Court Opinion

ID: 9736891
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:09:07.132493+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:55.150802
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
The majority opinion carefully recites the four requirements for the application of the doctrine of comity, but fails to explain how the federal judgment in this case satisfies the requirements. Instead, the majority merely offers a cursory conclusion that the requirements were met: “We conclude that the federal court’s criminal sentencing of Daly meets all of the foregoing conditions.” Careful analysis demonstrates that the jurisdiction requirement is not met.
As we explained in Mexican v. Circle Bear, 370 N.W.2d 737 (S.D.1985), the doctrine of comity will not be applied to the judgment of a foreign court unless that court actually had jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties. Here, the federal court clearly was lacking in jurisdiction. The federal court can obtain subject-matter jurisdiction over Daly’s burglary charge only if 18 U.S.C. § 1153 applies. That statute applies when an Indian commits a major crime within Indian country. However, the Lumbee Indian Act specifies that: “None of the statutes of the United States which affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall be applicable to the Lumbee Indians.” 70 Stat. 255 (1956). Daly is a Lumbee Indian. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 affects Indians because of their status as Indians. Therefore, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 is not applicable to Daly, and the federal court lacks jurisdiction. Since the federal court does not have jurisdiction, only the state court has jurisdiction to prosecute this crime.