Court Opinion

ID: 9396269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-20 06:11:28.004573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:15.734218
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed May 18, 2023

                                     In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                  __________

                             No. 11-21-00196-CR
                                 __________

               REYDESEL MARQUEZ-ORTIZ, Appellant
                                        V.
                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                     On Appeal from the 161st District Court
                              Ector County, Texas
                      Trial Court Cause No. B-18-0049-CR

                     MEMORANDUM OPINION
      This is an appeal from an eight-year sentence assessed after the trial court
adjudicated Appellant, Reydesel Marquez-Ortiz, guilty and revoked his deferred
adjudication community supervision. Appellant challenges his sentence in two
issues. He requests that we reverse his conviction and sentence and remand the case
for a new punishment hearing. We affirm.
                                  Background Facts
         In January 2018, the State charged Appellant by indictment with the third-
degree felony offense of evading arrest with a motor vehicle. See TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 38.04(a), (b)(2)(A) (West 2016). In January 2019, Appellant pleaded guilty
pursuant to a plea bargain agreement. The trial court deferred a finding of guilt and
placed Appellant on deferred adjudication community supervision for a term of two
years.
         The term of Appellant’s community supervision was set to expire on
October 23, 2020. But on October 13, 2020, the State filed a motion to adjudicate
his guilt, alleging that Appellant had committed four violations of the terms
and conditions of his community supervision.        Two conditions of Appellant’s
community supervision were (1) that he not commit any additional offenses and
(2) that he be at his residence from 10:00 p.m. to 6:30 a.m. The alleged violations
were that on October 5, 2020, Appellant (1) failed to be at his residence by his
10:00 p.m. curfew, (2) committed the offense of evading arrest with a motor vehicle,
and (3) committed two “Duty on Striking Fixture/Highway Landscape” offenses.
See PENAL § 38.04(a); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 550.025(a) (West 2021).
         The testimony at the adjudication hearing showed that on October 5, 2020, at
approximately 2:35 a.m., Deputy Keith Hinojos with the Ector County Sheriff’s
Office heard a call for service broadcasted over his radio. The call detailed that a
dark-colored, single cab Dodge Ram was involved in a nearby hit-and-run. Deputy
Hinojos saw a vehicle matching the given description traveling southbound. Deputy
Hinojos testified that, after he activated his emergency lights, the vehicle proceeded
to turn at an intersection and begin traveling “in excess of 90 miles per hour.”

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Deputy Hinojos pursued the vehicle for about fifteen seconds before it “struck an
unknown object” and flipped.
       Deputy Hinojos exited his patrol vehicle and went to check on the driver of
the crashed vehicle. Deputy Hinojos testified that no one was in the vehicle but that
he “heard some commotion in the bushes nearby.” Deputy Hinojos saw a man in a
white T-shirt running through the bushes. Deputy Hinojos testified that the man
continued to run despite Deputy Hinojos ordering him to stop. Deputy Hinojos ran
after the man, tackled him, and detained him. Deputy Hinojos identified the man as
Appellant. He arrested Appellant for evading arrest with a motor vehicle. 1
       Appellant testified at the adjudication hearing. Appellant testified that he was
spending time with his family at his grandmother’s house, lost track of time, and was
on his way home when he was arrested. Appellant testified that he was remorseful
for his actions and requested that he be able to remain on community supervision so
that he could work to support his family.
       The State recommended that the trial court sentence Appellant to seven years
in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The trial
court found the allegations that Appellant violated his curfew and evaded arrest with
a motor vehicle to be true. The trial court assessed Appellant’s punishment at
confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice for a term of eight years and a fine of $2,000.
                                               Analysis
       In his first issue, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion
by failing to consider the objectives of Section 1.02 of the Texas Penal Code when

