Court Opinion

ID: 9380567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-20 16:07:14.881305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:26.226754
License: Public Domain

J-A23009-22

                                   2023 PA Super 44

    CHRIS TAYLOR                               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    PENNSYLVANIA STATE                         :   No. 1473 MDA 2021
    CORRECTIONS OFFICERS                       :
    ASSOCIATION                                :

              Appeal from the Order Entered October 15, 2021
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County Civil Division at
                             No(s): 2021-688

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY BOWES, J.:                                   FILED MARCH 20, 2023

       Chris Taylor appeals from the October 15, 2021 order sustaining the

preliminary objections of the Pennsylvania State Corrections Officers

Association (“PSCOA”) as to Mr. Taylor’s claim under the Declaratory

Judgments Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 7531-41, which sought a legal determination

that PSCOA had violated its duty of fair representation. We affirm.

       The underlying facts of this matter are undisputed.        Mr. Taylor is

employed by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections at SCI-Huntingdon

in a bargaining unit represented by PSCOA. Mr. Taylor was a member of this

labor union until June 2019, when he and several of his colleagues resigned

from PSCOA in response to the United States Supreme Court’s holding in

Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 2448, 2486 (2018),

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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which established that “public-sector unions may no longer extract agency

fees from nonconsenting employees” under the First Amendment to the United

States Constitution.      Despite his resignation, PSCOA remains Mr. Taylor’s

“exclusive representative” pursuant to the Public Employe Relations Act

(“PERA”), 43 P.S. §§ 1101.101-.2301.1 See 43 P.S. § 1101.606. Accordingly,

PSCOA remains obligated under Pennsylvania law “to bargain on wages,

hours, terms and conditions of employment” upon Mr. Taylor’s behalf. Id.

Furthermore, both parties agree PSCOA has an ongoing duty under the

relevant collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) to submit employment

grievances on Mr. Taylor’s behalf and represent him at related proceedings.

       In or about July 2019, PSCOA promulgated a schedule of fees in

connection with its putative representation of non-union members like Mr.

Taylor in the context of various employment grievances (“the fee schedule”).

See id. at Exhibit A. This document provides as follows:

        Scheduling Fees for Grievance and Heart and Lung Arbitrations

       Grievance Process
       Step 1:   Filing fee $50.00
       Step 2:   Filing fee $100.00
                 Panel cost of 3 business agents @ [$]40.00 per hour

____________________________________________

1 We note that “[i]ndividual claims by employees against the union that allege
a breach of the duty of fair representation do not qualify as unfair labor
practices in violation of PERA.” Case v. Hazelton Area Educational
Support Personnel Ass’n (PSEA/NEA), 928 A.2d 1154, 1161 (Pa.Cmwlth.
2007) (en banc). Although the decisions of the Commonwealth Court do not
bind this Court, such writings do constitute persuasive authority. See
Eastern Steel Constructors, Inc. v. International Fid. Ins. Co., 282 A.3d
827, 861 n.40 (Pa.Super. 2022).

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                     Representation from local-Local VP @ $200.00 per
                     day plus travel and lodging
       Step 3:       Filing fee/Cost of Arbitrator $3000.00
                     Lawyer @ $250.00 per hour plus travel and lodging
                     Business Agent @ $40.00 per hour
                     Executive Officers @ $85.00 per hour

       Heart and Lung Process (Denial or termination of benefit)
       Filing fee $225.00
       Cost of Arbitrator $3000.00
       Lawyer @ $250.00 per hour plus travel and lodging
       Medical Reports and Depositions – Cost varies ($1000.00 to
       $4000.00) Average cost is $5000.00 and up.

Id. (line breaks homogenized).

