Court Opinion

ID: 9556161
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-16 14:09:13.370915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:32.603628
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                    Decided: August 16, 2023

S23Y0743. IN THE MATTER OF RAMON DAVID SAMMONS JR.

        PER CURIAM.

        This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the report and

recommendation of the State Disciplinary Review Board (“Review

Board”), which reviewed the report and recommendation issued by

Special Master Charles D. Jones, at the request of Ramon David

Sammons Jr. (State Bar No. 623560), pursuant to Bar Rules 4-214

and 4-216.            The formal complaint upon which this disciplinary

proceeding was based alleged that Sammons, who has been a

member of the Georgia Bar since 1999, had violated Rules 1.2 (a)

(lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the scope and

objectives of representation and shall consult with the client as to

the means by which they are to be pursued); 1.3 (lawyer shall act

with reasonable diligence in representation); 1.4 (lawyer shall
reasonably communicate with the client); and 5.5 (lawyer shall not

engage in the unauthorized practice of law) of the Georgia Rules of

Professional Conduct (“GRPC”) found in Bar Rule 4-102 (d).1

     After the Bar’s initial attempt to personally serve Sammons

could not be perfected, it served him by publication and then moved

for an entry of default against Sammons. However, the Special

Master then suggested that the Bar make “more effort” to perfect

personal service upon Sammons, and the Bar was able to discover

Sammons’s correct home address and personally served him there.

Sammons then filed his answer to the formal complaint within 30

days, as required by Bar Rule 4-212 (a). Nonetheless, the Special

Master later entered an order of default against Sammons, followed

by the Special Master’s report and recommendation that Sammons

be disbarred. Sammons filed exceptions to and requested review of

the Special Master’s report and recommendation. In its report, the

Review Board recommended that the Special Master’s entry of

     1 The maximum penalty for violations of Rules 1.2, 1.3, and 5.5 is
disbarment; the maximum penalty for a violation of Rule 1.4 is a public
reprimand.
                                     2
default against Sammons be vacated and that the case be remanded

back to the Special Master for discovery and an evidentiary hearing

on the merits of the alleged rule violations. The State Bar filed

exceptions to the Review Board’s report and recommendation, and

Sammons has responded.      After considering the record and the

parties’ arguments, we conclude that under the particular

circumstances of this case, default should not have been entered

against Sammons. We therefore vacate the Special Master’s default

order and his report and recommendation and remand this matter

to the Special Master for proceedings on the merits of the alleged

rule violations.

     1. Procedural Background.

     On October 28, 2020, after a finding of probable cause by the

State Disciplinary Board, the State Bar filed the formal complaint

underlying this matter.     The formal complaint alleged that

Sammons violated Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, 1.4, and 5.5 during the course

of his representation of an elderly client and her daughter in a

personal injury matter against a nursing home due to Sammons’s

                                   3
repeated and ongoing inaction in the matter; his misrepresentations

to the daughter; his failures to communicate with or respond to the

daughter; his participation in the matter during periods when he

was either suspended from the practice of law for CLE deficiency or

ineligible to practice for nonpayment of dues; and his ultimate

abandonment of the matter. On November 13, 2020, the Special

Master was appointed.

      On February 18, 2021, the Bar filed an entry of service non est

inventus,2 dated December 7, 2020, as well as a return of service by

publication.    On February 22, 2021, the Bar filed a motion for

default. The record reflects that on March 3, 2021, the Special

Master emailed counsel for the Bar, stating

      I need to see more effort at personal service on Mr.
      Sammons. Nothing in the materials provided to me
      indicate anyone attempted personal service on Mr.
      Sammons at his personal residence, most notorious
      abode, or present place of business. Beyond that, the
      hearsay contained in Para. 6 [of the Bar’s motion for

      2 “The Latin term, sometimes shortened to ‘non est’ or abbreviated as

‘n.e.i.,’ means ‘he is not found,’ and is used to indicate that the person in
question could not be found within the jurisdiction.” In the Matter of Arrington,
314 Ga. 696, 697 n.3 (878 SE2d 534) (2022) (citing “Non est inventus,” Black’s
Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)).
                                          4
     default], suggests Mr. Sammons does not work at 307
     14th Street NW, Atlanta, GA 30318. That causes me
     concern for a number of reasons, but as a practical matter
     you may not have the correct email address for Mr.
     Sammons.

