Court Opinion

ID: 9947034
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 21:03:26.697686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:45.496673
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/1/24 P. v. Foster CA2/4
           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
 opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
 opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
               SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                      DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,                                                 B324335

        Plaintiff and Respondent,                            Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. A969446
        v.

 DAYMOND LEE FOSTER,

        Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Craig E. Veals, Judge. Affirmed.
      Kevin D. Sheehy, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Michael C. Keller and Yun K. Lee,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                        INTRODUCTION
       In 1989, a jury convicted defendant and appellant
Daymond Lee Foster of first degree murder. The jury also found a
robbery-murder special circumstance allegation true, which
included a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Foster was the
actual killer.
       In 2022, Foster filed a petition for recall and resentencing
under former Penal Code section 1170.95.1 The trial court denied
the petition, concluding the record of conviction demonstrated as
a matter of law that Foster was the actual killer, and thus Foster
is ineligible for resentencing. On appeal, Foster argues the trial
court’s conclusion constitutes error, and asks that his case be
remanded with instructions to issue an order to show cause and
hold an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

                PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       In 1989, the Los Angeles County District Attorney filed an
amended information charging Foster (a.k.a. Rodney Thompson)
and codefendant Randy Whittenburg with various crimes.2 The
amended information charged Foster with murder (§ 187, subd.
(a); count one); attempted second degree robbery (§§ 664/211;
count two); and second degree robbery (§ 211; count three). It
further alleged Foster: (1) personally used a firearm in the

1     All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code. Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered
section 1170.95 to section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
There were no substantive changes to the statute.
2    For purposes of clarity, we note that Foster was charged
under the name “Rodney Thompson, a.k.a., Damon Lee Foster,”
and was referred to at his original trial as Rodney Thompson.

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commission of counts one through three (§ 12022.5, subd. (a));
and (2) murdered the victim while engaged in the commission
and attempted commission of robbery (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)).3
       Foster and Whittenburg had a joint trial with separate
juries. Foster’s jury found him guilty on all counts. It also found
true the allegations on all counts that Foster personally used a
firearm, in addition to finding true the allegation that Foster
committed the murder during the commission and attempted
commission of robbery. The trial court sentenced Foster to life
without the possibility of parole on the murder count. On direct
appeal, a different panel of this court affirmed the judgment.
       In February 2022, Foster filed a resentencing petition
under former section 1170.95. The trial court tentatively ruled
Foster was ineligible for relief as a matter of law because he was
the actual killer, then appointed counsel on Foster’s behalf. The
prosecution filed a response, and attached as exhibits this court’s
opinion resolving Foster’s direct appeal, the jury instructions
from Foster’s trial, and the jury verdicts.
       In August 2022, the trial court held a hearing on Foster’s
eligibility for relief. After both sides submitted without argument,
the court denied Foster’s petition. In denying relief, the court
explained the record demonstrated the jury convicted Foster as
the actual killer, in addition to finding he personally used a
firearm in the commission of the murder.
       Foster timely appealed. We granted the parties’ requests
for judicial notice and to augment the record to include various

3     The amended information charged Whittenburg with
counts one through three and alleged the special circumstance on
count one, but did not charge him with personal use of a firearm
on any count.

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documents, including the closing arguments, jury instructions,
and verdict forms from Foster’s original trial, as well as this
court’s opinion resolving Foster’s direct appeal.

                  FACTUAL BACKGROUND

       The following facts are taken from this court’s opinion
resolving Foster’s direct appeal. We include this information
solely to provide background and context for the parties’
arguments, and do not rely on it to resolve this appeal. (See
People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 222, fn. 2.)
       “On the night of September 17, 1987, Feliz Zuniga Estrada
(‘Estrada’) accompanied his brother-in-law, Juan Rivas Avendano
(‘Avendano’) to make a call from the public telephones outside a
convenience store in their neighborhood in Los Angeles. While
they were standing at the telephone, two men approached from
behind. Estrada and Avendano turned, and Estrada saw Foster
pointing a pistol at Avendano. Whittenberg was standing at
Foster’s side and did not have a gun. Foster, speaking English,
demanded money, pointing the gun at Avendano. Whittenberg
grabbed Estrada’s arm, put his hand in Estrada’s left front
trouser pocket and took money from his person. The amount
taken was less than $10.
       “Avendano resisted, grabbing the outside of his pockets and
shaking his head from side to side in a negative manner.
Avendano removed his hands from his pockets, flashed them at
appellants and dropped them. He then pushed Foster’s gun aside
with his hand and said ‘Run.’ Whittenberg let go of Estrada’s
arm, and both victims fled. As Avendano and Estrada ran toward
the market, Estrada looked back and saw Foster fire three or four
shots in rapid succession directly at Avendano. Avendano
collapsed in front of the market and was helped inside by

