Court Opinion

ID: 9945504
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 21:03:30.855046+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:30.850453
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/27/24 Gonzalez v. Anthem CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 APRIL J. GONZALEZ,                                                   B323876

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                                      Super. Ct. No. 22STCV13837)
           v.

 ANTHEM, INC., et al.,

           Defendants and Appellants.

       APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County and ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; petition for
writ of mandate. Yolanda Orozco, Judge. Order affirmed and
petition denied.
       Constangy, Brooks, Smith & Prophete, Steven B. Katz, Thy
B. Bui, Lisa Yumi Mitchell and Deepa Kollipara for Defendants
and Appellants.
       Stonebrook Law, Joseph Tojarieh; Rager & Yoon
Employment Law, Jeffrey Rager, James Y. Yoon; Gusdorff Law
and Janet R. Gusdorff for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                  ____________________________
       This is an appeal from orders denying an initial motion and
a renewed motion to compel arbitration of April J. Gonzalez’s
employment law claims. The trial court denied both motions
because Anthem, Inc. (Anthem or the company), The Anthem
Companies, Inc., and Patricia Amoroso (collectively, appellants)
failed to prove the existence of an agreement to arbitrate.
       This appeal requires us to apply contract principles of
implied consent and incorporation by reference that were forged
over time in a paper-based world. That world is diminishing.
The arbitration policy here did not live in a paper world, but,
instead, appeared in one of several links on the company’s
internal website.
       Appellants argue that prior to and during Gonzalez’s
tenure at the company, Anthem provided Gonzalez with notice of
an arbitration policy that was accessible on the company’s
intranet site. Appellants do not claim Gonzalez signed an
arbitration agreement or that Anthem gave Gonzalez a
standalone, printed copy of the arbitration policy. Rather, they
claim (1) Anthem’s initial offer letter to Gonzalez and (2) certain
form notices referencing the intranet site that Anthem had sent
to Gonzalez during her employment provided her with sufficient
notice of the arbitration policy accessible on the site.
       Although the trial court’s ruling denying appellants’
renewed motion to compel arbitration is not an appealable order,
we exercise our discretion to treat the appeal of that order as a
writ petition and accept the parties’ invitation to review the
evidentiary record for both motions to determine whether an
agreement to arbitrate exists. On the merits, we conclude the
trial court did not err in denying either motion.

                                    2
       The offer letter Anthem sent to Gonzalez does not bind her
to the arbitration policy because the letter expressly states that
the offer was contingent on Gonzalez having signed the
document, and appellants concede Gonzalez never did so.
       We also conclude that Anthem did not provide Gonzalez
with sufficient notice of the arbitration policy on the two
iterations of the intranet site that Anthem maintained during
Gonzalez’s tenure. Specifically, the first iteration of the site did
not alert Gonzalez that the human resources policies found in
links on that site created binding legal obligations, and indeed
disclaimed that those policies created contractual obligations.
Appellants also fail to demonstrate that the form notices Anthem
sent to Gonzalez validly incorporated by reference the arbitration
policy accessible on the second iteration of the company’s intranet
site, given that neither the form notices nor the site itself called
Gonzalez’s attention to the arbitration policy. We reject the
remainder of appellants’ challenges to the court’s orders. We
thus affirm the order denying appellants’ initial motion and deny
the petition seeking review of the order denying their renewed
motion.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
      We summarize only those facts relevant to our review.

      1  We derive our Factual and Procedural Background in
part from admissions made by the parties in their appellate
briefing, assertions Gonzalez makes in her respondent’s brief that
appellants do not dispute in their reply, and undisputed aspects
of the trial court’s rulings. (See Artal v. Allen (2003)
111 Cal.App.4th 273, 275, fn. 2 (Artal) [“ ‘[A] reviewing court may
make use of statements [in briefs and argument] . . . as
admissions against the party [advancing them].’ ”]; Association

                                    3
       Gonzalez began working for Anthem as a customer service
associate in May 2008.2 Her employment ended in
December 2021. Appellants claim that “The Anthem Companies,
Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Anthem . . . and . . .
paymaster entity that process[es] payroll and maintains payroll
records for various Anthem . . . employees,” and that Amoroso
was one of Gonzalez’s supervisors.
       Gonzalez commenced the instant action by filing suit
against appellants and Cheryle Anaya.3 In her complaint,
Gonzalez pleads the following 12 causes of action: (1) violation of
pregnancy disability leave (PDL); (2) retaliation under the Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA); (3) retaliation in violation
of PDL; (4) disability discrimination—failure to make reasonable
accommodation in violation of FEHA; (5) failure to engage in the
interactive process in violation of FEHA; (6) pregnancy
discrimination in violation of FEHA; (7) disability discrimination
(FEHA)—wrongful termination; (8) retaliation in violation of the
California Family Rights Act; (9) wrongful termination in
violation of public policy; (10) failure to prevent and/or remedy

for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023)
94 Cal.App.5th 764, 773–774 (Association for Los Angeles Deputy
Sheriffs) [holding that “by failing to dispute” an assertion made
by respondents, “appellants [had] tacitly concede[d] that point”];
Baxter v. State Teachers’ Retirement System (2017)
18 Cal.App.5th 340, 349, fn. 2 [utilizing the summary of facts
provided in the trial court’s ruling].)
      2  The name of the entity that hired Gonzalez was
“WellPoint, Inc.,” which was later changed to Anthem. For the
sake of clarity, we attribute WellPoint’s actions to Anthem.
      3   Anaya is not a party to this appeal.

