Court Opinion

ID: 9492773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:50:15.942876+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:29.425233
License: Public Domain

FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in Parts I, II, III, IV-A, and V-A of the majority opinion, but for the following reasons I dissent from Parts IVB and V-B.
The Bowen Group insists that the Bureau’s position cannot be used against its members because to do so would be a forbidden retroactive application of the Bureau’s views. That group relies on our decision in Cort v. Crabtree, 113 F.3d 1081, 1086-87 (9th Cir.1997). In Cort, the Bureau attempted to apply a program change to prisoners who had already commenced a comprehensive substance abuse treatment program and been told that they were eligible for early release. See id. at 1082-83. We determined that the change could not be construed as having retroactive effect. See id. at 1084. Were it applied retroactively, we said, the prisoners’ “settled expectations” would have been disrupted. Id. at 1086. Thus, we said, “the Bureau’s new definition of ‘nonviolent offenses’ cannot be applied to prisoners already in the treatment program on the date of its adoption, much less to prisoners who have already been found eligible.” Id. Then, we concluded by saying that the change “applies only to prisoners who had neither entered the substance abuse treatment program nor received favorable eligibility determinations as of the date of its issuance.” Id. at 1086-87. The Bowen Group puts too much weight on that decision.
In the first place, despite its somewhat broader language, the decision can only directly apply to those who have both received a favorable eligibility determination and entered the program. That is because it is only that group that the case dealt with. Perhaps that group did have settled expectations. However, as we later decided, a prisoner who had entered a substance abuse treatment program, but who had not yet been found eligible for early release, could not “urge a retroactivity argument” because he did not have settled expectations that were protected from disruption. Furguiel v. Benov, 155 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir.1998); see also Delancy v. Crabtree, 131 F.3d 780, 785-87 (9th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 932, 118 S.Ct. 2332, 141 L.Ed.2d 705 (1998). Similarly, a person who has received an eligibility determination, but who has not yet entered and commenced the drug abuse treatment program itself, should not be treated as having a settled expectation about the outcome. In other words, Cort dealt with a conjunction — entry and eligibility determination' — even though its conclusion seemed to speak in the disjunctive. Because the disjunctive is dicta, it does not control here. Thus, the Bowen Group is not protected by Cort, even if the cases were otherwise the same.
More importantly, the cases are not the same. Retroactivity concerns are, therefore, out of place here. The key to a concern about retroactivity is whether a prisoner’s settled expectations have been disrupted. If a prisoner has no settled expectation that he will be granted a reduction of his custody period, a program change will not be retroactive as to him. As we have said in a similar context:
In order to urge a retroactivity argument, a prisoner’s notice of eligibility for early release must have accrued prior to the promulgation of § 550.58. Under the factual circumstances of this case, we find that Furguiel has failed to demon*1224strate any settled expectation of legitimate eligibility for early release under § 3621(e)(2)(B).
Furguiel, 155 F.3d at 1049 (footnote omitted).
In the case at hand, the Bowen Group could not have had a settled expectation. Unlike Cort, this case is not one where there had been a determination of eligibility. Rather, the Bureau told the group members that their eligibility was only provisional, and they agreed. The notice to them was clearly entitled “Provisional Notice of ... 3621(E) Eligibility,” and goes on to state that it is the “current assessment ... that it does appear that you will be 'provisionally eligible for early release.” (Emphasis in original.) The agreement that they signed stated,- among other things, “I understand that if I have been found eligible for an early release under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e), this eligibility is provisional, and may change.” (Emphasis in original.)1
I do not quite see how a person can claim a settled expectation that he will obtain an early release when the notice of that possibility is expressly made provisional. Whether I look at a law dictionary, a general American dictionary, or the OED, I find that provisional means just what I would expect — something that is subject to nullification, or that is tentative, or temporary, or preliminary. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1224 (6th ed.1990) (“provisional” means “[tjemporary; preliminary; tentative; taken or done by way of precaution or ad interim.”); Aneriean Heritage Dictionary 1459 (3d ed.1992) (“provided or serving only for the time being;. tempor rary.”); Websters’ Third New Int’l Dictionary 1827 (3d ed.1986) (“suitable or acceptable in situation but subject to change or nullification: tentative, conditional.”); Compact Oxford English Dictionary 1456 (2d ed.1991) (“of or belonging to, or of the nature of a temporary provision ... for the time being ... preparatory, preliminary.”). That simply cannot convey an expectation that the denouement will be the same as the interim decision, much less a settled expectation. And, it should be emphasized, this was not sprung on the inmates mid-program, after they had devoted many hours to the program’s completion. Rather, they were so informed before they actually entered and began working in the treatment program. In that respect, their expectations, if any, were even less likely to be settled than those of the prisoner in Furguiel, 155 F.3d at 1047, who had actually entered and begun work in the treatment program before he was notified that he would be ineligible for early release.
Nor can I accept the Bowen Group’s claim that “provisional” only means, in effect, that a prisoner had to complete the treatment program before he could get early release. That would make the word a mere tautology, or, at best, an unexplained redundancy. The whole statutory scheme required that a prisoner could only obtain early release “after successfully completing a treatment program.” 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B). And the agreement’s many detailed provisions informed the prisoner that he must fully engage in and complete all parts of the program, if he expected to remain in and complete it. Obviously, the word “provisional” goes beyond those conditions; it, instead, must cover other possibilities — for example, as Program Statement 5330.10 states at ¶ 6.6, eligibility is subject to a final release review at which time the staff will “carefully review all relevant statutory and regulatory criteria.”
In fine, here, as in Furguiel, 155 F.3d at 1049, no “settled expectation of legitimate *1225eligibility for early release under § 3621(e)(2)(B)” has been demonstrated.
Therefore, I concur in all but Parts IVB and V-B of the majority opinion, and dissent as to those parts.

. I am cognizant of the claims by five members of the Bowen Group that their cases are special because they, at some point, had a document in hand that did not specifically state that their eligibility was provisional. However, each of them received a provisional notice either before, or within a few days after, the date of the mentioned document, and each received that notice long before starting a drug abuse treatment program. Moreover, each received a notice of ineligibility for early release before he entered a program. Indeed, as of March 5, 1998, three of 'the five still had not started a program.