Court Opinion

ID: 9827950
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:57:32.084754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:40.070103
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
All the appellants -have filed motions for rehearing. The motion filed for Pilar Garcia and wife consists of 15 pages and 16 paragraphs, and includes the same grounds set up in the brief which were the same grounds stated in the motion for a new trial below and are the same here.
In this discussion we will dispose of appellants’ tenth and eleventh grounds first, because appellants have devoted so much space and time in discussing and in charging that we have refused “to pass on and consider each assignment separately” as required by article 1876, R. S. Such is not required by the statute. The Court of Civil Appeals is required to only “decide all issues presented * * * by proper assignments * * * and announce in writing their conclusions so found.”
Article 1873 provides “within thirty days after the decision of the case” the court “shall make and file a conclusion of fact and law upon each material point assigned as error in that court. * * . Such findings of fact and conclusions of law may be included in the opinion of the court.” That has been done here by setting out the evidence on the point discussed. The statute never required, nor is there, any decision that supports appellants’ contention. Certainly the case cited by appellant and relied upon with great insistence does not so hold. In that case (Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Hartford Eire Ins. Co. [Tex. Civ. App.] 220 S. W. 785) the court says:
“We thought when the opinion was written, and think now, that this is a useless waste of time, because, as we understand the rules and holdings of the Supreme Court, it would, if writ of error was granted, pass upon all questions, unless it be one requiring a finding of fact by this court. Wilson v. Johnson, 94 Tex. 272, 60 S. W. 242.
“However, we have concluded that under the statute we are required to specifically pass upon each assignment of error, so we give the following reasons for overruling the appellant’s other 31 assignments.”
In Wilson v. Johnson, 94 Tex. 272, 60 S. W. 242, Chief Justice Gaines, writing the opinion for the court, said:
“The judgment was affirmed without considering the case upon its merits, for the reasons that no error was assigned. When we granted the writ of error, we were of opinion that the court erred in refusing to consider the question submitted, and were of the impression that it would be our duty to reverse the judgment and remand the cause to that court, to the end that they might pass upon the merits of the case in the first instance. We now think we were mistaken in the latter conclusion. The court of Civil Appeals not having dismissed the appeal, but having affirmed the judgment, we are of opinion that we have jurisdiction over the whole case, and that, if the judgment should have been affirmed upon its merits, it is our duty to affirm it here, whether an assignment of error was necessary or not.”
The opinion shows that we did just what the statute requires of us to do, “decide all issues presented * * * by proper assignments of error.” Our opinion also shows we made conclusions of law generally upon each material point assigned without consecutively naming the assignment passed on, without setting out the evidence, except when necessary, which we did, to determine upon the correctness of some ruling of the court.
If appellate courts, in passing upon all the numerous prolix and involved assignments and propositions presented and urged in many cases without regard to their merit, should discuss them, we fear it would tend to keep the courts busy writing lengthy, so-called unnecessary opinions which would increase the law book industry and fill many volumes. They would not be “lucid, in order, solid, and at hand,” nor would they be “mul-tumi in parvo.”
The appellants broadly say this court is in conflict with other named decisions of other courts. By an examination of the cited authorities we fail to find any conflict.
If any conflicts exist, it is only in appellant’s mind for it does not arise from any statement or holding by us pertinent to any issue decided here, or'decided by any appellate court upon similar facts, nor in the proper application of the law adverse to this. But the learned counsel seems to “shy” more at the brevity of the opinion rather than at anything else, forgetting for the time “that brevity is the soul of wit,” and has placed a crown of thorns on this court by its criticism.
We meant what we said in the-final conclusion of the opinion, that so displeases appellants, that we “decided all issues presented” and found that the case was fairly tried below.
We very carefully read and considered each of appellants’ assignments, brief, and argument, for errors in the first place. We thought then, and now are doubly convinced, that the trial court covered by its charges all the questions fairly raised that should have been considered by the jury, and, as that was done, there was no error in refusing to further charge the jury as requested by ap*261pellants in tlie several issues presented by them.
■ All tbe issues of fraud and every other material question that was raised by tbe pleading or proof was submitted tó tbe jury.
