Court Opinion

ID: 9917035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-11 15:06:22.901407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:54:53.600452
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Lloyd v. Lloyd, 2024-Ohio-56.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                       ADAMS COUNTY

TONYA L. LLOYD,                                :

        Plaintiff-Appellant,                   :   CASE NO. 22CA1159

        v.                                     :

JOSHUA M. LLOYD,                               :   DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

        Defendant-Appellee.                    :

______________________________________________________________

                                          APPEARANCES:

Robert R. Goldstein, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant.

Barbara A. Moore, West Union, Ohio, for Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
CIVIL CASE FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT, DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION
DATE JOURNALIZED:1-3-24
ABELE, J.

        {¶1}     This is an appeal from an Adams County Common Pleas

Court judgment that denied a motion to modify child support.

Tonya Lloyd, plaintiff below and appellant herein, assigns two

errors for review:

                 FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

                 “THE COURT ERRED IN ISSUING [A] DECISION
                 WHICH IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE
                 EVIDENCE.”

                 SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

                 “THE COURT ERRED IN NOT RECALCULATING THE
                 AMOUNT OF SUPPORT THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO
                 BE PAID UNDER THE CHILD SUPPORT ORDER IN
                 ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULE AND THE
ADAMS, 22CA1159                                                  2

            APPLICABLE WORKSHEET, AS REQUIRED BY OHIO
            REVISED CODE 3119.79(A).”

    {¶2}    The parties married in 2006 and are the parents of two

children, V.L. (DOB 2004) and O.L. (DOB 2010).    On June 20,

2020, appellant filed a complaint for divorce.    Appellant’s

affidavit listed her income at $41,600, appellee’s base yearly

income at $84,000, and appellee’s estimated total yearly income

at $100,000.     On March 19, 2021, the trial court issued a final

decree that incorporated, approved, and adopted the parties’

separation agreement.    The court: (1) designated both parents as

residential parent and legal custodian, and (2) ordered appellee

to pay $710.66 per month for child support.

    {¶3}    On April 8, 2022, appellant filed a motion to modify

child support.    Appellant alleged that, although the initial

support order included a 50% deviation due to “extended

parenting time and post secondary expense,” their minor son

spends every other weekend, and a few hours on weekdays, with

appellee.    In addition, V.L.’s post-secondary expense “is being

paid by the company and not by Defendant.”    Thus, appellant

argued that (1) appellee received a de facto deviation, and (2)

appellee’s income is “now substantially higher than when the

child support was set.”

    {¶4}    Appellant’s most recent affidavit listed her yearly

income at $41,599 in 2019, $42,474 in 2020, $18,374 in 2021,
ADAMS, 22CA1159                                                  3

current annual income $6,000, and $3,731.15 in total monthly

expenses.    Appellee’s affidavit listed his annual income at

$115,477 in 2019, $124,884 in 2020, $30,306 in 2021, current

income at $87,038, and $7,713.74 in total monthly expenses.

    {¶5}    On June 14, 2022, appellee filed a motion for contempt

and argued that appellant failed to vacate a specific property

as the separation agreement required.

    {¶6}    On August 25 and November 1, 2022, the trial court

held a hearing to consider the pending motions.     Appellant

testified that, according to the shared parenting plan, appellee

should have the children overnight on Wednesdays, Thursdays and

every other weekend.    However, appellee apparently exercises

parenting time with O.L. every other weekend.     Appellant pointed

out that the initial child support worksheet included a

deviation based in part on the expectation that appellee would

exercise additional parenting time beyond every other weekend.

Furthermore, although appellee recently purchased clothes for

their minor son, appellee provides no other in-kind

contributions.

    {¶7}    Appellant stated that, when the trial court

established the shared parenting plan, she earned $41,599 per

year, but now only receives $500 per month in rental income.         At

the time of the divorce, appellant worked in healthcare and

earned $22 per hour, but she could not continue in that position
ADAMS, 22CA1159                                                4

because she must now drive their son to and from school.

Appellant is, however, pursuing a medical coding degree and is

in contact with a hospital about a future position, and does

anticipate an increase in income. Appellant also testified that

appellee receives income from Lloyd’s Excavating, Meigs

Township, farming, rentals, Black Diamond Grocery, and real

estate.     Appellant explained that appellee’s affidavit of income

indicated a farming loss, but did not reflect his crop check

“anywhere from $2000 to $3000.”     Appellant did acknowledge that

she remained in their home rent-free for 13 months beyond the

decree’s requirement to vacate, but explained she waited for

refinancing and could not obtain a loan because her “income to

debt ratio was too high because I was still on the mortgages.”

