Court Opinion

ID: 9946083
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 01:09:40.688804+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:25.041776
License: Public Domain

02/28/2024
                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                             AT KNOXVILLE
                              Assigned on Briefs January 2, 2024

                                       IN RE NEVAEH K.

                    Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Sullivan County
                         No. 20-JV-43626 Mark Toohey, Judge
                        ___________________________________

                                No. E2023-01106-COA-R3-PT
                           ___________________________________

This is a termination of parental rights case. Both parents appeal the trial court’s
determination of the existence of statutory grounds to terminate their rights, as well as its
conclusion that termination is in their child’s best interests. The father also challenges
whether the trial court erred in denying his motion for in-person attendance at trial. Upon
our review of the record, we affirm.

  Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Affirmed
                                  and Remanded

ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK G. CLEMENT,
JR., P.J., M.S., and JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., joined.

Samuel G. Hall, Kingsport, Tennessee, for the appellant, Chester H.

Samuel E. White, Kingsport, Tennessee, for the appelee, Faith K.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter, and Clifton Wade Barnett, Assistant
Attorney General, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services.

                                              OPINION

                    BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      Nevaeh K. (“Child”) was born to Faith K.1 (“Mother”) in August 2019. The
Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) was notified of Child’s birth due

        1
         This Court has a policy of protecting the identities of children involved in parental termination
cases and accordingly abbreviates certain names appearing in the Opinion.
to the presence of methamphetamine, amphetamine, and THC in her system. At the time
of Child’s birth, Mother was married. However, Mother’s husband was incarcerated during
the time Child was conceived, and he was subsequently adjudicated not to be the legal or
biological parent of Child.

       Upon discovering she was pregnant, Mother informed Chester H. (“Father”) about
the pregnancy and that she believed him to be the father. At the time Mother initially
informed Father of his potential paternity, he alleges he was under the belief that he was
unable to father children due to a health condition. Nevertheless, the two moved in together,
and Father began offering various forms of support, including purchasing items such as
pregnancy tests and diapers.

       Both before and during the pregnancy, Mother was an addict and used
methamphetamine. Father also used methamphetamine with Mother during the pregnancy.
Mother also sold methamphetamine to earn money. Moreover, Mother testified to using
drugs just days before Child’s birth. Mother’s drug use led to Child being diagnosed post-
birth with Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome (“NAS”). In response to Child’s NAS diagnosis
and positive drug test, DCS filed a petition for temporary legal custody with the Juvenile
Court of Sullivan County (“the trial court”). DCS took custody of Child pursuant to an ex-
parte custody order granting its petition. The Child was later found to be dependent and
neglected by court order entered by the trial court on January 22, 2020.

       Following Child’s birth, Father and Mother ceased their relationship. On November
22, 2019, Father was arrested while in possession of methamphetamine and several
firearms. Father later pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute at least fifty grams of
methamphetamine. Although Father had not been sentenced by the last day of the
termination trial, his impending sentence included a minimum of ten years of
imprisonment, along with fines and an eventual supervised release.

        After Child’s birth, Mother obtained full-time work earning a minimum wage but
did not obtain stable housing, moving weekly. Meanwhile, DCS took several measures to
assist Mother in planning for Child’s safe care, including scheduling meetings,
investigating potential relationship placements, monitoring Child’s status in a resource
home, and developing permanency plans. Prior to the filing of the termination petition, two
permanency plans were created and ratified by the trial court. The trial court ratified the
initial permanency plan on January 3, 2020, and the second amended permanency plan on
August 14, 2020, finding the plans to be reasonable and related to Child’s placement with
DCS.

       The responsibilities outlined in the amended permanency plan remained
substantively the same as the original and required Mother to:

                                            -2-
   1. resolve all pending charges to the point of no pending incarceration and execute a
       release of information associated with her probation;
   2. participate in a clinical parenting assessment with an alcohol and drug component
       and follow all recommendations;
   3. participate in and pass requested drug screens;
   4. complete the NAS class with the Sullivan County Health Department and provide
       DCS with a certificate of completion;
   5. participate in 4.3 hours of visitation per month;
   6. obtain and maintain safe and stable housing;
   7. maintain biweekly contact with DCS;
   8. provide DCS with updated contact information;
   9. obtain and maintain a legal source of income and provide documentation to DCS;
   10. pay $20 a month in child support; and
   11. maintain insurance on Nevaeh when/if it becomes available and provide proof of
       coverage to DCS.

