Court Opinion

ID: 9407392
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-06 19:03:49.281344+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:37.470780
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/6/23 Marriage of Perkal CA2/3

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 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     DIVISION THREE

 In re the Marriage of DAVID and                                B319411
 MONICA PERKAL.

 DAVID PERKAL,                                                 Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. BD630924
      Respondent,

      v.

 MONICA PERKAL,

      Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Bruce G. Iwasaki, Judge. Affirmed.
      Fernandez & Karney, Mark H. Karney; Law Offices of Ben
Gharagozli and Ben Gharagozli for Appellant.
      Law Office of Stephanie J. Finelli and Stephanie J. Finelli
for Respondent.
           _______________________________________
                           INTRODUCTION

       Monica Perkal1 appeals from the February 10, 2022 order
denying in part her request for orders (RFOs). Specifically, she
challenges the trial court’s denial of her request for: (1) gains,
losses, or interest earned on $168,000 that allegedly became her
separate property in March 2018 or January 2019; (2) attorney’s
fees under Family Code2 section 6344; and (3) monetary sanctions
against David under section 271 due to his litigation conduct. We
conclude that Monica has forfeited her claims by failing to
provide this court with any of the exhibits admitted in evidence
or refused during the two-day hearing on her RFOs. We also
conclude that she failed to affirmatively establish prejudicial
error. We therefore affirm the order.

          FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Although the appellate record presented by Monica is
incomplete, it is voluminous. The facts and procedural
background necessary to our opinion, however, are
straightforward.
1.      Background
      Monica and David married in 2000 and have two children,
Nikolas and Natasha. Nikolas was born in 2003; Natasha was
born in 2006. In 2015, David filed a petition for dissolution of

1Monica Perkal’s former name, Monica Moynihan, was restored after
the parties’ judgment of dissolution and termination of marital status
was entered in 2019. The parties, however, refer to her as Monica
Perkal in their appellate briefs. For clarity, we refer to the parties by
their first names. No disrespect is intended.
2   All undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.

                                     2
marriage. Since then, the matter has been heavily litigated at
almost every juncture.
       On May 6, 2016, Monica requested and obtained a domestic
violence temporary restraining order (TRO) against David. At the
time, she was represented by counsel from Feinberg Mindel
Brandt & Klein (FMBK). The TRO was reissued and the hearing
on her request for a restraining order was continued to July 1,
2016. David filed his own request for a TRO against Monica on
June 22, 2016. His request was opposed by FMBK on Monica’s
behalf. The court denied David’s TRO request until the continued
hearing on Monica’s request was conducted.
       Meanwhile, on May 19, 2016, Monica filed RFOs for child
support, spousal support, accounting fees, and attorney’s fees of
no less than $75,000 payable to FMBK. The RFOs, also filed by
FMBK on Monica’s behalf, stated that the request for attorney’s
fees was based in part on Monica having been “forced to seek
domestic violence restraining orders against [David] in May
2016.” In June 2016, however, the parties entered into a written
stipulation taking the RFOs off calendar and agreeing to resolve
all outstanding issues at a voluntary settlement conference with
a retired judge. Per the stipulation, the parties also agreed to
distribute $35,000 to FMBK from proceeds from the sale of the
family home.
       On July 1, 2016, the court granted Monica’s request for a
three-year restraining order and denied David’s request for a
restraining order. Although both parties were represented by
counsel at the hearing, the court did not award attorney’s fees.
       On October 11, 2016, Monica, through her counsel at
FMBK, filed an order to show cause for contempt (OSC) based on
David’s purported violations of the July 1, 2016 restraining order.

