Court Opinion

ID: 9861086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:40:51.88745+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:10.323093
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE GEOMETER, specially concurring: I agree with the result to which the majority comes. I write separately to address an apparent inconsistency between this case and certain recent supreme court cases. The majority accepts the State’s argument that double jeopardy is no bar to defendant’s prosecution, because the circuit court did not have jurisdiction under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/1 — 1 et seq. (West 2002)) to accept his admission. I agree with this proposition; however, I find the majority’s reliance on In re O.H., 329 Ill. App. 3d 254 (2002), somewhat problematic. Relying on that case, the majority states: “Our legislature may define a justiciable matter in such a way as to preclude or limit the authority of the circuit court.” 375 Ill. App. 3d at 730. This proposition is, on its face, at odds with cases like Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 529-30 (2001), Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 335 (2002), and People ex rel. Graf v. Village of Lake Bluff, 206 Ill. 2d 541, 553 (2003), which hold that, with the exception of administrative review, the jurisdiction of the circuit courts is conferred by the state constitution. In re O.H. was issued about one month after Belleville Toyota and about six months after Steinbrecher, and it acknowledges neither case. In their wake, I think it no longer appropriate to say that “[t]he legislature may define the justiciable matter in such a way as to preclude or limit the authority of the circuit court.” In re O.H., 329 Ill. App. 3d at 258. It is, at the very least, imprecise. Steinbrecher and its kin were civil cases. In Steinbrecher, the supreme court left room for a somewhat different (or additional) set of principles for criminal cases in the following passage: “Quoting a more recent decision, People v. Davis, the dissent asserts that failure to comply with a statute is tantamount to a jurisdictional defect and renders the judgment ‘void.’ 197 Ill. 2d at 547 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow and Kilbride, JJ.), quoting Davis, 156 Ill. 2d at 156 (‘ “the power [conferred by the statute] to render the particular judgment or sentence is as important an element of jurisdiction as its personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction” ’). Initially, we observe that Davis discusses jurisdiction ‘in the context of criminal proceedings.’ Davis, 156 Ill. 2d at 156. Criminal proceedings that involve the power to render judgments or sentences address a separate set of concerns not at issue in the present matter.” (Emphasis added.) Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d at 531-32. Thus, there are actually three potential jurisdictional problems that a court might encounter: (1) personal jurisdiction — or, power over the individual; (2) subject matter jurisdiction — or, the ability to entertain a particular type of case; and (3) the power to render a particular disposition. Indeed, Davis expressly recognizes this: “Some authorities, including this court, have held that the power to render the particular judgment or sentence is as important an element of jurisdiction as is personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction.” Davis, 156 Ill. 2d at 156. Some cases characterize the third as a subspecies of subject matter jurisdiction. See In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 64 (1993) (“Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of the court to adjudge concerning the general question involved [citation], as well as the power to grant the particular relief requested”). Others identify the problem as a court, otherwise having subject matter jurisdiction, acting in excess of its jurisdiction. See Hartt v. Hartt, 397 A.2d 518, 522, 121 R.I. 220, 226 (1979). For the sake of clarity, I will address them separately. It is the third jurisdictional problem that gives us the principle that a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum is void (People v. Brown, 225 Ill. 2d 188, 205 (2007)), and it is the type at issue in this case. Here, there is no question that the trial court had jurisdiction over defendant’s person. Moreover, as the supreme court observed in In re Greene, 76 Ill. 2d 204, 214 (1979), in proceedings under the Act, establishing age is unnecessary to establish the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court, because the juvenile court is simply a division of the circuit court and the circuit court has jurisdiction of all justiciable matters — adult and juvenile. Hence, as a court of general jurisdiction, the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of these proceedings, whether properly brought in juvenile or adult court. All that remains is to consider whether the trial court had the authority to adjudicate defendant delinquent. Section 5 — 130 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5 — 130 (West 2002)) states that the definition of “delinquent minor” contained elsewhere in the Act “shall not apply to any minor who at the time of an offense was at least 15 years of age and who is charged with *** armed robbery when the armed robbery is committed with a firearm.” Thus, the trial court lacked the authority to adjudicate defendant delinquent. Lacking the ability to adjudicate defendant delinquent, the court could not proceed on the normal course enabled by such a finding, such as adjudging defendant a ward of the court. See In re L.H., 102 Ill. App. 3d 169, 171 (1981). The important distinction here is that the trial court did not incorrectly determine that defendant was a delinquent minor when it accepted his admission; rather, under no circumstances, given the statutory scheme, could the trial court make such an adjudication. Simply, the circuit court did not have the “power to render [the] judgment[ ].” Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d at 532. Absent the power to render a judgment and impose any sanctions upon defendant, defendant never was actually in jeopardy during the earlier proceedings.