Court Opinion

ID: 9893438
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-27 05:08:55.398236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:39.652282
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

JOSEPH QUINLAN,                                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                    October 26, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                   No. 363579
                                                                    Ottawa Circuit Court
DEREK PAUL GENDRON, also known as DEREK                             LC No. 21-006582-CZ
PAUL,

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: RICK, P.J., and SHAPIRO and YATES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Defendant appeals as of right an order granting plaintiff’s motion to confirm an arbitration
award and enter judgment. We affirm.

                     I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

        This case arises out of an agreement for the sale of an online pet store. In February 2020,
plaintiff entered into a Website Services and Domain Transfer Agreement with Semper Fi
Services, Inc.—a Wyoming corporation for which defendant is the sole shareholder, officer, and
agent. This agreement, which governed the sale, contained the following arbitration clause:

               Any dispute, claim, proceeding, or other action among the parties shall be
       heard by the American Arbitration Association and conducted according to the
       American Arbitration Association Commercial Arbitration Rules. The parties
       agree to service of notices and actions under those rules via email delivery with
       postal service supplement as required by such rules.

The agreement also contained a governing law, jurisdiction, and venue clause, which stated:

               This agreement is governed by and enforced according to State of Michigan
       laws. Any dispute arising must be brought in any court having jurisdiction in
       Ottawa County, Michigan. The parties consent to such venue and waive objection
       to such venue.

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        In August 2020, plaintiff obtained an arbitration award for $7,800 against “Derek Paul”
and Semper Fi Services. Plaintiff then filed a complaint against “Derek Paul Gendron, a/k/a Derek
Paul,” in August 2021, to enforce the arbitration award. Defendant moved for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4) (lack of subject-matter jurisdiction) and MCR 2.116(C)(8)
(failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted), arguing (1) he was not a named party in
the agreement, nor was he a named party in the arbitration, because it was against “Derek Paul,”
and he was “Derek Gendron;” (2) even if the arbitration did use his proper name, the arbitrator
lacked jurisdiction over defendant; and (3) the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction because
defendant lived in Tennessee, plaintiff lived in Colorado, none of the transactions occurred in
Michigan, and the only connection to Ottawa County was the dispute resolution clause in the
agreement, which defendant did not sign in his individual capacity. The trial court denied
defendant’s motion, finding there was “no genuine issue of material fact that ‘Derek Paul’ is one
and the same person as ‘Derek Paul Gendron’ and ‘DP Gendron,’ and [found defendant] to be one
and the same person under the misnomer doctrine.” The trial court also found that it had personal
jurisdiction over defendant, because defendant had sufficient contacts with Michigan regardless of
his current Tennessee residence. The trial court ultimately granted plaintiff’s subsequent motion
to confirm the arbitration award, and defendant now appeals.

                                          II. ANALYSIS

                                        A. JURISDICTION

       Defendant argues the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. We disagree.1

        “When examining whether a Michigan court may exercise limited personal jurisdiction
over a defendant, this Court employs a two-step analysis.” Yoost v Caspari, 295 Mich App 209,
222; 813 NW2d 783 (2012). “First, this Court ascertains whether jurisdiction is authorized by
Michigan’s long-arm statute. Second, this Court determines if the exercise of jurisdiction is
consistent with the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id.
“Both prongs of this analysis must be satisfied for a Michigan court to properly exercise limited
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident.” Id. “Long-arm statutes establish the nature, character,
and types of contacts that must exist for purposes of exercising personal jurisdiction. Due process,
on the other hand, restricts permissible long-arm jurisdiction by defining the quality of contacts
necessary to justify personal jurisdiction under the constitution.” Id. at 222-223. We use a three-
part test to determine whether the exercise of limited personal jurisdiction over an individual
comports with due process:

       First, the defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
       conducting activities in Michigan, thus invoking the benefits and protections of this
       state’s laws. Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant’s activities

1
  We review de novo the legal question whether a trial court possesses personal jurisdiction over
a party. Yoost v Caspari, 295 Mich App 209, 219; 813 NW2d 783 (2012). Furthermore, we review
de novo “the legal question of whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident . . .
is consistent with the notions of fair play and substantial justice required by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id.

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       in the state. Third, the defendant’s activities must be substantially connected with
       Michigan to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. [Id.
       at 223, quoting Mozdy v Lopez, 197 Mich App 356, 359; 494 NW2d 866 (1992).]

