Court Opinion

ID: 9912788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-23 00:02:18.530255+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:54.407560
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/22/23 P. v. Sida CA2/4
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                       DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,                                                     B323689

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. BA393693)
         v.

DEREK SIDA,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Ray G. Jurado, Judge. Affirmed.
      Kevin D. Sheehy, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J.
Wise, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                 ____________________________
       In 2012, a jury convicted appellant Derek Sida of three
counts of premeditated attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a).)
In 2022, appellant filed a petition for resentencing under Penal
Code section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95).1 The trial court
summarily denied the petition, finding appellant failed to
establish a prima facie right to relief.
       On appeal, appellant contends the trial court erred by
summarily denying his petition without first appointing counsel.
The People concede the error, but argue the failure to appoint
counsel in this case was harmless because the record of conviction
establishes appellant was ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a
matter of law. We agree with the People, and accordingly affirm
the trial court’s order.

       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.     Factual Background
       The following summary is taken from our opinion resolving
Sida’s direct appeal to provide background and context. (People
v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 222, fn. 2.)
       On February 3, 2012, around 6:15 p.m., someone fired
10 bullets into a car driven by John Riccio, an 18th Street gang
member, just after he parked at a residential hotel. Also in the
car were Jack Eloyan and a third passenger. Riccio was struck in
the shoulder. He screamed, stumbled from the car, and fell.
Eloyan and the other passenger, who were not hit, helped Riccio
to a room in the hotel.

1      Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was
renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10). We hereafter cite to section 1172.6 for ease of reference.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                    2
       Los Angeles police officers responded to the scene and
canvassed the area. An officer entered a nearby barbershop and
saw appellant’s girlfriend, who the officer knew to be a member of
the La Mirada Locos, a rival of the 18th Street gang. Appellant,
also a La Mirada Locos member, was in the rear of the shop,
wearing a barber’s smock and vigorously washing his hands and
face in the sink.
       At the Rampart station, appellant provided a written
statement reflecting that before the shooting, he was at the
barbershop with two other La Mirada Locos, G.O. and Monster,
when G.O. announced he was going to “blast these fools.”
Appellant became nervous and walked into the barbershop
parking lot, where he heard several gunshots. G.O. then ran up
to him and gave him the gun. Appellant began running in the
parking lot when Monster told him to give him the gun.
Appellant did so, and Monster got into his car with the gun and
drove away.
       Appellant said he changed clothes and then washed his
hands and face because he held the gun and wanted to wash off
any gunshot residue. Appellant said he did not know the true
names of G.O. and Monster, and when shown a photograph of a
La Mirada Locos member whose moniker was Monster, said it
was a different Monster. After being told that he was going to be
arrested, appellant changed the names of the others involved to
Lil Kro (as the one who said he was going to “blast these fools”)
and Silent (as the one who took the gun from him).
       A few days after the shooting, a detective viewed a
surveillance video from a nearby liquor store showing a male in a
black-hooded sweatshirt step to the curb, raise his arm, and then
walk away. The person could not be identified from the video.

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The police went to the barbershop where they found a black-
hooded sweatshirt hanging on a coat rack next to the sink where
defendant had washed his face. (People v. Sida (June 24, 2014,
B248886 [nonpub. opn.].)

B.    Procedural Background
      In April 2013, a jury convicted appellant of three counts of
premeditated attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. a)), finding
true the special allegation that the attempted murders were
willful, deliberate, and premeditated. The jury further found the
crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)) and that a principal personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm during the offenses. The jury,
however, found not true allegations that appellant personally
used or discharged a firearm. The trial court sentenced appellant
to a prison term of 75 years to life.
      A panel of this court affirmed the convictions in People v.
Sida (June 24, 2014, B248886) [nonpub. opn.], with several
sentencing modifications.2 In the opinion, this court observed,
“From the jury’s finding that [appellant] did not personally
discharge a firearm, it appears that the jury convicted him as an
aider and abettor.”
      In August 2022, appellant filed a resentencing petition
under former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6. The petition
requested appointment of counsel. The trial court, without
appointing counsel or ordering a response from the People,
summarily denied the petition. After reviewing the file,

2     On direct appeal, appellant raised several assertions of
sentencing error and sought review of a pre-trial discovery motion
under Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.

