Court Opinion

ID: 9581562
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:16:16.206514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:04.049097
License: Public Domain

*100SLOAN, J.,
dissenting.
It is just simply absurd to tell a jury that the loss for the wrongful death of a child is computed by speculating on Ms anticipated earnings during his minority, less the anticipated cost of rearing the child. This ignores the facts of life including the stringent limitations on child labor made by law. Except in rare instances, this rule will always produce a negative result and everybody knows it. Professor Prosser says that: “Such decisions [like the majority decision] do' not appear very likely to command respect for the administration of justice; * * ■*.” Prosser, Torts (3d ed) 931, § 121. It is difficult to understand how a judge could avoid blushing when he repeats this sophistry to a jury.
It is an equal fallacy to say that the legislature by its amendments to OES 30.020 and its predecessors has fixed the measure of damages of its “complementary” statute, OES 30.010. There is no legislative history directly related to OES 30.010 except that when the statute was originally enacted in 1862 it was placed in Title III of the code which was limited to who could be or were necessary parties to an action. It remained in that chapter until the code revision of 1953. See 1 OCLA 307. This provides the only indication o! legislative purpose relative to OES 30.010. "When OES 30.020 was enacted in 1862 it was placed in Title VT relating to actions by or against executors and administrators. It remained in that title until the 1953 code revision. There is no legislative history that gives the slightest support to the majority’s characterization of the two statutes as complementary. But even if for the sake of argument it is said that they are complementary, the active concern of the leg*101islature with ORS 30.020 and its predecessors from 1862 until 1953 has been limited to increasing- the amount of allowable damages, nothing more. The legislature has been totally silent about the kind of losses that are compensable. By Oregon Laws 1953, ch 600, ORS 30.020 was amended to permit recovery for burial and medical expenses. This is the first legislative word about the character of damages. In 1967, as the majority state, the words “actual pecuniary loss” were inserted. It is obvious that those words require judicial clarification as to what kind of losses are pecuniary. . Thus, it appears certain that the legislature has never been concerned about the elements of loss and has left this entirely to the courts for determination. It is inconceivable to me that this legislative history, limited in scope and limited entirely to ORS 30.020, provides a bar to judicial determination of what evidence and instructions the jury shall consider to determine the amount of damages in an action permitted by ORS 30.010.
The majority are also well aware that it is futile to expect the legislature to correct the error the majority perpetuate. The legislature seldom responds when, as here, the problem is one for the court to solve. The cases in which the legislature has specified a rule of damages are almost non-existent.
Other courts that have, in recent years, confronted a similar statute have accepted the responsibility and abolished the rule of profit less cost. Wycko v. Gnodtke, 1960, 361 Mich 331, 105 NW2d 118, and Fussner v. Andert, 1961, 261 Minn 347, 113 NW2d 355, are the two leading cases. Both of these cases state that the loss should be measured in terms of the pecuniary loss of comfort, society and companionship. *102The Minnesota decision stated that 24 states allow recovery on this basis.
The majority say that the use of words “society, comfort and companionship” are the equivalent of allowing damages for the “emotional trauma” suffered by the parent. I doubt that this is so or that the jury would have any problem in making the distinction. As a practical matter, however, it is apparent that juries do consider these unarticulated considerations. See Prosser, supra, for a few examples. It may be that it is unnecessary to use the actual words “society, comfort and companionship” in our instructions. The first paragraph of the instruction given by the trial court in the instant case would, no doubt, be adequate in the usual ease. The vice of the majority rule is its insistence on limiting the damages to a child’s earnings and then reducing that amount by the cost of rearing the child. As stated before, this confronts the jury with a choice of ignoring the court’s instructions or returning a negative verdict. This, as pointed out by Prosser, is demeaning to the court and to the jury. There is no need to continue this predicament.