Court Opinion

ID: 9505626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 20:13:20.302163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:39.657610
License: Public Domain

BOEHM, Justice,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s resolution of the “Admission of Character Evidence” issue. The majority holds that the issue was not preserved because Azania did not object at the proper -time at trial. I believe that Azania’s raising of the issue in a pretrial motion, renewing the issue again on the first day of trial, and making of an offer of proof at trial is sufficient to preserve the issue for our review. I would *656reverse the judgment of the trial court and order a new penalty phase.
On July 21, 1995, Azania filed a Motion for Disclosure of Rule 404 Evidence. After a hearing the trial court entered the following order on December 18: “If the defendant raises character as an issue in his case in chief, the State will be allowed to present relevant character evidence in rebuttal. It is the Court’s opinion that discussing the defendant’s family history and background places the defendant’s character in issue.” On February 14, 1996, Azania filed a Motion in Limine requesting an order preventing the State from presenting evidence relating to another homicide that had occurred several years earlier. After a jury had been selected but before the State began its presentation of evidence, the trial court heard argument on the motion. At that hearing Azania described the nature of the mitigating evidence he planned to introduce. The State responded that if Azania chose to offer evidence such as testimony of his disturbed childhood, the State would introduce rebuttal evidence that Azania had killed another man several years before the murder of Officer Yaros.1 The trial court ruled that the State could not present evidence of a prior killing in its casein-chief. However, if Azania submitted the planned evidence of his family history and background the prior killing evidence would be “fair game” for rebuttal. Faced with this ruling Azania chose to omit the evidence he had proposed. After the jury began its deliberations the trial court permitted Azania to make a formal offer of proof at which he submitted testimony and a twenty-nine page report about his family history and background and, by agreement with the State, a deposition of his mental health expert.
I. Preservation of the Error
The majority holds that, because the trial court made only a preliminary ruling on the admissibility of the evidence of a prior homicide, the issue was not preserved for appellate review. It reasons that Azania should have presented his mitigating evidence, allowed the State the opportunity to choose whether to offer the evidence of a prior homicide, and then allowed the trial court to decide whether to admit it. Only from such a ruling could Azania appeal.
The only case cited by the majority for this requirement is Miller v. State, 716 N.E.2d 367, 370 (Ind.1999). That case stands for the general principle that a party must do more than challenge a ruling on a motion in limine in order to preserve an issue for appellate review.2 This Court has given two fundamental reasons for the requirement that a party renew a ruling on a pretrial motion in limine at trial and make an offer of proof of the excluded evidence in order to preserve the error. First, an objection at trial gives the trial court the opportunity to make a final determination of the admissibility of evidence in the context in which it is offered. See Clausen v. State, 622 N.E.2d 925, 928 (Ind.1993). Second, the offer of proof establishes a record on which an appellate court can assess the value of the excluded evidence and the prejudice resulting from its exclusion. See Taylor v. State, 710 N.E.2d 921, 923 (Ind.1999) (quoting 12 Robert Lowell Miller, Jr., Indiana Prac*657tice § 103.113, at 55 (2d ed.1995)). In the typical case, these requirements imppse a minimal burden on the objecting party. Normally a party who has incurred an adverse ruling on its motion in limine faces no adverse consequences from renewing the issue at trial.3 This can be done outside the jury’s presence to avoid any appearance of an obdurate defense, and at worst, the party will get the same ruling.
Although Azania made an offer of proof at trial after raising the issue both in a pretrial motion and again on the first day of trial, the majority finds any claim of error waived because the objection came too early. I see no reason why Azania should have been required to raise the issue a third time with the trial court. The important goals furthered by requiring an objection at trial and offer of proof were satisfied in this case. The trial court was given an opportunity to reconsider its pretrial ruling on the first day of trial. It knew the nature of both Azania’s mitigating evidence and the State’s rebuttal evidence at that time. Azania made an offer of proof on which this Court can evaluate the prejudice resulting from the trial court’s' ruling. Finally, unlike the typical case in which renewing an adverse 'ruling on a motion in limine at trial poses no adverse consequences, Azania had a great deal to lose by waiting to object until the State offered the evidence of a prior homicide in rebuttal. It is clear that defense counsel viewed this evidence as very damaging to Azania’s case.4 Confronted with the option of either submitting mitigating evidence that would open the door to devastating rebuttal evidence or submitting no childhood or background evidence at all, Azania reasonably chose the latter.
I see nothing to be gained by the majority’s requirement that Azania wait to object until after the State sought to admit the prior homicide evidence in rebuttal. The trial court had been apprised both before and at trial of the relevant evidence and arguments on the issue. The possibility that it would have changed its ruling when presented with the issue for a third time seems remote at best, and the purposes of the Miller requirements were, in my view, all fully served. In short, I believe Azania’s raising of thé issue before trial, renewal of the issue at the beginning of trial, and making of an offer of proof is sufficient to preserve the issue for this Court’s review.
II. The Merits of Azania’s Claim
Consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(e)(8) allows capitally charged defendants to present evidence in a penalty phase that supports “every conceivable mitigator.” Minnick v. State, 698 N.E.2d 745, 761 (Ind.1998), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 501, 145 L.Ed.2d 387 (1999). Azania sought to submit evidence regarding his childhood, family background, and mental capabilities. A licensed social worker had prepared a detailed social history that included evidence of Azania’s difficult childhood, namely, that he grew up poor in a large family that initially lived in a housing project. At the age of nine Azania witnessed his father die of a heart attack. His family then moved into a new house with insurance proceeds, but his mother soon went to work in Chicago, where she would stay from Monday morning through Friday, leaving Azania and his younger siblings at *658home without adult supervision. When Azania’s mother was at home, she sometimes disciplined the children by whipping them with belts and extension cords. Azania also sought to offer evidence from Dr. Michael Gelbort, who conducted a series of tests on Azania and concluded that Azania had problems with concentration, juggling cognitive information, and- working at a normal rate of speed. Dr. Gel-bort categorized Azania in the mild, moderately impaired range.
Although it is clear that this evidence was admissible pursuant to the statute and Lockett, Azania ultimately decided not to offer it solely because of the trial court’s ruling that it would open the door to rebuttal evidence of a prior homicide. The State contended at trial that evidence of the prior homicide was proper to “rebut whatever character evidence [Azania] put forth tó show that he’s such a great guy.”5
It is well, settled that “[t]he State may properly introduce rebuttal evidence tending to disprove mitigating circumstances shown by defendant’s evidence.” Stevens v. State, 691 N.E.2d 412, 435 (Ind.1997) (quoting Fleenor v. State, 622 N.E.2d 140, 149 (Ind.1993)). “When the accused offers evidence of her own character, she opens the door to the subject .of her character for the trait placed in issue.” Brown v. State, 577 N.E.2d 221, 232 (Ind.1991). Although the scope of'rebuttal evidence lies within the trial court’s discretion, see id., it is clear under these authorities that the rebuttal evidence must pertain to the specific mitigating evidence submitted by the defendant.6
Here, Azania sought to submit evidence of a difficult childhood and family background as well as cdntinuing mental impairments. In my view, this is not character evidence: 'Rather,' it is presented as evidence' of the sources of a flawed character. ' Whether that should or should not be given weight is for the jury to consider. The State would have been entitled to present evidence rebutting the proffered evidence. But this does not open the door to evidence dealing with other alleged crimes or bad acts. None of the proffered evidence suggests that Azania was nonviolent, had no criminal history, or was otherwise a “great guy.” Accordingly, under these circumstances evidence of a prior homicide is not proper rebuttal.
III. Prejudice
Not every error in the admission or exclusion of evidence is grounds for reversal . An error will be found harmless if its probable impact on the jury, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor that it did not affect the substantial rights of a party. Ind. Trial Rule 61; Fleener v. State, 656 N.E.2d 1140, 1142 (Ind.1995). In a death penalty case in which the jury unanimously recommended death, I believe the required standard for prejudice is whether there is a reasonable probability that the excluded mitigating *659evidence would have convinced at least one juror not to recommend death.
In this case the State alleged two aggravating circumstances: (1) intentionally killing while committing a robbery and (2) killing a law enforcement officer in the course of duty. See Ind.Code § 35-50-2-9(b)(1) & (6). The jury was -properly instructed that it could recommend death only if it found that the statutory aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances. See id § 35-50-2-9(k). The jury was specifically instructed “to consider the following mitigating circumstances: The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another person and the defendant’s participation was relatively minor; or two, any other circumstances appropriate for your consideration.”
The evidence presented in the offer of proof is not especially strong in comparison to the available but unpresented evidence in cases in which this Court has granted a new penalty phase based on ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Rondon v. State, 711 N.E.2d 506, 522 (Ind.1999); Burris v. State, 558 N.E.2d 1067, 1075-76 (Ind.1990). Nonetheless, jurors in a death penalty case have widely differing views on the significance of mitigating evidence, and it is difficult if not impossible to know what evidence might sway an individual juror'to vote against a recommendation of death. I believe the trial court’s ruling significantly hampered Azania’s ability to argue that the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating ones. The excluded evidence was in no way cumulative. Indeed, because of the trial court’s ruling, Azania was left to argue as mitigation only that his co-defendants had not been sentenced to death and that, in light of the forensic evidence, he may not have fired the fatal shot. ■
The United States Supreme Court has observed that “the sentence imposed at the penalty stage should reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant’s background, character, and erimé.” Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987) (O’Con-nor, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted)). Although the jury heard a great' deal about Azania’s crime, the trial court’s ruling prevented it from hearing anything about Azania’s background. Although many or even most of the jurors may have found the proffered mitigating evidence insignificant in comparison to the aggravating circumstances,- I cannot exclude the possibility that some would not have arrived at that conclusion. Cf. Smith v. State, 547 N.E.2d 817, 822 (Ind.1989) (“In the absence of any evidence of mitigating circumstances ... or of evidence to rebut the existence of the charged aggravating factors, a death sentence is a foregone conclusion.”) Accordingly, the death sentence should be vacated and this case should be remanded for a new penalty phase in which a jury may receive the claimed mitigating evidence of Azania’s background without hearing the prior homicide evidence.

