Court Opinion

ID: 9812938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:52:14.163613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:27:16.947370
License: Public Domain

Stacy, C. J.,
dissenting: I have an abiding confidence that soon or late the Court will recede from the position first taken in the Newton case and repeated and extended in principle here. The two cases are at variance with the public policy of the State as established by a long line of decisions, extending over a,period of more than half a century. Brodnax v. Groom, 64 N. C., 244, decided in 1810, and followed in probably as many as two hundred cases since. See Shepard’s Citations and Allen’s Reported and Cited Cases, 1926.
It is no duty of the courts to supervise, or to control, the discretionary powers of administrative bodies, except in cases of oppression or manifest abuse, and they ought not to go out of their way hunting such tasks. Supervisors v. Comrs., 169 N. C., 548. To do so, says Chief Justice Pearson in Brodnax v. Groom, supra, would be to erect a “despotism of five men, which is opposed to the fundamental principles of our government and the uses of all times past.” This expression is referred to in the Court’s opinion, but apparently the further observation of the learned Chief Justice, made in the same connection, has been overlooked. Continuing, he said: “This Court has no power, and is not capable if it had the power, of controlling the exercise of power conferred by the Constitution upon the legislative department of the government or upon the county authorities.” The *61wisdom of this statement would seem to be abundantly supported by our recent disagreements in cases dealing with the powers of the State Highway Commission.
Speaking to the identical question in Peters v. Highway Commission, 184 N. C., 30, the late Chief Justice Clark said: “The courts are not empowered to supervise the action of administrative boards because of a difference of opinion as to the action taken or contemplated by the officials charged with the duties of administration.” And in Newton v. School Committee, 158 N. C., 186, Hoke, J., gave expression to the same position in forceful and emphatic language, as follows: “In some of the opinions, decided intimation is given that in so far as the courts are concerned the action of these administrative boards must stand unless so arbitrary and unreasonable as to indicate malicious or wanton disregard of the rights of persons affected. It is undesirable and utterly impracticable for the courts to act on any other principle.”
Prior to the decision in Newton v. Highway Commission, 192 N. C., 54, it was never thought that the State Highway Commission, clothed, as it is, with certain administrative and governmental functions, chiefly those enumerated in 3 C. S., 3846(j), has less discretion in the location of roads than a township road commission, a county highway commission, or a board of county commissioners. But such is the law as now declared. I know the majority opinion says that the Legislature has so commanded and we must obey. Quite true, if such be its mandate, but I do not so understand the language employed in the statute, and it is recalled that even in Joe'Newton case something was said about “the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.”
Speaking to the question of authority in Road Commission v. Highway Commission, 185 N. C., 56, Clark, C. J., delivering the opinion of the Court, said: “It was evidently the intent of the statute that the posting at the courthouse door was to give the State Highway Commission an opportunity to pass upon objections which might be raised against the proposed location by the local authorities and the restriction of 60 days in which such objection could be made, was a restriction upon the local authorities only. It was not intended to take from the State Highway Commission the general discretionary authority conferred in section 7 to 'change, alter, add to, or discontinue’ the roads shown on the map posted by the Highway Commission.”
The provisions of the statute applicable are as follows: “Fifty-five hundred (5500) miles shall be the approximate maximum limit of mileage of the State Highway System. The designation' of all roads comprising the State Highway System as proposed by the State Highway Commission shall be mapped, and there shall be publicly posted *62at the courthouse door in every county in the State a map of all the roads in such county in the State system, and the board of county commissioners or county road-governing body of each county, or street-governing body of each city or town in the State shall be notified of the routes that are to be selected and made a part of the State System of Highways; and if no objection or protest is made by the board of county commissioners of the county, road-governing body of any county, or street-governing body of any city or town in the State within sixty days after the notification before mentioned, then and in that case the said roads or streets, to which no objections are made, shall be and constitute links or parts of the State Highway System. If any objections are made-by the board of county commissioners or county road-governing body of any county or street-governing body of the city or town, the whole matter shall be heard and determined by the State Highway Commission in session, under such rules and regulations as may be laid down by the State Highway Commission, notice of the time and place of hearing to be given by the State Highway Commission at the courthouse door in the county, and in some newspaper published in the county, at least ten days prior to the hearing, and the decision of the State Highway Commission shall be final. A map showing the proposed roads to constitute the State Highway System is hereto attached to this article and made a part hereof. The roads so shown can be changed, altered, added to or discontinued by the State Highway Commission: Provided, no roads shall be changed, altered or discontinued so as to disconnect county seats, principal towns, State or National parks or forest reserves, principal State institutions and highway systems of other states.” 3 C. S., 3846(c).
