Court Opinion

ID: 9683169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:23:46.189864+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:45.847584
License: Public Domain

MERRILL, Justice.
This is an appeal by the defendants in a damage suit from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Henry C. Lowe. The suit arose out of a collision of Lowe’s automobile with defendants’ truck and as a result of the collision Lowe received a broken back.
Assignments of error '4 to 16, inclusive, deal with objections to questions propounded' by plaintiff to two • doctors or with motions to exclude the' answers after-they were ■ permitted:- The-.chief objection'assigned to the questions was that they called for hearsay testimony, although many other grounds of objection were stated.
Dr. Samford is a specialist in the field of X-ray and Dr. Owsley was'Mr. Lowe’s attending physician. Dr. Samford, Dr. Owsley and Dr. Jack Hughston held conferences dealing with ,the injuries to Mr. Lowe’s back. Plaintiff showed more than once that Dr. Jack Hughston was “the bone specialist” from Columbus, Georgia. Dr. Hughston was not present at the trial. Dr. Samford and Dr. Owsley each testified as to their individual diagnosis and prognosis of the case but, following that testimony, each was asked on direct examination what Dr. Hughston said in the conferences and whether the opinion or conclusion of the witness was concurred in by the other doctors. We quote these questions and answers from the record omitting the objections, the rulings of the court, *412the motions to exclude, the exceptions and a few nonpertinent remarks.
Testimony of Dr. Samford:
“Q. Now, will you tell the court and the jury what Dr. Hughston said in those conferences with respect to the diagnosis of Mr. Lowe’s injuries and also with reference to the prognosis, the permanency of his injuries? A. As to the diagnosis we all agreed and I have given the diagnosis before.
“A. The other part of the question I believe was the prognosis. That was the conclusion of the diagnosis part of it. As I understood there were two parts. As to the prognosis he, Dr. Jack Hughston, thought that there would always be a weakness of that region, so that extreme or more than usual bending and heavy weight lifting would be a part of his activities that should probably, would probably be impossible.”
“Q. And that opinion, as expressed to you by Dr. Hughston in these conferences held by you, Dr. Hughston and Dr. Owsley, was that the joint opinion of all three doctors? A. That was our opinion.
“Q. The opinion of all three doctors? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. As expressed at the conference? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Dr. Samford, in that conference you had with the other doctors with respect to Mr. Lowe’s injuries he received in this accident, did Dr. Hughston state that it might be necessary to have another operation performed on Mr. Lowe’s back ? A. He did.
“Q. Now, Dr. Samford, will you explain to the jury and the court in greater detail as to what was said about the necessity, the possible necessity, of an operation? A. He said that there may have to be an operation performed to anchor those — to stiffen those joints to keep them from moving.
“Q. Now, Dr. Samford, the opinion that you have expressed, as having been expressed by Dr. Hughston in these joint conferences on the condition, diagnosis and prognosis of Mr. Henry Lowe, do you concur in his opinion as so expressed? A. I do.”'
Testimony of Dr. Owsley:
“Q. Was your conclusion or your opinion or your judgment as to the permanence of his injuries concurred in by the other doctors in those conferences? A. Dr. Hughston, at the time of the operation, I mean at the setting of his back, was not able to get this bone back into direct alinement with the rest of his back. The reason he did not do it was because he was afraid to. It was already pressing on the spinal cord, and he was, not having it open where he could see it, he was afraid to put too much pressure. If you don’t know how you set these backs, you hang a man up by his neck his, actually his legs, and it swings down between to a point to which it is attached and press on the back, and you get a tremendous amount of pressure there, and he was afraid to put too much pressure bécause he was afraid it would result in permanent paralysis due to moving that bone too much, so that’s the reason it was left a little bit out of line, and he said at the time—
“A. He said at the time that Mr. Lowe would always have an unstable back, which means a weak back, because his ligaments were torn and because of inability to put this thing in the exact alinement that he would like to have.
“Q. Dr. Owsley, the statements you have just made to the court and the jury as being the statements of Dr. Jack Hughston were made by him in conference between you and Dr. Samford in conferences dealing par*413ticularly with the injuries of Mr. Henry Lowe, were they not? A. Correct.
“Q. And then you concurred in these statements of Dr. Hughston? A. Yes, Dr. Samford was present at this operation, and Dr. Hughston and I.”
