Court Opinion

ID: 9379966
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-16 19:00:35.434734+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:54.432737
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                               File Name: 23a0136n.06

                                          No. 22-5067

                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT                                 FILED
                                                                                Mar 16, 2023
                                                                            DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
                                                )
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                )
        Plaintiff-Appellee,                     )         ON APPEAL FROM THE
                                                )         UNITED STATES DISTRICT
v.                                              )         COURT FOR THE EASTERN
                                                )         DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
PATRICK BAKER,                                  )
                                                )                                  OPINION
        Defendant-Appellant.
                                                )
                                                )

Before: MOORE, CLAY, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.

       KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. In 2017, a Kentucky jury found Patrick

Baker guilty of reckless homicide, robbery in the first degree, impersonating a peace officer, and

tampering with physical evidence in connection with the death of Donald Mills. Baker was

sentenced to nineteen years’ imprisonment in state custody. Two years later, Baker received a

pardon for offenses stemming from his conduct related to Mills’s death from then-Governor of

Kentucky Matthew Bevin. In 2021, however, Baker was federally indicted on one count of

unlawfully causing Mills’s death through the use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug

trafficking offense, based on the same conduct for which he had been pardoned.            A jury

subsequently found Baker guilty, and the district court sentenced him to a total of 474 months’

imprisonment in federal custody. On appeal, Baker argues that (1) his due-process rights were

violated because the federal government vindictively prosecuted him after he received a

gubernatorial pardon for state-law offenses based on the same underlying conduct; (2) the evidence
No. 22-5067, United States v. Baker

presented at trial was insufficient to sustain a conviction; and (3) he is entitled to discovery and an

evidentiary hearing on his claims that a government witness testified falsely against him and that

the government relatedly violated its Brady obligations regarding impeachment material about the

same witness. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.

                                        I. BACKGROUND

         At around 5:00 AM on May 9, 2014, two men kicked in the door of Donald Mills’s home,

where Mills and his family were sleeping. R. 140 (Trial Tr. at 97) (Page ID #737). The men

claimed to be federal law-enforcement officers. Id. at 98 (Page ID #738). One of the men took

Mills’s wife, Charlene James Mills, and children into a separate bedroom while the other man

remained with Mills. Id. at 98–99 (Page ID #738–39). According to Charlene, the man who stayed

with her husband was taller and “a lot skinnier” than the man who was with her and the children.

Id. at 101 (Page ID #741). She testified that the taller, skinnier man asked Mills: “Where is the

dope, and where is the money?” Id. at 99 (Page ID #739). While separated from her husband,

Charlene heard five or six gunshots from the other side of the house. Id. at 102 (Page ID #742).

She testified that she did not hear a struggle or fight prior to the gunshots. Id. at 108 (Page ID

#748).

         As the two men left Mills’s house, Charlene retrieved a gun and went out to the porch to

fire at the men’s vehicle as it pulled away. Id. She described the vehicle as a maroon Ford F-150

and said that she had seen the truck parked in her driveway two days prior. Id. She did not know

who drove the truck two days earlier, but stated that Elijah Messer had exited from the passenger’s

side of the truck. Id. at 108–09 (Page ID #748–49). After the truck drove away, Charlene went to

the master bedroom, where she found her husband “laying up against the wall with towels held up

                                                  2
No. 22-5067, United States v. Baker

to his chest bleeding to death.” Id. at 109 (Page ID #749). Mills told her that he did not know

who shot him. Id. Mills died after being transported to a hospital. Id. at 118 (Page ID #758).

       At the time of his death, Mills sold oxycodone and would typically keep 600 to 1,000

oxycodone pills in his house at any given time. Id. at 106–07 (Page ID #746–47). According to

his wife, however, Mills did not have any oxycodone pills in their house during the early hours of

May 9, although he did have some Neurontin and Zanaflex. Id. at 118–19 (Page ID #758–59).

Charlene James Mills testified that it was not a secret in their community that Mills sold

oxycodone. Id. at 107 (Page ID #747).

       Nathan Wagoner testified that in April and May 2014, Wagoner and Baker sold oxycodone

to each other, and that Baker was $1,200 in debt to Wagoner as a result of Baker’s addiction to

oxycodone. Id. at 195–96 (Page ID #835–36). Wagoner was friendly with Mills and had obtained

oxycodone from Mills since around 2007. Id. at 197 (Page ID #837). One or two weeks before

Mills was killed, Baker went to Wagoner’s apartment and mentioned that he wanted to rob

“someone with pills and money,” but did not specify whom he intended to rob. Id. at 198–99

(Page ID #838–39). Wagoner later talked to Stephanie Smith, who tried to convince him to help

Baker rob Mills and told Wagoner that she and Baker “had been staking out Donald Mills’ place.”

Id. at 205 (Page ID #845). Smith and Baker had staked Mills’s house out “[f]rom an elevated

position with binoculars, . . . for, like, two days watching his every move.” Id. At the time,

however, Wagoner did not know Smith was talking about Mills. Id. at 205 (Page ID #845). On

the evening of May 8, Wagoner returned to Smith’s trailer. Id. at 206 (Page ID #846). Baker,

Christopher Wagner, Steven Hensley, and Wagoner’s younger brother, Austin, were all at Smith’s

                                                3
No. 22-5067, United States v. Baker

trailer. Id. Shortly after Wagoner arrived, Wagner and Baker left in a maroon Ford F-150, which

Wagoner identified as belonging to Baker. Id. at 209, 215–16 (Page ID #849, 855–56).

        Wagner testified that, on May 8, Baker gave him a firearm to use for the robbery. Id. at

261 (Page ID #901). Baker told Wagner that Mills supposedly had 1,500 Roxicet 30s1 and

$200,000 in cash in Mills’s home. Id. at 257 (Page ID #897). They then went to Smith’s trailer

but left in the maroon F-150 shortly after Wagoner arrived. Id. at 267–68 (Page ID #907–08).

Baker and Wagner drove to Adam Messer’s trailer, where they met Elijah Messer. Id. at 270 (Page

ID #910). The three men smoked meth and discussed the robbery. Id. at 273–74 (Page ID #913–

14). Wagner testified that it was his impression that Elijah “was the ring leader,” and that Elijah

wanted Wagner and Baker to conduct the robbery on his behalf because Elijah would be

recognized easily as a result of having only one leg. Id. at 274–75 (Page ID #914–15). Baker then

showed Wagner and Elijah Messer an aerial photograph of Mills’s house on Baker’s iPad. Id. at

276–77 (Page ID #916–17). Wagner testified that the plan was for him, Baker, and Elijah Messer

to split the pills and cash among them after the robbery. Id. at 279 (Page ID #919).

        Wagner and Baker then left in Baker’s truck, and Elijah Messer followed them in his

brother’s truck, which was driven by Angela Mills,2 who had been at Adam Messer’s trailer while

the three men discussed the robbery. Id. at 280–81, 284–85 (Page ID #920–21, 924–25). After

arriving at Donald Mills’s house, Baker busted through the front door. Id. at 287 (Page ID #927).

Wagner corroborated the version of events given by Charlene James Mills and testified that he

        1
            A “Roxicet 30” is an oxycodone pill. R. 141 (Trial Tr. at 10) (Page ID #981).
        2
           Angela Mills was also known to some of the witnesses as Michelle Brown or Michelle Brown Mills. R. 141
(Trial Tr. at 208–09) (Page ID #1179–80); R. 144 (Trial Tr. at 102) (Page ID #1939). There is no indication that she
is related to Donald Mills.

                                                           4
No. 22-5067, United States v. Baker

stayed with Mills’s wife and children, while Baker tried to find out from Mills where the pills and

money were. Id. at 291–93 (Page ID #931–33). Wagner heard several gunshots, walked toward

the front door, and saw Baker come out of a room. Id. at 295 (Page ID #935). The two men left

in Baker’s truck, and Baker told Wagner that Mills “pulled a gun” and that “I had to shoot him.”

Id. at 298 (Page ID #938). Baker took approximately five oxycodone pills from Mills’s house. R.

141 (Trial Tr. at 14) (Page ID #985).

       Hensley also testified that Baker said he was planning to rob “a guy that had a bunch of

money and some pills in a safe.” Id. at 163 (Page ID #1134). Baker was in his truck with Wagner

during this conversation with Hensley. Id. Baker’s ex-wife testified that Baker told her that he

had planned to rob Mills but that “Mills pulled a gun on him and [Baker] had to shoot [Mills] in

self-defense.” Id. at 178 (Page ID #1149). Elijah Messer testified that Baker and Wagner arrived

at Adam Messer’s trailer in the early hours of May 9. Id. at 210–12 (Page ID #1181–83). Elijah

Messer corroborated that Baker showed him and Wagner an aerial shot of Mills’s house and that

the three of them discussed robbing Mills. Id. at 214–16 (Page ID #1185–87). Elijah Messer

testified that the plan was that “[Baker] was going to give me some [pills]. And then I was going

to buy some [pills], or trade some meth for some [pills].” Id. at 218 (Page ID #1189). Wagner

and Baker would split the rest of the pills. Id. After the robbery, Baker told Elijah Messer that he

shot Mills because Mills had a gun and tried to shoot him. Id. at 224–25 (Page ID #1195–96).

       Adam Messer also testified that sometime at night on May 8 or early in the morning of

May 9, he heard his brother, Baker, and Wagner discussing “Mills flashing money” and having

“all of these pills.” R. 144 (Trial Tr. at 112) (Page ID #1948). Adam Messer testified that his

brother was a drug dealer and would get 100 to 200 oxycodone pills from Mills at a time, which

                                                 5
No. 22-5067, United States v. Baker

Elijah would sell “to support his habit.” Id. at 113 (Page ID #1949). Adam Messer also saw the

aerial photograph of Mills’s house on Baker’s iPad. Id. at 116–17 (Page ID #1952–53).

       In July 2014, Baker was indicted in the Knox County Circuit Court on several state-law

counts related to Mills’s death. R. 149 (Mot. Dismiss/Limit Sentence at 1) (Page ID #2774). In

November 2017, a Kentucky jury found Baker guilty of reckless homicide; robbery in the first

degree; impersonating a peace officer; and tampering with physical evidence, and he was

sentenced to a total of nineteen years’ imprisonment. Id. Two years later, he received a pardon

from then-Governor of Kentucky Matthew Bevin, who commuted his sentence to time served. R.

165 (Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) ¶ 116) (Page ID #3005). Governor Bevin stated

in the pardon that “the evidence supporting [Baker’s] conviction is sketchy at best,” and expressed

that he was “not convinced that justice has been served in the death of Donald Mills,” nor was he

“convinced that the evidence has proven the involvement of Patrick Baker as murderer.” Id.

       In May 2021, a federal grand jury indicted Baker on one count of unlawfully causing

Mills’s death through the use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense,

namely conspiracy to distribute oxycodone, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1) and 21 U.S.C.

§ 846. R. 1 (Indictment) (Page ID #1). Following a nine-day trial, the jury found Baker guilty on

that count. R. 120 (Verdict) (Page ID #548). Baker then moved to dismiss the indictment against

him, or in the alternative, to limit his federal sentence to no more than nineteen years’

imprisonment, the same length as his state-court sentence prior to the pardon and commutation.

R. 149 (Mot. Dismiss/Limit Sentence at 1) (Page ID #2774). He also filed a Brady motion, seeking

the production of impeachment material related to any deals for leniency or sentence modification

struck with government witnesses Wagoner, Wagner, and Elijah Messer. R. 151 (Brady Mot. at

                                                6
No. 22-5067, United States v. Baker

1) (Page ID #2781). The district court denied both motions. R. 159 (Mem. Op. & Order at 1)

(Page ID #2933). The district court sentenced Baker to a term of 504 months’ imprisonment, with

a downward departure of 30 months to account for the time that Baker had already served in state

custody, for a total of 474 months’ imprisonment. R. 168 (Sent’g Hr’g Tr. at 93–94) (Page ID

#3143–44). Baker now timely appeals. R. 163 (Notice of Appeal) (Page ID #2967).

