Court Opinion

ID: 9919011
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 14:02:20.159289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:56.133603
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                    Decided: January 17, 2023

                       S23A1159. WILLIAMS v. THE STATE.

         PETERSON, Presiding Justice.

         Eric Williams appeals his convictions and sentence for malice

murder and other offenses, stemming from the shooting death of

Sean Brooks and non-fatal shooting of Michael Waters outside of a

Chatham County nightclub in 2017. 1 Williams argues that the trial

         1The crimes occurred in the early morning of October 8, 2017. On
December 20, 2017, a Chatham County grand jury indicted Williams for malice
murder (Count 1), two counts of felony murder predicated on aggravated
assault (Count 2) and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 3),
two counts of aggravated assault (Count 4 for the aggravated assault of Brooks,
and Count 9 for the aggravated assault of Waters), four counts of possession of
a firearm during the commission of a crime (Counts 5, 6, 7, and 10), and one
count of possession of firearm by a convicted felon during the commission of a
crime (Count 11). The indictment also charged Williams as a recidivist (Count
12). The indictment included no Count 8. At a May 2019 trial, the jury found
Williams guilty on all counts (except the recidivist count, which was not
submitted to the jury). On May 24, 2019, the trial court imposed a sentence of
“[l]ife imprisonment pursuant to OCGA [§] 17-10-7 (a)” for malice murder, four
consecutive 10-year sentences for possession of a firearm during the
commission of a crime, 20 years concurrent for the aggravated assault of
Waters, and 15 years consecutive for possession of a firearm by a convicted
court erred by (1) denying Williams’s motion to suppress evidence

extracted from his cell phone; (2) admitting a YouTube video offered

as a demonstrative aid; (3) admitting evidence of Williams’s refusal

to submit to a gunshot residue test; and (4) resentencing Williams

sua sponte under the recidivist provision of OCGA § 17-10-7 (b) (2).

Williams also raises several claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel. We conclude that Williams has not shown that the trial

court plainly erred in admitting evidence of his refusal to submit to

a gunshot residue test, that any errors in admitting the YouTube

video or denying the motion to suppress were harmless, and that the

felon during the commission of a crime. The other counts merged or were
vacated by operation of law. On May 28, 2019, Williams filed a motion for new
trial, which was amended by appellate counsel on October 30, 2019. In an order
entered on May 10, 2023, the trial court denied Williams’s motion for new trial,
except to the extent that the trial court stated that it agreed with Williams
that Counts 5, 6, and 7 (three of the four possession of a firearm during the
commission of a crime counts) should merge into the possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon during the commission of a crime count (Count 11), such that
the only firearms counts on which Williams would stand sentenced were Count
10 (possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, based on the
aggravated assault of Waters) and Count 11 (possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon during the commission of a crime, based on the aggravated
assault of Brooks). The order also stated that “Count 1 should read Life
Imprisonment pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-7 (b) (2).” The following day, an
amended final disposition form was filed reflecting these changes. Williams
filed a timely notice of appeal. The case was docketed to this Court’s August
2023 term and submitted for consideration on the briefs.
                                       2
trial court did not err to the extent that it resentenced Williams

pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-7 (b) (2). And, with respect to each claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel, we conclude that trial counsel

either did not perform deficiently in the way claimed or that any

claimed deficiency did not prejudice Williams’s defense, even when

considered collectively with the other deficiencies of counsel and

trial court errors that we presume. We therefore affirm.

      The evidence presented at trial may be summarized as follows.2

In October 2017, the defendant, Williams, was dating and living

with Charietta Williams (“Charietta”). Charietta had previously

dated the victim, Brooks, and the two had a son known as “Baby

Sean.” Charietta and Brooks frequently argued about the care of

Baby Sean. Williams had negative feelings toward Brooks and had

made threats against him, telling Charietta that he wanted to

murder Brooks because of the way he disrespected her. Early in the

      2 Because Williams does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as

to his convictions, and because we evaluate several claims of error and
ineffective assistance in the light of the overall strength of the State’s case, we
do not present this in the light most favorable to the verdicts.
                                        3
morning of October 8, 2017, Brooks was fatally shot outside a

Chatham County nightclub. Police responded around 2:50 a.m.

based on a 911 call and an automatic notification system that detects

the sound of a gunshot in a given area.

