Court Opinion

ID: 9796780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:04:51.045863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:51:36.527163
License: Public Domain

Nuss, J.,
dissenting: I respectfully dissent because of two primary concerns with the majority’s treatment of its first issue: that the trial court did not err in denying Kirkpatrick’s request for instructions on the lesser included offenses of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.
First, the majority essentially has declared that K.S.A. 21-3214(1) absolutely bars a self-defense claim once any defendant is merely charged with a forcible felony, regardless of the particular facts of a case. This declaration produces absurd results, is contrary to the legislative purpose, and fails to address contrary Kansas law.
Second, the majority has declared that because Kirkpatrick’s “claim of self-defense in this case was directed to the underlying felony of criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling,” imperfect self-defense cannot apply because “imperfect self-defense exists only as a lesser degree of the crime of homicide.” Slip op. at 15. This declaration effectively disregards two facts: (1) that the only charge that went to the jury was felony murder, i.e., a *357homicide, and (2) that the requested instructions were for lesser included offenses of felony murder, i.e., lesser degrees of homicide: voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.
Each concern will be discussed in turn.
1. Application of K.S.A. 21-3214(1) as interpreted by Bell and the majority:
The majority correctly recites K.S.A. 21-3211 (Furse) as providing:
“A person is justified in the use of force against an aggressor when and to the extent it appears to him and he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or another against such aggressor’s imminent use of unlawful force.”
The statute “is a codification of the common law right of self-defense.” State v. Stokes, 215 Kan. 5, 9, 523 P.2d 364 (1974). Indeed, the right of self-defense has been with us since our earliest days of statehood. See, e.g., Wise v. State, 2 Kan. 419 (1864). Referencing this statute, the majority consequently states that perfect self-defense “applies broadly to all crimes involving the use of force against another.” Slip op. at 14.
The majority also correctly recites K.S.A. 21-3214(1) as providing in relevant part:
“The justification, described in sections 21-3211 [use of force in defense of a person], 21-3212 [use of force in defense of a dwelling], and 21-3213 [use of force in defense of property other than a dwelling], is not available to a person who: (1) Is attempting to commit, committing, or escaping from the commission of a forcible felony . . . .” (Emphasis added.)
The majority also correctly recites K.S.A. 21-3110(8) (Furse) to define “forcible felony” as including “any treason, murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, robbery, burglary, arson, kidnapping, aggravated battery, aggravated sodomy and any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any person.” (Emphasis added.)
However, the majority incorrectly concludes from these statutes that regardless of the particular facts of a case, K.S.A. 21-3214(1) absolutely bars the assertion of a self-defense claim under K.S.A. 21-3211 (Furse) — and the corresponding use of a self-defense in*358struction — for all forcible felonies. It further incorrectly concludes that 21-3214(1) absolutely bars the assertion of a self-defense claim to any charge of a forcible felony, citing State v. Bell, 276 Kan. 785, 80 P.3d 367 (2003). By extension of the majority’s general rationale, a defendant would also be barred from even introducing evidence of self-defense once he or she has merely been charged with a forcible felony. In my view, these conclusions are incorrect because they produce absurd results, contravene the intent of the legislature, and fail to address contrary decisions of this court.
The first absurdity is the majority’s effective elimination of self-defense for most of the very crimes for which that defense was developed over the centuries. For in addition to those general categories listed in the statute, these crimes obviously also include the attempts to commit the listed felonies (State v. Sullivan & Sullivan, 224 Kan. 110, 578 P.2d 1108 [1978] [attempted burglary]), some lesser included offenses of the listed felonies (involuntary manslaughter based upon excessive force), and those felonies we have added through case law. See, e.g., State v. Bell, 276 Kan. 785 (discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle); State v. Mitchell, 262 Kan. 687, 694, 942 P.2d 1 (1997) (sale of cocaine); State v. Ackward, 281 Kan. 2, 128 P.3d 382 (2006) (under facts of case, attempted possession of marijuana with intent to sell). Additionally, if other felonies happen to involve “the use of threat of physical force or violence against any person” in their perpetration, they also can be included, e.g., criminal threat, aggravated trafficking, aggravated sexual batteiy, aggravated intimidation of a witness or victim, and child abuse. See K.S.A. 21-3110(8) (Furse).
