Court Opinion

ID: 9399342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-02 17:09:37.459104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:09.755297
License: Public Domain

J-S09032-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 RICHARD SEAN PARNELL                   :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                        :
              v.                        :
                                        :
                                        :
 LAURIE A. PARNELL                      :
                                        :
                   Appellant            :   No. 1296 WDA 2022

             Appeal from the Order Entered October 19, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County Civil Division at No(s):
                              17-90403-D

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                        FILED: June 2, 2023

     Laurie A. Parnell (“Wife”) appeals pro se from the order entered on

October 19, 2022, in the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County, granting

Richard Sean Parnell’s (“Husband”) petition to enforce a consent order dated

March 28, 2022, and entered on March 29, 2022, in settlement of their

economic claims in this divorce action. We affirm.

     The relevant facts are as follows. Husband filed a complaint in divorce

against Wife on May 30, 2019. The parties subsequently reached a settlement

agreement of their economic claims, which was entered as a consent order on

March 29, 2022 (“Consent Order”). A final divorce decree was entered on

March 31, 2022.

     On May 13, 2022, Husband filed a petition to enforce the Consent Order,

wherein he specifically sought enforcement of paragraph 4, which provides:
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        Prior to the closing on the marital residence, the parties shall
        schedule a time for Husband to visit the marital residence to
        retrieve any of the following items remaining in the marital
        residence which are hereby awarded to Husband as his sole and
        separate property:

             a.    High[]top square dining table in basement;

             b.    One dining room table;

             c.    Master Bedroom porch furniture;

             d.    Playroom bookshelf;

             e.    Army dress uniforms;

             f.    All military equipment in Army duffle bags;

             g.    Hockey equipment and skates;

             h.    All ski clothes and North[ F]ace ski jacket;

             i.    Fender Telecaster guitar;

             j.    Steel guitar;

             k.    Acoustic guitar with nylon string;

             l.    Electric acoustic guitar;

             m.    Outdoor storage bin;

             n.    Tool box;

             o.    George Washington print in master bedroom;

             p.    Jurassic World pinball machine; and

             q.    Gym equipment.

Petition to Enforce Consent Order, 5/13/22, at ¶ 4 (quoting Consent Order at

¶ 4).

        In his petition, Husband averred that he made arrangements with Wife

to retrieve the foregoing items at the marital residence on March 16, 2022,

prior to the closing on the marital residence scheduled for March 18, 2022.

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Id. at ¶¶ 5-6.    On March 16, 2022, after some initial resistance, Wife agreed

to allow the movers into the residence to remove the items awarded to

Husband. Id. at ¶¶ 7-8. Husband contended, however, that Wife refused to

allow him to enter the residence with the movers and that she refused to make

available eight (8) of the eighteen (18) enumerated items in paragraph 4 of

the Consent Order, including the four (4) guitars and the George Washington

print. Id. at ¶¶ 8, 11-12. Subsequent to the closing on the marital residence,

Husband claimed that he attempted, to no avail, to communicate with Wife

regarding the remaining items due to him under the Consent Order. Id. at ¶

13. Accordingly, Husband requested that the lower court award him counsel

fees in accordance with 23 Pa.C.S. § 3502(e)(7). Id. at ¶ 20.1

       On July 7, 2022, Wife filed an answer to Husband’s petition to enforce

the Consent Order, in which she asserted that paragraph 4 of the Consent

Order “does not state that all of the listed property remains in the marital

residence as Husband had previously removed property from the residence

during the parties’ separation.” Answer, 7/7/22, at ¶ 4. Wife claimed that

Husband was permitted to remove “all the items listed that remained at the

marital residence when he arrived on March 16, 2022[,]” id. at ¶¶ 11-13, that

Husband did not notify her on that date or prior to the closing that he was
____________________________________________

1 Section 3502(e)(7) of the Divorce Code provides that “if, at any time, a party
has failed to comply with an order of equitable distribution … or with the terms
of an agreement as entered into between the parties, after hearing, the court
may, in addition to any other remedy available under this part, award counsel
fees and costs[,]” in order to effect compliance with its order. 23 Pa.C.S. §
3502(e)(7).

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unable to retrieve any items from the residence, id. at ¶ 8, and that Husband

never returned to the residence to retrieve the remaining items which he

claims to be owed. Id. at ¶¶ 11-13.

       An evidentiary hearing was held on September 26, 2022, at which both

Husband and Wife testified. At the close of the hearing, the trial court directed

both parties to submit letter briefs regarding the court’s authority to impose

sanctions in the form of compensation or damages for failure to comply with

the Consent Order. After consideration of the oral arguments and evidence

presented by both parties at the hearing, in addition to the parties’ letter

briefs, the trial court entered an order on October 19, 2022, directing Wife to

deliver “the steel guitar that is or was hanging in the entryway of her home”

to Husband within 20 days, and within 60 days, to pay Husband “sanctions in

the sum of $5,000[2] and counsel fees of $2,500, for a total of $7,500.” Order,

10/19/22, at 4-5.

