillas,
Deputy Appellate Chief; Gary M. Restaino, United States
Attorney, District of Arizona; Office of the United States
Attorney; Tucson, Arizona; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

                         OPINION

HAWKINS, Circuit Judge:

    Defendant Joshua William Scheu appeals his sentence
following a guilty plea to two counts of aggravated sexual
abuse of a child in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c),
2246(2) & 1152. He contends that the district court
misapplied a sentencing enhancement for abduction and thus
improperly added four levels to his sentencing range. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
affirm.
       FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
   In October 2019, Scheu was indicted on two counts of
aggravated sexual abuse of a child for sexual acts of violence
committed against a fourteen-year-old Native American girl
on the Gila River Indian Community outside of Phoenix,
Arizona, in November 2004. Scheu pled guilty without the
benefit of a plea agreement.
4                         USA V. SCHEU

    The Presentence Investigation Report calculated the
sentence using the 2004 version of the Guidelines, applied a
downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, and
added a four-level enhancement because “the victim was
abducted.” U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”)
§ 2A3.1(b)(5). This enhancement increased both ends of the
advisory sentencing range by more than six years. Scheu
objected, arguing that the abduction enhancement should not
be applied because there was no significant change in
location during or prior to the assault.
    At the sentencing hearing, the government presented the
testimony of a former Gila River Police Department
detective who had investigated the case in 2004. 1 The
detective testified that the victim and victim’s mother said
that the victim had been waiting by a dirt berm and water
pumping station along 83rd Avenue when the defendant
drove by, made a U-turn, parked, and got out of his vehicle.
As he approached the victim, she began walking backwards,
but Scheu caught up to her, grabbed her arms, and put his
hand over her mouth. He then pushed, pulled, dragged
and/or moved her approximately 35 to 40 feet into the corner
of a nearby cornfield where the sexual assault occurred, and
ordered her to lie down and not to scream or cry. The field
was adjacent to the road, and the corn was approximately
two-and-a-half feet high at the time. Several photographs
and a hand-drawn diagram of the crime scene were admitted
in evidence.
    Overruling Scheu’s objection to the enhancement, the
district court concluded that the forced movement of the
victim from the roadside into the cornfield was sufficient to

1
  The victim died of natural causes in 2020 and was not available to
testify at Scheu’s sentencing hearing.
                        USA V. SCHEU                         5

support the abduction enhancement and noted that the
defendant had “physically forced the victim into a cornfield
to conceal the assault from public view or detection.” The
court sentenced Scheu to 210 months of imprisonment and
lifetime supervised release.
                STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review de novo the district court’s legal
interpretation of the Guidelines. United States v. Gasca-
Ruiz, 852 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). A
court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts of a case is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion and its factual findings
for clear error. Id. at 1170.
                       DISCUSSION
   The Sentencing Guideline            at   issue,   U.S.S.G.
§ 2A3.1(b)(5) (2004), provides:
   Criminal Sexual Abuse; Attempt to Commit
Criminal Sexual Abuse:

       a. Base Offense Level: 30
       b. Specific Offense Characteristics
       ....
       (5) If the victim was abducted, increase by 4
           levels.

The application note to this Guideline further provides that
the term “abducted” in subsection (b)(5) shall “have the
meaning given those terms in Application Note 1 of the
Commentary to § 1B1.1.” In turn, the commentary to
§ 1B1.1 explains:

       “Abducted” means that a victim was forced
       to accompany an offender to a different
6                       USA V. SCHEU

       location. For example, a bank robber’s
       forcing a bank teller from the bank into a
       getaway car would constitute an abduction.

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, cmt. n.1(A) (2004).
    Applying the definition in the commentary, the district
court found the defendant had forcibly moved the victim
from the shoulder of the road into an adjoining cornfield,
where he shoved her onto the ground, approximately 35 to
40 feet from the spot where he had initially grabbed her by
the open road. The district court ruled that this movement
was sufficient to demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that Scheu had forced the victim to accompany him
to a different location and applied the four-level
enhancement.
                             I.
    For many years, the leading case on how courts should
treat definitions, examples, and other information in the
Guideline commentary has been Stinson v. United States,
508 U.S. 36 (1993). Stinson concluded that the Sentencing
Commission’s commentary in the Guidelines manual that
interprets or explains a Guideline is binding and that courts
must follow it unless it is plainly erroneous, inconsistent
with the Guideline provision itself, or violates the
Constitution. Id. at 47. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court considered various analogies to other legal areas and
ultimately concluded that, although “not precise,” the
Guideline commentary was much like an agency’s
interpretation of its own legislative rule (and not like an
agency’s construction of a federal statute that it
administers). Id. at 43‒45.
                         USA V. SCHEU                         7

