Court Opinion

ID: 9960230
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 19:18:45.984265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:18.851920
License: Public Domain

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

                                 Spring 2024 Term                         FILED
                             _____________________                  April 15, 2024
                                                                      released at 3:00 p.m.
                                                                ASHLEY N. DEEM, DEPUTY CLERK
                                 No. 22-ICA-163                 INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
                             _____________________                     OF WEST VIRGINIA

                     HANK HECKMAN and LOREN GARCIA,
                          Plaintiffs Below, Petitioners,

                                        v.

           BETSY JIVIDEN, JEFF SANDY, and PATRICK MORRISEY,
                        Defendants Below, Respondents.
         ________________________________________________________

                  Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
                           Honorable Tera Salango, Judge
                     Civil Action Nos. 21-C-903 and 21-C-904

                               AFFIRMED
        _________________________________________________________

                           Submitted: January 10, 2024
                              Filed: April 15, 2024

Jeremy B. Cooper, Esq.                         Johnnie E. Brown, Esq.
Blackwater Law PLLC                            James A. Muldoon, Esq.
Aspinwall, Pennsylvania                        Pullin, Fowler, Flanagan, Brown &
Counsel for Petitioners                        Poe, PLLC
                                               Charleston, West Virginia
                                               Counsel for Respondent Morrisey

                                               William E. Murray, Esq.
                                               Bailey & Wyant, PLLC
                                               Charleston, West Virginia
                                               Counsel for Respondents Jividen and
                                               Sandy

CHIEF JUDGE SCARR delivered the Opinion of the Court.
SCARR, CHIEF JUDGE:

              Petitioners, Hank Heckman and Loren Garcia, appeal the Orders granting the

Respondents’ motions to dismiss entered by the Circuit Court of Kanawha County on

September 14, 2022. Petitioners brought various claims against the Respondents in their

individual and official capacities for their involvement in the creation and implementation

of a West Virginia Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation policy that changed the

good time and parole eligibility for those reincarcerated after the revocation of their

supervised release. The implementation of the new policy led to the rearrest and

reincarceration of individuals who had already been released on parole, including the

Petitioners. After the Petitioners’ release pursuant to State ex rel. Phalen v. Roberts, 245

W. Va. 311, 858 S.E.2d 936 (2021), they brought suit, seeking damages, injunctive relief,

and declaratory judgment for various tort and constitutional claims. The circuit court found

that the Respondents were entitled to absolute, qualified, and statutory immunity from

liability regarding their involvement with the creation and implementation of the policy.

The circuit court also concluded that the Respondents were not “persons” under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, that the Petitioners had failed to state a claim for a taking and for money damages,

and that Respondent Morrisey’s office was entitled to sovereign immunity.

              Having reviewed the parties’ arguments, the record on appeal, and the

controlling law, we affirm the circuit court’s September 14, 2022, dismissal orders. We

affirm for the reasons discussed below, on the basis of the Respondents’ immunity from

liability regarding the creation and implementation of the policy.

                                             1
                 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

              Petitioner Hank Heckman was indicted in Taylor County, West Virginia, in

2010 for sexual offenses, and was subsequently committed as a youthful offender pursuant

to a plea agreement. Following Mr. Heckman’s commitment as a youthful offender, he was

placed on three years of supervised probation and ten years of extended supervised release.

Mr. Heckman violated his supervised probation and was reincarcerated until he completed

his term of supervised probation. Once released, Mr. Heckman began his ten-year term of

supervised release. Mr. Heckman’s supervised release was subsequently revoked, and on

July 20, 2017, he was ordered to serve all ten years of his supervised release in prison. On

June 11, 2020, Mr. Heckman was released on parole after serving one fourth of his ten-

year sentence.

              Petitioner Loren Garcia was indicted in Randolph County, West Virginia, in

2013 for child abuse offenses. Ms. Garcia pleaded guilty and was sentenced to an

indeterminate term of not less than one nor more than three years in prison followed by ten

years of extended supervised release. After Ms. Garcia was released from prison and placed

on supervised release, she was indicted for First Degree Robbery in Harrison County, for

which she pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a determinate term of ten years in prison.

