Court Opinion

ID: 9893435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-27 05:08:53.707149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:39.640174
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

TIFFANY A. FIELDS and DENNIS L. FIELDS, JR.,                          UNPUBLISHED
                                                                      October 26, 2023
               Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v                                                                     No. 363092
                                                                      Kent Circuit Court
SAHERS, LLC,                                                          LC No. 21-006588-CH

               Defendant-Appellee.

Before: RICK, P.J., and SHAPIRO and YATES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        In this boundary dispute, plaintiffs appeal as of right the trial court’s order denying
plaintiffs’ motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) and granting defendant
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We reverse and remand.

                                 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

        This case involves a dispute over adjoining properties that share a legal property line. The
two properties involved are 4908 Division Street (the Division Street property), which is owned
by defendant, and 24 Daniel Street (the Daniel Street property), which is currently owned by
plaintiffs. The dispute arose because defendant destroyed a fence that was constructed 36 feet onto
defendant’s property.

        To understand this dispute, it is helpful to understand the history of the property. George
and Mary Dyhouse, plaintiff Tiffany Fields’s adoptive parents, acquired the Daniel Street property
on April 17, 1992. The fence was present on the land when the Dyhouses bought the property,
and in the ensuing years, it was treated as the property line between the Division Street and Daniel
Street properties. Mary passed away in 2010, leaving George the sole owner of the Daniel Street
property. Defendant acquired title to the Division Street property in 2013 with a plan to rehabilitate
an abandoned gas station located on that parcel. At the time of purchase, the eastern portion of the
Division Street property, including the disputed area, was zoned as residential. The rest of the
property was zoned as commercial.

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        In April 2013, the Kentwood Planning Commission held a public hearing regarding a
proposal submitted by defendant to rezone the residential portion of the property. George Dyhouse
and Steven Dyhouse, Tiffany’s brother, made comments at the hearing. Steven indicated that he
was afraid that defendant would move the fence over to the legal property line, which ran along
the driveway of the Daniel Street property. A representative from defendant’s construction firm
responded “that legally [defendant] could move the fence further back, but [defendant] plan[ned]
to leave [the fence] where it [was] currently located.” The Kentwood Planning Commission
approved defendant’s rezoning request.

        In 2014, George told defendant’s sole owner and representative, Saherinder Kaur, that the
fence did not mark the legal property line between the two properties and that the disputed area
was a part of defendant’s property. At that time, Kaur already knew that the disputed area was a
part of the Division Street property and had been paying the property taxes on the entire parcel
since acquiring it in 2013. According to Tiffany, George stated that the family had permission to
use the disputed area, provided that the family maintained the disputed area’s lawn. However,
Kaur stated in an affidavit that in April 2014, she hired someone to mow on both sides of the fence.
George asked her to stop mowing in August 2014 because he was unwell and the noise was
bothering his rest, at which point Kaur stopped mowing the disputed area. She took no action to
move the fence or reclaim the disputed area at that time. George passed away in 2018, and Tiffany
became personal representative of his estate. Within a month of George’s death, plaintiffs moved
into the Daniel Street property. Later in 2018, plaintiffs constructed a storage shed in the disputed
area.

       On October 8, 2020, Kentwood Police Department Officer Ralph Mason visited plaintiffs
to investigate a complaint regarding two inoperative cars located on 24 Daniel. Officer Mason
spoke to Tiffany, who “said that the [disputed area] actually belongs to [defendant] next door, but
they have permission to use [the disputed area] as long as they cut the grass,” which “has gone on
for 30 years per the house owner.” Officer Mason contacted plaintiffs again on October 12 and
13, 2020, to ensure that the inoperative cars were moved off the property. Both cars were moved
by October 26, 2020. No further incidents involving the property occurred in 2020.

          On June 11, 2021, Tiffany, as personal representative of George’s estate, conveyed the
property to herself and her siblings via quitclaim deed. Also on that date, Tiffany’s siblings
conveyed their interest in the property to her via quitclaim deed, and in turn, she conveyed part of
her interest to her husband, plaintiff Dennis Fields, via quitclaim deed. Thus, plaintiffs acquired
title to the Daniel Street property on June 11, 2021.