                                3
The OSC alleged David violated the order by sending Monica two
emails regarding financial matters and by showing up at one of
the children’s dental appointments. The OSC was scheduled for
hearing on November 23, 2016, and sought an award of attorney’s
fees. There is no indication in the record that David was ever
held in contempt, and the November 23, 2016 minute order is not
in the record.
       On February 6, 2017, the parties filed a judgment resolving
issues regarding child custody, and Monica represented that
attorneys from FMBK were involved in the negotiations and
preparation of that judgment. A day later, FMBK substituted out
of the case and Monica agreed to represent herself in the
litigation. In May 2018, FMBK filed a notice of lien in the amount
of $48,101.90 for outstanding fees.
       On August 1, 2017, David’s employee benefit plan, Motion
Picture Retirement, was joined as a party to the proceedings.
       In October 2017, Monica, though her newly obtained
attorney (William W. Oxley), filed RFOs for financial support and
for $71,179 in attorney’s fees and costs. On December 7, 2017, the
court ordered David to provide Monica with $30,000 as “an
uncharacterized sum.”
       The parties reached a settlement of reserved issues on
March 21, 2018 (Settlement Agreement) with the assistance of a
private mediator. The Settlement Agreement was incorporated
into a judgment entered on January 19, 2019 (2019 Judgment).
       The Settlement Agreement provides for the division of the
parties’ assets including, as relevant here, two of David’s
retirement accounts. Specifically, paragraph 1.C states that the
“community portion” of his “Motion Picture Industry Pension
Plan (accrued benefits) xx4739 [MPI plan]” “shall be equally

                                4
divided per QDRO3 by the time rule/Brown by Louise Nixon. The
fees and costs for Ms. Nixon shall be equally divided by the
Parties. [David’s] separate property shall be confirmed to him.”
Paragraph 1.D, titled “Dave’s Motion Picture IAP Plan (defined
contribution) xx4739 [IAP plan],” states that “[f]rom said account,
upon execution of the Judgment the sum of $168,000 shall be
rolled over into an account to be designated by Monica. The
amount rolled over shall be deemed to include Monica’s share of
the community property portion of the IAP plan, as well as an
equalization payment to Monica to satisfy any and all
reimbursement claims and any other claims pertaining to
property division and arrears. All remaining funds in the account
shall be awarded and/or confirmed to Dav[id] as his sole and
separate property.”
       The Settlement Agreement also provides for the sale of
certain motion picture camera lenses with the net proceeds to be
divided equally between Monica and David4. If the parties “are
unable to agree upon a third party broker to list” the lenses for
sale, the private mediator “shall select the broker as a binding
arbitrator.” The private mediator was also to resolve any dispute

3 “Under provisions of the federal Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.; hereafter ERISA),
private retirement plans may, pursuant to a state court’s domestic
relations order, pay a portion of an employee participant’s retirement
benefits directly to the employee’s former spouse or dependents, if and
only if the state court order meets certain specifications. Such an order
is a ‘qualified domestic relations order’ (hereafter a QDRO). (29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d)(3).)” (In re Marriage of Oddino (1997) 16 Cal.4th 67, 71.)

4   David is a cinematographer in the motion picture industry.

                                    5
regarding the sale, acceptance of offers, David’s right of first
refusal, and the division of the proceeds from the sale.
       In addition, the Settlement Agreement provides for the
payment of the parties’ attorney’s fees and costs. David’s attorney
and Monica’s attorney (William Oxley) would each receive one-
half of the proceeds from an account held at First Republic Bank.
Aside from the distributions from this account, each party “shall
pay his/her own attorneys’ fees … through the entry of
Judgment.” Nevertheless, each party reserves his or her “rights,
claims, and defenses with respect to attorneys’ fees and
sanctions” for “the pending domestic violence restraining order
actions, the pending appeal, and the fees and costs and sanctions
incurred after April 1, 2018 for the pending RFO for child and
spousal support.”
       On April 26,2018, Nikolas, as a self-represented party,
obtained a one-year restraining order against David. On August
7, 2019, Nikolas, represented by attorney John Glantz, obtained
another restraining order against David and he was ordered to
pay Glantz $10,000 in fees and costs by September 24, 2019.
       On October 9, 2019, Monica obtained an order renewing her
restraining order against David. She was represented by Glantz
in that proceeding. The following month, the court awarded
Monica $8,500 in fees in connection with the renewal request and
ordered David to pay those fees directly to Glantz within 60 days.
       On March 18, 2021, the court ordered Monica to pay David
$20,000 in sanctions under section 271 in connection with a
request for spousal and child support. The court found that
Monica “engaged in litigation tactics that made the case more
expensive, that [Monica] did not participate in the process, and

