Court Opinion

ID: 9772408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:16:55.762119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:43.875709
License: Public Domain

WHITHAM, Justice,
dissenting and concurring.
I concur in part and respectfully dissent in part. I agree with the majority that the trial court did not err in admitting into evidence proof that appellant assaulted two police officers. Therefore, I concur that we overrule appellant’s first point of error. I disagree, however, with the majority in its disposition of appellant’s second point of error. Thus, I respectfully dissent for the reasons below. Consequently, I would sustain appellant’s second point of error and reverse and remand.
In his second point of error, appellant contends that the trial court committed fundamental error during the punishment hearing when it submitted instructions to the jury on the law of parole. Appellant’s second point of error involves constitutional issues. It is well settled that the constitutionality of a statute will not be determined in any case unless such a determination is absolutely necessary to decide the case in which the issue is raised. Smith v. State, 658 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). Since I find no merit in appellant’s first point of error, I must address the issue of the constitutionality of article 37.-07, § 4 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure raised in appellant’s second and remaining point of error. Under his second point of error, appellant argues that the instructions given as directed by article 37.07, § 4 violate the separation of powers doctrine contained in both the Constitutions of the United States and of the State of Texas. Appellant also argues that the instructions given deprived appellant of due process of law under both constitutions. Appellant failed to object to the instructions. Thus, appellant asserts fundamental error on appeal. The issue presented involves only governmental powers of the *840State of Texas and not of the United States. Consequently, I perceive no issue of separation of powers between the executive branch of the government of the United States and the judicial branch of the government of the United States. Therefore, I conclude that the instructions given as directed by article 37.07, § 4 do not violate the separation of powers doctrine contained in the Constitution of the United States. I conclude, however, for the reasons expressed below, that article 37.07, § 4 violates the separation of powers doctrine provided by article II, § 1 of the Constitution of the State of Texas and, therefore, is unconstitutional. I also conclude for the reasons expressed below that the instructions given deprived appellant of due process under both the Constitutions of the United States and of the State of Texas; and, therefore, is unconstitutional.

Separation of Powers

At the punishment phase of the trial, the trial court instructed the jury as follows pursuant to article 37.07, § 4:
Under the law applicable in this case, the defendant, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, may earn time off the sentence imposed through the award of good conduct time. Prison authorities may award good conduct time to a prisoner who exhibits good behavior, diligence in carrying out prison work assignments, and attempts at rehabilitation. If a prisoner engages in misconduct, prison authorities may also take away all or part of any good conduct time earned by the prisoner.
It is also possible that the length of time for which the defendant will be imprisoned might be reduced by the award of parole.
Under the law applicable in this case, if the defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, he will not become eligible for parole until the actual time served equals one-third of the sentence imposed or 20 years, whichever is less, without consideration of any good conduct time he may earn. If the defendant is sentenced to a term of less than six years, he must serve at least two years before he is eligible for parole. Eligibility for parole does not guarantee that parole will be granted.
It cannot accurately be predicted how the parole law and good conduct time might be applied to this defendant if he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, because the application of these laws will depend on decisions made by prison and parole authorities.
You may consider the existence of the parole law and good conduct time. However, you are not to consider the extent to which good conduct time may be awarded to or forfeited by this particular defendant.
You aré not to consider the manner in which the parole law may be applied to this particular defendant.
TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 37.07, § 4 (Vernon Supp.1986). Appellant’s basic contention is that these article 37.07, § 4 instructions violate the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and, therefore, article 37.07, § 4 is unconstitutional. I begin with some background.

