Court Opinion

ID: 9665709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:55:27.29891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:18.131241
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). I dissent because a sentence of 14 years and 11 months to 15 years — a minimum sentence 99% of the maximum — is not an indeterminate sentence.
1 do not quarrel with my colleagues’ thesis that Haggitt and the defendants in the companion cases,1 all of whom were convicted of assaultive crimes, belong in jail. Nor is there any disagreement on my part with their strictures about plea bargaining; my thoughts about plea bargaining have already been set forth at considerable length.2
Nor is there any disagreement regarding the maximum term for which Haggitt and the other defendants should be jailed — the maximum term is established by law.
The question is whether a sentencing judge may fix a minimum sentence so close to the maximum that the parole board is prevented from releasing the offender on parole short of service of the maximum sentence provided by law. Our disagreement, then, does not center around the decision to incarcerate the offender — that decision has, indeed, been confided to the sentencing judge alone. At issue is the release decision — the harmonization of the judge’s power to establish a minimum sentence and the parole board’s power to release an offender on parole before the maximum term has been served.
The source of the sentencing power exercised by a sentencing judge is legislation, not inherent judicial power.3 In People v. Cummings (1891), 88 *106Mich 249, the Michigan Supreme Court declared unconstitutional an indeterminate sentencing law on several grounds, including that the act vested judicial power in the board of control of prisons established under the act.4 To meet the constitutional objection, the Legislature submitted to the people, and the people by their vote adopted, an amendment to thé 1850 Constitution authorizing the Legislature to provide by law for indeterminate sentencing.5
Now the ultimate source of the power to sentence is the mandate from the people and its implementing legislative expression. That mandate of the people and the subsequent legislative expressions divide the power to confine offenders between the judiciary and the correctional authorities. The power of both, derived as it is from the same source, is equal in time and equal in right. If the allocations of power and function are to be workable, they must be accommodated to each other; neither authority should be allowed to invade the function of the other, nor, in deference or respect for the other, abdicate its own responsibility.
Manifestly, a sentence where both the minimum and maximum are for the same term of years is not an indeterminate sentence. And the Michigan Supreme Court has so held. See In re Cummins (1904), 138 Mich 39, 40; similarly, see People v. Westbrook (1952), 411 Ill 301 (103 NE2d 494, 29 ALR2d 1341); Sanders v. State (1923), 19 Ala App 367 (97 So 294); State v. Moore (1952), 21 NJ Super 419 (91 A2d 342, 347); In re Collins (1915), 51 Mont 215 (152 P 40).
*107The policy and the spirit of the indeterminate sentencing law require more than a mere nod of literal or technical compliance on the part of the judiciary. A sentence of one month less than the maximum is hut a nod, a gesture — more form than substance. It converts “the sharply drawn legislative distinction between definite and indeterminate sentences into an empty formula of words.” People v. Westbrook, supra, p 303.
Courts in other jurisdictions faced with identical minimum and maximum sentences have expressed well the reasons why a determinate sentence — and the sentence here on appeal is substantially a determinate sentence — violates the concept of indeterminate sentencing.
“If such a sentence as here imposed were permitted, it would quite conceivably tend to thwart the legislative intendment of the parole system and remove the prisoner from the supervision of the Parole Board during that time which [sic] he is released upon parole and under surveillance until the expiration of time equivalent to the maximum prison term. In effect, it would shorten that period of supervision by the board in those cases where a prisoner is released by commutation of sentence and completely eliminate that supervision in cases where no commutation is earned and directs the prisoner’s discharge at the expiration of the minimum term. Whatever powers of persuasion toward rehabilitation of the prisoner the board may have during the period of parole would be seriously reduced or entirely eliminated and the benefits thereof lost to the prisoner and to society. This, we feel, is contrary to the very nature and intent of the parole system and its design and purpose.” (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Moore, supra, p 428.
“The conception of the Legislature, as indicated by the use of the term ‘indeterminate,’ was that the *108minimum and maximum terms fixed should be so adjusted as to allow a substantial period of time to intervene during which the application for parole might be made, and the governor and board of prison commissioners might determine its merits by inquiry touching the conduct of the applicant, in order to ascertain whether or not he has exhibited a disposition to reform, and hence is entitled to invoke the discretionary power lodged in them. This being manifestly the end sought to be accomplished, it is mandatory upon the courts to enforce the statute in every case, according to its spirit. It is not to the purpose to say that the provision does not prohibit the fixing of the minimum and maximum so that both will expire on the same date, because they may, in the nature of things, approach each other until the difference disappears. This view is not in accord with the spirit of the provision, and would defeat effectually the purpose had in view by the Legislature.” (Emphasis supplied.) In re Collins, supra, p 218.
The Michigan Supreme Court has expressed much the same view of our indeterminate sentencing law. In holding that a sentencing judge has no control over a statutorily-prescribed maximum sentence, the Court reasoned that otherwise “the trial judge, by prescribing a very low maximum, may totally deprive the governor, pardon board, and board of control of the opportunity to exercise the discretion which the statute intended to give them. If it does, then the trial judge, in cases where he can fix the minimum — as in larceny — may, by increasing the minimum and reducing the maximum, make a determinate sentence, and thus frustrate the legislative purpose in enacting the indeterminate sentence law”. (Emphasis supplied.) In re Campbell (1904), 138 Mich 597, 599.
*109The word “indeterminate” is rooted in the Constitution. The purpose of the people to override the judicial protectionism of judicial power (People v. Cummings, supra) and the implementation of that purpose by the enactment of the indeterminate sentencing law would be reduced to an ineffectual caricature if a sentence of 99% of the statutory maximum is held to be an indeterminate, rather than a determinate, sentence.
