Court Opinion

ID: 9954605
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 17:03:57.661431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:58.539670
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/26/24 P. v. Contreras CA2/6

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                          SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                           DIVISION SIX

 THE PEOPLE,                                                      2d Crim. No. B317846
                                                               (Super. Ct. No. 19CR05914)
      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  (Santa Barbara County)

 v.

 ROBERTO CARLOS
 CONTRERAS,

      Defendant and Appellant.

       Roberto Carlos Contreras appeals his convictions by a jury
of sodomy by use of force (Pen. Code1, § 286, subd. (c)(2)(A); count
2), assault and battery (§§ 240 & 242; counts 3 and 4), forcible
oral copulation (§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(A); counts 5 and 6), assault
(§ 240; counts 7, 10, and 13), corporal injury to spouse (§ 273.5,
subd. (a); counts 8, 9, 11, and 12), assault with a deadly weapon
(§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 14), and spousal rape (former § 262,

          1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal

Code.
subd. (a)(1); count 15). On count 6, the jury found true
allegations he used a deadly weapon (§ 667.61, subds. (b), (e)(3))
and inflicted torture (§ 667.61, subds. (a), (d)(3).) He was
sentenced to an aggregate term of 50 years to life in state prison.
       Appellant contends: (1) the prosecutor committed
misconduct under Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609
(Griffin); (2) the trial court erred in denying appellant’s petition
for juror identifying information; (3) the trial court erred in
denying his motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct; and
(4) cumulative error. We disagree and will affirm.
         FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       Jane Doe and appellant were married with two young
children. From approximately November 2018 to June 2019,
appellant severely abused Jane. In one incident appellant kicked
Jane in the face, breaking her glasses and cutting her. She still
has a scar. Appellant hit her with shoes, vacuum accessories,
tennis rackets, and extension cords. On other occasions he
stomped on her, raped her, forced her to have anal sex, and
punched her.
       During the week of June 15 to June 21, 2019, Jane suffered
hours-long beatings nearly every day. Appellant made her watch
her reflection as he beat her. He said beating her gave him
pleasure. He searched her body for unbruised skin to strike her.
He held a knife to her neck. He placed a belt around her neck
and made her eat off the floor like a dog. He kicked her in her
vaginal area and he forced her to orally copulate him.
       When Jane dropped her children off at daycare on the
morning of June 21, a daycare worker noticed Jane had a black
eye. She had previously seen Jane with bruises and asked her
what was going on. Jane told her about the abuse and when they

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were both done with work for the day, the daycare worker
accompanied Jane to file a police report.
       The next day, an emergency medical doctor treated Jane for
injuries consistent with blunt trauma from assault and sexual
assault. Jane’s injuries were extensive and covered most of her
face and body. A Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner documented
Jane’s injuries.
       Jane’s boss and co-workers testified to having personally
observed Jane with black eyes and bruises. Appellant’s ex-wife
testified to having experienced similar abuse. During closing
rebuttal argument the prosecutor said, “Defense, I’d also like to
point out, not at one point in time during their closing argument
said, the defendant didn’t beat Jane Doe, right? That was never
said. Not once.” Defense counsel objected on the basis of
“improper argument, burden shifting, and Griffin error.” The
trial court found that while the prosecutor may not have intended
a Griffin error, her comment could be misconstrued as such. The
court instructed her to “move away from commenting on the
Defense’s argument regarding the defendant being the only one
who could have done this, or anything along those lines.” The
court then instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s
statement.
        The prosecution and defense counsel spoke with eight of
the twelve jurors after trial. Juror No. 8 said there was a
compromise. Juror No. 2 said there were “three of us” who did
not believe great bodily injury was proven beyond a reasonable
doubt as to the torture special allegation on count 6, so they
agreed to compromise. Juror No. 9 said she did not believe great
bodily injury was proven beyond a reasonable doubt for the
torture special allegation on count 6 and agreed to compromise.

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She said she and three other jurors wanted to vote not guilty but
compromised because there was group pressure during
deliberations. She felt she should have been “stronger in what I
believe.”
       When asked how they arrived at their decision, the jurors
answered, “there was a compromise . . .” Juror No. 2 said Juror
No. 12, “was adamant to compromise so that they wouldn’t have
to retry the case.” Juror No. 2 also stated regarding Juror No. 12
that he “[r]ight away” discussed his personal history of
experiencing family violence as a child and he “kept it up. It was
like he had a hidden agenda.”
       Appellant petitioned the trial court for an order disclosing
personal juror information under Civil Procedure Code section
237. He argued the information was necessary for defense
counsel to prepare a motion for a new trial based on jury
misconduct. The court denied the petition. It found the evidence
regarding Juror No. 12 “speculative” and the other evidence
inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1150. It later denied
appellant’s motion for new trial.
                            DISCUSSION
                         Alleged Griffin Error
       Appellant contends the prosecutor committed a prejudicial
Griffin error when she commented on appellant’s failure to
testify. We disagree with appellant’s characterization of the
prosecutor’s comments and accordingly find no error. We also
determine that even if Griffin error occurred it was harmless.
       Prosecutors may not comment “on the accused’s silence or
instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.”
(Griffin, supra, 380 U.S. at p. 615.) Griffin violations occur where
a prosecutor’s or trial court’s remarks draw attention to a

