Court Opinion

ID: 9910538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 20:01:37.068854+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:53:09.284216
License: Public Domain

U NITED S TATES A IR F ORCE
             C OURT OF C RIMINAL APPEALS
                         ________________________

                              No. ACM 40302
                         ________________________

                            UNITED STATES
                                Appellee
                                     v.
                       Nikolas S. CASILLAS
          Airman First Class (E-3), U.S. Air Force, Appellant
                         ________________________

        Appeal from the United States Air Force Trial Judiciary
                       Decided 15 December 2023
                         ________________________

Military Judge: Colin P. Eichenberger.
Sentence: Sentence adjudged 18 March 2022 by GCM convened at Fran-
cis E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming. Sentence entered by military
judge on 8 April 2022: Dishonorable discharge, confinement for 2 years,
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to E-1.
For Appellant: Major Spencer R. Nelson, USAF.
For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Alford, USAF; Captain
Olivia B. Hoff, USAF; Mary Ellen Payne, Esquire.
Before JOHNSON, RICHARDSON, and WARREN, Appellate Military
Judges.
Senior Judge RICHARDSON delivered the opinion of the court, in which
Chief Judge JOHNSON and Judge WARREN joined.
                         ________________________

    This is an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as
    precedent under AFCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 30.4.
                         ________________________

RICHARDSON, Senior Judge:
   A general court-martial composed of officer and enlisted members convicted
Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of one specification of sexual assault in
                    United States v. Casillas, No. ACM 40302

violation of Article 120, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C.
§ 920.1,2 The military judge sentenced Appellant to a dishonorable discharge,
confinement for two years, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction
to the grade of E-1. The convening authority took no action on the findings or
sentence.
    Appellant raises six issues on appeal, asking whether: (1) Article 120(b)(2)
and (g)(7), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 920(b)(2), (g)(7), are unconstitutionally vague
because they fail to put defendants on fair notice of the specific charge against
them; (2) as applied, Article 120(b)(2) and (g)(7), UCMJ, did not give Appellant
fair notice when the military judge denied trial defense counsel’s request for a
tailored jury instruction; (3) the military judge abused his discretion when (a)
he ruled that the declarant-witness can state what the effect on the listener
was, instead of the listener themselves, (b) the statement was character evi-
dence that Appellant “wasn’t a good person,” and (c) he did not conduct a Mil.
R. Evid. 403 balancing test; (4) the military judge abused his discretion when
he denied Appellant’s challenge for cause of a court member for actual and
implied bias; (5) relief is required to correct the staff judge advocate’s indorse-
ment to the Statement of Trial Results that states a firearm prohibition was
triggered;3 and (6) whether Appellant’s convictions are legally and factually
insufficient.4 We have carefully considered issues (1), (2), and (5) and find they
do not require discussion or warrant relief. See United States v. Guinn, 81 M.J.
195, 204 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (citing United States v. Matias, 25 M.J. 356, 361
(C.M.A. 1987)). We find no error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substan-
tial rights, and we affirm the findings and sentence.

1 Unless otherwise noted, all references in this opinion to the UCMJ, Military Rules of

Evidence, and Rules for Courts-Martial are to the Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States (2019 ed.).
2 Appellant was acquitted of a second specification of sexual assault.

3 Appellant phrases this assignment of error as follows:

        The [G]overnment cannot prove 18 U.S.C. § 922 is constitutional by
        “demonstrating that it is consistent with the nation’s historical tradi-
        tion of firearm regulation” when [Appellant] was convicted of a non-
        violent offense and this court can decide that question under United
        States v. Lemire, 82 M.J. 263 (C.A.A.F. 2022) [(mem.)] or United States
        v. Lepore, 81 M.J. 759 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2021).
4 Raised pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982).