       In June 2021, Mr. Taylor initiated this declaratory judgment action by

filing a civil complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Huntingdon County.2

See Complaint, 6/23/21, at ¶¶ 1-47. Therein, he asserted, upon non-specific

“information and belief,” that PSCOA “will refuse to file a grievance on behalf

of a nonmember without first receiving payment” as provided in the above-

quoted fee schedule. Id. at ¶ 20. Furthermore, Mr. Taylor alleged that the

fee schedule was instituted in “bad faith” to discourage non-members of

PSCOA from filing grievances and to retaliate against Mr. Taylor and other

union resignees. Id. at ¶¶ 29-31. Thus, he requested a determination that

the institution of non-member fees in connection with employment grievances

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2  Our jurisprudence suggests that claims in the courts of common pleas
concerning a union’s alleged breach of the duty of fair representation must be
equitable in nature. See Waklet-Riker v. Sayre Educ. Ass’n, 656 A.2d 138,
141 (Pa.Super. 1995). It is well-established that “declaratory judgment
actions arise in equity[.]” Carlino East Brandywine, L.P. v. Brandywine
Village Assoc., 197 A.3d 1189, 1199 (Pa.Super. 2018).

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and arbitration by PSCOA had breached the duty of fair representation under

Pennsylvania state law. Id. at ¶¶ 35-47.

      PSCOA filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer pursuant

to Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(4), arguing Mr. Taylor had failed to allege a sufficient

basis to sustain a cause of action for a breach of the duty of fair

representation.   Specifically, PSCOA asserted that Mr. Taylor had failed to

plead sufficient material facts in support of his claims for relief.        See

Preliminary Objections, 8/18/21, at ¶ 34 (“The instant [c]omplaint contains

no averment that that PSCOA acted in bad faith other than the conclusory

statement made by [Mr. Taylor.]”). The trial court held a brief hearing on the

preliminary objections, wherein Mr. Taylor rested upon the allegations present

in his complaint. See N.T. Hearing, 12/27/21, at 4 (“I think that the facts

here are far from conclusionary. . . . And there are plenty of paragraphs that

related to how it is bad faith and discriminatory against non-members.”).

      On October 15, 2021, the trial court sustained PSCOA’s preliminary

objections and dismissed Mr. Taylor’s complaint without prejudice.      Rather

than amend, on November 9, 2021, Mr. Taylor filed a praecipe to dismiss his

claims with prejudice. On November 15, 2021, he filed a timely notice of

appeal to this Court. Both Mr. Taylor and the trial court have complied with

the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Mr. Taylor has raised a single issue for our review:

      Does a complaint allege sufficient facts to show that a union
      violates its duty to fairly represent all employees when it alleges
      that the union discriminates against those who are not union

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      members, and institutes policies to retaliate against an employee
      it disfavors, in the administration of rights under the collective
      bargaining agreement?

Appellant’s brief at 2.

      In reviewing this matter, we bear the following legal principles in mind:

      In ruling on preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer,
      the trial court was required to accept as true all well-pleaded
      allegations of material fact and all reasonable inferences deducible
      from those facts and resolve all doubt in favor of the non-moving
      party. The question presented was whether, on the facts averred,
      the law says with certainty that no recovery is possible. When
      any doubt exists as to whether the demurrer should be sustained,
      this doubt should be resolved in favor of overruling it.

      On appeal from the trial court’s order overruling preliminary
      objections in the nature of [a] demurrer, our standard of review
      is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Hence, we apply
      the same standard as the trial court in evaluating the legal
      sufficiency of the complaint, and examine whether, on the facts
      averred, the law says with certainty that no recovery is possible.

Lomax v. Sullivan, 282 A.3d 790, 792 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up). In

this context, “no testimony or other evidence outside of the complaint may be

considered to dispose of the legal issues presented by a demurrer.” Mellon

Bank, N.A. v. Fabinyi, 650 A.2d 895, 899 (Pa.Super. 1994). However, “a

court need not accept as true conclusions of law, unwarranted inferences, or

expressions of opinion.” Bayada Nurses, Inc. v. Comm., Dept. of Labor

and Industry, 8 A.3d 866, 884 (Pa. 2010).

