Court Opinion

ID: 9880778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-28 17:00:38.622122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:57:31.454754
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10949    Document: 61-1      Date Filed: 09/28/2023   Page: 1 of 33

                                                            [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10949
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        DIANA ROBINSON,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 6:20-cr-00057-PGB-LHP-3
                            ____________________

        Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
USCA11 Case: 22-10949      Document: 61-1     Date Filed: 09/28/2023     Page: 2 of 33

        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-10949

        ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge:
               A court’s injunction may require a person to do or refrain
        from doing a particular act. 1 Howard C. Joyce, A Treatise on the
        Law Relating to Injunctions § 1, at 2–3 (1909). But unlike a congres-
        sionally enacted statute, which can apply to everyone, an injunction
        generally applies to only those over whom the court has jurisdic-
        tion in the proceedings leading to the injunction, and only to the
        extent that the injunction gives notice to them. This case raises the
        question of just how far an injunction of a private corporation can
        reach.
               In 2017, TASER International, Inc., obtained an injunction
        against “Phazzer [Electronics] and its oﬃcers, agents, servants, em-
        ployees, and attorneys; and any other persons who are in active
        concert or participation with Phazzer Electronics or its oﬃcers,
        agents, servants, employees, or attorneys” (the “2017 injunction”).
        The injunction prohibited Phazzer Electronics from distributing or
        causing to be distributed certain stun guns and accompanying car-
        tridges that infringed on TASER’s intellectual property. At the time
        of the TASER-Phazzer Electronics litigation, Steven Abboud con-
        trolled Phazzer Electronics (though not on paper). And Phazzer
        Electronics employed, among others, Defendant-Appellant Diana
        Robinson.
               In 2018, after the district court found Abboud in contempt
        for violating the 2017 injunction, Phazzer Electronics became inac-
        tive, and Abboud persuaded Uriel Binyamin to start a new com-
        pany called Phazzer-USA. In the meantime, Abboud and Robinson
USCA11 Case: 22-10949      Document: 61-1     Date Filed: 09/28/2023     Page: 3 of 33

        22-10949               Opinion of the Court                        3

        went to work for other entities with “Phazzer” in their names.
        Among others, these included Phazzer IP and Phazzer Global.
        Phazzer IP and Phazzer Global, in turn, assisted Phazzer-USA in
        2019 in distributing stun guns that the 2017 injunction prohibited
        Phazzer Electronics from distributing.
                Based on that activity the district court found Robinson (and
        others) in contempt of the 2017 injunction. On appeal, the ques-
        tion we must answer is whether the 2017 injunction extended
        broadly enough to bind Robinson and prohibit her conduct under
        the theories of liability that the government has pressed and the
        district court decided. After oral argument and careful review of
        the record, we conclude that the record cannot sustain Robinson’s
        conviction under the any of these theories.
                To be sure, the government did not seek a contempt convic-
        tion under and the district court did not consider one last theory of
        liability in a criminal-contempt case—whether Robinson aided and
        abetted a person or entity in privity with an enjoined party in vio-
        lating the injunction—a theory that the government may believe
        possibly applies here. But now it’s too late. So we vacate Robin-
        son’s conviction.

                              I.   BACKGROUND
                              A. Factual Background

              As we’ve mentioned, the district court in this case found
        Robinson in contempt of an injunction it issued July 17, 2017,
        against “Phazzer [Electronics] and its oﬃcers, agents, servants,
USCA11 Case: 22-10949        Document: 61-1        Date Filed: 09/28/2023       Page: 4 of 33

        4                         Opinion of the Court                    22-10949

        employees, and attorneys; and any other persons who are in active
        concert or participation with Phazzer [Electronics] or its oﬃcers,
        agents, servants, employees, or attorneys.” Doc. No. 183, at 11–12.
        Before we get to that point in the story, though, we must explain
        how the 2017 injunction came about.
                           1. Phazzer Electronics, Inc.
               Kirk French and Steven Abboud were cousins-in-law. Some-
        time around 2006 or 2007, Abboud approached French about form-
        ing a company to sell conducted electrical weapons, also known as
        stun guns. According to French, Abboud asked French to form the
        company, Phazzer Electronics, Inc. (“Phazzer Electronics”), be-
        cause Abboud was going through a divorce and wanted to conceal
        the company from his wife. French thought he’d also beneﬁt from
        the company because he hoped to become an active participant in
        the company’s operations when he retired from the military.
               So in 2008 or 2009, French formed Phazzer Electronics. Rel-
        evant to this appeal, Phazzer Electronics sold a stun gun called the
        Enforcer.
               Though French and his wife were the named owners of the
        company, Abboud ran the day-to-day operations of the business. 1
        For example, Abboud had the business relationships with compa-
        nies located in Taiwan that manufactured the products Phazzer

        1 For nearly all Phazzer Electronics’s existence, French did not receive com-
        pensation from the company, though Phazzer Electronics did pay his cell-
        phone bill.
USCA11 Case: 22-10949     Document: 61-1      Date Filed: 09/28/2023    Page: 5 of 33

        22-10949               Opinion of the Court                       5

        Electronics sold. He also obtained Phazzer Electronics’s inventory,
        and he made the bulk of the decisions for the company. In fact,
        Abboud’s role was so tied up with Phazzer Electronics’s business
        that he went by the nickname “The General” within the company.
        Abboud resigned from the company sometime in 2017 but pro-
        vided consulting services to Phazzer Electronics until 2018.
              Phazzer Electronics also employed Diana Robinson. Robin-
        son answered the phones, shipped inventory, and responded to
        technical questions. She took her directions from Abboud, who
        always acted as the owner of Phazzer Electronics.
              By the end of 2018, Phazzer Electronics ceased operating.
                          2. The TASER Civil Injunction
               In March 2016, TASER International (“TASER”), a stun gun
        manufacturer, brought suit against Phazzer Electronics for trade-
        mark and patent infringement, false advertising, and unfair compe-
        tition. On July 21, 2017, the district court entered judgment in fa-
        vor of TASER and awarded several remedies, including a perma-
        nent injunction precluding Phazzer Electronics from producing
        and selling certain products such as the Enforcer stun gun. The
        injunction provided,
              Phazzer [Electronics] and its oﬃcers, agents, servants,
              employees, and attorneys; and any other persons who
              are in active concert or participation with Phazzer
              Electronics or its oﬃcers, agents, servants, employ-
              ees, or attorneys, are hereby enjoined from:
                     a. Making or causing to be made,
USCA11 Case: 22-10949         Document: 61-1        Date Filed: 09/28/2023        Page: 6 of 33

