Court Opinion

ID: 9919196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 18:02:42.782117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:10.610252
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/17/24 Tenser v. County of Los Angeles CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

ADAM J. TENSER,                                          B316259

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                        (Los Angeles County
                                                         Super. Ct. No. 20SMCV01690)
         v.

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

     Defendant and
Respondent.

ADAM J. TENSER,                                          B326976

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                        (Los Angeles County
                                                         Super. Ct. No. 20SMCV01690)
         v.

BETH SILVERMAN et al.,

     Defendants and
Respondents.
      APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Mark H. Epstein, Judge. Affirmed.
      Adam J. Tenser, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Collins + Collins, Erin R. Dunkerly, Jessica C. Covington
and James C. Jardin for Defendant and Respondent and
Defendants and Respondents.

                            ******

       Appellant, Attorney Adam J. Tenser (appellant), sued the
County of Los Angeles (county) and six individual employees of
the county (county employees) (collectively respondents) for
violation of California’s unfair competition law (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 17200), defamation, and negligence following various
events surrounding the arrest and trial of appellant’s client Blake
Leibel for the murder of Iana Kasian.1 In July 2021, the trial
court sustained without leave to amend the county’s demurrer to
appellant’s first amended complaint on the ground that appellant
failed to present a timely claim pursuant to the Government

1       The county employee respondents are Robert Joshua Ryan,
Beth Silverman, Tannaz Mokayef, Robert Martindale, Maurice
Jollif, and Elizabeth Dumais Miller. Silverman and Mokayef
were sued individually and in their capacities as deputy district
attorneys for the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office.
Martindale and Jollif were sued individually and in their
capacities as employees of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department (LASD). Miller was sued individually and in her
capacity as county counsel. Ryan was a prosecution witness in
the trial of Blake Leibel.

                                2
Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.).2 The county was dismissed
from the lawsuit. In July 2022, the trial court sustained without
leave to amend the county employees’ demurrer on the same
ground. A judgment of dismissal was subsequently entered.
Tenser separately appealed from the two dismissals. We consider
both appeals in this opinion. Because appellant failed to file a
timely government claim, we affirm the judgment in full.

                    FACTUAL BACKGROUND
        The complaint alleges the following facts: Appellant is an
entertainment lawyer who represents Blake Leibel. On May 26,
2016, Leibel was arrested for the murder of Kasian. Appellant
met with Leibel the following day at the county’s Twin Towers
Correctional Facility, where Leibel asked appellant to find him
criminal counsel. Appellant did so and attempted to visit Leibel
with criminal counsel on June 7, 2016. However, they were
denied attorney-client visitation. Appellant attended a criminal
hearing in late July 2016 with a criminal attorney and attempted
to substitute in as counsel but was denied.
        Appellant was denied attorney-client visits with Leibel
beginning in August 2016. He sought relief through respondent
Jollif, the supervisor of the Twin Towers legal intake unit, but
Jollif denied appellant’s request because appellant was not
Leibel’s attorney of record and did not have a court order
authorizing visitation. Leibel signed a notarized agreement
evidencing appellant’s representation, but appellant was still
denied a confidential attorney-client visitation. In late August

2    All further statutory references are to the Government
Code unless otherwise noted.

                                3
2016, appellant contacted respondent Miller of the county counsel
office, but Miller also denied appellant’s request to visit Leibel
absent a court order. Appellant was unable to provide criminal
counsel for Leibel, who was forced to use a public defender.
Appellant asserts that he was denied access to confidential
attorney-client communications with Leibel from August 1, 2016,
through June 28, 2018, the date of Leibel’s sentencing.
       Leibel’s trial began in early June 2018 and appellant
attended, sitting in the gallery. Leibel requested appellant
attend the trial and inform him of the civil consequences.
Prosecutors Mokayef and Silverman drew attention to appellant’s
presence. The attention was enough that one juror apparently
asked about appellant during voir dire.
       On June 13, 2018, trial was adjourned for the lunch break,
and due to issues with the elevator, the hallway outside the
courtroom became packed with members of the press, jurors,
witnesses, and counsel. Silverman, Mokayef, and Martindale
were engaged in a boisterous conversation between themselves
and witnesses, including the victim’s mother and Martindale’s
partner, detective William Cotter. The group was sharing their
opinions of the morning’s testimony and its effect on the case, and
celebrating their apparent progress towards conviction of Leibel.
The discussion was taking place within audible distance to the
members of the press and the jury. Appellant stood equal
distance from the group as the nearest juror, to ascertain what
the jurors were hearing.
       Detective Cotter turned to appellant, and appellant said,
“Your conduct is highly inappropriate in front of the jury.”
Detective Cotter replied, “Mr. Tenser I’m not interested in your
opinion.” Silverman then lashed out yelling, “This is none of your

