Court Opinion

ID: 9582586
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:29:07.111339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:00.251920
License: Public Domain

Buchanan, Miller and Snead, JJ.,
dissenting.
Buchanan, J..:
We dissent from the conclusion reached by the majority in this case because we believe it is contrary to the established legal principle governing the weight of a jury’s verdict approved by the trial judge, as this one was, and because it gives no weight to facts which the jury could and did consider in arriving at their verdict.
The legal principle referred to is stated as recently as today in Bates v. Thompson, ante p. 501: “We have repeatedly held that if reasonable men may differ as to the conclusion of fact to be drawn from the evidence, or if the conclusion is dependent upon the weight to be given the testimony, a jury is the proper tribunal to decide the question.”
Otherwise expressed, the question of negligence is a question of fact and the jury is the trier of such question. “It is only when the issue is one about which reasonable persons cannot differ—the question so plain in the meaning and interpretation that should be given to it—that no doubt is admitted of its legal significance and effect, that it becomes a question of law for the courts to determine.” Virginia E. & P. Co. v. Steinman, 177 Va. 468, 474, 14 S. E. 2d 313, 315.
The jury found that the signal devices were not adequate. The trial judge held that there was sufficient evidence to support their verdict and three judges of this court also say that there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. Not so long ago this court advanced the theory that “(w)hen such is the case, it is conclusive that it should go to the jury, for the justices must be presumed to be fair-minded men, and if they differ, they honestly differ.” Virginia E. & P. Co. v. Wright, 170 Va. 442, 447, 196 S. E. 580, 582.
However that may be, we base this dissent on evidence in the *553record, which in our opinion inescapably requires the issues to be decided by the jury, under the familiar rule that the evidence must be evaluated in the aspect most favorable to the plaintiff and effect given to all reasonable inferences the jury could draw from it.
First as to the weather conditions: These conditions cannot be played down. Officer Peele said the night was cold and the fog was very, very heavy. Officer Walters said the fog was extremely heavy. Trooper Pace said he had to drive with his headlights on low beam because the fog would reflect high beam lights back in his face. McCoy said there was a rolling fog which was freezing on his windshield. Trump, defendant’s signal maintainer, said that when he looked into the fog he could not see anything, but could see the edge of the road when he kept his eyes down. Defendants’ witness Carey had to keep his windshield wipers on because of the heaviness and the moisture of the fog.
This crossing was along the north edge of the Dismal Swamp. The time was in January. The engineer of this train said he had operated trains before in the fog in that area. Carey said he had seen fogs of this type in that area ever since he was a small child. The jury could say from this evidence that the defendant knew or was chargeable with knowledge that fog similar to that prevailing on the night of the accident might be expected at that time of the year at that crossing. Not only so, but the engineer knew it prevailed that night. It was generally foggy, he said, all along the line and at spots it was thick. He could not see the mileposts as he went along but, as he said, he took no account of this condition in the speed of his train.
Defendant’s signal maintainer said that U. S. Highway 17 at the crossing was one of the busiest roads that the Company’s tracks crossed between Suffolk and Norfolk.
It was over this busy crossing on this cold, foggy night that the defendants elected to run this train at a speed of 75 to 78 miles an hour. The majority opinion says the speed of the train had nothing to do with the accident and that the accident would have happened no matter at what speed the train was running. The fact is, however, that the automobile was struck at its rear wheels. It lacked just that much of getting across. Had the train been running at even 60 miles an hour the accident would not have happened. The point is that the greater the speed the greater the necessity for clear and timely *554warning. To say that the speed of the train had nothing to do with the accident is wholly unrealistic.
The speed of a train at a crossing is not of itself negligence per se. 44 Am. Jur., Railroads, §§ 511-12, pp. 751-3; Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Crowder, 191 Va. 635, 643, 62 S. E. 2d 227, 231. But the speed at which a train was moving may be an essential element in considering whether the railway company was negligent in a situation where the crossing was much used by the public or rendered dangerous by obstructions. 44 Am. Jur., Railroads, § 512, p. 753; Anno. 154 A.L.R. 212 at 235; 3 Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, Rev. ed., § 451 at 1081.
