Court Opinion

ID: 9792960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:40:10.772809+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:03.413326
License: Public Domain

LUMPKIN, Presiding Judge,
specially concurring.
I join in the Court’s decision in this case and provide the following observations on the words of art “vouching” and “bolstering” which are not defined within our statutes.
As practitioners in the law, we have been somewhat spoiled since the 1978 adoption of the Oklahoma Evidence Code, 12 O.S.1991, § 2101 et seq. The codification of the rules of evidence relieved us of the case by case analysis of the evaluation of each particular evidentiary issue and provided an encapsulated compendium of the law governing evidence. However, our conditioning'to attempt to fit every evidentiary question into an answer provided by the Code often obviates our consideration of whether the Code applies in the first instance. As Professor Leo H. Whinery has noted,
the Code does not purport to deal with the entire body of law governing the impeachment and rehabilitation of witnesses. Only a few aspects of the evidentiary law governing impeachment and rehabilitation are covered in the Code. As observed by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Alvarez-Lopez, ‘[t]he Evidence Code does not attempt to write a catalog of all the rules which govern evidence that can be used to impeach a witness. Rather, the code only attempts to lay down a few specific rules dealing with the situations in which impeachment upon collateral matters may be particularly subject to potential abuse, and, in those situations, to give substantial discretion to the trial court in admitting or excluding the impeaching evidence.
3 L. Whinery, Oklahoma Evidence, § 47.01, p. 370 (1994) (citing United States v. Alvarez-Lopez, 559 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir.1977).
This observation can also be made as we seek to apply the concepts contained within the terms “vouching” and “bolstering”. At common law, the concept of “vouching” was inherent when a party called a witness to testify, i.e. if the party did not think the witness was truthful, the witness would not have been called to the witness stand. This led to the ancient common-law rule that one could not impeach his own witness. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 315 n. 5, 110 S.Ct. 648, 654 n. 5, 107 L.Ed.2d 676 (1990). However, the provisions of the Evidence Code have stripped away this concept of the party “vouching” for the testimony of each witness called and allows for the impeachment of a witness, even by the party calling the witness. See 12 O.S.1991, § 2607, The current scope of the term “vouching” is basically restricted to the concept of an attorney personally assuring the truthful nature of the testimony of a witness to the trier of fact. See Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 359 n. 15, 78 S.Ct. 311, 323 n. 15, 2 L.Ed.2d 321 (1958); United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1044, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985).
While the term “bolstering” is not specifically defined in the Evidence Code, its concept is addressed within the provisions of 12 O.S.1991, § 2608, as it relates to reputation or opinion evidence of character of a witness for truthfulness or untruthfulness. However, under the facts of this case, the Court is not presented with opinion evidence relating to a witness, but the very basis of the witnesses’ testimony. At common law, the concept of “bolstering” was addressed within the term “rehabilitation”. The reason was this type of evidence for truthfulness was generally excluded until the witnesses’ credibility was attacked. See Jackson v. State, 12 Okl.Cr. 406, 157 P. 945 (1916) (error to admit prior consistent statement before witness impeached). See also 4 J. Wigmore, Evidence, § 1104, pp. 233-34 (J. Chadbourn ed. 1972); 3 L. Whinery, Oklahoma Evidence, § 47.31, pg. 377 (1994); United States v. Sherman, 171 F.2d 619, 622 (2d Cir.1948) (Judge Learned Hand reasoned: “[t]he reason for ... exclusion [of an earlier consistent account] is because it has not been made on oath rather than because it has no probative value, although courts have often spoken as though it had none.”) Therefore, “bolstering” constitutes nothing more than “preemptive rehabilitation” of a witness. In other *678words, it is the timing of the evidence based on the anticipated attempt to impeach a witness which is at issue and, to a degree, it is addressed in Section 2608. However, our jurisprudence has vacillated on whether the predicates ultimately codified in the Evidence Code must be followed, especially as it relates to non-opinion evidence.1
I submit the issues involved in the admission of a cooperative agreement do not require the “vouching” v. “bolstering” analysis. The testimony of the witness regarding his cooperation agreement does not constitute “bolstering” any more than a witness taking the oath prior to testifying or an expert witness providing his or her qualifications to testify prior to rendering an opinion as an expert.

. See Scales v. State, 737 P.2d 950, 952 (Okl.Cr.1987) (Court held a witness, after making an in-court identification of the defendant, may testify as to extra-judicial identification because "testimony of a victim concerning a pre-trial identification is not only material, but most competent for corroboration.” Id. (citing Hill v. State, 500 P.2d 1075 (Okl.Cr.1972)). Such pre-trial identification evidence may also be admitted "not only to corroborate an identification made at trial, but as independent evidence of identity.” Id. (citing Young v. State, 531 P.2d 1403, 1406 (Okl.Cr. 1975)), if it is first demonstrated that the identifier can no longer make an in-court identification (citing Elvaker v. State, 707 P.2d 1205, 1206 (Okl.Cr.1985)). See Also Trim v. State, 808 P.2d 697, 699 (Okl.Cr.1991) (same); Maple v. State, 662 P.2d 315, 316 (Okl.Cr.1983) (reversed because officer allowed to testily as to extrajudicial identification by victim); Brownfield v. State, 668 P.2d 1165, (Okl.Cr.1983) (same); Hickerson v. State, 565 P.2d 684, 685-86 (Okl.Cr.1977) (noting cases not permitting extrajudicial identification evidence had been overruled). The old cases were based on the proposition it was improper to bolster testimony because it was self-serving, immaterial or simply hearsay (Cothrum v. State, 379 P.2d 860, 865 (Okl.Cr.1963), Gillespie v. State, 355 P.2d 451, 453-54 (Okl.Cr.1960); Noyes v. State, 516 P.2d 1368, 1370-71 (Okl.Cr.1973) ("It is not competent to introduce testimony as to what a witness may have sworn or stated on some previous occasion, simply to confirm or bolster up the testimony of said witness as delivered before the jury, in the absence of some attack on the testimony of said witness, as by showing that the witness had sworn differently or stated differently to the testimony delivered on the trial of the case, or in the absence of some effort made to impeach the witness." (citing Doser v. State, 88 Okl.Cr. 299, 337, 203 P.2d 451, (1949) (Syllabus 17)). The Court’s decision in the present case is consistent with the recent line of cases allowing extrajudicial identification by a witness to be admitted as a part of the case in chief.