Court Opinion

ID: 9376029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-01 17:07:09.857404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:03.911161
License: Public Domain

J-S02038-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    WILLIAM MATTHEW MYERS                      :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 786 MDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 24, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
                           CP-67-CR-0007386-2019

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                       FILED: MARCH 1, 2023

        Appellant, William Matthew Myers, appeals from the judgment of

sentence1 imposed after a jury convicted him of two counts of Unlawful

Contact with a Minor.2 He challenges an evidentiary ruling, the sufficiency of

the evidence, and the legality of his sentence. Upon review, we affirm.

        The factual and procedural history is as follows. On August 15, 2019,

and early into the morning on August 16, 2019, then-14-year-old I.M.

(“Victim”) attended a baseball game in York with her brother. At some point

during the evening, Victim became separated from her brother.
____________________________________________

1 Appellant’s notice of appeal states that appeal is from the “Order Denying
Post Sentence Motion dated and entered on April 21, 2022.” Notice of Appeal,
5/21/22. “In a criminal action, appeal properly lies from the judgment of
sentence made final by the denial of post-sentence motions.”
Commonwealth v. Shamberger, 788 A.2d 408, 410 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2001)
(en banc). We have changed the caption accordingly.

2   18 Pa.C.S. 6318(a).
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      After the game, around 1:00 AM, Victim waited in a public square

outside the baseball stadium for her foster parent to pick her up. While Victim

sat on a bench, Appellant approached Victim and asked her how old she was

and why she was there. When Victim responded that she was 14 years old

and waiting for a ride, Appellant walked away. But Appellant returned a few

minutes later and started to talk to Victim about “sexual things” and asked

her what she would do if he “tried something.” N.T. Trial, 8/23-24/21, at 101.

Victim felt uncomfortable and began video recording Appellant on her cell

phone via the SnapChat app. Victim recorded Appellant saying the following:

      [APPELLANT]: -- fuckin’ rape fuckin’ never, a gentleman rape.
      (Laughing). I mean, not that - - I am saying, but you know you
      are attractive, right? Yes, you are. And if I like desired you, I
      mean, what would you possibly do to stop me? So then I would
      do the gentleman thing and just ask you instead of taking it. I’m
      trying to do it the gentleman way instead of just like, you know
      what I mean, doing it just like outright just crazy. I think it would
      be a whole lot better if we just did consensual. Don’t you think?
      Because you are here. And I am here. You don’t know me from
      a can of paint. I am not going to hurt you. As a matter of fact, I
      wouldn’t even penetrate you. I will just lick it. What do you think?

N.T. Trial, 8/23/21, at 91-92; Commonwealth Exhibit 2.

      Victim’s foster parent arrived, and Victim ran to the car to escape

Appellant.   Victim sent the SnapChat videos of Appellant to her biological

mother (“Mother”), who contacted the police the following day.         Detective

Tiffany Pitts of the York City Police viewed the video and identified Appellant.

      The Commonwealth charged Appellant with one count of Unlawful

Contact with a Minor - Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse (“Unlawful

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Contact-IDSI”), one count of Unlawful Contact with a Minor – Indecent Assault

(“Unlawful Contact-IA”), and one count of Harassment. The court held a jury

trial on August 23, 2021, and August 24, 2021. The Commonwealth presented

testimony from Victim, Mother, and Detective Pitts who testified in accordance

with the above events. The Commonwealth also entered the SnapChat video,

as well as a transcript of the video, into evidence without objection. Appellant

did not testify on his own behalf or present any evidence.

      After both parties rested, Appellant made a verbal motion for judgment

of acquittal of Unlawful Contact-IDSI, which the court denied.

      On August 24, 2021, a jury found Appellant guilty of Unlawful Contact-

IDSI, graded as a felony of the first degree, and Unlawful Contact-IA, graded

as a felony of the second degree. On November 24, 2021, the court sentenced

Appellant on both charges—which merged for sentencing purposes—to a

mandatory minimum sentence of 25 to 50 years’ incarceration pursuant to 42

Pa.C.S. § 9718.2(a)(1) due to his prior convictions of sexual offenses.

      On February 3, 2022, after the trial court granted multiple extensions,

Appellant filed a post-sentence motion raising, inter alia, a challenge to the

weight of the evidence. On April 29, 2022, after a hearing, the trial court

denied the motions.

      Appellant timely appealed. Appellant and the trial court complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

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      A. Whether the trial court erred in denying defense objection to
         the Commonwealth replaying Commonwealth’s Exhibit “1” and
         making comment thereon, in the Commonwealth’s closing
         statement to the jury which contained a nonconsensual audio
         and video recording by [] Victim of the testimonial statements
         of [] Appellant that were to constitute the crimes charges as
         an impermissible testimony exhibit that prejudiced [] Appellant
         in violation of fair trial and due process rights in Article I,
         Sections 1 and 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Sixth
         and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United
         States?