So in Carbone v. Boston & Maine R. R., 89 N. H. 12, 192 A. 858, 860, it was said: “If the defendant saw fit to run its trains over a crossing carrying the heavy traffic above described, in the night, and without regard to weather conditions, at a speed of 45 miles per hour, it was for the jury to say whether ordinary prudence would not require provision for a more effective warning of the approach of trains than was furnished by the whistle and bell of the locomotive.” Cf. Southern Pac. Co. v. Haight, (9 Cir.) 126 F. 2d 900, 908; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. McKinley, (5 Cir.), 84 F. 2d 33, 34.
It is to be remembered, too, that the occupants of this car were strangers to this crossing. “The duty of a traveler to look and listen for an approaching train when he knows of the existence of the crossing is very different from that of the traveler who is ignorant of its existence. # * ‘(W)e do not believe such duty exists until he has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care, should have had knowledge that there is, in fact, a crossing. * ” Ivory Storage Co. v. A.C.L.R. Co., 187 Va. 857, 874, 48 S. E. 2d 242, 251.
As this automobile approached this crossing, the view of its occupants toward the west where the train was coming from was obstructed by the houses. Having no knowledge of the presence of a crossing, they could reasonably have failed to look between the houses, and if they had looked it could well have been at a point from which they could not see. There was no fair view for a motorist approaching from the north until he had passed the houses, and only then if he happened to be looking immediately in the direction the train was coming from and recognized the light he saw, if he could see it at all in the fog, as the headlight of an engine approaching on a track he did not know was there.
*555The majority opinion says it is undisputed that all statutory requirements were observed by the Railway Company. Let us see just what help that was to the people in this car.
The jury were instructed that the evidence showed that the statutory signals were given. Conceding that they were, the fact remains that not a single witness traveling in an automobile at or near this crossing that night heard any whistle or bell. The two witnesses who arrived at the crossing before the train was completely across, McCoy and Carey, both testified that they heard no whistle or bell before the train reached the crossing, and neither saw the train approaching. Moreover, the whistleboard where the signals began was 1320.5 feet from the crossing. At 78 miles an hour the engine was on the crossing in 12 seconds after the whistle first blew. So far as the statutory signals were concerned, the engineer and fireman had as well been blowing a tin whistle and ringing a sleigh bell.
It was such considerations that led this court to hold that it is the over-all duty of the railroad to provide adequate warning of the approach of its train to a grade crossing and “the statutory requirement [of whistle and bell] is merely the minimum precaution which the railroad company is required to exercise.” Ivory Storage Co. v. A.C.L.R. Co., supra, 187 Va. at 869, 48 S. E. 2d at 249. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408, 12 S. Ct. 679, 36 L. ed. 485; 44 Am. Jur., Railroads, § 520 at 765; Anno. 5 A.L.R. 2d 112-116; 74 C. J. S., Railroads, § 742, p. 1388.
The crossarm signal required by § 56-406 of the Code to be erected and maintained at grade crossings “at such heights as to be easily seen by travelers” was in this case 12 % feet above the rails and approximately 16 feet above the road level north of the crossing. It carried no reflectors. Trooper Davis said he could not see it that night until he was within 50 feet of the crossing. It was of no help to the driver of this automobile who, as the jury could readily conclude from the evidence, had to drive with his lights on low beam and watch the side of the road as he drove along in the fog. None of the five witnesses for the plaintiff who approached the crossing from the direction this automobile came said they saw the unlighted yellow and black sign north of the crossing.
The jury could reasonably believe from the evidence that there was nothing at this crossing or on the approach to it to apprise the driver of this automobile that he was coming to a railroad crossing. *556The only warning from any source that was of any value on this night to give notice of the approach of the train was the wigwag signal.
This was not the flashing type of signal and was equipped only with an 11-watt bulb, whereas one of the defendant’s signal maintainers testified that an 18-watt bulb was the standard. This appears in his testimony: “Q. This 11-watt light is an old-timey type of light, isn’t it? A. No, sir. No. We use that in all our signals on the Norfolk & Western Railroad. That is our standard. Q. You are talking about 16 watts? A. No. 11 volt, 11 watts. That is for our signals we use them all the time. Q. I know that, but not for your signals where the cars are approaching? A. Oh, no.”
