Court Opinion

ID: 9410911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-25 07:00:12.498457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:01.140830
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     IRINA FARQUHAR,                                  DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                          DC-1221-17-0296-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,                          DATE: July 24, 2023
                 Agency.

                   THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Irina Farquhar, Burke, Virginia, pro se.

           Andrea Blake Saglimbene, Esquire, and Jonathan A. Heller, Esquire, Fort
             Belvoir, Virginia, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                      REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     denied her request for corrective action in her individual right of a ction (IRA)
     appeal. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant ’s petition for

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative ju dges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     review and REMAND the case to the Washington Regional Office for further
     adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant was hired as an Operations Research Analyst with the agency
     in Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 8. O n August 23,
     2016, the appellant’s supervisor (the proposing official) proposed removing the
     appellant based on her failure to adequately contribute to the agency ’s mission.
     Id. at 9-23. Six days after the proposal was issued, the appellant filed a compl aint
     with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) alleging that the agency’s proposal to
     remove her and to take a number of other personnel actions against her was in
     retaliation for disclosures she made in 2015 and 2016. IAF, Tab 7 at 4 -19. After
     receiving the appellant’s oral and written replies to the proposal, IAF, Tab 6
     at 21-35, on December 14, 2016, the appellant’s second-line supervisor (the
     deciding official) issued a decision removing the appellant from Federal service,
     effective January 7, 2017, IAF, Tab 1 at 24-26.         On February 2, 2017, the
     appellant filed the instant appeal challenging her removal. IAF, Tab 1. Attached
     to her appeal, the appellant provided a January 26, 2017 preliminary close -out
     letter from OSC that identified her January 7, 2017 removal as one of the
     personnel actions that she contested with OSC. Id. at 27-31. On March 2, 2017,
     the appellant submitted OSC’s final close-out letter dated February 16, 2017.
     IAF, Tab 8 at 4-5.
¶3         After initially determining that the appeal was limited to the appellant’s
     challenge to her performance-based removal, the administrative judge issued an
     order reconsidering his decision and concluded that, based on the additional
     documents the appellant submitted regarding her communications with OSC, the
     appeal would be considered as an IRA appeal, as the appellant requested. IAF,
     Tab 28 at 2-6, Tab 31 at 1-3. In the order, the administrative judge also identified
     the following exhaustive list of disclosures that he would be considering in
                                                                                          3

     adjudicating the IRA appeal:     (1) memoranda and presentations the appellant
     provided to her first-line supervisor and former second-line supervisor from
     March through May 2015, disclosing purported agency program failures;
     (2) information communicated to the agency’s equal employment opportunity
     (EEO) office in September 2015 concerning her attempts to notify her supervisors
     of purported deficiencies with agency programs; (3) information provided to the
     agency’s Inspector General (IG) office in August 2015 and August 2 016
     concerning alleged deficiencies with agency programs; and (4) the appellant’s
     communications with the office of Senator John McCain in September 2016
     regarding her allegations of whistleblower reprisal.     IAF, Tab 31 at 2.         The
     administrative judge also identified the following personnel actions the appellant
     alleged were taken against her in reprisal for her purported disclosures: (1) her
     annual contribution appraisal was downgraded on January 11, 2016; (2) she was
     placed on a Contribution Improvement Plan (CIP) on February 1, 2016; (3) she
     received a proposed removal on August 23, 2016; (4) she received a removal
     decision letter on December 14, 2016, and was removed from Federal service,
     effective January 7, 2017; and (5) she was subjected to a hostile work
     environment by agency officials. Id. at 2-3.
¶4        After holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative judge
     issued an initial decision denying her request for corrective action. IAF, Tab 35,
     Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 17. The administrative judge found that the appellant’s
     first- and second-line supervisors did not know about her purported disclosures to
     the agency’s IG office or the EEO office, or about her communications with the
     office of Senator McCain. ID at 12-14. Consequently, the administrative judge
     concluded that those purported disclosures could not have contributed to either
     official’s decision to take any of the contested personnel actions. ID at 12-14.
¶5        Regarding one of the purported disclosures, a memorandum on Econom ic
     Analysis (EA) Services, which the appellant prepared in February 2015 and
     claimed to have disclosed to her first-line supervisor at various times from March
                                                                                          4

