Court Opinion

ID: 9699659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:44:17.872144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:55.223657
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
KLEIN, J.:
¶ 1 I respectfully dissent. A preliminary hearing should be held within ten days of the arraignment under Pa. R.Crim.P. 540(F)(1). After the first listing on May 22, 2003, the preliminary hearing in this case was repeatedly continued until March 24, 2004, a period not of ten days, but of 329 days. The Commonwealth claims there was nothing it could do about this, blaming the delay on the trial court calendar. Yet, this scheduling problem would not have exceeded the run date had *1105the Commonwealth not already continued the case twice before. The Commonwealth requested the continuances due to a missing witness, but later permitted the hearing, as well as the trial, to go forward, without that same witness. These unnecessary delays show a lack of due diligence on the part of the Commonwealth, ultimately denying Ramos his right to a speedy trial.
¶ 2 One is reminded of the quote from Attorney Brendan V. Sullivan in the 1987 Oliver North hearings, when, after he was criticized for making an objection, Sullivan responded, “I’m not a potted plant. I’m here as a lawyer. That’s my job.”
¶ 8 I believe the only way to sustain the Commonwealth’s argument is for the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office to take the position that it is only a “potted plant,” and has no responsibility to do anything when there are untoward continuances. The charge here was that Ramos drove away in his car after a police officer stopped him, hitting the officer’s bicycle and bruising the officer, causing him to miss a week of work. The initial stop came after a woman signaled the officer to pull Ramos over. This woman is the civilian witness who did not show up at the preliminary hearings, which is why the Commonwealth requested the continuances. In fact, she never showed up and ultimately the preliminary hearing and trial proceeded without her.
¶ 4 Moreover, when an arraignment was finally held on April 14, 2004, the Commonwealth acquiesced to a trial date almost a month beyond what was universally believed to be the adjusted run date. I cannot see how this equates to due diligence. Accordingly, I must dissent.
¶ 5 I certainly am aware that in the real world of the Philadelphia courts a preliminary hearing cannot be held in every case within ten days. But I am also aware that in the real world of the Philadelphia courts, the District Attorney has many options other than remaining silent when preliminary hearings get continued for months at a time, causing the trial to be ultimately listed beyond the run date. The District Attorney can point out to the judge that there have been multiple listings of the preliminary hearing and this case needs an expedited date, or at least not a date thirty times longer than what the rule requires. The District Attorney could have done much earlier what was ultimately done, allowing the case to proceed without the “missing” civilian witness.
¶ 6 The Commonwealth’s repeated requests for a continuance due to the essential nature of the absent witness starkly contrasts with the Commonwealth’s eventual acceptance at the preliminary hearing that this witness was no longer necessary. On appeal, the Commonwealth ignores the preliminary hearing delays, focusing instead on the arraignment that finally occurred on April 14, 2004. According to the Commonwealth, it acted with due diligence because it was prepared for trial at this point. The Commonwealth argues that, under Commonwealth v. Mines, due diligence must be evaluated according to the last listing before the run date. 797 A.2d 963, 965 (Pa.Super.2002). But a more recent decision, Commonwealth v. Kearse, distinguishes Mines and explains that the Mines holding was tailored to its facts, where the only disputed listings in the case were the last two prior to the run date. 890 A.2d 388 (Pa.Super.2005). This Court in Kearse clarified that:
[I]t appears that the notion that the Commonwealth had to prove that it acted with due diligence at the last listing before the run date and thereafter has been overruled by our Supreme Court in Hawk, supra where the Court, in examining a challenge to the trial court’s *1106grant of an extension of time pursuant to 1100(c) stated, “we find that the Commonwealth should be held to the requirement that it exercise due diligence at all times during the pendency of a case.” Hawk, 597 A.2d at 1145. To hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of Rule 600, allowing the Commonwealth to carelessly linger in the early stages of a case while providing a defendant with no recourse to effectuate his state and federal constitutional right to a speedy trial and the procedural mandates of Rule 600.
