Court Opinion

ID: 9929243
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 01:00:49.930659+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:18.923162
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-20035     Document: 00517053433          Page: 1    Date Filed: 02/01/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                 ____________                                FILED
                                                                      February 1, 2024
                                  No. 23-20035                          Lyle W. Cayce
                                 ____________                                Clerk

   Jennifer Harris,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   FedEx Corporate Services, Inc.,

                                           Defendant—Appellant.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 4:21-CV-1651
                  ______________________________

   Before Southwick, Engelhardt, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Cory T. Wilson, Circuit Judge:
          This appeal arises from a $366,160,000 jury verdict in favor of
   Plaintiff-Appellee Jennifer Harris and against Defendant-Appellant FedEx
   Corporate Services, Inc. (FedEx) for retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C.
   § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–
   2000e17. FedEx challenges the jury’s verdict, the damages awarded, and the
   district court’s denial of a new trial due to the court’s admission of Harris’s
   expert’s flawed testimony.
Case: 23-20035     Document: 00517053433           Page: 2   Date Filed: 02/01/2024

                                    No. 23-20035

          As we will discuss, Harris’s § 1981 claims were time-barred under her
   employment contract, so they fail as a matter of law. Otherwise, the evidence
   was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict for Harris on her Title VII
   retaliation claim. But in view of Title VII’s $300,000 cap on damages and
   the evidence presented at trial, we remit Harris’s compensatory damages to
   $248,619.57, and conclude she was not entitled to punitive damages.
   Likewise, FedEx is not entitled to a new trial because of the court’s
   evidentiary ruling.
                                        I.
                                        A.
          FedEx hired Harris, an African American woman, in 2007 as an
   Account Executive in sales.     Relevant to this appeal, her employment
   contract contained a “Limitation Provision,” which provides that “[t]o the
   extent the law allows an employee to bring legal action against the Company,
   [Harris] agrees to bring that complaint within the time prescribed by law or 6
   months from the date of the event forming the basis of [her] lawsuit,
   whichever expires first.” Harris was successful at her job, and FedEx
   promoted her to District Sales Manager in 2017. Her new supervisor was
   Michelle Lamb, a white woman.
          Harris’s new position required her to lead a team of eight Account
   Executives responsible for making sales in the Houston area. FedEx partly
   measured Harris’s success by her team’s sales. She was initially successful
   in her new role, so much that FedEx recognized her with an award in 2018.
   However, according to FedEx, Harris’s and her team’s performance started
   declining in mid-2018. From October 2018 to February 2019, Harris and
   Lamb met more than ten times to discuss strategies to improve Harris’s
   team’s performance. Despite those meetings, FedEx alleges Harris’s sales
   continued to lag other teams.

                                         2
Case: 23-20035     Document: 00517053433           Page: 3   Date Filed: 02/01/2024

                                    No. 23-20035

          In early March 2019, Lamb suggested Harris step down as a District
   Sales Manager. Harris was “blindsided” because “Lamb had not discussed
   any areas in which Harris needed to grow” in any of their prior meetings.
   Shortly thereafter, on March 11, Harris sent her first e-mail to a FedEx Vice
   President accusing Lamb of race discrimination. Human Resources (HR)
   advisor Michael Clark immediately opened an investigation, which he
   concluded on June 3. Clark interviewed six witnesses and completed a
   detailed analysis of each of Harris’s allegations. He ultimately concluded
   that Harris’s discrimination claims were unsubstantiated but recommended
   that Lamb be coached “to ensure she responds accordingly to all of her
   managers regarding work related questions.”
          FedEx policy did not allow Lamb to discipline Harris during an
   ongoing HR investigation. But on June 26, Lamb gave Harris a “Letter of
   Counseling for Unacceptable Performance.” The letter required Harris to
   create a Performance Improvement Plan “highlighting the specific goals and
   activities [she] [would] focus[] on to improve [her] team’s performance and
   accountability.” It further advised Harris that “recurrent patterns of [her]
   performance [would] not be tolerated” and might result in her termination.
          Two days later, Harris filed another internal complaint against Lamb,
   averring the letter was retaliation for her first discrimination complaint.
   Clark opened another investigation, which he concluded on September 6. He
   interviewed three witnesses and completed a detailed analysis of each of
   Harris’s allegations.   He again determined that Harris’s claims were
   unsubstantiated, finding that “Lamb’s decision to issue discipline to [Harris]
   was in line with the unacceptable performance that [Harris] and her direct
   reports continue to demonstrate.”
          On September 13, Lamb gave Harris a second “Letter of Warning,”
   requiring Harris to submit another Performance Improvement Plan and

                                         3
Case: 23-20035      Document: 00517053433          Page: 4   Date Filed: 02/01/2024

                                    No. 23-20035

   advising her again that failure to improve her performance might result in her
   termination. A week later, Harris submitted a third internal complaint. Clark
   again opened an investigation, interviewed two witnesses, completed a
   detailed analysis of each of Harris’s allegations, and concluded on December
   31 that Harris’s claims were unsubstantiated.
          On January 7, 2020, Lamb submitted a Request for Termination to
   HR, citing Harris’s continued poor performance and failure to meet the
   terms of her two Performance Improvement Plans. HR approved the
   request, and FedEx fired Harris, effective January 8.
                                         B.
          Harris filed suit in May 2021, sixteen months after FedEx fired her.
   She alleged race discrimination and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. After
   months of discovery, FedEx moved for summary judgment, arguing inter alia
   that Harris’s claims were time-barred by the six-month Limitation Provision
   in her contract. Harris responded and moved to amend her complaint to add
   claims for discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. The district court
   denied FedEx’s motion and granted Harris leave to amend. It concluded that
   the Limitation Provision “cut[] against public policy and sidestep[ped] a
   federal administrative process designed to meet and defeat long-standing
   policies of bias and discrimination in the workplace.” Thus, in October 2022,
   Harris’s § 1981 claims proceeded to trial, along with her new Title VII claims.
          At trial, FedEx presented evidence that it fired Harris because of her
   poor performance, not based on discrimination or in retaliation for her
   complaints. In response, Harris offered evidence of pretext to rebut FedEx’s
   non-discriminatory and non-retaliatory reason. That evidence included
   (1) the temporal proximity between the filing of her internal complaints and
   FedEx’s disciplinary actions; (2) that white employees had underperformed
   but had not been placed on a Performance Improvement Plan or terminated;

