Court Opinion

ID: 9372395
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-21 14:11:23.289681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:34.814069
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Judges Humphreys, AtLee and Raphael
              Argued at Norfolk, Virginia

              ADRIAN ELIJAH PIERCE
                                                                            MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 0281-22-1                                   JUDGE STUART A. RAPHAEL
                                                                               FEBRUARY 21, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                             FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS
                                               Gary A. Mills, Judge

                               Joshua A. Goff (Goff Voltin, PLLC, on brief), for appellant.

                               Aaron J. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
                               Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     A jury convicted Adrian Elijah Pierce of second-degree murder, use of a firearm in the

              commission of a felony, and misdemeanor destruction of property. On appeal, Pierce contends

              that the two main witnesses against him gave inherently incredible testimony and that the

              Commonwealth failed to prove that he shot the victim. We disagree and affirm the convictions.

                                                          BACKGROUND

                     On appeal, we recite the facts “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, the

              prevailing party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022)

              (quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). Doing so requires that we “discard”

              the defendant’s evidence when it conflicts with the Commonwealth’s evidence, “regard as true

              all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth,” and read “all fair inferences” in the

                     *
                         Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
Commonwealth’s favor. Cady, 300 Va. at 329 (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323,

323-24 (2018)).

       Around 3:00 p.m. on April 16, 2019, high-school senior A.M. and her friend met Pierce

and T.R. at a park near an apartment complex. A.M. testified at trial as an eyewitness to the

shooting at issue. The group walked to D.Y.’s apartment where D.Y. and his neighbor—a close

friend of the victim, Kahli Curry—got into a fight. After D.Y.’s mother ended the fight, Pierce,

A.M., D.Y., and two other friends went to the park, then to the apartment’s fitness center to

smoke marijuana. They encountered Curry when they gathered in a breezeway to use the public

Wi-Fi. Unarmed, Curry raised his arms and declared, “I don’t want no smoke.” A.M. saw

Pierce draw a gun from his waistband and shoot Curry repeatedly before fleeing with T.R. and

D.Y. A.M. testified that although she had never met Pierce before that day, she was certain

Pierce was the shooter because she had been “inches” away from him when he fired the shots.

She also said that Pierce was the only person there who had a weapon.

       When police arrived in response to a 911 call reporting the shooting, they found Curry

lying on the ground, bleeding from gunshot wounds that would prove fatal. Residents had heard

the shots and had seen Curry collapse after he ran from the breezeway, where police collected

several bullet fragments and cartridge casings. Bullets had also shattered the windshield of a

parked car. The apartment’s property manager gave police screenshots of a video from a

security camera in the fitness center that had recorded Pierce smoking marijuana with A.M. and

the others about ten minutes before the shooting.

       Two days later, Newport News Police Detective William Gordon interviewed Pierce,

who admitted being present during “a fight,” but not “for the shooting.” Later that month,

Gordon interviewed A.M., who identified Pierce as the shooter. An investigation of Pierce’s

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cellphone, email, and Lyft-account records established that he was present during the shooting.

Gordon interviewed Pierce again, but he still denied involvement in the murder.

       Pierce was arrested and subsequently indicted for second-degree murder, use of a firearm

in the commission of a felony, and destruction of property. While awaiting trial, Pierce was

incarcerated in the same cell as A.J. According to A.J., Pierce said that the Commonwealth’s

only evidence against him was the testimony of “a young lady” named “[A.M.].” A.J. also

testified that he overheard Pierce tell another inmate to “make sure she doesn’t come to court.”

Pierce told A.J. that he had “buried” a gun that had been “used in a murder,” and someone

named “[T.H.]” had since “got[ten] locked up” for possessing it in Virginia Beach. Detectives

confirmed that, in late April 2019, Virginia Beach police had arrested T.H. for illegally

possessing the gun used in the shooting.

       At trial, A.J. acknowledged that he had an extensive criminal record, including 27

pending criminal charges.1 He maintained, however, that the Commonwealth had offered

nothing in exchange for his testimony. A.J. denied reading Pierce’s “discovery” materials or

other legal mail, but he admitted that he had access to Pierce’s bunk while the two were confined

and that it was common to store private legal documents underneath one’s bunk.

       After the trial court denied his motion to strike, Pierce testified in his defense. His

account of the events differed from A.M.’s in only one principal respect: he identified D.Y. as

the shooter. Pierce admitted that he had “probably” encountered A.J. while incarcerated but

denied discussing his case with anyone at the jail. He also acknowledged that he had repeatedly

lied to police during their investigation and that his cellphone records proved his presence at the

shooting. But Pierce maintained that D.Y. murdered Curry.

       1
         A.J. had been convicted of nine felonies and four misdemeanor crimes of moral
turpitude.
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       The jury convicted Pierce of second-degree murder, use of a firearm in the commission

of a felony, and misdemeanor intentional destruction of property. Pierce appeals.

