Court Opinion

ID: 9367360
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-31 17:01:53.624416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:59.700937
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10358    Document: 39-1      Date Filed: 01/31/2023    Page: 1 of 17

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10358
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        FRANKENMUTH MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellant,
        versus
        BROWN'S CLEARING, INC.,
        COURTNEY FORD,
        BREON FORD,

                                                   Defendants-Appellees.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Alabama
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        2                       Opinion of the Court               22-10358

                    D.C. Docket No. 2:20-cv-00576-ECM-JTA
                           ____________________

        Before WILSON, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
        LAGOA, Circuit Judge:
                This is a duty to defend insurance dispute brought by the
        insurer, Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance Company (“Franken-
        muth”), seeking to reverse the district court’s determination that
        its insured, Brown’s Clearing, Inc. (“Brown’s Clearing”), is entitled
        to coverage under its policy. Frankenmuth, a Michigan corpora-
        tion, appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment
        in favor of Brown’s Clearing, Courtney Ford, and Breon Ford (col-
        lectively, “Appellees”). For the reasons discussed below, we affirm
        the district court’s judgment.
               I.     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                           A.      The Insurance Policy
                Brown’s Clearing is a land-clearing business incorporated in
        Alabama and registered to do business in Georgia. Kelley Brown
        and Steve Brown, a married couple, own Brown’s Clearing. Frank-
        enmuth is an insurance company licensed to issue insurance poli-
        cies in Alabama. On March 14, 2017, Frankenmuth issued a Com-
        mercial General Liability policy to Brown’s Clearing, effective from
        March 13, 2017, through March 13, 2018 (the “Policy”). On Febru-
        ary 6, 2018, Frankenmuth and Brown’s Clearing renewed the Pol-
        icy for another year, from March 13, 2018, through March 13, 2019.
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        22-10358               Opinion of the Court                       3

        The Policy provided general liability coverage and additional um-
        brella coverage. Pursuant to Section I of the Policy, Frankenmuth
        agreed to “pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obli-
        gated to pay as damages because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property
        damage’ to which this insurance applies.” Section I also provides
        that Frankenmuth has the “right and duty to defend the insured
        against any ‘suit’ seeking those damages.” Further explaining those
        conditions, Section IV of the Policy provides:
              Section IV – Commercial General Liability Condi-
              tions
              2. Duties in The Event of Occurrence, Offense, Claim
              Or Suit
                   a. You must see to it that we are notified as soon
                   as practicable of an “occurrence” or an offense
                   which may result in a claim. To the extent possi-
                   ble, notice should include:
                      (1) How, when and where the “occurrence” or
                      offense took place;
                      (2) The names and addresses of any injured
                      persons and witnesses; and
                      (3) The nature and location of any injury or
                      damage arising out of the “occurrence” or of-
                      fense.
                   b. If a claim is made or “suit” is brought against
                   any insured, you must:
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        4                    Opinion of the Court                  22-10358

                    (1) Immediately record the specifics of the
                    claim or “suit” and the date received; and
                    (2) Notify us as soon as practicable.
                   You must see to it that we receive written no-
                   tice of the claim or “suit” as soon as practicable.
                 c. You and any other involved insured must:
                    (1) Immediately send us copies of any de-
                    mands, notices, summonses or legal papers re-
                    ceived in connection with the claim or “suit”;
                    ....
        The Commercial Liability Plus endorsement modifies the terms of
        the Policy and provides as follows:
              4. Duties in the Event of Occurrence, Claim or Suit
                 a. The requirement in condition 2.a. that you
                 must see to it that we receive notice of an “occur-
                 rence” applies only when an “occurrence” is
                 known to:
                    (1) You, if you are an individual;
                    (2) A partner, if you are a partnership; or
                    (3) An executive officer or insurance manager
                    if you are a corporation.
                 b. The requirement in condition 2.b. that you
                 must see to it that we receive notice of a claim or
                 “suit” will not be considered breached unless the
                 breach occurs after such claim or “suit” is known
                 to:
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        22-10358               Opinion of the Court                        5

