Court Opinion

ID: 9480163
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:40:08.716227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:31.516400
License: Public Domain

PAULINE NEWMAN, Circuit Judge,
with whom BENNETT, Senior Circuit Judge, and MAYER, Circuit Judge, join, concurring in the judgment.
On the major issue of this appeal I reach the same conclusion as does the court, for the reasons stated in the per curiam opinion. I agree that the damages must be redetermined, and the case remanded to the district court for this purpose. I also concur in the court’s implicit conclusion that New England’s concern with the trial judge’s asserted bias does not warrant the court’s taking action on New England’s request that the matter be retried and that further proceedings be conducted before a different judge.
I do, however, believe that the issue of judicial bias has been properly raised on this appeal, and that it is not frivolous. Therefore, I address the question of the court’s jurisdiction to determine the issue.
The issue of our appellate authority, when judicial bias is asserted, was considered in Petersen Mfg. Co. v. Central Purchasing, Inc., 740 F.2d 1541, 222 USPQ 562 (Fed.Cir.1984). I believe that Petersen has been superseded, if not expressly overruled, by decisions of the Federal Circuit in banc and the Supreme Court.
*1178In Petersen a panel of this court held, in response to an allegation of judicial bias and a request for remand to a different judge:
[W]e do not sit to judge the character of district court judges. Nor do we have the authority, as counsel asserts, to order assignment of this case to a different judge on remand. Unlike other Circuit Courts of Appeal we have no direct supervisory authority over district courts. Hence, we cannot act on Petersen’s request.
740 F.2d at 1552, 222 USPQ at 570 (citations omitted). The panel in Petersen did not review the merits of the requested reassignment. Nor did it discuss which court might review the issue in our stead, or the procedural and jurisdictional dilemmas there created.
However, only a few months after the Petersen decision, this court took in banc action that appeared to resolve the matter. In Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 747 F.2d 1422, 223 USPQ 1074 (Fed.Cir.1984) {in banc), we affirmed that our exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of cases arising under the patent law requires us to resolve all issues fairly raised on appeal, and not only issues of patent law. We recognized the intent of Congress that formation of the Federal Circuit not impose on parties and courts a new burden of multiple appeals to different tribunals. We observed that bifurcation of appeals between the Federal and a regional circuit, depending on the issue requiring decision, would be “in direct defiance of this intent of Congress”. 747 F.2d at 1435, 223 USPQ at 1084. We said that:
continuing uncertainty [as to the path of appellate jurisdiction] could result in unnecessary disputes, undue costs, and additional mid-process litigation concerning the proper appellate forum for individual claims, for interlocutory appeals, and for writs of mandamus.
A major reason for creating this court was to eliminate such sideline skirmishing.
Atari, 747 F.2d at 1435, 223 USPQ at 1084.
In Atari the Federal Circuit appeared fully to accept its obligation to decide all issues that require decision on appeals that reach us because of our assigned exclusive jurisdiction. This position has been reinforced by the Supreme Court. In United States v. Hohri, 482 U.S. 64, 107 S.Ct. 2246, 96 L.Ed.2d 51 (1987), the Court noted that bifurcation of an appeal based on different “legal claims”, in that ease a Little Tucker Act claim and a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, is “inappropriate.” The Court held that both claims must be decided by the Federal Circuit, that our jurisdictional statute so requires. The Court stated:
The language of [28 U.S.C.] § 1295(a)(2) discusses jurisdiction over an appeal “in a case,” not over an appeal from decision of “a claim.” This strongly suggests that appeals of different parts of a single case should not go to different courts.... a bifurcated appeal of the different legal claims raised in any one case would result in an inefficient commitment of the limited resources of the federal appellate courts.
482 U.S. at 69 n. 3, 107 S.Ct. at 2250 n. 3 (citing Atari, supra). See also Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 2173, 100 L.Ed.2d 811, 7 USPQ2d 1109, 1113 (1988) (discussing jurisdiction based on cases arising under the patent law; rejecting bifurcation of appeal based on issues raised in defense).
This unanimous post-Petersen authority, that there should not be separate appellate routes depending on the claims or issues of a case, made clear that the Federal Circuit has both the obligation, and the authority, to consider any issue fairly raised in a case properly before us. This is no longer a matter of uncertainty.
Indeed, in Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 867 F.2d 1415, 9 USPQ2d 1877 (Fed.Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1956, 104 L.Ed.2d 425 (1989), we decided the issue of judicial disqualification, for which the requested remedy was vacation of the judge's decision and a new trial before a different judge — the same remedy New England is here requesting. We did *1179not hint in Polaroid that we believed the Federal Circuit was without authority to deal with the issue, as in Petersen. Instead, we granted an interlocutory appeal to consider and decide the issue.
Thus Petersen has been superseded by practicality and overruled by authority.
