Court Opinion

ID: 9960899
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-17 16:00:35.070936+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:02.124179
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                 No. 22-35422

             Plaintiff - Appellee,       D.C. No. 2:17-
                                         cv-00668-TSZ
 v.

SHAUN ALLAHYARI,                           OPINION

             Defendant - Appellant,
and

KOMRON M. ALLAHYARI,

             Defendant.

      Appeal from the United States District Court
        for the Western District of Washington
       Thomas S. Zilly, District Judge, Presiding

       Argued and Submitted September 12, 2023
                 Seattle, Washington

                  Filed April 17, 2024

Before: Michael D. Hawkins, Ryan D. Nelson, and Daniel
              P. Collins, Circuit Judges.

               Opinion by Judge Collins
2                       USA V. ALLAHYARI

                          SUMMARY *

                                Tax

    The panel dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, in
an action by the government to reduce federal tax liens to
judgment and foreclose on real property, because there was
no final decision to appeal.
    The order that taxpayer sought to appeal found that the
government was entitled to foreclose on the tax liens, and to
the sale of certain real property. However, the order was not
final because the district court did not have sufficient
information to enter an order for judicial sale. Instead, the
district court ordered the parties to submit a Joint Status
Report. Taxpayer filed his notice of appeal before the parties
submitted the Joint Status Report and stipulated to the value
of the property to be sold. The district court still has not
entered an order for judicial sale.
    Taxpayer contended that the district court’s subsequent
entry of an order resolving the value of the property ripened
the premature notice of appeal into an effective appeal of
what he contended was the then-final judgment of
foreclosure. The panel first explained that, although a
premature notice of appeal “filed after the court announces a
decision or order—but before the entry of the judgment or
order—is treated as filed on the date of and after the entry,”
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2), this rule was inapplicable here. The
rule was intended to protect unskilled litigants from failing
to timely file a notice of appeal from what they reasonably

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                       USA V. ALLAHYARI                       3

believe to be a final judgment, such as where the only steps
that remain to produce a final decision are essentially
ministerial tasks. This rule could not be stretched to cover a
premature notice of appeal directed at an order that explicitly
deferred resolution of the quantification of a monetary award
and that called for briefing from the parties on that issue.
Taxpayer’s premature notice of appeal thus would not have
been effective to appeal any later final judgment if indeed
there were one here. But the panel further held that, in any
event, Taxpayer was wrong in contending that there was now
a final judgment. The panel clarified that, for a decree of sale
in a foreclosure suit to be considered a final decree for
purposes of an appeal, it must settle all of the rights of the
parties and leave nothing to be done but to make the sale and
pay out the proceeds. Because that standard was not met in
this case, there still was no final judgment. The panel
therefore dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

                         COUNSEL

Rachel I. Wollitzer (argued) and Jacob Christensen,
Attorneys; David A. Hubbert, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General; Nicholas W. Brown, United States Attorney;
United States Department of Justice, Tax Division,
Appellate Section, Washington, D.C.; Morgan B. Hlinka,
Trial Attorney; United States Department of Justice, Tax
Division, Washington, D.C.; for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Curtis Isacke (argued) and Avi J. Lipman, McNaul Ebel
Nawrot & Helgren PLLC, Seattle, Washington, for
Defendant-Appellant.
4                       USA V. ALLAHYARI

                           OPINION

COLLINS, Circuit Judge:

    Shaun Allahyari appeals the district court’s order
concluding that a deed of trust granted in Shaun’s favor by
his son Komron Allahyari was a fraudulent transfer that
lacks priority over the Government’s federal tax liens against
Komron. 1 We conclude that the challenged order is not a
final decision and that we therefore lack jurisdiction over
this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Accordingly, we
dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
                                 I
    In April 2005, Komron filed late tax returns for the years
1999–2002, and a tax return for 2004. Although these
returns showed that Komron owed various amounts to the
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), he did not include any
payments with these returns. The IRS subsequently assessed
unpaid income taxes, interest, and penalties against Komron.
    In April 2017, the Government filed this action in which,
inter alia, it sought to reduce the IRS’s assessments to a
judgment and to obtain foreclosure relief, in partial
satisfaction of these liabilities, with respect to a residence
owned by Komron in Mercer Island, Washington (the
“Mercer Island Property”). Shaun was named as an
additional Defendant with respect to the foreclosure-related
claims, because he was the beneficiary of two deeds of trust
that were recorded against the Mercer Island Property. In
June 2018, Komron and the Government stipulated to the
1
 Because Shaun Allahyari and Komron Allahyari share the same last
name, we will generally refer to them only by their respective first
names.
                         USA V. ALLAHYARI                             5

