Court Opinion

ID: 9964539
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 14:07:35.888402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:34.593791
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2333-22

GLORIA FLORES,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JEANETTE PAGE-HAWKINS,
ROBERT D. JACKSON, ESSEX
COUNTY, ESSEX COUNTY
CITIZEN SERVICES/WELFARE
DEPARTMENT,

          Defendants-Respondents,

and

CHERYL CUCCINELLO,

     Defendant.
____________________________

                   Submitted March 20, 2024 – Decided April 30, 2024

                   Before Judges Currier and Vanek.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-8167-19.
             Cecile D. Portilla, Attorney at Law, LLC, attorneys for
             appellant (Eldridge T. Hawkins and Cecile Delrose
             Portilla, on the briefs).

             Jerome M. St. John, Essex County Counsel, attorney for
             respondents (Olivia Palamara, Assistant County
             Counsel, and DaQuan Edward Brown, Assistant
             County Counsel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

      Plaintiff Gloria Flores appeals the trial court's March 17, 2023 denial of

her motion for reconsideration of the February 7, 2023 order granting summary

judgment to defendants Jeanette Page-Hawkins, Robert D. Jackson, Essex

County and Essex County Citizen Service/Welfare Department 1 dismissing

plaintiff's claims for disability discrimination, hostile work environment, and

constructive discharge in connection with her County employment under the

New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50, and

denying plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment. Because we see no

error with the trial court's determination that plaintiff has not established a prima

facie case as to any of her LAD-based claims, we affirm.

1
   Defendants Jeanette Page-Hawkins, Robert D. Jackson, Essex County and
Essex County Citizen Service/Welfare Department are collectively referred to
as "defendants." Essex County and the Essex County Citizen Service/Welfare
Department are collectively referred to as "the County."
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                                         2
                                         I.

      In reviewing whether summary judgment was improvidently granted, we

view the facts set forth in the record in the light most favorable to non-movants.

Harz v. Borough of Spring Lake, 234 N.J. 317, 329 (2018). In doing so, we give

non-movants "the benefit of the most favorable evidence and most favorable

inferences drawn from that evidence." Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72, 86

(2014); see also R. 4:46-2(c). We summarize the salient facts in the record under

this lens.

      Plaintiff was hired by the County in May 1990 as a bilingual clerk typist

and was promoted to a bilingual secretarial assistant position in 2002, where she

remained until 2016. On April 26, 2016, the County eliminated the title of

bilingual secretarial assistant and plaintiff was laterally transferred to the title

of records support technician 4, with no change in salary.

      As required by the State of New Jersey, Civil Service Commission (CSC),

plaintiff completed an application for permanent appointment to the records

support technician 4 position to effectuate the transfer.

      On August 7, 2017, the CSC sent a letter to the County notifying it that

plaintiff had failed the qualifying examination for the position due to lack of

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experience. The County took no further action in response to the letter and did

not notify plaintiff at that time.

      On December 10, 2018, plaintiff inquired with the County about possible

retirement and to "see what her pension numbers were like." On December 19,

2018, the CSC again sent the County a letter requiring plaintiff's removal from

the records support technician 4 position and return to her prior permanent title

or another more suitable title. Plaintiff was still not informed at this point about

the communication from the CSC.

      On January 31, 2019, Page-Hawkins retired, and Kecia Burnett became

the new director of the County's Division of Family Assistance & Benefits

(DFAB). On February 8, 2019, the CSC sent another letter to the County, this

time to Burnett, again reiterating that plaintiff must be removed from the records

support technician 4 position.

      On February 14, 2019, the County's Records Management Department

(RMD) adopted a new case records management (CRM) system to address the

over 16,000 cases in backlog. To address the backlog, the RMD increased the

number of employees plaintiff supervised from fourteen to twenty-seven on

March 18, 2019. Two additional employees, Kareemah Lucas and Valentina

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                                         4
Green, were assigned to the RMD to serve as consultants in order to facilitate

the transition of the CRM system.