“Whether jurisdiction is proper under the minimum contacts test does not depend on the weight of
the factors individually. Rather, the primary focus when analyzing personal jurisdiction should be
on reasonableness and fairness.” Oberlies v Searchmont Resort, Inc, 246 Mich App 424, 433; 633
NW2d 408 (2001). This analysis is performed on a case-by-case basis. Id.

        As noted, the first part of our analysis depends on whether jurisdiction over defendant was
authorized by Michigan’s long-arm statute. Michigan’s long-arm statute for limited personal
jurisdiction over individuals, MCL 600.705, states:

               The existence of any of the following relationships between an individual
       or his agent and the state shall constitute a sufficient basis of jurisdiction to enable
       a court of record of this state to exercise limited personal jurisdiction over the
       individual and to enable the court to render personal judgments against the
       individual or his representative arising out of an act which creates any of the
       following relationships:

               (1) The transaction of any business within the state.

               (2) The doing or causing an act to be done, or consequences to occur, in the
       state resulting in an action for tort.

               (3) The ownership, use, or possession of real or tangible personal property
       situated within the state.

                (4) Contracting to insure a person, property, or risk located within this state
       at the time of contracting.

              (5) Entering into a contract for services to be rendered or for materials to be
       furnished in the state by the defendant.

              (6) Acting as a director, manager, trustee, or other officer of a corporation
       incorporated under the laws of, or having its principal place of business within this
       state.

               (7) Maintaining a domicile in this state while subject to a marital or family
       relationship which is the basis of the claim for divorce, alimony, separate
       maintenance, property settlement, child support, or child custody. [Id.]

        The trial court relied on numerous different interactions and relationships defendant had
with the state when it determined it had personal jurisdiction over him. These factors included:
(1) that defendant “presented plaintiff with a contract by the company that he controlled stating
that Ottawa County, Michigan would be the venue for any contract dispute[;]” (2) that plaintiff
was the sole officer and agent of another company, which had “filed no less than forty different
lawsuits in the courts of Ottawa County, Michigan in the four years preceding the present action[;]”

                                                 -3-
(3) that defendant informed the American Arbitration Association via e-mail he was in Michigan
due to the COVID-19 quarantine in August 2020; (4) that this e-mail also identified a Michigan
attorney with an office in Ottawa County as the corporate attorney for Semper Fi Services, Inc.;
and (5) that defendant was identified in the annual report of his other company as a Michigan
resident “at least as of June 23, 2019.”

        Defendant contends he was not a party to the agreement and is therefore not bound by its
terms. However, Semper Fi Services, Inc., was a party to the agreement, and is a corporation for
which defendant is the sole shareholder, officer, and agent. It was in this capacity that defendant
conducted business in Michigan. MCL 600.705(1). This, considered with the factors provided by
the trial court, particularly the fact that the agreement specifically designated Ottawa County,
Michigan, as the proper venue for disputes, is sufficient evidence of defendant’s connections with
the state, justifying the trial court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over him.

         Moving to the second prong, we consider the three-part test in determining whether the
trial court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction comported with due process. First, the evidence
presented demonstrates defendant “purposely availed himself of the privilege of conducting
activities in Michigan, thus invoking the benefits and protections of this state’s laws[,]” Oberlies,
246 Mich App at 433, by including the venue clause in the agreement he signed in his professional
capacity as the sole owner of Semper Fi Services, Inc. Second, this cause of action arose from
defendant’s activities in the state—an arbitration award stemming from the agreement, which, as
discussed, identified Ottawa County, Michigan, as the sole venue for dispute resolution. Third, as
noted earlier, defendant had various activities which were “substantially connected with
Michigan[.]” Id. Defendant’s numerous contacts with the state, coupled with the very specific
language of the agreement that disputes were to be governed by Michigan law and settled in Ottawa
County, Michigan, demonstrate the trial court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant
did not violate his due-process rights. Indeed, the governing law clause specifically notes: “The
parties consent to such venue and waive objection to such venue.”

                                  B. ARBITRATION AWARD

       Defendant next argues the trial court erred by confirming the arbitration award and denying
defendant’s motion for reconsideration. We disagree.2

        On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by confirming the arbitration award
because he was “never made a party to the original agreement, was never notified and did not
participate in arbitration, was not named in the arbitration award, and could not legally become a
party to the case.” These arguments lack merit.

         First, regarding defendant’s argument he was not a party to the agreement, the trial court,
in its opinion and order confirming the arbitration award, reasoned:

2
 “We review de novo a trial court’s decision to enforce, vacate, or modify a statutory arbitration
award.” Tokar v Albery, 258 Mich App 350, 352; 671 NW2d 139 (2003).

