Court Opinion

ID: 9931167
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 16:08:35.421594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:16:44.023598
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                           IN THE OFFICE OF THE
                                                                        CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
                                                                             FEBRUARY 8, 2024
                                                                         STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                  IN THE SUPREME COURT
                  STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                 2024 ND 20

Stacey Jean Dimmler,                  Plaintiff, Appellee, and Cross-Appellant
      v.
Dustin Scott Dimmler,               Defendant, Appellant, and Cross-Appellee
      and
State of North Dakota,                         Statutory Real Party in Interest

                                No. 20230154

Appeal from the District Court of Ramsey County, Northeast Judicial District,
the Honorable Kari M. Agotness, Judge.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

Opinion of the Court by Crothers, Justice, in which Chief Justice Jensen and
Justices McEvers, Tufte and Bahr joined. Justice Tufte filed a concurring
opinion, in which Chief Justice Jensen joined.

Ashley R. Heitkamp, Fargo, ND, for plaintiff, appellee, and cross-appellant.

Patti J. Jensen (argued) and Ashley A. Olson (on brief), East Grand Forks, MN,
for defendant, appellant, and cross-appellee.
                        Dimmler v. Dimmler, et al.
                             No. 20230154

Crothers, Justice.

[¶1] Dustin Dimmler appeals and Stacey Dimmler cross-appeals from a
district court’s judgment granting them a divorce. Dustin Dimmler argues the
court erred in valuing and distributing the marital estate, in making findings
on primary residential responsibility, in calculating child support, and by
refusing to remove a parenting investigator.

[¶2] Stacey Dimmler cross-appeals arguing the district court erred by not
making child support retroactive to the date of the interim order, in not
awarding her attorney’s fees incurred during the divorce, and by not ordering
Dustin Dimmler to repay her the cost of her parental capacity evaluation.

[¶3] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

                                      I

[¶4] The Dimmlers married in June 2013, and have two children, E.J.D. and
L.D.D. Stacey Dimmler filed for divorce in June 2021 and Dustin Dimmler
counterclaimed for divorce and other relief.

[¶5] In August 2021, the district court held an interim hearing where it
temporarily awarded primary residential responsibility to Stacey Dimmler,
and reserved the issue of child support. In October 2021, Dustin Dimmler
moved for the district court to appoint a parenting investigator. The court
granted the motion, an investigator was appointed, and she published a report
in March 2022. The divorce trial was set for April 2022 but was continued until
October 2022 because of a medical emergency. During this period, Stacey
Dimmler provided additional information to the parenting investigator despite
earlier statements that the parties should not have further contact with the
investigator.

[¶6] On June 30, 2022, the district court held a second interim hearing. In
July 2022, the court issued the second interim order granting Dustin Dimmler

                                      1
sole possession of the marital home and sole responsibility for the mortgage
payment. In August 2022, Dustin Dimmler moved to remove the parenting
investigator and strike her report because Stacey Dimmler provided additional
information to the investigator after the deadline to do so. He alleged the
parental investigator acted with bias. The court denied the motion and ordered
the parenting investigator to continue. A second report was submitted in
September 2022. The day before trial, parties learned that the parenting
investigator also provided information to child protection services.

[¶7] In October 2022, the district court conducted a two-day trial, after which
it granted Stacey Dimmler primary residential responsibility. Stacey and
Dustin Dimmler received joint decision-making responsibility for the children.
The court divided the marital estate, including land given to Dustin Dimmler.
Dustin Dimmler’s grandparents gave him and his brother approximately 912
acres of farmland, subject to the grantors’ life estate and a secondary life estate
by Mark Dimmler, Dustin Dimmler’s uncle. Dustin Dimmler’s parents
purchased a Florida property and gave it to him and his brother. Both
transactions occurred before Dustin and Stacey Dimmler married.

[¶8] The district court included the farmland and Florida property in the
marital estate, but excluded debt secured by a mortgage on the farmland
because the court considered it “non-marital.” The court did not value the
parties’ personal property.

[¶9] The district court awarded Stacy Dimmler child support after finding
Dustin Dimmler was underemployed and imputed his income. The court
reiterated the interim order’s finding that there would be no retroactive child
support. The court found each party was responsible for their own attorney’s
fees, and were to split the parenting investigator’s fees. Dustin Dimmler timely
appealed and Stacey Dimmler timely cross-appealed.

                                        II

[¶10] Dustin Dimmler argues the district court erred in valuing his remainder
interest in the farmland because the court excluded the debt as non-marital.

                                        2
He further argues the court erred in its valuation of the Florida property and
the Dimmlers’ personal property.

                                         A

[¶11] “A district court’s property valuations and division are findings of fact,
which will not be reversed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous.” Orwig
v. Orwig, 2021 ND 33, ¶ 22, 955 N.W.2d 34 (citing Wald v. Wald, 2020 ND 174,
¶¶ 11, 19, 947 N.W.2d 359). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced
by an erroneous view of the law, there is no evidence to support it, or, after
reviewing the entire record, this Court is left with a definite and firm
conviction a mistake has been made.” Wald, at ¶ 11. “The district court’s
valuations depend on the evidence the parties present, and we presume the
court’s valuations are correct.” Orwig, at ¶ 21. This Court gives deference to
the “district court’s credibility determinations.” Id. at ¶ 22.

