Court Opinion

ID: 9946080
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 01:00:41.297698+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:25.008094
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10584            Document: 200-1           Page: 1    Date Filed: 02/28/2024

            United States Court of Appeals
                 for the Fifth Circuit
                                    ____________                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                     No. 22-10584
                                                                                       FILED
                                                                                February 28, 2024
                                    ____________
                                                                                  Lyle W. Cayce
United States of America,                                                              Clerk

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                           versus

Alfredo Navarro Hinojosa; Miguel Casas; Martin
Salvador Rodriguez,

                                            Defendants—Appellants.
                    ______________________________

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Northern District of Texas
                             USDC No. 3:16-CR-536-9
                    ______________________________

Before Jones, Barksdale, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
          After a jury convicted the defendants of a variety of crimes related to
drug sales that occurred in one of the defendant’s nightclubs, the
defendants challenged their convictions and sentences. Because there was
extensive evidence in support of each, the defendants’ convictions and
sentences are AFFIRMED.

          _____________________
*
    This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                 No. 22-10584

                                      I
       Alfredo Navarro Hinojosa owns several nightclubs in Dallas and Fort
Worth, Texas.        Miguel “Mike” Casas and Martin “Chava” Salvador
Rodriguez were two of his most trusted managers and advisors. Hinojosa,
Casas, and Rodriguez, along with other co-defendants not involved in this
appeal, were charged as part of a thirty-three-count indictment related to
third-party drug sales that occurred at Hinojosa’s clubs between 2009 and
2016. The drugs sales, which occurred in the bathrooms of the clubs,
typically consisted of $20 in exchange for a small bag of cocaine for personal
use.
       The dispute at trial centered around: (1) whether the defendants
passively acquiesced to the drug sales occurring in the bathrooms of the
clubs or actively allowed those sales; and (2) when the defendants learned
that the drug sales were occurring. The evidence presented consisted of
statements made by the defendants to the FBI, testimony from club
employees and drug dealers, wiretaps and recordings of conversations
between club management, and testimony about controlled buys conducted
by federal agents.
       Evidence was presented indicating that Hinojosa, Casas, and
Rodriguez knew about the drug sales for all or most of the period during
which the sales occurred.      Evidence also showed that the defendants
stopped allowing drug sales after the FBI raided the clubs but resumed
allowing sales several months later because prohibiting sales hurt
attendance and revenue. The defendants presented evidence indicating
that the drug dealing did not occur with management’s knowledge or
approval.
       The trial also included testimony from Deputy Easterling, who
testified about the 2017 arrest of Josephine Hinojosa—Alfredo Hinojosa’s

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niece—and Eric Lee, an expert witness who testified about Hinojosa’s
business records and noted numerous red flags indicating that Hinojosa was
probably engaged in money laundering.
       After a seventeen-day trial, Hinojosa, Casas, and Rodriguez were
each convicted on three counts: making a premises available for drug sales
(Count 19); conspiracy to make a premises available for drug sales (Count
20); and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine (Count 25).
The jury also found that the defendants knew or should have known that
the conspiracy involved at least five kilograms of cocaine. See United States
v. Staggers, 961 F.3d 745, 762 (5th Cir. 2020). The jury did not reach a
verdict on the remaining counts.
       The district court sentenced Hinojosa to 192 months, Casas to 168
months, and Rodriguez to 150 months. Hinojosa was sentenced within his
guideline range. Casas received a perjury enhancement and was sentenced
below his guideline range because the district court determined that he was
less culpable than Hinojosa and should receive a shorter sentence.
Rodriguez was sentenced within his guideline range and received a lower
sentence than Casas based on his relative culpability.
       Hinojosa, Casas, and Rodriguez challenge the admission of certain
evidence against them, the sufficiency of evidence as to their convictions,
and the district court’s application of the sentencing guidelines.
                                      II
                                      A
       Defendants collectively challenge four aspects of their trial: (1) They
each challenge the admission of testimony regarding Josephine Hinojosa’s
arrest; (2) Casas and Rodriguez challenge the admission of Alfredo
Hinojosa’s redacted statement; (3) Casas challenges the admission of Eric

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                                 No. 22-10584

Lee’s testimony about money laundering; and (4) Hinojosa claims that his
trial counsel was ineffective.
       Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact [material
to determining the action] more or less probable than it would be without
the evidence.”      Fed. R. Evid. 401.      Relevant evidence is generally
admissible unless “its probative value is substantially outweighed by a
danger of . . . unfair prejudice[.]” Fed. R. Evid. 402, 403.
       Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion if the
argument was preserved and plain error if not preserved. United States v.
Nutall, 180 F.3d 182, 189 (5th Cir. 1999) (discussing the standard for
relevance); United States v. Setser, 568 F.3d 482, 495 (5th Cir. 2009)
(discussing the standard for prejudice); United States v. Lewis, 796 F.3d 543,
546 (5th Cir. 2015) (discussing plain error). An argument not raised before
the district court, even if challenging an evidentiary ruling that was objected
to before the district court, is not preserved. Lewis, 796 F.3d at 546. Plain
error requires showing that: (1) the district court clearly or obviously erred
in a way that affected the defendant’s substantial rights; and (2) the court
should correct the error because it seriously affects the integrity of judicial
proceedings. See id.
       An error, even on the abuse-of-discretion standard, is harmless if it
cannot reasonably be taken to have affected the jury’s decision. Nutall, 180
F.3d at 189 (citations omitted); see also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S.
750, 764 (1946). Put another way, we will not overturn a jury verdict when
aside from the improperly admitted evidence, there is otherwise ample
evidence from which the jury could have convicted the defendant. See
United States v. Perry, 35 F.4th 293, 334 (5th Cir. 2022).

