Court Opinion

ID: 9665133
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:41:15.896712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:13.284747
License: Public Domain

LEE, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority opinion holds that a trial court need not admonish a defendant of the dangers of self-representation where standby counsel, who is appointed by the court and over the defendant’s objection, does not participate in the trial. I respectfully dissent.
An individual accused of a crime has a right to assistance of counsel for his defense. U.S. Const, amend. VI; see also Tex.Code CRIM.PROC.Ann. art. 1.051 (Vernon Supp, 1996). An accused also has the right of being heard by himself or counsel or both. Tex. Const, art.' I, § 10; Tex.Code CRiM. PROcAnn. art. 1.05 (Vernon 1977). Because revocation of probation is a criminal prosecution for purposes of this right to be heard, a defendant on probation is entitled to the assistance of retained or appointed counsel at a revocation hearing unless he has affirmatively waived that right. Parker v. State, 545 S.W.2d 151, 155 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 42.12 § 21(d) (Vernon Supp.1996). A waiver of the right to counsel will not be lightly inferred and the courts will indulge every reasonable presumption against the validity of such a waiver. Geeslin v. State, 600 S.W.2d 309, 313 (1980) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)).
The Sixth Amendment also affords a defendant the right to prosecute his own legal defense, both through trial and appeal, without the aid of counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Hathorn v. State, 848 S.W.2d 101, 123 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 932, 113 S.Ct. 3062, 125 L.Ed.2d 744 (1993). The defendant’s choice of self-representation need not be wise and may ultimately be to his own detriment. Hathom, 848 S.W.2d at 123. However, if his choice is made knowingly and intelligently, the defendant must be allowed to proceed pro se. Id. Once an accused unequivocally asserts his right to self-representation, the trial court should admonish him of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Hathorn, 848 S.W.2d at 123.1
In this case, the record reflects that appellant unequivocally asserted his right to self-representation. At the beginning of the revocation hearing appellant advised the trial court:
It’s my privilege to represent myself if I feel distrust or lack of confidence in court appointed counsel and that’s the decision that I made [sic] at this time that I will represent myself. I do not wish to be represented by Mr. Fernandez. I do not wish to have him on record as representing me.2
The court refused to dismiss Mr. Fernandez and required him to remain in the courtroom, essentially as standby counsel.3 In doing so, the trial court granted appellant’s request to represent himself. Although appellant could have thereafter waived his right to self-representation by subsequently asking his attorney for advice or to participate in his *867defense, he did not do so. See Maddox v. State, 613 S.W.2d 275, 286 (Tex.Crim.App.1980); see also Culverhouse v. State, 755 S.W.2d 856, 861 (Tex.Crim.App.) (noting that a defendant waives his asserted right to self-representation when he invites or agrees to any substantial participation by standby counsel), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 863, 109 S.Ct. 164, 102 L.Ed.2d 134 (1988). Instead, appellant represented himself throughout the entire hearing without inviting or receiving any assistance by counsel.4 Because appellant never withdrew the right he had been granted to represent himself, the trial court erred in failing to admonish appellant of the dangers of self-representation before being granted that right.
The majority holds that “because admonishment is not required for hybrid representation, we conclude that it is not required for standby counsel.” However, the hybrid representation situation is different than the situation which arises when standby counsel is appointed. Hybrid representation has been described as “partially pro se and partially by counsel.” See Landers v. State, 550 S.W.2d 272, 280 (Tex.Crim.App.1977).5 With hybrid representation, the defendant remains represented by counsel and, thus, the trial court is not required to admonish him of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Clark v. State, 717 S.W.2d 910, 918 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (en banc).6
A situation whereby “standby counsel” is appointed arises when, in response to a defendant’s request for self-representation, the trial court instead allows (or in the instant case, insists) the defendant’s attorney to remain as counsel and be available to advise the defendant and participate in the ease, or not, as requested by the defendant. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 n. 46; Maddox, 613 S.W.2d at 286. In Maddox, the court stated that if a defendant meaningfully invokes the assistance of standby counsel during trial, the representation becomes hybrid, no waiver of counsel is involved, and a failure by the trial court to have admonished the defendant of the dangers of self-representation is therefore not error. Id.; see also Culverhouse, 755 S.W.2d at 861, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 863, 109 S.Ct. 164, 102 L.Ed.2d 134. Although neither party has cited another opinion reaching this issue, the clear inference from Maddox and Culverhouse is that where, despite the presence of standby counsel, a defendant acts alone in his defense, his self-representation is not waived or withdrawn by the presence of standby counsel, and a trial court's failure to have admonished him on self-representation is error.7
The State argues that even if he did proceed pro se, appellant nevertheless demonstrated that he knew of the dangers of self-representation by stating that he was entitled to self-representation and by asking that his objection be put on the record. On the contrary, however, knowing that he was entitled to self-representation and believing that he preferred it to representation by his appointed counsel did not signify that appellant knew of the dangers and disadvantages of *868self-representation or take the place of that knowledge. See Blankenship v. State, 673 S.W.2d 578, 583 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (en banc) (citing Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723, 68 S.Ct. 316, 323, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948)).
Instead, when an accused asserts his pro se rights, the court must determine whether the defendant is aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Johnson v. State, 760 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex.Crim. App.1988). In doing so, a litany of “formulaic questioning” is not required; rather, the record must merely reflect that the defendant knowingly exercised his right to defend himself. Id. at 278-79. The trial court’s admonishment should seek to ensure that the accused is aware of the practical disadvantages of representing himself, that there are technical rules of evidence and procedure, and that he will not be granted any special consideration solely because he asserted his pro se rights. Id. at 279.
In this case, because appellant was not admonished of these dangers, there is no basis to conclude that he knowingly exercised his right to represent himself. Without such a knowing waiver of his right to counsel, allowing appellant to represent himself with standby counsel who did not participate in the proceeding was a denial of his right to counsel. Moreover, although courts are generally required to assess whether error contributed to the conviction or punishment,8 harm is not a consideration with regard to denial of the right to counsel. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827-828 n. 8, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Accordingly, I would sustain appellant’s sole point of error, reverse the judgment of the trial court, and remand the case for further proceedings.