A further absurdity is evident when we acknowledge that while self-defense is no longer a valid claim for any of these violent, serious, charged crimes, i.e., felonies, under the majority’s holding self-defense would nevertheless remain valid for violent, yet less serious crimes, e.g., misdemeanors. And under its holding, claims of self-defense to charged misdemeanors typically would at least be allowed to go to the trier of fact for resolution.
In reaching my conclusions, I acknowledge that where the language of a statute is clear, our normal rule is that we are bound by it. A legitimate exception exists, however, when that language leads *359to absurd results. The United States Supreme Court agrees. See Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 453, 454 n.9, 455, 105 L. Ed. 2d 377, 109 S. Ct. 2558 (1989) (despite a “straightforward reading” óf statutory language, absurd “that Members of Congress would vote for a bill subjecting their own political parties to bureaucratic intrusion and public oversight when a President or Cabinet officer consults with party committees concerning political appointments”); Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 510-11, 104 L. Ed. 2d 557, 109 S. Ct. 1981 (1989) (no matter how plain the text of Federal Rule of Evidence 609[a][l] may be, it “can’t mean what it says”); United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 27, 92 L. Ed. 442, 68 S. Ct. 376 (1948) (“No rule of construction necessitates our acceptance of an interpretation resulting in patently absurd consequences.”).
Nor is the “absurd result” rule applied by only a few justices belonging to a particular school of thought. Even a “textualist” jurist like Justice Scalia has done so. See Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. at 527 (“statute, if interpreted literally, produced an absurd result,” thus justifying departure from the “ordinary meaning” of word “defendant” in Federal Rule of Evidence 609[a][l]) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice Kennedy has addressed potential critics who might argue that this exception could constitute inappropriate judicial activity:
"[T]his narrow exception to our normal rule of statutory construction does not intrude upon the lawmaking powers of the Congress, but rather demonstrates a respect for the coequal Legislative Branch, which we assume would not act in an absurd way.” (Emphasis added.) Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. at 470 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Like the United States Supreme Court, the Kansas Supreme Court has applied the “absurd result” rule for many years. See, e.g., State v. Le, 260 Kan. 845, 850, 926 P.2d 638 (1996) (“The legislature is presumed to intend that a statue be given a reasonable construction so as to avoid unreasonable or absurd results.”); Todd v. Kelly, 251 Kan. 512, 520, 837 P.2d 381 (1992) (same); State ex rel. Beck v. Gleason, 148 Kan. 1, 79 P.2d 911 (1938) (well-settled rule of construction that the letter of a statute will not be followed when it leads to an absurd conclusion).
*360Kansas has also applied the “contravention of the manifest purpose of the legislature” exception to plain language when, as here, the statutes are construed in pari materia. As we stated in Todd v. Kelly, 251 Kan. at 516:
“ '[I]n order to ascertain the legislative intent, courts are not permitted to consider only a certain isolated part or parts of an act, but are required to consider and construe together all parts thereof in pari materia. When the interpretation of some one section of an act according to the exact and literal import of its words would contravene the manifest purpose of the legislature, the entire act should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding so far as may be necessary the strict letter of the law.’ Kansas Commission on Civil Rights v. Howard, 218 Kan. 248, Syl. ¶ 2, 544 P.2d 791 (1975) (Emphasis added.).”
We construed several criminal statutes in pari materia in State v. Le, 260 Kan. at 850, and concluded: “Surely the legislature did not intend that recklessly causing the death of a law enforcement officer, would have a lesser penalty than reckless aggravated battery against a law enforcement officer.” (Emphasis added.)
