Court Opinion

ID: 9785709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 22:16:35.445151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:14.095101
License: Public Domain

BRYNER, Justice,
with whom FABE, Justice, joins, dissenting.
I agree that Brown's call to Lange's attorney did not amount to a Rule 55 "appearance" but disagree with the court's conclusion that Lange's attorney had no duty to notify Brown of his intent to apply for entry of default. In my view, this court's caselaw *829obliged Lange's attorney to inform Brown of the impending default.
Cook v. Aurora Motors, Inc. was the first of our cases to recognize an attorney's professional duty to give reasonable notice to an opposing party before applying for a default.1 As the court's opinion today correctly notes,2 Cook drew this duty from the American College of Trial Lawyers Code of Trial Conduct, which, at the time, advised:
When [a lawyer] knows the identity of a lawyer representing an opposing party, he should not take advantage of the lawyer by causing any default or dismissal to be entered without first inquiring about the opposing lawyer's intention to proceed.3
The Trial Lawyers Code obviously regards this duty a "professional courtesy"-that is, as an obligation that one lawyer owes another by virtue of their common bond in the legal profession. Yet even though both parties in Cook were represented by counsel,4 Cook carefully avoided describing the notice requirement as this kind of narrow, lawyer-to-lawyer duty. After quoting the Trial Lawyers Code approvingly, Cook found that "[this practice is a highly desired courtesy to the opposing side." 5
We reaffirmed Cook's notice requirement in City of Valdes v. Salomon.6 Like Cook, Salomon involved lawyers on both sides of the litigation.7 More recently, though, in Herts v. Bersanske,8 we expressly extended the notice requirement to situations involving unrepresented litigants9 In Herts an injured motorist sued Hertz for injuries arising from a collision. Hertz's insurance adjuster, Dean, contacted the plaintiff's attorney, Gregg, and asked for twenty additional days to answer the complaint.10 After the twenty-day deadline passed, Gregg moved for entry of default without informing either Hertz or Dean of his intentions.11 This court, relying on Cook and Salomon, found the default improper, holding that Gregg breached his duty to notify his opponent:
While Gregg did send a letter to Dean advising him of the twenty day extension, he made no effort to notify Dean of his intent thereafter to seek a default, or to inquire about Dean's intention to proceed. We have adopted the following rule of trial conduct:
When [a lawyer] knows the identity of a lawyer representing an opposing party, he should not take advantage of the lawyer by causing any default or dismissal to be entered without first inquiring about the opposing lawyer's intention to proceed.
The same rule of inquiry should apply when a lawyer knows the identity of an agent representing an opposing party, even if he does not know the identity of opposing counsel. "[The purpose of the default procedure is to prevent a procrastinating defendant from unduly delaying a case; it should not be regarded as a tactical tool by which a plaintiff may obtain judgment without the bother and expense of litigation." While Gregg had the procedural right to seek a default entry, he was obligated to inquire into Hertz's intent to proceed and to inform Hertz of his intent to seek a default entry.12
Hertz thus recognizes that the duty of pre-default inquiry and notice can arise when a plaintiff's attorney is contacted by a non-*830lawyer on behalf of the defendant.13 More significantly, in holding that Gregg "was obligated to inquire into Hertz's intent to proceed and to inform Hertz of his intent to seek a default entry," Hertz expressly recognizes that the plaintiffs lawyer owes this duty not to the defendant's agent, but directly to the defendant.14
Thus, in concluding that Cook merely establishes a rule of "professional courtesy," today's opinion misreads our caselaw. Until now, we have always viewed Cook's notice requirement not just as a courtesy among lawyers, but as a duty owed directly to the defendant.15
The court offers two reasons for limiting Cook to attorneys and agents. Neither is persuasive.
First, the court asserts, "(tlhe act of retaining an attorney ... unequivocally evidences an intent to defend the case.16 But surely this overstates the case. A defendant who has just been served with a complaint will often consult an attorney as a tentative first step in deciding what to do. If the defendant ultimately decides to hire the attorney and defend the case, the event that "unequivocally evidences" this decision is the lawyer's formal entry of appearance. And because this entry formally signals a commitment to defend, a lawyer who is consulted about defending but subsequently fails to appear and answer necessarily raises serious questions about the defendant's intent.
So too, a defendant's early discussion of settlement through a lawyer or a non-attorney agent signals neither a commitment to settle nor an unequivocal decision to defend. Hertz provides a useful example. Hertz's adjuster, Dean, discussed the possibility of settlement with plaintiff's counsel, Gregg, before Gregg had even filed a complaint.17 Later, after asking Gregg for an informal extension of time to answer, Dean failed even to acknowledge Gregg's letter granting the extension and discussing a settlement.18 At the time Gregg applied for default, Hertz's insurer, Providence Washington, had not yet assigned an attorney to the case, and it is unclear whether Providence Washington had even made a final decision to cover Hertz's claim.19
