Court Opinion

ID: 9706677
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:49:18.687304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:24.346851
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Judge PaLladino:
I respectfully dissent. The decision of the Board in denying Claimánt a rehearing should be affirmed.
Whether to grant a rehearing is within the discretion of the Board. The medical evidence presented by Claimant at the original hearing was not equivocal; it was just not accepted by the referee. There was a full and complete record before.the referee. Claimant chose her medical expiert and that expert testified that Claimant had a soft tissue injury. Two years after the referee reached his decision, Claimant consulted another doctor who ordered a test, not previously performed, which indicated a soft tissue injury.
The Board determined that the referee had made his decision upon a complete record. I agree. Additional medical evidence, even if not cumulative, need not re*409quire a rehearing. There is no indication here that a full and complete medical inquiry was not made at the time of the first hearing. It is not necessary that every conceivable medical test which might aid in diagnosis be performed for a medical record to be complete. The Board did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant a rehearing to allow additional medical evidence “discovered” two years after the original hearing.
The majority’s reliance on Jones v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 76 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 345, 463 A.2d 1266 (1983), is misplaced. In Jones, the evidence was indeed after-discovered medical evidence. It was discovered as a result of a surgical procedure done to correct a medical problem. A myelogram is not done to correct medical problems. A myelogram is a diagnostic test. It is termed surgery only because it requires injection of a dye, making it an invasive procedure. The test could have been ordered by Claimant’s physician. He chose not to utilize it.
The majority opinion also cites the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Cudo v. Hallstead Foundry, Inc., 517 Pa. 553, 539 A.2d 792 (1988), as support for its conclusion that the Board abused its discretion in denying a rehearing. The Supreme Court in Cudo, 517 Pa. at 558, 539 A.2d at 794 (quoting Greeby v. Philadelphia Asbestos Co., 120 Pa. Superior Ct. 9, 12, 181 A.2d 452, 453 (1935)), stated:
[I]t is held that the court’s duty does not extend to sending the record back for an opportunity to furnish cumulative evidence to strengthen a weak case, as the board’s finding is binding on it; but it does not hold that so long as the record is within the grasp of the board it may not order a rehearing for further testimony to be taken.
Based on this test, the court in Cudo held that this court had erred- in reversing the Board’s grant of a *410rehearing because this court had applied the judicial standard for granting rehearings. The Supreme Court discounted “due diligence,” a part of the judicial standard, as a factor to be considered when reviewing the Boards grant of a rehearing. It did not foreclose the Board from considering it as a factor.
The Supreme Court in Cudo emphasized that the Board was correct in ordering a new hearing because the Board had determined that the medical evidence before it was equivocal and in light of the employees death from a heart attack while at work, a full and complete medical inquiry was required, in the interests of justice, to assess the merits of the claim.
Because factually we are not met with either a Jones or a Cudo case, we should not disturb the Boards exercise of its discretion.