Court Opinion

ID: 9564747
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:06:20.57379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:38.861350
License: Public Domain

DE MUNIZ, J.,
dissenting.
The majority holds that Deputy Oswald had probable cause to arrest defendant for possession of a controlled substance, and thus the authority to search defendant’s person incident to that arrest. As I understand the majority’s analysis, it essentially relies on two factors in finding probable cause — defendant’s visible drug intoxication and his presence in a remote forested area that the deputy suspected was used to “consummate illegal activities such as narcotics.” Because neither of these factors is sufficient to establish probable cause, I respectfully dissent.
As the majority acknowledges, defendant’s drug intoxication, by itself, cannot justify the warrantless arrest and search. State v. Lavender, 93 Or App 361, 364, 762 P2d 1027 (1988). The majority reasons, however, that probable cause was based on more than the fact that defendant was under the influence of methamphetamine. The majority states: “[N]othing in Oswald’s conversation with defendant suggested to him any other explanation for defendant’s behavior or caused him to believe that someone other than defendant had introduced the methamphetamine into defendant’s body.” 143 Or App at 589.1 fail to understand the significance of that observation and, more specifically, how that *591is a factor distinct from the intoxication itself. I would suspect that rarely, if ever, is there any indication that anyone but the intoxicated person introduced drugs into his or her own body. That fact adds nothing to the analysis. In Lavender, there was also no indication that anyone but the defendant had introduced controlled substances into her body, but we did not consider that an additional factor, apart from her intoxication, in determining the validity of the subsequent arrest and search. We should not do so here.
The majority’s other factors include complaints about traffic in a remote forested area and defendant’s presence there; the deputy’s knowledge that such areas are used to consummate drug activities in Coos County; and the presence of tire tracks near defendant’s vehicle.1 These several reasons actually amount to a single factor — defendant’s presence in an area that the deputy suspected was associated with drug activity. However, we have consistently held that a person’s presence in a “high crime” area, by itself, is insufficient to provide “reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity, much less probable cause.
In State v. Butkovich, 87 Or App 587, 743 P2d 752, rev den 304 Or 548 (1987), the defendant’s presence in a vehicle parked in the lot of a closed fast-food restaurant at 2:00 a.m., in a neighborhood hit by a string of recent burglaries, did not by itself establish a reasonable suspicion sufficient to support a stop under ORS 131.615. Id. at 590-91. In State v. Moya, 97 Or App 375, 775 P2d 927 (1989), the defendant was parked across the street from a hotel known as a source of extensive drug activity when she was approached by two police officers. In finding insufficient reasonable suspicion, we held that
“[t]here is nothing inherently suspicious about parking in or frequenting’ such an area. * * * When all is said and done, police suspected defendant for simply being where she was. That is an insufficient basis for a stop.” 97 Or App at 378.
*592In State v. Anfield, 95 Or App 568, 770 P2d 919 (1989), we held that a defendant walking down the street at night in a high crime neighborhood carrying a bag, without more, “does not support a reasonable suspicion that he had committed a crime.” Id. at 571. In State v. Aguilar, 139 Or App 175, 912 P2d 379, rev den 323 Or 265 (1996), we held that a defendant entering a car parked in front of a known drug house, by itself, did not “provide reasonable suspicion to believe that he had engaged in a drug transaction there.” Id. at 182. See also State v. Bates, 304 Or 519, 526, 747 P2d 991 (1987) (“Neither the hour nor the ‘high crime’ nature of the area tells us whether this defendant is likely to be a criminal [.]” (Emphasis in original.)).2
If mere presence in a high crime area is not enough to establish reasonable suspicion to stop under ORS 131.615, then it is certainly inadequate to establish probable cause to arrest. “The statutory standard for stopping is less than the probable cause standard for an arrest.” Butkovich, 87 Or App at 590.
The majority’s analysis therefore rests on two factors — defendant’s intoxication and his presence in an areá possibly associated with drug activity — neither of which individually establishes probable cause to believe that defendant was in possession of a controlled substance.3 Considering *593these factors together does not make them any more compelling. In both Moya and Butkovich, we held that a person’s surprised look and furtive movements by themselves provided no basis for a stop, and neither did mere presence in a high crime area. Moya, 97 Or App at 378; Butkovich, 87 Or App at 590-91. Where those factors individually failed to add up to a reasonable suspicion, they did not in the aggregate somehow suffice. The same is true here.
I would hold that Oswald lacked probable cause to believe that defendant was in possession of methamphetamine, and the warrantless search of defendant’s person therefore cannot be justified as a search incident to arrest. 4

 Sometime during Oswald’s encounter with defendant, another vehicle drove up, and the driver talked briefly with defendant and then drove on. That fact does not indicate involvement in criminal activity.

 We have held that a defendant’s presence in a high crime area justifies a stop, but only when he has engaged in some “affirmative conduct” indicating criminal activity, which is lacking here. See State v. Wolfe, 93 Or App 401, 405, 763 P2d 154 (1988), rev den 307 Or 303 (1989) (in neighborhood hit by burglaries, defendant seen approaching homes bearing “for sale” signs and disappearing briefly behind one home before returning to vehicle); State v. Stiles, 68 Or App 297, 299, 301, 680 P2d 1016, rev den 297 Or 459 (1984) (police saw defendant and companion at 2:00 p.m. leaving backyard of residence through a hedge and over downed fence, carrying shaving kit, felt bag and suitcase); State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Lesh, 49 Or App 373, 377, 619 P2d 935 (1980) (police observed school age boys pushingwheelbarrow containing stereo equipment during school hours); State v. Anderson, 46 Or App 501, 503-04, 612 P2d 309 (1980) (police observed defendant drive into parking lot of closed business at 1:00 a.m. and walk up to door); State v. Vanderberg, 25 Or App 811, 815, 550 P2d 1248, rev den (1976) (police saw defendant emerge from shadows of church in a high burglary area carrying an object).

 The majority’s reliance onStafe v. Reid, 107 Or App 352, 811 P2d 1380 (1991), is misplaced. In Reid, there were other factors, in addition to the defendant’s presence in a known drug area, that connected him with a drug transaction — namely, he matched the description of someone who had recently sold marijuana to another person, and his actions were consistent with drug deals in which one person carries *593the money and the other the drugs. 107 Or App at 355. Here, nothing tied this particular defendant to prior drug transactions, and he engaged in no conduct consistent with drug activity, other than his apparent intoxication and his presence in the woods. However, as discussed above, those factors do not establish probable cause.

 Without the methamphetamine seized from defendant’s pocket, there was insufficient probable cause to believe his truck contained controlled substances, and the search of his truck cannot be justified by the automobile exception.