                                4
business.” Appellant replied, “It is my business. I’m an officer of
this court and your opinion does not matter.” Silverman and
Mokayef then called appellant a “stalker” in the presence of the
jury, witnesses and the press. Mokayef later told the judge that
appellant was “basically stalking” prosecutors, while Silverman
added that appellant should know better as an attorney and
either should act professionally or be ordered out of the building.
       Mokayef later solicited a libelous e-mail from Ryan,
alleging that appellant had accosted Ryan in the parking lot of
the courthouse. On June 14, 2018, after the lunch break, the
same juror that had inquired about appellant during voir dire
expressed fear of appellant and was excused from jury duty.
       On June 18, 2018, the court cited appellant for contempt for
following a juror in his car, which appellant denied, and ordered
him to leave the courthouse for the remainder of the trial.
       On June 20, 2018, Martindale executed a declaration that
appellant claims mischaracterized the events described therein.
The declaration described Martindale witnessing repeated ethical
and professional lapses in appellant’s behavior during the trial.

                  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant’s attempted claims and complaint
     Appellant filed an action against the county employees in
the United States District Court on June 24, 2019.3
     Appellant asserts he first filed a government claim notice
when he mailed his federal complaint to the State of California’s
Department of Justice and Department of General Services on

3     Appellant’s federal civil rights claims against respondents
in the district court were dismissed and the federal court declined
to exercise jurisdiction over the California causes of action.

                                5
June 27, 2019.4 On November 2, 2019, Tenser served the federal
complaint on the Los Angeles County Clerk. On December 4,
2019, the county mailed appellant a letter stating that the claim
was received on November 14, 2019, and that “[t]he Los Angeles
County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk is not the proper venue
for presenting a Claim.” On January 31, 2020, appellant served
the federal complaint on the county’s Board of Supervisors.
       Appellant filed this action on November 6, 2020. The first
amended complaint was filed on February 24, 2021. It included
causes of action against the county employees for violation of the
unfair competition law, defamation, and negligence, and a cause
of action against the county for negligence in the form of
vicarious liability.
The county’s demurrer
       On March 29, 2021, the county filed a demurrer pursuant
to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e) on the
ground that appellant failed to state a claim against it. The
county argued, among other things, that appellant did not allege
that he presented a government claim to the county within the
time frame required by section 911.2, nor did he meet any of the
requirements of that statute.5
       Appellant submitted an opposition in which he argued that
he substantially complied with the requirements of the

4     The trial court found, and appellant appears to accept, that
“[o]ne does not give the County notice of something by serving the
State.”
5     The county’s alternative arguments were prosecutorial
immunity based on section 821.6, discretionary acts immunity
under section 820.2, and the litigation privilege under Civil Code
section 47.

                                6
Government Claims Act and the county had waived the defense
of appellant’s noncompliance due to its failure to give appellant
notice of any deficiency. Appellant asserted his service of a
federal complaint based on the same fundamental facts as the
present lawsuit constituted substantial compliance. Appellant
asserted the county received the claim on November 2, 2019, and
returned it with a notice of improper venue. Appellant further
asserted he sent another claim on January 31, 2020. Appellant
argued that the county failed to provide any notice of deficiency.
Appellant submitted argument opposing the county’s other
defenses. The county submitted a reply brief arguing, among
other things, that the county had no duty to notify appellant that
his claim was rejected because appellant did not file it on time.
       On July 16, 2021, the trial court issued an order sustaining
the county’s demurrer on the ground that appellant failed to
present a timely government claim. The trial court did not reach
the other issues raised by the county in its demurrer. The county
was dismissed from the lawsuit. On October 12, 2021, appellant
filed a notice of appeal from the July 16, 2021 order.6

