Court Opinion

ID: 9446814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:18:53.206367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:46.256055
License: Public Domain

SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I agree with the result reached by Judge HASTINGS, but not with all of his reasons therefor.
Judge Hastings relies on the following language in Shaw v. Edward Hines Lumber Co., 7 Cir., 249 F.2d 434, 439: “[T]his does not mean that we may ignore uncontradicted, unimpeached evidence supporting defendant’s position.” If we assume the correctness of the holding in the Shaw case,1 it is apparent that the quoted language is not applicable to the case at bar. In order to rely on the Shaw case, the majority opinion treats as “uncontroverted facts”, established by the driver’s testimony, that at the time of the accident the bus was traveling within the speed limit and “was slowing down for a street intersection about one-half block away”. As a matter of fact, plaintiff testified that at that time the bus stopped with a sudden lurch, and she grabbed the seat ahead of her with one hand, to keep from falling, and the plastic slip cover of the seat came apart and let her go, whereupon she fell on her back.
It is obvious that the testimony of the bus driver as to the movement of the bus prior to plaintiff’s falling was not uncontroverted. Clear contradiction exists between that evidence and plaintiff’s testimony. Her version tended to prove the bus company’s negligence in the operation of the bus, while the driver’s testimony tended to negative that alleged fact; in fact, it was admissible for no other purpose. This situation is a commonplace and classic example of contradiction in evidence. That being so, the rule of the Shaw case, assuming it to be sound, has no application to this case. The evidence on behalf of plaintiff when considered with that offered on behalf of defendant, on the question of the bus company’s alleged negligence, presented a jury question, under the *72well-established rule that, on a motion by defendant for a directed verdict, at the close of all the evidence, the court must accept as true all facts (favorable to plaintiff) which the evidence tends to prove and draw against the defendant all inferences which the jury might reasonably draw, and, in case of conflict in the evidence, consider only that which is favorable to the plaintiff. Mescall v. W. T. Grant Co., 7 Cir., 133 F.2d 209, 210. In deciding a motion for a directed verdict, where the evidence is conflicting, evidence favorable to movant is, in general, to be disregarded, and only evidence favorable to the adverse party is to be considered. 88 C.J.S. Trial § 257, p. 664.
However, an affirmance of the judgment of the district court is required on the ground that the evidence, when tested by the aforesaid rule, proves as a matter of law that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, which was as great or greater than that of the bus company. 2 Wis.Stat. (1957) § 331.045, ch. 331, and Wasikowski v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 259 Wis. 522, 49 N.W.2d 481.
The district court properly commented,
“If she [plaintiff] had remained in her seat, this accident never would have occurred. Why she got up out of her seat when 28 blocks away from the bus depot, her destination, is something I don’t understand. * * * And when a passenger stands up in the aisle of a moving bus, she incurs the risk incident to standing up there. It is a matter of common knowledge that when you are standing in a moving bus or a moving coach, that you are easily thrown off balance, and you may fall unless you have something to reach for. It is a matter of common knowledge, as I said, that it is difficult to maintain one’s equilibrium while' standing on a moving bus, particularly when the bus is in the process of stopping. * * * The Court finds as a matter of law that there was no negligence on the part of the bus driver; and the Court is also firmly of the opinion that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in standing in that aisle in a moving bus under the circumstances in which she did.”
It is my opinion that plaintiff’s negligence was greater than the negligence of the bus company, if any. The language of the trial court does not expressly show that he believed plaintiff’s contributory negligence was greater than that of the bus company, but he did hold that she was guilty of contributory negligence and that the bus company was not negligent, which means the same thing, for the purpose of this appeal.
I would affirm.

. The only precedent cited in the Shaw case is our opinion in Brunner v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie R. Co., 7 Cir., 240 F.2d 608, 609. We have found no other support.