     through May 2015, the administrative judge concluded that, because the
     memorandum was not provided with her Board appeal, he could only make his
     findings based on the parties’ second-hand descriptions of the contents of the
     memorandum as well as the appellant’s characterization of the contents of the
     memorandum to OSC.         ID at 14.    Based on the information provided, the
     administrative judge concluded that the memoranda and other materials the
     appellant provided did not contain protected disclosures but instead reflected the
     appellant’s unsolicited suggestions for ways to improve the agency’s inventory
     organization policies and economic assumptions used in cost-analysis models,
     and similar policy suggestions for ways to improve the economic analysis
     services provided by the agency.       ID at 14-17.      The administrative judge
     concluded that the appellant’s suggested improvements constituted policy
     disagreements and did not evidence any violation of any law, rule, or regulation,
     gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a
     substantial and specific danger to public health or safety, s uch that they would
     rise to the level of protected disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).             ID
     at 14-17. Consequently, the administrative judge denied the appellant ’s request
     for corrective action. ID at 17.
¶6        The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision. Petition
     for Review (PFR) File, Tab 2. The agency has filed a response in opposition to
     the petition for review, and the appellant has filed a reply. PFR File, Tabs 5-6.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     The appellant’s petition for review was timely filed.
¶7        The initial decision was issued on September 7, 2017, and informed the
     appellant that a petition for review must be filed by October 12, 2017. ID at 1,
     17. The appellant filed two submissions with the Washington Regional Office on
     October 11 and 12, 2017, entitled “Reopening an Appeal Dismissed Without
     Prejudice,” and documents entitled “Petition for Review” and “Supplement to
                                                                                        5

     PFR” with the Office of the Clerk of the Board on October 12, 2017, which the
     Clerk’s Office rejected for failing to comply with the Board’s requirements for
     filing a petition for review. PFR File, Tab 1 at 1. The letter from the Clerk’s
     Office instructed the appellant to file a single, perfected petition for review on or
     before October 27, 2017. Id. at 2. The appellant submitted a perfected petition
     for review, which was received by the Clerk’s Office on October 30, 2017. PFR
     File, Tab 2.   With her petition, the appellant submitted a co py of a Federal
     Express receipt reflecting payment for overnight priority delivery with a
     time-stamp showing October 28, 2017, at 12:03 a.m. Id. at 1-2. The petition also
     included a signed statement from a Federal Express employee averring that,
     although the appellant’s petition-for-review package was tendered to the Federal
     Express office at 11:45 p.m. on October 27, 2017, the package was not processed
     and time-stamped until after 12:00 a.m. on October 28th, due to a system error.
     Id. at 1.   In a subsequent motion to accept her petition as timely filed, the
     appellant provided an affidavit explaining that she delivered her petition for
     review to a Federal Express office in Fairfax, Virginia, at 11:45 p.m. on the
     deadline date. PFR File, Tab 4 at 1-2. With her motion, the appellant provided
     additional detail, including an email from the Federal Express Senior Center
     Manager explaining that the label for the appellant’s petition-for-review package
     was printed at 11:50 p.m. on October 27th, but the label had to be reprinted,
     resulting in a package time-stamp dated October 28th. Id. at 7.
¶8         The Board’s regulations state that the date of filing by commercial
     overnight delivery “is the date the document was delivered to the commercial
     delivery service.” 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(l). Here, the record evidence shows that,
     despite the time-stamp on the package, the package containing the appellant’s
     petition for review was timely tendered to the overnight delivery service.
                                                                                        6

Accordingly, we find the petition for review timely filed. 2           See McDavid v.
Department of Labor, 64 M.S.P.R. 304, 306 (1994) (extending to commercial
delivery services the rule that, although the postmark date is ordinarily the date of
filing, a party may establish otherwise by presenting evidence, in the form of an
affidavit or a sworn statement, that, despite the postmark date appearing to
indicate that the submission was filed beyond the deadline, the pleading was
actually placed in the delivery stream by the filing deadline, and thus was timely
filed).

