Court Opinion

ID: 9831944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:29:51.962246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:28.129869
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
On rehearing the appellant has requested us to make some additional findings. Most of the requested findings are mere matters of record which appear without dispute. The findings will be given as requested with such amendment or brief comment as deemed necessary to a correct understanding of them:
First. “Upon the trial appellees presented the purported grazing lease dated July 27, 1922, purporting to be signed by O. T. Cuniff and covering the land in controversy and other land. Appellants deny that the said lease was signed by O. T. Cuniff and contended that same was a forgery. An issue of forgery of said instrument, was made in the record and in the seventh special issue, the following question was asked and the following answer given ‘do you find from the preponderance of the evidence that the grazing lease dated July 27th, 1922 was signed by O. T. Cuniff? Answer Yes or No as you find the fact to be.’ To which issue the Jury answered No.”
Second. “In special issue No. Eight the Jury was asked the following questions ‘do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant O. T. .Cuniff in 1925 requested an oil and gas lease on the land in controversy? Answer Yes or No as you find the fact to be.’ To this question the Jury answered Yes.”
Third. “In special issue No. Ten, the Jury was asked the following question ‘do you find from the preponderance of the evidence that the defendant O. T.- Cuniff requested the oil and gas lease dated August 31, 1926, and marked as exhibit No. 76, on the land therein described? Answer Yes or No as you find the fact to be.’ To this question the Jury answered Yes.”
Fourth. “The Jury in special issue No. 11 was asked the following question ‘do you find from the preponderance of the evidence that O. T. Cuniff in 1926 requested an oil lease on the land in question herein, answer yes or no as you find the fact to be’ to this question the jury answered Yes.”
As stated in our original opinion, the Guniffs contended that their negotiation and correspondence with Mr. Sterling concerning pasture leases had to do with that part of the .Sterling lands which lay outside of their inclosures and which were not sued for in this suit. Mr. Cuniff specifically denied that he had attempted to lease any of the Sterling lands which he had inclosed and which are here sued for. As bearing upon his theory that his acknowledgment of ownership in the letters written to Mr. Sterling related to the outside lands, excerpts from certain of the letters are given in the following three findings:
Fifth. “On August 16th 1923, Mrs. Cu-niff for her husband wrote to R. S. Sterling a letter containing the following language;: ‘Mr. Sterling you will find enclosed the' pasture lease, I have been unable to fence1 it at all.’ ”
Sixth. “That O. T. Cuniff wrote R. Sv Sterling on March 7, 1925, a letter containing the following language ‘now I want to know if it will be satisfactory for me to return the lease on the land to you until I am able to fence it.’ ”
Seventh. “On Feb. 15 1926, O. T. Cuniff wrote R. S. Sterling a letter containing the following language: ‘I am sorry but have been unable to fence the land at all.’ ”
To the above we will add that none of the letters written by O. T. Cuniff to R. S. Ster-, ling made reference to any specific tracts, of land except the letter of September 15, 1925, which is set out in the original opinion, which does make reference to block 6, which was within the Cuniff inclosure and sued for in this suit.
Eighth. “No letter was ever addressed by either of the appellants to R. S. Sterling Investment Company, the record holder re-, questing any pasture lease or having reference to any pasture lease during the term of the possession, during which they claimed limitation.”
*582As stated in the original opinion, the correspondence was addressed to R. S. Sterling, and various negotiations for pasture leases and oil leases were carried on with him.by letters addressed to him and by a personal visit made by O. T. Cuniff to Mr. Sterling’s office in Houston.
Ninth. “No holder of the record title to the land in controversy ever wrote any letter to the appellants or either of them relative to a pasture lease during the limitation period claimed by the appellant.”
The letters respecting the above matter were written by R. S. Sterling personally.
Tenth. “No correspondence written by the appellants or R. S. Sterling with reference to a pasture lease described any land supposed to be contained in said lease, or showed that any of the land in controversy was considered in said lease.”
The correspondence with reference to pasture leases did not designate the particular tracts referred to or make any specific reference as to whether they lay inside or outside of Mr. Cuniff’s fences.
Eleventh. “Appellee to show that the land in controversy was intended to he considered in the correspondence with reference to a pasture lease attempted to tie the said letter into the description in the purported pasture lease, which the Jury found to have been a forgery.”
Twelfth. “There was no correspondence of any kind between the appellant and the R. S. Sterling Investment Company or other owner of the record title, relative to the execution of any oil lease in 1925,' or 1926.”
The negotiations by Mr. Cuniff. for se-' curing the oil and gas leases in 1925 and 1926 were with Mr. R. S. Sterling.
Thirteenth. “There was no finding of the Jury that the appellants or either of them ever requested from R. S. Sterling Investment Company the Record owner any oil lease on any part of the land in controversy.”
In response to special issue No. 8 the. jury found that O. T. Cuniff, in 1925, requested an oil and gas lease on the land in controversy. The issue did not name the person from whom it was requested, but the evidence was undisputed that, if requested at-all, it was requested from R. S. Sterling. The only issue was as to whether it was requested at all. In response to issue 10 the jury found that O. T. Cuniff requested the oil and gas lease dated August 31, 1926, and which was placed in evidence.
Fourteenth. “There was no correspondence of any kind between the appellants and R. S. Sterling or anyone else having reference to any oil lease on Blocks one, two or three of the Sterling Subdivision, nor was there any letter referring to an oil lease on any part of said subdivision, except the letter-of dáte of September 15, 1925, copied in the opinion.”
Fifteenth. “Governor Sterling testified by deposition as follows:
“ ‘Q. This mineral lease that was made and sent over here to the hank in 1926 was signed by you individually, wasn’t it? A. I think so.
“ ‘Q. ,1 mean both the letter and the lease was signed by you? A. I believe it was.
“ ‘Q. At that time you had passed your individual interest to this corporation and the title was in the corporation?' A. Yes, sir.’ ”
Sixteenth. “The only oil lease shown by the record was the one dated August 31, 1926, inquired about in special Issue No. 10 which was executed by R. S. Sterling individually who was a stranger to the title and was sent to the Sour Lake State Bank to be delivered to appellant when the -well was spudded in, which lease covered a part but not all of the land in appellant’s enclosure and said lease was never delivered to or accepted by the appellant.”
Seventeenth. “No witness testified as to any statement by Cuniff that he had a pasture lease from anyone either Sterling or Sterling Investment Company, to any land in his enclosure, but appellee’s witness Jim Barfield corroborated appellant in stating that the appellant discussed with him the leasing of outside land, he having testified on page 810 of the Statement of Facts, ‘well he and I, he came to me and wanted us to get together and fence up the whole block of outside land of Mr. Sterling’s and two other sections adjoining it,’ and was further corroborated by the appellee’s witness Mitchell, who testified that appellant discussed with him the sending back of a grass lease, and at the time they were discussing it, they were riding outside the enclosure on the land which appellant testified was the only land considered by him for the pasture lease.”
In their motion for rehearing appellants also object to our statement in the original opinion that they made a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto; their contention being, as we understand it, that they were entitled to judgment on the verdict. *583Whether their motion was one technically non obstante veredicto is not material. In any event, they necessarily insist that the findings of recognition of title were of no consequence. As discussed in our original opinion, it is our view that such findings were decisive of the case.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.