Court Opinion

ID: 9682174
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:06:38.753127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:37.940419
License: Public Domain

WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because this decision produces an absurd result. The speedy trial claim as a matter of law lacks merit under all the standards set out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). The application of Commonwealth v. Hicks, Ky., 869 S.W.2d 35 (1994), will certainly come as a surprise to counsel because neither side considered Hicks, supra, in its briefs or oral presentations to this Court. The defendant will undoubtedly be smiling because he has received more relief than he could possibly imagine.
In his dissent in Hicks, supra, Justice Spain notes that the language of the rule itself begins by excepting from its effect a dismissal not intended by the court to operate as a final adjudication on the merits. I believe we have such a situation here.
My review of the record indicates that there is no clear and unambiguous ruling by the trial judge on the denial of a speedy trial claim. It would appear more sound to interpret the record to the effect that the trial judge actually passed on the issue.
The first postponement of trial was at the defendant’s request. The second postponement was caused by a conflict in the trial calendar of the court. The third postponement was as a result of an unavailability of witnesses. These delays were not caused by the prosecution. One of the continuances was at the request of the defendant. Consequently, the reasons justifying the delay support a denial of a speedy trial motion pursuant to Barker.
A review of the facts is helpful. In December of 1991, Taber and an associate broke a window of a building occupied by a business. Once inside, they took money, flashlights, blank checks and a .9 mm. pistol. The pair later forged and cashed several of the checks. Taber was indicted on February 3, 1992 on nine charges: first-degree burglary, felony theft by unlawful taking, five counts of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree, third-degree criminal mischief and first-degree PFO, based on two prior burglary convictions.
On April 3,1992, Taber obtained a continuance to undergo a mental evaluation, claiming that he was influenced by drugs and had no recollection of the crime. The trial date was set for April 20 and continued to September 22, 1992. The September date was again continued to November 6 due to a scheduling conflict with a murder case. On October 1, Taber moved to dismiss the indictment claiming a speedy trial violation. This motion was denied and a trial date of November 6 was set. On November 2, the prosecutor sought a continuance because material witnesses could not be present. The investigating officers were scheduled to be out of the state and the codefendant had absconded from probation. The trial judge dismissed the indictment.
The facts indicate that the missing prosecution witnesses were located and on January 4, 1993, the grand jury reindicted the defendant on the same charges. On February 22, 1993, the defendant moved to dismiss these charges on the basis of a violation of speedy trial provisions. The trial judge denied the motion. Thereafter, the defendant entered into an agreement for a conditional guilty plea pursuant to RCr 8.09 with the prosecution to change his plea to guilty in exchange for the dismissal of the persistent felony offender charge, amendment of the burglary charge from first to third degree and recommended sentencing totalling eight *466years with the prosecution taking no position on probation. The trial court accepted such a plea.
The defendant has never argued any prejudice from the trial delays. The hypertech-nical approach used by the majority produces a bizarre result which reverses the conviction and dismisses the indictment so as to release the defendant.
GRAVES, J., joins this dissent.