Court Opinion

ID: 9488120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:36:55.582927+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:42.404061
License: Public Domain

WALD, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Section 3B1.3 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines requires a two-level upward adjustment of a defendant’s base offense level when “the defendant abused a position of public or private trust ... in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 (Nov. 1, 1993). The § 3B1.3 inquiry is two-pronged: (1) whether the defendant occupied a “position of public or private trust”; and (2) whether abuse of that position facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense. Because I am convinced that both requirements are satisfied on the facts of this case, I would affirm the district court.
*222A. The Nature of West’s Position
The logical first step in deciding whether defendant Gary West occupied a “position of trust” lies simply in determining what position he held. It is at this early stage that I part ways with the majority’s analysis. The majority repeatedly refers to West as a “simple courier,” claiming that the “Government’s theory in this case [is] that a simple courier should be subject to an abuse-of-trust enhancement under § 8B1.3_” See Majority Opinion (“Maj. op.”) at 220.
The government has been crystal-clear throughout the course of West’s prosecution, however, that the “position” it believes he “abused” within the meaning of § 3B1.3 was that of “president of his courier company,” not that of “simple courier.” See, e.g., Appel-lee’s Brief at 5, 6, 8 & 11 (emphasis added). The transcript of West’s plea hearing establishes this fact with particular force. At the plea hearing, West requested to remain at liberty until the time of his sentencing hearing. See Transcript of Plea Hearing (Mar. 31, 1994) at 34-36, reprinted in Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 42-45. He also asked to be permitted to continue working as a courier— for a company owned and managed by someone else — until that time. Id. at 45. The government saw no reason why West could not keep his job as a “simple courier”; government counsel stated that the “concern [was essentially with West operating a business and not working as a courier].... [T]he unlawful acts that are the basis of this case relate to the defendant’s operation and ... ownership [of his courier business] ... rather than acting as an employee.” Id.
The question, then, is whether West’s position as president and owner of his courier company was one of “trust” within the meaning of § 3B1.3. The commentary to § 3B1.3 provides limited guidance; it states that an individual in a position of trust is endowed with “professional or managerial discretion” and “subject to significantly less supervision than employees whose responsibilities are primarily nondiscretionary in nature.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, Application Note 1 (Nov. 1, 1993).
West certainly satisfies these minimal requirements. As president of his courier company, West was not “subject” to any “supervision” whatsoever.1 Unlike a “simple courier,” he was therefore free to misdirect items entrusted to him without fear of reprisals from above. West was, moreover, endowed with complete discretion in the selection and execution of contracts; again unlike the “simple courier,” he was free to pick and choose among clients on the basis of their susceptibility to his connivances.
This straightforward application of the § 3B1.3 commentary to West creates no tension with our decision in United States v. Smaw, 22 F.Sd 330 (D.C.Cir.1994) (“Smaw II”), upon which the majority relies. In Smaw II, we held that a secretary — a “time and attendance clerk” — in a federal agency did not occupy a position of trust because she lacked the requisite “professional or managerial discretion.” Id. at 332. It is an unremarkable conclusion that a level GS-7 employee of the federal government — surely subject to close supervision — lacks “managerial discretion”; indeed, the court correctly observed that “to include Smaw’s position [within the scope of § 3B1.3] is to approach the danger ... of converting the position of every person who handles property into one of trust.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). On the other hand, to include within § 3B1.3 those individuals who — like West — both determine what “property” they will “handle” and then “handle” it entirely without supervision does not remotely “approach” this danger.
B. Trust Relationship
West argues, however, that even if he did enjoy the “managerial discretion” and absence of supervision required by the commentary to § 3B1.3, those are necessary, but not sufficient, requirements for invoking the enhancement. Specifically, West argues that § 3B1.3 enhancements also require a “trust *223relationship” between the defendant and his victim, relying on United States v. Kosth, 943 F.2d 798 (7th Cir.1991). See Appellant’s Brief at 13-15.
Kosth was the owner of a credit reporting company that had a point-of-sale merchant account for processing credit card transactions. He submitted phony invoices for nonexistent purchases using fraudulent credit cards. The court of appeals reversed the district court’s imposition of a § 3B1.3 enhancement because there was “no special element of private trust involved in Kosth’s relationship with the bank”:
[T]he relationship [here] ... was a standard commercial relationship. The fraud described [ ] does not differ from any other commercial credit transaction fraud.
Id. at 800.
This circuit has declined to adopt such a “trust relationship” rule in circumstances involving an abuse of “public trust.” In United States v. Shyllon, 10 F.3d 1 (D.C.Cir.1993), we recently said that it is enough for a “public entity [to] place its trust in the defendant, and [for] the defendant to use that trust to harm a victim who may not trust the defendant at all.” Id. at 5. Still, we observed that “[t]he requirement that the victim subjectively “trust” the defendant might make some sense when the enhancement is for abuse of private trust. We need not decide the question....” Id.
This case, however, does pose that question. I agree with West that we should require a “special element of trust” between the defendant and the victim before applying § 3B1.3 in the private trust context. The commentary’s examples of positions that fall within § 3B1.3 provide support for this view; for example, an attorney serving as a guardian and a physician giving an examination make implicit or explicit representations to their victims that encourage reliance on their good faith. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, Application Note 1 (Nov. 1, 1993).
United States v. Boyle, 10 F.3d 485 (7th Cir.1993), upon which the government relies, does not hold otherwise. Boyle was the president of an armored car company, who had contracts to store and deliver coin for the Federal Reserve Bank (“FRB”) and the Illinois Tollway Authority. The court of appeals upheld Boyle’s § 3B1.3 enhancement:
Unlike Kosth, who was only an account holder at the bank he defrauded, Boyle was an agent of his victims, which entitled him to take possession of funds on their behalf.... It is difficult to imagine a position embodying more trust.
Boyle is thus consistent with a requirement of a “trust relationship” between a § 3B1.3 “private trust” defendant and his victim.
Accepting West’s premise that a one-on-one “trust relationship” between a private actor and his victim must exist for a § 3B1.3 enhancement, however, I disagree with his conclusion that it is absent in his case. While West essentially claims to be more like Kosth than Boyle, I think the opposite is true. West — like Boyle — through implicit or explicit representations of trustworthiness induced clients to hire his courier company as their “agent.” Signet entrusted West with valuables (checks), much as the FRB entrusted Boyle with its coin. I would therefore hold that West did occupy a position that potentially brought him within § 3B1.3, even though I agree with him that both lack of oversight and the existence of a trust relationship are necessary elements of such an enhancement.
C. Facilitation
West occupied a “position of trust” as president of his courier company; the remaining question is simply whether he “abused” that position in a way that “facilitated the commission or concealment of [his] offense[s],” the second prong of the § 3B1.3 analysis. Although the majority purports not to reach this question, see Maj. op. at 219, the final full paragraph of the opinion appears to hold that West’s position as president did not facilitate his crime because he “was entrusted with checks in his capacity as a simple courier, not in his capacity as president.” Id. at 221.
The question, however, is not which hat West was wearing when he actually purloined the checks at issue, but rather whether the fact that he sometimes wore the “presidential” cap “facilitated the commission or *224concealment of his offense[s].” I believe it did. As the government stated at West’s plea hearing, the entire “basis of this case relate[s] to the defendant’s operation and ... ownership [of his courier business] ... rather than acting as an employee.” See Transcript of Plea Hearing (Mar. 81,1994) at 34-36, reprinted, in J.A. at 42-45. In other words, it was in West’s capacity as president of his company that he “was solely responsible for the negotiation [ ] performance” of the contract with Signet, which allowed him access to the checks in the first place. Appel-lee’s Brief at 11. Therefore, West’s position as president of his company surely “facilitated” the commission of his crimes.
Conclusion
While the realm of “positions of trust” under the Guidelines may be unsettled at the frontier, I believe that the circumstances of this case take us well into the heartland. West’s position as president of his courier company was one of “trust” within the meaning of § 3B1.3, and it “facilitated” the commission of his offenses. I would affirm the district court’s application of the “abuse-of-trust” enhancement to West.

. The majority’s hotel housekeeper hypothetical is, of course, clearly distinguishable from this case. West's situation is more analogous to that of a hotel manager who invites guests to keep their valuables in the hotel safe — thus making an implicit representation of trustworthiness — and then absconds with them.