Court Opinion

ID: 9414636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 15:00:33.138889+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:56.442432
License: Public Domain

19-4304
     Mutoni v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                             Ruehle, IJ
                                                                           A205 277 608

                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                               SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 2nd day of August, two thousand
 4   twenty-three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7                   GERARD E. LYNCH,
 8                   RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
 9                   EUNICE C. LEE,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   CLELIA-ARIELLE MUTONI,
14            Petitioner,
15
16                   v.                                          19-4304
17                                                               NAC
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20              Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
22
23
 1   FOR PETITIONER:                     Anne E. Doebler, Buffalo, NY.
 2
 3   FOR RESPONDENT:                     Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Acting Assistant
 4                                       Attorney General; Ernesto H. Molina, Jr.,
 5                                       Deputy Director; Nancy N. Safavi, Trial
 6                                       Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation,
 7                                       United States Department of Justice,
 8                                       Washington, DC.

 9         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

10   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

11   DECREED that the petition for review is GRANTED.

12         Petitioner Clelia-Arielle Mutoni, a native and citizen of Burundi, seeks

13   review of a November 26, 2019 decision of the BIA affirming a March 5, 2018

14   decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which denied her application for asylum,

15   withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

16   (“CAT”). In re Clelia-Arielle Mutoni, No. A 205 277 608 (B.I.A. Nov. 26, 2019), aff’g

17   No. A 205 277 608 (Immig. Ct. Buffalo Mar. 5, 2018). We assume the parties’

18   familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

19         We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA. See Xue Hong

20   Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). We review adverse

21   credibility determinations “under the substantial evidence standard,” Hong Fei

22   Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018), and “the administrative findings of
                                              2
 1   fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to

 2   conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

 3         “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a

 4   trier of fact may base a credibility determination on . . . the consistency between

 5   the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , the internal

 6   consistency of each such statement, [and] the consistency of such statements with

 7   other evidence of record . . . without regard to whether an inconsistency,

 8   inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.”         8 U.S.C.

9    § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from

10   the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could

11   make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162,

12   167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Where, however, there is

13   an error in one of the bases for an adverse credibility determination, we remand

14   unless we can be “confident that the agency would reach the same result upon a

15   reconsideration cleansed of errors.” Gurung v. Barr, 929 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 2019)

16   (quotation marks omitted). We grant Mutoni’s petition and remand because we

17   cannot be so confident here.

18         The BIA relied on three inconsistencies in finding Mutoni not credible as to

                                               3
 1   her claim that she was kidnapped and assaulted because she was a journalist and

 2   feared future harm on that basis. But the first of these inconsistencies, regarding

 3   the year Mutoni completed her college classes, is not supported by the record.

 4         Mutoni initially testified that she “graduate[d]” from university in 2009 and

 5   began working at Net Press (a news organization) about four months later. Cert.

 6   Admin. R. at 265. She later testified consistently that she attended classes at the

 7   university until September or October 2009, began working at Net Press in January

 8   2010, and graduated in 2011 after writing a thesis. When asked why her diploma

 9   stated that she attended classes only until 2008, she testified that this was a mistake

10   that she had not noticed earlier.        The agency should have accepted that

11   explanation because the year on the untranslated document is consistent with

12   Mutoni’s testimony, and the inconsistency resulted from a transposition of the

13   dates by the translator. Compare Cert. Admin. R. at 788 (Translation) (diploma

14   issued “10/31/2011” and reporting that Mutoni “regularly took courses . . . during

15   the period from 06/05–09/08”), with id. at 787 (Original) (“durant la période 05/06–

16   08/09” and “Délivré . . . le 31/10/2011”); cf. Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d

17   Cir. 2018) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation for his

18   inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable

                                               4
 1   fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (quotation marks

 2   omitted)). An inconsistency remained because Mutoni testified that she attended

 3   classes until September 2009, while her diploma reflected that she finished classes

 4   in August, but that difference may be insignificant as it does not alter the overall

 5   timeline of Mutoni’s account.