                                                -4-
                Defendant continues to assert that he is not personally subject to an
       arbitration award as he never agreed to arbitrate. The UAA [Uniform Arbitration
       Act, MCL 691.1681 et seq.,] provides that the court shall decide whether an
       agreement to arbitrate exists or a controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate.
       MCL 691.1686(2). Michigan law respects the separate existences of corporate
       entities—and limited-liability companies—even when one entity owns another, or
       when a single individual owns an entire entity. Wells v Firestone Tire & Rubber
       Co, 421 Mich 641, 650; 364 NW2d 670 (1984) (“We recognize the general
       principle that in Michigan separate entities will be respected.”); Rymal v Baergen,
       262 Mich App 274, 293; 686 NW2d 241 (2004) (“The law treats a corporation as
       an entirely separate entity from its shareholders, even where one individual owns
       all the corporation’s stock.”).

               Defendant, however, signed the agreement in this case personally, without
       disclosing his agency status. In Altobelli v Hartman, 499 Mich 284; 884 NW2d
       537 (2016), the Michigan Supreme Court quoted with approval the following
       principle:

               “It is well established that corporate employees and officials are
               personally liable for all tortious and criminal acts in which they
               participate, regardless of whether they are acting on their own behalf
               or on behalf of a corporation.” Id., [sic] at 301 n 9.

       The court therefore concluded:

               “. . . because plaintiff’s claims challenge defendants’ actions taken
               in their capacity as agents of the Firm, plaintiff’s dispute falls within
               the scope of this particular arbitration clause and must therefore be
               resolved in arbitration. Since this dispute must be resolved in
               arbitration, whether these defendants can be held personally liable
               for the challenged actions is a substantive matter reserved for the
               arbitrator. . . .” Id. [(citation omitted, second ellipses added).]

As recognized by the trial court, defendant was not exempt from the terms of the arbitration
agreement when the entire basis for plaintiff’s claim was the alleged fraud committed by defendant
on behalf of Semper Fi Services, Inc. Plaintiff sought to pierce the corporate veil in his complaint
for this very reason.

        Regarding defendant’s contention that he was not notified about, nor was he part of, the
arbitration proceedings, MCL 691.1682 states:

              (1) Except as otherwise provided in this act, a person gives notice to another
       person by taking action that is reasonably necessary to inform the other person in
       ordinary course, whether or not the other person acquires knowledge of the notice.

              (2) A person has notice if the person has knowledge of the notice or has
       received notice.

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               (3) A person receives notice when it comes to the person’s attention or the
       notice is delivered at the person's place of residence or place of business, or at
       another location held out by the person as a place of delivery of such
       communications. [Id.]

We first note that defendant does not address the trial court’s ruling on whether he was given
adequate notice. “When an appellant fails to dispute the basis of a lower court’s ruling, we need
not even consider granting the relief being sought by the appellant.” Denhov v Challa, 311 Mich
App 499, 521; 876 NW2d 266 (2015). However, even if defendant did properly dispute the ruling,
plaintiff provided sufficient notice under the statute, because, while the e-mail address on the
demand for arbitration was incorrect, the mailing address used was the address specified as the
one to use for defendant in the agreement. Thus, plaintiff took action that was “reasonably
necessary to inform” defendant of the proceedings at a “location held out by [defendant] as a place
of delivery of such communications.” MCL 691.1682(1) and (3).

        Defendant’s final argument is that he was not named in the arbitration award, and,
therefore, could not be a legal party in this case. Again, we disagree. In denying defendant’s
motion for summary disposition, the trial court found “no genuine issue of material fact that ‘Derek
Paul’ is one and the same person as ‘Derek Paul Gendron,’ and [found] him to be one and the same
person under the misnomer doctrine,” citing Miller v Chapman Contracting, 477 Mich 102, 106-
107; 730 NW2d 462 (2007). “As a general rule, . . . a misnomer of a plaintiff or defendant is
amendable unless the amendment is such as to effect an entire change of parties.” Id. at 106
(quotation marks and citation omitted, ellipses in original). “The misnomer doctrine applies only
to correct inconsequential deficiencies or technicalities in the naming of parties, for example,
[w]here the right corporation has been sued by the wrong name, and service has been made upon
the right party, although by a wrong name . . . .” Id. at 106-107 (quotation marks and citations
omitted, ellipses and alteration in original). Defendant does not dispute that he is the person with
whom plaintiff contracted, and, as such, the misnomer was amendable, because it did not “effect
an entire change of parties.” Id. at 106.