                                     4
discrimination and retaliation (FEHA); (11) defamation per
se/per quod; and (12) intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Among other things, Gonzalez avers that Anthem terminated her
in December 2021 “under the false pretext that Gonzalez had
been absent from work . . . without any contact with her
employer,” despite the fact that she had “dutifully kept in contact
with [Anthem] and requested medical leave” in connection with
her pregnancy.
       Appellants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that
during Gonzalez’s tenure, Anthem had provided Gonzalez with
notice of the company’s arbitration policy and information on how
to access that policy.4 According to the trial court, appellants
did not “dispute [Gonzalez’s] assertion there is no signed
arbitration agreement or that [Gonzalez] was never presented
with a standalone arbitration agreement.” The trial court denied
the motion because appellants had “not met [their] burden of
proving the existence of a valid Arbitration Agreement.”
       Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1008,
subdivision (b), appellants filed a renewed motion to compel
arbitration. Based on the court’s findings that appellants’
renewed motion was timely and that they had “provided a
satisfactory explanation as to why the previously filed motion
failed to present . . . alleged new or different evidence,” the court
decided to “consider[ ] the newly submitted declarations to
determine if [appellants had] proven by a preponderance of the
evidence[ ] the existence of a valid contract binding

      4  In our Discussion, parts B–C, post, we detail appellants’
assertions that Anthem provided Gonzalez with sufficient notice
of the company’s arbitration policy.

                                     5
[Gonzalez] . . . .”5 “Having reviewed [appellants’] newly
submitted evidence, the Court [could not] find that [appellants]
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that [Gonzalez] agreed
to be bound by any arbitration agreement.”
      On September 29, 2022, appellants filed a notice of appeal
seeking review of the trial court’s orders denying their initial and
renewed motions to compel arbitration.

  APPLICABLE LAW REGARDING ENFORCEMENT OF
  ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND STANDARDS OF
                   REVIEW
      “ ‘In ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, the trial
court shall order parties to arbitrate “if it determines that an
agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists . . . .” [Citation.]
“[T]he party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the
existence of an arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the
evidence, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence any defense . . . .”
[Citation.]’ ” (Western Bagel Co., Inc. v. Superior Court (2021)
66 Cal.App.5th 649, 662.)
      “ ‘ “[G]eneral principles of contract law determine whether
the parties have entered a binding agreement to arbitrate.” ’
[Citation.] ‘Mutual assent, or consent, of the parties “is essential
to the existence of a contract” [citations], and “[c]onsent is not
mutual, unless the parties all agree upon the same thing in the
same sense” [citation]. “Mutual assent is determined under an
objective standard applied to the outward manifestations or
expressions of the parties, i.e., the reasonable meaning of their

      5 Neither side contests the trial court’s decision to reach
the merits of appellants’ renewed motion.

                                     6
words and acts, and not their unexpressed intentions or
understandings.” ’ [Citations.]” (B.D. v. Blizzard Entertainment,
Inc. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 931, 943 (Blizzard Entertainment).)
Put differently, “ ‘notice—actual, inquiry, or constructive—is the
touchstone for assent to a contract[.]’ ” (Id. at p. 944.)
       “These consent principles apply ‘with equal force to
arbitration provisions contained in contracts purportedly formed
over the Internet.’ [Citations.] ‘While Internet commerce has
exposed courts to many new situations, it has not fundamentally
changed the requirement that “ ‘[m]utual manifestation of assent,
whether by written or spoken word or by conduct, is the
touchstone of contract.’ ” ’ [Citation.]”6 (Blizzard Entertainment,
supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 943.) “ ‘[I]n order to establish mutual
assent for the valid formation of an internet contract, [the offeror]
must first establish the contractual terms were presented to the
[offeree] in a manner that made it apparent the [offeree] was
assenting to those very terms . . . .’ [Citation.]” (See id. at
p. 944.)
       “ ‘Under traditional contract principles, where there is no
dispute as to the material facts, “the existence of a contract is a
question [of law] for the court to decide.” [Citation.] . . . .’
[Citations.]” (Blizzard Entertainment, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at
p. 949.) Such “pure questions of law . . . are subject to de novo
review.” (See Shewry v. Begil (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 639, 642.)
Although Gonzalez insists that “the parties dispute . . . the facts,”
neither side contests the contents of the written and electronic
materials that appellants claim give rise to an agreement to

      6 The trial court found that Anthem’s intranet site was a
“website that contained” the company’s policies. Appellants
do not challenge that finding.

