Court Opinion

ID: 9950998
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 15:17:10.023659+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:51.395044
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                         No. 124,412

                                   CITY OF WICHITA, KANSAS,
                                           Appellee,

                                              v.

                                      GABRIELLE GRIFFIE,
                                         Appellant.

                              SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1.
       The constitutionality of a statute or ordinance is a question of law subject to
unlimited review. The party challenging the statute or ordinance as unconstitutionally
overbroad has the burden to establish its overbreadth.

2.
       The First Amendment facial overbreadth doctrine departs from the traditional rule
of standing that a person may not challenge a statute on the ground that it might be
applied unconstitutionally in circumstances other than those before the court.

3.
       A First Amendment facial overbreadth analysis consists of three steps. First, the
court interprets the language of the challenged law to determine its scope. If the scope of
the law extends to prohibit protected activity, the court next decides whether the law
prohibits a substantial amount of protected activity judged in relation to the law's plainly
legitimate sweep. Finally, if the court finds substantial overbreadth, the court looks to see
whether there is a satisfactory method of severing the law's constitutional provisions from
its unconstitutional provisions.

                                              1
4.
        A court may sever unconstitutional provisions from a law and leave the remainder
in force and effect if, after examining the law, it can conclude (1) the Legislature would
have passed the law without the objectionable portion and (2) the law would operate
effectively to carry out the intention of the Legislature with the objectionable portion
stricken.

        Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed November 18,
2022. Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; ERIC WILLIAMS, judge. Oral argument held September 12,
2023. Opinion filed March 15, 2024. Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is
reversed. Judgment of the district court is reversed.

        Kurt Harper, of Depew Gillen Rathbun & McInteer, LC, of Wichita, argued the cause, and Dylan
P. Wheeler, of the same firm, was on the briefs for appellant.

        Nathaniel Johnson, assistant city attorney, argued the cause, and Jan Jarman, assistant city
attorney, and Jennifer Magana, city attorney, were with him on the briefs for appellee.

        Anthony J. Powell, solicitor general, Ryan J. Ott, assistant solicitor general, and Kris W. Kobach,
attorney general, were on the brief for amicus curiae State of Kansas.

        Sharon Brett, of ACLU Foundation of Kansas, of Overland Park, was on the brief for amicus
curiae American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Kansas.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

        STANDRIDGE, J.: This case requires us to decide whether the provision within
Wichita Municipal Code of Ordinances (W.M.O.) § 5.24.010(c) criminalizing "noisy
conduct tending to reasonably arouse alarm, anger or resentment in others" is
unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment. Both the district court and the
Court of Appeals held the provision constitutional. We disagree. Applying the substantial

                                                        2
overbreadth doctrine used by Kansas courts to adjudicate First Amendment overbreadth
challenges, we conclude the noisy conduct provision within W.M.O. § 5.24.010(c) is
unconstitutionally overbroad because it prohibits a substantial amount of protected
activity in relation to the provision's plainly legitimate sweep. But our conclusion does
not require us to strike subsection (c) in its entirety because there is a satisfactory method
of severing the unconstitutional "noisy conduct" provision from the constitutional
"fighting words" provision within the same subsection.

                                           FACTS

       In July 2020, Project Justice ICT (ICT) organized a protest against police brutality
in downtown Wichita following the May 2020 murder of George Floyd. Gabrielle Griffie
served as the executive director of ICT. She helped coordinate food drives, protests, and
community events. City of Wichita v. Griffie, No. 124,412, 2022 WL 17072292, *1 (Kan.
App. 2022) (unpublished opinion).

       ICT promoted the protest on Facebook, informing interested participants to
"[b]ring shields, umbrellas, and other protective gear. We will be marching." ICT did not
obtain a community event permit to close off streets for the march. But the Wichita Police
Department monitored the group's online activity and prepared for the event by blocking
off the streets around the group's planned route to limit the amount of contact with
motorists. 2022 WL 17072292, at *1.

       Between 40 and 60 people showed up to participate in the protest. While
marching, they chanted slogans such as, "No justice, no peace," and, "Black lives matter."
2022 WL 17072292, at *1. They also chanted, "Whose streets? Our streets." The streets
were "almost entirely empty." 2022 WL 17072292, at *1. Griffie marched at the front,
leading the group with a megaphone and a homemade shield. 2022 WL 17072292, at *1.

                                              3
       For part of the march, protesters walked in the two middle lanes of the four lanes
of traffic along the route. Despite the police traffic diversion, there were some open
streets providing access to the marching route. On one of these open streets, Jeremy
McTaggart drove a white Chevy Tahoe north on the route into the march.

       "LJ," an independent journalist, recorded a video of the protest for an independent
group called "Liberty ICT" and posted it to Facebook. Liberty ICT is not part of Project
Justice ICT. LJ's recording shows McTaggart honking, slowing his Tahoe, honking again,
and then continuing to drive his vehicle until it collided with a protester. The video shows
the protester McTaggart hit with his Tahoe becoming visibly irritated with McTaggart. At
first, she did not move out of the way. Another protester in the group grabbed her and
dragged her out of the way.

       The rest of the two-hour recording shows no other traffic confrontations. But the
protesters yelled the following at police: "get a real job," "you fascist people," "learn to
code," "useless piece of shit," "go home," "fuck you, fascist," "I didn't know pigs knew
how to ride bikes," "pigs are smarter than cops," and more.

       When the protestors arrived at the federal courthouse, they stood on the front steps
and gave speeches to the crowd over megaphones for about 30 minutes. One megaphone-
equipped speaker quoted a chant that previously had been used during a protest in
Portland, Oregon, "There is no riot here, why are you in riot gear . . . ." A speaker also
said, "What did we do, block some fucking streets?" The same speaker mentioned an
armed officer's appearance within the courthouse behind them and said, "He's moving to
a different tactical position . . . so he can come and fucking blast us if he wants to . . . .
What are they going to do? Teargas us when we're just standing around? . . . We need to
be out here every fucking day." Based on exhibits the State later presented at trial, this
speaker may have been Griffie.

                                                4
       Several days after the protest, Detective Marianna Hoyt reviewed the videotape
posted on Facebook. Lieutenant Drew Sielor helped Detective Hoyt identify Griffie out
of the crowd of protestors. Detective Hoyt ultimately issued Griffie a citation for
unlawful assembly under W.M.O. § 5.73.030. The complaint alleged Griffie violated
W.M.O. § 5.73.030(1) when she "participat[ed] in the meeting or coming together of at
least five persons for the purpose of engaging in conduct constituting disorderly conduct
. . . by blocking traffic." (Emphasis added.) Griffie, 2022 WL 17072292, at *2. To
support the unlawful assembly charge, the City of Wichita relied on its disorderly
conduct ordinance, W.M.O. § 5.24.010:

       "Disorderly conduct is, one or more of the following acts that the person knows or should
       know will alarm, anger or disturb others or provoke an assault or other breach of the peace:

       "(a) Engaging in brawling or fighting; or

       "(b) Disturbing an assembly, meeting, or procession, not unlawful in its character; or

       "(c) Using fighting words or engaging in noisy conduct tending to reasonably arouse alarm,
       anger or resentment in others.

