Court Opinion

ID: 9765857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:22:40.899205+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:16.432362
License: Public Domain

SPARLING, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority devotes considerable space to the issue of whether the document in question was an option or a contract of sale. I find the majority’s conclusion unnecessary because an option is a contract — for which there must be consideration. Therefore, if there was no consideration passing from Hott to Pearcy/Christon — as majority contends and I agree — the document was a nudum pactum: no contract at all. This is a basic truth regardless of whether the document is an option or a contract of sale.
I further disagree with the majority’s disposition of the issues of estoppel and fraud. Plaintiff Hott pled estoppel and fraud; therefore, to successfully obtain summary judgment defendant Pearcy/Chri-ston must demonstrate that Hott cannot prevail as his case is pleaded. Clark v. Memorial Hospital, 551 S.W.2d 469 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1977, no writ).
Pearcy/Christon’s Motion for Summary Judgment dated August 21, 1981, alleged that the “contract” lacks consideration, but the motion is silent regarding estoppel or fraud. On October 1, 1981 Hott countered with his motion for summary judgment and answer to Pearcy/Christon’s motion. Hott’s motion spoke only to the validity of the contract, although he did allege by affidavit a detrimental reliance upon a representation made by Pearcy/Christon.1 On October 26, 1981, Pearcy/Christon again filed a motion for summary judgment and answer to Hott’s motion. Again, Pear-cy/Christon alleged that the document was unenforceable as a contract, and, again, there was no mention of fraud or estoppel. In sum, Pearcy/Christon nowhere demonstrated that Hott cannot prevail under his pleadings of fraud and estoppel.
Yet the majority claims “[T]he summary judgment proof and allegations presented all three of these issues to the trial court.... We reach the conclusion here that the trial court necessarily disposed of these issues when it resolved the parties’ cross-motions and responses that presented all three issues to the trial court.” The record simply does not support this statement.
The majority disposes of the issue of es-toppel by simply stating “... it [estoppel] requires reliance upon a misrepresentation which was not present here.”2 By such *856statement, the majority has shifted the burden of summary judgment proof. The plaintiff, Hott, need not prove estoppel to avoid summary judgment; the defendant, Pearcy/Christon, must, by summary judgment proof, show that Hott was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law under the theory of estoppel. Pearcy/Christon failed to do this.
In disposing of Hott’s averments of fraud, the majority, citing no authority, states “Similarly, because Hott relied solely on the contract ... an essential element of fraud is lacking.” Perhaps the majority has overlooked the right of Hott to plead in the alternative. TEX.R.CIV.P. 48.
I am not unaware of Tatum v. Tatum, 606 S.W.2d 31 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1980, no writ) which places an affirmative duty upon the plaintiff, as the party opposing a motion for summary judgment, to point out to the court a theory of recovery which was properly pled but unaddressed by defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Tatum, 606 S.W.2d at 33. I would respectfully refuse to follow Tatum.
City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority, 589 S.W.2d 671 (Tex.1979), teaches that “[t]he trial court may not grant a summary judgment by default for lack of an answer or in response to the motion by the non-movant when the mov-ant’s summary judgment proof is legally insufficient.” Clear Creek, 589 S.W.2d at 678. A defendant has the burden of establishing by his motion for summary judgment that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all theories of recovery. Chessher v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 658 S.W.2d 563 (Tex.1983); Ashcroft v. W.T. Bradshaw and Co., 601 S.W.2d 809 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The burden of proof does not shift from the movant in summary judgment proceedings. Clear Creek, 589 S.W.2d at 678. See also Orozco v. Texas General Indem. Co., 611 S.W.2d 724 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1981, no writ). Because a promise supported by promissory estoppel and fraud are “theories of recovery” and they were unaddressed by Pearcy/Christon’s motion for summary judgment, Hott, as non-mov-ant, had no duty to respond.
Again, Pearcy/Christon’s Motions for Summary Judgment aver only that the agreement with Hott is unenforceable; they do not negate Hott’s cause of action relating to estoppel or fraud. Therefore, I would hold that the court erred by granting summary judgment as to these matters and that a partial summary judgment was appropriate. Accordingly, I dissent from the opinion of the majority and would remand this case to the trial court to dispose of the issues of estoppel and fraud.

. This allegation is quoted in the majority opinion.

. In supporting this grand conclusion, majority cites Echols v. Bloom, 485 S.W.2d 798. But Echols was not decided by summary judgment *856The court in Echols had an entire trial record before it from which to draw the conclusion of “no evidence.”