Court Opinion

ID: 9742319
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:10:41.251334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:30.943762
License: Public Domain

HUNTER, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The state simply failed to produce “clear and convincing” evidence to establish that the victim had a basis for her in-court identification, independent of the pretrial confrontation which the state concedes was impermissibly suggestive. Her in-court identification of defendant consequently should not have been permitted. The majority opinion, in concluding otherwise, stands in irreconcilable conflict with Holt v. State, (1979) Ind., 396 N.E.2d 887 (Givan, C. J., and Pivarnik, J., dissenting).
Here, the state stipulated that a lineup it had conducted eleven days after the crime, wherein the victim had singled out defendant, was impermissibly and unconstitutionally suggestive. The record indicates the state’s stipulation followed from defendant’s motion to suppress the pretrial identification on the basis that the victim was told a “suspect” was in the lineup, that the victim was unable to identify defendant at one lineup, and that a second lineup involving participants with vastly dissimilar physical characteristics culminated in the victim’s identification of defendant.
Due to the state’s stipulation, the question whether the victim should have been permitted to make an in-court identification is governed by the well-established guidelines and rules laid down in Neil v. Biggers, (1972) 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401; Stovall v. Denno, (1967) 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199; and the case progeny thereof. See, e. g., Swope v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 148, 325 N.E.2d 193.
At issue in cases where an unnecessarily suggestive pretrial confrontation has occurred is the question whether a “substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification” has followed from the pretrial confrontation. Neil v. Biggers, supra; Simmons v. United States, (1968) 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247; Swope v. State, supra; Holt v. State, supra. In order for a subsequent in-court identification to be admissible, the state has the burden of producing “clear and convincing” evidence that, independent of the unconstitutional pretrial confrontation, the witness has a basis for the identification made in court. Id.
As has been repeatedly stated, the question whether an “independent basis” exists in fact is resolved by examining the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding the unnecessarily suggestive pretrial identification, as well as the witnesses’ opportunity to observe the perpetrator at the scene of the crime. See, e. g., Love v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 577, 365 N.E.2d 771; Jones v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 555, 334 N.E.2d 689. As Chief Justice Givan explained in Jones v. State, supra:
“As pointed out by this Court in Dillard v. State, (1971) 257 Ind. 282, 274 N.E.2d 387, 27 Ind.Dec. 346, the test of the admissibility of the identification focuses attention on two different sets of facts; (1) the facts bearing on the confrontation during the identification itself; (2) the facts bearing on how good a chance the witness had to observe the perpetrator of *8the crime to the extent that any suggestiveness in an improper confrontation could be resisted by the witness and that he could, nevertheless, make an accurate decision as to the identification of the suspect.” 263 Ind. at 556, 334 N.E.2d at 690.
The factors to be considered in examining the “totality of the circumstances” were outlined in Neil v. Biggers, supra:
“We turn, then, to the central question, whether under the ‘totality of the circumstances’ the identification was reliable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive. As indicated by our cases, the factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.” 409 U.S. at 199, 93 S.Ct. at 382, 34 L.Ed.2d at 411.
In Holt v. State, supra, which involved factual circumstances remarkably similar to the instant case, this Court reversed the defendant’s conviction for the failure of the state to establish an independent basis by clear and convincing evidence.
Holt involved the murder of Edward McGuire. He and his wife had returned to their home at midnight one June night in 1977 to discover lights were on in their house. After they entered, a struggle ensued in which Edward sustained his fatal injuries. Mrs. McGuire’s opportunity to observe the attacker was detailed by Justice DeBruler:
“She had observed the attacker twice during the episode, once when she first entered under lights in a bedroom when he was about nine feet away for a period of about fifteen seconds, and again as he ran past her on his way out.” Id., Ind., 396 N.E.2d at 888 [emphasis added].
Based on the rules heretofore enunciated, Justice DeBruler analyzed the totality of circumstances and found them inadequate to establish a basis independent of the im-permissibly suggestive confrontation which had occurred in Holt:
“The opportunity of Mrs. McGuire to view the attacker existed, but was very limited. It came late at night after an evening out. When Mr. McGuire first left the car to enter the house, Mrs. McGuire became anxious and attempted to dissuade him from going inside. When she did enter she first viewed the attacker while he was struggling with her husband. Her view of him in this state of emergency lasted for only a few seconds and then she went to summon help. The next time she saw him was as he ran by her. Her verbal descriptions of the attacker had been consistent with the appearance of appellant, but were very general in nature. The first positive identification of appellant as the attacker did not occur until ten months after the crime. The witness’ explanation of her reason for not making an identification of appellant at the first showup on June 3 was that she was in a state of shock, and is a reasonable one. However, that same explanation for her failure to identify appellant on June 23 is less supportable, as at that time she was in the safety of a police station, in a room separate from appellant, and had agreed to view a suspect. And there is no explanation offered at all as to how she was able to recognize appellant at trial as the killer when his appearance by that time had been altered by the shortening of his hair and removal of his beard.” Id. at 889.
The facts and circumstances of the instant case present a less compelling argument for the existence of the necessary “independent basis” than those found wanting in Holt.
