Court Opinion

ID: 9397824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-26 16:09:10.236747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:27.973425
License: Public Domain

J-A05004-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    JOSEPH WESLEY                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1640 EDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 2, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division
                       at No(s): CP-46-CR-0004711-2017

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                                 FILED MAY 26, 2023

        Joseph Wesley appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in the

Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, after a jury convicted him of

two counts of attempted first-degree murder1 and one count each of criminal

solicitation to commit first-degree murder2 and criminal conspiracy to commit

first-degree murder.3 After review, we affirm.

        In April and June 2016, Wesley sold drugs and firearms to Danielle Miller

who, Wesley later learned, was acting at the direction of law enforcement.4
____________________________________________

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a).

2   Id. at § 902(a).

3   Id. at § 903(a)(1).

4Wesley was charged in connection with the drug and firearms sales to Miller
and, on June 15, 2018, was convicted of, inter alia, the illegal sale or transfer
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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On October 14, 2016, authorities were unable to locate Wesley, but served

his girlfriend, Jennifer Vance, with a warrant for Wesley’s arrest. On October

21, 2016, Wesley contacted Darelle Bean and asked him to kill Miller in

exchange for $5,000.00. See N.T. Jury Trial, 11/3/21, at 333, 335, 337. That

same day, Wesley traveled with Bean to Norristown, Montgomery County to

show him Miller’s home, her vehicle and a nearby trail that Bean could use to

flee the area after the murder. Bean took pictures of Miller’s residence and

screenshots of its location on Google Maps. Id. at 335-36, 339. Bean traveled

to Miller’s residence a few more times before recruiting Ceasar Morales to

carry out the murder due to Bean’s reservations about killing a woman. Id.

at 341, 346.

       On December 2, 2016, at approximately 5:00 p.m., Miller and her

friend, Stephen Rowl entered Miller’s vehicle.    Immediately after Miller sat

down in the front passenger seat, Morales fired shots into her car.       Miller

suffered bullet wounds to her right hand and left bicep, resulting in two broken

bones in her hand and requiring her to wear an arm sling for approximately

two months. Rowl was shot in the back and in his right leg; he still has a

bullet in his back, which causes him pain. At approximately 5:15 p.m., Bean

called Wesley to inform him that “the job was done.” Id. at 356. Wesley

____________________________________________

of firearms and possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. On
appeal, this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence. See Commonwealth
v. Wesley, 3084 EDA 2018 (Pa. Super. filed Dec. 12, 2019) (unpublished
memorandum decision).

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subsequently fled to Louisiana and was not apprehended until January 17,

2017.

        During trial, Bean testified regarding lies5 he told to the police

throughout in his attempt to transfer blame to Morales. Id. at 388-91, id. at

358 (Bean testifying, “It wasn’t that I lied. It was minimizing my role.”). Bean

stated that in exchange for testifying he had been hoping for “leniency from

the court,” but that no specific amount of incarceration had been discussed.

Id. at 361; id. at 371 (Bean conceding he was testifying for selfish reasons).

        Wesley was arrested and charged with the above-mentioned crimes. He

proceeded to trial on November 1, 2021. At trial, various people testified,

including, inter alia:       Earnest Reed, Bean’s cousin, who had originally

introduced Bean and Wesley; Vance, with whom Wesley has a son; Ronald

Knight, with whom Miller has a child; and Detective Mark Minzola of the

Montgomery County Police Department, an expert in forensic cell phone data

analysis.   The jury found Welsey guilty of all charges and, on February 2,

2022, the court imposed an aggregated sentence of 40 to 80 years’

imprisonment.      On February 9, 2022, Wesley filed a timely post-sentence

motion, and, on May 5, 2022, he filed a supplemental post-sentence motion.

On June 6, 2022, the trial court denied the post-sentence motions. Wesley
____________________________________________

5 Bean had originally told the police that Morales purchased the gun used in
the shooting, that Morales called Wesley to tell him that the shooting was
complete, and that Morales negotiated payment for the murder. See N.T.
Jury Trial, 11/3/21, at 358. However, Bean provided the weapon, called
Wesley after the shooting, and received a partial payment of $500.00 from
Wesley.

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filed a timely notice of appeal, and both he and the trial court complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Wesley raises the following issues for our review:

        1. Did the trial court impose an illegal sentence by sentencing
           [Wesley] to 20-40 years’ incarceration to run consecutively for
           both counts of [a]ttempted [m]urder where the maximum
           sentence on the offense actually charged was 20 years’
           incarceration, the Commonwealth never charged [Wesley] with
           the enhanced offense of [a]ttemped [m]urder – [s]erious
           [b]odily [i]njury [c]aused[—]which would allow a 40[-]year
           incarceration sentence, and imposing such a sentence required
           a constructive amendment to the bills of information which was
           not authorized by the Rules of Criminal Procedure?

