Court Opinion

ID: 9919198
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 18:02:45.869385+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:10.349274
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/17/24 P. v. Partain CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081542

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. SCS317350)

JOHN OLIVER PARTAIN,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Enrique Camarena, Judge. Affirmed.
         Cindy Brines, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Steve Oetting and Paige B. Hazard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
      A jury found John Oliver Partain guilty of second-degree murder.

(Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a).) The jury further found that Partain personally
used a deadly and dangerous weapon, a hammer, in committing the offense.
(§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) Partain contends on appeal that: (1) there was
insufficient evidence to prove that he was guilty of second-degree murder and
not voluntary manslaughter; (2) the trial court erred in its response to a jury
question about the voluntary manslaughter instruction; and (3) the
cumulative effect of the court’s errors violated his due process rights.
      We conclude that substantial evidence supports the jury’s implicit
finding that Partain did not act in the heat of passion upon adequate
provocation when he killed his wife. We further conclude the trial court did
not err in responding to the jury’s question about voluntary manslaughter.
Because we find no error, we reject Partain’s argument that the cumulative
effect of any errors violated his due process rights. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      A. The Killing
      Partain and the victim, Billie Jean Partain, were married for 36 years
and lived in Chula Vista, California. They struggled financially for many
years during their marriage. In November 2019, Billie suffered serious
injuries in a car accident. She needed assistance walking for months
afterwards, and her sister, R.S., noticed that Billie’s personality changed.
For example, she was not “as happy as she used to be” and was more verbally
aggressive after the accident. She argued with others more often, displayed
anger and emotional instability, and “was always afraid” that someone would
“put her away.” Partain also noticed Billie was more “mean” and irritable

1     Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
                                        2
than she used to be. R.S. suspected that Billie suffered brain damage from
the accident.
      On the morning of February 25, 2021, Billie and Partain fought after
Billie put a piece of bread with peanut butter in the toaster, which she had
done before. They fought periodically throughout the day. At some point,
Partain went outside to the side of the house to get a hammer. He walked
back through the sunroom, kitchen, living room, and hallway, then stood in
the doorway of the bedroom where Billie was in bed watching television.
Partain then approached Billie and hit her with the hammer 75 times,
including 34 strikes to her head, killing her.
      Afterwards Partain called two cousins “to let them know what [he] had
done,” and one of his cousins called the police. Officers responded to
Partain’s home, but he refused to come out, and he spoke with a crisis
negotiator for several hours. Officers eventually forced entry into the home
and found Partain on the living room couch, appearing intoxicated and
bleeding from his wrists from self-inflicted wounds. The officers found Billie’s
body in the bedroom.
      B. Partain’s Testimony
      Partain testified in his own defense at his August 2022 trial. He
described his difficult childhood, including the death of his mother at a young
age and being the victim of physical and sexual abuse by his family members.
He drank alcohol to cope with the abuse and dropped out of school in the
ninth grade after being bullied. He eventually joined the Navy in 1979 and
met Billie a few years later. Partain described Billie as being “a wonderful
person,” with whom he enjoyed a positive relationship until the car accident.
      After the accident, Partain visited Billie in the hospital daily, and then
cared for her at home after she spent some time living with R.S. Partain

                                        3
helped Billie with showering, using the bathroom, and other needs, but Billie
often yelled at him, called him names, and rejected his help. At times, Billie
also threw things at Partain in anger, including a peanut butter jar and a cell
phone. They also argued about their finances. Partain was not working after
Billie’s accident, and he was concerned about losing the house. Partain said
he felt “horrible” about himself during this time, and he had been drinking
more heavily since Billie’s accident.
      In early February 2021, Partain told R.S. that he wanted to sell the
house, move in with R.S., and put Billie in an assisted living facility. R.S.
rejected the idea, and shortly thereafter Partain called a veterans’ crisis
hotline seeking mental health help because he was irritated with Billie. He
was told, however, that the next available appointment was in March 2021.
      Partain said he had a “fairly good memory” of the day of the killing. He
and Billie had been fighting “off and on” throughout the day, starting with
the argument over the toaster. After a fight later in the day during which
Billie yelled at Partain, he “snapped” and “lost all conception of reality.” He
admitted he intended to kill Billie, and then himself. After attacking Billie
with a hammer, Partain doused various rooms with gasoline, unplugged the
gas line from the wall furnace, and started drinking whisky and watching
television. He thought that when the police came, they would use a flash-
bang and burn the house down. Partain cut his wrists so he would “bleed out
and die.” He also told officers who arrived on the scene that he had firearms,
hoping they would “come in and shoot [him] by force.”
      C. Neuropsychologist’s Testimony
      Dr. Catherine Ward, a clinical and forensic neuropsychologist, testified
as a defense expert. After assessing Partain, she concluded he was not
malingering and had a “borderline to low average” IQ. Dr. Ward further