There was no error committed in permitting Margarita Garcia de Arrieta and her husband to intervene because the evidence showed that the lot involved in the controversy was purchased with proceeds and from the increase of funds belonging to him and to his deceased wife, which entitled the inter-vener at law as an heir to her undivided one-half interest in the property in said suit.
The right to amend pleadings is within the fair and rightful and sound discretion of the trial court, and the ruling will not be disturbed unless that discretion has been 'shown to be abused. The court properly refused plaintiffs’ request for an instructed verdict, because it was sufficiently shown that the property in this suit was purchased with funds arising from the continuation of the grocery business owned by Pilar Garcia and ■his first wife, intervener’s mother, and continued in his possession and managed by him for many years with the community funds or property without any division thereof.
Mrs. Gonzales Arrieta was entitled to an undivided one-half interest under the law and as shown by the undisputed evidence. Wherefore, the uncontradicted evidence showing the intervener to be the sole heir of her deceased mother and entitled to an undivided one-half of the estate, it was not error to instruct a verdict for her.
There was never any settlement of the estate, and the business was continued with the property in question by her father, the survivor of the community estate; therefore she was entitled under the undisputed evidence to the instruction.
 The deed in question was properly admitted, and it does not appear by any evidence that it was given or accepted in full settlement of her interest in said lot and improvements. Under the law she inherited her mother’s one-half share of the estate, and no conveyance was necessary to pass to her what she inherited and was entitled to.
The testimony showed- that intervener was an heir, and therefore under the law she inherited the one-half of the estate being her mother’s share, as she was the only child, whether you call it an equitable interest or a legal title, the effect is the same as the suit is maintainable under either theory, whether as an action of law or in equity. In this state the result would be the same. In view of our statute vesting a legal title to the heir in community estate of her deceased parent, we incline to the statement made in our opinion, challenged by appellants as not correct who insist that it did not cast a legal title thereto. See the point expressly decided in Sandoval v. Priest, 210 P. 814,, 127 C. C. A. 364.
A so-called equitable title is often a misnomer and is not a title, but a mere right in the party to whom it belongs to have the legal title transferred to him. But when the title is vested directly by- the statute as it is here by the death of the survivor of the community, no equity or equitable proceeding is necessary to establish or to transfer the title. The statute vests the title in the heir and divests the survivor in community of all but one-half of the estate. But the nature and character of the title is not important here.
Pilar Garcia, the survivor, after the death of the wife handled the community estate as a trustee, the relation imposed upon him by law, and he was not authorized to profit to himself in dealing therewith, but she was entitled to all advantages of the increase of investment of funds arising from the community estate.
The court did not err in allowing the inter-vener to file a trial amendment so that she would be entitled to prove and recover the interest she was shown entitled to inherit under the law and the evidence. However, in respect to handling the property and making changes and new investments, the relation of trust and trustee continued, and a resulting trust was created in favor of intervener for whom appellant held the legal title.
We have again separately examined each assignment and proposition, and, without discussing them at length separately herein, but considered in group, we reach the conclusion that they fail to show any substantial error committed by the court, and. this also applies to the motion for a rehearing.
Because of the great respect we have for the learning and high character and integrity of appellants’ counsel, who so earnestly insist that we have not given that consideration of the ease we should have, we have again gone over the entire record, briefs, and argument of counsel, and have reached the same conclusion. The opinion shows that we considered and decided every question raised fully, and no lengthy discussion would have been worth while. Clearly, appellant has a misconception of what our duty is under the rules governing the procedure for Courts of Civil Appeals. The first’ duty of an appellate court, aside from upholding the law, is to determine whether a case has been properly presented and fairly tried and, as said by the lamented Chief Justice Roberts, “according to law,” and within those rules. We think, as first said, substantial justice has been administered.
We cannot take into consideration, without substantial proof and a jury finding thereon, whether one brother has swindled the other or not, whatever we may think about it. That issue was- settled by the judgment of the trial court upon evidence. We have to follow the judgment of the court based upon the jury’s verdict that no fraud *262has been established. It may be likely, but the fraud was not established.
Nothing new has been set up in the motion for a rehearing that has not been heretofore presented, and the motion is overruled.
In respect to the motion for a rehearing by Melquíades Garcia, we have also examined the record very carefully, have decided all issues presented, and, finding nothing new set up that we have not passed on and considered, that motion is likewise also overruled.
Therefore both motions for a rehearing are overruled.