Court Opinion

ID: 9950576
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 15:08:14.921549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:25.625778
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 14, 2024
                                                           TO BE PUBLISHED

                Supreme Court of Kentucky
                                 2023-SC-0284-WC

LEWIS HICKS                                                         APPELLANT

                  ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS
V.                         NO. 2022-CA-1392
            WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD NOS. WC-20-01293,
                WC-20-01296, WC-20-01373, & WC-20-01449

KENTUCKY EMPLOYERS’ MUTUAL                                          APPELLEES
INSURANCE COMPANY;
SOUTHEASTERN LAND LLC; THOMAS
POLITES, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE; UNINSURED EMPLOYERS’
FUND; AND WORKERS’
COMPENSATION BOARD

                OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE NICKELL

                                       AFFIRMING

      Lewis Hicks has appealed from the decision of the Court of Appeals

which reversed a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board (“Board”)

affirming an Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) Opinion and Order which

awarded KRS Chapter 342 medical and disability benefits after determining

Kentucky had extraterritorial jurisdiction over Hicks’ workers’ compensation

claim. Hicks argues the ALJ and Board correctly determined Kentucky has

extraterritorial jurisdiction over this workers’ compensation claim under KRS 1

      1   Kentucky Revised Statutes.
342.670 and the Court of Appeals erred in concluding to the contrary. After a

careful review, we disagree, and affirm the Court of Appeals.

                I.   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Hicks worked in Kentucky as a foreman for Eagle Coal, a subsidiary of

Booth Energy, from 1996 until 2017, a period of about twenty-one years. In

August 2017, Booth Energy’s HR director, CEO, and one of its owners, asked

Hicks to transfer his employment to another of Booth Energy’s subsidiaries,

Southeastern Land, LLC, to work as a section foreman at that company’s

“Alma” Mine location in Williamson, West Virginia. Southeastern Land was

headquartered in Debord, Kentucky, approximately a 45-minute drive from the

Alma Mine. Hicks agreed, transferred his employment from Eagle Coal to

Southeastern Land, and began working as an onsite foreman at the Alma Mine

where he remained until January 10, 2019—the date of his work-related

injury.

      During that seventeen-month period, Hicks worked six days and sixty

hours per week in West Virginia, although he remained a resident of Kentucky.

He obtained a valid West Virginia mine certification card, performed pre- and

post-shift inspections as an underground foreman, and escorted and interacted

with federal and West Virginia mine inspectors. In addition, he prepared

paperwork from an office in a converted double-wide trailer on the mine

premises provided by Southeastern Land for that purpose.

      While working as a full-time foreman at the Alma Mine, Hicks would

occasionally travel to Southeastern Land’s headquarters in Kentucky to drop

                                       2
off and pick up equipment, meet with the human resources supervisor and

other members of management, and visit the mine supply store and safety

office to return or obtain items for use at the Alma Mine. As a member of

Southeastern Land’s mine rescue team, he would also attend quarterly training

sessions in Kentucky and visit the company’s other mining facilities for

training and “familiarization” with the mines. Although he believed his tenure

in West Virginia was to be temporary, he was never offered reemployment in

Kentucky.

      On the date of his injury, Hicks was in the Alma Mine when he noticed a

miner cable hung across a belt line. While he was attempting to remove the

cable, a splice in the conveyor belt caught his jacket and pulled him down the

belt line, causing injuries to his right shoulder and neck. He did not return to

work following the injury.

      Hicks received medical and income benefits from Southeastern Land’s

West Virginia workers’ compensation insurance carrier. 2 Notwithstanding, on

September 23, 2020, Hicks filed a workers’ compensation claim in Kentucky

alleging acute right shoulder and neck injuries with a claim for psychological

overlay, cumulative trauma injuries to his back and bilateral shoulders,

cumulative hearing loss, and coal workers’ pneumoconiosis (“CWP”).

      2  In addition to medical benefits, Hicks received temporary total disability (TTD)
benefits of $823.14 per week from January 11, 2019, through September 3, 2020, and
a permanent partial disability (PPD) award based on an 8% whole person impairment
rating in the amount of $18,438.40.

                                           3
      Southeastern Land and its Kentucky insurance carrier, Kentucky

Employers’ Mutual Insurance Company (“KEMI”), argued Hicks’ claim should

be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the accident which resulted in his

injuries occurred in West Virginia and Kentucky’s extraterritorial coverage

statute—KRS 342.670—could not operate to save the claim. Following briefing

and a hearing, the ALJ issued an order concluding KRS 342.670(1)(a) was

applicable based on his conclusion that Hicks’ employment was “principally

localized” in Kentucky at the time of his West Virginia injuries, thereby

conferring jurisdiction in Kentucky for his claims. Based on this holding, the

ALJ awarded Hicks TTD benefits, PPD benefits, and medical benefits for his

back and shoulder injuries, while only medical benefits were awarded for his

hearing loss. Hicks’ CWP claim was dismissed.

      Southeastern Land’s subsequent petition for reconsideration was denied

and KEMI appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Board. In affirming, the Board

concluded the evidence did “not compel a different result.” KEMI then

appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and remanded upon

concluding the ALJ and Board had misconstrued KRS 342.670, having erred in

holding Hicks’ employment was “principally localized” in Kentucky rather than

West Virginia. This appeal followed.

