Court Opinion

ID: 9741014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:47:34.068293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:21.644551
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
concurring in result and dissenting.
Among the trial court's written findings of fact on the imposition of the death penalty, are the following two:
"I find that the Defendant Donald Ray Wallace, Jr.'s conduct and behavior following the commission of the offenses indicated his intent to conceal his act, that his conduct surrounding the cireum-stances of this case showed a total disregard for human life, and that the imposition of anything less than the death penalty would depreciate the seriousness of the offense."
"8. The Court finds that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that two aggravating cireumstances exist that warrant the imposition of the death penalty:
A. That the Defendant, Donald Ray Wallace, Jr., murdered Patrick Gilligan, Theresa Gilligan, Lisa Gilligan and Gregory Gilligan, while committing the crime of Burglary on the 14th day of January, 1980, in Vanderburgh County, State of Indiana. (I.C. 35-50-2-9(b)(1).
B. That the Defendant, Donald Ray Wallace, Jr., murdered Patrick Gilligan, ..." {emphasis added)
The sentencing court has departed in these findings from the death penalty statutes in two respects. In the first, the court has utilized a factor applicable only in non-death sentencing as an aggravating cireum-stance. 1.0. 85-88-1-7(b)(4) governing non-death sentences provides:
(b) The court may consider the following factors as aggravating circumstances or as favoring imposing consecutive terms of imprisonment:
* * * * * *
(4) Imposition of a reduced sentence or suspension of the sentence and imposition of probation would depreciate the seriousness of the crime."
To the extent that the judge's death decision rests upon this criterion as an aggravating circumstance, it is erroneous. The death sentence statutes does not incorporate this criterion as an aggravating circumstance. This court has said, and I agree, that the death sentence statute ".. gives clear and specific guidance to the sentencing authority and adequately protects each individual's constitutional rights". Williams v. State (1982), Ind., 430 N.E.2d 759, Davis v. State (1985), Ind., 477 N.E.2d 889 (separate opinion of DeBru-ler, J. concurring and dissenting, Smith v. State (1985), Ind., 475 N.E.2d 1139 (separate opinion of DeBruler, J. concurring and dissenting). By the same token a departure from the guidance of the statute undermines that protection against an arbitrary decision that the defendant deserves death rather than imprisonment.
The second departure is in the court's critical finding of the aggravating cireum-*465stance alleged on the basis of I.C. 85-50-2-9(b)(1). That statutory aggravating circumstances is as follows:
"(1) The defendant committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim while committing or attempting to commit.... burglary ..."
As trial prosecutor Leveo accurately argued during his statement to the jury in the death penalty phase of the trial, the jury's attention under this alleged circumstance, in the aftermath of the verdicts of guilty of felony murder pursuant to I.C. 35-42-1-1(2), must focus upon whether the killings were intentional. There is no finding by the sentencing court in its written findings set forth above, that appellant intentionally killed the victim, rather the court finds that the appellant "murdered" them, the term murder encompassing both a knowing and intentional killing. While the evidence supports a finding of intentional killings, that finding is for the sentencing judge to make and accurately record, and is not for this court in reviewing the sentence. I would therefore remand for further proceedings to conform to the death statute.
There is a nagging doubt, arising from this court's frequent confrontation in reviewing death sentences with the finding of absolutely no mitigating circumstances, that the mitigating circumstance search required by the death statute is either being misunderstood, misapplied, or not reflected in sentencing court findings. In my opinion it needs to be reiterated and emphasized for the guidance of judges and lawyers that a finding of the existence of a mitigating cireumstance does not preclude a positive death decision. Second, to regard the aggravating circumstance or circumstances as so horrendous as to withstand all and any conceivable mitigating cireumstances, without identifying appropriate mitigating circumstances on the record, clearly "creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty." Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978). I would therefore add to the remand in this case, the requirement that the trial court make a special finding dealing with appellant's long history from childhood of special mental health care, the court's own previous finding that he was not competent to stand trial, and the fact that appellant was being administered drugs during the trial. It is difficult to accept the proposition that such history should have no weight whatever in making the death decision.
PRENTICE, J., concurs.