    Twenty-six years after Stinson, the Supreme Court
decided Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019), which
addressed the proper deference to an agency’s interpretation
of its regulations (in that case, the Board of Veterans’
Appeals interpretation of an agency rule in a particular
decision). Kisor reaffirmed the existence of, but limited the
scope of, “Auer / Seminole Rock deference”; the Court
explained that “the possibility of deference can arise only if
a regulation is genuinely ambiguous” and a court has
exhausted all the “traditional tools of construction.” Id. at
2414‒15 (citation omitted); see Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S.
452 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S.
410 (1945).
    Since Kisor was decided, a circuit split has arisen over
whether this more limited deference should apply to the
Sentencing Guidelines commentary and application notes.
Compare United States v. Moses, 23 F.4th 347, 351‒58 (4th
Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 640 (Jan. 9, 2023) (setting
forth reasons why Kisor did not apply to the Guidelines, and
continuing to apply Stinson), with United States v. Riccardi,
989 F.3d 476, 484‒85 (6th Cir. 2021) (applying Kisor to the
Guidelines and concluding that a court may defer to
commentary only if Guideline is ambiguous).
    Our court recently weighed in on the debate and agreed
that the “more demanding deference standard articulated in
Kisor applies to the Guidelines’ commentary.” United
States v. Castillo, 69 F.4th 648, 655 (9th Cir. 2023). As we
explained:

       Kisor directly examined and narrowed
       Seminole Rock and Auer deference in the
       context of an administrative agency’s
       interpretation of its own regulation, noting
8                       USA V. SCHEU

       that such deference is not permitted without
       first finding the regulation ambiguous.
       Stinson deference is directly grounded in
       Seminole Rock and Auer deference. . . .
       Therefore, to follow Stinson’s instruction to
       treat the commentary like an agency’s
       interpretation of its own rule, we must apply
       Kisor’s clarification of Auer deference to
       Stinson.

       Id. at 655‒56 (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
   In any event, the result in this case is unaffected by this
change in analysis. As discussed below, we would reach the
same conclusion in this case whether we evaluate the plain
meaning of the term “abducted” as it appears in the
Guideline itself, or whether we consider “abducted” to be
ambiguous and look to the commentary’s definition.
                             II.
    We apply “the traditional rules of statutory construction
when interpreting the sentencing guidelines.” United States
v. Flores, 729 F.3d 910, 914 n.2 (9th Cir. 2013). “Our
interpretation will most often begin and end with the text and
structure of the guidelines provisions themselves.” United
States v. Cuevas-Lopez, 934 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2019)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
    Here, the Guideline itself simply provides that “[i]f the
victim was abducted, increase by 4 levels.” U.S.S.G.
§ 2A3.1(b)(5). The word “abduct” derives from the Latin
“‘abduco’ to lead away.” Humphrey v. Pope, 54 P. 847, 848
(Cal 1898). Contemporary dictionary definitions define
“abduct” as “to seize and take away (a person) by force,”
                         USA V. SCHEU                         9

