Court Opinion

ID: 9464667
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:39:49.466119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:45.482840
License: Public Domain

*415FAIRCHILD, Chief Judge,
concurring.
I interpret the directions given by the Supreme Court on remand as requiring a determination whether or not (1) the state’s separation of the municipal boundary from the school district boundary was done with intent to maintain the concentration of black students in IPS schools and (2) the Housing Authority’s (and Commission’s) choices in the location of housing were made with similar discriminatory intent. If the record required us to say as a matter of law that there was no such intent, we would reverse and direct denial of interdistrict relief and dismissal of the cross-complaint against HACI. If it required us to say as a matter of law that such intent was present, we would either affirm the decree, modify it, or reverse and remand for modification by the district court.
I agree with Judge Swygert that existence or absence of intent cannot be determined as a matter of law from the present record, particularly since that issue was not really tried, and therefore agree that we should reverse and remand for further proceedings and findings on the issue of intent. If such intent be found with respect to (1) or (2), or both, the district court should impose an appropriate interdistrict desegregation remedy. If such intent be found with respect to (2), the district court should also enter an appropriate injunction against HACI (and Commission). I concur in reversal with those directions.
I agree, generally, with Parts I and II of the opinion prepared by Judge Swygert.
With all respect, I do not subscribe to all the matters stated in Part III. In particular, I do not agree with the analysis of the issue of intent in terms of “type,” “subjective test,” or “standard” of intent.
I recognize, to be sure, the difficulties attendant upon determination of the “intent” with which an action is taken by a state legislature or other multi-member governmental body. It is often difficult to identify the group of individuals who controlled a particular decision and whose individual purposes in making it are therefore the most significant.
Fundamentally, however, the intent of a body of individuals with respect to a particular act of the body must be determined by the same process as an individual’s intent is determined. It is to be inferred from acts (including acts and statements of individuals which can reasonably be attributed to the body) and surrounding circumstances (including foreseeable consequences of the act in question).
This is essentially a fact finding process. The Supreme Court has provided guidance in Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-68, 97 S.Ct. 555. As the Court stated:
The foregoing summary identifies, without purporting to be exhaustive, subjects of proper inquiry in determining whether racially discriminatory intent existed.
429 U.S. at 268, 97 S.Ct. at 565.
Part IV deals with the injunction entered upon the IPS cross-complaint, forbidding HACI to build future public housing within IPS. I agree that there must be a finding as to the intent with which HACI chose the locations of its projects.
Where a suburb had power to prevent HACI from locating a project within it, that suburb’s attitude would be relevant in the process of finding whether HACI acted with discriminatory intent in deciding to build elsewhere. Once HACI were found, however, to have acted with discriminatory intent, it is hard to see how the guilt or innocence of various suburbs would affect the scope of an injunction against HACI.
If and to the extent that relief were sought against a suburb on a claim that it violated rights either by preventing students from attending its schools or by preventing people from obtaining housing within its borders, its discriminatory intent would, of course, be relevant.