Court Opinion

ID: 9951647
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-18 17:02:11.926867+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:41:53.801496
License: Public Domain

Slip Op. No. 24-33

          UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

               Plaintiff,
                                              Before: Stephen Alexander Vaden,
v.                                                            Judge

AEGIS SECURITY INSURANCE                      Court No. 1:20-cv-03628 (SAV)
COMPANY,

               Defendant.

                                   OPINION

[Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Plaintiff’s Motion
for Summary Judgment.]

                                                      Dated: March 18, 2024

Beverly A. Farrell, Senior Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of New York, NY, and Peter Mancuso, Trial
Attorney, for Plaintiff United States. With them on the briefs were Brian M.
Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Patricia M. McCarthy,
Director, Commercial Litigation Branch; Aimee Lee, Assistant Director, Commercial
Litigation Branch; Justin R. Miller, Attorney-In-Charge, International Trade Field
Office, of New York, NY; and Suzanna Hartzell-Ballard, Office of the Assistant
Chief Counsel, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, of Indianapolis, IN.

T. Randolph Ferguson, 1 Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A., of San Francisco, CA,
and Jeffrey M. Telep, King & Spalding LLP, of Washington, DC, for Defendant
Aegis Security Insurance Company.

Gilbert Lee Sandler, Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A., of Miami, FL, for Amicus
Curiae the Customs Surety Coalition and its individual members the International
Trade Surety Association; the National Association of Surety Bond Producers, Inc.;
the Surety & Fidelity Association of America; and the Customs Surety Association.

1 The Court notes with sadness that Mr. Ferguson passed away while this case was
pending.
Court No. 1:20-cv-03628 (SAV)                                              Page 2

With him on the brief were Robert B. Silverman and Peter W. Klestadt, Grunfeld,
Desiderio, Lebowitz, Silverman & Klestadt LLP, of New York, NY.

Michael J. Coursey, Paul C. Rosenthal, John M. Herrmann II, Jennifer E.
McCadney, and Cameron R. Argetsinger, Kelley Drye & Warren, LLP, of
Washington, DC; and Louis S. Mastriani, Adduci, Mastriani & Schaumberg, LLP, of
Washington, DC, on the brief for Amici Curiae Adee Honey Farms; American Honey
Producers Association; Bayou Land Seafood, LLC; Catahoula Crawfish, Inc.;
Christopher Ranch, LLC; L.K. Bowman Company; Sioux Honey Association; and
The Garlic Company.

      Vaden, Judge:       This saga involves a customs bond, a congressional

experiment, and Chinese garlic. For a short time, Congress allowed new shippers of

merchandise subject to antidumping or countervailing duties to post a bond instead

of a cash deposit while undergoing a new shipper review. Aegis Security Insurance

Company (Aegis) underwrote such a bond for a Chinese garlic importer. The entries

that the bond backed were deemed liquidated by operation of law in 2006.

Following liquidation, nothing happened for almost eight years.     United States

Customs and Border Protection (Customs) did not bill anyone for the unpaid duties,

and no one paid the duties. Customs eventually billed the importer in late 2014 and

then Aegis in early 2015.   The importer had long since disappeared; and Aegis

refused to pay, arguing Customs waited too long to demand payment.             The

Government then brought this action. Aegis is correct that the Government sat on

its rights for too long. Therefore, its Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED,

and the Government’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Court No. 1:20-cv-03628 (SAV)                                               Page 3

                                 BACKGROUND

      This case involves a congressional experiment gone awry. Normally, when an

importer enters goods subject to antidumping or countervailing duties, it gives

Customs a cash deposit representing the estimated duties owed. See 19 U.S.C. §

1673e(a)(3).   The retrospective duty system in the United States requires cash

deposits because the system only fixes the final amount owed after importation. See

19 C.F.R. § 351.212(a). If a party requests an administrative review of the relevant

antidumping or countervailing duty order to establish a new rate, then the

liquidation or final assessment of duties occurs at the new rate established by the

review — which can take years. Id. If no party requests an administrative review,

Customs assesses duties at the rate from the most recent review or, if there has not

been a review, the rate applicable at the time of entry. Id. When an importer owes

additional fees or duties after a review, Customs must manually liquidate the

entries at the higher rate and notify the importer of the liquidation. See 19 U.S.C.

§§ 1500(c)–(e), 1505(b). If Customs fails to timely liquidate an entry within the

statutorily defined time, then the entry is deemed liquidated by operation of law at

the value estimated at entry — even if that value is wrong. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(a)(1).

In cases of deemed liquidation, the statute does not require notice of liquidation

because the cash deposits taken on entry cover the amount owed. Id.

