Court Opinion

ID: 9906632
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-04 19:23:32.750246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:19.307123
License: Public Domain

J-S33021-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  SHAWN MCFARLAND                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 498 WDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 9, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-02-CR-0004150-2021

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:

                                                    FILED: December 4, 2023

       Under the circumstances presented in the instant case, assuming,

arguendo, Appellant Shawn McFarland demonstrated the presumption of

vindictiveness, the trial court rebutted the presumption of vindictiveness.

Thus, contrary to the Majority, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment of

sentence imposed on March 9, 2022, and accordingly, I dissent.

       As this Court has recognized:

             [T[he United States Supreme Court in Pearce[1] established
       a presumption of vindictiveness when a more severe sentence is
       imposed upon resentencing. However, the Pearce Court held the
       presumption of vindictiveness may be rebutted where the trial
       court places on the record non-vindictive reasons for the increased
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

11 North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
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     sentence, such as “objective information concerning identifiable
     conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of
     the original sentencing proceeding.” [Commonwealth v.]
     Barnes, 167 A.3d 110, 123 (Pa.Super. 2017) (en banc) (quoting
     Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726).
           Further, in Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134…(1986),
     which expanded the Pearce Court’s approach to resentencing and
     due process, the High Court held the presumption could also be
     overcome by other forms of objective information or legitimate
     sentencing concerns that were not presented to or considered by
     the trial court at the original sentencing hearing. McCullough,
     475 U.S. at 138[.]

Commonwealth v. Ali, 197 A.3d 742, 762 (Pa.Super. 2018).

     In the case sub judice, in explaining the reasons it imposed a

consecutive   sentence,   as   opposed   to   a   concurrent   sentence,    upon

reconsideration, the trial court indicated the following during the re-

sentencing hearing:

           I have considered the statements made by [Appellant]
     today. I have considered the arguments of counsel. I have
     considered the specific arguments of defense counsel, [who]
     claims that there should be mitigation in this case.
          I have considered all other factors that I may take into
     account, as well as the contents of the motion to modify the
     sentence that was originally imposed in this case filed by the
     defense.
           I have also considered the Commonwealth’s response to
     that motion in support of sentencing, that it appears that I may
     have overlooked aggravating factors by not specifying them on
     the record at the previous sentencing.
           One of which, the Commonwealth argues, is the commission
     of additional criminal activity while on federal supervised release,
     rather than a mitigating factor or circumstance.
           The inconvenience that this must have caused the number
     of victims in this case, although they only charged as one
     particular count, criminal mischief.

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           The amount of damage. The extent of damage. The
     number of individual victims that were affected by [Appellant’s]
     actions.
            For all those reasons…at Count 1, this case warrants, if any
     that I have come across, an upward departure from the standard
     range of the sentencing guidelines, and [the trial court’s] sentence
     for [Appellant] is not less than one or more than two years in a
     State Correctional Facility to be determined by the Department of
     Corrections.
                                     ***
           Additionally, at Count 6, [Appellant] is sentenced to not less
     than one nor more than two years in a State Correctional Facility
     to be determined by the Department of Corrections.
           This sentence shall be served consecutive to the sentence I
     just imposed at Count 1. He shall receive credit for time served,
     which may be attributable to this case.

N.T., 3/9/22, at 24-26.

     Moreover, in its opinion, the trial court indicated the following:

           [Upon reconsideration,] [t]he [trial] court closely reviewed
     its original sentence.     The [trial] court also considered the
     Commonwealth’s objection to granting relief. The [trial] court
     incorporated the affidavit of probable cause at the entry of
     [Appellant’s] original plea in this case. [Appellant] was on federal
     supervised release at the time of the offense, a point notably
     omitted from defense counsel’s argument. [Appellant] was using
     controlled substances and was intoxicated at the time of the
     incident. [Appellant] was armed with a knife, which he apparently
     used to randomly slash more than a dozen tires—some vehicles
     had several tires destroyed. [Appellant] wielded the knife in a
     menacing fashion toward a passerby who witnessed the senseless
     vandalism and called police.          [Appellant] fled police who
     responded to the call and discarded the knife during a brief foot
     chase and initially resisted being taken into custody. [Appellant]
     admitted to being intoxicated but denied using controlled
     substances that night; [however,] blood taken from [Appellant]
     upon his admission to the County Jail showed otherwise[.]
     [Appellant] testified positive for a veritable cocktail of
     miscellaneous controlled substances, including cocaine that night.
     This was not an isolated incident of minor vandalism, but was

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      instead, [a] senseless rampage by [Appellant] with a knife that
      affected nearly a dozen property owners. For these reasons, the
      [trial] court reconsidered its original sentence, denied post-
      sentence motions, and resentenced [Appellant] to consecutive
      terms of incarceration.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/1/22, at 4-5.

      Based on the aforementioned, the trial court rebutted the presumption

of vindictiveness. See Ali, supra. The trial court disavowed any vindictive

purpose in reconsidering and resentencing Appellant, and the trial court noted

that it had originally overlooked aggravating factors, as set forth by the

Commonwealth in its response to Appellant’s post-sentence motion. The trial

court revealed that it had misapprehended the facts of Appellant’s crime

during the initial sentencing proceedings, which led to the trial court

underestimating the impact Appellant’s crime had on the victims and

community.

      The reasons stated by the trial court are clearly based upon legitimate

sentencing concerns. See id. Respectfully, this Court has no reason to disturb

the sentencing scheme of the trial judge or to substitute its own judgment

over that of the trial judge on appropriate sentencing for Appellant.

      Thus, I conclude “the trial court rebutted any presumption of

vindictiveness that may have attached to its sentence imposed upon

[reconsideration].” Id. at 763. Consequently, I would affirm the trial court’s

March 9, 2022, judgment of sentence and respectfully dissent.

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