Court Opinion

ID: 9375906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-01 15:00:22.924153+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:02.726894
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                     MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

TANYA TITO,                                       DOCKET NUMBER
                      Appellant,                  SF-0752-15-0684-I-1

             v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,                       DATE: February 28, 2023
            Agency.

        THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Thomas R. Wickwire, Esquire, Fairbanks, Alaska, for the appellant.

      Kevin D. Mack, Esquire, Sacramento, California, for the agency.

      Rachel Weighaus, Washington, D.C. for the agency.

                                        BEFORE

                            Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                              Raymond A. Limon, Member
                               Tristan L. Leavitt, Member
                          Member Limon recused himself and
                  did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                     2

                                      FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     sustained the charge of possessing a firearm in a Federal facility without
     authorization, found that she did not prove any of her affirmative defenses, and
     upheld the removal penalty. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only
     in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings
     of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of
     statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the
     case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or
     the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an
     abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or
     new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the
     petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of
     the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After
     fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. We MODIFY the initial decision to
     supplement the administrative judge’s analysis of the claim of reprisal for
     whistleblowing disclosures and protected activity and to clarify the administrative
     judge’s disparate penalty analysis. Except as expressly MODIFIED by this Final
     Order, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The following background information, as recited in the initial decision, is
     generally undisputed. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 45, Initial Decision (ID).
     The appellant was employed at the agency as an Administrative Officer. ID at 2.
     On or around October 24, 2014, the appellant received a purple 0.22 caliber
     Beretta handgun as a birthday present. Id. On October 27, 2014, the appellant
     brought the handgun to work at the Tetlin National Wildlife Refuge (TNWR) in
                                                                                            3

     Tok, Alaska, to show her coworkers. Id. On December 9, 2014, the appellant
     brought the same handgun in one of her bags to the Fish and Wildlife Service
     regional office in Anchorage. Id. The next morning, at the agency’s request,
     officers from the Federal Protective Service (FPS) initiated an inquiry into the
     matter, and the appellant was placed on administrative leave. ID at 3. Following
     an investigation, FPS issued the appellant a U.S. District Court Violation Notice
     that charged her with violating 41 C.F.R. § 102-74.440, by knowingly bringing a
     handgun into a Federal facility on December 9, 2014. Id. The appellant paid a
     $125.00 fine in lieu of appearing in court. Id.; IAF, Tab 6 at 195.
¶3         The agency proposed and effected the appellant’s removal based on the two
     incidents described above.       ID at 3; IAF, Tab 6 at 40-46, 149-55.           After the
     appellant filed a Board appeal, the agency rescinded the removal, and the
     administrative judge dismissed the appeal as moot over the appellant’s objection. 2
     ID at 3-4; Tito v. Department of the Interior, MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-15-
     0523-I-1, Initial Decision (Jul. 10, 2015).
¶4         On June 5, 2015, the agency again proposed the appellant’s removal based
     on a single charge of possessing a firearm in a Federal facility wi thout
     authorization, and the charge included two specifications. ID at 4; IAF, Tab 6
     at 28-31.   The appellant did not reply to the proposal notice, and the agency
     sustained the charge and removed the appellant, effective July 8, 2015. ID at 4;
     IAF, Tab 6 at 19, 21-26.
¶5         The appellant filed a Board appeal. ID at 5; IAF, Tab 1. A hearing was
     held. ID at 5; Hearing Transcripts (HTs). The administrative judge issued an
     initial decision that sustained the two specifications and the charge of possessing
     a firearm in a Federal facility without authorization, concluded that the appellant
     did not prove any of her affirmative defenses, and upheld the removal.                     ID
     2
      Neither party filed a petition for review of the initial decision, and the initial decision
     became final on August 14, 2015.
                                                                                     4

