Court Opinion

ID: 9810142
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:41:11.910244+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:24.612836
License: Public Domain

Meriiimon, C. J.
dissenting: The special contract alleged by the defendants was not in writing. If it had been so, and the writing had been admitted or proven by proper evidence, the Court would have interpreted its meaning. The proper construction of contracts is matter of law, and it is the province of the Court to interpret its meaning. When they are written, and cannot be explained or modified by parol, as in some cases they may be, their terms are settled, and their meaning is simply a question of law to be determined by the Court.
When, also, a contract has not been reduced to writing, but its terms appear — are precise, clear and explicit — the Court must interpret their meaning and legal effect. If, however, the parties to an unwritten contract dispute about its terms, a,nd these are not clear nor definite, are obscure or equivocal, or their use is not certain and determinate, or it must be' inferred from the conduct of the parties, such contract— *454what its terms are — must be ascertained by the jury. And so, also, if the terms used are technical, or unusual, and their meaning must be gathered from experts, or persons acquainted with the particular act or business to which such terms refer,'Shd in the like cases, the jury must ascertain the meaning of such terms as used by the parties; still, when their use and what they are are ascertained by the jury, it is the duty of the Court to interpret the contract ascertained as matter of fact by the jury. The jury must ascertain, as matter ‘of fact, what the contract is, and the Court must determine what is its legal import and effect. In such cases the Court should generally give the jury instructions as to the méalñing, and effect óf the contract, accordingly as they may nhd'it to be, carefully pointing out their duty in ascertaining what the contract in question is. Young v. Jeffreys, 4 Dev. & Bat., 216; Massey v. Belisle, 2 Ired., 170; Festerman v. Parker, 10 Ired., 474; Silverthorn v. Fowle, 4 Jones, 359.
In this case the exception is based upon a misapprehension of the instruction complained of. The Court did not intend to leave it to the jury to interpret the contract in question, nor did it do so in effect. The contract alleged was not in writing: the principal evidence — that of one of the defendants — tending to prove it was not very explicit, unequivocal and determinate. Oh the contrary, it left the real agreement to inference in material respects. The witness said: “ I agreed to buy of him (the plaintiff’s agent) a bill of shoes upon his promise to have them in Aulander in two weeks;” but he did not say certainly, in terms, that the agent agreed, on his part, to deliver the shoes at the place mentioned within that time; that this was a substantial part of the contract, and that it was understood that the defendants would not be bound to take the shoes if they were not so delivered. This was left in doubt — to inference. He said “ that this was the main inducement to the bargain ; without this promise I would not have taken the goods.” He does *455not say, in terms, that the agent so understood and agreed— that he did, was left to inference. ITe did not say, in terms, that the contract was special — out of the ordinary course of trade in such cases. That was left to inference. Hence the Court told the jury to enquire whether there was such special contract, and if so, what was meant, not as matter of law, but as matter-of fact, by it, by what was said and mutually understood and agreed upon by the parties. That is, the Court’ instructed the jury to ascertain from -the uncertain, undeterminate evidence of such contract, what it was as matter of fact. It submitted to them, not what was the legal meaning, of the words used by the defendants, or by either party/-but whether the parties, in fact, mutually understood and agreed; that the shoes should’ be' delivered “in two weeks'” at the -defendants’ place of business, or whether, in fact, it was agreed that the plaintiffs, in the ordinary course’ of'business, sold the defendants the shoes, and this was the fact of the agreement, and the plaintiff’s agent said — simply added — not as a part of the agreement, that he would deliver them “in two weeks,” meaning no more than that he would be prompt in shipping them. The Court further said, .in substance, that if the jury should find the contract to be as contended by the defendants, then, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs could not recover. Thus it intepreted the contract in that view. It further said, in effect, that if the jury should find the contract to be, in fact, as contended by the plaintiffs, then the latter could recover. Thus it interpreted the meaning and legal effect of it in the view favorable to the plaintiffs.
The evidence in this case left the terms of the contract much more in doubt than did the evidence of the contract in-question in Massey v. Belisle, supra. In that case “the plaintiff 'stated to the defendant, as a fact, that it had been discovered that her house was two feet upon his lot. Upon this information she promised to pay him four dollars per *456annum while it remained there. At the expiration of the first year, when the rent was demanded, she refused to pay, alleging that the house was altogether upon her own land. After this refusal, she did pay four dollars, upon his express promise to refund it if it should turn out that the house was not upon his lot. The parties then agreed upon a mode by which the boundaries of their respective lots should be determined. Unfortunately, the attempt thus to determine their boundaries failed, and the plaintiff sued for the next year’s rent. Now, it seems to us clear that upon what terms and upon what consideration the defendant promised to pay rent, was an inquiry of fact for the determination of a jury.” The Court said that th'e terms of fact being doubtful, it was the province of the jury to ascertain the same. They certainly were more definite than the terms in question in the present case.
Perhaps the instruction given to the jury might have been more precise, but it was quite intelligible, and substantially, in all respects, correct. The Court interpreted the contract as to its legal import and effect, accordingly as the jury might ascertain it to be as matter of fact, and it gave them proper instructions as to their duty.
The other exceptions are without merit, and it would serve no useful purpose to advert further to them.
Per Curiam. New trial.