Court Opinion

ID: 9367251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-31 14:04:35.485293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:58.682605
License: Public Domain

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                  THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

                              ___________________________

Hillsborough-northern judicial district
No. 2021-0462

                 PETITION OF THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

                          Argued: September 15, 2022
                        Opinion Issued: January 31, 2023

      John M. Formella, attorney general, and Anthony Galdieri, solicitor
general (Elizabeth C. Woodcock, senior assistant attorney general, on the brief
and orally), for the State.

      Christopher M. Johnson, chief appellate defender, of Concord, on the
brief and orally, for the juvenile.

      HANTZ MARCONI, J. The State filed a petition for writ of certiorari
seeking review of an order of the Superior Court (Nicolosi, J.) declining to
accept the transfer of a juvenile delinquency case because the superior court
concluded that the circuit court erred when it found that the juvenile was
competent. The superior court remanded to the circuit court for a new
competency determination. The State argues that RSA 169-B:24 (2022) does
not authorize the superior court to conduct an appellate review of the circuit
court’s competency ruling. We vacate and remand.
                                        I.

       The record supports the following facts. In June 2019, the State filed a
delinquency petition charging the sixteen-year-old juvenile with attempted
second-degree murder. At arraignment in the circuit court, the State moved to
certify the juvenile as an adult and to transfer the case to the superior court.
Before considering transfer, however, the circuit court held a competency
hearing. After considering expert testimony that the juvenile was not
competent, the circuit court issued a nine-page order rejecting that testimony
and finding the juvenile competent. The juvenile then filed a habeas petition in
superior court challenging the competency finding. The Superior Court
(Anderson, J.) denied the petition because the juvenile had not sought an
interlocutory appeal of the competency ruling and therefore had not exhausted
his available remedies. The transfer hearing proceeded, and after considering
the transfer factors in RSA 169-B:24, I(a)-(h), the circuit court granted the
State’s transfer petition.

       The Superior Court (Nicolosi, J.) then considered whether to accept
transfer. It declined, concluding that the circuit court’s earlier competency
finding was erroneous. It reasoned that the circuit court did not “adequately
point out the facts upon which it relied,” nor “adequately delineate its reasons
for rejecting uncontroverted expert testimony.” The court remanded the case to
the circuit court “for further articulation of any additional facts upon which it
relied.” The order directed that “[i]f the circuit court upon review finds no
further factual support for its finding, it shall so state and a finding [of]
incompetency should be entered.” The State then filed this petition for writ of
certiorari. See Sup. Ct. R. 11.

                                       II.

       The State argues that the superior court erred by reviewing the circuit
court’s competency finding. It asserts that competency is not a transfer factor
in RSA 169-B:24, but rather is a “separate and distinct issue addressed under
RSA 169-B:20.” See RSA 169-B:20 (2022). The State thus argues that the
superior court exceeded its authority to review the transfer order under RSA
169-B:24 by reviewing a competency order entered under RSA 169-B:20. In
opposition, the juvenile argues that the “superior court ha[s] the authority to
remand the case to the circuit court for a proper application of the competency
standards governing juveniles.” (Capitalization omitted.) He asserts that he
has a federal and state constitutional right not to be subjected to a transfer
hearing unless competent, and that incompetency hampers his defense and
“render[s] unreliable” the court’s resolution of factual questions. He contends
that competency falls within the superior court’s authority to review whether
the circuit court fairly considered the factors of RSA 169-B:24, and whether the
transfer was erroneous as a matter of law. He argues that the scope of transfer
review should be construed broadly because of the “statute’s requirement that

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‘all . . . papers’ filed in the Circuit Court be transferred to the Superior Court”
(quoting RSA 169-B:24, II), and because other transfer cases have reviewed
questions about the “lawfulness or constitutionality of Circuit Court rulings in
transfer proceedings.” We agree with the State that review of competency is
outside the scope of the superior court’s appellate authority under RSA 169-
B:24.

       Whether RSA 169-B:24 permits the superior court to review a
competency finding of the circuit court is an issue of statutory interpretation,
which we review de novo. See Langevin v. Travco Ins. Co., 170 N.H. 660, 664
(2018). We first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible,
construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. We
interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider
what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did
not see fit to include. Id. We construe all parts of a statute together to
effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust result. Id. Absent
an ambiguity we will not look beyond the language of the statute to discern
legislative intent. State v. Addison (Capital Murder), 165 N.H. 381, 418 (2013).
Our goal is to apply statutes in light of the policy sought to be advanced by the
entire statutory scheme. Id. Accordingly, we interpret a statute in the context
of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation. Id.

       Under RSA 169-B:24, the decision to transfer a juvenile to superior court
for adult prosecution falls within the circuit court’s discretion. See RSA 169-
B:24; In re Eduardo L., 136 N.H. 678, 683 (1993). The statute requires the
circuit court to hold a transfer hearing, and it provides eight factors to guide
the transfer decision. RSA 169-B:24, I(a)-(h); Eduardo L., 136 N.H. at 683-84.
Though RSA 169-B:24 does not specify the superior court’s role in accepting
transfer, we have held that it acts as an appellate court, reviewing the circuit
court’s transfer ruling for an unsustainable exercise of discretion. In re Erik
M., 146 N.H. 508, 510-11 (2001). In light of the discretionary nature of the
circuit court’s decision, we have deemed the superior court’s review to be
limited to whether the circuit court fairly considered all the applicable factors
of RSA 169-B:24, and whether its decision is supported by the evidence and
not erroneous as a matter of law. Id. at 510.

