Court Opinion

ID: 9432104
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:34:13.221265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:32.417597
License: Public Domain

Justice White,
with whom Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Blackmun join, dissenting.
I dissent from the Court’s opinion and judgment because it is inappropriate for the Court to deny standing to sue under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U. S. C. § 15, to customers of a regulated utility in circumstances such as those presented in this case. By its plain language, § 4 reflects an “ ‘expansive re*220medial purpose.’” Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U. S. 465, 472 (1982) (citation omitted). It does not distinguish between classes of customers, but rather grants a cause of action to “any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . . . .” 15 U. S. C. § 15(a). In enacting §4, Congress sought to ensure that victims of anticompetitive conduct receive compensation. Blue Shield, supra, at 472; Pfizer Inc. v. India, 434 U. S. 308, 314 (1978).
In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U. S. 720 (1977), we held that certain indirect purchasers of concrete block lacked standing to challenge the manufacturer’s business practices under the antitrust laws because they could not be deemed to have suffered injury from the alleged illegal conduct. This suit, however, is very different from Illinois Brick. That case involved a competitive market where concrete block manufacturers sold to masonry contractors who in turn sold to general contractors who in turn sold to the Illinois Brick respondents; this case involves a highly regulated market where utilities possessing natural monopolies purchase gas from natural gas suppliers and then sell the gas to residential customers. Illinois Brick did not hold that, in all circumstances, indirect purchasers lack § 4 standing. Indeed, just last Term we observed that under Illinois Brick “indirect purchasers might be allowed to bring suit in cases in which it would be easy to prove the extent to which the overcharge was passed on to them.” California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U. S. 93, 102, and n. 6 (1989). See also Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U. S. 481, 494 (1968).
The issue in this case is whether Illinois Brick bars a suit by retail customers to whom the utilities have passed on the entire cost of the gas sold to them, including any illegal overcharge. Before the District Court, the utilities moved to dismiss the States as parens patriae, arguing that the States lacked standing because they represented indirect purchas*221ers. In response, the States contended that the indirect purchasers were proper plaintiffs because the utilities had passed through the entire overcharge to their residential customers. The District Court found it unnecessary “to wait upon evidence establishing the degree to which the utilities passed on the overcharge,” In re Wyoming Tight Sands Antitrust Cases, 695 F. Supp. 1109, 1116 (Kan. 1988), for even accepting the States’ position that there had been a total pass-on, decisions of this Court were thought to bar the suit. Likewise, in affirming the District Court, the Court of Appeals presumed a “perfect and provable pass-on of the allegedly illegal overcharge.” In re Wyoming Tight Sands Antitrust Cases, 866 F. 2d 1286, 1293 (CA10 1989). Indeed, the vice president and general counsel of one of the respondent utilities is on record as stating that the utility’s customers “pay all of any increases in the cost of natural gas [Kansas Power & Light] must purchase to serve them.” Affidavit of David S. Black, Vice President and General Counsel of the Kansas Power & Light Company, Record, Doc. No. 485, Exhibit D (emphasis in original). Rather than embarking, as the Court does, on what amounts to a factfinding mission, which the courts below eschewed, about the fact and provability of this pass-on, we should decide this case on the basis that there has been a complete passthrough of the overcharge. On that basis, it is evident that the concerns underlying the decision in Illinois Brick do not support the judgment below. Rather, we should follow the plain intent of § 4 that the victims of anticompetitive conduct be allowed the remedy provided by the section.
Illinois Brick barred indirect purchaser suits chiefly because we feared that permitting the use of pass-on theories under § 4 would transform these treble-damages actions into massive and inconclusive efforts to apportion the recovery among all potential plaintiffs that could have absorbed part of the overcharge — from direct purchasers to middlemen to ultimate consumers. 431 U. S., at 737. As Judge Posner has *222written: “The optimal adjustment by an unregulated firm to the increased cost of the input will always be a price increase smaller than the increase in input cost, and this means that the increased cost will be divided between the two tiers, the direct and indirect purchasers — but in what proportion will often be hard to determine, even by sophisticated techniques of economic analysis. This is a central insight of the Illinois Brick decision.” Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 852 F. 2d 891, 894 (CA7 1988).
In this case, however, it is regulation rather than market forces that determines the amount of overcharge that the utility passes through to its residential customers. The rates of utilities are determined by law and are set at a level designed to allow a fair return on a rate base that includes the cost of furnishing the service, plainly including in this case the cost of gas purchased from the pipelines and resold to customers. It is fanciful, at least unrealistic, to think that a utility entitled to pass on to its customers the cost of gas that it has purchased will not do so to the maximum extent permitted by law. Furthermore, petitioners assert that in this case the applicable law requires that such cost be passed on to consumers. And, as we have said, the Tenth Circuit opinion reflects the likelihood of a perfect and provable pass-on.
Of course, to recover in a case like this, the plaintiff must prove that the utility paid the pipelines an illegally high price and must demonstrate the amount of the overcharge. That amount is included in the rates charged by the utility and hence is passed through to the consumer. The result is that determining the injury inflicted on consumers involves nothing more than reading their utility bills, which reveal the amount of gas purchased by them at a price which includes the amount of the illegal overcharge passed through to them. Where it is clear that the entire overcharge is passed through, there can be no claim that indirect purchasers can*223not prove the extent of their damage caused by a rate calculated on a rate base inflated by an illegal price paid for gas.
