Court Opinion

ID: 9645520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:27:39.563316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:29.085230
License: Public Domain

WIEAND, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
Joni Magee filed a complaint in equity seeking to enforce against Richard Magee the terms and provisions of a separation agreement. Richard Magee, the defendant, filed preliminary objections raising questions of jurisdiction in which he alleged that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law. In response to these preliminary objections, the trial court dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff appealed.
The trial court’s order was clearly erroneous and must be reversed.1 Pa.R.C.P. 1509(c) provides as follows:
(c) The objection of the existence of a full, complete and adequate nonstatutory remedy at law shall be raised by preliminary objection. If the objection is sustained, the court shall certify the action to the law side of the court. If not so pleaded, the objection is waived.
This rule is controlling of the issue now before us. In accordance therewith, I would reverse the order dismissing the complaint and remand for further proceedings.
*72Having reached this conclusion, I find it unnecessary— and also inadvisable — to establish a general rule, as the majority appears to do, that “[t]he proper remedy to enforce a separation agreement is an action in assumpsit.” (Opinion at p. 68). In some instances a money judgment may be an entirely inadequate remedy. Similarly, I do not join the majority’s direction to the trial court to order consolidation of the assumpsit action with the support action pending in the Family Court Division. Consolidation of actions is discretionary with the trial court, see Pa.R.C.P. 213(a), and I would not attempt to advise the court in advance with respect to the manner in which that discretion should be exercised.

. Even the trial judge has suggested that the case should be remanded for further consideration.