Court Opinion

ID: 9408371
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-12 16:08:21.33478+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:43.538463
License: Public Domain

J-A07022-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 NIRAN L. WILLIAMS                     :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 176 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 15, 2021
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-CR-0001887-2016

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 NIRAN L. WILLIAMS                     :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 177 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 15, 2021
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-CR-0001889-2016

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 NIRAN L. WILLIAMS                     :
                                       :
                   Appellant           :   No. 178 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 15, 2021
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-CR-0001890-2016

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                       :        PENNSYLVANIA
J-A07022-23

                                        :
              v.                        :
                                        :
                                        :
 NIRAN L. WILLIAMS                      :
                                        :
                   Appellant            :   No. 179 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 15, 2021
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-CR-0001891-2016

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                        :
              v.                        :
                                        :
                                        :
 NIRAN L. WILLIAMS                      :
                                        :
                   Appellant            :   No. 180 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 15, 2021
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-CR-0001892-2016

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                        :
              v.                        :
                                        :
                                        :
 NIRAN L. WILLIAMS                      :
                                        :
                   Appellant            :   No. 181 EDA 2022

         Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 15, 2021
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-CR-0001893-2016

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                       FILED JULY 12, 2023

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        Niran L. Williams appeals the denial of his Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”) petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. He maintains that the

court erred in denying his PCRA petition because he raised meritorious

ineffectiveness, constitutional, and sentencing claims. He also contends that

the court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing. We vacate the PCRA

order to the extent it denied Williams’ challenge to the constitutionality of his

Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) registration

requirements and remand for further proceedings.1 We affirm the remainder

of the order denying Williams relief.

        A jury found Williams guilty in June 2017, of six counts of robbery, two

counts each of rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI), and sexual

assault, and three counts each of possessing an instrument of crime (PIC),

possessing a firearm without a license, and carrying a firearm on public streets

in Philadelphia.2 In a separate bench trial following the jury’s verdict, the court

found Williams guilty of three counts of persons not to possess a firearm.3 See

Commonwealth v. Williams, No. 1118 EDA 2018, 2019 WL 1522643, at *1

n.1 (Pa.Super. filed Apr. 5, 2019). The court deferred sentencing to

September 2017, to obtain a presentence investigation (“PSI”) report and

mental health evaluation, with no objection from counsel. See Tr. Ct. Docket
____________________________________________

1   See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.51-9799.75.

2See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1), 3121(a)(1), 3123(a)(1), 3124.1, 907(a),
6106, and 6108, respectively.

3   See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105.

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Entry No. 125. Before sentencing, counsel requested a continuance for further

investigation and waived the issue of speedy sentencing. See Tr. Ct. Docket

Entry No. 129; Pa.R.Crim.P. 704. The court continued sentencing to December

1, at which time it held a hearing. See Tr. Ct. Docket Entry No. 129. The trial

court sentenced Williams to an aggregate term of 36 to 73 years’

incarceration. We affirmed the judgment of sentence, and our Supreme Court

denied Williams’ petition for allowance of appeal. Williams, No. 1118 EDA

2018, 2019 WL 1522643, appeal denied, 217 A.3d 1209 (Pa. filed Sept. 17,

2019).

      Williams filed the instant PCRA petition, his first, in August 2020. The

court appointed counsel who filed an amended petition. Williams claimed

ineffective assistance of counsel for several issues, a violation of his

constitutional rights based on the sufficiency and weight of the evidence, the

imposition of an illegal sentence, and a violation of his due process rights due

to his lifetime registration as a sexual offender pursuant to SORNA.

      The PCRA court issued a Rule 907 notice of its intent to dismiss the

petition without a hearing. It concluded that Williams failed “to state a claim

upon which post-conviction relief could be granted.” Notice of Court’s Intent

to Dismiss Without Hearing Defendant’s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, filed 11/22/21, at ¶ 10; Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1).

The court stated that Williams had not presented evidence to support his

ineffectiveness claims and failed to show prejudice. The court also concluded

that Williams’ claims regarding the weight and sufficiency of the evidence were

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both previously litigated on direct appeal and without merit. Williams did not

file a response, and the court denied the petition. Order Dismissing PCRA

Petition, filed 12/15/21. This timely appeal followed.4

       Williams presents the following claims:

          1. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing the PCRA
             petition when clear and convincing evidence was
             presented to establish that trial counsel was ineffective
             for failing to protect [Williams’] constitutional rights and
             the application of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal
             Procedure on multiple occasions; investigate or interview
             potential witnesses, including alibi witnesses; adequately
             prepare for trial or properly object to the introduction of
             prejudicial evidence and improper amendment of the bills
             of information; protect [Williams’] speedy trial rights;
             and appeal the pre-trial hearing decision granting joinder
             of the cases, or file a motion to sever prior to trial.

