Court Opinion

ID: 9518010
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:40:30.59674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:49.623588
License: Public Domain

Justice GREENSPAN,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that “the issue for which we granted allowance of appeal ... is not made out by these facts.” Majority Op. at 37, 977 A.2d at 1105. For that reason, it may be we should dismiss this case as improvidently granted. Nevertheless, I agree with the majority that Appellant’s judgment of sentence must be affirmed because there is ample evidence of record to support the verdicts rendered, namely, third-degree murder and conspiracy to commit homicide.
I view this case as posing not so much an inquiry into the legality of a conviction for conspiracy to commit third-degree *40murder, but instead an inquiry into the comprehensiveness (or lack thereof) of the trial court’s instruction on the conspiracy charge. Conspiracy, of course, is routinely charged in homicide cases involving more than one actor. Where degree of guilt for the homicide, rather than outright guilt or innocence, may prove to be the dispositive issue for the jury, the trial court must ensure that the jury is instructed to account for the sort of circumstance revealed by the cáse. This is so because, as Justice Eakin wisely recognizes, “the crime ultimately accomplished does not retroactively limit the scope of the original conspiracy.” Majority Op. at 38, 977 A.2d at 1105.
Despite this fact, the manner in which a criminal defendant is charged in a murder/conspiracy case, and the manner in which a trial court instructs the jury on those charges, indeed can affect the sentence ultimately imposed. This case does not raise the question of whether the trial court’s instructions to the jury were proper or whether Appellant’s sentence was appropriate.1 Nonetheless, it is important to ensure that a jury is instructed in accordance with the charges that have been brought and the evidence that has been presented. In that way, a proper verdict is rendered and the proper sentencing range prescribed.
There is more to be said on this issue. As Justice Eakin observes, the Superior Court’s jurisprudence is replete with cases that involve both conspiracy and third degree murder. I would encourage the Standard Jury Instruction Advisory Committee to consider amending its suggested conspiracy instruction to reflect the need for specificity when a defendant is charged with conspiracy in a case involving homicide.
Finally, I note that despite the seriousness of the charges and the complexity of the issues raised, the Commonwealth declined to file a brief in this case. This lack of advocacy on the Commonwealth’s part complicates our review, particularly as it pertains to what charges were actually brought, withdrawn, and pursued. The Commonwealth’s decision to forego *41an opportunity to brief these issues denies this Court the wisdom of litigants who have been engaged in the controversy and have a comprehensive picture of the case and its issues.
Chief Justice CASTILLE joins this concurring opinion.

. Appellant did not object to the court's instructions to the jury. The trial court sentenced Appellant to 12 'k to 25 years for third-degree murder and 2% to 5 years for conspiracy.