      On April 1, 2019, Burnett met with plaintiff, who was accompanied by the

Public Employee Supervisors' Union (PESU) President Lisa Maddox Douglas.

Burnett explained that she "received a memo from human resources stating

[plaintiff] did not pass the [qualifying exam] and . . . needed to find her another

title maintaining her salary or return her to her last permanent title." During the

meeting, Burnett and plaintiff discussed transferring her to another department

because "she seemed overwhelmed and over the past few weeks she ha[d] been

crying."   Plaintiff and Maddox Douglas asked if plaintiff could submit a

proposal to correct any deficiencies with her work, to which Burnett agreed.

After that date, it was discovered that 21,000 records in the RMD had not had

file location updates since February 15, 2019.

      On May 17, 2019, Maddox Douglas sent a letter to Burnett stating:

                   Our Union submits this Step II Contractual
            Grievance on behalf of [plaintiff], [r]ecords [s]upport
            [t]echnician 4 to protest the unfair and disparate manner
            in which you continuously and unfairly subjected our
            member. Since your appointment as Division Head
            [plaintiff] was assigned an unprecedented total of
            [twenty-seven] clerical employees to report to her. The
            mere number of employees assigned [to] our member is
            unconscionable and violates multiple contractual
            articles. Despite multiple conversations and pleas to

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                                        5
            promote an additional Clerk 4 to assist, you rejected
            such . . . .

                    ....

            As remediation our union respectfully demands the
            following:

             ....

            • Immediately promote an additional Clerk 4 to assist
              with supervisory roles and responsibilities within the
              [RMD].

      On June 6, 2019, plaintiff sent an email to Inspector General Dominic

Scaglione alleging a "[h]ostile [w]ork [e]nvironment." The email stated,

            I am writing to advise that the working environment in
            which I am subjected to, has jeopardized my safety
            within the workplace.

            I am consistently harassed and intimidated by several
            employees within my worksite . . . . The employees in
            which I would like to identify are Ms. Burnett, Acting
            Division Head and her direct reports Valentina Green;
            . . . and Kareemah Lucas, . . . who have consistently
            utilized intimidation tactics and the like to create an
            atmosphere which is emotionally hazardous.

            The intimidation tactics in which they have engaged
            include those which have caused emotional
            consequences as they have consistently engaged in
            humiliation, intimidation, bullying and angry outbursts
            in the presence of multiple employees.

            I have worked directly with several [d]irectors over my
            [twenty-nine-]year tenure and never experienced such

                                                                           A-2333-22
                                       6
              torturous actions. As a result, my health is suffering
              adversely and I have become withdrawn. . . .

On June 17, 2019, Burnett complied with Maddox Douglas' demand and reduced

the additional employees that were assigned to plaintiff to ten.

       On June 25, 2019, Scaglione and internal investigators Brian Dyer and

Casey McMahon interviewed plaintiff regarding her hostile work environment

complaint in the presence of Maddox Douglas. During the interview, plaintiff

stated she filed a grievance on April 5, 2019, regarding unfair treatment and

retaliatory actions prohibited under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

However, plaintiff did not provide a copy of the grievance to the investigators,

to the trial court or to us on appeal. Plaintiff stated she believed that Burnett

was treating her differently because she went to the County Hall of Records in

December 2018 to inquire about retirement.          Plaintiff discussed various

incidents where she felt she was belittled and bullied by Green and Lucas.

       Beginning in July of 2019, investigators from the Office of Inspector

General conducted interviews with several DFAB employees to investigate

plaintiff's   harassment   complaint   including   Nancy    Gervickas,   Brenda

Williamson, Janet Bifalco, Green, Lucas, Rosemary Patrick, and Al Fusco.

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                                        7
      Plaintiff took a series of leaves of absence beginning July 31, 2019,

through January 31, 2020. Plaintiff also submitted documents in furtherance of

her retirement. On September 24, 2019, the County's chief financial officer

transmitted plaintiff's salary certification to her and confirmed she would be

removed from the payroll system as of her chosen retirement date of February

1, 2020.