       We need not address either the juvenile’s argument that the Federal and
State Constitutions prohibit conducting a transfer hearing with an incompetent
juvenile, or the juvenile’s argument that incompetency would undermine the
reliability of a transfer hearing. Even if we assume that the juvenile is correct,
these arguments do not affect our analysis. The legislature has recognized the
importance of juvenile competency, providing statutory safeguards within RSA
169-B:20. Competency is a prerequisite to any delinquency proceeding —
including a transfer hearing. See RSA 169-B:20, VI. If competency is at issue,
proceedings are suspended until a competency evaluation is performed, and
the entire petition must be dismissed if competency is not established. RSA

                                         3
169-B:20, VI, VIII. If a juvenile disputes the circuit court’s competency finding,
the juvenile may seek immediate review in this court by interlocutory appeal
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 8, or, if the trial court declines to authorize
such an appeal, by petition for writ of certiorari. See Sup. Ct. R. 8
(interlocutory appeal from ruling); Sup. Ct. R. 11 (petition for original
jurisdiction). A competency finding may also be reviewed on appeal from a
final disposition. See, e.g., State v. Moncada, 161 N.H. 791, 793-98 (2011). If
a juvenile is found to be competent in the circuit court and the case is
transferred, RSA 169-B:20, XI allows the superior court to revisit competency
and to make its own finding relevant to the adult criminal proceedings. RSA
169-B:20, XI. Thus, because juvenile competency is protected by a separate
statute within RSA chapter 169-B and is independently appealable, and
because RSA 169-B:24 does not include competency as a transfer factor, we
conclude that transfer review does not include review of the circuit court’s
competency finding.

       Next, the juvenile argues that RSA 169-B:24, II’s requirement that “[a]ll
original papers” of the circuit court be filed in the superior court supports a
broad scope of appellate review in the superior court. See RSA 169-B:24, II
(“All original papers . . . shall be filed with and shall constitute the records of
the court to which transfer is made.”). The juvenile’s argument effectively asks
us to consider a single phrase in isolation to support his position that transfer
review under RSA 169-B:24 includes the circuit court’s competency ruling. We
do not, however, consider words and phrases in isolation when interpreting
statutes, but rather within the context of the statute as a whole. Petition of
Carrier, 165 N.H. 719, 721 (2013). And as described above, review of the
circuit court’s competency ruling under RSA 169-B:20 is already available.
Given the statutory context of this language, we are not persuaded that it
supports a broad scope of review. Furthermore, the original records of a
delinquency proceeding may be relevant to other matters that the superior
court does have authority to consider. For example, the history of a
delinquency case may be relevant if the superior court decides to revisit
competency pursuant to RSA 169-B:20, XI. Thus, this statutory language does
not support a broad scope of transfer review.

        Nor are we persuaded by the four cases the juvenile cites in support of
his position that the superior court has the authority to “review[] questions
about the lawfulness or constitutionality of Circuit Court rulings in transfer
proceedings.” See Eduardo L. 136 N.H. 678 (reviewing admission of hearsay
statements during transfer hearing); In re Farrell, 142 N.H. 424 (1997)
(reviewing evidentiary rulings in the transfer hearing that implicated
constitutional rights); State v. Gibbs, 126 N.H. 347 (1985) (reviewing circuit
court’s admission of a confession at the transfer hearing, when it was found at
trial to violate the right to counsel); and Vernon E., 121 N.H. 836 (reviewing
whether admission of evidence at transfer hearing violated double jeopardy).
None of these cases supports a scope of review reaching beyond the transfer

                                        4
proceeding itself, because they all dealt with rulings made within transfer
proceedings. In contrast, competency decisions are made before transfer
proceedings begin. We decline to extend this line of cases to rulings made
outside of the transfer hearing.

       Lastly, the juvenile contends that “this Court ought bear in mind the
interpretive principle enacted by the legislature,” namely, that the provisions of
“RSA 169-B ‘shall be liberally interpreted, construed, and administered to
effectuate’ the legislature’s purposes, which include . . . encouragement of ‘the
wholesome moral, mental, emotional, and physical development of each minor
coming within’ the Chapter’s scope ‘by providing the protection, care,
treatment, counselling, supervision, and rehabilitative resources which each
minor needs.’” (Quoting RSA 169-B:1, I.) He argues that including competency
in transfer review “serves those goals by helping to ensure that courts will not
transfer for trial in criminal court juveniles who should not be prosecuted in
that forum.” This policy argument is better made before the legislature. See
Appeal of New England Police Benevolent Ass’n, 171 N.H. 490, 497 (2018)
(“Because our function is not to make laws, but to interpret them, any public
policy arguments relevant to the wisdom of the statutory scheme and its
consequences should be addressed to the General Court.” (quotation omitted)).
As explained above, nothing in RSA 169-B:24 gives the superior court authority
to review competency findings during a transfer hearing. See RSA 169-B:24.
For the reasons set forth above, we decline to read such authority into RSA
169-B:24.

                                                   Vacated and remanded.

      HICKS, BASSETT, and DONOVAN, JJ., concurred.

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