Regulation of Parole

Article IV, § 11 of the Texas Constitution provides that “[t]he Legislature shall by law establish a Board of Pardons and Paroles and shall require it to keep record of its actions and the reasons for its actions. The Legislature shall have authority to enact parole laws.” TEX.CONST. art. IV, § 11. The Legislature has enacted rules governing the application of parole laws. Pursuant to article 42.12, § 15(g)(1) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the Board of Pardons and Paroles is authorized, where not inconsistent with law, to adopt rules with respect to eligibility of prisoners for parole. The Board is designated as “the agency of state government with exclusive authority to determine paroles." TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 42.18, § 1 (Vernon Supp.1986). The Legislature has fixed eligibility requirements for parole. Article 42.18, § 8(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a prisoner under a death sentence is not eligible for parole. A person *841convicted of the class of offenses under article 42.12, § 3g(a)(l) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (aggravated kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault and aggravated robbery) is not eligible for release on parole until his actual calendar time served, without consideration of good conduct time, equals one-third of the maximum sentence or twenty calendar years, whichever is less, but in no event shall he be eligible for release on parole in less than two calendar years. The same provisions apply where the court makes an affirmative finding that a deadly weapon was used or exhibited. All other prisoners are eligible for release on parole when their calendar time served plus good conduct time equals one-third of the maximum sentence imposed or twenty years, whichever is less. TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 42.18, § 8(b) (Vernon Supp.1986). The Parole Board is authorized to release on parole any person confined in a penal or correctional institution who is eligible for release under the preceding section. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC.ANN. art. 42.18, § 8(a) (Vernon Supp.1986).

Regulation of Good Conduct Time

Pursuant to article 6181-1 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes, inmates are to be classified by the Texas Department of Corrections into three categories according to such factors as conduct, obedience, industry, and prior criminal history. TEX.REV. CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 6181-1, §§ 2 & 3(a) (Vernon Supp.1986). Inmates earn a specified amount of good conduct time based upon their classification. TEX.REV.CIV. STAT.ANN. art. 6181-1, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1986). Good conduct time is a privilege and not a right, and these credits may be forfeited by the director of the Texas Department of Corrections if the inmate commits an offense or violates a departmental rule. Good conduct time affects only the prisoner’s eligibility for parole or mandatory supervision and does not otherwise operate to reduce the prison term. TEX.REV. CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 6181-1, § 4 (Vernon Supp.1986).