    Mother failed to engage with DCS and the resources it offered in any significant
manner. Moreover, Mother neither visited nor provided financial support for Child. Mother
later alleged that the money she earned working was used to remedy her legal challenges,
as she had multiple outstanding warrants.

       Mother was arrested on December 13, 2019, and remained incarcerated throughout
the entire termination trial. She subsequently pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine, and as to her potential sentence, she testified as follows: “What I have
been told is I am looking at probably around seven years or so.”

       On October 26, 2020, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both
Mother and Father. Following a trial, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence
to support several grounds to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights as well as
clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights
was in Child’s best interests. This appeal followed.

                                  ISSUES PRESENTED

      Father raises four issues for our review on appeal, restated as follows:

      1. The trial court erred in finding that the grounds terminating Father’s
         rights were proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Tenn.
         Code Ann. § 36-1-113;
      2. The trial court erred in finding that the best interest factors set out in Tenn.
         Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i) supporting termination of Father’s parental
         rights were proven by clear and convincing evidence;

                                             -3-
        3. The trial court erred in overruling Father’s motion for in-person
           attendance at trial; and
        4. The trial court erred in granting the termination of Father’s parental rights
           because the petitioner failed to conform with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-
           113(f).

      In addition to requesting that we overturn various statutes associated with the
termination of parental rights,2 Mother raises additional issues for our review on appeal,
which we revise and restate as follows:

        1. The trial court erred in finding grounds for substantial noncompliance by
           Mother with the permanency plan pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-
           113;
        2. The trial court erred in finding that the ground terminating Mother’s
           rights based upon failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume
           custody was proven by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Tenn.
           Code Ann. § 36-1-113;
        3. The trial court erred in finding that the best interest factors set out in Tenn.
           Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i) supporting termination of Mother’s parental
           rights were proven by clear and convincing evidence.

       Consistent with In re Carrington H., we “review the trial court’s findings as to each
ground for termination and as to whether termination is in the child’s best interests,
regardless of whether the parent challenges these findings on appeal.” In re Carrington
H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 525-526 (Tenn. 2016).

                                     STANDARD OF REVIEW

       “A parent’s right to the care and custody of her child is among the oldest of the
judicially recognized fundamental liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clauses
of the federal and state constitutions.” Id. at 521 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,
65 (2000)). However, “[w]ell-defined circumstances” exist “under which a parent’s rights
may be terminated” In re Roger T., No. W2014-02184-COA-R3-PT, 2015 WL 1897696,
at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2015). These circumstances are statutorily defined, and a
court must determine the existence of these statutory grounds by clear and convincing
evidence. In re Andrew L., No. E2022-01465-COA-R3-PT, 2023 WL 5013253, at *2
(Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 7, 2023). After establishing at least one statutory ground relative to

        2
          Mother failed to raise these issues during the trial court proceedings. “It has long been the general
rule that questions not raised in the trial court will not be entertained on appeal[.]” Lawrence v. Stanford,
655 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tenn. 1983). As such, we conclude that Mother has waived these issues on appeal.
Of course, as noted elsewhere, we ultimately review all grounds for termination found by the trial court
against Mother.

                                                    -4-
a parent, a court must determine by clear and convincing evidence that termination of
parental rights is in the child’s best interests. Id. Clear and convincing evidence is
demonstrated when “there is no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the
conclusions drawn from the evidence.” In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002)
(citing Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 n.3 (Tenn. 1992)).

      In light of the heightened burden of proof, we employ the following standard of
review:

      First, we must review the trial court’s specific findings of fact de novo in
      accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). Thus, each of the trial court’s
      specific factual findings will be presumed to be correct unless the evidence
      preponderates otherwise. Second, we must determine whether the facts,
      either as found by the trial court or as supported by the preponderance of the
      evidence, clearly and convincingly establish the elements required to
      terminate a biological parent’s parental rights.

In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).

                                     DISCUSSION

       The trial court determined that several separate grounds existed for the termination
of both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. We first address the propriety of the trial
court’s grounds as to Mother, turning to the grounds related to Father thereafter.