                                              ANALYSIS

       Pierce argues that no physical or scientific evidence tied him to the shooting. He says

that the Commonwealth’s “case rested almost entirely on the eyewitness testimony of” A.M.,

who “had never met [him] before” the day of the murder. Pierce emphasizes that the shooting

“occurred very suddenly and unexpectedly,” but A.M. did not immediately report it. He adds

that A.J.’s testimony was undermined by his criminal record and revealed nothing new that only

the shooter himself would have known. Pierce urges us to conclude that “no reasonable finder of

fact” would have convicted him based on the testimony of A.M. and A.J. We are not persuaded.

       “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to

support it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original)

(quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does

not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204,

228 (2018)). “Rather, the relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v.

Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193

(2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted

to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by

the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72 Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v.

Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).

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       “At trial, the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving the identity of the accused as

the perpetrator beyond a reasonable doubt.” Cuffee v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 353, 364

(2013) (quoting Blevins v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 412, 423 (2003)). The testimony of a

single witness, if believed, may be sufficient to establish the defendant’s identity. Bryant v.

Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 421, 427 (1990).

               [T]he factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of a
               misidentification [by an eyewitness] include the opportunity of the
               witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’
               degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior description
               of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness
               at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and
               the confrontation.

Cuffee, 61 Va. App. at 364 (quoting Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972)).

       The record supports the jury’s finding that Pierce shot Curry. At trial, A.M. testified that

after spending the afternoon with Pierce, she stood only “inches” away from him as he fired the

fatal shots. She said he was the only one who was armed. Less than a month later, A.M.

identified Pierce to the police as the shooter. Her account was corroborated by A.J.’s testimony.

That evidence suffices to prove that Pierce was the perpetrator. Cf. Cuffee, 61 Va. App. at 366

(finding evidence sufficient to prove that the defendant was the shooter when one eyewitness

identified him with a “high level of certainty,” even though another witness was “not ‘[one]

hundred percent’ certain” (alteration in original)).

       In addition, the jury could reasonably infer Pierce’s guilt from his false statements to

police and his efforts to conceal the murder weapon. See Palmer v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App.

346, 348‑49 (1992) (“[I]t is today universally conceded that the fact of an accused’s flight,

escape from custody, resistance to arrest, concealment, assumption of a false name, and related

conduct are admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt, and thus of guilt itself.” (alteration

in original) (quoting Langhorne v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 97, 102 (1991))). By his own

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admission, Pierce repeatedly lied to police about his presence during the shooting. A.J. testified

that Pierce confessed to burying the murder weapon and told a fellow inmate to prevent A.M.

from testifying against him at trial. Although Pierce maintained that D.Y. was the gunman, the

jury “was at liberty to discount [his] self-serving statements as little more than lying to ‘conceal

his guilt,’ and could treat such prevarications as ‘affirmative evidence of guilt.’” Coleman v.

Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 19, 25 (2008) (first quoting Haskins v. Commonwealth, 44

Va. App. 1, 10 (2004); and then quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296 (1992)).

       Pierce insists that the testimony from A.M. and from A.J. was inherently incredible.

“Determining the credibility of witnesses . . . is within the exclusive province of the [fact finder],

which has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify.”

Dalton v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 512, 525 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Lea v.

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 300, 304 (1993)). “[T]he conclusions of the fact finder on issues of

witness credibility may be disturbed on appeal only when we find that the witness’ testimony

was ‘inherently incredible, or so contrary to human experience as to render it unworthy of

belief.’” Ragsdale v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 421, 429 (2002) (quoting Ashby v.

Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 540, 548 (2000)). “Evidence is not ‘incredible’ unless it is ‘so

manifestly false that reasonable men ought not to believe it’ or ‘shown to be false by objects or

things as to the existence and meaning of which reasonable men should not differ.’” Gerald v.

Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 487 (2018) (quoting Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 415

(2006)).

       Pierce does not come close to meeting that high bar here. Pierce’s own testimony

corroborated most of A.M.’s account. See Lambert v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 740, 760

(2019) (finding a witness’s testimony not inherently incredible when it was corroborated by

other evidence). A.M. had been with Pierce for hours before the shooting, standing right beside

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him as he shot Curry. There was no evidence that “rumors” had influenced her testimony. “The

mere fact that [she] may have delayed in reporting knowledge of a case . . . does not necessarily

render [her] testimony unworthy of belief.” Juniper, 271 Va. at 415. That circumstance was

properly weighed by the jury when assessing witness credibility. Id.

       Similarly, A.J.’s criminal record, though extensive, did not automatically render his

testimony unworthy of belief. See Yates v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 140, 144 (1987). Pierce

presented no evidence to support his theory that A.J. had read Pierce’s legal papers or was

promised something in exchange for his testimony. And even if A.J. hoped for leniency in his

pending cases, a witness’s testimony is not inherently incredible just because he hopes to

ingratiate himself with the Commonwealth. Id.; Johnson v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 303,

312, 315 (2011) (finding testimony not inherently incredible simply because the witness

“hope[d] for leniency” from the Commonwealth). Rather, that circumstance is “appropriately

weighed as part of the entire issue of witness credibility.” Juniper, 271 Va. at 415.

                                           CONCLUSION

       The testimony from the eyewitness to the shooting and from Pierce’s cellmate sufficed to

establish his identity as the perpetrator and was not inherently incredible. The trial court thus

committed no error when it denied Pierce’s motions to strike.

                                                                                           Affirmed.

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