Court Opinion

ID: 9373005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:02:06.124547+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:39.333397
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                     MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

EDWARD HAMEL,                                     DOCKET NUMBER
           Appellant,                             DE-0752-15-0039-I-2

             v.

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND                            DATE: January 26, 2023
  SECURITY,
            Agency.

        THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Jeffrey H. Jacobson, Esquire, Tucson, Arizona, for the appellant.

      John B. Barkley, Esquire, Phoenix, Arizona, for the agency.

      Jaime Diaz, El Paso, Texas, for the agency.

      Charlotte Schmitt Marquez, New Orleans, Louisiana, for the agency.

                                        BEFORE

                            Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                              Raymond A. Limon, Member
                               Tristan L. Leavitt, Member
                          Member Leavitt recused himself and
                  did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                           2

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     sustained his removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the
     following circumstances:      the initial decision contains erroneous findings of
     material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute
     or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the
     administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
     decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
     discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
     material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.          Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).               After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petit ioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED by
     this Final Order to expand upon the administrative judge’s analysis as to why the
     appellant is not entitled to corrective action in connection with his claim of
     whistleblower reprisal and to correct the penalty analysis, we AFFIRM the initial
     decision.
¶2         The instant decision involves the appellant’s removal appeal. 2 Hamel v.
     Department of Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. DE-0752-15-0039-I-1,
     Initial Appeal File (IAF); Hamel v. Department of Homeland Security, MSPB

     2
      The appellant also has an individual right of action appeal pending in which he alleged
     unlawful reprisal. See Hamel v. Department of Homeland Security, MSPB Docket
     No. DE-1221-16-0046-W-1.       Although that appeal involves many of the same
     underlying facts as his removal appeal, the two appeals have been and continue to be
     adjudicated separately. Joining them would not expedite case processing. See 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.36(b) (explaining that joinder is appropriate if doing so would expedite case
     processing and not adversely affect the interests of the parties).
                                                                                          3

     Docket No. DE-0752-15-0039-I-2, Appeal File (AF-2). 3              There is no dispute
     regarding the following facts set forth in the initial decision.
¶3         The appellant most recently held a GS-14 Resident Agent in Charge
     (Supervisory Criminal Investigator) position with the agency’s U.S. Immigration
     and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), in
     Phoenix. AF-2, Tab 47, Initial Decision (ID) at 2. In 2009, he was involved in
     an investigation with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) known
     as Operation Fast & Furious.        ID at 36.     Based on his knowledge of the
     investigation, the appellant disclosed that the ATF’s tactics included allowing
     weapons purchased under suspicious circumstances to cross the United States’
     border into Mexico, contrary to the agency’s mission and in violation of law. Id.
     Later, in 2010, a Border Patrol Officer was murdered and weapons associated
     with Fast & Furious were found at the crime scene. Id. Between January 2012
     and July 2013, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of
     Justice (DOJ) Offices of Inspectors General (OIG), DHS management, and
     Congressional staff interviewed the appellant about Fast & Furious, and he
     reportedly detailed his concerns with the investigation as well as his disagreement
     with particular officials’ characterization of their involvement. ID at 37.
¶4         Meanwhile, in March 2013, the agency received a detailed but anonymous
     complaint about the appellant’s conduct. IAF, Tab 10 at 40. After a lengthy
     investigation about that complaint and other matters that arose from it, the agency
     proposed his removal. Id. at 4-13. That May 2014 proposal charged the appellant
     with (1) conduct unbecoming a supervisor, (2) failure to be forthright in reporting
     damage to a Government-owned vehicle, and (3) lack of candor and/or failure to

     3
        The administrative judge dismissed the removal appeal without prejudice t o
     accommodate the parties’ discovery needs. She subsequently refiled the appeal,
     resulting in the two docket numbers associated with the one appeal. IAF, Tab 15; AF -2,
     Tab 1.
                                                                                          4

     cooperate with Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) investigators.           Id.
     The deciding official removed him for the same reasons. IAF, Tab 8 at 20 -36.
¶5         After     holding   the     requested   hearing   in   this   removal    appeal,
     the administrative judge sustained the action. ID at 49. For charge (1 ), she found
     that the agency proved all 10 of the underlying specifications.          ID at 7-12.
     For charge (2), the administrative judge found that the agency did not meet its
     burden. 4     ID at 12-15.      For charge (3), she found that the agency proved
     specifications 4 and 6, but failed to prove specifications 1-3, 5, or 7. ID at 15-32.
     Although the appellant presented allegations of a due process violation and
     harmful procedural error, the administrative judge found that he failed to prove
     either.     ID at 32-35.         Concerning his retaliation affirmative defense,
     the administrative judge found that the appellant presented a prima facie case of
     reprisal, ID at 35-41, but the agency met its burden of proving that it would have
     taken the same action absent his protected activity, ID at 41-44.             Finally,
     the administrative judge found that the agency proved nexus, and removal was the
     maximum reasonable penalty for the specifications and charges sustained.
     ID at 44-48.
¶6         The appellant has filed a petition for review.         Hamel v. Department of
     Homeland Security, MSPB Docket No. DE-0752-15-0039-I-2, Petition for Review
     (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has filed a response. 5 PFR File, Tab 4.

