Court Opinion

ID: 9555934
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 18:02:14.500646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:36:54.793007
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                      FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

    IN RE:

     ANDRENA DIANE CROCKETT
        DEBTOR/APPELLANT
                                        Civ. Action No. 20-2545
                                        (EGS)
    ANDRENA DIANE CROCKETT,             Bankr. Case No. 19-101
                                        (Chapter 13)
             Debtor/Appellant,
                                        Adversary Proceeding No.
    v.                                  19-10030
                                        (Bankr. Court)
    NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC
    D/B/A MR. COOPER,

             Creditor/Appellee.

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

         Andrena Diane Crockett (“Ms. Crockett”) appeals the

Bankruptcy Court’s Memorandum Decision and Order re Motion

To Dismiss; Judgment Dismissing Adversary Proceeding; Order

Dismissing Two Miscellaneous Motions as Moot; 1 and Memorandum

Decision and Order Denying Motion to Reconsider Judgment

Dismissing Adversary Proceeding. See Transmittal of Record on

Appeal (“A.R.”), ECF No. 2 at 8-40 (Memorandum Decision and

Order re Motion to Dismiss), 41-42 (Judgment Dismissing

1 The Court may consider the Order Dismissing Two Miscellaneous
Motions as Moot even though it was not transmitted as part of
the Record on Appeal. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8009(e)(2).
                                    1
Adversary Proceeding), 43-50 (Memorandum Decision and Order

Denying Motion to Reconsider Judgment Dismissing Adversary

Proceeding); Order Dismissing Two Miscellaneous Motions as Moot,

Crockett v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC d/b/a Mr. Cooper (In re

Crockett), No. 19-ap-10030 (Bankr. D.D.C.), ECF No. 27. 2 Upon

consideration of the briefing, the applicable law, and the

entire record, this Court AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s

Memorandum Decision and Order re Motion to Dismiss; AFFIRMS the

Bankruptcy Court’s Judgment Dismissing Adversary Proceeding;

AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s Order Dismissing Two

Miscellaneous Motions as Moot; and AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy

Court’s Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion to

Reconsider Judgment Dismissing Adversary Proceeding.

I. Background

     The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the factual

background of this case, as set forth in its July 20, 2023

Memorandum Opinion. See In re Crockett, No. BR 19-101, 2023 WL

4637000, at *1-2 (D.D.C. July 20, 2023). The Court therefore

reviews only the relevant procedural history here.

     Ms. Crockett filed the Complaint in this Adversary

Proceeding on November 15, 2019. See Crockett, No. 19-ap-10030

2 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the
Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the
filed document.
                                2
(Bankr. D.D.C.), ECF No. 1. On December 26, 2019, Nationstar

filed its Motion to Dismiss all ten claims raised in the

Complaint. See id., ECF No. 4. The Bankruptcy Court for the

District of Columbia (“Bankruptcy Court”) granted Nationstar’s

motion in its Memorandum Decision and Order re Motion to Dismiss

on January 27, 2020. See A.R., ECF No. 2 at 8-40 (Memorandum

Decision and Order re Motion to Dismiss).

     In that ruling, the Bankruptcy Court granted Ms. Crockett

“leave to file an amended complaint regarding [her] claims under

RESPA and its regulations (other than her claim based on 12

C.F.R. § 1024.38) within 21 days of the entry of this Memorandum

Decision and Order.” Id. at 39-40. Ms. Crockett did not file an

amended complaint. See generally Docket for Bankr. Action No.

19-10030. As a result, the Bankruptcy Court entered its Judgment

Dismissing Adversary Proceeding on March 16, 2020. See A.R., ECF

No. 2 at 41-42 (Judgment Dismissing Adversary Proceeding).

     Ms. Crockett then moved for relief from the Judgment

Dismissing Adversary Proceeding. See Crockett, No. 19-ap-10030

(Bankr. D.D.C.), ECF No. 26. On August 27, 2020, the Bankruptcy

Court denied her motion. See A.R., ECF No. 2 at 43-50

(Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion to Reconsider

Judgment Dismissing Adversary Proceeding).

                                3
     Ms. Crockett filed a Notice of Appeal on September 8, 2020.

See Crockett, No. 19-ap-10030 (Bankr. D.D.C.), ECF No. 34. This

appeal is ripe for review.

II. Standard of Review

     A. Appeals of Decisions by the Bankruptcy Court

     This Court has jurisdiction over appeals of decisions by

the Bankruptcy Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (conferring

jurisdiction on federal district courts “to hear appeals ...

from final judgments, orders, and decrees” of bankruptcy

courts). On appeal from a bankruptcy court, a district court

“may affirm, modify, or reverse a bankruptcy judge’s judgment,

order, or decree or remand with instructions for further

proceedings.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013.