Separation of Powers

With this background, I reach the separation of powers issue. At the outset, I emphasize what the present case does not involve. The present case does not involve jury misconduct in discussing the parole laws. Therefore, we do not have before us the precise questions ably and forcefully addressed by the majority and dissenting opinions in Sneed v. State, 670 S.W.2d 262 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). Instead, we must decide whether, under the Constitution of the State of Texas, the trial court can advise the jury of certain aspects of the parole and good time laws, including time computations for eligibility for parole, then tell the jury that they may consider the existence of these aspects of those laws and yet order them not to consider the manner in which the parole law may be applied to appellant.
From the Constitution of the State of Texas, we know that the people of Texas have divided the powers of government of the State of Texas into three departments. We know also that these three departments are the legislative, the executive and the judicial and that none of these departments can exercise any power assigned by the constitution to either of the others. As commanded by the people of Texas in article II, § 1 of the Constitution of the State of Texas:
The powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be divided into three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to-wit: Those which are Legislative to one, those which are Executive to another, and those which are Judicial to another; and no person, or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted.
TEX.CONST. art. II, § 1. Therefore, in the context of the present case we must determine if this same constitution has “attached” to any of the three departments any power with respect to parole. I find that the constitution does so. As further commanded by the people of Texas in arti-*842ele IV, § 11 of the Constitution of the State of Texas:
The Legislature shall by law establish a Board of Pardons and Paroles and shall require it to keep record of its actions and the reasons for its actions. The Legislature shall have authority to enact parole laws.
In all criminal cases, except treason and impeachment, the Governor shall have power, after conviction, on the written signed recommendation and advice of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, or a majority thereof, to grant reprieves and commutations of punishment and pardons; and under such rules as the Legislature may prescribe, and upon the written recommendation and advice of a majority of the Board of Pardons and Paroles, he shall have the power to remit fines and forfeitures. The Governor shall [have] the power to grant one reprieve in any capital case for a period not to exceed thirty (30) days; and he shall have power to revoke conditional pardons. With the advice and consent of the Legislature, he may grant reprieves, commutations of punishment and pardons in cases of treason.
TEX.CONST. art. IV, § 11.
The majority seizes on the language of article IV, § 11 that “[t]he Legislature shall have authority to enact parole laws” as divesting the executive branch of government of any power with respect to parole and vesting that power solely within the province of the legislative branch. To my mind, nothing could be more wrong. The majority errs because it misreads the constitutional history of article IV, § 11 and the decisions of our Court of Criminal Appeals. First, I note some of the history of article IV, § 11. The 1936 amendment of article IV, § 11 added the language “[t]he Legislature ... shall have authority to enact parole laws.” TEX.CONST. art. IV, § 11 (1936, amended 1983). That language appeared in a third paragraph of article IV, § 11. The subsequent 1983 amendment to article IV, § 11 deleted that third paragraph and moved the language “[t]he Legislature shall have authority to enact parole laws” to its present place in article IV, § 11. TEX.CONST. art. IV, § 11. Therefore, the language relied upon by the majority as divesting the executive branch of government of any power with respect to parole and vesting that power solely within the province of the legislative branch has been in our constitution since 1936. Second, with this history in mind, let us turn to what the Court of Criminal Appeals has said about the matter. To my mind, the constitutional directive to the legislature to establish “a Board of Pardons and Paroles” is no more than a commission to place certain executive functions of government in a specialized office within the executive branch of government. Indeed, the Court of Criminal Appeals said just that in 1944, after the 1936 amendment to article IV, § 11. “[The Board of Pardons and Paroles and parole officers] are merely arms of the executive designed to assist him [the governor] in a wiser performance of his duty.” Ex parte Ferdin, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 590, 183 S.W.2d 466, 467 (1944). Furthermore, in 1975 the Court of Criminal Appeals pointed out that legislative authority to enact parole laws did not deprive the executive branch of government of the exclusive power to make decisions to parole. Consider this language in Heredia v. State, 528 S.W.2d 847, 853 (Tex.Crim.App.1975) 1:
The decision to parole, if and when made, is beyond the province of the courts (except, of course, complaints of denial of constitutional or statutory rights in consideration for parole may be raised by petition of the courts, e.g., by habeas corpus) and therefore of the jury, and is exclusively a matter within the province of the executive branch of government, under proper regulation by *843the legislative branch. Article IV, Section 11, Texas Constitution.
Heredia, 528 S.W.2d at 853, n. 4 (emphasis added). Thus, decisions with respect to parole are exclusively a matter within the province of the executive branch of government. Therefore, the majority errs in holding that the present language of article IV, §11 divests the executive branch of government of any power with respect to parole. The Court of Criminal Appeals has held otherwise. Indeed, the majority’s holding that article IV, § 11 divests the executive branch of government of any power with respect to parole and vests that power solely within the province of the legislative branch will come as a surprise to the trial court. Consider, if you will, a specific instruction given in the present case concerning parole. In addition to the instructions provided in article 37.07, § 4, the same charge in the present case later instructed the jury:
You are further instructed that in determining the punishment in this case, you are not to discuss among yourselves how long the defendant -will be required to serve any sentence you decide to impose. Such matters come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons and Paroles and the Governor of the State of Texas and are no concern of yours.
(Emphasis added). I must insist that the majority is wrong in holding that the executive branch is divested of any power with respect to parole by the present language of article IV, § 11.
Moreover, I am not alone in my conclusion that decisions with respect to parole are exclusively a matter within the province of the executive branch of government. In Williams v. State, 461 P.2d 997 (Okla.Crim.App.1969), the highest court of Oklahoma with criminal jurisdiction held a statute requiring trial courts to instruct the jury on parole law to be unconstitutional under the separation of powers provision of the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma. In the language of the Oklahoma court:
The State of Oklahoma, by and through its Attorney General, has filed a Petition for Rehearing in the above styled and numbered cause on the grounds that this Court, in its opinion, failed to pass on the constitutionality of 57 O.S.Supp.1969, § 138. In this contention the Attorney General is correct, and to make it crystal clear that an instruction should not be given under the provisions of 57 O.S. Supp.1969, § 138, nor should the District Attorney argue it as a part of his closing remarks to the jury, we specifically hold that the provisions of the statute making it mandatory for the court to give such an instruction is in violation of Article 4, Section 1, of the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma, the some [sic] providing: “The powers of the government of the State of Oklahoma shall be divided into three separate departments: The Legislative, Executive, and Judicial; and except as provided in this Constitution, the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial departments of government shall be separate and distinct, and neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others.”
Williams, 461 P.2d at 1001. Consider also, albeit dicta, the concern of the court in United States v. Scott, 793 F.2d 117 (5th Cir.1986) as to separation of powers in the federal system. “We have grave doubts whether the grant of judicial power in Article III of the Constitution extends to the relief granted by the district court in this case: Article II of the Constitution confers upon the President — the holder of executive power in our constitutional scheme— the power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States.” Scott, 793 F.2d at 118.
Indeed, in the present case the State appears to concede that decisions with respect to parole are exclusively a matter within the province of the executive branch of government. The State, however, insists that no separation of powers problem exists. First, the State argues that to allow jurors to consider the existence of parole and good conduct presents no constitutional problem because the existence of these factors is common knowledge among jurors. I disagree. I am unwilling to hold that asserted “common knowledge” of citi*844zens, including jurors, rewrites constitutional provisions. I decline to accept the premise that the Constitution of the State of Texas is subject to daily amendment by force of the perceived “common knowledge” of the moment. It is precisely that manner of government that the Constitutions of the United States and of the State of Texas are designed to protect against. Second, the State insists that no separation of powers problem exists because article 37.07, § 4 does not allow the jurors to consider application of parole and good conduct laws, and that, indeed, the statute requires instructions to that effect. I disagree. I conclude that article 37.07, § 4 is an attempt to allow the judicial branch of government to exercise a power exclusively within the province of the executive branch of government. I conclude that article 37.