Court Opinion

ID: 9535323
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:48:03.966401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:13.184178
License: Public Domain

RABINOWITZ, Justice
(dissenting in part, concurring in part).
Assuming that adoption of the doctrine of strict liability is warranted, and assuming further that the Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.’s1 formulation of the doctrine is preferable to that in Restatement (Second) Torts section 402A (1965), I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court’s failure to instruct on strict liability prejudiced appellant.2 For in the case at bar the jury was instructed on appellant’s alternate theory of liability which was based on breach of warranty.3
In this regard the trial court informed the jury that in the factual context in question “there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be merchantable. By this we mean that the goods are at least fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.” The jurors were further instructed that in order for appellant to recover they had to find that “the warranty was breached and that the breach of warranty was the proximate cause of the *252loss sustained.”4 Under the court’s instructions concerning breach of warranty, all warranty defenses, including contributory negligence, were withheld from the jury’s consideration. In such circumstances I do not believe that appellant has shown how she was prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to give her proposed instructions pertaining to strict liability.
There is considerable authority to the effect that “defect” in strict liability terms is co-extensive with that of the implied warranty of fitness for reasonable use.5 Appellant has not demonstrated that the strict liability “defect” concept, if applied to the case at bar, would have furnished a more expansive base for determination of liability than that afforded by the implied warranty of fitness for reasonable use criteria. Thus, I do not believe that a new trial is warranted on the facts appearing in this record and would hold that the trial court’s failure to instruct on the theory of strict liability was harmless error.6
On the other hand, although I view the question as an extremely close one, I concur in the majority’s view concerning the trial court’s refusal to admit the operating manuals. I therefore concur in the granting of a new trial on this ground.

. 59 Cal.2d 57, 62, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 13 A.L.R.3d 1049 (1962).

. Appellant’s two proposed instructions pertaining to strict liability read as follows :
A manufacturer is strictly, liable when an article he places on the market proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.
A retailer is strictly liable when he sells an article which proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being.

.Appellant alleged four alternative theories of liability. The trial court instructed the jury on all theories asserted with the exception of strict liability.

. An additional facet of the warranty question was presented to the jury in the following instruction:
One who sells a product which is likely to be dangerous when used for the purpose for which it was made or for a reasonably foreseeable purpose and has reason to believe that those who will use it will not realize the risk has a duty to exercise reasonable care to warn them of the danger involved. Failure to fulfill that duty to warn may make the product unmerchantable and unfit and result in a breach of warranty.

. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.2d 9, 45 Cal.Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145, 150 (1965); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305, 313 (1965); Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J.Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879, 884 (1967); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 191 N.E.2d 81, 82-83 (1963) ; L. Frumer & M. Friedman, Products Liability § 164 (4), at 3-188 (1968).

. In my view, the court’s instruction quoted in n. 4 supra adequately covered the issue of lack of warning-unmerchantability. Compare Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 Ill.App.2d 334, 236 N.E. 2d 125, 139 (1968); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 Minn.L.Rev. 791, 808 (1966) ; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, comments (h) (j) (1965) ; Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 Tenn.L.Rev. 363, 372-74 (1965).