Court Opinion

ID: 9782831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:21:24.258699+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:13.996020
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting: In my original dissent I warned that the court’s decision will cause confusion to Illinois mechanics hen law, an area of practice that is both “technical and complex.” 242 Ill. 2d at 257 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by Burke, J.). The court made no attempt to address the legal concerns raised in that dissent concerning its unsupportable interpretation of section 16 of the Mechanics Lien Act. And, because it did not do so, both contractors, Eagle Concrete and Edon Construction, now seek rehearing, in large part because the decision has consequences that they believe the court may have inadvertently overlooked or, perhaps, could not foresee. For example, Eagle notes that the court’s construction of the statutory phrase “at the time of the making of the contract” will have an adverse impact on subcontractor’s liens, which have, until now, related back to the date of the original contractor. Eagle also asks, in light of the court’s holding, “what happens to the value given to a project by a contractor which was neither paid nor for whom a lien was filed?” Eagle explains that this question is a direct result of the court’s interpretation of section 16. Eagle further asserts that in the wake of the court’s opinion, there will be “only two possible ways for a contractor to ensure payment of its work. It will either need to require the lender to prepay for the next segment of work or require the owner to post a payment bond.” Eagle asserts that it is “rare” in the construction industry for there to be such bonds. Edon, for its part, points out that, in the wake of the court’s opinion, “trial courts will be confronted with the virtually impossible task of determining the exact components of a building which are subject to claims of lien creditors,” which is the result of the court’s novel interpretation of section 16. The points raised by these contractors demonstrate that the court’s opinion, apart from contradicting existing case law, will unnecessarily disrupt existing commercial practices and cause a ripple effect on the marketplace For these reasons, the contractors’ contentions should be addressed. As Edon aptly observes: “If the Court fails to reconsider its decision and the Majority Opinion stands, *** mechanic’s lien[s] will no longer provide protection to contractors. The inevitable result will be chaos in the construction industry. Contractors will [no] longer be able to rely upon the protection of the Act and will have to require payment in advance, which will increase the risk assumed by owners and developers, delay completion of troubled projects, and interfere with economic recovery.” The court’s resolution of this case unfairly gives a financial advantage to the banking industry at the expense of the construction industry in the area of mechanics liens. This is not merely unfair, it contradicts the express intent of the General Assembly in enacting the Mechanics Liens Act. Historically, this court has consistently viewed the Act’s purpose to “protect” those who increase or improve, by the furnishing of labor and materials, the “value or condition of the property,” that is, contractors like Eagle and Edon. R.W. Dunteman Co. v. C/G Enterprises, Inc., 181 Ill. 2d 153, 164 (1998); see also Weather-Tite v. University of St. Francis, Inc., 233 Ill. 2d 385, 391 (2009) (same). Apparently, that is no more. Rehearing is appropriate where the reviewing court has overlooked or misapprehended a point. Ill. S. Ct. R. 367 (eff. Sept. 1, 2006). Rehearing is warranted under these circumstances, and I dissent from the court’s denial. JUSTICE BURKE joins in this dissent.