Court Opinion

ID: 9879615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-27 18:28:39.057548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:47:58.191536
License: Public Domain

EDMONDSON,-J. ¶1 Petitioners filed applications for the Court to ■ assume ■ original jurisdiction' and grant extraordinary declaratory and injunc-tive relief. Petitioners have four constitutional claims. Two claims attack the constitutionality of Oklahoma Senate Bill No. 643, the Impaired Driving Elimination' Act 2 (IDEA2). Two claims attack the constitutionality of the Governor’s Executive Order 2017-19, promulgated on June 8, 2017, and designed to implement a portion of S.B. No. 643. ¶ 2 We hold the Impaired Driving Elimination Act 2 is unconstitutional in its entirety due to violating the single subject rule in Okla. Const. Art. 5 § 57. We hold one provision of the Act, section 13, violates the Due Process Clause in Okla. Const. Art. 2 § 7. Because we conclude the provisions of the Act are not severable and the Act is unconstitutional in'its entirety, we. need not adjudicate petitioners’ additional claims challenging the Act and the Governor’s Executive Order. We hold these, petitioners possess standing. We further hold respondents Schulz and McCall are not proper parties, and their motion to be dismissed as parties is granted. I. Petitioners’ Standing  ¶ 3 The new Impaired Driving Elimination Act 2 (IDEA2) contains seventeen numbered sections and according to its title includes, but is not limited to, provisions which relate to revocation, modification, and reinstatement of driver licenses, ignition interlock devices installed in vehicles, making certain acts unlawful, clarifying and deleting procedures relating to blood and breath tests for the presence of alcohol, surrender of driver licenses, and authorization to the Department of Public Safety to create the Impaired Driver Accountability Program by June 30, 2018. Petitioners, four Oklahoma lawyers and licensed drivers raise two constitutional claims on' behalf of themselves and their clients and argue they will be adversely affected when the Act is scheduled to become effective on November 1, 2017. Respondents challenge the standing of the petitioners to bring an action challenging a new Act which has not yet been made effective.1 Standing is a preliminary or threshold issue adjudicated prior to an examination of the merits.2  ¶ 4 Petitioners allege they possess standing based upon one or more of five criteria: 1. They are subject to potential criminal prosecution pursuant to the new legislation; 2. They are subject to potential civil drivers’ revocation in the future; 3. They represent the interests of future clients subject to civil and criminal proceedings within the scope of the, new. Act; (4) The new Act will have an adverse economic impact on their businesses which represent many Oklahomans in erimi-nal and civil proceedings related to the subject matter of the new Act; and (5) They possess “public interest” standing. We need not analyze the issues raised by petitioners and respondents relating to petitioners’ standing based upon potential criminal proceedings,3 potential and hypothetical civil proceedings, their representation of hypothetical future clients, or any potential adverse business impact to them practice of law.4 We find petitioners possess a public interest standing in this matter as we now explain.  ¶ 5 This Court possesses discretion to grant standing to private parties to vindicate the public interest in eases presenting issues of great public importance.5 This discretion is properly exercised to grant standing where there are “competing policy considerations” and “lively conflict between antagonistic demands.”6   ¶ 6 A matter that affects the rights of the citizens of the State is publici juris.7 During oral argument before the Court all parties commented on publici juris attributes of this controversy, including the great number of Oklahoma citizens in all counties of the State subject to the provisions in the new Act related to impaired driving and other provisions;8 and additionally certain administrative procedures authorized for Department of Public Safety creation to supplement the Act, but which have not yet been created or approved for the effective date of November 1, 2017; and other administrative procedures which the Department has legislative approval to delay creation until June 30, 2018.  ¶ 7 The adjective-law9 component to standing in an Oklahoma state court, while creating a bander in a private-law original jurisdiction action, does not hinder this Court from giving adequate relief in a publici juris original jurisdiction proceeding.10 Any potential Okla. Const. Art. 7 § 1 jurisdictional/“judicial power” or justiciability components to standing11 which may act as potential barriers to petitioners’ standing to obtain declaratory relief are resolved by our findings: (1) Petitioners possess interests in challenging this specific Act which are opposed to those of respondents and the controversy presents a “lively conflict between antagonistic demands;” (2) The controversy is publici juris due to the negative consequences attendant to enforcing alleged unconstitutional provisions statewide which relate to both criminal and civil adjective and substantive law involving operating a motor vehicle; (3) The controversy has an exigent nature due to the effective date for the Act which is linked to an allegation of delayed or untimely administrative regulations affecting substantive rights granted under the Act;12 and (4) Petitioners’ standing to enforce public officials’ compliance with constitutional requirements by means of declaratory relief is not a prohibited advisory opinion, but has a common-law prototype “in both the historic prerogative writ of mandamus and the bill in equity for an injunction which tested the legality of public officials’ conduct.”13 We conclude these petitioners possess standing to vindicate the public interest in a case presenting issues of great public importance. II. Motion to Dismiss Filed by Respondents Schulz and McCall  ¶ 8 Oklahoma Senate President Pro Tempore, Senator Mike Schulz, and Speaker of the Oklahoma House of Representatives, Representative Charles McCall, were named as respondents by petitioners. These two respondents filed a response and motion to dismiss the action against them. They assert they are immune from petitioner’s action, and they are correct. ¶ 9 Petitioners allege these two respondents “in their official capacities violated the Oklahoma