Court Opinion

ID: 9841220
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-21 17:04:02.367803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:42:36.804379
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/21/23 P. v. Bland CA4/1

                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          D080245

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. SCD291991)

 DOMINIC BLAND,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Laura J. Birkmeyer, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
         Savanna Rae Montanez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Charles C.
Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General, Steve Oetting and Michael Dolida,
Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.

         A jury convicted Dominic Bland of second degree robbery (Pen. Code,1

1        Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
§ 211). Bland waived a jury trial on priors and special allegations, and in a
bifurcated proceeding the trial court found true allegations that he had
suffered a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)) and one prior
strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i); 1170.12). The court also found true
several aggravating sentencing factors but found the People had not proved
allegations that the offense was carried out with planning, sophistication,
and professionalism, that there was a vulnerable victim, or that the crime
involved taking great monetary value. The court sentenced Bland to a prison
term of 10 years, consisting of the upper term of five years doubled under the
“Three Strikes” law.
      Bland contends the trial court prejudicially erred by excluding the
testimony of his proposed expert psychologist who would have addressed how
police interviewing techniques can influence a witness’s memory, and
therefore was assertedly highly probative of whether the bank teller whom he
approached was subjectively afraid for purposes of the fear element of
robbery. Bland additionally asks this court to strike from the sentencing
minute order and abstract of judgment a $41 criminal theft fine, as well as a
10 percent administrative fee relating to his restitution fine. The People
concede the specified fine and fee should be stricken. We agree with the
concessions and modify the judgment accordingly, but otherwise affirm the
judgment.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Robbery
      In August 2021, Bland, wearing a hat, sunglasses and a face mask,
entered a San Diego bank and placed a handwritten note on the counter in
front of a teller that said, “Give me the money please.” Bland did not present
a weapon, brandish anything, threaten the teller, or ask for a specific amount

                                        2
of money. In accordance with her training, the teller handed Bland about
$400 or $500, which was the cash in her drawer. After he took the money
and left, the teller pressed the alarm.
      San Diego police officers responded to the bank and contacted the
teller. During an interview recorded on one of the officers’ body camera, the
officer and teller had the following exchange:
      “[Officer]: Did he present a weapon to you at all?
      “[Teller]: No, no.
      “[Officer]: Did he use any force or fear . . .
      “[Teller]: No.
      “[Officer]: . . . to obtain . . .
      “[Teller]: No.
      “[Officer]: . . . the cash?
      “[Teller]: No, he was very calm.
      “[Officer]: Okay.
      “[Teller]: He was very calm.
      “[Officer]: Did he brandish anything at you?
      “[Teller]: No, no. [¶] . . . [¶]
      “[Officer]: Were you fearful?
      “[Teller]: You know what, uhm, no.
      “[Officer]: No, okay. [¶] . . . [¶]
      “[Officer]: Okay, so, you, so you didn’t fear for your life or anything like
that? You weren’t scared of him at all?
      “[Teller]: No.
      “[Officer]: Okay.
      “[Teller]: I mean, I felt that he was going to rob but—but what—what
can you do? You have to . . . [¶] . . .

                                            3
      “[Officer]: Were—were you afraid from those actions though?
      “[Teller]: Uh, this is the second time I’ve been robbed. So, I have—I
know that I have to be calm.”
      The officer turned to another officer and said in part, “[I] mean it’s
still—there’s no force or fear—” and that it was “488 or 487,” referring to the
Penal Code sections defining petty and grand theft. The officer continued:
“Cause I mean, if there’s no force or fear, and he didn’t present a weapon or
anything, she wasn’t scared.”
      A few moments later, the officer explained his questions to the teller:
      “[Officer]: . . . [S]o, the reason why I’m asking this is because the—the
Penal Code states something specific. And with robbery it’s the intent to gain
some form of property using force or fear.
      “[Teller]: Okay.
      “[Officer]: We’re trying to establish that and we’re trying to meet the
elements of specific crimes right now.
      “[Teller]: Okay.
      “[Officer]: That’s why I’m asking you. So, when he gave you that note,
internally, not based off your training, you personally, were you scared?
      “[Teller]: I’m scared, yes.
      “[Officer]: Okay.
      “[Teller]: I’m shaking.
      “[Officer]: Okay. Yeah, all right. That’s why. I just wanna make sure.
Hey [addressing the other officer], it’s a valid 211 [referring to the robbery
Penal Code section]. She was scared.”
      Later, the officer asked the teller additional questions about the
robbery, including about the fact she gave the suspect the money without him
taking it. This exchange then occurred:

                                         4
      “[Officer]: Okay. And you were fearful? You were scared?
      “[Teller]: Uh, it—I just felt huh . . . nervous.
      “[Officer]: Okay.”
Bland’s Pretrial Motion to Introduce Expert Testimony and Court’s Ruling
      Before trial, Bland’s counsel moved to introduce into evidence the
testimony of Dr. John Wixted, a clinical and experimental psychologist and
distinguished university psychology professor. According to counsel, Dr.
Wixted had worked on how malleable memory could be and how experiences
could affect it. Counsel stated Dr. Wixted worked specifically on “eyewitness
memory and how police actions and the way that police interview witnesses
can affect those memories.” He explained Dr. Wixted would address
“standards in terms of how you question people and that there are
psychological, scientific reasons why these standards are in place.” Counsel
anticipated an Evidence Code section 352 argument, stating Dr. Wixted was
clear and easy to follow, and that he was not going to give opinions on
whether the teller was in fear or lying or whether his client intended to inflict
fear, but the jury should consider how her testimony was affected by the way
she was questioned by police. More specifically, pointing out the jury would
hear the teller say first that she was not afraid, and then that she was afraid,
counsel stated Dr. Wixted would help the jury decide why the teller’s first
statement “is probably the most reliable one.” Counsel stated that Bland’s
position would be that the police interview was done improperly and tainted
the teller’s memory.
      The prosecutor pointed out that Dr. Wixted’s expert statement, which
had been exchanged late the prior week, indicated only that there was a
“textbook example of a bad interview.” The prosecutor stated she later
received two articles, one “related to a cognitive interview technique that can

                                        5
be used by officers” and another regarding interview techniques in child
abuse cases. The prosecutor asserted that neither article addressed the
interview techniques described by defense counsel, and Dr. Wixted’s
curriculum vitae did not indicate he had referenced POST [Peace Officer
Standards and Training] protocols or had ever trained San Diego police
officers. The prosecutor also pointed out that defense counsel brought up
eyewitness identification such as the impact of a photographic lineup, but
that was not at issue in the case, and required a “completely different
analysis . . . .” According to the prosecutor: “There is not one article cited in
[Dr. Wixted’s curriculum vitae] or written about by [sic] [Dr. Wixted], not one
provided to the People, not one research paper or anything to suggest that
suggestibility specifically in an interview of an officer can impact or affect an
individual’s memory related to their own human experience, feeling, and
emotion.” The prosecutor argued Dr. Wixted was not helpful to the jury as
there was body-worn camera footage of the officer’s interview, and there was
nothing factually significant for him to add as both counsel could make their
arguments, which amounted to assertions about the teller’s credibility.
Finally, the prosecutor argued that fear was an element of the offense, and
that Dr. Wixted would be specifically telling the jury that the teller was not
in fear or that her first statement that she was not in fear was the only
reliable statement without supporting research. The prosecutor argued Dr.
Wixted was not qualified to testify on those facts; that his testimony was
more prejudicial than probative and confused issues that the jury was meant
to decide.
      The court indicated its tentative ruling was to exclude the evidence, but
invited an Evidence Code section 402 hearing to explore Dr. Wixted’s
qualifications regarding police officer conduct and standards, as well as the

                                        6
nature of his testimony regarding memory and emotional memory. During
questioning, Dr. Wixted explained that his expertise was on “eyewitness
memory in general . . . .” When asked about standards and practices
regarding police interviews, he acknowledged there had been science-based
recommendations in a 1999 Department of Justice report about what police
should do on arriving at a scene and interviewing witnesses, but he was
unsure whether those protocols had been adopted in California. He described
general research that led to the report and a “real-world” example, the 1980’s
McMartin preschool sexual abuse case, showing that children and adults
under repetitive and leading questioning would start saying what the
interviewer wants to hear, then come to believe what they said actually
happened. Dr. Wixted testified that the problem was that a witness affected
by an interviewing technique is not lying: “This is why the whole field has
come to a consensus that you have to put your eyes on the very first things
that witnesses say, whether it’s eyewitness identification or recall. That’s the
uncontaminated memory test. Because when their memory is changed, they
don’t know that their memory has changed. And at the time of trial, the jury
doesn’t know it. The judge doesn’t know it. The witness doesn’t know it.
Nobody knows it. And they are highly confident in telling the truth.” He
explained that the uncontaminated memory test focused on what witnesses
said when they identified someone the first time, or when asked a question
the first time: “And that’s the most reliable information.”
      On the prosecutor’s questions, Dr. Wixted confirmed that if a witness
said one thing when first asked and then said something different later on,
the latter statement was “probably contaminated memory. And by then, they
may have picked up on what the police want them to say. The police may
have made it clear.” He confirmed that no California law enforcement agency