                      (1) You, if you are an individual;
                      (2) A partner, if you are a partnership; or
                      (3) An executive officer or insurance manager,
                      if you are a corporation.
        Similarly, the Commercial Liability Umbrella Coverage states that
        Frankenmuth “will pay on behalf of the insured the ‘ultimate net
        loss’ in excess of the ‘retained limit’ because of ‘bodily injury’ or
        ‘property damage’ to which this insurance applies.” Pursuant to
        Section IV of the Umbrella Coverage, the insured must notify
        Frankenmuth of occurrences that may result in a claim and of suits
        brought against the insured “as soon as practicable.” The Umbrella
        Coverage also states that:
              c. You and any other involved insured must:
                   (1) Immediately send us copies of any demands,
                   notices, summonses or legal papers received in
                   connection with the claim or “suit”;
                   (2) Authorize us to obtain records and other infor-
                   mation;
                   (3) Cooperate with us in the investigation or set-
                   tlement of the claim or defense against the “suit”;
                   and
                   (4) Assist us, upon our request, in the enforcement
                   of any right against any person or organization
                   which may be liable to the insured because of in-
                   jury or damage to which this insurance may also
                   apply.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court               22-10358

        The Commercial General Liability contains the same language.
               The Policy defines “occurrence” as “an accident.” The Pol-
        icy also defines “executive officer” as “a person holding any of the
        officer positions created by your charter, constitution, by-laws or
        any other similar governing document.”
              B.     The Underlying Action and Coverage Dispute
               On July 20, 2018, Courtney Ford was travelling on Interstate
        75 in Bartow County, Georgia. While she was driving her car,
        workers were cutting trees along the side of the interstate. Sud-
        denly, a tree limb struck the windshield of Courtney’s car and
        pierced the vehicle, resulting in injuries. Brown’s Clearing did not
        have employees cutting trees on Interstate 75, but it had hired S&S
        Diesel as a subcontractor to perform those services. No one from
        S&S Diesel ever told anyone from Brown’s Clearing about that ac-
        cident.
               Then, on January 24, 2019, Courtney and Breon Ford (“the
        Fords”) sued Gunnison Tree Specialists, Inc. (“Gunnison”), and
        Georgia Power in the State Court of Cobb County, Georgia, alleg-
        ing that the companies’ negligence caused the tree limb to hit
        Courtney’s car, resulting in injuries. The Fords sought compensa-
        tory, special, and punitive damages, along with a claim brought by
        Breon Ford for loss of consortium.
               On February 11, 2019, during the discovery phase of the
        Ford lawsuit, Andrew Horowitz, an attorney representing Gun-
        nison and Georgia Power, emailed Kelley Brown about a “request
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        22-10358               Opinion of the Court                          7

        for documents.” After Brown asked for an explanation, Horowitz
        responded on February 12, 2019:
              I’m defending Georgia Power and Gunnison Tree in
              a suit filed by a motorist who claims that she was in-
              jured on 7/20/18. I understand that Brown’s Clear-
              ing had a tree crew alongside I-75 North that day, do-
              ing work for GDOT around Mile Marker 294. I
              wanted to give someone at Brown’s Clearing a heads-
              up that I was about to serve a records request on your
              company’s GA registered agent. The request gener-
              ally seeks docs relating to Brown’s Clearing’s work in
              that area between 7/18 and 7/20/18. When we serve
              the request, I’d be happy to send you a copy. My con-
              tact info is below, so feel free to call anytime if you or
              another Brown’s Clearing rep wants to talk.
        On February 15, 2019, Brown’s Clearing provided the requested
        information, showing where their equipment was located along In-
        terstate 75 on the day of the accident. Kelley Brown testified that
        she “thought they wanted a witness or something, and so [she] just
        sent him the log.”
               On May 10, 2019, the Fords filed an amended complaint in
        the underlying state court action against Gunnison and Georgia
        Power that added Brown’s Clearing as a defendant. On May 16,
        2019, a process server tried to serve Brown’s Clearing’s authorized
        agent of process, Registered Agents, Inc. (“Registered Agents”),
        with summons, the amended complaint, interrogatories, and a re-
        quest for production. Registered Agents then emailed Kelley
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        8                     Opinion of the Court               22-10358