Whereas in Holt, the witness initially viewed the attacker for a period of fifteen seconds in the lighted house, the victim in the instant case had only “a few seconds” in the light of the house to view the perpetrator. The term “a few seconds,” which had been employed by the victim at a pretrial deposition, was clarified by her at trial to mean “ten seconds.”
*9In both Holt and the instant case, the witnesses had a second opportunity to view the perpetrators. In each instance, the observation period was brief. In Holt, the attacker ran past Mrs. McGuire at the entrance to the house, where she had gone to cry for help. Here, it occurred as the assailant fled through the victim’s back yard. For a “few seconds,” the victim testified that, in the illumination of nearby street lights, she observed the person walking away from her. The victim stated that in this second opportunity to view the perpetrator, she observed his back and his profile as he crossed the fence at the back of the yard.
Unlike Holt, a third observation period is at issue here. The victim testified that shortly into the ten-minute period during which the rape occurred, her eyes adjusted and she was able to “see his face and distinguish his features.” Notwithstanding her testimony, however, the only identifying facial characteristic which she ever provided to police was the fact that the perpetrator had a beard. When police inquired whether the beard was “full or partial,” the victim was unable to recall.
Similarly, the complete description of the perpetrator which the victim gave police, as in Holt and Neil v. Biggers, supra, was “very general in nature.” Holt v. State, supra, at 889. Here, the only characteristics the victim could attribute to her assailant was that he was a “black male, 5'6" to 5'7" tall, slender build, beard, unknown if full or partial, and wearing a white T-shirt.” As the majority has acknowledged, investigating Police Officer Lorraine Loney stated that defendant could not be described as “slender,” as observed shortly after the crime. Not, insignificantly, Officer Loney’s report of the crime also stated that during the brief time when the light switch was “on,” the victim “was unable to get a good look at him”; in addition, the report stated the “rape attempt [was] not completed.”
Inconsistencies and equivocations in a witness’s version of events shortly after a crime vis-a-vis his or her testimony at trial do not ipso facto establish that an “independent basis” is lacking; credible explanations exist for inconsistencies, hysteria being one. But the equivocal and inconsistent nature of the testimony must be considered as part and parcel of the totality of circumstances, which here include: (1) the limited opportunity to view the perpetrator, both in terms of time and lighting conditions, (2) the general nature of the description provided police, and (3) the excited circumstances in which the opportunity to observe occurred.
In conjunction with these circumstances, we are required to focus on yet another factor — and a very significant one. Just as the witness in Holt v. State, supra, the victim here was unable to identify defendant at the first confrontation arranged by police. Here, the victim did not identify defendant until the second lineup arranged by police, which was part and parcel of the pretrial procedures which the state stipulated were “impermissibly suggestive.”
This latter factor takes us to the heart of the question before us. As Justice Powell explained in Neil v. Biggers, supra:
“Some general guidelines emerge from these cases as to the relationship between suggestiveness and misidentification. It is, first of all, apparent that the primary evil to be avoided is ‘a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.’ Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S., at 384, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247, 88 S.Ct. 967 [at 971]. While the phrase was coined as a standard for determining whether an in-court identification would be admissible in the wake of a suggestive out-of-court identification, with the deletion of ‘irreparable’ it serves equally well as a standard for the admissibility of testimony concerning the out-of-court identification itself. It is the likelihood of misiden-tification which violates a defendant’s right to due process, and it is this which was the basis of the exclusion of evidence in Foster. [Foster v. California, (1969) 394 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 22 L.Ed.2d 402.] Suggestive confrontations are disapproved because they increase the likelihood of misidentification, and unnecessar-*10illy suggestive ones are condemned for the further reason that the increased chance of misidentification is gratuitous.” 409 U.S. at 198, 93 S.Ct. at 381-2, 34 L.Ed.2d at 410-11 [emphasis added; footnote omitted].
It is the danger that irreparable misidentifi-cation will follow from a suggestive confrontation that requires the state to produce “clear and convincing” evidence to prove that any subsequent in-court identification is independently based. Here, as in Holt, the totality of circumstances simply does not render “clear and convincing” the indication that an independent basis exists. Only after the impermissibly suggestive confrontation was arranged by police did the victim’s ability to identify defendant gain particularity. In the face of that circumstance, together with the other details which compose the “totality of circumstances” before us, the due process dictates of Neil v. Biggers, supra, and Foster v. California, (1969) 394 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 22 L.Ed.2d 402, constrain us. As those constitutional guarantees were implemented in Holt v. State, supra, so also it must necessarily be concluded that the state failed to satisfy its burden of proof. The evidence that an independent basis in fact existed for the victim’s in-court identification simply was not “clear and convincing.” Compare, Harris v. State, (1980) Ind., 403 N.E.2d 327; White v. State, (1979) Ind., 397 N.E.2d 949; Young v. State, (1979) Ind., 395 N.E.2d 772. The trial court erred in admitting the victim’s in-court identification over defendant’s objection.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and defendant should be granted a new trial.
PRENTICE, J., concurs.