        6                         Opinion of the Court                      22-10949

                       b. Using or causing to be used,
                       c. Oﬀering for sale, or causing to be oﬀered for
                       sale,
                       d. Selling or causing to be sold,
                       e. Donating or causing to be donated
                       f. [D]istributing or causing to be distributed,
                       g. Importing or causing to be imported,
                       h. Exporting or causing to be exported
               the Phazzer Enforcer CEW, and any other conducted
               electrical weapon (“CEW”) or device which infringed
               upon claim 13 of the ‘262 Patent, and any device not
               colorably diﬀerent from the Enforcer CEW. The ef-
               fect of this injunction shall continue through October
               14, 2019. 2
        Doc. No. 183, at 11–12.
               The Federal Circuit aﬃrmed the district court’s judgment
        and injunction.
         3. 2018 Civil Contempt Finding Against Phazzer Electronics and
                                      Abboud
              Before the Federal Circuit issued its opinion (and less than a
        year after the district court enjoined Phazzer Electronics, its

        2 The district court also entered the same injunction for Phazzer Electronics’s
        stun-gun cartridges.
USCA11 Case: 22-10949      Document: 61-1      Date Filed: 09/28/2023      Page: 7 of 33

        22-10949                Opinion of the Court                         7

        oﬃcers, employees, and agents), the district court found Phazzer
        Electronics and Abboud to be in civil contempt of the 2017 injunc-
        tion. In particular, TASER presented evidence that Phazzer Elec-
        tronics sold and shipped the enjoined Enforcer stun gun to
        TASER’s investigator and that Abboud continued to conduct
        demonstrations of the enjoined products. Although the district
        court declined to impose additional penalties, it notiﬁed Phazzer
        Electronics and Abboud that any continued violations of the
        court’s injunction would result in the initiation of criminal-con-
        tempt proceedings. The Federal Circuit summarily aﬃrmed.
        TASER Int’l, Inc. v. Phazzer Elecs., Inc., 773 F. App’x 1092 (Fed. Cir.
        2019).
                         4. Formation of Phazzer-USA
              Four months after these events, Abboud approached Uri Bin-
        yamin about forming a company to sell Phazzer products. 3 Ac-
        cording to Binyamin, in the process of forming the company, Ab-
        boud gave him a choice of four names for the company. Binyamin
        chose the name Phazzer-USA LLC, and the company was formed
        on September 21, 2018. The company was registered to Robinson,
        who used an email address of controller@phazzerglobal.com.
              Four days after Phazzer-USA was formed, an entity called
        Phazzer IP LLC appeared on the scene. While it’s unclear from the
        record generated during this litigation when Phazzer IP was

        3 Abboud and Binyamin previously met around 2013 or 2014 when Binyamin
        was filling a request for proposal for the Israeli police.
USCA11 Case: 22-10949      Document: 61-1     Date Filed: 09/28/2023     Page: 8 of 33

        8                      Opinion of the Court                22-10949

        formed, the context of the evidence in the record suggests that
        Phazzer IP formally held at least some of the intellectual property
        supporting the Phazzer Electronics devices and that Phazzer IP and
        Phazzer Electronics had entered into a Trademark License Agree-
        ment so that Phazzer Electronics could sell the devices. In any case,
        on September 25, 2018, Robinson, writing as a member of Phazzer
        IP, notiﬁed French that Phazzer IP was terminating its Trademark
        License Agreement with Phazzer Electronics. This spelled the end
        of Phazzer Electronics. It also cleared the way for Phazzer IP to
        work with Phazzer-USA. Binyamin testiﬁed that Robinson was his
        contact at Phazzer IP.
               Yet another Phazzer entity—Phazzer Florida—also existed.
        Either Abboud or Robinson, acting on behalf of Phazzer Florida,
        gave Binyamin a username and password so that Phazzer-USA
        could order products from a manufacturer in Taiwan named Dou-
        ble Dragon. Robinson also facilitated payments between Phazzer-
        USA and Double Dragon.
                 Binyamin testiﬁed that Robinson sent him several emails
        about purchases Phazzer-USA made from Double Dragon. Essen-
        tially, it appears that Robinson acted as a facilitator for Phazzer-
        USA’s purchases from Double Dragon. For instance, on February
        25, 2019, Robinson, writing on behalf of Phazzer IP, listed the items
        in the order Binyamin placed with Double Dragon. That order in-
        cluded two products the injunction prohibited Phazzer Electronics
        from causing to be manufactured or sold. And nine days later, Rob-
        inson emailed Binyamin asking him to review the Double Dragon
USCA11 Case: 22-10949     Document: 61-1      Date Filed: 09/28/2023    Page: 9 of 33

        22-10949               Opinion of the Court                       9

        invoices attached to the email. The invoices listed several products
        the injunction prohibited Phazzer Electronics from causing to be
        manufactured or sold. On another occasion, Robinson, writing on
        behalf of an entity called Phazzer Global LLC (where Abboud was
        employed), asked Binyamin for an inventory of all products he had
        in stock. Binyamin responded with a list of products that the in-
        junction covered.
               When it came to paying Double Dragon, Double Dragon
        never collected payment from Binyamin for products he ordered
        on behalf of Phazzer-USA. Rather, Robinson or Abboud would
        call Binyamin to ensure that the invoices he received were correct,
        and they would deal with Double Dragon.
         5. TASER learns that Phazzer-USA is selling enjoined products.
                It wasn’t that long before TASER learned of Phazzer-USA’s
        sales to the public. In March 2019, Richard Beary received an un-
        solicited email from Phazzer-USA asking about his interest in pur-
        chasing a “law enforcement kit.” Unbeknownst to Phazzer-USA, it
        targeted the wrong person.
               As it turns out, Beary was a retired law-enforcement oﬃcer
        working as a consultant for a company contracting with Axon En-
        terprise, Inc., 4 formerly known as TASER. When Beary received
        the solicitation, he visited Phazzer-USA’s website. Although the
        website didn’t contain speciﬁc details about the models of stun gun

