Court Opinion

ID: 9690449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:13:30.432593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:57.214304
License: Public Domain

Wendell L. Griffen, Judge, dissenting. “It is the duty of a driver of a motor vehicle to keep a lookout for other vehicles or persons on the street or highway. The lookout required is that which a reasonably careful driver would keep under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence in this case.” — AMI Civ. 901(A) (2008) One of the first things that new drivers are taught is to always keep their eyes on the road. Not only is it a good way to avoid accidents, it is the law. The majority’s decision chips away at that fundamental rule, as it has the practical effect of declaring that a driver has no duty to keep a proper lookout if another vehicle fails to yield the right of way. I cannot embrace this decision. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent. As the majority opinion states, the accident occurred as both parties were attempting to look for a parking space. Bell was driving down Powell Street as Misenheimer was pulling from a driveway. Both claimed that they were hit by the other driver. The key testimony for the purpose of this appeal was from Misenhe-imer: “[Bell] said she was looking to the left to find a parking place in front of the church house and she didn’t see me. Obviously, that’s what caused the accident. She said it was her fault.” While Bell denied making this statement, she admitted that her vision was obscured by the cars parked along the street and that she did not see Misenheimer prior to the impact. After the close of evidence, the jury was given the comparative-fault instruction that is the subject of this appeal. Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-64-122(a) (Repl. 2005) instructs that in any personal-injury or property-damage action where injury is predicated on fault, liability shall be determined by comparing the plaintiffs fault to the defendant’s fault. The definition of “fault” includes “any act, omission, [or] conduct . . . which is a proximate cause of any damages sustained by any party.” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-64-122(c). A party is entitled to a jury instruction when it is a correct statement of the law and there is some evidentiary basis for giving the instruction. Barnes v. Everett, 351 Ark. 479, 95 S.W.3d 740 (2003). However, a comparative-fault instruction should not be submitted to the jury absent evidence that the plaintiff failed to do something a reasonably prudent person would do or did something a reasonably prudent person would not do under the circumstances. Skinner v. RJ Griffin & Co., 313 Ark. 430, 855 S.W.2d 913 (1993); Marx v. Huron Little Rock, 88 Ark. App. 284, 198 S.W.3d 127 (2004). The majority writes that Bell had no duty to anticipate Misenheimer’s failure to yield and that, because she had no such duty, the circuit court erred in giving the comparative-fault instruction. True, as a driver pulling out of a driveway, Misenheimer was required to yield to oncoming traffic. See Ark. Code Ann. § 27-51-603 (Repl. 1994). Also true, it is not an act of negligence to assume, until the contrary is or reasonably should be apparent, that every other person will use ordinary care and obey the law. See AMI Civ. 602 (2008); Sw. Ry. Co. v. Evans, 254 Ark. 762, 497 S.W.2d 692 (1973). However, the failure of one driver to yield the right-of-way does not excuse another driver’s failure to keep a proper lookout. See AMI Civ. 901(A). A proper lookout implies being watchful of one’s own vehicle as well as the movement of other things seen. Wingate Taylor-Maid Transp., Inc. v. Baker, 310 Ark. 731, 840 S.W.2d 179 (1992); Cobb v. Atkins, 239 Ark. 151, 388 S.W.2d 8 (1965). Further, the right-of-way does not give a driver the right to abandon caution when traversing the roadway. The “right-of-way” is merely “the privilege of the immediate use of the highway.” Ark. Code Ann. § 27-49-211 (Repl. 1994). Once a driver has the right-of-way, he or she still “must continue to use ordinary care to avoid injury or damage to himself/herself or others.” AMI Civ. 909; cf. AMI Civ. 902 (2008) (noting that, while the vehicle in front has a right to use the highway superior to any vehicle traveling behind it, the driver of the forward vehicle still has an obligation to use ordinary care and to obey the rules of the road). Here, the circuit court gave a comparative-fault instruction in the face of testimony that Bell was looking somewhere other than at the road when the accident occurred. While she had no duty to anticipate that another vehicle would fail to yield, she still had the duty to keep a proper lookout for other vehicles in an effort to avoid injury to herself or other vehicles. Had Bell kept a proper lookout, this accident could have possibly been avoided. This alleged breach of duty warranted the jury instruction on comparative fault. If any teenager in this country were involved in an accident, few parents would refrain from admonishing the young driver if he or she was not paying attention to the road at the time of the accident. Today, the majority has excused such careless behavior. Because the circuit court properly gave the comparative-fault instruction in the face of evidence that Bell was not keeping a proper lookout, I would affirm. Because a majority of my colleagues hold to the contrary, I must respectfully dissent. I am authorized to state that Judge Gladwin joins in this dissent.