Court Opinion

ID: 9381603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-23 15:05:46.743139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:33.441495
License: Public Domain

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        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

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                                                  RENDERED: MARCH 23, 2023
                                                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                2021-SC-0548-MR

MACH SAR                                                              APPELLANT

                  ON APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
V.                   HONORABLE JOHN R. GRISE, JUDGE
                             NO. 20-CR-00409

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE

                   MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                     AFFIRMING

      After a three-day trial, a Warren County Circuit Court jury found Mach

Sar guilty of murder for stabbing Sam Phan twenty-seven times. The trial

court sentenced Sar to forty-five years in prison in accordance with the jury’s

recommendation. Sar raises two evidentiary issues on appeal. After careful

review, we affirm the trial court.

                     FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      In January 2020, Mach Sar and his fiancée, Stephanie Harris, moved

from Elkhart, Indiana to Bowling Green, Kentucky after learning of a possible

job opportunity. Sar, Harris, and their four children moved in with Sar’s sister

and her boyfriend but after Sar threatened his sister on their first night in the

home, his sister threw them out. Sar and Harris packed up their children and
moved into a two-bedroom trailer with his brother, Rackney “Ricky” Sean.

Sean lived in the trailer with his wife, Catherine, their two children, his niece,

his nephew, and Sar and Sean’s father. Sean and Catherine had a close friend,

Somrhut “Sam” Phan, who they considered family and stayed with them often.

      Sean testified that Sar seemed stressed about finances. The day before

Phan died, Harris and Sar went to the store and their debit card was rejected.

Sar was upset because his last paycheck from his employment in Indiana had

not been deposited. In the late evening hours of January 29 or early morning

hours of January 30, 2020, Sean returned home from work. The kids were

asleep and most of the adults were still awake. Sean played video games for a

few hours then watched some television. Both Sar and Phan were still up

when Sean went to bed around 4:00 a.m. About thirty minutes later, Sean

woke up to his wife Catherine screaming.

      Sean ran into the kitchen and saw Sar holding a long kitchen knife and

standing over Phan’s body. He then went to Phan to see if he could assist him.

Sean heard Sar saying that Phan was trying to steal Sar’s money and that

Phan tried to take a picture of Sar’s bank card. Sean heard Phan say, “it

hurts.” Sean did not call the police immediately. Instead, he led Catherine

back into their bedroom and found some pants and his phone. When he came

back out of the bedroom, Sar, Harris, and their four children were exiting the

trailer. Sean called 911 and continued to try to help Phan.

      Harris, Sar’s fiancée, also testified at trial and said that after Sean went

to bed Sar and Phan were picking on each other like brothers might do. At one

                                         2
point, Phan told Sar “you think you’re so smooth,” and Sar said something in

response but Harris could not determine what he said. Sar went to the kitchen

and returned with a knife. Harris testified that at that point, Sar did not seem

like himself. She described him as robotic and stated that he moved in a

trance like a zombie. Harris saw Sar stab Phan multiple times. She

unsuccessfully tried to pull Sar away from Phan when Sar said, “let’s go.” They

grabbed their children, exited the trailer, and drove away. As they were

leaving, Harris saw Catherine and heard her scream.

      After driving for approximately thirty minutes, Sar, Harris, and the

children stopped at a McDonald’s and Sar threw away his bloody shirt. During

the drive, Harris asked Sar what happened, and he responded that he stabbed

Phan over thirty times. Sar also mentioned that Phan had a photo of Sar’s

bank card, and he was worried that Phan had taken money from him. The

next day, the money Sar thought was missing from his last paycheck was

deposited onto the bank card.

      Catherine, Sean’s wife, testified that she was in bed asleep in the early

morning hours of January 30, 2020, when she was awoken by yelling in the

living room. When she heard a thud, she ran into the kitchen and saw Sar

standing over Phan, stabbing him at least twice. She screamed for Sar to stop

as she backed into the laundry room. Sean rushed out of the bedroom and

saw Phan on the floor. Catherine heard Sar telling Ricky repeatedly that Phan

took his money.

