Court Opinion

ID: 9499182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:40:05.145613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:19.947190
License: Public Domain

BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
After careful consideration of the issues in this case, I must respectfully dissent *657from the majority’s opinion. The district court’s dismissal of the Hardestys’ claims at the summary judgment stage was in error and should be reversed.
I.
The majority opinion omits a few important facts regarding the timing of events on that fateful night at the Hardesty house. Julie Taylor was arrested at 2:11 a.m. for drunk driving. Upon learning that she had consumed the alcohol at the Hardesty residence, the police chose to not go to the house and immediately enter but merely put the residence under observation. They observed the house for over two hours, until, at approximately 4:30 a.m., the officers decided it was an appropriate time to approach the house and ask the occupants some questions. After knocking on the door and, according to the officers’ testimony, ringing a doorbell (which in fact does not exist), the officers decided to walk around the house to see if they could rouse the occupants from the back of the house.
To be clear, the officers had no warrant to enter the house or search the premises. The officers acknowledge that there were no exigent circumstances justifying a search apparent from their visit to the front door. There was no indication that a crime was being committed inside the house or that there was any activity inside the house. Finally, the officers approached at 4:30 a.m. after observing the house for over two hours without any indication that a crime was being committed in the house.
II.
With these facts in mind, I will now address the review of the summary judgment in favor of the defendants in this case. The section 1983 ease stems from a Fourth Amendment violation against the Hardestys when the officers entered the back of their home without a warrant or a legitimate basis. Their claim relies on the recognition that their backyard and, specifically, the deck of the ■ house is part in parcel of the home and subject to Fourth Amendment protection. Areas that lie beyond the physical walls of a home but which remain under its protection are referred to as curtilage.
“The curtilage concept originated at common law to extend to the area immediately surrounding a dwelling house the same protection under the law of burglary as was afforded the house itself.” United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987). Blackstone explained the rationale behind curti-lage as follows: “if the barn, stable, or warehouse, be parcel of the mansion-house, and within the same common fence, though not under the same roof or contiguous, a burglary may be committed therein; for the capital house protects and privileges all its branches and appurtenances, if within the curtilage or homestall.” 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 225 (emphasis added). In Dunn, the Supreme Court laid out a four factor test for defining curtilage: 1) proximity of the area to the home, 2) whether the area is included within the enclosure which surrounds the home, 3) the nature of the uses of the area, and 4) the steps taken by the resident to prevent the area from being seen by people passing by. Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134. While I disagree with the majority in its characterization of the second factor 1, I agree with its eventual result, finding this area to be within the curtilage of the home.
*658Despite finding the backyard and deck of the Hardesty house to be within the curtilage of the home, the majority holds that the officers’ actions were excused by the “knock and talk” rule.
Courts have defined [knock and talk] as a noncustodial procedure [in which] the officer identifies himself and asks to talk to the home occupant and then eventual*ly requests permission to search the residence. Courts generally have upheld this investigative procedure as a legitimate effort to obtain a suspect’s consent to search.
United States v. Chambers, 395 F.3d 563, 568 n. 2 (6th Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This Court has also held that “[fjederal courts have recognized the ‘knock and talk’ strategy as a reasonable investigative tool when officers seek to gain an occupant’s consent to search or when officers reasonably suspect criminal activity.” Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 504-05 (6th Cir.2002) (quoting United States v. Jones, 239 F.3d 716, 720 (5th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 861, 122 S.Ct. 142, 151 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001)).
The majority states that the Hardestys have acknowledged that the officers were within their rights to approach the house. It is unclear from reading the Hardestys’ brief that such a concession has been made. However, I would disagree with the majority opinion that the officers had a right to approach the house. I read this Court’s precedent for the ‘knock and talk’ rule as requiring the officers’ decision to knock and talk to be a reasonable one. In this case, the officers acted strangely and without a reasonable explanation in waiting outside the house for over two hours then, at 4:30 a.m., approached the house to supposedly obtain consent for a search. I fail to see how, in this instance, the knock and talk was used as a “reasonable investigative tool.”