     A district court reviews a bankruptcy court’s findings of

fact only for indication that they are clearly erroneous. Id.;

see also In re Johnson, 236 B.R. 510, 518 (D.D.C. 1999). “A

finding [of fact] is clearly erroneous when, although there is

evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a

mistake has been committed.” In re Johnson, 236 B.R. at 518

(quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395

(1948)). A bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions, however, are

reviewed de novo. See In re WPG, Inc., 282 B.R. 66, 68 (D.D.C.

2002) (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405

                                4
(1990)). The party seeking to reverse the bankruptcy court’s

ruling bears the burden of proof and may not prevail by showing

“simply that another conclusion could have been reached.” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, a district court

reviews a bankruptcy court’s exercise of discretion under an

abuse of discretion standard. See In re Douglas, 477 B.R. 274,

275 (D.D.C. 2012) (collecting cases).

     B. Pro Se Litigants

     “[P]ro se litigants are not held to the same standards in

all respects as are lawyers.” Roosevelt Land, LP v. Childress,

No. CIV.A. 05-1292(RWR), 2006 WL 1877014, at *2 (D.D.C. July 5,

2006) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). The

pleadings of pro se parties therefore “[are] to be liberally

construed.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per

curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Even

so, “[t]his benefit is not . . . a license to ignore the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.” Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 658

F. Supp. 2d 135, 137 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Jarrell v. Tisch, 656

F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987)). Pro se litigants must comply

with federal and local rules. See Jarrell, 656 F. Supp. at 239;

Roosevelt Land, 2006 WL 1877014, at *2.

                                5
III. Analysis

     A. The Court Will Not Dismiss This Appeal Despite Ms.
        Crockett’s Failure to Timely File and Serve Required
        Documents

     Nationstar contends that the Court may dismiss this appeal

for two reasons: (1) Ms. Crockett’s failure to timely file her

opening brief; and (2) Ms. Crockett’s failure to timely file or

serve her Rule 8009 Designation of Record or Statement of Issues

on Appeal. See Appellee’s Br., ECF No. 11 at 6. For the reasons

that follow, the Court will entertain this appeal.

       1. The Court Declines to Dismiss This Appeal Despite Ms.
          Crockett’s Failure to Timely File Her Appellant Brief

     Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8018(a)(4) states that

“the district court . . . , after notice, may dismiss the appeal

on its own motion” when “an appellant fails to file a brief on

time or within an extended time authorized by the district

court.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8018(a)(4). The Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) has declined

“to impose on district courts any hard-and-fast rule” to govern

summary dismissals of bankruptcy appeals. Eng.-Speaking Union v.

Johnson, 353 F.3d 1013, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Instead, it has

expressed a “preference for an adjudication on the merits and a

corresponding disfavor for resolving litigation by default.”

Canady v. Erbe Elektromedizin GmbH, 307 F. Supp. 2d 2, 9 (D.D.C.

2004). District courts therefore should “consider[] the

                                6
circumstances before them and explain[] why it is in the

interest of justice to dismiss rather than to proceed to the

merits.” Eng.-Speaking Union, 353 F.3d at 1022.

     Here, Ms. Crockett filed her Notice of Appeal on September

8, 2020, and the Clerk of this Court entered it on September 9,

2020. See Transmittal of Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 1. The Clerk

of the Bankruptcy Court transmitted the Record on Appeal on

November 30, 2020. See A.R., ECF No. 2. This Court granted Ms.

Crockett’s motion for an extension of time to file and ordered

that she submit her appellant brief by January 27, 2021. See

Minute Order (Jan. 25, 2021). The docket does not show that any

brief was filed on or before January 27, 2021. See generally

Docket for Civ. Action No. 20-2545. In fact, the appellant brief

first appears on the docket for this case on July 19, 2021 as an

addendum to Ms. Crockett’s motion for an extension of time to

file her reply brief. See Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at 7-35.

     Nationstar noted the absence of Ms. Crockett’s appellant

brief in its opposition, stating that she sent its counsel an

email with her brief as an attachment. See Appellee’s Br., ECF

No. 11 at 4 n.1, 6. 3 In response, Ms. Crockett requested a 30-day

extension to file her reply brief in order “to research the

missing filing and correct and update the [U.S.] District Court

3 Nationstar does not identify the date on which she sent that
email. See Appellee’s Br., ECF No. 11 at 6.
                                7
docket.” Consent Mot., ECF No. 12 at 2. 4 She explains that the

“docket does not reflect the filing of [her] Appellant brief on

January 14, 2021.” Id. Later, in her reply brief, Ms. Crockett

claims that she corrected the record on July 18, 2021 by hand-

delivering a copy of “[a] timely electronic filing dated January

14, 2021” and depositing the copy in the Court’s after-hours

box. Appellant’s Reply, ECF No. 14-1 at 7. She also supplies a

copy of the email she purportedly sent to the Court with her

appellant brief attached. See Ex. A, ECF No. 12 at 5 (January

14, 2021 email from Ms. Crockett to the Court).