      Another patron of the bar, Waters, was shot in the leg during

the shooting; he survived. Waters reported that just prior to the

shooting, he observed the shooter and another man arguing with

Brooks. Brooks told Waters that the dispute was over “some kind of

female problem” or, more specifically, a “baby momma.”

      Christian Kelly testified that she drove Williams and

Williams’s father to the club that night. V7-117-118, 121-123, 129»

She reported seeing Williams with a black gun in a holster on his

hip prior to the shooting. Immediately after the shooting, Williams

and his father ran to Kelly’s car, and Kelly drove them away from

the scene. In the car, Kelly heard Williams say to his father, “Dad, I

think I shot him.” 3 Kelly dropped off Williams’s father and drove

      3 A detective testified that Kelly said in a prior interview that Williams

said, “I don’t think I shot him.”
                                       4
Williams to the hotel where Charietta was working. Charietta

reported seeing a gun on Williams’s hip when he arrived at the hotel.

According to Charietta, while Williams and Charietta were driving

from the hotel to her home, Williams informed Charietta that he

shot Brooks.

     Iesha Reed, a bystander who knew neither Williams nor

Brooks, testified that she heard men outside the club arguing about

“something pertaining to a child” before she heard gunshots. She

identified Williams as the shooter in a photographic lineup.

     1.   Williams argues that the trial court erred by denying his

motion to suppress evidence seized from his cell phone. Assuming

without deciding that the admission of this evidence was error, we

conclude that any error was harmless.

     As established at a pre-trial hearing, Detective Jason Manley

proceeded to Charietta’s home on the day of the shooting. Detective

Manley testified at the hearing that, by this point, Kelly already had

implicated Williams in the shooting and indicated that she believed

Williams would be found with Charietta. The detective testified that

                                  5
he encountered Williams at the house and noticed that “as soon as

our   eyes    made    contact,   [Williams]    immediately     started

manipulating” his cell phone. Williams and Charietta agreed to go

to police headquarters for interviews. The detective “seized

[Williams’s cell phone] from his person” before they left Charietta’s

home. After placing Williams under arrest following the interview,

police obtained a search warrant for the phone. The affidavit offered

in support of the warrant application detailed information that

implicated Williams in the shooting and made statements about the

importance of cell phones in criminal investigations, but the

affidavit did not mention any observation about Williams

“manipulating” the cell phone or offer any particular statements

about Williams’s cell phone’s connection to the crime. The warrant

itself was rather sparse, stating by way of limitation only that

“[t]here is now located [on Williams’s phone] certain instruments,

articles, persons, or things, namely: Information and data which are

being possessed in violation of Georgia Law(s): . . . 16-5-1 Murder[.]”

      Later, police obtained a passcode for the phone from Charietta.

                                  6
Williams filed a motion to suppress evidence gathered from the

search of his phone, arguing that police illegally seized the phone

without a search warrant or probable cause, and illegally searched

his phone when they “without [a] warrant or probable cause

deputized [Charietta] as [an] agent of the State to open his cell

phone[.]”A more particularized motion to suppress filed later

specifically sought suppression of a particular photograph obtained

from the phone, raising similar complaints. Defense counsel did not

raise additional grounds for suppression in a hearing on the motion.

The trial court denied the motion to suppress the photograph in a

written order, stating: “The Court disagrees with Defendant’s

premise, finding the police had a valid search warrant for the

contents of the cell phone. Further, the password was obtained from

an independent source voluntarily.” The information extracted from

the cell phone was admitted at trial.

     Citing cases largely decided under the Fourth Amendment,

Williams argues that the evidence should have been suppressed

because the cell phone was seized from his hands without probable

                                 7
cause and was searched based on an overly broad search warrant

that was not supported by probable cause. Although Williams did

preserve his claim of error as to the seizure of the cell phone, it does

not appear that Williams raised below all of his arguments about

the search of the phone. 4 And the parties’ arguments (which are not

well developed in the record below or well briefed by the parties)

raise complex issues about cell phone seizures and searches, such as

the extent to which a warrant application must connect a phone to

be searched to the underlying crime, and the sort of particularity

needed in a warrant for a cell phone search. See, e.g., State v. Wilson,

315 Ga. 613, 628 (884 SE2d 298) (2023) (Pinson, J., concurring) (“[I]f

this generic ‘criminals use cell phones, too’ logic is enough for

      4 Although the language in Williams’s motion to suppress is confusing in

its contention that police “without [a] warrant or probable cause deputized
[Charietta] as [an] agent of the State to open his cell phone[,]” he appears to
acknowledge on appeal that he did not raise below an argument that the search
warrant lacked probable cause, stating in his appellate brief in support of his
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that “[t]rial counsel failed to
particularize in the motion to suppress the absence of probable cause to
conduct a download of the cell phone.” He also states on appeal in support of
his ineffectiveness claim that “counsel failed to particularize in the motion to
suppress the failure to limit the scope of the download of the contents of the
cell phone.”
                                       8
probable cause to get a warrant to search a suspect’s cell phone — it

