Court Opinion

ID: 9794357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:04:35.405876+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:14:46.811787
License: Public Domain

HODGES, Vice Chief Justice.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Robert L. Smith (Smith), brought this action below for damages on four theories of recovery after he was discharged from his job at the Farmers Cooperative Association of Butler, Oklahoma (Co-op). The Coop, R.B. Shepherd, Melvin Baker, Glen Hubbard, Gene Miller and Curtis Walker (defendants/appellees), filed a motion for summary judgment on all four theories. Smith filed a brief opposing only two of the theories: (1) tortious discharge in violation of public policy relating to public officials; and (2) tortious intentional infliction of *1325emotional distress. The trial court granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment on all counts and Smith appealed.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to the trial court, finding that the trial court erred in determining that appel-lees’ conduct could not as a matter of law give rise to an action for tortious discharge or tortious intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court of Appeals recognized the public policy exception to the at-will employee termination rule when the discharge of an at-will employee is in contravention of a clear mandate of public policy as set forth in Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24 (Okla.1989).
ISSUES
The issues on appeal are whether summary judgment should have been granted to the appellees in the trial court (1) on the issue of tortious discharge in violation of public policy relating to public officials and (2) on the issue of tortious intentional infliction of emotional distress.
FACTS
Smith had been an at-will employee of the Co-op for more than six years when he was terminated. He was terminated by unanimous vote of the Board of Directors of the Co-op, who are the individual appel-lees, Shepherd, Baker, Hubbard, Miller and Walker. He was also the mayor of Butler, Oklahoma, and a voting member of the town board of trustees.
Smith asserts that Baker wanted to obtain a zoning variance. Baker allegedly spoke to Smith about obtaining the variance. However, Baker’s request was subsequently denied by the town board. Smith claims that he was fired in retaliation for the denial of Baker’s zoning variance. Appellees, on the other hand, assert that Smith was discharged because of customer complaints and abuse of overtime hours when he had been warned not to take any more overtime.
In order to rebut appellees’ motion for summary judgment by demonstrating that there were issues of material fact still in controversy surrounding the alleged retaliatory firing, Smith offered the following evidence. Don Mitchell (Mitchell), the manager at the Co-op, stated in his sworn affidavit that, approximately one week after the zoning variance denial, Baker spoke to him about Smith’s possible termination from his position as a sales clerk at the Coop. Mitchell also stated that he personally attended all of the meetings held by the Coop Board and that at the first meeting following the denial of the zoning variance request, Baker brought up the issue of firing Smith.
Mitchell further stated in his affidavit that at each subsequent board meeting following the zoning variance denial, Baker brought up the subject of firing Smith and that Baker had never discussed this subject prior to the zoning variance denial. There is a discrepancy between the depositions of the Co-op board members, who say that Smith was not fired in retaliation for the zoning variance denial, and Mitchell’s affidavit.
DISCUSSION
I.
Okla.Stat. tit. 12, ch. 2, app., rule 13 (Supp.1984) states:
a. A party may move for judgment in his favor on the ground that the depositions, admissions in the pleadings, stipulations, answers to interrogatories and to requests for admissions, affidavits, and exhibits on file, filed with this motion. ... show that there is no substantial controversy as to any material fact.
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e. If it appears to the court that there is no substantial controversy as to any material fact and that one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the court shall render judgment to said *1326party whether or not he is the moving party.
Summary judgment is proper only when no substantial controversy exists as to any material fact. Flanders v. Crane Co., 693 P.2d 602, 605 (Okla.1984); Hinson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d 549, 551 (Okla.1987). Material facts are those facts which tend to prove or disprove an element of the case. Summary judgments are similar to judgments on the pleadings, which are not favored by the courts, Love v. Harvey, 448 P.2d 456, 462 (Okla.1968).
Therefore, it must be determined whether there exists any substantial controversy as to any material fact. If so, summary judgment was not proper.
II.
In Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24, 26 (Okla.1989), this Court stated the general principle that “an employment contract of indefinite duration may be terminated without cause at any time without incurring liability for breach of contract.” However, this Court also recognized a public policy exception to the terminable-at-will rule in a narrow class of cases. Id. at 28. The public policy exception applies when “the discharge is contrary to a clear mandate of public policy as articulated by constitutional, statutory, or decisional law.” Id. Under Burk, it is a tort for an employer to terminate an at-will employee in contravention of a clear mandate of public policy. Id.
Furthermore, this Court reasoned that because the term “public policy” has such a vague meaning, the exception must be tightly circumscribed. Id. at 29. This Court recognized “an actionable tort claim under Oklahoma law where an employee is discharged for refusing to act in violation of an established and well defined public policy or for performing an act consistent with a clear and compelling public policy.” Id. This reasoning is consistent with this Court’s earlier statement in Hinson finding that
[a]n at-will employee’s discharge has been declared to be actionable on several public policy grounds. Claims recognized under this rubric are those by employees dismissed for (a) refusing to participate in an illegal activity; (b) performing an important public obligation; (c) exercising a legal right or interest; (d) exposing some wrongdoing by the employer; and (e) performing an act that public policy would encourage or, for refusing to do something that public policy would condemn, when the discharge is coupled with a showing of bad faith, malice, or retaliation.
Hinson at 552, 553.
