Court Opinion

ID: 9382820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-28 20:04:13.089705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:41.831214
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                         2023 IL App (3d) 190598-U

                                  Order filed March 28, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                    IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                              THIRD DISTRICT

                                                     2023

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                        )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                         )       of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
                                                        )       Will County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                        )
                                                        )       Appeal No. 3-19-0598
             v.                                         )       Circuit No. 18-CF-488
                                                        )
      DEMETRIOUS MONTELL HOUSTON,                       )       Honorable
                                                        )       Daniel L. Kennedy,
             Defendant-Appellant.                       )       Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE HETTEL delivered the judgment of the court.
            Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justice Davenport concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                  ORDER

¶1          Held: The court did not err in making its fitness determination. The court’s failure to
                  provide the correct Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) admonishment to the
                  potential jurors is not a reversible plain error.

¶2          Defendant, Demetrious Montell Houston, appeals his convictions for residential burglary,

     indecent solicitation of a child, and sexual exploitation of a child. Defendant argues the Will

     County circuit court failed to: (1) make an independent determination of his fitness to stand trial
     at the fitness hearing, and (2) comply with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule

     431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012). We affirm.

¶3                                             I. BACKGROUND

¶4              The State charged defendant with four counts of residential burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-

     3(a), (b) (West 2018)), two counts of indecent solicitation of a child (id. § 11-6), and one count

     of sexual exploitation of a child (id. § 11-9.1(a)(2)). Counsel was appointed to represent

     defendant.

¶5              On October 24, 2018, defense counsel opined as to defendant’s fitness to stand trial,

     stating:

                       “Your Honor, at this time I’m requesting a fitness evaluation. Based on my

                       conversation with the defendant, I believe there’s a bona fide doubt whether he’s

                       fit or not. I’m asking [for] the evaluation, I’m asking [Y]our Honor to sign the

                       order, have the next court date be November 26th for return of the evaluation.

                       Also asking [Y]our Honor to sign the order so I can provide these documents to

                       the Chief Judge’s Office.”

     The State offered no opinion regarding defendant’s fitness, and the court granted defense

     counsel’s motion, stating: “[o]kay, so ordered, um, to be evaluated.” The court then signed a

     preprinted form order, which read: “Pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/104-11, the Court finds that a

     bona fide doubt exists as to the [defendant]’s fitness to stand trial.” The case was continued to

     November 26, 2018, and then again to December 17, 2018, for completion of the fitness

     evaluation.

¶6              The evaluation opined that defendant was fit to stand trial. On December 17, 2018, the

     court held a fitness hearing which proceeded as follows:

                                                        2
                            “[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, it is up for fitness hearing.

                            THE COURT: Do we have a report?

                            [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes.

                            THE COURT: Come on up. What was the finding of the report?

                            [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He was found fit. We do have a stipulation.

                            THE COURT: Any openings on behalf of the State?

                            [THE STATE]: Waive.

                            THE COURT: Any openings on behalf of the defense?

                            [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Waive. We do stipulate to the education,

                    credentials, and findings of the evaluator ***.

                            THE COURT: All right. Closing on behalf of the State?

                            [THE STATE]: Waive.

                            THE COURT: Any closings on behalf of the defense?

                            [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Defense waives.

                            THE COURT: Okay. Defendant is fit to stand trial. ***”

¶7          The case proceeded to jury trial on March 25, 2019. During jury selection, the court made

     the following inquiry to the jurors:

                            “Do you understand this means A) the State has the burden of proving the

                    defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt? Let the record reflect no one has

                    raised their hand.

                            B) the defendant does not have to prove his innocence? Let the record

                    reflect no one has raised their hand.

                                                      3
                              C) the defendant does not have to present any evidence on his own behalf?

                      Let the record reflect no one has raised their hand.

                              Do you have any disagreements with any of these principles of law? Let

                      the record reflect no one has raised their hand.”

¶8            At trial, April F. testified that she had two daughters, J.F. and S.F. On March 8, 2018, J.F.

       was 12 years old and S.F. was 6 years old. The children had been released from school early and

       were at home with J.F.’s friend, K.D., while April was at work. April indicated that J.F. called

       her several times and informed her that a man was at the door, and he would not leave. The man

       entered their apartment. Both J.F. and April, via speaker phone, told the man to leave. April

       spoke with the man, and he told April that his name was Joey, he was 13 years old, J.F. had

       called him over, and he had met her in the kitchen. April heard J.F. say that the man “has his

       private parts out.”

