Court Opinion

ID: 9569351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:13:07.501143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:51:07.560282
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Chief Judge,
concurring specially.
I fully concur in the majority opinion. While I find that Clay failed to establish that Rippy violated the professional standard of care as set out in Division 1 thereof, I write separately to express my empathy for Clay because a physician unquestionably has a “generalized duty to impart relevant information to a patient concerning his or her medical condition[,]” here the need to take folic acid. Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 260 Ga. 711, 715 (398 SE2d 557) (1990). Nevertheless, if a medical malpractice action is to survive summary judgment, it is essential that the supporting expert’s affidavit set out a standard of care showing that a duty was owed. Clay was advised to have her pregnancy immediately terminated in the best interest of her unborn child. Clay’s expert, however, failed to establish that, at that time, a further duty is owed to the patient, which includes the physician (1) explaining to an upset Clay that she should take a regulár dose of folic acid if she planned to have a healthy pregnancy in the future, and (2) ¿dvising Clay to return to her physician for a follow-up visit or to see a new ob-gyn for her condition. While perhaps there is an expert who might have testified that the standard of care here included such a duty owing to Clay, her expert did not do so. Accordingly, I am constrained to find that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in Rippy’s favor. Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (405 SE2d 474) (1991).