Court Opinion

ID: 9723954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:39:20.667835+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:53.716714
License: Public Domain

*700WUEST, Justice
(concurring in result and concurring specially).
While I concur in the result in this case, I write specially to address certain points that merit the attention of this court.

1. Construction of Anticipatory or Pre-in-jury Releases

A review of the cases that involve releases in conjunction with a recreational activity reveals two evident trends:
First, the more inherently dangerous or risky the recreational activity, the more likely that an anticipatory release will be' held valid. That is, individuals who engage in activities like mountain climbing, race car driving, parachute jumping, and the like, are more likely to be held to have an understanding of the risky nature of their chosen activity. Lee v. Beauchene, 337 N.W.2d 827 (S.D.1983); Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370 (Colo.1981); Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d 102, 424 N.Y.S.2d 365, 400 N.E.2d 306 (1979).
Second, anticipatory, pre-injury releases are much more likely to be deemed valid and enforceable when they are written on a separate document —that is, not imbedded in an application, rental agreement, or sign-up sheet. A good example is found in Baker v. City of Seattle, 79 Wash.2d 198, 484 P.2d 405 (1971). When Baker rented a golf cart at a city golf course, the rental agreement contained a clause stating in part that the “Lessor shall not be liable for any damages whatsoever arising from injuries to the person and/or property damage or loss ... from whatever cause arising.” 484 P.2d at 406. The brakes on the cart failed, the cart overturned, and Baker was injured. Especially because the disclaimer was in the middle of the agreement and was not conspicuous, the court held the disclaimer was invalid. Id. at 406-07. See also Rosen v. LTV Recreational Development, Inc., 569 F.2d 1117 (10th Cir.1978). Rosen was injured in a ski area; his season pass contained pre-injury release language, wherein the purchaser of the pass accepted the “existence of such dangers ... including the chance of injury.” 569 F.2d at 1122. The court stated that, “Because of its one-sidedness, [such pre-injury releases must] be interpreted strictly in considering the rights of the party who has prepared it.” Id. The court held that the agreement fell short of saying that the “ski area may be negligent toward the signer free of liability.” Id. at 1123.
General discussion of pre-injury releases and exculpatory clauses is found in 1 Stuart M. Speiser et al., The AmericaN Law of Torts § 5.39 at 1084-98 (1983). This treatise states in part:
As to construction of anticipatory or pre-injury release clauses, it is a favored rule that the law’s reluctance to enforce exculpatory provisions of this nature has resulted in the development of an exacting standard by which courts measure their validity. So, it has been repeatedly emphasized that unless the intention of the parties is expressed in unmistakable language, an exculpatory clause will not be deemed to insulate a party from liability for his own negligent acts. Not only does this stringent standard require that the drafter of such an agreement make its terms unambiguous, but it mandates that the terms be understandable as well.... Of course, this does not imply that only simple or monosyllabic language can be used in such clauses. Rather, what the law demands is that such provisions be clear and coherent. In applying this rule of strict construction, particularly where the court is able to ascertain any ambiguity, the one-sidedness or adhesion nature of such contracts is often emphasized.
Id. at 1087-88 (footnotes and citations omitted).
In the present case, if Johnson did not sign the roster and pay her fifteen dollars, she could not play softball in Rapid City. Thus, this was a “one-sided” agreement, and the rules of construction expressed above should apply. These rules of construction are applied in Dobratz v. Thomson, 161 Wis.2d 502, 468 N.W.2d 654 (1991), wherein the Wisconsin Supreme Court carefully considered the validity of an anticipatory release,* reviewing *701the facts and circumstances of the agreement “to determine whether [the release] expresses the intent of the parties with particularity.” 468 N.W.2d at 660. In Dobratz, a case involving water skiing club activities, the court held that the language of the release was not particular enough to exculpate the defendants from liability. Id. at 662. In particular, the court found that the language failed to specify the particular siding stunts that Dobratz might be asked to perform, nor did it specify the level of difficulty or dangerousness of these stunts; and the record made clear that no such information was provided to the participant. Id. at 661-62.
In the present case, Johnson contends that the softball field (in particular, the base) was negligently maintained. This is, of course, a question of fact. However, it is a question of fact that cannot be reached until the validity of the document signed by Johnson is determined. A player signing the Rapid City Softball Association roster would not have had any reason to read the language at the bottom of the sheet of paper; this is why a separate form is recommended for such anticipatory releases — then there is little question that the signer had a fair opportunity to see and read the language. Further, a review of the language on the team sign-up sheet does not convince the reader that such language could be clearly understood to mean the following: The Rapid City Softball Association, and the City of Rapid City, may negligently maintain the softball fields; and if a player is injured due to that negligence, there is no recourse. To find a valid release in this case, we must find that Johnson agreed that the fields could be negligently maintained. Review of both the form and the substance of the language at the bottom of the team sign-up sheet fail to convince that Johnson signed a valid anticipatory release.
2. Public Policy Considerations — Exculpatory Releases
It has been stated that, “ ‘anticipatory releases are neither unusual nor per se void as a matter of public policy.’ ” SpeiseR, AMERICAN Law of Touts § 5.39 at 1085 n. 98 (quoting American Druggists’ Ins. Co. v. Equifax, Inc., 505 F.Supp. 66, 68 (S.D.Ohio 1980) and citing Colton v. New York Hosp., 98 Misc.2d 957, 414 N.Y.S.2d 866, 874 (N.Y.Sup.1979)). The line of cases cited therein all concern “purely voluntary activity by the promisor and involved no relationship or activity affected by a public interest. All were activities which could be considered soeietally insignificant.” Id.
The present ease, however, may involve a matter of public interest worthy of attention by this court. The nature of this public interest is found in a line of cases represented by Wagenblast v. Odessa Sch. Dist. No. 105-157-166J, 110 Wash.2d 845, 758 P.2d 968 (1988). Wagenblast involved releases signed by public school students and their parents as a condition of participation in extra-curricular sports and other activities. 758 P.2d at 969. The court framed the issue as follows:
Can school districts require public school students and their parents to sign written releases which release the districts from the consequences of all future school district negligence, before the students will be allowed to engage in certain recognized school related activities, here interscholastic athletics?
Id. at 969-70. Obviously, the question in the case before us does not involve a school district. However, we are faced with an issue involving city baseball, softball, and other athletic fields. There is a great deal of emphasis on sports and athletics in our society. If an individual wishes to play in an *702organized softball league — in Rapid City, as well as many other towns and cities in South Dakota — they must play on fields owned and maintained by the city. There is no choice to play elsewhere. Do we wish it to be the law in South Dakota that those athletic fields may be negligently maintained with impunity? Are all participants — adults and children — who participate in organized athletics to be faced with a take-it-or-leave-it choice when presented with such anticipatory releases, as a condition of participation? If we uphold these types of releases, that is what we are saying the law is in South Dakota.
Guidance is found in Wagenblast, wherein the court carefully reviewed “exculpatory agreement” cases, and formulated six characteristics, “the more [of which] appear in a given exculpatory agreement case, the more likely the agreement is to be declared invalid on public policy grounds.” 758 P.2d at 971. Thus, all six factors need not apply to a given situation; instead, these factors would be applied in weighing the equities of the situation. i These six characteristics are listed here:

1. The agreement concerns an endeavor of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation.

2. The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for some members of the public.

S. Such party holds itself out as willing to perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at least for any member coming within certain established standards.

⅛. Because of the essential nature of the service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who seeks the services.

5. In exercising a superior bargaining power, the part confronts the public with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence.

6. The person or property of members of the public seeking such services must be placed under the control of the fur-nisher of the services, subject to the risk of carelessness on the part of the furnisher, its employees or agents.

Id. at 972-73. These six characteristics appear to be well-considered and have applicability to the present case. It is generally thought proper that municipalities offer opportunities to participate in organized athletics, such as softball and baseball leagues. Municipalities generally own and maintain the athletic fields. While athletics are not “necessary” to survival, there is certainly a great deal of emphasis in our society on community recreational sports. Those members of our communities wishing to participate in organized sports usually do not have a choice to go elsewhere to play; they must play on the public athletic fields. It is possible that for an additional fee, additional protection against negligence could be purchased.
Similarly, the court in Dobratz acknowledged the Wagenblast factors — and pointed out that they were not particularly helpful to the plaintiff. 468 N.W.2d at 660 n. 5. The court noted that water-skiing is “not a subject ‘generally thought suitable for public regulation,’ or ‘a service of great importance to the public’[.]” Nor did the defendant in this case “have a ‘decisive advantage in bargaining strength.’ ” Id. The Dobratz court also applied the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195 which lists certain situations where exculpatory contracts are unenforceable on grounds of public policy. The pertinent language states:
(2) A term exempting a party from tort liability for harm caused negligently is unenforceable on grounds of public policy if ... (b) the term exempts one charged with a duty of public service from liability to one to whom that duty is owed for compensation for breach of that duty....
468 N.W.2d at 659 (citing Restatement (Second) of CONTRACTS § 195 (1979)). Under the circumstances of that case, the court did not find that the Dobratz water-skiing club re*703lease was unenforceable on grounds of public policy.
Whether cities should be able to free themselves for all liability for negligence in the maintenance of public athletic fields is questionable public policy. Application of either the six factors listed in Wagenblast, or the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 195, would militate against validating anticipatory exculpatory agreements in situations like that presented here. The ease at bar presents us with this question, and it is an issue that should be faced by this court.

The language of the Dobratz release stated in pertinent part:
*701I, hereby release, and agree to hold harmless the Webfooter Water Shows Inc., the promoters, the owners and lessees of the premises, the participants, and the officers, directors, officials, representatives, agents and employees of all of them, of any and from all liability, loss, claims, and demands that may accrue from any loss, damage or injury (including death) to my person or property, in any way resulting from, or arising in connection with this event, and whether arising while engaged in competition or in practice or preparation therefore, or while upon, entering or department from said premises, from any cause whatsoever. I know the risk and danger to myself and property while upon said premises or while participating or assisting in this event, so voluntarily and in reliance, upon my own judgment and ability, and I hereby assume all risk for loss, damage or injury (including death) to myself and my property from any cause whatsoever.
468 N.W.2d at 657 n. 1.