Court Opinion

ID: 9829277
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:08:49.716465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:59.358710
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[5] On a former day of this term of court we affirmed the judgment in this cause on the theory that the facts showed a combination of circumstances that the jury were authorized to find that appellant was guilty of negligence in operating its gin stands, and that appellee was not aware of the danger, and therefore did not assume the risk in managing the said operations. Upon reconsideration of the evidence, and especially that of the appellee himself, we have reached the conclusion that we erred in affirming the ease on the former hearing. The testimony of appellee showed that he was perfectly familiar with the situation of the gin stands with relation to each other; he knew that the belt was laced crooked, that it worked in and out, and that the lacing caused it to jump when passing over the pulley, he knew how the receptacle for the oil was placed, and that he would have to reach his hand between the belt to fill the cup with oil. While he was under a foreman, he had charge of the operations of the gin. He testified that; ‘T had done some of that lacing myself. I have done pretty near all the belt lacing last year and this. It (the belt) was laced in the usual way. The belt was laced crooked. I mean by that I noticed the belt wasn’t going straight. The two ends were not cut straight. One was cut at a slant I noticed that right after it started up. I noticed it as it jumped in and out on the pulley where the lace would catch it. The belt would not work off the pulley, but just work out, and when it would hit it would come back again. It just worked in *142and out Just after we started up, I noticed it, and it kept up until the time of the accident. I have care of the stands too while we were not running; when we would have no cotton to gin and shut down the machinery temporarily, I would generally fix one thing and another. I would look around the machinery generally, sort of like an engineer would his engine, and see that everything was in order; see that nothing was getting out of fix or getting loose that needed tightening up. If I found anything out of order, little things around there, I would fix it.”
In our first opinion we said: “While he knew of the way the belt was laced, he did not know of the danger attending the work, as shown by the evidence.” Also: “If a servant knows of one defect, he does not take the risk of another of which he has no knowledge, and if both contribute to injure him he is entitled to recover, provided, but for the unknown defect, the accident would not have happened.”
Appellee was an experienced person, 28 years of age, and from his testimony we must conclude that all the defects of which he insisted contributed to his injury were known to him, and it is inconceivable that he did not know of the danger of placing his hand between the belt when the gin was running. It was unnecessary for him to take any such risk when he could have the engineer to stop the gins, or he could have stopped either gin separately by dropping the idler. He could have stopped the gin which he was oiling, thereby taking no risk of injury from the laced belt.
When the evidence about which there is no serious conflict is considered, we are of the opinion that it fails to show any liability on the part of the appellant, that the motion for rehearing should be granted, and the judgment he reversed, and, as the case seems to be fully developed, judgment should be rendered for appellant, and it is so ordered.
On Motion for Rehearing and Additional Findings of Fact.
We are asked by appellee to find as a fact that he did not know the danger attending the putting of his hand between the belt while the gin. was in operation. It is true that he testified he did not know the danger; but we are of the opinion, when all of his testimony is duly considered, that it shows he was perfectly familiar with the operation of the gins, acquired by long experience in their- operation, and the danger of putting his hand between the belt was so apparent that he must of necessity have known of the danger, and is therefore chargeable with knowledge thereof.
The motions are overruled.