Court Opinion

ID: 9777751
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:22:54.665049+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:00.924810
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion because the seizure of the semiautomatic “assault rifle” recovered from beneath appellant’s feet as he sat in a pickup truck outside the house in which Ms companion had gone to effect a drug trans*566action was part and parcel of a single continuing transaction. It is always permissible to prove the “context of the offense;” 1 what occurs immediately prior and subsequent to the commission of the offense on trial is always admissible under the reasoning that events do not occur in a vacuum and the jury has a right to have the offense placed in its proper setting so that all evidence may be realistically evaluated. See Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
When evidence is offered under this “context of offense” rationale, the prejudicial nature of it will rarely render it inadmissible so long as it truly sets the stage for the jury’s comprehension of the whole criminal transaction.
Since it is clear under the record of this particular ease that arresting appellant and finding the rifle at his feet were constituent facts of the context of the criminal transaction, those facts were correctly admitted in appellant’s trial.
The majority errs, however, in suggesting there is some authoritative rule which generally admits evidence of circumstances surrounding — or the context of — the arrest in all criminal prosecutions. To the contrary, the general rule is that only if the circumstances of the arrest are relevant to a material issue in the prosecution,2 for some reason unique to that prosecution, is evidence of those circumstances admissible, and then, only if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial potential.3 E.g., Smith v. State, 646 S.W.2d 452 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Heflin v. State, 574 S.W.2d 554 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Gaston v. State, 574 S.W.2d 120 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). As in the instant case, since evidence of the arrest happens to coincide with context of offense evidence, the probative value is very high.
It is true that in days past a line of cases developed for the purported proposition that circumstances surrounding the arrest of every accused were somehow elevated to admissible matters in every prosecution;4 many of those cases are cited in the State’s petition for review. Though this line of cases has never been directly overruled, the modern trend, since 1978 when Judge Yollers wrote Gaston v. State, supra, has been to recognize the error of those cases, the error of their application as a rote rule, and to treat the issues on a case by case basis.5 Thus, cases decided prior to 1978 on “res gestae of the arrest” are of questionable precedential value and should be viewed as such.
Indeed, if the case before us involved admission of prejudicial evidence which related only to the arrest and in no way to the offense, we would be called upon finally to review and to overrule the prel978 line of cases cited by the State. But as stated *567earlier, it is unnecessary to rely on those cases at all.6
The majority opinion cites and quotes cases dealing with the issue which when properly interpreted are essentially correct; e.g., Williams v. State, 535 S.W.2d 637 (Tex.Cr.App.1976) and Ross v. State, 169 Tex.Cr.R. 313, 334 S.W.2d 174 (Tex.Cr.App.1960); the majority even points out that the court of appeals erroneously relied on Cunningham v. State, 500 S.W.2d 820 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) and Stanley v. State, 606 S.W.2d 918 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), because in those cases, “the State failed to show any connection whatever between the evidence introduced and the crimes committed.”7 But the majority then incorrectly recites an ultimate rationale for upholding the admission of the rifle in this case: that is that the rifle was shown to have been “directly connected with, and contemporaneous to, the arrest of appellant.”
Only because the arrest of appellant was “directly connected with, and contemporaneous to,” the offense committed by appellant, is the evidence complained of admissible.
On this basis, I concur in the judgment of the Court.

. This is sometimes unconducively labeled "res gestae.” The term "res gestae," however, adds little more than confusion to any legal discussion because so many wholly unrelated types of evidence which may or may not be admissible for a diversity of reasons are also labeled "res gestae.” See King v. State, 631 S.W.2d 486, 492, n. 12 and accompanying text (Tex.Cr.App.1982); see also Gaston v. State, 574 S.W.2d 120 (Tex.Cr.App.1978).

. The material issues in any given case are those framed by the State’s indictment on which the State has the burden of proof. See Rubio v. State, 607 S.W.2d 498 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) (Opinion concurring). Thus the arrest of the accused is never of and by itself a material issue in the case and will generally be made one only at the defendant’s option. See Hardesty v. State, 667 S.W.2d 130, 133, n. 6 (Tex.Cr.App.1984).

. Again I note that the prejudicial nature of true "context of offense” evidence is generally irrelevant to its admission. In other words very little, if any, "balancing” is required because the probative value of true "context" evidence is so great.

. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 471 S.W.2d 413 (Tex.Cr.App.1971) and its progeny.

. While I believe the majority opinion has essentially reasoned through this case individually, and reached the correct result, I do not feel assured that it recognizes the notable lack of logic in some of the “res gestae of arrest” cases it cites, particularly Jones, supra.

. Indeed, if the State had only read the record in this case carefully at any point after trial, the best ground for rejecting appellant’s complaint about the rifle might have been discovered: the error was not preserved.
Though both the court of appeals and the majority opinion for this Court state that a hearing was had on appellant’s objection (that a discussion of the rifle was prejudicial and irrelevant to any material issue in the case), the record reflects a hearing was conducted only on appellant’s objection that the officers had no probable cause to search the truck or seize the rifle.
After appellant’s "motion in limine/motion to suppress" was overruled the rifle was exhibited before the jury and addressed at length in the testimony of the arresting officer before appellant ever voiced his objection that the court of appeals sustained.
Incredibly, the State has never brought this sequence of events to the attention of either appellate court. Because of this failure and the concomitant fact that we granted review on the merits, I believe that, as a reviewing court, we are correct to resolve the case on the merits.

. All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.