Court Opinion

ID: 9486729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:57:54.980082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:53.866218
License: Public Domain

BEAM, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I fully concur in parts II, III, IV, and V of the court’s opinion and in the result reached in this case. I write separately to express my disagreement with the rationales of both Judge Morris Sheppard Arnold and Judge Wellford on the speedy trial issue. This case is controlled by 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(A) (delay resulting from any proceeding to determine mental competency is excluded from computation) or 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(F) (delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from filing of motion through conclusion of hearing thereon is excluded from computation) and not by 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(l)(J) (limiting excludable time to thirty days after a motion is under advisement). The matter of Jones’s competency was not “under advisement” at all until after the April 2, 1993, hearing.
As Judge Wellford notes in his concurrence, infra at 1316-17, sections 3161(h)(1)(F) and 3161(h)(l)(J) apply differently to pretrial motions that require hearings and those that do not. Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 329-30, 106 S.Ct. 1871, 1876-77, 90 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986). For pretrial motions that do not require hearings, section 3161(h)(1)(F) excludes time from a motion’s filing until either the motion is disposed of or taken under advisement. United States v. Hohn, 8 F.3d 1301, 1305 n. 6 (8th Cir.1993). If the court requires time to consider the motion after all the information is available (and the motion is thus “under advisement”), excludable time is limited to thirty days under section 3161(h)(1)(J). Id. For motions that require hearings, section 3161(h)(1)(F) excludes all time between the filing of the motion and the conclusion of the hearing at which it is addressed. United States v. Davenport, 935 F.2d 1223, 1228 (11th Cir.1991). Then, after the hearing, the matter is “under advisement” and section 3161(h)(1)(J) becomes operative. Id.
Crucial to the analysis here is the question of whether a hearing is “required.” Judge Morris Sheppard Arnold and Judge Wellford seem to equate “required” with “mandated by statute,” while I would give it a broader definition such as “necessary” or “required by the circumstances.” Competency evaluations are conducted pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-47. Athough the language of the statute seems to contemplate a competency hearing in every case, the eases cited in the court’s opinion, supra at 1309, hold that a competency hearing is not generally required *1315in cases, as here, in which an initial finding of competency has been made.3 That is not to say that a hearing is never necessary in such instances. Although not mandated by statute, a hearing is certainly required if circumstances so dictate. There are many instances in which a hearing is not mandated by either statute or case law but nevertheless may be needed to determine the issues. For example, under the Federal- Rules of Civil Procedure, no hearing is required on motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment. Nevertheless, a judge may find it necessary to grant a hearing on the motion in order to fully develop the record. In those circumstances, whether or not a hearing is technically required, subsection (F) and not subsection (J) would initially apply. Surely, no one would contend the matter was under advisement until the conclusion of the hearing.
This is a case where, though a hearing may not have been technically mandated, the trial court, in its discretion, ordered a hearing. Here, both Judge Morris Sheppard Arnold and Judge Wellford rely on the assertion that “nothing happened” between receipt of the psychiatric report (more particularly, thirty days after its receipt — August 22, 1992) and December 7, 1992, the date the ease was set for retrial. To the contrary, something did happen: the government requested a hearing on September 14, 1992. According to the Magistrate Judge, it was the practice of the trial court to hear pending motions at the beginning of trial. See United States v. Jones, No. 4:92-CR-11(SNL), Memorandum and Order at 2 n. 1 (E.D.Mo. May 13, 1993). Accordingly, because the request for a hearing was never denied, I assume it was implicitly granted and was set for December 7, 1992, immediately prior to trial. Also, when the district court first ordered the psychological evaluation, it expressly relied on and referred to 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241 and 4247, which define the scope and conduct of. competency hearings. See United States v. Jones, No. 4:92-CR-11(SNL), Order for Psychiatric Examination at 1 (E.D.Mo. June 9, 1992). Inclusion of these references stated, or at least implied, that a hearing would take place. Indeed, a competency hearing -did eventually occur. See United States v. Jones, No. 4:92-CR-11(SNL), Courtroom Minutes (E.D.Mo. April 2, 1993).
My review of the record convinces me that no one — neither the government, the defendant, nor the judge — thought or had any reason to believe that the speedy trial clock was running during this time period. In these circumstances, I am hesitant to rely upon a waiver by defendant. In the court’s opinion, Judge Morris Sheppard Arnold states that the trial court was free to either hold or forego a hearing on the competency issue. Swpra at 1309. While that proposition of law may be correct, nothing in this record shows any intention by the trial court to forego the hearing. In fact, the opposite is true, as shown by the filing of a request for - a hearing and the fact that such hearing occurred on April 2, 1993. While a hearing may not have been required under our precedents, it is certainly not precluded. It is within the trial judge’s discretion to set a hearing, which he did in this case.
I am reluctant to further cloud the often murky waters of speedy trial calculations. As it stands, parties and courts understand that once a motion is filed, the speedy trial clock is stopped until the matter is “under advisement.” The moment at which a matter comes “under advisement” is usually marked by some bright-line event such as conclusion of a hearing; the end of a briefing schedule; or a judicial declaration. To start the clock again at some mysterious and previously undefined point — here, thirty days after the receipt of a psychiatric report that was never *1316even filed with the clerk of the district court — will only confuse Speedy Trial Act jurisprudence in this circuit.
I would thus find that all the time between the order for psychiatric examination on June 9, 1992, and the hearing on the matter on April 2, 1993, is excluded from calculation for speedy trial purposes under either section 3161(h)(1)(F) or section 3161(h)(1)(A). This would comport with Henderson, 476 U.S. at 329, 106 S.Ct. at 1876, and eases that apply its rationale in the context of competency hearings. See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez, 918 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir.1990) (“[a]fter the [Supreme] Court’s decision in Henderson, we read its rationale requiring an automatic exclusion to apply as well to subsection (h)(1)(A) concerning competency proceedings of defendant”), and United States v. Antwine, 873 F.2d 1144, 1149 n. 7 (8th Cir.1989) (delays as a result of competency proceedings are excluded).

. I note that these cases stand only for the proposition that a defendant cannot challenge his conviction or premise a habeas action on the denial of a competency hearing. None of these cases involve Speedy Trial Act computation. See United States v. Goodman, 590 F.2d 705, 708 n. 5 (8th Cir.) (habeas), cert. denied, 440 U.S, 985, 99 S.Ct. 1801, 60 L.Ed.2d 248 (1979); Belvin v. United States, 538 F.2d 1335, 1336 (8th Cir.1976) (per curiam) (habeas), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1100, 97 S.Ct. 1123, 51 L.Ed.2d 549 (1977); United States v. Dworshak, 514 F.2d 716, 717 n. 2, 719 (8th Cir.1975) (challenge to conviction); Rose v. United States, 513 F.2d 1251, 1256 (8th Cir.1975) (per curiam) (habeas); United States v. Maret, 433 F.2d 1064, 1067 (8th Cir.1970) (challenge to conviction), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 989, 91 S.Ct. 1678, 29 L.Ed.2d 155 (1971).