      Abandonment by an incarcerated parent

       The first ground supporting the termination of Mother’s rights is abandonment
pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 36-1-113(g)(1) and 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv). If
a parent “is incarcerated at the time of the filing of a proceeding, pleading, petition, or
amended petition to terminate[,]” the trial court may establish abandonment if the parent
has
      (a) Failed to visit, has failed to support, or has failed to make reasonable
          payments toward the support of the child for four (4) consecutive months
          immediately preceding the parent’s or guardian’s incarceration;
      ....

      (c) Has engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibits a wanton
      disregard for the welfare of the child[.]

                                           -5-
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv).3 The trial court found that Mother failed to visit
Child in the four consecutive months preceding her incarceration, despite the lack of any
legal impediment preventing visitation and knowing Child was in DCS custody. The trial
court next found that Mother failed to provide any monetary support for Child in the four
months preceding her incarceration. Finally, the trial court found that Mother exhibited a
wanton disregard for the welfare of Child by abusing illegal substances that caused Child
to test positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and THC at birth.

       In light of these findings, the trial court concluded that DCS had proven the ground
of abandonment applicable to an incarcerated parent by clear and convincing evidence. We
agree. Upon our review of the record, we highlight that Mother did not visit Child from
August 2019 to December 2019, and she failed to offer any legitimate excuse for her
absence. Moreover, despite working a full-time job earning minimum wage, Mother failed
to provide any form of financial support to Child. Inasmuch as Mother claims she was not
aware she had to financially support Child, we note that she is presumed to have knowledge
of her duty to support. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(H). As to whether Mother
exhibited wanton disregard for the welfare of Child, we note that Mother’s exposure of
Child to illegal and controlled substances while in utero has caused Child significant health
complications, which standing alone could substantiate a finding of wanton disregard. See
In re C.T.S., 156 S.W.3d 18, 25 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (finding wanton disregard on the
basis of a mother’s use of crack cocaine during a period she knew she was pregnant).
However, Mother’s continued illegal use of controlled substances, prior to her
incarceration, further support a finding of wanton disregard.

       As such, we find no error in the trial court’s conclusion that clear and convincing
evidence existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by
failure to visit, failure to support, and wanton disregard for Child’s welfare under
Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv).

        Abandonment through failure to provide a suitable home

       The trial court next made several findings underlying abandonment through failure
to provide a suitable home pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 36-1-113(g)(1)
and 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii)(a-c). In pertinent part, a trial court may support this ground
pursuant to the following statutory provisions:

                (ii)(a) The child has been removed from the home or the physical or
                legal custody of a parent or parents or guardian or guardians by a court
                order at any stage of proceedings in which a petition has been filed in
                the juvenile court alleging that a child is a dependent and neglected

        3
         Unless otherwise noted, all statutes discussed in this Opinion are the versions effective on October
26, 2020, the date DCS filed its petition to terminate.
                                                   -6-
              child, and the child was placed in the custody of the department or a
              licensed child-placing agency;

              (b) The juvenile court found, or the court where the termination of
              parental rights petition is filed finds, that the department or a licensed
              child-placing agency made reasonable efforts to prevent removal of
              the child or that the circumstances of the child’s situation prevented
              reasonable efforts from being made prior to the child’s removal; and

              (c) For a period of four (4) months following the physical removal,
              the department or agency made reasonable efforts to assist the parent
              or parents or the guardian or guardians to establish a suitable home
              for the child, but that the parent or parents or the guardian or guardians
              have not made reciprocal reasonable efforts to provide a suitable
              home and have demonstrated a lack of concern for the child to such a
              degree that it appears unlikely that they will be able to provide a
              suitable home for the child at an early date. The efforts of the
              department or agency to assist a parent or guardian in establishing a
              suitable home for the child shall be found to be reasonable if such
              efforts equal or exceed the efforts of the parent or guardian toward the
              same goal, when the parent or guardian is aware that the child is in the
              custody of the department;

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii)(a-c).

        In the instant case, the trial court granted a petition for removal of Child filed by
DCS, pursuant to DCS’s allegation that Child is dependent and neglected. Furthermore,
the trial court made findings in the ex parte custody order indicating that the circumstances
of the child’s situation prevented reasonable efforts from being made prior to removal.
Finally, the trial court noted several actions DCS took to help Mother find Child a suitable
home in the four months following removal, including investigating placements with
family, addressing the immediate needs of Child, and conducting several meetings intended
to help Mother create a plan for Child’s residence. The trial court found that Mother did
not demonstrate the same level of effort as DCS to find Child a home, and Mother’s failure
to do so, the court found, made it unlikely she could provide Child a suitable home at an
early date.