        On June 15, 2021, Officer Mason again spoke to Tiffany regarding a complaint concerning
a parking violation on the property. Tiffany told him that defendant owned the disputed area but
allowed plaintiffs to park vehicles on the land in exchange for keeping the grass cut. Officer
Mason also spoke to a representative of defendant, who indicated an interest in taking the property
back. On July 4, 2021, defendant hired one of plaintiffs’ neighbors to remove the old fence and
put a new fence closer to the property line. According to Tiffany, defendant “didn’t like that [the
neighbor] had put the fence up initially straight, whereas, the property line . . . is kind of at an
angle, and [defendant] didn’t like how he had it in there, because it gave [plaintiffs] a little bit too
extra on the backside of [the fence], so [defendant] . . . had [the fence] removed and then cemented

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in place.” Additionally, defendant destroyed plaintiffs’ shed and removed the items that plaintiffs
were storing in the shed.

        Plaintiffs subsequently initiated the underlying action to quiet title to the disputed area.
Specifically, plaintiffs claimed ownership over the disputed area under a theory of acquiescence
or adverse possession (Counts I and II), and presented a separate claim contending that defendant
trespassed by destroying plaintiffs’ shed (Count III).

        Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) (failure to state a
claim) and (C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact), arguing, in relevant part, that plaintiffs
failed to establish an ownership interest in the disputed area of the property under a theory of
adverse possession or acquiescence because they knew that the disputed area belonged to
defendant’s predecessors in interest, and later to defendant. Defendant also argued that plaintiffs
failed to demonstrate that defendant trespassed on the property by destroying plaintiffs’ shed.
Plaintiffs also moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that they had an
ownership interest in the property under a theory of acquiescence because the parties’ predecessors
in interest and plaintiffs treated the fence as the property line between the two properties for over
29 years, well over the 15 years necessary to prove a claim for acquiescence, MCL 600.5801(4).

        In June 2022, the trial court heard argument on the parties’ motions for summary
disposition. Defendant argued, in relevant part, that plaintiffs’ predecessors in interest did not
acquire the disputed area by acquiescence because plaintiffs’ predecessors in interest used the
disputed area pursuant to an oral contract. In response, plaintiffs argued that their predecessors in
interest acquired the disputed area by acquiescence because, regardless of hostility and permissive
use, the parties’ predecessors in interest treated the fence as the property line between the two
properties for more than the statutory period of 15 years.

       In September 2022, the trial court granted defendant’s motion summary disposition and
denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary disposition. Specifically, the trial court reasoned:

               A fence of sorts existed on [] Sahers’ commercial parcel for many years
       before it was taken down and moved to the actual property line. The moving of the
       fence, though within Sah[e]rs’ commercial parcel, was at the expense of the Fields.
       The Fields filed the current action in equity to quiet title alleging that the doctrine
       of acquiescence mandates that they are the true owners of the thirty-foot wide
       disputed area.

                To complicate matters, Sahers petitioned the City of Kentwood in 2013 to
       rezone the entire parcel commercial in order to expand the business. This resulted
       in a full study of the property and at least two public hearings. Mr. [Steven] Fields
       attended at least one of those hearings. The fence and the actual property line was
       fully and completely described in the hearings and in the final documents. During
       the hearing, although Mr. Fields asked a question, he never informed the planning
       commission of the dispute over the property being rezoned. This raises the issue
       of equitable estoppel.

                                              * * *

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                To complicate matters, the City of Kentwood, unaware of the coming
        property line dispute, relied on the accurate survey line when it granted the request
        to rezone the property from residential to commercial in 2013.

                These undisputed proceedings in 2013 defeat plaintiffs’ claims. In those
        proceedings, Sahers requested and obtained a change in the zoning of the disputed
        area from residential to commercial. It is also undisputed that Mr. Dyhouse, the
        then owner and occupant of the Daniel Street parcel in 2013, had notice of and even
        participated in those proceedings without raising any objection or making any
        mention of the current dispute. The Kentwood proceedings establish that in 2013,
        Sah[e]rs had in no manner “acquiesced” to changing the parcel’s boundary line.
        Sah[e]rs requested the zoning change to benefit its commercial use of the original
        parcel. This illustrates the absence of any agreement, overt or tacit, upon a new
        boundary. Further, the fact that the Kentwood proceedings occurred in 2013 cuts
        off any argument that the 15 year period for either adverse possession or
        acquiescence can be proven.

        Accordingly, the trial court found that plaintiffs’ claim to the disputed area was barred by
the doctrine of equitable estoppel, and that defendant was entitled to summary disposition.
Plaintiffs now appeal to this Court.