Construing the above provisions in Cameron v. Highway Com., 188 N. C., 84, Adams, J., delivering the opinion of the Court, said: “We think it will appear, from a careful reading of those sections, that the roads outlined on the map. were intended as a tentative and not as a completed or final system of highways. Road Commissioners v. Highway Commission, 185 N. C., 56. They were referred to in the act as comprising a system ‘proposed’ by the commission, and again as roads ‘proposed’ for the State Highway System. They were not intended to be unalterable. In section 1 the commission was given express power, subject to limitations, to change, alter, add to, and discontinue roads; and, apparently, with a view to removing all doubt as to the scope of this power in relation to the question under consideration, it was vested with the specific right ‘to change or relocate any existing roads that it'may now own or may acquire.’ These definite and significant provisions convince us that the map cannot reasonably be accepted as a legislative fiat to construct a system of highways in strict *63conformity with the roads 'proposed/' and that the roads may be changed, altered, relocated and discontinued in the sound discretion of the commission, subject to the limitations prescribed by law.”
It will be observed that the finality of the decision of the State Highway Commission, mentioned in the statute, relates only to its decision on objections made by the local authorities within sixty days after a map of the proposed roads has been posted at the courthouse door. This is eminently proper, for such decision relates only to a preliminary or interlocutory question, and no appeal to the courts ought to be allowed or permitted until the final location of the road is to be determined. Then, as provided by 3 C. S., 3846(p), in cases calling for its application, “any party affected thereby shall be entitled to an.appeal, and the procedure for such appeal shall be the same as provided in chapter twenty-one for appeals from decisions and determinations of the Corporation Commission.” The plaintiffs, however, are not proceeding under this section, nor is it a case for such procedure. They are seeking to enjoin the State Highway Commission from locating the-road via Pembroke on the ground that such action is unlawful. This is the sole basis of plaintiff’s suit. We are therefore not now concerned with the wisdom or impolicy of the proposed change in the highway, but only with the legality of such change.
An erroneous position once taken and adhered to is difficult to maintain, and .when such is the case, as here, elaboration not infrequently results in reductio ad absurdum. How is the Highway Commission to proceed in the future? It is admitted that the road in the instant case, running from Philadelphus Church to McNeill’s Bridge, heretofore designated as a part of route No. 70, is not the same as that shown on the legislative map of 1921. But it has been taken over as such, and, according to the logic of the Court’s opinion, it cannot now be abandoned or discontinued as a part of the State System. Why not? Express statutory authority is given the Highway Commission to “change, alter, add to, or discontinue” any of the proposed roads shown upon the legislative map after they have been taken over as a part of the State System, subject only to the prohibition against disconnecting county seats, principal towns, State or National parks or forest reserves, principal State institutions and highway systems of other states. In the Cameron case, the entire road from Oxford to Durham, via Stem, was abandoned or discontinued, after it had been taken over and maintained as a part of the State System foi* three years, and an entirely different road, running by Creedmoor, was substituted in its place. This was held to be lawful, though Stem appeared on the legislative map, and Creedmoor did not. But it is now said that a much less deviation in Robeson County is unlawful. Is the law different in Robeson from *64what it is in the counties of Durham and Granville? Under this interpretation it may be doubted as to whether a single one of the highways, going to make up the State System, has been built in strict compliance with the law’s command.
Speaking to the question in Johnson v. Comrs., 192 N. C., 561, Connor, J., said: “No question or issue of fact involved, in the decision of the Highway Commission with respect to the location of route 21 is raised by the pleadings requiring that it be submitted to or passed upon by a jury; whether the Highway Commission had the power to change the location of the road, presents a question of law only to be determined by the Court. We are of the opinion that the Highway Commission had such power, and that upon the facts alleged in the complaint its exercise of such power is not subject to judicial review.”
In Newton v. Highway Commission, supra, it was said: “The Court cannot direct the location of the road,” and this case is cited with approval in the Court’s opinion. Is the Highway Commission, therefore, to understand that the Court is not directing the location of the present road, but is saying that the commission may not abandon or discontinue any part of the road heretofore taken over? If so, which holding is the Highway Commission to follow in the future, the one which says the Court will not direct the location of the road or the one which says the road heretofore taken over may not now be abandoned or discontinued? Has not the Court in effect done in the second breath what it said it would not do in the first? The location of the road is the point at issue in the present suit, hence the two expressions are difficult to reconcile when it comes to applying the law to variant facts.
