Court Opinion

ID: 9928825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 22:11:03.233819+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:53.608983
License: Public Domain

J-S44012-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ANDRE RASHODD SMITH                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2790 EDA 2022

              Appeal from the Order Entered October 4, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-15-CR-0001819-2016

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                              FILED JANUARY 24, 2024

       Appellant, Andre Rashodd Smith, appeals pro se from the October 4,

2022 order dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief

Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541–9546. We affirm.

       A panel of this Court previously explained:

        The operative facts of the matter involve [Appellant] stabbing
        his former friend Grayling Chambliss in the chest and abdomen
        five [] times with a butcher knife, procured from his girlfriend’s
        kitchen before he answered the front door, shortly after
        midnight on May 11, 2016, such that the knife penetrated the
        victim’s lung, heart, and aorta, reaching at one point to the
        victim’s vertebrae, and also tore out the victim’s small intestine,
        which caused the victim’s small intestine to protrude from his
        abdominal cavity. The victim died within minutes.

        The murder occurred while [Appellant] was experiencing the
        psychotropic effects of his voluntary ingestion of “wet”, i.e.,
        PCP-laced marijuana, most likely earlier in the evening while he
        was at a bar drinking with his cousin. Immediately after
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S44012-23

      stabbing [] Chambliss, [Appellant] ran into the bathroom of his
      girlfriend’s home, removed all of his own bloody clothes, ripped
      the toilet/toilet tank from the wall/floor, and jumped naked out
      of a second story window onto the pavement below, fracturing
      his own heel and ankle and sustaining various abrasions to his
      body in the process. In a police interview conducted a couple
      hours later at the hospital, which was played for the jury,
      [Appellant] told one Detective Raech, “So I know the only . . .
      way for me to kill this man and like to stop him from fightin’
      [sic] me I gotta [sic] stab him in his heart.”

      [Appellant], who testified on his own behalf at trial, advanced
      the theory that due to his mental illness and voluntary
      intoxication on the night of the murder, he was unable to form
      the specific intent to kill and he claimed he acted in
      self-defense, on the basis that he was allegedly afraid of []
      Chambliss, who, according to the defense, had a [20]-year old
      conviction for [s]imple [a]ssault, two [] arrests for [r]ape, and
      was known to [Appellant] to carry a gun. The defense alleged
      that [] Chambliss had been calling [Appellant] repeatedly on his
      cellular telephone] that evening and trying to contact him in
      person by knocking on [Appellant’s] girlfriend’s door,
      interrupting the [Appellant’s] family and prayer time, and was
      trying to forcibly enter [Appellant’s] girlfriend’s home, where
      [Appellant] was staying, after being warned to go away.
      [] Chambliss’s persistence in contacting [Appellant] may have
      been occasioned by a drug debt that [] Chambliss wished to
      reimburse to [Appellant], who had previously supplied []
      Chambliss with controlled substances.

      Despite his attorneys’ attempt to persuade the jury that
      [Appellant] could not have formed the specific intent to kill []
      Chambliss due to his mental illness and voluntary drug
      intoxication, [Appellant] testified, notwithstanding the
      toxicology report, that he had not smoked PCP on the day of
      the murder and that he was not high on the drug at the time he
      committed the offense.

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Commonwealth v. Smith, 2020 WL 550739, at *1–*2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 4,

2020) (unpublished memorandum).

      On March 2, 2018, following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of

murder in the first degree and possessing an instrument of a crime. On May

7, 2018, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment, with a

consecutive sentence of 16 to 36 months’ incarceration. This Court affirmed

Appellant’s judgment of sentence on February 4, 2020. Id. Our Supreme

Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance to appeal on October 5, 2020.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 240 A.3d 96 (Pa. 2020).

      On August 6, 2021, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition, his

first, alleging that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, citing several

facets of counsel’s supposedly deficient performance. On August 16, 2021,

the PCRA court appointed C. Curtis Norcini, Esquire (“Attorney Norcini”) as

PCRA counsel. Ultimately, on March 4, 2022, Attorney Norcini filed a motion

to withdraw, as well as a “no merit” letter pursuant Commonwealth v.

Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) and Commonwealth v. Turner, 544

A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988).

      On March 30, 2022, the PCRA court filed a notice of intent to dismiss

the petition without an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(a).