                                        4
concluded that he suffered from “other specified dissociative disorder,” “major
depressive disorder recurrent, severe with mood congruent psychotic
features,” severe alcohol abuse, and “other personal history of psychological
trauma.” She testified that Partain was likely decompensating around the
time of the killing due to the stress from being Billie’s caretaker, financial
hardship, and the disarray in their home.
      D. Jury Instructions and Closing Arguments
      The People charged Partain with murder and personal use of a deadly
weapon. (§§ 187, subd. (a) & 12022, subd. (b)(1).)
      The trial court gave instructions to the jury on first- or second-degree
murder with malice aforethought (CALCRIM No. 520), first-degree murder
(CALCRIM No. 521), and voluntary manslaughter in the heat of passion as a
lesser included offense (CALCRIM No. 570). The court gave the following
instruction for voluntary manslaughter:
         “A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to
         voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed someone
         because of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion.

         “The defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel
         or in the heat of passion if:

         “1. The defendant was provoked;

         “2. As a result of the provocation, the defendant acted
         rashly and under the influence of intense emotion that
         obscured his reasoning or judgment;

         “AND

         “3. The provocation would have caused a person of average

                                        5
         disposition to act [rashly]2 and without due deliberation,
         that is, from passion rather than from judgment.

         “Heat of passion does not require anger, rage, or any
         specific emotion. It can be any violent or intense emotion
         that causes a person to act without due deliberation and
         reflection.

         “In order for heat of passion to reduce a murder to
         voluntary manslaughter, the defendant must have acted
         under the direct and immediate influence of provocation as
         I have defined it. While no specific type of provocation is
         required, slight or remote provocation is not sufficient.
         Sufficient provocation may occur over a short or long period
         of time.

         “It is not enough that the defendant simply was provoked.
         The defendant is not allowed to set up his own standard of
         conduct. You must decide whether the defendant was
         provoked and whether the provocation was sufficient.

2      The reporter’s transcript uses the word “rationally” here instead of
“rashly,” which deviates from the written instruction as provided in the
clerk’s transcript. Given that neither party objected at the time, the words
sound similar, and the context supports that the parties understood the
instruction should read as “rashly,” “[w]e assume this rendering resulted
from a transcription error. [Citations.]” (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th
935, 945, fn. 7 (Beltran) [assuming transcription error where reporter’s
transcript “ungrammatically render[ed]” the phrase “ ‘do an act rashly’ ” as
“ ‘do and act rashly’ ”]; see People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599 [“ ‘It
may be said . . . as a general rule that when, as in this case, the record is in
conflict it will be harmonized if possible; but where this is not possible that
part of the record will prevail, which, because of its origin and nature or
otherwise, is entitled to greater credence [citation]. Therefore whether the
recitals in the clerk’s minutes should prevail as against contrary statements
in the reporter’s transcript, must depend upon the circumstances of each
particular case.’ ”]; People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 747, 750, fn. 2
[“When a clerk’s transcript conflicts with a reporter’s transcript, the question
of which of the two controls is determined by consideration of the
circumstances of each case.”].)
                                       6
         “In deciding whether the provocation was sufficient,
         consider whether a person of average disposition, in the
         same situation and knowing the same facts would have
         reacted from passion rather than from judgment.

