Court Opinion

ID: 9581558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:16:15.755046+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:03.936294
License: Public Domain

Undercofler, Justice.
This appeal is from a judgment rendered by the trial court in a contested divorce case. Held:
1. The appellant husband contends that the trial court having tried the contested divorce case upon the facts without a jury was required by Code Ann. § 81A-152 (a) to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. Ga. L. 1969, pp. 645, 646; 1970, pp. 170, 171.
The failure of the trial judge to make findings of fact and conclusions of law does not in this case affect the result reached and, therefore, if error, it was harmless.
2. The appellant husband contends that the trial court erred in granting a divorce on the ground of cruel treatment because the evidence is insufficient to show the wilful infliction of pairi bodily or mentally upon the wife by the husband such as to reasonably justify apprehension by the wife of danger of life, limb or health. We do not agree with this contention. We have carefully reviewed the evidence in this case and it is sufficient to support the verdict.
3. The judgment provided that the defendant should pay child support in the amount of $25 per week until the child reached the age of 18 years, married or became self-supporting. As additional child support, the judgment provided that the father "shall transfer title to the following described real estate, to a trustee for the use, benefit, education and support of the child.”
The appellant contends that the additional child support is void for uncertainty because it orders title to certain property to be transferred to a trustee and fails to name a trustee, the powers of said trustee, the duration of said trust, and the disposition of the trust property when and if the trust terminates. "A divorce court can not award any part of the father’s property to his children.” 24 AmJur2d 949, § 837. "He is not required to settle an estate upon them.” Clark v. Clark, 228 Ga. 838, 840 (188 SE2d 487). However, under the provisions of Code § 30-207, the father is responsible for the support of his minor children and this may include providing for their education. Fitts v. Fitts, 231 Ga. 528; Bateman v. Bateman, 224 Ga. 20 (159 SE2d 387); and Moody v. Moody, 224 Ga. 13 (159 SE2d 394).
(a) The appellant here contends that the trust in this case is void for uncertainty because it does not name a trustee or enumerate his powers. There is no merit in this contention. In Wallace v. *684Graves, 229 Ga. 82 (189 SE2d 447) this court held that a trust shall never fail for want of a trustee and that a court of equity has jurisdiction and power to appoint a trustee for trust property and decree title in him.
Submitted January 4, 1974
Decided February 7, 1974.
Wright, Walther & Morgan, Robert S. Walther, for appellant.
Harl C. Duffey, Jr., Robert J. Evans, for appellee.
(b)The contention that the trust is void for uncertainty because it fails to state the duration of the trust is without merit. The trust was provided as additional child support and the previous provision of the decree stated that the $25 per week child support would continue until the child reached the age of 18 years, married or became self-supporting. Construing this trust provision with the other child support provision, we conclude that the trust property is to be used for the "use, benefit, education and support of the child” until he becomes 18 years of age.
(c) A trust for children during their minority established out of the husband’s estate by decree of court in a divorce and alimony suit is not void for uncertainty because it does not provide for the disposition of the corpus when the trust terminates. The . court has no authority to give the trust corpus to the children after they have reached majority and the uses have terminated. Therefore, by implication, the trust corpus here reverts to the husband. Code § 108-106 (4). See Kiser v. Ga. Power Co., 126 Ga. App. 551 (191 SE2d 311).

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Gunter and Ingram, JJ, who dissent from the ruling made in Division 1 and who concur specially in the ruling made in Division 3.