Court Opinion

ID: 2964709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:29:58.209338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:00.414670
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1802

                       JAMES L. MINITER INSURANCE AGENCY, INC.,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                               OHIO INDEMNITY COMPANY,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                    [Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]
                                              ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                 Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________
                              Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                   ____________________
                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                                 ____________________

            Peter  C. Knight  with  whom  Hunter O'Hanian,  Tory  A.  Weigand,
            ________________              _______________   _________________
        Morrison, Mahoney & Miller were on brief for appellant.
        __________________________
            David P.  Shouvlin  with  whom Porter,  Wright, Morris  &  Arthur,
            __________________             __________________________________
        Michael  R. Gottfried  and Burns  & Levinson,  LLP were  on brief  for
        _____________________      _______________________
        appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                     May 12, 1997
                                 ____________________

                      STAHL, Circuit Judge.  Plaintiff-appellant James L.
                      STAHL, Circuit Judge.
                             _____________

            Miniter  Insurance  Agency,  Inc.  ("Miniter")   appeals  the

            district  court's  grant  of  summary judgment  in  favor  of

            defendant-appellee   Ohio   Indemnity  Company   ("Ohio")  on

            Miniter's six-count  complaint for  damages arising out  of a

            dispute over  right to commissions.1   Finding  no error,  we

            affirm.

                                      Background
                                      Background
                                      __________

                      Miniter, an insurance  brokerage located in Quincy,

            Massachusetts, serves  over four hundred  and fifty insureds,

            three  hundred  of  which   are  banks  and  other  financial

            institutions.  Banks and  financial institutions need,  among

            others, a type of insurance known as Vender's Single Interest

            Insurance  ("VSI"), which  insures lenders  against potential

            losses arising from the differential between the actual value

            of  a  vehicle  being  financed  and  the  lender's  security

            interest.   VSI  is offered  by  Ohio, an  insurance  company

            located in Columbus.  

                      In  1984, Miniter  became  broker  for  Connecticut

            National Bank  ("CNB")  and procured  a  VSI policy  for  CNB

            through Fidelity and  Deposit Insurance Company ("Fidelity").

            In  1988, CNB  merged  with Shawmut  Bank ("Shawmut"),  which

                                
            ____________________

            1.  As   amended,  Miniter's  complaint   alleged  breach  of
            contract, breach of  the implied covenant  of good faith  and
            fair dealing,  breach of  fiduciary duty,  unjust enrichment,
            interference  with advantageous  relations, and  violation of
            Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A,    2, 9, and 11.

                                         -2-
                                          2

            continued to meet its insurance needs  through Miniter.  That

            same   year,  Fidelity  stopped   issuing  VSI   policies  in

            Massachusetts, and  Miniter moved Shawmut's  VSI coverage  to

            Travelers  Insurance  Company  ("Travelers").     Eventually,

            Travelers  also discontinued  its  VSI  business,  which  led

            Miniter to solicit a  VSI proposal from Ohio.  In  1990, Ohio

            agreed to  provide  VSI  to Shawmut,  and  Miniter  and  Ohio

            entered   into   an  agency   agreement  to   effectuate  the

            arrangement.

                      Miniter  characterizes  the  agreement  as  a  non-

            exclusive   agency  agreement  under  which  Miniter  had  no

            obligation to  issue insurance exclusively through Ohio; Ohio

            had  no  obligation  to  accept  only  policies  brokered  by

            Miniter.   The agency agreement contained  several provisions

            relevant to  this dispute.   First, it provided  that Miniter

            would  receive commissions  of 20%  of the  premiums  paid on

            policies  issued  by  Ohio  to  "policyholders  obtained"  by

            Miniter.  Second, it provided that should a conflict arise as

            to which agent  was entitled to  commissions on a  particular

            policy, "the policyholder's written statement designating his

            agent  or broker  shall be  binding" upon  Miniter and  Ohio.

            Third,  the  agreement  provided  that   Miniter's  right  to

            commissions  would  cease  upon  proper  cancellation of  the

            policy.  Finally, Ohio  orally agreed not to contact  or deal

            directly with Shawmut without involving Miniter.

                                         -3-
                                          3

                      In September 1990, Ohio issued the first of two VSI

            policies  to Shawmut.   The  first policy  provided "run-off"

            coverage, meaning  that should either Shawmut  or Ohio cancel

            the policy, Ohio would be obligated to continue coverage  for

            any vehicle insured  during the life of the policy.  In order

            to provide run-off coverage, Ohio needed to hold a portion of

            each  premium   in  reserve  for  potential   future  claims.

            According to  Ohio, the run-off coverage  rendered its policy

            to  Shawmut unprofitable.   Miniter, however,  viewed run-off

            coverage  as  an  essential element  of  any  VSI policy  for

            Shawmut.

                      In  the spring  of 1993  David  Juredine, Miniter's

            contact at Ohio, began to indicate to Arthur Donley, Chairman

            of the  Board and  Chief Executive  Officer of  Miniter, that

            Ohio wished  to cease providing run-off  coverage to Shawmut.

            In the spring of 1994, Juredine indicated to Donley that Ohio

            would make a  one time, lump  sum payment  to Shawmut of  its

            run-off  reserve if  Shawmut  would relieve  Ohio of  run-off

            liability.    During the  same  period,  Gary Grondin,  Vice-

            President of  Shawmut   who handled VSI,  began conveying  to

            Miniter Shawmut's desire to reduce the amount Shawmut paid in

            premiums  on its  VSI policy.   At  some point  Grondin asked

            Donley to solicit proposals from other carriers.