Whether under the “absurd result” rule or die less-popular “contravention of the manifest purpose of the legislature” rule, I believe that the majority’s opinion is incorrect. Moreover, its reasoning could be characterized as circular. Here, Kirkpatrick claims that he was shooting in self-defense. However, the majority bars his claim of self-defense simply because he shot into an occupied dwelling. Yet he shot only because he was defending himself immediately after a death threat communicated by an armed Tedlock from within the dwelling. In my view, the legislature never contemplated that if a particular act of self-defense was the same act constituting the commission of the purported forcible felony, the self-defense claim would be barred, neady clearing the way for a nearly trouble-free prosecution. See Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. at 527 (“counsel have not provided, nor have we discovered, a shred of evidence that anyone has ever proposed or assumed such a bizarre proposition”: that civil defendants but not civil plaintiffs receive the benefit of weighing prejudice under die federal rules of evidence) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Stated another way, under self-defense the defendant does not contest that he or she committed the acts which typically would *361constitute the crime, but argues that the commission of the otherwise criminal act was justified. Kansas law therefore considers it an affirmative defense. See State v. Kershner, 15 Kan. App. 2d 17, 19, 801 P.2d 68 (1990) (true affirmative defense does not serve to disprove an essential element of the crime, but merely consists of facts which might exonerate a defendant); PIK Crim. 3d 52.08. If, as here, the act of self-defense is the same act which allegedly constitutes the crime commission, then under the majority's ruling the affirmative defense of self-defense is eliminated as a matter of law.
Had the tables been turned, i.e., had Tedlock felt that he needed to have shot in order to save himself and others, the majority apparently would not bar him from raising the self-defense claim— only because he had the apparent good sense, or good fortune, to shoot at someone barely outside of an occupied dwelling. Accordingly, under the majority’s rationale, once Tedlock began threatening to kill Kirkpatrick, brandishing the cocked pistol and moving toward the door, Kirkpatrick had several tough choices. He could either shoot and be barred from asserting self-defense to a first-degree murder charge, or he could preserve his right to assert self-defense by waiting until Tedlock clearly stepped through the doorway and further attempted to make good on his lethal threat. The law of self-defense does not require such a choice: “If a threatened harm is such that it cannot be avoided if the intended victim waits until the last moment, the principle of self-defense must permit him to act earlier — as early as is required to defend himself effectively.” 2 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 10.4(d) (2d ed. 2003).
Additionally, under the majority’s rationale, the following unfortunate situation could occur. If from A’s house he fires multiple shots at B who is walking on the sidewalk, and to protect himself B returns fire toward A’s house, killing A, then B can be charged with felony murder. The underlying felony would be the forcible felony of discharging a firearm at an occupied dwelling, and the State would successfully bar B from asserting self-defense.
In my view, these statutes are designed to bar self-defense only if the accused is already otherwise committing a forcible felony *362when he or she commits a separate act of violence, i.e., in purported self-defense. Indeed, before Bell, those appeared to be the cases in Kansas where the defense was barred. See State v. Purdy, 228 Kan. 264, 615 P.2d 131 (1980) (during residential burglary, occupant retrieves handgun and is shot by burglar; self-defense denied); State v. Marks, 226 Kan. 704, 707, 602 P.2d 1344 (1979) (during armed robbery of service station, proprietor strikes defendant with cane and is shot; self-defense denied).
The case of State v. Alderson, 260 Kan. 445, 922 P.2d 435 (1996), supports my opinion that the legislature never contemplated that if a single act of self-defense was the same act constituting the commission of the purported forcible felony, that the self-defense claim would be barred. Its facts are similar in that not only was the first-degree felony-murder charge based on the underlying felony of criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle, but also that the act of self-defense was the very same act allegedly constituting the commission of that crime. According to defendant, while the victim drove his car circularly in a parking lot, the victim almost hit defendant’s friend and was headed toward him. Defendant admitted firing two or three shots at the car; there was no dispute the victim was in the car. Defendant testified he was outside of his car and that he fired in self-defense to prevent the victim from running over him. Despite a large amount of evidence contrary to defendant’s stoiy, he was allowed to present his self-defense theory and the court instructed on the self-defense theory. Unlike the majority opinion, on appeal this court did not reach out and bar the self-defense claim or instruction as a matter of law under K.S.A. 21-3214, which would have been the easiest resolution.
