Court Opinion

ID: 9385141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-05 22:03:16.592921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:59.177054
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/5/23 In re K.C. CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re K.C., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
                                                                D081171
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES
AGENCY,                                                         (Super. Ct. No. J519962C)

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.

F.E.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Margie G. Woods, Judge. Conditionally reversed and remanded with
directions.
         William D. Caldwell, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, and Tahra Broderson, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
      F.E. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her

parental rights as to her son, K.C. under Welfare and Institutions Code1
section 366.26. She argues the juvenile court should have applied the
beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption pursuant to section
366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). She also contends the court’s order must be
conditionally reversed because the San Diego County Health and Human
Services Agency (Agency) failed to satisfy its further inquiry obligations
under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and
California law adopted to pursuant to ICWA. The Agency maintains the
juvenile court properly found that the beneficial parent-child relationship
exception to adoption did not apply. It concedes, however, that conditional
reversal is appropriate to ensure ICWA compliance. Agreeing with the
Agency, we conditionally reverse the order and remand for the limited
purpose of ensuring ICWA compliance.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      In December 2021, the Agency petitioned the juvenile court under
section 300, subdivision (b), claiming that K.C. suffered, or there was
substantial risk he would suffer, serious physical harm or illness due to
Mother’s inability to provide regular care for him as a result of her substance
abuse. The petition alleged that K.C. tested positive for amphetamine and
methamphetamines in November 2021. Mother tested positive for the same
substances and admitted using drugs during her pregnancy.
      K.C. was initially allowed to remain in Mother’s care on a safety plan
because she agreed to attend substance abuse treatment. When she failed to
do so, however, the Agency obtained a protective custody warrant for K.C. on

1     All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
                                       2
December 3. K.C. was detained in a licensed foster home that same day. At
the detention hearing three days later, the juvenile court found the Agency
made a prima facie showing that K.C. was a person described by section 300,
subdivision (b), and ordered him detained. It granted Mother liberal
supervised visitation at a minimum of twice per week.
        Three weeks later, the Agency reported that Mother had completed an
intake for substance abuse treatment at KIVA. She had also visited K.C.
twice a week, was attentive and loving during her visits, and the visitor
monitors had no concerns. According to K.C.’s caregivers, he seemed to
adjust well after his visits with Mother and he preferred to be held all the
time.
        By early February, Mother left KIVA due to a family emergency. Her
visitation during this period was inconsistent. Meanwhile, K.C. was
adjusting well to being with the caregivers and was also doing well in
daycare.
        K.C. was placed in a different foster home on February 18 and adjusted
well. By mid-March, Mother had completed a drug treatment intake with
Parent Care and was participating in parenting classes, but canceled or no-
showed to four classes in February. Mother also no-showed to visits with
K.C.
        In May, the Agency reported that Mother tested positive for
methamphetamine at her intake with Parent Care and she had not
participated in treatment since then. K.C. was still thriving in his current
placement and meeting all his developmental milestones. He was eating
solid foods and formula throughout the day and loved to babble. The Agency
indicated K.C. was healthy, growing, and a very happy baby. It
recommended that he be placed in the current foster home, Mother be

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granted supervised visitation, and Mother’s reunification services be
bypassed.
      At the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing on May 5, the
court found that K.C. was a person described by section 300, subdivision (b),
removed him from Mother’s custody under section 361, subdivision (c)(1), and
ordered that he continue his placement in a foster home. Pursuant to section
361.5, subdivision (b)(10)-(11), it determined that no reunification services
would be provided to Mother and set a section 366.26 hearing.
      Following disposition, Mother had seven visits with K.C. in June and
July; all went well with no concerns. She played with K.C., did tummy time,
and told him she loved him. During these visits, Mother was affectionate,
loving, appropriate, and attended to his needs. However, she was again
inconsistent with visits in August.
      In the beginning of September, the Agency reported that K.C., who was
10 months old at the time, was still in the foster home that he had been in
since February 18, and the caregivers wanted to adopt him. It characterized
K.C. as a happy baby who did not display distress upon separation from
Mother when visits ended and easily transitioned back to daycare or the
caregiver.
      Mother subsequently visited with K.C. once in September, which went
well. She read him a book, showed him how to roll a plush soccer ball across
the room, and motivated him to crawl with baby biscuits. At the end of the
visit, Mother brought K.C. out to the car. When she strapped him into his car
seat, he started to cry and Mother comforted him with his pacifier.
      Mother attended two visits in October, during which she was attentive,
engaged in appropriate play, and told K.C. she loved him. In its section