       "As used in this section, 'fighting words' means words that by their very utterance inflict
       injury or tend to incite the listener to an immediate breach of peace.

       "Every person convicted of violating this section shall be punished by imprisonment of a
       term not to exceed 30 days or a fine of not more than $500.00 or both such imprisonment
       and fine."

                                        PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       Griffie appeared for a bench trial in Sedgwick County Municipal Court. The court
found Griffie guilty of violating W.M.O. § 5.73.030(1) as charged.

                                                    5
       Griffie appealed the municipal court's decision to the Sedgwick County District
Court and requested a jury trial. Before trial, the City clarified its theory of the case:
Griffie violated the unlawful assembly ordinance by meeting with five or more persons
with the intent to engage in "noisy conduct tending to reasonably arouse alarm, anger or
resentment in others." In response, Griffie argued that over 40 years ago, the Kansas
Supreme Court examined a state statute mirroring the Wichita ordinance and, in order to
avoid holding the entire statutory subsection unconstitutional, construed the language in
subsection (c) narrowly to mean only "fighting words." See State v. Huffman, 228 Kan.
186, 612 P.2d 630 (1980). Based on the holding in Huffman, Griffie argued the "noisy
conduct" provision in subsection (c) is unenforceable. The district court was not
persuaded by Griffie's argument.

       The case proceeded to trial. McTaggart testified first, followed by Lieutenant
Sielor and Detective Hoyt. The two-hour videotape of the protest was played for the
jury. The City rested its case, and Griffie moved for acquittal. The district court denied
her motion. Griffie's attorney asked for permission to submit a trial brief for
reconsideration, which the court granted. On reconsideration, Griffie argued the "noisy
conduct" part of the disorderly conduct definition in subsection (c) is unconstitutionally
overbroad and should be struck from the ordinance because it prohibits all noisy
conduct, even if the conduct is protected under the First Amendment. The court
remained unpersuaded and denied Griffie's motion for reconsideration.

       Griffie testified last. She acknowledged her role as the executive director of ICT,
though she denied having chosen the position. She believed she was given the position
"because nobody else really wanted to do the work" and that it was "forced upon [her]."
Griffie testified that ICT's decisions were made as a group. Griffie's time on the stand
established that she had told other protestors to bring shields as defensive and symbolic
tools, that she wished she would have tried "to keep people more compact or organized,"

                                               6
and that she felt Wichita police targeted her because she was the face of ICT. Griffie also
testified about the impact on her resulting from the City's decision to prosecute her for
participating in the protest:

       "I don't think in the future I would ever organize any more protests, like, that's just not
       really my jam. But I think, yeah, eventually I would like to get involved in some other,
       like, I really enjoyed doing, like, distributions. I really enjoyed, you know, speaking to
       people on these things, but I don't think protest is the way for me."

       A jury found Griffie guilty of unlawful assembly. The court imposed $346.50 in
fines and costs. At sentencing, the prosecutor noted Griffie was "a great asset to the
community and does a lot of things," and suggested Griffie could do community service
rather than paying the fine. The court held Griffie could perform community service,
credited at $5 an hour.

       Griffie appealed. She argued W.M.O. § 5.24.010(c) was facially unconstitutional
under the overbreadth doctrine. While her appeal was pending, we issued a decision in
City of Wichita v. Trotter, 316 Kan. 310, 514 P.3d 1050 (2022). Griffie submitted a timely
Rule 6.09 letter addressing the Trotter decision shortly before her Court of Appeals oral
argument date.

       A divided panel affirmed the district court, finding W.M.O. § 5.24.010(c) survived
Griffie's constitutional overbreadth challenge. Griffie, 2022 WL 17072292, at *8. Senior
Judge Timothy G. Lahey disagreed with the majority:

       "The constitutional problem with the 'noisy conduct' form of disorderly conduct is not
       that the ordinance was passed with the intention of targeting a specific political message.
       The problem is that it is overbroad and includes within its scope, without exception,
       protected First Amendment speech and conduct. Under the ordinance, a criminal penalty
       attaches to noisy conduct whether it occurs in a private home or in the public square—it

                                                     7
       applies to political debates, meetings, and conventions, and at all times of the day or
       night. The scope is constitutionally significant and unmistakably chills free speech and
       expressive conduct." Griffie, 2022 WL 17072292, at *9.

Griffie petitioned for review, asking this court to reverse the Court of Appeals and adopt
Judge Lahey's reasoning. The Attorney General and ACLU filed briefs as amicus curiae,
supporting the City and Griffie respectively.

       Jurisdiction is proper. See K.S.A. 20-3018(b) (providing for review of Court of
Appeals' decisions); K.S.A. 60-2101(b) (Supreme Court can correct, modify, vacate, or
reverse Court of Appeals' decisions).

                                               ANALYSIS

       Griffie claims the "noisy conduct" provision of W.M.O. § 5.24.010(c)—which
defines the disorderly conduct element on which her unlawful assembly conviction was
based—is overbroad on its face such that it unconstitutionally infringes on freedom of
speech and expression protected by the First Amendment. Griffie reiterates she brings
only a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the ordinance and is not challenging the
constitutionality of the ordinance as applied to her conduct here.

A. Standard of review

       The constitutionality of a statute or ordinance is a question of law subject to
unlimited review. Trotter, 316 Kan. at 312. As the party challenging the ordinance as
unconstitutionally overbroad, Griffie has the burden to establish its overbreadth. See 316
Kan. at 314.

                                                    8
B. Standing

       Before addressing the merits of Griffie's overbreadth claim, we first consider
whether Griffie has standing to challenge W.M.O. § 5.24.010(c) as unconstitutionally
overbroad. Although the parties do not raise it, "standing is a component of subject matter
jurisdiction" and "may not be waived." Creecy v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 310 Kan. 454,
459-60, 447 P.3d 959 (2019).

       Under Kansas' traditional standing test, parties must demonstrate they personally
"suffered a cognizable injury" and "a causal connection between the injury and the
challenged conduct." State v. Bodine, 313 Kan. 378, 385, 486 P.3d 551 (2021). As such, a
party generally has standing to challenge the constitutionality of an ordinance or statute
only to the extent it adversely impacts that party's own rights. So "if there is no
constitutional defect in the application of the statute to a litigant, [the litigant] does not
have standing to argue that it would be unconstitutional if applied to third parties in
hypothetical situations." Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154-55, 99 S. Ct.
2213, 60 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1979).

