Court Opinion

ID: 9951002
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 15:17:23.979025+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:00.403763
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                             No. 125,488

              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                         STATE OF KANSAS,
                                             Appellee,

                                                    v.

                                 DUSTIN STOUGHTON SULLIVAN,
                                          Appellant.

                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appeal from Barton District Court; CAREY L. HIPP, judge. Submitted without oral argument.
Opinion filed March 15, 2024. Sentence vacated and case remanded with directions.

       Adam D. Stolte, of Stolte Law, LLC, of Overland Park, for appellant.

       Ryan J. Ott, assistant solicitor general, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, for appellee.

Before ISHERWOOD, P.J., GREEN and PICKERING, JJ.

       ISHERWOOD, J.: Dustin Stoughton Sullivan was charged with possession of
methamphetamine with intent to distribute at least 3.5 grams but less than 100 grams of
methamphetamine and, in a separate case, faced charges for possession with intent to
distribute at least 1 gram but less than 3.5 grams of methamphetamine, alongside a charge
for failing to possess the required tax stamp. The cases were consolidated for trial and the
jury returned a guilty verdict for each offense. At sentencing, the district court assigned
Sullivan's full criminal history score to the primary offense in each case and imposed the
mitigated term from the applicable grid box for each offense. Sullivan appeals and
suggests the district court committed two errors that call the validity of his sentence into

                                                    1
question: (1) its failure to inquire and appoint new counsel when Sullivan expressed
dissatisfaction with his attorney at the conclusion of his sentencing hearing, and (2) its
application of Sullivan's full criminal history score to both primary offenses in his two
consolidated cases. Following a thorough review of the record and controlling legal
principles we find the court had no duty to inquire further into Sullivan's postsentencing
complaint but did err in applying Sullivan's full criminal history to both of his
consolidated cases. Accordingly, we vacate Sullivan's sentence and remand his case for
resentencing.

                        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       In late 2019, Great Bend law enforcement officers initiated a narcotics
investigation focused on Sullivan. Their efforts ultimately gave rise to criminal charges
filed against him in two separate cases. In 2019-CR-471 (2019 case), Sullivan was
charged with one count of distributing at least 3.5 grams but less than 100 grams of
methamphetamine, in violation of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5705 (a)(1), (d)(3)(C). In 2020-
CR-123 (2020 case), the State charged Sullivan with one count of distributing at least 1
gram but less than 3.5 grams of methamphetamine, in violation of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-
5705 (a)(1), (d)(3)(B), and one count of possession of a controlled substance without tax
stamps, in violation of K.S.A. 79-5204. The two cases were later consolidated for trial.

       The case proceeded to a jury trial and, after three days of receiving evidence, the
jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts in both cases. At sentencing, the district court
inquired whether Sullivan was satisfied with the representation he received from his
retained counsel, Donald E. Anderson, and if he wanted Anderson to continue
representing him. Sullivan responded affirmatively to both questions. The district court
then found a criminal history score of C for the single offense in the 2019 case,
distribution of at least 3.5 grams but less than 100 grams of methamphetamine, a severity
level 2 drug felony. Neither party objected to that score. The district court announced the

                                              2
sentencing range, then afforded both parties the opportunity to argue in support of their
respective sentencing recommendations, at which time Sullivan's counsel requested a
dispositional departure. The district court then asked Sullivan if there was anything he
wanted to tell the court before it pronounced his sentence and Sullivan declined this
opportunity. The district court denied Sullivan's departure request and sentenced him to
the mitigated term of 117 months in prison followed by 36 months of postrelease
supervision.

       The district court then addressed the 2020 case where it again found a criminal
history score of C for the primary offense, distribution of at least 1 gram but less than 3.5
grams of methamphetamine, a severity level 3 drug felony, and a criminal history score
of I for the tax stamp offense, a severity level 10 nonperson felony. Neither party
objected to the criminal history scores. Again, the district court stated the sentencing
range for each count and asked for the parties' recommendations. It also gave Sullivan the
opportunity to address the court before his sentence was pronounced but he opted to
again stand silent. For the primary offense of distribution of methamphetamine, the
district court sentenced Sullivan to the mitigated term of 65 months in prison and 36
months of postrelease supervision. For the additional offense of no drug tax stamp, the
district court sentenced Sullivan to the mitigated term of 5 months in prison with 12
months of postrelease supervision, and ordered the two terms to run consecutively, for a
total of 70 months in prison. However, the district court ordered the overall sentence in
the 2020 case to run concurrently with that imposed in Sullivan's 2019 case, for a total
controlling sentence of 117 months in prison.

       After the district court pronounced the sentences in both cases, Sullivan
interjected:

       "I probably need to get another lawyer or something. I think I need to get another lawyer.
       He never told me I'd get that much time if I lose a jury trial. Someone—I need to get

                                                   3
       another lawyer. I'm not—I don't care about the—he didn't do good, I don't think. He
       didn't tell me what the full sentence would be. Ten years and stuff like that for losing a
       jury trial? I never knew nothing about that."

       The district court explained that it had already pronounced the sentences and that
Sullivan would have to explore an appeal or a postconviction remedy.

       Sullivan now brings his case to this court for a determination of whether the
district court committed errors which necessitate that he be resentenced.

                                          LEGAL ANALYSIS

The district court did not have a duty to inquire into the concern Sullivan expressed at the
conclusion of sentencing with respect to a conflict with his counsel.

