Court Opinion

ID: 9906548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-04 15:05:52.137227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:25:12.047141
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3795-21

NEWARK HOUSING
AUTHORITY CLAREMONT,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

TY-TANIESHA WILDER,

     Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________

                   Submitted November 9, 2023 – Decided December 4, 2023

                   Before Judges Firko & Susswein.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Essex County, Docket No. LT-004866-21.

                   Rutgers Economic Justice and Public Benefits Clinic,
                   attorneys for appellant (Victor Manuel Monterrosa Jr.,
                   of counsel and on the briefs; Sarah Choudhry, and
                   Nicholas Willette, appearing pursuant to Rule 1:21-3
                   (b), on the briefs).

                   Ehrlich, Petriello, Gudin, Plaza & Reed, PC, attorneys
                   for respondent (Nicholas Mesarick, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      This appeal stems from a June 27, 2022 eviction from federally subsidized

housing. Defendant Ty-Taniesha Wilder and her three minor children lived in

plaintiff Newark Housing Authority Claremont's multi-unit housing complex

located in Newark under Section 8 regulations, 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.1 to -982.643,

promulgated by the United States Bureau of Housing and Urban Development

(HUD). Defendant is the head of household and primary voucher holder. 24

C.F.R. § 982.302(a).

      Plaintiff initiated a removal action under the Anti-Eviction Act, N.J.S.A.

2A:18-61.1(d) and (e), on the basis of breach of lease because defendant failed

to annually re-certify her income and expenses as required under Section

VII(c)(1) and (2) of the lease. We affirm.

                                       I.

      The essential facts are not in dispute. At the time this action commenced,

plaintiff owned the residential housing complex. On April 20, 2018, defendant

entered into a residential lease agreement with plaintiff. Section 10.2 of the

lease requires the composition of the household to be stated as approved by

plaintiff, in conformity with 24 C.F.R. 966.4(a)(1)(v), which requires the family

to "request [plaintiff's] approval to add any other member as an occupant of the

unit." Defendant was identified as head of household, and two of her three minor

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children, D.W.1 and S.H., were listed on the lease as members of defendant's

household authorized to occupy the premises. The lease is renewed annually by

a rider that must be signed by all adult household members. T.M. was born

while defendant was occupying the unit. Defendant's mother was also living at

the premises as an unauthorized occupant.

      HUD subsidizes the rent in plaintiff's building. Plaintiff offers families

the choice between a flat rent and an income-based rent. Section 12.3 of the

lease incorporates a HUD-required certification; to retain their subsidy, tenants

must annually certify information relating to income, expenses, and occupancy.

Plaintiff reexamines the families' incomes once a year if income-based rent is

paid, as in the matter under review.

      Plaintiff conducts annual re-certifications by interviewing adult members

and verifying their income and asset information, deductions, family size, and

composition. Failure to properly certify the information results in a breach of

the lease and termination of assistance. The HUD Handbook section 7-8(A)

provides, "In general, re[-]certification processing should be complete by the

re[-]certification anniversary date." When a tenant is out of compliance with

1
   We use initials to protect the identity of the minor children. D.W. turned
eighteen years of age in May 2023 while this appeal was pending.
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the re-certification requirements, the tenant is projected to be evicted. HUD

Handbook section D(3)(b).

      Between December 2020 and February 2021, defendant ignored three re-

certification notices, which were personally delivered and mailed to her. On

December 10, 2020, the first re-certification letter was sent to defendant with a

scheduled appointment. On February 10, 2021, a second re-certification letter

was sent to defendant and stated: "Failure to appear for this re-scheduled

appointment may result in termination of your lease and eviction." On February

19, 2021, a third re-certification letter was sent to defendant and stated: "You

failed to attend two scheduled re-certification appointments.        A third re-

certification appointment is scheduled for you on February 22, 2021, at 10:00

a.m." Attached to the third letter was a notice to cease and notification that

plaintiff had commenced an action to terminate the lease.

      On April 12, 2021, after the notices were sent, defendant was arrested and

incarcerated at the Essex County Correctional Facility where she is currently

detained. Defendant's mother continues to reside in the unit with the children.

      It is undisputed defendant failed to re-certify and missed the in-person re-

certification meetings scheduled before and during the COVID-19 pandemic and

prior to her incarceration. During that time, plaintiff refused to accept rent on

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two occasions—on or about April 22, 2021, and May 20, 2021—from D.W.,

who is defendant's eldest daughter and a remaining occupant at the unit. D.W.

was sixteen years old at the time and went to plaintiff's management office to

pay the rent.

