Court Opinion

ID: 9567835
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:58:16.005986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:20:45.821993
License: Public Domain

Smith, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
This situation would be ludicrous if it was not so serious. Quoting from the appellants’ brief, appellee “overlooks the very nature of this case which, at bottom, is another ‘disappointed bidder’ or ‘frustrated bidder’ claim.”
The undisputed facts are:
(a) Appellees filed their bid properly and before the filing deadline.
(b) Interstate Construction Company filed its bid after the filing deadline.4
(c) Palote Construction Company filed it’s bid after the filing deadline, but before any bids were opened; it was rejected without being opened.
(d) The City bid officer declared the 2 o’clock deadline had arrived and stated he would not accept anymore bids.
(e) Despite this, the same officer stamped the bid of Interstate Construction Company, showing it was received after the 2 o’clock deadline.
(f) The same officer stated that the Interstate bid was late and would not be opened.
(g) Despite the announcement set out in (f) above, Interstate’s untimely bid was opened and read along with the bids submitted on *662time.
(h) The bid officer, his supervisor (the head of the Bureau of Purchasing), and his supervisor’s supervisor (the Commissioner of Administrative Services), all took the position that Interstate’s bid should be rejected as untimely.
(i) At that time, Mayor Young overruled all of them and ordered the contract be awarded to Interstate although it was filed after the deadline had passed for filing bids.5
Appellee is not a “disappointed” or “frustrated” bidder, it is a deprived bidder — deprived by direction of the former Mayor of the City of Atlanta. The majority opinion states at p. 659 that: “We do not reach the issue of whether a public official could be held personally liable in the event of fraud, collusion, or corruption since that was not an issue in this case.” That issue should have been addressed.6
I ask you, what do you call it when the Mayor, over the objection of the legally constituted body for passing on city bids, directs that a contract be awarded to one whose bid was not filed on time? There is no effort by the majority opinion to exonerate or justify this illegal act.
The only thing the majority does is to try and explain that the bid requirement is for the purpose of protecting the taxpayers.7 The time deadline is to protect the taxpayers also. Up until now it meant if you do not get your bid in on time, you do not get the bid — period, end of paragraph.
So now that we have allowed a contract beyond the deadline, what deadline do we set past the deadline when one may file his bid? There is a timeworn, but never the less true, expression that illustrates the case at hand. You cannot be a little pregnant. Either you are or you are not. Either you file on time or you do not. A knowing *663violation of the time limit by one not authorized to award bids cannot be excused by pointing a finger and saying, naughty, naughty, do not do that. Nevertheless, the majority says it must protect the taxpayers by striking this large verdict.
There are two remedies applicable to this situation: equitable relief in the form of an injunction, or money damages. As to the first, the appellees’ attorney made the statement in his argument that they were requested not to pursue an injunction because it would delay the construction of the parking decks at the airport.8 Obviously such a delay would cost the taxpayers money. The appellants should not be allowed to take advantage of that courtesy in this law suit. They should be estopped from doing so.
Thus, the only way for the appellees to stop public officials from violating the law is to let courts and juries pass upon their wrongdoing such as we have here and, if the damages awarded are high, the voters have a way to handle that — the ballot box.
In closing, I think it well to point out that appellant’s brief relied upon Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 477 U. S. 299 (106 SC 2537, 91 LE2d 249) (1986) for the proposition that the appellee could only recover nominal damages, “unless it could show that it had been wrongfully denied the contract on which it bid.” (Emphasis supplied.) This statement is made despite the fact that the trial court, the jury, the Court of Appeals, and the majority opinion found that appellee had been wrongfully (unfairly is the way the majority opinion put it) denied the contract.
Let us see what The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language has to say about the word “wrongfully” as quoted in appellant’s brief and the word “unfairly” as used in the majority opinion.
Wrongfully: Wrong; Injurious; Unjust. Contrary to law; Unlawful; Illegal.
Unfairly: Not just or evenhanded; Biased; Contrary to laws or convention, especially in commerce; Unethical.
Unjust: (Not just) violating principles of justice or fairness; (unfairly). Wrongful; (as in Memphis Community School District, cited by appellant as authority for the proposition that the appellee could recover only nominal damages unless it had been wrongfully denied the contract).
Now the two interlocking words in the definitions of unfairly and wrongfully, the two words used by appellant and the majority opinion, are not just in unfairly, and unjust in wrongfully. Also the last *664word in the definition of unjust is unfair. Therefore, you can take these two words used by the majority opinion and the appellant and without a shadow of a doubt uphold the verdict and judgment in this case.

 According to newspaper reports, a principal owner of Interstate Construction Company is Mr. Herman Russell, a heavy contributor to Andrew Young’s campaigns for Mayor of Atlanta and Governor of Georgia.

 As I sit here in the den of my home preparing this dissent, I see in the newspaper that the Chairman of the Fulton County Commission has “one-upped” the former Mayor of the City of Atlanta. He has awarded a county contract to the highest bidder, who, coincidentally contributed $10,000 to the chairman’s political campaign. To his credit, however, the bid was apparently filed on time.

 Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed.), defines corruption thusly:
An act done with an intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others. The act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure same benefit for himself or for another person contrary to duty and the rights of others.
(Emphases supplied.) That is this case, by the definition of corruption.

 The Mayor, by awarding the bid to the late, low bidder, still cost the taxpayers money. Although the wrongful bid award was $10,542 less than the low legal bid, the majority awards to the appellee $22,125.05 for the cost of preparing its plans. Thus, even when deducting the lesser amount of the late, low bid from the $22,125.05 awarded to the appellee, the taxpayers must still pay an additional $11,583.05 plus the expense of defending this action. I do not imply that the appellee should not receive the costs of preparing its plans; I only seek to show that the taxpayers are not served well by the majority’s result.

 This statement was made during oral argument and was not challenged by appellant on rebuttal argument. However, in a supplemental brief after argument, appellant states that the record had been searched and nothing was found. This is entirely reasonable as there was no reason to raise it at trial.