Court Opinion

ID: 9721219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:52:29.633089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:05:21.346724
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE GEORGE J. MORAN dissenting in part: In my opinion this case should be reversed outright instead of being remanded to the trial court because the defendant pled guilty to a void information. The information alleged that the defendant had violated Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 23, § 2361(a), in that he had knowingly caused Debbie Weisenberger, a female under the age of 18, to be on a public street in the City of Albion, Illinois, after 11 P.M. on October 26, 1972, thereby rendering her a delinquent child. Section 2360(a) of chapter 23 defines a delinquent child as any child who has violated or attempted to violate any Federal, State or municipal ordinance. The instant indictment fails to allege that Debbie Weisenberger violated or attempted to violate any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance. Instead, it merely alleges that the defendant caused her to remain on a public street after 11 P.M. This allegation is clearly insufficient to demonstrate that Debbie Weisenberger had become a delinquent child since it fails to allege that she violated any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance. In the case of People v. Plocar, 411 Ill. 141, 145, our supreme court said: “# * * It is not specified by the information in what respect these facts tend to render the child delinquent, as set forth in the statute, nor do they by their plain meaning import a criminal or improper act or motive. The information is not sufficient, since it does not with reasonable certainty describe the crime in the terms of the statute, nor does it set forth sufficient facts to plainly apprise the defendant of the crime charged and of the specific violation of the statute.” Under the language of the information in the present case, Debbie’s conduct and that of the defendant could have been wholly innocent. Where the conduct alleged in an indictment may in itself be wholly innocent, it is essential that the unlawfulness of the conduct be averred either by express allegations or by the use of terms, or the statement of facts, which clearly imply such unlawfulness. (41 Am.Jur.2d Indictments and Informations §§ 111 and 113 (1968). See also People v. Stewart, 3 Ill.App.3d 699, 279 N.E.2d 53.) If the facts alleged may all be true and yet constitute no offense, the indictment is insufficient. (People v. Barnes, 314 Ill. 140,145 N.E. 391.) In the absence of an accusation charging defendant with a violation of the criminal law, the indictment is void on its face, the trial court has no jurisdiction or authority to convict, and the defendant cannot by waiver or consent confer such jurisdiction or authority. People v. Fore, 384 Ill. 455, 51 N.E.2d 548; People v. Minto, 318 Ill. 293, 149 N.E. 241. For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse this conviction outright.