As a result, Ms. Garcia’s supervised release in Randolph County was revoked and she was

ordered to serve three years of her ten-year supervised release term in prison, to run

consecutively to the prison term imposed in Harrison County, with an additional thirty-

                                             2
year period of supervised release to begin upon her release. Ms. Garcia began serving her

prison terms for the Harrison County case and the revocation of her Randolph County

supervised release on April 12, 2016. On December 5, 2019, Ms. Garcia was released on

parole after serving more than one fourth of her thirteen-year term. Both Petitioners were

released on parole after only serving a portion of the prison terms imposed after the

revocation of their supervised release due to the accumulation of good time pursuant to

West Virginia Code § 62-12-13 (2021) and West Virginia Code § 15A-4-17 (2021).

              Following the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, certain inmates in the custody

of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“DOCR”) were awarded good time

credit for their efforts in making masks and cleaning to help mitigate the spread of Covid-

19 in DOCR facilities. As part of the DOCR’s review of these inmates’ timesheets for the

award of good time, someone at the DOCR determined that certain inmates selected to

receive good time were ineligible for good time. As a result, on August 7, 2020,

Respondent Betsy Jividen, the DOCR Commissioner, put the good time award program

under review. At the time of this review, DOCR Policy Directive 151.02 governed good

time eligibility. It did not limit good time eligibility for persons whose supervised release

had been revoked, such as the Petitioners, who had already been released by this time. In

October of 2020, the DOCR adopted a new policy that made persons whose supervised

release had been revoked ineligible for parole and good time credit. As a result, on

November 23, 2020, Policy Directive 151.06, which removed good time eligibility for

persons whose supervised release had been revoked, was implemented. No formal

                                             3
administrative rule regarding parole eligibility was issued, as Policy Directive 151.06 was

an internal DOCR policy.

              On December 7, 2020, Respondent Jividen signed a series of arrest warrants

for those individuals who had previously had their supervised release revoked but were

subsequently released on parole based on good time credit. The reason alleged for the

arrests was “clerical error or mistake.” Two of these warrants were for Mr. Heckman and

Ms. Garcia, and another was for an individual named Scott Phalen. There were no

allegations that they had violated the terms of their parole. Soon after the issuance of these

warrants, Mr. Heckman, Ms. Garcia, and Mr. Phalen were arrested and reincarcerated.

              On December 22, 2020, Ms. Garcia filed an original jurisdiction habeas

action in the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia (“SCAWV”) predicated on the

theory that regardless of whether the DOCR policy changes were valid, such changes could

not be retroactively applied to persons whose crimes occurred before the policy change

took place on ex post facto principles. On December 23, 2020, Mr. Phalen filed a similar

original jurisdiction habeas with the SCAWV which was consolidated with Ms. Garcia’s.

The matter was set for oral argument to be held on April 14, 2021.

              On March 25, 2021, SB 713 was introduced in the West Virginia Senate,

which codified the DOCR’s policy change regarding the ineligibility of good time for

persons whose supervised release had been revoked but restored the good time that was

                                              4
previously taken from persons revoked from supervised release up to October 21, 2020.

SB 713 also provided absolute immunity to the DOCR and its agents for reincarcerating

individuals based on the change in good time policy. SB 713 was signed into law by the

Governor on April 19, 2021, with an effective date of April 30, 2021, amending West

Virginia Code § 15A-4-17.

              On April 13, 2021, the day before oral argument in the SCAWV, the DOCR

preemptively recalculated Ms. Garcia’s good time based on SB 713 and determined that

she had sufficient good time to discharge her three-year sentence and be parole eligible for

her ten-year sentence. Ms. Garcia was released that same day, and thus her habeas petition

was dismissed as moot. On April 27, 2021, Mr. Heckman filed an original jurisdiction

habeas with the SCAWV on the same basis as the habeas petitions filed by Ms. Garcia and

Scott Phalen. On June 16, 2021, the SCAWV issued its decision in State ex rel. Phalen v.