                                           II. ANALYSIS

         Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by concluding that they did not have a viable quiet-
title claim where the parties’ predecessors in interest and plaintiffs treated the fence as the property
line between the Division Street and Daniel Street properties for more than 15 years. We agree.

                                   A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        “Actions to quiet title are equitable in nature; this Court reviews such actions de novo.”
Sackett v Atyeo, 217 Mich App 676, 680; 552 NW2d 536 (1996). Additionally, to the extent that
this case concerns the doctrine of equitable estoppel, whether estoppel bars a subsequent action or
claim is reviewed by this Court de novo. McMichael v McMichael, 217 Mich App 723, 726; 552
NW2d 688 (1996). This Court also reviews de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a
motion for summary disposition. Barnard Mfg Co, Inc v Gates Performance Engineering, Inc,
285 Mich App 362, 369; 775 NW2d 618 (2009). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the
factual sufficiency of a claim.1 Johnson v VanderKooi, 502 Mich 751, 761; 918 NW2d 785 (2018).
When a motion is brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court must “review the pleadings,
affidavits, and other documentary evidence submitted, make all reasonable inferences therefrom,
and determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, giving the nonmoving party the
benefit of reasonable doubt.” Wheeler v Shelby Charter Twp, 265 Mich App 657, 663; 697 NW2d

1
 Although it is unclear whether the trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(8) or (C)(10), we treat it as granted under (C)(10) because the trial court
clearly considered evidence outside the pleadings in making its ruling. See MCR 2.116(C)(10);
Van Buren Charter Twp v Visteon Corp, 319 Mich App 538, 544; 904 NW2d 192 (2017).

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180 (2005). The motion may only be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact.
Lowrey v LMPS & LMPJ, Inc, 500 Mich 1, 5; 890 NW2d 344 (2016). “A genuine issue of material
fact exists when the record leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.”
Johnson, 502 Mich at 761 (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted).

                               B. DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENTS

        As an initial matter, we note that defendant argues on appeal that plaintiffs cannot prove
they have an interest in the disputed area of the property under a theory of adverse possession.
Defendant also argues that plaintiffs are equitably estopped from making their claim to the
disputed property. Plaintiffs have not raised either of these issues on appeal, and defendant has
not brought them to this Court’s attention in a cross-appeal. However, an appellee need not file a
cross-appeal to argue an alternative basis for affirming a trial court’s ruling. See Pegasus Wind,
LLC v Tuscola Co, 340 Mich App 715, 753, 988 NW2d 17 (2022). Thus, we will address the
merits of defendant’s issues.

                                  1. ADVERSE POSSESSION

        “A party claiming adverse possession must show clear and cogent proof of possession that
is actual, continuous, open, notorious, exclusive, hostile, and uninterrupted for the relevant
statutory period.” Marlette Auto Wash, LLC v Van Dyke SC Props, LLC, 501 Mich 192, 202; 912
NW2d 161 (2018) (citations omitted). The statutory period is 15 years. MCL 600.5801(4). “Clear
and cogent evidence” has been described by this Court as “more than a preponderance of the
evidence, approaching the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Walters v Snyder, 225 Mich
App 219, 223; 570 NW2d 301 (1997). “When the elements of adverse possession have been met,
the law presumes that the true owner, by his acquiescence, has granted the land, or interest to the
land, so held adversely.” Marlette Auto Wash, LLC, 501 Mich at 202 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “[H]ostile use is that which is inconsistent with the right of the owner, without
permission asked or given, and which would entitle the owner to a cause of action against the
intruder.” Houston v Mint Group, LLC, 335 Mich App 545, 559; 968 NW2d 9 (2021) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). “Peaceable occupation or use by acquiescence or permission of the
owner cannot ripen into title by adverse possession, no matter how long maintained. Hostility is
the very essence of adverse possession.” King v Battle Creek Box Co, 235 Mich 24, 35; 209 NW
133 (1926).

