Court Opinion

ID: 9752100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:36:25.366134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:07.420372
License: Public Domain

ROBERT M. BELL, Judge,
dissenting.
I agree totally with the Court of Special Appeals that the Circuit Court for Frederick County erred when it, relying on the “antiquated version [of the boulevard rule], which gives favored drivers the right-of-way regardless of contributory negligence,” see Myers v. Bright, 327 Md. 395, 404, 609 A.2d 1182, 1186 (1992), granted the petitioner’s (Ida Patricia Myers’) motion for judgment. Bright v. Myers, 88 Md.App. 296, 305, 594 A.2d 1177, 1181 (1991). Because the boulevard rule is inapplicable to the facts sub judice, the intermediate appellate court correctly held that the issues of negligence and contributory negligence, rather than being resolved on a motion for judgment, should have been submitted to the jury for its determination. Id. at 305, 594 A.2d at 1181.
*411The majority rejects the Court of Special Appeals’ conclusion that the trial judge’s ruling was based on the boulevard rule, expressing its belief that “the trial judge was merely making an aside about the boulevard rule and recognized that Myers’ contributory negligence would have precluded recovery.” 327 Md. at 404, 609 A.2d at 1186. Its support for that belief—that before the trial judge referred to the boulevard rule, he had stated “ T don’t see that [Myers] did anything that contributed to the accident at all,’ ” id.,— overlooks the fact that the argument on the motion for judgment proceeded on the basis, and on no other, of the boulevard rule: the petitioner argued “there is very clear evidence that Mr. Bright did take away the right-of-way of Ms. Myers in violation of the boulevard rule.” Moreover, in granting the petitioner’s motion, the trial judge spoke in terms of an absolute right-of-way: “Obviously Mr. Bright had a duty to yield the right of way to Mrs. Myers”; “[Mrs. Myers] has the right to assume that no one is going to take the right of way from her”; and “[s]he was travelling perhaps in excess of the posted speed limit. But that by itself is not evidence of contributory negligence from one who must assume that no one is going to take the right of way.” As Judge Alpert, speaking for the Court of Special Appeals, so aptly observed:
[T]he trial court incorrectly stated that appellee had “the right to assume that no one is going to take the right of way from her.” No such absolute right-of-way, as is found under the boulevard rule, exists pursuant to section 21-402[1]. Whereas a directed verdict[2] is appropriate in *412boulevard law cases where the favored driver was proceeding lawfully because of the automatic finding of negligence as a matter of law, see, e.g., Dail [v. Tri-City Trucking Co., 39 Md.App. 430, 432, 387 A.2d 293, 295, cert. denied, 283 Md. 741 (1978)], the language of section 21-402 indicates that it is incumbent upon the trier of fact to determine whether the car “approaching from the opposite direction” was or was not so near so as to constitute “an immediate danger.” As the Court of Appeals stated in Meldrum v. Kellam Distributing Co., 211 Md. 504, 128 A.2d 400 (1957):
Where the nature and attributes of an act relied upon to show negligence contributing to an injury sustained can only be determined correctly by considering all the attending and surrounding circumstances of the transaction, it falls within the province of the jury to pass upon and characterize it and it is not for the court to determine its quality as a matter of law.
Id. at 511, 128 A.2d [at 403] (applying section 21-402(a)). In this case, the jury must determine whether Myers’ car was near enough to create “an immediate danger” of which Bright should have been aware. Additionally, the jury must consider whether Myers acted in a contributorily negligent manner, i.e., whether the speed at which she was travelling was excessive.
88 Md.App. at 304-05, 594 A.2d at 1181.
Addressing the contributory negligence of the petitioner, the majority asserts: “We must keep in mind that there is no hard evidence that Myers was, in fact, speeding. There is merely a possibility that she was driving her car a few miles an hour above the posted limit.” 327 Md. at 404, 609 A.2d at 1186. That assertion is, to say the least, just a little curious.
There was ample evidence from which the jury could have found that the petitioner was speeding and, therefore, con*413tributorily negligent. Much of that evidence came from the testimony of the motorcyclist, upon which the majority also heavily relies. It is true that the motorcyclist, who was behind the pickup truck, the driver of which motioned the respondent (Matthew Lynn Bright) to proceed, did state, on direct examination, that he could not say whether the petitioner was speeding. On the other hand, that same witness provided evidence critical to the respondent’s case. He noted, in the first place, that the respondent “almost made it across the road but [the petitioner] nailed him in the back of his car.” Just as important he testified on cross-examination, as follows:
Q. [By the respondent’s counsel] And you’re unsure of the speed?
A. Like I said the light had changed. The only thing I can think is she was going a normal speed. Is the only thing I can think because the light had changed for her to go.