       Sullivan's first contention of error consists of the claim that the district court erred
by neglecting to inquire further when, after sentencing was largely concluded, he
expressed dissatisfaction with what he claimed was his counsel's failure to inform him of
the lengthy sentence he faced upon conviction for the charged offenses. The State
counters that Sullivan failed to preserve this claim in the district court, so it is not
properly before us for review. But, to the extent that procedural bar can be cleared, we
should confine our analysis to the threshold question of the district court's duty to inquire
into Sullivan's complaint.

       Standard of Review

       Sullivan had a right to effective assistance of counsel during all critical stages of
his criminal proceedings under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
This is accompanied by "a correlative right to representation that is unimpaired by
conflicts of interest or divided loyalties." State v. Pfannenstiel, 302 Kan. 747, 758, 357
P.3d 877 (2015). The district court bears the responsibility to ensure this right is honored,
                                                       4
so when a defendant articulates dissatisfaction with his or her attorney, the district court
generally has an obligation to inquire further. 302 Kan. at 760.

       Whether the district court adequately discharged its duty is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. Pfannenstiel, 302 Kan. at 760-61. Judicial discretion is abused if judicial
action is (1) arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e., no reasonable person would take the
view adopted by the trial court; (2) based on an error of law, i.e., the discretion is guided
by an erroneous legal conclusion; or (3) based on an error of fact, i.e., substantial
competent evidence does not support a factual finding on which the exercise of discretion
is based. State v. Stovall, 298 Kan. 362, 370, 312 P.3d 1271 (2013). The defendant bears
the burden of showing the court abused its discretion. 298 Kan. at 370.

       The duty of inquiry may lead a district court to abuse its discretion in three ways:
(1) When the district court becomes aware of a potential conflict of interest but fails to
inquire at all, it sidesteps its obligation to fulfill a legal duty which constitutes a decision
based on an error of law; (2) when the court is aware of the conflict and proceeds with an
investigation, but fails to conduct an appropriate inquiry; and (3) when the court, after
learning of the conflict, conducts an appropriate inquiry but commits an abuse of
discretion through its ultimate decision concerning whether to appoint substitute counsel.
Pfannenstiel, 302 Kan. at 760-62.

       Preservation

       Generally, constitutional issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised
on appeal. State v. Daniel, 307 Kan. 428, 430, 410 P.3d 877 (2018) (citing State v.
Godfrey, 301 Kan. 1041, 1043, 350 P.3d 1068 [2015]). There are several exceptions to
this rule, including: (1) the newly asserted theory involves only a question of law arising
on proved or admitted facts and is finally determinative of the case; (2) resolution of the
question is necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent denial of fundamental

                                                5
rights; and (3) the district court was right for the wrong reason. State v. Johnson, 309
Kan. 992, 995, 441 P.3d 1036 (2019).

       Kansas Supreme Court Rule 6.02(a)(5) (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 36) requires an
appellant to explain why an issue that was not raised below should be considered for the
first time on appeal. Johnson, 309 Kan. at 995. Sullivan asserts that his constitutional
claim meets the first two exceptions for considering a new issue on appeal. But even if
the exceptions apply, our decision to address the issue remains a prudential one. See State
v. Genson, 316 Kan. 130, 135-36, 513 P.3d 1192 (2022) (finding that appellate court can
exercise its discretion to consider whether to apply a prudential exception to the general
rule that issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal). This claim involves a pure question of law, and the record reflects that Sullivan
voiced dissatisfaction and the district court did not inquire but directed him to explore the
postconviction options available to him through which the issue could be addressed.
Since these are the only facts required for a determination of the threshold issue before
us, we are persuaded that the first exception is applicable here and will exercise our
discretion to analyze the question.

       District Court's Duty to Inquire

       When a defendant alleges deficiencies in defense counsel's performance, a district
court must inquire further into the alleged conflict. State v. Prado, 299 Kan. 1251, 1258,
329 P.3d 473(2014). For a required inquiry to be satisfactory, the district court must
investigate: (1) the basis for the defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel, and (2) the facts
necessary to determine whether that dissatisfaction warrants new counsel. State v.
Toothman, 310 Kan. 542, 554, 448 P.3d 1039 (2019). A single open-ended question by
the trial court may suffice if its effect is to afford the defendant a chance to explain their
perceived conflict of interest, irreconcilable disagreement, or inability to communicate
with counsel. 310 Kan. at 554. A district court's failure to inquire after learning of a

                                               6
potential attorney-client conflict may amount to an abuse of discretion. State v. Vann, 280
Kan. 782, 789, 127 P.3d 307 (2006).

       To recap, the record before us reflects that early in the sentencing proceeding,
Sullivan assured the court he was satisfied with retained counsel's representation and had
the opportunity to review the presentence investigation report.

       "THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Anderson has been representing you. Have you been satisfied
       with his representation of you?
       "MR. SULLIVAN: Yeah.
       "THE COURT: Would you like for him to continue to represent you?
       "MR. SULLIVAN: Yeah.
       "THE COURT: On both of these cases, just to be clear?
       (Mr. Sullivan nodded.)
       "THE COURT: Answer out loud for me.
       "MR. SULLIVAN: Yes.
       "THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. All right. Have you had an opportunity to look at the
       presentence investigation in—talking on the 19 CR 471 case?
       "MR. SULLIVAN: Yeah."

