Court Opinion

ID: 9634020
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 12:14:40.863245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:48.193249
License: Public Domain

SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
California law requires that employees be compensated for all time “during which an employee is subject to the control of an employer.” Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 22 Cal.4th 575, 578, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 995 P.2d 139 (2000). In Morillion, the California Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs were “subject to the control” of their employer during a mandatory bus commute because “plaintiffs could not drop off their children at school, stop for break*1102fast before work, or run other errands requiring the use of a car.” Id. at 586, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 995 P.2d 139. The California Supreme Court reasoned that the “[p]laintiffs were foreclosed from numerous activities in which they might otherwise engage if they were permitted to travel to the fields by their own transportation.” Id. That is precisely the situation here. Rutti was required to drive the company vehicle, could not stop off for personal errands, could not take passengers, was required to drive the vehicle directly from home to his job and back, and could not use his cell phone while driving except that he had to keep his phone on to answer calls from the company dispatcher. There is simply no denying that Rutti was under Lojack’s control while driving the Lojack vehicle en route to the first Lojack job.
The majority attempts to distinguish Morillion by summarily concluding that “Rutti’s use of Lojack’s automobile to commute to and from his job sites is more analogous to the ‘home to departure points’ transportation in Morillion than to the employees’ transportation on the employer’s buses.” Aside from the lack of factual analysis to support this ipse dixit, the majority also utterly ignores the relevant question under California law, which is whether Rutti was “subject to the control of an employer” during his mandatory travel time. A straightforward application of Morillion easily answers that question in the affirmative. Rutti was required not only to drive the Lojack vehicle to the job site, but was forbidden from attending to any personal business along the way. Because he was obviously under the employer’s control in these circumstances he was, under California law, entitled to be paid.1
The majority makes the mistake of assuming that any employer-mandated travel that begins at home is automatically noncompensable, but that assumption again ignores the controlling legal principle. It is the “level of the employer’s control over its employees” that “is determinative,” not whether the employee just so happens to depart from his home instead of some other location. Id. at 587, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 995 P.2d 139. Here, the level is total control. To repeat, Rutti was required to use the company truck and was permitted no personal stops or any other personal use. Thus, under Morillion, Rutti had a valid state-law claim for compensation. I would, therefore, reverse the dismissal of this portion of his lawsuit. To that extent, I respectfully dissent, but I agree with the balance of the majority opinion.

. The additional cases cited by the majority do nothing to advance its conclusion. In Overton v. Walt Disney Co., 136 Cal.App.4th 263, 271, 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 693 (2006), the court held that time spent by an employee on an employer-provided shuttle bus from the employer parking lot to the job site was not compensable because the employees were not required to use the parking lot or to take the shuttle. In contrast, Rutti was required to drive the company vehicle and was subject to numerous restrictions while doing so. The majority also cites Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir.2007), which it says gave "no suggestion that the employees [in Morillion ] were entitled to compensation for commuting to the designated meeting points.” But no one has ever suggested that the employees in Morillion were entitled to compensation for that time — they clearly were not "subject to the control of an employer” then. Finally, California Labor Code § 510(b) does not apply to compulsory travel time. See Morillion, 22 Cal.4th at 590 n. 6, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 995 P.2d 139.