                                6
that [Monica] made certain filings requiring [David] to respond
which were not pursued by [Monica].”
2.   Monica’s March 29, 2021 RFOs (March 2021 RFOs)
      On March 29, 2021, Monica filed RFOs regarding the
following: $448,000 for the “converted community property”
camera lenses and as “reimbursement” owed by David for income
derived from the lenses, plus $80,946.63 in attorney’s fees under
sections 271, 290, 2030-2032, and/or Code of Civil Procedure
section 128.5; the “Stipulated QDRO” or, alternatively, $168,000
to be paid to Monica from David’s retirement account, plus
$48,702.08 in fees and “interest in the amount of $47,687.08
($446.03 per diem for 1036 days)”; child and spousal support
arrears; unreimbursed medical expenses for Nikolas’s surgery;
$46,317 in attorney’s fees regarding “the restraining order(s)
obtained in this case” and to defend against David’s dismissed
restraining order under section 6344; $87,598.44 in fees under
sections 2030-2032 for dismissed appeals and RFOs for support;
and $10,000 in sanctions regarding “the non-compliance of
signing the QDRO that was stipulated to on March 21, 2018.”
      David opposed the RFOs. He argued, among other things,
that Monica failed to contact Louise Nixon to prepare a QDRO
and Monica was not entitled to interest for the amount to be
disbursed to her from his retirement account.
3.   Scheduling Conferences
      The hearing on Monica’s March 2021 RFOs was scheduled
for November 4, 2021. On that date, however, the court stated
that Monica had not complied with a prior order which required
her to pay David $10,408.40 for child support overpaid by him.
Under the disentitlement doctrine, the court refused to proceed

                                7
with the hearing on Monica’s pending RFOs until she complied
with the court’s prior order. The court took the March 2021 RFOs
off calendar but invited the parties to contact the court to
reschedule the hearing after Monica paid David the amount owed
by her. Although there were grounds to sanction Monica again,
the court declined to do so and noted it had concerns about the
behavior and litigation conduct of both parties.5
       On December 21, 2021, after confirming that Monica had
paid David the amount previously ordered, the court rescheduled
the hearing for February 9 and 10, 2022.
4.    Monica’s Trial Brief
      Monica filed a trial brief on February 8, 2022. She
contended the court would have to resolve issues regarding the
QDRO, child support, lenses, reimbursements (medical expenses
for minor child), attorney’s fees and costs, and sanctions.
Relevant here, Monica argued that David refused to sign the
QDRO, $168,000 and the community portion from the MPI
pension were Monica’s sole and separate property as of the date
the Settlement Agreement was signed, and she was entitled to
interest on the $168,000 in the amount of $68,216.46. Regarding
attorney’s fees, Monica sought a total of $200,000, including
$50,000 for fees incurred by her under section 6344. Finally,
Monica sought an award of section 271 sanctions against David
in an unspecified amount “for his conduct regarding the lenses,
QDRO and meritless appeals.”

5 Two weeks later, a different judicial officer denied Monica’s request
to declare David a vexatious litigant.

                                    8
5.   The February 2022 Evidentiary Hearing
       In February 2022, the court conducted a two-day
evidentiary hearing to address Monica’s March 2021 RFOs.
Monica, David, and Wayne Loucks testified. Monica was
represented by counsel. David was self-represented. Loucks was
hired by Monica to provide a market value estimate of five
camera lenses and testified they were worth between $85,000 and
$92,000.
       Numerous exhibits were marked and admitted in evidence
during the hearing. Based on the reporter’s transcript, some of
those exhibits addressed issues raised by Monica in this appeal.
For example, Exhibit 3, pages 15-16, were emails between David
and QDRO counsel. And, according to David, Exhibit 3, pages 17-
18, show he is “pleading with [Monica] and [her] counsel to
contact Miss Nixon’s firm within five days, by July 26th, and
engage them in creating a QDRO as per the court order on
January 18, 2019.” Further, Exhibit 27, an email with the subject
heading “Language Approved for QDRO (Perkal),” was used by
David during the hearing to challenge Monica’s attempt to
include language regarding gains and losses in a QDRO. As for
any delay in dividing the camera lenses, exhibit 5 contains 56
pages relating to attempts by David “to confer about the lens
selection” process.
       Monica’s attorney also marked but never requested
admission of certain exhibits supporting her claim for attorney’s
fees. By way of example, Exhibit X appeared to be 30 pages of
bills from FMBK, some of which related to Monica’s request for
fees under section 6344. Exhibit Y included bills from FMBK and
William Oxley. Exhibit X or Y contained a hand-written notation