          2. Whether the PCRA court erred by dismissing the PCRA
             petition when clear and convincing evidence was
             presented to establish violations of [Williams’]
             constitutional rights under the United States and
             Pennsylvania Constitutions, including Fourth Amendment
             violations based on the inclusion of knowingly false
             information on the affidavits of probable cause for arrest;
             due process violations based on the improper
             amendment of the bills of information; admission of
             prejudicial evidence; a violation of his speedy trial rights;
             a conviction based on insufficient evidence; a verdict
             against the weight of the evidence; and the Sixth

____________________________________________

4 When a single order resolves issues arising on more than one docket,
separate notices of appeal must be filed from that order at each docket. See
Commonwealth v. Young, 265 A.3d 462, 477 (Pa. 2021). Williams filed a
notice of appeal at each separate trial court docket number, listing all six
docket numbers on each notice. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.3d
1141, 1148 (Pa.Super. 2020) (en banc). We consolidated the appeals sua
sponte.

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            Amendment       violation    established    by    counsel’s
            ineffectiveness.

         3. Whether the trial court imposed an illegal sentence in
            excess of the statutory maximum.

         4. Whether the PCRA court erred by failing to grant an
            evidentiary hearing.

Williams’ Br. at 9.

      “Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to

examining whether the evidence of record supports the court’s determination

and whether its decision is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Beatty,

207 A.3d 957, 960-61 (Pa.Super. 2019).

      Within his first issue, Williams raises several ineffectiveness claims. A

petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must overcome the

presumption of effectiveness. See Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601,

618 (Pa. 2015). The petitioner may do so by pleading and proving: “(1) the

legal claim underlying the ineffectiveness claim has arguable merit; (2)

counsel’s action or inaction lacked any reasonable basis designed to effectuate

petitioner's interest; and (3) counsel’s action or inaction resulted in prejudice

to petitioner.” Id. (citation omitted). Prejudice in this context means “that

there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would

have been different but for counsel’s action or inaction.” Commonwealth v.

Johnson, 139 A.3d 1257, 1272 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted). Counsel will not

be deemed ineffective for failing to raise meritless claims. See id.

Furthermore, a failure to establish any of the prongs of an ineffectiveness

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claim will result in rejection of the claim. See Commonwealth v. Basemore,

744 A.2d 717, 738 n.23 (Pa. 2000).

      Williams raises multiple ineffectiveness claims within his first issue; we

address each separately. We note that collectively for the prejudice prong,

Williams maintains that counsel’s actions or inactions “adversely affected the

outcome of the trial” and denied him the opportunity to prove his innocence.

Williams’ Br. at 18. He also claims that counsel’s failures prejudiced him by

“undermin[ing] the jury’s ability to make a reliable determination of guilt or

innocence.” Id. at 19.

Failure to Object to Commonwealth’s Noncompliance with Rule 556(B)

      Williams argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to,

or file a motion to quash, the indictment due to the Commonwealth’s failure

to comply with Rule 556(B) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure.

He maintains that the Commonwealth failed to comply with Rule 556 because

it did not provide proof that the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas petitioned

our Supreme Court to resume an indicting grand jury.

      This claim of ineffectiveness fails as it lacks arguable merit. Williams

confuses the Court of Common Pleas’ responsibility pursuant to Rule 556(B)

with the Commonwealth’s responsibility under Rule 556.2(A) as it relates to

indicting grand juries. Pursuant to Rule 556(B), the Court of Common Pleas,

not the Commonwealth, petitioned the Supreme Court to resume indicting

grand juries and was granted that ability “on or after December 18, 2012.” In

re Empanelment of Indicting Grand Jury, 54 A.3d 13, 14 (Pa. 2012);

                                      -7-
J-A07022-23

Pa.R.Crim.P. 556(B). In comparison, Rule 556.2 requires that when the

Commonwealth wishes to proceed by way of a grand jury, it files a motion to

“present the matter to an indicting grand jury instead of proceeding to a

preliminary hearing.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 556.2(A). Upon receiving this motion, “the

president judge, or the president judge’s designee” reviews the motion and

determines whether to grant the motion. Id. at 556.2(A)(3). Here the

Commonwealth motioned for a grand jury before the president judge in the

instant case in 2016, more than three years after our Supreme Court’s 2012

order. See Docket Entry No. 6. Counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise

this meritless claim. Johnson, 139 A.3d at 1272.

