Court Opinion

ID: 9958134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-08 12:01:54.901606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:57.400550
License: Public Domain

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                           Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Scroggin

                        CHASE HOME FINANCE, LLC v.
                           DANIEL J. SCROGGIN
                                (AC 45996)
                           Bright, C. J., and Cradle and Suarez, Js.

                                           Syllabus

         The plaintiff, C Co., sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property
            owned by the defendant, S. Thereafter, A Co. was substituted for C Co.,
            and the trial court granted A Co.’s motion for a judgment of strict
            foreclosure and rendered judgment thereon, from which S appealed to
            this court, which reversed in part the trial court’s judgment and
            remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. Following the
            remand, A Co. filed a motion for summary judgment as to liability only,
            and, in support of its motion, submitted, inter alia, the affidavit of H, a
            litigation specialist employed by A Co.’s loan servicer. In her affidavit,
            H summarized the history of the assignment of the mortgage and further
            averred that C Co. had been the holder of the note at the time the
            present action was commenced and that A Co. was the current holder
            of the note and the mortgagee of record. After the deadline for filing a
            response to A Co.’s motion for summary judgment expired, S filed a
            document captioned ‘‘Practice Book § 17-47 Motion for Extension of
            Time to Respond to the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or
            Alternatively, Objection to Summary Judgment,’’ which the court denied
            as untimely. S then noticed the deposition of a designee of A Co., seeking
            various documents, and A Co. filed a motion for a protective order on
            the grounds that S’s requests were untimely and sought information to
            which he was not entitled, and the trial court summarily granted the
            motion for a protective order. When the parties appeared before the
            court, the court granted A Co.’s motion for summary judgment without
            a hearing, in the absence of opposition, after S’s attorney acknowledged
            that he had not filed a response to the motion. Subsequently, A Co. filed
            a motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure, which the trial court
            granted and rendered judgment thereon, from which S appealed to this
            court, which reversed in part the trial court’s judgment and remanded
            the case to that court for further proceedings. During the proceedings
            on remand, A Co. reclaimed for adjudication its summary judgment
            motion, and S issued notices of two depositions, seeking information
            nearly identical to the information he had previously sought, which was
            the subject of the protective order. A Co. then moved for a protective
            order barring S from deposing its corporate designee and keeper of
            records. S filed a memorandum of law in opposition to A Co.’s motion
            for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that, because A Co. refused
            to produce H for a deposition, the court should deny the motion pursuant
            to the rule of practice (§ 17-47) that permits the court to deny summary
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                         Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Scroggin
           judgment when appropriate documents are unavailable. S also filed an
           affidavit pursuant to Practice Book § 17-47 explaining why he should
           be granted a continuance to conduct discovery. After a hearing, the
           court granted A Co.’s motion for summary judgment as to liability and
           rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure, from which S appealed to
           this court. Held:
       1. S could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred in granting
           summary judgment as to liability because it improperly relied on H’s
           affidavit in determining that C Co. was the holder of the note at the
           time the action had been commenced: H averred that she had personal
           knowledge of the records pertaining to the note and mortgage in this
           case based upon her review of those records, which were received and
           maintained in the regular and ordinary practice of A Co.’s loan servicer,
           such that they constituted competent evidence of C Co.’s status as holder
           of the note when the action had been commenced; moreover, this court
           rejected S’s claim that the trial court should not have relied on H’s
           affidavit because she failed to attach to it the documents on which her
           averments were based, noting that our Supreme Court rejected virtually
           the same argument in RMS Residential Properties, LLC v. Miller (303
           Conn. 224), and reasoning that to be competent to testify, H needed
           only to have personal knowledge of the business records.
       2. S could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred in granting
           summary judgment as to liability because it failed to give him, as the
           nonmoving party, the benefit of all favorable inferences to be drawn
           from the evidence by neglecting to draw an adverse inference from A
           Co.’s refusal to produce witnesses and documents requested by S: S
           failed to set forth any facts, other than A Co.’s filing of a motion for a
           protective order, which is permitted by our rules of practice, in support
           of his contention that A Co. had engaged in extraordinary measures to
           prevent S from deposing H or any other corporate designees of A Co.;
           moreover, S’s claim that he was entitled to an adverse inference for A
           Co.’s failure to allow him to depose H on the basis of the missing witness
           rule adopted in Secondino v. New Haven Gas Co. (147 Conn. 672) was
           legally flawed in that the missing witness rule was significantly limited
           in civil cases by statute (§ 52-216c) after Secondino had been issued,
           and S failed, in his brief to this court, to acknowledge the abrogation
           of Secondino; furthermore, setting aside the fact that S’s reliance on
           Secondino was misplaced, S was unable to demonstrate that he would
           have been entitled to the benefit of the adverse inference permitted by
           § 52-216c.
       3. S could not prevail on his claim that the trial court abused its discretion
           when it implicitly granted A Co.’s motion for a protective order, resulting
           in a complete denial of discovery and a denial of his ability to rebut A
           Co.’s claims: S’s claim was belied by the fact that he neither filed a
           request pursuant to Practice Book § 17-47 with the court nor requested
           that the court rule on A Co.’s motion for a protective order; moreover,
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                            Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Scroggin
             the trial court granted A Co.’s motion for a protective order as to S’s
             request to depose a designee of the plaintiff after the first remand from
             this court and prior to S’s second appeal, and S could have challenged
             the propriety of the protective order in his second appeal, but chose
             not to do so; furthermore, further discovery was beyond the rescript
             order of this court in the second appeal, as this court addressed the
             discovery issue because it was likely to arise on remand and determined
             that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that S’s request
             for an extension of time to conduct discovery to respond to A Co.’s
             motion for summary judgment was untimely.