      This case implicates the duty of fair representation, which arises

because “a union acts as a trustee for the rights of its members and employees

in the bargaining unit.”    Case v. Hazelton Area Educational Support

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Personnel Ass’n (PSEA/NEA), 928 A.2d 1154, 1158 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2007) (en

banc).3 Consequently, “the members and employees are beneficiaries of a

fiduciary obligation owed to them by the union,” which the union transgresses

“when it acts in bad faith toward its members, and violates the fiduciary trust

created from the principal-agent relationship.” Case, supra at 1158 (citing

Falsetti v. Local Union No. 2026, UMWA, 161 A.2d 882, 895 (Pa. 1960)).

Specifically, “[a] union has the duty to fairly represent its members

throughout any grievance and arbitration process provided for by a collective

bargaining agreement.”         Miles v. FOP Lodge #5, 217 A.3d 892, 898-99

(Pa.Cmwlth. 2019).         A labor union violates its duty if, in processing an

employee’s grievance, it does “not act in good faith, in a reasonable manner

and without fraud[.]”          Falsetti, supra at 895-96.       Finally, “a public

employee’s remedy for his bargaining agent’s refusal to submit a grievance

. . . is an action against the union for damages for breach of its duty of fair

representation.” Ziccardi v. Comm., 456 A.2d 979, 981 (Pa. 1984).

       Mr. Taylor’s arguments are best summarized as follows: “Pennsylvania

law prohibits a union from discriminating against a nonmember in the

administration of rights under a CBA.            And, in this case, [PSCOA’s] own

contract grants rights to all employees it represents. The Union may not now

____________________________________________

3 We note that the name of one of the litigants, Hazleton Area Educational
Support Personnel Association, is misspelled in the name of this case. See
Case, supra at 1155. For the sake of consistency and accurate citation, we
have utilized the “correct” title of the case throughout this writing.

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condition those rights to nonmembers on newly invented, and illegal, pay-to-

play fees.” Appellant’s brief at 11-12. Under Mr. Taylor’s theory, PSCOA’s

circulation of the fee schedule is sufficient to demonstrate it has acted in bad

faith and to retaliate against Mr. Taylor for resigning from the union.

      The scope of PSCOA’s representation of Mr. Taylor in the context of

employment grievances emanates from the terms of the CBA, as evidenced

by the contents of Mr. Taylor’s complaint. See Complaint, 6/23/21, at ¶¶ 18-

19 (averring that PSCOA’s representation of Mr. Taylor in the context of

grievances is governed by “Article 35” of the CBA); Appellant’s brief at 10 (“As

a corrections officer for the Commonwealth, Mr. Taylor is entitled to the

employments the CBA guarantees to his position.”). Despite referring to this

inherently critical document throughout his complaint, Mr. Taylor has

neglected to attach a copy of the CBA to any filing submitted in the trial court.

Hence, it was not included in the certified record on appeal.       This glaring

oversight creates significant ambiguity with respect to the grievance process

dictated by the CBA and, more importantly, the arguable impact of the fee

schedule upon the grievance and arbitration process that PSCOA must follow.

To the extent Mr. Taylor relies upon the CBA to support his position, such

reliance is fruitless due to the deficiency of his pleadings and the record.

      As drafted, Mr. Taylor’s claim for relief is not grounded in the specific

terms of his employment. Rather, his argument is much more general and

avers that PSCOA is precluded, under all circumstances, from imposing the

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fee schedule. In staking out this position, he asserts that the union cannot

treat him any differently from any other employees of the bargaining unit. Mr.

Taylor is mistaken on this point, however, as it is well-established under

Pennsylvania law that unions enjoy significant discretion in declining to pursue

grievances raised by the individuals that they represent:

       Individual bargaining unit members have no absolute right to have
       their grievances arbitrated. Ziccardi v. Commonwealth, 456
       A.2d 979, 981 (Pa. 1982). Rather, a union has broad discretion
       to determine whether to pursue a grievance to arbitration and has
       no duty to arbitrate every grievance.              Falsetti, supra
       at 894 n.19. . . . A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed
       to a bargaining representative in serving the unit it represents,
       subject always to good faith and honesty of purpose in the
       exercise of this discretion. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345
       U.S. 330, 338 (1953). A union’s actions are arbitrary only if, in
       light of the factual and legal landscape at the time of the union’s
       actions, the union’s behavior is so far outside a wide range of
       reasonableness as to be irrational.          See Air Line Pilots
       Association, International v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 78 (1991).
       Bad faith, for its part, requires a showing that a union either acted
       in a fraudulent, deceitful, or dishonest manner or with an improper
       motive. See Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S.
       274, 299 (1971).

