Court Opinion

ID: 9710487
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:10:38.098511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:43.447797
License: Public Domain

RUIZ, Associate Judge,
concurring:
I fully join the court’s endorsement of a revised reasonable doubt instruction. As the majority opinion notes, in view of the central importance of that instruction to criminal trials and in the interest of uniformity and conservation of judicial resources, pursuant to the appellate court’s supervisory power over the trial court, it is proper for the Court of Appeals to invest its time and authority in developing a revised reasonable doubt instruction for use in all criminal trials. It is correspondingly incumbent on the trial court to conform its practice accordingly. In view of our prior decisions endorsing the Redbook instruction on reasonable doubt, see, e.g., Butler v. United States, 646 A.2d 331, 337 (D.C.1994), the full court appropriately announces the revised rule sitting en banc. In the unanimous opinion of the Court of Appeals, the revised instruction we have formulated is not only constitutional but also well-designed to address the deficiencies that have been identified in the Redbook instruction.
I disagree with Judge Schwelb that we should refrain from acting beyond deciding the immediate case. We not only have the power to endorse an instruction pursuant to our supervisory authority, but the responsibility to do so in order to respond in a comprehensive manner to systemic issues even if they come to our attention in the context of individual eases.1 When we so act, however, we must be mindful of the limitations inherent in our adjudicative proceedings. If we are going to develop and announce an instruction for general application, as we do here, we should act on as informed a basis as we possibly can. Accordingly, we sensibly sought advice not only from the parties, but also from appointed amicus curiae, who in turn sought information from the trial judges who daily instruct juries on reasonable doubt, observe their reactions, and deal with their questions. The revised rule reflects their comments and incorporates a number of their suggestions.
My sole reservation is that we have not gone far enough to seek the views of jurors *85themselves in order to understand what terms in the current instruction are problematic, and become better informed as to what substitute language would be most helpful in conveying the core but slippery concept, “beyond a reasonable doubt.” In truth, it is difficult for an appellate court, in the context of an appeal, to obtain this kind of information. It would have been possible in this case, however, just as we requested that amicus consult with trial judges, to request that jurors be consulted, or that data and recommendations be obtained from expert individuals or organizations with the appropriate juror testing and sampling techniques to provide us with necessary information on what jurors think and would prefer. My point is not that we should not act—we should—but that we tailor our proceedings consistent with the task at hand.

. As the majority notes, the judgment of conviction is affirmed because the instruction given in this case was not violative of constitutional standards.