                                   4
including the jury instructions, the court concluded, “No natural
and probable consequences instruction was given,” and appellant
was “ineligible for resentencing because he was convicted of
attempted murder as a direct aider and abettor.”
      Appellant timely appealed.

                            DISCUSSION
A.     Section 1172.6 Procedures and Standard of Review
       Through Senate Bill No. 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1),
the Legislature clarified the felony-murder rule and eliminated
the natural and probable consequences doctrine to ensure that
any murder conviction and attached sentence is commensurate
with individual culpability. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 957, 971 (Lewis); People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830,
842–843; accord, § 189, subd. (e); § 188, subd. (a)(3) [“[m]alice
shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime”].) The Legislature also added former
section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6), pursuant to which
individuals convicted of felony murder, murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, or any theory under which
malice is imputed to a person solely based on his participation in
a crime, may petition for vacatur of their convictions and
resentencing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
       In 2021, the Senate amended section 1172.6 to make clear
that defendants convicted of attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine or manslaughter are also
entitled to seek resentencing relief. (Sen. Bill No. 775 (2021–
2022 Reg. Sess.); Stats. 2021, ch. 551, §§ 1–2, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.)
       If a petitioner makes a prima facie showing for relief, the
trial court is required to issue an order to show cause for an

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evidentiary hearing. (People v. Hurtado (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th
887, 891; § 1172.6, subds. (c), (d).) If the petition and record in
the case establish conclusively that the petitioner is ineligible for
relief as a matter of law, the trial court may deny the petition.
(People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708; Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at pp. 970–972; § 1172.6, subd. (c).)
       We review de novo whether the trial court properly denied
appellant’s section 1172.6 petition without issuing an order to
show cause. (People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244,
1251.)

B.       Section 1172.6 Relief for Attempted Murder
         Convictions
         Subdivision (a) of section 1172.6 now provides that a person
convicted of “attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine” may file a petition with the court to have
the conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining
counts when certain conditions apply. One required condition is
“[a] complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the
petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory
of . . . attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.”
         In his opening brief, appellant argues that notwithstanding
the language of the statute, a defendant convicted of attempted
murder qualifies for relief if he or she was convicted under any
theory in which malice was imputed to him or her based solely on
his or her participation in a crime. We need not address this
purported distinction as it would make no difference in the

                                  6
outcome.3 That is, the record of conviction establishes appellant
was not convicted on a theory that imputed malice to him “solely”
based on his participation in “a crime.”

C.     The Superior Court Erred by Summarily Denying
       Appellant’s Petition Without Appointing Counsel
       In Lewis, our Supreme Court held that once a petitioner
files a facially sufficient petition under section 1172.6 and
requests appointment of counsel, the superior court must appoint
counsel before conducting any prima facie review. (11 Cal.5th at
p. 963 [“petitioners who file a complying petition requesting
counsel are to receive counsel upon the filing of a compliant
petition”]; accord, § 1172.6, subd. (b)(3).) Appellant contends, and
the People concede, the trial court erred in summarily denying
his petition without first appointing him counsel and affording
his attorney an opportunity to file a brief because appellant filed
a facially sufficient petition. We agree with the parties on this
point. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 963.)
       However, the erroneous failure to appoint counsel for a
section 1172.6 petitioner is subject to harmless error analysis
under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 957–958 [failure to appoint counsel under
§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3) is “state law error only, tested for prejudice
under [Watson]”]; People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666,
676.) Thus, the error requires reversal in this case only if

3      We accordingly deny as unnecessary appellant’s request for
judicial notice of legislative materials “pertaining to the scope of
Senate Bill 775.” (Cf. People v. Lamoureux (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 241,
251, fn.4; Tom v. City and County of San Francisco (2004) 120
Cal.App.4th 674, 688, fn. 2.)

