Court Opinion

ID: 9776471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:36:59.581746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:39.066634
License: Public Domain

Judge WEBB
specially concurring.
Before denying Garcia's motion to suppress, the trial court observed, "the Fourth Amendment has been eroded significantly from the days that I was in law school from "73 to '76." While I agree with the majority that existing law dictates denial of the motion, I write separately to amplify the trial court's concern and suggest a solution.
Traffic stops that ripen into lawful searches for drugs frequently involve the following progression:
e A traffic stop is made based on probable cause. People v. Cherry, 119 P.3d 1081, 1083 (Colo.2005) ("[the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred").
e Because no information surfaces during the stop that creates reasonable suspicion of other eriminal conduct, it is not prolonged beyond its necessary purposes. People v. Cervantes-Arredondo, 17 P.3d 141, 147 (Colo.2001) ("The officer may detain the driver long enough to check his driver's license and vehicle reg*1163istration and to issue a citation. The stop usually must 'last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop,' and the 'seope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification. " (citations omitted)).
e Once the stop has concluded, the motorist is told that he or she is free to leave. People v. Brandon, 140 P.3d 15, 18 (Colo.App.2005) ("[Olnee a driver produces a valid license and proof that he or she is entitled to operate the vehicle, the driver 'must be allowed to proceed on his [or her] way, without being subject to further delay by police for additional questioning.' ").
e Nevertheless, the officer then extends the stop by engaging the motorist in a consensual encounter, and sometimes thereby obtains additional information establishing reasonable suspicion. Cervantes-Arredondo, 17 P.3d at 147 ("[Fjlurther questioning is permissible if the initial detention becomes a consensual encounter.").
Consistent with this pattern, the traffic stop here ended with the officer returning Garcia's papers, giving a verbal warning, and telling him that he was free to go. The officer testified that he then had no problem with Garcia, the passenger, and the truck, leaving the seene. When Garcia began to do so, however, the offieer-who also testified that he had been trained "how to develop reasonable suspicion during the course of a traffic contact"-asked if Garcia would be willing to answer additional questions. The officer did not testify that he told Garcia that he was free to refuse the request.
Because "Lolbjective standards of reasonableness guide our inquiry," People v. Ramos, 13 P.3d 295, 297 (Colo.2000), whether the officer did so only to buy time until the K-9 unit arrived is beyond our purview. Regardless, but for Garcia's acquiescence, he would have driven off, the truck would not have been searched, and the evidence on which he was convicted would not have been discovered. Thus, the majority's conclusion that the officer could have held Garcia based on reasonable suspicion ignores that what kept Garcia at the seene-directly leading to the search, his arrest, and his conviction-was the consensual encounter, not reasonable suspicion.
Under the Fourth Amendment, on these facts nothing more could be said of the denial than "affirmed." See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1271 (10th Cir.2001) ("[TJhe officer's indication to [the defendant] that he was free to leave bears no significance in our determination of whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain [the defendant].").
But Garcia's right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure was also protected by Article II, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution. This provision offers greater protection than the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., People v. Haley, 41 P.3d 666, 671 (Colo.2001). In my view, extending the protection of Article II, Section 7 is warranted here for the following three reasons.
First, because a consensual encounter is merely a request for "voluntary cooperation" through noncoercive questioning, an officer may initiate this contact despite lack of probable cause or reasonable suspicion. People v. Heilman, 52 P.3d 224, 227 (Colo.2002). But where an officer has lawfully seized a motorist, the officer's "inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop ... do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop." Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 788, 129 S.Ct. 781, 788, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009). Thus, after such expansive questioning has run its course and the traffic stop ended, whether any objectively legitimate purpose exists for which voluntary cooperation could be sought is dubious.
Second, if questioning during the stop has not produced reasonable suspicion for protracting it, allowing officers further to question motorists unfairly disadvantages them because they may well be unaware that the traffic stop has ended. Cervantes-Arredondo, 17 P.3d at 147 ("The transition between a detention and a consensual exchange can be seamless. Most citizens would not recognize the transition and would not feel free to *1164terminate the encounter absent a clear endpoint to the investigative detention." (internal citations omitted)). This disadvantage is exacerbated because while "[iInherent social pressure to cooperate with the police is not itself a sufficient basis for declaring the encounter nonconsensual," Heilman, 52 P.3d at 228, the officer need not tell the motorist that he or she is free to decline the officer's request and leave the scene. See People v. Melton, 910 P.2d 672, 677 (Colo.1996); People v. Paynter, 955 P.2d 68, 72 (Colo.1998).
Third, although Colorado courts have sometimes excluded evidence seized as a result of traffic stops protracted by consensual encounters under the "totality of the cireum-stances," this approach is "necessarily imprecise." Heilman, 52 P.3d at 228 (internal quotation omitted); see, e.g., People v. Johnson, 865 P.2d 836, 844 (Colo.1994) (length of further questioning); People v. Castaneda, 187 P.3d 107, 109 (Colo.2008) (questioning on the same subject as interrogation during the traffic stop); Brandon, 140 P.3d at 20 (continued questioning despite motorist's statements that she wanted to leave). These criteria lack sufficient precision to protect motorists or guide police.1
"[EJxtending rights protected under our state constitution beyond those protected by the federal constitution has been largely within the domain of the supreme court." People in Interest of A. C., 991 P.2d 304, 307 (Colo.App.1999), aff'd, 16 P.3d 240 (Colo.2001). The supreme court, either on certio-rari review of this case or of a case that presents the same sequence of events, could level the playing field by adopting a bright-line rule that Article II, Section 7 prohibits officers from initiating consensual encounters solely to continue questioning motorists who have been seized and then told they may be on their way, unless the officer tells the motorist that cooperation is strictly voluntary.

. The same is true of courts in other states that have focused on the officer's conduct rather than their words. See, e.g., Daniel v. State, 277 Ga. 840, 597 S.E.2d 116, 122 (2004) ("[Elven after a driver has been expressly advised that he or she is free to leave, an officer's subsequent actions may be so inconsistent with that advice that a reasonable person could conclude that the advice was no longer operative."), abrogated by Salmeron v. State, 280 Ga. 735, 632 S.E.2d 645, 647 (2006); Commonwealth v. Freeman, 563 Pa. 82, 757 A.2d 903, 907 (2000) ("Since the trooper had accomplished the purpose of the stop, as he expressly indicated, [the defendant] would have been entirely within her rights to drive away at that point. Nevertheless, the trooper's subsequent actions were inconsistent with his statement to [the defendant] that she was free to leave. ..."); Reittinger v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 232, 532 S.E.2d 25, 28 (2000) ("Although [the deputy] had told [the defendant] that he was free to go, we think that the events that transpired immediately thereafter would suggest to a reasonable person that just the opposite was the case. We do not think that a reasonable person, under the circumstances, would have considered that he was free to disregard the deputies and simply drive away.").