Court Opinion

ID: 9577172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:32:21.668907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:04.189123
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially and in the judgment.
I concur specially and in the judgment because I agree that Con*773stance Humfleet’s telephonic demand for payment of benefits was premature because it was asserted before Primerica had proof of the insured’s death, i.e., a condition for payment under the policy. I do not agree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that the demand “must be sufficient to alert the insurer that bad faith is being asserted.” Georgia law has never required such specificity, Hanover Ins. Co. v. Hallford, 127 Ga. App. 322, 323 (1a) (193 SE2d 235). And contrary to the majority’s reliance, Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 114 Ga. App. 439, 446 (8), 447 (151 SE2d 780), does not provide otherwise. In fact, even though the insured in Clark said nothing about statutory damages when he requested payment under a fire insurance policy, this Court held that the insured’s verbal threat of court action against his insurance carrier was sufficient to invoke the 60-day period prescribed by OCGA § 33-4-6.
Decided July 10, 1995.
Drew, Eckl & Farnham, Maureen M. Middleton, Theodore Freeman, for appellant.
Calvin A. Rouse, for appellee.