Roberts, 245 W. Va. 311, 858 S.E.2d 936 (2021), holding that persons who had their

supervised release revoked remained parole eligible, and that the DOCR was not permitted

to reduce eligibility for good time for persons who had their supervised release revoked

when their underlying crimes were committed prior to the effective date of SB 713, due to

ex post facto principles. As a result of Phalen, Mr. Heckman was released on parole on

June 24, 2021, and his habeas petition was thus dismissed as moot.

                                             5
              On October 8, 2021, Mr. Heckman and Ms. Garcia, both individually and on

behalf of a class of persons similarly situated, filed this civil action. Their Complaint

asserted the following claims and relief:

              • a declaration that the absolute immunity provision of SB
                713 (codified as W. Va. Code § 15A-4-17(p)) is
                unconstitutional;
              • an injunction preventing the Respondents from relying on
                the absolute immunity provision in litigation;
              • “Civil RICO” pursuant to 18 U.S. §1961-1968 for the
                Respondents’ alleged enterprise formed to advance
                Governor Justice’s political interests by changing the good
                time and parole eligibility policies to prevent any
                perception of leniency to sex offenders;
              • assault and battery for the effectuation of the unlawful
                arrests;
              • false imprisonment;
              • abuse of process for issuing the warrants for arrest for
                nonexistent clerical error or mistake;
              • malicious prosecution;
              • violation of the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
                for detaining people beyond the termination of their
                sentences;
              • violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
                for the unlawful seizure;
              • violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
                U.S. Constitution for failing to provide Heckman and
                Garcia any due process before reincarcerating them;
              • violation of the Ex Post Facto clause of the U.S.
                Constitution;
              • an unlawful taking under the West Virginia Constitution for
                depriving Heckman and Garcia of their right to earn an
                income;
              • damages pursuant to W. Va. Code § 55-7-9, which
                authorizes a cause of action for damages sustained for
                violation of a statute, for Respondents’ violation of W. Va.
                Code § 62-12-13(b)(1)(A) and W. Va. Code § 15A-4-17(a);
                and
              • civil conspiracy for the Respondents’ concerted action and
                common plan to commit the torts outlined in the complaint.

                                            6
              After the Complaint was filed, Respondents Jividen and Sandy filed a joint

motion to dismiss, and Respondent Morrisey and the Attorney General’s office filed their

own motion to dismiss. These motions raised several defenses, including sovereign

immunity, absolute prosecutorial immunity, absolute immunity related to administrative

rule-making functions, absolute statutory immunity stemming from West Virginia Code §

15A-4-17(p), and qualified immunity. On August 31, 2022, the circuit court held oral

argument regarding these motions.

              On September 14, 2022, the circuit court entered orders granting the

Respondents’ motions to dismiss. Regarding Respondents Jividen and Sandy, the circuit

court concluded that they were entitled to absolute immunity pursuant § 15A-4-17(p); that

they are agents of the State, therefore they are not “persons” under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and

no respondeat superior liability exists under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; that Petitioners failed to

state a claim for a taking under the West Virginia Constitution because they did not assert

that property was taken; that there is no independent cause of action for money damages

pursuant to the West Virginia Constitution; that Respondents Jividen and Sandy are entitled

to qualified immunity because they did not violate a clearly established right because

Phalen had not been decided before the Petitioners were reincarcerated; and that

Respondents Jividen and Sandy were entitled to absolute immunity because their actions

stem from administrative policy-making.

                                            7
                Regarding Respondent Morrisey and the Attorney General’s Office, the

circuit court concluded that they were entitled to absolute immunity for performing

statutory prosecutorial duties; that they were not a “person” under 42 U.S.C. §1983; that

they were entitled to sovereign immunity since the Complaint did not allege that recovery

was sought under the limits of the State’s liability insurance policy; and they were entitled

to qualified immunity because making legal arguments on behalf of the State is a

discretionary function and his arguments did not violate the Rules of Professional

Responsibility. This appeal followed.1

                              II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

                Our standard of review is well settled. “A circuit court's decision that a

complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted is a ruling of law, and we

review such a decision de novo.” See Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan

Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 194 W. Va. 770, 461 S.E.2d 516 (1995).