                                         4
Case: 23-20035        Document: 00517053433              Page: 5      Date Filed: 02/01/2024

                                         No. 23-20035

   (3) that the only other person who was fired had also filed a discrimination
   complaint; and (4) that Lamb told HR that she had “extreme concern with
   [Harris’s] behavior” because Harris was “taking the approach of arguing
   with [Lamb] about many things” and “demonstrating an insubordinate
   attitude.”
           As her first trial witness, Harris called Coneisha Sherrod to testify as
   a “human resources expert.” After the district court overruled FedEx’s
   objections, 1 Sherrod testified that FedEx “didn’t follow normal protocol and
   procedure, and that discrimination and retaliation did occur.” But Sherrod
   admitted on cross-examination that her testimony was based only on her
   review of Harris’s complaint, and she conceded that she did not have any
   knowledge of FedEx’s HR policies and procedures.
           After Harris presented her evidence, FedEx moved for judgment as a
   matter of law. It argued that Harris’s § 1981 claims were time-barred by the
   Limitation Provision in her contract; her evidence was insufficient to support
   her discrimination and retaliation claims; and punitive damages were
   unwarranted because Harris had failed to prove malice or reckless
   indifference. The district court denied FedEx’s motion. As with FedEx’s
   motion for summary judgment, the district court determined that the
   Limitation Provision did not apply. But instead of relying on its former
   reasoning that the Limitation Provision “cut against public policy,” it held
   that the Limitation Provision applied only to lawsuits “arising out of
   [Harris’s] contract of employment.” The district court also found that

           _____________________
           1
            FedEx had filed a motion pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
   509 U.S. 579 (1993), before trial to exclude Sherrod’s testimony, which the district court
   also denied.

                                               5
Case: 23-20035          Document: 00517053433            Page: 6       Date Filed: 02/01/2024

                                         No. 23-20035

   Harris presented sufficient evidence to support her discrimination and
   retaliation claims and to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury.
           FedEx presented its case; the parties gave their closing arguments;
   and the jury deliberated for two days. The jury returned a verdict on October
   25, 2022, finding that FedEx had not discriminated against Harris, but that it
   had retaliated against her. The jury awarded her $120,000 for “[p]ast pain
   and suffering, inconvenience, [and] mental anguish” and $1,040,000 for
   “[f]uture pain and suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, and loss of
   enjoyment of life.” 2 It also found that Harris was entitled to punitive
   damages and awarded Harris an additional $365,000,000. Thus, the jury’s
   verdict totaled $366,160,000.
           Harris moved for entry of judgment in November 2022. FedEx
   responded, informing the district court that it intended to file post-trial
   motions.        Subsequently, FedEx moved under Federal Rules of Civil
   Procedure 50(b) and 59 for judgment as a matter of law or in the alternative,
   for remittitur or a new trial. It renewed its arguments from its motion for
   judgment as a matter of law and added three new arguments: Harris’s
   compensatory damages should be remitted pursuant to the maximum
   recovery rule; the punitive damages award was unconstitutionally excessive;
   and FedEx was entitled to a new trial based on Sherrod’s testimony. 3 But the
   district court did not rule on FedEx’s post-trial motions. 4 Instead, it entered

           _____________________
           2
             For reasons not apparent from the record, the district court stated Harris was
   awarded $1,060,000 in future damages in its final judgment. That number contradicts the
   jury’s verdict form.
           3
               FedEx made additional arguments but does not renew them on appeal.
           4
            “We treat the district court’s entry of final judgment as an implicit denial of any
   outstanding motions, even if the court does not explicitly deny a particular motion.”
   Edwards v. 4LJ, L.L.C., 976 F.3d 463, 465 (5th Cir. 2020) (internal quotations omitted).

                                                6
Case: 23-20035        Document: 00517053433            Page: 7      Date Filed: 02/01/2024

                                        No. 23-20035

   final judgment in February 2023 and ordered FedEx to pay Harris
   $366,060,000. 5
                                             II.
           FedEx raises five issues on appeal: (A) whether the Limitation
   Provision in Harris’s contract barred her § 1981 claims; (B) whether Harris
   presented sufficient evidence at trial to support her retaliation claim;
   (C) whether our maximum-recovery rule limits Harris’s compensatory
   damages; (D) whether Harris presented sufficient evidence at trial to warrant
   punitive damages and whether the damages awarded were unconstitutionally
   excessive; and (E) whether FedEx is entitled to a new trial based on the
   district court’s admission of Sherrod’s testimony. We examine each in turn.
                                             A.
          FedEx first challenges the district court’s denial of its motion for
   judgment as a matter of law as to Harris’s § 1981 claims. We review that
   issue de novo. Nobach v. Woodland Vill. Nursing Ctr., Inc., 799 F.3d 374, 377
   (5th Cir. 2015).
          FedEx contends that the Limitation Provision unambiguously applies
   to Harris’s § 1981 claims and is reasonable and enforceable. Harris counters
   that the Limitation Provision is not enforceable because (1) she did not
   knowingly and voluntarily accept it; (2) the Limitation Provision only applies
   to lawsuits arising out of her employment contract, not to discrimination or
   retaliation claims; (3) the six-month limitation period is unreasonable as
   applied to § 1981 claims; and (4) the Limitation Provision is unenforceable

          _____________________
          5
           As stated in note 2, the district court’s judgment awarded $1,060,000 in future
   damages instead of the $1,040,000 set forth in the jury’s verdict. It further subtracted
   $100,000 from the final award without explanation, resulting in the $366,060,000
   judgment.