       For the foregoing reasons, the trial court concluded DCS had proven, by clear and
convincing evidence, the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home
against Mother. We agree. After DCS removed Child, Mother was obligated to make
reasonable efforts in reciprocation to the efforts DCS made to find Child a suitable home.
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(ii)(c). However, Mother refused to provide DCS
with her address or phone number so they could reach her, and she failed to maintain
                                             -7-
regular contact with DCS. In the time between the initiation of this custodial dispute and
Mother’s incarceration, she did not have regular housing. After her incarceration, Mother
testified that she planned to live in a halfway house, but she did not provide assurances that
Child could also live in the halfway house, or if such a residence would be appropriate for
Child.

      As such, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding clear and convincing
evidence to establish termination of Mother’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment
through failure to provide a suitable home.

       Substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan

        Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(2) provides “substantial
noncompliance . . . with the statement of responsibilities in a permanency plan” as a ground
for termination of parental rights. The trial court found that, although DCS created a
reasonable permanency plan, Mother failed to comply with several significant elements of
the plan. For example, Mother did not resolve all pending legal charges, failed to pay
support for Child or Child’s health insurance, failed to maintain safe housing, and failed to
participate in or pass random drug screens, among other issues. In light of these findings,
the trial court concluded, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother was in substantial
noncompliance with the permanency plans.

        We agree. In assessing whether a parent is in substantial noncompliance with a
permanency plan, the significance and extent of the noncompliance are key components of
our analysis. In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d 643, 656 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). As such, minor or
trivial deviations do not substantiate a finding of substantial noncompliance. Id. Here, the
main objectives of the permanency plan centered on eliminating Mother’s drug use,
promoting Mother’s relationship with Child, and increasing Mother’s financial and
housing stability. We highlight that Mother’s drug-related criminal activity did not cease
in response to the permanency plans and eventually led to her incarceration.

       Moreover, Mother did not have stable housing prior to her incarceration and did not
have appropriate housing for Child upon release. We are aware that Mother’s incarceration
likely stymied her ability to gain stable housing. However, under these circumstances,
incarceration is not an excuse for failing to fulfill her parental duties. See In re Aiden R.,
No. E2015-01799-COA-R3-PT, 2016 WL 3564313, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 23, 2016)
(“Her incarceration prevented her from accomplishing other reasonable responsibilities of
the permanency plan, such as obtaining housing and source of support and exhibiting
appropriate parenting skills. We conclude these failures amount to substantial
noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plans.”). In light of such findings,
we conclude the trial court did not err in finding clear and convincing evidence existed to
terminate Mother’s parental rights on the ground that Mother was in substantial
noncompliance with the permanency plan.
                                             -8-
       Persistent Conditions

       Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(3), parental rights may
be terminated if

       (3)(A) The child has been removed from the home or the physical or legal
       custody of a parent or guardian for a period of six (6) months by a court order
       entered at any stage of proceedings in which a petition has been filed in the
       juvenile court alleging that a child is a dependent and neglected child, and:

              (i) The conditions that led to the child’s removal still persist,
              preventing the child’s safe return to the care of the parent or guardian,
              or other conditions exist that, in all reasonable probability, would
              cause the child to be subjected to further abuse or neglect, preventing
              the child’s safe return to the care of the parent or guardian;

              (ii) There is little likelihood that these conditions will be remedied at
              an early date so that the child can be safely returned to the parent or
              guardian in the near future; and

              (iii) The continuation of the parent or guardian and child relationship
              greatly diminishes the child’s chances of early integration into a safe,
              stable, and permanent home[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3). The trial court found that Mother’s use of
amphetamine, methamphetamine, and THC, which precipitated neglect and abuse of Child,
provided the main basis for Child’s removal. Moreover, the trial court determined that these
conditions still persist due to Mother’s unaddressed substance abuse issues, and that there
is little chance these issues will be remedied soon so that the child may safely return home.
Finally, the trial court found that continuation of the parent-child relationship greatly
diminishes the chances of Child’s placement into a safe, stable, and permanent home,
concluding that DCS had proven the ground of persistent conditions by clear and
convincing evidence.

