Court Opinion

ID: 9615361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:35:36.642087+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:47.218120
License: Public Domain

Hines, Justice,
concurring.
I agree that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must be reversed because the Board was entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law on the third-party claim and the fourth-party claim against it. I too fail to discern any authority under Georgia law or under the circumstances of this case for preservation of the claims under the crafted theory of “identical reciprocal implied contractual indemnification.” But I write separately to address significant questions raised by the flawed analysis of the Court of Appeals, and which were posed for resolution by this Court in granting certiorari.
1. The third-party action brought by Joyner against Dr. Michaels and SHS was plainly pled as one for medical malpractice by virtue of the direct negligence of Dr. Michaels and the imputed negligence of SHS. The pleading was styled as a “Third-Party Complaint for Medical Malpractice,” alleging that Dr. Michaels failed to exercise that degree of skill and care ordinarily exercised by a psychiatrist generally under like conditions and similar circumstances in providing care for Fields, and that Dr. Michaels’s negligence in caring for Fields deprived Fields of treatment that would have reduced her violent behavior, the failure causing Fields to inflict pain and suffering on Rowell and to stab her to death; the action further alleged that SHS was liable to Fields for the negligence of Dr. Michaels under the theory of respondeat superior. Appended to the action was a physician’s affidavit pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-9.1, which requires an expert affi*809davit to accompany an action for damages alleging professional malpractice.
Even though the pleadings contain the cursory statement that Dr. Michaels is liable to Fields for the claims against Fields and the incurred litigation fees, there is no stated basis for the liability other than Dr. Michaels’s direct professional negligence. What is more, the third-party claim demands judgment against SHS and Dr. Michaels, not for part or all of the amount of any judgment secured by the plaintiffs against Fields, but instead in an open-ended amount in excess of $10,000.
It has been firmly established that [OCGA § 9-11-14 (a)] authorizes a defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, to file a claim against a third-party defendant for secondary liability on the plaintiff’s claim, i.e., a claim for liability over, but not a direct claim for damages. ..." ‘The absolute requirement of every third-party proceeding is that its purpose must be to impose upon the third-party defendant a liability for part or all of the liability asserted by the original plaintiff against the third-party plaintiff. A third-party action may be maintained only against one who is secondarily liable to the original defendant for part or all of the original plaintiff’s claim. When a recovery by the plaintiff against the defendant would necessarily be followed by recovery for the defendant against the third-party defendant, then a third-party action is proper.’ ... ‘it is not a device for bringing into an action any controversy which may happen to have some relationship with it.’ ”
Cohen v. McLaughlin, 250 Ga. 661, 662 (1) (301 SE2d 37) (1983). Typically, a third-party defendant may be involved in cases of indemnity, subrogation, contribution, warranty, and the like. Lamb v. K. M. Insurance Co., 208 Ga. App. 746, 747 (431 SE2d 744) (1993); Quality Ford Sales v. Greene, 201 Ga. App. 206, 207 (410 SE2d 389) (1991). Plaintiffs are alleging Fields’s liability for Rowell’s pain, suffering, and death as the result of Fields’s unprovoked attack on Rowell; Joyner on behalf of Fields is alleging the liability of Dr. Michaels and SHS for the negligent medical treatment of Fields. It certainly cannot be said that if there was a recovery by the plaintiffs against the assailant Fields, it would “necessarily follow” that Fields recover against Dr. Michaels and SHS for professional negligence in caring for her. Instead, this is a situation in which the third parties are being tendered as substitute defendants.8 Cohen v. McLaughlin, *810supra at 662 (1).
The claims for medical malpractice against Dr. Michaels and SHS were unauthorized as a third-party action in this suit. Consequently, their resulting fourth-party complaint against the Board, which is contingent upon their liability as third-party defendants, was not viable. Cohen v. McLaughlin, supra; Lamb v. K. M. Insurance Co., supra; Quality Ford Sales v. Greene, supra.