entry of a partial judgment that fully resolved the IRS’s
claims for a monetary judgment concerning the amounts
assessed. 2 Under the terms of that partial judgment, a
monetary judgment was entered against Komron in the total
amount of $3,910,470.35, plus “interest and statutory
additions from June 14, 2018.”
    With that partial judgment in place, three claims in the
Government’s operative amended complaint against
Komron and Shaun were left for resolution: (1) a request for
a declaration that any mortgage or deed of trust granted by
Komron in Shaun’s favor was invalid or unenforceable and
that Komron “owns the [Mercer Island] Property free and
clear of Defendant Shaun Allahyari’s purported interest”;
(2) a request for an order declaring that any such deeds of
trust were fraudulent transfers and setting them aside under
Washington law; and (3) for an order, under Internal
Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) § 7403(c), that would (i) foreclose
on the various federal tax liens that had arisen from the IRS
assessments and that the IRS had recorded against the
Mercer Island Property beginning in 2005; and (ii) order the
sale of the property, with the proceeds “to be applied toward
satisfaction of the outstanding and unpaid tax assessments.” 3

2
  Komron’s ex-wife, Leslie Cover, was originally named as a co-
defendant with respect to at least some of the amounts assessed, but in
April 2018, the Government stipulated to Cover’s dismissal from the
case, without prejudice.
3
  The Government had also initially named King County as an additional
defendant because of the concern that it might assert an interest in the
Mercer Island Property. But in July 2017, the Government stipulated to
King County’s dismissal from the suit, without prejudice. The
stipulation between the Government and King County agreed that,
pursuant to I.R.C. § 6323(b)(6), the Government would “include in any
6                         USA V. ALLAHYARI

     These remaining claims challenged two distinct deeds of
trust that had been granted by Komron in favor of Shaun.
The first was a 2003 deed of trust on the Mercer Island
Property that had initially been granted by Komron to the
Boeing Employees’ Credit Union (“BECU”) as security for
a $400,000 loan. After Komron defaulted on that loan,
Shaun borrowed money in order to pay BECU the
outstanding balance of the loan, and Shaun took an
assignment of the BECU loan and the 2003 deed of trust.
BECU’s formal assignment of that deed of trust to Shaun
was recorded on September 8, 2010. On the parties’ cross-
motions for summary judgment, the district court held that,
as a matter of law, Shaun had “with respect to the amount he
paid to BECU in exchange for the assignment
($383,044.74), the same priority position that BECU had as
to its security interest in the real property at issue, which is
senior to the Government’s tax liens.” The court, however,
left for trial the question whether “any interest that has
accrued with respect to the amount defendant Shaun
Allahyari paid to BECU has priority over the Government’s
tax liens.” At that subsequent bench trial, the district court
ruled in Shaun’s favor on this issue, holding that “Shaun is
entitled to priority over the United States’ federal tax liens
with respect to interest that has accrued on the amount Shaun
paid to BECU.”
   The second deed of trust that the Government challenged
had been granted by Komron to Shaun on July 25, 2005 and
formally recorded against the Mercer Island Property the
next day. At the bench trial, the district court ultimately

proposed order of sale a provision that any and all liens King County
may have on the [Mercer Island] Property for unpaid real property taxes
or special assessments at the time of sale be satisfied from the proceeds
of sale prior to any distribution on the federal tax liens.”
                      USA V. ALLAHYARI                       7