      This case did not follow the normal order because Congress briefly decided to

allow new shippers of goods subject to antidumping or countervailing duties to post
Court No. 1:20-cv-03628 (SAV)                                                Page 4

bonds instead of cash deposits while undergoing a new shipper review.         See 19

U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(B)(iii) (1994); 19 C.F.R. § 351.214(e) (1997) (allowing “at the

option of the importer, the posting, until the completion of the review, of a bond or

security in lieu of a cash deposit”).     New shippers — shippers who were not

exporting subject merchandise when the current duty rate was set — can petition

the U.S. Department of Commerce (Commerce) for a separate and individualized

tariff rate.    See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(B).    In 1997, Commerce promulgated

regulations to implement the bond program for new shippers.         See 19 C.F.R. §

351.214 (1997). Congress later had second thoughts about its experiment because

the bond program allowed exporters to evade paying their duties by making large

entries under bonds and then disappearing without paying the duties owed. See

Regulations to Improve Administration and Enforcement of Antidumping and

Countervailing Duty Laws, 86 Fed. Reg. 52,300, 52,301 n.11 (Dep’t of Com. Sept. 20,

2021).    It eliminated the bond option for new shippers.    Trade Facilitation and

Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-125, § 433, 130 Stat. 122, 171

(2016).

         Aegis issued the bond here in 2002, during the failed experiment. Pl.’s Am.

Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (Pl.’s Facts) ¶ 1, ECF No. 76; Def.’s

Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (Def.’s Facts) ¶ 10, ECF No. 77. Aegis

underwrote the bond as part of a bond program organized by Kingsway Financial

Services, Inc. (Kingsway). Def.’s Facts ¶ 2, ECF No. 77. Kingsway approached
Court No. 1:20-cv-03628 (SAV)                                               Page 5

Aegis to underwrite the bond program because Aegis had the necessary regulatory

authorizations.   Id. ¶¶ 2–3.   One of Kingsway’s subsidiaries — Avalon Risk

Management, Inc. (Avalon) — administered the bond program. Id. Kingsway and

Aegis designed the program to protect Aegis from any risk through a reinsurance

contract with another Kingsway subsidiary, Lincoln General Insurance Company

(Lincoln General). Id. ¶ 6. Lincoln General eventually had financial difficulties,

and Aegis’ reinsurance contracts were dissolved in 2009 after an insurance rating

agency downgraded Lincoln General.       Id. ¶ 7.   Lincoln General liquidated in

November 2015 but paid claims up until that point. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. Following the

liquidation, Aegis sued Kingsway and reached a settlement that gave Aegis a one-

time payment and covered a portion of future losses and legal costs for the bonds

Lincoln General insured. Id. ¶ 8; see Settlement Agreement, Def.’s Ex. 14, ECF No.

77.

      On October 24, 2002, Aegis underwrote a continuous bond — one bond

securing multiple entries — for Linyi Sanshan Import & Export Company (Linyi).

Pl.’s Facts ¶ 1, ECF No. 76; Def.’s Facts ¶ 10, ECF No. 77. The bond was effective

from October 26, 2002, until October 25, 2004, and covered entries of Chinese garlic

that were subject to antidumping duties. Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 4–6, ECF No. 76; Def.’s

Facts ¶¶ 11–13, ECF No. 77. The bond incorporated by reference 19 C.F.R. § 113.62

and made Aegis jointly and severally liable to “[p]ay, as demanded by [Customs], all

additional duties, taxes, and charges subsequently found due, legally fixed, and
Court No. 1:20-cv-03628 (SAV)                                                Page 6

imposed on any entry secured by this bond” up to the $50,000 “limit of liability” on

the bond. 19 C.F.R. § 113.62; Am. Compl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 66; Second Am. Answer ¶ 8,

ECF No. 71; Pl.’s Ex. 1, ECF No. 76 (original bond listing § 113.62 as the regulation

“in which conditions [are] codified”).

        Between January 16 and February 11, 2004, Linyi made ten entries of fresh

garlic from China, all subject to antidumping duties. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 5, ECF No. 76;

Def.’s Facts ¶ 14, ECF No. 77. Linyi applied to Commerce’s new shipper program

and posted bonds instead of cash deposits when it entered the garlic. See Fresh

Garlic from the People’s Republic of China, 68 Fed. Reg. 40,242 (Dep’t of Com. July

7, 2003) (notice of Linyi’s new shipper review). In addition to Aegis’ continuous

bond, Linyi obtained single transaction bonds for each entry from Hartford, a

different surety. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 9, ECF No. 76; Def.’s Facts ¶¶ 13–14, ECF No. 77. In

July 2004, Avalon noticed problems with Linyi and requested financial documents

and a signed indemnity agreement from Linyi before renewing Linyi’s bond. Def.’s

Facts ¶ 12, ECF No. 77. When Linyi failed to respond by October 2004, Avalon did

not renew the bond, allowing it to terminate on October 25, 2004. Id.         Linyi’s

behavior was consistent with that of other importers who used new shipper reviews

and bonds to evade duties.        See Regulations to Improve Administration and

Enforcement of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, 86 Fed. Reg. at 52,301

n.11.
Court No. 1:20-cv-03628 (SAV)                                                  Page 7