     at 6-76.   The appellant has filed a petition for review, the agency has filed a
     response, and the appellant has filed a reply. Petition for Review (PFR) File,
     Tabs 1, 3-4.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     We agree with the administrative judge that the agency proved the charge and
     both specifications.
¶6         The appellant did not challenge below or on review the administrative
     judge’s finding that the elements of the charge included (1) possession of a
     firearm, (2) in a Federal facility, and (3) without authorization, or that the charge
     did not include an intent element. ID at 6-7; IAF, Tab 24 at 2-3; PFR File, Tab 1
     at 16. The appellant also does not dispute that she brought her handgun into the
     Federal facilities on the dates in question or that carrying a firearm was not part
     of her duties. ID at 7-8; PFR File, Tab 1 at 4.
¶7         The appellant challenges the administrative judge’s conclusion that she
     was not authorized to bring the firearm into the TNWR facility on October 27,
     2014. 3    PFR File, Tab 1 at 4.     Instead, she asserts that she had apparent
     authorization to carry a firearm because she had seen numerous other individuals
     carrying firearms in the facility who were not disciplined. Id. at 6-7. The record
     reflects the administrative judge’s conscientious consideration of the witness
     testimony and documentary evidence, including the appellant’s position
     description.   ID at 6-9; IAF, Tab 6 at 249-55.     We discern no error with the
     administrative judge’s conclusion that the appellant was not authorized to bring in
     her personal firearm into the respective Federal facilities on either date. ID at 6-9
     & n.6. Accordingly, we affirm the administrative judge’s decision to sustain both
     specifications and the charge.

     3
       In her discussion of the charge, the appellant raises issues of notice, intent, and
     disparate treatment, and she asserts that the penalty was too severe for the second
     specification. We will address these issues in our penalty analysis, below.
                                                                                      5

     We agree with the administrative judge that the appellant did not prove any of her
     affirmative defenses.
¶8        The appellant does not challenge on review the administrative judge’s
     conclusion that she did not prove her affirmative defenses of harmful procedural
     error, laches, or prohibited personnel practices pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(2)
     and (11).   ID at 9-21.   Because the appellant is not pursuing these claims on
     review, we need not analyze them in this order. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115 (stating
     that the Board normally will consider only issues raised in a timely filed petition
     or cross petition for review). Accordingly, we affirm the administrative judge’s
     decision regarding these affirmative defenses.
¶9        The appellant’s petition for review appears to primarily challenge the
     administrative judge’s analysis of her claim of reprisal for whistleblowing
     disclosures and/or protected activity.       PFR File, Tab 1 at 17-20.          When
     whistleblower retaliation claims are made in the context of an otherwise
     appealable action, as here, the appellant must prove by preponderant evidence 4
     that she made a protected disclosure pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged
     in protected activity as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), and (D)
     and that the disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor in the
     personnel action(s) at issue. 5   Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget,
     2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 49; Ayers v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 11, ¶ 12
     (2015); Alarid v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 12 (2015); see
     5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1). If the appellant makes this showing, the burden shifts to

     4
       Preponderant evidence is the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person,
     considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a contested
     fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).
     5
       We have reviewed the relevant legislation amending the whistleblower protection
     statutory scheme enacted during the pendency of this appeal and have concluded that it
     does not affect the outcome of the appeal.
                                                                                           6

      the agency to prove by clear and convincing evidence 6 that it would have taken
      the personnel action absent the protected disclosure or activity.               Pridgen,
      2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 49; Ayers, 123 M.S.P.R. 11, ¶ 12; Alarid, 122 M.S.P.R. 600,
      ¶ 12; see 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2).
¶10           In the initial decision, the administrative judge found that the appellant
      made a protected whistleblowing disclosure when she orally disclosed to her
      former supervisor that his plan to purchase a quantity of oil from a former agency
      employee was precluded by purchasing rules and regulations. ID at 25-31. The
      administrative      judge   also   found    that   the   appellant’s   January 14,   2014
      memorandum to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) that was critical of the
      Human Resources Manager and four Human Resources Specialists constituted
      activity protected by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C). 7             ID at 36-37; IAF, Tab 6
      at 81-84.     He further found that the appellant proved that her whistleblowing
      disclosure and protected activity were a contributing factor in the agency’s
      decision to remove her. 8 ID at 37-39. The administrative judge found, however,
      that the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
      removed her absent her whistleblowing disclosure or protected activity.                  ID
      at 39-47.
¶11           On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge improperly
      analyzed the agency’s clear and convincing burden. PFR File, Tab 1 at 11, 17-20.
      In determining whether an agency has shown by clear and convincing evidenc e

