Court Opinion

ID: 9566695
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:42:04.878393+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:00.018638
License: Public Domain

MULLARKEY, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Although I concur in the portion of the majority opinion ordering a new trial on the issue of damages, I do not agree that a new trial is required on the issue of liability. The record makes clear that the jurors agreed that the defendant, David Neil, was liable to the plaintiffs for damages under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and that the disagreement among the jurors was only as to the amount of actual damages. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment as to liability and remand for a new trial only as to damages.
I.
The verdict form was divided into three parts: first, Neil's liability to the plaintiffs; second, the City and County of Denver’s liability to the plaintiffs; and third, the amount of damages to be awarded to the plaintiffs. Each part was divided into six subparts, one for each plaintiff. The first part, as filled in by the jury, read as follows:
We, the jury, unanimously find as follows:
I. Claim for intentionally depriving Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights, asserted against Defendant David Neil:
CHECK ONE BOX ONLY AFTER EACH LETTER.
a) For Andrew Espinoza a For David Neil □
b) For Jeannie Espinoza 0 For David Neil □
c) For Judith Espinoza 0 For David Neil □
d) For Arthur Espinoza, Jr. 0 For David Neil □
e) For Barry Espinoza 0 For David Neil □
f) For Beverly Espinoza 0 For David Neil □
The second part was left blank, because the jurors could not agree on the City and County of Denver’s liability. The third part, on which the majority focuses, read as follows:
ONLY in the event you find for a particular Plaintiff on one or both of his/her claims, complete the following as to such Plaintiff: (Punitive Damages may be assessed only against defendant, David Neil)
Upon our unanimous verdict for Plaintiff
a) Andrew Espinoza, we award him $_ actual damages; we award him $_ in punitive (exemplary) damages against David Neil.
b) Jeannie Espinoza, we award her $_actual damages; we award her $_ in punitive (exemplary) damages against David Neil.
c) Judith Espinoza, we award her $_actual damages; we award her $_ in punitive (exemplary) damages against David Neil.
d) Arthur Espinoza, we award him $_ actual damages; we award him $_ in punitive (exemplary) damages against David Neil.
e) Barry Espinoza, we award him $_ actual damages; we award him $_ in punitive (exemplary) damages against David Neil.
*1263f) Beverly Espinoza, we award her $_actual damages; we award her $_ in punitive (exemplary) damages against David Neil.
The jury initially placed a question mark in the space for actual damages to be awarded each plaintiff and $5000 in the blank for punitive damages to he awarded each plaintiff. Upon receiving the verdict, the trial judge properly instructed the jury that it had to award a specific amount of compensatory damages. The jury resumed its deliberations and all six jurors signed a verdict form striking the question marks and awarding $150,000 in actual damages to each plaintiff. The jury left in place the $5,000 in punitive damages to each plaintiff.
At defendant’s request, the trial judge then polled the jurors, asking each “was this and is this your verdict?” Five jurors answered in the affirmative. The sixth juror, Raymond Rector, asked, “Can this be decided, the actual damages, by majority vote?” (Emphasis added.) The judge replied that “it has to be unanimous.” Rector informed him that “[i]t was by majority.” The judge then stated, “In that event, you haven’t reached unanimity as to the actual damages in this case. ... [A]m I correct there is no unanimity as to the actual damages in this case? ” (Emphasis added.)
After the jury had been discharged, the trial judge stated that because of “the statement by one of the jurors that the actual damages that were added to the verdict form” had not been decided by a unanimous vote, the court would entertain a motion for a mistrial or a new trial. Four days later, prior to receiving Rector’s affidavit or any relevant motions or briefs, the court entered an order of judgment nunc pro tunc to the day the jury had been dismissed. That order stated that the initial verdict against the defendant, David Neil, had been “unanimous,” but that one juror had indicated that the sum of $150,-000 for compensatory damages “was not arrived at by unanimous vote but only by majority vote.” In its order of judgment, the trial court entered judgment for the plaintiffs and against Neil, awarding $150,-000 in compensatory damages and $5,000 in punitive damages to each plaintiff. After reviewing the post-trial briefs, the judge orally confirmed the entry of judgment.
II.
Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 59 provides that a new trial may be granted on “all or part of the issues.” When the issue of liability is entirely separate and distinct from the issue of damages and the jury verdict is improper only as to the amount of damages, in general the jury’s verdict as to liability is determinative and the court should grant a new trial only as to damages. See, e.g., Kistler v. Halsey, 173 Colo. 540, 481 P.2d 722 (1971); Denton v. Navratil, 170 Colo. 158, 459 P.2d 761 (1969); Whiteside v. Harvey, 124 Colo. 561, 239 P.2d 989 (1951); Brncic v. Metz, 28 Colo.App. 204, 471 P.2d 618 (1970); cf. 6A J. Moore, J. Lucas & G. Grother, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 59.06 (2d ed. 1987) (discussing partial new trials under Fed.R.Civ. P. 59(a)). However, if the trial court finds that an excessive jury verdict was the result of bias, prejudice, or passion, then it must grant a new trial on all issues, since it is not possible to determine whether and how much the jury’s verdict as to liability was also improperly influenced. See Marks v. District Court, 643 P.2d 741 (Colo.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1107, 102 S.Ct. 3486, 73 L.Ed.2d 1368 (1982); see also Higgs v. District Court, 713 P.2d 840, 861 (Colo.1985). In deciding whether a new trial on all issues is warranted, “the determinative considerations are those factors relating to fairness.” Marks, 643 P.2d at 744 (quoting Kitto v. Gilbert, 39 Colo.App. 374, 570 P.2d 544 (1977)).
Here, the issues are clearly separate and distinct, as shown by the three parts of the verdict form. No one questioned the unanimity of the jury’s verdict as to liability. There is no suggestion that the jury was motivated by bias, prejudice, or passion. *1264The majority opinion remands for a new trial on all issues based solely on one juror’s unexplained statement that the jury was not unanimous as to the amount of actual damages which the plaintiffs should be awarded. Because it is clear that the jurors all agreed that Neil was liu^le to the plaintiffs, basic fairness requires that the trial court’s judgment as to liability be affirmed. On the same basis, I agree that because the jury’s intent as to the amount of damages cannot be discerned from the record, we must remand this matter on the question of damages.
The majority opinion relies on the fact that the trial judge did not technically comply with the requirements of C.R.C.P. 47(o) and (s), because he did not receive and record the jury’s verdict as to liability before discharging the jury. However, the record1 on its face shows that the jury unanimously returned a verdict on liability in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant Neil. When the jury’s intent is clear from the face of the record, it must be given effect. Tyler v. District Court, 200 Colo. 254, 256, 613 P.2d 899, 901 (1980); Rome v. Gaffrey, 654 P.2d 333, 334 (Colo.Ct.App.1982). Accordingly, I would conclude that the trial court’s failure to formally record the jury’s verdict prior to discharging the jury was harmless error. See C.R.C.P. 61.
III.
Because I conclude that Rector’s statement during the polling is not a sufficient basis for vacating the trial court’s judgment on the question of liability, I must address the other issues on which we granted certiorari.
First, the defendant argues that we should modify our decision in the first appeal of this case, Espinoza v. O’Dell, 633 P.2d 455 (Colo.1981), dismissed, 456 U.S. 430, 102 S.Ct. 1865, 72 L.Ed.2d 237 (1982).2 The defendant relies solely on a recent Tenth Circuit decision holding that “an allegation of intent to interfere with a particular relationship protected by the freedom of intimate association is required to state a claim under [42 U.S.C.] section 1983.” Trujillo v. Board of County Comm’rs, 768 F.2d 1186, 1190 (10th Cir.1985). He suggests that Espinoza did not decide what type of conduct would amount to a deprivation of the constitutional liberty interest in a continuing family relationship, so that we are free to follow Trujillo. In Espinoza we stated that the plaintiffs had “allege[d] the deprivation of a constitutional liberty interest in a continuing family relationship” and that they had stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. 633 P.2d at 465. Therefore, defendant’s suggestion that we did not decide what type of conduct amounts to a deprivation is without merit.
In addition, Trujillo has been criticized by several other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1420 n. 12 (9th Cir.) (declining to follow Trujillo because Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 *1265(1986), solved the “floodgate” problem with which the Trujillo court was concerned), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 108 S.Ct. 311, 98 L.Ed.2d 269 (1987); de la Cruz LaChapel v. Chevere Ortiz, 637 F.Supp. 43, 46 (D.P.R.1986) (finding the Trujillo intent requirement “idealistic and unworkable”). But cf. Stengel v. City of Hartford, 652 F.Supp. 572, 575 (D.Conn.1987) (citing Trujillo in support of imposing an intent requirement in first amendment context). At least one district court in the Tenth Circuit has concluded that an allegation of recklessness or deliberate indifference satisfies the Trujillo intent requirement. White v. Talboys, 635 F.Supp. 505, 507 (D.Colo.1986). In Trejo v. Wattles, 636 F.Supp. 992, 997 (D.Colo.1985), plaintiff alleged that defendants had fatally shot his son. The Trejo court held that allegations almost identical to those in the case before us satisfied the Trujillo intent requirement. Compare Trejo, 636 F.Supp. at 997 with Espinoza, 633 P.2d at 459.