                                           2
                    United States v. Casillas, No. ACM 40302

                                I. BACKGROUND
    The victim in this case, SF, hosted a birthday party at her off-base apart-
ment for a fellow Airman.5 Through a mutual friend, SF invited HC, who in
turn invited Appellant. During the party, SF became intoxicated from alcohol.
She also showed romantic interest in Appellant. After the party ended, Appel-
lant, a civilian female MM, and SF stayed at SF’s apartment to sleep. SF was
feeling “super woozy,” and “really tired.” She changed into shorts and a t-shirt,
and went to sleep on her bed, along with MM. SF testified that she awoke to
Appellant penetrating her vulva with his penis. Appellant pulled up SF’s
shorts and walked to the bathroom. MM was asleep in another room, having
moved at some point before the assault.
    After HC left the party but before the sexual assault, she communicated
with both SF and Appellant. HC went to SF’s house because SF told her on the
phone “she no longer wanted [Appellant] to stay at her house.” After she ar-
rived, HC asked SF “if she was okay with [Appellant] staying at her house.” At
first SF did not answer, then—with her eyes closed—she mumbled something
to the effect that it was okay. Before she left, HC talked to Appellant, who
assured her he would be leaving within 30 minutes.
    After the sexual assault, SF texted her friend ES, and asked him to come
over to get Appellant out of the house. SF and Appellant interacted until ES
arrived, then Appellant left. SF “was shaking” and told ES she “didn’t want to
stay there anymore.” SF woke MM, and they left with ES to go to his house.
HC later joined them.

                                II. DISCUSSION
A. Challenge for Cause
   Appellant asserts the military judge abused his discretion in this case when
he denied Appellant’s challenge for cause based on actual and implied bias for
a member whose wife had been “raped.” We find the military judge did not
abuse his discretion.
    1. Additional Background
   In group voir dire, the military judge asked, “Has anyone, any member of
your family, or anyone close to you personally ever been the victim of any of-
fense similar to . . . the charged offense in this case?” Chief Master Sergeant
(CMSgt) AG and eight other court members answered in the affirmative.

5 The victim and, except where indicated, the witnesses were active-duty Airmen at

the time of the offense.

                                        3
                  United States v. Casillas, No. ACM 40302

    In individual voir dire by the military judge, CMSgt AG elaborated. In
1992, his wife told him she was a rape victim. Since then, it came up in conver-
sation no more than two or three times. When asked whether this affected him
personally, he said, “I don’t know that it necessarily affected me personally
other than feeling bad for her and what she went through and trying to under-
stand that.” The military judge asked CMSgt AG several questions about what
he thinks:
       Q. Do you think that knowledge of what your wife went through,
       your knowledge of that matter might impact your ability to be a
       fair and impartial panel member in a case that involves an alle-
       gation of sexual assault?”
       A. I think I can be impartial, Your Honor.
       ....
       Q. Why do you think, even though you’re aware of what hap-
       pened with your wife, you can kind of set that aside and you can
       be a fair and impartial panel member in this case?
       A. So, I think that any incident that is separate from another
       incident—you know, this we’ve lived with for a long time and I
       think we’ve processed it. And I just think—I think I can separate
       that incident from basically any other incident that I might hear
       of or try to assess, I guess, for lack of a better word.
       ....
       Q. If you remained as a panel member in this case, after the
       presentation of evidence, you know, you honestly kind of
       thought, you know, the [G]overnment hasn’t really met their
       burden, “I think the right outcome here is a finding of not guilty.”
       Do you think you’d have any difficulty disclosing that to your
       wife or letting her know that ultimately the decision reached
       was a not guilty verdict?
       A. I don’t think I’d have a problem with that.
       ....
       Q. And, again, just similar, just kind of a broad, wide question.
       If you got to sentencing, why don’t you think this wouldn’t have
       any impact on your sentencing determinations?
       A. So, again, I just think that I can separate different cases—I
       shouldn’t say that because it wasn’t a case before, but different
       incidents. I don’t think I have a much better answer than that.

