Court Opinion

ID: 9889721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 13:07:46.294151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:19.505885
License: Public Domain

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
ex rel. Mobley v. Tyack, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3673.]

                                           NOTICE
      This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
      advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
      promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
      South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
      formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
      the opinion is published.

                          SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-3673
         THE STATE EX REL. MOBLEY, APPELLANT, v. TYACK, APPELLEE.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
         may be cited as State ex rel. Mobley v. Tyack, Slip Opinion No.
                                     2023-Ohio-3673.]
Vexatious litigators—R.C. 2323.52—R.C. 2323.52(G) unambiguously prohibits an
        appeal from a court of appeals’ judgment denying a motion to continue
        proceedings as a vexatious litigator—Appeal dismissed for lack of
        jurisdiction.
     (No. 2023-0314—Submitted July 18, 2023—Decided October 11, 2023.)
               APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,
                                       No. 22AP-313.
                                     _______________
        Per Curiam.
        {¶ 1} Appellant, Alphonso Mobley Jr., filed a complaint for a writ of
mandamus in the Tenth District Court of Appeals against appellee, Franklin County
Prosecutor G. Gary Tyack, seeking an order compelling production of public
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records and awarding statutory damages. During the pendency of the case, Mobley
was declared a vexatious litigator. He filed a motion for leave to continue the
mandamus action against Tyack, but the Tenth District denied the motion and
dismissed his complaint. Mobley appeals the dismissal. We dismiss Mobley’s
appeal.
                                  BACKGROUND
          {¶ 2} Mobley alleges that in April 2022, he made a public-records request
to Tyack under Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43, for paper copies of the
following: “a. Records Retention Schedule[,] b. File [N]o. PRR-0599[, and] c.
Certified Statements [p]ursuant to R.C. 309.16 for the years of 2016-2020.”
          {¶ 3} On June 1, 2022, Mobley filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in
the Tenth District, arguing that Tyack had “failed to answer” his records request.
Mobley requested that the Tenth District compel production of the requested public
records and award statutory damages.           Tyack moved to dismiss Mobley’s
complaint, arguing that he had responded to Mobley’s request, that he had produced
the requested records, and that he did not possess the certified statements for the
years 2016 through 2019.
          {¶ 4} Mobley filed a supplemental affidavit, attesting that on June 3, 2022,
he received a response from Tyack, in which Tyack said he would provide Mobley
with paper copies of the records-retention schedule and the documents comprising
“[f]ile [N]o. PRR-0599.”       Tyack filed a response to Mobley’s supplemental
affidavit, stating that “after an extensive search, the current administration is unable
to locate the requested certified statements for the years 2016, 2017, 2018, and
2019.” Tyack further said that he provided Mobley with the 2020 certified
statement on July 6, 2022.
          {¶ 5} On January 20, 2023, in a separate case, the Franklin County Court of
Common Pleas issued a judgment declaring Mobley a vexatious litigator under
R.C. 2323.52. Tyack v. Mobley, Franklin C.P. No. 21CV2747 (Jan. 20, 2023).

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                                January Term, 2023

       {¶ 6} On January 31, Mobley filed a motion for leave in the Tenth District
to continue his mandamus action as a vexatious litigator, as required under R.C.
2323.52(F)(2). On February 2, the Tenth District denied Mobley’s motion and
dismissed the mandamus action, stating that Mobley’s motion and complaint failed
to establish that his mandamus claim was not an abuse of process or that there were
reasonable grounds for allowing the action to proceed.
       {¶ 7} Mobley timely appealed to this court and argues that the requirement
that he obtain leave to proceed as a vexatious litigator is unconstitutional and
conflicts with the Ohio Revised Code and the Rules of Civil Procedure. Mobley
also argues that if the Tenth District’s decision is considered a ruling on the merits,
he is entitled to statutory damages.
                                       ANALYSIS
       {¶ 8} R.C. 2323.52 was enacted to “ ‘prevent abuse of the system by those
persons who persistently and habitually file lawsuits without reasonable grounds
and/or otherwise engage in frivolous conduct in the trial courts of this state.’ ”
Mayer v. Bristow, 91 Ohio St.3d 3, 13, 740 N.E.2d 656 (2000), quoting Cent. Ohio
Transit Auth. v. Timson, 132 Ohio App.3d 41, 50, 724 N.E.2d 458 (10th Dist.1998).
Once Mobley was declared a vexatious litigator, R.C. 2323.52(F)(2) required him
to file a motion for leave to proceed in the court of appeals on his pending
mandamus action. To grant Mobley leave to proceed, the court of appeals had to
be “satisfied that the proceedings * * * [were] not an abuse of process of the court
and that there [were] reasonable grounds for the proceedings or application,” id. In
denying Mobley leave, the Tenth District necessarily determined that his
mandamus claim constituted an abuse of process of the court and that there were
no reasonable grounds for the action.
       {¶ 9} R.C. 2323.52(G) states that when the order declaring an individual a
vexatious litigator is in effect, “no appeal by the person who is the subject of that
order shall lie from a decision of the * * * court of appeals * * * that denies that

