Court Opinion

ID: 9584728
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:52:10.276536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:58.436336
License: Public Domain

FISHER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting,
with whom
Chief Judge SCIRICA, Judge SLOVITER, Judge RENDELL and Judge COWEN join.
I.
As the procedural history of this appeal clearly shows, this Court has wrestled with the decision in this case for close to two and one half years, during which time the judges on this Court have tried to determine whether the sentence given for this crime was substantively reasonable. The offense we encounter in this case is no garden variety tax evasion. The conduct underlying the offense involved an intricate scheme spanning several years and involved the coercion and coordination of *576numerous other individuals, all for the personal gain of one man, William G. Tomko, Jr., a successful business owner with the means to easily pay the taxes he owed to the Government.
Tomko’s fraudulent tax evasion scheme revolved around the construction of his luxurious new home in southwestern Pennsylvania. During the construction of this home, Tomko had subcontractors falsify their billing invoices to make it appear their work had been done for his construction company, W.G. Tomko, Inc. (“Tomko, Inc.”), at one of its job sites, rather than for Tomko, the individual, at his personal residence. The Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation Division investigators interviewed seventeen individuals with respect to Tomko’s scheme. While the details varied from individual to individual, a consistent pattern of conduct emerged: At Tomko’s behest, subcontractors who performed work at his residence were instructed to write billing invoices that made it appear that their work had been done at one of five local area schools. Because Tomko, Inc. was working jobs at these local schools, the company could appear to be legitimately paying the invoices.13 As a result, the construction costs were diverted from Tomko personally to Tomko’s company, which then deducted them as business expenses, while Tomko also failed to report as personal income the value of the services provided to him at no cost. Thus, Tomko’s income was under-represented in two regards: The profits earned by his business appeared to be less and the substantial benefit he received as a result of the construction of a new 8,000-square-foot home went unreported.14
Tomko’s scheme resulted in a stipulated tax deficiency of $228,557; however, a disputed portion of the record included evidence that the pervasiveness of his scheme was even more extensive. In particular, the Government presented evidence that Tomko on more than one occasion told individuals that his vacation home in Maryland was “a gift from Uncle Sam.” Because the Government was unable to provide reliable figures to account for the impact of this alleged fraud with respect to the tax loss incurred by the Government, this disputed evidence apparently did not factor into the District Court’s judgment of sentence, and we mention it solely to underscore the point that we are not faced with a garden variety case of tax evasion.
Tomko pleaded guilty to a one-count information charging him with tax evasion, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201. His properly calculated Guidelines range was twelve to eighteen months of incarceration. At Tomko’s sentencing hearing, the District Court stated that it had reviewed and considered all motions and briefs submitted by the parties and then stated on the record its consideration of the Guidelines and the § 3553(a) factors.
The District Court then sentenced Tomko to 250 hours of community service, three years of probation with one year of home confinement, and ordered him to pay a fine of $250,000. Tomko was also ordered to undergo twenty-eight days of in-house alcohol treatment. As reason for this judgment, the District Court stated:
*577“Defendant stands before us for sentencing after pleading guilty to tax evasion. A review of the Defendant’s financial condition paints a picture of a very wealthy man who had the means and the wherewithal to easily pay whatever tax obligation is owing. He was a successful businessman earning a significant salary. There is simply no reason for him to have done this.
This being said, I also note his negligible criminal history, his record of employment, his support for and ties in the community, and extensive charitable work he has done. I have also — therefore, I have sentenced him to a period of probation, which I recognize is below the guideline range. Given the Defendant’s wealth, the guideline range in fines is insufficient deterrence.
Therefore, I’ve done this mitigation of the sentence under the provisions set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553 for the reasons I stated. Taking all these factors into account, the Court sentences the Defendant to a period of probation, a substantial fine, and allows for repayment to the Internal Revenue Service of his outstanding tax obligation. The Court views that this sentence will address the sentencing goals of punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation.”
As this excerpt demonstrates, the District Court recognized that the sentence was below the Guidelines and did not include a term of imprisonment, but explained that it had mitigated the sentence for its stated reasons in conjunction with the factors set forth in § 3553(a).15
In accordance with the standard announced by the Supreme Court in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), our task on appeal is to review the sentence imposed by the District Court for “reasonableness.”16 In Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007), the Supreme Court clarified that appellate reasonableness review involves two steps: the first procedural and the second substantive. The Supreme Court categorized, inter alia, “failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors” and “failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence,” as procedural errors under the first step of Gall. Id. at 597. The Court then instructed:
“Assuming that the district court’s sentencing decision is procedurally sound, the appellate court should then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. When conducting this review, the court will, of course, take into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range. If the *578sentence is within the Guidelines range, the appellate court may, but is not required to, apply a presumption of reasonableness. But if the sentence is outside the Guidelines range, the court may not apply a presumption of unreasonableness. It may consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.”
Id. (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added); accord United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217-18 (3d Cir.2008) (“As an appellate court, our role is two-fold.... If we determine that the district court has committed no significant procedural error, we then review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard.... ”).
The Court in Gall also reaffirmed its decision in Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007), which emphasized the importance of reviewing sentences for substantive reasonableness. See Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 596-98. As the Supreme Court stated in Rita: “In sentencing, as in other areas, district judges at times make mistakes that are substantive. At times, they will impose sentences that are unreasonable. Circuit courts exist to correct such mistakes when they occur.” 127 S.Ct. at 2466-67. Consequently, the substantive component of reasonableness review, while deferential, is not impotent.
For these reasons, we disagree with the Majority’s statement that “if the district court’s sentence is proeedurally sound, we will affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.” Majority Op. at Part II.C. We recognize that “appellate review of sentencing decisions is limited to determining whether they are ‘reasonable,’ ” Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 594, but we believe that encompassed within this limited role is the authority and the obligation to vacate sentences that are substantively unreasonable. Therefore, although the Supreme Court “made it pellucidly clear that the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard of review now applies to appellate review of sentencing decisions,” id., we cannot agree with the Majority’s characterization of the appellate courts’ role in reviewing sentences as “requiring] us to do nothing more and nothing less than to apply the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Majority Op. at Part V. We believe that when the Supreme Court instructed appellate courts to review for both procedural and substantive reasonableness, it meant what it said. Accordingly, because we conclude that this sentence is substantively unreasonable, we dissent.