                      On May 19, 1994 Juredine informed Miniter that Ohio

            could offer a lump sum payment of approximately $2,000,000 to

                                         -4-
                                          4

            Shawmut.    Miniter immediately  communicated  this  offer to

            Shawmut.    On  May  20,  however,  Ohio  faxed  Miniter  the

            following:

                      Dear  Art:  Please disregard previous and
                      current  correspondence   (UPS  overnight
                      already mailed).  The amount  of unearned
                      premiums  mentioned  is inaccurate.   The
                      new figure is being calculated.

            On May  26, Ohio faxed Miniter  a new lump sum  offer of $1.8

            million, contingent on  Shawmut's agreement to eliminate  the

            run-off coverage.  Miniter  communicated the reduced offer as

            well.

                      From late  May into  July 1994, Grondin  and Donley

            continued to  discuss whether Shawmut would  receive the lump

            sum payment.  The discussions came to a head in mid-July at a

            meeting  between Grondin,  Grondin's supervisor,  Donley, and

            Donley's  daughter  Julianne,  who  serves  as  president  of

            Miniter.   Grondin came to the meeting expecting a check from

            Ohio, payable  to  Shawmut, in  the amount  of $1.8  million.

            Instead,  Donley informed  him that  Ohio had reneged  on its

            offer,  that Ohio had no interest in  making a deal, and that

            he  wanted to move Shawmut  to a different  carrier.  Grondin

            asked  Donley for  something in  writing to  this effect,  in

            response  to  which  Donley  produced  a  letter  from  Ohio.

            Grondin  testified that "[a]fter [he]  read the letter  . . .

            [he]  stated to Arthur Donley  that this does  not state that

            David Juredine from  [Ohio] didn't want  to drop the  run-off

                                         -5-
                                          5

            coverage  and  give  us the  $1.8  million."2   Grondin  then

            refused to  consider  proposals Miniter  had  solicited  from

            other  carriers,  and  cancelled  a  subsequent  meeting with

            Donley.

                      At that point, Shawmut  began to lose patience with

            Miniter, and felt deceived  and "taken for a ride."   Shortly

            after the meeting,  Grondin informed Donley that he wanted to

            speak directly with someone at  Ohio.  Donley responded  that

            Ohio  did not want to  speak with Shawmut  and reiterated his

            desire to change insurance carriers.  Grondin replied that he

            did  not want to change  carriers; he simply  wanted the $1.8

            million. On his own, Grondin  began to solicit proposals from

            other carriers.  Grondin also called Juredine at Ohio.  

                      In   his   conversation   with  Juredine,   Grondin

            indicated  that  he   viewed  Ohio's  offer  and   subsequent

            retraction as very unethical.  Grondin also informed Juredine

            that  Shawmut sought to broker  a new policy  directly with a

            carrier  rather than  work through  Miniter or any  agent and

            that Shawmut intended to change carriers.  Grondin indicated,

            however,  that  if  Juredine  wished to  submit  a  proposal,

            Grondin would  consider it.   Juredine responded that  he had

            "no  problem" giving Shawmut the 1.8 million dollars.  In the

            same  conversation Juredine also  informed Grondin  that Ohio

                                
            ____________________

            2.  Grondin  testified that  he did  not have  a copy  of the
            letter Donley showed him,  and the letter is absent  from the
            record.

                                         -6-
                                          6

            had  no  problem  letting  Shawmut  have  a  portion  of  the

            commissions, but that Donley did not want to reduce Miniter's

            commission level.

                      Juredine then called  Donley and apprised  him that

            Grondin had  contacted him  and that  Shawmut wanted  to work

            through its own in-house agency, that is, Shawmut wanted some

            or  all  of the  commissions  deriving from  the  VSI policy.

            Donley asked  Juredine  what he  planned to  do and  Juredine

            responded that he had to save the business for Ohio before he

            could  worry  about Miniter.   Donley  gave no  indication to

            Juredine whether  Shawmut had terminated Miniter.   He simply

            reminded Juredine that  he was not to  negotiate with Shawmut

            directly without Miniter's involvement.

                      From that point forward  Shawmut began to negotiate

            VSI coverage  directly with Ohio.  On  July 28, 1994 Ohio and

            Shawmut came to an agreement on  the second VSI policy.   The

            terms of  the second policy designated  the Shawmut Insurance

            Agency  as the broker and required Ohio to pay commissions of

            30%.  The new  policy did not include  run-off coverage.   It

            did  include a lump  sum payment to  Shawmut of  just over $2

            million,  representing  the   $1.8  million  plus  additional

            reserves earned during the summer of  1994.  Also on July 28,

            Grondin and his supervisor  informed Donley by telephone that

            Shawmut was  terminating its relationship  with Miniter,  and

            Grondin followed up with a letter.

