Court Opinion

ID: 9399427
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-03 00:00:32.50148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:06.499945
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-11180      Document: 00516773583           Page: 1     Date Filed: 06/02/2023

            United States Court of Appeals
                 for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                           United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                    Fifth Circuit

                                  ____________                                    FILED
                                                                               June 2, 2023
                                    No. 21-11180                             Lyle W. Cayce
                                  ____________                                    Clerk

   Allyson Raskin, on behalf of her minor children JD1 and JD2,

                                                               Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                         versus

   Dallas Independent School District; Dallas
   Independent School District Board of Trustees;
   Michael Hinojosa, Superintendent of the Dallas Independent School
   District in his individual capacity and in his official capacity as Superintendent
   of the Dallas Independent School District; Ben Mackey, President;
   Edwin Flores, 1st Vice President; Maxie Johnson, 2nd Vice
   President; Joe Carreon, Board Secretary; Dustin Marshall; Dan
   Micciche; Karla Garcia; Joyce Foreman; Justin Henry,
   all in their Individual Capacities and in their Capacities as Members of the
   Dallas Indpendent School District Board of Trustees,

                                            Defendants—Appellees.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Northern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 3:21-CV-2429
                   ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Higginson, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge:
          Allyson Raskin filed this pro se action in federal district court alleging,
   as relevant here, that the Dallas Independent School District (DISD) violated
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                                           No. 21-11180

   her children’s rights under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
   (GINA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff, et seq. The district court dismissed the GINA
   claims because Raskin lacked Article III standing to bring those claims on her
   own behalf and because Raskin—who is not a licensed attorney—could not
   proceed pro se on behalf of her children. In reaching the latter conclusion,
   the district court relied on our unpublished authority that 28 U.S.C. § 1654,
   which guarantees parties the right to proceed pro se in federal court, does not
   authorize pro se parents to litigate their children’s claims. See, e.g., Sprague
   v. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 547 F. App’x 507, 508 (5th Cir. 2013) (per
   curiam). Having dismissed the only federal claims alleged in the operative
   complaint, the district court then declined to exercise supplemental
   jurisdiction over the state-law claims. 1
           On appeal, Raskin contends that the district court erred in holding
   that she cannot represent her children in federal court. 2 To support Raskin’s
   position, we appointed an amicus, who argues that we should adopt a
           _____________________
           1
             The original complaint asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that DISD
   deprived Raskin’s children of their constitutional rights. The amended complaint, which
   does not raise any § 1983 claims, was filed while DISD’s motion to dismiss the original
   complaint was still pending. “An amended complaint supersedes the original complaint
   and renders it of no legal effect unless the amended complaint specifically refers to and
   adopts or incorporates by reference the earlier pleading.” King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346
   (5th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Although we construe Raskin’s pro se pleadings liberally,
   see SEC v. AMX, Int’l, Inc., 7 F.3d 71, 75 (5th Cir. 1993), we cannot say that her amended
   complaint “specifically refers to and adopts or incorporates by reference” the original
   complaint, King, 31 F.3d at 346. Accordingly, the amended complaint rendered the original
   complaint of no effect, and “the district court [had] the option of either denying the
   pending motion as moot or evaluating the motion in light of the facts alleged in the amended
   complaint.” Pettaway v. Nat’l Recovery Sols., LLC, 955 F.3d 299, 304 (2d Cir. 2020). Here,
   the district court acted within its discretion by ruling on the pending motion.
           2
             Raskin does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that she lacks Article III
   standing to bring the GINA claims on her own behalf, and so any argument that the district
   court erred in this regard is waived. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir.
   1993).

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   multifactor test to determine when a parent can proceed pro se. DISD
   counters that we should adhere to our unpublished caselaw and points to
   decisions from ten other circuits applying a per se rule against pro se parent
   representation.
          Today, we hold that an absolute bar on pro se parent representation is
   inconsistent with § 1654, which allows a pro se parent to proceed on behalf of
   her child in federal court when the child’s case is the parent’s “own.” 28
   U.S.C. § 1654. As we explain, this condition would be met if federal or state
   law designated Raskin’s children’s cases as belonging to her. Because the
   district court did not have the opportunity to consider whether Raskin’s
   children’s claims under the GINA belong to Raskin within the meaning of
   § 1654, we VACATE the district court’s dismissal of the GINA claims and
   REMAND for further proceedings rather than take up this inquiry in the
   first instance.
                                         I.
          This case starts and ends with the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1654. In relevant
   part, § 1654 says that “[i]n all courts of the United States the parties may
   plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel.” 28 U.S.C.
   § 1654. We have understood this provision to comprehensively list all the
   ways that a party may appear in federal court. See Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d
   1016, 1021 (5th Cir. 1998). So, “a party can represent himself or be
   represented by an attorney,” id., because § 1654 says he can. On the other
   hand, he “cannot be represented by a nonlawyer,” id., because the statute
   does not include the phrase, “or by a nonlawyer.”
          But the right to proceed pro se under § 1654 is not limited to cases
   where the pro se party is a named plaintiff. The statute provides for pro se
   representation in any case that is a party’s “own.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654. This
   language is rooted in the Judiciary Act of 1789, which said that “parties may

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   plead and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of . . .
   counsel[.]” Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (emphasis added). At the
   Founding, “own” meant “belonging to” oneself, Samuel Johnson, A
   Dictionary of the English Language (1755) (Beth Rapp Young
   et al. eds., 2021); see, e.g., U.S. Const., art. I § 5 (“Each House shall be the
   Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members[.]”
   (emphasis added)), and it means the same thing today, Own, Merriam-
   Webster             Dictionary                Online,          https://www.merriam-
   webster.com/dictionary/own            (last       visited   Feb.   6,   2023)     (same).
   Accordingly, for a person to invoke § 1654, the only requirement is that the
   case he seeks to prosecute must belong to him. 3
           Taken by itself, § 1654 does not say when a child’s case belongs to the
   parent. However, as our court has recognized, at common law, non-attorneys
   could not litigate the interests of others. See Guajardo v. Luna, 432 F.2d 1324,
   1324 (1970) (per curiam); see, e.g., Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d
   225, 232 (3d Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Winkelman ex rel.
   Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007); Russell v. United
   States, 308 F.2d 78, 79 (9th Cir. 1962) (per curiam); Collins v. O’Brien, 208
   F.2d 44, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (per curiam), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 944 (1954);
   Acme Poultry Corp. v. United States, 146 F.2d 738, 740 (4th Cir. 1944) (rule
   for corporations); Schifrin v. Chenille Mfg. Co., 117 F.2d 92, 94 (2d Cir. 1941)
   (describing whether and what kind of remedies are appropriate for violation
   of this rule, and collecting cases); Heiskell v. Mozie, 82 F.2d 861, 863 (D.C.
   Cir. 1936); Turner v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 407 F. Supp. 451, 477 (S.D. Tex. 1975);
           _____________________
           3
            This interpretation is consistent with the general rule that corporations cannot
   appear pro se under § 1654. § 1654 gives a party the right to plead and conduct a case
   “personally.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654. A corporation, which is a “fictional legal person,
   obviously cannot appear for [itself] personally.” Sw. Express Co. v. Interstate Com. Comm’n,
   670 F.2d 53, 55 (5th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted).

