Court Opinion

ID: 9552277
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:07:58.200541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:01.889080
License: Public Domain

*176JACKSON, Vice Chief' Justice
(concurring specially).
By the plain terms of 84 O.S.1961, § 44, the Legislature has placed a limitation upon the power of one spouse by will to disinherit a surviving spouse, or give the survivor (by will) less than the survivor would receive through succession by law. The statutes of this state are'wholly silent as-to any “right or requirement of election”, and for this reason it may not be inferred from Sec. 44, supra, that a surviving spouse must elect to take under the law of succession in order to avoid the provisions of a will which are in conflict with that section. On the contrary in view of Sec. 44, if a survivor is to avoid the law of descent and distribution such survivor must affirmatively elect to take under the will.
In In re Baker’s Estate, 170 Okl. 595, 41 P.2d 640, we said:
“Under a system like ours, we know of no theory or rule of law under which a widow would be compelled to take under the law of descent and distribution if she preferred to take under the will of her husband. She undoubtedly has the right to elect under which she will take and, having elected, there is no ground on which anyone else may complain.”
In view of 84 O.S.1961, § 44, it is immediately apparent that a surviving spouse is a forced heir to the extent that the surviving spouse shall not he required to receive less in value than would be obtained through succession by law. It is also apparent from our holding in the Baker Estate that the surviving spouse has a right to take under the will notwithstanding the fact that in so doing such survivor may receive less than he or she would receive through succession by law.
Since L. E. Stinson did not elect to take under the law of descent and distribution, Eugenia Sherman contends that L. E. Stin-son’s estate will take under the will.
In the body of the opinion in Bank of Commerce & Trust Co. v. Trigg, 138 Okl. 216, 280 P. 563, we said:
“Since the widow died without electing to take under the will, did she take under the will or under the statute? There are numerous decisions holding that where an election is necessary, and where the legatee dies without having made an election, the heirs of the deceased are presumed to take under the will, and not under the statute. All of these cases, however, in so far as we have been able to ascertain, are based on statutes.
# ⅜ * * * #
“ * * * In all the states where these statutes prevail, it is uniformly held that, if the wife does not made an election, she is deemed to take under the will. The statutes so provide. These decisions, therefore, are not in point in this state, because we have no such statute.
“It is clear, from the terms of the will of Jerome B. York, that he did not intend the trust fund set aside for his wife as a bounty, in addition to her right to take under the statute. It was therefore necessary, if she desired to take under the will, to affirmatively elect to do so. Since the will was invalid as to her unless she affirmatively elected to take under it, and since she did not do this, it follows that one-third of the estate of Jerome B. York was inherited by her as a forced heir, and on her death the same passed to her heirs or legatees.” (emphasis supplied)
Eugenia Sherman, appellee, in her answer brief states that this court in the Trigg case, supra, “took the position that the Will leaving to a surviving spouse less than she is entitled to Under Title 84 O.S.A. § 44, is automatically void.” That, “later Oklahoma decisions have corrected what they consider error in this early decision insofar as this point is concerned.” Our attention is then invited to “the leading case” of Por*177ter v. Hansen (1942), 190 Okl. 429, 124 P.2d 391, wherein we said:
“ * * * If, as we hold, the will is only voidable at the election of the widow when the inheritance is governed by the proviso in the second subdivision (of 84 O.S.1961, § 213), it would likewise be voidable only at the election of the widow when the inheritance is governed by the fifth subdivision (of 84 O.S.1961, § 213).
