Court Opinion

ID: 9712835
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:01:06.13039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:14.748109
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE APPLETON, specially concurring: I write separately to state that while I agree this case is factually square with Mitchell and with other decisions of this court (see, e.g., Pappas v. Waldron, 323 Ill. App. 3d 330, 337, 751 N.E.2d 1276, 1281 (2001)), the analyses employed here and by the supreme court in Mitchell permit an injustice that should not be allowed to stand. It is common, especially in cases such as this, where somewhat arcane points of law, i.e., the application of the exclusionary rule to administrative hearings, are at issue and require the circuit court to conduct research for itself. In such circumstances, it is impossible for the court to pronounce judgment while the parties and counsel are physically present. The responsibility for the justice and integrity of our system then must rest solely on a clerk’s or secretary’s ability to follow a directive. As a result, the preservation of a litigant’s right to appeal depends on that clerk or secretary (most probably the least trained in the justice system) to ensure that a final order is communicated. When, as here, that responsibility is not met, an overwhelming unfairness occurs in the punishment. An innocent party is deprived of a substantial right by the dismissal of his appeal. Although reliance on the strict language of the supreme court rules is intended to promote justice, such reliance has the opposite effect here. To avoid a callow response to strict construction, the rules should be changed to require the mailing of final orders by certified mail with the determination of finality delayed until the party’s receipt of the order.