                            II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

      The Court of Appeals conducts a review of the Board with the purpose of

“[correcting] the Board only where the Court perceives the Board has

overlooked or misconstrued controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an

                                        4
error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice.” W.

Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Ky. 1992). Further review by

this Court of the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Board is meant “to

address new or novel questions of statutory construction, or to reconsider

precedent when such appears necessary, or to review a question of

constitutional magnitude.” Id. at 688.

      As to questions of fact, “the ALJ, not this court and not the Board, has

sole discretion to determine the quality, character, and substance of the

evidence.” Abbott Laboratories v. Smith, 205 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Ky. App. 2006).

However, “we are bound neither by an ALJ’s decisions on questions of law or

an ALJ’s interpretation and application of the law to the facts. In either case,

our standard of review is de novo.” Bowerman v. Black Equip. Co., 297 S.W.3d

858, 866 (Ky. App. 2009).

      More particularly, “[t]he question of jurisdiction is ordinarily one of law,

meaning that the standard of review to be applied is de novo.” Appalachian

Reg’l Healthcare, Inc. v. Coleman, 239 S.W.3d 49, 54 (Ky. 2007). While KRS

342.670 is titled “Extraterritorial coverage,” Kentucky appellate decisions have

historically used the terms “extraterritorial jurisdiction” and “extraterritorial

coverage” interchangeably in relation to KRS 342.670, and this Court has

expressly stated “KRS 342.670(1) provides that Kentucky can, under certain

limited circumstances, exercise jurisdiction over injuries suffered in other

states.” Consol of Kentucky, Inc. v. Goodgame, 479 S.W.3d 78, 84 (Ky. 2015)

(emphasis added).

                                          5
                       III.   STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

      As a matter of law, we review issues relative to statutory construction de

novo. Thus, on appeal, we owe no deference to the construction of statutes by

the trial court or Court of Appeals. Cumberland Valley Contractors, Inc. v. Bell

Cnty. Coal Corp., 238 S.W.3d 644, 647 (Ky. 2007).

      The primary objective in construing statutory language is determining

the intent of the Legislature in enacting the legislation. To do so, “we look first

to the language of the statute, giving the words their plain and ordinary

meaning.” Richardson v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t, 260 S.W.3d

777, 779 (Ky. 2008). Statutes are to be construed as they are written, and “the

intent of the Legislature must be deduced from the language it used, when it is

plain and unambiguous[.]” W. Ky. Coal Co. v. Nall & Bailey, 228 Ky. 76, 14

S.W.2d 400, 401-02 (1929).

      If the statutory language is unambiguous, extrinsic evidence of legislative

intent and public policy need not be considered. Cnty. Bd. of Educ. of Jefferson

Cnty. v. Southern Pac. Co., 225 Ky. 621, 9 S.W.2d 984, 986 (1928). Conversely,

if an ambiguity exists, we may resort to examining legislative history and public

policy considerations to determine the true intent of the statute. MPM

Financial Group Inc. v. Morton, 289 S.W.3d 193, 198 (Ky. 2009). Otherwise,

statutes are to be “read . . . as a whole, and with other parts of the law of the

Commonwealth, to ensure that our interpretation is logical in context.”

Lichtenstein v. Barbanel, 322 S.W.3d 27, 35 (Ky. 2010). Utilizing these

principles, we turn to an analysis of the language contained in KRS 342.670.

                                         6
                                 IV.   ANALYSIS

      As in the Court of Appeals, the sole issue to be decided is whether KRS

342.670 authorizes KRS Chapter 342 medical and income benefits for injuries

Hicks sustained while working under a Kentucky employment contract as a

foreman for Southeastern Land at its West Virginia mining facility. Generally,

the statute was enacted to extend such benefits to employees suffering out-of-

state work-related injuries which would have otherwise been available under

KRS Chapter 342 had the injuries occurred within Kentucky, but only in

certain limited circumstances. In relevant part, 3 KRS 342.670(1) provides:

      (1) If an employee, while working outside the territorial limits of
          this state, suffers an injury on account of which the employee .
          . . would have been entitled to the benefits provided by this
          chapter had that injury occurred within this state, that
          employee . . . shall be entitled to the benefits provided by this
          chapter, if at the time of the injury:

      (a) His or her employment is principally localized in this state; or

      (b) He or she is working under a contract of hire made in this state
          in employment not principally localized in any state; . . . .

Thus, the dispositive issue in the present appeal concerns whether Hicks’

employment was “principally localized” in Kentucky, thereby sanctioning KRS

Chapter 342 coverage under KRS 342.670(1)(a), or whether his employment

      3 Under the present facts, KRS 342.670(1)(c) cannot authorize KRS Chapter
342 extraterritorial coverage because—though he was hired under a Kentucky
employment contract and even if his employment were deemed “principally localized”
in West Virginia—that state’s workers’ compensation laws were applied to provide
medical and income benefits covering Hicks’ work-related injuries. Further, KRS
342.670(1)(d) cannot authorize KRS Chapter 342 coverage because—even though
Hicks was hired under a Kentucky employment contract—his position did not entail
work “outside the United States or Canada.”