                                         -7-
                                          7

                                  Standard of Review
                                  Standard of Review
                                  __________________

                      We review  the award  of summary judgment  de novo.
                                                                 _______

            See Ortiz-Pinero  v. Rivera-Arroyo, 84  F.3d 7, 11  (1st Cir.
            ___ ____________     _____________

            1996).  Summary judgment  is appropriate in the absence  of a

            genuine  issue of  material fact,  when the  moving party  is

            entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See Fed. R. Civ. P.
                                                      ___

            56(c).   A  fact is  material  when it  has the  potential to

            affect the  outcome of the suit.  See  J. Geils Band Employee
                                              ___  ______________________

            Benefit Plan  v. Smith Barney  Shearson, Inc., 76  F.3d 1245,
            ____________     ____________________________

            1250-51  (1st  Cir.), cert.  denied,  117 S.  Ct.  81 (1996).
                                  _____  ______

            Neither   party  may   rely  on  conclusory   allegations  or

            unsubstantiated  denials, but  must  identify specific  facts

            derived   from   the  pleadings,   depositions,   answers  to

            interrogatories,  admissions  and  affidavits to  demonstrate

            either the existence  or absence of  an issue of  fact.   See
                                                                      ___

            Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) & (e). 

                                    Choice of Law
                                    Choice of Law
                                    _____________

                      Miniter    initially    filed   this    action   in

            Massachusetts  state  court  and alleged  only  state claims.

            Ohio  removed   the  case   to  federal  district   court  in

            Massachusetts.   See  28 U.S.C.    1332.   The  parties agree
                             ___

            that, pursuant to  a choice  of law provision  in the  agency

            agreement, Ohio law governs Miniter's contract  based claims,

            and  that Massachusetts  law  governs Miniter's  tort claims.

            The parties dispute  only which state's law governs the claim

                                         -8-
                                          8

            for breach of  the implied  covenant of good  faith and  fair

            dealing, ostensibly  because  of Ohio's  contention that  the

            common law  of the state  of Ohio  does not recognize  such a

            cause of action in these circumstances.

                      We have held  that "[w]here  . . . the parties have

            agreed about  what law governs,  a federal  court sitting  in

            diversity is free,  if it chooses,  to forego an  independent

            analysis and accept the parties' agreement."   Borden v. Paul
                                                           ______    ____

            Revere Life Ins. Co., 935 F.2d 370, 375 (1st  Cir. 1991).  In
            ____________________

            the absence of any compelling reason to do otherwise, we will

            honor the parties'  choice of  law on all  counts upon  which

            they agree.   As we  explain below, we need  not decide which

            state's law governs Miniter's claim for breach of the implied

            covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

                                      Discussion
                                      Discussion
                                      __________

                      As  indicated, the  district court  granted summary

            judgment  against Miniter on  all counts.   On appeal Miniter

            claims  that the  district court improperly  resolved genuine

            issues  of  material   fact  in  order   to  arrive  at   its

            conclusions.    We  review  Miniter's claims  in  turn,  and,

            finding no error, we affirm.

            A.  Breach of Contract
            ______________________

                      Miniter advances two arguments within its breach of

            contract claim.  First, it asserts, Ohio breached the written

            agreement  by  failing to  pay  Miniter  commissions for  the

                                         -9-
                                          9

            second policy  issued to Shawmut.   Second, Miniter contends,

            Ohio breached  "its subsidiary  but separate promise"  not to

            contact  or  deal  directly  with  Shawmut  without involving

            Miniter.  

                      1.  The Agency Agreement
                      ________________________

                      The  relevant provisions  of  the agency  agreement

            provide:

                      The   Agent   shall   be    entitled   to
                      commissions equal to  20% of the  written
                      premiums paid  on policies issued  by the
                      Company to policyholders obtained  by the
                      Agent.  If a  conflict exists as to which
                      producer  is  authorized  to represent  a
                      policyholder, the  policyholder's written
                      statement designating his agent or broker
                      shall be binding upon  the Agent and  the
                      Company.  

                                         ....

                      The  Agent's  right to  commissions shall
                      cease  upon cancellation  of a  policy in
                      accordance    with    the    cancellation
                      provisions in the policy.

            The  district court found  the relevant  terms of  the agency

            agreement  unambiguous, and  held  that as  a  matter of  law

            Shawmut's  designation of  its in-house  agency as  broker of

            record  disposed of  Miniter's  claim to  commissions on  the

            second policy.

                      On appeal Miniter asserts  that the language in the

            agreement  allows  for  more  than  one  interpretation,  and

            therefore,   should   have   precluded    summary   judgment.

            Specifically, Miniter  asserts that  an issue of  fact exists

                                         -10-
                                          10

            whether  it "obtained"  Shawmut  for purposes  of the  agency

            agreement.   Miniter also  contends that the  term "producer"

            does not apply  in this  situation between an  agent and  the

            insured client.   Instead, Miniter contends,  the term should

            only apply  in situations  involving two competing  insurance

            agents.   Finally, Miniter avers that  it produced the second

            policy.  We disagree.