The case of State v. Sullivan & Sullivan, 224 Kan. 110, 578 P.2d 1108 (1978), further supports my opinion. There, defendant and his brother were hiding outside a farmhouse where they had gone either to retrieve defendant’s possessions taken by one of the occupants or to obtain other property items. Several occupants then opened the door to let a dog out. Defendant claimed that his shooting of one occupant was an accident because he was actually shooting at the vicious dog in self-defense. The State responded that Sullivan was involved in the commission of aggravated burglary at *363the time he shot, apparently the underlying felony for his felony-murder conviction.
Although the defendant was charged with a forcible felony, i.e., murder (see K.S.A. 21-3110[8]), unlike the majority opinion here, the Sullivan court did not reach out and simply apply K.S.A. 21-3214 to bar his self-defense claim. Indeed, it expressly held the trial court erred when that court gave an “instruction against self-defense” which provided: “ "Under Kansas law, the circumstances in this case are such that the defendants cannot claim the defense of self-defense, and you will not consider this as a defense.’ ” 224 Kan. at 124. According to the Sullivan court, “[T]he problem here is that the instruction . . . took from the jury the decision as to whether the defendants had completed the necessary overt act and attempted the burglary.” 224 Kan. at 126. Accordingly, it reversed and remanded for the jury to decide if attempted burglary had in fact been committed.
The case of State v. Ackward, 281 Kan. 2, also supplies some guidance. There, a death occurred during a purported attempt to possess marijuana with intent to sell, a potential forcible felony. The trial court not only instructed on self-defense, but also instructed that a person is not justified in using force in defense if committing a forcible felony. This court held that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on the felony-murder charge that a person is not justified in using force in defense of himself or herself if attempting to possess marijuana with intent to sell. 281 Kan. at 26. Unlike the majority opinion, on appeal the Ackward court did not reach out and bar the self-defense claim or instruction as a matter of law under K.S.A. 21-3214, which would have been the easiest resolution. This opinion, like Sullivan, suggests that it is a jury question whether self-defense could apply or if the defendant was instead committing a forcible felony.
See also State v. Gayden, 259 Kan. 69, 910 P.2d 286 (1996) (defendant’s request for self-defense instruction in felony-murder case with attempted voluntary manslaughter as underlying felony not rejected under K.S.A. 21-3214; rather, court rejected because evidence did not support defendant’s belief that shooting was nec*364essary to defend himself against victim’s imminent use of unlawful force).
The majority does not address any of these Kansas Supreme Court cases in its opinion, much less attempt to reconcile them with its holding.
I also find support for my opinion in the language of K.S.A. 21-3214(2) and (3). I first emphasize that what little protection is left to the defendant who desires to claim self-defense, and who is not automatically barred by the “forcible felony” exclusion in 21-3214(1), is further reduced by these subsections. But most important to my position is the language illustrating the overall barring purpose of the statute intended by the legislature: the defendant must be the instigator, either through the initial commission of the forcible felony or of the separate act of violence.
Subsection (2) provides (assuming of course that the defendant is not charged with a forcible felony) that he or she may nevertheless be further barred from claiming self-defense if the defendant “[ijnitially provokes the use of force against himself or another, with intent to use such force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant.” (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 21-3214(2). The remainder of the statutory self-defense protection supplied by K.S.A. 21-3211 (Furse) is further reduced by subsection (3) of K.S.A. 21-3214: if he or she “otherwise initially provokes the use of force against himself or another,” unless certain limited exceptions apply. (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 21-3214(3).
Finally, I would point out that in Bell, the assertion of our new-found rule was simply an alternate basis for denying the defendant a self-defense jury instruction. Bell’s facts also supported the denial by the district court and that affirmation on appeal. Here, the facts are better for Kirkpatrick — as evidenced in part by the State’s request for a self-defense instruction and the district court’s giving of two of them. The majority opinion omits several and de-emphasizes others that I think are relevant to the inquiry.