The Court contends that the apportionment problem is not so simple. It maintains that, even where a utility raises its rates to compensate for the overcharge and passes the overcharge through to the indirect purchasers, an apportionment problem still exists because “to show that a direct purchaser has borne no portion of an overcharge, the indirect purchaser would have to prove, among other things, that the direct purchaser could not have raised its rates prior to the overcharge.” Ante, at 209. The problem identified by the majority is not peculiar to indirect purchaser suits. In antitrust cases where suppliers increase their prices, courts frequently must separate the price increase attributable to anticompet-itive conduct (i. e., the “overcharge”) from the price increase attributable to legitimate factors. This type of calculation “has to be done in every case where the plaintiff claims to have lost sales because of the defendant’s unlawful conduct and the defendant argues that the loss was due partly or entirely to other factors.” Panhandle Eastern, supra, at 897; see Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U. S. 251 (1946). The problem identified in Illinois Brick was entirely different: There, we were concerned that it would unduly complicate litigation to require courts to separate the portion of the overcharge absorbed by the direct purchaser from the portion of the overcharge passed onto the indirect purchaser. As argued above, this difficulty is not a concern in the present case. * It is at least very doubtful that a utility that is *224in position to secure a rate increase on grounds having nothing to do with the price paid for its gas would fail to request a rate increase that included as well the entire amount paid for gas purchased from pipelines and sold to consumers.
Illinois Brick also observed that granting standing to the indirect purchasers in that case would lead to the under-enforcement of the antitrust laws. 431 U. S., at 745-747. In the cases where there is “a perfect and provable pass-through,” however, the opposite is true for two reasons. First, because the passthrough of the overcharge is complete and easily demonstrated, the indirect purchasers — and the States in their parens patriae capacity — may readily discover their injury. Second, although the utility could sue to recover lost profits resulting from lost sales due to the illegally high price, its injury is not measured by the amount of the illegal overcharge that it has passed on, and hence the utility would have no incentive to seek such a recovery.
The majority suggests that, even where a utility passes the entire overcharge through to the indirect customers, the utility nonetheless might actively prosecute antitrust claims because the state regulatory commission may allow the utility to keep any damages that the utility recovers. But the utility commissions cannot allow an antitrust recovery forbidden by federal law. Given a passthrough, the customer, not the utility, suffers the antitrust injury, and it is the customer or the State on his behalf that is entitled to recover treble damages. In any event, it seems to me that the majority conjures up a very strange utility commission, the possible existence of which the court fails to document.
A third consideration prompting our decision in Illinois Brick was our belief that permitting indirect purchaser suits might subject antitrust defendants to multiple liability. Id., at 730-731. Again however, where there is a “perfect and provable” passthrough, there is no danger that both the utilities and the indirect purchasers will recover damages for the same anticompetitive conduct because the utili*225ties have not suffered any overcharge damage: The petitioners will sue for the amount of the overcharge, while the utilities will sue for damages resulting from their lost sales.
The majority argues that, even “[ljeaving aside the apportionment issue” (i. <?., assuming that there is no apportionment difficulty as the Tenth Circuit did in affirming summary judgment), the multiple recovery problem identified in Illinois Brick still exists. Ante, at 212-213. I disagree. Illinois Brick “focused on the risk of duplicative recovery engendered by allowing every person along a chain of distribution to claim damages arising from a single transaction that violated the antitrust laws.” Blue Shield, 457 U. S., at 474-475. The danger of multiple recoveries does not exist aside from the apportionment difficulty; rather, it stems from it. If only defensive use of a pass-through defense were barred, or if it were extremely difficult to ascertain the percentage of an overcharge that the utility passed through, then the supplier of natural gas might potentially have to pay overlapping damages to successive purchasers at different levels in the distribution chain. But where there is no apportionment difficulty, there is no comparable risk.
In sum, I cannot agree with the rigid and expansive holding that in no case, even in the utility context, would it be possible to determine in a reliable way a passthrough to consumers of an illegal overcharge that would measure the extent of their damage. There may be cases, as the Court speculates, where there would be insuperable difficulties. But we are to judge this case on the basis that the pass-through is complete and provable. There have been no findings below that this is not the fact. Instead, the decision we review is that consumers may not sue even where it is clear and provable that an illegal overcharge has been passed on to them and that they, rather than the utility, have to that extent been injured.
None of the concerns that caused us to bar the indirect purchaser’s suit in Illinois Brick exist in this case. For that *226reason, rather than extending the Illinois Brick exception to §4’s grant of a cause of action to persons injured through anticompetitive conduct, I would hold that the petitioners in this case have standing to sue. This result would promote the twin antitrust goals of ensuring recompense for injured parties and encouraging the diligent prosecution of antitrust claims.

The majority also suggests that “difficult questions of timing might necessitate apportioning overcharges if we allowed indirect suits by utility customers. Even if, at some point, a utility can pass on 100 percent of its costs to its customers, various factors may delay the passing-on process.” Ante, at 210. This suggestion, as indicated by the words “might” and “may,” is quite speculative. It is much more realistic to believe that sooner or later, the customer will foot the cost of overpriced gas. If timing was such a problem, the Tenth Circuit would not have assumed a “perfect and provable” passthrough.