     4
       On review, neither party disputes the administrative judge’s decision not to sustain
     charge (2). Therefore, we find it unnecessary to address this charge further.
     5
       In a September 6, 2017 notice, the Board explained that the agency could file its
     response on or before September 30, 2017. PFR File, Tab 2. The agency failed to mee t
     that deadline. Instead, on October 2, 2017, the agency submitted both its response and
     a request for an extension. PFR File, Tabs 3-4. Agency’s counsel declared, under
     penalty of perjury, that he had been assisting in a prolonged family medical emerge ncy
     throughout the agency’s response period. PFR File, Tab 3 at 3 -4. Agency’s counsel
     further declared that the appellant’s counsel had no objection to the extension. Id.
     Under these limited circumstances and absent any objection from the appellant, we have
     considered the agency’s untimely response. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(g) (recognizing
                                                                                          5

      The administrative judge properly sustained charge (1), conduct unbecoming a
      supervisor.
¶7         For charge (1), conduct unbecoming a supervisor, the agency’s removal
      action included 10 specifications concerning various matters occurring between
      2010 and 2012. ID at 7-12; IAF, Tab 10 at 6-8. While we need not recount all of
      the alleged behavior, we note examples such as the appellant “rubbing [his]
      crotch area” against a subordinate from behind, telling subordinates that he would
      “skull fuck” them, asking subordinates “who wants to give me a blow job,”
      saying “come suck my cock” to them, and pulling his weapon unnecessarily in
      response to agents asking questions. IAF, Tab 10 at 6 -8.
¶8         Based on the appellant’s stipulations, the administrative judge found that
      the agency proved all 10 specifications and the charge.          ID at 7-12; AF-2,
      Tabs 37, 39. The appellant does not dispute that finding on review.

      The administrative judge properly sustained charge (3), lack of candor and/or
      failure to cooperate with OPR investigators.
¶9         The appellant does dispute the administrative judge’s findings concerning
      charge (3). PFR File, Tab 1 at 7-18. He generally argues that the administrative
      judge erred by affirming specifications 4 and 6 of that charge using the same
      rationale that she used to reject specifications 1, 2, 3, 5, and 7. Id. at 8. We are
      not persuaded. Without considering whether the administrative judge properly
      rejected the remaining specifications, which neither party challenges on review,
      we find that she properly sustained specifications 4 and 6.
¶10        Although the agency labeled charge (3) “lack of candor and/or failure to
      cooperate with OPR investigators,” the administrative judge determined that the
      latter portion merged into the former.         See Gunn v. U.S. Postal Service,
      63 M.S.P.R. 513, 516-17 (1994) (finding no error in an administrative judge’s
      decision to merge a charge of unacceptable conduct into charges of falsification

      that the Board will excuse a late filing on review if a party shows good cause for the
      delay).
                                                                                            6

      and providing false information in an agency investigation because the agency did
      not accuse the appellant of any additional specific misconduct under the
      unacceptable conduct charge); ID at 15-16.          Accordingly, she found that the
      agency’s burden was to prove that the appellant exhibited a lack of candor by
      knowingly providing incorrect or incomplete information.            ID at 16 (citing
      Fargnoli v. Department of Commerce, 123 M.S.P.R. 330, ¶ 17 (2016)).
      The appellant has not challenged the administrative judge’s findings in this
      regard.
¶11         The administrative judge next recognized that each specification underlying
      this charge was based on the appellant’s interview by a particular OPR
      investigator.    ID at 16.     The appellant alleged that this individual harbored
      animosity toward him because of prior conflict and that impacted his interv iew.
      Id.   The administrative judge agreed, based on various evidence and witness
      testimony.      ID at 16-17.    Therefore, the administrative judge indicated that
      she considered those circumstances while determining whether the appellant had
      actually exhibited a lack of candor. ID at 17. For example, she did not sustain
      one of the specifications because she found that the OPR investigator’s abrupt
      line of questioning prevented the appellant from providing a complete answer.
      ID at 18-19.
¶12         The    first   specification   the   administrative   judge   did   sustain   was
      specification 4.     ID at 23-25.      According to that specification, the OPR
      investigator asked the appellant if he walked into an agent’s cubicle and “act[ed]
      like or actually unzip[ped] [his] zipper,” to which the appellant responded, “I
      would describe the gesture more as adjusting or checking the zipper as opposed
      to . . . mimicking.” IAF, Tab 10 at 9.
¶13         In connection with the charge of conduct unbecoming a supervisor, the
      appellant stipulated that he approached three different subordinate agents from
      behind on separate occasions, unzipped his pants, and when each agent turned
      around in response to the noise of the appellant’s zipper going down, he laughed
                                                                                        7

