Court Opinion

ID: 9614939
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:29:48.627229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:40.760213
License: Public Domain

Benham, Justice,
concurring.
We accepted certiorari in this case to determine, in part, whether the state should be time-barred from introducing evidence of some types of similar transactions in the trial of a criminal case.
I agree fully with the principle stated in Division 1 (a) of the main opinion, with the application in Division 1 (b) of that principle to evidence of similar transaction, and with the conclusion that an event which occurred 31 years in the past is too remote for evidence of that event to be admissible as a similar transaction. However, I believe that remoteness in time is not, alone, a sufficient standard by which to determine the admissibility of evidence of similar transactions.
*800Decided December 5, 1991 —
Reconsideration denied December 20, 1991.
Cook & Palmour, Bobby Lee Cook, Alan J. Baverman, Robert E. Andrews, for appellant.
C. Andrew Fuller, District Attorney, Lee Darragh, Leonard C. Parks, Jr., Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
In determining which factors a trial judge should consider in deciding whether to admit evidence of a similar transaction, we must not lose sight of the fact that the similar transactions rule is an exception to the general rule that cases should be tried on their own merit without the introduction of extraneous matters. Therefore, evidence of similar transactions should be inadmissible where allowance of such evidence would be so manifestly unfair as to deny a defendant a reasonable opportunity to prepare an adequate defense. In determining whether such “manifest unfairness” exists, the trial court’s inquiry should include but not be limited to the nature of the similar offense; its susceptibility to proof; its remoteness in time, with special attention to the applicable statute of limitation for such similar offense;2 the victim; the degree of specificity of the notice given pursuant to USCR 31.3, and the defendant’s opportunity to investigate and to cross-examine at trial.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Smith joins in this concurring opinion.

 As to this factor, the trial court should consider such matters as would toll a statute of limitation, including the involvement of minors, absence of the defendant from the state, concealment of the crime, or the incarceration of the defendant.