    {¶8}    Appellee testified that his current sources of income

include construction, township trustee, farm, and rental

property.     Appellee is an employee and owner of his construction

company, earns $700 to $900 per month as a township trustee,

sometimes sells items to earn additional money, owns five rental

properties, and has a home equity loan.     Appellee did purchase a

house for their adult daughter and two houses for resale, but

due to market changes he has not sold the properties.     In 2021,

appellee had $32,000 income from Allied Construction, $4,400

from Firehouse Construction, $71,136 from Lloyd’s Excavating,

$11,947 from Meigs Township, depreciation of $179,000 and
ADAMS, 22CA1159                                                5

$64,000 in total income.   Appellee owns 50% of Lloyd’s

Excavating with his father, and appellee described an ongoing

excavating project with an original bid of $2.2 million.

    {¶9}   Appellee further testified that he has two bank

accounts, one in his name and one in his and his daughter’s

name, deposits $25,000 to $45,000 per month in his personal

account, pays $648 per month health insurance, pays for V.L.’s

online classes, pays the loan and fuel for her car, and deposits

money in her account when she overdrafts.   Appellee also picks

up O.L. two days per week from school and takes him to

McDonald’s for a snack before he brings him home.   Appellee said

O.L. stays overnight with him “every other weekend usually,” and

he would prefer for him to stay with him more, but his son often

gets emotional and asks to return to appellant’s home.     Their

adult daughter does not stay with him.

    {¶10} Appellee explained that he understood that the

parties’ separation agreement required him to remove appellant’s

name from the mortgage and appellant to vacate the home.

Although appellee started the refinance process within a week of

the divorce, it took much longer to conclude the process.

Also, appellee did not evict appellant when she failed to vacate

the residence because he did not “wanna be like that.”

Currently, appellee rents that property for $550 per month, but,

to his credit, he did not ask appellant to make payments while
ADAMS, 22CA1159                                                   6

she lived in the home.     However, after appellant sought more

child support, appellee’s counsel advised him to file a motion

for contempt against her.     On November 10, 2022, the trial court

denied appellant’s motion for modification of child support and

appellee’s motion for contempt.     The court determined that the

“agreed to financial positions of the parties at the time of the

divorce have not changed sufficiently to require a modification

of child support.”

This appeal followed.

                                  I.

    {¶11} In her first assignment of error, appellant asserts

that the trial court’s decision is against the manifest weight

of the evidence.     In her second assignment of error, appellant

contends that the trial court erred when it failed to

recalculate child support and complete the worksheet that R.C.

3119.79(A) requires.     Because appellant’s assignments of error

raise related issues, we will consider them together.

    {¶12} In particular, appellant argues that the trial court

failed to recalculate child support before it decided that no

change of circumstances had occurred.     Appellant also argues

that the court misstates the source of her income because the

court categorized her $6,000 income as social security

disability, but, as the appellee concedes, that money is rental

income.
ADAMS, 22CA1159                                                 7

    {¶13} Generally, a trial court’s modification of a prior

child support order is within a court’s broad discretion and

should not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion.

Morrow v. Becker, 138 Ohio St.3d 11, 2013-Ohio-4542, 3 N.E.3d

144, ¶ 9.   A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision

is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.   Blakemore v.

Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).

    {¶14} R.C. 3119.79 establishes when a change in

circumstances requires the modification of child support:

    (A) If an obligor or obligee under a child support order
    requests that the court modify the amount of child
    support required to be paid pursuant to the child support
    order, the court shall recalculate the amount of support
    that would be required to be paid under the child support
    order in accordance with the schedule and the applicable
    worksheet. If that amount as recalculated is more than
    ten per cent greater than or more than ten per cent less
    than the amount of child support required to be paid
    pursuant to the existing child support order, the
    deviation from the recalculated amount that would be
    required to be paid under the schedule and the applicable
    worksheet shall be considered by the court as a change
    of circumstance substantial enough to require a
    modification of the child support amount. (Emphasis
    added).

Thus, the statute sets forth three circumstances that require a

child support order modification following recalculation: 1)

after the guidelines are applied using the parties’ current

circumstances, at least a ten percent increase or decrease

exists in the amount the guidelines establish for support

payments (R.C. 3119.79(A)); 2) the evidence shows that the
ADAMS, 22CA1159                                                  8

current support order is not sufficient to satisfy the dependent

child’s medical needs (R.C. 3119.79(B)); or 3) a substantial

change of circumstances occurred and had not been contemplated

when the court issued the original child support order (R.C.

3119.79(C)).