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                                           1
        Hinojosa, Casas, and Rodriguez each challenge the admission of
testimony regarding the arrest of Josephine Hinojosa, Hinojosa’s niece.1
Josephine was arrested in 2017 while traveling from Texas to North
Carolina with fourteen kilograms of cocaine and a computer drive
containing business records related to the clubs. The defendants argue that
the error was not harmless and their convictions on all three counts should
be reversed. Hinojosa’s challenge is reviewed under abuse of discretion.
The parties dispute whether Casas and Rodriguez preserved this argument.
        We need not resolve the disputed standard of review or evaluate
whether admission of the Josephine testimony was proper because any error
on either standard of review was harmless. An erroneous evidentiary ruling
is harmless unless there is a reasonable probability that the improperly
admitted evidence contributed to the conviction. United States v. Lewis, 774
F.3d 837, 844 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding harmless error on an abuse of
discretion standard).
        Here, there was extensive evidence supporting each of the
convictions and the findings that Hinojosa, Casas, and Rodriguez claim
were tainted by the Josephine testimony. See United States v. Williams, 620
F.3d 483, 493 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding any potential Rule 403 error harmless
because of the substantial evidence against the defendant). Based on that

        _____________________
        1
          The government claims that because relevance and prejudice are fact-specific
inquiries, Casas and Rodriguez cannot adopt Hinojosa’s arguments about Josephine.
Accordingly, the government argues, their claims fail for inadequate briefing. We
disagree. Hinojosa’s brief discusses the lack of connection between Josephine’s trip and
the clubs and the inherently prejudicial nature of the quantity of drugs involved in her
arrest. Because the argument does not rely on information specific to Hinojosa, it can be
adopted by Casas and Rodriguez.

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evidence, there is not a reasonable probability that the testimony about
Josephine contributed to any of the jury’s determinations.
       The Counts 19 and 20 charges for making a premises available for
drugs and conspiracy to do the same turn on whether the defendants knew
and actively allowed the drug sales. Several employees and drug dealers
testified that the drug sales were conspicuous and ubiquitous as early as
2013. Humberto Novoa, one of Hinojosa’s most trusted advisors, testified
that sales were occurring as early as 2013. He explained that “all of us
knew” and referenced Casas and Rodriguez by name. Erick Lopez, a
security guard at OK Corral Fort Worth from 2009 to 2014, testified that
drug sales were conspicuous and ubiquitous when he worked at the clubs.
Juan Julio Rodriguez, who was the head of security at Far West and OK
Corral Dallas from 2013 to 2016, testified that drug sales consistently
occurred while he worked at the clubs. He also testified that he told Casas
and Rodriguez about the sales. Luis Rendon, a bouncer at the nightclubs,
testified that he reported the drug sales to Casas and another manager
reported them to Rodriguez in 2013 or 2014. Juan Lara, known as Negro or
El Negro, who oversaw most of the drug dealers who sold at the clubs,
testified that drugs were sold at the clubs from 2012 to 2015.                    At a
minimum, because Hinojosa, Casas, and Rodriguez were known as hands-
on managers,2 the jury could infer from how prevalent and conspicuous the
sales were that each of the defendants knew about the sales. The ubiquity
of the drug sales is further supported by the nineteen controlled buys
conducted by federal agents between 2013 and 2016. The timing of each
defendant’s knowledge is discussed in detail below.

       _____________________
       2
          There was testimony that Casas and Rodriguez were two of the few people
whom Hinojosa trusted, that they were two of the top five decision-makers for the clubs,
and that they had the authority to direct employees and make decisions for the club.

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       There is also evidence that each defendant approved of the sales.
Hinojosa instructed Casas to occasionally clean up drug activity but
otherwise be more accommodating. This instruction was a response to
customer complaints about the lack of drugs, which were relayed to
Hinojosa by Rodriguez. Casas and Rodriguez both advocated for allowing
drug sales because customers complained to them when sales were
prohibited.
       There was also testimony about a meeting during which Casas
explained that management decided to resume allowing drug sales because
lack of drug sales was bad for business. Rodriguez made similar statements
at a different meeting. There was evidence that Casas instructed a security
guard to keep a payment that the security guard received from a drug
dealer, that Rodriguez personally observed a drug deal in the bathroom in
2014, and that Hinojosa instructed a security guard to allow certain drug
dealers to sell in the bathrooms.       In other words, through their own
statements and actions, all three defendants demonstrated their knowledge
and approval of the sales.
       The idea that the defendants actively facilitated the sales, rather than
passively and reluctantly accepted them, is bolstered by their recognition
that the drug sales were crucial to club attendance and revenue. Hinojosa
admitted that he allowed drug sales to occur because preventing them was
bad for business. He was recorded saying, “[w]e can’t really clean [the
drug sales] because then we lose business.” Hinojosa specifically explained
his plan to allow discreet sales so as not to attract too much attention.
       Casas and Rodriguez also recognized the importance of the sales to
the business. Novoa testified that management decided to resume allowing
drug sales as long as they were discreet. He also testified that when the
decision to resume allowing drug sales was made, Casas and Rodriguez

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                                No. 22-10584

