Court Opinion

ID: 9895286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-06 17:09:10.980162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:57.413876
License: Public Domain

J-A18037-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 MICHAEL R. MERRINGER, SR.                :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 1457 WDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 8, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-56-CR-0000417-2019

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                  FILED: November 6, 2023

      Michael Merringer appeals from the judgment of sentence entered after

he was convicted of thirty-three sexual offenses. He claims that he was denied

his constitutional rights to a speedy trial, and he challenges the admission of

certain testimony against him.    We conclude that this prosecution did not

violate his right to a speedy trial.   However, based on our review of the

testimony, we are bound to reverse and remand for a new trial.

      On April 15, 2019, Pennsylvania State Police Corporal Shawn Reynolds

filed a criminal complaint charging Merringer with sexual offenses against A.D.

and N.M., two of his children, between 1996 and 2012. The charges were

held for court.

      Merringer moved to continue trial three times beginning on September

11, 2019, each of which the trial court granted. On July 22, 2020, the trial

court granted the Commonwealth’s first request to continue “due to the
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unavailability of witnesses.” Order, 7/23/20. On September 23, 2020, over

Merringer’s objection, the trial court granted the Commonwealth’s second

continuance request. Order, 9/28/20.

      The trial court ordered a final continuance on October 1, 2021:

      [A]fter a previous conference with counsel for the Commonwealth
      and the defendant, the jury trial scheduled for October 18-22,
      2021 is hereby CONTINUED and RESCHEDULED for February 28,
      2022 through March 4, 2022, over the objection of the
      Commonwealth. It appears that criminal charges have been filed
      against the defendant’s wife, a proposed material witness of the
      defendant and, consequently, defendant has asserted prejudice in
      proceeding with this trial until, at a minimum, a preliminary
      hearing has been held on this related matter. We hereby grant
      the continuance without assigning any of the time delay to either
      party and have it attributed to procedures accepted by the court.
      The parties shall be prepared for the jury selection on February
      28, 2022 and begin the trial immediately following the jury
      selection.

Order, 10/4/21.

      The case proceeded to trial as scheduled, beginning with jury selection

on February 28, 2022. A.D. and N.M. testified about years of sexual abuse.

Merringer testified on his own behalf denying the abuse and called additional

witnesses in support. Relevant to this appeal, the last two witnesses in the

Commonwealth’s case-in-chief were Jo Ellen Bowman and Corporal Reynolds.

      The Commonwealth offered Ms. Bowman as an expert witness in the

field of child sexual assault and children’s behavioral responses to sexual

assault.   When the Commonwealth was questioning Ms. Bowman on her

qualifications, the trial court interrupted to limit her testimony:

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     [The Assistant District Attorney (ADA):] Have you attended
     trainings on the medical examination?

     A.    I have.

     Q.    Can you talk about those a little bit?

     A.     It’s really important for [me] as a [Child Advocacy Center]
     staff person to understand medical findings, be able to interpret
     the reports. And also to understand and . . . help non-offending
     caregivers, parents, to understand the purpose of the medical
     exam.

           A lot of times people think that if there’s been a penetration,
     if there’s allegations of penetration, that there’s going to be
     medical evidence. You know, it’s they think something is going to
     show up at the doctor’s, but it’s not uncommon for there not to
     be any medical evidence, especially with a delayed report.

            And we need to understand, I have been to a lot of trainings
     where . . . I’ve been trained by a physician where we understand
     that the vaginal area and the rectum heals very quickly. And even
     if there has been trauma, if it’s not examined pretty quickly after
     the trauma occurred, there’s usually no medical finding of
     penetration. And so most of our cases after the doctor has seen
     them, it will say that there is no medical indicators, you know,
     there is no physical indicators of trauma. But they said that does
     not rule out that the sexual assault occurred. Because we have
     to understand, and . . . in my opinion, it’s really important for us
     to help non-offending caregivers get that, because sometimes,
     you know, they’re struggling with knowing that this might have
     occurred, and they’re trying to sort everything out.

            And sometimes they think that there’s medical evidence and
     it gives them some [peace] of mind. But it’s really our role to
     explain to them that it’s unlikely there will be medical evidence,
     and we explain that whole process to them so that there’s no kind
     of -- we try to explain to them that just because there’s no medical
     evidence doesn’t mean it didn’t happen. We don’t want them not
     to believe the child if there’s [no] medical evidence. I guess that’s
     the easiest way.