-07, § 4, in the last analysis, is no more than an artfully drafted subterfuge to permit the judicial branch of government, acting by the trial court via instructions to the jury, to authorize the jury to attempt to apply the parole laws in assessing punishment. I reach this conclusion, in part, because of the State’s first argument. If the existence of the parole law is a matter of “common knowledge” among jurors, I fail to see the need to instruct them as to what they already know. Thus, there must be some other reason for the instructions. I conclude that this other reason is to permit the judicial branch, through jurors, to exercise executive powers with respect to parole. I reach this conclusion because the instructions directed by article 37.07, § 4 go beyond the explanation suggested by Judge Clinton in Keady v. State, 687 S.W.2d 757, 762 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (Clinton, J., dissenting). Thus, for example, I conclude that the instructions directed by article 37.07, § 4 and given in the present case, exceed constitutionally permissible limits when they provide:
Under the law applicable in this case, if the defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, he will not become eligible for parole until the actual time served equals one-third of the sentence imposed or 20 years, whichever is less, without consideration of any good conduct time he may earn. If the defendant is sentenced to a term of less than six years, he must serve at least two years before he is eligible for parole. Eligibility for parole does not guarantee that parole will be granted.
Article 37.07, § 4. With this information article 37.07, § 4 allows the jury, in the words of Judge Davidson, to engage in action:
[S]usceptible of but one construction, that being ... a revolt by the jury against the commutation and good-behavior laws of this state and a denial to this appellant of the rights given him by those laws.
Salcido v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 173, 319 S.W.2d 329, 334 (1959) (Davidson, J., dissenting). I conclude that the immediately above-quoted instruction directed by article 37.07, § 4 permits the jury to calculate and assess a sentence that thwarts the parole laws and the executive department’s powers as to parole laws. I reach this conclusion because jurors, individually and silently in their own minds, without discussion among themselves, can calculate a sentence that thwarts the parole laws and executive powers as to parole laws and then vote to assess a sentence designed to accomplish that objective. All without one word of discussion between members of the jury. Thus, jury misconduct would never surface. In short, I can only conclude that the article 37.07, § 4 instructions are not intended to be helpful informational services to jurors. Instead, I can only conclude that the article 37.07, § 4 instructions are intended and designed to be a skillful scheme to thwart the powers of the executive branch of government and to deny rights given an accused under the law.
Furthermore, for reasons that follow, I cannot agree that the final directed instruction of article 37.07, § 4 saves the statute. That final instruction reads:
You may consider the existence of the parole law and good conduct time. However, you are not to consider the extent to which good conduct time may be awarded to or forfeited by this particular defendant. You are not to consider the *845manner in which the parole law may be applied to the particular defendant.
(Emphasis added). I am at a loss to understand how jurors are expected to distinguish between considering the existence of the parole law and the manner of application of the parole law. For the reasons I discuss below concerning a fair and impartial trial, I conclude that to instruct jurors to distinguish between existence of the parole law and application of the parole law creates an irreconcilable conflict and that this irreconcilable conflict misleads jurors as a matter of law. Indeed, the fact that the instructions so mislead the jurors illustrates the evil inherent in attempting to devise a scheme accomodating public outcry against the parole laws of this State. I cannot accept fiction and subterfuge to circumvent the Constitution of the State of Texas as it requires separation of powers. Consequently, I would hold that article 37.-07, § 4 violates the separation of powers doctrine found in article II, § 1 of the Constitution of the State of Texas. Thus, I conclude that the trial court erred in the charge on the parole law.
Substantive Due Process — A Fair and Impartial Trial
Certainly one of the basic purposes of the Due Process Clause has always been to protect a person against having the Government impose burdens upon him except in accordance with the valid laws of the land. Implicit in this constitutional safeguard is the premise that the law must be one that carries an understandable meaning with legal standards that the courts must enforce, Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 403, 86 S.Ct. 518, 521, 15 L.Ed.2d 447 (1966) (emphasis added).
The majority treats appellant’s contention that he was deprived of due process under the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, under article I, § 19 of the Texas Constitution, and under article 1.04 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure as a complaint that he was denied a fair and impartial trial at the punishment phase of the trial. I agree with the majority’s reading of appellant’s argument. The majority then describes appellant as asserting that he was denied a fair and impartial trial because the instructions are self-contradictory and misleading. I agree in substance with the majority’s reading of appellant’s argument. As does the majority, I will address appellant’s due process arguments within the concept of a fair and impartial trial. Before proceeding, however, I remind the reader that in the present case the trial court gave further instructions on the parole law than those directed by article 37.07, § 4. In addition to the instructions provided in article 37.07, § 4, the same charge later instructed the jury:
You are further instructed that in determining the punishment in this case, you are not to discuss among yourselves how long the defendant will be required to serve any sentence you decide to impose. Such matters come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board of Pardons and Paroles and the Governor of the State of Texas and are no concern of yours.
(Emphasis added).
Article 36.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires the trial court in the present case to deliver to the jury “a written charge distinctly setting forth the law applicable to the case.” TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC.ANN. art. 36.14 (Vernon 1981). Nevertheless, whenever it appears by the record in any criminal action upon appeal that any requirement of article 36.14 has been disregarded, the judgment shall not be reversed unless it appears from the record that the defendant has not had a fair and impartial trial. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC.ANN. art. 36.19 (Vernon 1981). For the reasons that follow, I conclude that the trial court failed to deliver to the jury a written charge distinctly setting forth the law applicable to the case. Moreover, for the reasons that follow, I conclude further that it appears from the record that appellant has not had a fair and impartial trial.
The instructions that are eventually delivered to the jury should be clear, succinct, unambiguous and free from internal contradictions. Perkins v. State, 117 Tex. Cr.R. 415, 37 S.W.2d 163, 164 (1931); McElwee v. State, 73 Tex.Cr.R. 445, 165 S.W. *846927, 928-29 (1914); Bennett v. State, 75 S.W. 314, 316-17 (Tex.Cr.App.1903); Henry v. State, 54 S.W. 592, 594 (Tex.Cr.App.1899); Criner v. State, 41 Tex.Cr.R. 290, 53 S.W. 873, 874 (1899); Green v. State, 32 Tex.Cr.R. 298, 22 S.W. 1094, 1095-96 (1893); Johnson v. State, 21 Tex.App. 368, 17 S.W. 252, 253 (1886). I read appellant to argue that the instructions given on the parole law are confusing and internally contradictory. In the present case, the trial court told the jury that they may consider the existence of the parole law, told the jury that they may not consider the manner of application of the parole law and told the jury that the parole law is no concern of theirs. Trial courts should avoid venturing out into broad fields of lectures to juries upon their duties other than upon necessary topics. Pugh v. State, 131 Tex.Cr.R. 169, 97 S.W.2d 200, 201 (1936). It is not the function of the charge merely to avoid misleading or confusing the jury. It is the function of the charge to lead and prevent confusion. Williams v. State, 547 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex.Crim.App.1977). I fail to see how jurors may consider the existence of the parole law when told that the parole law is not their concern. Furthermore, I am at a loss to understand how jurors are expected to distinguish between considering the existence of the parole law and the manner of application of the parole law. I recognize that appellate courts must presume that the jury followed the trial court’s instructions. Ainsworth v. State, 517 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Tex.Crim.App.1975). Nevertheless, the presence of a correct instruction does not cure the error of giving another inconsistent one. Lowry v. State, 671 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1984), rev’d on other grounds, 692 S.W.2d 86 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). Each instruction must be judged in the context of the entire charge. Lowry, 671 S.W.2d at 603. It is fundamental to our jurisprudence that instructions to the jury must be consistent with each other, and not misleading to the jurors. Lowry, 671 S.W.2d at 603.
I conclude that to instruct jurors that they may consider the existence of the parole law and thereafter instruct jurors that the parole law is not their concern, creates an irreconcilable conflict and that this irreconcilable conflict misleads jurors as a matter of law. Moreover, I conclude that to instruct jurors to distinguish between the existence of the parole law and the application of the parole law also creates an irreconcilable conflict and that this irreconcilable conflict misleads jurors as a matter of law. Consequently, I agree with appellant that the instructions given on the parole law are confusing and internally contradictory. Therefore, I conclude that the trial court’s charge on the parole law denied appellant a fair and impartial trial on the punishment issues in violation of article 36.19. I conclude further that, for the reasons expressed above, appellant was deprived of due process under the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, under article I, § 19 of the Texas Constitution and under article 1.04 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure in that the trial court's charge denied appellant a fair and impartial trial on the punishment issues. Thus, I conclude further that the trial court erred in its charge on the parole law.

