Court Opinion

ID: 9600848
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:32:00.765296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:54.145570
License: Public Domain

*632PIEPER, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, this case involves more than a situation where a party alleges fraud in the inducement of just the contract itself, as opposed to challenging the arbitration provision of the contract. I believe the Church has raised a colorable claim that there was no arbitration agreement by alleging the signer of the agreement had neither the authority to agree to the contract itself, nor the authority to agree to the arbitration provision.
I fully support the policy in favor of arbitration and will not resort to citation of the law in this regard. I believe the majority opinion fully recounts the applicable law. However, the majority notes that where there has been no agreement to arbitrate, a party cannot be forced to do so. I believe further clarification of the law in this area is necessary. Based on the facts of this case, I find it very problematic that a person, without authority, may set out to not only bind another to a contract, but also to arbitration without the right to do so, and without a preliminary court determination on the issue of the authority to bind (i.e. the existence of the agreement to arbitrate). Under the facts herein, I respectfully believe this case falls within that type of “gateway matter” ripe for a judicial determination as to the existence of the agreement to arbitrate. See Simpson v. MSA of Myrtle Beach, Inc., 373 S.C. 14, 22, 644 S.E.2d 663, 667 (2007) (stating where one party denies the existence of an arbitration agreement raised by an opposing party, a court must immediately determine whether the agreement exists in the first place); see also 9 U.S.C.A. § 4 (2008) (wherein the Federal Arbitration Act directs the court to summarily determine the existence of the arbitration agreement if it is at issue); accord S.C.Code Ann. § 15-48-20(a) (2005).
Moreover, the circuit court did not rule that arbitration may not eventually result; instead, the court concluded that a preliminary and threshold determination must be made about the existence of an agreement to arbitrate. Once that threshold determination is made, I do not read the court’s order as precluding arbitration if the issue as to the authority to enter the agreement to arbitrate is determined adversely to the *633Church. Therefore, I agree with the assertion by the Church in its brief that the appeal is premature.
Accordingly, I would affirm.