      and walked away.     Id. at 6; AF-2, Tabs 37, 39.     As the administrative judge
      recognized, separate from the appellant’s stipulation, the record includes evidence
      documenting employees either observing or being subjected to this behavior.
      ID at 24; IAF, Tab 10 at 17, 19-20, 64, 303-04, Tab 11 at 303, 474-76, Tab 12
      at 74-76.
¶14        When an underlying misconduct charge has been proven, a lack of candor
      charge also must be sustained based on the appellant’s knowing failure to respond
      truthfully or completely when questioned about matters relating to the proven
      misconduct.    Social Security Administration v. Steverson, 111 M.S.P.R. 649,
      ¶¶ 12-13 (2009), aff’d per curiam, 383 F. App’x 939 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Table); see
      Fargnoli, 123 M.S.P.R. 330, ¶ 17 (discussing the requirement to prove intent in
      connection with a lack of candor charge). On review, even though the appellant
      has admitted the underlying conduct, he argues that the administrative judge
      should have interpreted his response to questioning about that conduct not as a
      lack of candor, but as an attempt to qualify his answers in the face of hostile
      questioning. PFR File, Tab 1 at 9-13. We disagree.
¶15        After reviewing the associated transcript for further context, i t is evident
      that the appellant was not merely attempting to provide a meaningful explanation.
      IAF, Tab 11 at 40-44. Instead, he knowingly provided inaccurate or incomplete
      information.   Id.    Rather than acknowledge that his zipper behavior was
      an inappropriate joke or antic that he had engaged in numerous times, the
      appellant falsely suggested that he innocuously checked his zipper, “the same way
      as we all check our zipper.” Id.; see Ludlum v. Department of Justice, 278 F.3d
      1280, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (recognizing that lack of candor necessarily involves
      an element of deception and “may involve a failure to disclose something
      that . . . should have been disclosed . . . to make the given statement accurate and
      complete”).
¶16        The appellant separately argues that the administrative judge failed to
      recognize that his response to this line of questioning was specific to a period in
                                                                                         8

      which he was a Border Enforcement Security Taskforce (BEST) Group
      Supervisor. PFR File, Tab 1 at 12. This argument is unavailing. The appellant
      stipulated that he engaged in the conduct at issue while a BEST Group
      Supervisor. IAF, Tab 10 at 6; AF-2, Tabs 37, 39. His statement to the OPR
      investigator should have encompassed this period, a s the OPR investigator asked
      the appellant if he “ever” engaged in the conduct regarding his zipper.
      IAF, Tab 11 at 40-44. Therefore, we agree with the administrative judge that the
      agency proved specification 4.
¶17        The    second    specification   the   administrative   judge   sustained   was
      specification 6.     ID at 28-30.     According to that specification, the OPR
      investigator asked the appellant if he ever referred to a particular Special Agent
      as “Donny,” because that name reminded him of a mentally challenged childhood
      classmate, to which the appellant responded by denying that he came up with the
      nickname and indicating that he did not recall ever specifically referring to the
      individual as “Donny.” IAF, Tab 10 at 10.
¶18        In connection with the charge of conduct unbecoming a supervisor,
      the appellant stipulated that he gave or condoned the use of nicknames for his
      subordinates, including referring to an agent “as ‘Bobby Boucher or Donny’
      because he reminded [the appellant] of a childhood classmate who was slow and
      challenged.”   IAF, Tab 10 at 6-7; AF-2, Tabs 37, 39.           In addition to the
      appellant’s stipulations concerning this nickname and its origin, the record
      includes other supportive evidence. E.g., IAF, Tab 10 at 19-20, Tab 12 at 39.
      Most notably, the record includes an investigatory report in which the agent at
      issue explained the nickname, consistent with the appellant’s stipulations.
      IAF, Tab 10 at 19-20.
¶19        On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge failed to
      adequately account for the fact that the agent at issue harbored personal animus
      towards him. PFR File, Tab 1 at 14-15. The appellant further suggests, as he did
      in response to his proposed removal, that the nickname actuall y stemmed from a
                                                                                        9

