Court Opinion

ID: 9914657
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-02 18:01:05.798334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:15.751697
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-14103    Document: 30-1     Date Filed: 01/02/2024   Page: 1 of 7

                                               [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-14103
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       ANTWAN B. CHANCE,
                                                   Petitioner-Appellant,
       versus
       SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

                                                  Respondent-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 8:13-cv-01399-MSS-TGW
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-14103         Document: 30-1         Date Filed: 01/02/2024         Page: 2 of 7

       2                          Opinion of the Court                       22-14103

       Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Antwan Chance appeals the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254
       petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He argues that, because the
       evidence introduced at his state court trial did not support his con-
       viction, his trial and appellate counsel were unconstitutionally in-
       effective by (1) being insufficiently specific while moving for a judg-
       ment of acquittal, (2) not objecting to the State’s closing argument,
       (3) failing to file a motion for a new trial, and (4) not arguing on
       direct appeal that his trial had fundamental error. After review, 1
       we affirm the district court.
                                    I. DISCUSSION
               To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner
       must show his attorney’s performance was deficient, and that the
       deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Wash-
       ington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Deficient performance requires
       that no competent counsel would have taken the action. Pinkney
       v. Sec., Fla. Dept. of Corr., 876 F.3d 1290, 1295 (11th Cir. 2017).

       1 We review de novo a district court’s denial of a § 2254 petition but are highly

       deferential to the state court’s decision. Ferguson v. Culliver, 527 F.3d 1144,
       1146 (11th Cir. 2008). A claim in a § 2254 petition that was adjudicated on the
       merits in state court proceedings cannot be granted unless the state court’s
       adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that unreasonably applied
       clearly established federal law or (2) was an unreasonable determination of the
       facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C.
       § 2254(d).
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       22-14103                Opinion of the Court                        3

       Prejudice requires a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
       unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
       been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. When the state court
       applies the correct governing federal legal principle to the facts of
       the case, the petitioner must show that the state court’s error in
       applying the standard was so obviously wrong that it was “beyond
       any possibility for fair-minded disagreement.” Shinn v. Kayer, 141
       S. Ct. 517, 523 (2020).
       A. Specificity of Judgment of Acquittal
              Chance contends the State did not present sufficient evi-
       dence to support his conviction; specifically, he argues the record
       contained no evidence that he had put his finger in—as opposed to
       “on”—the victim’s vagina. Under Florida law, sexual battery re-
       quires penetration or union with a sexual organ, or penetration by
       an object. Fla. Stat. § 794.011(1); Seagrave v. State, 802 So. 2d 281,
       287 n.7 (Fla. 2001). “Union” can be contact, while penetration “re-
       quires some entry into the relevant [body] part, however slight.”
       Seagrave, 802 So. 2d at 287 n.7.
              A Florida trial court may enter a judgment of acquittal upon
       motion by a party if the evidence is insufficient to warrant a con-
       viction. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.380(a). The trial court should not grant
       the motion unless the evidence is such that the jury could not have
       lawfully come to its verdict. Lynch v. State, 293 So. 2d 44, 45 (Fla.
       1974).
              The Florida post-conviction court did not unreasonably ap-
       ply clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). It
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                22-14103

