Court Opinion

ID: 9619195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:23:25.338612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:13:01.737510
License: Public Domain

Benham, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the appeal filed by the Board of Commissioners was not subject to dismissal, and that the Board of Commissioners had the authority to enact ordinances concerning the collection of solid waste and the fees to be charged for that service. I cannot agree, however, that the ordinance in question is not subject to the complaint made by the appellees, that it denies them due process of law by making them liable for the debts of others.
The majority opinion suggests that the ordinance makes the garbage collection fee a charge on the property. If that were so, this would be a different case. However, the ordinance involved in this case recognizes that the solid waste regulations of Atkinson County provide that a garbage can shall be provided for each housing unit, rental unit, and mobile home, and that “every user of a garbage can shall pay the established collection fee.” Nonetheless, the ordinance goes on in its very next section to purport to make owners of rental property liable for the garbage collection fees on their rental property. It may thus be seen that the basic system in Atkinson County is not one that makes garbage collection fees a charge on the property as the majority suggests, but one that links liability for garbage collection fees to the use of a garbage can supplied by the county. That basic system is disturbed by the present ordinance which seeks to make some owners responsible for the debts of other persons who, having used a garbage can, are personally liable for the garbage collection fees.
The situation in this case may be contrasted with that in Bowery Savings Bank v. DeKalb County, 240 Ga. 528 (242 SE2d 50) (1978), where an ordinance established a lien on property and permitted cessation of water service until an arrearage is paid. There, all property served by the water was subject to such liens. On the record before us, only rental properties are made subject to liens for nonpayment. Thus, the county has sought to enforce against the property of one person the personal debts of another. While this Court found no due process violation in the collection system set forth in Bowery Savings Bank, supra, the system questioned on this appeal does what our Constitution forbids in the first paragraph of the first section of the first article: it deprives the owners of rental units of property by leg*6islatively making them liable for debts they did not incur.
Decided October 2, 2000
Reconsideration denied October 20, 2000.
Manley R. Gillis, for appellant.
Sutton & Associates, Berrien L. Sutton, Josephine E. Graddy, for appellees.
Because I am convinced that the ordinance in question violates the guarantee of due process in Art. I, Sec. I, Par. I of the Georgia Constitution, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court to that effect. Accordingly, I must dissent to the majority opinion’s reversal of the trial court’s judgment.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in this dissent.