Court Opinion

ID: 9697641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:23:47.262571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:33.936773
License: Public Domain

BATTAGLIA, J., Dissents.
Dissenting Opinion by
BATTAGLIA, J.
I respectfully dissent.
In this case we have been asked to decide if under Section 9-503(e) of the Labor and Employment Article dependents of firefighters who die from cancer contracted during the course of employment may collect full worker’s compensation death benefits and retirement benefits to which a firefighter who *23survives cancer would be entitled. According to the Majority, when a firefighter survives, he or she is entitled to receive both worker’s compensation benefits and retirement benefits, but if the firefighter perishes from cancer contracted during his or her employment, then the general worker’s compensation off-set provision contained in Section 9 — 610(a)(1) applies, substantially reducing the benefits to the dependents of those firefighters who themselves would otherwise be entitled to the dual benefits. The Majority’s argument is premised upon the absence of the word “dependents” in Section 9 — 503(e). I disagree, and would hold that Section 9-503(e) permits the dependents of firefighters who die from an occupational cancer to collect full worker’s compensation death benefits and retirement benefits.
Section 9 — 503(e) states in pertinent part:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, any paid firefighter ... who is eligible for benefits under subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d) of this section shall receive the benefits in addition to any benefits that the individual is entitled to receive under the retirement system in which the individual was a participant at the time of the claim.
(2) The benefits received under this title shall be adjusted so that the weekly total of those benefits and retirement benefits does not exceed the weekly salary that was paid to the ... firefighter.
This Court has often stated that our goal in interpreting statutes is to “identify and effectuate the legislative intent underlying the statute(s) at issue.” Serio v. Baltimore County, 384 Md. 373, 863 A.2d 952, 962 (2004), quoting Drew v. First Guaranty Mortgage Corp., 379 Md. 318, 327, 842 A.2d 1, 6 (2003), in turn quoting Derry v. State, 358 Md. 325, 335, 748 A.2d 478, 483 (2000); Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 57-58, 862 A.2d 419, 425 (2004); Graves v. State, 364 Md. 329, 346, 772 A.2d 1225, 1235 (2001). As we have stated, the best source of legislative intent is the statute’s plain language and when the language is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ordinarily ends there. Serio, 384 Md. at 373, 863 A.2d at 962; Pete, 384 *24Md. at 57-58, 862 A.2d at 425; Drew, 379 Md. at 327, 842 A.2d at 6; Beyer v. Morgan State Univ., 369 Md. 335, 349, 800 A.2d 707, 715 (2002); Whack v. State, 338 Md. 665, 672, 659 A.2d 1347, 1350 (1995). Although the plain language of the statute guides our understanding of legislative intent, we do not read the language in a vacuum. See Serio, 384 Md. at 373, 863 A.2d at 962; Drew, 379 Md. at 327, 842 A.2d at 6; Derry, 358 Md. at 336, 748 A.2d at 483-84. Rather, we read statutory-language within the context of the statutory scheme, considering the “purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body.” Serio, 384 Md. at 373, 863 A.2d at 962; Pete, 384 Md. at 57-58, 862 A.2d at 425; Drew, 379 Md. at 327, 842 A.2d at 6; Beyer, 369 Md. at 350, 800 A.2d at 715; In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 711, 782 A.2d 332, 346 (2001)(quoting Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387, 614 A.2d 590, 594 (1992)). We have stated that,
[w]hen we pursue the context of statutory language, we are not limited to the words of the statute as they are printed.... We may and often must consider other “external manifestations” or “persuasive evidence,” including.... other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal, which becomes the context within which we read the particular language before us in a given case.
Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, 116, 753 A.2d 41, 49 (2000) (quoting Kaczorowski v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514-15, 525 A.2d 628, 632-33 (1987)). When interpreting the language of a statute, “we assign the words their ordinary and natural meaning.” Serio, 384 Md. at 373, 863 A.2d at 962; Pete, 384 Md. at 57-58, 862 A.2d at 425; O’Connor v. Baltimore County, 382 Md. 102, 114, 854 A.2d 1191, 1198 (2004); Lewis v. State, 348 Md. 648, 653, 705 A.2d 1128, 1131 (1998). Thus, the provisions must be read in “a commonsensical perspective to avoid a farfetched interpretation.” Serio, 384 Md. at 373, 863 A.2d at 962; Graves v. State, 364 Md. 329, 346, 772 A.2d 1225, 1235 (2001); Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137, 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994); Dickerson v. State, 324 Md. 163, 171, 596 A.2d 648, 652 (1991).