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                                          No. 21-11180

   In re Looney, 262 F.209, 212 (W.D. Tex. 1920); Weir v. Slocum, 3 How. Pr.
   397, 398 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 828
   (1975) (“The right of self-representation was guaranteed in many colonial
   charters and declarations of rights,” and those documents gave “the
   colonists a right to choose between pleading through a lawyer and
   representing oneself.” (emphases added)); Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. 9, 13
   (1856) (“[I]t has been well settled, by the rules and practice of common-law
   courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified
   to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counsellor, and for what
   cause he ought to be removed.”). 4 Nothing in § 1654 abrogates this common-
   law rule or its corollary that non-attorney parents cannot act as attorneys for
   their children, see Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 536 n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring in
   the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Thus, a child’s case only belongs
   to the parent under § 1654 if some other source of law alters the common-law
   backdrop.

           _____________________
           4
              Although the Supreme Court has long recognized that the “office” of an attorney
   “confers upon him [a right] to appear for suitors, and to argue cases,” Ex parte Garland, 71
   U.S. 333, 379 (1866), lay practitioners who were not admitted to the bar represented others
   in court at various points before and after the Revolution. See Barlow F. Christensen, The
   Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences Really Make Good Neighbors—or Even Good
   Sense?, 1980 Am. Bar. Found. Rsch. J. 159, 161-75. For example, John Adams
   complained that he “found the practice of law grasped into the hands of deputy sheriffs,
   pettifoggers and even constables who filled all the writs upon bonds, promissory notes, and
   accounts, received the fees established for lawyers, and stirred up many unnecessary
   suits.” Id. at 167 (citation omitted). The rights of these non-attorneys “to appear as the
   attorney of another,” having “produc[ed] a warrant of attorney” from the client
   authorizing the representation, Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 829 (1824), have always
   been limited by the provision now codified at § 1654, which empowers federal courts to set
   rules for the appearance of counsel, see Garland, 71 U.S. at 362. There is no reason to think
   that these non-attorney counsel were acting as the “next friend” of a party without capacity
   to sue or to authorize the non-attorney to act as his representative.

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          Other federal statutes can overwrite the general rule against pro se
   parent representation. We have previously decided that a child’s appeal from
   certain administrative decisions under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
   § 405(g), belongs to the parent such that the parent can proceed pro se on the
   child’s behalf in federal court. See Harris v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 413, 416-17 (5th
   Cir. 2000); Machadio v. Apfel, 276 F.3d 103, 107 (2d Cir. 2002) (similar). And
   the Supreme Court has left open the question of whether the Individuals with
   Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., similarly “entitles
   parents to litigate their child’s claims pro se.” Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 535.
          We also look to state law in determining whether one person’s case
   belongs to another under § 1654. See Rodgers v. Lancaster Police & Fire Dep’t,
   819 F.3d 205, 211-12 (5th Cir. 2016). For example, if state law affords a
   parent the right to proceed pro se on behalf of her child, the child’s case is the
   parent’s “own” within the meaning of § 1654. This is because the state, in
   giving a parent this right, assigns to the parent the child’s “individual choice
   to proceed pro se,” Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d
   59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990), signals that “the minor’s interests would be furthered
   by [the parent’s] representation,” id., permits the parent to waive the child’s
   right to counsel, see Osei-Afriyie ex rel. Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937
   F.2d 876, 883 (3d Cir. 1991), and trusts the parent to represent the child.
   Where state law has this effect, the parent acts within the parent-child
   relationship—“a traditional area of state concern,” Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S.
   415, 435 (1979)— as the child’s pro se alter ego. § 1654 does not disturb these
   state law determinations about the substance of the parent-child relationship.
   See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (“State family and
   family-property law must do major damage to clear and substantial federal
   interests before the Supremacy Clause will demand that state law be
   overridden,” and then Congress must have “positively required by direct
   enactment that state law be pre-empted.” (cleaned up)); Hillman v. Maretta,

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   569 U.S. 483, 490-91 (2013) (same). To the contrary, Congress left open to
   states the choice to authorize non-attorney parents to represent their
   children. 5
           Our unpublished cases 6 and authority from other circuits 7 have
   adopted an absolute bar against pro se parent representation without fully

           _____________________
           5
              It is important not to confuse capacity to sue under Federal Rule of Civil
   Procedure 17 and the right to proceed pro se under § 1654. While minors do have a right to
   proceed pro se under § 1654, under Texas law and Rule 17(b), minors cannot exercise that
   right because they lack capacity to sue. Under Rule 17(c)(1), a minor’s guardian can sue
   “on behalf” of the minor in federal court. As we explained, this does not answer the
   question of whether the minor’s case is the guardian’s “own” such that the guardian can
   proceed pro se under § 1654. Stated otherwise, we must not conflate capacity, which
   concerns “a party’s personal right to come into court,” Wright & Miller, 6A Fed.
   Prac. & Proc. § 1559 (3d ed. 2022), and representation, which asks who gets to act as
   the legal representative of the party in court proceedings. It is true that under Texas law,
   minors can sue through a legal guardian. Just because a represented guardian can sue on
   behalf of a child in Texas state court does not mean that the guardian can proceed pro se on
   behalf of the child. Judge Oldham argues that because, under Texas law, a parent has the
   “right to represent the child in legal action and to make other decisions of substantial legal
   significance concerning the child,” Tex. Fam. Code § 151.001(a)(7), a parent can
   proceed pro se on the child’s behalf. Yet Texas law does not expressly state that a parent
   can proceed pro se. On remand, the district court is free to address this issue of Texas law
   in the first instance and with ample opportunity for adversary briefing on the meaning of
   § 151.001(a)(7), not done before us, a court of review.
           6
            See, e.g., Dobbs v. Warden, 2022 WL 4244283, at *3 (5th Cir. Sept. 15, 2022) (per
   curiam) (unpublished); Fountain v. Thaler, 629 F. App’x 592, 595 (5th Cir. 2015) (per
   curiam) (unpublished); Sprague, 547 F. App’x at 507-08 (per curiam) (unpublished);
   Johnson v. Lufkin Daily News, 48 F. App’x 917, 917 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam)
   (unpublished).
           7
             See Crozier ex rel. A.C. v. Westside Cmty. Sch. Dist., 973 F.3d 882, 887 (8th Cir.
   2020); Myers v. Loudoun Cnty. Pub. Schs., 418 F.3d 395, 399-401 (4th Cir. 2005); Shepherd
   v. Wellman, 313 F.3d 963, 970 (6th Cir. 2002); Navin v. Park Ridge Sch. Dist. 64, 270 F.3d
   1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 2001); Devine v. Indian River Cnty. Sch. Bd., 121 F.3d 576, 581 (11th Cir.
   1997), overruled in part on other grounds, Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 535; Johns v. Cnty. of San
   Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876-77 (9th Cir. 1997); Ethan H. v. New Hampshire, 968 F.2d 1210,
   1992 WL 167299, at *1 (1st Cir. July 21, 1992) (per curiam) (unpublished); Osei-Afriyie, 937

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   accounting for the text of § 1654. At best, those cases assert that § 1654
   “does not speak to the issue” of “whether [the parent] may plead or conduct
   his [child’s] case,” Devine, 121 F.3d at 581, rest on the premise that “[t]he
   right to litigate for oneself . . . does not create a coordinate right to litigate for
   others,” Myers, 418 F.3d at 400, or conclude that “because a minor’s personal
   cause of action is her own,” it “does not belong to her parent,” Shepherd, 313
   F.3d at 970. At worst, they assume, without considering state law, that
   “[t]here is nothing in the guardian-minor relationship that suggests that the
   minor’s interests would be furthered by representation by the non-attorney
   guardian,” Cheung, 906 F.2d at 61, or apply an absolute bar without giving
   any reason, see Meeker, 782 F.2d at 154. By recognizing that the meaning of
   “their own cases” in § 1654 sometimes depends on other federal and state
   law, we make a minor course correction in our circuit.
           The absolute bar in our fellow circuits is designed to ensure that when
   children “have claims that require adjudication,” they receive “trained legal
   assistance so their rights may be fully protected.” Cheung, 906 F.2d at 61.
   This policy concern is reflected in the common law and prevails absent
   federal or state law to the contrary. But where a state has decided that pro se
   parental representation does adequately protect children’s rights, the text of
   § 1654 does not allow us to interfere absent extenuating circumstances. 8 See,
   e.g., Hoffert v. Gen. Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 161, 164 (5th Cir. Unit A Sept.
   1981) (holding that courts “have inherent power to appoint a guardian ad

           _____________________
   F.2d at 882-83; Cheung, 906 F.2d at 61; Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 154 (10th Cir.
   1986) (per curiam).
           8
             In addition to the usual factors district courts consider in deciding whether
   appointment of counsel is warranted, see Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir.
   1982), district courts may also account for whether denying counsel to a minor litigant
   would force the minor out of court and prejudice the minor’s claim.

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   litem when it appears that the minor’s general representative has interests
   which may conflict with those of the person he is supposed to represent”).
          Moreover, in some circumstances, the absolute bar may not protect
   children’s rights at all. When counsel is unavailable, the absolute bar
   “undermine[s] a child’s interest in having claims pursued for him or her,”
   and “may force minors out of court altogether.” Tindall v. Poultney High Sch.
   Dist., 414 F.3d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 2005).                “Children represent a
   disproportionate number of those living in poverty in the United States,” and
   “[t]here is a dearth of legal services available” in this country “to meet the
   legal needs of those who cannot afford to pay.” Lisa V. Martin, No Right to
   Counsel, No Access Without: The Poor Child’s Unconstitutional Catch-22, 71
   Fla. L. Rev. 831, 856 (2019). As a result, “the mandate that parents retain
   counsel to advance their children’s claims cannot be met by a substantial
   portion of families.” Id. at 858.
          At least in part, the absolute bar expresses our need to “jealously
   guard[] [our] authority to govern those who practice in [our] courtrooms.”
   Myers, 418 F.3d at 400. From this perspective, “[r]equiring a minimum level
   of competence protects not only the [client] but also his or her adversaries
   and the court from poorly drafted, inarticulate, or vexatious claims,”
   Collinsgru, 161 F.3d at 231. But Congress did not write an absolute bar into
   § 1654. And we already live on a pro se planet. Between 2000 and 2019,
   twenty-seven percent of all civil cases had at least one pro se plaintiff or
   defendant. U.S. Cts., Just the Facts: Trends in Pro Se Civil
   Litigation from 2000 to 2019 (Feb. 11, 2021). Last year, forty-six
   percent of filings in federal courts of appeals were pro se. Chief Justice
   John G. Roberts, Jr., U.S. Sup. Ct., 2022 Year-End Report
   on the Federal Judiciary 6 (2022). Pro se litigants routinely practice
   in our courtrooms, as § 1654 permits.

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                                             II.
          In this case, the district court faithfully followed our unpublished
   authority that pro se parents cannot represent their children except in Social
   Security appeals. However, as we now clarify, because § 1654 does not
   absolutely bar parents from proceeding pro se on behalf of their children, we
   must conclude the district court erred in failing to consider whether federal
   or state law designates Raskin’s children’s claims as her “own” such that she
   can represent them. Accordingly, the district court’s dismissal of the GINA
   claims is vacated. On remand, it will be Raskin’s burden to establish that
   under § 1654, federal or state law authorizes her to proceed pro se on behalf
   of her children.
          Still, on remand, the district court remains free to “note the
   inadequacy of the complaint and dismiss it for failure to state a claim as long
   as the procedure employed is fair to the parties,” Century Sur. Co. v. Blevins,
   799 F.3d 366, 372 (5th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). In this circuit, “fairness
   requires that a litigant have the opportunity to be heard before a claim is
   dismissed, except where the claim is patently frivolous.” Id.              A claim is
   frivolous when it is “so lacking in merit that it [is] groundless.” 9 United
   States v. Mississippi, 921 F.2d 604, 609 (5th Cir. 1991). Since dismissal of a
   patently frivolous claim does not require a response from a pro se parent, a
   district court can dismiss a claim alleged by such a parent without considering

          _____________________
          9
              Here, Raskin brings claims on her children’s behalf under the GINA. But that
   statute “prohibits an employer from discriminating or taking adverse actions against an
   employee because of genetic information with respect to the employee” or “request[ing],
   requir[ing], or purchas[ing] genetic information with respect to an employee or a family
   member of the employee.” Ortiz v. City of San Antonio Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 826 (5th
   Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). It is not apparent from the face of the operative complaint how
   this statute has any relevance to DISD’s alleged conduct or Raskin’s children.

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   whether the parent is qualified to bring the suit in the first place. Under those
   circumstances, dismissal of the claim should ordinarily be without prejudice.
          In any event, we leave it up to the district court to decide whether this
   case is best resolved by considering the implications of federal or state law
   vis-à-vis § 1654 or through an alternative procedural mechanism like sua
   sponte dismissal.
          The district court’s dismissal of the GINA claims is VACATED and
   the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order.

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   Andrew S. Oldham, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part and concurring in
   the judgment:
          Since the First Judiciary Act in 1789, every person—including a
   minor—has enjoyed a right to litigate pro se in federal court. The question
   presented is whether a parent can vindicate that right for her children, just as
   she can vindicate her children’s other rights. The district court said no. The
   majority says maybe. I would say absolutely.
                                          I.
          Allyson Raskin is not an attorney. On October 4, 2021, however, she
   filed a pro se complaint on behalf of herself and her minor children against the
   Dallas Independent School District and the District’s Superintendent, the
   Board of Trustees, and various Board members (collectively “Dallas ISD”).
   The complaint listed both minor children (“JD1” and “JD2”), as well as Ms.
   Raskin, as plaintiffs. On October 26, 2021, Dallas ISD filed a motion to
   dismiss the complaint, arguing in relevant part that Ms. Raskin lacks standing
   to proceed pro se on her children’s behalf. Ms. Raskin responded by filing a
   “Response to Motion to Dismiss,” an “Amendment to Complaint,” and an
   “Emergency Motion for a Preliminary Injunction”—all on November 16,
   2021. All of her district court pleadings were cogent, persuasive, and
   included citations to relevant legal authorities.
          In a puzzling opinion, the district court dismissed the complaint for
   lack of subject matter jurisdiction. “For a legal dispute to qualify as a genuine
   case or controversy, at least one plaintiff must have standing to sue.” Dep’t
   of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2565 (2019). It’s both undisputed and
   indisputable that two of the plaintiffs—minors JD1 and JD2—have standing
   to sue, and hence the district court had jurisdiction over the case. But the
   district court somehow overlooked the minors’ standing, and “sua sponte
   dismisse[d] without prejudice for lack of Article III standing the federal