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appellant can show a reasonable probability that his petition
would not have been summarily denied if he had been afforded
the assistance of counsel. (Lewis, at pp. 972–974; Daniel, at
p. 676.) Appellant fails to meet this standard if the record of his
conviction, which includes the jury instructions, establishes that
he is not entitled to relief as a matter of law. (Daniel, at p. 678.)
As explained below, the record establishes appellant is not
entitled to relief in this case.

D.    The Error was Harmless
      “Direct aiding and abetting remains a valid theory of
attempted murder after the enactment of Senate Bill No. 775.”
(People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548; see also People v.
Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 848.)
      Here, the record of conviction demonstrates appellant was
convicted of attempted murder as either a direct perpetrator or
an aider and direct abettor to that crime.
      Specifically, the trial court instructed the jury on the
elements of attempted murder (CALCRIM No. 600), which stated
that to find appellant guilty of the attempted murders charged in
the information,4 the People must prove “[t]he defendant
intended to kill that person.” The jury also received instruction
on the general principles of aiding and abetting (CALCRIM
No. 400), which informed the jury that someone may be guilty of
a crime by either personally committing the crime or aiding and
abetting the perpetrator of the crime (CALCRIM No. 400 [Aiding

4     The amended information, filed on September 2012, charged
appellant with three counts of attempted premeditated murder of
victims John Riccio, David Eloyan, and John Doe (§§ 664, 187,
subd (a)). Appellant was not charged with any other crimes.

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and Abetting: General Principles]). As to the theory of aiding
and abetting, specifically, the jury was instructed with CALCRIM
No. 401 which provided in relevant part: “To prove that a
defendant is guilty of a crime based on aiding and abetting that
crime, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The perpetrator
committed the crime; [¶] 2. The defendant knew that the
perpetrator intended to commit the crime; [¶] 3. Before or during
the commission of the crime, the defendant intended to aid and
abet the perpetrator in committing the crime; [¶] AND [¶] 4. The
defendant’s words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the
perpetrator’s commission of the crime. [¶] Someone aids and
abets a crime if he or she knows of the perpetrator’s unlawful
purpose and he or she specifically intends to, and does in fact,
aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s
commission of that crime.” (CALCRIM No. 401 [Aiding and
Abetting: Intended Crimes].)
       By convicting appellant on the attempted murder charges,
the jury necessarily found he shared his codefendants’ criminal
purpose, and with the intent of attempting to kill the victims, in
fact aided the commission of the attempted murders. (See People
v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1191–1192 [even assuming
appellant was convicted of attempted murder as an aider and
abettor, the instructions necessarily required the jury to find he
intended to aid and abet an unlawful killing—“the very definition
of express malice”]; People v. Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 547–548 [“by finding appellant guilty of attempted murder,
the jury necessarily found he had personally harbored intent to
kill or express malice when he aided and abetted the [underlying]
murder”]; People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1054

                                9
[observing the person guilty of attempted murder as an aider and
abettor must have intended to kill].)
       In arguing otherwise, appellant notes the CALCRIM
No. 400 instruction given in his case also included a bracketed
paragraph that is to be provided when the prosecutor is relying
on the natural and probable consequences theory, which reads:
“Under some specific circumstances, if the evidence establishes
aiding and abetting of one crime, a person may also be found
guilty of other crimes that occurred during the commission of the
first crime.” However, we disagree the inclusion of this bracketed
language was tantamount to the jury being instructed on the
theory of natural and probable consequences—or otherwise
resulted in the jury imputing liability based on an improper
theory.
       Neither the court’s instructions nor the prosecution’s
closing argument indicate the jury was given the option of, or
actually relied upon, the natural and probable consequences
theory of liability or any theory under which liability was
imputed to appellant based solely on his participation in “one
crime” that resulted in “other crimes.” Appellant was not
charged with any other crimes and the jury was not instructed on
any other “target” or “non-target” crimes. (People v. Estrada
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941, 947; cf. People v. Lopez (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 1, 20 [observing “[t]he jury would not have been
aware of CALCRIM instructions other than those given and
would not have known of any bench notes”].) Instead, and as
previously discussed, the jury was told to find appellant liable as
an aider and abettor, he must have “intended to aid and abet the
perpetrator in committing the crime” “[b]efore or during the
commission of the crime” and “the crime” at issue on this case—