[¶12] A court must equitably distribute the marital estate to the parties.
N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24(1); see Berg v. Berg, 2018 ND 79, ¶ 7, 908 N.W.2d 705 (the
court must determine the value of the marital estate before equitably
distributing to the parties). “A trial court starts with a presumption that all
property is marital whether held jointly or individually,” including inherited
property. Kitzan v. Kitzan, 2023 ND 23, ¶ 12, 985 N.W.2d 717. This Court has
“consistently held that property acquired before marriage must be included in
the marital estate.” Neidviecky v. Neidviecky, 2003 ND 29, ¶ 10, 657 N.W.2d
255. “While a court must consider all debt, it does not have to find that all
claimed debt is, in fact, marital debt.” Dronen v. Dronen, 2009 ND 70, ¶ 28, 764
N.W.2d 675.

[¶13] A remainder interest is non-possessory, but represents a value that must
be included within the marital estate. McCarthy v. McCarthy, 2014 ND 234,
¶¶ 11-14, 856 N.W.2d 762. The value of a remainder interest in a marital estate
may be valued using N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-02.1-32. Lee v. Lee, 2019 ND
142, ¶ 7, 927 N.W.2d 104. This administrative code section guides the
calculation of Medicaid eligibility when a life estate or remainder interest is
involved, and provides a table allowing for calculation of the value of either a
future or remainder interest. N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-02.1-32(4)(c).

                                         3
[¶14] A district court cannot equitably divide a marital estate without fully
accounting for a remainder interest. N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24(1); Lee, 2019 ND 142,
¶ 7. Throughout this litigation Dustin Dimmler offered varying approaches to
calculate the value of his remainder interest in the farmland. In a pre-trial
brief he suggested calculating the value of his interests using actuarial tables,
but did not provide the court with calculations for the farmland’s value beyond
the suggestion to use actuarial tables. Ultimately at trial, Dustin Dimmler
argued his remainder interest had no value because it was a gift to him, the
land was subject to a life estate, and the land was burdened with substantial
debt secured by a mortgage on the property.

[¶15] The district court correctly rejected Dustin Dimmler’s claim the
farmland had no value because it was received as a gift and because he owned
a remainder interest behind two life tenants. Those factors affect, but do not
eliminate the farmland’s value. At the same time, the court erroneously
disregarded the debt by accepting Stacey Dimmler’s argument that the
mortgage was not “marital debt.”

[¶16] By excluding all consideration of the debt, the district court over-valued
Dustin Dimmler’s interest in the farmland because it was encumbered by a
mortgage. The court must take that debt into account to properly value and
equitably divide the Dimmlers’ marital estate. While not the exclusive means
of calculation, N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-02.1-32(4)(c) provides a way to value
a marital estate with a remainder interest on a life estate when the real estate
is encumbered with debt.

                                       B

[¶17] Dustin Dimmler claims the district court erred in its valuation of the
Florida real estate given to him and his brother by their parents.

[¶18] “Valuations of marital property within the range of the evidence
presented are not clearly erroneous.” Berdahl v. Berdahl, 2022 ND 136, ¶ 6,
977 N.W.2d 294.

                                       4
[¶19] These proceedings began on June 18, 2021, with service of a summons,
which predate a change in law governing when the marital estate is valued.
The applicable version of the statute provides, “If the parties do not mutually
agree upon a valuation date, the valuation date for marital property is the date
of service of a summons in an action for divorce or separation or the date on
which the parties last separated, whichever occurs first.” N.D.C.C. § 14-05-
24(1) (2017). The parties did not agree on an alternative valuation date. Thus,
the district court properly used the 2017 version of N.D.C.C. § 14-05-24(1),
June 18, 2021, the date of service of the summons, as the valuation date for
the marital estate.

[¶20] Dustin Dimmler’s parents purchased a rental property in Fort Meyers,
Florida, and placed the property in Dustin Dimmler’s and his brother’s name
on June 11, 2013. The brothers own the home as joint tenants. Neither party
presented a value of the property as of June 18, 2021. On October 12, 2021, an
appraiser valued the property at $208,000. Dustin Dimmler’s father testified
and did not contest the appraised value of the property. Dustin Dimmler argues
his share of the Florida property is $78,000 because that was the value listed
on the April 2022 Rule 8.3 statement.

[¶21] Based on the evidence presented, the district court found Dustin
Dimmler’s share of the Florida property was $104,000, and used that amount
in its calculations. We affirm because the court’s finding is within the range of
evidence, and was not induced by an erroneous view of the law, evidence exists
to support the finding, and, on the entire record, we are not left with a definite
and firm conviction the court made a mistake.

                                        C

[¶22] Dustin Dimmler alleges the district court erred in its valuation of
personal property.