        Brown at her email address on file with Registered Agents, notify-
        ing her of a delivered service of process document and a prompt to
        log into the computer system and review the document. The next
        day, because the documents had not been reviewed, Registered
        Agents sent another email stating that the “document we uploaded
        on your company’s behalf could be really important and we want
        to make sure you see it.” Two days later, another email was sent
        stating the same. On May 21, 2019, Registered Agents sent another
        email, stating:
              It’s been 5 days and unfortunately, you haven’t
              logged into your account to look at it. We’re email-
              ing it to you as a PDF attached to this email. We’d
              prefer you login to your online account because we
              believe that’s a more secure way to deliver docu-
              ments, but maybe you don’t want to do that and we
              don’t want to slow you down. So here it is.
        Finally, Registered Agents mailed a physical letter to Brown’s
        Clearing requesting that someone open the account and view the
        documents.
               Brown’s Clearing was never served by hand or by mail with
        a copy of the amended complaint. In 2019, Kelley Brown, who
        served as a kind of office manager for the business, did not know
        what the phrase “service of process” meant. She did not open any
        of the four computer generated emails because she thought they
        looked like all previous emails she received from that account,
        which were all invoice and billing related emails. Brown had re-
        ceived over one hundred other emails from the Registered Agent
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        22-10358               Opinion of the Court                        9

        account between 2017 and 2020, almost all of which were invoices.
        Brown’s Clearing and Steve and Kelley Brown had never been sued
        before either as a business or personally.
               Unsurprisingly, Brown’s Clearing did not respond to the
        state court amended complaint, and the Fords filed a motion for
        entry of default judgment in the underlying action on July 19, 2019.
        That same day, Horowitz emailed Kelley Brown notifying her of
        the motion for default judgment and suggesting that she contact
        Brown’s Clearing’s liability carrier to let them know of the lawsuit.
        Kelley Brown stated that this email from Horowitz was the first
        time she had ever heard of the lawsuit. The Georgia state court
        denied the Fords’ motion for default judgment, finding that service
        was “without effect” because the process server was not properly
        appointed. Several days after she received the email from Horo-
        witz, Kelley Brown reported a claim online to Frankenmuth re-
        garding the underlying action. Randy Eichhorn, a claim senior lit-
        igation examiner with Frankenmuth, stated that Kelley Brown re-
        ported a claim to Frankenmuth on July 26, 2019.
               On August 7, 2020, Frankenmuth filed a complaint for de-
        claratory judgment against Brown’s Clearing, seeking a judicial de-
        termination about whether Frankenmuth had a duty to defend and
        indemnify Brown’s Clearing in the underlying litigation before the
        Georgia state court. On September 20, 2020, the Fords filed a mo-
        tion for joinder as an indispensable party, which the district court
        granted. The parties subsequently cross-moved for summary judg-
        ment. Brown’s Clearing and the Fords argued: (1) that Brown’s
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                22-10358