Kearse, 890 A.2d at 393.
¶ 7 While it is true that due diligence “does not require the Commonwealth to exercise every conceivable effort,” the Commonwealth failed to show even a minimal effort in bringing Ramos to trial in a timely manner. Commonwealth v. Wentzel, 434 Pa.Super. 76, 641 A.2d 1207, 1209 (1994). The Commonwealth did not present any evidence as to what efforts had been made to locate the missing witness. Repeated oversights in locating a witness, with only a bare assertion that the witness was unavailable, have been sufficient to find that the Commonwealth lacked due diligence. See Commonwealth v. Tyler, 382 Pa.Super. 384, 555 A.2d 232, (1989) (unanswered phone calls and subpoenas returned unserved do not constitute due diligence in obtaining a witness).13
¶ 8 The inconsistency of the Commonwealth’s requests raises doubt about its motives: if the witness was so essential to the preliminary hearing that the hearing had to be delayed twice, why did the Commonwealth suddenly allow the hearing, not to mention the trial, to proceed without that same witness? And if the Commonwealth ultimately allowed the case to proceed without the witness to prevent any further delays, why didn’t the District Attorney speak up and request a trial date before the run date? At the arraignment, if the District Attorney had looked at the adjusted run date, he or she could have asked for a trial date before the rule ran. Instead, the District Attorney remained silent, causing the trial to take place after the run date and in violation of Ramos’ right to a speedy trial.
¶ 9 For many years the only automatically “excludable” delay to adjust the run date has been delay caused by the defendant or his or her counsel. Court delay or continuances for the failure of a witness to appear have not been chargeable to the defendant, and have not been considered excludable time. The “due diligence” test only applies when at the time of a scheduled trial within the run date the Commonwealth is unable to proceed. In such cases, the prior delays were not held to be excludable and did extend the rule — “extendable time.”
¶ 10 The majority believes that “extendable time,” the 82 days between May 22 and August 12, 2003, carries the run date past the trial date, effectively making moot any argument regarding due diligence. The 82 days in question represents time between the status date of May 22 and the listing of the case for preliminary hearing as a “protracted case.”14 Although there *1107is no case law addressing whether such a delay is properly considered to be “extendable time,” the majority accepts, without comment or analysis, the contention that the “complexity of the case and the clogged trial docket” were circumstances beyond the Commonwealth’s control and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the 82 day period to be excusable pursuant to Rule 600(G).
¶ 11 The two problems with this are: 1) the record contains no evidence that the trial court docket was “clogged” to the point that a three month delay was required to list this case for a preliminary hearing; and 2) there is no proof that the case was in any way “complex” or required a “protracted” classification.
¶ 12 With regard to the first contention, there would appear to be something seriously wrong with the system in Philadelphia if, routinely, preliminary hearings were not scheduled for over three months when the rules call for the hearings to be scheduled within 10 days of arraignment. If the trial court is correct, then certain preliminary hearings are systematically scheduled at a period of time nine times longer than the rules suggest. I am unconvinced that such a routine delay should be countenanced by our Court, without comment or analysis, to the possible detriment of a defendant’s constitutional rights.
¶ 13 Perhaps more importantly, there is absolutely no showing that this case was in any way a complex or protracted matter. In point of fact, the trial transcript in this case is comprised of 43 pages (from page 32 to page 75). A general rule of thumb is that a page of testimony represents a minute of time. This matter took less than one hour to try. Yet the trial court determined and the majority accepts the notion that this represents a complex, protracted matter. I cannot accept the notion that a 45 minute trial, basically a simple car accident, represents a complex criminal trial issue. Further, there is nothing in the record to indicate that this matter was ever believed to be anything other than what it turned out to be, a simple and straightforward case.
¶ 14 In ruling on the 82 day delay the trial court made no finding as to what actually occurred. The trial judge stated:
No, I’m not finding that it’s excludable, I’m not finding that it’s anything. It’s just non-time, it’s just time that passed.
N.T. Motion to Dismiss, 7/7/04 at 28.
¶ 15 The court also stated:
I don’t have enough information, I can only go by what I have. If there was a defense objection, you can be sure you would have slam dunked this. If there was a Commonwealth objection, you would be sure you would have had the time excludable. Because there’s nothing, I can’t make a determination. There’s no fact for me to make it so I’m quashing. That’s the best I can do and I’m sorry I can’t be more articulate. But I don’t have anything else to say.
Id. at 29.
¶ 16 The trial court admitted, in no uncertain terms, that it had no clear idea of what happened on May 22, 2003. It stated that it had no proof, one way or another, of who asked for the “protracted” classification and whether anyone objected to that classification and resulting delay. The lack of evidence supporting the contention that the 82 day delay was the unavoidable result of court scheduling and the complex *1108nature of the case, leads back to an examination of due diligence.
¶ 17 I note that until the second day of the hearing on the motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 600,15 the Commonwealth was operating under the belief that the 82 days in question were not extendable. A Rule 600 Tally Sheet was entered into evidence16 that indicates only 16 days of time and no extendable time. The notes of testimony indicate that until July 7, 2004, the Commonwealth agreed that there were only 16 days at issue.
Mr. Hochberg (Defense Counsel): Judge, I think they already agreed that they’re 49 days over. Your honor found that they were not duly diligent. The issue, Your Honor, is that, well, Mr. Sabatina argued about prejudice, that’s not part of the rule and he was going to do some research.
The Court: Okay.
Mr. Sabatina (Prosecutor): Your Honor, that is partially correct. It is correct as of yesterday. My position has changed, Your Honor.
N.T. Motion to Dismiss, 7/7/04 at 5.17
¶ 18 From this, it is clear that until the day of trial, the Commonwealth was operating under the belief that the 82 days now in question were neither excludable nor extendable. Not until its back was against the wall on the second day of the hearing did the Commonwealth think of arguing that this particular 82 days of time was available to extend the run date. Whether the Commonwealth was correct in this belief is immaterial in analyzing whether the Commonwealth exercised due diligence. Throughout the process — when the Commonwealth did not believe it was entitled to extra time, where the Commonwealth repeatedly asked for continuances to produce a witness it patently did not need, and up to the point that the trial was scheduled past the run date — the Commonwealth remained silent about the speedy trial problem. In essence, the Commonwealth remained a potted plant. This cannot equate to due diligence.
¶ 19 Given that it is the Commonwealth’s burden to show it exercised due diligence and that the trial date is the earliest date available, Commonwealth v. Lafty, 333 Pa.Super. 428, 482 A.2d 643 (1984), and because there is no requirement that a defendant object to such a delay, Commonwealth v. Hunt, 858 A.2d 1234 (Pa.Super.2004), I cannot see how the trial court concluded that the Commonwealth met its burden. Similarly, I cannot agree with the majority that the delay was proper. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

. I realize that the charges in Tyler were not dismissed, due to the unique nature of the case: the delay was only one month past the run date (with the other 120 days requested by defendant) and the defendant was not prejudiced by the delay (he was actually trying to capitalize on it).

. There is some confusion over what transpired on May 22, 2003. The Commonwealth claims that date was only a status date; the defense claims the continuance was due to the Commonwealth’s failure to bring in witnesses. The record indicates that both are at least partially true. The official record indicates that the case was classified as protract*1107ed on 5/22 and that the Commonwealth failed to bring in witnesses. Contrary to the Majority’s contention, the trial court did not find that Ramos did not object to this classification. Rather, the trial court made no findings at all.

. The second day of the hearing on the motion is also the trial date.

. It is unclear how the document came to be in the official record. It appears that the Tally Sheet was filled in by the defense, but references to the origin of the document in the notes of testimony are oblique.

.On pages 7 and 11 of the notes, defense counsel makes additional references to the fact that the Commonwealth had previously agreed that the 82 days were not extendable.