Court Opinion

ID: 88520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-28 16:01:41+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:34.054217
License: Public Domain

81 U.S. 87 (1871)
14 Wall. 87
TRADERS' BANK
v.
CAMPBELL.
Supreme Court of United States.

*91 Messrs. G.C. Campbell and B.C. Cook, for the appellants.
Mr. M.W. Fuller, contra.
*93 *94 Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.
It is not asserted by counsel here that the defendant acquired any rights to the property levied on by its execution. It would be useless to do so in view of the acknowledgments of the president of the bank upon this subject and of the circumstances in which he stated that he had instituted his proceeding.[*]
We are of opinion that the proviso to the 50th section of the Bankrupt Act, which declares that no petition or other proceeding under it shall be commenced before the first day of June, 1867, is limited in its effect to such commencement, and that any act done after its approval, March 2d, 1867, in fraud of the purpose of the statute, was within its prohibitions.
We will consider the objections to the decree in favor of the plaintiff in the order in which they are assigned in the appellant's brief.
1. It is said that Hotchkiss & Sons were necessary parties, without whom the court could not proceed. They were not within the jurisdiction of the court, and, though made defendants by the bill, never appeared in the case, and it was dismissed as to them without prejudice.
Their interest, as asserted by the appellant's counsel, was that they also had a judgment against the bankrupts, on which execution was levied, on the same property, and that, as it was sold under both executions, Hotchkiss & Sons have a right to be heard as to the validity of that sale.
In the case of Barney v. Baltimore,[] this court, after reviewing the former decisions on this subject, remarks that there is a class of persons having such relations to the matter in controversy, merely formal or otherwise, that, while they may be called proper parties, the court will take no account of the omission to make them parties. There is another class whose relations to the suit are such that, if their interest and their absence are formally brought to the attention of the court, it will require them to be made parties, *95 if within its jurisdiction, before deciding the case. But, if this cannot be done, it will proceed to administer such relief as may be in its power between the parties before it. And there is a third class, whose interest in the subject-matter of the suit, and in the relief sought, is so bound up with that of the other parties, that their legal presence as parties in the proceeding is an absolute necessity, without which the court cannot proceed.
Hotchkiss & Sons manifestly belong to this second class, and not the third. The bank is sued for its own wrong in procuring judgment and selling the property, and for the proceeds now in its vaults. Hotchkiss & Sons may, or may not, be in the wrong in procuring their judgment and levy, but it is not alleged that they have received any of the money. If they are entitled to any of it they will be at liberty to bring any suit they may be advised to, after this suit is disposed of, against the assignee, or any one else, and their rights will not be precluded by the present decree; nor have they any such interest in the subject-matter of this suit, that their presence is necessary to the protection of the bank. A complete decree can be made between the bank and the assignee without touching the rights of Hotchkiss & Sons, or embarrassing the bank in its relations to them. The organization of the Federal courts has always required them to dispense with parties in chancery not within their jurisdiction, unless their presence was an absolute necessity, which it clearly is not in this case.
2. It is said that the assignee should have applied to the State court for an order on the sheriff to pay over the proceeds of the execution to him.
But it cannot be maintained that the assignee, who is pursuing the assets of the bankrupt in the hands of third parties, is bound to resort to the State courts because there is a litigation there pending. The language of the 14th section, that the assignee may prosecute and defend all suits, pending at the time of the adjudication of bankruptcy, in which the bankrupt is a party, does not oblige him to seek a remedy in that way. The 2d section of the act declares that the *96 Circuit Courts of the United States shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the District Courts of all suits, at law or in equity, which may or shall be brought by the assignee against any person claiming an adverse interest touching any property, or rights of property, of said bankrupt.
The decree in the present suit is founded on the idea that the bank, by means of its illegal and collusive proceedings in the State court, has received the proceeds of property which ought to have come to the assignee. He has a right to proceed against the bank directly in the Federal court for those proceeds, and is not obliged to resort to the State court, where the matter is substantially ended, for relief.
3. The third objection is, that the bank has not received from the sheriff any sum whatever in satisfaction of the judgment which it recovered against the bankrupts.
The facts of the case are simple and undisputed. The goods of the bankrupt were sold under the execution in favor of the bank, and the sheriff after deducting the costs of the proceeding deposited the remainder with the defendant. This suit being then pending, the defendant, instead of giving the sheriff a receipt for the amount as paid on the execution in his hands, gave him a certificate of deposit. This transparent device can deceive no one, and does not vary the legal character of the transaction. The sheriff, under the direction of the bank, levies upon and sells the property of the bankrupt, after the title has passed to the assignee, and in violation of the law. He deposits the proceeds of the sale with the party whose agent he was in this illegal appropriation of the goods. The assignee electing to assert his right to the proceeds of the sale instead of the goods themselves, sues the party who caused the seizure and sale, and who has their proceeds in his possession. His right to recover under such circumstances cannot well be doubted.
4. The fourth objection is that the decree rendered against the bank is for too large a sum.
This assignment of error has regard to certain sums coming to the hands of the defendant as bankers of Hitchcock & *97 Endicott, and which they claim a right to retain by way of set-off.
The amount of $928.38 was received on the 12th day of June, some days after their judgment had been recovered in the State court, and after the execution had been levied on the stock of the bankrupts' goods. It was received as collections made by the bank, from drafts placed by the bankrupts in their hands in the ordinary course of business, and if they had retained it and appropriated it as a set-off against the debt of the bankrupt to them, an interesting question might have arisen as to their right to do so. But instead of doing this, they handed it over to the sheriff who levied or it as the property of the bankrupt, by virtue of the same execution under which he levied on and sold the goods. By the act of the bank it was thus placed in the same category with the goods, and instead of exercising their own right of set-off, by directing the sheriff to credit the execution with the sum received by them on the debt, they delivered it to him to be treated as the goods of the bankrupt and subjected by him to their illegal judgment. This amount then must be treated in the same manner as the other money received by them from the sheriff on the sale of the goods.
There was in the bank on deposit to the credit of Hitchcock & Endicott on the day they gave the judgment note, the sum of $325.20. This sum was not computed or deducted when the note was given. On the next day, before the bank caused the judgment to be entered up, they credited this amount on the note, and took judgment for that much less. They now assert that this was what they had a right to do, and that it should remain a valid set-off. But this does not appear to have been really what was done. It appears that Hitchcock & Endicott gave the bank a check for the sum, and by virtue of that check it was indorsed on the note as a payment. Now as both the bank and the bankrupts knew of the insolvency of the latter, this was a payment by way of preference and therefore void by the 35th section of the bankrupt act. In this case as in the other, if they had stood on their right of set-off, it might *98 possibly have been available, but when they treat it as the bankrupts' property, and endeavor to secure an illegal preference by getting the bankrupts to make a payment in the one case, and seizing it by execution in the other, when they knew of the insolvency, both appropriations are void.
We see no error in the decree which was rendered in the District Court and affirmed in the Circuit Court on appeal, and which is again
AFFIRMED BY THIS COURT.
NOTES
[*]  See supra, p. 89.
[]  6 Wallace, 280.