        We agree with defendant that plaintiffs cannot establish a claim for adverse possession.
George and Mary Dyhouse, plaintiffs’ predecessors in interest, purchased the Daniel Street
property in 1992. The parties do not dispute that the fence at issue was already in place in 1992,
and that the Dyhouses exclusively used and maintained the disputed area from 1992 until the fence
was torn down by defendant in 2021. The 15-year statutory period for demonstrating an ownership
interest in the property via adverse possession would have been met in 2007. However, plaintiffs
have not presented evidence to show that their use of the disputed area was truly “hostile” for
purposes of showing adverse possession. According to the police report filed on October 8, 2020,
Tiffany told Officer Mason that “the property actually belongs to the gas station next door, but
[plaintiffs] have permission to use it as long as they cut the grass. [T]his has gone on for 30 years
per the house owner.” Plaintiffs do not dispute that for the 30 years that the fence was in place,
they had permission from the owner of the Division Street property to use the disputed area, in

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exchange for maintaining the lawn. Moreover, at the 2013 zoning meeting, George and Steven
Dyhouse appeared and asked questions about whether defendant planned to move the fence, to
which a representative from defendant’s construction firm responded “that legally [defendant]
could move the fence further back, but [defendant] plan[ned] to leave [the fence] where it [was]
currently located.” This indicates defendant was aware that the Dyhouses were using the disputed
area even though it did not belong to them, but was content to permit them to continue to do so at
that time.

        “In the adverse-possession context, ‘hostility’ refers to use of property without permission
and in a manner that is inconsistent with the rights of the true owner.” Jonkers v Summit Twp, 278
Mich App 263, 273; 747 NW2d 901 (2008), citing Wengel v Wengel, 270 Mich App 86, 92-93;
714 NW2d 371 (2006) (emphasis added). The record lacks any evidence that plaintiffs or their
predecessors in interest used the property without permission for the statutory 15-year period
necessary to establish an interest in the property on the basis of adverse possession. Moreover, the
evidence establishes that plaintiffs’ predecessors in interest, and plaintiffs themselves, recognized
that defendant, and defendant’s predecessor in interest, held superior title to the disputed property
from 1992 until 2021. This evidence wholly defeats any claim to the land under a theory of adverse
possession. See Smith v Feneley, 240 Mich 439, 441; 215 NW 353 (1927) (stating that recognizing
someone else holds superior title to a parcel of property “destroys the adverse character of
possession.”).

                                   2. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL

       As noted above, defendant alternatively argues that plaintiffs were equitably estopped from
claiming ownership over the disputed area because plaintiffs knew that it belonged to defendant
and did not contest defendant’s application to rezone the property in 2013. We disagree.

        Here, the trial court unilaterally concluded that plaintiffs were equitably estopped from
laying claim to the disputed area of the property. It explained that this was so because the
Kentwood Planning Commission relied on the accurate property line when rezoning the property
in 2013, and noted that defendant never acquiesced to a new boundary line at that time.2 Defendant
reiterates this argument in a single paragraph in its appellate brief. Such a brief and unsupported
argument would ordinarily be insufficient to warrant appellate review. See Walters v Nadell, 481
Mich 377, 387; 751 NW2d 431 (2008) (“Trial courts are not the research assistants of the litigants;
the parties have a duty to fully present their legal arguments to the court for its resolution of their
dispute.”). However, because equitable estoppel was central to the trial court’s ruling and the
pertinent facts are available to us, we will overlook the aforementioned principle and consider
defendant’s argument. See Nuculovic v Hill, 287 Mich App 58, 63; 783 NW2d 124 (2010) (“This
Court may overlook preservation requirements if the failure to consider the issue would result in

2
 We note that the trial court did not cite or discuss the elements of equitable estoppel, and in many
ways, it appears that the trial court may have confused the principles relevant to equitable estoppel
and acquiescence claims. Neither party asked the trial court to clarify its ruling. We have
attempted here to faithfully interpret the trial court’s reasoning.

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manifest injustice, if consideration is necessary for a proper determination of the case, or if the
issue involves a question of law and the facts necessary for its resolution have been presented”).

        Equitable estoppel is not itself a cause of action. American Federation of State, Co & Muni
Employees v Bank One, NA, 267 Mich App 281, 292-293 n 3; 705 NW2d 355 (2005). Instead, it
“is merely a defense to be applied only when a party justifiably relies and acts on the belief that
misrepresented facts are true.” Id. A claim for equitable estoppel arises when “(1) a party by
representation, admissions, or silence, intentionally or negligently induces another party to believe
facts; (2) the other party justifiably relies and acts on this belief; and (3) the other party will be
prejudiced if the first party is permitted to deny the existence of the facts.” Cook v Grand River
Hydroelectric Power Co, Inc, 131 Mich App 821, 828; 346 NW2d 881 (1984). For equitable
estoppel to apply in this instance, defendant must therefore establish that (1) plaintiffs’ acts or
representations induced defendant to believe that plaintiff would not enforce the fence as the
property line between the two properties, (2) defendant justifiably relied on that belief, and (3)
defendant was prejudiced as a result of relying on that belief.