2. The premise of Joyner’s third-party claim against the Board for breach of contradt is that Fields was a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the Board and the hospital. Fields’s lack of standing bears comment.
It is without dispute that
“[i]n order for a third party to have standing to enforce a contract... it must appear clearly from the contract that it was intended for [the benefit of the third party]. The mere fact that [the third party] would benefit from performance of the agreement is not alone sufficient."’ [Cit.]; OCGA § 9-2-20 (b). “Unless such an intention is shown on the face of the contract, defendant is under no duty [to the third party] and consequently plaintiff acquires no right as the [third-party] beneficiary.” [Cit.]
Scott v. Mamari Corp., 242 Ga. App. 455, 457 (1) (530 SE2d 208) (2000). Accord Vaughn, Coltrane & Assoc. v. Van Horn Constr., 254 Ga. App. 693, 694 (563 SE2d 548) (2002); Anderson v. Houser, 240 Ga. App. 613, 619 (1) (523 SE2d 342) (1999).
Even though the contract between the Board and the hospital was for the provision of crisis stabilization services for the Board’s “consumers,” like Fields, the contract was primarily intended for the benefit of the Board, that is, to secure an entity to furnish emergency mental health services, and for the benefit of the hospital, that is, monetary profit. The fact that the “consumer” might gain from the agreement is not sufficient, without more, to confer on the “consumer” the status of a third-party beneficiary of the contract.
In the recent case of Youngblood v. Gwinnett Rockdale Newton Community Service Board, 273 Ga. 715 (545 SE2d 875) (2001), the mother placed her mentally disabled daughter in a residential home sponsored by the Gwinnett Rockdale Newton Community Service Board (GRNCSB). The GRNCSB entered into a contract with a *811couple to care for the daughter. It was later revealed that the daughter had been beaten by the couple, who subsequently were convicted of battery and simple battery, and she was removed from their home. The mother, as guardian of the daughter’s property, filed suit against the GRNCSB alleging breach of contract and negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment to the GRNCSB. This Court found no evidence of a written contract between the GRNCSB and the daughter covering the date on which she received her injuries; therefore, the GRNCSB was entitled to summary judgment on the breach of contract claims to the extent that such claims sought to enforce agreements to which the daughter was a party. However, there was the further contention that the daughter was the intended third-party beneficiary of the written contracts between the GRNCSB and the wrongdoing caregiver, and therefore, the daughter could maintain an action against the GRNCSB as if she were a party to the contract. In allowing a remand to the trial court for consideration of the third-party beneficiary claim, this Court made it plain that this was warranted only because there were at least two written agreements between the GRNCSB and the caregiver identifying the daughter as the resident for whom personal support and residential services would be provided during the relevant period of time.9 Id. at 717 (4). In this case, there is no evidence of any written agreement between the hospital or SHS and the Board specifically identifying Fields as the consumer for whom mental health services would be provided during the time in question.10 Accordingly, Joyner, on behalf of Fields, could not maintain a claim against the Board for breach of contract.
Decided November 25, 2002.
Whelchel, Brown, Readdick & Bumgartner, Terry L. Reddick, Richard K. Strickland, for appellant.

Hall, Booth, Smith & Slover, Michael G. Frick, Norman D. Lovein, Weinberg, Wheeler, Hudgins, Gunn & Dial, Johnathan T. Krawcheck, Gibson & Spivey, Douglas L. Gibson, Cottingham &

*812Porter, Robert L. Porter, Jr., Dillard & Crowley, Terry A. Dillard, John R. Thigpen, Sr, W. Grady Pedrick, for appellees.

 This does not mean however that the plaintiffs are precluded from pursuing claims of *810negligence against Dr. Michaels and SHS in the professional care of Fields. See Bradley Center v. Wessner, 250 Ga. 199 (296 SE2d 693) (1982). But they have not done so in the present action. In fact, it has been represented in brief that plaintiffs have now filed a separate lawsuit against Dr. Michaels and SHS for the wrongful death of Rowell.

 This Court made no ruling regarding the daughter’s status as a third-party beneficiary; that matter was left for determination by the trial court.

 The voluminous record is replete with documentation of Fields’s physical and psychiatric history, conditions, and treatments, and some of these documents were prepared either by the hospital or the Board; however, there is no showing of any document which would confer upon Fields the status of third-party beneficiary of the contract at issue.