Court Opinion

ID: 9930836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 20:01:52.412673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:44:29.502448
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10625   Document: 42-1     Date Filed: 02/07/2024   Page: 1 of 15

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                  In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 22-10625
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

        DALZIEL DALZEAL LLC,
        d.b.a Dalziel Law Firm,
        CHARLES M. DALZIEL, JR.,
                                                   Plaintiﬀs-Appellants,
        versus
        JOSHUA MELLBERG et al.,

                                                           Defendants,

        DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC,

                                                   Defendant-Appellee.
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        2                          Opinion of the Court                        22-10625

                                 ____________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Northern District of Georgia
                        D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-00377-MHC
                              ____________________

        Before WILSON, LUCK, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Plaintiff filed this action to collect unpaid fees incurred for
        legal services he provided to Chris Stanton, an individual who was
        named as a co-defendant with Joshua Mellberg in a Dekalb County
        defamation suit in 2014. 1 Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Mellberg
        from the action pursuant to a settlement agreement, and the dis-
        trict court subsequently dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Dickin-
        son Wright PLLC (“Dickinson Wright”), Mellberg’s attorney in the
        Dekalb suit, under Federal Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff appeals the Rule
        12(b)(6) dismissal. After a careful review of the record and the
        briefing submitted by the parties, we AFFIRM.

        1 The complaint names two plaintiffs: Dalziel, Dalzeal LLC and Charles Dal-

        ziel. The two plaintiffs have identical interests relative to this appeal. Accord-
        ingly, we refer to Dalziel, Dalzeal, LLC and Charles Dalziel collectively as
        “Plaintiff.” Likewise, we refer to Joshua Mellberg, named as an individual, and
        his corporate affiliate Joshua David Mellberg, LLC, as “Mellberg.”
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        22-10625               Opinion of the Court                          3

                                  BACKGROUND
               This case arises from Plaintiff’s representation of Chris Stan-
        ton in a Dekalb County defamation suit filed against Joshua Mell-
        berg in 2014. The suit involved allegedly defamatory statements
        Mellberg made in a press release. Stanton, the Dekalb County pro-
        cess server who distributed the press release, was named as Mell-
        berg’s co-defendant. Dickinson Wright, via its partner David Bray,
        represented Mellberg in the DeKalb suit. Plaintiff, who at the time
        was affiliated with the law firm Gregory, Doyle, Calhoun and Rog-
        ers, LLC, was hired to represent Stanton in the suit. Plaintiff alleges
        in the complaint that Mellberg “individually through his attorneys
        and agents personally requested that [he] defend Stanton at the ex-
        pense of himself” and his corporation Mellberg LLC.
                According to Plaintiff, he performed a significant amount of
        work in the initial stages of the DeKalb suit. Mellberg instructed
        Plaintiff to bill his time for this work at $355 per hour, which Plain-
        tiff did. Pursuant to their billing arrangement, Plaintiff sent Mell-
        berg an invoice in October 2014 for $28,812.78, representing the
        fees incurred for services provided to Stanton through that date.
        Mellberg did not contest the invoice, and he told Plaintiff he would
        pay it. However, no payment was forthcoming.
                In June 2015, Plaintiff emailed Mellberg and Dickinson
        Wright about the outstanding invoice. Plaintiff stated in the email
        that it was his understanding Mellberg was responsible for paying
        the invoice. In response to Plaintiff’s email, Mellberg likewise con-
        firmed that he was responsible for payment. In a separate response,
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                22-10625

