Court Opinion

ID: 9595550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:41:27.446429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:28.438984
License: Public Domain

ROSE, Justice
(dissenting).
PRIOR MISCONDUCT AND TESTING CREDIBILITY
The defendant, on trial for robbery before a judge, took the stand in his own defense, at which time, on cross-examination, he was asked how he came into possession of the car in which the stolen goods were found. Objection was made on the ground that it would involve inquiry into irrelevant prior misconduct. The objection was overruled when the state’s attorney explained that the inquiry was being made for the purpose of testing credibility, whereupon the defendant answered, “I stole it.” At this time the stolen car was not the subject of any criminal charges. When the question was asked, neither the defendant’s character nor his proclivity for truth-telling — or lack of it — were in issue.
The court, in permitting the inquiry, held that credibility is “really the heart of this matter,” and said:
“Now, as far as the first objection of prior offenses and that sort of thing is concerned, I think I am quite familiar *15with not only the Garrison [Gabrielson] Case but with that whole principal [sic] and have honored it many times. I think it goes essentially to jury trials and their conduct and the concept that while such things may be rather highly relevant, never the less [sic], Courts have come to the conclusion they cannot adequately trust a jury to separate that out and refrain from finding somebody guilty in the instant case because they were bad people in other cases. I think that is not a reason that is cogent in this non-jury case.” [Bracketed matter supplied]
As I understand the rule (excepting with respect to felony convictions), in Wyoming, and generally, credibility cannot be tested through examination into past misconduct unless the defendant’s propensities regarding truth-telling are in issue.
Rule 608(b), Federal Rules of Evidence, enunciates the legal principle and the prevailing rule :
“Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.” [Emphasis supplied]
We have held that only felony convictions are a proper subject of past misconduct examination for the purpose of testing credibility. State v. Hines, 79 Wyo. 65, 81, 331 P.2d 605, 611. This kind of credibility inquiry may be made only for impeachment purposes and then only under the watchful eye of the court’s discretion. The reason for caution is, as the majority quotes us as having previously said in Rosencrance v. State, 33 Wyo. 360, 239 P. 952, 953,
“ ‘It is a dangerous species of evidence, not only because it requires a defendant to meet and explain other acts than those charged against him and for which he is on trial, but also because it may lead the jury to violate the great principle, that a party is not to be convicted of one crime by proof that he is guilty of another.’ ”
While past misconduct may be inquired into for other purposes, such as identity, guilty knowledge, intent and motive,1 examination to test credibility does not fall within this class of permissible subjects for examination.
I would, therefore, conclude that it was improper for the trial court to have allowed the question about how the defendant came by the automobile and to have received the testimony for the purpose of attacking his credibility.
The majority seem to agree with me up to this point, as indicated by the author’s review of authority capped by a conclusion in which he says:
“The motive of the State in its desire to test the credibility of the defendant is questionable . . . ”
and in which Gabrielson and Dorador are quoted as standing for the proposition that ordinarily
“ . . . evidence of prior misconduct of the accused is inadmissible in a criminal proceeding . . . ”
Remembering that the trial judge has said he has admitted the testimony about possession of the car for purpose of testing credibility, which he considers to be “really the heart of this matter,” [Emphasis supplied] and remembering that he believes that the only reason for excluding such testimony is that juries cannot sort out the wheat from the chaff — but judges can — the *16majority opinion concludes that it was not prejudicial to elicit the information that the vehicle was stolen. The opinion states:
“Thus, the only real question here is whether the answer compelled of the defendant was prejudicial to him, in that we must conclude that technically the evidence was improperly received. The answer is found in the controlling case of Galbraith v. State, Wyo.1972, 503 P.2d 1192, 1194, where in a bench-tried case it was held that there is a presumption on appeal that the trial court disregarded improperly admitted evidence unless the record affirmatively shows the trial court’s decision was influenced by such evidence. This court there cited Birmingham v. State, 1938, 228 Wis. 448, 279 N.W. 15, 17, 116 A.L.R. 554, as particularly persuasive on the proposition that even though an appellate court views certain evidence of other offenses as having been improperly received and inadmissible, and would have been grounds for reversal if it had been a jury trial, nevertheless a conviction will be affirmed if prejudice is not shown.” [Emphasis supplied]
I must say that I am unable to see what difference it makes whether it is a jury trial or a court trial if, under these facts, credibility may not be tested by prior misconduct. The court, as a fact-finder, has agreed to admit and consider the evidence for a prohibited purpose — i. e., the testing of credibility.
According to Galbraith v. State, Wyo., 503 P.2d 1192, 1194, there is a presumption on appeal that
“the trial court disregarded improperly admitted evidence” unless the record
“affirmatively shows the trial court’s decision was influenced by such evidence, X v. Y, Wyo., 482 P.2d 688, 691; Russell v. Curran, 66 Wyo. 173, 206 P.2d 1159, 1167; Yount v. Strickland, 17 Wyo. 526, 101 P. 942, 944.”
I read the Galbraith case to support my theory here — while the majority cites it to support theirs. I say this about Galbraith:
If, in a non-jury case, testimony of prior misconduct is improperly allowed into the evidence and the judge either expresses no opinion or recognizes it as improper and agrees to disregard it— then I have no quarrel with either the presumption that he would disregard the testimony or his ability and willingness to do it in the decision-making process. I would — as did Galbraith — apply strictly the presumption that the evidence would be disregarded, and I would apply the rule of Galbraith which holds that, in order to overcome the presumption, there must be an affirmative record showing that the trial court’s decision was influenced by such evidence.
But — that is not this case. Here we do not have the opportunity to apply the presumption to the effect that the court has disregarded the complained-of testimony. The judge said he did not disregard it — he said he was going to consider it for the purpose of testing credibility — a forbidden consideration. This admission, to me at least, affirmatively shows that the trial court’s decision was influenced by such evidence. He announced his belief that it was acceptable for testing credibility — he allowed it for that purpose — and considered it for that purpose. Can we then say, as the majority does, that the presumption of Galbraith, nonetheless, operates to lead us to a conclusion that the trial court “disregarded improperly admitted evidence”? Based upon the trial judge’s admission, I would hold that the Galbraith presumption cannot operate to correct the court’s error under these conditions.
But, it is argued, since the question was permitted only to test credibility and, even though the answer (“I stole it.”) comes into evidence for a prohibited reason — as the poisoned fruit of the evil inquiry, nevertheless, the defendant having passed his credibility test, there will, therefore, be no resultant prejudicial infection in the mind of a judge who seeks to discover whether or not the defendant is a thief. The framing of the proposition seems to compose the answer to the question of whether or *17not the introduction of the evidence was prejudicial. For me, it reeks of prejudice. It is like saying that the judge, who happened to be walking along in front of Bank A when the robber ran out with a sack of money, wouldn’t be influenced on the question of whether the robber had bank-robbing propensities at a trial where he is charged with robbing Bank B.
I would reverse and hold that the presumption of Galbraith is not operative in the face of a judge’s admission that the evidence was permitted for a prohibited reason.
I would hold that the record affirmatively reflects prejudice in the form of a wrongful admission of evidence of other larceny for the reason that such diseased proof established the defendant, in the mind of the judge, as a thief in a case where the issue is thievery.
OTHER GROUNDS FOR DISSENT
I take further issue with these following statements of the majority opinion. First, the majority says:
“ . . . The motion in limine and the objection made was an admission of or created a strong suspicion of guilt
Secondly :
“ . ■ . An objection claiming incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in itself, probably carries with it as much or more onus than an answer to the question, when made by any witness, including a defendant, sworn to ‘tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.’ ”

