Court Opinion

ID: 9588506
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:34:58.051933+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:36.883489
License: Public Domain

Sognier, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. First, Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170 (104 SC 1735, 80 LE2d 214), relied upon by the majority, has no application to property within the curtilage, and the majority recognizes that the garden here was within the curtilage. Oliver does nothing more, or less, than iterate the “open fields” doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court in Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57 (44 SC 445, 68 LE 898). This is clear from the following statement in Oliver: “[T]he rule of Hester v. United States, supra, that we reaffirm today, may be understood as providing that an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the home.” Id. at 178. Oliver then defines an open field as “any unoccupied or undeveloped area outside of the curtilage.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 466 U. S. 180, fn. 11. Since the garden in question here was neither in an unoccupied or undeveloped area, nor outside the curtilage, Oliver is not applicable to the facts of this case, and makes no change in the rule that property within the curtilage is protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Secondly, the majority statement that the garden was open to casual view is unsupported by any evidence of record. The garden was 70 to 80 yards behind appellants’ residence, and could only be reached by going to the rear of the residence, past a shed, and through the barn; it could not be observed by a passerby or from the air. In fact, the only State witness testified that he could not see the marijuana growing until he was at the edge of the garden itself. Nor is there any evidence to support the majority statement that police or *409passersby could have approached from a different direction where the garden was open to view. Not only is this mere speculation, but the exhibits in the case controvert such a conclusion. Thus, the majority’s attempt to analogize the factual situation here with someone who plants marijuana in a flower garden in their front yard, exposed to the view of a casual passerby, is unwarranted by the facts in this case.
The “plain view” doctrine (see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (91 SC 2022, 29 LE2d 564)), does not occur until a search is in progress, id. at 467, and the State’s only witness testified that he was not conducting a search. Further, the case does not fall within the “plain view” doctrine because the officer had intruded within the curtilage before he saw the marijuana. Bunn v. State, 153 Ga. App. 270, 275 (2) (265 SE2d 88) (1980). A barn 70 or 80 yards from the house is within the curtilage, Norman v. State, 134 Ga. App. 767, 768 (1) (216 SE2d 644) (1975), and the fact there is no fence is immaterial. “Prima facie, a search made within the curtilage of the owner without a warrant is unconstitutional and void.” (Emphasis supplied.) Bunn, supra at 272. Here the officer had no warrant and no probable cause to search, but went to appellants’ residence on a second hand tip that appellant Gravley “may be” growing marijuana in his garden. “The intrusion by police officers into the curtilage, without probable cause to search or arrest, without a warrant, and without exigent circumstances, rendered the subsequent seizure invalid.” Bunn, supra at 275.
In regard to the fact that the deputy saw some “unusual activity” in the garden, this raised no more than a suspicion in the deputy’s mind, and “suspicion” is not a valid ground for a search. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471, 479 (83 SC 407, 9 LE2d 441). Nor can “unusual activity” be equated to a situation where a police officer sees a crime being committed in his presence, since unusual activity does not equate to a crime.
Lastly, to adopt the rule enunciated by the majority would eliminate the need for police officers to obtain a search warrant before intruding upon a person’s curtilage, and give police the right to roam over the curtilage at will, seizing any contraband or evidence that is not completely hidden from view. I do not believe this is the rule under existing law and hopefully, it shall never become the law. The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that “[a]bsent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police . . . The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals.” McDonald v. United States, 335 U. S. 451, 455-456 (69 SC 191, 93 LE 153). No “grave emergency” existed here, since the officer only went to appellants’ residence to talk to Gravley.
For the foregoing reasons, I find the intrusion into the curtilage *410here was without probable cause to search or arrest, without a warrant, and without exigent circumstances; hence, the seizure was illegal. Bunn, supra. Accordingly, I would reverse on the ground that the seizure was unlawful and unjustified under any existing theory of law.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Banke and Judge Ben-ham join in this dissent.