        2. Whether the trial court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary
           hearing and denying [Wesley’s] motion for a new trial based
           on after[-]discovered evidence of a [Brady6] violation where
           the cooperating co-defendant filed a motion to withdraw his
           guilty plea in which he asserted that he was promised a
           “single[-]digit sentence” in exchange for his testimony against
           [Wesley], the Commonwealth never provided that information
           to [Wesley] prior to trial despite having a copy of the motion,
           and the credibility of the cooperating co-defendant was the
           only real issue in the case?

        3. Whether the trial court should have granted a new trial because
           the verdict was against the weight of the evidence where the
           only real evidence against [Wesley] was the testimony of the
           cooperating co-defendant who told multiple different stories,
           admitted to lying, [and] received a favorable plea deal[;] where
           the testimony was contradicted by the cell phone records[;]
           and where people other than [Wesley] had expressed a desire
           to kill the complainant?

Appellant’s Brief, at 6-7.

        Wesley first contends that the court imposed an illegal sentence for

attempted first-degree murder with a serious bodily injury enhancement

without providing notice of its intent to seek the enhancement in the bills of
____________________________________________

6   Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

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information.   Id. at 36.   Wesley argues that by permitting a constructive

amendment of the bill of information during trial, the trial court violated his

due process right not to be convicted of an offense other than the one charged.

Id. at 34.

      Section 1102(c) of the Crimes Code provides that the maximum

sentence for attempted murder is no more than 20 years. 18 Pa.C.S.A. §

1102(c).     However, if serious bodily injury occurs during the attempted

murder, the maximum sentence increases to no more than 40 years. Id.

(emphasis added). Serious bodily injury is a fact that must be proven by the

Commonwealth, beyond a reasonable doubt, for this sentence enhancement

to apply. See Commonwealth v. Barnes, 167 A.3d 110, 117 (Pa. Super.

2017) (en banc).

      Due process requires the Commonwealth to give a defendant notice if it

seeks to prove serious bodily injury. Id. Notice must “be sufficiently specific

so as to allow the defendant to prepare any available defenses should he

exercise his right to a trial.” Commonwealth v. Sims, 919 A.2d 931 (Pa.

2007) (citation omitted); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 560(C) (information shall cite

to statute or provision of law defendant is alleged to have violated).

      In Commonwealth v. King, 234 A.3d 549 (Pa. Super. 2020), this Court

determined that although the defendant’s indictment and criminal information

were facially inadequate to give notice regarding the Commonwealth’s intent

to charge the defendant with the serious bodily injury enhancement, this error

was harmless and, thus, the sentence was not illegal. Id. at 562-63. There,

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defendant received de facto notice of the Commonwealth’s intent to charge

him with the enhancement where:                factual summaries in the charging

documents made clear that the victim suffered serious bodily injury; the

Commonwealth advised the defendant of the minimum sentence that could be

imposed, which was consistent with serious bodily injury enhancement

guidelines; and the Commonwealth and defense attorney reviewed and

agreed to the verdict sheets, which included a special interrogatory regarding

whether the victim suffered serious bodily injury. Id. at 566.

        However, in Commonwealth v. Bickerstaff, 204 A.3d 988 (Pa. Super.

2019),7 a case that Wesley argues is “directly on point,” Appellant’s Brief, at

37, the defendant was not given de facto notice of the charge. Rather, this

Court determined that the Commonwealth “ambushed” the defendant with the

serious bodily injury charge where it had been mentioned for the first time on

the verdict sheet’s special interrogatory at the time it was provided to the

jury.    Indeed, the complaint, information, and jury instructions made no

mention of the enhancement.            In rejecting the Commonwealth’s harmless

error argument, this Court reasoned that the defendant was unable to defend

against the charge at trial. Id. at 997-98. That is not the case here.

        Here, like in King, Wesley was given de facto notice of the

Commonwealth’s intent to prove the serious bodily injury enhancement.

____________________________________________

7In Bickerstaff, the notice issue was made in the context of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim on collateral appeal from an order denying a Post
Conviction Relief Act petition.