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Estrada. He had been shot four times and died at the scene.
Appellants fled.
      “The preliminary hearing testimony of Rell King, who
witnessed the shooting, was read to both juries. She was standing
across the street from the convenience store when she saw Foster
and another man confront a third man she identified as
Avendano. She could not hear what was said, but observed Foster
draw a handgun and point it at Avendano. The victim shook his
head from side to side, pulled his hands from his pockets and
dropped them to his side and began to back away from Foster.
King heard Foster fire four shots at Avendano. Foster and his
companion then fled, running toward King. King did not see
Estrada until she entered the store after Avendano died. She
identified Foster as the shooter from a photographic lineup and
at both the preliminary hearing and trial.
      “Marcus Branson testified that he was on his way to the
same market when he heard four gunshots. He then saw Foster
and a man he was unable to identify running toward him from
the direction of the market. Prior to the night of the shooting
Branson often had seen Foster playing basketball at the school
Branson attended. As they ran past Branson, one man said ‘I
think we killed them.’ The other responded ‘I know. Let’s go.’
      “The Foster jury heard the testimony of Los Angeles Police
Detective William Baird who interviewed Foster after his arrest.
Foster told Baird that he had encountered Whittenberg near the
convenience store on the evening of the shooting. Whittenberg
announced that he was planning to commit a robbery. According
to Foster’s account, Whittenberg accosted the victims, pointed a
gun at them, struggled with one victim when he resisted and

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then shot that victim while Foster fled. Foster claimed that his
role was limited to removing money from Estrada’s hand.
      “The Whittenberg jury heard Los Angeles Police
Department Detective Eric Campos testify to a statement made
by Whittenberg after his arrest in which he implicated Foster as
the instigator of the robbery which culminated in Foster’s
shooting of Avendano. According to Whittenberg, his only role
was taking the money from Estrada’s hand.
      “Whittenberg presented no defense. Foster offered the
testimony of a private investigator who contradicted Nell King’s
testimony about the distance from her vantage point to the site of
the shooting. A search of the appellants’ homes revealed no
property relating to the crimes.” (People v. Foster et al. (Feb. 26,
1991, B042375) [nonpub. opn.], fn. omitted.)

                          DISCUSSION

   I.    Governing Law

       The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (SB 1437) “to
amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that
murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual
killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f);
accord, § 189, subd. (c); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959
(Lewis).)
       SB 1437 also added section 1170.95 to the Penal Code
which, as mentioned above, was later renumbered to section
1172.6. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4; Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) This
section permits individuals who were convicted of felony murder

                                 6
or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
but who could not be convicted of murder following SB 1437’s
changes to sections 188 and 189, to petition the sentencing court
to vacate the conviction and resentence on any remaining counts.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) The statute also provides relief for certain
individuals convicted under any “other theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime.” (Ibid.)
       A petition for relief under section 1172.6 must include a
declaration by the petitioner that he or she is eligible for relief
based on all the requirements of subdivision (a), the superior
court case number and year of the petitioner’s conviction, and a
request for appointment of counsel, should the petitioner seek
appointment. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1).)
       Subdivision (c) of section 1172.6 provides: “Within 60 days
after service of a petition that meets the requirements set forth in
subdivision (b), the prosecutor shall file and serve a response.
The petitioner may file and serve a reply within 30 days after the
prosecutor’s response is served. These deadlines shall be
extended for good cause. After the parties have had an
opportunity to submit briefings, the court shall hold a hearing to
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for
relief. If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the
petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to
show cause. If the court declines to make an order to show cause,
it shall provide a statement fully setting forth its reasons for
doing so.”
       If the trial court determines the petitioner has made a
prima facie showing for relief and issues an order to show cause,
the court must hold a hearing “to determine whether to vacate