     Despite these arguments, the Court still does not have any

record of an electronic filing on January 14, 2021, see

generally Docket for Civ. Action No. 20-2545; and does not

possess a physical copy of Ms. Crockett’s appellant brief.

According to federal rules, then, this appeal is subject to

dismissal. See Fed. R. Bankr. Proc. 8018(a)(4).

     Nevertheless, the circumstances in this case and the

interest of justice counsel against dismissal. Most

significantly, there is little risk of prejudice to Nationstar.

Nationstar received Ms. Crockett’s appellant brief at some time

4 Ms. Crockett also explains that she needed additional time to
file her reply brief because “she needed to be out of town” and
“also had to be focused on other personal obligations requiring
immediate attention” “[d]ue to the COVID-19 pandemic” and
related restrictions. See Consent Mot., ECF No. 12 at 2.
                                8
before filing its brief in opposition. See Appellee’s Br., ECF

No. 11 at 4 n.1. Indeed, Nationstar’s appellee brief clearly

responds to the points Ms. Crockett raises in her appellant

brief. See id. at 6 n.4 (“All references herein to Appellant’s

Brief are to the unfiled brief that was emailed to undersigned

counsel.”). Moreover, continuing to the merits serves important

public policy interests, including the public interest favoring

disposition of cases on their merits, the public interest

favoring prompt resolution of cases, and the public interest in

conservation of judicial resources. See In re Fletcher Int’l,

Ltd., 536 B.R. 551, 558-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d sub nom. In

the Matter of: Fletcher Int’l, Ltd., 661 F. App’x 124 (2d Cir.

2016). Accordingly, the Court will consider Ms. Crockett’s

appeal despite her failure to properly file her appellant brief.

       2. The Court Declines to Dismiss This Appeal Despite Ms.
          Crockett’s Failure to File and Serve a Designation of
          Record and Statement of Issues on Appeal

     Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8009 states that an

“appellant must file with the bankruptcy clerk and serve on the

appellee a designation of the items to be included in the record

on appeal and a statement of the issues to be presented” “within

14 days after[] the appellant’s notice of appeal as of right

becomes effective.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8009(a)(1). Local Rules

provide that the Court, “after notice and reasonable opportunity

to respond, may dismiss the appeal on its own motion” in cases

                                9
where “an appellant fails timely to designate items to be

included in the record on appeal or to file a statement of the

issues to be presented.” LCvR 8009–1.

     There is no dispute that Ms. Crockett failed to timely file

and serve a designation of record and statement of issues on

appeal. 5 See A.R., ECF No. 2 at 2 (Clerk of Bankruptcy Court

stating that “[t]he appellant failed to file a designation of

the record and a statement of issues on appeal”); see also

Consent Mot., ECF No. 12 (not addressing issue); Appellant’s

Br., ECF No. 12 (same); Appellee’s Br., ECF No. 11 (“As of the

filing of this Appellee Brief, Appellant has still not filed, or

served, her Rule 8009 Designation of Record or Statement of

Issues on Appeal.”); Appellant’s Reply, ECF No. 14-1 (not

addressing issue). The appeal is therefore subject to dismissal

on this ground. See LCvR 8009–1.

     The D.C. Circuit has not directly addressed this issue.

Accordingly, the Court assesses the appropriateness of dismissal

on this ground using the same standard the D.C. Circuit has

imposed for assessing whether dismissal is appropriate for

failure to timely file an appellant brief. See supra; Eng.-

5 Ms. Crockett filed a Notice of Filing of Appellant’s Statement
of Issue and Designation of Record on Appeal with this Court on
January 6, 2021. See ECF No. 8. However, she never filed this
document with the Bankruptcy Court as required by Rule 8009. See
generally Docket for Bankr. Action No. 19-10030.
                                10
Speaking Union, 353 F.3d at 1022. Based on that standard, the

Court concludes that dismissal is not warranted here. It appears

unlikely that any party will be prejudiced if the Court hears

this appeal. The Clerk of the Bankruptcy Court transmitted to

this Court portions of the record, see A.R., ECF No. 2 at 2

(citing Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8009(a)(4)); and the Court may refer

to other documents from the Bankruptcy Court as needed, see Fed.

R. Bankr. P. 8009(e)(2). The parties have completed briefing

without raising any problems with the existing Record on Appeal.