        Clearing did not know about the underlying lawsuit until July 19,
        2019, notified Frankenmuth about the action as soon as practicable,
        and is therefore entitled to coverage under the Policy; and (2) that
        economic losses are covered under the Policy. Frankenmuth ar-
        gued: (1) that Brown’s Clearing knew about the accident in Febru-
        ary 2019 and the underlying action in May 2019; (2) that Brown’s
        Clearing failed to notify Frankenmuth “as soon as practicable” pur-
        suant to the Policy; and (3) that Brown’s Clearing failed to give
        Frankenmuth “written notice” as it failed to forward the summons
        and legal papers.
               On January 4, 2022, the district court granted summary judg-
        ment in favor of Brown’s Clearing and the Fords, agreeing with the
        position of Brown’s Clearing. In reaching that conclusion, the
        court interpreted the word “known” in the Policy’s notice require-
        ments to require a Brown’s Clearing executive officer to have ac-
        tual knowledge of the occurrence, claim, or suit. The court ex-
        plained that “[v]iewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
        Frankenmuth and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor,”
        no reasonable jury could conclude that the e-mail.
        exchange with Horowitz or a certificate of liability insurance as to
        the subcontractor demonstrated that Brown’s Clearing had actual
        knowledge of the accident in February 2019. The court also found
        that Brown’s Clearing provided written notice of the claim and did
        so “as soon as practicable.”
              Frankenmuth timely appealed.
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        22-10358                Opinion of the Court                        11

                         II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW
               We review de novo the resolution of cross-motions for sum-
        mary judgment. Am. Bankers Ins. Grp. v. United States, 408 F.3d
        1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2005). In doing so, we apply the same stand-
        ards used by the district court, assessing the evidence and all rea-
        sonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving
        party. Ramji v. Hosp. Housekeeping Sys. LLC, 992 F.3d 1233, 1241
        (11th Cir. 2021).
                                 III.    ANALYSIS
                On appeal, Frankenmuth argues that Brown’s Clearing is
        not entitled to coverage under the Policy based on its breach of
        duties after loss, particularly because Brown’s Clearing failed to no-
        tify Frankenmuth of the underlying action in a timely fashion. Ap-
        pellees argue that the district court was correct in ruling that Frank-
        enmuth owed a duty to defend and indemnity because Brown’s
        Clearing did not have knowledge of the underlying action until July
        19, 2019, after which notice was given to Frankenmuth soon
        enough after to comply with the terms of the Policy.
                Under the Commercial General Liability Conditions section
        of the Policy, Brown’s Clearing was required to “[s]ee to it that
        [Frankenmuth] is notified as soon as practicable of an ‘occurrence’
        . . . which may result in a claim.” Similarly, the Policy requires
        Brown’s Clearing to “[n]otify [Frankenmuth] as soon as practica-
        ble” if a “claim or ‘suit’ is brought against any insured.” Those con-
        ditions are breached only if Brown’s Clearing failed to provide such
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10358

        notice when “an ‘occurrence’ is known to . . . [a]n executive of-
        ficer,” or when a “claim or ‘suit’ is known to . . . [a]n executive
        officer.” (Emphasis added). The parties primarily dispute the
        meaning of the word “known.” Before determining whether
        Brown’s Clearing complied with the obligations under the Policy,
        we must first resolve that dispute.
               Construction of an insurance contract is a question of law
        we review de novo. Tech. Coating Applicators, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. &
        Guar. Co., 157 F.3d 843, 844 (11th Cir. 1998). The construction of
        insurance contracts is governed by substantive state law. Dempsey
        v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 717 F.2d 556, 559 (11th Cir. 1983); see also
        Tech. Coating, 157 F.3d at 844–45. In this case, the parties have
        agreed that Alabama substantive law applies. Insurance policies are
        contracts, and like other contracts, they are “governed by the gen-
        eral rules of contracts.” Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Alfa Mut. Ins.
        Co., 817 So. 2d 687, 691 (Ala. 2001). We must construe the policy
        to give effect to the intention of the parties. Id. Under Alabama
        law, “[i]f a word or phrase is not defined in [an insurance] policy,
        then the court should construe the word or phrase according to the
        meaning a person of ordinary intelligence would reasonably give
        it.” Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Alabama Gas Corp., 117 So. 3d
        695, 700 (Ala. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Safeway Ins.
        Co. of Ala., Inc. v. Herrera, 912 So. 2d 1140, 1143 (Ala. 2005)). “The
        court should not define words it is construing based on technical
        or legal terms.” Safeway Ins. Co., 912 So. 2d at 1143.
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        22-10358               Opinion of the Court                        13