2
  The appellant also has filed an untimely reply to the agency’s response to the petition
for review and requests that the Board find that there is good cause for the filing delay.
PFR File, Tab 6. The agency filed its response to the appellant’s petition for review on
November 20, 2017, and the appellant filed her reply to the agency’s response on
January 16, 2018. PFR File, Tabs 5-6. As the Board noted in the petition for review
acknowledgment order, a reply to a response to a petition for review must be filed
within 10 days after the date of service of the response to the petition for review. PFR
File, Tab 3 at 1; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e). Here, the appellant filed her reply to the
agency’s response on January 16, 2018—over a month and a half after the
November 30, 2017 filing deadline. PFR File, Tab 5.
The appellant requests that the Board accept her untimely filing and has submitted three
letters from two different doctors, dated December 28, 2017, November 28, 2017, and
November 9, 2017, respectively, describing her degenerative hip and eye conditions and
other medical complications related to those conditions. PFR File, Tab 6 at 16-19. In
the last of those letters, dated December 28, 2017, the appellant’s treating physician
notes that the appellant’s condition and the severe pain associated with it would prevent
her from sitting or standing in front of a computer. The letter specifically states that
the appellant would need to be excused from work -related activities, including those
pertaining to her Board appeal, and notes that he would follow up to reevaluate her
condition 45 days later (on or about February 11, 2018). Id. at 17. As such, the
appellant has provided sufficient cause, supported by corroborating medical evidence,
explaining how her illness prevented her from timely filing her reply. See Stribling v.
Department of Education, 107 M.S.P.R. 166, ¶ 8 (2007); Lacy v. Department of the
Navy, 78 M.S.P.R. 434, 437-38 (1998). Accordingly, we have considered the reply. In
the reply, the appellant merely restates her arguments concerning the invalidity of the
CIP and the removal action, and her claim that the administrative judge erred in
determining that she did not make any protected disclosures. PFR File, Tab 6 at 1 -15.
                                                                                             7

      The appellant’s decision to seek corrective action challenging her removal before
      OSC was not a binding election, and the appeal must be remanded and redocketed
      as an appeal of her performance-based removal.
¶9             On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge failed to
      address “all aspects” of her appeal and focused only on her IRA appeal. PFR
      File, Tab 2 at 17. Among other things, the appellant contends that there were
      irregularities in the process the agency used to assess her contributions and that
      her peers and superiors thought highly of her work. 3 Id. at 5-10, 17-18.
¶10            As previously noted, the administrative judge originally determined that the
      Board only had jurisdiction over the appellant’s appeal as a challenge to her
      performance-based removal before later acquiescing to the appellant’s request
      that her appeal be adjudicated as an IRA appeal. ID at 2-3; IAF, Tab 28 at 2-6,
      Tab 31 at 1-3. Because the administrative judge ultimately co ncluded that some
      of the appellant’s disclosures could not have been a contributing factor to any of
      the contested personnel actions and that her other disclosures were not protected
      under the rubric of the whistleblower-protection statutes, he did not discuss the
      details of the challenged personnel actions at length in the initial decision. ID
      at 17.
¶11            Under 5 U.S.C. § 7121(g), an appellant who has been subjected to an action
      appealable to the Board, and who alleges that she has been affected by a
      prohibited personnel practice other than a claim of discrimination under 5 U.S.C.

      3
        The appellant also argues that the electronic record is mislabeled and that the
      recording of the first hearing day, June 26, 2017, is missing from the electronic file.
      PFR File, Tab 2 at 12-14. The appellant’s assertion is correct. The electronic record
      was in fact mislabeled, and the June 26, 2017 hearing recording was missing from the
      electronic file. On June 11, 2018, the Clerk’s Office issued a notice acknowledging
      that Tab 32, the tab identified as containing the hearing testimony from June 26, 2017,
      was mislabeled and instead contained the hearing recording from testimony taken on
      June 27, 2017. PFR File, Tab 7 at 1. The notice also stated that the corrected audio file
      for the testimony from June 26th had been reuploaded to Tab 32 and provided the
      appellant with 35 days to submit a 10-page filing supplementing her petition for review.
      Id. The appellant did not reply to the Board’s notice and did not submit a supplement
      to her petition for review or any additional filings .
                                                                                         8

      § 2302(b)(1), may elect one, and only one, of the following remedies: (1) an
      appeal to the Board under 5 U.S.C. § 7701; (2) a grievance filed under the
      provisions of a negotiated grievance procedure; or (3) a complaint following the
      procedures for seeking corrective action from OSC under 5 U.S.C. chapter 12,
      subchapters II and III.         Corthell v. Department of Homeland Security,
      123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 15 (2016); Savage v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R.
      612, ¶ 17 (2015), overruled in part by Pridgen v. Office of Management and
      Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 23-25; 5 C.F.R. § 1209.2(d)(1). Whichever remedy is
      sought first by an aggrieved employee is deemed an election of that procedure
      and precludes pursuing the matter in either of the other two fora. Agoranos v.
      Department of Justice, 119 M.S.P.R. 498, ¶ 14 (2013). However, an employee’s
      election of remedies under section 7121(g) will not be binding if it is not knowing
      and informed. Id., ¶ 16. When an agency takes an action without informing the
      appellant of her procedural options under section 7121(g) and the preclusive
      effect of electing one of those options, any subsequent election by the appellant is
      not binding. Id., ¶ 17.
¶12         As previously noted, the record reflects that the appellant filed a
      whistleblower reprisal complaint with OSC after she received her removal
      proposal letter but before she received the removal decision letter and before she
      filed her initial Board appeal. IAF, Tab 1 at 9-26, Tab 7 at 4. The record also
      reflects that after       receiving the removal decision letter, the appellant
      supplemented her OSC filings to include her removal as one of the contested
      actions, and OSC’s preliminary and final determination letters reflect that it
      considered the removal decision in its investigation. IAF, Tab 1 at 27 -31, Tab 8
      at 5-6. Additionally, the appellant supplemented the record for her Board appeal
      with a copy of OSC’s final decision letter and further supplemented the record
      with copies of email correspondences with OSC demonstrating that she had
      amended her OSC complaint to include a challenge to the removal decision after
                                                                                             9

