Court Opinion

ID: 9758538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:35:16.057444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:52.529946
License: Public Domain

VAN der VOORT,'Judge,
dissenting:
In this case the defendant-appellant, based upon Pa.R. Crim.P. 1100, should have been brought to trial on or before April 28, 1975.1 His trial commenced on August 25, 1975. The next day on August 26, 1975, defendant’s counsel petitioned the trial court for an Order dismissing the charges with prejudice on the ground that Rule 1100 had been violated. Rule 1100 provides that in order for a defendant to take advantage of a violation of the Rule, he, or his attorney, must apply to the court before trial for an Order dismissing the charge.2 Neither the defendant nor his counsel complied with this Rule of procedure and the defendant thereby lost his right to have the charges dismissed. The *261defendant claims however that he is entitled to have the charges dismissed and to have himself discharged because his counsel was ineffective in not complying with Rule 1100(f).
The Majority Opinion holds that the defendant’s contention is correct and would discharge the defendant appellant. I disagree with this conclusion. In my judgment when a defendant claims his counsel was ineffective because he failed to perform a purely technical procedural requirement of the law, before the defendant is permitted to escape prosecution he must prove that his defense(s) other than such technical ineffectiveness were prejudiced by counsel’s nonperformance.
In other words, I believe in this case when defendant’s counsel failed to file his application to dismiss before trial the defendant lost his right to dismissal for failure to comply with the Rule. In order to re-establish this right on the grounds of ineffective counsel I think the defendant should be required to prove that his defenses to the charges other than the defense founded upon Rule 1100 were harmed or injured. In the instant case, I think he should be required to prove that his ability to defend himself on April 25th was substantially greater than it was on August 25th, 1975. I believe that the decision of the Majority holds in effect that a defendant is entitled to perfect performance by his counsel. I further believe that no human endeavor can be performed with perfection. A defendant is entitled to a good defense on the merits of his case not a defense that is technically perfect. Our cases hold that when the Attorney for the Commonwealth neglects to apply timely to the court for an extension of the time for trial and the trial date goes beyond the critical period (now 180 days) then society loses its right to try the defendant and he must be discharged.3 I see no reason why a similar standard should not apply to the defendant i. e., where he or his counsel neglect to apply timely to the court for discharge because of the passage of 180 days under Rule 1100 he loses his right to such discharge *262unless he can show prejudice from the delay. The lines determining ineffectiveness of counsel must be drawn somewhere and it seems to me this is a place where one should be drawn.
I would remand this case for a hearing to determine whether or not the delay in the trial caused appellant’s defenses other than the Rule 1100 defense to be substantially prejudiced. If they were thus prejudiced then the judgment of sentence should be vacated and the defendant discharged. If they were not thus prejudiced then the judgment of sentence should be affirmed.

. As calculated in the Opinions of HOFFMAN and PRICE, JJ.

. Rule 1100(f) 19 P.S. Appendix.

. Commonwealth v. Shelton, 469 Pa. 8, 364 A.2d 694 (1976).