                     Argued January 3—officially released April 9, 2024

                                      Procedural History

            Action to foreclose a mortgage on certain real prop-
         erty owned by the defendant, and for other relief,
         brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district
         of Middlesex, where the defendant was defaulted for
         failure to plead; thereafter, Bank of America, N.A., was
         cited in as a defendant and the plaintiff filed an amended
         complaint; subsequently, AJX Mortgage Trust I was sub-
         stituted as the party plaintiff; thereafter, the court, Auri-
         gemma, J., granted the substitute plaintiff’s motion for
         judgment as to counts two through six of the amended
         complaint; subsequently, the court granted the substi-
         tute plaintiff’s motion for a judgment of strict foreclo-
         sure and rendered judgment thereon, from which the
         named defendant appealed to this court, Keller, Prescott
         and Bear, Js., which reversed in part the trial court’s
         judgment and remanded the case for further proceed-
         ings; thereafter, the substitute plaintiff withdrew counts
         five and six of the amended complaint; subsequently,
         the court, Aurigemma, J., granted the substitute plain-
         tiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability only
         and granted the substitute plaintiff’s motion for a judg-
         ment of strict foreclosure and rendered judgment
         thereon, from which the named defendant appealed to
         this court, Keller, Moll and Bishop, Js., which reversed
         the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for
         further proceedings; thereafter, the court, Hon. Edward
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                         Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Scroggin

       S. Domnarski, judge trial referee, granted the substitute
       plaintiff’s motion for a judgment of strict foreclosure
       and rendered judgment thereon, from which the named
       defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
          Thomas P. Willcutts, for the appellant (named defen-
       dant).
         Christopher J. Picard, with whom, on the brief, was
       Joseph R. Dunaj, for the appellee (substitute plaintiff).
                                         Opinion

          CRADLE, J. The defendant, Daniel J. Scroggin, who
       is also known as Daniel F. Scroggin or Daniel Scroggin,
       appeals from the judgment of strict foreclosure ren-
       dered by the trial court, for the third time, in favor of the
       substitute plaintiff, AJX Mortgage Trust I, a Delaware
       Trust, Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, Trustee.1
          1
            This is the third appeal taken from a judgment rendered in this case.
       We note that, ‘‘[i]n a prior appeal, this court explained that in September,
       2010, after the named plaintiff, Chase Home Finance, LLC (Chase), had
       commenced this action against the defendant, Chase filed a motion to cite
       in Bank of America, N.A. (Bank of America), as a [third-party] defendant.
       The court granted this motion. Subsequently, [Chase] served Bank of
       America with an amended complaint that alleged that Bank of America was
       a lien holder. In March, 2011, Bank of America was defaulted for failure to
       appear. In January, 2012, Middconn Federal Credit Union sought to be made
       a party defendant to the action as a postjudgment lis pendens holder. The
       court granted the request. Later, Middconn Federal Credit Union was
       defaulted for failure to plead and failure to disclose a defense.
          ‘‘In June, 2012, Chase moved to substitute JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
       as [the] plaintiff in the action. The court granted the motion. In June, 2014,
       JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., moved to substitute Ventures Trust 2013-I-H-
       R by MCM Capital Partners, LLC, its trustee, as [the] plaintiff in the action.
       The court granted the motion. In July, 2015, Ventures Trust 2013-I-H-R by
       MCM Capital Partners, LLC, its trustee, moved to substitute AJX Mortgage
       Trust I, a Delaware Trust, Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, Trustee,
       as [the] plaintiff in the action. The court granted the motion. Chase Home
       Finance, LLC v. Scroggin, 178 Conn. App. 727, 729 n.1, 176 A.3d 1210 (2017).
       As in the prior appeal, we will refer to AJX Mortgage Trust I, a Delaware
       Trust, Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, Trustee, as the plaintiff. Addi-
       tionally, because neither Bank of America nor Middconn Federal Credit
       Union is participating in this appeal, we will refer to Daniel J. Scroggin as
       the defendant.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chase Home Finance,
       LLC v. Scroggin, 194 Conn. App. 843, 846 n.1, 222 A.3d 1025 (2019).
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                       Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Scroggin

         On appeal, the defendant claims that the court (1) erred
         in granting summary judgment as to liability in that
         it improperly relied on an affidavit of a loan officer
         employed by the plaintiff in determining that the origi-
         nal plaintiff, Chase Home Finance, LLC (Chase), was
         the holder of the note in this case at the time the action
         was commenced and failed to draw an adverse infer-
         ence from the plaintiff’s refusal to produce witnesses
         and documents requested by the defendant, and (2)
         abused its discretion when it implicitly granted the
         plaintiff’s motion for a protective order, which, he
         alleges, ‘‘resulted in a complete denial of discovery and
         a denial of [his] ability to rebut the plaintiff’s claims.’’
         We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
           The following factual and procedural history is rele-
         vant to our resolution of the defendant’s claims on
         appeal. In 2009, Chase commenced the present foreclo-
         sure action against the defendant. In its original com-
         plaint, Chase alleged that, in 2007, the defendant exe-
         cuted a promissory note in favor of Chase Bank USA,
         N.A., which was secured by a mortgage on certain real
         property in Portland owned by the defendant. Chase
         further alleged that the mortgage was subsequently
         assigned to it, that it was the holder of the note and
         mortgage, and that the defendant had defaulted on the
         note by failing to make the required payments. By way
         of relief, Chase sought, in relevant part, foreclosure of
         the mortgage.
           In 2010, after the defendant was defaulted for failure
         to plead, Chase filed a request for leave to amend its
         complaint along with the proposed amended complaint,
         to which the defendant did not object. At no time did
         the defendant move to set aside the default for failure
         to plead.
           In November, 2015, the defendant filed an answer to
         the original complaint and disclosed a defense challeng-
         ing the plaintiff’s ‘‘right and standing to foreclose upon
         the subject mortgage . . . .’’ Shortly thereafter, Chase
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                         Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Scroggin