                                              7
Case: 23-20035      Document: 00517053433          Page: 8   Date Filed: 02/01/2024

                                    No. 23-20035

   under Texas law. We agree with FedEx that the Limitation Provision
   included in the parties’ contractual agreement bars Harris’s § 1981 claim.
          Harris’s first two counterarguments are easily dispatched. She asserts
   she did not knowingly and voluntarily accept the Limitation Provision
   because it was in “small, hard-to-read print” and “[s]he does not remember
   reading th[e] provision and no one pointed it out to her.” But “parties to a
   contract have an obligation to protect themselves by reading what they sign
   and, absent a showing of fraud, cannot excuse themselves from the
   consequences of failing to meet that obligation.” In re Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc.,
   257 S.W.3d 228, 233 (Tex. 2008). Harris is not excused from the Limitation
   Provision simply because she did not read it.
          Harris next adopts the district court’s reasoning that the Limitation
   Provision is a “self-contained provision” that only applies to “lawsuits about
   events arising out of [the] contract of employment, not discrimination or
   retaliation claims.” But that interpretation is contrary to the plain language
   of the contract. The phrase “legal action” is not confined to claims arising
   out of Harris’s employment contract. Instead, it is modified by the phrase
   “[t]o the extent the law allows.”         That language is broad enough to
   encompass retaliation and discrimination claims.
          For her third argument—that a six-month limitation period is
   unreasonable as applied to § 1981 claims—Harris relies on Burnett v.
   Grattan, 468 U.S. 42 (1984). In Burnett, the Court declined to apply
   Maryland’s six-month statute of limitations for filing employment
   discrimination complaints to the plaintiffs’ § 1981 claims. Id. at 49–55. It
   reasoned that “borrowing an administrative statute of limitations ignores the
   dominant characteristic of civil rights actions: they belong in court.” Id. at
   50. The Court explained that “[l]itigating a civil rights claim requires
   considerable preparation,” and applying a six-month statute of limitations is

                                         8
Case: 23-20035         Document: 00517053433               Page: 9      Date Filed: 02/01/2024

                                          No. 23-20035

   “manifestly inconsistent with the central objective of the Reconstruction-Era
   civil right statutes, which is to ensure that individuals whose federal
   constitutional or statutory rights are abridged may recover damages or secure
   injunctive relief.” Id. at 50, 55.
           But there is an important distinction between Burnett and this case:
   FedEx is not asking us to enforce a state statute, but rather a contractual
   limitation provision. And “it is well established that . . . a provision in a
   contract may validly limit . . . the time for bringing an action on such contract
   to a period less than that prescribed in the general statute of limitations,
   provided that the shorter period itself shall be a reasonable period.” Order of
   United Com. Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 608 (1947); see also
   Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 571 U.S. 99, 107 (2013)
   (applying Wolfe in the ERISA context). The question, therefore, is whether
   a six-month contractual limitation is reasonable as applied to § 1981 claims.
           Other courts have concluded that it is.                       E.g., Thurman v.
   DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 397 F.3d 352, 357–58 (6th Cir. 2004); Taylor v. W. &
   S. Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 1188, 1202–06 (7th Cir. 1992); Njang v. Whitestone
   Grp., Inc., 187 F. Supp. 3d 172, 178–79 (D.D.C. 2016). “[B]y enacting section
   1981 without a statute of limitations, Congress implied that it is willing to live
   with a wide range of state statutes and rules governing limitations of actions
   under section 1981.” Taylor, 966 F.2d at 1205. And in Njang, then-Judge
   Ketanji Brown Jackson explained that a six-month limitation period for
   § 1981 claims is not unreasonable because, unlike Title VII claims, “there are
   no time-consuming procedural prerequisites that a plaintiff must satisfy
   before she brings her claim in court.” 187 F. Supp. 3d at 179 (citing Johnson
   v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 466 (1975)). 6 She further noted that
           _____________________
           6
             FedEx rightfully does not assert that the Limitation Provision applies to Harris’s
   Title VII claims. Unlike § 1981 claims, a plaintiff alleging claims under Title VII must first

                                                 9
Case: 23-20035        Document: 00517053433               Page: 10       Date Filed: 02/01/2024

                                          No. 23-20035

   a six-month period is not “inherently unreasonable” because such a period
   is “prescribed in various other federal laws.” Id. (citing DelCostello v. Int’l
   Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169–72 (1983)). We find Justice Jackson’s
   reasoning persuasive and see no reason to depart from other circuits on this
   issue. The Limitation Provision in Harris’s contract is reasonable as applied
   to her § 1981 claims.
           Fourth and finally, Harris contends that, even if the Limitation
   Provision is reasonable, it is unenforceable under Texas law. She cites Texas
   Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 16.070, which states:
           [A] person may not enter a stipulation, contract, or agreement
           that purports to limit the time in which to bring suit on the
           stipulation, contract, or agreement to a period shorter than two
           years. A stipulation, contract, or agreement that establishes a
           limitations period that is shorter than two years is void . . . .

   Harris did not raise this argument in the district court. Generally, “[a] party
   forfeits an argument by failing to raise it in the first instance in the district
   court—thus raising it for the first time on appeal . . . .” Rollins v. Home Depot
   USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021). True, we have discretion to consider
   a forfeited issue if “it is a purely legal matter and failure to consider the issue
   will result in a miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 398 (quoting Essinger v. Liberty
   Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 534 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 2008)). “But what constitutes
   a pure legal question or a miscarriage of justice is ‘a question with no certain
   answer.’” Id. (quoting Essinger, 534 F.3d at 453).

           _____________________
   file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Typically,
   a plaintiff must then wait 180 days before she can file suit. See id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Thus, a
   six-month contractual limitation provision for Title VII claims would be unreasonable
   because it would amount to “‘a practical abrogation of the right of action’ under Title VII.”
   Njang, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 179–81 (quoting Taylor, 966 F.2d at 1205–06).

