Court Opinion

ID: 9947290
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 16:01:40.88142+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:18.230706
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                             For the Eighth Circuit
                         ___________________________

                                 No. 23-1113
                         ___________________________

                             United States of America

                                       Plaintiff - Appellee

                                         v.

                              Lewis W. Paraham, III

                                    Defendant - Appellant
                                  ____________

                     Appeal from United States District Court
                   for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central
                                  ____________

                           Submitted: October 16, 2023
                              Filed: March 4, 2024
                                 [Unpublished]
                                 ____________

Before BENTON, SHEPHERD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
                          ____________

PER CURIAM.

       After Lewis W. Paraham, III pleaded guilty to a firearm offense, the district
court1 sentenced him to 102 months of imprisonment. Paraham appeals, arguing the

      1
        The Honorable Lee P. Rudofsky, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Arkansas.
length of his sentence is substantively unreasonable. Having jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

                                          I.

       Paraham was charged in a three-count indictment. Pursuant to a plea
agreement, he pleaded guilty to Count 1, Felon in Possession of a Firearm, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).2 As part of the agreement, the parties also
stipulated that neither would request a variance above or below the applicable
Guidelines range. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(A), (B). During the change of plea
hearing, the district court reminded the parties that the Plea Agreement was not
binding on the court and that the court had discretion to sentence Paraham below or
above the advisory Guidelines range, including “all of the way to the [120-month]
statutory maximum.”

        At sentencing, the parties agreed that Paraham’s advisory range was 37 to 46
months of imprisonment. The district court found it “very odd” that the calculated
range was so low because Paraham was convicted of violent felonies in 1991 and
1992 at the age of nineteen, including the use of a firearm during a robbery, and the
use of a firearm to kidnap and rape a minor. Since then, he was also convicted of
unlawful possession of a firearm, failure to register as a sex offender, attempting to
use counterfeit currency, and possession of controlled substances. In response, the
government explained that its recommendation of a 46-month sentence was “easily
justified” by the facts in the record. Paraham also recommended a within-Guidelines
sentence. But he highlighted mitigating factors such as the lengthy prison term he
served for his 1991 and 1992 felonies, the nonviolent nature of his offenses from

      2
        Count 2 charged Paraham with possession of methamphetamine with intent
to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and Count 3 charged
him with possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Pursuant to the Plea Agreement, the
government agreed to dismiss Counts 2 and 3 “upon acceptance of the guilty plea.”
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that point forward, his reduced likelihood of violence as a now-fifty-year-old man,
and his drug addiction.

       After a brief recess, the district court imposed an above-range sentence of 102
months. The court concluded that the calculated Guidelines range did not sufficiently
account for Paraham’s history and characteristics or his need for a longer sentence.
Of particular concern to the court was Paraham’s pattern of criminal behavior despite
multiple terms of imprisonment, his violent offenses involving the use of firearms,
his lack of respect for the law, his need for specific deterrence, and the need to
protect the public. The court concluded that a sentence of 102 months was “sufficient
but no more than necessary” under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to achieve the purposes of
sentencing. Paraham appeals his sentence.

                                          II.

       “We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence using a deferential
abuse of discretion standard.” United States v. DaCruz-Mendes, 970 F.3d 904, 909
(8th Cir. 2020) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 914 F.3d 581, 587 (8th Cir. 2019)).
“A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to consider a relevant factor
that should have received significant weight; (2) gives significant weight to an
improper or irrelevant factor; or (3) considers only the appropriate factors but in
weighing those factors commits a clear error of judgment.” United States v.
Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal quotations and
citation omitted).

        As we have recognized, “[a] district court may vary upward from the
[G]uideline[s] range if the extent of the deviation is supported by the . . . § 3553(a)
factors.” United States v. Drew, 9 F.4th 718, 725 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting United
States v. Martinez, 821 F.3d 984, 989 (8th Cir. 2016)). However, when it decides to
do so, the court “must ‘consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the
justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.’”
Feemster, 572 F.3d at 461 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007));
                                         -3-
e.g., United States v. Hall, 825 F.3d 373, 375 (8th Cir. 2016) (concluding that the
weight given to the defendant’s “extensive criminal history” in varying above the
Guidelines was a reasonable exercise of discretion). “[T]he mere fact that the court
could have weighed the sentencing factors differently does not amount to an abuse
of discretion.” Hall, 825 F.3d at 375 (citing United States v. Gasaway, 684 F.3d 804,
808 (8th Cir. 2012)).

       Paraham argues that the district court abused its discretion by giving undue
weight to his criminal history. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). He asserts that his
Guidelines range already factored in his criminal record, and that the district court’s
reliance on this factor cannot support the weight of such a substantial upward
variance.

       The district court provided a sufficiently compelling reason for the sentence
imposed. See Feemster, 572 F.3d at 461. It considered the parties’ sentencing
recommendations but exercised its discretion to weigh the § 3553(a) factors
differently than the parties, expressing concern about Paraham’s repeated criminal
conduct. Paraham’s prior violent convictions, which the court addressed at length,
were not considered in calculating his advisory range due to their age. See United
States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) § 4A1.2(e) (2021). When explaining its
sentencing decision, the court expressly relied on the need to promote respect for the
law, afford specific deterrence to avoid recidivism, and protect the public. See
§ 3553(a)(2)(A), (B), (C). The district court took into account Paraham’s criminal
history, but it did so alongside careful consideration of these other relevant factors,
which “are appropriate factors to consider when making a sentencing decision.”
Hall, 825 F.3d at 375. We discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s weighing of
appropriate factors to reach a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary” to meet the goals of sentencing under § 3553(a).

      We affirm the judgment of the district court.
                      ______________________________

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