Court Opinion

ID: 9844332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:00:59.168945+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:32.911466
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
joined by SILAK, J., concurring in Part I and dissenting in Part II:
I must respectfully dissent from Part II of the Court’s decision and judgment.
I first question the requirement that when an employee’s preexisting condition is aggravated by his or her employment to the extent that it becomes an occupational disease, he or she must prove that the aggravation stemmed from an “accident.” Neither Nycum v. Triangle Dairy Co., 109 Idaho 858, 712 P.2d 559 (1985), nor Carlson v. Batts, 69 Idaho 456, 207 P.2d 1023 (1949), stands for that precise proposition. In Carlson v. Batts, the employee suffered an injury, not an occupational disease. Likewise, the Commission found and this Court affirmed that the employee in Nycmn did not suffer an occupational disease. The inquiry in both cases, therefore, concerned the cause of the claimants’ injuries, and whether the claimants had carried their burden of proof as to an “accident.”
By defining occupational diseases as certain conditions that arise over a period of time, out of and in the course of employment and which can disable employees, the Worker’s Compensation Act distinguishes occupational diseases from accident-induced injuries. I.C. § 72-102(18)(b). This point is critical. An employee who, for the first time, is disabled by an occupational disease does not have to prove that an “accident” caused the disease or disablement. Today’s decision, however, eliminates the distinction between “injury” and “occupational disease” for those employees whose preexisting occupational diseases re-manifest themselves in the course of their employment. Those employees now must prove that the second manifestation of their occupational diseases was ag*134gravated by an “accident,” a burden which is illogical in the context of most occupational diseases and which therefore was expressly eliminated by the 1939 revisions to the Worker’s Compensation Act. See Nycum v. Triangle Dairy Co., 109 Idaho at 860, 712 P.2d at 561 (because the “courts were constantly straining the definition of ‘accident’ to permit compensation for diseases genuinely contracted as a result of employment ... the legislature, in 1939, amended the workmen’s compensation law to specifically provide a right to compensation for disablement resulting from occupational disease.”) (emphasis in original).
If, however, the Nycum requirement of an “accident” is indeed to be imposed on employees whose preexisting conditions have been aggravated to the point of occupational diseases, then this Court should interpret “accident” in a manner that is consistent with precedent and which accurately reflects the realities of the occupational diseases that arise out of and in the course of the modern, increasingly sedentary, work place.
Idaho Code § 72-102(15)(b) defines accident as “an unexpected, undesigned, and unlooked for mishap, or untoward event, connected with the industry in which it occurs, and which can be reasonably located as to time when and place where it occurred, causing an injury.” (emphasis added). In Wynn v. J.R. Simplot Co., 105 Idaho 102, 666 P.2d 629 (1983), this Court ruled in favor of a claimant whose spine had suffered “repetitive trauma.” Wynn, 105 Idaho at 104, 666 P.2d at 631. Similarly, this Court, in Brooks v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 117 Idaho 1066, 793 P.2d 1238 (1990), ruled that a series of minor stress fractures, which occurred over a period of several months in the claimant’s wrist, supported the Industrial Commission’s finding of an “accident.” Brooks, 117 Idaho at 1071, 793 P.2d at 1243.
Today, however, the Court holds that Nelson failed to carry her burden of an “accident,” even though the aggravation of her occupational disease of carpal tunnel syndrome occurred in substantially less time than did the aggravation in Brooks. I can discern no apparent reason for the different results between these eases, other than this Court’s concern that relying on Brooks will eventually obligate employers to compensate every ache and pain suffered by their employees.
The “slippery slope” argument is invalid here, however, because Nelson’s case presents only issues relating to the aggravation of carpal tunnel syndrome, a disease that by its nature is not induced by a specific “accident.” I submit that the Industrial Commission is well able to determine whether the repetitive motions performed by a claimant are “reasonably located” enough to constitute an “accident” for purposes of the aggravation of preexisting carpal tunnel syndrome, and that this Court should not second-guess such determinations unless they are unsupported by substantial and competent evidence. In the present case, substantial and competent evidence as to Nelson’s employment tasks supports the Commission’s finding.
Accordingly, I would affirm the Commission’s conclusion that Nelson is entitled to compensation for the aggravation of her carpal tunnel syndrome, which aggravation arose out of and in the course of her employment with Ponsness-Warren. I would also affirm the Commission’s award to Nelson of permanent partial impairment.