      On October 9, 2019, Scaglione interviewed Burnett regarding plaintiff's

workplace harassment complaint. Burnett advised that she was unaware that

plaintiff had taken any action to apply for retirement benefits at the time plaintiff

filed her harassment complaint. In response to plaintiff's request for additional

help in the RMD, Burnett added several clerical workers to assist with the

backlog and with the transition of the new CRM system. Those additional

workers included Lucas and Green.

      Burnett advised Scaglione that plaintiff complained to her directly that

she was being "harassed, bullied, and humiliated" by Lucas. Burnett stated she

could tell Lucas had issues with plaintiff and instructed Lucas to have no further

contact with plaintiff, with any future communication going through Green.

Burnett arranged for "communications training" within the agency as a result of

the situation between Lucas and plaintiff. Burnett directed plaintiff to contact

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                                         8
her by email instead of coming directly to her office because plaintiff was

"constantly changing what she was saying" to her and she "wanted to establish

a paper trail."

      On September 30, 2019, Burnett learned plaintiff had been admitted to the

hospital for an anxiety attack after receiving an email from someone working on

the tenth floor at the DFAB office. Burnett did not know who sent the email but

stated she did not believe it came from Lucas, as Lucas was assigned to the ninth

floor of the office.

      On October 28, 2019, following an investigatory interview with Lucas,

Scaglione issued a memorandum with his findings. Scaglione determined "there

exists sufficient corroboration from the testimony of witnesses to support a

finding of conduct unbecoming a [C]ounty employee on the part of . . . Lucas in

her interaction with [plaintiff] . . . . Lucas was determined to be rude, dismissive

and hostile in her association with [plaintiff]." The findings were "presented to

the Director of Department of Citizen Services[] for whatever action [was]

deemed appropriate." No other co-worker was found to have acted improperly

towards plaintiff.

      On November 4, 2019, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Law Division,

followed by an amended complaint. On October 6, 2020, plaintiff then filed a

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                                         9
five-count corrected amended complaint alleging: the County violated the LAD

by failing to accommodate her under the ADA (count one); breach of contract

and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, interference with

plaintiff's beneficial economic position (count two); misuse and abuse of process

(count three); violations of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act under N.J.S.A 10:6-

2(c) (count four); and defendants recklessly, intentionally, maliciously, inflicted

severe emotional distress on plaintiff with a wanton and reckless disregard to

the consequences causing plaintiff to be constructively discharged (count five).

      On February 1, 2020, plaintiff retired from employment with the County.

There is no evidence in the record that plaintiff submitted any request for a

disability accommodation while employed. In her answers to interrogatories,

plaintiff identified her disabilities as "anxiety, panic attacks, depression" and

"stress."

      On February 7, 2023, the trial court granted defendants' motion for

summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's corrected amended complaint and

denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in an order accompanied by a

written decision. The trial court rejected plaintiff's argument that defendants'

motion was based on an improper certification of counsel that violated Rule

1:6-6. The trial court also rejected plaintiff's argument that summary judgment

                                                                             A-2333-22
                                       10
could not be granted in favor of defendants because the County did not have

publicized policies prohibiting the complained-of conduct, since the County's

policy documents were in the summary judgment record.

      The trial court also found that the only time plaintiff identified her alleged

disabilities was in answers to defendants' interrogatories.             The court

acknowledged defendants were aware plaintiff was "having some issues with

stress or anxiety," but concluded there was nothing in the record establishing

plaintiff submitted a clear request for an accommodation of a disability within

the standard set forth in Tynan v. Vicinage 13 of the Superior Court of New

Jersey, 351 N.J. Super 385, 400 (App. Div. 2002).

      Additionally, the trial court found there was no threat of discharge nor

was plaintiff ever encouraged to retire early. The trial court noted plaintiff never

requested to transfer out of the RMD, and most significantly, plaintiff inquired

about retirement on December 10, 2018, prior to the events that she claimed

forced her retirement.

      Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration on February 27, 2023. In the

certification in support of the motion for reconsideration, plaintiff's counsel sets

forth that the trial judge should recuse herself because of an alleged bias related

to a prior unrelated litigation and an alleged improper deficiency notice filed

                                                                              A-2333-22
                                        11
against plaintiff's counsel. The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration.

On the issue of recusal, the trial judge found that plaintiff failed to present any

evidence to show impartiality on behalf of the judge against plaintiff. This

appeal follows.

                                        II.

      On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred in finding that she had not

established her LAD claim for failure to accommodate a disability because she

did not show proof of a disability or evidence of a clear request to be

accommodated for any documented disability. Further, plaintiff asserts the trial

court erroneously rejected her hostile work environment and constructive

discharge claims.2 Plaintiff additionally alleges the trial judge hearing the

summary judgment motions erred in failing to recuse herself because she gave

the appearance of bias and abused her discretion.

      We review a trial judge's decision to grant or deny a motion for rehearing

or reconsideration under Rule 4:49-2 for an abuse of discretion. Branch v.

Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021). "'Reconsideration is a matter

2
  Plaintiff does not address the dismissal of the claims for breach of contract,
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and abuse of process on
appeal. Thus, we do not review the trial court's order granting summary
judgment on those causes of action.
                                                                             A-2333-22
                                       12
within the sound discretion of the [c]ourt, to be exercised in the interest of

justice.'"   Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. Div. 1996)

(quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 392, 401 (Ch. Div. 1990)).

Reconsideration is appropriate where "'1) the [c]ourt has expressed its decision

based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the

[c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of

probative, competent evidence.'" Ibid. (quoting D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. at

401-02). Reconsideration is not appropriate where a litigant is unhappy with the

trial court's decision and wishes to reargue a motion. Dennehy v. E. Windsor

Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 469 N.J. Super. 357, 362-63 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting

Palombi v. Palombi, 414 N.J. Super. 274, 288 (App. Div. 2010)), aff'd, 252 N.J.

201 (2022).

       We review a grant of summary judgment "de novo, applying the same

standard as the trial court." L.A. v. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs., 217 N.J.

311, 323 (2014) (citing Coyne v. N.J. Dep't of Transp., 182 N.J. 481, 491

(2005)). Summary judgment must be granted "if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged a nd

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R.

                                                                             A-2333-22
                                       13
4:46-2(c). "To decide whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the trial

court must 'draw[] all legitimate inferences from the facts in favor of the non -

moving party.'" Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 472 (2020) (alteration in

original) (quoting Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 480 (2016)).

                                        III.

      At the outset, we address plaintiff's claim that the trial court judge hearing

the summary judgment motions should have recused herself from this matter

because of her bias towards plaintiff. Specifically, plaintiff contends the judge's

bias stems from a prior unrelated case plaintiff's counsel argued before her, and

an allegedly improper electronic deficiency notice filed against plaintiff's

counsel in separate, unrelated litigation.

      Disqualification of a judge is warranted for the reasons specified in Rule

1:12-1, including "when there is any other reason which might preclude a fair

and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or

the parties to believe so." R. 1:12-1(g). To that end, Rule 1:12-2 states that

"[a]ny party, on motion made to the judge before trial or argument and stating

the reasons therefore, may seek that judge's disqualification." When reviewing

the appearance of impropriety, the Court has adopted the test in DeNike v. Cupo,

which requires a determination as to whether "a reasonable, fully informed

                                                                              A-2333-22
                                       14
person [would] have doubts about the judge's impartiality." 196 N.J. 502, 517

(2008).

      We find no merit to plaintiff's contention that the judge demonstrated bias

against her. Plaintiff did not present any evidence to establish that the allegedly

improper deficiency notice posted on eCourts in a previous, unrelated case heard

before the judge where one of the parties was represented by plaintiff's counsel,

was intentional rather than an error. Plaintiff also failed to present evidence that

the judge was impartial in her ruling because of her alleged relation to a former

colleague of plaintiff's counsel. Our review of the record confirms the judge

hearing the motions did not err in declining to recuse herself on this matter.