                                        4
                   United States v. Casillas, No. ACM 40302

(Emphasis added). CMSgt AG then affirmed he could separate his wife’s inci-
dent from the incident alleged at trial, he could base his decisions on evidence
and not personal experiences, he could follow the law, and he believed he could
give Appellant a full, fair, and impartial hearing.
   After the military judge concluded his questions for CMSgt AG, trial de-
fense counsel questioned CMSgt AG:
       Q. A few follow-up questions for you. You mentioned that when
       asked if you thought this could impact—a finding of not guilty
       would impact your wife and your relationship in any way. You
       said, “I think it wouldn’t impact.” Why did you use “I think”?
       A. Well, yeah, I hate to assume anything, how she might feel,
       but—so, if I may, not to give too long of an answer, but she’s a
       social worker; so I know she—she deals with these—you know,
       kind of sensitive issues, if you will. So, I just—I think our rela-
       tionship, you know, that—that it just wouldn’t—I know I said “I
       think.” I didn’t—I guess I didn’t really focus on the word I was
       using. I know words mean things. So that’s interesting that I
       said “I think.” I just—You never know, right, when you’re talk-
       ing about [a] relationship with somebody else on what they
       might think, what they might—how they might act. I just don’t
       want to assume that—that it won’t affect her, that she won’t
       have a different reaction than what I’m thinking.
       Q. And I just noticed a little bit of hesitation.
       A. Right.
       Q. Is that you thinking of an answer or is there an emotional
       response there?
       A. I think I’m thinking of the answer because that was an inter-
       esting point that you brought up. So I think I’m just thinking
       through the question and the answer, not necessarily emotional.
    Trial defense counsel challenged CMSgt AG for actual and implied bias.
Trial defense counsel argued that after CMSgt AG was asked whether “a find-
ing of guilty [would] impact his relationship with his wife,” he took “an ex-
tremely long pause to answer that question.” Trial defense counsel disputed
that CMSgt AG was “simply . . . thinking about the answer to the question, it
genuinely seemed like a concerned hesitation.” Trial defense counsel contin-
ued, CMSgt AG was “unable to answer for his wife, he didn’t know how she
was going to react if she found out about a finding of not guilty in this particu-
lar case.”

                                         5
                    United States v. Casillas, No. ACM 40302

    The military judge considered the defense challenge for cause “based on
[CMSgt AG’s] wife having been a victim of sexual assault or rape under both
the actual bias and implied bias standards,” considered the liberal grant man-
date, and denied the challenge. He did “not find this to be a particularly close
call.” He stated, inter alia:
       Though [CMSgt AG’s] demeanor was characterized as drasti-
       cally long pauses; and, potentially, at least in this Court’s inter-
       pretation of counsel’s argument an indication that he was some-
       how emotionally impacted or less than truthful in his responses.
       The Court did not get that impression from his responses. The
       pauses in his responses to questions to this Court, they were
       more clearly indicative of his thoughtfulness of the questions
       asked, his desire to answer them as candidly as possible. The
       Court found him and his body language and his demeanor and
       his responses to the questions posed to be candid and credible;
       and to have clearly articulated, he had no actual bias in this
       case.
       ....
       When asked about the way it impacted him personally,
       [CMSgt AG’s] responses, what I’d imagine any of our responses
       would be, and that is that he had feelings for his wife and what
       she went through, but it didn’t affect him personally, he just felt
       bad for her and trying to understand and be supportive for her.
       Not an unnatural human reaction and not one that would
       demonstrate a bias on the part of an individual such that their
       continued participation would cause damage to the perception of
       fairness in these proceedings.
   CMSgt AG remained on the panel after the Rule for Courts-Martial
(R.C.M.) 912(f)(5) random assignment. The Defense exercised its preemptory
challenge on a court member whom it had not challenged for cause. CMSgt AG
remained on the panel throughout Appellant’s court-martial.6
   2. Law
   An accused has “the right to an impartial and unbiased panel.” United
States v. Nash, 71 M.J. 83, 88 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (citation omitted). A person

6 Before cross-examination of SF, CMSgt AG informed the military judge he thought

Appellant looked familiar. The military judge questioned CMSgt AG, who could not
place how or when he might have interacted with Appellant. CMSgt AG had no nega-
tive memory of Appellant, and thought it was a positive experience. Thereafter, neither
party desired to question or challenge CMSgt AG.

