Court Opinion

ID: 9367681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-01 17:02:14.051415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:02.228121
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/31/23 P. v. Nagata CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F082198
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                             (Super. Ct. No. 19CR-06497A)
                    v.

 STUART JOHN TSUNEO NAGATA,                                                               OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County. Carol K. Ash
and Steven K. Slocum, Judges.

         Marcia R. Clark, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and John
Merritt, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
         A jury found Stuart John Tsuneo Nagata (defendant) guilty of first degree murder
and attempted unlawful possession of ammunition. The murder was alleged to be gang
related for purposes of Penal Code section 186.22 (all undesignated statutory references
are to the Penal Code), but the jury rejected the allegation. Defendant now appeals based
on the allegedly erroneous admission of prejudicial gang evidence at trial.
       In his initial briefing, defendant challenged the denial of a pretrial motion to
dismiss the gang enhancement pursuant to section 995. In the alternative, he assigned
error to rulings concerning the nature and extent of the gang evidence admitted at trial
and the trial court’s modification of the pattern instruction regarding its permissible uses.
Following the enactment of Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly
Bill 333), defendant asserted new claims in supplemental briefing based on changes to
section 186.22 and the creation of section 1109, which provides for bifurcation of gang
enhancement allegations upon a defendant’s request.
       Arguing section 1109 applies retroactively, defendant claims the trial court
committed reversible error by denying his motion to bifurcate the trial of the gang
enhancement allegations. We agree the bifurcation ruling was both erroneous and
prejudicial. The judgment will therefore be reversed.
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
July 14, 2019
       On July 14, 2019, at 11:31 p.m., a 911 caller reported hearing gunshots near
Merced Avenue in the City of Merced. The caller lived on Rose Avenue, which
intersects with Merced Avenue, but his residence was approximately 15 houses away
from the intersection and he was unable to provide further information.
       A second 911 caller, F.G., requested police assistance at the 1300 block of Merced
Avenue. He had also heard gunshots and could see “somebody laying down” in the
street. When asked if there were any vehicles in the area, F.G. told the dispatcher,
“There’s a white ca— it was a—it was a white Cadillac. It’s—I don’t know if it’s—if
this is the car.” A few questions later, the dispatcher asked, “Is the white Cadillac still
parked there?” F.G. replied, “No, he took off. He took off. He’s long gone.” The next

                                              2.
question was, “Which way did the Cadillac go?” F.G. answered, “Going towards the
Marriott out by the freeway by Motel Drive.”
       Police officers soon discovered the dead body of a 48-year-old man, Juan Ramirez
(the victim). He was found lying on his stomach in the eastbound lane of Merced
Avenue, near the address F.G. had provided to the dispatcher. An autopsy confirmed the
victim sustained six bullet wounds, though one was characterized as a “graze wound.”
There was a front wound to the left shoulder and multiple posterior wounds, including
one to the back of the head.
       Investigators found 11 expended .40-caliber bullet casings and a bullet hole in a
vehicle parked approximately 40 feet northwest of the victim’s body, all in the vicinity of
the 1400 block of Merced Avenue. It was determined the victim resided on the 1600
block of Merced Avenue, a considerable distance to the east of where he was evidently
shot and killed. The police found no blood trails or droplets between the two locations.
July 15, 2019
       In the early hours of July 15, 2019, a homicide detective conducted recorded
interviews with F.G. and his friend, A.D. Another detective located video evidence
captured by security cameras at the west end of Merced Avenue and along the northern
stretch of Motel Drive. Later in the day, the police spoke to the victim’s neighbors and
executed a search warrant at the victim’s home.
       F.G.’s Recorded Statements
       F.G. had been visiting A.D. on the night of the shooting. A.D. lived on Merced
Avenue, approximately one block east of where the victim’s body was found.
       Late that evening, F.G. and A.D. had a strange encounter with an unidentified
woman. F.G. described her as a “really skinny” Hispanic female with black hair and a
tattoo on her left arm. She was approximately 19 or 20 years old, was sweating
profusely, and appeared to be “on drugs.” The woman had attempted to enter the house,

                                            3.
and she seemed startled and/or frightened when F.G. opened the front door. She claimed
to be looking for someone named “Jesse” before wandering off west on Merced Avenue.
       F.G. exited the house and saw the woman behaving suspiciously outside of
another residence. A.D. called the police, and officers came out to the neighborhood to
investigate. The police departed after failing to locate the woman. Approximately 10 to
20 minutes later, F.G. and A.D. heard gunshots.1
       F.G. recalled hearing a man “arguing with somebody” immediately prior to the
shooting. He and A.D. hurried outside after hearing the shots, looked to their right
(west), and saw a white car in the westbound lane of Merced Avenue. Although F.G. had
said it was a Cadillac during the 911 call, he told the detective it was a two-door
Chrysler. After further questioning about the make, model, and year, F.G. said, “I had
told the cops 2015. But [A.D.] was like, ‘No that had to be like, older—2005.[’] And he
pulled up a picture and it looked exactly the same as the car.”
       When F.G. first saw the white vehicle, its brake lights were illuminated. The car
remained stationary for approximately five seconds before slowly proceeding to a stop
sign at the intersection of Merced Avenue and Motel Drive, then it “took off fast.”
       A.D.’s Recorded Statements
       A.D.’s statements were generally consistent with those of F.G. regarding the
events preceding the shooting. After hearing gunfire, A.D. and some of his relatives
exited the house behind F.G. to see what had happened. Similar to F.G.’s account, A.D.
remembered running outside, looking to his right, and seeing the brake lights of a car in
the westbound lane of Merced Avenue. But whereas F.G. had indicated the vehicle was

       1F.G.’sstatements about the police being in the neighborhood prior to the shooting were
confirmed by officer testimony. F.G. and A.D. did contact the police to report a suspicious
woman, and responding officers searched the area “roughly ten minutes before [the] shooting
occurred.”

                                              4.
stopped close to the body, A.D. said the car was approximately “two houses down” from
it, meaning west of the body, “[r]ight before Rose Avenue.”
       The details provided by A.D. further differed from F.G.’s account in two
significant respects. First, A.D. was certain the white car had turned onto Rose Avenue,
i.e., “[t]he street before the stop sign.” In other words, the vehicle did not traverse Motel
Drive. Second, A.D. was “pretty sure” it was a four-door Cadillac CTS.
       The detective asked A.D. if he had shown F.G. “a picture of a car” (presumably
referring to the one F.G. described as looking “exactly the same” as the suspect vehicle),
and A.D. responded affirmatively. He then showed the detective the results of a Google
images search he had performed on his phone for the term “2006 cadillac cts.” All the
images were of four-door vehicles. The detective informed A.D. that F.G. had said he
thought it was a Chrysler. A.D. replied, “He didn’t—he didn’t really see. He was more
payin’ attention to the [dead] body.”
       Security Camera Footage
       A resident of the 1200 block of Merced Avenue had a video surveillance system
with a camera mounted above his garage. The home was located between Rose Avenue
and Almond Avenue (Rose to the east and Almond to the west), and the camera was
pointed toward Merced Avenue. The grainy, low-resolution video feed showed cars
passing by the house in the eastbound and westbound lanes of Merced Avenue. To a
lesser extent, the feed also showed the headlights of vehicles traveling northwest and
southeast on Motel Drive.
       In reviewing the Merced Avenue video, the police saw a white- or light-colored
two-door vehicle entering the neighborhood in the eastbound lane at approximately 11:22
p.m. A second white- or light-colored vehicle, which appeared to have four doors, passed
by the camera in the eastbound lane at approximately 11:26 p.m. Next, at approximately

                                              5.
11:29 p.m., a car resembling the previously seen two-door vehicle passed by the camera
in the westbound lane.2
       Security cameras at nearby businesses captured video of a white two-door vehicle
traveling northwest on Motel Drive, toward State Highway 140 (also known as Yosemite
Parkway), at approximately 11:30 p.m. Earlier footage from those cameras showed a
white two-door vehicle traveling southeast on Motel Drive, toward Merced Avenue,
between approximately 11:21 and 11:22 p.m.
       Collectively, the videos appeared to show that a white two-door vehicle had
entered the victim’s neighborhood from Motel Drive at 11:22 p.m. and departed from the
neighborhood via Motel Drive between 11:29 and 11:30 p.m.
       Neighbors’ Statements
       Witness M.A. was contacted by the police at approximately 7:00 a.m. the day after
the shooting. M.A.’s bedroom faced the victim’s backyard, and she recalled waking up
sometime “after midnight” to the sound of voices from that area. The voices were
described “as being two males and one female.” One of the males spoke in English, but
the other two conversed in Spanish, and the female had seemed “kind of mad.” M.A. did
not report hearing any gunshots. When asked about vehicles, M.A. claimed to have
previously seen a white car parked outside of the victim’s home.

       2A   24-hour screen clock showed the cars passing by at 23:21:28, 23:25:38, and 23:28:42.
However, according to the police testimony, the clock was approximately one minute slow. This
was a rough estimate, as the officer’s comparison of the video clock to his “department-issued
iPhone” was only in relation to the hour and minutes, not the hour, minutes, and seconds. For
the sake of readability, most subsequent time references concerning video evidence are stated in
a 12-hour format based on the approximations of the police witnesses. For example, video from
a security camera at 11 West 15th Street in Merced captured footage of a moving vehicle at the
purported date and time of “07/15/2019 13:59:22.” But according to the police testimony, the
video clock was about “14 hours and 38 minutes ahead of time.” We will simply describe what
the video showed on July 14, 2019, at approximately 11:21 p.m., without further noting or
explaining the discrepancy.

                                               6.
       Another neighbor, D.M., told the police she had seen the victim on July 14th
“drinking beers with a light-skinned male and two female friends that were at his house.”
D.M. also claimed to have heard the victim “breaking bottles in the front yard” at
approximately 10:00 p.m., i.e., 90 minutes prior to the shooting. A third neighbor, A.V.,
reported seeing the victim sometime between 5:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. on the day of the
shooting. According to this witness, the victim had appeared drunk and angry, “and was
throwing cans of beer against the wall.”3
       Search of the Victim’s Home
       Outside the victim’s residence, along a walkway leading to the backyard, the
police found the remnants of a food order from In-N-Out Burger. These items consisted
of an upside-down French fry tray or serving boat, scattered fries, and a ketchup packet.
Several aluminum cans were strewn about the same area.
       Also found outside was a laminated key tag, such as might be used by a car
dealership or body shop to keep track of multiple sets of keys. The preprinted strip of
paper had blank spaces next to the words “Year,” “Make,” “Model,” “Body” and
“Color.” Someone had scrawled “CADDY” in handwritten letters across the entire tag.
       Inside the victim’s home the police found photographs of defendant, a piece of
mail addressed to defendant, and another document with his name on it. There was a
receipt from a Big 5 sporting goods store dated July 1, 2019, for the purchase of a
flashlight, golf balls, two pairs of shoes, and a $19 charge listed as “STD AMMO
BCKGRND CK FEE.” A separate document indicated the same store had initiated a
background check for someone named Karla Perez within minutes of the transaction
shown on the receipt.

       3The information   in this paragraph comes from the police testimony at the preliminary
hearing. Witnesses D.M. and A.V. did not testify in court. According to the lead detective on
the case, A.V. further reported that “a white Dodge four-door vehicle came to the [victim’s]
house” on the day of the shooting.