       moved for a judgment of strict foreclosure. In April,
       2016, the defendant filed an answer to Chase’s amended
       complaint and an objection to the plaintiff’s motion for
       strict foreclosure. Following a hearing, the trial court,
       Aurigemma, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion for judg-
       ment of strict foreclosure.
         The defendant appealed from the judgment of strict
       foreclosure to this court. This court reversed the judg-
       ment, concluding that the trial court had abused its
       discretion in failing to consider the effect of the
       amended complaint upon the 2010 default and that the
       court should have considered the defendant’s answer to
       the amended complaint as well as his disclosed defense.
       Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Scroggin, 178 Conn. App.
       727, 745–46, 176 A.3d 1210 (2017) (Chase I).
         In March, 2018, following remand, the plaintiff moved
       for summary judgment as to liability only on its strict
       foreclosure claim. In support of its motion, the plaintiff
       submitted, inter alia, the affidavit of Naomi Hernandez,
       a litigation specialist employed by the plaintiff’s loan
       servicer. In her affidavit, Hernandez summarized the
       history of the assignment of the mortgage and further
       averred, in relevant part, that Chase was the holder of
       the note at the time the present action was commenced
       and that the plaintiff is the current holder of the note
       and is the mortgagee of record.
         The deadline for filing a response to the plaintiff’s
       motion for summary judgment expired on May 10, 2018.
       See Practice Book § 17-45 (b).2 On May 24, 2018, the
          2
            Practice Book § 17-45 provides: ‘‘(a) A motion for summary judgment
       shall be supported by appropriate documents, including but not limited to
       affidavits, certified transcripts of testimony under oath, disclosures, written
       admissions and other supporting documents.
          ‘‘(b) Unless otherwise ordered by the judicial authority, any adverse party
       shall file and serve a response to the motion for summary judgment within
       forty-five days of the filing of the motion, including opposing affidavits and
       other available documentary evidence.
          ‘‘(c) Unless otherwise ordered by the judicial authority, the moving party
       shall not claim the motion for summary judgment to the short calendar less
       than forty-five days after the filing of the motion for summary judgment.’’
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                            Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Scroggin

         defendant filed a document captioned ‘‘Practice Book
         § 17-47 Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to
         the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or Alter-
         natively, Objection to Summary Judgment.’’3 The court,
         Aurigemma, J., denied that motion as untimely. Also
         on May 24, 2018, the defendant noticed the deposition
         of a designee of the plaintiff, seeking numerous docu-
         ments, including ‘‘[a]ll documents in the deponent’s pos-
         session, custody or control that the [plaintiff’s] affiant
         relied upon in executing the [plaintiff’s] affidavit in sup-
         port of summary judgment.’’ The plaintiff filed a motion
         for a protective order on the grounds that the defen-
         dant’s requests were untimely and sought information
         to which he was not entitled, to which the defendant
         objected. The trial court, Aurigemma, J., summarily
         granted the motion for a protective order.
           On May 29, 2018, the parties appeared before the
         court, Aurigemma, J., at short calendar. The defen-
         dant’s attorney acknowledged that he had not filed a
         response to the motion for summary judgment. The
         court then proceeded to rule on the motion without a
         hearing, concluding: ‘‘ ‘Well, there’s no opposition, so
         the motion’s granted, absent opposition.’ ’’ Chase Home
         Finance, LLC v. Scroggin, 194 Conn. App. 843, 850,
         222 A.3d 1025 (2019) (Chase II). The court thereafter
         granted the plaintiff’s subsequent motion for judgment
         of strict foreclosure.
           The defendant appealed that judgment on the grounds,
         inter alia, that the court (1) erred in granting summary
         judgment without hearing oral argument as required by
         Practice Book § 11-18 and (2) abused its discretion in
            3
              Practice Book § 17-47 provides: ‘‘Should it appear from the affidavits of
         a party opposing the motion [for summary judgment] that such party cannot,
         for reasons stated, present facts essential to justify opposition, the judicial
         authority may deny the motion for judgment or may order a continuance
         to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had or may make
         such other order as is just.’’
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                          Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Scroggin

