Court Opinion

ID: 9667953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:58:57.358775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:41.907264
License: Public Domain

Cynar, J.
(dissenting). I must respectfully dissent.
According to the certified concise statement of facts submitted in this appeal, the following background information is included.
Pursuant to the terms of the contested judgment *382of divorce, which was entered on April 26, 1978, the trial court found on the record that Kevin Cogan was the child of the parties. Over three years after the entry of the judgment of divorce, on June 24, 1981, defendant filed a petition to determine paternity seeking a full evidentiary hearing, including blood group testing, on the issue as to whether defendant could be excluded as the father of Kevin Cogan. On July 7, 1981, plaintiff moved for an accelerated judgment alleging the doctrines of res judicata and estoppel barred defendant from disestablishing paternity.
On August 6, 1981, the circuit court entered an order granting accelerated judgment, which in pertinent part stated:
"* * * the court now finds that the Defendant is therefore barred from proceeding to disestablish his paternity on the grounds that this court did on April 26, 1978, enter an order covering the subject of the present proceeding and therefore Defendant’s current cause of action is barred.”
On appeal from the August 6, 1981, order granting accelerated judgment, the Court of Appeals on July 28, 1982, affirmed the August 6, 1981, order of the trial court. The Court of Appeals on September 15, 1982, denied the application for rehearing. The Michigan Supreme Court on May 17, 1983, denied an application for leave to appeal.
Plaintiffs, Sandra Cogan and Kevin Cogan, filed their complaint in this action on July 7, 1981, against Leon Cogan for defamation and slander. According to the plaintiffs, defendant had falsely and maliciously represented to his present wife, members of his family, the Oakland County Friend of the Court and others that he was not the child’s father. In his affirmative defense, defendant as*383serted that his denial of paternity was in good faith and based on evidence that Kevin’s blood type was inconsistent with a determination that defendant was the child’s father.
The majority opinion observes, after wrestling with the applicability of the often elusive res judicata, collateral estoppel, and equitable estoppel doctrines, that paternity is in controversy and MCR 2.311(A) provides for the relief the defendant seeks. By this, are we to assume that, although prior appropriate litigation established paternity, a subsequent action based on a different theory is permissible to establish nonpaternity?
In effect if defendant is attempting to establish nonpaternity, he is barred from doing so by the August 6, 1981, order granting accelerated judgment.
If the defendant is attempting to raise truth as a defense, he was not precluded from doing so by the trial court. There is no authority presented indicating that, when fatherhood is determined through judicial disposition, this slams the door on the person found to be the father from disputing he is the father if he acts within recognized precepts of the law.
Defendant’s affirmative defense asserted that his denial of paternity was in good faith and based on evidence that Kevin’s blood type was inconsistent with a determination that defendant was the child’s father.
In support of his contention, defendant indicates that in approximately November, 1980, he had occasion to examine a document relating to Kevin Cogan’s driver’s education. At that time Kevin Cogan was 15 years of age. The document included Kevin Cogan’s blood type. He concluded that the blood types of Sandra Cogan and himself could not *384produce a child with the blood type possessed by Kevin Cogan.
The truth as an affirmative defense does not lie in this proceeding to disestablish paternity previously adjudicated. However, the defendant in support of his defense against the allegation of slander, defamation, or intentional infliction of emotional distress has a right to offer proof that truth is a defense on the basis that paternity is incompatible with Kevin Cogan’s blood type.
I would affirm the result reached by the trial court, with a further observation that the document relating to Kevin Cogan’s driver’s education referred to in defendant’s affidavit can be admittéd on the issue of the alleged blood type incompatibility.