                                                10
Case: 23-20035        Document: 00517053433              Page: 11       Date Filed: 02/01/2024

                                         No. 23-20035

           Regardless, we find no miscarriage of justice here. Harris could have
   raised the issue in her response to FedEx’s motion for summary judgment
   before trial or in her response to FedEx’ motion for judgment as a matter of
   law during trial, but she did not. On substance, Harris cites no authority from
   Texas or this court applying § 16.070 to any cause of action other than a
   breach-of-contract claim. But see Celaya v. Am. Pinnacle Mgmt. Servs., LLC,
   No. 3:13-CV-1096, 2013 WL 4603165, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2013)
   (collecting contrary cases and holding that § 16.070 did not apply to
   plaintiff’s Title VII and § 1981 claims). All told, “[w]e see no principled basis
   for addressing [Harris’s] forfeited argument here.” Rollins, 8 F.4th at 398.
           To sum up:         The Limitation Provision in Harris’s contract is
   reasonable and enforceable, and the district court erred by allowing Harris’s
   § 1981 claims to proceed to trial.               That determination has outsized
   importance here because § 1981 claims are not subject to statutory caps, but
   Title VII claims are. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (allowing recovery of
   compensatory and punitive damages under Title VII “provided that the
   complaining party cannot recover under section 1981”); id. § 1981a(b)(3)(D)
   (capping damages, inclusive of punitive damages, at $300,000). Because we
   reverse the district court’s denial of FedEx’s motion for judgment as a matter
   of law as to Harris’s § 1981 claims, the most she can recover is $300,000. 7

           _____________________
           7
             Our dismissal of Harris’s § 1981 retaliation claim has no bearing on the jury’s
   finding for Harris on her Title VII retaliation claim. Though “the remedies available under
   Title VII and under § 1981 . . . are separate, distinct, and independent,” Johnson, 421 U.S.
   at 461, we (and the jury) analyze them under the same evidentiary framework, Sanders v.
   Christwood, 970 F.3d 558, 561 n.7 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Lawrence v. Univ. of Tex. Med.
   Branch at Galveston, 163 F.3d 309, 311 (5th Cir. 1999)).

                                               11
Case: 23-20035     Document: 00517053433            Page: 12   Date Filed: 02/01/2024

                                     No. 23-20035

                                          B.
          FedEx next contends that Harris did not present sufficient evidence
   to substantiate her retaliation claim. We review a post-verdict challenge to
   the sufficiency of the evidence using the same standard the district court used
   in first passing on the motion, namely whether “a reasonable jury would not
   have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.”
   Nobach, 799 F.3d at 377–78 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1)). We
   consider all the evidence in the record, Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
   Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000), “draw[ing] all reasonable inferences in the
   light most favorable to the verdict,” E.E.O.C. v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., 731 F.3d
   444, 453 (5th Cir. 2013). We may not make credibility determinations, weigh
   evidence, or draw inferences because those “are jury functions, not those of
   a judge.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
   U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). “[A] Rule 50 motion must be denied ‘unless the facts
   and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in the movant’s favor
   that reasonable jurors could not reach a contrary conclusion.’” Wantou v.
   Wal-Mart Stores Tex., L.L.C., 23 F.4th 422, 431 (5th Cir. 2022) (alteration in
   original) (quoting Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 235
   (5th Cir. 2001)), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 745 (2023).
          Initially, Harris was required to succeed under the McDonnell Douglas
   burden shifting framework. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
   792, 800–06 (1973); Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 577–79 (5th Cir. 2003).
   But “[t]he McDonnell Douglas formula . . . is applicable only in a directed
   verdict or summary judgment situation and is not the proper vehicle for
   evaluating a case that has been fully tried on the merits.” Kanida v. Gulf
   Coast Med. Pers. LP, 363 F.3d 568, 575 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations
   and citation omitted). Accordingly, “[p]ost-trial, the [McDonnell Douglas]
   framework becomes moot . . . .” Adams v. Groesbeck Indep. Sch. Dist., 475
   F.3d 688, 691 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Bryant v. Compass Grp. USA Inc., 413

                                          12
Case: 23-20035        Document: 00517053433              Page: 13       Date Filed: 02/01/2024

                                          No. 23-20035

   F.3d 471, 476 (5th Cir. 2005)). 8 Thus, “[w]e need not parse the evidence
   into discrete segments corresponding to a prima facie case, an articulation of
   a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer’s decision, and a
   showing of pretext.” Bryant, 413 F.3d at 476 (quoting Vaughn v. Sabine
   County, 104 F. App’x 980, 982 (5th Cir. 2004)). Instead, we need only decide
   “whether the record contains sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
   determine that [FedEx’s] stated reason for terminating [Harris] was pretext
   [for retaliation].” Id.
           “Pretext can be proven by any evidence that casts doubt on the
   credence of the employer’s proffered justification for the adverse
   employment action.” Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 969 F.3d 571, 578
   (5th Cir. 2020). One way to show pretext is by providing evidence that
   similarly situated employees were treated more favorably. See id. at 580. And
   while temporal proximity between a protected activity and an adverse
   employment action is not sufficient by itself to demonstrate pretext, “other
   evidence, in combination with . . . temporal proximity, is sufficient for a
   reasonable jury to find but-for causation.” Id. at 579.
           Harris’s strongest evidence of pretext at trial was that she was treated
   less favorably than similarly situated employees. Specifically, she offered
   evidence that other District Sales Managers performed the same or worse
   than she did but were not given warnings and were not fired. Further
   bolstering her retaliation claim, Harris presented evidence that the only other
   employee who was terminated for poor performance also filed a
   discrimination complaint.          FedEx attempts to refute that evidence by

           _____________________
           8
             Likewise, the district court, correctly, did not frame the jury instructions “based
   upon the intricacies of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis.” Kanida, 363 F.3d
   at 576. Instead, the jury only considered “the ultimate question of whether [FedEx] took
   the adverse employment action against [Harris] because of her protected status.” Id.

