Court Opinion

ID: 9894489
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-01 21:04:17.041746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:47.726987
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

LLOYD CHAPMAN,                            )
                                          )
       Plaintiff,                         )
                                          )
              v.                          )
                                          )   C.A. No. N18C-11-201 CLS
HARIM USA, LTD., a Delaware               )
Corporation,                              )
                                          )
       Defendant.                         )
                                          )
                                          )

                       Date Submitted: October 13, 2023
                       Date Decided: November 1, 2023

    Upon Defendant’s Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. GRANTED.

                                   ORDER

D. Miika Roggio, Esquire, Silverman McDonald & Friedman, Wilmington,
Delaware, 19803, Attorney for Plaintiff, Lloyd Chapman.

Daniel P. Bennett, Esquire, Mintzer Sarowitz Zeris Ledva & Meyers, LLP,
Wilmington, Delaware, 19801, Attorney for Defendant, Harim USA, Ltd.

SCOTT, J.

                                      1
                                 INTRODUCTION
      Before the Court is Defendant's, Harim USA, Ltd. (“Harim”), Motion for

Summary Judgment. Harim contends that this Court should grant summary

judgment in its favor because Plaintiff, Lloyd Chapman (“Chapman”), has failed to

identify an expert to testify that Harim's employee breached its duty of care in

maintaining a machine in a chicken production facility and caused a metal plate to

fall on him. After reviewing the Motion and Plaintiff's Response, this Court finds

that Harim's Motion is GRANTED.

                  BACKGROUND/PARTIES CONTENTIONS

      Chapman alleges that he was injured while performing his cleaning duties at

the Harim chicken production facility in Harbeson, DE on July 19, 2017. He alleges

his injuries were caused by the negligence of Harim. At his deposition in December

2020, Chapman testified that he was picking up chicken scraps from beneath a

machine called a “skinner”. He claims that as he stood up beneath the machine, a

piece of the machine, a metal plate, fell from several feet above his head and struck

him on the right side of his neck, head, and shoulder. He speculates that a pin which

goes through the metal plate to keep it in place may have come loose, causing the

plate to fall and strike him. Chapman claims that he took pictures of both the machine

and the bent pin with his cell phone, but he also claims that he lost the phone and the

pictures with it. He does not believe that he previously produced the photographs to

                                          2
his attorney. Similarly, an unknown person purportedly recorded a video description

of the sequence of events, but Chapman is not able to produce this video recording.

      Harim’s Motion for Summary Judgment was initially filed in July 2022. At

that time, Chapman requested an extension to conduct further discovery with respect

to a witness in order to be able to retain an expert. The Court granted Chapman’s

request on August 29, 2022. On September 29, 2022, the Court entered a new Trial

Scheduling Order imposing a deadline of February 28, 2023 for plaintiff’s experts.

When Chapman’s witness failed to show for his deposition, Chapman requested

another continuance of the expert deadline and Trial. The Court granted such motion

on March 6, 2023, allowing for specific discovery and an extension of all deadlines

for six months. Based upon said Order, Chapman’s expert deadline would be August

31, 2023. Chapman did not complete the requested deposition nor provide any expert

reports by the deadline. Defendant renews its Motion for Summary Judgment on

September 11, 2023.

      Harim, in this renewed Motion, argues summary judgment should be granted

because apart from Chapman’s assertion that a pin came loose, causing the metal

plate to fall, Chapman has failed to provide any evidence with respect to this causal

chain. Additionally, Harim argues Chapman has not identified any experts who

could testify to his theory of how the incident occurred or the negligence of the

defendant.
                                         3
      Harim, in opposition, argues the renewed Motion should be denied because

“Based on Plaintiff’s testimony1, together with Defendant’s effective admission that

it was responsible for maintenance of the machine in question, a jury could

reasonably conclude that negligence on the part of Defendant caused the accident.”

                             STANDARD OF REVIEW
      Summary judgment may only be granted when no genuine issues of material

fact exist.2 The moving party bears the burden of establishing the non-existence of

genuine issues of material fact.3 If the burden is met, the burden shifts to the non-

moving party to establish the existence of genuine issues of material fact.4 “Where

the moving party produces an affidavit or other evidence sufficient under Superior

Court Civil Rule 56 in support of its motion and the burden shifts, then the non-

moving party may not rest on its own pleadings, but must provide evidence showing

a genuine issue of material fact for trial.”5 If genuine issues of material fact exist, or

if the Court determines that it does not have sufficient facts to enable it to apply the

1
  A. the “chute” which struck him was not in place properly, and was being held in
place by a makeshift bold or bin that appeared to be damaged and
B. the issue of the improper fastening of the chute was brought to the attention of
Defendant’s personnel as a potential safety issue prior to the accident alleged by
Plaintiff
2
  Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680 (Del.Supr.1979).
3
  Id.
4
  Id. at 681.
5
  Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(3); Ramsey v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co., 2004 WL 2240164, at *1 (Del.Super.)(citing Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 322–23 (1986)).
                                            4
law to the facts before it, then summary judgment is inappropriate.6 The court must

view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.7 Issues of

negligence are generally not susceptible to summary judgment.8

      Delaware Rule of Evidence 702 provides that “[i]f scientific, technical or

other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence

or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,

experience, training or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or

otherwise.”9 However, there are some situations when expert testimony is required.