                                        3
      In addition to her testimony about the stabbing incident, Catherine was

also permitted to testify about an earlier conversation she had with Sar. Before

the stabbing, Sar and Phan left the trailer and were gone for several days. Sar

returned alone and Catherine asked Sar why Phan did not come back with

him. According to Catherine, Sar “jokingly said that [Phan] felt like he was

going to kill him, so he stayed wherever he was.” Catherine asked Sar why he

would say that, and Sar said, “he did not know” and “shrugged it off.”

Catherine continued: “And then not even twenty-four hours after the fact, he

literally killed him in my home.”

      Phan died on the scene before officers arrived. According to the medical

examiner, of the twenty-seven stab wounds only one was deemed fatal—a stab

wound in the torso that penetrated through Phan’s ribs and lower portion of

the right lung. Officer Ben Craig of the Bowling Green Police Department was

the first to arrive at the scene. Officer Tyler Norris arrived a few seconds after

Officer Craig. Officer Norris noticed a pool of blood above Phan’s head had

started clotting, which indicated that some time had passed since he was

stabbed. Officers Craig and Norris moved Sam a few feet to give them room to

provide medical aid. Portions of both Officers’ body camera footage was played

for the jury. Additionally, the lead investigator in the case, Detective Michael

Nade, testified that during his interview, Sar mentioned trying to stop a

masked man who actually killed Phan. But Detective Nade found no evidence

for another suspect besides Sar.

                                         4
       As the Commonwealth introduced photos of inside the trailer, defense

counsel objected to admitting closeup photos of Phan’s face, arguing the photos

were repetitive of the body camera footage. The Commonwealth agreed not to

admit those photos. Sar also objected to a five-second portion of Officer

Norris’s walk-through body camera footage that showed a closeup view of

Phan’s face and upper torso. The trial court overruled the objection,

concluding it was important for the jury to understand the positioning of the

people during the incident, especially Sar and Phan, and the layout of the

trailer.

       The jury found Sar guilty of murder and recommended a sentence of

forty-five years.1 The trial court followed the jury’s recommendation. Sar now

appeals as a matter of right. KY. CONST. § 110(2)(b).

                                     ANALYSIS

       I.    The trial court did not err in denying Sar’s motion to exclude
             a five-second clip contained in police body camera footage.

       During the police investigation, Office Tyler Norris performed a video

walk-through of Sean and Catherine’s trailer. This video contained a five-

second clip of a close-up of Phan’s face and upper torso. The Commonwealth

moved to introduce Norris’s walk-through video, explaining that it would help

put the crime scene photos in context and give the jury a better sense of the

space. Defense counsel responded that they did not have an issue with the

      1 Sar was also charged with tampering with physical evidence for disposing his

bloody clothing at McDonald’s. The trial court granted a directed verdict on that
charge because there was no evidence that the disposal occurred in Warren County,
Kentucky.
                                          5
video in general but objected to the five-second clip of Phan’s face and torso,

arguing that it was repetitive. The Commonwealth highlighted the fact that the

clip in question was only five seconds of a six-minute video and that the jury

would not be shocked by the clip since they were already aware of the nature of

Phan’s injuries from previous testimony.

      The trial court overruled Sar’s objection, determining that it was

important for the jury to understand the “relative positioning of the people,

especially the defendant and the victim in this case.” On appeal, Sar argues

that it was error to allow the jury to see this five-second clip and that the trial

court should have ordered the Commonwealth to redact that five-second clip

from the rest of the video.

      Generally, graphic or gruesome photos are admissible. Hall v.

Commonwealth, 468 S.W.3d 814, 822 (Ky. 2015). However, this general rule of

admissibility “‘loses considerable force when the condition of the body has been

materially altered by mutilation, autopsy, decomposition or other extraneous

causes, not related to the commission of the crime. . . .’” Id. at 823 (citation

omitted). These images are still subject to the balancing test of Kentucky Rule

of Evidence (KRE) 403, which provides that “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may

be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of

undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by

considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative

evidence.”