“were the ones telling Mr. Hinojosa that we should allow [drug sales in the
bathrooms] to happen.” During a recorded phone call between Hinojosa
and his head of security, Eddie Villareal, Hinojosa stated that Rodriguez
complained to him that the clubs were being too hard on drugs sales and
Hinojosa told Villareal that he ordered Casas to be “more flex” about the
drug sales.
       To be sure, there is also evidence suggesting that the defendants
opposed the sales to the extent that they were aware of them. Lara testified
that he sometimes bribed security guards to remove rival drug dealers. He
also testified that he never interacted with management and believed
management was unaware that the sales were occurring. A security guard
testified to bringing drugs into the club for a drug dealer so that the drugs
would not be detected by security. A drug dealer also told an FBI agent that
he was warned not to let Casas see him selling drugs. Casas texted a
security guard to “stay on those bathrooms,” but the security guard
interpreted that to mean he should make sure that drug sales were not
conspicuous. There is also a conversation in which Hinojosa states that he
would rather have lower attendance than risk losing his club. Ali Valdez,
who managed one of the clubs, testified that the clubs had a zero-tolerance
policy for drug sales.
       Much of this contrary evidence is consistent with the jury’s
determinations. The bribes were not to get the security guards to ignore
prohibited selling but to remove competition. The fact that security guards
were used to bring drugs into the clubs is consistent with the defendants’
stated desire that sales be discreet. And the statements by Hinojosa and
Valdez lack credibility in light of the evidence that drug sales occurred,
including after the FBI raid. Given the extensive inculpatory evidence, this
contrary evidence does not establish a reasonable probability that the
testimony about Josephine contributed to the defendants’ convictions.

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       Hinojosa contends that the jury’s inability to reach a verdict on
sixteen out of the seventeen charges for maintaining a drug premises means
we cannot determine whether the testimony about Josephine influenced the
jury’s decisions on Counts 19 and 20. But the Supreme Court has rejected
attempts to use failure to reach a verdict as evidence of the jury’s views on
other issues. Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110, 124–25 (2009). In
Yeager, the Supreme Court considered whether the jury’s inability to reach
a verdict on some counts proved it acted irrationally by acquitting on
another count. Id. The Supreme Court explained that “the fact that a jury
hangs is evidence of nothing,” id. at 125, because “[t]o ascribe meaning to a
hung count would presume an ability to identify which factor was at play in
the jury room.” Id. at 121. So too here. To determine that the testimony
about Josephine was probably a factor in the Counts 19 and 20 convictions
because the jury hung on other counts would be to assume that the jury
hung on those other counts for a reason that the Josephine testimony
addressed.
       The Count 25 charge for conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute turns on whether there was sufficient evidence from which the
jury could have inferred an agreement between the defendants and the drug
dealers. United States v. Chapman, 851 F.3d 363, 376 (5th Cir. 2017) (listing
elements of conspiracy). There was a variety of evidence from which the
jury could have inferred a tacit agreement.        Id. (explaining that tacit
agreement is sufficient and can be “proved with circumstantial evidence”
or “inferred from concert of action”).          There was evidence that
management allowed certain drug dealers to sell in the bathrooms, while
rival drug dealers were removed. A drug dealer testified that Juan Lara,
who oversaw most of the drug dealers who sold in the clubs, received
permission from Hinojosa to resume sales in the clubs. Another drug dealer

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testified that his supervisor received permission from Rodriguez to sell
drugs in the bathrooms.
        The defendants shared the same purpose as the drug dealers and
benefitted from their success. And as the crackdown following the FBI raid
and subsequent return to drug sales demonstrates, the defendants and drug
dealers were coordinated about when sales could and could not occur. This
evidence of coordination and shared purpose strongly supports an inference
that the defendants and drug dealers had a tacit agreement to sell drugs.
        The defendants each argue that they cannot be liable under Count 25
because knowledge, approval, or acquiescence in the purpose of the
conspiracy is insufficient to establish participation. United States v.
Chandler, 586 F.2d 593, 602 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing United States v. Falcone,
311 U.S. 205 (1940)). In Chandler, we held that evidence that an officer was
present when deliveries of stolen gasoline were made was insufficient to
sustain a conspiracy conviction because the evidence did not establish
participation. Id. at 601–02. By influencing when and how the drug sales
occurred, the defendants did more than just know about or approve of
them. They participated. And because the defendants benefitted from the
sales and decided to resume the sales after temporarily stopping them, they
did more than merely acquiesce to something that they wished was not
happening. We cannot hold that there was a reasonable probability that the
testimony about Josephine contributed to the Count 25 convictions.
        The drug quantity finding turns on when the defendants knew the
drug sales were occurring.3 The defendants contend that the evidence
        _____________________
        3
           The PSRs, which the district court adopted, calculated the drug quantity by
multiplying the number of weeks attributable to each defendant by an estimated 50 grams
sold per week. Therefore, the sufficiency of the evidence for the quantity finding turns on
the sufficiency of the evidence for the weeks attributed to each defendant.

