Court Opinion

ID: 9680814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:39:08.484303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:30.677890
License: Public Domain

WANDA McKEE FOWLER, Justice,
concurring.
I concur fully in the court’s opinion and write separately only to differ with the analysis used in the majority opinion to resolve whether chapter 38 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code can be used in this family case to support attorney’s fees.
“Statutory provisions for the recovery of attorney’s fees are in derogation of the common law, are penal in nature and must be strictly construed.” Knebel v. Capital Nat. Bank, 518 S.W.2d 795, 804 (Tex.1974). Consequently, attorneys fees are not recoverable unless provided for by statute or by contract between the parties. Dallas *152Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Seven Inv. Co., 835 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex.1992).
Here, the Family Code specifically provided for attorneys fees because this was a suit affecting the parent-child relationship. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 106.002. But, even though this statute was available to Leticia London, we held that she was not able to recover any fees because — other than the total amounts charged — -she did not present any evidence regarding the hourly rate and the total amount of hours spent by the lawyers or regarding the reasonableness and necessity of the fees.
Leticia also claimed that she was entitled to rely on the provisions of chapter 38 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code to recover fees. That chapter provides for recovery of attorneys fees in eight types of claims. A family dispute is not one of the enumerated claims.1 Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem. Code Ann. § 38.001. For three reasons I believe this chapter was not available to Leticia to recover fees. First, a family law dispute is not one of the listed claims. Second, when read as a whole, it is clear that the sections in the chapter are intended to be read together and are intended to apply only to that chapter. Nothing in the chapter indicates in any way that one or more of its subsections may be used with attorneys fees provisions contained in unrelated codes. Third, reading the chapter in this restrictive manner is consistent with the way Texas courts have read attorneys fee provisions. Thus, chapter 38 was not available to Leticia.
Because provisions for attorneys fees are to be strictly construed, I believe Leticia was limited to the attorneys fee provision in the Family Code. She had one chance to recover attorneys fees, and that was through the Family Code provisions. Consequently, I would have held simply— as Jeffrey London requested — that chapter 38 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code does not apply to a modification suit involving the parent-child relationship, and that none of its sections are available to Leticia London to support an award of fees. See Tex. Civ. Pac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 38.001-38.006.

. Leticia argues that her contract with her lawyer supports the application of chapter 38, but that contract is not the '‘claim” involved in the case — changes in child support, conser-vatorship, parental rights and duties, and residency restrictions were the claims. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 38.001 (chapter 38 applies to eight enumerated types of “claims”)