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defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege while implying the
exercise of that privilege infers guilt. (People v. Murtishaw
(1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 757-758, superseded on other grounds in
People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 772-773.) Griffin errors also
occur when prosecutors comment either directly or indirectly on a
defendant’s failure to testify (People v. Hubbard (2020) 52
Cal.App.5th 555, 563), or argue certain testimony or evidence is
uncontradicted when defendant is the only witness who could
contradict it (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1339), or
where there is a reasonable likelihood the comments could have
been understood to refer to defendant’s failure to testify. (People
v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663).
       Griffin does not extend to comments on the state of the
evidence or the defense’s failure to introduce material evidence or
call logical witnesses. (People v. Vargas (1973) 9 Cal.3d 470, 475
(Vargas).)
       Here, the prosecutor’s comment did not draw attention to
appellant’s failure to testify. Counsel merely pointed out that
appellant’s counsel did not argue appellant did not beat Jane.
(Cf. Vargas, supra, 9 Cal.3d at p. 474, italics omitted [prosecutor’s
argument that “there was no denial” is improper when it
connotes a personal response by the defendant].)
       Appellant contends the only possible source of evidence
necessary to support an argument he did not beat Jane would
have been his own testimony. Not true. As appellant’s trial
counsel argued, evidence could have come from “third-party
culpability [evidence]” of which there was none. Had he
presented such evidence, appellant would not have needed to
testify for his counsel to argue in closing he did not beat Jane.

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The prosecution was entitled to comment on his attorney’s failure
to argue he did not inflict Jane’s injuries.
       Even if the prosecutor’s comment could be construed as
Griffin error, courts have consistently held “‘indirect, brief and
mild references’” to a defendant’s failure to testify, without
suggesting an inference of guilt, is a harmless Griffin error.
(People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1340.) It is settled
that a prompt jury admonition will cure any Griffin-related
concerns. (People v. Carr (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 475, 484.) We
review alleged Griffin errors de novo. (People v. Hubbard (2020)
52 Cal.App.5th 555, 562.)
       The prosecutor’s comment was isolated and brief. She
made no claims of uncontradicted evidence that could only have
been contradicted by appellant’s testimony. The court promptly
admonished jurors to disregard the statement. (Vargas, supra, 9
Cal.3d at p. 479 [Griffin error harmless where remark was brief,
mild, and indirect and followed by prompt admonition]; People v.
Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 184-185 [prompt admonition to
jury sufficient to alleviate Griffin concerns].) We presume the
jury followed the trial court’s instructions. (People v. Yeoman
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 138-139; Francis v. Franklin (1985) 471
U.S. 307, 324, fn. 9.)
       “[F]or Griffin error to be prejudicial, the improper
comment or instruction must either ‘serve to fill an evidentiary
gap in the prosecution’s case,’ or ‘at least touch a live nerve in the
defense.’” (Vargas, supra, 9 Cal.3d. at p. 481.) “The effect of
Griffin error is assessed under the standard of prejudice set forth
in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 . . . . That is, ‘before
a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court
must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a

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reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.] That standard is met when the
evidence of defendant’s guilt is so strong as to leave no doubt that
the jury would have reached the same result in the absence of the
error.” (People v. Denard (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1012, 1022.)
       Appellant asserts there was a paucity of evidence and the
jury’s request for a rereading of Jane’s testimony establishes this
was a close case. We disagree.
       Jane’s testimony alone was sufficient to support appellant’s
conviction, but there was also abundant evidence corroborating
her testimony. The jury saw Jane’s medical records and
photographs of her injuries. They viewed the household items
used as weapons to beat her, including a tennis racket deformed
by repetitive blows to her body. Neighbors backed Jane’s
testimony with their own. Appellant’s ex-wife testified to an
incident of abuse that left a permanent scar on her face and was
eerily similar to an incident Jane endured. Jane’s boss, co-
workers, and a day care worker observed Jane with black eyes
and bruises and heard her contemporaneous statements that
appellant was responsible for her injuries. The jury heard from
police investigators, an emergency doctor, and the sexual assault
nurse examiner who treated Jane. The evidence against
appellant was so strong, we have no doubt the jury would have
reached the same conclusion even without the prosecutor’s
comment. Unless a witness’s testimony is “physically impossible
or inherently improbable” one witness’s testimony is enough to
support a conviction. (People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997,
1118; see also Evid. Code § 411.)