       Shortly thereafter, the court afforded Sullivan's attorney the opportunity to present
arguments in support of his request for a dispositional departure. Counsel fully embraced
the opportunity and spent a considerable period of time addressing Sullivan's criminal
history, a conversation he shared with Sullivan concerning that history, the advanced age
of his prior convictions, and in what ways that history accurately conveyed the nature of
Sullivan's conduct and character, as well as its potential to be misapprehended. Counsel
concluded by summarizing why Sullivan was a good candidate for the more lenient
disposition. The State then presented counterarguments in opposition to Sullivan's
departure request. Once both parties sufficiently offered their points of view, the court
inquired of Sullivan:

                                                 7
       "THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Mr. Sullivan, is there anything that you would like to
       tell me before I sentence you?"
       "MR. SULLIVAN: No."

       The court worked its way through the various steps required to impose a sentence
and reiterated the applicable sentencing range Sullivan faced for the first offense. The
judge stated his intention to impose the mitigated sentence in the grid box and provided
Sullivan with a lengthy explanation as to why he intended to deny the departure request.
The court then advised the parties of the jail credit Sullivan was entitled to receive in
connection with that case. Through it all Sullivan stood silent.

       The court then moved on to impose sentence in Sullivan's second case. It
announced the criminal history score again and after receiving clarification, Sullivan
assured the court he had no objections to the calculation. After the parties offered their
respective sentencing recommendations, the court again inquired of Sullivan:

       "THE COURT: Okay. All right. Mr. Sullivan, anything that you would like to tell me
       then before I sentence you on this case?"
       "MR. SULLIVAN: No."
       "THE COURT: Anything else then before I move forward with sentencing?"
       "MR. ANDERSON: No, Your Honor."
       "MR. MORRIS: No."

       The court proceeded on, imposed the mitigated term for the remaining offenses,
and determined whether the sentences imposed would be served concurrently or
consecutively. It was only in that moment that Sullivan spoke up and expressed that he
"probably need[ed] to get another lawyer or something" because counsel allegedly failed
to "[tell him he would] get that much time if [he lost] a jury trial." That is, it was not until
after Sullivan already asserted that he was satisfied with counsel's representation and
wanted him to remain on as his attorney for sentencing, assured the judge there were no
concerns he wanted to bring to the court's attention, and sentences were imposed from the
                                                   8
bench, that Sullivan voiced any concern with respect to counsel's representation. The
court advised Sullivan that given the fact his sentences were already imposed; his
recourse was to explore avenues of postconviction relief and "make whatever motion [he]
want[ed] to" once the court wrapped up the hearing.

       Sullivan now asserts the court erred in failing to delve into his concerns regarding
his attorney in that moment and directs our attention to State v. Prado, 299 Kan. 1251, as
a proposed model for resolution of this issue and support for his claim that the district
court's failure to inquire into his complaint constitutes an abuse of discretion that
demands reversal. But Sullivan's case is readily distinguishable from Prado. In that case,
Prado orally moved to withdraw his plea at the outset of his sentencing proceeding due to
his dissatisfaction with counsel and confusion about the plea agreement he entered into.
Prado's counsel interjected with a two-fold purpose, to attempt to explain Prado's
concerns about his representation and to assure the court that he adequately explained the
terms of the agreement to Prado. The district court sidestepped its obligation to inquire
into Prado's concerns and moved straight to the merits of his motion to withdraw plea. It
ultimately concluded Prado failed to establish the good cause required to grant him the
relief he requested.

       On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court agreed that the statements from Prado and
his counsel were sufficient to put the district court on notice that a potential conflict
existed. Thus, the district court abused its discretion in failing to inquire into that matter
and ensure Prado's right to conflict-free counsel for the hearing on his motion to
withdraw plea was protected. In arriving at its conclusion, the Court observed that
ordinarily when such a finding is made, the next step is to remand the case back to the
district court for a determination of whether the defendant can establish that the conflict
adversely affected his attorney's performance. But the Prado court found that step was
unnecessary in his case because the record alone demonstrated the existence of an actual
conflict and that it was one which necessarily adversely affected counsel's performance.

                                               9
That is, prejudice was presumed. Prado, 299 Kan. at 1260 (citing State v. Sharkey, 299
Kan. 87, 101, 322 P.3d 325 [2014]) (presuming prejudice when defendant was
constructively denied his right to counsel because of a conflict).

       Despite Sullivan's contentions to the contrary, his case is not on equal footing with
Prado, where the conflict had a demonstrable effect on counsel's ability to represent
Prado's interests at the exact critical stage, the motion to withdraw plea hearing, that was
in controversy. By contrast, in Sullivan's case, the record does not establish that
Sullivan's tersely expressed desire for new counsel caused any conflict bearing directly
on Anderson's ability to represent him during sentencing because he waited until that
hearing was concluded to voice any concern or disapproval. That is, unlike Prado, the
district court gave Sullivan the chance to voice any concerns at various different times
during the proceeding, but Sullivan actively declined to capitalize upon those
opportunities.