      6
       Clear and convincing evidence “is that measure or degree of proof that produces in the
      mind of the trier of fact a firm belief as to the allegations sought to be established.”
      5 C.F.R. § 1209.4(e).
      7
         The administrative judge concluded that the appellant did not prove that her
      disclosures regarding a violation of the agency’s housing manual and her former
      supervisor’s directive to teach only creationism were protected whistleblowing
      disclosures. ID at 31-36. The appellant does not challenge these findings on review,
      and we affirm the administrative judge’s findings in this regard.
      8
          The agency does not challenge this finding, and we affirm it herein.
                                                                                          7

      that it would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of a
      whistleblowing disclosure or protected activity, the Board will consider all of the
      relevant factors, including the following factors (“Carr factors”): (1) the strength
      of the agency’s evidence in support of its action; (2) the existence and strength of
      any motive to retaliate on the part of the agency officials who were involved in
      the decision; and (3) any evidence that the agency takes similar actions against
      employees who did not engage in such protected activity, but who are otherwise
      similarly situated. Soto v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 6, ¶ 11;
      see Carr v. Social Security Administration, 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
      Alarid, 122 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 14. 9          The appellant does not challenge the
      administrative judge’s conclusion that the agency’s evidence was “very strong”
      and “weighed significantly” in its favor, ID at 39-40, and we affirm that finding.
¶12         Regarding the second Carr factor, the administrative judge noted that the
      proposing official—who was the appellant’s supervisor—could have a strong
      motive to retaliate because he was involved in the oil transaction that was the
      subject of the appellant’s whistleblowing disclosure and that transaction later
      became the subject of agency criminal and non-criminal investigations. ID at 41.
      The administrative judge made demeanor-based credibility determinations in
      favor of the proposing official in part because he (the proposing official) initia ted
      the criminal inquiry and had no knowledge that the appellant made a disclosure
      regarding the transaction. ID at 41-42. The administrative judge further found
      that the Human Resources Manager could have a somewhat strong motive to
      retaliate if she knew of the appellant’s OIG disclosure.              ID at 42.      The
      9
        Historically, the Board has been bound by the precedent of the U.S. Court of Appeals
      for the Federal Circuit on these types of whistleblower issues. However, pursuant to
      the All Circuit Review Act (Pub. L. No. 115-195), appellants may file petitions for
      judicial review of Board decisions in whistleblower reprisal cases with any circuit court
      of appeals of competent jurisdiction. See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B). Therefore, we
      must consider these issues with the view that the appellant may seek review of this
      decision before any appropriate court of appeal.
                                                                                           8

      administrative judge also found that there was, at most, a negligible motive to
      retaliate that could be imputed to the deciding official because of the proposing
      official’s involvement in the oil transaction and the involvement of the Human
      Resources Manager in the removal action. ID at 46.
¶13         The appellant’s arguments on review regarding the motive to retaliate factor
      appear to focus on the proposing official and the Human Resources Manager. For
      instance, she asserts that the proposing official was motivated to “get her” well
      before the two handgun incidents occurred. PFR File, Tab 1 at 18. As support
      for this assertion, however, she focuses on evidence that the administrative judge
      considered in his discussion of her claim of reprisal for activity protected by
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10), 10 including her participation in the Tok Community
      Umbrella Corporation (TCUC), the fact that several individuals involved in the
      dispute between the TCUC and the Tok Chamber of Commerce told the proposing
      official to fire her, and the proposing official drafted, but did not issue, a
      proposed 7-day suspension based on community complaints about her. PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 18 (citing ID at 49-50). By including such evidence under the heading
      “Retaliation for Whistleblowing,” however, the appellant is improperly conflating
      the   two    different   claims.     Because    the   allegations    relating   to       her
      section 2302(b)(10) claim are distinct from the allegations relating to her claim of
      reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures and protected activity, such allegations
      do not change our view of the administrative judge’s analysis of the motive to
      retaliate factor. 11

