Court Opinion

ID: 9793253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:45:03.361932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:10.192845
License: Public Domain

CORCORAN, Justice,
specially concurring.
I
This disciplinary case raises a peripheral question: can an inadequate defense be the “best” defense by an attorney?
Objectively, the client-defendant benefited by respondent’s inadequate and incompetent representation. Under the first plea agreement presented to the client by a previous attorney, there was a maximum sentence of 7 years. The client rejected that offer. As a result of going to trial while represented by respondent, the client-defendant received a 12-year sentence. After the trial court determined that client-defendant was convicted because of inadequate representation by respondent, the client through a successor deputy public defender, got a second plea agreement which provided for a one-year jail sentence.
Respondent says that his representation of client-defendant involved a “deliberate trial strategy.” Although the record indicates to us that respondent did not “intentionally” seek to injure the client-defendant, one may reasonably ask whether respondent sought to “intentionally” benefit the client-defendant. Although the record presents this question, the record does not answer it.
Since the client-defendant had rejected the first plea agreement, respondent’s inadequate representation created a no-lose situation for the client-defendant. If his “deliberate trial strategy” proved successful, the client-defendant would be found not guilty; if the client-defendant was found guilty (as she was), she would be no worse off and might be better off (as she was). An attorney who intentionally seeks to bring about such a result should be the subject of special condemnation.
The facts of this case would require that the trial judge report respondent’s misconduct to the State Bar. Canon 3(B)(3), Ari*60zona Code of Judicial Conduct. The prosecutor had the same obligation. Ethical Rule 8.3(a), Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct.
II
I disagree with the Chief Justice that this court (and the commission) should consider as a mitigating circumstance respondent’s “cooperation” with the deputy public defender who succeeded him in representing client-defendant at 59 n. 12, 847 P.2d at 104 n. 12. The deputy public defender indicates that respondent “was very cooperative.” Respondent could not not cooperate; he did no more than admit that which was undeniable. It should also be kept in mind that they both represented the same client-defendant.
I cannot consider this “cooperation” as mitigating; at most, I can only consider it to be neutral.