Court Opinion

ID: 9489637
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:20:08.63265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:37.804202
License: Public Domain

WALD, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment:
Charlie R. Miller obtained an order from a state court in Smith County, Texas on July 27, 1992, establishing paternity of his daughter, Lorelyn. If he had obtained the decree on June 19, 1991, the day before Lorelyn’s 21st birthday, she would now be a citizen of the United States. But because of his delay of little more than a year and a month, she is not a citizen — though there is no question that Miller is her father.1 Unlike the majority, I see no rational basis for a law that requires a U.S. citizen father, but not a U.S. citizen mother, to formally legitimate a child before she reaches majority as well as agree in writing to provide financial support until that date or forever forfeit the right to transmit citizenship. Rather, I believe that this requirement is based simply on the stereotyping assumption that a mother will be closer to her child bom out of wedlock than a father will be to his. Unfortunately, however, I also believe that the Supreme Court’s decision in Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 97 S.Ct. 1473, 52 L.Ed.2d 50 (1977), forecloses us from holding that the imposition of such requirements on U.S. citizen fathers but not on U.S. citizen mothers is unconstitutional, and thus I regretfully concur in the judgment against Ms. Miller.
As the majority notes, under Fiallo we must uphold the requirement that a U.S. citizen father must legitimize and agree to provide financial support for his child before the age of majority to transmit citizenship, even though no parallel burden is placed on U.S. citizen mothers, if we find that there is a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” to distinguish between U.S. citizens in this fashion. Id. at 795, 97 S.Ct. at 1479; Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770, 92 S.Ct. 2576, 2585, 33 L.Ed.2d 683 (1972).2 The majority *1474offers two rationales for the different treatment afforded men and women under the statute, both drawn from Fiallo. The first is that this approach will reduce fraudulent claims because there will generally be more reliable proof of maternity than paternity. The second is that distinguishing between the mothers and fathers of illegitimate children reflects the “ ‘perceived absence of close family ties’ between illegitimate children and their natural fathers.” Maj. op. at 1472 (quoting Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 799, 97 S.Ct. at 1481). In the majority’s language, “ ‘a desire to promote early ties to this country and to those relatives who are citizens of this country is not a[n irjrational basis for the requirements made by’ sections 1409(a)(3) and (4).” Maj. op. at 1472 (quoting Ablang v. Reno, 52 F.3d 801, 806 (9th Cir.1995)).
There is nothing inherently illegitimate about either of these two goals. I am on common ground with the majority in believing that the government has a bona fide interest in ensuring that the children on which it confers citizenship are in fact the children of U.S. citizen parents. I also agree that requiring some sort of minimal “family ties” between parent and child, as well as fostering an early connection between child and country, is rational government policy. But these goals, however worthy, do not justify the imposition of a set of procedural hurdles on men — and only men — who wish to confer citizenship on their children.
Clearly the United States should not be in the business of conferring citizenship on people whose parentage is uncertain. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538, 93 S.Ct. 872, 875, 35 L.Ed.2d 56 (1973) (discussing “lurking problems with respect to proof of paternity”). But this problem, as the majority appears to concede, is satisfactorily addressed by the requirement of “clear and convincing evidence” of the father’s paternity before a child can be declared a U.S. citizen. 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a)(1). Once parentage has been definitively established, there is no reason to require fathers, but not mothers, to take the additional step of formal legitimation and a written agreement to provide financial support before a child’s 18th birthday. Before the advent of reliable genetic testing, this requirement of legitimation may well have been a reasonable method for preventing fraud, as false fathers would be more likely to claim paternity once a child had reached majority and no financial responsibility to the child remained. In the absence of “clear and convincing” evidence of the blood tie, such as genetic testing, this legitimation requirement might well have been a useful proxy.
But Congress itself has acknowledged that genetic testing is extremely reliable. In the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Congress required states, as a condition of receiving federal funds, to eliminate laws establishing statutes of limitation on proof of paternity:
Relatively short statutes of limitation were enacted in the past in order to prevent stale claims and to protect a man from having to defend himself against a paternity action brought years after the child’s birth when witnesses may have disappeared and memories may have become faulty. Recent progress in developing highly specific tests for genetic markers now permits the exclusion of over 99 percent of those wrongly accused of paternity regardless of the age of the child. These *1475advances in scientific paternity testing eliminate the rationale for placing arbitrary time limitations on the establishment of paternity for a child and therefore the obligation to support that child.
H. Rep. No. 527, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1983) (emphasis added). Since Congress itself has acknowledged that the accuracy of genetic testing has “eliminate[d] the rationale” for time limits on the establishment of paternity, the fear of fraud cannot be a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for requiring fathers — and only fathers — to take special actions to legitimate and agree to support their child by a certain date.