Witnesses referred to this signal as a single small red light. Officer Walters testified that when he saw it operating as a westbound train came along later, he was standing 12 paces from, it and even then it was blurred with fog and “sort of like a reflection.” What the engineer and fireman said they saw was its reflection against the fog. When McCoy and Carey, both of whom had been familiar with the crossing for years, momentarily saw the signal operating as the last two or three cars were passing over the crossing, they were aided by the light from the flaming automobile beyond the crossing. As a warning this signal was materially less adequate than the neon lights on the gate maintained at the Yadkins crossing which enabled the engineer to tell that he was going by Yadkins just a mile away from the crossing here involved.
■ Very clearly we think the jury had a right to conclude that this wigwag signal was not adequate to give effective warning of the approach of this train at a speed of 78 miles an hour on a night in which Officer Peele said he could not see the burning automobile until he was within 50 feet of it, and Officer Walters said he was within 30 feet of the tracks before he could see the light from that fire.
The majority opinion says it is highly significant that every automobile known to have been driving toward the crossing at the time of the approach of this train, except the one occupied by the decedent, stopped before going over the crossing. Let us look at the facts. Neither Carey nor McCoy, familiar as they were with the crossing, stopped because they had any warning of the approach of the train. The train had struck the automobile and all but the last two cars of the train had gone through the crossing before either *557Carey or McCoy got there. Neither of them saw the train approaching the crossing or heard it give any signal. The first they knew about a train being there was when they saw the last of its cars on the crossing. The train itself on the crossing and not any signals or any sight of its approach is what caused them to stop. Carey said, “1 honestly believe the light I saw [from the burning car] was what made me see the train cars, more or less.”
The opinion further says that the driver of the Buick car ahead of McCoy and Carey stopped and parked his car in the county road that ran parallel to the track. The fact is that the evidence does not show when or why the Buick stopped or how long it had been parked, why it was there or to whom it belonged. McCoy did not mention seeing such a car. Cary was asked what movement that car was making, and this was his reply: “I could not state whether he was parked or was in the process of being parked.”
The driver of the northbound car did not testify in this case but did testify in No. 4814 and his testimony as to why and how he stopped is revealing also on the question of the adequacy of the signals.
The most significant fact in this case is that the signals of the approach of this train were not adequate under the conditions then prevailing to warn the driver of this automobile of the approach of this train at its high rate of speed. It is not to be presumed that he saw the signals in time to stop and then drove on heedlessly at the risk of his own life and the lives of his passengers.
The question for the jury was whether under the circumstances of speed and weather the Railway Company exercised reasonable care and prudence in what it did and whether “under the circumstances described, taking into consideration the physical conditions of the crossing, the extent of its use by the public, the nature of the surroundings, the speed of the train, and other matters tending to show exceptional dangers incident to the particular locality, they performed their duty toward persons using the highway.” Cummings v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 301 Pa. 39, 42-3, 151 A. 590, 591, 71 A.L.R. 1156, 1158-9.
If the defendant elected to run its train through this fog over this crossing at a speed of 75 to 78 miles an hour, its right to do so carried a correlative duty “to provide warning signals commensurate and adequate with the danger.” Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Bowen, 192 Va. 162, 168, 63 S. E. 2d 804, 807. An adequate warning to a *558stranger exercising reasonable care would necessarily be one sufficient to warn him of the presence of the crossing and the approach of the train in time to enable him to avoid being struck. Reasonable minds could well differ as to whether the small red light waving back and forth in an arc on a 24-inch arm afforded a warning commensurate with the danger of running this train at 75 to 78 miles an hour over this crossing through this fog.
As said in the Ivory Storage Co. case, supra, approving the statement in the Ives case, supra, “ ‘(E) ach case must stand upon its own merits and be decided upon its own facts and circumstances; and these are the features which make the question of negligence primarily one for the jury to determine, under proper instructions from the court.’ ”
As was said in Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Wiggins, (5 Cir.), 234 F. 2d 128, 132, “reasonable minds might well say of the facts here, as did the jury, that the underlying cause of this event was ignorance of the crossing flowing from the Railroad’s negligence.”
We agree with the trial court that there was sufficient evidence to support the finding of the jury that the defendant company was negligent in failing to have adequate warnings at the crossing and that its negligence was a-contributing cause of the accident. That being true, it follows that the alleged negligence of the driver was not the sole proximate cause as a matter of law, .as held in the majority opinion.
For the reasons stated it is our opinion that the judgment below should be affirmed.