Court Opinion

ID: 9408546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-13 00:00:53.007861+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:44.208314
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-20281           Document: 00516818771              Page: 1       Date Filed: 07/12/2023

                United States Court of Appeals
                     for the Fifth Circuit                                    United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                       Fifth Circuit

                                        ____________                                 FILED
                                                                                 July 12, 2023
                                          No. 21-20281
                                                                                Lyle W. Cayce
                                        ____________                                 Clerk

   Cecil Max-George,

                                                                        Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                                versus

   Officer C. A. Myrick; Officer J. Mejia; Officer L.
   Matthews; City of Houston,

                                                 Defendants—Appellees.
                        ______________________________

                        Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the Southern District of Texas
                                 USDC No. 4:17-CV-2264
                        ______________________________

   Before Haynes and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges, and deGravelles,
   District Judge.*
   Per Curiam:†
              Texas inmate Cecil Max-George, proceeding pro se, sued the City of
   Houston and several Houston Police Department officers (collectively,
   “Defendants”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 following a violent encounter at a
   traffic stop. On appeal, Max-George challenges the district court’s partial
              _____________________
   *
       United States District Judge for the Middle District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.
   †
       This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 21-20281            Document: 00516818771               Page: 2       Date Filed: 07/12/2023

                                              No. 21-20281

   grant of Defendants’ motion to dismiss, grant of Defendants’ motion for
   summary judgment, denial of his motion to recuse the district court judge,
   and denial of his motion for relief from the judgment filed under Federal Rule
   of Civil Procedure 60(b). For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.

                          I.       Factual & Procedural Background
              This case arose from a traffic stop that turned violent. Officers Myrick
   and Duval pulled Max-George over after an automated license plate reader
   revealed outstanding warrants associated with his truck.                            Max-George
   refused to exit the vehicle, the officers called for backup, and an altercation
   ensued. Ultimately, Max-George was forcibly pulled from the car. Two
   officers were injured during the struggle, and Max-George was arrested for
   assaulting an officer.
              In his complaint, Max-George asserted that Defendants violated his
   constitutional rights by using excessive force, denying him access to medical
   treatment, and retaliating against him for making a crude comment. He
   further claimed that Defendants conspired against him and violated various
   federal and state criminal laws and the Texas Tort Claims Act. Finally, he
   alleged that the Houston Police Department maintained an unwritten policy
   of encouraging officers to racially profile and use excessive force against
   Black men.
              Defendants moved to dismiss Max-George’s claims and for summary
   judgment. In a single order, the district court granted Defendants’ motion to
   dismiss as to Max-George’s federal and state criminal law claims, his civil
   conspiracy claim, and his Monnell1 claim, and it granted Defendants’ motion

              _____________________
   1
       See Monnell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

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                                          No. 21-20281

   for summary judgment as to Max-George’s remaining federal claims.2 As
   explained below, Max-George ultimately filed a notice of appeal, which is
   now timely given the district court’s grant of his motions to reopen. See FED.
   R. APP. P. 4(a)(6) (permitting the district court to “reopen the time to file an
   appeal” under certain conditions).
                      II.      Jurisdiction & Standard of Review
           The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Because
   the district court granted Max-George’s motions to reopen, we may now
   properly exercise appellate jurisdiction over both the denial of his Rule 60(b)
   motion and the underlying order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.3

           _____________________
   2
    The district court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Max-George’s
   cause of action under the Texas Tort Claims Act, which Max-George does not contest on
   appeal.
   3
    Max-George failed to receive timely notice of the judgment dismissing his claims, entered
   on October 28, 2020, and, therefore, he did not appeal within thirty days. See FED. R. APP.
   P. 4(a)(1)(A) (requiring plaintiffs to appeal within thirty days after entry of judgment).
   However, four months after the district court’s final judgment, he filed two motions to
   reopen the time to file an appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(6).
   Shortly thereafter, he also sought relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b), which the
   district court denied. Max-George then filed separate notices of appeal as to both the Rule
   60(b) ruling and the underlying order. While the case was pending in this court, the district
   court dismissed Max-George’s Rule 4(a)(6) motions for lack of jurisdiction.
   Another panel of this court then vacated this dismissal and remanded for the limited
   purpose of having the district court decide the motions to reopen. See Max-George v.
   Myrick, No. 21-20281, 2022 WL 2462689, at *1 (5th Cir. July 6, 2022) (per curiam)
   (unpublished); see also FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6). Specifically, the panel stated:
           We REMAND for the limited purpose of permitting the district court to
           determine whether the time to file an appeal from the October 28, 2020,
           judgment should be reopened under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
           4(a)(6). The district court is directed to return the case to this court for
           further proceedings or dismissal, as appropriate, once the ruling has been
           made.

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                                          No. 21-20281

           We review a dismissal for failure to state a claim de novo, considering
   all facts “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Turner v.
   Pleasant, 663 F.3d 770, 775 (5th Cir. 2011). However, “[w]e do not accept as
   true conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal
   conclusions.” Plotkin v. IP Axess Inc., 407 F.3d 690, 696 (5th Cir. 2005). To
   survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a
   claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
   U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
   pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
   that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
   U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
            We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the
   evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. United Fire &
   Cas. Co. v. Hixson Bros., Inc., 453 F.3d 283, 285 (5th Cir. 2006). Summary
   judgment is proper where there are no genuine issues of material fact, and
   the movant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Alkhawaldeh v. Dow Chem.
   Co., 851 F.3d 422, 426 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a)).
           Finally, we review a district court’s denial of recusal and Rule 60(b)
   motions for abuse of discretion. United States v. Bremers, 195 F.3d 221, 226
   (5th Cir. 1999) (recusal motion); Bailey v. Cain, 609 F.3d 763, 767 (5th Cir.
   2010) (Rule 60(b) motion). “A district court abuses its discretion if it bases
   its decision on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous

           _____________________
   Id. Upon finding Rule 4(a)(6)’s conditions satisfied, the district court granted the motions
   to reopen—rendering Max-George’s notice of appeal timely—and returned the case back
   to this court as part of the same appellate case. Therefore, we conclude we now have
   jurisdiction over this appeal. Cf. Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774, 777–79 (10th Cir.
   1993).