6      The July 16, 2021 order sustaining the demurrer is not an
appealable order. Generally, an order sustaining a demurrer “is
neither appealable per se nor as a final judgment.” (Molien v.
Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1980) 27 Cal.3d 916, 920.) The
parties have not drawn our attention to a judgment of dismissal
as to the county following the July 16, 2021 order. Although the
trial court noted in a later order that the county had been
dismissed from the lawsuit, no judgment of dismissal appears in
the record on appeal. However, we may “deem an order
sustaining a demurrer to incorporate a judgment of dismissal.”
(Ibid.) In the absence of a formal judgment of dismissal as to the

                                 7
The county employees’ demurrer
       On March 21, 2022, appellant sought leave to file a third
amended complaint as to the county employee respondents.7 The
proposed third amended complaint included as a fourth cause of
action appellant’s claim of negligence against the county. As to
the fourth cause of action against the county, appellant asked the
court “GRANT the Motion for Leave to Amend the Second
Amended Complaint as to the defaulting defendants and LODGE
the [Third Amended Complaint] pending a ruling on the appeal
as to the [county].”
       On June 22, 2022, the county, along with the county
employee respondents, demurred to the third amended
complaint. Respondents argued that appellant’s failure to timely
file a government claim against respondents barred his lawsuit
entirely. Respondents argued that under the Government Claims
Act, no person may sue a public entity or public employee unless
a government claim has been timely filed. Appellant’s third
amended complaint did not contain allegations showing
compliance with this requirement. Respondents also reiterated
the privilege and immunity arguments previously advanced on
behalf of the county.
       Appellant opposed the motion, making substantially
similar arguments to those he made in opposition to the county’s

County, we deem the order sustaining the county’s demurrer to
incorporate a judgment of dismissal.
7     Appellant characterized these individuals as the
“defaulting defendants.” While the county employee respondents
had previously been subject to entry of default, respondents’
motion to set aside entry of default was granted as a clerical error
on July 18, 2022.

                                 8
previous demurrer. On July 22, 2022, the trial court sustained
the demurrer without leave to amend as to the county employees,
specifically noting that its order did not involve the county as
“the County has been dismissed and the Court[’]s orders in that
regard are on appeal.” The court sustained the county employee
respondents’ demurrer based on appellant’s failure to file a
timely government claim. The court declined to address any
other grounds raised by the county employee respondents.
       Judgment was entered on December 12, 2022. Appellant
filed his notice of appeal from the judgment on January 25, 2023.

                           DISCUSSION
I.     Standard of review
       “The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the
complaint as a matter of law, and it raises only a question of
law.” (Holiday Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc. (2004) 118
Cal.App.4th 1413, 1420.) Therefore, we apply a de novo standard
of review. (Ibid.) A demurrer is appropriate where the complaint
on its face does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action or discloses that the court has no jurisdiction. (Ibid.) “On
demurrer review, we accept the truth of material facts properly
pleaded, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or
law.” (State Dept. of State Hospitals v. Superior Court (2015) 61
Cal.4th 339, 346.)
       Denial of leave to amend is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. (Eghtesad v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2020) 51
Cal.App.5th 406, 411.) Denial of leave to amend is appropriate
“‘only when it conclusively appears that there is no possibility of
alleging facts under which recovery can be obtained.’” (Id. at
p. 412.)