Failure to Object to Amendment of Bills of Information

      Williams maintains that the Commonwealth “amended the bills on the

day jury selection was to begin, without objection from trial counsel.” Williams’

Br. at 16. He states that he did not know the additional charges and was not

able to “prepare a defense against the new claims.” Id. He argues that this

amendment was not proper and counsel’s failure to object “equates to a failure

to protect [Williams’] constitutional right to due process and satisfies the

arguable merit standard.” Id.

      This claim is also meritless. A review of the record reveals that on June

5, 2017, the Commonwealth moved to amend the charge of Section 6105

from a felony of the second degree to a misdemeanor of the first degree. See

Docket Entry No. 65. It made this amendment on the day of jury selection

with no objection from trial counsel. However, the record does not reflect that

                                      -8-
J-A07022-23

the Commonwealth moved to amend for additional charges. See Pa.R.Crim.P.

564 (an amendment to an information may be made “provided that the

information as amended does not charge offenses arising from a different set

of events and that the amended charges are not so materially different from

the original charge” as to unfairly prejudice the defendant). Furthermore,

Williams fails to explain what charges the Commonwealth added, and does

not explain how he was prejudiced by such. See Commonwealth v.

Picchianti, 600 A.2d 597, 599 (Pa.Super. 1991) (stating an amendment may

be proper even on the day of trial where “there is no showing of prejudice” to

the defendant). The court did not err in rejecting this meritless claim.

Johnson, 139 A.3d at 1272; Basemore, 744 A.2d at 738.

Failure to Request Franks Hearing

      Williams also argues that counsel should have filed a motion to suppress

and requested a Franks hearing. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,

155-56 (1978) (holding a defendant may request a hearing to attack the

validity of a warrant on the basis that the affiant knowingly and intentionally,

or recklessly, included a false statement in the affidavit). He claims the

affidavits of probable cause contained “patently false” information and were

“made with disregard for the truth.” Williams’ Br. at 16. He maintains the

allegedly false statements in the affidavits invalidate the arrest warrants

because the statements “w[ere] never corroborated by additional evidence,

nor the veracity confirmed by additional witnesses or documentation.” Id.

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      Williams’ claim is underdeveloped, and he fails to cite any statements

within the affidavit that would be deemed false. His brief never identifies the

allegedly false statements. See Commonwealth v. James, 69 A.3d 180, 188

(Pa. 2013) (allegations of false statements in warrant affidavit must be “more

than conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-

examine”) (citation omitted). This claim is waived. See Commonwealth v.

Brown, 200 A.3d 986, 992 (Pa.Super. 2018).

Failure to Present Alibi Witnesses

      Williams alleges that counsel failed to present testimony from alibi

witnesses, Cassandra Torres and Yusef Davis. He claims both witnesses “were

prepared to testify at trial that [Williams] was with them at the time of alleged

incidents, and was nowhere near the vicinity where the criminal acts are

alleged to have occurred.” Williams’ Br. at 17. He maintains that this testimony

would have been admissible and would have established a defense. Without

this testimony, “the jury was not afforded the opportunity to hear certain facts

that would definitively establish [Williams’] actual innocence.” Id. at 16-17.

      Beyond his own suggestion, Williams provides nothing to show that

these witnesses were available and willing to testify on his behalf. See

Commonwealth v. Cousar, 154 A.3d 287, 312 (Pa. 2017) (stating

requirements of establishing ineffectiveness claim for failure to call witness,

including but not limited to proof that witness was available and willing to

testify on appellant’s behalf). Williams did not provide a signed certification or

affidavit to substantiate his claim that either witness would testify that he was

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not in the vicinity of the area where any of the crimes occurred or otherwise

substantiate his claim. See Commonwealth v. Lopez, 739 A.2d 485, 496

(Pa. 1999) (rejecting ineffectiveness claim for failure to call witnesses where

the witnesses’ existence and willingness to testify on defendant’s behalf is

based solely on defendant’s “unsubstantiated allegations”). This claim is

meritless.

