Court Opinion

ID: 9616839
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:50:21.793117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:03.145272
License: Public Domain

Gregory, Justice,
concurring specially.
I concur in the judgment of affirmance but write to indicate a different rationale for reaching the same result the majority reaches in Divisions 2 and 3. The rule heretofore followed in Georgia confuses the function of the judge with that of the jury in my opinion. Admissibility of evidence is to be decided by the judge. The weight to be given evidence, once admitted, is for the jury. Thus the judge must *7decide those factual questions relating to a dying declaration, including the declarant’s consciousness of approaching death. If the predicates to admissibility are met the judge allows the declaration into evidence. Then, it is for the jury to decide what weight shall be given the declaration. The decision of the jury on that matter is not a question of law governed by the rules for admissibility of dying declarations. Rather, the jury performs its usual weighing of evidence function taking all relevant circumstances into account as in other circumstances. V Wigmore on Evidence, § 1451, p. 317.
Decided April 30, 1986
Reconsideration denied May 13, 1986.
Crisp & Oxford, Henry L. Crisp, Howard S. McKelvey, Jr., for appellant.
John R. Parks, District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Eddie Snelling, Jr., Staff Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Justice Smith and Justice Weltner join in this special concurrence.