      In November 2004, certain petitioners requested an administrative review of

the relevant antidumping duty order, including a request that Commerce review

Linyi’s entries. See Pl.’s Am. Mot. Summ. J. (Pl.’s Mot.) at 4 n.3, ECF No. 76; Def.’s

Am. Mot. Summ. J. (Def.’s Mot.) at 6–7, ECF No. 77. This caused Commerce to

suspend liquidation of Linyi’s entries until the end of the review. See Pl.’s Facts ¶

14, ECF No. 76; Def.’s Facts ¶¶ 14–16, ECF No. 77. The petitioners later withdrew

their request regarding Linyi’s entries.     Def.’s Facts ¶¶ 15–16, ECF No. 77.

Commerce rescinded its review of the Linyi entries on May 4, 2006, and lifted the

suspension of liquidation. Id. When Customs failed to liquidate Linyi’s entries

within six months after Commerce lifted the suspension, the entries were deemed

liquidated by operation of law on November 4, 2006, at the estimated amount of

duty Linyi gave at entry. Am. Compl. ¶ 17, ECF No. 66; Second Am. Answer ¶ 17,

ECF No. 71; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (“Any entry … not liquidated by [Customs]

within 6 months … shall be treated as having been liquidated at the rate of duty,

value, quantity, and amount of duty asserted by the importer of record[.]”).

      For nearly eight years after the deemed liquidation, nothing happened. See

Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 12–15, ECF No. 76.       Customs claims that, although notice was

published in the Federal Register, it only learned of the liquidation in July 2014

because Commerce did not follow its normal practice of sending liquidation

instructions to Customs after Commerce lifted the suspension of liquidation. Third

Oral Arg. Tr. at 37:19–22, ECF No. 128; see also Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 12–15, ECF No. 76;
Court No. 1:20-cv-03628 (SAV)                                                  Page 8

Def.’s Facts ¶ 18, ECF No. 77.      Customs first billed Linyi for eight entries on

October 3, 2014, and then for the remaining two on October 31. 2 Pl.’s Facts ¶ 15,

ECF No. 76; Def.’s Facts ¶ 19, ECF No. 77. When Linyi failed to pay, Customs

billed the sureties for the bonds that secured Linyi’s entries — both Aegis and

Hartford. See Pl.’s Facts ¶¶ 19–20, 24–25, ECF No. 76; Def.’s Facts ¶¶ 19–21, 24–

26, ECF No. 77. Customs first billed Aegis on January 7, 2015. 3 Pl.’s Facts ¶ 20,

ECF No. 76; Def.’s Facts ¶ 24, ECF No. 77. Aegis refused to pay and filed protests

with Customs alleging that the applicable statute of limitations had run. Pl.’s Facts

¶¶ 32, 34, ECF No. 76; Def.’s Facts ¶ 24, ECF No. 77. Customs denied Aegis’

protests. Pl.’s Mot. at 11–12, ECF No. 76; Def.’s Facts ¶ 24, ECF No. 77.

                               The Present Dispute

      This case has a long and winding procedural history. It began on October 2,

2020, when the Government filed its initial Complaint. Compl., ECF No. 3. The

Court first held oral argument in July 2021. ECF No. 47. After the first oral

argument, the Court granted the parties’ subsequent Motion to conduct additional

discovery. See Disc. Order, ECF No. 62. The Court held a second oral argument in

April 2023.   ECF No. 97.     After the second oral argument, the Court ordered

supplemental briefing.    Minute Order, ECF No. 96.        During the supplemental

briefing period, another Judge of this Court decided a similar case, United States v.

2 The Government admits the bills it sent Linyi were incorrect because of an error by
Customs. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 16, ECF No. 76.
3 The Government also admits this bill was incorrect. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 21, ECF No. 76. The

Government now seeks to collect the correct amount. Id. ¶ 22.
Court No. 1:20-cv-03628 (SAV)                                                Page 9

American Home Assurance Company, 47 CIT __, 653 F. Supp. 3d 1277 (2023). The

Court ordered additional briefing to address this new authority. See Minute Order,

ECF No. 111. Finally, the Court held a third oral argument in November 2023.

ECF No. 123.

      After multiple rounds of briefing and oral argument, much of this case is

undisputed. The parties agree that the Government and Aegis contracted for Aegis

to secure Linyi’s garlic entries with a continuous bond. See Pl.’s Facts ¶ 1, ECF No.