      10
        Section 2302(b)(10) makes it a prohibited personnel practice to “discriminate for or
      against any employee or applicant for employment on the b asis of conduct which
      does not adversely affect the performance of the employee or applicant or the
      performance of others.”
      11
         Even if we construe the appellant’s assertion as a challenge to the administrative
      judge’s evaluation of her claim of retaliation for activity protected by
      section 2302(b)(10), a different outcome is not warranted. The initial decision reflects
      the administrative judge’s careful consideration of the relevant case law and the
                                                                                         9

¶14         In the initial decision, the administrative judge credited the testimony of the
      proposing official as “direct, forthright, and persuasive” r egarding his decision to
      take responsibility for the oil transaction, and he rejected as speculative the
      appellant’s attorney’s suggestion that the proposing official’s acceptance of
      responsibility was a ploy to protect the appellant’s former supervisor.                ID
      at 41-42 & n.15.     The Board defers to an administrative judge’s credibility
      determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on observing the
      demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing; the Board overturn s such
      determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so. See
      Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002) .              The
      appellant has not presented any such reasons. We have considered her assertion
      that the initial decision does not explain why the proposing official’s motive to
      protect the appellant’s former supervisor and the agency’s “interest in
      maintaining control over subordinates” should not be imputed to the proposing
      official as a possible reason for the proposing official taking responsibility for the
      oil transaction that the former supervisor initiated.         PFR File, Tab 1 at 20.
      However, there is no evidence to support this assertion, and we find it unavailing.
¶15         We have considered the appellant’s contention that the administrative judge
      should have penalized the agency—by applying the “usual inference [that the
      agency was] trying to hide something”—because the agency did not call the
      Human Resources Manager as a witness.            Id. at 19.   The appellant does not
      indicate on review when she requested below that the administrative judge issue
      such a sanction, and we could not find such a request in the record. Nevertheless,
      we are not persuaded that any such sanction is necessary to serve the ends of

      evidence, and we discern no error with his conclusion that the appellant failed to prove
      that her TCUC activity played a role in her removal or that the removal action
      constituted a prohibited personnel practice as described in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(10). ID
      at 47-53.
                                                                                    10

      justice. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.43. Indeed, as noted above, the administrative judge
      acknowledged that the Human Resources Manager could have a “somewhat
      strong” motive to retaliate if she was aware of the disclosure .      Based on the
      testimony of the proposing and deciding officials, however, the administrative
      judge found that there was nothing in the record to suggest that the Human
      Resources Manager influenced either of them. ID at 42-45; HT 1 at 75 (testimony
      of the proposing official), 282-83, 285-87, 296-97 (testimony of the deciding
      official).   Under these circumstances, we find that it was unnecessary for the
      Human Resources Manager to testify regarding any of the issues in this matter,
      and we decline to sanction the agency for not calling her as a witness.
¶16         Regarding the third Carr factor, the administrative judge noted in the initial
      decision that the agency did not present any evidence regarding this factor, the
      charged misconduct was unique to the experience of both the proposing and
      deciding officials, and none of the purported comparators identified by the
      appellant were valid comparators. ID at 45-46. He therefore concluded that this
      factor was of “relatively little import.” ID at 46. We agree. The absence of
      evidence on the third Carr factor can render that factor neutral, but an agency’s
      failure to produce such evidence if it exists may prevent it from carrying its
      burden overall. Soto, 2022 MSPB 6, ¶ 18; see Whitmore v. Department of Labor,
      680 F.3d 1353, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2012).          Thus, the administrative judge
      correctly determined that the absence of evidence on the third Carr factor in the
      record is a neutral factor. Soto, 2022 MSPB 6, ¶ 18; see Rickel v. Department of
      the Navy, 31 F.4th 1358, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (holding that “[t]he lack of
      evidence on the third Carr factor appears neutral”).        Overall, based on the
      administrative judge’s findings regarding the strength of the agency’s evidence as
      to Carr factors 1 and 2, and concurring with his analysis of Carr factor 3, we
      defer to the administrative judge’s demeanor-based credibility determinations,
      and we agree with his conclusion that the agency proved by clear and convincing
                                                                                    11

