Court Opinion

ID: 9466838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:30:17.17868+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:00.412665
License: Public Domain

MeMILLIAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
After carefully considering the majority opinion and the concurring opinion, I continue to adhere to the general analysis set forth in the panel decision and therefore dissent.
To the extent relief under Rule 60(b)(4) enables a party to evade the doctrine of finality of judgments and to in effect appeal indirectly from a final judgment, I think this is the function of Rule 60(b)(4). In my view, the judgment of the district court is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because, as is apparent from the face of the record, the United States was not a party to the proceedings below. In the present case, the failure to join the United States is a “fatal” jurisdictional defect. See Schwartz v. Bowman, 244 F.Supp. 51, 69 (S.D.N.Y.1965), aff’d sub nom. Annenberg v. Alleghany Corp., 360 F.2d 211 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 921, 87 S.Ct. 230, 17 L.Ed.2d 145 (1966), citing Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 258 U.S. 377, 382, 42 S.Ct. 349, 351, 66 L.Ed. 671 (1922). The United States should have been made a party because the action was a direct review proceeding to set aside or suspend an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) under § 17(10)1 of the Interstate *828Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 17(10), as revised and codified2 at 49 U.S.C. § 10325, and not an action to enforce a reparation award under § 16(2)3 of the Act, 49 U.S.C. § 16(2), as revised and codified at 49 U.S.C. § 11705. See ICC v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 383 U.S. 576, 579-89, 602-06, 86 S.Ct. 1000, 1003-08, 1015-18, 16 L.Ed.2d 109 (1966) (hereinafter Atlantic).
As a preliminary matter, I note that the district court may not have had jurisdiction for another reason, that is, failure to exhaust administrative remedies. It appears from the record that neither the shipper (GLC) nor the carrier (KCS) filed a petition for reconsideration before the ICC. Denial or other disposition of a timely petition for reconsideration may well be a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial review in a direct review proceeding. “Section 17(9) [renumbered as § 17(10), recodified as § 10325] provides that after an application for rehearing, reargument, or reconsideration has been denied or otherwise disposed of, a suit may be brought to enforce, enjoin, suspend, or set aside the Commission decision, order, or requirement.” Atlantic, supra, 383 U.S. at 582-83, 86 S.Ct. at 1005 (footnote omitted); see United States v. Southern Ry., 364 F.2d 86, 92-93 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1031, 87 S.Ct. 1479, 18 L.Ed.2d 592 (1967); Southern Ry. v. United States, 412 F.Supp. 1122, 1134-35 & n. 31 (D.D.C.1976); but see Resort Bus Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 264 F.Supp. 742, 745 & n. 6 (S.D.N.Y.1967). New § 17(9) suggests, however, that a petition for reconsideration may not be necessary, at least in rail carrier proceedings,4 because petitions for reconsideration are essentially discretionary and based upon allegations of material error, new evidence, or substantially changed circumstances, 49 U.S.C. § 17(9)(g) (now revised and recodified at 49 U.S.C. § 10327(g)). See ICC General Rules of Practice, 49 C.F.R. § 1100.-98 (Rail appellate procedures, Rule 98) (1979) (also reprinted in 49 U.S.C.A. Appendix).
*829I agree that the district court was the appropriate court in which to review the order of the ICC at issue. The district court as the referring court has exclusive jurisdiction to review ICC orders from referrals under the primary jurisdiction doctrine. 28 U.S.C. § 1336(b); see, e. g., Atlantic, supra, 383 U.S. at 580, 86 S.Ct. at 1004; Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. United States, 205 Ct.Cl. 451, 505 F.2d 1252, 1254-55 (1974); Keller Industries, Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d 163, 166-67 (5th Cir. 1971); McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 181 Ct.Cl. 170, 387 F.2d 657, 659-61 (1967); see also S.Rep. No. 1394, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 reprinted in [1964] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 3235. Compare Pennsylvania R.R. v. United States, 363 U.S. 202, 205, 80 S.Ct. 1131, 1133, 4 L.Ed.2d 1165 (1960) (the holding in this case prompted the amendment of § 1336). The action was initially filed in district court by the carrier to recover undercharges; the shipper filed a counterclaim for overcharges. Because the action raised questions within the primary jurisdiction of the ICC, the district court correctly referred the issues to the ICC. E. g., United States v. Western Pacific R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 63-64, 77 S.Ct. 161, 164-65, 1 L.Ed.2d 126 (1956). “When that occurs, the court ordering the reference of such issues to the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action to enforce, enjoin, suspend, set aside, or annul a Commission order arising out of the referral . . . .” Atlantic, supra, 383 U.S. at 580, 86 S.Ct. at 1004. In addition, as noted by the concurring opinion, the ICC order at issue was basically an order for the payment of money and as such subject to judicial review by the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1336(a);5 United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426, 442, 69 S.Ct. 1410, 1419, 93 L.Ed. 1451 (1949); Aluminum Co. of America v. United States, 553 F.2d 1268, 1269-70 (D.C.Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