ruled for the Government on this claim. The court
preliminarily agreed with Komron and Shaun that various
“transfers” made by Shaun to Komron “beginning in 1991
through 2005 were bona fide loans, not gifts.” Although the
2005 deed of trust was purportedly granted to secure
Komron’s performance with respect to such loans, the
district court nonetheless held that the 2005 deed of trust did
not take priority over the federal tax liens. The court relied
on two alternative grounds in reaching this conclusion. First,
the court held that the 2005 deed of trust did not meet the
requirements of federal and Washington law to qualify as a
“security interest” that would be entitled to priority over a
later-recorded tax lien under I.R.C. § 6323(a). See I.R.C.
§ 6323(h)(1) (defining “security interest” in part based on
incorporation of state law). Second, the court held that the
2005 deed of trust was “voidable under Washington’s
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act because Komron intended
to ‘hinder, delay, or defraud’ the United States” in granting
the 2005 deed to Shaun.            See REV. CODE WASH.
§ 19.40.041(1)(a).
    On October 30, 2018, the district court entered a formal
judgment in accordance with these findings, and that
judgment specifically “foreclosed” the IRS’s tax liens and
ordered that the Mercer Island Property “shall be sold
pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7403 and 28 U.S.C. § 2001, with the
net proceeds to be disbursed as set forth” in a simultaneously
filed “Order of Foreclosure and Judicial Sale.” The latter
order contained detailed instructions concerning the “terms
and conditions of the sale,” which was to be conducted by
the U.S. Marshal or an IRS “Property Appraisal and
Liquidation Specialist,” and the order also contained detailed
instructions concerning the distribution of the proceeds.
8                      USA V. ALLAHYARI

    Both Shaun and the Government appealed, and we
reversed and remanded. United States v. Allahyari, 980 F.3d
684 (9th Cir. 2020). We concluded that the district court had
applied the wrong legal standards in both of its alternative
grounds for concluding that the 2005 deed of trust did not
have priority over the federal tax liens. Id. at 689–92. We
also held, in the Government’s cross-appeal, that the district
court failed to consider the effect of the Washington “statute
of limitations when calculating the value of Shaun’s senior
lien under the BECU Deed of Trust.” Id. at 694.
    After receiving additional briefing on remand, the
district court on March 31, 2022 issued an order again
concluding that the 2005 deed of trust was a fraudulent
transfer and that a foreclosure order in the Government’s
favor was warranted.
    The district court noted that the only error that this court
had identified with respect to the earlier fraudulent transfer
finding was that the district court had applied the
“preponderance of the evidence” standard rather than the
“clear-and-satisfactory-proof standard” that applied under
the relevant Washington law. Allahyari, 980 F.3d at 692.
Accordingly, the district court re-evaluated the relevant
factors under that standard and concluded that the
Government had “met its burden to demonstrate that the
2005 Deed of Trust was a fraudulent transfer by clear and
satisfactory proof.” Because the court found that the 2005
deed was voidable as a fraudulent transfer, it explicitly
declined to address, on remand, whether Shaun had
adequately established a “security interest” within the
meaning of I.R.C. § 6323.
    As to the 2003 BECU deed of trust that had been
assigned to Shaun and that had priority over the
                       USA V. ALLAHYARI                        9

Government’s liens, the district court on remand resolved
certain legal issues between the parties as to how the statute
of limitations applied. However, the court ultimately
concluded that it did not have sufficient information or
assistance from the parties to make what it believed to be the
necessary calculations to determine the amounts secured by
the BECU deed. Accordingly, the court ordered the parties
to “meet and confer” and to “submit a Joint Status Report”
setting forth their views as to five specified issues.
    The district court further held that, although the court had
“limited discretion to not order a foreclosure sale,” Shaun
had failed to show that a favorable exercise of such
discretion was warranted here. Accordingly, the court
concluded that “[t]he United States has established it has
valid federal tax liens against the [Mercer Island] Property,
and therefore the United States is entitled to judgment and to
foreclose those liens, sell the [Mercer Island] Property, and
apply the proceeds toward its tax liens.”
    The district court stated, however, that it would “delay
entering an order for judicial sale until after it ha[d] received
the requisite Joint Status Report from the parties and ha[d]
determined how to calculate the value of the BECU Deed of
Trust.” On May 23, 2022, the parties submitted a Joint
Status Report stating that they had “reached a tentative
agreement regarding the value of the BECU Deed of Trust”
and requesting additional time to “memorialize their
agreement via stipulation.”
    On May 27, 2022, Shaun filed a notice of appeal from
the March 31, 2022 order.
    On June 2, 2022, the parties filed their stipulation
regarding the value of the BECU Deed of Trust. The district
court entered an order approving the stipulation on June 29,
10                      USA V. ALLAHYARI