                                       7
was legally obligated to follow the Department of Justice recommendations,
and that he was not familiar with the San Diego Police Department policy,
nor had he taught San Diego Police Department officers about interview
techniques. He testified he was unfamiliar with POST. According to Dr.
Wixted, there was no distinction between false memories and true memories
with respect to a person’s feelings or emotions: “[P]eople have this mistaken
idea that if it has emotion associated with it, it’s a true memory, and a false
memory wouldn’t, or vice versa; and just—there is no evidence to support
that intuition.” Dr. Wixted could not point to a specific research study on
that point, only studies showing that “you can manipulate any aspect of
memory selectively, if you want to.”
      When defense counsel resumed questioning, he asked why Dr. Wixted
characterized the officer’s interview as a textbook example of a bad interview.
Dr. Wixted testified that he did not mean misconduct, but human nature:
“[T]he police are just trying to do their job. The witnesses are just trying to
cooperate with them.” He explained, “[Y]ou don’t ask witnesses questions
repeatedly that they have already answered because it’s a clear sign—you
know, usually witnesses want to help police officers who have come to their
aid. . . . [A]nd so if they are giving a clear signal that that’s the wrong
answer, they are going to respond to that. And you don’t suggest information
that the witness hasn’t already brought up . . . . If the witness has brought it
up, you can ask them to elaborate on it, but you don’t mention things that the
witness hasn’t mentioned because they will pick up on that too.” In his view,
the improper police questioning was not a problem “as long as you focus on
the first answer. That’s fine, as long as you realize all the later answers are
not telling you necessarily what the witness had in their brain. The first
answer is doing that. That’s why I always say it doesn’t really matter if it is

                                         8
done wrong afterwards as long as you know where to put the focus.” Dr.
Wixted testified that the officer’s statement to the teller that the officer
needed the element of fear was “a suggestive statement, making it clear what
the officer wants from the witness. And witnesses are going to—cooperative
witnesses, anyway, are—you know, have a high likelihood of complying. And
not so long thereafter, they are going to believe it was true. And they are
going to sit there in the courtroom and testify with complete certainty that
that’s how they felt.” He testified that the “uncontaminated forensic memory
evidence” would be found in the witness’s response to the first question put to
them. Dr. Wixted agreed there was a general scientific consensus in the field
about these matters.
      Answering the court’s questions, Dr. Wixted testified that the memory
research did not address deliberately lying witnesses, whose truthfulness was
the court’s province to decide. He stated a question could be clarified as long
as the questioner did not suggest anything. He testified it was possible to
make suggestions to a witness that would cancel a false memory. But,
according to Dr. Wixted, “nothing changes the rule that the best information
comes from the first test.”
      The trial court ruled Dr. Wixted’s testimony was more prejudicial than
probative under Evidence Code section 352. The court stated it was the jury’s
province to make credibility and reliability assessments of witnesses and to
evaluate witness’s prior statements and trial testimony. The court found Dr.
Wixted’s “opinion that essentially . . . the first statement is always the
truthful one” addressed the jury’s province to decide whether the teller was
being truthful, and that his studies or theories were “not necessarily
addressing the witness’s recounting of her own feelings and emotions.” It
ruled the information about the malleable nature of memory, and how it

                                        9
could be “brought back by a series of factors” could be demonstrated through
cross-examination. The court found the parts of Dr. Wixted’s testimony
regarding historical references to police interviewing and the McMartin case
could be confusing and divert the jury’s attention. The court further ruled
Dr. Wixted possessed “no knowledge of the training of this particular officer
or San Diego P[olice] D[epartment] or even POST in California,” and thus did
not have the level of expertise to opine as to the particular police officer’s
conduct or whether it met San Diego Police Department standards. The
court thus excluded the evidence.
Teller’s Testimony
      On direct examination during trial, the teller testified that when Bland
entered the bank branch with his face and head covered, she “felt afraid” and
“thought he was going to do something.” Her training required her to follow
Bland’s instructions so as to avoid him hurting anyone or taking anyone
hostage, and she felt this personally, as she “had a fear” and “was afraid” that
“maybe something happen to me [sic] or to somebody else.” She testified she
complied with his request for money because she was not going to struggle
with someone and put herself and coworkers at risk of him “doing something”
to them or taking somebody hostage because she refused. The prosecutor
played the officer’s body worn camera video for the jury and provided
transcripts.
      The prosecutor asked the teller to describe why she had first told the
officer she was not fearful, then that she was scared and shaking. The teller
responded: “I was in shock when that happened, and I—I keep—I keep my
emotions. When something bad happens, it’s like—I keep my emotions. It
doesn’t show up until later. [¶] So what I did that day, I follow the
instructions in my job. I was trained for 15 years. I watch a video every day.

                                        10
So I did what I supposed to do. And, yes, I was fearful. I had—I was—I was

afraid.”2 Responding to follow up questions, the teller testified again that
she was afraid of “something happen [sic]. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [b]ecause I was
robbed.”
      The teller testified that she showed the police officer her shaking hands
because she thought the officer might not believe that she was afraid, “[o]r
maybe I didn’t say the right word.” When asked if she was trying to say what
she thought the officer wanted her to say, the teller answered that she
thought the officer was minimizing the situation and would not look for the
suspect if she did not show the officer she was nervous, shaking and scared.
She said, “That’s when I . . . show my hands. I’m nervous. I’m shaking.” The
teller testified she was “stressed” about the situation.
      On cross-examination, the teller conceded that Bland was cordial and
courteous in that he did not say any bad words or anything threatening, nor
did he display angry body language. The teller agreed the circumstances
were very different from the first time she was involved in a bank robbery
years earlier.
Closing Arguments
      In closing, the prosecutor spent a significant part of her argument on
the fear element of robbery. She began with the definition of fear, then
reminded the jurors that they were the sole judges of witness credibility and
that they should use their common sense and experience to decide whether
what a witness said was believable. She discussed direct and circumstantial
evidence, arguing there was both direct and circumstantial evidence of the