                                     7
arbitrate. The de novo standard thus governs our review. (See
Blizzard Entertainment, at p. 949 [“ ‘Where . . . the trial court
denies a petition to compel arbitration based on the threshold
issue of the existence of a contract, and the evidence of the
alleged contract formation consists primarily of undisputed
screenshots of the website at issue, our review is de novo.’ ”].)
      “ ‘ “A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be
correct on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions are
indulged in favor of its correctness.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]
Thus, ‘ “ ‘it is the appellant’s responsibility to affirmatively
demonstrate error’ ” ’ by ‘ “ ‘supply[ing] the reviewing court with
some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to
the record.’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Association for
Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 776–
777.) The presumption of correctness applies “ ‘[e]ven when our
review . . . “is de novo,” ’ ” meaning that although we are “ ‘not
bound by, or . . . required to show any deference to, the trial
court’s conclusion[s]’ ” in such cases, the scope of our review “ ‘ “is
limited to issues which have been adequately raised and
supported in [the appellant’s opening] brief. [Citations.] . . . .” ’
[Citation.]” (See Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County of San
Diego (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 467, 554–555.)

                           DISCUSSION
      Appellants contend the arbitration policy in effect when
Gonzalez left the company (the 2016 revision) provided in
relevant part: “ ‘By entering into the employment relationship,
the company and its associates subject to the policy consent to
resolution by binding arbitration of all claims arising out of or

                                      8
related to the termination of the relationship.’ ”7 Appellants
contend that prior to and throughout Gonzalez’s employment,
Anthem repeatedly provided her notice that she could access the
arbitration policy via the company’s intranet site. Appellants
further argue that by working for Anthem after receiving notice
of the policy, Gonzalez impliedly agreed to it. “[Appellants]
do[ ] not dispute that Ms. Gonzalez . . . never accessed the
arbitration policy[ ] and believed that she was not bound by it.”
Nevertheless, appellants contend, “That Ms. Gonzalez did not
bother to read the arbitration policy—or subjectively (and
secretly) believed she was not bound by it—makes no difference.”
(See also Blizzard Entertainment, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 943
[“If an offeree objectively manifests assent to an agreement, the
offeree cannot avoid a specific provision of that agreement on the
ground the offeree did not actually read it.”].)
       As we explain in Discussion, parts B–D, post, appellants
have failed to show that Gonzalez impliedly agreed to Anthem’s
arbitration policy. Before we address the merits of appellants’
arguments, we address immediately below the scope of our
review because the denial of the renewed motion to compel
arbitration is not an appealable order.

      7 Appellants concede that “[p]rior versions [of the policy]
had the same language.” For that reason, we do not differentiate
among the various iterations of the arbitration policy in effect
during Gonzalez’s tenure with Anthem.

                                   9
A.    We Exercise Our Discretion To Treat Appellants’
      Appeal of the September 29, 2022 Order as a Writ
      Petition
       In their notice of appeal, appellants sought review of the
(1) August 1, 2022 order denying their initial motion to compel
arbitration,8 and (2) September 29, 2022 order denying their
renewed motion to compel arbitration. The August 1, 2022 order
is appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1294, subd. (a) [“An aggrieved
party may appeal from: [¶] . . . An order . . . denying a petition to
compel arbitration.”].) The September 29, 2022 order is not.9
(Westmoreland v. Kindercare Education LLC (2023)
90 Cal.App.5th 967, 973 (Westmoreland) [“ ‘[A]n order denying a
renewed motion,’ including a renewed motion to compel
arbitration, ‘is not appealable.’ ”].)
       Appellants correctly note, “ ‘[W]hile the denial of a motion
for reconsideration is usually not an appealable order, the denial
is reviewable if the request for reconsideration is made from an
appealable order.’ [Citation.]” (Quoting George v. Shams-Shirazi
(2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 134, 138.) Appellants do not explain how
this legal principle supports appealability of the order denying
the renewed motion to compel arbitration (made pursuant to

      8  Although appellants mistakenly asserted in their notice
of appeal that the trial court issued this order on August 3, 2022,
we construe the notice to reference the August 1, 2022 order.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2) [“The notice of appeal must
be liberally construed.”].)
      9 Although Gonzalez does not contest our jurisdiction to
review the September 29, 2022 order, “ ‘we are dutybound to
consider [that issue] on our own motion.’ [Citation.]” (See
Nguyen v. Calhoun (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 428, 436.)

                                    10
Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (b)), which is not a motion for
reconsideration (see id., subd. (a)).
       Be that as it may, we have discretion to review the
September 29, 2022 order by treating appellants’ appeal from
that order as a petition for writ of mandate. (See Westmoreland,
supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 970.) Here, appellants timely
appealed the August 1, 2022 order denying their motion to
compel arbitration, the trial court exercised its discretion to reach
the merits of their renewed motion, and Gonzalez does not claim
prejudice were we to review that order. Additionally, were we to
affirm the order denying appellants’ initial motion to compel but
decline to review the order denying their renewed motion,
appellants may have to wait until final judgment before they
could obtain review of that second ruling. (See Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 906 [“[T]he reviewing court may review . . . any intermediate
ruling . . . which . . . necessarily affects the judgment or order
appealed from or which substantially affects the rights of a
party . . . .”].) Under these circumstances, “ ‘refusing [to] review
[the September 29, 2022 order] at this point . . . would result in a
significant waste of time and judicial resources.’ [Citation.]” (See
Westmoreland, at p. 970.)
       We thus exercise our discretion to hear the appeal of the
order denying appellants’ renewed motion as a writ petition. We
also accept the parties’ invitation to utilize the evidentiary record
for both motions in assessing whether Gonzalez agreed to
Anthem’s arbitration policy. (See Artal, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th
at p. 275, fn. 2 [holding that we may accept the parties’
concessions].)