See generally Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12; Appellee’s Br., ECF

No. 11; Appellant’s Reply, ECF No. 14-1. Further, as above,

entertaining this appeal despite Ms. Crockett’s failure to file

serves important public policy goals. The Court therefore

declines to dismiss this appeal for failure to timely file and

serve a designation of record and statement of issues on appeal.

     B. The Bankruptcy Court Correctly Dismissed the Adversary
        Proceeding After Ms. Crockett Failed to File an Amended
        Complaint

     Ms. Crockett argues that the Bankruptcy Court “made an

err[or] of discretion” when it dismissed the Adversary

Proceeding. Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at 16. She acknowledges

that the Bankruptcy Court dismissed the case only after she

failed to timely file an amended complaint or file an extension

of time to do so according to that court’s prior order. Id. She

states that she did not receive the Bankruptcy Court’s

                               11
Memorandum Decision and Order re Motion to Dismiss on time

because: (1) the electronic copy “went into junk mail”; and (2)

a family member “misplaced [the physical copy mailed to her

address] in another location unbeknown to [her].” Id. at 17. She

also mentions the COVID-19 pandemic but does not explain how the

pandemic or related circumstances affected her ability to file.

See id. Nationstar does not address this issue in its opposition

briefing. See generally Appellee’s Br., ECF No. 11. 6

     Rule 58 provides that “[e]very judgment and amended

judgment must be set out in a separate document.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 58(a); see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7058 (incorporating Rule 58

in adversary proceedings in bankruptcy court). Here, in its

Memorandum Decision and Order re Motion to Dismiss, the

Bankruptcy Court “ordered that Claims II and X of the Complaint

are dismissed with [Ms.] Crockett granted leave to file an

amended complaint regarding [her] claims under RESPA and its

regulations (other than her claim based on 12 C.F.R. § 1024.38)

within 21 days of the entry of this Memorandum Decision and

Order.” A.R., ECF No. 2 at 39-40 (Memorandum Decision and Order

re Motion to Dismiss) (capitalization omitted). Ms. Crockett did

not file an amended complaint or request an extension of time

6 Nationstar instead addresses the Bankruptcy Court’s Memorandum
Decision and Order Denying Motion to Reconsider Judgment
Dismissing Adversary Proceeding. See Appellee’s Br., ECF No. 11
at 11-12.
                                12
within 21 days of that decision. See generally Docket for Bankr.

Action No. 19-10030. As a result, the Bankruptcy Court issued

the Judgment Dismissing Adversary Proceeding, “order[ing] that

this adversary proceeding is dismissed on the merits.” A.R., ECF

No. 2 at 41 (Judgment Dismissing Adversary Proceeding). Stated

differently, the Bankruptcy Court set forth its judgment

dismissing the Complaint, including the claims for which it had

previously granted Ms. Crockett leave to amend. See id.

     Ms. Crockett does not cite any legal authority to explain

why the Bankruptcy Court should have ignored its prior order and

the rules by which it is bound. In fact, her arguments suggest

that she should have taken certain steps—such as checking her

email junk folder, adding the court’s email address to her

contact list, and communicating about court mail with family

present at her designated address—to ensure that she received

communications from the court. And even so, there is no evidence

that Ms. Crockett would have ever filed an amended complaint.

See generally Docket for Bankr. Action No. 19-10030 (no entry

indicating that she attempted to file or was prepared to file an

amended complaint).

     The Bankruptcy Court dismissed the Complaint, and Ms.

Crockett failed to file an amended complaint for Claims II and X

per court order. Because the entry of judgment is required by

Rule 58, the Bankruptcy Court did not err or abuse its

                               13
discretion in entering its Judgment Dismissing Adversary

Proceeding.

     C. The Bankruptcy Court Correctly Dismissed Claim I

     Ms. Crockett contends that the Bankruptcy Court “made a

clear err[or] of law,” arguing that Nationstar violated the

automatic stay by participating in a status hearing at the

Superior Court of the District of Columbia (“D.C. Superior

Court”) without informing that court of her second bankruptcy

petition. 7 See Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at 17-22. She alleges

that a paralegal from the law firm representing Nationstar in

the D.C. Superior Court emailed her on May 28, 2019 with a

request to cancel the May 31, 2019 status hearing “due to the

bankruptcy filing.” Id. at 18. She contends that she “relied on

the email and assumed the hearing would be cancelled.” Id. She

further alleges that the attorney in that case was aware of her

second bankruptcy petition but failed to inform the D.C.

Superior Court at the May 31, 2019 status hearing. See id. As a

result, she continues: she did not attend the hearing; the D.C.

