Court Opinion

ID: 9894049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-31 16:04:25.584973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:03.350576
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                      STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellant,

                                        v.

                   JACKIE RAY MANUEL, JR., Appellee.

                             No. 1 CA-CR 23-0099
                              FILED 10-31-2023

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
                        No. P1300CR202100494
                The Honorable Debra R. Phelan, Judge

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

DM Cantor, Phoenix
By Courtney R. Sullivan
Counsel for Appellee

Yavapai County Attorney’s Office, Prescott
By Amy C. Drew
Counsel for Appellant
                           STATE v. MANUEL
                           Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Chief Judge David B. Gass joined.

J A C O B S, Judge:

¶1           The State appeals the superior court’s order granting Jackie
Ray Manuel, Jr.’s motion to suppress evidence seized after an unlawfully
extended traffic stop. Because the State has shown no error, we affirm.

             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2              Deputy Camacho served as a K-9 officer in the Criminal
Interdiction Unit within the Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office, which is
specifically tasked with stopping the flow of contraband across Arizona’s
interstate highways. Deputy Camacho understood his role in the Criminal
Interdiction Unit was not to enforce traffic laws but instead to “catch
smugglers.” In the course of his duties, Deputy Camacho stopped Manuel
for a traffic violation, conducted a warrantless search of his rental vehicle,
and located cannabis-infused edibles and methamphetamine.

¶3            The State charged Manuel with one count each of sale or
transportation of dangerous drugs, a class 2 felony, sale or transportation
of narcotic drugs, a class 2 felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a
class 6 felony. Before trial, Manuel moved to dismiss the charges as based
on an unlawfully extended traffic stop, which the superior court treated as
a motion to suppress evidence. Manuel argued Deputy Camacho lacked
reasonable suspicion to extend the stop and that all evidence seized from
the vehicle should be suppressed. The State opposed the motion and
argued, as it does before us, that Deputy Camacho had reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity, did not unlawfully extend the stop, and
secured Manuel’s consent to the search.

¶4             On the morning of April 13, 2021, Deputy Camacho observed
Manuel driving too closely behind another vehicle on Interstate 40. He
observed no other traffic violations. Deputy Camacho approached the
passenger side window of Manuel’s vehicle and explained the reason for
the traffic stop. He told Manuel he would be giving him a warning. Manuel
handed Deputy Camacho his driver’s license and rental agreement, then

                                      2
                          STATE v. MANUEL
                          Decision of the Court

added “that he was going to be shipped out” for military training in a few
weeks and pointed to a military-style bag in the backseat. Deputy Camacho
claimed he suspected Manuel’s “unsolicited” reference to his military
service and travel plans to be a “cover story.” He did not observe anything
suspicious about Manuel’s demeanor, paperwork, or vehicle.

¶5           Deputy Camacho repeated that he would issue a warning to
Manuel, directed him to get out of his vehicle, and had him sit in the
passenger seat of the patrol vehicle. Despite that, Deputy Camacho agreed
he could have safely conducted the traffic stop from Manuel’s passenger
side window. Once in the patrol vehicle, the deputy said a third time he
would be giving Manuel a warning. While running “checks” on Manuel’s
paperwork, Deputy Camacho asked him questions aimed at learning more
about what he viewed as his “cover story.” During this interaction, the
deputy had his K-9 in the backseat of the patrol vehicle.

¶6            Manuel answered Deputy Camacho’s questions about the
training and travel plans, explaining he traveled from Mississippi to
California to visit family before shipping out for his service. Under the
pretense of checking Manuel’s paperwork, the deputy searched the route
from Mississippi to California and questioned Manuel’s motivation for
traveling that distance. Deputy Camacho explained his role in catching
“smugglers” and asked if Manuel was traveling with any contraband.
Manuel said no to all drugs, except when the deputy “got to marijuana he
said, do edibles count as marijuana.” Deputy Camacho said it depended
on the amount of edibles Manuel possessed, continued to ask for specifics
about the edibles, and explained how criminal arrests and charges work in
Arizona. Manuel eventually admitted to having a large quantity of edibles
and consented to a search of his vehicle.

¶7            After Deputy Camacho testified, the superior court took a
recess to watch his body-worn camera footage from the traffic stop. In that
footage, the deputy told Manuel he would be receiving a warning. Deputy
Camacho ordered Manuel to move to the patrol vehicle. Manuel was calm
and respectful throughout this interaction. When the K-9 began barking
from the backseat, Deputy Camacho joked that he hoped Manuel was not
afraid of dogs. The deputy asked a number of questions about Manuel’s
travel plans, military service, and the rental vehicle. Manuel responded
politely to these questions, consistently answering “yes sir” or “no sir.”
Over 10 minutes into the stop, Deputy Camacho explained his role as a
criminal interdiction officer and asked whether Manuel was traveling with
any contraband. When Manuel eventually admitted to having edibles in

                                    3
                           STATE v. MANUEL
                           Decision of the Court

the vehicle, additional deputies can be seen arriving. Appearing reluctant,
Manuel consented to a search of his vehicle.

