Court Opinion

ID: 9831559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:11:07.372192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:35.810771
License: Public Domain

*145ON REHEARING.
In the main opinion we stated that the case of Taylor v. Watkins, 26 Texas, 688, was not in point on the proposition that a plaintiff in trespass to try title is required to plead specially the execution of a conveyance in his chain of title if he wishes to establish the conveyance by circumstantial evidence or ■ fact presumption growing out of circumstances proved. We added the comment that what was said upon the question in that case was dicta and was not mentioned in the syllabus as a point decided. This comment, insofar as the syllabus is concerned, is inaccurate, and the writer is now unable to account for the error. We still think, however, the point was not up for decision, as the plaintiff in that case undertook to plead his title specially. Nor was the point up for decision in Yancy v. Norris, 27 Texas, 40, cited by appellant in his motion.
Montgomery v. Carlton, 56 Texas, 361, simply decides that one relying upon a paroi gift of real estate must allege and prove such facts as take the conveyance out of the statute of frauds. Taylor’s case and Norris’s case, supra, have been many times cited in subsequent decisions and invariably followed' upon the questions actually decided therein, but in no case of which we are aware have they been cited upon the point here presented, nor has any similar holding been made as to proof of a transfer from circumstantial evidence.
In Daily v. Starr, 26 Texas, 564, the point was made by appellant who had been sued in trespass to try title and cast in the suit. The statement of the case discloses that plaintiff did not plead his title specially, but merely alleged title in himself. The point was made that the general allegations did not authorize proof sustaining the existence of a power to execute one of the deeds in plaintiff’s title. The point was ignored as unworthy of notice and the judgment affirmed. The pleadings and proof admissible thereunder in trespass to try title are governed by statute, and the only legal title required to be pleaded specially is title by limitation. (Ortez v. State, 86 S. W. Rep., 46.)
Such a title in this State does not rest upon a presumption of a deed. A compliance with the requirements of the statute vests title, though the claimant might admit he had no other and laid no claim to title by conveyance. Our statutes of limitation are statutes of repose, and there is no kinship between them and the presumption of a deed infer-able from facts and circumstances proven. The contention of appellant that because of such supposed analogy the latter must be specially pleaded as in limitation, can not be allowed.
We have found no reason to change our views upon any point decided on the main hearing of this cause.- The motion for rehearing is therefore overruled.

Overruled.

Writ of error refused.