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   claims in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint” based on Ms. Raskin’s purported
   incapacity to sue on the children’s behalf.
          Ms. Raskin timely appealed. She filed two excellent briefs in our court.
   She timely and properly filed the Record Excerpts required by our rules. And
   on November 9, 2022, Ms. Raskin presented oral argument in front of our
   panel. Ms. Raskin was a passionate and effective advocate.
                                          II.
          “Jurisdiction is always first.” Arulnanthy v. Garland, 17 F.4th 586, 592
   (5th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). The district court sua sponte held that it
   somehow lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case. That was wrong
   for at least three reasons.
          First, as noted above, it takes just one plaintiff with standing to create
   a justiciable case or controversy. Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2565. The
   two minor children, JD1 and JD2, unquestionably satisfy this requirement.
   They have concrete and particularized injuries, traceable to the defendants’
   conduct, and redressable by a favorable judicial decision. See Lujan v. Defs. of
   Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The complaint contains well-pleaded
   facts, for example, that JD1 has suffered anxiety, depression, and social
   ostracism on account of Dallas ISD’s policies. JD2 likewise suffered anxiety,
   but it was so severe that JD2 was forced out of Dallas ISD and into a small
   private school. That is far more than our cases require to establish JD1’s and
   JD2’s standing.
          Second, the district court seemed troubled by Ms. Raskin’s invocation
   of her children’s injuries in addition to her own. But jus tertii standing is well
   established in the law. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 193 (1976). In
   fact, the Supreme “Court almost routinely . . . permit[s] assertions of third-
   party standing upon finding (i) some sort of ‘relationship’ between the
   litigants seeking third-party standing and those whose rights they want to

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   assert and (ii) some sort of impediment to third parties’ effective assertion of
   their own rights through litigation.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., John
   F. Manning, Daniel J. Meltzer, & David L. Shapiro, Hart
   & Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal
   System 165 (7th ed. 2015). And these rules appear easily satisfied here. Like
   the near-beer vendor in Craig, Ms. Raskin has her own independent
   injuries—Ms. Raskin, for example, has been forced to spend $10,000 a year
   in JD2’s tuition on account of Dallas ISD’s policies. And that allows her to
   complain not only of her own injuries but also of her children’s. The “special
   relationship” between a mother and her children makes the beer vendor-
   vendee relationship in Craig pale in comparison. And there’s an obvious
   obstacle to JD1 and JD2’s effective assertion of their own rights—Dallas
   ISD’s extraordinary efforts to prevent this case from being heard, and its
   intrepid lawyers’ at-all-costs litigation strategy proves it.
          Third, even if all of that’s wrong, it doesn’t defeat Article III
   jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court has said, “limitations on a litigant’s
   assertion of jus tertii are not constitutionally mandated, but rather stem from
   a salutary ‘rule of self-restraint’ designed to minimize unwarranted
   intervention into controversies where the applicable constitutional questions
   are ill-defined and speculative.” Craig, 429 U.S. at 193. And more generally,
   as the Supreme Court recently reminded us earlier this Term:
                 Jurisdiction, this Court has observed, is a word of many,
          too many, meanings. In particular, this Court has emphasized
          the distinction between limits on the classes of cases a court
          may      entertain     (subject-matter     jurisdiction)     and
          nonjurisdictional claim-processing rules, which seek to
          promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the
          parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times
          ....

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                To police this jurisdictional line, this Court will treat a
         procedural requirement as jurisdictional only if Congress
         ‘clearly states’ that it is. This principle of construction is not a
         burden courts impose on Congress. To the contrary, this
         principle seeks to avoid judicial interpretations that undermine
         Congress’      judgment.        Loosely     treating    procedural
         requirements as jurisdictional risks undermining the very
         reason Congress enacted them.
                 Procedural rules often seek to promote the orderly
         progress of litigation within our adversarial system. Limits on
         subject-matter jurisdiction, in contrast, have a unique potential
         to disrupt the orderly course of litigation. Branding a rule as
         going to a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction alters the normal
         operation of our adversarial system. For purposes of efficiency
         and fairness, our legal system is replete with rules like
         forfeiture, which require parties to raise arguments themselves
         and to do so at certain times. Jurisdictional bars, however, may
         be raised at any time and courts have a duty to consider them
         sua sponte. When such eleventh-hour jurisdictional objections
         prevail post-trial or on appeal, many months of work on the
         part of the attorneys and the court may be wasted. Similarly,
         doctrines like waiver and estoppel ensure efficiency and
         fairness by precluding parties from raising arguments they had
         previously disavowed. Because these doctrines do not apply to
         jurisdictional objections, parties can disclaim such an
         objection, only to resurrect it when things go poorly for them
         on the merits.
                Given this risk of disruption and waste that accompanies
         the jurisdictional label, courts will not lightly apply it to
         procedures Congress enacted to keep things running smoothly
         and efficiently. Courts will also not assume that in creating a
         mundane claims-processing rule, Congress made it unique in
         our adversarial system by allowing parties to raise it at any time
         and requiring courts to consider it sua sponte.

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                                    No. 21-11180

   Wilkins v. United States, 143 S. Ct. 870, 875–76 (2023) (quotation omitted). I
   am aware of no rule—and neither the district court nor Dallas ISD cited
   any—that suggests failure to hire an attorney is a jurisdictional defect. Thus,
   the federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute.
          The majority opinion says otherwise only by ignoring Ms. Raskin’s
   original complaint, the numerous factual allegations in it, and the four legal
   claims it pleaded. The majority opinion justifies this result by holding that
   Ms. Raskin’s “Amendment to Complaint” operated to delete and then
   supersede her original complaint. See ante, at 2 n.1. I dissent from that
   determination.
          An amendment supplements—rather than supersedes—the original
   complaint if the amendment “refers to and adopts or incorporates by
   reference the earlier pleading.” King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir.
   1994) (per curiam). And as we recently explained, such “incorporation by
   reference” need only have the “degree of specificity and clarity which would
   enable the responding party to easily determine the nature and extent of the
   incorporation.” New Orleans Ass’n of Cemetery Tour Guides v. New Orleans
   Archdiocesan Cemeteries, 56 F.4th 1026, 1033 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Carroll
   v. Fort James Corp., 470 F.3d 1171, 1176 (5th Cir. 2006)).
          Every reasonable defendant would understand that Ms. Raskin
   amended her complaint rather than superseded it. In her amendment, Ms.
   Raskin explained that after filing the original complaint, she discovered
   “[n]ew information not available at the time of the original filing” that
   further “substantiates Plaintiff’s case.” Accordingly, she added five new
   counts on top of her original four. And she numbered the additional claims in
   the Amendment as Counts V through IX—obviously supplementing (rather
   than deleting and superseding Counts I through IV in the original complaint).
   She also omitted all the prefatory content that she included in the original

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                                            No. 21-11180

   complaint, including a list of the parties, the basis for jurisdiction and venue,
   and a statement of the facts (altogether, roughly 20 pages of material)—
   obviously relying on that material to survive the Amendment. And lest there
   be any residual doubt, Ms. Raskin titled her filing as an “Amendment to
   Complaint,” not, for example, an “Amended Complaint.” This was more
   than enough to “enable the responding party to easily determine the nature
   and extent of the incorporation.” Ass’n of Cemetery Tour Guides, 56 F.4th at
   1033 (quotation omitted). In fact, I cannot imagine how any reasonable
   defendant could receive Ms. Raskin’s “Amendment” and understand it to
   do anything other than what it says—that is, it made an “Amendment” to
   the original complaint by adding five new claims without deleting the first
   four (and the accompanying allegations). 1
                                                 III.
           Turning to the merits, I first (A) explain that federal and state law
   allow Raskin to represent her minor children without hiring an attorney.
   Then I (B) analyze and reject Dallas ISD’s counterarguments.
                                                  A.
           The merits of this dispute turn on 28 U.S.C. § 1654, which provides:
   “In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their
   own cases personally or by counsel.” This language has remained unchanged
   since 1948. See Act of January 6, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-646, 62 Stat. 964, 944.
   But the right of self-representation has a far deeper basis in Anglo-American

           _____________________
           1
              That’s doubly true here because “[t]he filings of a pro se litigant are to be liberally
   construed.” Coleman v. United States, 912 F.3d 824, 828 (5th Cir. 2019). To expect more
   of any litigant—much less a pro se one—undercuts a primary goal of the Federal Rules of
   Civil Procedure: “to encourage pleadings that are short, concise, and free of unwarranted
   repetition as well as to promote convenience in pleading.” 5A Charles Alan Wright
   et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1326 (4th ed., April 2023 update).