II.
This case presents the opportunity for us to examine the implications of the Supreme Court’s directive in Gall that in reviewing for reasonableness, appellate courts are to conduct a substantive inquiry as well as a procedural one. We are not the first court of appeals which has wrestled with the concept of engaging in a deferential review of the substantive reasonableness of sentences. See, e.g., United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 191 (2d Cir.2008) (“At the substantive stage of reasonableness review ... we consider whether the factor, as explained by the district court, can bear the weight assigned it under the totality of circumstances in the case.... Accordingly, we will continue to patrol the boundaries of reasonableness, while heeding the Supreme Court’s renewed message that responsibility for sentencing is placed largely in the precincts of the district courts.”); United States v. *579Taylor, 532 F.3d 68, 69-70 (1st Cir.2008) (explaining its view that although district courts are “empowered with considerable discretion in sentencing,” recent Supreme Court decisions have also “underscored the importance of the district court’s justifications” for sentencing decisions); United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 265 (4th Cir.2008) (“While Gall assuredly made clear the limited and deferential role of appellate courts in the sentencing process, see [128 S.Ct.] at 597-98, it was not a decision wholly without nuance or balance.”). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit provided the following explanation post-Gall:
“[Gall’s ] directives leave no doubt that an appellate court may still overturn a substantively unreasonable sentence, albeit only after examining it through the prism of abuse of discretion, and that appellate review has not been extinguished. Thus, a sentence still may be substantively unreasonable if it does not achieve the purposes of sentencing stated in § 3553(a). So, even though we afford ‘due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance,’ Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597, we may find that a district court has abused its considerable discretion if it has weighed the factors in a manner that demonstrably yields an unreasonable sentence. We are therefore still required to make the calculus ourselves, and are obliged to remand for resentencing if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.”
United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir.2008) (select internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
We agree wholeheartedly with the reasoning expressed by our sister circuits. If the substance of a sentence is not “logical and consistent” with the § 3553(a) factors or fails to “reasonably appl[y]” them to “the circumstances of the case,” United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir.2006), the sentence is not substantively reasonable and does not survive abuse-of-discretion review. Therefore, while “reasonableness is a range, not a point,” id. at 332 n. 11, a range by definition has both upper and lower limits that will be exceeded in some cases. See Eastway Construction Corp. v. City of N.Y., 821 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir.1987) (“The concept of discretion implies that a decision is lawful at any point within the outer limits of the range of choices appropriate to the issue at hand; at the same time, a decision outside those limits exceeds or, as it is infelicitously said, ‘abuses’ allowable discretion.”). In this case, we undertake our duty, as outlined in Gall, to review whether the sentence Tomko received exceeded the lower bounds of that range.
III.
The Government, as the appellant in this case, bears the burden of establishing that the sentence imposed is unreasonable in light of both the record and the § 3553(a) factors. Cooper, 437 F.3d at 332. The Government states that the “bottom line” in this case is “that a rich defendant was allowed to buy his way out of a prison sentence.” While we resist such ad hominem arguments and do not think the finer issues presented by this appeal can be so bluntly summarized, we do share what we perceive to be the underlying sentiment of the Government’s appeal. That is, a defendant who committed a very serious offense “did not receive so much as a slap on the wrist — it was more like a soft pat.” *580United States v. Crisp, 454 F.3d 1285, 1291 (11th Cir.2006). As we will more fully explain, the District Court abused its discretion in imposing the sentence it did in this case in light of the facts and circumstances in the record and the § 3553(a) factors.
A.
As an initial matter, we address the Government’s argument that Tomko’s sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the District Court failed to consider general deterrence in arriving at its sentencing decision. We find this argument unavailing. Although the District Court never expressly mentioned general deterrence, the Majority correctly notes that a sentencing court is not required to “discuss and make findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors if the record makes clear the court took the factors into account in sentencing.” Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329. Based on the record, we cannot conclude that the District Court failed to consider deterrence in the course of sentencing Tomko.
And while our task of reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence would be aided by a more explicit analysis of the District Court’s consideration of deterrence, whether specific or general, ultimately this perceived procedural deficiency is not at the root of the sentence’s unreasonableness. As the Government acknowledged at oral argument, even if the sentence was vacated and remanded to the District Court in order to remedy this alleged procedural error, if the District Court nonetheless imposed the same sentence, the Government would still maintain that the sentence was unreasonable. Thus, it is not the District Court’s failure to expressly consider general deterrence that causes us to doubt the reasonableness of the sentence so much as the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding the District Court’s decision and the “extent of ... variance from the Guidelines range.” Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. Accordingly, although we may question whether the sentence the District Court imposed reflects the sentencing goal of deterrence, under Gall’s two-step framework, this concern relates to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence as opposed to its procedural reasonableness.
B.
Based on the guidance that the Supreme Court in Gall provided to appellate courts with respect to engaging in substantive reasonableness review, we begin our task by looking to the Sentencing Guidelines. See id. (“When conducting this review, the court will, of course, take into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range. If the sentence is within the Guidelines range, the appellate court may, but is not required to, apply a presumption of reasonableness. But if the sentence is outside the Guidelines range, the court may not apply a presumption of unreasonableness.” (internal citation omitted)); see also Taylor, 532 F.3d at 70 (“[T]he guidelines are the starting point for the fashioning of an individualized sentence, so a major deviation from them must ‘be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one.’ ” (quoting Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597) (select internal quotation marks omitted)).17 *581And although the Guidelines are advisory, they must still be afforded due weight as a factor under § 3553(a)(4). See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 128 S.Ct. 558, 574, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007) (explaining that the Court’s decisions have “preserved a key role for the Sentencing Commission ... [, which] has the capacity courts lack to base its determinations on empirical data and national experience, guided by a professional staff with appropriate expertise” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 260 (3d Cir.2007) (“[O]ne of the reasons that the Guidelines are of significant assistance in sentencing is that they incorporate the results of research into what may be called the ‘heartland’ of sentencing considerations and incarceration periods for typical offenses and offenders.”); see also Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 261 (“[T]he applicable guidelines range plays an important role.”).