*25At the heart of this matter is the General Assembly’s intent in creating the presumption of compensability for certain occupational diseases and the provision entitling firefighters and other specified public employees to worker’s compensation and retirement benefits. We have often stated that the Worker’s Compensation Act is remedial in nature and “should be construed as liberally in favor of the injured employees as its provisions will permit in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes. Any uncertainty in the law should be resolved in favor of the claimant.” Harris v. Board of Education of Howard County, 375 Md. 21, 57, 825 A.2d 365, 387 (2003) (quoting Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Cassidy, 338 Md. 88, 97, 656 A.2d 757, 761-62 (1995)). As this Court has explained, the Act’s purposes include “protecting workers and their families from hardships inflicted by work-related injuries,” “preventing the State and its taxpayers from having to care for injured workmen and their dependents,” and providing “sure and certain relief for workmen injured in extra-hazardous employment and their families and dependents ....” B. Frank Joy Co. v. Isaac, 333 Md. 628, 634, 636 A.2d 1016, 1019 (1994) (quoting the Preamble to 1914 Md. Laws, Chap. 800). When effectuating the “benevolent purposes” of the Act, this Court has opined that “all sections of the Act must be read together, in conjunction with one another, to discern the true intent of the legislature.” Breitenbach v. N.B. Handy, 366 Md. 467, 472, 784 A.2d 569, 572 (2001). Thus, contrary to the Majority’s emphasis on the absence of the term “dependents” in the statute to justify its outcome, Section 9-503(e) must be considered in light of the overall history and purpose of its enactment and should not be read in a vacuum. Id. at 482-87, 784 A.2d at 577-81.
Section 9-502 of the Act requires that employers and insurers compensate covered employees and their dependents for a disability or death that results from an occupational disease: “a covered employee of the employer for disability of the covered employee resulting from an occupational disease; or the dependents of the covered employee for death of the covered employee resulting from an occupational disease.”
*26Md.Code, § 9-502(c) of the Labor and Employment Article (emphasis added). The statute limits the liability of the employer/insurer by providing that compensation only must be paid if:
(1) the occupational disease that caused the death or disability: (i) is due to the nature of an employment in which hazards of the occupational disease exist and the covered employee was employed before the date of disablement; or (ii) has manifestations that are consistent with those known to result from exposure to a biological, chemical, or physical agent that is attributable to the type of employment in which the covered employee was employed before the date of disablement; and
(2) on the weight of the evidence, it reasonably may be concluded that the occupational disease was incurred as a result of the employment of the covered employee.
Md.Code (1991, 1999 Repl.Vol., 2004 Cum.Supp.), § 9-502(d) of the Labor and Employment Article.
In the very next section, 9-503, firefighters and other specified public employees suffering from certain occupational diseases, including heart disease and cancer, are “presumed to be suffering from an occupational disease that was suffered in the line of duty and is' compensable.” Md.Code (1991, 1999 Repl.Vol., 2004 Cum.Supp.), § 9-503 of the Labor and Employment Article. Section 9-503 was derived from former Maryland Code (1957, 1985 Repl.Vol., 1990 Cum.Supp.) Article 101, § 64A; its purpose was clearly set forth in Chapter 695 of the Acts of 1971:
An Act to add new Section 64A to Article 101 of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1970 Supplement), title “Workman’s Compensation,” to follow immediately after Section thereof, to provide that there is a presumption of compensable occupational disease in cases of certain fire fighters sustaining temporary or total disability or death under certain conditions, and to provide that benefits may also be payable under a retirement system under certain conditions.
*271971 Md. Laws, Chap. 695 (emphasis added). The Act, entitled “Death and Disability Payments — Fire Fighters” stated in part:
Any condition or impairment of health of any paid municipal, county, airport authority, or fire control district fire fighter caused by lung diseases, heart diseases, or hypertension resulting in total or partial disability or death shall be presumed to be compensable under this article and to have been suffered in the line of duty and as a result of his employment.
1971 Md. Laws, Chap. 695. In 1985, this section was amended to include throat, prostate, rectal or pancreatic cancer, and leukemia, see Md.Code (1957, 1985 Repl.Vol., 1990 Cum. Supp.), Art. 101, § 64A(b), and has been recodified into the current Sections 9-503(a) through (d) of the Labor and Employment Article. See 1991 Md. Laws, Chap. 8, § 2.
We have consistently recognized the legislative intent underlying the presumption of compensability under Section 9-503 for firefighters suffering from an occupational disease: “[T]he Maryland legislature created the presumption in light of the general public knowledge that firefighters in the course of their daily activities are exposed to inhalation of smoke or noxious fumes and are subjected to unusual stresses and strains.” Montgomery County Fire Board v. Fisher, 298 Md. 245, 256, 468 A.2d 625, 630 (1983). Furthermore, the presumption is
reflective of a social policy affording preferential treatment to firefighters disabled by heart disease. Although the presumption of compensability is a rebuttable one of fact, the legislature manifestly intended that the statute impose a formidable burden on the party against whom it operates.