        Dickinson Wright attorney Bray explained to Plaintiff that Mell-
        berg was trying to get Dickinson Wright’s and Plaintiff’s invoices
        paid by Mellberg’s insurance carrier, State Farm. Bray advised that
        he had suggested Mellberg make an immediate, partial payment to
        Plaintiff while awaiting a response from State Farm. But again, no
        payment was forthcoming. Plaintiff alleges that the delay hurt his
        standing with his own law firm and contributed to a mental health
        crisis that led to his hospitalization for depression.
                When he returned to work after his release from the hospi-
        tal, Plaintiff resumed his efforts to collect on Mellberg’s outstand-
        ing invoice. In response to these efforts, Bray again affirmed to
        Plaintiff that Mellberg had acknowledged his responsibility for pay-
        ment, and he told Plaintiff he would try to secure payment via
        Mellberg’s new corporate counsel. Thereafter, Plaintiff sent an
        email to Dickinson Wright in which he offered to accept $25,000 to
        settle the unpaid invoice. Dickinson Wright did not accept the of-
        fer or otherwise agree to pay the $25,000, and Bray relayed to Plain-
        tiff that he had communicated the offer to Mellberg, who appar-
        ently did not accept it either.
               Meanwhile the Dekalb suit, having been dormant for some
        time, began to ramp up again at the end of 2016. Plaintiff claims
        he was required to participate in costly discovery during this phase
        of the suit, precipitating another email to Dickinson Wright in July
        2017 requesting payment of fees in the amount of $48,161.05. Dick-
        inson Wright advised Plaintiff that it would try to talk to Mellberg
        about the outstanding fees, and it directed Plaintiff to discuss the
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        22-10625              Opinion of the Court                        5

        issue with David Robinson, an employee of Mellberg’s. Again, no
        payment was forthcoming.
               Despite not being paid, Plaintiff continued his representa-
        tion of Stanton in the DeKalb suit. According to Plaintiff, he could
        not in good faith withdraw from representing Stanton, who was
        facing a claim of $14 million in damages, and he believed he could
        eventually sue for his fees and other damages caused by the non-
        payment. Consequently, Plaintiff kept working on the DeKalb suit
        while simultaneously trying to collect his unpaid fees from both
        Mellberg and Dickinson Wright. During this time, Bray repeatedly
        acknowledged that Plaintiff should be paid by Mellberg, and he
        tried—unsuccessfully, and Plaintiff claims negligently—to arrange
        for such payment.
               In March 2019, Plaintiff sent an email to Mellberg and Dick-
        inson Wright stating that his fees and expenses, now totaling
        $150,000, were due immediately, and giving them notice of claims
        he planned to assert under the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act.
        A second email followed in August 2019, noting that no progress
        had been made on payment. Then, in January 2020, Plaintiff sent
        Mellberg and Dickinson Wright a statement of account indicating
        a balance owing of $197,000, with interest running at 1.5% per
        month and 18% per year if not paid within 30 days. In November
        2020, Plaintiff sent Mellberg and Dickinson Wright a statement of
        account indicating a balance of $231,058.50. According to Plaintiff,
        interest is still running at 18% per year on the balance from Decem-
        ber 2020 forward.
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                   22-10625

               Plaintiff filed this action in January 2021, asserting a claim for
        fraud against Mellberg, a claim for negligence against Dickinson
        Wright, and claims for open account and account stated, promis-
        sory estoppel, and constructive fraud against both Mellberg and
        Dickinson Wright. Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s com-
        plaint under Federal Rule 12(b)(6). Dickinson Wright argued that
        dismissal was warranted because Plaintiff failed to allege that Dick-
        inson Wright promised or agreed to pay Stanton’s legal fees and
        also because Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of frauds
        and the statute of limitations. Mellberg argued that Plaintiff’s re-
        covery of fees was barred by the statute of limitations and, moreo-
        ver, that any fees should be paid to Plaintiff’s former law firm ra-
        ther than to Plaintiff himself.
                While awaiting a ruling on the Rule 12(b)(6) motions, Plain-
        tiff and Mellberg filed a separate, joint motion to dismiss the claims
        asserted against Mellberg with prejudice and to remove Mellberg
        from the case. The parties indicated in the motion that Plaintiff
        and Mellberg had settled their dispute. The court granted the mo-
        tion and denied as moot Mellberg’s pending Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
               Thereafter, the district court granted Dickinson Wright’s
        motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s remaining claims pursuant to Rule
        12(b)(6). First, the court held that Plaintiff had failed to assert a
        plausible claim against Dickinson Wright for open account or ac-
        count stated because he did not allege a debt owed to him by Dick-
        inson Wright, and the allegations and exhibits attached to the com-
        plaint made it clear that the debt at issue was owed by Mellberg
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        22-10625               Opinion of the Court                          7

