Court Opinion

ID: 9717859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:11:44.911463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:55.872464
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Justice.
This case is before us on rehearing. For a recitation of the facts see our former holding at 411 N.W.2d 415 (S.D.1987). After granting rehearing we received additional briefs and heard oral argument. Based on all the authority previously cited, we continue to be persuaded that the trial court erred in the entry of its summary judgment of foreclosure and we therefore renew our reversal.
As we previously noted, SDCL 21-47-15 and -16 are clear. Those statutes, read together, place a burden upon a mortgagee seeking a deficiency judgment to establish by competent proof the fair and reasonable value of the mortgaged premises and further mandate that the court shall find and determine such value in its decree.
Here, the trial court made no determination of the fair and reasonable value of the property. Its holding may have been an attempt at providing a reasonable, practical procedure to deal with these specific facts. However, the statute does not give trial courts the authority to take such shortcuts.1 We are dealing with statutes which were adopted in 1939 and which are now being utilized and interpreted in more modern times. Certainly more sophisticated financial arrangements are being utilized in the 1980s than during the Great Depression, which preceded the enactment of these statutes. However, it is the function of the legislature, not the courts, to modernize statutes to bring them in line with current times and practices.
After the trial court determines the fair and reasonable value of the property, as *100established by competent proof, it may then determine what amount to allow the mortgagee to bid and whether to provide for a deficiency judgment, following the provisions of SDCL 21-47-16.2
MORGAN, J., and GERKEN, Circuit Judge, concur.
WUEST, C.J., and SABERS, J., dissent.
GERKEN, Circuit Judge, sitting for HENDERSON, J., disqualified.

. We have clearly held that these procedural steps are mandatory. Todd v. Winkeiman, 320 N.W.2d 525, 528 (S.D.1982); Perpetual Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 85 S.D. 330, 334, 182 N.W.2d 216, 218 (1971).

. We have not "overlooked” the trial court's statement nor its conclusion and judgment, as suggested by the dissent. Rather, we have disregarded them as not appropriate or relevant to the specific issues addressed in this summary judgment proceeding. We fail to see any “rank injustice” or "perversity” in requiring a trial court to do that which is required of it by statute.