Court Opinion

ID: 9648463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:22:14.754258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:01.447328
License: Public Domain

Wachenfeld, J.
(dissenting). I am to reverse and to remand but on broader grounds than embraced by the majority.
*567As stated in the majority opinion, the law of defamation imposes broad liability for the publication of false matters which tend to injure the reputation of others and it embodies the important public policy that individuals and businesses should generally be free to enjoy their reputation unimpaired by false and defamatory attacks. But the majority conclude in the instant case there was an absolute privilege and immunity.
It is true that administrative agencies are now a vital part of American life and perform important public duties, but in my opinion it is not yet part of the American way of life that one may falsely and with malice aforethought be permitted to slander and libel another and then successfully claim absolute immunity for his acts.
I would not create another forum where such practice is tolerated and the offender shielded as suggested by the majority.
My conclusion is that the privilege in the case sub judice is qualified rather than absolute, as defined in Finkelstein v. Geismar, 91 N. J. L. 46 (Sup. Ct. 1917), and I would sustain the complaint in its present form.
For remandment—Chief Justice Vandekbilt, and Justices Hehek, Oliphant, Bukling, Jacobs and Bbennan—6.
For reversal—-Justice Wacheneeld—1.