     As it stands now, I will not grant the motion for default
     judgment. Let me know what you want to do. I can rule
     or you can withdraw it subject to my suggestions outlined
     above. Please make this email part of the record.

     If you have any questions or concerns feel free to contact
     me.

     In response, the Bar discovered Sammons’s home address and

on March 10, 2021, personally served him with the petition for

appointment of a special master, the order appointing the special

master, the notice of a finding of probable cause, and the formal

complaint, and filed an entry of service that same day. On March

24, 2021, Sammons filed his answer and response to the formal

complaint, as well as his answer and response to the Bar’s motion

for default.   Sammons denied the alleged misconduct and rule

violations and asserted defenses of insufficiency of process,

insufficiency of service of process, and failure of timely service.

                                      5
     2. Special Master’s Order Entering Default against Sammons.

     On October 27, 2021, after accepting briefing on the default

motion but without holding a hearing, the Special Master issued its

order granting the Bar’s motion for default.          In that order, the

Special Master set forth the following applicable Bar Rules: “Receipt

of a Return of Service Non Est Inventus shall constitute conclusive

proof that service cannot be perfected by personal service,” Bar Rule

4-203.1 (b) (3) (i); “If personal service cannot be perfected, . . . service

may be accomplished by publication . . .[,]” Bar Rule 4-203.1 (b) (3)

(ii); and “[Respondent] shall file and serve his answer to the formal

complaint . . . within 30 days after service of the formal complaint.

If the respondent fails to answer or to obtain an extension of time

for his answer, the facts alleged and violations charged in the formal

complaint shall be deemed admitted.” Bar Rule 4-212 (a). The

Special Master noted that Sammons did not file an answer to the

formal complaint within 30 days of the Bar’s service by publication,

did not request an extension, and did not move to open default. The

Special Master also explained that after the Bar moved for default,

                                        6
he suggested that it make additional efforts to personally serve

Sammons; that in response, the Bar discovered Sammons’s home

address and personally served him there; and that Sammons then

filed his answers and responses to the formal complaint—denying

the allegations of the complaint without further explanation—and

to the motion for default.

     The Special Master rejected Sammons’s argument that the Bar

did not exercise the necessary due diligence in locating him before

moving for default. The Special Master explained that Bar Rule 4-

203.1 requires lawyers to keep the Bar informed of their official

address and any changes thereto, and that the Bar may rely on that

information in all efforts to perfect service upon a lawyer, meaning

it was Sammons who had the responsibility to keep the Bar apprised

of the information needed to serve him—a responsibility he failed to

fulfill. The Special Master therefore determined that the Bar was

authorized under the Bar Rules to first attempt service at the

address provided by Sammons and then, after that attempt failed,

to serve him by publication, which it did, and that Sammons “has

                                    7
not contested or otherwise shown that the State Bar’[s] service of

Respondent     was    done    in   violation   of   Bar    Rule    4-203.1,

notwithstanding my subsequent direction that the State Bar serve

Respondent at his home. . . . The State Bar having properly served

Respondent according to its rules, and Respondent having failed to

file a timely answer, Respondent is in default.”3

     The Special Master then concluded that he was authorized to—

and would—treat Sammons’s response to the Bar’s motion for

default as a motion to open default, but that Sammons’s request to

open default did not satisfy OCGA § 9-11-55 or the standards set

forth in In the Matter of Turk, which was Sammons’s burden to

show. See In the Matter of Turk, 267 Ga. 30, 30 (471 SE2d 842)

(1996) (“OCGA § 9-11-55 (b) applies in disciplinary proceedings.

Thus, in order to authorize the opening of [his] default, [Respondent]

must show providential cause, excusable neglect[,] or a proper

case.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Butterworth v.