     THE COURT: [To the ADA,] we’re getting into an area into specific
     opinions. I want to make sure that we have her qualified as an
     expert before we get into some of the opinions she’s already
     expressing.

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      [The ADA]: I have.

                                 *    *     *

      [Defense counsel]: Your Honor, if I may add; the testimony she
      just offered is way outside the scope of what was included in the
      report she submitted to [prior counsel] on April 9th of 2021.

N.T., 3/3/22, at 3.16–3.18.

      The trial court instructed Ms. Bowman to refrain from providing opinion

evidence until she was qualified. Id. at 3.19. The court qualified Ms. Bowman

to testify as an expert on victim responses and behaviors but advised that

further medical testimony would exceed the scope of her expertise. Id. at

3.23–3.24. Ms. Bowman testified without further objection. Id. at 3.25–3.50.

      The Commonwealth then called Corporal Reynolds to testify about his

investigation, which included a three-hour recorded interview of Merringer on

April 15, 2019. Id. at 3.77. Corporal Reynolds summarized his training in

criminal investigation, including courses on interviews and interrogations. Id.

at 3.55–3.56. He explained that an interview and an interrogation share the

purpose of obtaining information.     Id. at 3.78–3.80.    Corporal Reynolds

described how the police observe an interview subject’s baseline verbal and

non-verbal responses and then proceed to an interrogation phase, in which

they might observe different “stressors.” Id. at 3.80–3.81; see id. at 3.110

(explaining that shaking one’s head side-to-side is “a stressor. It’s a non-

verbal behavior, characteristic”).

      The Commonwealth played portions of Merringer’s interview for the jury.

Before each clip, Corporal Reynolds testified what would occur, including his

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observations about Merringer’s phrasing, pacing, demeanor, and posture.

Prior to the fourth clip, Merringer objected to Corporal Reynolds’ testimony:

      [The ADA:] Corporal, moving to the next segment[,] what is the
      jury about to see?

      A. So [] this next portion that you’re going to see, prior to this, I
      gave the Affidavit of Probable Cause to the defendant and had him
      read it, took him approximately nine minutes to read.

            After [] reading the affidavit, [he] sits back in his chair and
      he crosses his leg; his posture closes off; he takes his glasses off
      again and starts rubbing his eyes. These are non-behavioral -- or
      non-verbal behavior stuff that we see.

            I ask him about the pornography in different parts of the
      house. He denies that. He does admit to having a paddle, but he
      denies -- he denies -- he says, [“]I don’t think I ever used it[,] to
      tell you the truth,[”] which is an embellishment, and we see
      embellishments. And embellishments are words o[r] phrase[s]
      that are used to try to give credence or --

      [Defense counsel]: Your Honor, I’m going to object to testimony
      essentially trying to distinguish or dissect what Mr. Merringer’s
      words are. The video is here. The video speaks for itself. The
      jury can judge credibility, that’s what they’re here for. But for
      [Corporal Reynolds] to try to dissect embellishments and the way
      [Merringer] delivers his words is outside the scope of what his
      investigative skills are.

      THE COURT: I think the jury will be able to judge whether they
      agree or disagree with the testimony given.

            So the objection is overruled.

      [Corporal Reynolds]: I had a conversation about -- we talked
      about his work and how hard he worked. And I’m still trying to
      build rapport with him and develop themes that I can use later to
      try to relate to him.

            And I asked him again, “Why would the kids make this up?”
      And his response was, “I wish I could tell you that.” Again offers
      no motive. He discussed his childhood. He describes how he was
      abused by his father. He talks about how he would work a lot to
      not be home to avoid the abuse. I offered that Amanda did the

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       same thing to him, and there is some reaction, there is some
       nervous activity there. So I’ll let you look at that.

Id. at 3.98–3.99.

       The Commonwealth played the clip for the jury.        Before other clips,

Corporal Reynolds continued to preview when Merringer would add an

“embellishment” or display non-verbal behaviors. Id. at 3.110–3.112, 3.115,

3.124, 3.126, 3.129–3.132.              After the last clip,1 Corporal Reynolds

summarized the interview:

       [The ADA:] At the end of the day, did you get a confession from
       [Merringer]?