       {¶15} Trial courts generally follow a two-step process to

determine whether to modify a child support order.    First, a

court must consider whether a substantial change in

circumstances has occurred.    DePalmo v. DePalmo, 78 Ohio St.3d

535, 540, 679 N.E.2d 266 (1997).    Second, if a substantial

change does exist, a court must order a modification of the

order unless the court finds the modified amount would be unjust

or inappropriate, or not in the child’s best interest.     Id. at

540.    If, however, a trial court denies a motion for

modification on the basis that no substantial change in

circumstances has occurred, the court must base its finding on

specific facts.    Yark v. Yark, 6th Dist. Fulton No. F-00-010,

2001 WL 27550, * 6 (Jan. 12, 2001).    Further, the Supreme Court

of Ohio has held a trial court must complete child support

computation worksheets and include them in the record so

appellate courts can meaningfully review the court’s rulings.

Marker v. Grimm, 65 Ohio St.3d 139, 601 N.E.2d 496 (1992),

paragraph one of the syllabus.
ADAMS, 22CA1159                                                  9

    {¶16} While we do find in the record child support

computation worksheets dated June 3, 2020, February 17, 2021,

and March 16, 2021, the trial court’s entry is dated November

10, 2022.     The court also referred to appellant’s $6,000 social

security disability income (which both parties concede is

incorrect).     Although the court stated that appellee is to pay

appellant $75,000 at a rate of one third per year, and noted the

parties’ debts, we do not find a child support recalculation.

    {¶17} R.C. 3119.79(A) provides that when a party files a

motion to modify child support, the court shall recalculate the

amount of support that would be required.     Appellee, however,

argues that, if the parties’ incomes have not changed, no reason

exists to perform a new calculation.

    {¶18} When a statute uses the word “shall,” that word

usually denotes that compliance with the terms of that statute

is mandatory.    Smith v. Leis, 106 Ohio St.3d 309, 2005-Ohio-

5125, 835 N.E.2d 5, at ¶ 62; State ex rel. Botkins v. Laws, 69

Ohio St.3d 383, 385, 632 N.E.2d 897 (1994).     “The rule has been

stated frequently and clearly: ‘In statutory construction, the

word “may” shall be construed as permissive and the word “shall”

shall be construed as mandatory unless there appears a clear and

unequivocal legislative intent that they receive a construction

other than their ordinary usage.’ ”     Dept. of Liquor Control v.

Sons of Italy Lodge 0917, 65 Ohio St.3d 532, 534, 605 N.E.2d 368
ADAMS, 22CA1159                                                  10

(1992), citing Dorrian v. Scioto Conservancy Dist., 27 Ohio

St.2d 102, 271 N.E.2d 834 (1971), paragraph one of the syllabus;

State v. Solomon, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 22CA011916, 2023-Ohio-

1935, ¶ 9.    Consequently, Ohio’s statutory scheme requires a

child support calculation be made in accordance with the support

worksheets.   Raff v. Raff 5th Dist. Stark No. 2004CA00251, 2005-

Ohio-3348; Cutlip v. Cutlip 5th Dist. Richland No. 02CA32, 2002

WL 31412399 (Oct.24, 2002).     However, case authority also

supports the view that, when a support modification is not

warranted, courts need not include in the record a completed

child support worksheet.     Barnard v. Kuppin 1st Dist. Hamilton

No. C-980360 and C-980400, 1999 Lexis 4185 (Sept. 10, 1999);

Nwabara v. Willacy 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 8772, 2006-Ohio-6414;

Koustis v. Koustis 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2015-G-0032, 2016-Ohio-

7144; Orefice v. Orefice 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 70602, 1996 LEXIS

5752, (December 19, 1996).

     {¶19} Therefore, based upon R.C. 3119.79(A), a trial court

must recalculate support when an obligor or obligee files a

motion to modify child support when the circumstances indicate

that a modification may be appropriate.     Although we recognize

that the trial court in the case sub judice issued a detailed

judgment entry, our review is hampered when the court did not

complete a formal recalculation worksheet.     It is also very

problematic that sizeable deposits or monetary assets appear in
ADAMS, 22CA1159                                               11

appellee’s bank accounts without an adequate explanation, along

with appellant’s statement regarding unexplained expenses.

Thus, we believe that the parties and the court should have the

opportunity to fully address these and any other issues on

remand.

    {¶20} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we

sustain appellant’s assignments of error, reverse the trial

court’s judgment, and remand this matter for further

proceedings.

                              JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CAUSE
                              REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
                              CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
ADAMS, 22CA1159                                                12

                         JUDGMENT ENTRY

     It is ordered that the judgment be reversed and the cause
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Appellant shall recover of appellee the costs herein taxed.

     The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this
appeal.

     It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this
Court directing the Adams County Common Pleas Court to carry
these judgments into execution.

     A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that
mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

    Smith, P.J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

                                    For the Court

    BY:__________________________
                                       Peter B. Abele, Judge

                        NOTICE TO COUNSEL

     Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a
final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
commences from the date of filing with the clerk.