                                         6
      There are three fact-intensive inquiries that a trial court must undertake

when determining whether evidence is admissible under KRE 403. Hall, 468

S.W.3d at 823. The trial court must: (1) address the probative value of the

evidence; (2) assess the probability that the evidence will cause undue

prejudice; and (3) determine whether the probative value is substantially

outweighed by the undue prejudice. Id. We review a trial court’s evidentiary

determination for an abuse of discretion, Benjamin v. Commonwealth, 266

S.W.3d 775, 791 (Ky. 2008), reversing a trial court’s determination if it is

“arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”

Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999) (citations omitted).

      As the trial court explained, the video displayed the crime scene and

provided a more in-depth understanding of the layout of the trailer, allowing

the jury to mentally place Sar and Phan in appropriate positions as the

incident was described to them. Clearly, Phan’s appearance had likely not

been transformed by autopsy or decomposition, given that the video was taken

shortly after the crime. While the trailer and crime scene were depicted by the

admitted photographs, the video served an alternative, and probative, purpose.

      Further, any prejudicial effect of the five-second clip is an obvious result

of the nature of the crime itself. We must determine whether that prejudice

was “unnecessary and unreasonable.” Price v. Commonwealth, 31 S.W.3d 885,

888 (Ky. 2000). Sar argues that the five-second clip was unnecessary because

the Commonwealth already introduced twenty-five photos of the scene into

                                        7
evidence. Also, the Commonwealth already introduced body camera footage

from Office Craig’s walk-through of the scene.

      At trial, the Commonwealth produced a significant amount of evidence

demonstrating that Sar repeatedly stabbed Phan, including twenty-five photos

of the crime scene. But there was only one photo admitted that depicted

Phan’s head, so the video clip in question was only duplicative of one photo.

Five seconds of one six-minute video is not unduly duplicative of one photo out

of twenty-five photos. Additionally, the footage from Officer Craig’s body

camera depicted the scene before Phan was moved to render aid. The footage

from Officer Norris’s body camera contributed to providing a complete

understanding of what the officers saw upon arriving at the scene, attempting

to render aid to Phan, and assessing how to proceed with an investigation and

pursuit of the perpetrator. The perception of the crime scene gleaned from a

video is more comprehensive than any isolated photo. As a result, we cannot

say that the probative value was outweighed by any undue prejudice. Hall, 468

S.W.3d at 823.

      Recently, in Sutton v. Commonwealth, 627 S.W.3d 836, 854 (Ky. 2021),

the defendant sought to exclude a five-minute video of body camera footage

from admission at trial. The video was recorded by the first officer to arrive on

the scene of the crime, and half of the video showed the officer applying first

aid to the gunshot victim. Id. This Court reasoned that “[a] crime scene video

is admissible even if gruesome, and may represent a more accurate depiction of

the scene than testimony alone.” Id. at 855 (citations omitted).

                                        8
      In Sutton, the Court cited Hall, 468 S.W.3d at 820, a case in which the

Commonwealth introduced a ten-minute video depicting the crime scene and

forty-three crime scene and autopsy photos, twenty-eight of which were

admitted over the defendant’s objection. The Court concluded that the twenty-

eight photos admitted over the defendant’s objection were needlessly

cumulative when considering the danger of inflaming the jury. Id. at 826. The

Court described Hall as “the rare instance of an abuse of the trial court’s

discretion under Rule 403 in admitting gruesome photographs.” Id. at 827.

Sar’s case is readily distinguishable from Hall from a sheer volume

standpoint—twenty-eight disputed photos in Hall versus one five-second video

clip here. Further, the jury was not shown endless, repetitive images of

victim’s body like the jury was shown in Hall. Id. at 826.

