Court Opinion

ID: 9530053
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:56:51.98169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:59.501842
License: Public Domain

EDMONDS, J., Dissenting.
Although I agree with the mathematical result reached in the opinion of my associates, I cannot concur in their construction of the applicable sections of the Welfare & Institutions Code.
By section 1510, there is provided, out of money in the state treasury not otherwise appropriated, to each county maintaining needy children aid not in excess of $15 per month. The next section fixes the amount of the total aid at $22.50 per month “or so much thereof as is necessary for the adequate care of the child, ’ ’ of which the state shall pay two-thirds and the county one-third, the maximum liability of the state being $15 per month. But under this section “any county may pay from its own funds additional sums for the care of any needy child.”
Although before 1937 the state had reimbursed the counties for part of the amount expended by them in the care of needy children, the present plan for supporting these persons was adopted in 1937 when the Welfare & Institutions Code was enacted. Unquestionably, in fixing the amount to be appropriated, the Legislature took into consideration the then and present policy of the federal government, for section 1553 provides that “During such time as grants in aid are made available by the United States Government” the state treasurer shall pay to each county the specified amount “which shall be used exclusively as aid to dependent children.” And the next section carries the amount of the federal aid into the formula by which the state’s proportion of the total cost shall be determined. First, the amount of federal aid “shall be deducted from the total amount granted for the child pursuant to section 1511 . . . and two-thirds of the remaining sums (not in excess of $15 per month) shall be paid to the county by the state treasurer.
Under these provisions, as I read them, the aid for dependent children is made up of money appropriated by the federal government, the state, and the county in specified amounts, and, insofar as aid over a total of $22.50 per month is concerned, in determining the amount which the county *664shall contribute, it is necessary to determine how much of that excess it has paid “from its own funds.” Under the construction adopted by my associates, in the event that the county paid a total of $36 per month “for the adequate care of the child” or $13.50 more than the basic amount of $22.50, in making its settlement the state would first deduct the federal aid of $9 per month at the present rate. But as two-thirds of the remainder, $27, amounts to more than $15, the state’s proportion would be limited to that amount. The result would be that the county had added $13.50 to the $22.50 base aid but eventually had to pay only $12 of that amount.
A more logical construction, it seems to me, is to say that the federal aid is never a part of the county’s “own funds,” but that it is a component part of the total aid given to the dependent child. On this basis, and using the same example, the county, with the knowledge that it will receive $9 of federal aid for each dependent child, decides that it will use that amount and $4.50 of its own funds to make up $36 for “adequate care.” The state would pay to the county the $9 of federal aid and its own proportion of $15. The balance, or $12, represents the county’s proportion of $7.50 of the basic aid of $22.50, plus the additional $4.50 which it has paid “from its own funds.” This construction harmonizes the language found in each pertinent section of the code.
But if the obligation of the state to reimburse counties for aid furnished by the latter is an implied contract, then the writ should require the respondents to recalculate the petitioner ’s accounts for the period of two years prior to the commencement of this proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 339.)
The nature of the right asserted in a mandamus proceeding determines which statutory provision, in regard to limitation of actions, applies. (Dillon v. Board of Pension Commrs., 18 Cal. (2d) 427 [116 P. (2d) 37, 136 A. L. R. 800].)
Respondents’ petition for a rehearing was denied September 2, 1942. Edmonds, J., voted for a rehearing.