Court Opinion

ID: 9406909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-05 06:07:56.486435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:33.752350
License: Public Domain

Affirmed and Opinion Filed June 21, 2023

                                      In The
                               Court of Appeals
                        Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-22-00964-CR

                  BRANDON EDDARIUS WHITE, Appellant
                                 V.
                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

               On Appeal from the 401st Judicial District Court
                            Collin County, Texas
                   Trial Court Cause No. 401-81750-2020

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION
                 Before Justices Nowell, Goldstein, and Breedlove
                          Opinion by Justice Breedlove
      A jury found appellant Brandon Eddarius White guilty of aggravated robbery

and the trial court sentenced him to 20 years’ imprisonment. In two issues, appellant

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and complains that his counsel was

ineffective. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in this memorandum opinion. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

                                   Background

      On March 4, 2020, complainant Kasi Kalahasti was on his way home from

work. He walked from a bus stop to his apartment complex at about 7:00 p.m. It was
dark; it had rained during the day and it was cloudy and cold. Kalahasti had his

headphones in and was talking on his phone. As he was walking, a person pulled on

the hood of his jacket and then struck him on the head with a handgun. Kalahasti fell

to the ground, and when he looked up, he saw the gun pointed at his face. The man

holding the gun took Kalahasti’s backpack, handed it to another person, and then

took Kalahasti’s gold ring, cell phone, and wallet. The two men then fled from the

scene, and Kalahasti did not see where they went. He testified that he thought the

gun used to strike him was “black—or I’m not sure, actually.” He described the men

as wearing a blue hoodie and a red hoodie. Neither wore a mask.

      Kalahasti went to his apartment and, using his roommate’s phone, called 911.

Dallas police officer Tony Black arrived shortly afterward. In Black’s presence,

Kalahasti used his roommate’s computer to track activity on his stolen credit cards.

Two of his stolen credit cards had been used at a specific QT gas station. There were

subsequent transactions at a Wal-Mart store and a McDonald’s inside the Wal-Mart.

Black relayed this information to other officers who were working in the area.

      At 7:45 or 8:00 p.m. the same evening, Dallas police officer Jason Born was

called to a QT convenience store about a 30-minute drive from where Kalahasti’s

assault occurred. Born located a white Nissan that was suspected to be involved.

While there, Born received information about Kalahasti’s credit cards. Born

observed two men exit from the vehicle, go inside the store, and then return to the

                                        –2–
vehicle. One wore a black hoodie and black jeans, and the other, a gray hoodie and

blue pants.

      Born then followed the pair to a nearby Exxon station and then to a Wal-Mart.

Born did not follow them inside the store because he was in plain clothes and

working in a covert capacity as part of the Dallas Police Department’s Crime

Response Team (CRT). The men stayed in the store for about ten minutes, and Born

received additional information about use of Kalahasti’s credit cards there, including

use at a McDonald’s inside the Wal-Mart. Born observed the men making a purchase

at a vending machine near the door.

      Officer Justin Burt testified that he was working in uniform with the CRT on

the night of the robbery. He and his team received information about potential

suspects at the Wal-Mart, and proceeded to that location.

      Burt testified that he observed the two men leave the Wal-Mart and return to

the white vehicle. Officers then approached the men. Burt testified that with his gun

drawn, he came up the passenger side of the car and opened the door to find appellant

in the passenger seat. Officers arrested appellant as well as his companion. Burt

could see the butt of a handgun protruding from under the front passenger seat of the

vehicle. He retrieved the gun and unloaded it. He described it as a silver .38 caliber

revolver with a brown handle. The gun was admitted into evidence at trial.

      In the vehicle, police found Kalahasti’s backpack, wallet, credit cards, and

cell phone. Police also found merchandise purchased that evening at a nearby DTLR

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store, including several pairs of Nike shoes, T-shirts, underwear, socks, and pairs of

pants with the tags still on them. The State offered receipts into evidence showing

that the purchases were made on the same evening with credit cards matching the

last four digits of Kalahasti’s missing cards. There was also a receipt for a purchase

at McDonald’s inside the Wal-Mart. The State also offered records from Kalahasti’s

bank accounts showing purchases at DTLR and McDonald’s on the date of the

offense.

      But as appellant argues, he was not wearing a red or blue hoodie and neither

was his companion, Dontarius Lollie. Instead, they were wearing black and grey.

Neither had a gun in his possession. The firearm found under the passenger’s seat of

the white vehicle where appellant was sitting was silver with a brown handle, not

black. The vehicle was not appellant’s. Neither Kalahasti nor any other witness

identified appellant.

      After the State rested, the trial court denied appellant’s motion for directed

verdict. The jury found appellant guilty of aggravated robbery as charged in the

indictment. This appeal followed.