      evidence that it would have removed the appellant absent her whistleblowing
      disclosure and/or protected activity. ID at 39-47; see Haebe, 288 F.3d at 1301.
¶17        The appellant also asserts on review that the agency violated her due
      process and equal protection rights by punishing her for violating a rule for which
      she had no notice and for behavior that other people engaged in and for which
      they were not punished. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5, 8-10. Contrary to the appellant’s
      assertion, we agree with the administrative judge that the appellant received
      minimum due process because the agency gave her advance notice of the charge
      against her, evidence that it relied upon to support the charge and penalty, and an
      opportunity to respond.     ID at 11-13; see Cleveland Board of Education v.
      Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) (explaining that tenured public employees
      cannot be deprived of their property right in continued employment without du e
      process of law, i.e., notice and an opportunity to respond).      Additionally, the
      appellant’s allegation that the agency treated her disparately to other employees,
      without a claim of prohibited discrimination, is an allegation of disparate
      penalties to be proven by the appellant and considered by the Board in
      determining the reasonableness of the penalty, but it is not an affirmative defense.
      Vargas v. U.S. Postal Service, 83 M.S.P.R. 695, ¶ 9 (1999).          The appellant
      has not persuaded us that the administrative judge erred when he found that she
      did not prove an equal protection violation in this regard, ID at 13-14; however,
      we will address her disparate penalty claim in our penalty analysis, below.

      We agree with the administrative judge that there was a nexus between the
      sustained misconduct and the efficiency of the service .
¶18        On review, the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s nexus
      analysis and contends that the two incidents had a minimal effect on the
      efficiency of the service. PFR File, Tab 1 at 20-22; ID at 53-54. This argument
      is unavailing.   For purposes of whether an agency has shown that its action
      promotes the efficiency of the service, the nexus requirement means there must be
      a clear and direct relationship between the articulated grounds for an adverse
                                                                                    12

      action and either the employee’s ability to accomplish his or her duties
      satisfactorily or some other legitimate Government interest.              Merritt v.
      Department of Justice, 6 M.S.P.R. 585, 596 (1981), modified by Kruger v.
      Department of Justice, 32 M.S.P.R. 71, 75 n.2 (1987). Sufficient nexus exists
      between an employee’s conduct and the efficiency of the service when the
      conduct occurred at work, as in this case. Parker v. U.S. Postal Service, 819 F.2d
      1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see HT 1 at 245 (testimony of the deciding official)
      (explaining that the appellant’s conduct in the second incident was “very
      disruptive” because “many of [the employees] were concerned about the safety
      for the staff” and “people were unable to do their regular job until things were
      figured out”). Accordingly, we affirm the administrative judge’s nexus analysis.

      We agree with the administrative judge that the removal penalty is reasonable for
      the sustained misconduct.
¶19        The Board will review an agency-imposed penalty only to determine if the
      agency considered all the relevant factors and exercised management discretion
      within tolerable limits of reasonableness. Douglas v. Veterans Administration,
      5 M.S.P.R. 280, 306 (1981).         On review, the appellant challenges the
      administrative judge’s evaluation of intent, notice, the consistency of the penalty
      with those imposed upon other employees for the same or similar offenses , and
      the agency’s failure to apply progressive discipline.    PFR File, Tab 1 at 6-17,
      23-24. For the following reasons, a different outcome is not warranted.
¶20        The administrative judge discussed at length the appellant’s contention that
      the agency treated her differently from several other agency employees and
      members of the public who brought firearms into the TNWR building or on an
      agency airplane without any consequences.       ID at 66-71.   The administrative
      judge noted that the alleged comparators did not engage in substantially similar
      misconduct—either because they were not agency employees or because they
      were authorized to carry firearms for survival, protection, or other work-related
      purposes—and any difference in treatment by the proposing and deciding officials
                                                                                    13