Superior Court “lifted the [s]tay” at the hearing; the Court of

Appeals for the District of Columbia (“D.C. Court of Appeals”)

7 Ms. Crockett also argues that Nationstar violated the automatic
stay by making collections calls. See Appellant’s Br., ECF No.
12 at 20-21. Because she did not raise this claim in her
Complaint, see Crockett, No. 19-ap-10030 (Bankr. D.D.C.), ECF
No. 1 ¶ 24 ; the Court will not address this argument here.
                                14
affirmed the D.C. Superior Court’s Decree of Sale; and she

experienced “stress as a result of the foreclosure moving

forward.” Id. at 18-19. She alleges that Nationstar’s actions

“amount[] to fraudulently omitting that fact [of the second

bankruptcy petition] for the purpose of lifting the stay and

financial enrichment.” Id. at 18.

     Nationstar does not dispute Ms. Crockett’s factual

allegations. See Appellee’s Br., ECF No. 11 at 9. Instead,

Nationstar contends that these allegations “would not change the

Bankruptcy Court’s [a]nalysis in [d]ismissing the Claim”—

specifically, that “Nationstar took no action to resume the

civil litigation, so there was no violation of the automatic

stay.” Id. Nationstar further asserts that Ms. Crockett has not

met her burden to show that the Bankruptcy Court committed an

error of law or abused its discretion in dismissing Claim I,

arguing that the decision to lift the automatic stay “‘is within

the discretion of the bankruptcy judge and . . . may be

overturned on appeal only for abuse of discretion.’” Id. at 10

(emphasis omitted) (quoting In re Robbins, 964 F.2d 342, 345

(4th Cir. 1992)) (citing In re Ramarkan, 315 B.R. 361, 363-64

(D. Md. 2004)).

     As a preliminary matter, the Court clarifies that Ms.

Crockett appeals the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of Claim I,

                               15
not its decision to lift the automatic stay. 8 See Appellant’s

Br., ECF No. 12 at 17-22. As such, the Court reviews the

Bankruptcy Court’s factual findings for clear error and legal

conclusions de novo. See In re Johnson, 236 B.R. at 518; In re

WPG, Inc., 282 B.R. at 68. Applying these standards, the Court

concludes that Nationstar did not violate the automatic stay

through its participation in the May 31, 2019 status hearing at

the D.C. Superior Court.

     Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code “is one of the

fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws,

designed to relieve the financial pressures that drove [the]

debtors into bankruptcy” by “afford[ing] [the] debtors a

breathing spell from the collection process and enabl[ing] them

to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan to satisfy

existing debt.” E. Refractories Co. v. Forty Eight Insulations

Inc., 157 F.3d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1998) (alterations, citations,

and quotation marks omitted). Pursuant to this provision, the

filing of a bankruptcy petition triggers an automatic stay,

“applicable to all entities, of” most actions against the debtor

and the property of the debtor and bankruptcy estate, including

the continuation of judicial foreclosure actions against the

8 Additionally, there is no indication in the record that the
Bankruptcy Court ever lifted the automatic stay. Cf. A.R., ECF
No. 2 at 13 (D.C. Superior Court determined that the automatic
stay was lifted because Bankr. Action No. 19-00019 was closed).
                                16
debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a); In re McGuirl, 349 B.R. 759, 760–61

(D.D.C. 2006) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362). Still, “[t]he automatic

stay is not permanent.” In re McGuirl, 349 B.R. at 760–61. It

continues until: (1) the property is no longer property of the

estate, if the action is against property of the estate; or (2)

the time that the case is closed, the case is dismissed, or a

discharge is granted or dismissed. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c). “The acts

prohibited by the stay do not include[] . . . a status hearing

in such proceeding to ascertain if the automatic stay still

applies.” Steah v. Shinn, No. CV2101265PHXJATJZB, 2023 WL

2330714, at *1 (D. Ariz. Mar. 2, 2023) (citing In re Miller, 262

B.R. 499, 503 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001); In re Perryman, 631 B.R.

899, 903 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2021)).

     Here, the D.C. Superior Court held a status hearing on May

31, 2019. See Crockett, No. 19-ap-10030 (Bankr. D.D.C.), ECF No.

1 ¶ 24. The record does not include an audio recording or

transcript of the hearing. However, following that hearing, the

D.C. Superior Court entered on the docket: “Bankruptcy case [No.

19-00019] was closed as of 05/24/2019. Bankruptcy stay is

lifted. Status Hearing continued to 08/02/2019 at 10:00 AM.” See

A.R., ECF No. 2 at 13 (Memorandum Decision and Order re Motion

to Dismiss). There is no indication that the D.C. Superior Court

took any other action during or as a result of this hearing.

Based on this evidence from the record, this Court agrees with

                               17
the Bankruptcy Court that the status hearing “served

informational purposes” and did not “entail a resumption of the

litigation.” Id. at 15. Nationstar therefore did not violate the

automatic stay by attending the status hearing.

