Court Opinion

ID: 9865564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 19:00:59.078826+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:58.416459
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10736    Document: 16-1     Date Filed: 09/25/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-10736
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       MICHAEL DAVID TAYLOR,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       OFFICER ANDREW J. KUNCAS,

                                                   Defendant- Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-20864-DPG
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10736

       Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Michael Taylor appeals the district court’s grant of summary
       judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against a police officer. He
       argues that the officer, Andrew Kuncas, lacked arguable reasonable
       suspicion to detain Taylor and arguable probable cause to arrest
       him. Taylor also argues that the district court abused its discretion
       when it denied his Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60(b) motion for relief from the
       judgment.
                                         I.
              We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
       novo, viewing all the evidence and drawing all reasonable infer-
       ences in favor of the plaintiff. Fish v. Brown, 838 F.3d 1153, 1156-57
       (11th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant
       shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
       the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
       P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).
              A brief, investigatory stop does not violate the Fourth
       Amendment “when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspi-
       cion” that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime.
       Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1165 (11th Cir. 2000). Arrests must
       be based on probable cause. Miller v. Harget, 458 F.3d 1251, 1259
       (11th Cir. 2006). “Probable cause exists when the facts and circum-
       stances within the officers’ knowledge . . . would cause a prudent
       person to believe, under the circumstances shown, that the suspect
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       23-10736                Opinion of the Court                          3

       has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.”
       Id. (quotation marks omitted).
              Qualified immunity shields government officials performing
       discretionary functions from liability for civil damages in § 1983 ac-
       tions so long “as their conduct does not violate clearly established
       statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
       would have known.” Jackson, 206 F.3d at 1164.
               In the context of an allegedly unconstitutional arrest, an of-
       ficer is entitled to qualified immunity if, based on the totality of the
       circumstances, the officer had arguable probable cause to make the
       arrest. Fish, 838 F.3d at 1167. Arguable probable cause is a lower
       standard than actual probable cause, and only requires that “under
       all of the facts and circumstances, an officer reasonably could—not
       necessarily would—have believed that probable cause was pre-
       sent.” Id. Likewise, when an officer asserts qualified immunity in
       the context of an allegedly unconstitutional investigatory stop,
       “the issue is not whether reasonable suspicion existed in fact, but
       whether the officer had arguable reasonable suspicion to support
       an investigatory stop.” Jackson, 206 F.3d at 1166 (quotation marks
       omitted).
               In this case, Officer Kuncas moved for summary judgment
       and supported same with a Statement of Material Facts. Taylor
       filed a response to the motion for summary judgment, but he did
       not file a competing Statement of Material Facts or any evidence to
       support his allegations and assertions. Pursuant to Southern
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       4                         Opinion of the Court                      23-10736

       District of Florida Local Rule 56.1(a)(2), 1 the district court deemed
       admitted the facts in Kuncas’s Statement of Material Facts and
       based its ruling on those undisputed facts. See S.D. Fla. R. 56.1(c)
       (“All material facts in any party’s Statement of Material Facts may
       be deemed admitted unless controverted by the other party’s State-
       ment of Material Facts, provided that: (i) the Court finds that the
       material fact at issue is supported by properly cited record evi-
       dence; and (ii) any exception under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 does not ap-
       ply.”).
              The district court noted that Kuncas was dispatched follow-
       ing a 911 call from a citizen advising that a man was walking on a
       bridge carrying a flag and a gun. When Kuncas arrived at the
       bridge, he observed Taylor still walking on the bridge carrying a
       flag saying “Don’t Tread on Me,” an AR-15 rifle, a Glock pistol in a
       holster on his hip, and a fishing pole, but with no bucket, bait, fish-
       ing knife, net, or other equipment commonly used by fishermen.
       The area was marked with “No Fishing” signs.
              The district court acknowledged that although it was unlaw-
       ful to openly carry weapons, there was an exception for a person
       engaged in fishing or hunting or going to or returning therefrom.
       The district court concluded:

       1 “An opponent’s Statement of Material Facts shall clearly challenge any pur-

       portedly material fact asserted by the movant that the opponent contends is
       genuinely in dispute. An opponent’s Statement of Material Facts also may
       thereafter assert additional material facts that the opponent contends serve to
       defeat the motion for summary judgment.” S.D. Fla. R. 56.1(a)(2).
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       23-10736               Opinion of the Court                         5

             Officer Kuncas had no reasonable basis to believe that
             Plaintiff was fishing; nor was it apparent that Plaintiff
             was going to or coming from a fishing expedition. Ra-
             ther, Plaintiff was seemingly making a political state-
             ment—parading his political flag and brandishing his
             fishing pole and weapon as props. Prior to his arrest.
             Plaintiff also refused to identify himself to Officer
             Kuncas or present his fishing license.
       Dist. Ct. Order, Doc. 33 at 5. Accordingly, the district court held
       that the fishing exception was not applicable and held that Officer
       Kuncas had reasonable suspicion to detain Taylor for an investiga-
       tory stop, and also held that the officer had probable cause to arrest
       Taylor. Alternatively, the district court also held that Officer Kun-
       cas was entitled to qualified immunity (i.e. that he had at least ar-
       guable reasonable suspicion to detain Taylor and arguable proba-
       ble cause to arrest him).
               We agree with the district court that Officer Kuncas is enti-
       tled to qualified immunity. For the same reasons that persuaded
       the district court, we agree that Officer Kuncas had at least arguable
       reasonable suspicion to detain Taylor for an investigatory stop. It
       was absolutely clear that Taylor was not fishing, and there was at
       least arguable reasonable suspicion that Taylor was not either com-
       ing from or going to a fishing location. And we agree with the dis-
       trict court that, when Taylor refused to provide a fishing license,
       the officer had at least arguable probable cause to arrest Taylor.
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                  23-10736

                                         II.
              We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for an abuse of
       discretion. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co., 198 F.3d
       1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999).
              A district court may relieve a party from a final judgment
       where there has been mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
       neglect. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). The moving party must show
       that his mistake or neglect would affect the outcome. In re World-
       wide Web Sys., Inc., 328 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003).
               The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
       Taylor’s post judgment motion. We agree with the district court
       that Taylor did not show good reason for his failure to follow the
       local rules. Moreover, even if we considered Taylor’s belatedly
       filed Statement of Material Facts (filed with his Rule 60(b) motion),
       we cannot conclude that Taylor has shown a likelihood of a differ-
       ent outcome.
              AFFIRMED.