Failure to Appeal Consolidation of Cases or Move to Sever

      Williams claims that counsel should have filed a motion to sever

Williams’ cases, and the failure to do so resulted in a denial of his due process

rights. He maintains that the joinder of the cases “created bias” and that there

was no nexus between the allegations of each complainant. Williams’ Br. at

17. He also maintains that “the allegations are not part of the same sequence

of events.” Id.

      Williams’ claim is meritless. On direct appeal, this Court determined that

the trial court did not err by granting the Commonwealth’s motion to

consolidate. We determined that “the crimes were not just ‘of the same class’”

but “[t]he methods employed in carrying out the crimes were remarkably

similar.” Williams, 2019 WL 1522643 at *5. We noted that Williams “targeted

prostitutes who were soliciting their services on Backpage and who lived in

proximity to one another.” Id. “After engaging in consensual sex for money,

the victims were held up at gunpoint, forced to perform oral sex, raped

vaginally from behind, and robbed.” Id. Because this Court previously

concluded that the trial court did not err in granting the motion to consolidate,

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we cannot now say that a motion for severance would have had arguable merit

or that Williams was prejudiced by counsel’s omission. No relief is due.

Failure to Ensure Timely Sentencing

       Williams next argues that counsel ought to have ensured that the court

sentenced him within 90 days, as required by Rule 704 of the Pennsylvania

Rules of Criminal Procedure. He states that the court sentenced him almost 6

months after the jury found him guilty.

       “[A] defendant who is sentenced in violation of [Rule 704] is entitled to

a discharge only where the defendant can demonstrate that the delay

in sentencing prejudiced him or her.” See Commonwealth v. Anders,

725 A.2d 170, 173 (Pa. 1999) (emphasis added).5 The 90-day deadline can

be extended for good cause. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(A)(2). The court sentenced

Williams on December 1, 2017, 79 days beyond the 90-day limit. See

Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(A)(1). This deferment of sentencing was based on good

cause, as the court needed to obtain a PSI and a mental health report. Counsel

also requested a continuance to obtain the reports. Moreover, Williams fails

to identify any prejudice. This issue, and all of Williams’ first issue, fails.

       In his second issue, Williams argues that his constitutional rights were

violated. As with his first issue, Williams’ second issue contains multiple sub-

claims. We address each separately.

Rule 600 Violation
____________________________________________

5Anders references the previous version of Rule 704, Rule 1405, which was
not materially different from Rule 704. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 704, Note.

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      Williams maintains that the Commonwealth violated his right to a

speedy trial, and argues a violation of Rule 600 of the Pennsylvania Rules of

Criminal Procedure. He states that he was arrested on January 15, 2016, but

his trial did not commence until June 5, 2017, beyond the 365 days required

by Rule 600. He claims that trial counsel therefore should have filed a motion

to dismiss, and the court should have granted the motion.

      Williams conflates two related but separate issues. To the extent he

claims a constitutional violation, but fails to make a constitutional argument,

this issue is waived as undeveloped. To the extent he is arguing a Rule 600

violation, the claim fails for lack of merit. Considering the 188 days of

excludable time, this claim fails. 47 days between October 20, 2016, and

December 5, 2016, are excludable due to a defense continuance. See Docket

Entry No. 35. 56 days between January 17, 2017, and March 13, 2017, are

excludable due to a continuance request by the Commonwealth to obtain DNA

results. See Docket Entry No. 49; Commonwealth v. Frye, 909 A.2d 853,

858-59    (Pa.Super.      2006)      (concluding   continuance        request     from

Commonwealth due to unavailability of DNA constituted excusable delay). 85

days between March 13, 2017, and June 5, 2017, are also excludable because

the Commonwealth requested a continuance due to the unavailability of

necessary witnesses. See Commonwealth v. Wendel, 165 A.3d 952, 957

(Pa.Super. 2017) (concluding continuance request from Commonwealth due

to unavailability of witness that was “beyond the Commonwealth’s control”

constituted   excusable    delay).    Taking    these   days   into    account,    the

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Commonwealth brought Williams’ case to trial within 320 days, well within the

time required by Rule 600.

Sufficiency and Weight of Evidence

      Williams claims that his due process rights were violated because the

Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence and because the jury’s verdict

was against the weight of the evidence. To the extent he is asserting

sufficiency and weight claims, he is not entitled to relief because he previously

litigated those issues on direct appeal. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3) (stating

to be eligible for relief, a petitioner must show “[t]hat the allegation of error

has not been previously litigated or waived”). Furthermore, sufficiency and

weight claims are not cognizable under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9543(a)(2) (listing cognizable claims under PCRA). To the extent he attempts

to refashion his sufficiency and weight claims as constitutional violations, even

if they are not properly deemed previously litigated, they fail for the reasons

we set forth in our decision on direct appeal.