[¶23] “Valuations of marital property within the range of the evidence
presented are not clearly erroneous.” Berdahl, 2022 ND 136, ¶ 6. The parties
valued their own personal property as zero or unknown. Dustin Dimmler
valued Stacey Dimmler’s personal property at $30,000. Stacey Dimmler valued

                                        5
Dustin Dimmler’s property as unknown. Because of uncertainty of the values,
the district court did not place a value on the personal property. See Bucholz v.
Bucholz, 2022 ND 203, ¶¶ 19, 22, 982 N.W.2d 275 (a court can find marital
property does not have value if parties either show the items have little value
or fail to provide evidence of a value). We affirm because the court’s findings
were not induced by an erroneous view of the law, evidence of value was
lacking, and, on the entire record, we are not left with a definite and firm
conviction the court made a mistake.

                                       III

[¶24] Dustin Dimmler argues the district court erred when it placed primary
residential responsibility with Stacey Dimmler based on the children’s best
interests.

[¶25] “An award of primary residential responsibility is a finding of fact that
will not be reversed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous.” Doll v. Doll, 2011
ND 24, ¶ 6, 794 N.W.2d 425. “A district court’s decision on residential
responsibility is a finding of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard of
review.” Queen v. Martel, 2022 ND 178, ¶ 3, 980 N.W.2d 914. “A finding of fact
is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if no
evidence supports it, or if after reviewing the entire record, we are left with a
definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.” Id. The district court
must make findings of fact on the best interest factors under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-
06.2(1). The court’s findings of fact “must be stated with enough sufficient
specificity to enable a reviewing court to understand the factual basis” for its
decisions. Doll, at ¶ 8.

[¶26] The district court made findings on eleven of the best interest factors.
The court found factors c, d, e and g favored Stacey Dimmler. The court found
factors a, b, f, h, j, k and m favored neither party. The court found factors i and
l did not apply to the Dimmlers.

                                        6
                                        A

[¶27] Dustin Dimmler argues the district court erred when it found factor a
was neutral when evidence demonstrating his ability to provide guidance
should have resulted in the factor favoring him. Factor a examines “The love,
affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parents and child and
the ability of each parent to provide the child with nurture, love, affection, and
guidance.” N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(a).

[¶28] The district court relied on testimony from friends, family, and the
parenting investigator’s testimony and report. The friends testified that both
parents are good parents. Dustin Dimmler’s sister-in-law testified that Stacey
Dimmler did not discipline the children. Stacey and Dustin Dimmler told the
parenting investigator that L.D.D. was attached to his mother more and E.J.D.
was more attached to her father. The court found each parent had the ability
to nurture their children and provide them with love, affection, and guidance.
The finding was not induced by an erroneous view of the law, there is evidence
to support the finding, and, after reviewing all the evidence, we are not left
with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.

                                        B

[¶29] Dustin Dimmler argues the district court erred when it found factor b
was neutral because the evidence demonstrated he had the ability to provide a
safe environment and appropriate nutrition, and the weight of the evidence
“demanded a conclusion that the Factor favored Dustin.” Factor b examines
“The ability of each parent to assure that the child receives adequate food,
clothing, shelter, medical care, and a safe environment.” N.D.C.C. § 14-09-
06.2(1)(b).

[¶30] Dustin Dimmler testified Stacey Dimmler fed the children fast food
meals, but the parenting investigator reported that Dustin Dimmler also fed
E.J.D. fast food. Stacey Dimmler used a monkey jam to ensure L.D.D. stayed
in bed at night because he has trouble sleeping. A monkey jam is a door locking
mechanism to keep children in or out of a room. The district court found Stacey
Dimmler removes the monkey jam at night. During these proceedings, L.D.D.

                                        7
suffered from a medical issue that Dustin Dimmler argued shows Stacey
Dimmler is not a fit parent. Text messages in evidence show both parents did
not think it was an emergent issue. The finding was not induced by an
erroneous view of the law, there is evidence to support the finding, and, after
reviewing all the evidence, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction
a mistake has been made.

                                      C

[¶31] Dustin Dimmler claims the district court erred finding factor c favors
Stacey Dimmler because he argues he prioritizes his children’s needs and can
provide for their current and future needs. Factor c examines “The child’s
developmental needs and the ability of each parent to meet those needs, both
in the present and in the future.” N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(c).

[¶32] The parenting investigator noted that both parents help the children
with their hobbies and educational needs. The district court did note that
Stacey Dimmler bathed herself and the two children together at the same time.
The court also noted that the children would sleep with both parents. The court
did not find these actions outside the norm of parenting.

[¶33] The district court considered a history of parental disputes including
Stacey Dimmler’s removal of family portraits from the marital home, using her
non-marital name during social events, and posting “TikTok” videos on social
media. The court also weighed Stacey Dimmler seeking therapy for E.J.D.
during the divorce proceedings when both parents noticed changes in E.J.D.,
including arguing with Stacey Dimmler and showing symptoms of depression.
“We do not re-weigh evidence or reassess credibility when there is evidence to
support a trial court’s findings.” Dickson v. Dickson, 2001 ND 157, ¶ 29, 634
N.W.2d 76. Considering the varied and disputed evidence, the findings were
not induced by an erroneous view of the law, there is evidence to support them,
and, after reviewing all the evidence, we are not left with a definite and firm
conviction a mistake has been made.