Merriam Webster Online (2023), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/abduct       [https://perma.cc/32EU-
LC8Y], “to carry off by force,” The American Heritage
Dictionary (2d Coll. Ed. 1991), and “[t]o take (a person)
away by force or deception,” The Oxford English Dictionary
Online (2023),          https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/212
[https://perma.cc/KJ3L-Z3KX]. Black’s Law Dictionary
similarly defines abduct(ion) as “[t]he act of leading
someone away by force or fraudulent persuasion.” (9th Ed.
2009). Scheu argues that “abducted” requires a “substantial
leading away” and is “akin to protracted custody, captivity,
or significant isolation.”
    The plain meaning of “abducted” is not difficult to
discern, and the facts of this case would constitute an
abduction under any of these definitions. The defendant
encountered, chased, and caught the victim by the side of the
open road, and then forced her to accompany him 35 to 40
feet into a nearby cornfield, where the corn was
approximately two-and-a-half feet high; he then pushed her
down onto the ground so they could not be seen by passing
vehicles, ordered her not to scream or cry so no one would
come to her aid, and raped her. It can easily be said that the
defendant seized the victim and led her away by force,
significantly isolating her and holding her in his custody and
captivity while he perpetrated the crime.
    We note that this interpretation is also consistent with the
structure and use of “abducted” as an enhancement in other
Guidelines provisions, such as U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1 (robbery)
and § 2B3.2 (extortion by force or threat). In these
Guidelines, there is lesser, two-level enhancement if the
victim was “physically restrained” and a separate, four-level
enhancement if the victim was abducted. Unlike abduction,
physical restraint does not require any movement of the
10                      USA V. SCHEU

victim and applies if the victim is simply restrained in place.
See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 109 F.3d 639, 641 (9th
Cir. 1997) (noting examples such as being tied, bound, or
locked up). Applying the abduction enhancement in this case
is also completely consistent with the underlying purpose of
the enhancement in the sexual assault guideline. As the
Eighth Circuit has noted: “Abduction increases the gravity
of sexual assault or other crimes because the perpetrator’s
ability to isolate the victim increases the likelihood that the
victim will be harmed.” United States v. Saknikent, 30 F.3d
1012, 1013 (8th Cir. 1994).
    Employing these “traditional tools of construction,”
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted), we conclude that the text of § 2A3.1(b)(5)
is not ambiguous and that the district court correctly applied
the abduction enhancement in this case.
                             III.
    Because § 2A3.1(b)(5) is not ambiguous, “we are not
permitted under Kisor to defer to the Commission’s
commentary.” Castillo, 69 F.4th at 658. However, we
recognize that the commentary reflects the Commission’s
“experience and informed judgment,” and we may weigh it
according to its “power to persuade.” Hernandez v.
Garland, 38 F.4th 785, 789, 792 (9th Cir. 2022) (first
quoting Orellana v. Barr, 967 F.3d 927, 934 (9th Cir. 2020);
and then quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944)). The commentary defines “abducted” as “forced to
accompany an offender to a different location.” U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.1, cmt. n.1(A) (2004); see United States v. Jordan,
256 F.3d 922, 933 (9th Cir. 2001) (interpreting U.S.S.G.
§ 2B3.1(b)(4) and applying this definition of “abducted”).
This commentary provision does not conflict with or
                             USA V. SCHEU                               11

impermissibly expand the text of U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(5) but
seeks to clarify the meaning of the term as used in this (and
several other) Guidelines. The relevant commentary to
§§ 2A3.1(b)(5) & 1B1.1 is particularly authoritative because
it has remained substantively unchanged since the initial
Sentencing Guidelines were adopted in 1987, and those
Guidelines went through public notice-and-comment. 2
    This circuit has not yet had an occasion to consider what
constitutes a “different location” when applying this
commentary        definition   to    the    sexual     assault
Guideline. Although Scheu argues for an interpretation that
requires a “substantial change in place” and argues that the
approximately 35 to 40 feet of movement here was
insufficient, there is no requirement of “substantial”
movement in the Guideline or the commentary’s definition,
and we will not read requirements into a Guideline that do
not appear in its text. See Whitfield v. United States, 574
U.S. 265, 269 (2015); United States v. Gonzalez, 262 F.3d
867, 870 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (declining to read a

2
   See Sentencing Guidelines for U.S. Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 44,674,
44,681, 44,685 (Nov. 20, 1987); U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(5) & app. n.1
(1987); id. § 1B1.1, cmt. n.1(a) (1987); see also Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416
(“[W]e have deferred to ‘official staff memoranda’ that were ‘published
in the Federal Register . . . .’” (quoting Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566 n.9, 567 n.10 (1980))); Skidmore, 323 U.S.
at 140 (explaining that the weight we may accord to agency guidance
“depend[s] upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade,
if lacking power to control.”); see generally United States v. Dupree, 57
F.4th 1269, 1280 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc) (Pryor, J., concurring)
(explaining that “Guidelines commentary ordinarily goes through the
same notice-and-comment and congressional review procedures as
substantive guidelines revisions”).
12                         USA V. SCHEU

