Court Opinion

ID: 9480744
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:57:08.074038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:52.780392
License: Public Domain

MUKASEY, District Judge,
concurring:
I concur in parts II, III and IV of the majority opinion, and in the judgment. However, I believe respectfully that in part *544I the majority imposes a rule that excludes relevant evidence, in order to avoid only in part a danger that is in any event illusory, and does so on highly debatable authority. For those and other reasons set forth below, I write separately.
I.
A short discussion of basic principles is necessary to an appreciation of what the majority has withdrawn from a jury’s consideration. After the effective date of the Federal Rules of Evidence in July 1975,1 it became permissible in federal courts under Fed.R.Evid. 405(a) to offer evidence of a person’s character by testimony not only as to reputation among others than the witness, but also as to the witness’ own opinion.2 Particularly as applied to evidence of good character offered by a criminal defendant, the ultimate point of both kinds of testimony is the same: to suggest to the jury that because the defendant is a person of good character — as shown either by a generally held opinion that he is, or by the witness’ own opinion that he is — he would not have committed a crime, and therefore did not commit the crime charged in the indictment. See, 1A Wigmore, Evidence, § 52 (Chadbourn Rev. 1974) (hereinafter “Wigmore”); 5 Wigmore § 1608. The character judgment here thus has to do at its essence with whether a defendant adheres to a moral and ethical standard, and how likely it is that his behavior has conformed to that standard.
A jury evaluating the testimony of a reputation witness for the defendant in a criminal case must determine how accurately the witness has reported what others think, presumably as evidenced by what they say. Accordingly, such a witness may be cross-examined about well-founded rumors circulating in the community concerning events having nothing to do with the crime on trial in order to determine whether the witness has reported accurately a community consensus. 3A Wigmore, § 988. Because rumors of the crime on trial would prove nothing about how likely it is that the defendant committed that crime, which is the ultimate point of character testimony, a reputation witness may not be cross-examined about such rumors. 5 Wigmore, § 1618.
A jury evaluating the testimony of an opinion witness, however, has a different focus. That jury must determine two things: how well the witness knows the defendant, and by what standard the witness judges the defendant. Both are essential in order for the jury to weigh the testimony. If the witness does not know the defendant well, it is unlikely the witness will have seen enough of the defendant’s behavior to judge his character. If the witness’ judgment is distorted either by such partisanship that the witness would think highly of the defendant despite misbehavior, or by a warped ethical standard, the witness’ opinion may be correspondingly discounted. A strong enough partisan would swear truthfully that the defendant is a person of good character even if he has committed the crime on trial; a witness who thinks the crime on trial is not inconsistent with good character would do the same. The question at issue in this case probes both the witness’ bias and the witness’ own standards by asking whether the witness would retain a favorable opinion of the defendant even if the evidence at trial proved guilt. In either eventuality — bias or distorted ethics — the excluded testimony would be bound to alter the value the jury sets on the opinion. Thus the testimony the majority withdraws from the jury is valuable and relevant in determining by what standard the witness has judged the defendant.
The majority concedes that its rule excludes relevant testimony, supra, at 539, but invokes the specter of greater evils— prejudice to the defendant from two ideas that might infect the jury: first, that the *545presumption of innocence is attenuated or inapplicable; and second, that the prosecutor has undisclosed evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Id.
The first is utterly illogical. There is no chain of reasoning by which a rational jury could conclude that a question calling for a witness to indulge an assumption for the purpose of testing that witness’ opinion invites the jury to indulge the same assumption when weighing the evidence of which that opinion is a part. Moreover, consider the setting in which the jury would succumb to this hypothesized illogic. As part of their orientation in this Court House, an orientation that is not unique either among or to federal courts, jurors are shown a film designed to impress upon them the importance of their duties. That film includes reference to the presumption of innocence in criminal cases. Also, it is a routine part of the voir dire in criminal cases to explain this presumption to jurors, to tell them they are obligated to apply it, and to exclude for cause those who cannot promise upon oath that they will apply it. Further, and most important in my view, a trial judge would instruct the jury specifically, as did the trial judge here, that the question is limited to testing the witness’ views and does not bear on guilt or innocence, which is for the jury to decide. Finally, the presumption of innocence is a central and mandatory feature of the jury charge, Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 486 n. 13, 98 S.Ct. 1930, 1935 n. 13, 56 L.Ed.2d 468 (1978), and one often alluded to by defense counsel in their summations even before the charge is delivered. To fear that a jury so oriented, so sworn and repeatedly so instructed would be impelled by the hypothetical question at issue here to the illogical conclusion suggested by the majority is to fear a phantasm.