                                      8
                                       D

[¶34] Dustin Dimmler argues the district court erred by ignoring the
importance of the children’s relationship with his extended family, and
therefore erred finding factor d favored Stacey Dimmler. Factor d considers
“The sufficiency and stability of each parent’s home environment, the impact
of extended family, the length of time the child has lived in each parent’s home,
and the desirability of maintaining continuity in the child’s home and
community.” N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(d).

[¶35] The district court found that Dustin Dimmler’s extended family made
several insensitive comments about Stacey Dimmler. Dustin Dimmler’s
brother did not get along with Stacey Dimmler during or after the marriage,
which lead to derogatory comments aimed at Stacey Dimmler. Dustin
Dimmler’s mother called Stacey Dimmler “fat, crazy, and lazy.” The court
weighed the problems between Stacey Dimmler and Dustin Dimmler’s family
in its decision. The court reprimanded both families for actions during hearings
and at trial. The findings were not induced by an erroneous view of the law,
there is evidence to support the findings, and, after reviewing all the evidence,
we are not left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.

                                       E

[¶36] Dustin Dimmler claims that the district court erred finding factor e
favors Stacey Dimmler, that the court took a “broad leap from a statement of a
concerned parent to a determination that Stacey is more willing to cooperate,
and coparent,” and that the statement cannot be justified. Factor e has the
court considering “The willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and
encourage a close and continuing relationship between the other parent and
the child.” N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(e).

[¶37] The district court found both parties have difficulty co-parenting. The
findings include that Stacey Dimmler failed to follow the right of first refusal
of parenting time and that Dustin Dimmler removed the children from daycare
with little discussion with Stacey Dimmler. The evidence shows Stacey
Dimmler used law enforcement to assist in picking up the children and both

                                       9
parents have limited each other’s ability to communicate by either blocking
phone numbers or not using a central email for the children’s activities.

[¶38] The district court found Stacey Dimmler used social media, primarily
TikTok, to vent her frustrations during the divorce. The court also considered
how Dustin Dimmler spoke negatively about Stacey Dimmler to his extended
family in the presence of the children.

[¶39] The district court considered the parents’ willingness to have the
children spend time with both parents. Stacey Dimmler testified she allowed
Dustin Dimmler to have more time with the children because of holidays, work
events, and if she knew that her schedule caused her to be late coming home.
She testified she intended to offer Dustin Dimmler more time with the
children. Dustin Dimmler testified he plans to continue the fight to have equal
parenting time with the children. Based on the record, the court’s findings are
not induced by an erroneous view of the law, evidence supports the findings,
and we are not left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been
made.

                                      F

[¶40] Dustin Dimmler claims the district court erred finding factor g slightly
favors Stacey Dimmler. He argues his mental health problems occurred only
because Stacey Dimmler alleged he was unfaithful during the marriage, and
she cannot question his mental health while hers is poor as well. Factor g
considers “The mental and physical health of the parents, as that health
impacts the child.” N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(g).

[¶41] The district court found Stacey and Dustin Dimmler have mental health
problems. Stacey Dimmler testified she receives medical treatment, uses
medications, and attends therapy. She also uses medical marijuana when
needed. To help her sleep, she uses sleep aids when the children are present.
The court also found Dustin Dimmler contemplated self-harm when Stacey
Dimmler alleged marital infidelity during their marriage. Dustin Dimmler
went to his family farm, thought about self-harm, and decided against it. The

                                      10
court heard testimony about Dustin Dimmler losing his job as a helicopter pilot
because of stress and complaints from other team members.

[¶42] The parental investigator recommended Stacey and Dustin Dimmler
participate in a parental capacity evaluation. Stacey Dimmler participated.
Dustin Dimmler did not. He cited the parenting capacity evaluation costs too
much money and tried to find someone else who could perform the evaluation
for less than $5,000. He argued that his Federal Aviation Administration
mandated mental health examination should suffice and replace the need to
participate in a parental capacity evaluation. The district court found the FAA
mandated health examination does not measure his ability to parent children.
The findings on factor g were not induced by an erroneous view of the law,
evidence supports the findings, and, after reviewing all the evidence, we are
not left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.

                                       G

[¶43] Dustin Dimmler claims the district court erred when it found factor h
was neutral when the evidence “demanded a conclusion” the factor favored
him. Factor h examines “The home, school, and community records of the child
and the potential effect of any change.” N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(h).

[¶44] The district court found factor h is neutral. Stacey Dimmler testified she
would move when she no longer felt safe in Devils Lake. Dustin Dimmler plans
to keep the children in the marital home and community and does not plan to
move from Devils Lake. Dustin and Stacey Dimmler, evidenced by the
parenting investigators report, are active in the children’s activities. The
finding that factor h is neutral was not induced by an erroneous view of the
law, evidence supports the finding, and, after reviewing all the evidence, we
are not left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.

                                       H

[¶45] Dustin Dimmler claims “the district court erred when it wholly
disregarded factor (i) because EJD had a definite preference.” Factor i allows
the court to “give substantial weight to the preference of the mature child.”

                                      11
N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.2(1)(i). “The court also shall give due consideration to
other factors that may have affected the child’s preference, including whether
the child’s preference was based on undesirable or improper influences.” Id.