According to Kirkpatrick, after his group returned to the apartment location, Powers came out to talk. Powers and Farha discussed the previous punching incident “like friends” to tiy to resolve the resultant tension. During this time that Kirkpatrick *365thought everything was going well, he looked through the apartment’s sliding glass door. He saw that the man who had previously lost his temper and punched Wright (Tedlock) was waving a black .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol which Kirkpatrick knew Powers kept at the house. Kirkpatrick testified that Tedlock was yelling, “Where is Tom [Wright] at? Does he want more?”
According to Kirkpatrick, he pushed Powers out of the way, walked up to the window, and told Tedlock to put the gun away, that the situation was over. Kirkpatrick told his friends that Tedlock had a gun, and Wright confirmed that he heard Kirkpatrick state that the men inside the apartment had a gun.
According to Kirkpatrick, Tedlock continued yelling and cursing. He saw Tedlock look at him, while saying, “I’ll kill you,” and cock the pistol by moving its slide back and then forward. Tedlock moved in the direction of the apartment’s front door, which was only a couple of feet away, and within a second Kirkpatrick brought up the gun and began firing three shots because “[he] had a fear for [his] life and [his] two friends’ life [sic].” Some evidence suggests that only after the door opened partly and slammed shut did Kirkpatrick actually fire at the door. Kirkpatrick testified that by shooting the door, he tried to keep Tedlock from coming outside and shooting them to death.
Other evidence confirms that Tedlock clearly had been aggressive during the first episode, which would additionally support Kirkpatrick’s concern about Tedlock making good on his threat to kill him. Tedlock had followed the Kirkpatrick group out of the apartment and engaged Farha in a verbal dispute, eventually striking Wright. Tedlock also pulled out a knife and was forcibly restrained by Powers.
Other evidence also confirms that Powers kept a .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol and its accompanying magazine in his apartment. The majority accurately states that the gun — with slide pulled back and magazine well empty — and its magazine were later found by police inside snapped compartments of a guncase on a bedroom closet shelf. It is possible, however, that these placements all occurred after the shooting and after the apartment dwellers realized law enforcement would explore the apartment while re*366sponding to their 911 call. Whether Powers’ gun, or any other gun besides Kirkpatrick’s, had been involved in the episode was for a jury to determine.
In short, according to Kirkpatrick, only in response to perceived aggression by an armed and threatening Tedlock did Kirkpatrick shoot to defend himself and his two friends. But under the majority’s mechanical application of the “Bell rule” interpreting K.S.A. 21-3214, the only relevant fact of this case regarding his claim of self-defense is the following: Kirkpatrick was charged with felony murder, a forcible felony. The majority automatically bars a claim of self-defense even though the act of self-defense, as in the instant case, is the very same act constituting the basis for the forcible felony: shooting to protect oneself and the lives of others. As a matter of law, the majority will not acknowledge the possibility that Kirkpatrick was not committing a felony and that he was instead legitimately defending himself.
In conclusion, in my view the majority stands more than 100 years of Kansas jurisprudence on its head. I would disapprove of the overly broad language in Bell and of the majority’s reliance upon it to bar Kirkpatrick’s assertion of self-defense. Additionally, under these facts, the district court was correct to give the self-defense instruction. See State v. Ackward, 281 Kan. 2, State v. Alderson, 260 Kan. 445. Accordingly, I would also reject the majority’s holding that because Kirkpatrick was not entitled to assert self-defense that he is therefore not entitled to instructions on voluntary and involuntary manslaughter as imperfect self-defense crimes.