       But the United States Supreme Court recognizes an exception to traditional
standing rules when a litigant claims that a statute broadly prohibits speech protected by
the First Amendment. City of Wichita v. Wallace, 246 Kan. 253, 267, 788 P.2d 270 (1990)
(citing Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 60, 96 S. Ct. 2440, 49 L. Ed. 2d
310 [1976] [citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-14, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 37 L.
Ed. 2d 830 (1973)]). This exception grew out of the notion that violations of the First
Amendment impact society as a whole by exerting a chilling effect on the free and open
exchange of ideas. See Wallace, 246 Kan. at 267. Therefore, litigants "are permitted to
challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but
because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute's very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or

                                                9
expression." Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612. This court first applied the relaxed standing
rules for First Amendment overbreadth challenges in Moody v. Board of Shawnee County
Comm'rs, 237 Kan. 67, 75, 697 P.2d 1310 (1985), and most recently applied the
exception in Trotter, 316 Kan. at 312.

       Here, Griffie brings an overbreadth challenge to an ordinance seeking to protect
First Amendment rights. Thus, her claim fits squarely within the exception to general
standing requirements, and she has standing to argue on behalf of third parties that
W.M.O. § 5.24.010(c) is unconstitutionally overbroad on its face.

C. Overbreadth

       Griffie claims the "noisy conduct" provision of W.M.O. § 5.24.010(c) is facially
overbroad and thus unconstitutional. To determine whether the ordinance is overbroad,
we apply the facial overbreadth standard as developed in Kansas cases. The Kansas
standard evolved over several decades, incorporating criteria from legal treatises and
several United States Supreme Court cases along the way. Perhaps this extended
evolution is why our current overbreadth standard appears, at least on its face, to be
internally incongruous. In practice, however, Kansas courts have reconciled the
incongruity. To place the current overbreadth standard in context so that we can apply it
here, we begin with a chronological review of key substantial overbreadth legal
principles as developed in the Supreme Court and in Kansas.

       Evolution of the United States Supreme Court substantial overbreadth doctrine

       Without labeling it as such, the United States Supreme Court first recognized what
is now known as the facial overbreadth doctrine in Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
97-98, 60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093 (1940). In that case, Thornhill was arrested under a
statute broadly criminalizing all picketing, including labor-management disputes. In

                                             10
response, Thornhill alleged violations of his constitutional right to free speech, to
peacefully assemble, and to petition for redress. The State argued the law was vital in
keeping the community safe and maintaining the peace. Finding no merit to his
constitutional claims, the trial court convicted Thornhill as charged.

       In reversing the lower court, the Supreme Court established some significant legal
principles of lasting importance. First, the Court held a First Amendment overbreadth
challenge to a statute must be "judged upon its face" and not as applied to the particular
facts of a case. 310 U.S. at 96. Next, the Court held a law is overbroad when it "does not
aim specifically at evils within the allowable area of [governmental] control, but . . .
sweeps within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an
exercise of freedom of speech or of the press." 310 U.S. at 97. Finally, and probably most
significantly, the Court created an exception to ordinary standing requirements in First
Amendment overbreadth cases by permitting facial challenges to overbroad statutes even
if a more narrowly drawn statute would have been valid as applied to the challenging
party. 310 U.S. at 97-98.

       Thirty years after Thornhill, the Supreme Court defined the limits of the facial
overbreadth doctrine in the seminal case of Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.
Ct. 2908, 37 L. Ed. 2d 830 (1973). The case involved a challenge to the provision of a
statute restricting political activities of the state's classified civil servants. The Court held
the overbreadth doctrine inapplicable, noting it generally does not apply to a law that may
only incidentally have an impact on expression. In so holding, the Court established the
"substantial overbreadth" doctrine, declaring that "particularly where conduct and not
merely speech is involved, . . . the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but
substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." 413 U.S.
at 615. This inquiry necessarily involves a comparative analysis between the law's effect
on protected versus unprotected activity and requires that the unconstitutional

                                               11
applications of the law be disproportionately "substantial" in relation to the constitutional
applications. 413 U.S. at 609-18.

       Not long after Broadrick, the Supreme Court incorporated the substantiality
requirement into all overbreadth challenges, whether the statute applies to conduct,
speech, or conduct plus speech. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 770-71, 102 S. Ct.
3348, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1113 (1982) (recognizing the substantiality requirement applies
equally to overbreadth challenges involving pure speech or speech-related conduct);
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 n.12, 105 S. Ct. 2794, 86 L. Ed. 2d
394 (1985) (reiterating Ferber's holding that the substantial overbreadth doctrine applies
to pure speech).

       Fifty years after Broadrick, the United States Supreme Court continues to adhere
to the substantial overbreadth doctrine. See United States v. Hansen, 599 U.S. 762, 770,
143 S. Ct. 1932, 216 L. Ed. 2d 692 (2023) ("If the challenger demonstrates that the
statute 'prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech' relative to its 'plainly
legitimate sweep,' then society's interest in free expression outweighs its interest in the
statute's lawful applications, and a court will hold the law facially invalid.").

       Evolution of the Kansas substantial overbreadth doctrine

       The first Kansas case setting forth specific standards in a First Amendment
overbreadth challenge is State ex rel. Murray v. Palmgren, 231 Kan. 524, 646 P.2d 1091
(1982). In Palmgren, the Attorney General sought to recover civil penalties against
county officials for violating the Kansas Open Meetings Act (KOMA). The county
officials argued KOMA was unconstitutionally overbroad in that it "has a potential
inhibiting effect on the 'rights of public officials to assemble and discuss public affairs'"
and thwarts the rights of Kansans to engage in "unfettered discussion of governmental
affairs in private while retaining anonymity." 231 Kan. at 533-34.

                                              12
       The Palmgren court began its overbreadth analysis by setting forth the existing,
and rather general, legal standard for overbreadth: "[A]n overbroad statute makes
conduct punishable which under some circumstances is constitutionally protected." 231
Kan. at 533 (citing State v. Huffman, 228 Kan. 186, 189, 612 P.2d 630 [1980]; State v.
Stauffer Communications, Inc., 225 Kan. 540, 547, 592 P.2d 891 [1979]). The court went
on to note, however, that "almost every law is potentially applicable to constitutionally
protected acts." 231 Kan. at 533. Thus, the court clarified that a successful overbreadth
challenge can be made only when "1) the protected activity is a significant part of the
law's target, and 2) there exists no satisfactory method of severing the law's constitutional
from its unconstitutional applications." 231 Kan. at 533. Palmgren derived these
prerequisites to a successful overbreadth challenge from a discussion on the standing
component of overbreadth challenges by Professor Lawrence Tribe in his treatise,
American Constitutional Law. Palmgren, 231 Kan. at 533 (citing Tribe, American
Constitutional Law § 12-24, 711 [2d ed. 1978]). Notably, Tribe also discussed Broadrick
and its comparative substantiality requirement. But the Palmgren court did not discuss
the substantial overbreadth standard or cite Broadrick for this legal principle.