      misspelling on the agent’s nameplate, rather than originating from the appellant’s
      memory of a mentally challenged child.       Id. at 17; IAF, Tab 8 at 93.     These
      arguments are unpersuasive in the face of the appellant’s stipulations.
¶20         The appellant separately suggests that he reasonably could have forgotten
      about the nickname by the time of the interview in which he was asked about it.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 15.      However, the administrative judge made credibility
      findings to the contrary, finding it implausible that the appellant would forget the
      origin of the nickname or the existence of the real Donny. ID at 29 -30 (citing
      Hillen v. Department of the Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987)). We find no
      basis for reaching a different conclusion. See Haebe v. Department of Justice,
      288 F.3d 1288, 1299-1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (explaining the deference the Board
      must give to an administrative judge’s credibility findings).

      The agency proved that it would have removed the appellant in the absence of his
      protected whistleblowing.
¶21         The appellant’s next argument on review concerns his retaliation
      affirmative defense. PFR File, Tab 1 at 20-22. He argues that the administrative
      judge erred by finding that the agency met its burden of proving that it would
      have taken the same action, notwithstanding his protected whistleblowing
      activity.   Id.   We disagree, but modify the initial decision to address this
      argument and expand upon the administrative judge’s findings.
¶22         Under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, to prevail
      on a prohibited personnel practice affirmative defense in a chapter 75 appeal that
      independently could form the basis of an individual right of action (IRA) appeal,
      once the agency proves its adverse action by a preponderance of the evidence, the
      appellant must demonstrate by preponderant evidence that he made a protected
      disclosure or engaged in protected activity and that the disclosure or activity was
      a contributing factor in the adverse action. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1), (i); Alarid v.
      Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 12 (2015); Shibuya v. Department
      of Agriculture, 119 M.S.P.R. 537, ¶ 19 (2013). If an appellant meets that burden,
                                                                                      10

      the burden of persuasion shifts to the agency to prove by clear and convincing
      evidence that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the
      appellant’s protected disclosure or activity. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2); Shannon v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 221, ¶ 24 (2014). In determining
      whether an agency has met this heightened burden, the Board will consider all
      relevant factors, including the following Carr factors:    (1) the strength of the
      agency’s evidence in support of its action; (2) the existence and strength of any
      motive to retaliate on the part of the agency officials who were involved in the
      decision; and (3) any evidence that the agency takes similar actions against
      employees who do not engage in protected whistleblowing activity, but who are
      otherwise similarly situated. Soto v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB
      6, ¶ 11; see Carr v. Social Security Administration, 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed.
      Cir. 1999).
¶23        Here, the administrative judge found that the appellant met his burden.
      ID at 35-41. First, she found that the appellant’s disclosures about the danger and
      legality of the Fast & Furious operation were protected by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
      ID at 36-38. She also found that the appellant’s disclosures to and cooperation
      with the DOJ and DHS OIG were protected by section 2302(b)(9)(C).
      ID at 37-38.
¶24        Next, based on the knowledge/timing test, the administrative judge found
      that the appellant’s protected activity was a contributing factor in his proposed
      removal.       ID at 38-41; see Carey v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      93 M.S.P.R. 676, ¶¶ 10-11 (2003) (recognizing that an appellant may demonstrate
      that his disclosure was a contributing factor in a personnel action through
      circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that the official taking the personnel
      action knew of the disclosure, and that the personnel action occurred within a
      period of time such that a reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure
      was a contributing factor in the personnel action). She found that the knowledge
      prong was satisfied because the entire agency had actual or constructive
                                                                                            11

      knowledge of the appellant’s protected activity after it was revealed in an OIG
      report on the Fast & Furious operation. ID at 38-41. She found that the timing
      prong was satisfied because the agency began its investigat ion into the appellant’s
      conduct around the time of the OIG report and proposed his removal within
      15 months of that report. ID at 40-41. Neither party challenges this finding on
      review and we decline to disturb it.
¶25         Although the administrative judge found that the appellant met his burden,
      she also determined that the agency proved, by clear and convincing evidence,
      that it would have taken the same action, notwithstanding the appellant’s
      protected activity. ID at 41-44. First, she found that the agency’s evidence in
      support of the appellant’s removal was very strong. ID at 42. Next, she found
      that there was nothing to connect the Disciplinary and Adverse Action Panel
      (DAAP) that proposed the appellant’s removal with anyone who was the subject
      of the appellant’s disclosures.     ID at 43.     Further, the deciding official was
      altogether unaware of the appellant’s role in the Fast & Furious matter , and those
      who were aware and had the most motive to retaliate were not involved in the
      appellant’s removal. ID at 42-43. Lastly, she found that the agency had similarly
      removed several other employees who exhibited a lack of candor in responding to
      some type of investigation. 6 ID at 43.

