Court Opinion

ID: 9497675
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:57:12.620985+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:20.901885
License: Public Domain

DISSENT
GILMAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The jury’s verdict reflects its conclusion that there was no “past history” of Pound’s harassment prior to McCombs filing her written complaint on November 25, 1997. From that point forward, there is insufficient evidence for any reasonable juror to find that Meijer’s subsequent response was reckless, indifferent, or unreasonable. Furthermore, even if the compensatory verdict were allowed to stand, the award of punitive damages in this case is totally beyond the pale. I would therefore reverse the district court’s denial of Meijer’s renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law and direct the district court to enter judgment in favor of Meijer.
I. The jury’s determination in favor of Meijer on McCombs’s Ohio common-law sexual harassment claim is fully supported by the evidence
In the present case, the jury was instructed on three sexual harassment charges: a Title VII claim, an Ohio statutory claim, and an Ohio common-law claim. Although the instructions to the jury on the Ohio statutory claim and the Title VII claim were identical, the Ohio common-law claim required proof of a fifth element— that the accused employee had “a past history of harassment about which the employer knew or should have known.” Bell v. Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll, 129 Ohio App.3d 461, 717 N.E.2d 1189, 1193 (1998). Thus, in order to prevail on her Title VII and state statutory claims, McCombs’s burden was limited to proving that Meijer’s response after it received written notice of Pound’s harassing behavior was reckless, indifferent, or unreasonable. See Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs., Inc., 123 F.3d 868, 873 (6th Cir.1997). McCombs’s counsel reiterated this point during closing arguments, advising the jury that if it found that “she never said anything until November,” when McCombs filed her written complaint, but that Meijer failed to respond appropriately, the jury could still properly impose liability on Meijer. By contrast, in order to find for McCombs on her Ohio common-law claim, the jury had to find that a pattern of harassment existed prior to McCombs’s first written complaint in November and that Meijer knew or should have known about this harassment.
That the jury found against McCombs on her Ohio common-law claim of sexual harassment establishes that it did not believe that Pound’s isolated verbal statements to McCombs rose to the level of sexual harassment prior to her written complaint in November. The majority at*363tempts to explain away the jury’s finding by pointing to the fact that the Ohio courts “have not determined a precise definition of ‘past history’ ” as that term is used in the Ohio common-law sexual harassment charge. Maj. Op. at 353-54. They suggest that the jury might have interpreted the instruction — that “McCombs must show that the employee had a past history of gender harassment about which Meijer knew of should have known” — as requiring that McCombs show that Pound had a history of harassing other women prior to his harassment of McCombs. If the jury instruction cited by the majority were the only mention of “past history” before the jury, this argument would have more force. During closing argument, however, McCombs’s counsel explained to the jury that “[ujnder the common law of Ohio we have to show a history. Certainly, May through December is a history, and that’s all that means is that this wasn’t just a one-time thing, that, yes, there’s been a history of this gentlemen over and over and over again from May.” (Emphasis added.)
The jury’s finding against such a history from “May through December” is well supported by the evidence. Despite McCombs’s isolated complaints about Pound’s comments to her between May and November of 1997, her testimony establishes that during this same period of time she “became William[ Poundj’s friend.” McCombs went to Pound’s home on two different occasions in August to help him clean and prepare for the arrival of his new baby. And when the baby arrived in late August, McCombs gave Pound’s wife a baby gift, either dropping the gift by Pound’s home or giving the gift to Pound himself. Pound’s conduct was apparently acceptable to McCombs even into late October, when “he and his kids came over for Halloween.”
McCombs did not use Meijer’s written complaint procedure to call attention to Pound’s conduct until November 25, 1997. Although she had complained orally to Me-ijer personnel on a few occasions prior to this time, she never followed up in writing. Yet McCombs was well aware of Meijer’s written complaint policy because, during this same time period, she used it to file a report against another male coworker whose conduct she considered to be sexual harassment — writing that he would “come up from behind and with both hands, grab my side.”
Even as late as November 23, 1997, when Pound approached McCombs and asked if she could take a break with him, she replied, “If I can, sure.” While the two were walking back from this break, Pound touched McCombs’s buttocks. She later testified that this incident was the triggering event that led her to conclude that Pound’s behavior had finally “crossed the line.” McCombs’s actions and her testimony concerning her friendly relationship with Pound before this incident plainly support the conclusion that McCombs had not expected Meijer to take any action against Pound prior to this time. This reality is reflected in the jury’s decision in favor of Meijer on the Ohio common-law claim of sexual harassment.