Title 11, section 43-101 of the Oklahoma Statutes is a statutory mandate of public policy as contemplated by Burk. Section 43-101 provides that the general zoning power of municipalities is “[f]or the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the community.” An official who derives his authority from section 43-101 is required to act in the public’s best interest. The public policy exception to the employee-at-will doctrine applies when an employee is fired in retaliation for acting consistent with section 43-101. Under Burk and Hinson, if Smith were fired for performing an act consistent with public policy such as administering the town’s zoning laws while acting in his capacity as mayor and a voting member of the town’s board of trustees, he would have an actionable tort claim.1
III.
The parties submitted evidentiary material supporting the following contentions. Smith contends that Baker influenced the appellees to fire him in retaliation for the town board denying his zoning *1327variance. Baker asserts that Smith was fired because he abused overtime hours and customers were dissatisfied with Smith’s work. Baker also claims that Smith was fired upon Mitchell’s advice. However, Mitchell denies that he ever recommended that Smith be fired and even states that Smith was a capable employee. Mitchell states that it was always Baker who brought up the subject of firing Smith at board meetings.
In Thompson v. Medley Material Handling, Inc., 732 P.2d 461 (Okla.1987), this Court stated:
Although the evidence relied upon to prove wrongful discharge must, in most cases, of necessity be circumstantial in nature, that evidence must have sufficient probative value to constitute the basis for a legal inference rather than mere speculation, and the circumstances proved must lead to the conclusion with reasonable certainty and probability.
Id. at 463. Generally, in wrongful discharge cases the evidence is only circumstantial, as it is in this case. The employee generally does not have access to information regarding the true cause of the firing, even though the employer does. Based on the fundamental differences in Mitchell's affidavit and the other depositions, the parties have raised an issue of material fact as to whether Smith was fired in retaliation for the zoning variance denial.
The issue of fact as to whether this was a retaliatory firing is material under the public policy exception to the employee-at-will doctrine. The facts in the record do not need to conclusively support a finding that Smith was terminated for voting against Baker’s requested zoning variance, just that there is an issue of material fact which should have been left for a jury to decide. A substantial controversy still exists over the circumstances surrounding and reasons for Smith’s termination. Thus, there exists an issue of material fact which is in controversy precluding summary judgment on this issue.
IV.
The second issue is whether summary judgment should have been granted on the issue of tortious intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Eddy v. Brown, 715 P.2d 74, 76 (Okla.1986), this Court stated that the “tort of outrage” is defined by the “narrow standards” of Restatement (Second) Of Torts § 46(1) (1977), which reads:
One who by extreme or outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.
Initially, it is the trial court’s responsibility “to determine whether the defendant’s conduct may reasonably be regarded as sufficiently extreme and outrageous to meet the § 46 standards.” Eddy at 76. According to Breeden v. League Services Corp., 575 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Okla.1978), the court must determine whether, “based upon the evidence presented, severe emotional distress can be found.”2
*1328In Breeden, this Court was faced with a situation in which a trial court sustained a summary judgment in a tort action involving the plaintiffs right to be free from emotional distress. Breeden 575 P.2d at 1377. The actions of the defendant were not so extreme or outrageous as to subject the defendant to liability. Likewise, nothing in the record indicates that the appel-lees behaved in such an extreme or outrageous manner toward Smith to impose liability. In fact, Smith states in his deposition that no cross words were ever spoken by any of the appellees. Smith also admitted that he had no evidence of any intentional outrageous conduct; he simply believed that two of the appellees did not like him.
Although it is natural that an employee would suffer some sort of distress from being terminated, the distress here was not extreme or outrageous. Upon these facts, it is evident, that Smith was not subjected to the type of conduct for which recovery under the tort theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress should be allowed.
CONCLUSION
Because there still exist issues of material fact in controversy concerning the public policy exception to the terminable-at-will employment doctrine, we reverse and remand that issue to the trial court. As for the issue of intentional infliction of emotional distress, there are no factual questions in dispute as to the nature of appel-lees’ behavior toward Smith. Therefore, summary adjudication was proper on this issue, and we agree with that part of the trial court’s decision.
COURT OF APPEALS’ OPINION VACATED; JUDGMENT OF TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART; CAUSE REMANDED.
OPALA, C.J., and DOOLIN, ALMA WILSON, KAUGER and SUMMERS, JJ., concur.
LAVENDER, SIMMS and HARGRAVE, JJ., concur in part, dissent in part.

. For an analysis of the employment-at-will doctrine and Burk, see Comment, Burk v. K-Mart Corporation: The Oklahoma Supreme Court Adopts a Narrow Exception to the Employment-at-Will Rule?, 14 Okla.City U.L.Rev. 645 (1989).

. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1977) comment j, provides in part:
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the emotional distress has in fact resulted, and where it is severe.... [Emotional distress] includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea. It is only where it is extreme that the liability arises.... The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. The intensity and duration of the distress are factors to be considered in determining its severity. Severe distress must be proved; but in many cases the extreme and outrageous character of the defendant's conduct is in itself important evidence that the distress has existed.
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The distress must be reasonable and justified under the circumstances, and there is no liability where the plaintiff has suffered exaggerated and unreasonable emotional distress, unless it results from a peculiar susceptibility to such distress of which the actor has knowledge.