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366.26 reports, the Agency recommended that the court terminate Mother’s
parental rights and order a permanent plan of adoption.
      At the section 366.26 hearing on November 1, Mother explained that
she attended the majority of her scheduled visits with K.C. to the best of her
ability. While acknowledging that she missed visits, she testified that she
saw him develop since birth and was involved as much as possible. She
claimed K.C. knows who she is, he knows she is his mother, and they have an
amazing time together. When she meets the visitor monitor outside and K.C.
sees her, he has a “big surprise look” and stops crying. Mother testified that
he hates being in the car and when she takes him out of the car seat, he
immediately calms down. Also, in the last month, he started to notice a
pattern and would start to get “antsy” with a worried look on his face when
the visit is almost over. According to Mother, at the last three or four visits,
K.C. started calling her “mama” at the end of the visit and it “makes it really
difficult for the both of us.” She emphasized that she loves him and he loves
her, and she has built a relationship with him as much as she could. Mother
believed that her relationship with K.C. was just like any other mother who
loves and cares for her child from “a difficult stance,” but when they are
together, she is “a mother to him.”
      The Agency asked the court to find that K.C. was both generally and
specifically adoptable and argued the beneficial parent-child relationship
exception to adoption did not apply because Mother’s visitation had not been
regular and consistent. If the court were to find sufficiently regular
visitation, the Agency contended there was no evidence of a substantial
positive emotional attachment between K.C. and Mother, urging the court to
take into account the amount of time that K.C. had been out of Mother’s
care—virtually his entire life—and his very young age. He was also in a

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stable environment and had a relationship with his prospective adoptive
parents. Thus, any relationship K.C. and Mother did have was outweighed
by the benefits K.C. would receive through adoption. Minor’s counsel agreed
with and adopted the Agency’s arguments.
      Mother’s attorney argued that the beneficial parent-child relationship
exception to adoption should apply because Mother visited K.C. to the extent
she could and had strong, positive visitation. She also argued K.C. would
benefit from a continued relationship with Mother and it would be
detrimental to sever the relationship because K.C. knew that Mother is his
mother, he gets excited to see her, and he gets upset at the end of visits.
      In issuing its ruling, the juvenile court observed that K.C. would be
turning one year old in one week. It found that he was adoptable and moved
on to the question of whether the beneficial parent-child relationship
exception to adoption applied, stating:
          “So as far as visitation is concerned, the court would have
         to agree with the assessment of minor’s counsel and the
         Agency’s counsel that there has been visitation, but not one
         where the court can determine and find that the two other
         elements exist, that the child would benefit from continuing
         the relationship, and that terminating the relationship
         would [be] detrimental to the child.”

      Specifically, the court found that the evidence did not show “by a
preponderance or by any other lower level,” that K.C. had a significant
positive emotional attachment to Mother. It also found that the
preponderance of the evidence did not show that the harm of severing the
relationship between K.C. and Mother would outweigh the benefit of K.C.
being placed in a new adoptive home such that severing the relationship
would be detrimental to K.C.’s health, well-being, or development.
Concluding that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption

                                          6
did not apply, the court terminated Mother’s parental rights as to K.C. and
ordered the permanent plan of adoption.
                                 DISCUSSION
      Mother raises two issues on appeal, contending: (1) the juvenile court
erred in failing to apply the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to
overcome the statutory preference for adoption; and (2) the requirements
under ICWA were not satisfied.
A. The Beneficial Parent-Child Relationship Exception
      Mother argues that the evidence does not support the juvenile court’s
findings and that the juvenile court abused its discretion in declining to apply
the beneficial parent-child relation exception. We conclude, however, that
substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that K.C. did not have a
substantial, positive, emotional attachment to Mother such that K.C. would
benefit from continuing a relationship with her, and the juvenile court was
within its discretion to decline to apply the beneficial parent-child
relationship exception.
      “ ‘At a permanency plan hearing, the court may order one of three
alternatives: adoption, guardianship or long-term foster care. [Citation.] If
the dependent child is adoptable, there is a strong preference for adoption
over the alternative permanency plans.’ [Citation.]” (In re B.D. (2021) 66
Cal.App.5th 1218, 1224.) Once the juvenile court finds the child is adoptable,
the burden then shifts to the parent to demonstrate that a statutory
exception applies. (Id. at p. 1225; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) If the parent does
not establish the applicability of a statutory exception, the juvenile court
must terminate parental rights. (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
303, 316 (Katherine J.).)