       denying his motion for an extension of time to respond
       to the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment pursuant
       to Practice Book § 17-47. Id., 846. In Chase II, this court
       concluded that ‘‘the defendant had a right to oral argu-
       ment, which was not waived, with respect to the plain-
       tiff’s motion for summary judgment, and, therefore, the
       trial court improperly adjudicated the motion without
       permitting oral argument.’’ Id., 859. As to the defen-
       dant’s second claim, which the court addressed because
       it was likely to arise on remand; see id., 847 n.2; the
       court held that, ‘‘[b]ecause the defendant did not timely
       comply with the requirements of § 17-47 [which imports
       the forty-five day filing deadline set forth in Practice
       Book § 17-45] . . . the trial court did not abuse its dis-
       cretion by denying the defendant’s motion for an exten-
       sion of time to respond to the plaintiff’s motion for
       summary judgment and to conduct discovery related
       thereto.’’ Id., 862; see also id., 863. This court’s rescript
       stated as follows: ‘‘The judgment is reversed and the
       case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
       with this opinion.’’ Id., 863. Our decision in Chase II
       was officially released on December 17, 2019.
          On April 5, 2021, during the proceedings on remand,
       the plaintiff reclaimed for adjudication its 2018 sum-
       mary judgment motion. On that same day, the defendant
       issued notices of two depositions, seeking information
       nearly identical to the information he sought in 2018,
       which was the subject of the protective order.4 On April
         4
           The defendant requested that the plaintiff make a corporate designee
       available for deposition to testify regarding (1) the basis for the averments in
       Hernandez’ affidavit, (2) the identity of the owners of the note and mortgage
       throughout the pendency of the present action, and (3) the basis for the
       current substitute plaintiff’s claim of ownership of the note and mortgage.
       The defendant also noticed the deposition of the plaintiff’s keeper of records
       and requested that the deponent produce at the deposition (1) the plaintiff’s
       complete mortgage file, (2) all correspondence to or from the defendant,
       (3) all documents referenced in the plaintiff’s memorandum of law in support
       of its motion for summary judgment, and (4) all documents that may be
       referenced in the deposition of the plaintiff’s corporate designee.
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                       Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Scroggin

         12, 2021, the plaintiff moved for a protective order bar-
         ring the defendant from deposing the plaintiff’s corpo-
         rate designee and keeper of records. The plaintiff
         argued that the defendant was seeking information that
         he was ‘‘simply not entitled [to] . . . concerning the
         trust and the transfers of the loan.’’ The plaintiff also
         argued that the trial court was limited by this court’s
         2019 remand order in Chase II to hearing oral argument
         on the summary judgment motion and that, therefore,
         the defendant was precluded from conducting any fur-
         ther discovery. On April 21, 2021, the defendant filed
         an objection to the plaintiff’s motion, arguing that the
         plaintiff’s motion sought ‘‘a complete bar to all discov-
         ery’’ in its efforts to ‘‘conceal access to such basic evi-
         dentiary matters as being sought by the defendant here
         . . . .’’ In response to the plaintiff’s argument that the
         defendant’s pursuit of discovery went beyond this
         court’s remand order in Chase II, the defendant argued
         in his memorandum of law in opposition to the motion
         for a protective order, inter alia, that the plaintiff’s
         motion ‘‘mis-cites two Appellate Court cases for the
         proposition that they place limitations upon the discov-
         ery that the defendant is seeking, where the holdings
         in neither case even addresses the proper scope of
         discovery, let alone restrict the scope of discovery
         sought by the defendant here . . . .’’ (Citations omit-
         ted.)

            On May 13, 2021, the defendant filed a memorandum
         of law in opposition to the plaintiff’s motion for sum-
         mary judgment, arguing, in relevant part, that the plain-
         tiff had failed to meet its burden of establishing that it
         had standing to enforce the subject note and mortgage.
         The defendant also argued that the trial court should
         deny the motion pursuant to Practice Book § 17-47 due
         to the plaintiff’s refusal to produce Hernandez for a
         deposition. Along with his memorandum of law in oppo-
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                    Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Scroggin

       sition to the motion for summary judgment, the defen-
       dant’s counsel also filed an affidavit pursuant to § 17-
       47 in which he explained why the defendant should
       be granted a continuance to permit him to conduct
       discovery to further support his opposition to the plain-
       tiff’s motion for summary judgment.
          A hearing was scheduled for August 29, 2022, on the
       plaintiff’s motions for a protective order and summary
       judgment and the defendant’s objections to those
       motions. At that hearing, the court, Hon. Edward S.
       Domnarski, judge trial referee, marked the motion for
       a protective order off. The court, however, heard oral
       argument on the motion for summary judgment and the
       defendant’s objection thereto. On September 28, 2022,
       the court issued a memorandum of decision granting
       the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liabil-
       ity only. On the basis of Hernandez’ affidavit and copies
       of the note, mortgage, and assignments, the court con-
       cluded that the plaintiff had ‘‘provided evidence suffi-
       cient to establish that it is the current holder of the
       note and that [Chase] was the holder of the note at the
       commencement of this action. The defendant has failed
       to present any evidence to contravene ownership, thus,
       there is no genuine issue of material fact as to owner-
       ship of the note.’’ The court thereafter rendered a judg-
       ment of strict foreclosure. This appeal followed. Addi-
       tional facts and procedural background will be set forth
       as necessary.
                                     I
         The defendant first challenges the summary judgment
       as to liability rendered in favor of the plaintiff. ‘‘The
       standard of review of a trial court’s decision granting
       [a motion for] summary judgment is well established.
       Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment
       shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits
       and any other proof submitted show that there is no
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                       Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Scroggin

          genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
          party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In
          deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court
          must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
          the nonmoving party. . . . The courts are in entire
          agreement that the moving party . . . has the burden
          of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all
          the material facts . . . . When documents submitted
          in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to
          establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact,
          the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit docu-
          ments establishing the existence of such an issue. . . .
          Once the moving party has met its burden, however,
          the [nonmoving] party must present evidence that dem-
          onstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue.
          . . . A material fact . . . [is] a fact which will make a
          difference in the result of the case. . . . Our review
          of the trial court’s decision to grant the [defendants’]
          motion[s] for summary judgment is plenary.’’ (Citations
          omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dusto v.
          Rogers Corp., 222 Conn. App. 71, 87, 304 A.3d 446 (2023),
          cert. denied, 348 Conn. 939, 307 A.3d 274 (2024). Like-
          wise, our review of a court’s determination that a party
          has standing to assert a claim, which implicates the
          court’s subject matter jurisdiction, presents a question
          of law over which our review is plenary. Bayview Loan
          Servicing, LLC v. Ishikawa, 220 Conn. App. 625, 632,
          298 A.3d 1276 (2023).
            The defendant claims that the court erred in granting
          summary judgment as to liability in that it improperly
          relied on an affidavit of a loan officer employed by the
          plaintiff in determining that Chase was the holder of
          the note at the time this action was commenced. He
          further contends that the court failed to give him, as
          the nonmoving party, the benefit of all favorable infer-
          ences to be drawn from the evidence by neglecting to
          draw an adverse inference from the plaintiff’s refusal
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                         Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Scroggin