        4 To avoid confusion and for convenience, we refer to Axon as TASER
        throughout this opinion.
USCA11 Case: 22-10949     Document: 61-1     Date Filed: 09/28/2023    Page: 10 of 33

        10                     Opinion of the Court               22-10949

        and cartridges included in the kit, Beary purchased the kit, anyway.
        The kit contained enjoined Phazzer products. Based on this inci-
        dent, TASER moved for an order to show cause why Phazzer Elec-
        tronics, Abboud, and Robinson should not be held in criminal con-
        tempt of the 2017 injunction.
                             B. Procedural Background

               In response to TASER’s motion, the district court issued a
        notice of criminal-contempt proceedings and a show-cause order
        for Phazzer Electronics, Abboud, and Robinson to respond to
        charges that they willfully violated the 2017 injunction when
        Phazzer-USA sold the enjoined products in 2019. The notice stated
        that the court would conduct a bench trial, so if Abboud or Robin-
        son were found guilty, their maximum penalty would not exceed
        six months’ imprisonment.
               After trial, but before the district court made any factual
        ﬁndings, Robinson moved for a judgment of acquittal. She argued
        that she could not be guilty of contempt because she was a third
        party not bound by the injunction. As Robinson saw things, once
        Phazzer Electronics ceased operations following Phazzer IP’s ter-
        mination of the IP license, Robinson was no longer an employee
        of Phazzer Electronics. And because she did not work in concert
        with Phazzer Electronics, Robinson reasoned, she couldn’t other-
        wise be bound by the injunction. Alternatively, Robinson argued
        that, even if bound by the injunction, she did not willfully violate
        it.
USCA11 Case: 22-10949     Document: 61-1      Date Filed: 09/28/2023     Page: 11 of 33

        22-10949               Opinion of the Court                        11

                 The court denied Robinson’s motion and found Phazzer
        Electronics, Abboud, and Robinson guilty of criminal contempt.
        First, the district court determined that the injunction was lawful
        and reasonably speciﬁc. Second, the court found that Phazzer Elec-
        tronics, Abboud, and Robinson violated the injunction because, at
        all times, Abboud was the de facto owner of Phazzer Electronics,
        and Robinson was an employee and agent of the company. And
        after the 2017 injunction was entered, Abboud recruited Binyamin
        to “form a new entity to pick up where Phazzer Electronics left
        oﬀ.” Doc. No. 107, at 16. Indeed, the district court explained, Rob-
        inson, acting on behalf of Phazzer IP, terminated Phazzer Electron-
        ics’s license agreement “on the exact same day that Phazzer-USA []
        received an [employer identiﬁcation number].” The district court
        also found that Abboud and Robinson supervised the distribution
        of Phazzer products by Phazzer-USA. Ultimately, the district court
        concluded that Phazzer Electronics, Abboud, and Robinson vio-
        lated the injunction by causing Phazzer-USA to oﬀer for sale, sell,
        and distribute enjoined products.
               The district court also addressed Robinson’s argument that
        she was not bound by the injunction. In the court’s view, Robin-
        son’s argument “miss[ed] the point” because “Mr. Abboud and Ms.
        Robinson were without a doubt Phazzer Electronics’ agent” when
        they “caused Phazzer-USA to oﬀer for sale, sell, and distribute prod-
        ucts covered by the injunction.” Id. at 17. And, the court ex-
        plained, “[i]t is not a defense . . . that Ms. Robinson and Mr. Abboud
        used other legal entities (Phazzer Global and Phazzer IP) to facili-
        tate their actions.[]” Id. at 17-18. To accept Abboud’s and
USCA11 Case: 22-10949     Document: 61-1     Date Filed: 09/28/2023    Page: 12 of 33

        12                     Opinion of the Court                22-10949

        Robinson’s argument, the district court reasoned, “would . . . en-
        courage entities and individuals subject to an injunction to side-
        step it by enlisting a family member or unwitting party to form an
        LLC.” Id. at 18 n.13.
               Third, the district court found that Phazzer Electronics, Ab-
        boud and Robinson willfully engaged in “a pattern of activity that
        violated the injunction” by selling the enjoined products and con-
        sciously taking steps to circumvent the injunction. So the district
        court found Phazzer Electronics, Abboud, and Robinson guilty of
        criminal contempt and set a separate date for sentencing.
               In preparation for sentencing, the probation oﬃce prepared
        Robinson’s presentence investigation report (“PSI”), which noted
        that Robinson was subject to six months in prison or ﬁve years of
        probation and a maximum ﬁne of $5,000. The PSI asserted that
        Robinson’s contempt oﬀense was a class B misdemeanor and that
        the Sentencing Guidelines did not apply. It also said that, under 18
        U.S.C. § 3583(b)(3), the court could impose a one-year term of su-
        pervised release following imprisonment.
              Robinson objected to the possibility of post-imprisonment
        supervision. She argued that her oﬀense was a “petty oﬀense,” ex-
        empt from a term of supervised release. The district court over-
        ruled Robinson’s objection, and it sentenced Robinson to three
        weeks in prison followed by one year of supervised release.
               Robinson now appeals the district court’s denial of her mo-
        tion for judgment of acquittal and her sentence of supervised re-
        lease.
USCA11 Case: 22-10949      Document: 61-1       Date Filed: 09/28/2023      Page: 13 of 33

        22-10949                Opinion of the Court                          13

                                II.   DISCUSSION
                                 A. Standards of Review

                As always, we begin with the applicable standards of review.
        We review de novo the denial of a motion for acquittal. United
        States v. Evans, 473 F.3d 1115, 1118 (11th Cir. 2006). As for the dis-
        trict court’s judgment that an injunction binds a party, we review
        that for clear error. See ADT LLC v. NorthStar Alarm Servs., LLC, 853
        F.3d 1348, 1351 (11th Cir. 2017); see also United States v. Uscinski, 369
        F.3d 1243, 1246 (11th Cir. 2004) (reviewing factual ﬁndings in the
        criminal context for clear error).
               We also review de novo the suﬃciency of the evidence.
        United States v. Taylor, 480 F.3d 1025, 1026 (11th Cir. 2007). In con-
        ducting that review, we consider whether the evidence, construed
        in the light most favorable to the government, would ultimately
        permit the trier of fact to ﬁnd the defendant guilty beyond a rea-
        sonable doubt. United States v. Maynard, 933 F.2d 918, 920 (11th Cir.
        1991). But we don’t make factual ﬁndings in the ﬁrst instance.
        United States v. Noriega, 676 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th Cir. 2012); United
        States v. Fulford, 662 F.3d 1174, 1181 (11th Cir. 2011). Finally, we
        review, to the extent any such question is raised, the district court’s
        credibility choices for clear error only. See United States v. Brown,
        415 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 2005).
USCA11 Case: 22-10949      Document: 61-1      Date Filed: 09/28/2023      Page: 14 of 33

        14                       Opinion of the Court                 22-10949

        B. The district court’s factual findings are insufficient to allow for
            the conclusion that Robinson was bound by the 2017 injunc-
                                           tion.