                The ultimate determination of whether qualified or statutory
                immunity bars a civil action is one of law for the court to
                determine. Therefore, unless there is a bona fide dispute as to
                the foundational or historical facts that underlie the immunity
                determination, the ultimate questions of statutory or qualified
                immunity are ripe for summary disposition.

Syl. Pt. 1, Hutchison v. City of Huntington, 198 W. Va. 139, 479 S.E.2d 649 (1996). With

this plenary standard in mind, we address the parties’ arguments.

       1
           This Court held oral argument on January 10, 2024.
                                              8
                                    III. DISCUSSION

              The issue facing this Court is to determine what immunity, if any, to which

the Respondents are entitled. The State enjoys, with some exceptions, a near-absolute

degree of protection from lawsuit or liability, recognized as sovereign immunity. See W.

Va. Const. art. VI, § 35; Pittsburgh Elevator Co. v. W. Virginia Bd. of Regents, 172 W. Va.

743, 749–57, 310 S.E.2d 675, 681–89 (1983). Additionally, the employees, officials, and

agents of the State (“public officials”) enjoy different but related immunities that shield

them from liability for much of the conduct that they undertake in service to the State. See

W. Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Marple, 236 W. Va. 654, 661, 783 S.E.2d 75, 82 (2015).

Although related, sovereign immunity and the immunities enjoyed by public officials differ

in their scope and purpose. Id. Sovereign immunity is greater in scope, as it is intended to

protect the public purse. The immunities of a public official often confer a lesser degree of

protection, as their purpose is not to preserve the public official from damages, but to allow

them to perform their duties freely. See id. A public official can receive either qualified or

absolute immunity, depending upon the nature of the act and the nature of their duties.

Parkulo v. W. Virginia Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 199 W. Va. 161, 176, 483 S.E.2d 507, 522

(1996). Qualified immunity is, intuitively enough, a lesser degree of liability protection

than absolute immunity. See W. Virginia Reg'l Jail & Corr. Facility Auth. v. A.B., 234 W.

Va. 492, 507–08, 766 S.E.2d 751, 766–67 (2014).

                                              9
              “Qualified immunity is an immunity afforded to government agencies,

officials, and/or employees for discretionary activities performed in an official capacity.”

Maston v. Wagner, 236 W. Va. 488, 499, 781 S.E.2d 936, 947 (2015). Qualified immunity

shields public officials performing discretionary functions from civil liability so long as

their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that the

public official should have reasonably known. Id., at 499–500, 781 S.E.2d at 947–48. The

scope of protection provided by qualified immunity is meant to strike a balance between

the competing societal interests of holding public officials accountable when they exercise

power irresponsibly, and shielding them from harassment, distraction, and liability when

they perform their duties reasonably. Id., at 500, 781 S.E.2d at 948 (quoting Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). Qualified immunity allows public officials to operate

with a freer hand, without fear of vexatious litigation holding them liable for difficult

decisions often required to be made by one performing the State’s business. “A policeman's

lot is not so unhappy that he must choose between being charged with dereliction of duty

if he does not arrest when he has probable cause, and being mulcted in damages if he does.”

Syl. in part, Bennett v. Coffman, 178 W. Va. 500, 361 S.E.2d 465 (1987) (overruled on

other grounds by Dale v. Ciccone, 233 W. Va. 652, 760 S.E.2d 466 (2014)).

              The protections granted by qualified immunity protect not only public

officials, but society as a whole, as “claims frequently run against the innocent as well as

the guilty.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982). The societal costs qualified

immunity wards against include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of public officials’

                                             10
energy from their duties, deterring able citizens from seeking public office, and the danger

that fear of being sued will discourage the effectual discharge of duty from all but the most

resolute or irresponsible of public officials. Id. In addition, because the discretionary acts

relevant to qualified immunity are necessarily influenced by the decisionmaker’s

experiences, values, and emotions, there often is no clear end to the relevant evidence. Id.

at 816. Judicial inquiry into subjective, discretionary acts therefore may entail overly broad

discovery, further increasing the burden of such litigation upon both public officials and

society. Id. at 817.

