Court Opinion

ID: 9460477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:51:30.049155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:38.163224
License: Public Domain

ALDISERT, Circuit Judge
(concurring and dissenting.)
I would reverse the final judgment of conviction and remand these proceedings to the district court for reconsideration. Assuming without conceding a constitutional prerogative of the Chief Executive to intercept, I am persuaded that the strictures of § 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, as interpreted by the Court in Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 58 S.Ct. 275, 82 L.Ed. 314 (1937), prevents divulging or publishing the contents of the interception. My view coincides precisely with that taken by the Department of Justice under Attorneys General Tom C. Clark, J. Howard McGrath, Herbert Brownell, Jr., William P. Rogers and Robert F. Kennedy.
I.
Before proceeding into a discussion of this issue in part III, infra, I am constrained to set forth additional observations to present in detail the equally important issue upon which the panel of this court was not divided and upon which there appears to be unanimity in the full court: the district court’s holding that the first set of logs, designated as “4001-S*” and “4002-S*” did not taint the conviction. To put these issues in proper perspective I find it necessary to set forth the facts.
Appellant Igor Ivanov, a Soviet national, was charged with having conspired with one John Butenko, an American, to violate the federal espionage statute, 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) and (c) 1 *616(Count I), from April to October in 1963, and with having conspired to violate the statutory prohibition against acting as an agent of a foreign government without prior notification to the Secretary of State, 18 U.S.C. § 9512 (Count II). Following a jury verdict of guilty, appellant Ivanov was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment on Count I and five years’ imprisonment on Count II, the ’ sentences to run concurrently. This court affirmed the judgment of conviction against him on Count I and directed his acquittal on Count II. United States v. Butenko, 384 F.2d 554 (3d Cir. 1967). Appellant then filed petitions for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. While the cases were there pending, the Solicitor General revealed that the United States had engaged in certain electronic surveillances and that Butenko and Ivanov had been overheard. The Supreme Court ordered a remand to the district court for “a hearing, findings, and conclusions (1) on the question of whether with respect to any petitioner there was electronic surveillance which violated his Fourth Amendment rights, and (2) if there was such surveillance with respect to any petitioner, on the nature and relevanee to his conviction of any conversations which may have been overheard through that surveillance.” 3 Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 186-187, 89 S.Ct. 961, 973, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969).
On remand, the government conceded that one set of interceptions was illegal but convinced the district court that these did not taint the conviction. The district court found a second set of interceptions to have been properly authorized by virtue of the President’s prerogative to obtain foreign intelligence information, denied appellant’s application for disclosure, denied an eviden-tiary hearing pertaining thereto, and entered a new judgment of conviction. United States v. Ivanov, 342 F.Supp. 928 (D.N.J.1972). This appeal followed.
The precise nature of the espionage conspiracy was a scheme to transmit to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the plan of a command and control system of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). Given the name “465-L,” the system was being produced by International Electronic Company, a subsidiary of International Telephone and Telegraph, and was an automatic electronic system which enabled the commander of *617SAC to alert and deploy his forces and provide him with an up to the minute status of the total force. Additional details on the nature of this project are summarized in our earlier opinion. 384 F.2d at 557. We found that “there was substantial evidence to buttress the conviction” of Butenko, then employed as a control administrator at the International Electronic Company, and that “sufficient evidence was offered by the government to show [Ivanov’s] intimate involvement with the conspiracy.” 384 F. 2d at 563.
At trial the government proved that on October 29, 1963, appellant was observed in Englewood, New Jersey, with two other Soviet Nationals, Pavlov and Romashin, in the vicinity of the Engle-wood railroad station parking lot. An automobile “driven by Butenko, drove into the railroad station lot, parked, turned off the headlights and turned on the parking lights and within a few minutes the Soviet automobile, now driven by Pavlov with Ivanov in the right front seat, came into the parking lot, signaled by turning off headlights and turning on parking lights. Here, there was a direct confrontation between Ivanov and Butenko and several minutes later, when the defendants were arrested, the briefcase of Butenko was found in the Soviet automobile.” 384 F.2d at 563-564.
Two sets of logs reflecting electronic surveillances were introduced at the remand hearing and form the backdrop of this appeal. The first set covered the periods from May 15, 1963, to June 11, 1963, and from June 27, 1963, to August 13, 1963, and were designated as “4001-S*'” and “4002-S*.” These logs were disclosed to appellant. The government conceded that these logs represented illegal surveillances but contended that their use did not taint the conviction. The district court agreed. A second set of logs was not shown to appellant or his counsel but was examined by the court in camera. The government represented that these logs reflected intercepted conversations of Ivanov, duly obtained by the Department of Justice in the exercise of the President’s right to obtain foreign intelligence information. These sealed documents, government exhibits A-l, A-2, and A-3, were accompanied by an affidavit of Attorney General John N. Mitchell setting forth the circumstances of, and authority for, the surveillance. The court ruled that this second set of logs was lawfully obtained under the theory set forth by the Attorney General and refused Ivanov the opportunity of examining them or an evi-dentiary hearing relating thereto.
Ivanov mounted separate arguments relating to each set of logs. He contended that the first set of logs was incomplete and, therefore, the court erred in its ruling that the use of these illegal surveillances did not taint the conviction. Secondly, he argued that the use of the surveillance evidence from the second set of logs was illegal, contravening Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934,4 or, alternatively, that use *618of this evidence by the prosecution violated Fourth Amendment protections guaranteed him as an alien. See Au Yi Lau v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Service, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 147, 445 F.2d 217, 223, cert, denied, 404 U.S. 864, 92 S.Ct. 64, 30 L.Ed.2d 108 (1971), stating that aliens in this country, like citizens, are protected by the Fourth Amendment. See generally Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596-597, 73 S.Ct. 472, 97 L.Ed. 576 (1953).
