Court Opinion

ID: 9944266
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 16:34:56.036701+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:57:34.915040
License: Public Domain

ON SUGGESTION OF ERROR
On August 10, 1961, appellant Lee V. Prisock was convicted of a felony and sentenced to serve three years in the state penitentiary. Under Miss. Code 1942, Rec., Sec. 8667, the court in which an attorney is convicted of a felony is required to enter an order disbarring him from the practice of law. The judgment in the criminal case did that. It was affirmed by this Court on June 4, 1962. Prisock v. State, No. 42,231. *Page 424
(Hn 4) About three months after Prisock's conviction, and while it was on appeal, a committee of the Bar filed in the Chancery Court of Hinds County the present petition to disbar him, alleging three instances of automobile wrecks fraudulently staged by him and others for the purposes of obtaining insurance money and damages. One of these events was that for which appellant was convicted in the above-stated criminal case, with the judgment of disbarment. The other two events alleged in the petition did not pertain to the charges in the criminal case. Defendant neither admitted nor denied the averments of the petition, and therefore in effect admitted them. Miss. Code 1942, Rec., Sec. 1291; Griffith, Miss. Chancery Practice (2d Ed. 1950), Secs. 353, 348, 350, 351.
Prisock pleaded that the judgment of disbarment in the criminal case deprived the chancery court of jurisdiction in this petition to disbar him; that only one disbarment judgment could be entered against him; that the matter of disbarment in this suit had become a "moot question"; and therefore this cause should be held in abeyance pending decision on appeal in the criminal case, which he contended could be the sole and only disbarment judgment against him. The chancery court overruled these jurisdictional pleas. Defendant made no objection to the offer in evidence of sworn statements of witnesses attached as exhibits to the petition, and offered no evidence on the issues. Hence the trial court found that all of the charges were sustained by the evidence. Its decree disbarred appellant from the practice of law in this state.
Our original opinion correctly held that it was within the sound discretion of the chancery court either to proceed with this petition or to hold it in abeyance pending outcome of the appeal from the criminal conviction; and the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in going ahead with it. The charges were "wholly undisputed." *Page 425 
The evidence unquestionably sustains that conclusion. However, the suggestion of error contends again that the chancery court abused its discretion, because appellant had already been disbarred in the judgment entered in the criminal action; and one cannot be twice disbarred for the same offense.
(Hn 5) It is pertinent here to examine that argument. Its fallacy lies in a misconception of the nature of a disbarment proceeding. It is neither a civil nor a criminal action, strictly speaking. It is a special proceeding, peculiar to itself, disciplinary in nature, and of a summary character, resulting from the inherent power of the courts over their officers. Its purpose is not to punish, but to protect the courts and the public. Ex parte Cashin, 128 Miss. 224, 90 So. 850 (1922); 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, Sec. 28. Nevertheless, in general terms a disbarment proceeding is of the nature of a civil rather than a criminal action. Ex parte Redmond, 156 Miss. 439,125 So. 833 (1930); 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, Sec. 28. It is designed to determine the fitness of an officer of the court to continue in that capacity, and to preserve and protect the courts of justice and the public from persons unfit to practice law.
(Hn 6) Automatic disbarment under Code Sec. 8667 is a part of the punishment for the commission of a crime. Ex parte Crisler,159 Miss. 247, 132 So. 103 (1931), to that effect, held that a full pardon by the governor absolves an attorney from the consequences of an order of disbarment made under the statute. Manifestly, the present action was intended by appellees to effectuate a disbarment not dependent on a criminal conviction and on the statute, but based squarely on the court's inherent power to control its own officers. In Re Higgins, 194 Miss. 838,13 So.2d 829 (1943).
(Hn 7) This distinction is generally recognized. Where the misconduct of an attorney falls within the sphere of his official duties, it is no objection to disbarment *Page 426 
proceedings that an indictment is pending against him for the same misconduct. Anno., 76 A.L.R. 674 (1932); 5 Am. Jur., Attorneys at Law, Sec. 282. Some courts distinguish between offenses committed by the attorney as an individual, and those committed by him as an attorney. They hold that when the offense for which a criminal charge is pending was committed by the attorney in his private character, disbarment proceedings for the same misconduct should await termination of the criminal charges. However, if the criminal charges fall within the sphere of his official duties, as they do in the instant case, the pendency of criminal charges is no objection to separate disbarment proceedings. Ibid., Sec. 282. Moreover, the present suit includes two additional charges not involved in the criminal case.
(Hn 8) Furthermore, the fact that an attorney has been convicted of a felony, resulting in automatic disbarment under Code Sec. 8667, does not preclude separate disbarment proceedings to determine the fitness of an officer of the court to continue in that capacity. Such proceedings are not punishment, but protect the administration of justice. See 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, Sec. 21b. In short, where the conduct of an attorney falls within the sphere of his official duties, as here, the court may proceed against him without awaiting the results of a criminal prosecution, or the determination of the validity of a criminal conviction then pending on appeal.
(Hn 9) A final judgment of conviction does not preclude separate disbarment proceedings against an attorney, where his conduct affects his moral character and capacity as a lawyer. The rule of sound judicial discretion is one of propriety, and not of power. Anno., 90 A.L.R. 1111 (1934).
(Hn 10) The correctness of this conclusion is further supported by two generally recognized propositions: The granting of a pardon to an attorney convicted of a crime *Page 427 
does not prevent the court having jurisdiction from disbarring him because of the acts upon which the conviction was based. This is the usual rule, although a decision on it was pretermitted in Ex parte Crisler, 159 Miss. at 251; Anno., 143 A.L.R. 172, 173, 179 (1943). (Hn 11) And the acquittal of an attorney in a prosecution for criminal acts constitutes no bar to an adjudication in disbarment proceedings based upon the same acts or the conduct involved in them. Anno., 123 A.L.R. 779, 780 (1939).
Suggestion of error overruled.
McGehee, C.J., and Kyle, Arrington and Gillespie, JJ.,
concur.