Court Opinion

ID: 9530454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:59:57.613501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:07.247161
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent as to Part I.
It appears that were it not for the specific wording of 1.0. § 11-13-3-4(g) the general provision of I.C. § 11-13-3-4(b) would permit the Parole Board to impose a condition that a person not convicted of a crime defined under .C. § 5-2-12-4 regis*1053ter as a sex offender, so long as the conditions of parole were reasonably related to the parolee's successful reintegration into the community and not unduly restrictive of a fundamental right.
The presence of I.C. § 11-13-34(g) however persuades me that such is not the case with respect to the parolee here. This provision is specifically and unmistakably focused upon persons convicted of the crimes enumerated in IC. § 5-2-12-4. Here, Weiss was convicted of aggravated battery, a crime not covered by I.C. § 5-2-12-4. In this respect, although the circumstances of the commission of Weiss's crime might well be relevant to imposition of sex-offender conditions were it not for 1.0. § 11-13-3-4(g), the latter provision speaks to the legislative intent in enacting the statute in the manner and form which was done.
I draw significance from the fact that subsection 4(g) is the more specific of the provisions involved and it appears subsequent in position to the general provisions of 11-18-8-4(b). If the legislature had intended that sex-offender parole conditions be imposed under (b) in an appropriate cireumstantial setting there would have been no reason to make specific provision for such conditions under (g). Furthermore, any such perceived legislative intent is undercut by the fact that imposition of the conditions is clearly restricted to an "offender" as defined within I.C. § 5-2-12-14.
The general provision of subsection (b) of 1.0. § 11-13-8-4 was contained in the original legislation enacted in 1979, effective October 1, 1980. Acts 1979, P.L. No. 120, § 6. The specific provision of subsection (g) concerning sexual offenders was not placed into the statute until 1994. Acts 1994, P.L. No. 11, § 8.
As a general proposition of statutory construction, the 1994 amendment must be taken to have been intended as a limitation of the very broad words of subsection (b). Houtchens v. Lane, 246 Ind. 540, 545-46, 206 N.E.2d 131, 134 (Ind.1965) noted the well-established proposition that where there is a conflict between statutory provisions, the more recent is controlling and a specific provision controls over a general provision relating to the same subject matter.
In Robinson v. Wroblewski 704 N.E.2d 467 (Ind.1998), our Supreme Court was confronted, as here, with an apparent conflict between sections of the same statute. The Court reiterated the holding of Houtchens and held onee again that the specific provision takes priority over a general provision. Id. at 475.
More apropos to the. case before us is the analysis found in 73 AM.JUR.2d Statutes § 170 (2001):
"Where there is in the same statute a specific provision and also a general on which in its most comprehensive sense would include matters embraced in the former, the particular provision must control, and the general provision must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular provision 39
Furthermore, when, as here, there has been an amendment to the statute, the principle has been stated as follows:
"It is presumed that an amendment of a prior statute is intended to change the law unless it clearly appears the amendment was passed to clarify the legislature's original intent." Halley v. Blackford County Sch. Corp., 581 N.E.2d 1182, 1184 (Ind.Ct.App.1988).
It is my view that the 1994 amendment to the statute in question reflects the proposition set forth in Bailey v. Menzie, 505 N.E.2d 126, 128 (Ind.Ct.App.1987):
*1054"One inference that may be drawn from an amendment adding a provision to a statute is that, in the view of the legislature, the statute as originally drafted did not contain the provision."
Under such analysis, subsection (b) did not, and does not now contemplate imposition of conditions of probation for sex offenders enumerated under subsection (g).
It may be noted in this regard that the magnitude of the problem perceived to exist with respect to sex offenders first received outright legislative attention from our General Assembly in 1994 when the underlying statutes, 1.0. § 5-2-12-1 et seq. were enacted. It was in this same session and in the same Public Law 11 of the Acts of 1994 that I.C. § 11-13-3-4(g) was added to the Conditions of Parole statute.
Accordingly, it is my firm impression that the 1994 enactments reflected a legislative view that the broad language of I.C. § 11-13-3-4(b) would not embrace a discretionary condition of parole regarding sex offender registration. Thus, I do not believe that the language of (b), unchanged in its form or content, allows sex offender registration as a condition of parole except as provided under the specifics of subsection (g).
Although it would be within the prerogative of the General Assembly to amend the statute to reflect the policy inferred by the majority in its opinion here, the statute in its present form and in the clear and unmistakable language chosen does not so provide.