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person leave for the * * * continuance of * * * legal proceedings * * * in a court of
appeals * * * .” See also Marin v. Trumbull Cty. Probate Court, 133 Ohio St.3d
1416, 2012-Ohio-4758, 976 N.E.2d 908 (under R.C. 2323.52(G), “no appeal shall
lie from a decision that denies leave to institute or continue legal proceedings in a
court of appeals”). Because R.C. 2323.52(G) unambiguously prohibits an appeal
from a court of appeals’ judgment denying a motion to continue proceedings filed
by a vexatious litigator, we lack jurisdiction to consider Mobley’s appeal. Our
resolution of this issue is dispositive, and we need not reach Mobley’s other
propositions of law.
                                  CONCLUSION
       {¶ 10} Mobley’s appeal from the Tenth District is prohibited under R.C.
2323.52(G). Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
                                                                   Appeal dismissed.
       FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, and DETERS, JJ., concur.
       KENNEDY, C.J., concurs, with an opinion joined by BRUNNER, J.
                                _________________
       KENNEDY, C.J., concurring.
       {¶ 11} I agree with the majority that the appeal brought by appellant,
Alphonso Mobley Jr., is prohibited by R.C. 2323.52(G) and must be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction. I write separately, however, to caution courts against using the
vexatious-litigator statute to thwart legitimate public-records requests.
       {¶ 12} “ ‘The purpose of the vexatious litigator statute is clear. It seeks to
prevent abuse of the system by those persons who persistently and habitually file
lawsuits without reasonable grounds and/or otherwise engage in frivolous conduct
in the trial courts of this state.’ ” Mayer v. Bristow, 91 Ohio St.3d 3, 13, 740 N.E.2d
656 (2000), quoting Cent. Ohio Transit Auth. v. Timson, 132 Ohio App.3d 41, 50,
724 N.E.2d 458 (10th Dist.1998), abrogated by Mayer. The statute is designed to
prevent “ ‘baseless litigation,’ ” id., quoting Timson at 50, and “illegitimate

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                                 January Term, 2023

activities,” id. “[T]he statute is not designed, nor does it operate, to preclude
vexatious litigators from proceeding forward on their legitimate claims.” Id. at 14.
         {¶ 13} In this case, the vexatious-litigator statute did not operate according
to its purpose. As noted by the majority, by denying Mobley’s motion for leave to
proceed, the Tenth District Court of Appeals necessarily determined under R.C.
2323.52(F)(2) that either Mobley’s mandamus action was an abuse of process or
there were no reasonable grounds for the action. But the facts demonstrate that
Mobley did have reasonable grounds for the action, because he had a legitimate
claim.
         {¶ 14} In April 2022, Mobley requested records under Ohio’s Public
Records Act, R.C. 149.43, from appellee, Franklin County Prosecutor G. Gary
Tyack, including “Certified Statements [p]ursuant to R.C. 309.16 for the years of
2016-2020.” Three months later, on July 6, Tyack provided Mobley with only the
2020 certified statements.      Construing the Public Records Act liberally, the
presiding magistrate denied Tyack’s motion to dismiss, finding that Tyack had
failed to prove by sworn statement that the 2016 through 2019 certified statements
did not exist. Although Mobley maintained a legitimate claim, resolution of his
mandamus action did not proceed until after he was declared a vexatious litigator.
         {¶ 15} When a person has a legitimate mandamus claim based on a party’s
failure to provide public records within a reasonable time, that person’s status as a
vexatious litigator should not be used to preclude the claim. Nor should courts
grant vexatious-litigator status simply because a person is exercising a substantive
right as afforded by the General Assembly to seek access to a public record.
However, because I agree that R.C. 2323.52(G) divests this court of jurisdiction
over Mobley’s appeal, I must concur in the majority opinion in this case.
         BRUNNER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
                                 _________________
         Alphonso Mobley Jr., pro se.

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                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

       G. Gary Tyack, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Thomas W.
Ellis, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
                               _________________

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