In said notice, the PCRA court gave Appellant 20 days to file a response. On

April 18, 2022, Appellant moved for an extension of time to file his Rule 907

response. The PCRA court granted the extension, directing Appellant to file his

response on or before June 20, 2022. Appellant’s pro se response to the PCRA

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court’s Rule 907 notice was filed on June 21, 2022, and raised issues of trial

counsel’s and appellate counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance. Because “the

postmark on the envelope in which [Appellant’s pro se Rule 907 response]

arrived indicated that [Appellant] placed his [Rule 907 response] in the prison

mail system on or about June 16, 2022,” the PCRA court considered it to be

timely filed. PCRA Court Opinion, 2/27/23, at 3-4, citing Commonwealth v.

Smith, 2017 WL 3586734 *1, *2 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“Under the ‘prisoner

mailbox rule,’ a pro se petitioner’s document is deemed filed on the date he

delivers it to prison authorities for mailing.”).

      On July 8, 2022, the PCRA court ordered Attorney Norcini to review

Appellant’s pro se Rule 907 response and “advise the [c]ourt whether the

averments [within it], in conjunction with or separately from [Appellant’s] pro

se PCRA petition[] have any merit, by filing an [a]mended PCRA [p]etition or

an [a]mended Turner/Finely letter.” PCRA Court Order, 7/8/22, at 1. “PCRA

[c]ounsel filed an amended Turner/Finley letter on August 19, 2022,

determining that none of [Appellant’s] additional issues had any merit.” PCRA

Court Opinion, 2/27/23, at 4. Thereafter, on October 4, 2022, the PCRA court

issued an order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition and granting Attorney

Norcini leave to withdraw as counsel.

      Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on November 1, 2022.        On

December 8, 2022, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file and serve a

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal within 21 days, pursuant

to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). After securing an extension, Appellant timely complied.

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In Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement, he claimed, for the first time, that

Attorney Norcini provided ineffective assistance.

       Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:1

        1. [Whether the trial court erred in failing to remove trial
           counsel due to a conflict of interest; denying Appellant a
           suppression hearing; permitting the Commonwealth to
           submit evidence “after the time period ended;” allowing an
           “all[-]white jury [to convict Appellant who] is African
           American;” and allowing Appellant “to be slandered by the
           District Attorney?”

        2. Whether trial counsel was ineffective?

        3. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective?

        4. Whether Attorney Norcini, PCRA counsel, was ineffective?]

See generally Appellant’s Brief at 2-5.

       Our standard of review for challenges to the denial and dismissal of

petitions filed pursuant to the PCRA is well-settled.

        We must determine whether the findings of the PCRA court are
        supported by the record and whether the court's legal
        conclusions are free from error. The findings of the PCRA court
        and the evidence of record are viewed in a light most favorable
        to the prevailing party. The PCRA court's credibility
        determinations, when supported by the record, are binding;
        however, this [C]ourt applies a de novo standard of review to
        the PCRA court's legal conclusions. We must keep in mind that
        the petitioner has the burden of persuading this Court that the
        PCRA court erred and that such error requires relief. Finally,
        this Court may affirm a valid judgment or order for any reason
        appearing of record.

____________________________________________

1 We have re-ordered Appellant’s claims for ease of discussion and disposition.

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Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 205 A.3d 274, 286 (Pa. 2019) (citations

omitted).

      Moreover,

         [t]o be entitled to PCRA relief, [an] appellant must establish, by
         a preponderance of the evidence, his conviction or sentence
         resulted from one or more of the enumerated errors in 42
         Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9543(a)(2). These errors include a constitutional
         violation or ineffectiveness of counsel, which “so undermined
         the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of
         guilt or innocence could have taken place.” Id. Additionally,
         [an] appellant must show his claims have not been previously
         litigated or waived, and “the failure to litigate the issue prior to
         or during trial ... or on direct appeal could not have been the
         result of any rational strategic or tactical decision by counsel.”
         42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9543(a)(3), (a)(4). An issue is previously
         litigated if “the highest appellate court in which [appellant]
         could have had review as a matter of right has ruled on the
         merits of the issue.” 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9544(a)(2). An issue is
         waived if appellant “could have raised it but failed to do so
         before trial, at trial, . . . on appeal or in a prior state
         postconviction proceeding.” 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9544(b).

Commonwealth v. Cousar, 154 A.3d 287, 296 (Pa. 2017) (some citation

omitted).

      In Appellant’s first issue, he argues that the trial court committed

various errors before and during trial. See Appellant’s Brief at 5 and 26-28.