                                          6
                  United States v. Casillas, No. ACM 40302

detailed to a court-martial shall be excused whenever it appears he or she
“[s]hould not sit as a member in the interest of having the court-martial free
from substantial doubt as to legality, fairness, and impartiality.” R.C.M.
912(f)(1)(N). “‘Substantial doubt’ exists where the presence of a member on the
panel would cause the public to think ‘that the accused received something less
than a court of fair, impartial members,’ injuring the public’s perception of the
fairness of the military justice system.” United States v. Commisso, 76 M.J.
315, 323 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (citation omitted). “The burden of establishing that
grounds for a challenge exist is upon the party making the challenge.” R.C.M.
912(f)(3).
   Potential court-martial members are subject to challenges for cause under
actual bias and implied bias theories. United States v. Hennis, 79 M.J. 370, 384
(C.A.A.F. 2020). Under the former, the question is whether the member per-
sonally holds a bias “which will not yield to the military judge’s instructions
and the evidence presented at trial.” Nash, 71 M.J. at 88 (citation omitted).
Claims that a military judge erred with respect to challenges alleging actual
bias are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Hennis, 79 M.J. at 384.
    Implied bias is measured by an objective standard. United States v. Bag-
stad, 68 M.J. 460, 462 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (citation omitted). “Implied bias exists
when, ‘regardless of an individual member’s disclaimer of bias, most people in
the same position would be prejudiced [that is, biased].’” United States v.
Briggs, 64 M.J. 285, 286 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Napolitano, 53 M.J. 162, 167 (C.A.A.F. 2000)). We assess implied bias
based on the “totality of the factual circumstances,” assuming the “hypothetical
‘public’” is familiar with the military justice system. Bagstad, 68 M.J. at 462
(citations omitted).
    We review the military judge’s ruling on a claim of implied bias “pursuant
to a standard that is ‘less deferential than abuse of discretion, but more defer-
ential than de novo review.’” United States v. Dockery, 76 M.J. 91, 96 (C.A.A.F.
2017) (quoting United States v. Peters, 74 M.J. 31, 33 (C.A.A.F. 2015)). This
standard is appropriate “in light of the fact that resolving claims of implied
bias involves questions of fact and demeanor, not just law.” United States v.
Woods, 74 M.J. 238, 243 n.1 (C.A.A.F. 2015). Appellate courts afford greater
deference to a military judge’s ruling on a challenge for implied bias where the
military judge puts his analysis on the record and provides a “clear signal” he
applied the correct law. United States v. Rogers, 75 M.J. 270, 273 (C.A.A.F.
2016) (citations omitted). “In cases where less deference is accorded, the anal-
ysis logically moves more towards a de novo standard of review.” Id.
    “The military judge is [ ] mandated to err on the side of granting a chal-
lenge[; t]his is what is meant by the liberal grant mandate.” Peters, 74 M.J. at
34 (citation omitted). That is, “if after weighing the arguments for the implied

