Court Opinion

ID: 9408430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-12 19:05:31.057668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:43.853305
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/12/23 P. v. Patton CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE,                                                  B320626

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. MA073477)
         v.

ACORRI PATTON,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court for the
County of Los Angeles, Daviann L. Mitchell, Judge. Reversed
and remanded with directions.
      Adrian K. Panton, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, David E. Madeo and Daniel C.
Chang, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                     I.     INTRODUCTION

      On remand for a resentencing hearing, the trial court
conducted the hearing and imposed sentence without defendant
Acorri Patton in attendance. On appeal from that sentence,
defendant contends, among other things, that the court erred by
not complying with the waiver requirements of Penal Code
section 977, subdivision (b)(1).1 We reverse and remand for
resentencing.

                      II.   BACKGROUND

A.    Convictions and Appeal

       In 2019, a jury found defendant guilty of one count of first
degree murder in violation of section 187, subdivision (a) and one
count of first degree robbery in violation of section 211. That jury
also found: true the robbery and burglary special circumstance
allegations within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision
(a)(17)(A) and (G); and not true the personal use of a deadly
weapon allegation within the meaning of section 12022,
subdivision (b)(1) and the personal infliction of great bodily injury
allegation within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a).
       The trial court sentenced defendant on the murder count to
life without the possibility of parole and on the robbery count to
the high term of six years, but stayed execution of sentence.
       On appeal from the judgment of conviction, this court in
People v. Brandon, et al. (Nov. 1, 2021, B300932) [nonpub. opn.]

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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(Brandon)2 reversed defendant’s murder conviction and the true
findings against her on the special circumstance allegations. We
therefore remanded the matter with directions to conduct a
resentencing hearing on defendant’s conviction on the robbery
count.

B.    Resentencing

      Prior to the resentencing hearing, defendant filed a
statement in mitigation that attached as an exhibit a social
history report, including mental health records. The mitigation
statement listed three “‘contributing factor[s]’” under section
1170 for the trial court to consider during resentencing, including
that she had been the victim of intimate partner violence. Among
other things, defendant argued that, under section 1170, the
court could only impose a sentence that exceeded the four-year
middle term for robbery if there were circumstances in
aggravation to which defendant stipulated, or which were found
true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or the judge in
a court trial.
      On May 16, 2022, the trial court called the matter for a
probation and resentencing hearing. Defendant did not appear.
She was a “miss-out” as she was under quarantine in the county
jail.
      On May 26, 2022, the trial court held the continued
probation and resentencing hearing. At the outset, the court
stated, “All right. The defendant is not in court. And do you

2      We deny the Attorney General’s request for judicial notice
of the record on appeal in Brandon, supra, B300932 as that
record is unnecessary for our resolution of this appeal.

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waive her appearance? She’s a medical missout due to
quarantine. And do you do that?”
      Defense counsel replied, “Yes.”
      The trial court continued, “And based on our conversation
this morning, and [defendant] giving you authority to hear this
matter pursuant to [section] 997[, subdivision] (b) . . . , do you
want to proceed in that manner?”
      Counsel again replied, “Yes.”
      The trial court then ruled that it would permit defendant’s
counsel to proceed on her behalf during the resentencing
proceeding.
      The trial court began the resentencing discussion by
confirming that it had read and considered defendant’s statement
in mitigation. The prosecutor then recited the aggravating
factors that favored a high term sentence. The court asked
defense counsel questions about defendant’s assertion, in her
statement of mitigation, that she had been the victim of intimate
partner violence by her codefendant. When defense counsel cited
to a page of defendant’s statement of mitigation in support, the
court disagreed, noting that although the statement of mitigation
described defendant’s torture by a boyfriend, it did not specify
that the boyfriend was codefendant. After reviewing the evidence
in support of the mitigating and aggravating factors, the court
denied probation and sentenced defendant on the robbery count
to the high term of six years.

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                       III.   DISCUSSION

     Defendant contends that the trial court prejudicially erred
when it conducted the resentencing hearing without either
defendant’s personal appearance or a valid waiver of her
appearance.

A.    Legal Principles and Standard of Review

      Both the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and article 1, section 15 of the California
Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to the
assistance of counsel “at all critical stages of a criminal
prosecution, including sentencing.” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45
Cal.4th 390, 417, 453.) “Both constitutions similarly afford a
defendant the right to be present at all critical stages of a
criminal prosecution.” (People v. Rocha (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th
352, 357 (Rocha).) Resentencing is considered a critical stage of
the proceedings for purposes of a defendant’s right to be present.
(People v. Cutting (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 344, 347–348
[“Sentencing is considered to be one such critical stage [citations],
and, because the trial court has discretion to reconsider the entire
sentence on remand, resentencing is another critical stage”].)
      Section 977, subdivision (b)(1) codifies a defendant’s right
to be present at certain stages of a criminal proceeding, including
at the time of imposition of sentence, and sets forth the
circumstances under which a defendant may waive that right.
The version of that section in effect at the time defendant was

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sentenced3 provided, “[I]n all cases in which a felony is charged,
the accused shall be personally present at the arraignment, at
the time of plea, during the preliminary hearing, during those
portions of the trial when evidence is taken before the trier of
fact, and at the time of the imposition of sentence. The accused
shall be personally present at all other proceedings unless they
shall, with leave of court, execute in open court, a written waiver
of their right to be personally present, as provided by paragraph
(2).” (Former section 977, subd. (b)(1), added by Stats. 2021, ch.
196, § 1 (AB 700), effective Jan. 1, 2022.)
       Whether defendant has a right to be present at a hearing is
a question of law we review de novo. (People v. Santos (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 965, 972.) We review the trial court’s factual
findings for substantial evidence. (People v. Reneaux (2020) 50
Cal.App.5th 852, 863.)