                      Neither  the  parties' nor  our own  examination of

            Ohio  law has  uncovered  any cases  construing the  disputed

            terms  of  the  agency agreement.    We  turn, therefore,  to

            general  principles  of  contract  construction.    In  Ohio,

            construction of  written contracts is  a matter of  law, with

            the underlying  purpose of  discovering and  effectuating the

            intent of the  parties.  See Graham v. Drydock  Coal Co., 667
                                     ___ ______    _________________

            N.E.2d  949,  952 (Ohio  1996).   We  must give  common words

            appearing in  written  contracts "their  plain  and  ordinary

            meaning  unless manifest  absurdity  results or  unless  some

            other meaning  is clearly intended  from the face  or overall

            contents"  of the  contract.   Alexander v.  Buckeye Pipeline
                                           _________     ________________

            Co.,  374 N.E.2d  146,  150 (Ohio  1978).   We  may  consider
            ___

            extrinsic evidence  to ascertain  the parties'  intent either

            when  faced  with  unclear  or ambiguous  language,  or  when

            circumstances  surrounding  the  agreement  give   the  plain

            language special  meaning.  See  Graham, 667  N.E.2d at  952.
                                        ___  ______

            "[W]here  the terms  in an  existing contract  are  clear and

                                         -11-
                                          11

            unambiguous,"  however, we  "cannot  in effect  create a  new

            contract  by finding  an intent  not  expressed in  the clear

            language employed by the parties."   Alexander, 374 N.E.2d at
                                                 _________

            150.

                      We agree with the  district court that the language

            of  the  agency  agreement  is  clear  and  unambiguous,  and

            provides  without  caveat  that  the  policyholder's  written

            statement designating its agent binds Miniter and  Ohio.  The

            agency   agreement  provides  that   the  agent's   right  to

            commissions shall cease upon  cancellation of a policy.   The

            parties  do  not dispute  that  Shawmut  cancelled the  first

            policy,  terminating  Miniter's  right to  commissions.   The

            agency  agreement  further provides  that  the policyholder's

            designation  of  its agent  or  broker  shall be  binding  on

            Miniter and Ohio.   Shawmut's  written statement  designating

            its  in-house  agency  as  its  agent,   therefore,  controls

            disbursement of commissions under the second policy.

                      Miniter's contention that it "obtained" Shawmut for

            purposes of the second policy fails to find support either in

            the agreement  or  the  record.    Miniter  asserts  that  by

            introducing Shawmut  to Ohio and brokering  the first policy,

            Miniter obtained  Shawmut for  the  second policy.   On  that

            basis,  Miniter contends, the  agency agreement requires Ohio

            to remit commissions to  Miniter, and not Shawmut.   The most

            obvious flaw in this argument is that it ignores the sentence

                                         -12-
                                          12

            immediately following the  "obtained" sentence, which, as  we

            have pointed out, provides  that in the event of  a conflict,

            the  policyholder's written  statement designating  its agent

            shall bind Miniter and Ohio.

                      The  record  further  belies  Miniter's  assertion.

            Shawmut  cancelled the  first  policy, initiated  discussions

            with  Ohio as well as  other carriers, and  ultimately made a

            deal with Ohio.  Shawmut's  decision to work in-house  rather

            than  through   an  independent  agency   fatally  undermines

            Miniter's contention  that it  obtained Shawmut for  Ohio for

            purposes of the  second policy.   Further, as  we discuss  in

            greater  detail below,  Miniter tried  to steer  Shawmut away

            from Ohio toward another carrier rather than maintain Shawmut

            as a policyholder of Ohio.    Miniter  ominously argues  that

            to  interpret the  agency  agreement in  this fashion  "would

            eviscerate  the independent agency  practice and arm insurers

            with  a lethal  weapon for  eliminating and  compromising the

            intermediary agent after the account has been brought to it."

            Miniter's interpretation would  effectively allow Miniter  to

            collect  premiums on  any  policies Ohio  issued to  Shawmut,

            whether or not  it actually brokered them,  simply because it

            brokered  the  initial  VSI  policy  between  those  parties.

            Miniter's  interpretation would  preclude Ohio  from honoring

            Shawmut's designation  in any insurance  policies Ohio issued

            to  Shawmut.    In  other words,  that  interpretation  would

                                         -13-
                                          13

            contradict subsequent  provisions in the same  section of the

            agreement.  We reiterate that "where the terms in an existing

            contract  are clear  and unambiguous,  [we] cannot  in effect

            create a new contract  by finding an intent not  expressed in

            the clear language."  Alexander, 374 N.E.2d at 150.
                                  _________

                      Miniter argues that "the producer provision applies

            when there are two competing insurance agents, not between an

            agent and the insured."  Miniter points to no language in the

            agreement limiting  that  provision beyond  its plain  terms.

            Ohio  law  dictates that  we  must presume  that  the written

            contract  reflects the intent of the parties, see Graham, 667
                                                          ___ ______

            N.E.2d at  952, and that  we may consider  extrinsic evidence

            only when  that language  is ambiguous or  when circumstances

            surrounding  the agreement  give the  plain language  special

            meaning.   See  id.    Miniter  points  us  to  no  authority
                       ___  ___

            indicating that an insured may not procure insurance directly

            from  a  carrier, and  in  effect, act  as its  own  agent or

            broker.    We  do  not  identify  any  special  circumstances

            surrounding  this   agreement  which  might  give  the  plain

            language special meaning.

                      We note  that by  the terms  of the  agreement, the

            producer provision  only takes effect when  a conflict exists

            regarding which producer represents a policyholder.   Shawmut

            informed  Ohio that  it  would no  longer be  working through

            Miniter and that it  was seeking proposals for a  new policy.

                                         -14-
                                          14

            Shawmut  cancelled  the  first  policy.   While  Miniter  now

            attempts  to generate a conflict, or argue that the provision

            does  not  govern  this  situation,  nothing  in  the  record

            triggers the  producer provision  inasmuch as Shawmut  on its

            own affirmatively undertook to negotiate the second policy.