     3 The Special Master also noted that Sammons made an unsupported

claim that he emailed a response to the notice of investigation to the Bar’s
investigator, but that this did not change the Special Master’s analysis.
                                        8
Safelite Glass Corp., 287 Ga. App. 848, 849 (652 SE2d 877) (2007)

(“Compliance with the four conditions . . . [i.e., the showing shall be

made under oath, shall set up a meritorious defense, shall offer to

plead instanter, and shall announce ready to proceed with the trial],

however, is a condition precedent; absent the showing of . . . [these

conditions], a trial court has no discretion to open a default.”)

(citations omitted). The Special Master determined that Sammons

failed to meet the conditions precedent, see In the Matter of Starling,

297 Ga. 359 (773 SE2d 768) (2015); Butterworth, 287 Ga. App. at

849-850, and that, regardless, he also failed to show providential

cause, excusable neglect, or a proper case authorizing the opening of

default, see Bowen v. Savoy, 308 Ga. 204, 207 (839 SE2d 546) (2020);

Turk, 267 Ga. at 30-31.

     3. Special Master’s Report and Recommendation.

     On September 12, 2022, the Special Master issued his report

and recommendation, noting that by virtue of Sammons’s default,

he was deemed to have admitted the facts as set forth in the formal

complaint. See Bar Rule 4-212 (a). The Special Master determined,

                                     9
based on the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA

Standards”), that Sammons’s misconduct was knowing and

intentional; that Sammons caused his client actual and permanent

injury (because the statute of limitations ran on his client’s claim);

that the following aggravating factors existed: a dishonest or selfish

motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith

obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding, a refusal to acknowledge

the wrongful nature of his conduct, a vulnerable victim, substantial

experience in the practice of law, and indifference to making

restitution, see ABA Standard 9.22 (b), (c), (d), (e), (g), (h), (i), and

(j); and that the following mitigating factors existed: absence of a

prior disciplinary record and personal problems, see ABA Standard

9.32 (a) and (c). The Special Master recommended that Sammons

be disbarred for violating Rules 1.2 (a), 1.3, and 5.5 (a), and publicly

reprimanded for violating Rule 1.4. Sammons filed exceptions to

and requested review of the Special Master’s report and

recommendation.

                                      10
     4. Review Board’s Report and Recommendation.

     On review, the Review Board issued its report and

recommendation, concluding that the entry of default against

Sammons was error and therefore recommending that the case be

remanded to the Special Master for an evidentiary hearing on the

merits of the alleged rule violations. The Review Board noted that

the Bar has the burden of proving each element of the alleged rule

violations by clear and convincing evidence and that the Review

Board may reverse the Special Master’s findings of fact if they are

clearly erroneous or manifestly in error, but that his conclusions of

law are reviewed de novo. See Bar Rule 4-216 (a).

     The Review Board recounted that at the Special Master’s

suggestion, the Bar took additional steps to perfect personal service

on Sammons, who, pursuant to Bar Rule 4-212, filed his answer

within 30 days of being personally served.       The Review Board

acknowledged that “the rules regarding procedure of default and

service do not mirror the Georgia Civil Practice Act,” but stated it

was “worth noting” that the entry of service non est inventus, dated

                                   11
December 7, 2020, and the proof of service by publication were not

filed until February 18, 2021; that under OCGA § 9-11-4 (h), “‘[i]f

proof of service is not filed within five business days [of the service

date], the time for the party served to answer the process shall not

begin to run until such proof of service is filed’”; and that under

OCGA § 9-11-55, a respondent could open the default as a matter of

right within 15 days of an answer being due. The Review Board

opined:

     The Review Board has serious concerns about the rules
     giving the State Bar the ability to effectuate service by
     publication, especially when a lawyer can be so easily
     found, as was the case of the Respondent. The Review
     Board understands that the Bar Rules are what governs
     lawyers that practice in the State of Georgia, and that
     publication is a permissible (while certainly not
     preferred) method of service.      In the case of the
     Respondent, the Special Master and the State Bar chose
     to go beyond the minimum required by the rules and have
     the Respondent personally served after the service by
     publication was effectuated.     The Respondent then
     answered timely after personal service was effectuated.
     The State Bar and the Special Master should now be
     estopped from seeking and entering a Default Judgment
     based upon the original service by publication, when
     personal service was then made and an answer was
     timely filed.