                               II. VINDICTIVE PROSECUTION

        Baker argues that the federal government vindictively prosecuted him by pursuing federal-

law charges against him only after he received a gubernatorial pardon for his state-law conviction

based on the same underlying conduct. We have held that “the ultimate decision whether to

dismiss an indictment for prosecutorial vindictiveness is reversible only if the district court abused

its discretion.” United States v. LaDeau, 734 F.3d 561, 565 (6th Cir. 2013). As we have explained:

        Because a district court has no discretion not to abide by governing law, an
        erroneous legal conclusion deserves no deference on appeal. As a result, even
        under abuse-of-discretion review, a district court commits error requiring reversal
        if its determination whether to dismiss an indictment for prosecutorial
        vindictiveness depends upon a misapplication of pertinent law. By contrast, where
        the district court’s dismissal determination hinges upon factual findings, we defer
        to the district court’s decision unless the findings upon which it was predicated are
        clearly erroneous.

Id. at 566 (internal citations omitted).

        The Due Process Clause “prohibits the prosecution from punishing a defendant for

exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right.” Id. A defendant can demonstrate

vindictive prosecution either through actual vindictiveness or by showing a “realistic likelihood of

vindictiveness.” Bragan v. Poindexter, 249 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States

v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 453 (6th Cir. 1980)).            To establish a “realistic likelihood of

vindictiveness,” a defendant must show “that (1) the prosecutor has ‘some “stake”’ in deterring

                                                  7
No. 22-5067, United States v. Baker

the [defendant’s] exercise of his rights and (2) the prosecutor’s conduct was somehow

‘unreasonable.’” Id. at 482 (quoting United States v. Anderson, 923 F.2d 450, 453–54 (6th Cir.

1991)). “Once a court has found that a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness exists, the government

bears the burden of disproving it or justifying the challenged state action.” Id. But “[i]f the

government fails to present evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption, the presumption stands

and the court must find that the prosecutor acted vindictively.” Id.

        Baker therefore must demonstrate that federal prosecutors had some stake in deterring the

exercise of his state-law right to seek a pardon, but his argument falters as a result of the separate-

sovereigns (or dual-sovereignty) doctrine. Under the separate-sovereigns doctrine, the Fifth

Amendment right against double jeopardy is not violated when a defendant is indicted and

convicted in federal court after already having been convicted of an offense based on the same

conduct in state court, or vice versa. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959); see also

Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1964 (2019). Baker’s claim is further complicated by

the fact that federal prosecutors generally are afforded broad discretion in decisions involving

charging. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“In our system, so long as

the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by

statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand

jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”).

        Accordingly, we have previously held that a defendant’s due-process rights are not violated

when state authorities refer the defendant’s case to federal authorities for prosecution, “as long as

[federal] prosecutors are not acting as rubber stamps and exert their own discretion as to whether

or not to prosecute.” United States v. Allen, 954 F.2d 1160, 1166 (6th Cir. 1992). Similarly, we

                                                       8
No. 22-5067, United States v. Baker

have also found no due-process violation where state authorities allegedly “triggered” the

defendant’s federal prosecution by placing a call to federal law enforcement regarding the

defendant’s guilty plea in state court. United States v. Odom, 42 F.3d 1389, 1994 WL 669675, at

*2 & n.1 (6th Cir. Nov. 29, 1994) (table). Baker has not presented any facts that suggest that

federal prosecutors simply acted as rubber stamps for the state instead of exercising their own

discretion in charging him. Baker points to the fact that the U.S. Attorney for the Western District

of Kentucky announced that his office would consider federally prosecuting individuals pardoned

by Governor Bevin. Appellant Br. at 30–31. But Baker was prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney for

the Eastern District of Kentucky. And even so, the fact that federal prosecutors might “consider”

prosecution of such individuals does not suggest an abdication of federal discretion.

       Our sibling circuits have likewise declined to find prosecutorial vindictiveness in cases

involving separate sovereigns. See, e.g., United States v. Ng, 699 F.2d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 1983)

(“[T]he fact that the prosecutions of the defendants are by two different sovereigns, each acting

independently under its own laws and in its own interest without any control of or by the other,

renders inapplicable the concept of prosecutorial vindictiveness.”); United States v. Schoolcraft,

879 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (“[T]he involvement of a separate sovereign tends to

negate a vindictive prosecution claim.”); United States v. Johnson, 91 F.3d 695, 698–99 (5th Cir.

