Court Opinion

ID: 9690700
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:36:02.680392+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:09.704410
License: Public Domain

DEININGER, J.
¶ 36. (dissenting). Because I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 767.242(5)(b)l.b. does not require the circuit court to order Vangelos to reimburse Bernier for the one-half share of guardian ad litem fees the court directed Bernier to pay, I respectfully dissent. *763I would also affirm the amount awarded to Bernier by the circuit court for attorney fees.
¶ 37. Determining whether Wis. Stat. § 767.242(5)(b)l.b. requires a prevailing petitioner to be awarded guardian ad litem fees as a "cost of maintaining an action under this section" presents a question of statutory interpretation. When we interpret a statute, we are to begin with the language of the statute and give it its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially defined words are given their technical or special definitions. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. If statutory language is unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning and look no further to determine the legislature's intent. See id., ¶ 46.
¶ 38. Instead of beginning with the statutory language at issue, however, the majority begins its analysis of the guardian-ad-litem-fees issue by considering what the author of an article in Wisconsin Lawyer had to say about the legislative purpose behind the enactment of Wis. Stat. § 767.242. Majority, ¶ 11. The majority also later concludes, without citation, that the legislature's intent was to encourage parties to vindicate their rights and to provide financial disincentives for a custodial parent to interfere with the other parent's placement rights. Majority, ¶ 16. These may well be goals the legislature had in mind when it enacted § 767.242, but, as a matter of statutory interpretation, we must first attempt to ascertain what the legislature intended regarding awardable costs from the language the legislature enacted into law. See Kalal, ¶¶ 45-46.1 conclude that, under the plain language of § 767.242(5)(b) 1 .b., guardian ad litem fees cannot be deemed a "cost of maintaining an action under this section."
*764¶ 39. If a petitioner under Wis. Stat. § 767.242 succeeds in convincing a judge or a circuit court commissioner that the other parent "has intentionally and unreasonably denied the petitioner one or more periods of physical placement or ... has intentionally and unreasonably interfered with one or more of the petitioner's periods of physical placement," the court "[s]hall... [ajward the petitioner a reasonable amount for the cost of maintaining an action under this section and for attorney fees." Wis. Stat. § 767.242(5)(b)l.b. (emphasis added). At first blush, any guardian at litem fees ordered to be paid by a petitioner might seem to be a "cost" of his or her maintaining a placement enforcement action. The term "cost," however, has a "technical or special definition" when used in statutes dealing with litigation costs, which definition, in my view, must be employed when interpreting this statute. See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶ 45.
¶ 40. Wisconsin Stat. § 814.04 details the "items of costs" that are generally "allowed" to a prevailing party in civil litigation. That section specifically excludes guardian ad litem fees from being deemed a "cost": "Guardian ad litem fees shall not be taxed as a cost or disbursement." Section 814.04(2). We have relied on the statutory exclusion of guardian ad litem fees from "costs" in rejecting an argument that guardian ad litem fees are assessable against a parent who brings an arguably frivolous motion to modify physical placement. Lofthus v. Lofthus, 2004 WI App 65, ¶ 33 n.8, 270 Wis. 2d 515, 678 N.W.2d 393 ("[Section] 814.04(2) specifically excludes guardian ad litem fees as taxable. Moreover, the guardian ad litem's fees are not considered 'attorney fees' simply because the guardian ad litem is also a lawyer.").
*765¶ 41. Because guardian ad litem fees are statutorily excluded from being a taxable litigation "cost," if the legislature intended guardian ad litem fees to be awardable as a "cost of maintaining an action" under Wis. Stat. § 767.242(5)(b)l.b., it should have expressly said so. This is especially true given that the legislature was well aware that guardian ad litem fees will often be incurred in an enforcement action under § 767.242. See § 767.242(5)(a) ("The judge or circuit court commissioner may, on his or her own motion or the motion of any party, order that a guardian ad litem be appointed for the child prior to the hearing.").
