Court Opinion

ID: 9707617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:16:45.022584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:35.800773
License: Public Domain

DEL SOLE, Judge,
dissenting.
Today, the Majority concludes as a matter of law that a child who witnesses the death of a cousin does not suffer emotional distress.1 Because I cannot agree no emotional harm would be suffered, I must dissent.
*279Appellants brought a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress on behalf of their child. They claimed that the harm was occasioned when the boy witnessed his cousin drown on Appellee’s property, as a result of Appellee’s negligence. Appellee filed preliminary objections, contending that the nature of the relationship between the boys was not sufficient to support the cause of action. The trial court granted a demurrer and dismissed the claim, holding that, as a matter of law, the relationship of cousin is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements for a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress.
In Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979) our Supreme Court rejected the prior “zone of danger” concept and adopted one based on foreseeability, making clear that a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress must be addressed in terms of foreseeability. “Foreseeability enters into the determination of liability in determining whether the emotional injuries sustained by the plaintiff were reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.” 486 Pa. at 170, 404 A.2d at 684. The court discussed with approval three factors the California Supreme Court identified in Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968) as necessary to determine whether the plaintiffs injury was reasonably foreseeable, only one of which concerns us:2 (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship. Id., 404 A.2d at 685. The Court concluded that an evaluation of these factors will determine foreseeability. For instance, it is obvious that a defendant is more likely to foresee emotional harm to a parent who observes an *280accident to a child, than to a stranger who witnesses the same incident.
Given this test of foreseeability, I cannot say that cousins do not enjoy a sufficient familial relationship that precludes recovery. This relationship initially satisfies one factor of the test to the degree that the issue should proceed, and not be determined as a matter of law.
Appellants should be afforded the opportunity to present the case to a jury, which vail ultimately determine what injuries, if any, where inflicted; whether the harm to this plaintiff was foreseeable; and whether the personal relationship of these cousins was sufficient to support the claimed emotional distress. Jurors are capable of deciding if the harm claimed is legitimately supported by the event surrounding the accident, and the relationship between the plaintiff and victim.
Since the Majority refuses to allow the issue to proceed, I dissent.

. My characterization of the majority's decision is based on its result— no possibility of compensation. In footnote one, the majority concedes that the plaintiff “undoubtedly suffered] emotional distress.” The majority poses the question as "whether the law should allow for a *279recovery in money terms for that distress.” The majority answers no. I ask, why not?

. The other two factors are (1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it; (2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence. We will not discuss these factors because Appellee raised only the relationship issue.