Court Opinion

ID: 9378348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-10 06:05:16.81989+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:20.472191
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     March 9, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 359964
                                                                     Ingham Circuit Court
MARCUS CHARLES WRIGHT,                                               LC No. 20-000023-FH

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: RICK, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and RIORDAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       After a bench trial, the trial court found defendant, Marcus Charles Wright, guilty of
accosting a child for immoral purposes, MCL 750.145a. The trial court subsequently sentenced
defendant to serve 20 to 48 months in prison, with credit for 110 days served.1 Defendant appeals
by right. We affirm defendant’s conviction and sentence but remand to the trial court for the
ministerial task of correcting his judgment of sentence.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

        The parties do not dispute the facts in this case, but they are in dispute as to whether the
facts meet the elements of the charged offense. At the time of the offense, the victim was a 12-
year-old girl, and defendant was 34 years old. Defendant was a friend of the family and had
routinely spent time with the victim, her siblings, her mother, and her stepfather. The victim
developed a crush on defendant. The crux of this case is a secret romantic relationship that
defendant carried on with the victim for several months in 2019. The victim’s parents learned
about this secret relationship in August 2019. The evidence at trial showed that the secret
relationship primarily was conducted by text messaging. Defendant put his phone number into the
victim’s phone, and the two began exchanging messages. At first, the messages were benign, but
eventually the messages became far more intimate and personal. As described by the victim, the

1
  As will be discussed, defendant’s judgment of sentence incorrectly states that defendant was
sentenced to serve 21 to 48 months.

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messaging became “like a romantic relationship.” In these messages, defendant used pet names
such as “babe” and “boo” when referring to the victim. Defendant and the victim discussed and
acted as if they were a romantic couple, and the victim testified that she believed that they were a
couple and that defendant had feelings for her. Messages exchanged between defendant and the
victim’s mother show defendant instigated this secret relationship sometime after learning of the
victim’s crush on him.

        The victim and other witnesses testified that this secret relationship began during a period
of time in which the victim was depressed and unhappy. The victim had felt that defendant was
the only person she could confide in during this time. The victim and defendant both testified that
there was no sexual conduct or kissing between the two, and the victim further testified that
defendant never pressured her to engage in any sexual conduct. However, the messages did
contain discussions of sexual activity. Defendant and the victim discussed wanting to engage in
sexual activities but that they needed to wait until the victim turned 18. However, defendant
responded to a message in which the victim stated that she and defendant would “get together
either way” by stating, “[w]e will, and you let me know when you’re ready for more. I don’t want
to pressure you, k.” Defendant conceded that he intentionally encouraged the victim’s crush and
the romantic relationship, however he claimed that he did so to help cheer the victim up during her
difficult time and to boost her confidence.

        This secret relationship was discovered by the victim’s older sister, who found the
messages on the victim’s phone. The victim’s mother contacted police, and an investigation began.
Defendant and the victim were both interviewed. Despite the discovery and investigation,
defendant carried on the secret relationship by using different phones, encouraging the victim to
delete their messages, and instructing the victim to “be discreet.” Defendant even discussed plans
to meet with the victim secretly at a park. Defendant was eventually charged with accosting a
minor, and he waived his right to a jury trial. The trial court heard testimony from the victim,
defendant, and other witnesses. Moreover, an extensive number of text messages were admitted
into evidence and read into the record. The trial court found that the prosecution had proven the
charge beyond reasonable doubt.

         At sentencing, the trial court assessed 15 points for offense variable (OV) 10 and 10 points
for OV 19 over defendant’s objections. Defendant’s recommended guidelines minimum sentence
range was 10 to 23 months, and the trial court orally sentenced defendant “for a minimum term of
20 months, and a maximum of 48.” However, when the judgment of sentence was entered, it listed
a minimum of 21 months and a maximum of 48 months. On appeal, defendant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction, the scoring of OVs 10 and 19, the effectiveness of
his trial counsel, and the accuracy of his judgment of sentence. We affirm on all issues defendant
raises, but remand for the sole purpose of correcting the judgment of sentence.

                                          II. ANALYSIS

                            A. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

                                  1. STANDARD OF REVIEW

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        A claim of insufficient evidence is reviewed de novo. People v Solmonson, 261 Mich App
657, 661; 683 NW2d 761 (2004). The claim invokes a defendant’s constitutional right to due
process of law. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich
1201 (1992); In re Winship, 397 US 358, 364; 90 S Ct 1068; 25 L Ed 2d 368 (1970). All “factual
conflicts are to be viewed in a light favorable to the prosecution.” Wolfe, 440 Mich at 515. We
must “view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any
rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Id. Evidence may be circumstantial or drawn from reasonable inferences.
Solmonson, 261 Mich App at 661. However, inferences may not be based only upon speculation.
People v Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 59; 862 NW2d 446 (2014). Furthermore, “[t]his Court will not
interfere with the trier of fact’s role of determining the weight of the evidence or the credibility of
witnesses.” People v Kanaan, 278 Mich App 594, 619; 751 NW2d 57 (2008).