is hard to imagine a case in which police cannot get that warrant.”).5

But we need not resolve these difficult questions. Even assuming

that Williams preserved all of his arguments about the seizure and

search of his cell phone, the strength of the State’s case against

Williams and the limited value of the evidence extracted from the

cell phone render any error harmless.

      “[A]n error of constitutional magnitude may be deemed

harmless if the State can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

error did not contribute to the verdict[.]” Johnson v. State, 310 Ga.

685, 696 (4) (c) (853 SE2d 635) (2021) (citation and punctuation

omitted). The State’s case against Williams was strong. The jury

heard evidence that Williams had negative feelings toward Brooks,

threatened Brooks, and told Charietta that he wanted to kill Brooks

      5 Among other things, the warrant’s statement that the phone contained

information and data “being possessed in violation of” the murder statute
makes little sense. OCGA § 16-5-1 does not prohibit the possession of
information and data. See Wilson, 315 Ga. at 620 n.6 (Peterson, P.J.,
concurring, joined by Boggs, C.J., and Warren, Bethel, Colvin, and Pinson, JJ)
(“What it means to possess an item in violation of the law prohibiting murder
is wholly unclear to me; that statute does not prohibit the possession of
anything. Once again, it matters what actual language a warrant uses.”).
                                      9
because he perceived Brooks as disrespecting her.6 Consistent with

the notion that the shooting stemmed from a dispute between

Williams and Brooks over the mother of Brooks’s child, the surviving

victim (Waters) and a disinterested eyewitness (Reed) reported that

the shooter and the victim had some sort of argument over a

“female,” a “baby momma” or “a child.” Reed also identified Williams

as the shooter. Kelly testified that she dropped Williams off at the

club that night, saw he had a gun, and drove him away from the

scene after the shooting. Both Kelly and Charietta reported that

Williams confessed to the shooting in their presence.

     Given this strong evidence that Williams shot Brooks, the

value of the evidence extracted from Williams’s cell phone was

minimal. Among the evidence extracted from the phone, Williams

on appeal specifically cites a photograph of himself with a firearm

and a “closeup” of the weapon; a text message from Williams to his

father at 1:33 a.m. on the morning of the shooting that read, “Um

     6 Although some of these threats were contained in text messages, those

messages were contained in an extraction from Charietta’s cell phone, the
admission of which Williams has not challenged.
                                    10
parked on the Side of the club . . . UM WIT YA . . . 312”; and another

text message at 6:32 a.m. that morning from Williams’s father that

read, “One dead . . . one shot n da leg.” Although the State attempted

to link the photograph of Williams carrying a gun taken from his

phone to the gun that Kelly and Charietta described Williams as

carrying, the description given — a black gun in a holster — was

rather general, and thus the photograph did not definitively link

Williams to the shooting even if that testimony were credited by the

jury. And the photograph extracted from Williams’s phone showing

him carrying a gun on his person is somewhat cumulative of an

admitted photograph taken from Charietta’s phone that also

appeared to show him carrying a gun in a holster, minimizing the

prejudicial impact of the photograph taken from Williams’s phone.

See Scott v. State, __ Ga. __, __ (2) (__ SE2d __) (Case No. S23A0861,

decided Dec. 19, 2023) (concluding that assumed constitutional error

was harmless where evidence in question was cumulative of other,

properly admitted evidence).

     As for the other evidence extracted from the phone that

                                 11
Williams cites, the text message from Williams to his father

indicating that he was at a club on the night of the shooting had

little marginal benefit to the prosecution given the other eyewitness

evidence placing Williams at the club and Williams’s statements

that he shot Brooks. And the later text in which Williams’s father

appeared to report the extent of injuries suffered by victims of the

shootings was of little probative value.

     In short, “[Williams’s] claim fails because, even if he could show

that the trial court erred in this regard, any such error was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Johnson, 310 Ga. at 696 (4) (c). The

evidence that Williams now argues was erroneously admitted after

being extracted from his phone was of minimal value to the

prosecution in the light of the other, strong evidence against him.