               As we’ve noted, the district court concluded that Robinson
        caused Phazzer-USA to oﬀer for sale, sell, and distribute the en-
        joined products, and that when she did so, she always acted as an
        employee or agent of Phazzer Electronics.
               A court can “punish by ﬁne or imprisonment, or both, at its
        discretion, . . . contempt of its authority,” including a defendant’s
        “disobedience or resistance” to its lawful order. 18 U.S.C. § 401(3).
        A valid conviction for criminal contempt requires proof of all the
        following: (1) the court entered a lawful order of reasonable speci-
        ﬁcity; (2) the defendant violated that order; and (3) the defendant
        did so willfully. Maynard, 933 F.2d at 920.
              The only element Robinson presses on appeal is the second
        one—whether Robinson violated the district court’s 2017 injunc-
        tion. But before we can decide that, we must ﬁrst determine
        whether the 2017 injunction bound Robinson.
               Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 reﬂects the courts’ tradi-
        tional understanding of whom a federal injunction binds. As a
        starting point, an injunction binds a person who “receive[s] actual
        notice of it” if that person falls into any of the three categories that
        Rule 65(d) delineates:
              (A) the parties;
USCA11 Case: 22-10949        Document: 61-1         Date Filed: 09/28/2023         Page: 15 of 33

        22-10949                   Opinion of the Court                               15

               (B) the parties’ oﬃcers, agents, servants, employees,
               and attorneys; and
               (C) other persons who are in active concert or partici-
               pation with anyone described in Rule 65(d)(2)(A) or
               (B).
        FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2).
                But though we generally stick to the limitations of the text,
        our precedent is clear that Rule 65(d) “embodies, rather than limits
        the common law powers of the district court.” ADT, 853 F.3d at
        1351 (cleaned up). So besides those categories Rule 65(d) identiﬁes,
        we have read the rule to continue to permit application of “the
        commonlaw doctrine that a decree of injunction not only binds the
        parties defendant but also those identiﬁed with them in interest, in
        ‘privity’ with them, represented by them or subject to their con-
        trol.” United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261, 267 (5th Cir. 1972) (quoting
        Regal Knitwear Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 9, 14 (1945) (quotation marks
        omitted)). 5 As our predecessor Court explained, Rule 65(d) “can-
        not be read to restrict the inherent power of a court to protect its
        ability to render a binding judgment.” Id.
               Still, due-process considerations limit the circumstances in
        which a court can ﬁnd someone in contempt who is not a party to
        the injunction. See ADT, 853 F.3d at 1352. After all, a person must

        5 We recognize decisions of the former Fifth Circuit issued before October 1,
        1981, as binding precedent. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th
        Cir. 1981) (en banc).
USCA11 Case: 22-10949     Document: 61-1      Date Filed: 09/28/2023    Page: 16 of 33

        16                     Opinion of the Court                22-10949

        ﬁrst know that she is bound by an injunction before she can be re-
        quired to comply with it.
                To determine the scope of the 2017 injunction, we begin
        with its text. The 2017 injunction applied to “Phazzer [Electronics]
        and its oﬃcers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and any
        other persons who are in active concert or participation with
        Phazzer or its oﬃcers, agents, servants, employees, or attorneys.”
        Doc. No. 183, at 11–14. This language largely tracks Rule 65(d). So
        by its own terms, the district court’s injunction binds these catego-
        ries of people and entities: (1) Phazzer Electronics, which was a
        party in the TASER civil case; (2) Phazzer Electronics’s oﬃcers,
        agents, servants, employees and attorneys; and (3) those in active
        concert with Phazzer Electronics, its oﬃcers, agents, servants, em-
        ployees or attorneys—that is, those who were neither party to the
        litigation nor the agents of a party, but who aid and abet those who
        are bound by the injunction.
               Our caselaw also recognizes that the injunction binds (4)
        those under the “general rubric of privity,” a category that includes
        “nonparty successors in interest” and “nonparties otherwise legally
        identiﬁable with the enjoined party.” ADT, 853 F.3d at 1352. And
        some of our sister Circuits have concluded that (5) those who aid
        and abet those in privity with an enjoined party are also bound. As
        we explain later, we agree that those who aid and abet those in priv-
        ity with an enjoined party are bound by an injunction.
               One observation about the ﬁve categories: the ﬁrst two bind
        parties, and the last three cover nonparties.
USCA11 Case: 22-10949     Document: 61-1      Date Filed: 09/28/2023     Page: 17 of 33

        22-10949               Opinion of the Court                        17

               So Robinson can be bound by the injunction only if she falls
        into one of these ﬁve categories.
                    1. Robinson was not a party to the 2017 injunction.
               For starters, Robinson is not Phazzer Electronics. And she
        was not named as a defendant in the litigation that resulted in the
        2017 injunction. So much for subsection (A) of Rule 65(d).
        2. Robinson was not an employee or officer of Phazzer Electron-
            ics when Phazzer-USA distributed items that the 2017 injunc-
                                     tion enjoined.
               So we move on to subsection (B). As a general matter, a
        court may not enjoin a non-party that has not appeared before it to
        have its rights legally adjudicated. See Chase Nat’l Bank v. City of
        Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 436–37 (1934).
                But as the text of subsection (B) reﬂects, there’s always an
        exception. And as relevant here, the Supreme Court has explained
        that (consistent with subsection (B) of Rule 65(d)) oﬃcers or em-
        ployees of a company are bound by an injunction, even if they did
        not appear before the court, because “[a] command to the corpo-
        ration is in eﬀect a command to those who are oﬃcially responsible
        for the conduct of its aﬀairs.” Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361,
        376 (1911); see also United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349, 357–58
        (1950) (“A command to the corporation is in eﬀect a command to
        those who are oﬃcially responsible for the conduct of its aﬀairs. If
        they . . . prevent compliance or fail to take appropriate action
        within their power for the performance of the corporate duty, they,
        no less than the corporation itself, are guilty of disobedience and
USCA11 Case: 22-10949      Document: 61-1       Date Filed: 09/28/2023      Page: 18 of 33

