Court Opinion

ID: 9556577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-17 18:03:46.233247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:09:52.317942
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/17/23 Baron v. Baron CA2/6

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

  SANDRA BARON,                                                 2d Civ. No. B323127
                                                             (Super. Ct. No. SD036684)
       Plaintiff and Respondent,                                 (Ventura County)

  v.

  RICHARD BARON,

       Defendant and Appellant.

      Richard Baron appeals a post-judgment order granting
Sandra Baron’s request to sell a ranch property they acquired
during their marriage. He contends the order violates the terms
of a marital settlement agreement incorporated into their
interlocutory judgment of dissolution. We affirm the order.
        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      Richard and Sandra1 divorced in 2011 after 28 years of
marriage. The judgment of dissolution (judgment) incorporated a

         1 We use the first names of the parties for clarity, intending

no disrespect.
“Partial Marital Settlement Agreement” dividing their assets and
liabilities (settlement). This included a 46-acre ranch on
Stockton Road in Moorpark, California. The settlement required
Sandra to transfer her interest in the ranch to Richard. In
exchange, Richard agreed to refinance the $1.4 million mortgage
and to “remove [Sandra] as a borrower as soon as he possibly
can.” Sandra recorded an interspousal transfer deed granting
“[a]ll of her right, title and interest” in the ranch to Richard
shortly after signing the settlement.
        The parties returned to court in 2017 when Sandra
requested an order enforcing the settlement’s refinancing
provision. Richard acknowledged he had not yet removed her as
a borrower. The court continued the matter several times as
Richard applied to assume their current mortgage, and, later,
sought to refinance with other lenders. His low credit scores and
high debt-to-income ratio made him a poor candidate for a loan.
He also discovered most banks would not accept residential loan
applications for the ranch because he used part of it for
commercial growing operations. The outbreak of COVID-19 in
2020 slowed progress further. Sandra remained on the mortgage
in the meantime.
        Sandra requested an order in February of 2022 compelling
Richard to sell the ranch. Sandra argued it was not fair for her to
carry a large debt on a property she had “no rights or interest in.”
She also feared becoming entangled in probate litigation if
Richard predeceased her. Richard insisted he was working
diligently to obtain commercial financing with a local credit union
and requested more time to complete the process. He opposed
selling the ranch because it would leave him without income.
        The trial court granted Sandra’s request and appointed a
receiver to oversee the sale (sale order). It concluded: “[T]he
Court accepts that, perhaps, it may, in fact, be true that

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[Richard] can’t refi. Then it’s time to sell, willingly or
unwillingly. That is the only path out of this situation.” Richard
retained the right to keep the ranch if he removed Sandra from
the mortgage before it sold.
                           DISCUSSION
       Richard contends the trial court lacked authority to issue
the sale order because the judgment and settlement contain no
language permitting this remedy. (See Kulchar v. Kulchar (1969)
1 Cal.3d 467, 470-471 [“If a property settlement is incorporated in
the divorce decree, the settlement is merged with the decree and
becomes the final judicial determination of the property rights of
the parties”].) He interprets the settlement’s phrase “as soon as
he possibly can” as meaning he must only “try” to refinance and
remove Sandra from the mortgage. The sale order, Richard
argues, violated the settlement’s requirement that the parties
consent in writing to any modification. We review the sale order
independently because the trial court based its decision on the
terms of the settlement. (See In re Marriage of Schu (2014) 231
Cal.App.4th 394, 399 [“A marital settlement agreement . . .
incorporated into a stipulated judgment [is interpreted] under
the general rules governing the interpretation of contracts”].) We
review the order appointing a receiver for abuse of discretion.
(City and County of San Francisco v. Daley (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th
734, 744.)
       The issue is whether the settlement authorized the trial
court to order the ranch sold because Richard, despite his best
efforts, could not remove Sandra from the mortgage eleven years
after entry of judgment? We conclude it did. The settlement’s
aim was “to make a final and complete settlement of all rights
and obligations between [the parties]” and to resolve “all other
issues incidental to an action for dissolution of marriage.”
Richard and Sandra agreed to divide their property “so that the

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aggregate net fair market value of the community and co-owned
property received by each is approximately equal, considering the
division of any community or joint liabilities, the assumption of
indebtedness, payment of the equalizing payment, and the waiver
of any rights to reimbursement.” (Italics added.) They also
agreed the trial court would retain jurisdiction “to supervise . . .
the overall enforcement” of their settlement.2
       Richard’s restrictive view of the trial court’s enforcement
powers is not consistent with these provisions. Compelling
Sandra to remain indefinitely as a co-borrower on a property
owned by her ex-husband would run counter to the settlement’s
fundamental goal: effectuating a fair, final, and complete
disposition of their assets and liabilities. Ordering Richard to
convert a physical asset (real property) into a liquid asset (cash)
under the auspices of a court-appointed receiver achieves this
goal. We decline to treat Richard’s obligation to extinguish
Sandra’s liability differently than an obligation to transfer
marital property, or to make an equalization payment.
       The sale order would have been permitted even had the
settlement not preserved the court’s enforcement authority. “A
judgment or order made or entered pursuant to this code may be

      2 The settlement’s enforcement provision states in its

entirety: “Retention of Jurisdiction. In the Judgment anticipated
by this Settlement Agreement, the Superior Court shall retain, in
addition to the jurisdiction specifically mentioned elsewhere in
this Settlement Agreement, the jurisdiction to supervise the
payment of any obligation to be paid by the terms of this
Settlement Agreement, the execution of any documents required
or reasonably necessary to carry out the terms of any documents
required or reasonably necessary to carry out the terms of this
Settlement Agreement and the overall enforcement of this
Settlement Agreement.”

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enforced by the court by execution, the appointment of a receiver,
or contempt, or by any other order as the court in its discretion
determines from time to time to be necessary.” (Fam. Code,
§ 290.) “To the extent that a judgment of dissolution is not self-
executing in respect of any division of property therein ordered,
the court retains jurisdiction to make such further orders as are
appropriate to compel obedience to its judgment.” (Bonner v.
Superior Court (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 156, 165].)
       The open-ended nature of Richard’s obligation to remove
Sandra from the mortgage did not divest the court of its power “to
make such further orders” it determined necessary to enforce
their settlement. The sale order falls within its authority to
accomplish an “approximately equal” division of marital assets
and liabilities. The appointing of a receiver furthers this end by
ensuring the transaction proceeds promptly and fairly.
                           CONCLUSION
       Judgment is affirmed. Sandra shall recover her costs.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                    CODY, J.

We concur:

      GILBERT, P.J.

      YEGAN, J.

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                     Michael S. Lief, Judge
               Superior Court County of Ventura
                ______________________________

     Jeffrey L. Hoffer, for Defendant and Appellant Richard
Baron.
     Edwin S. Clark, for Plaintiff and Respondent Sandra
Baron.

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