                                    12
Therefore, the Review Board recommended that “the entry of default

be vacated, and that the case be remanded back to the Special

Master for discovery and an evidentiary hearing as if no default had

been granted.”

     5. State Bar’s Exceptions.

     The Bar contends that the Special Master did not err when he

applied the Bar Rules precisely to the facts of Sammons’s default.

The Bar acknowledges that under Bar Rule 4-221.2 (b), “the

procedures and rules of evidence applicable in civil cases under the

laws of Georgia shall apply, except that the quantum of proof

required of the State Bar shall be clear and convincing evidence,”

but argues that nothing in this rule suggests that when there is

some conflict between the Bar Rules and the Georgia Civil Practice

Act (“CPA”), the CPA was meant to abrogate the Bar Rules. More

specifically, the Bar argues that the Review Board incorrectly

applied OCGA §§ 9-11-4 (h) and 9-11-55 (a) and their different

service and default rules—such as the requirement that a return of

service be filed or the ability to open default within 15 days as a

                                   13
matter of right—contrary to Bar Rules 4-203.1 and 4-212 (a),

respectively.

     The Bar also acknowledges that the Special Master initially

prompted it to track down and personally serve Sammons—despite

that suggestion being erroneous and not required by the Bar Rules—

but contends that the Special Master later issued an order that fully

considered the Bar Rules and correctly found Sammons to be in

default because the Bar made prima facie showings that it had

properly served Sammons and that he was in default according to

the Bar Rules. See Bar Rule 4-203.1 (a), (b) (3) (i), (ii). The Bar

argues that Sammons’s default was consistent with his failure to

engage     with   the   disciplinary   process,   including   his   non-

responsiveness during the investigative phase, as well as his failure

to provide an updated address to the Bar as required by the Bar

Rules.     The Bar also argues that the Special Master correctly

concluded that Sammons did not satisfy the requirements to open

default.

                                       14
        The Bar contends that the Review Board erred when it applied

the principle of judicial estoppel to the Special Master’s timely

reconsideration of his prior erroneous and informal suggestion to

track down and personally serve Sammons, despite that suggestion

contradicting the Bar Rules. In sum, the Bar argues that the Review

Board’s “concerns” that the Court-promulgated Bar Rules are

contrary to the legislatively enacted CPA do not warrant rejection of

the Special Master’s application of the Bar Rules to the facts of this

case.

        6. Sammons’s Response to the State Bar’s Exceptions.

        Sammons maintains his position that the Bar did not exercise

due diligence in locating him as required by OCGA § 9-11-4 and Bar

Rule 203.1 and that therefore he was not in default. He argues—

relying in large part on the COVID-19 lockdowns of 2020 and the

difficulties arising therefrom—that the Special Master erred in

granting the Bar’s motion for default and in refusing to open the

default. Sammons also argues that contrary to the Bar’s position,

he has engaged in the disciplinary process, with any failures being

                                     15
caused by circumstances such as the difficulties arising from the

pandemic lockdowns, as well as his own misunderstanding of the

process.

     7. Analysis and Conclusion.

     After reviewing the record, and pretermitting whether the

Review Board’s analysis contained certain legal errors, we conclude

that under the circumstances of this case, Sammons was not in

default at the time the Special Master issued the order entering

default against him. Accordingly, the Special Master’s order on the

State Bar’s motion for default and his report and recommendation,

which relied upon that entry of default, are due to be vacated and

the case remanded to the Special Master for proceedings on the

merits of the violations alleged in the formal complaint.