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Wesley’s criminal complaint set forth Miller’s and Rowl’s injuries. See Criminal

Complaint, 5/9/17 at 2 (“[] Miller suffered bullet wounds to her right hand and

left bicep. [] Rowl suffered bullet wounds to his right[-]side torso and his right

leg.”). Further, on October 12, 2021, both parties were sent the proposed

verdict sheet and proposed criminal charges, which contained an interrogatory

below each count asking the jury whether the victims suffered serious bodily

injury as a result of each offense. Additionally, during the October 13, 2021

status conference, Kelly Lloyd, Esquire, the Assistant District Attorney,

explained, in relevant part, that “Wesley’s maximum exposure . . . and the

serious bodily injuries established, he’ll be looking at 20 to 40 [years]

on each of those counts, yes, on the attempted murder.” Status Conference,

10/13/21, 45-46 (emphasis added). Indeed, almost three weeks before

trial, Wesley knew of the facts alleged in the criminal complaint, that the

proposed verdict sheet included a serious bodily injury interrogatory, and that

his maximum exposure was consistent with a serious bodily injury charge.

Accordingly, unlike in Bickerstaff, Wesley was not “ambushed” regarding the

enhancement.

      In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the Commonwealth gave

Wesley de facto notice that it intended to charge him with attempted first-

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degree murder with the serious bodily injury enhancement.8           See King,

supra. Accordingly, Wesley’s first claim is meritless.

       Next, Wesley argues that the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose Bean’s

pro se letter to the Commonwealth, in which Bean “insisted that he had been

promised a single[-]digit prison sentence in exchange for his testimony”

constituted a Brady violation. Appellant’s Brief, at 45. Wesley contends that

it is irrelevant whether the Commonwealth actually made or meant to keep a

promise of a single-digit sentence but that “the fact [] Bean believed he would

receive [a single-digit] sentence would have shown the jury that his testimony

was fabricated.” Id. at 46.

       To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must demonstrate
       that: (1) the evidence was suppressed by the Commonwealth,
       either willfully or inadvertently; (2) the evidence was favorable to
       the defendant; and (3) the evidence was material, in that its
       omission resulted in prejudice to the defendant. The mere
       possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have
       helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of trial[,]
       does not establish materiality in the constitutional sense.

____________________________________________

8 We also note that, Attorney Walker objected, on the final day of trial, to only
the sufficiency of evidence regarding the serious bodily enhancement, not the
charge itself. N.T. Jury Trial, 11/4/21, at 595-96 (Attorney Walker stating
“My argument, I guess, Your Honor, is that there was no evidence that
suggested that this was serious bodily injury to either one of the parties . . .
I suggest that the Commonwealth has not made out the elements for serious
bodily injury.”). Attorney Walker also did not object to the serious bodily
enhancement jury charge. Id. at 663; see also Pa.SSJI (Crim) § 901D
(Additional Elements).     Inasmuch as Wesley was actually aware that
Commonwealth intended to charge him with the serious bodily injury
enhancement, he cannot argue that he was not given notice.

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Commonwealth v. Robinson, 122 A.3d 367, 373 (Pa. Super. 2015).

“Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the

evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would

have been different.” U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); see also

Commonwealth v. Gibson, 951 A.2d 1110, 1127 (Pa. 2008).

     Instantly, Bean conceded that he was testifying for selfish reasons,

including “leniency from the court,” and that the nature and extent of his

cooperation would be made known to [his] sentencing judge. N.T. Jury Trial,

11/3/21, at 360-61.   He testified that no specific amount of incarceration

sentence had been discussed, but that he would be permitted to plead guilty

to two counts of attempted murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and person

not to possess a firearm. Id. Bean also admitted that he “tried to put the

blame away from [him].” Id. at 259. Accordingly, the jury was aware of

Bean’s involvement in the incident, the extent his cooperation would impact

his sentence, and that he been untruthful with law enforcement officials

throughout the investigation.

     Moreover, the trial court highlights that there was no mention of the

“single[-]digit” sentence agreement at Bean’s own sentencing hearing and

that Bean was ultimately sentenced to an aggregate term of 15 to 30 years’

incarceration. Trial Court Opinion, 8/29/22, at 29. Inasmuch as Bean’s self-

serving pro se letter is the only evidence this agreement existed, the

Commonwealth had no obligation to inform Wesley of a non-existent

agreement or to correct Bean’s testimony at trial. See Commonwealth v.

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Bomar, 104 A.3d 1179, 1194 (Pa. 2014) (no Brady violation where no

credible evidence established Commonwealth promised witness parole in

exchange for his testimony).

      In light of the foregoing, we conclude that there was no Brady violation

where the only evidence of Bean’s alleged promise from the Commonwealth

was a self-serving letter written by Bean; nor has Wesley established that

there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have

been different had the evidence been disclosed. Bagley, supra.

      Finally, Wesley claims that his convictions were against the weight of

the evidence.   Specifically, he contends that the Commonwealth’s “entire

case” relied on Bean’s testimony, which had been “thoroughly impeached.”