       1
           Deputy Hinojos was unable to determine whether Appellant was the driver involved in the hit-
and-run.

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sentencing Appellant. See PENAL § 1.02 (West 2021). The State asserts that
Appellant waived the issue by failing to object on that basis at either sentencing or
in a motion for new trial. Alternatively, the State contends that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by sentencing Appellant within the prescribed punishment
range.
         We first observe that a trial court’s decision regarding what sentence to
impose is a “normative process, not intrinsically factbound.” Ex parte Chavez, 213
S.W.3d 320, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). “Subject only to a very limited,
‘exceedingly rare,’ and somewhat amorphous Eighth Amendment gross-
disproportionality review, a punishment that falls within the legislatively prescribed
range, and that is based upon the sentencer’s informed normative judgment, is
unassailable on appeal.”2 Id. at 323–24 (footnote omitted); see State v. Simpson,
488 S.W.3d 318, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (“[T]his Court has traditionally held
that punishment assessed within the statutory limits, including punishment enhanced
pursuant to a habitual-offender statute, is not excessive, cruel, or unusual.”).
         We begin with the threshold matter of whether Appellant preserved his first
issue for appeal. To preserve error for appellate review, the record must show that
“the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion
that: (A) stated the grounds for the ruling that the complaining party sought from the
trial court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint,
unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context.”                                   TEX. R.
APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). To preserve alleged error relating to excessive punishment,
a defendant must make a timely request, objection, or motion to the trial court.

        Since Appellant is not making an Eighth Amendment claim that his sentence was grossly
         2

disproportionate, it would appear that there is a question as to whether his claims are cognizable in light
of Chavez’s use of the term “unassailable.”

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Mercado v. State, 718 S.W.2d 291, 296 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Casteneda v. State,
135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.); see Burt v. State, 396
S.W.3d 574, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“In some instances, an appellant may
preserve a sentencing issue by raising it in a motion for new trial.”); Vidaurri v.
State¸ 49 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (failure to object at the time of
sentencing or in a posttrial motion waives error for appeal); see also Nieto v. State,
No. 11-20-00163-CR, 2022 WL 2252424, at *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 23,
2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
      Appellant did not assert that the sentence imposed by the trial court violated
Section 1.02 at the adjudication hearing or in a motion for new trial. A complaint
that a sentence violates Section 1.02 must be presented to the trial court in order to
preserve the complaint for appellate review. Nieto, 2022 WL 2252424, at *1–2;
Neal v. State, No. 05-19-00699-CR, 2020 WL 3958192, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas
July 13, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Littlebird v. State,
No. 05-17-00709-CR, 2018 WL 2926811, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 7, 2018,
no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Thornton v. State, No. 05-16-
00565-CR, 2017 WL 1908629, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 9, 2017, pet. ref’d)
(mem. op., not designed for publication).
      Even if Appellant had preserved the error, his contention is without merit. We
review a trial court’s determination of punishment for an abuse of discretion.
Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). The general rule is
that a trial court does not abuse its discretion if the sentence is within the proper
range of punishment. Id. The range of punishment for a third-degree felony is for
any term of not more than ten years or less than two years in the Texas Department
of Criminal Justice. PENAL § 12.34. The trial court sentenced Appellant to a term

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of eight years. Thus, Appellant’s sentence is within the statutory range for a third-
degree felony. See PENAL § 12.34.
        Appellant also asserts that the trial court imposed a sentence that is
disproportionate3 to Appellant’s original sentence of deferred adjudication for a
period of two years. This contention is unsupported by authority or the record before
us. Appellant’s contention “confuses the decision to adjudicate, which [is] based on
the violations of supervision, with the punishment decision.” See Atchison v. State,
124 S.W.3d 755, 759 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, pet. ref’d). The trial court imposed
an eight-year sentence as punishment for the third-degree felony to which Appellant
had previously pleaded guilty.
        Appellant further asserts that the trial court’s “real goal” was to punish
Appellant with a harsh sentence and that the trial court did not consider public
safety, deterrence, or Appellant’s rehabilitation. See PENAL § 1.02. Appellant was
originally placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for the offense of
evading arrest in a motor vehicle. Appellant was then placed in the Intensive
Supervision Program of the Ector County Community Supervision and Corrections
Department from March 2019 to March 2020 after he tested positive for cocaine
during his second month of probation. The State filed a motion to adjudicate guilt
only after Appellant was arrested for evading arrest with a motor vehicle for a second
time.
        Appellant testified that he “ran” from Deputy Hinojos because he believed
that he was going to have his community supervision revoked or face potential

        3
         Although Appellant asserts that his sentence is disproportionate, he does not contend that the
sentence violates the United States Constitution or the Texas Constitution. Thus, a constitutional analysis
is beyond our review. However, we find nothing disproportionate in an eight-year sentence for evading
arrest with a motor vehicle.

