Court Opinion

ID: 9702031
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:50:33.3317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:32.705758
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
(dissenting in part and concurring in part). The majority unnecessarily and inappropriately overrules People v Taylor1 to hold that the smell of marijuana by a qualified police officer may establish probable cause for a warrantless search of a motor vehicle.2
Taylor held that the odor of marijuana alone is insufficient to create probable cause to search a vehicle. In that case, the arresting police officer had little practical experience and no training in detecting the odor. In this case, the officer had extensive experience in the area. Hence the finding of probable cause here is based on more than the odor of marijuana. It is based on the odor, coupled with the knowledge necessary to accurately distinguish the odor.3
*428In applying a totality of the circumstances analysis, one finds that other relevant facts were that the officer saw no marijuana or evidence of its presence before he searched. The occupants of the car denied having contraband. The contraband was not in plain sight, but was sealed and in the closed trunk. There was nothing else to weigh against the officer’s claim of smelling marijuana and his experience with it. Hence the finding of probable cause can be justified.
But I stress that the finding is not based solely on the odor of marijuana. It is based on the odor, plus the officer’s ability accurately to detect the odor, weighed with the other relevant facts.4 When all is *429considered, the factors supporting probable cause overwhelm those opposing it here.
I see no reason why this reversal cannot apply rather than overturn Taylor. To the extent that the Taylor majority may have misread the Taylor and Johnson United States Supreme Court cases, it can be corrected without undermining the overall validity of the holding. Johnson v United States, 333 US 10; 68 S Ct 367; 92 L Ed 2d 436 (1948).
This Court should correct the Court of Appeals perception that “the odor of either fresh marijuana or marijuana smoke, standing alone, provides probable cause for a warrantless search.” We should clarify that all relevant circumstances must be considered and that the odor, coupled with an officer’s training, *430may, but not necessarily will, be enough to establish probable cause.5
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Kelly, J.

 454 Mich 580; 564 NW2d 24 (1997).

 Ante, pp 413, 426. However, on page 424 of its opinion, the majority states a different holding: “Probable cause can exist when the odor of marijuana is the only factor indicating the presence of contraband.” See also p 423, n 11. The majority should determine which holding it prefers and state that holding consistently throughout its opinion in order to avoid unnecessary confusion.

 In setting out the facts in Taylor, the majority specifically mentions that the officer instigating the search “had no special training in the smell of marijuana and that he had not been administered a test regarding the smell of marijuana.” Id. at 584. The training and experience of the officer did not bolster his claim that he smelled marijuana upon approaching the defendant’s car. In the totality of the circumstances analysis, his experience was not a factor indicating probable cause. No other fact supporting a finding of probable cause was presented except the officer’s claim that he smelled marijuana. At no time was marijuana found. Id. at 585.
*428In footnote 12 of its opinion, the majority notes that the second officer summoned as back-up in Taylor also testified regarding smelling marijuana. This was not relevant in determining whether probable cause existed on the basis of the totality of the circumstances. “[T]he level of intrusion upon the defendants escalated to a seizure requiring probable cause when Officer Walendzik summoned dispatch for back-up.” Id. at 590. Furthermore, the Taylor majority specifically noted that the second officer likewise lacked any special training in identifying the smell of marijuana The Taylor Court’s emphasis on the officers’ lack of special training suggests that probable cause may have been found had the first officer testified that he had such training.
The Taylor Court stated that the “odor [of marijuana] alone is not sufficient probable cause to search a vehicle.” Id. at 593. This is not inconsistent with the Court’s holding today that the odor of marijuana alone by a person qualified to know the odor may establish probable cause.
In both cases, the odor without more is insufficient for probable cause. Also, in both a totality of the circumstances must be considered before probable cause can be determined.

 At least two federal circuits have unequivocally acknowledged that the training and experience of the officer making the probable cause detennination must be considered in the totality of the circumstances. The Fifth Circuit declared in United States v Paige, 136 F3d 1012, 1023-1024 (CA 5, 1998):
[l]n reviewing probable cause determinations, we must consider the totality of the circumstances—including the officers’ training and experience as well as their knowledge of the situation at hand.
*429Likewise, in United States v Jerez, 108 F3d 684, 708 (CA 7, 1997), the Seventh Circuit stated:
“[W]e consider the ‘totality of the circumstances’ as they were presented to the officer at the time of the encounter. Included in this picture are the officer’s experience and his knowledge of the typical behavior of persons involved in [such criminal activity].”
The majority counters that an officer’s training and experience is not “an independent factor indicating the presence of contraband.” Rather it goes to the reliability of the officer’s testimony that the odor of contraband was detected. Ante, p 423. I disagree. Numerous factors universally considered as part of the totality of the circumstances are more relevant to the weight to be given an officer’s testimony than independently evidencing the presence of contraband, e.g., the packaging of marijuana in such a manner that detection of its odor is unlikely, the presence of wind or competing odors that could confuse or overwhelm the officer’s sense of smell, or a head cold that adversely affects the arresting officer’s sense of smell. Because these are all independent factors considered in the totality of the circumstances, the training and experience of the officer must be, as well. The majority cites no authority for the proposition that to be a “factor” included in the totality of the circumstances analysis something must independently show the presence of contraband.

 The majority claims that its holding today returns Michigan to the majority view. However, a probable cause determination based on the totality of the circumstances has always been “the view” in both Michigan and among “the majority” of jurisdictions. The majority today unnecessarily overrules Taylor while at the same time reaffirming its holding.
The majority claims no reliance interests aside from those of “illicit substance transporters]” are affected by its decision today. Ante, p 425. However, lawyers, state courts at all levels and the law enforcement community rely on the stability of the law in performing their respective duties competently and efficiently. This reliance interest is adversely affected when we rapidly and needlessly overrule a precedent.