Court Opinion

ID: 9897289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:44.077807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:42.066249
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                Sep 14 2023, 9:55 am

                                                                                     CLERK
                                                                                Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                   Court of Appeals
                                                                                     and Tax Court

      ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
      Jan B. Berg                                               Jenny R. Buchheit
      Indianapolis, Indiana                                     Sean T. Dewey
                                                                Alexandria H. Pittman
                                                                Ice Miller LLP
                                                                Indianapolis, Indiana

                                                  IN THE
          COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

      In the Matter of the Civil                                September 14, 2023
      Commitment of:                                            Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                                23A-MH-341
      M.T.,
                                                                Appeal from the Marion Superior
      Appellant-Respondent,                                     Court
              v.                                                The Honorable David J. Certo,
                                                                Judge
      Community Health Network,                                 Trial Court Cause No.
                                                                49D08-2301-MH-2458
      Appellee-Petitioner

                                        Opinion by Judge Mathias
                                      Judges Vaidik and Pyle concur.

      Mathias, Judge.

[1]   In In re Commitment of C.P., ___ N.E.3d ___, No. 22A-MH-2960 (Ind. Ct. App.

      Sept. 14, 2023), we held that an appeal from an expired involuntary civil

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-341 | September 14, 2023                       Page 1 of 13
      commitment order was not moot and was properly before us based on the

      negative collateral consequences that that respondent may face under federal

      and state firearm restrictions that accompany involuntary civil commitment

      orders. Here, we hold, based on the facts established in the record and the

      attendant briefing, that this appeal from an expired involuntary civil

      commitment order is not moot. Rather, it is properly before us based on the

      negative collateral consequences that the respondent, M.T., may face with

      respect to future involuntary civil commitment proceedings if the instant

      commitment order were invalid and left undisturbed. However, on the merits of

      this appeal, we hold that Community Health Network presented sufficient

      evidence to support M.T.’s temporary commitment.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   M.T. has a history of mental illness and has previously been diagnosed with

      Schizophrenia, for which he has been prescribed medication. Since July 2022,

      M.T. has lived with his parents in their home. During that time, M.T. did not

      take his prescription medication, and his behavior “progressively got[] worse.”

      Tr. Vol. 2, p. 12. M.T. would go two-to-three weeks without changing his

      clothes. He would not sleep for up to three days on end, and, instead of

      sleeping, M.T. would “stand in the middle of the hallway and stare at the wall.”

      Id. at 13. M.T. also did not eat regularly, sometimes going days without eating,

      and, aside from occasionally making himself a bowl of cereal, his food was

      prepared by his mother.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-341 | September 14, 2023    Page 2 of 13
[3]   Sometime in January 2023, M.T.’s mother attempted to make a phone call, and

      M.T. “tried to grab the phone away from her forcefully.” Id. at 14. M.T. then

      “took off” out of the front door even though he was not “dressed for January

      weather.” Id. at 15. M.T., who was unemployed, did not have identification or

      money with him. M.T.’s parents and brother “drove around” and “look[ed] for

      him” for six to eight hours, but they were unable to locate him. Id. M.T.’s father

      was concerned for M.T. because M.T. was not able to “live independently”

      from his parents and their home. Id. at 17.

[4]   On January 15, M.T. appeared at a pizzeria and told staff that he had hit his

      head and was confused. M.T. was then transported to a nearby emergency

      department. After doctors there were unable to identify a physical injury, they

      had him moved to Fairbanks Behavioral Health within the Community Health

      Network (“Community Health”).

[5]   There, Dr. Ishrat Bhat examined M.T. and diagnosed him with Schizophrenia,

      post-traumatic stress disorder, and catatonia. In reaching those conclusions, Dr.