[¶46] The district court found that factor i did not apply. E.J.D. did not testify.
A child therapist testified that E.J.D. is “very smart, she’s very intuitive, she
has some insight that I would say is maybe beyond her years. She struggles
with some things.” The therapist indicated that E.J.D. will pick up emotions
from Stacey Dimmler. The therapist testified that a child could voice their
opinion to a judge, but the therapist opined that “I don’t think it’s okay that
they be part of the decision because I would never want a patient to feel guilty
for a decision that is made later.” The parenting investigator noted that E.J.D.
parrots Dustin Dimmler’s phrases and talking points during her report. On
this record, the court’s finding on factor i was not induced by an erroneous view
of the law, evidence supports the finding, and, we are not left with a definite
and firm conviction a mistake has been made.

                                         I

[¶47] Dustin Dimmler claims the district court erred when it found factor m
was neutral and when it failed to address additional items. This factor invites
consideration of “Any other factors considered by the court to be relevant to a
particular parental rights and responsibilities dispute.” N.D.C.C. § 14-09-
06.2(1)(m).

[¶48] Dustin Dimmler claims the district court did not adequately evaluate the
importance of his family and the children’s relationship with them. The court
made findings about the extended family’s impact on the children under factor
d. Findings under that factor were not clearly erroneous. We also do not
reweigh trial court evidence or second guess how the court weighed the
evidence. Doll, 2011 ND 24, ¶ 6. Therefore, we conclude the court’s treatment
of factor m was not clearly erroneous.

                                        12
                                      IV

[¶49] Dustin Dimmler claims the district court erred in calculating his child
support obligation by imputing his income.

[¶50] “The standards of review used in child support determinations vary,
depending on the issue appealed.” Wisnewski v. Wisnewski, 2020 ND 148, ¶ 51,
945 N.W.2d 331. “Child support determinations involve questions of law which
are subject to the de novo standard of review, findings of fact which are subject
to the clearly erroneous standard of review, and may, in some limited areas, be
matters of discretion subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review.” Id.
“Determination of whether an individual is underemployed is within the
discretion of the trial court.” Torgerson v. Torgerson, 2003 ND 150, ¶ 10, 669
N.W.2d 98.

                                       A

[¶51] Dustin Dimmler argues the district court erred by considering his income
at the time of the trial, and imputing additional income because he was
underemployed.

[¶52] “An obligor’s ability to pay child support is not solely determinable from
actual income, and an obligor’s earning capacity also can be utilized.” Bucholz
v. Bucholz, 1999 ND 36, ¶ 13, 590 N.W.2d 215. “Child support determinations
are governed by the child support guidelines, N.D. Admin. Code ch. 75-02-
04.1.” Brew v. Brew, 2017 ND 242, ¶ 24, 903 N.W.2d 72. “Each child support
order must include a statement of the net income of the obligor used to
determine the child support obligation, and how that net income was
determined.” N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-02(9).

[¶53] “An obligor is presumed to be underemployed if the obligor’s gross
income from earnings is less than the greater of” either “a monthly amount
equal to one hundred sixty-seven times the federal hourly minimum wage” or
“six-tenths of this state’s statewide average earnings for persons with similar
work history and occupational qualifications.” N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-
07(2). “Before a court can find an obligor is underemployed and impute his

                                       13
income, the court must first determine the obligor’s gross income from
earnings.” Schrodt v. Schrodt, 2022 ND 64, ¶ 22, 971 N.W.2d 861. “Income
must be sufficiently documented through the use of tax returns, current wage
statements, and other information to fully apprise the court of all gross
income.” N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-02(7).

[¶54] If a parent is underemployed the district court must determine gross
income from the earning capacity “equal to the greatest of subdivisions a
through c” less actual gross earnings. N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-07(3).
These subdivisions include:

      “a. A monthly amount equal to one hundred sixty-seven times the
      hourly federal minimum wage.
      b. An amount equal to six-tenths of this state’s statewide average
      earnings for persons with similar work history and occupational
      qualifications.
      c. An amount equal to ninety percent of the obligor’s greatest
      average gross monthly earnings, in any twelve consecutive months
      included in the current calendar year and the two previous
      calendar years, for which reliable evidence is provided.”

Id.

[¶55] The district court set Dustin Dimmler’s child support at $1,462 per
month based on imputed income of $90,516 per year. Dustin Dimmler claims
his child support should have been based on his gross income of $57,093 per
year as a health equity coordinator.

[¶56] The district court found that, from 2008 to August 2021, Dustin Dimmler
was a helicopter pilot and his current wages were less than the statewide
average for a commercial pilot. The court found under N.D. Admin. Code § 75-
02-04.1-07(3)(a) that Dustin Dimmler’s annual gross income based on
minimum wage would be $14,532. The court also found under N.D. Admin.
Code § 75-02-04.1-07(3)(b) that the statewide average annual gross income for
a commercial pilot is $99,860. The court found six-tenths of $99,860 is $59,916.
Id. Dustin Dimmler is presumed underemployed because his current gross
income is less than this amount. Under subsection (c), the court found Dustin

                                      14
Dimmler’s annual gross income was $91,996 in 2019, $100,574 in 2020, and
$63,075 in 2021. The court found 2020 was the highest earnings year for
Dustin Dimmler and calculated 90% of $100,574, or $90,516.60. N.D. Admin.
Code § 75-02-04.1-07(3)(c). The court found the amount calculated under N.D.
Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-07(3)(c) applicable because it is the greatest of
Dustin Dimmler’s earnings.

