Court Opinion

ID: 9825591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 13:27:19.870571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:41:02.759212
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
• We have given careful consideration to the authorities and argument presented in the several briefs filed in support of this motion, and those contra, with a view to the announcement of a ruling that will not in any way militate against or be in conflict with the inherent power of trial -judges to set aside verdicts of juries that are plainly the result of passion, prejudice, or other improper influence. In the interest of fairness and justice, this power must continue in trial courts, and we take occasion here to adopt the language of Chief Justice Stone in White v. Blair, 95 Ala. 148, 10 South. 258:
“We hold that no higher duty rests on a court of original jurisdiction than to assert his manhood, and grant or refuse to grant a new trial as.the merits of the controversy may point out his duty.”
To this end, appellate courts will allow all reasonable presumptions of the correctness of his judgment. Briel v. Exch. Bank, 180 Ala. 576, 61 South. 277. But this power is to be exercised within certain defined limits and with due regard to the importance of verdicts of juries, who themselves are acting under oath, and whose findings -on the facts, when not affected by passion, prejudice, or other improper influence, are superior to that of the trial judge. To permit a trial judge to substitute his judgment on the facts for that of the jury, or to give undue presumption to the action of the trial judge in dealing with verdicts, would minimize the jury system rendered juries advisers of the trial judge rather than a positive force in the administration of justice, and would be “an entering wedge” to a destruction of jury trials, a system so long' held to be one of the most sacred rights of the Anglo-Saxon race.
In the instant case, the judge was not of the opinion that the verdict for the plaintiff was contrary to the weight of the evidence. It also appears he would not have disturbed the verdict, if the damages assessed had not exceeded $75. The verdict being for $350, there was a difference between the judge and the jury of $275. In this case $75 would have been no more than a mere nominal recovery. The question of compensating the plaintiff for the injury was for the jury, whose findings ought not to be disturbed, unless the facts and circumstances show bias, passion, or prejudice. There is no evidence of this in this record, unless as is contended, the amount. of the verdict itself discloses this fact, and this we do not think is the case here. Regardless of what the trial judge would have done, if he had constituted a part of the jury, we do not think the verdict was so excessive as to authorize a judgment setting it aside. Bellingrath v. Anderson, supra.
The application for a rehearing is denied.
Application denied.