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the murder . . . conviction and to recall the sentence and
resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts in the same
manner as if the petitioner had not previously been sentenced,
provided that the new sentence, if any, is not greater than the
initial sentence.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).) At the hearing, the
parties may rely on the record of conviction or present “new or
additional evidence” to support their positions, and “the burden of
proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder . . . under California
law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)

   II.      Analysis

        Foster argues the trial court erred by denying his petition
as a matter of law. Specifically, he contends: (1) in light of People
v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 (Strong), the felony murder
special-circumstance finding did not render him ineligible for
relief as a matter of law; (2) instructions on the special-
circumstance allegation were ambiguous as to which codefendant
could be the actual killer or had the intent to kill; (3) the jury was
not instructed on Foster’s liability as an accomplice or aider and
abettor for the felony-murder special circumstance; and (4) the
personal use of a firearm finding did not preclude the possibility
that it was Whittenberg, not Foster, who killed the victim.
        Foster’s contentions are without merit. Although the jury
was instructed on the felony murder rule, Foster is ineligible for
section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law, because the record
demonstrates the jury convicted him of murder under the theory
he was the actual killer. (See § 189, subd. (e)(1) [actual killers are
still liable for felony murder under current law]; Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 959 [section 1172.6 relief extends to convicted

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murderers who could not be convicted under current law, but
does not extend to actual killers].)
      In concluding Foster is ineligible for relief as a matter of
law, we first turn to the jury instructions and verdicts. Using
CALJIC No. 8.80, the trial court instructed the jury, in pertinent
part, as follows regarding the special circumstance:

            If, and only if, you find the defendant in this case
      guilty of murder in the first degree, you must then
      determine if the following special circumstance is true or
      not true that the murder was committed while the
      defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery or
      attempted robbery.

            The People have the burden of proving the truth of a
      special circumstance. If you have a reasonable doubt
      whether a special circumstance is true, you must find it to
      be not true.

             If, and only if, you find beyond a reasonable doubt
      that the defendant was the actual killer, then you must also
      find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended
      to kill a human being.

             In order to find a special circumstance alleged in this
      case to be true or untrue, you must agree unanimously.
      (Italics added.)

It is thus clear that, by finding the special circumstance true on
Foster’s murder count, the jury concluded beyond a reasonable
doubt Foster was the actual killer (in addition to finding he
harbored the intent to kill).

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       It is true, as Foster notes, that the trial court instructed the
jury as follows using CALJIC No. 1.11: “The word ‘defendant’
applies equally to each defendant unless you are expressly
instructed otherwise.” According to Foster, when viewed in
tandem, CALJIC Nos. 8.80 and 1.11 created an ambiguity
regarding whether the jury found Foster was the actual killer, or
alternatively, found Whittenburg was the actual killer. We
discern no such ambiguity. CALJIC No. 8.80, as given in Foster’s
case, clearly specified that it was referring to “the defendant in
this case.” (Italics added.) Because Foster and Whittenburg were
tried by separate juries, it was clear to the jury that the
instruction was referring to Foster.
       Other parts of the record likewise support the conclusion
that Foster’s jury convicted him of murder as the actual killer.
For example, that was the sole theory the prosecution presented
to the jury during closing arguments. The prosecution argued to
the jury:

             What happened during the course of this robbery?
      What happened is the evidence is clear that someone was
      gunned down in coldblooded murder and Mr. Thompson
      [a.k.a. Foster] is the one that did it. . . . [¶] What happened
      was that Mr. Thompson [Foster] shot him. Not once. Not
      twice. Not three times. But four times. He hit him each and
      every time. He shot him at close range in the hand, he shot
      him at close range in the side, and as Mr. Avendano was
      fleeing for his life, he shot him twice in the back in
      coldblooded murder . . . . [¶] The evidence is clear Mr.
      Thompson is the murderer in this case.

In his reply brief, Foster does not dispute the fact that the
prosecution’s sole theory was that he was the actual killer.