                               9
of $27,764 but Monica did not know who made the notation on
the invoices.
      During David’s examination, Monica’s attorney marked
Exhibit VV for identification and sought its admission in
evidence. According to counsel, Exhibit VV would allow the court
to make a ruling regarding section 6344 fees incurred by Monica.
David objected to the admission of the exhibit for lack of
foundation and the court sustained the objection. In response to
the court’s evidentiary ruling, Monica’s counsel stated he would
revisit the issue once Monica was back on the stand but he never
did.
6.    February 10, 2022 Order and Findings; the Appeal
      After the matter was submitted on February 10, 2022, the
court issued an oral ruling on Monica’s March 2021 RFOs. Later
that day, the court issued a four-page written order with an
attached dissomaster report. Neither party requested a
statement of decision.
      Based on the language in paragraph 1.D of the Settlement
Agreement, the court found that, unlike the MPI plan, the parties
did not agree to divide David’s IAP plan by a QDRO. “The IAP
defined contribution plan was simply a source of funds to pay
Monica a negotiated amount” and included, “in unknown
amounts, equalization payments and reimbursements to Monica.”
The court denied Monica’s request for gains or interest as of the
date the Settlement Agreement or the 2019 Judgment was signed
because, among other things, Monica never designated an
account to receive the $168,000 from David’s IAP plan.
Nevertheless, within five days after Monica designates such an
account in writing, the court ordered David to execute all
necessary documents for effectuating the rollover of $168,000 into

                               10
the designated account. The court also awarded Monica interest
at the legal rate on the $168,000 beginning on the fifteenth day
after she designates the account.
       As for David’s MPI plan, the court ordered both parties to
comply with the Settlement Agreement by paying and
cooperating with QDRO counsel for preparation of a QDRO. The
court found that both parties were to blame for delaying
resolution of the QDRO issue: “At times, Dave was unreasonably
recalcitrant. At times, it appears that Monica or her counsel was
unresponsive.”
       Although it found that Monica was a prevailing party
because she had obtained and extended a domestic violence
restraining order against David, it denied her request for
attorney’s fees under section 6344. The court explained that
“Monica failed to provide information about the attorney’s
experience, what work was done, and why the fees were
necessary and reasonable.” “The bills she sought to introduce are
raw invoices uncharacterized by subject area, and include work
for other aspects of this dissolution matter.” The court also
denied Monica’s request for sanctions under section 271, finding
that she “similarly offered no basis to impose sanctions against
David.”6
       Monica appeals from the February 10, 2022 order.

6 To be sure, the court found that David was to blame for the delay in
dividing the camera lenses. It rejected, however, Monica’s claim that
David delayed the process because he was using or renting the lenses
for his own benefit: “No admissible evidence of David’s use or rental of
the lenses was introduced.”

                                   11
                           DISCUSSION

      Monica argues the clear intention of the parties was for the
$168,000 from the IAP plan to be paid “immediately”—i.e., in
March 2018—or no later than when the 2019 Judgment was
entered.7 Thus, contrary to the court’s order, she was entitled to
the gains and losses in the IAP plan as of 2018 or 2019 even if the
$168,000 was an equalization payment. Monica also argues she
was not required to identify an account to receive those proceeds
“until MPI was served with a QDRO.” In her view, the
Settlement Agreement’s language requiring her to designate an
account as a condition precedent to receiving the funds was
“drafted incorrectly.” Monica also argues the court erred in not
awarding her attorney’s fees under section 6344 because she was
a prevailing party and submitted detailed billing records from
her attorneys.8 Finally, Monica contends the court erred in not
awarding section 271 sanctions based on David’s delay in
engaging QDRO counsel and in selling or dividing the camera
lenses.
1.    The incomplete record is fatal to Monica’s appeal.
     It is well-settled that “[a]ppealed judgments and orders are
presumed correct, and error must be affirmatively shown.”
(Hernandez v. California Hospital Medical Center (2000) 78

7 On page 13 of her opening brief, Monica also suggests that one of the
errors made by the court concerned her entitlement to the gains and
losses of her “share of funds left in Dave’s MPI plan for the past four
years.” The challenged order, however, expressly states that the
“community portion plus all gain and losses” from the MPI plan will be
determined as of March 21, 2018 and shall be divided equally.

