Court Opinion

ID: 9560651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:53:04.483678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:04.526952
License: Public Domain

SHELLEY, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, a white defendant normally does not have standing to contest the use of peremptory challenges to strike the only blacks from a jury. However, because this defendant is represented by a black attorney, the fact situation is sufficient to satisfy the principles set forth in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).
The majority mistakenly holds that the standing issue is controlled by Peters v. Kiff 407 U.S. 493, 92 S.Ct. 2163, 33 L.Ed. 2d 83 (1972). In that case, peremptory challenges were not involved. The case involved the systematic exclusion of blacks from being initially drawn for grand and petit juries. In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975), the jurors were excluded from the venire. Peremptory challenges were not involved.
Batson makes it clear that the prosecutor’s historical privilege of peremptory challenges should be as free from judicial control as possible. This right is deeply rooted and comes from common law. Bat-son held that if a prosecutor was required to explain his reasons for exercising peremptory challenges, that explanation did not need to rise to the level justifying challenge for cause. The question to be determined was whether the peremptories made were based solely on the prosecutor’s intuitive judgment that they would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race. The Batson case held:
The standards for assessing a prima facie case in the context of discriminatory selection of the venire have been fully articulated since Swain. These principles support our conclusion that a defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor’s exercise of per*517emptory challenges at the defendant’s trial. To establish such a case, the defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant’s race.
‡ # * # & *
But the prosecutor may not rebut the defendant’s prima facie case of discrimination by stating merely that he challenged jurors of the defendant’s race on the assumption — or his intuitive judgment — that they would be partial to the defendant because of their shared race. (Emphasis added — citations omitted)
476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-23, 90 L.Ed.2d at 87-88.
In the case of Phillips v. State, 496 N.E.2d 87 (Ind.1986), the Indiana Supreme Court, referring to Batson, stated:
To establish such a case, appellant must show: 1) he is a member of a cognizable racial group; 2) the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove that group’s members from his jury; and 3) the facts and circumstances of his case raise an inference the exclusion was based on race. Batson, supra. Once appellant has made a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors. The prosecutor’s explanation need not rise to the level of a challenge for cause. The trial court will then have the duty to determine whether appellant has established purposeful discrimination. (Emphasis added)
Id. at 89.
Phillips interprets Batson to require that the defendant must be a member of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor has exercised challenges to remove that group’s members from his jury.
In State v. Jackson, 317 N.C. 1, 343 S.E.2d 814 (1986), the court interpreted Batson as follows:
The Court stated that in order to establish such a prima facie case, the defendant must first show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant’s race; second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that lends itself to potential abuse; and third, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances (e.g., a pattern of strikes against black jurors in a particular voir dire, questions and statements by the prosecutor during voir dire, etc.) raise an inference that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors on the basis of race. (Emphasis added)
Id. at 11-12, 343 S.E.2d at 820.
The reasoning in Phillips and Jackson is entirely consistent with the holding in Bat-son.
The majority states:
The state bases its standing argument on the language in Batson, supra, which requires a defendant to be of the same race as the veniremen being excluded. In our opinion the “same class” language of Batson, goes not to the issue of standing (right to use the issue), but is directed only toward the establishment of a prima facie evidentiary case of purposeful discrimination. Thus, if the defendant and excluded veniremen are of the same race, a strong evidentiary inference may be drawn that prima facie purposeful discrimination has occurred and the burden thereby shifted to the state to explain its actions.
I disagree. Batson clearly states unequivocally that the defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group and second that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant’s race. The foregoing is the threshold requirement. If the first requirement is not met, then it is not necessary to consider the remaining two requirements specified in Batson.
The United States Supreme Court cases cited by the majority are all pre-Batson *518determinations. Batson is therefore controlling on this issue.
The cases cited by the majority involving U.S.C. Title VII are inapposite, inasmuch as they involve statutory interpretation and not constitutional rights.
A defendant has the right to have an attorney of his choosing, or if indigent, a right to have an attorney appointed by proper authorities. Since this defendant has a black attorney to present his case to the jury, the principles of Batson apply to this defendant as if he were black. He has standing to contest the use of peremptory challenges.
The majority states that under Batson, the initial burden is upon the trial judge to make his discretionary determination “as to whether there is sufficient evidence of purposeful discrimination in the peremptory striking of veniremen to require explanation by the prosecution for its actions.” The majority quotes the following from Batson:
[i]n deciding whether the defendant has made the requisite showing, the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances. For example, a ‘pattern’ of strikes against black jurors included in the particular venire might give rise to an inference of discrimination. Similarly, the prosecutor's questions and statements during voir dire examination and in exercising his challenge may support or refute an inference of discriminatory purpose. These examples are merely illustrative. We have confidence that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors.
We are therefore required to look at the relevant circumstances ineluding voir dire to determine whether or not the trial court abused its discretion in finding that an inference of discrimination was raised sufficient to require the prosecutor to give an explanation. In this connection, the record shows the following statement by the trial court referring to one of the two black jurors stricken: “I know he did say, I believe he had a past history, a felony for aggravated assault, or assault, and probation and if my memory serves me correct, he said it was five years ago.” The court further stated: “Since both were black, I necessarily have to ask as to both blacks.”
It is clear that the trial court made this ruling solely on the basis of the racial exclusion by peremptories without taking into consideration the circumstances revealed on voir dire. In my opinion, the trial court abused its discretion in requiring the prosecutor to respond with respect to the striking of this one juror.
I find no abuse of discretion in requiring the prosecutor to give the reason for striking the other black juror. The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed with respect only to requiring an explanation with regard to one black juror.