Court Opinion

ID: 9399650
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-05 23:00:56.231613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:31.099462
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                                 File Name: 23a0252n.06

                                       Case No. 22-5517
                                                                                     FILED
                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       Jun 05, 2023
                               FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT                       DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

                                                     )
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                     )
       Plaintiff-Appellee,                           )
                                                     )        ON APPEAL FROM THE
v.                                                   )        UNITED STATES DISTRICT
                                                     )        COURT FOR THE EASTERN
MICHAEL DISHMAN,                                     )        DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
       Defendant-Appellant.                          )
                                                     )                                OPINION

Before: MOORE, McKEAGUE, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.

       McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Michael Dishman pled guilty to one count of possession

with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1). He was sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Dishman challenges his

below-Guidelines sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable. For the reasons set

forth below, we affirm.

                                                I

       On August 11, 2021, a confidential source informed the Wayne County Sheriff’s Office

that Dishman had been selling large quantities of methamphetamine. Specifically, the confidential

source advised the officers that she had visited Dishman’s home on the previous day to purchase

two ounces of methamphetamine for $600 per ounce. The Sheriff’s Office executed a search

warrant at Dishman’s residence, which resulted in the seizure of more than 100 grams of

methamphetamine.
No. 22-5517, United States v. Dishman

       On September 22, 2021, Dishman was indicted in the Eastern District of Kentucky for

possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a methamphetamine mixture, in violation

of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On January 31, 2022, he pled guilty. Due to his prior felony drug

convictions, Dishman was classified as a career offender. Dishman’s Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”)

calculated his Guidelines sentencing range as 262 to 327 months of imprisonment based on a total

offense level of 34 and a criminal-history category of VI. After considering the sentencing factors

under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court varied downward slightly and sentenced Dishman to

240 months’ imprisonment.

       Dishman did not object to the length of his sentence at sentencing. He did, however, file a

timely appeal arguing that his sentence is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.

                                                II

   A. Procedural Reasonableness

       A sentence is procedurally unreasonable “if the district court fails to calculate (or

improperly calculates) the Guidelines range, treats the Guidelines as mandatory, fails to consider

the § 3553(a) factors, selects a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fails to adequately

explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines

range.” United States v. Gates, 48 F.4th 463, 473 (6th Cir. 2022) (internal alterations, citations,

and quotations omitted).

       Dishman contends that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable for two reasons. First,

he argues that “it is unclear from the record whether the district court believed it was restricted

from applying a more significant downward variance based on Mr. Dishman’s status as a career

offender.” Appellant Br. at 7. And second, he claims that the district court failed to address his

life-expectancy argument. Because Dishman failed to raise these procedural objections below, we

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No. 22-5517, United States v. Dishman

review his claims for plain error. See United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872–73 (6th Cir.

2004). Under plain-error review, Dishman must show an “(1) error (2) that ‘was obvious or clear,’

(3) that ‘affected [his] substantial rights[,]’ and (4) that ‘affected the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of the judicial proceedings.’” United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir.

2008) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 459 (6th Cir. 2006)).

        We begin with Dishman’s first contention—that the district court believed it lacked

discretion to apply a more significant downward variance given Dishman’s status as a career

offender—and find that the district court did not plainly err. Contrary to Dishman’s suggestion,

the district court clearly recognized that the Guidelines were advisory. Not only did the court

impose a sentence below the Guidelines range, but the sentencing judge repeatedly acknowledged

his discretion to deviate from that range irrespective of Dishman’s status as a career offender. For

example, the sentencing judge stated, “ultimately, I am not bound by the sentencing guidelines.

They are only advisory. They are a recommendation to the Court.” R. 42, PID 216. And later, he

further clarified, “I can go away from the guidelines. I can go above the range or below the range

or sentence within it, based on my consideration of the particulars in the case[.]” Id. Nothing in

the record supports Dishman’s contention that the court doubted its own authority to apply a more

significant downward variance. To the contrary, the record shows that the sentencing court was

aware of and understood its discretion to depart from the Guidelines.

        Dishman’s second procedural challenge—that the district court ignored his life-expectancy

argument—is equally unavailing. At sentencing, Dishman argued, “This is my life. You give me

262 months, average person only lives 76 years, male. I won’t live very long afterwards if I don’t

die while I’m in there.” R. 42, PID 242. But contrary to Dishman’s contention on appeal, the

district court clearly understood that Dishman faced a lengthy sentence. When discussing the

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No. 22-5517, United States v. Dishman

potential penalties associated with Dishman’s conviction, the sentencing judge noted, “So you

could receive life in prison for this time. Now, I’m not going to do that, but that’s the territory you

are in with this kind of criminal conduct and this record.” Id. at 245.

       Regardless, Dishman’s dissatisfaction with the extent to which the district court considered

his life-expectancy argument is unpersuasive. The court was “not required to respond to every

argument raised by the defendant.” United States v. Judge, 649 F.3d 453, 457 (6th Cir. 2011).

Rather, the sentencing judge merely needed to “set forth enough [explanation] to satisfy the

appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for

exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” United States v. Jeross, 521 F.3d 562, 583

(6th Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)).

And here, the district court satisfied this requirement. The court properly calculated the Guidelines

range, clearly recognized that the range was advisory, considered the § 3553(a) factors without

considering any impermissible factors, made proper factual findings, gave due consideration to

Dishman’s arguments, and adequately explained its chosen sentence. See Gates, 48 F.4th at 473.

Accordingly, we find that the district court did not plainly err and that Dishman’s sentence is

procedurally reasonable.