                                 9
II.    The Government Claims Act
       “‘[S]ubmission of a claim to a public entity pursuant to
section 900 et seq. “is a condition precedent to a tort action and
the failure to present the claim bars the action.”’” (State of
California v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1240 (State
of California).) “[F]ailure to allege facts demonstrating or
excusing compliance with the requirement subjects a complaint
to a general demurrer for failure to state a cause of action.” (Id.
at pp. 1240-1241.)
       A claim for personal injury against a public entity generally
must be presented to the public entity “not later than six months
after the accrual of the cause of action.” (§ 911.2, subd. (a).)
“‘Accrual of the cause of action for purposes of the government
claims statute is the date of accrual that would pertain under the
statute of limitations applicable to a dispute between private
litigants.’” (Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1 (2017) 3 Cal.5th 903, 906.)
Thus, accrual occurs at “‘the time when the cause of action is
complete with all of its elements.’” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery,
Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806.) Because such accrual generally
occurs at the time of the alleged wrongful act, a plaintiff must
generally file a claim not later than six months after the incident
in order to survive demurrer on a claim against a public entity.
(Estill v. County of Shasta (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 702, 712 (Estill)
[“Estill cannot maintain a cause of action against defendants
because she failed to present the County with a prelawsuit claim
no later than six months after the accrual of her causes of
action . . . .”].)
       A claimant who fails to submit a claim within six months of
the occurrence may apply for permission to file a late claim.
(§ 911.4, subd. (a).) The application to file a late claim “shall be

                                10
presented to the public entity . . . within a reasonable time not to
exceed one year after the accrual of the cause of action and shall
state the reason for the delay in presenting the claim.” (§ 911.4,
subd. (b).) When an application to file a late claim is not filed
within one year after the cause of action accrued, the trial court
“lack[s] jurisdiction to relieve [the party] of the . . . requirement
for presenting a timely claim.” (Simms v. Bear Valley
Community Healthcare Dist. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 391, 406
(Simms); see Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th
1767, 1779.)
III. The demurrers were properly sustained
        The trial court sustained first the county’s, and then the
county employees’, demurrers on the ground that appellant failed
to file a timely claim. The trial court did not err in making these
rulings.
        Appellant asserts that his causes of action accrued in June
and July of 2018. Appellant further asserts that he substantially
complied with the Government Claims Act by “mailing a letter
claim-notice with the federal complaint to the Clerk of the
County in accordance with [§ 915, subd. (a)(2)] on November 2,
2019.”
        Appellant’s purported substantial compliance on
November 2, 2019, is more than a year after appellant’s claims
accrued in June and July 2018. Because appellant has failed to
“allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the
[government claim] requirement,” his complaint is properly
subject to a general demurrer for failure to state a cause of
action. (State of California, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1243.)
        Even if appellant’s November 2, 2019 mailing to the clerk
of the County could be considered an application for permission

                                 11
to file a late claim, it was not presented within the one-year time
limit set forth in section 911.4. The trial court therefore lacked
jurisdiction to relieve appellant of the requirement of filing a
timely claim. (Simms, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 406.) Under
the circumstances, appellant cannot maintain his causes of action
against either the county or its employees, and their respective
demurrers were properly sustained.
IV. County’s failure to give notice of rejection of claim
        Appellant argues that because the county failed to give him
written notice that his claim had been rejected, he had until two
years from the date his cause of action accrued to sue the county.
Appellant’s argument is based on a faulty premise, and the
statutes upon which he relies are only relevant if the individual
has filed a timely claim.
        Section 913 applies if a plaintiff files a timely claim. It
requires that notice be given to the claimant regarding whether
the claim has been rejected, among other things. (§ 913, subds.
(a), (b).)
        If written notice is given in accordance with section 913,
the claimant is required to bring suit “not later than six months
after the date such notice is personally delivered or deposited in
the mail.” (§ 945.6, subd. (a)(1).) However, if the public entity
fails to give notice in accordance with section 913, the claimant
must bring an action “within two years from the accrual of the
cause of action.” (§ 945.6, subd. (a)(2).) Thus, assuming a timely
claim has been filed, “[i]f the public entity does not give written
notice that the claim has been rejected (§ 913), the plaintiff has
until two years from the date her cause of action accrued to sue
the entity.” (S.M. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2010) 184
Cal.App.4th 712, 717 (S.M.).)