II.
Some factual background to the first set of logs is necessary. The actual tapes were not available; only logs reflecting a summary of their contents were presented. Government witnesses testified that it was standard practice to erase tapes which were not productive of meaningful evidence or leads, and because these surveillances were unproductive, the taped interceptions were not preserved. The court found as a fact: “Rarely did intelligible adult conversations come through, and no clear conversation of Ivanov was received over the equipment.” 342 F.Supp. at 933. Using the test of United States v. Delerme, 457 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1972), I believe there is substantial evidence to support this finding.5
Typical of the testimony adduced at the hearing was that of Agent Mc-Williams who supervised the wiretapping. The district court reported: “McWilliams admitted that the electronic surveillance of Ivanov conducted under his supervision produced no evidence that would have waiTanted Ivanov’s arrest for engaging in any unlawful activity.” Id. Agents McWilliams, Martin, Conway and Manning testified that no use was made of the results of those surveillances and no reports were furnished pertaining to their contents. The Assistant United States Attorney who prosecuted the case and the two Department of Justice agents who assisted him testified that they were unaware of any electronic surveillance.
Indeed, the district court observed throughout its opinion:
The evidence adduced at the hearing conclusively shows that Ivanov’s conviction was not in any way tainted by reason of the unlawful electronic sur-veillances conducted by the Government.
342 F.Supp. at 931.
There is no question in the Court’s mind, based on personal knowledge of the trial, and a careful review of the evidence adduced at the taint hearing, that the arrest and subsequent conviction of Ivanov resulted from the Government’s independent investigation of the case, in which electronic surveillances 4001-S* and 4002-S'x' played no part.
342 F.Supp. at 936.
The electronic surveillances in this case were ineffective and unsuccessful. What they produced was, at best, innocuous, even when viewed by the *619specially trained and experienced FBI Agents. An examination of the logs, reflecting summaries of the surveillance tapes, reveals nothing more than a history of small talk and unintelligible chatter of such obvious insignificance that the FBI discontinued its electronic surveillance of Ivanov on June 18, 1963, because of its demonstrated consistent showing of non-productivity.
342 F.Supp. at 937.
The Court finds no specific evidence of taint in this case. Even assuming, arguendo, that some such evidence existed, the Court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that in this case the Government has met its ultimate burden of showing that no substantial or measurable portion of the evidence used against Ivanov at his trial was tainted.
342 F.Supp. at 939.
Finally, Ivanov mounted a somewhat technical argument relating to the May 26 and May 27 surveillances. The government contended that the logs for these dates were before the district court. Appellant claimed that these were not the logs for May 26 and May 27, but rather, the logs for May 21 and May 22. The opinion of the court admits the date is unclear, and states concerning one log, it “could be either May 21 or May 26,” and concerning the other, “the date appearing on C-6-2 could be read as either May 22, or May 27, 1963.” 342 F.Supp. at 940.
From this Ivanov argued that the logs for May 26 and May 27 were destroyed or lost, and that these logs contained exculpatory or contradictory evidence. Additionally, he continued, if the logs for May 26 and May 27 were missing, there existed a possibility that evidence admitted at trial was the product of leads obtained from, and therefore tainted by, the illegal May 26 and May 27 surveillances; that is, because these logs were not before the court, there could be no finding that any of the government evidence was derived from legitimate independent sources.
As the district court’s opinion demonstrates, these conclusions do not follow. One log was compiled for each day. There were ten days in May in the twenties — May 20 through May 29. There were ten logs for this period. “While there may be some question as to which log is which, the Court is satisfied that all logs covering the period May 20 through May 29, 1963, were in Court and in the possession of Ivanov’s counsel, and further that no logs covering the period in question were missing, lost or destroyed.” 342 F.Supp. 940. This is a finding of fact by the district court and I will not disturb it. United States v. Delerme, swpra.
Moreover, my own independent scrutiny of these logs permits me to be more specific in my findings concerning these exhibits. Preliminarily, I observé that this court may examine documents and exhibits, which were before the district court and make its own independent determinations concerning them. See, e. g., Shiya v. National Committee of Gi-bran, 381 F.2d 602 (2d Cir. 1967), cert, denied, 389 U.S. 1048, 88 S.Ct. 778, 19 L.Ed.2d 842 (1968).
There is no dispute concerning the dating of the 4001-S* logs. This set presents ten log sheets, one for each day from May 20 through May 29, 1963, all clearly dated. Also, there is only one log sheet for each day for each of the two surveillances. Because the log sheets for both surveillances were maintained by one agent, an entry on either log for the same date bears the same agent’s initials. Of course, different agents were on duty at different times, and on different dates.
With these facts as a basis, an examination of exhibits C-6-1 and C-6-2 reveals that appellant was correct in asserting that these two log sheets are for May 21 and May 22, respectively. Appellant introduced before the district court a full-page advertisement by NBC News in the May 21, 1963 issue of the *620New York Times, announcing that the documentary film “The Kremlin” would be shown on Channel 4 from 9:30 to 10:30 that night. A log entry on exhibit C-6-1 shows that a television program entitled “The Kremlin” was overheard by electronic surveillance at 9:55 p. m. on the date of the log. Also, appellant introduced a New York Times television schedule for May 26, 1963, showing that “The Kremlin” was not scheduled for viewing at any time on that date. Moreover, a comparison of the agent’s initials on exhibits C-6-1 and C-6-2, the log sheets in controversy, with the initials on the 4001-S* log sheets for May 21 and May 22, reveals that the initials and entries are identical. However, when compared with the agents’ initials and entries on the 4001-S* log sheets for May 26 and May 27, there is no similarity. It is clear that exhibits C-6-1 and C-6-2 are log sheets for May 21 and May 22, 1963, respectively*
