Court Opinion

ID: 9399185
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-02 14:06:28.313014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:44.974161
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MAY 26, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2021-CA-1347-MR

JAMES ARTHUR HARMON, JR.                                            APPELLANT

               APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT
v.                  FAMILY COURT DIVISION
         HONORABLE JANIE MCKENZIE-WELLS, SPECIAL JUDGE
                     ACTION NO. 18-CI-00491

WANDA B. HARMON                                                       APPELLEE

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, KAREM, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

TAYLOR, JUDGE: James Arthur Harmon, Jr., brings this appeal from orders

entered in the Floyd Circuit Court, Family Court Division (family court) on

September 9, 2021, October 18, 2021, and November 15, 2021, dividing marital

property and awarding maintenance to Wanda B. Harmon. We affirm.

            James and Wanda were married June 3, 1967. The parties separated

after fifty years of marriage on April 8, 2018. During the marriage, James and
Wanda both worked outside the home; however, at the time of separation both

parties were retired. On July 25, 2018, Wanda filed a petition for dissolution of

marriage in the family court. Following a final evidentiary hearing, Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decree of Marriage and Order, and Judgment were

entered on September 23, 2019 (September 23, 2019, Judgment). Relevant to this

appeal, the family court divided the parties’ marital property1 and awarded Wanda

permanent maintenance of $1,000 per month. James pursued a direct appeal to this

Court (Harmon v. Harmon, No. 2020-CA-0072-MR, 2021 WL 3435511 (Ky. App.

Aug. 6, 2021)).

              By Opinion rendered August 6, 2021, this Court affirmed in part and

vacated in part the family court’s September 23, 2019, Judgment and remanded for

proceedings consistent with the Opinion. In its August 6, 2021, Opinion, this

Court of Appeals affirmed the family court’s order as to the division of marital

property but vacated and remanded as to the award of permanent maintenance to

Wanda in the amount of $1,000 per month. Upon remand, the family court was

directed to make the requisite findings of fact required by Kentucky Revised

Statutes (KRS) 403.200(1)(a) and (b) regarding whether Wanda lacked sufficient

1
 Regarding the division of marital property, the family court ordered the marital residence
belonging to James Arthur Harmon, Jr., and Wanda B. Harmon be sold and the proceeds divided
equally between the parties after payment of the mortgage. The family court further ordered that
James’s Merrill Lynch retirement account would also be divided equally after an offset for
marital guns she sold. The court also divided myriad items of personal property belonging to the
parties including multiple vehicles.

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property to provide for her reasonable needs and whether she was able to support

herself through appropriate employment. The Court further directed that if the

family court made the requisite findings of fact and deemed an award of

maintenance appropriate, the family court must then consider the factors

enumerated in KRS 403.200(2)(a)-(f) to determine the amount and duration of the

maintenance award.

            Upon remand, the family court made the following findings of fact in

its September 9, 2021, Order:

            [T]he parties were married for approximately fifty-one
            (51) years, before they separated in 2018. Both parties
            are over seventy (70) years of age at this time. [Wanda]
            draws social security benefits in the amount of $1,124.00
            per month and [James] receives social security benefits in
            the amount of $2,090.00 per month plus $700.00 per
            month from a retirement account with Merrill Lynch.
            This results in a discrepancy in income received by the
            parties. Further, [James] previously agreed and requested
            Merrill Lynch to make monthly payments from his
            retirement account in the amount of $1,800.00 to
            [Wanda] as maintenance herein. [James] further testified
            to expenses that totaled approximately $1,930.00 per
            month, not counting entertainment expenses. Therefore,
            [Wanda] has shown, by her testimony, her need for
            maintenance based on her age (over 70), the length of her
            marriage (51 years), and her current income, and [James]
            has shown the ability to pay maintenance herein as his
            income exceeds his necessary expenses. . . .

September 9, 2021, Order at 2. The family court again awarded Wanda $1,000 per

month in maintenance but limited it to a period of ten years. Notably absent from

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the family court’s September 9, 2021, Order was any finding regarding whether

Wanda had sufficient property to provide for her reasonable needs and whether she

was able to support herself through appropriate employment.

            James subsequently filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the

September 9, 2021, Order and filed a motion for more specific findings of fact. By

Order entered October 18, 2021, the family court denied James’s motion to alter,

amend, or vacate but reserved ruling upon James’s motion for more specific

findings of fact. Then, by Order entered November 15, 2021, the family court

ruled on James’s motion for more specific findings of fact as follows:

            1. That [James’s] motion for additional or more specific
               findings should be a moot point as the Court has
               already addressed this matter. However, the Court
               now reiterates their position and findings as to the
               award of maintenance.

            2. That the Court stands by the Findings of Fact and
               Conclusions of Law and Judgment entered by the
               Court and states that per the requirements of KRS
               403.200, [Wanda] qualified for and was due the
               permanent award of maintenance given to her.

            3. That [Wanda] fully established her need for
               maintenance which was the first prong of the test.
               Even with the division of marital assets [Wanda]
               would be without financial resources to sustain the
               lifestyle to which she had become accustomed.

            4. Further, that per KRS 403.200, the Court took into
               account the very lengthy marriage of the parties and
               the age of the litigants. It is unlikely, to the point of

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                impossible, for [Wanda] to become gainfully
                employed at her age and health status.

