Court Opinion

ID: 9739010
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:07:11.905184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:09.644840
License: Public Domain

Reilly, J.
(concurring in the result only). I concur with the results reached by Judge Maher on both issues. However, because of a split of opinion on this Court with respect to the first issue, I believe additional comments are appropriate.
Defendant’s guilty plea does not operate to waive his claim that the police did not act with due diligence in executing the bench warrant charging him with violation of probation because such a claim contests the authority of the state to prosecute. In People v New, 427 Mich 482; 398 NW2d 358 (1986), the Supreme Court set aside its dictum in People v Alvin Johnson, 396 Mich 424; 240 NW2d 729 (1976), cert den 429 US 951; 97 S Ct 370; 50 L Ed 2d 319 (1976), and dictated a new test to be applied to distinguish between those rights or defenses which are waived by a plea of ghilty and those which may be asserted despite a guilty plea.
Today, we hold that a defendant, after pleading *512guilty, may raise on appeal only those defenses and rights which would preclude the state from obtaining a valid conviction against the defendant. Such rights and defenses "reach beyond the factual determination of defendant’s guilt and implicate the very authority of the state to bring a defendant to trial . . . [People v] White, 411 Mich [366] 398 [308 NW2d 128 (1981)] .... In such cases, the state has no legitimate interest in securing a conviction. On the other hand, where the defense or right asserted by defendant relates solely to the capacity of the state to prove defendant’s factual guilt; it is subsumed by defendant’s guilty plea.
In summary, ... a criminal defendant may appeal from an unconditional guilty plea . . . only where the claim on appeal implicates the very authority of the state to bring the defendant to trial, that is, where the right of the government to prosecute the defendant is challenged. Such rights are never waived by a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. [427 Mich 491, 495-496.]
Such a challenge is made in this case because defendant claims that if due diligence was not exercised, the probation violation should have been waived and the court should have lost jurisdiction. People v Miller, 77 Mich App 381; 258 NW2d 235 (1977).
I recognize that there is a split on this Court as to the eifect of a guilty plea on a defendant’s claim on appeal that there was a denial of the right to a speedy trial because of the prosecutor’s lack of due diligence. Those cases deal with a claim similar to the one posed by the facts of this case. The panels which would hold that a guilty plea waives the right to a speedy trial have, without discussion, cited various federal cases in support of their position. See People v Rivera, 164 Mich App 670; *513417 NW2d 569 (1987); People v Parshay, 104 Mich App 411; 304 NW2d 593 (1981), lv den 411 Mich 1081 (1981).
I have reviewed the cited federal cases and the earlier cases upon which they rely. The rationale which supports the position that a "speedy trial” or "due diligence” right is always "waived” by a guilty plea was provided by Judge Learned Hand in United States v Parrino, 203 F2d 284 (CA 2, 1953). In that case the court ruled that a habeas corpus motion to vacate sentence was not the proper remedy when the defendant was claiming on appeal that his guilty plea should be set aside because of his statute of limitations defense. The court explained that prior to the enactment of FRCP 12(a), an accused person could assert the statute of limitations to avoid prosecution by either a "special plea” in response to an indictment or by presenting evidence "under the general issue.” However, Rule 12(a) abolished all defensive pleadings except "not guilty” and provided that defenses which previously had been raised by demurrer must be raised only by a motion to dismiss. In his opinion, Judge Hand reasoned that because the statute of limitations could not be raised by demurrer under the old practice, it could not, under Rule 12(a), be raised by a motion to dismiss. That being so, it must be raised by a plea of "not guilty.” Recognizing the procedural aspects of the situation, the court determined:
[I]f the plea stands, the defence of the Statute of Limitations is out of the case, and the only question open is whether Parrino shall be allowed to withdraw it. Id. at 287.
The court emphasized that it was not ruling on Parrino’s right to withdraw his plea under Rule 32(d), based upon a claim of manifest injustice.
*514None of the federal cases reviewed dealt with the underlying substantive issue relating to the authority of the state to prosecute the case or the fact that a plea of guilty does not directly address the right of the government to proceed. Nor did any of the cases reviewed suggest any basis for a determination by this Court that the test enunciated in People v New should not be applicable in this case. I therefore concur that People v New is the controlling law on this issue.
I also agree that this case must be remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether due diligence was exercised and what prejudice to defendant, if any, occurred, using the guidelines recognized in People v Miller, supra. However, I reject Judge Maher’s statement that the twenty-seven-week delay was "unreasonable on its face.” Considering the nature of the charge made here, and recognizing the tremendous workload being handled by the various law enforcement agencies involved, I would not make any presumption as to the question of reasonableness, but would leave such determination to the factfinder.