Court Opinion

ID: 9865221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:27:28.214051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:56.305756
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Butlee,
concurring.
The conclusion arrived at by the court seems to me to be sound, and I concur therein.
As I view it, the right of way provision in the statute is free from ambiguity and confusion. Words could not make it clearer. It is so plain that “he who runs may read” and, reading, understand. In Golden Eagle Dry Goods Co. v. Moekbee, 68 Colo. 312, 189 Pac. 850, the court had before it an ordinance providing: “Every *557driver of a vehicle approaching the intersection of a street or public road shall grant the right of way at such intersection to any vehicle approaching from the right, * * *.” Of course, the ordinance did not mean that a vehicle approaching from the right a block distant would have the right of way over a vehicle that had entered the intersection. The court had to give the ordinance a reasonable construction. The rule announced was this: “We think the right rule is that it is the duty of every driver, when approaching a street intersection, to use reasonable care to see whether there is likelihood of collision with any car appr'oaching from the right, and, if there is, to yield to it the right of way, and to keep his car under such control that he can do so.” The rule there adopted by the court, in construing the ordinance, made the test the “likelihood” of collision with a car approaching from the right. Such likelihood, of course, would depend upon several contingencies; for example, the speed of the car appr'oaching from the right; whether or not the speed probably would be increased or diminished ; whether or not the car probably would change its course, and if so, in which direction and how far. It is obvious that the probable point of intersection of the lines of travel of the two cars might vary suddenly and considerably from minute to minute and even from second to second. There we have a variable point, which may shift its position several times as the cars approach each other, and the burden is cast upon the drivers to determine whether or not, in view of all the uncertainties described above, there is a “likelihood” of collision. And yet the court enforced the ordinance as so construed. The statutory provision involved in this suit is far more likely to prevent collisions than the rule adopted by the court in the Golden Eagle case.
The criticism of the statutory provision really amounts to this, that a better or more reasonable regulation could be adopted. But' that question is for legislative, not judicial, determination. The wit of man has not yet de*558vised, and probably never will devise, a traffic regulation that will be perfect. Difficulties will arise under any regulation.
We need not fear an increase of racing as a result of our upholding the' statute. Reckless drivers, like the poor, shall be with us always. Such drivers will race for' the intersection of the lines of travel of the cars or for the street crossing, whichever will give them the right of way. No traffic regulation can be fool-proof. The statute does not constitute “a license to race for the intersection.” The check upon racing is the well-established rule that in approaching an intersection, as well as at all other times, a driver, even when he has the right of way, must exercise reasonable care. If he fails in this respect, he is guilty of negligence, and the fact’ that he has won the race will be no protection to him. The race may be to the swift, it is true, but a person who is injured through the racer’s negligence is entitled to recover judgment. A right of way won by neglig*ent racing can hardly be considered a “prize.” It reflects neither honor nor glory upon the victor; it carries with it no profit or immunity, but, on the contrary, may impose a liability.