[¶57] The district court did not clearly err in finding facts regarding Dustin
Dimmler’s income. The court did not abuse its discretion by finding Dustin
Dimmler was underemployed and subsequently finding his child support
obligation was $1,462 per month.

                                       B

[¶58] Dustin Dimmler claims the district court clearly erred by imputing
higher income and causing his child support obligation to increase. He argues
he was adequately employed at the time of trial because he obtained work as
soon as possible after he lost his pilot job.

[¶59] Under N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-07(5) an underemployed obligor
must show employment opportunities “would provide earnings at least equal
to the lesser of the amounts determined under subdivision b or c of subsection
3, are unavailable within one hundred miles [160.93 kilometers] of the obligor’s
actual place of residence,” or the district court must impute the obligor’s
income “based on earning capacity equal to the amount determined under
subdivision a of subsection 3, less actual gross earnings.” Imputing income is
not required if the obligor shows jobs that would allow him to earn an “amount
equal to six-tenths of the state’s statewide average earnings for persons with
similar work history and occupational qualifications” are unavailable or the
obligor shows the unavailability of jobs that would allow him or her to earn
90% of his or her greatest consecutive twelve month period within the last two
years. N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-04.1-07(3)(b) and (c); see also Updike v.
Updike, 2022 ND 99, ¶ 7, 974 N.W.2d 360 (interpreting the administrative code
exceptions to imputing income). The obligor has the burden to establish an
exception. Verhey v. McKenzie, 2009 ND 35, ¶ 11, 763 N.W.2d 113.

                                      15
[¶60] Dustin Dimmler did not establish that he met an exception for imputed
income. He argues that working at the Lake Region District Health Unit “was
the single position available within the area.” Stacey Dimmler provided a June
2023 job listing for a pilot based in Grand Forks, within 100 miles of Devils
Lake. However, the employer posting the position was the same one that
released Dustin Dimmler from employment in August 2021.

[¶61] This Court ruled on two comparable cases in Rathbun v. Rathbun, 2017
ND 24, 889 N.W.2d 855; and Updike, 2022 ND 99. In Rathbun, the obligor
testified he applied for 61 jobs but was unable to obtain any of them because of
the economic downturn in the oilfield. Rathbun, at ¶ 9. This Court concluded
the district court erred by not finding the obligor met the exception for being
underemployed. Id. Unlike in Rathbun, in Updike the obligor stated he
accepted a job outside the oilfield, but did not supply evidence that other jobs
requiring his work history or qualifications were available. Updike, at ¶¶ 10-
11. This Court concluded the district court did not err in finding the obligor
failed to provide adequate evidence that he could not obtain a job within his
field. Id. at ¶ 11.

[¶62] Dustin Dimmler’s evidence aligns more with Updike than Rathbun
because he found a job in the area, but did not show why he could not find
employment within his qualified field or his required level of qualification. On
this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion by imputing Dustin
Dimmler’s wages. Moreover, the court’s findings were not induced by an
erroneous view of the law, evidence supports the findings, and this Court is not
left with a definite and firm conviction the district court made a mistake.

                                      V

[¶63] Dustin Dimmler claims the district court erred by not removing the
parenting investigator from the case. He argues the parenting investigator did
not remain impartial during the proceedings by participating in ex parte
communications with Stacey Dimmler. He also alleges the parenting
investigator breached confidentiality when she supplied documents to child
protection services.

                                      16
[¶64] We review a “district court’s decision on a motion in limine for an abuse
of discretion.” State v. Bowen, 2023 ND 25, ¶ 12, 985 N.W.2d 636. “A district
court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unconscionable manner or if it misinterprets or misapplies the law.” Id. “We
emphasize the importance of parenting investigators strictly adhering to the
Code of Conduct when rendering their services—at all stages of their
involvement with a case.” Morris v. Moller, 2012 ND 74, ¶ 16, 815 N.W.2d 266.
“A parenting investigator shall preserve professional independence in the
discharge of the investigator’s duties. An investigator should act in accordance
with the law, free from all influence, rendering investigative services based
upon the investigator’s best knowledge.” N.D.R. Ct. Appendix G. “All parenting
investigators shall maintain confidentiality and protect against unauthorized
disclosure and usage of information acquired in connection with the
investigation.” Id.

[¶65] The district court heard testimony regarding the parenting
investigator’s reports. The court found the parenting investigator made and
delivered the first report 30 days before the tentative start of trial. The court
continued the trial from April 26, 2022, to October 13, 2022. Between June 2
and June 7, 2022, Stacey Dimmler provided additional information to the
parenting investigator. In August 2022, Dustin Dimmler moved to remove the
parenting investigator or prohibit the parenting investigator’s involvement,
claiming she became biased. The court ordered the parenting investigator to
continue serving, and denied Dustin Dimmler’s motion to remove the
investigator. The order was based in part on a finding that the investigator’s
continued investigation is “necessary to determine the best interests of the
children.”