The defendant contends that 42 U.S.C. section 1988 requires this court to follow federal law and specifically to follow Trujillo. The United States Supreme Court has explained that section 1983 “contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 664, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). The Supreme Court has not addressed the question of what conduct and what type of intent must be alleged to state a claim for the deprivation of the constitutional liberty interest in a continuing family relationship. The Trujillo intent requirement is the minority view. See, e.g., Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651, 654-55 (9th Cir.1985); Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1242-45 (7th Cir.1984); Mattis v. Schnarr, 502 F.2d 588, 593-95 (8th Cir.1974); Jones v. McElroy, 429 F.Supp. 848, 852-53 (E.D. Pa.1977). Our decision in Espinoza, 633 P.2d 455, is consistent with the majority federal rule. Accordingly, we need not decide whether, if the Trujillo intent requirement were clearly the federal rule on this issue, section 1988 would require us to adopt that requirement.
In summary, our prior decision in Espinoza, 633 P.2d 455, is the law of the case and one of the purposes of the law of the case doctrine is to protect against the rear-gument of settled issues in the same action. People v. Roybal, 672 P.2d 1003, 1005 (Colo.1983). Although we have the power to reconsider our prior decision, there is no compelling reason to do so and I would decline to modify our decision in Espinoza v. O’Dell, 633 P.2d 455.
- IV.
Finally, defendant argues that one juror’s lack of candor during voir dire requires that the jury’s verdict be vacated. A new trial is required under this theory only if a juror deliberately misrepresented or concealed relevant facts. See People v. Dunoyair, 660 P.2d 890, 895-96 (Colo.1983) (inadvertent nondisclosure is not sufficient to require a new trial absent a showing of actual bias); People v. Borrelli, 624 P.2d 900, 903 (Colo.Ct.App.1980) (juror’s deliberate lack of candor requires a new trial). Here, defendant contended that Rector failed to disclose certain aspects of his background, including that he once had been detained overnight in jail and that he had been investigated by the FBI after subscribing to a communist newspaper.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the question of Rector’s alleged lack of candor. The judge found that “the questions propounded on voir dire were truthfully answered and there was no nondisclosure of any material or relevant fact inquired into by counsel or the Court.” Although the jurors had been asked if they had had any unusual experiences with police officers or had ever been arrested, none of the questions was explicitly addressed to the type of incidents which defendant contended Rector had concealed. The trial court’s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and the correct standard of law was applied. Accordingly, I would conclude that the trial court *1266was correct to hold that this allegation did not require a new trial.
V.
For the reasons given above, I would hold that the trial court properly rejected the defendant’s arguments about the effect of Trujillo v. Board of County Commissioners, 768 F.2d 1186, and the alleged lack of candor of one juror. Like the majority, I would remand for a new trial on the question of damages. However, requiring a new trial on liability would be nothing but a windfall for the defendant, needlessly prolonging litigation which already has taken almost ten years. The defendant has had a full and fair trial on liability in which a unanimous jury found against him. I do not believe he is entitled to relitigate liability based solely on a technical error by the trial judge which the judge tried to correct within a few days of trial. Accordingly, I would affirm the entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against defendant Neil on the question of Neil’s liability under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (1982).
I am authorized to state that KIRSH-BAUM, J., joins in this concurrence and dissent.

. I agree with the majority opinion that Rector’s post-trial affidavit cannot properly be considered in determining whether the trial court’s error was harmless. See CRE 606(b). Accordingly, I base my analysis only on the statements that the trial judge and the jurors made at the time of the trial and on the form of the verdict itself.

. The majority declines to address this argument because the defendant did not properly preserve the issue for appellate review. The issue was raised, although briefly, during the March 12, 1985, hearing on the defendant's motion for directed verdict. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs had failed to prove their case because the evidence showed only that the defendant’s conduct was directed toward the deceased father of the plaintiffs and that no evidence showed "that any of the actions here were [sic] intended and directed toward the claimants who are the heirs.” (Trujillo was not discussed; it had not been decided at that time.) The trial court rejected the defendant’s argument based on its interpretation of Espinoza. The issue also was raised by the defendant in a post-trial supplemental brief citing Trujillo and was rejected by the trial court in its order denying the defendant’s motion for new trial. The issue has been fully briefed and argued before us and the plaintiffs have not asserted that the issue was not properly preserved. Accordingly, I believe the issue is before us and should be decided.