                                  12
Cal.App.4th 498, 502, citing Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2
Cal.3d 557, 564.) As the party challenging the court’s presumably
correct findings and rulings, Monica is required “to provide an
adequate record to assess error.” (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43
Cal.3d 1281, 1295.) “Failure to provide an adequate record on an
issue requires that the issue be resolved against appellant.”
(Barak v. The Quisenberry Law Firm (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 654,
660.)
       A party who contends that a particular finding is not
supported by substantial evidence is obligated to set forth in his
or her brief all the material evidence on the point, not merely the
party’s own evidence. (Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2005) 127
Cal.App.4th 1640, 1657–1659.) Facts must be presented in the
light most favorable to the judgment (id. at pp. 1657–1658), and
the burden on appellant to provide a fair summary of the
evidence “ ‘ “grows with the complexity of the record.
[Citation.]” ’ ” (Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2009) 178
Cal.App.4th 735, 739; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C)9
[briefs must support any reference to a matter in the record with
a citation to the record]; rule 8.204(a)(2)(C) [appellant’s opening
brief must “[p]rovide a summary of the significant facts limited to
matters in the record”].) The appellant forfeits or waives a claim
of lack of substantial evidence to support a finding by failing to

8Monica does not state the amount of attorney’s fees sought by her for
work done by her counsel in obtaining restraining orders. Instead, she
notes that the billing statements attached to the March 2021 RFOs
provided that information. Those attachments, however, were not
admitted in evidence and the court declined to consider them.
9   All further rule citations are to the California Rules of Court.

                                      13
set forth, discuss and analyze all the evidence on that point. (See
Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881 [error
is deemed to be waived]; Myers, at p. 749 [same].)
       Finally, an appellant has the burden not only to show error
but prejudice from that error. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) If an
appellant fails to satisfy that burden, his or her argument will be
rejected on appeal. (Century Surety Co. v. Polisso (2006) 139
Cal.App.4th 922, 963.) “[W]e cannot presume prejudice and will
not reverse the judgment in the absence of an affirmative
showing there was a miscarriage of justice. [Citations.] Nor will
this court act as counsel for appellant by furnishing a legal
argument as to how the trial court’s ruling was prejudicial.
[Citations.]” (Ibid.)
       In this appeal, Monica elected to proceed by appendix
pursuant to rule 8.124. Rule 8.124 requires that an appellant’s
appendix contain any item listed in rule 8.122(b)(3) “that
is necessary for proper consideration of the issues … .” (Italics
added.) Such items may include “[a]ny … document filed
or lodged in the case in superior court” and “[a]ny exhibit
admitted in evidence, refused, or lodged[.]” (Rule 8.122(b)(3)(A),
(B).) While the appellate record includes a reporter’s transcript of
the testimony during the two-day hearing, it does not include any
of the 12 exhibits admitted in evidence during the hearing.10
Those exhibits were used during the hearing to substantiate the
rights of the parties, explain their conduct, and support and

10It appears that Exhibit A, Monica’s declaration in support of the
March 2021 RFOs, might be the same document found at pages 1,414
through 1,422 of the appendix.

