Court Opinion

ID: 9646906
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:15:47.863069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:27.594882
License: Public Domain

SEARS, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority opinion reverses the trial court’s judgment based on a finding of no *423evidence supporting the jury’s findings of false representations and misappropriation of trade secrets, and that the jury’s finding of conspiracy is precluded as a matter of law. Although I agree with the majority’s holding regarding the conspiracy issue, I believe sufficient evidence supports the jury’s findings of false representations and misappropriation of trade secrets. Having overturned all liability findings, the majority does not reach the points of error regarding damages. Because I would uphold two liability findings, I address the damages issues and would hold that insufficient evidence supports the award of actual damages. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
In points of error four and five, appellants claim that insufficient evidence supports the jury’s findings that ARCO and Chemlink made false representations to MPI. In points of error six and seven, appellants challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding that Steve Murphy, as an employee of ARCO, made false representations to MPI.
Where a party challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court may consider only the evidence tending to support the jury’s finding, disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences. Best v. Ryan Auto Group, Inc., 786 S.W.2d 670, 671 (Tex.1990). The jury’s finding must be upheld if any evidence of probative force supports it. Southern States Transp., Inc. v. State, 774 S.W.2d 639, 640 (Tex.1989).
When confronted with a challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury finding, the reviewing court must examine all the evidence. Lofton v. Texas Brine Corp., 720 S.W.2d 804, 805 (Tex.1986). After considering all of the evidence, the reviewing court may set aside the verdict only if the evidence is so weak or the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986); Anthony Pools v. Charles & David, Inc., 797 S.W.2d 666, 676 (Tex.App. [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied). Furthermore, if a court of appeals reverses on insufficiency grounds, Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex.1986) requires the court to specify the relevant evidence and state why it is factually insufficient. The court must also state why the contrary evidence greatly outweighs the evidence in support of the verdict. Id.
Finally, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the appellate court, after reviewing the evidence, would have reached a different conclusion. Walter Baxter Seed Co. v. Rivera, 677 S.W.2d 241, 244 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.). It is within the sole province of the jury, as trier of fact, to judge the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Id. An appellate court may not interfere with the jury’s resolution of conflicts in the evidence or to pass upon the weight or credibility of the witness’ testimony. Id.
Appellees pled fraud and misrepresentation by ARCO and Chemlink, and by their employees. The elements of fraud are:
(1) that a material representation was made;
(2) that it was false;
(3) that, when the speaker made it, he knew it was false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of its truth and as a positive assertion;
(4) that he made it with the intention that it should be acted upon by the party;
(5) that the party acted in reliance upon it; and
(6) that he thereby suffered injury.
Trenholm v. Ratcliff, 646 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex.1983). Silence can constitute a false representation when the circumstances impose a duty to speak and the party deliberately remains silent. Spoljaric v. Percival Tours, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 432, 435 (Tex.1986). Fraudulent intent may be proven by circumstantial evidence. Id. Circumstantial evidence can establish a fact when that fact is a fair and reasonable inference from other facts proven in the case. Rivera, 677 *424S.W.2d at 244. Bearing these rules in mind, I turn to the evidence.
MPI supplied ARCO with industrial soap and related equipment under annual contracts from 1980-84. In the summer of 1984, Chemlink, a subsidiary of ARCO, demonstrated its interest in entering the industrial soap area when it considered the acquisition of MPI. An employee of Chem-link met with Misty Rucker, the owner of MPI, and the two parties entered into a commission agreement in the event a sale of MPI to Chemlink occurred. Richard Quinn, the Chemlink manager of marketing and planning in Philadelphia testified that he requested and received general product information from MPI. Contrary to this testimony, Rucker testified that Quinn requested and received financial data, including confidential matter.
Although Chemlink subsequently decided not to purchase MPI, the evidence shows that during the same general time period, Chemlink was preparing to enter the industrial soap business. Although there were no complaints about the quality of MPI’s soap, ARCO determined that its industrial soap costs were rising because of increases in the quantity of soap used. Steve Murphy, the ARCO purchasing manager, asked Chemlink to consider developing an industrial cleaner. Chemlink did develop a product and submitted a bid, competing with MPI, for the 1985 ARCO contract. Despite tests reflecting similar cleaning capabilities by the MPI and Chemlink soaps submitted, and higher quoted prices for the Chemlink soaps, ARCO awarded the 1985 contract to Chemlink.
