Court Opinion

ID: 9812983
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:52:53.113254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:27:25.903101
License: Public Domain

*67Cjlabk, J.,
dissenting: “"Where a wife joins her husband in a conveyance of her separate property to secure a debt of the husband, the relation she sustains to the transaction is that of surety.” Eeade, J., in Purvis v. Carstaphan, 73 N. C., 675; 24 Am. & Eng. Enc., 720, and numerous cases cited.
“In all cases where the wife executes a mortgage on her property for her husband’s debts, or for money loaned to him, it is well settled that she occupies the position of and is entitled to all the rights and privileges of surety for her husband.” Kelly Contracts of Married Women, 105; Hinton v. Greenleaf, 113 N. C., 6; Smith v. B. & L. Asso., 119 N. C. 257; Montgomery, J., in Hedrick v. Byerly, 119 N. C., 420; JBrandt on Suretyship, sec. 34, 35 and cases there cited. The only distinction between such suretyship and any other, is that the liability of the wife as surety is restricted to the value of the property mortgaged by her. Hubbard v. Ogden, 22 Kan., 363. There is no decision in our courts that a married woman cannot be surety for her husband. Pippen v. Wesson, 74 N. C.5 437, merely holds that the bond of a woman, whether as principal debtor or surety, is not binding unless she charges her separate estate with its payment. Any indemnity furnished by the principal to his surety enures to the benefit of the creditor and is a security for his debt (Morrill v. Morrill, 53 Vt., 74), which he may enforce whether the surety is or is not dam-nified. Smith, C. J., in Matthews v. Joyce, 85 N. C., 258, on p. 264, citing Story Equity Jur., sec. 499; Wiswall v. Potts, 58 N. C., 184; Bank v. Jenkins, 64 N. C., 719; Harrison v. Styres, 74 N. C., 290. In Ijames v. Gaither, 93 N. C., 358, Ashe, J., says: “The principle is so well settled, as not at this day to admit of controversy, that where a mortgage is given by a principal debtor to his surety, to indemnify him as such surety, the creditor *68has an equitable claim to the securities, and upon the insolvency of both principal and surety, may have the security subjected to the satisfaction of his debt”— citing Jones on Mortgages, sec. 386 and 387. To same effect, Brandt on Suretyship, sec. 324, 325 and many cases there cited.
The answer of defendants admits that the money borrowed by the husband was invested in the land in controversy, and that the deed therefor first made to him was changed to avoid the expense of another conveyance, and was made to the wife in trust to indemnify her for any contingent loss by reason of her suretyship to her husband, and His Honor finds such to be the fact. The bus-band was therefore the equitable owner of the land, and it could have been subjected by the plaintiff to the payment of his debt. Thurber v. LaRoque, 106 N. C., 301. If the plaintiff had proceeded first against such equitable estate of the husband, upon its proving insufficient, be would not have been estopped to' proceed against the land mortgaged by the wife as surety. That the plaintiff proceeded first against the land mortgaged by the wife and then against the equitable estate of the husband, in the land paid for by his money, does not increase or affect the rights of the surety in any way. If, upon application to the husband’s debt of the property mortgaged by the wife as security, the wife can instantly subtract from liability to the creditor an equal amount of the husband’s property which has been conveyed to her in trust to indemnify her, then such suretyship is a mere delusion. Instead of having the additional resource of the property of the wife mortgaged as security for his debt, the creditor has in fact no security but the extent of the husband’s property, if an equal amount of the husband’s property can thus be relieved of liability to the creditor and turned over to the wife to reimburse her. Such security for debt *69adds no more to tbe amount of property which would have been liable to the claim of the creditor than if no security had been given. Such proceedings resemble nothing so much as Sancho Rauza’s feast in the island of Baratada, when tbe fine dishes set before him were whished away before he could touch them.
There is no distinction between the suretyship of the wife and that of any other person, except that the liability of the wife is restricted .to the value of the property mortgaged by her, but there is nothing in that restriction which can alter the long recognized principle that property conveyed by a principal debtor, to indemnify a surety against loss, enures to the benefit of the creditor. The wife might have charged her entire separate estate with the payment of the husband’s debt, (Flaum v. Wallace, 103 N. C., 296,) or, as in this case, the specific property embraced in the mortgage. To the extent of the charge she is surety for her husband, and with the same duties and rights as any o'ther surety.