Court Opinion

ID: 9483078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:10:19.904142+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:24.510869
License: Public Domain

E. GRADY JOLLY,
concurring and dissenting:
In concurring, I would first point out that both the cases of Turner and P & M Crane involved claimants who contended that they were permanently and totally disabled. Consequently, the test and the analysis applied in those cases to determine disability are not in all respects applicable in determining the disability of Guidry, who only claims to be partially disabled. The Turner, and P & M Crane tests are applied to determine “whether or not,” whereas our determination here is “how much.” Although Turner and P & M Crane are clearly precedent to the extent that they are relevant, we are not constrained to force the “square” facts of this case into the “round” analysis of those cases, but instead should apply those precedents only to the extent that their analyses and holdings fit the case with which we are confronted today.
Further, I would emphasize that the ultimate question for the factfinder in this case is solely whether Guidry’s admitted permanent partial disability affects his wage-earning capacity in the relevant employment market, and if so to what extent. In order to stay focused on this question, it is important to recognize what the ultimate question is not. It is not what Guidry’s wage was at the time that he reached maximum medical recovery, nor the effect of that wage having been subsequently reduced, nor whether there are certain tradeoff benefits in a civil service job that must be taken into account, nor what rate he could have earned in a different job at the time that he reached maximum medical recovery, nor what rate he could earn in a different job tomorrow, or next month, or even in the next six months, nor whether he diligently sought such a job; although relevant considerations, each is only secondary to the ultimate issue for determination.
In particular, the ultimate question is not whether there are jobs in the relevant market that are presently available. For example, if the evidence shows a general unavailability of relevant jobs, the evidence might also show it was caused by a temporary downturn in the economy. Such an explanation for job unavailability, if accepted, would consequently not be probative of Guidry’s contention that his injury was the reason for his failure to secure a higher paying job. After all, it is important in assessing Guidry’s disability to remember that we are dealing with Guidry’s right to disability compensation, not his right to unemployment supplemental benefits or his right to permanent employment at the Avondale rate of pay. Indeed, the very fact that there are higher paying jobs in the market — although presently filled— that Guidry is qualified to perform is powerful evidence that his permanent partial disability has resulted in no loss of wage-earning capacity. In short, the unavailability of a higher paying job to Guidry must be causally related to his injury, not to the market, personal choice, or other factors. On the other hand, on the proper record evidence, the factfinder may well find that it is relevant, in determining whether Gui-dry’s injury has damaged his earning capacity, that Guidry’s disability has reduced the number of jobs available to him.
In concurring, I hope my point is clear that the factfinder cannot be placed in the straitjaeket of a one-two-three type of *1047analysis, but instead, the factfinder must consider and analyze the totality of the evidence. The more important point I am emphasizing, however, is that each of the inquiries — into Guidry’s wage-earning history, the value to be attached to non-economic benefits of his present work, his diligence in seeking other jobs, the current conditions of the labor market, defining the relevant labor market, and so on — are merely secondary to the ultimate inquiry on which the factfinder must cast his primary focus: has Guidry’s capacity to earn wages been affected by his 'permanent partial disability?
Finally, I feel it necessary to comment on footnote 11. As I have noted earlier, Turner and P & M Crane do not in all respects fit this case, because in those cases the court was discussing the analysis applicable in determining whether a claimant is permanently and totally disabled. Consequently, when those cases speak of the “critical time” in determining whether a disability exists, we should not be misled or confused by the comments in those cases that are inapplicable to a determination of the degree to which an injury has affected, and continues to affect, the amount of money a claimant can earn. Common reasoning surely tells us that before we can determine the “critical time,” we must know the “critical question.” Here, for example, if the critical question is Avondale’s liability for disability at the time Guidry reached maximum medical recovery, then obviously, the “critical time” of the inquiry is the time that Guidry reached maximum medical recovery. On the other hand, if Avondale is alternatively seeking modification of the award, contending that it has no future liability, or perhaps that its future liability is in a lesser amount than it is presently paying, the “critical time” for that inquiry would be at the time of the hearing.
At least as I understand this case, both the time that Guidry reached maximum medical recovery and the time of the hearing are critical times, each for a different purpose. Indeed, on remand there may be a third critical time — the time of the remand hearing. In sum, Avondale may wish to demonstrate that Guidry suffered no loss of earning capacity either at the time of his maximum medical recovery, or at the time of the first hearing, or at the time of the remand hearing. Its liability would be reduced or eliminated at whichever point it first proved no loss of wage-earning capacity.
Consequently, to the extent that footnote 11 suggests that because “it is more efficient,” an employer can defend its liability during the entire disability period by introducing evidence relevant to only one part of that period, I respectfully dissent.