Court Opinion

ID: 9652634
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:29:19.289344+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:53.166545
License: Public Domain

WOODROUGH, Circuit' Judge
(concurring) .
I concur fully in the court’s opinion in this case and I agree on the grounds set forth that the labor union ought not have been enjoined from making the representations which it did make in carrying on its labor dispute with the appellees. But in addition to the issues which were sharply contested and which have been carefully considered and decided, I think the record before us also shows that the federal court *621had no jurisdiction of the case. The parties are residents of the same state and the only ground of jurisdiction is asserted violation of the Sherman Anti Trust laws as amended. The labor union was attempting by strike, boycott and secondary boycott, to coerce the employer to accede to demands concerning collective bargaining and wage and working conditions. It was not attempting, and did not intend, either by its own effort or in concert with any one else, to effect or foster any monopoly or combination restrictive of competition'in a product in commerce or to effect fixing prices thereof, against the public interest of the United States, and whatever rulings federal courts may have made in the past, it seems to me the Supreme Court has now firmly settled that on the facts of this case there existed no “combination in the form of trust or otherwise” and no “conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce” forbidden by the anti trust laws, and no controversy of federal cognizance.
In Apex Hosiery Company v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, page 487, 60 S.Ct. 982, page 988, 84 L.Ed. 1311, 128 A.L.R. 1044, the court addressed itself to the specific question “whether a conspiracy of strikers in a labor dispute to stop the operation of the employer’s factory in order to enforce their demands against the employer is the kind of restraint of trade or commerce at which the [Sherman] Act is aimed”, and the question was answered in the negative. In the later case of United States v. Hutcheson, 61 S.Ct. 463, 464, 85 L.Ed. -, decided Feb. 3, 1941, where the labor union had attempted to enforce its demands in a labor dispute by means of picketing and local boycott at the place of production, and secondary boycott extended throughout the country, the court said the question was “whether the use of conventional, peaceful activities by a union in controversy with a rival union over certain jobs is a violation of the Sherman Law”, and that question is answered in the negative.
The broad ground of both decisions is that in the cases presented the combination and acts of the members of labor unions were directed to the object of labor unionization of a plant and to obtaining^ jobs awarded to a rival union and therefore they were not directed to any restraining of trade or commerce to prevent competition therein or to foster monopoly or to effect o'r foster any trust or like combination to fix prices or to any violation of the anti trust laws.
The decisions do not imply that all strikes and boycotts by labor unions are beyond the reach of the Sherman Act as amended. On the contrary, it is made clear in each case that where labor unions combine upon objects outside of the field of labor relations, “the area of economic conflict” (Hutcheson case, 61 S.Ct. at page 465), or “combine with non-labor groups” (Hutcheson case, 61 S.Ct. at page 466), to effect the objects at which the anti trust laws are directed, then, and then only, they do become amenable to the provisions thereof. The decisions establish that the objects and intent with which those who are combined in labor unions are acting must determine whether their labor union has intruded into the field of the Sherman Act, and on the facts of the cases before the court it found there was no intent to effect the objects at which the Act is aimed. Here the common objects and intent concerned only labor relations. Making misrepresentations about the facts or issues of the labor dispute could not change the concerted attempts to bring about desired labor relations into a conspiracy to effect or foster monopoly or to fix prices. Though the Supreme Court found no occasion to so state specifically in the cases before it, its determination necessarily carries such implication.2
As I read the recent decisions they compel the conclusion that there is no violation of the anti trust laws and therefore no federal jurisdiction in this case. Cf. Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261, 60 S.Ct. 561, 84 L.Ed. 738; American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 61 S.Ct. 568, 85 L.Ed. -, decided Feb. 10, 1941; Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 60 S.Ct. 746, 84 L.Ed. 1104; Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union v. Lake Valley Farm Producers, Inc., 311 U.S. 91, 61 S.Ct. 122, 85 L.Ed.-; Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 61 S.Ct. 552, 85 L.Ed. —, decided, Feb. *62210, 1941; Stevens & Co. v. Foster & Kleiser, 311 U.S. 255, 61 S.Ct. 210, 85 L.Ed. -; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093.

 Restraints not within the Act when achieved by peaceful means are not brought within it merely because without •other differences they are attained by violence. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, supra, 310 U.S. at page 485, 60 S.Ct. 982, 84 L.Ed. 1311, 128 A.L.R. 1044.