      Bhat relied on M.T.’s record of “previous hospitalizations” for mental-health

      issues, which had started in 2017. Id. at 21. Those prior hospitalizations

      included an August 2022 hospitalization. 1 M.T.’s medical records indicated

      Schizophrenia, and Dr. Bhat opined that the “five . . . year[]” timeline of

      1
          It is not clear from the record on appeal whether any of M.T.’s prior hospitalizations were involuntary.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-341 | September 14, 2023                               Page 3 of 13
      M.T.’s mental-health records and hospitalizations was “enough to establish a

      diagnosis of Schizophrenia.” Id.

[6]   Dr. Bhat also based his diagnosis of Schizophrenia on his own observations.

      Those observations included M.T.’s “disorganized” behavior and speech,

      “catatonic” behavior, and “negative symptoms of Schizophrenia,” namely,

      “apathy, social withdraw[al], . . . being quiet, poor self-care,” and lack of

      pleasure. Id. at 22. Dr. Bhat concluded that M.T. lacks insight into his own

      mental illness and that M.T.’s lack of insight results in M.T. not taking his

      prescribed medication or being able to take care of himself. Dr. Bhat further

      concluded that, due to M.T.’s mental illness, M.T. is unable to provide himself

      with food, clothing, shelter, and other essential human needs and also that

      M.T.’s mental illness causes M.T. to suffer a substantial impairment of his

      judgment, reasoning, or behavior that results in his inability to function

      independently.

[7]   Community Health then petitioned for M.T.’s involuntary temporary

      commitment in order to re-establish M.T.’s routine with his prescription

      medication. Dr. Bhat testified in support of M.T.’s temporary commitment. In

      addition to the reasons for his diagnoses and M.T.’s mental-health history, Dr.

      Bhat noted that a ninety-day commitment would be necessary for M.T.

      because, “usually if someone has been in a state of psychosis or catatonia for a

      long time, it takes a while for them to get better and to get stabilized.” Id. at 26.

      M.T.’s father also testified in support of M.T.’s commitment. M.T. testified

      against his own commitment and denied suffering from mental illness.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-341 | September 14, 2023       Page 4 of 13
[8]    Following the fact-finding hearing, the court found that M.T. was gravely

       disabled. The court then granted Community Health’s petition for M.T.’s

       involuntary temporary commitment. M.T. now appeals that order, and he

       timely filed his notice of appeal. On April 24, 2023, hardly more than one week

       before M.T.’s initial brief in our Court was due, his ninety-day term of

       commitment expired.

       1. Where, as here, commitment orders carry consequences
       beyond the terms of the commitments and appellate review
       can provide meaningful relief from those collateral
       consequences, appeals from expired involuntary civil
       commitment orders are not moot, and they are properly before
       us on their merits.
[9]    In C.P., we explained that, while our Court has traditionally considered appeals

       from expired involuntary civil commitment orders to be moot, at least until

       2019 we had nonetheless “routinely considered the merits” of those appeals.

       E.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 188 N.E.3d 464, 466 (Ind. 2022)

       (per curiam). However, in more recent years, various panels of our Court have

       dismissed these appeals on the theory that there is no meaningful relief that can

       be had by our review of them. See, e.g., In re Commitment of J.G., 209 N.E.3d

       1206, 1210-11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).

[10]   Yet, we also explained in C.P. that our Supreme Court’s opinions in this area

       have made it a point to leave open the possibility of an alternative analytical

       framework in which to reach the merits of expired involuntary civil

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-341 | September 14, 2023      Page 5 of 13
       commitment orders on appeal. In particular, our Supreme Court has “left open

       the possibility that respondents in [temporary-commitment appeals] could seek

       relief” from allegedly invalid orders due to any “harmful collateral

       consequences” that accompany such orders. E.F., 188 N.E.3d at 466; In re

       Commitment of T.W., 121 N.E.3d 1039, 1044 n.5 (Ind. 2019). In C.P., we held

       that the respondent had successfully demonstrated one such negative collateral

       consequence, namely, that his involuntary civil commitment would make it a

       violation of federal and state criminal law for him to carry a handgun. C.P., ___

       N.E.3d at ___.