               We find the case West Virginia Reg'l Jail & Corr. Facility Auth. v. A.B., 234

W. Va. 492, 766 S.E.2d 751 (2014), to be instructive to our analysis of a public official’s

immunity.

               To determine whether the State, its agencies, officials, and/or
               employees are entitled to immunity, a reviewing court must
               first identify the nature of the governmental acts or omissions
               which give rise to the suit for purposes of determining whether
               such acts or omissions constitute legislative, judicial, executive
               or administrative policy-making acts or otherwise involve
               discretionary governmental functions. This critical first step
               may be evident from the nature of the allegations themselves
               or may be effectively accomplished by identifying the official
               or employee whose acts or omissions give rise to the cause of
               action.

A.B., 234 W. Va. at 507, 766 S.E.2d at 766. If this initial analysis finds that the

claims against the public official arise from judicial or legislative acts, or executive

                                              11
or administrative policy-making, the public official is absolutely immune from

liability. Id.

                 Next, we must consider whether any claims that survive the first step

arise from ministerial or discretionary acts. See id. at 508, 766 S.E.2d at 767.

“Ministerial acts, by definition, are official acts which, under the law, are so well

prescribed, certain, and imperative that nothing is left to the public official's

discretion.” State v. Chase Sec., Inc., 188 W. Va. 356, 364, 424 S.E.2d 591, 599

(1992). As ministerial acts are so well-defined and proscriptive, they are essentially

“clearly established,” and thus a public officer would not be entitled to qualified

immunity and be liable for “nonperformance or misperformance of such acts.” See

id. In contrast, discretionary functions are those acts performed by a public official

which require the use of their discretion, judgements and decisions informed by their

knowledge, experience, values and emotions. See A.B., 234 W. Va. at 509, 766

S.E.2d at 768; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816. Upon finding that a public official who was

not entitled to absolute immunity was performing discretionary functions, the last

step is for the reviewing court to determine whether the plaintiff has shown that the

public official violated clearly established and reasonably known statutory or

constitutional rights, or was otherwise fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive. A.B.,

234 W. Va. at 507, 766 S.E.2d at 766. In absence of such a showing, both the State

and its officials are immune from liability. Id.

                                              12
               There is only a narrow bandwidth of official conduct that a public

official may be held personally liable for under the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Because the purpose of qualified immunity is to allow public officials to exercise

their official discretion in the discharge of their duties without constant fear of

lawsuits, the sweep of qualified immunity is necessarily broad. Hutchison, 198 W.

Va. at 148, 479 S.E.2d at 658. Qualified immunity’s broad protections safeguard

from liability all but the plainly incompetent public official or one who knowingly

violates the law. Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). The

constitutional or statutory right the plaintiff alleges was violated must have been

clearly established, settled law at the time of the act’s occurrence. Furthermore, that

clearly established, settled law must also have been reasonably known by the public

official. This presents serious hurdles for plaintiffs hoping to prevail in lawsuits

against public officials for their discretionary acts, as if the public official has a

colorable argument for the legality of their conduct, the legal right violated was

likely to not be so settled as to be “clearly established.”

               Given this rule, we now must apply our immunities analysis to the

case at hand. The first step in this analysis is to identify whether the public official’s

acts constitute legislative or judicial acts, or executive or administrative policy-

making. Here, we look to the Petitioners’ Complaint to analyze the allegations and

the public officer’s duties.

                                               13
              The Complaint identifies the Respondents, listing their positions

within the government of West Virginia. Respondent Jividen is described as the

Commissioner for the DOCR. The Complaint describes Respondent Morrisey as the

Attorney General, with “authority over the Office of the Attorney General of West

Virginia.” Respondent Sandy is described as the Cabinet Secretary of the West

Virginia Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). The Complaint also notes that

the DOCR is a subpart of the DHS. The Complaint alleges that Respondent Jividen

placed the “good time” award program under review, and signed arrest warrants for

the Petitioners that caused their rearrest and reincarceration. The Complaint alleges

that Respondent Morrisey is “personally responsible” for deciding whether the

Office of the Attorney General would defend the DOCR’s actions or “alternatively

whether his office will confess error,” and states that the Office of the Attorney

General defended the DOCR’s policy and actions at Respondent Morrisey’s behest.

