Court Opinion

ID: 9563609
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:43:18.702939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:58.125640
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because the amended complaint, which was verified individually by the 13 plaintiffs remaining at the time it was filed, met the requirements of the law to create a genuine issue of material fact when measured against the affidavits of the defendants. Defendants’ affidavits were filed after two hearings and two injunctions against particular defendants had been ordered by the trial court. One of them was enjoined from further participation as a member of the board of directors and officers, and the other ordered that a proper membership meeting be called because of various irregularities in a purported meeting. The court’s orders set out the supporting findings of fact.
OCGA § 9-11-56 (e) requires that affidavits “shall be made on personal knowledge.” It does not require that an affidavit must employ those precise words in order to be valid. It suffices if the fact that the affidavit is made on personal knowledge is conveyed, to assure that the statements would not constitute hearsay or mere speculation or conclusions or suffer some other such incompetency and thus be inadmissible in evidence. See, e.g., Davis v. Haupt Bros. Gas Co., 131 Ga. App. 628, 629 (2) (206 SE2d 598) (1974); Computer Maintenance Corp. v. Tilley, 172 Ga. App. 220, 223 (2) (322 SE2d 533) (1984).
Even defendants’ affidavits do not include such language, but it is evident from the nature of the facts set forth that they are made on personal knowledge. Illustrative is the first fact set forth in each of the three affidavits: “I am/was a member of the Board of Directors of Mt. Yonah Scenic Estates Club, Inc.” If the law required the document containing the testimony to expressly state that it was “made *261on personal knowledge,” then these affidavits would fall short and the question of the competency of plaintiffs’ testimonial evidence would be moot. But defendants’ affidavits show that they are made on personal knowledge by “other material” rather than on an outright statement, which is allowed. Wakefield v. A. R. Winter Co., 121 Ga. App. 259, 264 (174 SE2d 178) (1970). In Moore v. Goldome Credit Corp., 187 Ga. App. 594, 596 (370 SE2d 843) (1988), the Court examined the pleadings because “ ‘(t)he requirement of personal knowledge . . . may be met where the contents of the pleading indicate that material parts of it are statements within the personal knowledge of the party.’ [Cit.]”
Properly verified pleadings are equivalent to a supporting or opposing affidavit for the purpose of raising a fact issue on summary judgment. Harrison v. Harrison, 159 Ga. App. 578 (284 SE2d 83) (1981); Foskey v. Smith, 159 Ga. App. 163 (283 SE2d 33) (1981). Foskey’s verified answer, which swore that the factual allegations were true and correct, was sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 164.
The plaintiffs’ amended complaint meets the test, at least, in some material particulars. Each verification states that “the facts and allegations set forth in the foregoing complaint are true and correct.” Period. There is no qualifier. There is no equivocator. It is a positive, direct, forthright statement unencumbered by a fatal detractor such as “to the best of my knowledge” or “upon information and belief.” See Spires v. Relco, Inc., 165 Ga. App. 4, 5 (299 SE2d 58) (1983).
The complaint sets forth facts such as what occurred at the August 20, 1994 membership meeting, what defendants did thereafter, that defendants refuse to surrender the association books and records, that there has been no accounting made of association funds, that defendants have acted in bad faith by refusing to provide the records, by continuing to conduct business without lawful right, and by letting paving contracts after the association voted not to pave any roads other than the main entrance. The statements that a named person was the last known person to have the financial records “to the best of Plaintiffs’ knowledge” and that plaintiffs “believe” that defendants have continued to disburse monies are not statements of fact but do not purport to be; they merely explain some of the consequences of the alleged misdeeds of defendants, that is, that plaintiffs as members do not know who has the financial books or whether defendants disbursed association funds or contractually bound it. These two statements do not invalidate the sufficiency of the testimony that the other facts set forth are “true and correct.” It is implicit that their personal knowledge is gained from their status and involvement as members of the defendant club.
*262Decided July 11, 1997.
Erck, Dever & Merlin, Lawrence M. Merlin, Judith W. Bowman, for appellants.
William S. Hardman, for appellees.
Since the verified amended complaint indicates personal knowledge of material facts, it meets the defendants’ sworn statements that they acted in good faith and with the care of an ordinary person in like position and circumstances. The latter constitutes subjective, biased opinion, not objective statements of fact by disinterested persons. Construing all evidence including reasonable inferences most favorably toward the nonmovant plaintiffs, Greenforest Baptist Church v. Shropshire, 221 Ga. App. 465 (471 SE2d 547) (1996), we must conclude that defendants have not eliminated the necessity for a jury trial. The sworn testimony of the two sides is in conflict as to pertinent facts; summary judgment is premature.
I am authorized to state that Judge Smith and Judge Ruffin join in this dissent.