      Thereafter, defendant sought to have D.W. become head of household,

perform the re-certification, and sign a new lease in her stead while she was

incarcerated and her criminal case was pending, citing 24 C.F.R. § 982.308 (a).2

Head of household "means the adult member of the family who is the head of

household for purposes of determining income eligibility and rent." 24 C.F.R.

§ 5.504. Plaintiff declined to permit D.W. to become head of household because

she was not eighteen years old as required under its Admissions and Continued

Occupancy Policy (ACOP) and 24 C.F.R. § 5.902, which defines an adult "as a

person who is [eighteen] years of age or older. . . ." ACOP defines "head of

household" as

            the adult member of the family who is considered the
            head for purposes of determining income eligibility and
            rent. The head of household is responsible for ensuring
            that the family fulfills all of its responsibilities under
            the program, alone or in conjunction with a co-head or

2
  24 C.F.R. 982.308(a) addresses a tenant's legal capacity and provides: "The
tenant must have legal capacity to enter a lease under State and local law. 'Legal
capacity' means that the tenant is bound by the terms of the lease and may
enforce the terms of the lease against the owner."
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            spouse. [24 C.F.R. 5.504(b)]. The family may
            designate any qualified adult family member as the
            head of household. The head of household must have
            the legal capacity or guardianship to enter into a lease
            under state and local law. A minor who is emancipated
            under state law may be designated as head of
            household.

            [(emphasis added).]

      In February 2021, plaintiff again served notices to cease, and to quit,

followed by filing an eviction complaint against defendant. On April 30, 2021,

the lease was terminated. The matter was scheduled for trial on January 4, 2022,

and adjourned to January 25, 2022. On that date, defendant filed a motion to

dismiss the complaint. The matter was adjourned until May 19, 2022.

      On May 19, 2022, defendant's daughter D.W., a non-party to the litigation,

joined in the motion to dismiss the complaint and sought to be authorized to re-

certify and assume the lease. At the time of the motion hearing, D.W. was

seventeen years old, had a part-time job, and offered to continue paying the rent.

Defendant remained incarcerated. Plaintiff opposed the motion to dismiss on

the grounds that D.W. was not a named party to the suit, and she lacked the legal

capacity to enter into a contract or lease because she was not eighteen years old.

      Following oral argument, the court rendered an oral decision and denied

the motion to dismiss. The court found D.W. was not a tenant and was not of

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sufficient age under N.J.S.A. 9:17B-1(d)3 to contract on her own behalf.

Because defendant had not responded to the complaint, she was in default and a

holdover tenant.    The court highlighted non-payment of rent was not the

dispositive issue. The court found D.W. could not become the leaseholder and

re-certify with plaintiff as to her income.

       The court held defendant was subject to eviction under N.J.S.A. 18-

61.1(d) and (e) as a result of her failure to properly re-certify and comply with

the lease terms. The court observed that defendant was arrested after the three

notices were served upon her but before the lease termination date.        Thus,

defendant had the ability to attend the re-certification meetings and re-certify.

A memorializing order was entered, and a proof hearing was ultimately

scheduled for June 27, 2022.

3
    N.J.S.A. 9:17B-1 provides:

             The Legislature finds and declares and by this act
             intends, pending the revision and amendment of the
             many statutory provisions involved, to:

             ...

             (d) abolish the right of a person between the ages of 18
             and 21 years to disaffirm and be relieved of contractual
             obligations by reasons of age.
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                                         7
      At the proof hearing, the court considered the testimony of Tashana

Taylor, plaintiff's assistant asset manager. Taylor confirmed that defendant

failed to comply with the yearly re-certification process and did not update her

required information. No other witnesses testified. A judgment of possession

was entered against defendant. Plaintiff then sought a warrant of removal.

      In response, defendant filed an order to show cause seeking to vacate t he

judgment of possession, or in the alternative, for a hardship stay. The court

granted the application and stayed execution of the warrant of possession

pending this appeal.

      Defendant presents the following sole argument for our consideration: the

court lacked jurisdiction to grant an order of possession and a warrant of removal

because the alleged breach of lease was neither a substantial nor a continuous

act, failing to meet the statutory preconditions set forth in the Anti-Eviction Act,

N.J.S.A. 2A:61.1 to -61.12. We disagree.

                                        II.

      We utilize a deferential standard in reviewing factual findings by a judge.

Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 595 (2020). In an appeal from a non-jury trial,

appellate courts "give deference to the trial court that heard the witnesses, sifted

the competing evidence, and made reasoned conclusions." Griepenburg v. Twp.