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recounted above only shows that they knew about and allowed the drug
sales starting in 2014. The defendants ignore two ways in which the jury
could have determined that the defendants knew about and were liable for
drug sales occurring before 2014. First, the defendants rely on testimony
from Juan Julio Rodriguez, in which he stated that Hinojosa told him to
continue allowing sales in the clubs, a few months after the OK Corral
Dallas club opened in 2014. But the OK Corral Dallas club opened in 2013.
If the jury believed that Juan Julio correctly remembered that the
conversation occurred a few months after the club opened and
misremembered the year, they could have viewed the defendants’ evidence
as supporting participation in the conspiracy in 2013.
       The jury also could have determined that the defendants knew about
drug sales as early as 2013 based on the fact that Hinojosa told Juan Julio to
continue allowing drug sales. That testimony does not suggest Hinojosa was
surprised or learning for the first time that drug deals were happening. The
statement that the sales were necessary strongly implies, though does not
prove, that Hinojosa had experience with drug sales in his clubs for long
enough to know the impact that they had on revenue. In other words, the
conversation is evidence of participation well before the date when the
conversation occurred. Given that knowledge even one year earlier than
when Hinojosa admits to knowing drug sales were occurring would be
sufficient to establish a quantity triggering the mandatory minimum, there
was sufficient evidence for a rational juror to find that the conspiracy
involved at least five kilograms on either standard of review. And that
reasoning applies equally to Casas and Rodriguez given that management
met every week and Casas and Rodriguez were deeply involved in running
the clubs.
       The evidence of ubiquitous and conspicuous drug sales starting well
before 2014 also supports the drug quantity finding. The defendants were

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                                 No. 22-10584

very engaged in running the nightclubs. With the exception of the months
immediately following the FBI raids when they were concerned about a
federal investigation, the defendants were consistent in (1) acknowledging
the importance of the drug sales to the business and (2) permitting drug
sales provided that they were discreet. The jury may simply have inferred
that this attitude and approach to the drug sales occurred prior to 2014.
       Just three days after the FBI arrested a number of drug dealers at
each of the three clubs, Hinojosa was recorded saying that “customers
complain” and “we lose business” when “I get really tough in the
bathrooms.” This conversation is crucial because it occurred in March
2015 before the defendants decided in April 2015 to curtail drug sales out of
fear that they were being investigated. It demonstrates that the defendants
did not learn that drug sales were important to their business during the
post-raid shut down. That contention, if true, would lend credence to the
argument that the defendants were not responsible for sales that occurred
before 2015. But the fact that Hinojosa already knew that drug sales were
important to the business greatly undermines that argument. And the fact
that Hinojosa knew is strong evidence that Casas and Rodriguez knew as
well. Casas and Rodriguez were Hinojosa’s most trusted advisors. They
met every week.
       We cannot say that there was a reasonable probability that the
testimony about Josephine contributed to the drug quantity finding.
                                      2
       Casas and Rodriguez challenge the admission of a redacted
statement that Hinojosa made to the government on the ground that it
violates the Sixth Amendment. A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
confront witnesses against him is violated when: (1) “several co-defendants
are tried jointly”; (2) “one defendant’s extra-judicial statement is used to

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                                  No. 22-10584

implicate another defendant”; and (3) “the confessor does not take the
stand.” United States v. Restrepo, 994 F.2d 173, 186 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 127 (1968)).
       Here, a redacted portion of Hinojosa’s confession was admitted
during trial.4 The admitted statement was:
       Question: And so who is the one bringing you these
       complaints about the drugs.
       Hinojosa: It could be the manager, it could be the promotion’s
       guy . . . Because that’s—that’s the first people to hear the
       complaints.
       The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that confessions that
directly implicate a co-defendant fall within Bruton, while those that do so
indirectly do not. Samia v. United States, 599 U.S. 635, 647 (2023). The
fact that an inference is required does not necessarily mean implication is
indirect. Id. at 652 (citing Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 195 (1998))
(explaining that admissibility must depend on the kind of inference because
use of descriptions like “the red-haired, bearded, one-eyed man-with-a-
limp” surely fall within Bruton). Direct implication can occur when a
statement is redacted to remove a defendant’s name, yet still obviously
refers to the defendant. Id. at 653 (citing Gray, 523 U.S. at 196 (explaining
that the blanks would cause the jurors to speculate as to whom the blanks
refer)).   By contrast, if a redacted statement only implicates the co-
defendant in conjunction with other evidence, there is no Confrontation
Clause violation. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208 (1987).
       We need not determine whether a Bruton violation occurred because
it is well established that a Bruton violation may be considered harmless
       _____________________
       4
        At one point, Hinojosa decided to plead guilty and made admissions to the
government. He later decided not to plead guilty.

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where, as here, disregarding the co-defendant’s confession, there is
otherwise ample evidence against the defendant. United States v. Powell,
732 F.3d 361, 379 (5th Cir. 2013) (explaining that a Bruton violation does not
mandate reversal).
       As recounted above, there was extensive evidence indicating that
Casas and Rodriguez knew about and supported the drug sales. Novoa
testified that when the decision to resume allowing drug sales was made,
Casas and Rodriguez “were the ones telling Mr. Hinojosa that we should
allow [drug sales in the bathrooms] to happen.” During a recorded phone
call between Hinojosa and his head of security, Eddie Villareal, Hinojosa
stated that Rodriguez complained to him that the clubs were being too hard
on drug sales and told Villareal that he ordered Casas to be “more flex”
about the drug sales. Compared to this evidence, Hinojosa’s statement that
“the manager” and “the promotion’s guy” told him about customer
complaints was cumulative, and its admission, even if error, was harmless.
                                          3
       Casas also challenges the admission of testimony by Eric Lee, an
expert witness who testified about Hinojosa’s business records and noted
numerous red flags indicating that Hinojosa was probably using the clubs for
money laundering. Casas argues that Lee’s testimony was irrelevant and
prejudicial. Specifically, Casas argues that though the indictment lacked
any money laundering claims, Lee testified extensively that the clubs served
a money laundering function, prejudicing the defendants by making them
look like money launderers for drug cartels.5 Casas claims Count 21, which