     The Court also concludes that Nationstar did not violate

the automatic stay by failing to inform the D.C. Superior Court

of the automatic stay imposed by Bankr. Action No. 19-00101.

Local Bankruptcy Rule 2072-1 states: “The Debtor, petitioning

creditor(s), or other party filing a bankruptcy case must

promptly send notice of the bankruptcy filing to the following

persons: (1) the clerk of any court where the debtor is a party

to a pending civil action and all parties of record; [and] (2)

chambers of any judge specially assigned to a pending civil

action in which the debtor is a party.” Local Bankr. R. 2072-1.

Ms. Crockett states no legal authority to support her position

that Nationstar—a non-petitioning creditor—had a duty to notify

the D.C. Superior Court of her Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition,

see generally Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at 17-22; and the

Court knows no such authority. 9 Accordingly, this Court concludes

9 Ms. Crockett’s argument is particularly confusing because her
attorney was present at the May 31, 2019 status hearing and did
not inform the D.C. Superior Court at that time of the automatic
stay imposed by Bankr. Action No. 19-00101. See Crockett, No.
19-ap-10030 (Bankr. D.D.C.), ECF No. 1 ¶ 24.
                                18
that Nationstar did not violate the automatic stay and AFFIRMS

the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of Claim I.

     D. The Court Affirms the Dismissal of Ms. Crockett’s
        Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Unjust Enrichment
        Claims

     Ms. Crockett next asserts that the Bankruptcy Court “made

an error of law” by dismissing Claims II, III, V, and VI. 10

Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at 23. This Court addresses each

claim and, for the reasons that follow, AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy

Court’s decision to dismiss these four claims.

       1. The Court Affirms the Dismissal of Claim II

     Ms. Crockett contends that: the Proof of Claim contains

inaccuracies; Nationstar “knew the documents were misleading”;

and Nationstar “meant to deceive for their enrichment taking

[her] property equity.” Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at 25. She

also acknowledges that, at the time of her submission, this

Court was reviewing her appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s rulings

with respect to her Objection to the Proof of Claim. Id.

Nationstar asks this Court to affirm the Bankruptcy Court’s

dismissal because Ms. Crockett has not identified any particular

10Ms. Crockett also argues that Nationstar violated various
consumer laws. See id. at 23-28. Because she did not make these
allegations in the Complaint, see generally Crockett, No. 19-ap-
10030 (Bankr. D.D.C.), ECF No. 1; the Court will not address
those arguments here.
                                19
error(s) of law made by the Bankruptcy Court. Appellee’s Br.,

ECF No. 11 at 12.

     This Court AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of Ms.

Crockett’s claim regarding Nationstar’s Proof of Claim. In the

related case, the Court explained that “Ms. Crockett had not

produced sufficient evidence to meet her burden of proof to show

an error in the Proof of Claim.” In re Crockett, 2023 WL

4637000, at *3. The Court has no occasion to disturb that ruling

here since: her arguments are confusing and conclusory; and she

has not identified any errors in the Bankruptcy Court’s rulings.

See generally Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at 25 (failing to

discuss evidence of inaccuracies in the Proof of Claim or

alleged errors in the Bankruptcy Court’s decision); Appellant’s

Reply, ECF No. 14-1 at 14 (raising arguments similar to those

she raised in the appeal in the related case).

     Ms. Crockett makes other allegations in Claim II. See

Crockett, No. 19-ap-10030 (Bankr. D.D.C.), ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 29-41.

However, her briefing here does not clearly or specifically

address Nationstar’s alleged violations of 12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)

or of 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.32, 1024.34, 1024.35, and 1024.38. See

generally Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at 23-28; cf. Appellant’s

Reply, ECF No. 14-1 at 11 (arguing in a conclusory fashion that

three exhibits consisting of QWRs “clearly state[] the required

information” without any further explanation). Finding no error

                               20
with the Bankruptcy Court’s analysis as to these other alleged

violations, this Court therefore AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s

dismissal of Claim II.

       2. The Court Affirms the Dismissal of Claim III

     Ms. Crockett asserts that the Bankruptcy Court “made an

error of law” by dismissing Claim III, but her briefing does not

address the allegations in Claim III or identify any errors in

the Bankruptcy Court’s decision. Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at

23-28. Consequently, this Court AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s

dismissal of Claim III.