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prison time for breaking his curfew.        Appellant also failed to meet with his
community supervision officer for their scheduled meeting on October 22, 2020.
Appellant’s explanation for missing the meeting was because he was “trying to stay
away from jail, knowing that [he] had the warrants” so that he could be there for his
third child’s birth.
       Based on the crime charged and Appellant’s own admissions, we cannot say
that the sentence violates Section 1.02’s objectives to prevent the reoccurrence of
criminal behavior to ensure public safety. See PENAL § 1.02 (1)(A), (C). Moreover,
incarceration does not necessarily mean that Appellant will be denied the
opportunity for rehabilitation. See Foster v. State, 525 S.W.3d 898, 911 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2017, pet. ref’d). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion. Appellant’s sentence is within the prescribed statutory range, and it does
not violate the objectives stated in Section 1.02 of the Texas Penal Code. We
overrule Appellant’s first issue.
       In his second issue, Appellant contends that the trial court failed to consider
“the good and the bad” of Appellant’s criminal and social history, citing Stringer v.
State in support of his contention that this failure resulted in his eight-year sentence.
See Stringer v. State, 276 S.W.3d 95, 96, 101 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, 2008), aff’d,
309 S.W.3d 42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (“The statutory provisions require a judge’s
consideration of a defendant’s entire ‘criminal and social history’—i.e., the good
and the bad aspects of the defendant’s criminal and social history.”).
       Specifically, Appellant contends that the trial court violated Article 37.07,
Section 3(d) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure because it did not reference
the prepared presentence investigation report (PSI), which “presumably” included
topics such as Appellant’s family and work history. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

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ANN. art. 37.07 § 3(d) (West Supp. 2022) (“When the judge assesses the punishment,
the judge may order a presentence report . . . and after considering the report, and
after the hearing of the evidence . . . the judge shall forthwith announce the judge’s
decision in open court as to the punishment to be assessed.”). The State asserts that
Appellant waived this issue by failing to object at either sentencing or in a motion
for new trial.
        Appellant did not assert that the trial court violated Article 37.07, Section 3(d)
at the adjudication hearing or in a motion for new trial. A complaint that a sentence
violates Article 37.07, Section 3(d) must be presented to the trial court in order to
preserve the complaint for appellate review. See Herrera v. State, 599 S.W.3d 64,
68 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, no pet.) (holding that a defendant’s rights involving a
PSI can be waived by inaction).
        Even if Appellant had preserved the error, the record does not support
Appellant’s contention that the trial court did not consider the “good” information
contained in the PSI. Notably, the trial court stated on the record that it had reviewed
the PSI. Further, we note that the “good” information Appellant claims the trial
court did not consider—his lack of previous criminal history, his family, and his
work experience—were all mentioned by Appellant in his testimony. Finally, the
PSI is not included in the record before us. 4 As such, we cannot determine whether
the PSI contained additional “good” information that was not considered by the trial
court. See Diaz v. State, No. 11-10-00381-CR, 2012 WL 2978786, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Eastland July 19, 2012, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for

        4
         “Because the PSI report is deemed ‘confidential’ by law, it is not required to be made part of the
appellate record and thus is not normally included in that record.” Ibarra v. State, No. 06-21-00013-CR,
2021 WL 4095255, at *2 n.4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Sept. 9, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated
for publication).

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publication) (citing a legal commentary for the proposition that defense counsel
should include the PSI in the record if the appellant relies upon it for presenting his
claim on appeal).
      We briefly address Appellant’s contention that the trial court’s focus on the
“bad” facts of Appellant’s criminal history was due to a misunderstanding of the
facts surrounding Appellant’s October 5, 2020, evading arrest with a motor vehicle
offense.     Appellant notes that the State asserted in its closing argument that
Appellant was arrested for the “exact same thing on the PSI that he did before” and
that the trial court agreed by responding, “Exactly.” While Appellant concedes that
he was charged with evading arrest in both 2018 and 2020, he argues that the
“underlying basis” of each offense was different because Appellant’s first evading
arrest charge was in an attempt to avoid being charged with the possession of an
illegal substance, while Appellant’s second charge did not involve illegal substances.
Thus, Appellant asserts, the trial court relied on a misunderstanding of the similarity
between Appellant’s two evading arrest charges.
      We disagree with Appellant’s interpretation of the trial court’s statement.
Appellant conceded during his testimony that he committed “essentially, the same
offense that [he was] already on probation for.” Further, Appellant’s trial counsel
acknowledged in his closing argument that Appellant “made a mistake doing the
same thing that he was caught doing the last time.” Thus, we believe the record
clearly indicates that the “same thing” both parties and the trial court were referring
to was Appellant’s decision to evade arrest with a motor vehicle, rather than his
motivations behind his evasions from law enforcement. Appellant’s second issue is
overruled.

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                                   This Court’s Ruling
      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                JOHN M. BAILEY
                                                CHIEF JUSTICE

May 18, 2023
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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