                                          2. DISCUSSION

       Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We
disagree.

       Accosting a minor is governed by MCL 750.145a:

               A person who accosts, entices, or solicits a child less than 16 years of age,
       regardless of whether the person knows the individual is a child or knows the actual
       age of the child, or an individual whom he or she believes is a child less than 16
       years of age with the intent to induce or force that child or individual to commit an
       immoral act, to submit to an act of sexual intercourse or an act of gross indecency,
       or to any other act of depravity or delinquency, or who encourages a child less than
       16 years of age, regardless of whether the person knows the individual is a child or
       knows the actual age of the child, or an individual whom he or she believes is a
       child less than 16 years of age to engage in any of those acts is guilty of a felony
       punishable by imprisonment for not more than 4 years or a fine of not more than
       $4,000.00, or both. [Emphasis added.]

The prosecution may prove the offense of accosting a minor via two different theories of guilt:

       [T]he defendant (1) accosted, enticed, or solicited (2) a child (or an individual
       whom the defendant believed to be a child) (3) with the intent to induce or force
       that child to commit (4) a proscribed act. Alternatively, a defendant is guilty of
       accosting a minor if the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the
       defendant (1) encouraged (2) a child (or an individual whom the defendant believed
       to be a child) (3) to commit (4) a proscribed act. [People v Kowalski, 489 Mich
       488, 499; 803 NW2d 200 (2011).]

        As described by our Supreme Court, the former theory of guilt “pertains to certain acts and
requires a specific intent” while the latter theory requires only that the defendant encourage the
victim with “general criminal intent.” Id. at 499-500. In other words, for the second theory, “the
act of encouragement is the evil in itself, and an accused, by completing the act, is ‘presumed to
intend the natural consequences of his [actions] . . . .’ ” Id. at 500 (citation omitted; alterations in

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original). The word “encouraged” is defined to mean “to inspire with courage, spirit, or
confidence[,] . . . to stimulate by guidance, approval, . . . to promote; foster.” Id. (quotation marks
and citation omitted; alterations in original).

         This contrasts with the first theory, which “requires the prosecution to demonstrate a
specific intent to induce or force the child to commit proscribed acts; it is not enough for the
prosecution to merely establish that the defendant committed acts of accosting, enticing, or
soliciting.” Id. Accordingly, our Supreme Court stated that, by enumerating these two differing
theories of guilt, our Legislature “demonstrated an intention to criminalize a wide range of sexually
predatory actions aimed at children.” Id. at 500-501.

        In the present case, there was ample evidence for the trier of fact to find that defendant
intended to induce the victim to engage in sexual or immoral conduct or that defendant encouraged
the victim to engage in sexual or immoral conduct. Defendant knew about the victim’s crush on
him, and he conceded that he actively encouraged the victim’s feelings for him. The victim agreed
that defendant treated her as an adult, which she liked; that she and defendant discussed being a
couple; and that she trusted defendant and confided in him during a time of vulnerability. The
victim further agreed that defendant told her that they needed to wait to engage in sexual activities.
However, the victim sometimes felt that she wanted to ignore the law and to do these activities
with defendant anyway. In fact, the victim agreed that if there had been no law against it, she
would have been willing to have sex with defendant.

         Additionally, there were numerous text messages between defendant and the victim
demonstrating that defendant fostered a romantic relationship with the victim. In some of these
messages, defendant told the victim that she smelled and tasted good. In other messages, the two
discussed engaging in sexual conduct in the future. For example, defendant told the victim that he
wanted to give her a “present,” and the victim testified that she understood this to mean having
sex. More so, the defendant continued to message the victim even after the investigation into his
activities began. The messages demonstrated that defendant desired to engage in sexual activity
with the victim and was slowly moving her toward being comfortable with this. There even was
photographic evidence of defendant and the victim sleeping on a couch with defendant’s head on
the victim’s breasts. The lead detective on this case, Detective Jason Pung, testified that, in his
professional opinion, defendant’s conduct amounted to grooming of the victim.