2     The prosecutor asked the teller to explain what she meant by “shock,”
and the teller responded: “I think I couldn’t—I wasn’t realizing what was
happened to me at that moment. I just was acting like a robot.”
                                        11
teller’s fear: her shaking was direct evidence, and her immediately handing
over the money to Bland was circumstantial evidence of her fear.
      The prosecutor highlighted the officer’s interaction with the teller on
the video as to her fear, pointing to the teller’s answer that she was “in
shock” and “acting like a robot.” She also acknowledged the teller’s testimony
that she was trained to hand over the money, but stated, “[T]he law is not . . .
how were you trained? . . . No. The law is, ‘How did you personally feel, and
why did you do what you do’—or ‘why did you do what you did?’ Is it
consistent with your training?” The prosecutor specifically addressed the
officer’s repeated question about whether the teller was fearful, and her
answer that she was scared and shaking:
      “[Prosecutor]: Very interesting about the ‘I’m shaking.’ The
assumption that the defense counsel said in opening, and may again, and the
assumption that you may have had upon seeing that video for the first time
in opening statement—just a small portion of it, by the way—the first thing
that you may have thought was, ‘Well, gosh darn it; that officer is convincing.’
Right? [¶] She is saying ‘fear’ because he said, ‘Here are some of the
elements I need to make. I’m trying to figure out what’s going on.’ . . .
[¶] . . . [¶] But when he asked [the teller] about that, right, ‘Were you trying
to say you were scared because the officer convinced you or you wanted to
convict this person or you had some motive to get him?’ Her interpretation
was a complete 180 from what his assumptions were, maybe mine when I
first watched the video, maybe even yours. What did [the teller] say? [¶]
‘Why were you shaking . . . .? Why did you show the officer that?’ [¶] ‘I
thought he was minimizing what I had to say. I thought he didn’t believe me
that I was scared, so I showed him my hands.’ [¶] Whoa. Not at all maybe
what you first thought; right? But who is the person to tell you that

                                       12
interpretation of what she is feeling, why she said those things? Why is
shaking important? What is shaking a sign of? Happiness? Joy? No. All of
this is her direct evidence of her fear [sic].”
      The prosecutor pointed to the teller’s use of the word hostage,
suggesting that if she was not scared she would not bring up the possibility of
customers being taken hostage. She argued the teller’s statement that she
did not know what could happen was reasonable, logical, comported with
common sense, and was “the law that you are guided by.”
      Defense counsel began his closing by emphasizing the teller’s repeated
answers to the officer that during the robbery she was not fearful, she did not
fear for her life, and she was not scared of Bland “at all.” He argued the
teller, who had 15 years of experience along with training in dealing with
robberies, was being honest and telling the truth when the officer asked if she
was afraid. He characterized her as feeling as if the officer did not believe
her, or was minimizing what had happened unless she told him what he
needed to hear: that if she “want[ed] to be taken seriously, I have to say, ‘I’m
afraid.’ And I know when I talk to the detective later that that’s something
they will need to hear if I want to be taken seriously. If I need protection, I
need them to take this serious. I know when I talk to the prosecutor in court
that’s what I have to say. I come [sic] to believe this.”
      Defense counsel argued that reasonable doubt was shown by the fact
the teller was trained to hand over the money. He further argued: “[The
teller] said over and over that she wasn’t in fear. I don’t need an expert to
tell you that memory can change. Some of you told me in voir dire when we
spoke before that you have remembered something and been wrong about it.
Okay? [¶] Your memory can be changed by other people, by what they say,
by your experiences. It can happen fast. So I’m not saying that this was a

                                         13
wily officer that got her to lie and now here we are. I’m saying that this can
happen inadvertently. [¶] In this case, it happened after—you saw it
happen, after the officer challenged her and said no robbery, no fear.”
      Defense counsel argued the officer did not focus on discovering the
truth, or “go where the evidence led him, which was that this was not a
robbery.” He argued that another piece of evidence was the officer’s reaction,
in which he believed the teller and felt there was no crime, telling his partner
there was no robbery. He argued to the jury that the People failed to prove
fear beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus no robbery occurred.
      In rebuttal the prosecutor attacked defense counsel’s characterization
of the teller as feeling she needed to say she was afraid or had “come to
believe” she was afraid, telling the jury there was no evidence of it and it “did
not exist.” She argued the defense was using logic that everything the teller
said after her first statement was a lie: “In order to believe defendant’s story
for the first statement only to be true, you need every single thing is a lie
[sic]. Everything else is a lie, that’s what you have to believe for that logic to
be true.”
                                  DISCUSSION
                        I. Exclusion of Expert Testimony
A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
      “ ‘ “A person is qualified to testify as an expert if he has special
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him
as an expert on the subject to which his testimony relates.” (Evid. Code,
§ 720, subd. (a).) An expert may express an opinion on “a subject that is
sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would
assist the trier of fact.” (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).)’ ” (People v. Duong
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 36, 60; see also People v. Brown (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th