. Although Azania pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter in that case, the conviction was set aside pursuant to a petition for postconviction relief and the State did not pursue the case any further.

. In Miller, at a pretrial motion in limine hearing the trial court ruled the defendant's proffered evidence was inadmissible. This ruling was erroneous but the error was held to have been waived on appeal because no offer of proof was made at trial. This Court observed, "To raise the question of error, the evidence must be offered at trial to give the trial court the opportunity to "rule on its admissibility at that time." Miller, 716 N.E.2d at 370 (quoting Tyra v. State, 506 N.E.2d 1100, 1103 (Ind.1987)); see also Ind. Evidence R. 103(a) (requiring a timely objection and offer of proof at trial in order to preserve error).

. In Vehom v. State, 111 N.E.2d 869, 872 (Ind.1999), this Court repeated the general principle of non-preservation of errors raised in a pretrial motion in limine but not renewed at trial'. However, we noted that "there are occasional exceptions to this general rule.” Id. at 872-73. In that case, the exception was the trial court's assurance 1'even if you don’t object, the Court will find ... that your objections to this type of evidence have been timely made.” 'Id. at 873.

. Counsel described the evidence as "[t]he most prejudicial information that this jury” could hear. “If [it] comes in, it’s over.”

. The State makes no argument on appeal about the merits of the trial court’s ruling. It simply asserts that the issue is not preserved without making an alternative argument, as it often does, that even if preserved the issue fails on its merits.

.- In' Stevens, the defendant elicited penalty phase testimony regarding his nonviolent and law-abiding character. 691 N.E.2d at 435. On cross-examination, the State then asked one of Stevens’ expert witnesses about Stevens' prior molestation of children, Stevens’ alleged involvement in another killing, and the expert's opinion regarding Stevens' future dangerousness. Although this Court found any claim of error waived on appeal because defense counsel did not object to this cross-examination, we observed that counsel likely did not object because the cross-examination testimony was relevant to countering Stevens’ mitigating evidence and that Stevens had "opened the door” to this testimony. See id. Similarly; in response to the defendant’s mitigating evidence of a general lack of aggressiveness, domination by another person, and borderline retardation in Brown, this Court held that it was proper rebuttal for the State to submit a videotape from another trial in which the defendant testified that she had willingly and independently murdered a woman by beating her- with a vice grip, pop bottle, candy dish, and crowbar. See 577 N.E.2d at 231-32.