Court Opinion

ID: 9901309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 17:02:13.291141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:30.492136
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

                                       UNITED STATES

                                                v.

                                  Alina N. ANDERSON
                        Yeoman Second Class (E-5), U.S. Coast Guard

                                        CGCMSP 25001
                                        Docket No. 1477

                                          11 April 2022

Special court-martial sentence adjudged on 30 April 2021.

       Military Judge:                          CDR Paul R. Casey, USCG
       Appellate Defense Counsel:               CDR Jeffrey G. Janaro, USCG
       Appellate Government Counsel:            LCDR Nicholas J. Hathaway, USCG

                                      BEFORE
                          MCCLELLAND, JUDGE & BRUBAKER
                               Appellate Military Judges

Per curiam:

       Appellant was tried by special court-martial, military judge alone. Pursuant to her pleas
of guilty, entered in accordance with a pretrial agreement, Appellant was convicted of eight
specifications of presenting a false claim for approval and payment, in violation of Article 124,
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The court sentenced Appellant to a bad-conduct
discharge and reduction to E-2. The Convening Authority approved the sentence. Judgment was
entered accordingly.

       Before this Court, Appellant has assigned as error that Appellant’s due process rights
were violated by excessive and unexplained post-trial delay.

       Appellant asserts that the ninety days between the convening authority’s action and
docketing of the case with this Court was presumptively unreasonable under United States v.
Moreno, 63 M.J. 129 (C.A.A.F. 2006) because it exceeded thirty days, and deprived her of her
          United States v. Aline N. ANDERSON, No. 1477 (C.G.Ct.Crim.App. 2022)

right to speedy post-trial review. We apply the conclusion we reached in United States v. Tucker,
__ M.J. __ , slip op. at 26 (C.G.Ct.Crim.App. 7 Apr 2022): that Moreno’s use of the convening
authority’s action as a terminal benchmark prior to docketing has been superseded by statute and
regulation. As in Tucker, there was no presumptively unreasonable delay in this case. Further,
even under a full due-process analysis, Appellant was not deprived of due process.

        Briefly, whereas in the past the convening authority’s action was the last event before a
record of trial was forwarded for appellate review, under the Military Justice Act of 2016 (MJA
2016),1 the opportunity for the convening authority to take action is followed by the entry of
judgment, which “terminates the trial proceedings and initiates the appellate process.” Rule for
Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1111(a)(2) . Thereafter, further administrative processing might take
significant time, especially if the transcript was not completed before the entry of judgment.2

        Accordingly, we apply a presumption of unreasonable delay triggering a full due-process
analysis when: (1) the record of trial is not docketed with this Court within a total of 150 days of
the completion of trial; or (2) we do not complete appellate review and render a decision within
eighteen months of docketing. Tucker, slip op. at 26.

        Here, although more than thirty days elapsed between the convening authority’s action
and docketing with this Court, a total of only 108 days elapsed between completion of the trial
and docketing. Accordingly, there was no presumptively unreasonable delay.

        Alternatively, even if there was presumptively unreasonable delay, there still was no due
process violation and relief is not warranted.

        The full due-process analysis, called for upon presumptively unreasonable delay,
comprises consideration of the following four factors to determine whether post-trial delay

1
  The alleged offenses in this case occurred after 1 January 2019, the date when the Military Justice Act of 2016
took effect, per E.O. 13825 (March 1, 2018).
2
  The Coast Guard Military Justice Manual (MJM) (COMDTINST 5810.1H) (9 July 2021) calls for the transcript to
be completed within thirty days of adjournment of the court-martial. MJM subsection 21.E.5. (This provision is
unchanged from the previous edition of the MJM.) That time standard was not met in this case.

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         United States v. Aline N. ANDERSON, No. 1477 (C.G.Ct.Crim.App. 2022)

constitutes a due process violation: “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3)
the appellant’s assertion of the right to timely review and appeal; and (4) prejudice.” Moreno,
63 M.J. at 135 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)). “No single factor is required
for finding a due process violation and the absence of a given factor will not prevent such a
finding.” Id. at 136. If we conclude there was a due process violation, we must grant relief unless
we are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless. United States v. Toohey,
63 M.J. 353, 363 (C.A.A.F. 2006).

       The record shows the following sequence of post-trial events:

       Date            Event                                                  Days elapsed

       30 Apr 21       Sentence adjudged                                               0
       18 May 21       Convening Authority signed                                     18
       24 May 21       Entry of Judgment                                              24
       9 Jun 21        Transcriptionist’s certification                               40
       23 Jun 21       Court reporter’s certification of ROT                          54
       6 Jul 21        Military Judge received ROT                                    67
       12 Jul 21       Military Judge’s verification                                  73
       16 Aug 21       Docketing at CGCCA                                            108

       The length of the delay—ninety days between the convening authority’s action and
docketing—favors Appellant, but there were many steps required and hence sound reasons for
delay under the restructured post-trial process of MJA 2016. Further, Appellant did not assert the
right to speedy post-trial processing until filing her appellate brief, which weighs against her.
Also, importantly, Appellant has provided no evidence of cognizable prejudice as a result of the
ninety days it took from convening authority’s action to docketing, and we discern none—
particularly in light of the case being docketed well within the overall timeframe of 150 days
envisioned by Moreno. Finally, there is little indication of dilatory processing or lack of
institutional diligence, and relief is not warranted under Article 66(d)(2), UCMJ and United
States v. Tardif, 57 M.J. 219 (C.A.A.F. 2002).

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            United States v. Aline N. ANDERSON, No. 1477 (C.G.Ct.Crim.App. 2022)

                                            Decision
       We determine that the findings and sentence are correct in law and fact and, on the basis
of the entire record, should be approved. Accordingly, the findings of guilty and the sentence are
affirmed.

                                                            For the Court,
                                                        VALDES.SARA Digitally   signed by
                                                                       VALDES.SARAH.P.15038
                                                        H.P.15038547 54704
                                                                       Date: 2022.04.11
                                                        04             10:43:21 -04'00'

                                                            Sarah P. Valdes
                                                            Clerk of the Court

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