      the administrative judge initially determined that she had failed to prove
      exhaustion of her removal challenge with OSC. IAF, Tabs 8, 28, 29-30.
¶13         Nevertheless, there is nothing in the record demonstrating that either the
      agency or the administrative judge apprised the appellant of the preclusive effect
      of her decision to challenge her removal with OSC. The notice of appeal rights in
      the agency’s removal decision letter did not identify OSC as a possible avenue for
      relief and did not identify the preclusive effect of the appellant ’s decision to seek
      corrective action regarding her removal with OSC under subchapters II and III of
      chapter 12 of Title 5, followed by an IRA appeal with the Board. IAF, Tab 1
      at 24-26;   see   5   C.F.R.    § 1201.21(d)(4). 4      Additionally,    although    the
      administrative judge identified the appellant’s removal as an “otherwise
      appealable” action, noted that the appellant’s challenge to her removal would
      have been timely filed as a performance-based action appeal, and identified the
      differences in the burden of proof requirements between IRA appeals a nd
      performance-based actions in his initial ruling on IRA jurisdiction, he did not
      clearly identify that the appellant’s decision to challenge her removal as a part of
      her IRA appeal would preclude a later performance-based action appeal. IAF,
      Tab 28 at 5-6. Accordingly, we find that the appellant’s decisions to file an OSC
      complaint of her removal and a subsequent IRA appeal with the Board were not
      “knowing and informed” because she was not informed by the agency of all of her
      procedural options under section 7121(g) or of the preclusive effect of filing the
      OSC complaint, and there is no evidence in the record indicating that she was

      4
         During the pendency of this appeal, Congress enacted the National Defense
      Authorization Act of 2018 (2018 NDAA). Pub. L. No. 115-91, 131 Stat. 1283 (Dec. 12,
      2017). The 2018 NDAA codified, with respect to an action taken under 5 U.S.C.
      §§ 7503(b)(1), 7513(b)(1), or 7543(b)(1), an agency’s obligation to notify an employee
      of her right to appeal an action brought under one of the applicable sections, the forums
      in which she may file her appeal, and any limitations on her rights that would apply
      because of her forum selection. Section 1097(b)(2), 131 Stat. at 1617 (5 U.S.C. § 7503
      Note). We need not consider the retroactivity of this provision because our finding
      would be the same regardless—the agency did not provide the appellant the requisite
      notice.
                                                                                              10

      informed of such by some other means. 5           IAF, Tab 1 at 24-26; see Corthell,
      123 M.S.P.R. 417, ¶ 17; Edwards v. Department of the Air Force, 120 M.S.P.R.
      307, ¶ 13 (2013); 5 C.F.R. § 1209.2(d)(1).
¶14         Despite her request that her appeal be docketed as an IRA appeal below, on
      review, the appellant appears to challenge the adjudication of her appeal as an
      IRA appeal instead of as a challenge to her performance -based removal. PFR
      File, Tab 2 at 17. Because we conclude that the appellant ’s decisions to file a
      request for corrective action with OSC and a subsequent Board IRA appeal did
      not constitute a knowing and informed election, we must remand the appeal to the
      regional office for redocketing as an appeal of her performance -based removal. 6