       3. The Court Affirms the Dismissal of Claim V

     Ms. Crockett also contends that the Bankruptcy Court

dismissed Claim V in error. See Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at

23-28. Her briefing in this appeal restates the allegations she

makes in the Complaint. Compare id., with Crockett, No. 19-ap-

10030 (Bankr. D.D.C.), ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 55-69. Specifically, she

argues that: Nationstar has made statements and omissions that

it knowingly or reasonably believed to be “untrue or misleading,

amount[ing] to fraud or deceit”; Nationstar did not have the

authority to exercise the power of sale when the D.C. Superior

Court issued the Decree of Sale; and Nationstar submitted

inaccurate documentation, including in the Proof of Claim. See

Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at 23-28. She cites various legal

authority, such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and

                               21
unrelated caselaw, but does not explain the relevance to this

appeal. See id.

     In its opposition briefing, Nationstar argues that Ms.

Crockett has not specified any errors of law in the Bankruptcy

Court’s decision, which dismissed Claim V for failure to plead

all necessary elements of a fraud claim. See Appellee’s Br., ECF

No. 11 at 14-15. The Court agrees with this assessment. Ms.

Crockett has not identified any errors in the Bankruptcy Court’s

analysis of Claim V. See Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at 23-28.

She has also failed to cure the pleading defects discussed by

the Bankruptcy Court. Compare id., with A.R., ECF No. 2 at 28-30

(Memorandum Decision and Order re Motion to Dismiss).

Accordingly, this Court AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal

of Claim V.

       4. The Court Affirms the Dismissal of Claim VI

     Ms. Crockett argues that the Bankruptcy Court “made an

error of law” in dismissing Claim VI, stating that “Nationstar

broke consumer trust by engaging in unfair and deceptive

practices prohibited by the Consumer Financial Protection Act of

2010, as well as violations of the Real Estate Settlement

Procedures Act and the Homeowner’s Protection Act.” Appellant’s

Br., ECF No. 12 at 23, 27. She also mentions a class action

settlement against Nationstar by the Consumer Financial

Protection Bureau but does not explain that settlement’s

                               22
connection to her Complaint. See id. at 28; see also Crockett,

No. 19-ap-10030 (Bankr. D.D.C.), ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 70-75.

     Nationstar again points out that Ms. Crockett has failed to

specify any error of law in the Bankruptcy Court’s Memorandum

Decision and Order re Motion to Dismiss. See Appellee’s Br., ECF

No. 11 at 15-16. The Court agrees. Ms. Crockett’s briefing makes

only a brief and conclusory argument as to her unjust enrichment

claim and makes no reference to the Bankruptcy Court’s decision.

See Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at 23-28.

     Ms. Crockett also contends that the Bankruptcy Court “made

an error of discretion when dismissing . . . Claim VI without

understanding Nationstar[’s] accounting or requiring them to

explain their accounting records leading to unjust enrichment.”

Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at 33 (citing Chen v. Bell-Smith,

768 F. Supp. 2d 121, 151 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Griffith v.

Barnes, 560 F. Supp. 2d 29, 34 (D.D.C. 2008))). She states that

there is an unexplained increase of $45,000 in the principal

balance in the Proof of Claim and asserts that the Bankruptcy

Court abused its discretion by not requiring Nationstar to

explain its documents in a hearing. See id. Nationstar does not

address this argument in its opposition briefing. See generally

Appellee’s Br., ECF No. 11 at 15-16.

                               23
     The Court previously decided this issue in the related

case. See In re Crockett, 2023 WL 4637000, at *4-5. Accordingly,

this Court AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of Claim VI.

     E. The Court Affirms the Dismissal of Claims IV and X

     Ms. Crockett next asserts that the Bankruptcy Court “made

an error of law” in dismissing Claims IV and X. Appellant’s Br.,

ECF No. 12 at 28.

     As to Claim IV, she argues that “[l]ack of standing has

been alleged and unsettled in both [the D.C.] Superior Court and

the Bankruptcy Court.” Id. She then recounts the history of the

judicial foreclosure proceedings in the D.C. Superior Court,

focusing on Nationstar and MTGLQ’s actions. See id. at 28-29. As

Nationstar points out in its opposition briefing, see Appellee’s

Br., ECF No. 11 at 13-14; Ms. Crockett neither explains how

Nationstar lacked standing nor specifies any errors of law

committed by the Bankruptcy Court, see Appellant’s Br., ECF No.

12 at 28-31. This Court therefore AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s

dismissal of Claim IV.

     Ms. Crockett also argues that she suffered damages because

she had to file for bankruptcy to preserve her primary

residence. Id. at 29. She states that this filing affected her

credit and asserts that Nationstar’s actions are

“unconscionable.” Id. She cites various federal and local

statutes but does not explain how those authorities pertain to

                               24
her arguments on appeal. Id. at 29-31, 34. The Court agrees with

Nationstar that Ms. Crockett has failed to specify any errors of

law in the Memorandum Decision and Order re Motion to Dismiss.

