Court Opinion

ID: 9526810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:24:28.381514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:22:23.440757
License: Public Domain

Dissenting
Arterburn, J.
I must dissent from the majority opinion because I feel it is a usurpation by this Court of the function of the jury in weighing the evidence and determining what inferences of guilt should be believed or disbelieved by the jury from circumstantial evidence. The opinion states that the jury has a right to draw inferences of guilt from circumstantial evidence, but only if there is no reasonable hypothesis of innocence. However, the opinion then proceeds to perform the function of the j ury in weighing and considering the inferences of guilt and innocence and concludes that the *347jury was in error. We have no more right to weigh these inferences and determine which we desire to believe than we do to weigh any other evidence in determining whether or not the jury has excluded all reasonable doubt of innocence. We may only determine whether there is evidence to support the verdict which the jury returned. Whether or not a reasonable hypothesis of innocence exists is a question for the jury. In determining this the jury has a right to determine what they wish to believe or disbelieve.
In the case before us there are reasonable inferences of guilt. We have no right to overrule the jury’s conclusion in this respect.
Briefly, the evidence shows that the appellant, with the stolen articles in his car, observed a police inspection and blockade ahead on the highway and to avoid being stopped, made a virtual U-turn off the highway and was followed by a state policeman as a result of this obvious attempt to avoid the police. When he was finally stopped by the police, it was discovered that he had no motor vehicle registration for the car he was driving. The owner of the car could not be found. The license plates affixed to the car the appellant was driving were for a 1955 Ford and he was driving a Chevrolet. He claimed that he had possession of the car to repair the clutch. The testimony showed that the clutch had not been altered or repaired. The various automotive equipment and articles found in his car were proved to have been stolen only three days previously, and a reasonable inference arises from the possession of recently stolen property. Finally, the jury had a right to take into consideration the appellant’s conviction of past misdemeanors in determining whether his story and testimony were believable. Some argument is made that the rear trunk of the car was partially open and therefore this shows good faith on the part of the appellant. To me this is a question for the jury to weigh and consider against the other logical inferences of guilt which may be drawn. It is not *348shown whether the trunk lid could or could not have been closed by reason of the equipment hauled in the rear.
For the reasons stated, I think this Court is stepping down into the jury box and weighing the evidence on appeal when this is solely a constituitional privilege of the jury. We may only consider the evidence and inferences most favorable to the State, excluding those which the jury sees fit not to believe in case of a conviction.
I would affirm the conviction.
Mote, J. concurs.
Note. — Reported in 236 N. E. 2d 173.