                            Sufficiency of the Evidence

      In his first issue, appellant contends the State failed to present legally

sufficient evidence to support a conviction for aggravated robbery. He contends

there is no evidence connecting him to any robbery of Kalahasti. He argues that there

was no evidence showing that he used Kalahasti’s credit cards, he did not match the

                                         –4–
description of the individuals who assaulted Kalahasti, and he was not found with

the weapon used to attack Kalahasti.

         When we review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we

uphold the conviction if any rational trier of fact could have found all essential

elements of the offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Edward v. State, 635

S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). In conducting our review, we consider the

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id. The jury is the sole judge of

the weight and credibility of the evidence, and it may choose to believe all, some, or

none of the evidence presented. Id. Moreover, the jury may draw reasonable

inferences from the evidence, and the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction

if the inferences necessary to establish guilt are reasonable based on the cumulative

force of all the evidence when considered in the light most favorable to the verdict.

Id. at 655–56. Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in

establishing an actor’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to

establish guilt. O’Reilly v. State, 501 S.W.3d 722, 726 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, no

pet.).

         We measure the sufficiency of the evidence against the hypothetically-correct

jury charge, defined by the statutory elements as modified by the charging

instrument. Edward, 635 S.W.3d at 656. Here, appellant was convicted of

aggravated robbery. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.03(a). A person commits

aggravated robbery if he commits robbery and (1) causes serious bodily injury to

                                          –5–
another or (2) uses or exhibits a deadly weapon. Id. A person commits robbery if,

during the course of committing a theft and with the intent to obtain or maintain

control of the property, he intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in

fear of imminent bodily injury or death. Id. § 29.02(a)(2). A person commits theft if

he unlawfully appropriates property with the intent to deprive the owner of property.

Id. § 31.03(a).

      The Penal Code defines “in the course of committing theft” as “conduct that

occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission, or in immediate flight after

the attempt or commission of theft.” Id. § 29.01(1) (emphasis added). Thus, proof of

a completed theft is not required to establish a robbery. See id.; Wolfe v. State, 917

S.W.2d 270, 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Jones v. State, No. 05-18-00588-CR, 2019

WL 4071995, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 29, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication).

      The State contends that the jury could infer that appellant was one of the

robbers based on his unexplained possession of items stolen from Kalahasti.

Appellant was spotted by police approximately one hour after the robbery, followed,

and apprehended thirty or forty minutes later. Kalahasti’s possessions stolen during

the robbery were found in the car in which appellant was apprehended. The car’s

back seat contained items recently purchased with Kalahasti’s stolen credit cards.

The jury may draw an inference of guilt when a defendant is found in unexplained

possession of recently stolen property, although the inference is not conclusive. See

                                         –6–
Hardesty v. State, 656 S.W.2d 73, 76–77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); see also Louis v.

State, 159 S.W.3d 236, 248 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, pet. ref’d) (jury could

infer that appellant was one of gunmen who committed robbery when he was found

a short time later with the stolen items in close proximity after attempting to hide

from police). “Once the permissible inference arises, the sufficiency of the evidence

must still be examined according to applicable direct or circumstantial evidence

standards of appellate review since the inference is not conclusive.” Hardesty, 656

S.W.2d at 77; see also Barwari v. State, No. 05-08-01325-CR, 2010 WL 338198, at

*4–5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 1, 2010, pet. ref’d) (op. nunc pro tunc, not designated

for publication) (discussing Hardesty and concluding that evidence of appellant’s

unexplained possession of stolen laptop computer with its identifying stickers peeled

off and its operating system and software changed was legally sufficient to support

finding of guilt).

      The jury heard the conflicting evidence. Although Kalahasti’s description of

appellant’s clothes and the gun did not match the evidence introduced at trial, the

jury also heard evidence that it was dark at the time of the offense and Kalahasti

testified that he was “in shock at that time.” Kalahasti testified that he is not familiar

with firearms because they are illegal in his home country. The jury also heard

testimony that there was red wording on appellant’s white T-shirt worn under the

gray hoodie.

                                           –7–
      The jurors were the sole judges of the weight and credibility of the evidence

and resolved any conflicts and inconsistencies. See Edward, 635 S.W.3d at 655.

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude a

rational jury could have found all essential elements of the offense beyond a

reasonable doubt. Id. at 656. We decide appellant’s first issue against him.

                         Request to Obtain New Counsel

      In his second issue, appellant contends the trial court erred by denying his

request to appoint new counsel to represent him. “Under the State and Federal

Constitutions [a criminal defendant] is entitled to effective assistance of counsel,”

but he “is not entitled to appointed counsel of choice.” Dunn v. State, 819 S.W.2d

510, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The defendant carries the burden of proving he is

entitled to new counsel. Cooper v. State, No. 05-18-01246-CR, 2019 WL 6606364,

at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 5, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication).   Generally,   conclusory    allegations   of   conflicts   of   interest,

disagreements on trial strategy, and personality conflicts are insufficient to satisfy

the defendant’s burden. Loring v. State, No. 05-18-00421-CR, 2019 WL 3282962,

at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 22, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication).