These cireamstances hardly constitute "unequivocal evidence" of Hertz's commitment to defend his claim. To the contrary, when viewed in conjunction with Hertz's failure to meet the deadline for filing his answer, they raise serious questions about his intent. Yet despite these uncertainties-indeed, because of these uncertainties-this court concluded that, Gregg was "obligated to inquire into Hertz's intent to proceed and to inform Hertz of his intent to seek a default entry.20 By specifying that Gregg's duty encompassed the duty to "inquire into Hertz's intent to proceed,21 we unmistakably signaled that our decisions in Cook, Salomon, and Herts are founded on the existence of doubt concerning the defendant's intent to defend, not on unequivocal evidence of a decision to defend. Thus, the force driving the duty is uncertainty, not certainty.
In the case at hand, the cireumstances surrounding Brown's failure to file a timely answer raised substantial questions about his intent to defend. Brown called Lange's attorney's office within the allowable time for *831filing an answer; he was not represented by counsel but expressed a clear interest in defending the case. Brown left his message on the law firm's voice mail. He also left his telephone number in Kake, where he lived with his parents. A legal assistant returned Brown's call but was unable to reach him because he was out fishing; she spoke with his mother instead, and asked her to relay the firm's message. The legal assistant told Brown's mother that no court date had yet been set and that Brown would need to file an answer to the complaint. But the legal assistant did not remind Brown of the deadline for answering or the consequences of failing to answer. Neither did she encourage him to consult an attorney if he had further questions.22 Less than a month later, with no further effort to establish contact or inquire into Brown's intentions, Lange's attorney moved for entry of default.
As we emphasized in Herts and Salomon, "[the purpose of the default procedure is to prevent a procrastinating defendant from unduly delaying a case.23 Here, the circumstances surrounding the default hardly suggest deliberate procrastination; to the contrary, they strongly suggest a delay stemming from miscommunication, misunderstanding, or confusion. In my view, these cireumstances generate the same kind of uncertainty that led us to impose the duty of inquiry and notice in Cook, Salomon, and Hertz.
Nor do the cireumstances of this case suggest that compliance with the duty of inquiry and notice would have been burdensome or impractical. Lange's attorney knew Brown's telephone number and knew that Brown lived with his parents in the small community of Kake. Nothing in the record indicates that Brown could not have been reached with a minimal expenditure of time and effort.24 Given these cirenmstances, I fail to see why Lange's attorney should be relieved of the duty that would have applied had Brown been represented by counsel or helped by an agent. In effect, the court simply punishes Brown for being a pro se litigant.
As its second reason for declining to apply Cook, Salomon, and Herts to cases involving pro se litigants, the court expresses the fear of ethical problems grounded on "the law's historical concern about giving legal advice to an opposing party.25 But the court's fear is groundless. The court bases its ethical concern on Rule 4.3 of the Model Rules of Conduct,26 which Alaska has adopted as Rule 4.3 of the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer *832shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.27
Alaska's commentary to this rule explains:
An unrepresented person, particularly one not experienced in dealing with legal matters, might assume that a lawyer is disinterested in loyalties or is a disinterested authority on the law even when the lawyer represents a client.28
As can be seen, the Alaska Rule and its commentary have nothing to do with the present situation. Rule 4.8 and its Alaska commentary address the issue of communicating with unrepresented litigants in a way that might cause them to misunderstand the opposing lawyer's true intentions and interests. But compliance with Cook, Salomon, and Heriz creates no such danger. These cases require a plaintiff's attorney, before applying for default, "to inquire into [the defendant's] intent to proceed and to inform [the defendant] of [plaintiffs] intent to seek a default.29 Because the core purpose of this requirement is to ensure full disclosure of an impending conflict, nothing in Rule 4.3 or the Alaska commentary could conceivably bar such inquiry and notice.
The court nonetheless suggests possible problems arising from a sentence of commentary that appears in Model Rule 4.3; this Model Rule commentary warns: "During the course of a lawyer's representation of a client, the lawyer should not give advice to an unrepresented person other than the advice to obtain counsel.30 But, Alaska's commentary to Rule 4.8 conspicuously omits this sentence of the Model Rule commentary, even though the Alaska rule incorporates the rest of Model Rule 4.3's commentary. Because the omitted commentary strays so far from the text of the Rule itself, Alaska's decision to omit the commentary is hardly surprising.31 Moreover, even if the Model Rule's comment did apply in Alaska, it would not advance the court's position, since a plaintiff's attorney who notifies a pro se defendant that the plaintiff intends to apply for a default cannot plausibly be deemed to be giving the kind of "advice to an unrepresented litigant" that the commentary forbids.
The court thus fails to offer any sound reason why Cook should not extend the present situation. In Cook we emphasized that the chief purpose of requiring a pre-default warning is to "help avoid unnecessary, time-consuming motions before the court.32 Lange's attorney's decision to seek entry of default without prior inquiry or notice to Brown promised exactly this kind of lengthy and unnecessary litigation. The present appeal fulfills the promise. To avoid similar problems, I would hold that the Cook duty of inquiry and notice applied in this case.33
*833Accordingly, I would reverse the superior court's judgment, vacate the default, and remand for trial on the merits.

