Court Opinion

ID: 9658952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:23:37.161971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:02.155213
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 73. (dissenting). Today's decision again affirms the constitutional requirement that officers must have reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that a suspect is armed and dangerous before conducting a pat-down search for weapons.
¶ 74. But while paying lip service to this constitutional requirement, today's decision so waters down the reasonable suspicion standard that the majority opinion is in effect adopting the unconstitutional blanket rule proffered by the circuit court and court of appeals that the pat-down search of Kelsey was reasonable because it was prudent for the officers to frisk Kelsey before placing her inside the squad car.
HH
¶ 75. The absence of reasonable suspicion that the suspect in this case was armed and dangerous could not be clearer. The officer who ordered the search testified that the only reason he wanted to search the suspect was because he was about to place her in the *467squad car to take her home. He further testified that it was standard policy to conduct a search before placing an individual in the squad car, although he noted that he usually asks the individual to consent to such a search. He did not explain why he failed to obtain consent to search in this instance.
¶ 76. The circuit court concluded that the officers in question exhibited good, even exemplary, police practice in taking Kelsey home. Nevertheless, the circuit court concluded that the evidence did not support reasonable suspicion that Kelsey was armed and dangerous.
¶ 77. I agree with the circuit court on both counts. In showing concern for a girl huddled alone on the sidewalk, after dark, the officers performed their function as community caretakers. In detaining her to determine whether she was a runaway and contacting her mother, the officers did their utmost to ensure that a vulnerable 15-year-old arrived home safely. The officers are to be commended for these actions.
¶ 78. But under the constitutional standard that has been in place since the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), an officer must have reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that an individual is armed and dangerous before conducting a pat-down search for weapons. Anything less than this minimum requirement of reasonable suspicion constitutes an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment.
¶ 79. In this case, there was no reasonable suspicion that Kelsey was armed and dangerous. The officer testified that the only reason he ordered a search was because he was about to transport Kelsey in the squad car, and that it is his policy to always search an individ*468ual for weapons before placing him or her in the squad car.
¶ 80. The majority relies on our statement in State v. McGill1 that we may find reasonable suspicion based on any facts in the record that are known to an officer at the time of a frisk.2 But McGill makes clear that the facts upon which we rely must be "supported by [the officer's] testimony at the suppression hearing."3 Thus, the majority opinion cannot rely on McGill to draw a conclusion that conflicts with the officer's testimony.
¶ 81. The majority justifies the frisk on six factors: (1) Kelsey's initial appearance, sitting on the sidewalk against a building, and her demeanor, sitting in a huddled position with her hood pulled over her head; (2) her age; (3) night time; (4) few people in the area; (5) high-crime area; and (6) Kelsey's fleeing from the officers because she was afraid but could not explain why she was afraid.
¶ 82. First, the officer testified that Kelsey's initial appearance and demeanor made him concerned for her welfare. The majority does not explain how the officer's concerns for Kelsey's welfare, which the officer described in his testimony, are consistent with a reasonable suspicion that she was armed and dangerous, which the officer did not mention in his testimony. The majority merely concludes that the facts that supported the officer's concern for her welfare, thus justifying the detention under the community caretaker function, must have simultaneously supported a suspicion that Kelsey was armed and dangerous.4
*469¶ 83. What explanation can there be for the unsupported conclusion that a girl who is huddled against a storefront with her hood over her head might reasonably be suspected of being armed and dangerous? As the officer's own testimony shows, these facts are consistent with vulnerability, not dangerousness to others. To conclude that the same facts justifying the stop also justify a suspicion that Kelsey was armed and dangerous is to disregard the tenor of the entire encounter.
¶ 84. Second, the majority says that her age is a factor that would support the officer's unspoken suspicion that she was armed and dangerous. Kelsey was 15 years old. Is a younger or older person less likely to be suspected of being armed and dangerous? The majority opinion does not tell us.
¶ 85. Third, the majority points out that it was nighttime. In McGill, 2000 WI 38 at ¶ 32, the court held that darkness was a factor to be considered in determining whether there was reasonable suspicion that a suspect was armed and dangerous, to the extent that the officer's visibility was reduced. Here, however, the officer testified that the area .was well lit, so that he could clearly observe Kelsey's face, hair color, and clothing from his patrol car on the opposite side of the street, at a distance of approximately 25 feet.5 Where an officer testifies that an area is well lit and that an *470individual can be clearly observed, the rationale set forth in McGill no longer applies.