       A. No.

       Q. Based on your training and experience; did he display any signs
       of deception to you?

       A. Yes.

       Q. What were they?

       A. Like I described throughout, before we watched the different
       clips, couldn’t sit still; crossing his arms and legs; constant
       nodding; the embellishment; just everything, everything that I
       discussed before each clip.

Id. at 3.136–3.137.2
____________________________________________

1 The last clip ended with another officer asserting that “kids don’t make that

stuff up,” mentioning Merringer’s non-verbal behavior, and declaring: “You did
something wrong. We know that.” N.T., 3/3/22, at 3.133–3.135.
2 The Assistant District Attorney spoke in closing arguments about Corporal

Reynolds’ interview of Merringer:

       You know, Corporal Reynolds had you look at a number of things
       during that interview about body language.          The defendant
       fidgeting, scratching his head, taking his glasses on and off. . . .
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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        The jury found Merringer guilty of all 33 counts charged. On June 8,

2022, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 25 to 50 years of

imprisonment.       Merringer filed a timely post-sentence motion and two

supplemental post-sentence motions.            The trial court heard argument on

September 22, 2022. On November 14, 2022, it entered an opinion and order

denying Merringer’s post-sentence motions. Merringer timely appealed. He

and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure

1925.

        Merringer presents four issues for review:

        1. Was it error to deny [Merringer’s] Motion for Arrest of
           Judgment based upon a violation of his right to a speedy trial
           as protected by the Constitutions of the United States and
           Pennsylvania?

        2. Was it error to deny [Merringer’s] Motion for New Trial based
           on his trial objection to Jo Ellen Bowman’s testimony, as set
           forth in the second supplemental post-sentence motion?

        3. Was it error to deny [Merringer’s] Motion for New Trial based
           upon his trial objection to Cpl. Reynolds’ improperly admitted
           opinion testimony concerning [Merringer’s] vocal mannerisms,
           as set forth in the second supplemental post-sentence motion?

        4. Did cumulative error accrue in this matter to [Merringer’s]
           prejudice?

____________________________________________

              Corporal Reynolds is one of the best in the business. Top
        notch. Even defense counsel conceded that. He has had the
        training.   He’s had the experience.          He knows when
        someone is not being truthful. And I’m telling you, ladies and
        gentlemen, this man, not truthful. Not truthful in the least.

N.T., 3/4/22, at 4.115 (emphasis added).

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Merringer’s Brief at 3 (issues reordered).

                  1. Constitutional Rights to a Speedy Trial

      We address Merringer’s speedy trial issue first because if it is successful,

it results in discharge. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Colon, 87 A.3d 352,

361 (Pa. Super. 2014).      Merringer argues that although time calculations

under Pennsylvania’s speedy trial rule were suspended due to the COVID-19

pandemic, the delay in prosecuting him nevertheless violated his underlying

constitutional rights to a speedy trial.

      The federal Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the

accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” U.S. Const. amend.

VI. Likewise, the Pennsylvania Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal

prosecutions, the accused hath a right . . . in prosecutions by indictment or

information, [to] a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage.”

Pa. Const. art. I, § 9.

      The Supreme Court of the United States set out four criteria to be

balanced in assessing whether a pretrial delay violated a defendant’s Sixth

Amendment right to a speedy trial: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason

for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and

(4) prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).

The same test applies to a speedy trial claim under Article I, Section 9. See

Commonwealth         v.   DeBlase,     665   A.2d    427,   432    (Pa.   1995);

Commonwealth v. Hailey, 368 A.2d 1261, 1264 (Pa. 1977) (listing cases

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applying the Barker factors to a Pennsylvania constitutional claim; rejecting

an argument that the Article I, Section 9 requires anything more).

      Regarding the fourth Barker factor, our Supreme Court has instructed

that prejudice may be presumed upon a showing that the government was

negligent in bringing the accused to trial. DeBlase, 665 A.2d at 437 & n.8

(analyzing Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992)).            However,

where the Commonwealth is not at fault for the delay, the defendant must

prove specific prejudice, which includes “(1) impairment of witness[es]’

memories; (2) loss of evidence; (3) loss of witnesses; or (4) other specifically

articulable facts representing a substantial interference with his ability to

conduct a defense.” Id. at 438 (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S.

307, 321–22 (1977)).

      Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600 (previously Rule 1100) is

intended to “give substance to the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial

for criminal defendants.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 409 A.2d 308, 310

(Pa. 1979) (citing Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 297 A.2d 127, 133 (Pa.

1972)). A speedy trial analysis “mandates a two-step inquiry:” first, whether

the delay violated Rule 600, and if it did not, then second, whether it violated

the constitutional guarantees of a speedy trial. Colon, 87 A.3d at 356–57

(quoting DeBlase, 665 A.2d at 431).

      Here, the trial court found that the delay in bringing Merringer to trial

did not violate Rule 600. Trial Court Opinion, 11/14/22, at 11–12. The trial

court then found no constitutional violation based on the Barker factors:

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           Here, the length of the delay [between the filing of the
     complaint and commencement of trial] was 1,050 days. The
     length of the delay is sufficient to trigger further inquiry. See
     Commonwealth v. Africa, 569 A.2d 920, 923 (Pa. 1990) (delay
     of twenty-seven months between arrest and trial was sufficient to
     trigger further inquiry. Thus, we must consider the remaining
     factors.

            The reason for the delay weighs in the Commonwealth’s
     favor. The primary reason for delay was the suspension of jury
     trials due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Such a delay is outside of
     the Commonwealth’s control. Next, [Merringer] asserted his
     rights by twice objecting to Commonwealth continuances.
     However, the Commonwealth’s continuances and [Merringer’s]
     objections were during the COVID-19 pandemic when jury trials
     had not yet resumed.

           The final factor is prejudice to [the defendant].

              The fourth Barker factor, prejudice to the defendant,
        must be assessed within the context of those interests which
        the speedy trial right protects: (1) preventing oppressive
        pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the accused’s anxiety
        and concern; and (3) limiting the impairment of the defense.
        The last consideration, impairment of or prejudice to the
        defense, represents the most serious of these three
        concerns, because the inability of a defendant adequately to
        prepare his case for trial skews the fairness of the entire
        system.

     DeBlase, 665 A.2d at 436 (internal citations omitted).

            Here, [Merringer] was not incarcerated while he awaited
     trial. Most importantly, [Merringer] has not alleged[] that the pre-
     trial delay impaired his defense. There is no evidence that
     [Merringer] changed his defense or that defense evidence was lost
     due to the pre-trial delay. Therefore, the fourth Barker factor
     does not weigh in [Merringer’s] favor.

           None of the Barker factors weigh heavily in favor of finding
     that the pretrial delay violated [Merringer’s] constitutional right to
     a speedy trial. Furthermore, we see no reason to conclude that
     the delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic was prohibited by
     the Sixth Amendment. Therefore, [Merringer’s] claim that the
     pretrial delay violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial fails.

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Trial Court Opinion, 11/14/22, at 13–14 (citations altered).

      We agree with the trial court that the delay in prosecuting Merringer’s

case did not violate his constitutional rights to a speedy trial.        Notably,

Merringer has not suggested, under the facts of his case, how the

Commonwealth was negligent in bringing him to trial or the delay caused him

prejudice. See DeBlase, 665 A.2d at 438. Rather, Merringer was able to

examine witnesses about inconsistencies in their memories and to present

witnesses in his defense.    Because Merringer has only generally asserted

prejudice, the Barker factors weigh against him, and his constitutional

challenge fails.

               2. Expert Testimony About Child Sexual Abuse

      Merringer argues that the trial court should have granted a new trial

because Jo Ellen Bowman testified outside the scope of her expertise and

beyond statutory authorization. During questioning on her qualifications, Ms.

Bowman opined that a lack of medical evidence does not mean that

penetration and sexual assault did not occur, and the trial court interjected to

limit her from giving opinions before she was qualified. Merringer noted that

Ms. Bowman testified outside the scope of a letter that had been provided to

defense counsel. The trial court subsequently denied Merringer’s motion for

a new trial on this basis.

      This Court reviews a trial court’s evidentiary rulings, including rulings on

the admissibility of expert testimony, for an abuse of discretion. L.L.B. v.

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T.R.B., 283 A.3d 859, 865 (Pa. Super. 2022). Likewise, we review a trial

court’s denial of a post-sentence motion for a new trial for an abuse of

discretion.   See Commonwealth v. Perrin, 291 A.3d 337, 342–43 (Pa.

