Court Opinion

ID: 9690351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:08:37.827195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:52:12.859540
License: Public Domain

LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.
¶ 81. (concurring in part, dissenting in part). The majority, in affirming all three convictions of Charles Young (Young),1 concludes the following: first, the Kenosha police officer had reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop of the parked car that the defendant, Young, was sitting in; second, when the officer ordered Young to return to the car after Young started to run away, the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe Young was committing a crime; third, Young was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment until the officer physically detained him. Majority op., ¶¶ 5, 80. Because I agree that Young was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment until the officer physically detained him, I concur with and join Part III A of the majority opinion. I also join that portion of the mandate that affirms the judgments of conviction for each of the possession and resisting counts, albeit on different grounds. Because I conclude that the police initially lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Young in the first instance, I conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the charge of obstructing an officer. Consequently, I would reverse the decision of the court of appeals with respect to that count.
¶ 82. The four elements of obstructing an officer pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1), are as follows:
*431. The defendant obstructed an officer.
2. The officer was doing an act in an official capacity.
3. The officer was acting with lawful authority.
4. The defendant knew that (officer) was an officer acting in an official capacity and with lawful authority and that the defendant knew (his) (her) conduct would obstruct the officer.
Wis JI — Criminal 1766 (2003) (footnotes omitted). See also State v. Grobstick, 200 Wis. 2d 242, 248, 546 N.W.2d 187 (Ct. App. 1996) (citing § 946.41(1)).
¶ 83. There is no question that the officer was acting in an official capacity when he pulled alongside the vehicle and ordered Young to stop. For purposes of this analysis, I also accept that the term "obstructed" as used in the first element, means "hindered, delayed, impeded, frustrated or prevented an officer from performing his or her duties[.]" State v. Hamilton, 120 Wis. 2d 532, 541, 356 N.W.2d 169 (1984). See also Grobstick, 200 Wis. 2d at 249-50. At issue is whether the officer was acting with lawful authority at the time he initially ordered Young to stop, and whether Young knew that the officer was acting with lawful authority. See State v. Lossman, 118 Wis. 2d 526, 348 N.W2d 159 (1984).
¶ 84. For the reasons stated in Justice Bradley's dissenting opinion,2 I conclude that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion of the parked car in which Young was sitting. An investigatory stop is constitutional if the police have a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been, is being, or is about to be committed. Majority op., ¶ 20 (citing State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 56, 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996)). "Reasonable suspicion requires that a police officer possess specific and articulable facts that *44warrant a reasonable belief that criminal activity is afoot.... A mere hunch that a person has been, is, or will be involved in criminal activity is insufficient." Majority op., ¶ 21 (citing Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d at 55; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)).
¶ 85. Simply stated, five individuals sitting in a legally parked vehicle for nine minutes at night provides no specific or articulable facts that warrant a reasonable belief that criminal activity is afoot. The officer had no complaints linking the vehicle that Young was sitting in to any criminal activity. The individuals in the vehicle had done nothing suspicious to suggest that they were involved in criminal activity, unless, of course, sitting in a vehicle is considered inherently suspicious activity. No one in the car was observed drinking what appeared to be alcohol. No one in the car appeared to be engaged in drug transactions. No one in the car appeared to be arguing. The vehicle's radio was not being played at a loud volume. There was no evidence of littering around the vehicle.
¶ 86. The fact that the vehicle was unfamiliar to the officer adds nothing to the majority's analysis, as that would allow any officer to stop any vehicle that officer was unfamiliar with at any time, without regard to whether the person was acting suspicious. Moreover, while Wisconsin sports fans might view people from Illinois in a suspicious light, a person from Illinois being present in a Wisconsin border community provides no specific or articulable facts that criminal activity is taking place. No massaging of the facts here leads to a viable conclusion that reasonable suspicion existed prior to the stop.
¶ 87. The ramifications of the majority's analysis are downright frightening. If police can stop anyone they fail to recognize who is in a "problem area" without *45any articulable showing that the person is doing something to suggest criminal activity, such a rationale could be used to support the wholesale interference of anyone who fails to fit the "community profile": a person who fails to match the racial profile of a community, a person who has out-of-state license plates, etc. Moreover, if this court were to allow such stops within the state, then other states might treat our citizens in the same manner. Would a car possessing Wisconsin license plates provide the basis for a lawful investigatory stop in Rockford, Illinois? What about Duluth, Minnesota? Would wearing a cheesehead provide a sufficient basis for a lawful stop in another state? Of course, such a result would be ridiculous and intolerable.