                                               7.
        Other items found inside the residence included a packaged component of a
medical neck brace. According to preliminary hearing testimony, there was also an
eviction notice indicating the victim was being evicted.
July 16, 2019
        By July 16, 2019, investigators knew defendant owned a 1999 Cadillac Eldorado
and had determined the license plate number. It was a two-door car with white paint.
While conducting a “grid search” in the nearby town of Planada, the police located the
vehicle at the residence of a man named Felix.
        Undercover law enforcement agents surveilled Felix’s residence for the remainder
of the day. A maroon- or burgundy-colored Buick eventually pulled up to the house. A
man later identified as Martin Olvera was seen exiting the Buick and, a few minutes later,
relocating to the driver’s seat of the Cadillac.
        At approximately 8:45 p.m., Olvera departed from Felix’s residence in the
Cadillac. The Buick, which was then occupied by two females, followed behind Olvera
as he proceeded to State Highway 140. The undercover agents tailed both vehicles for
approximately 15 minutes before police officers in marked cars effectuated a stop in the
City of Merced.
        Driving due west on State Highway 140 is the most direct path between where the
Cadillac and Buick started and ended their journey. However, the vehicles took what the
People describe as a “serpentine” route by detouring north on Plainsburg Road, west on
Bear Creek Drive, and south on Arboleda Road. The cars resumed westbound travel on
State Highway 140 at roughly the midway point between Planada and Merced.
        The driver of the Buick is not identified in the record. The passenger was
Annabelle Perez (Annabelle). Annabelle is the sister of Karla Perez (Karla), i.e., the
person whose name and address were listed on a document found inside the victim’s
home.

                                              8.
       Olvera and Annabelle were arrested during the traffic stop. Felix was arrested and
interrogated the same evening. Over the course of two interviews (the second one was
conducted two weeks later), Felix told multiple conflicting stories about defendant and
Karla arriving at his Planada residence sometime between the afternoon of July 14, 2019,
and the afternoon of July 15, 2019. In one version of events, Karla and defendant had
told Felix they were at a casino on the evening of July 14, i.e., the night of the shooting.
       A document found inside the Cadillac showed defendant to be its registered owner
as of July 12, 2019. His registered address was on East Alexander Avenue in the City of
Merced.
Further Investigation
       In late July, detectives obtained store surveillance video of the transaction
documented on the Big 5 receipt found in the victim’s home. The video showed
defendant, Karla, and a man named Fernando Luna shopping together on July 1, 2019.
Portions of the video showed defendant wearing a neck brace and being physically
affectionate toward Karla. It also appeared to show him paying for the items listed on the
receipt.
       On July 29, 2019, Karla’s then 17-year-old daughter, D.P., was hospitalized for
alcohol intoxication and a stab wound sustained during an incident unrelated to this case.
As the police had not yet located defendant or Karla, detectives went to the hospital to
question D.P. about the victim’s death. D.P. was still intoxicated at the time of the
interview, which lasted approximately three hours.
       D.P. claimed to have killed the victim herself while under the influence of alcohol,
cocaine, and marijuana. She referred to the victim by his first name, describing him as “a
Mexican man that my mom was renting a room from.” D.P. then added, “Her and her
boyfriend were living there.” She also remarked that her mother’s boyfriend “wears a
neck brace.”

                                              9.
       Although D.P. claimed to have shot the victim, her story conflicted with some of
the physical evidence. The major discrepancy was in her account of the victim being shot
“in the face” while inside his home and then going “into the road asking for help.” But
she did accurately describe the interior and exterior of the victim’s residence, and she
knew the shooting “happened, like, around 11:30 [p.m.] almost 11:31.”
       On July 30, 2019, detectives obtained security camera footage from Casino
Merced, located at 1459 Martin Luther King Jr. Way in the City of Merced. One video
showed Karla, Annabelle, defendant, and the victim in the casino on the night of the
shooting. Defendant was wearing a neck brace. Exterior camera footage showed the
group leaving together in defendant’s Cadillac, with Karla behind the wheel, at
approximately 11:10 p.m.
       On July 31, 2019, detectives obtained surveillance video from a business located
on West 15th Street, a few blocks east of Casino Merced. It showed a car resembling
defendant’s Cadillac approaching the intersection of 15th and G Streets at approximately
11:21 p.m. on the night of the shooting. After pausing for traffic, the car turned left and
proceeded northbound on G Street.
       In early August, the police obtained surveillance video from an In-N-Out Burger
located across the street from Casino Merced. It showed defendant’s Cadillac was in the
drive-thru lane on the night of the shooting from approximately 11:11 p.m. to 11:18 p.m.
The license plate was clearly visible in the footage.
Defendant’s Arrest and Prosecution
       The police eventually received information that defendant was in Tulare County.
On August 10, 2019, a team of undercover officers apprehended defendant and Karla in
the City of Lindsay. They were arrested outside of an apartment occupied by two adults
and a small child. Some of defendant’s belongings were found inside the apartment,

                                            10.
including a neck brace. In addition, according to an arresting officer, a “broken” cell
phone was found “in the restroom of that residence.”4
       In December 2019, Karla, Annabelle, Olvera, and defendant were named in a
criminal information pertaining to the victim’s death. Defendant and Karla were accused
of premeditated murder (§§ 187, 189; count 1). Karla was also charged as an accessory
after the fact, as were Annabelle and Olvera (§ 32; count 2). Defendant and Karla were
further charged with attempted unlawful possession of ammunition (§§ 664, 30305; count
3).
       All counts included gang enhancement allegations pleaded pursuant to a former
version of section 186.22, subdivision (b). Defendant was further alleged to have
personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (b)–(d),
and to have previously been convicted of a serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)). The same
prior conviction was alleged to constitute a strike for purposes of the “Three Strikes” law.
(§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12.)
       On January 7, 2020, the information was amended to delete an inapplicable
reference to section 190.2. Three weeks later, defendant filed a motion under section 995
to set aside the information. On February 18, 2020, defendant’s motion was granted as to
the count 3 gang enhancement but denied in all other respects.
       Defendant also filed motions to be tried separately from his codefendants and to
bifurcate the trial of the gang enhancements. The trial court agreed to sever the case
against Karla, but the motions were otherwise denied. A jury trial commenced on

       4In   their briefing, the People argue the “‘smashed’” cell phone was especially probative
of defendant being the victim’s killer. It was the prosecutor who used the word “smashed,” not
the officer who testified. During closing argument, the prosecutor said, “Inside that residence
was a smashed cell phone. [¶] I want you to ask yourself, ladies and gentlemen, why do people
smash cell phones? There’s obviously something on that cell phone that someone doesn’t want
other people to see.” However, apart from the phone being located inside the apartment, there
was no evidence it belonged to defendant. We note the officer testified defendant was “standing
in front of the apartment” and using “his cell phone” immediately prior to his arrest.

                                               11.
February 25, 2020. On March 19, 2020, the trial court declared a mistrial due to the
COVID-19 pandemic.
       Retrial began in September 2020 and continued into the following month.
Defendant’s renewed motions to be tried separately and to bifurcate the gang
enhancement allegations were denied, as were several motions to limit the introduction of
gang evidence. Defendant, Olvera, and Annabelle were jointly tried before a single jury.
Trial Evidence re: Count 1
       A neighbor testified to seeing the victim outside his residence at approximately
10:30 p.m. on the night of the shooting. The victim was “throwing beer bottles or cans
around” and yelling to someone inside the house “that he just wanted to go for a ride.”
He seemed “really upset.” The witness did not know to whom he was speaking, but on
prior occasions she had seen “two ladies and a gentleman that would usually let
themselves into the home.” The man wore a neck brace, and the trio had come and gone
in a white Cadillac that “looked like an Eldorado.”
       Video evidence clearly showed defendant, Karla, Annabelle, and the victim
departing from Casino Merced in defendant’s Cadillac on the night of the shooting. The
casino footage was edited to focus on the activity between 11:06 p.m. and 11:11 p.m.
The evidence did not reveal when the group had arrived at the casino, but a detective
testified to Karla’s cell phone data showing her phone was “in the area of Casino
Merced” from 11:00 p.m. to 11:19 p.m. The same witness testified that Annabelle’s cell
phone data showed her phone was “in the area of Casino Merced” from 9:53 p.m. to
11:30 p.m.5

       5The detective’s exact testimony regarding Annabelle’s phone was that, according to
“information provided by T-Mobile for July 15th, 2019, from 0453 hours through 0630 hours
Coordinated Universal Time, which converts to July 14th, 2019, from 2153 hours to 2330 hours
Pacific Standard Time, this particular device was in the area of Casino Merced.” If the testimony
was accurate, and assuming Annabelle had possession of her phone, this evidence conflicted
with the People’s theory that she was on Merced Avenue at the time of the shooting and
witnessed the murder.

                                              12.
       The In-N-Out Burger videos showed the Cadillac in the drive-thru lane from
approximately 11:11 p.m. to 11:18 p.m. According to the People’s theory, the Cadillac
then drove on West 15th Street, passing a security camera at 11:21 p.m. as it approached
the G Street intersection. It proceeded northbound on G, then east on 16th street, and
eventually made its way to Motel Drive. Between 11:21 and 11:22 p.m., the Cadillac
traveled southeast on Motel Drive and entered the victim’s neighborhood in the
eastbound lane of Merced Avenue.
       The People’s trial exhibit No. 114 was a video consisting of seven minutes and 40
seconds of footage captured by the security camera on the 1200 block of Merced Avenue.
It depicted the activity there from approximately 11:22 p.m. until just prior to 11:30 p.m.
(See fn. 2, ante.) The exhibit was a recording of the recording. The detective who
authenticated it explained there was a problem converting the video files from the
homeowner’s security system to a viewable format. He improvised a solution: “I … used
my department-issued iPod with the Axon Video Capture to actually record the monitor
while I played the video [on the homeowner’s equipment] so I could actually capture
what was on screen.” The detective stopped recording when the video clock hit 23:28:47,
which he explained was approximately one minute behind the actual time.6
       Based on the Merced Avenue video and the In-N-Out Burger items found outside
the victim’s residence, the People argued Karla, Annabelle, defendant, and the victim
arrived back at the victim’s home at approximately 11:22 p.m. The People theorized the
victim had said or done something at the casino that made defendant feel disrespected,
which led to an argument at the house. Defendant was alleged to have shot the victim to

       6The defense criticized  the detective for failing to record the “three minutes” preceding
the first 911 call. The three-minute estimate assumed the video clock was not approximately one
minute slow. The detective conceded it was possible other cars had driven past the camera
during the relevant time period. He also testified to having attempted to review the original
video again in preparation for the preliminary hearing, whereupon he discovered that it had been
erased.

