Court Opinion

ID: 9699948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:00:20.984558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:28.706020
License: Public Domain

Souris, J.
(concurring). I concur in affirmance on the ground that in the absence of a valid marriage between defendant and Joseph Daniel or Daniels, as behveen themselves, their heirs and their estates, no tenancy hy the entireties was created.
Like Spence v. Jones, 359 Mich 231, and Collins v. Norris, 314 Mich 145, no facts appear in this case that would bar plaintiff from contradicting the ap*190parent legal effect of the deed upon which defendant must rely.
In Spence v. Jones, supra, plaintiff was the administrator of Mack Jones. Mack Jones and defendant, with whom he had lived for a number of years prior to his death, took title to 2 parcels of real estate as husband and wife. Plaintiff administrator claimed a 1/2 interest in the property on the ground that Mack Jones had been lawfully married in Georgia and left surviving him his wife and 9 children and that, therefore, in the absence of a lawful marriage between the grantees, only a tenancy in common was created. No other person had relied upon the apparent title, and no reason of policy existed to bar plaintiff from establishing the real relationship between the grantees. We ruled in favor of the administrator. In Collins v. Norris, supra, plaintiff and defendant were the grantees on the deed involved in the litigation. Each was married to another at the time they took title as husband and wife, and no one else claimed any right to the property at the time of suit. This Court ruled title was taken not as tenants by the entireties, but rather as tenants in common.
In Porter v. Landis, 329 Mich 76, the title involved was taken in the names of a man and woman-as husband and wife when in fact they were not. This Court barred the dead woman’s children from denying the existence of a valid marriage between the grantees (they were claiming their mother took an undivided 1/2 as a tenant in common) because (p 83) “one who claims under a deed confirms all its provisions, and cannot establish his claim by adopting those provisions, only, which are in his favor, while he repudiates or contradicts others that are repugnant thereto.” In other cases this Court has upheld the apparent legal title on similar grounds, but in each of such cases third-party interests had intervened in reliance upon the apparent title-created or *191there was a failure of proof. In Porter, for example, the surviving grantee had conveyed to plaintiffs, who had gone into possession of the property a year before suit was instituted by them to quiet their title. In Franklin v. Franklin, 354 Mich 543, defendant relied upon fraud by plaintiff to defeat plaintiff’s claim, but the Court found defendant failed to prove actionable fraud.
Stone v. Culver, 286 Mich 263 (119 ALR, 512), sets forth, in succinct language by Mr. Justice Btitzel, the only basis upon which these cases rationally can be decided to the end that, the stability of record title to real property be preserved. Where rights of others than the grantees, their heirs or estates, depend upon the apparent title created, this' Court will apply a theory of estoppel to protect süch rights. Justice Btjtzel put it this way (pp 267, 268) :
“It is true that title may notbe created by estoppel. Bruun v. Hansen, 281 Mich 362. But that is not this case. The estoppel does not create the title, but prevents the vitiation of a title already apparently éreated-. When a person has so, acted as to make it appear from the face of a deed that a certain title has been created, he may be estopped to introduce parol evidence to show that that is not the actual title. Stevens v. DeBar, 229 Mich 251; Colonial Theatrical Enterprises v. Sage, 255 Mich 160; Spitzley v. Holmes, 256 Mich 559. The purpose of the rule that title may not be created by estoppel is to prevent the uncertainty of titles which would arise if the statute of frauds could be evaded and parol evidence of an estoppel could be introduced to show that the paper title is not what it appears to be. The rule is not applicable to the instant case in which the estoppel serves to defend and not to destroy the apparent paper title. A party may not be estopped from claiming that the paper title is what it appears to ■be, but he may be estopped, as in the instant-case, *192from showing by parol evidence that the paper title is not what it appears to be.”
In the case at bar, in Spence v. Jones, supra, and in Collins v. Norris, supra, the only parties interested in the controversies over title were the grantees or 1 grantee and the estate of the other. No reason exists, in the absence of evidentiary problems here avoided by stipulation, to preclude plaintiff from proving the real relationship between defendant and Daniel or Daniels and from proving the real title acquired by defendant.
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiff.
Smith, Black, and Edwards, JJ., concurred with Souris, J.