Court Opinion

ID: 9729909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:52:24.945139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:00.465353
License: Public Domain

Pashman, J.,
concurring. I concur in the opinion of the Chief Justice. However, I would address the Port Authority’s assertion that its police jurisdiction extends beyond the Port District and its facilities. Ths issue, which is expressly reserved in the majority opinion, see ante at 341 and n. 5, is coneededly not essential to the resolution of this appeal, but I believe that we should dispel any doubts concerning the breadth of the Authority’s jurisdiction by definitively interpreting N. J. S. A. 32:2-25 to confer statewide powers on its police force. The issue has been fully briefed and argued by the parties, and amicus curiae Port Authority has represented to us that such powers are necessary to perform its various functions.
In addition, there is a public interest in clear delineation of law enforcement responsibilities and powers. The State Police and various municipal police forces have a legitimate interest in knowing whether they will be free to *346leave certain tasks to Authority police officers, or whether they are legally compelled to discharge certain functions themselves outside the Port District. While the Court’s opinion will resolve many of these difficulties because the Port District encompasses a considerable area of the State, see ante at 334, N. J. S. A. 32:1-3, many crimes, such as cargo thefts, necessitate investigative work, and may require arrests in other parts of the State. Rather than utilize the exclusionary rule as a vehicle to define the Authority’s jurisdiction, and thus endanger an otherwise valid arrest or search, of. State v. Bisaccia, 58 N. J. 586 (1971), we should take this opportunity to determine the full sweep of N. J. S. A. 32:2-25.
My willingness to address this issue is reinforced by the thorough canvassing of the statutory history and relevant policy considerations in the Court’s opinion. I have little to add to this treatment. The broad range of Authority activities; the unqualified nature of the statutory language conferring jurisdiction; the long-standing legislative acquiescence to the Authority’s extensive police role; and the desirability of conforming with New York’s practice, all support a liberal reading of N. J. S. A. 32:2-25. The only countervailing factor is the supposed desirability of confining the Authority police to the territorial limits of their employer, in a manner similar to the limitation expressly placed on municipal police by N. J. S. A. 40A:14-152. See State v. Williams, 136 N. J. Super. 544, 548 (Law Div. 1975). Such a restriction would prevent any jurisdictional conflicts which might stem from overreaching by the Authority police. However, the language of N. J. S. A. 32:2-25 contains no comparable limitation on the powers granted to Authority police. Furthermore, this concern for overlapping responsibilities should have little bearing on the scope of the Port Authority’s police jurisdiction since its activities outside the Port facilities are likely to be related to a specialized range of responsibilites whch are far re*347moved from the standard fare of municipal, or even State, police. See ante at 337, 338.
Par more persuasive, in my view, is the grant of jurisdiction enjoyed by Authority police officers in New York, see ante at 340, and the need for uniform treatment in both states. Although New York’s jurisdictional grant is clearly set forth by statute, we should presume, in the absence of any compelling policy reasons, that our own Legislature would welcome a judicial interpretation which encourages common treatment of the Authority police in both states. Cf. Moonachie v. Port of New York Authority, 38 N. J. 414, 425 (1962), in which Justice Prancis said: “Since the Authority is an instrumentality of New York and New Jersey, it is eminently desirable, of course, that the path of judicial decision in the courts of the two States be a common one.”
Consequently, I would reach the issue posed in footnote 5 of the Court’s opinion and hold that N. J. 8. A. 32:2-25 permits the Authority police to exercise “all the powers conferred by law on police officers” throughout the State.
Justice Scheeibee joins in this opinion.