Court Opinion

ID: 9571399
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:31:29.34029+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:23.483684
License: Public Domain

Hays, J.
(dissenting) — I am unable to agree with the result announced in the majority opinion, and respectfully dissent.
The majority opinion holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the issues present, and I agree. It is a habeas corpus action. The corpus is the two minor children. They were actually before the trial court at the time of the hearing, this being the basic requirement for jurisdiction to try the issues raised.
The majority opinion also holds that the full faith and credit clause is not a bar to jurisdiction, and with this I agree. Assuming that this clause is applicable, it is not jurisdictional but rather a limitation upon what action the courts may take. The limitation is that there must be a change of conditions since the original decree, before the decree may be ignored. In this case we must assume the fact of changed conditions. In the instant case the full faith and credit clause does,not even constitute a limitation.
However, appellant asserts that on the theory of comity the trial court should have refused to ignore the Missouri decree even in the face of the changed conditions and should leave the question for the determination of the Missouri courts. The majority says no, and with this I disagree.
Comity is the recognition which one Nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive and judicial acts of another Nation, having due regard both to the international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113, 16 S. Ct. 139, 40 L. Ed. 95; In re Fischer’s Will, 119 N. J. Eq. 217, 181 A. 875. It is not a rule of law but of practice, convenience and expediency. It does not declare how a case shall be determined but how it may with propriety be decided.
The polar star in this type of litigation — custody of children —is the best interest of the children. It is clearly not only the right but the duty of the courts of this state to safeguard the rights of its citizens and persons legally within its boundaries. The rule announced in the majority opinion, while apparently in accord with the weight of authority, goes beyond that. It is *332an’ open invitation to divorced parents, who have had their day in a court of competent jurisdiction, to bring by stealth or force into this state, children to whose custody they have been denied and thus avoid the effect of a legal decree. By this rule the status of the child is constantly in doubt, depending upon the views of the eourt before whom it may happen at the time to be. This is not, in my judgment, conducive to the best interest of the child. If the custody, as provided in the decree, is not proper we must assume that the eourt making such order is just as anxious to protect the child as is the court of this state, and that upon proper application a change would be made.
The rule announced in In re Mullins, 26 Wash. 2d 419, 443, 174 P. 2d 790, 803, appears to me to be sound. It is:
“We now hold that the decrees of a court of a sister state must be given full credit in cases in which the court of the sister state has jurisdiction, and that we will not consider the change of custody of children whose custody has been determined by that decree, until such time as the children become domiciled in this state,” and at page 445 of 26 Wash., page 804 of 174 P. 2d: “All reasonings and ideas of fair play and justice demand a holding that a parent acting in disobedience to an order of a eourt cannot seeure a new domicile for his or her child.”
I should like to see this court adopt the domicile rule as a basis for action in this type of eases and believe that thereby, the best interest of the child would be preserved. I would reverse the trial eourt.
WeNNERstRum, J., joins in this dissent.