76; Def.’s Facts ¶ 10, ECF No. 77. They agree that Linyi failed to pay the duties for

its entries. See Pl.’s Facts ¶ 19, ECF No. 76; Def.’s Facts ¶ 21, ECF No. 77. They

agree that Aegis at one point was obligated to pay those outstanding duties. See

generally Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 76; see also Def.’s Mot. at 1, ECF No. 77. The only

dispute is whether Aegis is still obligated to pay. Compare Pl.’s Mot. at 9, ECF No.

76 (“Aegis is liable for the unpaid duties[.]”), with Def.’s Mot. at 12, ECF No. 77

(“Aegis … cannot be held to account for such a stale claim.”).

      Aegis makes three main arguments for why it is no longer obligated to pay.

First, the statute of limitations passed. See Def.’s Mot. at 12, ECF No. 77. Second,

even if the statute of limitations had not run, Customs violated an implied

contractual requirement in the bond that demand for payment occur in a reasonable

amount of time. Def.’s Supp. Br. at 27, 29, ECF No. 104. Third, Customs’ actions

constitute impairment of suretyship. Def.’s Mot. at 35, ECF No. 77.
Court No. 1:20-cv-03628 (SAV)                                                 Page 10

      Two statutes establish the time limit for the Government to recover on a

customs bond: 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) and 19 U.S.C. § 1505(b). Section 2415(a) puts a

six-year statute of limitations on Government actions for “money damages …

founded upon any contract[.]”     The parties agree § 2415(a) applies to the bond

contract here. See Pl.’s Mot. at 18, ECF No. 76; Def.’s Mot. at 12, ECF No. 77.

Section 1505(b) defines when the Government’s cause of action to sue on a customs

bond accrues and the six-year statute of limitations starts to run. It states, “Duties,

fees, and interest determined to be due upon liquidation or reliquidation are due 30

days after issuance of the bill for such payment.” 19 U.S.C. § 1505(b).

      The Government argues that, under § 1505(b), the statute of limitations

period does not start to run until the Government sends a bill. See Pl.’s Reply at 19,

ECF No. 89. The Government points to the phrase “are due 30 days after issuance

of the bill” as the primary support for its assertion. See id. at 18–19; 19 U.S.C. §

1505(b). The Government also cites an amendment to § 1505(b) that changed the

statute to its current form. See Pl.’s Reply at 18, ECF No. 89. Previously, the

statute provided that duties became due “15 days after the date of … liquidation.”

19 U.S.C. § 1505(c) (1992). According to the Government, the change to “30 days

after issuance of the bill” altered the statute’s meaning; it previously set the due

date based on liquidation but now sets it based on the billing date. See Pl.’s Reply

at 18–19, ECF No. 89. At oral argument, the Government claimed the two relevant

statutes provide no limit on how long it can wait to bill a surety. See First Oral Arg.
Court No. 1:20-cv-03628 (SAV)                                                  Page 11

Tr. at 97:1–8, ECF No. 49 (Government counsel agreeing that the Government

could wait fifty years before sending a bill without offending statute of limitations).

      Aegis argues § 1505(b) does not make duties due only after billing. See Def.’s

Mot. at 18, ECF No. 77 (“Section 1505(b) does not mandate that the United States’

claims accrue upon demand by Customs.”).         According to Aegis, the entire duty

collection scheme centers on liquidation. See First Oral Arg. Tr. at 87:10–11, ECF

No. 49 (“Everything keys off liquidation or reliquidation.”).           This focus on

liquidation means duties come due on the liquidation date. See Def.’s Mot. at 18–

20, ECF No. 77.      Aegis emphasizes the first portion of § 1505(b), “[d]uties …

determined to be due upon liquidation,” and argues that this portion of the statute

describes when duties are due, not the later portion of § 1505(b) stating duties “are

due 30 days after issuance of the bill.” See id. at 20–21.

      Aegis also makes two primary arguments for why it should prevail even if the

statute of limitations only starts running on demand. First, Aegis argues the bond

contract contained an implied reasonable time requirement. Def.’s Supp. Br. at 27,

29, ECF No. 104.      Second, Aegis argues the Government’s actions constituted

impairment of suretyship.     Id. at 3.   The third oral argument and the parties’

supplemental briefing focused on these two issues.

      According to Aegis, in contracts where one party can unilaterally delay the

statute-of-limitations period by not making a demand, there is an implied

reasonable time requirement. Id. at 29. This implied contractual term dictates that
Court No. 1:20-cv-03628 (SAV)                                               Page 12

demand must be made within a reasonable time. Id. Such a requirement imposes a

limit on the Government’s ability to collect from Aegis independent of the statute of

limitations.    Aegis argues a reasonable time requirement exists here, and the

Government violated that requirement by waiting too long to make demand. See

id.; Third Oral Arg. Tr. at 34:17–18, ECF No. 128 (“[T]here is nothing reasonable

about the delay that took place.”).

       The Government conceded at oral argument that the reasonableness

requirement exists and applies here. See Third Oral Arg. Tr. at 57:16–20, ECF No.

