Court Opinion

ID: 9785828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 22:34:53.362489+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:07.696209
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
T 16 In its petition for rehearing, the State asks us to "delete from [this] opinion unnee-essary language that pre-sentence motions to withdraw guilty pleas 'should, in general, be liberally granted'"6 See supra ¶¶ 11, 14. According to the State, the current version of Utah Code section T7-18-6 (the current statute), see Utah Code Ann. § 77-183-6 (2008), has made the notion that such motions should be liberally granted "obsolete," for two reasons. First, the State claims that all prior direction that trial courts should liberally grant presentence motions to withdraw guilty pleas was based on a prior version of section 77-13-6 (the 1980 statute) that allowed both presentence and post-sentence motions to withdraw guilty pleas. See generally id. § Ti-13-6 (1980 Special Supp.) (containing no time restrictions on when a defendant could file a motion to withdraw a guilty plea). The State theorizes that the underlying reason for allowing such liberality was based on the relatively minor prejudice the prosecution would suffer from the grant of a presentence motion as compared to the more substantial prejudice it would suffer from the grant of a post-sentence motion. See State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1041-42 (Utah 1987). As no post-sentence motions are allowed under the current statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (2008) ("A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, exeept for a plea held in abeyance, shall be made by *960motion before sentence is announced.") (emphasis added), the State contends that such liberality has necessarily fallen by the wayside.
T 17 Second, the State argues that because prior versions of section 77-13-6 required a defendant to prove "good cause" for withdrawal of the plea, see id. § T7-13-6 (1980 Special Supp.) ("A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with leave of court."); id. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (1989 Cum.Supp.) (same), rather than specifically requiring proof that the guilty plea "was not knowingly and voluntarily made," id. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (2008) ("A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made."), the trial court's discretion in granting the motion to set aside a guilty plea was broader then than it is now. Expressing concern that "future trial judges and litigants may labor under the misapprehension that motions to withdraw guilty pleas should be liberally granted merely because they have been filed presentence, irrespective of whether the defendant has made the required statutory showing that his plea was not knowing or voluntary," the State asks us to delete the language regarding such liberality from this decision. For the reasons explained below, we decline to delete the language.
118 Respecting the State's first argument, even though post-sentence motions are no longer allowed, the fact remains that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, if proper under the current statute, is a presentence motion, see id. § T7-6-18(2)(b) (2008), and the State, generally, will suffer minimal prejudice if the court grants it, see Gallegos, 738 P.2d at 1042. Further, the Utah Supreme Court's discussion in Grimmett v. State, 2007 UT 11, 152 P.3d 306, indicates that the discretion to liberally grant presentence motions to withdraw survived a prior amendment to section 77-18-6 (the 1989 statute), see id. 112, which amendment required a defendant to file a motion to withdraw within thirty days of entry of a guilty plea, see Withdrawal of Guilty Plea Amendments, ch. 65, § 1, 1989 Utah Laws 163, 163 (amending section 77-13-6); Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (1989 Cum.Supp.) ("A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by motion, and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea.").
119 In Grimmett, while evaluating the defendant's claim under the 1989 statute, our Supreme Court distinguished the Gallegos opinion because it had been rendered based on the 1980 statute that included no jurisdictional time limits for filing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. See Grimmett, 2007 UT 11, 10-11, 152 P.3d 306. And in response to Grimmett's argument, the Supreme Court determined that the "liberally grant" language used in Gallegos, a case in which the defendant had filed his motion to set aside guilty plea prior to sentencing, did not excuse Grimmett's untimely motion to withdraw his plea, which he had filed nearly two years after his conviction. See id. Because the 1989 statute "impose[d] a strict jurisdictional time limit" of thirty days following entry of the guilty plea, id. 112; see Utah Code Ann. § 77-183-6 (1989 Cum.Supp.), the trial court had no jurisdiction to consider Grimmett's motion under the 1989 statute. See Grimmett, 2007 UT 11, 1110-12, 152 P.3d 806. The Supreme Court stated, however, that "[wlhile courts may still liberally grant' presentence motions to withdraw a guilty plea, they may now do so only if they have jurisdiction." Id. 112. In making this statement, the Supreme Court does not appear to have contemplated that such lHiberality only existed insofar as presentence motions could be meaningfully contrasted to post-sentence motions.7 See id. 1% 10-12.
*961T20 Under our case law, then and now, we do not think that trial courts are charged to liberally grant presentence motions to withdraw only as compared to post-sentence motions. Rather, the case law suggests that presentence motions should be liberally granted on their own terms because-in addition to the important constitutional rights at stake-prejudice to the State will not ordinarily arise in the short time between entry of the plea and the scheduled sentencing; delay will be minimal; and, most importantly, the motion will not be prompted by "buyer's remorse" upon learning that one's sentence is more severe than anticipated-a motive that has long been disapproved, and appropriately so. The State's first argument, then, is not persuasive.
{21 We also disagree with the State's contention that the current statute's specific requirement that a defendant prove his plea was not knowingly or voluntarily entered, rather than just that "good cause" exists, limits the discretion the trial court previously had to grant such motions. As pointed out by Ruiz in his reply to the State's petition for rehearing, proving that a guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered has long been part of a defendant's burden when seeking to withdraw a guilty plea; it was the penultimate "good cause" required under the former statute. See, e.g., State v. Munson, 972 P.2d 418, 422 (Utah 1998) ("Generally, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea will be granted only for good cause, ie., when the defendant can show that the plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily."); State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1041 (Utah 1987) ("'A plea of guilty ... may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with leave of court. The rationale for allowing a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea is to permit him to undo a plea which was unknowingly, unintelligently, or involuntarily made.") (omission in original) (footnote omitted); State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337, 388-89 (Utah 1977) ("We are in full agreement with the proposition that for a plea of guilty to be valid it must appear that the accused had a clear understanding of the charge and without undue influence, coercion, or improper inducement voluntarily entered such plea."); State v. Smit, 2004 UT App 222, ¶ 18, 95 P.3d 1203 ("Good cause is shown when the [dJefen-dant does not knowingly and voluntarily enter the plea agreement."). The Legislature thus appears to have essentially codified pri- or case law by incorporating the "knowing and voluntary" lynchpin into the statute, and a defendant's burden on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea has not, therefore, fundamentally changed.
122 Furthermore, when referring to the notion that trial courts should liberally grant presentence motions to withdraw guilty pleas, this court in State v. Thorup, 841 P.2d 746 (Utah Ct.App.1992), cert. denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993), stated: "This liberal-approach language, ... is directed to the trial court's exercise of discretion. The language in no way alters the statutory requirement of good cause for the withdrawal of a *962guilty plea nor our abuse-of-discretion standard of review." Id. at 747. Likewise, the liberality a trial court should exercise when reviewing or granting a motion to withdraw a guilty plea would not undercut the newly articulated statutory requirement, the essence of which has long been reflected in our case law. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by the State's second argument.
23 For the foregoing reasons, we decline to delete the language in our opinion indicating that presentence motions to withdraw guilty pleas should be liberally granted because we do not think this precept is in any way at odds with the current statute. The State's petition for rehearing is granted for the limited purpose of considering its arguments and addressing them in this Amended Opinion. The petition for rehearing is otherwise denied.
1 24 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge and WILLIAM A. THORNE JR., Associate Presiding Judge.