                                        7
      One such statutory exception is the beneficial parent-child relationship
exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) It applies if “[t]he court finds a
compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to
the child” because “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and
contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) This exception requires the
parent to prove three elements: “1) regular visitation and contact with the
child, taking into account the extent of visitation permitted; (2) a substantial,
positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment
implying that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship; and 3)
a showing that terminating the attachment would be detrimental to the child
even when balanced against the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive
home.” (In re M.G. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 836, 847.)
      “We review the juvenile court’s findings as to whether the parent has
maintained regular visitation and contact with the child, as well as the
existence of a beneficial parental relationship, for substantial evidence.” (In
re B.D., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1225 [citing to In re Caden C. (2021) 11
Cal.5th 614, 639–640 (Caden C.)].) We do “ ‘not reweigh the evidence,
evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts’ ” and
will not disturb the juvenile court’s findings even where substantial evidence
to the contrary also exists. (Caden C., at p. 640, citations omitted.) “[T]he
ultimate decision—whether termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child due to the child’s relationship with [the] parent—is
discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Ibid.) A court
abuses its discretion “ ‘ “ ‘by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.)

                                         8
      The Agency contends that although the juvenile court’s finding
regarding the first element was unclear, the record would support a

conclusion that Mother failed to have regular visits and contact with K.C.2
Mother argues that the juvenile court acknowledged her visits with K.C. and
this court cannot imply a finding that she failed to satisfy the first element.
She suggests we should reverse and remand the matter to resolve any
unclarity.
      Based on our review of the juvenile court’s oral ruling, it is reasonably
clear the court found that Mother satisfied the first element of regular
visitation and contact with K.C., but that such visitation and contact was not
enough to establish the two remaining elements of the exception. Because we
conclude the court found in favor of Mother on the first element, and because
we agree with the juvenile court on the second and third elements even with
the first element in Mother’s favor, we need not address the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the first element nor reverse for clarification.
      Turning to the second element—the existence of a beneficial parent-
child relationship—the juvenile court must “consider the evidence showing
whether the parent’s actions or inactions ‘continued or developed a
significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent.’ ” (In re B.D.,
supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1230 [italics added].) To determine whether the
parent has established this element, the court considers factors including the
age of the child, the amount of time the child spent in the parent’s custody,
the interaction between parent and child, and the child’s needs. (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The court should also examine “how children
feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their parents.” (Ibid.)

2      Significantly, the Agency does not assert there is insufficient evidence
to find that Mother maintained regular visitation with K.C.
                                        9
      Here, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that
K.C. did not have a significant, positive, emotional attachment to Mother.
Notably, he was in her care only until he was three and a half weeks old. By
the time of the section 366.26 hearing, he was just days from his first
birthday. Although the record shows Mother had positive visits with K.C.—
and according to Mother, K.C. did not want the visits to end—the reports also
reflect that he did not display distress upon separation from her and adjusted
well after the visits, transitioning easily back to daycare or the caregiver.
Mother argues that at the beginning of visits, K.C. would immediately calm
down when she took him out of the car seat; however, she also testified that
he hated being in the car. Similarly, while she claims K.C. is extremely
happy with her, the record shows that he was generally a very happy baby
and very social.
      Mother cites to her testimony that her visits with K.C. were amazing
and contends the Agency’s reports “are consistent with such loving and
attentive relating.” But the report to which Mother cites simply states that
visitation monitors have reported that Mother “was attentive and loving
towards the child during her visits. They have not expressed any concern.”
Although Mother may have been appropriate, attentive, and loving during
the visits, the observations did not necessarily indicate that K.C. had a
significant emotional attachment to her. (In re Katherine J. (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 303, 318.)
      The third element of the beneficial parent-child relationship exception
requires the juvenile court to determine whether terminating the parental
relationship would be detrimental to the child. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 633.) “[I]n assessing whether termination would be detrimental, the
trial court must decide whether the harm from severing the child’s

                                       10
relationship with the parent outweighs the benefit to the child of placement
in a new adoptive home. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 632.) This requires the
juvenile court to determine “how the child would be affected by losing the
parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like for the child in an
adoptive home without the parent in the child’s life.” (Id. at p. 633.) The
juvenile court must then weigh the loss of this relationship with “the benefit
of placement in a new, adoptive home . . . .” (Ibid.)
      Mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion because in
weighing the harm of severing K.C.’s relationship with her against the
benefit of a new adoptive home, the juvenile court assigned a benefit only to
the adoptive home, and “failed to recognize the countervailing benefit of
continuing [K.C.’s] significant, positive emotional attachment with [her].”
      The juvenile court, found, however, that K.C. did not have a
substantial, positive, emotional attachment to Mother, and we have
concluded there is substantial evidence to support this finding. While this
finding addresses the second element, the second and third elements of the
exception “significantly overlap.” (Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at
p. 317, fn. 7.) “For example, evidence that terminating the parental relation
would cause harm indicates that the child would lose important relational
benefits if severed from parent.” (Ibid.) “When the relationship with a
parent is so important to the child that the security and stability of a new
home wouldn’t outweigh its loss, termination would be ‘detrimental to the
child due to’ the child’s beneficial relationship with a parent.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 633–634.)
      Here, because K.C. did not have a substantial, positive, emotional
attachment to Mother, there was no beneficial relationship between them.
Mother does not point to facts or identify what benefits the court should have

