Court Opinion

ID: 9702257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:03:56.553782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:35.834338
License: Public Domain

HANDLER, J.,
concurring.
I join in the majority’s reasoning and conclusion. My added reasons for concurring in the Court’s opinion are presented in my separate opinion in In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 428 (1987).
The special significance of this case is the factual record that conveys to a high degree of confidence the soundness of affirming Mrs. Farrell’s decision to discontinue the medical treatment that was precluding her from a natural and dignified death. Our confirmation of her decision under these circumstances would have effectuated her right of self-determination.
This case presents us, in the context of a right-to-die opinion, with a clear example of individual self-determination expressed by the informed wish of a competent patient. Because Mrs. Farrell was competent, she could express her wishes directly and she could be questioned to confirm that her decision was both voluntary and knowing. It is a prototypical example of individual self-determination, which provides the conceptual *360foundation that can guide the application of similar principles to treatment decisions involving incompetent patients. This case underscores by contrast how much less certain we can be that treatment decisions made in the name of an incompetent patient effectuate her right of self-determination. See Jobes, supra, 108 N.J. at 433-37 (Handler, J., concurring). We are thus alerted to the need to consider and develop additional criteria to inform the medical treatment decision for incompetent patients. This will in many cases encompass objective factors bearing upon the patient’s best interests to buttress, or, if necessary, to supplant, a treatment decision based on the earlier expressed wishes or views of the incompetent patient.