       to produce witnesses and documents requested by the
       defendant. We address the defendant’s claims in turn.
                                            A
          The defendant first contends that the court erred in
       relying on Hernandez’ affidavit as proof that Chase was
       the holder of the note at the time this action was com-
       menced. Specifically, the defendant argues that ‘‘[t]here
       was no foundation for [Hernandez’ statement] that
       [Chase] was in possession of and/or [was] the holder
       of the note when the action was commenced’’ in that
       the statement was not based on Hernandez’ personal
       knowledge, as required by Practice Book § 17-46. The
       defendant also argues that Hernandez’ statements con-
       stitute inadmissible hearsay because the documents
       Hernandez purportedly relied on in support of her affi-
       davit were not attached to her affidavit. We disagree.5
          In the affidavit accompanying the plaintiff’s motion
       for summary judgment, Hernandez averred, inter alia:
       ‘‘Gregory Funding LLC maintains records for the Loan
       in its capacity as Substitute Plaintiff’s loan servicer. As
       part of my job responsibilities for Gregory Funding LLC,
       I am familiar with the type of records maintained by
         5
           The defendant also argues that Hernandez’ affidavit was insufficient to
       establish the plaintiff’s standing because it ‘‘makes no statement as to when
       the note was endorsed, nor does the note itself contain a date for the
       endorsement.’’ He contends that ‘‘there is nothing in the record here to
       indicate when the note was endorsed in blank or that said endorsement
       was made prior to the commencement of this action . . . .’’ In so arguing,
       the defendant ignores the well established principle that ‘‘[t]he plaintiff’s
       possession of a note endorsed in blank is prima facie evidence that it is a
       holder and is entitled to enforce the note . . . . After the plaintiff has
       presented this prima facie evidence, the burden is on the defendant to
       impeach the validity of [the] evidence that [the plaintiff] possessed the note
       at the time that it commenced the . . . action or to rebut the presumption
       that [the plaintiff] owns the underlying debt.’’ (Internal quotation marks
       omitted.) Ditech Financial, LLC v. Joseph, 192 Conn. App. 826, 832, 218
       A.3d 690 (2019). Here, after the plaintiff submitted to the court a copy of
       the note endorsed in blank, the burden shifted to the defendant to impeach
       the plaintiff’s evidence. He failed to do so.
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          Gregory Funding LLC in connection with the Loan. . . .
          The information in this affidavit is taken from Gregory
          Funding LLC’s business records. I have personal knowl-
          edge of Gregory Funding LLC’s procedures for creating
          these records. They are: (a) made at or near the time
          of the occurrence of the matters recorded by persons
          with personal knowledge of the information in the busi-
          ness record, or from information transmitted by per-
          sons with personal knowledge; (b) kept in the course
          of Gregory Funding LLC’s regularly conducted business
          activities; and (c) it is the regular practice of Gregory
          Funding LLC to make such records. To the extent
          records related to the Loan come from another entity,
          those records were received by Gregory Funding LLC
          in the ordinary course of its business, have been incor-
          porated into and maintained as part of Gregory Funding
          LLC’s business records, and have been relied on by the
          Gregory Funding LLC. It is the regular and ordinary
          practice of the Gregory Funding LLC to make and
          receive such records. I make this Affidavit based upon
          personal knowledge that I obtained through the review
          of and in reliance upon business records concerning
          the Loan. . . . I have personally reviewed Gregory
          Funding LLC’s business records that relate to the Note
          and Mortgage and to the servicing of the loan evidenced
          by the Note, which Note and Mortgage are more particu-
          larly described below. . . . In the capacity and by rea-
          son of the foregoing, I have personal knowledge of the
          facts stated in this affidavit. . . . On or before Decem-
          ber 4, 2009, [Chase], directly or through an agent,
          acquired and has continuously had possession of the
          original promissory note. The promissory note contains
          an allonge and is endorsed in blank. [Chase] was the
          holder of the Note at the time of commencement of the
          instant foreclosure action. Substitute Plaintiff is the
          current holder of the Note and mortgagee of record.
          Substitute Plaintiff has the right to foreclose the subject
          note and mortgage.’’
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          The defendant contends that the court erred in relying
       on Hernandez’ affidavit because Hernandez lacked per-
       sonal knowledge of the facts to which she averred and
       her reliance on a review of business records rendered
       the affidavit fatally infirm under Practice Book § 17-
       466 and constituted inadmissible hearsay. Our Supreme
       Court addressed this issue, albeit in the context of an
       affidavit of debt, in Jenzack Partners, LLC v. Stoneridge
       Associates, LLC, 334 Conn. 374, 222 A.3d 950 (2020)
       (Jenzack). In Jenzack, the court explained that ‘‘[t]he
       initial rationale for the [business records] exception
       was that, although hearsay, business records [are] trust-
       worthy because their creators had relied on the records
       for business purposes. . . . Because of the trustwor-
       thiness of business records, [General Statutes] § 52-180
       should be liberally interpreted in favor of admissibility.
       . . . Section 52-180 (b) provides that a record shall not
       be rendered inadmissible by (1) a party’s failure to
       produce as witnesses the person or persons who made
       the writing or record, or who have personal knowledge
       of the act, transaction, occurrence or event recorded
       or (2) the party’s failure to show that such persons are
       unavailable as witnesses. Either of such facts and all
       other circumstances of the making of the writing or
       record, including lack of personal knowledge by the
       entrant or maker, may be shown to affect the weight
       of the evidence, but not to affect its admissibility. As
       such, we have held that the witness introducing the
       document need not have made the entry himself or
       herself . . . [or] have been employed by the organiza-
       tion during the relevant time period. . . . In addition,
       [t]here is no requirement in § 52-180 . . . that the docu-
       ments must be prepared by the organization itself to
         6
           Practice Book § 17-46 provides: ‘‘Supporting and opposing affidavits shall
       be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be
       admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is compe-
       tent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all
       papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto.’’
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          be admissible as that organization’s business records.
          . . .
             ‘‘When a party introduces a document that it did
          not create but that it received from a third party, the
          business records exception will apply only if the infor-
          mation contained in the document is based on the
          entrant’s own observation or on information of others
          whose business duty it was to transmit it to the entrant.
          . . . Where the prior owner of the note had a legitimate
          business duty to provide to the next holder the informa-
          tion used to generate the payment history, the printout
          of that information was the business record of the pres-
          ent holder. . . . If part of the data was provided by
          another business, as is often the case with loan records
          in connection with the purchase and sale of debt, the
          proponent does not have to lay a foundation concerning
          the preparation of the data it acquired but must simply
          show that these data became part of its own business
          record as part of a transaction in which the provider had
          a business duty to transmit accurate information. . . .
             ‘‘[R]egardless of whether supporting documentation
          or testimony from the third party is offered—it is the
          third party’s duty to report [the information] in a busi-
          ness context which provides the reliability to justify
          [the business records exception to the hearsay rule].
