Court Opinion

ID: 9697652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:24:18.859208+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:33.983653
License: Public Domain

ROBINSON, J.,
with whom SUTTELL, J., joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
We are pleased to concur in the majority opinion to the extent that it interprets the charter provisions in a manner that would accord certain procedural protections to plaintiff if and when charges should be brought against him.7 We must very respectfully dissent, however, from that portion of the Court’s opinion which upholds the award of attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff pursuant to G.L.1956 § 9-1-45.8
Pursuant to the “American Rule” (which is traditionally contrasted with the “English Rule”),9 it has long been held that *216“[ajttorney’s fees * * * are not ordinarily recoverable as an element of damages, in the absence of a statute or enforceable contractual provision providing for them.” 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 430 at 384-85 (2003); see also Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975) (“In the United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys’ fee from the loser.”); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717, 87 S.Ct. 1404, 18 L.Ed.2d 475 (1967) (“The rule * * ⅝ has long been that attorney’s fees are not ordinarily recoverable in the absence of a statute or enforceable contract providing therefor.”).
Section 9-1-45, the statute relied upon by the Superior Court in this case constitutes a legislatively fashioned and carefully worded exception to the usual “American Rule,” pursuant to which attorneys’ fees are not normally awarded to prevailing parties. Under the terms of this statute, we do not think that there is any basis for an award of attorneys’ fees — even if this were a contract action of the usual sort.10
We simply do not understand how it can be said that there was “a complete absence of a justiciable issue,” which is an unequivocal prerequisite that must be satisfied before the court may consider making, a discretionary award of fees under the statute. See UXB Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Rosenfeld Concrete Corp., 641 A.2d 75, 80 (R.I.1994) (reversing an award of fees under § 9-1^45, because “the • question of whether the statute of frauds was satisfied presented a justiciable issue even though the evidence eventually proved to be legally deficient.”); see also Hemingway v. Hemingway, 698 A.2d 228, 230 (R.I.1997); Bucci v. Anthony, 667 A.2d 1254, 1256 (R.I.1995).
It is clear to us that numerous legally trained minds have shed the mental equivalent of “blood, sweat and tears”11 before concluding that the charter should be read as the Court reads it today. To our minds, this controversy constituted a virtual prototype. of a “justiciable issue.”12 The issues before the Superior Court were complex and challenging — to be distinguished from (for example) a simple claim on book account when the defendant is obdurate. We continue to believe that this case was close and the “right result” was far from being intuitively obvious. In our judgments it is clear as a matter of law that there was not “a complete absence of a justiciable issue.”13
*217For these reasons, we do not believe that an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to § 9-1-45 was proper in this case, and we therefore respectfully dissent from that aspect of the Court’s opinion.

. We wish to add that, after studying the Court’s opinion at some length, we finally came to perceive the correctness of its careful parsing of the rights that accrue to plaintiff by virtue of his contract and the charter of the Town of Lincoln. In view of several of the considerations discussed in such cases as Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980), we question the wisdom of making it so relatively difficult for an incoming chief executive to remove an official as important as the chief of police. We realize, however, that passing upon the wisdom of charter provisions is not an appropriate judicial function.

. General Laws 1956 § 9-1-45 provides:
"Attorney’s fees in breach of contract actions. — The court may award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party in any civil action arising from a breach of contract in which the court:
(1) Finds that there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the losing party; or
(2) Renders a default judgment against the losing party."

.See Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145, 1147-48 (Fla.1985) (describing the nature and the genesis of both the "English Rule” and the “American Rule"); see also Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 *216U.S. 517, 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455 (1994).

. It is at least arguable that a claim alleging the existence of procedural rights under a municipal charter does not constitute a “civil action arising from a breach of contract,” which is the only type of civil action to which § 9-1-45 applies. We concede, however, that entirely reasonable arguments can be made for the contrary proposition; and we do not basé our dissent upon this issue.

. Winston Churchill’s actual words (in his first speech to the House of Commons as Prime Minister, on May 13, 1940) were: "I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat.” John Bartlett, Familiar Quotations 743 (15th ed. 1980).

. In UXB Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Rosenfeld Concrete Corp., 641 A.2d 75 (R.I.1994), this Court vacated the Superior Court’s award of over $100,000 in attorneys' fees, which award had been predicated upon § 9-1-45. This Court stated "We are of the opinion that the question of whether the statute of frauds was satisfied presented a justiciable issue even though the evidence eventually proved to be legally deficient.” Id at 80. (Emphasis added.)

. Even when there is "a complete absence of a justiciable issue,” the trial justice still has discretion as to whether or not to award attorneys' fees. In our judgment, however, the question of whether or not there is a "complete absence of a justiciable issue” is *217inherently a question of law. Accordingly, unlike my colleagues, we have not scrutinized the trial justice's decision to award attorneys’ fees under the abuse of discretion standard.