“We thus see no reasonable possibility that this evidence may have

contributed to the verdict,” and Williams’s contention therefore fails.

Id. at 696-697 (4) (c) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also

Young v. State, 309 Ga. 529, 537-538 (3) (847 SE2d 347) (2020) (any

error in admitting photograph depicting defendant with a gun was

                                  12
harmless, because the value of the photograph was marginal in the

light of the other evidence of guilt, and the photograph was

cumulative of other properly admitted evidence); Ensslin v. State,

308 Ga. 462, 471 (2) (d) (841 SE2d 676) (2020) (“Even an error of

constitutional magnitude . . . may be deemed harmless if the State

can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not

contribute to the verdict, such as when the evidence at issue is

cumulative of other properly-admitted evidence or when the

evidence against the defendant is overwhelming.” (citation and

punctuation omitted)).

     2.   Williams argues that the trial court erred by admitting a

video as a demonstrative aid purportedly to illustrate the concept of

“selective attention.” Assuming without deciding that the trial court

erred in that regard, we conclude that any such error was harmless.

     Shortly before the trial testimony of Detective Manley, the

State informed the court that it intended to introduce a short video

— the detective would testify that the video was “pulled from the

Internet” — involving cups and a piece of chocolate, purportedly to

                                 13
help the detective explain the concept of “selective attention,” which

the prosecutor described as “the inability of the human brain to

effectively multitask when there’s lots of competing stimuli.” The

prosecutor suggested that the video was relevant given the apparent

defense strategy of highlighting discrepancies between what

witnesses said Williams was wearing on the night of the shooting

and what Waters reported the shooter was wearing. The defense

objected to the admission of the video on the basis that the detective

was not an expert in psychology and the video “encroaches on the

domain of the jury.” The trial court overruled the objection, with the

caveat that the video would not go out with the jury, referring to it

as a “demonstrative aid.” The trial court gave a cautionary

instruction to the jury that the exhibit “is being exhibited to you to

what extent it may or may not help you to understand the testimony

of this particular witness and, therefore, you are entitled to give it

whatever weight you wish to give it, if you give it any weight at all.”

The record makes clear that the recording did not go out with the

jury.

                                  14
      The nature of Williams’s argument challenging the admission

of this evidence on appeal is not entirely clear. He complains that

“[t]he State did not tender [Detective] Manley as an expert to

authenticate the experiment[,]” saying that authentication “requires

more than establishing a demonstration was found on YouTube.” He

argues that “[t]he demonstration in question did not have

substantial and reasonable similarity to the facts at issue in the case

at bar.” He also references the standard found in OCGA § 24-4-403,

without explaining how that standard called for exclusion of the

video.7

      But even assuming error in admission of the demonstrative

aid, it was harmless. See Morrell v. State, 313 Ga. 247, 261 (2) (c)

(869 SE2d 447) (2022) (“It is fundamental that harm as well as error

      7 Indeed, “[d]emonstrative evidence implicates several provisions of the .

. . Evidence Code.” Smith v. State, 299 Ga. 424, 434 (3) (b) (788 SE2d 433)
(2016). It of course must be relevant, and it may be excluded under OCGA §
24-4-403 if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence. See id. at 434-435 (3) (b). Laying a proper foundation for
demonstrative evidence often means establishing a substantial similarity
between the demonstration and the actual event at issue. See id. at 435 (3) (b).
                                      15
must be shown for reversal.”). “The test for determining

nonconstitutional harmless error is whether it is highly probable

that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” Id. (citation and

punctuation omitted). Given the lack of similarity between the

events at issue in this case and what was depicted on the video —

which involved merely cups and chocolate — there was little danger

that the jury would consider the video to be some sort of reenactment

of the events in question. And given that all the video appears to

convey is the unremarkable proposition that an observer may

sometimes miss something in the face of multiple simultaneous

events or stimuli, it is highly probable that the video did not

contribute to the verdict. This is especially true given the strength

of the evidence, as detailed above. Therefore, any error in its

admission is not a basis for reversal. See Jivens v. State, __ Ga. __,

__ (2) (__ SE2d __) 2023 WL 8721065, at *5 (No. S23A1078, decided

Dec. 19, 2023) (any error in admission of demonstrative photographs

of model firearms was harmless given the compelling evidence of

guilt and the limited prejudicial effect from the photographs);

                                 16
Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 147, 155 (4) (805 SE2d 873) (2017) (any

error in allowing State to engage in a demonstration regarding the

crime was harmless, as any effect that the demonstration may have

had on the jury “would have been minimal compared to the effect of

the properly-admitted evidence before it”).

