Court Opinion

ID: 9790293
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:50:09.378105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:27.973843
License: Public Domain

CARTER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I agree with the reasons given by the majority for reversing the judgment against Mrs. Abrahamson, but I can no longer assent to the dogma, so long parroted, -that a juror’s affidavit cannot be used to impeach his verdict.
The common formula that “a juror’s testimony or affidavit is not receivable to impeach his own verdict is not correct as a statement of existing law, nor is it maintainable on any principle in this unqualified form.” “It is a mere shibboleth and has no intrinsic signification whatever.” (8 Wigmore on Evidence, Privileged Communications, § 2345, p. 663.) Notwithstanding Wigmore’s acute analysis disapproving the form in which the rule exists and the automatic application of it by the courts (8 Wigmore on Evidence, Privileged Communications, §§2345-2356), the practice in both aspects, unfortunately, remains unchanged. This persistence may, per*775haps, be attributed to the one great difficulty with a rule that may be stated clearly and simply. When such a rule is completed and rounded, the corners smoothed and the content cohesive and coherent, it is likely to become a thing in itself, a work of art. It is then like a finely engineered bridge or a completed painting. One hates to disturb it. Even if knowledge and experience should demonstrate its obsolescence, one hates to tear it down because it has existed so long in its original design. I resist any such temptation and approach to the law.
The rule that a juror may not impeach his verdict is founded on three independent and general principles: (1) Privileged communications; (2) parol evidence rule; and (3) self-stultifying testimony. (8 Wigmore on Evidence, Privileged Communications, § 2345.)
The application of the principle of privileged communications between jurors is to insure the attainment of the jurors’ constitutional purposes. It prohibits the disclosure of communications with a fellow juror upon the witness stand without the latter’s consent. However, this principle is generally not significant primarily because what is said between jurors is seldom relevant at a new trial. (8 Wigmore on Evidence, Privileged Communications, § 2346.) Moreover, what is disclosed in the affidavit herein is not in the nature of a communication.
As for the doctrine of self-stultifying testimony, this principle forbids a juror from showing that a juror’s behavior was not in the prescribed form which is necessary before a juror’s actions may be valid. (8 Wigmore on Evidence, Privileged Communications, § 2345.) It is based on the principle “nemo turpitudinem suam allegans audietur” (a witness shall not be heard to allege his own turpitude). (8 Wigmore on Evidence, Privileged Communications, § 2345.) Wigmore convincingly establishes that this principle no longer exists in our law and should not be resurrected for present purposes. (8 Wigmore on Evidence, Privileged Communications, §§ 2352-2353.)
Therefore, the only principle on which we may validly reject the affidavits of the jurors herein is by the application of the parol evidence rule. This principle applies to the verdict of a jury like a will or a contract or a judgment.
Applying this principle it is evident that a juror’s motives, beliefs, misunderstandings, intentions, and the like are immaterial. The verdict is the sole embodiment of the juror’s acts. *776“The policy which requires this is the same which forbids a consideration of the negotiations of parties to a contract leading up to the final terms as deliberately embodied in the deed, namely, the loss of all certainty in the verdict, the impracticability of seeking for definiteness in the preliminary views, the risk of misrepresentation after disclosure of the verdict, and the impossibility of expecting any end to trials if the grounds for the verdict were allowed to effect its overthrow.” (8 Wigmore on Evidence, Privileged Communications, § 2349, p. 668.) This rule and policy is followed in California. (Amsby v. Dickhouse, 4 Cal. 102, 103; People v. Wyman, 15 Cal. 70, 75; People v. Hughes, 29 Cal. 257, 258, 263; see People v. Reid, 195 Cal. 249 [232 P. 457, 36 A.L.R. 1435].) Accordingly the statements by the jurors in their affidavits that the foreman told them that they would have to abide by the verdicts completed by him or they would never again be allowed to act as jurors are immaterial and may properly be excluded.
However, the policy of the parol evidence rule prohibiting the disclosure of a juror’s motives, beliefs, misunderstandings, et cetera, does not compel a similar conclusion with respect to disclosure of irregularities and misconduct of jurors during their deliberations which constitute deviations from those certain formalities that are regarded as desirable policy-wise in the conduct of jury deliberations. The law of verdicts “must prescribe requisite formalities of conduct for the jurors, and define those informalities and irregularities which ‘per se’ invalidate the verdict. What those shall be is thus elsewhere in the law predetermined. The principle of the Parol Evidence rule then enters and declares that the lack of such formalities, for this as for every other legal act (whatever the respective required formality may be), is always proper to establish as a ground for declaring the act void. Whatever misconduct of the jury, therefore, is an irregularity fatal to the verdict may always be proved.” (8 Wigmore on Evidence, Privileged Communications, § 2352, p. 683.)
Admittedly the distinction between motive and irregularity may sometimes be shadowy and difficult to perceive, but this offers no excuse for not attempting to remove the cloud of uncertainty. Moreover, it is readily apparent that a court by merely pronouncing the “shibboleth that a juror cannot impeach his verdict can never appreciate the vital distinction between impeaching” it by motive and impeaching it by irregular conduct. (8 Wigmore on Evidence, Privileged Communications, § 2349.)
*777If Wigmore is correct in his deductions that the prohibition against impeaching a jury verdict is founded on the policy behind privileged communications and the parol evidence rule, then this court should be ready to refer its rule to those ends, stating why those ends are desirable, what is given up to attain them, and whether they are worth the price. A reading of the majority opinion leaves one in doubt as to what end is being subserved. This doubt is permitted to grow because of the court’s interpretation of the phrase “irregularity in the proceedings,” which appears in subdivision 1 of section 657 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The majority opinion declares that this phrase “does not refer to jurors’ affidavits and may not be regarded as permitting the use of such affidavits in situations where they would not otherwise be proper.”
In view of the principles heretofore stated the holding of the majority avoids the very question the court should decide, i. e., do the affidavits allege irregularity and misconduct which constitute deviations from those formalities that are regarded as desirable in jury deliberations? This is a policy question that has been left to the courts to work out case by ease. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 657, subd. 1.) After due consideration this court might well conclude that the allegations in the affidavits do not state a deviation from the desired formalities, but such a conclusion should only be reached after careful thought.
The court should reconsider the matter clearly setting forth its reasons. This can only be accomplished by rejecting the automatic formula that a juror’s testimony or affidavit is not receivable to impeach his own verdict.
I think the affidavits in the instant case are sufficient to establish misconduct of a character justifying the impeachment of the verdict and that a new trial should be granted as to all parties and all issues.