                      Equally unavailing  is Miniter's argument  that it,

            and  not  Shawmut's  in-house  agency,  produced  the  second

            policy.  Accepting  Miniter's definition of "produced,"3  the

            record  does not support its contention that, at a minimum, a

            dispute of fact exists  as to whether it or  Shawmut produced

            the  second policy.    Instead, as  the record  demonstrates,

            Miniter  repeatedly urged  Shawmut  to move  its business  to

            another carrier  rather than come to an  agreement with Ohio,

            and  effectively  forced Shawmut  to  produce  the policy  by

            itself.  

                      Grondin's  undisputed testimony  reflects Miniter's

            indication  that Ohio was  no longer  interested in  making a

            deal with  Shawmut involving the  lump sum payment.   Miniter

            made  this  assertion despite  the  fact  that Ohio  remained

            willing to  remit  $1.8 million  to  Shawmut.   In  addition,

            Miniter tried  to present  Shawmut with proposals  from other

            companies and  urged Shawmut to let Miniter  move the account

            to a different carrier.  It was not until  Shawmut decided to

                                
            ____________________

            3.  According  to Miniter,  "[t]he  common  sense meaning  of
            produce  or 'producer'  is  one who  'brings forth,'  'brings
            forward,' 'generates,' or 'causes,' or 'to effect.'"

                                         -15-
                                          15

            work  directly  with a  carrier and  contacted Ohio  that the

            second policy began to  take shape.  On the  undisputed facts

            in this  record, Miniter cannot  lay claim to  commissions on

            the  second  policy by  claiming  that it,  and  not Shawmut,

            produced the policy.

                      2.  The No-Contact Agreement
                      ____________________________

                      For  purposes of  summary judgment,  Ohio does  not

            dispute  that in  addition to  the written  agency agreement,

            Miniter  and  Ohio  orally  agreed that  Ohio  would  neither

            communicate nor deal directly with Shawmut without  including

            Miniter.  The district  court found that Ohio did  not breach

            the no-contact agreement on the basis that Shawmut decided to

            terminate  Miniter prior  to initiating  direct contact  with

            Ohio  and then  informed Ohio  of that  fact.   Miniter makes

            three principal arguments on appeal:  (1) compliance with the

            agreement did not hinge on which party initiated the contact;

            (2)  Ohio's wrongful  conduct precipitated  Shawmut's contact

            and Ohio's misrepresentations  then compounded the situation;

            and  (3)  whether  and  when Shawmut  intended  to  terminate

            Miniter  presents a  dispute of  fact that  precludes summary

            judgment on this  claim.  Miniter attempts  to buttress these

            arguments  with  evidence  of  an industry  custom  which  it

            alleges Ohio violated.   We find none  of Miniter's arguments

            persuasive  and conclude  that on  this record  no reasonable

            jury could find that Ohio breached the no-contact agreement.

                                         -16-
                                          16

                      We understand Miniter's first  argument essentially

            to contend that even if Shawmut initiated the direct contact,

            the  agreement   bound  Ohio   to  include  Miniter   on  the

            substantive discussions as long as Miniter remained Shawmut's

            broker  of record.  Even  if the fact  that Shawmut initiated

            the contact  does not relieve  Ohio of its  obligations under

            the  no-contact  agreement,   the  undisputed  substance   of

            Shawmut's initial contact does.

                      After the July meeting  which failed to net Shawmut

            a  $1.8  million payment,  Grondin  informed  Donley that  he

            wished to contact Ohio.  He  then called Juredine at Ohio, as

            well  as at  least one  other insurance  company, to  solicit

            proposals.  Grondin told  Juredine of his disappointment that

            Ohio had reneged on  the $1.8 million lump sum  payment, that

            he  was planning  to  change carriers,  that  Shawmut was  no

            longer going  to use  Miniter, that  Shawmut desired to  work

            directly  with a carrier  rather than  through an  agent, and

            that if Juredine wished he could submit a proposal.  Juredine

            then  apprised  Miniter  of the  situation.    Only then  did

            Grondin and  Juredine engage in substantive  discussions on a

            second VSI policy.   In other words, only after  Shawmut told

            Ohio that Miniter was out of  the picture, that Ohio was next

            on  the chopping  block,  and Ohio  informed  Miniter of  the

            situation  did Juredine  and  Grondin engage  in  substantive

            negotiations.

                                         -17-
                                          17

                      The  record does  not support  Miniter's contention

            that  misconduct by Ohio  precipitated Shawmut's contact with

            Ohio.   Miniter takes the  position that Ohio,  in retracting

            the  initial   offer  of   $2   million,  injured   Miniter's

            credibility with  Shawmut, its client.   The record, however,

            does  not  support  Miniter's  claim.    Ohio  erred  in  its

            calculation of $2 million and immediately informed Miniter of

            that  error.  Six  days later, Ohio  submitted a recalculated

            figure  of $1.8  million.   Contrary  to  Donley's claims  to

            Grondin and Grondin's supervisor,  Ohio never  indicated that

            it no longer wished to negotiate  a lump sum deal.  Grondin's

            disgruntlement came not  from the reduction of  the figure to

            $1.8  million, but  from his  understanding from  Donley that

            Ohio had  backed out altogether.   In his  deposition Grondin

            repeatedly testified that Shawmut expected  $1.8 million from

            Ohio.

