Court Opinion

ID: 9759433
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:16:11.343908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:01.724915
License: Public Domain

Sullivan, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I am in accord with so much of the majority opinion as reverses the judgments of conviction of defendant Boratto and orders a new trial for him on both charges. However, while I also agree that incompetent and highly prejudicial evidence was admitted against defendant Silverman, I must dissent from the majority holding that not only must his conviction be set aside but that judgments of acquittal should be entered in his favor.
The basic issue at trial was whether Michael G-. DePhillips actually executed his purported last will and testament, later admitted to probate. Boratto and Silverman were law partners and had signed the will as attesting witnesses. (De-Phillips was Boratto’s uncle.) After DePhillips’ death, Silver-man appeared in the surrogate’s office on the probate of the will and made an affidavit that the will had been executed in accordance with N. J. 8. A. 3A-.3-2 and that he saw the decedent DePhillips sign the will. The charge of perjury against Silverman is based on this affidavit.
In ordering Silverman’s acquittal, the majority reasoned that even though there was evidence that the DePhillips signature on the will was a forgery, there was no proof that Sil-verman knew that the person signing was not Mr. DePhillips. The majority also held that there was a lack of proof that Silverman, the defendant on trial, had executed the affidavit in the surrogate’s office and not another individual using his name. I disagree, and would not allow defendant, a member of the bar of this State, to have an acquittal as a matter of law on what I consider to be such fragile and tenuous grounds.
The special deputy surrogate who appeared as a State’s witness testified that, on the probate of the DePhillips will, *527“Martin E. Silverman” appeared before her as a witness to prove the will and executed an affidavit that the requirements of N. J. S. A. 3A:3-2 had been met and that he saw the decedent DePhillips sign the will. A jury could reasonably infer that she was referring to defendant Martin E. Sil-verman then present in court defending against a charge of perjury arising out of the execution of the very affidavit in question.
It was undisputed that defendant Silverman was a member of the bar of this State and a former law partner of his co-defendant Boratto. Boratto and Silverman had signed the DePhillips will as attesting witnesses. Indeed, the backer of that law firm was attached to the will when it was offered for probate. The “Martin E. Silverman” who executed the affidavit in the surrogate’s office swore that he was one of the two witnesses to the DePhillips will. The matter of identity, therefore, was sufficiently established by the State.
As to proof of Silverman’s knowledge of the alleged falsity, there was expert evidence that the DePhillips signature on the will was a forgery. As noted, Silverman swore in the affidavit filed on the probate of the will that he had seen the decedent DePhillips sign the will. Based on the foregoing, the jury had an adequate basis for finding Silverman guilty of having executed a false affidavit, if it found the DePhillips signature to be a forgery.
I agree with the majority that the “two-witness” rule is not the law of this State, and that perjury can be established by the testimony of one witness if supported by strong corroborating circumstances. Instead of acquittal, I would order that Silverman be retried on both charges.
For reversal and acquittal as to Silverman and reversal and remandment as to Boratto — Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Mountain, Pashman, Clifford, Schreiber and Handler — 6.
For reversal and remandment as to both defendants — Justice Sullivan — 1.