I know the reply is, the road has already been located and the Court is not undertaking to locate the road, but only declaring what constitutes a permanent location under the statute. But what is the difference, on the facts of the present record, between directing a location and declaring that a permanent location has already been made, when the location of the road is the very question at issue? The plaintiffs say it should be located at one place, the intervehers at another and the defendant at still another. The Court says that the road has already been located, though unwittingly on the part of everybody, and that said location may not now be abandoned or discontinued. In the Newton case, the Court was careful to point out that it would not direct the location of roads. Then the question still remains: Does the Court intend to locate the present road by judicial decree or not? If it does not so intend to locate the road, the result is “confusion worse confounded.” On the other hand, if the road is to run from Philadelphus Church to McNeill’s Bridge as originally taken over, it *65will do so by judicial decree and not otherwise, for no one charged with the duty of designating the roads which are to constitute the State System, thinks it ought to go that way. So in the end, it would seem, that in the instant case the location of the road in controversy is to be made by the Court, and not by the Highway Commission.
The fundamental error in this case lies in the fact that the Court is undertaking to deal with a matter which properly belongs to another tribunal. The location of the road in question has been determined by the State Highway Commission in the exercise of authority conferred upon it by statute. There is no suggestion of any arbitrary action or abuse of discretion on its part. We are, therefore, concerned solely with the lawfulness of the proposed change, and nothing else. That it is in the interest of economy and produces a more practical and convenient route is the judgment, not only of the Highway Commission, but of the local authorities as well.
In the next place, the Court has erroneously assumed, it seems to me, that if the road from Philadelphus Church to McNeill’s Bridge is run via Pembroke (even at an increased distance of 2.9 miles, but at a saving in cost of approximately $225,000.00) Eaeford, the county seat of Hoke County, ipso facto will be disconnected from Lumberton, the county seat of Eoheson County, by a distance of thirteen miles, or the distance from Pembroke to Lumberton. The finding of the trial court, in this respect, is not supported by the evidence, and it is not binding on us if it were. The road is not going to stop at Pembroke simply because that portion of it from Lumberton to Pembroke has already been hard-surfaced. The road from Lumberton to Pembroke will become as much a part of route No. Y0, as it is now a part of route No. 20, just as the road from Cary to Ealeigh is a part of two routes and serves to connect both Durham, the county seat of Durham, and Sanford, the county seat of Lee, with Ealeigh, the county seat of Wake.
Clinton and Burgaw are connected with Wilmington by roads which converge at Castle Hayhe. Smithfield and Goldsboro are connected with Wilson by roads which converge at Oontentnea. The roads which connect Snow Hill and Kinston with Goldsboro become common some distance east of Goldsboro. And the roads which connect New Bern and Greenville with Kinston intersect at a point several miles north of Kinston. Without these and similar economies, it is reasonable to suppose that the county seats, principal towns and other termini mentioned in the Act of 1921, would never he linked together in one comprehensive system of State highways. It is estimated that more than 20,000 miles would be required to run a direct road from every county seat to every other county seat and principal town in the State.
*66Why should it be necessary to parallel these two roads, approximately a mile apart for a distance of ten miles at an increased cost of $225,-000.00 when a single road will serve all the traffic? One reason assigned is that the proposed change is not in accord with the legislative map. Neither is the road that has been taken over. The map, therefore, is to be used only to prevent a change in location and not for the purpose of determining the correct location, otherwise the interveners might prevail. A very remarkable map, indeed! I confess that it does not excite my admiration as a work of art, for it was never intended as such. It was prepared hurriedly by men in Raleigh, who had no idea they were actually locating roads “by painting highways on a painted landscape,” and I cannot think the Legislature intended to adopt it as a work of finality, else the State Highway Commission would never have been given authority to employ engineers who use transit and tape.
Speaking to this position, in his excellent brief, the learned Assistant Attorney-General, Mr. Ross, well says: “These proposed roads, as said by Mr. Justice Adams in Cameron v. Highway Commission, 188 N. C., 187, ‘were not intended to be unalterable.’ They were to be laid out ‘by the most practical routes.’ To attempt to view them as the then existing traveled highways — the majority of which had been built without engineering advice at all, and some had only followed the trail of the savage or the buffalo — would, in the very beginning, have shackled the Highway Commission to a dead past.”
The case, in its final analysis, presents but a single question. It is this: Has the location of all the highways, going to make up the State System, been settled in advance by legislative fiat, or is this a matter to be determined by the State Highway Commission? Before a' road can be built, it must be located at some definite and specific place on the ground. Who is to say where that place shall be? I think the Legislature has wisely committed this question to the decision of the State Highway Commission in the exercise of a sound but not arbitrary judgment. It is undesirable and utterly impracticable to build roads in any other way. It is not to be presumed that the Legislature intended a policy of reckless extravagance rather than one of prudent economy in providing for the construction and maintenance of a State System of hard-surfaced and other dependable roads, connecting by the most practicable routes the various county seats and other principal towns of every county in the State.
