Court Opinion

ID: 9626473
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:13:55.297932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:28.068884
License: Public Domain

*1059BURKE, J.
I dissent. The majority opinion holds that the privilege against self-incrimination, though applicable to section 20002 of the Vehicle Code, does not furnish a defense to a charge of violation of that section since the privilege is satisfied by precluding prosecuting authorities from using information divulged in compliance therewith {ante, p. 1057). Nevertheless, the majority would affirm the judgment granting the writ of prohibition to Byers on the sole ground that “fairness dictates that Byers not be punished for his failure to comply with section 20002,” relying upon Murphy v. Waterfront Com., 378 U.S. 52, 79-80 [12 L.Ed.2d 678, 695-696, 84 S.Ct. 1944] (ante, p. 1057). I do not believe that the rationale of Murphy should be applied to the instant case.
In Murphy, petitioners claimed the privilege and refused to testify at a state agency hearing on the ground that their testimony might tend to incriminate them under federal law. The court held that petitioners could be compelled to answer the questions propounded to them, since the federal authorities would be prohibited from using their testimony or its fruits against them in any subsequent criminal proceeding. However, the court vacated the contempt judgment in order to afford petitioners an opportunity to testify and thereby purge themselves of contempt. The court noted that at the time petitioners refused to testify, they had a “reasonable fear, based on this Court’s decision in Feldman v. United States . . . [322 U.S. 487 (88 L.Ed. 1408, 64 S.Ct. 1082, 154 A.L.R. 982)], that the federal authorities might use the questions against them. ...” (378 U.S. at p. 79 [12 L.Ed.2d at p. 695].)
The result reached in Murphy appears defensible, as it not only gave petitioners, who had claimed the privilege under a “reasonable fear” of federal prosecution, an opportunity to purge themselves of contempt by furnishing the requested information, but also promoted the interests of the state in obtaining that information from them. However, Murphy should not be used to totally exculpate Byers from his violation of section 20002.
Unlike the petitioners in Murphy, Byers claimed no privilege when he violated section 20002 — instead he simply left *1060the scene of the accident without furnishing the required information. Nothing in the record suggests that in so doing Byers intended to claim or exercise the privilege against self-incrimination under a reasonable fear of prosecution. As the majority opinion indicates, California decisions in existence at the time of the accident did not. recognize the application of the privilege to “hit-and-run” cases, {ante, p. 1058.)
Therefore, if Byers was unaware of the existence of the privilege and was not acting in reliance upon existing state law, how are the ends of justice met by excusing Byers from conduct which, as the majority hold, remains unlawful and unprivileged? I cannot see any element of unfairness in holding Byers fully responsible for the consequences of his deliberate violation of section 20002.
Moreover, unlike the result reached in Murphy, the majority holding promotes no corresponding governmental interest to balance a determination of leniency towards Byers, since obviously any offer by him to comply with the requirements of section 20002 would come several years too late.
In my view, the judgment of the superior court granting a writ of prohibition was erroneous and should be reversed with appropriate instructions.
McComb, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied October 15, 1969. McComb, J., and Burke, J., were of' the opinion that the petition should be granted.