                                              13.
death, but no theory was offered as to why the shooting occurred roughly two blocks
away from the victim’s home.
      Witness M.A. was called to testify about waking up to the sound of people arguing
on the night of the shooting. She was unsure of the time but again estimated it was “after
midnight.” She did not recall hearing any gunshots.
      F.G. and A.D. both testified to having little memory of the incident. Their
recorded interviews were played for the jury, as was F.G.’s 911 call. A police officer
who had spoken to A.D. at the crime scene testified that he reported hearing someone
say, prior to the shooting, “‘Why are you mad?’” During the same conversation, A.D.
claimed to have seen a 2005 or 2006 Cadillac CTS turn right onto Rose Avenue.
      The 911 caller who lived on Rose Avenue, D.W., testified he was on his front
porch when he heard the gunshots. He called 911 from inside his home approximately
one minute later. The location of his garage obstructed his view such that he would not
have seen a vehicle approaching from Merced Avenue before going into the house.
There was also a period of approximately 45 to 60 seconds during which he would not
have seen any vehicles that might have passed by his house. After calling 911 and
returning to his porch, D.W. saw a police officer driving south on Rose Avenue toward
Merced Avenue. He flagged down the officer and told him about the gunshots.
      The People’s theory was that Karla served as the getaway driver. She, Annabelle,
and defendant were alleged to have fled the scene in defendant’s Cadillac, passing
multiple security cameras while heading northwest on Motel Drive at 11:30 p.m.
However, the People’s cell phone mapping expert testified the data for Karla’s and
Annabelle’s phones showed both devices were one or two miles southwest of the crime
scene at 11:30 p.m., “in the area of East Childs Avenue and Brantley Street.” Upon
further questioning, the witness explained the data was classified as having “a low

                                           14.
confidence level,” meaning the phones were more than 300 meters away from that
location.7
       Felix testified about the Cadillac being found at his home in Planada on Tuesday,
July 16, 2019. Although he struggled with dates and times, the testimony indicated Karla
and defendant had shown up at his house on the night of the shooting (Sunday) or in the
early hours of July 15, 2019 (Monday). In his words, “[T]hey just wanted a place to
rest—to rest their head. And I said that they could stay in my room, as I was in my
mom’s room … with another friend of mine. And I was—I was busy, that I didn’t have
time to talk to them, you know, but that they could spend the night. [¶] They stayed the
night. That was it.”8 Felix admitted he was using methamphetamine on the dates in
question.
       Felix’s testimony seemed to indicate Karla and defendant had arrived alone, i.e.,
without Annabelle. There was no mention of Annabelle being there until Monday
afternoon. Annabelle’s cell phone data reportedly showed her device was in Planada at
5:19 a.m. Monday morning. Felix referred to a lunch conversation from that day, during
which plans were made for him, Karla, Annabelle, and defendant to go to a casino. But
then Olvera “happened to show up” and Felix “didn’t want to go anymore because [he]
did not want to be, like, a fifth wheel.” For reasons not explained, Felix let them borrow
his car and the Cadillac was left at his house. He admitted to placing some type of
covering over the Cadillac at Karla’s request.

       7It was never explained why Annabelle’s cell phone data reportedly showed her device in
two locations at the same time, i.e., “in the area of Casino Merced” and “in the area of East
Childs Avenue and Brantley Street.” (See fn. 5, ante.)
       8  Felix testified the person with Karla was introduced to him as “Chino” or “Gino.”
When asked to make a courtroom identification of defendant, Felix denied recognizing him.
Later in the trial, Karla’s daughter and a defense witness both testified to knowing defendant by
the nickname “Chino.”

                                               15.
        Karla and defendant did not return to Felix’s home. Felix did not see Annabelle or
Olvera again until Tuesday, when they finally brought his vehicle back and took
possession of the Cadillac. Annabelle’s cell phone data showed her device had traveled
south on Monday night, registering with cell towers in Madera at 10:44 p.m. and in
Tulare County at 11:59 p.m.
        Karla’s daughter, D.P., testified pursuant to a grant of immunity after invoking her
constitutional right against self-incrimination. She denied ever meeting the victim or
discussing his murder with Karla or defendant. D.P. also denied remembering what she
had said during her hospital interview. A recording of the interview was played for the
jury.
        Through cross-examination of the lead detective, counsel for Olvera and
Annabelle suggested D.P. may have been the Hispanic female that F.G. and A.D.
reported seeing prior to the shooting. The detective admitted to having considered this
possibility, saying it was why he had asked D.P. what she wore that evening. During her
interview, D.P. claimed to have been wearing pants and a black sweater. F.G. had
described a person wearing shorts and a white tank top. The detective also testified that
D.P.’s phone records “don’t put her in that area” on July 14, 2019.9
Trial Evidence re: Count 3
        To prove attempted possession of ammunition by a felon, the People introduced
the Big 5 video and related documents found inside the victim’s home. The assistant
manager who handled the transaction testified. Defendant stipulated to having an
unspecified prior felony conviction.
        The video showed Karla bringing two boxes of shoes to a counter near the cash
register and conversing with the assistant manager. Defendant and Fernando Luna
moved in and out of the camera’s view as this was happening. Luna then joined Karla at

        9The testimonyregarding D.P.’s phone records was hearsay, but it was elicited by
defendant without any objections from the other parties.

                                              16.
the counter for about 60 seconds, during which time defendant was somewhere off
screen. When defendant returned, he and Luna began playing with a flashlight and
laughing about it. As Karla continued to speak with the assistant manager, defendant and
Luna interacted with another employee. The assistant manager then went into a back
room for about three minutes.
       While the assistant manager was gone, defendant and Luna interacted with Karla,
talked to the other employee, and looked at various merchandise. When the assistant
manager returned, the trio congregated near the register and spoke to both employees.
There was a subsequent period of one-on-one communication between defendant and the
assistant manager, and he appeared to tender a payment.
       The assistant manager’s testimony briefly explained what was happening in the
video. She referred to defendant as the “gentleman with the neck brace” and to Luna as
the “shorter Hispanic male.” Her interactions with Karla concerned a prerequisite
background check for the sale of ammunition. The witness recalled Karla filling out “the
paperwork to do that,” and Luna asking “a few questions as far as the ammunition and
what caliber.” She added, “I don’t remember what specifically—what specific calibers
they were.”
       On cross-examination, defendant asked if Karla had inquired about a “specific
kind of ammunition.” The witness did not remember, and defendant said, “[W]ould it
ring a bell if I—was it 9 millimeter ammunition?” The witness replied, “In the area that
she was, it was either 9, .38 Special, or .40.”
       Olvera’s counsel asked the witness to confirm there was “no attempt by either of
the males to purchase ammunition.” She responded, “There was. Just not by the taller
gentleman with the neck brace. The shorter Hispanic male was the one asking about the
ammunition.”

                                              17.
Trial Evidence re: Gang Allegations
       Defendant was alleged to have killed the victim after being publicly disrespected
by him at Casino Merced. The preliminary facts of a public dispute and defendant
feeling disrespected were supposedly inferable from the Casino Merced videos. (See
further discussion, post.) The victim had no known involvement with gangs, but
defendant was shown to be “a high-ranking Nuestra Familia criminal street gang
member.”
       According to expert testimony, Nuestra Familia or “NF” is a criminal street gang
with multiple levels of membership. Affiliates are commonly known as Northerners or
Norteños, but those terms technically refer to a certain status or membership level.
Nuestra Familia is both the name of the organization and the highest level of membership
therein. The next level down is variously known as the “Northern Structure,” “Nuestra
Raza,” and “Norteños Soldados” (abbreviated as “N-Sols”). Below that are the Norteños.
As explained at trial, “Norteños are people that still are part of the cause or part of the
Nuestra Familia, but they’re lower level and haven’t been selected or they haven’t
committed to being investigated [for advancement in the hierarchy].” Norteños may
subdivide into smaller groups (“subsets”) outside of the prison system, but “eventually it
all leads up to Nuestra Familia.”
       Nuestra Familia’s primary activities reportedly include murder, carjacking,
witness intimidation, “major narcotic trafficking,” and “[a]nything to do with violence.”
Murder, if committed against a gang rival, benefits NF by helping it maintain a reputation
for violence and instilling fear and intimidation in others. The prosecution asked an
expert witness if murdering someone not affiliated with gangs is also beneficial to NF.
The expert replied, “Yes. If there was a reason for the homicide that they can articulate,
then yes, it would benefit the gang as well.” He then gave the example of an NF member
reporting to his superiors that a victim “‘totally disrespected me or disrespected the

                                              18.
gang,’” in which case “that murder would be authorized.” In other testimony, the expert
noted the importance of respect in NF gang culture.
       Two gang experts opined defendant had attained the status of “Carnal” (“Brother”)
and was thus a “full-fledged member of the Nuestra Familia.” According to one expert,
“the NF has three categories of Carnals …[:] Cat-1, Cat-2, Cat-3.” He opined defendant
was at least a “Cat-2 NF member,” meaning he was involved in the overall management
of the gang. The expert opinions regarding defendant’s NF status were based on a
recorded telephone conversation and photographs of defendant in the company of “Cat-3
NF members.”10 The phone conversation was played for the jurors and explained to
them through the testimony of a special agent with the FBI.
       The phone call had been intercepted during a wiretapping operation conducted in
November 2017. It was a conversation between defendant and a higher ranking NF
member. They discussed large-scale trafficking of methamphetamine and heroin,
including a purchase that would require “about a 100 G’s.” The conversation shifted to
the topic of postponing or cancelling previously made plans to kill two women who had
stolen money from the organization. Also discussed was an NF investigation of a lower
level member for possible removal from the gang. It was said they would “hit him” if the
findings were negative, which the expert testified meant some degree of physical assault
and “could mean death.”
       As further evidence of his gang membership, the People introduced photographs
of defendant’s tattoos. The only tattoo directly related to NF was of the number 14, inked
in large Roman numerals across defendant’s stomach and upper abdomen. According to
expert testimony, references to this number are “predominant throughout the entire
organization” because the 14th letter of the alphabet is N. The expert explained,

       10The People’s briefing erroneously states the photographs were found inside the
victim’s home. The photos were located during a probation search at a different address in April
2018, nearly 15 months prior to the shooting. The jury was not told when or how the
photographs were obtained.

                                              19.
“Anything that you can kind of put the, you know, emphasis on the N or the F could be
used to represent the Nuestra Familia.”
       A tattoo of the word “murder” across defendant’s left forearm was deemed
relevant because murder is one of Nuestra Familia’s primary activities. This and several
other tattoos were held admissible for the dual purpose of proving the gang enhancement
allegations and showing “motive and identity of the shooter.” Defendant’s arguments for
exclusion pursuant to Evidence Code section 352 were rejected.
       The prosecutor repeatedly displayed and referenced a tattoo on defendant’s chest
of someone holding a gun to the back of a man’s head, just behind the right ear. When
the gang expert was asked about it, he noted defendant also had tattoos of dollar signs
and the word “money,” opining they were collectively “indicative of gang behavior” but
did not specifically pertain to Nuestra Familia. During closing argument, the prosecutor
asked the jury to “remember the tattoo on [defendant]’s chest that depicts someone being
shot in the back of the head, the exact same manner in which [the victim] was killed.”
       The jury also saw a tattoo on defendant’s right hand that said “get MAD” and
another on his left hand that said “go BAD.” A handgun was tattooed above the words
on his left hand. One of the gang experts interpreted this as “indicating that when he gets
mad, it’ll go bad. So there’s a propensity for violence if things go wrong.” The trial
court sustained an objection to this testimony and ordered it stricken, but the prosecutor
was allowed to rephrase the question as follows: “So you’re saying someone with a
tattoo, based on your knowledge of criminal street gangs, like this would be signifying
that if they get mad, they go bad?” The witness answered, “Right. That—that’s what
that would indicate to me, that that person would.”
       To establish a “pattern of criminal gang activity” (§ 186.22, former subd. (e)), the
People relied on the prior convictions of two gang members, one of whom was Fernando
Luna. The jury learned this was the same person seen on the Big 5 video shopping with
defendant and Karla on July 1, 2019. Luna was arrested on July 13, 2019, one day prior

                                            20.
to the victim’s murder, and he was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm. It was
further revealed that codefendant Olvera was with Luna at the time of Luna’s arrest.
Verdicts and Sentencing
       The jury began deliberating on Thursday, October 8, 2020, at approximately 3:33
p.m. It recessed for the day at 4:44 p.m. Deliberations resumed on Friday, lasting from
10:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. There was an afternoon request for a readback of Felix’s
testimony and that of the neighbor who testified to seeing the victim outside of his house
on the night of the shooting. At 3:48 p.m., the jury submitted the following question: “If
[defendant] is not found guilty can Anabelle … and … Olvera be found guilty of
accessory after the fact?”
       The jury returned from a three-day weekend on Tuesday, October 13, 2020.
Deliberations lasted from approximately 10:24 a.m. to 4:07 p.m. Late that afternoon, a
request was submitted for “pictures of … Olvera’s tattoos.” The trial court referred the
jury to “Exhibit 383,” which the trial transcript describes as showing tattoos of the word
“Merced,” an “Aztec numeral” indicative of membership in a Norteño subset, and an
image of “someone pointing a gun.”
       On Wednesday, October 14, 2020, the jury deliberated for approximately 4.5
hours before returning its verdicts. Defendant was found guilty of first degree murder
and attempted unlawful possession of ammunition as alleged in counts 1 and 3. He was
also found liable for personal discharge of a firearm under section 12022.53, subdivision
(d). The gang enhancement allegations were rejected as not true.
       Annabelle and Olvera were found guilty of being accessories after the fact. As to
both these codefendants, the gang enhancement allegations were found true.
       In a bifurcated proceeding, defendant admitted the prior strike and serious felony
conviction allegations. He later filed a motion for new trial, which was denied.
       In December 2020, defendant was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 80
years to life. He received 25 years to life for the murder conviction, which was doubled