Indeed, the Guidelines continue to be a vital force in sentencing as they “reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives.” Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2465; see also id. at 2463 (“The upshot is that the sentencing statutes envision both the sentencing judge and the Commission as carrying out the same basic § 3553(a) objectives, the one, at retail, the other at wholesale.... [The Commission] has tried to embody in the Guidelines the factors and considerations set forth in § 3553(a).”); United States v. Goldberg, 491 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir.2007) (describing the Guidelines as “drafted by a respected public body with access to the best knowledge and practices of penology”).
As numerous courts have recognized, the Guidelines serve a particularly important purpose in the area of white-collar crime. For instance, the Supreme Court in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 375 n. 9, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989), noted that the Senate Report on the Sentencing Reform Act “gave specific examples of areas in which prevailing sentences might be too lenient, including the treatment of major white-collar criminals.” Accord United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 129 (2d Cir.2006) (“[T]he Guidelines reflect Congress’ judgment as to the appropriate national policy for [white-collar] crimes.... ”); United States v. Mueffelman, 470 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir.2006) (noting the importance of “the minimization of discrepancies between white- and blue-collar offenses”). In United States v. Martin, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit provided the following explanation:
“Our assessment is consistent with the views of the drafters of § 3553. As the legislative history of the adoption of § 3553 demonstrates, Congress viewed deterrence as ‘particularly important in the area of white collar crime.’ S.Rep. No. 98-225, at 76 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3259. Congress was especially concerned that pri- or to the Sentencing Guidelines, ‘[m]ajor white collar criminals often [were] sentenced to small fines and little or no imprisonment. Unfortunately, this creates the impression that certain offenses are punishable only by a small fine that can be written off as a cost of doing business.’ Id.”
455 F.3d 1227, 1240 (11th Cir.2006).
In light of the important position that the Guidelines continue to occupy in sen-*582fencing decisions, the Supreme Court teaches that, in reviewing for substantive reasonableness, we are to take into account “the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.” Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. Here, the District Court’s decision to vary from the recommended sentence of twelve to eighteen months of imprisonment under the Guidelines all the way down to a term of probation amounts to a 100% downward variance. Moreover, there is an important qualitative difference between incarceration and no incarceration, such that the Supreme Court in Gall specifically “recognize[d] that custodial sentences are qualitatively more severe than probationary sentences of equivalent terms.” Id. at 595. Therefore, unlike the Majority, which characterizes this variance as “not substantial,” Majority Op. at Part IV, we believe that the variance the District Court granted to Tomko constitutes both a quantitatively and qualitatively significant deviation from the Guidelines.18
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s instructions in Gall, although we “may consider the extent of the deviation, [we] must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Id. at 597. Accordingly, we will consider, with appropriate deference to the District Court, whether the § 3553(a) factors widen or shift the District Court’s range of reasonable choices to include the sentence it imposed, and thereby justify the extent of the variance. Because we are to “take into account the totality of the circumstances” in the course of our reasonableness review, id., we will look first to the § 3553(a) factors upon which the District Court expressly based its decision to mitigate the sentence, and then we will look to the other relevant factors, as they relate to the facts and circumstances of record, which the District Court may have mentioned but did not rely upon.
1.
The District Court concluded that a significant downward variance was merited in Tomko’s case because of his: (1) negligible criminal history; (2) record of employment; and (3) support for the community and extensive charitable work. Under § 3553(a)(1), the District Court was free to consider each of these circumstances as part of Tomko’s “history and characteristics.” See Rita, 127 S.Ct. at 2473 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Matters such as age, education, mental or emotional condition, medical condition (including drug or alcohol addiction), employment history, lack of guidance as a youth, family ties, or military, civic, charitable, or public service are not ordinarily considered under the Guidelines [but are] matters that § 3553(a) authorizes the sentencing judge to consider.”). However, just because these circumstances were permissible considerations in the District Court’s sentencing calculus does not resolve whether they actually justified the significant variance which the District Court granted, and therefore we will review each of these “mitigating” circumstances in turn.19
*583With respect to negligible criminal history, the Government argues, citing Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 111, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996), that reliance on this consideration as a mitigating factor is inappropriate insofar as Tomko’s criminal history is already accounted for in the calculation of his Guidelines range. However, under § 3553(a), the District Court was permitted to give further weight to a factor covered by a specific Guidelines provision. See United States v. Johnson, 427 F.3d 423, 428 (7th Cir.2005) (stating that sentencing courts can “give further weight to a factor covered by a specific guidelines adjustment, especially where (as is true here) that ‘factor is present to an exceptional degree or in some other way makes the case different from the ordinary case where the factor is present’ ” (quoting Koon, 518 U.S. at 96, 116 S.Ct. 2035)). Still, while negligible criminal history may have been an appropriate consideration for the sentencing court to take into account as relevant to “the history and characteristics of the defendant” under § 3553(a)(1), it does not provide strong support for the variance in this case because Tomko’s status as a “first-time offender” does not differentiate him from many, if not most, tax evaders. See Goff, 501 F.3d at 261 (explaining that the defendant’s “criminal history, in Category I, is similar to the vast majority of those convicted” of the same offense, and therefore, the defendant “is no outlier; he is, on the contrary, plainly in the ‘heartland’ of offenders.”). Where a consideration speaks well of a defendant but in a manner typical of many similarly situated defendants, a district court’s over-reliance on it, i.e., by varying significantly downward both quantitatively and qualitatively from the typical sentence imposed on such defendants, signifies an abuse of discretion.20
Similarly, in some cases it is appropriate for the sentencing court to consider the defendant’s record of employment as a mitigating factor under § 3553(a)(1). However, with respect to Tomko, the significance of his employment record is arguably equivocal at best. Indeed, the District Court heard evidence that presented Tomko as “a person with a high school education who built a multi-million dollar company and hires ... 300 people and looks after them like family,” and that Tomko’s absence from the company could place Tomko, Inc. in financial trouble. But, as the Government points out, the District Court also found that Tomko “had threatened the contractors with nonpayment and lost business opportunities unless they submitted falsified invoices as defendant instructed.” Thus, this conflicting evidence creates considerable tension.