Next, the majority urges that “after a jury has repeatedly heard a prosecutor assure a trial judge that he has a good-faith basis for asking permitted hypothetical questions, the jury might infer from the judge’s permission to ask a guilt-based hypothetical question that the prosecutor has evidence of guilt beyond the evidence in the record.” Supra at 539. Although no explicit reference is provided, the majority seems to be talking about questions of the “Have-you-heard” variety posed to a reputation character witness, which the court should be assured have some factual basis before the court allows them. 3A Wigmore, § 988. See, Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 481 and n. 18, 69 S.Ct. 213, 221 and n. 18, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948); United States v. Birney, 686 F.2d 102, 108 (2d Cir.1982). However, the jury in this case never heard any such assurance from the prosecutor to the trial judge; nor would a jury in any other case hear it, because no capable trial judge would permit such assurances to be given in the jury’s presence. Michelson, 335 U.S. at 481 and n. 18, 69 S.Ct. at 221 and n. 18. Again, we are dealing with a phantasm.
But.even giving the majority the benefit of all the arguendos, its rule does not apply to a category of witness it believes was recognized in United States v. Morgan, 554 F.2d 31 (2d Cir.1977)—expert character witnesses. The Morgan panel, as the majority reads the opinion, “did not wish to foreclose the possibility that guilt-assuming hypothetical questions may be asked of the expert character witness, just as other expert witnesses, such as Internal Revenue Service agents in a tax fraud case, may be asked hypothetical questions based on facts offered to establish the defendant’s guilt.” At 539. Yet if the danger to be avoided is a virus of illogic in the jury box, what is the difference to the jury whether the question is asked of an expert or a lay witness? There is no difference, and so the proposed solution does not cure thoroughly even the imaginary problem the majority fears.
II.
The other prop supporting the majority position — authority—is not much stronger than the policy arguments discussed above. The main authority, of course, is Morgan, and the majority expends considerable energy decrying the alleged disregard of that case — a decision the majority describes in the same sentence as both “clear” and *546“susceptible to misinterpretation.” At 541. As set forth below, Morgan is not without ambiguity and there is another possible answer to the majority’s question, “What does Morgan mean?” Swpra, at 538. It bears mention, however, that even if Morgan means exactly what the majority says it means, Morgan itself contemplated at least the possibility of change in light of experience under the Federal Rules of Evidence, which were brand new when Morgan was decided. Morgan, 554 F.2d at 34. Although the reexamination suggested in Morgan was in the direction of greater restriction, there is no reason to put a one-way ratchet on experience, and every reason to reexamine the logical basis for Morgan — if Morgan is to be read as the majority reads it.
But again, that reading is not the only one possible. The character witness in Morgan testified, as Fed.R.Evid. 405(a) permits, as to both the defendant’s reputation and the witness’ own opinion of the defendant’s honesty, integrity and truthfulness. Opinion testimony was an innovation introduced by the Rule; prior practice had permitted only reputation testimony. On cross-examination, the witness was asked if his opinion (as distinguished from the defendant’s reputation) would change if he knew that facts specified in the prosecutor’s questions, comprising all or part of the crime charged, were true. 554 F.2d at 32. On appeal, the defendant argued that the questions were improper inter alia because they asked the jury to assume guilt. The panel majority in Morgan first distinguished cases involving reputation character testimony from the case then at hand, which dealt with opinion character testimony:
“Here, the matter being pursued was the opinion of the witness concerning the defendant’s character. When a witness is permitted to state his own opinion on a matter in issue, as he is now under Rule 405 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, some latitude in cross-examination must be allowed.”