Appellant’s Brief, at 54. Wesley argues that phone data showing him in the

Norristown area “proved nothing more than [] that [he] traveled to Norristown

a month and a half before the shooting.” Id. at 55. He also claims that other

people, including Reed, Vance, and Knight, each had a motive to kill Miller.

Wesley is afforded no relief.

      This Court reviews weight of the evidence claims for an abuse of

discretion:

      The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact[,]
      who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to
      determine the credibility of the witnesses. [This Court] cannot
      substitute its judgment for that of the finder of fact. Thus, we
      may only reverse the lower court’s verdict if it is so contrary to
      the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. Moreover, where
      the trial court has ruled on the weight claim below, [this Court’s]
      role is not to consider the underlying question of whether the
      verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Rather, appellate

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      review is limited to whether the trial court palpably abused its
      discretion in ruling on the weight claim.

Commonwealth v. Hunzer, 868 A.2d 498, 506-07 (Pa. Super. 2005).

Additionally, “[a] motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is

contrary to the weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient

evidence to sustain the verdict. Thus, the trial court is under no obligation to

review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner.”

Commonwealth v. Dupre, 866 A.2d 1089, 1101 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations

omitted).

      The trial court’s determination that Wesley’s convictions were not

against the weight of the evidence where Bean was vigorously cross-examined

by Attorney Walker, instructions informed the jury that Bean’s testimony was

“from a corrupt and polluted source,” and Bean’s testimony was corroborated

by Detective Minzola’s cell-phone data analysis, is supported by the record.

Trial Court Opinion, supra at 10-12; see N.T. Jury Trial, 11/4/21, at 756-60,

quoting Pa.SSJI (Crim), § 4.01.

      Indeed, the jury was well aware of the various lies Bean told through

the investigation and the self-serving reasons for which he was testifying.

Moreover, the jury was carefully instructed by the court regarding how to

evaluate witness credibility and accomplice testimony. See N.T. Jury Trial,

11/4/21, at 758-59. The jury also heard Detective Minzola’s cell phone data

analysis, which substantially corroborated Bean’s testimony.             Bean’s

testimony that he went with Wesley to Miller’s residence on October 21, 2016

is supported by cell phone tower data. Id., 11/3/21, at 490-92 (Detective

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Minzola testifying both Bean and Wesley’s phones accessed cell towers in

Delaware County, Montgomery County, and Norristown area at 7:56 p.m.,

8:01 p.m., and 8:04 p.m., respectively). Bean also testified that, on that day,

he took screenshots of the portion of the block where Miller’s residence was

located. Id. at 488-90 (Detective Minzola testifying Bean download an image

on October 21, 2021, at 5:41 p.m., depicting 100 block of Haws Avenue,

where Miller’s home is located). Phone analysis also confirmed that Bean went

to Miller’s residence in Norristown a few more times before the shooting. Id.

at 496-98 (Detective Minzola testifying Bean’s phone accessed towers in

Norristown on October 22, 2016, and October 23, 2016).

      Phone data also shows that after Bean informed Wesley that the

shooting had occurred, Welsey left Pennsylvania and spent the next three days

traveling to Louisiana.   Id. at 517 (Detective Minzola testifying that on

December 2, 2016, the day of shooting, at 5:15 p.m., Bean made a 25-second

phone call to Wesley); id. at 520-22 (Detective Minzola testifying that

between December 2, 2016, and December 4, 2016, Wesley used phone

towers in Maryland, Virgina, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,

Alabama, Mississippi, and, finally, Louisiana).    Indeed, Wesley was later

apprehended in Louisiana.

      Finally, Wesley’s claim that his conviction is against the weight of the

evidence because Reed, Vance, and Knight each had a motive to kill Miller

affords him no relief.    Although Reed introduced Bean and Wesley and

accompanied them on their initial trip to Norristown, Bean’s testimony

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indicates that Wesley, not Reed, requested Bean’s assistance in murdering

someone.    See N.T. Jury Trial, 11/3/21at 329, 333.          Additionally, Vance

testified that although she knows that Miller was involved in Wesley’s arrest

and that she does not like Miller, Vance “place[s] the blame where it lies, on

[Wesley].” Id. at 183-84. Further, Knight testified that he has known Miller

for 12 years, and that although he has verbally threatened Miller in the past,

he has never and would never follow through on these threats. N.T. Jury Trial,

11/1/21, at 155, 158-59. Knight stated that he did tell Vance he wanted Miller

“to pay” but he explained that he meant “through the legal system” and in

regard to their child custody claims. Id. at 172-74.

      In light of the foregoing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its

determination that Wesley’s conviction is not against the weight of the

evidence.   Hunzer, supra.       We, therefore, affirm Wesley’s judgment of

sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/26/2023

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