      6
        As we previously noted, the third Carr factor concerns any evidence that the agency
      takes similar actions against employees who do not engage in protected whistleblowing
      activity, but who are otherwise similarly situated.         See Siler v. Environmental
      Protection Agency, 908 F.3d 1291, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (explaining that the agency’s
      more favorable treatment of similarly situated whistleblowers is not relevant to Carr
      factor 3). In the initial decision, the administrative judge did not indicate whether the
      similarly situated employees she considered were non-whistleblowers. ID at 43. The
      evidence she cited was the agency’s documentation of several other employees who
      were removed for conduct similar to the appellant’s. AF -2, Tab 28 at 13-51. The
      agency’s representative submitted a statement under penalty of perjury, which the
      appellant does not contest, indicating that these individuals were non-whistleblowers.
      Id. at 3, 9-10. A statement signed under penalty of perjury and not rebutted is
      competent evidence of the assertions it contains. Coles v. U.S. Postal Service,
                                                                                          12

¶26        On    review,   rather   than   disputing   the   specific   findings   that   the
      administrative judge did make, the appellant argues that she ignored a key point
      pertaining to his reprisal claim. PFR File, Tab 1 at 20 -22. According to the
      appellant, the administrative judge should have ruled on whether the anonymous
      complaint about his conduct was likely motivated by retaliatory animus.             Id.
      Under this theory, the appellant suggests that if it were not for his protected
      activity, there would have been no anonymous complaint, no OPR investigation
      stemming from that complaint, and no removal action stemming from that
      investigation. Id.
¶27        The appellant is essentially arguing that he may have been subjected to
      retaliation by investigation. An investigation is not per se a personnel action but
      may effectively fall within the definition of a personnel a ction, such as a
      significant change in duties, responsibilities, or working conditions.       Spivey v.
      Department of Justice, 2022 MSPB 24, ¶¶ 10-11 (citations omitted).             This is
      particularly so if an investigation is one of several actions underlying a hostile
      work environment. However, the appellant has not alleged that he was subject to
      a hostile work environment in this case or his IRA appeal. Separately, it is proper
      to consider evidence regarding an investigation if it is so closely related to a
      personnel action, such as the appellant’s removal, that it could have been a
      pretext for gathering information to retaliate for whistleblowing . E.g., Skarada v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 18 n.4; Mattil v. Department of
      State, 118 M.S.P.R. 662, ¶ 21 (2012).
¶28        To address the appellant’s argument in this context, it is worth recounting
      some pertinent events that occurred during the period leading up to the
      anonymous complaint. In late March 2012, one of the appellant’s subordinates,
      identified here as subordinate A, met with the appellant’s first-level supervisor,
      the Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC), to complain that the appellant had

      105 M.S.P.R. 516, ¶ 12 (2007). Therefore, we credit the agency’s characterization of
      the comparator evidence as concerning non-whistleblowers.
                                                                                                13

      engaged in behavior consistent with that which makes up the conduct unbecoming
      charge in this appeal. 7 IAF, Tab 10 at 66-68. For example, he complained that
      the appellant had propositioned him for oral sex and rubbed his crotch on
      subordinate A. Id. at 64-71. According to subordinate A, he further complained
      that the appellant was making veiled threats by repeatedly telling other employees
      to search for him on the internet to aid in the appellant’s “own kind of
      investigation of [the subordinate].” Id. at 68-71.
¶29           Days after subordinate A made this complaint to the ASAC, in early
      April 2012, the appellant sent a memo to the ASAC, describing how
      subordinate A had exhibited performance deficiencies and misconduct.                   AF-2,
      Tab 21 at 29-31.         In or around March 2013, subordinate A reported that he
      submitted similar complaints about the appellant’s behavior to the “ICE [office of
      equal employment opportunity (EEO)] and [the] Office of Special Counsel.”
      IAF, Tab 10 at 50-52. He reported doing so after deciding that the ASAC had not
      bothered to investigate, much less remedy, his prior allegations about the
      appellant. Id. at 75. The ASAC, on the other hand, indicated in a later statement
      that he doubted subordinate A’s complaints and found them unspecific, and that
      subordinate A’s removal was later proposed as a result of information
      he disclosed to the ASAC concerning subordinate A’s own employment history,
      but the proposal was later vacated over the ASAC’s apparent objections.
      IAF, Tab 9 at 87, Tab 10 at 47-48.
¶30           It was a different complaint, dated February 2013 and reportedly received in
      March 2013, that sparked the OPR investigation which resulted in the appellant’s
      removal. IAF, Tab 10 at 15, 40. That complaint was addressed to the agency’s
      OIG, the agency’s OPR, and Congressional offices. Id. at 40. Though unsigned,
      the nature and text of the complaint strongly suggests that this complaint was
      written by one of the appellant’s current or former male subordinates. Id. The

