Court Opinion

ID: 9527670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:32:33.777629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:03.714905
License: Public Domain

BARTEAU, Judge,
concurring in result.
I do not agree with the majority's reasoning that the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA), adopted by Illinois, grants Illinois the authority to modify the Indiana court's child support order. However, I concur in result because I believe the act of registering the Indiana judgment in Illinois vested the Illinois court with that authority.
I disagree with the majority's reasoning in two respects: First, I do not agree that the language in the Illinois order that "'there has been a substantial change in Respondent's cireumstances sufficient to warrant a modification in [Father's] present child support obligation" is sufficient to constitute a "specific" nullification of the Indiana order. Second, I do not agree that Illinois has definitively interpreted RURE-SA as providing the responding court with the authority to modify foreign support orders if they specify the intent to do so.
Section 81 of RURESA, as adopted by Illinois in 750 ILCS 20/31, provides that a support order made by an Illinois court does not nullify a support order made by a court of another state "unless otherwise specifically provided by the court." The Illinois court's finding that "there has been a substantial change in Respondent's circumstances sufficient to warrant a modification in [Father's] present child support obligation" is language which will be found in every Tilinois and Indiana case granting a modification of child support, because such a finding is required before a modification can be granted. 750 ILCS 5/510; Indiana Code 81-1-11.5-17. I am simply unable to read into this standard, and in fact almost required, language any indication that the Illinois court "specifically" nullified the Indiana order. Absent a "specific" nullification, the Illinois order had no effect on the existing Indiana support order. In fact, Illinois has held that the *967language that a child support payment shall be "in liew of the present order for child support'" was not specific enough to indicate an intent to nullify the existing support order. Oetjen v. Oetjen (1981), 92 Ill.App.3d 699, 48 Ill.Dec. 247, 251, 416 N.E.2d 278, 282 (emphasis added). If "in lieu of" is insufficient, then silence on the issue surely is also.
I also disagree with the blanket statement that Illinois courts "have read RURE-SA as providing the responding court with the authority to modify foreign support orders if they specify the intent to do so." While the two Illinois appellate court cases cited in support do so hold, In re Marriage of Head (1989), 187 Ill.App.3d 159, 135 IIl. Dec. 110, 543 N.E.2d 345 and Oetjen, 48 Ill.Dec. 247, 416 N.E.2d 278, another district of the Illinois appellate court held to the contrary in In re Marriage of Casey (1990), 198 Ill.App.3d 619, 144 Ill.Dec. 804, 556 N.E.2d 271. The court stated: "Under URESA, a responding court may enter a decree for an amount of prospective child support that differs from the amount previously ordered by the initiating court. However, a support order issued pursuant to URESA does not supersede any previous order of support.... Though the respondent is entitled to a credit against the amount of arrearage due under the divorce judgment for the support he paid under the URESA judgment, his original obligations under the divorce judgment remain and any arrearage continues accumulating." Id. 144 Ill.Dec. at 805-806, 556 N.E.2d at 272-278 (citation omitted).
As noted by the majority, most courts interpreting URESA have concluded that orders of the responding court have no effect on the original judgment because the purpose of URESA is to provide an additional remedy. The authority is split on whether, given the fact RURESA has the same purpose, the same should hold true in spite of the language indicating that a specific order of a responding court will nullify an existing order. I am not persuaded by a 2-1 split between districts of the Illinois appellate court that we can safely say that Illinois interprets RURESA to permit the responding court to modify the child support order of the initiating court. To the contrary, I find instructive the opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Gifford (1988), 122 Ill.2d 34, 118 Ill.Dec. 452, 521 N.E.2d 929. The statute at issue in that case was Michigan's URE-SA provision, which did not include the "unless otherwise specifically provided by the court" language. But, in holding that an Illinois order was not nullified, the court concluded that allowing modification by a responding state defeats the stated purpose of providing an additional remedy. The Court held that because the remedies were designed to be in addition to and not in substitution for any other remedies, "if a URESA support order constituted a binding modification of the underlying decree then the legislature's laudable objective of providing an additional remedy would be thwarted." Id. 118 Ill.Dec. at 454, 521 N.E.2d at 981. Based on the foregoing, I am unconvinced that under Illinois law a responding state has the authority to modify a child support order of the initiating state.
However, I concur in result with the majority's opinion because I believe that by registering the Indiana judgment in IIli-nois, Wife conferred authority upon the Illinois court to make a binding prospective modification of the Indiana judgment.
Indiana's URESA statute provides: "The support order as confirmed shall have the same effect and may be enforced as if originally entered in the court of this state." IC. 81-2-1-87. Illinois's RURE-SA statute provides: "Upon registration the registered foreign support order shall be treated in the same manner as a support order entered by a court of this State. It has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a support order of this State and may be enforced and satisfied in like manner." 750 ILCS 20/40. Because support orders are subject to modification in Indiana and Illinois, if the registered judgment is treated as if originally entered in the state enforcing it, it is subject to modification. See *968Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Musiak (1989), Ky.App., 775 S.W.2d 524; Bjugan v. Bjugan (1985), Wyo., 710 P.2d 213; Banton v. Mathers (1974), 159 Ind.App. 634, 309 N.E.2d 167, n. 5. By choosing to proceed with the additional remedy of registration, Wife conferred the Illinois court with the power to modify the support obligation.
I concur in full with the majority's resolution of Issue III.