        18                      Opinion of the Court                   22-10949

        may be punished for contempt.” (internal quotation marks omit-
        ted)). The 2017 injunction, following Rule 65(d), speciﬁcally cov-
        ered employees of Phazzer Electronics.
                So we consider whether Robinson was an oﬃcer, agent, or
        employee of Phazzer Electronics. The answer to that inquiry is
        yes, for some period. But when that period was is everything here.
               To be sure, the record reﬂects that Robinson performed
        mostly administrative work when Phazzer Electronics employed
        her, before it ceased operating in September 2018. So as an em-
        ployee of Phazzer Electronics at that time, she was bound by the
        2017 injunction. The district court also concluded that Robinson
        was an agent of Phazzer Electronics.
                That reasoning goes only so far, though. The problem is that
        Robinson was no longer a Phazzer Electronics employee or agent
        in 2019 when she caused Phazzer-USA to sell the enjoined prod-
        ucts. And since she wasn’t a Phazzer Electronics employee or agent
        at that time, she could no longer be bound by the injunction as an
        employee or agent under the second Rule 65(d) category. In fact,
        Phazzer Electronics was not even operating at that time. See, e.g.,
        Nat’l Spiritual Assembly of Baha’is of U.S. Under Hereditary Guardian-
        ship, Inc. v. Nat’l Spiritual Assembly of Baha’is of U.S., Inc., 628 F.3d
        837, 848 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Although the individual defendants might
        have qualiﬁed as ‘oﬃcers’ or ‘agents’ of the [organization] in June
        of 1966 when the injunction was entered, after the organization
        was dissolved in December of that year, they obviously no longer
USCA11 Case: 22-10949     Document: 61-1      Date Filed: 09/28/2023     Page: 19 of 33

        22-10949               Opinion of the Court                        19

        held that status.”). So that eliminates the second Rule 65(d) cate-
        gory.
          3. Under the district court’s order, Robinson was not bound by
                           the 2017 injunction as a nonparty.
               Before considering the remaining categories in earnest, we
        pause to discuss Robinson’s obligations under the district court’s
        injunction as a former employee of Phazzer Electronics. We have
        not yet answered this question expressly. But Rule 65(d) contains
        no category pertaining speciﬁcally to “former employees.” Rather,
        it speaks of “employees.”
               Because the rule does not deﬁne the term “employees,” we
        consider “the common usage of [the] word[] for [its] meaning.”
        CBS Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir.
        2001). And more speciﬁcally, we consider the word’s meaning at
        the time Rule 65(d) was adopted, in 1937. See Wis. Cent. Ltd. v.
        United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2070 (2018). Around that time, dic-
        tionary deﬁnitions for the term “employee” included, for example,
        “[o]ne employed by another; one who works for wages or salary in
        the service of an employer,” Employee, WEBSTER’S NEW
        INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1938), and “[a] term of rather
        broad signiﬁcation for one who is employed,” Employee, BOUVIER’S
        LAW DICTIONARY (1934).
                These deﬁnitions both employ the present, not past tense.
        Webster’s speaks speciﬁcally of only one who “works.” And Bou-
        vier’s refers to one who “is” employed. So the ordinary usage of
USCA11 Case: 22-10949      Document: 61-1       Date Filed: 09/28/2023      Page: 20 of 33

        20                      Opinion of the Court                   22-10949

        the term “employee” generally denotes someone who is currently
        employed.
               As for the common law, it does not allow for injunctions to
        capture former employees merely because they are former em-
        ployees, either. In other words, under Rule 65(d) and the common
        law, a former employee can be bound exactly to the extent that a
        non-former employee, nonparty can be bound. And we are aware
        of no circuit that has found any special liability for an enjoined
        party’s former employees that would transcend the outer bounds
        of the established categories.
               Some of our sister circuits have eﬀectively applied this rule.
        In sum, they have considered a former employee bound by an in-
        junction if she falls into either the third or fourth categories of
        those whom an injunction may bind—that is, if she is a person or
        entity who aids or abets a named defendant or its agent, or a person
        or entity who is legally identiﬁed with the enjoined party. See, e.g.,
        Alemite Man’g. Corp. v. Staﬀ, 42 F.2d 832, 832 (2d Cir. 1930).
                Besides these four categories, at least two of our sister cir-
        cuits have recognized a ﬁfth category of nonparties (whether for-
        mer employees or not) that an injunction may bind: a nonparty
        who aids or abets a nonparty in privity with an enjoined party can
        be bound by an injunction. See People of State of New York by Vacco
        v. Operation Rescue National, 80 F.3d 64, 70 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Ad-
        ditive Controls & Measurement System, Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 154 F.3d
        1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1998). As Wright & Miller explains,
USCA11 Case: 22-10949      Document: 61-1      Date Filed: 09/28/2023     Page: 21 of 33

        22-10949                Opinion of the Court                        21

               [P]ersons who are not actual parties to the action or
               in privity with any parties may not be brought within
               the eﬀect of a decree merely by naming them in the
               order. The only signiﬁcant exception to this rule
               involves nonparties who have actual notice of an
               injunction and are guilty of aiding or abetting or
               acting in concert with a named defendant or the
               defendant’s privy in violating the injunction. They
               may be held in contempt.
        11A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal
        Practice & Procedure § 2956 (3d ed. 2023 Update) (emphasis added).
        But no one has gone further than that.
                That is so because, as the Second Circuit noted before the
        adoption of Rule 65(d), “no court can make a decree which will
        bind any one but a party,” so a court of equity “cannot lawfully
        enjoin the world at large, no matter how broadly it words its de-
        cree.” Alemite, 42 F.2d at 832. After all, courts are “not vested with
        sovereign power to declare conduct unlawful.” Id. Rather, their
        “jurisdiction is limited to those over whom [they] get[] personal ser-
        vice, and who therefore can have their day in court.” Id. at 832–33.
        So a non-party may be punished in conjunction with contempt of
        an injunction only when the person “has helped to bring
        about . . . an act of a party,” meaning the person “must either abet
        the defendant, or must be legally identiﬁed with him.” Id. at 833;
        see also Additive Controls, 154 F.3d at 1350; G. & C. Merriam Co. v.
        Webster Dictionary Co., 639 F.2d 29, 39–40 (1st Cir. 1980); Nat’l Spir-
        itual Assembly, 628 F.3d at 849.
USCA11 Case: 22-10949     Document: 61-1      Date Filed: 09/28/2023     Page: 22 of 33

