Court Opinion

ID: 9588651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:36:37.188026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:39.607582
License: Public Domain

*662Judge LEWIS
dissenting.
I dissent. The court’s construction of the language of a will must be guided by the intent of the testator. White v. Alexander, 290 N.C. 75, 224 S.E. 2d 617 (1976). The testator’s intent is to be gathered from the four corners of the will. Vick v. Vick, 297 N.C. 280, 254 S.E. 2d 576 (1979). The construction of particular words is to be guided by an examination of the instrument in its entirety. Lambeth v. Fowler, 33 N.C. App. 596, 235 S.E. 2d 914 (1977). In its entirety, the will states:
I give to my wife, Sophia Jarman Mayo, all my Personal Property, Real Estate, Money, Bonds, Etc., except the farm I inherited from my father. This farm I give to my wife, Sophia Jarman Mayo, her life time and at her death, said farm shall be divided between my living neices (sic) and nephews.
The majority concludes that the word “living” signifies an express condition that nieces and nephews survive the life tenant before they take a vested remainder. They hold that the word “living” comes after the phrase “at her death” and thus suggests that the remaindermen must be living at the death of the life tenant for the remainder to vest in them. However, the meaning of particular words in a will is to be determined in accordance with the testator’s overall intention. Schaeffer v. Haseltine, 228 N.C. 484, 46 S.E. 2d 463 (1947).
Looking at the four corners of the will I gather that the overall intent of the devise was to guarantee that the farm Jake G. Mayo inherited from his father remained in the possession of lineal descendants of his father. All eleven of the nieces and nephews were on the Mayo side, the children of the testator’s brothers. The structure of the will suggests it was written to exclude the farm from all other property taken by Sophia Mayo in fee simple. This farm was a Mayo family place and Jake G. Mayo singled it out to belong to his brother’s children, as he had none of his own.
The language of a will is to be construed in light of the circumstances of the testator’s family and estate known to the testator at the time. Wilson v. Church, 284 N.C. 284, 200 S.E. 2d 769 (1973). Had Jake G. Mayo not written the will and excluded the Mayo farm from the balance of his estate, his father’s land would have passed to his wife. Given that she, at age 40, had not borne children, it was possible that the farm would then pass to someone other *663than his father’s lineal descendants. Particular language of the will must therefore be read in light of Jake G. Mayo’s intention to keep his father’s farm in the Mayo family.
In applying this overall intent to the word “living,” I see no reason why Jake G. Mayo would have wanted to disenfranchise those nieces and nephews who died during the life tenancy. There is a presumption against disinheritance among heirs of the same class. Palmer v. Ketner, 29 N.C. App. 187, 223 S.E. 2d 913 (1978). This presumption is overcome only by clear expression of intent. Id. I believe that Jake G. Mayo employed the word “living” because he sought to devise the farm to those nieces and nephews who would themselves perpetuate the paternal line. Where the word “living” can be so explained, there is no evidence outweighing the presumption against disinheritance.
Furthermore, the law favors early vesting of estates. Priddy & Co. v. Sanderford, 221 N.C. 422, 20 S.E. 2d 341 (1942). An estate will be held to vest at the death of the testator unless it is clear from the language of the will that the testator intends to postpone vesting. Id. Where the word “living” does not unambiguously indicate such postponement, the presumption for early vesting prevails. I believe the remainder in the farm vested in those nephews and nieces who survived the testator.
For these reasons, I would affirm the order of the trial judge.