                                    11
B.    Appellants Do Not Establish that Anthem’s Offer
      Letter Evidences an Agreement to Arbitrate
       Shortly before Gonzalez began her employment in
May 2008, Anthem sent her a two-page offer letter. Among other
things, the offer letter identified Gonzalez’s start date and hourly
pay and informed her, “[A]ll . . . associates are employed on an
‘at-will’ basis.” The top of the second page of the letter provides:
“This offer is contingent upon receipt of the signed copy of this
letter, a satisfactory background investigation, and proof of your
employment eligibility in the United States.” The next sentence
states: “Finally, as an associate of [Anthem], you will be subject
to the Company’s binding arbitration policy, as more fully
described on my HR, HR Policies, Arbitration.” The end of the
letter contains the words “Offer acceptance,” followed by a line
designated for the recipient’s signature.
       The trial court observed, and appellants do not dispute,
that they had “not established that [Anthem] provided [Gonzalez]
with a stand-alone copy of the arbitration agreement . . . .” Nor
do appellants claim that at the time Gonzalez received the offer
letter, she had access to the arbitration policy via the intranet
site referenced in the correspondence, to wit, “MyHR.” Further,
appellants concede that “Gonzalez never signed the offer
letter . . . .”
       Appellants claim the absence of Gonzalez’s signature on the
offer letter is of no consequence because she allegedly “accept[ed]
the offer,” including the arbitration policy, by “go[ing] to work for
the company . . . for 13 years.” Put differently, working for
Anthem constituted “Gonzalez’s assent” to the offer letter’s terms,
including the arbitration policy. We disagree.

                                    12
       Civil Code section 1582 provides: “If a proposal prescribes
any conditions concerning the communication of its acceptance,
the proposer is not bound unless they are conformed to; but in
other cases any reasonable and usual mode may be adopted.”
(Civ. Code, § 1582.) Here, the offer letter states, “This offer is
contingent upon receipt of the signed copy of this letter . . . .”
(Italics added.) This text did not allow Gonzalez to manifest her
acceptance to the terms of the letter by working for Anthem
without signing the correspondence. Accordingly, the terms of
the offer letter demonstrate that Gonzalez did not consent to the
arbitration policy referenced in the letter. (Cf. Gorlach v. Sports
Club Co. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1507–1511 [rejecting an
employer’s argument that “an implied-in-fact agreement to
arbitrate . . . was created when [an employee] remained in [the
employer’s] employ after learning that signing the arbitration
agreement was a condition of employment,” and reasoning that
the employee had not signed the agreement and that an employee
“handbook told employees that they must sign the arbitration
agreement, [thereby] implying that it was not effective until (and
unless) they did so”].)
       Appellants argue that Division Five’s decision in Harris v.
TAP Worldwide, LLC (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 373 (Harris),
supports their position that Gonzalez agreed to the arbitration
policy by working for the company after receiving the offer letter.
The Harris court held that the employee assented to an
arbitration agreement attached to an employee handbook by
(a) signing a form acknowledging receipt of the handbook, and
then (b) beginning employment. (See Harris, at pp. 381–385.)
The court rejected the employee’s argument that he was not
bound by the arbitration agreement because he did not sign it.

                                   13
(See id. at pp. 383–384.) The court reasoned the employee had
“unequivocally accepted the offer of employment by commencing
to work . . . for which he was paid.” (See id. at p. 384.) The
handbook stated, “ ‘If, for any reason, an applicant fails to
execute the Agreement to Arbitrate yet begins employment, that
employee will be deemed to have consented to the Agreement to
Arbitrate by virtue of receipt of this Handbook.’ ” (See id. at
p. 383.)
        In contrast, Anthem’s letter provided the opposite; it stated
the company’s offer to Gonzalez was “contingent” upon her
signing the letter. The handbook in Harris expressly authorized
implied acceptance to the arbitration agreement (see Harris,
supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 383); Gonzalez’s offer letter did not.
Accordingly, Harris is inapposite. (See id. at pp. 383–385
[holding that “an agreement to arbitrate may be” “ ‘implied-in-
fact where . . . the employee’s continued employment constitutes
[his or] her acceptance of an agreement proposed by [his or] her
employer[,]’ ” and the handbook in Harris had “expressly
addresse[d] the situation where an employee fails to execute the
arbitration agreement and accepts employment”].)
        Lastly, appellants suggest that the offer letter did not
require Gonzalez’s signature “ ‘to be binding’ ” because she had
“ ‘fully performed’ ” her employment contract with Anthem by
staying with the company for 13 years. This assertion is puzzling
because Anthem offered her “at-will” employment and not
employment for a specified term. Because appellants do not
elaborate on this point, we do not address it further. (See
Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277
[“We may and do ‘disregard conclusory arguments that . . . fail to

                                    14
disclose the reasoning by which the appellant reached the
conclusions he wants us to adopt.’ ”].)
       In sum, appellants fail to demonstrate that Gonzalez
agreed to Anthem’s arbitration policy by working for the company
after she received the offer letter.

