Court Opinion

ID: 9565417
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:20:33.014979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:37.329784
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE GULBRANDSON,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
*230After citing Stewart v. Phoenix National Bank (1937), 49 Ariz. 34, 64 P.2d 101, for the existence of a bank’s fiduciary duty to a loan customer, the majority opinion states: “The Bank was unquestionably involved in the sale of the ranch and Wachholz was not so detached from the transaction that imposition of fiduciary responsibilities would be impermissible.”
I quote from the next case cited by the majority, Fridenmaker v. Valley National Bank of Arizona (1975), 23 Ariz.App. 565, 534 P.2d 1064, 1070:
“Fridenmaker has previously alleged that he was in a confidential relationship with the Bank and that this relationship forces this court to examine the right to rely in that light. It is contended that the length of time he dealt with the Bank, the receipt of credit lines on a signature, the intermittent advice given by the Bank, all, if proven, indicate a confidential relationship. Stewart v. Phoenix National Bank, 49 Ariz. 34, 64 P.2d 101 (1937). We agree that this is a correct statement of law and will concede, for argument’s sake, that initially a confidential relationship existed. The presence and participation of counsel representing Fridenmaker interests was so prevalent, however, as to leave any confidential relationship that existed of nugatory legal effect.” (Emphasis added.)
Here, the plaintiff was represented by attorney James Murphy throughout all negotiations for the sale of the ranch after Mr. Deist’s death. Attorney Murphy was instrumental in drawing the proposed contract to Dr. Vranish, and in fact testified that he told Dr. Vranish the offer of $800 per acre was too low. When the Vranish negotiations ended, attorney Murphy, after consultations with the plaintiff, obtained information from the plaintiff’s accountant, Harry Isch, regarding terms of down payment, annual payments and release provisions, and then drew the final contract with Dittman, trustee, at $1,050 per acre.
Attorney Murphy testified as follows:
“Q. With reference to Mr. Isch, what did he do in the con*231tinuing negotiations over the summer and autumn?
“A. I consulted with him about the amount of money we could take down on the Ranch. I consulted with him about the payments. I particularly consulted with him about release provisions, because we didn’t want a whole bunch of money to be coming in in any one year where — and let too much of it go to income tax.”
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“Q. All right. Do you remember, Mr. Murphy, a conversation with Dr. Vranish with reference to an eight hundred dollar per acre figure?
“A. Yes.
“Q. What did you say to Dr. Vranish with reference to that conversation?
“A. He said he was going to talk to Joan about it, and I asked him not to.
“Q. Why?
“A. Well, because they were real good friends. And if he was going to talk to her, I felt that he was going to try to get her to take eight hundred dollars an acre. And I asked him not to, because she needed the money a lot more than he did, because that was all she had to live on. And he had a medical practice to keep him going. And I told him that we could get more than that for it.
“Q. Did you get more than that?
“A. We got one hundred [sic] thousand and fifty for it.
“Q. Okay. In your best judgment as her counsel, Mr. Murphy, do you believe that was a fair price for the sale at that time of the land?
“A. I thought we had made a heck of a good deal.”
In my view, the knowledge of the purchasers, and of all the terms of the contract, by the plaintiffs attorney and accountant, rendered the existence of any fiduciary relationship between Paul Wachholz and the plaintiff of little legal effect.
In addition, the majority correctly states Montana law regarding the appropriateness of findings by a trial judge, but *232then ignores that case law, with the admonition that trial judges should comply in future cases involving valuation of real estate. Here the trial court found the market value of the Deist ranch at the time of sale was $635,000. The testimony to that figure was by the plaintiff that she consulted an appraiser named Zugliani about ten months after the sale and that his appraisal value was $635,000. Zugliani was not called, his appraisal was not offered by the plaintiff, and no foundation was made regarding qualifications, acreage appraised, or appraisal methods used.
The trial court also found that the annual rental value of the ranch was $11,122. That figure could only have come from the report of the purchaser’s appraiser, Mr. Wayne Neil, and was clearly based on the assumption that approximately $100,000 of ditch improvements would have to be made first to generate that income. In addition, the plaintiff herself testified that the ranch had not shown a profit in the ten-year period preceding the sale of the ranch.
The trial court further ordered an immediate set off in favor of the plaintiff of the proceeds of the two sales made by the appellants even though the sales were made on contract. In essence, the judgment converted a contract receivable into a cash payment without consideration of any discounted value.
Because I believe erroneous findings and conclusions were entered, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.