From this, however, it does not follow that the 4002-S* surveillance log sheets for May 26 and May 27 have been lost or destroyed. On the contrary, examination of exhibits C-8-1 and C-8-2 reveals that these sheets are the logs of surveillance 4002-S* for May 26 and May 27, respectively. First, an examination of exhibit C-8-1, ostensibly dated “5/21/63”, reveals that the date on the log sheet previously read “5/26/63”. The “6” was erased at some point and replaced with a “1”, yet the “6” remains clearly visible underneath. Secondly, a comparison of the agents’ entries and initials on exhibit C-8-1 with the 4001-S* log for May 26, discloses that they are identical. Thus, exhibit C-8-1 is the log sheet of surveillance 4002-S* for May 26, 1963.
Examination of exhibit C-8-2 reveals a similar change. This would appear to be the log sheet for “5/22/63”. Upon closer examination, however, a “tail” can be seen to have been added to what was originally the “7” in “27” so as to make it a “2”. Following this alteration, what was “5/27/63”, became “5/22/63”. Secondly, comparison of exhibit C-8-2 with the 4001-S* log sheet for May 27 yields a complete identity of the agents’ entries and initials. Yet, when exhibits C-8-1 and C-8-2 are compared with the 4001-S* log sheets for May 21 and May 22, there is no similarity.
I have no basis for ascribing a sinister motive to the erasures and alterations.
Thus, I conclude (1) that exhibits C-6-1 and C-6-2 are the log sheets of surveillance 4002-S* for May 21 and May 22 respectively, and (2) that exhibits C-8-1 and C-8-2 are the log sheets of surveillance 4002-S* for May 26 and May 27, respectively.
These findings in no way conflict with those of the district court. Rather, these findings make specific that which the district court left general, and, as such, make them more definite and sustainable.
I conclude, therefore, that as to the first set of logs the district court discharged its responsibility properly under the Supreme Court’s mandate. Confronted with a government concession that these surveillances were illegal, it had but one responsibility: to determine whether “the conviction of [the] petitioner was not tainted by the use of evidence so obtained.” The district court found no such taint from the first set of logs and I find no error in this determination.
III.
The second set of logs forms the background of the major issue in this appeal : whether the government could properly utilize in a criminal prosecution the product of an electronic surveillance obtained in 1963 solely on the strength of the Attorney General’s position as the representative of the President in gathering foreign intelligence information.
At the outset, it is important to emphasize what is not before us. We are not interpreting Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub.L. 90-351, June 19, 1968, 82 Stat. 212, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. Both the government and appellant agree that the governing statute at the *621time of these interceptions was the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1103; 47 U.S.C. § 605. Therefore, we are not called upon to consider the applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (3).6 Thus, I do not meet the issue reserved in United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 308, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2132, 32 L.Ed. 2d 752 (1972): “Further, the instant ease requires no judgment on the scope of the President’s surveillance power [under Title III of the 1968 Act] with respect to the activities of foreign powers, within or without this country.” Indeed, we are not required to define the parameters of the President’s surveillance power under § 605. The limited nature of our inquiry is simply this: assuming a constitutional power of the President to have ordered surveillance of foreign agents in 1963, was it permissible for the government, under § 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, to utilize the products of such surveillance in a criminal prosecution ?
That I so frame the question indicates that I avoid the invitation to plunge into an evaluation of Fourth Amendment considerations. I am mindful of Justice White’s admonition “to [stop and] inquire whether the challenged interception was illegal under the statute” rather than proceed “directly to the constitutional issue without adverting to the time-honored rule that courts should abjure constitutional issues except where necessary to decision of the case before them. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346-348, 56 S. Ct. 466, 482-483, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (concurring opinion).” United States v. United States District Court, supra, 407 U.S. at 340, 92 S.Ct. at 2148 (concurring opinion). Also, that I so frame the question and assume the constitutional power of the President in order to meet the statutory issue should not be interpreted as an agreement with the sweep of Judge Adams’ discourse in Part III of the majority opinion. I simply do not meet this question.
I accept the hypothesis suggested by appellant that “it must be assumed that the conversations of Ivanov overheard on the wiretaps led to evidence used at his criminal trial.” For the issue of taint could not be resolved against Ivanov without an evidentiary hearing. Alderman v. United States, and Ivanov v. United States, supra, 394 U.S. 165, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176; Kolod v. United States, 390 U.S. 136, 88 S.Ct. 752, 19 L.Ed.2d 962 (1968). Thus, I must assume “in the present posture of this case,” as we did in In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Appeal of Sister Egan, 450 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1971), and as the Supreme Court did in Gelbard v. United States, and United States v. Egan, 408 U.S. 41, 92 S.Ct. 2357, 33 L.Ed.2d 179 (1972), that the government intercepted communications and utilized them in the proceedings against the appellant.
I am not without guidance in approaching this issue. The Supreme Court has ruled forcefully, specifically and in clear language free from any ambiguity, that § 605 was a complete and total bar to the admissibility of wiretap information obtained by federal agents in a smuggling prosecution. Interpreting the statutory language, “ . ‘no person not being authorized by the *622sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance,' purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person,’ ” the Court said:
Taken at face value the phrase “no person” comprehends federal agents, and the ban on communication to “any person” bars testimony to the content of an intercepted message.
Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 381, 58 S.Ct. 275, 276, 82 L.Ed. 314 (1937).
In the second Nardone case, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939), the Court held that the statutory prohibition barred the evidentiary use of the fruits of the intercepted conversations, as well as the conversations themselves. The Supreme Court continued the absolutism of its pronouncements in review of a conviction for unlawful possession of alcoholic spirits in Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 100, 78 S.Ct. 155, 157, 2 L.Ed.2d 126 (1957):
The Nardone decisions laid down the underlying premises upon which is based all subsequent consideration of Section 605. The crux of those decisions is that the plain words of the statute created a prohibition against any persons violating the integrity of a system of telephonic communication and that evidence obtained in violation of this prohibition may not be used to secure a federal conviction. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is the government’s contention that the President, acting through the Attorney General, may constitutionally authorize the use of electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States.7 The government properly observes that Article II vests the President, as Chief Executive, with responsibility for the conduct of the nation’s foreign affairs.