In Weaver v. Lukoff10, the Supreme Court of Delaware stated that “[a]s a general rule

the standard of care applicable to a professional can only be established through

expert testimony. An exception to this rule exists, however, when the professional's

mistake is so apparent that a layman, exercising his common sense is perfectly

competent to determine whether there was negligence.”11

      In addition, the issue of proximate cause is ordinarily a question of fact to be

submitted to the jury.12 In Money v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Disease Comp. Trust

6
  Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 470 (Del.1962).
7
  Lupo v. Medical Center of Delaware, 1996 LEXIS 46, at *5 (Del.Super.).
8
  Frelick v. Homeopathic Hosp. Ass'n of Del., 150 A.2d 17 (Del.Super.Ct.1959).
9
  Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 1996 WL 945018, at *2 (Del.Super.).
10
   Weaver v. Lukoff, 1986 WL 17121 (Del.Supr.).
11
   Id.
12
   Mazda Motor Corp. v. Lindahl, 706 A.2d 526, 533 (Del.1998).
                                          5
Fund,13 the Delaware Supreme Court held that “it is permissible for a plaintiff to

make a prima facie case that a defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of

plaintiff's injuries, based upon an inference from the plaintiff's competent evidence,

if such a finding relates to a matter which is within a lay person's scope of

knowledge.”14 However, “[i]f the matter in issue is one within the knowledge of

experts only and not within the common knowledge of laymen, it is necessary for

the plaintiff to introduce expert testimony in order to establish a prima facie case.”15

The inquiry in this case is whether expert testimony is needed to establish a prima

facie case that Harim breached its standard of care and thereby caused the metal

plate to fall.

                                     DISCUSSION

       In this present case, it is disputed whether Harim’s maintenance of the

“skinner” machine used in its poultry processing plant was negligent and thereby

caused the chute to strike Chapman. Where “negligence is charged against a person

or firm in a trade, the jury is instructed that:

       [Plaintiff] has alleged that [defendant] was negligent in [the alleged negligent
       conduct]. One who undertakes to render services in the practice of a
       profession or trade is always required to exercise the skill and knowledge
       normally held by members of that profession or trade in good standing in
13
   Money v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Disease Comp. Trust Fund, 596 A.2d 1372,
1375 (Del.1991).
14
   Id.
15
   Id.
                                             6
      communities similar to this one. If you find that [defendant] held [itself] out
      as having a particular degree of skill in [its] trade or profession, then the
      degree of skill required of [defendant] is that which [it] held [itself] out as
      having.”16

Harim, an experienced poultry processing company renders services in the practice

of its profession. In rendering these services, Harim and its employees clearly hold

themselves out as having a particular degree of skill and expertise, thus, requiring

Harim to exercise a specialized degree of care in maintaining their facility.17 Without

expert testimony in this case, “jurors would be forced to surmise about the particular

degree of skill and how to measure it against”18 Harim’s maintenance of the facility

on the day of the accident.

      This Court finds that expert testimony is needed to determine exactly how

“skinner” machine works, to demonstrate both that Harim’s negligence caused a pin

to come loose and that the loose pin caused the piece of metal to fall. This type of

information is not within the common knowledge of laymen. Thus, without this

information and knowledge, this Court finds that jurors would be unable to

16
   Brandt v. Rokeby Realty Company, et al., 2004 WL 2050519, at *6
(Del.Supcr.)(citing Tydings v.Lowenstein, 505 A.2d 443, 445 (Del.1986); Seller v.
Levitz Furniture, Co., 367 A.2d 999, 1007–08 (Del.1976); Sweetman v. Strescon
Indus., Inc., 389 A.2d 1319, 1324 (Del.Super.Ct.1978); See also Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 299A (1965)).
17
   Id. (citing Ruddy v. Moore, 1997 WL 717790, at *8 (Del . Super.)(expert
testimony presented concerning HVAC installation)).
18
   Id.
                                          7
sufficiently determine whether there was negligence. In addition, under

circumstances where poultry processing plants are using heavy machinery, and there

is an allegation of negligent servicing, this Court finds that a layperson would be

unable to form an intelligent judgment, without the aid of an expert, as to whether

the poultry processing plant’s actions fell below the standard of care and caused the

chute to fall on Plaintiff. Here, the causal nexus between Chapman’s injuries and

action or omission of Harim is not obvious and is not within the common knowledge

of a layperson. A lay jury's finding that Harim’s conduct caused Chapman’s injuries

would be mere speculation. Therefore, this Court finds that expert testimony is

needed to establish that the chute would not have fallen but for the acts or omissions

of Harim. As such, this Court finds as a matter of law that expert testimony is needed.

                                  CONCLUSION
      For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Renewed Motion for Summary

Judgment is GRANTED.

      IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                                     /s/ Calvin L. Scott
                                                     Judge Calvin L. Scott, Jr.

                                          8