Court Opinion

ID: 9927080
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 06:04:54.259681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:47.112821
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                    UNPUBLISHED
                                                                    January 25, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                   No. 364356
                                                                    Tuscola Circuit Court
PATRICK NOVOSAD,                                                    LC No. 2022-015854-FH

               Defendant-Appellee.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                   No. 364357
                                                                    Tuscola Circuit Court
MATTHEW LOMPREY,                                                    LC No. 2022-015855-FH

               Defendant-Appellee.

Before: GADOLA, C.J., and MURRAY and YATES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       In these consolidated appeals,1 the prosecution appeals as of right the trial court’s orders
dismissing with prejudice the charges against defendants of one count each of assault with a
dangerous weapon (felonious assault), MCL 750.82, and aggravated assault, MCL 750.81a. We
reverse.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

1
 People v Novosad, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 17, 2023 (Docket
Nos. 364356 and 364357).

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        Defendants were accused of felonious and aggravated assault of two individuals in May
2022. The facts of the underlying charges are not relevant to this appeal. The Genesee County
Prosecutor’s Office was appointed as special prosecutor after the Tuscola County Prosecutor
showed good cause for recusal. On the original plea cut-off date, August 22, 2022, the parties and
the trial court agreed to extend the deadline because of communication difficulties between
defendants’ counsel and the prosecution. At the adjourned plea cut-off hearings held on October
3, 2022, the parties and trial court again agreed to an extension because of defendants’ counsel’s
medical issues. Before the November 7, 2022 plea cut-off hearing, the parties reached a plea
agreement which entailed pleading to misdemeanor charges in exchange for the dismissal of the
felony charges. The parties filed a stipulated motion to remand to district court. On November
10, 2022, the trial court denied the stipulated remand order, leaving trial scheduled for December
13, 2022.

         On December 8, 2022, the prosecution moved for nolle prosequi and to dismiss the charges
against defendants without prejudice. The motion indicated the charges against defendants would
be refiled as misdemeanors in the district court. The trial court denied the request to dismiss the
charges without prejudice and instead dismissed the charges with prejudice. The trial court relied
on an unpublished opinion of this Court, which establishes a trial court can sanction the prosecution
with dismissal of charges if the prosecution attempts to use a motion for nolle prosequi to usurp
the trial court’s ability to control its docket and courtroom. The prosecution now appeals.

        On appeal, defendants moved to expand the record to file the affidavits of Michael D.
Thomas, the Genesee County Special Prosecutor, and Jeffrey Clothier, trial counsel for both
defendants. This Court granted the motion and accepted the affidavits into the record. The
affidavits provide some context to the procedural history.

        Clothier’s affidavit explains that he met with the Genesee County prosecutor David S.
Leyton on November 3, 2022, and they reached a plea agreement that entailed the defendants
pleading guilty to one misdemeanor each in exchange for the prosecutor moving to dismiss both
felonies without any sentence agreement. On November 7, 2022, Clothier and Thomas (the special
prosecutor) appeared for the plea cut-off hearing. Apparently, the trial court had a busy docket
that day so Clothier suggested they take the misdemeanor plea in district court to save time for the
circuit court. When they conferred with the circuit court clerk regarding their plan, the clerk
indicated that the prosecutor would have to file a motion to dismiss in circuit court before
proceeding with the pleas in district court. Thus, Clothier prepared and filed the motion to remand
while Thomas prepared and filed the motion to nolle prosequi. Clothier and Thomas believed that
they timely resolved the cases and that the guilty pleas would be taken at a future time to be set by
the district court.

        On December 7, 2022, the parties received an email from the circuit court clerk asking if
the parties were proceeding to trial on December 10, 2022. Thomas replied that the parties agreed
to remand the cases to district court to plead to a misdemeanor rather than the felonies charged.
Then on December 17, 2022, the circuit court notified both parties that the court had rejected the
motion to remand and that in response to the people’s motion to dismiss without prejudice the
court had dismissed the cases with prejudice. The prosecution then filed this appeal. Lastly, the
affidavits state that both parties remain in support of their plea agreement.

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                                           II. DISCUSSION

        The prosecution argues the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the charges
against the defendants with prejudice because this was an improper infringement on the exercise
of the prosecution’s charging power as part of the executive branch of government. We agree.

