Court Opinion

ID: 9382459
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-27 19:00:40.432065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:39.528271
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10931    Document: 30-1     Date Filed: 03/27/2023   Page: 1 of 8

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-10931
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,
       versus
       GARNELL DEWITT QUARTERMAN,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Georgia
                 D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cr-00064-WTM-CLR-1
                           ____________________
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       2                       Opinion of the Court                  22-10931

       Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Garnell Dewitt Quarterman appeals his 235-month sentence
       following his conviction for one count of conspiracy to interfere
       with commerce by robbery. On appeal, Quarterman argues that
       his sentence is unreasonable because it is disparate in comparison
       to his co-defendant’s sentence and because it is at the high end of
       the guideline range. After thorough review, we affirm.
                                          I.
               We review the sentence a district court imposes for “reason-
       ableness,” which “merely asks whether the trial court abused its
       discretion.” United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir.
       2008) (quotations omitted). That said, we only review for plain er-
       ror a sentencing challenge raised for the first time on appeal.
       United States v. Henderson, 409 F.3d 1293, 1307 (11th Cir. 2005).
       To establish plain error, the defendant must show (1) an error, (2)
       that is plain, and (3) that affected his substantial rights. United
       States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007). If the de-
       fendant satisfies these conditions, we may exercise our discretion
       to recognize the error only if it seriously affects the fairness, integ-
       rity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.
              To preserve an issue for appeal, a defendant “must raise an
       objection that is sufficient to apprise the trial court and the oppos-
       ing party of the particular grounds upon which appellate relief will
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       22-10931                   Opinion of the Court                                 3

       later be sought.” United States v. Straub, 508 F.3d 1003, 1011 (11th
       Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted). A defendant preserves the issue of
       the substantive reasonableness of his sentence for review by advo-
       cating for a less severe sentence. Holguin-Hernandez v. United
       States, 140 S. Ct. 762, 766–67 (2020).
               In reviewing sentences for reasonableness, we perform two
       steps. Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1190. First, we “‘ensure that the district
       court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to
       calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating
       the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) fac-
       tors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing
       to adequately explain the chosen sentence -- including an explana-
       tion for any deviation from the Guidelines range.’” Id. (quoting
       Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). 1 The district court is
       not required to state on the record that it has explicitly considered
       each of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors if the record reflects the dis-
       trict court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. United States v.

       1 The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense
       and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sen-
       tence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
       the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for the
       sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence; (4) the need to protect the
       public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational
       training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing
       Guidelines range; (8) the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Com-
       mission; (9) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the
       need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10931

       Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 609 (11th Cir. 2020). So, an ac-
       knowledgment by the district court that it considered the § 3553(a)
       factors is sufficient. Turner, 474 F.3d at 1281. Further, a failure to
       discuss mitigating evidence does not indicate that the court “erro-
       neously ‘ignored’ or failed to consider this evidence.” United States
       v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007). “[T]he adequacy of
       a district court’s findings and sentence explanation is a classic pro-
       cedural issue, not a substantive one.” United States v. Irey, 612
       F.3d 1160, 1194 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
               If we conclude that the district court did not procedurally
       err, we consider the “substantive reasonableness of the sentence
       imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard,” based on the “to-
       tality of the circumstances.” Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1190 (quotations
       omitted). A court may abuse its discretion if it (1) fails to consider
       relevant factors that are due significant weight, (2) gives an im-
       proper or irrelevant factor significant weight, or (3) commits a clear
       error of judgment by balancing a proper factor unreasonably. Irey,
       612 F.3d at 1189. Also, a court’s unjustified reliance on any one §
       3553(a) factor may be a symptom of an unreasonable sentence.
       United States v. Crisp, 454 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 2006).
              We have “underscored” that we must give “due deference”
       to the district court to consider and weigh the proper sentencing
       factors. United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204, 1224 (11th Cir.
       2018) (quotations omitted). The district court does not have to
       give all the factors equal weight and is given discretion to attach
       great weight to one factor over another. United States v.
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       22-10931               Opinion of the Court                        5

       Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015). Sentencing
       courts are also afforded “broad leeway in deciding how much
       weight to give to prior crimes the defendant has committed.”
       United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355–56 (11th Cir. 2022).
              We will vacate a sentence only if we are “left with the defi-
       nite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear
       error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a
       sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dic-
       tated by the facts of the case.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 (quotations
       omitted). We will not substitute our own judgment for that of the
       sentencing court and will sometimes affirm the district court even
       if we would have done something differently because the question
       is whether the district court’s decision was “in the ballpark of per-
       missible outcomes.” Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355 (quotations omitted).
              A claim of unwarranted sentencing disparities requires that
       the defendant be similarly situated to the defendants to whom he
       compares himself. United States v. Duperval, 777 F.3d 1324, 1338
       (11th Cir. 2015). District courts should not draw comparisons to
       cases involving defendants who were convicted of less serious of-
       fenses, pleaded guilty, or who lacked extensive criminal histories.
       United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1118 (11th Cir. 2011). In
       other words, a well-founded claim of unwarranted disparity be-
       tween sentences “assumes that apples are being compared to ap-
       ples.” United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1101 (11th Cir.
       2009) (quotations omitted).
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                22-10931

