Court Opinion

ID: 9590839
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:58:42.745033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:57.348143
License: Public Domain

HOWE, Associate Chief Justice,
dissenting:
I dissent. I would affirm the award of attorney fees made by the Commission.
Although the majority professes “our complete confidence in the professionalism of the Commission,” it then proceeds to accord no confidence in its award of fees by reversing the Commission on every determination of fact and law made by it.
The majority departs from our general rule of reviewing awards of fees under an abuse of discretion standard and instead imposes a heightened standard, not because of any bias demonstrated by the Commission but because there is “a potential for the appearance of bias.”
The setting of fees here by the Commission is not different from the everyday occurrence in the trial courts, where trial judges who have been reversed on appeal are called upon to fix a reasonable fee for the attorney who prosecuted the appeal and was responsible for reversing the judge. Yet we have never presumed that the judge could not be fair in such a situation and imposed a heightened scrutiny in reviewing the judge’s award. We should not treat the Commission differently. The members are entitled to our respect and confidence, and we should not review their work with suspicion. So far as I know, we have never reversed a judgment simply because “there is a potential for the appearance of bias.” We have always required that bias be demonstrated. That has not been done here.
The award of fees made by the Commission is well supported by the evidence, which has always been the standard by which we have reviewed awards of fees. While the majority recites evidence supporting the Commission’s award, it gives no weight to that evidence. Instead, the majority makes a de novo determination of the factual issues which the Commission made in setting a reasonable fee. For example, the Commission reduced by twenty-five percent the number of hours for which the attorneys should be compensated. This reduction was made because the attorneys’ time records lacked meaningful detail; Barker reconstructed his time spent on the ease; two attorneys spent time on the same task; the records reflected inconsistencies in time billed for the same task; and the time billed for certain tasks appeared excessive on its face. In any other case, this explanation would suffice, and we would not hesitate to affirm the award made. But here, even though the explanation is *714supported by the affidavit of Gary A. Dodge, a capable practicing attorney, the majority rejects the Commission’s explanation because Barker and Flynn testified that they had understated their hours by at least twenty-five percent and observes that their testimony went uncontested. Of course it went uncontested; it was subjective and incapable of being challenged by anyone. But the Commission as the fact finder was not required to believe their testimony. Nevertheless, the majority reverses the Commission on disputed facts and substitutes themselves as the fact finders.
In a similar manner, the majority reverses the Commission’s determination that $25 per hour was a reasonable rate for Funk and McDermott, who were not paralegals. Indeed, Funk had done work for the Commission at $25 per hour, and McDermott was a law student. Yet the majority rejects this reasoning of the Commission and awards them “$45 an hour at least,” the rate for paralegals, which they admittedly were not. Again, the majority rolls over the Commission’s factual determination.
The majority recognizes that “the rates Barker and Flynn requested rank among the highest in Salt Lake City.” Barker will receive $175 for every hour requested except for the 9.5-hour token reduction made by the majority. Flynn will receive $250 per hour for every hour he requested. But it seems that is not enough. The majority then proceeds to apply a multiplier of 2.5.
I do not discount the value of the service provided by the attorneys. They deserve to be fairly compensated. But when they are awarded compensation for almost every hour they requested, even though their time records were subject to question and they are paid at the highest rates known in this community, I fail to see the necessity of or fairness in applying a multiplier. The attorneys took the case on a pro bono basis and had no agreement with anyone for a fee. They are to be commended for their public spirit and hard work. I would leave them with their handsome fee determined without a multiplier and would not shower them with a windfall.
ZIMMERMAN, C.J., concurs in Associate Chief Justice HOWE’s dissenting opinion.