 6         Further, the BIA overlooked the distinction that Mutoni made between

 7   completing classwork and graduating. Mutoni used the term “graduate” to refer

 8   to both events; but that imprecise word choice does not provide sufficient support

 9   for an adverse credibility determination. See Gurung, 929 F.3d at 61 (holding that

10   “trivial differences in the wording of statements describing the same event are not

11   sufficient to create inconsistencies . . . especially . . . where an immigrant applicant

12   is relying on an interpreter to convey his story”). Notably, the IJ did not find the

13   testimony to be inconsistent about when Mutoni graduated, but only about when

14   she completed her college classes.

15         Where the agency’s adverse credibility determination contains an error, “we

16   can (and we will) affirm only if (a) the agency offered a clearly independent and

17   sufficient ground for its ruling, one that is not affected by any erroneous adverse

18   credibility findings, or (b) the evidentiary record includes statements that are so

                                                5
 1   inconsistent that we can be confident that the agency would not accept any kind

 2   of explanation.” Id. at 62. We do not conclusively determine the validity of the

 3   other inconsistencies, but address them only to explain why we cannot conclude

 4   that remand would be futile. Id.

 5         The two remaining inconsistencies in the record are not significant and

 6   might be explained. As the agency noted, Mutoni gave a May 2011 start date for

 7   her employment at Net Press on her LinkedIn profile, and the agency was not

 8   compelled to accept her explanation for giving this date on her profile (rather than

 9   the January 2010 date that she maintained was correct). But, in light of the error

10   regarding the date Mutoni completed college classes, we are not convinced that

11   the agency would not accept any explanation for this inconsistency: there was

12   other evidence corroborating the January 2010 start date; the agency already

13   accepted Mutoni’s explanation for omitting different information from her

14   LinkedIn profile; and—as she notes here and as the IJ also observed—the date she

15   gave on LinkedIn coincided with her employer’s release from prison, suggesting

16   a plausible explanation that, in the context of a public profile for seeking

17   employment, she wished to disassociate herself from the company during the

18   period when its owner was incarcerated.

                                              6
 1         The final inconsistency related to the sequence of events during an alleged

 2   2012 kidnapping and rape. While we agree that the inconsistency was present,

 3   we cannot be confident that the agency would view Mutoni’s inconsistent

 4   description of a traumatic event in the same light if it viewed her testimony about

 5   other aspects of her biography as consistent. We note that the agency did not find

 6   that other lapses in Mutoni’s memory of this incident—including how many

 7   people raped her—undermined her credibility.

 8         In addition, the agency’s corroboration findings do not provide an

 9   independent alternative ground to deny the petition. The BIA found that Mutoni

10   failed to present sufficient corroborating evidence to rehabilitate her testimony,

11   but it is not clear that the agency would have required additional corroboration if

12   it found Mutoni’s testimony credible.         See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(B)(ii) (“The

13   testimony of the applicant may be sufficient to sustain the applicant’s burden

14   without corroboration” if that testimony “is credible, is persuasive, and refers to

15   specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a refugee.”); see also

16   Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s failure to

17   corroborate . . . may bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in

18   general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been

                                              7
 1   called into question.”).      Mutoni presented substantial country conditions

 2   evidence documenting abuses of journalists, including two with whom she

 3   claimed to have a relationship, and she also presented letters and other documents

 4   corroborating the alleged assault. Further, the IJ found that Mutoni should have

 5   corroborated her testimony with her press badge from Net Press, in part because

 6   her testimony that she had a badge was called into question by her witness’s

 7   testimony that he was a journalist at Net Press and he did not have a badge. But

 8   we do not read the witness’s testimony as denying that he had a badge; he testified

 9   that he was issued a badge, but he did not currently have it and did not generally

10   use it to identify himself.

11         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is GRANTED, the BIA’s

12   decision is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED. All pending motions and

13   applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

14                                         FOR THE COURT:
15                                         Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

                                             8