Constitution’s single subject provision in passing SB 643.”14 In their response to the motion to dismiss, petitioners argue respondents’ legislative immunity applies “only to certain criminal charges and lawsuits seeking damages.” They further argue without citation of authority: “Because the legislators aré the ones who passed the bill, it is only appropriate that they be made a party to the suit that seeks to have the bill voided.”15 We disagree with petitioners’ interpretation of respondents’ constitutionally granted legislative immunity. . , , ¶ 10 The language of Oklahoma Constitution, Article 5 § 22 states: “Senators and Representatives shall, except for treason, felony, or breach of the'peace, be privileged from arrest during the session of the Legislature, and in going to and returning from the same, and, for any speech or. debate in either House, shall not be questioned in any other place,” We have explained this language: The Speech or Debate Clause of the Oklahoma Constitution, Art. 5, § 22, absolutely protects legislators from suit calling for judicial inquiry into their performance “within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.”16 We added: Legislators may not be haled into court, either to account for acts that occurred in the course of legislative process or for judicial inquiry into their motivation for those acts. The legislative privilege has never been limited to words spoken in debate. The constitution’s immunity shields all enactment-related conduct, whether a ■legislator be sued (1) personally, (2) in an official capacity, or (3) as the Legislature’s leader. The line separating protected from unprotected legislative activity lies in the distinction between “purely legislative activities” and those that are nongermane “political matters”. Brook v. Thompson, 1997 OK 127, ¶ 14, 948 P.2d 279, 287-288 (notes omitted). ¶ 11 Petitioners have haled into this Court these two legislators for the purpose of giving an account and defense for their participation in enacting a piece of legislation while serving in the Oklahoma Legislature. The petitioners’ claim against these respondents does not fall within a listed exception in Okla. Const. Art. 5 § 22, but is based solely on petitioners’- claim the legislation violates a provision of the State Constitution. ¶ 12 Senator Mike Schulz and Representative Charles McCall clearly possess immunity from the legal liability sought to be imposed by petitioners and they are dismissed asparties. Ill, Okla. Const Art. 2 § 7 Due Process Clause and Senate Bill No. 643  ¶ 13 Section. 13 of the new Act amends 47 O.S. 2011 § 754, and provides upon arrest by an officer for a prohibited alcohol concentration in a breath test the evidence of driving privilege shall be seized by the officer who shall deliver it to the Department of Public Safety and the “Department shall destroy the evidence of driving privilege upon receipt thereof.” The officer provides the driver with a paper receipt which serves .as a driver’s license for no longer than forty-five (days). No Department of Public Safety administrative hearing is allowed for challenging the seizure of the license. Petitioners argue this provision violates the Due Process Clause in our State Constitution because no opportunity for a hearing takes place (procedural due process), and “there is no need to take an individual’s property and certainly no reason to destroy it” (substantive due process claim — taking of property, ie., the driver’s license). ¶ 14 More than forty years ago the U. S. Supreme Court explained that revocation of a driver’s license must conform to the Due Process Clause.17 The Due Process protection of the licenses was viewed not as a mere state-created interest, right, or privilege, but when drivers’ licenses are issued “their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood ... [and] [suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such eases the licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”18 In addressing whether a license suspension hearing complied with procedural due process, the Court obseived: “It is a proposition which hardly seems to need explication that a hearing which excludes consideration of an element essential to the decision whether licenses of the nature here involved shall be suspended does not meet this standard.”19   ¶ 15 In 1986, we explained: “One’s claim to a driver’s license is indeed a protec-tible property interest that may not be terminated without due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”20 The Due Process Clause in the Oklahoma Constitution,' Okla. Const. Art. 2 § 7,21 does not provide any less protection for those rights which are also protected by its federal counterpart in the 14th Amendment.22 An Oklahoma driver’s license is an interest protected by both State and Federal Due Process Clauses. ¶ 16 Respondents argue that the seizure and destruction of a driver’s license upon arrest without the opportunity for an administrative hearing does not violate the State Due Process Clause because no driving privilege is revoked when the license is seized and destroyed and an additional license may be obtained by the driver. At oral argument, counsel for the Commissioner for the Department of Public Safety stated that the new Act and new administrative rules expected to be promulgated allow a person whose license is seized and destroyed under the new Act to appear at the Department of Public Safety and; replace the-seized license with “a new plastic driver’s license” for twenty-five dollars ($25.00), or a new temporary paper license valid for an additional forty-five days. Again, contrary to petitioners’ claim that 47 O.S. § 6-303(G)23, would prohibit a person from obtaining a new license after seizure and destruction of a license under the new Act, counsel for the Commissioner of Public Safety argued such is not the case and further argued on this basis there is no due process violation when the “piece of plastic” is seized and destroyed. ¶ 17 The new Act provides for revocation of driving privileges upon a person’s criminal conviction of certain crimes (when final), receipt of a deferred criminal sentence, and receipt of a deferred prosecution agreement for these statutorily specified crimes.24 Counsel for the Department of Public Safety agreed during questioning from the Court that a person arrested whose license is seized upon arrest could theoretically thereafter obtain an unrestricted number of new serial plastic driver’s licenses for $25.00 each when obtained after each new and additional arrest for impaired driving (with seizure and destruction of each new serial driver’s license) if the serial arrests occurred during the time his or her first criminal case was being adjudicated in the District Court. When questioned what the purpose was for seizing a license and destroying it upon arrest when no new or additional requirement would be imposed on obtaining a new license while the criminal case was being adjudicated, counsel responded that revocation of driving privileges in the new Act, with one exception, was based upon what happened in the District Court with the criminal case. He further stated that the license is not seized to commence an administrative revocation of driving privileges.25  ¶ 18 The one exception to revocation of driving privileges based upon District Court criminal adjudications (conviction, deferred sentence and deferred prosecution) occurs where the Department is given discretion to revoke driving privileges in certain other circumstances. For example, when the Department receives “a report of a verified ignition interlock violation” it may revoke a driving privilege.26 The Governor’s Executive Order 2017-19 states in part: I am requiring the DPS to follow directions consistent with the recent Oklahoma Supreme Court Order in Nichols v. State, ex rel. Dept, of Public Safety, 2017 OK 20 [392 P.3d 692]. I also direct and order the DPS to grant a hearing on revocation of license in conformity with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and within the time limits imposed by our Supreme Court. DPS may create an exception to these hearings for any individual that receives a deferred adjudication, a suspended sentence, or a formal conviction under the criminal code. Executive Order, 2017-19, (June 8, 2017). At oral argument, counsel for the Governor explained that Executive Order 2017-19 was intended to apply only when the Department revokes driving privileges unrelated to revocation as a direct consequence from convictions or deferred sentences prosecutions. He again explained that under the new Act revocations are either a consequence of (1) a criminal conviction (including deferred sen-tenee/proseeution) or (2) specific statutory violations where the Department is given the power to revoke the driving privilege. He explained it is only in the latter circumstances where a driver may have an opportunity for an administrative hearing before the Department of Public Safety. ¶ 19 The parties agree the new Act provides for mandatory seizure of the license, its transmittal to the Department, and its immediate destruction upon receipt. The parties agree this action is not reviewable by an opportunity for any administrative proceeding. This Court determines (1) if there is a legitimate government interest (a) articulated in the legislation or (b) championed by the parties or (c) expressed by a recognized public policy in support of the legislation, and (2) if that interest is reasonably advanced by the legislation.27 The seizure and destruction of “the piece of plastic” resulting in a circumstance where a driver must pay an additional fee to the Department for its replacement is not a nominal economic harm for the citizens of the State. The seizure takes place as part of a law enforcement procedure, but this procedure is entirely divorced from any law enforcement substantive goal, when the driver whose license is seized may obtain another identical replacement license upon payment of the standard mandatory fee. ¶ 20 A law enforcement seizure and immediate destruction of a driver's license constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of property when no legitimate State purpose is shown for seizure and destruction. No opportunity to challenge this seizure and destruction is given to the driver. Respondents rely upon Price v. Reed, supra, and the constitutionality of an immediate seizure of a license. However, the license seizure in Price was part of an administrative/regulatory scheme combining seizure with loss of driving privileges and with an opportunity for a driver to challenge the regulatory actions of the State. Price gives no support to respondents’ due process argument on petitioners’ substantive due process property claim. No State purpose, regulatory goal, or law enforcement goal for the seizure and destruction was articulated during oral argument by respondents, or is revealed in their filings, or is revealed by our review of S.B. No. 643 when construed consistent with the respondents’ arguments.28 We must conclude S.B. No. 643 amending 47 O.S. 2011 § 764 and requiring seizure and destruction of a driver’s license violates the Due Process Clause of the State Constitution, Okla. Const. Art. 2 § 7. IV. Okla. Const Art. 5 § 57 Single Subject Rule and Senate Bill No. 643  ¶ 21 The Oklahoma Constitution, Art 5 § 57,29 states that every act of the Legislature, apart from specified exceptions, shall embrace but one subject. Petitioners assert S.B. No. 643 violates this constitutionally, required single subject rule for legislated acts. Petitioners argue the Act includes more than one subject because it enacts law concerning; (1) revocation and modification of a driver’s license for non-impaired driving offences; (2) license destruction; (3) creation of an impaired driver diversion program; (4) bond requirements; (5) criminal-liability for refusing a breath - test; (6) notice requirements for prosecutors in cases including those not involving impaired driving; and (7) an admission of evidence in criminal trials. This constitutional challenge requires an analysis of the.provisions of the Act. ¶ 22 Section 1 of the Act provides the name “Impaired Driving Elimination'Act 2,” and is not codified. Section 2 states a purpose of Act to include “effective and meaningful administrative monitoring by the Department of Public Safety of impaired driving offenders” and is not codified. Section 3 has no reference to impaired driving, but provides for notice given by the Department to those to whom notice is authorized or required.30 Section 4 provides a court and prosecutor shall provide' notice to the Department when a person receives a deferred sentence or deferred prosecution for “any offense” which Title 47 “makes mandatory the revocation of a driving privilege.”31  ¶ 23 Section 5 requires revoking driving privileges when a person receives a deferred sentence, conviction, or deferred prosecution for the eleven enumerated offenses listed in the statute.32 One of the eleven enumerated statutory