                                            21.
because of the prior strike. A consecutive term of 25 years to life was imposed for the
firearm enhancement, plus another five years for the prior serious felony conviction. A
concurrent upper term sentence was imposed for count 3. The notice of appeal was filed
on the date of sentencing.
                                      DISCUSSION
       Defendant challenges the denial of his section 995 motion regarding the gang
enhancement for count 1. He relies on the holdings of People v. Prunty (2015) 62
Cal.4th 59 and People v. Ramirez (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 800 (Ramirez). Although the
jury found the gang allegations not true, defendant argues the error directly resulted in the
admission of prejudicial evidence. Alternatively, defendant claims “the sheer volume
and inflammatory nature of that evidence would have been improper even if the gang
enhancement had justifiably been before the jury.” He further alleges instructional error
regarding the use of the gang evidence to prove identity.
       In supplemental briefing, defendant relies on Assembly Bill 333’s changes to
section 186.22. He argues those changes apply retroactively and bolster his challenge to
the section 995 ruling. In further supplemental briefing, defendant relies on Assembly
Bill 333’s enactment of section 1109. Arguing section 1109 also applies retroactively, he
claims the denial of his motion to bifurcate the gang enhancement allegations was a
reversible error.
       We agree with defendant’s section 1109 claim. The People dispute the claim on
the merits and also argue harmless error. Because the harmless error analysis turns on the
cross-admissibility of the gang evidence, we will address defendant’s reliance on Ramirez
and his arguments regarding the People’s theory of a gang motive (collectively, the
Ramirez claim). We also consider whether the evidence of defendant’s tattoos was
admissible to prove identity. Defendant’s remaining claims need not be resolved.

                                            22.
I.     Denial of Section 995 Motion
       A.     The Ramirez Claim
              1.     Overview
       Section 186.22 provides for enhanced punishment of gang-related crimes. A
gang-related felony is one “committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in
association with a criminal street gang.” (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1); see People v. Albillar
(2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 60.) The statute also requires “the specific intent to promote,
further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members.” (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) These
elements are sometimes described as the first and second “prongs” of the enhancement
provision. (E.g., People v. Renteria (2022) 13 Cal.5th 951, 964.)
       In Ramirez, Jerry Ramirez and his girlfriend, Catherine Villarreal, were
respectively accused of attempted murder and aggravated assault. Those counts included
gang enhancement allegations, and the pair were also charged with unlawful participation
in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)). All counts stemmed from an incident
during which Villarreal had allegedly struck her neighbor with a baseball bat. The
neighbor’s brother got involved, and Ramirez shot him with a firearm. (Ramirez, supra,
244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 803–804.)
       At the preliminary hearing, a gang expert opined that Ramirez was a Sureño gang
member. (Ramirez, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 808.) The expert concluded Villarreal
was a Sureño “associate” based on her intimate relationship with Ramirez. (Id. at p.
809.) The expert’s opinions regarding the first prong of the gang enhancement were as
follows:

       “‘This alleged crime benefits the Surenos. The more violent crime Sureno
       gang members are willing to commit, the larger their reputation will grow.
       In gang subculture, violent crimes are revered and encouraged when
       compared to the general public they would be frowned upon. This
       reputation increases intimidation that the gang is able to employ over other
       people, the general public, other gangs, and even to law enforcement. If a
       gang or a gang member has such a large reputation as being willing to
       commit a violent crime such as shooting somebody in the face, there’s a

                                             23.
       very good chance that nobody is going to report this person, try to contact
       this person, and stop him from committing any criminal activity.’” (Id. at
       pp. 808–809.)
       After being held to answer on all charges, Ramirez and Villarreal unsuccessfully
moved for relief under section 995. (Ramirez, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 811–812.)
They were later acquitted of the substantive gang offense. Both were convicted on the
remaining counts, but “the jury rejected gang sentencing enhancement allegations that the
attempted murder and the assault were committed for the benefit of the Sureños.” (Id. at
p. 803.) Ramirez and Villarreal appealed, challenging the denial of their section 995
motion as to gang allegations.
       The appellate court agreed the section 995 motion was erroneously denied. As
relevant here, the expert’s opinion testimony regarding the first prong of the gang
enhancement was described as “purely conclusory and factually unsupported.” (Ramirez,
supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 819.) “For example, no gang signs were flashed, no gang
names were called out, and no gang attire was worn. Plus, while there [was] some
evidence Ramirez actually is a gang member and Villarreal might be a gang sympathizer,
there [was] no evidence [the victims] are gang members. Likewise, there [was] no
evidence the disputes between [the victims] on the one hand, and Ramirez and Villarreal
on the other, had anything to do with any gang.” (Ibid.) “Consequently, the preliminary
hearing evidence was insufficient to support the section 186.22(b)(1) gang enhancement
allegations.” (Id. at p. 820.)
       Although the jury ultimately rejected the gang allegations, the Ramirez court held
the erroneous section 995 ruling was prejudicial under People v. Watson (1956) 46
Cal.2d 818 (Watson). (Ramirez, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 820, 822.) In other
words, there was “a reasonable probability defendants would have achieved a more
favorable result on the attempted murder and assault charges if the section 995 motion
had been granted and the gang evidence had been excluded.” (Id. at p. 822.) The trial
evidence “presented the jury with two plausible factual scenarios,” one of which was

                                            24.
based on Ramirez’s own testimony and supported his claim of self-defense and defense
of others. (Id. at p. 821.) There was “a substantial likelihood the jury’s evaluation of his
credibility was colored by the gang evidence admitted at trial.” (Ibid.)
       The prosecution’s gang expert had “repeated most of his preliminary hearing
testimony, but with more detail.” (Ramirez, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 821.) He
discussed the Sureños’ involvement in “‘everything from attempted murder, robbery,
extortion, narcotics, trafficking, narcotic sales, possession of firearms, possession of
loaded firearms, kidnapping, false imprisonment, grand theft auto, basically any crime.’”
(Id. at p. 822.) The appellate court held “[n]one of this gang evidence was relevant to the
attempted murder and assault charges, but its potential prejudicial effect upon them was
manifest. … It also tended to impermissibly show defendants’ bad character as a means
of creating an inference they committed these charged offenses.” (Ibid.)
               2.     Additional Background
                      a.      The Preliminary Hearing
       At defendant’s preliminary hearing, the People introduced four video clips
recorded at Casino Merced on the night in question. The main clip provided a wide view
of the casino floor, showing the interactions between Karla, Annabelle, defendant, and
the victim shortly before their departure. A second clip of interior footage showed each
of them exiting through the front door of the building. The third video, recorded by an
exterior camera, briefly showed them walking toward the parking lot. The fourth video
showed them approaching the Cadillac, getting inside, and driving away.11

       11Based   on the time estimates stated in the preliminary hearing transcript, it appears two
of the clips were identical to People’s trial exhibits Nos. 102 and 103. The clip of the casino
floor was estimated to be “3 minutes and 51 seconds,” which is approximately 75 seconds longer
than the corresponding trial exhibit (No. 196). However, it is clear from witness testimony that
the salient footage from the preliminary hearing video is the same as was introduced at trial. The
preliminary hearing video of the group entering the Cadillac was estimated to be “1 minute, 38
seconds,” which is a few seconds shorter than the corresponding trial exhibit (No. 104).

                                               25.
       At 22:08:15 on the video clock, defendant is seated at a card table. He is wearing
a neck brace. The victim is standing behind him, wearing a dark hat and stroking his
chin. Karla is standing next to defendant, on his left. Defendant picks up a rack of
casino chips and rises out of the chair, removing himself from the game. Karla and the
victim gather near him, and it becomes apparent that Annabelle has been seated at a
different table nearby. Annabelle stands up and joins the group, and they move to a small
circular drink table. Defendant and the victim are both holding bottles of beer.
       There is no audio, but when the video clock reads 22:09:01, the victim appears to
be speaking to Annabelle. A moment later, Annabelle lurches slightly forward. She may
have been laughing, as indicated by the contemporaneous movements of Karla and the
victim. As the victim turns his back to Annabelle and takes a few steps forward, Karla
swats at his back and, as fairly described in defendant’s briefing, makes a “playful” and
exaggerated kicking gesture toward his rear end.
       Between approximately 22:09:07 and 22:09:15 on the video clock, the victim
strides back toward the circular table and past it, walking between Annabelle and Karla
and returning to near where he had been standing when defendant was still gambling.
Karla, meanwhile, takes a few steps toward the nearest blackjack table and sets her purse
down next to a patron wearing a sleeveless top, R.Z. Although not disclosed in the
preliminary hearing testimony, it came out at trial that R.Z. is a cousin of Karla and
Annabelle.
       At 22:09:16 on the video clock, the victim’s head is turned and he appears to be
speaking to a casino employee. The employee soon begins wandering about the area, and
the victim continues to speak and make occasional gestures. This goes on for about 15
seconds, but it is impossible to determine whether he is talking to himself, the employee,
R.Z., Karla, Annabelle, defendant, or a combination of all the above. Defendant has not
yet moved from his spot at the drink table.

                                              26.
       At approximately 22:09:28 on the video clock, defendant appears to be conversing
with Annabelle, who has been standing to his right. Karla is a short distance from
Annabelle’s right and is standing next to R.Z., who is still seated at the blackjack table.
R.Z. is located to Karla’s right and to the left of the victim. During the next 10 seconds
defendant moves to his left, circling toward Karla while still looking at, and seemingly
talking to, Annabelle. As defendant gets closer to Karla, he appears to be looking in the
general direction of her and the victim. In a fluid sequence of movements, Karla appears
to say something to R.Z. before turning and moving slightly toward defendant. As this
happens, the victim walks back toward the group and rejoins them.
       Next, at 22:09:40 on the video clock, R.Z.’s head is turned toward the group and
she raises her right arm and hand. Immediately thereafter, defendant raises his left arm
and hand. He then begins walking toward the front of the casino with Karla, the victim,
and Annabelle following behind him—in that order. Between 22:09:44 and 22:09:45,
defendant turns and raises his left arm again, possibly pointing with his index finger. The
group proceeds to the end of the casino floor, near the exit, and defendant speaks with an
employee in a purple shirt.
       During the preliminary hearing, R.Z. testified to having raised her hand to say
goodbye to defendant. She understood defendant’s act of raising his hand as him saying
goodbye to her. R.Z. was not specifically questioned about defendant raising his hand
the second time. When asked if she had observed any confrontations or signs of hostility
between defendant and the victim, she answered, “None whatsoever.”
       At approximately 22:09:53 on the video clock, defendant begins walking back
toward the drink table with the employee in the purple shirt. Karla, Annabelle, and the
victim stand by waiting for him. Defendant proceeds to the cashier’s window, and the
employee turns off in another direction. After looking inside of a drawer, the employee
appears to say something to defendant from across the room. As this is happening, Karla
and Annabelle begin walking to the front door. The victim remains where he has been

                                             27.
standing, continuing to drink his beer. At approximately 22:10:27, defendant finishes up
at the cashier’s window and begins making his way to the exit. He pauses to interact with
a few patrons, shaking one person’s hand and giving a two-fingered “peace sign” to two
others. At approximately 22:10:48, he and the victim meet up at the front door.
       In the next video clip, defendant walks out the front door and holds it open for the
victim as the victim exits. The third video briefly shows them walking to the parking lot
together, engaged in conversation. In the last video, Karla is seen opening the driver’s
side door of the Cadillac and standing there as Annabelle climbs into the back seat.
When defendant and the victim come into view, defendant makes a gesture with his arms
resembling a baseball umpire’s signal for “safe.” He swings his arms in a similar fashion
a few moments later as he and the victim approach the passenger side of the Cadillac.
Defendant opens the door and waits for the victim to get into the back seat, then he sits
down in the front passenger seat.
       According to police testimony, additional footage from Casino Merced appeared
to show defendant buying the victim a beer. This was consistent with the testimony of
another eyewitness, J.S. Visible in the bottom middle portion of the casino floor video,
wearing a yellow top, J.S. was the last person defendant waved at before leaving the
building. As a regular patron of the casino, J.S. knew Karla, Annabelle, defendant, and
the victim from seeing them there on prior occasions. J.S. denied observing any
confrontations that evening between anyone in defendant’s group. She did recall
defendant buying drinks for the victim.
       The defense questioned the lead homicide detective about his interviews with four
Casino Merced employees. Some of them had specific recollections of interacting with
defendant that night, but none recalled any type of argument, altercation, or “any kind of
hostilities” between him and the victim, nor any type of gang talk. One of the employees,
upon being shown the relevant footage, had repeatedly asked the detective, “What [am I]
supposed to be looking for?”

