Court Opinion

ID: 9487536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:19:39.446871+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:20.475089
License: Public Domain

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I dissent from the decision affirming the district court’s order finding Reinhold Mar-soner in contempt of court.
The district court ordered Marsoner to sign the disclosure directive authorizing disclosure of information and production of all documents in possession of a bank, including Austrian banks, under threat that noncompliance would result in his incarceration and imposition of a fine. Marsoner refused to sign, and the district court ordered Marsoner incarcerated until he signs the disclosure directive or until the term of the grand jury expires in October 1994.
It is uncontroverted that coerced consent would violate Austrian law. The experts on Austrian law, Bruce Zagaris and Wulf G. Hauser, both expressed the opinion that incarcerating an individual as punishment for refusing to sign a disclosure directive authorizing release of Austrian bank records violates the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), which is considered constitutional law in Austria. Zagaris deel. ¶ 80; Hauser deck ¶¶41-42.1 Austria prohibits the use of coercion or threats to obtain a confession or other evidence. Hauser deck *967¶42. According to Zagaris and Hauser, an Austrian court is likely to interpret Marsoner’s compelled consent as violating Articles 3, 6, and 8 of the ECHR.2 Zagaris decl. ¶ 80; Hauser decl. ¶¶ 41-42.
Because the district court’s order is coercive and probably violates Austrian law, we should balance the “competing” interests of the two nations to determine whether notions of international comity preclude enforcement of the coercive order. See United States v. Vetco Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1288 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098, 102 S.Ct. 671, 70 L.Ed.2d 689 (1981). Under the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 403(2)(h), we consider the likelihood that the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction conflicts with regulation by Austria. We are obligated to evaluate each state’s competing interests in exercising jurisdiction, and we “should defer to the other state if that state’s interest is clearly greater.” Id. at § 403(3).
Austria’s Law on Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters prohibits foreign authorities from conducting investigations or procedural acts on Austrian territory. Bundesgesetz vom 4. Dezember 1979, uber die Auslieferung und die Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen (Auslieferungs- und Reehtshilfe-gesetz), Bundesgesetzblatt No. 529/1979 (hereinafter “ARHG”) § 59. See also Zagar-is decl. ¶75; Hauser decl. ¶50. According to Zagaris, the only means by which foreign prosecutors may obtain Austrian bank records is to apply through or comply with the ARHG or an applicable treaty. Zagaris decl. ¶¶75, 83. Because there currently is no applicable treaty between the United States and Austria, the ARHG governs in this case. Hauser decl. ¶48.
“[N]o legal assistance [from Austria] is possible under the ARHG if the claimed violation of the foreign law consists in a violation of tax or customs law.” Hauser decl. ¶ 49 (citing ARHG § 15). Accordingly, legal assistance is'“impossible in the present case.” Hauser ¶ 49. Zagaris expressed the opinion that the compelled consent violates the ARHG. Zagaris decl. ¶ 82.
Both experts expressed the opinion that “[a] compelled consent is essentially an effort to circumvent the prohibition against official acts in Austria.” Zagaris decl. ¶75. See Hauser decl. ¶ 50. See also United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1034 (2d Cir.1985) (“[I]n recent years litigants have often attempted to circumvent [the limitations of international comity] by seeking an order compelling the record-owner to consent to the disclosure of the record”). According to the undisputed testimony of both experts, an Austrian court is likely to rule the consent unenforceable.3 Zagaris ¶ 82. Thus, forcing Marsoner’s signature appears unlikely to achieve the intended result. Therefore, on balance, Austria’s interest in protecting its citizens and regulating official acts in Austria appears to outweigh the United States’ interest in obtaining Marsoner’s signature.
Although the act of compelling Marsoner’s signature takes place wholly within the United States, it is designed to accomplish what could not otherwise be accomplished in Austria through the ARHG: it is an attempt to obtain Austrian bank records otherwise inaccessible to the United States through the ARHG. It might be an affront to the United States for “a foreign court ... to compel someone to violate our laws within our borders.” In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d 494, 498-99 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963, 108 S.Ct. 451, 98 L.Ed.2d 391 (1987). Likewise, it might also be an affront for a United States court to compel an action, which is performed in the United States but has ramifications in a foreign country, in an attempt to circumvent the laws of that foreign country.
The majority cites In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Yanagihara), 709 F.Supp. 192 *968(C.D.Cal.1989), when discussing its preference that Austrian courts determine the validity of Marsoner’s compelled consent. That case is distinguishable on the ground that the appellant had failed to show that compelling his consent was inconsistent with Swiss law. Id. at 196. By contrast, here, the uncontro-verted testimony presented indicates that compelling Marsoner’s consent is inconsistent with Austrian law. I would conclude that notions of international comity preclude enforcement of the district court’s coercive order.

. Reference is to the affidavits of the experts submitted by Marsoner to the district court.

. Article 3 states, “no-one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Article 6 states, that everyone charged with a criminal offense “is entitled to a fair ... hearing” and has the right "to examine or have examined witnesses against him....” Article 8 states, “everyone has a right to respect for his private and family life ... there shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right.”

. Common sense supports the view that Austrian courts are unlikely to enforce the consent. To do so would be akin to endorsing a violation of the ARHG.