                                         7
was not “principally localized” in Kentucky but rather another state, including

West Virginia, whose workers’ compensation law is applicable, under KRS

342.670(1)(b), thereby disallowing KRS Chapter 342 coverage.

      KRS 342.670(5)(d) provides the statutory definition to be applied to the

term, “principally localized,” stating:

      A person’s employment is principally localized in this or another
      state when:

      1. His or her employer has a place of business in this or the other
         state and he regularly works at or from that place of business,
         or

      2. If subparagraph 1. foregoing is not applicable, he or she is
         domiciled and spends a substantial part of his or her working
         time in the service of his or her employer in this or the other
         state[.]

(Emphasis added). 4 Thus, when determining if employment is “principally

localized” within a particular state, KRS 342.670(5)(d) directs an ALJ to first

discern whether the employer has a regular place of business in the state, and

if so, to then establish whether the employee regularly works at or from that

place of business. Haney v. Butler, 990 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Ky. 1999). If the

      4   Notably, the General Assembly incorporated the disjunctive “or”
multiple times in crafting KRS 342.670(5)(d). As we have previously held “[i]n
common and natural usage the word ‘or’ is disjunctive and expresses an
alternative as between either of two or more separate subjects or conditions and
implies an election or choice as between them.” Cabinet for Health and Fam.
Servs. on behalf of C.R. v. C.B., 556 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Ky. 2018) (citations
omitted). Applying this legal precedent, it is clear the General Assembly plainly
intended that only one state—if any—can qualify as an employee’s “principal”
employment location. This construction is wholly consistent with the legal
understanding of the term, “principal,” which has been defined to mean “[c]hief;
primary; or most important,” thereby suggesting a singular and preeminent
character. Principal, Black’s Law Dictionary, 1443 (Rev. 11th ed. 2019).

                                           8
answer to each inquiry is in the affirmative, then the employee’s employment

must be deemed to be “principally localized” in the subject state, and no

further analysis is warranted. Id. The resulting employment characterization

must be appropriately applied under the provisions contained in KRS

342.670(1).

      The parties agree Hicks was injured while working in West Virginia.

Further, it is undisputed that Hicks would have been entitled to KRS Chapter

342 benefits if his injury had occurred in Kentucky. Thus, Hicks plainly falls

within the category of employees for whom KRS 342.670 potentially extends

coverage. Therefore, the dispositive issue centers on where Hicks’ employment

was “principally localized.”

      Here, the ALJ determined Southeastern Land had a place of business at

its headquarters in Debord, Kentucky, that Hicks regularly worked at or from

that place of business, and that he had done so for twenty of the previous

twenty-three years “until the temporary transfer or loan” to the West Virginia

mine. The Board noted Hicks’ past work in Kentucky was not determinative

yet concluded Hicks’ testimony regarding the temporary nature of his West

Virginia employment to be compelling.

      The Court of Appeals, citing Amax Coal Co. v. Smith, 748 S.W.2d 158,

160 (Ky. App. 1988), agreed with the Board that an employee’s past work

history is irrelevant because the inquiry under KRS 342.670(1) is limited to the

employee’s status “at the time of the injury.” It disagreed with the remainder of

the ALJ’s and the Board’s conclusions that KRS 342.670(1)(a) was applicable

                                        9
and entitled Hicks to KRS Chapter 342 benefits. Our review confirms the

analysis and conclusion of the Court of Appeals was correct.

      First, as relates to Kentucky workers’ compensation claims, the term

“regular” has been defined to mean “customary, usual or normal.” General

Elec. Co. v. Cain, 236 S.W.3d 579, 586 (Ky. 2007) (citing Webster’s New College

Dictionary, 928 (1995)). Legal lexicons have similarly defined “regular” to mean

“[s]teady or uniform in course, practice or occurrence; not subject to

unexplained or irrational variation” and “[u]sual, customary or general.”

Regular, Black’s Law Dictionary, 1155 (Rev. 5th ed. 1979).

      Second, this Court has previously clarified the two-pronged requirements

enacted in the foregoing statutory definition of “principally localized,” holding:

      for an employment to be principally localized within a particular
      state for the purposes of KRS 342.670(4)(d)1., the employer must
      either lease or own a location in the state at which it regularly
      conducts its business affairs, and the subject employee must
      regularly work at or from that location.

Haney, 990 S.W.2d at 617. Thus, to meet the first prong of the definition, it

must be shown an employer not only leased or owned a “place of business”

within a state, the employer must have also “regularly” conducted its business

affairs from that location. For this reason and applying the plain and ordinary

meaning of “regular,” an employer’s place of business under KRS

342.670(5)(d)1. is any leased or owned location at which its customary, usual,

and normal business-related activities are generally, typically, and routinely

carried out in a steady, stable, and consistent course.

