Court Opinion

ID: 9791837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:18:53.17368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:38.849974
License: Public Domain

Finley, J.
(concurring in the result) — The majority opinion holds that the appellant is the fee owner of the land in question but cannot successfully prosecute an ejectment action to have the physical structures of the respondent removed from the right of way or waterway of appellant, on which the structures are presently encroaching. I concur in these judgments of the majority opinion. However, I cannot agree with the majority’s interpretation of Laws of 1917, chapter 152, § 2, 'as not permitting the appellant district to collect a fee for the continuation of respondent’s encroachment upon the waterway.
Although the majority opinion quotes the pertinent statute, I think the last sentence of subsection (d) thereof is important enough to warrant reiteration herein:
“Said district through its board, shall also have power to lease all properties or lands on such terms and in such manner as the. commissioners may deem advisable from time to. time.” (Italics mine.)
The majority construe the phrase, “all property or land” as meaning all' property or land of the district- except the waterway right of way. In justifying that interpretation the majority take two tacks, which will now be briefly discussed. ; • - .
One rationale of the. majority appears to -be that, since *526the legislature created a public water highway, it must obviously follow that the waterway district could not lease a part of that highway. But the conclusion which seems so obvious to the majority does not appear to me to be so obvious or imperative. In Winkenwerder v. Yakima (1958), 52 Wn. (2d) 617, 328 P. (2d) 873,. upholding the city’s contracting to permit a company to install advertising signs on parking meters, we stated at page 624:
“It is generally recognized that a sovereign may lease its property to private parties, so long as there is no interference with the public use. ...”
Obviously, the appellant district is not the sovereign state, but its authority to lease is derivative therefrom. Its authority under the circumstances should be neither more nor less than the sovereign’s. The existence of the general restriction quoted from Winkenwerder should alleviate the concern expressed by the majority that the basic public purpose of the water highway would be defeated by the leasing of part of the right of way. (It should be parenthetically noted that the commerce clause of the United States Constitution grants the federal government control over navigable waters; hence, the right to lease portions of the right of way is also subject to federal restrictions or control.) In the present case the respondent’s dock and facilities extend only 50' into the 500' right of way, of which only the central 250' are dredged as a channel; and, as pointed out in the majority opinion, the respondent’s structures do not constitute an obstruction to navigation. The majority view leasing, or imposition of a fee or charge, as constituting an ultra vires restriction upon the right of public access to the public waterway. My interpretation of the power to lease “all property or land” means that a charge may be made for the physical occupation of the district’s property, not that such a charge is made for the use of the waterway itself. Therefore, I would conclude that this objection made by the majority is without sufficient foundation to warrant the majority’s restrictive gloss upon the express language of the statute.
*527The majority, in reaching their interpretation of the statutory provision, “all property or lands,” considered the nature of the additional powers conferred upon the district by the 1917 act. In so far as is here pertinent, the Laws of 1917, chapter 152, § 2, constituted a re-enactment and amendment to the Laws of 1911, chapter 11, § 7. The new language contained in Laws of 1917, chapter 152, § 2 (d) (which includes the provision for the lease of all property or lands) principally relates to the acquisition of property in the vicinity of the waterway itself. The majority, therefore, interpreted the phrase, “all property or lands,” to embrace only those referred to in the preceding sentences. But if that was the intended result, then the last sentence of that subsection should have read, “all such property or lands.” The majority are clearly correct in stating that we should construe the language of this particular subsection in the context of the other portions of the amendment and the purposes of the whole act. However, I differ in the conclusion which has been reached by such a reading. A reading of the 1917 act indicates that the legislature was clearly expanding the power and authority of the commercial waterway districts, and the authority to lease all property or lands is consistent therewith.
Despite the preceding discussion of the statute permitting the appellant to impose a charge for the continued physical encroachment by the respondent’s dock and facilities, such a charge must be disallowed in the instant case. The record indicates that there have not been any harbor lines established in the waterway. And the Washington State Constitution, Article 15, and amendment 15 require the establishment of such harbor lines as a condition precedent to the leasing of such property. In concluding that these constitutional provisions apply, I have rejected the appellant’s contention that the Duwamish Waterway is man-made and, therefore, is not a harbor.
Before concluding, I feel compelled to say that respondent’s use of a portion of the waterway, whether (a) for free and without fee, under the guise of implementation *528of “a right of access,” as emphasized by the majority, or (b) under a lease and for a fee, as urged by appellant, raises, the ghost of the majority opinion in the case of Hogue v. Port of Seattle (1959), 54 Wn. (2d) 799, 341 P. (2d) 171. Any qualms on my part are alleviated by the dissent in Hogue. With this qualification and for the reasons stated hereinbefore, I concur in the majority’s disposition of this appeal.
Hunter, J., concurs with Finley, J.
May 6, 1963. Petition for rehearing denied.