      3.    Williams argues that the State violated his Georgia

constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination, see Ga.

Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XVI (“Paragraph XVI”), by eliciting

testimony of his refusal to submit to having his hands swabbed for

purposes of gunshot residue (GSR) testing. We conclude that the

trial court did not plainly err in admitting this testimony.

      With no defense objection, the State elicited Detective Manley’s

testimony that, during his October 8, 2017, interview of Williams,

Williams refused to submit to GSR testing. 8 At the end of his initial

closing argument, the prosecutor referenced this evidence of

Williams’s refusal.

      8 A recording of the interview of Williams was admitted at a pre-trial

motion hearing. But it was not introduced at trial.
                                      17
     Because Williams did not object to the admission of evidence of

his refusal to submit to GSR testing, the admission of the evidence

is reviewed only for plain error, which requires, among other things,

a showing of an error that is clear or obvious. See State v. Herrera-

Bustamante, 304 Ga. 259, 263-264 (2) (b) (818 SE2d 552) (2018). “An

error is plain if it is clear or obvious under current law. An error

cannot be plain where there is no controlling authority on point.” Id.

at 264 (2) (b) (citation and punctuation omitted). “[A]n error is not

plain under current law if a defendant’s theory requires the

extension of precedent.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).

Because Williams cannot show that admission of evidence of his

refusal was an error that was clear and not open to reasonable

dispute, he cannot show plain error.

     Williams acknowledges that our precedent holds that

admission of expert testimony about the results of GSR testing of a

defendant does not violate Paragraph XVI. See Tuff v. State, 278 Ga.

91, 94 (3) (597 SE2d 328) (2004); Strickland v. State, 247 Ga. 219,

225 (18) (275 SE2d 29) (1981). The question of whether evidence of

                                 18
his refusal to submit to such testing may be admitted consistent

with Paragraph XVI raises a different, albeit related, question. In

support of his argument that such evidence was inadmissible,

Williams points to our decision in Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 179 (824

SE2d 265) (2019), wherein we held that Paragraph XVI barred the

State from using a defendant’s refusal to submit to a chemical

breath test against the defendant in her criminal trial. Id. at 179-

180. But that holding was based on the conclusion in Elliott’s

precursor, Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228 (806 SE2d 505) (2017), that

submission to such a chemical breath test was an affirmative act to

which Paragraph XVI applied given the deep lung breath and

sustained strong blowing necessary for such a breath test, which

requires a certain level of cooperation. See Elliott, 305 Ga. at 189-

190 (III); Olevik, 302 Ga. at 243-244 (2) (c) (iii). Whether refusal to

submit to swabbing of one’s hands is similarly protected by

Paragraph XVI presents a different question, and Williams points

to no decision of ours that has decided it. Cf. Olevik, 302 Ga. at 243

(2) (c) (iii) (whether a test falls within Paragraph XVI’s prohibition

                                  19
on compelling a suspect to perform an incriminating act “depends on

the details of the test”). Williams’s argument thus would require an

extension of, if not a departure from, existing case law. And that is

fatal to Williams’s argument under plain-error review. See Herrera-

Bustamante, 304 Ga. at 266 (2) (b).

     4.   Williams argues that the trial court committed error by

sua sponte resentencing him under the recidivist provision found in

OCGA § 17-10-7 (b) (2). We disagree.

     OCGA § 17-10-7 (a) provides that repeat felony offenders

generally shall be given the sentence at the longest end of the

statutory range, “provided that, unless otherwise provided by law,

the trial judge may, in his or her discretion, probate or suspend the

maximum sentence prescribed for the offense.” In contrast, OCGA §

17-10-7 (b) (2) provides that generally “any person who has been

convicted of a serious violent felony in this state . . . and who after

such first conviction subsequently commits and is convicted of a

serious violent felony for which such person is not sentenced to death

shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without parole” without

                                  20
an option for the sentence to be suspended, stayed, probated,

deferred, or withheld. The recidivist count of the indictment of

Williams, Count 12, merely cited OCGA § 17-10-7 generally, not a

specific subsection, and charged Williams as a recidivist by citing

March 2008 convictions for armed robbery and possession of a

firearm during the commission of a felony.