                                            28.
       Officer Steven Odom of the Merced Police Department testified as the People’s
gang expert. He opined that defendant and Karla were both gang members and
Annabelle was a gang “associate.” He also testified to his personal interpretation of the
Casino Merced videos.
       Officer Odom testified to believing the video of the casino floor showed the victim
“challenging or disrespecting” defendant. This prompted multiple objections and
extensive debate over the admissibility of such opinions. The magistrate eventually said,
“I am going to reserve and listen to the testimony and decide whether or not there was
anything that this witness can offer as an expert. Okay. So it’s reserved.”
       The testimony resumed as follows: “Well, you can see [defendant] and [the
victim] almost simultaneously come together. And that’s when Karla steps in between
them both. [Defendant] raises his hand and points at [the victim], appears to say
something. Don’t know. No audio. He then appears to exit, turns back around, points a
second time towards [the victim].”
       Officer Odom was asked about the significance of “those gestures … as it relates
to the gang.” He responded: “Well, [defendant], knowing his high ranking gang status,
an individual who is obviously speaking to [defendant], disrespecting him to where
[defendant] is pointing a finger at him, twice; viewing all the gang assault videos I have
watched, videos involving gang members, it’s my opinion.” The prosecutor followed up,
“That it was a hostile gesture?” The witness answered, “I believe that. Yes.”
       When defense counsel asked Officer Odom to consider the gesture by R.Z. that
preceded defendant raising his hand the first time, Officer Odom did not change his
opinion. He theorized R.Z. was waving to Karla, claiming the video shows that Karla
“taps [R.Z.] on the back of the—the back, [to indicate] that she’s leaving. And then
[R.Z.] points her hand up to acknowledge as she’s leaving.”12

       12The video is reasonably interpreted as showing Karla reaching out and tapping R.Z. to
say goodbye at approximately 22:09:36 on the video clock. However, R.Z. does not raise her

                                              29.
       Officer Odom also testified to the significance of defendant being disrespected in a
public place: “[I]n my experience, status and reputation is what a gang member lives by.
And if you are an NF member, you are the highest of the highest. You are not a normal
Norteño, status that Norteños sometimes will never achieve. So that status, that
reputation to continue to live by and hold if you are disrespected in public, you are going
to respond.” He further opined “the altercation that occurred in the casino” continued as
defendant and the victim walked out to the car. Officer Odom interpreted the “umpire
safe gesture” to mean defendant was telling the victim, “‘Stop. It’s done. It’s finished.’”
       The magistrate ultimately excluded and ruled inadmissible all testimony about
whether defendant felt disrespected. The magistrate explained, “I think the witness can
testify, based on his opinion, based on these gestures, that he has an opinion there was a
conflict. But he can’t testify about the person’s mental state and, therefore, based on his
opinion, based on the video, that there is a conflict, this could result in some type of gang
culture response.” The expert’s testimony regarding the importance of respect in gang
culture was held admissible.
       On further direct examination, the following testimony was elicited:

              “Q. Does committing an assault or homicide benefit the gang?

              “A. Yes.

              “Q. How so?

             “A. Instills fear in the community, in their rivals, in law
       enforcement that the gang is not to be disrespected, gang is to be feared.
       Gangs want to be the most powerful violent gang.

              “Q. Does it also benefit individual gang members?

              “A. Definitely.

hand until four seconds later, and when she does, Karla is turned around with her back facing
her. Of the four people in defendant’s group, the only person facing R.Z. is defendant. Karla
and the victim are looking the other way, and their bodies obscure Annabelle’s face from view.

                                              30.
              “Q. How?

              “A. As I said earlier, gang members and their status, reputation is
       what they live by. So if they have higher status, they want to continue to
       keep that status, high and respected. So it will benefit their gang or that
       gang member by keeping their status where it is or elevating one’s status.”
       The prosecutor later described a hypothetical scenario in which a “Nuestra Familia
member shoots and kills a person who has disrespected him.” The following testimony
was given in relation thereto:

              “Q. How do the crimes in that hypothetical benefit the gang?

              “A. The crime of murder benefits the gang tremendously.

                “Q. And is that because of—for the reasons that you stated before
       that it instills fear in the community and rivals?

              “A. And that they are not to be disrespected.”
       On cross-examination, Officer Odom was asked to explain what he perceived to
be the act of disrespect by the victim. The witness answered, “Well, it’s the totality of
that video when you watch everything.” When pressed to identify the evidence upon
which his opinions were based, Officer Odom claimed defendant had a “very serious”
look on his face and again relied on the finger pointing. The witness also said that a gang
member’s response to “conflict and argument” is “not always what we [lay people]
interpret the typical idea of angry to appear to be,” but he conceded that he is not a body
language expert.
       Defendant was held to answer to the gang enhancements on counts 1 and 3 based
on the first prong being satisfied by evidence the crimes were “committed in association
with a criminal street gang.” Although not specifically tied to the theory of acting for the
benefit of a gang, the magistrate also made these findings: “There’s some evidence,
although slight, in my opinion, of a conflict between [defendant] and [the victim] at the
casino. But, more importantly, witnesses who spoke to law enforcement at the scene of

                                            31.
the crime described there being a commotion prior to the shooting, both at the [victim’s
residence] and down the street.”
                      b.      Section 995 Motion and Ruling
       In moving to set aside the gang enhancements, defendant relied, inter alia, on
Ramirez and People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214. The motion was heard on
February 10, 2020, with the trial court tentatively ruling to deny it except as to the gang
enhancement alleged for count 3. The stated reasoning for denial as to count 1 was, in
pertinent part, as follows:

       “There’s two prongs, obviously, to the gang enhancement. First, you have
       to find the crime benefited the Nortenos and benefited their reputation. In
       Ramirez cited by [defendant], the Court in that case found insufficient
       evidence even at a preliminary hearing where no gang signs were flashed,
       no gang names were shouted out. There was no evidence of gang attire.
       Victim wasn’t a gang member, and there was no evidence that the dispute
       between the victim and the defendants had anything to do with the gang. I
       think the distinction in this case that we do have Officer Odom’s testimony
       that the motive for the shooting or his interpretation of what he saw in the
       video, that it was a gang related disrespect of a high ranking NF member,
       [defendant]. It was in a public place where several people knew
       [defendant], and that’s even shown by [defendant]’s own witnesses, who
       testified: [J.S.] and [R.Z.]. So I think for purposes of the preliminary
       hearing, there’s sufficient evidence as to the first prong. [Defendant] also
       cited People v. Albarran, and that’s a 2007 case. … That case was dealing
       with sufficient evidence at trial, not a preliminary hearing. And in that
       case, the expert conceded he didn’t know the motive. He had just heard
       there were gang members at some private birthday party where the shooting
       took place. I think that’s different than this case and the evidence that was
       presented at the preliminary hearing. So I think the first prong was
       satisfied.”13

       13In Albarran, “the prosecutor argued the motive for the shooting was to gain respect and
enhance the shooter’s reputation—essentially to ‘earn one’s bones’ within the gang (i.e., the
respect motive).” (People v. Albarran, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 227.) In a pretrial hearing,
the prosecution’s gang expert conceded “he did not know the exact reason for the shooting” but
opined “the offenses were gang related because there were two shooters involved, and the crime
would intimidate people.” (Id. at p. 220.) At trial, the same expert conceded the perpetrators had
done nothing to identify themselves as gang members or implicate their gang in the shooting.
“Nonetheless [the expert] insisted that the shooters would gain respect within the gang absent

                                               32.
        On February 18, 2020, after hearing further argument on defendant’s motion, the
trial court made these statements: “Well, I would agree Ramirez did find insufficient
evidence was even presented at the preliminary hearing, but I think as I said in my
tentative ruling, that was—that was a different case than this; in that, it was a shooting at
a birthday party. [¶] Again, like this case, there was no gang evidence as far as the actual
casino. I mean, I agree with that. No words were spoken. No colors. Whatever. I’ve
said that. [¶] But then the expert also testified that he wasn’t even sure what the motive
was for the shooting. It was a very different situation than we have here.”14 The trial
court later adopted its tentative ruling.
               3.      Analysis
        “A defendant may utilize section 995 to strike invalid enhancement allegations.”
(Hale v. Superior Court (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 268, 271.) To prevail on a section 995
motion, the defendant must show the absence of probable cause for at least one element
of the enhancement. (§ 995, subd. (a)(2)(B); Thompson v. Superior Court (2001) 91
Cal.App.4th 144, 148.) “‘“Probable cause is shown if a man of ordinary caution or
prudence would be led to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the
guilt of the accused.”’ [Citations.]” (Rideout v. Superior Court (1967) 67 Cal.2d 471,
474.)
        “[T]he showing required at a preliminary hearing is exceedingly low.” (Salazar v.
Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 840, 846.) Circumstantial evidence may suffice,
and the evidence “need not be sufficient to support a conviction.” (Williams v. Superior
Court (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1144, 1147.) “Thus, an indictment or information should be set

such evidence because the people present at the party would know who was present at the party
and would also know the shooters.” (Id. at p. 221.) The appellate court determined there was
“nothing inherent in the facts of the shooting to suggest any specific gang motive.” (Id. at p.
227.)
        14As defendant notes in his briefing, the trial court was apparently conflating the facts of
Ramirez and Albarran. The Albarran case involved a shooting at a birthday party and Ramirez
did not. (People v. Albarran, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 217.)