      In disciplinary proceedings, the Bar is entitled to rely upon

the Bar Rules. That includes the Bar Rules permitting service by

publication if personal service cannot be perfected, see Bar Rule 4-

203.1 (b) (3) (ii), and authorizing the entry of default against a

respondent who fails to timely answer after such service, see Bar

                                    16
Rule 4-212 (a). A special master, therefore, would err in denying a

motion for default in such circumstances and instead requiring

additional efforts at personal service beyond those required by the

Bar Rules. See Bar Rule 4-203.1 (b) (3) (i); see also Bar Rule 4-203.1

(a). Here, however, after the Special Master’s email, the Bar chose—

whether at the suggestion of the Special Master or not—to take

additional steps to discover Sammons’s home address and to perfect

personal service upon him on March 10, 2021. The Bar’s motion for

default remained pending, having neither been granted nor denied,

when Sammons, on March 24, 2021, “file[d] and serve[d] his answer

to the formal complaint of the State Bar of Georgia pursuant to Rule

4-221 (b) within 30 days after service of the formal complaint.” Bar

Rule 4-212 (a). At that point, Sammons was not in default and an

order of default should not have been entered against him. Cf.

OCGA § 9-11-55 (a) (providing that if an answer is not timely filed,

“the case shall automatically become in default”) (emphasis

supplied); In the Matter of Boyd, 315 Ga. 390, 394 (882 SE2d 339)

(2022) (noting that “defaults in disciplinary cases most often involve

                                    17
respondents who completely fail to respond to disciplinary

proceedings,” and that “the proper-case ground for opening a default

should be liberally applied so as to keep with the policy of deciding

cases on their merits”) (emphasis supplied).

     We acknowledge the Bar’s predicament of being prompted by

the Special Master to take additional efforts at personal service to

avoid having its motion for default denied.            Nevertheless,

Sammons’s timely answer after the Bar personally served him

should not have been followed by a grant of that motion. After the

Special Master’s email, the Bar was left with the decision to either

stand on its prior service by publication and its motion for default

based thereon—with the right to seek review if the Special Master

indeed denied that motion and issued a report and recommendation

in accordance with such denial, see Bar Rules 4-214; 4-216—or to

follow the path it ultimately took, providing Sammons with a new

opportunity to file a timely answer under the Bar Rules.

     Although we do not adopt the full analysis of the Review Board,

we do agree with its ultimate recommendation that “the entry of

                                   18
default be vacated, and that the case be remanded back to the

Special Master for discovery and an evidentiary hearing as if no

default had been granted.”    Accordingly, we vacate the Special

Master’s order granting the Bar’s motion for default and the Special

Master’s report and recommendation, and we remand this matter to

the Special Master with direction that he decide the merits of the

case in accordance with the applicable rules and law.

     Vacated and remanded with direction. All the Justices concur.

                                   19
     PETERSON, Presiding Justice, concurring specially.

     I share the Review Board’s “serious concerns about the rules

giving the State Bar the ability to effectuate service by publication,

especially when a lawyer can be so easily found, as was the case”

with Mr. Sammons. The policy underlying the State Bar disciplinary

process has a strong preference for “deciding cases on their merits,”

rather than by default. In the Matter of Boyd, 315 Ga. 390, 394 (882

SE2d 339) (2022). This policy is frustrated – and discipline bears

little relation to protecting the public – when a disciplinary matter

is resolved on default grounds because the lawyer did not have

actual notice of the proceeding.

     Default is a necessary part of the disciplinary process because

many lawyers who commit serious violations simply refuse to

participate in the process. The public would be at considerable risk

if those lawyers were allowed to evade discipline simply by staying

on the sidelines. But that’s not what happened here, and enforcing

default in these circumstances (instead of proceeding to the merits)

would not protect the public.

                                    20
     Rule 9.3 requires lawyers to “respond to disciplinary

authorities in accordance with State Bar Rules.” The maximum

penalty for violation of that rule is merely a public reprimand. And

there is no Rule of Professional Conduct imposing discipline for a

lawyer’s failure to update their official address on file with the Bar,

as required by Rule 4-203.1. But when default is the result of

personal service attempted only on the address on file – without any

attempt to determine whether a different, correct address is readily

ascertainable – followed by service by publication, it converts a

violation of those two requirements into the functional equivalent of

an automatic disbarment. This is not how the system should work.

Whether or not the Bar was authorized to serve by publication, it

should not have done so before taking the simple steps that found

Mr. Sammons. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment only.

                                    21