       On November 3, 2022, Wife filed a timely, notice of appeal, along with

her Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.

The trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion on November 7, 2022, in which

it incorporates the reasons set forth in its October 19, 2022 order, in support

of its decision. On appeal, Wife presents the following issues for our review:

____________________________________________

2 Specifically, the court sanctioned Wife to pay $4,500 to Husband for her
failure to make the other three (3) guitars available to him, as well as $500
for her failure to make the George Washington print available. Order,
10/19/22, at 3-4.

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      A. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and erred as a
         matter of law when it awarded [Husband] a guitar that belongs
         to [Wife] and was purchased well after the date of separation.

      B. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and erred as a
         matter of law when it awarded [Husband] sanctions for [Wife’s]
         failing to provide guitars that were never in the marital home
         or had already been removed from the marital home by
         [Husband].

      C. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and erred as a
         matter of law when it awarded [Husband] sanctions for a
         “George Washington print in master bedroom” that was already
         removed previously from the marital home by [Husband].

      D. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and erred as a
         matter of law when it awarded [Husband] reimbursement of
         counsel fees.

Wife’s Brief at 7 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

      In considering Wife’s claims, we remain mindful of the following

principles:

      Where, as herein, a property settlement agreement did not merge
      into the divorce decree, it stands as a separate contract, is subject
      to the law governing contracts[,] and is to be reviewed as any
      other contract. Simeone v. Simeone, … 581 A.2d 162, 165-[66]
      ([Pa.] 1990). It is well-established that the law of contracts
      governs marital settlement agreements, and under the law of
      contracts, the court must ascertain the intent of the parties when
      interpreting a contractual agreement. Kripp v. Kripp, … 849 A.2d
      1159, 1163 (Pa. 2004) (citations omitted). The standard of
      enforceability of a contractual agreement is also clear: “[a]bsent
      fraud, misrepresentation, or duress, spouses should be bound by
      the terms of their agreements.” McMahon v. McMahon, … 612
      A.2d 1360, 1363 ([Pa. Super.] 1992) (citations omitted). As such,
      a trial court may interpret a property settlement agreement as it
      would a contract, but it has neither the power nor the authority to
      modify or vary the decree unless there is conclusive proof of fraud
      or mistake. Bianchi v. Bianchi, 859 A.2d 511, 515 (Pa. Super.
      2004). Moreover, the long-standing law of this Commonwealth is
      that property settlement agreements are presumed to be valid

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      and binding upon the parties. McGannon v. McGannon, … 359
      A.2d 431 ([Pa. Super.] 1976).

      When construing agreements involving clear and unambiguous
      terms, a trial court need only examine the writing itself to give
      effect to the parties’ understanding. Vaccarello v. Vaccarello,
      … 757 A.2d 909, 913-[14] ([Pa.] 2000). See Creeks v. Creeks,
      … 619 A.2d 754, 756 ([Pa. Super.] 1993). A court may not modify
      the plain meaning of the words under the guise of interpretation.
      Id. In addition, this Court must consider such contracts without
      reference to matters outside of the document, and we must
      ascertain the parties’ intentions when entering into the contract
      from the entire instrument. Purdy v. Purdy, 715 A.2d 473, 475
      (Pa. Super. 1998). Also, the parties are bound “without regard to
      whether the terms were read and fully understood and
      irrespective of whether the agreements embodied reasonable or
      good bargains.” Sabad v. Fessenden, 825 A.2d 682, 688 (Pa.
      Super. 2003).

Crispo v. Crispo, 909 A.2d 308, 312-13 (Pa. Super. 2006).

      Additionally,

      [b]ecause contract interpretation is a question of law, this Court
      is not bound by the trial court’s interpretation. Our standard of
      review over questions of law is de novo and to the extent
      necessary, the scope of review is plenary as the appellate court
      may review the entire record in making its decision. However, we
      are bound by the trial court’s credibility determinations.

      When interpreting a marital settlement agreement, the trial court
      is the sole determiner of facts and absent an abuse of discretion,
      we will not usurp the trial court’s fact-finding function. On appeal
      from an order interpreting a marital settlement agreement, we
      must decide whether the trial court committed an error of law or
      abused its discretion.

Kraisinger v. Kraisinger, 928 A.2d 333, 339 (Pa. Super. 2007) (internal

citations omitted).

      Preliminarily, we observe that Wife failed to divide the argument section

of her brief into separate subsections for each question to be argued, nor did

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she provide discussion and citation of pertinent legal authority for each issue,

in contravention of Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2119(a). See

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (“The argument shall be divided into as many parts as there

are questions to be argued; and shall have at the head of each part—in

distinctive type or in type distinctively displayed—the particular point treated

therein, followed by such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed

pertinent.”). Rather, Wife’s brief contains only one “argument” section that

spans less than two pages, notwithstanding her presentation of four issues on

appeal. See Wife’s Brief at 14-15.