[11]   M.T. raises a different negative collateral consequence for our consideration,

       one we passed over in C.P. See id. at ___ n.2. In particular, M.T. asserts that the

       order for his involuntary temporary commitment, if invalid but left in place,

       would add to the history of hospitalizations on his medical record and make

       future involuntary commitment proceedings against him more likely to be

       successful. We agree, and we therefore conclude that this negative collateral

       consequence M.T. potentially faces makes our review of his involuntary

       temporary commitment order meaningful and not moot.

[12]   As we explained in C.P.:

               Indiana’s appellate courts have applied the “collateral
               consequences” doctrine to hold that appeals are not moot where
               meaningful relief may still be had by our review of those appeals
               on their merits. For example, in In re S.D., our Supreme Court
               considered the validity of a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”)
               adjudication. 2 N.E.3d 1283 (Ind. 2014). However, while the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-341 | September 14, 2023     Page 6 of 13
        appeal was pending, the child was returned to her mother’s care,
        and the CHINS case was closed. Accordingly, the Indiana
        Department of Child Services (“DCS”) moved to dismiss the
        appeal as moot.

        Our Supreme Court held that the appeal was not moot based on
        the following “long-lasting collateral consequences” that
        accompany CHINS adjudications:

                 a CHINS finding can relax the State’s burden for
                 terminating parental rights. Under Indiana Code section
                 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2013), the State may
                 terminate parental rights if a child has been adjudicated [a]
                 CHINS on two prior occasions, without proving either
                 that the conditions resulting in a child’s removal will not
                 be remedied or that continuing the parent-child
                 relationship threatens the child’s well-being. And a prior
                 CHINS finding may have adverse job consequences as
                 well, such as precluding Mother from employment with
                 any DCS contractor. See generally Ind. Dept. of Child
                 Servs., Ind. Child Welfare Policy Manual § 13.4 (2013),
                 available at http://www.in.gov/dcs/files/
                 13.4_Evaluation_of_Background_Checks_
                 for_DCS_Contractors.pdf. Similarly, a CHINS finding
                 may preclude her from become a licensed foster parent. Id.
                 at § 13.10, available at http://www.in. gov/dcs/files/
                 13_10_Evaluating_Background_Checks_for_Foster_Famil
                 y_Licensing. pdf. Reversal cannot change the efforts Mother
                 expended in complying with the CHINS case, but it still affords
                 her meaningful relief by lifting those collateral burdens. We
                 therefore decline to find the case moot.

        Id. at 1285, 1290 (emphasis added).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-341 | September 14, 2023          Page 7 of 13
        Our appellate courts have likewise repeatedly invoked the
        collateral-consequences doctrine to review the merits of appeals
        where the order at issue, if invalid and left undisturbed, could
        contribute to a future adverse finding against the appellant. See,
        e.g., Smith v. State, 971 N.E.2d 86, 89 (Ind. 2012) (reviewing the
        merits of the trial court’s finding that the defendant had violated
        the conditions of his placement in community corrections due to
        possible “negative collateral consequences” from such a finding,
        even though the defendant had “served his sentence”); Hamed v.
        State, 852 N.E.2d 619, 622-23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (reviewing the
        merits of an expired no contact order because, if a violation of
        the order were later alleged, it could contribute to a contempt
        proceeding or a criminal charge); Kirby v. State, 822 N.E.2d 1097,
        1101 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (reviewing the merits of a post-
        conviction petition, even though the sentence for the underlying
        conviction had been served, because “convictions have collateral
        consequences inasmuch as they . . . may form the basis of a
        habitual offender enhancement”), trans. denied; McBain v.
        Hamilton Cnty., 744 N.E.2d 984, 987-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)
        (reviewing the merits of a tax sale, even though the original
        owners had redeemed their property, based in part on “negative
        collateral consequences that would be unjustified if the sale
        w[ere] invalid . . . .”); Roark, 551 N.E.2d at 867-68 (reviewing the
        merits of a CHINS adjudication, despite the matter being closed,
        “because of the potentially devastating consequences” of the
        adjudication); In re Marriage of Stariha, 509 N.E.2d 1117, 1123
        (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a father’s appeal of his
        contempt conviction for failure to pay child support was not
        moot, even though his sentence had been served, because of
        “possible collateral consequences”); see also S.D., 2 N.E.3d at
        1290 (holding that a closed CHINS case is not moot in part
        because a CHINS adjudication can result in “relax[ing] the
        State’s burden for terminating parental rights”).

