Court Opinion

ID: 9522065
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:17:25.237711+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:14.196737
License: Public Domain

Zonay, Supr. J.,
¶ 90. Specially Assigned, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with Parts I and 11(B) of the majority opinion. I also agree with the majority’s conclusion in Part 11(A) that the Towns have not established that the failure to hold a hearing on Condition 15(a) violated their constitutional right to due process. I am, however, unable to join the majority’s *462determination that the Public Service Board’s denial of the hearing to address Condition 15(a) was a proper exercise of its discretion. Rather, I agree with the dissenting opinion of Board member Burke that a hearing was necessary. As such, I would remand the matter for a hearing on Condition 15(a) where the Towns would, at a minimum, be afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the Agency of Natural Resources (ANR) expert relied upon by the Board in issuing its order on August 31, 2011.
¶ 91. In issuing the certificate of public good (CPG) the Board, after hearings, recognized the potentially significant impacts the project could have and expressly conditioned its approval on the compliance of Green Mountain Power (GMP) with the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) it had entered into with ANR. The MOU, among other things, required GMP to secure conservation easements on four identified parcels of land adjoining the project area. When unauthorized work was performed on the parcels, and modifications to Condition 15(a) were necessary, the Board, without hearings, modified the terms it previously found necessary. I cannot agree that the latter action was simply a compliance issue, and believe that the same process, i.e., a hearing, which led to the issuance of Condition 15(a) was necessary to modify the condition.
¶ 92. My view echoes that of Board member Burke, who dissented from the Board’s decision on the basis that a hearing should have been held to allow the Towns an opportunity to cross-examine ANR’s expert as to adequacy of the remediation. He further concluded that the Board’s treatment of the issue as a compliance filing “push[ed] the limits of compliance too far” given that the “original decision has to be modified because of the drastic activities which occurred on the parcels to be conserved.” Notably, his disagreement, and mine, lies with the process followed and does not address the ultimate issue as to whether the remediation efforts were adequate.
¶ 93. As to the actual process employed by the Board, when the unauthorized work was brought to its attention it issued a compliance order. In the order, the Board denied the Towns’ requests to hold a technical hearing subject to discovery and cross-examination and required GMP to remediate and mitigate the impacts of the unauthorized work. Thereafter, following review of GMP’s remediation report, and in response to ANR’s letter, the Board requested that ANR file “a complete explanation from a qualified expert” concerning aspects of the remediation.
*463¶ 94. Significantly, despite the Board’s explicit direction, ANR submitted, and the Board relied upon, a letter from ANR’s counsel summarizing its expert’s position. Although the majority here recognizes that “[njormally, this type of a response would not be acceptable in a contested matter before the Board,” it approves the procedure on the basis that “the Board could consider the information presented in the letter to determine whether more process was due in the form of an evidentiary hearing.” Ante, ¶ 75. Leaving aside the issue of the Board’s acquiescence in ANR’s clear violation of its directive, it cannot be overlooked that the Board did far more than use the information in deciding whether to hold a hearing when it relied on the unsworn representations of ANR’s attorney as to what ANR’s expert believed when it modified the condition at issue.
¶ 95. The Towns’ repeated requests for an opportunity to cross-examine ANR’s expert should have been granted. As to the importance of such an opportunity, it has been recognized that cross-examination is the “greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.” California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quotation omitted). It is not surprising then, that “[i]n almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970).
¶ 96. Although I agree with the majority that the Towns have failed to establish a violation of due process, I cannot escape the conclusion that the underlying reasons for requiring an opportunity for cross-examination where “important decisions turn on questions of fact” applies with such force here that, in denying the Towns such an opportunity, the Board abused its discretion. Nor does it follow, as the majority suggests, that simply because the Board did not credit the views of the Towns’ expert, the views of ANR’s expert were therefore correct. This is precisely why the Towns should have been afforded an opportunity to cross-examine ANR’s expert on his opinions.
¶ 97. In addressing the hearing request, the Board concluded that it was dealing with a post-certification compliance issue that does not require the same level of process as the initial proceedings. The majority concurs in this rationale. This was not, however, a simple case of assuring compliance with a condition; from the time the unauthorized work was identified by GMP, *464there was no question that to address the issue would require modifying a condition the Board had already found, after hearing, to be necessary to address potentially significant impacts.
¶ 98. While I agree with the majority that a post-certification compliance issue does not require the same level of process, the issues addressed by the Board here went well beyond the type of post-certification compliance proceedings generally deemed adequate by this Court. See, e.g., In re UPC Vt. Wind, LLC, 2009 VT 19, ¶ 10, 185 Vt. 296, 969 A.2d 144 (“The Board acted within its discretion in using post-certification proceedings to evaluate UPC’s compliance with the conditions imposed.”); In re Vt. Elec. Power Co., 131 Vt. 427, 434-35, 306 A.2d 687, 692 (1973) (approving process whereby Board gave parties in post-certification proceeding opportunity to comment and convince Board that hearing was necessary for further review as to specific route of transmission lines where Board had already approved general route for proposed line). This was not a case of monitoring compliance with a condition, but rather a case of changing a noncomplying condition.
¶ 99. More than fifty years ago, this Court addressed the issue of an abuse of discretion by the as-then-named Public Service Commission in In re New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 116 Vt. 480, 80 A.2d 671 (1951). There, the Commission made findings for a rate increase based upon estimates because the actual operating expenses were not yet available at the time of the hearings. After the Commission made its findings, the telephone company moved to reopen the hearing in order to submit the actual operating expenses for the last fiscal year, which expenses differed widely from the estimates relied upon. The Commission denied the motion to reopen the hearing, and the phone company appealed. Id. at 508-09, 80 A.2d at 688-89.
¶ 100. In finding the Commission’s denial to be an abuse of discretion, this Court wrote:
Although the allowance of such a motion is discretionary, we think that its disallowance here constituted an abuse of discretion. It would not have taken long to hear the new evidence, and in view of the wide discrepancy between the commission’s estimates and the actual experience, the commission should have gone to the trouble to hear the company’s evidence and the State’s evidence in reply thereto. Had it done so, it could have determined *465just what the lawful expenses actually were, and have based its findings upon facts rather than estimates.
Id. at 515, 80 A.2d at 692.
¶ 101. The majority, in my view, fails to follow the holding in New England Telephone. Now, just as more than a half-century ago, it would not have taken long for the Board to allow the Towns an opportunity to cross-examine ANR’s expert. Given the significance of the condition being changed, the Board plainly should have gone to the trouble of allowing the Towns to cross-examine ANR’s expert. This is especially true where the condition was originally implemented through such a process, and later changed based on unsworn statements by a party’s attorney as to what the expert would say.
¶ 102. Finally, I do not agree with the majority that requiring a hearing in this case would have the effect of requiring a full-blown technical hearing every time there is a post-certification claim that a condition has not been complied with. Ante, ¶ 80. Rather, the specific facts at issue, including the critical nature of Condition 15(a) concerning possible “undue impact,” the unauthorized work done that affected this condition, and the evidentiary basis for the Board’s finding make the decision here a case-specific one requiring more process than was provided.
¶ 103. I am authorized to state that Judge Eaton joins this dissent.