       The State counters that the district court had no duty to inquire because by the
time Sullivan expressed any dissatisfaction with counsel's representation the proceeding
was essentially concluded, and Sullivan's sentence was final. We agree. The sentence
imposed became effective upon its pronouncement and the district court lacked
jurisdiction to reopen it for modification. See State v. McKnight, 292 Kan. 776, 779, 257
P.3d 339 (2011). Although technically illegal, as will be discussed below, Sullivan's
sentence was final when pronounced, thus, at that point Sullivan was required to file an
appeal or postconviction motion to challenge the legality of the sentence. Illegal
sentences are those sentences that (1) are imposed by a court without jurisdiction; (2) do
not conform to the applicable statutory provisions, either in character or the term of
punishment; or (3) are ambiguous about the time and manner in which they are to be
served. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3504(a), (c)(1); State v. Mitchell, 315 Kan. 156, 158, 505
P.3d 739 (2022).

                                             10
       It is important to note that our decision here today does not strip Sullivan of all
avenues for relief. As the district court noted, Sullivan remains free to pursue any
complaints concerning counsel's representation through a postconviction remedy, namely
at this juncture a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion. But, in so doing, he must be prepared to satisfy
the two-part test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80
L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). First, he must demonstrate that his attorney's performance was
deficient, which requires him to show that counsel made errors so serious that he
neglected to function in the capacity Sullivan was entitled to by the Sixth Amendment.
466 U.S. at 687. Next, Sullivan will need to demonstrate that the errors he complains of
were so significant that they actually resulted in prejudice to him. Stated another way, he
has the burden to establish that there is a reasonable probability his case would have
yielded a different outcome had counsel's errors not occurred. 466 U.S. at 694. We
recognize that Sullivan's attorney was retained and one of his own choosing rather than
appointed, but defendants who retain their own counsel are entitled to no less protection
under the Sixth Amendment than those for whom the State appoints counsel. See Cuyler
v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344-45, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1980):

       "A proper respect for the Sixth Amendment disarms petitioner's contention that
       defendants who retain their own lawyers are entitled to less protection than defendants
       for whom the State appoints counsel. We may assume with confidence that most counsel,
       whether retained or appointed, will protect the rights of an accused. But experience
       teaches that, in some cases, retained counsel will not provide adequate representation.
       The vital guarantee of the Sixth Amendment would stand for little if the often uninformed
       decision to retain a particular lawyer could reduce or forfeit the defendant's entitlement to
       constitutional protection. Since the State's conduct of a criminal trial itself implicates the
       State in the defendant's conviction, we see no basis for drawing a distinction between
       retained and appointed counsel that would deny equal justice to defendants who must
       choose their own lawyers."

       The district court judge here fulfilled his obligation to ensure that Sullivan's rights
were protected throughout sentencing and that he received every opportunity to make his

                                                     11
questions and concerns known. Sullivan repeatedly assured the court that everything was
satisfactory, and sentencing could move forward without cause for concern, only to
reverse course at the very end with the pronouncement that his feelings toward counsel
and the matters addressed were precisely the opposite of what he had previously stated.
This is not the procedure contemplated by the avenue of relief Sullivan endeavors to
travel. If litigants believe a conflict with their counsel exists, they have an obligation to
notify the court at the earliest opportunity so that a proper inquiry can be made before the
conflict can poison the proceeding at issue. They may not lead the district court down the
primrose path with their declarations of satisfaction only to later claim, after the point in
time when any corrective measures can be taken has passed, that the court abused its
discretion when it relied on their repeated assurances. We decline to find the district court
abused its discretion when it directed Sullivan to explore postconviction options rather
than inquire into his alleged dissatisfaction with his attorney.

The district court erred in applying Sullivan's full criminal history score to the primary
offenses in both of his consolidated cases.

         Sullivan next argues that the district court erred when it assigned a criminal
history score of C to the primary charges in both of his cases. According to Sullivan,
given that the cases were consolidated, that criminal history score could only be assigned
to the primary charge in his 2019 case, and all the charges in his 2020 case were limited
to criminal history scores of I. The State concedes that the district court erred on this
issue.

         Preservation and Standard of Review

         While Sullivan did not raise this issue below, an illegal sentence can be corrected
at any time while the defendant is serving the sentence. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 22-3504(a). A
sentence is illegal when it does not conform with statutory provisions, either in the
character or the term of the authorized punishment. State v. Neal, 292 Kan. 625, 630, 258

                                               12
P.3d 365 (2011). We exercise unlimited review when determining whether a sentence is
illegal. 292 Kan. at 630.

       Base-Sentence Rule

       Under the revised Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act, a district court must
establish a "base sentence" for the crime with the highest severity level, known as the
primary crime. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6819(b)(2). The base sentence is calculated by
applying the defendant's criminal-history score to the primary crime. K.S.A. 2022 Supp.
21-6819(b)(3). Sentences for the remaining convictions are calculated using a criminal
history score of I. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6819(b)(5). While appearing simple on paper,
the proper application of the base-sentence rule to consolidated cases has eluded many
district courts, which has prompted clarification from the appellate courts. See State v.
Dixon, 60 Kan. App. 2d 100, Syl. ¶ 11, 429 P.3d 455 (2021) (application of "double
rule," prohibiting multiple-charge convictions from exceeding twice the base sentence,
violated defendant's equal-protection rights where his two cases were consolidated for
trial, but he was sentenced separately in each case); State v. Anderson, No. 124,727, 2023
WL 176658, at *6 (Kan. App. 2023) (unpublished opinion) (application of "base-
sentence" rule separately to each of defendant's three consolidated cases violated his
equal-protection rights); State v. Fitzgerald, No. 123,121, 2022 WL 815839, at *5 (Kan.
App. 2022) (unpublished opinion) (extending Dixon holding to defendants who accept
plea deals).