      7
          We have omitted any reference to this individual’s name t o protect his privacy.
                                                                                            14

      complainant described himself as a “VICTIM/SPECIAL AGENT” of the HSI
      office in Phoenix and a “JUNIOR AGENT” who was not including his name out
      of fear of reprisal. Id. This description is consistent with subordinate A’s status
      as a relatively new employee, who started with the agency in January 2012.
      Id. at 42, 47, 49. The author of the anonymous complaint also described himself
      as a victim of the appellant’s sexual harassment of male agents, which
      he indicated as happening in the presence of female agents.            Id. at 40.    For
      example, the complainant alleged that the appellant had asked him to perform oral
      sex on the appellant and had rubbed his crotch on the complainant. Id. Not only
      are the incidents described in the anonymous complaint similar to those
      previously described by subordinate A, but subordinate A also indicated, when
      interviewed as part of the OPR investigation, that the appellant engaged in
      misconduct in front of female agents.           Id. at 52-53, 57.       Elsewhere, the
      anonymous complaint describes the appellant as being able to get away with
      harassing his employees in this way because the appellant was a favorite of the
      appellant’s first-, second-, and third-level supervisors, including the ASAC, all of
      whom the complaint identified by name and title. Id. at 40. According to the
      anonymous complainant, this was illustrated by the fact that this management
      chain had just promoted the appellant. Id. This allegation that the appellant was
      favored and protected is also similar to the subordinate A’s description of the
      appellant to OPR as one of management’s “top guys,” and his expressed hesitance
      to report the appellant’s misconduct for that reason. Id. at 67.
¶31         Subordinate A indicated that he was not the source of the anonymous
      complaint. Id. at 50. Nevertheless, we find it highly likely that this anonymous
      complaint was authored by him or some other male subordinate of the appellant’s
      who was subjected to the appellant’s inappropriate behavior. 8 That explains the

      8
        Although this subordinate was an approved witness, AF-2, Tab 23 at 2, he did not
      testify at the hearing, AF-2, Speaker Sheets for Hearing. Our discussion of his
      reporting about the appellant instead stems from the subordinate’s tr anscribed interview
                                                                                          15

      consistency of the anonymous complaint with the numerous interviews with
      the appellant’s employees about his behavior and the shared fears of him
      retaliating, as these employees believed to have happened to subordinate A.
      E.g., IAF, Tab 10 at 16-35, 50-52, 65-71.       To illustrate with an example, one
      other direct report of the appellant’s described being subjected to the same type
      of “hazing” by the appellant. Id. at 20-21. He indicated that he feared reprisal if
      he complained, and nearly resigned for these reasons before ultimately
      transferring to escape the appellant’s abuse. Id.
¶32         On review, the appellant has not offered any evidence or persuasive theory
      about someone other than an employee that had reported to him authoring the
      anonymous complaint. PFR File, Tab 1 at 20-22. Below, he suggested that it
      may have been his third-level supervisor, the Special Agent in Charge (SAC).
      AF-2, Tab 15 at 8-9. The appellant advanced this theory based on assertions that
      the SAC was a recipient of the appellant’s Fast & Furious disclosures, he was the
      official most implicated by the disclosures, he made negative comments about the
      appellant in the aftermath, and he was involved in the appellant’s placement on
      administrative leave pending removal. Id. at 8-9. The appellant presented this
      theory about the SAC authoring the anonymous complaint, despite the complaint
      specifically naming the SAC as an individual who favored the appellant
      and causing employees to hesitate in filing any complaint against him.
      IAF, Tab 10 at 40.
¶33         We recognize, as the appellant has, that the anonymous complaint occurred
      just after some select agency officials, possibly including the SAC, got a preview

      with OPR investigators, in June 2013. IAF, Tab 10 at 45. The administrative judge
      found that one small portion of the subordinate’s OPR testimony was not credible,
      regarding a specific instance of the appellant stating that he would “ skull fuck” this
      subordinate. ID at 21. Nevertheless, regardless of the subordinate’s credibility as to
      this one instance, we find the testimony, generally, is evidence of the identity of the
      anonymous complaint. Further, much of his other testimony was corroborated by
      numerous others.
                                                                                          16

