Court Opinion

ID: 9810491
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:51:35.03778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:58.369410
License: Public Domain

Connor, J.,
dissenting: Plaintiff shows, without contradiction, that the telegram was written by bis brother, addressed to 1pm, at “923 East Marshall Street, Richmond, Ya.,” and delivered tó the operator at Beaufort. He then introduced Miss Lucy Edwards, who testified that “she was working for defendant company and the Beaufort and Newport Telegraph Company at Newport; that she transmitted 'a message similar to the one offered in evidence; that she received the message on the Beaufort and Newport line, and when it was received it was addressed to 23 East Marshall Street. Mr. Duncan is the owner of the Beaufort and Newport line, and I call it the Duncan line, and I received compensation from him for my services.” Tbe Western Union tariff book shows that the Beaufort and Newport line is an entirely different line. At the time the original telegram was received from Beaufort by her it was addressed to plaintiff, at 23 East Marshall Street, Richmond, Ya. Defendant has no office at Beaufort, as she understood it. There was no Western Union operator at Beaufort. Tbe plaintiff introduced the telegram addressed to and received by him in Richmond, “23 East Marshall Street.” Tbe message was sent from Newport immediately, and it is conceded that the delay in delivering the message in Richmond was caused by the mistake in the address. There was no other evidence on the part of plaintiff in regard to the place at which the mistake occurred. Tbe evidence of Miss Edwards was corroborated by defendant’s witnesses. There is, upon this testimony, no possible room for doubt that the Beaufort and Newport line was entirely independent of defendant company, and that the mistake occurred on' that line. There is not a scintilla of evidence to the contrary. Why, then, was defendant not entitled to the instruction asked? Plaintiff bad made out a perfect case against the Beaufort and Newport line, *326exonerating defendant from any liability for the mistake. When the complaint was- filed plaintiff alleged that defendant was conducting the business’ of receiving and transmitting messages between Beaufort and Richmond, and that 'on 27 July plaintiff’s brother filed with defendant at Beaufort the telegram, etc.; that it negligently failed to deliver the message in time for plaintiff to attend his father’s funeral, etc. Defendant, at the return term, answered, denying the allegations in regard to negligence, etc., and omitted to make answer to the other allegations. At the next term defendants obtained from the court leave, upon terms, paying cost, etc., to file an amended answer. Pursuant to said permission, defendant filed an answer denying that it had any office at Beaufort or that it received any message at that place for transmission. The amended answer, in this respect, was in exact accord with plaintiff’s proof. The original answer was introduced as evidence to show that, in truth, notwithstanding plaintiff’s evidence, defendant did receive the message at Beaufort, and the jury were permitted to find the fact. The plaintiff recovers a verdict and damages in direct contradiction of his own- proof, because the Counsel for defendant omitted in the original answer to deny the allegation. It was permitted to file the amended answer, and did so, alleging just what plaintiff proved. I do not deny that admissions in .an answer, although afterwards cured by amendment, may be introduced in evidence when the truth of the matter alleged in the answer is in controversy. Here the truth of the matter alleged in the answer was not only not in controversy, but was established beyond controversy by plaintiff’s witness. His Honor instructed the jury that if they found that the mistake in the address occurred at the Beaufort office they should answer the issue for defendant. The plaintiff showed by his own witness that it did occur at that office. As frequently occurs, counsel inadvertently failed to answer'an allegation and, .as matter of course, is permitted to put in a denial. This is very far from being a “solemn admission,” as if defendant had admitted the allegation. The purpose of a judicial trial is to ascertain the truth and administer the law as applicable to the facts. Rules of pleading and practice are made to promote this end. The plaintiff may show the fact to be different from the testimony of *327bis witness, but be cannot impeach bis witness and ask the jury to discredit ber. In tbis case be did neither, but be fixed liability upon one company and recovers damages from another. It is not suggested that there was any connection between the two lines fixing liability upon defendant company for the mistake of the Beaufort and Newport line. Plaintiff shows that the telegram was delivered to the Beaufort and Newport operator, addressed to “923 East Marshall Street”; that it was received by defendant’s operator, addressed to “23 East Marshall Street,” transmitted and delivered to the plaintiff in Richmond, addressed to “23 East Marshall Street”; and yet, for injury conceded to result from the mistake made at Beaufort, the defendant is made to pay damages, and this because counsel inádvertently failed to answer an allegation of the complaint which, by permission, it did answer and deny. I think that bis Honor should have told the jury that, upon the uneontradicted evidence, the mistake occurred on the Beaufort and Newport line, for which defendant was not responsible. There is *no denial that defendant delivered the message promptly when the correct address was given it. Tbe only suggestion of negligence is tbat< there was delay in sending the office message calling for a better address. Tbis was, in the light of plaintiff’s evidence, the only question for the jury.
Brown, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion.