Court Opinion

ID: 9587074
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:17:48.358597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:01.000635
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice.
Henry Bell was arrested for murder in December 1995, but was not indicted until April 1996. In July 1996, he filed a pleading styled as a “Motion to Set Jury Trial.” In August 1999, he moved to dismiss the case pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-171 and, in November of that same year, he also moved to dismiss based upon an alleged violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. After a hearing, the trial court granted both motions. The State brings this appeal from the trial court’s dismissal orders.
1. The State contends that Bell’s 1996 motion does not satisfy the requirements of OCGA § 17-7-171, because it did not provide the prosecution with adequate notice that he was seeking a speedy trial and not merely a jury trial. Although the pleading does not expressly reference the statute or demand a “speedy” trial, such specifics are unnecessary. “No particular form is required ‘so long as the demand can reasonably be construed as a demand for trial under the provisions of [the statute].’ [Cit.]” Baker v. State, 212 Ga. App. 731, 732 (442 SE2d 815) (1994) (dealing with OCGA § 17-7-170, which applies to non-capital cases). The motion in this case was not misleadingly styled as simply a demand for a jury trial. Compare Kramer v. State, 185 Ga. App. 254 (363 SE2d 800) (1987). The caption identifies it as a request that the State “set” Bell’s case for a jury trial, and correctly specifies the number of the indictment which charged him with murder. In the body of the motion, he requested that a jury trial be held “in his capital case within the next two terms of court. . . .” This is a demand that the prosecution comply with OCGA § 17-7-171 (a). The pleading, considered in its entirety, was clear as to its purpose and the right which it sought to enforce. A motion is sufficient to invoke the extreme sanction of OCGA § 17-7-171 so long as it constitutes a demand to be tried within the next two succeeding terms of court. See Forbus v. State, 250 Ga. 24 (295 SE2d 530) (1982) (approving Court of Appeals’ construction of OCGA § 17-7-170 in State v. Adamczyk, 162 Ga. App. 288, 289 (290 SE2d 149) (1982)).
The dissent correctly notes that a defendant who seeks a speedy trial pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-171 must comply strictly with the applicable statutory requirements. In determining what those requirements are, however, we must adhere to applicable legal principles, one of which is that “there is no magic in mere nomenclature, even in describing pleadings. [Cit.] Under our rules of pleading!,] substance, not mere nomenclature, controls. [Cit.]” Marshall v. State, 229 Ga. 841 (1) (195 SE2d 12) (1972). The style of Bell’s pleading clearly identified it as a request for the scheduling of a jury trial, and not as a simple request that he be tried by a jury whenever the trial might be held. Compare Bennett v. State, 244 Ga. App. 149, 150 (1) *720(534 SE2d 881) (2000). The document expressly requested that a jury trial on the murder charge be held within the next two terms of court. Compare Bennett, supra. Under the applicable rules of construction of pleadings, the trial court correctly found that Bell’s motion strictly complied with the requirements of OCGA § 17-7-171.
2. The State asserts that Bell waived his statutory right to a speedy trial by failing to appear at the timely call of his case in September 1996. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, however, Bell and his trial counsel testified that they were present and announced “ready” when the case was called on that occasion. The State presented evidence to the contrary, but the trial court expressly found that the testimony of Bell and his counsel was more credible. “The finder of fact, in this case the superior court judge, is the final arbiter of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses.” Hughes v. Cobb County, 264 Ga. 128, 130 (1) (441 SE2d 406) (1994). The State had the burden to show that Bell waived his statutory right to a speedy trial. Sykes v. State, 236 Ga. App. 518, 520 (2) (511 SE2d 566) (1999). The trial court’s finding that the State did not meet that burden will not be disturbed.
3. The trial court correctly held that Bell is entitled to dismissal of the murder charge in accordance with OCGA § 17-7-171 (b). The additional issue regarding the denial of his constitutional right to a speedy trial is moot and need not be addressed.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Benham and Hines, JJ., who dissent.