Court Opinion

ID: 9624838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:19:20.738935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:34.410092
License: Public Domain

WYNN, Judge
dissenting.
I dissent from the majority opinion because the issue addressed by the majority regarding the defendant’s Motion in the Cause was not presented by either the Motion in the Cause, or by the defendant’s appeal to this Court. The majority invites this issue by stating, “defendant specifically requested that the trial court enter a modified or amended Qualifying Order increasing defendant’s percentage of plaintiff’s retired pay ‘for as long as the pension remains reduced due to a disability payment.’ ” Having set the stage with this introduction, the majority inferentially states that “defendant was not seeking to have the trial court treat plaintiff’s disability benefits as divisible marital property. Rather, defendant merely sought a modification, or amendment, of the 1998 Qualifying Order, providing that defendant is entitled to an increased percentage of plaintiff’s retired pay.”
In fact, defendant’s Motion in the Cause, appended to this dissent, sought to enforce the Consent Order and agreement of the parties that defendant would receive “[o]ne-half of any and all pension benefits accumulated [during the marriage]” which amounted to 29.4% of plaintiff’s retirement benefits. Defendant alleged that the election by the plaintiff to receive disability benefits altered her percentage from 29.4% to 15%. Thus, defendant contended the plaintiff’s disability benefits “come from the same source and the disability benefits are in actuality retirement benefits the Court had previously assigned to Defendant and to which the Defendant should be entitled.” In other words, defendant’s motion was based upon the contention that, under the Consent Order she is entitled to one-half of all of plaintiff’s benefits, including his retired pay benefits and his disability benefits. Accordingly, defendant sought to have the trial court, “Require the Plaintiff to restore to the Defendant her full pension benefit by increasing her percentage of the reduced pension benefit from 29.4% to 57.0% . . . .” In essence, defendant sought an increase in benefits that would have the same effect as treating the disability benefits as marital property which is prohibited by Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 104 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1989).
Recognizing defendant’s veiled attempt to thwart the plain language of the statutory and case law, Judge Corpening correctly con-*596eluded that, “Federal law continues to preempt state law on the issue of dividing upon divorce military retirement pay that has been waived to receive disability benefits.”
It is further significant to point out that in this appeal, defendant presents only two issues for our consideration.
First, defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to find that plaintiff was not disabled and therefore was not entitled to received disability income. Defendant argues that
By the unilateral actions of the Plaintiff in converting retirement pay into disability benefits after a portion of the retirement pay was awarded to the Defendant, the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (USFSPA) has become a hindrance to Defendant in obtaining what is legally hers. In order to correct this inequity, the Defendant moved the trial court, pursuant to Rule 60 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, to use its authority under state law, without running afoul of the Supremacy Clause, to reapportion an equitable distribution of the parties’ marital property based on the Plaintiff’s post dissolution acts.
Second, defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to make findings that she is entitled to an unequal distribution of plaintiff’s remaining pension income. In support of this contention, defendant argues:
The force of the federal preemption should not extend so as to preclude the state courts from awarding the Defendant fifty-percent (50%) of the Plaintiffs military retirement pay out of assets he has other than his VA disability benefits. It would be consistent with both North Carolina law and the USFSPA for the trial court to consider the VA benefits received by the Plaintiff as a distributional factor in awarding the Defendant an unequal division in her favor, using assets other than the VA benefits themselves.
No argument is made by either party concerning the issue of whether the defendant should be allowed to thwart the spirit of Mansell to have the court reconfigure her percentage to give her the same benefit she would have obtained if plaintiff had not elected to receive disability benefits. Likewise, the issue of whether Mansell prohibits military spouses from contracting away their disability benefits is not presented by this appeal and remains for another day.
*597In sum, while the issue addressed by the majority may indeed be an interesting issue to resolve, it is not presented at all by this appeal. I, therefore, dissent from the decision of the majority to reverse the trial court’s order on that basis.
APPENDIX
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF NEW HANOVER
IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE DISTRICT COURT DIVISION 89 CVD 1214
DAVID W. WHITE Plaintiff, v. KATHY H. WHITE, Defendant
MOTION IN THE CAUSE
NOW COMES the Defendant, and moves this Court for an Order requiring the Plaintiff to pay to the Defendant the full amount of pension benefits she would have been entitled to, except for the unilateral actions of the Plaintiff, and in support thereof shows the Court as follows:
1. That on or about the 17th day of July, 1990 the parties entered into a Consent Order with regard to the issue of equitable distribution.
2. Pursuant to that Consent Order the Defendant was to be granted one-half of any and all pension benefits accumulated during the course of the marriage.
3. That on or about the 22nd day of May, 1998 a Qualified Domestic Relations Order was entered in this matter providing that the Defendant would receive one-half of the Plaintiff’s United States Coast Guard pension benefits which were accumulated during the course of the marriage. The Defendant’s portion amounts to 29.4% of the Plaintiff’s entire pension benefit.
4. When the Order was entered and accepted by the U. S. Coast Guard, Plaintiffs Disposable Retired Pay became $1,582.17, after the survivor’s benefit charge was applied. Plaintiff’s share was $1,102.89 and Defendant’s share was $429.28. A cost of living increase later raised Defendant’s share to $465.00
5. After receiving notice that the Defendant would begin receiving a portion of his retirement benefits, the Plaintiff, without the knowledge or approval of the Defendant, made application to have a portion of his benefits converted to “disability benefits”. This request *598was granted and thereafter the disability benefits were paid to Plaintiff and the total amount of the disability payment was subtracted from the pension before it was divided between the two parties. As a result of the Plaintiffs actions, the Defendant’s monthly benefit was reduced by $223.19 from $459.28 to $236.09 per month, while Plaintiff’s benefits of pension plus disability payment increased by the same amount. This altered the percéntage division from 71% for Plaintiff and 29% for Defendant to 85% for Plaintiff and 15% for Defendant. The actions on behalf of the Plaintiff were done for the sole purpose of reducing the benefits to which the Defendant was entitled, and increasing the Plaintiff’s portion of a benefit that had already been fairly divided by the Court.
6. That these benfits come from the same source and the disability benefits are in actuality retirement benefits the Court had previously assigned to Defendant and to which the Defendant should still be entitled.
WHEREFORE the Defendant prays this Court for an Order to do the following:
a. Require the Plaintiff to restore the Defendant her full pension benefit by increasing her percentage of the reduced pension benefit from 29.4% to 57.0% for as long as the pension remains reduced due to a disability payment, and to secure this benefit with a Second Amended Qualifying Order for Uniformed Services Retirement System Military Retired Pay, to be prepared by Defendant’s attorney.
b. Require the Plaintiff to reimburse Defendant, within sixty days of the date of the Order, for the twenty months that her portion of the pension has been reduced, in the amount of $4,463.80.
c. Such other and further relief as to the Court may seem just and proper.
This the_day of January, 2000.
LEA, CLYBURN & RHINE
(s) JAMES W. LEA. ITT
JAMES W. LEA, III
State Bar No. 9323 Attorney for Defendant 314 Walnut Street, Suite 1000 Wilmington, NC 28401 (910) 772-9960