Court Opinion

ID: 9781827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 17:32:48.985761+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:39.763228
License: Public Domain

LUMPKIN, Presiding Judge:
Concur in Results
T1 I concur in the Court's decision to affirm the judgments and sentences in this case. As I stated in my separate vote in Glenn v. State, 2001 OK CR 15, 26 P.3d 768, 772-774, I believe the Oklahoma Legislature provided broader application in the Oklahoma Corrupt Organizations Prevention Act, 22 0.9.1991, § 1401, et seq. (OCOPA), than that provided in the federal act. While the Oklahoma Legislature stated in Section 1419, the courts of this state "may follow the construction given to federal laws by the federal courts", it did not require us to do so. Our state OCOPA statutes should be interpreted independently to apply the intent of the Oklahoma Legislature and not the Federal Congress. That intent is evidenced through the limitation of the application of the act to those crimes defined as "Racketeering activity" in Section 1402(10). In addition, the Legislature has clearly defined what constitutes an "enterprise" under OCOPA. See 22 O.8.8upp.1998, § 1402(2).
T2 I am not enamored with either the use of federal caselaw to define terms that are already defined in the Oklahoma Statutes or the verbal gymnastics required to apply those statutes to this case. Neither am I willing to limit the plain language of the statutes to entities/individuals organized to conduct a legal business but who also commit criminal acts which come within our OCOPA statutes. The Court's opinion gives this im*1067pression. Regardless of whether an "enterprise," as defined by the statute, was created to engage primarily in legal or illegal activities, it could still be prosecuted if it committed a pattern of racketeering activity which meet the requirements of the state OCOPA statutes.
T3 Finally, I am afraid this opinion fails to give trial judges and attorneys the clear direction they need to administer our OCOPA statutes. This is a complex area of law, and this Court should always seek to clarify, rather than complicate, the application of our statutory language. Due to the breadth of my concerns with the Court's analysis, I can only concur in results.