Anderson v. Pleasant Valley Educational Support Professionals’

Assoc., 272 A.3d 999 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2022) (unpublished memorandum at 6).4

Thus, it is incumbent upon a plaintiff to “plead any material facts upon which

a claim of bad faith could be based” in the context of an action for an alleged

breach of the duty of fair representation. Waklet-Riker v. Sayre Area Educ.

____________________________________________

4   The Commonwealth Court permits the citation of its unreported decisions
filed after January 15, 2008, for their persuasive value. See Commonwealth
Court I.O.P. § 414(a).

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Ass’n, 656 A.2d 138, 141 (Pa.Super. 1995).         A plaintiff’s failure to allege

sufficient facts on this required element is “fatal” to their claims. Id.

      Here, the factual record establishes that Mr. Taylor resigned from PSCOA

and no longer pays an agency fee to PSCOA. Approximately one month later,

PSCOA issued the fee schedule and advised Mr. Taylor that any future

employment grievances filed through PSCOA would be governed by these

provisions. These are the only relevant factual averments that Mr. Taylor has

pleaded in support of his allegations of breach of duty and bad faith. See

Complaint, 6/23/21, at ¶¶ 31.       Thus, Mr. Taylor’s claim is that PSCOA’s

promulgation of the fee schedule is self-evidently an act of bad faith under

Pennsylvania law since it constitutes differential treatment.

      As noted above, there is no merit to Appellant’s general contention that

a union must treat all grievances from the individuals it represents identically.

See Anderson, supra at 6. To the contrary, PSCOA is empowered to make

reasonable assessments with respect to deciding whether to pursue employee

grievances based upon “the factual and legal landscape” at the time of its

actions. Id. Furthermore, there is no support under Pennsylvania law for Mr.

Taylor’s broad contention that PSCOA is not permitted to charge ancillary fees

to non-union members in connection with representing such individuals in the

context of employment grievances. Indeed, we note that there is a dearth of

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on-point Pennsylvania precedent concerning this specific question.5     Under

such circumstances, we are permitted to “look to federal decisions for

guidance” where there is “no meaningful difference” between state and federal

labor policies. See, e.g., Burse v. Comm., Pennsylvania Labor Relations

Board, 425 A.2d 1182, 1184 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1981). Under this rubric, Janus

provides substantial guidance here. In that case, the United States Supreme

Court concluded that a state’s “extraction of agency fees from nonconsenting

public-sector employees violates the First Amendment,” overruling Abood v.

Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (permitting mandatory collection of

____________________________________________

5  The holdings selectively cited by Mr. Taylor in support of his position are
unavailing and inapposite. See Appellant’s brief at 12-27. The only such
passage that arguably directly addresses the issue of representing non-union
members in grievances processes comes from dicta from Falsetti v. Local
Union No. 2026, UMWA, 161 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1960), wherein our Supreme
Court quoted the following passage from a secondary source:              “‘The
bargaining representative would be guilty of a breach of duty if it refused to
press a justifiable grievance either because of laziness, prejudice or
unwillingness to spend money on behalf of employees who were not members
of the union.’” Id. at 895 n.21 (quoting Cox, Individual Enforcement of
Collective Bargaining Agreements, 8 Lab.L.J. 850, 858-9 (1957)). This
quotation was offered as an example of the manner in which certain legal
scholars had defined the general scope of the duty of fair representation. Id.

Critically, however, Falsetti never explicitly adopted this precise formulation
with respect to the expenditure of funds on behalf of non-union members and
no subsequent Pennsylvania court has ever elected to do so. Thus, the
passage cited by Mr. Taylor is mere dicta that boasts no precedential value.
See Castellani v. Scranton Times, L.P., 124 A.3d 1229, 1243 n.11 (Pa.
2015). In light of the authoritative guidance offered by Janus on the matters
raised by Mr. Taylor, we decline his invitation to elevate this footnote to the
level of binding precedent under Pennsylvania law.

