Court Opinion

ID: 9750708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:26:09.279384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:27.104900
License: Public Domain

Pashman, J.,
concurring in result only and dissenting. In this and the companion case of State v. Atkins, 78 N. J. 454 (1979), the majority rules that a person may be convicted of the crimes of assault with intent to rob and breaking and entering with intent to steal even though he never, in fact, intended to rob. anyone or steal anything. The majority arrives at this anomolous result by holding that voluntary intoxication can never constitute a defense to any crime other than first-degree murder even though, due to intoxication, the accused may not have possessed the mental state specifically required as an element of the offense. This holding not only defies logic and sound public policy, it also runs counter to dictates of prior caselaw and the policies enunciated by ;our Legislature in the new criminal code. I therefore dissent from that holding although I agree that the defendant is entitled to a new trial.
I
The majority’s heavy reliance upon State v. Maik, 60 N. J. 203 (1972), as supportive of its holding is wholly misplaced. The sole issue presented in Mailc was whether a defendant’s use of narcotics could be utilized to assert the insanity defense. In dicta the Court did state that as a general rule “a defendant will not be relieved of criminal responsibility because he was under the influence of intoxicants or drugs voluntarily taken.” Id. at 214. The Court, however, also explicitly remarked that most jurisdictions *491deem this “general rule” inapplicable where intoxication “prevent [s] the formation of a ‘specific intent’ required in the definition lof a particular offense.” Id. Although the Mails Court acknowledged the difficulty of distingushing between specific and general intent, it in no way indicated that the general rule should be abandoned.1
That Maik did not limit the intoxication defense to the crime of first-degree murder has been the holding of two different parts of our Appellate Division. In both State v. Del Vecchio, 142 N. J. Super. 359 (App. Div. 1976), and State v. Atkins, 151 N. J. Super. 555 (App. Div. 1977), the respective courts stated that Maik merely reaffirmed the long established Tule that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to second-degree murder, and that it did not operate to negate such a defense when intoxication prevents the formation of an intent constituting an element of a non-homicide offense.
Pre-Maik easelaw also demonstrates that the intoxication defense is not confined to first-degree murder. See, e.g., State v. Frankland, 51 N. J. 221 (1968) (per curiam); State v. White, 27 N. J. 158 (1958); State v. Kinlaw, 150 N. J. Super. 70 (App. Div. 1977); State v. Letter, 4 N. J. Misc. 395 (Sup. Ct. 1926). In Frankland the defendant was charged with willfully setting fire to a motor vehicle in violation of N. J. S. A. 2A:89-2. Defendant denied that he had set the fire and further testified that he was so intoxicated at the time of the alleged offense that he could not remember his activities. The trial judge charged the jury sua sponte as to the defense of intoxication. On *492appeal defendant’s conviction was reversed by the Appellate Division on the ground that the intoxication charge conflicted with the defendant’s general denial and therefore might have led the jurors to believe that the defendant admitted the act but sought to excuse it. This Court reversed and reinstated the conviction. We there held that, given the evidence that defendant had been drinking heavily, “the jury was entitled to be instructed on the effect of a finding by them that the defendant committed the act but did not know what he was doing.” Id. at 223. We also noted that “had the trial judge failed to charge on this evidence of intoxication, the defendant well might argue that such failure was reversible error despite the lack of a request to so charge.” Id. at 224. Had the Court been of the view that intoxication was a viable defense only to the crime of first-degree murder, the above holding clearly would not have been reached.
The Franlcland holding was not a mere aberration. In State v. White, supra, we stated that “substantial authority supports the view that [intoxication] may lead to an acquittal when it excludes a required specific intent for the reason that in such circumstances the defendant did not commit the crime charged.” 27 N. J. at 165. The Appellate Division, in State v. Kinlaw, supra, concluded that “as to a certain category of offenses, where specific intent is a necessary element, if the intoxication was such as to preclude the formation of such intent, the fact of intoxication may bo shown to negate this element.” 150 N. J. Super. at 73. See also State v. Burrell, 120 N. J. L. 277 (E. & A. 1938); State v. Ghaul, 132 N. J. Super. 438 (App. Div. 1975).