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                                         8
of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015). "The general rule is that findings by a trial

court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credib le

evidence." Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (citing Cesare v. Cesare,

154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)). Issues of law, including the interpretation of

contracts, statutes, and regulations are reviewed de novo. Serico v. Rothberg,

234 N.J. 168, 178 (2018).

      Defendant asserts the court: (1) erred by not allowing D.W. to re-certify

in place of defendant; (2) erred by finding that D.W., although a minor, had no

legal right to contract for housing; and (3) erred by concluding D.W. could not

cure the breach of lease that was the basis of the asserted good cause for eviction.

Defendant also contends her mother can re-certify in addition to D.W.

                                        A.

      Multiple sources of law govern whether a tenant receiving a Section 8

subsidy is removable. First, federal regulations specify termination of a tenancy

in a subsidized project is prohibited except in the case of:        "(1) [m]aterial

noncompliance with the rental agreement, [or] (2) [m]aterial failure to carry out

obligations under any state landlord and tenant act . . . ." 24 C.F.R. § 247.3(a).

"Material noncompliance" occurs in the event of:

            (1) One or more substantial violations of the rental
            agreement;

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                                         9
            (2) Repeated minor violations of the rental agreement
            that . . . [h]ave an adverse financial effect on the
            project;

            (3) If the tenant: (i) [f]ails to supply on time all required
            information on the income and composition, or
            eligibility factors, of the tenant household, as provided
            in 24 C.F.R. part 5; or (ii) [k]nowingly provides
            incomplete or inaccurate information as required under
            these provisions; and

            (4) Non-payment of rent or any other financial
            obligation due under the rental agreement (including
            any portion thereof) beyond any grace period permitted
            under State law, except that the payment of rent or any
            other financial obligation due under the rental
            agreement after the due date, but within the grace
            period permitted under State law, constitutes a minor
            violation.

            [24 C.F.R. § 247.3(c).]

      On appeal, defendant contends plaintiff was required to inquire about her

"extenuating circumstances" for missing the re-certification dates. Relying on

the   HUD    Handbook      §    7-8(D)(4)(A),    defendant    argues    "extenuating

circumstances" are those "beyond the tenant's control." We are unpersuaded.

      The HUD Handbook § D(4)(a) lists "extenuating circumstances," as

including but not limited to:

            (1) Hospitalization of the tenant.

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                                        10
            (2) Tenant out of town for a family emergency (such as
            the death or severe illness of a close family member).

            (3) Tenant on military duty overseas.

      The record does not reveal and defendant does not set forth any facts in

her merits brief to justify "extenuating circumstances." Moreover, the record

shows defendant did not respond to three re-certification notices that were

served upon her in the months preceding her arrest and incarceration. We note

that § 12.23 of the lease lists "incarceration" as an acceptable reason for missing

a deadline to re-certify. But as we noted previously, defendant's incarceration

occurred after the three re-certification notices were sent.      The COVID-19

pandemic had ended by that time, and defendant gives no explanation for her

failure to not re-certify the lease before she was incarcerated. Defendant has not

presented any extenuating circumstances that were beyond her control based on

our review of the record and thus, we reject her argument. Defendant's breach

of the lease is substantial and continuous.

      Here, defendant had been a participant in the Section 8 program since

2018. No evidence was proffered by defendant to show she made any effort to

communicate with plaintiff about re-certification. And, nothing was presented

by defendant to establish that the re-certification request was suspended during

the COVID-19 pandemic. It is immaterial that D.W. is seeking to re-certify with

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                                       11
the terms of the lease and rent amount defendant agreed to because the lease was

properly terminated.

                                       B.

      We next address the question of whether D.W.'s minority status affected

her ability to assume the status of head of household from defendant, re -certify,

and cure the breach of lease. On appeal, defendant reiterates the argument she

made to the court that there is "no federal or state statute which placed any age

limit, or minimum age requirement" on being considered a "remaining member

of the tenant family," citing Carteret v. Hous. Auth. v. Gilbert, 301 N.J. Super.

109, 112 (Law Div. 1997) and an unpublished Appellate Division decision,

which is not precedential.4

      As the trial court correctly found, Carteret is factually distinguishable

because the breach was a failure to pay rent, not a failure to certify eligibility

for a subsidy. In Carteret, the local Housing Authority and the tenant entered

into a month-to-month tenancy arrangement with a Section 8 housing subsidy.

Id. at 110.   The named tenant's daughter, Samantha, also resided in the

subsidized apartment. Id. at 110-11. At some point during the leasehold, the

4
  "No unpublished opinion shall constitute precedent or be binding upon any
court." R. 1:36-3.
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                                       12
mother was incarcerated and failed to pay her monthly rent; the local Housing

Authority moved to evict the mother for nonpayment. Ibid.