                                       7
                  United States v. Casillas, No. ACM 40302

bias challenge the military judge finds it a close question, the challenge should
be granted.” Id. Military judges who squarely address the liberal grant man-
date on the record are given greater deference on appeal than those who do
not. United States v. Clay, 64 M.J. 274, 277 (C.A.A.F. 2007).
    “[A] prior connection to a crime similar to the one being tried before the
court-martial is not per se disqualifying to a member’s service.” United States
v. Terry, 64 M.J. 295, 297 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (upholding military judge’s determi-
nation of no actual or implied bias where court member’s wife had been sex-
ually abused before they met, and rarely discussed it).
   3. Analysis
    Appellant first faults the military judge by claiming “his voir dire was in-
sufficient.” He lists numerous questions that went unasked, the answer to
which “would have provided valuable information for [d]efense [c]ounsel to
make a challenge and for the [m]ilitary [j]udge to rule on the decision.” Appel-
lant concedes that the military judge “permitted counsel to ask additional ques-
tions when he was finished.” We reject Appellant’s claim of error. As this court
has stated, “Appellant had the burden of establishing the basis for his chal-
lenge, not the military judge,” and “it is up to the parties to obtain the infor-
mation from the members to support their respective positions.” United States
v. Covitz, No. ACM 40193, 2022 CCA LEXIS 563, at *36 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.
30 Sep. 2022) (unpub. op.) (first citing R.C.M. 912(f)(3); then citing United
States v. Wiesen, 57 M.J. 48, 49 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (per curiam); and then citing
United States v. Mayo, No. ARMY 20140901, 2017 CCA LEXIS 239, at *7–8 (A.
Ct. Crim. App. 7 Apr. 2017) (mem.)).
    Appellant asserts the “perhaps most glaring deficiency that the [m]ilitary
[j]udge let stand” is CMSgt AG’s pauses and answers caveated with the word
“think.” We give deference to the military judge’s conclusions from CMSgt AG’s
demeanor, which he attributed to “thoughtfulness” and “his desire to answer
[questions] as candidly as possible.” We do not read CMSgt AG’s answers—as
Appellant implies—to signal that he would be influenced in his duty as a court
member because his wife was a rape victim. Regarding word choice, it was the
military judge who asked CMSgt AG multiple questions about what he
“thinks;” CMSgt AG simply answered the questions asked. Later when con-
fronted with his answers, CMSgt AG did not know why he used the word
“think,” probably because he did not remember that was how the questions
were posed to him.
   Regarding implied bias, Appellant asserts:
       Most members of the public in [CMSgt AG’s] position would not
       want to go home to their rape-victim-wife and tell them, “we ac-
       quitted the accused for sexual assault charges today.” While not

                                       8
                      United States v. Casillas, No. ACM 40302

       wanting to overgeneralize or stereotype, it is not difficult to im-
       agine that most women who had been forcibly raped would not
       appreciate hearing that from their husband.
We think it much more likely that a member of the public, including one who
had been forcibly raped, would want a court-martial to convict the guilty and
acquit the innocent, regardless of the crime alleged. We agree with the military
judge’s conclusions that CMSgt AG’s understanding and support for his wife
was “[n]ot an unnatural human reaction and not one that would demonstrate
a bias on the part of an individual such that their continued participation
would cause damage to the perception of fairness in these proceedings.”
    The military judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the challenge
for actual bias or implied bias. CMSgt AG’s continued presence as a court
member would not have caused the public to perceive Appellant’s panel as less
than fair and impartial.
B. Objection to Witness Testimony
   1. Additional Background
   After the sexual assault, SF texted HC, stating “Your friend is not a good
guy.” HC saw the text later in the morning, and contacted SF. HC then met up
with SF and ES at the latter’s house.
    During its direct examination of SF, the Government tried to elicit from
her the substance of her text to HC. The Defense objected to it on hearsay
grounds. The military judge held a session outside the presence of the members
to consider the matter. The Government argued the text showed SF’s state of
mind, or present-sense impression, or was an exited utterance, and thus was
an exception to the hearsay rule. The Defense stated it was just SF’s opinion
of Appellant. The military judge sustained the Defense’s hearsay objection.
    The Government then asserted it wanted to elicit the statement as “effect
on the listener.” The Government averred that it expected HC to testify that
this text “played into her” meeting with SF that morning. The Defense ob-
jected, asserting SF could not attest to the effect on the listener. The Govern-
ment questioned SF on this point:
       Q. [SF], did you receive a phone call from [HC] after that text
       message at some point that morning?
       A. Yes, sir.
       Q. And did that phone call—the substance of that phone call, the
       nature of that phone call relate to the message, as you under-
       stand, relate to the message you sent?
       A. Yes, sir.