Appellees contend the jury could infer from this evidence that Chemlink feigned an interest in acquiring MPI .to induce MPI to divulge confidential information, and that Rucker would not have divulged this information had she known Chemlink was preparing to bid against MPI for the ARCO contract. By considering the acquisition of MPI, Chemlink demonstrated some interest in entering the industrial soap business. The jury may have believed Rucker’s testimony that Chemlink sought and received confidential financial information from MPI when they were considering acquiring it. If so, the evidence that Chemlink began preparing to bid against MPI for the ARCO contract almost immediately thereafter is sufficient to raise suspicion as to Chem-link’s motives in reviewing the MPI data. The jury could have inferred from this evidence that Chemlink requested and received the MPI data to discover any information helpful in competing with MPI for the ARCO contract, and not because it was interested in acquiring MPI. Thus, these facts alone are sufficient to support a finding that Chemlink falsely represented an interest in acquiring MPI, intending that MPI rely and act upon this representation by divulging information. Other evidence, however, also supports the jury’s finding of false representation.
The ARCO bid invitation stated that a successful bidder’s formula would remain sealed unless a question arose about the product. Because MPI had been the successful bidder for several years, ARCO had files containing MPI’s formula in sealed envelopes. According to Chemlink’s purchasing manager, Steve Murphy, he discussed the increases in the quantity of MPI soap used in the ARCO plant with Archer Allan Muse, Jr., the plant manager, approximately one month before Chemlink began preparing to bid on the ARCO contract. Murphy testified that Muse asked if they could determine whether the MPI product had changed and that Murphy suggested they check the sealed MPI formula. Murphy also testified that he opened the sealed formula in Muse’s presence. Muse, however, testified that he did not recall this conversation and denied being present when the sealed formula was opened. Although Murphy testified that he had the Chemlink chemists analyze the formula, Murphy maintained that he asked all personnel to keep the formula confidential and that the chemists were unable to decipher the formula.
The majority relies on the testimony that Chemlink could not decipher the formula and did not use this formula in its bid to conclude that, even if the formula was opened with fraudulent intent, no injury to MPI resulted from this action. The jury *425did not, however, have to find that this was a separate false representation. The opening of the sealed formula is simply one more fact raising the inference that ARCO v/as engaging in deceptive conduct and may have attempted to assist its subsidiary in gaming an unfair advantage over MPI in bidding for the 1985 ARCO contract.
The evidence regarding the performance tests for the soaps submitted for the 1985 and 1986 bids further support the jury’s finding of fraud. The jury heard testimony about conflicting results of the tests of soaps submitted in the 1985 and 1986 bids. The results from the 1985 performance test showed that the Chemlink and MPI soaps performed similarly and satisfactorily. The results from the 1986 performance test, in which MPI and Chemlink submitted the same soaps submitted in 1985, indicated major differences between the two soaps. While the MPI soap performed well, the Chemlink product performed poorly, producing large amounts of foam that failed to clean oily surfaces.
Misty Rucker’s testimony offered a reason for these conflicting results. Rucker testified that she asked Bill Stevenson, apparently an ARCO employee, how Chem-link’s soap performed in the test for the 1985 contract and Stevenson said, “Just fine. It is your product.” Based on this testimony together with the evidence of the conflicting test results, the jury could have found that Chemlink used MPI’s soap, falsely representing it to be Chemlink’s, for the 1985 contract performance test. This evidence is also sufficient to support the jury’s finding of false representations by ARCO, since at least one ARGO employee was aware of the deception. This evidence also supports a finding of false representations by Chemlink in using MPI’s product while representing it as theirs.
The jury question asked whether ARCO or Chemlink made false representations inducing MPI to act on these representations to MPI’s detriment. The instruction for this question explained that, to find liability, the jury had to find the false representation was “made for inducing [MPI] to do something which they otherwise would not have done_” Despite the evidence indicating deception, the majority concludes there is no evidence of false representations because no evidence shows that the deceptive acts induced MPI to do anything it otherwise would not have done. I disagree with this conclusion.
