Court Opinion

ID: 9943479
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 17:06:07.792847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:04.050460
License: Public Domain

STATE OF LOUISIANA

                              COURT OF APPEAL

                                FIRST CIRCUIT

                                  2023 CA 0572

                              WHITNEY CONDON

                                     VERSUS
t

                            HORACE CONDON, JR.

                                                      Judgment Rendered:
                                                                           FEB 2 3 2024

                                Appealed from the
                            21" Judicial District Court
                        In and for the Parish of Livingston
                                State of Louisiana
                            Case No. 174838, Division J

                 The Honorable Jeffrey C. Cashe, Judge Presiding

    C. Glenn Westmoreland                   Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant
    Albany, Louisiana                       Whitney Condon

    David C. Hesser                         Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
    Alexandria, Louisiana                   Horace Condon, Jr.

              BEFORE: GUIDRY, C.J., CHUTZ, AND LANIER, JJ.
LANIER, J.

       In this custody proceeding that originated in Vernon Parish, the plaintiff,

Whitney Condon, appeals a judgment of the trial court sustaining an objection to

venue in Livingston Parish.       We amend the judgment to order that the suit be

transferred to Vernon Parish and, as amended, affirm the judgment.

                      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       During their marriage, Whitney and Horace Condon resided in Vernon

Parish. One child was born of the marriage on August 15, 2019. On October 19,

2020, the parties entered into a consent judgment that awarded " split custody with

visitation one week on and one week off with the minor child" with each parent

designated as " the    domiciliary parent of the minor child when he is in their

custody."    The parties also waived their right to any joint implementation plan by

the trial court.   The consent judgment was read, rendered, and signed by the trial

court in the 30th Judicial District Court, Vernon Parish, on January 5, 2021.        The

parties divorced in October 2021.

       On July 22, 2022, Ms. Condon filed a petition for custody and support in the

21st Judicial District Court, Livingston Parish, seeking an award of joint custody

with her designated as the domiciliary parent.       She also sought child support in

accordance with the guidelines.        Ms.   Condon subsequently filed an amended

petition, noting that she had relocated to Livingston Parish and was engaged to be

remarried.   She asserted " that it would serve the best interest of the minor child, the

parties and judicial economy that [ the prior consent judgment] be made executory

in the Parish of Livingston ...    and that any and all future litigation concerning

custody and support ... be brought in the Parish of Livingston."

       In response to the petition, Mr. Condon         filed an exception raising the

objections of improper venue, lack of jurisdiction over the defendant, and forum

non conveniens.     Mr. Condon argued that because there was no domiciliary parent

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designated in the consent judgment, Ms. Condon's domicile, Livingston Parish,

was not a court of proper venue and that the matter should remain in Vernon

Parish. He further asserted that based on the factors set forth in La. R.S. 13: 1819,

Livingston     Parish    is   an    inconvenient        forum    for   this   matter   under   the

circumstances.'     The matter was argued before the trial court on December 7, 2022,

at which time the trial court sustained the exception raising the objection of

improper venue.       The trial court signed a judgment in accordance therewith on

January 26, 2023. From this judgment, Ms. Condon has appealed.

                                   LAW AND DISCUSSION

        Venue means the parish where an action or proceeding may properly be

brought and tried under the rules regulating the subject." La. Code Civ. P. art. 41.

The objection to improper venue is raised by a declinatory exception.                   La. Code

Civ. P. art. 925( A). The general rules of venue provide that an action against "[ a] n

individual who is domiciled in the state shall be brought in the parish of his

domicile; or if he resides but is not domiciled in the state, in the parish of his

residence."    La. Code Civ. P. art. 42( 1).           However, "[ t] he general rules of venue

provided in Article 42 are subject to the exceptions provided in [ Articles 71

through 86] and otherwise provided by law." La. Code Civ. P. art. 43.

 As set forth in La. R.S. 13: 1819( B),      for the purpose of determining whether a forum is
inconvenient, the trial court shall consider all relevant factors, including:
        1) Whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continue in the future
       and which state could best protect the parties and the child.
        2) The length of time the child has resided outside this state.
        3) The distance between the court in this state and the court in the state that
       would assume jurisdiction.
       4) The relative financial circumstances of the parties.
        5) Any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume jurisdiction.
        6) The nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the pending
       litigation, including testimony of the child.
        7) The ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously and the
       procedures necessary to present the evidence.
        8) The familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues in the
       pending litigation.

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      The venue exceptions pertinent to custody and child support proceedings are

found in La. Code Civ. P. art. 74.2, which provide in part:

             A. A proceeding to obtain the legal custody of a child or to
      establish an obligation of support may be brought in the parish where
      a party is domiciled or in the parish of the last matrimonial domicile.

             B. A proceeding for change of custody may be brought in the
      parish where the person awarded custody is domiciled or in the parish
      where the custody decree was rendered. If the person awarded
      custody is no longer domiciled in the state, the proceeding for change
      of custody may be brought in the parish where the person seeking a
      change of custody is domiciled or in the parish where the custody
      decree was rendered.

             E. For the convenience of the parties and the witnesses and in
      the interest of justice, a court, upon contradictory motion or upon its
      own motion after notice and hearing, may transfer the custody or
      support proceeding to another court where the proceeding might have
      been brought.

      Thus, under Article 74. 2( B),   a proceeding for change of custody may be

brought in the parish where the person awarded custody is domiciled or in the

parish where the custody decree was rendered.           Comment ( c)    of the   1983

comments to this article provides: "   Venue for a proceeding for change of custody

would be the parish where the person awarded custody is domiciled or where the

original decree was rendered because both courts would be familiar with the

circumstances of the case and could rule in the best interest of the minor."

      On appeal, Ms. Condon argues that venue was proper in Livingston Parish

as Article 74. 2 clearly provides that her domicile is a proper venue for a change in

custody and for the initial setting of child support.      Ms. Condon asserts that

because she and Mr. Condon       were awarded split custody and designated co -

domiciliary parents, the parish of her domicile is a proper venue for this matter.

Ms. Condon maintains the trial court's focus should not have been on whether

Vernon Parish was still a court of proper venue but rather on whether Livingston

Parish was a court of proper venue.

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       In support of her argument, she cites Pinegar v. Harris, 2006-2489 ( La.

App. 1 Cir. 5/ 4/07), 961 So. 2d 1246. In Pinegar, three earlier consent judgments

had been entered into by the parties in East Baton Rouge Parish reflecting that the

parents had shared physical custody of the child, with alternating weeks, but

neither parent was named as the domiciliary parent. Thereafter, the mother filed a

rule to modify custody and support in St. Tammany Parish where she was

domiciled.    The trial court denied the father's exception raising the objection of

improper venue, finding that venue was proper in St. Tammany Parish. Pinegar,
961 So.2d at 1249- 1250. On appeal, this court held that because there had been no

designation of a domiciliary parent and the parents had been awarded joint

custody,   venue was proper in either East Baton Rouge Parish or St. Tammany

Parish pursuant to Article 74. 2( B) and that the trial court had not abused its vast

discretion in declining to transfer the matter to East Baton Rouge Parish. Pinegar,

961 So. 2d at 1250- 1251.

       Mr. Condon      argues that venue based on a weekly " rotating domiciliary

parent" is invalid according to the Louisiana Supreme Court's holding in Hodges v.

Hodges, 2015- 0585 ( La. 11/ 23/ 15), 181 So. 3d 700. He further asserts that the trial

court was correct to consider Article 74.2( E) in its decision and did not abuse its

discretion in ordering that the proceedings be heard in Vernon Parish. Mr. Condon

notes that not only does he continue to reside in Vernon Parish, but the minor child

resides there for half of the time.      He adds that Vernon Parish is where the case

originated and that numerous witnesses,           including grandparents, other family,

babysitters, and friends, also reside in Vernon Parish and would potentially have to

travel approximately 193 miles to testify in this custody matter.

       In Hodges, the court held that "[ a] lthough each parent can share physical

custody, the court can only designate a single domiciliary parent."          Hodges, 181

So. 3d at 706; see La. R.S. 9: 355( A)( 2)( b) and ( 13)( 1).   Further, " when parties are

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awarded joint custody, the court must designate a domiciliary parent unless the

implementation order provides otherwise, or for other good cause shown."                          Id.

 citing Evans v. Lungrin, 97- 0541 ( La. 2/ 6/ 98), 708 So. 2d 731, 737).

       In the instant case, Mr. and Ms. Condon consented to an award of split

custody, with each parent designated as " the domiciliary parent of the minor child

when he is in their custody."              Further, the parties waived their right to an

implementation plan by the trial court. Pursuant to Hodges, a single domiciliary

parent must be designated.         Hodges, 181 So. 3d at 706.          Thus, by entering into a

consent judgment that was not in compliance with the supreme court's ruling in

Hodges, the parties have chosen not to designate a domiciliary parent. Thus, based

on a plain reading of Article 74. 2( B), under the facts and circumstances of this

case, venue was proper in either Livingston Parish or Vernon Parish. See Pinegar,

961 So. 2d at 1251. 2

       However, we note that Article 74.2( E) provides a party with a procedure to

challenge a venue that may also be appropriate under that article.' In evaluating

such a challenge, the trial court has great discretion to decide which of the several

proper venues is more appropriate when considering the convenience of the parties

and the witnesses and the interest of justice.            When exercising its discretion, the

court always should be mindful of whether it has access to the relevant information

pertinent to a determination of the overriding concern in all child custody

disputes— the best interest of the child.         Lewis v. Marcotte, 2021- 0432 ( La. App.

1 Cir. 12/ 22/ 21),    339 So. 3d 1189, 1193 ( finding          no abuse of discretion under

Article 74. 2( E) in determination that Jefferson Parish was more appropriate venue

2 Although Pinegar was decided before the supreme court's ruling in Hodges regarding the need
for the designation of a single domiciliary parent, we find the ruling instructive herein. In
Pinegar, neither parent was named domiciliary parent. Similarly, in the case before us, the
improper designation of co -domiciliary parents results in no domiciliary parent designated.
3 We note that pursuant to Article 74. 2( E), the trial court in Livingston Parish, on its own motion,
could have transferred Ms. Condon's petition for custody and support to Vernon Parish in the
interest ofjustice and based upon the convenience of the parties.

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to hear petition seeking a modification of custody although domiciliary parent

resided in Tangipahoa Parish;          the custody proceeding originated in Jefferson

Parish, the parties shared physical custody of the child on a 50/ 50 basis, the child

attended school in Jefferson Parish, and non -domiciliary parent was domiciled in

Jefferson Parish).

       In the instant case, the consent decree originated in Vernon Parish.

Moreover, as        noted by Mr. Condon, numerous witnesses, including the minor

child' s grandparents, reside in Vernon Parish.          Under the facts and circumstances

of this case, we find no error in the trial court's decision granting the exception to

decline venue in Livingston Parish and concluding that Vernon Parish was the

proper venue for Ms. Condon's petition for custody and support.'

        While we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion with respect to its

determination that under Article 74. 2( E), Vernon Parish was the more appropriate

venue for the relief sought by Ms. Condon, we note that inherent in such

determination is that an order be issued for the actual transfer of the newly filed

matter to that more appropriate venue or court.           See La. Code Civ. P. art. 74. 2( E);

see also Labostrie v. Labostrie, 605 So.2d 187 ( La. 1992). Herein, while the trial

4 In reaching a decision herein, we are mindful of our prior holding in St. Amant v. St. Amant,
564 So.2d 1312, 1315 ( La. App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 567 So.2d 622 ( La. 1990), which pre -dated
the supreme court's holding in Hodges, and find it to be clearly distinguishable from the instant
case.
       St. Amant stands for the proposition that when there is joint custody and a domiciliary
parent has been named, the parish of the domiciliary parent and the parish of the custody decree
are proper venues under Article 74. 2( B).   In considering the venue provisions of Article 74. 2,
this court found:

              We note at least the possibility of an argument that Article 74.2 speaks of
        the person awarded custody," and that in a joint custody situation either parent
       could claim custody for venue purposes. We dismiss the merits of such an
       argument because Article 74.2 in speaking of venue uses the singular in referring
       to " the parish where the person awarded custody is domiciled." The legislature
       obviously meant one parish and one person.   The one person in a joint custody
       circumstance would obviously be the domiciliary parent ....
St. Amant, 564 So. 2d at 1315. Unlike in St. Amant, at the time Ms. Condon file her petition for

custody and support, although the parties were awarded split custody, there was no proper
domiciliary parent designated. Thus, we decline to extend the holding of St. Amant beyond the
facts presented in that case

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court sustained the objection of venue and ordered that all proceedings be heard in

Vernon Parish, the trial court's judgment did not actually transfer the proceeding

back to Vernon Parish.     Therefore, we amend the trial court's judgment to order

that this matter—   Ms. Condon's petition for custody and support— be transferred to

the 30th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Vernon. As amended, the January

26, 2023 judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                      DECREE

      For the above and foregoing reasons, we amend the January 26, 2023

judgment of the trial court to order that this matter be transferred to the 30th

Judicial District Court for the Parish of Vernon, and, as amended, we affirm. We

assess all costs associated with this appeal against Whitney Condon.

AMENDED AND AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.

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