        We agree. It is not disputed that, prior to her incarceration, Mother’s living situation
was heavily influenced by illegal drug use. Although Mother testified to attending a drug
and alcohol program while incarcerated and a desire to avoid drugs and drug use going
forward, the trial court concluded Mother’s testimony concerning her desire to quit using
illegal drugs was not credible. (II, 149.) “[B]ecause trial courts are ‘uniquely positioned to
observe the demeanor and conduct of witnesses[,]’” we see no reason to question the trial
court’s credibility assessment in this matter. Kelly v. Kelly, 445 S.W.3d 685, 692 (Tenn.
2014). As such, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding clear and convincing
                                              -9-
evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the ground of persistent conditions.

       Severe Child Abuse

        Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(4), parental rights may
be terminated upon a finding of severe child abuse, as it is defined in Tennessee Code
Annotated section 37-1-102(b)(27). The trial court found that Mother committed severe
child abuse by exposing Child to substance abuse in utero, which caused Child to suffer in
the womb and continue to suffer presently. The trial court concluded that DCS had proven
severe child abuse by clear and convincing evidence. We agree. This Court has previously
held that “severe child abuse can result from prenatal drug use.” In re Benjamin M., 310
S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). Here, Child tested positive for amphetamine,
methamphetamine, and THC upon birth, suffering immediate and ongoing health issues as
a result. Given that Mother last used illegal drugs within days of Child’s birth, we agree
with the trial court’s finding that Mother knew or should have known that her substance
abuse could have harmed Child. In light of these facts, we conclude the trial court did not
err in finding clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights
on the ground of severe child abuse.

       Failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody

        Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(14), parental rights may
be terminated upon a finding that parent has “failed to manifest, by act or omission, an
ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial
responsibility of the child, and placing the child in the person’s legal and physical custody
would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the
child[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). Our Supreme Court has recently discussed
the analysis underpinning this ground, stating

       [t]wo prongs must be proven by clear and convincing evidence to terminate
       parental rights under this statute: (1) the parent or legal guardian failed to
       manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical
       custody or financial responsibility of the child; and (2) placing the child in
       the parent’s legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm
       to the physical or psychological welfare of the child.

In re Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d 659, 674-75 (Tenn. 2020). Our Supreme Court also clarified
that the statute

       places a conjunctive obligation on a parent or guardian to manifest both an
       ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or
       financial responsibility for the child. If a person seeking to terminate parental
       rights proves by clear and convincing proof that a parent or guardian has
                                             - 10 -
       failed to manifest either ability or willingness, then the first prong of the
       statute is satisfied.

Id. at 677.

      The trial court’s order concluded both prongs were established and that DCS had
proven the ground by clear and convincing evidence. Based on the record transmitted to us
on appeal, we agree with the trial court’s determination.

        On appeal, Mother argues that the trial court erred in not permitting her adequate
time to demonstrate meaningful progress and, as we construe her argument, that her
testimony demonstrates a willingness to assume custody. However, willingness alone is
not enough. As noted above, the first prong of the statute places a conjunctive obligation
on a parent, and DCS may satisfy the first prong by demonstrating Mother’s inability to
assume custody by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 674-77. As to her ability to assume
custody, we emphasize that Mother continued to engage in illegal drug-related activities
after Child’s birth, which eventually led to her incarceration. Moreover, Mother’s
testimony reflects that she plans on staying in a halfway house for an indeterminate amount
of time after her release from prison. Most strikingly, Mother testified that she believes it
is not in Child’s best interest to come into her custody immediately upon her release.

       As to the second prong, we find our previous discussion of substantial harm to be
helpful:

       By way of illustration, forcing a child to begin visitation with a near-stranger
       would make psychological harm sufficiently probable. Or placing a child
       with a parent who engaged in repeated criminal conduct that required
       incarceration would put a child at risk of substantial physical or
       psychological harm. And parents with a significant, recent history of
       substance abuse, mental illness, and/or domestic violence could lead to a
       conclusion of a risk of substantial harm.

In re Brianna B., No. M2019-01757-COA-R3-PT, 2021 WL 306467, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Jan. 29, 2021) (internal citations omitted). Mother does not have a meaningful relationship
with Child. Moreover, Mother has demonstrated a history of repeated criminal conduct,
which we conclude presents a substantial risk to the welfare of Child. For the foregoing
reasons, we conclude the trial court did not err in finding clear and convincing evidence
existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the ground of failure to manifest an ability
and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of Child.