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                                    No. 21-11180

   law. Some trace it to the Magna Carta. See Nina Ingwer VanWormer, Help at
   Your Fingertips: A Twenty-First Century Response to the Pro Se Phenomenon, 60
   Vand. L. Rev. 983, 987 (2007) (citing Magna Carta art. XL, which
   provides: “To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or
   justice.”). Others claim the right began “as a bulwark against the abuses of
   the English Star Chamber, in which individuals were forced to be represented
   by state counsel in politically motivated trials.” Lisa V. Martin, No Right to
   Counsel, No Access Without: The Poor Child’s Unconstitutional Catch-22, 71
   Fla. L. Rev. 831, 846 (2019) [hereinafter No Right, No Access]; see also
   Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821–22 (1975) (discussing the practices
   of, and reactions against, the English Star Chamber).
          Regardless of when exactly the self-representation right emerged, it
   has deep roots in the American Founding. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 826 (“In
   the American Colonies the insistence upon a right of self-representation was,
   if anything, more fervent than in England.”). The Founding generation
   maintained an abiding “appreciation of the virtues of self-reliance.” Ibid.
   Informed by “the ‘natural law’ thinking that characterized the Revolution’s
   spokesmen,” the “Founders believed that self-representation was a basic
   right of a free people.” Id. at 830 n.39. That’s primarily because the Founders
   understood “the freedom to state one’s own case” as “a defense against
   government oppression” and “a guarantee of individual dignity and
   autonomy.” No Right, No Access, supra, at 846. Thomas Paine, for example,
   argued in support of the 1776 Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights by
   explaining that people had “a natural right to plead [their] own case.”
   Faretta, 422 U.S. at 830 n.39 (quoting Thomas Paine on a Bill of Rights, 1777,
   reprinted in 1 Bernard Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A
   Documentary History 314, 316 (1971)).
          Equally strong as the Founding generation’s belief in the “virtues of
   self-reliance” was its “distrust of lawyers.” Id. at 826. The colonists’ anti-

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                                    No. 21-11180

   lawyer sentiment stemmed from their experiences with the Justices of the
   King’s Court as well as the Crown’s Attorneys- and Solicitors-General—
   whom many colonists believed “twist[ed] the law to secure convictions” of
   “those who opposed the King’s prerogatives.” Ibid. (quoting Charles
   Warren, A History of the American Bar 7 (1911)); see also id. at
   827 (“[D]istrust of lawyers became an institution.” (quoting Daniel
   Boorstin, The Americans: The Colonial Experience 197
   (1958))). Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, this understandable anti-
   lawyer prejudice intensified “as ‘the lower classes came to identify lawyers
   with the upper class.’” Id. at 827 (quoting Lawrence Friedman, A
   History of American Law 82 (1973)). And when the time came to
   draft and ratify the Constitution, such anti-lawyerism and anti-elitism
   reached a crescendo. Ibid. One Anti-Federalist captured the zeitgeist this way
   when expressing his frustration with some supporters of the Constitution:
          [M]any undesigning citizens may wish [the Constitution’s]
          adoption from the best motives, but these are modest and
          silent, when compared to the greater number, who endeavour
          to suppress all attempts for investigation; these violent
          partizans are for having the people gulp down the gilded pill
          blind-folded, whole, and without any qualification whatever,
          these generally, of the noble order of Cincinnatus, holders of
          public securities, men of great wealth and expectations of
          public office, Bankers and Lawyers: these with their train of
          dependants from the Aristocratick combination—the Lawyer in
          particular, keep up an incessant declamation for its adoption,
          like greedy gudgeons they long to satiate their voracious
          stomacks with the golden bait—The numerous tribunals to be
          erected by the new plan of consolidated empire, will find
          employment for ten times their present numbers; these are the
          loaves and fishes for which they hunger . . . .

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   Essay by a Federalist, Boston Gazette (Nov. 26, 1787), reprinted in 4
   The Complete Anti-Federalist 117 (Herbert J. Storing ed. 1981)
   (emphasis added) (quotation omitted).
          Considering the Founding generation’s self-reliance and distaste for
   attorneys, it is unsurprising that “the right of self-representation has been
   protected . . . since the beginnings of our Nation.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 812.
   Indeed, many (perhaps most) colonial charters, declarations of rights, and
   State constitutions guaranteed self-representation. See, e.g., id. at 828 n.37,
   829 n.38, 830 n.40 (collecting examples). For example, the Pennsylvania
   Frame of Government of 1682 provided that “in all courts all persons of all
   persuasions may freely appear in their own way.” Pa. Frame of Gov’t
   art. VI (1682). The Georgia Constitution in 1777 likewise secured “that
   inherent privilege of every freeman, the liberty to plead his own cause.” Ga.
   Const. art. LVIII (1777). And the first Congress did the same when it
   passed the Judiciary Act of 1789, which provided “in all the courts of the
   United States, the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally
   or by the assistance of . . . counsel.” Pub. L. No. 1-20, 1 Stat. 73, 92. This
   language is functionally identical to the right at issue in this case and codified
   at 28 U.S.C. § 1654: “In all courts of the United States the parties may plead
   and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel.”
          With the statutory text and the corresponding right properly situated,
   let’s begin with the parties’ common ground. The parties first agree that
   federal law allows children to litigate pro se. Congress was quite clear on that.
   Nothing in § 1654 limits the right to proceed “personally”—that is, pro se—
   to those who are at least 18 years old. To the contrary, unless context dictates
   otherwise, congressional enactments generally treat adults and minors as
   equal “persons.” 1 U.S.C. § 8(a). That’s presumably why Dallas ISD
   concedes that “minor children have the same statutory right under 28 U.S.C.
   § 1654 as their parents to proceed in litigation pro se.” Dallas Supp. Br. 12.

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          The parties’ second agreement concerns the Federal Rules. Those
   Rules direct us to consider state law in determining who has the capacity to
   sue in federal court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(3) (“Capacity to sue is
   determined . . . by the law of the state where the court is located.”). So here
   too Dallas ISD agrees that a child’s “access to the [federal] courts, or
   capacity to sue or be sued, is determined by state not federal law.” Dallas
   Supp. Br. 26. 2

          The parties disagree on how best to understand state law, but I do not
   think this is a close question. The Texas Legislature has unequivocally sided
   with Ms. Raskin: The “parent of a child” has the “right to represent the child
   in legal action and to make other decisions of substantial legal significance
   concerning the child.” Tex. Fam. Code § 151.001(a)(7). True, Texas
   minors are “unable to sue or be sued in their individual capacities.” Austin
   Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex. 2005). But both the
   Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Rules specify that minors can bring suit
   through a legal guardian, next friend, or guardian ad litem. Ibid.; Tex. R.
   Civ. P. 44 (a legal guardian may sue on behalf of a minor); accord Fed. R.
   Civ. P. 17(c) (providing that a minor can sue through a legal guardian, next
   friend, or guardian ad litem where consistent with state law). And the Texas
   Supreme Court has stated that a parent is “a legal guardian qualified to sue

           _____________________
           2
              Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c) likewise directs us to consider state law. For
   example, Rule 17(c) authorizes a minor to sue through a general guardian, a next friend, a
   guardian ad litem, or a like fiduciary. We nonetheless must understand those terms in light
   of state law restrictions on the capacity to sue and be sued. See Rideau v. Keller Indep. Sch.
   Dist., 819 F.3d 155, 163 (5th Cir. 2016) (“[C]ourts, including ours, have read Rule 17(c) in
   conjunction with Rule 17(b), which mandates the use of state law in determining a
   representative’s capacity to sue.”); 6A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal
   Practice and Procedure § 1571 (3d ed., April 2023 update) (“[T]he district court’s
   power of appointment under Rule 17(c)(2) should not be used as a vehicle for
   circumventing the mandate in Rule 17(b) to employ state law to determine capacity.”).