      B. Whether the trial court erred in denying defense motion for
         acquittal at the close of Commonwealth[’s] case regarding the
         lack of sufficient evidence for Count 1, Unlawful Contact[-IDSI]
         in that [] Appellant’s recorded statement indicated that he
         would not penetrate and would only lick [] Victim, which failed
         to establish communication of his intent to penetrate [] Victim,
         however slight?

      C. Whether the trial court erred in denying the post sentence
         motion based on the verdict being against the weight of the
         evidence for Count 1, Unlawful Contact[-IDSI] in that the
         evidence did not establish that [] Appellant ever communicated
         an intent to penetrate [] Victim, however slight, by stating that
         he would not penetrate and would only lick [] Victim?

      D. Whether the trial court’s imposition of the mandatory minimum
         sentence of 25 to 50 years in a state correctional facility is cruel
         and unusual punishment in violation of the 8th Amendment of
         the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 13
         of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania given
         the nature of the offense?

Appellant’s Br. at 4-5 (some capitalization omitted).

                                        A.

      In his first issue, Appellant avers that the trial court erred when it

permitted the Commonwealth to replay the SnapChat video during its closing

arguments.    Appellant’s Br. at 17.      Appellant argues this was improper

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readmission of testimonial type evidence that would unduly influence the jury.

Appellant’s Br. at 17. Upon review, Appellant’s claim lacks merit.

      Appellant provides no authority to support his assertion that it was

improper for the trial court to allow the Commonwealth to replay a video

during its closing statement—a video that had been previously entered into

evidence without objection. In fact, this Court has consistently held that items

introduced as evidence can be used during closing argument.                See

Commonwealth v. Stark, 526 A.2d 383, 392 (Pa. Super. 1987) (allowing

recorded confession to be playing during closing argument); Commonwealth

v. Wise, 444 A.2d 1287, 1289-90 (Pa. Super. 1982) (holding that the trial

court did not err in permitting the Commonwealth to publish photos to the

jury during closing argument that were already admitted as evidence);

Commonwealth v. Burton, 330 A.2d 833, 837 (Pa. Super. 1975) (new trial

not warranted where prosecutor handled weapons which had been introduced

as Commonwealth exhibits). Accordingly, Appellant’s unsupported claim is

devoid of merit.

                                      B.

      In his second issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

to support his conviction for Unlawful Contact-IDSI.       A challenge to the

sufficiency of the evidence presents a question of law for which our standard

of review is de novo. Commonwealth v. Weimer, 977 A.2d 1103, 1104-05

(Pa. 2009). In reviewing a sufficiency challenge, we must determine whether

the evidence, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence,

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when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict

winner, establish each element of the challenged offense beyond a reasonable

doubt. Commonwealth v. Brewer, 876 A.2d 1029, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2005).

The trier of fact—while passing on the credibility of the witnesses and the

weight of the evidence—is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 40 (Pa. Super. 2014). Moreover, the

trier of fact may base a conviction solely on circumstantial evidence. Id. In

conducting this review, the appellate court may not reweigh the evidence and

substitute its judgment for that of the fact-finder. Id. at 39-40.

      A person is guilty of Unlawful Contact with a Minor if he or she is

intentionally in contact with a minor for the purpose of engaging in a

prohibited Chapter 31 sexual offense. 18 Pa.C.S. § 6318(a)(1). As this Court

has   explained   that   “[t]he   statute   is   best   understood   as   unlawful

communication with a minor, for by its plain terms, it prohibits

communication with a minor for the purpose of carrying out certain sex acts.”

Commonwealth v. Davis, 225 A.3d 582, 587 (Pa. Super. 2019) (emphasis

in original). Notably, “Section 6318 does not require that a defendant even

be charged with, let alone convicted of, any underlying substantive offense for

which he contacted the minor.” Commonwealth v. Aikens, 168 A.3d 137,

141 (Pa. 2017). Moreover, “a defendant need not be successful in completing

the purpose of his communication with a minor in order to be convicted of

unlawful contact with a minor.” Id.

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      Relevant to this appeal, a person is guilty of IDSI if he “engages in

deviate sexual intercourse” with a Victim who is less than 16 years of age. 18

Pa.C.S. § 3123(a)(7). “Deviate sexual intercourse” is defined as “[s]exual

intercourse per os or per anus between human beings” and “includes

penetration, however slight, of the genitals[.]” Id. at § 3101. “Deviate sexual

intercourse is considered to have occurred if one’s mouth or tongue penetrates

the vaginal area of another.” In Interest of J.R., 648 A.2d 28, 33 (Pa. Super.

