Court Opinion

ID: 9456062
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:41:03.544099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:50.235412
License: Public Domain

GODBOLD, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
I would affirm the judgment and affirm on the cross-appeal.
There was nothing remotely resembling an objection to the failure to charge on § 940.10. The suit alleged violation of § 940.3 and § 940.10. By motion Borden attacked the constitutionality of the Act and of more than a dozen sections and subsections including § 940.3 and § 940.10.
In his charge the District Judge referred to giving or offering rebates as disruptive trade practices, without referring to the language of § 940.10. Elsewhere he referred to “wrongful conduct as defined by the Orderly Milk Marketing Act” and “violation of the Orderly Milk Marketing Act, particularly that part having to do with the prohibited payment of rebates and discounts.” He charged that the Act was constitutional and must be considered by the jury.
The only objection was this:
We also filed a pretrial motion relating to the temporary injunction and we also had a pending motion which was denied at the close of plaintiff’s case to dismiss this on the grounds that the Act was unconstitutional.
So, for the record, I would like simply to preserve an objection to those instructions relating to those three items.
The motion at the close of plaintiff’s case had been no more illuminating. It was oral and made no mention of § 940.-10. In fact it centered on § 940.3 in this manner;
[Counsel for Borden];
Now, as I understand their position, and I think there may be an instruction to that affect [sic], although I *1360don’t recall at the moment, as I understand their position, the — the reliance which they place now on Act 193 is solely directed to section 943B [sic] of the act which absolutely prohibits discounts. And I think our position in reference to that has been laid out in the briefs. We have urged that it is that — that section which absolutely prohibits discounts for whatever reason is unconstitutional because it is arbitrary, it bears no reasonable relation to the declared purpose of the act, it’s arbitrary in prohibiting discounts and fails to require an unlawful intent.
Borden’s motion for judgment n. o. v. referred in general terms to the Act’s being unconstitutional then dwelt at length on § 940.3.
Borden’s position in this court is even more carefully targeted. The first line of text in its brief is this (under “Issues Presented for Review”):
1. Was Section 940.3(b) of the Louisiana Orderly Milk Marketing Act of 1958 constitutional?
The subsequent argument of the point begins this way:
The sole provision of the 1958' Act involved in this case was Section 940.-3(b) which professed to make it unlawful “to give or offer any discount or rebates on [milk] products sold * * *_» n0 exceptions whatever were permitted. The prohibition was absolute and unambiguous. (Emphasis in original.)
Whether ingeniously or ingenuously, Borden has leveled its guns at § 940.3 and enjoyed the advantage of a full field of fire on the issue of constitutionality under the absolute prohibition cases referred to by Judge Bell. There is nothing to suggest that Borden wanted to go to the jury on the intent provisions of § 940.10. Everything points the other way, that it sought to win by a ruling of law that § 940.3 was unconstitutional. Having made that choice, in the District Court and in this court, and having sought all the benefits therefrom, it is not entitled to a new trial on a ground it has eschewed in both courts.