              We do not apply a presumption of reasonableness to sen-
       tences within the guideline range, but we ordinarily expect these
       sentences to be reasonable. United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633,
       656 (11th Cir. 2014). The party challenging the sentence bears the
       burden of establishing that it is unreasonable based on the record
       and the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371,
       1378 (11th Cir. 2010).
              Here, Quarterman has not shown that his sentence is either
       procedurally or substantively unreasonable. As the record reveals,
       Quarterman and his codefendant, Malik Stephens, were charged
       with several counts arising out of the robberies of businesses near
       Savannah, Georgia. In the initial indictment, both were charged
       with one count of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, in vi-
       olation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); Stephens was charged in three addi-
       tional counts; and Quarterman was charged in thirteen additional
       counts. After Stephens pleaded guilty to the initial indictment,
       Quarterman was charged in a superseding indictment with twenty-
       six counts, including conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, in
       violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); four counts of attempted Hobbs
       Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); twelve counts of
       possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, in vi-
       olation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); eight counts of Hobbs Act robbery, in
       violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); and one count of possession of a
       firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
             Quarterman later agreed to plead guilty to the conspiracy
       count of the superseding indictment in exchange for the dismissal
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       22-10931               Opinion of the Court                         7

       of the other counts, pursuant to a written agreement. After hear-
       ing arguments in mitigation from Quarterman and his mother, the
       district court said that it had considered the testimony, the parties’
       arguments and the § 3553(a) factors, and emphasized “the egre-
       gious conduct involved in the instant offense with the commission
       of 12 armed robberies [, the victims’ testimony about how the rob-
       beries have affected them, as well as] the defendant’s repeated vio-
       lent criminal history, the criminal history here in this area and also
       in Maryland.” It then sentenced Quarterman to 235 months’ im-
       prisonment, at the high end of the guideline range.
              To the extent that Quarterman now raises a procedural rea-
       sonableness challenge to the explanation of the sentence, he failed
       to raise any issue like this before the district court, despite being
       given the opportunity to do so. Thus, we review his procedural
       reasonableness challenge for plain error, and can find no error,
       much less plain error. As we’ve said, the court was not required to
       discuss each subpart of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in explaining his sen-
       tence. Kulhman, 711 F.3d at 1326. Further, the record -- including
       the undisputed portions of his PSI -- reflects that his history and
       characteristics, and his actions during the course of the offense con-
       duct, supported the district court’s decision, as we’ll discuss.
              As for Quarterman’s challenge to the substantive reasona-
       bleness of his 235-month sentence, it was not a result of an unwar-
       ranted sentencing disparity. This kind of claim “assumes that ap-
       ples are being compared to apples,” but the record shows that the
       codefendants here played significantly different roles in the offense
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       8                      Opinion of the Court                22-10931

       conduct. While Stephens was charged with four counts in the ini-
       tial indictment, Quarterman was charged in a superseding indict-
       ment with twenty-six counts. Moreover, Stephens pleaded guilty
       to the initial indictment, rather than the superseding indictment.
       Ultimately, Stephens’s guideline range was 120 to 150 months im-
       prisonment, while Quarterman’s was 188 to 235 months imprison-
       ment, even though Stephens had a higher criminal history score
       than Quarterman. On this record, there was no error in treating
       Stephens and Quarterman differently for sentencing purposes.
       Duperval, 777 F.3d at 1338.
               Nor are we persuaded by Quarterman’s argument that the
       235-month sentence was otherwise substantively unreasonable. In
       sentencing Quarterman at the high end of the guideline range, the
       district court emphasized his “egregious” conduct and “repeatedly
       violent criminal history.” The court was permitted to attach
       weight to these considerations, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) -- even great
       weight, Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355 -- and we will not second guess this
       weight if the sentence is reasonable under the circumstances. Id.
       Further, Quarterman has not shown that the district court failed to
       consider any relevant factors, to give weight to any “improper or
       irrelevant factor,” or to make any “clear error of judgment” in con-
       sidering the relevant factors. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189. Accordingly,
       Quarterman has not shown the district court’s within-guideline
       sentence was outside “the ballpark of permissible outcomes,” But-
       ler, 39 F.4th at 1355, and we affirm.
             AFFIRMED.