     The   trial   court   initially    imposed   a   sentence   of   life

imprisonment for malice murder, four consecutive 10-year sentences

for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, 20

years concurrent for the aggravated assault of Waters, and 15 years

consecutive for the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon

during the commission of a crime. The trial court, both at sentencing

and in the final disposition form, specified that the life sentence was

imposed pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-7 (a).

     In Williams’s motion for new trial, he asserted, among other

things, a merger error with respect to the firearms offenses. In its

May 10, 2023, order otherwise denying the motion for new trial, the

trial court agreed with Williams’s merger argument. The following

                                   21
day, the trial court issued an amended final disposition form,

merging all but one of the possession of a firearm during the

commission of a crime counts into the possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon during the commission of a crime count. he amended

form specified that the sentence for malice murder was “[l]ife

imprisonment pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-7 (b) (2),” although the

form also had a box checked specifying that Williams was being

sentenced as a recidivist under OCGA § 17-10-7 (a).

     The parties apparently assume that the reference to OCGA §

17-10-7 (b) in the amended final disposition form means that the

amended sentence for malice murder was one of life without parole.

The State, via the Attorney General, argues that a sentence of life

without parole was required under OCGA § 17-10-7 (b) based on

Williams’s prior armed robbery conviction. 9 Without addressing the

State’s argument that a life without parole sentence was required

under OCGA § 17-10-7 (b) (2), Williams argues that the trial court

     9  The District Attorney’s appellate brief states that “the trial court
exercised its discretion in sentencing Appellant pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-10-
7 (b).”
                                     22
erred by sentencing him under that provision because that provision

had not been “invoked” by the State such that he did not receive

sufficient notice that such a sentence was possible. He also argues

that he was “entitled to rely upon the finality” of the initial

sentencing.

      A sentence of life without parole was the sentence mandated

by statute in this case. See OCGA § 17-10-7 (b) (2); see also OCGA §

17-10-6.1 (a) (2) (defining “serious violent felony” as including armed

robbery). This Court has made clear that it does not violate double

jeopardy “finality” principles to resentence a defendant in order to

correct a void sentence. See Parrott v. State, 312 Ga. 580, 582-585

(3) (864 SE2d 80) (2021). And the State cannot deprive the trial court

of the ability to correct a void sentence by inviting the initial error.

See Barber v. State, 314 Ga. 759, 766 (3) n.6 (879 SE2d 428) (2022).

Therefore, the trial court did not err to the extent that it imposed an

amended sentence of life without parole pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-

7 (b) (2).

      To the extent that Williams complains of lack of notice, OCGA

                                  23
§ 17-16-4 (a) (5) does provide that the State must, “no later than ten

days prior to trial, or at such time as the court orders but in no event

later than the beginning of the trial, provide the defendant with

notice of any evidence in aggravation of punishment that the state

intends to introduce in sentencing.” But the indictment itself gave

Williams notice of the evidence that the State intended to introduce

in support of a life-without-parole sentence under OCGA § 17-10-7

(b) (2) — the prior armed robbery conviction. Therefore, Williams

cannot say he did not receive the notice required by law.

     5.    Finally, Williams argues that his trial counsel was

ineffective in several respects. In particular, he argues that counsel

was ineffective for (a) failing to properly allege applicable grounds

in Williams’s motion to suppress the evidence extracted from

Williams’s cell phone, (b) failing to object or ask for curative

instructions when a prospective juror referred to Williams as an

inmate during voir dire, (c) interjecting into the trial evidence of

Williams’s invocation of his right against self-incrimination, (d)

failing to object to evidence of Williams’s refusal to submit to GSR

                                  24
testing, and (e) failing to request the redaction of the indictment to

exclude certain references to a prior conviction. He also argues that

he is entitled to a new trial due to the collective prejudicial effect of

these alleged deficiencies in counsel’s performance. We conclude

that trial counsel either did not perform deficiently in the way

claimed or that any claimed deficiency did not prejudice Williams’s

defense, even when considered collectively with the other

deficiencies of counsel and trial court errors that we presume.

       To succeed on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

Williams must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and

that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced Williams’s defense.

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80

LE2d 674) (1984). “If [a defendant] fails to establish one of these two

prongs, we need not examine the other.” Payne v. State, 314 Ga. 322,

328 (3) (877 SE2d 202) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted).