       _____________________
       5
         Count 21 charged Hinojosa and other defendants who are not part of this appeal
with conspiracy to structure transactions to evade reporting requirements. Unlike money
laundering, structuring transactions to evade reporting requirements does not require

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                                    No. 22-10584

charged Hinojosa and Novoa with conspiracy to structure transactions to
evade reporting requirements, was improperly used to justify the admission
of Lee’s testimony.6
       The testimony was relevant because it provided another plausible
motive for allowing the drug sales: if attendance and revenue at the clubs
decreased, it would be more difficult to hide the money being laundered
through the clubs. In other words, lack of cash flow was not just a threat to
business, it risked exposing an illegal money laundering scheme.
       Nor was the testimony prejudicial. Lee’s testimony was a technical
analysis of business records, defense counsel repeatedly told the jury that
there was no money laundering charge, and the jury instructions cautioned
the jury not to consider charges not contained in the indictment. And any
prejudice did not outweigh the probative value of the testimony. The
central dispute for Counts 19, 20, and 25 was the defendants’ level of
involvement in the drug sales occurring at the clubs. Evidence that the
defendants had a strong motive for allowing the sales made the defendants’
argument that they reluctantly acquiesced to the sales less probable.
                                         4
       Hinojosa claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance
of counsel by advising him to withdraw his plea agreement based on a legal
strategy that was directly in conflict with United States v. Chen, 913 F.2d
183, 190 (5th Cir. 1990). Specifically, Hinojosa moved for judgment of

showing that the proceeds involved came from an illegal activity. Compare 18 U.S.C. §
1956 with 31 U.S.C. § 5324.
       6
          Count 21 was based on actions taken by Hinojosa and Novoa. Novoa gave
Hinojosa $140,000 and asked him to clean the money. Hinojosa deposited the money in
several of his own accounts using two separate transactions. He then wired money from
his accounts to a bus company to purchase a bus for a band that Novoa managed.

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                                 No. 22-10584

acquittal because there was no evidence that he opened the clubs for the
purpose of selling drugs. In Chen, we explained that “under § 856(a)(2),
the person who manages or controls the building and then rents to others,
need not have the express purpose in doing so that drug related activity take
place.” Id. He concedes that we cannot evaluate the merits of his claim
based on the existing record, so he asks us to use our supervisory authority
to remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing.
       Our typical practice is not to address ineffective assistance of counsel
claims unless there is a record on the merits from the district court. United
States v. Higdon, 832 F.2d 312, 313–14 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Freeze, 707 F.2d 132, 138–39 (5th Cir. 1983). We have applied that principle
when a party asks for an evidentiary hearing rather than resolution on the
merits. United States v. Jones, 969 F.3d 192, 199–200 (5th Cir. 2020).
Though we have remanded for evidentiary hearings in conflict-of-interest
cases, that issue is different than ineffective assistance of counsel. United
States v. Infante, 404 F.3d 376, 393 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Solado,
339 F.3d 285, 291–92 (5th Cir. 2003). Because the practices of other
circuits and policy arguments that Hinojosa advances do not warrant
departing from our typical practice, we do not reach those arguments.
                                      B
       Casas and Rodriguez challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for
their convictions under Counts 19 and 20. Hinojosa, Casas, and Rodriguez
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for their convictions on Count 25
and the jury’s finding that the Count 25 drug conspiracy involved at least
five kilograms of cocaine. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,
we consider whether the evidence, “viewed in the light most favorable to
the verdict, would permit a rational trier of fact to find [the defendant]
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Sila, 978 F.3d 264, 270

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                                No. 22-10584

(5th Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (internal quotations and citation
omitted). Our review must consider countervailing evidence, as well as the
evidence supporting the verdict. Id.
                                       1
      21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2), the basis for Count 19 and the predicate of the
conspiracy for Count 20, makes it a crime to:
      manage or control any place, whether permanently or
      temporarily, either as an owner, lessee, agent, employee,
      occupant, or mortgagee, and knowingly and intentionally rent,
      lease, profit from, or make available for use, with or without
      compensation, the place for the purpose of unlawfully
      manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a controlled
      substance.
      The purpose prong applies to the person dealing or using the
controlled substance, not the person who manages or controls the property.
Chen, 913 F.2d at 190.
      Conspiracy to manage a drug premises requires a finding that: (1)
two or more people reached an agreement to manage a drug premises; (2)
the defendant knew of the unlawful purpose of the agreement; and (3) the
defendant joined in the agreement willfully. 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 856(a)(2).
      Casas argues that if § 856(a)(2) imposes liability merely for failure to
take action, it impermissibly lacks an actus reus. He further argues that if
“making the place available” requires more than failure to remove drug
dealers, there is no evidence that he completed that requirement. Casas
challenges Count 20 based on the same arguments.
      The government claims that because Casas based his sufficiency of
the evidence objections on different grounds before the district court, the