       Almost two decades after Palmgren, we applied the United States Supreme Court's
comparative substantial overbreadth doctrine for the first time. State v. Whitesell, 270
Kan. 259, 271, 13 P.3d 887 (2000) ("An overbreadth challenge will be successful if the
challenged statute trenches upon a substantial amount of First Amendment protected
conduct in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.") (citing Staley v. Jones, 108
F. Supp. 2d 777, 786 [W.D. Mich. 2000] [citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612-15]). Since
Whitesell, Kansas appellate courts have consistently held that a statute is overbroad only
when it prohibits a substantial amount of protected expressive activity when judged in
relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. See Trotter, 316 Kan. at 314; State v.
Jones, 313 Kan. 917, 932, 492 P.3d 433 (2021); State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 911, 920, 329
P.3d 400 (2014); State v. Zabrinas, 271 Kan. 422, 428, 24 P.3d 77 (2001); City of Wichita

                                              13
v. Trotter, 60 Kan. App. 2d 339, 361, 494 P.3d 178 (2021); Griffie, 2022 WL 17072292, at
*4; State v. Neloms, No. 110,391, 2016 WL 463362, at *9 (Kan. App. 2016) (unpublished
opinion); State v. Bland, No. 108,272, 2014 WL 1362644, at *4 (Kan. App. 2014)
(unpublished opinion); State v. Gile, No. 108,279, 2014 WL 1302608, at *7 (Kan. App.
2014) (unpublished opinion).

       But alongside the comparative substantial overbreadth doctrine, our courts have
also continued to cite Palmgren's overbreadth standard, derived from Tribe's treatise.
Because the two standards use different criteria to assess overbreadth, we question
whether using them together can be reconciled. A plain reading of the language in the two
standards shows the difference between them. Under the substantial overbreadth doctrine,
a law is overbroad if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected activity as compared
to the amount of unprotected activity it prohibits. Under the Tribe overbreadth doctrine, a
law is overbroad if the protected activity is a significant part of the law's target, with no
comparison to the amount of unprotected activity it prohibits.

       Although they may be irreconcilable in the abstract, we find Kansas courts have
reconciled the two standards in practice by incorporating the secondary Tribe standard
into the primary substantial overbreadth doctrine. For example, in Williams we held

       "[w]here conduct and not merely speech is involved, the United States Supreme Court
       requires that 'the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well,
       judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.' Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615.
       This court has divided this burden into a two-part test. The party attacking the
       constitutionality of a statute on the basis of overbreadth must establish '(1) the protected
       activity is a significant part of the law's target, and (2) there exists no satisfactory method
       of severing that law's constitutional from its unconstitutional applications.'" 299 Kan. at
       920 (citing Whitesell, 270 Kan. 259, Syl. ¶ 6).

                                                     14
       This excerpt from Williams reflects that, at least where conduct and not merely
speech is involved, we have construed Tribe's "significant part of the law's target"
standard as a legal equivalent to the Supreme Court's substantial overbreadth doctrine.
See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615 ("[P]articularly where conduct and not merely speech is
involved, . . . the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well,
judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."). This construction may
suggest we are not applying the required Supreme Court's substantial overbreadth
doctrine. See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8-9, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 131 L. Ed. 2d 34 (1995)
("State courts . . . are not free from the final authority of" the Supreme Court when
interpreting the U.S. Constitution.); State v. Tatro, 310 Kan. 263, 272, 445 P.3d 173
(2019) ("[T]his court must follow the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the
United States Constitution."). To clarify that we are, indeed, applying United States
Supreme Court precedent on questions of federal law, we no longer will express the
substantial overbreadth doctrine as a standard requiring protected activity be a
"significant part of the law's target." Instead, we will apply the doctrine using the same
language as the Supreme Court to determine whether the law prohibits "a substantial
amount of protected activity judged in relation to the law's plainly legitimate sweep."
Consistent with Supreme Court precedent, we will apply the substantial overbreadth
doctrine not just to conduct, but also to overbreadth challenges involving conduct,
speech-related conduct, and pure speech. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 770-71 (recognizing the
substantiality requirement applies not just to conduct, but equally to overbreadth
challenges involving pure speech and speech-related conduct); Brockett, 472 U.S. at 503
n.12 (reiterating Ferber's holding that the substantial overbreadth doctrine applies to pure
speech).

       Thus, the First Amendment facial overbreadth analysis consists of three steps.
First, we interpret the language of the challenged law to determine its scope. See United
States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 170 L. Ed. 2d 650 (2008) ("The
first step in overbreadth analysis is to construe the challenged statute; it is impossible to

                                              15
determine whether a statute reaches too far without first knowing what the statute
covers."). If the scope of the law extends to prohibit protected activity, we next decide
whether the law prohibits a substantial amount of protected activity judged in relation to
the law's plainly legitimate sweep. Williams, 299 Kan. at 920; see also Williams, 553 U.S.
at 297; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 771 (recognizing the substantiality requirement applies not
just to conduct, but equally to overbreadth challenges involving pure speech and speech-
related conduct). Finally, if we find substantial overbreadth, we look to see whether there
is a satisfactory method of severing the law's constitutional provisions from its
unconstitutional provisions. Trotter, 316 Kan. at 320-21.

       Having clarified the substantial overbreadth doctrine as applied by Kansas
appellate courts, we now apply the overbreadth analysis to the noisy conduct provision of
W.M.O. § 5.24.010(c).

   1. Interpreting the language of the ordinance to determine its scope

       The most fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is that the intent of the
Legislature governs if that intent can be determined. To determine intent, we look first to
the plain language of the statute, giving common words their ordinary meanings. When a
statute is plain and unambiguous, we do not speculate about the legislative intent behind
that clear language, and we avoid reading something into the statute not readily found in
its words. State v. Eckert, 317 Kan. 21, 27, 522 P.3d 796 (2023). Our court applies the
same rules to interpreting a municipal ordinance as we would when interpreting a statute.
Robinson v. City of Wichita Employees' Retirement Bd. of Trustees, 291 Kan. 266, 272,
241 P.3d 15 (2010).