                                 14
challenge their credibility. And as previously noted, some of those
exhibits clearly involved issues raised by Monica in this appeal.
      To the extent Monica challenges the court’s refusal to
consider or admit exhibits establishing the amount or
reasonableness of her attorney’s fees under section 6344, those
exhibits are also not in the record. Regardless, Monica has not
provided us with reasoned argument and relevant authority to
show that the court abused its discretion by excluding any
particular exhibit, or that she was prejudiced by the court’s error.
Evidence Code section 354 prohibits setting aside a judgment or
decision “by reason of the erroneous exclusion of evidence unless
the court which passes upon the effect of the error or errors is of
the opinion that the error or errors complained of resulted in a
miscarriage of justice … .” (See Zhou v. Unisource Worldwide
(2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1471, 1480 [trial court’s error in
excluding evidence is grounds for reversing a judgment only if the
party appealing demonstrates a miscarriage of justice].) Here,
Monica only states that the court had an obligation to review “the
raw bills” submitted by her—without distinguishing between
those that were offered in evidence but rejected and those that
were merely marked with exhibit numbers or letters but never
offered in evidence—and has not even attempted to show that
any specific exhibit was improperly excluded. We cannot base a
finding of miscarriage of justice on such untethered generalities.
      By failing to provide an adequate record, Monica cannot
meet her burden to show error and we must resolve any
challenge to the order against her. (See Hernandez v. California
Hospital Medical Center, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 502.)

                                15
2.    Based on the limited record, Monica did not establish
      prejudicial error.
       Even if we were to consider the merits of Monica’s claims,
we would conclude that, based on the record before us, she has
failed to demonstrate reversible error.
      2.1.   Characterization of the $168,000 distribution
             from the IAP plan
      “Characterization of property, for the purpose of
community property law, refers to the process of classifying
property as separate, community, or quasi-community.
Characterization must take place in order to determine the rights
and liabilities of the parties with respect to a particular asset or
obligation and is an integral part of the division of property on
marital dissolution.” (In re Marriage of Haines (1995) 33
Cal.App.4th 277, 291.) The most basic characterization factor
determinative of whether property is separate or community is
the time when property is acquired in relation to the parties’
marital status. (Ibid.) “Appellate review of a trial court’s finding
that a particular item is separate or community property is
limited to a determination of whether any substantial evidence
supports the finding.” (In re Marriage of Dekker (1993) 17
Cal.App.4th 842, 849.) “But de novo review is appropriate where
resolution of ‘the issue of the characterization to be given (as
separate or community property) … requires a critical
consideration, in a factual context, of legal principles and their
underlying values, the determination in question amounts to the
resolution of a mixed question of law and fact that is
predominantly one of law.’ [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of
Rossin (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 725, 734.)

                                16
       Monica has not shown that the $168,000 that was supposed
to be transferred to her from David’s IAP plan became her
separate property as of March 2018 when the Settlement
Agreement was finalized, or January 2019 when the 2019
Judgment incorporating the Settlement Agreement was entered.
Paragraph 1 of the Settlement Agreement, titled “Retirement
Accounts,” states, “Except as set forth herein, each party is
awarded his/her own retirement account as his/her separate
property.” And, as previously noted, paragraph 1.D of the
Settlement Agreement provides that the $168,000 from David’s
IAP plan would “upon execution of the Judgment … be rolled over
into an account to be designated by Monica. The amount rolled
over shall be deemed to include Monica’s share of the community
property portion of the IAP plan, as well as an equalization
payment to Monica to satisfy any and all reimbursement claims
and any other claims pertaining to property division and arrears.
All remaining funds in the account shall be awarded and/or
confirmed to Dav[id] as his sole and separate property.” (Italics
added.) Thus, the court reasonably found that the $168,000
would only become Monica’s separate property once it was “rolled
over” into an account designated by Monica, and it is undisputed
that Monica never identified or designated an account for this
purpose. In fact, Monica appears to acknowledge that her
designation of an account for receipt of the $168,000 was a
condition precedent set forth in the Settlement Agreement but
now claims paragraph 1.D was “drafted incorrectly.”
       We also agree with the trial court that In re Marriage of
Janes (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1043 is distinguishable. In Janes,
the parties executed a marital settlement agreement, which was
attached to a judgment of dissolution, that awarded the wife