        22                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10949

               Though we don’t appear to have previously addressed a con-
        tempt case involving a former employee, our precedent recognizes
        many of these same principles. Indeed, we’ve said that “both Rule
        65 and the common-law doctrine contemplate two categories of
        nonparties potentially bound by an injunction[:] The ﬁrst category
        is comprised of parties who aid and abet the party bound by the
        injunction in carrying out prohibited acts[,] [and] [t]he second cat-
        egory, captured under the general rubric of ‘privity,’ includes non-
        party successors in interest and nonparties otherwise legally iden-
        tiﬁed with the enjoined party.” ADT, 853 F.3d at 1352 (cleaned up).
                As for the ﬁfth category (the third category of nonparties)—
        a nonparty who aids or abets a nonparty in privity with an enjoined
        party—for reasons we explain later in this opinion, we join our sis-
        ter circuits in recognizing that an injunction can bind such nonpar-
        ties.
                But even as we acknowledge that the 2017 injunction can
        bind these categories of nonparties, we must still review the district
        court’s factual ﬁndings to determine whether Robinson falls within
        any of the categories. And if she does not, she cannot be bound by
        the injunction. As we’ve explained, her status as a former employee
        of Phazzer Electronics alone does not mean that the injunction ap-
        plies to her. See Wright & Miller, 11A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2956
        (3d ed. 2023) (“[A] person who ceases to act [as a corporation’s of-
        ﬁcer or agent] is no longer is bound by the decree, assuming the
        individual does not act in concert with the named enjoined party.”).
USCA11 Case: 22-10949      Document: 61-1      Date Filed: 09/28/2023     Page: 23 of 33

        22-10949                Opinion of the Court                        23

               With the understanding that injunctions apply to an en-
        joined party’s former employees the same way they apply to all
        nonparties, we consider the three nonparty categories whom the
        2017 injunction would bind.
           i.   Robinson did not aid and abet a named enjoined party.
               We start with the category of those who aid and abet the
        enjoined party. As the Supreme Court has explained, “defendants
        may not nullify a decree by carrying out prohibited acts through
        aiders and abettors, although they were not parties to the original
        proceeding.” Regal, 324 U.S. at 14. Rule 65(d)’s “active concert or
        participation” language recognizes that parties who aren’t speciﬁ-
        cally named in an injunction’s text may nonetheless thwart the ob-
        jectives of that injunction. Nat’l Spiritual Assembly, 628 F.3d at 887.
               But Robinson cannot fall into the aiding-and-abetting cate-
        gory because, as we’ve noted, Phazzer Electronics—the enjoined
        party—no longer existed at the times of Robinson’s acts. As French
        testiﬁed, after the district court found Abboud in contempt in 2018,
        Phazzer Electronics stopped operating and became inactive. The
        company “shut everything down” and it no longer sold any prod-
        ucts. Doc. No. 95, at 32. And when Robinson engaged in the dis-
        tribution of enjoined Phazzer products, the year was 2019, well af-
        ter Phazzer Electronics had stopped operating. So though Robin-
        son was aware of the injunction when she acted with Phazzer-USA
        to distribute Phazzer enjoined products, that is not enough under
        an aiding-and-abetting theory here. In short, Phazzer Electronics
        wasn’t around for Robinson to aid and abet. See Additive Controls,
USCA11 Case: 22-10949     Document: 61-1      Date Filed: 09/28/2023     Page: 24 of 33

        24                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10949

        154 F.3d at 1353 (“Non-parties are subject to contempt sanctions if
        they act with an enjoined party to bring about a result forbidden by
        the injunction, but only if they are aware of the injunction and
        know that their acts violate the injunction. (citations omitted)).
               Nor does the record show that Robinson aided and abetted
        any other party to the injunction. The district court did ﬁnd that
        Robinson and Abboud worked together in 2019 to supervise the
        distribution of Phazzer products through Phazzer-USA. But when
        they did this, Abboud was no longer an employee of Phazzer Elec-
        tronics. Rather, Abboud resigned from Phazzer Electronics in Au-
        gust 2017 and then worked with the company as a consultant. And
        by September 2018, he was no longer paid by Phazzer Electronics.
        Because Abboud was no longer an employee, oﬃcer, or agent of
        Phazzer Electronics, we cannot consider him a named party to the
        injunction. See Nat’l Spiritual Assembly, 628 F.3d at 848. Ultimately,
        then, an aiding-and-abetting theory alone cannot support Robin-
        son’s contempt conviction.
       ii.   The record does not allow us to conclude that Robinson was
                           in privity with a named party.
               That brings us to whether the record shows that Robinson
        satisﬁed the fourth category—that is, whether, generally speaking,
        she herself was in privity with Phazzer Electronics or another
        bound party. See ADT, 853 F.3d at 1352. In the context of the scope
        of injunctions, “privity is seen as a descriptive term for designating
        those with a suﬃciently close identity of interests” to justify en-
        forcement of an injunction against a nonparty. Nat’l Spiritual
USCA11 Case: 22-10949      Document: 61-1      Date Filed: 09/28/2023      Page: 25 of 33