offenses involves driving, operating, or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any other intoxicating substance, or the combined influence of alcohol and any other intoxicating substance.33 The language in S.B, No. 643, § 5, relating to deferred prosecutions and deferred sentences was not limited by the legislature to the offenses involving impaired driving relating to intoxicating substances, but placed the language in the statute so as to include other types of offenses. ¶ 24 Section 6 .provides for revocations based upon conviction, deferred sentence, or deferred prosecution unless the person has successfully completed, or is currently participating in, the Impaired Driver Accountability Program.”34 .This program is authorized by the new Act and which also provides the Department shall create this program by June 30, 2018. Section 6 requires the issuance of a modified driver’s license and a mandatory continuous ignition interlock device. Section 6 provides for increasing time periods (one year to 4 years) for modified licenses corresponding to longer time periods for mandatory continuous ignition interlock devices based upon a driver’s repeat offenses. Section 6 as amended states that the period of modification “shall be mandatory and neither the Department nor any court may grant driving privileges for the duration of that period.” ¶ 26 Section 7 of the Act states the Department “is authorized” to make an agreement with a person whose license is revoked or suspended “for issuance of a provisional license that allows a person to drive between statutorily specific places,35 Section 7 also includes a requirement the Department shall establish the Impaired Driver Accountability Program by June 30, 2018, approximately eight months after the Act’s effective date of November 1, 2017.36 This section provides for driver participation fees for the program and length of required participation by the driver. A driver must request participation in the program within fifteen calendar days of his or her license being seized.37  ¶26 Section 8 of the Act includes provisions relating to ignition interlock devices and restricting driving privileges based upon receipt of a report' of a “verified ignition interlock violation as defined by the Board of Tests for Alcohol and Drug Influence.”38 This section provides for issuance of a “restricted driver license” and fees to be paid to the Department, and the fees collected shall be remitted to the State Treasury for use by the Department of Public Safety for administering this section of law,.’ ¶ 27 Section 9 forbids a person to “knowingly authorize or permit” another person to operate a motor vehicle without an ignition interlock device, when the person is required to use such a device; and a violation of this section is defined as a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment.39 The section also prohibits a person interfering with the operation of the ignition interlock device or driving a vehicle without the device, The ignition interlock device is made a mandatory condition of any bond, unless the person has successfully completed the Impaired Driver Accountability Program prior to a plea or verdict in the person’s criminal case. ¶ 28 Section 10 provides that breath shall be tested unless the officer requests a blood test.40 Section 11 provides that blood may drawn by an “Intermediate Emergency Medical Technician,” and additionally “Advanced Emergency Medical Technicians or Paramedics” when requested by a law enforcement officer.41 Section 12 states it shall be a misdemeanor for a conscious person to refuse to submit to a breath test when under arrest for driving while impaired, driving under the influence or while'under the influence being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon public roads, or other public place, or any private road which provides access to one or more dwellings.42 Section 13 provides for seizure and destruction of a driver’s license' upon arrest of an individual.43 Section 14 states that a person whose license revocation is modified “may only operate a motor vehicle. equipped with an approved ignition interlock device.44  ¶ 29 Section 16 contains provisions for admission of test results in -any criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have been committed by any person while driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.”45 The section specifies “the following may be considered as evidence that the test of the breath of the person was validly administered in accordance with the rules of the Board of tests for Alcohol and Drug Influence” and then lists four criteria. Section 15 states a person’s refusal to a test or tests is admissible, and further provides that in some circumstances the results of “the test of a [sic] the breath or blood of the person, if admissible, shall be admitted without reference to measurement uncertainty.” ¶ 30 Section 16 of the Act repeals 47 O.S. 2011 § 755, and section 17 makes November 1, 2017, the effective date of the Act.  ¶31 Legislation with multiple sections or provisions must be germane, relative, and cognate to a common theme and purpose.46 Compliance with this test allows those voting on the law in question to avoid making an otherwise constitutionally prohibited forced decision to accept an all or nothing choice between two or more unrelated provisions contained in one measure.47 The public is entitled to a clear picture of how their elected officials have voted on a particular issue,48 the public is entitled to be adequately notified of the potential effect of legislation,49 and these constitutionally protected public policies have been recognized since statehood.50 Respondents argue the Act is necessary as “a common purpose” for Department of Public Safety administrative enforcement of statutes prohibiting impaired driving, and further “administrative monitoring” is a stated purpose in the Act. Respondents also invoke the highly generalized subject of “impaired driving.” ¶32 Section 13’s license seizure and destruction upon arrest does not advance an articulated goal related to administrative monitoring of an impaired driving. New criminal liability for a breath test refusal is created by section 12, and while this subject relates generally to “impaired driving” its function -within the legislatively stated purpose of the Act, “administrative monitoring by the Department of Public Safety” is not present on the face of the Act. Section ll’s expanded scope in authorizing additional medical personnel to