In my view, however, the shipper’s motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the district court, was either an action to set aside the ICC order finding that the higher specific commodity rates, as modified by the ICC, were applicable to the shipments at issue or an action challenging the adequacy of the reparations award (to the extent the carrier recovered less than it demanded). In either case, judicial review was available only in a direct review proceeding (under old § 17(9) or new § 17(10) of the Act), and not in an action for enforcement under § 16(2). In the absence of a reparations award, there is nothing upon which to base an enforcement action, see Atlantic, supra, 383 U.S. at 587, 86 S.Ct. at 1007; United States v. ICC, supra, 337 U.S. at 439-41, 69 S.Ct. at 1417-18, and a shipper cannot challenge the adequacy of a reparations award in an enforcement action, see Atlantic, supra, 383 U.S. at 587, 86 S.Ct. at 1007, citing Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Brady, 288 U.S. 448, 457-58, 53 S.Ct. 441, 443, 77 L.Ed. 888 (1933); D. L. Piazza Co. v. West Coast Line, 210 F.2d 947, 949 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 839, 75 S.Ct. 42, 99 L.Ed. 661 (1954).
The characterization of the action below as a direct review proceeding and not an enforcement action is critical because, although both involve “orders for the payment of money,” only § 16(2) actions for the enforcement of orders for the payment of money are brought as ordinary civil actions. 49 U.S.C. § 16(2); Atlantic, supra, 383 U.S. at 585, 86 S.Ct. at 1006. In contrast, direct review proceedings are distinct proceedings for judicial review and have special procedural requirements, in particular that such actions be brought by or against the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 2322. Originally, injunc-tive relief required a three-judge district court, 28 U.S.C. § 2325, with direct review to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1253. However, §§ 2324-25 were repealed in 1975, Act of Jan. 2, 1975, § 7, *830Pub.L. No. 93-584, 88 Stat. 1918, and judicial review of orders other than for the payment of money or to enforce ICC orders is now in the courts of appeal, like review of other administrative agencies, with discretionary review by writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254 (writ of certiorari), 2341 et seq. (Judicial Review Act of 1950 (Hobbs Act)); see generally H.R.Rep. No. 93-1569, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in [1974] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 7025, 7034-36 (report of Department of Justice).
The action below was, in my opinion, a direct review proceeding to review an adverse reparations order. The fact that the ICC order under attack was one relating to the payment of money and thus in substance one for the payment of money meant that the order was “not of sufficient public importance to justify the accelerated judicial review procedure [the three-judge district court and direct review by the Supreme Court].” United States v. ICC, supra, 337 U.S. at 442, 69 S.Ct. at 1419. “Thus, though the procedures set out in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2321-25 (1964 ed.) otherwise govern § 17(9) proceedings to review such orders, § 2325 is not applicable and the matter may be adjudicated by a single judge.” Atlantic, supra, 383 U.S. at 585, 86 S.Ct. at 1007. The provision requiring a three-judge district court (now repealed, see discussion supra) does not apply to judicial review of adverse reparations orders, but the other provisions, including that requiring the action be brought against the United States, are applicable. Moreover, a reviewing court “may not formally set aside the Commission’s order in an action in which neither the Commission nor the United States is a party.” Atlantic, supra, 383 U.S. at 599, 86 S.Ct. at 1014.
In response to the argument that an action to set aside an order for the payment of money should be treated exactly like an action to enforce an order for the payment of money, I note that the Supreme Court in the Atlantic case addressed a similar argument. In that case the ICC resisted allowing a carrier to bring a direct review proceeding as a cross-action to the shipper’s enforcement action. The ICC argued that “reparation orders respecting past rates are not of sufficient general importance to require their defense by the United States and the Commission, and the direct review proceeding should not be permitted regardless of the court in which it is brought.” Atlantic, supra, 383 U.S. at 605, 86 S.Ct. at 1017. The Supreme Court stated that this was apparently not the view of Congress and cited the 1964 amendments which placed jurisdiction and venue of the direct review proceeding following reference to the ICC under the primary jurisdiction doctrine in the referring court, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1336(b), 1398(b), in the referring court and not as an incident of the original action. Atlantic, supra, 383 U.S. at 605-06, 86 S.Ct. at 1017. Thus, an action for direct review of an ICC order, which must be brought against the United States, may involve an order “for the payment of money.” Apparently only actions to enforce an order for the payment of money pursuant to § 16(2) of the Act do not require the United States as a party to the action.6
*831As noted by the Supreme Court, the statutory provisions controlling the availability of judicial review in this case are “an historical patchwork subject to more than one interpretation.” Atlantic, supra, 383 U.S. at 586 n. 4, 86 S.Ct. at 1007 n. 4. Nonetheless, because the proceeding below was a direct review proceeding to set aside an ICC order for the payment of money and as such should have been brought against the United States, but was not, I would find that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and would reverse the denial of the Rule 60(b)(4) motion.

