Court Opinion

ID: 9789175
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:29:40.320303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:20.303959
License: Public Domain

Davis, J.,
dissenting: I join with Chief Justice McFarland in her dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Agent Pontius’ conduct rendered Morton’s statement involuntary and inadmissible. I write separately to emphasize that an application of the criteria to determine voluntariness, as set forth in the majority opinion, does not lead to the conclusion that “ ‘the behavior of . . . law enforcement officials was such as to overbear [Morton’s] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined.’ [Citation omitted.]” Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347-48, 48 L. Ed. 2d 1, 96 S. Ct. 1612 (1976).
*657The majority opinion accurately states that a determination as to whether a defendant’s confession is voluntary — and thus satisfies the requirements of due process — turns on whether the confession is “the product of the free and independent will of the accused. [Citation omitted.]” State v. Walker, 283 Kan. 587, 596, 153 P.3d 1257 (2007). The court considers the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement, including the following factors, as noted by the majority:
“(1) the accused’s mental condition; (2) the manner and duration of the interrogation; (3) the ability of the accused to communicate on request with the outside world; (4) the accused’s age, intellect, and background; (5) the fairness of the officers in conducting the interrogation; and (6) the accused’s fluency with the English language.” Walker, 283 Kan. at 596-97; see Morton, Kan. at 650.
In my opinion, application of these factors to the circumstances in this case — particularly in light of the previous case law of this court and of the United States Supreme Court — does not support the majority’s conclusion that Morton’s admissions were involuntarily given.
In this case, we deal with a 40-year-old, college-educated woman working in what appears to be a professional capacity with the Ottawa Recreation Commission (ORC). There is no evidence to suggest that her mental condition was anything other than that of a rational human being. In fact, the majority opinion recognizes that “there is no claim that Morton had a mental condition that impacted the voluntariness of her statements.” 286 Kan. at 650. Likewise, there is nothing in the record to suggest that at the time she talked with Agent Pontius, she was subjected to undue influence. As the majority states, there is “no evidence the agent was hostile, threatening, or abusive.” 286 Kan. at 650. In short, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Morton’s actions and subsequent statements were involuntary in light of the first factor listed in Walker.
The manner and duration of the interrogation further suggests voluntariness. First and foremost, the majority concludes that the session was not custodial, as Morton called the agent in response to his phone call to her, agreed on the place to meet for the interview, and drove herself to the session. 286 Kan. at 646-47. Morton *658contacted her attorney but could not reach him before attending the interview and nevertheless decided to meet with Agent Pontius. During the interview, she was told that she did not have to answer any questions and was free to leave anytime she desired, and she was not arrested but left of her own accord. The interview itself lasted for only a brief duration. Thus, the second factor does not support a conclusion other than that her conduct and discussion with Agent Pontius was voluntary.
The third factor — Morton’s ability to communicate with the outside world — supports the same conclusion that Morton’s statements were voluntarily given. Although the defendant was able to contact her attorney, she elected to go to the interview when the attorney could not be reached. She was free to leave anytime and was not required to answer any questions. She was free to come and go as she pleased. Morton has never claimed that she was deprived of the ability to communicate with the outside world. 286 Kan. at 650.
The fourth factor also demonstrates voluntariness. The majority opinion acknowledges that Morton does not claim that “her age, level of education, or background are relevant to the admissibility of her statements.” 286 Kan. at 650. This statement is somewhat misleading because these factors are surely relevant to a determination of voluntariness, as our discussion in Walker indicates. An examination of these factors demonstrates, however, that her statements were knowingly and voluntarily made. Morton’s age and occupation suggest a level of competence in dealing with world problems; her intellect, capable of obtaining a college degree, suggests an above-average intellectual capacity. This is a woman who had been interviewed by the police with her attorney present concerning the same matter — a woman who tried to contact her attorney for the interview in question but could not reach him so consciously decided to go it alone. Her background with this matter was extensive, as well as her background with the legal requirements surrounding surplus property and the demands of her position with the ORC.
In examining these four factors, the majority opinion came to the same conclusion that I do here — that all of these “other aspects of the circumstances surrounding this interview indicate that Mor*659ton’s statements were voluntarily made.” 286 Kan. at 654. Despite this recognition, however, the majority concludes that Morton’s statements during the interview with Agent Pontius were rendered involuntary solely on the basis of the agent’s previous statement that the interview was not the sort where she would need an attorney. To put this conclusion into the context of our due process jurisprudence relating to confessions, the majority has determined that the agent’s conduct in advising Morton that she did not need an attorney (thus implying that this was not part of a criminal investigation) had the effect of overbearing her will so as to compel her to make involuntary statements.
I do not dispute that Agent Pontius’ misrepresentation to Morton regarding the nature of the interview was wholly inappropriate or that it must be made crystal clear that his conduct is unacceptable for a professional criminal investigator. I would conclude — as the majority does in this case — that if Morton had known that the criminal investigation was ongoing, she probably would not have gone to the interview. But this conclusion wholly fails to support the conclusion that the interview was anything but voluntary on her part. Instead, as the Chief Justice notes in her dissenting opinion, we have tolerated this sort of material misrepresentation in criminal investigations on numerous occasions, and we have never concluded that a misrepresentation of law, standing alone, renders a statement involuntary. I would conclude that although the agent’s misrepresentation is certainly a factor to be considered in the court’s assessment of voluntariness, that factor alone does not indicate that under the totality of the circumstances, Morton’s statements were not the product of a free and independent will.
To reach its conclusion that Agent Pontius’ misrepresentation rendered Morton’s subsequent statements involuntary, the majority determines that the agent’s conduct had the effect of “ ‘misleading the suspect regarding points of law,’ ” and such legal deception “ ‘is generally held to invalidate subsequent confessions.’ ” 286 Kan. at 652 (quoting 3 Ringel, Searches & Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 25:8 [2d ed. 1993]). Interestingly, the majority recognizes that “ ‘giving the suspect false information regarding the status of the investigation against him [or her]’ ” does not have the *660same result of rendering a statement involuntary. See 286 Kan. at 652 (quoting 3 Ringel, Searches & Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 25:8).
I would conclude that Agent Pontius did not misrepresent the law to Morton. In fact, I question whether we are confronted in this case with a point of law. Even the majority opinion acknowledges that “[tjelhng Morton she did not need a lawyer because it was not that kind of interview did not misrepresent the law as Morton had no right to have an attorney present in a noncustodial interview.” (Emphasis added.) 286 Kan. at 653. Instead, the majority concludes that “the agent’s response to Morton’s question was an affirmative misrepresentation about the true nature of the interview.” (Emphasis added.) 286 Kan. at 653. It strikes me that Agent Pontius’ statement had the effect of “ ‘giving the suspect false information regarding the status of the investigation against him [or her].’ ” 286 Kan. at 652. While the agent’s statement took the form of legal advice — you do not need an attorney — this is not the type of misrepresentation of the law that might give rise to a voluntariness question. See State v. Haddock, 257 Kan. 964, 975, 897 P.2d 152 (1995), abrogated on other grounds by State v. James, 276 Kan. 737, 79 P.3d 169 (2003).
Giving due consideration to the totality of circumstances surrounding the interview with particular emphasis on the factors we have considered important in determining whether a particular confession is voluntary, I would conclude that Morton’s statement was voluntary. I realize that the resolution of this issue is not a numbers determination based on the factors to be considered, but given the strength of all other factors and the weakness of the one relied on by the majority, I would conclude that Morton’s statement was not obtained in violation of her due process rights.
McFarland, C.J., joins in the foregoing dissenting opinion.