        22-10949                Opinion of the Court                         25

        Assembly, 628 F.3d at 849. Privity involves a close relationship be-
        tween the party on record and the non-party. ADT, 853 F.3d at 1352.
        But the constitutional due-process requirement limits the privity
        exception. Richards v. Jeﬀerson Cnty., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996). So
        again, “courts [ ] my not grant an . . . injunction so broad as to
        make punishable the conduct of persons who acted independently
        and whose rights have not been adjudged according to law.” Regal,
        324 U.S. at 13. As we’ve noted, privity captures two subcategories:
        (1) “nonparty successors in interest” and (2) “nonparties otherwise
        legally identiﬁed with the enjoined party.” ADT, 853 F.3d at 1352
        (quotation marks and citation omitted).
               We start with nonparty successors in interest. Successors in
        interest can be bound by an injunction, even though they weren’t
        parties to it because “[a]n injunction would be of little value if its
        proscriptions could be evaded by the expedient of forming another
        entity to carry on the enjoined activity.” Additive Controls, 154 F.3d
        at 1354; see also Regal, 324 U.S. at 14. But successor liability depends
        on the successor’s knowledge of the injunction at the time of the
        purchase or transfer. ADT, 853 F.3d at 1353 (concluding that the
        record developed at the district court contains no evidence that the
        purchaser knew about the injunction before it acquired assets from
        or hired employees of the enjoined company).
              In the context of a labor injunction, for instance, the Su-
        preme Court has held that a bona ﬁde purchaser who acquired an
        enjoined company with knowledge of a National Labor Relations
        Board (“NLRB”) order and who was a “continuing business
USCA11 Case: 22-10949     Document: 61-1      Date Filed: 09/28/2023     Page: 26 of 33

        26                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10949

        enterprise” was in privity with the enjoined company. Golden State
        Bottling Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 179–80 (1973). As a result,
        the purchaser, too, was bound by the injunction. Key to this hold-
        ing was the fact that the purchasing company had notice of the
        NLRB’s order and received a hearing with the assistance of counsel
        on whether the purchasing company was bound company’s succes-
        sor. Id. at 181.
              Here, though, the record contains no evidence to suggest
        that Robinson was a bona ﬁde purchaser of Phazzer Electronics.
               Then again, bona ﬁde purchasers aren’t the only ones who
        can be successors in interest of an enjoined party. See Walling v.
        James V. Reuter, Inc., 321 U.S. 671, 674 (1944) (injunction may be en-
        forced “against those to whom the business may have been trans-
        ferred, whether as a means of evading the judgment or for other
        reasons”). As the Second Circuit has explained, “an organization
        and its agents may not circumvent a valid court order merely by
        making superﬁcial changes in the organization’s name or form, and
        in appropriate circumstances a court is authorized to enforce its or-
        der against a successor of the enjoined organization.” Vacco, 80
        F.3d at 70. To determine whether a successor falls into this cate-
        gory, we look to “whether there is a substantial continuity of iden-
        tity” between the enjoined party and the successor. Id.
               Still, though, we have found no cases where a court has ap-
        plied the successor-in-interest theory to an individual instead of a
        business or an organization. When we are talking about an indi-
        vidual, we think the question becomes whether that person can be
USCA11 Case: 22-10949      Document: 61-1      Date Filed: 09/28/2023      Page: 27 of 33

        22-10949                Opinion of the Court                         27

        legally identiﬁed with an enjoined party. The Seventh Circuit has
        commented on the meaning of “legal identity” in the former-em-
        ployee context. It has said the term “usually means successors and
        assigns, but it can include a limited class of other nonparties as
        well—provided the evidence establishes a very close identity of in-
        terest and such signiﬁcant control over the organization and the un-
        derlying litigation that it is fair to say that the nonparty had his day
        in court when the injunction was issued.” Nat’l Spiritual Assembly,
        628 F.3d at 853.
                In determining whether a nonparty satisﬁes this threshold,
        courts have considered “the oﬃcer’s position and responsibilities in
        the enjoined corporation, his participation in the litigation that pre-
        ceded the entry of the injunction, and the degree of similarity be-
        tween his activities in the old and new businesses.” Additive Con-
        trols, 154 F.3d at 1352; see also G. & C. Merriam Co., 639 F.2d at 37–
        38. Essentially, we view this category “as an instance of piercing
        corporate veils.” G. & C. Merriam Co., 639 F.2d at 39; see also Nat’l
        Spiritual Assembly, 628 F.3d at 854.
               To show what that means in practical terms, we turn to the
        First Circuit’s discussion in G. & C. Merriam Co. of the “legal iden-
        tity” concept. The First Circuit has explained that it’s not enough
        for a former employee to have been a “key employee” of the en-
        joined company and to have known of the injunction. 639 F.2d at
        37. Rather, the employee must have had “such a key role in the
        corporation’s participation in the injunction proceedings that it can
        be fairly said that he has had his day in court in relation to the
USCA11 Case: 22-10949     Document: 61-1      Date Filed: 09/28/2023     Page: 28 of 33

        28                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10949

        validity of the injunction.” Id. Not only that, but to ﬁnd such a
        former employee in contempt, the record must prove each of these
        facts. See id.
                These important qualities keep the scope of contempt liabil-
        ity “within the limits of due process.” Nat’l Spiritual Assembly, 628
        F.3d at 852. Indeed, as the Seventh Circuit has recognized, “due
        process requires an extremely close identiﬁcation [between the en-
        joined party and the nonparty legally identiﬁed with it].” Id. at 854.
        So it is “satisﬁed only when the nonparty ‘key employee’ against
        whom contempt sanctions are sought had substantial discretion,
        control, and inﬂuence over the enjoined organization—both in
        general and with respect to its participation in the underlying liti-
        gation—and there is a high degree of similarity between the activ-
        ities of the old organization and the new.” Id.
               The record here does not clear these hurdles. The district
        court did not make factual ﬁndings about whether Robinson was a
        key employee. Nor did it determine whether she so controlled
        Phazzer Electronics and the litigation that resulted in the 2017 in-
        junction that it would be fair to say she had her day in court on that
        injunction. Because the record lacks ﬁndings and relevant evidence
        on these important questions, we cannot conclude that Robinson
        was bound by the 2017 injunction on this basis.
USCA11 Case: 22-10949       Document: 61-1      Date Filed: 09/28/2023       Page: 29 of 33