. The State acknowledges that, at oral argument, in response to a question asking if the law had changed with regard to whether presentence motions should be liberally granted, the State indicated that the law had not changed. Counsel did not point out until its petition for rehearing that the Legislature had amended section 77-13-6 in a way that arguably affects the ability of judges to liberally grant presentence motions to withdraw.

. The State characterizes Grimmeit as a case interpreting a version of section 77-13-6 that allowed post-sentence motions to withdraw, based on State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, 31 P.3d 528, superseded by statute as discussed in Grim-mett v. State, 2007 UT 11, ¶¶ 15-16, 152 P.3d 306. Ostler held that the thirty-day time constraint in the 1989 statuie was ambiguous because the time period could be interpreted as starting after the plea colloquy or after the conviction was entered, which typically corresponds to the time of sentencing. See 2001 UT 68, ¶ 8, 31 P.3d 528. The Ostler court interpreted that time restriction as starting to "run[] from the date of final disposition." Id. 111. The Ostler holding, however, was superseded by the 2003 amendment to section 77-13-6. See Grimmett, 2007 UT 11, ¶¶ 15-16, 152 P.3d 306. The cur*961rent statute requires that a defendant file his motion before sentencing, not thirty days after final disposition. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (2008). When the Grimmett court made its statement that trial courts could still liberally grant presentence motions as long as they had jurisdiction to do so, even though it discussed the time limit distinctions between the different versions of section 77-13-6, it did not tie the liberality courts had to grant presentence motions to the notion that post-sentence motions were also allowed under the 1989 statute, based on the court's interpretation of Ostler. See Grimmett, 2007 UT 11, ¶¶ 10-12, 15-16, 152 P.3d 306. Importantly, the Supreme Court made this statement while analyzing the issue presented in Grimmett under the 1989 statute, after the Ostler opinion had been superseded by the 2003 amendments. See id. 115-16; Utah Code of Criminal Procedure Amendments, ch. 290, § 1, 2003 Utah Laws 1321, 1321. Accordingly, we think the statement in Grimmeft is very relevant to the issue as addressed under the current statute, regardless of Ostler. We further note that even under Ostler, the prejudice the prosecution would suffer from a motion to withdraw filed within thirty days of a defendant's conviction would still be much less than the prejudice the prosecution would experience if a motion to withdraw was filed years after conviction and after the evidence was marginalized, as had previously been possible. See 2001 UT 68, ¶ 9, 31 P.3d 528 (quoting floor debates on the 1989 amendment to section 77-13-6, which discussed how, in the past, defendants had filed motions to withdraw "four and five years after a person ha{d] entered a guilty plea when there's no way to come back and retry the case after the evidence is gone") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).