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Additionally, when addressing the jury regarding the special
circumstance allegation, the prosecution explained why the
evidence demonstrated Foster harbored the intent to kill. In
arguing this point, the prosecution again expressed its sole
theory that Foster was the actual killer:

             How can you tell that Mr. Thompson [Foster]
      intended to kill Mr. Avendano? You can tell by the
      number of times he was shot. If he just wanted to wound
      Mr. Avendano, he could have stopped after shooting him in
      the hand. He could have stopped after shooting him in the
      side. But, no, that’s not where he stopped. He didn’t stop
      there at all. He waited until the man was fleeing, an
      unarmed fleeing man, running for his life, and then shot
      him twice in the back. [¶] If that isn’t intent to kill, ladies
      and gentlemen, then I don’t know what is.

Because the prosecution’s sole theory was Foster was the actual
killer, it follows logically that the jury convicted him of murder
under that theory.4
       Foster argues the jury’s finding that he personally used a
firearm in the commission of the murder does not prove, as a
matter of law, that the jury convicted him under the theory he
was the actual killer. Although it may be correct that such a
personal use true finding may not be dispositive in all section
1172.6 cases, here, it provides further support for what the rest of
the record demonstrates, i.e., that the jury convicted Foster as
the actual killer. In other words, the jury’s true finding on the

4     Consistent with the prosecution theory that Foster was the
actual killer, the District Attorney brought no personal firearm
use allegations against codefendant Whittenburg.

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special circumstance allegation demonstrates as a matter of law
that Foster is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief, and the jury’s
true finding on the firearm enhancement only bolsters that
conclusion.
        Contrary to Foster’s assertions on appeal, Strong is
inapplicable to his case. Strong deals with a fairly narrow set of
circumstances in which the trial court denied section 1172.6 relief
as a matter of law based on an outdated jury finding that the
defendant was a major participant in the felony underlying the
murder conviction who acted with reckless indifference to human
life. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 703.)5 Here, by contrast, the
trial court denied relief based on a conclusion that the record
demonstrated as a matter of law Foster was convicted of murder
as the actual killer. Strong thus deals with an issue not present
in Foster’s case.
        We likewise reject Foster’s argument that remand is
warranted because current law would require the trial court to
instruct the jury using CALCRIM No. 703. As Foster points out, a
trial court’s sua sponte duty to instruct the jury with CALCRIM
No. 703 regarding “the mental state required for accomplice
liability when a special circumstance is charged” arises when
“there is sufficient evidence to support the finding that the
defendant was not the actual killer.” (Bench Note to CALCRIM
No. 703, citing People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1117.)

5     Strong held: “Findings issued by a jury before [People v.]
Banks [(2015) 61 Cal.4th 788] and [People v.] Clark [(2016) 63
Cal.4th 522] [that a defendant was a major participant who acted
with reckless indifference to human life] do not preclude a
defendant from making out a prima facie case for relief under
Senate Bill 1437.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 710.)

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Here, even assuming (without deciding) that a CALCRIM No. 703
instruction would be required under current law based on the
evidence presented in Foster’s case, Foster’s record of conviction
nevertheless demonstrates the jury found beyond a reasonable
doubt he committed murder as the actual killer, rendering him
ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law.6
       Foster lastly suggests the trial court engaged in improper
factfinding based on its statement “the evidence established”
Foster was the actual killer. We need not address that
contention, because we review the court’s ruling rather than its
reasoning. (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 39.) For the
reasons expressed in this opinion, the court’s ruling was legally
correct. The record demonstrates Foster is ineligible for section
1172.6 relief as a matter of law as the actual killer.

6       Many of Foster’s arguments on appeal are premised on the
notion that, because there was some evidence presented at trial
suggesting he was not the actual killer (i.e., his statements to
police that Whittenburg was the killer), his case must be
remanded for an evidentiary hearing. This premise is incorrect.
The record demonstrates the jury convicted Foster as the actual
killer.

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                        DISPOSITION
     The order denying Foster section 1172.6 relief is affirmed.

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                  CURREY, P. J.
We concur:

COLLINS, J.

ZUKIN, J.

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