“While there are expressions in some of our decisions that a will made in contravention of the proviso in the second subdivision is 'void’ and ‘invalid’ as to the widow (see Bank of Commerce & Trust Co. v. Trigg, 138 Okl. 216, 280 P. 563; Ward v. Cook, 152 Okl. 234, 3 P.2d 728), yet the words are there used loosely as is so frequently the case (67 C.J. 265) when the word ‘voidable’ was intended. The true rule is that a mill which gives to a forced heir less than the cited statutes give him or her is voidable as to such forced heir at his or her election. The will is rendered valid when the heir elects to take under the will, but is rendered inoperative as to such heir by his or her election to take under the law.” (emphasis supplied)
Our attention is also invited to the second paragraph of the syllabus in Odle v. Baskins, 190 Okl. 664, 126 P.2d 276, wherein we hold in part:
“If the surviving spouse is to avoid the will of the deceased spouse and elect to take by succession, such election must be made in county court prior to final distribution and settlement of the estate * * (emphasis supplied);
and to the body of the opinion wherein we said:
“While administration proceedings are still pending in the matter of the estate of a spouse who died testate, the surviving spouse, if the zv-ill is to be avoided, must elect to take by succession, or be bound by the final decree of distribution under the will.” ' (emphasis ours).
In Porter and Odie, supra, we neglected to let the language and meaning of Sec. 44, supra, direct us, but concentrated our attention upon the meaning of words previously selected by this court. In the Porter case we noticed that in some of our former decisions we had said that a will made in contravention of 84 O.S.1961, § 44, is “void” and “invalid” when the word “voidable” was intended. If the word “voidable” is used it follows that a will written in contravention to Sec. 44, supra, is not void or invalid but only “void” at the option of the- surviving spouse, and the burden of making an election to take under the law of succession is cast upon the surviving spouse. ' In other words if the word “voidable” is used the will is not void or illegal unless and until the surviving spouse makes an affirmative election to take through succession by law. The result which flows from this reasoning is demonstrated in Odie v. Baskin's, supra, wherein we said:
“ * * * the surviving spouse, if the will is to be avoided, must elect to take by succession * * *.”
Under Sec. 44, supra, it is provided that “no spouse shall bequeath or devise away’ from the other so much of the estate of the testator that the other spouse would receive' less in value than would be obtained through succession by law.” But where a spouse-violates this limitation imposed upon him. or her, and the surviving spouse remains silent, did the Legislature intend that the surviving spouse would take under such will? I do not believe so. When our decision in In re Baker’s Estate, supra, is read in connection with Sec. 44, supra, I believe it is correct to say that a will written in violation of Sec. 44 is simply “ineffective” as to the surviving spouse until the surviving spouse elects to take under the will. In this connection, however, it will be remembered that 58 O.S.1961, § 632, provides that a final decree “is conclusive as to the rights of heirs, legatees or devisees, subject only to be reversed, set aside, or modified on appeal.” 1 *178As to finality of final decrees in probate see Oberlander v. Eddington, Okl., 391 P.2d 889.
The principle of “offer” and “acceptance” in contract law, by analogy, seems to express the view which I am attempting to convey. A will which gives a surviving spouse less than the survivor would receive through succession by law is in the nature of an “offer” or invitation by deceased to the surviving spouse to take less than the survivor would take through succession by law. Such an “offer” or invitation, as in contract law, is not binding upon the surviving spouse and is ineffective unless the surviving spouse accepts such offer by electing to take under the will. In continuing the analogy it would be the duty of the probate court at the time of distribution and final decree, if the inventory and appraisement indicates that Sec. 44, supra, has been violated, to determine whether the surviving spouse had accepted the offer by electing to take under the will. Proof of an election to take under the will might appear from a written election, verbal expressions in court, or by conduct. Absent evidence of an election to take under the will it would be the legal duty of the trial court to give effect to Sec. 44, supra, and make provisions for the survivor under the laws of descent and distribution. Again, however, where there is no appeal from a final decree we must look to the validity of the final decree, as distinguished from the provisions of the will. 58 O.S.1961, § 623; Oberlander v. Eddington, supra. In Porter v. Hansen and in Odie v. Baskins, supra, attacks were being made upon final decrees.
I believe we should approve our holding in Bank of Commerce & Trust Co. v. Trigg, supra, and reject our statements in Porter and Odie, supra, that an election to take by succession must be made if the will is to be avoided.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice BLACKBIRD and Mr. Justice IRWIN concur in the views herein expressed.