          . . . This reliability is further strengthened, in our view,
          when the entity receiving the information from a third
          party, with a business duty to report it, subsequently
          integrates that information into the entity’s own busi-
          ness records and has a self-interest in [ensuring] the
          accuracy of the outside information . . . . By relying
          on information from a third party, an entity stakes not
          only its livelihood on the accuracy of the information
          received but also its reputation as being a trustworthy
          entity with which to do business in the future. . . .
            ‘‘Furthermore, a business record is admissible if the
          information therein is reliable, which, in the case of
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       information provided by a third party, is established by
       the third party’s business duty to report the information.
       [T]here is no requirement that the accuracy of a busi-
       ness record be proved as a prerequisite to its admis-
       sion.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omit-
       ted.) Id., 390–92.
          Here, as indicated previously, Hernandez averred that
       she had personal knowledge of the records pertaining
       to the note and mortgage in this case based on her
       review of those records, which were received and main-
       tained in the regular and ordinary practice of the plain-
       tiff’s loan servicer.
          We also are unpersuaded by the defendant’s argu-
       ment that the court should not have relied on Hernan-
       dez’ affidavit because she failed to attach to it the docu-
       ments on which her averments were based. Our Supreme
       Court rejected virtually the same argument in RMS Resi-
       dential Properties, LLC v. Miller, 303 Conn. 224, 235–36,
       32 A.3d 307 (2011), overruled on other grounds by J.E.
       Robert Co. v. Signature Properties, LLC, 309 Conn.
       307, 325 n.18, 71 A.3d 492 (2013). In RMS Residential
       Properties, LLC, the plaintiff, which was seeking a judg-
       ment of foreclosure, moved for summary judgment,
       and, in support of its motion, ‘‘filed the affidavit of
       Thomas Gilmore, vice president with Specialized Loan
       Servicing, LLC, attorney in fact of [the plaintiff], alleging
       that, ‘prior to the commencement of this action, [the
       plaintiff], through its attorney . . . became the holder
       of the note.’ ’’ Id., 227. The trial court rendered summary
       judgment in favor of the plaintiff and subsequently ren-
       dered a judgement of foreclosure by sale. Id., 228. The
       defendant appealed, contending that Gilmore ‘‘lacked
       personal knowledge of necessary facts, and therefore
       his reliance on a review of business records rendered
       the affidavit fatally infirm under Practice Book § 17-46.’’
       Id., 235. Our Supreme Court rejected that contention,
       concluding that the trial court properly found that the
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          affidavit was competent evidence in support of sum-
          mary judgment. Id., 236. The court reasoned that,
          ‘‘[u]nder . . . § 52-180,7 to be competent to testify, the
          affiant need only have personal knowledge of the rele-
          vant business records.’’ (Footnote in original.) Id., 235–
          36. In the present case, because Hernandez’ averments
          in her affidavit were based on her personal knowledge
          of the business records, they constituted competent
          evidence of Chase’s status as holder of the note when
          the action was commenced. We therefore conclude that
          the court did not err in relying on it.
                                        B
             The defendant also claims that the court erred in
          failing to give him, as the nonmoving party, the benefit
          of all favorable inferences to be drawn from the evi-
          dence by neglecting to draw an adverse inference from
          the plaintiff’s refusal to produce witnesses and docu-
          ments requested by the defendant.8 Specifically, he
             7
               ‘‘General Statutes § 52-180 provides in relevant part: ‘(a) Any writing or
          record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as a
          memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence or event, shall
          be admissible as evidence of the act, transaction, occurrence or event, if
          the trial judge finds that it was made in the regular course of any business,
          and that it was the regular course of the business to make the writing or
          record at the time of the act, transaction, or occurrence or event or within
          a reasonable time thereafter.
             ‘‘ ‘(b) The writing or record shall not be rendered inadmissible by (1) a
          party’s failure to produce as witnesses the person or persons who made the
          writing or record, or who have personal knowledge of the act, transaction,
          occurrence or event recorded or (2) the party’s failure to show that such
          persons are unavailable as witnesses. Either of such facts and all other
          circumstances of the making of the writing or record, including lack of
          personal knowledge by the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect the
          weight of the evidence, but not to affect its admissibility. . . .’ ’’ RMS Resi-
          dential Properties, LLC v. Miller, supra, 303 Conn. 235–36 n.9.
             8
               The defendant also argues that ‘‘a reasonable inference to be drawn on
          summary judgment is that the tortured history of this case flows from the
          failure of the original plaintiff to have proper documentation in place under
          Connecticut law before initiating this action.’’ The defendant has cited no
          legal authority, nor are we aware of any, to support this argument. Further-
          more, the defendant’s suggested inference amounts to little more than specu-
          lation in which we will not engage.
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       argues that the plaintiff ‘‘has taken extraordinary mea-
       sures to shield its own witness from answering ques-
       tions’’ and asserts that he was entitled to an adverse
       inference for the plaintiff’s failure to allow him to
       depose Hernandez on the basis of the ‘‘missing witness
       rule’’ adopted in Secondino v. New Haven Gas Co., 147
       Conn. 672, 165 A.2d 598 (1960), overruled in part by
       State v. Malave, 250 Conn. 722, 737 A.2d 442 (1999),
       cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1170, 120 S. Ct. 1195, 145 L. Ed. 2d
       1099 (2000).9 The defendant’s argument is both factually
       and legally flawed.
         Factually, the defendant has failed to set forth any
       facts, other than the plaintiff’s filing of a motion for a
       protective order, which is permitted by our rules of
       practice, in support of his contention that the plaintiff
       has engaged in extraordinary measures to prevent the
       defendant from deposing Hernandez or any other corpo-
       rate designees of the plaintiff.
          Legally, the missing witness rule was significantly
       limited in civil cases by the enactment of No. 98-50
       of the 1998 Public Acts, which is codified at General
       Statutes § 52-216c, and provides: ‘‘No court in the trial
       of a civil action may instruct the jury that an inference
       unfavorable to any party’s cause may be drawn from
       the failure of any party to call a witness at such trial.
       However, counsel for any party to the action shall be
       entitled to argue to the trier of fact during closing argu-
       ments . . . that the jury should draw an adverse infer-
       ence from another party’s failure to call a witness who
       has been proven to be available to testify.’’
         The defendant failed, in his brief to this court, to
       acknowledge the abrogation of Secondino. When asked
          9
            The ‘‘missing witness rule’’ provided that ‘‘[t]he failure of a party to
       produce a witness who is within his power to produce and who would
       naturally have been produced by him, permits the inference that the evidence
       of the witness would be unfavorable to the party’s cause.’’ (Internal quotation
       marks omitted.) Secondino v. New Haven Gas Co., supra, 147 Conn. 675.
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          about it at oral argument before this court, the defen-
          dant’s attorney contended that the logic of the missing
          witness rule applied in the context of summary judg-
          ment because this is not a case that would be tried to
          a jury. Setting aside the fact that the defendant’s reliance
          on Secondino is misplaced, we also note that the defen-
          dant is unable to demonstrate that he would have been
          entitled to the benefit of the adverse inference permit-