The district court accepted this contention, and solely for the purpose of this analysis, I shall assume that the district court did not err in this respect. However, accepting this contention does not put the matter to rest. The issue central to this case is not the constitutional power of the President to conduct such surveillances, but it is the less sophisticated question of admissibility of evidence in a criminal prosecution.
A review of the authorities relied upon by the government indicates that these cases failed to make the important distinction between the congressional power to forbid the disclosure of interceptions and the President’s constitutional power to make interceptions.
It is beyond question that the President, as Chief Executive, possesses certain powers and responsibilities which are not dependent upon a specific legislative grant from Congress, but derive from o the Constitution itself.8 This principle was announced as early as Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137, 165-166, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803):
By the Constitution of the United States the President is invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion,' and is accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience.
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 328, 57 S.Ct. 758, 759, 81 L.Ed. 1134 *623(1937), held that “the conduct of foreign relations was committed by the Constitution to the political departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this power [is] not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” 9
It is also beyond cavil that Congress has the power to regulate the reception of evidence in federal courts. This was recently demonstrated when the President signed S. 583 under which the Rules of Evidence for United States Magistrates, amendments to the federal rules of civil and criminal procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court on November 20, 1972, will have no force or effect “except to the extent ... as they may be expressly approved by Act of Congress.” In Sablowsky v. United States, 101 F.2d 183, 189 (3d Cir. 1938), we said that Nardone “holds clearly that Section 605 creates a rule of evidence relating to the admission of intercepted wire communications sought to be divulged by officers of the United States in courts of the United States. No other interpretation can be placed upon this phase of the Nardone decision.”10 It remains only for us to determine whether it is consistent to assume that the President has the right to intercept and at the same time hold that the contents of the interception may not be divulged as evidence in a criminal prosecution. To resolve this we must turn to the language of the statute.
For my purposes the critical clause of § 605 is that which provides: “no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person.” (Emphasis supplied.) I emphasize that the Act states that no person shall “intercept any communication and divulge or publish.” The conjunction “and” mandates the conclusion that two circumstances must occur for the bar of the statute to take effect: first, the interception, and, second, the divulging or publishing of the intercepted information “to any person.” Thus, the Supreme Court has not construed this Act to make wiretapping an offense in all instances. Rather, it is the interception and disclosure of the contents of the message which constitute the crime. “Both acts are essential to complete the offense.” United States v. Coplon, 91 F.Supp. 867, 871 (D.D.C. 1950), reversed on other grounds, 89 U. S.App.D.C. 103, 191 F.2d 749 (1951).
Under the theory of the presidential prerogative to gather foreign intelligence information, it is never contended that the President himself or his authorized Cabinet officer, performs the act of interception. This is done by special “agents” of a given department of the Executive Branch. Indeed, against the backdrop of the sophisticated interrelationships of a sprawling administrative bureaucracy, as required by the complexities of modern government, thousands of personnel within the Executive Branch are often considered as representatives of the person of the President. Five distinguished Attorneys General — with the scholarship and research at their command and a consummate desire to utilize the fruits of wiretaps as evidence in espionage prosecutions — concluded that Section 605 prevented the introduction of the evidence which is now permitted by the majority. *624The official representatives of three Presidents — Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy — introduced legislation and actively beseeched Congress to amend this statute so that the government could utilize the fruits of interception in espionage cases and cases involving national security. They uniformly represented that what the Act of 1934 expressly forbade was the divulgenee of the information received by interception, that the problem was not so much the act of interception, but the divulging in court of that which was learned from interception.
Former Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., observed that after passage of the 1934 Act, “[t]he question soon arose as to whether mere interception by federal agents of messages was forbidden by Section 605. The Attorney General at that time took the view that what the law prohibited was both interception and divulgenee, and that mere report of the intercepted message to public officials by FBI or other federal agents did not constitute divulgenee. None of the decisions [Nar-done] rendered by the Supreme Court held that wire tapping by federal officers in and of itself was illegal, absent divulgenee.” Brownell, “Public Security and Wire Tapping,” 39 Cornell L.Q. 195, 197, 198 (1954).11
“[T]he President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation’s organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are not and ought not to be published to the world.” Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S. S. Corp., supra, 333 U.S. 103, 111, 68 S.Ct. 431, 436, 92 L.Ed. 568 (1948). The growing complexity and sophistication of modern society have led to the reeog-nitition that sophisticated techniques are required for gathering intelligence information where national security is involved. As early as 1876, the Supreme Court recognized the presidential power to conduct intelligence operations in order to protect the security of the nation. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 23 L.Ed. 605 (1876). In 1940, President Roosevelt, in a confidential memorandum to Attorney General Robert H. Jackson recognized the necessity of wiretapping in matters “involving the defense of the Nation.” President Truman expressly approved this practice as have all Attorneys General since 1940.
