Court Opinion

ID: 9545611
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:16:10.858572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:10.163788
License: Public Domain

ORME, Judge
(concurring specially):
Sua sponte dismissal for failure to prosecute is usually not appropriate except when it follows a substantial period of complete inactivity. It would be an extraordinary case where such a dismissal would be appropriate with trial scheduled in just a few days, especially following a flurry of motion activity. While the question is a closer one for me than the main opinion may suggest, I am persuaded this is that extraordinary case.
In my view, what saves the dismissal in this case from crossing into the realm of abused discretion is this: Maxfield’s latest counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw coupled with his motion for leave to file yet another amended complaint constituted, taken together, a concession by Maxfield that he was nowhere near being ready to try his case in a matter of a few days even though the action had been pending for the better part of a decade. It is the length of time this action had been pending coupled with Maxfield’s obvious unreadiness that make sua sponte dismissal appropriate in this case. I reiterate, however, that in the ordinary case where a trial date is set, potentially dispositive motions have been denied at a recent pretrial, and all parties are represented by counsel, however reluctant such representation might be, the appropriate course for the court is simply to try the case, even though earlier periods of inaction may exist.
I also wish to comment on two aspects of the main opinion’s analysis of the parties’ comparative culpability in connection with the delays which plagued this case. First, the opinion says that “Maxfield was unable to prosecute the case while the Rushtons served their eighteen month mission” and seems to imply that the Rushtons were likewise relieved of their duty to move the case along during that period. However, voluntary absence from the jurisdiction does not insulate a party from litigation nor is it a legitimate justification for avoiding one’s own litigation obligations. This is so even where the reasons for the absence are well-intentioned, such as with the Rush-tons’ religious mission in this case.
Second, the main opinion seems to blame Maxfield for a delay of nearly two years following his bankruptcy filing and to suggest that Rushtons were excused from pursuing their counterclaims during that time. But from all that appears, Maxfield’s bankruptcy petition was legitimate under federal law. and I do not see how we can fault *242him for taking advantage of his rights under this federal scheme. That being the case, 11 U.S.C. § 362 stayed the Rushtons and the state from pursuing their claims against him. Of course, this “automatic stay” protects the debtor from the prosecution of actions against him, but does not, of itself, excuse him from proceeding with his actions pending against others. Nonetheless, the debtor’s claims pending against others become the property of the bankruptcy estate and where the bankruptcy is one where a trustee is appointed, the trustee succeeds the debtor as real party in interest relative to those claims. The trustee enjoys the authority to administer the claims, i.e., pursue them, settle them, or abandon them as the trustee may deem appropriate. Thus, Maxfield may not be responsible for the inactivity in the instant action which followed his bankruptcy filing. Even if he is, the delay may be entirely legitimate depending on the objectives and status of the bankruptcy cases and the ongoing progress of liquidation or reorganization.
Conversely, one who has an action pending against a party who files a bankruptcy petition — as with the Rushtons and their counterclaim against Maxfield — is not altogether helpless in the face of the bankruptcy filing. With leave of the bankruptcy court, as ultimately was obtained here, the claim can be pursued in state court at least to the point of liquidating the claim or, with consent of the non-bankruptcy party, can be adjudicated by the bankruptcy court. Depending on the particular case, waiting two years to request relief from the stay may or may not be consistent with appropriate diligence on the part of Rushton and the state.
In short, lengthy delays in state court litigation, for which “bankruptcy” is offered up as the major excuse, should be carefully scrutinized. Bankruptcy is simply not the hinderance to the timely resolution of disputes pending in state court which many would have state court judges believe.
The parties to the main action in this case sparred and postured for some seven years, showing little inclination to get their claims resolved on the merits. The system had been burdened long enough. Dismissal for failure to timely prosecute was an appropriate exercise of judicial discretion.