¶9            April immediately left work to return home. She observed a man exit through the side of

       her apartment and walk around the front of the building. April had never seen the man before.

       She followed and observed him enter an apartment a short distance away. She stood outside until

       police arrived. April identified defendant as the man she saw that day. She testified that a cell

       phone had been taken from her kitchen during the incident. Photographs of the cell phone were

       admitted into evidence.

¶ 10          J.F. testified that on March 8, 2018, she was home with S.F. and K.D. A man knocked on

       the door and asked if her mother was home. April was at work at the time, but J.F. lied and told

       the man that April was asleep on the couch. He asked J.F. to wake April. J.F. pretended to try

       several times, eventually telling the man that her mother would not wake up. She attempted to

       close the door, but the man pushed it open and entered the apartment. She identified defendant as

                                                        4
       the man who entered her apartment. He walked around the apartment looking for April.

       Defendant entered April’s bedroom and knocked belongings off the dresser and moved blankets

       around.

¶ 11          The children were in J.F.’s bedroom at the time. J.F. called April and defendant entered

       J.F.’s bedroom. Defendant would not answer any of J.F.’s questions. J.F. saw that defendant’s

       pants were undone, and his boxer shorts were unfastened. She did not observe this until

       defendant stepped in front of her and lifted his jacket. She saw defendant’s penis while he was

       holding his jacket up. Defendant told J.F. to “come taste him in the bathroom.” J.F. was on the

       phone with April at that time. She put the call on speaker so April could speak with defendant.

       He left the bedroom with the phone, speaking to April as he left. Defendant went to the kitchen

       and began to leave with J.F.’s cell phone. J.F. ran after defendant and retrieved the phone.

       Defendant left the apartment.

¶ 12          J.F. testified that officers brought defendant to her apartment. J.F. identified defendant as

       the man who entered her apartment that day. J.F. described the clothing that defendant was

       wearing as: a dark colored shirt, red boxers, pants with designs on the back pockets, timberland

       boots, and an oversized jacket. Officers showed her defendant but did not have him lift his shirt

       or jacket during the on-scene identification. The only time J.F. had seen defendant’s boxer shorts

       was in her bedroom when defendant exposed himself.

¶ 13          K.D. testified that she was a friend of J.F. and had gone home with her on March 8, 2018,

       after their early release from school. She stayed in J.F.’s bedroom for the entirety of the incident.

       Someone began knocking on the door and J.F. left the bedroom to answer it. An unknown man

       entered the apartment. At trial, K.D. identified defendant as the man who entered the apartment.

       From J.F.’s bedroom, K.D. could see defendant walking into different rooms. He eventually

                                                         5
       came to J.F.’s bedroom. Defendant stopped at the door and asked K.D. to come out of the room.

       He told K.D. to “come taste him.” K.D. did not move from her position on J.F.’s bed.

¶ 14          J.F. called her mother as defendant entered the bedroom. He moved in front of J.F. with

       his back to K.D. K.D. heard J.F. say that defendant had his penis exposed and she was scared.

       K.D. did not see defendant’s penis. Defendant began speaking with April and left the bedroom

       with J.F.’s cell phone. K.D. indicated during a victim interview that she observed defendant

       move his hands toward his pants and begin rubbing his genitals outside of his pants. When police

       brought defendant back to April’s apartment, K.D. identified defendant to police as the man who

       had entered the apartment. She recalled seeing defendant once previously, a few weeks before

       the incident. She and J.F. had been walking to April’s apartment and defendant yelled at them

       and told them to “come here.”

¶ 15          Derrick Dawson testified that he was April’s neighbor. On March 8, 2018, he observed a

       black male with a medium build exiting April’s apartment. He had never seen the man before.

       He saw J.F. run after the man and ask for her cell phone back, which the man provided. The man

       left quickly. Dawson met April when she returned home. They followed the man and Dawson

       waited with April for officers to arrive.

¶ 16          Officer Peter Van Gessel of the Joliet Police Department testified that he met with April

       who identified the apartment the man had entered. He knocked on the door of that apartment for

       10 minutes with no answer. Eventually, an apartment resident, Elaine Glover, arrived and

       allowed police to enter and search her apartment. Van Gessel located defendant sleeping in the

       bedroom. Defendant was fully clothed, lying face down on the mattress. Van Gessel searched the

       apartment for the missing cell phone that was taken from April’s kitchen. A cell phone was

       discovered hidden in the ceiling tiles of Glover’s apartment.