       Sullivan's case is analogous to State v. Myers, 62 Kan. App. 2d 149, 509 P.3d 563
(2022). There, the State charged Myers with multiple counts in two separate cases that
were consolidated for trial. The district court sentenced Myers separately in each case and
applied his full criminal history for the primary offense in each. On appeal, this court
found that the base-sentence rule, as applied to Myers, violated his equal-protection
rights. As a remedy, Myers' sentences were vacated, and his case was remanded for

                                             13
resentencing with directions to designate one primary crime of conviction and a single
base sentence for both cases. 62 Kan. App. 2d at 192-93.

       The record reflects that the same error was committed in Sullivan's case when the
district court applied Sullivan's full criminal history score of C to the primary offenses in
both his 2019 and 2020 cases. The only offense that can properly receive that score is the
primary offense from his 2019 case, and all remaining convictions must be assigned a
criminal history score of I. Accordingly, Sullivan's sentence must be vacated, and his
case remanded so that he might be sentenced anew, utilizing the appropriate criminal
history score for each offense. Additionally, Sullivan should have the benefit of conflict-
free counsel at resentencing.

       Sentence vacated and case remanded with directions.

                                            ***

       PICKERING, J., dissenting: I respectfully dissent because a defendant's right to
counsel at a sentencing hearing does not end once the district court orders the defendant
to prison. A defendant has a fundamental right to conflict-free counsel throughout the
entire adversarial proceeding. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
imposes a duty on the district court to inquire when a defendant expresses dissatisfaction
with his or her attorney. This constitutional right should be honored and upheld.

       As the King of Hearts in Alice's Adventures in Wonderland advised: "'Begin at the
beginning,' the King said, very gravely, 'and go on till you come to the end: then stop.'"
Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, p. 60 (Random House, 1955) (1865). I will
endeavor to do the same. In 2019 and 2020, Dustin Stoughton Sullivan was charged with
two criminal cases. In the first case, 2019-CR-471, Sullivan was ultimately charged with
distributing methamphetamine (between 3.5-100 grams), a level 2 drug felony. In the

                                             14
second case, 2020-CR-123, he was charged with two felonies: distributing
methamphetamine (between 1-3.5 grams), a level 3 drug felony, and possession of a
controlled substance without a tax stamp, a level 10 nonperson felony.

       At a later pretrial hearing, when asked by the district court regarding his counsel's
representation, Sullivan advised the court that he was satisfied with his counsel. During
the time leading up to the trial, Sullivan and the State entered into plea negotiations, but
no plea agreement was reached. Sullivan was later tried and convicted in both cases on all
counts.

       In the beginning of Sullivan's sentencing hearing, in response to the district court's
question about his counsel, again Sullivan did not state he had any concerns. It was only
after the court imposed a controlling prison sentence of 117 months that Sullivan voiced
his "need to get another lawyer." It is important that we do not overlook the court's
response to Sullivan's expressed need for a new attorney:

               "THE COURT: Yes. I may have just unnecessarily complicated things. I just
       wanted to make sure, yes, both these sentences are going to run concurrent with each
       other. So I don't think it makes any difference as far as the post-release.
               "MR. SULLIVAN: I probably need to get another lawyer or something. I think I
       need to get another lawyer. He never told me I'd get that much time if I lose a jury trial.
       Someone—I need to get another lawyer. I'm not—I don't care about the—he didn't do
       good, I don't think. He didn't tell me what the full sentence would be. Ten years and stuff
       like that for losing a jury trial? I never knew nothing about that.
               "THE COURT: Well, I've already pronounced sentence. So at this point there's
       just a few things that need to be wrapped up. But you're free to make whatever motion
       that you want to once I finish with your sentence. But I've already pronounced the
       sentence, so that's not going to change at this point.
               "MR. SULLIVAN: So I got to appeal it or something?
               "THE COURT: Correct. Yes."

                                                    15
       Sullivan had clearly expressed dissatisfaction with his attorney for apparently
failing to advise him of the potential sentences he could face after losing a jury trial. The
district court did not stop to inquire further but, rather, continued making additional
rulings, including:

       (1)     remanding Sullivan to the custody of the department of corrections;
       (2)     ruling on Sullivan's jail credit;
       (3)     ordering Sullivan to pay court costs;
       (4)     discussing whether Sullivan should pay the DNA database fee of $200;
       (5)     advising Sullivan of his duty to register;
       (6)     ordering Sullivan not to carry a firearm or a dangerous weapon;
       (7)     advising Sullivan that he could not vote;
       (8)     denying Sullivan's motion for an appeal bond; and
       (9)     improperly notifying Sullivan of his statutory right to appeal.

       When the court only advised Sullivan of his right to appeal his sentences, Sullivan
expressed not understanding how his sentence went from 2 years with community
corrections to 10 years in prison:

               "THE COURT: . . .I will also let you know that you do have the right to appeal
       my sentences today on both of these convictions. If you choose to do so, you must do so
       within 14 days of today, and you may be entitled to a court-appointed attorney for that—
       for those appeals. Do you understand [that], sir?
               "MR. SULLIVAN: Yeah. I don't understand how it goes from two years of
       corrections to ten years in prison; went from the plea bargain—I mean, that's what I don't
       understand.
               "THE COURT: Okay. So my question to you is do you understand you have a
       right to appeal?
               "MR. SULLIVAN: Oh, yeah. Yeah."

