Court Opinion

ID: 9606620
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:51:21.999841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:34.907122
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice.
An officer observed Omar Salmerón driving too closely behind another vehicle, and also noticed that one of the brake lights on Salmeron’s car was not functioning. The officer initiated a traffic stop and began to write a citation. Having detected a heavy odor of air freshener in the interior of the automobile, the officer suspected that Salmerón might have used it to mask the presence of alcohol or narcotics. He asked for consent to search the vehicle, and Salmerón agreed. One of the rear seats was not fastened properly and, when the officer removed it, two kilograms of cocaine were exposed. Subsequently, another kilogram of cocaine was discovered in the car. The grand jury indicted Salmerón for trafficking in the contraband. He filed a pre-trial motion to suppress, which the trial court denied. At the conclusion of a bench trial, the trial court found Salmerón guilty. On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s denial of Salmeron’s motion to suppress, and affirmed his conviction. Salmeron v. State, 273 Ga. App. 55 (614 SE2d 177) (2005). We granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred by holding *736that law enforcement did not violate the Fourth Amendment during the traffic stop by asking Salmerón for consent to search.
1. The Fourth Amendment is not violated when, during the course of a valid traffic stop, an officer questions the driver or occupants of a vehicle and requests consent to conduct a search. The Supreme Court of the United States has
“held repeatedly that mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure.” [Cits.] “(E)ven when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual; ask to examine the individual’s identification; and request consent to search his or her luggage.” [Cit.]... [Unless] the detention was prolonged by the questioning, there [is] no additional seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Muehler v. Mena, 544 U. S. 93 (125 SC 1465, 161 LE2d 299) (2005). Therefore, the dispositive factor in this case is not the nature or subject of the officer’s questioning, but whether that questioning took place during Salmeron’s otherwise lawful detention for committing the traffic violations in the officer’s presence. If a driver is questioned and gives consent while he is being lawfully detained during a traffic stop, there is no Fourth Amendment violation. Harris v. State, 269 Ga. App. 48 (603 SE2d 476) (2004). However, “[a] seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S. 405, 407 (125 SC 834, 160 LE2d 842) (2005).
“(T)he officer’s purpose in an ordinary traffic stop is to enforce the laws of the roadway, and ordinarily to investigate the manner of driving with the intent to issue a citation or warning. Once the purpose of that stop has been fulfilled, the continued detention of the car and the occupants amounts to a second detention. [Cit.]” [Cits.]
Daniel v. State, 277 Ga. 840, 841 (1) (597 SE2d 116) (2004).
Salmerón asserts that his detention was prolonged when the officer asked him to get out of the car. The officer testified that he made that request for reasons of safety. “[0]nce a motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures.” Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, 111, fn. 6 (98 SC 330, 54 LE2d *737331) (1977). Thus, ordering Salmerón from the car was an extension of the constitutionally valid detention resulting from the traffic stop.
After Salmerón complied with the officer’s directive, they stood at the rear of Salmeron’s car,
and [the officer] began filling out the citation. While writing the citation, [the officer] engaged in “some small talk” with Salmerón, asking him about his travel plans— [W]hile [he] was completing the citation and before checking the status of Salmeron’s license, he asked Salmerón for consent to search the car.
Salmerón v. State, supra at 55-56. On this evidence, the questioning and request for consent to search occurred before the purpose of the traffic stop was fulfilled. “ ‘[A]n officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request and examine a driver’s license and vehicle registration and run a computer check on the documents.’ [Cit.]” Harris v. State, supra at 50.
[I]t does not unreasonably expand the scope or duration of a valid traffic stop for an officer to prolong the stop to immediately investigate and determine if the driver is entitled to continue to operate the vehicle by checking the status of the driver’s license, insurance, and vehicle registration. [Cits.]
State v. Williams, 264 Ga. App. 199, 202 (590 SE2d 151) (2003).
As recognized by the Court of Appeals, the record in this case shows that the officer
testified unequivocally that he asked for consent to search before completing the traffic citation and obtaining information on the status of Salmeron’s license. The trial court found that consent was obtained during the traffic stop rather than afterward, which is permissible. [Cit.] Thus, Salmeron’s argument that the traffic stop was unlawfully expanded is not well founded. [Cits.]
Salmeron v. State, supra at 56 (1).
The dissent correctly points out that, in Daniel v. State, supra at 841-842 (1) this Court held
that a law enforcement officer’s continued questioning of a vehicle’s driver and passengers outside the scope of a valid traffic stop passes muster under the Fourth Amendment *738either when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion of other illegal activity or when the traffic stop has de-escalated into a consensual encounter.
The dissent then states that
[tjoday, this reasonable standard [of Daniel] is effectively rendered irrelevant, replaced with a meaningless standard that allows any and all manner of interrogation, unrelated to the initial purpose of the traffic stop, so long as the questioning does not prolong the duration of the traffic stop. Dissent, p. 739.
What the dissent fails to acknowledge, however, is that the standard it dismisses as “meaningless” is one which, subsequent to Daniel, the' Supreme Court of the United States adopted in Muehler v. Mena, supra: “‘[M]ere police questioning does not constitute a seizure.’ [Cits.] . . . [Unless] the detention was prolonged by the questioning, there [is] no additional seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Obviously, Daniel is not viable Fourth Amendment authority to the extent that it conflicts with a controlling decision of the Supreme Court of the United States.
Although the only decision cited by the dissent is Daniel, which was a Fourth Amendment case, it ultimately invokes the Georgia Constitution for the proposition that this state’s citizens are provided protection “from any interrogation beyond the scope of the initial traffic stop unless the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion of other illegal activity or the stop has devolved into a consensual encounter.” Dissent, p. 741. However, the dissent does not cite any authority which holds that the Georgia Constitution gives greater search and seizure rights and protection than the United States Constitution. Moreover, our state constitution, like its federal counterpart, protects against “unreasonable” searches and seizures. The dissent does not attempt to explain how mere extraneous questioning, which does not have the effect of prolonging an already valid seizure for a traffic offense, can itself constitute an independent unreasonable seizure of the traffic offender. A valid ongoing seizure is not rendered “unreasonable” simply because, during its course, certain unrelated questions, which the detainee is free to decline to answer, are posed to him or her. In any event, Salmerón does not invoke his rights under the Georgia Constitution in this Court and, when this Court granted his application for certiorari, we stated the question to be considered as whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that law enforcement did not violate the Fourth Amendment during the traffic stop by asking for Salmeron’s consent to search. As *739to that issue, the Court of Appeals did not err, because the questioning did not prolong the valid traffic stop. Muehler v. Mena, supra.
2. Salmerón also asserts that his consent was not voluntary, because his driver’s license was in the possession of the officer at the time consent was requested and given. However, this contention confuses the lawful detention of Salmeron’s person with his constitutional right to refuse to consent to a search of his vehicle. As discussed in Division 1, he was not free to go because, at the time his consent was requested, the traffic stop was ongoing. Insofar as his car is concerned, however, there is no evidence that the officer coerced or tricked him into agreeing to a search.
. In the trial court and the Court of Appeals, Salmerón challenged the validity of his consent on the basis of his lack of proficiency in English. With regard to that contention, “the record contains evidence that [he] spoke English reasonably well, which supports a finding that he validly consented to the search.” Salmeron v. State, supra at 57 (2). Accordingly, as to this ground, the Court of Appeals also correctly affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Sears, C. J., Hunstein, P. J., and Benham, J., who dissent.