         The record does not support defendant’s claim. At all times relevant to this appeal,
plaintiffs and defendant agreed that the fence marked the de facto boundary between the properties,
even though the legal boundary was 36 feet away from the fence. The parties also agreed that
plaintiffs would be able to continue using the disputed area next to the fence, provided that they
mowed the lawn and kept the area in good repair. If a party wishes to establish a claim of equitable
estoppel, they must show that they were “not only destitute of knowledge of the state of the facts,
but . . . destitute of any convenient and available means of acquiring such knowledge[.]” Rix v
O’Neil, 366 Mich 35, 42; 113 NW2d 884 (1962) (quotation marks and citation omitted). However,
“where the facts are known to both parties, or both have the same means of ascertaining the truth,
there can be no estoppel.” Id. Such is the case here: the parties agreed that the fence marked the
boundary line of the property, defendant did not depend on on any assurances made by plaintiff
regarding the disputed area, and defendant cannot show prejudice as a result of reliance on such
assurances. Thus, defendant cannot now raise the equitable estoppel doctrine to defeat plaintiff’s
claim to the disputed area.3 We now turn to plaintiffs’ claim on appeal.

                                       C. ACQUIESCENCE

       Plaintiffs argue that they have an interest in the disputed property under a theory of
acquiescence. We agree.

        “Under Michigan law, parties may acquiesce to a new property boundary line.” Houston,
335 Mich App at 567. “[A]cquiescence is established when a preponderance of the evidence
establishes that the parties treated a particular boundary line as the property line.” Id. (quotation

3
  Defendants also argue that 1) plaintiffs cannot prove their claim that defendant trespassed on the
land; 2) plaintiffs’ citations to unpublished caselaw are inapplicable, and 3) defendant’s
documentary evidence does not constitute hearsay. Unlike defendant’s adverse possession and
equitable estoppel arguments, which are clearly presented as alternate grounds for affirmance,
these three issues have not been presented as alternative grounds for affirmance. Accordingly, we
decline to address them on the merits.

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marks and citation omitted). A plaintiff in an action to quiet title bears the initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case of title to the property in question. Trademark Props of Mich, LLC
v Fannie Mae, 308 Mich App 132, 138; 863 NW2d 344 (2014). The plaintiff must be able to
“prove acquiescence by a preponderance of the evidence.” Killips v Mannisto, 244 Mich App 256,
260; 624 NW2d 224 (2001).

        There are three main methods for showing acquiescence: “(1) acquiescence for the
statutory period; (2) acquiescence following a dispute and agreement; and (3) acquiescence arising
from intention to deed to a marked boundary.” Houston, 335 Mich App at 567 (quotation marks
and citation omitted). Here, the parties’ arguments generally concern the first theory of
acquiescence. Statutory acquiescence is met “when a preponderance of the evidence establishes
that the parties treated a particular boundary line as the property line” for the 15-year period
required by statute. Id. at 567-568 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also
MCL 600.5801(4). “The acquiescence of predecessors in title can be tacked onto that of the parties
to establish the mandated period of fifteen years,” Id. at 568 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “Proof of privity is not necessary, however, to employ tacking of holdings to obtain the
15-year minimum under the doctrine of acquiescence.” Siegel v Renkiewicz Estate, 373 Mich 421,
426; 129 NW2d 876 (1964).

        Additionally, “[u]nlike adverse possession, a claim of acquiescence does not require that
possession of the land was hostile or without permission.” Houston, 335 Mich App at 568.
Instead, the proper inquiry is whether the property owners “treated a particular boundary as the
property line.” Walters v Snyder, 239 Mich App 453, 458; 608 NW2d 97 (2000). “Only when
there has been some agreement, whether tacit or overt, as to the location of the boundary does the
question of acquiescence become important.” Wood v Denton, 53 Mich App 435, 439-440; 219
NW2d 798 (1974). In cases involving a boundary marked by a fence, our Supreme Court has
opined that “[w]here a fence has been treated and acquiesced in as the correct boundary line
between adjacent owners for 15 years the boundary line ought not to be disturbed even if there
were some variance from the true line . . . .” Escher v Bender, 338 Mich 1, 5; 61 NW2d 143 (1953)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). A boundary line long acquiesced to and treated as the true
line should not be disturbed on the basis of new surveys. Johnson v Squires, 344 Mich 687, 692;
75 NW2d 45 (1956); Escher, 338 Mich at 5-6.