C.    Appellants Fail To Demonstrate that Gonzalez
      Manifested Her Assent to the Arbitration Policy
      Accessible on Anthem’s Intranet Site
      Before 2017, Anthem provided employees access to all of
the company’s human resources policies, including its arbitration
policy, through its intranet portal called “MyHR.” Anthem
thereafter provided employees access to the arbitration policy
through a new intranet site, “Anthem Pulse.” During the trial
court proceedings, appellants introduced into evidence
screenshots from MyHR and Anthem Pulse to show that
Gonzalez had electronic access to the company’s arbitration
policy.
      Appellants argue Gonzalez is bound by the arbitration
policy accessible on MyHR and Anthem Pulse because Anthem
periodically provided her with constructive notice of the policy
and, by continuing to work for the company after receiving such
notice, she impliedly manifested her assent to the terms of the
policy.10

      10  Appellants do not clarify whether, were we to reject
their contention that she did not have to sign the offer letter to
manifest her assent to the terms of that correspondence (see
Discussion, part B, ante), the letter nonetheless provided
adequate notice to Gonzalez that she was bound by the
arbitration policy found on Anthem’s intranet page. Appellants
thus waive any such argument. (See Cahill v. San Diego Gas &

                                   15
        In support of their constructive notice argument, appellants
maintain that from 2009 to 2020, Gonzalez electronically signed
annual certification acknowledgments upon completing an ethics
and compliance training course.11 Those compliance
certifications provided in pertinent part: “Compliance with
Anthem policies is a condition of employment and Anthem may
take corrective action, including termination, for violations of:
[¶] . . . Anthem policies and procedures [¶] . . . [¶] I have access
to Human Resources policies via the Anthem intranet site and
understand I am responsible for reading and abiding by the
policies and procedures listed in them and as amended from time
to time.”12
        Further, appellants claim that “in May 2011, October 2013,
and May, June and August 2017, Ms. Gonzale[z] received written
‘corrective action’ forms for various reasons, each of which
‘acknowledge,’ above Ms. Gonzalez’s signature, that she
‘received . . . electronic access via the company intranet [to] . . .
the Anthem . . . HR Policies’ ” and “ ‘agree[d] to abide by the
policies contained within . . . .’ ” (Fn. omitted.)

Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956 (Cahill) [“ ‘We are
not bound to develop appellants’ argument for them. [Citation.]
The absence of cogent legal arguments or citation to authority
allows this court to treat the contention as waived.’ ”].)
      11  As a shorthand, we refer to Gonzalez’s signed
certifications as “compliance certifications.”
      12  The parties agree that “[t]hese certifications changed
little from year to year and, for the purposes of this appeal, were
substantively identical during each year Gonzalez worked for
Anthem.”

                                    16
       For the reasons set forth below, we reject appellants’
contention that Anthem provided Gonzalez with adequate notice
that by continuing to work for the company, she would be bound
by its arbitration policy. Specifically, certain aspects of MyHR
strongly suggested that the human resources policies accessible
on the site did not constitute contractual terms to which Gonzalez
would be legally bound. (See Discussion, part C.1, post.)
Furthermore, although Anthem Pulse omitted certain language
from MyHR that had disclaimed any legally binding effect of the
company’s human resources policies, Anthem nonetheless failed
to provide Gonzalez with sufficient notice of the arbitration
policy. (See Discussion, part C.2, post.) Accordingly, appellants
do not establish the existence of an agreement to arbitrate.

      1.    Gonzalez did not have adequate notice that she was
            bound by the arbitration policy found on MyHR
       Upon reviewing evidence that appellants introduced
concerning Anthem’s MyHR intranet site, the trial court stated,
“[T]he Court does not find that the arbitration policy on the
‘MyHR’ intranet was noticeable and distinguishable as a binding
agreement to arbitrate sufficient to put [Gonzalez] on notice as to
the existence of the agreement.” We agree.
       During the proceedings below, an Anthem human resources
official attested that once an employee “was on the ‘MyHR’ home
screen, [the employee] was required to click on the menu tree
under ‘HR Policies’ to access all of” them. The link to “Anthem’s
arbitration policy was the third policy listed [under the HR
Policies menu tree] and ‘no additional scrolling [was] necessary to
locate it.’ ”
       A screenshot for the MyHR home screen shows that
“Arbitration” is one of 16 policies listed under the menu tree

                                   17
titled “HR Policies.” The trial court found, and our review of the
screenshot confirms, that “the section titled ‘Arbitration’ is not
distinguishable from other HR designated categories, such as
‘Attendance’ and ‘Bereavement.’ ” The court further remarked,
“[Appellants] fail[ ] to explain how employees were supposed to
distinguish between HR policies that were merely informational
such as for attendance or [bereavement], and those which
pertained to substantive employment rights, such as an
agreement to arbitrate.”
       In addition, the first paragraph at the top of the MyHR
screenshot states: “The HR policies on this intranet site
supersede and replace any inconsistent policies or practices and
replace any past handbook or HR policies. These policies are not
intended to be a contract (express or implied), nor are they
intended to otherwise create any legally enforceable obligations on
the part of the company or its associates. As a growing and
changing company, our HR policies and procedures are
continually evaluated and may be amended, modified, or
terminated at any time, without notice.” (Italics added.) This
disclaimer further supports the trial court’s conclusion that
Anthem did not clearly communicate to its employees that the
human resources policies accessible on MyHR created contractual
obligations.
       Furthermore, the compliance certifications and corrective
action forms did not specifically identify the arbitration policy
found on MyHR, nor did they differentiate that policy from others
on the site that the trial court characterized as “merely
informational” in nature. (See Discussion, part C, ante [the
beginning of this part reproduced the pertinent text from the
compliance certifications and corrective action forms].)