[¶66] Also relevant to this issue is that Dustin and Stacey Dimmler signed an
authorization allowing the parenting investigator to release information to the
Eastern Plains Human Service Zone. See N.D.R. Ct. Appendix G (a parenting
investigator must ensure that there is no unauthorized disclosure of
information). The child protection services agent worked in that office. Dustin
and Stacey Dimmler’s releases included authorization to provide information
to child protective services. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its

                                       17
discretion by permitting the exchange of documents between Stacey Dimmler
and the parenting investigator, or by allowing the parenting investigator to
continue serving.

                                       VI

[¶67] Stacey Dimmler argues the district court abused its discretion by not
ordering child support retroactive to the date of her motion requesting child
support.

[¶68] Our standard of review for child support determinations is mixed.
“[Q]uestions of law . . . are subject to the de novo standard of review, findings
of fact . . . are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review, and may, in
some limited areas, be matters of discretion subject to the abuse of discretion
standard of review.” Grossman v. Lerud, 2014 ND 235, ¶ 6, 857 N.W.2d 92. “A
district court has discretion to decide the appropriate effective date of an order
modifying a child support obligation and whether the effective date should be
the date the motion was filed or some later effective date.” Norberg v. Norberg,
2014 ND 90, ¶ 40, 845 N.W.2d 348 (citing Wagner v. Wagner, 2007 ND 101,
¶ 28, 733 N.W.2d 593). “A district court’s decision whether to award past child
support is discretionary and will not be overturned unless the court abuses its
discretion.” Rebel v. Rebel, 2013 ND 116, ¶ 20, 833 N.W.2d 442.

[¶69] The district court’s first order did not award child support but “reserved
[it] in the interim.” The court reserved the issue because Dustin Dimmler
recently lost his job as a helicopter pilot. Despite not awarding interim support,
Stacey and Dustin Dimmler shared the expenses of the marital home until the
court’s second interim order. Prior to the second interim order, Dustin and
Stacey Dimmler notified each other of their monthly expenses and the party
who paid the lesser amount then paid the other party an equalizing payment.
These equalizing payments tended to be small, ranging from $70 to $80. Dustin
Dimmler made mortgage payments and Stacey Dimmler paid the children’s
living expenses. Stacey Dimmler lived in the marital home between the two
interim orders because Dustin Dimmler had access to more housing options.
Stacey Dimmler did not receive any equity in the home, but lived in the home
until the second interim order.

                                       18
[¶70] After the second interim order Dustin Dimmler paid the mortgage and
resided in the marital home. The district court did not receive evidence or make
findings on any disparity in amounts paid by the respective parties during the
interim, or any equity increase in the home Dustin Dimmler received as a
result of the interim financial arrangements. On this record, and in view of the
other shared expenses, the court did not abuse its discretion by not ordering
retroactive child support payments.

                                     VII

[¶71] Stacey Dimmler argues the district court abused its discretion by not
ordering Dustin Dimmler to pay her attorney’s fees. This Court has held: “The
district court has broad discretion to award attorney’s fees in divorce
proceedings under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-23.” Brew v. Brew, 2017 ND 242, ¶ 32, 903
N.W.2d 72 (cleaned up). We have said the primary standard for awarding
attorney’s fees under N.D.C.C. § 14-05-23 is consideration of one spouse’s needs
and the other spouse’s ability to pay. Id. However, we have also recognized
attorney’s fees may be appropriate “where a party’s actions have unreasonably
increased the time spent on a case.” Id. “A district court’s award of attorney’s
fees will not be disturbed on appeal unless the appealing party establishes the
court abused its discretion.” Tuhy v. Tuhy, 2018 ND 53, ¶ 17, 907 N.W.2d 351.

[¶72] The district court found that Dustin and Stacey Dimmler should pay
their own attorney’s fees. Stacey Dimmler argues Dustin Dimmler prolonged
the divorce proceedings causing increased fees, but failed to establish how the
court abused its discretion by not awarding her attorney’s fees. The district
court did not abuse its discretion when it found the parties are to pay their own
attorney’s fees.

                                     VIII

[¶73] Stacey Dimmler argues the district court erred by not requiring Dustin
Dimmler to reimburse her $5,000 for the fees she spent obtaining a parental
capacity evaluation. Her request for this relief was contained in her “proposed
asset/debt distribution,” as “Parental Capacity Evaluation Reimbursement -
$5,000.” Reimbursement of the evaluation fees were sought as part of a larger

                                       19
request for recovery of “additional monies owed by Dustin,” including her half
of parenting investigator fees, appraisal fees, rent reimbursement and
“$15,000 in Conduct Based Attorney’s Fees.”

[¶74] “An award of costs, including expert witness fees, lies within the sound
discretion of the district court.” Hager v. City of Devils Lake, 2009 ND 180, ¶
57, 773 N.W.2d 420. When a court assesses costs and fees, it “must consider
the overall financial circumstances of the parties and whether either party’s
actions have unreasonably increased the expenditures in the case.” Berg v.
Berg, 2000 ND 36, ¶ 22, 606 N.W.2d 895, superseded by statute N.D.C.C. § 14-
05-22. “The court shall enter an order for the costs of any such investigation
against either or both parties.” N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.3(4) (2021).1

[¶75] “A court has discretion to award fees against either or both parties, the
court’s decision on the matter will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse
of discretion.” Horsted v. Horsted, 2012 ND 24, ¶ 15, 812 N.W.2d 448. “A district
court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unconscionable manner or if it misinterprets or misapplies the law.” Bowen,
2023 ND 25, ¶ 12.

