Court Opinion

ID: 9756243
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:17:56.799525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:16.912624
License: Public Domain

Pkoctok, J.
(dissenting). I must dissent, for it seems to me that if ever there was a pedestrian-automobile accident case where there was contributory negligence as a matter of law, this is it. Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the evidence discloses that while he was standing on the medial divider he observed two cars—one behind the other—one hundred yards away (the plaintiff testified the cars were thirty to forty yards away) traveling on the lane adjacent to the divider at a speed of between fifty to fifty-five miles per hour. Plaintiff was a licensed driver; He must therefore have realized that the cars would arrive where he was attempting to cross in about four seconds. It would take a man walking hurriedly more than that time to travel the thirty-five feet which plaintiff had to go. Additionally, plaintiff was well acquainted with the neighborhood. At the point where he intended to cross there was a well traveled ramp leading to an overpass south of the Woodland Avenue intersection. Drivers intending to take this ramp necessarily had to travel on the westerly of the southbound lanes. On these facts it seems to me that when the plaintiff stepped off the medial divider he should have reasonably *249anticipated that one or both of these cars might turn onto the outside lane in order to use the ramp. In spite of his knowledge of the area and his awareness of the approaching vehicles, plaintiff voluntarily stepped in the path of defendant’s car. If he had remained on the medial strip for a matter of seconds, both vehicles would have passed and by his own testimony the plaintiff could have then crossed with-safety. In my opinion, reasonable minds cannot fairly deny that any man who attempted to cross a major highway under such circumstances was not acting as a reasonably prudent person and contributed to the cause of his own injury.
On the above facts I would find that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law and would therefore affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division. I am authorized to say that Mr. Justice Hall joins in this dissent.
For reversal and remandment—Chief Justice Wbintratjb, and Justices Jacobs, Ebajstcis, Schettino and Hanbman—5.
For affirmance—Justices Pkoctok and Halt,—3.