Court Opinion

ID: 9680072
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:18:45.538358+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:53.487063
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice LAMBERT
Dissenting In Part.
Appellant, Robert Terry, was convicted of five felony offenses and one misdemeanor offense for breaking into a tomb, disturbing human remains, and stealing objects interred with the remains. On appeal to this Court, he raised several claims of error, including claims of double jeopardy. Because I believe Appellant was convicted of multiple, functionally identical offenses for the same despicable act, I must conclude that some of his convictions violated his right to be free of double jeopardy.
On March 19, 2004, Johnny Logsdon, the Chief of Police of Booneville, drove through a local cemetery looking for truant children. While there, he discovered a casket lying outside of a small mausoleum that had been forced open. Chief Logsdon stopped to investigate, and found that the casket which contained the remains of Peggy Cornett had been opened and her body disturbed. It was determined that several items of jewelry that had been interred with the deceased were missing. One of the deceased’s hands and a finger from the other hand were also missing.
The ensuing police investigation quickly led to Appellant as a suspect. Two people who testified at trial told the police that Appellant had approached them about buying some jewelry he intended to take from a grave in the cemetery. The police recovered a necklace that had been entombed with the deceased from a pawnshop in Winchester. Appellant’s name was on the pawn ticket, and a security video from the pawn shop showed Appellant completing the transaction. The police obtained a search warrant for Appellant’s home where a watch, bracelet, and rings from the tomb were discovered. When the police arrested Appellant, he slipped the wedding band that had been taken from the tomb to his girlfriend, and she hid the ring while she was being questioned by police. The ring was later recovered.
In May 2004, Appellant, his girlfriend, and three others were indicted on four criminal counts: first-degree complicity in the desecration of venerated objects, complicity in violating a grave, complicity in theft by unlawful taking over $300, and complicity in the abuse of a corpse. Remarkably, the foreman of the grand jury that returned the indictments was Ova Cornett, Jr., the son of the deceased woman whose grave had been plundered.1
After the indictment, Mr. Cornett continued his involvement in the case. He sent the trial judge multiple letters that were included in the record. In one letter, he chastised the judge for releasing one of the co-defendants for surgery; in another, he asked that Appellant’s bond, which had been reduced from $50,000 cash to $20,000 cash, be increased. The trial judge eventually recused himself from the case, and a special judge was assigned to preside.
Mr. Cornett persisted with his involvement by filing a pro se motion asking for the removal of the prosecutor, alleging lax prosecution. The special judge assigned to the case heard argument from the attorneys about Mr. Cornett’s motions. The Commonwealth’s attorney decided to disqualify himself, thus rendering moot any discussion of the merits of the motion. However, the judge and attorneys discussed the propriety of the filings themselves, as Mr. Cornett was not a party to the proceeding and appeared to be attempting to practice law without a license. The judge barred Mr. Cornett from filing any further motions and stated that he *479would refer Mr. Cornett to the state bar for investigation.
The Commonwealth’s Attorney in neighboring Madison County, was assigned as the special prosecutor. He obtained a superseding indictment of Appellant. The superseding indictment alleged that Appellant was the actor in the criminal acts, rather than an accomplice, and two new felony charges of first-degree criminal mischief for the damage done to the mausoleum and to the casket were added. Though not relevant to the issues in the case, a subpoena issued prior to trial to Ova Cor-nett, Sr. (the widower of the deceased) by the special prosecutor was styled, “Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Robert (Bob) (The most inhuman that ever lived) Terry.”
Appellant was convicted of all six charges brought against him and punishment was recommended by the jury as follows: five years each on the two criminal mischief counts; eight years for the desecration of venerated objects count; five years for the violating a grave count; five years for the theft count; and twelve months and a $500 fine for the abuse of a corpse count. Appellant was sentenced to a total of twenty years, the maximum allowable sentence since the highest charge was a Class C felony. The court stated orally that it was holding the fine in abeyance for future levy, though such was not included in the judgment.
I. Double Jeopardy
Appellant makes multiple claims of double jeopardy violations. The specific double jeopardy question presented by Appellant requires an application of the Blockburger test: “The applicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.” Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). The Block-burger test is codified in Kentucky law at KRS 505.020.
A. First-Degree Criminal Mischief and Violating Graves
Criminal mischief in the first degree is denounced in KRS 512.020(1): “A person is guilty of criminal mischief in the first degree when, having no right to do so or any reasonable ground to believe that he has such right, he intentionally or wantonly defaces, destroys or damages any property causing pecuniary loss of $1,000 or more.” The basic element of the crime, indeed of all degrees of criminal mischief, is intentional or wanton damage to property.2 The statute makes no distinction among types or kinds of property. First-degree criminal mischief is a Class D felony. KRS 512.020(2).
Violating graves is denounced in KRS 525.115(1) and (2), as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of violating graves when he intentionally:
(a) Mutilates the graves, monuments, fences, shrubbery, ornaments, grounds, or buildings in or enclosing any cemetery or place of sepulture; or
(b) Violates the grave of any person by destroying, removing, or damaging *480the headstone or footstone, or the tomb over the enclosure protecting any grave; or
(c) Digs into or plows over or removes any ornament, shrubbery, or flower placed upon any grave or lot.
(2) The provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to ordinary maintenance and care of a cemetery nor the removal and relocation of graves pursuant to procedures authorized by and in accordance with applicable statutes.