Had Misty Rucker known that Chemlink was preparing to develop an industrial soap product and submit a competing bid for the ARCO contract, she most likely would not have sent MPI financial data to Richard Quinn. Although Rucker probably would have submitted a bid for the 1985 ARCO contract even if she had known that Murphy opened her sealed formula, she may have taken other actions to protect her trade secret. Although she was not induced to do anything she would not otherwise have done, she was induced not to take protective action by ARCO’s representations that the formula would remain sealed. Similarly, Rucker was not induced to do anything she would not otherwise have done by Chemlink’s actions during the performance test. By the time Chemlink allegedly used her product in the performance test, MPI had already submitted a bid. However, had she known at the time that Chemlink was using her product and that ARCO’s procedure for testing products was lax enough to allow a bidder to engage in such deception, Rucker might have sought more reliable testing or taken additional steps to protect her company. Certainly, the evidence is sufficient to show that Murphy, ARCO, and Chemlink knowingly made false representations, either by positive assertions or by their silence, and that MPI relied on the representations and suffered injury by losing the ARCO contract. Accordingly, I would overrule points of error four through seven.
In points of error fourteen through sixteen, appellants claim the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s findings that Murphy, ARCO, or Chemlink misappropriated or disclosed any of MPI’s trade secrets. The majority accepts appellants’ contention that commercial use of the trade secret is a required element of the tort of misappropriation of trade secrets. Texas law holds that a party is liable for disclos*426ing or using the trade secret of another if “(a) he discovers the secret by improper means, or (b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by the other in disclosing the secret to him.” Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 314 S.W.2d 763, 769 (1958), cert, denied, 358 U.S. 898, 79 S.Ct. 223, 3 L.Ed.2d 148 (1958). This language indicates that liability may be based on either disclosure or use. Thus, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that commercial use of the trade secret is a requirement.
Furthermore, there is sufficient evidence that Steve Murphy disclosed MPI’s soap formula. Murphy admitted he opened the sealed formula and shared it with Chemlink employees who attempted to decipher it. Although Murphy testified that the bidding rules provided for the opening of a formula if questions arose about a product, the jury could have disbelieved Murphy’s explanation of why he opened the sealed formula. We may not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if, after reviewing the evidence, we would have reached a different conclusion. Rivera, 677 S.W.2d at 244. Thus, I would overrule points fourteen and fifteen because sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding.
Since I would uphold the jury’s findings of liability for false representations and misappropriation of trade secrets, I would also address the points of error regarding damages. In points of error one and two, appellants contend insufficient evidence supports the jury’s award of $1,030,000.00 in actual damages. Alternatively, appellants claim there is insufficient evidence that MPI suffered more than $30,337.00, the 1984 profits stated on MPI’s tax return, or $190,000.00, the amount of net profits in 1984 as calculated by MPI’s expert witness. Appellants claim that (1) appellees’ evidence of lost profits was insufficient because appellees’ expert witness failed to deduct actual expenses from the gross receipts; (2) the evidence of lost profits for any year after 1985 was uncertain; (3) ap-pellees’ testimony as to the value of MPI’s equipment was insufficient to establish market value; and (4) appellees’ testimony that an unnamed lender refused to finance a purchase of equipment because the purchase was not for the ARCO contract was insufficient evidence of loss of credit.
To recover lost profits, a party must show the amount of the loss with reasonable certainty by competent evidence. Lovelace v. Sabine Consolidated, Inc., 733 S.W.2d 648, 655 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ denied). Uncertainty as to the fact of damages will defeat recovery. Id.
In their post-submission brief, appellants argue that the evidence and argument concerning conspiracy prejudicially influenced the jury in answering the damages issues. Appellants contend this influence is exemplified by the jury’s punitive damages award of $30,000.00 against Richard Quinn, whom the jury found liable only for conspiracy. Furthermore, the jury assessed more punitive damages against Quinn and Chemlink (Quinn’s employer) than it assessed against Murphy and ARCO (Murphy’s employer). Appellants assert that this variance must have resulted from the conspiracy finding.
Rule 277 authorizes the submission of broad-form questions to the jury. The actual damages issue in this case is in broad form, asking the jury to assess damages if they had affirmatively answered any of the three liability issues. Because the issue was submitted subjunctively, the reviewing court cannot determine the amount of damages assessed for any particular liability finding. A trial court is not, however, required to submit an issue relating the various elements of damages to the underlying theories of recovery unless a party specifically objects to the issue on this basis. Wilgus v. Bond, 730 S.W.2d 670, 672 (Tex.1987). Appellants did not object to the issue on this basis and do not complain on appeal about submission of this issue. Although the punitive damages award indicates a heavier assessment against those parties found liable for conspiracy, a reviewing court may not presume that the liability finding of conspiracy similarly influenced the jury in awarding actual damages. Because I would uphold two of the three liability findings, the broad-form sub*427junctive submission of the actual damages issue requires upholding the jury’s award if sufficient evidence supports it.
