Court Opinion

ID: 9684361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:54:40.010958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:55.250833
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The appellant in this case was convicted of aggravated perjury. V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 37.03. The offense involves no use or threatened use of force or violence. No evidence of violence or threats was introduced at trial.
Nonetheless, the prosecutor argued outside the record as follows:
“MR. SHUVAL [Prosecutor]: If you turn the Defendant loose he is going to go out and kill somebody.
“MR. FAIRWEATHER [Defense Counsel]: All right, Your Honor, at this time I renew my objection for a mistrial on the grounds that the statement is not supported by the record, it’s an attempt to prejudice the Jury and totally and — inflammatory.
“THE COURT: I will overrule your motion, Mr. Fairweather.
“MR. FAIRWEATHER: All right. Then, I also ask the Court to instruct the Jury to disregard the statement by the District Attorney as unsupported by the evidence.
“THE COURT: Well, I will ask the Jury to disregard the statement made by the District Attorney. You may proceed, Mr. Shuval.
“MR. FAIRWEATHER: Thank you, Your Honor.
“MR. SHUVAL: He was charged with driving while intoxicated in 1966 in Houston; in 1972 in Dumas and convicted, in 1972 in Castro County and convicted, and in 1974 in this County and convicted. That’s the thing.
Now, you know he has been convicted of car theft in 1949, you don’t know what else he has been convicted of or charged with in between and I am not allowed to introduce that into evidence.
“MR. FAIRWEATHER: Your Honor, at this time the defense moves for a mistrial on the grounds that the District Attorney has alluded to and suggested to incriminating facts or allegations that are not in the record supported by the evidence.
“MR. SHUVAL: This is a proper answer to the untaken argument of the defense attorney when he did not request a court reporter and he develed [sic] at length as to what convictions were admitted into evidence and that those are the only ones that we could consider and lead the Jury to believe that there were no others and I don’t know whether there are others are [sic] not, but that is good answer to his comment, that that is the only ones we can consider and that there may or may not be others.
“MR. FAIRWEATHER: Your Honor, I will renew my request for a mistrial.
“THE COURT: I will overrule your motion.
“MR. FAIRWEATHER: Note my exception.”
Of course, as a majority of this Court said in Hodge v. State, 488 S.W.2d 779, 781-782 (Tex.Cr.App.1973):
“The question . . . whether either of the statements of counsel necessitates a reversal of the judgment is to be resolved on the basis of the probable effect on the minds of the jurors and the facts of each case must be looked to.”
I agree with the majority that the argument of the prosecutor concerning inadmissible offenses outside the knowledge of the jury does not present reversible error. I cannot agree with the majority’s reasoning, however, that the argument was not improper. In Morgan v. State, 502 S.W.2d 695 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), this Court held that an *825almost identical argument was improper, but was nonetheless cured by an instruction to disregard. I would hold, under the facts of this case, that such an instruction would have cured the error, and the failure to request an instruction waived the error. See Steam v. State, 487 S.W.2d 734 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
However, I would reverse this conviction because of the prosecutor’s argument that the appellant would kill someone if the jury failed to convict him. This argument was totally outside the record, and could in no way be called a logical inference therefrom.
In Falco v. State, 115 Tex.Cr.R. 318, 29 S.W.2d 764 (1930), this Court was confronted with a similar argument. The defendant in that case was charged with possessing intoxicating liquor for purposes of sale. The prosecutor argued to the jurors that they should “stop bootleggers running up and down the road killing people.” Id., at 319, 29 S.W.2d, at 765. As in the case before us, there was no testimony in the record to support the argument. The Court held, under the facts of that case, see Hodge v. State, supra, that reversible error was reflected.
I conclude under the facts of this case that the instruction to the jury to disregard the argument was insufficient to cure the error.1 Compare Simpson v. State, 493 S.W.2d 793 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). My conclusion is based not only on the grossly prejudicial and inflammatory nature of the argument, which directly accused the appellant of having a predisposition to commit violent acts. It is also based on the fact that this argument was immediately followed by the prosecutor’s thinly-veiled assertion that he knew of other criminal acts committed by the appellant which could not be admitted before the jury. This was calculated to leave in the minds of the jurors the unmistakable impression that the prosecutor had personal knowledge of the appellant’s violent nature which he could not pass on to the jury. '
This argument was rendered even more grievous by the fact that it came from an attorney who had been placed under oath before the jury during the trial on the merits and had provided important testimony for the State.
We have noted before that when attorneys go outside the permissible areas of jury argument they “too often place before the jury unsworn, and most times believable, testimony.” Alejandro v. State, 493 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex.Cr.App.1973). (Emphasis added.) Certainly in this case the argument of the prosecutor was given an extra measure of credibility because he had previously sworn to tell the truth before the jury.
Under these facts, the appellant has been denied a fair and impartial trial. Compare Moore v. State, 530 S.W.2d 536 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), and cases there cited.
The judgment should be reversed.
ONION, P. J., joins in this opinion.

. In Falco, the request for such an instruction was overruled.