                                         9
                   United States v. Casillas, No. ACM 40302

As the military judge overruled Defense’s objection to SF testifying about the
text she sent HC, he informed the parties of the limiting instruction he planned
to give the members about the substance of the text. Neither party objected.
     SF continued her testimony before the members. She testified she commu-
nicated in the text message to HC, “That [Appellant] wasn’t a good person.”
Immediately following, the military judge instructed the members substan-
tially as he had told the parties, stating, “The statement the witness just tes-
tified to is being offered [ ] not for the truth of the matters contained in the
prior statement. In other words, you can only consider it for its effect on any
listener of that statement, not for the truth of the contents of the statement.”
Each member affirmed they understood the instruction.
   HC testified that one message from SF “said that my friend was not a good
guy.” HC replied to this message about 10–15 minutes later, asking SF what
happened. HC received another message from SF, and in response, went to
ES’s house, where SF had gone that morning.
   2. Law
    Appellate courts review “a military judge’s decision to admit or exclude ev-
idence for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Clayton, 67 M.J. 283, 286
(C.A.A.F. 2009) (citing United States v. Datz, 61 M.J. 37, 42 (C.A.A.F. 2005)).
We will find an abuse of discretion when a military judge’s “findings of fact are
clearly erroneous, the court’s decision is influenced by an erroneous view of the
law, or the military judge’s decision on the issue at hand is outside the range
of choices reasonably arising from the applicable facts and the law.” United
States v. Ayala, 81 M.J. 25, 27–28 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (quoting United States v.
Frost, 79 M.J. 104, 109 (C.A.A.F. 2019)).
    “As a general rule, hearsay, defined as an out of court statement offered
into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted, is not admissible in
courts-martial.” Ayala, 81 M.J. at 28 (first citing Mil. R. Evid. 801(c); and then
citing Mil. R. Evid. 802). “[O]ut-of-court statements offered for other purposes,
such as their effect on the listener to provide context, may be admitted as non-
hearsay statements.” United States v. Leach, No. ACM 39805 (f rev), 2022 CCA
LEXIS 76, at *15–16 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 3 Feb. 2022) (unpub. op.) (citing
United States v. Dupree, 706 F.3d 131, 136 (2d Cir. 2013) (interpreting Fed. R.
Evid. 801(c)(2), a provision identical to Mil. R. Evid. 801(c)(2)) (additional cita-
tion omitted), rev. denied, 82 M.J. 355 (C.A.A.F. 2022). After allowing an out-
of-court statement offered for another purpose, the military judge should in-
struct the members accordingly so that the evidence “is not transformed from
evidence introduced for the limited purpose . . . into substantive evidence in-
troduced for the purpose of establishing a truth of the matter.” United States
v. Lusk, 70 M.J. 278, 281–82 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (citations omitted). Court

                                        10
                   United States v. Casillas, No. ACM 40302

members are presumed to follow the limiting instructions of the military judge
absent evidence to the contrary. United States v. Taylor, 53 M.J. 195, 198–200
(C.A.A.F. 2000) (citations omitted).
   “Evidence is relevant if (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable that it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of conse-
quence in determining the issue.” Mil. R. Evid. 401. “The military judge may
exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the members, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.” Mil. R. Evid. 403.
   “Evidence of a person’s character or character trait is not admissible to
prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the
character or trait.” Mil. R. Evid. 404(a)(1).
   3. Analysis
    Appellant asserts the military judge abused his discretion by allowing SF
to repeat the words of a message she sent HC: “Your friend is not a good guy.”
In his assignment of error, Appellant claims the military judge abused his dis-
cretion when (a) “he ruled that the declarant-witness [SF] can state what the
effect on the listener was, instead of the listener [HC] themselves;” (b) he al-
lowed the statement which “was character evidence that [Appellant] ‘wasn’t a
good person;’” and (c) he “did not conduct a Mil. R. Evid. 403 balancing test.”
    First, we cannot agree with Appellant’s characterization of assertion (a).
The military judge did not rule that SF could testify to the effect on the listener
instead of HC. He allowed SF to testify that she sent those words about Appel-
lant to HC, and to testify that HC contacted her afterwards regarding SF’s
interactions with Appellant. After an overruled defense objection on the
grounds of “asked and answered,” HC testified about the contents of this mes-
sage. She also testified about her actions with respect to SF and Appellant that
morning. We decline Appellant’s suggestion to adopt a rule that someone other
than the listener cannot provide relevant testimony about the effect the words
had on the listener. Cf. United States v. Roberson, 65 M.J. 43, 46–47 (C.A.A.F.
2007) (finding an abuse of discretion where the military judge excluded a wit-
ness’s opinion of the effect the witness’s statement had upon the appellant).
    Appellant makes a related claim: SF was speculating about the effect the
statement had on HC. We find little support for this claim in the record. SF did
not speculate that her message to HC that Appellant “was not a good guy”
caused HC to act a certain way. SF testified she made this and other state-
ments to HC about Appellant that morning. Her testimony, and the testimony
of HC, showed that these discussions led to HC checking on SF’s welfare and
learning of her sexual assault allegation.