¶ 42. Moreover, I also find it highly significant that guardian ad litem fees are the subject of a separate and specific statutory directive that applies to "any action affecting the family." See Wis. Stat. § 767.045(l)(a). The provision for compensating guardians ad litem appointed in proceedings under ch. 767 authorizes the circuit court to exercise discretion in allocating the responsibility for paying guardian ad litem fees between the parties. See § 767.045(6) ("The court shall order either or both parties to pay all or any part of the compensation of the guardian ad litem."); Tesch v. Tesch, 63 Wis. 2d 320, 339, 217 N.W.2d 647 (1974) ("The services of a guardian ad litem are to protect the interests of the children. Both of the parents are concerned that these interests be protected and that is the reason... where both spouses have ability to pay each should be required to contribute to the cost of the guardian ad litem, with the percentage to be paid by each parent left to the discretion of the trial court."). If this subsection were intended to govern the treatment of guardian ad litem fees in all proceedings under ch. 767 except an action under Wis. Stat. § 767.242, one would expect the legislature to have spelled out that exception.
*766¶ 43. Quite simply, the legislature has not specified in Wis. Stat. § 767.242(5)(b)l.b., or elsewhere, that, contrary to its directives regarding guardian ad litem fees in Wis. Stat. §§ 767.045(6) and 814.04(2), guardian ad litem fees must be awarded as a "cost of maintaining an action" under § 767.242(5)(b)l.b. For that reason, I cannot join the majority in concluding that the circuit court erred by not shifting to Vangelos the portion of guardian ad litem fees it had allocated to Bernier.1 Had the circuit court done as Bernier advocates, that, in my view, would have constituted error: " 'Many expenses of litigation are not allowable or taxable costs even though they are costs of litigation.' Thus, any award of a 'cost' which is not specifically authorized by a Wisconsin statute constitutes an error of law that must be reversed." Kleinke v. Farmers Coop. Supply & Shipping, 202 Wis. 2d 138, 147, 549 N.W.2d 714 (1996) (citation omitted).
¶ 44. My principal reason for writing separately is my disagreement with the majority's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 767.242(5)(b)l.b. on the issue of whether guardian ad litem fees are an awardable "cost" under that paragraph. Because I write separately, I must also explain whether I agree or disagree with the majority's conclusion that the circuit court erred in awarding attorney fees to Bernier in the amount that it did. I find I also cannot join that portion of the majority opinion.
*767¶ 45. As the majority notes, the determination of the amount of reasonable attorney fees to award under a fee-shifting statute is a matter for the circuit court's exercise of discretion, and we accord deference to that court's determination because it is in a better position than we to assess the reasonableness of requested fees in light of the facts and circumstances of the litigation that unfolded before it. Majority, ¶ 23. Under our deferential standard of review, I cannot conclude the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in awarding Bernier $11,700 in attorney fees as the prevailing petitioner in his placement enforcement action under Wis. Stat. § 767.242.
¶ 46. The supreme court has adopted the "lodestar" methodology for determining reasonable attorney fees to be awarded under fee-shifting statutes, and the court has "direct[ed] circuit courts to follow its logic when explaining how a fee award has been determined." Kolupar v. Wilde Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2004 WI 112, ¶ 30, 275 Wis. 2d 1, 683 N.W.2d 58. Under the lodestar approach, the starting point is a determination of the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, with upward or downward adjustments made thereafter based on any factors in SCR 20:1.5 (2004) that may be relevant. Id., ¶ 29. Those factors are:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with *768the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
SCR 20:1.5(a).2
¶ 47. I conclude the trial court properly employed the lodestar method as directed by the supreme court in Kolupar to determine a reasonable amount of attorney fees to award to Bernier. The court explained its decision to award $11,700 in fees (instead of the $26,422.50 Bernier requested) as follows:
Cary's request for costs and attorney's fees in the amount of $26,921.86 is comprised of 135.5 hours of attorney time at $195.00 per hour plus $499.36 costs .... Of these hours, 20.75 were devoted to preparation for the Family Court Commissioner proceeding on April 8, 2003. Discovery consumed 41.5 hours between April 9 and June 24, 2003. In addition, between 40 and 50 hours were spent on trial preparation and trial time for the hearing on July 25, 2003. Carey's counsel also spent approximately 17 hours on proposed amendments to the parties' Marital Settlement Agreement.
