Court Opinion

ID: 9710159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:03:20.464389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:54.685828
License: Public Domain

Kelly, Justice
(concurring specially).
Conceivably it might be argued that Louisiana by maintaining its 1-year statute of limitations does have an interest in having its statute of limitations applied as to its resident defendants and an insurance company licensed and authorized to do business in Louisiana might come within this classification. Thus, I see no harm in discussing the application of the better rule of law.
In my view, the circumstances of this case do not evidence as strong a preference for Minnesota law over another state’s law permitting direct actions against insurers as did the cases involving foreign guest statutes or intrafamily tort immunity. Although we do not have a statute permitting direct actions against insurers, the maintenance of such an action does not run sharply counter to my concepts of fairness and equity. Neither am I prepared to say that our rule is better in all instances.1 I believe that to resist the application of another state’s law under circumstances such as this, it must appear not merely that we have a different policy in this state, but that our policy is deeply and unequivocally engrained both socially and legally and is clearly the better rule. The determination of liability between parties *370before insurance coverage is revealed is not of such overriding interest. In fact, this policy is to a large extent a fiction since jurors usually know that there is insurance coverage and are often indirectly made aware of this at trial during the voir dire. Furthermore, it is no secret that the cost of this type of insurance is related to the monies paid by insurance companies on claims. Jurors as members of the general public are no doubt keenly aware of the high cost of automobile liability insurance and are mature enough and intelligent enough to keep their verdicts within reasonable limits.
It should be noted that a conclusion that Minnesota should apply its own law in this case may force plaintiffs to sue in Louisiana and thereby deprive them of a forum because their claim may be barred in Louisiana by its statute of limitations.
If we are to apply the better rule of law, it seems that a 1-year statute of limitations is much too short, particularly if, as claimed, plaintiffs were lulled into not taking any action because of the alleged fraud of the defendant. Even without delay caused by such alleged fraud, many accidents are not ripe for settlement as the true extent of personal injuries often is difficult of ascertainment in a year’s time. Thus, the Minnesota statute of limitations appears to be a far better rule of law than the 1-year statute of Louisiana. Furthermore, application of this state’s statute of limitations will advance this forum’s governmental interests.
I would hold that the fifth test — application of the better rule of law — is met by applying the Louisiana law permitting direct actions against insurers and the 6-year statute of limitations of Minnesota rather than the 1-year statute of limitations of Louisiana. Even if the direct action law of Louisiana is not better than our law denying such direct action, this combination of laws will achieve a just result and will advance this state’s interests of protecting its citizens from alleged fraud practiced in this forum.
The plaintiffs’ further claims based upon fraud are an added *371reason for determining that the district court of Minnesota has jurisdiction of the subject matter. Judicial economy dictates that all of their causes of action should be brought in the same lawsuit. The allegedly fraudulent actions complained of occurred in Minnesota and this state would normally assume jurisdiction of such an action. Minnesota law is clearly applicable to plaintiffs’ alleged cause of action for fraud. Minnesota has a governmental interest in permitting its citizens to avail themselves of its courts for causes of action arising in Minnesota.
Mr. Chief Justice Sheran, not having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

 It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court of Florida overruled its prior ease law and held that in an action for damages from the alleged negligent operation of an insured automobile by its insured owner, the plaintiff as a third-party beneficiary of the motor vehicle liability policy has a direct cause of action against the insurer. Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969). See and compare Simmon v. Iowa Mutual Casualty Co. 3 Ill. 2d 318, 121 N. E. 2d 509 (1954); Wheeler v. Creekmore, 469 S. W. 2d 559 (Ky. 1971).