Court Opinion

ID: 9765374
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:01:24.561743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:09.373692
License: Public Domain

NIX, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
We are here called upon to resolve two questions: a) whether a prior conviction for a summary offense, resulting *120from an uncounseled guilty plea entered by an adult defendant, may be used to enhance the grading and sentencing of a second conviction for the same offense; and b) whether a prior conviction for a summary offense, resulting from an uncounseled guilty plea entered by a juvenile defendant, may be used to enhance the grading and sentencing of a second conviction for the same offense. The majority has concluded that neither of these situations would be offensive under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution nor Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. I seriously question the majority’s conclusions relating to the federal constitutional issues and strongly disagree with their result as it relates to Article I, Section 9 of our Constitution.
It is true that the per curiam order entered in Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 100 S.Ct. 1585, 64 L.Ed.2d 169 (1980), does not provide precedent for a conclusion that an uncounseled prior conviction may never be used to enhance the sentence for a subsequent offense. However, Baldasar does not provide authority that such enhancement will not offend the federal right to counsel. In Baldasar four of the members of the Court expressed the view that an uncounseled conviction may not be used to impose an increased term of imprisonment upon a subsequent conviction. See Baldasar, supra at 224, 100 S.Ct. at 1586 (Stewart, J., concurring, joined by Brennan & Stevens, JJ.) and Baldasar, supra at 225, 100 S.Ct. at 1586 (Marshall, J., concurring, joined by Brennan & Stevens, JJ.). Mr. Justice Blackmun limited his concurrence in the Baldasar order to the fact that the original offense was punishable by more than six months.1 Baldasar, supra at 229, 100 S.Ct. at 1589 (Blackmun, J., concurring). That fact does not guar*121antee that he would allow enhancement of all subsequent offenses where the original offense did not provide for a sentence of more than six months, particularly where the juvenile status of the defendant at the time of the first uncounseled plea adds a further dimension to the unreliability of the first conviction. While the views expressed in Baldasar may provide an argument to overcome the federal constitutional challenges raised here, it is far from certain that the United States Supreme Court, as presently composed, would find that the factual situations here presented would pass federal constitutional muster.
More disturbing is the majority’s implicit premise that Article 1, section 9 is merely a reflection of the minimal constitutional guarantees provided under its federal counterpart. It is completely inexplicable to me how the majority can conclude that “any differences that may exist between the right to counsel granted by the Federal Constitution and the right to counsel granted by the Pennsylvania Constitution are not relevant in this case”, see maj. op. at 59 n. 6, after admitting that this Court has never defined the state constitutional right to counsel with regard to defendants who have been charged with summary offenses.
When the issue of the requirements of the federal and state constitutional right of counsel for an indigent defendant has been considered the question of the severity and nature of the potential sanction has been deemed significant.2 The consensus that counsel is not required where a sentence of imprisonment will not be imposed is consistent with present perceptions of justice and fairness.3 The majority of this Court focuses upon the fact that since the defendant did not face the possibility of imprisonment for *122the first offense, his uncounseled conviction for the summary offense was constitutionally valid. However, where the issue is whether the original uncounseled conviction may be used to enhance a subsequent offense which does expose the defendant to possible imprisonment, the focus must shift to the reliability of the original conviction. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31-36, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 2009-12, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972).
In a summary proceeding the defendant, without the advice of counsel, is implicitly induced not to resist a finding of guilt because the punishment is slight and the resultant harm to him is de minimis. Where that first offense is subsequently used to enhance a later one, it can no longer be viewed as inconsequential and its reliability should be subject to the strictest scrutiny. The fact that it was originally accepted as valid is not a justification for not scrutinizing its validity where it is used as a basis for enhancing a subsequent sentence. To do so would be inconsistent with the accepted constitutional principle that an indigent defendant is entitled to counsel where he is exposed to a sanction of imprisonment.4 Id. Argersinger, supra at 31-36, 92 S.Ct. at 2009-12.
Thus an analysis which merely distinguishes between the first and second offenses is both unrealistic and inadequate. Regardless of the result reached under the analysis of the United States Supreme Court in Baldasar, supra, we must give a full and thorough consideration of the defendant’s rights under Article I, section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Factors which are relevant to the reliability of the first conviction in such summary offense situations include whether the defendant was fully aware of all the conse*123quences of the conviction as well as the maturity of making that judgment. These considerations were ignored by the majority in its haste to accept what it perceives to be the minimal guarantees provided for under the Federal Constitution.
I dissent.

. Justice Blackmun believed that such a "bright-line” rule would best preserve constitutional values and do so with a measure of clarity for all concerned. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 230, 100 S.Ct. 1585, 1589, 64 L.Ed.2d 169 (1980) (Blackmun, J. concurring). Since Petitioner Baldasar was prosecuted for an offense punishable by more than six months’ imprisonment, under Justice Blackmun’s test Petitioner Baldasar should have been accorded counsel for that prosecution. Id.

. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 194, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932).

. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra.

. The view expressed by the minority in Baldasar, which attempts to segregate the second offense and fails to recognize the continuing impact of the first offense, is fallacious on its face. As noted by Mr. Justice Marshall in his concurring opinion in Baldasar,
This logic is fallacious for the simple reason that petitioner’s prior conviction was not valid for all purposes. Specifically, under the rule of Scott and Argersinger, it was invalid for the purpose of depriving petitioner of his liberty.
Baldasar, supra at 226, 100 S.Ct. at 1587 (Marshall, J., concurring).