                                                13
Case: 23-20035     Document: 00517053433             Page: 14   Date Filed: 02/01/2024

                                      No. 23-20035

   asserting that Harris’s comparators were not similarly situated because they
   performed better than Harris overall. But as FedEx notes in its own reply
   brief, “[c]onstrued in Harris’s favor, the evidence at trial demonstrated, at
   most, that certain of her sales numbers were better than certain of her peers’
   numbers at certain times.” To accept FedEx’s view of the evidence and
   reject the jury’s, we would necessarily wade into making credibility
   determinations, weighing the evidence, and drawing inferences. This we
   cannot do. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150–51 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
   Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
          Harris also provided other evidence of pretext. She showed temporal
   proximity between the filing of her internal complaints and Lamb’s
   disciplinary actions; each adverse employment action took place less than a
   month after an internal investigation into Harris’s protected activities. 9 And
   on cross-examination Lamb testified that she told HR that she had “extreme
   concern with [Harris’s] behavior” because Harris was “taking the approach
   of arguing with [Lamb] about many things” and “demonstrating an
   insubordinate attitude.”      That evidence could be viewed as further
   supporting the jury’s verdict.
          Admittedly, FedEx presented substantial evidence that Harris was
   terminated because of her poor performance, not in retaliation for her
   discrimination complaints. Arguably, the temporal proximity of Harris’s
   internal complaints and FedEx’s adverse employment actions was also self-
   generated, in that there was a pattern of Harris filing a complaint when she
   knew adverse action was imminent. But considering all of Harris’s evidence
   and resolving credibility determinations in favor of the verdict, “we cannot

          _____________________
          9
              As noted, FedEx policy did not allow Lamb to discipline Harris while an
   investigation was ongoing.

                                           14
Case: 23-20035      Document: 00517053433             Page: 15      Date Filed: 02/01/2024

                                       No. 23-20035

   say the jury’s verdict is against the great weight of the evidence or that a
   reasonable person could only have reached an opposite decision.” Wantou,
   23 F.4th at 437. “Although we might reach a different result if we considered
   the claim in the first instance, that is not the role of the appellate court.” Id.
   Given the great deference owed to jury verdicts, we find that Harris
   presented sufficient evidence to support her retaliation claim.
                                            C.
          Having determined that Harris presented sufficient evidence to
   support her retaliation claim, we now examine whether that evidence
   supports the jury’s compensatory damages award. “There is a strong
   presumption in favor of affirming a jury award of damages.” Eiland v.
   Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 58 F.3d 176, 183 (5th Cir. 1995). “The damage
   award may be overturned only upon a clear showing of excessiveness or upon
   a showing that the jury was influenced by passion or prejudice.” Id.
   “However, when this court is left with the perception that the verdict is
   clearly excessive, deference must be abandoned.” Id. “A verdict is excessive
   if it is ‘contrary to right reason’ or ‘entirely disproportionate to the injury
   sustained.’” Id. (quoting Caldarera v. E. Airlines, Inc., 705 F.2d 778, 784 (5th
   Cir. 1983)). “When deciding whether a jury award is excessive, we consider
   the amount of the award after application of the statutory cap, not the amount
   given by the jury.” Giles v. Gen. Elec. Co., 245 F.3d 474, 487 (5th Cir. 2001).
          Generally, we use the maximum recovery rule to determine whether
   damages are excessive. See Longoria v. Hunter Express, Ltd., 932 F.3d 360,
   364–65 (5th Cir. 2019). 10 The maximum recovery rule requires us to “look[]

          _____________________
          10
              This court “ha[s] been inconsistent about where in the analysis the [maximum
   recovery] rule has a role.” Longoria, 932 F.3d at 365. “Sometimes we apply maximum
   recovery at the outset to determine whether the damages are excessive.” Id. (collecting
   cases). “Other times we use the rule only to determine how much of a reduction is

                                             15
Case: 23-20035       Document: 00517053433             Page: 16      Date Filed: 02/01/2024

                                        No. 23-20035

   to other published decisions from the relevant jurisdiction . . . involving
   comparable facts.”       Id. at 365.     “The relevant jurisdiction for federal
   discrimination law can only mean cases decided by this court.” Salinas v.
   O’Neill, 286 F.3d 827, 832 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations omitted).
   “When ‘defects in the award are readily identifiable and measurable,’
   remittitur ordinarily is appropriate.” Wantou, 23 F.4th at 431 (quoting
   Matter of 3 Star Props., L.L.C., 6 F.4th 595, 613 (5th Cir. 2021)). We have
   discretion either to set the remitted verdict or to remand the case for the
   district court to do so. Longoria, 932 F.3d at 368.
          Because Harris’s § 1981 claims are time-barred and Title VII’s
   statutory cap otherwise applies, see supra Part II.A, the question before us is
   whether an award of $300,000 is excessive in this case. See Giles, 245 F.3d
   at 487. Several prior cases serve as possible analogues.
          FedEx offers two employment discrimination cases to argue that we
   should limit Harris’s compensatory damages to $15,000. 11 See Vadie v. Miss.
   State Univ., 218 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2000); Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare
   Corp., 90 F.3d 927 (5th Cir. 1996). In Vadie, the jury awarded the plaintiff
   $350,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress, which the district
   court reduced to $300,000 based on Title VII’s statutory cap. 218 F.3d at
   370. The only evidence supporting emotional damages was the plaintiff’s
   own brief testimony that failing to get the job as a professor “destroyed” him,
   “totally ruined” him, and he became “sick, totally ill, physical, mentally, and

          _____________________
   warranted after deciding the award is excessive.” Id. (same). Because this case arises
   under federal law, this inconsistency is of no moment to our analysis. See id. at 364–66
   (explaining that the issue may matter in diversity cases).
          11
             FedEx calculated its $15,000 number by multiplying our award of $10,000 in
   Vadie by 150%. We discuss the appropriate way to calculate remittitur using the maximum
   recovery rule below.