554 F.2d at 33. In order to measure how much latitude is appropriate, the Morgan majority then examined the pre-Federal Rules of Evidence practice with respect to experts, who are asked all the time to give opinions and answer hypothetical questions, on both direct and cross-examination, and concluded as follows:
“We conclude, therefore, that the asking of the hypothetical question at issue herein, based as it was upon testimony already offered, was not prejudiciously improper so as to mandate reversal. It introduced nothing into the case which was not already before the jury.”
Id. However, the opinion went on to say that because the Rule was new insofar as it permitted opinion testimony, the Court was reluctant to impose an evidentiary rule “which will inhibit full cross-examination of any such expert.” 554 F.2d at 34. It was during this discussion that the panel majority first introduced the concept of “witnesses who may qualify as experts on traits of character.” As I read the case, that does not necessarily refer literally to experts, whose testimony is governed in any event by the rules in Fed.R.Evid. Article VII, but rather to those who testify in the manner of experts — i.e., by expressing an opinion after they have been qualified to do so by evidence of their acquaintance with the defendant, something only experts had been permitted to do before Fed.R.Evid. 405(a). Indeed, nothing in the facts of Morgan makes any other reference to experts necessary or relevant; Morgan did not involve expert testimony as that term is commonly understood and as the majority appears to use it here. Thus the statement in Morgan that a guilt-assuming question “should not be asked” of “non-expert character witnesses,” 554 F.2d at 34, can be read to mean that the question should not be asked of reputation witnesses, as distinct from opinion witnesses.
Lest this reading of Morgan be dismissed as entirely idiosyncratic, I hasten to add that one of the circuit court decisions cited by the majority here in support of its position, United States v. Polsinelli, 649 F.2d 793 (10th Cir.1981), reads Morgan precisely that way, to draw a distinction between witnesses who testify in the manner of experts to personal opinion, and those *547who testify as non-experts to reputation, as follows:
“Stated differently, we are not here concerned with the situation faced by the Second Circuit in United States v. Morgan, discussed supra, namely cross-examination of a so-called ‘expert’ character witness who has testified, on direct examination, as to his personal opinion of the defendant’s character. In our case the so-called ‘non-expert’ character witnesses only testified as to Polsinelli’s community reputation. We have now held that the Government’s cross-examination of these ‘non-expert’ character witnesses was improper and, under the circumstances, prejudicial. In thus holding, we do not intend to imply that such cross-examination would have been proper had the character witnesses expressed their personal opinion of Polsinelli’s character. Resolution of that particular matter must await a different fact situation.”
Polsinelli, 649 F.2d at 799. To be sure, the panel in Polsinelli, while conceding that the issue was not before it, then went on — in dictum — to express opposition to such a question posed to an opinion witness.
It bears mention also that in Lopez v. Smith, 515 F.Supp. 753, 756 (S.D.N.Y.1981), Judge Weinfeld wrote that when a character witness testified to opinion, “it was not error to allow the attempt to impeach his opinion” with a guilt-assuming hypothetical question; his authority for that proposition was a “cf.” citation to Morgan. Id. n. 13.
Of the three cases the majority cites as having “correctly” read Morgan to prohibit the question at issue here when addressed to a “non-expert,” supra at 539, two fail to live up to that billing: Polsinelli, as set forth above, did not read Morgan to bar the question at issue when asked of an opinion character witness; United States v. McGuire, 744 F.2d 1197, 1204-05 (6th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004, 105 S.Ct. 1866, 85 L.Ed.2d 159 (1985), cited Morgan and Polsinelli for the general proposition that questions to character witnesses which assume guilt of the charge on trial were improper, while pointing out that the question at issue in that case was of a different sort. Only United States v. Williams, 738 F.2d 172, 177 (7th Cir.1984) focused on the distinction between reputation and opinion witnesses and found “no reason to treat reputation and opinion witnesses differently in this regard.” 738 F.2d at 177. Notably, Williams did not rely on Morgan in reaching that conclusion, but described Morgan simply as follows: “(allowing conclusory cross-examination of expert character witness, but, in dictum, disapproving similar questioning of a non-expert character witness).” The majority tells us that “every circuit to have considered the issue, except the District of Columbia Circuit ... has agreed that guilt-assuming hypothetical questions should not be asked of character witnesses.” Supra, at 539. That is literally true, but the impression it creates — of widespread support for the majority’s position as to opinion witnesses — seems extravagant in view of what those cases actually considered. Of the six cases cited, each from a different circuit, only Williams supports the rule the majority would impose.