      5
        In the prehearing conference summary determining that the appellant ’s appeal would
      be adjudicated as an IRA appeal based on the additional evidence she supplied, the
      administrative judge identified the appellant’s purported disclosures and contested
      personnel actions as the issues in dispute and stated that “additional issues are
      precluded in this appeal.” IAF, Tab 31 at 1-2 (emphasis in original). However, this
      statement did not clearly identify that the appellant’s decision to pursue her appeal as
      an IRA appeal constituted a binding election, did not identify the alternative avenues
      for challenging her removal, and did not state that her decision to proceed with her IRA
      appeal would preclude a later challenge of the agency’s removal decision as a
      stand-alone performance-based action appeal. Id. Consequently, this statement did not
      provide sufficient notice to meet the election notice requirements under 5 U.S.C.
      § 7121(g). See 5 C.F.R. § 1209.2(d).
      6
        Regarding the appellant’s argument that new and material evidence became available
      after the record closed below that warrants a different outcome in her case, the
      purportedly newly discovered evidence appears to relate to the fact that in August 2017 ,
      she was diagnosed with persistent pain, a degenerative hip condition, and a tear in the
      retina of her right eye, and she attaches several letters from her physicians dated in July
      and August 2017 documenting these findings. PFR File, Tab 2 at 10-11, 22-28.
      Although this evidence is “new” in the sense that it was unavailable when the record
      closed below, the appellant has not explained how it is material to the outcome of her
      appeal. See Russo v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980) (noting that
      the Board will not grant a petition for review based on new evidence absent a showing
      that it is of sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that of the initial
      decision). Nevertheless, because we are remanding the appeal for redocketing as an
      appeal of her performance-based removal, the appellant may proffer the medical
      evidence before the administrative judge on remand , and the administrative judge in
      that case may determine its relevance. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.41(b)(10). Similarly, regarding
      the appellant’s argument that the administrative judge incorrectly stated that a copy of
      her memorandum on EA Services dated February 15, 2015, was not included within her
                                                                                           11

      On remand, the administrative judge may incorporate into his new decision the
      prior findings concerning the appellant’s purported whistleblowing activities to
      the extent he finds appropriate.
¶15         The administrative judge in this appeal held a full hearing on the merits of
      the appellant’s IRA appeal and determined that of the six purported disclosures
      the appellant had exhausted with OSC, the agency officials involved in effecting
      the appellant’s removal did not know about three of them (and therefore they
      could not have contributed to either official’s decision to remove the appellant),
      and the remaining purported disclosures identified policy disagreements and did
      not disclose any protected matter.      ID at 12-17.     Although the administrative
      judge must make findings concerning any new affirmative defenses the appellant
      may raise on remand, the administrative judge may, to the extent he finds
      appropriate, incorporate his previous findings concerning the appellant’s existing
      whistleblowing disclosures into any new initial decision. 7

      appeal, the appellant’s assertion is correct. PFR File, Tab 2 at 16. Although the
      appellant does not identify where the memorandum can be found in the record, it
      appears that a copy of it was included within the appellant’s approved hearing exhibits.
      IAF, Tab 27 at 106-10. On remand, the parties will have the opportunity to address the
      contents of the memorandum in the context of the appellant’s performance-based
      removal appeal.
      7
        During the pendency of the petition for review in this case, the U.S. Court of Appeals
      for the Federal Circuit held in Santos v. National Aeronautics and Space
      Administration, 990 F.3d 1355, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2021), that part of the agency’s
      burden under 5 U.S.C. chapter 43 is to justify the institution of the performance
      improvement plan by proving by substantial evidence that the employee’s performance
      was unacceptable prior to that time. Following the issuance of Santos, the Board issued
      Lee v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 11, ¶¶ 15-16, which incorporated
      the changes made by Santos and found that Santos applies to all pending cases,
      regardless of when the events took place. Although the appeal in Santos involved a
      performance-based adverse action under a traditional performance -based appraisal
      system, we find that the court’s reasoning applies equally to the contribution-based
      adverse action taken under the Contribution-based Compensation Appraisal System at
      issue here. IAF, Tab 6 at 18-20. Accordingly, on remand, the administrative judge
      shall accept argument and evidence on whether the appellant’s cont ribution level
      leading up to the contribution-based improvement plan was unacceptable, in addition to
      argument and evidence on the remaining issues. Lee, 2022 MSPB 11, ¶ 17. Any new
      argument or evidence affecting his prior findings as to the appellant’s whistleblower
                                                                                             12

                                              ORDER
¶16         For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Washington
      Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                               /s/ for
                                                   Jennifer Everling
                                                   Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.

      claim should be addressed in the remand initial decision. See Spithaler v. Office of
      Personnel Management, 1 M.S.P.R. 587, 589 (1980) (explaining that an initial decision
      must identify all material issues of fact and law, summarize the evidence, re solve issues
      of credibility, and include the administrative judge’s conclusions of law and her legal
      reasoning, as well as the authorities on which that reasoning rests).