Court Opinion

ID: 9410093
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-20 15:01:02.163204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:55.364259
License: Public Domain

21-6334
    Jin v. Garland
                                                                                        BIA
                                                                                   Wright, IJ
                                                                                A205 614 849
                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                  SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

           At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
    held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
    City of New York, on the 20th day of July, two thousand twenty-three.

    PRESENT:
               PIERRE N. LEVAL,
               RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
               SARAH A. L. MERRIAM,
                     Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________

    ZHENGXUN JIN,
                           Petitioner,

                     v.                                               21-6334
                                                                      NAC
    MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
    STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
                     Respondent.
    _____________________________________

    FOR PETITIONER:                      Mike P. Gao, Esq., Law Offices of Mike P. Gao,
                                         P.C., Flushing, NY.

    FOR RESPONDENT:                      Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney
                                         General; John S. Hogan, Assistant Director;
                                         Christina R. Zeidan, Trial Attorney, Office of
                                         Immigration Litigation, United States Department
                                         of Justice, Washington, D.C.
       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

       Petitioner Zhengxun Jin, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China,

seeks review of a May 17, 2021 decision of the BIA affirming an October 3, 2018 decision

of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal,

and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Zhengxun Jin, No. A 205

614 849 (B.I.A. May 17, 2021), aff’g No. A 205 614 849 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. Oct. 3,

2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

       We have considered both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions “for the sake of

completeness.” Huo Qiang Chen v. Holder, 773 F.3d 396, 403 (2d Cir. 2014) (citation and

quotation marks omitted). “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.

§1252(b)(4)(B); see also Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014) (reviewing

factual findings for substantial evidence and questions of law de novo).

       An asylum applicant like petitioner, who does not allege past persecution, has the

burden to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of “race, religion,

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C.

§1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see also 8 C.F.R. §1208.13(b). An applicant must both “present credible

testimony that he subjectively fears persecution and establish that his fear is objectively

reasonable.” Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004). “Objective

                                             2
reasonableness entails a showing that a reasonable person in the petitioner’s circumstances

would fear persecution if returned to his native country.” Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. I.N.S.,

421 F.3d 125, 128 (2d Cir. 2005). A “fear may be well-founded even if there is only a

slight, though discernible, chance of persecution.” Diallo v. I.N.S., 232 F.3d 279, 284 (2d

Cir. 2000). But a fear is not objectively reasonable if it lacks “solid support in the record”

and is merely “speculative at best.” Jian Xing Huang, 421 F.3d at 129.

       An applicant can show either “a reasonable possibility [that] he ... would be

singled out individually for persecution” or a “pattern or practice” of persecution of a

group of similarly situated people. 8 C.F.R. §§1208.13(b)(2)(iii), (iii)(A). Applicants

claiming a fear of persecution absent evidence of past persecution “must make some

showing that authorities in his country of nationality are either aware of his activities or

likely to become aware of his activities.” See Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135,

143 (2d Cir. 2008).

       The record does not compel a conclusion that petitioner’s fear is objectively

reasonable. Petitioner argues that Chinese officials will become aware of his Christian

practice because he plans to attend unregistered family churches in China, which are

subject to surveillance and raids by the government. He testified that he would be “under

supervision by Communist entity[]” in China because of his religion, but he offered no

specific evidence that he would be singled out for surveillance. Certified Admin. Record

at 100. Petitioner submitted to the IJ the U.S. State Department’s Country Report on

Human Rights Practices for 2016 and International Religious Freedom Report for 2016.

                                              3
These reports mention government surveillance of bishops and pastors of Christian

churches, as well as surveillance of individuals such as human rights activists and lawyers,

former political prisoners, publishers, booksellers, and foreign correspondents, for reasons

unrelated to religion. The Human Rights report also mentions surveillance of the general

public, but indicates that this is conducted “to monitor and intimidate political dissidents.”

Certified Admin. Record at 205. Neither report discusses surveillance of ordinary church

members.

       Petitioner also submitted two letters from his mother, in which she reported her own

arrest in 2012 for attending a church and alleged that she knew of one other church that

was raided in 2012. Her letters state that: (1) she was arrested by the Chinese police in June

2012 for attending a family church; (2) she was released the same day after paying a fine

and submitting a “guarantee letter” promising not to attend family church; (3) she was

required to check in monthly with local authorities, and when she did not, she would

receive calls asking questions about her life and urging her to check in; and (4) the month

after her arrest, another family church was raided by the police because one of its members

was under surveillance, and all attendees were arrested. Petitioner argues that he will be in

contact with his mother if he returns to China, and officials will learn that he attends an

unregistered church “through the surveillance of his mother.” Pet’r’s Br. at 9.

       The BIA did not err in concluding that petitioner failed to establish “a reasonable

possibility” he would be singled out for persecution. 8 C.F.R. §1208.13(b)(2)(i)(B). The

inference that petitioner would be identified by authorities through his mother is not

                                              4
persuasive. Both the IJ and BIA considered his mother’s letters and concluded that they

did “not meet the [petitioner’s] burden to show that authorities in China would become

aware of his attending an underground church.” Certified Admin. Record at 4; see also id.

at 64–65. On this record, it was reasonable for the BIA to conclude that petitioner’s fear of

persecution for attending a church was speculative. See Jian Xing Huang, 421 F.3d at 129.

       Similarly, petitioner failed to establish a pattern or practice of persecution of

similarly situated Christians. See 8 C.F.R. §1208.13(b)(2)(iii)(A). When persecutory acts

in the petitioner’s country of nationality vary across regions, the BIA may require evidence

specific to the petitioner’s locality. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 165–66

(2d Cir. 2008) (finding no error in the agency’s requirement that an applicant demonstrate

a well-founded fear of persecution specific to his or her local area when persecutory acts

vary by locality); see also Jian Liang v. Garland, 10 F.4th 106, 117 (2d Cir. 2021) (holding

that applicant failed to meet burden where his evidence did not “speak[] to persecution

occurring in [his] home province of Fujian[]”). Here, petitioner has failed to show a pattern

or practice of prosecution in his locality, the Jilin Province.

       Petitioner argues that the IJ failed to consider the reports’ findings that unregistered

churches are considered illegal and attendees are often arrested and detained in police raids.

In addition to the 2016 reports submitted by petitioner, the IJ took administrative notice of

the 2017 versions of the same reports. The 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom

discusses incidents involving Christians in certain provinces, but the only reference to

religious persecution in Jilin involved practitioners of Falun Gong. The agency did not err

                                               5
in concluding that the only incidents in the record occurring in Jilin -- his mother’s arrest

in 2012 and the raid of another family church in 2012 -- did not establish a pattern or

practice of persecution. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 160 (upholding BIA’s decision that

petitioner failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution based on unattributed

reports of forced sterilizations, absent evidence of the number or circumstances of such

sterilizations).

       In sum, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his fear of persecution was

objectively reasonable because he did not provide evidence that he would be singled out or

that there is a pattern or practice of persecution of Christians in Jilin Province. Because he

did not establish a well-founded fear as required to state an asylum claim, he necessarily

failed to meet the higher standards for withholding of removal and CAT relief. See Lecaj

v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2010).

       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending motions

and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

                                           FOR THE COURT:
                                           Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
                                           Clerk of Court

                                              6