                                        14
140, 156.) “However, ‘ “ ‘[w]here the jury is just as competent as the expert to
consider and weigh the evidence and draw the necessary conclusions, then
the need for expert testimony evaporates.’ ” ’ [Citation.] Expert testimony
will be excluded ‘ “ ‘when it would add nothing at all to the jury’s common
fund of information, i.e., when “the subject of inquiry is one of such common
knowledge that men [and women] of ordinary education could reach a
conclusion as intelligently as the witness.” ’ ” ’ ” (Brown, at pp. 156-157;
People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 709.)
      Under these principles, an expert may not give an opinion as to
whether another witness is telling the truth. (People v. Coffman and Marlow
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 81-83; People v. Lapenias (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 162, 176;
see also People v. Brown, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 157 [topics that are
“categorically off-limits” to expert testimony include witness credibility,
“whether a crime has been committed,” the “definition of a crime” or “other
matters of law even if disguised as opinions about ultimate facts”]; see
generally People v. Sibrian (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 127, 133 [“ ‘[e]xpert opinion
is not admissible . . . if it consists of inferences and conclusions which can be
drawn as easily and intelligently by the trier of facts as by the witness’ ”].)
“The general rule is that an expert may not give an opinion whether a
witness is telling the truth, for the determination of credibility is not a
subject sufficiently beyond common experience that the expert’s opinion
would assist the trier of fact; in other words, the jury generally is as well
equipped as the expert to discern whether a witness is being truthful.”
(People v. Coffman and Marlow, at p. 82.)
      Thus, in People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th 1, the court
explained that a psychological expert may not testify about rape trauma
syndrome in order to prove that a rape actually occurred. (Id. at p. 82.)

                                        15
There, the California Supreme Court found the trial court should have
excluded the testimony of an expert psychologist who, when asked whether a
codefendant was “telling you the truth during your interviews,” said, “ ‘Well,
. . . in the way . . . that I measure truth, I think she told them as she knew

it.’ ” (Coffman and Marlow, at p. 82, fn. 26.)3
      Similarly, in People v. Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th 162, the
appellate court held it was error to admit into evidence expert testimony that
it is “ ‘rare’ ” for children to make up a story that abuse occurred. (Id. at p.
166; see also id. at pp. 177, 180.) That testimony “went considerably beyond
the limited purpose of [child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome]
evidence” and—“by implication and by inference—violated the general rule
that an expert may not give an opinion as to whether another witness is
telling the truth or the defendant is guilty.” (Id. at p. 179.) The appellate
court explained there was “ ‘no meaningful distinction between giving a
statistic that indicates that false allegations are rare and stating that
children rarely make false allegations without explicitly quantifying the word

3      That expert further testified: “ ‘[I]n my professional opinion, Mr.
Marlow was indeed in control of [the codefendant], and I think that’s what
she told. She told it consistently to the police, to me, to this jury, and I
believe it.’ [¶] ‘[P]sychologists are trained to look for whether people are
lying or are telling you the truth . . . . [¶] We’re looking for reliability, we’re
looking for validity and of that kind of consistency in the patterns, and then
compare that with what I know and studied about human behavior. And
that’s the way I make those kinds of judgments. [¶] And in my judgment,
she was not lying about what happened to her.’ ” (People v. Coffman and
Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 82, fn. 26.) The expert answered “Yes” to the
question: “ ‘[D]o you feel that [the codefendant] was, generally speaking, a
credible reporter to you as to really what was going on about the things that
you were asking her about Mr. Marlow?’ ” (Ibid.)

                                        16
“rare.” The problem with both assertions is that [the] expert is vouching for
the veracity of the’ alleged victims.” (Id. at pp. 179-180; see also People v.
Wilson (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 559, 561, 568, 570 [court improperly admitted
expert testimony that false child abuse allegations occurred “ ‘very
infrequently or rarely’ ” and that studies showed false allegations in 1 to 6
percent of cases, as testimony “had the effect of telling the jury there was at
least a 94 percent chance that any given child who claimed to have been
sexually abused was telling the truth” and thus “the practical result was to
suggest to the jury that there was an overwhelming likelihood [the victims’]
testimony was truthful,” which invaded the jury’s province].)
      In People v. Sedano (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 474, the Court of Appeal
explained that an expert who properly testifies about child sex abuse
accommodation syndrome to rehabilitate a complaining witness’s credibility
nevertheless must not “cross over into affirmatively vouching for the
truthfulness of a complainant’s allegations against the defendant.” (Id. at pp.
479-480.) Such evidence “ ‘is not admissible to prove that the complaining
witness has in fact been sexually abused.’ ” (Id. at p. 480; see also People v.
Julian (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 878, 885.) Accordingly, the expert on that
syndrome “may not give ‘ “general” testimony describing the components of
the syndrome in such a way as to allow the jury to apply the syndrome to the
facts of the case and conclude the child was sexually abused.’ ” (Sedano, at p.
480; Julian, at p. 885.) “[T]he testimony must respect the ‘ “ ‘fine but
essential’ ” ’ line between an ‘ “ ‘opinion which would be truly helpful to the
jury and that which merely conveys a conclusion concerning [the] defendant’s
legal guilt.’ ” ’ ” (Sedano, at p. 480.)
      We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings, including the exclusion of
expert testimony allegedly relevant to a proffered defense, for abuse of