128 (The Court:      “So just to clarify, the Government does not dispute that the

implied reasonableness contractual term applies to it. Its dispute is what the time

period we’re looking at [is] to determine whether it is reasonable.” Ms. Farrell:

“Right.”).     It instead argues the delay here was reasonable because Customs

promptly billed Aegis after it learned from Commerce that Linyi’s entries were

deemed liquidated by operation of law years earlier. See id. at 44:21–45:18. This

approach would have the Court examine the reasonableness of Customs’ actions

only, ignoring any portion of the delay attributable to Commerce. See id. Aegis

responds that the Court should examine the delay attributable to the Government

regardless of which agency contributed to it. See id. at 68:18–69:3. Under this

approach, Aegis argues that the delay was unreasonable. Id. at 34:17–18.

       Aegis also raises the impairment of suretyship defense. Def.’s Supp. Br. at 3,

ECF No. 104.       Impairment of suretyship occurs when the party protected by a
Court No. 1:20-cv-03628 (SAV)                                                 Page 13

suretyship contract unilaterally increases the surety’s risk.       See Restatement

(Third) of Suretyship & Guaranty § 37 (Am. L. Inst. 1996); United States v. Great

Am. Ins. Co. of NY, 738 F.3d 1320, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2013). When this happens, the

surety is excused from any further obligations under the contract. See Restatement

(Third) of Suretyship & Guaranty § 37; Great Am. Ins., 738 F.3d at 1332. Aegis

claims it agreed to the bond contract with an expectation — grounded in Customs’

prior practice — that the six-year statute of limitations begins to run on liquidation.

Def.’s Supp. Br. at 3, ECF No. 104. By bringing suit in this case more than six

years after the deemed liquidation, Aegis argues Customs unilaterally modified the

contract in a way that increased Aegis’ risk. Id. at 7.

      Aegis raised several additional arguments at various points during this case

but now emphasizes the above-discussed arguments. Aegis’ additional arguments

include a laches claim and a claim that the Government unlawfully reliquidated the

entries at issue. See, e.g., Def.’s Mot. at 28, 36, ECF No. 77. These arguments are

unconvincing, and the Court need not address them further to decide this case.

                JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

      The Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1582(2), which gives the Court

exclusive jurisdiction over actions by the United States “to recover upon a bond

relating to the importation of merchandise required by the laws of the United

States or by the Secretary of the Treasury[.]” The parties filed cross-motions for

summary judgment under USCIT Rule 56. See Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 76; Def.’s Mot.,
Court No. 1:20-cv-03628 (SAV)                                                 Page 14

ECF No. 77. Summary judgment “shall be granted if the movant shows that there

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” USCIT Rule 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of

showing no genuine issue of material fact exists. See, e.g., id.; Adickes v. S.H. Kress

& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). To determine whether a genuine issue of material

fact exists, the Court reviews evidence submitted and draws all inferences against

the moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 587 (1986). At summary judgment, “the judge’s function is not himself to

weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether

there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

249 (1986); see also Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 157 F.3d 849, 854 (Fed. Cir.

1998).

                                   DISCUSSION

         This case began as a case about the statute of limitations.     It ends as a

contract law case. Although this case involves antidumping duties, the Government

seeks to recover under its contract with Aegis. That contract contains a demand

requirement, which in turn contains an implied reasonable time requirement. The

requirement dictates that the Government must make a demand within a

reasonable time. The Government made no demand for more than eight years and

presents no good reason for the delay. Accordingly, the Government breached the

contract and cannot now recover under it even though the Government filed suit
Court No. 1:20-cv-03628 (SAV)                                                  Page 15

within the statute of limitations. 4 Aegis’ impairment of suretyship claim, however,

fails.

                             I.    The Statutory Scheme

         The Government has multiple methods for recovering unpaid duties. It can

sue under 28 U.S.C. § 1582(3) to recover from an importer or under § 1582(2) to

recover on a bond. There is no statute of limitations for § 1582(3) actions against an

importer. United States v. E.G. Plastics, Inc., 45 CIT __, 494 F. Supp. 3d 1361, 1363

(2021) (“No statute of limitations exists for an importer’s liability for duties

assessed on entered merchandise.”). If Linyi ever reappears, no matter how far in

the future, the Government can recover.         Here, however, the Government sued

Aegis to “recover upon a bond” under 28 U.S.C. § 1582(2). Am. Compl. ¶ 2, ECF No.

66.      A bond is a contract, and 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) sets a six-year statute of

limitations for any “action for money damages brought by the United States …

which is founded upon any contract[.]”

         The parties agree that § 2415(a)’s six-year statute of limitations applies, and

they agree the six years began to run whenever payment was due. See Pl.’s Mot. at

18, ECF No. 76; Def.’s Mot. at 12, ECF No. 77. 19 U.S.C. § 1505(b) governs when

payment was due.        However, the parties disagree on § 1505(b)’s interpretation.