When Secretary of State William P. Rogers was Deputy Attorney General he wrote a perceptive article which completely supports my analysis that there is a basic distinction under § 605 between the right to intercept and the right to use interceptions as evidence. Rogers, “The Case for Wire Tapping” 63 Yale L.J. 792 (1954): “It has long been the position of the Department of Justice that mere interception of telephone communications is not prohibited by federal law.” 63 Yale L.J. at 793. Mr. Rogers outlined the long struggle of Attorneys General to persuade Congress to enact legislation to permit the introduction into evidence of intercepted com-municipations in criminal prosecutions. “Attorney General J. Howard McGrath submitted wire tap legislation for introduction in the 82d Congress. In doing so, he repeated [a plea of former] Attorney General Clark and indicated that such legislation would ‘enable the prosecution of present, futuré, and past violations of laws endangering our internal security, not barred by the statute of limitations, which would otherwise go unpunished to the detriment of the Nation.’ ” 63 Yale L.J. at 795.
Mr. Rogers states that Attorney General McGrath reaffirmed the inability of his department to fulfill “its statutory duty of prosecuting,” and that Attorney General Herbert Brownell complained to Congress that without wiretap legislation “the hands of prosecuting officers are tied and their efforts to maintain the security of the Nation are thwart*625ed.” 12 “Again, on November 17, 1953, Attorney General Brownell advised a congressional committee that the work of the Department of Justice has clearly shown the need for legislation which would permit the use of wire tap evidence in espionage cases. He advised that there are cases of espionage presently in the Department of Justice but that since some of the important evidence was obtained by wire tapping, such cases could not be brought to trial so long as the law remains in the present state.” 63 Yale L.J. at 796. (Emphasis supplied.) Significantly, the “law” explicitly referred to by Mr. Rogers and Attorney General Brownell was the instruction contained in the Nardone eases, as amplified by Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321, 60 S.Ct. 269, 84 L.Ed. 298 (1939), applying the doctrine to intrastate as well as interstate communications. 62 Yale L.J. 793 nn. 5, 6, and 7.
The efforts of the various Attorneys General came to fruition with the passage of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, supra. Unlike § 605, the present wiretap statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3), note 6, supra, contains a provision providing for the evidentiary use of intercepted communications : “The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by authority of the President in the exercise of . . . [his constitutional] powers may be received in evidence in any trial hearing. . . . ”13
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy testifying before Congress on May 22, 1962, in support of H.R. 10185, dramatically pin-pointed the deficiencies in § 605:
Why do I say the existing situation is unsatisfactory?
The existing federal law on wiretapping is Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, which provides in part:
“. . .no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person . . . ”
This law is unsatisfactory in two respects. It permits anyone to tap wires. Mere interception is not a crime; a crime is not committed until the intercepted information is divulged or published. (Another provision makes it a crime to use such information for one’s own benefit.)
Thus even if we find an intercepting device attached to a telephone line, and find out who is doing the intercepting, we still cannot prosecute. We have to find that the information was divulged or published or used improperly. This means that no one’s privacy is adequately protected. Anyone can listen in to your telephone conversations, and mine, without violating the federal law.
On the other hand, all divulgence is prohibited. This means that it is against the law for law enforcement officials to disclose in court any of the words they overhear from wiretapping or the substance, purport, or effect of those words — even though what they overhear is clear evidence of a vicious crime.
*626The Supreme Court so held with respect to federal officers in the Nar-done case, decided in 1937. And it so held with respect to state officers in the Benanti case, decided in 1957. Indeed, the federal courts refuse to receive in evidence, not only the substance of the intercepted conversation, but any evidence obtained as a result of leads which that conversation gave. As a result, wiretapping cannot be used effectively by the federal government or the states to aid in law enforcement, even for the most serious crimes.
The strange paradox is that under this federal law a private individual is free to listen in to telephone conversations for the most improper motives, but law enforcement officials cannot use wiretapping effectively to protect society from major crimes.
Hearings on Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., at 145 (1971). (Emphasis supplied.)
Attorney General Kennedy stated that the passage of the bill was needed for national security cases:
Wiretapping is an important tool in protecting the national security. In 1940, President Roosevelt authorized Attorney General Jackson to approve wiretapping in national security cases. Attorney General Clark, with President Truman’s concurrence, extended this authorization to kidnapping cases.
As Congress has been advised each year-,by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the practice has continued in a limited number of cases upon express permission from the Attorney General. But, as I have pointed out, the evidence received from these wiretaps or developed from leads resulting from these wiretaps cannot be used in court. It is an anomalous situation to receive information of a heinous crime and yet not be able to use that information in court.
And, of course, this applies not only in cases of espionage and treason but in pressing the fight against organized crime.
* X- -X- * * X-
H.R. 10185 would authorize wiretapping and introduction of wiretap evidence in court for the following federal offenses:
Crimes affecting the national security: Espionage, sabotage, treason, sedition, subversive activities and unauthorized disclosure of atomic energy information;
* X- X- X- -X- X-
Ibid., at 146-147. (Emphasis supplied.)
I am persuaded, therefore, that the district court erred in equating an assumed presidential power to intercept with the right to “divulge or publish” that which was intercepted. I would hold that assuming a constitutional prerogative of the Chief Executive to intercept, the doctrine of Nardone prevents, under strictures of § 605, divulging or publishing the contents of the interception. In this context any use of the intercepted material beyond the confines of the Executive Branch would have been contrary to the statutory prohibition. I would remand these proceedings to the district court for reconsideration in accordance with the foregoing analysis.
On the present state of the record I would agree with the government’s contention that additional overhearings of Ivanov’s conversations following his conviction were not within the mandate for disclosure of “electronic surveillance which might have violated defendants Fourth Amendment rights and tainted their convictions.”
Judge Van Dusen joins in this opinion.

