Court Opinion

ID: 9791235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:07:55.358829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:35.010695
License: Public Domain

BENCH, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I agree that the Controlled Substances Act passes constitutional muster under article V, section 1, of the Utah Constitution. I disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that the Act violates article YI, section 1.
When we are faced with a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, we must adhere to the rule that “legislative enactments are endowed with a strong presumption of validity and will not be declared unconstitutional unless there is no basis upon which they can be construed as conforming to constitutional requirements.” In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988) (citing Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805, 806-07 (Utah 1974)).
The main opinion reverses defendant’s convictions on the authority of State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 1977). The narrow holding of Gallion is that the former Act was an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine of article V since it allowed the executive in charge of enforcing the law to exercise legislative functions. The Gallion opinion could have, and for clarity’s sake arguably should have, stopped there. Instead, it went on to talk about improper legislative delegation.
My colleagues suggest that this dicta was framed under article YI. I disagree. The legislative delegation discussion in Gallion was framed under statute and case law.1 The statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105 (1974), provided as follows: *918“Common law crimes are abolished and no conduct is a crime unless made so by this code, other applicable statute or ordinance.” The case, State v. Johnson, 44 Utah 18, 137 P. 632 (1913), held that under article V (not VI), courts may not denounce and punish as crimes acts and omissions not made punishable by statute.
By enacting the Controlled Substances Act, the legislature has criminalized the manufacture, distribution, and possession of controlled substances. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a) (1990). The legislature has given a federal agency the task of identifying the particular substances to be controlled. Such delegation of responsibility is not, on its face, an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. See Williams, Police Rulemaking Revisited: Some New Thoughts on an Old Problem, 47:4 Law & Contemp.Probs. 123 (Autumn 1984). Whether our statute is unconstitutional should turn not on article VI, but on whether the legislature has adequately identified standards and procedural safeguards for the placement of substances on the schedules. See generally, Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U.Chi.L. Rev. 713 (1969).
From a practical viewpoint, the prohibition against legislative delegation cannot be absolute. As explained by Justice Crockett in his concurring opinion in Gallion:
[D]ue to the complexities of human society, which are ever increasing, the function of the legislative branch must necessarily be that of a general policy making body and that it cannot spell out all of the details of the administration and application of law. Consequently, it is necessary that the executive branch (e.g., administrative agencies ...), in order to carry out the responsibilities imposed upon them, have the power to make rules and regulations that must be complied with, and that failure to comply must have sanctions or penalties, and that they therefore must have the force of law.
572 P.2d at 690.
In addition to the Controlled Substances Act, other legislation has defined the general crime and then left to an administrative agency the responsibility of specifying the prohibited activity. As long as the rules and regulations promulgated under such legislation meet due process requirements, they should be enforceable.
I cannot reverse this case solely on the authority of Gallion.

. In Gallion, “the Utah Supreme Court affirmed on grounds that the Constitution of Utah prohibits the legislature from delegating both legislative and executive powers to a single person, and further, that the power to define conduct as criminal is exclusively reserved to the legisla*918ture by both statute and case law.” 1978 Utah L. Rev. 399 (footnotes omitted).