      As with any depiction of a recently deceased person, the five-second clip

is gruesome. However, the jurors were already aware of the gruesome nature

of the crime and Phan’s injuries from previous testimony. In addition to

emotional testimony by Catherine and Harris describing how they watched Sar

stab Phan repeatedly, the jury heard Sean weeping over Phan’s body and

begging for help during the 911 call. Here, like in Sutton, the video provided

more detail about the layout of the trailer, where the altercation occurred, and

the position of the victim relative to the other individuals present during and

after the crime occurred. Even though the officers moved Phan to render first

aid, as indicated by marks on the floor, and Sar was not present when police

arrived, the visual video representation allowed jurors to better visualize the

                                        9
incident while considering the trial testimony. The video gave the jurors a

better sense of the space than the photos alone could provide.

       Sar also argues that the Commonwealth should have produced an

alternative to the five-second clip. “When ruling on the admissibility of a

gruesome photograph, the trial court should consider whether evidentiary

alternatives would sufficiently prove the fact at issue without a comparable risk

of prejudice.” Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 194 S.W.3d 258, 271 (Ky. 2006)

(citations omitted). But evidence “must be highly inflammatory and

prejudicial to compel a party to employ evidentiary alternatives.” Id.

(Emphasis added). In light of our conclusion that the five-second clip was not

highly inflammatory, the trial court did not err in failing to consider evidentiary

alternatives. Sar also argues that the trial court did not conduct a proper KRE

403 analysis. However, in reviewing the trial court’s ruling, we believe the trial

court conducted the proper analysis based on the parties’ arguments and

properly considered probative value, undue prejudice, and appropriately

weighed the two considerations.

      In sum, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in

admitting the five-second clip showing Phan’s face and upper torso. Sar

emphasizes that the five-second clip amounts to only 1.4% of the video in

question, and 150-600 of 10,800-43,200 frames if the video were converted to

still images, so he only requested that a minute fraction of the video be

excluded. The miniscule quality of the clip only underscores our determination

that the five-second clip could not have been unduly prejudicial. It certainly

                                        10
did not constitute the same volume and quality of photos that this Court

disapproved of in Hall. 468 S.W.3d at 827. Even if this Court were to find that

the five-second clip was erroneously admitted, it was unquestionably harmless

in light of the other evidence. In reviewing a non-constitutional evidentiary

error, if the reviewing court “can say with fair assurance that the judgment was

not substantially swayed by the error,” then it can be deemed harmless.

Winstead v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 678, 689 (Ky. 2009). There is simply

no substantial possibility that the jury was swayed by the five-second glimpse

of Phan’s head and upper torso.

      II.   The trial court did not err in overruling Sar’s objection to
            Catherine’s testimony.

      Sar also argues reversal is required given Catherine’s testimony that Sar

allegedly joked less than twenty-four hours before the stabbing that Phan felt

like Sar was going to kill him. The Commonwealth responds that the error is

unpreserved. We disagree.

      An objection as to the admission of evidence is preserved only if “a timely

objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of

objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context.” KRE

103(a)(1); see also Rule of Criminal Procedure 9.22. Here, the Commonwealth

asked Catherine if there had been any problems between Sar and Phan in the

days before the stabbing. Catherine answered that she was asleep when the

stabbing began and therefore did not know what happened immediately

beforehand. She then began to recount an incident less than twenty-four

hours before the shooting in which she asked Sar where Phan was after Sar
                                       11
returned from an extended absence without him. She testified that Sar

responded with a joking statement, at which point her testimony was

interrupted by a defense objection.

      A bench conference followed, and defense counsel contended Catherine’s

answer was not responsive to the Commonwealth’s question and the defense

did not know what was going to be said. The Commonwealth stated Catherine

was going to testify to a joking reference by Sar to killing Phan. The trial court

ruled that the answer was responsive to the Commonwealth’s question and

testimony resumed with Catherine telling the jury Sar had made such a

statement.