. 49 U.S.C. § 17(10) provides:
Judicial relief from decisions, etc., upon denial or other disposition of application for rehearing etc.
When an application for rehearing, reargument, or reconsideration of any decision, order, or requirement of a division, an individual Commission, or a board with respect to any matter or referred to him or it shall have been made and shall have been denied, or after rehearing, reargument, or reconsideration otherwise disposed of, by the Commission or an appellate division, a suit to enforce, enjoin, suspend, or set aside such a decision, order, or requirement, in whole or in part, may be brought in a court of the United States under those provisions of law applicable in the case of suits to enforce, enjoin, suspend, or set aside orders of the Commission, but not otherwise.
This section was formerly numbered § 17(9) and was added to the Interstate Commerce Act in 1940 by the Transportation Act of 1940, ch. 722, § 12, 54 Stat. 916. The Supreme Court characterized this section as “basically a provision requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to resort to the courts.” ICC v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., infra, 383 U.S. 576 at 583 n. 2, 86 S.Ct. 1000 at 1006, 16 L.Ed.2d 109. In 1976 this section was renumbered and a new § 17(9) was added providing new administrative hearing and review procedures. Act of Feb. 5, 1976, Pub.L. No. 94-210, § 303(a), 90 Stat. 48. In the Revised Interstate Commerce Act (see note 2 infra) § 17(10) is now § 10325, which provides:
Judicial review — nonrail proceedings
A civil action to enforce, enjoin, suspend, or set aside an action of the Interstate Commerce Commission taken by a division, individual Commissioner, employee board, or employee delegated to act under section 10305 of this title may be started in a court of the United States only—
(1) on denial of an application for rehearing, reargument, or reconsideration; or
(2) if the application is granted, after a rehearing, reargument, reconsideration or other disposition by the Commission or an appellate division under section 10323 of this title.
49 U.S.C. § 10325. New § 17(9) (added in 1976) is now 49 U.S.C. § 10327.
For clarity, I shall refer to a former § 17(9) action (new § 17(10) and now codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10325) as a direct review proceeding and a § 16(2) action (now codified at 49 U.S.C. § 11705) as an enforcement action.