*584Nonetheless, even if we assume that the positive aspects of Tomko’s employment record outweigh the negative aspects, consideration of this circumstance fails to distinguish Tomko from other tax evaders— as was true of his negligible criminal history — and therefore falls far short of widening the range of decisions permitted by § 3553(a) to include the sentence the District Court imposed. An admirable record of employment is a characteristic common to many white-collar criminals, and the prospect of business failure seems of little relevance as a mitigating circumstance when the business itself was the vehicle through which the defendant perpetrated the crime. See United States v. Sharapan, 13 F.3d 781, 785 (3d Cir.1994) (deemphasizing the fact that the imprisonment of the principal of a business “for mail fraud and filing false corporate tax returns may cause harm to the business and its employees. The same is presumably true in a great many cases in which the principal of a small business is jailed for comparable offenses.... ”); United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1424 (3d Cir.1994) (de-emphasizing “the fact that [the defendant’s] conviction may harm not only his business interests but also those of his family members”). Although a variance rather than a departure is at issue in the present case, the pr e-Booker cases from our Court still provide valuable insight into what constitute meaningful mitigating factors. See United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir.2006) (“[0]ur Circuit’s pr e-Booker case law ... continues to have advisory force.” (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, Tomko is no different than most tax evaders with respect to this “mitigating” circumstance, and therefore it does not stand up as a justification for varying from a year or more of imprisonment, as called for under the Guidelines, to no imprisonment at all.
Finally, the District Court relied heavily on Tomko’s community ties and purportedly extensive charitable work. It reviewed more than fifty letters of support, most of which paint a picture of Tomko as a man with great concern for his employees and his community. Some attest to truly admirable acts of kindness. Similarly, the Majority discusses at length the evidence pertaining to Tomko’s philanthropic acts. See Majority Op. at Part IV. However, the Guidelines provide that a defendant’s prior good works — such as civic, charitable, or public service — are “not ordinarily relevant,” and discourage downward departures from the normal sentencing range based on these types of considerations. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5H1.11; Koon, 518 U.S. at 96, 116 S.Ct. 2035 (“If the special factor is a discouraged factor ... the court should depart only if the factor is present to an exceptional degree____”). Although in the post -Booker world, the District Court may consider such good works in the context of § 3553(a)(1), we think it is important to keep in mind that Congress, through the Commission, did not intend for this information to ordinarily be taken into account by sentencing courts. Thus, we find it troubling that the District Court, as well as the Majority, placed so much credence in this one, previously prohibited consideration as justifying the significant variance at issue here.
The Government views the letters written in support of Tomko with jaundiced eyes, noting that many, if not most, of these letters were from Tomko’s own employees and that one might expect such individuals to be easily “persuaded” to pen arguably overwrought letters of support and concern. We find it unnecessary to weigh in with our own cynical speculations as to the underlying motives of the authors of these letters, as we find that Tomko’s *585“support in the community” and “charitable work” simply do not justify the degree of variance that was granted in this case, especially because his negligible criminal history and employment record keep him squarely in the category of typical tax evaders.21 Even assuming arguendo the purest of motives for Tomko’s well-timed interest in Habitat for Humanity, and viewing as completely altruistic the letters attesting to his beneficence, this single consideration — which arguably differentiates Tomko more than the other “mitigating” circumstances on which the District Court relied — at most justifies some downward variance, but not to the degree the District Court chose here. See Goff, 501 F.3d at 261 n. 16 (concluding, in the course of finding the sentence substantively unreasonable, that the district court “put undue emphasis on [the defendant’s] service to the community”).
Viewed cumulatively, out of the three reasons offered by the District Court for mitigating Tomko’s sentence, only one— community support based on charitable work — even begins to justify a downward variance in this case. Thus, these considerations fall short of placing the sentence imposed within the albeit broad range of permissible choices, even when we add them together. Moreover, the “mitigating” circumstances relied upon by the District Court only address one of the § 3553(a) factors, namely “the history and characteristics of the defendant” under § 3553(a)(1), and therefore do not reflect the “totality of the circumstances” and the “§ 3553(a) factors, on a whole.” Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. As a number of our sister courts of appeals have recognized, excessive reliance on a single § 3553(a) factor is indicative of an unreasonable sentence. United States v. Hampton, 441 F.3d 284, 288-89 (4th Cir.2006); United States v. Givens, 443 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir.2006); see also Cavera, 550 F.3d at 191 (considering whether a particular “factor relied on by a sentencing court can bear the weight assigned to it”). As the remainder of our analysis reveals, the District Court’s over-reliance on § 3553(a)(1) as justification for the significant qualitative and quantitative variance it granted pales in comparison to the numerous § 3553(a) factors which suggest that a term of imprisonment is warranted in a case of tax evasion as willful and brazen as Tomko’s.22
2.
Viewed cumulatively, we conclude that the relevant § 3553(a) factors advocate in *586the strongest possible terms for a sentence including a term of imprisonment. Beginning with § 3553(a)(1), district courts are instructed to consider not only a defendant’s “history and characteristics,” but also “the nature and circumstances of the offense,” which the District Court did not emphasize. In this respect, Tomko did much more than fail to report income on a form; he conceived of a sophisticated plan to evade taxation and compelled multiple individuals to aid him in the scheme. This scheme spanned several years, involved the planning, coordination, and coercion of numerous subcontractors, required a complicated system of concealment through fraudulent billing, and resulted in a stipulated tax loss of over $225,000. Thus, while the District Court’s stated justifications for mitigating Tomko’s sentence fail to differentiate him from other tax evaders, the severity of his offense and the extent of his culpability, as evidenced by the willful and brazen nature of his conduct, remove Tomko’s tax evasion from the garden variety type. As such, even assuming “the history and characteristics of the defendant” point in the direction of a lenient sentence, “the nature and circumstances of the offense” certainly do not.