1996) (concluding that there was no prosecutorial vindictiveness when the defendant was

prosecuted federally following his acquittal in state court on a capital-murder charge and his

successful filing of a grievance against two local assistant district attorneys for withholding

exculpatory evidence); United States v. Heidecke, 900 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1990) (concluding

that there was no prosecutorial vindictiveness when federal prosecutors indicted the defendant

                                                 9
No. 22-5067, United States v. Baker

after his state-court indictment was dismissed, in part because “[w]here there are successive

prosecutions by two sovereigns, as in this case, it is improbable that a realistic likelihood of

vindictiveness exists”); United States v. Beede, 974 F.2d 948, 952 (8th Cir. 1992) (concluding that

“state and federal prosecutors must remain free to exercise their prosecutorial discretion with

respect to the charging decision” regardless of the other sovereign’s charging decision); United

States v. Turpin, 920 F.2d 1377, 1388 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that the defendant’s due-process

rights were not violated when his state-court case was dismissed and he was indicted in federal

court based on the same conduct, even though he was subject to a harsher sentence in federal

court); United States v. Robison, 644 F.2d 1270, 1273 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that “the

involvement of separate sovereigns tends to negate a vindictive prosecution claim,” but declining

to hold that “a second prosecution can never be vindictive when it follows a successful defense in

a foreign jurisdiction”).

       As the Seventh Circuit concluded, “the possibility of institutional bias against retrial and a

personal prosecutorial stake in the proceedings is minimized” when separate sovereigns initiate

the two indictments. Heidecke, 900 F.2d at 1160. And the First Circuit has even suggested that

“a finding of complicity between federal and state prosecutors” would be required to show

vindictive prosecution where separate sovereigns are involved. United States v. Stokes, 124 F.3d

39, 45 n.4 (1st Cir. 1997). Baker has not made any showing of complicity between state and

federal prosecutors that would make us depart from the holdings of our sibling circuits.

       Baker’s argument also falters on the unreasonableness prong, because new evidence was

developed between his conviction in state court and his prosecution in federal court. Wagoner

first talked with law enforcement in August 2021 about his version of the events at issue, and thus

                                                10
No. 22-5067, United States v. Baker

his testimony was newly available at Baker’s federal trial. R. 140 (Trial Tr. at 218) (Page ID

#858). Wagner also provided additional, previously unavailable, details as part of his testimony

at Baker’s federal trial. R. 141 (Trial Tr. at 23–27) (Page ID #994–98). The new availability of

this additional evidence thus provides a possible explanation, unrelated to Baker’s pardon, for the

federal prosecutors’ decision to seek an indictment against Baker in 2021.

       Although we are troubled by the timing of Baker’s federal prosecution following his state-

law pardon, and by the impression that Baker may not have received such a lengthy federal

sentence but for his acceptance of a state-law pardon, we cannot say that the district court abused

its discretion in finding that there was no reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness in these particular

circumstances. Cases may arise in which the facts demonstrate that the federal government had a

stake in defeating a defendant’s exercise of their state-law rights, and thus under such

circumstances, a defendant’s due-process rights may be violated by a subsequent prosecution by a

separate sovereign. In this case, however, Baker has not made such a showing.

                           III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

A. Standard of Review

       Baker next argues that that the government’s evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that he unlawfully caused Mills’s death through the use of a firearm during the

commission of a drug trafficking conspiracy. We review de novo challenges to the sufficiency of

evidence. United States v. Ray, 803 F.3d 244, 262 (6th Cir. 2015). If, however, “after viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,” we must uphold the jury’s

verdict. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).

                                                  11
No. 22-5067, United States v. Baker

       In analyzing sufficiency of the evidence issues, “we do not weigh the evidence, consider

the credibility of witnesses or substitute our judgment for that of the jury.’” United States v.