¶ 88. Based on the majority's analysis, the focus is no longer on the behavior of the accused, but would now rest solely on the character of the community. I am not aware of any decision that justifies the interference of one's liberty without considering that person's conduct. I would not adopt such a rule now. The officer in this case lacked reasonable suspicion that Young and the others who were with him were engaged in criminal activity prior to illuminating Young's vehicle with his spotlight and turning on his flashing emergency lights.
¶ 89. Justice Bradley correctly observes that when the police "do not possess reasonable suspicion to justify such a seizure, citizens have the right to go about their business and walk away." Justice Bradley's dissent, ¶ 97 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983)). The mere "refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure." Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991). Young, therefore, had every right to go about his business and walk away, which, according to the majority opinion, is exactly *46what he did. Majority op., ¶ 11. Young got out of the vehicle, which he had a right to do absent reasonable suspicion. When ordered to get back into the vehicle, he started to walk away, which he also had a right to do absent reasonable suspicion. It was after the officer ordered Young to return to the vehicle a second time that Young started running toward the house, subsequently resisted the officer, and finally slipped out of his coat (which contained marijuana).
¶ 90. This court has recognized that "[fllight at the sight of police is undeniably suspicious behavior." State v. Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 84, 454 N.W.2d 763 (1990). Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that unprovoked flight is not a mere refusal to cooperate, but, by its very nature, is the opposite of "going about one's business[.]" Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000). While both courts recognize that there are many innocent explanations for flight from police,3 "flight is not necessarily indicative of ongoing criminal activity. This fact is undoubtedly true[.]" Id. As such, while flight "does not rise to a level of probable cause,"4 it does provide the officer with "a reasonable suspicion that all is not well." Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d at 84. See also Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125.
¶ 91. It is Young's flight, his physical resistance of the officer, coupled with this court's decision in State v. Hobson, 218 Wis. 2d 350, 380, 577 N.W.2d 825 (1998) (abrogating the previously recognized common law *47privilege to forcibly resist an unlawful arrest),5 that compel the conclusion that the officer was justified in arresting Young on the porch. It does not matter that the officer lacked a reasonable suspicion to initially stop Young. For public policy reasons,6 he had no right to physically resist the officer, and in any case, Young's flight ultimately provided the officer with a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Similarly, Young's coat could be seized and searched incident to his arrest for resisting the officer on the porch.
¶ 92. The same cannot be said of the obstructing count. Prior to Young's flight, the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that would justify a Terry7 stop. Thus, he was without lawful authority to order Young to get back in or return to the vehicle. Absent that lawful authority, the State has failed to establish the third element of the offense here, that being that the officer was acting with lawful authority prior to Young's flight. Thus, his flight cannot provide the basis for the obstructing charge. Further, the State has not and cannot establish that Young subjectively knew that the officer was acting with lawful authority. See Lossman, 118 Wis. 2d at 542-43. To conclude otherwise would relieve the State of its burden of proving each element beyond a reasonable doubt, and render the third and fourth elements meaningless. Consequently, I would reverse the court of appeals decision with respect to the obstructing count, as the evidence is insufficient to support that charge.
*48¶ 93. For the forgoing reasons, I concur with the mandate affirming Young's convictions for possession of marijuana and for resisting an officer, but I respectfully dissent from the decision and mandate affirming Young's conviction for obstructing an officer.

 Young was convicted of one count each for possession of marijuana, resisting an officer, and obstructing an officer.

 Justice Bradley’s dissent, ¶ 94 n.l.

 State v. Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 84, 454 N.W.2d 763 (1990); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000).

 Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d at 84. See also Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125. The majority errs in concluding to the contrary, ignoring this controlling precedent. Majority op., ¶ 56.

 1 do not mean to suggest that this decision relieves the State of its burden to establish the element of lawful authority. Compare e.g. Wis JI — Criminal 795 and 1765 (2003). Young has not challenged the sufficiency of evidence of the resisting count.

 State v. Hobson, 218 Wis. 2d 350, 371-80, 577 N.W2d 825 (1998).

 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).