Compare Pl.’s Reply at 9–10, ECF No. 89 (“[T]he Government’s cause of action could

not, and did not, accrue until the bill issued to Aegis went unpaid for 30 days.”),

4 The Government made no argument it is entitled to recover under a quantum meruit or

other similar theory.
Court No. 1:20-cv-03628 (SAV)                                                Page 16

with Def.’s Mot. at 18, ECF No. 77 (“[A]ccrual began at liquidation, not at sending of

a bill.”). According to Aegis, payment was due immediately on liquidation, which

started the six-year statute of limitations.   See Def.’s Mot. at 18, ECF No. 77.

According to the Government, payment was not due until the Government made a

demand by sending a bill. See Pl.’s Reply at 9–10, ECF No. 89. Section 1505(b)’s

text and history show the Government is correct.

      The Court begins, as always, with the text. See Van Buren v. United States,

141 S. Ct. 1648, 1654 (2021) (“[W]e start where we always do: with the text of the

statute.”). Section 1505(b) reads:

             The Customs Service shall collect any increased or
             additional duties and fees due, together with interest
             thereon, or refund any excess moneys deposited, together
             with interest thereon, as determined on a liquidation or
             reliquidation. Duties, fees, and interest determined to be
             due upon liquidation or reliquidation are due 30 days
             after issuance of the bill for such payment. Refunds of
             excess moneys deposited, together with interest thereon,
             shall be paid within 30 days of liquidation or
             reliquidation.
19 U.S.C. § 1505(b). The critical language states that duties “are due 30 days after

issuance of the bill[.]” Id. (emphasis added). The plain text of the statute links the

time duties become due with the billing date, not the liquidation date. The earlier

phrase “determined to be due upon liquidation” does not change this. That phrase

merely acknowledges that liquidation is when the amount of duty due is fixed. Like

a credit card bill or utility bill, where the amount due is established on purchase

and the customer is given a later date by which to pay, the duties described here are
Court No. 1:20-cv-03628 (SAV)                                                   Page 17

not due immediately when they are established. Instead, they are due later —

thirty days after the bill is issued. 5 The next sentence of § 1505(b) proves Congress

can link a due date to liquidation when it wishes. Congress requires that refunds

“be paid within 30 days of liquidation or reliquidation.” Id. That Congress did not

use similar language in the preceding sentence shows that the liquidation date is

not the date duties are due.

      The statute’s history further supports this reading.              Section 1505(b)

previously set when import duties became due using the liquidation date. Before

changes made in the NAFTA Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, § 642, 107

Stat. 2057, 2205 (1993), what is now § 1505(b) read “duties determined to be due

upon liquidation … shall be due 15 days after the date of that liquidation.” 19

U.S.C. § 1505(c) (1992) (emphasis added). Under this prior version, there was a

definite due date based on the liquidation date. Now, however, § 1505(b) reads

“[d]uties … are due 30 days after issuance of the bill for such payment.” 19 U.S.C. §

1505(b) (emphasis added). When Congress amends a statute, courts must assume

the amendment changes the statute’s meaning. Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397

(1995) (“When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its

amendment to have real and substantial effect.”); see also GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v.

United States, 678 F.3d 1308, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“a statute cannot be

interpreted in a manner that would ‘negate[] its recent revision’”) (quoting Rumsfeld

5 The Court’s statutory interpretation, but not its ultimate result, differs from American

Home Assurance. See 47 CIT __, 653 F. Supp. 3d at 1290, n.20.
Court No. 1:20-cv-03628 (SAV)                                               Page 18

v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 57–58 (2006) (alteration in

original)). This principle of statutory interpretation dictates that the amendment to

§ 1505(b) must mean something, and there is only one thing it can mean. Section

1505(b) once meant what Aegis claims it does, but no longer.

      Read together, 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a) and 19 U.S.C. § 1505(b) set a six-year

statute of limitations from the billing date. The Government first billed Linyi on

October 3, 2014. Pl.’s Facts ¶ 15, ECF No. 76; Def.’s Facts ¶ 19, ECF No. 77. The

Government filed its initial complaint on October 2, 2020. First Compl., ECF No. 3.

This suit was therefore timely whether the statute of limitations began to run when

the Government billed Linyi or when it billed Aegis.

                                II.   The Contract

      Regardless of the statute of limitations, contract law limits how long the

Government can wait before making a demand.             Contracts with a demand

requirement — like the one here — contain an implied reasonable time requirement

for making demand.       There was an approximately eight-year delay between

liquidation and demand for which the Government offers no good excuse. That

delay was unreasonable and a breach of contract.          Because the Government

breached the bond contract, it cannot now recover under that contract.