The majority dispatches in a footnote United States v. White, 887 F.2d 267, 274-75 (D.C.Cir.1989), which holds that a question of the sort at issue here to an opinion character witness is entirely permissible. That decision, we are told, relied on cases that do not support the proposition for which they are cited, supra at 539, n. 4, but that conclusion is itself questionable for two reasons. First, White cited three cases: Polsinelli, supra, which read Morgan as I do to suggest a distinction between opinion (“expert”) and reputation (“non-expert”) character witnesses; United States v. Palmere, 578 F.2d 105 (5th Cir.1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1118, 99 S.Ct. 1026, 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979), which reiterated the holding in United States v. Candelaria-Gonzalez, 547 F.2d 291 (5th Cir.1977) that guilt-assuming questions to reputation witnesses are impermissible; and Morgan itself. For the reasons set forth above, it is not unreasonable to read those cases as supporting a distinction between opinion and reputation charac*548ter witnesses, such that the question challenged here would be permissible for the one and not for the other. Second, the majority’s dismissal of White seems too casual also because that case does not simply cite authority; it is authority.
III.
A.
Anyone who reads Morgan literally to distinguish between lay and expert character witnesses must then consider who would qualify as an expert on the character of his fellow beings — a topic ripe with possibilities, none of them attractive. The majority seems to suggest, hesitantly but as-sumptively, the candidacy of psychiatrists as experts on character. Supra, at 539. The assumption seems characteristic of the faith our age reposes in science in general and psychiatry in particular; the hesitation is entirely warranted. To assume that psychiatrists, because they understand more than most people about certain forces that govern human behavior, are therefore experts in human character, is sublimely logical, but quite wrong — rather like assuming that because Albert Einstein understood more than Ted Williams about the laws of physics that govern the path of a moving sphere, he must also have been a better hitter. Psychiatrists, as psychiatrists should be the first to concede, are experts in pathology, not in morality. They are limited by their discipline to recognized patterns of mental illness. See, e.g., American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Third Edition—Revised), p. xxix (1987 ed.) (hereinafter “DSM-III-R”).3 Yet we have all seen criminals who are glowing portraits of mental health, and saints who bristle with neuroses.
A stock swindler or a tax cheat may act based on a recognized personality disorder, e.g. DSM-III-R 301.70, or he may act based on simple greed and the belief that he can get away with it. Psychiatrists may be able to detect mental conditions that generate criminality, and thus would qualify as experts to testify about such conditions. But that does not make them experts on human character.
That is not to say there will be any shortage of candidates for the title of expert. Among the first probably would be the clergy, who deal regularly with sin and virtue, good and evil, and the like. Of course, once we recognize the clergy as experts in character, we would have to avoid offense to the First Amendment, cf., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1792, 1795, 26 L.Ed.2d 308 (1970), by recognizing also a Coxey’s army of lay moralists, ethicists, and pretty much anyone else willing to set up a booth on the fair ground — including, as a matter of professional courtesy if nothing else, judges. All in all, this is not an appetizing prospect.