       explained the trial court would not have sustained a more detailed
       motion for judgment of acquittal, as there was sufficient evidence
       to present a question to the jury under Florida law. Chance cannot
       show this determination was beyond any possibility for fair-
       minded disagreement. See Shinn, 141 S. Ct. at 523. The victim
       made several statements that could result in an inference that
       Chance penetrated the victim’s vagina—she said yes when asked if
       she had been touched “in” her vagina, and said yes on cross-exam-
       ination when asked if she was testifying that Chance had touched
       her “in” her vagina. See Seagrave, 802 So. 2d at 287 n.7. And even
       if Chance were correct in arguing that this was an incorrect con-
       struction of Florida law, this Court could not grant his habeas peti-
       tion on that ground. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010)
       (stating a prisoner may not obtain federal habeas relief purely as a
       result of an error of state law). The district court did not err in
       denying Chance’s petition on this ground.
       B. Closing Argument
              Chance contends the prosecutor went beyond the evidence
       at closing argument by stating Chance’s fingers penetrated the vic-
       tim’s vagina. Under Florida law, proper closing arguments review
       the evidence and explain the reasonable inferences that could be
       drawn from it. Gonzalez v. State, 990 So. 2d 1017, 1028-29 (Fla.
       2008).
             The Florida post-conviction court similarly did not unrea-
       sonably apply clearly established federal law when rejecting
       Chance’s claim that his trial counsel should have argued that the
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       22-14103               Opinion of the Court                        5

       state’s closing argument impermissibly went beyond the evidence,
       as the evidence presented could reasonably lead to an inference of
       digital penetration. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Gonzalez, 990 So. 2d at
       1028-29. Its determination is not beyond the possibility for fair-
       minded disagreement, so the district court did not err by denying
       Chance’s petition on this ground. See Shinn, 141 S. Ct. at 523.
       C. New Trial
               Chance contends his trial counsel should have moved for a
       new trial, based on the same theory of lack of evidence of digital
       penetration. A Florida criminal court grants a new trial if “the ver-
       dict is contrary to law or the weight of the evidence.” Fla. R. Crim.
       P. 3.600(a)(2).
               The Florida post-conviction court did not unreasonably ap-
       ply clearly established federal law when rejecting Chance’s claim
       that his counsel should have moved for a new trial. See 28 U.S.C.
       § 2254(d). It found that such a motion would have been futile un-
       der Florida law, and that Chance’s counsel could not have violated
       Strickland by failing to file a futile motion. Chance’s counsel had
       already filed two unsuccessful motions for judgment of acquittal
       and the evidence presented at trial supported his conviction. He
       has not shown that no competent counsel would have failed to
       move for a new trial or that not doing so resulted in prejudice. See
       Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Pinkney, 876 F.3d at 1295. Accordingly,
       we affirm as to this issue.
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                  22-14103

       D. Appellate Counsel
              Lastly, Chance asserts his appellate counsel should have ar-
       gued on direct appeal that his trial had fundamental error. The
       same Strickland standard of review applies to claims of ineffective
       appellate assistance as to trial assistance. Tuomi v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t
       of Corr., 980 F.3d 787, 795 (11th Cir. 2020). Under Florida law, fun-
       damental error requires error that reaches down into the validity
       of the trial itself, such that a verdict of guilty could not have been
       obtained without the alleged error. Kilgore v. State, 688 So. 2d 895,
       898 (Fla. 1996).
              The Florida post-conviction court did not unreasonably ap-
       ply clearly established federal law when rejecting Chance’s claim
       that his appellate counsel should have argued that his trial had fun-
       damental error. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Its decision implicitly de-
       termined that Chance’s trial did not have fundamental error under
       Florida law. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98-99 (2011) (ex-
       plaining when a state post-conviction court denies a habeas peti-
       tion without opinion and there is no lower court state opinion to
       look through to, the federal habeas court must determine what ar-
       guments or theories could have supported the state court’s deci-
       sion). Chance has not shown his trial had fundamental error, be-
       cause the evidence presented by the state at trial supported his con-
       viction. See Kilgore, 688 So. 2d at 898.
                               II. CONCLUSION
             The evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude Chance
       penetrated the victim’s vagina with his finger. As a result, the trial
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       22-14103               Opinion of the Court                        7

       court would not have sustained a more detailed motion for judg-
       ment of acquittal, the state’s closing argument’s references to digi-
       tal penetration did not go beyond the evidence, Chance has not
       shown that no competent lawyer would have failed to move for a
       new trial, and his trial did not have fundamental error. Therefore,
       we affirm.
             AFFIRMED.