                               17
approximately $113,392 from the husband’s 401(k) retirement
account, but the judgment did not mention gains or losses on that
amount. (Id. at pp. 1045, 1050.) The money was not distributed
immediately, and later the wife sought the $113,392 plus the
gains and losses resulting from that money in a request for a
QDRO. (Id. at p. 1046.) In rejecting the husband’s argument that
the court lacked jurisdiction to modify the earlier judgment of
dissolution by awarding the gains and losses to the wife, the
court found that the judgment did not need to explicitly reference
the gains and losses since it included all the necessary
information to make any necessary calculations—$113,392 of the
401(k) account was the wife’s separate property as of the date the
marital settlement agreement and dissolution judgment were
executed. (Id. at pp. 1049–1050.) Importantly for our purposes,
Janes held that assuming the $113,392 was an equalization
payment “as opposed to part of the regular division of community
property[,] … [t]here is nothing indicating an equalization
payment was to be delayed; therefore, we assume the payment
was to be made immediately.” (Id. at pp. 1050–1051.) Here,
unlike in Janes, the payment to the other spouse was not to be
made “immediately”—it would only be made after Monica
designated an account to receive the funds.
      In any event, Monica cites no evidence showing she was
prejudiced by any delay in the designation of the $168,000 as her
separate property. (See In re Marriage of Steiner &
Hosseini (2004) 117 Cal. App. 4th 519, 524 [although a rule of
court phrased in mandatory language is generally binding on the
courts, departure from a rule of court is not reversible error
unless prejudice is shown].) Although David’s employee
retirement plan was joined as a party in 2017, no evidence was

                               18
presented during the hearing that it incurred gains or suffered
losses since 2018 when the Settlement Agreement was signed.
And although Monica requested interest in the amount of
“$446.03 per diem” in her March 2021 RFOs, she testified she
didn’t recall how that number was calculated.
       For the first time in her reply brief, Monica argues that
David could have distributed the funds from his IAP plan into
one of the “three separate retirement-based accounts” identified
in the Settlement Agreement. We disregard this argument
because it was not raised below or in her opening brief. For the
same reason, we will not address Monica’s argument that the
court had a sua sponte obligation to correct its erroneous
February 10, 2022 order after it received a February 24, 2022
letter regarding preparation of a QDRO.
       In her reply brief, Monica also contends that “as drafted[,]”
paragraph 1.D of the Settlement Agreement “did not comport
with the Plan Administrator’s QDRO requirement.” Thus, “funds
could not simply be rolled out of the IAP [plan] and paid to
Monica.” In support of this argument, Monica relies on a January
20, 2022 email bearing no exhibit designation and the February
24, 2022 letter written to the parties after the court issued its
decision. These record citations, however, don’t establish that she
could not designate an account to receive the funds until after a
QDRO was filed and served on the IAP plan. And even if a QDRO
needed to be prepared and served before the $168,000 was
transferred into an account designated by Monica— to “avoid
taxes and penalties” per the February 24, 2022 letter—the
exhibits admitted in evidence at the hearing, and which are not
in the record, suggest Monica was partially responsible for the
parties’ failure to complete the QDRO.

                                19
      2.2.   Attorney’s fees under section 6344
       Section 6344 authorizes an award of attorney’s fees and
costs to the prevailing party in a proceeding concerning a
domestic violence restraining order. (See Loeffler v.
Medina (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1508.) During the relevant
time period,11 subdivision (a) of section 6344 provided, “After
notice and a hearing, the court may issue an order for the
payment of attorney’s fees and costs of the prevailing party.” By
contrast, subdivision (b) of section 6344 provided, “In any action
in which the petitioner is the prevailing party and cannot afford
to pay for the attorney’s fees and costs, the court shall, if
appropriate based on the parties’ respective abilities to pay, order
that the respondent pay petitioner’s attorney’s fees and costs for
commencing and maintaining the proceeding. Whether the
respondent shall be ordered to pay attorney’s fees and costs for
the prevailing petitioner, and what amount shall be paid, shall be
determined based upon (1) the respective incomes and needs of
the parties, and (2) any factors affecting the parties’ respective

11 The Legislature amended section 6344, effective January 1, 2023, to
provide as follows: “(a) After notice and a hearing, a court, upon
request, shall issue an order for the payment of attorney’s fees and
costs for a prevailing petitioner. [¶] (b) After notice and a hearing, the
court, upon request, may issue an order for the payment of attorney’s
fees and costs for a prevailing respondent only if the respondent
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the petition or
request is frivolous or solely intended to abuse, intimidate, or cause
unnecessary delay. [¶] (c) Before a court awards attorney’s fees and
costs pursuant to this section, the court shall first determine pursuant
to Section 270 that the party ordered to pay has, or is reasonably likely
to have, the ability to pay.” (Stats. 2022, ch. 591, § 2.) Former
section 6344 applies in this case as the court’s order denying Monica’s
request for fees was made on February 10, 2022.

