Court Opinion

ID: 9479560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:21:39.802942+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:06.985271
License: Public Domain

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The simple issue in this case is whether a court has authority to award attorneys’ fees to a person who has prevailed in an administrative proceeding under the Education of the Handicapped Act (“EHA”), as amended in 1986 by the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act (“HCPA”). This is not a novel question, nor is it an issue of first impression, for it has been the subject of litigation in numerous actions in federal court. Every circuit court that has considered this issue has concluded that EHA provides for an award of attorneys’ fees to parents who prevail in administrative proceedings in a suit brought to obtain those fees;1 and an overwhelming number of *352district courts have held the same.2 I can see no reason for this court to conclude otherwise.
The majority offers an exhaustive examination of the case law and legislation bearing on the matter before us. But, in my view, the majority opinion supports a result just the opposite from the one it reaches. Most of the evidence cited by the majority shows that, in enacting HCPA, Congress clearly intended to provide attorneys’ fees for those individuals who prevail in administrative proceedings. Because I believe the result reached by the majority is inconsistent with the language of the statute, its legislative history and the view held by an overwhelming majority of the courts that have addressed this question, I dissent.
I.
To begin with, the plain language of the statute provides that a court may award attorneys’ fees to a party who has prevailed in either a judicial action or an administrative 'proceeding. Section 1415(e)(4)(B) expressly states that
In any action or proceeding brought under this subsection, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as a part of the cost to the parents or guardian of a handicapped child or youth who is the prevailing party.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(B) (emphasis added). There is no way that this provision can be read other than to allow for an award of fees to parents who prevail in administrative proceedings in a suit brought to obtain those fees.
The majority opinion simply ignores the plain language. Instead, it asserts that a party who prevails in a proceeding cannot seek attorneys’ fees under the “subsection” because the party is not “aggrieved.” Majority Opinion (“Maj.Op.”) at 337 (referring to subsection 1415(e)(2)).3 This argument completely begs the question. What this court is deciding is precisely whether a party who has secured all but attorneys’ fees in a proceeding is an “aggrieved” party entitled to bring suit for attorneys’ fees.
The majority opinion similarly glosses over the import of section 1415(e)(4)(D), which also discusses attorneys’ fees for prevailing parties “in an action or proceeding.” This section sets the parameters for such awards: it bars the award of attorneys’ fees when either “the court or administrative officer” finds that the relief finally obtained by a prevailing party is not more favorable than an earlier offer of settlement. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4)(D) (emphasis added).4 Under this provision, *353an administrative officer has the authority to make findings relevant to an award of attorneys’ fees. Thus, a party may file suit in court as an “aggrieved party” when an administrative officer’s determinations are unfavorable with respect to findings necessary to support a claim for fees. The majority inexplicably ignores the statutory role of the administrative officer and the appealability of his or her adverse findings.
Furthermore, and more importantly, there is absolutely nothing in the language of section 1415(e)(4)(D) to support the majority’s view that the statute “merely provides that a parent who rejected an offer of settlement, made in either the administrative or the judicial proceedings, cannot obtain attorney fees if the result the prevailing party obtains in court is not more favorable than the offer of settlement.” Maj.Op. at 339 (emphasis added). As the highlighted portion of the quoted material shows, the majority opinion does nothing more than construe the statute in a way to achieve the result sought; but the language of section 1415(e)(4)(D) does not say what the majority says.
What the statute does say is that an award of fees is barred only if “the court or the administrative officer finds that the relief finally obtained by the parents or guardian is not more favorable to the parents or guardian than the offer of settlement.” “Relief finally obtained” can be the relief awarded in the administrative proceeding. Thus, if a parent rejects an offer of settlement because it does not include fees, and then obtains all of the relief sought except fees at the administrative proceeding, that parent is not barred from an award of fees under section 1415(e)(4)(D); and the administrative officer would be authorized to find that the relief awarded at the administrative proceeding “is not more favorable to the parents ... than the offer of settlement.” And, as the majority correctly recognizes, “such findings would be relevant only in a subsequent civil action brought under subsection 1415(e) by the aggrieved party” (i.e., the parents who have failed to obtain fees). See Maj.Op. at 339 (emphasis added).
II.
Moreover, to the extent that there is any ambiguity in the meaning of the statute, it is cured by the legislative history, which makes clear that Congress provided an action for attorneys’ fees. The majority opinion itself concludes that “[t]he House intended to authorize the district courts to award attorneys' fees for services rendered in the administrative proceedings, in a suit brought solely for that purpose, and believed that the language in the Senate bill —‘in any action or proceeding brought under this subsection’ — accomplished this result.” Maj.Op. at 348. The majority cannot point to anything in the Senate’s legislative history that contradicts this understanding of the provision.
The majority only asserts that it can discern “no clear expression of the Senate’s intention.” Id. at 349. On the one hand, it acknowledges that Senator Simon saw the provision as establishing the right to sue for attorneys’ fees; on the other hand, it finds somehow troubling the statements by Senator Weicker allowing “for the award of attorneys’ fees to parties who prevail in court to obtain what is guaranteed to them by law.” 132 Cong.Reo. 16823 (1986) (statement of Sen. Weicker) (quoted in Maj.Op. at 347-48).
Senator Weieker’s statements, however, in no way contradict Senator Simon’s or the House’s understanding of the attorneys’ fees provision; and his statements in no way negate the view that the statute provides for attorneys’ fees for parents who prevail in administrative proceedings. Indeed, this point is confirmed by the Amicus Brief submitted to this court. This brief, signed by various members of the Senate and House, who are identified as the “chief sponsors and co-sponsors of the legislation, chairmen and ranking minority members of the committees and subcommittees with jurisdiction, and conferees,” says that
amici believe that after two years of deliberation on exactly the issue before this Court, there can be no doubt that the *354effect, meaning, and intent of Congress’ action was to provide for attorneys’ fees for parents who prevail in administrative proceedings.
Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Senators Tom Harkin, Edward M. Kennedy, John F. Kerry, Paul Simon, Robert T. Stafford, Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., and Representatives Tony Coelho, Augustus F. Hawkins, James M. Jeffords, Major R. Owens, Pat Williams at 1. In short, there is no basis for the majority’s assertion that the House and the Senate were not in agreement on the attorneys’ fees provision that both houses enacted into law.
Finally, the most convincing evidence of legislative intent is the HCPA conference bill and its enactment. The House version of the bill that went to conference included a provision saying that the authority of the court to award fees to parents prevailing at administrative hearings would be repealed in four years. 131 Cong.Rec. 31370 (1985) (statement of Rep. Williams). This sunset provision was added to appease Representatives who opposed attorneys’ fees at the administrative level. 131 Cong.Reo. 31376 (1985) (statement of Rep. Jeffords). However, the conference bill deleted the sunset provision, thus removing any limitation on the authority of a court to award fees to parties prevailing in an administrative proceeding. H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 687, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, at 7.
The majority opinion concedes that “one possible explanation” of the conferees’ action in deleting the sunset provision is that the Senate conferees intended to adopt the authority the bill conferred, but did not want to limit it to four years. Maj.Op. at 349. I submit that this is the only possible explanation. The conference report itself expressly acknowledges “the courts’ authority to award fees at the administrative level,’’ and then says that the conference bill removes the sunset provision that would have limited this authority. H.R. Conf.Rep. No. 687, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, at 7 (emphasis added), 1986 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News p. 1809. The import of the conferees’ action is thus absolutely clear.
The majority opinion argues that “an equally plausible explanation” of the conferees’ action is that the Senate conferees did not believe the conference bill contained any authority for the award of fees at the administrative level, so that there was no reason to terminate it after four years. Maj.Op. at 349. But this explanation is completely at odds with what the conference report itself says. The report says that “[t]he House amendment, but not the Senate bill,” would limit “the court’s authority to award fees at the administrative level” after four years. H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 687, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, at 7 (emphasis added), 1986 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News p. 1809. If the Senate conferees truly believed that the bill contained no authority for the award of fees at the administrative level, as the majority suggests, then the conference report makes no sense as written. The conference report can only be read to indicate that the conferees agreed to retain the court’s authority to award fees at the administrative level without any limitation through a sunset provision.
III.
The statutory language and the legislative history of EH A, as amended by HCPA, show that Congress provided for attorneys fees for parents who prevail in administrative proceedings. I dissent because the result reached in the majority opinion is wholly at odds with this congressional intent.