                                             16
Case: 23-20035        Document: 00517053433              Page: 17       Date Filed: 02/01/2024

                                         No. 23-20035

   everything.” Id. at 377. Though this court held that Vadie’s “testimony was
   sufficient to support a finding of actual injury,” the panel remitted his
   compensatory damages from $300,000 to $10,000 because the record was
   “devoid of any specific evidence whatsoever supporting Dr. Vadie’s broad
   assertions of emotional injury.” Id. at 377–78.
           In Patterson, the district court, after a bench trial, awarded one plaintiff
   $40,000 in emotional damages under § 1981 and another plaintiff $150,000
   in emotional damages under Title VII. 90 F.3d at 937. The § 1981 plaintiff’s
   sole evidence was his own testimony that he felt “frustrated” and “real
   bad,” and that his work environment was “tearing [his] self-esteem down.”
   Id. at 939. The Title VII plaintiff’s sole evidence was her testimony that she
   was “emotionally scarred” after her termination and “that she endured a
   great deal of familial discord” because she had to leave her children to look
   for other jobs. Id. at 940–41. This court held that the plaintiffs’ limited
   testimony did not support the district court’s damages awards and remanded
   with instructions for the district court to award nominal damages. Id. Our
   court noted that “[h]urt feelings, anger[,] and frustration are part of life,”
   and clarified that “[u]nless the cause of action manifests some specific
   discernable injury to the claimant’s emotional state,” then substantial
   emotional damages are not warranted. Id. at 940.
           Harris counters with four published decisions where the plaintiffs
   were awarded between $100,000 and $150,000 for emotional damages in
   Title VII cases. 12 See Salinas, 286 F.3d at 827; Giles, 245 F.3d at 474;
           _____________________
           12
              Harris initially contends that the maximum recovery rule is not implicated
   because her case “presents unique facts for which there are no controlling cases.”
   Learmonth v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 631 F.3d 724, 739 (5th Cir. 2011). But Learmonth was a
   personal injury case where the plaintiff suffered traumatic injuries that required treatment
   for the rest of her life. Id. at 738. Nothing in the record suggests that Harris’s claim is
   materially different than other retaliation cases.

                                               17
Case: 23-20035     Document: 00517053433           Page: 18    Date Filed: 02/01/2024

                                    No. 23-20035

   Williams v. Trader Publ’g Co., 218 F.3d 481 (5th Cir. 2000); Forsyth v. City of
   Dallas, 91 F.3d 769 (5th Cir. 1996). Two are particularly noteworthy.
          In Salinas, the plaintiff and his wife testified about “Salinas’s loss of
   self-esteem, feelings of not being a competent agent, loss of sleep, stress,
   paranoia, fear of future retaliation, and high blood pressure,” as well as his
   numerous trips to the doctor. 286 F.3d at 829–30, 832. As in this case, the
   jury awarded Salinas one million dollars in compensatory damages, which the
   district court reduced to $300,000 based on Title VII’s statutory cap. Id. at
   829. This court distinguished Salinas’s case from Vadie, observing that
   Salinas “offered a much more detailed description of the emotional harm he
   suffered,” and that his testimony was corroborated by his wife. Id. at 832–
   33. Even then, our court held that “Salinas ha[d] not presented enough
   evidence to support an award of $300,000.” Id. at 833. Rather, “a
   comparison with other emotional damages awards . . . stemming from
   discrimination point[ed] to $100,000 as the proper award.” Id.
          In Giles, the jury awarded the plaintiff $400,000 in compensatory
   damages, which the district court reduced to $300,000. 245 F.3d at 487. At
   trial, Giles “primarily [relied] on his own testimony to support his contention
   of emotional distress,” but he also offered testimony from a co-worker. Id.
   at 488. Giles testified that he had “trouble sleeping, suffered headaches and
   marital difficulties, and lost the prestige and social connections associated
   with his position at GE.” Id. His co-worker testified that Giles “appeared
   despondent, depressed, down and absolutely utterly discouraged about not
   being able to come back to work.” Id. This court determined that Giles’s
   and his co-worker’s testimony was “specific enough to allow a jury to award
   compensatory damages.” Id. at 489. But the panel remitted the amount to
   $100,000 because “[t]he symptoms of which Giles complain[ed] [did] not
   support an award of $300,000.” Id. at 489.

                                         18
Case: 23-20035     Document: 00517053433           Page: 19    Date Filed: 02/01/2024

                                    No. 23-20035

          Harris’s case is more like Salinas and Giles than Vadie and Patterson.
   Harris testified at length about the emotional distress she suffered from
   Lamb’s conduct and her termination. Specifically, Harris stated she suffered
   from stress and anxiety, which resulted in dry heaving; she took medication
   and sought professional help; she had trouble sleeping; she gained weight;
   and she generally lost her enjoyment of life. Harris’s pastor, her cousin, and
   a long-time friend also testified on her behalf. Her pastor testified that after
   her termination “it was like the bottom fell out . . . . She was so emotionally
   destroyed.” He was “worried about her mental state because . . . [he] was
   just worried about if she was going to do something crazy.” Harris’s cousin
   testified that after her termination, she noticed Harris “was having to go to
   the doctor more for stomach issues” and that “she was gaining weight.” And
   Harris’s friend testified that after her termination, Harris “had a sadness
   about herself,” and “[s]he wasn’t . . . the optimistic . . . hopeful friend that
   she was used to.”
          That evidence is more than the cursory, uncorroborated testimony in
   Vadie and Patterson. Indeed, like the plaintiffs in Salinas and Giles, Harris
   sought medical treatment, testified to physical symptoms resulting from her
   emotional distress, and had other witnesses corroborate her testimony.
   Hence, Harris is entitled to more than nominal damages. However, Harris’s
   symptoms do not warrant a $300,000 compensatory damage award. See
   Giles, 245 F.3d at 489. Instead, a comparison of her case with this court’s
   precedent suggests a base sum of $100,000 is more appropriate. See Salinas,
   286 F.3d at 833; Giles, 245 F.3d at 489; see also Williams, 218 F.3d at 486
   (upholding $100,000 award in sex discrimination case based on plaintiff’s
   testimony that her discharge resulted in “sleep loss, beginning smoking[,]
   and severe weight loss”); Forsyth, 91 F.3d at 776 (upholding $100,000 award
   for emotional damages in § 1983 case based on plaintiff’s testimony that “she