                                12
      Nothing in the statutory scheme requires the public entity
to respond to an untimely claim. Appellant did not file a timely
claim, nor did he file a timely application for relief, therefore he
was not entitled to notice under section 913. As such, the time
limits present in section 945.6 are inapplicable to appellant.
      The cases that appellant cites do not suggest otherwise.
Mandjik v. Eden Township Hospital Dist. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th
1488, 1504, involved a plaintiff whose injury accrued in
approximately February or March 1988. The plaintiff filed a
timely application for relief from the claim presentation
requirement, which was granted in part. (Id. at p. 1495.) Relief
was granted on April 18, 1989, and the public entity failed to give
written notice of rejection. (Id. at p. 1499.) Plaintiffs filed their
complaint on January 10, 1990. (Ibid.) Under those
circumstances, the Mandjik court concluded that the plaintiff’s
complaint was not barred because “[w]here the public entity fails
to give written notice of rejection in accordance with section 913,
the statute of limitations is ‘within two years from the accrual of
the cause of action.’” (Id. at p. 1499.) As appellant failed to
present a timely application for relief from the claim presentation
requirement, the Mandjik case is irrelevant.
      In S.M, the minor plaintiff waited nearly two years to
submit a government claim based on allegations of sexual abuse.
The school district denied the claim and obtained summary
judgment based on failure to comply with the claim presentation
requirement. (S.M., supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at pp. 715-716.) In
Martinez v. County of Los Angeles (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 242, the
plaintiff submitted to surgery at a county hospital, discovered
that the county employees had committed malpractice roughly
five months later, and submitted a claim three months later. The

                                 13
county’s demurrer was sustained without leave to amend, but
this court reversed, finding that submission of a claim within
three months of discovery of the malpractice was timely. (Id. at
pp. 245-246.) Neither case suggests that the county was required
in this matter to respond to appellant’s untimely claim.
       Both Phillips v. Desert Hospital Dist. (1989) 49 Cal.3d 699
and Roger v. County of Riverside (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 510
involved claims that were filed more than six months, but less
than one year, after accrual of the claims. In Phillips, the
plaintiff’s defective claim triggered the notice and defense-waiver
provisions of the Government Claims Act. (Phillips, supra, at
pp. 707-708.) The case did not address a situation where, as
here, a defective claim is filed after the time has run for the
plaintiff to file an application for leave to file a late claim. In
Roger, the public agency notified the plaintiff in summary fashion
that it had rejected his claim, but failed to notify him of the
specific defects in his claim. The Roger court agreed that the
public entity waived its ability to assert a late-claim defense
because it had failed to notify him of this defect as required by
the act. (Roger, supra, at p. 523.) While these cases address the
application of the notice and defense-waiver provisions of the
Government Claims Act, neither suggests that these provisions
are applicable when the claimant fails to file any claim—whether
defective or not—within one year of the accrual of his causes of
action.
       Estill, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th 702 is instructive. The
plaintiff’s claim accrued in 2009, but she did not file a
government claim until February 2012. In her claim, she stated
that the date of the incident was September 2009, but
represented that she did not become aware of her claim until

                                14
September 2011. However, during discovery, the county learned
that the claimant had actually become aware of her claim in
2009. (Id. at p. 707.) The county then moved for summary
judgment, which was granted and affirmed on appeal. The Court
of Appeal rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the county’s
failure to notify her that her claim was untimely resulted in
waiver pursuant to section 911.3. The Estill court reasoned:
“even if the County had given Estill the section 911.3, subdivision
(a) warning, Estill could not have obtained relief from the claim
presentation requirements because a late-claim application must
be presented no more than one year after the accrual of the cause
of action and Estill submitted her claim to the County more than
one year after her causes of action accrued.” (Estill, at p. 712.)
       Similarly, here, even if notified that his defective claim was
untimely, appellant could not have obtained relief from the claim
presentation requirements because his defective notice was not
provided to the county until more than a year after his claim
accrued. Under the circumstances, the county was not required
to provide notice of the late-claim relief procedures.8
V.     Substantial compliance/prejudice
       Appellant argues that his late-filed letter with the federal
complaint attached constituted substantial compliance with the
Government Claims Act. Appellant cites Minsky v. City of Los

8     We reject appellant’s suggestion that respondents should be
equitably estopped from asserting any deficiency regarding the
timing of appellant’s claim notice due to the county’s failure to
inform appellant of the deficiencies of the claim. Appellant cites
no authority that this equitable doctrine applies in the context of
a party’s failure to file a timely claim under the Government
Claim Act.