   B. Substantive Reasonableness

       We now consider whether Dishman’s below-Guidelines sentence is substantively

reasonable. “A sentence may be considered substantively unreasonable when the district court

selects a sentence arbitrarily, bases the sentence on impermissible factors, fails to consider relevant

sentencing factors, or gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.” United

States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508, 520 (6th Cir. 2008). In essence, a challenge to the substantive

reasonableness of a sentence is “a complaint that the court placed too much weight on some of the

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No. 22-5517, United States v. Dishman

§ 3553(a) factors and too little on others in sentencing the individual.” United States v. Rayyan,

885 F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2018). However, “[t]he district court’s decision to assign more or less

weight to a given factor is ‘a matter of reasoned discretion, not math, and our highly deferential

review of a district court’s sentencing decisions reflects as much.’” United States v. Boucher, 937

F.3d 702, 707 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Rayyan, 885 F.3d at 442). “The fact that [we] might

reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify

reversal of the district court.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Furthermore, “[w]hen,

as here, a defendant argues that his below-Guidelines sentence is substantively unreasonable, a

presumption of reasonableness applies and the ‘task of persuading us that the more lenient sentence

[ ] is unreasonably long is even more demanding.’” United States v. Hills, 27 F.4th 1155, 1200

(6th Cir. 2022) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Curry, 536 F.3d 571, 573 (6th Cir.

2008)).

          Unlike challenges for procedural unreasonableness, challenges for substantive

unreasonableness need not be preserved for appeal. United States v. Freeman, 640 F.3d 180, 185–

86 (6th Cir. 2011). We therefore review the substantive reasonableness of Dishman’s sentence for

an abuse of discretion. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. To find an abuse of discretion, we must be “left with

a definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment.” United

States v. Perez-Rodriguez, 960 F.3d 748, 753 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Coach, Inc. v. Goodfellow,

717 F.3d 498, 505 (6th Cir. 2013)).

          Dishman argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court

failed to reference § 3553(a)’s “parsimony” idea and “gave an unreasonable amount of weight to

the non-binding guidelines range at the expense of other mitigating factors.” Appellant Br. at 16.

For the following reasons, Dishman’s arguments are without merit.

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No. 22-5517, United States v. Dishman

        First, the district court repeatedly addressed § 3553(a)’s requirement that a sentence be

“sufficient, but no greater than necessary.” For example, the sentencing judge noted that it was

his “responsibility and job . . . to impose a sentence that is sufficient, but no greater than necessary,

to accomplish the purposes set forth in [§ 3553(a)].” R. 42, PID 220. Later, the sentencing judge

repeated that he was required to impose a sentence that was “enough but no more than enough.”

Id. at PID 253. The court even expressly considered whether the Guidelines range for career

offenders “fit[s] with the parsimony idea, that the sentence should be no more than enough to

accomplish the purposes[,]” before concluding that “a sentence of 240 months is sufficient, but no

greater than necessary.” Id. at 254–55. The record plainly contradicts Dishman’s allegation that

the district court failed to consider § 3553(a)’s parsimony requirement.

        We are similarly unpersuaded by Dishman’s assertion that the sentencing court gave undue

weight to his status as a career offender at the expense of other mitigating factors. Instead, we find

that the court appropriately weighed each relevant sentencing factor. As to the seriousness of

Dishman’s offense, the court noted that Dishman had been convicted of a Class A felony with a

statutory minimum sentence of ten years’ imprisonment and the potential for a life sentence.

Regarding Dishman’s respect for the law, the court noted:

        [B]y and large, your entire adult life -- you have lived in a way that shows disrespect
        for the law, and that is a commitment of living within the law. You just haven’t
        had it. And to the contrary, you have had a regular and repeated tendency to make
        choices outside the law, far outside the law, and I have got to . . . address it within
        the judgment.

R. 42, PID 246. The court then acknowledged that in order to impose just punishment there must

be “a sharp consequence for” Dishman’s “criminal thinking and criminal decision-making.” Id.

at 246–47.

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No. 22-5517, United States v. Dishman

       The court also addressed deterrence, stating that Dishman’s sentence “ought to make

people think twice about going down this path.” Id. at 247. As for protecting the public, the court

noted that Dishman “pose[d] a significant risk to society,” and that the only certain way to protect

the public from that risk was imprisonment. Id. at 247–48. The district court also sought to provide

any available and necessary treatment or educational opportunities to Dishman during his

incarceration. And finally, the court considered the sentences available under the Guidelines,

relevant policy statements, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities.

       Although Dishman’s status as a career offender was undoubtedly a significant

consideration at sentencing, the court appropriately balanced Dishman’s past encounters with the

criminal justice system against various mitigating considerations, such as his acceptance of

responsibility and his long-term struggle with drug addiction. See United States v. Dunnican, 961

F.3d 859, 881 (6th Cir. 2020). For example, the court acknowledged that Dishman was “a 28-year

daily meth user,” and that methamphetamine addiction “is a powerful voice,” but it weighed this

struggle with addiction against Dishman’s otherwise “pretty dark and dismal record.” R. 42, PID

252–53. Ultimately, the court concluded that each sentencing factor weighed in favor of a lengthy

sentence, and that 240 months’ imprisonment—a slight downward variance from the Guidelines

range—was sufficient but no greater than necessary to accomplish the sentencing aims of

§ 3553(a).

       On appeal, Dishman essentially asks that we reweigh the sentencing factors, but we have

no license to do so. See United States v. Sexton, 512 F.3d 326, 332 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Because

[Dishman’s] argument ultimately boils down to an assertion that the district court should have

balanced the § 3553(a) factors differently, it is simply beyond the scope of our appellate

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No. 22-5517, United States v. Dishman

review[.]”). Because the district court’s analysis evinces no abuse of discretion, we conclude that

Dishman’s below-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable.

                                               III

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s sentence.

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