Court Opinion

ID: 9825940
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 14:40:36.734565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:41:35.129895
License: Public Domain

After the foregoing opinion the case was tried in the Common Pleas Division, and the plaintiff recovered a verdict. The defendant then filed a petition for a new trial.
Matteson, O. J.
The principal question raised by the defendant’s exceptions and petition for new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the evidence, is as to the degree of care required of a passenger riding on the foot-board of a car. It is contended by the defendant' that the plaintiff was guilty of contribu*713tory negligence, because if he had been paying attention he could have heard the warnings given to ' “ look out for the poles.” This contention rests on the assumption that it was the duty of the plaintiff, though he did not know of the dangerous proximity of the poles to the track, to have anticipated some possible danger and, therefore, to have been sufficiently alei’t to have heard the calls. We think this is too strict a rule to be applied to the plaintiff. In our former opinion we stated the rule which seemed to us applicable, as follows: “ A passenger who rides on the foot-board of a car necessarily takes on himself the duty of looking out for and protecting himself against the usual and obvious perils of riding there; such, for instance, as injury” from passing vehicles, or of being thrown off by the swaying or jolting of the car ; assuming, of course, proper management of the car and proper construction and condition of the road. We do not think, however, that the danger of being hit by a trolley pole is such a peril as a passenger whom the railroad company has undertaken to carry on the foot-board of its car is bound to anticipate and be on the lookout for ; unless, indeed, it appears that the passenger had knowledge of the close proximity of the track to the trolley pole. He has a right to assume that the railway company has performed its duty in so constructing its road that its passengers, even on the foot-boards of its cars, riding there by its permission, shall not be exposed to injury by the unsafe construction of its road.” Ante, p. 711. The charge of the court, taken as a whole, fairly and correctly stated this rule to the jury.
If the plaintiff was under no duty to listen for a warning, he is not to be charged with contributory negligence unless the warning was actually heard by him, or unless it be shown that he had knowledge of the danger of being struck by the pole. His testimony was that no warning was given to his knowledge, which was equivalent to a denial that he heard the warning. He also testified that he was unacquainted with the' location of the poles, never having ridden on that part of the defendant’s road prior to the accident, and being familiar with the street only by having casually driven *714through, it. The conductor of the motor car when he first called out, ‘ ‘ look out for the poles, ” while the car was stopped at Touro street, stood on the opposite side of the car from that- on which the plaintiff was about to get on the car, and when he repeated the calls after the car had started, stood on the foot-board on the opposite side of the car from the plaintiff. The brakeman and conductor of the tow car also gave similar warnings. The plaintiff was accompanied by a young lady and the attention which he bestowed upon her may have prevented him from hearing the warnings given by the defendant’s employees ; or he may have been prevented from hearing the warnings by the noise and confusion in the street and the noise of the cars after they had started. Other witnesses, who occupied positions as favorable for hearing the calls as that occupied by the plaintiff, testified that they, too, did not hear the calls. The question whether the plaintiff heard the warnings, as also that of his knowledge concerning the location of the poles near to the track, was for the jury. The plaintiff’s credibility and that of the witnesses whose testimony tended to corroborate him, was for the jury. They found for the plaintiff, and it is not sufficiently clear that they made a mistake to justify us in setting aside their verdict as against the evidence.
The plaintiff, who at the time of the accident was twenty-three years of age, was severely injured. Besides the breaking of two or three bones in his left foot, he' suffered the loss of the front part of his right foot which was amputated at the instep. At the time of the accident he was earning forty-five dollars a month besides his board, which he estimated at twenty dollars a month more. He was prevented by his injuries from pursuing any occupation for upwards of fourteen months while his wounds were healing, during which he also experienced much pain. By the accident he has been permanently disabled and debarred from engaging in any pursuit which will require him to stand any considerable portion of the time. In view of these considerations, we cannot say that the verdict for $6,950 is so clearly exces*715sive as to lead as to believe that it was not a proper and honest exercise of the judgment of the jury.
Patrick J. Galvin & Charles Acton Ives, for plaintiff.
Darius Baker, David 8. Baker, Jun., & William C. Baker, for defendant.
Defendant’s petition for a new trial denied, and dismissed with costs, and case remitted to the Common Pleas Division with direction to enter judgment on the verdict.
Stiness, J. Non-concurs.