                                        10
      Hicks argues Southeastern Land did not have a principal place of

business in West Virginia, thereby making it impossible for his employment to

be considered “principally localized” in that state under the first prong of KRS

342.670(5)(d)1. As an initial matter, the statutory scheme does not require an

employer to have a “principal” place of business in a state, but merely a “place

of business.” The location of Southeastern Land’s headquarters is immaterial

to the calculus. Further, Hicks’ assertion that Southeastern Land did not

operate a place of business in West Virginia is contrary to the evidence. Hicks

himself testified Southeastern Land’s Alma Mine was an active mine site and

admitted the company maintained structures on the site for equipment and

materials storage along with two mobile office trailers—one of which served as

his personal space for completion of paperwork. In support of his assertion

that his position was merely temporary, Hicks makes much of the office trailers

being “mobile” structures. However, Hicks’ point is immaterial because our

inquiry focuses on whether the employer owns or leases a location with a state

rather than on the permanency of a particular location or structure. Haney,

990 S.W.2d at 617.

      Here, the record establishes Southeastern Land owned or leased

locations in both Kentucky and West Virginia at which it “regularly” conducted

business affairs related to its mining operations, whether at its headquarters or

its active mine sites. For these reasons, Southeastern Land clearly maintained

“a place of business” in each state pursuant to KRS 342.670(5)(d)1.

                                       11
      Third, under the foregoing statutory definition of “principally localized”

employment, it must next be determined whether the employee “regularly”

worked at or from the employer’s place of business located within a state.

Hicks argues he did not regularly work in West Virginia because he spent the

vast majority of his working years in Kentucky; his assignment to West Virginia

was merely “temporary;” he only paid Kentucky state income taxes; 5 his

domicile remained in Kentucky throughout his employment; and he completed

substantial amounts of work in Kentucky. We disagree.

      Again, applying the plain and ordinary meaning to terms used in the

second prong of KRS 342.670(5)(d)1., an employee “regularly works” at or from

an employer’s place of business where he or she usually, ordinarily, generally,

or routinely performs his or her usual, customary, chief, or primary

employment duties, as opposed to locations where he or she may occasionally,

sporadically, or intermittently perform special, ancillary, subsidiary, or

subordinate employment duties. Generally, evidence that an employee spent a

significant portion or majority of his or her work time at an employer’s

particular place of business within a state impact the inquiry, if not prove

dispositive. Haney, 990 S.W.2d at 617-18. 6

      5  We note, however, Kentucky and West Virginia entered into a reciprocal
income tax agreement on April 9, 1965, whereby employees who reside wholly in one
state but earn wages or salaries in the other are taxed by their state of residence, and
not the state where the income is earned. See 103 KAR 17:140. Thus, because Hicks
remained a Kentucky resident throughout the period he was working at the Alma
Mine, his income was only subject to taxation by the Kentucky Department of Revenue
and not by the West Virginia Tax Division.
      6In Haney, the employer maintained corporate headquarters in Paducah,
Kentucky, and was involved in the business of hauling cargo over inland waterways
                                          12
      In Eck Miller Trans. Corp. v. Wagers, 833 S.W.2d 854 (Ky. App. 1992), the

Court of Appeals dealt with a factually analogous situation to the present

appeal. Wagers was a truck driver who resided in Kentucky and worked for a

company which did business in Kentucky and Tennessee. Id. at 855. For

approximately eighteen months, he was assigned to his employers’

Chattanooga, Tennessee, terminal, where he received most of his work orders.

Id. However, he performed a “substantial” amount of work from his home,

including preparing paperwork and performing vehicle maintenance tasks. Id.

During that time, Wagers sustained a work-related injury and did not return to

work. Id. An ALJ concluded Kentucky did not have extraterritorial jurisdiction

over Wagers’ claim. The Board reversed, but the Court of Appeals disagreed,

stating that

      [u]pon our review of the record, we must hold that the ALJ’s
      findings were consonant with the evidence presented to him. It is
      indisputably the case that Miller assigned Wagers to work from
      Miller’s place of business in Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the one
      and one-half years prior to his accident. Wagers received

stretching across Kentucky, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Louisiana. The
employee maintained an office at the Kentucky headquarter facilities but resided near
Nashville, Tennessee. As a “troubleshooter,” he traveled extensively, but there was no
evidence concerning what portion of his work time was spent in each state. He was
killed in a motor vehicle accident in Alabama while returning to his Tennessee home
after attending to the employer’s business affairs in Alabama. Though the employee
spent significant work time in Alabama at various ports, the employer did not lease or
own any property, nor did it maintain a business office in the state. We held the
evidence was insufficient to establish an Alabama place of business. We similarly held
the evidence was insufficient to establish the employee “spent a ‘substantial part’ of
his working time” in his employer’s service in Tennessee. Because it was undisputed
that employment was not principally localized in Kentucky, and because the evidence
was insufficient to establish employment was principally located in Alabama,
Tennessee, or any other state, we concluded Kentucky had jurisdiction over the claim
pursuant to KRS 342.670(1)(b), due to his having been hired under a Kentucky
employment contract.

