Court Opinion

ID: 9781807
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 17:32:29.543943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:39.667448
License: Public Domain

WILKINS, Justice,
concurring in the result:
116 This is the first case to reach us arising from application of the boat owner liability statute found in section 78-18-18, and specifically regarding the scope of the words, "with the ... implied consent of the owner" as used in the statute. I agree with the lead opinion's conclusion that the information presented by affidavit and otherwise to the trial court was insufficient to know, as a matter of law, that Mr. Croft did not give his implied consent for use of the vessel by persons of Mr. Bearden's choosing-minors and adults-so as to include Mr. Golsan. I, too, believe that there remains a material, contested issue of fact on that point that prevents the granting of summary judgment at this stage of the proceedings.
T 17 I write separately to caution against the blanket application of cases decided under the motor vehicle lability statutes. While it is true, as the lead opinion notes, that we have decided a number of cases under section 58-38-212(1) addressing the seope of liability accruing to a motor vehicle owner for the "causing or knowingly permitting" a minor to operate a motor vehicle, the language of the watercraft owner's lability statute in question in this case is different, turning on whether a minor operated the "vessel with the express or implied consent of the owner." Utah Code Aun. § 73-18-18 (1989). The language of the two statutes is not the same, and I do not read them as being "similar" as suggested by the lead opinion. I see them as very different legal standards, requiring both different factual inquiry and different considerations of the fair import of the facts presented.
118 In essence, I agree with the main opinion that the central question is whether the minor operator of the vessel had the "express or implied consent" of the owner to operate the Waverunner at the time of the *542accident, and that summary judgment is inappropriate given the facts before the trial court. I agree that the finder of fact, at trial, may well be able to discern the seope of Mr. Croft's consent, express or implied, if any, as it considers the evidence. I also agree that the only thing we can or should do is to remand the case for proper determination of those facts.
119 I do not agree that the automobile liability statute and cases reviewed by the main opinion aid in that effort. In fact, I believe that the differences in statutory language make reliance upon the reasoning and interpretations of the motor vehicle Hability cases potentially quite misleading.