       Termination of a putative father’s parental rights

       As to the termination of Father’s rights, the trial court made findings pursuant to
                                          - 11 -
Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(9) which provides guidance in the
termination of parental rights of a putative father. In pertinent part, the statute provides as
follows:

       (9)(A) The parental rights of any person who, at the time of the filing of a
       petition to terminate the parental rights of such person, or if no such petition
       is filed, at the time of the filing of a petition to adopt a child, is the putative
       father of the child may also be terminated based upon any one (1) or more of
       the following additional grounds:
               ....

       (ii) The person has failed, without good cause or excuse, to make reasonable
       and consistent payments for the support of the child in accordance with the
       child support guidelines promulgated by the department pursuant to § 36-5-
       101;

       (iii) The person has failed to seek reasonable visitation with the child, and if
       visitation has been granted, has failed to visit altogether, or has engaged in
       only token visitation, as defined in § 36-1-102;

       (iv) The person has failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume
       legal and physical custody of the child;

       (v) Placing custody of the child in the person’s legal and physical custody
       would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare
       of the child; or

       (vi) The person has failed to file a petition to establish paternity of the child
       within thirty (30) days after notice of alleged paternity, or as required in §
       36-2-318(j), or after making a claim of paternity pursuant to § 36-1-
       117(c)(3)[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9). The trial court made findings concerning all five of the
above grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights. Specifically, it found that Father
failed to make reasonable and consistent payments for Child’s support, without good cause
or reason; that he failed to seek reasonable visitation or visit with Child; that he failed to
manifest a willingness and ability to take custody of Child; that he failed to file a petition
for paternity after notice from Mother; and that placing custody of Child with Father would
pose a risk of substantial harm to Child’s physical or psychological welfare. In support of
these determinations, the trial court found that Father was engaged in illegal drug abuse,
similar to Mother, and that he is presently incarcerated for said actions. The trial court also
determined that Father failed to file a petition within thirty days after receiving notice of
alleged paternity from Mother, that he failed to make proper support payments after
                                            - 12 -
receiving notice, and that he abandoned Mother and Child after Child’s birth.

        Upon our review of the record, we agree with the trial court’s findings. As to the
last of the above grounds, we observe that notice of alleged paternity may be provided by
Mother and may be communicated orally. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(9)(B)(i-ii).
Although Father argues he did not receive notice of alleged paternity until he was
incarcerated, Mother testified that she informed him of alleged paternity while still
pregnant with Child. (V3 pg 58) Even if he had not received notice of his alleged paternity
until DCS sent him a letter of confirmation of paternity in the summer of 2020, Father
never filed a petition to establish paternity at any point.

        As to the remaining grounds, we turn first to whether Father failed to make
reasonable child support payments. Mother and Father testified that Father purchased
various items for Mother during her pregnancy to assist her with the pregnancy. However,
after Child’s birth, Mother and Father ceased their relationship, and Father failed to offer
any more financial support. When DCS confirmed to Father that he was the biological
parent of Child, Father still failed to make child support payments. As such, we conclude
the trial court did not err in finding clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate
Father’s parental rights on the ground of failure to make reasonable and consistent child
support payments.

        We next turn to whether Father failed to visit or seek reasonable visitation with
Child. As aforementioned, Father and Mother ceased their relationship shortly after Child’s
birth. Father did not interact with Mother or Child between that moment and his subsequent
incarceration. Furthermore, he failed to petition the court for visitation until February 2022,
well over a year after the termination proceedings began. Therefore, we conclude the trial
court did not err in finding clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Father’s
parental rights on the ground of failure to visit or seek reasonable visitation with Child.

        The next ground concerns whether Father failed to manifest an ability and
willingness to assume legal and physical custody of Child. Again, we note that Father
willingly left Mother and Child after the pregnancy, despite Mother informing Father that
Child is his progeny. Father only began demonstrating interest in Child after his
incarceration through his participation in the termination proceeding. In light of Father’s
previous voluntary abandonment of child and his current incarceration, we conclude the
trial court did not err in finding clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Father’s
parental rights on the ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume
legal and physical custody.

       Finally, we assess whether placing Child in Father’s legal and physical custody
would pose a risk of substantial harm to Child’s physical or psychological welfare. Father
has displayed a history of criminal conduct that ultimately led to his current lengthy
incarceration. Moreover, Father ingested methamphetamine with Mother, while Mother
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was pregnant. Taken in tandem, the facts demonstrate that Father has participated in
activities that harmed Child, raising serious doubt that Child would be safe in Father’s
custody upon his eventual release from incarceration. Therefore, we conclude the trial court
did not err in finding clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Father’s parental
rights on this ground concerning a risk of substantial harm to Child.