                In the Policy, the notice requirement is triggered when a suit
        is “known” to an executive officer or insurance manager. “Known”
        is used as a verb in the past tense of “know”, which is defined as
        “[t]o recognize, acknowledge, perceive.” Know, Oxford English
        Dictionary (3d ed. 2010); see also Known, Oxford English Diction-
        ary (3d ed. 2010) (“That has become an object of knowledge; that
        is or has been apprehended mentally; learned; familiar;”). Frank-
        enmuth urges us to adopt a Merriam-Webster definition of
        “known” to mean “generally recognized”. Such a definition im-
        plies not whether information is known to an individual but rather
        whether information is widely known among a certain population.
        Certainly, the Policy addresses whether an occurrence is specifi-
        cally recognized by an individual or partner, not whether it is gen-
        erally recognized. Instead, we agree with the district court’s deter-
        mination that, to an ordinary person, the word “known” means
        “actually known.” If a fact is “known” to a person, it is reasonable
        to assume that person has actual knowledge of the fact.
               As the district court noted, Frankenmuth and Brown’s
        Clearing were free to contract with the phrases “should have
        known,” “had reason to know,” or “would be likely to have
        known,” but they did not––rather, they chose the term, “known.”
        We will not change the language of their agreement now. Addi-
        tionally, while we find none, even if there existed a genuine ambi-
        guity around the meaning of “known” in this contract, we would
        be directed to construe such ambiguity “liberally in respect to per-
        sons insured and strictly with respect to the insurer.” Crossett v.
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                22-10358

        St. Lous Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 269 So. 2d 869, 873 (Ala. 1972). For
        purposes of evaluating Brown’s Clearing’s compliance with the
        Policy, we will construe “known” to mean that an executive officer
        must have had actual knowledge of the occurrence, claim, or suit.
                When did an executive officer of Brown’s Clearing have ac-
        tual knowledge of the underlying occurrence and action? Appel-
        lees contend that no executive officer at Brown’s Clearing had ac-
        tual knowledge of the underlying action before July 19, 2019, when
        Horowitz emailed Kelley Brown about the motion for default judg-
        ment. Frankenmuth argues that Brown’s Clearing knew of the suit
        on May 16, 2019, when its authorized agent, Registered Agents,
        was served with process. According to Frankenmuth, because Reg-
        istered Agents was served with process, Brown’s Clearing “knew”
        of the lawsuit at the same time. Instead of wading into questions
        of agency law and constructive knowledge, as Frankenmuth sug-
        gests, we need only look at the language of the parties’ agreement.
        The Policy does not state that a suit being “known” to a registered
        agent is imputed to an executive officer. In fact, the Policy explic-
        itly states that the notice requirement is triggered “only” when a
        suit is “known” to certain individuals––“[a]n executive officer or
        insurance manager.” Again, the parties could have added “regis-
        tered agent” to that list, but they did not. Given the language of
        the Policy and the record, the district court was correct in finding
        that the date triggering Brown’s Clearing’s duty to provide notice
        to Frankenmuth was July 19, 2019.
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        22-10358                  Opinion of the Court                              15

               The next question before us is whether Brown’s Clearing
        notified Frankenmuth “as soon as practicable,” as required by the
        Policy. Kelley Brown gave notice of the underlying action to
        Frankenmuth seven days after learning about the suit, on July 26,
        2019. Because Frankenmuth focuses on the reasonableness of the
        delay assuming Brown’s Clearing had the obligation to notify start-
        ing May 16, 2019, Frankenmuth makes no argument that a seven-
        day delay would fail to meet the Policy’s requirements. Thus, the
        delay between when Brown’s Clearing triggered the notice re-
        quirement and when Brown’s Clearing provided notice did not
        constitute breach of duty under the Policy.1
              Frankenmuth also argues that Brown’s Clearing violated the
        cooperation clauses in the Policy, referring to the provisions