      We decline to consider plaintiff's newly asserted argument that Rules

1:12-1 and -2 violate the due process rights under the New Jersey and United

States Constitutions by allowing the trial judge to rule on her own motion for

recusal. Plaintiff did not raise this issue below. "Generally, issues not raised

[before the trial court], even constitutional issues, will not ordinarily be

considered on appeal unless they are jurisdictional in nature or substantially

implicate public interest." Paff v. Ocean Cnty. Prosecutor's Off., 446 N.J. Super.

163, 190 (App. Div. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Walker, 385

N.J. Super. 388, 410 (App. Div. 2006)), rev'd on other grounds, 235 N.J.1

                                                                              A-2333-22
                                        15
(2018). Plaintiff's argument does not meet this heightened standard. Therefore,

no further discussion is warranted on this issue.

                                       IV.

      Next, we turn to our review of the trial court's grant of summary judgment

as to plaintiff's failure to accommodate, hostile work environment, and

constructive discharge claims under the LAD. Under the LAD, an employee

who has a disability is a member of a protected class.        N.J.S.A. 10:5-12.

Disability is defined under N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(q).

                   Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 10:5-5(q), there are two
            specific categories of handicap: physical and non-
            physical. The physical and non-physical clauses of the
            statute are distinct from each other and provide separate
            ways of proving handicap.

                  To meet the physical standard, a plaintiff must
            prove that he or she is (1) suffering from physical
            disability, infirmity, malformation or disfigurement (2)
            which is caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness
            including epilepsy. . . . To meet the non-physical
            standard, a plaintiff must prove that he or she is
            suffering (1) from any mental, psychological or
            developmental disability (2) resulting from an
            anatomical,       psychological,    physiological      or
            neurological condition that either (a) prevents the
            normal exercise of any bodily or mental functions or (b)
            is demonstrable, medically or psychologically, by
            accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques.

                  ....

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                                       16
                   Where the existence of a handicap is not readily
            apparent, expert medical evidence is required.
            Accordingly, courts place a high premium on the use
            and strength of objective medical testimony in proving
            the specific elements of each test contained in the
            statute.

            [Viscik v. Fowler Equip. Co., 173 N.J. 1, 15-16 (2002)
            (italicization omitted) (citations omitted).]

      "Discrimination      based     on     an     employee's    disability,       or

perceived disability, is illegal under the LAD." Guzman v. M. Teixeira Int'l,

Inc., 476 N.J. Super. 64, 70 (App. Div. 2023).

      We broadly construe and apply the protections of the LAD to allow for

the greatest available antidiscrimination impact. Richter v. Oakland Bd. of

Educ., 246 N.J. 507, 537 (2021). "The LAD's worthy purpose is no less than

eradication of '"the cancer of discrimination" in our society.'" Ibid. (quoting

Smith v. Millville Rescue Squad, 225 N.J. 373, 390 (2016) (quoting Nini v.

Mercer Cnty. Cmty. Coll., 202 N.J. 98, 115 (2010))). In a discrimination claim

under the LAD, it is the plaintiff who bears the burden to establish a prima facie

case. Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383, 408 (2010).

      Given that claims under the LAD are to be interpreted broadly and the

standard for summary judgment requires facts to be viewed in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party, the trial court's task is not to determine the

                                                                               A-2333-22
                                       17
strength of the case, but rather if plaintiff's "allegations, if true, can establish

that defendant[] violated the LAD." Beneduci v. Graham Curtin, P.A., 476 N.J.

Super. 73, 81-82 (App. Div. 2023).

            Rather than considering each incident in isolation,
            courts must consider the cumulative effect of the
            various incidents, bearing in mind "that each successive
            episode has its predecessors, that the impact of the
            separate incidents may accumulate, and that the work
            environment created may exceed the sum of the
            individual episodes."

