Court Opinion

ID: 9856416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:47:04.848224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:43.918303
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
I dissent.
Revenue and Taxation Code section 10758 provides, inter alia: “The *418license fee imposed under this part is in lieu of all taxes according to value levied for State or local purposes on vehicles of a type subject to registration under the Vehicle Code whether or not the vehicles are registered under the Vehicle Code.” (Italics added.)
The trial court found as a matter of fact that Bigge’s truck-mounted cranes were self-propelled vehicles which used the public highways. That factual determination standing alone establishes that the cranes are “subject to registration” and therefore local taxes are not to be levied “whether or not the vehicles are registered under the Vehicle Code.”
While Bigge’s truck-mounted cranes were not actually registered in the sense that vehicle licenses were issued, a registration obligation was fulfilled by an alternative method found in Vehicle Code section 4003: trip permits in lieu of the normal registration process.
The eiTor of the trial court was in construing Vehicle Code section 4003 not as an alternative method for fulfilling the registration requirement, but as an absolute exemption from registration. That the Department of Motor Vehicles in its discretion allowed trip permits, rather than insisting upon vehicle licenses is of no consequence in the process of determining the nature of the vehicles themselves. The fact remains that the mounted cranes, being self-propelled vehicles using the public highways, were clearly subject to and not exempt from registration. (Veh. Code, § 4000.)
Section 4003 which provides the method of highway use for “one continuous trip” indicates that the permit shall be posted and specifies that such permit “shall serve in lieu of California registration.” Since “in lieu of” means "to substitute for” or “in place of,” the clear implication is that if such permit is not issued then registration is required. It follows that if registration or any lawful alternative therefor is required the vehicle is clearly “of a type subject to registration” referred to in Revenue and Taxation Code section 10758.
Undoubtedly the county, as well as the trial court, suspected that Bigge is enjoying the best of two possible worlds: it claims exemption when the county tax collector comes around, and yet omits to obtain state licenses for its motor vehicles. The single trip permits, particularly when purchased in multiple form, give the impression of being an economy-sized evasion of the registration costs required of others using the highways. Whether that be so or not, the vehicles remain “a type subject to registration” and thus are legally exempt from local taxation. If Bigge is avoiding a just tax obligation to the state, the responsibility rests with the manner in which discretion is exercised by the Department of Motor Vehicles. On the other *419hand, if there is a statutory loophole large enough to drive a truck through, the Legislature should close it: if “a change is to be made, it should be effected through the legislative process.” (People v. Anderson (1972) 6 Cal.3d 628, 659 [100 Cal.Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880], McComb, J., dissenting.) While equalization of tax burdens is a laudable objective, it is a function generally unsuited to the judicial process.
I would reverse the judgment.
Wright, C. J., concurred.