Id. at 257, 468 A.2d at 631.
Section 9-503(e), which permits firefighters suffering from one of the enumerated occupational diseases to collect worker’s compensation benefits and retirement benefits up to the amount of the firefighter’s weekly salary, also was derived from former Section 64A of the Code, which stated:
*28Notwithstanding any provision of this article any paid fire fighter whose compensable claim results from a condition or impairment of health caused by lung diseases, heart diseases or hypertension and has been suffered in the line of duty shall receive such benefits as are provided for in this article in addition to such benefits as he may be entitled to under the retirement system in which said fire fighter was a participant at the time of his claim. The benefits received under this article however, shall be adjusted so that the total of all weekly benefits shall not exceed one hundred percent of the weekly salary which was paid to said fire fighter.
1971 Md. Laws, Chap. 695. Language was added in 1985 to add firefighters with cancer. See Md.Code (1957, 1985 Repl.Vol.), Art. 101, § 64A(b). The statutory language was recodified without substantive change into the current Section 9-503(e) and underscores the notion that “fire fighters are exposed to health hazards not shared by other government employees.” Board of County Commissioners for Prince George’s County v. Colgan, 274 Md. 193, 208, 334 A.2d 89, 97 (1975).
Essentially, the statutes when read in relation to one another provide that a firefighter diagnosed with one of the enumerated diseases in Section 9-503 is presumed to have satisfied the requirements of Section 9-502(d) that he or she is suffering from a prescribed occupational disease that resulted from the hazardous nature of the job. The remaining provisions of Section 9-502, that the employer/insurer must compensate the covered employee and their dependents, are still applicable; thus, it is entirely permissible for dependents of firefighters who suffer from cancer or heart disease to rely on the same presumption of compensability to receive all of the benefits afforded to the firefighter under Section 9-503(e), even though the term “dependents” is not mentioned in that provision.
The Majority places significance on the absence of the term “dependents” in Section 9-503(e) because in its view “the language reads as if it only pertains to the individuals men*29tioned in the statute.... Those individuals shall receive the worker’s compensation benefits ‘in addition to any benefits that the individual is entitled to receive....’” Maj. op. at 9, 874 A.2d at 444 (emphasis added in original). Apparently, the Majority relies on the juxtaposition of the word “individual” in Section 9-503(e) against the listing of specified public service employees in the same section in order to exclude dependents. The Revisor’s Notes to Section 9-503, however, explain the use of the term “individual” : “the word ‘individual’ is substituted for the former word ‘person’, since only a human being may be a firefighter, fire fighting instructor, or rescue squad member. As to the definition of ‘person,’ see § 1-101 of this article [Labor and Employment].” 1991 Md. Laws, Chap. 8, § 2, Revisor’s Notes.1 Therefore, the Majority’s reliance on the term “individual” to conclude that Section 9-503(e) does not contemplate dependents is misplaced and reads more into the language than was intended by the General Assembly.2
Likewise, the Majority states that the “language in [Section 9-503(e) ] reads as if the Legislature intended to provide benefits to firefighters and (other public safety employees) who are living but unable to work as a result of their occupational diseases.” Maj. op. at 16-17, 874 A.2d at 448-49 (emphasis added). In essence, the Majority’s holding awards the more favorable benefits to those firefighters who have the good fortune of surviving their cancer, but denies those benefits to the widows and children dependent on those firefighters whose lives were lost. Such a narrow construction of the *30statute in light of the General Assembly’s focus on protecting firefighters in recognition of the many hazards they face, is contrary to the General Assembly’s expressed concern for those firefighters who sacrifice their lives in the line of duty.
In the cases sub judice, there is no dispute that the spouses were wholly dependent on the firefighters who died from their occupational cancers and that the underlying worker’s compensation death claim was compensable. A liberal construction of Section 9-503(e) in favor of deceased firefighters supports the benevolent purposes of the statute and the conclusion that the firefighters qualified for the worker’s compensation benefits in addition to the retirement benefits. Because I would hold that the firefighters themselves are entitled to full benefits in recognition of their great sacrifices to protect our communities while in the line of duty, the dependents also should be entitled to those benefits. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

. Md.Code (1991, 1999 Repl.Vol., 2004 Cum.Supp.), § 1-101 of the Labor and Employment Article, defines a "person” as: "an individual, receiver, trustee, guardian, personal representative, fiduciary, or representative of any kind and any partnership, firm, association, corporation, or other entity.”

. The Majority also points to various provisions of the Act that specifically refer to the dependents of a deceased worker as evidence that the absence of "dependents” in Section 9-503(e) means that the General Assembly did not intend to provide the same benefits to dependents under this off-set provision. I note, however, that none of the referenced sections contain an exclusion for benefits resulting from an occupational disease established under the Section 9-503 presumption.