[¶76] In February 2022, the parenting investigator requested that both parties
have a parental capacity evaluation. Stacey Dimmler obtained the evaluation.
Dustin Dimmler did not. Stacey Dimmler requested that Dustin Dimmler
reimburse her $5,000, the cost of the evaluation because Dustin Dimmler
refused to obtain an evaluation. Dustin Dimmler claimed his annual FAA
mental health checks are comparable to a parenting capacity evaluation.

[¶77] To the extent Stacey Dimmler’s claim for reimbursement of the $5,000
are viewed as recovery of costs or fees, we have not been shown how the district
court acted in an arbitrary, unreasonable or unconscionable manner.
Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in not awarding recovery of
the fee paid by Stacey Dimmler for her evaluation. To the extent Stacey

1 N.D.C.C. § 14-09-06.3(4) was revised in 2023 to eliminate this sentence, but the revision was not

codified until after the trial and order for judgment occurred in this matter.

                                                  20
Dimmler’s claim for reimbursement of the $5,000 are part of the overall
division of the marital estate, we have not been shown how the court’s division
was clearly erroneous. We therefore affirm denial of Stacey Dimmler’s request
that she recover the parental capacity evaluation fees she expended.

                                       IX

[¶78] The district court erred when it did not include the life estate’s debt in
calculating the value of Dustin Dimmler’s remainder interest in the farmland.
The court did not err when it valued the Florida property and the parties’
personal property. The court did not err when it applied the best interest
factors and found primary residential responsibility should be placed with
Stacey Dimmler. The court did not err or abuse its discretion when it found
Dustin Dimmler was underemployed and imputed income to calculate child
support payments. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion
in limine to remove the parenting investigator. The court did not abuse its
discretion when it refused to retroactively award child support to Stacey
Dimmler. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney’s fees or
reimbursement of Stacey Dimmler’s fees incurred to obtain a parental capacity
evaluation.

[¶79] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings to
properly evaluate the farmland’s value and to equitably divide the marital
estate.

[¶80] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
      Daniel J. Crothers
      Lisa Fair McEvers
      Jerod E. Tufte
      Douglas A. Bahr

Tufte, Justice, concurring.

[¶81] I join the majority opinion in full.

[¶82] Reaching an accurate valuation of a life estate or remainder interest
requires answering an actuarial question dependent on the life expectancy of

                                        21
the life tenant. N.D. Admin. Code § 75-02-02.1-32(4)(c). The district court
correctly started with an appraisal of the farmland as a fee simple interest.
Aided by the parties, it then considered that Dustin Dimmler has only a partial
remainder interest subject to multiple life estate interests. The youngest life
tenant as of the valuation date was 58 years old. The court’s findings relating
to the value of an unencumbered partial remainder interest are well explained
and supported by the record.

[¶83] The administrative code table the district court relied on to value the
remainder interest does not appear to have straightforward application to the
encumbrance at issue here. Unlike the complicated analysis the court applied
to value the partial remainder interest, the court’s analysis of the debt was
uncomplicated by the multiple contingencies that affect Dustin Dimmler’s
interest in the land. The court reasoned that Dustin and Stacey Dimmler were
not obligated to pay the debt, did not guarantee the debt, and had not
contributed to service the debt. On that basis, the court determined the debt
was not a marital debt and did not further consider it.

[¶84] The greater the burden of encumbrances on a property, the less a
disinterested buyer will pay for an interest in the property. See Hoverson v.
Hoverson, 2001 ND 124, ¶ 12, 629 N.W.2d 573. Where there is debt
encumbering the entire property but only the life tenant is obligated to make
payments, the question of how to account for the debt’s effect on the remainder
interest is also an actuarial question. Ultimately the valuation depends on the
likelihood that the remainderman will receive the property before the debt is
satisfied. Here, this question concerns the life expectancy of the life tenant who
is obligated to pay the debt. If the life expectancy of the debtor life tenant is
much longer than the remaining term on the debt and there is no other reason
to doubt continuation of regular payments by the life tenant, the likelihood is
that the debt will be satisfied before the remainder interest matures. Of course,
there may be potential circumstances other than death of the life tenant that
would prevent discharge of the debt before the remainderman succeeds to
ownership. The record contains information about the life tenants, the terms
of the life estate deeds, and the terms of the debt sufficient to make findings
on the extent to which the debt encumbering the farmland affected its value as

                                       22
of the valuation date. For purposes of valuing the remainder interest, the
court’s finding that the debt burdening the land is not a marital debt is not
clearly erroneous. It is clearly erroneous to further find that the total
outstanding encumbrance of $504,122.67 has no effect on the value of Dustin
Dimmler’s remainder interest.

[¶85] Jerod E. Tufte
      Jon J. Jensen, C.J.

                                     23