        rather than Dickinson Wright. Similarly, the court found that any
        promissory estoppel or constructive fraud claim against Dickinson
        Wright was precluded by the demonstrable lack of a promise or
        representation by Dickinson Wright to pay the fees Plaintiff in-
        curred representing Stanton. Finally, regarding Dickinson
        Wright’s alleged negligence, the court noted that Georgia’s version
        of the “good Samaritan” rule, which requires a person who volun-
        tarily undertakes a duty to exercise ordinary care in the undertak-
        ing, generally does not apply to the contractual obligation to pay a
        debt.
                Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his claims against Dickinson
        Wright. Plaintiff’s appellate brief does not discuss or otherwise
        challenge the district court’s ruling as to the negligence and con-
        structive fraud claims asserted against Dickinson Wright in the
        complaint. As such, we find that Plaintiff has abandoned those
        claims on appeal, and we do not address them further. See Sapuppo
        v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (“We
        have long held that an appellant abandons a claim when he either
        makes only passing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory man-
        ner without supporting arguments and authority.”).
                As to his remaining claims, Plaintiff argues that: (1) he has
        sufficiently stated a claim against Dickinson Wright for open ac-
        count and account stated pursuant to the requirements of
        O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-84 and 9-11-104 and (2) the allegations in the com-
        plaint, taken as true and construed in Plaintiff’s favor, state a claim
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        8                          Opinion of the Court                      22-10625

        for promissory estoppel under Georgia law. 2 For the reasons dis-
        cussed more fully below, we are unpersuaded by these arguments.
        Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s
        complaint against Dickinson Wright in its entirety.
                                      DISCUSSION
        I.      Standard of Review
                We review the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s com-
        plaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) de novo,
        accepting the facts asserted in the complaint as true and then deter-
        mining whether those facts are sufficient to survive dismissal. See
        Jacob v. Mentor Worldwide, LLC, 40 F.4th 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2022).
        The standard governing that inquiry, which was set forth by the
        Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
        (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), requires that a com-
        plaint “allege facts sufficient to raise a right to relief above the spec-
        ulative level [and] . . . state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
        face.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
               When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may con-
        sider exhibits attached to the complaint. See Turner v. Williams, 65
        F.4th 564, 583 n.27 (11th Cir. 2023) (“[C]ourts . . . consider the four
        corners of a complaint and the complaint’s attached exhibits when
        analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”). Furthermore, and
        relevant here, “when the exhibits contradict the general and con-
        clusory allegations of the [complaint], the exhibits govern.” Griffin

        2 The parties agree that Georgia law applies to this diversity action.
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        22-10625               Opinion of the Court                          9

        Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1206 (11th Cir. 2007). See also
        Turner, 65 F.4th at 583 n.27 (“[A] litigant may be defeated by his
        own evidence, the pleader by his own exhibits when he has pleaded
        too much and has refuted his own allegations by setting forth the
        evidence relied on to sustain them.” (quotation marks and citation
        omitted)).
        II.    Analysis
               A.     Open Account and Account Stated
               Under Georgia law a plaintiff can assert a claim for “open
        account” or “account stated” to collect payment for goods or ser-
        vices he has provided to the defendant “where the price of such
        goods or services has been agreed upon and where it appears that
        the plaintiff has fully performed its part of the agreement and noth-
        ing remains to be done except for the [defendant] to make pay-
        ment.” Altacare Corp. v. Decker, Hallman, Barber & Briggs, P.C., 316
        Ga. App. 718, 719 (2012) (quotation marks omitted and alteration
        adopted). The claims are slightly different. An open account is an
        account that “has not been finally settled or closed, but is still run-
        ning or open to future adjustment or liquidation.” Id. An open
        account becomes an account stated when the parties “fix the
        amount due” and the indebted party “promises payment of the bal-
        ance.” Kay Solar Sys., Inc. v. Rome Printing Co., 160 Ga. App. 825,
        826 (1982). But both types of claims require (1) an agreement by
        the defendant to pay the plaintiff for the goods or services provided
        and (2) assent by the parties to the price and other essential terms
        of the agreement. See id. (defining an account stated in terms of an
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  22-10625