      was not knowing or intentional because such prior conduct predated their roles as
      agency managers. ID at 67-71.
¶21        In analyzing the appellant’s disparate penalty claim, the administrative
      judge cited Boucher v. U.S. Postal Service, 118 M.S.P.R. 640 (2012), which, in
      turn, cited Lewis v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 657 (2010), for
      the proposition that, to trigger the agency’s burden to show a legitimate reason
      for the difference in treatment in a disparate treatment claim, there must be
      enough similarity between the nature of the misconduct and other factors to lead a
      reasonable person to conclude that the agency treated similarly situated
      employees differently. ID at 67. The Board has since overruled Lewis to clarify
      that, when analyzing disparate penalty claims, broad similarity between
      employees is insufficient to establish that they are appropriate comparators, and
      the relevant inquiry is whether the agency knowingly and unjustifiably treated
      employees who engaged in the same or similar offenses differently. Singh v. U.S.
      Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 15 ¶¶ 9-18.        However, the administrative judge’s
      discussion of the standard set forth in Boucher and Lewis was not prejudicial in
      this case because, as the administrative judge properly found, the appellant failed
      to satisfy even that less onerous standard. ID at 67-71.
¶22        On review, the appellant does not contest the administrative judge’s finding
      that the law enforcement officer who was authorized to carry firearms as part of
      his duties and the two nonemployees were not proper comparators. PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 11-12.    She asserts, however, that there was a pattern of allowing
      employees to bring handguns into the building for social purposes. Id. at 6, 11.
      Indeed, the record reflects that around Christmas 2013, J.E. , who was a pilot,
      brought in a .22 rifle to the workplace to show other employees the gift that he
      had purchased for his son.      HT 2 at 8-9 (testimony of J.E.).     However, the
      circumstances surrounding this incident are easily distinguishable. Importantly,
      as a pilot, J.E. was authorized to carry a firearm for protection, he was one of the
      “few employees that could open a handgun safe,” and he “inventoried the
                                                                                  14

      firearms.” HT 2 at 5-7 (testimony of J.E.). Moreover, there was no evidence that
      anyone in management observed J.E. bringing in the rifle on that date or
      otherwise realized the circumstances under which he brought it to work. HT 1
      at 149, 152, 155 (testimony of a Federal wildlife officer).     There is also no
      evidence that J.E. brought in a personal firearm for non-work-related reasons on
      more than one occasion. Under these circumstances, the appellant failed to show
      that the agency knowingly or unjustifiably treated employees who engaged in
      similar offenses differently. Singh, 2022 MSPB 15, ¶ 14.
¶23        In discussing issues of condonation, notice, and intent, the administrative
      judge noted that the parties’ accounts varied and he had to make credibility
      determinations. ID at 60 (discussing the relevant credibility factors as described
      in Hillen v. Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987)). Regarding
      condonation,   the   administrative    judge   made   demeanor-based   credibility
      determinations in favor of the proposing official and another agency witness that
      the proposing official told the appellant on the day of the October 27, 2014
      incident that she had to leave her handgun in her car and could not bring it into
      the office. ID at 60-62. Regarding notice, the administrative judge found that it
      was inherently improbable that the appellant, because of her Administrative
      Officer position, was unaware of any agency rules prohibiting firearms in the
      workplace absent authorization.       ID at 63.   The administrative judge made
      credibility determinations against the appellant based on her demeanor and stated
      that he was “left . . . with the impression [that] her testimony was contrived and
      less than forthright on the issues of notice and intent. ” ID at 64. He determined
      that the appellant’s explanation that she did not know that it was a problem to
      bring her handgun to work on October 27, 2014, and “feigned inadvertence”
      regarding her decision to bring in her handgun to the regional office on
      December 9, 2014, “derogated common sense, [F]ederal law, the reality of her job
      duties and work environs.”      ID at 64-65.      He further found “unworthy of
      credence” her accounts involving condonation, lack of notice, and lack of intent,
                                                                                        15