In order to compensate for the lack of contemporary caselaw supporting its view, the majority resurrects the common law rule that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to any crime. It is well settled, however, that common law principles are to be solely a guide and then only when they reflect current notions of proper jurisprudence. State v. Toscano, 74 N. J. 421 (1977). As shown *493above, our caselaw has rejected the common law position. Further, it must be noted that this common law policy-originated at a time when public drunkenness was itself a crime. It is perhaps understandable that courts in an earlier day would not allow an accused to utilize one criminal act as a defense to another. In 1975, however, our Legislature decriminalized public intoxication and adopted a broad policy of affording treatment. N. J. S. A. 26:2B-7 et seq. The Legislature specifically declared that:
[i]t is the policy of the State of New Jersey that alcoholics and intoxicated persons may not be subjected to criminal prosecution because of their consumption of alcoholic beverages hut rather should he afforded a continuum of treatment in order that they may lead normal lives as productive members of society.
[N. J. S. A. 26:2B-7]
The foregoing evidences the Legislature’s recognition that alcoholism is a disease and should be dealt with through rehabilitation and treatment rather than imprisonment. The Legislature has thus abandoned the common law’s premise that one who becomes intoxicated necessarily harbors an “evil” intent.
II
Today’s holding by the majority not only departs from precedent, it also stands logic on its head. This Court and the Legislature have long adhered to the view that criminal sanctions will not be imposed upon a defendant unless there exists a “ 'concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand.’” State v. Williams, 29 N. J. 27, 41 (1959). The policies underlying this proposition are clear. A person who intentionally commits a bad act is more culpable than one who engages in the same conduct without any evil design. The intentional wrongdoer is also more likely to repeat his offense, and hence constitutes a greater threat to societal repose. A sufficiently intoxicated defendant is thus subject *494to less severe sanctions not because the law “excuses” his conduct but because the circumstances surrounding his acts have been deemed by the Legislature to be less deserving of punishment.
It strains reason to hold that a defendant may be found guilty of a crime whose definition includes a requisite mental state when the defendant actually failed to possess that state of mind. Indeed, this is the precise teaching of case's allowing the intoxication defense in first-degree murder prosecutions. To sustain a first-degree murder conviction, the State must prove that the homicide was premeditated, willful, and deliberate. State v. King, 37 N. J. 285, 293-294 (1962). If the accused, due to intoxication, did not in fact possess these mental attributes, he can be convicted of at most second-degree murder, see, e. g., State v. Polk, 78 N. J. 539 (1979); State v. Maik, supra, 60 N. J. at 215; State v. King, supra, 37 N. J. at 297-298; State v. DiPaolo, 34 N. J. 279, 295-296, cert. den. 368 U. S. 880, 82 S. Ct. 130, 7 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1961). That offense, however, can be sustained on a mere showing of recklessness, State v. Gardner, 51 N. J. 444 (1968), and the necessary recklessness can he found in the act of becoming intoxicated.
Just as the lask of premeditation, willfulness, or deliberation precludes a conviction for first-degree murder, so should the lack of intent to rob or steal be a defense to assault and battery with intent to rob, or breaking and entering with intent to steal. The principle is the same in both situations. If voluntary intoxication negates an element of the offense, the defendant has not engaged in the conduct proscribed by the criminal statute, and- hence should not be subject tó the sanctions imposed by that statute.
111
The majority ultimately grounds its conclusions on public policy considerations. It professes to be concerned with protecting society fxom drunken offenders. There are several *495problems with this approach. First, the majority’s opinion is not even internally consistent. Although intoxication is not to be given the status of a defense, the majority states that it can be considered to “buttress the affirmative defense of reasonable mistake.” State v. Atkins, supra, 78 N. J. at 460. It is difficult to comprehend why the public would be less endangered by persons who become intoxicated and, as a result, commit alcohol-induced “mistakes” which would otherwise be criminal offenses, than by persons who get so intoxicated that they commit the same acts without any evil intent. In fact, it appears highly likely that the first group would encompass a larger number of persons and hence constitute a greater menace to society.