         “If enough time passed between the provocation and the
         killing for a person of average disposition to cool off and
         regain his or her clear reasoning and judgment, then the
         killing is not reduced to voluntary manslaughter on this
         basis.

         “The People have the burden of proving beyond a
         reasonable doubt that the defendant did not kill as the
         result of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. If the
         People have not met this burden, you must find the
         defendant not guilty of murder.”
(See CALCRIM No. 570.)
      The prosecutor argued during closing that the jury should find Partain
guilty of first-degree murder because the killing was willful, deliberate and
premeditated. She pointed to Partain’s own testimony that he intended to
kill Billie, and highlighted evidence that he went outside to retrieve a
hammer, walked through multiple rooms, and beat Billie to death while she
sat watching television.
      Defense counsel argued in closing that Partain should be found not
guilty because his dissociative disorder made him unable to form the
necessary intent for murder during the incident. His counsel further argued
that even if the jury believed Partain had the necessary intent for murder, it
should find him guilty of the lesser included offense of voluntary
manslaughter in the heat of passion. Counsel pointed to evidence that
Partain endured a long period of provocation after Billie’s accident, including
Billie’s mistreatment of Partain and their financial struggles. Regarding the
“reasonable person standard,” he said that when it comes to sufficient

                                       7
provocation, the question for the jury was not “would a reasonable person kill
another person” in those circumstances, but rather “[w]ould they act out of
passion, that’s it.”
      In rebuttal, the prosecutor said that the provocation element for
voluntary manslaughter requires determining whether “the provocation

would have caused a person of average disposition to act [rashly]3 and
without due deliberation. It’s important to note that this isn’t talking about
the average person killing. It’s would the average person have acted [rashly]
and without due deliberation on the same set of facts.”
      E. Jury Questions and Verdict
      While the jury was deliberating, it sent a note to the trial court, which
stated in relevant part:
          “The Jury would like clarification on [CALCRIM No.] 570
          voluntary manslaughter specifically[:] ‘In deciding whether
          the provocation was sufficient, consider whether a person of
          average disposition, in the same situation and knowing the
          same facts, would have reacted from passion rather than
          from judgment[.’]

          “1) Does this mean the end result of action, or everything
          that leads up to the event

          “2) Does the reaction mean emotional vs. logical. . . .”

The court and counsel agreed to provide a response based on the trial court’s
instruction in Beltran:
          “A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to
          voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed someone
          because of a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.

3       For the reasons discussed in footnote 2 and below, we assume that the
use of “rationally” instead of “rashly” here in the reporter’s transcript
resulted from a transcription error. (See Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 945,
fn. 7.)
                                         8
         “Heat of passion does not require anger, rage, or any
         specific emotion. It can be any violent or intense emotion
         that causes a person to act without due deliberation and
         reflection.

         “Now, in order for heat of passion to reduce a murder to
         voluntary manslaughter, the defendant must have acted
         under the direct and immediate influence of provocation as
         defined in Instruction 570.

         “While no specific type of provocation is required, slight or
         remote provocation is not sufficient. Sufficient provocation
         can occur over a short or a long period of time.

         “Now, it is not enough that the defendant simply was
         provoked. The defendant is not allowed to set up his own
         standard of conduct. You must decide whether the
         defendant was provoked and whether the provocation was
         sufficient.

         “In deciding whether the provocation was sufficient,
         consider whether a person of average disposition would
         have been provoked and how such a person would
         react in the same situation knowing the same facts.”
(See Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 944 (emphasis added).) Although the
response did not repeat the three elements of voluntary manslaughter
included in the original instruction, it closely tracked the rest of the language
in CALCRIM No. 570, except for the bolded portion, which was taken from an
earlier version of CALCRIM No. 570 given in Beltran.
      The court sent the response to the jury and then recessed for lunch.
After the break, defense counsel expressed concern that the court’s response
would misleadingly suggest that the proper inquiry is “how would a person
act in this situation,” not “whether a person would act under passion rather
than judgment in this situation[,]” which is the appropriate question.