      We conclude, based on the context of that objection, that this claim of

error as to admission of the testimony is preserved. At the bench conference

defense counsel expressed concern they did not know what Catherine was

going to say. The pending question asked Catherine to identify issues between

Sar and Phan shortly before the crime, and in response Catherine had begun to

relate a story regarding Sar’s brief absence from the trailer with Phan followed

by Sar’s return without him. This context makes evident that one reason for

defense counsel’s concern about the testimony was that it might include

irrelevant matters occurring before the crime itself. Though the objection

certainly could have been stated more plainly, we nonetheless conclude based

on the context that it was sufficient to preserve the claim of error on grounds of

relevance.

                                        12
      As to the merits, Sar argues Catherine’s testimony regarding the

allegedly joking statement was irrelevant because Sar’s state of mind was not

at issue at trial. Sar contends the statement was also irrelevant because it

related not to Sar’s state of mind but rather only to Sar’s speculation regarding

Phan’s state of mind. Sar also maintains the statement was highly prejudicial

because it portrayed him as someone who jokes about killing. Finally, Sar

asserts the statement caused the jury to reject his extreme emotional

disturbance (EED) defense and thus requires reversal.

      KRE 401 defines relevant evidence as “evidence having any tendency to

make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of

the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the

evidence.” KRE 402 provides that while relevant evidence is admissible,

irrelevant evidence is not. And as noted above, KRE 403 permits the trial court

to exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed

by the danger of undue prejudice.” We review a trial court’s application of

these Rules for abuse of discretion. Love v. Commonwealth, 55 S.W.3d 816,

822 (Ky. 2001). We therefore find error only if the trial court’s ruling was

“arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”

English, 993 S.W.2d at 945.

      Here, we find no such error. First, Catherine’s testimony was relevant to

the core disputed issue in the case, Sar’s state of mind at the time of the

stabbing. The Commonwealth contended at trial that Sar intentionally killed

Phan and that he did not do so under EED. Sar asserted in contrast that he

                                        13
killed Phan under EED arising from a mistaken belief that Phan had stolen

money from him. Thus a central issue in the case was whether the killing

occurred under EED.

      Catherine’s testimony that Sar made a passing and seemingly joking

reference to killing Phan in the twenty-four hours before the crime occurred

bore materially on whether Sar killed Phan under EED. EED is defined as “‘a

temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome

one’s judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from the impelling force

of the extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil or malicious

purposes.’” Hargroves v. Commonwealth, 615 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2021) (quoting

McClellan v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464, 468-69 (Ky. 1986)). An EED

defense is applicable only where the occurrence giving rise to the defendant’s

conduct was “so dramatic as to render the mind temporarily uncontrollable

and provoke ‘an explosion of violence.’” Id. (quoting Luna v. Commonwealth,

460 S.W.3d 851, 883 (Ky. 2015)). Though the “triggering event does not have

to immediately precede a criminal act, it must be sudden and uninterrupted.”

Posey v. Commonwealth, 595 S.W.3d 81, 85 (Ky. 2019).

      Here, Catherine testified Sar made a brief and seemingly joking passing

reference to killing the victim hours before he actually did so. This suggested

killing Phan was already on Sar’s mind hours before the stabbing. The joking

nature of the statement also suggested that Sar contemplated killing Phan

during a period of mental calm rather than in an uncontrollable explosion of

violence. These facts thus made it less probable that Sar acted in response to

                                       14
a sudden and uninterrupted triggering event, i.e. that he acted under EED.

Indeed, as Sar himself explicitly notes in his briefing, the “statements led the

jury to reject the EED defense.” Catherine’s testimony was therefore directly

relevant to a central issue in the case.

      Second, prejudice resulting from the testimony did not substantially

outweigh its probative value. The testimony was certainly prejudicial given

that it depicted Sar making a seemingly joking reference to a killing he would

commit less than twenty-four hours later. However, it was also significantly

probative of a central issue in the case, whether Sar killed Phan under EED.

As such, we do not find that the testimony warrants reversal.

                                  CONCLUSION

      For the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm the judgment of the Warren

Circuit Court.

      All sitting. All concur.

                                           15
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Robert Chung-Hua Yang
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Jenny Lynn Sanders
Assistant Attorney General

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