I have great confidence in the wisdom, compassion, and steadfastness of trial judges. Less than 9% of the sentences for serious felonies (statutory maximum sentences between 5 and 20 years) exceed 1/2 of the maximum and less than 6% exceed 2/3 of the maximum.6
But, however noble may be the purpose of the sentencing judge, it is clearly the legislative purpose, in implementation of the intent of the people, that the sentencing judge’s at-time-of-sentence view of the offender be subject to reappraisal by the parole board some time short of service of the maximum term. That intention and purpose should not be thwarted by an overzealous exercise of the sentencing power which excludes the parole board from making such a reappraisal or which reserves to the judiciary a veto of the parole board’s determination —a veto which is exercisable, as has been the sentencing power, unguided and unrestrained by any objectifiable criteria and which, under present practice, is unreviewable by any other man, tribunal, or court.
*110A minimum sentence set so close to the maximum that there is little or no difference between the minimum and the maximum sentences undermines the function of the correctional authorities by preventing them from offering the convicted felon the prospect of release on parole before service of his maximum sentence as an inducement to his rehabilitation and also prevents supervision by the correctional authorities of his readjustment to society during his parole.7
Since good time reduces the length of the sentence and counts against the discharge date, the period between the good-time release date and the last day of the statutory maximum term is not a period during which the offender is on parole subject to supervision by the correctional authorities.8
The correctional authorities have access to the same pre-sentence report that the judge sees before sentencing. Additionally, they have an opportunity to observe the convicted felon during a long period of confinement. They, too, are men of high purpose, training and experience, and they, too, are concerned with the needs of society. A judge is not justified *111in prejudging the date of release to the point of depriving the correctional authorities of the power to release the convicted person short of service of his maximum sentence unless the sentencing judge or his successor in his sole and unreviewable discretion chooses to accept the parole board’s decision that an earlier release on parole is desirable. It is against that view that I write, against the mortification of the indeterminate sentencing law resulting from the imposition of excessive “mortmain” minimum sentences.
The parole board might very well share the sentencing judge’s view that a convicted person should remain in prison for the maximum statutory term less good time. The point, however, is that if the parole board disagrees with the sentencing judge it should be able to do something about it — to release him on parole some time short of the maximum sentence.
Although it is generally said that a trial judge’s exercise of his sentencing discretion, if within statutory limits, is not reviewable, there are exceptions. Judicial discretion may, my colleagues and I agree, be abused, and it may be abdicated, supra (majority opinion, p 101).
It merely begs the question now presented to say that an exercise of “discretion” within “statutory limits” is not reviewable. If, as I am convinced, a sentence only one month short of the maximum is not an indeterminate sentence, then such a sentence exceeds the statutory limit — it exceeds the bounds of constitutionally and statutorily permissible exercise of discretion.
In other jurisdictions appellate courts “have for many years construed the power to ‘reverse, affirm or modify,’ a criminal judgment as including the power to review the merits of a sentence.” See *112American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences, commentary-accompanying § 1.1, pp 14, 15, listing, as among such States, Arkansas, Idaho, Oklahoma, New Jersey, and Wisconsin.
In an early case the Michigan Supreme Court asserted and exercised such a reviewing function and reduced a heavy sentence for “abuse of discretion.” People v. Murray (1888), 72 Mich 10, 17.
It does seem anomalous that as to this and to no other aspect of the administration of justice, appellate courts shun their traditional role of providing relief from an abuse of discretion and correcting error. There is a clear trend of opinion in favor of appellate review of sentencing. See American Bar Association, supra.
In no case has the Michigan Supreme Court approved a sentence one month short of the statutory maximum. The declarations by the Court on review-ability of sentences are in cases distinguishable from this case.9 In neither Guillett (see fn 9) nor any other case did the Court consider whether the sentence violated the spirit or policy of the indeterminate sentencing law. In this connection it is not without significance that from 1927 until the estab*113lishment of our Court in 1965 a writ of error to review a criminal court conviction did not issue as a matter of course. Criminal convictions were reviewed only on leave granted by tbe Supreme Court or a justice of the Court.10 Eelatively few criminal convictions were reviewed, the Supreme Court being heavily burdened with its compulsory civil appeals jurisdiction.* 11 Efforts to cast upon the Supreme Court this additional appellate burden as a matter of right of the convicted person were turned aside by the Supreme Court itself.12 Plainly the Court had no time to discharge both its obligatory civil appellate responsibilities and, additionally, take on the review of sentences.
It is beyond the scope of this opinion, to draw a precise line between an indeterminate and determinate sentence. The American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, in its report on Standards Eelating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures, has declared:
“In order to preserve the principle of indeterminacy, the court should not be authorized to impose a minimum sentence which exceeds one-third of the maximum sentence actually imposed.” (Standard 3.2 [c] [iii], p 142.)
The commentary accompanying the standard states that (p 158), “this percentage is representative of the provision now in effect in many states”.
Our Court does not enjoy superintending or supervisory control over the general practices of the trial courts as does the Supreme Court. We are *114limited to reviewing for particular errors in actual cases and controversies.13 There is no need to draw a precise line in order to decide this case or the companion cases. It is enough to say that a sentence of one month short of the maximum sentence is not an indeterminate sentence within the meaning of that term as used in the constitution or the governing statute. It is for the Supreme Court to say where, if at all, the line shall be drawn.

