Court Opinion

ID: 9587595
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:24:05.596721+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:04.178469
License: Public Domain

BILLINGS, Presiding Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. As the majority opinion correctly states, we can affirm the dismissal “only if it clearly appears the complainant can prove no set of facts in support of his or her position.” This court has previously held that
[dismissal of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) is a severe measure given the liberality of notice pleading.... When challenging a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) the appellant is entitled to a generous standard of review. We “construe the [pleading] in the light most favorable to the [claimant] and indulge all reasonable inferences in [the claimant’s] favor.”
Olson v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 P.2d 1356, 1360 (Utah App.1991) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 773 P.2d 405, 406 (Utah App.1989)).
Under that standard, I conclude the trial court erred in dismissing Wright’s claim. In her complaint, Wright alleged that the University employee “assaulted and struck” her. A reasonable inference of this allegation is that Wright claimed both an intentional and a negligent striking. Such a construction does not, as the majority contends, require us to “add facts or causes of action to the complaint that do not exist.” Rather, “assaulted” and “struck” can and should be read separately. If they are read as one and the same, then the use of both terms is redundant. See, e.g., Soter’s, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 857 P.2d 935, 941 (Utah 1993) (acknowledging that use of “and” in enumerating three requirements for proving waiver either was a “redundant rephrasing[]” or “ha[d] the inevitable effect of suggesting to the reader that each statement means a different thing or else each would not be required.”); see also California First Bank v. State, 111 N.M. 64, 72, 801 P.2d 646, 654 (N.M.1990).
The majority asserts that if Wright had intended to advance two alternative theories, she should have taken more definitive steps to develop her factual theory in her complaint, not in her responsive memorandum to the State’s motion to dismiss. However, this is not the purpose of notice pleading.1 Given the early stage in the development of this case and the liberal requirements of notice pleading, I would allow the case to proceed on the alternative theories alleged in the complaint. Other courts have similarly denied a government entity’s motion for summary judgment, recognizing the necessity for “further development of the record” before concluding “that the substance of plaintiffs’ claim is that defendants committed an intentional tort barring suit against the government. ...” Ricca v. United States, 488 F.Supp. 1317, 1323 (E.D.N.Y.1980). Wright should be given an opportunity to develop her theory that the University is liable for an unintentional (negligent) striking by its employee.2
*391Finally, the majority faults Wright for failing to join the employee as a defendant, claiming that as a result she may not recover on her respondeat superior theory against the University. I disagree. In Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991), the supreme court allowed a suit to proceed against a non-governmental employer under the theory of respondeat superior without joinder of the individual employee. Addressing an alleged defamation by an employee not named as a defendant, the court stated that “[cjommon law rules of agency and respondeat superior should be applied to determine [the employer’s] liability, if any....” Id. at 1058.
Furthermore, the Governmental Immunity Act makes joinder of the defendant in a representative capacity permissive rather than mandatory and bars personal liability unless the employee is guilty of fraud or malice. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-:4(4) (1993). The majority would have Wright sue the employee as an individual and attempt to prove a claim of malice before advancing her open courts challenge. It makes little sense, however, to require Wright to allege fraud or malice without any basis for such an allegation; in fact, by so holding we would encourage litigants to file false claims.
Moreover, even if I agreed that Wright must join the employee, I would nevertheless allow her case to proceed because she will have ample opportunity to join him after the State files an answer. Wright’s failure to join the employee should not result in the dismissal of her complaint against the University.
In sum, I believe the majority mistakenly relies on a technical, mechanistic reading of Wright’s complaint. I would reverse the dismissal of her complaint and remand to allow Wright her day in court.

. The majority also faults Wright for the two-year period between the filing of the complaint and the entry of the order of dismissal. However, it is not clear from the record which party was responsible for the delay. Indeed, the University filed the motion to dismiss and could just as easily be at fault for failing to submit its motion for a decision. In any event, the fact that Wright did not amend her. complaint during that two-year period is not dispositive if she believed her complaint was sufficient. While she may have been better served by an amended complaint, that is not the issue before us; instead, we are charged only with evaluating her complaint under the liberal rules of notice pleading.

. The University may be held liable for the employee’s negligent striking under the theory of respondeat superior. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1993); accord J.H. v. West Valley City, 840 P.2d 115, 122-23 (Utah 1992) (evaluating re-spondeat superior claim and holding plaintiff failed to meet burden of proof); Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1056-58 (Utah 1989) (concluding County not liable under re-spondeat superior doctrine because employee's conduct was outside scope of employment). The University may also be liable for its negligent supervision of the employee if the assault and battery exception does not apply. See Birkner, 111 P.2d at 1059 ("[e]ven when the doctrine of respondeat superior is inapplicable, an employer *391may be liable for its negligence in the hiring or supervision of an employee.”). The decision in Ledfors v. Emery County School District, 849 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1993), does not bar the negligent supervision claim because its holding applies only when the assault and battery exception is implicated. Moreover, this claim is colorable notwithstanding the amendment to the Governmental Immunity Act's definition of "governmental function.” See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(4)(a) (1993). Whether that amendment will ultimately defeat Wright's claim on the merits should not be decided in the litigation's infancy.