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               Denial of Petition for Order Disclosing
                    Personal Juror Information
       Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by
denying his petition for an order disclosing personal juror
information. He alleges two potential incidents of misconduct:
(1) juror pressure leading to a compromise verdict, and (2) juror
bias on the part of Juror No. 12. We conclude the trial court
exercised sound discretion in denying the petition.
       In criminal cases, the court’s records containing juror
identifying information are sealed once the jury has returned its
verdict. (People v. Carrasco (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 978, 989
(Carrasco).) Disclosure of juror personal identifying information
is governed by Civil Procedure Code sections 206 and 237. A
defendant may “petition the court for access to personal juror
identifying information within the court’s records necessary for
the defendant to communicate with jurors for the purpose of
developing a motion for new trial or any other lawful purpose.”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 206, subd. (g).) “The petition shall be
supported by a declaration that includes facts sufficient to
establish good cause for the release of the juror’s personal
identifying information.” (Id., § 237, subd. (b).) An adequate
petition must “establish a prima facie showing of good cause.”
(Ibid.)2 “[G]ood cause” exists if the petition supports “‘a
reasonable belief that jury misconduct occurred, that diligent
efforts were made to contact the jurors through other means, and

      2 Upon receipt of an adequate petition the court shall set

the matter for hearing unless the court finds there is a
“compelling interest against disclosure.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 237,
subd. (b).)

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that further investigation is necessary to provide the court with
adequate information to rule on a motion for new trial.’”
(Carrasco, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 990.) We review the
denial of a petition filed pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 237 for abuse of discretion. (People v. Jones (1998) 17
Cal.4th 279, 317; Carrasco, at p. 991).
       We agree appellant failed to make a prima facie showing of
good cause to release juror identifying information and find no
abuse of discretion. Even crediting the jurors’ statements that
they felt “pressured,” their verdicts were reached by compromise,
and Juror No. 12 discussed his personal life experiences, these
statements are not evidence of juror misconduct. Evidence
showing a juror’s thought process in reaching a verdict is
irrelevant and inadmissible. (Evid. Code, § 1150, subd. (a);3
People v. Johnson (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 486, 494.) Compromise
verdicts are valid. (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 513
[valid jury verdicts may reflect “jury lenity, compromise, or
mistake”].) Jurors may rely on their own experiences in
evaluating evidence presented at trial. (People v. Leonard (2007)
40 Cal.4th 1370, 1414.)
       Appellant’s assertion the trial court’s denial of his petition
for juror information denied him effective assistance of counsel is

      3 Evid. Code § 1150 subdivision (a) states:  “Upon an
inquiry as to the validity of a verdict, any otherwise admissible
evidence may be received as to statements made, or conduct,
conditions, or events occurring, either within or without the jury
room, of such a character as is likely to have influenced the
verdict improperly. No evidence is admissible to show the effect
of such statement, conduct, condition, or event upon a juror
either in influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict
or concerning the mental processes by which it was determined.”

                                  9
unfounded. He cites no relevant supporting authority. His
petition seeking additional information regarding jurors’ thought
processes and rationales in reaching their verdicts was properly
denied.
            Denial of Appellant’s Motion for a New Trial
       Appellant asserts his Sixth Amendment rights to an
impartial jury and due process were violated when the trial court
denied his motion for a new trial based on jury misconduct under
section 1181, subdivision 3. We again disagree.
       When a party seeks a new trial based upon jury
misconduct, the trial court must determine whether evidence
presented for its consideration is admissible, whether the facts
establish misconduct, and whether misconduct was prejudicial.
(People v. Duran (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 103, 112-113.) We review
the court’s denial of a motion for new trial independently to
determine whether alleged misconduct prevented the appellant
from having a fair trial. (People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250,
1263-1264.)
       Evidence Code section 1150 allows juror misconduct to be
shown by juror affidavit. “‘Upon an inquiry as to the validity of a
verdict, any otherwise admissible evidence may be received as to
statements made, or conduct, conditions, or events occurring,
either within or without the jury room, of such a character as is
likely to have influenced the verdict improperly. No evidence is
admissible to show the effect of such statement, conduct,
condition, or event upon a juror either in influencing him to
assent to or dissent from the verdict or concerning the mental
processes by which it was determined.’” (People v. Hutchinson
(1969) 71 Cal.2d 342, 349.) The “moving party must present
admissible evidence that misconduct occurred.” (People v. Von

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Villas (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 201, 251.) The motivation and
reasons that bear on a juror’s decision about the case are “beyond
the competence of affidavits to show . . . jury misconduct.”
(People v. Brown (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 476, 482.)
      Appellant submitted a juror declaration in support of his
motion for new trial repeating the same information regarding
the jury’s agreement to compromise and Juror No. 12’s discussing
his personal history of domestic violence, and adding that the
juror did not believe infliction of great bodily injury or use of a
knife had been proven. The trial court correctly found the
declaration consisted of hearsay, speculation, and the juror’s
subjective mental processes during deliberation. This single,
inadmissible declaration was insufficient to establish juror
misconduct. The trial court properly denied the motion.
                          Cumulative Error
      Appellant claims cumulative error. We have determined
each of his contentions lack merit. There is no cumulative error.
(People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 608.)
                            DISPOSITION
      Judgment is affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                     CODY, J.

We concur:

      YEGAN, Acting P. J.            BALTODANO, J.

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             The Honorable Patricia Kelly, Judge
           Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
              ______________________________

      Jennifer A. Mannix, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, Ryan M. Smith, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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