The State Highway Commission, with the aid of the commissioners of Robeson County and other local authorities, has determined that “the most practical route” from Red Springs to Lumberton is by way of Pembroke. The wisdom of this decision is neither questioned nor *67denied; but it is alleged that another road between these two places has already been taken over and that it has now become a .part o£ the State System and as such cannot be abandoned or discontinued. When did a sovereign state ever commit itself to such a policy before?
There is another provision of the judgment deserving of attention. It is not only held that the entire road, heretofore taken over as route No. 70, has now become a part of the State System, and as such, may not be abandoned or discontinued, either in whole or in part, but the defendant is also restrained from building any road “from Philadelphus along the yellow line to a point in the vicinity of Pembroke.” Why this specific injunction? Is the Highway Commission limited in its work to the construction and maintenance of roads shown upon the map, except in those cases where it has inadvertently taken over a road which does not appear thereon? If so, then the law sanctions an “ignorant” departure from the map and condemns an “intelligent” one.
It is specifically provided by 3 C. S., 3846(j) that the State Highway Commission shall have power “to locate and acquire rights of way for any new roads that may be necessary for a State Highway System, with full power to widen, relocate, change or alter the grade or location thereof; to change or relocate any existing roads that the State Highway Commission may now own or may acquire,” etc. This language would seem to be too plain for debate or for any diversity of opinion. But for some reason not stated by the majority we construe it differently.
The road which connects Raeford, the county seat of Hoke County, with Lumberton, the county seat of Robeson County, runs by Red Springs, Philadelphus Church, thence east of Pembroke to McNeill’s Bridge and on into Lumberton. As a more practical route it is proposed to run this same road by Red Springs, Philadelphus Church, Pembroke, thence to McNeill’s Bridge and on into Lumberton. And yet it is seriously contended, and actually held for law, that, if that portion of the road between Philadelphus Church and McNeill’s Bridge is deflected so as to run by Pembroke, this will disconnect the two county seats. If the two county seats are thus disconnected by the distance from Lumberton to Pembroke, why not by the distance from Lumberton to McNeill’s Bridge, or by the distance from Lumberton to Philadelphus Church, or by the distance from Lumberton to Red Springs? What is there about Pembroke that a road cannot pass without stopping ?
Under the statute, as now interpreted, it would seem that the State Highway Commission, instead of trying to serve all the people of the State, as it has been and is now doing, should have started at a given *68point, moved as rapidly as it could, but taking care not to assume control of any road, either in whole or in part, which, in its judgment, ought not to become a permanent link in the Highway System, for once having taken it over it could not thereafter be abandoned or discontinued. This would have given one section of the State a first and prior advantage over other sections, to be equalized only as the work progressed, but it appears that, in no other way would it have been possible to comply with the statute as presently interpreted. It certainly has not been complied with up to date, for heretofore it has been thought that it had quite a different meaning. Our own decisions have been otherwise. With due deference to my brethren, I think the interpretation now placed on the statute is, not only strained, but entirely at variance with the intent of the Legislature.'
It is conceded that when the meaning of a statute is plain and its provisions susceptible of but one intepretation, its consequences, if objectionable, can’ only be avoided by a change in the law itself. But where the purpose of the Legislature is not clearly expressed, it is always to be presumed that a statute was intended to have the most reasonable and beneficial operation permissible from the language used. And when a statute is ambiguous in terms, or fairly susceptible of two interpretations, the injustice, hardship, or inconvenience which is likely to follow the one construction, or the other, may be considered, and a construction of which'the statute is fairly susceptible may be placed upon it, so as to avoid all such objectionable consequences and advance what must be presumed to be its true object and purpose. 25 R. C. L., 1018. In short, it is well settled that if the language of a statute be obscure or ambiguous and its meaning not clearly designated, the effects and consequences of the one construction or the other may and ought to be resorted to as important aids in determining its true meaning and intent. 2 Lewis’ Suth. Statutory Construction (2 ed.), secs. 488-490.
But why pursue the matter at greater length? Cui bono? Enough has already been said to demonstrate the necessity of further legislative action in order that the State Highway Commission may proceed, in some workable way, with the construction of the State highways. Without such relief, the Commission must now labor under the tyranny and thraldom of intolerable restrictions, which, in my opinion, were never intended by the Legislature; indeed, which cannot be observed if the highways of the State are to be constructed with any regard whatever for economy and the first principles of civil engineering. Nevertheless, the law is, as it is declared. And while all are compelled to bow to the present attitude of the majority, I do so with a firm conviction that the judgment is erroneous, both in principle and result.