                                                   16
       Again, the district court did not stop to inquire—even though when Sullivan first
told the court he needed a new attorney, he stated that the attorney did not tell him what
the "full sentence" would be: "Ten years and stuff like that for losing a jury trial? I never
knew nothing about that." Without any inquiry by the court into Sullivan's belief that he
needed a new attorney, the record remains unclear regarding the conflict between
Sullivan and his attorney, including what Sullivan's attorney previously advised him
during plea negotiations and the trial.

The pronouncement of a defendant's sentence does not extinguish the right to conflict-
free counsel.

       The majority ruling that the district court has no duty to inquire after the
incarceration phase essentially bifurcates a defendant's right to counsel at sentencing. In
other words, the court has a duty to inquire regarding an attorney-client conflict before
the incarceration phase of sentencing, but the court has no duty to inquire after the
incarceration phase of sentencing. The court, however, must maintain its responsibility to
ensure the defendant's constitutional right to conflict-free counsel. I cannot agree with a
ruling that one portion of the sentencing hearing is important, and the other portion of the
sentencing hearing is not important. It is all important.

       The majority ruling is, of course, contrary to the Sixth Amendment, which
guarantees a defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel. The right to counsel
includes the right to representation free from conflicts of interest. State v. Stovall, 298
Kan. 362, 370, 312 P.3d 1271 (2013).

       We must remember that the pronouncement of a sentence does not extinguish the
right to effective assistance of counsel. Rather, the right to effective assistance of counsel
applies during all critical stages of a criminal proceeding. State v. Pfannenstiel, 302 Kan.
747, 758, 357 P.3d 877 (2015). It first attaches when judicial proceedings are initiated

                                              17
against the defendant and extends to the first appeal of right. State v. Sharkey, 299 Kan.
87, 93, 322 P.3d 325 (2014). Sullivan raised a potential attorney-client conflict at a
postconviction hearing where the State was represented by counsel and before filing his
direct appeal. Therefore, his right to effective assistance of counsel remained in effect,
and the district court retained its duty to inquire into the potential conflict.

       Not fulfilling the district court's duty to inquire once the court becomes aware of a
possible conflict of interest opens the probability that the defendant is effectively without
legal representation for the remaining portion of the sentencing hearing. See Sharkey, 299
Kan. at 101 (finding at hearing on defendant's pro se posttrial motions that asserted
attorney was ineffective due to conflict of interest, defendant "effectively had no legal
representation at the motions hearing" when defendant argued counsel was ineffective).
Failure to inquire creates a constitutional peril that could leave defendants like Sullivan
without legal representation for the remainder of the sentencing hearing.

Liberty interests are at stake throughout a defendant's sentencing hearing.

       Besides the incarceration phase, a defendant has additional liberty interests that are
at stake throughout the sentencing hearing. The district court, however, effectively told
Sullivan that he did not need an attorney after the court had imposed its sentence:

               "THE COURT: Well, I've already pronounced sentence. So at this point there's
       just a few things that need to be wrapped up. But you're free to make whatever motion
       that you want to once I finish with your sentence. But I've already pronounced the
       sentence, so that's not going to change at this point."

       The right to counsel exists at sentencing even if the defendant's sentence would
not have changed with the presence of an attorney. In Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736,
740-41, 68 S. Ct. 1252, 92 L. Ed. 1690 (1948), the United States Supreme Court held that
the defendant without counsel at a sentencing coupled with "assumptions concerning his
                                                    18
criminal record which were materially untrue" had been deprived of due process.
Notably, Justice Jackson stated: "In this case, counsel might not have changed the
sentence, but he could have taken steps to see that the conviction and sentence were not
predicated on misinformation or misreading of court records, a requirement of fair play
which absence of counsel withheld from this prisoner." 334 U.S. at 741; see also Gardner
v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 S. Ct. 1197, 51 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1977) ("Even though the
defendant has no substantive right to a particular sentence within the range authorized by
statute, the sentencing is a critical stage of the criminal proceeding at which he is entitled
to the effective assistance of counsel.").

       "As explained in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158
(1932), the purpose of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is to protect the rights of
laymen, who are assumed to be unfamiliar with the intricacies of legal proceedings, by
providing them with assistance of counsel." State v. Bristor, 236 Kan. 313, 317, 691 P.2d
1 (1984). The Constitution, as the Powell Court states, gives the defendant the right to
"the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him." 287 U.S. at
69. Due to these "intricacies of legal proceedings," defendants should have "the guiding
hand" of counsel even after the court has imposed the incarceration sentence. See 287
U.S. at 69; Bristor, 236 Kan. at 317.

       Defendants may have other liberty interests that are considered and ruled on after
the incarceration phase of sentencing, liberty interests that are protected by the Due
Process Clause. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 132 L. Ed
2d 418 (1995). These liberty interests include but are not limited to jail time credit; an
appeal bond; request to be released from custody while awaiting start of treatment;
request to attend drug treatment; contact orders, e.g., lifting restrictions on contact with a
victim, family, etc. Should the defendant be placed on probation, the district court
imposes specific probation restrictions. See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6607(b), (c).

                                              19
          What occurred here is an excellent example of the need for conflict-free counsel.
In this case, the district court ruled on Sullivan's jail credit. Calculating jail credit is part
of the sentence imposed on a defendant. K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6615(a); State v. Hopkins,
317 Kan. 652, 537 P.3d 845, 849 (2023). The district court also denied Sullivan's motion
for an appeal bond, another ruling that affects Sullivan's liberty interest.