Id. at ___.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-341 | September 14, 2023     Page 8 of 13
[13]   M.T.’s involuntary civil commitment order carries at least one similar and

       significant negative collateral consequence. We have long recognized that a

       “history of mental illness requiring hospitalizations” may be probative of

       whether a person is “gravely disabled and should be involuntarily committed.”

       Golub v. Giles, 814 N.E.2d 1034, 1039 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Thus,

       as M.T. notes in his brief on appeal, a respondent’s history of being committed

       may contribute to a future serious adverse finding that he again should be

       committed. That consequence, which is adequately developed in the record and

       in the briefing here, is sufficient to place M.T.’s appeal from his expired

       involuntary civil commitment order within Indiana’s case law that such appeals

       are not moot under the collateral-consequences doctrine. See, e.g., S.D., 2

       N.E.3d at 1290; Kirby, 822 N.E.2d at 1101 n.4.

[14]   Indeed, Dr. Bhat’s testimony in support of Community Health’s petition for

       M.T.’s involuntary commitment proves the point. In his testimony, Dr. Bhat

       emphasized M.T.’s record of “previous hospitalizations” for mental-health

       issues, which dated back to 2017 and included an August 2022 hospitalization.

       Tr. Vol. 2, p. 21. Dr. Bhat opined that the five-year timeline of M.T.’s prior

       hospitalizations “establish[d]” M.T.’s “diagnosis of Schizophrenia.” Id. And

       Dr. Bhat further opined that the term of the requested commitment order here

       would be necessary because, “usually if someone has been in a state of

       psychosis or catatonia for a long time, it takes a while for them to get better and

       to get stabilized.” Id. at 26.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-341 | September 14, 2023     Page 9 of 13
[15]   Thus, M.T.’s medical history, including his prior hospitalizations, was relevant

       to Dr. Bhat’s diagnosis of M.T. and to Dr. Bhat’s recommended treatment plan

       for M.T. If the instant order were invalid but not reviewed in this appeal, it

       would potentially contribute to that evidence against M.T. in a future

       commitment proceeding just as his existing history contributed to the evidence

       against him here. Our review of the instant order is therefore an opportunity for

       meaningful relief to M.T.

[16]   Still, Community Health asserts that our holding that M.T.’s appeal is

       meaningful and not moot is contrary to our Supreme Court’s opinion in E.F.

       But Community Health is mistaken. In E.F., our Supreme Court expressly said

       that any possible collateral-consequences analysis in temporary-commitment

       appeals was “left open.” 188 N.E.3d at 466. Community Health interprets that

       language to mean that in fact any such analysis was closed shut. We think that,

       if our Supreme Court had intended that outcome, it would have explicitly said

       so.

[17]   Community Health further asserts that our holding for M.T. will effectively

       make every appeal from an expired involuntary civil commitment order not

       moot. We also addressed this assertion in C.P. As we noted there, while “[o]ur

       Supreme Court’s analysis” in its most recent opinion on collateral consequences

       was based on the consequences “that attach to any” orders of the type on appeal

       and “was not based on a showing of specific facts,” we need not go so far to

       decide this appeal. See C.P., ___ N.E.3d at ___ n.1 (discussing S.D., 2 N.E.3d at

       1285-86, 1290); see also id. at ___ (collecting cases). Instead, and as in C.P., “we

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-341 | September 14, 2023      Page 10 of 13
       limit our holding to these specific facts and need not reach the question of

       whether the same showing” M.T. makes here “would suffice to enable appellate

       review of the merits of every involuntary civil commitment order.” Id. at ___

       n.1.

