Court Opinion

ID: 9719528
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:55:20.594883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:16.389227
License: Public Domain

DUFRESNE,
Active Retired Justice1 (concurring in result only respecting the State’s appeal; concurring fully in connection with the defendant’s appeal).
I agree entirely with the reasoning of the majority insofar as they deny the defendant’s appeal and affirm the Superior Court’s order of March 14, 1979 disallowing the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained in a warrantless search of the defendant’s home.
In connection with the State’s appeal, I agree with the result reached by the majority in that the State’s appeal must be sustained and the Superior Court’s order of March 14,1979 suppressing certain evidence of the defendant’s financial affairs and transactions (information and records allegedly obtained in violation of law) must be vacated. With the greatest respect for my colleagues’ opinion, I cannot, however, subscribe to the basis upon which they rest their conclusion.
The decision of the Superior Court Justice which we are now upsetting reads as follows:
“In the instant case, the State has failed to present evidence to the court at the hearing on this motion to suppress to prove that it secured Defendant’s bank records through the use of legal process. *71See 9-B M.R.S.A. §§ 161 — 164. Since the State has failed to establish that it used legal process to obtain Defendant’s financial records, evidence relating to those records must be suppressed.” (Emphasis in original)
The rationale underlying the majority’s decision, with which I respectfully disagree, may be gleaned from the following excerpt:
“Since Mrs. Fredette had , no expectation of privacy in her bank records that was constitutionally protected, their revelation to police agencies, whether by subpoena or otherwise, cannot be suppressed. Thus, the presence, or absence, in the record of the hearing below of legal process, defective or otherwise, becomes an improper basis for the suppression of those records.”
Rule 41(b), M.R.Crim.P. authorizes the issuance of a search warrant for the purpose of searching for and seizing “any property . . (4) Consisting of non-testimonial evidence which will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction,” the warrant to issue only “[i]f the judge or complaint justice is satisfied that grounds for the application exist or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist.” The rule (Rule 41(e)) further provides that
“[a] person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the Superi- or Court in the county in which the property was seized for the return of the property and to suppress for use as evidence anything so obtained on the ground that:
(1) The property was illegally seized without warrant, or ... .” (Emphasis supplied)
As an initial observation, let me say that Rule 41 nowhere limits its application to the suppression of evidence which is illegal, because it was obtained in violation of a constitutional proscription such as, for example, evidence procured contrary to Fourth-Fourteenth Amendment rights, as distinguished from evidence which is illegal, because it was secured in violation of statutory law. Also, Rule 41 carries no statement of intent that it was formulated for the sole purpose of deterring enforcement authorities from violating constitutional or statutory law, as distinguished from the purview of providing direct implementation of constitutional or statutory mandates. In other words, the deterrence rationale of the so-called exclusionary rule was not integrated in our rule 41, either expressly or impliedly, as the sole reason for its existence.
I do recognize that the rule itself (Rule 41(b)) uses the word “may”, when it states that “[a] warrant may be issued under this rule to search for and seize . . . property . . . [consisting of non-testimonial evidence which will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction,” and that, when used in a statute or rule,2 the word “may” is ordinarily interpreted as permissive, discretionary, and not mandatory. But this Court, in Collins v. State, 161 Me. 445, 213 A.2d 835 (1965), quoted with approval the following passage from Low v. Dunham, 61 Me. 566, 569 (1872), wherein the Court stated that sometimes legal principles require that the word “may” be given the sense of “shall” or “must:”
“The word ‘may’ in a statute is to be construed ‘must’ or ‘shall,’ where the public interest or rights are concerned, and the public or third persons have a claim de jure that the power shall be exercised.” (Emphasis in original)
The Legislature’s grant of the right of privacy to bank depositors’ financial records created valuable rights in a substantial portion of the public generally, the protection of these rights mandating that the power to issue warrants of search and seizure in connection with bank deposits or other depositor financial records be exercised, and this upon the conditions stated in 9-B M.R.S.A., § 163. Undoubtedly, the word “may” was used to allow for well recognized excep*72tions, such as when consent is given, or exigent circumstances may exist, or, as in this case, where the Confidential Financial Records Act under specific circumstances expressly dispenses with the service of the warrant upon the fiduciary institution’s customer.
In 1977 the Legislature amended Title 9-B regulating the fiduciary institutions of the State and established for the first time the privilege of confidentiality respecting all financial records therein, except in specially exempted situations. P.L.1977, c. 416. (9-B M.R.S.A., §§ 161-164).
Chapter 16 of Title 9-B provides in pertinent part as follows:

Confidential Financial Records

§ 162. Disclosure of financial records prohibited; exceptions
A fiduciary institution may not disclose to any person, except to the customer or his duly authorized agent, any financial records relating to that customer of that fiduciary institution unless:
1. Authorized disclosure. The customer has authorized disclosure to the person; or
2. Disclosure in response to legal process. The financial records are disclosed in- response to a lawful subpoena, summons, warrant or court order which meets the requirements of section 163. § 163. Subpoena, summons, warrant or court order
1. Service. A fiduciary institution shall disclose financial records under section 162 pursuant to a subpoena, summons, warrant or court order which on its face appears to have been issued upon lawful authority only if the subpoena, summons, warrant or court order is first served upon the customer and then upon the fiduciary institution. The court for good cause shown may delay or dispense with service of the subpoena, summons, warrant or court order upon the customer. The court shall delay or dispense with service of the subpoena, summons, warrant or court order upon the customer upon notice by the Attorney General or b-'s designee that such service upon the customer would not be in the public interest.
§ 164. Penalties
1. Violation. Any officer or employee of a fiduciary institution or consumer reporting agency who intentionally or knowingly furnishes financial- records in violation of this chapter commits a. civil violation and shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $1,000.
2. Inducing violation. Any person who intentionally or knowingly induces or attempts to induce any officer or employee of a fiduciary institution or consumer reporting agency to disclose financial records in violation of this subtitle commits a civil violation and shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $1,000.
As stated previously, my colleagues now rule that, even in the absence of proof of compliance with the reference statute and notwithstanding a possible and perhaps probable violation thereof, the use in evidence of Mrs. Fredette’s confidential financial records cannot be suppressed for the reason that Mrs. Fredette had no expectation of privacy in her bank records that was constitutionally protected.
State v. Schoppe, 113 Me. 10, 92 A. 867 (1915) is the case which prior to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), purportedly reiterated the rule followed in Maine and in the majority of jurisdictions to the effect that a person could be proven guilty of crime upon evidence obtained illegally. In Schoppe, the Court stated:
“The defendant is none the less guilty, however the government may obtain possession of his person. If a complaint is made against one for larceny, and a search warrant is granted, and the stolen goods found, the thief is not to be discharged when his guilt is fully established, because the officer in serving the warrant may have exceeded his authority, or the complainant may not have had sufficient reasons for the belief upon which his complaint was based [lack of probable cause for search].” (Emphasis provided)
*73Mapp v. Ohio, supra, did compel this Court to abandon the Schoppe rule, so-called, which stands for the principle that the fruits of an illegal search, if they establish guilt, are justifiably admissible in evidence at trial, even though such evidence was obtained illegally.
Our Court has ruled in State v. Fletcher, Me., 288 A.2d 92, 98 (1972) that
“just as probable cause for an arrest cannot be justified upon facts learned after the arrest (State v. Hawkins, . [Me., 261 A.2d 255 (1970)]), neither can probable cause for the search be bolstered by evidence, discovered in the search.”
This was an outright and unconditional overruling of State v. Schoppe, supra, and an unequivocal repudiation of the doctrine that Schoppe stands for, i. e. that, even if a seizure is illegal, the illegally obtained evidence is admissible to prove guilt. As I stated in my dissenting opinion in State v. Caron, Me., 334 A.2d 495, at 507 (1975):
“To the extent that State v. Schoppe, supra, and the cases which the Schoppe Court purported to follow, express a contrary view respecting the reasonableness of searches and seizures within the meaning of Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution of Maine and concerning the applicability of the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained in violation of the State constitutional right of privacy, I would overrule them.”
The instant case differs from State v. Caron, supra, in that, here, we are dealing with illegally obtained evidence sought to be suppressed in a criminal prosecution, to wit, murder, pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A., § 201(1)(A). The record indicates that the evidence was obtained by an Assistant Attorney General for presentation to the Grand Jury in the investigation of the death of Frederick R. Fredette, the defendant’s husband. Even at that initial stage, the evidence of the defendant’s private holdings in the several relevant fiduciary (banking) institutions was sought to be used in a criminal prosecution. A grand jury is an integral part in the criminal process, and proceedings before it are definitely “criminal proceedings” within the meaning of those terms as stated in Rule 1, M.R. Crim.P.,3 and, thus, within the scope of Rule 41 of our rules of criminal procedure. See State v. Carroll, 83 Wash.2d 109, 515 P.2d 1299 (1973); Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir., 1971); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir., 1956); Ex parte January, 295 Mo. 653, 246 S.W. 241, 243 (1922). See also Gendron v. Burnham, 146 Me. 387, 82 A.2d 773, 38 A.L.R.2d 210 (1951). Cf. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974).