. The relevant subsections of 18 U.S.C. § 794, “Gathering or delivering defense information to aid foreign government,” read as follows:
(a) Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, communicates, delivers, or transmits, or attempts to communicate, deliver, or transmit, to any foreign government, or to any faction or party or military or naval force within a foreign country, whether recognized or unrecognized by the United States, or to any representative, officer, agent, employee, subject or citizen thereof, either directly or *616indirectly, any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, note, instrument, appliance, or information relating to the national defense, shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
(c) If two or more persons conspire to violate this section, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be subject to the punishment provided for the offense which is the object of such conspiracy.

. Whoever, other than a diplomatic or consular officer or attaché, acts in the United States as an agent of a foreign government without prior notification to the Secretary of State, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

. Tlie Court also ordered :
The District Court should confine the evidence presented by both sides to that which is material to the question of the possible violation of a petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights, to the content of conversations illegally overheard by surveillance which violated those rights and to the relevance of such conversations to the petitioner’s subsequent conviction. The District Court will make such findings of fact on those questions as may be appropriate in light of the further evidence and of the entire existing record. If the District Court decides on the basis of such findings (1) that there was electronic surveillance with respect to one or more petitioners but not any which violated the Fourth Amendment, or (2) that although there was a surveillance in violation of one or more of the petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights, the conviction of such petitioner was not tainted by the use of evidence so obtained, it will enter new final judgments of conviction based on the existing record as supplemented by its further findings, thereby preserving to all affected parties the right to seek further appropriate appellate review. ■