As a result, the majority places greater weight on the argument that requiring U.S. citizen fathers, but not U.S. citizen mothers, to legitimize and agree to give financial support to their children before they turn 18 fosters close and early ties between illegitimate children, the United States, and the relatives of the children. According to the majority, it is “entirely reasonable for Congress to require special evidence of such ties between an illegitimate child and its father. A mother is far less likely to ignore the child she has carried in her womb than is the natural father.” Maj. op. at 1472. The majority seems to believe that there automatically will be closer and earlier “family ties” between a mother and her illegitimate child than between a father and his illegitimate child. I agree with the majority that traditionally mothers more frequently have assumed primary responsibility for illegitimate children, although it is a subject of some debate whether this phenomenon is traceable as much to socialization and sexism as to biological necessity. But there is a world of difference between noting that men and women often fill different roles in society and using these different roles as the justification for imposing inflexible legal restrictions on one sex and not the other. To do the latter is to govern on the basis of stereotyping assumptions, an approach that has been repeatedly criticized by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3336, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982) (“Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions”); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 369, 99 S.Ct. 664, 671, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979) (state’s practice of excluding women from jury venire violated equal protection where it was justified only by stereotype of “safeguarding the important role played by women in home and family life”); As the Supreme Court said in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, -, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 1422, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994):
Today we reaffirm what, by now, should be axiomatic: Intentional discrimination on the basis of gender by state actors violates the Equal Protection Clause, particularly where, as here, the discrimination serves to ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and women.
Just last term, in reviewing the exclusion of women from the Virginia Military Institute, the Court reiterated that any governmental justification for official action that distinguishes between men and women “must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.” United States v. Virginia, - U.S. -, -, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 2275, 135 L.Ed.2d 735 (1996). While it is true that these eases represent instances where legislation was reviewed under heightened scrutiny, the tenor of the Court’s castigation of gender stereotypes makes it highly doubtful that such stereotypes can ever serve as justifications for governmental action restricting the rights of citizens.3
Of particular significance to this case, the Court has been unwilling to countenance the use of stereotypes to justify lasting distinc-
*1476tions between the mothers and fathers of illegitimate children. In Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979), the Court struck down a New York statute that required the consent of a mother and not of a father for the adoption of an illegitimate child, arguing that stereotypes regarding the relationships mothers and fathers will have with their illegitimate children are only acceptable, if at all, in the child’s infancy: “Even if unwed mothers as a class were closer to their newborn infants, this generalization concerning parent-child relations would become less acceptable as a basis for legislative distinctions as the age of the child increased.” Id. at 389, 99 S.Ct. at 1766. Subsequent case law has established that as the child gets older the extent of the mother’s or father’s relationship with the child becomes the only relevant basis on which to distinguish between them: “If one parent has an established custodial relationship with the child and the other parent has either abandoned or never established a relationship, the Equal Protection Clause does not prevent a state from according the two parents different legal rights.” Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267-68, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2996-97, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983).4 Needless to say, here we have a statute that distinguishes between fathers and mothers of illegitimate children a substantial period — 18 years — after birth, and does so in addition to requiring clear and convincing evidence of paternity. We also have a statute that accords different treatment to U.S. citizen mothers who fail to establish relationships with their illegitimate children until after they turn 18 than to U.S. citizen fathers in the same situation; the mothers can transmit their citizenship to their children despite the lack of an early relationship, whereas the fathers cannot.
As a general rule, of course, Congress is free to promote close family ties by ensuring that citizenship is conferred only on children who have at least minimal contact with citizen parents during their early and formative years. Thus, even though the line is arbitrary, I see no problem with a requirement that the U.S. citizen parent take some action to acknowledge parentage or responsibility for a child before the child reaches age 18. But this putative interest provides absolutely no basis for requiring fathers, and only fathers, to formally declare parentage and agree to provide financial support before a child reaches age 18. Such a distinction clearly derives from the stereotyping assumption that mothers automatically will be close to their illegitimate children whereas fathers will not, and under current jurisprudence such an assumption should not be considered a facially legitimate or bona fide reason for government action. In Fiallo, however, the Court held that the exact same assumption that fathers will not be close to their illegitimate children was a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for distinguishing between the mothers and fathers of illegitimate children in immigration legislation. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 799, 97 S.Ct. at 1481-82. Notably, and regrettably, Fiallo treated the fear of legislating on the basis of stereotypes *1477with a somewhat cavalier disdain, remarking in a footnote that any complaints that statutory distinctions between the illegitimate children of mothers and fathers and their illegitimate children are “based on an over-broad and outdated stereotype concerning the relationship of unwed fathers and their illegitimate children” were more appropriately addressed to Congress. Id. at 799 n. 9, 97 S.Ct. at 1482 n. 9.
Fiallo is a Supreme Court decision directly on point and, as a result, we have no choice but to hold section 1409(a) constitutional. Yet I think it is important to underscore the extent to which Fiallo is out of step with the Court’s current refusal to sanction “official action that closes a door or denies opportunity to women (or to men)” based on stereotypes or “overbroad generalizations” about men and women. Virginia, - U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 2275. Fiallo is a precedent whose time has come and gone; it should be changed by Congress or the Supreme Court.