The court announced that the record would show that the evidence was admitted on the authority of three cases: Grammer v. State, 239 Ala. 633, 196 So. 268; Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Brantley, 231 Ala. 554, 165 So. 834 and Taylor v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 232 Ala. 378, 168 So. 181.
The exact question before us has not been decided many times. In 1886 in the case of Village of Ponca v. Crawford, 18 Neb. 551, 26 N.W. 365, 367, a doctor was on the stand and testified in part as follows:
“ ‘Q. State, if you can, what caused that, or what it is (an enlargement of the breast). A. I don’t exactly know what it is. I have been puzzled in my own mind in regard to it; so much so that I laid the case before Drs. Frazer, Biggs, and Clinger, of Sioux City, and they were not fully decided in their own minds as to what it was.
“Q. Were you present at the time of this alleged examination by those doctors? A. I was; yes, sir.
“Q. Did you take part in it? A. Yes, sir. * * *
“Q. State what you found as the result of that examination. A. They didn’t decide fully what it was.
“Q. State more fully whether you took part in the examination, and in the forming of the opinion that resulted. A. Well, if you will allow me to explain, I took him into Dr. Frazer’s office first, and told him there was a matter which I wanted his opinion about; and if he thought best, I wanted other opinions in regard to it. He said he would like to have Dr. Biggs see that also; so we had Dr. Biggs come in, and then we had Dr. Clinger come in, and they all examined that with him. All of us had hands in that examination, and each expressed his opinion of it after it was done. The result of that examination was that we decided that it was the result of an injury.
“Q. State your conclusion as to the result of that joint examination. A. I think we all decided that it was a tumor resulting from an injury.’ ”
The court then said:
“The admission of this testimony, so far as it applies to the expressions of opinion by the other physicians, was-clearly incompetent and prejudicial. The examination was ex parte produced by defendant in error, and his son, without the knowledge of the plaintiff in error, its agents or attorneys. None of the physicians engaged in it were under oath, and no opportunity given the defendant to cross-examine them as to the basis of their conclusions. The testimony was upon an essential part of the case, and was simply hearsay. We know of no rule by which the testimony or opinions of expert witnesses may be produced in evidence, save by the usual methods of taking their testimony where the opinion rests upon the facts of the case on trial. If those doctors had opinions as to the cause of this enlargement, of which defendant in error desired the benefit, he should have placed them upon the witness stand in order that plaintiff in error might cross-examine them.”
The next case we find is that of Hussey v. State, 87 Ala. 121, 6 So. 420, 425, decided in 1888, where the court said:
“The testimony of Dr. Dement to the effect that other physicians concurred with him in his opinion as to the nature of the wound of the deceased was clearly hearsay, and not admissible. There is no more reason for permitting the unsworn assertions of experts to be detailed second-handed in court than the like testimony of other persons. Each is equally hearsay, *414within the strictest meaning of the term.”
In 1937 the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, upholding the lower court in excluding testimony of one doctor who related the opinion of another doctor, said in Tevis v. Proctor & Gamble Distributing Co., 21 Tenn.App. 494, 113 S.W.2d 64, 70:
“But the testimony offered violates the rule prohibiting hearsay evidence from being introduced, and also the rule requiring the best evidence to be produced. The witness sought to testify to statements of Dr. Spurling, thus violating the rule against hearsay evidence, and he also sought to testify as to the contents of a written report made by Dr. Spurling, thus violating the rule requiring the production of the .’best evidence.”
In the case of Bluebird Baking Co. v. McCarthy, Ohio App., 1935, 36 N.E.2d 801, 805, the court in holding that the lower court erred in permitting the witness, a local süfgeon, to quo’té “a reputably recognized brain specialist’1, cited with approval the following statement: “ * * * ‘the testimony of a physician that other physicians concurred with him in his opinion is hearsay.’ ”
In Jones on Evidence, Civil Cases, 4th Ed. Vol. 1, p. 297, it is said: “By hearsay is meant that kind of evidence which derives its value, not solely from the credit to be attached to the witness himself, but also in part because of the veracity and competency of some other person from whom the witness may have received the information.”
In Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Ed. Vol. 5, § 1362, we find: “It is sufficient to note that the Hearsay rule, as accepted in our law, signifies a rule rejecting assertions, •offered testimonially, which have not been in some way subjected to the test of cross-examination.”
■Wharton, Criminal Evidence, 11th Ed. § 427, says: “Hearsay evidence may be defined as that kind of evidence which does not derive its value solely from the credit to be given to the witness himself, but rests, also, in part, on the veracity and competency of some other person.”
