Court Opinion

ID: 9712624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:57:26.028972+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:13.362643
License: Public Domain

Oliver, J.
(concurring specially) — I concur in this opinion but would reverse the judgment upon the merits, also. My views of the controlling legal propositions are set out in Division I of Cook v. Estate of Todd, 249 Iowa 1274, 1277, 90 N.W.2d 23, 25, 66 A. L. R.2d 1257, 1262, and authorities there eited. Appellee relies largely upon The Estate of Sunderland (1884) 60 Iowa 732, 13 N.W. 655.
The last reference to the Sunderland case by this court was in Mesecher v. Leir (1950) 241 Iowa 818, 826, 827, 43 N.W.2d 149, 154, which states:
*1386“They [defendants] further argue that the capacity to inherit is governed by the adoption law of the state where the adoption became effective, citing * * * The Estáte of Sunder-land * # *.
“We think the defendants are in error in their argument. Even though a court Should consider the laws of inheritance of the state of adoption, we do not think that such consideration would be of value.”
In support of this the Meseeher ease cites sections in C. J., C. J. S., and Am. Jur., Adoption of Children, and quotes' Restatement, Conflict of Laws, section 143: “The status of adoption, created by the law of a state having jurisdiction to create it, will be given the same effect in another state as is given by the latter state to the status of adoption when created by its own law.”
Shick v. Howe (1908) 137 Iowa 249, 250, 251, 253, 114 N.W. 916, 14 L. R. A., N. S., 980, a leading Iowa case, states:
“* * * Demetrius C. Howe was a resident of New York, and the adoption was in compliance with the laws of that State. The domicile of both adoptive parent and child was there, and for this reason the laws of New York fix their status and relation one to the other. This rule was laid' down in Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243, 37 Am. Rep. 321, where the court said:
“ ‘It is a general principle that the status or condition of a person, the relation in which he stands to another person, and by which he is qualified or made capable to take certain rights in that other’s property, is 'fixed by the law of the domicile, and that this status and capacity are to be recognized and upheld in every other State, so far as they are not inconsistent with its own laws and policy. Subject to this limitation,' upon the death of any man, the status of those who claim succession or inheritance in his estate is to be ascertained by the law under which that status was acquired. His personal property is indeed to be distributed according to the law of his domicile at the time of his death, and his real estate descends according to the law of the place in which it is situated; but, in either case, it is according to those provisions of that law which regulate the succession or the inheritance of persons having such a status.’
*1387«# * *
“The important inquiry is whether under the statute quoted [section 3253, Code, as amended by chapter 132, Acts 29th G. A.] the adopted child will take by descent through the foster parent. The point has in effect been decided by this court in construing the legitimation statutes.”
With reference to the Sunderland case the decision states, in part:
“Though some things there said ai*e inconsistent with our conclusion as they are with McGuire v. Brown, supra, as was observed in Johnson v. Bodine, supra, a careful reading of the opinion indicates that the decision was based on the construction of the special act of the General Assembly of Louisiana, otherwise the reasoning of the dissenting opinion, which was in the line of the argument in McGuire v. Brown, must have prevailed.”
The majority opinion in Sunderland eited but one authority, Keegan v. Geraghty, 14 Chicago Legal News 84, 101 Ill. 26. It misinterpreted that decision. The Keegan case held the right of a child adopted in Wisconsin to share in the estate of an Illinois decedent was governed by Illinois statutes. The Sunder-land dissent called attention to this and reference to it is made in Van Matre v. Sankey, 148 Ill. 536, 559, 36 N.E. 628, 634, 39 Am. St. Rep. 196, 207, 23 L. R. A. 665, as follows:
“* * # This court [in Keegan] expressly recognized the status established in Wisconsin, so far as it related to the right to inherit from the parent by adoption, because consistent with the laws of this State relating to descent to adopted children, but denied the right to take by representation from collateral kindred of the parent, for the reason that such taking was prohibited by and inconsistent with the laws of this State.”
Phelan v. Conron, 323 Mass. 247, 252, 81 N.E.2d, 525, 527, refers to the Keegan case as follows:
“In the case last cited it was held that the rights of one adopted in Wisconsin to inherit from one who died domiciled in Illinois must be governed by the law of Illinois rather than by the law of Wisconsin. The rule in Illinois appears to be similar to the rule set forth in our own decision in Ross v. Ross, *1388129 Mass. 243, 37 Am. Rep. 321 [hereinbefore quoted in Shick v. Howe], and to that formulated by the American Law Institute. [Restatement, Conflict of Laws, section 143, already quoted from Mesecher v. Leir] Thus, since the status of the intestate created by the law of Massachusetts does not appear to be inconsistent with or opposed to the laws or policy of Illinois,-it would be recognized there. But inasmuch as the intestate died domiciled in Illinois, the rights of inheritance flowing from her status are determined by the law of Illinois, at least as to personal property.”
Restatement, Conflict of Laws, section 247 states:
“Clad^ of Adopted Child to Inherit.
“Whether an adopted child is an heir and the extent to which he may inherit an interest in land is determined by the law of the state where the land is.

“Comment:

“a. The rule stated in this Section applies equally to a child adopted under.the law of the state where the land is and to one who has been made an adopted child by the law of another state, as stated in §142.
“b. The law of the state in which the land is may allow an adopted child to take only in so far as he has been given power to do so by the foreign adoption proceedings.
“c. Whether an adopted child can inherit from a collateral relative or transmit an inheritance to a collateral relative by adoption is determined by the law of the state where the land is.
"d. * * 77
In 1 Am. Jur., Adoption of Children, section 69, it is stated:
“There is no disagreement as to the principle that' descent of real property is governed by the law of the place where it is situated. Some courts emphasize this undisputed principle and regard the question as one of descent, and not of'’status, and, as such, governed by the lex rei sitae or lex domicilii decedentis. This principle may operate not only in diminution of the rights of the child, but also in extension thereof. If, for example, *1389under the lex rei sitae or lex domicilii decedentis, an adopted child cannot inherit through his adopting parent, one adopted in a foreign state cannot thus inherit. On the other hand, if he can, by those laws, inherit, he may so inherit notwithstanding that he could not inherit in the state where the adoption proceedings were had. It is the law of descent and distribution of the state where the owner resides or the property is situated that controls.”
The Sunderland case has had little impact upon our decisions. It has been excused or explained but not followed. I believe it is unsound and I would overrule it.
All Justices concur in both opinions.