. As the majority notes, Lorelyn Miller fell into a narrow statutory age bracket the members of which were allowed to elect to have the version of 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) that was in force at the time of the 1986 amendments apply to their citizenship applications. See 8 U.S.C. § 1409 note (Effective Date of 1986 Amendment). This version of section 1409(a) provided that a child bom out of wedlock to a U.S. citizen father was a U.S. citizen at birth if the father met certain residency requirements and "the patemily of such child is established while such child is under the age of twenty-one years by legitimation.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1409(a) note (Amendments). The government does not appear to dispute the fact that Charlie Miller met the relevant residency requirements and thus, under the version of section 1409(a) applicable to her, Lorelyn Miller was only required to have established her paternity by legitimation the age of twenty-one in order to qualify for citizenship. Since the government also does not dispute that the Texas state court order constituted legitimation under the terms of this version of section 1409(a), I assume that this order would be sufficient to support Lorelyn Miller's claim for citizenship had she obtained it before she turned 21. I have couched the foEowing discussion, however, in terms of the requirements contained in the current version of section 1409(a), which, as the majority describes, require the illegitimate child of a U.S. citizen father to "prove both a biological relationship with the father, and the existence, prior to the child's eighteenth birthday, of a personal relationship between them, as evidenced by (a) the father’s written agreement to provide it with financial support until it reaches that age and (b) the father’s voluntary acknowledgment of his paternity or a court adjudication confirming the fact.” Majority opinion (“Maj. op.”) at 1471.

. Although my main complaint here is with Fial-lo's acceptance of stereotypes as a basis for distinguishing between the sexes, I pause to note that Fiallo’s application of the "faciaEy legitimate and bona fide reason” standard to aH immigration legislation, no matter how directly or *1474severely that legislation interferes with fundamental rights of U.S. citizens, is also outdated. This standard may have been appropriate when the Court was moving from its longstanding refusal to subject immigration legislation to any scrutiny whatever to the position that immigration legislation is not immune from review. But this transition having been accomplished, it would seem more in keeping with current Supreme Court doctrine to use a standard that grants great weight to Congress’ power over immigration yet also takes into account the degree to which a particular immigration law restricts the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens and the importance of the rights affected. Cf. 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island, - U.S. -, -, 116 S.Ct. 1495, 1507, 134 L.Ed.2d 711 (1996) (an absolute ban on the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech is subject to more rigorous review than a regulation that targets deceptive sales practices or leaves open alternative means of communication); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2819, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992) (abortion restrictions should he judged by an undue burden standard that takes account of the degree to which a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy is infringed).

. In a recent speech, then-Solicitor General Drew S. Days explained that the United States did not seek certiorari in Wauchope, a Ninth Circuit case holding that the pre-1934 rule granting citizenship to the foreign-bom children of U.S. citizen fathers but not to the foreign-bom children of U.S. citizen mothers was unconstitutional, because it was convinced that the Ninth Circuit’s decision was "consistent with modem developments in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning statutory distinctions based on gender.” Drew S. Days, Lecture, The Solicitor General and the American Legal Ideal, 49 SMU L.Rev. 73, 81 (1995); Wauchope v. United States Dep't of State, 985 F.2d 1407, 1416 (9th Cir.1993).

. The majority cites Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 99 S.Ct. 1742, 60 L.Ed.2d 269 (1979), for the proposition that the "mothers and fathers of illegitimate children are not similarly situated.” Id. at 355, 99 S.Ct. at 1747. Parham was a plurality opinion upholding a Georgia law that allowed only mothers of illegitimate children and fathers who had legitimated their children to sue for the wrongful death of the child. The crucial link in the Court's reasoning was the fact that Georgia provided that only the father could legitimize a child; the Court argued that the requirement that a father can only bring a wrongful death action if he has legitimated his child "does not reflect any overbroad generalizations about men as a class, but rather the reality that in Georgia only a father can by unilateral action legitimate an illegitimate child.” Id. at 356, 99 S.Ct. at 1748. In other words, the Court explicit-Iy based its finding that the mothers and fathers of illegitimate children are not similarly situated on the fact that under Georgia law only a father can legitimate an illegitimate child. Id. at 355-56, 99 S.Ct. at 1747-48. Of course, the real question then becomes whether a statute that allows fathers but not mothers to legitimate their illegitimate children is unacceptably based on stereotypes, but the Court refused to consider the constitutionality of the legitimization restriction on the grounds that a challenge to its constitutionality was not before the court. Parham, 441 U.S. at 355, 99 S.Ct. at 1747. Here, however, there is no underlying additional statute that excuses or explains the distinctions drawn between the U.S. citizen mothers and fathers of illegitimate children, and thus Parham's holding appears irrelevant.