Court Opinion

ID: 9846350
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:39:44.525571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:28.255399
License: Public Domain

*443Carley, Justice,
concurring specially.
I concur fully in Divisions 1 and 3, and in the affirmance of Parker’s convictions and sentences. In Division 2, the majority holds that, although the trial court erred by overruling an objection to a portion of the prosecuting attorney’s opening statement, the error was harmless. In my opinion, however, we do not need to reach the question of harm, because the challenged comments fall within the permissible scope of opening statements.
“The district attorney may make an opening statement prior to the introduction of evidence. This statement shall be limited to expected proof by legally admissible evidence.” Uniform Superior Court Rule 10.2. “[A] prosecutor’s opening statement must be confined to what he or she expects the evidence to prove at trial. [Cits.]” Hartry v. State, 270 Ga. 596, 598 (2) (512 SE2d 251) (1999). “Good faith is the general test in passing upon the preliminary statement of the [district attorney] to the jury as to what he expects to prove in a criminal case. [Cits.]” Daniels v. State, 58 Ga. App. 599, 605 (3) (199 SE 572) (1938).
Here, the contested portion of the opening statement informed the jury that the prosecuting attorney expected that Parker’s mother and sister would attempt to provide him with an alibi, but that the State intended to prove that, according to their pre-trial statements, they were unsure whether he was home on the day of the crimes. As the majority concedes, the prosecutor had a reasonable basis for believing that Parker would rely on his mother and sister as alibi witnesses. Thus, there is no question but that the comment was a good faith remark to the effect that the assistant district attorney expected to prove an inconsistency between any exculpatory testimony that Parker’s mother and sister might offer and their previous statements. As the trial developed, Parker did assert an alibi defense, but not by calling his mother or sister as witnesses on his behalf. Therefore, the prosecuting attorney never had occasion to introduce the inconsistent statements to which she referred in her opening statement. However, we have held that,
if defense counsel objects to a statement of the prosecutor, and if the trial court instructs the jury that the remarks of counsel in opening [statement] are of no probative value, no error is committed where it does not appear that the remarks of the prosecutor were otherwise than in good faith.
Cargill v. State, 255 Ga. 616, 636 (21) (a) (340 SE2d 891) (1986). See also Hartry v. State, supra at 598 (2). Such a cautionary charge was given by the trial court in this case. Thus, there clearly was no error here, because the prosecutor acted in good faith in apprising the jury *444of what she expected that the evidence would show, and the trial court properly instructed the jury that the opening statement was not evidence.
The majority cites United States v. Hall, 165 F3d 1095 (7th Cir. 1999), and states that “[w]e agree with the Hall court that it is inappropriate for a prosecutor in a criminal case to discuss in opening statement the evidence she anticipates the defense will present at trial.” Majority opinion, p. 441. However, I do not read that case as clear-cut authority for characterizing the comments in this case as inappropriate.
[W]e have serious doubts as to the appropriateness of a prosecutor commenting on potential alibi witnesses of a defendant .... In any event, whether it was improper for the prosecutor to comment on potential alibi witnesses under the facts of this case is an issue we need not reach in order to dispense with Hall’s appeal.... (Emphasis supplied.)
United States v. Hall, supra at 1115 (III). Moreover, even assuming that Hall supported the cited proposition, it still would not authorize a departure from the rule in Georgia that the scope of a prosecutor’s opening statement is limited only by his or her good faith expectation of what the admissible evidence will prove at trial.
In further support of its holding, the majority also cites one commentator’s observation that
“many courts . . . prohibit any mention of the other side’s anticipated evidence during the opening statement. The advocate is thus precluded from criticizing the anticipated proof of the other side or from discussing evidence that will be elicited during the cross-examination of adverse witnesses.” (Footnotes omitted.) Perrin, From O.J. to McVeigh: The Use of Argument in the Opening Statement, 48 Emory L.J. 107, 130-131 (1999).
Majority opinion, p. 440. What the majority fails to note, however, is that the same commentator is critical of those courts which impose that limitation on the scope of opening statements.
Criminal defendants lose the most under this application of the rule. Defendants in criminal cases who choose to invoke their Fifth Amendment rights and to simply attack the government’s case may be forbidden from making any opening statement at all because of their lack of affirmative proof. The rationale is superficially flawless: the analysis or criticism of the other side’s case constitutes [impermissible] *445argument because it goes beyond the mere presentation of the party’s own case. Yet, deeper reflection reveals the error in this analysis. A party may introduce its proof during direct or cross-examination, a distinction that should be irrelevant for purposes of the opening statement. . . . [RJecitation to the jury of evidence about the credibility of witnesses should not be excluded simply because it cannot be elicited until cross-examination. (Emphasis supplied in part and in original in part.)
Decided October 20, 2003 —
Reconsideration denied December 11, 2003.
Dwight L. Thomas, Caprice R. Jenerson, for appellant.
J Tom Morgan, District Attorney, Barbara B. Conroy, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Ruth M. Pawlak, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Perrin, supra at 131-132. Thus, notwithstanding the limit on opening statements imposed in “many courts,” the very authority cited by the majority supports Georgia’s more expansive rule whereby an attorney is entitled to comment on whatever he or she has a good faith reason to believe any of the evidence adduced at trial will show. Because it is clear that the prosecutor’s comment in this case is well within that broad scope of permissible opening statements, there was no error.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Sears and Justice Hines join in this special concurrence.