In particular, Appellant claims that the trial court erred by (1) failing to remove

trial counsel due to a conflict of interest; (2) “deny[ing]” Appellant a

suppression hearing; (3) letting the Commonwealth submit evidence “after

motions were filed for all evidence to be turned over;” and (4) allowing the

District Attorney to “slander” him in front of the jury.       Appellant’s Brief at

26-28.      These trial-based claims are not raised within the context of a

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challenge to trial counsel’s effectiveness and, thus, could have been litigated

on direct appeal. We therefore conclude that Appellant’s first appellate issue

is waived. See Commonwealth v. Reyes-Rodriguez, 111 A.3d 775, 780

(Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) (“At the PCRA stage, claims of trial court error

are either previously litigated (if raised on direct appeal) or waived (if not).”)

      In Appellant’s second and third issues, Appellant sets forth various

claims of trial and appellate counsels’ ineffective assistance. Appellant’s Brief

at 4-5 and 9-19. Appellant, however, failed to raise any of the aforementioned

issues in his Rule 1925(b) statement.           See Appellant’s Rule 1925(b)

Statement, 1/13/23, at 1-2. Thus, Appellant’s claims are necessarily waived.

See Pa.R.A.P.1925(b)(4)(vii) (“[i]ssues not included in the [Rule 1925(b)

s]tatement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of [Rule

1925(b)(4)] are waived”); see also Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306,

309 (Pa. 1998) (holding that any appellate issues not raised in a compliant

Rule 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived).

      We now turn to Appellant’s final appellate issue in which he argues that

PCRA counsel, Attorney Norcini, provided ineffective assistance. Our Supreme

Court recently restructured the procedure by which a PCRA petitioner may

assert claims of PCRA counsel's ineffectiveness to “allow[] a PCRA petitioner

to raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at the first opportunity

to do so, even when on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d

381, 401 (Pa. 2021) (emphasis added). In a subsequent decision, however,

our Supreme Court “emphasized the importance of raising a claim of PCRA

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counsel’s ineffectiveness in the Rule 1925(b) statement if that filing is the

petitioner’s first opportunity to do so.” Commonwealth v. Spady, 2023 WL

2923091 *1, *3 (Pa. Super. April 13, 2023) (unpublished memorandum),

citing Commonwealth v. Parrish, 273 A.3d 989, 1002 (Pa. 2022) (“Parrish

adequately raised and preserved his layered claim of the ineffective assistance

of trial and initial PCRA counsel by raising it at the first opportunity to do so,

specifically in his [c]orrected 1925(b) [s]tatement and in his brief filed with

this Court in this appeal.”). Thus, pursuant to Parrish, this Court has held

that, if a petitioner’s 1925(b) statement is his first opportunity to raise a claim

regarding PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness and he fails to do so, such a claim is

waived. See Spady, supra at *3; see also Commonwealth v. Womack,

2022 WL 17099016 *1, *3 (Pa. Super. Nov. 22, 2022) (unpublished

memorandum) (“[B]ecause new PCRA counsel did not raise Womack's layered

claim of ineffectiveness in his Rule 1925(b) statement, we agree with the

Commonwealth that Womack's second issue is waived.”); Commonwealth

v. Alston, 2022 WL 1658068 *1, *7 (Pa. Super. May 25, 2022) (unpublished

memorandum) (same).

      Herein, Appellant sets forth the following claims against PCRA counsel,

Attorney Norcini: Attorney Norcini provided ineffective assistance of counsel

by failing to assert that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) “not suppressing

information prior to trial;” (2) “not calling upon []or interviewing witnesses

prior to trial [after Appellant] provided a list [of said witnesses] and the

witnesses would have cor[r]oborated [Appellant’s] testimony;” (3) “not

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accepting the [trial j]udge’s reco[m]mendation of a mistrial [after] the District

Attorney slandered [Appellant];” and (4) raising a diminished capacity defense

that was not agreed upon in violation of Appellant’s Sixth Amendment rights.

Appellant’s Brief at 3 and 21-24. In addition, Appellant claims that Attorney

Norcini was ineffective for failing to “search the entire record” and raise

“meritorious PCRA issues not recognized or raised by Appellant.” Id. at 20.