Q. Did she seem to come out of nowhere?
A. Yes she did but there was nothing in front of her at that time. Because those other cars had already cleared out. That’s why the guy in the pickup truck motioned for him to come across.
Q. And did you also believe that the area was clear until she came out of nowhere?
A. I can see the area was clear. I mean in front of her ... in front of her. I could see that there was nothing in front of her.
Q. But you did indicate that she seemed to come from out of nowhere, is that correct?
A. Well yes but I was in the lane to turn left and I really wasn’t paying any attention until the guy in the truck motioned for him to come across. And like I said, me being on my motorcycle I try to watch everything. I look in my mirror of my motorcycle and I seen her coming, (emphasis added)
*414In addition to the foregoing, from the petitioner’s testimony, the jury could have found that she was travelling above the speed limit by as much as 10 miles.
The majority suggests that even if the petitioner were speeding, a fact that the court did not discount, judgment in favor of the petitioner as a matter of law was nevertheless required because the evidence did not demonstrate that her speed was the proximate cause of the accident. By so holding, the majority assumes, on the basis of mere conjecture, the result it wishes to achieve. This record is skimpy, at best, on the question of where the various cars were in relation to each other at the critical time. All we know is that the respondent’s left turning car was waved across by the driver of a truck waiting to turn left. What we don’t know is where, vis-a-vis the respondent’s car, the petitioner’s was at the time. While the petitioner’s testimony would suggest that she was near the intersection, the motorcyclist’s testimony may be otherwise construed; he indicated, as we have seen, that she appeared “to come from out of nowhere.” In any event, we know that the left turning vehicle almost made it into the parking lot before it was hit in the back. How these circumstances relate to the duties and responsibilities of the parties to the accident is a matter for the jury’s determination, on proper instructions, not the trial court’s on a motion for judgment.
The majority recognizes that:
In some circumstances, someone planning to turn left might make a reasonable observation of the oncoming motorist and realize that (1) the driver is not obeying the speed laws and (2) the turn cannot be made safely. Under other circumstances, however, the turning driver, making a reasonable observation of traffic, will not be able to recognize that the oncoming vehicle is moving faster than the law allows and might reasonably proceed into the turn. Factors that might mask an approaching vehicle’s speed from a prudent driver—and thus lead him or her to misjudge the timing of its arrival—could include *415weather conditions, distance, topography, angle of observation, etc.
Thus, a speeding driver may not appear to necessarily constitute “an immediate danger” to a left-turning driver, even when the laws of physics dictate that there will be a collision if the turning driver proceeds. Drivers, including those intending to turn left, are ordinarily entitled to assume that other drivers are obeying the law. Visual or aural information sufficient to overcome the ordinary assumption that the approaching driver is travelling within the speed limit might not be available.
327 Md. at 401-402, 609 A.2d at 1184-1185. The majority suggests that because the respondent could not see, he had no opportunity “to gauge the speed or location of any oncoming vehicle” and, thus, the finding of negligence, as a matter of law, was justified.
What the majority fails to recognize is that the respondent’s negligence does not answer the question whether the evidence was sufficient to justify submission of the case to the jury on the petitioner’s contributory negligence. That the respondent may not have looked and, therefore, may have been negligent does not negate, or relieve, the trier of fact of the need to resolve additional issues of proximate causation that may have been presented. The facts and circumstances of this case indicate that even after the respondent was found negligent, a real issue persisted as to the petitioner’s contributory negligence, which should not have been resolved on a motion for judgment, using conjecture and speculation, on the basis of factual findings made by the court. When a case is tried to a jury, finding facts is the province of the jury, not the trial court.
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

. Maryland Code (1977, 1987 Repl.Vol.), Transp. Article, § 21-402(a) provides:
(a) Turning left.—If the driver of a vehicle intends to turn to the left in an intersection or into an alley or a private road or driveway, the driver shall yield the right-of-way to any other vehicle that is approaching from the opposite direction and is in the intersection or so near to it as to be an immediate danger.

. Maryland Rule 2-519(a) provides for a “motion for judgment” to be made at the end of the plaintiff s case or, in a jury trial, at the close of all the evidence. The motion for judgment was formerly the "motion *412for directed verdict." Consequently, under present practice, the court did not “direct a verdict,” rather it “granted judgment.”