                                   A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        This Court “review[s] for an abuse of discretion a circuit court’s decision on a motion to
dismiss.” People v Witkoski, 341 Mich App 54, 59; 988 NW2d 790 (2022). “An abuse of
discretion occurs when the trial court’s outcome falls outside the range of reasonable and
principled outcomes.” People v Meeker (On Remand), 340 Mich App 559, 563; 986 NW2d 622
(2022) (citation omitted). However, “a trial court necessarily abuses its discretion when it makes
an error of law[.]” People v Zitka, 325 Mich App 38, 43-44; 922 NW2d 696 (2018) (quotation
marks, citation, and alteration omitted). We review a charging decision under an “abuse of power”
standard, “questioning whether a prosecutor has acted in contravention of the constitution or the
law.” People v Barksdale, 219 Mich App 484, 488; 556 NW2d 521 (1996).

                                     B. LAW AND ANALYSIS

       The trial court abused its discretion by interfering with the prosecution’s charging power,
which the prosecutor attempted to exercise by reaching a plea agreement with defendants to
remand to the district court to charge defendants with misdemeanors without a sentencing
agreement.

         This case involves the intersection of two areas of law. Pertinently, the trial court focused
on its inherent ability to control its docket, which includes the ability to sanction litigants, including
the prosecution, via dismissal of charges. The prosecution, on the other hand, focuses on its
charging power, which is an executive-branch function, and therefore implicates the separation-
of-powers doctrine. “It is well settled that the decision whether to bring a charge and what charge
to bring lies in the discretion of the prosecutor.” People v Conat, 238 Mich App 134, 149; 605
NW2d 49 (1999), quoting People v Venticinque, 459 Mich 90, 100; 586 NW2d 732 (1998)
(quotation marks omitted). “The prosecutor is a constitutional officer whose duties are as provided
by law.” Genesee Prosecutor v Genesee Circuit Judge, 386 Mich 672, 683; 194 NW2d 693 (1972),
citing Const 1963, art VII, § 4. As such, when the prosecutor performs those duties on behalf of
the people of the state it is an act of the executive branch of government. See Genesee Prosecutor,
386 Mich at 683; see also Conat, 238 Mich App at 149 (holding that the duty of the prosecutor to
charge defendants “is grounded in the responsibility of the executive branch to enforce the laws.”).
If the judicial branch sought to control or overly regulate “the institution and conduct of
prosecutions[,]” then there “would be an intrusion on the power of the executive branch of
government and a violation of the constitutional separation of powers.” Genesee Prosecutor, 386
Mich at 684.

        Stated differently, “the prosecutor is the chief law enforcement officer of the county and
has the right to exercise broad discretion in determining under which of two arguably applicable
statutes a prosecution will be instituted.” People v Yeoman, 218 Mich App 406, 414; 554 NW2d
577 (1996). “This is true even where one applicable offense is a felony and one is a misdemeanor.”

                                                   -3-
Id. (citation omitted). Considering the broad discretion provided to the prosecutor in deciding
what to charge, “judicial review of the exercise of that discretion is limited….” Conat, 238 Mich
App at 149. Indeed, “[t]he prosecutor has discretion to bring any charges supported by the
evidence.” People v Nichols, 262 Mich App 408, 415; 686 NW2d 502 (2004). In other words,
“[i]f warranted by the facts, the prosecutor has the discretion to proceed under any applicable
statute.” Yeoman, 218 Mich App at 414. When there is evidence “available to support a charge
under either statute,” the prosecutor’s broad charging power can only be abused when the
prosecutor’s choice was “made for reasons that [we]re ‘unconstitutional, illegal, or ultra vires.’ ”
Barksdale, 219 Mich App at 488, quoting People v Morrow, 214 Mich App 158, 161; 542 NW2d
324 (1995).

