Court Opinion

ID: 9563565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:41:54.79122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:55.271612
License: Public Domain

RUSSON, Justice,
concurring in parts I and II and dissenting in part III:
While I concur with the majority opinion as to parts I and II, I respectfully dissent as to part III, which holds that Judges Rigtrup and Iwasaki abused their discretion in sentencing Galli to serve consecutive sentences. In my opinion, they did not abuse their discretion as the majority claims but acted well within their statutory right and consistently with our prior case law in ordering consecutive sentences.
The general rule we have wisely and consistently followed is that we will not disturb a sentence “unless it exceeds that prescribed by law or unless the trial court has abused its discretion.” State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986). A trial court abuses its discretion when it “ ‘fails to consider all legally relevant factors’ or if the sentence imposed is ‘clearly excessive.’” State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) (citations omitted). Moreover, we have recognized that “the exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court and the appellate court can properly find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court.” State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978) (citation omitted).
The majority does not assert that the consecutive sentences were clearly excessive. Indeed, it acknowledges that the string of armed robberies Galli committed were “very serious crimes.” Nor does the majority contend that the trial judges failed to consider all legally relevant factors when they sentenced Galli.1 Instead, it tenuously asserts that the judges “may not have given adequate weight to certain mitigating circumstances.” However, in doing so, the majority has selected those factors which the majority deems relevant in senténcing and has simply imposed its own judgment without granting any deference to the trial judges, who are much more familiar with this case and with this defendant, and who are in a much better position than this court to impose sentences.
Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that the judges failed to properly weigh certain factors, the “mitigating circumstances” which the majority relies upon are hardly mitigating at all. With respect to the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the majority offers three mitigating circumstances: (1) Galli did not inflict any physical injuries on his victims; (2) the pellet gun which he used during the robberies was incapable of inflicting serious injury; and (3) the amount of money taken was relatively small. In addition to being incorrect, these observations are wholly irrelevant.
For example, under section 76-6-302, a person commits aggravated robbery if he “(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon *940as defined in Section 76-1-601; (b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or (c) takes an operable motor vehicle.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(1) (emphasis added). To say that because Galli did not inflict physical injury upon his victims, he should be treated with leniency is tantamount to saying that his punishment should be mitigated by the fact that he refrained from taking an operable motor vehicle. Causing serious bodily injury is simply one means by which an individual may be guilty of aggravated robbery; its absence does not constitute a mitigating circumstance.
The majority also misapprehends the nature of a pellet gun. Common sense indicates that a pellet gun, while not as dangerous as a .357 magnum, can certainly cause death or serious injury if it strikes its victim in certain vulnerable parts of the body. Nevertheless, even if Galli had used a facsimile or representation of a dangerous weapon, he still would have committed aggravated robbery so long as the victims reasonably believed the facsimile was likely to cause death or serious bodily injury. See id. § 76-1-601(5). Therefore, the majority’s conclusion that an offender’s use of a pellet gun may be a mitigating factor in sentencing directly contravenes the purpose of the aggravated robbery statute, which is to impose a harsher punishment2 when the offender uses either a dangerous weapon or a facsimile or representation of such a weapon which creates in the victim an apprehension that the device would cause death or serious injury.
Lastly, the majority’s observation that Gal-li stole only a relatively small amount of money makes a travesty of justice. Will we cal the next robber who leaves half the money in the till a charitable thief and treat him with more leniency than the one who emptied it?
As to the majority’s consideration of Galli’s criminal history, the majority states that he had only a minor traffic offense and a misdemeanor theft conviction. Moreover, the majority gives weight to the fact that the State did not charge him with bail jumping when he absconded to Minnesota. However, the majority ignores the fact that when Judge Iwasaki imposed the first consecutive sentence, Galli’s criminal history included an aggravated robbery conviction. Furthermore, when Judge Rigtrup imposed the second consecutive sentence, Galli’s criminal history included two aggravated robbery convictions. Also, the fact that the State elected not to charge Galli with bail jumping cannot be considered a mitigating factor. Indeed, it would be nearly impossible to count the times when the State could have charged an individual with several crimes as opposed to just one but chose not to for one reason or another. However, this does not, in any way, preclude the sentencing judge from considering the defendant’s actions to be aggravating circumstances deserving a harsher sentence.
With respect to the majority’s consideration of Galli’s character, the majority gives weight to the fact that while Galli was in Minnesota, “he apparently obeyed the law, helped his neighbors, and was a productive individual.” It almost goes without saying that a fugitive from justice will be on his best behavior so as not to be noticed by the authorities. Also, the majority’s references to Galli’s helping his neighbors and being a “productive individual” are so vague that they lack any substantive merit. The majority further gives weight to the fact that Galli expressed a commitment and hope to improve himself. While Galli should be commended for his intentions of becoming a better person, most judges would agree that a defendant tends to express remorse and intentions of conversion right about the time the judge is considering the defendant’s sentence. Nevertheless, even if a defendant’s desire to reform should be given weight during sentencing, the sentencing judge — not this court — is best equipped to evaluate the defendant’s credibility and sincerity in this regard.
Finally, the majority suggests that concurrent rather than consecutive sentences better serve Galli’s rehabilitative needs by allowing *941the Board of Pardons and Parole to release him after five years if he has shown “genuine progress toward rehabilitation.” In doing so, the majority recognizes the Board’s discretion to release prisoners before their sentences have run but ignores the trial courts’ discretion to set minimum sentences. Nevertheless, those courts play an important role in sentencing criminal offenders, and I am unwilling to take away what the legislature has given to them.
The majority’s opinion in part III sends a message to would-be criminals that they will receive no harsher punishment for committing two, three, or even twenty crimes than if they committed only one, so long as after they have completed their crime spree they become law-abiding individuals who help their neighbors and who desire to reform. Contrary to such reasoning, the legislature undoubtedly gave sentencing judges discretion, in part, to impose consecutive sentences for the very purpose of deterring criminals from engaging in repetitive criminal behavior.
Without any evidence that the judges in this ease abused their discretion, I would affirm the consecutive sentences. At a minimum, the majority should remand this case to the trial judges to consider those “mitigating circumstances” which the majority asserts they failed to weigh. Only then can this court engage in meaningful appellate review to determine whether the judges in fact abused their discretion.

. The legally relevant factors are outlined in section 76-3-401, which provides that in determining whether to impose consecutive sentences, the judge must consider "the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) (Supp.1997).

. Robbery is a second degree felony, whereas aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-301 & -302.