      The bond here incorporated by reference 19 C.F.R. § 113.62, which requires

sureties to “[p]ay, as demanded by [Customs], all additional duties, taxes, and

charges subsequently found due, legally fixed, and imposed on any entry secured by
Court No. 1:20-cv-03628 (SAV)                                                Page 19

this bond.”   See Pl.’s Ex. 1, ECF No. 76 (original bond listing § 113.62 as the

regulation “in which conditions [are] codified”). The parties agree this language is a

demand requirement, meaning Aegis had no obligation to pay until Customs made a

demand.   See Third Oral Arg. Tr. at 26:14–19, ECF No. 128 (counsel for Aegis

acknowledging the bond contains a demand requirement); Pl.’s Sur-reply Br. at 5,

ECF No. 113 (describing § 113.62 as a demand requirement).

      Contracts with a demand requirement and no express limitation on the time

for demand contain an implied reasonable time requirement: The party required to

make demand must do so within a reasonable time. See Nyhus v. Travel Mgmt.

Corp., 466 F.2d 440, 452–53 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“a party is not at liberty to stave off

operation of the statute [of limitations] inordinately by failing to make demand” and

“the time for demand is ordinarily a reasonable time”); United States v. Vanornum,

912 F.2d 1023, 1027 n.5 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing Nyhus); United States v. Gottlieb, 948

F.2d 1128, 1130–31 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Vanornum and Nyhus); United States v.

Gordon, 78 F.3d 781, 787 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[I]f a contract does not expressly limit a

party’s time to perform, courts routinely require performance within a reasonable

time.”); see also United States v. First City Cap. Corp., 53 F.3d 112, 115 (5th Cir.

1995) (applying Texas law and stating that “demand … must be made within a

reasonable time” for contracts with a demand requirement). The reasonable time

requirement is an implied contractual term, not an equitable defense.         United
Court No. 1:20-cv-03628 (SAV)                                                 Page 20

States v. Garan, 12 F.3d 858, 860 (9th Cir. 1993) (distinguishing the reasonable

time requirement from the equitable defense of laches).

      The requirement also protects the contracting parties’ expectations.         See

Nyhus, 466 F.2d at 452–53.      Without it, one party could indefinitely delay the

statute of limitations.   Id.; see also First Oral Arg. Tr. at 97:1–8, ECF No. 49

(Government counsel agreeing that the Government could wait fifty years before

making demand without offending the statute of limitations). The requirement is

especially important in adhesion contracts — like customs bonds — where the

parties have no opportunity to negotiate a time limit for demand. See Third Oral

Arg. Tr. at 20:5–7, ECF No. 128 (Government counsel acknowledging that bond

contracts are not “individually negotiated”).

      The Government concedes that the implied reasonable time requirement

applies against the United States here. See id. at 57:16–20. Implied contractual

duties — like other ordinary principles of contract law — apply when the United

States contracts with private parties. See Mobil Oil Expl. & Producing Se., Inc. v.

United States, 530 U.S. 604, 607–08 (2000) (“When the United States enters into

contract relations, its rights and duties therein are governed generally by the law

applicable to contracts between private individuals.”) (quoting United States v.

Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 895 (1996) (plurality opinion)); see also Precision Pine

& Timber, Inc. v. United States, 596 F.3d 817, 828 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The United

States, no less than any other party, is subject to [the implied duty of good faith and
Court No. 1:20-cv-03628 (SAV)                                                Page 21

fair dealing].”) (citing First Nationwide Bank v. United States, 431 F.3d 1342, 1349

(Fed. Cir. 2005)); Sunrez Corp. v. United States, 157 Fed. Cl. 640, 661 (2022) (“[T]he

government’s failure to fulfil [the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing] would

constitute breach of contract[.]”). Multiple appellate courts acknowledge that the

reasonable time requirement applies against the United States. See, e.g., Garan, 12

F.3d at 860 (stating the reasonable time requirement applies against the United

States even though laches does not); Gordon, 78 F.3d at 786–87; Vanornum, 912

F.2d at 1027 n.5; First City Cap., 53 F.3d at 116.

      There is no bright-line rule for what constitutes a reasonable time to make

demand. Some sources suggest a reasonable time equals the relevant statute of

limitations. See, e.g., Gordon, 78 F.3d at 786 (“[A] delay … that does not exceed the

applicable limitations period is ordinarily regarded as reasonable.”).     That rule,

however, is not universally recognized and may have fallen out of favor. Compare

3A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 643, at 75 (1960) (although some courts

measure reasonableness using the statute of limitations, there “seems to be slight

reason” to do so), with 8 Timothy Murray, Corbin on Contracts § 31.4 (Matthew

Bender 2024) (modern version of Corbin on Contracts omitting any reference to

measuring reasonableness using the statute of limitations). Other sources suggest

reasonableness depends on the parties’ expectations. See, e.g., Nyhus, 466 F.2d at

453 (reasonableness is “a matter of the parties’ expectations”). A reasonable time
Court No. 1:20-cv-03628 (SAV)                                               Page 22

should allow the parties sufficient opportunity to negotiate before litigation. See

United States v. Dos Cabezas Corp., 995 F.2d 1486, 1491 (9th Cir. 1993).