          Additionally, the district court improperly advising Sullivan that he just had a right
to appeal the sentence again illustrates the need for counsel throughout a sentencing
hearing. See State v. Ortiz, 230 Kan. 733, 735-36, 640 P.2d 1255 (1982) (finding
defendant may file late appeal if defendant not informed of right to appeal, was not
furnished with attorney to perfect appeal, or was furnished with attorney who failed to
perfect appeal). Sullivan was convicted in a jury trial, and thus he would have the
statutory right to appeal both his convictions and sentence. See 2022 Supp. K.S.A. 22-
3601(a) ("Any appeal permitted to be taken from a district court's final judgment in a
criminal case shall be taken to the court of appeals[.]"). A defense counsel would be able
to correctly advise a defendant of his or her full appellate rights, including the right to
appeal a conviction. Conflict-free counsel could also make any corrections on the record
at the hearing, which would ensure the defendant is fully aware of his or her appellate
rights.

          In cases involving indigent defendants, a defense counsel would ensure that the
district court follows State v. Robinson, 281 Kan. 538, 546-47, 132 P.3d 934 (2006). That
is, when the court assesses the defendant's duty to reimburse the Board of Indigents'
Defense Services for attorney fees, a defense counsel would advocate for the defendant's
inability to pay the fees and ask the court to consider the defendant's lack of financial
resources in making its ruling.

          Another possible ruling made after the incarceration phase of the sentencing
hearing is restitution. See K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6604(b)(1). A district court may decide

                                                20
not to rule on restitution until after the incarceration phase is completed to consider if the
restitution is workable. K.S.A. 21-6604(b)(1); see State v. Meeks, 307 Kan. 813, 815, 415
P.3d 400 (2018). As our Supreme Court has clearly stated: "[R]estitution constitutes a
part of a [criminal] defendant's sentence . . . . Until any applicable restitution amount is
decided, a defendant's sentencing is not complete." State v. Hall, 298 Kan. 978, 986, 319
P.3d 506 (2014). The restitution phase of sentencing must be completed before the
defendant can file a notice of appeal. 298 Kan. at 988.

The district court has a duty to inquire.

       "Our state and federal constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to
effective assistance of counsel, and a district court's duty to inquire into a potential
conflict with counsel derives from this right." State v. Bacon, 309 Kan. 1235, 1238, 443
P.3d 1049 (2019). "'Where a trial court becomes aware of a possible conflict of interest
between an attorney and a defendant charged with a felony, the court has a duty to
inquire further.'" State v. Vann, 280 Kan. 782, 789, 127 P.3d 307 (2006). "An articulated
statement of attorney dissatisfaction triggers the district court's duty to inquire." State v.
Toothman, 310 Kan. 542, 554, 448 P.3d 1039 (2019).

       When a defendant alleges deficiencies in defense counsel's performance, a district
court must inquire further into the alleged conflict. An appropriate inquiry requires the
district court to investigate "'(1) the basis for the defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel'"
and (2) the facts necessary to determine whether that dissatisfaction warrants new
counsel. 310 Kan. at 554. "'A single, open-ended question by the trial court may suffice'"
if the defendant has a chance "'to explain a conflict of interest, an irreconcilable
disagreement, or an inability to communicate with counsel.'" 310 Kan. at 554. A district
court's failure to inquire after learning of a potential attorney-client conflict is an abuse of
discretion. Vann, 280 Kan. at 789.

                                              21
A district court should not relinquish its duty to inquire into a potential attorney-client
conflict.

       In State v. Brown, 300 Kan. 565, 331 P.3d 797 (2014), the Kansas Supreme Court
considered whether a district court abused its discretion when it failed to inquire further
into a potential attorney-client conflict. There, the defendant, Brown, had filed a pro se
motion requesting the court to appoint new counsel, and a hearing was set. But for
reasons unclear from the record, the motion was later withdrawn, and no hearing took
place. At the sentencing hearing, with a different presiding judge, Brown explained to the
district court that he had earlier filed a motion for new counsel but later learned that the
court had withdrawn his motion. Now aware of Brown's potential conflict with his
counsel, the court did not attempt to inquire into the potential attorney-client conflict. The
district court would not let Brown speak any further, and, instead, the court spoke of the
defense counsel's abilities. The court also told Brown that he could "file a motion, an
action alleging ineffective assistance of counsel after your appeals are exhausted." 300
Kan. at 574. The Kansas Supreme Court ruled that the district court's failure to perform
its duty to inquire further was an abuse of discretion. 300 Kan. at 578. A district court's
duty to inquire into a potential attorney-client conflict "accrues when the court first learns
of the potential conflict, and that duty does not decay or dissipate" through any inaction
on the part of the defendant. 300 Kan. at 577.

       Important to this case, the Brown ruling abrogated State v. Boyd, 27 Kan. App. 2d
956, 9 P.3d 1273 (2000). In that case, Boyd, the defendant, had filed a motion to dismiss
his counsel, but his motion was never ruled upon by the district court. The Boyd panel
found no error due to the defendant's later inactions:

       "There is nothing in the record to indicate that Boyd ever objected to the appearance of
       his trial counsel. Boyd appeared with his attorney at the motions hearing, the jury trial,

                                                    22
       the motion for new trial, and at sentencing. He had ample opportunity to object to the
       presence of his attorney." 27 Kan. App. 2d at 965.