      In conclusion, we find that the trial court did not err in finding clear and convincing
evidence existed to support the termination of Father’s parental rights on all five grounds
provided by Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(9).

       Motion to Appear in Person

       Father filed a motion for in-person attendance, requesting that he be permitted to
personally attend hearings despite his incarceration. The trial court ultimately denied the
motion because Father was in federal custody in North Carolina and in light of the COVID-
19 dangers. Instead, the trial court permitted Father to participate via Zoom throughout the
proceedings. On appeal, Father asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion for
in-person attendance and cites to instances in the record reflecting connectivity issues.

       We review a trial court’s denial of an incarcerated parent’s motion to appear in
person under an abuse of discretion standard. In re Adoption of S.T.D., No. E2007-01240-
COA-R3-PT, 2007 WL 3171034, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2007). Section 36-1-
113(f)(3) provides the trial court broad discretion to fashion the means of permitting an
incarcerated parent to participate in trial, stating, in pertinent part as follows regarding the
incarcerated parent’s right to participate:

       [A]t the discretion of the court, such participation may be achieved through
       personal appearance, teleconference, telecommunication or other means
       deemed by the court to be appropriate under the circumstances[.]

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(f)(3) (emphasis added). We have previously discussed the
applicability of Zoom to this statute, concluding that participation in this matter satisfies
due process requirements. In re Bentley J., No. M2022-00077-COA-R3-PT, 2022 WL
16559454, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2022). Moreover, we concluded then, as we do
now, that Zoom affords an incarcerated parent ample opportunity to participate in the
termination proceedings. Id. As to Father’s cited concerns of connectivity issues, we note
that the record reveals that the trial court took steps to safeguard the parties’ meaningful
participation when issues were brought to its attention. By way of example, on one
occasion when Father expressed that he could not hear, the trial court immediately directed
the guardian ad litem in the case to “get a little closer here and speak up.” The transcript
reflects that questioning of the witness under examination then continued. On another
occasion, the trial court ordered the proceeding continued when Mother was unable to
connect to the hearing through Zoom. These are but a few examples in the record where
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steps were taken by either the court or examining counsel to ensure that the parties could
hear and that the participation by Zoom was meaningful. In light of this and the foregoing
discussion on this issue, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of
Father’s motion to appear in person.

      Notice

       Father argues that he was never provided proper service of DCS’s petition to
terminate his parental rights because he did not receive “official notice[,]” which was
allegedly attached as a part of DCS’s petition to terminate Father’s rights. In assessing
whether notice was properly provided, we first turn to the pertinent statutory language:

      (f) Before terminating the rights of any parent or guardian who is incarcerated
      or who was incarcerated at the time of an action or proceeding is initiated, it
      must be affirmatively shown to the court that such incarcerated parent or
      guardian received actual notice of the following:

               (1) The time and place of the hearing to terminate parental rights;

               (2) That the hearing will determine whether the rights of the
               incarcerated parent or guardian should be terminated;

               (3) That the incarcerated parent or guardian has the right to participate
               in the hearing and contest the allegation that the rights of the
               incarcerated parent or guardian should be terminated, and, at the
               discretion of the court, such participation may be achieved through
               personal appearance, teleconference, telecommunication or other
               means deemed by the court to be appropriate under the circumstances;

               (4) That if the incarcerated parent or guardian wishes to participate in
               the hearing and contest the allegation, such parent or guardian:

                      (A) If indigent, will be provided with a court-appointed
                      attorney to assist the parent or guardian in contesting the
                      allegation; and

                      (B) Shall have the right to perpetuate such person’s testimony
                      or that of any witness by means of depositions or
                      interrogatories as provided by the Tennessee Rules of Civil
                      Procedure; and

               (5) If, by means of a signed waiver, the court determines that the
               incarcerated parent or guardian has voluntarily waived the right to
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              participate in the hearing and contest the allegation, or if such parent
              or guardian takes no action after receiving notice of such rights, the
              court may proceed with such action without the parent’s or guardian’s
              participation.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(f).