                                       11
but failed to assign to the continuation of K.C.’s relationship with her. The
record further shows K.C. would suffer minimal harm from the termination
that relationship. Again, while Mother testified that he would get “antsy” at
the end of visits, reports indicate that he did not display distress upon
separation from her and adjusted well after the end of a visit. Mother does
not point to specific facts or detail how K.C. would suffer harm from the loss
of a relationship with her.
      On the other hand, the record shows that K.C. would derive great
benefit from the permanency of adoption. He adjusted well to his first foster
home where he was placed for two and a half months. His current placement
with the prospective adoptive parents began on February 18, 2022. By the
time of the section 366.26 hearing, he had been with them for almost nine
months. The Agency reported that K.C. was thriving in his placement and
meeting all his developmental targets. He was a happy and healthy baby,
eating solid foods, sleeping well, and learning to self-soothe.
      In sum, the record fully supports the juvenile court’s ultimate
determination that any harm that might result from termination of K.C.’s
relationship with Mother was outweighed by the substantial benefits K.C.
would receive through the permanency of adoption. Accordingly, the court
did not abuse its discretion when it declined to apply the beneficial parent-
child relationship exception to adoption and terminated Mother’s parental
rights.
B. ICWA
      Mother argues the Agency failed to comply with its further inquiry
obligations under ICWA because it should have contacted the Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) and the State Department of Social Services (SDSS) for
assistance in identifying potentially relevant tribes. She also contends that

                                       12
because the Agency did not specify what information it included in its further
inquiry communications with the Iipay Nation of Santa Ysabel (Iipay
Nation), it is unclear whether the Agency provided the necessary information
for the tribe to make a determination regarding K.C.’s possible Indian
heritage.
      The Agency responds there was no need to contact the BIA or the SDSS
because the Iipay Nation was the only tribe implicated as a source of K.C.’s
potential Indian heritage. It concedes, however, it would have been better to
submit copies of the written letters and emails that it sent to the Iipay
Nation so there would be a record of the information on which the tribe relied
to determine that K.C. was not eligible for membership.
      We agree with Mother on both ICWA issues. The juvenile court’s
finding that ICWA did not apply to the proceedings implied that the Agency
fulfilled its further inquiry duties. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2); see In re Austin J.
(2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 885 [a finding that “ICWA does not apply” implies
social workers and court “did not know or have a reason to know the children
were Indian children and that social workers had fulfilled their duty of
inquiry”].) The record does not support these findings. We therefore
conditionally reverse and remand the matter for the limited purpose of
ensuring ICWA compliance.
            1. Additional Facts
      The Agency initially reported that Mother indicated maternal
grandmother was part of the “Digueno Mission Indians.” At the detention
hearing, the court found there was a reason to believe K.C. may be an Indian
child and ordered the Agency to conduct further inquiry under section 224.2,
subdivision (e).

                                         13
      Mother then claimed she had Indian ancestry and that maternal
grandmother and maternal aunt were registered tribal members. Maternal
aunt reported that she was registered with Santa Ysabel Mission Indians and
that she currently lived on the Sycuan reservation. Similarly, maternal
grandmother indicated she was registered with the Santa Ysabel Mission
Indians and grew up on the Sycuan reservation.
      The Agency sent inquiries to the Iipay Nation by email and certified
mail, and also attempted to contact the tribe by telephone, leaving a
voicemail message. Although the tribe did not return the call, the Agency
reported receiving a letter from the tribe stating that Mother and K.C. were
not eligible for enrollment. At both the next hearing and the contested
jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the court found that ICWA did not apply
to the proceedings.
      The Agency later reported that Mother’s cousin claimed she had Indian
heritage, but indicated she was not affiliated with a tribe. At the section
366.26 hearing, the court again found that ICWA did not apply to the
proceedings.
         2. Applicable Law
      Congress enacted ICWA to address concerns regarding the separation
of Indian children from their tribes through adoption or foster care placement
with non-Indian families. (In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 7.) Under
California law adopted pursuant to ICWA, the juvenile court and Agency
have an “affirmative and continuing duty to inquire” whether a child “is or
may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a); see In re Isaiah W., at p. 9.) As
outlined by this court in In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1052, “section
224.2 creates three distinct duties regarding ICWA in dependency
proceedings. First, from the Agency’s initial contact with a minor and his