. 47 U.S.C. § 605. Unauthorized publication or use of communications
No person receiving or assisting in receiving, or transmitting, or assisting in transmitting, any interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio shall divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning thereof, except through authorized channels of transmission or reception, to any person other than the addressee, his agent, or attorney, or to a person employed or authorized to forward such communication to its destination, or to proper accounting or distributing officers of the various communicating centers over which the communication may be passed, or to tlie master of a ship under whom he is serving, or in response to a subpena (sic) issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, or on demand of other lawful authority ; and no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person; and no person not being entitled thereto shall receive or assist in receiving any interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio and use the same or any information therein contained for his own benefit or for the bene*618fit of another not entitled thereto; and no person having received such intercepted communication or having become acquainted with the contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, knowing that such information was so obtained, shall divulge or x>ub-lisli the existence, contents, substance, imrport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or use the same or any information therein contained for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto: Provided, That this section shall not apply to the receiving, divulging, publishing, or utilizing the contents of any radio communication broadcast, or transmitted by amateurs or others for the use of the general xrablic, or relating to ships in distress. June 19, 1934, c. 652, Title YI, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103.

. In Delerme, we drew a distinction between review of historical or narrative facts in a criminal proceeding, and review of facts critical to the ultimate factual question of guilt. In the former case, this court will emxdoy the clearly erroneous rule, while in the latter, we must determine whether there was substantial supportive evidence. Even applying the substantial evidence test, I would not disturb this finding.