        Thus, there is ample evidence for the trial court to find that defendant was grooming the
victim, i.e., gaining her trust and affection, and actively inducing or encouraging her to eventually
engage in an immoral or sexual act with him. See Kowalski, 489 Mich at 499-500; MCL 750.145a.
The victim was in a vulnerable and depressed state, and defendant used the victim’s trust to
manipulate and encourage her into a false relationship. This required only the general intent to
encourage the victim, Kowalski, 489 Mich at 499, which the evidence, taken in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, supports. Defendant goes to great lengths to argue that he never
intended to engage in any sexual conduct with the victim. However, his testimony was a matter
of credibility for the trier of fact to decide, and this Court will not disturb such a finding. Kanaan,
278 Mich App at 619.

                        B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

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                                  1. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        Because defendant failed to move the trial court for a new trial or evidentiary hearing, we
review his ineffective assistance claim for errors apparent from the record. See People v Lockett,
295 Mich App 165, 186; 814 NW2d 295 (2012). “If the record does not contain sufficient detail
to support defendant’s ineffective assistance claim, then he has effectively waived the issue.” Id.
at 186 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

                                         2. DISCUSSION

        Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a directed
verdict. We disagree.

         There is a strong presumption that trial counsel “rendered adequate assistance and made
all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment,” People v Vaughn,
491 Mich 642, 670; 821 NW2d 288 (2012) (quotation marks omitted), quoting Strickland v
Washington, 466 US 668, 690; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984), and a defendant has a
“heavy burden” to show otherwise, People v Seals, 285 Mich App 1, 17; 776 NW2d 314 (2009)
(quotation marks and citations omitted). For an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be
successful, a defendant must show: (1) “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness,” and (2) “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 US at 688, 694.

        “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Id. at 694. “A defendant must also show that the result that did occur was
fundamentally unfair or unreliable.” Lockett, 295 Mich App at 187. Furthermore, examination of
counsel’s actions must be “highly deferential” and without the benefit of hindsight, Strickland,
466 US at 689, and there is a “strong presumption” that counsel’s actions arose from “sound trial
strategy,” People v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38, 52; 826 NW2d 136 (2012). We must not
“substitute our judgment for that of counsel on matters of trial strategy . . . .” People v Unger, 278
Mich App 210, 242-243; 749 NW2d 272 (2008).

        As previously discussed, there was sufficient evidence to prove each element of the
offense, and our Supreme Court has held that trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to move for
a directed verdict under such circumstances. See People v Riley, 468 Mich 135, 141-142; 659
NW2d 611 (2003). Trial counsel has no duty to make a meritless or futile objection, see People v
Putman, 309 Mich App 240, 245; 870 NW2d 593 (2015), and, given that the evidence amply
supported each element of the offense, defendant has failed to overcome the high burden of
showing that his counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a directed verdict. Moreover, in
light of the overwhelming evidence, defendant has failed to show a reasonable probability that the
outcome would have been different.

        We further see no merit to defendant’s contention that he is entitled to relief for his trial
counsel’s failure to object to certain findings made by the trial court. Defendant in his Standard 4
brief challenges the trial court’s statement, “And also it’s important to the Court that Defendant
told Detective Pung that he, quote, entertained the idea of sex.” It does appear that the trial court
misquoted the detective’s testimony. According to Detective Pung, defendant had stated that “he

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was entertaining the thought of” wanting “a relationship after [the victim] turned 18.” Although
Detective Pung inferred that this meant having sex after the victim turned 18, there was no
testimony in which defendant explicitly told Detective Pung that he entertained the idea of sex or
wanted to have sex with the victim. However, defendant’s intention could be inferred from the
numerous text messages and trial testimony, including a text message in which defendant told the
victim to tell him when she was ready to engage in sexual activity. Therefore, any misstatement
by the trial court was harmless. See MCL 769.26. Defendant is not entitled to relief.

                                          C. SENTENCING

                                   1. STANDARD OF REVIEW

         A trial court’s factual findings with respect to scoring of the sentencing guidelines are
reviewed for clear error and must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. People v
Hardy, 494 Mich 430, 438; 835 NW2d 340 (2013). “Whether the facts, as found, are adequate to
satisfy the scoring conditions prescribed by statute, i.e., the application of the facts to the law, is a
question of statutory interpretation, which an appellate court reviews de novo.” Id. However,
given that defendant failed to raise any challenge to the accuracy of the judgment of sentence, we
review this portion of defendant’s argument for plain error. People v Meshell, 265 Mich App 616,
638; 696 NW2d 754 (2005). The defendant must show that an error occurred, that the error was
plain, and that the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich
750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).