. See Duane v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 861 F.2d 115 (5th Cir.1988); Eggers v. Bullitt County School Dist., 854 F.2d 892 (6th Cir.1988); Counsel v. Dow, 849 F.2d 731, 740-41 n. 9 (2d Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 391, 102 L.Ed.2d 380 (1988).

.See, e.g., Michael F. v. Cambridge School Dept., No. 86-2532-C, slip op. (D.Mass. Mar. 5, 1987); Williams v. Boston School Comm., 709 F.Supp. 27 (D.Mass. 1989); Doe v. Watertown School Comm., 701 F.Supp. 264 (D.Mass.1988); Burr v. Ambach, 683 F.Supp. 46 (S.D.N.Y.1988); Chang v. Board of Educ., 685 F.Supp. 96 (D.N.J.1988); Neisz v. Portland Pub. School Dist., 684 F.Supp. 1530 (D.Or.1988); Dodds v. Simpson, 676 F.Supp. 1045 (D.Or.1987); Robert D. v. Sobel, 688 F.Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y.1988); Turton v. Crisp County School Dist., 688 F.Supp. 1535 (M.D.Ga. 1988); Burpee v. Manchester School Dist., 661 F.Supp. 731 (D.N.H.1987); Kristi W. v. Graham Indep. School Dist., 663 F.Supp. 86 (N.D.Tex. 1987); Mathern v. Campbell County Children’s Center, 674 F.Supp. 816 (D.Wyo.1987); Prescott v. Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified School Dist., 659 F.Supp. 921 (C.D.Cal.1987); School Bd. of Prince William County v. Malone, 662 F.Supp. 999 (E.D.Va.1987); Unified School Dist. No. 259 v. Newton, 673 F.Supp. 418 (D.Kan.1987). But see McCormack v. Burlingame Elementary School Dist., No. C-88-0141 JPY, slip op. (N.D. Cal. June 27, 1988); Rollison v. Biggs, 660 F.Supp. 875 (D.Del.1987).

. Section 1415(e)(2) states that "[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision made under subsection (b) of this section ... and any party aggrieved by the findings and decision under subsection (c) of this section [dealing with administrative proceedings by State educational agencies], shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this section.... ”

. Section 1415(e)(4)(D) bars an award of attorneys’ fees in any action or proceeding under this subsection for services performed subsequent to the time of a written offer of settlement to a parent or guardian, if—
(i) the offer is made within the time prescribed by Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the case of an administrative proceeding, at any time more than ten days before the proceeding begins;
(ii) the offer is not accepted within ten days; and
(iii) the court or administrative officer finds that the relief finally obtained by the parents or guardian is not more favorable to the parents or guardian than the offer of settlement.