                                          19
Case: 23-20035        Document: 00517053433               Page: 20       Date Filed: 02/01/2024

                                          No. 23-20035

   suffered depression, weight loss, intestinal troubles, and marital
   problems, . . . and that she had to consult a psychologist”).
           In view of that, we remit Harris’s damages using the maximum
   recovery rule. See Longoria, 932 F.3d at 368. “The rule allows some leeway,
   so it permits a verdict at 150% of the highest inflation-adjusted recovery in an
   analogous, published decision.” Id. at 365; see Salinas, 286 F.3d at 831. 13 We
   employ Salinas as an analogue and start with a base sum of $100,000. Salinas
   was published in April 2002. Adjusted for inflation, a $100,000 award back
   then is equal to $165,746.38 in October 2022, when the jury returned its
   verdict. 14 That amount properly compensates Harris for her damages shown
   at trial. But “[t]o avoid substituting our judgment for that of the jury,” we
   also multiply that number by 150%, see Giles, 245 F.3d at 489, entitling Harris
   to $248,619.57 in compensatory damages.
                                                D.
           Next, we consider whether Harris presented sufficient evidence to
   support an award of punitive damages. Again, we ask whether “a reasonable
   jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party
   on that issue.” Nobach, 799 F.3d at 377–78 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
   50(a)(1)).
           “A Title VII plaintiff may recover punitive damages upon proof that
   the defendant acted ‘with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally

           _____________________
           13
               We do not apply the multiplier when such a calculation was a part of the initial
   award because doing so “could lead to explosive growth in damage awards.” Salinas, 286
   F.3d at 831. In Salinas, as here, the multiplier was not part of the damages awarded at trial,
   so the Salinas court multiplied the base $100,000 award by 150% and thereby set the
   plaintiff’s compensatory damage award at $150,000.
           14
              We used the CPI Inflation Calculator from the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
   available at https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl. See Longoria, 932 F.3d at 367 n.6.

                                                20
Case: 23-20035     Document: 00517053433           Page: 21    Date Filed: 02/01/2024

                                    No. 23-20035

   protected rights of an aggrieved individual.’” Wantou, 23 F.4th at 439
   (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1)). “This is a higher standard than the
   showing necessary for compensatory damages.” Id. “Thus, ‘not every
   sufficient proof of pretext and discrimination is sufficient proof of malice or
   reckless indifference.’” Id. (quoting Hardin v. Caterpillar, Inc., 227 F.3d 268,
   270 (5th Cir. 2000)).
          “Ultimately, the terms ‘malice’ and ‘reckless indifference’ ‘focus on
   the actor’s state of mind.’” Id. (quoting Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527
   U.S. 526, 535 (1999)). “Both ‘pertain to the employer’s knowledge that it
   may be acting in violation of federal law, not its awareness that it is engaging
   in discrimination [or retaliatory conduct].’” Id. (alteration in original)
   (quoting Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 535). Thus, the defendant employer “must at
   least [have] [retaliated] in the face of a perceived risk that [her] actions
   w[ould] violate federal law to be liable for punitive damages.” Id. at 440
   (alterations in original) (quoting Boh Bros., 731 F.3d at 467). “Moreover,
   even if particular agents acted with malice or reckless indifference, an
   employer may avoid vicarious punitive damages liability if it can show that it
   made good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII.” Boh Bros., 731 F.3d at 467.
   “Given these stringent standards, a plaintiff faces . . . a ‘formidable burden’
   in seeking punitive damages for employment discrimination.” Id. (quoting
   Canny v. Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up Bottling Grp., Inc., 439 F.3d 894, 903 (8th Cir.
   2006)).
          Although we affirm the jury’s finding that Lamb engaged in
   retaliation, Harris does not meet the higher burden to show that Lamb did so
   “in the face of a perceived risk” that her actions would violate federal law.
   See id. at 468. While Lamb testified that she told HR that she had “extreme
   concern with [Harris’s] behavior” because Harris was “taking the approach
   of arguing with [Lamb] about many things,” Lamb also testified that she
   made those comments because she “believe[d] . . . those concerns need[ed]

                                         21
Case: 23-20035       Document: 00517053433              Page: 22       Date Filed: 02/01/2024

                                         No. 23-20035

   to be taken into consideration” because they showed a lack of accountability
   and “wanting to argue” on Harris’s part. The evidence suggests that Lamb
   believed Harris should be disciplined for “insubordination,” not in
   retaliation for her complaints. And for punitive damages, it is the employer’s
   subjective intent that matters. “Because the uncontroverted evidence shows
   that [Lamb] did not subjectively perceive a risk of violation of federal law, we
   conclude that [FedEx] was entitled to judgment as matter of law overturning
   the jury’s punitive-damage award.” Id.
           Even if Lamb had acted with malice and reckless indifference, FedEx
   was still entitled to judgment as a matter of law because FedEx made good-
   faith efforts to comply with Title VII. Each time Harris filed an internal
   complaint, HR conducted an in-depth investigation: Clark interviewed
   multiple witnesses, examined relevant evidence, and provided a detailed
   analysis of Harris’s allegations. Moreover, FedEx policy did not allow Lamb
   to discipline Harris while Clark’s investigations were ongoing. FedEx’s
   actions in this case are unlike other cases where this court has found
   companies vicariously liable for punitive damages because they ignored the
   plaintiff’s complaints. See, e.g., Wantou, 23 F.4th at 440; Rhines v. Salinas
   Const. Techs., Ltd., 574 F. App’x 362, 368 (5th Cir. 2014); Deffenbaugh-
   Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 188 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 1999).
   Accordingly, FedEx was also entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to
   punitive damages based on its good-faith efforts to comply with Title VII.
           Because Harris failed to meet the heavy burden required for punitive
   damages in Title VII cases, we reverse the district court’s denial of judgment
   as a matter of law on this issue and vacate the punitive-damages award. 15

           _____________________
           15
             Because we find Harris is not entitled to punitive damages as a matter of law, we
   need not determine the constitutionality of the jury’s punitive damages award.