2. Imperfect self-defense only applies to degrees of homicide:
The majority has declared that “even if it had been appropriate to instruct on self-defense, it does not follow that imperfect self-defense applied to require instructions on voluntary manslaughter or involuntary manslaughter.” Slip op. at 14. According to the majority, this is because Kirkpatrick’s “claim of self-defense in this case was directed to the underlying felony of criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling” — and imperfect self-defense cannot apply because it “exists only as a lesser degree of the crime *367of homicide.” Slip op. at 15. The majority cites 2 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 10.4(i) (2d ed. 2003) and several Maryland cases for this proposition.
Even assuming that these authorities’ general statements are correct, in my view the majority has stretched their reach to deny Kirkpatrick’s requested instructions. Moreover, the majority’s holding effectively disregards two facts that I think are important. These are: (1) the only charge that went to the jury, and that Kirkpatrick therefore defended himself against, was felony murder, i.e., a homicide, and (2) the requested instructions were for “lesser degrees of the crime of homicide,” i.e., the lesser included offenses of felony murder — voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.
Kirkpatrick argues that his claimed self-defense would negate the criminal intent and other elements required for the underlying felony. He reasons that the evidence that the district court found strong enough to warrant a self-defense instruction necessarily makes the evidence of the underlying felony inconclusive. He properly notes that in such situations, instructions on lesser included offenses may be required. See State v. Calvin, 279 Kan. 193, 201-02, 105 P.3d 710 (2005). (Only when the evidence of the underlying felony is weak, inconclusive, or conflicting, instructions on felony murder’s lesser included offenses may be required.).
As a result, because voluntary and involuntary manslaughter are lesser-included offenses of felony murder, and because they are recognized as forms of “imperfect” self-defense under Kansas law, Kirkpatrick was entitled to instructions on them. Specifically, here voluntary manslaughter is defined as the intentional killing committed upon an unreasonable but honest belief that circumstances existed that justified deadly force in defense of a person. PIK Crim. 3d 56.05. Involuntary manslaughter is defined here as the unintentional killing during the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner, e.g., use of excessive force while committing the lawful act of self-defense. State v. Gregory, 218 Kan. 180, 542 P.2d 1051 (1975); PIK Crim. 3d 56.06.
I acknowledge that Kirkpatrick argues his entitlement to these instructions by attacking the underlying felony in the felony-murder charge, first through self-defense and later through imperfect *368self-defense grounds. However, this attack cannot be separated from his attack on the felony murder itself for several reasons.
First, here the charge of felony murder consists of simply two factors. They are: (1) the killing of a human being committed (2) in the commission of an inherently dangerous felony, i.e., shooting at an occupied dwelling. See K.S.A. 21-3401; K.S.A. 21-4219 (Furse). Because it is uncontroverted that a human being was killed, that element cannot be attacked. Moreover, because the first-degree murder elements of premeditation and deliberation are supplied by the legislature through the commission of the inherently dangerous felony of discharging a firearm at an occupied dwelling, those elements cannot be readily directly attacked here. See State v. Calvin, 279 Kan. at 201-02. What remains is for Kirkpatrick to attack the commission of the underlying inherently dangerous felony.
Second, under the particular facts of this case, Kirkpatrick’s attack on the underlying felony is conducted only to attack the felony murder. We know this because according to the jury instructions in the record on appeal, the only charge that went to the jury was felony murder. Two self-defense instructions were given immediately following the one on felony murder: Kirkpatrick’s “perfect” self-defense and the one requested by the State under PIK Crim. 3d 54.22 (initial aggressor’s use of force). Accordingly, the only charge to which his claims of perfect and imperfect self-defense applied was the felony murder. As a result, even if imperfect self-defense applies only to “degrees of homicide,” then the only charge against Kirkpatrick — felony murder, i.e., a first-degree homicide— is worthy of receiving this application.
In short, once self-defense is allowed to attack this underlying felony, it follows that he should also be allowed to use imperfect self-defense to attack the only charge against him — felony murder — and thereby receive instructions on the lesser included offenses which are manifestations of imperfect self-defense. All three crimes — felony murder and voluntaiy and involuntary manslaughter — are either homicides or lesser degrees of homicides.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial on these bases.
*369Beier, J., joins in the foregoing dissent.