1994). “Additionally, we note that ‘actual’ penetration of the vagina is not

necessary; some form of oral contact with the genitalia of the female victim

is all that is required.” Id.

      Instantly, Appellant avers that his recorded statement: “I wouldn’t even

penetrate you. I will just lick it” did not rise to the level of Unlawful Contact-

IDSI. Appellant argues that the evidence was not sufficient to prove his intent

to penetrate the victim because he did not specify where or how he would lick

Victim and, in fact, stated to Victim that he did not intend to penetrate.

Appellant’s Br. at 23. We disagree.

      The evidence clearly demonstrates that Appellant communicated with a

minor for the purpose of carrying out a sex act. In his statements to Victim,

he talks about “rape” and then asks Victim to “consent” so that he can be a

“gentleman.” Appellant then goes on to discuss penetration and licking “it.”

Given the totality of the evidence, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that

Appellant was referring to a form of oral contact with Victim’s genitalia.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the

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verdict winner, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to convict

Appellant of Unlawful Contact-IDSI.

                                               C.

       In his third issue, Appellant purports to challenge the weight of the

evidence. However, upon review, we discern that Appellant is essentially re-

raising a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Appellant addresses his

weight claim in the same section as his sufficiency claim, and simply repeats

the arguments that he used to support his sufficiency claim, i.e., that

Appellant’s statement did not communicate an intent to penetrate Victim but

rather a desire to lick Victim in some unspecified manner.           Id. at 24.

Accordingly, Appellant avers, there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate

Unlawful Contact-IDSI and the jury’s verdict “shocks one’s sense of justice.”

Id. at 25. As explained above, Appellant’s sufficiency claim does not entitle

him to relief, and this attempted weight challenge fails.

                                               D.

       In his final issue, Appellant avers that the trial court’s imposition of a

mandatory minimum sentence of 25 to 50 years’ incarceration, imposed

pursuant to Section 9718.2,3 is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
____________________________________________

3 Section 9718.2 (a)(1) provides, in relevant part: “Any person who is
convicted in any court of this Commonwealth of an offense set forth in section
9799.14 (relating to sexual offenses and tier system) shall, if at the time of
the commission of the current offense the person had previously been
convicted of an offense set forth in section 9799.14 or an equivalent crime
under the laws of this Commonwealth in effect at the time of the commission
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Constitution. Appellant’s Br. at 25. Appellant

argues that the mandatory minimum sentence imposed in this case is

disproportionate to the nature of the offense, which he characterizes as a mere

“verbal communication.” Id. at 28. We are unpersuaded.

       Appellant’s challenge to the constitutionality of his sentence is a pure

question of law. Brown v. Levy, 73 A.3d 514, 517 (Pa. 2013). Therefore,

our scope of review is plenary and our standard of review is de novo. Id.

       In addressing constitutional challenges, we are mindful that there is a

strong    presumption       that    legislative   enactments   are   constitutional.

Commonwealth v. Barud, 681 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1996). For an act to be

declared unconstitutional, an appellant must prove that the act “clearly,

palpably and plainly” violates the constitution.       Id. (citation omitted). “All

doubts are to be resolved in favor of sustaining a statute; thus an appellant

has the heavy burden of persuasion when challenging the constitutionality of

a statute.” Commonwealth v. Nguyen, 834 A.2d 1205, 1208 (Pa. Super.

2003).

       Moreover, “Pennsylvania courts have repeatedly and unanimously held

that the Pennsylvania prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is

____________________________________________

of that offense or an equivalent crime in another jurisdiction, be sentenced to
a minimum sentence of at least 25 years of total confinement, notwithstanding
any other provision of this title or other statute to the contrary.” 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9718.2(a)(1).

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coextensive with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution, and that the Pennsylvania Constitution affords no broader

protection against excessive sentences than that provided by the Eighth

Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Commonwealth v. Elia, 83

A.3d 254, 267 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). Appellant has not argued to the contrary. Accordingly, we only

need    to   review   Appellant’s   claim      under   the   Eighth   Amendment.

Commonwealth v. Barnett, 50 A.3d 176, 197 (Pa. Super. 2012).

       The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that

“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel

and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const., Amend. VIII. “The Cruel

and Unusual Punishment clause prohibits not only barbaric punishments, but

also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed.” Elia, 83

A.3d at 268 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

However, “[t]he Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality

between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences which

are grossly disproportionate to the crime.” Commonwealth v. Baker, 78

A.3d 1044, 1047 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted).