      of OIG’s forthcoming Fast & Furious report. AF-2, Tab 21 at 53 (final report,
      dated March 22, 2013), 121 (agency’s January 17, 2013 comments provided for
      the draft report). For that reason, it is within the realm of possibility that the
      SAC or someone else who was not subordinate to the appellant but was
      implicated by the forthcoming Fast & Furious report could have conspired against
      the appellant by authoring the anonymous complaint. But we find that highly
      improbable. In the absence of specific evidence to the contrary, we find it highly
      probable that the anonymous complaint about the appellant’s behavior was
      authored by those who had intimate knowledge of that behavior, had endured that
      behavior, and feared reprisal for reporting that behavior.
¶34         We also find no reason to conclude that those who likely authored the
      anonymous complaint were motivated by the appellant’s whistleblowing when
      they disclosed their abuse at the hands of the appellant. If they even knew of the
      appellant’s whistleblowing, these lower-level employees do not appear to have
      been implicated by it. The whistleblowing occurred before some of them had
      even joined the agency and the whistleblowing primarily implicated two Special
      Agents in Charge or other “leadership” for allowing Fast & Furious to proceed
      over the objections of lower-level agents. 9     E.g., AF-2, Tab 21 at 56, Tab 26
      at 5-8.
¶35         Though not specifically argued by the appellant, we have next considered
      whether any of the parties that acted on the anonymous complaint were
      improperly motivated by the appellant’s whistleblowing and using the anonymous
      complaint as a pretext to investigate and retaliate . See Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17,
      ¶ 18 n.4.   This includes both those with OPR that decided to investigate the

      9
        Because we do not find that the anonymous complaint by a subordinate was motivated
      by the appellant’s whistleblowing, we need not decide whether the agency could be held
      responsible for the same. See Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411, 422 n.4 (2011)
      (declining to express any view as to whether an “employer would be liable if a
      co-worker, rather than a supervisor, committed a discriminatory act that influenced the
      ultimate employment decision”).
                                                                                        17

      complaint and then did investigate, as well as the DAAP that acted upon OPR’s
      referral by proposing the appellant’s removal. Below, the administrative judge
      found that OPR’s own leadership initiated and controlled its investigation.
      ID at 43.    She also found no reason to conclude that those implicated by the
      appellant’s whistleblowing had spoken to the DAAP or that the DAAP was
      otherwise motivated to retaliate against the appellant.      Id.   We modify these
      findings to acknowledge that none of these individuals seem to be personally
      implicated by the appellant’s whistleblowing, but they still may have harbored
      some institutional motive to retaliate, which the administrative judge failed to
      recognize.    See Smith v. Department of the Army, 2022 MSPB 4, ¶¶ 28-29
      (discussing how agency officials as representatives of its general institutional
      interests may have a motive to retaliate, even if they were not directly implicated
      by a disclosure, such as when the disclosed wrongdoing was egregious and
      generated significant negative publicity).     However, we have not reached a
      different result as to the agency’s overall burden.
¶36         The Board does not view the Carr factors as discrete elements, each of
      which the agency must prove by clear and convincing evidence, but rather weighs
      these factors together to determine whether the evidence is clear and convincing
      as a whole. Soto, 2022 MSPB 6, ¶ 13. To further illustrate this point, the Board
      has explained that it is not correct to state that an agency may “prevail ” on a Carr
      factor, or that it must establish a Carr factor by any particular quantum of
      evidence. Id.     On balance, the record contains clear and convincing evidence
      that the agency would have taken the same removal action in the absence of the
      appellant’s protected whistleblowing.      Agency officials had some motive to
      retaliate, but evidence in support of the appellant’s removal action is very strong
      and the agency has removed several similarly situated non-whistleblowers. The
      appellant’s suggestion that the investigation may have been a pretext for
      retaliating is not persuasive, particularly because we find that the investigation
      was the natural result of his subordinates complaining of sexual harassment or
                                                                                         18

      even assault.     Cf., Russell v. Department of Justice, 76 M.S.P.R. 317, 325-28
      (1997) (granting corrective action when an employee’s removal was precipitated
      by investigations that were initiated by individuals who had just days earlier been
      the subject of the employee’s whistleblowing and there was no evidence that
      these     individuals   referred   similarly   situated    non-whistleblowers     for
      investigation).