                                        11
                   United States v. Casillas, No. ACM 40302

    The Government did not offer the message as evidence of Appellant’s char-
acter, the Defense did not object on those grounds, and the military judge did
not allow it to be considered for that purpose. The military judge specifically
limited its use “not for the truth of the matters contained in the prior state-
ment” but “for its effect on any listener of that statement.” The members each
affirmed they could follow the military judge’s instruction.
    HC’s interactions with SF before and after the offense, especially as they
related to Appellant, were relevant to the charge of sexual assault; indeed, trial
defense counsel did not object to the bulk of this testimony. While Appellant is
correct that the military judge did not conduct a Mil. R. Evid. 403 balancing
test on the record, we disagree with Appellant’s implication that such an anal-
ysis was required on the record. Mil. R. Evid. 403 was not a basis for the De-
fense’s objection to SF’s testimony about this message. In conducting our own
Mil. R. Evid. 403 balancing test, we see little danger in a witness who alleged
sexual assault repeating a statement she made soon after the sexual assault
that the assailant whom she barely knew was “not a good guy.” We find the
military judge did not abuse his discretion.
C. Legal and Factual Sufficiency
   1. Additional Background
    While at ES’s house, SF messaged Appellant, then talked to him on the
phone. Appellant did not know their phone conversation was recorded, or that
others were listening to the conversation. SF confronted Appellant with her
memory that she woke up to his penis inside her; Appellant did not deny the
act and told SF he ejaculated outside her. Appellant told SF, “[Y]ou were re-
sponsive for a little while. And after that you just weren’t talking, weren’t mov-
ing.” Appellant told SF he felt “terrible” and was sorry. Appellant also said:
       I drank a lot and I started kissing you on the bed. You were kiss-
       ing me back. And I just knew that I took it too far. You might have
       not been completely there, and I might not have been
       aware. . . . But I just knew—I don’t think I—without making sure
       that you were fully there.
   MM, the civilian female, recorded part of a conversation between Appellant
and HC:
       [HC]: She was like just tired and you kept tickling her?
       [Appellant]: Yeah, she was out of it. I kept f[**]king with her,
       like I told you.
       [HC]: Yeah.

