Court Opinion

ID: 9719848
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:06:46.12987+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:10.639413
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE STOUDER, dissenting: I respectfully disagree with the majority position that the trial court was correct in granting a new trial on damages only. Neither is the liability of the defendant so clear, nor the issues of the liability and damages so separable, such as to justify granting a new trial on damages only. I also question the conclusion in the majority opinion which states that an order granting a new trial may not be reviewed once an earlier petition for leave to appeal from that order has been denied. At common law orders granting new trials were considered interlocutory and review of such an interlocutory order could not be obtained until after a final judgment was entered. Supreme Court Rule 306 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 306), and its several statutory predecessors, modified the common law and allowed review of a new trial order upon the grant of a petition for leave to appeal. But while Rule 306 authorizes one avenue for securing review of an interlocutory order granting a new trial, the Rule does not purport to be the sole or exclusive method of securing review of such an order. Provision in the Rule for review via petition for leave to appeal imports discretion in the court of review without declaring any of the consequences which will flow from a denial of the petition. When review is discretionary, it is difficult to imply or import reasons for the denial of leave to appeal. A court may have merely considered that the issue was not ripe for review. I therefore disagree with the conclusion of the majority which declares that the merits of defendant’s objection to the order granting a new trial on damages only, were fully considered in reaching our earlier decision denying defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. By way of analogy, the authority of our supreme court to deny a petition for leave to appeal is discretionary. Yet, no particular significance is attached to such a denial, either by precedent or by Supreme Court Rule. If the denial of a petition for leave to appeal is to constitute a ruling on the merits, then a petitioner should be entided to more from an appellate tribunal than a perfunctory reply. Having sought review by the statutorily prescribed procedure, a petitioner is entitled to the same quantum of review that is customarily afforded litigants on appeals from final judgments as a matter of right. Whether on a petition for leave to appeal or on an appeal from the judgment of a second trial after the denial of an earlier petition, the appellate court should allow a party an opportunity to fully argue his objections to the order granting the new trial. The majority cites three cases dealing with Supreme Court Rule 306(a) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 306(a)). Two of the three cases, Rodriquez v. Chicago Transit Authority, 58 Ill. App. 150,206 N.E.2d 828, and Hamas v. Payne, 107 Ill. App. 2d 316, 246 N.E.2d 1, do not even involve situations where a petition for leave to appeal has been filed, review of the new trial order being sought only after the second trial had been held and a final judgment entered. This distinguishing feature of the Hamas and Rodriquez opinions serves to diminish their precedential value in the issue before us. While these cases may not be authoritative, the case of Martino v. Barra, 10 Ill. App. 3d 97, 293 N.E.2d 745, is direct authority for the proposition announced in the majority opinion that the denial of the petition for leave to appeal from an order granting a new trial prevents review on a subsequent appeal. I disagree with this decision and would urge this court to adopt a contrary position. Furthermore, I believe such a contrary position finds considerable support in the Illinois Supreme Court decision in Hall v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co., 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77. In Hall, plaintiff won a jury verdict for *50,000. Defendant moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial. Defendant sought and was granted leave to appeal from the order granting a new trial, pursuant to section 77 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, ch. 110, par. 201), a predecessor to Supreme Court Rule 306 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 306(a)). (The only issues allowed on this appeal were those relating to the new trial order.) The appellate court reversed and remanded with directions to reinstate the judgment. Plaintiff petitioned our supreme court for leave to appeal, but the court denied the petition. Upon the case being redocketed, and judgment entered for plaintiff, both parties appealed to the appellate court. On this second appeal the appellate court reversed the trial court’s earlier denial of defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and remanded with directions to enter judgment for defendant. Plaintiff was then granted leave to appeal by our supreme court. After holding that the appellate court’s decision ordering judgment for defendant was incorrect, the supreme court considered sua sponte whether the merits of the issue concerning the original order granting a new trial were properly before the court. The court formulated the issue as follows: “The particular question now before us is whether, after the case has been remanded to the trial court and judgment entered thereon pursuant to the first Appellate Court opinion, a second appeal is perfected to the Appellate Court at which the latter considers only whether there was sufficient evidence to warrant judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and we allow a petition for leave to appeal from the second decision, the question passed upon by the Appellate Court in its first opinion is now before us for decision.” (5 Ill. 2d 135, 146, 125 N.E.2d 77, 83.) The court held that the issue was properly before them and decided that the trial court’s original order granting a new trial was proper and remanded the case for a new trial. The facts and procedure in Hall are closely analogous to those in this case and the holding in Hall supports a position opposite to that suggested by the majority. The mere fact the majority does discuss the merits of the order granting a new trial indicates that just reasons do exist for resolving the issue on the merits. Upon consideration of the merits of the order granting a new trial, I also find myself in disagreement with the majority. My reasons for disagreeing with the majority’s position on the propriety of granting a new trial on damages only are two-fold. First, I do not believe defendant’s liability is unquestionably established by the evidence, as the majority indicates. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the facts of this case clearly indicate an instance in which it is reasonable to assume the jury’s damage award was a compromise on the issue of liability, not between the plaintiff and defendant, but rather between the defendant and Ms. Kirchner, a potential defendant. I agree with the majority that the applicable rule in deciding when a new trial on damages only is proper, is whether the damage issue is so separable and distinct from the issue of liability that a trial of it alone may be held without injustice. (Paul Harris Furniture Co. v. Morse, 10 Ill. 2d 28,139 N.E.2d 275.) If either the liability of defendant is questionable, or may be the result of compromise, the issue of damages is neither separable nor distinct from the issue of liability. In resolving whether there exists the quantum of evidence necessary to show the requisite unquestionable liability of defendant, the question is not whether there is sufficient evidence to justify the jury’s verdict, rather it is whether there is sufficient evidence to justify a directed verdict in favor of plaintiff as a matter of law. If a party’s liability fails to meet this level of certainty, then any ruling by either trial or appellate court that the issues of liability and damages are separable and distinct, would be invading areas customarily within the province of the jury. I cannot say, from the evidence in this case, that the plaintiff would be so entitled to a directed verdict as a matter of law. Even the trial court stated that there were disputed questions of fact to be resolved and at least intimated that a contrary verdict on defendant’s liability would find considerable support. From an appellate court’s standpoint, I am sure that if defendant had been found not liable, we would have affirmed the jury’s verdict. Defendant’s liability was far from being decisively established by the evidence supporting the jury’s original verdict, as an examination of the facts will reveal. The sequence of events resulting in Mr. Robbins’ death began when the vehicle driven by Bonita Kirchner crossed over the center line into the lane of defendant’s vehicle and collided with it. Since it would almost appear as a matter of law that the actions of Ms. Kirchner were negligent, events regarding defendant’s negligence must be premised upon the conduct of the operator of the Kirchner vehicle. The only evidence introduced to establish defendant’s negligence concerned the speed of defendant’s truck and the driver’s conduct in controlling the truck after the collision with the Kirchner vehicle. The truck driver testified that he was travelling 50 miles per hour when approaching the scene of the accident. An independent witness observed the accident and testified that it occurred at 7:20 in the morning on “a clear, nice day and the pavement was dry.” The posted speed limit was 65 miles per hour. This witness first stated that he “was not really able to determine the speed of the truck at or before the impact.” Later in his testimony, he estimated that defendant’s truck was going from 40 to 50 miles per hour at the time of impact with the Robbins vehicle. Over objection of defense counsel, plaintiff’s attorney introduced testimony from a coroner’s inquest showing the witness had previously testified that the speed of the vehicle on impact was 50 to 60 miles per hour. The witness then changed his testimony to agree with the testimony he had given at the coroner’s inquest. The witness also testified that “maybe a second and a half passed between the first impact and the second impact,” indicating little opportunity to reduce speed. The foregoing is the extent of the most significant facts upon which defendant’s liability is predicated. While evidence does exist to indicate defendant’s possible negligence, defendant’s actions failed to possess the decisive character which is necessary to say that plaintiff is entitled to a directed verdict on defendant’s negligence. Without this level of certainty, the issue of damages cannot be deemed separable and distinct from the issue of liability. My strongest objection concerns the issue of compromise. While the majority correctly states that no evidence exists to show compromise between the plaintiff and defendant, they fail to recognize that a compromise could certainly exist between the defendant and Bonita Kirchner, whose initial actions instigated the chain of events which culminated in plaintiff’s decedent’s death. As a result of the differing magnitudes of responsibility for plaintiff’s decedent’s death on the part of defendant and Ms. Kirchner, the jury could well have returned an amount of damages which would reflect this difference in culpability. In the opinion of Paul Harris Furniture Co. v. Morse, 10 Ill. 2d 28,139 N.E.2d 275, our supreme court approved on the merits a new trial on damages only, but did so because the unusual manner in which the jury returned its verdict indicated that the verdict had resulted from a clearly erroneous view of damages. Prior to the original trial in Harris, one defendant, Acme, made a settlement with each of several plaintiffs, took a covenant not to sue, and was dismissed without prejudice. As to the three remaining defendants, the jury returned guilty verdicts against them and awarded damages against each in amounts which were identical to the amounts received by the plaintiffs from Acme under the covenant not to sue. In support of its approval of the new trial on damages only, the court believed that there was nothing to indicate a compromise, and in fact, the record pointed rather to misunderstanding or confusion by the jury of the evidence of the Acme settlement. In this case, the amount paid for the covenant not to sue was not introduced into evidence and therefore, could not have confused or mislead the jury in arriving at their verdict. I believe the only time one can say in a tort case that the verdict was not a compromise on the issue of liability, is when evidence can be pointed to which shows how the jury returned that amount of damages. This court has been shown no such evidence. In presenting his position for a new trial on damages only, plaintiff undertook the burden of proof in establishing the separable and distinct character of the liability and damages issues. Plaintiff has not met such burden in this case. As stated previously, the issues will not be deemed separable if it appears the verdict was the result of compromise. (Gainer v. Bates, 14 Ill. App. 3d 297, 302 N.E.2d 463; Keel v. Compton, 120 Ill. App. 2d 248, 256 N.E.2d 848.) Hence, I believe the trial court erred in granting a new trial on damages only. The majority states that the case of Keel v. Compton, 120 Ill. App. 2d 248, 256 N.E.2d 848, is distinguishable from the instant case, but fails to indicate the basis for its distinguishability. I believe that Keel is not distinguishable and should control the result in this case. “[T]here is nothing from the amount of the verdict, considered in relation to the facts and circumstances of the case, indicating that the verdict may not have been a compromise of liability against damages.” (120 Ill. App. 2d 248, 256-57, 256 N.E.2d 848, 852.) Not only do the facts and circumstances fail to establish the absence of a compromise, if anything, the facts and circumstances are indicative of a compromise by the jury. In summary, I believe that this court is not prevented by our previous denial of petition for leave to appeal from considering defendant’s objections to the merits of the order granting a new trial on damages alone. When the merits of that issue are considered, I think the trial court did err in granting a new trial on the issues of damages only.