                                          2. DISCUSSION

        Defendant argues that the trial court improperly assessed 15 points for OV 10 and 10 points
for OV 19. We disagree. However, we agree that his judgment of sentence appears to be
inaccurate and that remand to the trial court is required for the judgment of sentence to be
corrected.

        “Offense variables must be scored giving consideration to the sentencing offense alone,
unless otherwise provided in the particular variable.” People v McGraw, 484 Mich 120, 133; 771
NW2d 655 (2009). A defendant is entitled to resentencing when a trial court commits an error in
scoring the sentencing guidelines and when this error “altered the appropriate guidelines range.”
People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 88-91; 711 NW2d 44 (2006). OV 10 relates to the “exploitation
of a vulnerable victim.” MCL 777.40(1). OV 10 requires that 15 points be assessed if “[p]redatory
conduct was involved.” MCL 777.40(1)(a). “ ‘Predatory conduct’ means preoffense conduct
directed at a victim . . . for the primary purpose of victimization.” MCL 777.40(3)(a). We
previously set forth a three-part test to determine whether there was predatory conduct for purposes
of OV 10:

               (1) Did the offender engage in conduct before the commission of the
        offense?

               (2) Was this conduct directed at one or more specific victims who suffered
        from a readily apparent susceptibility to injury, physical restraint, persuasion, or
        temptation?

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               (3) Was the victimization the offender’s primary purpose for engaging in
       the preoffense conduct? [People v Steele, 283 Mich App 472, 491; 769 NW2d 256
       (2009) (citation omitted).]

        All three parts must be met for there to be predatory conduct. Pursuant to this test, we have
held that grooming supports the assessment of 15 points for OV 10. See id. at 491-492.

        Contrary to defendant’s arguments on appeal, there is a preponderance of the evidence that
he engaged in predatory conduct before the offense of accosting the victim. As previously
discussed, defendant engaged in grooming of the victim. Defendant knew about her crush on him,
knew that she was depressed and vulnerable and he encouraged the relationship and manipulated
and exploited her for his own gain. Although this case may have begun with a simple crush,
defendant’s conduct led to the victim eventually believing that the two were a couple and led her
to entertain the idea of engaging in sexual activity with defendant despite her age. This was
predatory grooming activity in which defendant was preparing the victim for the subsequent
offense of encouraging the victim to engage in immoral acts.

        OV 19 concerns the “threat to the security of a penal institution or court or interference
with the administration of justice or the rendering of emergency services.” MCL 777.49. OV 19
requires that 10 points be assessed if “[t]he offender otherwise interfered with or attempted to
interfere with the administration of justice, or directly or indirectly violated a personal protection
order.” MCL 777.49(c). We have held that 10 points were properly assessed for OV 19 when the
“defendant told his victims not to disclose his acts or he would go to jail.” Steele, 283 Mich App
at 492. We reasoned that the “[d]efendant’s admonitions to his victims were a clear and obvious
attempt by him to diminish his victims’ willingness and ability to obtain justice.” Id. at 493. In
the present case, after the investigation began, defendant used a different phone, told the victim to
store his phone number under a different name, and told the victim to delete their messages.
Defendant also told the victim that they needed to “be discreet,” to “play it safe,” and to meet in
secret at a nearby park. This conduct is analogous to the defendant’s conduct in Steele and the
assessment of 10 points under OV 19 is proper here.

        For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s scoring of OV 10 and OV 19. However, at
sentencing, the trial court clearly sentenced defendant “for a minimum term of 20 months, and a
maximum of 48,” but defendant’s judgment of sentence listed a minimum of 21 months with a
maximum of 48 months. There is no indication from the record as to why the one-month
discrepancy exists, and, notably, the prosecution has chosen not to address or dispute defendant’s
position on appeal. To facilitate appellate review, a trial court must articulate on the record the
reasons for a sentence it imposes. People v Pena, 224 Mich App 650, 661; 569 NW2d 871 (1997).
The trial court gave a rationale for a sentence of 20 to 48 months but not for 21 to 48 months.
Therefore, it appears to us that the judgment of sentence contains a plain error by imposing a more
severe sentence without the proper articulation from the trial court. Therefore, we remand solely
for the trial court to correct the judgment of sentence to provide that defendant’s sentence is 20 to
48 months. See MCR 7.216(A)(7) (granting this Court power to “enter any judgment or order or
grant further or different relief as the case may require”).

                                        III. CONCLUSION

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      Affirmed but remanded to the trial court for the ministerial task of correcting defendant’s
judgment of sentence. We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                           /s/ Michelle M. Rick
                                                           /s/ Michael J. Kelly
                                                           /s/ Michael J. Riordan

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