Disposition

Finding trial court error, I reach the question of whether the error constitutes reversible error. I recognize that Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) instructs that whether objection to the charge was made or fundamental error claimed “the actual degree of harm must be assayed in light of the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, including the contested issues and weight of probative evidence, the argument of counsel and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole.” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. Appellant did not object to the charge on any grounds. Thus, appellant asserts fundamental error. Fundamental error is error so egregious and creates such harm that an accused has not had a fair and impartial trial— n short “egregious harm.” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. Thus, we have two basic questions. First, whether anything conspicuously bad happened to appellant because the trial *847court charged the jury as directed by law as enacted by the legislature in article 37.-07, § 4. Second, whether anything conspicuously bad happened to appellant because the trial court submitted to the jury a confusing and internally contradictory charge. See White v. State, 699 S.W.2d 607, 617 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1985, no pet.).
Assaying the actual degree of harm in light of the entire jury charge alone, I conclude that the actual degree of harm to appellant requires that we reverse the trial court’s judgment. In addressing the first basic question, I consider the consequences that must follow the effort to circumvent the separation of powers doctrine contained in the Constitution of the State of Texas. It is well established that under article II, § 1 of the Constitution of the State of Texas power which has been granted to one department of government may be exercised only by that branch to the exclusion of the others, and any attempt by one department of government to interfere with the powers of another is null and void. Munroe v. State, 637 S.W.2d 475, 477 (Tex.Crim.App.1982).2 Clemency powers embodied in the parole system are beyond the reach of interference by the judicial branch and any action by the judicial branch to frustrate or delay the exercise of the power by the executive branch is as much of an unconstitutional interference as is an attempted usurpation of that power. This is the constitutional basis for the established rule that discussion of the parole law is always jury misconduct. Munroe, 637 S.W.2d at 477. Munroe teaches that any attempt by one department of government to interfere with the powers of another is null and void. Munroe, 637 S.W.2d at 477. Having concluded that the trial court’s instructions in the present case given pursuant to article 37.07, § 4 constitute an unconstitutional interference with the exercise of a power exclusively within the province of the executive branch of government, I conclude that the trial court’s instructions at the punishment phase of trial in the present case directed by article 37.07, § 4 are null and void in that the trial court was prohibited by article II, § 1 of the Constitution of the State of Texas from giving the instructions directed in article 37.07, § 4. I would hold that an accused may not be assessed punishment by a criminal procedure which is null and void in part. To hold otherwise renders meaningless the concept of null and void. To my mind, something conspicuously bad happened to appellant because the trial court charged the jury as directed by law as enacted by the legislature in article 37.07, § 4. I reach this conclusion because appellant has been assessed punishment at life in the Department of Corrections by a criminal procedure which is null and void in part. Therefore, appellant has not had a fair and impartial trial. Thus, I would hold that egregious harm mandating reversal exists as a matter of law because the trial court instructed the jury in accordance with article 37.07, § 4 in violation of the separation of powers doctrine contained in article II, § 1 of the Constitution of the State of Texas. Furthermore, I cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court error made no contribution to the punishment. TEX.R. APP.PROC., R. 81(b)(2). Thus, I would reverse the trial court’s judgment, because the trial court instructed the jury in accordance with article 37.07, § 4 in violation of the separation of powers doctrine contained in article II, § 1 of the Constitution of the State of Texas. TEX.R.APP.PROC., R. 81(b)(2).
In addressing the second basic question, I consider the consequences that must follow the confusing and internally contradictory charge on the parole law. Assaying the actual degree of harm in light of the entire jury charge alone, I conclude that the actual degree of harm to appellant *848requires that we reverse the trial court’s judgment. I reach this conclusion because a confusing and internally contradictory charge on the parole law which misleads the jury as a matter of law constitutes that actual degree of harm to appellant which requires reversal. I reason that the law must not allow incarceration of an accused in the Texas Department of Corrections as the result of confusion and contradiction in the charge presented to the accused’s peers sitting in judgment as to punishment. I conclude that when the State imposes punishment resulting from such confusion and contradiction something conspicuously bad happens to an accused. Therefore, I conclude that egregious harm mandating reversal exists as a matter of law. Consequently, I conclude further that the trial court committed fundamental error during the punishment hearing when it submitted the complained of instructions to the jury on the law of parole. Furthermore, I cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court error made no contribution to the punishment. TEX.R.APP.PROC., R. 81(b)(2). Thus, I would reverse the trial court’s judgment because the trial court submitted a confusing and internally contradictory charge on the parole law and, therefore, denied appellant a fair and impartial trial. TEX.R.APP.PROC., R. 81(b)(2).
For the reasons expressed, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.
HOWELL, McCRAW, HOLLINGSWORTH and MITCHELL, JJ., join in this opinion.

. We recognize that Heredia’s test for reversible error in jury misconduct has been questioned, modified and recognized as overruled in various cases (e.g., Sneed v. State, 670 S.W.2d 262, 264-66 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). However, Heredia’s analysis of the constitutional issues involved in a jury’s consideration of parole has not been questioned. All citations to Heredia in this opinion are from those parts of Heredia that the subsequent cases have not questioned.

. We recognize that Munroe's test for reversible error in jury misconduct has been questioned, modified; and recognized as overruled in various cases (e.g. Dugard v. State, 688 S.W.2d 524, 531 (Tex.Crim.App.1985)). However, Munroe’s analysis of the constitutional issues involved in a jury's consideration of parole has not been questioned in any of these cases. All citations to Munroe in this opinion are from those parts of Munroe that the subsequent cases have not questioned.