                                               22
Case: 23-20035      Document: 00517053433            Page: 23     Date Filed: 02/01/2024

                                      No. 23-20035

                                           E.
          Finally, FedEx contends it is entitled to a new trial based on Harris’s
   expert Sherrod’s testimony. “We review a district court’s evidentiary
   rulings and denial of a motion for a new trial [for abuse of discretion].”
   Fornesa v. Fifth Third Mortg. Co., 897 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 2018). “[T]o
   vacate a judgment based on an error in an evidentiary ruling, ‘this court must
   find that the substantial rights of the parties were affected.’” Wantou, 23
   F.4th at 432 (alteration in original) (quoting Seatrax, Inc. v. Sonbeck Int’l, Inc.,
   200 F.4th 358, 370 (5th Cir. 2000)). This “requires that the error be
   prejudicial; it must affect the outcome of the proceeding.” Crawford v.
   Falcon Drilling Co., 131 F.3d 1120, 1125–26 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting United
   States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 164 (5th Cir. 1994)). “If the court is sure,
   after reviewing the entire record, that the error did not influence the jury or
   had but a very slight effect on its verdict,” then a party’s substantial rights
   have not been affected. Kelly v. Boeing Petroleum Servs., Inc., 61 F.3d 350, 361
   (5th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
           “Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, district courts are assigned a
   gatekeeping role to determine the admissibility of expert testimony.” United
   States v. Valencia, 600 F.3d 389, 423–24 (5th Cir. 2010). “The court must
   find that the evidence is both relevant and reliable before it may be
   admitted.” Id. at 424. “This requires more than a glance at the expert’s
   credentials; the court must also ensure that the expert has reliably applied the
   methods in question.” Id. Mindful of these guideposts, we conclude that the
   district court abused its discretion by allowing Sherrod to opine that FedEx
   “didn’t follow normal protocol and procedure, and that discrimination and
   retaliation did occur.”
          FedEx filed a pre-trial motion to exclude Sherrod’s testimony in part
   because she “d[id] not utilize a reliable methodology as required by

                                           23
Case: 23-20035     Document: 00517053433           Page: 24   Date Filed: 02/01/2024

                                    No. 23-20035

   Daubert.” FedEx asserted that Sherrod’s testimony was based solely on her
   review of Harris’s complaint, such that she had not reviewed any of FedEx’s
   policies or Harris’s employment contract. The district court denied FedEx’s
   motion “[b]ased on Sherrod’s vast experience in the HR area, and the fact
   that she has been permitted to testify in federal courts on several occasions.”
   When FedEx renewed its objections at trial, the district court overruled
   them, pointing to the reasoning in its prior order.
          On cross-examination, Sherrod conceded that she did not have any
   knowledge of FedEx’s HR policies and procedures and that her testimony
   was based only on her review of Harris’s complaint. This is problematic
   because an expert’s testimony must be “based on sufficient facts or data.”
   Fed. R. Evid. 702(b). “Although . . . an expert can rely on information
   provided by a party’s attorney, . . . an expert cannot forgo [her] own
   independent analysis and rely exclusively on what an interested party tells
   them.” Orthoflex, Inc. v. ThermoTek, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 2d 776, 798 (N.D.
   Tex. 2013). By allowing Sherrod to testify without a proper foundation, the
   district court abdicated its role as gatekeeper. Though we generally “afford
   broad discretion to a district court’s evidentiary rulings,” Adams v. Mem’l
   Hermann, 973 F.3d 343, 352 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Sprint/United Mgmt.
   Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 384 (2008)), Sherrod’s opinions about
   FedEx’s “protocol and procedure”—and, indeed, her opinion “that
   discrimination and retaliation did occur”—should not have been allowed
   through the gate.
          Nevertheless, FedEx fails to show that Sherrod’s testimony affected
   its substantial rights. Even without Sherrod’s testimony, Harris presented
   sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Lamb retaliated against
   her. See supra Part II.B. Additionally, Sherrod was subject to FedEx’s
   vigorous cross-examination, affording FedEx the chance to demonstrate the
   deficiencies and inadequacies of her testimony, which the jury was then free

                                         24
Case: 23-20035     Document: 00517053433           Page: 25   Date Filed: 02/01/2024

                                    No. 23-20035

   to consider. And assuming arguendo that the jury relied on Sherrod’s
   testimony in awarding punitive damages, that prejudice is cured by our
   overturning the jury’s punitive award. FedEx has not otherwise shown that
   the district court’s admission of Sherrod’s testimony “influence[d] the jury
   or had [more than] a very slight effect on its verdict,” Kelly, 61 F.3d at 361,
   such that a new trial would be warranted.
                                        III.
          For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s denial of
   FedEx’s motion for judgment as a matter of law as to Harris’s § 1981 and
   punitive damages claims, render judgment in favor of FedEx on those claims,
   and vacate the jury’s award of punitive damages. We affirm the jury’s verdict
   in favor of Harris as to her Title VII retaliation claim, but we remit Harris’s
   compensatory damages to $248,619.57. Finally, we affirm the district court’s
   denial of FedEx’s motion for a new trial.
             AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED and RENDERED in part.

                                         25