                                                33.
aside only when there is a total absence of evidence to support a necessary element of the
offense charged.” (People v. Superior Court (Jurado) (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1226.)
       Here, as in Ramirez, the People’s gang expert opined defendant’s killing of the
victim would have benefited his gang by instilling fear in the community and the gang’s
rivals. (Ramirez, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 808–809.) Similar to the facts of
Ramirez, there was no evidence defendant made his gang affiliation known to the victim
or the patrons and employees of Casino Merced. Witnesses on Merced Avenue reported
hearing an argument prior to the shooting, but none reported anything indicative of gang
activity or that they suspected the crime was gang related.
       “Across cases, appellate courts have relied on similar factors—whether the
defendant’s gang membership was apparent to observers, whether the victim was a gang
member or rival of the defendant’s gang, and whether retaliation for prior gang activity or
disputes prompted the defendant’s crime—to describe the limits of reputation evidence
and ensure that it is grounded in specific facts that show the defendant acted on behalf of
a gang rather than for personal reasons. [Citations].” (People v. Renteria, supra, 13
Cal.5th at p. 968.) None of those factors were present in this case. The trial court gave
weight to the fact defendant was known to some of the casino patrons and staff, but there
was no evidence any of them knew or suspected he was a gang member. Nor was there
any evidence of the crime being attributed to Nuestra Familia. (Cf. People v. Ochoa
(2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 650, 662 [reversing gang enhancement where appellant “did not
call out a gang name, display gang signs, wear gang clothing, or engage in gang
graffiti …. There was no evidence of bragging or graffiti to take credit for the crimes”].)
       Defendant’s reliance on Ramirez is sound, but the argument only goes so far.
“Because the first prong is worded in the disjunctive, a gang enhancement may be
imposed without evidence of any benefit to the gang so long as the crime was committed
in association with or at the direction of another gang member.” (People v. Weddington
(2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 468, 484.) The trial court’s section 995 ruling was based on the

                                            34.
theory of a gang benefit, which likely explains defendant’s focus on the same, but the
magistrate found the evidence supported a theory the murder was committed in
association with a criminal street gang. We, of course, would be obligated to uphold the
section 995 ruling if it were supported by “‘“any theory of the law applicable to the case
… regardless of the considerations which may have moved the trial court to its
conclusion.”’” (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976.) As previously indicated,
the merits of defendant’s section 1109 claim (see further discussion, post) make it
unnecessary to decide whether the section 995 motion was properly denied for reasons
not relied upon by the trial court.
       We have addressed defendant’s Ramirez claim because the trial court’s rationale
for denying the section 995 motion and for subsequently declaring the gang evidence
admissible to prove motive was essentially the same. In both instances, the trial court
concluded there was sufficient evidence to support a theory defendant was publicly
disrespected by the victim. Like the gang benefit theory, the gang motive theory was
entirely dependent upon what could reasonably be inferred from the Casino Merced
videos. Defendant argues the videos do not support either theory, and we agree.
       B.     Evidence of a Gang Motive
       “A ‘motive’ is defined as a ‘[c]ause or reason that moves the will and induces the
action[,]’ ‘[a]n inducement, or that which leads or tempts the mind to indulge a criminal
act.’ [Citation.] Motive is an intermediate fact which may be probative of such ultimate
issues as intent [citation], identity [citation], or commission of the criminal act itself
[citation].” (People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1017–1018.) Ordinarily, the
existence of a motive need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence. (See
Evid. Code, §§ 115, 403; People v. Herrera (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 46, 61 [“the correct
standard of proof for a preliminary fact under Evidence Code section 403 is evidence
sufficient to support a finding by a preponderance of the evidence”]; People v. Lynn

                                              35.
(1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 715, 728 [“The general rule is motive is not an element of any
crime”].)
       The question presented is what inferences may reasonably be drawn from the
Casino Merced videos. “An inference is a logical and reasonable deduction or conclusion
to be drawn from the proof of preliminary facts. [Citations.] It is the province of the trier
of fact to decide whether an inference should be drawn and the weight to be accorded the
inference. … [T]o constitute an inference, the conclusion must to some degree
reasonably and logically follow from the preliminary facts. If, upon proof of the
preliminary facts, the conclusion is mere guesswork, then we refer to it by such words as
speculation, conjecture, surmise, suspicion, and the like; and it cannot rise to the dignity
of an inference.” (People v. Massie (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 365, 373–374.)
       “Somewhere along the evidentiary spectrum, a rational inference loses its
character if one or more of the premises upon which it rests, fails. When this happens,
the inference becomes irrational speculation.” (People v. Bohana (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th
360, 369.) Such is the case here regarding inferences of a motive based on defendant
feeling he was publicly disrespected at the casino.
       Viewed in the light most favorable to the People, the video evidence is ambiguous,
at best, in terms of showing any type of dispute or hostility between defendant and the
victim. None of the patrons or staff appeared to be paying any attention to defendant’s
group during the relevant segment. If people in the crowd had looked over during the
period of supposedly escalating tensions, one might be able to infer there had been some
type of argument or dispute. The video simply does not support that theory.
Furthermore, there were at least 30 other people on the casino floor but not one person
reported seeing or hearing anything noteworthy.
       Officer Odom’s interpretation of the video was partially based on alleged facial
expressions. In his briefing, defendant argues “the video does not back up those claims.”
He adds, “To the extent the expressions worn by [defendant] and [the victim] can be

                                             36.
discerned at all, they show no evidence of hostility.” We agree. Frankly, defendant’s
face is too blurry in the video to allow for anything but raw speculation about his mental
state. Even the detective who authenticated the video admitted he could not see any
“angry faces” in the footage.
       Any attempt to interpret the “umpire safe gesture” near the parking lot is also
hopelessly speculative. The arm movements could have meant any number of things.
For example, defendant claimed he was saying, “When you go to the casino and you win,
you want to stop right away and just dip [leave]. Go with your winnings.”
       As for the hand movements inside the casino, a trier of fact could reasonably infer
defendant was waving goodbye to R.Z. based on her testimony and personal knowledge
of the events. Officer Odom admitted he lacked personal knowledge of what or at whom
defendant was pointing. A trier of fact would be free to reject R.Z.’s testimony, but it
would require speculation to conclude defendant’s hand gestures specifically meant
something else.
       Even if the video evidence were sufficient to allow the conclusion defendant was
pointing at the victim and that it was a hostile gesture, it would still require speculation to
infer defendant did so because he felt disrespected. This is where the theory of a gang
motive fully devolves into conjecture and guesswork. A person can be mad at someone
for countless reasons other than feeling they have been publicly disrespected. Expert
testimony that disrespect may motivate gang members to kill does not permit the leap of
reasoning that if defendant was mad at the victim, it was more likely than not due to a
perceived act of disrespect. (See People v. Gonzalez (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 643, 649
[“Experts declaring unsubstantiated beliefs do not assist the truth-seeking enterprise”]; cf.
People v. Albarran, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 227 [“In the final analysis, the only
evidence to support the respect motive is the fact of [the appellant’s] gang affiliation”].)
       Reports of witnesses on Merced Avenue hearing an argument prior to the shooting
provide no further support for the gang motive theory. There was certainly no evidence

                                             37.
that gang members argue with people only when they feel disrespected. In essence, the
People’s position was that gang members are more likely than nongang members to kill
people who have angered them. But that is not a theory of motive; it is a propensity
argument. (See People v. Gonzalez, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 649 [“A propensity for
violence is logically unconnected to a decision to act for the benefit of a gang. One fact
does not imply the other”].) As we discuss in the next part, there is a “‘“strongly
entrenched”’ rule that propensity evidence is not admissible to prove a defendant’s
conduct on a specific occasion.” (People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 299.)
II.    Assembly Bill 333
       A.     Overview
       In 2021, while this appeal was pending, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill 333,
which took effect on January 1, 2022. (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206.)
The legislation amended section 186.22 in several ways:

       “First, it narrowed the definition of a ‘criminal street gang’ to require that
       any gang be an ‘ongoing, organized association or group of three or more
       persons.’ [Citation.] Second, whereas section 186.22, former subdivision
       (f) required only that a gang’s members ‘individually or collectively engage
       in’ a pattern of criminal activity in order to constitute a ‘criminal street
       gang,’ Assembly Bill 333 requires that any such pattern have been
       ‘collectively engage[d] in’ by members of the gang. [Citation.] Third,
       Assembly Bill 333 also narrowed the definition of a ‘pattern of criminal
       activity’ by requiring that (1) the last offense used to show a pattern of
       criminal gang activity occurred within three years of the date that the
       currently charged offense is alleged to have been committed; (2) the
       offenses were committed by two or more gang ‘members,’ as opposed to
       just ‘persons’; (3) the offenses commonly benefitted a criminal street gang;
       and (4) the offenses establishing a pattern of gang activity must be ones
       other than the currently charged offense. [Citation.] Fourth, Assembly Bill
       333 narrowed what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a
       street gang, requiring that any ‘common benefit’ be ‘more than
       reputational.’ [Citation.]” (Tran, at p. 1206.)
       “Finally, Assembly Bill 333 added section 1109, which requires, if requested by
the defendant, a gang enhancement charge to be tried separately from all other counts that

                                            38.
do not otherwise require gang evidence as an element of the crime. If the proceedings are
bifurcated, the truth of the gang enhancement may be determined only after a trier of fact
finds the defendant guilty of the underlying offense.” (People v. Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th
at p. 1206.)
       B.      Retroactivity
       Section 3 states that no part of the Penal Code is retroactive “unless expressly so
declared.” However, in In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, an amendment to a criminal
statute was held to apply retroactively despite the Legislature’s failure to expressly
declare such an intent. (Id. at pp. 742–745.) The rationale for this outcome is now
known as the “Estrada rule.” (E.g., People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 624.) “When
new legislation reduces the punishment for an offense, we presume that the legislation
applies to all cases not yet final as of the legislation’s effective date.” (People v. Esquivel
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 673.)
       The Estrada rule has been applied “to statutes that merely made a reduced
punishment possible.” (People v. Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 629.) In People v.
Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, the inference of retroactivity was extended
to legislation that “ameliorated the possible punishment for a class of persons.” (Id. at p.
308.) In Frahs, a pretrial diversion statute (§ 1001.36) was held to apply retroactively
because it “offers a potentially ameliorative benefit for a class of individuals—namely,
criminal defendants who suffer from a qualifying mental disorder.” (Frahs, at p. 631.)
       Assembly Bill 333’s amendments to section 186.22 have been held to apply
retroactively. (People v. Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 1206–1207.) However, there is a
split of authority on the retroactive application of section 1109. (Compare People v.
Burgos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 550, 565–568 [holding § 1109 applies retroactively under
Estrada], review granted July 13, 2022, S274743, and People v. Ramos (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 1116, 1128–1131 [same], with People v. Ramirez (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 48,
65 [holding § 1109 is not retroactive], review granted Oct. 12, 2022, S275341, People v.

                                             39.
Boukes (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 937, 948 [same], review granted Dec. 14, 2022, S277103,
and People v. Perez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 192, 207 [same], review granted Aug. 17,
2022, S275090.) The issue is currently pending before the California Supreme Court in
the lead case of Burgos.
       This district has held that section 1109 applies retroactively in nonfinal cases such
as this one. We reach the same conclusion here for the reasons fully stated in People v.
Ramos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th 1116 and People v. Montano (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 82.
The following is a summary of the analyses in those opinions.
       Section 1109 contains no express declaration of retroactivity. However, there is a
statement of legislative findings in an uncodified section of Assembly Bill 333. (Stats.
2021, ch. 699, § 2.) “An uncodified section is part of the statutory law.” (Carter v.
California Dept. of Veterans Affairs (2006) 38 Cal.4th 914, 925.) We thus consider these
legislative declarations:

              “According to the Committee on Revision of the Penal Code’s 2020
       report: [¶] … [¶] Gang enhancement evidence can be unreliable and
       prejudicial to a jury because it is lumped into evidence of the underlying
       charges which further perpetuates unfair prejudice in juries and convictions
       of innocent people.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 2, subd. (d)(6).)

              “California courts have long recognized how prejudicial gang
       evidence is. [Citation.] Studies suggest that allowing a jury to hear the
       kind of evidence that supports a gang enhancement before it has decided
       whether the defendant is guilty or not may lead to wrongful convictions.
       [Citations.] The mere specter of gang enhancements pressures defendants
       to accept unfavorable plea deals rather than risk a trial filled with
       prejudicial evidence and a substantially longer sentence.” (Stats. 2021, ch.
       699, § 2, subd. (e).)