            5. That the record shows the parties were not litigants of
               great means. However, [Wanda] is by law entitled to
               live in the lifestyle she had become accustomed
               during the marriage, KRS 403.200 (2) (c), and
               therefore the award of maintenance was proper.

            6. The testimony shows that [James] is left, after the
               division of property, reasonable assets to maintain his
               lifestyle.

            7. That Newman v. Newman, 597 S.W. 2d 137 [(Ky.
               1980)], dictates that an award of maintenance is under
               the discretion of the trial court and shall not be
               overturned unless there is clear error. In the case at
               bar, the elements of both prongs of the test set forth in
               KRS 403.200 have been met and proved. The award
               of maintenance is not in err.

November 15, 2021, Order a 1-3. This appeal follows.

            James initially contends the family court abused its discretion and

failed to make the requisite findings of fact under KRS 403.200(1)(a) and (b)

regarding whether Wanda had sufficient property to meet her reasonable needs and

whether Wanda was able to support herself through appropriate employment. We

disagree.

            It is well settled that KRS 403.200(1)(a) and (b) must both “be

satisfied before the family court may award maintenance.” Shafizadeh v.

Shafizadeh, 444 S.W.3d 437, 446 (Ky. App. 2012). And, it is equally settled that

the family court has “dual responsibilities” pursuant to KRS 403.200: “one, to

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make relevant findings of fact; and two, to exercise its discretion in making a

determination on maintenance in light of those facts.” Wattenberger v.

Wattenberger, 577 S.W.3d 786, 788 (Ky. App. 2019) (citation omitted). It is only

after the “threshold conditions of KRS 403.200(1)” have been satisfied that the

family court may “legally consider the factors enumerated in KRS 403.200(2)(a)-

(f)” to determine the amount and duration of the maintenance award.

Wattenberger, 577 S.W.3d at 787-88 (citation omitted).

             The family court’s findings of fact are viewed pursuant to Kentucky

Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01. CR 52.01 provides that “[f]indings of fact,

shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous[.]” A finding of fact is not clearly

erroneous if supported by substantial evidence of a probative value. Moore v.

Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 353-54 (Ky. 2003).

             KRS 403.200(1) governs an award of maintenance and provides:

              (1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal
             separation, or a proceeding for maintenance following
             dissolution of a marriage by a court which lacked
             personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse, the court
             may grant a maintenance order for either spouse only if it
             finds that the spouse seeking maintenance:

             (a) Lacks sufficient property, including marital property
             apportioned to him, to provide for his reasonable needs;
             and

             (b) Is unable to support himself through appropriate
             employment . . . .

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             In this case, the family court clearly found that even after the division

of marital property Wanda would not have sufficient property to provide for her

needs. The family court, likewise, found it was almost impossible that Wanda

could become employed given her age and her health status, thus precluding

Wanda’s ability to support herself through appropriate employment. Therefore, we

conclude the family court made the requisite findings of fact pursuant to KRS

403.200(1)(a) and (b) and did not abuse its discretion in determining that Wanda

was entitled to maintenance.

             James finally contends that the family court abused its discretion as to

the amount and duration of the maintenance award to Wanda. More particularly,

James asserts that even if Wanda satisfied the threshold requirements of KRS

403.200(1)(a) and (b), the family court abused its discretion by awarding Wanda

maintenance of $1,000 per month for a period of ten years.

             It is well established that if KRS 403.200(1) is satisfied, the

maintenance award shall be in an amount and duration deemed just after

considering the factors set forth in KRS 403.200(2)(a)-(f). KRS 403.200(2)(a)-(f)

includes consideration of the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance;

the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party

seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment; the standard of living

established during the marriage; the duration of the marriage; the age and the

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physical/emotional condition of the spouse seeking maintenance and the ability of

the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his needs while meeting

those of the spouse seeking maintenance.

             It is axiomatic that the amount and duration of a maintenance award

are within the sound discretion of the family court. Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d

928 (Ky. 1990). An award of maintenance may only be reversed where there has

been a clear abuse of discretion. Combs v. Combs, 622 S.W.2d 679 (Ky. App.

1981). And, of course, the family court’s findings of fact on this issue are

conclusive if supported by substantial evidence of a probative value. Spurlin v.

Spurlin, 456 S.W.2d 683 (Ky. 1970); CR 52.01.

             Having reviewed the record, we are simply unable to conclude that the

family court abused its discretion by awarding Wanda maintenance of $1,000 per

month for a period of ten years. The family court engaged in a thorough analysis

and considered the appropriate factors set forth in KRS 403.200(2)(a)-(f). For

example, the family court found that due to Wanda’s age and health status it was

likely impossible that she could find appropriate employment. The family court

also noted the length of the parties’ marriage, which was more than fifty years.

Finally, the family court also pointed out that James had the ability to pay

maintenance to Wanda while still meeting his needs. Therefore, the family court

made detailed findings of fact on this issue and those findings are supported by

                                         -8-
substantial evidence. Accordingly, we reject James’s contention that the family

court erred in awarding Wanda maintenance of $1,000 per month for a period of

ten years.

                In sum, we are of the opinion that the circuit court did not commit

reversible error in awarding Wanda $1,000 per month in maintenance for a period

of ten years.

                For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the Floyd Circuit Court,

Family Court Division, are affirmed.

                ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                        BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 James Brandon May                           Jennifer Burke Elliott
 Paintsville, Kentucky                       Prestonsburg, Kentucky

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