The Brown court explained that the rationale in Boyd "does not comport with our current
decisions" because a district court's duty to inquire regarding a potential attorney-client
conflict "emanates from its responsibility to assure that a defendant's constitutional right
to effective assistance of counsel is honored." Brown, 300 Kan. at 577.

       Here, the district court was tasked with a responsibility to assure that Sullivan's
constitutional right to conflict-free counsel was upheld. Sullivan's right to conflict-free
counsel cannot be waived by his earlier statements to the court that—at that time—he
was satisfied with this counsel. As Brown explains, Sullivan's earlier statements do not
cause a district court's duty to inquire into a potential conflict to "decay or dissipate." 300
Kan. at 577. The court clearly heard Sullivan's statements about his need for new counsel
but did not make any further inquiries. Instead, the court told Sullivan that he was "free to
make whatever motion" he wanted once the court had finished with his sentence and he
had a right to appeal. The district court should not have relinquished its duty to inquire
into a potential attorney-client conflict.

We should be guided by all of State v. Prado's reasoning.

       In State v. Prado, 299 Kan. 1251, 329 P.3d 473 (2014), our Supreme Court
considered whether a district court has a duty to inquire about the defendant's
dissatisfaction with defense counsel. There, Prado pled guilty under a convoluted plea
agreement. At sentencing, Prado made a pro se oral motion to withdraw his plea and
spoke of his dissatisfaction with his defense counsel for failing to adequately explain the
plea agreement. Defense counsel helped explain Prado's complaints about his
representation but also went on to explicitly advocate against his client's position by
arguing that he had adequately explained the plea agreement. The district court did not

                                                  23
inquire about the nature of the conflict between Prado and his attorney. Rather, the court
immediately considered whether good cause existed for Prado to withdraw his plea.
Finding no good cause to withdraw the plea, the district court denied Prado's motion and
proceeded with sentencing.

       On appeal, the Prado court held that Prado's pro se statements placed the district
court on notice of the potential conflict and triggered the duty to further inquire. By
skipping the inquiry step, the district court had abused its discretion by denying Prado the
opportunity to have conflict-free counsel argue the plea withdrawal motion. The Prado
court noted that, ordinarily, the remedy for this abuse of discretion was to remand to the
district court for determination of whether Prado can establish that the conflict of interest
adversely affected his counsel's performance. But since defense counsel explicitly argued
against Prado's position, the record indicated an actual conflict. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court reversed the denial of Prado's motion to withdraw his plea, vacated his
sentence, and remanded to the district court to appoint conflict-free counsel to represent
the defendant at a new hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea. 299 Kan. at 1260-61.

       Like Prado, Sullivan expressed dissatisfaction with his defense counsel during the
sentencing hearing. Sullivan's statements suggest that his counsel failed to advise him of
the potential sentence he could receive if he was found guilty by a jury—but without any
inquiry by the court, this remains uncertain. These statements put the district court on
notice of the potential conflict and triggered the duty to inquire further. In fact, when the
district court advised Sullivan of his appellate rights, Sullivan again expressed his
confusion of how his sentence went from "two years of [community] corrections to ten
years in prison." Sullivan's statements should have prompted the district court to make an
inquiry.

       Because the district court failed to inquire, it abused its discretion. But unlike in
Prado, Sullivan's defense counsel did not argue against his client's position. In fact,

                                              24
defense counsel remained silent both times that Sullivan spoke. Therefore, the record in
Sullivan's case does not reveal an actual conflict of interest, although a potential one.
Without an inquiry, the record is not sufficiently developed for us to conclude whether an
actual conflict existed. A remand to the district court for further inquiry into the nature of
the potential conflict is required.

       I disagree with the majority and find that Prado controls. Even if Prado can be
distinguished, Kansas caselaw demands that an inquiry is made. See Pfannenstiel, 302
Kan. at 758; Brown, 300 Kan. at 576; Sharkey, 299 Kan. at 93; Stovall, 298 Kan. at 370;
Vann, 280 Kan. at 789. Sullivan's statements were made while the sentence hearing was
ongoing. By distinguishing Prado and holding the court had no duty to inquire, the
majority loses sight of the importance of conflict-free counsel throughout the entire
sentencing hearing. That duty should remain intact.

The importance of upholding constitutional rights

       Finally, I pause to express a serious concern. The majority's ruling gives the wrong
impression that a district court's duty to inquire of an attorney-client conflict ends after
the court rules on the defendant's incarceration—prison, probation, and postrelease
supervision. Adopting such a mistaken view leads to an erroneous belief that the district
court has no duty to inquire after the defendant is sentenced to prison or probation. Yet in
accordance with the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel, the district court—which is
entrusted with ensuring that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel is
honored—has a duty to stop the proceedings and make the necessary inquiries.

       Arguably, moments after hearing that they are about to serve years in prison,
defendants like Sullivan are at their most vulnerable. Consequently, to uphold the virtues
of our legal system, a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an attorney should remain
steadfast. This right to conflict-free counsel should be acknowledged, respected, and

                                              25
upheld. This fundamental right must not be ignored or brushed away by telling the
defendant he or she can later appeal the court's rulings. The integrity of our adversarial
system of justice demands that we uphold the rights of its people at all critical stages.

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