Court Opinion

ID: 9614596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:26:43.782575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:37.644826
License: Public Domain

Benham, Judge,
dissenting.
I must dissent because I disagree with the majority’s analysis and result in Division 1 regarding the admissibility of the evidence of appellant’s fabrication of an entry on a patient’s chart. Appellees offered the evidence in an attempt to disprove appellant’s testimony that she had never written a history and physical examination in a patient’s chart when she had not actually performed those tasks. While I agree that “[a] witness may be impeached by disproving the facts testified to by him,” (OCGA § 24-9-82), “[a] witness is not to be discredited because of a discrepancy as to a wholly immaterial matter. [Cit.]” Daniels v. Luton, 40 Ga. App. 741 (1) (151 SE 659) (1930). “It is a *572general rule that in a suit for negligence, evidence of similar acts or omissions on other and different occasions is not admissible. [Cits.]” Thompson v. Moore, 174 Ga. App. 331 (1) (329 SE2d 914) (1985). “ ““[E]ach transaction must be ascertained by its own circumstances, and not by the reputation or character of the parties.’ ” ’ ” Williams v. Naidu, 168 Ga. App. 539, 540 (309 SE2d 686) (1983). “A witness’ possible lack of credibility concerning matters otherwise irrelevant to any issue in dispute does not thereby become material to the case as an issue of impeachment. [Cits.]” E. H. Siler Realty &c. Broker v. Sanderlin, 158 Ga. App. 796 (1) (282 SE2d 381) (1981).
The issue at trial was whether appellant misdiagnosed the decedent’s symptoms. Appellant’s office chart on the decedent was the document from which the parties ascertained appellant’s treatment of the decedent. When asked on direct examination whether she had fabricated or reconstructed any of the entries made on the decedent’s chart, appellant responded that she had not. Appellees were then entitled to impeach appellant as to that statement by presenting evidence that appellánt had fabricated an entry on the decedent’s chart, but they did not do so. Instead, appellees impeached appellant’s statement by presenting evidence that appellant had fabricated an entry on another patient’s chart. Whether appellant fabricated an entry on the chart of another patient was wholly immaterial to the question of whether appellant misdiagnosed the decedent’s symptoms and accurately entered her treatment of the decedent on the decedent’s office chart. As such, it had no place as impeachment material in this trial. See Daniels v. Luton, supra; OCGA §§ 24-9-82; 24-9-83; 24-9-84. See also E. H. Siler Realty &c. Broker v. Sanderlin, supra.
The majority’s reliance on Richards v. Harpe, 42 Ga. App. 123 (1) (155 SE 85) (1930) is misplaced, inasmuch as Richards permits cross-examination on the statements made on direct examination by the defendant physician. Also see Johnson v. Myers, 118 Ga. App. 773 (1) (165 SE2d 739) (1968). That is not what occurred in the instant case. Here, the information was not volunteered or otherwise brought out on direct examination, but the defendant was challenged on cross-examination for the first time on the issue of falsification of other patient’s records. I believe that the judgment must be reversed due to the admission of inadmissible material, and so I respectfully dissent.
I also disagree with the majority’s position in Division 2 that there was no error in the trial court’s failure to submit the issue of full satisfaction to the jury. I find that error was committed, but that it was harmless. It is my opinion that with the change in the law created by Posey v. Med. Center-West, 257 Ga. 55 (354 SE2d 417) (1987), we are faced with a new issue: How will the release of a joint tortfeasor be treated in the trial against the unreleased defendants?
We begin with “the just principle that there should be but one *573satisfaction of a single injury. Stated otherwise, in a tort action, compensation, and not enrichment, is the basis for the award of damages.” Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ouzts, 82 Ga. App. 36, 58 (60 SE2d 770) (1950). Since Posey, supra, the co-defendant of a released defendant is in a situation identical to the co-defendant of a defendant who is a party to a covenant not to sue: the plaintiff has dismissed a defendant from the suit in exchange for an amount of money. Because the plaintiff is entitled to but one satisfaction, “if the manner of releasing one involves satisfaction in whole or in part of the claim, it will enure to the discharge, pro tanto, of all who are liable. ...” Id. at 58. Thus, the remaining defendant, in an effort to reduce or avoid the plaintiff’s right of recovery, may plead and prove the payment made. Trice v. Wilson, 113 Ga. App. 715 (2) (149 SE2d 530) (1966). See also Ford Motor Co. v. Lee, 237 Ga. 554 (2) (229 SE2d 379) (1976); City Express Svc. v. Rich’s, 148 Ga. App. 123 (4) (250 SE2d 867) (1978); Pennsylvania Threshermen &c. Ins. Co. v. Hill, 113 Ga. App. 283, 289 (148 SE2d 83) (1966); Malone v. City of Rossville, 107 Ga. App. 271 (1) (129 SE2d 563) (1963); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ouzts, supra at 59. In a post-Posey case, this court recently held that the failure of the remaining defendant to prove the fact of and the amount of the releases entered into by the plaintiffs and the other defendants precluded those settlement amounts from being used to offset the jury verdict rendered against the remaining defendant. See Payne v. Jones & Kolb, 190 Ga. App. 62 (378 SE2d 467) (1989). Therefore, while the jury in the case at bar was apprised of the fact of settlement, it should have been made aware of the amount appellees had already received from the former defendants. The question remains whether the failure to give the jury the required information constituted reversible error.
It was for the jury to determine, if it found for the appellees, whether appellees were entitled to additional remuneration from appellant in order to be fully compensated for the wrongful death of their mother. Trice v. Wilson, supra; Pennsylvania Threshermen &c. Ins. Co. v. Hill, supra at 290. This could have been accomplished by informing the jury of the amount appellees had already received as a result of the release and settlement, and by instructing the jury to reduce the total amount of damages, if any, by the amount already received. See, e.g., Saint v. Ryan, 114 Ga. App. 489 (151 SE2d 826) (1966). See also King Cotton v. Powers, 190 Ga. App. 845 (380 SE2d 481) (1989). The trial court’s instructions to the jury that it disregard any dismissals from the action; that it determine the total amount of damages; and that the amount so found would be reduced by the amount of settlement effected the same result as would the procedure used in Saint v. Ryan, supra. Cf. King Cotton v. Powers, supra. I cannot and will not indulge in speculation as to how the jury’s verdict *574might have been affected by knowing the amount of settlement. Inasmuch as appellees were compensated and not enriched by the jury’s verdict and the subtraction therefrom of the settlement amount, we perceive no harm. Therefore, I concur in the majority’s result with regard to this issue, but not its analysis.
Decided July 14, 1989
Rehearing denied July 31, 1989
Weymon H. Forrester, Lambert & Roffman, E. R. Lambert, for appellant.
Carter & Butt, James E. Carter, Eugene D. Butt, for appellees.