Court Opinion

ID: 9678863
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:34:30.637268+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:08.561365
License: Public Domain

WILSON, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority finds this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal of appellant, Floyd Lee Kaigler. Because I believe the majority has misapplied Mafrige and Inglish by overextending each case’s holding, I respectfully dissent.
Relative to a “Mother Hubbard” clause and the facts of this case, I believe the law can be summarized in two general statements:
1. A Mother Hubbard clause found in a judgment following a trial on the merits is presumed to indicate for appellate purposes that all issues have been decided and merged into the judgment, and that all parties have concluded their substantive business before the court. The appellate timetable therefore begins when the judgment is signed.1
2. A Mother Hubbard clause found in a summary judgment is presumed to indicate for appellate purposes that all issues between the parties to the summary judgment have been decided, and that the parties to the summary judgment have no further substantive business before the court. The appellate timetable does not necessarily begin with the signing of the summary judgment, notwithstanding the presence of the Mother Hubbard clause.
The Mother Hubbard clause derives its meaning not only from its language, but also from the context of the document in which it appears. Its value of “cleaning up loose ends,” merging the totality of a case into a final document, and clarifying the intent of the trial court to render a final judgment is apparent. However, I do not find a case that says that in every instance in which a Mother Hubbard clause appears in a summary judgment, the language of the clause alone triggers the appellate timetable for the participants to the summary judgment procedure when other parties remain in the case, or makes an otherwise intrinsically interlocutory judgment a final judgment. This apparently is our holding today.
It would necessarily follow, as in Inglish,2 that in a case with only two parties, that a Mother Hubbard clause3 contained in a summary judgment when signed by the trial judge would trigger the appellate timetable. But in the case before us, there are more than two parties, and in the document entitled “Summary Judgment” we consider, Katherine Keys Kaigler is not mentioned except that her name appears in the style of the suit. Because Inglish concerns the impact of a Mother Hubbard clause on outstanding issues left dangling, rather than as to parties not involved in a summary-judgment procedure, I do not think it is determinative of our jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
Mafrige itself deals with the impact of Mother Hubbard language on unresolved issues between parties, rather than the disposition as to the parties themselves. The supreme court states in Mafrige that:
No one disputes that granting a motion for summary judgment on causes of action not addressed in the motion is reversible error. Rather, the issue is whether such a summary judgment, which purports to be final by the inclusion of Mother Hubbard language or its equivalent, should be treated as final for purposes of appeal.
Mafrige v. Ross, 866 S.W.2d 590, 591 (Tex.1993).
If I understand the majority’s opinion correctly, the majority holds today that when a trial court (1) grants a motion for summary *278judgment directed at some, but not all, of the parties, and (2) the trial court grants the motion, then signs an order that includes Mother Hubbard language, the mere presence of the Mother Hubbard clause transforms an otherwise interlocutory summary judgment into a final summary judgment for appellate purposes.
This holding represents a substantial change in the jurisprudence of “finality” and ■will lead to more complexity and confusion. Because I do not see Mafrige as signaling such a fundamental change as the majority, I respectfully dissent.

. See North East Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 897-98 (Tex.1966).

. Inglish v. Union State Bank, 945 S.W.2d 810, 811 (Jan. 10 1997). The case was originally multi-party, but the appeal arose from a severed counterclaim between only the bank and Robert B. Inglish.

.The supreme court notes that although the language of the order in Inglish "does not contain a true Mother Hubbard clause, it clearly purports to be final.” Inglish, 945 S.W.2d at 811.