                                10
i.e., attempted murder—requires that “[t]he defendant intended
to kill that person.”
        Appellant complains the prosecutor merely “generally”
(and, purportedly “incorrectly”) told the jury that an aider and
abettor is someone who “knows of the crime [and] aids and abets
the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose” without informing the jury
that appellant must “both know about, and share, the
perpetrator’s murderous specific intent.” Although the
prosecutor’s argument may have tracked only a portion of the
aiding and abetting instructions, he did not convey to the jury
that appellant could be convicted on a natural and probable
consequences theory. He did not ask the jury to impute liability
based on appellant’s participation in a crime or offense other than
attempted murder. (Estrada, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 949 [so
noting]; see also People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198, 205
[“[Appellant] overlooks the fact that the prosecution did not argue
at any point during trial, including closing argument, that a
crime other than murder or attempted murder was committed,
and no other crime was charged or at issue throughout the
trial”].)
        In sum, the inclusion here of the reference to “other crimes”
in CALCRIM No. 400 cannot be read to invoke the natural and
probable consequences theory or any now-invalid theory of
liability in light of the record of conviction in this case. The
superior court’s error in failing to appoint counsel and accept
briefing before making its prima facie determination is therefore
harmless. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 957–958; People v.

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Cortes, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 205–206; Daniel, supra, 57
Cal.App.5th at p. 677.)5

E.    Appellant’s Contentions of Trial Error or Attacks on
      the Sufficiency of Evidence Are Not Cognizable in
      this Section 1172.6 Appeal
      In his opening brief, appellant also raises additional
arguments which are beyond the scope of this appeal.
      First, appellant asserts the prosecutor’s argument
generally suggested an aider and abettor and principal are
equally guilty and points out the “equally guilty” language in
aiding and abetting instructions has been recognized as
“misleading” under some circumstances. (See People v. Bryant,
Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 433 [discussing
previous cases and instructions on issue].) To the extent
appellant is suggesting a separate claim of trial error, he could
have asserted this issue in his direct appeal and cannot now do so
as a basis for section 1172.6 relief. (Cf. People v. Burns (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 862, 866–867 [affirming summary denial of
section 1172.6 petition and observing appellant could have raised
his challenge to “equally guilty” language in instructions on
direct appeal and section 1172.6 “does not create a right to a
second appeal”].)

5      To the extent appellant cites People v. Langi (2022) 73
Cal.App.5th 972 and People v. Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257,
those cases are inapposite. Langi concerned a conviction for second
degree implied malice murder and Maldonado involved lying in wait
which does not require an intent to kill. (See People v. Lee, supra, 95
Cal.App.5th at p. 1191 [noting concerns in Langi and Maldonado not
present under instructions given in attempted murder prosecution].)

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       In a similar vein, appellant argues his criminal conduct
“came after the fact” “from his own post-hoc handling of the gun”
and there is “no solid, credible, and incontrovertible evidence”
that he “knew of or shared” the perpetrator’s intent. However,
“[t]he mere filing of a [prior Penal Code] section 1170.95 petition
does not afford the petitioner a new opportunity to raise claims of
trial error or attack the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
jury’s findings.” (People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942,
947, emphasis added; see also People v. Daniel, supra, 57
Cal.App.5th at p. 678.)
       Our sole inquiry is whether appellant was convicted under
a now-invalid theory of liability. (Burns, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th
at p. 868–869.) For the reasons indicated above, we have
concluded this was not the case, and we accordingly affirm the
trial court’s order denying resentencing relief.

                        DISPOSITION
      The order denying appellant’s postconviction petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6 is affirmed.

                                           MORI, J.

      We concur:

            COLLINS, Acting P.J.

            ZUKIN, J.

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