      Within the argument section, Wife utilizes almost an entire page of her

sparse, two-paged argument to merely restate her claims, baldly stating that

the trial court abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law when it: a)

awarded Husband “a guitar that belongs to [Wife] and was purchased well

after the [d]ate of [s]eparation[;]” b) awarded Husband sanctions “for failing

to provide guitars that were never in the marital home or had already been

removed from the marital home by [Husband;]” c) awarded Husband

sanctions “for a ‘George Washington print in master bedroom’ that was

already removed previously from the marital home by [Husband;]” and d)

awarded Husband reimbursement of counsel fees. Id. at 14. Other than a

single reference to Section 2503(7) of the Pennsylvania Judicial Code,

acknowledging that the trial court “has authority to order a party to pay

attorneys’ fees as a sanction for ‘dilatory, obdurate or vexatious conduct[,]’”

see id. (quoting 42 Pa.C.S. § 2503(7)), Wife cites to no legal authority in

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support of any of her claims. In fact, the entirety of Wife’s argument regarding

the trial court’s reimbursing Husband for counsel fees consists of the following

single statement: “Because the actions of [Wife] were neither dilatory,

obdurate nor vexatious, and all items that still remained in the [m]arital

[r]esidence were returned to Husband, sanctions should not have been

imposed during court proceedings brought by Husband to sue for items that

had already been returned.” Id. at 15.

      As to her other three issues regarding the guitars and the George

Washington print, Wife simply states that Husband failed to provide any proof

that he purchased any of these items, and she points to the transcript from

the evidentiary hearing in an attempt to attack the validity of Husband’s

testimony.    She provides no legal analysis whatsoever.        “The Rules of

Appellate Procedure state unequivocally that each question an appellant raises

is to be supported by discussion and analysis of pertinent authority.” Estate

of Haiko v. McGinely, 799 A.2d 155, 161 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations

omitted). “Without a reasoned discussion of the law … our ability to provide

appellate review is hampered. It is not this Court’s function or duty to become

an advocate for the appellant.” Id. (internal citations, brackets, and quotation

marks omitted). Moreover, Wife is essentially asking this Court to re-weigh

the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder, which we

cannot and will not do. See Kraisinger, supra. Due to Wife’s significant

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violations of the briefing requirements, we deem her claims to be waived on

appeal.3

       Nevertheless, even if not waived, we would conclude that Wife’s claims

lack merit. The trial court thoroughly addressed the issues raised by Wife in

its October 19, 2022 order. First, it expressly responded to Wife’s assertion

that some of the items listed in paragraph 4 of the Consent Order had been

removed prior to the parties’ agreement.

       Initially, the court interprets the language in paragraph 4, “ … any
       of the following items remaining in the marital residence” to mean
       whatever items were still present and not assurance that the items
       did still remain there. Nevertheless, if [Wife] knew or should have
       known that specifically described items were not present, she
       should have objected to the items being included in the list.

Order, 10/19/22, at 1.

       Regarding the guitars awarded to Husband, the trial court opined:

       In paragraphs 11 through 13 of [Wife’s] Answer, [Wife] states that
       she “has no knowledge regarding the guitars and has never seen
       them.” She testified that she sent one guitar with her daughter
       years ago because [Husband] was going to teach her to play. She
       testified that she never saw four guitars in the house. [Husband]
       testified that the four guitars were placed on stands in the
       basement storage room.

       [Husband] produced a photograph of a steel guitar hanging on the
       wall in the front entry way of [Wife’s] house (Exhibit 4).
       [Husband] stated that she bought it at an estate sale in Virginia

____________________________________________

3  We note that we are willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro se
litigant; however, pro se status confers no special benefit upon the appellant.
See Commonwealth v. Adams, 82 A.2d 496, 498 (Pa. Super. 2005)
(citations omitted). “To the contrary, any person choosing to represent
[her]self in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume that [her]
lack of expertise and legal training will be [her] undoing.” Id.

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     in 2020. [Husband] testified that it is one of his guitars on the
     list.

     [Husband’s] testimony on this point is believable. He played
     guitar, as evidenced by [Wife’s] testimony that she previously
     delivered a guitar so [Husband] could teach their daughter to play.
     The fact that the parties gave specific descriptions of the four
     guitars in paragraph 4, together with the lack of evidence that
     [Husband] had reason to fabricate his testimony[,] indicates that
     his testimony is credible.