 People v. Jordan (1971), 33 Mich App 15: People v. Pollard (1971), 33 Mich App 114.

 People v. Byrd (1968), 12 Mich App 186, 196 et seq. (Levin, J., concurring); People v. Hollman (1968), 12 Mich App 231, 236, et seq. (Levin, J., dissenting); People v. Earegood (1968), 12 Mich App 256, reversed in People v. Earegood (1970), 383 Mich 82.

 See In re Callahan (1957), 348 Mich 77, 80.

 See In re Southard (1941), 298 Mich 75, 79.

 “The legislature may, by law, provide for the indeterminate sentences, so-called, as a punishment for crime, on conviction thereof, and for the detention and release of persons imprisoned or detained on said sentences.” Const 1850, art IV, § 47, added by PA 1901 JB No 11, ratified at the November election, 1901; reprinted in 1 MCLA 305 and 1 MSA 212.
This provision was continued without substantive change in Const 1908, art V, § 28, and Const 1963, art IV, § 45.

 The figures are based only on felonies not punishable by a mandatory life sentence (first-degree murder) or a sentence for “life or any term of years” (e.g., seeond-degre murder, MCLA § 750.317 [Stat Ann 1954 Eev § 28.549]; rape MCLA § 750/520 [Stat Ann 1954 Eev § 28.788];; armed robbery, MCLA § 750.529 [Stat Ann 1954 Eev § 28.797]). The figures are for 1969 commitments from all courts and are taken from Table B la, Criminal Statistics, 1969, State of Michigan, Department of Corrections.

 “An indeterminate sentence law is not a new thing; men and women interested in sociology have for a long time endeavored to enact into law provisions that should be an incentive to lawbreakers, who have been convicted of crime, to reform and become good citizens.” In re Manaca (1906), 146 Mich 697, 701.
“The design of the indeterminate sentence law is to reform criminals and to convert bad citizens into good citizens, and thus protect society. In order to accomplish this result, the theory is that, when the prisoner has shown by his conduct that he may turn from his criminal career, he should have an opportunity, under favorable circumstances, to make the test.” People v. Cook (1907), 147 Mich 127, 132.

 Also, the statutory provisions (MCLA §§ 769.10-769.12 [Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1082-§ 28.1084]), referred to by the majority, concerning the sentencing of habitual offenders, are not applicable unless the defendant is charged and convicted as a habitual offender. In re Wall (1951), 330 Mich 430, 434; People v. Hatt (1970), 384 Mich 302, 307, et seq. Neither Haggitt nor the defendants in the companion cases were so charged.

 In the ease of In re Leonard (1904), 137 Mich 457, the Court merely held that a sentence of 10 to 15 years is “valid”. In People v. Dumas (1910), 161 Mich 45, 50, the Court reviewed the circumstances and concluded that it did not appear that the sentence was unwise “much less does it appear shocking”. Clearly, those statements are entirely consistent with a review for abuse of discretion. In People v. Allen (1941), 299 Mich 242, 249, the Court refused to review a sentence of 15 to 40 years. In People v. Costanza (1943), 306 Mich 415, 419, the Court refused to review a sentence of 4 to 20 years. In People v. Connor (1957), 348 Mich 456, 463, the Court refused to review a sentence of 8 to 15 years. In People v. Krum (1965), 374 Mich 356, the sentence was 30 days. In People v. Guillett (1955), 342 Mich 1, 9, the Court, in dictum, after reviewing the facts, said that a sentence of 7-1/2 to 10 years would not be reviewed.

 PA 1907, No 175, part X, § 3; CL 1948, § 770.3.

 CL 1948, § 650.1 (Stat Ann § 27.2591).

 See People v. Stanley (1956), 344 Mich 530, holding unconstitutional PA 1954, No 53, which amended CL 1948, § 650.1 (Stat Ann § 27.2591) to grant an appeal as of right in a criminal ease where the defendant’s personal liberty was involved.

 Morcom v. Recorder’s Court Judges (1968), 15 Mich App 358, 360; Wayne Circuit Judges v. Wayne County (1969), 15 Mich App 713, 730.