                                       12
                   United States v. Casillas, No. ACM 40302

       [Appellant]: I had to wake her a[**] up. But, yeah, she was com-
       pletely out of it.
During a different recorded conversation, Appellant told HC he was not sure
he penetrated SF with his penis.
   SF testified that she did not consent to Appellant penetrating her vagina
with his penis. MM opined SF was “very truthful.” HC testified that SF’s rep-
utation in her unit is that she is untruthful.
   2. Law
    We review issues of legal and factual sufficiency de novo. United States v.
Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 399 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (citation omitted). “Our assess-
ment of legal and factual sufficiency is limited to the evidence produced at
trial.” United States v. Rodela, 82 M.J. 521, 525 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2021)
(citation omitted), rev. denied, 82 M.J. 312 (C.A.A.F. 2022).
    “The test for legal sufficiency is whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United
States v. Robinson, 77 M.J. 294, 297–98 (C.A.A.F. 2018) (citation omitted).
“[T]he term ‘reasonable doubt’ does not mean that the evidence must be free
from any conflict . . . .” United States v. King, 78 M.J. 218, 221 (C.A.A.F. 2019)
(citation omitted). In resolving questions of legal sufficiency, we are “bound to
draw every reasonable inference from the evidence of record in favor of the
prosecution.” United States v. Bright, 66 M.J. 359, 365 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (inter-
nal quotation marks and citation omitted). The evidence supporting a convic-
tion can be direct or circumstantial. See United States v. Long, 81 M.J. 362,
368 (C.A.A.F. 2021) (citing R.C.M. 918(c)) (additional citation omitted). “[A]
rational factfinder[ ] could use his ‘experience with people and events in weigh-
ing the probabilities’ to infer beyond a reasonable doubt” that an element was
proven. Id. at 369 (quoting Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954)).
The “standard for legal sufficiency involves a very low threshold to sustain a
conviction.” King, 78 M.J. at 221 (internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted).
    “The test for factual sufficiency is ‘whether, after weighing the evidence in
the record of trial and making allowances for not having personally observed
the witnesses, [we are] convinced of the [appellant]’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.’” Rodela, 82 M.J. at 525 (second alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324, 325 (C.M.A. 1987)). “In conducting this unique
appellate role, we take ‘a fresh, impartial look at the evidence,’ applying ‘nei-
ther a presumption of innocence nor a presumption of guilt’ to ‘make [our] own
independent determination as to whether the evidence constitutes proof of
each required element beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Wheeler,

                                       13
                   United States v. Casillas, No. ACM 40302

76 M.J. 564, 568 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting
Washington, 57 M.J. at 399), aff’d, 77 M.J. 289 (C.A.A.F. 2018).
    To convict Appellant of sexual assault, the Government was required to
prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Appellant
committed a sexual act upon SF, specifically by penetrating her vagina with
his penis, and (2) Appellant did so without the consent of SF. See 10 U.S.C.
§ 920(b)(2); Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2019 ed.), pt. IV,
¶ 60.b.(2)(d).
   3. Analysis
    Appellant personally asserts the findings of guilty to the charge and speci-
fication are legally insufficient because (1) SF was blacked out, and not passed
out, and misinterpreted a consensual interaction as nonconsensual; (2) SF did
not remember what happened or she was not testifying truthfully; (3) SF did
not want to report the incident; (4) after the incident, SF allowed Appellant to
rub her back, and SF did not leave the apartment or call the police; and (5) at
least one witness testified that SF had a reputation for being untruthful. We
are unpersuaded.
    A rational finder of fact easily could have found the Government proved
each element of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Importantly, corrobo-
ration of a witness’s testimony is not required for legal sufficiency. See United
States v. Rodriguez-Rivera, 63 M.J. 372, 383 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (“The testimony
of only one witness may be enough . . . so long as the members find that the
witness’s testimony is relevant and is sufficiently credible.” (Citations omit-
ted)). SF credibly testified that she woke to Appellant’s penis inside her vagina,
and that she did not consent to that sexual act. Moreover, when SF confronted
Appellant later that day, Appellant admitted to SF that the act occurred, and
that at some point during the encounter she was no longer responsive. Appel-
lant did not claim that he got SF’s consent for the sexual act. See United States
v. McDonald, 78 M.J. 376, 381 (C.A.A.F. 2019) (“The burden is on the actor to
obtain consent, rather than the victim to manifest a lack of consent.”).
   We conclude that, viewing the evidence produced at trial in the light most
favorable to the Prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the es-
sential elements of the convicted offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Rob-
inson, 77 M.J. at 297−98. Furthermore, after weighing the evidence in the rec-
ord of trial and making allowances for not having personally observed the wit-
nesses, we are ourselves convinced of Appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. See Rodela, 82 M.J. at 525.

                                       14
                  United States v. Casillas, No. ACM 40302

                               III. CONCLUSION
    The findings and sentence as entered are correct in law and fact, and no
error materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of Appellant occurred. Ar-
ticles 59(a) and 66(d), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859(a), 866(d). Accordingly, the find-
ings and sentence are AFFIRMED.

                     FOR THE COURT

                     CAROL K. JOYCE
                     Clerk of the Court

                                       15