2022. In the order, the court adopted the parties’ stipulation
that the “value of the BECU Deed of Trust as of May 1, 2022
is $620,000.” The order also set forth how interest would be
calculated on that sum. The final paragraph of the order
provides as follows: “The parties’ agreement does not impact
or waive the United States’ ability to seek a sale of the
[Mercer Island Property] . . . or Shaun Allahyari’s right to
oppose such a sale.” There are no further relevant
subsequent entries on the district court’s docket. In
particular, the district court has not entered on remand, as it
previously had in October 2018, an order for judicial sale.
                                II
    At the threshold, the Government contends that we lack
jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because
the district court did not enter a final judgment and order of
sale. We agree.
    Under § 1291, the courts of appeals are authorized to
hear “appeals from all final decisions of the district courts.”
28 U.S.C. § 1291. “A final decision ‘ends the litigation on
the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute
the judgment.’” Hall v. Hall, 584 U.S. 59, 64 (2018)
(quoting Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Central Pension Fund of
Operating Eng’rs & Participating Emps., 571 U.S. 177, 183
(2014)). Finality in this sense “is to be given a practical
rather than a technical construction,” Microsoft v. Baker, 582
U.S. 23, 37 (2017) (quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
417 U.S. 156, 171 (1974)), and a judgment will be deemed
final “if it fully adjudicates the issues and clearly evinces the
district court’s intention that it be that court’s final act in the
matter.” Long Beach Area Chamber of Com. v. City of Long
Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 690 (9th Cir. 2010); accord FirsTier
Mortg. Co. v. Investors Mort. Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269, 273–
                        USA V. ALLAHYARI                        11

74 (1991). We conclude that, under these standards, Shaun’s
appeal was not taken from a final decision.
    As an initial matter, at the time that Shaun filed his notice
of appeal from the March 31, 2022 order, the district court
had not yet determined the “value of the BECU Deed of
Trust,” which the court had held was senior to the
Government’s tax liens here. For that reason alone, the order
appealed from was plainly not final at the time that this
appeal was taken. The Supreme Court has squarely held that
a foreclosure decree that referred to a special master the
determination of “the extent and amount of all liens prior to
said general mortgage upon the properties thereby covered”
was not a “final decree within the meaning of that term as
used in the statutes which provide for appeals to th[e]
[Supreme] [C]ourt from the final decrees of the Circuit
Courts in cases of equity jurisdiction.” Parsons v. Robinson,
122 U.S. 112, 114 (1887). The decree in Parsons left several
other substantive issues open as well, including key details
as to the manner in which the foreclosure sale was to be
conducted. Id. at 115. The Court held that, “[u]ntil the
particulars of the prior liens are ascertained,” and the
additional issues concerning the manner of the sale resolved,
“the rights of the parties will not have been sufficiently
settled” so as to allow an appeal to be taken. Id. So too here,
the March 31, 2022 order did not resolve the value of the
senior BECU deed of trust, but instead directed the parties to
provide their respective views concerning a variety of
substantive issues on that score. On its face, the order did
not “fully adjudicate[] the issues,” nor did it “clearly evince[]
the district court’s intention that it be that court’s final act in
the matter.” Long Beach Area Chamber of Com., 603 F.3d
at 690. The fact that, at the time the notice of appeal was
filed, the parties had jointly reported to the district court that
12                     USA V. ALLAHYARI

they had reached a tentative agreement on the open issues
concerning the BECU deed of trust did not suffice to make
the March 31, 2022 order final. Notwithstanding that joint
report, the district court had neither been presented with, nor
had it yet adopted, any substantive resolution of those issues
at the time that Shaun filed his notice of appeal. In the
absence of such a ruling, the district court unquestionably
had not yet entered a final decision. At the time of its filing,
Shaun’s notice of appeal therefore was directed at a non-
final, non-appealable order.
    Shaun does not contest this point, but he insists that, with
the district court’s subsequent entry of the June 29, 2022
order resolving the value of the BECU deed of trust, his
premature notice of appeal ripened into an effective appeal
of the then-final judgment of foreclosure. However, if
Shaun were correct that the June 29, 2022 order, without
more, sufficed to produce a final, appealable decision, the
result would be that Shaun would thereby now have lost his
appellate rights with respect to the March 31, 2022 and June
29, 2022 orders. That is because (1) Shaun did not file a new
notice of appeal within the 60-day statutory jurisdictional
time limit after the entry of the June 29, 2022 order, see 28
U.S.C. § 2107(b); and (2) under our settled caselaw, Shaun’s
May 27, 2022 premature notice of appeal cannot be applied
to what he posits is a June 29, 2022 final decision.
    The latter point follows from our decision in Kennedy v.
Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477 (9th Cir. 1996). There, the
plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from a post-judgment order
awarding attorney’s fees, but that order explicitly left the
amount to be awarded “undetermined,” and the district court
“requested further submissions from both parties in order to
assist it in this determination.” Id. at 1482–83. We held that
the notice of appeal was “premature” and that it was not
                          USA V. ALLAHYARI                            13

