Court Opinion

ID: 9726485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:53:02.02404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:27.521394
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE STENGEL, dissenting: I must dissent from the majority’s conclusion that defendant Ricky J. McMahon was arrested without probable cause. Their reliance on Dunaway v. New York (1979), 442 U.S. 200, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 99 S. Ct. 2248, is misplaced. In Dunaway, the court held the defendant was “seized” in the Fourth Amendment sense when he was taken involuntarily to the police station. As noted in the majority opinion, the police were ordered by their supervisor to “pick up” defendant and “bring him in.” When seized, the defendant was not told he was under arrest, but if he had attempted to leave he would have been physically restrained. Because the police lacked probable cause to arrest him, a subsequent confession was tainted by the illegal seizure and was inadmissible. In making that ruling, the court noted that the limited intrusions in Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868, which were upheld, fell far short of the type of intrusion associated with an arrest. For purposes of arrest, reasonable grounds and probable cause are one and the same. (People v. Wright (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 523, 309 N.E.2d 537.) The existence of probable cause was set forth in People v. Robinson (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 273, 276-77, 342 N.E.2d 356, 358: or not probable cause for an arrest exists in a particular case depends upon the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officers when the arrest was made. [Citations.] In deciding the question of probable cause in a particular case the courts deal with probabilities and are not disposed to be unduly technical. These probabilities are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable men, not legal technicians, act. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 3 L. Ed. 2d 327, 79 S. Ct. 329; People v. Fiorito, 19 Ill. 2d 246, 166 N.E.2d 606.' Also it is proper to recognize in judging whether there was probable cause that ‘[pjolice officers often must act upon a quick appraisal of the data before them, and the reasonableness of their conduct must be judged on the basis of their responsibility to prevent crime and to catch criminals/ People v. Watkins, 19 Ill. 2d 11, 19, 166 N.E.2d 433, 437.” For a thorough discussion of probable cause, see Justice Linn’s dissenting opinion in People v. Creach (1979), 69 Ill. App. 2d 874,387 N.E.2d 762. A similar issue was confronted in People v. Ramsey (1979), 77 Ill. App. 3d 294, 297, 395 N.E.2d 973, 975, where they held: “Assuming, arguendo, that defendant’s stop and subsequent arrest contained elements of illegality, the products of the arrest would still be admissible against defendant in the instant case. As pointed out in Brown v. Williams (1975), 422 U.S. 590, 599, 45 L.E,2d 416, 424, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2259, quoting from Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 488, 9 L.E.2d 441, 455,83 S. Ct. 407, 417, all evidence is not necessarily ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ when its delivery results from illegal police action. Rather, the issue becomes whether the evidence was uncovered through ‘exploitation of that illegality’ or in a manner ‘sufficiently distinguishable’ to be purged of the primary taint.’ Brown, 422 U.S. 590, 599, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 424, 94 S. Ct. 2254, 2259.” I would agree that observing defendant at the rear of the premises that had been previously burglarized did not, alone, establish probable cause for the defendant’s warrantless arrest. However, those observations, considered in conjunction with the other circumstances, such as the similar shoe prints, the fact that defendant had no available automobile and was hungry, and that food was offered defendant by the police officers, certainly explain his willingness to accompany the police officers in their automobile to the station. At this point in time, I believe probable cause was apparent, and defendant’s consent to accompany the police was voluntary. In the case at bar the police officers did not brandish any weapons; the defendant was not frisked or handcuffed nor was he ordered to spread-eagle against a wall. On the contrary, Officers Madsen and Due testified that the defendant was free to go and was not under arrest until he had made his first oral admission. These facts do not warrant the adoption of the Dunaway standards to the case before us. In addition, in the instant case the police officer’s investigation of the burglary and the observation of the shoe prints by both officers, and the series of events triggered by that information were revealed “by means sufficiently distinguishable” from the initial inquiry, “to be purged of the primary taint.” Brown, 422 U.S. 590, 599, 45 L.Ed. 2d 416, 424, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2259. For the reasons stated above, I dissent.