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                                     No. 21-11180

   on his child’s behalf” under Texas Rule 44. In re Bridgestone Ams. Tire Ops.,
   LLC, 459 S.W.3d 565, 572 n.9 (Tex. 2015).

          I would therefore hold that federal law gives Raskin’s minor children
   the unequivocal right to “conduct their own cases personally,” 28 U.S.C.
   § 1654; Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17 directs us to consider state law in
   determining who has the capacity to sue; and Texas law plainly lodges that
   capacity in Ms. Raskin as the parent of JD1 and JD2. Tex. Fam. Code
   § 151.001(a)(7).

                                          B.
          Dallas ISD offers two primary responses: (1) Courts should not
   respect a parent’s choice to appear for her children without an attorney
   because we cannot be sure it’s what the child would want; (2) Courts have a
   freestanding responsibility to ensure the best interest of children before
   them, and mandatory attorney representation of minor children protects
   them from their “unskilled, if caring, parents.” Dallas Supp. Br. 1. Both
   arguments are unavailing.

                                          1.
          First, Dallas ISD says that the choice to appear without an attorney
   isn’t a “true choice” for minors because, under state law, they “cannot
   determine their own legal actions.” Dallas Supp. Br. 12 (quotation omitted).
   Dallas ISD quotes liberally from a Second Circuit decision, which says: “[A]
   non-attorney parent must be represented by counsel” because the “choice
   to appear pro se is not a true choice for minors,” so “[t]here is thus no
   individual choice to proceed pro se for courts to respect.” Cheung v. Youth
   Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc., 906 F.2d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1990).

          That critique, however, fundamentally misunderstands both the law
   and the parent-child relationship. As to the law, Dallas ISD confuses who has
   the authority to exercise the § 1654 pro se right (and other legal rights) when
   a parent acts as their child’s legal guardian and sues on behalf of her child. As

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                                      No. 21-11180

   discussed above, state and federal law assign to parents the right to
   “represent the child in legal action” and “make other decisions of substantial
   legal significance” on the child’s behalf. Tex. Fam. Code § 151.001(a)(7).
   It is thus incorrect to say that there’s no “individual choice” for “courts to
   respect.” Cheung, 906 F.2d at 61. It’s the parent’s choice on the child’s
   behalf—a choice written law recognizes and requires us to honor. So while
   the § 1654 pro se right is the child’s, the parent as legal guardian is authorized
   to exercise that right on her child’s behalf.

           As to the parent-child relationship, Dallas ISD misunderstands that
   too. Parents make decisions all the time for their children, including decisions
   that children could not make on their own. See, e.g., Tex. Fam. Code
   § 151.001(a)(1)–(11) (recognizing various rights and duties of parents); see
   also Smith v. Org. of Foster Fams. for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 841 n.44
   (1977) (noting that children “lack the capacity to make [certain] decision[s],
   and thus their interest is ordinarily represented in litigation by parents or
   guardians”); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (explaining that the
   law “presume[es] that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity,
   experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult
   decisions”). Parents sometimes use their rights to give legal effect to the
   child’s wishes. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 505(a) (prohibiting 17-year-olds from
   enlisting in the armed forces, even if they want to, without parental consent);
   Tex. Fam. Code § 151.001(a)(6) (recognizing parent’s “right to consent
   to the child’s . . . enlistment in the armed forces”). Other times, parents use
   their rights to do things their children might not like. See, e.g., Tex. Fam.
   Code § 151.001(a)(5) (recognizing parent’s “right to the services and
   earnings of the child”); id. § 151.001(a)(2) (recognizing parent’s “duty of . . .
   reasonable discipline of the child”); id. § 151.001(a)(10) (recognizing
   parent’s “right to make decisions concerning the child’s education”).

         But on Dallas ISD’s reasoning, none of the judgments parents make
   on a daily basis deserve our respect because none are “true choices” for

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                                     No. 21-11180

   minors. That cannot be so. Minors lack capacity to make “true choices” until
   they reach the age of majority, which is precisely why the law recognizes
   parents’ rights to make myriad decisions for them—including whether to
   litigate without an attorney. It would make little sense to “reserve[] this
   particular litigation choice—whether to be represented by counsel—to child
   litigants without explanation for why this litigation choice should be set apart
   from all other choices routinely reserved to children’s legal representatives,”
   like “whether, when, and where to bring suit, what claims to advance, what
   information to disclose, and whom to sue.” No Right, No Access, supra, at 848;
   see also id. at 860–72. To say nothing of the myriad other life-altering choices
   that parents make concerning their children’s education, medical care,
   financial affairs, and even military service.

           Nor could it be otherwise under 28 U.S.C. § 1654. After all, Dallas
   ISD concedes that § 1654 gives children the choice to litigate pro se or by
   counsel. Dallas Supp. Br. 12. But under their understanding, § 1654 offers
   minors a Hobson’s choice: litigate with counsel, or don’t litigate at all. Dallas
   ISD’s heads-I-win-tails-you-lose approach to § 1654 plainly defies the text of
   the statute and centuries of Anglo-American law dating as far back as the
   Magna Carta. Dallas’s position also would have baffled the Founders. As the
   Supreme Court explained in Faretta, “the basic right to self-representation
   was never questioned” at the Founding, and “the notion of compulsory
   counsel was utterly foreign to [the Founders].” 422 U.S. at 827–28, 833; see
   also id. at 834 (“To force a lawyer on a [litigant] can only lead him to believe
   that the law contrives against him.”).

                                          2.
           Second, Dallas ISD says time and again that children are “the ward of
   every court where their rights are brought into jeopardy,” so courts are
   entitled to vindicate the best interests of those children by protecting them
   from their “unskilled, if caring, parents.” Dallas Supp. Br. 1, 12–13, 19. That
   is a startling assertion, and it’s decidedly not the law. Almost 100 years ago,

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                                            No. 21-11180

   the Supreme Court rejected the notion that every child is a ward and the
   notion that any organ of government, state or federal, has some sort of
   freestanding power to gainsay parents’ choices. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters,
   268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (“The child is not the mere creature of the state;
   those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the
   high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”). Rather,
   the Court has recognized that parents’ interests “in the care, custody, and
   control of their children” is “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
   interests.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality op.).
   Consequently, we cannot “infringe on the fundamental right of parents to
   make child rearing decisions simply because a . . . judge believes a ‘better’
   decision could be made.” Id. at 72–73 (plurality op.). 3 As Justice Blacklock
   has powerfully explained:

           _____________________
           3
              See also Parham, 442 U.S. at 602–03 (“Our jurisprudence historically has
   reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority
   over minor children. . . . That some parents may at times be acting against the interests of
   their children . . . creates a basis for caution, but is hardly a reason to discard wholesale
   those pages of human experience that teach that parents generally do act in the child’s best
   interests.” (quotation omitted)); id. at 602 (“[O]ur constitutional system long ago rejected
   any notion that a child is the mere creature of the State.” (quotation omitted)); Prince v.
   Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“[T]he custody, care and nurture of the child
   reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
   obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
   753 (1982) (noting that there is a “fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the
   care, custody, and management of their child”); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255
   (1978) (“We have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent
   and child is constitutionally protected.”); Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 834
   (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he founding generation believed parents had absolute
   authority over their minor children.”); Troxel, 530 U.S. at 91 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In
   my view, a right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children is among the
   ‘unalienable Rights’ with which the Declaration of Independence proclaims ‘all men . . .
   are endowed by their Creator.’ And in my view that right is also among the ‘othe[r] [rights]
   retained by the people’ which the Ninth Amendment says the Constitution’s enumeration
   of rights ‘shall not be construed to deny or disparage.’” (alterations in original)); In re H.S.
   550 S.W.3d 151, 176–77 (Blacklock, J., dissenting) (decrying the prospect that “a judge or

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           In the context of child-rearing, control of a child entails the
           power and authority to make important decisions about the
           child’s life. . . . [T]o have control of a child is to govern,
           oversee, and direct the child. This means more than day-to-day
           or hour-to-hour supervision and discipline—and certainly
           more than deciding ‘when a child gets up and goes to bed, how
           much television she watches, and whether she gets dessert.’
           Ante at 158. It means responsibility for the important choices
           that must be made for the child—choices about where she will
           live, her medical care, her education, and her future. Such
           control is by its nature, and by law, the exclusive right and duty
           of parents in the first instance. When important decisions must
           be made for a child, someone bears ultimate responsibility for
           them no matter how many other caregivers may be involved in
           the child’s life or consulted on the decision. Unless the child’s
           parents refuse or shirk this responsibility, it is theirs both in law
           and in fact.
   In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d 151, 169–70 (Tex. 2018) (Blacklock, J., dissenting)
   (quotation omitted).
            It’s true, of course, that the best-interest-of-the-child standard is an
   important one. But Dallas ISD’s invocation of the standard proves both too
   little and too much here.

         First, the too little. The best-interest-of-the-child doctrine derives
   from the parens patriae doctrine, and it is unclear that federal courts have
   inherent powers under either one. As the Supreme Court has explained:

           Parens patriae means literally “parent of the country.” The
           parens patriae action has its roots in the common-law concept
           of the royal prerogative. The royal prerogative included the
           _____________________
   group of judges—not the parents—will ultimately decide whether to uphold or reverse the
   parents’ decisions about their child's future” and arguing that “government usurpation of
   parental authority raises serious constitutional questions”).

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           right or responsibility to take care of persons who are legally
           unable, on account of mental incapacity, whether it proceed
           from 1st. nonage: 2. idiocy: or 3. lunacy: to take proper care of
           themselves and their property.
   Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600
   (1982) (quotation omitted); see also Saavedra v. Schmidt, 96 S.W.3d 533, 544
   (Tex. App.Austin 2002) (describing the best-interests standard as a subset
   of the parens patriae doctrine). But when our Nation inherited these doctrines
   from Mother England, we bequeathed them to the States—not the federal
   government. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972)
   (“In the United States, the ‘royal prerogative’ and the ‘parens patriae’
   function of the King passed to the States.”); Fontain v. Ravenel, 58 U.S. (1
   How.) 369, 384 (1855) (“Powers not judicial, exercised by the chancellor
   merely as the representative of the sovereign, and by virtue of the king’s
   prerogative as parens patriae, are not possessed by the [federal] courts.”). 4

           _____________________
           4
               See also No Right, No Access, supra, at 878, 880 (“[F]ederal courts’ protective role
   towards children is limited by several doctrines. First, it is limited by federalism. The parens
   patriae doctrine in the United States derives from the powers of the English Court of
   Chancery. All of the Court of Chancery’s powers, including the parens patriae power,
   devolved to the states and not to the federal government. . . . And even the states’ parens
   patriae authority is limited by the constitutional rights of parents to the care, custody, and
   control of their children’s constitutional rights. . . . Second, courts’ role in overseeing
   children’s litigation interests is limited by the parent’s and children’s constitutional
   rights. . . .”). Put differently, “The courts of the United States cannot exercise any equity
   powers, except those conferred by acts of congress, and those judicial powers which the high court
   of chancery in England, acting under its judicial capacity as a court of equity, possessed and
   exercised, at the time of the formation of the constitution of the United States.” Fontain,
   58 U.S. at 384 (emphasis added); see also id. at 393 (Taney, C.J., concurring) (comparing
   the “judicial power” conferred by Article III of the Constitution and the “prerogative
   powers” that the King “as parens patriae, in England, exercised through the courts” and
   concluding that “[t]he wide discretionary power which the chancellor of England exercises
   over infants, lunatics, or idiots, or charities, has not been conferred” to the federal courts,
   but rather “remain[s] with the States.”).

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          And when States use their parens patriae powers to protect the best
   interests of the child, they do so because the parents cannot agree or because
   the child has no parents at all. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 173.2(a)(1). For
   example, in a contested divorce proceeding, the state court must use the best-
   interest standard to mediate ex-spouses’ disagreement over their children’s
   educations. See, e.g., Magro v. Magro, 2020 WL 7251864, at *11–12 (Tex.
   App.Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 10, 2020). Likewise, when the parents are
   absent or so abusive as to be no parents at all, the state courts have numerous
   powers (including the power to terminate the parental relationship) to
   protect the best interests of the child. See, e.g., Interest of P.W., 2023 WL
   68146 (Tex. App.Waco Jan. 4, 2023). But I am aware of no authority, and
   Dallas ISD cites none, to suggest States can use their parens patriae powers
   to impose blanket prohibitions on parental choices simply because the
   government does not trust an otherwise-present-and-fit parent to choose
   wisely. And even if States had such limitless powers, Dallas ISD cites no
   authority to suggest federal courts somehow share them.

           Second, Dallas ISD’s invocation of the best-interest-of-the-child
   standard also proves too much. Even if state courts had freestanding best-
   interest powers, and even if federal courts had them too, it would prove that
   we need not create a general prohibition on parents’ rights to sue on behalf
   of their children. It’s precisely because some courts can sometimes intervene
   to prevent truly egregious harms that all courts cannot all-the-time intervene
   to prevent everyday parental decision-making. Thus, we need not decide
   here whether a federal court could intervene in a truly outrageous case to
   prevent a parent from prejudicing her unrepresented child’s legal rights. See,
   e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c) (authorizing federal courts under limited
   circumstances to appoint guardians and other representatives). It’s enough
   to hold that neither federal nor state law generally requires a parent to hire an
   attorney before suing on behalf of her children.