                                       14
family, the statute imposes a duty of inquiry to ask all involved persons
whether the child may be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subds. (a), (b).) Second, if
that initial inquiry creates a ‘reason to believe’ the child is an Indian child,
then the Agency ‘shall make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian
status of the child, and shall make that inquiry as soon as practicable.’ (Id.,
subd. (e), italics added.) Third, if that further inquiry results in a reason to
know the child is an Indian child, then the formal notice requirements of
section 224.3 apply.”
      After a “reason to believe” that an Indian child is involved has been
established, further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child
is required. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) The duty of further inquiry includes
(1) interviewing the parents, Indian custodian, and extended family
members; (2) contacting the BIA and the SDSS for assistance in identifying
the names and contact information of the tribes in which the child may be a
member, or eligible for membership; and (3) contacting tribes and anyone else
who might have information regarding the child’s membership or eligibility
in a tribe; contact with a tribe “shall include” information identified by the
tribe as necessary for the tribe to make a membership or eligibility
determination. (Id., subd. (e)(2)(A–C).)
      “On appeal, we review the juvenile court’s ICWA findings for
substantial evidence.” (In re D.S., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 1051.)
However, where the facts are undisputed, we independently determine
whether ICWA’s requirements have been satisfied. (Ibid.)
         3. Analysis
      As the Agency contends, the only claims of Indian membership
identified by the maternal family were with the “Digueno Mission Indians”
and the “Santa Ysabel Mission Indians.” The Agency argues these claims

                                        15
implicated only one tribe—the Iapay Nation—which was previously
recognized as Santa Ysabel Band of Diegueno Mission Indians of the Santa
Ysabel Reservation. (See 87 Fed.Reg. 4636-4640 (Jan. 28, 2022).) According
to the Agency, the variation of the tribal names included in its reports reflect
the change in one tribe’s official name—the Iapay Nation.
      However, there are seven other Federally recognized tribes with
“Diegueno Mission Indians” in its name. (See 87 Fed.Reg. 4636-4640 (Jan.
28, 2022).) Additionally, maternal aunt reported she currently lived on the
Sycuan reservation and maternal grandmother reported she grew up on the
Sycuan reservation. While not addressed or acknowledged by the Agency, the
Sycuan Band of the Kumeyaay Nation is a Federally recognized tribe. (Ibid.)
Finally, Mother’s cousin claimed she had Indian heritage but did not identify
a tribe. Given these ambiguities, the Agency should have contacted the BIA
and the SDSS for assistance in identifying tribes in which K.C. may be
eligible for membership.
      The Agency acknowledges it should have submitted copies of the letters
and emails it sent to the Iipay Nation so the record would show what
information the tribe relied on in determining that K.S. was not eligible for
membership. Unlike when a “reason to know” gives rise to the obligation to
provide formal notice to tribes, the statute does not require the Agency to file
its communications with the tribes where there was only a “reason to believe”
requiring further inquiry. (See § 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(C) [when there is a
“reason to believe” a child is an Indian child, further inquiry includes
contacting tribes by “telephone, facsimile, or electronic mail”], italics added;
compare with § 224.3, subds. (a)(1), (c) [when there is a “reason to know” a
child is an Indian child, formal notice “shall be sent by registered or certified
mail with return receipt requested” and “[p]roof of the notice, including copies

                                       16
of notices sent and all return receipts and responses received, shall be filed
with the court”], italics added.) However, the statue does require that the
Agency’s further inquiry communications include information necessary for
the tribe to make a membership or eligibility determination. (§ 224.2, subd.
(e)(2)(C) [when conducting further inquiry, “[c]ontact with a tribe shall
include sharing information identified by the tribe as necessary for the tribe
to make a membership or eligibility determination”].) Without at least a
summary in the record of what information it provided, there is insufficient
evidence to support the trial court’s implicit finding that the Agency
conducted a proper and adequate further inquiry.

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                                DISPOSITION
      The juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights is conditionally
reversed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court with directions for
the Agency to comply with the further inquiry provisions of ICWA and section
224.2 (and, if applicable, the notice provisions under section 224.3) as
discussed in this opinion. If, after completing its further inquiry, neither the
Agency nor the juvenile court has reason to know that K.C. is an Indian child,
the order shall be reinstated. If the Agency or the juvenile court has reason
to know K.C. is an Indian child, the Agency and the juvenile court shall
proceed in conformity with ICWA and related California law.

                                                                       DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, Acting P. J.

DO, J.

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