                                           17
discretion. (People v. Duong, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 60 [describing court’s
discretion in admitting or excluding expert testimony as “broad”]; People v.
Dejourney (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1091, 1110 [court reviews for abuse of
discretion lower court’s decision as to whether a subject is proper for expert
opinion].) Though the court here excluded Dr. Wixted’s testimony under

Evidence Code section 352,4 we may uphold its ruling on any ground if
correct in result. (People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 901 [when deciding
challenge to admission or exclusion of evidence, appellate court examines the
result, not the trial court’s rationale].)
B. Contentions
      Bland contends the court prejudicially abused its discretion and
exceeded the bounds of reason by excluding Dr. Wixted’s testimony in its
entirety. He argues Dr. Wixted was a qualified memory expert, and his
testimony would have assisted the jury as jurors would likely be unfamiliar
with interviewing techniques that could contaminate memory, unaware that
such contamination happens as a result of a witness’s psychological
inclination to cooperate with an interviewer, and unlikely to know that the
field of psychology accepts that a witness’s first response is likely to be the
least contaminated and most reliable one. He argues Dr. Wixted’s opinion is
based on decades of psychological research, including the expert’s own

4      Evidence Code section 352 allows a trial court “in its discretion” to
exclude “evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission will . . . create substantial danger of undue
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” “ ‘ “A trial
court’s exercise of discretion under [Evidence Code] section 352 will be upheld
on appeal unless the court abused its discretion, that is, unless it exercised
its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner.” ’ ”
(People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 472.)

                                         18
research, and it was highly probative of the “key issue at trial: whether [the
teller] was subjectively afraid during her encounter with [Bland.]”
      Bland maintains that the court could have limited Dr. Wixted’s
testimony as to the McMartin case or historical research to the extent it was
confusing and that the court’s concern over his expertise with San Diego
Police Department interview techniques was misplaced, as Dr. Wixted was
not called upon to give opinions about whether the officer complied with
them. According to Bland, the court’s blanket decision to exclude Dr.
Wixted’s opinions “hollowed [his] defense case,” thus violating his state and
federal constitutional rights to due process and to present a complete defense,
as occurred in Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683. He points out his
defense theory was that the teller was unafraid during their encounter,
negating the element of fear, and because Dr. Wixted was the only witness
that would support that theory, his testimony was “ ‘all but indispensable to
any chance of [the defense] succeeding.’ ” Bland says that as a result, he was
“unable to present any evidence explaining how suggestive questioning can
contaminate memory.”
      Bland argues the error was prejudicial under either state or federal
prejudice standards: that “there is a concrete possibility the jury would have
acquitted [him] of robbery had the trial court allowed Dr. Wixted to testify”
as “[t]he evidence that [the officer] contaminated [the teller’s] memory was
substantial” and thus there was a reasonable chance the jury would have
found the teller was not actually afraid during the encounter. And Bland
argues the prosecutor aggravated the error in closing argument. Though he
concedes asking jurors to use their common sense and experience to decide
whether a witness is telling the truth is consistent with the law, he claims it
was “misleading insofar as common sense and experience were insufficient to

                                       19
evaluate [the teller’s] fear in this particular case” as common sense and
experience would not allow the jurors to consider that the officer’s questions
could have caused the teller to have a false memory regarding her fear.
According to Bland, the prosecutor used a false premise—that the jury would
have to believe the teller was lying after her first statement about being
unafraid, or that the officer convinced her to testify she was scared—when
Dr. Wixted would have made clear witnesses in such circumstances were not
lying and that it was an officer’s human nature, not misconduct, to engage in
a suggestive interview. Though Bland points out his defense counsel sought
to raise the defense theory in his closing argument, he maintains it was “half
unsupported” without Dr. Wixted’s testimony, and “ ‘not an adequate
substitute’ ” for similar argument based on an expert’s explanation of
professional research.
C. Analysis
      We conclude Bland has not demonstrated the court’s evidentiary ruling
excluding Dr. Wixted’s testimony was an abuse of discretion as beyond all
bounds of reason. First, we are not convinced Dr. Wixted had the basis in
knowledge to render his opinions. The prosecution sought to show the teller
told the officer she was afraid when the officer made clear he was asking her
about how she felt personally, as opposed to what her training instructed.
The defense would have had Dr. Wixted counter that by attacking the
reliability of the teller’s answers about her personal feelings or emotions,
even though there is no indication Dr. Wixted ever met with the teller,
subjected her to psychological testing, or became familiar with her personal
background so as to opine on her personality.
      Further, as stated, decisions about a witness’s credibility are solely the
jury’s province. (See People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 202; accord,