                                         13
      substantially all his work orders from Chattanooga, and was in
      fact in Tennessee when the accident in question occurred. Under
      these circumstances, the ALJ’s finding under KRS 342.670(1)(a) as
      defined by (4)(d)(1) [now KRS 342.670(5)(d)1 7] that Wagers worked
      “from” Tennessee for statutory purposes is certainly supported by
      “reliable, probative, and material evidence.” KRS 342.285(2)(d).

      Here, like the truck driver in Wagers, Hicks was required to perform

some work-related tasks in Kentucky. However, as correctly noted by the

Court of Appeals, none of those tasks could be deemed more “substantial” than

the work performed by Wagers. Notably, the injuries incurred in the present

case and in Wagers each occurred outside of Kentucky after both employees

had regularly worked for a significant period in a neighboring state. Thus, the

logic and holding of Wagers apply with equal force to the present

circumstances.

      Here, Southeastern Land conducted ongoing business-related activities

at its West Virginia mining facility where Hicks worked six days and sixty

hours per week while regularly and steadily performing his chief duties as an

onsite underground section foreman. He only occasionally traveled to the

company’s Kentucky headquarters or other mining locations to perform

ancillary, subsidiary, secondary, or special administrative or mining duties. He

had been employed as a foreman at the Alma Mine for seventeen months when

he sustained his injuries while performing his duties at the facility. Certainly,

the vast majority of his work time was devoted to his employment

      7In 1996, the Kentucky legislature amended KRS 342.670, resulting in a
renumbering of this section. See 1996 Ky. Laws ch. 355 (S.B. 161) (eff. Jul. 15, 1996).

                                          14
responsibilities at the West Virginia jobsite. For these reasons, Hicks

“regularly” worked at or from Southeastern Land’s regular “place of business”

in West Virginia pursuant to KRS 342.670(5)(d)1.

      Based on the foregoing, and pursuant to KRS 342.670(1), we hold Hicks’

employment was “principally localized” in West Virginia. As a result, we

further hold Hicks does not qualify for KRS Chapter 342 benefits under KRS

342.670(1)(a) because his employment was not principally localized in

Kentucky, nor does he qualify under KRS 342.670(1)(b) because though

working under a Kentucky employment contract his employment was

principally localized in another state.

      Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

      VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Keller, Nickell and Thompson, JJ., sitting.

VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig and Conley, JJ., concur. Keller, J., dissents by separate

opinion in which Thompson, J., joins. Lambert, J., not sitting.

      KELLER, J., DISSENTING: According to the record, Lewis Hicks is a 53-

year-old lifelong Kentuckian and coal miner who worked for a single

corporation or its subsidiaries for over two decades. He possesses a high school

degree and numerous mining certificates. While working at his employer’s West

Virginia mine in January 2019, Hicks attempted to remove a mining cable from

a conveyer belt line when a splice in the conveyer belt caught his jacket and

pulled him down the conveyer belt. He sustained significant injuries to his

right shoulder and neck. Hicks received approximately $92,000 in total

workers’ compensation income benefits from Southeastern’s West Virginia

                                          15
workers’ compensation insurance carrier. A Kentucky Administrative Law

Judge (ALJ) awarded Hicks approximately $275,000 in workers’ compensation

income benefits (plus interest) to be reduced by the award he had already

received in West Virginia—meaning that Hicks would additionally receive over

$180,000 in income benefits for his injury in the Commonwealth of Kentucky

under KRS Chapter 342, our Workers’ Compensation Act. The Workers’

Compensation Board (Board) affirmed the ALJ’s award. Today, the Majority has

affirmed the Court of Appeals, which reversed the ALJ and the Board, and, in

doing so, has stripped Hicks of his Kentucky workers’ compensation award.

Because I would hold that the ALJ’s factual determination that Hicks

regularly worked at or from Kentucky is both supported by substantial

evidence and entitled to this Court’s deference, I would affirm the ALJ’s award

of workers’ compensation benefits to Hicks.

   A. Standard of Review

   Our standards of review in workers’ compensation cases have been firmly

established for decades. It is the ALJ, not this Court, that has the sole

discretion to determine the quality, character, and substance of the evidence.

Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, 695 S.W.2d 418, 419 (Ky. 1985). On

appellate review, the ALJ’s findings of fact are entitled to considerable

deference. U.S. Bank Home Mortg. v. Schrecker, 455 S.W.3d 382, 384 (Ky. 2014)

(citing Bullock v. Peabody Coal Co., 882 S.W.2d 676 (Ky. 1994)). By the time a

workers’ compensation appeal reaches this Court, “our review is generally

limited to the determination of ‘new or novel questions of statutory

                                        16
construction, or to reconsider precedent when such appears necessary, or to

review a question of constitutional magnitude.’” Lexington Fayette Urban Cnty.

Gov’t v. Gosper, 671 S.W.3d 184, 200 (Ky. 2023) (quoting W. Baptist Hosp. v.

Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Ky. 1992)). Simply, we will not second-guess the

decisions of the ALJ, Board, or Court of Appeals upon the same evidence. Id. at

200. Accordingly, we will only reverse the ALJ’s decision where the “ALJ

overlooked or misconstrued controlling law or so flagrantly erred in evaluating

the evidence that it has caused gross injustice.” Schrecker, 455 S.W.3d at 384

(citing W. Baptist Hosp., 827 S.W.2d at 687–88).

