Court Opinion

ID: 9945294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 18:03:24.522283+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:25.851149
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/27/24 P. v. Brogdon CA1/2

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                        A167875
 v.
 DAVID BROGDON,                                                         (Lake County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. CR965834)
           Defendant and Appellant.

         Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant David Brogdon pleaded no
contest to assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2))1 and
admitted he personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)).
The trial court declined to grant probation and sentenced defendant to five
years in prison. On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred in
concluding he was presumptively ineligible for probation and, therefore, the
matter should be remanded for a new sentencing hearing. We affirm.

         1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                                               1
                               BACKGROUND2
      On September 24, 2022, police received a report of a shooting at a gas
station in Clearlake, California. Surveillance footage depicted the shooting
victim riding a bicycle into the parking lot of the gas station and stopping
near a group of three people. One of the people in the group then fired
multiple shots from a handgun at the victim as he rode away.
      The victim was taken to the hospital where he was treated for a
gunshot wound to his leg. At the hospital, police interviewed the victim, who
explained that he was riding his bicycle when the shooter asked him “why he
was ‘riding up on them.’ ” The victim told the shooter that he did not want
any trouble. The shooter stated he was an active gang member and then
reached into his jacket. Believing that the shooter might have a weapon, the
victim started riding away. As he rode away, the victim heard gunshots,
including a round “ ‘fly by’ ” his head, before feeling pain in his leg. The
victim later identified defendant as the person who shot him.
      On November 16, police also received reports of separate incidents in
which defendant made multiple death threats to another victim (a minor)
both in person and while broadcasting himself live on Instagram. While on
Instagram live, defendant held up a gun to the screen. Defendant also

      2 We, like the parties, rely on the presentencing probation report for the

facts concerning defendant’s offense. The probation report was transmitted
to this court as a confidential record. We interpret defendant’s reliance on it
in his brief, which he filed without redactions or a sealing request, as a
waiver of the confidentiality of the report. (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.47(c)(1) [publicly-filed documents may not “disclose material contained
in a confidential record, including a record that, by law, a party may choose
be kept confidential in reviewing court proceedings and that the party has
chosen to keep confidential,” italics added] (further rule references are to the
California Rules of Court); see also rule 8.47(c)(2) [to maintain
confidentiality, a party may file a motion to file a document under seal].)

                                        2
allegedly hit the victim and told the victim that he had “ ‘jumped [the victim]
in.’ ” When the victim told defendant he did not want to be in the gang,
defendant said he knew where the victim lived, would put the victim “ ‘in a
body bag’ ” and “ ‘shoot [his] house up’ ” if he backed out, and sent the victim
images of his house from Google Maps.
      On January 11, 2023, the district attorney filed a complaint charging
defendant with assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); count one);
discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner (§ 246.3, subd. (a); count
two); criminal threats (§ 422; count three); misdemeanor battery (§ 242; count
four); and unlawful possession of a firearm by a minor (§ 29610; count five).
The complaint also alleged that defendant used a firearm as to count one
(§ 12022.5); and that he personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7,
subd. (a)) as to counts one and two.
      Although defendant was a minor at the time of the offenses, he turned
18 years old before he was charged, and so his case was transferred from
juvenile court to adult criminal court.
      On February 1, the district attorney filed an information charging
defendant with the same offenses and alleging the same enhancements as
those in the complaint.
      On February 7, pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded no
contest to assault with a firearm as charged in count one and admitted the
great bodily injury enhancement allegation under 12022.7, subdivision (a).
In exchange, the People dismissed the remaining counts and allegations with
Harvey waivers,3 and would recommend a sentence of not more than five

      3 In People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754, 758 (Harvey), the Supreme

Court held that a trial court may not impose any adverse sentencing
consequences on a defendant as a result of a negotiated plea based on

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years in state prison—the low-term of two years for the assault, plus three
years for the great bodily injury enhancement. On his plea form, defendant
acknowledged he understood he would not be granted probation unless the
court were to find at sentencing “that this is an unusual case where the
interests of justice would be best served by granting probation.”
        On March 14, the court held the sentencing hearing, prior to which the
probation department submitted its presentence report. The report
summarized defendant’s prior juvenile delinquency record, and noted he had
been placed on probation about a year before the date of the report.
Defendant’s performance on probation was poor, as he failed to enroll in
mental health and substance abuse counseling, check in with probation as
required, and respond to attempts to contact him. He “completed his term of
probation unsuccessfully” ten days before he committed the assault in this
case.
        The probation department concluded that pursuant to section 1203,
subdivision (e)(3) (section 1203(e)(3)), “defendant is presumptively ineligible
for probation except in an unusual case, in that the defendant willfully
inflicted great bodily injury.” The probation department found no such
unusual circumstances, pursuant to the factors in rule 4.413. The probation
department additionally concluded that defendant was not a suitable
candidate for probation based on the factors in rule 4.414. Finally, the
probation department reviewed circumstances in aggravation and mitigation,
before recommending against probation and in favor of a prison sentence for

dismissed counts absent an agreement by the defendant. (See People v.
Brooks (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 331, 334, fn. 3 [“A Harvey waiver is a
defendant’s agreement, as part of a plea bargain, to allow the sentencing
court to consider facts supporting dismissed counts”].)

