Court Opinion

ID: 9571139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:29:19.396877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:28:46.985961
License: Public Domain

*185Benton, J.,
concurring and dissenting.
I join in Parts I and II of the opinion. I also join in those portions of Part III holding that the trial judge erred in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Code § 18.2-67.7(C). I dissent from the remainder of Part III because I believe that the trial judge erred in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding the allegations against the complaining witness H.
The notice that Johnson filed pursuant to Code § 18.2-67.7(C) contains allegations of facts relating to H’s conduct and asserts that those facts are “relevant to show that the complaining witnesses . . . had a motive to fabricate the charges.” The majority apparently believes that because the record contains no representation that H threatened to fabricate the charges the trial judge did not err in refusing a hearing. A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to present “evidence relevant to show that the complaining witness had a motive to fabricate the charge.” Code § 18.2-67.7(B) (emphasis added). Code § 18.2-67.7 does not require proof of an actual threat to fabricate.
Johnson’s notice alleges that, during a conversation with Johnson, H accused another adult male of making sexual advances to her. In addition, it alleges that Johnson learned that H was engaging in oral sex and confronted her. The allegations provide the foundation for a claim that H had a motive to fabricate charges against Johnson. The allegations might support an inference that H harbored animosity toward Johnson arising from his confrontation with her concerning her sexual conduct. Contrary to the assertions in the majority opinion, the allegations on their face establish a nexus between those acts and a motive for falsifying charges against Johnson. This is not simply a case where the defendant alleges he was aware of prior sexual misconduct, and that this knowledge, standing alone, provided a motive to fabricate. Here, Johnson was the family’s minister and had confronted H with her misconduct. It is reasonable to infer that H might fear that Johnson would inform her family, thus providing an incentive for H to make a pre-emptive strike by claiming that Johnson himself had engaged in sexual misconduct. The issue, however, is not which party is telling the truth; the issue is, instead, whether, based on the assertions contained in the notice, there was a need for an evidentiary hearing. In my opinion, Johnson was entitled to an opportunity to present evidence to a judge concerning the alie*186gations and to have that judge make a decision concerning the admissibility of that evidence based on the testimony presented. For these reasons, I would reverse all three cases and remand them to the circuit court for evidentiary hearings and for new trials.