See Appellee’s Br., ECF No. 11 at 20. Further, her arguments

here—like her allegations in the Complaint—are conclusory, so

this Court AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s decision to dismiss

Claim X.

     F. The Court Affirms the Dismissal of Claim VII

     Ms. Crockett contends that the Bankruptcy Court “made an

error of law” by dismissing Claim VII. Appellant’s Br., ECF No.

12 at 33. She states that she “intended to bring this claim

under D.C. Code § 28-3904(r)” but does not explain if or how she

has pleaded the necessary elements of a claim under that

statute. Id. (citing D.C. Code § 28-3904(r); Johnson v. Long

Beach Mortg. Loan Tr. 2001-4, 451 F. Supp. 2d 16, 37 (D.D.C.

2006) (quoting D.C. Code § 28-3904(r))). She argues that “any

reasonable person would deem Nationstar[’s] behavior

unconscionable at best and criminal at . . . worst” and that the

Bankruptcy Court “ignor[ed] and minimiz[ed]” Nationstar’s

actions in its ruling. Id. at 33-34.

     Nationstar argues that Ms. Crockett has not specified any

error of law made by the Bankruptcy Court. Appellee’s Br., ECF

No. 11 at 17. This Court agrees that she has not responded to

the Bankruptcy Court’s decision. In the Memorandum Decision and

                               25
Order re Motion to Dismiss, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed Claim

VII for two reasons. See A.R., ECF No. 2 at 31-32 (Memorandum

Decision and Order re Motion to Dismiss). First, that court

determined that Ms. Crockett’s allegations were “all conclusory

allegations that do not pass muster under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id. at

31. Second, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that Claim VII “is

insufficient as a matter of law” because “[c]ourts in this

jurisdiction have found that the crediting and accounting of

mortgage payments and the initiation of foreclosure proceedings

do not rise to the extreme or outrageous level necessary to

support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress.” Id. at 32 (citing Ihebereme v. Capital One, N.A., 730

F. Supp. 2d 40, 55 (D.D.C. 2012); Avila v. CitiMortgage, Inc.,

45 F. Supp. 3d 110, 121 (D.D.C. 2014)). This Court agrees with

the Bankruptcy Court’s analysis and conclusion and therefore

AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal of Claim VII.

     G. The Court Affirms the Dismissal of Claims VIII and IX

     Ms. Crockett argues that the Bankruptcy Court “made an

error of discretion” by dismissing Claims VIII, IX, and XI. 11

11Ms. Crockett does not allege a Claim XI in her Complaint. See
generally Crockett, No. 19-ap-10030 (Bankr. D.D.C.), ECF No. 1.
The Court assumes that she is referring to Section XI of the
Bankruptcy Court’s Memorandum Decision and Order re Motion to
Dismiss, in which that court discusses her request for punitive
damages. See A.R., ECF No. 2 at 38 (Memorandum Decision and
Order re Motion to Dismiss).
                                26
Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at 34. She recites part of 15 U.S.C.

§ 1692 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, but she does not explain the

alleged “error of discretion.” See id.

     Ms. Crockett also contends that the Bankruptcy Court “made

an error of law” by dismissing Claims IX and XI. 12 Appellant’s

Br., ECF No. 12 at 31. She claims that Nationstar violated the

Fair Debt Collection Act because it “knowingly forged documents,

kept inaccurate accounting records, and falsified testimony or

omitted material facts.” Id. at 32. She also alleges that

Nationstar engaged in predatory loan practices in violation of

local law. See id. Finally, she discusses various federal

programs pertaining to residential mortgages and states that she

was not offered relief pursuant to any of these programs. See

id. at 32-33.

     The Court agrees with Nationstar that Ms. Crockett has

failed to specify any error of law or abuse of discretion made

by the Bankruptcy Court. See Appellee’s Br., ECF No. 11 at 17-

21. Moreover, rather than discuss the allegations in the

Complaint, she raises new allegations with respect to Claims

VIII and IX. Compare Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 12 at 31-34, with

Crockett, No. 19-ap-10030 (Bankr. D.D.C.), ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 85-89.

12Again, the Court will not address Claim XI, as she did not
allege a Claim XI in the Complaint. See supra.
                                27
Accordingly, this Court AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s dismissal

of these claims.

IV.   Conclusion

      For the foregoing reasons, this Court AFFIRMS the

Bankruptcy Court’s Memorandum Decision and Order re Motion to

Dismiss; AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s Judgment Dismissing

Adversary Proceeding; AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s Order

Dismissing Two Miscellaneous Motions as Moot; and AFFIRMS the

Bankruptcy Court’s Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion

to Reconsider Judgment Dismissing Adversary Proceeding. An

appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

      SO ORDERED.

Signed:    Emmet G. Sullivan
           United States District Judge
           August 15, 2023

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