                                                       6
¶ 17          Sergeant Tizoc Landeros of the Joliet Police Department testified that in March 2018, he

       conducted an interview with defendant. The interview was video and audio recorded. The

       recording was admitted into evidence and published to the jury.

¶ 18          In the interview, defendant informed the officers that he did not know the people who

       lived in the apartment, but he had seen them previously. He knocked on the door and asked the

       child who answered if her mother was present. Initially, he indicated that the child let him into

       the apartment and told him that her mother was asleep on the couch; however, she was not there

       so he went into her bedroom. The child was on the phone with her mother. He informed the

       officers that the mother had called him earlier on his brother’s phone. He spoke with the mother

       on her child’s phone and inquired if she asked him to come to the apartment. When the mother

       said she did not, he left the apartment. As he left, a woman he had never seen before followed

       him to Glover’s apartment, accusing him of exposing himself to her daughter. He indicated that

       his pants had not fallen at April’s apartment, and he had not exposed his penis.

¶ 19          As the interview progressed, defendant admitted that he entered the apartment without

       being invited. He again indicated that April had called his brother’s phone; however, when

       confronted with the information that the phone records would be used to confirm that, defendant

       admitted he lied about April calling his brother. He explained that he knocked on two different

       doors before knocking at April’s apartment and received no answer. He then explained that an

       individual named Jimmy had driven him to the apartment because the woman there wanted to

       have sexual intercourse with defendant. He again denied exposing himself intentionally or

       inadvertently and denied the desire to have oral intercourse with the children that were present.

       He reiterated that the mother had invited him to the apartment to have sexual intercourse.

                                                        7
¶ 20          After this exchange, defendant explained to police that he had been walking in the area

       and randomly went to an apartment door. He knocked and received no answer. He then went to a

       second door which was open. He pushed the door open, and a child came to the door. He asked if

       her mother was home and then entered the apartment without an invitation. He asked the child to

       wake her mother and followed her into a bedroom. While in the apartment, he took loose change

       and a cell phone. He entered another bedroom where two children were present. One child was

       on the phone with her mother. Defendant grabbed the phone and spoke with the mother. He lied

       to her about his name and walked toward the kitchen with the phone. The child asked him to

       return the cell phone, which he did. He left the apartment. He admitted that the cell phone and

       change he had taken were found at Glover’s apartment. He informed officers that he put the cell

       phone in the ceiling tiles. Defendant denied exposing himself or asking the children for oral sex

       but admitted to rubbing his genitals over his clothing.

¶ 21          Defendant continued to insist that the mother had called him over to the apartment to

       have sexual intercourse. He again claimed that she had called his brother and that the child had

       let him into the apartment. After which, he looked for the mother and upon failing to locate her,

       grabbed the cell phone and change and left.

¶ 22          Eric Stanley, an evidence technician for the Joliet Police Department, testified that he

       took photographs of the individual that was apprehended by police on March 8, 2018, regarding

       this incident. He identified defendant as the individual that was apprehended. He took

       photographs depicting defendant and the clothing that he was wearing that day which were

       admitted into evidence. The photographs matched the description provided by J.F.

¶ 23          Officer Gregory Kazak of the Joliet Police Department testified that he responded to

       April’s apartment on March 8, 2018. J.F. and K.D. were separated and he took their statements.

                                                        8
       J.F. reported that defendant had exposed himself to her and said to her, “[c]ome taste me.” K.D.

       reported that defendant asked her to “come play with [him]”. Neither child reported that they had

       asked defendant to leave the apartment. On cross-examination, Kazak explained that with

       juvenile victims he would take brief statements initially and then refer them to the Children’s

       Advocacy Center for more in-depth interviews. He acknowledged that as a result, a lack of detail

       in the account given to him on scene is possible.

¶ 24          The jury found defendant guilty on all seven counts. The court sentenced defendant to an

       aggregate 10 years’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals.

¶ 25                                              II. ANALYSIS

¶ 26          Defendant argues that the circuit court erred when it (1) passively relied on stipulated

       findings of defendant’s fitness at hearing instead of making an independent determination, and

       (2) failed to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012) where it failed to

       ask potential jurors whether they understood and accepted “that if a defendant does not testify it

       cannot be held against him.” Defendant acknowledges that these issues were not preserved for

       appeal and requests that we review the issues for plain error.

