Court Opinion

ID: 9722556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:38:57.68945+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:36.896423
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
dissenting.
The admission of a criminal suspect's confession given during custodial police interrogation, over proper trial objection, is federal constitutional error where the interrogation was not preceded by a knowing and voluntary waiver by the suspect of the right to then confer with a lawyer. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The two keys to evaluating the 3:10 p.m. decision of Brown, a decision she made in Chicago before giving her oral confession, to refuse to sign a waiver form but to go ahead and answer her interrogator's questions so long as she could stop answering at any time, are (1) the previous 1:04 p.m. conduct in Evanston of Illinois Detective Schockweiler minutes after Brown said she wanted to speak to a lawyer and (2) the previous consistent presence and role of F.B.I. agent Gretz during the entire early period of detention before 8:10 p.m.
Gretz first gave Brown her Miranda rights in Evanston at 1:04 p.m. and she responded by requesting to speak to a lawyer. Schockweiler was then present. No one attempted to aid or assist her in connecting with counsel. Instead, Gretz continued to question Brown as did Schock-weiler in the presence of Gretz. Gretz was also later present in the car as Brown was transported to Chicago in federal custody. Arriving in Chicago, Gretz gave Brown her Miranda rights the second time before commencing his interrogation there which resulted in Brown's decision to submit to interrogation without counsel.
The conduct of Schockweiler at 1:04 p.m. back in Evanston, after Brown requested the opportunity to speak to a lawyer in response to her first receipt of advice of the right to counsel from Gretz, and after Gretz then finished collecting background information from Brown, is described in the testimony of Gretz. Gretz was able to describe the conduct of Schockweiler because he had made notes describing Schockweiler's conduct and refreshed his recollection from these notes. Gretz testified as follows:
Q Were you present when Detective Sergeant Schockweiler asked questions of Deborah Brown?
A I was.
Q And what questions did he ask?
A Detective Sergeant Schockweiler, because of the magnitude of the case, at that point was concerned as to whether or not there had been any other victim in the Evanston area. At that point, we did not know where Mr. Coleman or Ms. Brown had been staying and we were interested in trying to identify that as well as to determine whether or not there was anybody out there that they may have harmed, in particular whether or not anybody was injured that might need some medical assistance at that time.
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Q What was it that Officer Schockweiler asked Deborah Brown and what were her responses?
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*236A Okay, Detective Sergeant Schock-weiler had asked something to the effect whether or not she or Mr. Coleman had been involved with anybody else in the Evanston area that could be injured and Ms. Brown responded by saying, "cool," and that she and Mr. Brown (sic) had stayed the previous evening with a Jackie, last name unknown, who resided in the first floor apartment on the east side of Evans-ton. He then said well, how long had she been staying there, and she responded by saying that she had been there two (2) to three (8) days and that Jackie has two (2) children.
Q Did Detective Schockweiler to your recollection ask any further questions?
A Yes, sir, he did.
Q What were those?
A He asked Ms. Brown if she had gone to a Salvation Army thrift store this date and she said that she had walked from Jackie's to the thrift store where she had purchased a blue shirt and some blue jeans.
That this custodial interrogation of Brown by Schockweiler after she had just expressed her desire to speak with a lawyer is an egregious violation of the constitutional rule governing the interrogation of suspects by police could not be clearer. Edwards v. Arizona 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 LEd.2d 378 (1981). Her request was not respected, and her right to counsel at that point was simply overridden by Schockweiler in the presence and understanding of Gretz.
That this unlawful police conduct did not itself directly produce evidence of guilt which the State might seek to exploit is beside the point in this case. Its importance is the role that it played in the events of the next two hours which included the conversation in the car during the trip to Chicago in the company of Gretz fully described in the majority opinion, the reiteration of the Miranda rights to Brown by Gretz upon arriving in Chicago and, finally, Brown's decision to refuse to sign the waiver of counsel form but to answer questions on her own. The events immediately preceding Brown's decision in Chicago were also provided by the testimony of Gretz.
Q There's one part here that says, "you have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions and to have a lawyer with you during questioning." Did you ask her that precise question?
A Yes, six, I did.
Q Did you say anything else in reference to that question?
A I asked her if she understood that sentence; she said yes.
Q Did she say anything else in response to that particular question.
A She did not.
Q And the next question, you remember you said, "If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appoint for you before any questioning if you wish?" Did you advise her precisely as I just mentioned her right?
A Yes, sir, I did.
Q And did you add anything to that?
A Yes, sir, I asked her if she understood what that meant, meaning that if she could not afford an attorney one would be appointed for her, and she said yes.
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Q Did anyone else advise her of her rights?
A No they did not.
Q After reading her the waiver of rights part of the form that we have been referring to, what happened?
A She again declined to sign the waiver form portion, but again she said she would be willing to answer our questions as long as it was understood that she could stop at any time and it was agreed to.
The interrogation commenced during which Brown gave an oral confession wherein she described her involvement in the murder of Tamika Turks and the molestation and attempted murder of Annie Hillard. The interrogation ceased at 5:83 p.m. when Brown refused to answer any additional questions and again asked to speak to her attorney. She provided Gretz with a name *237and telephone number. With respect to this event, Gretz testified as follows:
Q -Is it finally-finally, is it correct that Deborah Brown was not afforded an opportunity to speak to an attorney until after her statement was taken by you?
A She was not afforded the opportunity to speak with an attorney from the time she was arrested until the time that I placed a phone call after obtaining Mr. Hauser's name and phone number, that's correct.
Q That was after she gave a statement to you?
A Yes, it was.
The initial overriding of Brown's express wish to speak with a-lawyer by Schockweiler in the presence of Gretz, coupled with the refusal of Brown to sign the written waiver of counsel when read her rights the second time by Gretz constitute two events and circumstances within all the events and cireumstances occurring between Brown's 1:04 p.m. expression of her desire to speak with a lawyer and her 8:00 p.m. agreement to speak alone and without a lawyer so long as she could stop answering questions at any time, that serve to distinguish this case from Oregon v. Bradshaw 462 U.S. 1039, 108 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983). In Bradshaw, the suspect's initial expression of his desire to have an attorney was serupulously honored as the officer immediately terminated the conversation when the request was made.
By contrast, here, Schockweiler commenced an interrogation after Brown expressed this same desire. Further, in Bradshaw, the suspect signed a written waiver of counsel before the later interrogation that resulted in the confession was initiated. By contrast, here, Brown refused to sign the written waiver of counsel deciding to counsel herself.
Bradshaw's experience with the promise by the police of the right to counsel had been positive. Brown's experience by contrast was that it was hollow. In her recent experience, her expression of the desire to speak with a lawyer would be met by more interrogation and she could not expect police to help her reach a lawyer. She was nineteen years old at the time. There was no voluntary and intelligent waiver by Brown of her right to counsel before she gave her oral confession during custodial interrogation. It was therefore constitutional error to admit her oral confession at trial. The error was clearly not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and no such assertion is made by the State.