            [Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 607 (1993)
            (quoting Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 955
            F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir. 1992)). ]

                    A. Failure to accommodate under the LAD.

      Under the LAD, a plaintiff has a cause of action for failure to

accommodate a disability when they prove that: (1) they qualify as having a

disability or perceived disability, (2) they were performing the functions of their

job, and (3) defendant failed to accommodate plaintiff's disability. Victor, 203

N.J. at 410. "It is not necessary that requests for reasonable accommodations be

in writing or even use the phrase 'reasonable accommodation.'" Tynan, 351 N.J.

Super. at 400 (quoting Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 313 (3d

Cir. 1999)). "While there are no magic words to seek an accommodation, the

employee, however, '"must make clear that . . . assistance [is desired] for his or

                                                                              A-2333-22
                                        18
her disability."'" Ibid. (quoting Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 214 F.3d 402, 408

(3d. Cir. 2000)). "An employee may use plain English and need not mention the

ADA or any other legal source requiring accommodation." Ibid. (citing Taylor,

184 F.3d at 313). Tynan sets forth the following four-part test that an employee

must establish in order to prevail on a failure to accommodate claim:

                   (1) the employer knew about the employee's
            disability; (2) the employee requested accommodations
            or assistance for her disability; (3) the employer did not
            make a good faith effort to assist the employee in
            seeking accommodations; and (4) the employee could
            have been reasonably accommodated but for the
            employer's lack of good faith.

            [Id. at 400-01.]

      Plaintiff argues that she established a prima facie case of discrimination

for failure to accommodate under the LAD by making the County aware of her

disability through medical information transmitted during the course of her

employment. We are unconvinced that plaintiff has met the Tynan standard.

      The trial court did not err in finding that plaintiff did not submit any

request for accommodation of a disability to her employer. Even if plaintiff

mentioned in an email her health was "suffering," there is no evidence in the

record she made any request for a disability accommodation. Any request for

                                                                           A-2333-22
                                       19
leaves of absences that plaintiff submitted were granted.         Therefore, we

conclude the trial court did not err in finding the plaintiff did not establish a

prima facie case of failure to accommodate a disability under LAD.

                  B. Hostile work environment under the LAD.

      To establish a hostile work environment under LAD, plaintiff must prove

"(1) that plaintiff is in a protected class; (2) that plaintiff was subjected to

conduct that would not have occurred but for that protected status; and (3) that

it was severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of employment."

Victor, 203 N.J. at 409 (citing Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 603-04).

      Plaintiff argues that Scaglione's report affirms her claim of a hostile work

environment. Scaglione found that Lucas was "rude, dismissive, and hostile in

her association with [plaintiff.]" Plaintiff alleges the hostility was related to

plaintiff's disability because Burnett wanted to transfer her since she was

"overwhelmed and . . . crying" all the time.

      The trial court found that even assuming plaintiff's anxiety was a LAD-

protected disability, she did not establish that the conduct would not have

occurred but for any medically-established disability. The trial court found that

plaintiff supported her claim using the effects it had on her, rather than the

conduct itself, which is insufficient under Lehmann. The trial court found that

                                                                            A-2333-22
                                      20
plaintiff was unable to connect the conduct of Lucas to her protected status nor

that the conduct was severe enough to alter the conditions of plaintiff's

employment.

      We find no error in the trial court's ruling. There are no proofs in the

record establishing that any conduct was taken because of any alleged disability.

While Scaglione's investigative report found plaintiff was subject to rude and

dismissive behavior from Lucas, there was no evidence proffered Lucas' conduct

was undertaken because of plaintiff's disability and the conduct was not

pervasive or severe enough to alter the conditions of plaintiff's employment.

                    C. Constructive discharge under the LAD.

      "[C]onstructive discharge under the LAD occurs when an '"employer

knowingly permit[s] conditions of discrimination in employment so intolerable

that a reasonable person subject to them would resign."'" Shepherd v. Hunterdon

Dev. Ctr., 174 N.J. 1, 27 (2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Muench v. Twp.

of Haddon, 255 N.J. Super. 288, 302 (App. Div. 1992)). Constructive discharge

requires more than the severe or pervasive conduct required to establish a hostile

work environment. Ibid. "[T]he standard envisions a 'sense of outrageous,

coercive and unconscionable requirements.'"        Id. at 28 (quoting Jones v.