. The Interstate Commerce Act was revised and recodified by the Act of Oct. 17, 1978, Pub.L. No. 95 — 473, 92 Stat. 1337. The legislative history clearly indicates that the revision and recodification was not intended to make any substantive changes but only to modernize some of the Act’s archaic language. E. g., Chicago & N. W. Transp. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 609 F.2d 1221, 1222 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1979), citing H.R.Rep. No. 95-1395, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 4, 9-10, reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News, pp. 3009, 3013, 3018.

. 49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (now revised and codified at 49 U.S.C. § 11705) provides:
Proceedings in courts to enforce orders; costs; attorney’s fees. If a carrier does not comply with an order for the payment of money within the time limit in such order, the complainant, or any person for whose benefit such order was made, may file in the district court of the United States for the district in which he resides or in which is located the principal operating office of the carrier, or through which the road of the carrier runs, or in any state court of general jurisdiction having jurisdiction of the parties, a complaint setting forth briefly the causes for which he claims damages, and the order of the commission in the premises. Such suit in the district court of the United States shall proceed in all respects like other civil suits for damages, except that on the trial of such suit the findings and order of the commission shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, and except that the plaintiff shall not be liable for costs in the district court nor for costs at any subsequent stage of the proceedings unless they accrue upon his appeal. If the plaintiff shall finally prevail he shall be allowed a reasonable attorney’s fee, to be taxed and collected as a part of the costs of the suit.

. 49 U.S.C. § 17(9)(h) (now revised and codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10327(i)) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, any decision, order, or requirement of the Commission, or of a duly designated division thereof, shall be final on the date on which it is served. A civil action to enforce, enjoin, suspend, or set aside such a decision order, or requirement, in whole or in part, may be brought after such date in a court of the United States pursuant to the provisions of law which are applicable to suits to enforce, enjoin, suspend, or set aside orders of the Commission.
49 U.S.C. § 10327(i) provides:
Notwithstanding this subtitle, an action of the Commission under this section and an action of a designated division under subsection (c) of this section is final on the date on which it is served, and a civil action to enforce, enjoin, suspend, or set aside the action may be filed after that date.

. 28 U.S.C. § 1336(a) provides:
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district courts shall have jurisdiction of any civil action to enforce, in whole or in part, any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and to enjoin or suspend, in whole or in part, any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission for the payment of money or the collection of fines, penalties, and forfeitures.

. See generally Atlantic, supra, 383 U.S. at 579-89, 605-06, 86 S.Ct. at 1003-08, 1017. In my view, actions to enforce orders for the payment of money are brought in the district courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1336(a), as any other civil action, 49 U.S.C. § 16(2); the United States need not be made a party. However, actions to enforce non-payment orders, although properly brought in the district courts, 28 U.S.C. § 1336(a), must be brought by or against the United States, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2321(b), 2322. Actions to set aside orders for the payment of money are brought in the district court and not the courts of appeals; such actions fall within the “Except as otherwise provided by an Act of Congress” language of 28 U.S.C. § 2321(a). 28 U.S.C. §§ 1336(a), 1336(b) (referral actions); see also United States v. ICC, supra, 337 U.S. 426, 69 S.Ct. 1410, 93 L.Ed. 1451 (direct review of adverse reparations order before single-judge district court). Such an action must be brought by or against the United States, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2321(a), 2322. Finally, actions to set aside non-money orders are properly brought in the courts of appeals and by or against the United States, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2321(a), 2322, unless the underlying order was referred to the ICC, in which case the referring court has exclusive jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1336(b).