Court Opinion

ID: 9479122
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:08:55.994867+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:50.444899
License: Public Domain

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge,
concurring specially:
I join the majority’s opinion with the exception of the paragraphs discussing the imposition of liability on agency grounds. Although I agree with the majority’s conclusions, I see no reason to depart from the general principles of agency law.
A principal is liable for the acts of an agent only if the agent’s acts were within the line and scope of the agency relationship. Application of this general rule becomes more difficult where, as here, liability is predicated upon the commission of an intentional tort. Where the necessary intent bears no relation to the purposes of the agency relationship — as when one employee deliberately subjects another to racial insults and harassment — it will generally be the case that the principal will escape agency liability, although direct liability may apply in some cases. See Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., Engine Div., 797 F.2d 1417, 1423 (7th Cir.1986). Before holding an employer liable for intentional discrimination under § 1981, it will thus be necessary to examine carefully both the scope of the agency relationship and the connection between that relationship and the intentional acts complained of.
When applied to the facts of this case, these principles yield the same conclusions reached by the majority, and for the same reason: “in cases such as this one, where a clear agency relationship exists between the employer and supervisors with control over the operations of the employer and the employment status of the plaintiff, liability may be appropriately extended against the employer,” supra, 876 F.2d at 1236. Since standard agency law would reach the identical result arrived at by the majority, I would regard as dicta any suggestion that those standard principles do not apply in § 1981 cases.