effective to place before this court the subsequent final order
fixing the amount of attorney’s fees. Id. In reaching this
conclusion, we noted that, under Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4(a)(2), a premature notice of appeal “filed after
the court announces a decision or order but before the entry
of the judgment or order is treated as filed on the date of and
after the entry.” FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(2) (1995) (quoted in
Kennedy, 90 F.3d at 1482). 4 We observed that this rule “was
intended to protect the unskilled litigant who files a notice of
appeal from a decision that he reasonably but mistakenly
believes to be a final judgment, while failing to file a notice
of appeal from the actual final judgment.” Kennedy, 90 F.3d
at 1483 (quoting FirsTier Mortg., 498 U.S. at 276). As we
explained, this rule protects those who file a premature
notice of appeal, when the only steps that remain to produce
a final decision are essentially “ministerial task[s].” Id.
(citation omitted); see also Weston Family P’ship LLLP v.
Twitter, Inc., 29 F.4th 611, 618 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding that,
under Rule 4(a)(2), a subsequent district court order formally
dismissing the case after the plaintiff declined to amend the
complaint “cured the premature notice of appeal” directed to
the prior order dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint with
leave to amend).
    But we concluded in Kennedy that Rule 4(a)(2) could not
be stretched to cover a premature notice of appeal directed
at an order that explicitly deferred resolution of the
quantification of a monetary award and that called for
briefing from the parties on that issue. Kennedy, 90 F.3d at
1483. A litigant could not “reasonably” believe such an
order to be final, and the tasks left to be completed by such
an order were far from ministerial. Id. Because Shaun’s
4
 The current version of Rule 4(a)(2) is identical, except that the phrase
“but before the entry of the judgment or order” is now set off by dashes.
14                     USA V. ALLAHYARI

premature notice of appeal was directed at a March 31, 2022
order that explicitly left the amounts to be awarded from the
foreclosure sale unsettled and that asked for submissions
from the parties on that issue, that notice of appeal was
defective under Kennedy and cannot be applied to the
subsequent order that provided the court’s substantive
resolution of the merits of that open issue.
    Fortunately for Shaun, however, he is wrong in
contending that the June 29, 2022 order, without more, was
sufficient to produce a final judgment in this case. As our
prior discussion indicates, the Supreme Court in Parsons
further held that, in order for a foreclosure order to be
considered final and appealable, that order must determine,
not only the amount of any superior liens, but also “what the
order of sale of said mortgage properties shall contain” so
that the court’s “ministerial officers can proceed to carry the
decree into execution.” Parsons, 122 U.S. at 115 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, in order for a
“decree of sale in a foreclosure suit” to qualify as “a final
decree for the purposes of an appeal,” the court’s order must
“settle[] all the rights of the parties and leave[] nothing to be
done but to make the sale and pay out the proceeds.” Grant
v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 106 U.S. 429, 431 (1882).
Here, several aspects of the record make clear that, under
these standards, the district court has not yet issued a
sufficiently final order of sale that settles all of the rights of
the parties and that can be ministerially executed without
further substantive input from the court.
    First, the district court expressly stated in its March 31,
2022 order that it intended to issue a separate and further
“order for judicial sale,” but that it would “delay entering”
that order “until after it has received the requisite Joint Status
Report from the parties and has determined how to calculate
                       USA V. ALLAHYARI                       15