                                    C. TRIAL COURT BIAS

       Defendant lastly argues the trial court judge was prejudiced against him, and incapable of
impartially handling this case. We disagree.3

       Generally, a party must pursue a claim of disqualification before the trial court—including
requesting referral to the chief judge if the motion is denied—to preserve the issue for appeal. See
Sinicropi v Mazurek, 273 Mich App 149, 176 n 15; 729 NW2d 256 (2006). The issue may be
waived by the party’s failure to file an affidavit with the motion to disqualify. Davis v Chatman,
292 Mich App 603, 615; 808 NW2d 555 (2011). While parties acting in propria persona are

3
  “In reviewing a motion to disqualify a judge, this Court reviews the trial court’s findings of fact
for an abuse of discretion and reviews the court’s application of those facts to the relevant law de
novo.” In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich App 656, 679; 765 NW2d 44 (2009). An abuse of
discretion occurs when a decision is outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. In
re MKK, 286 Mich App 546, 564; 781 NW2d 132 (2009).

                                                -6-
entitled to some lenity in their pleadings, they are still required to provide adequate support for
their claims. Estelle v Gamble, 429 US 97, 106-108; 97 S Ct 285; 50 L Ed 2d 251 (1976). In this
case, defendant raised the disqualification issue when seeking reconsideration, but failed to request
a referral to the chief judge after the motion was denied. Nor did he attach an affidavit to his
motion. See Davis, 292 Mich App at 615. However, we choose to address this issue regardless
of any potential waiver because of the greater lenity afforded to parties acting in propria persona.

        “Due process requires that an unbiased and impartial decision-maker hear and decide a
case. A trial judge is presumed unbiased, and the party asserting otherwise has the heavy burden
of overcoming the presumption.” Mitchell v Mitchell, 296 Mich App 513, 523; 823 NW2d 153
(2012) (citation omitted). MCR 2.003(C) provides, in relevant part:

              (1) Disqualification of a judge is warranted for reasons that include, but are
       not limited to, the following:

               (a) The judge is biased or prejudiced for or against a party or attorney.

                (b) The judge, based on objective and reasonable perceptions, has either (i)
       a serious risk of actual bias impacting the due process rights of a party as enunciated
       in Caperton v Massey, [556 US 868]; 129 S Ct 2252; 173 L Ed 2d 1208 (2009), or
       (ii) has failed to adhere to the appearance of impropriety standard set forth in Canon
       2 of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct. [MCR 2.003(C)(1)(a) and (b)
       (alteration in original).]

        Defendant argues the trial court judge “allowed his personal opinion of [defendant] and his
friendship with [p]laintiff’s counsel to unduly influence his judicial decision making.” In support
of this argument, defendant argues the trial court judge denied or ignored every motion he filed.
However, merely ruling against a litigant is not a sufficient basis to warrant disqualification:

               Generally, a trial judge is not disqualified absent a showing of actual bias
       or prejudice. The mere fact that a judge ruled against a litigant, even if the rulings
       are later determined to be erroneous, is not sufficient to require disqualification or
       reassignment. Judicial rulings, in and of themselves, almost never constitute a valid
       basis for a motion alleging bias, unless the judicial opinion displays a deep-seated
       favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible and overcomes
       a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality. [In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich
       App 656, 680; 765 NW2d 44 (2009) (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

In further support of his bias allegation, defendant argues he has “personal knowledge” of a
“friendly relationship” between the trial court judge and plaintiff’s counsel, contending they “may
have engaged in ex parte communications concerning [defendant’s] pending federal case against
[plaintiff’s counsel] and the [p]laintiff’s law firm.” Defendant further contends he has personal
knowledge the trial court judge “does not like” him, and “has by his courtroom demeanor
expressed animus towards [defendant] and has clearly acted to show favoritism to his friend,
[plaintiff’s counsel].”

       However, defendant has provided no evidence to support these allegations outside his
“personal knowledge,” and “[a] party cannot simply assert an error or announce a position and

                                                -7-
then leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and
elaborate for him his arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his
position.” Mitchell, 296 Mich App at 524 (quotation marks and citation omitted). As noted, while
parties acting in propria persona are entitled to a certain degree of lenity, they are still required to
provide adequate support for their claims. Estelle, 429 US at 106-108. Defendant has failed to do
so. Considering the record as it stands, there is insufficient evidence of judicial bias.

                                         III. CONCLUSION

       Affirmed. As the prevailing party, appellee may tax costs as provided by MCR 7.219.

                                                               /s/ Michelle M. Rick
                                                               /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
                                                               /s/ Christopher P. Yates

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