¶ 86. Fourth, the fact that few people were around does not give the officers reasonable suspicion that Kelsey was armed and dangerous. At the time of Kelsey's frisk, there were three officers and a single 15-year-old girl, who was quiet and cooperative as she awaited the frisk and a ride home.6
¶ 87. Fifth, the majority, like the circuit court, states that the frisk occurred in a high-crime area. This fact is not supported by the record. The officer testified that the area in question had a high rate of graffiti and was "not what [he] would consider a good area especially at night. . .[for] a fifteen year old girl." This testimony is not the equivalent of testimony that they were in a "high-crime area" that would give an officer a reasonable suspicion that an individual encountered in that area might be armed and dangerous.7
¶ 88. Sixth, the majority says that Kelsey's flight from the officers supports the reasonable suspicion that she might be hiding a weapon. At best, the majority has identified flight as a factor that supports a suspicion that Kelsey was hiding something. Flight does not, however, support the suspicion that a suspect *471is hiding a weapon and is dangerous, which is the necessary quantum of suspicion under Terry.
¶ 89. The majority's conclusion is directly contradicted by the officers' actions in this case. If the officers suspected that Kelsey was armed and dangerous, they would not have delayed the frisk for twenty minutes while waiting for a female officer. Delay in the frisk is inconsistent with the purpose of a Terry frisk, which is to protect the immediate safety interests of officers. If the officers were concerned for their safety, they would have frisked Kelsey immediately. Instead, the female officer arrived twenty minutes after the encounter to find Kelsey sitting calmly on the hood of the squad car. This scene is not consistent with the purpose of a Terry frisk. It is consistent with the officer's practice of frisking anyone who rides in the squad car.
¶ 90. In sum, I conclude, as did the circuit court and court of appeals, that there was no basis for reasonable suspicion that Kelsey was armed and dangerous. The majority's effort to spin these facts into reasonable suspicion is contradicted by the officer's own testimony, the circuit court's findings, and common sense.
¶ 91. I now turn briefly to the final factor referred to by the majority: the fact that the officers were about to transport Kelsey in the squad car. This court must reject a per se rule allowing officers to search individuals before placing them in the squad car, the so-called "search incident to squad car ride." Such a rule would run afoul of U.S. Supreme Court case law that has rejected past efforts to do away with the need for specific ánd articulable facts that support a *472reasonable suspicion that an individual may be armed and dangerous.8
¶ 92. I conclude that the fact that an individual is about to be transported in a squad car provides no independent basis for establishing reasonable suspicion that an individual is armed and dangerous. While I recognize the added vulnerability that arises when officers place an individual in the back seat of the squad car, the proper mechanism for addressing this vulnerability is to request an individual's consent to search before the individual is transported in the squad car.
¶ 93. According to the testimony in this case, a request for consent to a frisk is already part of normal police practice. The officer testified that he usually seeks consent before conducting a search incident to squad car ride. He further stated that if he does not receive consent, he will not put the individual in the back of the squad car.
*473¶ 94. The officer's testimony reflects exemplary police practice, which strikes a viable balance between an individual's Fourth Amendment rights and an officer's concern for safety. The California Supreme Court has mandated a similar practice in such situations, stating that "the simple expedient of a warning and option will at once preserve both laudable objectives."9 This practice ensures that searches incident to squad car ride are based on consent, and therefore reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, without compromising officer safety. As the officer in this case testified, if an individual denies consent, "I will not put them in the back of my squad [car]. We will find other ways to do things."
¶ 95. In this case, the officer should have requested consent to search Kelsey before transporting her home in the squad car.10 Such a rule is more worka*474ble than the majority's undeveloped assertion that the decision to put an individual in a squad car should be "a factor justifying a frisk for weapons."11 Without more explanation about the significance of this factor, the majority is leaving officers without guidance in determining when a search is justified before placing an individual in a squad car. I conclude that a rule requiring consent under these circumstances provides better guidance to officers and courts and properly protects Fourth Amendment rights.
¶ 96. In sum, two of the factors identified by the majority as justifying the frisk are not supported by the record in this case, and the remaining factors do not give rise to a reasonable inference that the officers reasonably suspected that Kelsey was armed and dangerous.
¶ 97. For the reasons set forth, I dissent.
*475¶ 98. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins this opinion.