.Although the Code of Criminal Procedure requires a written admonishment and prescribes the form to be used, the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the admonishment need not be in writing provided that the record is sufficient for the reviewing court to make an assessment that the defendant was made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. See Goffney v. State, 843 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).

. After his motion to dismiss was denied, appellant stated, "I’d also like to have the record show that I also requested you to dismiss Mr. Fernandez and you refused.”

. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541 n. 46, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) (noting that a trial court may appoint standby counsel even over the defendant’s objection).

.The only "participation” by defense counsel in appellant's trial was a statement he made after appellant attempted to cite case law. In what appears to be an unsolicited observation, Mr. Fernandez stated to the court:
In talking to my client today, I thought he had misinterpreted some of these cases wrongly because all he has is one sentence summaries. He's never read the cases. I went and pulled one that he refused to discuss with me ... I just want to state for the record that my client has never carried on a civil conversation with me, listened [sic] to me, listened to a thing I said or attempted to let me represent him, and I just wanted to get that on the record.
It could hardly be said that defense counsel's uninvited interruption amounted to "assistance of counsel" or otherwise negates a finding that appellant represented himself.

. Although the Texas Constitution provides an accused in a criminal case "the right of being heard by himself or counsel or both,”’ there is no constitutional right to hybrid representation. Landers, 550 S.W.2d at 275, 280.

. See also Phillips v. State, 604 S.W.2d 904, 908 (Tex.Crim.App.1979).

. There is no question that appellant "acted alone” in his defense. Besides the unsolicited commentary of defense counsel (see supra note 4), the record shows that throughout the revocation hearing, appellant made his own objections, cross-examined the State's sole witness, testified on his own behalf, responded to the State’s objections and presented his own closing argument.

. See Tex.R.App.P. 81 (b)(2).