       Using these rules of statutory interpretation, we review W.M.O. § 5.24.010(c) to
determine the scope of activity prohibited by the ordinance:

                                             16
       "Disorderly conduct is, one or more of the following acts that the person knows or should
       know will alarm, anger or disturb others or provoke an assault or other breach of the peace:

       ....

       "(c) Using fighting words or engaging in noisy conduct tending to reasonably arouse alarm,
       anger or resentment in others."

       Neither the ordinance nor the identical state statute, K.S.A. 21-6203, define "noisy
conduct." And no case interpreting the ordinance or statute has defined the phrase either.
But Kansas courts interpreting statutes often look to dictionaries to explain the ordinary
meaning of common words. See Eckert, 317 Kan. at 29-30.

       "Noisy" means "making noise." Noisy, Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/noisy. In turn, noise is defined as "sound" .
. . "especially: one that lacks an agreeable quality or is noticeably unpleasant or loud."
Noise, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/noise.

       "Conduct" is defined as "a mode or standard of personal behavior especially as
based on moral principles." Conduct, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/conduct. Black's Law Dictionary further defines "conduct" as
"[p]ersonal behavior, whether by action or inaction, verbal or nonverbal; the manner in
which a person behaves." Black's Law Dictionary 369 (11th ed. 2019).

       Using these dictionary definitions to construe the "noisy conduct" provision of
W.M.O. § 5.24.010(c), the ordinance criminally punishes a person who makes
disagreeable, unpleasant, or loud sounds that the person knows or should know would
tend to reasonably arouse alarm, anger, or resentment in others. By its plain language
then, the "noisy conduct" provision of W.M.O. § 5.24.010(c) necessarily criminalizes

                                                   17
conduct previously deemed by the United States Supreme Court as protected by the First
Amendment, if accompanied by a disagreeable, unpleasant, or loud sound:

   • picketing a military funeral of a soldier killed in the line of duty with signs stating,
       "Thank God for Dead Soldiers," and, "America is Doomed," while singing hymns
       and reciting Bible verses, Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 448, 131 S. Ct. 1207,
       179 L. Ed. 2d 172 (2011);

   • burning a cross while playing religious hymns, such as "Amazing Grace," over
       loudspeakers, without an intent to intimidate, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 349,
       123 S. Ct. 1536, 155 L. Ed. 2d 535 (2003);

   • burning an American flag during a protest rally, while protesters chant: "America,
       the red, white, and blue, we spit on you," Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399, 109
       S. Ct. 2533, 105 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1989);

   • giving a lengthy and aggressive religious speech and loudly singing "The Star
       Spangled Banner" and other patriotic and religious songs while stamping feet and
       clapping hands, Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 233, 83 S. Ct. 680, 9 L.
       Ed. 2d 697 (1963); and

   • peaceful labor picketing, including assembling and discussing publicly the nature
       and causes of a labor dispute. Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104, 60
       S. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093 (1940).

       Given Supreme Court precedent and the plain language of the ordinance, we
conclude the scope of the ordinance extends to constitutionally protected activity.

                                             18
   2. Whether the ordinance prohibits a substantial amount of protected activity judged
       in relation to the law's plainly legitimate sweep

       Having concluded the scope of the law extends to prohibit constitutionally
protected activity, the next step in our analysis is to determine whether the ordinance is
substantially overbroad and therefore unconstitutional. A law is overbroad if it prohibits a
substantial amount of protected activity judged in relation to the law's plainly legitimate
sweep. The overbreadth inquiry necessarily involves a comparative analysis between the
law's effect on protected versus unprotected activity and requires that the unconstitutional
applications of the law be disproportionately "substantial" in relation to the constitutional
applications.

       We begin by looking at the effect of the ordinance on protected activity. On top of
activity deemed by the Supreme Court as protected by the First Amendment set forth in
the preceding section, the plain language of the ordinance reflects that the "noisy
conduct" provision W.M.O. § 5.24.010(c) criminalizes a broad range of other
constitutionally protected activities—whether expressed in public or private settings and
whether expressed at any time during the day or the night. If expressed in a disagreeable,
unpleasant, or loud way that would tend to reasonably arouse alarm, anger, or resentment
in others, the following nonexclusive list of conduct will be criminal in a considerable
number of cases under the noisy conduct provision of the ordinance:

   • Speaking, marching, and demonstrating;
   • Using profane language in front of, or directed to, another person;
   • Being insolent and disrespectful to another person;
   • Cheering, booing, or taunting at a sporting event or other occasion
          o See Calvert & Richards, Fans and the First Amendment: Cheering and
                Jeering in College Sports, 4 Va. Sports & Ent. L.J. 1, 3, n.9 (2004)
                                              19
              (analyzing the constitutionality of efforts to restrict spectators' offensive
              speech at sporting events held at public colleges and universities and
              concluding that any policy drafted and implemented by public universities
              would face an uphill court battle if challenged by free-speech advocates);
   • Talking on the phone in public;
   • Playing disagreeable or unpleasant music;
   • Honking a horn;
   • Talking during a movie at the theater; and
   • Revving the engine of a vehicle or motorcycle.

       Although the list above establishes the noisy conduct provision unconstitutionally
applies to a considerable amount of protected activity, our substantial overbreadth
standard requires further inquiry. We must determine whether the unconstitutional
applications of the noisy conduct provision are substantial when compared to legitimate
applications involving unprotected activity. Williams, 299 Kan. at 920; see also Williams,
553 U.S. at 297.

       A review of Kansas cases construing K.S.A. 21-6203(a)(3)—the statute identical
to the "noisy conduct" provision in W.M.O. § 5.24.010(c)—leads us to conclude that
legitimate applications of the "noisy conduct" provision involving unprotected activity
are limited to ones where the disagreeable, unpleasant, or loud conduct consists of
threatening behavior that poses a risk of provoking physical confrontation. See State v.
Hughs, No. 118,281, 2018 WL 2374766, at *1, 4 (Kan. App. 2018) (unpublished opinion)
(affirming defendant's disorderly conduct conviction based on evidence of screaming and
cursing that resulted in fighting and brawling); State v. Mead, No. 115,989, 2017 WL
4082240, at *4-5, 12 (Kan. App. 2017) (unpublished opinion) (affirming disorderly
conduct conviction based on evidence that defendant advanced toward others while
flailing his arm in the air as he yelled and screamed in an out-of-control, belligerent,
threatening, and aggressive manner, after which he battered the witness); City of Paola v.
                                             20
Ammel, No. 96,301, 2007 WL 2767953, at *3 (Kan. App. 2007) (unpublished opinion)
(affirming disorderly conduct conviction based on evidence that defendant screamed
insults at police officers at the top of his voice in a public library, which was heard
throughout the building, and physically resisted arrest by fighting the officers); State v.
Heyder, No. 82,810, 2000 WL 36745844, at *1-2 (Kan. App. 2000) (unpublished
opinion) (affirming disorderly conduct conviction based on evidence that defendant
exited his vehicle at a toll booth, angrily advanced toward the collector while flailing his
arms, and spewed profanity in a raised voice at the collector while blocking traffic until
he was forcibly taken down and handcuffed by law enforcement); cf. State v. Kiraly, No.
125,190, 2023 WL 2941555, at *2, 5-6 (Kan. App. 2023) (unpublished opinion) (holding
defendant's use of the phrase "stupid bitch" during an argument where defendant was
yelling and woman was sobbing and both were speaking in loud, upset voices did not
support arrest for disorderly conduct based on "fighting words" or "noisy conduct tending
to reasonably arouse alarm, anger or resentment in others").