              “Bifurcation of trials where gang evidence is alleged can help reduce
       its harmful and prejudicial impact.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 2, subd. (f).)
       In Lara, the California Supreme Court acknowledged “Estrada is not directly on
point” if the statute in question “does not reduce the punishment for a crime.” (People v.
Superior Court (Lara), supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 303.) “But its rationale does apply” if the

                                            40.
new legislation “reduces the possible punishment for a class of persons.” (Ibid.) A
possible reduction in the extent of punishment and the possibility of avoiding any
punishment whatsoever are both “potentially ameliorative benefit[s].” (People v. Frahs,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 631.)
       Section 1109 is intended to “reduce [the] harmful and prejudicial impact” of gang
evidence (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 2, subd. (f)) and ultimately prevent wrongful
convictions and unfair plea bargains (id., subds. (d)(6), (e)). The “increased possibility of
acquittal … necessarily reduces possible punishment.” (People v. Burgos, supra, 77
Cal.App.5th at p. 567, review granted.) Likewise, “[b]y reducing the pressure to accept
longer sentences, [section 1109] will necessarily reduce the degree of punishment for
many defendants charged with gang enhancements, even if they never have to invoke its
prophylactic protections at trial.” (Ibid.; see Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 2, subd. (e).)
       “[I]n order to rebut Estrada’s inference of retroactivity concerning ameliorative
statutes, the Legislature must ‘demonstrate its intention with sufficient clarity that a
reviewing court can discern and effectuate it.’” (People v. Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p.
634.) Because it “provides a possible benefit to a class of criminal defendants and the
statute does not contain an express savings clause that limits the [procedures] to
prospective-only application, the specific question before us boils down to whether the
Legislature ‘clearly signal[ed] its intent’ to overcome the Estrada inference that section
[1109] applies retroactively to all cases not yet final on appeal.” (Frahs, at pp. 631–632.)
The People fail to identify any such indicators in Assembly Bill 333 or its legislative
history. For all these reasons, we conclude section 1109 applies retroactively to nonfinal
judgments.
       C.     Error and Prejudice
       Defendant and his codefendants at trial all moved for bifurcation of the gang
enhancement allegations. The motions were denied. In light of section 1109, those

                                              41.
rulings were erroneous. We apply the Watson test to determine whether the error was
prejudicial. (People v. Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 1208–1209.)
       “[T]he Watson test for harmless error ‘focuses not on what a reasonable jury could
do, but what such a jury is likely to have done in the absence of the error under
consideration. In making that evaluation, an appellate court may consider, among other
things, whether the evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and
the evidence supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no
reasonable probability the error of which the defendant complains affected the result.’”
(People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 956.) “The Supreme Court has emphasized
‘that a “probability” in this context does not mean more likely than not, but merely a
reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility.’” (People v. Soojian (2010) 190
Cal.App.4th 491, 519.) Conviction of a lesser included offense, or a mistrial due to a
hung jury, is a more favorable result than being found guilty as charged. (Id. at pp. 520–
521; see People v. Walker (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 111, 118; People v. Padilla (2002)
103 Cal.App.4th 675, 679 [reversal based on reasonable probability jury would have
found appellant “committed not a first degree murder but a second degree murder”].)
       Section 1109 does not bar the admission of gang evidence, and its cross-
admissibility for other purposes may result in jurors learning of a defendant’s gang
membership despite bifurcation. (See People v. Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1208 [“We
have held that gang evidence, even if not admitted to prove a gang enhancement, may
still be relevant and admissible to prove other facts related to a crime”]; People v. Ramos,
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 1132.) “‘Evidence of the defendant’s gang affiliation—
including evidence of the gang’s territory, membership, signs, symbols, beliefs and
practices, criminal enterprises, rivalries, and the like—can help prove identity, motive,
modus operandi, specific intent, means of applying force or fear, or other issues pertinent
to guilt of the charged crime.’” (People v. Becerrada (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1009, 1022.)

                                            42.
        “But, ‘even where gang membership is relevant, because it may have a highly
inflammatory impact on the jury[,] trial courts should carefully scrutinize such evidence
before admitting it.’” (People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 294.) “Such evidence
should not be admitted if only tangentially relevant” (People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th
557, 653), or “where its sole relevance is to show a defendant’s criminal disposition or
bad character as a means of creating an inference the defendant committed the charged
offense” (People v. Sanchez (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1435, 1449; accord, People v.
Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897, 904–905). “Erroneous admission of gang-related
evidence, particularly regarding criminal activities, has frequently been found to be
reversible error, because of its inflammatory nature and tendency to imply criminal
disposition, or actual culpability.” (People v. Bojorquez (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 335,
345.)
        The People argue “the majority of the gang evidence would have been admissible
to prove the underlying charges even if the gang allegations had been bifurcated.” They
allege this is so because the evidence was “highly probative to issues of motive, intent to
kill, and identity.” The argument regarding intent to kill is not developed, but we assume
it is intertwined with the motive argument. The People’s briefing makes clear the latter
position relies on the theory defendant “retaliated against [the victim] for perceived
disrespect.” We reject these contentions for the reasons stated in our analysis of the
Ramirez claim.
        The People’s argument regarding proof of identity is also flawed. The
admissibility of gang evidence to prove identity is not an unqualified rule. First, such
evidence is admissible only if “‘its probative value is not outweighed by its prejudicial
effect.’” (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 398.) Second, it must have a logical
tendency to prove identity for reasons other than the inference of the defendant’s criminal
disposition. (See Evid. Code, § 1101.) For example, a defendant’s gang membership
would be probative of identity if the perpetrator had “‘identified himself as a gang

                                            43.
member and attempted to use that status in demanding money from the victim.’” (People
v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1096, quoting People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th
1040, 1051.) Gang evidence might also support eyewitness identifications or suspect
descriptions. (E.g., Ramirez, at p. 1095 [holding “defendant’s gang membership was
relevant and admissible to bolster [the victim’s] identification of defendant as one of his
assailants”]; People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 922 [“[E]vidence that defendants
were members of the same gang as other persons involved in the commission of the
crimes in this case fortified the testimony of the persons who identified defendants as
participants in the murders”].)
       The evidence of defendant’s tattoos was highly inflammatory but had no logical
tendency to prove identity apart from suggesting a propensity for violence and possible
willingness to kill. We are referring to the word “murder” tattooed on his left forearm; an
image on his right arm of a handgun with smoke coming out of the barrel; the tattoo on
his chest of a pistol being held to the back of a man’s head (and whose mouth appears to
be covered with duct tape); the “get MAD” and “go BAD” tattoos on his hands; and the
additional firearm tattoo on the left hand. Defendant had these tattoos long before the
victim’s murder, which he correctly argued distinguished his case from the authority
relied upon by the prosecutor, People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398.
       In Ochoa, a police witness testified the appellant had “a tattoo of the number
‘187,’ the California Penal Code section proscribing murder, which had been added after
the charged homicides occurred.” (People v. Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 437, italics
added.) On appeal, it was held the trial court “properly found the tattoo represented an
admission of defendant’s conduct and a manifestation of his consciousness of guilt. The
court reasonably considered the tattoo highly probative, as it would be unlikely that an
innocent person would so advertise his connection to murder.” (Id. at p. 438.) Here, in
contrast, defendant’s tattoos were documented in police contacts dating back at least one
year prior to the victim’s death.

                                            44.
       “Character evidence, sometimes described as evidence of a propensity or
disposition to engage in a type of conduct, is generally inadmissible to prove a person’s
conduct on a specified occasion.” (People v. Villatoro (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152, 1159,
citing Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).) Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b),
“clarifies that the usual prohibition on propensity evidence does not preclude the
admission of evidence relevant ‘to prove some fact … other than [the person’s]
disposition to commit such an act,’ such as the person’s ‘motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, [or] identity.’” (People v. Rhoades (2019) 8 Cal.5th 393,
414, italics added.) “Our Supreme Court has explained that propensity evidence is
prohibited not because it is irrelevant, but because it ‘“‘is said to weigh too much with the
jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny
him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge.’”’” (People v. Jones (2018)
28 Cal.App.5th 316, 323, quoting People v. Jackson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 300.)
       Again, the victim was not involved with gangs, the shooting did not occur in gang
territory, no witnesses saw or heard anything gang related in connection with the murder,
and there was insufficient evidence of a gang motive for the killing. The tattoo on
defendant’s chest was said have an anti-snitching connotation, but there was no evidence
the victim was an informant or a cooperating witness in a police investigation or legal
proceeding. No witnesses claimed to have seen the shooting, so defendant’s tattoos were
not relevant to any suspect descriptions or identifications. (Cf. People v. Young (2019) 7
Cal.5th 905, 915, 931 [appellant’s tattoos “had a tendency in reason to prove [his]
identity as ‘Li’l Jeff,’ the man [a witness] heard discussing his involvement in the
robbery murders”]; People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 749 [evidence appellant
“had tattoos of a ‘Nazi swastika and the grim reaper’” held admissible to strengthen
credibility of witness who identified him as the perpetrator].) The evidence of
defendant’s tattoos was probative of his identity as the shooter insofar as they suggested a
criminal disposition, but it was not admissible for that purpose.

                                            45.
       The People unpersuasively argue that any prejudice was cured by a limiting
instruction. “[W]hile we do presume the jury has endeavored to follow the court’s
instructions [citation], we cannot always assume that those instructions are sufficient to
dispel the taint of prejudicial information. A limiting instruction warning jurors they
should not think about the elephant in the room is not the same thing as having no
elephant in the room.” (People v. Fritz (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 949, 962.) As previously
noted, and further discussed post, the prosecution made blatant propensity arguments
based on the gang evidence. Moreover, the limiting instruction told jurors the gang
evidence could be considered in relation to issues of motive and identity.15
       The prosecutor displayed photos of defendant’s tattoos during opening argument,
noting the image of “a man shooting another man in the back of the head. … On his
hands, ‘Get Mad, Go Bad.’ And on his forearm, ‘Murder.’” The photos were twice
displayed during the prosecution’s case-in-chief and discussed on direct examination of
two law enforcement witnesses. Early in the People’s closing argument, the prosecutor
said, “Another undisputed fact is that Defendant … has these tattoos on his body. …
[T]he man shooting another man in the back of the head….”
       Later in the closing argument, the prosecutor said, “When you shoot someone in
the back of the head, that is to make sure that they are dead once and for all. Those are
the acts of a cold-blooded killer. And that cold-blooded killer is [defendant]. [¶] And

       15The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to CALCRIM No. 1403, a limiting
instruction on the use of gang evidence that does not—in either its standard or optional bracketed
language—include identity as a relevant issue for which such evidence may be considered. The
trial court modified the instruction sua sponte to read, in pertinent part: “[Y]ou may consider
evidence of gang activity … when deciding the identity of the person who shot [the victim].”
This modification is the subject of defendant’s claim of instructional error. The People argue the
claim was forfeited by defendant’s failure to object to the modification at trial. But the People
concede the issue of whether the gang evidence could be used to prove identity was “litigated
during motions in limine.” While defendant may have forfeited the claim of instructional error
(an issue we do not reach), it does not follow that the modified CALCRIM No. 1403 instruction
cured any prejudice resulting from the admission of evidence that would have otherwise been
excluded if the defense motions for bifurcation had been granted.