      In his third issue, Williams maintains that the trial court imposed an

illegal sentence. He argues that the court’s imposition of consecutive

sentences exceeded the statutory maximum. He claims his robbery and rape

convictions should have merged because they allegedly arose from one single

criminal act.

      “A claim that crimes should merge for sentencing purposes raises a non-

waivable challenge to the legality of the sentence; thus, our standard of review

is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Edwards,

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256 A.3d 1130, 1136 (Pa. 2021). Crimes merge for sentencing purposes when

“the crimes arise from a single criminal act and all of the statutory elements

of one offense are included in the statutory elements of the other offense.” 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9765 (emphasis added).

      Here, even if Williams’ convictions arose from a single criminal act,

which they did not, the crimes of robbery and rape would not have merged.

Section 3701(a)(1) of the Crimes Code defines robbery as follows: “[a] person

is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he: inflicts serious

bodily injury upon another.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1). The crime of rape

occurs when “[a] person engages in sexual intercourse with a complainant:

by forcible compulsion.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. 3121(a)(1). All the statutory elements

of robbery are not included in the statutory elements of rape. The offenses do

not merge. Further, as the PCRA court explained, Williams’ crimes “did not

derive from a single criminal act or episode.” Opinion, filed 8/3/22, at 17.

         [Williams] was found guilty of six counts of robbery for
         robbing six different victims over the course of three days.
         The six robbery convictions rose from six distinct criminal
         acts that had distinct differences to threats made and how
         the crime was carried out. [Williams] was also found guilty
         of two counts of rape for raping two different victims on two
         different days. [Williams’] rape convictions arose from
         distinct criminal acts on two different days and two different
         locations[.]

Id.

      Williams also alleges that his lifetime registration under SORNA

amounted to lifetime punishment and constitutes an illegal sentence. Williams’

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Br. at 23. He maintains that his registration violates his due process rights

“based on the Act’s declaration that registrants are highly likely to repeat their

behavior and are dangerous.” Id. at 24. He also claims that his registration

presumes “that he is dangerous and a high risk to repeat sexually criminal

behavior.” Id.

       Williams’ argument poses a question of law. Our standard of review is

de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Torsilieri,

232 A.3d 567, 575 (Pa. 2020). Because his challenge implicates the legality

of his sentence, it is nonwaivable. Commonwealth v. Thorne, 276 A.3d

1192, 1194, 1198 (Pa. 2022). Where such a challenge is raised for the first

time on appeal, remand is appropriate “to allow the parties to address whether

a consensus has developed to call into question the relevant legislative policy

decisions impacting offenders’ constitutional rights.” Torsilieri, 232 A.3d at

595.

       Williams’ claims are identical to those presented in Torsilieri. In

Torsilieri, the appellant challenged the constitutionality of the registration

requirements of Revised Subchapter H of SORNA, claiming that it presumed

“that all sexual offenders are dangerous and pose a high risk of recidivation,

necessitating registration and notification procedures to protect the public

from recidivist sexual offenders.” Id. at 573. The Torsilieri court remanded

the case, determining that the record was not sufficient to address the issue

on   appeal.   Pursuant   to   Torsilieri,   we   will   therefore   remand.   See

Commonwealth v. Boyd, 287 A.3d 957, 960 (Pa.Super. 2022) (remanding

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for “trial court to hold evidentiary hearing on the constitutional challenges to

SORNA II, Revised Subchapter H” raised on appeal where record was

underdeveloped).

      In his final issue, Williams argues that because he raised “legitimate”

claims the court erred by not granting an evidentiary hearing. Williams’ Br. at

25. We review the denial of an evidentiary hearing in a PCRA case for abuse

of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 617 (Pa. 2015).

As referenced above, all but one of Williams’ claims raised in his PCRA petition

were meritless. To the extent that Williams raised a challenge to the

constitutionality of SORNA, the PCRA court erred in denying an evidentiary

hearing on this sole issue. Therefore, we vacate the PCRA order in part and

remand as to the Torsilieri claim. We affirm as to the remaining issues.

      Order affirmed in part and vacated in part. Case remanded for

proceedings consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/12/2023

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