Hilliard, 11 F.3d 618, 620 (6th Cir. 1993). A conviction can be sustained on circumstantial

evidence alone, “and such evidence need not ‘remove every reasonable hypothesis except that of

guilt.’” United States v. Ellzey, 874 F.2d 324, 328 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Stone,

748 F.2d 361, 363 (6th Cir. 1984)). Likewise, “the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice

may support a conviction under federal law.” United States v. Gallo, 763 F.2d 1504, 1518 (6th

Cir. 1985). Baker has not surmounted the heavy burden to show that the evidence was insufficient

to support his conviction.

B. Conspiracy to Distribute Oxycodone

       To obtain a conviction against Baker, the prosecution was required to prove that Baker

caused Mills’s death through use of a firearm “in the course of a violation of subsection (c).” 18

U.S.C. § 924(j). In relevant part, subsection (c) criminalizes using or carrying a firearm “during

and in relation to any . . . drug trafficking crime.” Id. § 924(c)(1)(A). Subsection (c) further

defines “drug trafficking crime” as “any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act

(21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.),

or chapter 705 of title 46.” Id. § 924(c)(2). The relevant drug-trafficking crime that formed an

element of the charged offense was conspiracy to distribute oxycodone, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 846. R. 1 (Indictment) (Page ID #1).

       “To obtain a conspiracy conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 846, ‘the government must prove

the existence of an agreement to violate the drug laws and that each conspirator knew of, intended

to join and participated in the conspiracy.’” United States v. Anderson, 89 F.3d 1306, 1310 (6th

                                                12
No. 22-5067, United States v. Baker

Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Pearce, 912 F.2d 159, 161 (6th Cir. 1990)). Although there

need not be a “formal, written agreement,” the government must prove “an agreement beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Id. We have previously held that a buyer-seller relationship alone is generally

insufficient to bring a buyer into the conspiracy, because “mere sales do not prove the existence

of the agreement that must exist for there to be a conspiracy.” Id. If, however, “there is additional

evidence beyond the mere purchase or sale, from which knowledge of the conspiracy may be

inferred,” we will uphold a conspiracy conviction. United States v. Grunsfeld, 558 F.2d 1231,

1235 (6th Cir. 1977). Circumstantial evidence that can establish a conspiracy “includes advance

planning, ongoing purchases or arrangements, large quantities of drugs, standardized transactions,

an established method of payment, and trust between the buyer and seller.” United States v.

Williams, 998 F.3d 716, 728 (6th Cir. 2021).

       Here, the government established evidence of a conspiracy beyond a mere buyer-seller

relationship. Baker believed that Mills had 1,500 oxycodone pills and $200,000 in cash in his

home. R. 140 (Trial Tr. at 257) (Page ID #897). Both Wagner and Elijah Messer testified that the

plan after the robbery was for the three men to split the oxycodone pills among them. Id. at 279

(Page ID #919); R. 141 (Trial Tr. at 218) (Page ID #1189). Even split among three people, the

large quantity of oxycodone pills that Baker believed they would recover from the robbery

suggests the existence of a conspiracy beyond a mere buyer-seller relationship or the acquisition

of drugs for personal use. Testimony from Wagoner, Wagner, Hensley, Elijah Messer, and Adam

Messer demonstrated the substantial amount of advance planning that went into the robbery for

the purpose of obtaining and subsequently distributing the oxycodone. R. 140 (Trial Tr. at 198–

205, 270) (Page ID #838–45, 910); R. 141 (Trial Tr. at 163, 210–18) (Page ID #1134, 1181–89);

                                                 13
No. 22-5067, United States v. Baker

R. 144 (Trial Tr. at 112–17) (Page ID #1948–53). And Adam Messer’s testimony established that

the robbery and subsequent plan to split the oxycodone pills among Baker, Wagner, and Elijah

Messer went far beyond Elijah Messer’s regular buyer-seller relationship with Mills, where Elijah

would purchase 100 to 200 oxycodone pills from Mills at a time, which Elijah would then sell to

others. R. 144 (Trial Tr. at 113) (Page ID #1949). In sum, there was sufficient evidence from

which a rational factfinder could conclude that Baker, Wagner, and Elijah Messer conspired to rob

Mills of a large quantity of oxycodone for the purpose of distributing the oxycodone.