                                   18
       We acknowledge that the compliance certifications
Gonzalez signed stated that she had “access to Human Resources
policies via the Anthem intranet site and underst[ood she was]
responsible for reading and abiding by the policies and
procedures listed in them and as amended from time to time.”
(See Discussion, part C, ante.) Appellants seem to be contending
that this language provided Gonzalez with sufficient notice that
she needed to wade through each of the numerous hyperlinks on
the site to determine (1) which human resources policies applied
to her, and (2) of the applicable policies, which ones were simply
informational and which policies instead contradicted the home
screen’s disclaimer by imposing legal obligations upon her.
Appellants provide no analysis or citation to authority to support
such an expansive extrapolation from Gonzalez’s signing of the
compliance certifications. Appellants have thus waived that
contention. (See Cahill, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 956.)
       We further note that appellants’ argument flies in the face
of the bedrock common law principle that “ ‘ “[m]utual assent is
determined” ’ ” based on “ ‘ “the reasonable meaning of [the
parties’] words and acts . . . .” ’ [Citations.]” (See Blizzard
Entertainment, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 943, italics added; see
also id. at pp. 934–935, 942 [indicating that assent to an online
arbitration provision hinges on whether the clause was
“sufficiently conspicuous to establish an agreement to arbitrate”];
cf. Doe v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLC (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th
23, 34 (Doe) [holding that “ ‘ “ ‘consumers cannot be expected to
ferret out hyperlinks to terms and conditions to which they have
no reason to suspect they will be bound’ ” ’ ”].)
       We thus conclude that Anthem did not present the
arbitration policy found on the MyHR intranet site to Gonzalez

                                   19
“in a manner that made it apparent [she] was assenting to” the
policy’s terms by continuing to work for the company. (See
Blizzard Entertainment, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 944.)
Rather, the record indicates the arbitration policy was an
“ ‘inconspicuous contractual provision[ ] of which [Gonzalez] was
unaware, contained [on a site] whose contractual nature [was]
not obvious[,]’ ” meaning that she was “not bound” by the policy.
(See Doe, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 30–31; cf. Esparza v. Sand
& Sea, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 781, 787–791 [holding that an
employee was not bound by an arbitration provision included in
an employee handbook in part because a welcome letter at the
beginning of the handbook “declared that the handbook did not
‘create any legally enforceable obligations,’ ” and a policy
acknowledgment the employee signed “suggest[ed the handbook
was] merely informational”].)

      2.    Appellants fail to show the compliance certifications
            and corrective action forms incorporated by reference
            the arbitration policy on Anthem Pulse
       Although Anthem Pulse did not contain the language from
MyHR stating that the policies on the site had no legally binding
effect, the trial court ruled that Anthem’s compliance
certifications did not provide Gonzalez with adequate notice of
the arbitration policy on Anthem Pulse. Specifically, the court
concluded appellants failed to demonstrate that the electronically
accessible arbitration policy was incorporated by reference into
the compliance certifications. As explained below, we agree with
the trial court on this point, and we also find that the arbitration
policy was not incorporated by reference into the corrective action
forms Gonzalez received during her tenure.

                                    20
       “ ‘The general rule is that the terms of an extrinsic
document may be incorporated by reference in a contract so long
as (1) the reference is clear and unequivocal, (2) the reference is
called to the attention of the other party and he [or she] consents
thereto, and (3) the terms of the incorporated document are
known or easily available to the contracting parties.’ [Citations.]”
(Blizzard Entertainment, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 952.) Under
this doctrine, “ ‘[t]he contract need not recite that it
“incorporates” another document, so long as it “guide[s] the
reader to the incorporated document.” ’ ” (See ibid.)
       Courts utilize the incorporation by reference doctrine to
determine whether a document provides notice that is
“sufficiently conspicuous” to bind a party to terms found on an
electronic platform. (See Blizzard Entertainment, supra,
76 Cal.App.5th at pp. 934–936, 951–954.) We acknowledge,
however, that applying the incorporation by reference doctrine in
this context is more challenging than in other contexts. “ ‘In the
world of paper contracting, the outward manifestation of assent
to the same thing by both parties is often readily established by
the offeree’s receipt of the physical contract.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at
pp. 943–944.) Conversely, in determining whether an offeree has
assented to terms available electronically, “courts are actually
undertaking ‘a fact-intensive inquiry’ ” in determining whether
the terms are “sufficiently conspicuous to establish an agreement
to arbitrate.” (See id. at pp. 942, 946–947.) Courts are often
tasked with assessing “the size, color, contrast, and location of
any text notices; the obviousness of any hyperlinks; and overall
screen ‘clutter.’ [Citation.]” (See id. at p. 947.)
       As noted earlier in this part, the compliance certifications
and corrective action forms did not specifically reference