        In the trial court, plaintiffs submitted documentary evidence demonstrating use of the
disputed area by plaintiffs’ predecessors in interest and by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs attested that they
and their predecessors in interest exclusively occupied and used the disputed area following the
purchase of the property in 1992, until defendant destroyed the fence in 2021. Tiffany explained
that plaintiffs’ predecessors in interest and plaintiffs mowed, watered, and seeded the disputed
area; planted flowers and shrubs in the disputed area; hosted parties and entertained guests in the
disputed area; held yard sales in the disputed area; and parked and repaired vehicles in the disputed
area. Tiffany also testified that plaintiffs’ predecessors in interest and plaintiffs treated the fence
as the property line between the two properties, and asserted that nobody ever objected to the
location of the fence or the family’s use of the disputed area. Dennis agreed that the parties’
predecessors in interest treated the fence as the property line between the two properties.
Additionally, plaintiffs submitted numerous photographs depicting use of the disputed area by
plaintiffs’ predecessors in interest throughout the years. These photos provide clear proof that
plaintiffs’ predecessors in interest and plaintiffs exclusively used the disputed area for various

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purposes, including recreation and storage, and were solely responsible for maintaining the area
for nearly 30 years, split between the years that the Dyhouses owned the property and the years
that plaintiffs have owned the property. Plaintiffs also asserted that a family friend and a neighbor
could both testify about plaintiffs’ predecessors in interest and plaintiffs’ exclusive and personal
use of the disputed area.

        In response, defendants submitted documentary evidence indicating that plaintiffs and their
predecessors in interest used the disputed area pursuant to an oral contract initially made with
defendant’s predecessors in interest. Specifically, defendant’s predecessors in interest allowed
plaintiffs’ predecessors in interest and plaintiffs to use the disputed area as long as the disputed
area’s lawn was maintained. In addition, defendants submitted documentary evidence establishing
that plaintiffs’ predecessors in interest and plaintiffs knew that the fence was not the legal property
line and that the disputed area belonged to defendant’s predecessors in interest and defendant.
Essentially, defendant contends that plaintiffs’ predecessors in interest and plaintiffs’ knowledge
that the fence was not the legal property line, as well as their permissive use of the disputed area,
defeated any claim of acquiescence that plaintiffs may have had to the disputed area.

        However, while such knowledge may have defeated plaintiffs’ claim under a theory of
adverse possession, plaintiffs nevertheless presented ample evidence to support their claim to the
property under a theory of acquiescence. Plaintiffs’ knowledge that the fence was not the legal
property line, and their permissive use of the disputed area, does not negate the fact that for 29
years—almost twice the 15-year statutory period necessary to prove a claim of acquiescence—the
parties’ predecessors in interest and plaintiffs treated the fence as the property line between the
two properties and treated the disputed area as part of plaintiffs’ property. See Walters, 239 Mich
App at 458; Houston, 335 Mich App at 569-570 (evidence of the treatment of a retaining wall as
the boundary line between the respective properties was demonstrated by the predecessors’
maintaining of a garden up to the side of the wall).

        Defendant has proffered no documentary evidence to counter the evidence presented by
plaintiffs, which clearly shows that the disputed area had been occupied, maintained, and used by
plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest since 1992. Further, defendant’s evidence did not
contradict plaintiffs’ claim that the parties’ predecessors in interest and plaintiffs treated the fence
as the property line between the two properties for over 15 years. As a result, defendant has failed
to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding acquiescence. Accordingly, plaintiffs are
entitled to summary disposition, and the trial court’s order granting defendant summary disposition
under MCR 2.116(C)(10) must be reversed.

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                                     III. CONCLUSION

        The trial court erred by granting summary disposition to defendant under
MCR 2.116(C)(10). We reverse and remand for entry of an order granting plaintiffs’ summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) as to their claim of acquiescence. On remand, the trial court
must consider plaintiffs’ separate claim that defendant trespassed on the land. We do not retain
jurisdiction.

                                                           /s/ Michelle M. Rick
                                                           /s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
                                                           /s/ Christopher P. Yates

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