        agreement for the payment of a fixed amount); Altacare, 316 Ga.
        App. at 719 (noting that suit on an open account is not available
        where there is a dispute as to “assent to the services” or other terms
        of the contract). See also Z-Space, Inc. v. Dantanna’s CNN Center, LLC,
        349 Ga. App. 248, 251 (2019) (“Agreement as to the amount and a
        promise to pay are essential requisites” of a suit on account.).
                Applying the above principles, the district court correctly
        held that Plaintiff did not plausibly state a claim against Dickinson
        Wright for either open account or account stated. Plaintiff states
        in the complaint that it was Mellberg, rather than Dickinson
        Wright, who agreed to pay and undertook financial responsibility
        for representing Stanton in the DeKalb suit. Indeed, Plaintiff spe-
        cifically alleges that “Mellberg individually through his attorneys
        and agents personally requested that [he] defend Stanton at the ex-
        pense of himself and Mellberg LLC.” Plaintiff acknowledges fur-
        ther in the complaint that he sent his initial invoices to Mellberg,
        per the agreement between the parties that Mellberg would pay
        the fees.
               The exhibits attached to the complaint confirm that the
        agreement between the parties called for Mellberg, rather than
        Dickinson Wright, to pay Plaintiff’s fees. For example: (1) in an
        October 2014 email attached to the complaint as Exhibit A, Plaintiff
        confirms that Wellberg was financially responsible for Stanton’s
        representation, (2) a June 2015 email attached as Exhibit B likewise
        reflects Plaintiff’s understanding that Mellberg was responsible for
        the fees, (3) a March 2016 email attached as Exhibit I states that
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        22-10625                Opinion of the Court                          11

        Plaintiff was “assured several times by phone and email early on
        that Josh David Mellberg, LLC” would pay the fees for defending
        Stanton, and (4) in a March 2019 email attached as Exhibit K, Plain-
        tiff references “the fees J.D. Mellberg promised to pay [him] for
        defending Chris Stanton” in the DeKalb suit. All these exhibits, as
        well as Plaintiff’s own allegations, directly contravene Plaintiff’s at-
        tempt to recover his legal fees directly from Dickinson Wright
        based on an open account or account stated theory.
               Contrary to the recitation of Georgia law set out above,
        Plaintiff argues on appeal that he did not need to allege that Dick-
        inson Wright agreed to pay Stanton’s legal fees to recover on an
        open account or account stated theory. According to Plaintiff, he
        stated a plausible claim under both theories by filing a complaint
        that complied with the form set out in O.C.G.A. § 9-11-104, a Geor-
        gia statute that provides a template for asserting a claim on an ac-
        count.
               We are not persuaded. The Georgia statute cited by Plaintiff
        creates a simplified procedure to collect on an unpaid account. See
        O.C.G.A. § 9-11-84 (noting the “simplicity and brevity” of a claim
        on account as contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 9-11-104). But an agree-
        ment to pay for the goods or services charged to the account is an
        essential prerequisite to recovery under that procedure. Z-Space,
        349 Ga. App. at 251. See also Scott v. Prestige Fin. Serv., Inc., 345 Ga.
        App. 530, 532 (2018) (“A suit on account must be based either on
        an express or an implied contract.”). Indeed, as explained above, a
        plaintiff cannot recover on an open account or account stated claim
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                   22-10625

        if there are any substantive issues to be resolved about the debt at
        issue. See Altacare, 316 Ga. App. at 719. Obviously, a dispute about
        whether the party against whom the claim is asserted has an obli-
        gation to pay the debt on the account would constitute just such a
        substantive issue.
                Plaintiff suggests in his appellate brief that his complaint
        does allege an agreement by Dickinson Wright to pay his fees. In
        support of this argument, Plaintiff cites a few paragraphs in the
        complaint that vaguely—perhaps intentionally so—assert that “de-
        fendants” engaged Plaintiff to defend Stanton and represented that
        “they” would pay his fees for doing so. Leaving aside the vague-
        ness of the allegation and the oddity of an arrangement in which
        two entities would agree to pay substantial legal fees without any
        specification of how that debt would be apportioned, we will as-
        sume that Plaintiff has alleged that Mellberg and Dickinson Wright
        jointly promised to pay for Stanton’s representation in the DeKalb
        suit. But even assuming that the vague statements cited by Plaintiff
        are sufficient to allege some sort of undefined joint payment ar-
        rangement, they are superseded by the numerous exhibits to the
        complaint discussed above, which clearly establish that Mellberg—
        rather than and not in addition to—Dickinson Wright agreed to
        pay for Stanton’s representation in the DeKalb suit and undertook
        financial responsibility for Plaintiff’s fees incurred therein. See Grif-
        fin, 496 F.3d at 1206.
               In short, Plaintiff’s claims for open account and account
        stated fail because Plaintiff does not allege, and the exhibits
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        22-10625               Opinion of the Court                        13