Second, the majority’s opinion is not likely to deter the commission of alcohol-induced crimes. It is unrealistic to expect that before indulging in intoxicants people will consider the extent of their criminal responsibility -for acts they might commit. In this respect, therefore, today’s holding will not add to the public’s safety.
The most important consideration, however, is that the standards for establishing the defense are extremely difficult to meet. Contrary to the implications contained in the majority opinion, it is not the case that every defendant who has had a few drinks may successfully urge the defense. The mere intake of even large quantities of alcohol will not suffice. Moreover, the defense cannot be established solely by showing that the defendant might not have committed the offense had he been sober. See Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission, Yol. II, Commentary (1971) at 68. What is required is a showing of such a great prostration of the faculties that the requisite mental state was totally lacking. That is, to successfully invoke the defense, an accused must show that he was so intoxicated that he did not have the intent to commit an offense. Such a state of affairs will likely exist in very few cases. I am confident that our judges and juries will be able to distinguish such unusual instances.
*496IY
The majority and the commentators have criticized as elusive the “specific intent-general intent” dichotomy. See, e.g., LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law (1972) § 45 at 344; Note, “Intoxication as a Criminal Defense,” 55 Colum. L. Lev. 1210, 1218 ,(1955). The majority’s difficulty in distinguishing the various mental states should not, however, he sufficient reason to mandate that all intoxicated defendants be incarcerated. The proper approach is to try and outline a more rational rule for applying the defense. I believe that such a rule is that enunciated in our new Code of Criminal Justice, effective September 1, 1979, which provides that intoxication will be a defense whenever it negates 'an element of an offense. N. J. S. A. 2C:98-4. The Act defines four mental states — purpose, knowledge, recklessness and negligence — one of which is necessary to establish guilt depending on the particular offense involved. N. J. S. A. 2C :2-2. Purpose and knowledge may be negated by intoxication, whereas recklessness and negligence may not. Moreover, the elements of recklessness or negligence may, where required by the definition of the crime, be satisfied by the recklessness implicit in becoming voluntarily intoxicated.
Although our current criminal law does not neatly compartmentalize mens rea into four such categories, the same type of analysis can be applied. Whenever a defendant shows that he was so intoxicated that he did not possess the requisite state of mind, he may not be convicted. Intoxication would not be a defense, however, to criminal offenses which may be established by recklessness or negligence as the carelessness in getting intoxicated would of itself supply the necessary mental state. This analysis would leave intact the long-standing rule that intoxication is not a defense to second-degree murder as that crime may be established by showing recklessness. State v. Gardner, 51 N. J. 444, 458 (1968).
Although the distinction between specific intent and general intent would be erased by the rule enunciated herein, *497this does not mean that the different mental states implicit in our criminal law would become irrelevant. Some crimes — battery, for example — only require that the defendant intend the act that he has committed, while others — such as assault and battery with intent to kill — require that he also intend to bring about certain consequences. Certainly it would take a greater showing of intoxication to convince one that defendant had no intent to strike the victim than to show that he did not intend to kill. In the former case, one might well conclude that he must have intended his act unless he was unconscious. Indeed, this is the main reason why the “specific intent/general intent” dichotomy was first formulated.
Inasmuch as defendants in these two cases were charged with crimes requiring intent to rob or intent to steal, their convictions must be reversed and a new trial ordered at which they can attempt to persuade the jury that they lacked those mental states. We must respect the legislative judgment, made explicit in the new Criminal Code, that those persons who, due to intoxication, act without the intent required by law as an element of the crime, are not to be treated as are those who willfully commit the same acts. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division in this case and the companion case, State v. Atkins, 78 N. J. 454, decided this day.
Clieeord and Handler, JJ., concurring in the result and Pashman, J., concurring in the result and dissenting.
For affirmance — Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Mountain, Sullivan, Pashman, Clieeord, Schreiber and Handler — 7.
For reversal — None.

As Part IV of my opinion makes clear, infra, I, as does the majority, reject the illogical and unworkable “specific intent/general intent” dichotomy. Maik and other cases which speak in such terms are utilized herein solely to refute the majority’s contention that New Jersey precedent supports the view that voluntary intoxication is a defense only in a first degree murder prosecution. My usage of such cases therefore should not be interpreted as indicating any acceptance of that dichotomy on my part.