Court Opinion

ID: 9692362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:52:31.179127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:34.250599
License: Public Domain

Williams and Coleman, JJ.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part). We concur with our Brother Ryan’s opinion, except for parts II and III.
Part II minimizes the relevance of victim Greene’s alleged friendship with defendant White. We believe this was an important feature of the defendant’s defense and justified admitting the testimony of prosecution rebuttal witness Polasek. As our Brother Ryan says, "[i]n an attempt to prove that the defendant bore no animus toward Greene and that the two were friendly, the defense produced several witnesses who testified that * * * he and Greene were friendly”. This was a significant effort by the defendant to negate any possible *514motive for the killing, which, of course, was the gravamen of the case. In these circumstances, the justification for the prosecution’s introduction of witness Polasek’s testimony that victim Greene "had an argument with White and was frightened of him” seems to us to be both reasonable and logical. We therefore would admit this testimony with appropriate cautionary instructions.
Part III effectively precludes the future admission of accomplice Hodges’ prior testimony, given under oath at the first trial, implicating the defendant in the crime. According to our Brother Ryan, the prosecution cannot call Hodges as a witness and then impeach him with his prior sworn testimony, because of the ancient and often criticized rule against impeaching one’s own witness. Nor can the prosecution introduce Hodges’ prior testimony under the prior recorded testimony exception to the hearsay rule, because that exception is applicable only when the declarant is not available to testify, and in this case the declarant, Hodges, is still available.
At retrial, unless the defense calls Hodges as a witness, thereby opening him up for impeachment, the jurors will never hear unquestionably relevant evidence that is at least as credible as Hodges’ subsequent testimony exculpating the defendant. And it is unlikely that the defense will call Hodges because, without the defendant’s now suppressed confessions, Hodges’ prior testimony is the principal inculpatory evidence remaining. Without it, the prosecution does not have a case.
The jurors should hear both sides of the story before making a decision on the defendant’s guilt or innocence. They should hear Hodges’ prior inculpatory testimony, his present exculpatory testimony and any explanation he may have for the *515change. Then, presented with the whole picture, the jurors can intelligently decide who they will believe.
Proposed Michigan Rule of Evidence 607 permits a party to impeach his or her own witness. This case demonstrates the necessity for such a rule. We would permit the prosecution to call Hodges and impeach him with his prior sworn testimony.