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                                           IV.
          Lastly, a few words about the majority opinion. It claims that this
   dispute “starts and ends with the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1654.” Ante, at 3. And
   recall that the statute provides “parties may plead and conduct their own
   cases personally or by counsel.” The majority puts great weight on the
   phrase, “their own.” See id. at 3–4. It says that Ms. Raskin can represent her
   children pro se if, and only if, state or federal law clearly assigns the children’s
   case to Ms. Raskin—thus making their claims her “own.” Id. at 3–7. And the
   majority intimates that state and federal law might not be sufficiently clear in
   this regard. Id. at 7 n.5.
          I am troubled by the majority’s approach for three reasons.
          First, the majority’s rigid construction of § 1654 renders other run-of-
   the-mill cases problematic. See United States v. Palomares, 52 F.4th 640, 647–
   49 (5th Cir. 2022) (Oldham, J., concurring) (explaining why “hyper-
   literalism is bad textualism”); see also Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731,
   1754 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting). The parties, the district court, and the
   majority all agree that Ms. Raskin could have hired a lawyer to bring her
   children’s claims. E.g., ante, at 7 n.5 (“[A] represented guardian can sue on
   behalf of a child.”). Why doesn’t that run afoul of the majority’s
   interpretation of § 1654? After all, the phrase “their own” modifies both
   “personally” and “by counsel.” If the children’s claims aren’t Ms. Raskin’s
   “own,” then what authority does § 1654 give Ms. Raskin to exercise her
   children’s “own” option to proceed “by counsel”? The more natural
   reading of § 1654 in this context would be:
          In all courts of the United States the parties [parent-
          representative] may plead and conduct their own [children’s]
          cases personally or by counsel.
   28 U.S.C. § 1654 (alterations added).

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           Second, even if the majority’s interpretation of § 1654 is the right one,
   Texas law satisfies it. The majority says that “Congress left open to [S]tates
   the choice to authorize non-attorney parents to represent their children.”
   Ante, at 7 (emphasis added). The key word here is “represent.” 5 And the
   Texas Family Code assigns parents that very right: “A parent of a child has
   . . . the right to represent the child in legal action and to make other decisions
   of substantial legal significance concerning the child.” Tex. Fam. Code
   § 151.001(a)(7) (emphasis added). The majority attempts to sidestep Texas
   Family Code § 151.001(a)(7)’s clear statement by suggesting it might not be
   clear enough. In the majority’s words, § 151.001(a)(7) “does not expressly
   state that a parent can proceed pro se.” Ante, at 7 n.5 (emphasis added). But
   such an exacting clear-statement rule is usually reserved for an area—like
   preemption or abrogation of state sovereign immunity—where the
   Legislature is acting in derogation of some otherwise well-established
   background principle. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61
   (1991) (preemption); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College
   Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 634–35 (1999) (abrogation). We do not require
   clear statements when the legislature merely confirms a notion—like the
   parent’s right to make decisions for her child—that’s centuries older than
   the American Republic itself.

           _____________________
           5
               Indeed, the majority uses “represent” and “representation” throughout its
   opinion as synonymous with pro se advocacy on another’s behalf. See, e.g., ante, at 5 n.4
   (“[L]ay practitioners who were not admitted to the bar represented others in court at various
   points before and after the Revolution.” (emphasis added)); id. at 7 n.5 (“[W]e must not
   conflate capacity, which concerns a party’s personal right to come into court, and
   representation, which asks who gets to act as the legal representative of the party in court
   proceedings.” (emphasis added) (quotation omitted)); id. at 10 (“[T]he district court erred
   in failing to consider whether federal or state law designates Raskin’s children’s claims as
   her ‘own’ such that she can represent them.” (emphasis added)).

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           Third, the majority puts undue emphasis on the general common-law
   presumption that non-attorneys can’t represent others. Here’s how the
   analysis goes. The majority cites a bevy of cases establishing a general
   presumption that, “at common law, non-attorneys could not litigate the
   interests of others,” ante, at 4–5; then, armed with one citation to a Supreme
   Court partial dissent, the majority extends this general common-law
   presumption to encompass parental pro se advocacy in particular, id. at 5;
   finally, it suggests that to litigate on their children’s behalf, pro se parents
   must identify a state or federal law that “expressly” “abrogates th[e]
   common-law rule or its corollary that non-attorney parents cannot act as
   attorneys for their children,” id. at 7 n.5; see also id. at 5–7. If Ms. Raskin
   wanted to represent her neighbor or her friend from church, then the
   majority’s conclusion might follow. But the parent-child relationship is far
   different from the relationship between an unlicensed non-attorney and a
   would-be client from the neighborhood or church. The parent-child
   relationship is a sacred, pre-political bond that preexists both the United
   States and Texas, and which is uniquely enshrined into state and federal law.
   That’s likely why none of the cases the majority cites points to any evidence
   that parents were prohibited from making legal decisions for their children at
   common law.
           The closest the majority comes is its citation to one footnote in Justice
   Scalia’s partial dissent in Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City School
   District. 550 U.S. 516, 536 n.1 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment
   in part and dissenting in part); see ante, at 5. The footnote says, in relevant
   part:
           [P]etitioners also argue that even if parents do not have their
           own rights under the statute, they nonetheless may act on
           behalf of their child without retaining a lawyer. Both sides
           agree, however, that the common law generally prohibited lay

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          parents from representing their children in court, a
          manifestation of the more general common-law rule that
          nonattorneys cannot litigate the interests of another. See Brief
          for Petitioners 37; Brief for Respondent 9–10; see also, e.g.,
          Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Ed., 161 F.3d 225, 232 (C.A.3 1998).
          Nothing in the IDEA suggests a departure from that rule.
   550 U.S. at 536 n.1.
          The majority cites this (and only this) for the proposition that non-
   attorney parents were prohibited at common law from representing their
   children pro se. But the foundation for the Winkelman footnote is shaky at
   best. For one, Justice Scalia’s partial dissent wasn’t controlling. Seven
   Justices disagreed with it. Moreover, the Winkelman majority explicitly
   declined to decide “whether IDEA entitles parents to litigate their child’s
   claims pro se.” Id. at 535. And finally, the sources Justice Scalia cited do not
   prove there was a common-law rule “prohibit[ing] lay parents from
   representing their children in court.” Id. at 536 n.1. Justice Scalia cited
   Collinsgru v. Palmyra Board of Education, 161 F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 1998). But
   Winkelman abrogated Collinsgru, and Collinsgru only said there’s a general
   common-law presumption that “a non-lawyer may not represent another
   person in court”—not that there was a common law rule prohibiting parents
   from representing their children pro se. Ibid. And as I explain throughout this
   opinion, there’s good reason (recognized throughout English and American
   jurisprudence) to treat the parent-child relationship differently for these
   purposes. Justice Scalia also cited portions of the parties’ briefs, but they
   added nothing. The Winkelman petitioner, for example, discussed the
   general common-law principle that non-attorneys cannot represent others,
   then cited two cases that also did not discuss parents or children. Petitioner
   Br. at 37. And the Winkelman respondent cited Collinsgru, which—as
   explained above—only discussed the general pro se rule. Respondent Br. at
   9–10. The Respondent then relied upon various circuit court cases holding

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   that non-attorney parents must be represented by counsel when suing on
   behalf of their children. Ibid. That, of course, merely begs the question.
   Those cases also uniformly relied upon the general common-law
   presumption against pro se representation—not any text, history, or tradition
   regarding parents and their children.
                                  *        *         *
          Sadly, too many parents today do not share Ms. Raskin’s passionate
   desire to fight for her children. And even more sadly, too many organs of
   government today do share Dallas ISD’s passionate desire to stand between
   parents and their children. Ms. Raskin decided to fight back against that
   governmental effort, and her right to do so is both ancient and deeply rooted
   in American law and history. I can find nothing that justifies dismissing this
   case simply because Ms. Raskin and her children chose, as so many litigants
   understandably do, not to hire an attorney. Accordingly, I concur in the
   majority’s decision to vacate and remand. But I would further hold that Ms.
   Raskin and her children may proceed pro se, full stop. And I respectfully
   dissent from the majority opinion’s suggestion that Ms. Raskin must move in
   the district court to reinstate her original complaint.

                                           33