Under § 3553(a)(2), sentencing courts are instructed to consider the need for the sentence imposed to: (A) reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense; (B) afford adequate deterrence; (C) protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) facilitate rehabilitation. The District Court did consider the need to afford adequate deterrence to Tomko’s own criminal conduct, i.e., “specific deterrence,” and imposed a substantial fine to effectuate this sentencing goal. However, relying on a hefty fine in lieu of imprisonment as a means to deter Tomko from future criminal activity only reinforces the perception that wealthy defendants can buy their way out of a prison sentence.23 Moreover, we fail to see how the sentence reflects the equally important need to deter others, i.e., “general deterrence.” Martin, 455 F.3d at 1240 (“Because economic and fraud-based crimes are more rational, cool, and calculated than sudden crimes of passion or opportunity, these crimes are prime candidates for general deterrence.” (internal alterations, quotation marks, and citation omitted)); Mueffelman, 470 F.3d at 40 (noting the importance of “the deterrence of white-collar crime (of central concern to Congress)”). Thus, we are concerned about the message a sentence of probation for this indisputably serious offense of willful tax evasion sends to the public at large and would-be violators.
The Government argues that in this case “real deterrence is jail,” and this position finds support in United States v. Ture, 450 F.3d 352 (8th Cir.2006). The underlying facts of Ture and our own case are nearly identical. Ture, like Tomko, induced others to disguise income as deductible corporate expenses. Id. at 354. This failure to report funds as income led to a tax deficiency of $240,252 in Ture’s case, id. at 355, whereas in Tomko’s case the stipulated tax deficiency was $228,557. Additionally, in both cases the Guidelines range was twelve to eighteen months, and both *587district courts sentenced the defendants to probation and community service rather than imprisonment. Concluding that the district court’s granting of a downward variance was unreasonable, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted that, “[a]s the Guidelines explain, willful tax evaders often go undetected such that those who are caught ... evading nearly a quarter-million dollars in tax must be given some term of imprisonment.” Id. at 358. It reasoned that, in the case of a willful tax evader like Ture, “[t]he goal of deterrence rings hollow if a prison sentence is not imposed....” Id.
We find the reasoning of Ture persuasive. The sentence in this case, like the sentence in Ture, represents “in effect, a 100% downward variance from the Guidelines range,” id. at 357, which means that Tomko avoids serving any time in a federal prison. Moreover, Tomko’s sentence of probation included home confinement in the very mansion built through the fraudulent tax evasion scheme at issue in this case — an 8,000-square-foot house on approximately eight acres, with a home theater, an outdoor pool and sauna, a full bar, $1,843,500 in household furnishings, and $81,000 in fine art. The perverse irony of this gilded cage confinement was not lost on the Government, it is not lost on us, and it would not be lost on any reasonable public observer of these proceedings, including those would-be offenders who may be contemplating the risks associated with willful tax evasion. Accordingly, we find that the sentence imposed by the District Court fails to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense, and afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, and therefore is inconsistent with the sentencing goals outlined in § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(B).
Under § 3553(a)(5), districts courts are instructed to consider “any pertinent policy statement ... issued by the Sentencing Commission ... in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced.” Notably, the relevant Guidelines policy statements in this case reiterate and reinforce the sentencing mandate of § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(B). For example, the following policy statement further emphasizes the seriousness of the offense of tax evasion, observing:
“Under pre-guidelines sentencing practice, courts sentenced to probation an inappropriately high percentage of offenders guilty of certain economic crimes, such as theft, tax evasion, antitrust offenses ... that in the Commission’s view are ‘serious.’
The Commission’s solution to this problem has been to write guidelines that classify as serious many offenses for which probation previously was frequently given and provide for at least a short period of imprisonment in such cases.”
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 4(d). In addition, the following policy statement underscores the need for tax prosecutions to provide just punishment, promote respect for the law, and provide deterrence:
“Criminal tax prosecutions serve to punish the violator and promote respect for the tax laws. Because of the limited number of criminal tax prosecutions relative to the estimated incidence of such violations, deterring others from violating the tax laws is a primary consideration underlying these guidelines. Recognition that the sentence for a criminal tax case will be commensurate with the gravity of the offense should act as a deterrent to would-be violators.”
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual ch. 2, pt. T, introductory cmt. These policy statements clearly indicate the Sentencing *588Commission’s reasoned judgment that the offense of tax evasion should be met with a term of imprisonment in order to further the goals of sentencing. Thus, § 3553(a)(5) is yet another factor which points in the opposite direction of the sentence that the District Court chose to impose here.
Section 3553(a)(6) further directs sentencing courts to consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” The Guidelines elaborate on this theme, explaining:
“Under pre-guidelines practice, roughly half of all tax evaders were sentenced to probation without imprisonment, while the other half received sentences that required them to serve an average prison term of twelve months. This guideline is intended to reduce disparity in sentencing for tax offenses and to somewhat increase average sentence length. As a result, the number of purely probationary sentences will be reduced.”
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2T1.1 cmt. background; see also Kimbrough, 128 S.Ct. at 573-74 (“[Ajdvisory Guidelines combined with appellate review for reasonableness and ongoing revision of the Guidelines in response to sentencing practices will help to avoid excessive sentencing disparities.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Booker, 543 U.S. at 255, 125 S.Ct. 738 (“Congress enacted the sentencing statutes in major part to achieve greater uniformity in sentencing ....”); id. at 263, 125 S.Ct. 738 (emphasizing that reasonableness review will play a central role in advancing Congress’s original aim in enacting the Sentencing Reform Act because it will “tend to iron out sentencing differences”); Goff, 501 F.3d at 261 (finding an unreasonably lenient sentence when the district court deviated drastically from the norm with respect to a defendant in the “heartland” of offenders rather than an outlier).
The District Court stated on the record that “it recognized the need for consistent sentencing” but imposed a sentence that contributes to, rather than reduces, the marked disparity that Congress and the Commission sought to avoid. The District Court’s use of a substantial fine to counterbalance its decision not to impose a term of imprisonment is inconsistent with Congress’s clear intent, as expressed in the Sentencing Reform Act and § 3553(a), to reduce unwarranted disparities in sentencing, so often based on socio-economic status. See, e.g., Mueffelman, 470 F.3d at 40 (noting the importance of “limits on the ability of those with money or earning potential to buy their way out of jail”); United States v. Seacott, 15 F.3d 1380, 1389 (7th Cir.1994) (“Allowing sentencing courts to depart downward based on a defendant’s ability to make restitution would thwart the intent of the guidelines to punish financial crimes through terms of imprisonment by allowing those who could pay to escape prison. It would also create an unconstitutional system where the rich could in effect buy their way out of prison sentences.”); United States v. Harpst, 949 F.2d 860, 863 (6th Cir.1991) (“[Pjermitting greater leniency in sentencing in those eases in which restitution is at issue and is a meaningful possibility (i.e., generally white-collar crimes) would, we believe, nurture the unfortunate practice of disparate sentencing based on socio-economic status, which the guidelines were intended to supplant.”). Because the mitigating factors that the District Court relied upon to justify granting a significant variance fail to distinguish Tomko from other “defendants with similar records ... found guilty of similar conduct,” the District Court’s sentencing decision flies in the face of § 3553(a)(6) by further contributing to un*589warranted disparities. If anything, the distinctions between Tomko and other defendants actually militate toward imposing more severe punishment on Tomko than on someone who committed garden variety tax evasion. Thus, we cannot conclude that the far more lenient sentence imposed in this case is consistent with § 3553(a)(6).