scienter requirement into a Guideline “because the plain
language of the guideline does not require” knowledge).
     Numerous other circuits have examined this aspect of the
commentary’s definition in a variety of fact patterns; in
reviewing them, it becomes apparent that it is the qualitative
change in location that is of more significance than the
distance traveled. Thus, for example, moving from indoors
to outdoors (or vice versa) has been considered a “different
location,” even if only a few feet have been traversed. See
United States v. Whooten, 279 F.3d 58, 61 (1st Cir. 2002)
(defendant forced bank employee approximately 65 feet
from building into parking lot, but not all the way to getaway
vehicle); United States v. Davis, 48 F.3d 277, 278‒79 (7th
Cir. 1993) (defendant forced employee from parking lot into
credit union); United States v. Kills in Water, 293 F.3d 432,
434 (8th Cir. 2002) (defendant “picked up,” “dragged,” and
“lifted” victim inside abandoned trailer after she willingly
accompanied him to the trailer’s vicinity).
    But the definition has not been applied “mechanically
based on the presence or absence of doorways, lot lines,
thresholds, and the like,” and thus movement at gunpoint 40
to 50 feet between vehicles in the same parking lot has also
been held sufficient to support the enhancement, even
though no technical property line was crossed. United States
v. Hawkins, 87 F.3d 722, 728 (5th Cir. 1996) (per
curiam). 3 As that court explained:

        The victims were accosted at one “location,”
        near the pickup truck, then were dragged and

3
  We note there does appear to be tension among the circuits as to
whether movement of a victim within a single building can constitute a
“different location” within the meaning of the commentary’s
                            USA V. SCHEU                              13

         forced at gunpoint some 40 to 50 feet to
         another “location,” at the van. We are
         satisfied that it would be unduly legalistic,
         even punctilious, of us to say that those were
         not separate “locations” for purposes of the
         guidelines’ definition of “abduction,” or that
         something as coincidental and insignificant
         as a lot line or doorway could make or break
         the determination of “different location.”
         The district court did not commit reversible
         error in concluding, under the instant set of
         facts, that an abduction occurred.

Id.
     In United States v. Hefferon, the Fifth Circuit confronted
a factual scenario somewhat similar to what we confront
today. 314 F.3d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 2002). The defendant
encountered the seven-year-old victim in an outdoor area on
an Air Force base’s temporary lodging facility. Id. He
initially sexually assaulted her near some trees by a
playground; when her brother and sister approached, he
moved with the victim to an area behind some garbage
dumpsters and continued the assault. The court concluded
that this move was sufficient to constitute a “different

definition. Compare, e.g., United States v. Wells, 38 F.4th 1246, 1262,
1264 (11th Cir. 2022) (holding that forcibly dragging a victim from the
precipice of the front door as she was leaving the house into a back
bedroom where sexual assault occurred constituted more than “trivial
movement”) with United States v. Hill, 963 F.3d 528, 530‒31 (6th Cir.
2020) (concluding that forcing customers from a cell phone store sales
floor into a back room is not movement to a “different location” from the
store itself). As we are not confronted with a situation involving
movement within a building, we express no opinion on the reasoning in
these cases.
14                      USA V. SCHEU

location” even though the trees and garbage repository were
both located on the lodging facility’s property. Id. at
225. Although the court did not estimate the distance
between the two areas, it appears that the trees and
dumpsters were relatively close together, but the dumpsters
were more isolated and allowed the defendant to hide the
victim from the view of her family. Id. at 215.
    So too here, the cornfield was a qualitatively different
location than the (much more visible) side of the road, and
the defendant forced the victim to accompany him to this
location. The commentary’s definition of “abducted” thus
confirms that the district court properly applied the
enhancement.
                      CONCLUSION
     Whether we look only at the text of § 2A3.1(b)(5) or
consult the definition of “abduct” provided in the
Guidelines’ commentary, § 1B1.1, cmt. n.1(A), we have no
difficulty concluding that the victim in this case was indeed
“abducted” when the defendant forced her from the roadside
where he encountered her into a nearby cornfield to
perpetrate the sexual assault. The district court did not abuse
its discretion by applying the four-level enhancement.
       AFFIRMED.