                                       4
a term of five years.
      At sentencing, the court noted it had reviewed the probation report as
well as defendant’s juvenile records.
      The parties then argued whether the court should grant probation.
The prosecutor contended the court should deny probation on the ground that
defendant’s case was not unusual. The prosecutor noted defendant’s poor
performance on probation as a juvenile and his violent behavior.
      Defense counsel argued that defendant’s case was unusual due to his
youth at the time of the offense and the “transient and neglected lifestyle” in
which he had spent his youth. Counsel admitted that defendant had “been
an abject failure on juvenile probation,” but highlighted his history of neglect
by his mother and exposure to criminal activity growing up. Counsel further
argued that defendant was a good candidate for probation because he had
never been on adult probation before and could now appreciate the
consequences of failing juvenile probation. Counsel added that defendant has
a young son, had been living with his girlfriend, and was requesting for “a
second chance on felony probation.”
      Following this argument, the court announced its decision, as follows:
      “The primary question in this case is whether or not probation should
be granted or not. . . . [T]here is a limitation on this Court granting probation
because it’s been found true that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on
a human being. There is a restriction against granting probation. I can only
grant it if this is an unusual case.” The court then considered the factors set
forth in rule 4.413, before concluding that the factors weighed against finding
that this was an unusual case.
      The court continued: “The standard probation criteria under 4.414 are
also illuminating. The nature, seriousness, and circumstances of the crime

                                        5
are as serious as other instances of the same crime. He was armed with a
weapon. He did inflict physical injury to the victim. He was an active
participant. This crime was not committed because of an unusual
circumstance such as great provocation which is unlikely to recur. . . . The
man he shot did not seriously provoke him. He was riding away trying to get
away.
        “The defendant’s prior criminal conduct is recent and frequent and
increasing in seriousness. His prior performance on juvenile probation was
poor. The records show that he did little or nothing while on juvenile
probation.
        “His ability to comply with reasonable terms and conditions of
probation is poor based in large part on what he’s shown us in his juvenile
probation. The likelihood he would be a danger to others if not imprisoned is
substantial. He not only in this particular count fired several shots at this
man as the man tried to escape, one of them whizzed by the man’s head. This
could easily be a murder case. He was struck in the leg.
        “And as has been pointed out to me, there was a Harvey waiver on
Count 3 I believe it was, the 422, criminal threats. . . . [T]his is a situation
where the defendant told the minor that, ‘You’re either going to be in this
gang or you’re going to be in a body bag.’ Threats don’t get much worse than
that. And he’s threatening a child with that.
        “I do accept that he’s had a difficult childhood and a very difficult, if
nonexistent, home life. But this is not an unusual case and probation will be
denied.”
        Turning to the term of imprisonment, the court discussed various
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. As aggravating factors, the court
found that defendant engaged in violent conduct, his sustained petitions in

                                          6
juvenile delinquency proceedings are numerous, and his prior performance on
juvenile probation was unsatisfactory. As mitigating factors, the court found
that defendant had no other adult criminal record, and he was a youthful
offender. The court did not find that the aggravating factors outweighed
those in mitigation.
      Consistent with the plea agreement, the court sentenced defendant to
an aggregate term of five years in state prison.
      The minute order for the sentencing hearing states: “Probation is
denied for the reasons stated in open court. The Court does not find that this
is an unusual case. Even if the Court did find that this is an unusual case,
the defendant does not appear to be a suitable candidate for probation.”
      This appeal followed.4
                                DISCUSSION
      Defendant contends the trial court misinterpreted section 1203(e)(3),
which in turn led it to erroneously find he was presumptively ineligible for
probation. He claims that the trial court thus abused its discretion in
denying him probation. (See People v. Aubrey (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 279, 282
[denial of probation reviewed for abuse of discretion]; see also People v.
Armstrong (2019) 6 Cal.5th 735, 756 [“A court can abuse its discretion by
applying an erroneous legal standard. . .”].)
      The People contend that defendant has forfeited his appellate claim by
failing to raise it at sentencing. Forfeiture aside, the People argue that the
trial court correctly determined defendant was presumptively ineligible for

      4 We granted defendant’s motion to (a) construe the notice of appeal as

including the judgment date of March 14, 2023, rather than March 15, 2023
as mistakenly noted in the notice, and (b) amend the notice to check the box
for 2(a)(1), which states, “This appeal is based on the sentence or other
matters occurring after the plea that do not affect the validity of the plea.”

