Court Opinion

ID: 9786182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 23:50:10.927105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:42.314433
License: Public Domain

MORENO, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
We held in Carrisales v. Department of Corrections (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1132 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 804, 988 P.2d 1083] that the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) does not impose on nonsupervisory coworkers personal liability for harassment. The Legislature later amended Government Code section 12940, subdivision (j), to impose such personal liability. The statute as amended states that its provisions “are declaratory of existing law.” (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(2).)1
I agree with the majority that the Legislature could not, by amending the statute, clarify its meaning in a manner inconsistent with our decision in Carrisales. Thus, the amendment must be deemed to have changed, rather than merely clarified, the law. But unlike the majority, I conclude that by purporting to clarify its original intent, the Legislature clearly intended to apply this statutory change retroactively. We must honor this legislative intent, unless prevented from doing so by constitutional concerns.
The majority correctly recognizes that a statute may apply retroactively. As we stated in Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, *478840-841 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 40, 50 P.3d 751], “[generally, statutes operate prospectively only”; “unless there is an ‘express retroactivity provision, a statute will not be applied retroactively unless it is very clear from extrinsic sources that the Legislature . . . must have intended a retroactive application’ [citation] .... Under this formulation, a statute’s retroactivity is, in the first instance, a policy determination for the Legislature and one to which courts defer absent ‘some constitutional objection’ to retroactivity. [Citation.]”
The majority, however, “see[s] nothing here to overcome the strong presumption against retroactivity.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 475.) I disagree. The statute at issue, subdivision (j)(2) of section 12940, states that its provisions “are declaratory of existing law . . . .” In Western Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 244 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 933 P.2d 507], we recognized the importance of such legislative language: “[E]ven if the court does not accept the Legislature’s assurance that an unmistakable change in the law is merely a ‘clarification,’ the declaration of intent may still effectively reflect the Legislature’s purpose to achieve a retrospective change. [Citation.] . . . Thus, where a statute provides that it clarifies or declares existing law, ‘[i]t is obvious that such a provision is indicative of a legislative intent that the amendment apply to all existing causes of action from the date of its enactment.’ ”
We made the same point half a century earlier in California Emp. etc. Com. v. Payne (1947) 31 Cal.2d 210, 213 [187 P.2d 702], in which the Legislature had amended a statute to add a requirement of an “intent to evade the provisions of this act,” further stating that the amendment “is hereby declared to be merely a clarification of the original intention of the legislature rather than a substantive change and such section shall be construed for all purposes as though it had always read as hereinbefore set forth.” Despite the Legislature’s statement, it was clear that the amendment changed, rather than merely clarified, the law, as no such intent to evade had previously been required. Accordingly, we held that “the language of the ‘clarification’ provision in this case cannot be given an obviously absurd effect, and the court cannot accept the Legislative statement that an unmistakable change in the statute is nothing more than a clarification and restatement of its original terms.” (Id. at p. 214.) We recognized, however, that the Legislature’s statement indicated a clear intent that the amendment apply retroactively: “It does not follow, however, that the ‘clarification’ provision ... is ineffective for any purpose. It is obvious that such a provision is indicative of a legislative intent that the amendment apply to all existing causes of action from the date of its enactment. In accordance with the general rules of statutory construction, we must give effect to this intention unless there is some constitutional objection thereto.” (Ibid.)
*479In the present case, as in Western Security Bank and California Emp., we cannot give effect to the Legislature’s statement that the amendment to section 12940, subdivision (j) was declaratory of existing law, but we can give effect to the Legislature’s clear expression of its intent that this amendment be given retroactive effect.
The majority notes that the statutory language stating that the provisions of subdivision (j) of section 12940 are declaratory of existing law was originally added to the statute in reference to a 1987 amendment. The majority concludes from this that “[a]ny inference the Legislature intended the 2000 amendment to apply retroactively is thus far weaker than if the Legislature had asserted, in the 2000 amending act itself, that the amendment’s provisions declared existing law.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 476.) Again, I do not agree.