   B. Analysis

      Whether Hicks is entitled to Kentucky workers’ compensation benefits,

as a matter of law, hinges on whether his injury is covered under our

Commonwealth’s “extraterritorial coverage” statute which prescribes certain

factual circumstances in which an employee who is injured outside of

Kentucky “shall be entitled to the benefits.” KRS 342.670(1). Hicks is “covered”

under KRS 342.670, in this case, if his employment was “principally localized”

in Kentucky under KRS 342.670(1)(a), which is, in turn, predicated on a

necessary factual finding that he “regularly works at or from” Southeastern’s

place of business in Kentucky.

      This Court is not in the business of relitigating or reweighing the facts of

each workers’ compensation case that comes before it; we will not substitute

our judgment for that of the ALJ. However, that is exactly what the Majority

does in the case before us today. Rather than afford the ALJ’s factual findings

                                        17
their due deference in this case, the Majority couches its analysis as a purely

de novo review of the ALJ’s “jurisdiction” determination. This is the wrong

standard of review against which to examine this case. Although often couched

as a question of extraterritorial “jurisdiction,” the plain language of KRS

342.670 itself makes no mention of jurisdiction, as it is titled “Extraterritorial

coverage,” and merely states circumstances under which an employee who is

injured outside of Kentucky “shall be entitled to the benefits provided by [the

workers’ compensation] chapter.” KRS 342.670(5)(d)(1).

      Kentucky’s courts have often treated the factual preconditions necessary

to establishing extraterritorial coverage as just that: facts. Accordingly, our

appellate courts have not disturbed the ALJ’s determination of those facts

where they were supported by substantial evidence. See, e.g., Ky. Emps.’ Mut.

Ins. v. Burnett, 432 S.W.3d 733, 738–39 (Ky. App. 2014) (substantial evidence

supported the ALJ’s determinations that Appellee’s contract of hire was entered

into in Kentucky and his employment was not principally localized in any

state); Eck Miller Transp. Corp. v. Wagers, 833 S.W.2d 854, 855 (Ky. App. 1992)

(substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that Appellee worked

“from” employer’s place of business in Tennessee, therefore his employment

was principally localized in Tennessee); Graham v. TSL, Ltd., 350 S.W.3d 430,

432-33 (Ky. 2011) (substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determinations

that Appellant’s contract of hire was made in Missouri and his employment

was not principally localized in any state); Dallas Nat. Ins. Co. v. Board, No.

2012-SC-000288-WC, 2013 WL 3155846, *2 (Ky. June 20, 2013) (substantial

                                        18
evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that Appellee regularly worked at

or from employer’s place of business in Kentucky, therefore his employment

was principally localized in Kentucky).

       Here, the ALJ determined, as a matter of fact, that “[Southeastern] has a

place of business in Kentucky . . . and [Hicks] regularly works at or from that

place of business . . . .” As support for that finding, the ALJ noted an

abundance of substantial evidence which is necessary to recount.

      The ALJ found that Hicks worked for Southeastern (or its predecessor)

for 23 years and worked full time in Kentucky for Southeastern for

approximately 20 of those years. The ALJ further found that Southeastern

asked Hicks to temporarily transfer to its mine in West Virginia in 2017 to

assist in developing a new mining technique. Hicks testified that he was chosen

for this assignment because of his expertise and skills pertaining to ventilation

techniques and his experience as a mine superintendent. The ALJ found that

Hicks was “loaned” to the West Virginia mine “with the understanding that he

would return to Kentucky to work.”

      The ALJ noted that even after he began working in the West Virginia

mine, Hicks “remained in constant contact with his mines in Kentucky in

regard to equipment, inspections, and dust reports.” The ALJ further noted

that Hicks would receive phone calls and text messages from the workers at

the Kentucky mines “when he was in Kentucky and at home, all hours of the

night.” The ALJ also stated that Hicks “would occasionally visit the [Kentucky]

office to drop off equipment, discuss payroll issues, pick up parts that he could

                                          19
haul in his vehicle to take to West Virginia, and turn in safety equipment that

needed replacement or calibration.” Hicks would also go to the Kentucky office

to meet with supervisors “to receive instructions regarding mining issues and

execution of mine plans in regard to mines in Kentucky and West Virginia.”

      The ALJ further stated that Hicks “would still work in Kentucky in regard

to mine safety practices and he would go back and forth.” Hicks conducted

“mine rescue visits at mines in Perry and Pike counties which were quarterly

visits and he trained in Kentucky at the Defendant’s mine rescue training

facility which was in Kentucky.” (Emphasis added). The ALJ further specifically

stated that Hicks “returned to Kentucky regularly to train at the Defendant’s

mine rescue facility in Warfield, Kentucky, and he entered underground mines

on a regular basis in Pike and Perry counties to train and be familiar with the

mines.” (Emphasis added).