However, assuming that the original knock and talk was permissible, this does, not immediately mean that the officers had the right to further invade the privacy and sanctity of the Hardesty home and walk into the backyard. The majority, creating new law for this Court, holds that a knock and talk situation permits officers, upon receiving no response, to continue to the back of the house to look for its occupants without a search warrant. This bold extension of the ‘knock and talk’ rule essentially extinguishes the protections afforded to curtilage. “[T]he capital house protects and privileges all its branches and appurtenances, if within the curtilage or home-stall.” 4 Bl. Comm, at 225. A violation of the curtilage of the home is the same as violating the home itself. See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300, 107 S.Ct. 1134. To allow officers effective access to the entire home merely based on non-responsiveness to a knock at the front door flies in the face of the historic privilege extended to curtilage. Could the officers have, upon receiving no response from a knock at the front door, attempted to open that door and then enter the home unannounced? If we are truly to treat a home’s curtilage in the same manner and same protections afforded to the home itself, then a curtilage extension to the ‘knock and talk’ rule cannot be permitted under the Fourth Amendment.
The majority hangs this extension of the ‘knock and talk’ rule on the circumstance where “knocking at the front door is unsuccessful in spite of indications that someone is in or around the house, an officer may take reasonable steps to speak with the person being sought out even where such steps require an intrusion into the curtilage.” Maj. Opn. at 654. The majority believes this rule is sufficient to protect a home from officers entering curtilage when no one is actually home. Practically, however, this “safeguard” can not work. In this case, the Hardestys claim that the *659lights which were turned on and off inside the home (which the officers relied on to indicate that someone was present) were on a timer. Beyond lights set on a timer, one could imagine a number of “indications that someone was home” which are false indications. Security systems often turn on and off the lights or turn on and off a radio or television to give potential burglars the illusion that a home is occupied. Timed sprinkler systems or lighting systems make it seem that they are being turned on by someone within the home. Televisions, radios, and alarm clocks accidentally left on could give the impression that someone is present. Finally, voices from within the home could stem from a phone answering system or a friendly parrot. While these examples range from the realistic to the absurd, the reality is that to rely on “indications that someone is in or around the house” to destroy the Fourth Amendment protections of a residence is unjustifiable.2
Even if the majority’s extended ‘knock and talk’ rule is an appropriate one, I must question the decision in this case that the officers took “reasonable steps” when they entered the curtilage. I, again, must point out the more than two hours officers spent merely observing the Hardesty home. Then, at 4:30 a.m., the officers decided to approach, making their approach extremely remote in time to when they observed indications that someone was within the house. The time spent by the officers waiting outside the home was unreasonable. The time of the knock and talk, given the potential offenses in question, was unreasonable. Finally, the decision to enter the curtilage was unreasonable.
While the majority does not mention this, I believe it is also relevant to consider exactly what crimes the officers were investigating when these events took place. Julie Taylor, upon her arrest, told the police that she had been drinking alcohol at the Hardesty home with Joseph Har-desty, a minor. A first-time violation of Michigan’s Minor in Possession statute is a $100 fine and no jail time. M.C.L. § 436.1703. The Minor in Possession statute covers both possession and consumption of alcohol by a minor. Id. The “[Fjourth [Ajmendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless night entry of a person’s home in order to arrest him for violation of a nonjailable traffic offense.” United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1161 (6th Cir.1984) (citing Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 n. 10, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984)). Yet here we have a warrantless entry of a person’s home (treating the curtilage as equal to the home) at night to question the residents about an offense that carries with it no jail time. This Court has held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits such actions to make an arrest. Therefore, it is logical that the Fourth Amendment prohibits such actions being taken to merely question the occupants.
For these reasons, I would reverse the district court’s granting of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. Because I would reverse based on the officers’ violation of the Fourth Amendment by entering the curtilage, I would find summary judgment inappropriate whether or not there were exigent circumstances to justifying entering the home.3
*660III.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion.

. The presence of a line of trees surrounding the entire backyard, along with a railing encircling the deck, make the second factor one which I believe strongly favors a finding that this area is curtilage.

. I would be remiss to not mention the classic holiday film HOME ALONE (1990), in my discussion of how a home might appear to be occupied. In the film an eight-year-old Macaulay Culkin is able to outwit passers-by, convincing them that he is not home alone by using radios, televisions, lights, and cardboard cutouts.

. I do wish to note, however, that the “blood on the hands” of the person lying on the couch was, in fact, scabs on the knuckles of the young man who needed no medical atten*660tion after the officers entered the Hardesty home. Because this case is at the summary judgment stage and, taking these facts in the light most favorable to the Hardestys, it is hard to believe that the officers saw those scabs and believed it to constitute an exigent circumstance.