Court Opinion

ID: 9664776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:29:44.40567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:10.117636
License: Public Domain

Karen R. Baker, Judge, dissenting. I agree with the majority that the trial court did not err in refusing to enforce an alleged agreement between the parties that was not accepted and adopted by the court, that the parties never signed, and that the complete terms of which were never agreed on by the parties. However, the majority is clearly wrong when it goes on to find that the trial judge erred by failing to enforce a single provision of this twenty-one page proposed agreement and does so by stating that “[t]he trial court gave no explanation for deviating from the agreement, and we see no rational basis for its action in this regard.” The majority is wrong for three reasons: (1) the parties did not request specific findings pursuant to Rule 52 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore, we cannot reverse for the court’s failure to set out its reasoning; (2) the parties never agreed to the language that would define their rights and obligations under the proposed settlement, and a trial court cannot make the agreement for them; and (3) the trial court’s order that, in part, ordered the accountant’s fees to be paid by Mr. Fields, resulted from a contempt petition filed due to Mr. Fields’s failure to divide the property as ordered in the parties’ divorce decree, and the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in exercising the court’s inherent authority to enforce its own order. This dispute arises from the disposition of a hearing held on April 7, 2003, where the court was asked to rule on a petition for contempt and order to show cause filed November 2, 1999, a petition for contempt and for modification filed August 18, 2000, and a petition for contempt of court, order to show cause, and for modification filed August 21, 2002. These petitions were filed by Patrice Fields to enforce rights decreed to her in the parties’ divorce on September 2, 1999. By the time the trial judge rendered her opinion now appealed by Mr. Fields, almost three years had passed since the trial court had entered the order for which Mrs. Fields sought enforcement. First, the majority is wrong to reverse the trial court because the parties did not request specific findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting the trial court’s finding that Mr. Fields should pay the entire accountant fee. Our law does not require that a decree recite specific facts or conclusions of law on the issues presented and permits a trial court sitting as a jury to decide a case without stating its findings of fact separately. Rule 52 (a) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure affords a litigant a right to request specific findings of the trial court. However, failure to make a timely request for separate findings constitutes a waiver of that right. Legate v. Passmore, 268 Ark. 1161, 1162, 559 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Ark. App. 1980) (holding that parties’ could not construe trial court’s statement to be exclusive of other legal conclusions he might have reached in determining his verdict and judgment). Here, the parties made no request for findings of fact and are in no position to complain that the court did not make them. Neither can we reverse the trial judge’s order because she “gave no explanation” when no explanation was required or requested by the parties. Second, the parties never entered into an enforceable agreement. The majority thus finds that the trial court erred in failing to enforce a single provision of an agreement that the parties never had. The parties attached a transcript of a recorded conversation memorializing their “settlement.” The most significant evidence that the parties’ agreement was in theory only is the statement by counsel for Mr. Fields at the close of the proposal that “we will transfer the money within two (2) business days after the execution of the agreement.” No agreement was executed and no transfer of money took place. It is not within the judicial province to make private agreements. See Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 253 Ark. 750, 489 S.W.2d 1 (1973). Third, “the Court is not bound by an agreement [that a] disputing husband and wife may enter into, in order to terminate a controversy; and this is true even in the absence of fraud or coercion.” McCue v. McCue, 210 Ark. 826, 832, 197 S.W.2d 938, 941 (1946); Rutherford v. Rutherford, 81 Ark. App. 122, 98 S.W.3d 842 (2003). The trial court’s order, including the provision requiring that the accountant fee be paid by Mr. Fields, was entered to enforce the court’s previously entered divorce decree upon the petition of Ms. Fields for enforcement by contempt. A court’s contempt power may be wielded not only to preserve the court’s power and dignity and to punish disobedience of the court’s order but also to preserve and enforce the parties’ rights. Hart v. McChristian, 344 Ark. 656, 42 S.W.3d 552 (2001). Where a party is punished for civil contempt, we will not reverse the trial court’s order unless it is arbitrary or against the weight of the evidence. Id. It is a well established rule that the power to judge a contempt rests exclusively with the court contemned. See Harrison v. Harrison, 239 Ark. 756, 394 S.W.2d 128 (1965). A court must be able to enforce its judgments in order to retain its authority to act. Smith v. Credit Serv. Co., 339 Ark 41, S.W.3d 69 (1999). By reversing the trial court’s allocation of costs in the context of a petition for contempt, the majority disregards this standard and in so doing undermines the authority of the trial court to enforce its own orders. For these reasons, I dissent from the majority’s reversal of the trial court’s judgment ordering Mr. Fields to pay all of the accountant’s fees. I am authorized to state that Judge Hart joins this dissent.