        It is clear that the prosecution can abuse its charging power in two ways: by charging a
crime that is not “warranted by the facts” or by making the decision to charge a certain crime “for
reasons that are unconstitutional, illegal, or ultra vires.” Barksdale, 219 Mich App at 488
(quotation marks and citation omitted); Yeoman, 218 Mich App at 414. The trial court here did
not raise any issues with the facts of the case and whether those facts supported the charges.
Instead, the trial court focused its analysis on a trial court’s inherent ability to control its docket
and the courtroom. “Trial courts possess the inherent authority to sanction litigants and their
counsel, including the right to dismiss an action.” Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372,
388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006). Specifically with respect to a motion for nolle prosequi, “once an
information has been filed, it shall not be lawful for the prosecuting attorney to enter a nolle
prosequi or in any other way to discontinue or abandon the same, without stating on the record the
reasons therefor and without the leave of the court . . . .” Genesee County Prosecutor v Genesee
Circuit Judge, 391 Mich 115, 120; 215 NW2d 145 (1974) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
The trial court’s review of a nolle prosequi motion is “a judicial review, [which requires] searching
the record to determine whether the [] prosecutor’s decision is in accord with the law, facts and
reason of the matter.” Id. at 121. However, the separation-of-powers doctrine requires that the
trial court not be given “supervisory power over a prosecuting attorney,” and instead, the trial court
can only interfere after determining the prosecutor “abused the power confided to them.” Id.

         When deciding this case, the trial court relied on People v Borowka, unpublished per
curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 17, 2019 (Docket No. 346398). In that
case, this Court affirmed a trial court’s decision to dismiss a criminal action with prejudice instead
of granting a prosecutor’s motion for nolle prosequi and to dismiss the charges without prejudice.
Id. at 1. The basis for the trial court’s decision in Borowka was that the prosecution was attempting
to use the dismissal “solely [] to ‘get around’ the court’s decision not to adjourn the trial.” Id.
This Court agreed the prosecution’s attempt to avoid trial after an adjournment had been denied
was a sufficient reason for the trial court to deny the motion for nolle prosequi. Id. at 8. Further,
this Court determined the dismissal with prejudice was a sanction within the range of principled
outcomes in light of the trial court’s “ ‘fundamental interest in protecting its own integrity and
that of the judicial process.’ ” Id., quoting Maldonado, 476 Mich at 388.

       The present case is not similar to Borowka, nor is Borowka binding on us. MCR
7.215(C)(1). Here, the prosecution and defendants were in apparent agreement regarding how to
move forward with the case—remand to the district court to reissue charges as misdemeanors.
When the trial court refused to enter the stipulated order, the prosecution moved for nolle prosequi,
explaining the charges would be refiled as misdemeanors. There was no evidence the prosecution

                                                 -4-
was trying to avoid orders of the trial court nor that it was attempting to gain an advantage over
the defense. The defendant in Borowka opposed the prosecution’s decision to move for nolle
prosequi; the same simply is not true in the present case. The defendant in Borowka also alleged
he would suffer prejudice if the charges were to be dismissed and refiled, which again is not present
in this case. The record suggests defendants and the prosecution agreed to remand to the district
court so the charges could be reduced, and that the staff of the trial court had been advised of this
approach.

        The trial court decided to insert itself in this agreement and sanction the prosecution for
perceived procedural gamesmanship that does not appear to have occurred. Given the record and
procedural history of this case, there is no support to conclude the prosecution’s decision to move
for nolle prosequi was unlawful, unconstitutional, or ultra vires. Barksdale, 219 Mich App at 488.
The trial court’s reliance on Borowka undoubtedly is misplaced where there was no evidence the
prosecution moved for nolle prosequi to avoid the trial court’s decision to go forward with trial or
to gain an advantage on the defense. The prosecution did not abuse its power when it moved for
nolle prosequi, and therefore the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the motion and
dismissed the charges with prejudice. Genesee County Prosecutor, 391 Mich at 120-121. In light
of the lack of bad faith on the part of the prosecution, the trial court’s order of dismissal was not a
sanction on the basis of the trial court’s inherent ability to control its docket, but was instead an
invasion of the prosecution’s charging power, which is a power belonging to the executive branch.
Id. Consequently, we must reverse the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice.

                                        III. CONCLUSION

        We reverse the trial court’s order dismissing the charges with prejudice and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                               /s/ Michael F. Gadola
                                                               /s/ Christopher M. Murray
                                                               /s/ Christopher P. Yates

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