Court Opinion

ID: 9637972
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:28:13.957208+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:02.427885
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. Although I agree that the master applied an incorrect presumption, I cannot join the majority’s analysis or factual determinations. I would vacate the hearing court’s decree and would remand for further proceedings.
Two “one-sided presumptions” are at issue heré. The master in this case apparently applied the rebuttable presumption that a trust is created in a wife’s favor if a husband obtains a wife’s property without adequate consideration. There is another presumption, not applied by the master, that a gift arises when a husband purchases real or personal property with his own funds and places *533it in an entireties estate. Clay v. Reiser, 460 Pa. 620, 334 A.2d 263 (1975). The Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment, Pa.Const. art. I, § 28, (adopted May 18, 1971) prohibits such presumptions unless they are applied equally to both the wife and the husband. See Henderson v. Henderson, 458 Pa. 97, 327 A.2d 60 (1974). Since such an application of these two presumptions would create a conflict, we must choose between them. I agree with the majority that the “gift” presumption should remain and should be applied to both the husband and wife and that the “trust” presumption should be abandoned.
Here, the wife is entitled to a constructive trust, thus rebutting the gift presumption, only if she can establish her claim by clear and convincing evidence. Clay v. Keiser, supra. We have previously held that such a trust arises when:
“ ‘. . . a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it.’ Gray v. Leibert, 357 Pa. 130, 135, 53 A.2d 132, 135. Such a trust may arise where' there is a breach of a confidential relationship by the transferee, or it may arise out of circumstances evidencing fraud, duress, undue influence or mistake. Restatement, Trusts, Sec. 44(a), 44(b).”
Chambers v. Chambers, 406 Pa. 50, 54, 176 A.2d 673, 675 (1962). See also Buchanan v. Brentwood Federal Savings and Loan Assn., 457 Pa. 135, 150-52, 320 A.2d 117, 126-27 (1974); Shapiro v. Shapiro, 424 Pa. 120, 224 A. 2d 164 (1966).
The master found, based on substantial evidence, the following facts:
“11. That plaintiff trusted defendant and relied upon his advice from the time of the marriage and for more than one year thereafter.
*534“12. That the defendant by his advice and course of conduct together with his inquiries concerning the estate of the father of the plaintiff and the adoption of the son of plaintiff by her prior marriage was intended to enable defendant to obtain property of the plaintiff and place her under the control and domination of defendant.
“13. That defendant did physically abuse plaintiff and she was under undue pressure and in the later months of the parties living together, the plaintiff was in fear of the defendant.
Credibility is solely an issue for the trier of fact. Kay v. Kay, 460 Pa. 680, 334 A.2d 585 (1975); our review is therefore limited to determining whether the factual findings are adequately supported by the evidence. Kay v. Kay, supra; Silver v. Silver, 421 Pa. 533, 219 A.2d 659 (1966). Yet, despite these well established rules, the majority here rejects the findings of facts and engages in speculation concerning the existence of a confidential relationship.
The master relied on an improper “trust” presumption and incorrectly assumed that a confidential relationship existed as a matter of law in reaching his conclusions. We cannot determine what influence, if any, these errors had on his findings of fact. The Court should vacate the decree and remand for a new hearing to determine whether there is a factual basis for establishing a constructive trust. I dissent from the Court’s refusal to so direct.