                                 15
Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 113, 123 (Minsky) for the proposition
that, “[s]o long as the policies of the claims statutes are
effectuated, they should be given a liberal construction to permit
full adjudication on the merits.”9 Appellant relies on City of San
Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447 (San Jose), in asking
that we pose the question: “Is there sufficient information
disclosed on the face of the filed claim to reasonably enable the
public entity to make an adequate investigation of the merits of
the claim and to settle it without the expense of a lawsuit?” (Id.
at p. 456.)
       The San Jose court considered whether class certification
was appropriate in an action concerning alleged damages from
airport noise, vapor, dust and vibration. (San Jose, supra, 12
Cal.3d at p. 453.) In determining that class certification was not
appropriate, the San Jose court considered the parties’ competing
arguments regarding the representative plaintiffs’ compliance
with the Government Claims Act. There was no issue as to
timeliness, and the court ultimately concluded it need not decide
whether the claim at issue was sufficient. (Id. at p. 458.) The
case does not provide authority for appellant’s position that his
untimely and defective claim constituted substantial compliance.
       Malear v. State of California (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 213 is
also unhelpful to appellant. In Malear, the injury commenced on
May 28, 2020. (Id. at p. 218.) The plaintiff presented his claim to
the state on July 15, 2020, less than two months after the injury.
(Id. at p. 219.) However, the plaintiff filed his original complaint
prior to the state’s rejection of his claim. He later filed a first

9     The Minsky court held that the Government Claims Act did
not apply to the claims at issue in that matter, therefore the case
is unhelpful to appellant. (Minsky, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 117.)

                                16
amended complaint as of right, containing new allegations that
he had complied with the claim presentation requirements.
(Ibid.) Under those circumstances, the plaintiff was determined
to have substantially complied with the claim presentation
requirement of the Government Claims Act. (Malear, at p. 221.)
While the Malear court found that “the substantial compliance
doctrine remains viable,” it limited its holding to “the limited
circumstances presented in this case.” (Id. at p. 223.) The
Malear court did not suggest that a claim filed outside the
statutory period meets the doctrine of substantial compliance.
       Appellant further argues that the county cannot show
prejudice arising from his failure to file a timely claim. Appellant
cites Elias v. San Bernardino County Flood Control Dist. (1977)
68 Cal.App.3d 70, 74, for the proposition that “[i]f the claim
satisfies the purpose of the act without prejudice to the
government, substantial compliance will be found.” The claim at
issue in Elias was filed “[w]ithin the statutory period.” (Id. at
p. 72.) The issue of substantial compliance involved whether the
claim was addressed to the proper entity. Appellant has failed to
provide authority suggesting that a purported claim filed outside
of the statutory period does not cause prejudice to the public
entity.
       Contrary to appellant’s argument, caselaw interpreting the
claims requirements suggests that the time limits set forth in the
act are built in to prevent prejudice to the public entity and to the
public in general. “‘Requiring a [claimant] . . . to first present a
claim to the entity . . . affords the entity an opportunity to
promptly remedy the condition giving rise to the injury, thus
minimizing the risk of similar harm to others. [Citations.] [It]
also permits the public entity to investigate while tangible

                                 17
evidence is still available, memories are fresh, and witnesses can
be located. [Citations.] Fresh notice of a claim permits early
assessment by the public entity, allows its governing board to
settle meritorious disputes without incurring the added cost of
litigation, and gives it time to engage in appropriate budgetary
planning.’” (DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55
Cal.4th 983, 991, fn. 8.) Thus, we reject appellant’s argument
that his late-filed, deficient claim did not cause prejudice to the
county.
       Appellant has failed to convince this court that his
purported claim, filed over a year after his causes of action
accrued, substantially complies with the Government Claims
Act.10

                        DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their
costs of appeal.

                                           CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J.                HOFFSTADT, J.

10     Because we affirm the judgment on the ground that
appellant failed to file a timely claim, we decline to address the
parties’ arguments regarding prosecutorial immunity and
litigation privilege. We also decline to address the trial court’s
ruling on the county’s special motion to strike pursuant to Code
of Civil Procedure section 425.16.

                                18