      Regardless of how one measures reasonableness, the delay here was

unreasonable. The relevant entries were deemed liquidated by operation of law on

November 4, 2006. Am. Compl. ¶ 17, ECF No. 66; Second Am. Answer ¶ 17, ECF

No. 71. Customs did not bill Aegis until January 7, 2015 — more than eight years

later. See Pl.’s Facts ¶ 20, ECF No. 76; Def.’s Facts ¶ 24, ECF No. 77. Eight years

is more than the applicable six-year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a). The

Government has only one claim for why an eight-year delay was reasonable. It

argues that Customs acted within a reasonable time to bill Aegis once Customs

learned from Commerce in July 2014 that the relevant entries were deemed

liquidated years earlier. See Third Oral Arg. Tr. at 44:21–45:18, ECF No. 128. The

Government does not claim it was negotiating a settlement with Aegis or offer any

other justification beyond Commerce’s neglect to excuse the delay.         When the

Government haled Aegis into court, it did so as “the United States of America.” Am.

Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 66. Commerce and Customs are both part of one executive

branch. See generally U.S. Const. art. II. The question is not whether Commerce or

Customs as individual agencies unreasonably delayed making demand; the question

is whether the Government collectively did.
Court No. 1:20-cv-03628 (SAV)                                                Page 23

       The particular facts here constitute an unreasonable delay by any standard.

Because the Government unreasonably delayed making demand for more than eight

years, it breached the bond contract and cannot now recover under that contract.

                         III.   Impairment of Suretyship

       In addition to its contractual defense, Aegis raises as its primary alternative

argument the affirmative defense of impairment of suretyship. Despite finding for

Aegis on its contractual argument, the Court addresses this claim to facilitate

appellate review. To succeed in its impairment of suretyship defense, Aegis must

show that the United States “fundamentally alter[ed] the risks imposed” on Aegis

under the bond. Restatement (Third) of Suretyship & Guaranty § 37. Aegis bears

the burden of proving this defense. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 41

CIT __, 254 F. Supp. 3d 1333, 1365 (2017). Aegis must show it suffered a material

increase in risk. Great Am. Ins., 738 F.3d at 1332 (requiring the surety to show the

Government’s actions “materially modified the contract … by substantially

increasing its risk”); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. United States, 10 CIT 589, 602 (1986)

(“[T]he question is whether [the Government’s actions] materially increased the

surety’s risk[.]”).

       Even were it possible to view the facts in the light most favorable to Aegis,

Aegis cannot show that it suffered a material increase in risk. But see Matsushita

Elec. Indus., 475 U.S. at 587 (requiring all inferences to be drawn against the

moving party). Aegis argues the delay in demand impaired its ability to recover
Court No. 1:20-cv-03628 (SAV)                                                     Page 24

from its reinsurer, Lincoln General. 6 See Pl.’s Mot. at 36, ECF No. 77 (“By the time

Customs billed the importer … [Lincoln General] was in liquidation.”). But Lincoln

General was still paying claims until at least November 2015, almost a year after

Customs first billed Aegis. See Def.’s Facts ¶ 7, ECF No. 77. Counsel for Aegis

admitted at oral argument that, had Aegis made a timely claim before November

2015, Lincoln General would have paid its claim in full. See Third Oral Arg. Tr. at

63:11–16, ECF No. 128. Insurance companies like Aegis routinely enforce notice

requirements on policyholders. See, e.g., Aegis Sec. Ins. Co. v. Hiers, 211 Ga. App.

639, 440 S.E.2d 71, 72 (1994) (Aegis denying coverage because a policyholder failed

to give timely notice). If policyholders across the nation are expected to make a

timely claim with their insurers, so too is Aegis.        Aegis’ alternative affirmative

defense of impairment of suretyship therefore fails.

                                     CONCLUSION

       When the Government enters a contract, it is not immune from the ordinary

rules of contract law. The Government chose to contract with Aegis, and the parties

agree that their contract contained a demand requirement. They also agree that

the contract contained an implied reasonable time requirement that limited the

Government’s time to make demand. The Government waited nearly a decade to

6 To the extent Aegis also argues the delay impaired its ability to recover from Linyi, this

argument fails, too. Linyi disappeared by fall 2004, more than a year before the deemed
liquidation of the entries. See Def.’s Facts ¶ 12, ECF No. 77 (describing Linyi’s failure to
respond to inquiries about its bond). The undisputed facts show Aegis could not have
recovered from Linyi, even if Customs billed immediately on the deemed liquidation.