                      The record  similarly  does not  support  Miniter's

            claim  that  Ohio's  misrepresentations  following  Shawmut's

            initial contact in any way compounded the situation.  Miniter

            contends that Ohio cast  Miniter in a poor light  by averring

            that it  never had a problem  with the lump sum  payment.  As

            the  record reflects,  however, Ohio  simply told  the truth.

            Ohio's concern had  been primarily with the  amount, which it

            reduced from $2 million to $1.8 million, as well as with some

            of  the  details  of  the  revised  VSI  coverage.    Despite

                                         -18-
                                          18

            Miniter's   characterizations,   Ohio  remained   willing  to

            provide, and ultimately  did provide Shawmut with a  lump sum

            payment.

                      Miniter  also  asserts that  Ohio  falsely informed

            Shawmut  that  "any  impediment  to any  deal  was  Miniter's

            commission  expense."    This  mischaracterizes  the  record.

            Grondin testified that in their first conversation, and after

            he informed  Juredine that  Shawmut desired to  work directly

            with a  carrier, Juredine  responded that  he  had neither  a

            problem with paying a  $1.8 million lump sum nor  with giving

            Shawmut a part  of the commissions or a fee,  but that Donley

            did not want to reduce  his commission percentage. Nothing in

            the    record    supports   Miniter's    highly   exaggerated

            characterization of Juredine's remark.  In addition, Juredine

            did not  make that remark  until after  Grondin informed  him

            that Shawmut would no longer be working through Miniter.

                      Miniter  asserts that an  issue of fact  as to when

            Shawmut  actually terminated  Miniter  should have  precluded

            summary judgment on  its breach of  the no contact  agreement

            claim.  The district court found that Ohio did not breach the

            no contact  agreement in part  because it determined  that by

            the time Shawmut contacted  Ohio, Shawmut had already decided

            to terminate Miniter.  Miniter correctly asserts that Shawmut

            did not  formally terminate its  brokerage designation  until

            after  Shawmut had  negotiated the  second policy  with Ohio.

                                         -19-
                                          19

            Until  that  time  the record    supports  a conclusion  that

            Shawmut remained  willing  to consider  any proposal  Miniter

            might  have  made  along  with any  other  proposals  Shawmut

            received.  Grondin would have treated a proposal from Miniter

            like any other he received.

                      We conclude  that to the  extent an  issue of  fact

            exists as to when Shawmut decided to terminate Miniter, it is

            not material  to this dispute.  See J. Geils Band, 76 F.3d at
                                            ___ _____________

            1250-51  (explaining that a material fact is one that has the

            potential to affect  the outcome  of the dispute).   What  is

            material  is what Grondin  conveyed to Juredine  in the first

            call, namely, that Shawmut would no longer be working through

            Miniter or  any independent  agent, that Shawmut  intended to

            change  carriers, and that Ohio could submit a proposal if it

            wished. 

                      Finally, Miniter  points  to the  affidavit of  its

            expert, Frederick J. England, Jr., to establish the insurance

            industry  custom that  insurers should  not engage  in direct

            dealings with  insureds who  are also clients  of independent

            agents.    According to  Miniter,  Ohio's  violation of  this

            custom further supports Miniter's claim for breach of the no-

            contact agreement.

                      England  defines   the   industry  custom   as   an

            obligation by  Ohio not to  engage in continuous  dealings or

            discussions,  regardless of  whether  Shawmut  initiated  the

                                         -20-
                                          20

            contact, without first seeking to involve Miniter.  The facts

            in this record  do not support Miniter's assertion  that Ohio

            violated  industry  custom.    During  the  first  call  from

            Grondin, Juredine  urged Shawmut  to  officially resolve  the

            situation  with Miniter  prior to  moving forward.   Juredine

            then  called Donley to inform him of the situation.  Notably,

            Donley did not  clarify to  Ohio whether or  not Shawmut  had

            terminated  Miniter.   He  merely  exhorted  Juredine not  to

            negotiate with Shawmut without  his involvement.  We conclude

            that Ohio made a good faith effort to abide by  the custom in

            the industry as England describes it.

            B.  Miniter's Remaining Claims
            ______________________________

                      In addition to breach  of contract, Miniter alleged

            breach  of  the  implied  covenant of  good  faith  and  fair

            dealing,    intentional   interference    with   advantageous

            relations,   unjust  enrichment,   and   violation   of   the

            Massachusetts unfair trade practices statute, Mass. Gen. Laws

            ch. 93A.   Each of  these claims rests  in large part  on the

            conduct  which  has failed  to  support  Miniter's claim  for

            breach  of the  no  contact  agreement.    We  find  each  of

            Miniter's arguments on appeal unpersuasive.   For the sake of

            thoroughness, however, we discuss each of them in turn.

                      1.   Breach of the  Implied Covenant of  Good Faith
                      ___________________________________________________
            and       Fair Dealing
            ____      ____________

                      Miniter  alleged  that  Ohio's  breach  of  the  no

            contact agreement violated the implied covenant of good faith

                                         -21-
                                          21

            and  fair  dealing.    The  district  court  granted  summary

            judgment in favor of Ohio, determining that "Ohio courts have

            declined to  recognize the doctrine in  an at-will employment

            context."   On appeal Miniter argues  alternatively that Ohio

            does recognize the implied covenant  in this context and that

            the  district court  should have  applied Massachusetts  law,

            which  recognizes the  implied  covenant  in every  contract.