      and concluded that such claims “rang hollow” because they were inconsistent
      with and/or contradicted by other evidence, inherently improbable, and/or
      appeared contrived and less than forthright. ID at 64-65. Here, too, the appellant
      has not identified sufficiently sound reasons for overturning the administrative
      judge’s demeanor-based credibility determinations.         Haebe, 288 F.3d at 1301.
      Accordingly, we affirm the administrative judge’s analysis of the issues of
      condonation, notice, and intent.
¶24         The appellant also contends on review that the penalty of removal was too
      harsh, particularly since the FPS deemed the second incident “inadvertent”
      because she paid a $125.00 fine in lieu of appearing in court. PFR File, Tab 1
      at 4-5. There is no support for the appellant’s assertion that FPS found that she
      had no intent to violate the law.      To the contrary, the violation notice itself
      identified the relevant offense as knowingly bringing a handgun into a Federal
      facility and, as support, specifically cites to a law, 41 C.F.R. § 102-74.440. 12
      IAF, Tab 6 at 195. Thus, this argument does not warrant a different outcome.
¶25         Finally, the appellant argues that the “author of the [proposal notice] has
      stated that progressive discipline was skipped because she believes it would not
      work”; instead, the appellant contends that her past evaluations and letters of
      support warrant a penalty less than removal. 13           PFR File, Tab 1 at 23-24
      (emphasis supplied). This argument is confusing because the proposing official is

      12
         “Federal law prohibits the possession of firearms or other dangerous weapons in
      Federal facilities . . . by all persons not specifically authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 930.”
      The appellant does not contend that she was authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 930 to bring a
      firearm to work.
      13
          To the extent that the appellant argues that the administrative judge erred in
      analyzing her harmful procedural error claim based on the agency’s failure to follow its
      own internal policy regarding progressive discipline, PFR File, Tab 1 at 23-24, the
      appellant has not persuaded us that the administrative judge applied the wrong legal
      standard or improperly concluded that she failed to prove this affirmative defense, ID
      at 14-15.
                                                                                        16

      male and the deciding official is female, and the appellant did not cite to any
      documentary evidence or testimony to support this assertion .            We need not
      resolve this discrepancy, however, because the record reflects that both the
      proposing and deciding officials considered the appellant’s potential for
      rehabilitation, the adequacy and effectiveness of alternative sanctions to deter
      such conduct in the future, and her two prior superior ratings. 14         IAF, Tab 6
      at 22-24, 35-38.
¶26         We discern no error with the administrative judge’s conclusion that the
      deciding official considered the relevant penalty factors and exercised her
      discretion within tolerable limits of reasonableness.         ID at 54-75; see, e.g.,
      Coleman v. Department of Defense, 100 M.S.P.R. 574, ¶ 16 (2005) (noting that
      the Board has found removal to be a reasonable penalty when an appellant has
      violated an agency’s security regulations by his unauthorized possession of a
      firearm on agency premises).

      Conclusion
¶27         We have considered the appellant’s remaining argument s on review but a
      different outcome is not warranted. The record reflects that the administrative
      judge considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made
      reasoned conclusions on the issue of credibility. See, e.g., Crosby v. U.S. Postal
      Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997) (finding no reason to disturb the
      administrative judge’s findings when she considered the evidence as a whole,
      drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions); Broughton v.

      14
         We recognize that the deciding official’s analysis of the relevant penalty factors
      largely agrees with the proposing official’s analysis. IAF, Tab 6 at 22-24. However,
      the administrative judge noted that the testimony of the deciding official regarding the
      penalty assessment was “direct, forthright, and persuasive,” and he concluded that the
      deciding official “agreed with [the proposing official’s] assessment upon conducting
      her own, independent assessment of the situation.” ID at 44. The appellant has not
      persuaded us that the administrative judge’s credibility determination or his conclusion
      was in error. See Haebe, 288 F.3d at 1301.
                                                                                  17

Department of Health and Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same).
Accordingly, we affirm as modified the administrative judge’s decision to sustain
the charge and both specifications, to find that the appellant did not prove any of
her affirmative defenses, and to uphold the removal penalty.

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 15
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.     You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriat e for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applica ble to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choice s of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

15
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                    18

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at    the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particu lar
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving    a   claim      of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).                 If you have a
                                                                             19

representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                              131 M Street, N.E.
                                Suite 5SW12G
                          Washington, D.C. 20507
                                                                                  20

      (3) Judicial    review      pursuant    to   the    Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b)    other   than   practices   described    in   section 2302(b)(8),    or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 16 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                U.S. Court of Appeals
                                for the Federal Circuit
                               717 Madison Place, N.W.
                               Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

16
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                          21

      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.