¶8            In a detailed ruling, the superior court granted the motion to
suppress all evidence seized during the traffic stop. The court found that,
although there was a lawful basis to conduct the stop, Deputy Camacho did
not (1) have a reasonable basis to direct Manuel to sit in the patrol vehicle
and speak with him “in an attempt to find holes in [his] story or
inconsistencies in statements,” (2) need to have him in the patrol vehicle to
effectuate the stop, and (3) develop arguably reasonable suspicion to
investigate him for criminal activity until after directing him to sit in the
patrol vehicle and engaging in that unjustified conversation.

¶9             The superior court found that, based on the evidence
presented, Deputy Camacho directed Manuel to sit in the patrol vehicle to
investigate him “under the guise of writing a citation.” The court heard
Deputy Camacho’s testimony and evaluated his credibility, viewing it
“with much skepticism,” and found it “difficult to believe” that this
particular deputy forces “every single driver of every demographic” to exit
their vehicle and speak to them for 10 to 15 minutes while he processes their
citations. Based on the court’s assessment of the deputy’s credibility, the
court found it more likely “that there was something specific about”
Manuel, a black man, that resulted in his conduct. The court did not accept
that Manuel volunteering information regarding his military service, the
sole reason for Deputy Camacho’s concerns, gave him reasonable suspicion
to extend the traffic stop. The court noted that there could be many reasons
for a driver to volunteer information or “paint themselves in a more
positive light,” including trying to avoid a citation.

¶10          The superior court considered the body-worn camera footage
in determining the “length and scope of the stop,” finding that the
conversation in the patrol vehicle lasted about 10 minutes with the K-9
breathing and barking in the background. By the end of the conversation,
when Manuel “gave hesitant consent” to search his vehicle, the court noted
that a “multitude” of other deputies had arrived on scene. Thus, the court
concluded that Deputy Camacho acted in a way that “was more intrusive
than necessary to effectuate an investigative detention,” and suppressed all
evidence seized as a result of the search.

¶11          On the State’s motion, the superior court dismissed the case
without prejudice, and the State timely appealed. We have jurisdiction
under Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 13-
4032(6).

                                     4
                            STATE v. MANUEL
                            Decision of the Court

                               DISCUSSION

¶12           The State challenges the superior court’s suppression order,
arguing Deputy Camacho had reasonable suspicion to believe Manuel was
engaging in criminal activity, did not unlawfully extend the traffic stop, and
conducted a consensual search of the vehicle. We review the court’s ruling
on a motion to suppress for a clear abuse of discretion, State v. Atwood, 171
Ariz. 576, 603 (1992), considering only the evidence presented at the
suppression hearing and viewing it in the light most favorable to sustaining
the court’s ruling. State v. Manuel, 229 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 11 (2011). We defer to
the court’s factual findings, including its assessment of the officer’s
“credibility and the reasonableness of inferences that he drew.” State v.
Gonzalez-Gutierrez, 187 Ariz. 116, 118 (1996). We review the court’s ultimate
legal conclusions de novo. Id.

¶13             A traffic stop cannot last “longer than necessary to effectuate
the purpose of the stop.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). An
officer’s authority to conduct a stop “ends when tasks tied to the traffic
infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.” Rodriguez v.
United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). Such tasks include checking the
driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance, as well as the time
required for officers to “attend to related safety concerns.” Id. at 354–55.
“An officer’s inquiries into matters unrelated to the justification for the
traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter into something other than a
lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the
duration of the stop.” Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009). Once the
purpose of the stop is fulfilled, the officer cannot continue to hold the driver
“unless (1) the encounter between the driver and the officer becomes
consensual, or (2) during the encounter, the officer develops a reasonable
and articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” State v. Sweeney,
224 Ariz. 107, 112, ¶ 17 (App. 2010). The officer, however, must not use
pretextual “safety precautions” designed to facilitate an investigation into
other crimes absent sufficient reasonable suspicion to do so. Rodriguez, 575
U.S. at 355–57.

¶14          Although a lower standard than probable cause, reasonable
suspicion still requires “something more than an ‘inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’ ” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,
7 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). The officer must
“articulate some minimal, objective justification for an investigatory
detention.” State v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, 23, ¶ 25 (App. 2007). To determine
whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to extend a traffic stop, the
superior court must look at all relevant factors, each of which could have a

                                       5
                            STATE v. MANUEL
                            Decision of the Court

potentially innocent explanation, and examine them collectively. Id. at 24,
¶ 25. “But circumstances or factors that do not reliably distinguish between
suspect and innocent behaviors are insufficient to establish reasonable
suspicion because they may cast too wide a net and subject all travelers to
‘virtually random seizures.’” Sweeney, 224 Ariz. at 113, ¶ 22 (quoting Reid
v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980)).