Having presided over Michelle and Carey's divorce trial and post-divorce proceedings, the Court is well aware of the high level of animosity between these parties. This court has repeatedly admonished both parties to set aside their differences for the sake of their children, apparently to no avail. Nevertheless, Carey's attorney's fees request must be evaluated in light of the factors set forth in Stathus v. Horst.
*769The Court finds that Attorney Roman's method of billing and hourly rate are reasonable and consistent with local practice. However, the amount of time spent is out of proportion to the complexity of the case and the matters at issue. Carey prevailed on his motion, but this action was at base a conventional post-divorce placement dispute which ballooned out of control. If this case had required expert testimony, psychological evaluations or other outside expertise, extensive discovery and trial preparation may have been justified. The hearing on July 25, 2003, however, took six hours and only two witnesses testified; Michelle and Carey. This Court cannot find reasonable nearly one hundred hours of discovery and preparation for the July 25th motion hearing.
Moreover, the court cannot include the 17 hours allotted to preparation of proposed amendments to the Marital Settlement Agreement on a request for fees under § 767.242. Subsection (5)(d) of that statute prohibits the court from modifying the underlying custody or placement order except as specifically authorized. Any time devoted to that endeavor is not chargeable under the fee-shifting provisions of § 767.242.
There is no doubt that Attorney Roman represented her client3 zealously and effectively, achieving the result Carey sought. But, as stated above, the time spent was out of proportion to the nature of the motion and the complexity of the issues. Accordingly, to reach a reasonable amount, the attorney fee award shall be reduced as follows: 10 hours for obtaining the April 8 Family Court Commissioner Order; 20 hours discovery time related to the motion to enforce the placement *770order, and 30 hours for hearing preparation, court time, and follow-up associated with the motion hearing.
ORDER
For the reasons stated, IT IS ORDERED THAT Michelle Vangelos pay attorney's fees to Carey Bernier in the amount of $11,700, representing 60 hours at $195.00 per hour, plus costs in the amount of $499.36.
¶ 48. Thus, the circuit court awarded Bernier attorney fees based on its determination of a reasonable hourly rate ($195, as Bernier's counsel requested) multiplied by the number of hours the court concluded were reasonably expended in prosecuting the placement enforcement action (60 hours). In reducing the hours allowed from those requested (135.5 hours), the court considered an appropriate and relevant factor: the lack of novelty or complexity in the issues litigated. See SCR 20:1.5(a)(1). The majority agrees that "this was not a complex case in terms of the issues," and that the dispute 'ballooned out of control." Majority, ¶ 26. Furthermore, the majority specifically approves of the circuit court's disallowance of the seventeen hours devoted to negotiating an amendment to the existing judgment. Majority, ¶ 35. Rather than second-guessing the remainder of the circuit court's reductions in the hours claimed, I would conclude that the court "examined the relevant facts, applied the proper standard of law and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a reasonable conclusion." Majority, ¶ 23 (citing Randall v. Randall, 2000 WI App 98, ¶ 7, 235 Wis. 2d 1, 612 N.W.2d 737).
¶ 49. I would affirm the appealed orders and therefore dissent.

 Bernier argues only that the circuit court erred in failing to require Vangelos to pay all of the guardian ad litem's fees pursuant to the cost-shifting provision under Wis. Stat. § 767.242(5)(b)l.b. That is, he does not claim that the court erroneously exercised its discretion in allocating one-half of the guardian ad litem fees to each party under Wis. Stat. § 767.045(6), making it unnecessary for me to address that question.

 The factors in SCR 20:1.5(a)(l), (3), and (7) (2004) are essentially subsumed in the determination of a reasonable number of hours and a reasonable hourly rate. See Lynch v. Crossroads Counseling Ctr., Inc., 2004 WI App 114, ¶ 40, 275 Wis. 2d 171, 684 N.W.2d 141.

 [Footnote by the circuit court] Carey retained Attorney Roman on April 3, 2003. Ms. Roman had not represented Carey before in this matter, so their attorney-client relationship was not longstanding.