 2000 WI 38, ¶ 24, 234 Wis. 2d 560, 609 N.W.2d 795.

 Majority op. at ¶ 49 n.ll.

 See McGill, 2000 WI 38 at ¶ 24.

 See majority op. at ¶ 49.

 This testimony was necessary for the State's contention that Kelsey knew that she was fleeing police officers, as opposed to strange men approaching her at night in a deserted neighborhood. The squad car was unmarked and the officers did not identify themselves as police officers. However, one of the officers testified that the area was very well lit, so that Kelsey could probably see the officer's uniform at that distance.

 The officers' vulnerability under these facts is a far cry from McGill, in which this court found reasonable suspicion to frisk where an officer, acting alone and without backup, stopped a nervous and apparently intoxicated man. McGill, 2000 WI38, ¶¶ 32-33.

 Even if there were a basis in the record, this factor is of very limited import in a reasonable suspicion analysis. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 n.2 (1990) ("Even in high crime areas, where the possibility that any given individual is armed is significant, Terry requires reasonable, individualized suspicion before a frisk for weapons can be conducted.").

 See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997) (rejecting this court's attempt to create a blanket exception to the knock and announce rule where officers suspect drug dealing); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000) (declining to adopt a "firearm exception" to Terry).
The concurrence's proposed rule, though narrower than a per se rule for all squad car rides, is untenable nonetheless. Such a rule replaces the necessary Fourth Amendment inquiry of whether the search was reasonable under the particular facts with an inquiry into whether the ride in the squad car was pretextual. See Sykes, J., concurrence at ¶ 56.
The concurrence also assumes that a ride in a squad car always creates a greater risk of danger to an officer than a stop. I do not know if this assumption is correct. I would have to know the type of separation, if any, between the driver and the passenger.

 See People v. Scott, 546 P.2d 327, 332-33 (Cal. 1976) (an officer who proposes to give a private citizen a lift in the patrol car cannot lawfully subject the individual to a nonconsensual pat-down search for weapons when the individual is not under arrest and the officer has no duty to transport the individual and no reason to believe the individual is armed and dangerous; for a pat-down search to be valid the officer must inform the individual of the right to refuse the ride but that if the ride is accepted a pat-down search for weapons will be conducted).

 Whether Kelsey would have consented to the search is not before us, as it is undisputed that Kelsey was not asked for consent. Moreover, the prospect that her refusal to give consent would have conflicted with her mother's wishes assumes that Kelsey's mother would have asked the officers to bring Kelsey home with the knowledge that such a ride would require the officer to search Kelsey. The officer's testimony does not indicate that he Informed Kelsey's mother of his policy of searching all occupants of his squad car. Had he informed Kelsey's mother of his policy, there might have been no need for a squad car ride *474after all. The prospect of a dilemma for the officers in this case is wholly speculative.

 The cases cited by the majority for viewing an individual's transport in a squad car as a factor justifying a frisk do not provide clear support for this holding. For example, in State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1998), the court found that the search in question violated the Fourth Amendment when the woman frisked (who had been placed in the squad car) was alone, was cooperative, and did not engage in behavior evoking suspicion that she might be armed and dangerous. The court held that the fact that the search occurred at night and in a high-crime area did not support reasonable suspicion that the woman was armed and dangerous.
In People v. Tobin, 269 Cal. Rptr. 81, 83-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), the court of appeals concluded that a "duty to transport" existed, distinguishing the facts of that case from People v. Scott, 546 P.2d 327 (Cal. 1976), in which the California Supreme Court rejected a frisk incident to squad car ride rule. The State does not claim a duty to transport in the present case.