¶15           The State bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that Deputy Camacho lawfully seized evidence in the
warrantless search of Manuel’s vehicle. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 16.2(b)(1);
Rodriguez v. Arellano, 194 Ariz. 211, 215, ¶ 12 (App. 1999). The State failed
to meet that burden, and for three reasons, has failed to show error on
appeal.

¶16           First, we find no error in the superior court’s findings of fact.
The court reviewed Deputy Camacho’s body-worn camera footage at the
suppression hearing. As the footage shows, Deputy Camacho said he
would be issuing a warning, directed Manuel to get into the patrol vehicle,
and engaged in conversation unrelated to the traffic violation. That
conversation lasted over 10 minutes. Throughout this interaction, Manuel
appeared calm, treated Deputy Camacho with respect, and answered
questions appropriately. See Sweeney, 224 Ariz. at 113, ¶ 23 (considering
demeanor in determining reasonable suspicion, including signs of
nervousness and ability to answer questions). As noted by the court,
Deputy Camacho’s K-9 could be heard barking and breathing in the
backseat of the patrol vehicle.

¶17            The superior court compared the footage with Deputy
Camacho’s testimony, finding that he lacked any justification for moving
Manuel to the patrol vehicle. The court viewed Deputy Camacho’s
testimony that he treated all drivers similarly “with much skepticism,”
finding it more likely that “there was something specific” about Manuel
fueling his motivations. Here, the court reasoned that Deputy Camacho
had, to some degree, profiled Manuel and used pretextual tactics designed
to facilitate his investigation into other crimes. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at
356–57. When we defer to the superior court’s assessment of Deputy
Camacho’s credibility, as we must, we find ample support in the record for
the court’s factual findings. See Gonzalez-Gutierrez, 187 Ariz. at 118.

¶18           Second, we find no error in the superior court’s legal
conclusions. As the court concluded, Deputy Camacho did not need to
order Manuel out of his vehicle and make him sit in the patrol car to safely
effectuate the traffic stop. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354. Before doing so,

                                      6
                            STATE v. MANUEL
                            Decision of the Court

Deputy Camacho’s only reason for suspecting Manuel of criminal activity
was that he volunteered information regarding his military service. The
deputy conceded that he did not have any safety concerns, did not observe
weapons or contraband in the vehicle, and did not observe anything
suspicious about Manuel’s demeanor. Deputy Camacho could have
completed the stop without ordering Manuel into the patrol vehicle and
engaging in a conversation designed to ferret out criminal activity. Such
steps exceeded what was reasonably required to issue a warning, and
Deputy Camacho needed reasonable suspicion to extend the stop beyond
its original purpose. See Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333.

¶19           Accordingly, the superior court acted within its discretion
when it found Deputy Camacho’s self-serving assertion that Manuel gave
him a “cover story” did not amount to reasonable suspicion. There could
have been an innocent explanation for Manuel’s “unsolicited” statements
to Deputy Camacho. See Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 24, ¶ 25. The court soundly
reasoned that many drivers may be motivated to “paint themselves in a
more positive light” to avoid a citation. Because Manuel’s behavior could
be typical of “a very large category of presumably innocent travelers,” it
could not, on its own, establish reasonable suspicion. Id. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). The sole factor relied upon by Deputy
Camacho in extending the traffic stop “did not give rise to objective
reasonable suspicion of anything” and a “reasonably prudent person’s
suspicions would not be raised.” Sweeney, 224 Ariz. at 113, ¶ 24. The court
did not err in finding Deputy Camacho lacked the reasonable suspicion he
needed to extend the stop.

¶20           Third, the State’s contention that the traffic stop evolved into
a valid consensual search is likewise unavailing. “Evidence seized
following consent to a search must be suppressed if the consent is tainted
by a prior constitutional violation.” State v. Guillen, 223 Ariz. 314, 317, ¶ 13
(2010). “In other words, the unconstitutional acts of an officer taint a
consensual search unless there are sufficient intervening circumstances
between the unlawful conduct and the consent to truly show that it was
voluntary.” State v. Kempton, 166 Ariz. 392, 398 (App. 1990). Deputy
Camacho took Manuel’s paperwork, directed him to sit in the patrol
vehicle, and subjected him to questions unrelated to the stop. All the while,
Deputy Camacho’s K-9 could be heard from the backseat, prompting an
uncomfortable joke about whether Manuel feared dogs, and other deputies
arrived on scene. Within this factual context, Deputy Camacho obtained
Manuel’s “hesitant consent” to search the vehicle. The superior court did
not err when it found Deputy Camacho’s unlawful extension of the stop

                                       7
                           STATE v. MANUEL
                           Decision of the Court

tainted, and therefore invalidated, Manuel’s consent. See Guillen, 223 Ariz.
at 317, ¶ 13.

                              CONCLUSION

¶21          Because the superior court did not err in suppressing the
evidence seized during the search of the vehicle, we affirm the superior
court’s suppression order.

                           AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                           FILED: AA

                                       8