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agency fees from non-members if utilized solely for “collective bargaining,

contract-administration, and grievance-adjustment purposes”).

      In Janus, the Court also addressed one of the nascent issues posed by

the holding, namely that public-sector unions like PSCOA would be forced to

represent non-members like Mr. Taylor in grievance proceedings, as follows:

      What about the representation of nonmembers in grievance
      proceedings? Unions do not undertake this activity solely for the
      benefit of nonmembers . . . . Representation of nonmembers
      furthers the union’s interest in keeping control of the
      administration of the collective-bargaining agreement, since the
      resolution of one employee’s grievance can affect others. And
      when a union controls the grievance process, it may, as a practical
      matter, effectively subordinate the interests of an individual
      employee . . . to the collective interests of all employees in the
      bargaining unit.

      In any event, whatever unwanted burden is imposed by the
      representation of nonmembers in disciplinary matters can
      be eliminated through means significantly less restrictive
      of associational freedoms than the imposition of agency
      fees. Individual nonmembers could be required to pay for
      that service or could be denied union representation
      altogether.

Janus, supra at 2468 (cleaned up; emphasis added).

      Thus, while acknowledging that “free riders” like Mr. Taylor posed a

potential problem, the Court in Janus concluded that coercive agency fees

were not a viable solution. Rather, the Court suggested that the assessment

of individual fees associated with a union’s representation of a non-member

in pursuing a grievance is an appropriate, alternative response to this financial

conundrum. The above-quoted passage from Janus leads us to conclude that

there is a distinction between shop agency fees assessed as an automatic

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condition of a non-member’s employment in a bargaining unit, and the

permissive payment of certain fees in exchange for actual services rendered

by a public-sector union, i.e., representation in employment grievances and

arbitrations.6   According to the United States Supreme Court, “[t]his more

tailored approach, if applied to other objectors, would prevent free ridership

while imposing a lesser burden on First Amendment rights.” Id. at 2468 n.6.

       Viewing the totality of the factual and legal landscape of this case, we

cannot conclude that Mr. Taylor has proffered material facts demonstrating

that PSCOA has violated the duty of fair representation. As noted above, it is

undisputed that Mr. Taylor chose to alienate himself from his union

membership and elected to cease paying an agency fee to PSCOA.              In

response to these actions, PSCOA adopted the fee schedule to ease the

financial burden posed by its representation of non-members such as Mr.

Taylor in future employment grievances. This is precisely the arrangement

described by the United States Supreme Court as a permissible alternative to

compulsory agency fees. See Janus, supra at 2468 n.6. In the absence of

the CBA, it is not apparent from the record if, or how, the fee schedule will

otherwise negatively impact Mr. Taylor’s rights         with respect to his

____________________________________________

6 As an example of such an alternative arrangement, the Supreme Court cited
an Illinois statute providing that individuals who declined to pay agency fees
on religious grounds could be charged a “reasonable cost” by the union if they
later sought to avail themselves of union representation in a “grievance or
arbitration procedure[.]” Janus, supra at 2468 n.6 (citing 5 ILCS 315/6(g)).

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representation by PSCOA. Furthermore, Mr. Taylor has offered no allegations

that the fees imposed by PSCOA are excessive or unrelated to prospective

grievance and arbitration proceedings.        The mere fact that PSCOA has

implemented the fee schedule is not, in and of itself, sufficient to establish a

violation of the duty of fair representation. Without additional material facts

to support his conclusory averments, we cannot find that Mr. Taylor has

asserted a sufficient basis to establish that PSCOA has acted arbitrarily,

irrationally, or fraudulently. See Anderson, supra at 6.

      Based upon the foregoing discussion, we agree with the trial court’s

assessment that Mr. Taylor is not entitled to recovery as a matter of law.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/20/2023

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