      My review of the record and the ALJ’s detailed opinion convince me that

the ALJ’s finding that Hicks “regularly worked at or from” Southeastern’s place

of business in Kentucky was supported by substantial evidence, and thus

entitled to this Court’s deference. I note that my conclusion is also shared by

the Board, which upheld the ALJ’s determination on this matter and stated

that “substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that jurisdiction extended

to Kentucky pursuant to KRS 342.670(1)(a).” The Board further stated, “The

ALJ found Hicks’ testimony that he was a loaned employee to the Alma mine in

West Virginia on a temporary basis was credible and never rebutted. The ALJ

found Hicks was hired in Kentucky, was paid in Kentucky, and he continued to

                                       20
have contacts with the main office in . . . Kentucky on a regular basis.

Certainly, his work in West Virginia was not exclusive.”

        I am further unconvinced, and unwilling to hold, that the specific facts of

this case are somehow insufficient as a matter of law to preclude an award of

benefits or that the language of KRS 342.670 precludes an award of benefits.

While this Court does not owe any deference to the ALJ’s application of the

facts of this case to our existing law, nor its interpretation of our

extraterritorial coverage statute, the Majority’s analysis does not adequately

explain which portions of the law the ALJ misconstrued in reaching its

determination—only that the Majority would reach a different determination

based on the facts of this case. Such an analysis is not one grounded in

interpretation of the statute, but rather in a reweighing of the evidence.

        Simply, I would hold that the ALJ did not “misconstrue” any controlling

law in concluding that Hicks was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits

under KRS 342.670(1)(a). Until today, this Court had never thoughtfully

considered exactly what the legislature meant when it wrote “regularly works at

or from,” perhaps because of the inherent simplicity of these words. I am of the

opinion that the Majority’s reversal of the ALJ’s award today strips those words

of the simplicity the legislature intended and assigns to them a legal meaning

that hampers the discretion of our ALJs. In short, I do not believe that the ALJ

misconstrued the words “regularly works at or from” as the legislature wrote

them.

                                         21
      KRS 342.670(1)(a) provides for workers’ compensation coverage under

the laws of Kentucky when an employee is injured in another state if his

“employment is principally localized in this state.” We next look to KRS

342.670(5)(d)(1), which provides that “[a] person’s employment is principally

localized in this or another state when . . . [h]is . . . employer has a place of

business in this or the other state and he . . . regularly works at or from that

place of business.” (Emphasis added). When we construe statutes, “our goal . .

. is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. We derive that intent, if

at all possible, from the language the General Assembly chose, either as

defined by the General Assembly or as generally understood in the context of

the matter under consideration.” Shawnee Telecom Res., Inc. v. Brown, 354

S.W.3d 542, 551 (Ky. 2011) (citing Osborne v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 645

(Ky. 2006)). We are to “lend words of a statute their normal, ordinary, everyday

meaning.” Adams v. Commonwealth, 599 S.W.3d 752, 754 (Ky. 2019) (quoting

Stephenson v. Woodward, 182 S.W.3d 162, 170 (Ky. 2005)). Further, “we

assume that the ‘[Legislature] meant exactly what it said, and said exactly what

it meant.’” Revenue Cabinet v. O’Daniel, 153 S.W.3d 815, 819 (Ky. 2005)

(alteration in original) (quoting Stone v. Pryor, 103 Ky. 645, 45 S.W. 1136, 1142

(1898) (Waddle, S.J., dissenting)). We also presume that the General Assembly

intended for all of a statute’s parts to have meaning. Shawnee Telecom, 354

S.W.3d at 551.

      I find it noteworthy that the plain language of the statute includes no

requirement of comparative analysis—meaning it does not require that a

                                         22
person work at or from one state (Kentucky) more often than another (West

Virginia), in order for his employment to be principally localized there

(Kentucky). Neither does the statute prohibit the ALJ from considering the

“temporary” nature of an employee’s work location at the time of injury. Nor

does it preclude the ALJ from considering an employee’s entire work history

with his employer. The statute simply requires that the employee “regularly

works at or from” a place of business in Kentucky at the time of his injury.

      As the Majority points out, this Court has previously employed the words

“customary, usual or normal” to define the meaning of the word “regular” in

some workers’ compensation contexts. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Cain, 236 S.W.3d 579,

586 (Ky. 2007) (citing Webster’s New College Dictionary, 934 (1995)). However, I

assert that the use of the word “regular” in the phrase “regularly works” in KRS

342.670 refers only to regularity of time spent at the place of business as

opposed to regularity of task performed at the place of business, as is held by

the Majority. In order for an employee to “regularly work” at or from a certain

place of business, he must “usually, ordinarily, generally, or routinely perform[]

his or her” work duties there. There is nothing in the statute, however, that

requires that the duties performed at that location must also be “usual,

customary, chief, or primary.” Such a requirement would further frustrate the

portion of the statute that extends coverage to employees who regularly work

from Kentucky.

      I further posit to the Majority that a determination of what is usual,

ordinary, or routine necessarily involves a consideration of past practices and

                                        23
temporality—exactly the considerations most persuasive to the ALJ in the case

before us today. The Majority’s interpretation of KRS 342.670 minimizes, if not

erases, those considerations from the ALJ’s review; surely this cannot be what

the legislature meant when it used the word “regularly.” I am of the opinion

that the legislature did not intend to exclude from workers’ compensation

coverage those long-term Kentucky employees, like Hicks, who devote

substantial portions of their careers to one Kentucky company and are merely

temporarily transferred out of state for the benefit of their Kentucky employer.