      Samantha, who was seventeen years old at the time, occupied the unit with

her two-year-old child; Samantha was listed as an "occupant" on the lease

agreement but was not a named "tenant." Ibid. When Samantha learned of the

warrant of removal, she wrote a letter to the trial court seeking a stay and a

hearing. Id. at 110. The trial court subsequently vacated the judgment of

possession. Ibid. The trial court framed the issue as follows: "may a public

housing authority compel a member of a tenant's family who is underage to

move from an apartment, because no adult resides there?" Id. at 109.

      In addressing the question, the trial court noted that "[t]here appears to be

no legislative authority which establishes any minimum age limit for the

occupants of federally-subsidized housing." Id. at 112, 693. The court thus

determined that Samantha qualified as a "remaining member of a tenant family"

as outlined in 42 U.S.C.A. 1437A(B)(3)(A) and that "no federal or state statute

. . . places any age limit, or minimum age requirement, on the 'remaining member

of the tenant family'" and was allowed to remain in the apartment after her

mother breached the lease by not paying rent. But here, defendant breached the

lease before she was incarcerated by failing to follow the re-certification

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requirements.    The court correctly found D.W. could not re-certify on

defendant's behalf.

      The federal regulations define tenant as an "adult person . . . who resides

in the unit, and who is the remaining head of household." 24 C.F.R. § 966.53;

head of household as "the adult member of the family who is the head of

household for purposes of determining income eligibility and rent," 24 C.F.R. §

5.504; and an adult as "a person who is [eighteen] years of age of older," 24

C.F.R. § 5.902. Because D.W. was not an adult as defined by the C.F.R., as

eighteen or older, she could neither qualify as a tenant nor head of household.

Therefore, D.W. could not assume defendant's lease where defendant remained

the tenant and was head of household but failed to re-certify.

      In addition, § 12.7 of the lease states:

            In order for a minor to continue to receive assistance as
            a remaining family member, the court has to have
            awarded emancipated minor status to the minor or
            [plaintiff] has to verify that Social Services and or the
            Juvenile Court has arranged for another adult to be
            brought into the unit to care for the child[ren] for an
            indefinite period of time.

      It is undisputed that D.W. was not emancipated. And defendant's mother

was living in the household in violation of the lease and did not request to be

added as a member of the household. Absent approval of plaintiff and a court

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                                       14
order from the Family Part that defendant's mother would be caring for the

children, the lease could not be renewed. Moreover, § 12.10 of the lease requires

a tenant family to send a written request to plaintiff for the purpose of adding a

new member.

      Defendant raises a situation of necessities argument in her merits brief as

a justification to allow D.W. to re-certify on behalf of defendant, citing

Bancredit, Inc. v. Bethea, 65 N.J. Super. 538, 549 (App. Div. 1961). We are

unpersuaded.

      In Bancredit, a father and minor son executed a promissory note to

purchase an automobile for the minor.       Id. at 542. They defaulted on the

payments. Ibid. We recognized that a contract involving a minor is voidable at

the minor's election. Id. at 547. We reversed and remanded on the issue of

whether the promissory note bound the minor, which turned on whether the

automobile was a necessity. Id. at 553.

      Unlike Bancredit where the minor was a party to a contract and the issue

was enforceability of that contract, which depended on whether the automobile

was a necessity at the time of contract, D.W. was not a party to the lease

agreement, and the issue is not enforceability. Instead, defendant raises the issue

of whether D.W. could re-certify on her behalf. Defendant has not cited any

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statute, regulation, rule, or case law to support her argument, and we are not

aware of any legal authority to support defendant's argument.

      We stress that D.W. was not eighteen years old at the time re-certification

was required. The federal regulations regarding a tenant's legal capacity to

obtain Section 8 housing—24 C.F.R. § 982.308—defer to state and local laws

to define what capacity means. D.W. could not re-certify because she was not

an adult—age eighteen—and a necessities analysis does not come into play.

      In sum, defendant unquestionably failed to comply with the re-

certification process despite being validly served with notice on multiple

occasions prior to her incarceration.       And D.W. could not re-certify on

defendant's behalf because she was not eighteen years old at the time re-

certification was required and could not have qualified as a tenant or head of

household.

      We conclude that the remaining arguments—to the extent we have not

addressed them—lack sufficient merit to warrant any further discussion in a

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      The judgment of possession is affirmed, and the stay of eviction is

vacated.

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