        1 Frankenmuth     also argues two points that may not have been properly pre-
        served for appeal. See Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d
        1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004) First, Frankenmuth argues for the first time, be-
        yond a footnote in its summary judgment briefing, that the mailbox rule ap-
        plies to the letter sent by Registered Agents to Brown’s Clearing, implying re-
        ceipt. Even applying the mailbox rule, the letter only repeated the language
        from the emails and did not contain the actual complaint. So receipt of the
        letter would not impute knowledge on Brown’s Clearing any more than the
        emails did. Second, Frankenmuth argues for the first time that willful blind-
        ness supports a finding of actual knowledge. Aside from arguing that Brown’s
        Clearing cannot “wear ‘blinders’” and claim ignorance, nowhere below did
        Frankenmuth argue that Brown’s Clearing was engaged in willful blindness so
        as to impute actual knowledge. Thus, this argument is not properly before
        this Court. Even if it were, the record does not support an inference that Kel-
        ley Brown was deliberately ignoring occurrences and claim notices. Rather,
        she testified that she thought they were invoices.
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                22-10358

        requiring that the involved insured must “send us copies of any de-
        mands, notices, summonses or legal papers received in connection
        with the claim or ‘suit.’” Because Brown’s Clearing was provided
        a copy of the summons and complaint via email on May 21, 2019,
        but did not send it to its insurer, Frankenmuth contends that
        Brown’s Clearing breached these provisions and is therefore not
        entitled to defense or indemnification. That argument fails. First,
        even though the cooperation clauses do not explicitly mention a
        knowledge requirement, Frankenmuth’s reading of the contract
        would imply a duty to provide information of which Brown’s
        Clearing has no actual knowledge. Instead, a more logical under-
        standing of the Policy as a whole reads the requirement that the
        insured send copies of any demands, notices, summonses or legal
        papers as an instruction on cooperation after a notice of an under-
        lying occurrence or suit has been sent. Indeed, interpreting the
        Policy in a way to find that the parties agreed to require coopera-
        tion on a suit of which neither Frankenmuth nor Brown’s Clearing
        had any awareness would be a bizarre conclusion. Second, the rec-
        ord shows that the summons and complaint were served in a failed
        attempt to effect proper service and were thus “without effect.” If
        the summons and complaint were not properly received by
        Brown’s Clearing, they could not have had a duty to send them to
        Frankenmuth.
              Frankenmuth’s final argument, made in one paragraph at
        the end of its brief, is that Brown’s Clearing violated the Policy’s
        mandate that “[y]ou must see to it that we receive written notice
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        22-10358              Opinion of the Court                      17

        of the claim or ‘suit’ as soon as possible.” According to Franken-
        muth, Brown’s Clearing violated this provision because it “pro-
        vided no evidence that it provided written notice to Frankenmuth–
        –i.e. never provided a copy of the written notice of proof.” Frank-
        enmuth appears to argue that because Kelley Brown’s testified that
        she submitted the claim “online,” it was not “written notice” pur-
        suant to the policy. Frankenmuth points to no evidence that
        Brown’s Clearing’s notice was not in writing nor in the incorrect
        format. Thus, there is no genuine dispute about whether Brown’s
        Clearing provided written notice and no violation of the Policy.
        Thus, this argument must fail.
              Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding that
        Brown’s Clearing did not violate any provisions of the Policy and
        was thus entitled to coverage under that Policy with Frankenmuth.
                              IV.   CONCLUSION
               For all these reasons, we affirm the district court’s order
        granting summary judgment for Brown’s Clearing and the Fords.
              AFFIRMED.