2023). “An abuse of discretion is more than merely an error of judgment but

is rather the result of an error of law or is manifestly unreasonable or the

result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Section 5920 of the Judicial Code allows for expert testimony in certain

proceedings, including criminal prosecutions for sexual offenses. 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 5920(a)(1), (2)(ii). The statute provides:

      (1) In a criminal proceeding subject to this section, a witness may
      be qualified by the court as an expert if the witness has specialized
      knowledge beyond that possessed by the average layperson
      based on the witness’s experience with, or specialized training or
      education in, criminal justice, behavioral sciences or victim
      services issues, related to sexual violence …, that will assist the
      trier of fact in understanding the dynamics of sexual violence …,
      victim responses to sexual violence … and the impact of sexual
      violence … on victims during and after being assaulted.

      (2) If qualified as an expert, the witness may testify to facts and
      opinions regarding specific types of victim responses and victim
      behaviors.

      (3) The witness’s opinion regarding the credibility of any other
      witness, including the victim, shall not be admissible.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5920(b)(1)–(3).

      Here, Merringer does not explain how Ms. Bowman’s testimony about

the significance of medical evidence exceeds the bounds of Section 5920.

Rather, Ms. Bowman mentioned medical examinations generally while

explaining her training and experience under Section 5920(b)(1). When the

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trial court believed that Ms. Bowman was starting to give opinions, it

interjected and cautioned the prosecution not to get into opinions until she

was qualified. This was a proper exercise of discretion.

      Additionally,   when   Merringer   believed   Ms.   Bowman’s     testimony

exceeded her report, we note that he indicated as much but never formally

objected or requested a curative instruction. The trial court then agreed with

Merringer that further medical testimony would exceed the scope of Ms.

Bowman’s expertise. This ruling, too, was within the sound discretion of the

trial court.

      In its opinion, the trial court noted that Ms. Bowman’s statement was

substantially similar to testimony from Barbara Pyle, who the Commonwealth

had called on the second day of trial. Nurse Pyle had explained that, especially

in delayed reports of sexual abuse, physical evidence is not common. The

trial court concluded that Ms. Bowman’s statement was merely cumulative of

other admissible evidence, so any error was harmless. It therefore denied

Merringer’s post-sentence motion for a new trial based on Ms. Bowman’s

testimony. Trial Court Opinion, 11/14/22, at 17–18.

      We discern no abuse of discretion in this post-trial ruling. The trial court

was free to consider Ms. Bowman’s statement in the context of all the evidence

at trial, including Nurse Pyle’s testimony. Thus, the trial court’s conclusion

that any error in allowing Ms. Bowman’s testimony was harmless was

supported by the record. Its decision to deny Merringer’s motion for a new

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trial   was not    the    product   of bias,    ill-will, or   prejudice;   manifestly

unreasonable; or a misapplication or overriding of the law. This issue fails.

                  3. Lay Testimony About Signs of Deception

        Merringer argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a

new trial based on testimony from Corporal Reynolds. Like the previous issue,

we review this claim for an abuse of discretion. L.L.B., supra; Perrin, supra.

        Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence 701 and 702 provide the framework for

when lay witnesses and expert witnesses may give opinion testimony. First,

Rule 701 provides that a lay witness may give opinion testimony only when

three criteria are met.

        If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form
        of an opinion is limited to one that is:

              (a) rationally based on the witness’s perception;

              (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony
              or to determining a fact in issue; and

              (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
              knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.

Pa.R.E. 701.

        Our Supreme Court has observed that the first and second criteria

outlined in Rule 701 are “self-explanatory, in that they simply require that a

witness’s opinion testimony be based upon personal knowledge and be helpful

to the jury in understanding the witness’s testimony or a fact at issue.”

Commonwealth v. Jones, 240 A.3d 881, 889 (Pa. 2020). However, as the

high court emphasized, lay witnesses are precluded from giving “opinion

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testimony based upon scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge that

falls within the realm of expert opinion testimony as outlined by Rule 702.”

Id. at 889–90.

      Rule 702, in turn, provides the requirements for testimony by expert

witnesses as follows:

      A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
      experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
      opinion or otherwise if:

            (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
            knowledge is beyond that possessed by the average
            layperson;

            (b) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
            knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the
            evidence or to determine a fact in issue; and

            (c) the expert’s methodology is generally accepted in the
            relevant field.