            Appellee Ohio, by  contrast, seeks  to apply the  law of  the

            state  of Ohio,  arguing  that Ohio  law  does not  recognize

            Miniter's claim.

                      We  need not  determine which state's  law governs.

            Even  if,  as  Miniter  contends,  the  common  law  of  Ohio

            recognizes  a cause  of  action  for  breach of  the  implied

            covenant  of good  faith and  fair dealing,  Miniter has  not

            discussed  how Ohio law would  apply in this  case.  Instead,

            Miniter argues the merits of this claim only under the law of

            Massachusetts.  We have indicated that "issues adverted to on

            appeal   in  a  perfunctory  manner,  unaccompanied  by  some

            developed argumentation,  are deemed to have been abandoned."

            Ryan v.  Royal Ins. Co. of  Am., 916 F.2d 731,  714 (1st Cir.
            ____     ______________________

            1990); see also  Williams v.  Poulos, 11 F.3d  271, 285  (1st
                   ___ ____  ________     ______

            Cir.  1993).   We  conclude,  moreover,  that Miniter  cannot

            prevail under the law of Massachusetts.    

                      As we have recognized, "Massachusetts law implies a

            duty  of  good faith  and  fair  dealing  in  every  existing

                                         -22-
                                          22

            contract."  F.D.I.C. v.  LeBlanc, 85 F.3d 815, 822  (1st Cir.
                        ________     _______

            1996); see also Anthony's Pier Four v. HBC Assoc., 583 N.E.2d
                   ___ ____ ___________________    __________

            806,  820  (Mass.  1991).     Under  this  implied  covenant,

            "'neither party  shall do anything that will  have the effect

            of destroying or  injuring the  right of the  other party  to

            receive  the fruits of the contract.'"   Anthony's Pier Four,
                                                     ___________________

            583  N.E.2d  at 820  (quoting  Drucker v.  Roland  Wm. Jutras
                                           _______     __________________

            Assocs., 348 N.E.2d 763, 765 (Mass. 1976)).  The existence of
            _______

            the covenant in no way depends on the level of sophistication

            of the parties.  Massachusetts law  implies the covenant even

            in contracts between sophisticated  business people.  See id.
                                                                  ___ ___

            at 821.  

                      According  to Miniter,  Ohio  dealt  directly  with

            Shawmut in  breach of  the no  contact agreement  and falsely

            indicated to Shawmut a  willingness to pay the lump  sum with

            the  purpose  of excluding  Miniter  from  any deal,  thereby

            eliminating  Miniter's  commissions.    Miniter  claims  that

            Ohio's actions  "were calculated and intended  to subvert the

            relationship  and  to  otherwise obtain  the  Shawmut account

            directly and eliminate Miniter's involvement and commission."

                      Miniter, however, fails to identify evidence in the

            record that would establish a genuine issue of material  fact

            whether Ohio acted in  bad faith.  The record  indicates that

            by  the time Shawmut began negotiating  with Ohio Grondin had

            informed Juredine that Shawmut  was no longer working through

                                         -23-
                                          23

            Miniter.    Juredine,   moreover,  informed  Donley  of   the

            situation  shortly  after he  received  Grondin's  call.   In

            short, the record does  not support Miniter's contention that

            Ohio  acted  to destroy  or  injure Miniter's  rights  to the

            fruits  of the contract.  See Anthony's Pier Four, 583 N.E.2d
                                      ___ ___________________

            at  820.   Assuming  Massachusetts  law  governs this  claim,

            Miniter  fails to  point  to record  evidence supporting  its

            allegations that Ohio acted in bad faith.4

                                
            ____________________

            4.  Miniter's claim  for unjust enrichment also  fails.  That
            claim  is  based on  Miniter's  argument  that it  introduced
            Shawmut to Ohio,  that it brokered  the initial policy,  that
            Ohio went  behind its back  and dealt directly  with Shawmut,
            that Ohio  made misrepresentations  to Shawmut, all  with the
            result  that Ohio  benefited by  gaining a  new client.   See
                                                                      ___
            Salamon  v.  Terra, 477  N.E.2d  1029,  1031-32 (Mass.  1985)
            _______      _____
            (remedy  lies  for  value  of benefit  conferred).    We have
            already concluded  that rather than broker  or facilitate the
            second policy,  Miniter urged Shawmut to  change carriers and
            represented  to Shawmut  that Ohio  reneged on  its lump  sum
            offer.   Our  conclusion  that Ohio  did  not engage  in  any
            wrongful  conduct  precludes  any  plausible  assertion  that
            Miniter  conferred  a  benefit  upon Ohio  beyond  the  first
            policy.  

                                         -24-
                                          24

                      2.  Interference with Advantageous Relations  
                      ____________________________________________

                      Miniter  contends that the  district court erred in

            granting summary judgment in  favor of Ohio on its  claim for

            interference  with  advantageous  relations.    A  claim  for

            interference with  advantageous  relations depends  upon  the

            presence of  four criteria:  "(1) a business  relationship or

            contemplated   contract  of   economic   benefit;   (2)   the

            defendant's  knowledge   of   such  relationship;   (3)   the

            defendant's intentional and malicious interference   with it;

            (4) the plaintiff's loss of advantage directly resulting from

            the   defendant's conduct."   Comey v. Hill,  438 N.E.2d 811,
                                          _____    ____

            816 (Mass. 1982); see also Speen v. Crown Clothing Corp., 102
                              ___ ____ _____    ____________________

            F.3d 625, 634 (1st Cir. 1996).  The Supreme Judicial Court of

            Massachusetts has  indicated that the third  element requires

            merely  an improper  interference, and  not a  malicious one.