A statute that is amended is “re-enacted as amended.” (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 9.) “The amendment of a statute ordinarily has the legal effect of reenacting (thus enacting) the statute as amended, including its unamended portions.” (People v. Scott (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 550, 554 [239 Cal.Rptr. 588].) As amended, section 12940, subdivision (j) clearly states that its provisions are declaratory of existing law. The circumstance that the same statement had been made in reference to an earlier amendment of the same statute does not lessen the plain meaning of this statutory language. In general, we take it that the Legislature means what it says. In the present case, it is difficult to imagine how the Legislature could have more clearly expressed its intention that the 2000 amendment to subdivision (j) of section 12940, like the earlier amendment, was declaratory of existing law.
Because the Legislature clearly indicated its intent that the amendment to the statute be applied retroactively, we must honor that intent unless there is a constitutional objection to doing so.
The high court addressed the constitutional concerns posed by retroactive application of statutes at some length in Landgraf v. USI Film Products (1994) 511 U.S. 244 [128 L.Ed.2d 229, 114 S.Ct. 1483], The court recognized that “the presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted.” (Id. at p. 265, fn. omitted.) The court noted that “the antiretroactivity principle finds expression in several provisions of our Constitution,” including the ex post facto clause, the provision prohibiting the impairment of obligations of contracts, the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause, the prohibition of bills of attainder, and the due process clause. (Id. at p. 266.)
*480The court was careful to make clear, however, that these concerns do not necessarily prohibit retroactive application of statutes: “The Constitution’s restrictions, of course, are of limited scope. Absent a violation of one of those specific provisions, the potential unfairness of retroactive civil legislation is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a statute its intended scope. Retroactivity provisions often serve entirely benign and legitimate purposes, whether to respond to emergencies, to correct mistakes, to prevent circumvention of a new statute in the interval immediately preceding its passage, or simply to give comprehensive effect to a new law Congress considers salutary. However, a requirement that Congress first make its intention clear helps ensure that Congress itself has determined that the benefits of retroactivity outweigh the potential for disruption or unfairness.” (Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, 511 U.S. 244, 267-268, fn. omitted.)
Further, courts must defer to a legislative judgment that a statute should be applied retroactively: “In this century, legislation has come to supply the dominant means of legal ordering, and circumspection has given way to greater deference to legislative judgments.” (Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, 511 U.S. 244, 272.) Accordingly, the high court declared, “the constitutional impediments to retroactive civil legislation are now modest.” (Ibid., italics omitted.)
Significantly, defendant Lopez does not cite any authority establishing that retroactive application of the amendment to section 12940, subdivision (j) would violate the Constitution. Rather, he simply asserts that “to impose personal liability . . . retroactively should require a ‘clear and unavoidable’ statement from the Legislature favoring retroactivity . . . .” As explained above, I conclude that the provision stating that the amendment is declaratory of existing law constitutes such a clear statement of intent to apply the amendment retroactively.
Neither does the majority cite any authority establishing that retroactive application of the amendment to section 12940, subdivision (j) would violate the Constitution. Rather, the majority asserts that retroactive application would “raise constitutional implications,” while acknowledging that “[b]oth this court and the United States Supreme Court have expressed concerns that retroactively creating liability for past conduct might violate the Constitution, although it appears neither court has so held. [Citations.]” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 476-477, italics added.)
I discern no constitutional impediment to giving effect to the Legislature’s clear intent to apply the amendment to section 12940, subdivision (j) retroactively. As noted above, the amendment changed the law by imposing upon nonsupervisory coworkers personal liability under the FEHA for harassment, but this did not subject such nonsupervisory coworkers to liability for *481harassment for the first time. As we noted in Carrisales, “our conclusion [that nonsupervisory coworkers could not be held personally liable under the FEHA] does not necessarily prevent a harasser from being personally liable to the victim under some other statute or theory of tort. All we hold is that the FEHA does not cover harassment short of an unlawful employment practice. The FEHA’s noncoverage does not immunize anyone, including a coworker, from the consequences of conduct that is otherwise tortious.” (Carrisales v. Department of Corrections, supra, 21 Cal.4th 1132, 1136.) And we have recognized “that employment discrimination, including sexual harassment. . . can cause emotional distress [and] that such distress is a compensable injury under traditional theories of tort law . . . .” (Peralta Community College Dist. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1990) 52 Cal.3d 40, 48 [276 Cal.Rptr. 114, 801 P.2d 357], fn. omitted.)
Given the “modest” constitutional impediments to retroactive civil legislation (Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, 511 U.S. 244, 272), and the circumstance that harassment by nonsupervisory coworkers was tortious prior to the statutory amendment imposing liability for such conduct under the FEHA, I conclude that there is no constitutional obstacle to the retroactive imposition of personal liability for harassment on nonsupervisory coworkers, as the Legislature intended.

 All further statutory references are to the Government Code, unless otherwise specified.