. 503 P.2d 1046, 1049 n. 6 (Alaska 1972).

. See Op. at 827 n. 26.

. American College of Trial Lawyers Code of Conduct No. 14(a), at 149 (1971-72), incompletely quoted in Cook, 503 P.2d at 1049 n. 6; accurately quoted in City of Valdez v. Salomon, 637 P.2d 298, 299 (Alaska 1981).

. Cook, 503 P.2d at 1049 n. 6.

. - Id. (emphasis added).

. 637 P.2d at 299.

. See id.

. 704 P.2d 767 (Alaska 1985).

. See id. at 772-73.

. See id. at 768-69.

. See id. at 769.

. Id. at 772-73 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

. Although Hertz's adjuster, Dean, was hired to investigate by Providence Washington, our decision specifically described Dean as Hertz's ageni, not Providence Washington's. See id.

. Id. at 773.

. Indeed, it is noteworthy that, although the court's opinion today calls the duty of notice that we adopted in Cook a "professional courtesy," see Op. at 827, our relevant cases-Cook, Salo-mon, and Hertz-never used this term.

. Op. at 828. The court similarly reasons that, [bly the same token, an agent's negotiation of a time extension to answer shows the defendant's intention to resolve the matter by settlement or ... by litigation." Id.

. See Hertz, 704 P.2d at 768.

. See id. at 768-69.

. See id. Our opinion in Hertz suggests that, at the time of the default, Providence Washington had not yet decided whether it would provide Heriz with counsel. Id. at 769.

. Id. at 773 (citations omitted).

. 1d.