                                    21
Anthem’s arbitration policy, but instead mentioned that the
company’s human resources policies were available on Anthem’s
intranet site. The trial court observed that the compliance
certifications made “specific references to other important
Anthem policies,” including policies concerning confidentiality,
employees’ privacy, conflicts of interest, and inventions or
discoveries made by an employee while employed at Anthem, but
not to the arbitration policy.
       We conclude that the compliance certifications’ and
corrective action forms’ general references to human resources
policies on Anthem Pulse fall short of satisfying the incorporation
by reference doctrine because the site did not call Gonzalez’s
attention to, or otherwise guide, Gonzalez to the arbitration
policy.
       The trial court explained that to access the arbitration
policy on Anthem Pulse, an employee would first need to “click[ ]
on the ‘Human Resources’ page and then click[ ] on the header
‘HR Policies.’ ” The screenshot for Anthem Pulse shows that
several categories of policies thereafter appear on the left hand
side of the screen, to wit (listed from top to bottom): “My
Attendance & Work Time,” “My Job,” “My Workplace,” and
“Short Term.” The court noted that the “ ‘My Attendance & Work
Time’ category[ ] . . . presumably lists other policies about said
category only if an employee clicks on the category to expand
it.”13 The court further observed that if “the second category

      13  As we noted in Discussion, part C.1, ante, the trial court
distinguished Anthem’s attendance policies from the arbitration
policy by characterizing the former as “merely informational” and
the latter as “pertain[ing] to substantive employment rights . . . .”
Appellants do not dispute this finding.

                                    22
listed[,] . . . ‘My Job[,]’ . . . is selected/expanded, the first [policy]
listed is ‘Arbitration.’ ” The screenshot reveals that “Arbitration”
is one of 15 policies listed under the “My Job” category; the other
policies include “Immigration” and “Job Related Licensure and
Certifications.” Gonzalez points out that yet a further click is
required to read the full text of the arbitration policy because
only “[p]ortions of each policy . . . appear on the main part of the
screen after ‘My Job’ is clicked on,” and “these [policy] excerpts
can be expanded if the user clicks on ‘Read More.’ ”14
       These undisputed facts support the trial court’s finding
that “employees had to navigate two to three clicks to access the
arbitration policy” on Anthem Pulse. Appellants do not contest
the court’s conclusions that the arbitration policy “was hidden
within Anthem’s various HR policies in an intranet or website
that contained numerous other policies and that Anthem made
no effort to bring the arbitration policy to the attention of its
employees, including [Gonzalez].” Furthermore, as we have
explained above, absent from appellants’ briefing is any support
for their contention that Gonzalez was somehow obligated to click
through all of the hyperlinks on Anthem’s intranet site to
determine which human resources policies (1) applied to her and
(2) were not merely informational but instead affected her legal
rights.15 (See Discussion, part C.1, ante.)

      14 Appellants tacitly agree with these assertions by failing
to dispute them in their reply brief. (See Association for Los
Angeles Deputy Sheriffs, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 773–774.)
      15  In the factual and procedural history section of their
opening brief—but nowhere else—appellants direct our attention
to the following language from a page on the Anthem Pulse site:
“You are responsible for knowing and complying with all

                                       23
       For all these reasons, we conclude that the compliance
certifications and corrective action forms did not incorporate by
reference the arbitration policy found on Anthem Pulse. (Cf. Doe,
supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 26, 32, 34 [holding that a patron of a
massage parlor was not bound by an arbitration agreement in
part because the parlor’s electronic “check-in process [did not] call
any attention” to the document containing the agreement].)
       In arriving at this conclusion, we acknowledge the federal
district court ruling in Pulido v. Caremore Health Plan, Inc.
(C.D. Cal., May 12, 2020, No. CV 20-02730-AB (AFMx)) [2020 WL
5077353] (Pulido), to the contrary. There, the district court held
that Anthem’s compliance certifications incorporated by reference
the arbitration policy found on Anthem’s intranet site. (See id. at
pp. *1–2, *4–5.) We are not bound by Pulido,16 and we
respectfully disagree with its terse analysis.
       Although Pulido found that the compliance certifications
incorporated by reference the arbitration policy found on MyHR,
its analysis appears to be based on evidence relating to only

company policies, using good judgment, acting with integrity, and
obeying all laws.” Appellants do not argue that this text notified
Gonzalez that she was responsible for clicking through all the
hyperlinks corresponding to human resources policies on the site
to determine which ones affected her legal rights. Accordingly,
we do not further address this text from the Anthem Pulse site.
(See Cahill, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 956; Browne v. County
of Tehama (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 704, 725–726 (Browne)
[holding that an appellant forfeited a contention by failing to
“present[ it] in the argument section of either the opening or
reply brief”].)
      16 (See Sanchez v. Bezos (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 750, 769
[“We are not bound by federal district court decisions . . . .”].)