The Complaint alleges that Respondent Sandy was involved in the decision to place

the “good time” program under review and in the drafting of SB 713, and that an

“agent” of his testified before the legislature justifying SB 713’s codification of the

DOCR’s policy change.

              If the claims against the public official arise from judicial or

legislative acts, or executive or administrative policy-making, the public official is

entitled to absolute immunity. A.B., 234 W. Va. at 507, 766 S.E.2d at 766.

Analyzing the facts and allegations of the Complaint, it is evident that Respondents

                                             14
Morrisey and Sandy are entitled to absolute immunity. Respondent Morrisey is the

Attorney General, a public official whose purpose is to serve as the State of West

Virginia’s chief attorney, and his alleged factual involvement is defending the State

in court, the very essence of judicial acts entitled to absolute immunity. Respondent

Sandy, the Cabinet Secretary for DHS, is a public official whose role could involve

both policy-making and executive decision-making for DHS and the administrative

agencies under its authority. However, the Complaint alleges that Respondent

Sandy was involved in the DOCR’s decision to place the “good time” program

under review, which is plainly administrative policy-making. The other alleged acts

of Respondent Sandy’s are that he was involved in SB 713’s drafting, and that his

“agent” testified before the legislature about SB 713, clear examples of legislative

acts. A public official has absolute immunity for administrative policy-making and

legislative acts, so Respondents Morrisey and Sandy are entitled to absolute

immunity. Respondent Jividen’s placement of the “good time” program under

review is administrative policy-making, and thus she is entitled to absolute

immunity for any claims arising out of that act. On the other hand, Respondent

Jividen’s signing of the arrest warrants that caused the Petitioners’ reincarceration

was not a judicial or legislative act, nor administrative or executive policy-making.

The issuance of the warrants and subsequent arrests and reincarcerations were the

enactment of the DOCR’s new policy, not its formation. Therefore, Respondent

Jividen is not entitled to absolute immunity for signing the warrants authorizing the

Petitioners’ arrests.

                                            15
              Having thus segregated the acts for which the Respondents are

entitled to absolute immunity, this Court must consider whether Respondent

Jividen’s issuance of the warrants causing the Petitioners’ arrest and reincarceration

was ministerial or discretionary. A public official is entitled to qualified immunity

for discretionary acts and receives no immunity for ministerial acts. Id. at 508, 766

S.E.2d at 767; Chase Sec., Inc., 188 W. Va. at 364, 424 S.E.2d at 599. A ministerial

act is one where the public official has no real decision-making, as the act is so

proscribed that nothing of substance is left to their discretion. See Harlow, 457 U.S.

at 816; Chase Sec., Inc., 188 W. Va. at 364, 424 S.E.2d at 599. The record shows

no evidence that there was any process that mandated Respondent Jividen’s issuance

of the arrest warrants, therefore as Commissioner of the DOCR, the issuance of the

arrest warrants was within her discretion. Indeed, Respondent Jividen’s letter

claiming that the DOCR had the authority to rearrest Petitioner Heckman shows that

her reasoning, experience, and values informed her decision to issue the warrants,

characteristic of a discretionary act.2 We thus conclude that Respondent Jividen’s

issuance of the warrants that led to the rearrest and reincarceration of the Petitioners

was a discretionary act entitled to qualified immunity.