It would appear that the quoted testimony of Drs. Samford and Owsley was hearsay under. the general rule and the rule in Alabama, unless within an exception recognized in the cases cited by the court below. The case of Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Brantley, supra [231 Ala. 554, 165 So. 837], on the question before us says:
“The admission in evidence, over objection and exception, of the fact that, on examination of plaintiff by physicians, the latter made statements to him and gave advice on which he acted, was without reversible error. These stateaments were a part of the res gestae of the examination that caused him to retire from business, make his claim against the defendant for disability, for which this suit was brought, as well as claims against several other insurance companies, and which claims, or due proof thereof, are in evidence. * * *”
This statement is a relaxation of the general rule that a patient tnay not testify what his doctor told him in reference to his injuries. Blackman v. Johnson, 35 Ala. 252 [2]; Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Arnold, 80 Ala. 600, 2 So. 337; Taylor v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra, and Hornaday v. First Nat. Bank of Birmingham, 259 Ala. 26, 65 So.2d 678 [7]. But the case is not authority for the proposition that one doctor may testify what another doctor thought or said, unless the citations of and comment on the Texas case is such authority. We consider this Texas case later.' The only other authority cited by the court in the Brantley case is 29 C.J. p. 284 and Rocci v. Massachusetts Accident Co., 226 Mass. 545, 116 N.E. 477. The text in Corpus Juris is:
“In an action for benefits for sickness confining insured to his house, testimony of physicians that insured’s condition required him to be removed to another house, and testimony of the insured that he was ordered by his physician to move, is admissible to show an exigency for removal.”
*415The Rocci case is cited in Note 6, 29 C.J. p. 284, and is authority for the text, but it should be borne in mind that the physician himself testified that he advised the patient to make the move. Thus the patient’s statement was merely cumulative and if there was error in permitting him to testify that his doctor ordered him to move, it would not be reversible error because the doctor also testified to the same thing.
In Taylor v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra [232 Ala. 378, 168 So. 183], this court held that where plaintiff had testified that Dr. Edge had made an X-ray picture of his knee, the lower court properly sustained an objection to this question: “ ‘What did the doctor tell you in reference to the condition of your knee ?’ ” because “the unsworn opinion of a physician, like any other expert, is mere hearsay. The proper method of proving the result of Dr. Edge’s examination was to examine him as a witness.” The court refers to the holding in the Brantley case, supra, notes the text in Corpus Juris and the Rocci case, supra, and says:
“We would not extend the rule to include the unsworn opinion of a physician touching the. extent of injury from accident, in the absence of circumstances rendering such opinion a matter proper to be considered as part of the case. This would open wide the door to hearsay evidence.”
We now come to consider the case of Grammer v. State, supra [239 Ala. 633, 196 So. 273], where the court, in discussing the fact that Dr. Kay, an expert on mental disease connected with Bryce Hospital, had been permitted to testify, without objection, that “ ‘it was the unanimous opinion of the medical staff that Mr. Grammer was not insane” at all conferences that discussed the matter, and that “it was my feeling and the feeling of the rest of the medical staff that” etc., said on rehearing:
“Aside from the fact that no objection was made to it, it appears that those conclusions were expressed in their conferences and examinations of defendant, where, in many of them, he was personally brought to make a diagnosis, and in others they were con-. sidering and discussing his symptoms. When so, the opinions expressed by the physicians have been held by this Court, in line with others, to be a part of the res gestae of their diagnosis and that of the .physician testifying, since they were thus engaged in their professional service, and the expression of such opinions ‘were coincident business declarations,’ and admissible in evidence though given in the testimony of another witness. Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Brantley, 231 Ala. 554, 165 So. 834; Taylor v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 232 Ala. 378, 168 So. 181; Mutual Life Ins. Co. [of New York] v. Tillman, 84 Tex. 31, 36, 19 S.W. 294, 297. The fact that the witness expressed the ‘unanimous opinion of the medical staff’, rather than, a repetition of .what they said in that connection, is not sufficient, in the absence of objection on that ground, to impeach such testimony of Dr. Kay as not being of much probative value. Whether he should have been required to repeat what each doctor said in substance, or to give it as Dr. Kay did, was a matter which defendant and his- counsel could control by making objection or not as they should elect. They made no such objection, and therefore, it is not the. province of this Court to minimize the effect of it as given by the witness.”