       The list of cases cited above reveals the narrow scope of legitimate applications,
involving unprotected activity, of the "noisy conduct" provision of W.M.O. § 5.24.010(c):
noisy conduct consisting of threatening behavior that poses a risk of provoking physical
confrontation. The State agrees, citing these same cases to assert that the "'plainly
legitimate sweep'" of the "'noisy conduct'" provision is "preventing verbal and physical
confrontations between citizens in public places regardless of speech content." The Court
of Appeals panel majority also agreed, at least to a certain extent, as shown by its
concession that prohibiting "noisy conduct" on its own likely would be constitutionally
overbroad. Yet the majority concluded the ordinance survived a facial overbreadth
challenge because the ordinance includes actus reus and mens rea components, which the
majority believed would significantly curtail its application to protected activity. Griffie,
2022 WL 17072292, at *6.With less applications to protected activity, the majority
posited the scope of the law's unconstitutional applications would no longer be
substantial when compared to its legitimate sweep. But the majority provided no

                                              21
accompanying analysis or other discussion to support its summarily stated belief. 2022
WL 17072292, at *8.We provide that analysis below.

       Actus reus

       The panel majority held the law's application to protected activity is reined in by
what it viewed as restrictive language modifying the actus reus component of the law:
"noisy conduct tending to reasonably arouse alarm, anger or resentment in others."
(Emphasis added.) W.M.O. § 5.24.010(c). Griffie, 2022 WL 17072292, at *6. But we fail
to see how the modifying language places any meaningful restriction on the law's
application to protected activity. This is especially true given the descriptive modifier is
expressed as only "tending" to reasonably arouse alarm, anger or resentment. "Tend"
means: "1. To be disposed toward (something). 2. To serve, contribute, or conduce in
some degree or way; to have a more or less direct bearing or effect. 3. To be directed or
have a tendency to (an end, object, or purpose)." Black's Law Dictionary 1770 (11th ed.
2019). That others may experience alarm, anger, or resentment in response to noisy
conduct does not justify the wholesale restriction of free expression. The United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "the public expression of ideas may not be
prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers."
Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592, 89 S. Ct. 1354, 22 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1969). "If there
is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable." Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414; see Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,
615, 91 S. Ct. 1686, 29 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1971) ("[M]ere public intolerance or animosity
cannot be the basis for abridgment of these constitutional freedoms.").

       We also disagree with the panel majority that the objective component of the
law—tending to reasonably arouse alarm, anger, or resentment in others—places any
meaningful restriction on the law's application to protected activity. See Griffie, 2022 WL

                                             22
17072292, at *6. As the United States Supreme Court recognized long ago, "a principal
'function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may
indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.'" Johnson, 491
U.S. at 408-09 (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4, 69 S. Ct. 894, 93 L. Ed.
1131 [1949]); see Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 45
L. Ed. 2d 125 (1975) ("Much that we encounter offends our esthetic, if not our political
and moral, sensibilities. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not permit government to
decide which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require
protection for the unwilling listener or viewer."); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21, 91
S. Ct. 1780, 29 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1971) ("[T]he mere presumed presence of unwitting
listeners or viewers does not serve automatically to justify curtailing all speech capable of
giving offense.").

       Mens rea

       The panel majority believed that adding an intent requirement—"knows or should
know"—to the ordinance significantly curtails the law's application to protected activity.
Griffie, 2022 WL 17072292, at *6.

       A general intent mens rea element does not curtail the law's application to
protected activity. Whether a person knows (or should know) that such person's noisy
conduct is inclined to arouse alarm, anger, or resentment in others does nothing to narrow
the scope of the law's application to only unprotected activity. Looking at the broad swath
of the law's application to protected activity as described above, it is clear that in most, if
not all, cases, the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly engaged in the protected
activity constituting noisy conduct.

                                              23
       In sum, neither the actus reus nor the mens rea components limit the application of
W.M.O. § 5.24.010(c) to protected activity. Given the broad scope of protected activity
criminalized by the law, as well as the limited scope of legitimate applications of the
provision, we conclude the application to legitimate activity is substantially overcome by
the vast amount of protected activity the provision prohibits. As such, we deem the
provision unconstitutional.

       Time, Place, and Manner

       Before moving to severance, the final step in our analysis, we consider the
dissent's challenge to our conclusion that the noisy conduct provision is
unconstitutionally overbroad because it prohibits a substantial amount of protected
conduct relative to its plainly legitimate sweep. The dissent does not question the legal
framework for conducting a substantial overbreadth analysis. Instead, the dissent argues
that a substantial overbreadth analysis is premature until we determine whether the
provision lawfully imposes reasonable restrictions on time, place, and manner of
protected activity.

       The government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and
manner of protected speech. The analysis referred to by the dissent requires that the
government's time, place, and manner restrictions (1) be content-neutral, (2) be narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and (3) leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 791, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 105 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1989) (applying intermediate scrutiny to
time, place, and manner restrictions). The narrowly tailored requirement prevents the
government from imposing time, place, and manner restrictions that prohibit substantially
more protected conduct than necessary to further the government's legitimate interests.
491 U.S. at 799. Notably, the language used by the Court to describe the purpose of the
narrowly tailored requirement in a time, place, and manner analysis is strikingly similar

                                             24
to the language used by the Court to describe the purpose of the substantial overbreadth
doctrine. Compare Ward, 491 U.S. at 799 (restrictions must be narrowly tailored so time,
place, and manner restrictions do not prohibit substantially more protected conduct than
necessary to further the government's legitimate interests), with Broadrick, 413 U.S. at
615 (substantial overbreadth analysis requires the court to determine whether the
challenged law prohibits a substantial amount of protected conduct relative to its plainly
legitimate sweep).