This statute is specific in providing punishment for one who intentionally damages or destroys part of a grave, tomb, or cemetery.
These crimes, criminal mischief and violating graves, require the same basic element: intentional damage or destruction of property, but violating graves is specific to places of burial. It applies only where the damage is to certain types of property, namely, that related to burial grounds. Unlike criminal mischief which applies generally and provides for punishment according to pecuniary damage, violating graves is a Class D felony for every such violation without regard to value.
The fact that the two statutes essentially describe the same crime, and in this case, provide for the same punishment is an oddity in double jeopardy jurisprudence.3 In fact, it could be argued that a person who damages a grave simply does not commit criminal mischief and therefore could not be convicted of that crime. However, we have no doubt of the reason for the violating graves statute. The General Assembly believed that places of burial should be given specific protection and that the crime should be a felony without regard to pecuniary loss. From the statutory scheme I do not believe the General Assembly intended to punish the same act twice, and therefore must conclude that the more general conviction of criminal mischief must give way to the more specific. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has recognized that Block-burger is not all-encompassing; that it represents a default rule of law where legislative intent is not otherwise clear.4 In this case enactment of the violating graves statute manifests legislative intent with respect to punishment of the act. As Appellant was convicted of violating a grave, he cannot also be convicted of first-degree criminal mischief for damage to the mausoleum and of first-degree criminal mischief for damage to the casket.
*481B. Violating Graves and First-Degree Desecration of Venerated Objects
Our previous determination, however, does not resolve the entirety of Appellant’s conviction for violating graves. Appellant was also convicted of first-Degree Desecration of Venerated Objects. That statute, KRS 525.105(1) is as follows: “A person is guilty of desecration of venerated objects in the first degree when, other than authorized by law, he intentionally excavates or disinters human remains for the purpose of commercial sale or exploitation of the remains themselves or of objects buried contemporaneously with the remains.” This crime is a Class C felony. KRS 525.105(2). The elements of first-degree desecration of venerated objects are (1) excavation or disinterment of human remains, (2) where the disinterment or excavation is done for the purpose of commercial sale or exploitation of the remains or objects buried with the remains.
Though the elements of first-degree desecration of venerated objects (KRS 525.105) appear superficially different than the elements of violating a grave (KRS 525.115), the former includes the latter. The digging up or disinterment of human remains, as required for a violation of KRS 525.105 necessarily requires damaging or destroying a grave or tomb, the fundamental act required for a violation of KRS 525.115. First-degree desecration of a venerated object, the higher charge (a Class C felony), requires the added element of causing the damage for the purpose of commercial exploitation. Commission of an act that would constitute desecration of venerated objects would of necessity amount to violating graves. In a proper case, if the trier of fact was unconvinced that the purpose of the act was commercial exploitation, but believed the evidence of mutilation, guilt of violating graves would be an appropriate verdict. As such, violating graves is a lesser-included offense of first-degree desecration of venerated objects, and under the Blockburger test, a defendant cannot be convicted of both crimes for the same act.
A similar conclusion would follow with respect to criminal mischief. Conduct that would amount to desecration of venerated objects would also include conduct that would constitute ordinary criminal mischief, the difference being that desecration of venerated objects must include disturbance of a burial place and be for the purpose of commercial sale or exploitation.
C. First-Degree Desecration of Venerated Objects and Theft by Unlawful Taking
Theft by unlawful taking requires that a defendant “[tjake [or exercise] control over movable property of another with intent to deprive him thereof_” KRS 514.020. Appellant argues that objects buried with a body lose their character as property, as contemplated by the theft statute because KRS 525.105 converts the property into “venerated objects.” He also argues that a person cannot be convicted of desecration and theft of the same object. The first argument is simply incorrect, and the second is based on a misunderstanding of the act prohibited by the desecration statute.
The desecration statute does not alter the character of an object interred with a body, nor are such objects abandoned and rendered “there for the taking”, as Appellant implies. Objects interred with human remains belong to the estate of the decedent or to the decedent’s successor in interest, or perhaps to the original owner. Such objects are neither abandoned property, nor do they cease to be “property” within the purview of theft statutes.
*482The criminal act described by the desecration statute is excavation or disinterment of human remains with the intent to commercially exploit the remains or objects buried with them. Violation of this statute does not require that objects buried with the remains be destroyed, damaged, or taken. The crime is completed upon the excavation or disinterment with the requisite intent. Thereafter, the act of taking the human remains or objects buried with the remains constitutes the separate crime of theft by unlawful taking. Application of these statutes is analogous to the crimes of burglary and theft. The crime of burglary is complete upon unlawful entry accompanied by the intent to commit a crime. Theft of property or other criminal acts that occur thereafter may be separately prosecuted.5 Therefore, Appellant’s convictions for first-degree desecration of venerated objects and theft by unlawful taking do not violate double jeopardy principles.
As explained hereinabove, I believe Appellant’s convictions for two counts of criminal mischief and one count of violating graves were obtained in violation of double jeopardy principles. These convictions should be vacated and dismissed. Appellant’s convictions for desecration of venerated objects and theft by unlawful taking should be affirmed.
SCHRODER, J., joins this opinion dissenting in part.