       2
        Respondent Jividen’s letter was sent to a circuit court judge explaining Petitioner
Heckman’s rearrest and reincarceration by stating that his original release date was
“calculated using day-for-day good time credit” which the DOCR had since determined “is
not appropriate for sex offenders serving time for a violation of their supervised release.”
                                              16
              The last step is to determine whether qualified immunity protects

Respondent Jividen from liability arising out of the issuance of the arrest warrants

for the Petitioners. To answer this ultimate question, we must determine whether

Respondent Jividen violated a clearly established constitutional or statutory right,

of which she should have reasonably been aware. It should be noted that we are

asking this question at the time of the decisionmaker’s act, not the present day. With

the hindsight guidance provided by State ex rel. Phalen v. Roberts, 245 W. Va. 311,

858 S.E.2d 936 (2021), it has now been clearly established that Respondent

Jividen’s act violated the Petitioners’ legal rights. However, we must ask whether it

had been clearly established at the time of the warrants’ issuance that Respondent

Jividen was violating the Petitioners’ rights.

              The Petitioners argue that at the time of Respondent Jividen’s

issuance of the warrants, the case State v. Hargus, 232 W. Va. 735, 753 S.E.2d 893

(2013) had already clearly established that the issuance violated their legal rights.

In Hargus, the petitioners were sex offenders who had violated the terms of the

supervised release imposed on them pursuant to West Virginia Code § 62-12-26 and

had been subsequently reincarcerated after their supervised release’s revocation. Id.

at 739, 753 S.E.2d at 897. The Hargus petitioners claimed that their reincarceration

violated their due process rights and the double jeopardy clause under the United

States and West Virginia Constitutions. Id. at 741, 753 S.E.2d at 899. The Hargus

                                             17
petitioners argued that § 62-12-26 violated due process and the double jeopardy

clause because a revocation of supervised release and subsequent reimprisonment

could be authorized by a circuit court finding a violation by a clear and convincing

standard, a lesser standard than what is usually required for criminal punishment, a

jury’s finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. They also argued that § 62-

12-26 violated the prohibition against double jeopardy, because “a person sentenced

to incarceration for a violation of supervised release is punished twice, once for the

original offense and then a second time when his supervised release is revoked and

he is sentenced to post-revocation incarceration.” Id. at 743, 753 S.E.2d at 901. The

Hargus Court resolved both issues by holding that post-revocation reincarceration

is part of the single sentence arising from the original conviction. Id. at 742–43, 753

S.E.2d at 900–01.

              To understand whether Hargus had already “clearly established” the

legal rights at issue in Phalen, we must consider the issues addressed therein. The

petitioner in that case was Scott Phalen, one of the individuals released on parole

from post-revocation reincarceration. Phalen, 245 W. Va. at 314–15, 858 S.E.2d at

939–40. The DOCR argued that Mr. Phalen was ineligible for parole or good time,

despite § 62-12-13(b)’s statutory language that “any inmate” is eligible for parole if

they have served one fourth of their sentence, and West Virginia Code § 15A-4-

17(a)’s language that “all adult inmates” shall have good time apply to their

                                             18
sentences.3 Phalen, 245 W. Va. at 316–17, 858 S.E.2d at 941–42. See W. Va. Code

§ 62-12-13(b) (2021); Id. at § 15A-4-17(a) (2018). The DOCR’s argument was that

Mr. Phalen’s post-revocation reincarceration was not a “sentence” at all, but a

“sanction” for violating the terms of his supervised release, and thus inapplicable to

the good time or parole statutes. Phalen, 245 W. Va. at 316–17, 858 S.E.2d at 941–

42. The court rejected the DOCR’s argument, stating they had already established

in Hargus that post-revocation reincarceration is a part of the original sentence,

therefore those serving such a term were eligible for good time and parole until the

effective date of SB 713. Id. at 318, 321, 858 S.E.2d at 943, 946.