      An appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to substitute

counsel for an abuse of discretion. Turner v. State, No. 05-07-00616-CR, 2008 WL

2502143, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 23, 2008, no pet.) (not designated for

                                          –8–
publication) (citing Carroll v. State, 176 S.W.3d 249, 256 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d)). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is so

clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone within which reasonable persons might

disagree. Howell v. State, 175 S.W.3d 786, 790 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

      Appellant argues that he made his request weeks before trial when it became

apparent “that his trial counsel was not exercising his best efforts to pursue a defense

or explore favorable terms for a potential plea agreement.” In a motion for

continuance filed twelve days prior to the trial setting, appellant’s counsel detailed

his efforts “to obtain a plea offer to convey to the defendant.” He also explained,

“the defendant has indicated on a number of occasions that since I am court

appointed that I will not fight for him in his case. Furthermore, he is unhappy with

my representation and the plea offer.” He stated, however, “I have been representing

this defendant for the past two (2) years, and I have no objection to proceeding

forward as his legal counsel.”

      At a pretrial hearing the following day, appellant asked the trial court to

remove his attorney. He explained that he felt his attorney did not “have my best

interest.” The trial court denied the motion, explaining that a new lawyer would need

time to prepare the case and would be unlikely to provide any better representation

than appellant’s current lawyer. Counsel explained that he and appellant had a good

relationship for the past two years, but appellant was unsatisfied with the State’s plea

offers. Counsel discussed the efforts that had been made in previous negotiations

                                          –9–
with the State, and the court explained to appellant that neither party was required

to agree to a plea. The court noted it would revisit the issue if necessary.

      “Trial courts are vested with broad discretion to control and manage their

dockets in order to promote efficient and orderly administration of justice while

protecting the statutory and constitutional rights of all persons coming before the

court.” Thornton v. State, No. 05-16-00565-CR, 2017 WL 1908629, at *4 (Tex.

App.—Dallas May 9, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(citing Taylor v. State, 255 S.W.3d 399, 402 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, pet.

ref’d)). The trial court explained to appellant,

      With this case being set for trial as close as it is, I understand your
      concern, but, you know, that would result in even longer delays, would
      result in a new lawyer having to get on board. There’s no reason to
      believe that that new lawyer would, in your eyes, be any better than Mr.
      Smith. I think sometimes lawyers say things that are hard to hear and
      maybe—but I know Mr. Smith to be a zealous advocate for his
      client. . . .

      [T]here’s two parties to [a plea agreement]. There’s the State and
      there’s you, and if there is a plea, it’s a result of a negotiation. That
      doesn’t mean the State wants it or has to accept it. Doesn’t mean you
      want it or have to accept it. Your lawyer’s job is to merely try to get
      something you’re happy with. Doesn’t mean it’s successful ever. And
      it just means that he has to transmit to you what the State offers, so—
      which you certainly have a right to accept it or reject it.

      The court also heard that the State had reduced its initial offer by five years,

and noted, “that’s moving.” The court explained to appellant that “this will get

resolved one way or the other,” “because you don’t have to agree, they don’t have

                                         –10–
to agree, and we’ll try a case and it will be a fair case and it will be a well-tried case

because you’ve got a good lawyer.”

      Appellant also argues that “given the wholesale dearth of non-speculative

evidence connecting Mr. White to Kalahasti’s assault,” his lawyer could and should

have been more diligent in representing his interests. He did not bring this complaint

to the trial court’s attention, however, nor does he explain what counsel could or

should have done differently. His argument also lacks any citation to the record or

to authority, referencing only his previous argument about sufficiency of the

evidence. Accordingly, his complaint that his counsel “should have been more

diligent”   presents     nothing    for    our    review.     Washington      v.   State,

No. 05-22-00712-CR, 2023 WL 3814044, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 5, 2023,

no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Lucio v. State, 353

S.W.3d 873, 877–78 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), for the proposition that appellant’s

brief must contain “a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with

appropriate citations to authorities”).

      We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s

request for new counsel. See Thornton, 2017 WL 1908629, at *4. We decide

appellant’s second issue against him.

                                          –11–
                                  CONCLUSION

      Appellant’s conviction is affirmed.

                                            /Maricela Breedlove/
                                            MARICELA BREEDLOVE
220964f.u05                                 JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

                                      –12–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

BRANDON EDDARIUS WHITE,                       On Appeal from the 401st Judicial
Appellant                                     District Court, Collin County, Texas
                                              Trial Court Cause No. 401-81750-
No. 05-22-00964-CR          V.                2020.
                                              Opinion delivered by Justice
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                  Breedlove. Justices Nowell and
                                              Goldstein participating.

    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 21st day of June, 2023.

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