In sum, our review leads us to conclude that the § 3553(a) factors overwhelmingly support a sentence of imprisonment. The District Court’s reliance on Tomko’s negligible criminal history, employment record, and community support and charitable activity — which relate to only the second half of § 3553(a)(1), “the history and characteristics of the defendant” — as justification for Tomko’s sentence results in an abuse of discretion because it fails to overcome the dramatically contrary conclusion dictated by virtually every other relevant § 3553(a) factor.24 A sentence of probation, community service, and a fine is substantively unreasonable in light of “the totality of the circumstances” and “the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole.” Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. By granting a variance all the way down to probation, the District Court exceeded the lower outer limit of the range of appropriate choices it had the discretion to make, and in doing so abused that discretion.
We reiterate that we do not maintain that any below-Guidelines sentence would have been improper in this case, only that the District Court exceeded its discretion in rendering this particular below-Guidelines sentence. See Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 265 (“While we take exception to the sentence’s degree of deviation for the reasons we discuss, we do not seek to deprive the district court of discretion upon remand. Rather, our difference with the sentencing court here is based on the fact that the specific justifications offered were not ‘sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.’ ” (quoting Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597)).25 Indeed, any number of facts could have been present in the record to place the District Court’s sentence within the range of reasonable choices. But none of those facts existed here. At the same time, we need not articulate in speculative fashion the precise facts that would render a non-imprisonment sentence reasonable. Suffice it to say, this dissent would not close the door on the ability of facts not in Tomko’s record to support significant downward variances in future cases. We would leave ample room for the District Court’s discretion, but “discretion, like the hole in the doughnut, does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction.” Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d *590877, 884 (3d Cir.1981) (quoting R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 31 (1977)).
3.
Finally, we provide some commentary to highlight the differences between Gall and this case. Brian Gall was convicted of conspiracy to distribute ecstasy while a second-year college student at the University of Iowa. Notably, within six months of joining the conspiracy, Gall withdrew therefrom and stopped selling illegal drugs of any kind at that time. Upon graduation, Gall obtained employment earning $18 per hour as a master carpenter. The district court stated that Gall “self-rehabilitated” and sentenced him to probation for a term of 36 months. The court of appeals vacated the sentence as unreasonable.
The Supreme Court, in reversing the court of appeals, stated that “[t]he Government’s legitimate concern that a lenient sentence for a serious offense threatens to promote disrespect for the law is at least to some extent offset by the fact that seven of the eight defendants in this case have been sentenced to significant prison terms.” 128 S.Ct. at 599. No such offset is present here, as Tomko was the head or lead offender and beneficiary of his offense. Deterrence and respect for the law are greatly reduced here by the District Court’s probationary sentence in a way entirely absent from Gall. Gall was different from the other offenders in his conspiracy specifically and from other drug offenders generally. Specifically, Gall withdrew from the ecstasy distribution conspiracy; generally, he rehabilitated himself in a way that made him an outlier. By contrast, Tomko’s employment history not only failed to differentiate him, but it also served as the very vehicle he utilized to manipulate his taxes and commit his offense.
This contrast also explains how Gall’s disparity from other drug distribution conspirators appropriately resulted in a disparity in his sentence in that case, whereas the absence of disparity between Tomko and typical tax evaders should not have resulted in a sentencing disparity of the magnitude we face here. The Supreme Court emphasized “the critical relevance of Gall’s voluntary withdrawal, a circumstance that distinguished his conduct not only from that of all his codefendants, but from the vast majority of defendants convicted of conspiracy in federal court.” Id. at 600. No such distinguishing circumstance is present here to separate Tomko from the vast majority of defendants convicted of tax evasion. Also, “[gjiven the dramatic contrast between Gall’s behavior before he joined the conspiracy and his conduct after withdrawing, it was not unreasonable for the District Judge to view Gall’s immaturity at the time of the offense as a mitigating factor, and his later behavior as a sign that he had matured and would not engage in such impetuous and ill-considered conduct in the future.” Id. at 601. Without imposing any categorical rules about age, we believe it is clear from the record in our case that Tomko’s turn to charitable work can hardly be characterized as a turn toward maturity and away from impetuousness. Thus, the mitigating factors which supported Gall’s sentence and made it reasonable under the totality of the circumstances are absent in Tomko’s case.
IV.
In addition to rendering the Guidelines advisory, the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker undoubtedly gave courts of appeals a new role of ascertaining whether sentences are reasonable. Contrary to the suggestion of the Majority, when we are faced with a substantively unreasonable sentence, our hands are not tied and we *591need not resign ourselves to a sentencing regime which tolerates unwarranted disparities. See Majority Op. at Part IV. The Supreme Court in Booker did not sanction a return to the unfettered sentencing discretion districts courts enjoyed during the pre-Sentencing Reform Act era. Rather, in Booker, the Court recognized Congress’s goal of achieving “greater uniformity in sentencing” and was confident that courts of appeals would be able to “iron out sentencing differences” through reasonableness review. 543 U.S. at 255, 263, 125 S.Ct. 738. Because neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has abandoned the goal of uniformity in sentencing, neither should we. Rather than invite Congress to impose a system of mandatory sentences, we endeavor to fulfill our limited but important role of reviewing sentences for reasonableness.
Although in Gall the Supreme Court reiterated that we apply an abuse-of-discretion standard to reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, in this same decision the Court clarified that appellate courts must consider both procedural and substantive reasonableness. Accordingly, if substantive reasonableness review is to mean anything, courts of appeals must attempt to give content to this component of our review until the Supreme Court provides further guidance. Having reviewed, with due deference, the District Court’s stated justifications for granting a significant variance from the Guidelines range, we cannot conclude that the sentence imposed in this case was substantively reasonable in light of the “totality of the circumstances” and the “§ 3553(a) factors, on a whole.” Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. Gall’s instruction to review sentences for substantive reasonableness gives us the authority to vacate such sentences. Congress, the Sentencing Commission, and the public rely on us to exercise that authority. Therefore, we would vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand for re-sentencing in accordance with this opinion.