Motion in Limine

The motion in limine was made requesting an order of the court — as the majority opinion says—

to prevent any testimony relating to the fact that defendant allegedly had in his possession a stolen motor vehicle and cross-examination of the defendant by the Spate in that regard

The majority court then later says:
“ . . .it can be said that, ordinarily, evidence of prior misconduct of the accused is inadmissible in a criminal proceeding. Dorador v. State, Wyo. 1974, 520 P.2d 230, and Gabriels on v. State, Wyo. 1973, 510 P.2d 534 ... ” [Emphasis supplied]
Is the conclusion then to be drawn that when a defendant makes a motion in lim-ine to exclude admittedly inadmissible evidence it creates a
“strong suspicion of guilt . . . ”?
I would prefer to believe that a properly-made motion to exclude evidence would not carry with it suspicion of either guilt or innocence — especially in the mind of a trial judge. It would seem that this would be more particularly true in an appeal in which the appellate court urges that the evidence which the defendant sought to have excluded was improper and should not have been either introduced by the state or received by the court. We tell juries that they should disregard motions and their rulings — why, then, should the making of a motion in limine be
“ . . .an admission of or create [d] a strong suspicion of guilt . . . ”
in the mind of a trial judge ?
I hope that this is not the way it is.

The Fifth Amendment

I also hope it is not true that the invocation of constitutional rights, such as provided for in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution2, imposes such *18an “onus” 3 as to cause he who asserts his rights against self-incrimination to be unfavorably compared with a defendant
“ . . . sworn to ‘tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth’
who chooses to answer a question which might incriminate him.
Surely, we in this court do not embrace a doctrine which stigmatizes the defendant who would exercise his right to remain silent under the protection of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. We have held that he may not be so penalized. Jerskey v. State, Wyo., 546 P.2d 173, 183.
Finding prejudicial error on the issue of admitting the stolen car testimony into evidence for the purpose of testing the defendant’s credibility, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

. Gabrielson v. State, Wyo., 502 P.2d 1191; Valerio v. State, Wyo., 429 P.2d 317; Dorador v. State, Wyo., 520 P.2d 230.

. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part:
“No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;

. A synonym for “onus” is “stigma.” Webster’s Seventh Collegiate Dictionary.