                                       20
People v. Wells (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 179, 189 [jurors are “considered to be
equipped to judge witness credibility without the need for expert
testimony”].) As did the trial court, we view Dr. Wixted’s testimony as
crossing the line into the jury’s province to determine the teller’s credibility,
since the substance and effect of his testimony was that the teller’s first
statement was the “most reliable” one, and hence that the jury should
disregard her later statements as unreliable or false.
      Bland acknowledges the general rule expressed in People v. Coffman
and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th 1 that an expert may not give an opinion on a
witness’s truthfulness. He argues the rule does not control because he was
not calling on Dr. Wixted to opine that the teller was lying, but that certain
interview techniques could contaminate a witness’s memory without the
witness realizing it and the witness coming to believe it. Thus, like an
eyewitness identification expert, Dr. Wixted would have provided “additional
nuance” as to whether the teller was afraid without telling the jury if the
teller was being truthful or accurate in her testimony. He argues the jury
retained the power to decide whether to believe the teller, and could have
rejected Dr. Wixted’s testimony.
      We are not persuaded. Dr. Wixted may have denied he was giving an
opinion on whether the teller was lying, but the implication and inference of
his testimony was that she was dishonest, and thus not credible, when she
changed her story and said she was afraid in response to the officer’s
questions.
      Nor is our conclusion altered by Bland’s reliance on People v. Caparaz
(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 669 and People v. Page (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 161. In
Caparaz, the Court of Appeal observed that California courts have “long
permitted experts to rely ‘on “standardized” psychological tests.’ ” (People v.

                                        21
Caparaz, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 684, italics added.) Thus, it held the lower
court abused its discretion by excluding the testimony of an expert who
administered a particular psychological test to the defendant (id. at p. 681)
and would have testified the defendant was “ ‘highly susceptible to giving a
false confession under the stress of a police interrogation.’ ” (Ibid.) The
appellate court found no countervailing reason to exclude the testimony, that
is, it would not have wasted time, or confused or misled the jury. (Id. at p.
685.) The Caparez court observed that in Page, the expert was permitted to
testify on “ ‘general psychological factors which might lead to an unreliable
confession,’ ” but “was not permitted to identify particular elements in the
police interrogation of the defendant that indicated those psychological
factors were present or to opine on the reliability of the defendant’s
confession.” (Caparez, at p. 682, fn. 19, citing Page, at pp. 180-183.) Dr.
Wixted’s testimony here was not dependent on standardized testing as in
Caparez, and as stated, contrary to the limited testimony in Page, it in
substance and effect opined on the teller’s reliability or credibility such that
the trial court here did not abuse its broad discretion in excluding it.
      Bland urges that we should rely on People v. McDonald (1984) 37
Cal.3d 351 to find Dr. Wixted’s testimony would have assisted the jury in
assessing the teller’s interview and whether she was afraid. In particular,
Bland argues the jury would be unlikely to understand how memory
contamination happens and how witnesses come to believe false memories.
But the expert in McDonald involved eyewitness identification, not at issue
in this case and not involving the sort of testimony offered by Dr. Wixted,
which in effect would have had the jury either credit or discredit the teller’s
story at various points in recounting her personal feelings or emotions. A
trial judge has a responsibility to screen expert evidence for reliability and to

                                       22
determine the total effects of proposed evidence, weighing its probative value
against its potential to, among other things, confuse the jury. (Evid. Code,
§ 352.) Both reliability and the potential for confusion were factors here, and
we cannot say the court abused its broad discretion in refusing to admit the
expert evidence as unnecessary to assist the jury in deciding the teller’s
credibility.
      We finally emphasize that the exclusion of expert testimony does not
constitute a “blanket exclusion of evidence concerning the circumstances of [a
particular statement]” if the trial court admits other evidence concerning the
circumstances of the statement. (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146,
1183; see id. at pp. 1181-1183 [exclusion of the defendant’s “proffered expert
testimony regarding false and coerced confessions” did not violate the
defendant’s right to present a defense where the jury heard audio recordings
of the defendant’s police interviews and testimony from police detectives].) In
People v. Page, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th 161, the court found the defendant was
not deprived of his constitutional rights to present a complete defense about
an alleged inaccurate confession in part because the court permitted the
defendant and the prosecutor “to thoroughly explore the physical and
psychological environment in which the confession was obtained.” (Id. at pp.
184, 185.) “Among other things, the jury learned that: [The defendant] was
questioned by two police sergeants, both of whom were thoroughly cross-
examined on the method of interrogation; the police lied to [the defendant] to
extract his confession; the officers made him feel guilty; [defendant] took and
failed a polygraph exam; and [he] had only recently learned of [the victim’s]
death.” (Page, at pp. 185-186.) The jury further knew the physical details of
the interrogation room, the length of the interrogation, and when the
defendant got food, drink and other breaks. (Id. at p. 186.) Further, the

