Court Opinion

ID: 9713068
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:06:38.680727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:16.198583
License: Public Domain

Dethmers, C. J.
(dissenting). Were this a matter of first impression, I should find myself in agreement with Mr. Justice Edwards’ interpretation of the word “establishment” as, also, with that in the dissenting opinion in Chrysler Corp. v. Smith, 297 Mich 438 (135 ALR 900). It seems to me, however, that the majority opinion and decision in that case are conclusive of affirmance here, inasmuch as the facts distinguishing that case from this were not treated as essential to the reasoning and decision there. That case was decided in 1941. Since then, the statute and the particular section here in question have been amended several times, but never has the legislature adopted any amendment indicating legislative dissatisfaction with this Court’s construction, in Chrysler, of the term “establishment.” Where a statutory provision is re-enacted without change in language, it must be presumed that the action was taken in the light of prior judicial construction placed upon it and with the intent to adopt such construction. Van Antwerp v. State, 334 Mich 593. When the Supreme Court has placed an interpretation on a statute over a considerable period of years it may indulge the judicial assump*141tion that the legislature has been content with that interpretation in view of its failure to exercise its independent prerogative to restate the provision. Twork v. Munising Paper Co., 275 Mich 174, 178.
“In In re Clayton Estate, 343 Mich 101, 107, this Court quoted with approval the principle enunciated in 21 CJS, Courts, §214, pp 388, 390, as follows:
“ ‘ “The doctrine of stare decisis applies with full force to decisions construing statutes or ordinances, especially where the construction has been long-acquiesced in. * * *
“ ‘ “This rule is especially applicable where the construction placed on a statute by previous decisions has been long acquiesced in by the legislature, by its continued use or failure to change the language of the statute so construed, the power to change the-law as interpreted being regarded, in such circumtances, as one to be exercised solely by the legislature.”’ * * *
“To grant the relief requested by the plaintiff would require this Court to exercise legislative prerogatives.” (Emphasis supplied.) Consumers Power Co. v. County of Muskegon, 346 Mich 243, 250, 251.
See, also, cases to same effect from other jurisdictions, cited in In re Clayton Estate, 343 Mich 101. For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
Carr, J., concurred with Dethmers, C. J.