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                                    No. 22-10584

grounds he provides now are reviewed for plain error.7 Casas argues that
his claim that § 856(a)(2) must contain an actus reus is a constitutional claim
(not a sufficiency of the evidence claim) and a claim he made before the
district court. Casas’s claims fail on either standard of review.
       Casas’s analogy to strict liability, which is defined by a lack of a mens
rea requirement, is inapposite to his argument that § 856(a)(2) lacks an
actus reus. The cases he cites discuss mens rea requirements, not the need
for an actus reus. Courts have upheld convictions based on failure to
remove. See, e.g., United States v. Safehouse, 985 F.3d 225, 235 (3d Cir.
2021). In any case, our court need not determine whether the statutory text
“make available” and Chen’s language of “allow” require affirmative
action or merely failure to act because there is evidence Casas acted to make
the clubs available for drug sales. He urged Hinojosa to resume allowing
drug sales for the good of the business. Hinojosa told Casas to give the drug
dealers greater latitude to conduct sales. We view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict, Sila, 978 F.3d at 270, and the jury could
reasonably have assumed that Casas followed these instructions by
instructing the security guards to allow drug sales. Instructing the security
guards constitutes action in furtherance of the illicit sales, meaning that
Casas was not convicted merely for failure to take action.
       Casas’s challenge to Count 20 also fails. Count 20 is a conspiracy
charge so it does not require that Casas actually made a premises available
for drug use, only that he agreed to do so. The evidence that Hinojosa told

       _____________________
       7
         Before the district court Casas argued there was insufficient evidence that he
knew drugs were being sold and that there was an agreement to allow drug sales. On
appeal, he argues that “making a place available” requires more than failure to remove
drug dealers and there was evidence he tried to stop drug sales.

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                                No. 22-10584

Casas to be more flexible with drug dealers, without additional inference, is
sufficient evidence of an agreement.
       Rodriguez argues that there was no evidence that he was an owner,
lessee, agent, employee, occupant, or mortgagee of the building. There was
testimony that Rodriguez was one of the few people Hinojosa trusted, that
Rodriguez was one of the top five decision makers for the clubs, that
Rodriguez was second in the business behind Hinojosa, and that he had the
authority to direct employees and make decisions for the club. There was
also testimony that Rodriguez had authority over the security guards and
instructed them to allow drug sales. On either standard, this was sufficient
evidence to find that Rodriguez was an agent of the club.
                                       2
       Challenging their Count 25 convictions, Hinojosa, Casas, and
Rodriguez argue that there is no evidence that any of them entered into an
agreement with any of the drug dealers to possess cocaine with the intent to
distribute it. They argue that mere knowledge, approval, or acquiescence in
the object or purpose of a conspiracy is insufficient to prove participation.
They claim a contrary conclusion would render § 856(a)(2) superfluous,
contrary to traditional canons of interpretation. Rodriguez argues that there
was no evidence he actually or constructively possessed cocaine. Because
Hinojosa did not preserve error, plain error review applies to his claim.
Because Casas and Rodriguez did, de novo review applies to their claims.
       As detailed above, there was extensive evidence from which the jury
could have inferred a tacit agreement.            There was evidence that
management allowed certain drug dealers to sell in the bathrooms, while
rival drug dealers were removed. A drug dealer testified that Juan Lara,
who oversaw most of the drug dealers who sold in the clubs, received
permission from Hinojosa to resume sales in the clubs. Another drug dealer

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                                      No. 22-10584

testified that his supervisor received permission from Rodriguez to sell
drugs in the bathrooms.           Reasonable minds may differ regarding the
credibility of this testimony and the extent to which it implies an agreement.
As detailed above, the evidence against the defendants goes beyond mere
knowledge, approval, and acquiescence.8 See supra IIA1.
        Nor are we persuaded by the defendants’ surplusage argument.
Inferring an agreement from providing the location for the drug sales does
not convert every § 856(a)(2) violation into a conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute. A conspiracy requires the parties to share the purpose
of the unlawful activity, whereas § 856(a)(2)’s purpose element only applies
to the drug seller. Chen, 913 F.2d at 190. In other words, whether a
defendant can be charged under § 856 and § 841 (conspiracy) depends on
how he made his premises available for drug sales and whether those facts
can support an inference of a tacit agreement.
                                            3
        Hinojosa, Casas, and Rodriguez argue that there was insufficient
evidence to find that the alleged conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute involved at least five kilograms of cocaine. Specifically, Hinojosa
and Casas argue that there was insufficient evidence showing that they
allowed drug sales to occur before 2014 and they can only be accountable
for drug sales that occurred after they joined the conspiracy. Rodriguez
       _____________________
        8
           Rodriguez’s argument about constructive possession also fails given the
deferential standard of review. Constructive possession is established by showing
ownership, dominion, or control over the contraband itself or the premises containing the
contraband. United States v. Salinas-Salinas, 555 F.2d 470, 473 (5th Cir. 1977). Given his
standing in the business, Rodriguez had control over the premises containing the drugs.
Given that he had control over the security guards, he could remove people as he saw fit.
Additionally, because Count 25 is a conspiracy charge, what is relevant is that some
conspirator had control over the building. As the owner of the clubs, Hinojosa had
control.