the value of the BECU Deed of Trust.” The subsequent June
29, 2022 order does not constitute that separate “order for
judicial sale,” nor does it in any way indicate that the district
court had changed its mind about issuing such a separate
order. On the contrary, the June 29, 2022 order delimits
Shaun’s agreed-upon right to recover “sums under the
BECU Deed of Trust” “in connection with a sale of the
property, if ordered,” and it further preserves “the United
States’ ability to seek a sale of the subject property” and
“Shaun Allahyari’s right to oppose such a sale” (emphasis
added). On their face, the district court’s orders do not
“clearly evince[] the district court’s intention that [they] be
that court’s final act in the matter.” Long Beach Area
Chamber of Com., 603 F.3d at 690. By confirming that a
sale would be the subject of a further order, they instead
confirm the exact opposite.
    Second, as in Parsons, the lack of a final decision is
confirmed by the absence of any order specifying the
necessary substantive requirements governing how the sale
should be conducted and the proceeds distributed. This is
not a minor matter. Among other things, nothing in the
March 31, 2022 or June 29, 2022 orders contains the sort of
needful details that were supplied in the district court’s
previous formal order of sale that was reversed by our
opinion in the prior appeal. In particular, the prior order of
sale clearly specified the sequence in which the funds
obtained from a sale should be paid out: first to the IRS, but
only “for allowed costs and expenses of sale”; second, to
King County “for unpaid real property taxes or special
assessments”; third, to Shaun for the amounts due in
connection with the BECU deed of trust; and fourth to the
IRS for the tax liens. Nothing in the March 31, 2022 or June
29, 2022 orders explicitly addresses this crucial subject.
16                    USA V. ALLAHYARI

Although it might be reasonable to assume that the court
would probably follow the same ruling it had previously
made on that score, the fact remains that, after the case was
remanded for new proceedings concerning the merits, the
district court never did issue such an order. Moreover, in
contrast to the prior formal order of sale, there is nothing in
either of the 2022 orders that sets forth any details about how
the sale is to be conducted. Again, it is perhaps reasonable
to think that the district court would impose the same
conditions that it did before the prior appeal, but it has not
yet taken any action that can be said, even by implication, to
have done so. With this many loose ends, the district court
has neither “fully adjudicate[d] the issues,” nor has it
“clearly evince[d] [its] intention” that its two post-remand
orders are “that court’s final act in the matter.” Long Beach
Area Chamber of Com., 603 F.3d at 690.
    In arguing for a contrary conclusion, Shaun points to our
decision in Citicorp Real Estate, Inc. v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1097
(9th Cir. 1998), but that case instead confirms the
correctness of our holding. In Citicorp Real Estate, the
district court did “order[] the property securing the loans to
be sold at a judicial foreclosure sale,” and no party
contended that any further order of the district court was
necessary to accomplish that sale. Id. at 1100. Instead,
Citicorp argued that there was nonetheless no final,
appealable decision under § 1291 because the district court
had also entered deficiency judgments against the borrowers,
with the precise amount of those judgments to be fixed after
it was known exactly how much was left over from the
proceeds of the sale. Id. at 1101. We held that this
ministerial post-sale calculation did not detract from the fact
that the district court’s orders had “conclusively
determine[d] the rights of the parties to the litigation.” Id.
                       USA V. ALLAHYARI                       17

In contrast to Citicorp Real Estate, the issue here is not a
ministerial question about the post-sale application of funds
in accordance with the court’s pre-sale instructions. Rather,
the problem here is that the district court has not issued the
necessary pre-sale instructions in the first place.
    In all events, we now clarify that, in accordance with
more than 100 years of Supreme Court precedent, for “a
decree of sale in a foreclosure suit” to be considered “a final
decree for the purposes of an appeal” under § 1291, it must
“settle[] all the rights of the parties and leave[] nothing to be
done but to make the sale and pay out the proceeds” in
accordance with the decree’s terms. Grant, 106 U.S. at 431.
For the reasons we have explained, that standard is not met
in this case.
    Shaun complains that adherence to such a rule is
“inefficient” in this case, because it requires him to return to
the district court and obtain a final decision and then “to
pursue a new appeal.” That may be so, but clear
jurisdictional rules also have the countervailing benefit of
avoiding traps for the unwary. Indeed, if we did not apply
such a bright-line rule here, the supposedly efficient result
would be that, as we have explained, Shaun would have no
appeal at all.
                              III
    For the foregoing reasons, this appeal is dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.
    DISMISSED.