Court Opinion

ID: 9567745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:57:19.778303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:20:34.856040
License: Public Domain

LANGTRY, J.,
dissenting.
The court’s opinion at bar fails to consider all of the trial court’s findings in this post-conviction ease. They are:
“1. Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to the charge of Unlawful Possession of a Dangerous Drug on November 24, 1971, and on December 6, 1971, was sentenced to a maximum of 18 months in the Oregon State Penitentiary.
“2. Trial counsel for petitioner advised him that if the sole basis of his guilty plea was the denial of his Motion to Suppress, he could have the denial of that motion reviewed through post-conviction proceedings.
“3. Petitioner entered a plea of guilty not only because of the denial of the Motion to Suppress, but also in hopes of receiving a lighter sentence and to avoid return to Idaho for a probation violation.
“4. Petitioner failed to show that his attorney’s advice prejudiced him.
“5. Petitioner has failed to show that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The second question presented by petitioner is *613whether the giving of erroneous advice is in itself grounds for relief. Counsel for petitioner was active in filing motions on behalf of his client,① and aside from the one alleged error he gave competent advice concerning the consequences of the guilty plea. Upon the record, I do not think that the giving of the possibly erroneous advice amounted to a denial of the right to effective assistance of counsel. Cf. Herron v. Cupp, 1 Or App 300, 462 P2d 444 (1969); North v. Cupp, 254 Or 451, 461 P2d 271 (1969), cert denied 397 US 1054 (1970); Benson v. Gladden, 242 Or 132, 407 P2d 634 (1965), cert denied 384 US 908 (1966); State v. Abel, 241 Or 465, 406 P2d 902 (1965). That is what the trial court found.
Seemingly, because petitioner produced evidence to the effect that he was given erroneous advice by his counsel that had originated from the prosecutor’s office, and he testified to the effect that it “substantially influenced” him, the court has found his petition must be allowed. But that finding ignores the fact that the trial court in the case at bar found there was no prejudice—that is, that petitioner was not “substantially influenced” by the erroneous advice. There was substantial evidence upon which the trial court could base such a finding. That evidence included information given to petitioner that if he stood trial there was a good chance of his being found guilty, and that in that event he could expect a sentence of five years’ imprisonment. His counsel also testified to having advised him that the chances of overturning the ruling ■on the motion to suppress were questionable. Petitioner’s sentence after the guilty plea turned out to *614be what he was advised it probably would be with a guilty plea—18 months. Evidence showed that nego7 tiations were carried on at the instance of his counsel with an Idaho district attorney which appear to have resulted in petitioner’s not having had to answer in Idaho as a probation violator.
This is a statutory action at law. OHS 138.C50. We do not try it de novo. Where a fact finding of a trial court is based upon evidence, it is our duty to affirm it in cases such as this. Endsley v. Cupp, 1 Or App 169, 173-74, 459 P2d 448 (1969), Sup Ct review denied (1970); Alcorn v. Gladden, 237 Or 106, 111, 390 P2d 625 (1964). I find nothing in Santobello v. New York, 404 US 257, 92 S Ct 495, 30 L Ed 2d 427 (1971), relied upon in the court’s opinion at bar,-which justifies a disregard of this rule. I do not think Santobello is in point. It is not contended that the prosecutor here made any “promise or agreement” that was an “inducement” for the plea. The record does not indicate that the legal advice given by-the assistant district attorney to petitioner’s trial • counsel was a material element in the plea bargain. As we interpret petitioner’s claim for relief he makes no claim that the fact that the advice originated in the office of the prosecutor was a factor that motivated his plea. His claim was that the advice of his counsel was erroneous and that if he had received correct advice he would not have pled guilty. The post-conviction court’s findings of fact are a denial of this claim. I would affirm'

 Besides the motion to suppress, counsel testified he filed a motion that would have permitted defendant access to the county-law library.