“To show deficient performance, the defendant must demonstrate

that    counsel   performed   counsel’s   duties   in   an   objectively

unreasonable way, considering all of the circumstances and in the

                                   25
light of prevailing professional norms.” Id. at 328-329 (3). “To

establish prejudice, [a defendant] must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional error,

the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 329

(3) (citation and punctuation omitted). “In reviewing a ruling on a

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we defer to the trial court’s

findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we apply the

law to the facts de novo.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).

     (a)   Williams argues that trial counsel was ineffective by

failing properly to allege applicable grounds in Williams’s motion to

suppress the evidence extracted from Williams’s cell phone. In

particular, he argues that counsel should have argued below that

the extraction of data from the phone was not supported by probable

cause and that there was a failure to limit the scope of the

extraction. But we have concluded above, applying the higher

standard applicable to consideration of harm from preserved

constitutional error, that there is no reasonable probability that the

evidence extracted from Williams’s phone may have contributed to

                                   26
the verdict. Williams therefore cannot show prejudice from any

failure on counsel’s part to allege grounds additional to the ones he

in fact raised in the motion to suppress this evidence.

     (b)   Williams argues that trial counsel was ineffective by

failing to object or ask for curative instructions when a prospective

juror referred to Williams as an inmate during voir dire. We

conclude that Williams cannot show that he was prejudiced by any

deficient performance of counsel in this regard.

     During voir dire at the May 2019 trial of the case, when the

court’s clerk asked the panel about impartiality, Juror No. 49 raised

his hand and stated that he may have interacted with Williams in

his role as a jail chaplain. During follow up questioning by the

prosecutor, Juror No. 49 said he did not “recall specifically what [his]

interaction was with this particular inmate[.]”Defense counsel did

not seek a remedy for these comments. The juror was not selected

for the petit jury.

     Without deciding whether counsel performed deficiently in this

regard, we conclude that Williams cannot show prejudice. Even

                                  27
assuming that any juror who ultimately was empaneled mistakenly

took Juror No. 49’s remark to be evidence, “passing references to [a

defendant’s] incarceration [do] not place his character into evidence,

particularly since a jury could reasonably assume that a defendant

charged with murder would be arrested for the crime.” Miller v.

State, 295 Ga. 769, 776 (3) (a) (764 SE2d 135) (2014) (concluding that

appellant failed to demonstrate that he was harmed by the trial

court’s failure to issue sua sponte curative instructions in response

to witnesses’ references to appellant’s incarceration).

     (c)   Williams argues that counsel was ineffective in that

counsel interjected into the trial evidence of Williams’s invocation of

his right against self-incrimination, by eliciting testimony that

Williams exercised his right to an attorney and by referencing this

invocation in closing argument. We again conclude that Williams

cannot show he was prejudiced by any failure of counsel in this

regard.

     During cross-examination of Detective Manley, defense

counsel asked about the detective’s interview of Williams, eliciting

                                  28
testimony that Williams “freely talked” for some period of time but

then invoked his right to counsel and “stopped the interview.” In

closing argument, defense counsel referenced Williams’s invocation

of his right to counsel during the interview.

     Even assuming counsel performed deficiently in this regard,

Williams has not shown that he was prejudiced as a result. Evidence

that a defendant asks for an attorney and ends an interview is not

necessarily prejudicial. See Martin v. State, 290 Ga. 901, 903 (1) (a)

(725 SE2d 313) (2012) (“Martin’s request for an attorney did not

negatively point directly at the substance of Martin’s claim of self-

defense or otherwise substantially prejudice Martin.”). Here,

particularly given the strong evidence of Williams’s guilt presented

by the State, Williams has not shown that the result of his trial

would have been different but for counsel’s actions in this regard.

     (d)   Williams argues that trial counsel was ineffective by

failing to object to testimony that Williams refused to submit to GSR

testing. We disagree. As discussed above, the suggested objection

would have called for an extension of or a change in existing law.

                                 29
Failure to make an objection that would call for an extension of or a

change in the law is not deficient performance. See Lowe v. State,

314 Ga. 788, 796 (2) (b) (879 SE2d 492) (2022) (“[I]t is well settled

that a criminal defense attorney does not perform deficiently when

he fails to advance a legal theory that would require an extension of

existing precedents and the adoption of an unproven theory of law.”

(citation and punctuation omitted)); Rhoden v. State, 303 Ga. 482,

486 (2) (a) (813 SE2d 375) (2018) (“Counsel is not obligated to argue

beyond existing precedent.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).