                                        9
Counsel argued that the jury should be further instructed to clarify the
court’s response, and the court denied his request.
      The jury reached a verdict soon afterwards and found Partain guilty of
second-degree murder, with a true finding that he personally used a deadly
and dangerous weapon. Partain timely appealed.
                                 DISCUSSION
                                        I
      Partain first contends there was insufficient evidence for the jury to
find that he committed second-degree murder, rather than the lesser
included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Specifically, he argues that the
People failed to disprove that he acted in the heat of passion in response to
sufficient provocation. We conclude substantial evidence supports the jury’s
implicit finding that Partain did not kill Billie under provocation that would
have caused a person of average disposition to act rashly and without due
deliberation.
      A. Governing Law
      Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought. (§ 187, subd. (a).) “[S]econd degree murder . . . is ‘the unlawful
killing of a human being with malice aforethought but without the additional
elements, such as willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation, that would
support a conviction of first degree murder.’ ” (People v. Cravens (2012) 53
Cal.4th 500, 507; see §§ 187, subd. (a) & 189.) “ ‘A defendant who commits an
intentional and unlawful killing but who lacks malice is guilty of . . .
voluntary manslaughter.’ ” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 153
(Breverman), quoting § 192.) Voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included
offense of murder. (People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 197 [“Lesser
included offenses of first degree premeditated murder include second degree

                                       10
murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter”];
Breverman, at p. 154.)
      An intent to unlawfully kill generally constitutes malice. (§ 188.) But
a defendant who unlawfully kills in the “heat of passion” lacks malice and is
guilty of voluntary manslaughter. (§ 192, subd. (a); see People v. Lasko
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 109–110.) Provocation distinguishes this form
of manslaughter from murder. (People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192,
1225.) “ ‘To be adequate, the provocation must be one that would cause an
emotion so intense that an ordinary person would simply react, without
reflection. . . . [T]he anger or other passion must be so strong that the
defendant’s reaction bypassed his thought process to such an extent that
judgment could not and did not intervene.’ ” (Ibid.) “[I]f sufficient time has
elapsed for the passions of an ordinarily reasonable person to cool, the killing
is murder, not manslaughter.” (Ibid., internal quotation marks omitted.)
Whether someone killed with malice aforethought (constituting murder) or
killed in the heat of passion (constituting voluntary manslaughter) is a
factual matter for the jury to decide. (See, e.g., People v. Wright (2015) 242
Cal.App.4th 1461, 1482 [“whether adequate provocation and heat of passion
have been shown are fundamentally jury questions”].)
      The heat of passion requirement for manslaughter has both objective
and subjective components. (People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1252.)
“The defendant must actually, subjectively, kill under the heat of passion.
[Citation.] But the circumstances giving rise to the heat of passion are also
viewed objectively.” (Ibid.) The objective component requires that the
passion be such “ ‘as would naturally be aroused in the mind of an ordinarily
reasonable person under the given facts and circumstances,’ ” because “ ‘no
defendant may set up his own standard of conduct and justify or excuse

                                       11
himself because in fact his passions were aroused, unless further the jury
believe that the facts and circumstances were sufficient to arouse the
passions of the ordinarily reasonable man.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 1252–
1253.)
      On review for sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, we
must “ ‘examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment
to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that
is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—that would support a rational trier
of fact in finding [the defendant guilty] beyond a reasonable doubt.’
[Citations.]” (People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 657–658.) We will
not reverse unless there is no hypothesis upon which sufficient substantial
evidence exists to support the conviction. (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th
297, 331.) We must “presume in support of the judgment the existence of
every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v.
Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314.) “The same standard applies when the
conviction rests primarily on circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Kraft
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) “An appellate court must accept logical
inferences that the jury might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence.”
(People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 396.) “Given this deferential
standard of review, a ‘defendant bears an enormous burden in claiming there
is insufficient evidence’ to support a conviction.” (People v. Wear (2020) 44
Cal.App.5th 1007, 1020.)
      B. Analysis
      There was substantial evidence at trial from which the jury could
reasonably determine Partain did not kill Billie in the heat of passion
because of legally sufficient provocation. First, as the relevant jury
instruction notes, “[i]f enough time passed between the provocation and the