. Upon the receipt of these invoices, Tomko, Inc. paid the subcontractors in the normal course of business and posted the expenses to the jobs that were listed on the invoices.

. Because Tomko, Inc. is classified as a "flow-through" Subchapter S Corporation under the federal tax code, Tomko, the individual, was required to include on his personal income tax return his share of the company's items of income, deduction, loss, and credit.

. The District Court in this case did not grant Tomko a downward departure based on his charitable acts or any other ground, but rather took them into consideration as mitigating factors in the course of its analysis of § 3553(a). See United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 195 n. 2 (3d Cir.2006) (explaining the distinction between departures and variances).

. Our post-Booker precedent instructs district courts to follow a three-step sentencing process: (1) Courts must continue to calculate a defendant's Guidelines sentence precisely as they would have before Booker; (2) in doing so, they must formally rule on the motions of both parties, state on the record whether they are granting a departure and how that departure affects the Guidelines calculation, and take into account our Circuit's pre-Booker case law, which continues to have advisory force; and (3) they are required to "exercise their discretion by considering the relevant § 3553(a) factors” in setting the sentence they impose regardless of whether it varies from the sentence calculated under the Guidelines. United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir.2006) (alterations omitted).

. We need not resolve today whether our appellate review extends to ensure that district courts "must” support a major deviation by a more significant justification. All the Supreme Court stated in Gall was that it found it "uncontroversial that a major departure should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one." Gall, *581128 S.Ct. at 597. We thus leave for another day the task of defining the precise contours of that statement. Nonetheless, we note the nuanced distinction in language to highlight just how modest our appellate approach is. Here, even when we do not require "a more significant justification” from the District Court for its "major” deviation from the Guidelines, the justification it did provide fails to support the degree of downward variance.