        attached to the complaint conflict with any purported allegation,
        that Dickinson Wright agreed to pay for the legal services Plaintiff
        provided to Stanton and thereby was obligated to pay the fees in-
        curred on an account, open or stated. At most, Dickinson Wright
        attempted to persuade Mellberg—its client and the party that in
        fact undertook responsibility for Stanton’s representation—to ful-
        fill its obligation to pay Plaintiff’s fees. That attempt does not
        equate to a promise by Dickinson Wright to directly pay Plaintiff,
        the absence of which forecloses Plaintiff’s claims against Dickinson
        Wright for open account or account stated.
              B.     Promissory Estoppel
                Plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim against Dickinson
        Wright fails for the same reason: that is, he cannot allege a promise
        by Dickinson Wright to pay the legal fees he is attempting to collect
        in this action. Georgia has codified the doctrine of promissory es-
        toppel. See O.C.G.A. § 13-3-44. Pursuant to the relevant statute,
        the essential elements of a promissory estoppel claim include,
        among other things: (1) a promise by the defendant, (2) upon
        which the defendant should reasonably have expected the plaintiff
        to rely, and (3) the plaintiff’s reliance on the promise to his detri-
        ment. Id. See also Hendon Properties, LLC v. Cinema Dev., LLC, 275
        Ga. App. 434, 438 (2005) (setting out the essential elements of a
        promissory estoppel claim under O.C.G.A. § 13-3-44).
             As evidenced by Plaintiff’s allegations and the exhibits to the
        complaint cited above, Plaintiff cannot plausibly allege the first el-
        ement as to Dickinson Wright. Plaintiff expressly acknowledges in
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                22-10625

        several paragraphs of the complaint that it was Mellberg, and not
        Dickinson Wright, who undertook financial responsibility for Stan-
        ton’s legal representation and promised to pay Plaintiff’s fees in
        that regard. Numerous exhibits to the complaint likewise confirm
        that was the agreed-upon arrangement.
               As with his open account and account stated claims, Plaintiff
        argues in support of the promissory estoppel claim that his com-
        plaint sufficiently alleges that Dickinson Wright engaged him and
        promised it would pay his fees as part of a joint payment agree-
        ment. Again, Plaintiff bases this argument on vague statements in
        the complaint suggesting that the “defendants” collectively en-
        gaged Plaintiff to defend Stanton and represented that Stanton’s de-
        fense would be at “their” expense and acknowledged that Plaintiff
        “should be paid.”
                Such vague promises generally cannot sustain a promissory
        estoppel claim under Georgia law. See Georgia Inv. Int’l, Inc. v.
        Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 305 Ga. App. 673, 675 (2010) (“Promis-
        sory estoppel does not . . . apply to vague or indefinite prom-
        ises[.]”). Moreover, and as discussed above, to the extent these al-
        legations assert a promise by Dickinson Wright to pay Plaintiff’s
        legal fees, they are directly contravened and superseded by numer-
        ous exhibits attached to the complaint conclusively showing that
        all the parties, including Plaintiff, understood Mellberg was respon-
        sible for paying the fees, rather than Dickinson Wright. As such,
        they do not state a plausible promissory estoppel claim.
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        22-10625                  Opinion of the Court                              15

                                     CONCLUSION
              For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s
        order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety under Federal
        Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
        granted. 3

        3 Given our affirmance of the district court’s dismissal on the above-described

        grounds, we do not address the other grounds for affirmance raised by De-
        fendant.