       In order to determine if a sentence violates the Eighth Amendment, this

Court applies a three-pronged test, including:

       (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii)
       the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction;
       and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime
       in other jurisdictions.

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Id. (citation omitted). Importantly, we are not obligated to reach the second

and third prongs of the test “unless a threshold comparison of the crime

committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross

disproportionality.”     Commonwealth v. Succi, 173 A.3d 269, 285 (Pa.

Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

       Appellant’s claim of disproportionality challenges the constitutionality of

the recidivist sentencing statute germane to repeat convictions of sexual

offenses. Challenges to recidivist sentencing schemes are rarely successful.

Baker, 78 A.3d at 1048.4

       In Baker, our Supreme Court upheld the imposition of a mandatory

minimum sentence of 25 to 50 years’ incarceration for a defendant who had

been convicted of possessing child pornography more than one time. 78 A.3d

1052. Baker argued that his sentence was a simple, non-serious, possessory

offense. Our Supreme Court disagreed and emphasized “the fact that [the

appellant] is a repeat offender certainly goes to the gravity of his instant

offense.” Id. at 1051. The Court also explained that the appellant’s sexually
____________________________________________

4 In Baker, our Supreme Court observed that the United States Supreme
Court has only once struck down as unconstitutional the application of a
recidivist sentencing statute after a South Dakota court imposed a sentence
of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole based on the appellant’s
conviction of passing a bad check in the amount of $100. 78 A.3d at 1048.
See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (finding no violation of
the Eighth Amendment where a Texas court imposed a sentence of life with
the possibility of parole after 12 years’ incarceration for receiving $120 under
false pretenses); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 17-20, 30-31 (2003)
(upholding the constitutionality of a sentence of 25 years’ to life imposed
pursuant to California’s three-strikes law upon a conviction of theft involving
three golf clubs).

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based crimes could not be viewed “in a manner that detaches them from the

devastating victimization” and “sexual abuse and exploitation of innocent

children for personal gratification.” Id. at 1052.

      As Baker instructs, the fact that Appellant is a repeat offender is

relevant to the gravity of his offense. Over the last 33 years, Appellant has

been convicted of statutory rape, indecent assault (both to an adult and child),

corruption of minors, and unlawful restraint of an adult.        N.T. Sentencing,

11/24/21, at 9-10. Moreover, Appellant’s characterization of his crime as a

mere “verbal communication” is disingenuous and detaches the crime from

Appellant’s overall pattern of sexual victimization. As the trial court opined in

finding Appellant’s sentence to be constitutional:

      [A]ppellant is a repeat offender. The nature of the offense is of
      grave concern to the [c]ourt and the community. [] Appellant
      poses a risk to the community. The facts surrounding the crime
      concern the [c]ourt of Appellant’s ability to be rehabilitated, and
      this is not Appellant’s first conviction relating to a minor. [V]ictim,
      in this case, was a 14-year-old child at the date of the offense that
      he prayed upon. The crime took place in the early hours of the
      morning. The victim explicitly told [] Appellant that she was 14
      and yet continued to propose performing sexual acts upon
      [V]ictim.    The [c]ourt only wonders what else would have
      happened if the victim’s foster father had not shown up when he
      did.

Trial Ct. Op., 8/25/22, at 11.

      Appellant’s bald assertion that his sentence is grossly disproportionate

to the gravity of the offense fails to persuade us that his sentence is

unconstitutional.     Appellant    mischaracterizes     his   crime   as   “verbal

communication” with Victim when, in reality, he was propositioning a child for

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sex. Given the fact that Appellant is a repeat offender, has preyed on children

more than once, was aware that Victim was 14 years old, and repeatedly

propositioned Victim for sex, this Court’s threshold comparison of the crime

committed and the sentence imposed fails to lead to an interference of gross

disproportionality. Accordingly, Appellant’s claim that his sentence violates

the Eighth Amendment fails.5

                                               E.

       In sum, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to convict

Appellant of Unlawful Contact-IDSI and his mandatory minimum sentence of

25 to 50 years’ incarceration is constitutional. Moreover, the trial court did

not abuse its discretion by allowing the Commonwealth to present previously

admitted evidence during its closing argument.          Accordingly, none of

Appellant’s claims garner relief.

____________________________________________

5 Appellant also raises several challenges to the discretionary aspects of
sentencing, including that the trial court failed to consider (1) the mandatory
minimum sentence exceeds the standard range sentencing guidelines, (2)
Appellant would not be eligible for parole until he is 85 years old, and (3)
Appellant suffers from numerous mental health diagnoses. Appellant’s Br. at
27-28. Insofar as the imposed sentence was not discretionary, but rather
mandatory, we decline to address these arguments.

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     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/1/2023

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