A review of Appellant’s 1925(b) statement, however, reveals that Appellant

included only two of the aforementioned claims, namely, Attorney Norcini’s

alleged failure to (1) challenge trial counsel’s decision to pursue a diminished

capacity defense and (2) adequately review the record and pursue various

issues in an amended PCRA petition.            See Appellant’s Rule 1925(b)

Statement, 1/13/23, at 1-2. We therefore conclude that Appellant waived his

remaining claims by failing to include them in his 1925(b) statement.

      We now turn to the properly preserved claims challenging Attorney

Norcini’s effectiveness. As stated above, a PCRA petitioner is now permitted

to assert claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness, as long as he does so at

the first opportunity. Bradley, supra, at 401. When raised on appeal, the

Court explained:

       In some instances, the record before the appellate court will be
       sufficient to allow for disposition of any newly-raised
       ineffectiveness claims. However, in other cases, the appellate
       court may need to remand to the PCRA court for further
       development of the record and for the PCRA court to consider
       such claims as an initial matter. Consistent with our prior case
       law, to advance a request for remand, a petition would be
       required to provide more than mere boilerplate assertions of
       PCRA counsel's ineffectiveness; however, where there are

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       material facts at issue concerning claims challenging counsel's
       stewardship and relief is not plainly unavailable as a matter of
       law, the remand should be afforded.

Id. at 402 (quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). Accordingly,

appellate courts are empowered to consider claims that were never presented

to the PCRA court and remand cases for further development of the record

where appropriate. Id. PCRA petitioners who challenge the performance of

PCRA counsel for the first time on appeal are entitled to remand for further

consideration of their claims only where the law and the facts suggest a

colorable claim for relief that goes beyond mere boilerplate contentions. See

Parrish, 273 A.3d at 1007 (explaining that the appellant in that case pointed

to potential evidence supporting his claim, provided a colorable argument, and

alleged prejudice such that he was “entitled to a remand to present evidence

and argument to substantiate his claim[.]”).

      “[C]ounsel is presumed effective, and [the appellant] bears the burden

of proving otherwise.”   Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 804 (Pa.

2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Steele, 961 A.2d 786, 796 (Pa. 2008).

To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, an appellant must establish:

       (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable
       basis existed for counsel's actions or failure to act; and (3)
       [appellant] suffered prejudice as a result of counsel's error such
       that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the
       proceeding would have been different absent such error.

Commonwealth v. Lesko, 15 A.3d 345, 373–374 (Pa. 2011), citing

Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975 (Pa. 1987). Failure to meet

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any prong of the test will defeat an ineffectiveness claim. Commonwealth

v. Rainey, 928 A.2d 215, 224–225 (Pa. 2007).

      Importantly, when raising a layered claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, a petitioner's “ineffectiveness claims as to PCRA counsel are derived

from [the] underlying assertion that trial counsel performed deficiently and

PCRA counsel should have raised such issues in the amended PCRA petition[,]

PCRA counsel c[an] only be found ineffective if trial counsel was ineffective.”

Commonwealth v. Crumbley, 270 A.3d 1171, 1180 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(citation omitted). Thus, a litigant raising a layered claim of ineffectiveness

within the context of collateral review must adequately develop all three

prongs of ineffectiveness for each layer of representation that is the subject

of the challenge. See Parrish, 273 A.3d at 1003, n.11.

      First, Appellant claims that Attorney Norcini provided ineffective

assistance because he allegedly failed to investigate and/or recognize

meritorious issues and file an amended PCRA petition on Appellant’s behalf.

In its 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court addressed Appellant’s complaint as

follows:

       A review of the record demonstrates that [Appellant’s] assertion
       of ineffective assistance of [Attorney Norcini’s] alleged failure
       to “search the entire record” to find some unspecified
       outstanding “meritorious PCRA issues” not already intuited by
       [Appellant] is without merit.       [Appellant’s] claim is mere
       boilerplate and patently speculative. He does not identify any
       issue that [Attorney Norcini] missed. He simply states that
       [Attorney Norcini’s] alleged failure to review the “entire record”
       possibly left some nebulous issue or issues that might have, if

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      proven, provided him with an avenue for relief.       The record
      belies [Appellant’s] allegations.