The simple truth is that the notion of expert character testimony, although it has been bandied about in the literature for some time, compare, e.g., Curran, “Expert Psychiatric Evidence of Personality Traits,” 103 U.Pa.L.Rev. 999, 1013 (1955) (endorsing such evidence) with, Falknor and Steffen, “Evidence of Character: From the Crucible of the Community to the Couch of the Psychiatrist,” 102 U.Pa.L. Rev. 980, 994 (1954) (criticizing such evidence), is one of those ideas whose time has not yet come, and with common sense and a modicum of luck it never will. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that, “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert ... may testify thereto.” As this Court wrote in Andrews v. Metro *549North Commuter R. Co., 882 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir.1989), “For an expert’s testimony to be admissible under this Rule, however, it must be directed to matters within the witness’ scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge and not to lay matters which a jury is capable of understanding and deciding without the expert’s help.” Character is a subject on which jurors do not need and therefore should not get expert guidance. United States v. Webb, 625 F.2d 709, 710-11 (5th Cir.1980). To suggest otherwise is at best unhelpful.
B.
Finally, while fashioning an absolute rule about what sort of cross-examination should be permitted at a trial, the majority itself appears to have disregarded a bit of guidance on the wisdom of such appellate rule-making that the Supreme Court provided in Michelson, supra, albeit in the form of dictum. That case and its history are instructive. The case originated in this Circuit, and appears to have been heard by the Supreme Court at least in part at the request of the author of the Circuit opinion. That author, Judge Clark, urged that the rule permitting a reputation character witness to be cross-examined about other bad acts of the accused in order to test the witness’ grounds for knowledge, should be changed. He doubted that trial judges could fashion effective instructions:
“Because, as Wigmore says, the jury almost surely cannot comprehend the judge!s limiting instruction, the writer of this opinion wishes that the United States Supreme Court would tell us to follow what appears to be the Illinois rule, i.e., that such questions are improper unless they relate to offenses similar to those for which the defendant is on trial.”
United States v. Michelson, 165 F.2d 732, 735 n. 11 (2d Cir.1948). The Supreme Court took the ease, but left the prevailing rule undisturbed. It wrote that despite criticism, the law as it stood “has proved a workable even if clumsy system when moderated by discretionary controls in the hands of a wise and strong trial court.” 335 U.S. at 486, 69 S.Ct. at 223. As the majority opinion illustrates, those discretionary controls worked well here; lest anyone miss the point, the trial court made the obvious explicit by instructing the jury specifically on the limited purpose for which the evidence at issue was received. At 538, 541; App. 1422, 1433, 1461. Those discretionary controls should not be abandoned in favor of an inflexible rule. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Michelson, put the matter even more forcefully:
“Despite the fact that my feelings run in the general direction of the views expressed by Mr. Justice Rutledge in his dissent, I join the Court’s opinion. I do so because I believe it to be unprofitable, on balance, for appellate courts to formulate rigid rules for the exclusion of evidence in courts of law that outside them would not be regarded as clearly irrelevant in the determination of issues. For well-understood reasons this Court’s occasional ventures in formulating such rules hardly encourages confidence in denying to the federal trial courts a power of control over the allowable scope of cross-examination possessed by trial judges in practically all State courts. After all, such uniformity of rule in the conduct of trials is the crystallization of experience even when due allowance is made for the force of limitation. To reject such an impressive body of experience would imply a more dependable wisdom in a matter of this sort than I can claim.
“To leave the District Courts of the United States the discretion given to them by this decision presupposes a high standard of professional competence, good sense, fairness and courage on the part of the federal district judges. If the United States District Courts are not manned by judges of such qualities, appellate review, no matter how stringent, can do very little to make up for the lack of them.”
335 U.S. at 488-89, 69 S.Ct. at 224-25.
For the foregoing reasons, as to part I of the majority opinion, I concur only in the judgment.

. Pub.L. 93-595, § 3, Jan. 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1959.

. "(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of conduct."

. “CAUTIONARY STATEMENT.... The purpose of DSM-III-R is to provide clear descriptions of diagnostic categories in order to enable clinicians and investigators to diagnose, communicate about, study and treat the various mental disorders. It is to be understood that inclusion here, for clinical and research purposes, of a diagnostic category such as Pathological Gambling or Pedophilia does not imply that the condition meets legal or other nonmedical criteria for what constitutes mental disease, mental disorder, or mental disability. The clinical and scientific considerations involved in categorization of these conditions as mental disorders may not be wholly relevant to legal judgments, for example, that take into account such issues as individual responsibility, disability determination, and competency."