Court Opinion

ID: 9759107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:06:04.750518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:59.477557
License: Public Domain

KENNETH M. ROMINES, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent. The majority invents new meaning for a verdict of no liability. By tortured speculation and post hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning that only a sophist could appreciate — see the majority’s footnote 2 — a circuit judge that gave calm and reasoned consideration to the issue before him — followed by a long line of cases including a case that reasons clearly on the very issue facing the Court — is now convicted of error. The majority dismisses the record in this case as giving “... little assistance.” I find the record helpful and dispositive.
This record reflects that Ms. Braboy was unable to find a set of facts concerning the accident that she could consistently relate. Whether on direct, cross-examination, or re-direct, the facts came out differently — not just subtle nuances on the same theme. All the other fact witnesses, and both Ms. Braboy’s reconstructionist and FedEx’s reconstructionist, related facts and conclusions diametrically opposed to those proffered by Ms. Braboy.1 To speculate — as the majority does — the jury must not have believed Ms. Braboy.
Further, the record reflects deliberation and reasoned consideration by the trial judge when confronted by the verdict that so perplexes the majority. First, the trial judge did independent research while the jury was at recess, and heard argument from counsel concerning counsel’s research. Second, the trial judge polled the jury, and the jury affirmed the verdict. These actions seem to me an exercise in calm discretion which should not be reversed. The trial judge relied on Heitner v. Gill, 973 S.W.2d 98 (Mo.App. S.D.1998) *698and accepted the verdict, which I find absolutely appropriate.
As I understand the majority, inasmuch as the jury filled in an amount on the verdict tail, the “... verdict is inconsistent and a nullity, and cannot support the entry of a judgment ... ”, and, “it cannot fairly be resolved as a definite finding in favor of either party....”
Simply, the verdict is a no liability dog-fall. In nineteen years of seeing these verdicts on the Circuit bench in the 21st circuit, both Bench and Bar referred to these no liability verdicts as “St. Louis County Acts of God.” But, as they must, the majority acknowledges that a no liability verdict can be returned. Thus a double zero is not inconsistent in and of itself.
As to the damage tail, the jury completed the job when they found no liability, and that which follows is superfluous. A long line of cases, as early as 1870, spells out what is surplusage in a verdict in varying contexts.2 Heitner v. Gill, supra, is consistent with these cases and the logic is helpful here.
This was a tort case. The jury decides liability, and then damages. If the jury finds no liability, there is no further inquiry — the jury’s job is complete. Here, the jury twice said FedEx had no liability; this jury did not believe “FedEx indeed had liability.”
Under the initial portion of the majority opinion under “Discussion”, general guiding principles of the manner of our review are set out. The majority then ignores these principles — there is no attempt to construe the verdict to give it effect — the jury’s intent (though expressed twice) is not given a liberal viewing — and the verdict is not considered on the whole record.

. Braboy’s account of the accident was refuted by seven witnesses: Tom Schaefer, FedEx’s accident reconstruction expert; James Hall, Braboy’s own accident reconstruction expert; Jermaine Jackson, the St. Louis Police Officer who took Braboy’s statement after the accident; FedEx driver Michael Eilers; and three construction workers: Pete Prives, Chris Ra-dake, and Brian Skaggs.

. See State ex rel. Webster v. James K. Knight, Circuit Judge, 46 Mo. 83 (Mo.1870) (juiy’s finding of costs should have been stricken as surplusage); Ranney v. Bader, 48 Mo. 539 (Mo.1871) (jury’s finding of interest properly stricken); Hancock v. Buckley, 18 Mo.App. 459 (Mo.App.1885) (juiy’s finding of costs properly stricken); Buttron et al. v. Bridell et al., 228 Mo. 622, 129 S.W. 12 (Mo.1910) (Court properly struck jury's apportionment of damages); Roman v. King, 268 S.W. 414 (Mo.App.1925) (attorney’s fees award should have been stricken); Berryman v. People's Motorbus Co. of St. Louis et al., 228 Mo.App. 1032, 54 S.W.2d 747 (Mo.App.1932) (Court properly struck jury’s apportionment of damages); State ex rel. St. Louis Public Service Co. v. Becker et al., 334 Mo. 115, 66 S.W.2d 141 (Mo.1933) (jury’s apportionment of damages properly stricken); Crystal Tire Co. v. Home Service Oil Co., 465 S.W.2d 531 (Mo.1971) (juiy’s apportionment of damages should have been stricken); and Roberts v. Obremski, 761 S.W.2d 291 (Mo.App. E.D.1988) (jury’s finding that plaintiff was 100% at fault properly disregarded).