     (e)   Williams argues that trial counsel was ineffective by

failing to request the redaction of the indictment to exclude certain

references to his prior conviction for possession of a firearm during

the commission of a crime. Again, Williams cannot show how this

failure changed the outcome of the trial.

     The possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime

counts, Counts 5, 6, 7, and 10, in addition to alleging that Williams

possessed a firearm while committing various crimes against Brooks

and Waters on October 8, 2017, alleged that on March 13, 2008,

                                 30
Williams had been convicted of a violation of OCGA § 16-11-106. The

felon-in-possession count, Count 11, alleged that Williams had been

convicted of armed robbery on March 13, 2008, specifying that was

“a felony involving the use of a firearm[.]”And the indictment

included a separate count, Count 12, charging Williams as a

recidivist, specifying that Williams had been convicted of armed

robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a

felony on March 13, 2008. Although the specifics are unclear, the

transcript suggests that the indictment itself was redacted in some

fashion before it was sent back with the jury; the trial court at one

point indicated that the State had redacted the indictment “with

respect to the recidivist count as well as taking out the offense itself

in Count Three.”10

      Williams argues that trial counsel was deficient for failing to

request redaction of the references in Counts 5, 6, 7 and 10 to

      10  Count 3 charged Williams with felony murder predicated on the
commission of the offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, but
did not otherwise refer to any particular prior offense. The State represents
that “[t]he record does not contain a copy of the redacted indictment that went
out with the jury.”
                                      31
Williams’s previous conviction for a violation of OCGA § 16-11-106.

He argues that these references were germane only for sentencing

purposes and did not allege additional elements for the State to

prove to the jury at trial. But even assuming that these references

were not in fact redacted from those counts in the indictment given

to the jury, and even assuming that counsel performed deficiently in

failing to request such a redaction, Williams has not shown he was

prejudiced by any such failure. Even if trial counsel had successfully

moved for the redaction of the references to the prior conviction in

Counts 5, 6, 7, and 10, the jury still would have learned that

Williams previously had been convicted of a felony involving the use

of a firearm. The jury heard a stipulation to the effect that, in March

2008, Williams had been convicted of “a felony offense involving the

use of a firearm” in violation of OCGA § 16-11-106. Williams does

not argue that counsel’s agreement to the stipulation amounted to

deficient performance by counsel. Williams thus cannot show how

the reference to his prior conviction under OCGA § 16-11-106 in

Counts 5, 6, 7, and 10 changed the outcome of the trial.

                                  32
     (f)   Williams finally argues that the cumulative prejudicial

effect of trial counsel’s failures deprived him of a fair trial. See

Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 811 (II) n.1 (642 SE2d 56) (2007),

overruled on other grounds by State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 17 (1) (838

SE2d 808) (2020). We disagree. As discussed above, the marginal

value of the evidence extracted from Williams’s cell phone was

minimal, comments about Williams’s incarceration or invocation of

his right to counsel were not very prejudicial, and Williams cannot

show how he was harmed by any failure on counsel’s part to seek

redaction of the reference to a violation of OCGA § 16-11-106, given

the unchallenged stipulation. Even considering collectively the

deficiencies in counsel’s performance that we have assumed, we

conclude that Williams has not shown a reasonable probability of a

different result in the absence of these assumed deficiencies,

particularly given the strength of the other evidence of Williams’s

guilt.

     In addition to assuming some deficient performance by trial

counsel, we have assumed two trial court errors of an evidentiary

                                33
nature — admission of the extraction from Williams’s phone and

admission of the demonstrative video on selective attention — and

determined that each error was harmless. Although Williams

argues that we should consider the collective prejudice of alleged

instances of deficient performance by trial counsel, and although he

cites Lane and its progeny, Williams has made no argument that we

should apply a cumulative error review that encompasses trial court

errors. See Lane, 308 Ga. at 17 (1). Nevertheless, even assuming

that we must sua sponte apply a cumulative error review under

Lane, we conclude that Williams has failed to establish that the

combined prejudicial effect of these assumed trial court errors and

assumed deficient performance of trial counsel denied him a

fundamentally fair trial. See, e.g., Huff v. State, 315 Ga. 558, 568 (6)

(883 SE2d 773) (2023) (rejecting cumulative error claim “because

Appellant ha[d] not demonstrated that the prejudicial effect of the

assumed trial court errors and ineffective assistance denied him a

fundamentally fair trial, given the strong evidence against him[.]”).

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

                                  34