       Notwithstanding this similarity, the dissent claims our determination that the noisy
conduct provision is substantially overbroad is fatally flawed because we failed to first
undertake a Ward intermediate scrutiny analysis. The dissent's claim focuses on our
failure to analyze whether the provision imposed a permissible "manner" restriction on
protected conduct. This analysis would require us to decide whether the noisy conduct
provision—which criminally punishes a person who makes disagreeable, unpleasant, or
loud sounds that the person knows or should know would tend to reasonably arouse
alarm, anger, or resentment in others—is narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest. Given the procedural posture of this case, however, the dissent's
proposed scrutiny analysis is not possible. The parties have never alleged in these
proceedings that the noisy conduct provision is a "manner" restriction on protected
speech subject to scrutiny analysis. Because the issue was never litigated, the facts
necessary to engage in a scrutiny analysis on appellate review were never developed.
Specifically, there is no evidence of the significant governmental interest served by
criminally punishing a person who makes disagreeable, unpleasant, or loud sounds that
the person knows or should know would tend to reasonably arouse alarm, anger, or
resentment in others. Obviously, we cannot evaluate whether restrictions on the manner
in which protected activity is expressed are narrowly tailored to serve an unspecified and
factually unsupported significant governmental interest.

                                             25
         Yet the dissent suggests we can engage in appellate review because the provision
is really just a typical noise ordinance intended to govern sound, similar to the many that
are challenged in other courts under an intermediate scrutiny analysis. But there is no
evidence to suggest the noisy conduct provision here was enacted to govern sound. To the
contrary, the City's noise ordinances governing sound are provided in detail under
sections within the Noise Chapter of the Municipal Code. W.M.O. Chapter 7.41 - Noise.
The sections in this chapter enumerate a non-exclusive list of noise nuisances, identify
the tests for measuring noise, and set forth the decibel levels for time periods and zones at
which noises will be declared excessive, unusual, loud, and unnecessary. W.M.O. §
7.41.010-§ 7.41.060.

         Simply put, we are precluded from engaging in a sua sponte scrutiny analysis of
the noisy conduct provision as proposed by the dissent. Thus, we remain resolute in
concluding that the noisy conduct provision is unconstitutionally overbroad because it
prohibits a substantial amount of protected conduct relative to its plainly legitimate
sweep.

   3. Severance

         Because we have declared unconstitutional the "noisy conduct" provision of
W.M.O. § 5.24.010(c), we now must decide whether there is a satisfactory method of
severing the law's constitutional provisions from its unconstitutional provisions. The
touchstone for severability is legislative intent, which is determined by applying our well-
established two-part test. Under this test, the court may sever the unconstitutional
provisions from the law and leave the remainder in force and effect if, after examining
the law, we can conclude (1) the Legislature would have passed the law without the
objectionable portion and (2) the law would operate effectively to carry out the intention

                                             26
of the Legislature with the objectionable portion stricken. Trotter, 316 Kan. at 321
(quoting Gannon v. State, 304 Kan. 490, 519, 372 P.3d 1181 [2016]).

       In this case, the introductory General Provisions of the Wichita, Kansas, Code
include a catchall severability clause. See W.M.O. § 1.04.050 ("If for any reason any
part, section, subsection, sentence, clause or phrase of this Code, or the application
thereof to any person or circumstance, is declared to be unconstitutional or invalid such
decision shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this Code."). Although a
severability clause is not dispositive, it is a strong indication of legislative intent and
creates a presumption of severability. Gannon, 304 Kan. at 520 (citing State v. Next Door
Cinema Corp., 225 Kan. 112, 118-19, 587 P.2d 326 [1978]).

       We begin the severability analysis by examining what W.M.O. § 5.24.010(c)
would look like without the unconstitutional provision:

       "Disorderly conduct is, one or more of the following acts that the person knows or should
       know will alarm, anger or disturb others or provoke an assault or other breach of the peace:

       "(a) Engaging in brawling or fighting; or

       "(b) Disturbing an assembly, meeting, or procession, not unlawful in its character; or

       "(c) Using fighting words. or engaging in noisy conduct tending to reasonably arouse
       alarm, anger or resentment in others.

       "As used in this section, 'fighting words' means words that by their very utterance inflict
       injury or tend to incite the listener to an immediate breach of peace."

       By its plain language, the ordinance reflects the City's intent to protect physical
safety and preserve public peace (preventing "an assault or other breach of the peace"). If
we sever the unconstitutional provision criminalizing "noisy conduct tending to
                                                   27
reasonably arouse alarm, anger or resentment in others" from subsection (c), the
subsection still criminalizes unprotected "fighting words" as an act of disorderly conduct.
The ordinance defines "fighting words" as ones which "by their very utterance inflict
injury or tend to incite the listener to an immediate breach of peace." Because fighting
words, by their very nature, tend "to reasonably arouse alarm, anger or resentment in
others," the fighting words provision necessarily embraces what we found above as the
legitimate sweep of the "noisy conduct" provision: threatening behavior that poses a risk
of provoking physical confrontation.

       For this reason, we conclude (1) the lawmakers would have passed the ordinance
without the "noisy conduct" provision and (2) the ordinance will operate effectively to
carry out the intention of the lawmakers—protecting physical safety and preserving
public peace—with the "noisy conduct" provision stricken. Having met the two-part test,
we sever the "or engaging in noisy conduct tending to reasonably arouse alarm, anger or
resentment in others" language from W.M.O. § 5.24.010(c).

       Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is reversed.
Judgment of the district court is reversed.

                                              ***

       STEGALL, J., dissenting: In my view, the majority's analysis is sound, with one
crucial exception. After describing the appropriate overbreadth test, the majority fumbles
the ball when determining whether the challenged portion of the ordinance sweeps up
protected speech in its net. The extent of the analysis is simply the conclusory statement
that "[b]y its plain language then, the 'noisy conduct' provision of W.M.O. § 5.24.010(c)
necessarily criminalizes conduct previously deemed by the United States Supreme Court
as protected by the First Amendment, if accompanied by a disagreeable, unpleasant, or
loud sound." City of Wichita v. Griffie, 318 Kan. ___, slip op. at 17.