. The law firm's records summarized the contact as follows:
Lange, Robert Ernest, 18350-for DLF-3/22/96-On 3/22/96, 10:38 DLF wrote:
Wesley Brown Jr. called this am and wanted to know when he was going to be going to court. I returned his call to let him know there wasn't a court date yet but that he needed to answer the complaint-mail it to the courts w/a copy to CHP.
I left the message w/his mother as he had left to go fishing shortly before I called. The mother did tell me that John Willis the other person you are wanting to serve is in Juneau attending a ... program. She did say that Mr. Brown has not attended his ... program yet. Mr. Brown's phone # is ....
Brown would later indicate that he never received the message. The trial court did not question his explanation.

. Hertz, 704 P.2d at 772 (quoting Salomon, 637 P.2d at 299 n. 1).

. The court suggests that the failure to comply with Cook might be excused on equitable grounds because "Brown's interests must be balanced against the interests of Lange, who has a right to a timely determination of his damages." Op. at 826. But the record demonstrates that this equitable concern is unfounded: Lange's attorney applied for entry of default less than two months after filing Lange's complaint. Having secured the default, he waited more than fourteen months before moving for entry of judgment. Obviously, then, Lange's attorney was in no hurry to obtain "a timely determination of [Lange's] damages." I4.

. Op. at $28.

. Op. at 828 & n. 38 (quoting Model Rule 4.3 cmt. (1998)).

. Alaska R. Prof. C. 4.3.

. Alaska R. Prof. C. 4.3 cint.

. Hertz, 704 P.2d at 773.

. See Op. at 828 n. 38 (quoting Model Rule of Prof. Conduct 4.3 cmt (1998)).

. The omitted commentary's overbreadth can be readily illustrated by applying the commentary to the present case. Here, Lange's attorney instructed his legal assistant to tell Brown that "he needed to answer the complaint-mail it to the courts [with al copy to [Lange's attorneys]." This advice seems sensible and proper. Yet under the literal terms of the omitted Model Code commentary, we would have to conclude that the advice violated Rule 4.3 by (1) improperly advising Brown (an unrepresented litigant) how to handle his case ("he needed to answer the complaint" and "mail it to the court"); and (2) failing to give him the only advice that the comment actually permiis-the advice "to obtain counsel."

. 503 P.2d at 1049 n. 6.

. In comparable circumstances, courts in other jurisdictions have recognized an ethical duty to inquire or give notice before seeking a default. See, e.g., Bellm v. Bellia, 150 Cal.App.3d 1036, 198 Cal.Rptr. 389, 390 (1984) (suggesting that "as a matier of professional courtesy counsel should have given notice of the impending default"); Smith v. Johnston, 711 N.E.2d 1259, 1264 (Ind.1999) (specifying that "courtesy, common sense and the constraints of [the] judicial system" required an attorney to attempt to make contact with his opponent before seeking a default judgment and suggesting that failure to do so was an ethical violation); Lalumera v. Nazareth Hosp., 310 Pa.Super. 401, 456 A.2d 996, 999 (1983) (discussing the court's frequent suggestion that courtesy required counsel to give notice before seeking a default); Hartwell v. Marquez, 201 W.Va. 433, 498 S.E.2d 1, 4 n. 5 (1997) (requiring a lawyer seeking a default or dismissal to first notify opposing counsel and observing that the ethical duties of "courtesy, candor, honesty, diligence, fairness and cooperation" are owed not *833only to courts and counsel, but also to the parties themselves); Miro Tool & Mfg., Inc. v. Midland Mach., Inc., 205 Wis.2d 650, 556 N.W.2d 437, 440-43 (1996) (Anderson, J., concurring) (lamenting that Wisconsin did not follow California in recognizing an ethical duty to inform opposing counsel before seeking entry of a default). Some of these rulings confirm that this duty extends to the opposing party, not just to opposing counsel. See, e.g., Smith, 711 N.E.2d at 1263-64; Hartwell, 498 S.E.2d at 4 n. 5.