Court Opinion

ID: 9481499
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:21:05.902223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:21.723665
License: Public Domain

NORTON, District Judge,
dissenting:
The majority construes the probation revocation provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act to limit, with certain narrow exceptions, the sentence imposable upon revocation of probation to the maximum term of imprisonment within the guideline range applicable at the defendant’s initial sentencing. This interpretation of the statute is at odds with the Sentencing Reform Act scheme taken as a whole, has no support in the legislative history, produces anomalous policy results, and may frustrate implementation of the policy statements on probation revocation recently issued by the Sentencing Commission.
While I recognize that the 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a)(2) phrase "any other sentence that was available under subchapter A at the time of the initial sentencing” can be read to mean any other sentence within the original guideline range, it is not the most straightforward reading of the statutory language. The plain language of the statute does not use the words “guideline sentence” or any similar direct reference to the guideline range that was available at the initial sentencing. The statute speaks directly to “any other sentence that was available under subchapter A,” which appears to refer to any sentence of imprisonment (and/or fine) up to the statutory maximum. Subchapter A, section 3551(b) and sections 3559(a) and (b) set forth the authorized kinds of sentences for individuals, and set forth the maximum imprisonment sentence available for each offense, either by classification or reference to the existing .code. Thus, the phrase, “any other sentence” should be interpreted to refer to any sentence up to the statutory maximum, and not any sentence available under the original guidelines sentence.
The relevant legislative history of section 3565(a)(2) appears, at first glance, to support either interpretation of the statute. The Senate Judiciary Committee report simply states that “[sjection 3565(a) provides that if a defendant violates a condition of probation the court may ... revoke probation and impose any other sentence which could have been imposed at the time of the initial sentencing.” (Emphasis added.) S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 102 (1983), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1984, pp. 3182, 3285. Obviously, the report language is but a restatement of the statutory phrase “any other sentence that was available at the time of the initial sentencing.” In the context of a 153-page, *1000extremely detailed, principal statement of Congressional intent surrounding the Sentencing Reform Act, this cursory explanation would not be unremarkable if it was intended that the statutory phrase would have its straightforward meaning of any other sentence statutorily authorized by the Act. In contrast, given the level of detail with which the report describes the expected guidelines sentencing scheme, if the Committee had intended the phrase “any other sentence that was available” to be qualified by the guideline range applicable at initial sentencing, surely it would have said that somewhere in the report, considering the profound policy significance of such a decision.
Moreover, when viewed in the context of the Sentencing Reform Act as a whole, it is incongruous to interpret the language to mean a sentence within the original guidelines sentencing range for several additional reasons. First, the Sentencing Reform Act specifically directs the Sentencing Commission to write guidelines or policy statements for probation revocation. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(3). If the “any other sentence” language is construed to mean the original guidelines sentencing range, this directive to the Commission would be mere surplusage; i.e., revocation guidelines would be unnecessary if the sentencing judge must refer back to the original guidelines sentencing range. Second, Congress could not have anticipated precisely what approach the Commission would take in writing guidelines. For example the Commission could have followed an approach that used an “in/out” line (a scheme that finds some descriptive support in the legislative history). Under that approach, certain offenses would be punished only by probation and others only by incarceration. If the Commission had used this approach and the guidelines for an offense called for probation, a subsequent violation of probation could not be punished by incarceration if “any other sentence” means the original guidelines sentence.
Looking at the existing guidelines scheme, a similar result could occur in some instances. For example, assume the first offense had a guidelines range of 0-6 months and the sentencing judge sentenced the defendant to two years probation with a condition that the defendant spend six months in a local jail. After service of the six months, the defendant violates probation. If “any other sentence” means the original guidelines sentencing range, the violation could not be punished by imprisonment because under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) a defendant must be given credit for any time spent in official detention when probation is revoked. Surely Congress could not have intended a statutory construction that would, in many instances, yield an inadequate sanction for the probation violation and, in some instances, a zero sanction.
Appellant’s alternative approach, comparing the language in the last sentence of section 3565(a), actually shows why his construction of the 3565(a)(2) statutory provision is erroneous. Appellant correctly notes that the last sentence in section 3565(a) mandates revocation of probation for possession of a controlled substance and a sentence of not less than one-third, of the original sentence. Considering that he was originally sentenced to a three-year term of probation, he argues (again correctly, I believe) that the statute requires a revocation sentence of at least one year imprisonment for possession of a controlled substance. That construction may have suited his case, for his original guideline range was 6-12 months, and he desires the top of the original guideline range to cap his revocation sentence. But, suppose his original guideline range had been 0-6 months (or any range the maximum of which is less than one-third of the probation term). Then, upon revocation of his three-year probation sentence, would he argue that the mandatory minimum sentence required by the last sentence of section 3565 is trumped by the language of subsection (a)(2) (and limited by the maximum imprisonment sentence within the original guideline range)? Yet, considering that the mandatory revocation/minimum one-third of original sentence language was a later-enacted provision (adopted as part of the anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988), it seems highly unlikely that Congress would *1001have intended that it be limited by the previously existing language in subsection (a)(2). In other words, the majority opinion adopts a construction of these two related statutory provisions that puts them in conflict with one another. On the other hand, treating section 3565(a)(2) as referring to a statutorily available maximum sentence and the last sentence of section 3565(a) as referring to a minimum sentence renders the two provisions consistent with one another.
In sum, the majority opinion, instead of interpreting the statutory words according to their plain meaning, reads in an additional limitation not evident in the words themselves. It fails to construe related statutory provisions so that they will be consistent with one another, and it fails to consider the context of the Act as a whole, thereby rendering superfluous a specific directive to the Sentencing Commission mandating separate guidelines (or policy statements) for revocation of probation (and supervised release).