Misty Rucker testified that the ARCO contract constituted 50-60% of MPI’s total business. After losing the ARCO contract for 1985, Rucker estimated that, in 1985, MPI had 45-50% of the profits received in 1984. By 1986, Rucker estimated that MPI received 50-55% of the profits received in 1984. MPI’s accountant, James Thomas, testified that MPI’s net profit from sales to ARCO in 1984 was $190,000.00. Thomas defined net profits as sales minus material, labor, and overhead costs. Thomas deducted material costs directly. To calculate labor and overhead costs, Thomas allocated costs attributable to the ARCO account based on a percentage of total sales to ARCO. Thomas deducted this percentage allocation from gross profits.
Rucker further testified to other losses. Rucker testified that the market value of the equipment sold to Chemlink was $170,-000.00. Rucker explained that she was forced to sell this equipment to Chemlink for $57,000.00 because MPI had no use for the equipment without the ARCO contract. After losing the ARCO contract, Rucker further testified that she was unable to obtain financing for equipment for other jobs.
If the jury based their award of damages on this evidence alone, they could not have calculated a total of more than $1 million in actual damages. If the jury awarded lost profits of $190,000.00 for the years 1985-86, this results in a total of $380,000.00. The evidence supporting the jury’s liability findings relates only to the bid process for the 1985 ARCO contract. Chemlink did not obtain the ARCO contract in 1986. Thus, I would agree with appellants that the evidence of damages after the 1985 contract year is uncertain and that the maximum amount of lost profits available is $190,-000.00.
The value of the equipment sold to Chemlink, minus the amount paid by Chem-link, was $113,000.00. Adding this sum to the maximum amount of lost profits results in a maximum total of $303,000.00. Even if the jury included a sum for lost credit, no evidence supports an award of more than $700,000.00 for this loss.
The only other evidence regarding damage to MPI concerns loss of the value of the business. In November 1987, Rucker filed bankruptcy, which she attributed to the loss of income and loss of credit caused by the loss of the ARCO contract. As to the value of MPI, Rucker testified that, during acquisition discussions with Chem-link, she told Quinn it would take in excess of $1 million to purchase MPI.
Citing Porras v. Craig, 675 S.W.2d 503 (Tex.1984) and Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Wilson, 768 S.W.2d 755 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied), appellants contend Rucker’s testimony is not competent evidence because it does not refer to market value. In Porras, the court explained that an owner of real property can testify to its market value. 675 S.W.2d at 504. The court added that this testimony must clearly refer to market value, rather than intrinsic or other value of the property. Id. at 505. To meet this requirement, the court suggested that counsel ask the witness if he is familiar with the market value of his property. Id.
The Corpus Christi court extended the Porras requirements to testimony about the value of businesses and personal property. Wilson, 768 S.W.2d at 762. In Wilson, the owner of two corporations testified that the value of one corporation prior to seizure was $400,000.00 and that its value at the time of trial was zero. Id. As to the other corporation, the owner testified to an unaccepted offer to purchase the corporation for $1,500,000.00. Id. The trial court awarded the owner $400,000.00 and $1,500,000.00 for the diminution of value in the stock of the two corporations. Id. Citing Porras, the appellate court found that the owner never testified to the market value of his property. Id. Furthermore, the appellate court held that unaccepted offers to purchase are not competent evidence of fair market value. Id. Thus, the court found the owner’s testimony constituted no evidence of market value. Id.
*428I agree that Porras and Wilson are controlling in this case. Rucker’s counsel failed to ask her if she was familiar with the market value of her company. Furthermore, her testimony that she told Quinn she would sell MPI for a sum in excess of $1 million is not evidence of market value. Rucker’s testimony regarding the value of MPI is simply not competent evidence of market value. If this testimony constitutes no evidence of the value of MPI, the competent evidence regarding the amount of damage suffered by MPI indicates a maximum total of $303,000.00, rather than the $1,030,000.00 actually awarded by the jury. Thus, insufficient evidence supports the jury’s award of actual damages and I would sustain points of error one and two.
Based on my review of the evidence, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment insofar as it holds appellants liable for false representations and misappropriation of trade secrets. I agree with the majority that the finding of conspiracy is precluded as a matter of law. Thus, I would reverse and render judgment in favor of appellants as to conspiracy. Finally, insufficient evidence supports the jury’s award of actual damages and I would reverse this part of the trial court’s judgment and remand the cause for a new trial as to damages.