Court Opinion

ID: 9865542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 18:53:27.051627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:43.345657
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION TOR REHEARING.
Counsel for the plaintiff in error insist that the Caison case, supra, is in contemplation of law, and of section 6-1611 of the Code, “a unanimous decision rendered . . by a full bench of six” Justices, and that thisacourt is without authority to disapprove it. That séction declares that decisions by a full bench of six Justices shall not be overruled or materially modified, except with the concurrence of six Justices, etc. In the case last referred to, Russell, C. J., and Gilbert, J., were marked as concurring in 'the result. This is not the equivalent of concurring in the decision. So far as we know (and counsel have cited no case to the contrary), a decision of this court has not been treated as a decision by a full bench of six Justices when one or more are marked merely as concurring in the result. It is as if they wish to announce that they concur in the judgment only. Frequently the words “decision” and “judgment” may be used interchangeably, but in the abstract *602there is a shade of difference between the import of the two, according to Abbott’s Law Dictionary, 351. As expressed in Buckeye Pipe-Line Co. v. Fee, 62 Ohio, 543 (57 N. E. 446, 78 Am. St. R. 743): “The decision is the resolution of the principles which determine the controversy. The judgment is the formal paper applying them to the rights of the parties.” Numerous authorities are to the effect that.a decision is not an authority upon a question not considered by the court, though involved in a case decided. See Duronsseau v. United States, 6 Cranch, 307 (3 L. ed. 232); Buel v. Van Ness, 8 Wheat. 312 (5 L. ed. 624); New v. Oklahoma, 195 U. S. 252 (25 Sup. Ct. 68, 49 L. ed. 182); and other cases cited in 2 U. S. Dig. L. ed. 23-27, referred to in City of Raleigh v. Mechanics & Farmers Bank, N. C. 26 S. E. 2d, 573, 589. The position of counsel seems to be that because all the Justices concurred in the judgment in the Gaison ease, supra, they all are committed by every point there involved, and discussed in the opinion and ruled upon, although the concurrence of two members of the court was limited to the result. It is respectfully submitted that while the judgment was by six Justices, the decision was not the unanimous speech of the court under the circumstances there reported, and that it could no more be considered a decision by six Justices than it could be said, contrary to the line of authorities cited above, that a decision in a case, was binding on an issue not even considered by the court, although involved in the case which was adjudicated.
Counsel further argue that the opinion is' nót the decision; and that there is nothing in the constitution or the Code requiring the court to write an opinion, although they cite the Code, § 6-1606, which declares: “No decision shall be delivered ore-tenus; but the same shall be announced by a written synopsis of-the‘.'’points’'decided, which shall be delivered during, the term at which the decision was made. No decision shall be published in the reports until the said decision shall have been revised by each of the Judges presiding in the case.” To give the word “decision” the rendering contended for by counsel would, it seems to us, make it mean merely the judgment of the court, either that it be affirmed or reversed; thatdt is merely this judgment that shall appear in the reports; and that what it is that shall be revised by each of the Judges before publication is merely the order .reversing or affirm*603ing the judgment excepted to. The written synopsis of the points decided, as required by the Code, indicates that something more was intended by the use of the word “decision” than the mere judgment of affirmance or reversal. The result in the Caison case, supra, was a judgment of reversal. If Russell, C. J., and Gilbert, J., had agreed to the decision, as distinguished from the judgment of reversal, what need was there for having it entered that they concurred in the result? True no reason was assigned for their limited concurrence. For aught that appears, there might have been something in the record, apart from anything contained in the synopsis of the points decided, or in the reasons given by the Justice delivering the opinion, which caused them to concur in the judgment of reversal. The only thing that the six Justices concurred in, so far as is shown,' was that the judgment should be reversed. There is a negative pregnant in the clause “concur in the result.” It is tantamount to an expression that those who merely concur in the judgment are not giving their full concurrence to what appears in the report of the case, and that only the judgment is rendered by a full bench. •
The soundness of this line of reasoning is illustrated by the very ease under discussion. The judgment, in the. Caison case was reversed on two separate, independent assignments of error, agreement as to the decision on either of which would have required a concurrence in the result, i. e., a judgment of reversal. How can it be said that the two members of the court who merely concurred in the result agreed to the ruling under review? If there had been only one ground on which the judgment was reversed, and all had agreed to the result, it might possibly be said that the entire court were in accord in holding that the charge to the jury was error for the reason assigned, and that their concurrence in the result would indicate only that they might not have agreed to the reasoning set forth in the opinion; but no basis exists for any such supposition here.
The effect of the enactment by the General Assembly of the provision in the Code, § 6-1611, was to give the sanctity of a legislative act to all the unanimous decisions of this court, except as therein stated. See Atlanta & West Point Railroad Co. v. Hemmings, 192 Ga. 724 (16 S. E. 2d, 537), and cit. We are unwilling to invest a decision of this court with the rigidity of a statutory *604enactment by virtue of the Code section last cited, when it bears on its face, as we think the Gaison decision does, that the concurrence of one or more of the members of the court participating therein was only in the judgment entered therein, unless it further appears, as it does not in the Gaison case, that the concurrence in the judgment necessarily meant an agreement as to the decision of the court on which the judgment was based.

Rehearing denied.