Court Opinion

ID: 9386292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-11 22:00:43.225704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:05.479958
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                             FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

                                               )
 JULIO A. RAMOS,                               )
                                               )
                Plaintiff,                     )
                                               )
        v.                                     )       Civil Action No. 1:23-cv-00423 (UNA)
                                               )
 UNKNOWN SPECIAL AGENT, et al.,                )
                                               )
                Defendants.                    )
                                               )

                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION
       This matter is before the court on plaintiff’s pro se complaint, ECF No. 1, and application

for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. For the reasons explained below, the

IFP application will be granted, and this matter will be dismissed as precluded by res judicata.

        As background, on November 9, 2001, plaintiff was convicted of conspiracy to possess

with intent to distribute over five kilograms of cocaine and over 1,000 kilograms of marijuana, and

of possession with intent to distribute over 1,000 kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§§ 846, 841, by a jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. See

United States v. Ramos, No. 4:1999cr00457 (S.D. Tex. Filed Aug. 9, 1999), at ECF No. 644 (Jury

Verdict). He was sentenced to, inter alia, 405 months’ imprisonment. See id. at ECF Nos. 725

(Hearing), 727 (Judgment and Sentence). On August 4, 2003, the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. See id. at ECF No. 796 (USCA

Judgment).

       In this matter, plaintiff sues the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) and an

unnamed DEA “special agent,” seeking the return of real and personal property that was seized in

the Dominican Republic when he was arrested on an extradition warrant in 2000. He alleges that
defendants conspired to withhold his property in contravention of federal statutes and of his

constitutional rights. Plaintiff fails to mention, however, that he has already fully pursued these

claims at least twice, albeit unsuccessfully, in other federal courts.

       On August 26, 2002, plaintiff filed a motion for return of his property in Ramos v. United

States, No. 4:05-cv-02189 (S.D. Tex. filed Aug. 26, 2002) (consolidated from United States v.

Arredondo, No. 4:99-cr-00457 (S.D. Tex.)), at ECF No. 1 (Motion for Return of Property). The

Southern District of Texas denied that motion, see id. at ECF No. 11 (Order), as well as his motion

for reconsideration of same pursuant to Federal Rule 60(b), see id. at ECF No. 22 (Order). On

January 7, 2007, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the determinations of the trial court. See id. at ECF No.

30 (USCA Judgment).

       On July 27, 2010, plaintiff filed suit against the United States, again seeking the return of

the property seized in the Dominican Republic and demanding an additional $51,546,000 in

damages for alleged violations of federal law. See Ramos v. United States, 4:10-cv-02661 (S.D.

Tex. filed Jul. 27, 2010), at ECF No. 1 (Complaint). On December 19, 2010, the Southern District

of Texas denied the claims as barred by res judicata, see id. at ECF No. 14. (Findings of Fact &

Conclusions of Law), and on April 5, 2011, the court denied his motion for reconsideration of

same under Rule 60(b), see id. at ECF No. 16 (Order). On February 14, 2012, the Fifth Circuit

affirmed the determinations of the trial court. See id. at 28 (“USCA Mandate”). More specifically,

the Fifth Circuit agreed that plaintiff’s claims were barred by res judicata due to the preclusive

effect of the court’s final judgment in Ramos, No. 4:05-cv-02189, because, despite requesting

additional forms of relief and relying on some alternative sources of federal authority, plaintiff’s

claims still sought “redress for the same alleged wrong––the seizure of his property in the

Dominican Republic. Thus his claims share[d] the same nucleus of operative facts[,]” USCA
Mandate at 5. The Fifth Circuit also specifically highlighted, with approval, the trial court’s

findings that, in addition to sharing the same nucleus of facts, the parties in both cases were the

same, and that both courts were of competent jurisdiction that issued final decisions on the merits.

See id. at 5–6 (citing cases).

        For the very same reasons, plaintiff may not attempt “another bite at the apple” in this

court. Just the same, in this District, “[t]he doctrine of res judicata prevents repetitious litigation

involving the same causes of action or the same issues.” I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund v. Indus. Gear

Mfg. Co., 723 F.2d 944, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Courts may dismiss sua sponte when they are on

notice that a claim [or issue] has been previously decided because of the policy interest in avoiding

‘unnecessary judicial waste.’” Walker v. Seldman, 471 F. Supp. 2d 106, 114 n.12 (D.D.C. 2007)

(quoting Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412 (2000)); see accord Rosendahl v. Nixon, 360

Fed. Appx. 167, 168 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (courts “may raise the res judicata preclusion defense sua

sponte”) (citing Brown v. Dist. of Columbia, 514 F.3d 1279, 1285–86 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (other

citation omitted)); see also Fenwick v. United States, 691 F. Supp. 2d 108, 116 (D.D.C. 2010)

(observing that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel “are so integral to the

administration of the courts that a court may invoke [them] sua sponte.”) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted).

        This court notes that, although plaintiff, again attempts to, in part, reframe his claims in

this matter under new and alternative statutory authority––most notably, the Alien Tort Claims

Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350––it is of no consequence. As discussed above, whether a case is duplicative

or not turns on whether the two cases at issue share the same “nucleus of facts.” See Drake v. Fed.

Aviation Admin., 291 F.3d 59, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Page v. United States, 729 F. 2d 818,

820 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); see also Stanton v. D.C. Court of Appeals, 127 F.3d 72, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
And a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from

relitigating claims that “were or could have been raised in that action.” Drake, 291 F.3d at 66

(emphasis in original) (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)); see also Apotex, Inc.

v. Food & Drug Admin., 393 F.3d 210, 218 (D.C. Cir. 2004). There is no question that this matter

arises out of the same nucleus of facts as plaintiff’s prior cases. Plaintiff was therefore clearly on

notice of defendants’ alleged wrongdoing, and there was no reason why he could not have cited

this additional authority in his previous matters.

       Moreover, plaintiff cannot circumvent this prohibition by now naming the DEA and the

John Doe DEA agent 1 as defendants in this action, instead of the United States itself. “The

government, its officers, and its agencies are regarded as being in privity for claim-preclusive

purposes.” Wilson v. Fullwood, 772 F. Supp. 2d 246, 261 (D.D.C. 2011) (collecting cases); see

Sunshine Anthracite Coal v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402–03 (1940) (“There is privity between

officers of the same government so that a judgment in a suit between a party and a representative

of the United States is res judicata in relitigation of the same issue between that party and another

officer of the government.”).

        The prior final adjudications on the merits by the Southern District of Texas, affirmed by

the Fifth Circuit, all courts of competent jurisdiction, bear preclusive effect on this matter, and the

complaint is thus dismissed. The court also notes that, although no directive had yet been issued

directing any payment in this matter, the Clerk of Court indicates that is has received a partial

1
        Additionally, the Local Rules of this Court state that “[t]hose filing pro se in forma
pauperis must provide in the caption the name and full residence address or official address of
each defendant[,]”or face dismissal, D.C. LCvR 5.1(c)(1). And “there is no provision in the federal
statutes or federal rules of civil procedure for the use of fictitious defendants[,]” Armstrong v.
Bureau of Prisons, 976 F. Supp. 17, 23 (D.D.C. 1997) (citing Saffron v. Wilson, 70 F.R.D. 51, 56
(D.D.C. 1975) (other citation omitted)), aff’d, No. 97-5208, 1998 WL 65543, (D.C. Cir. Jan. 30,
1998).
payment from plaintiff, which shall be promptly returned to him. A separate order accompanies

this memorandum opinion.

Date: April 10, 2023

                                          Tanya S. Chutkan
                                          TANYA S. CHUTKAN
                                          United States District Judge