¶ 27          “Both a trial objection and a written post-trial motion raising the issue are required for

       alleged errors that could have been raised during trial.” (Emphases in original.) People v. Enoch,

       122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). A reviewing court may remedy plain errors affecting substantial

       rights, even if those errors were not objected to during trial or raised in the posttrial motion. See

       Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a). The plain error doctrine permits a reviewing court to remedy a “clear or

       obvious error” when: (1) “the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to

       tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error,” or

       (2) “that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the

                                                          9
       integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” People v.

       Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007). Defendant contends that the court’s failure to make an

       independent determination of his fitness at a hearing is reversible under the second prong of the

       plain error analysis, and its failure to comply with Rule 431(b) is reversible under the first prong

       of the plain error analysis. The first step of the plain error analysis is to determine whether an

       error occurred. People v. Eppinger, 2013 IL 114121, ¶ 19.

¶ 28                  A. Failure to Make an Independent Determination at a Fitness Hearing

¶ 29          Defendant contends that the court found a bona fide doubt as to his fitness and held a

       deficient fitness hearing where it passively relied on the parties’ stipulation to the findings of the

       fitness evaluation. The State argues that the court did not err in relying on the stipulated findings

       of the evaluator where the court did not find a bona fide doubt and was, therefore, not required to

       hold a fitness hearing. To determine whether error occurred, we must first determine whether the

       court found a bona fide doubt as to defendant’s fitness.

¶ 30          A criminal defendant is presumed fit to stand trial. 725 ILCS 5/104-10 (West 2018). “A

       defendant is unfit if, because of his mental or physical condition, he is unable to understand the

       nature and purpose of the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense.” Id. The issue of a

       defendant’s fitness for trial may be raised at any time, by either party or the court. Id. A

       bona fide doubt exists when the facts raise a real, substantial, and legitimate doubt regarding a

       defendant’s ability to meaningfully participate in his defense. People v. Washington, 2016 IL

       App (1st) 131198, ¶ 72. Relevant factors that the circuit court may consider in assessing whether

       a bona fide doubt exists include: (1) irrational behavior, (2) defendant’s demeanor at trial,

       (3) prior medical opinions regarding defendant’s competence, and (4) defense counsel’s

       representations about defendant’s competence. People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d 501, 518 (1991).

                                                         10
¶ 31          The order for a fitness evaluation was entered pursuant to section 104-11 of the Criminal

       Code of Procedure of 1963 (Code), which, in relevant part, provides that:

                                “(a) The issue of the defendant’s fitness for trial, *** may be raised by the

                       defense, the State or the [c]ourt at any appropriate time *** before, during, or

                       after trial. When a bona fide doubt of the defendant’s fitness is raised, the court

                       shall order a determination of the issue before proceeding further.

                                (b) Upon request of the defendant that a qualified expert be appointed to

                       examine him or her to determine prior to trial if a bona fide doubt as to his or her

                       fitness to stand trial may be raised, the court, in its discretion, may order an

                       appropriate examination. However, no order entered pursuant to this subsection

                       shall prevent further proceedings in the case.” 725 ILCS 5/104-11(a), (b) (West

                       2018).

       “[T]he primary distinction between sections 104-11(a) and 104-11(b) is that section 104-11(a)

       ensures that a defendant’s due process rights are not violated when the trial court has already

       found bona fide doubt to have been raised, while section 104-11(b) aids the trial court in

       deciding whether there is a bona fide doubt of fitness.” People v. Hanson, 212 Ill. 2d 212, 218

       (2004). If the court concludes that no bona fide doubt exists, then it need not conduct a fitness

       hearing. Id. at 217.

¶ 32          Whether a bona fide doubt exists is an objective and fact-specific inquiry left to the

       discretion of the court. People v. Garcia, 2012 IL App (1st) 103590, ¶ 123. An abuse of

       discretion will be found only where the court’s ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or

       where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the court. People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d

       1, 20 (2000).

                                                         11
¶ 33          Here, the record contains a single indication that the court found a bona fide doubt as to

       defendant’s fitness to stand trial—the language of the preprinted order that was presented by

       defense counsel and signed by the court. This court has previously found that signing an order

       containing this language is not sufficient to establish a bona fide doubt where nothing else in the

       record indicates the court implicitly agreed with defense counsel’s opinion of defendant’s fitness

       or raised their own bona fide doubt. See People v. Edwards, 2021 IL App (3d) 130190-C, ¶ 71.

       We find defendant’s attempts to distinguish Edwards unpersuasive.

¶ 34          In both Edwards, and the Illinois Supreme Court case which it relied upon, Hanson,

       defense counsel moved for defendant to be evaluated by an expert to determine their fitness to

       stand trial pursuant to section 104-13 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/104-13 (West 2000); 725 ILCS

       5/104-13 (West 2012)). Edwards, 2021 IL App (3d) 130190-C, ¶ 71; Hanson, 212 Ill. 2d at 219.