[18]   We therefore proceed to the merits of this appeal.

       2. Community Health presented sufficient evidence to support
       M.T.’s temporary commitment.
[19]   On the merits of his appeal, M.T. contends that Community Health failed to

       present sufficient evidence to support his temporary commitment. In our review

       of such issues, we consider “only that evidence most favorable to the judgment,

       along with” the reasonable inferences therefrom. In re Commitment of T.K., 27

       N.E.3d 271, 274 (Ind. 2015) (cleaned up). We will not reweigh the evidence or

       reassess witness credibility on appeal. Id. at 273. It is the petitioner’s burden in

       the trial court to support the petition for an involuntary civil commitment by

       clear and convincing evidence. Id.

[20]   To support its petition for M.T.’s involuntary temporary commitment,

       Community Health was required to show that M.T. was (1) mentally ill; (2)

       either dangerous or gravely disabled; and (3) that his commitment was

       appropriate. I.C. § 12-26-2-5(e) (2022) (emphasis added). M.T. challenges only

       whether Community Health’s evidence was sufficient to show that he was

       gravely disabled. According to Indiana Code section 12-7-2-96 (2022), “gravely

       disabled,” as relevant to our analysis here, “means a condition in which an

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-341 | September 14, 2023      Page 11 of 13
       individual, as a result of mental illness, is in danger of coming to harm because

       the individual . . . has a substantial impairment . . . of that individual’s

       judgment, reasoning, or behavior that results in the individual’s inability to

       function independently.”

[21]   Community Health presented sufficient evidence to show that M.T. was

       gravely disabled. M.T. has an established history of Schizophrenia, with

       multiple hospitalizations going back more than five years. He has been

       prescribed medication for that diagnosis. However, in July 2022, he ceased

       taking his prescription. Around that same time, his behaviors “progressively

       got[] worse.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 12. M.T. went weeks without changing clothes, days

       without sleeping, did not eat regularly, and had to have most meals prepared

       for him.

[22]   In January 2023, after “forcefully” trying to grab his mother’s phone from her,

       M.T. “took off” out of his parents’ house even though he was not “dressed for

       January weather.” Id. at 14-15. Sometime thereafter, he appeared at a pizzeria

       confused, which resulted in him being transported to Fairbanks Behavioral

       Health. And, there, Dr. Bhat observed M.T.’s “disorganized” behavior and

       speech, “catatonic” behavior, and “negative symptoms of Schizophrenia,”

       namely, “apathy, social withdraw[al], . . . being quiet, poor self-care,” and lack

       of pleasure. Id. at 22.

[23]   Dr. Bhat concluded that M.T. lacks insight into his own mental illness and that

       M.T.’s lack of insight results in M.T. not taking his prescribed medication or

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-341 | September 14, 2023      Page 12 of 13
       being able to take care of himself. Dr. Bhat also opined that M.T.’s mental

       illness causes M.T. to suffer a substantial impairment of his judgment,

       reasoning, or behavior that results in his inability to function independently.

       M.T.’s father likewise testified that M.T. was not able to “live independently”

       from his parents and their home. Id. at 17.

[24]   A reasonable fact-finder could conclude from those facts that M.T. was gravely

       disabled. And M.T.’s arguments to the contrary on appeal simply seek to have

       this Court reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. We affirm the trial

       court’s judgment.

       Conclusion
[25]   For all of these reasons, we hold that M.T.’s appeal of his temporary-

       commitment order is not moot, even though the term of his commitment has

       expired, based on the collateral consequences that accompany his order of

       involuntary civil commitment. On the merits of this appeal, we hold that

       Community Health presented sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s

       order that M.T. be committed for not more than ninety days. Accordingly, we

       affirm the trial court’s judgment.

[26]   Affirmed.

       Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-341 | September 14, 2023     Page 13 of 13