Aluminum Shapes, Inc., 339 N.J. Super. 412, 428 (App. Div. 2001)).

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                                       21
         A constructive discharge analysis requires the court to "consider 'the

nature of the harassment, the closeness of the working relationship between the

harasser and the victim, whether the employee resorted to internal grievance

procedures, the responsiveness of the employer to the employee's complaints,

and all other relevant circumstances." Ibid. (quoting Shepherd v. Hunterdon

Dev. Ctr., 336 N.J. Super. 395, 420 (App. Div. 2001)). "'[A]n employee has the

obligation to do what is necessary and reasonable in order to remain employed

rather than simply quit.'" Ibid. (quoting Shepherd, 336 N.J. Super. at 420).

         Plaintiff claims that when Burnett became the new division head in 2019,

she sought to demote plaintiff because she had animus towards her, which

ultimately led plaintiff to retire early. Plaintiff also claims that her failure to

qualify for the records management title was a pretext for discrimination against

her evidenced by Burnett recommending her demotion and transfer to another

floor.

         The undisputed facts in the record establish plaintiff complained directly

to Burnett that she felt she was being harassed, bullied, and humiliated by Lucas.

Burnett met with Lucas and advised her that she was to not have any contact

with plaintiff.     Burnett also arranged communications training following

plaintiff's complaint.

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                                         22
      The trial court did not err in concluding that plaintiff did not establish a

prima facie case of constructive discharge under the LAD. Plaintiff provides no

evidence that any of Burnett's actions were taken because of an alleged

disability. The undisputed facts in the record establish the CSC directed Burnett

to move plaintiff to a title she was qualified for. When given the opportunity to

fill a position she was qualified for, plaintiff asked Burnett if she could remain

in the RMD. The undisputed facts establish Burnett acted appropriately in

responding to plaintiff's complaint.

      Plaintiff also inquired about retirement prior to the events that led to her

complaint. A claim of constructive discharge fails where evidence shows that

plaintiff had contemplated retirement prior to the events that allegedly forced

retirement. See Kirschling v. Atl. City Bd. of Educ., 10 F.Supp.3d 587, 601

(D.N.J. 2014).     In reviewing all of the relevant circumstances, we are

unconvinced that plaintiff established a prima facie case of constructive

discharge.

                                       V.

      Plaintiff proffers a multitude of other arguments regarding the inadequacy

of defendants' proofs on summary judgment, which the trial court rejected. We

are unconvinced the trial court erred and conclude that defendants submitted

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appropriate proofs which were considered as part of the summary judgment

record. We briefly address plaintiff's contentions.

      Plaintiff posited that defendants have not produced any facts or affidavits

based on personal knowledge pursuant to Rule 1:6-6 in support of summary

judgment; defendants improperly cite to plaintiff's complaint for their statement

of material facts; defendants' affidavit was signed by their lawyer in violation

of Murray v. Allstate Ins. Co., 209 N.J. Super. 163 (App. Div. 1986), appeal

dismissed, 110 N.J. 293 (1988); and alleged unauthenticated documents

produced by defendants are inadmissible under N.J.R.E. 803(b)(4) and should

not have been considered as part of the record on summary judgment.

      The trial court did not err in concluding Murray does not require the court

to disregard the documents identified by defendants' counsel in their

certification because there are no facts set forth characterizing them or

interpreting them. We also conclude Rule 803(b)(4) was also not violated since

plaintiff has presented no legal authority supporting the argument that

defendants are barred from introducing the alleged unauthenticated documents,

while plaintiff simultaneously relies on them for its position on summary

judgment.

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                                       VI.

      We decline to further consider plaintiff's argument that the trial court did

not comply with Rule 1:7-4 by failing to provide a statement of reasons for the

entry of the summary judgment orders because this assertion is belied by the

extensive written decision issued by the trial court on summary judgment and

the oral statement of reasons supporting the denial of reconsideration.

      To the extent we have not addressed any arguments raised by plaintiff,

they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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