       This section specifies which types of individuals may be appointed to examine a defendant when

       questions about fitness involve mental health issues. While defense counsel in Hanson expressed

       a bona fide doubt as to defendant’s fitness in his motion, each case found that bringing a motion

       under this statute did not advance defendant’s argument that a fitness hearing was required under

       section 104-11(a) of the Code. Edwards, 2021 IL App (3d) 130190-C, ¶ 70; Hanson, 212 Ill. 2d

       at 215, 219-20

¶ 35          In the instant case, defense counsel made an oral motion which referenced no statute. He

       expressed a bona fide doubt as to defendant’s fitness and requested an evaluation. Defense

       counsel made no request for a hearing, he merely requested to continue the case for the return of

       the evaluation. While he did not specifically reference section 104-13, substantively, his motion

       is the same as the motion in Hanson.

                                                       12
¶ 36          Defendant also attempts to distinguish Edwards by highlighting this court’s concern that

       defense counsel was the person who prepared the order which contained the bona fide doubt

       language. Here, the record is silent as to who drafted the order which the court signed. The

       record does illustrate that the order that defense counsel presented to the court was a preprinted

       form order.

¶ 37          The oral pronouncement of the court upon granting defendant’s motion contained no

       explicit finding of a bona fide doubt. The court merely acquiesced to defense counsel’s request,

       stating, “[o]kay, so ordered, um, to be evaluated.” “When the oral pronouncement of the court

       and the written order are in conflict, the oral pronouncement of the court controls.” People v.

       Smith, 242 Ill. App. 3d 399, 402 (1993). The order signed in this case bears the next court date

       that was selected for return of the evaluation and the court’s signature. All other language was

       preprinted.

¶ 38          Additionally, the record contains no evidence that would lend itself to an implicit finding

       of a bona fide doubt nor does it contain evidence of defendant’s inability to understand the nature

       and purpose of the proceedings against him. Every time defendant was asked a question or

       invited to speak, he answered appropriately. There is no indication in the record that any

       irrational behavior or outbursts occurred. In the absence of any oral indication of finding a

       bona fide doubt, the fact that the court ordered the evaluation or even held a hearing does not

       lend itself to any implicit finding of such. See People v. Schnoor, 2019 IL App (4th) 170571,

       ¶¶ 40-51 (where the record failed to indicate the court had a bona fide doubt as to defendant’s

       fitness, no error occurred by holding a stipulated fitness hearing); Garcia, 2012 IL App (1st)

       103590, ¶¶ 125-37 (the court’s ordering of a fitness hearing did not indicate it shared defense

                                                       13
       counsel’s bona fide doubt where the record contained no comment or conduct by the court which

       supported that contention).

¶ 39             Accordingly, we do not find that this order reflects the intent of the court where the oral

       pronouncements made by the court contained no such findings and the record contains no

       support for the finding of a bona fide doubt.The record establishes that the court entered the

       order under section 104-11(b) of the Code, to help determine whether a bona fide doubt existed.

       Having found none, a fitness hearing was not required to proceed to trial.

¶ 40             Finally, the court did not abuse its discretion in failing to find a bona fide doubt as to

       defendant’s fitness. As discussed above, defendant exhibited no irrational or disruptive behavior

       during the proceedings in this case. When defendant appeared in court, he seemed to understand

       and be aware of the proceedings and charges against him. The fitness evaluation report does

       reflect prior medical opinions finding defendant unfit and defense counsel’s concerns regarding

       his ability to understand the proceedings; however, it also demonstrates that defendant

       understood what was occurring, answered the evaluator’s questions appropriately, and

       understood the charges against him. Accordingly, the court did not err in passively accepting the

       parties’ stipulations as to fitness where it did not find a bona fide doubt and was not required to

       hold a fitness hearing.

¶ 41             While we have found no error in the court’s passive acceptance of the parties’

       stipulations, we would suggest that circuit courts explicitly state their findings regarding

       defendant’s fitness on the record. An explicit indication of whether the court has a bona fide

       doubt as to defendant’s fitness or is ordering the evaluation to aid in that determination would

       make a clear record and avoid any unnecessary confusion regarding the court’s intent in the

       future.