      I am further unwilling to say that the transient nature of Hicks’s

employment—his travel “back and forth” from Kentucky and West Virginia—

somehow disqualifies him from coverage under KRS 342.670. It appears to

have been overlooked that our extraterritorial coverage statute clearly seeks to

extend coverage to those workers who work “at or from” a place of business in

Kentucky. (Emphasis added). The presence of the disjunctive “or” indicates

those two words which it separates are to be given separate meanings. MGG

Inv. Group LP v. Bemak N.V., Ltd., 671 S.W.3d 76, 85 (Ky. 2023).

       The plain language of this provision benefits those workers, like Hicks,

that cross state lines for work, but maintain a regular or fixed place of

employment in Kentucky from which they are dispatched. See, e.g., Wagers,

833 S.W.2d 854; Dallas Nat. Ins. Co., 2013 WL 3155846; Gaddis v. Lone Star

Transp., No. 2009-CA-001173-WC, 2010 WL 2010871 (Ky. App. May 21, 2010).

Our extraterritorial coverage statute is perhaps most important to those

workers who work from Kentucky, because it is those workers who assume the

                                        24
greatest odds they will be injured outside of the Commonwealth, and therefore

it is for the benefit of those workers that the statute exists at all.

      Although the Majority relies heavily on the analysis conducted by the

Court of Appeals in Eck Miller Transportation Corp. v. Wagers, 833 S.W.2d 854,

this Court has only reviewed the application of this crucial portion of the

extraterritorial coverage statute once. In that case, we affirmed an ALJ’s finding

that a Kentucky worker who regularly picked up a truck from his employer’s

place of business in Kentucky, received goods to be shipped, drove those goods

out of state, and was then injured in North Carolina did work “from” Kentucky

for purposes of extraterritorial coverage. Dallas Nat. Ins. Co., 2013 WL

3155846, at *2. I see no reason why the logic of this holding cannot be applied

to those Kentucky workers, like Hicks, who similarly engage in frequent travel

across state lines in service to their employer.

      I reemphasize the ALJ’s findings that Hicks would “visit the [Kentucky]

office to drop off equipment, discuss payroll issues, pick up parts that he could

haul in his vehicle to take to West Virginia,” and that he would “receive

instructions [at the Kentucky office] regarding mining issues and execution of

mine plans in regard to mines in Kentucky and West Virginia.” These facts

certainly support a finding that Hicks worked from Southeastern’s place of

business in Kentucky. Dropping off and picking up equipment, along with

receiving instructions and mine plans from a central office, are analogous to

those employment tasks completed by the worker in Dallas National Insurance

Co. who we held did, in fact, work from Kentucky.

                                         25
      In sum, there is nothing in the plain language of KRS 342.670 that

precludes the ALJ’s award of benefits to Hicks in the case before us today, nor

did the ALJ weigh the facts of this case against an incorrect legal standard. In

interpreting this statute, I further embrace the principle that this Court should

liberally construe our Workers’ Compensation Act “in favor of the employee in

order to effectuate the beneficent purposes of the” Act. Lewallen v. Peabody

Coal Co., 306 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Ky. 1957) (citing Bartley v. Bartley, 274 S.W.2d

48, 49 (Ky. 1954)). The legislature’s use of the entire phrase “regularly works at

or from” indicates an intention to broadly apply its extraterritorial coverage

statute. The phrase shows an intent for extraterritorial coverage to be

comprehensive and inclusive. The Majority applies this phrase narrowly, which

is at odds with both the intent of the legislature and the beneficent purposes of

the Act.

      Simply, Hicks regularly worked at or from Southeastern’s place of

business in Kentucky for two decades and was asked to temporarily relocate to

Southeastern’s West Virginia location with the promise that he would soon

return to working in Kentucky full-time. Hicks obliged and began a 17-month

stint in West Virginia, during which he continued to work at or from

Southeastern’s Kentucky places of business on a regular basis. Hicks was then

injured at Southeastern’s place of business in West Virginia. For purposes of

workers’ compensation coverage under KRS 342.670, I cannot say that Hicks

did not “regularly work at or from” Kentucky at the time of his injury as a

                                        26
matter of law. Nor can I say that the ALJ’s factual determination that Hicks

“regularly worked at or from” Kentucky was not based on substantial evidence.

      Accordingly, I would affirm the ALJ’s award of benefits to Hicks.

      Thompson, J., joins.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

McKinnley Morgan
W. Gerald Vanover, Jr.
Morgan Collins Yeast & Salyer

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, KEMI:

Johanna Frantz Ellison
Taylor L. Oldham
Fowler Bell PLLC

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, SOUTHEASTERN LAND LLC:

Brandon L. Rosen
POHL, AUBREY, GRAY P.S.C.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE, UNINSURED EMPLOYERS’ FUND:

James R. Carpenter
Assistant Attorney General

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD:

Hon. Michael Wayne Alvey
Chairman

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