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                                     No. 22-10584

argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that he knew of the drug
sales before 2015.9
        On either standard of review, the drug quantity finding was proper.
The parties do not dispute that the drug quantity can be calculated by
estimating 50 grams sold per week. They dispute how many weeks can be
attributed to the defendants.            That number depends on when the
defendants joined the conspiracy, which, because the conspiracy is based on
tacit agreement, turns on when they knew the drug sales were occurring.
        As detailed above, there was more than enough evidence from which
the jury could have determined that the defendants joined the conspiracy as
early as 2013, which would provide a sufficient number of weeks to reach
the five-kilogram determination. See supra IIA1.
        Casas also argues that there was additional evidence that he tried to
stop drug sales through 2015. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, this argument is unavailing. The record indicates
periods of time when the clubs allowed rampant drug sales, allowed some
drug sales while prohibiting others, and prohibited most or all sales. Casas
claims that he told Luis Rendon, a security guard, to clean up the drug sales.
Without more detail, one could infer that meant stopping drug sales
altogether, making them more discreet, or getting rid of the unruly drug
dealers while leaving the others. That action also must be viewed against
the background that ubiquitous drug sales were occurring through 2015 and
Casas had substantial control over security and their oversight of the

        _____________________
        9
          Rodriguez challenges the jury instructions on the ground that they allowed the
jury to convict without finding that the conspiracy involved at least five kilograms of
cocaine. That is unsurprising, as whether a defendant is guilty of conspiracy and whether
he receives a mandatory minimum because he meets a particular quantity threshold are
separate questions.

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                                 No. 22-10584

bathrooms. In other words, the jury might have concluded that Casas’s
instruction to Rendon was less persuasive than the other evidence.
       The arguments regarding Rodriguez are the same. He argues that the
direct evidence of his knowledge of the drug sales is insufficient to establish
five kilograms. The question is whether the ubiquity of drugs and his
leadership position support an inference beyond a reasonable doubt that he
knew about the drugs in earlier years. For the same reasons discussed
regarding Hinojosa and Casas, there was sufficient evidence to support the
inference.
                                       C
                                       1
       Casas challenges the sentencing enhancement that he received for
perjury. A defendant receives a two-level enhancement for committing
perjury. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. A defendant commits perjury if he provides
“false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to
provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or
faulty memory.” United States v. Perez-Solis, 709 F.3d 453, 469 (5th Cir.
2013) (citation and alterations omitted). Because Casas objected to the
PSR’s use of the two-level enhancement, the district court’s factual finding
that Casas obstructed justice is reviewed for clear error. United States v.
Juarez-Duarte, 513 F.3d 204, 208 (5th Cir. 2008). There is no clear error if
the finding is plausible considering the record as a whole, and deference is
given to the district court’s credibility determinations. Id.
       Casas testified that he never opposed restrictions on drug sales in the
bathrooms, had no knowledge of a 2016 meeting in which club management
decided to resume allowing drug sales at the clubs, and was never instructed
to allow drug sales to occur.

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                                 No. 22-10584

       Detective Hodack testified that Casas participated in a meeting in
2015 or 2016 during which club management decided to resume allowing
drug sales in the clubs because the lack of sales had decreased attendance by
more than 50%. Novoa testified that Casas was part of a meeting around
2016 where club management decided to allow drugs sales to resume.
Hinojosa, on a recorded phone call with Villareal, said that he told Casas to
be more flexible with the drug dealers.
       The Hodack and Novoa testimony contradict Casas’s statement that
he had no knowledge of a 2016 meeting where club management agreed to
resume allowing drug sales. The Hinojosa phone call contradicts Casas’s
statement that he was never instructed to permit drug sales.
       The conflict between Casas’s testimony and the information
provided by Hodack, Novoa, and Hinojosa, coupled with the reasonable
determination that Casas was less credible, is enough to establish the falsity
element of perjury. Whether Casas was involved in the decision to resume
drug sales was plainly material to the case. As the district court thoroughly
analyzed, Casas answered each question emphatically and unequivocally,
supporting the finding that he was intentionally lying rather than confused,
mistaken, or forgetful. The district court did not clearly err in applying a
perjury enhancement.
                                      2
       Rodriguez challenges his sentence on the basis that the district court
erred by attributing a drug quantity to him beyond that for which he was
personally responsible and by giving him a manager enhancement despite
insufficient evidence for that finding. Because Rodriguez objected to the
manager enhancement, we review the district court’s application of the
sentencing guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United
States v. Bowen, 818 F.3d 179, 192 (5th Cir. 2016).

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                                   No. 22-10584

       The drug quantity argument is addressed above.          The manager
enhancement applies if the defendant exercised some degree of control over
others involved in the commission of the offense. See United States v.
Delgado, 672 F.3d 320, 345 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc); United States v. Fuller,
897 F.2d 1217, 1220 (1st Cir. 1990). There was extensive testimony that
Rodriguez had control over whether the drug dealers could remain in the
bathrooms selling drugs. Based on this evidence, the district court’s factual
findings did not constitute clear error. The district court’s application of
the manager enhancement was proper.
                               *        *         *
       For the foregoing reasons, the convictions and sentences of
Hinojosa, Casas, and Rodriguez are AFFIRMED. Hinojosa’s motion for
an evidentiary hearing is DENIED.