I do not denigrate the salutary restraint underlying the ruling in Petersen by the young Federal Circuit. But I think it unlikely that the Federal Circuit was intended to have less authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2106 than did the courts that received patent appeals before our formation.1 While the mechanics of proceedings on remand are not the direct concern of circuit courts, the appellate structure is grounded on the assumption that appellate decisions will be appropriately implemented. The Second Circuit discussed this relationship in United States v. Yagid, 528 F.2d 962, 965 (2d Cir.1976), the court stating that the “district court’s apprehension that this Court is injecting itself into the assignment process of the district courts is unwarranted.” The Second Circuit drew a pragmatic line:
We did not suggest who should preside over the retrial. We suggested who should not preside. When we believe that there is an inherent problem in a particular remand, we have the power, indeed the duty, to frame our opinion to provide for “further proceedings ... [which are] just under the circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 2106. [emphases in original]
Id. (footnotes omitted). In United States v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir.1973), the circuit court, ordering a new trial in a criminal case, stated that it would be “advisable” if the hearing were held “before another member of the court”, because of the trial judge’s prior decision on certain issues. See also, e.g., Holley v. Lavine, 553 F.2d 845, 851 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 947, 98 S.Ct. 1532, 55 L.Ed.2d 545 (1978) (reassignment “advisable to avoid the appearance of prejudgment”).
The Second Circuit, whose law we apply to the issue of judicial bias, see Atari, 747 F.2d at 1440, 223 USPQ at 1087 (applying “established, discernable law of the involved circuit” to issues not exclusive to the Federal Circuit), discussed the usual procedures with respect to remand for further proceedings in United States v. Robin, 553 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.1977) (per curiam) (in banc):
As a general rule, cases sent back to a district court for further proceedings are remanded without any directions or suggestions as to the judge before whom they are to be conducted. That matter is properly left to the district court. However, in a few instances there may be unusual circumstances where “both for the judge’s sake and the appearance of justice,” see United States v. Schwarz, 500 F.2d 1350, 1352 (2d Cir.1974), an assignment to a different judge “is salutary and in the public interest, especially as it minimizes even a suspicion of partiality”, see United States v. Simon, 393 F.2d 90, 91 (2d Cir.1968).
Id. at 9-10.
Other circuits have applied reasoning similar to that of Robin, supra. See, e.g., Bembenista v. United States, 866 F.2d 493, 499 (D.C.Cir.1989) (considering the issue of judicial bias in the course of an appeal on the merits, and declining the requested remand to a different judge); United States v. Jacobs, 855 F.2d 652, 656 & n. 3 (9th Cir.1988) (discussing differences with respect to remand to a different judge under 28 U.S.C. § 2106, § 144, and § 455, and referring to “the court of appeals’ traditional power to reassign”); Bercheny v. Johnson, 633 F.2d 473, 476-77 (6th Cir. 1980) (applying the Robin test in considering remand to a different judge); Simon v. *1180City of Clute, 825 F.2d 940, 943-44 (5th Cir.1987) (“appellate courts consider three factors in deciding whether to remand a case to a different judge”); United States v. White, 846 F.2d 678, 695, 696 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 537, 538, 102 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988) (“where a reasonable person would question the trial judge’s impartiality, reassignment is appropriate”); United States v. Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030, 1042-43 (3d Cir.1982) (maintaining the authority to reassign cases to “preserve the appearance of justice”); Santiago v. Garcia, 821 F.2d 822, 832 (1st Cir. 1987) (adopting the Robin test of the Second Circuit); Everett Plywood Corp. v. United States, 227 Cl.Ct. 415, 651 F.2d 723, 734 (1981) (considering charges of judicial bias and prejudice).
Without doubt, New England’s requested remedy of a new trial and/or advising reassignment to a different judge are within appellate authority under 28 U.S.C. § 2106. The grant of such remedy, when warranted by the circumstances, is not a matter of intrusion into the supervision or internal management of district courts; it is simply a matter of doing the judicial job of justly resolving disputes between parties. For if the issue of judicial bias can not be reviewed on appeal to the Federal Circuit, jurisdiction must lie elsewhere — a possibility eliminated by the Hohri and Christian-son decisions. New England is entitled to full appellate review. See Deslions v. La Bourgogne, 210 U.S. 95, 111, 28 S.Ct. 664, 669, 52 L.Ed. 973 (1908) (“all the questions presented by the record are open and, as far as they are essential, must be disposed of”); Aerojet-General Corp. v. Machine Tool Works, 895 F.2d 736 at 739 n. 5 (Fed.Cir.1990) (in banc) (“The statute, 28 U.S.C. 1295(a), mandates that we decide nonfrivo-lous issues of whether we have appellate subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal, however difficult those issues may prove to be.”)
Because the issues of judicial bias and remand would have been reviewable by the regional circuit, there can be little doubt that they are equally reviewable by the Federal Circuit. I would have preferred that the court address this matter in its opinion so that it would be clear to the litigants whether it had been considered.2

. Appellate remedial authority is stated in 28 U.S.C. § 2106:
§ 2106. The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.

. The court took this case in banc in order to delete from the proposed panel opinion the discussion of the issue of judicial bias.