Court Opinion

ID: 9693038
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:17:12.77494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:39.069993
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
In this concurrence in part and dissent in part, I make reference, in toto, to my dissent in Rufener I, 392 N.W.2d at 429, hereby reiterating my previous work product.
It appears that Rufener will now have a new trial and I am gratified with the different perception of this Court. However, I do still hew to my viewpoints, in this case, concerning the right to sever charges for separate trials resulting from separate defenses. Since Rufener I was handed down, this author wrote on this same subject (which he has often heretofore by way of dissent) and my most recent and elaborated viewpoints on this subject are found in State v. Breed, 399 N.W.2d 311, 315 (S.D.1987) (Henderson, J., specially concurring).
In Rufener I, Justice Sabers, in his dissent, did not touch upon what I deemed to be improper joinder. I did not touch upon one of the bases of his dissent, namely, accomplice testimony. I have deliberated over his position with, hopefully, academic pursuit for the right legal position to be applied in this set of facts. I am now convinced that his position, as regards this set of facts, is correct. Therefore, in my opinion, the accomplice instruction should be given below at the new trial. As Justice Sabers reasons, the accomplice question should go to the jury. Under the circumstances of the dealings between Rufener *746and Persing, it is, at least, a question of fact for the jury to determine if Persing was an accomplice. As I did not touch on this subject in Rufener I, and as Justice Sabers has again, and more explicitly, set forth his position on accomplice instructions, I am compelled herein to voice my stand.