Court Opinion

ID: 9613930
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:20:55.735983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:33.276487
License: Public Domain

CLARK, J., Dissenting.
The majority hold that an ex-felon may possess a concealable firearm in the course of defending himself. The majority thus legislate an exception to Penal Code section 12021. They argue that since the statutory right of self-defense existed when section 12021 was adopted, we must presume the Legislature did not intend to deny ex-felons the “right” to resort to concealable firearms for self-defense. But this argument seeks to prove too much. It suggests, for example, that an ex-felon may lawfully possess a machine gun in the course of defending himself, for the statute prohibiting possession of that weapon (Pen. Code, § 12220) likewise was enacted after the right of self-defense received statutory recognition in California. It must be obvious that it is the later expression of legislative intent—here the unqualified prohibition of possession of a concealable weapon by an ex-felon—which controls any earlier statutory authorization to take possession of such a weapon. (See Coker v. Superior Court (1945) 70 Cal.App.2d 199, 201 [160 P.2d 885].)
*28Moreover, when the Legislature intends to provide a self-defense exception to a weapons control statute, it says so. Penal Code section 12031, subject to stated exceptions, prohibits canying a loaded firearm in certain places. Subdivision (j) of section 12031 provides: “Nothing in this section is intended to preclude the carrying of any loaded firearm, under circumstances where it would otherwise be lawful, by a person who reasonably believes that the person or property of himself or another is in immediate danger and that the canying of such weapon is necessary for the preservation of such person or property.” Absence of an analogous provision in section 12021 compels the conclusion that a self-defense exception was not intended.
The Legislature provided no such exception for apparent good reason. Just as ex-felons cannot be expected to properly use concealable firearms under ordinary circumstances, neither can they be expected to exercise sound judgment and self-restraint in the necessarily explosive situations giving rise to the right of self-defense. Moreover, granting ex-felons the right to use concealable firearms in purported self-defense must encourage them to abuse that right by possessing, or having ready access to, such weapons in anticipation of events justifying their use. This very case demonstrates the likelihood of such abuse. The other 30 to 40 guests responded to the intruders by attempting to reason with them, by engaging them in fistfights, by fleeing from the party or by calling the police. Only defendant saw fit to escalate the violence by using a firearm. By carrying the pistol to the party in her purse, furnishing it to defendant when the occasion arose,1 and then retrieving it from him after he shot someone, defendant’s companion demonstrated the ease with which the rule announced today will be manipulated.
I would affirm the judgment.

The record clearly supports a finding that defendant took possession of the weapon well before he was called upon to use it in his purported self-defense. At the moment of taking possession he was guilty of a violation of section 12021, regardless of whether he later used the gun in self-defense. (People v. Evans (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 582 [115 Cal.Rptr. 304].) The majority improperly decline to defer to the necessarily implied finding requiring affirmance of the judgment.