                                       12
killing for a person of average disposition to ‘cool off’ and regain his or her
clear reasoning and judgment, then the killing is not reduced to voluntary
manslaughter on this basis.” (CALCRIM No. 570.) Partain and Billie argued
the morning of the killing, and they continued to argue “off and on”
throughout the day, but the evidence does not show they were in the midst of
a heated argument at the time of the killing. Although Partain claims he just
“snapped” after Billie yelled at him, evidence shows he had time to choose the
specific instrument he used to kill Billie, walk out of the house to retrieve it,
walk back through several rooms inside the house to find Billie, and even
pause in the doorway while she watched television. And once Partain began
attacking Billie with a hammer, he did not stop until he struck her 75 times,
with nearly half of those strikes landing on her head. From these
circumstances, the jury reasonably could infer that “any passions that may
have been aroused upon first [being yelled at] had cooled so that the killing
became an act of revenge or punishment.” (People v. Fenenbock (1996) 46
Cal.App.4th 1688, 1704; see People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1144
[passion for revenge will not reduce murder to manslaughter].)
      Second, although there was evidence of the subjective component of
provocation, evidence of the required objective component was less
substantial and did not compel a finding in Partain’s favor. (See People v.
Padilla (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 675, 679 [“Failing the objective test, Padilla’s
hallucination cannot as a matter of law negate malice so as to mitigate
murder to voluntary manslaughter—whether on a ‘sudden quarrel or heat of
passion’ theory of statutory voluntary manslaughter”].) Billie’s provocative
conduct consisted of moodiness, harsh words, yelling, and on some occasions,
thrown household items. While a jury could infer such behavior was difficult
to tolerate, a jury could also reasonably conclude that such provocation would

                                        13
not naturally arouse judgment-clouding passion in the mind of an ordinarily
reasonable person. (See Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 950.) This
conclusion is supported by evidence that Partain and Billie argued
frequently, and even argued specifically about the toaster on at least one
prior occasion. A jury could reasonably conclude from that evidence that the
day of the killing was like many others in their troubled marriage. (See
People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1216 [insufficient evidence to support
giving voluntary manslaughter instruction, and in particular the objective
component of provocation, where “bickering, yelling, and cursing were the
norm” between defendant and victim].) And even though they were arguing
throughout the day, Billie was “in bed when [Partain] began his physical
assault” on her. (Ibid. [insufficient evidence to support voluntary
manslaughter instruction where victim was in bed when defendant assaulted
her].)
         Whether adequate provocation and heat of passion have been shown
are fundamentally jury questions because jurors are “ ‘much better qualified
to judge of the sufficiency and tendency of a given provocation, and much
more likely to fix, with some degree of accuracy, the standard of what
constitutes the average of ordinary human nature, than the judge whose
habits and course of life give him much less experience of the workings of
passion in the actual conflicts of life.’ [Citation.]” (Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th
at p. 948.) Here, the People presented sufficient evidence from which the
jury could conclude that the passions of an ordinarily reasonable person in
Partain’s circumstances would have cooled before the killing, and that such a
person also would not have reacted rashly without due deliberation.
Accordingly, we will not disturb the jury’s verdict finding Partain guilty of
murder on sufficiency of the evidence grounds.

                                        14
                                         II
        Partain next argues that the trial court’s response to the jury’s question
about the voluntary manslaughter instruction was erroneous. The People
argue that Partain forfeited the issue by failing to object until after the court
sent the response to the jury. We conclude that regardless of whether the
issue is forfeited, the court committed no reversible error in its response.
        The trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the law applicable
to the case, and if the jury has a question about the law during
deliberations, the court must provide information needed to clear up any
confusion the jury may have. (§ 1138; People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d
1179, 1212.) We review the court’s response to the jury’s question for
abuse of discretion. (See People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 714, 745–
746.)
        As noted, during deliberations the jury asked for clarification on how to
decide whether the evidence of provocation was sufficient to find Partain
guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Specifically, the jury asked a question
about the objective component of provocation and whether it should be
decided based on “the end result of action, or everything that leads up to the
event[.]” The jury also asked whether “the reaction” to the provocation meant
“emotional” or “logical.” The court responded—with the parties’ agreement—
by repeating portions of the original voluntary manslaughter instruction
(CALCRIM No. 570), along with the following language from Beltran:
           “In deciding whether the provocation was sufficient,
           consider whether a person of average disposition would
           have been provoked and how such a person would
           react in the same situation knowing the same facts.”
(See Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 944 (emphasis added).)