                                       23
defendant presented his own version of the interrogations, and the expert
gave his general testimony. (Ibid.) The circumstances were a “far cry from
the ‘blanket exclusion’ of evidence the Supreme Court faced in Crane[v.
Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. 683]. Unlike Crane, [the defendant] was not
‘stripped of the power to describe to the jury the circumstances that prompted
his confession.’ ” (Ibid.)
      Here, while the court excluded Dr. Wixted’s testimony about the flaws
in the officer’s interview and how it impacted the reliability of the teller’s
memory of how she felt, it admitted the body camera video evidence of her
interview, and the teller testified about it. Both the teller and officer were
subject to a thorough examination and cross-examination about the events.
      Thus, the exclusion of Dr. Wixted’s testimony did not constitute a
blanket exclusion of evidence of the conditions surrounding the teller’s
statement, nor did it foreclose Bland’s “efforts to introduce testimony about
the environment in which the police secured” the statements or deprive him
of the ability “to describe to the jury the circumstances that prompted” the
teller’s statements. (Compare, Crane v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 689,
691.) Unlike the defendant in Crane, on which Bland relies, Bland was not
“effectively disabled” from arguing that the manner in which the police
obtained the teller’s statements “casts doubt on its credibility.” (Crane, at p.
689 [involving a defendant’s confession].) We conclude under these
circumstances the court’s ruling did not deprive Bland of “ ‘a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense.’ ” (Id. at p. 690; accord, People v.
Ramos (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1206 [because the jury saw a videotape
of the defendant’s police interview, the defendant was able to attack the
reliability of his statement without expert testimony].) “[T]his is not a case

                                        24
like Crane where the defense was not permitted to attack the reliability of
the [teller’s] statement.” (Ibid.)
                              II. Sentencing Issues
A. Criminal Theft Fine
      During Bland’s sentencing hearing, the court imposed several fines and
fees, as well as victim restitution. The court did not order Bland to pay a $41
theft fine under section 1202.5, payable to the San Diego Police Department.
Both the minute order and abstract of judgment, however, reflect such a fine.
      The oral pronouncement controls over a subsequently entered minute
order and the abstract of judgment. (People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381,
384, fn. 2; People v. Portillo (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 577, 603; People v. Pack-
Ramirez (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 851, 858.) “ ‘If the clerk includes fines in the
court’s minutes or the abstract of judgment that were not part of the oral
pronouncement of sentence, those fines must be stricken from the minutes
and the abstract of judgment.’ ” (People v. Clark (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 248,
261, quoting People v. Bongani El (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 963, 967.)
      Bland contends we must strike the section 1202.5 $41 fine and the
People properly concede the point. We agree and strike this fine, and direct
the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment and sentencing minute
order to accurately reflect the court’s oral pronouncement.
B. Administrative Collection Fee
      During Bland’s sentencing hearing, the court imposed a $1,500
restitution fine under section 1202.4, subdivision (b). The minute order for
the sentencing hearing includes a 10 percent collection fee under section

                                       25
1204, subdivision (l).5 Appellant argues that “[b]ased on the plain language
of Assembly Bill [No.] 177, the portion of the minute order authorizing the
county to collect a 10 percent administrative fee pursuant to former section
1202.4, subdivision (l) was legally invalid at the time of sentencing” and must
be stricken. The People agree that to the extent, if any, such administrative
fee was triggered, it must be stricken.
      Effective January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 177 repealed and then re-
enacted section 1202.4, eliminating former subdivision (l), which had
authorized a county’s board of supervisors to impose an administrative fee to
cover the costs of collecting a restitution fine. (Stats. 2021, ch. 257, §§ 19-20.)
By its plain language, Assembly Bill No. 177 renders the balance of these
administrative fees that remained on or after January 1, 2022, unenforceable
and uncollectible. (Stats. 2021, ch. 257, § 35.) Bland was sentenced in March
of 2022, so any such administrative fee was no longer valid. Accordingly, we
strike from the judgment the former section 1202.4, subdivision (l)
administrative fee assessed in connection with the restitution fine.

5     The court checked boxes on the minute order, which included
preprinted language: “RESTITUTION FINES: $1500 (PC1202.4(b)) PLUS
10% (PC1202.4(l)) FORTHWITH (PC2085.5)”
                                        26
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is modified to strike the section 1202.5 $41 criminal theft
fine and the former section 1202.4 subdivision (l) administrative collection
fee. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment
and forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.

                                                      O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

IRION, J.

KELETY, J.

                                      27