. (3) Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 1103; 47 U.S.C. 605) shall limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities. Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be deemed to limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as lie deems necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the Government by force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and present danger to the structure or existence of the Government. The contents of any wire or oral communication intercepted by authority of the President in the exercise of the foregoing powers may be received in evidence in any trial hearing, or other proceeding only where such interception was reasonable, and shall not be otherwise used or disclosed except as is necessary to implement that power.

. The government suggests our reliance upon United States v. Dellinger, Crim. No. 60 CR. 180 (Memorandum Opinion N.D. Ill. February 20, 1970) reversed on other grounds, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972) ; United States v. Clay, 430 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1970), reversed on other grounds, 403 U.S. 698, 91 S.Ct. 2068, 29 L.Ed.2d 810 (1971) ; United States v. Hoffman, 334 F.Supp. 504 (D.D.C. 1971) ; United States v. Enten, 329 F.Supp. 307 (D.D.C.1971) ; United States v. Brown, 317 F.Supp. 531 (E.D.La.1970).

. See also, Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109, 68 S.Ct. 431, 92 L.Ed. 568 (1948) ; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-320, 57 S.Ct. 216, 81 L.Ed. 255 (1936) ; Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 890, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961) ; In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 15 S.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed. 1092 (1895).

. See also Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 38 S.Ct. 309, 62 L.Ed. 726 (1918) ; United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 62 S.Ct. 552, 86 L.Ed. 796 (1942).

. The majority state that “§ 605
does not, as Judge Aldisert urges, inexorably lead to the proposition that the statutory proscription against divulgence represented an evidentiary rule,” thus creating the inference that I am urging a new theory in this court. Quite the contrary is true. I am relying on case law which has been settled in this circuit since December 8, 1938, when this court, speaking through Judge Biggs, said: “[T]he provisions of the second and fourth clauses of Section 605, which upon their face purport to relate to all persons, do not relate to the regulation of communication carriers and therefore constitute a rule of evidence in the purest sense." Sa-blowsky v. United States, supra, 101 F.2d at 189. [My emphasis.]

. The debate on the Communications Act of 1934 did not discuss § 605. Mr. Brownell reports: “Not one word is said about making evidence obtained by wire tapping inadmissible in evidence or about prohibiting wire tapping.” See 73 Cong.Rec. 4138, 8822-8837, 8842-8854, 10304-10332 (1934). 39 Cornell L.Q. at 197 n. 10.

. Letter of May 7, 1953, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Vice President, transmitting a wiretap legislative proposal.

. I emphasize again that I do not meet the constitutional issue of the President’s power under Title III of the Act of 1968 to wiretap without a court order to gather foreign intelligence information, the question reserved in United States v. United States District Court, supra.
Section 605 does not appear to inhibit the Chief Executive from fully conducting the necessary operations within the framework of the Executive Branch, other than the use of the evidence in prosecutions. Thus, in the case at bar, Gleb Pavlov, Yuri Romash-in, and Vladimir Olenev, who were named as co-conspirators but not defendants in the indictments, were accredited representatives of the Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations. They were declared personna non grata and departed the United States.