Court Opinion

ID: 9722817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:51:21.166815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:40.250203
License: Public Domain

*626Fitzgerald, P. J.
On December 8, 1959, plaintiff, a month short of her 67th birthday, was attempting to get from the first floor to the basement in defendant’s store. The store was crowded with Christmas shoppers, and, as plaintiff approached the stairway, she observed a number of people standing in the area near the top of the stairs and blocking the right side of the approach to the stairway. In order to avoid the people, plaintiff started down the stairs on the left side of the stairway and then attempted to cross over to the right side. As she was reaching for the handrail on the right side, she lost her balance and fell, sustaining personal injuries.
•Evidence adduced at the trial showed that the elevators and escalators in defendant’s store were running and that there were no supervisory employees directing crowds at the top of the stairs.
Plaintiff instituted a suit for damages in 1961 and the case was tried before a jury in November of 1965. Plaintiff was the only witness at the trial and was awarded $1,000 by the jury. The jury verdict was subsequently set aside by the trial court and judgment notwithstanding the verdict entered for defendant on the grounds that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence which should have barred her relief.
Plaintiff now appeals to this Court seeking to set aside the judgment notwithstanding the verdict and restore the original judgment by the jury. We are asked to re-examine the record and determine the correctness of the trial court’s finding that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence following the decision of the jury to the contrary. The record shows that the issue of contributory negligence was made a part of the charge of the trial court to the jury, and the jury chose to find that defendant was negligent while plaintiff was not.
*627Both parties concede that the facts must be reviewed by this Court in a light most favorable to plaintiff, as this is apparently the view taken by the jury. See Nash v. Lewis (1958), 352 Mich 488; also see Kroll v. Katz (1965), 374 Mich 364. We will agree with plaintiff that a storekeeper is under a duty to use reasonable care to provide reasonably safe premises for his customers. See Winfrey v. S. S. Kresge Company (1967), 6 Mich App 504. For plaintiff to recover from such a storekeeper for injuries suffered on his premises, plaintiff must also show that this dpty to use reasonable care was breached by the storekeeper and that the breach was the proximate cause of the injury. Winfrey v. S. S. Kresge Company, supra. Such breach might be occasioned if the storekeeper failed to have knowledge of a dangerous condition which has existed a sufficient length of time for him to be aware of it. Winfrey v. S. S. Kresge Company, supra. Plaintiff testified that she thought defendant often had supervisors at the top of the stairs on other occasions and she contends that defendant breached a duty of care to her at the time of her falling by not having a supervisor present during the obvious rush and crush of Christmas shopping. The jury considered the evidence and returned a verdict for plaintiff, holding, in effect, that defendant was negligent. The jury must consider the issue if reasonable men could honestly reach different conclusions from the facts of the case in determining the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. Uren v. Toth (1966), 5 Mich App 170; Kroll v. Katz, supra, following the holding in Sparks v. Luplow (1963), 372 Mich 198. In the present case, after the jury had returned its verdict, the trial court vacated it by granting defendant’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, stating that plaintiff was contributorily negligent.
*628Defendant contends that this procedure is proper in the present case as the facts do not permit reasonable men to differ as to the condition of the staircase being open on the left, clear and not slippery. We have re-examined the record and agree with the conclusion that plaintiff was negligent. We will dispose of the issue of plaintiff’s contributory negligence by noting that the left side of the stairway was open, that elevators and escalators were running, and that plaintiff attempted to cross the top of the stairs to reach the right handrail because that is where “I always go”. See Jones v. Michigan Racing Association (1956), 346 Mich 648, where the Court said:
“Similarly here, plaintiff is guilty of the same neglect he charges to defendant. If defendant was guüty of negligence in ignoring the existence of a condition of which it knew or should have known and which it should have foreseen would be dangerous to invitees, then plaintiff, who should have seen, as he did, and been aware, as he was, of its existence and have known, as he said he did, that it was dangerous, was equally guilty of contributory negligence for having ignored it and acting, as did plaintiff in Shorkey, in disregard of that danger.”
The Court therein cited Shorkey v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (1932), 259 Mich 450, as to duties of both parties in such a situation. Plaintiff’s attempt to go about her normal way of descending the staircase when that staircase was temporarily blocked at the top by a crowd becomes a proximate cause of her injury. See Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. Marvin (1946), 313 Mich 528.
The remaining question is whether the trial court acted correctly in granting the judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Defendant assumes that this action was proper without citing supporting authority, with the contention that since there clearly was *629contributory negligence, tbe court could properly overturn any verdict of the jury to tbe contrary. The issue is not that simple. Tbe trial court included a discussion of plaintiff’s contributory negligence in tbe charge to tbe jury. Yet tbe jury did find tbe liability to be defendant’s. Plaintiff cites to this Court tbe decisions in Kroll v. Katz, supra, and Uren v. Toth, supra, where tbe trier of fact must determine tbe question of contributory negligence where reasonable minds may differ. However, GCR 1963, 515 (originally tbe Empson act*) allows tbe court to submit tbe entire case to tbe jury with proper instructions and then enter judgment notwithstanding tbe verdict if it could determine as a matter of law that tbe moving party was entitled to a directed verdict on tbe ground that there was insufficient evidence presented for reasonable minds to differ. See GCR 1963, 515.2, and 2 Honigman & Iiawldns, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), judgment notwithstanding tbe verdict, pp 531, 532.
In accordance with tbe foregoing discussion of contributory negligence, we find that tbe trial court did not abuse its discretion in bolding that reasonable minds could not have differed as to plaintiff’s contributory negligence in the present case. The question of fact becomes a question of law and is properly disposed of with the judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Tbe fact that tbe jury has reached a different conclusion does not mean that it was acting correctly.
Decision of tbe court in setting aside tbe verdict is affirmed, without costs.
McGregor, J., concurred with Fitzgerald, P. J.

 CL 1948, §§ 691.691-691.693 (Stat Ann §§27.1461-27.1463),