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                                        No. 21-20281

   assessment of the evidence.” Ross v. Marshall, 426 F.3d 745, 763 (5th Cir.
   2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
                                 III.      Discussion
          Max-George challenges the district court’s (1) partial grant of
   Defendants’ motion to dismiss, (2) grant of Defendants’ motion for
   summary judgment, (3) denial of his recusal motion, and (4) denial of his
   Rule 60(b) motion. We consider each in turn.
          A.      Motion to Dismiss
          Max-George has inadequately briefed, and thus abandoned, any points
   of error relevant to the district court’s partial grant of Defendants’ motion to
   dismiss. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 1993) (observing
   that even pro se litigants must adequately brief arguments to preserve them
   for appeal).    Construing his briefing generously, Max-George’s only
   discernible arguments on appeal are that (1) the district court did not liberally
   construe his filings; (2) Defendants failed to disclose certain police internal
   affairs documents and medical records; (3) the City of Houston violated the
   permanent injunction set forth in Sanders v. City of Houston, 543 F. Supp. 694
   (S.D. Tex. 1982); and (4) there was substantial evidence that the Officers and
   the City of Houston engaged in a conspiracy.
          However, Max-George wholly fails to explain how a more liberal
   reading of his filings or Defendants’ disclosure of certain documents would
   have lent his claims sufficient plausibility to overcome the motion to dismiss.
   Moreover, while Max-George asserts there was ample evidence of a civil
   conspiracy, he never references any factual allegations relevant to proving its
   existence. Mere conclusory allegations are insufficient to survive a motion
   to dismiss. See Powers v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 951 F.3d 298, 305 (5th
   Cir. 2020). Therefore, we discern no error in the district court’s partial
   dismissal of Max-George’s claims.

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                                    No. 21-20281

            B.    Summary Judgment
            Max-George’s challenges to the district court’s summary judgment in
   favor of Defendants suffer from similar defects. Max-George does not
   address the legal or factual bases underlying the district court’s reasoning.
   For the most part, he merely provides conclusory allegations that the
   Officers’ conduct was discriminatory, retaliatory, and excessively forceful
   without asserting any legal arguments or citing any case law.         Absent
   supporting factual evidence, these conclusory allegations are insufficient to
   survive summary judgment. See Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir.
   1996).
            Indeed, Max-George’s only colorable argument—relevant to his
   medical indifference claim—is that the district court incorrectly denied his
   request for a subpoena to obtain his jail medical records, which he claims the
   Houston Police Department’s Internal Affairs Division failed to turn over to
   him.     Per Max-George, these documents demonstrated that he was
   hospitalized for a heart condition following the encounter and given
   morphine. But even if that’s true, we fail to see how such documents would
   have demonstrated that the Officers inferred at the scene that Max-George
   faced a substantial risk of serious harm. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
   837 (1994) (holding that for a prison official to act with deliberate
   indifference, he must “both be aware of facts from which the inference could
   be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw
   the inference”).
            Moreover, Defendants submitted records demonstrating that
   emergency services were immediately called to the scene, but Max-George
   refused medical treatment. Max-George provides no evidence suggesting
   otherwise. Rather, he simply urges that the Defendants falsified the records,
   as evidenced by the fact that their timestamp “ironic[ally]” matches a

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                                     No. 21-20281

   booking sheet which erroneously states that Max-George was charged with
   homicide.     While these identical timestamps are a somewhat strange
   coincidence, without more, they are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of
   material fact as to whether Defendants “purposefully neglected” Max-
   George’s serious medical needs. See Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 349
   (5th Cir. 2006); see also Brown v. City of Houston, 337 F.3d 539, 541 (5th Cir.
   2003)    (“Unsubstantiated       assertions,     improbable    inferences,   and
   unsupported speculation are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary
   judgment.”). Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err in
   granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
           C.    Recusal Motion
           Max-George’s challenge to the denial of his recusal motion also lacks
   merit. Absent specific evidence of favoritism or personal antagonism, recusal
   is only required where alleged prejudice stems from an “extrajudicial
   source.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 544 (1994) (quotation
   omitted). But even liberally construed, the only evidence of bias or prejudice
   Max-George cites are the district court’s “intrajudicial” rulings against him.
   Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Max-
   George’s recusal motion.
           D.    Rule 60(b) Motion
           Finally, we also find no error in the district court’s denial of Max-
   George’s motion for relief from the district court’s judgment under Rule
   60(b). Like many of his other claims, Max-George fails to point to any
   specific error in the legal or factual bases undergirding the district court’s
   ruling. Accordingly, he has abandoned any arguments relevant to this issue.
   See Yohey, 985 F.2d at 224–25.

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                                     No. 21-20281

                               IV.      Conclusion
         For the reasons explained above, we AFFIRM the district court’s
   partial grant of Defendants’ motion to dismiss, grant of Defendants’ motion
   for summary judgment, and denial of Max-George’s recusal motion and Rule
   60(b) motion.

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