B.    Waiver of Defendant’s Personal Appearance

     We agree with defendant that—even assuming section 977,
subdivision (b)(1) permitted defendant to waive her right to be
present at the resentencing hearing—the trial court did not
comply with section 977, subdivision (b)(1)’s requirements for a
waiver of personal presence.4 Under the version of that provision

3      The current version of section 977, subdivision (b)(1),
effective June 30, 2022, omits the language requiring that the
written waiver be executed in court. (§ 977, subd. (b)(1) (Stats.
2022 ch. 57, § 13 (AB 199), effective June 30, 2022).)

4     For purposes of this appeal, we need not decide whether the
court violated defendant’s constitutional rights to be present

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in effect at the time of resentencing, the waiver of defendant’s
personal presence at the hearing was required to be made in open
court and in writing. As the record of the hearing reflects,
defendant was not present in court when her counsel attempted
to waive her appearance—she was a “missout due to
quarantine”—and the authorization for her counsel to represent
her at the hearing was given orally, not in writing. The
resentencing under such circumstances therefore violated
defendant’s rights under section 977.
       The Attorney General concedes that “the record does not
show that [defendant], in open court, executed a written waiver of
her right to be personally present at her resentencing hearing.”
But he nevertheless argues that, due to the ongoing COVID-19
pandemic, “the circumstances of [defendant’s] waiver satisfied
the policies underlying section 977 and Emergency Rule 5.”5

because we can resolve her appeal on the alternative state
statutory grounds she raises. “‘Our jurisprudence directs that we
avoid resolving constitutional questions if the issue may be
resolved on narrower grounds.’ (Loeffler v. Target Corp. (2014) 58
Cal.4th 1081, 1102.)” (Rocha, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 357.)

5     Emergency Rule 5(b)(2) (Cal. Rules of Court, Appen. I, rule
5(b)(2)), in effect at the time of resentencing, provided, in
pertinent part: “With the consent of the defendant, the court
must allow a defendant to waive his or her appearance and
permit counsel to appear on his or her behalf. The court must
accept defendant’s waiver of appearance or personal appearance
when: [¶] (A) Counsel for the defendant makes an on the record
oral representation that counsel has fully discussed the waiver
and its implications with the defendant and the defendant has
authorized counsel to proceed as counsel represents to the court;
[¶] (B) Electronic communication from the defendant as

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      Emergency rule 5 required defendant’s counsel to “fully
discuss” with her the waiver of her presence at the resentencing
hearing, including specifically the “implications” of doing so. The
transcript of the hearing, however, does not show that counsel
complied with these requirements. At best, it shows that
defendant gave counsel authority to represent her at the hearing,
but not that she had “fully discussed the wavier and its
implications” with her lawyer. (Emergency rule 5.) On this
record, we conclude that the express requirements of the
Emergency rule were not satisfied.
      For similar reasons, we also reject the Attorney General’s
assertion that there was substantial compliance with section 977
and Emergency rule 5. “Even if a statute is considered
mandatory, substantial compliance may suffice in some
circumstances if the purpose of the statute is satisfied. (People v.
Superior Court (Zamudio) (2000) 23 Cal.4th 183, 194 . . . .) . . .
[¶] ‘Substantial compliance’ means actual compliance in respect
to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the
statute, as distinguished from mere technical imperfections of
form. [Citations.] The essential inquiry is whether under the
circumstances the policies underlying the statute were served.
[Citation.] ‘“Where there is compliance as to all matters of
substance[,] technical deviations are not to be given the stature of
noncompliance.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Carroll (2014) 222
Cal.App.4th 1406, 1420–1421.)
      Defense counsel’s brief statements at the beginning of the
hearing about his client’s appearance fall short of actual
compliance with the requirements of section 977 and Emergency

confirmed by defendant’s counsel; or [¶] (C) Any other means
that ensure the validity of the defendant’s waiver.”

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rule 5 and cannot fairly be characterized as mere technical
deviations from such requirements. Defense counsel was never
asked and did not volunteer whether he had advised defendant
that she had the right to attend the resentencing hearing and
participate in her defense and that she nevertheless voluntarily
gave up that right.

C.    Prejudice

      We agree with defendant that the trial court’s conducting of
the resentencing hearing without her personal presence or a
compliant waiver under state law resulted in prejudice.6
      Had defendant been present at the hearing, she could have
provided specific information in support of the assertion that she
had been the victim of intimate partner violence by her
codefendant. That assertion, if accepted by the trial court, would
have been a factor in mitigation that could have affected the
length of defendant’s sentence. On this record, we conclude that

6     Because we resolve this appeal under state law, we
evaluate prejudice under the “reasonable probability” standard
articulated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818. “A
‘reasonable probability’ ‘does not mean more likely than not, but
merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility.’
[Citation.] It ‘does not mean “more likely than not,” but merely
“probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”’
[Citations.] Therefore, reversal is necessary when it cannot be
determined whether or not the error affected the result, as in
such a case there ‘exists . . . at least such an equal balance of
reasonable probabilities’ ‘“that it is reasonably probable that a
result more favorable to the appealing party would have been
reached in the absence of the error.”’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Hardy (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 312, 329–330.)

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it is reasonably probable that input from defendant would have
lead to a more favorable outcome at the sentencing hearing.
(Rocha, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 360.)7

                      IV.   DISPOSITION

     Defendant’s sentence is reversed and the matter is
remanded for a new resentencing hearing.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                             KIM, J.

We concur:

             RUBIN, P. J.

             BAKER, J.

7      Because we resolve this appeal on the first ground raised
for reversal, we do not address defendant’s alternative grounds
based on the trial court’s aggravated circumstances findings.
Those concerns can be raised with the court on remand at the
resentencing hearing.

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