Court Opinion

ID: 9696463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:48:57.309481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:22.632644
License: Public Domain

P. J. Marutiak, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent and would not allow this defendant to withdraw his plea.
Defendant’s main reliance is upon People v Dixon, 103 Mich App 518; 303 NW2d 32 (1981). To the extent that Dixon seems to infer that specific performance of a sentence bargain is a proper remedy, I disagree. Dixon reiterates that a breach of a sentence agreement only entitles defendant to withdraw his guilty plea, People v Hagewood, 88 Mich App 35; 276 NW2d 585 (1979), and that specific performance is not available as an alternative remedy because the authority to pronounce sentences is within the exclusive province of the judiciary. Dixon also recognizes that the remedy of specific performance presumes negotiation between the prosecutor and the defendant and was not intended to apply to bargains struck with the trial court, since it is well established that the trial courts are not to participate in bargaining negotiations. From this point forward the logic becomes confused. Dixon seems to find that, once a trial judge fails to follow the principle of nonparticipation in bargaining negotiations, the judge then becomes a prosecutor and that specific performance of the sentence agreement can be enforced against the judge as if he were the prosecutor.
The judiciary’s discretion and duty to sentence for the benefit of both the criminal and the public are well recognized. It is at least questionable whether, under any circumstances, a judge should be able to knowingly bargain away this duty. Michigan has addressed the problem. MCL 771.14; MSA 28.1144 makes the review of an up-to-date presentence report mandatory before a valid sen*390tence can be imposed. The presentence report cannot be waived even by a combined stipulation of prosecutor, defendant and the court. People v Brown, 393 Mich 174, 181; 224 NW2d 38 (1974). The Brown Court clearly stated:
"We are satisfied that the statute bespeaks a conviction that our criminal justice system is better served by requiring that a judge who is about to sentence a person have the information contained in a presentence report before making the decision whether to put that person on probation, fine or imprison him. It would militate against this conviction to recognize a right to waive the requirement even if the prosecutor, judge and defendant deemed it expedient in a particular case, for the Legislature, speaking for all the people, has ordained otherwise.”
I am of the opinion that the Supreme Court has held that an attempt to determine a sentence without a presentence report is a nullity. This is emphasized in the Matter of Del Rio, 400 Mich 665, 696; 256 NW2d 727 (1977), where such an action was referred to as a willful and blatant violation of the statute and court rule. I would hold then that such an unauthorized and void procedure to determine a sentence cannot be cured by specific performance. The remedy is to give the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea. In giving him this opportunity all of his due process rights are protected as are the rights which society has entrusted to the judiciary. United States ex rel Selikoff v Comm’r of Correction of the State of New York, 524 F2d 650 (CA 2, 1975), cert den 425 US 951; 96 S Ct 1725; 48 L Ed 2d 194 (1976). This procedure is in accord with People v Palma, 25 Mich App 682; 181 NW2d 808 (1970).
The defendant, represented by counsel and after conference with counsel, chose not to withdraw his guilty plea. Thus, I would affirm his conviction.