draw blood for a test upon request by an officer is related to “impaired drivers” in a general sense. However, the individual legislator’s calculus in deciding whether to vote for or against such language involves the legislator’s discretion concerning the professional expertise of the classes of individuals named for the statutory task and not the Department’s administrative monitoring of impaired drivers. Sections 13, 12, and 11 violate the single subject rule in Okla. Const. Art. 5 § 57 when measured against the other provisions of the Act. ¶ 33 Section 15’s creation of an evidentiary standard for admission of breath tests states it applies to “a proceeding arising out of of acts alleged to have been committed by a person ... under the influence of alcohol,” and this is sufficiently broad to include DPS administrative enforcement of the impaired driving statutes and administratively monitoring impaired drivers. However, the language is expressly made applicable to “the trial of any criminal action,” a forum outside the purview of the Department of Public Safety’s “administrative monitoring” of impaired driving. Section 16’s reach into District Court criminal proceedings is beyond administrative monitoring and violates the single subject rule in Okla. Const. Art. 5 § 57 when measured against the other provisions of the Act. ■ ¶ 34 Section 4 of the Act clearly provides for notices to the Department when a person receives a deferred sentence or deferred prosecution for offenses other than those related to impaired driving. Section 4’s reach to include non-impaired offenses is beyond the stated purpose of administrative monitoring for impaired drivers and violates the single subject rule in Okla. Const. Art. 5 § 57 when measured against the other provisions of the Act. Section 4⅛ invalidity impacts both sections 5 and 6. Section 5 requires revocation upon receipt of a notice of a deferred sentence or a deferred prosecution. This provision appears to involve “administrative monitoring by the Department of Public Safety,” but enforcement is based upon notices required by section 4, and section 4 violates the single subject rule. Similarly, section 6 also relies upon these section 4 notices of deferred sentences and prosecution agreements.  ¶35 Again, requiring notice of deferred sentences and prosecutions for crimes other than impaired driving clearly goes beyond the scope of an Act seeking to administratively monitor impaired driving offenders. The Act does not contain a severability clause, but 75 O.S.2011 § 11a51 requires a severability analysis. We are required to ask whether §§ 5 & 6 (assuming they also do not violate Art. 5 § 57) are capable of statewide equal enforcement in the absence of the statutory mandatory procedure in 4 for providing the notices of deferred sentences or deferred prosecutions upon which sections 5 and 6 expressly rely.52 Fundamental fairness cannot be afforded except within a framework of orderly procedure, and an orderly procedure is required when procedure is used to deprive a person of a constitutionally protected right, such as a driver’s license with its driving privileges.53 We hold 5 and 6 are not severable, and must fall with section 4.  ¶ 36 Generally, a severability analysis requires us to ask whether constitutional sections of an Act are capable of being executed in accoi-dance with legislative intent.54 Stripping those sections from the Act which vfe have now determined are constitutionally invalid, §§ 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 13, and 15, upon examination of' the remaining sections we must conclude they are not capable of being executed independently. These sections, although containing legislative subjects therein not germane to the invalid sections, they 'nevertheless contain internal references to, and rely upon, the invalid sections of S.B. No. 643, and they contain various provisions for repealing current procedures which would turn a selective enforcement of these sections55 into an unpalatable legislative choice by a legislator when faced with approving an all-or-nothing choice on these sections.56 We decline to give our opinion an effect which would have created an impermissible choice when originally presented to the legislators. ¶37 We conclude S.B. No. 643 violates Okla. Const. Art. 6 § 67 and Section 13 of S.B. No. 643 also violates Okla. Const. Art. 2 § 7. Because of these conclusions-we need not address petitioners’ additional claims that S. B. No. 643 impermissibly (1) revokes and modifies a driver’s license for non-impaired driving offences, or (2) creates an impaired driver diversion program, or (3) creates invalid bond requirements. The parties agree the Governor’s Executive Order 2017-19, was issued to administratively implement the new Act or a portion thereof. Due to our holding S.B. No. 643 violates Okla. Const. Art. 6 § 67 in its entirety, and leaving nothing for the Executive Order to enforce, we need not reach petitioners’ additional claims characterizing the Executive Order as a pocket veto,57 or challenging the order based upon the separation of powers provision in Okla. Const. Art. 4 § l.58 We presume public officials perform their public duties in good faith and we withhold equitable mandatory relief in anticipation of this performance.59 Petitioners’ request for injunctive relief is denied. Y. Conclusión and Effective Date of Court’s Opinion ¶38 The Court concludes the petitioners have standing. Two members of the Oklahoma Legislature possess constitutional legislative immunity from the legal liability and their motion to dismiss them as parties is granted. Section 13 of the Impaired Driving Elimination Act 2 violates Okla. Const. Art 2 § 7. Several provisions of the Impaired Driving Elimination Act 2 violate Okla. Const. Art. 6 § 57 and non-offending sections are not capable of being severed for independent enforcement. We conclude the Impaired Driving Elimination Act 2 is unconstitutional in its entirety, and we need not adjudicate petitioners’ remaining claims challenging either-the Act or the Governor’s Executive Order, Petitioners’ request for an injunction is denied. ¶ 39 The Court previously issued an order staying the application of the 2017 Impaired Driving Elimination Act 2, (S.B. No. 643). Hunsucker v. Fallin, 2017 OK 84, — P.3d -(October 30, 2017). The Court noted its stay was for the purpose of granting temporary relief in order to protect the lights, of parties pending resolution of a judicial controversy.60 This Court’s opinion is an exercise of original jurisdiction, the opinion is immediately effective upon its filing with the Clerk of this Court, and no post-opinion mandate issues by this Court.61 The stay pending this litigation is dissolved upon the conclusion of the matter before this Court. The stay .shall be dissolved upon ■ denial of a petition for rehearing if rehearing is sought by any party and not granted, or upon final adjudication of any petition for rehearing granted by the Court, or upon expiration of the time to file a petition for rehearing if no rehearing is sought. The temporary stay of the Act pending litigation will be effectively replaced by a final opinion of this Court concluding the Act is unconstitutional and lacking legal enforceability. ¶ 40 COMBS, C.J.; WATT, EDMONDSON, COLBERT, and REIF, JJ., concur. ¶ 41 GURICH, V.C.J.; KAUGER, and WYRICK (by separate writing), JJ., concur in part and dissent in part. ¶ 42 WINCHESTER, J., (by separate writing), dissent.  . Respondents rely in part on Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 125 S.Ct. 564, 160 L.Ed.2.d 519 (2004) where the Court concluded the attorneys did not have standing in an Art. III federal court to assert the rights of third parties who were hypothetical future clients.   . State ex rel. Howard v. Oklahoma Corporation Commission, 1980 OK 96, 614 P.2d 45, 47.   . We also do not reach issues necessarily raised by petitioners' claim which relate to this Court’s jurisdiction to determine the proper application of a criminal statute to a party before this Court, including, but not limited to, the propriety of a declaratory and injunctive relief request to a court in a civil action to enjoin or prevent a criminal action.   . In some circumstances, economic loss occasioned by governmental regulation has been sufficient to show Article III standing in a federal court. Nova Health Systems v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir. 2005) citing Salem Inn, Inc. v. Frank, 522 F.2d 1045, 1047 n. 10 (2d Cir.1975); Montana Shooting Sports Ass'n v. Holder, 727 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2013); National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 495-498, 118 S.Ct. 927, 140 L.Ed.2d 1 (1998). We need not analyze, circumstances when government regulation involving economic loss shows standing in an Article III federal court, or how such relates or compares to a petitioner's standing in an Oklahoma state court.   . Gentges v. Oklahoma State Election Board, 2014 OK 8, ¶ 7, 319 P.3d 674, 676, quoting State ex rel. Howard v. Oklahoma Corporation Commission, 1980 OK 96, 614 P.2d 45, 51.   . Gentges, 2014 OK 8, ¶7, 319 P.3d at 676, quoting State ex rel. Howard, 614 P.2d at 52.   . State ex rel. Freeling v. Lyon, 1917 OK 229, 63 Okla. 285, 165 P. 419, 420.   . The response filed by Governor Fallin, et al., states that in 2015 over 13,000 requests were made by drivers for Department of Public Safety administrative hearings. Response (July 21, 2017) at p. 2.   . The concept of "adjective law" includes legal rules or procedure or practice as opposed to substantive law. Black’s Law Dictionary 62 (4th ed. 1951); Maurizi v. Western Coal & Mining Co., 321 Mo. 378, 11 S.W.2d 268, 272 (1928) ("All of the authorities hold that a ‘substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion.' ”).   . Ethics Commission v. Cullison, 1993 OK 37, 850 P.2d 1069, 1073.   . Tulsa Industrial Authority v. City of Tulsa, 2011 OK 57, ¶ 13, 270 P.3d 113, 120-121, discussing Gordon v. Followell, 1964 OK 74, 391 P.2d 242, 243-244, and the concept that declaratory relief is limited to cases of actual controversy, and such is a jurisdictional component in the context of declaratory relief.   . Dank v. Benson, 2000 OK 40, ¶ 6, 5 P.3d 1088, 1090-1091 ("only under the most exigent circumstances are we to intercede in the internal affairs of a coordinate branch of government when it exercises a function — i.e., legislative or executive — committed to it by the Constitution”). See also Ethics Commission v. Keating, 1998 OK 36, ¶ 3, 958 P.2d 1250, 1253 ("Frequently, when this Court has assumed original jurisdiction in a publici juris controversy we have done so because of a public need for a speedy judicial determination.”).   . State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Mothershed, 2011 OK 84, n. 135, 264 P.3d 1197, citing Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 1A Harv. L.Rev. 1265, 1269, 1273-1274 (1961).   . Petitioners’ Application to Assume Original Jurisdiction and Petition for Declaratory and In-junctive Relief, Okla. Sup. Ct. No. 116, 113 (June 21, 2017) at p. 2.   . Petitioners’ Reply to Respondents’ Response, etc., Okla. Sup. Ct. No. 116, 131 (August 11, 2017) at p. 11,   . Brock y. Thompson, 1997 OK 127, ¶ 14, 948 P.2d 279, 287 (notes omitted).   . Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971). See also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430-31, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982) (a "property” interest may be "intangible” and relate "to the whole domain of social and economic fact;” and die Court listed Bell and a driver's license as an additional example). The United States Const., Amend. 14; provides in pertinent part: "Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the' jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges,or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. ...”   . Bell, 402 U.S. at 539, 91 S.Ct. 1586.   . Bell, 402 U.S. at 542, 91 S.Ct. 1586.   . Price v. Reed, 1986 OK 43, 725 P.2d 1254, 1260 (notes omitted).   . Okla. Const. Art. 2, § 7 provides that: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”   . State ex rel. Bd of Regents of University of Oklahoma v. Lucas, 2013 OK 14, n. 25, 297 P.3d 378, 391 ("Oklahoma's Due Process Clause, Okla. Const. Art. 2, § 7, is coextensive with its federal counterpart, although there may be situations in which the Oklahoma provision affords greater due process protections than its federal counterpart."), citing Oklahoma Corrections Professional Ass’n, Inc. v. Jackson, 2012 OK 53, n. 13, 280 P.3d 959, 963.   . 47 O.S.Supp.2016 § 6-303 (G): G. It shall be a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not less than seven (7) days nor more than six (6) months, or by a fine of not more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), or by both such fine and imprisonment, for any person to apply for a renewal or a replacement license to operate a motor vehicle while the person's license, permit or other evidence of driving privilege is in the custody of a law enforcement officer or the Department. A notice regarding this offense and the penalty therefor shall be included on the same form containing the notice of revocation issued by the officer.   . S. B. No. 643, 5, amending 47 O.S. 2011 § 6-205, as amended by Section 1, Chapter 279, O.S.L. 2013 (47 O.S.Supp. 2016, § 6-205), states: A. The Department of Public Safety shall revoke the driving privilege of any person, whether adult or juvenile, who, in any municipal, state or federal court within the United States, receives a deferred sentence, or a conviction, when such conviction has become final, or a deferred prosecution, for any of the following offenses: 1. Manslaughter or negligent homicide resulting form the operation of a motor vehicle; 2. Driving, operating or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any other intoxicating substance, or the combined influence of alcohol and any other intoxicating substance, or any offense in subsection A of Section 11-902 of this title; 3. Any felony during the commission of which a motor vehicle is used; 4. Failure to stop and render aid as required under the laws of this state in the event of a motor vehicle accident resulting in the death or personal injury of another; 5. Perjury or the making of a false affidavit or statement under oath to the Department under the Uniform Vehicle Code or under any other law relating to the ownership or operation of motor vehicles; 6. A misdemeanor or felony conviction for unlawfully possessing, distributing, dispensing, manufacturing, trafficking, cultivating, selling, transferring, attempting or conspiring to possess, distribute, dispense, manufacture, traffic, sell, or transfer of a controlled dangerous substance as defined in the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Act while using a motor vehicle; 7. Failure to pay for gasoline pumped into a vehicle pursuant to Section 1740 of Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes; 8. A misdemeanor conviction for a violation of Section 1465 of Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes; 9. A misdemeanor conviction for a violation of Section 609 of Title 37 of the Oklahoma Statutes; 10. Failure to obey a traffic control device as provided in Section 11-202 or 11-703 of this title when such failure results in great bodily injury to any other person; or 11. Failure to stop or to remain stopped for school bus loading or unloading of children pursuant to Section 11-705 or 11-705.1 of this title. B.The first license revocation under any provision of this section, except for paragraph 2, 6, 7 or 11 of subsection A of this section, shall be for a period of one (1) year. Such period shall not be modified. C. A license revocation under any provision of this section, except for paragraph 2, 6, or 7 of subsection A of this section, shall be for a period of three (3) years if a prior revocation under this section, except under paragraph 2 of subsection A of this section, commenced within the preceding five-year period as shown by the records of the Department. Such period shall not be modified. D. The period of license revocation under paragraph 2 or 6 of subsection A of this section shall be governed by the provisions of Section 6-205.1 of this title. E. The first license revocation under paragraph 7 of subsection A of this section shall be for a period of six (6) months. A second or subsequent license revocation under paragraph 7 of subsection A of this section shall be for a period of one (1) year. Such periods shall not be modified. F. The first license revocation under paragraph 11 of subsection A of this section shall be for a period of one (1) year. Such period may not be modified. Any appeal of the revocation of driving privilege under paragraph 11 of subsection A of this section shall be governed by Section 6-211 of this title. G. As used in this section, "great bodily injury” means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.   . Historically, a driver's license seizure was part of a civil regulatory/administrative proceeding. Price v. Reed, 1986 OK 43, 725 P.2d 1254, 1258-1259.   . S.B. No. 643, 8 (B), amending 47 O.S.2011 § 6-212.3, as amended by Section 2, Ch. 393, O.S.L. 2013 (47 O. S. Supp.2016, § 6-212.3): "The Department of Public Safety may- revoke, suspend or restrict the driving privileges of the person upon receipt of a report of a verified ignition interlock violation as defined by the Board of Tests for Alcohol and Drug Influence.”   . Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC, 2016 OK 20, ¶ 28, 373 P.3d 1057, 1072.   . The receipt/temporary license given by the arresting officer appears to be used by the Act as a triggering event for a driver's fifteen calendar days to request participation in the Impaired Driver Accountability Program to be created by June 30, 2018. See S.B. No. 643, § 7 (F)(1) ("The Department may enter into an IDAP program agreement with a person if: (1) The Department receives the request for IDAP participation pursuant to this section within fifteen (15) calendar days from the date reflected on the dated receipt issued by the officer to the person pursuant to subsection B of Section 754 of this title, on the form provided by the Department...."). No argument was made concerning why a notice to a driver used for commencing time for requesting participation in the program requires seizure and destruction of that person’s license.   .Okla. Const. Art. 5 § 57: Every act of the Legislature shall embrace but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in •its title,, except general appropriation bills, general revenue bills, and bills adopting a code, digest, or revision of statutes; and no law shall be revived, amended, or the provisions thereof extended or conferred, by reference to its title only; but so much thereof as is- revived, amended, extended, or conferred shall be re-enacted and published at length; Provided, That if any subject be embraced in any act contrary to the provisions of this section, such act shall be void only as to so much of the laws as may not be expressed in the title thereof. ' ■   . S. B. No. 643, § 3, amends 47 O.S.2011 § 2-116.   . S. B. No. 643, § 4, amends 47 O.S.2011 § 6-204.   . S. B. No. 643, § 5, amends 47 O.S.2011 § 6-205, as amended by section 1, Ch. 279, O.S.L. 2013 (47 O.S.Supp. 2016 § 6-205).   . S. B. No. 643, § 5, amending 47 O.S.Supp. 2016 § 6-205 (A)(2).   . S. B. No. 643, § 6, amends 47 O.S.2011 § 6-205.1, as amended by section 1, Ch, 393, O.S.L. 2013 (47 O.S.Supp. 2016 § 6-205.1).   . S. B. No. 643, § 7, amends 47 O.S.2011 § 6-212, as amended by section 3, Ch. 97, O.S.L. 2015 (47 O.S.Supp. 2016 § 6-212).   . Due to our holdings herein we need not reach the issue raised during oral argument concerning a statutory right created under the new Act effective November 1, 2017 to not have a license revoked based upon a driver’s participation in an administrative program which may not be created until several months after creation of the statutory right.   . See note 28, supra.   . S. B. No. 643, § 8, amends 47 O.S.2011 § 6-212.3, as amended by section 2, Ch. 393, O.S.L. 2013 (47 O.S.Supp. 2016 § 6-212.3).   . S. B. No. 643, § 9, amends 47 O.S.2011 § 11-902a.   .S. B. No. 643, § 10, amends 47 O.S.2011 § 751.   . S. B. No. 643, § 11, amends 47 O.S.2011 § 752. '   . S. B. No. 643, § 12, amends 47 O.S.2011 § 753, as amended by section 1, Ch. 131, O.S.L. 2015 (47 O.S.Supp. 2016 § 753).   . S. B. No. 643, § 13, amends 47 O.S.2011 § 754.   . S. B. Nq. 643, § 14, amends 47 O.S.2011 § 754.1, as amended by section 4, Ch. 393, O.S.L. 2013 (47 O.S.Supp. 2016 § 754.1).   . S. B. No. 643, § 15, amends 47 O.S.2011 § 756.   . Fent v. Fallin, 2013 OK 107, ¶5, 315 P.3d 1023, 1025; Burns v. Cline, 2016 OK 121, ¶27, 387 P.3d 348; Douglas v. Cox Retirement Properties, Inc., 2013 OK 37, ¶6, 302 P.3d 789, 792.   . Fent v. Fallin, 2013 OK 107, ¶5, 315 P.3d 1023, 1025.   . Fent v. Fallin, 2013 OK 107, ¶5, 315 P.3d 1023, 1025.   . Douglas v. Cox Retirement Properties, Inc., 2013 OK 37, ¶ 4, 302 P.3d 789, 792.   . Fent v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, 2009 OK 15, ¶ 15, 214 P.3d 799, 804-805, citing In re County Commissioners of Counties Comprising Seventh Judicial Dist., 1908 OK 207, 22 Okla. 435, 98 P. 557.   .75O.S.2011 § 11a: In the construction of the statutes of this state, the following rules shall be observed: 1. For any act enacted on or after July 1, 1989, unless there is a provision in the act that the act or any portion thereof or the application of the act shall not be severable, the provisions of every act or application of the act shall be severable. If any provision or application of the act is found to be unconstitutional and void, the remaining provisions or applications of the act shall remain valid, unless the court finds: a. the valid provisions or application of the act are so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon, the void provisions that the court cannot presume the Legislature would have enacted the remaining valid provisions without the void one; or b. the remaining valid provisions or applications of the act, standing alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accordance with the legislative intent. 2. For acts enacted prior to July 1, 1989, whether or not such acts were enacted with an express provision for severability, it is the intent of the Oklahoma Legislature that the act or any portion of the act or application of the act shall be severable unless: a. the construction of the provisions or application of the act would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the Legislature; b. the court finds the valid provisions of the act are so essentially and inseparably connected with and so dependent upon the void provisions that the court cannot presume the Legislature would have enacted thé remaining valid provisions without the void one; or c. the court finds the remaining valid provisions standing alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accordance with the legislative intent.   . Thomas v. Henry, 2011 OK 53, ¶ 31, 260 P.3d 1251, 1261-1262.   . Arkansas Valley State Bank v. Phillips, 2007 OK 78, ¶10, 171 P.3d 899, 903 (“The due process clauses of the United States and the Oklahoma Constitutions provide that certain substantive rights — life, liberty and property — cannot be deprived except by constitutionally adequate procedures.”) (notes omitted); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 179, 71 S.Ct. 624, 652, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("It is procedure that spells much of the difference between rule by law and rule by whim or caprice. Steadfast adherence to strict procedural safeguards is our main assurance that there will be equal justice under law.").   . Thomas v. Henry, 2011 OK 53, at ¶31, 260 P.3d at 1261-1262.'   . See, e.g., S.B. No. 843 § 14, referencing modification under S. B. No. 643, § 6, amending 47 O.S.Supp. 2016 § 6-205.1.   . Fent v. Fallin, 2013 OK 107, ¶7, 315 P.3d 1023, 1025 (The single subject rule prohibits this unpalatable choice thust upon a legislator to approve or disapprove a bill, with multiple subject.).   . A bill does not become law when a Governor creates an impermissible pocket veto of a substantive (non-appropriations) bill by giving a partial or qualified approval of the bill. Johnson v. Walters, 1991 OK 107, 819 P.2d 694, 699, quoting State ex rel. Wiseman v. Oklahoma Board of Corrections, 1978 OK 158, 614 P.2d 551, 555.   . Okla. Const. Art. 4 § 1: The powers of the government of the State of Oklahoma shall be divided into three separate departments: The Legislative, Executive, and Judicial; and except as-provided in this Constitution, the Legislative, .Executive, and Judicial departments of government shall be separate and distinct, and neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the others.   . In re Initiative Petition No. 397, State Question No. 767, 2014 OK 23, n. 20, 326 P.3d 496, 504.   . • The Court possesses judicial discretion to grant temporary relief or relief on the merits, with an opinion to follow, in order to protect the rights of parties pending resolution of a judicial controversy when a short period of time occurs between oral argument and the time an event will occur concerning the merits of the controversy. In re Initiative Petition No. 314, 1980 OK 174, 625 P.2d 595, 596; Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Oklahoma Corporation Commission, 1994 OK 142, 897 P.2d 1116, 1118-1119,   . In re Guardianship of Berry, 2014 OK 56, n. 1, 335 P.3d 779, 783, citing Okla. Sup. Ct. R. 1.16, 1.193; Chronic Pain Associates, Inc. v. Bubenik, 1994 OK 127, 885 P.2d 1358, 1364 (“In all original-proceedings, other than those to review a decision of the. Workers’ Compensation Court or to impose bar discipline, the decision of this Court shall become effective when the opinion or order is filed with the Clerk of this Court, unless this Court stays the effective date,”); Okla. Sup. Ct. R. 1.16 (no mandate is issued upon conclusion of an original jurisdiction action).