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                                 No. 22-10584

Jennifer Walker Elrod, Circuit Judge, concurring:
       I agree with the majority opinion that admission of the Josephine
testimony and Hinojosa redacted statement were both harmless error. I
write separately to explain why these harmless errors nevertheless
constituted an abuse of discretion and Bruton error, respectively.
                                       I
       As the majority explains, Deputy Easterling testified that Josephine
was arrested in 2017 while traveling from Texas to North Carolina with
fourteen kilograms of cocaine and a computer drive containing business
records related to the clubs. Hinojosa, Casas, and Rodriguez each claim
that admission of the testimony was an abuse of discretion because the tes-
timony was irrelevant and highly prejudicial.
       Evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact [material
to determining the action] more or less probable than it would be without
the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Relevant evidence is generally admissi-
ble unless “its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . .
unfair prejudice[.]” Fed. R. Evid. 402, 403. Evidentiary rulings are re-
viewed for abuse of discretion if the argument was preserved and for plain
error if not preserved. United States v. Nutall, 180 F.3d 182, 189 (5th Cir.
1999) (discussing the standard for relevance); United States v. Setser, 568
F.3d 482, 495 (5th Cir. 2009) (discussing the standard for prejudice).
       The relevance of the testimony is tenuous at best. There was no evi-
dence that Josephine was traveling with anyone affiliated with Hinojosa’s
clubs, nor that the drugs in the car were tied to any of the drug dealers who
sold at Hinojosa’s clubs. Josephine was not on a trip for the clubs when she
was arrested, and she was arrested in 2017, after drug sales at the clubs had
ceased. The records found in the car contained routine payroll information
and contained no information about drug sales at the clubs.

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                                    No. 22-10584

       Testimony about the arrest lacked any connection to any of the
charges except that someone associated with the clubs was found with a
large quantity of drugs. The association between the defendants and Jose-
phine does not make her actions relevant absent some connection to the
business or alleged conspiracy. That lack of relevance makes it very easy for
the testimony to be more prejudicial than probative. The testimony created
the impression that the clubs were engaged in large-scale drug-trafficking.
The jury instruction warning the jury that mere association does not prove a
conspiracy may have limited the prejudicial effect of the testimony, but it
did not make it more relevant. Even factoring in the jury instruction, the
testimony about Josephine should have been excluded because there was a
substantial danger that it was more prejudicial than probative.
                                         II
       As the majority also explains, Casas and Rodriguez challenge the
admission of a redacted statement that Hinojosa made to the government
on the ground that it violates the Sixth Amendment. A defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to confront witnesses against him is violated when: (1)
“several co-defendants are tried jointly”; (2) “one defendant’s extra-
judicial statement is used to implicate another defendant”; and (3) “the
confessor does not take the stand.” United States v. Restrepo, 994 F.2d 173,
186 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 127 (1968)).
This is a so-called Bruton error.
       Here, a redacted portion of Hinojosa’s confession was admitted
during trial.1 The admitted statement was:

       _____________________
       1
        At one point, Hinojosa decided to plead guilty and made admissions to the
government. He later decided not to plead guilty.

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                                No. 22-10584

       Question: And so who is the one bringing you these
       complaints about the drugs.
       Hinojosa: It could be the manager, it could be the promotion’s
       guy . . . Because that’s—that’s the first people to hear the
       complaints.
       The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that confessions that
directly implicate a co-defendant fall within Bruton, while those that do so
indirectly do not. Samia v. United States, 599 U.S. 635, 647 (2023). The
fact that an inference is required does not necessarily mean implication is
indirect. Id. at 652 (citing Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 195 (1998))
(explaining that admissibility must depend on the kind of inference because
use of descriptions like “the red-haired, bearded, one-eyed man with a
limp” surely fall within Bruton). Direct implication can occur when a
statement is redacted to remove a defendant’s name, yet still obviously
refers to the defendant. Id. at 653 (citing Gray, 523 U.S. at 196 (explaining
that the blanks would cause the jurors to speculate as to whom the blanks
refer)).   By contrast, if a redacted statement only implicates the co-
defendant in conjunction with other evidence, there is no confrontation
clause violation. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208 (1987).
       Casas and Rodriguez are not directly implicated by the redaction
itself. The redacted statement did not contain “deleted” or other fillers
that would cause the jurors to speculate as to whom the blanks referred. On
the contrary, reading the redacted statement, one does not know
information has been removed.
       Whether the references to “manager” and “promotion’s guy”
directly implicate Casas and Rodriguez poses a closer question.         The
indictment listed multiple managers and promoters. However, Hinojosa’s
statement referenced “the manager,” not “a manager,” arguably

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                                   No. 22-10584

implicating Casas as the general manager of the clubs. Rodriguez, in the
indictment, was introduced as the manager in charge of monthly
promotions while Novoa, the other promoter, was introduced as Hinojosa’s
protégé without reference to his role as a promoter.
       Given their status in the business and prominence at trial, the
reference to their job titles implicated Casas and Rodriguez just as a
reference to the owner would implicate Hinojosa. The jury did not need
any additional evidence to think that Hinojosa’s statement referenced Casas
and Rodriguez.     To be sure, references to “the manager” and “the
promotion’s guy” do not implicate with the same level of certainty as would
a reference to “a red-haired, bearded, one-eyed man.” Gray, 523 U.S. at
196. However, I read Gray’s example of a red-haired, bearded, one-eyed
man as an extreme one used to illustrate a point, not as defining the level of
uniqueness required for direct implication. Here, the use of the titles
“manager” and “promotion’s guy” were sufficiently specific to directly
implicate Casas and Rodriguez.
       The risk of a violation is heightened by the lack of a jury instruction.
Samia’s holding that no Bruton violation occurs when a party is only
indirectly implicated relied in part on the fact that the district court
provided a limiting instruction to the jury. Samia, 599 U.S. at 640. Here,
no limiting instruction was given.
                               *        *         *
       I agree that admission of the Josephine testimony and redacted
statement were harmless error, given the extensive evidence against the
defendants. But I would have also held that admission of the Josephine
testimony was an abuse of discretion and the admission of the redacted
statement was Bruton error. I concur.

                                       28