Court Opinion

ID: 9488075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:35:22.239301+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:40.433145
License: Public Domain

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with my colleagues that this court has not yet been required to explicitly adopt or reject the “exculpatory no” doctrine. See Maj. Op. at [1229], As with previous panels of this court, the majority here simply declines to apply the doctrine, based on its conclusion that “the doctrine does not apply to the facts now before us.” Maj. Op. at [1230]; see also United States v. Steele, 933 F.2d 1313, 1315 (6th Cir.) (en banc) (‘We decline to apply the doctrine to the facts in this case and find it unnecessary to decide whether the doctrine is viable in other circumstances”), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 909, 112 S.Ct. 303, 116 L.Ed.2d 246 (1991); United States v. Duranseau, 19 F.3d 1117, 1122 (6th Cir.1994) (declining to apply “exculpatory no” doctrine in case).
I dissent, however, for two reasons. First, I wish to renew the objections, voiced by the dissenters in United States v. Steele, to this court’s refusal to adopt the doctrine. See Steele, 933 F.2d 1313 at 1326-27 (Brown, J., dissenting) (joined by Keith, Jones, Krupansky, JJ.) (arguing that this court should adopt Ninth and Fourth Circuits’ formulation of “exculpatory no” doctrine); id. at 1327 (Merritt, C.J., dissenting) (concurring in Judge Brown’s dissenting opinion); id. at 1328 (Martin, J., dissenting) (agreeing that this court should adopt Ninth and Fourth Circuit’s formulation of “exculpatory no” doctrine). Second, I dissent because I believe that the doctrine does apply to the facts of this case.
*1234My colleagues recognize that the majority of the federal circuits have adopted the “exculpatory no” doctrine in various forms. Maj. Op. at [1227-28]. In Steele, I joined Judge Brown’s thoughtful dissent, urging that this court adopt the formulation of the Ninth Circuit, which the Fourth Circuit also followed. 933 F.2d at 1326-27. As my colleagues further note, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have also adopted the Ninth Circuit’s formulation. Maj. Op. at [1228-29]. Each of these circuits apply the following five-part test to determine whether the “exculpatory no” doctrine applies to a given set of facts:
1) the false statement must be unrelated to a claim to a privilege or a claim against the government;
2) the declarant must be responding to inquiries initiated by a federal agency or department;
3) the false statement must not impair the basic functions entrusted by law to the agency;
4) the government’s inquiries must not constitute a routine exercise of administrative responsibility; and
5) a truthful answer would have incriminated the declarant.
Steele, 933 F.2d at 1320, 1327; see United States v. Equihua-Juarez, 851 F.2d 1222, 1224 (9th Cir.1988); United States v. Cogdell, 844 F.2d 179, 183 (4th Cir.1988); see also United States v. Taylor, 907 F.2d 801, 805 (8th Cir.1990).
I believe that this formulation of the doctrine is necessary to effectively limit the sweeping scope sometimes given to 18 U.S.C. § 1001. See Steele, 933 F.2d at 1325 (Brown, J., dissenting) (“[I]f read literally, [this statute] could make virtually any false statement, sworn or unsworn, written or oral, made to a Government employee ... a felony.”) (citations and quotations omitted). Moreover, I respectfully submit that my colleagues’ and the Steele majority’s suggestion that “prose-cutorial discretion provide[s] sufficient limitations on the application of [18 U.S.C. § 1001],” Maj. Op. at [1229-30] (citing Steele, 933 F.2d at 1321), is wholly inadequate.
Finally, I believe that the “exculpatory no” doctrine applies to the facts of the present case. LeMaster responded “No sir” to the officers’ various inquiries. See Maj. Op. at [1227-28]. The majority believes, however, that LeMaster’s selective listing of gratuities, which he accepted, constituted false statements for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. This, in my opinion, gives new meaning to the phrase, “Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law.” See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). While Mr. LeMaster obviously had no constitutionally protected right to perjure himself or obstruct justice, the Fifth Amendment protected LeMaster’s right to decline to offer— voluntarily or as a result of compulsion— statements that would be self-incriminating. Thus, the “exculpatory no” doctrine should have been applied in this ease.
I respectfully dissent.