. We do not mean to suggest that white-collar offenses in general or tax evasion in particular must be met by a sentence of incarceration. See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 98-225, at 91-92 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3275 ("The placing on probation of [a white-collar criminal] may be perfectly appropriate in cases in which, under all the circumstances, only the rehabilitative needs of the offender are pertinent; such a sentence may be grossly inappropriate, however, in cases in which the circumstances mandate the sentence's carrying substantial deterrent or punitive impact.”).

. The Majority emphasizes that the District Court "conducted a thorough analysis of the § 3553(a) factors and provided a complete *583explanation of the reasons underlying Tomko's sentence.” Majority Op. at Part V. However, because "failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors” and "failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence" are examples that the Supreme Court provided in Gall of what constitutes "significant procedural error,” 128 S.Ct. at 597, the District Court's explanation of its chosen sentence and discussion of the § 3553(a) factors are merely indicative of a procedurally reasonable sentence but do not resolve whether the sentence is substantively reasonable. Therefore, what the Majority applauds the District Court for doing is necessary but not sufficient in order for a sentence to be reasonable.

. By referring to this stated justification for the variance as "typical” of other tax evaders, we are not suggesting that a closer review of the sentence is warranted or that this observation in any way alters our deferential standard of review. Rather, our purpose in describing this consideration as "typical” is to highlight that it fails to broaden the District Court's range of permissible sentencing choices because it would apply with equal force to most other defendants and therefore cannot accurately be characterized as a "mitigating” circumstance.

. We pause to note that we believe the Majority’s focus on the fact-bound nature of sentencing as a reason not to disturb the District Court’s chosen sentence in this case is overstated. While we do not question that "district courts have an institutional advantage over appellate courts” in making sentencing determinations, Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 598, and that this superior vantage point with respect to individualized sentencing drives our deferential standard of review, we do not believe that this case presents such a fact-intensive sentencing decision that on appeal we must refrain from drawing our own conclusions about the evidence of record.

. By concluding that the District Court's stated reasons for granting a significant variance fail to justify its decision, we are not advancing some permutation of the "proportionality test.” What the Supreme Court invalidated in Gall was a rule of appellate review which requires the use of a rigid mathematical formula whereby an extraordinary deviation from the Guidelines must be matched with an extraordinary justification. 128 S.Ct. at 595. Here, we have done only what the Supreme Court outlined in Gall by taking “the degree of variance into account and considering] the extent of deviation from the Guidelines” as we review the "totality of the circumstances” and the "§ 3553(a) factors, on a whole.” Id. at 595, 597.

. The Majority characterizes the absence of a term of imprisonment and the presence of a significant fine as a "simple coincidence.” Majority Op. at Part IV. We believe the record indicates otherwise. Specifically, immediately after the District Court announced its decision to sentence Tomko to probation instead of imprisonment, the District Court followed up by stating that a large fine was necessary to provide deterrence to Tomko. Thus, we cannot agree that the District Court’s decision to impose a substantial fine had nothing to do with its decision not to impose any period of incarceration.

. To be clear, we acknowledge that § 3553(a)(3) and (7) arguably support certain aspects of the District Court’s lenient sentence, but we find it unnecessary to elaborate on these factors because we conclude that they are overpowered by § 3553(a)(1), (2), (4), (5), and (6), which advocate in the strongest possible terms for a sentence that includes some duration of imprisonment.

. Again, we do not suggest that our appellate review extends to ensure that a district court’s reasons are sufficiently compelling, as the Supreme Court appeared to be describing only a district court's own duty to “ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.” Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. We nonetheless note this nuanced distinction because we believe our appellate approach post-Gall, as outlined in this opinion, is rather modest when compared to what some of our sister circuits have held. The Fourth Circuit knew well that Gall had invalidated the “proportionality principle,” so it must have believed its test to conform with Gall. In this case, even when we do not test the District Court’s degree of variance against "compelling” justifications, we still find an abuse of discretion.