                                        7
probation. But assuming there was error, the People argue that remand is
unnecessary because it is unlikely that the court would have imposed a
different sentence in any event.
      We agree with the People’s last argument, and so we need not decide
the issue of forfeiture or the correctness of the court’s finding that defendant
was presumptively ineligible for probation under section 1203(e)(3).
      Section 1203(e) sets forth categories of persons to whom probation shall
not be granted “[e]xcept in unusual cases in which the interests of justice
would best be served if the person is granted probation . . . .” In such a
circumstance, a court determines whether the presumption against probation
has been overcome pursuant to rule 4.413, which lists certain factors
“indicat[ing] the existence of an unusual case.” (People v. Stuart (2007)
156 Cal.App.4th 165, 178.) If a court determines the presumption is
overcome, it evaluates whether to grant probation pursuant to the factors set
forth in rule 4.414. (People v. Stuart, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 178.)
      Here, the trial court found defendant was presumptively ineligible for
probation pursuant to section 1203(e)(3), which applies to “[a]ny person who
willfully inflicted great bodily injury . . . in the perpetration of the crime of
which that person has been convicted.” In People v. Lewis (2004) 120
Cal.App.4th 837, 853 (Lewis), the court interpreted section 1203(e)(3) as
requiring that the defendant “intend[ed] to cause great bodily injury or
torture, not merely that the crime resulted in great bodily injury or torture.”
This interpretation, the court determined, “is supported by a comparison of
its language with that of the enhancement for the infliction of great bodily
injury contained in section 12022.7, subdivision (a).” (Lewis, at p. 853.)
“Section 12022.7 requires a person ‘personally inflict great bodily injury’ on
another in the commission . . . of a felony. Unlike section 1203(e)(3), it does

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not require that the infliction be willful” and “require[s] only a general
criminal intent, i.e., the defendant need not intend great bodily injury result,
the only intent required is that for the underlying felony. [Citations.]”
(Lewis, at p. 853, fn. omitted.)
      Defendant asserts that under Lewis, in order for him to be
presumptively ineligible for probation under section 1203(e)(3), the trial court
was required to find that he intended to inflict great bodily injury. No such
finding was made here, as defendant contends. Instead, the court found
defendant was presumptively eligible for probation “because it’s been found
true that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on a human being.” But
under the reasoning of Lewis, a true finding on the great bodily injury
enhancement under section 12022.7, subdivision (a), by itself, is insufficient
to establish the requisite intent to support application of section 1203(e)(3).
(See Lewis, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 853.) Likewise, defendant’s
admission that he “willfully . . . assaulted” the shooting victim as part of his
plea did not establish he willfully intended to inflict great bodily injury,
contrary to the People’s assertion otherwise. As the People concede, “[a]s
with any case of assault, a defendant is not required to act with the intent to
inflict such injury.” (See People v. Covino (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 660, 667.)
      But even if the court erred as defendant asserts, we agree with the
People that a remand for a new sentencing hearing is not required because it
is not reasonably probable the court would have granted probation but for the
error. (See People v. Weaver (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1318–1319,
disapproved on another ground in People v. Cook (2015) 60 Cal.4th 922, 927,
939; People v. Coelho (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 861, 889 [it would be an “idle act”
to remand for resentencing if it is not reasonably probable the court would
impose a different sentence].)

                                        9
      As the People note, the trial court denied probation not only on the
ground that defendant was presumptively ineligible for probation, but also on
the ground that he was not suitable for probation under rule 4.414 even if he
were eligible. Specifically, the court found, consistent with the probation
report, that the assault was as serious as other instances of assault
(rule 4.414(a)(1)); defendant was armed with a weapon (rule 4.414(a)(2)); he
inflicted physical injury on the victim (rule 4.414(a)(4)); he was an active
participant (rule 4.414(a)(6)); and the crime was not committed because of an
unusual circumstance such as great provocation, which is unlikely to recur
(rule 4.414(a)(7)). The court also found defendant had a prior criminal record
as a juvenile and that the prior crimes were recent, frequent, and increasing
in seriousness (rule 4.414(b)(1)); his prior performance on probation was poor
(rule 4.414(b)(2)); his willingness and ability to comply with the terms of
probation were also poor (rule 4.414(b)(3), (4)); and the likelihood he would be
a danger to others if not imprisoned was substantial (rule 4.414(b)(8)).
Defendant does not challenge these findings, and in any event, we conclude
such findings were within the court’s discretion.
      Because the trial court alternatively found probation should be denied
under rule 4.414, any error in relation to its finding that defendant was
presumptively ineligible for probation was harmless. Accordingly, we decline
to remand for a new sentencing hearing. (See People v. Brigham (1945)
72 Cal.App.2d 1, 8 [affirming denial of probation because trial court provided
other unchallenged reasons for denial]; cf. People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th
324, 492 [“When a trial court has given both proper and improper reasons for
a sentence choice, a reviewing court will set aside the sentence only if it is
reasonably probable that the trial court would have chosen a lesser sentence
had it known that some of its reasons were improper”], superseded by statute

                                       10
on other grounds as stated in People v. Hinks (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1157,
1161–1162; People v. Coelho, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at pp. 889–890 [declining
to remand matter for resentencing hearing where trial court indicated it
would impose consecutive terms, even if not mandatory, and “the record
reflects numerous grounds to support consecutive sentences, any one of which
would be sufficient by itself”].)
                                    DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

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                                     _________________________
                                     Richman, Acting P. J.

We concur:

_________________________
Miller, J.

_________________________
Mayfield, J. *

People v. Brogdon (A167875)

      *Superior Court of Mendocino County, Judge Cindee Mayfield, sitting as
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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