Court Opinion

ID: 9787312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:14:35.655466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:54.620289
License: Public Domain

STEWART, Judge,
concurring.
I agree with Judge Mannheimer that we apply Alaska law on the question of the retroactivity of Blakely v. Washington1 rather than the analysis in Teague v. Lane.2
However, I disagree with Judge Mann-heimer on whether Blakely should be granted retroactive application under Teague.
The cireuit courts of appeal that have considered the retroactive application of the rule announced in Blakely or the corresponding rule governing federal sentences announced in United States v. Booker3 have held that the rule does not apply to cases on collateral review because the rule constitutes a new rule of criminal procedure.4
Under the non-retroactivity doctrine from Teague, a decision creates a new rule "when it breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government." 5 When the opinion creates a new rule, the rule applies to previously final judgments only in limited cireumstances.6 For example, new substantive rules which decriminalize a class of conduct or prohibit capital punishment for a class of defendants generally apply retroactively.7 These new substantive rules apply retroactively because there is a risk that the defendant was con-vieted for an act that is not criminal or faces a punishment that is not allowed by law.8 However, new procedural rules generally do not apply retroactively.9 New procedural rules "merely raise the possibility that someone convicted with the use of the invalidated procedure might have been acquitted otherwise. Because of this more speculative connection to innocence, we give retroactive effect to only a small set of "watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. " 10
*41In Schriro v. Summerlin,11 the United States Supreme Court held that Ring v. Arizona'12 did not apply retroactively to a case on collateral review because the rule announced in Ring was neither a substantive rule nor a "watershed" rule of criminal procedure.13 In Ring, the Court held that a jury, rather than a judge, had to determine whether an aggravating factor that justified the death penalty was present.14 Because Arizona law required aggravators to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the Court was not required to decide whether the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt amounted to a substantive or watershed procedural rule.15
The Schriro Court found that the rule announced in Ring was procedural rather than substantive because it "altered the range of permissible methods for determining whether a defendant's conduct is punishable by death" rather than "the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes." 16 It further concluded that the rule was not a "watershed" rule of criminal procedure.17 The Supreme Court found that "tlhe evidence [was] simply too equivocal to support [the] conclusion" that "judicial fact-finding so 'seriously diminishe[s]' accuracy that there is an "impermissibly large risk' of punishing conduct the law does not reach." 18 Thus, because it did not fall within either of the two Teague exceptions, the Court concluded that the new procedural rule announced in Ring did not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review.19
While Judge Mannheimer has a thoughtful argument on why Blakely should be retroactive under Teague because of the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, it is my judgment that the United States Supreme Court will conclude otherwise. Of course, because the Court has granted certiorari on a case raising the issue of Blakely's retroactivity,20 we may soon have a definitive ruling on the retroactivity of the Blakely rule under Teag-a

. 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 LEd.2d 403 (2004).

. 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 LEd.2d 334 (1989).

. 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 LEd.2d 621 (2005).

. See Guzman v. United States, 404 F.3d 139, 141-44 (2d Cir.2005); In re Olopade, 403 F.3d 159, 160-64 (3d Cir.2005); United States v. Gentry, 432 F.3d 600, 602-06 (5th Cir.2005); Simpson v. United States, 376 F.3d 679, 680-81 (7th Cir.2004); Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1034-36 (9th Cir.2005); United States v. Price, 400 F.3d 844, 845-49 (10th Cir.2005); In re Dean, 375 F.3d 1287, 1290 (11th Cir.2004).

. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301, 109 S.Ct. at 1070.

. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351-52, 124 S.Ct 2519, 2522-23, 159 LEd.2d 442 (2004).

. Id.

. Id., 542 U.S. at 352, 124 S.Ct. at 2522-23.

. Id., 542 U.S. at 352, 124 S.Ct. at 2523.

. Id. (quoting Safflev. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 494-95, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 1264, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990) (some internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

. 542 U.S. 348, 352, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 2523, 159 LEd.2d 442 (2004).

. 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 LEd.2d 556 (2002).

. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 358, 124 S.Ct. at 2526.

. Id., 542 U.S. at 351, 124 S.Ct. at 2522 (citing Ring, 536 U.S. at 603-09, 122 S.Ct. at 2440-43).

. See id., 542 U.S. at 351 n. 1, 124 S.Ct. at 2522 n. 1.

. Id., 542 U.S. at 353, 124 S.Ct. at 2523.

. Id., 542 U.S. at 358, 124 S.Ct. at 2526.

. Id., 542 U.S. at 355-56, 124 S.Ct. at 2525 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 312-13, 109 S.Ct. at 1076-77) (last alteration in original).

. Id., 542 U.S. at 358, 124 S.Ct. at 2526.

. Burton v. Waddington, 142 Fed.Appx. 297 (9th Cir.2005), 2005 WL 1793351, cert. granted, -- U.S. --, 126 S.Ct 2352, 165 LEd.2d 278 (2006).