Court Opinion

ID: 9537460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:18:36.165151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:42.199059
License: Public Domain

Holmes, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
While I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion, I respectfully dissent from Syl. ¶ 3 and the corresponding portion of the opinion. Since authoring the opinion of the court in State v. Johnson, 223 Kan. 237, 573 P.2d 994 (1977), I have become increasingly concerned about the practice of law enforcement officers taking statements from persons accused of criminal activity after such person is represented by counsel and the officers have knowledge of such representation. As stated in Johnson, this court recognizes the right of an accused who is represented by counsel to waive his right to counsel and make a statement or subject himself to interrogation without any notice to or advice from his counsel. I am now convinced that this is a violation of a defendant’s constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.
In People v. Tompkins, 45 N.Y.2d 748, 380 N.E.2d 311 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 939 (1979), the New York Court of Appeals considered the problem and stated:
*321“ ‘[0]nce a lawyer has entered a criminal proceeding representing a defendant in connection with criminal charges under investigation, the defendant in custody may not waive his right to counsel in the absence of the lawyer’ (People v. Hobson, 39 NY2d 479, 481). The People concede, as they must, that an attorney representing defendant had entered the criminal proceeding but contend that defendant waived his rights, urging that the waiver was made with the assistance of counsel simply because he had talked with his counsel on the phone. This attenuated interpretation of the meaning of ‘presence of counsel’ is totally unacceptable. Such a theory runs completely afoul of the very basis of the rule enunciated in Hobson (p 484), where we said so clearly that ‘[t]he rule that once a lawyer has entered the proceedings in connection with the charges under investigation, a person in custody may validly waive the assistance of counsel only in the presence of a lawyer breathes life into the requirement that a waiver of a constitutional right must be competent, intelligent, and voluntary.’ If a mere telephone call from counsel would serve this function it would be a short breath indeed.
“The only remaining question is whether defendant’s statement constitutes a spontaneous admission under the rule enunciated in People v. Kaye (25 NY2d 139). Unlike the situation in that case, the defendant here made no ‘spontaneous volunteered admission’ at all. At best, it could be considered only as an attempt to make a spontaneous volunteered waiver of his right to counsel. It is suggested that we expand the Kaye rationale and hold that the making of his waiver thereby purifies the subsequent interrogation. We decline to do so. The Hobson rule is an unequivocal protection of basic rights guaranteed by our Constitution (People v. Hobson, 39 NY2d 479, 483, supra; People v. Arthur, 22 NY2d 325, 328) and once an attorney has entered a criminal proceeding on behalf of a defendant, the defendant in custody may not waive his right to counsel, spontaneously or otherwise, in the absence of the lawyer.” pp. 750-751.
In my view the rule adopted by the New York court as set forth in Tompkins and Hobson is not only preferable but necessary to protect the constitutional rights of an accused. However, based upon the other independent evidence in the case at bar, I would consider the error in this case to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and concur with the ultimate result.
Herd, J., joins the foregoing concurring and dissenting opinion.