          ted by § 52-216c. Accordingly, the defendant’s claim is
          unavailing.
                                                 II
             The defendant also claims that the court abused its
          discretion when it implicitly granted the plaintiff’s motion
          for a protective order, which, he alleges, ‘‘resulted in a
          complete denial of discovery and a denial of [his] ability
          to rebut the plaintiff’s claims.’’ We are not persuaded.
             On August 29, 2022, the parties appeared before the
          court to argue the plaintiff’s motions for summary judg-
          ment and a protective order and the defendant’s objec-
          tions to those motions. At that hearing, the court asked
          the plaintiff’s attorney if it was necessary to rule on its
          motion for a protective order in light of the fact that it
          was hearing the motion for summary judgment at that
          time. The plaintiff’s attorney responded that he believed
          it was relevant, but indicated that the defendant might
          request that the motion for summary judgment be
          marked off based on the defendant’s request to conduct
          discovery. The defendant’s attorney did not address
          the protective order but confirmed that he would like
          additional time to conduct discovery. The defendant’s
          attorney acknowledged, however, that there was no
          request pursuant to Practice Book § 17-47 pending
          before the court at that time.10 The court thus marked
             10
                At the beginning of the hearing, the parties confirmed that the trial court
          was scheduled to hear those motions. The court asked the plaintiff’s attorney
          if it was necessary to act on the motion for a protective order, in light of
          the court’s intention to hear the motion for summary judgment that day.
          The plaintiff’s attorney indicated that the defendant’s attorney might ask
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       the motion for a protective order off and heard argument
       on the motion for summary judgment.
          The defendant argues that ‘‘[t]he court’s failure to rule
       upon the plaintiff’s motion for [a] protective order and
       its failure to address the relief requested by the defen-
       dant under Practice Book § 17-47 resulted in a complete
       for the motion for summary judgment to be marked off so the defendant
       could conduct discovery. The court responded that it understood that the
       defendant’s attorney intended to proceed with the argument that day, stating,
       ‘‘I haven’t heard anything. There’s been nothing filed regarding further dis-
       covery. There’s been nothing filed by way of extension or a continuance.
       I’m ready to hear his motion for summary judgment.’’
           The defendant’s attorney then stated that, with his objection to the motion
       for summary judgment, ‘‘[t]here is a Practice Book § 17-47 affidavit filed
       which indicates that we were seeking discovery in connection with the
       summary judgment and that on the basis of that affidavit the court can deny
       the summary judgment because of the plaintiff’s efforts to not allow their
       affiant to be cross-examined or the court can continue it. So, those issues
       are before the court based on our [§] 17-47 filing. I do think that the . . .
       summary judgment fails without the discovery. But I . . . think that issue
       is on the table.’’
           The court determined that the motion for summary judgment would be
       heard that day. The court further stated that the defendant’s attorney failed
       to make a proper request for an extension of time to respond: ‘‘I didn’t see
       anything—with all due respect, Attorney Willcutts, I didn’t see any formal
       request for extension pursuant to the Practice Book section that says, hey,
       we need to extend a—a time to respond in order to do discovery. So, you’ve
       gone on and you filed an objection for motion for summary judgment. I
       know you’ve raised that.
           ‘‘But, in terms of the rules of practice, I’m not—unless I’m mistaken, it’s
       a long file, a lot of entries—I don’t think there was ever a motion for summary
       judgment by the plaintiff, and then, the—then the defendant’s Practice Book
       request for an extension of time to respond in order to conduct further dis-
       covery.
           ‘‘If I’m wrong on that, please let me know. I know you’re raising that
       issue now. But let’s face it, we’re parsing the Practice Book section pretty
       finely here, and I have to do it in the context of what the Appellate Court
       did at the status at that time.
           ‘‘But I think what I’m understanding—unless you—you—and I have misun-
       derstood something—you—the motion for summary judgment was filed at
       156. You filed an objection at 176, and you’re talking about wanting an
       extension but it doesn’t appear that there’s been a compliance with the
       Practice Book.’’
           The defendant’s attorney then acknowledged that he did not have a pend-
       ing request for an extension of the argument scheduled to be held on the
       motion for summary judgment.
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          denial of discovery and a denial of [his] ability to rebut
          the plaintiff’s claims . . . .’’ The defendant’s claim is
          belied by the fact that, as reflected in the transcript
          quoted previously; see footnote 10 of this opinion; and
          confirmed by our review of the trial court file, he neither
          filed a request pursuant to § 17-47 with the court nor
          requested that the court rule on the plaintiff’s motion
          for a protective order.
            Moreover, as noted in the procedural history of this
          case as set forth herein, the trial court granted the
          plaintiff’s motion for a protective order as to the defen-
          dant’s request to depose a designee of the plaintiff after
          the remand following Chase I and prior to Chase II.
          The defendant could have challenged the propriety of
          the protective order on appeal in Chase II but chose
          not to do so. In challenging the propriety of a protective
          order now, the defendant is ‘‘obliquely attempting to
          revive an appeal that has succumbed by being aban-
          doned.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) JPMorgan
          Chase Bank, National Assn. v. Essaghof, 221 Conn.
          App. 475, 488, 302 A.3d 339, cert. denied, 348 Conn. 923,
          304 A.3d 445 (2023).
             Additionally, as the plaintiff aptly points out, further
          discovery was beyond the rescript order in Chase II.
          As stated previously in this opinion, this court’s rescript
          order in Chase II was for ‘‘further proceedings consis-
          tent with [its] opinion.’’ Chase Home Finance, LLC
          v. Scroggin, supra, 194 Conn. App. 863. Although the
          reversal of the trial court’s judgment in Chase II was
          based on the denial of the defendant’s right to oral
          argument on the plaintiff’s motion for summary judg-
          ment, this court addressed the discovery issue because
          it was likely to arise on remand, and determined that
          the court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the
          defendant’s request for extension of time to conduct
          discovery to respond to the plaintiff’s motion for sum-
          mary judgment was untimely. Id., 847 n.2, 862. It would
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                         Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Scroggin

       be illogical to suggest that this court’s remand order
       encompassed discovery that the court determined was
       untimely. The fact that this court addressed the discov-
       ery issue that was not necessary for the disposition of
       the appeal in Chase II, but was likely to arise on remand,
       can only be read as a limitation of the proceedings on
       remand—namely, that the defendant was not entitled
       to a further extension of time to conduct discovery.11
       The defendant’s claim therefore fails.
         The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded
       for the purpose of setting new law days.
          In this opinion the other judges concurred.

         11
           We also note that the defendant’s claim that he was in need of discovery
       to respond to the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is somewhat
       belied by the fact that he waited more than one year from the court’s remand
       in Chase II before noticing the deposition of a designee of the plaintiff.
       Given the history of this case, such a delay would have been sufficient
       reason for the court, in the exercise of its discretion, to deny a request
       made pursuant to Practice Book § 17-47.