II. The jury’s compensatory award in favor of McCombs, based upon Mei-jer’s conduct between November 25, 1997 and December 6, 1997, is not supported by the evidence
In finding for McCombs on her Title VII and Ohio statutory sexual harassment claims, the jury’s award of compensatory damages must have been premised on its determination that Meijer’s response following McCombs’s written complaint was recklessness, indifferent, or unreasonable. See Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs., Inc., *364123 F.3d 868, 873 (6th Cir.1997) (stating that where a eoworker is harassing a fellow worker, “[t]he act of discrimination by the employer ... is not the harassment, but rather the inappropriate response to the charges of harassment”).
McCombs filed her first written complaint against Pound at 10 p.m. on November 25, 1997. The following morning, the day before Thanksgiving, Meijer began its investigation of McCombs’s allegations. Representatives from Meijer’s Labor Relations Department questioned Pound and took a written statement from him. At the conclusion of his interrogation, Pound was instructed not to speak to McCombs again. The investigation continued over the holiday weekend, during which time Meijer interviewed McCombs’s direct supervisor and another coworker, whom McCombs said could corroborate her complaints regarding Pound. Meijer officially reprimanded Pound on the following Monday, December 1, 1997, and warned him that “any further actions such as he had displayed in the past would result in his termination and that [Meijer] would not tolerate any type of retaliation” by Pound against McCombs.
On December 3, 1997, Pound and McCombs worked together without any reported problems until the end of McCombs’s shift, when she filed a written complaint alleging that Pound “keeps looking at me.” Before beginning work the next morning, on December 4, 1997, McCombs filed a third written complaint, wherein she recounted “the knife incident” that she had omitted from her complaint filed the previous evening. Meijer responded by immediately transferring Pound to another department. After Mei-jer conducted a two-day investigation into McCombs’s complaints, Pound was suspended on December 6, 1997 and later terminated, without ever returning to work.
The entire lapse of time between McCombs’s initial written complaint and Pound’s suspension, including the long Thanksgiving holiday weekend, was only 11 days. As the majority impliedly concedes, if Meijer is charged with knoyledge of Pound’s harassment only as of the date of McCombs’s first written complaint, then no reasonable juror could find that Mei-jer’s subsequent response was so deficient as to subject it to liability for sexual harassment. Maj. Op. at 354 (rejecting Meijer’s claim that its response was appropriate because “Meijer’s assertion is based on the notion that it was unaware of Pound’s behavior until November 25 ... [but] we have indicated that a jury could reasonably find that Meijer knew of the behavior prior to the first written incident”).
The jury’s finding in favor of McCombs on the Title VII and Ohio statutory claims of sexual harassment is therefore totally unsupported by the record. Granting a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) is proper under these circumstances. See, e.g., Murray Hill Publ’ns, Inc. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 361 F.3d 312, 314 (6th Cir.2004) (directing the district court to grant the defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law where the jury’s damage award was “unsupported in law or fact”); McCurdy v. Montgomery County, 240 F.3d 512, 517 (6th Cir.2001) (instructing the district court to grant a motion for a judgment as a matter of law where there was a “complete absence of fact to support the verdict, so that no reasonable juror could have found for the nonmoving party”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). I would therefore direct the district court to grant Meijer’s renewed motion for *365judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b).
III. The jury’s award of punitive damages and the court’s award of attorney fees are totally unjustified
The jury awarded McCombs $100,000 in punitive damages with respect to her Ohio statutory claim of sexual harassment, meaning that it found that McCombs had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Meijer exhibited “actual malice” in responding to her complaints. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2315.21(C). Actual malice exists under Ohio law where a defendant engages in conduct with “a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of other persons that has a great possibility of causing substantial harm.” Preston v. Murty, 32 Ohio St.3d 334, 512 N.E.2d 1174, 1174 (1987). In order to recover punitive damages, McCombs had to prove that Meijer had actual “subjective knowledge of the danger posed” by Pound. Malone v. Courtyard by Marriott, Ltd. P’ship., 74 Ohio St.3d 440, 659 N.E.2d 1242, 1243 (1996).
There is no way, in my opinion, for the punitive damage award to stand. Based on the jury’s determination in favor of Meijer on McCombs’s Ohio common-law claim of sexual harassment, McCombs’s entire case hinges on what transpired during the 11 days between her November 25, 1997 written complaint and Pound’s last day of work on December 6, 1997. For the reasons stated above, the evidence of Meijer’s actions during this short period of time does not permit a finding that its response was reckless, indifferent, or unreasonable, much less a finding that it was guilty of actual malice. McCombs, in short, produced absolutely no evidence that Meijer had actual knowledge of any danger posed by Pound that it failed to timely act upon. I would therefore vacate the award of punitive damages. Needless to say, I would also vacate the award of more than $460,000 in attorney fees to McCombs’s counsel.
IV. Conclusion
For all of the reasons set forth above, I would reverse the district court’s decision to deny Meijer’s Rule 50(b) motion and remand the case with instructions to dismiss McCombs’s complaint.