Pa.R.E. 702.

      In discussing this rule, the high court has “explained that expert

testimony is permitted only as an aid to the jury when the subject matter is

distinctly related to a science, skill, or occupation beyond the knowledge or

experience of the average layman.”         Jones, 240 A.3d at 890 (citation

omitted). It recognized that the standard for qualifying as an expert “is a

liberal one[;] the witness need only have any reasonable pretension to

specialized knowledge on the subject matter under investigation and the

weight to be given to the expert’s testimony is for the factfinder.” Id. Finally,

it has noted that expertise may be acquired by experience or through formal

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education. Id. 889–90 (Pa. 2020) (some citations, quotations, and brackets

omitted).

      In Jones, the supreme court directly addressed whether opinion

testimony by a police officer requires the officer to be qualified as an expert.

There, the defendant was charged with sexual offenses against his child. Id.

at 884. The Commonwealth presented testimony from a detective who had

interviewed the child; the detective said that he had investigated hundreds of

child sexual assault cases. Id. at 884–85. The Commonwealth then asked:

“And in your training and experience, Detective, do kids often have trouble

remembering each and every time when this is an ongoing incident?” Id. at

885. Over objection, the detective stated that they do; he also agreed that in

his training and experience, victims have trouble recalling details from every

incident and often confuse the timing of incidents. Id.

      The Supreme Court held that this opinion testimony “was based upon

scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule

702” because the detective had testified based on his training and experience

in investigating sexual assaults. Id. at 890. The court recognized that Rules

701 and 702 do not preclude a police officer from testifying both as a lay

witness and an expert witness.     Id. at 890–91 (adopting the reasoning of

Commonwealth v. Huggins, 68 A.3d 962 (Pa. Super. 2013)). An officer’s

testimony is lay opinion under Rule 701 “if it is limited to what he observed or

to other facts derived exclusively from a particular investigation.” Id. at 890

(citation and alterations omitted).    By contrast, the officer “testifies as an

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expert when he brings the wealth of his experience as an officer to bear on

those observations and makes connections for the jury based on that

specialized knowledge.”    Id. (citation and alterations omitted).    As the

detective in Jones had given opinions based on specialized knowledge derived

from his training and experience, his testimony was not admissible without

proper qualification as an expert. Id. at 891. The admission of this testimony

without proper foundation mandated a new trial. Id.

      Here, the trial court reasoned that Corporal Reynolds’ testimony did not

require qualification as an expert, and that Jones was distinguishable:

            We find that Corporal [Reynolds’] testimony was permissible
      lay witness testimony. Corporal [Reynolds’] testimony was based
      on his own observations of [Merringer] during the interrogation,
      rather than on any scientific, technical or other specialized
      knowledge. Corporal Reynolds never expressed an opinion as to
      whether [Merringer] was being truthful. Rather, he testified that
      [Merringer] displayed signs of deception during the interrogation.
      The distinction is subtle but important. Corporal Reynolds merely
      highlighted his perception of [Merringer’s] verbal and non-verbal
      responses for the jury to consider in light of their own common
      knowledge, experience and understanding. Corporal Reynolds
      never represented that his conclusions were based on a degree of
      scientific certainty.

             [Unlike the testimony in Jones that was not within the
      average layperson’s knowledge base,] Corporal [Reynolds]
      testified about his own personal observations. His personal
      observations were within the average layperson’s knowledge base
      and thus not subject to expert qualification.               See
      Commonwealth v. Boczkowski, 846 A.2d 75, 97 (Pa. 2004)
      (lay witness testimony that the defendant was “serious” when he
      made an inculpatory statement to him was permissible lay witness
      testimony about the defendant’s demeanor because it was within
      the realm of common knowledge and based on personal
      observation).    Therefore, [Merringer’s] argument that he is

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      entitled to a new trial because of Corporal [Reynolds’] testimony
      is without merit.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/14/22, at 19–20.

      We conclude that the trial court misapplied the law in finding that

Corporal Reynolds’ statements were permissible lay testimony.           Corporal

Reynolds did not just give observations from his interview of Merringer but

also used the wealth of his experience as an investigator to interpret those

observations and connect them for the jury based on his specialized

knowledge. Jones, 240 A.3d at 890. The Commonwealth established that

Corporal Reynolds had been trained in criminal investigation, specifically in

interviews and interrogations. Corporal Reynolds previewed for the jury what

Merringer said in a clip of his interview, and then he testified that Merringer’s

wording was “an embellishment.” He continued to describe Merringer’s verbal

and non-verbal behaviors before each clip. After the clips, Corporal Reynolds

testified that based on his training and experience, these were all signs

of deception.