                                              28
       At first glance, this sounds reasonable enough. But couldn't the same be said of
every time, place, or manner restriction on speech? Indeed, it could. See, e.g., Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 731-32, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 147 L. Ed. 2d 597 (2000) ("[I]t is not
disputed that the regulation affects protected speech activity; the question is thus whether
it is a 'reasonable restrictio[n] on the time, place, or manner of protected speech.' Here,
the comprehensiveness of the statute is a virtue, not a vice, because it is evidence against
there being a discriminatory governmental motive. . . . [The statute] simply does not 'ban'
any messages, and likewise it does not 'ban' any signs, literature, or oral statements. It
merely regulates the places where communications may occur. [Citation omitted.]");
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 331, 108 S. Ct. 1157, 99 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1988) (applying a
narrowing construction to limit application of the law to regulate the place and manner of
demonstrations directed at an embassy rather than a general breach of the peace law);
Carew-Reid v. Metropolitan Transp. Authority, 903 F.2d 914, 916-19 (2d Cir. 1990)
(finding a regulation banning use of amplifiers by musicians on subway platforms a
permissible time, place, and manner restriction, despite the fact that "music, as a form of
expression, is protected by the First Amendment," because the First Amendment "does
not guarantee appellees access to every or even the best channels or locations for their
expression"; even though the regulation banned a particular medium, it remained "neutral
with regard to the expression's content," and though the "incidental effect of the amplifier
ban, obviously, is that those musicians who previously used amplifiers on subway
platforms will be forced to alter their performances or to perform elsewhere . . . this
restriction on the manner of their expression is justified because it is the manner itself
that produces the evil that is the object of regulation").

       Time, place, or manner restrictions on speech occupy a unique place in our First
Amendment jurisprudence. Where there is a legitimate time, place, or manner restriction,
even though it will of course have the effect of limiting otherwise protected speech, it
cannot as a matter of law infringe on that speech. The phenomenon of a valid time,

                                              29
place, or manner restriction reaching otherwise protected activity is nothing new, and the
Supreme Court has addressed this reality for decades. See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 731-32
(evaluating regulations under a time, place, and manner analysis and acknowledging that
while some regulations will obviously "affect[] protected speech activity" they may pass
constitutional muster as a content neutral time, place, and manner restriction that lacks
any "discriminatory governmental motive"); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
791-93, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 105 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1989) (noting that while plaintiff's
arguments about government interference in "artistic judgment may have much force in
other contexts"—because "[a]ny governmental attempt to serve purely esthetic goals by
imposing subjective standards of acceptable sound mix on performers would raise serious
First Amendment concerns"—"they are inapplicable to the facts of this case" because the
record clearly showed the city had only content-neutral goals). For a law to be
unconstitutionally overbroad, we must consider whether a law reaches a substantial
amount of protected activity. Hill, 530 U.S. at 731-32 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 37 L. Ed. 2d 830 [1973] ["[P]articularly where
conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute
must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly
legitimate sweep."]). Otherwise, no time, place, or manner restriction could survive the
kind of overbreadth challenge plaintiff brings in this suit.

       But the majority never conducts an analysis of W.M.O. § 5.24.010(c) as a time,
place, or manner restriction. Maybe it would fail to meet the necessarily high threshold
required for such restrictions. Indeed, "noise ordinances" are widely categorized as
"fall[ing] into the category of time, place or manner regulations." Sharkey's, Inc. v. City
of Waukesha, 265 F. Supp. 2d 984, 994 (E.D. Wis. 2003). And even very broad noise
ordinances—similar to the one at hand—have been upheld as legitimate "manner"
restrictions. See Costello v. City of Burlington, 632 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2011) (upholding
city noise ordinance that made it "unlawful for any person to make or cause to be made
any loud or unreasonable noise," defined as noise that "disturbs, injures or endangers the

                                              30
peace or health of another or when it endangers the health, safety or welfare of the
community"); Howard Opera House Assocs. v. Urb. Outfitters, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 2d 559,
563 (D. Vt. 2001) (upholding city noise ordinance that banned "any loud or unreasonable
noise," defined as noise which "disturbs, injures or endangers the peace or health of
another, or which endangers the health, safety or welfare of the community"), aff'd 322
F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2003); DA Mortg., Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 486 F.3d 1254, 1267-
68 (11th Cir. 2007) (upholding city noise ordinance that proscribed unreasonably loud
noise "in such a manner as to disturb the peace, quiet and comfort of neighboring
inhabitants, or at any time louder that is necessary for convenient hearing for the person
or persons who are in the room"); City of Beaufort v. Baker, 315 S.C. 146, 149, 432
S.E.2d 470 (1993) (upholding city ordinance that made it "unlawful for any person to
willfully disturb any neighborhood or business in the City by making or continuing loud
and unseemly noises, or by profanely cursing and swearing, or using obscene language");
State v. Holcombe, 145 S.W.3d 246, 248 (Tex. App. 2004) (upholding a city noise
ordinance that made it illegal for one to "unreasonably disturb or interfere with the peace,
comfort and repose of neighboring persons of ordinary sensibilities"), aff'd 187 S.W.3d
496 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

       Other courts have come down differently, so the answer is not at all self-evident.
See Deegan v. City of Ithaca, 444 F.3d 135, 144 (2d Cir. 2006) (regulations prohibiting
sound that could be heard 25 feet from its source in downtown pedestrian mall were not
narrowly tailored to serve city's legitimate interest in preventing unreasonably injurious,
annoying, or disturbing sound because mall was a public forum already "bustling with the
sounds of recreation, celebration, commerce, demonstration, rallies, music, poetry,
speeches, and other expressive undertakings," and therefore its application to a street
preacher "unreasonably burden protected speech"); United States v. Doe, 968 F.2d 86, 87
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (a national park's regulation that prohibited sounds from "audio devices"
generating a higher than prescribed decibel level was not a constitutional time, place, and
manner restriction); Campa v. City of Birmingham, 662 So. 2d 917, 918-19 (Ala. Crim.

                                             31
App. 1993) (finding a noise ordinance "unduly restrictive because the only restriction it
places on the offending sounds is that they not 'disturb the peace, quiet and comfort of
neighboring inhabitants'" and these factors were not limited to a "specific time frame, a
specific place, or a specific manner in which sound can be emitted").

       The majority responds to this criticism by quite rightly asserting that the State has
never defended the ordinance as a manner restriction and has proffered no significant
government interest as its rationale. I don't begrudge the majority's refusal to do the
State's work for it; however, I would exercise our discretion to order the parties to
provide supplemental briefing on the question. After all, when important issues such as
this arise affecting major questions that will likely have ramifications on the law outside
any particular dispute, our recent practice has been to do just that. See, e.g., State v.
Patton, 315 Kan. 1, 5, 503 P.3d 1022 (2022) (ordering supplemental briefing on whether
application of statutory amendments violated the Ex Post Facto Clause); State v. Sayler,
306 Kan. 1279, 1280, 404 P.3d 333 (2017) (ordering supplemental briefing to address
what effect new Kansas caselaw regarding sufficiency of charging documents may have).

       In my view, our refusal to do so here may not do much damage in today's case, but
it may do a real disservice to legitimate time place or manner restrictions on the books in
towns and counties across our state. This is so because how this particular noise
restriction—which is admittedly quite broad—would fare under a proper time, place, or
manner review is uncertain at best. And as I have explained, the question must be
answered before any overbreadth analysis can proceed. Given all this, I am left with only
the option to dissent.

                                              32