Court Opinion

ID: 9587089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:17:57.352606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:01.456244
License: Public Domain

HUNSTEIN, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
In his modification petition, Husband alleges nothing more than the single fact that his eldest child has attained the age of 18. This fact alone, whether or not supported by evidence, does not constitute a “substantial change in either parent’s income and financial status or the needs of the child” as is required to sustain a petition for modification under OCGA § 19-6-15 (k) (1). See also former OCGA § 19-6-19 (a). Accordingly, contrary to the majority’s conclusion, I believe the trial court was correct in dismissing the petition. See Perry v. Williamson, 219 Ga. 701 (135 SE2d 412) (1964) (affirming dismissal of modification petition for failure to allege sufficient basis therefor).
Even more troubling than the majority’s reversal of the trial court’s dismissal, however, is its declaration that the inartfully phrased child support provision in the parties’ divorce decree is “unequivocal” in terminating Husband’s child support obligation for each child upon the child’s attainment of the age of 18 and completion of high school. Such a construction fails to acknowledge or attempt to assign meaning to the first clause of the child support provision, which states plainly, and in arguable contrast to the latter clause, that the prescribed payments are to continue “in like kind and fashion . . . until. . . the youngest minor child . . . attains the age of eighteen.” (Emphasis supplied.) It is a well established maxim that courts ‘“should avoid any construction that renders portions of the contract language meaningless. (Cit.)’ [Cit.]” Horwitz v. Weil, 275 Ga. 467, 468 (569 SE2d 515) (2002). Assuming arguendo, as the majority finds, that Husband’s petition properly states a claim for modification of child support, further adjudication of the merits should depend on a thoughtful inquiry into the meaning of the child support provision, utilizing the applicable rules of construction in conjunction with any evidence presented as to the parties’ intent. See id. (applying rules of construction to ascertain meaning of ambiguous provisions of settlement agreement); Rodgers v. Rodgers, 234 Ga. 463, 464 (216 SE2d 322) (1975) (where settlement agreement susceptible of more than one meaning, “intention of the parties at the time the agreement was made, as determined by all the *512evidence, becomes material”)- The majority unnecessarily bypasses this inquiry.
Decided June 8, 2009.
Meriwether & Tharp, Patrick L. Meriwether, Sarah L. Kass, for appellant.
Elizabeth Grenevitch, pro se.
For these reasons, I must respectfully dissent.