Court Opinion

ID: 9854070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:00:18.617416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:53.969114
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78 (55 SC 629, 79 LE 1314), cited in the majority opinion, is a 1934 case having little factual relation to those cited as following it. There seven persons were indicted for conspiracy. The proof showed two conspiracies fitting into the general allegations of the indictment, and that the defendant was a party to one but not to the other.
*418DePalma v. State, 225 Ga. 465 (169 SE2d 801), also cited held that where the Code defined robbery as a taking "without the consent of the owner or person in possession” an indictment substituting "and” for "or” was not fatal, although possession, not ownership, was proved. This follows the rule that where the crime is stated in the statute in the disjunctive, the indictment must state it in the conjunctive, or it will be subject to attack (Haley v. State, 124 Ga. 216, 217 (52 SE 159)), but proof of either alternative is sufficient for conviction. Jones v. State, 75 Ga. App. 610 (4) (44 SE2d 174).
In Dobbs v. State, 235 Ga. 800 the only discrepancy is that a police officer testified the license number was MRL 26 instead of MRL 826. This is an obvious slip of the tongue or typographical error.
On the other hand, there are still many Court of Appeals cases and Supreme Court cases which adhere to the rule that no words in an indictment descriptive of the identity of that which is legally essential to the charge can be rejected as surplusage; if not surplusage, it must be proved as alleged. This rule is of great antiquity. Fulford v. State, 50 Ga. 591, Watson v. State, 64 Ga. 61, Berry v. State, 92 Ga. 47, 48 (17 SE 1006). It has been consistently followed. Haupt v. State, 108 Ga. 53 (2) (34 SE 313) (number on an allegedly forged check); Gully v. State, 116 Ga. 527 (42 SE 790) (bigamy with "Gussie” instead of "Bessie” Shingler); Irwin v. State, 117 Ga. 722 (45 SE 59) (assault of "Ed.” instead of "Edmund Green” Hightower); Stevens v. State, 118 Ga. 806 (45 SE 615) (failure on vagrancy charge to prove age and inability of parents to support, as alleged); Hadden v. State, 196 Ga. 850 (28 SE2d 71) (murder of Mrs. "Emma” rather than "Carrie” Todd Hadden. The last case involves res judicata, and the holding is that where the variance is sufficient to nullify conviction on the first trial no res judicata results. State v. Marchman, 234 Ga. 40 (215 SE2d 467), would have reached a different conclusion had it followed Hadden; not having followed, it should have overruled it. However, Marchman involved what appears to have been a mere typographical error, such as appears in DePalma.
It appears to me that the only common sense application of the well known and oft stated rules on *419variance might be summed up as follows: If the variance results from a change of a letter or number which is palpably a slip of the tongue or a typographical error, it is not cause for reversal. But if the variance concerns the name of a person or place material to the indictment, the case should be reversed, and the first trial should not be res judicata as to a trial on a redrawn and perfect indictment.
I am willing to make one other distinction, which is the reason for my special concurrence in this case. Where two names are much alike, as here, and where it is proved that the name alleged in the indictment is not in fact the name of any extant entity (here, that there was no such corporation or trade name, and it was not the name of a person) then, when it becomes evident that the defendant has in fact been put on notice of what he is charged with, the trial may proceed. I therefore concur in the judgment, but not in all that is said in the opinion in this case.