                                               46.
when you’re thinking about the fact that [the victim] got shot in the back of the head and
you’re still asking yourself, ‘Well, who really shot him?’ remember the tattoo on
[defendant]’s chest that depicts someone being shot in the back of the head, the exact
same manner in which [the victim] was killed.”16
       The tattoos were subsequently referenced a third time: “[W]e’ve already talked
about the tattoos he has on his body—‘Murder,’ the shooting, ‘Make Money,’ ‘Go Bad,’
demonstrating the primary activities of the gang, not to mention the ‘XIV’ across his
abdomen.” This segued into a discussion of the wiretap call, which the prosecutor
described as, “Some of the most valuable evidence that you heard that shows you exactly
what [defendant] is all about, what he stands for, his allegiance to this criminal street
gang.” The jury was reminded of defendant’s prior involvement in “different drug sales,
disciplining other gang members,” and “discussing ‘hits’ on other members.”
       Following a 90-minute recess, the prosecution’s closing argument resumed with
further discussion of the tattoos: “[W]hen you’re deciding whether or not Defendant …
was the person who murdered [the victim], you can consider gang evidence, which brings
us back to [defendant]’s tattoos. [¶] [Defendant], plain and simple, is a walking billboard
for the Norteños and Nuestra Familia criminal street gang and what they stand for.
Money, murder, shootings, these are all primary activities of the gang, and this is what

       16The manner-of-death      argument was dubious. The number of expended bullet casings
at the crime scene indicated the shooter (or shooters) had fired 11 rounds. Five of the shots
missed, and a sixth “graze[d]” the victim. Of the five shots on target, one entered “his right wrist
or forearm,” another struck him in “the front of the left shoulder, …one [entered] the left lower
back and one [entered] in the—kind of right lower backside area.” The coroner’s testimony
provided no information regarding the order of the shots or the distance from which they were
fired (e.g., the presence of soot or stippling). A single bullet entered the back of the victim’s
skull, but the record does not suggest an execution-style killing in “the exact same manner” as
depicted on defendant’s chest tattoo. (Cf. People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1056–
1057 [“To be admissible on the issue of identity, an uncharged crime must be highly similar to
the charged offenses, so similar as to serve as a signature or fingerprint.… [¶] Defendant’s
previous possession of a weapon, even of a similar weapon, is not so distinctive on these facts as
to serve as a signature or a fingerprint supporting a conclusion that because he had committed the
earlier offense he must have committed the one for which he was on trial”].)

                                                47.
[defendant] chooses to display on his body. Most importantly, the tattoo on his chest
shows the man shooting someone else in the back of the head. (Indicating.) [¶] As I
stated earlier, we know that [the victim] was shot in the back of the head.” (See fn. 16,
ante.)
         In concluding remarks, the prosecutor made a final propensity argument based on
defendant’s tattoos: “And we all know what happens when [defendant] gets mad. When
[defendant] gets mad, things go bad, ladies and gentlemen. And that’s exactly what
happened that night. He got mad, and he used a gun to murder [the victim].”
         The wiretap call was discussed again in the prosecution’s rebuttal argument:
“[Defendant]’s phone call alone is enough to tell you about his ongoing criminal street
gang activities. He talked about the different drug sales, heroin, meth, different types of
money, different amounts, different crimes, putting hits on people, going to intimidate a
witness that was somehow named in a trial. Those are things that were just discussed in a
15-minute phone call.”
         In his briefing, defendant argues the “repetitive drumbeat … about the violence
and criminal activities of the NF and Nortenos, [his] status in those gangs and [his]
tattoos, hammered home the message that [he] was someone who’d committed crimes in
the past, would likely commit crimes in the future and therefore most likely committed
this crime.” We cannot disagree. A central theme of the People’s case was that a person
involved in the activities discussed on the wiretap, and who would tattoo his body with
words and imagery of murder, was more likely to have killed the victim than someone
who had not done those things.
         Some evidence of defendant’s gang membership may still have been admitted
because of the gang allegations against Annabelle and Olvera. At least with regard to
Olvera, there was a plausible motive for him to help a higher ranking gang member avoid
prosecution for the victim’s murder. Even so, it is unlikely the most inflammatory tattoo
evidence and portions of the wiretap recording would have withstood scrutiny under

                                             48.
Evidence Code section 352. Assembly Bill 333’s changes to section 186.22 and the
enactment of section 1109 also raise the possibility of a different ruling on defendant’s
motion to sever his case from the trial of all three codefendants.
       The People lastly argue the jury’s rejection of the count 1 gang enhancement
demonstrates the harmlessness of the bifurcation error. They rely on People v. Williams
(2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 587. In Williams, a not guilty verdict on a charged offense and a
not true finding on one of multiple gang enhancement allegations (id. at p. 595) showed
“the jury did not accept the gang evidence and prior crimes evidence uncritically” (id. at
p. 613). There, however, “[t]he admissible evidence overwhelmingly established
defendant’s guilt of the substantive offenses and the truth of the [remaining] gang
enhancement allegations.” (Ibid.)
       The evidence against defendant was not overwhelming. The People’s case was
entirely circumstantial, though still relatively strong given defendant’s sudden
disappearance from the area following the murder. Nevertheless, there were no
eyewitness; the murder weapon was never recovered; no guns or ammunition were found
in the victim’s home; there was no evidence defendant, Karla, or Annabelle owned
firearms; there was no scientific evidence linking defendant to the crime; and there was
no apparent motive for the killing. The People’s briefing also ignores the significance of
witness A.D.’s account of seeing a four-door vehicle turning onto Rose Avenue.
       As discussed, the Merced Avenue video came from a home security camera
located between Rose Avenue and Almond Avenue. It showed a white two-door
vehicle—presumably defendant’s Cadillac—driving east toward the victim’s residence at
23:21:28 on the video clock. At 23:25:38 on the video clock, a white four-door vehicle
passed by the camera heading in the same direction, i.e., toward the victim’s home.
Defendant’s vehicle appeared again at 23:28:42 on the video clock, now moving west.
The detective who authenticated the video testified the video clock was approximately
one minute slow. In other words, defendant’s Cadillac passed the 1200 block of Merced

                                             49.
Avenue, moving west, at approximately 11:29 p.m. The first 911 call came in at 11:31
p.m. But as explained in footnote 6, ante, the detective did not record the interim footage
and failed to preserve the original video. There was no way of knowing if other vehicles
entered or exited the neighborhood around the time of the shooting.
       As shown in maps used at trial and explained by witness testimony, a vehicle
proceeding west from where the victim’s body was found can only make one of three
possible turns: a right onto northbound Rose Avenue, a right onto northbound Almond
Avenue, or a right or left onto northbound or southbound Motel Drive. If it turned on
Rose, it would not have appeared on the video because the camera was located west of
Rose and east of Almond. Put differently, any car seen passing the camera in the
westbound lane of Merced Avenue must have necessarily turned on either Almond
Avenue or Motel Drive.
       The lead detective, when asked, “[D]o you have to turn off of Merced Avenue to
get onto Motel Drive?” explained, “Well, it kind of turns into it. There’s a—if you’re
going westbound on Merced Avenue, there’s a stop sign right here.… [¶] … [¶] And
then if you just keep going straight, you’ll run right into it.” It is an oddly configured
three-way intersection in that a car making a 90-degree right turn would be turning onto
Almond Avenue, not Motel Drive. Witness F.G. claimed to have seen a white car
“stopped at the stop sign” before it “took off” “going towards the Marriott.” The defense
suggested the car F.G. saw may have turned right on Almond Avenue instead of merging
onto northbound Motel Drive.
       A.D. lived on Merced Avenue at the time; F.G. did not. A.D. was confident they
had seen a white four-door vehicle turn right onto Rose Avenue. He said this to
investigators at the crime scene and again in his recorded interview, which was played for
the jury. The recording contained these statements:

                “Q: Are you sure it went down Rose and not down Mere- uh, Motel
       Drive?

                                             50.
              “A: No, I saw it go down Rose.

              “Q: So it turned on Rose.

              “A: Yeah.

               “Q: Okay. Um, and that’s the—that’s the—the street at the stop
       sign, right?

              “A: Mm, the street before it.

              “Q: The street before the stop sign.

              “A: Yeah.

              “Q: Okay.

              “A: So it’s like where the guy’s body was and it’s like probably
       three houses and then it’s Rose right there.

              “Q: So it didn’t go to the stop sign?

              “A: No.

              “Q: The—then—okay. And you’re—are you positive?

              “A: Yeah.”
       Security cameras at businesses along Motel Drive captured video of a northbound
vehicle closely resembling defendant’s white Cadillac at approximately 11:30 p.m. The
People argued the victim’s killer was inside the white car seen by F.G. and A.D.
However, if the white car those witnesses saw turned on Rose Avenue, it could not have
been defendant’s Cadillac.
       The discrepancy in F.G.’s and A.D.’s accounts was additionally important in
relation to the timing of the events. The jury was not told whether F.G. placed the first or
second 911 call, but we will assume it believed his was the first, i.e., the 11:31 p.m. call.
After answering several of the dispatcher’s questions, F.G. made a statement that
arguably suggested the white vehicle was at the crime scene at the very beginning of the
call. He referred to the car in both the past and present tense: “There’s a white ca—it

                                              51.
was a—it was a white Cadillac. It’s—I don’t know if it’s—if this is the car.”17
According to the People’s theory, defendant’s Cadillac entered Motel Drive at
approximately 11:29 p.m. and was already up at the Courtyard Marriot, close to Yosemite
Parkway, at 11:30 p.m. Defendant noted the timing issues during closing argument,
saying, “The shots fired call was at 11:31. I don’t know if you guys know how long it
takes to go one or two blocks, but it is not three minutes long.” (See fn. 6, ante.)
       In summary, conflicting evidence suggested it was possible defendant’s Cadillac
was already on Motel Drive before the victim was shot. If the white vehicle seen by F.G.
and A.D. was involved in the shooting but turned onto Rose Avenue, the shooter may
have been someone other than defendant. Also, the puzzling circumstance of the victim
being shot and killed two blocks away from his home was never explained. This,
combined with the evidence of the unidentified woman in the area prior to the shooting
and Karla’s daughter confessing to the crime, may explain why it took the jury so long to
reach its verdicts. The evidence supporting count 3 was not overwhelming either, as it
showed Karla might have been trying to purchase ammunition for Fernando Luna, not
defendant.
       “Juror questions and requests to have testimony reread are indications the
deliberations were close.” (People v. Pearch (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1282, 1295.)
Lengthy deliberations may compel the same conclusion. (See People v. Cardenas, supra,
31 Cal.3d at p. 907 [12 hours of deliberations in an attempted murder trial described as “a
graphic demonstration of the closeness of this case”]; accord, In re Martin (1987) 44
Cal.3d 1, 51 [citing additional examples].) The Cardenas opinion notes the California
Supreme Court “has held that jury deliberations of almost six hours are an indication that

       17Similarly, in A.D.’s recorded interview, he said, “Yeah it was stopped. Like, it was
completely stopped and then we saw the body and then the car took off once—once we started
running, like, towards that direction. The car took off and then it turned on to Rose and then
the—the neighbor came out and then we were on the phone already with the—with 911.” (Italics
added.)

                                             52.
the issue of guilt is not ‘open and shut’ and strongly suggest that errors in the admission
of evidence are prejudicial.” (Cardenas, supra, at p. 907.)
         Defendant’s jury deliberated for approximately 18 hours over the course of four
days, periodically asking to review certain evidence. While length of time may simply
indicate a jury’s “conscientious performance of its civic duty” (People v. Walker (1995)
31 Cal.App.4th 432, 438), it is hard to ignore the question submitted by this jury on the
second day of deliberations: “If [defendant] is not found guilty can Anabelle … and …
Olvera be found guilty of accessory after the fact?” Considering the totality of the
circumstances, as detailed in the foregoing analysis, it is reasonably probable defendant
would have achieved a more favorable outcome but for the denial of his motion to
bifurcate the trial of the gang enhancement allegations. He is therefore entitled to a new
trial.
                                      DISPOSITION
         The judgment is reversed.

                                                                                   PEÑA, J.
WE CONCUR:

FRANSON, Acting P. J.

SMITH, J.

                                             53.