      The     record,    including    both   of   [Attorney   Norcini’s]
      Turney/Finley letters[,] shows that [Attorney Norcini]
      addressed not only the issues [Appellant] raised in his pro se
      [p]etition, but also those that [Appellant] raised in his [pro se
      response to the PCRA court’s 907 notice]. [Attorney Norcini],
      in his Turney/Finley letters, affirmed that he had
      communicated with [Appellant] in writing regarding these
      issues. It is true that in representing a PCRA petitioner, counsel
      must certify to an exhaustive reading of the record and
      endeavor to uncover all possible issues for review.
      Commonwealth v. Perry, 959 A.2d 932 (Pa. Super. 2008)[.
      Attorney Norcini] [] satisfied this demand. [Attorney Norcini]
      listed the exhaustive record items he [] reviewed in making his
      determination that there were no meritorious issues to be
      advanced in [Appellant’s] case and expressly stated that he had
      studied all of the items and [“]unfortunately found that there
      are no issues of arguable merit that would form the basis of an
      amended petition[.]” [] PCRA Counsel's Turney/Finley Letter,
      3/4/22, at 1, [¶] 1; PCRA Counsel's Turney/Finley Letter,
      8/19/22, at 1, [¶] 1[.]

      As this [] Court recently set forth,

           "[Under Turner/Finley, i]f PCRA counsel seeks to
           withdraw on the grounds that the issues raised by the
           PCRA petitioner are without merit, he must satisfy the
           following requirements: he must file a sufficient no merit
           letter, send the PCRA petitioner copies of the application to
           withdraw and no-merit letter, and advise the PCRA
           Petitioner of his right to proceed pro se or with a privately
           retained attorney. The no-merit letter must set forth:
           1) the nature and extent of counsel's review of the case;
           2) each issue that the petitioner wishes to raise on appeal;
           and 3) counsel's explanation of why each of those issues is
           meritless."

      Commonwealth v. Frye, 287 A.3d 875, 2022 WL 10225179
      *4 (Pa. Super. 2022)[. Attorney Norcini’s] Turner/Finley
      letter[s] meets all of these requirements. In addition, [the
      PCRA court] conducted an independent review in this matter
      and determined that Attorney Norcini’s] analysis of the issues
      raised was correct and determined . . . that his conclusion that

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       there were no meritorious issues to be found in the record was
       sound. [Hence, Appellant’s boilerplate and speculative claim
       lacks merit].

PCRA Court Opinion, 2/27/23, at 10-12. We adopt this aspect of the PCRA

court reasoning as our own.      Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that

Appellant’s claim asserting PCRA counsel’s lack of diligence is devoid of merit.

      Next, Appellant claims that Attorney Norcini was ineffective for failing to

raise an issue of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. In particular, Appellant claims

that Attorney Norcini rendered ineffective assistance in failing to file an

amended PCRA petition averring that trial counsel, in violation of Appellant’s

Sixth Amendment rights, pursued a diminished capacity defense, as opposed

to claiming self-defense, without Appellant’s knowledge or consent.         Upon

review, we conclude that Appellant’s claim fails for lack of prejudice.

      In his appellate brief, Appellant proffers the following statement in

support of his claim:

       [Attorney Norcini] was ineffective for failing to raise the fact
       that trial counsel raised a defense that was not agreed upon
       with Appellant which violated his [S]ixth [A]mendment rights
       and prejudice[d] him by robbing him of a fair trial and making
       him look like a lier [sic] before the jury when a [d]iminsh[ed
       c]apacity defense was never suppose[d] to be brought up at all.
       Com[monwealth] v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975 ([Pa.]
       1987)[.] In this instant case[,] this petitioner asserts that this
       claim is of arguable merit in that a defendant has a fundamental
       right to choose his own defense. The United States Constitution
       Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to
       choose objective of his own defense and insist that his counsel
       refrain from admitting guilt[]. [See] McCoy v. Louisiana[,
       138 S.Ct. 1500 (2018).] And this right was violated when
       counsel chose to purse an entirely different defense than the
       agreed upon defense and that [is] how Appellant was
       prejudiced.

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Appellant’ Brief at 21-22.    Appellant, therefore, failed to set forth any

argument demonstrating that, had trial counsel avoided a diminished capacity

defense, the outcome would have been different. Instead, Appellant sets forth

a blanket statement claiming prejudice, which is utterly insufficient.   See

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 870 A.2d 822, 833-834 (Pa. 2005) (explaining

that to demonstrate prejudice, an appellant must show there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's error, the outcome of the proceeding would

have been different). Thus, we hold that Appellant's ineffective assistance

claims directed at PCRA counsel are unavailing.

     Order affirmed.

Date: 1/24/2024

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