                                   20
abilities to pay.” The standard of review for an order granting or
denying a motion for attorney’s fees under the Family Code is
abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Turkanis & Price (2013)
213 Cal.App.4th 332, 345.)
       Monica failed to establish any abuse of discretion in the
court’s denial of her fee request. As we noted before, in her
opening brief Monica does not state the amount sought by her, or
how we can determine whether the fees were actually incurred by
her, and not previously paid by David, under former subdivisions
(a) and (b) of section 6344.12 Monica also does not cite any
admissible evidence supporting her claim that she submitted
detailed billing records from her current and former attorneys for
section 6344 fees. At best, she relies on billing records attached to
her March 2021 RFOs, and the court expressly stated that those
attachments were not in evidence. And, as we said before, Monica
requested and received awards of attorney’s fees throughout the
litigation under various Family Code provisions, including under
section 6344. The parties’ son also requested and obtained his
own restraining orders against David and it appears that Monica
is seeking fees for his separate action against David.13 Moreover,

12 The amount sought by Monica also differed in her trial court filings.
In her March 2021 RFOs, she sought $46,317 in fees. And although
there is no evidence she requested or opposed a restraining order after
March 2021, Monica sought an amount no less than $50,000 in fees in
her February 8, 2022 trial brief. Then, during the hearing on February
9, 2022, Monica testified she spent “in excess of $50,000. I don’t have
the exact number in front of me.”
13On page 51 of her opening brief, Monica cites to a single page in her
declaration, found at page 1,420 of the appendix, to support her
contention that she submitted detailed billing records from her

                                   21
Monica does not advance any argument regarding the respective
incomes and needs of the parties, or factors affecting the parties’
respective abilities to pay attorney’s fees, as required under
former subdivision (b) of section 6344.
      In sum, the record supports the court’s finding that Monica
did not prove “the fees that were reasonable and necessary for
her domestic violence claim.” Accordingly, she has not met her
burden to establish that the court abused its discretion in
denying her fee request under section 6344.
      2.3.   Sanctions under section 271
       Finally, we turn to Monica’s request for sanctions under
section 271. “Section 271 authorizes a fees and costs award as a
penalty for obstreperous conduct.” (Robert J. v. Catherine D.
(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1520.) “ ‘The imposition of sanctions
under section 271 is committed to the sound discretion of the trial
court. The trial court’s order will be upheld on appeal unless the
reviewing court, “considering all of the evidence viewed most
favorably in its support and indulging all reasonable inferences
in its favor, no judge could reasonably make the order.”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Sagonowsky v. Kekoa (2016) 6
Cal.App.5th 1142, 1152.)
       Monica contends the court abused its discretion in not
awarding fees as a sanction under section 271 because David
delayed the sale or division of the community property camera

attorneys. The cited record only states that Monica paid the children’s
lawyer $4,000 allegedly owed by David as of an unknown date. She
does not state that David was ordered to reimburse her for the
payment.

                                  22
lenses and the engagement of QDRO counsel. For the most part,
Monica simply ignores the evidence and findings against her. For
example, in November 2021 the court took the hearing for her
March 2021 RFOs off calendar under the disentitlement doctrine.
The court explained that Monica had not complied with a prior
order which required her to pay David for child support overpaid
by him. Thus, Monica, not David, was responsible for the three-
month delay in the adjudication of her claims. And although the
court found David was responsible for the delay in dividing the
camera lenses, the court implicitly found Monica was not
prejudiced by the delay and awarded her “nothing for
reimbursement involving the lenses.” As for the delay in
engaging QDRO counsel, the court found both parties were to
blame for delaying resolution of the QDRO issue.
      In short, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Monica’s request for sanctions.

                               23
                        DISPOSITION

     The order is affirmed. David Perkal shall recover his costs
on appeal.

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                          LAVIN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

     EGERTON, J.

     ADAMS, J.

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