The authorities cited are the Brantley case, supra; the Taylor case, supra, and the Texas case, which was also cited in theBrantley case. We have already discussed the first named cases and we quote the per-tinent part of the decision in the Tillman (Texas) case [84 Tex. 31, 19 S.W. 295], The background of that case was that, the action was on an insurance policy and the insured, Goslin, was found in his locked store in a dying condition “from-the, effects, of morphine or opium poison administered by himself”, either by mistake or to commit suicide. The court said:
“Dr. W. B. Smoot and Dr. Leake were called as physicians to see Goslin. The former had testified as a witness *416for defendant that He examined Goslin, and concluded from symptoms which he described that the case was one of morphine poison. Dr. Leake was present in his professional capacity with Dr. Smoot. Under these circumstances, plaintiff’s counsel asked the witness Smoot, 'Wasn’t there some doubt between you and Dr. Leake as to what was the matter with him?’ To which the witness answered: ‘It is a fact that Goslin’s pulse did not manifest morphine poison at the time I first went there. This fact was noticed by Dr. Leake, and, from the fact that his pulse did indicate something else except morphine, there was some hesitancy with Dr. Leake as to what was the matter with him.’ This evidence was objected to as hearsay. The witness testified that he did not think Dr. Leake made a diagnosis of the case. It is, however, apparent from his statement that himself and Dr. Leake were engaged in a professional inquiry as to what was the matter with Goslin, — an inquiry pertinent to the issue here involved. The opinions expressed at the time with reference to the subject of consideration by the one or the other, in the course of their examination, were, in our opinion, in the nature of res gestae, and so admissible. The declarations were made in the course of their business, and while engaged in a professional duty. They were coincident business declarations. 1 Whart.Ev. § 262.”
It will be noted that the question was asked on cross examination and not direct, and was a legitimate question with the apparent aim of impeaching or modifying the direct testimony of Dr. Smoot. It was a question which could have been and, under our rules, should have been answered “yes” or “no”. But the answer was not responsive to the question and the defendant went into a detailed explanation of the difference of opinion between him and Dr. Leake. We do not think the Tillman case is helpful in deciding the question before us.
In 32 C.J.S., Evidence, § 570, we find: “It has been said that corroboration cannot be had by reciting the judgment of others on the subject,” citing Indiana Natural & Illuminating Gas Co. v. Anthony, 26 Ind. App. 307, 58 N.E. 868. That case holds that an expert may be asked his opinion on a matter, but it would not be competent for him to say what opinion other experts might have on the subject.
It is our opinion that the lower court should have sustained the objections to the questions to Dr. Samford and Dr. Owsley which are quoted herein on the grounds that they called for hearsay evidence and they represented an attempt to bolster their testimony with that of a third party not under oath or subject to cross examination. Too, this third party expert was the only recognized specialist in the particular field and as between experts with different experience and qualifications, the testimony of the one with the greatest experience and the more specialized knowledge of the question involved is entitled to the greater weight. 32 C.J.S., Evidence, § 572, p. 420, Note 77; Linn v. Terrell Compress & Warehouse Co., La.App., 142 So. 193; Benedict v. United States, D.C., 270 F. 267; Lapham v. United States, D.C., 93 F.Supp. 276.
The appellee knew that Dr. Hughston lived in Columbus, Georgia, and could not be compelled to come to this state to testify. Adequate provision to meet such circumstances is provided in Code of 1940, Title 7, Article 6, §§ 457-474, which provide for procuring testimony by deposition. The proper method to put the testimony of Dr. Hughston before the jury was either to have him testify in person or by deposition.
We reaffirm the rule laid down in Hussey v. State, supra, and since that conflicts with the quoted portion of the opinion in Grammer v. State, supra, the former must prevail.
It is never easy to reverse a judgment where it is obvious that both the trial attorney and the trial court followed to the letter the latest pronouncement of this court, and a check of the questions against the quoted portion of the Grammer case shows that to have been done here. But it is our duty to correct a statement in our de*417cisions which, in our considered opinion, improperly states the law. Insofar as our study reveals, the quoted part of the Grammer case has not been followed by this court since it was announced and this case presents the first opportunity of this court to reconsider the matter.
In view of the fact that the case must again be tried, we do not deem it necessary to discuss assignments of error 1, 2 or 3.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
LAWSON, STAKELY, GOODWYN and MAYFIELD, JJ., concur.
LIVINGSTON, C. J„ and SIMPSON, J., dissent.