C. Malice Aforethought

       Baker next argues that the government did not present sufficient proof of malice

aforethought at trial to sustain his conviction. To obtain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1),

the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed murder, as

defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1111. Section 1111 defines murder as “the unlawful killing of a human

being with malice aforethought.” 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a). “Malice aforethought may be inferred

when the defendant ‘grossly deviates from the standard of care to such an extent that a jury could

conclude that he must have been aware of a serious risk of death or serious bodily injury.’” United

States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508, 523 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Sheffey, 57 F.3d

1419, 1430 (6th Cir. 1995)).

       Baker argues that, because his ex-wife, Elijah Messer, and Wagner all testified that Baker

told them that he killed Mills after Mills pulled out a gun, there was insufficient evidence that

Baker acted with malice aforethought in killing Mills. R. 140 (Trial Tr. at 298) (Page ID #938);

R. 141 (Trial Tr. at 178, 224–25) (Page ID #1149, 1195–96). The jury, however, reasonably could

have chosen to credit the testimony of Mills’s wife that she did not hear a struggle or fight prior to

                                                 14
No. 22-5067, United States v. Baker

the gunshots, which cuts against Baker’s self-defense theory. R. 140 (Trial Tr. at 108) (Page ID

#748). And it is not proper for us to reweigh the evidence or consider the credibility of witnesses.

Hilliard, 11 F.3d at 620. We have, moreover, previously held that the fact of aiming a gun in the

victim’s direction and firing it “alone supports a finding of specific intent,” which is a more

culpable mental state than malice aforethought. United States v. Grant, 15 F.4th 452, 458 (6th Cir.

2021); see also United States v. Milton, 27 F.3d 203, 208 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that the

defendant acted with malice aforethought by firing two shots into the victim’s car). Baker does

not contest that he aimed the gun at Mills and fired it. Thus there was sufficient evidence for a

reasonable factfinder to conclude that Baker acted with malice aforethought when he shot Mills.

                           IV. FALSE TESTIMONY AND BRADY

       Baker argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for discovery and an

evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Wagoner received an agreement for a reduced sentence

in exchange for his testimony against Baker, and, if so, whether Wagoner testified falsely regarding

this issue. Although discovery motions are typically reviewed for abuse of discretion, we review

de novo claims pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). United States v. Miller, 161

F.3d 977, 986–87 (6th Cir. 1998). “To establish a violation of Brady, the [defendant] has the

burden of establishing that the prosecutor suppressed evidence; that such evidence was favorable

to the defense; and that the suppressed evidence was material.” Carter v. Bell, 218 F.3d 581, 601

(6th Cir. 2000).

       Baker’s motion was based on the fact that Wagoner, who was serving a federal sentence

for unrelated drug offenses at the time he testified against Baker in federal court, United States v.

Wagoner, 836 F. App’x 374, 376 (6th Cir. 2020), received a reduction in his federal sentence from

                                                 15
No. 22-5067, United States v. Baker

143 months’ imprisonment to 86 months’ imprisonment on November 1, 2021, just a few months

after testifying against Baker. R. 151 (Brady Mot. at 2) (Page ID #2782). Baker points to no

additional information to suggest that Wagoner had an agreement with the government prior to

testifying at Baker’s federal trial. As we have held:

       [A]lthough we do not take issue with the principle that the prosecution must
       disclose a tacit agreement between the prosecution and a witness, it is not the case
       that, if the government chooses to provide assistance to a witness following a trial,
       a court must necessarily infer a preexisting deal subject to disclosure under Brady.

Bell v. Bell, 512 F.3d 223, 234 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc); see also Williams v. Coyle, 260 F.3d 684,

707 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The mere fact that [the witnesses’] sentences were later altered is not

evidence that a deal existed prior to their testimony at trial.”). Because Baker has provided nothing

to suggest any agreement or understanding between the government and Wagoner prior to his

testimony, the district court did not err in denying Baker’s discovery motion pursuant to Brady.

                                       V. CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Baker’s conviction.

                                                 16