                                                           14
¶ 42                                 B. Failure to Comply with Rule 431(b)

¶ 43          Next, defendant contends that the court erred where it failed to ask potential jurors

       whether they understood and accepted “that if a defendant does not testify it cannot be held

       against him.” Defendant argues that this requires a reversal under the first prong of the plain

       error analysis where the evidence is closely balanced because it presents a credibility contest

       between defendant and the victims. The State concedes that the court erred in failing to ask

       jurors about this principle, however, the State argues that evidence was not closely balanced.

¶ 44          To ensure that a defendant receives a fair trial by an impartial jury, the circuit court is

       required to ask all potential jurors if they understand and accept four specific principles of law.

       The record before us demonstrates that the court failed to inquire about the fourth principle, that

       a defendant’s decision not to testify cannot be held against him. Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. July 1,

       2012). “The language of Rule 431(b) is clear and unambiguous. The rule states that the trial court

       ‘shall ask’ potential jurors whether they understand and accept the enumerated principles.”

       People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 607 (2010). Rule 431(b) imposes an affirmative duty on the

       court to make this inquiry to potential jurors. People v. Birge, 2021 IL 125644, ¶ 31.

       Accordingly, courts must take particular care to make these inquiries during the voir dire of

       potential jurors. Based on the record before us, we find the court committed a clear and obvious

       error when it failed to ask the potential jurors whether they understood and accepted the fourth

       principle. Having found clear and obvious error, we examine the record to determine whether the

       evidence was closely balanced.

¶ 45          When arguing for first prong plain error review, defendant bears the burden to persuade

       the reviewing court that the evidence is closely balanced. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 567. Whether

       evidence is closely balanced presents a different question than whether the evidence is sufficient

                                                         15
       to support the defendant’s conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 566. The question is

       whether the evidence is so closely balanced that “the error alone severely threatened to tip the

       scales of justice.” People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 51. We employ a commonsense evaluation

       of the evidence in answering that question and consider the totality of the evidence presented. Id.

       ¶ 53. In evaluating the strength of the evidence, we must consider both “the quantum and

       quality” of evidence. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 571.

¶ 46          Defendant argues the evidence regarding the sexual offenses was closely balanced.

       Concerning the single count of sexual exploitation of a child, defendant contends that the

       evidence was closely balanced regarding the required element of defendant exposing his sexual

       organs for the purpose of arousal or gratification of himself or the child. See 720 ILCS 5/11-

       9.1(a)(2) (West 2018). Concerning the indecent solicitation of a minor charges, defendant

       contends that the evidence was closely balanced regarding the required element that defendant

       knowingly solicited J.F. and K.D. to perform a sexual act. See id. § 11-6.

¶ 47          Here, there was substantial evidence to support J.F. and K.D.’s account of the sexual

       exploitation and indecent solicitation charges. Both children testified consistently regarding

       defendant exposing his penis to J.F. J.F. was able to describe the clothing that defendant was

       wearing, including his boxer shorts. Photographs of defendant’s clothing from the day of the

       incident were admitted into evidence and consistent with J.F.’s testimony. K.D. did not

       personally observe defendant’s exposed penis, however, she was present in the bedroom at the

       time it occurred and testified consistently as to J.F.’s contemporaneous reactions and statements.

       Additionally, April, who was on the phone, heard J.F. state that defendant was exposing himself.

       Both children’s testimony regarding defendant’s behavior and solicitous comments reflected the

                                                       16
       statements they made separately to police on the day of the incident which corroborate one

       another’s account of events.

¶ 48          Defendant’s account of the events is mercurial at best. He disclosed to investigators

       several versions of events throughout the interview. At one point, defendant indicated that April

       called for him on his brother’s phone to come over to her apartment. He claimed J.F. let him into

       the apartment. Later, defendant admitted that he lied about April calling his brother’s phone and

       that he entered the apartment without being invited. He later indicated that an individual named

       Jimmy drove him to the apartment then said he had been randomly walking around and decided

       to knock on apartment doors. Additionally, some of his statements corroborate the testimony of

       the other witnesses. Defendant admits to entering the apartment and searching for April. He

       admits to lying about his name to April on the phone and stealing change and a cell phone from

       the apartment. He admits to grabbing his genitals over his clothing. He denies exposing himself

       or making solicitous comments to the children. However, defendant’s version of events changed

       so often that it is simply not plausible considering the totality of the evidence. Therefore, we

       conclude that the evidence was not so closely balanced that the Rule 431(b) error requires

       reversal under the first prong of the plain error analysis.

¶ 49                                            III. CONCLUSION

¶ 50          The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.

¶ 51          Affirmed.

                                                         17