The Confidential Financial Records Act (9-B M.R.S.A., §§ 161-164) has established a limited right of privacy for the benefit of all depositors in financial institutions in the State of Maine. Under this law, depositors in Maine banking institutions have an expectation of privacy in their bank records, at least to the extent delimited by the statute. I agree readily that such right of privacy is not rooted in the constitution, but is derived wholly from statutory enactment. However, this Court should apply’the exclusionary rule, not only as a sanction against constitutional intrusions of privacy, but also in deference to legislative prohibitions. I believe that the supervisory powers of the Supreme Judicial Court over the administration of criminal justice in the courts of this State imply the duty of establishing and maintaining proper standards of procedure and evidence (see McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340, 63 S.Ct. 608, 613, 87 L.Ed. 819 (1943)); these have been provided in Rule 41 of our rules of criminal procedure. The Supreme Judicial Court has further carried out that duty by formulating Rule 501, M.R.Evid., which states in pertinent part:
“Except as otherwise provided by Constitution or statute or by these or other rules promulgated by the Supreme Judi*74cial Court of this state no person has a privilege to:
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(4) Prevent another being a witness or disclosing any matter or producing any object or writing.” (Emphasis added)
Hence, within the spirit of Rule 501, M.R. Evid., our Rule 41(e), M.R.Crim.P., which permits a person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure to move to suppress for use as evidence property illegally seized without a warrant, should be extended to vindicate the right of privacy created by 9-B M.R.S.A., §§ 161 — 164, if such remedial relief were within legislative intendment.
To apply the Schoppe concept in reaching their conclusion, the majority disregards “the imperial of judicial integrity” which requires that the judiciary not abet in any way the violation of statutory law. As quoted in State v. Hawkins, supra, from Mapp v. Ohio, supra: “Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws.”
In the instant case, however, there is no occasion to apply the exclusionary rule. In Ace Tire Co., Inc. v. Municipal Officers of Waterville, Me., 302 A.2d 90, at 95 (1973), we said that the manner of enforcement of a statute is fundamentally a legislative and not a judicial question. Our Legislature made the intentional or knowing violation of the Confidential Financial Records Act a civil violation for which the offender subjects himself to a civil penalty of not more than $1000. Notwithstanding that the penalties provided for the transgression of a depositor’s rights of privacy may be more or less illusory and offer little deterrence to prosecuting authorities who cannot be expected to prosecute themselves or the police, nevertheless the adequacy of the statutory remedy is solely for the Legislature to determine. Perry v. Dodge, 144 Me. 219, 67 A.2d 425 (1949); Inhabitants of Town of Beals v. Beal, 149 Me. 19, 98 A.2d 552 (1953).
The general rule is that where, as here, a statute creates a right and certain obligations thereunder which are unknown to the common law, the remedy provided therein for violation of the duties mandated by the statute is exclusive. Since the Legislature has subjected violators of the Confidential Financial Records Act to civil penalties, it is not proper for the courts to engraft additional sanctions, such as the exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of the statutory violation. Ward v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., Fla.App., 364 So.2d 73 (1978); Burland, Reiss, Murphy & Mosher v. Schmidt, 78 Mich.App. 670, 261 N.W.2d 540 (1978); Silverstein v. Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth, 38 Colo.App. 286, 559 P.2d 716 (1977); Hatfield v. Greco, 87 Wash.2d 780, 557 P.2d 340 (1976); National R. R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass’n of R. R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 94 S.Ct. 690, 38 L.Ed.2d 646 (1974). See also Irving Trust Co. v. Orvis, 139 Misc. 670, 248 N.Y.S. 771 (1931).
I agree that it was error for the Superior Court to suppress certain evidence of the defendant’s financial affairs and transactions and do join my colleagues in sustaining the State’s appeal, but on a basis different from that upon which they rest their conclusion.

. Sitting by assignment.

. For cases, where statutory rules of construction are stated to be applicable in interpreting our rules of criminal procedure, see Shorette v. State, Me., 402 A.2d 450, 460 (1979); Cote v. State, Me., 286 A.2d 868, 869 (1972); Tuttle v. State, 158 Me. 150, 180 A.2d 608, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 879, 83 S.Ct. 151, 9 L.Ed.2d 116 (1962).

. Rule 1, M.R.Crim.P. provides in pertinent part:
“These rules govern the procedure in the Superior Court in all criminal proceedings