        22-10949                 Opinion of the Court                          29

       iii.    The district court did not consider whether Robinson aided
              and abetted a person or an entity in privity with Phazzer Elec-
                                          tronics.
                Finally, we reach the category that includes those aiding and
        abetting an entity or person in privity with a party bound by the
        injunction. Once again, Rule 65(d) does not expressly address this
        possibility. But as we’ve noted, Rule 65(d) “cannot be read to re-
        strict the inherent power of a court to protect its ability to render
        a binding judgment.” Hall, 472 F.2d at 267. And just as “an organ-
        ization and its agents may not circumvent a valid court order
        merely by making superﬁcial changes in the organization’s name
        or form,” nor may a person knowingly aid and abet such an organ-
        ization acting in violation of the injunction. See Vacco, 80 F.3d at
        70; see also Additive Controls, 154 F.3d at 1353. Or as the district court
        put it when discussing another category of liability, “[a]n injunction
        is not a game of whack-a-mole where the Court must repeatedly
        issue new injunctions to address the Defendants’ post-injunction
        craftiness.”
               Here, the government did not pursue the theory that Rob-
        inson aided and abetted someone in privity with a party bound by
        the 2017 injunction, and the district court did not consider it. Of
        course, it’s really not a wonder why: we have not previously ex-
        pressly discussed this category of those bound by an injunction.
              Still, though, as we’ve noted, other circuits and treatises had
        recognized the theory before the district-court proceedings here.
        So had the government believed it had the goods, the government
USCA11 Case: 22-10949      Document: 61-1      Date Filed: 09/28/2023      Page: 30 of 33

        30                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10949

        certainly had a good-faith basis to advocate for the district court to
        ﬁnd Robinson in contempt of the 2017 injunction because she al-
        legedly aided and abetted someone or some entity in privity with a
        bound party. But it did not do that.
                And that fact has consequences here. In other contexts, the
        Supreme Court has rejected the notion that an appellate court
        should aﬃrm a conviction on a theory that the government did not
        advocate and the factﬁnder did not consider in the district court.
        For instance, just recently in the fraud context, the Supreme Court
        refused the government’s eﬀorts to defend an honest-services-
        fraud conviction by (1) relying on a theory that “diﬀer[ed] substan-
        tially” from the jury instructions and (2) relying on a second theory
        that the jury was not instructed on. Percoco v. United States, 598 U.S.
        319, 331–32 (2023). And though the Supreme Court remanded the
        case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, see id. at
        333, the Second Circuit then vacated the defendant’s conviction on
        that count, United States v. Percoco, ___ F.4th ___, 2023 WL 5688662,
        *2 (2d Cir. Sept. 5, 2023).
               The Supreme Court has reached similar conclusions in other
        fraud cases. In Ciminelli v. United States, 598 U.S. 306, 316–17 (2023),
        for example, the Court disapprovingly said, “With profuse citations
        to the records below, the Government asks us to cherry-pick facts
        presented to a jury charged on the right-to-control theory and ap-
        ply them to the elements of a diﬀerent wire fraud theory in the ﬁrst
        instance.” The Court continued, “In other words, the Government
        asks us to assume not only the function of a court of ﬁrst view, but
USCA11 Case: 22-10949      Document: 61-1       Date Filed: 09/28/2023       Page: 31 of 33

        22-10949                 Opinion of the Court                          31

        also of a jury. That is not our role.” Id. at 317. Similarly, in Chiarella
        v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 236 (1980), the Court cautioned that it
        could not “aﬃrm a criminal conviction on the basis of a theory not
        presented to the jury,” so it refused to “speculate upon whether [the
        alleged] duty [the government raised for the ﬁrst time on appeal]
        exists, whether it has been breached, or whether such a breach con-
        stitutes a violation of § 10(b)” (citations omitted). Instead, the
        Court simply reversed the defendant’s conviction on the spot and
        did not remand for further proceedings. Id. at 237.
               And the Court has also rejected the government’s attempts
        to substitute a new theory of liability in the extortion context. See
        McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 270–71, n.8 (1991) (“Appel-
        late courts are not permitted to aﬃrm convictions on any theory
        they please simply because the facts necessary to support the the-
        ory were presented to the jury.”).
               To be sure, these Supreme Court cases involved jury trials,
        and that factored into the Court’s holdings. See, e.g., McCormick,
        500 U.S. at 270–71 n.8 (“[I]n a criminal case a defendant is constitu-
        tionally entitled to have the issue of criminal liability determined
        by a jury in the ﬁrst instance.”). But we think due-process consid-
        erations of notice also support these conclusions. After all, a de-
        fendant who knows she faces a diﬀerent theory of prosecution may
        choose to present diﬀerent evidence, argument, or both, in her de-
        fense.
              In our view, this principle applies equally in the criminal-con-
        tempt context and equally when a judge, rather than a jury, is the
USCA11 Case: 22-10949      Document: 61-1      Date Filed: 09/28/2023     Page: 32 of 33

        32                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10949

        factﬁnder. Defending against a claim of contempt when the gov-
        ernment alleges the defendant is an employee of an enjoined com-
        pany certainly implicates diﬀerent evidence and arguments than
        defending against a claim of contempt when the government pur-
        sues the theory that the defendant aided and abetted someone or
        some entity in privity with a bound party. In the ﬁrst instance, a
        defendant need only show that the enjoined company did not em-
        ploy her at the time that alleged violations of the injunction oc-
        curred. Unlike in the second scenario, she has no reason to present
        evidence or argument about whether the person or entity alleged
        to be in privity with the enjoined company was, in fact, in privity
        with that company. Nor does she have any reason to show or argue
        that she did not aid or abet that person or entity that is allegedly in
        privity with the enjoined party.
               So we do not consider whether Robinson aided and abetted
        a party or entity in privity with Phazzer Electronics. Instead, we
        vacate Robinson’s conviction for insuﬃciency of the evidence un-
        der the ﬁrst four categories of persons and entities that the 2017
        injunction enjoined. Of course, if new alleged violations of the
        2017 injunction occur, nothing prevents the government from
        prosecuting them under the aiding-and-abetting-someone-in-priv-
        ity-with-a-bound-party theory in the future.

                             III. CONCLUSION
               For the reasons we’ve explained, we vacate Robinson’s crim-
        inal-contempt conviction. Because we vacate her conviction, we
USCA11 Case: 22-10949    Document: 61-1    Date Filed: 09/28/2023   Page: 33 of 33

        22-10949              Opinion of the Court                    33

        do not address Robinson’s argument about the propriety of her su-
        pervised-release sentence.
              VACATED.