Court Opinion

ID: 9759845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:29:30.432978+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:05.331804
License: Public Domain

WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent because I do not believe the statute is so absolutely clear in its language and because I believe the holding of the majority should be applied prospectively.
The statute in question was first enacted in 1974 and interpreted by this Court in Kendricks v. Commonwealth, Ky., 557 S.W.2d 417 (1977), so as to permit the jury to make a reasonable inference regarding age. If we now desire to change the case law, it should be done prospectively. The evidence here permits the jury to reasonably infer that the accused was over 18 years of age at the time he committed each of the previous felonies. The jury may *854consider the totality of the evidence in determining facts. Kendricks, supra.
A remand for a new trial would be analogous to the decision in Hobbs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 655 S.W.2d 472 (1983), in which it was held that a retrial is not precluded when an appellate court reverses a conviction because the only evidence admitted at trial to prove the dates of the commission of crimes underlying persistent felony offender charges was erroneously admitted.
Here the prosecution pursuant to the authority of Kendricks relied upon an inference to prove the age of the accused rather than producing a record to prove age. This was not a total failure of proof, but only a practice which could be held to be an erroneous method of proof. In such circumstances, I believe a remand for new trial is the appropriate remedy. Another trial would not be double jeopardy.