. No issue was raised on appeal regarding this fact.

. The only difference between the three degrees of criminal mischief is the amount of damage to the property. First degree requires that the property damage equal a "pecuniary loss of $1,000 or more,” KRS 512.020; second-degree requires that the property damage equal a “pecuniary loss of $500 or more,” KRS 512.030; and third-degree has no pecuniary loss requirement.

. See Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 297, 116 S.Ct. 1241, 1245, 134 L.Ed.2d 419 (1996) (“[T]wo different statutes define the ‘same offense,' typically because one is a lesser included offense of the other.”).

. United States v. Patel, 370 F.3d 108, 114 (1st Cir.2004)("The limited effect of the Double Jeopardy Clause on multiple punishment claims derives from 'the principle that the power to define criminal offenses and prescribe punishments ... belongs solely to the legislature.’ As a result, if the legislature decides to impose multiple punishments for the same offense, it may do so. Thus, determining the permissibility of imposing multiple punishments for one course of conduct is a matter of discerning the legislature’s intent.
Often, however, this intent will not be apparent. In such cases, the Blockburger test is employed to determine whether the legislature intended to authorize multiple punishments. Under Blockburger. 'where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two (or more) distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two (or more) offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.’ It must be emphasized, however, that for multiple punishment claims, Blockburger merely provides a default rule of statutory construction and should be employed only in the absence of a clear indication of legislative intent. (Internal citations omitted.)”)

. Campbell v. Commonwealth, 732 S.W.2d 878 (Ky.1987).