                                        15
      Partain contends that the court’s response inaccurately suggested that
the jury should consider whether a reasonable person would kill in this
situation, rather than whether a reasonable person would act rashly. But the
Supreme Court in Beltran found this same language (which came from a
prior version of CALCRIM No. 570) was not ambiguous as written, and under
ordinary circumstances, was “unproblematic” because “[t]elling the jury to
consider how a person of average disposition ‘would react’ properly draws the
jury’s attention to the objective nature of the standard and the effect the
provocation would have on such a person’s state of mind.” (Beltran, supra, 56
Cal.4th at p. 954.)
      Importantly, unlike in Beltran, the People’s closing argument in this
case did not muddy the waters. (Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 954–955
[finding that prosecutor’s argument may have confused the jury’s
understanding of the instructions, but was not prejudicial].) Citing the
reporter’s transcript, Partain claims the prosecutor argued that the jury
should consider whether an ordinary person in the same circumstances would
have acted “rationally and without judgment” and “rationally and without
due deliberation,” instead of “rashly.” As noted, we conclude that this must
have been a transcription error, because the written jury instructions use the
correct word “rashly,” the words “rashly” and “rationally” sound similar, the
court reporter also transcribed the word “rashly” as “rationally” when the
court read the instructions to the jury, neither party objected, the use of the
word “rationally” would not make logical sense in this context, and the
context supports that the parties knew the correct word was “rashly.” (See
Beltran, at p. 945, fn. 7.)
      Partain further contends that the jury may have been confused by the
prosecutor’s hypothetical example of parents discovering someone abusing

                                       16
their child, and then shooting the abuser with the intent to kill them. The
prosecutor, however, did not place undue emphasis on the hypothetical
parents’ intent to kill as a response, but explained that “under those facts [the
parents] were acting directly under that provocation seeing that when they
came home, that that decision was made under the heat of passion and that
an ordinary person under that same set of facts also would have acted
[rashly] and without judgment. That is voluntary manslaughter.” (Italics
added.) The prosecutor went on to say that the objective provocation
component examines whether “a person of average disposition to act [rashly]
and without due deliberation. It’s important to note that this isn’t talking
about the average person killing. It’s would the average person have acted
[rashly] and without due deliberation on the same set of facts.” (Italics
added.) The prosecutor later made clear that in deciding whether the
provocation was legally sufficient, the jury should consider “whether a person
of average disposition in that same situation and knowing the same set of
facts would have reacted from passion rather than judgment.” (Italics added.)
      Furthermore, Partain does not dispute that CALCRIM No. 570
correctly states the law (see Beltran, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 956 [“the
relevant mental state [is] properly set out in CALCRIM No. 570”]), and the
court’s response expressly directed the jury’s attention to “provocation as
defined in Instruction 570.” That instruction defines the objective component
of provocation as that which “would have caused a person of average
disposition to act rashly and without due deliberation, that is, from passion
rather than from judgment.” The instruction thus answered the jury’s
question by referring it back to CALCRIM No. 570. “The trial court was well
within its discretion to refer the jury back to the very instruction that
provided a specific answer to the jury’s question. No more information was

                                       17
needed or required.” (People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, 66–67.)
Although a trial court has a duty to help the jury understand applicable legal
principles, “the court need not elaborate on the standard instructions in every
instance. When the original instructions are full and complete, the trial court
has discretion to determine what additional explanations are sufficient to
satisfy the jury’s request for information. [Citation.]” (People v. Moore (1996)
44 Cal.App.4th 1323, 1331.) We therefore conclude that the court did not
abuse its discretion in responding to the jury’s question.
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                               BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

CASTILLO, J.

                                       18