        As to Father’s main contention, we emphasize that a court may rely on whether a
parent has actual notice, rather than “official notice.” Upon our review of the record, we
note that Father participated in the trial hearings via Zoom, understanding that the
proceeding would determine whether his parental rights would be terminated. Moreover,
Father was appointed counsel who represented him throughout the proceedings. Under
these circumstances, we conclude that Father had actual notice of the proceeding sufficient
to satisfy Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(f).

       Best Interests

        After establishing separate grounds for the termination of Mother’s and Father’s
parental rights, the trial court analyzed whether termination of their parental rights was in
Child’s best interests pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(i). As an
initial matter, we note that the trial court employed the statutory factors as amended
effective April 22, 2021. Because DCS filed its termination petition on October 26, 2020,
the statutory factors effective March 6, 2020, to April 21, 2021, are the appropriate factors
to employ. See In re Bralynn A., No. M2021-01188-COA-R3-PT, 2022 WL 2826850, at
*9 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 20, 2022) (explaining that the filing date of the termination petition
dictates which version of the statute is employed), appeal denied (Tenn. Aug. 12, 2022).
However, “this Court has held that there was no reversible error when the trial court relies
on the wrong factors because the old factors are essentially contained within the new
factors.” Id. Both Mother and Father admit that the use of the wrong version of the statutory
factors does not constitute reversible error, but nevertheless, they contend that the trial
court would have weighed evidence differently had it used the appropriate factors.

       According to the statute effective March 6, 2020, to April 21, 2021, the statutory
factors regarding a child’s best interests include, but are not limited to, the following:

       (1) Whether the parent or guardian has made such an adjustment of
       circumstance, conduct, or conditions as to make it safe and in the child’s best
       interest to be in the home of the parent or guardian;
       (2) Whether the parent or guardian has failed to effect a lasting adjustment
       after reasonable efforts by available social services agencies for such
       duration of time that lasting adjustment does not reasonably appear possible;
       (3) Whether the parent or guardian has maintained regular visitation or other
       contact with the child;
                                            - 16 -
       (4) Whether a meaningful relationship has otherwise been established
       between the parent or guardian and the child;
       (5) The effect a change of caretakers and physical environment is likely to
       have on the child’s emotional, psychological and medical condition;
       (6) Whether the parent or guardian, or other person residing with the parent
       or guardian, has shown brutality, physical, sexual, emotional or
       psychological abuse, or neglect toward the child, or another child or adult in
       the family or household;
       (7) Whether the physical environment of the parent’s or guardian’s home is
       healthy and safe, whether there is criminal activity in the home, or whether
       there is such use of alcohol, controlled substances or controlled substance
       analogues as may render the parent or guardian consistently unable to care
       for the child in a safe and stable manner;
       (8) Whether the parent’s or guardian’s mental and/or emotional status would
       be detrimental to the child or prevent the parent or guardian from effectively
       providing safe and stable care and supervision for the child; or
       (9) Whether the parent or guardian has paid child support consistent with the
       child support guidelines promulgated by the department pursuant to § 36-5-
       101.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i). In conducting its best interests analysis, the trial court
noted numerous facts supporting the notion that termination is in Child’s best interests,
including the parents’ instability, incarceration, criminal activity, Child’s needs, and
Child’s bond with her foster family. Moreover, the trial court specifically noted that “the
parents have made no change in their conduct or lifestyle.” We find those facts and
considerations similarly persuasive in our own analysis.

        Both Mother and Father have a history of criminal activity related to drug abuse and
trafficking. Indeed, this drug use severely harmed Child while in utero, leading to lasting
health complications.

        Prior to their incarceration, neither Mother nor Father demonstrated financial or
housing stability. Furthermore, neither parent conducted reasonable visitation or
maintained a significant presence in Child’s life, nor did they demonstrate an ability or
willingness to offer Child financial support. Their incarcerations subsequent to Child’s
birth further undermines their potential to offer this kind of support to Child.

       Finally, Child has nearly exclusively known support and care from her foster family,
and there is evidence demonstrating that Child has grown attached to the foster family. To
remove Child from this support structure would doubtlessly have a negative impact on
Child’s welfare.

       In light of the foregoing, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports
                                           - 17 -
it is in Child’s best interests for Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to be terminated.

                                      CONCLUSION

       In light of the foregoing, the trial court’s termination of Mother’s and Father’s
parental rights is affirmed.

                                                           s/ Arnold Goldin
                                                          ARNOLD GOLDIN, JUDGE

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