      Removal is the appropriate penalty.
¶37           In an adverse action appeal such as this, when some but not all charges are
      sustained, the Board will carefully consider whether the sustained charges
      merited the penalty imposed by the agency. Douglas v. Veterans Administration,
      5 M.S.P.R. 280, 308 (1981). The Board may mitigate the agency’s penalty to the
      maximum reasonable penalty so long as the agency has not indicated either in its
      final decision or in proceedings before the Board that it desires for a lesser
      penalty to be imposed if fewer than all of the charges are sustained. Lachance v.
      Devall, 178 F.3d 1246, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
¶38           As detailed above, the administrative judge sustained charge (1) and all 10
      of its underlying specifications, as well as charge (3) and 2 of its underlying
      specifications. ID at 7-12, 23-25, 28-30; Burroughs v. Department of the Army,
      918 F.2d 170, 172 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (observing that when more than one event or
      factual specification supports a single charge, proof of one or more , but not all, of
      the supporting specifications is sufficient to sustain the charge ). The deciding
      official noted that he would have demoted the appellant if the case only involved
      charge (1). IAF, Tab 8 at 26. He also indicated that charge (3) was the most
      serious charge, “tak[ing] the penalty from a demotion to a removal.” Id. at 25.
      However, he did not explicitly state what penalty he would have selected under
      the specific circumstances before us.
¶39           The administrative judge found that, contrary to the deciding official’s
      determination, charge (1) would support the appellant’s removal, by itself.
      ID at 46. She also disagreed with the seriousness the deciding official attached to
                                                                                        19

      charge (3). ID at 47. Therefore, the administrative judge essentially f lipped the
      seriousness afforded to each of the charges by the deciding official, then
      concluded that removal was still the maximum reasonable penalty. ID at 46 -48.
¶40         On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge’s penalty
      analysis is flawed because she substituted her judgment for that of the agency.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 18-20. We agree and modify the initial decision accordingly.
      Nevertheless, we still find that removal is appropriate.
¶41         On the one hand, as the deciding official noted, the appellant had
      approximately 18 years of outstanding service without any prior discipline.
      IAF, Tab 8 at 26; see Reid v. Department of the Navy, 118 M.S.P.R. 396, ¶ 30
      (2012) (finding 18 years of service with positive performance and no prior
      discipline was a mitigating factor). On the other hand, the appellant is held to a
      higher standard of honesty and integrity as a result of his law enforcement
      position. See Prather v. Department of Justice, 117 M.S.P.R. 137, ¶ 36 (2011).
      He also is held to a higher standard as a supervisor. See Edwards v. U.S. Postal
      Service, 116 M.S.P.R. 173, ¶ 14 (2010)        Further, while the deciding official
      determined that the appellant’s conduct unbecoming would not warrant removal,
      by itself, he described it as a shock to the consci ence. IAF, Tab 8 at 25. He also
      indicated that the appellant’s subsequent lack of candor is quite ser ious, affecting
      the value he could contribute to the agency. Id. at 25-26. We agree on both
      counts. See, e.g., Alberto v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 98 M.S.P.R. 50, ¶¶
      7-12 (2004) (affirming the penalty of removal for a supervisor that exhibited a
      pattern of inappropriate and offensive misconduct, including sexually insulting
      jokes), aff’d per curiam, No. 05-3090, 2005 WL 1368150 (Fed. Cir. June 10,
      2005); Ludlum v. Department of Justice, 87 M.S.P.R. 56, ¶¶ 28-29 (2000)
      (recognizing that an employee’s lack of candor is a serious offense that strikes at
      the heart of the employer-employee relationship), aff’d, 278 F.3d 1280 (Fed. Cir.
      2002). While the deciding official suggested that the appellant had shown some
      remorse, he also recognized that the appellant’s initial position was to “hedge his
                                                                                           20

      bets” before the OPR investigators. IAF, Tab 8 at 24. According to the deciding
      official, the appellant’s responses called into question his rehabilitation potential.
      Id. at 26.     Again, we agree.     See, e.g., Levinsky v. Department of Justice,
      99 M.S.P.R. 574, ¶ 31 (2005) (finding that an appellant’s expressions of remorse
      were not significantly mitigating because his responses to the allegations against
      him did not appear to reflect actual contrition), aff’d, 208 F. App’x 925 (Fed. Cir.
      2006).
¶42         Even though there are significant mitigating factors and the agency failed to
      prove all its charges and specifications, we find that removal remains the
      maximum reasonable penalty. See, e.g., Dunn v. Department of the Air Force,
      96 M.S.P.R. 166, ¶¶ 12-18 (2004) (finding that removal was the appropriate
      penalty for conduct unbecoming and lack of candor, even though the empl oyee
      had 28 years of spotless service), aff’d per curiam, 139 F. App’x 280 (Fed. Cir.
      2005). While the appellant has correctly noted that the administrative judge’s
      penalty analysis was flawed, and we have modified the analysis accordingly,
      he has failed to identify any basis for us to conclude that a lesser penalty is
      warranted.
¶43         Accordingly, we affirm the initial decision as modified herein.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 10
               The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
      Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.     You may obtain
      review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
      your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
      forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
      summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not

      10
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      21

provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
                                                                                    22

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving    a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).              If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
                                                                                     23

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 11 The court of appeals must receive your

11
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
                                                                                 24

petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                       25

      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                        Jennifer Everling
                                        Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.