Court Opinion

ID: 9711741
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:38:12.083126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:07.223786
License: Public Domain

Broadfoot, J.
(dissenting). I agree with the majority that the skidding of a car is not in itself evidence of negligence, but that is true only when the skidding is considered as an isolated factor unrelated to the conduct of the driver. If a prior careless act causes a car to skid and thus results in injury to another, the driver must be'held to be causally negligent.
The mere operation of a motor vehicle on the wrong side of a highway makes at least a prima jacie case of negligence and is enough, in the absence of an explanation which the jury is bound to accept, to warrant an inference of negligence on the part of its operator. Hamilton v. Reinemann, 233 Wis. 572, 290 N. W. 194; Kempfer v. Bois, 255 Wis. 312, 38 N. W. (2d) 483.
In this case Brock was not only on the wrong side of the street, but to reach there he hurdled a safety island 5 feet wide and 6 or 7 inches high, crossed 12J4 feet of street, mounted a curb 9 inches high, and passed over a sidewalk 7y2 feet wide to a point at which he struck a pedestrian. Here the driver attempted to make an improper left turn. He testified that when he had “50 per cent completed” his turn into North avenue the officer directed him to continue on Fond du Lac avenue. He turned to his right to comply with the officer’s command and, after he turned, his car started to skid toward the other side of the street and he “couldn’t get it back even.”
The officer testified that when he signaled Brock to continue on Fond du -Lac avenue Brock turned his wheel to the right, started to- skid, and skidded at all times thereafter. The skidding commenced when the driver was in the act of directing his car from a position upon the street at which *30he had no right to be because of his violation of a traffic rule. It was his violation of this rule which set in motion the circumstances which caused the car to skid. His only-explanation of the circumstances was that the cobblestones, with which a portion of the street was paved, were wet because of rain. The record shows these cobblestones to be 5 by 6 by 10 inches in size and, although 'the tops were somewhat smooth, as a whole the cobblestones presented a bumpy, rough surface. The record shows that his speed was 10 miles per hour. He testified that his wheels were straight when he struck the safety island and the sidewalk. There was no longer any 'skidding.
I realize that in reviewing the record we are bound to accept the testimony most favorable to Brock. The majority speak of the 50 to 55 feet that he skidded. This is taken from the testimony of Officer Freund, which was supplied by means of a deposition taken in California more than a year after he had last seen the street in question, and he was testifying from recollection only and not from any measurements. He testified that he based his estimate upon his recollection that the street was 38 to 40 feet wide, when actually it was more than 50 feet in width.
Brock has not given a satisfactory explanation of his presence upon the sidewalk a substantial distance from where he should have been. On the contrary, his testimony and that of the traffic officer show facts and circumstances which establish that his negligent acts were a substantial factor in bringing about plaintiff’s injuries. His is not an explanation, as was said in Kempfer v. Bois, supra, “which tfie jury is bound to accept.”
No attack is made upon the jury’s assessment of damages. I would reverse with directions that judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff in the amount found by the jury. The *31least that should be done under the circumstances is to grant a new trial in the interest of justice.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Chief Justice Fritz and Mr. Justice Gehl join in this dissent.