     On the other hand, [Wife’s] testimony that she has no knowledge
     of the four guitars, and she never saw them in the house is not
     believable. Guitars, because of their size and the way they must
     be handled, can be easily seen; unlike smaller objects that can be
     stored away in boxes. The fact that there were four guitars made
     them that much more visible. The guitars, as described, had
     monetary value and would have required some care and attention.
     [Wife] did not testify that she plays a guitar or has any reason to
     hang a guitar as a decoration in her entry way. Further, she did
     not object to the specifically described guitars being included in
     paragraph 4 of the [Consent] Order.

     The steel guitar that is or was hanging in the entry way of [Wife’s]
     home is [Husband’s] guitar. [Wife] shall deliver it to [Husband]
     within 20 days.

     Based on the broad enforcement authority granted by [S]ection
     3502 [of the Divorce Code], this court will require [Wife] to pay
     [Husband] a reasonable amount for failing to make the other
     described guitars available to him. The court cannot determine
     from the evidence the exact replacement cost. Nevertheless,
     given their descriptions, especially the “Fender Telecaster guitar,”
     they had monetary value. As a sanction, [Wife] shall pay $4,500
     to [Husband] within 60 days.

Order, 10/19/22, at 2-3.

     As to the George Washington print, the trial court stated:

     This item had sentimental value to [Husband] as a gift from his
     parents and having served in the military. It is reasonable to
     conclude that he would know if he already had it. The fact that
     he texted [Wife] on March 16, “my George Washington painting?”
     indicates that he was expecting to get it that day and he did not.

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      The [Consent] Order gives the location of the print, “in the master
      bedroom.” [Wife] would have known at the time she signed the
      Consent Order whether or not it was present [in] the master
      bedroom. If it was not, she would reasonably have objected to
      the item’s inclusion in the [Consent] Order and she did not. As a
      sanction, [Wife] shall pay [Husband] $500 within 60 days.

Id. at 3-4.   Based on our review, we would deem the trial court’s factual

findings to be supported by the record.       Moreover, the trial court found

Husband’s testimony to be credible, and we would be bound by such

determinations. See Kraisinger, supra.

      Additionally, we would conclude that it was in the trial court’s discretion

to order Wife to deliver the steel guitar to Husband and to sanction Wife for

failing to make the other three guitars and the George Washington print

available to Husband. As Husband stated in his letter brief to the trial court:

      “The Divorce Code grants trial courts broad powers to enforce
      orders of equitable distribution, and provides remedies available
      against one who fails to comply with a court’s order of equitable
      distribution.” Prol v. Prol, 935 A.2d 547, 553 (Pa. Super. 2007)
      (quoting Richardson v. Richardson, 774 A.2d 1267, 1270 (Pa.
      Super. 2001)). The court may therefore impose any appropriate
      sanction for noncompliance with its orders. Id. … This broad
      equitable power extends to enforcement of a settlement
      agreement between the parties. Miller v. Miller, 983 A.2d 736,
      744 (Pa. Super. 2009).

      Section 3323(f) of the Divorce Code provides that:

         In all matrimonial causes, the court shall have full equity
         power and jurisdiction and may issue injunctions or other
         orders which are necessary to protect the interests of the
         parties or to effectuate the purposes of this part and may
         grant such other relief or remedy as equity and justice
         require against either party or against any third person over

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           whom the court has jurisdiction and who is involved in or
           concerned with the disposition of the cause.[4]

        Further, Section 3502(e) of the Divorce Code states in pertinent
        part:

           If, at any time, a party has failed to comply with an order of
           equitable distribution, as provided for in this chapter or with
           the terms of an agreement as entered into between the
           parties, after hearing, the court may, in addition to any
           other remedy available under this part, in order to effect
           compliance with its order:

                                               …

           (4) order and direct the transfer or sale of any property
           required in order to comply with the court’s order;

                                               …

           (7) award counsel fees and costs.[5]

Husband’s Letter Brief, 9/30/22, at 1-2 (internal brackets omitted). Hence,

we would discern no abuse of discretion or error of law in the trial court’s

directing Wife to deliver the steel guitar to Husband or in its sanctioning Wife

for failure to comply with the Consent Order regarding the other items.

        Finally, regarding Wife’s claim that the trial court erred in awarding

Husband counsel fees, we would also conclude no relief is warranted. As the

trial   court   explained,    it   determined      that   Husband   was   entitled   to

reimbursement of these fees, since he was required to bring his petition to

enforce the Consent Order to obtain the relief that the court had provided.

Id. at 4. See also 23 Pa.C.S. § 3502(e)(7).

____________________________________________

4   23 Pa.C.S. § 3323(f).

5   23 Pa.C.S. § 3502(e)(4), (7).

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        Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s October 19, 2022 order granting

Husband’s petition to enforce the Consent Order.

        Order affirmed.

        Judge Bowes joins this memorandum.

        Judge Sullivan did not participate in the consideration or decision of this

case.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/2/2023

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