      Like in Jones, the officer’s interpretations of Merringer’s words and

behavior went beyond merely describing his own personal observations. The

inquiry is not whether Corporal Reynolds stated outright that Merringer was

being untruthful. Rather, it is whether in giving his testimony—that Merringer

displayed signs of deception—he relied on his training and experience as an

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officer and exceeded the knowledge base of an average lay juror.3

Considering Corporal Reynolds’ background and specialized knowledge, his

descriptions of Merringer’s words and behavior should have been subject to

his qualification as an expert witness.        Jones, 240 A.3d at 891.   Because

Corporal Reynolds was not qualified as an expert at trial, it was error to allow

such testimony.

       As in Jones, this error was not harmless. Id. at 891–92. This Court

may address sua sponte whether an error was harmless. Commonwealth v.

Hamlett, 234 A.3d 486 (Pa. 2020). We do so here because if the error was

harmless, a new trial is not warranted. The following passage from Jones

guides our analysis:

       This case involved competing narratives about whether or not
       various sexual assaults occurred, making credibility a central
       issue. Whether intentional or unintentional, the Commonwealth’s
       emphasis on [the detective’s] training and experience prior to
       eliciting testimony concerning common victim behavior in
       response to sexual abuse likely signaled to the jury that he was
       qualified to offer such a response. As a result, the jury was able
       to draw an inference that the victim’s behavior in this case was
       consistent with similarly situated victims, without any of the
       heightened reliability concerns that accompany expert testimony.
____________________________________________

3 We do not hold that this subject always requires specialized knowledge.    A
useful comparison is Commonwealth v. Boczkowski, 846 A.2d 75 (Pa.
2004), cited by the trial court. There, a fellow inmate said the defendant was
“serious” when he made an inculpatory statement. Id. at 97. The inmate’s
impression of the defendant’s demeanor, which was not purported to rely on
any specialized training or experience, was admissible as lay testimony. Id.
Here, unlike in Boczkowski, Corporal Reynolds’ conclusion that the behaviors
he observed were signs of deception was based on his extensive training and
experience in the field of criminal investigations and interviews. As such, it
was an expert opinion.

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J-A18037-23

         We therefore cannot say with certainty that the jury did not place
         undue weight on the testimony, despite defense counsel’s attempt
         to neutralize the effect of the testimony on cross-examination by
         eliciting a concession from the detective that an inability to recall
         dates and times of assaults could mean no assault occurred.
         Appellant is therefore entitled to a new trial.

Jones, 240 A.3d at 892.

         Here, A.D. and N.M. testified that Merringer subjected them to years of

sexual abuse, and Merringer and other witnesses denied that abuse occurred.

This case came down to the jury’s judgment of the credibility of these

witnesses. The jury was improperly presented with testimony that, based on

Corporal Reynolds’ training and experience, Merringer showed signs of

deception when he denied abusing his children. The Commonwealth argued

from this conclusion that Merringer was lying, both in his interview and at trial.

Like the high court in Jones, we cannot say that the jury did not unduly weigh

this unqualified expert testimony. Therefore, Merringer is entitled to a new

trial.

                                     4. Conclusion

         In sum, Merringer has not proven that the delay in his prosecution

violated his constitutional rights to a speedy trial. Further, the trial court did

not abuse its discretion by denying Merringer’s motion for a new trial based

on Jo Ellen Bowman’s testimony that the court addressed within its discretion.

         However, Corporal Reynolds testified that based on his training and

experience, Merringer displayed signs of deception, including embellishments,

during a recorded interview. The trial court misapplied the law, and therefore

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abused its discretion, by overruling Merringer’s objection to this testimony and

denying Merringer’s post-sentence motion for a new trial on this basis.

      We therefore reverse Merringer’s judgment of sentence and remand for

a new trial. Based on our relief, we do not reach Merringer’s fourth issue

concerning cumulative error.

      Judgment of sentence reversed.          Case remanded for new trial.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

DATE: 11/6/2023

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