                                    24
Anthem Pulse. In particular, Pulido observed, “Defendants
provide[d] evidence that the Arbitration Policy was made
available to Plaintiff via the ‘MyHR’ and ‘Anthem Pulse’ intranet
page as the first policy listed under the ‘My Job’ category of
Anthem’s HR policies.” (Pulido, supra, [2020 WL 5077353, at
p. *4], italics added.) Our analysis in Discussion, part C.1, ante,
shows that “arbitration” was the third link listed under the
“HR Policies” menu tree on the MyHR home screen. Pulido also
did not reference the express disclaimer in the MyHR intranet
site that the policies contained on the site did not create
contractual obligations. (See Pulido, supra, [2020 WL 5077353,
at pp. *1–4]; Discussion, part C.1, ante.)
       In addition, although Pulido found that the arbitration
policy was “ ‘easily accessible’ ” to a former Anthem employee via
the intranet site, the court did not assess whether the company
had guided or directed the former employee to the arbitration
policy available on Anthem Pulse. (See Pulido, supra, [2020 WL
5077353, at pp. *1–2, *4–5].) Yet, as we explained earlier in this
part, the incorporation-by-reference analysis turns on whether
Anthem had guided or directed Gonzalez to the arbitration policy
found on the site.
       In sum, appellants have failed to establish that Anthem
provided Gonzalez with sufficient notice of the arbitration policy
on the Anthem Pulse intranet site.

D.    We Reject Appellants’ Remaining Challenges to the
      Trial Court’s Rulings
       Appellants argue the trial court erroneously treated
Anthem’s arbitration policy as a proposal to enter into a
“bilateral” contract, rather than a “unilateral contract to which

                                   25
Ms. Gonzalez assented by continuing to work for Anthem.”17 To
support this contention, appellants maintain that the trial court
relied upon certain authorities “pertain[ing] to bilateral
contracts,” including Civil Code section 1565, subdivision (3),
which provides in relevant part: “The consent of the parties to a
contract must be [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [c]ommunicated by each to the
other.” (Civ. Code, § 1565, subd. (3).)
      Insofar as appellants are claiming the trial court should
have concluded that Gonzalez did not need to sign the offer letter
to be bound by the arbitration policy referenced in the
correspondence (i.e., that the letter was a proposal to enter into a
unilateral contract that Gonzalez had accepted by beginning her
employment for Anthem without signing the correspondence), we
have rejected that argument. (See Discussion, part B, ante.)
Furthermore, our analysis in Discussion, part C, ante,
demonstrates that the trial court did indeed consider the precise
question appellants insist the court “should have asked”—
“whether Ms. Gonzalez was put on notice (actual or constructive)
that continued employment would be acceptance of the
arbitration policy.” Whether, in the course of resolving that
question, the court cited any potentially inapplicable legal

      17   A “unilateral contract” is one in which the offeror
provides a “promise . . . in consideration of the [offeree’s] act or
forbearance,” whereas “an offer . . . to enter into a bilateral
contract . . . may be accepted by a promise” to perform “rather
than . . . actual performance on the part of the offeree.” (See
14 Cal.Jur.3d (2016) Contracts, §§ 19–20.)

                                     26
authorities is beside the point.18 (See Estate of Sapp (2019) 36
Cal.App.5th 86, 104 [“ ‘If the decision of a lower court is correct
on any theory of law applicable to the case, the judgment or order
will be affirmed regardless of the correctness of the grounds upon
which the lower court reached its conclusion.’ ”].)
      Appellants next argue that the compliance certifications
Gonzalez signed equitably estop her from “deny[ing] that she
knew her continued employment would be treated as consent to
Anthem’s arbitration policy.” Yet, appellants acknowledge that
in order for equitable estoppel to apply, “ ‘ “the party to be
estopped must be apprised of the facts . . . .” ’ ” (Quoting
Alameda County Deputy Sheriff’s Assn. v. Alameda County
Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1032, 1072.)
      As we explained in Discussion, parts B–C, ante, appellants
have not shown that Anthem provided Gonzalez with adequate
notice that working for the company would constitute implied
consent to its arbitration policy. Because Gonzalez was not
apprised of the relevant facts, appellants’ claim of equitable
estoppel necessarily fails.
      Lastly, appellants assert in the factual and procedural
history section of their opening brief that “Anthem employees
could . . . access the current arbitration policy through a search
box at the upper right-hand corner of the [Anthem intranet]
page.” Appellants further maintain, “The search box will
recognize the word ‘arbitration’ [as an employee begins to type
that word] and present[s] an employee with another link to the
arbitration policy.” Appellants do not rely upon these assertions

      18  In disposing of this argument, we do not imply that the
trial court did, in fact, rely upon inapposite legal authorities.
We merely conclude that appellants’ contention is irrelevant.

                                   27
in the legal argument sections of their opening or reply briefs.
Furthermore, appellants offer no response to Gonzalez’s counter-
arguments that (1) appellants did not offer sufficient evidence to
show that the arbitration policy was accessible via the search
box, and (2) appellants’ argument “presupposes the employee had
sufficient notice to search for an arbitration agreement.” We thus
disregard appellants’ representations concerning the search box.
(See Browne, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at pp. 725–726; Association
for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 773–774.)
       For the foregoing reasons, we conclude appellants have
failed to discharge their burden of overcoming the presumption of
correctness accorded to the trial court’s orders denying their
initial and renewed motions to compel arbitration.

                          DISPOSITION
      We affirm the trial court’s August 1, 2022 order denying
the motion to compel arbitration, and we deny the petition for
writ of mandate seeking review of the trial court’s
September 29, 2022 order denying the renewed motion to compel
arbitration. April J. Gonzalez is awarded her costs for this
review proceeding.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                          BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

             CHANEY, J.                   WEINGART, J.

                                  28