              The Petitioners’ argument that Hargus had already clearly established

the violation found in Phalen is predicated upon the fact that in both Hargus and

Phalen the argument concerned whether reincarceration after the revocation of

supervised release pursuant to West Virginia Code § 62-12-26 was a separate

punishment from the original sentence. In Hargus, the Petitioners’ constitutional

arguments were predicated upon the view that these were separate punishments, as

was the DOCR’s argument in Phalen. These arguments were essentially that a

person’s post-revocation reincarceration was a “sanction” distinct from their

original sentence, and thus they were ineligible for good time or parole. See Hargus,

       3
        It should be noted that in the 2018 version of West Virginia Code § 15A-4-17(a)
there was an exception to the general application of good time for those committed
pursuant to West Virginia Code § 25-4-1 (1999), but that statute is not implicated here.
                                             19
232 W. Va. at 741, 753 S.E.2d at 899; Phalen, 245 W. Va. at 316–17, 858 S.E.2d at

941–42. Indeed, the Phalen Court overtly recognized how neatly the Hargus

petitioners’ and the DOCR’s arguments dovetailed. Phalen, 245 W. Va. at 316, 858

S.E.2d at 941. The Petitioners’ argument here has an intuitive appeal, essentially

positing that since Hargus all but foreclosed the logic and reasoning behind the

DOCR’s argument in Phalen, the legal right must have already been “clearly

established.” Indeed, a review of Hargus makes the outcome of Phalen quite

predictable. If one were to forecast the outcome of Phalen, the prudent

prognosticator would have predicted the decision going against the DOCR.

              Despite Hargus’ influence upon Phalen’s outcome, qualified

immunity does not require the public official to have a strong argument; all that is

required to receive immunity is that the right was not “clearly established” or

reasonably known by the official. See Hutchison, 198 W. Va. at 148, 479 S.E.2d at

658 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)); A.B., 234 W. Va. at 507,

766 S.E.2d at 766. Crucially, Hargus and Phalen were addressing different issues,

despite the same underlying logic controlling the outcome of both cases. Hargus

only adjudicated the constitutionality of post-revocation reincarceration, while

Phalen addressed whether a person was eligible for good time and parole for their

post-revocation reincarceration. Hargus’ logic was plainly influential in deciding

Phalen, but qualified immunity’s standard is “clearly established,” not probable, or

                                            20
likely to be established. Although Phalen was plainly the next logical step after

Hargus, the SCAWV had not yet taken that step until the decision in Phalen.

               Indeed, despite the Phalen majority not finding the DOCR’s argument

persuasive, the DOCR was not without its own textual and logical support. As the

Phalen dissent points out, West Virginia Code § 62-12-26 states that supervised

release is only to begin upon the “expiration” of one’s sentence or parole, suggesting

that the underlying sentence had ended, making supervised release distinct from the

sentence. Phalen, 245 W. Va. at 323, 858 S.E.2d at 948 (Armstead, J., dissenting).

See W. Va. Code § 62-12-26(a) (2021). The dissent also points out that § 62-12-26

grants the court the discretion to modify, terminate, or revoke one’s supervised

release, powers the court is typically given over a parole term rather than a sentence.

Phalen, 245 W. Va. at 324, 858 S.E.2d at 948 (Armstead, J., dissenting). In light of

the contextual differences between Hargus and Phalen and the colorable arguments

put forth in the Phalen dissent, we cannot say that the application of parole and good

time to those reincarcerated after the revocation of their supervised release under §

62-12-26 was clearly established before the Phalen decision. Therefore, Respondent

Jividen is entitled to qualified immunity protection from liability for claims arising

out of her signing the warrants that led to the rearrest and reincarceration of the

Petitioners.

                                             21
              Because we hold that the Respondents have absolute and qualified

immunity from all claims arising out of their acts in this case, we need not reach any

of the Petitioners’ other claims, including respondeat superior, SB 713’s statutory

immunity provisions and their constitutional validity, declaratory judgment,

Respondent Morrisey’s sovereign immunity and alleged involvement in the crafting

and execution of the new DOCR good time policy, and the Respondents’

personhood under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It should be noted that nothing in this decision

should be taken to challenge or disturb Phalen. That case is the natural progeny of

Hargus’ reasoning, and since Phalen the applicability of good time and parole to a

person’s post-revocation reincarceration has been clearly established. All we are

deciding here is that before Phalen, the Respondents’ conduct did not fit into that

narrow bandwidth of conduct a public official can be held liable for under our

immunity doctrine.

                                   IV. CONCLUSION

              For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s September 14, 2022, dismissal

orders are affirmed.

                                                                                  Affirmed.

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