            See  United Truck Leasing Corp. v. Geltman, 551 N.E.2d 20, 23
            ___  __________________________    _______

            (Mass. 1990).5   Nevertheless,  a successful claim  must show

            something more  than just the  interference itself.   See id.
                                                                  ___ ___

            To the extent,  therefore, that any  of Ohio's actions  could

            constitute  an  interference,  that  alone  would  not  incur

            liability.   Instead,  Miniter must  demonstrate wrongfulness

                                
            ____________________

            5.  We  note  that in  Geltman,  the  Supreme Judicial  Court
                                   _______
            specifically  examined the  tort of  intentional interference
            with a  contract and prospective contractual  relations.  The
            court  indicated, however, that at least  with respect to the
            third  element, the same standard applied in both torts.  See
                                                                      ___
            id. at 23 n.6.  
            ___

                                         -25-
                                          25

            beyond the interference itself.  The interference must arise,

            for example,  from improper  motives or the  use of  improper

            means.  See id.
                    ___ ___

                      Miniter   bases  this   claim  yet  again   on  its

            contention that Ohio engaged  in direct dealings with Shawmut

            in  violation of the no contact  agreement and made injurious

            misrepresentations about  the lump  sum payment  and Miniter.

            Our examination of the record  has revealed no such  conduct.

            Miniter  points to  nothing  in  addition  to  the  facts  we

            considered in relation to Miniter's breach of contract claims

            that might support a  claim for intentional interference with

            advantageous relations.   In  the absence of  record evidence

            upon  which   a  reasonable  jury  could   find  an  improper

            interference, Miniter cannot survive summary judgment on this

            claim.        

                      3.   Breach of  Fiduciary Duty/Mass. Gen.  Laws ch.
                      ___________________________________________________

            93A
            ___

                      Finally,  Miniter  appeals  the  grant  of  summary

            judgment in favor of  Ohio on its claim under Mass. Gen. Laws

            ch. 93A ("93A") based  on breach of fiduciary duty.   Section

            2(a)  of Mass.  Gen.  Laws ch.  93A  provides that  "[u]nfair

            methods  of  competition  and  unfair or  deceptive  acts  or

            practices  in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby

            declared  unlawful."    Section  11  extends     2's  general

            protection to commercial  parties.  See  Mass. Gen. Laws  ch.
                                                ___

                                         -26-
                                          26

            93A   11; Industrial  Gen. Corp. v. Sequoia Pac.  Sys. Corp.,
                      ______________________    ________________________

            44 F.3d  40, 43 (1st Cir. 1995).  Whether a particular set of

            facts  constitutes  unfair  or  deceptive  acts  or practices

            ordinarily is a question of fact.  See id.  The parameters of
                                               ___ __

            conduct the  factfinder may consider, however,  is a question

            of law.  See id. at 44.
                     ___ ___

                      To fall within these  parameters, the conduct which

            undergirds  the complaint  must reside  "within at  least the

            penumbra  of some common-law,  statutory or other established

            concept  of  unfairness," or  rise to  the level  of immoral,

            unethical,   oppressive  or   unscrupulous,  and   result  in

            substantial injury to competitors  or other business  people.

            Id. (internal quotations and  citations omitted).  At bottom,
            ___

            a  claim under  93A must  rest on  conduct that  attained "'a

            level of  rascality that would  raise the eyebrow  of someone

            inured  to the rough and  tumble of the  world of commerce.'"

            See id. at 43 (quoting  Quaker St. Oil Ref. Corp.  v. Garrity
            ___ ___                 _________________________     _______

            Oil  Co.,  884  F.2d 1510,  1513  (1st  Cir.  1989) (internal
            ________

            quotation omitted)).  

                      Miniter  contends that the  agency agreement placed

            it  and Ohio  in a  fiduciary relationship,  the contours  of

            which derive from "the established obligations imposed in the

            industry  that  an  insurer  is  obligated  to  refrain  from

            interfering  with an  independent  agent's property  right in

            expirations   [and]   the  concomitant   prohibition  against

                                         -27-
                                          27

            engaging in direct dealings with the  insured while the agent

            remains the broker of record."

                      We agree  with Miniter  that breach of  a fiduciary

            duty might  constitute a  93A  violation.   See Sequoia  Pac.
                                                        ___ _____________

            Sys., 44 F.3d at 44.  We conclude, however, that Ohio did not
            ____

            breach  its  duty.    Miniter  supports  its  93A claim  with

            mischaracterizations  of  the  record   upon  which  we  have

            elaborated.      In   short,    Ohio   did   not   make   the

            misrepresentations Miniter  claims,  nor did  it violate  its

            written or oral agreements.  The record further reflects that

            Ohio adhered to the industry custom as described by Miniter's

            expert,  Frederick England.  As  such, Ohio did  not breach a

            fiduciary duty  to Miniter.    Miniter's 93A  claim based  on

            breach of fiduciary duty, therefore, fails.

                      Affirmed.  Costs to appellee.
                      Affirmed.
                      _________

                                         -28-
                                          28