Court Opinion

ID: 9490316
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:40:14.913337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:02.125762
License: Public Domain

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion because I fear it overlooks crucial issues of federalism and comity.
The continued health and success of our federal system demands that the branches of the national government maintain a proper respect for the independent functions of the separate States. Our judicial branch should be particularly sensitive to the impacts of its decisions on state legal systems. While federal courts may be obliged to speak on questions of state law in certain circumstances, we should always be mindful that, absent a strong justification, state law claims belong in state courts. After all, “the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44, 91 S.Ct. 746, 750, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971).
The Supreme Court has instructed that the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction should be rare when all federal claims have been dismissed before trial. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139-40, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). The Gibbs admonition is particularly perti*1002nent here where a federal court without diversity jurisdiction is being asked to decide claims based wholly and exclusively on state law, having dismissed the federal cause of action by summary judgment. State courts are the proper fora for those claims, and the federal courts should stay out of the fray unless there is a reason for them to jump in-that is, unless “values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity” would be served thereby. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350, 108 S.Ct. 614, 619, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988).
The majority essentially ignores what the Supreme Court has long required of federal courts exercising supplemental jurisdiction-that the court consider the prudential factors discussed in Gibbs and Camegie-Mellon. In my view, principles of comity and federalism demand consideration of these factors each time a district court confronts claims brought under its supplemental jurisdiction. The federal nature of our Union, and the commands of Gibbs and Camegie-Mellon, matter no less when the parties, for whatever self-serving reasons, fail to object to the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding Executive Software North America, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 24 F.3d 1545 (9th Cir.1994), I do not think 28 U.S.C. § 1367 changes this analysis, or the way federal courts should approach supplemental jurisdiction. And I am not alone in my belief that Congress endorsed and codified Gibbs’s first factor in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). See Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir.1995) (“Section 1367(c) ... was intended simply to codify the preexisting pendent jurisdiction law, enunciated in Gibbs and its progeny”) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 416, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6875); Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d 1176, 1182 (7th Cir.1993) (Posner, J.) (§ 1367(c)(3) is intended to codify rather than alter existing judge-made principles); Moore’s Federal Practice Sd § 106.66[1].
Because sensitive issues of federalism are involved, and because there are strong reasons to discourage the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction when one of the conditions of § 1367(c) is met, district courts should consider sua sponte whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Likewise, when the district court fails to address whether a claim should be in the federal courts at all, the appellate court should raise the question on its own. In my view, a proper respect for the authority of the States and a recognition of our own limitations requires this conclusion.
As a corollary, we should certainly not make effectively unreviewable the district court’s decision to retain jurisdiction absent a preserved objection. “While it is clear that Gibbs commits the determination of whether to exercise pendent jurisdiction to the sound discretion of the district court, it is equally clear that we must review the district court’s determination for an abuse of that discretion.” Schneider v. TRW, Inc., 938 F.2d 986, 997 (9th Cir.1991) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).
I fear that the majority’s opinion may incite increasing numbers of litigants to file their state claims in federal court (along with a marginal federal claim) with the hope that their opponents will not object. The resulting burden on the already overloaded dockets of our federal district courts, to say nothing of the heightened tension in federal-state relations, is too high a price to pay for the bright line rule we create today.
I respectfully dissent.