Court Opinion

ID: 9384146
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-31 21:01:18.131541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:50.981064
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 21-4496

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        JAMES JOSHUA HARDESTY, a/k/a James Hardesty,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at
        Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley, Senior District Judge. (1:20-cr-00066-IMK-MJA-1)

        Submitted: March 20, 2023                                         Decided: March 30, 2023

        Before NIEMEYER and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: L. Richard Walker, First Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF
        THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Clarksburg, West Virginia; Zoey Vilasuso, Law
        Student, WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Morgantown, West
        Virginia, for Appellant. William Ihlenfeld, United States Attorney, Wheeling, West
        Virginia, Sarah E. Wagner, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
        STATES ATTORNEY, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               James Joshua Hardesty pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation

        of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The charge arose after a Fairmont, West Virginia,

        police officer conducted a Terry * stop and recovered a firearm from Hardesty’s jacket

        pocket. Hardesty moved to suppress the firearm as evidence, arguing that it was the fruit

        of an unlawful seizure. The district court denied the motion, and Hardesty subsequently

        entered his guilty plea, preserving the right to challenge the court’s denial of his motion to

        suppress. The district court sentenced Hardesty to 63 months’ imprisonment. On appeal,

        Hardesty contends that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop. We affirm.

               “When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, [we] review[]

        conclusions of law de novo and underlying factual findings for clear error.” United States

        v. Fall, 955 F.3d 363, 369-70 (4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). “If, as here, the district court

        denied the motion to suppress, [we] construe[] the evidence in the light most favorable to

        the government.” Id. at 370 (cleaned up).

               The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

        persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.

        Const. amend. IV. “Under well-established doctrine, a police officer may, consistent with

        the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief investigatory stop—known as a ‘Terry stop’—

        predicated on reasonable, articulable suspicion that ‘criminal activity may be afoot.’”

        United States v. Mitchell, 963 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at

               *
                   Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

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        30). The officer must have “at least a minimal level of objective justification,” meaning

        that he “must be able to articulate more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or

        hunch of criminal activity.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24 (2000) (internal

        quotation marks omitted). “The degree to which the police may rely on a tip to establish

        reasonable suspicion depends on the tipster’s veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge.”

        United States v. Kehoe, 893 F.3d 232, 238 (4th Cir. 2018). While “[a] tip from an

        anonymous caller seldom . . . contains sufficient indicia of reliability necessary to provide

        the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a Terry stop and frisk,” “courts generally

        presume that a citizen-informant or a victim who discloses his or her identity and basis of

        knowledge to the police is both reliable and credible.” Id. Courts assess whether an officer

        has articulated reasonable suspicion for a stop under “the totality of the circumstances,”

        giving “due weight to common sense judgments reached by officers in light of their

        experience and training.” United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 321 (4th Cir. 2004); see

        Mitchell, 963 F.3d at 390.

               Here, the responding officer testified at the hearing on Hardesty’s motion to

        suppress. He recounted that dispatch told him a caller was concerned about a man who

        was potentially overdosing or having a seizure. The caller identified herself, implied that

        she resided nearby, and relayed what she was observing in real time. She provided detailed

        information about the man’s appearance, behavior, and location. When the officer arrived

        on the scene shortly thereafter, he found Hardesty in the described location and matching

        the physical description provided by the caller. The officer also observed behavior that he

        believed was consistent with intoxication. The district court found that the caller was

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        reliable and credible and that the officer was entitled to rely on the caller’s information and

        his own observations to establish reasonable suspicion to seize Hardesty. Considering the

        totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the district court did not err in denying

        Hardesty’s motion to suppress. See Perkins, 363 F.3d at 321.

               Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral

        argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

        before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                         AFFIRMED

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