Court Opinion

ID: 9720824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:42:19.892449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:21.565287
License: Public Domain

MORRIS, J.
I respectfully dissent.
Recent cases have uniformly held that an attorney who is sued by a former client for malpractice may not cross-complain against the client’s successor attorney who is retained to extricate the client from the situation created by the first attorney.
There are sound policy reasons supporting the rule that the first attorney has no right of indemnity from the second. Among them are: (1) the threat of such a lawsuit by a client’s adversary impinges upon the individual loyalty of the second attorney in advising his client (Held v. Arant (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 748, 752 [134 Cal.Rptr. 422]); (2) one consequence of such a cross-complaint is to preclude the second attorney from trying the lawsuit, thus depriving the party of the attorney of his choice (Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher v. Superior Court (1979) 94 Cal.*768App.3d 347, 352 [156 Cal.Rptr. 326]); (3) the threat of such a cross-complaint results in the injection of undesirable self-protective reservations into the attorney’s counselling role, thereby diminishing the quality of legal services received by the client (see Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 344 [134 Cal.Rptr. 375, 556 P.2d 737]); and (4) such lawsuits jeopardize the policy of encouraging confidence and preserving inviolate the attorney-client relationship (Commercial Standard Title Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 934, 944-995 [155 Cal.Rptr. 393]).
The majority opinion casually dismisses these policy considerations as having no applicability to the circumstánces of this case because they are factually distinguishable from the cases enunciating the rule. Certainly such factual differences exist, just as the cases cited are factually distinguishable one from another. However, the differences do not affect the policy considerations articulated in the cases. The threat to the attorney-client relationship posed by the filing of cross-complaints against plaintiffs’ counsel can be avoided only if the rule is applied to preclude the filing of all such cross-complaints.
The selective allowance or disallowance of cross-complaints based upon whether “the negligence alleged is the unreasonable choice of alternative remedies of uncertain efficacy and requiring the exercise of professional judgment” will result in emasculation of the rule. As long as a cross-complaint may be allowed if the court determines that the negligence alleged constitutes negligence as a matter of law, the danger to the attorney-client relationship envisioned by the courts in Goodman, Held, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher and Commercial Standard remains.
In my opinion the policy reasons underlying the rule stated in the above cases are applicable in this case.
Although my disagreement with the majority is based upon the public policy heretofore stated, I also note that the “general rule” allowing proportionate indemnity, relied on by the majority, was developed in a different factual context than that involved in this case.
As the court noted in Held v. Arant, supra, “Distinctions between the situation in Herrero and Niles” as well as peculiarities of the attorney-client relationship dictate that the Herrero-Niles rule not be extended to the situation involved in Held v. Arant. (Held v. Arant, supra, 61 *769Cal.App.3d 748, 752.) The Held court then pointed out in footnote 3 on page 752 that “In the Herrero-Niles situation, the original tortfeasor’s liability for further personal injury caused by subsequent negligent medical treatment is governed by Restatement Second of Torts, section 457. The situation at bench falls within the more restrictive terms of section 447. We express no opinion on the conclusion dictated by section 447 on the facts here present.”
The distinctions between the situation presented in the case at bench and the Herrero-Niles situation are even greater, and the policy reasons favoring the extension of the rule of proportionate indemnity correspondingly weaker. As the court noted in Held v. Arant, both Herrero and Niles involved factual situations falling within section 457 of the Restatement. Section 457 refers to additional harm resulting from efforts of a second tortfeasor to mitigate harm caused by negligence of the first. In Herrero and Niles the negligence of physicians and hospitals in providing treatment for injuries inflicted by the negligence of the first tortfeasor was alleged to have caused additional harm. In Held v. Arant the court noted that its own situation was covered by section 447 of the Restatement, which applies where the initial actor’s conduct is negligent because there is a realizable likelihood that a third person will act in the negligent manner in which a particular person acts. The first attorney in Arant alleged that the second attorney was negligent in settling defensible claims which were asserted against the client because of the first attorney’s alleged negligence.
In the present matter the negligence alleged against the first attorney is covered by section 439 of the Restatement, i.e., where the original tortfeasor’s negligent conduct actively and continuously operates to bring about harm to another even though a third person’s negligence may operate simultaneously. Here the alleged conduct of the first attorney was negligent at the time of performance and was still actively and continuously operating at the time the second attorney entered the case. The, damage to the client from that initial conduct was not dependent upon the actions of the second attorney (the § 447 situation) nor was it exacerbated by the second attorney (the § 457 situation).
Assuming, as the majority does, that Attorney Morton negligently failed to file an action against the client’s former spouse, that negligence did not increase the harm naturally flowing from the initial negligence of Attorney Parker. Morton’s alleged negligence was simply *770in failing to extricate the client from the continuing effect of Parker’s negligence.
Since the second attorney owed no duty to attorney number one, no public policy reason compels granting attorney number one a right of indemnity against attorney number two in this factual situation.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the cross-complaint.