Court Opinion

ID: 9696838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:59:58.055511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:26.994146
License: Public Domain

OLSZEWSKI, J.,
dissenting:
¶ 1 While the expression of the majority view provides a persuasive analysis and sound rationale, I am obliged to differ. Because I believe that the “newly discovered evidence” is not nearly material enough to warrant a new trial, I respectfully dissent.
¶2 The majority correctly recites the general rule that
[ajfter-discovered evidence can only be the basis for a new trial when it: (1) has been discovered after the trial and could not have been obtained at or prior to the conclusion of the trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to impeach the credibility of a witness; and (4) is of such a nature and character that a different verdict will likely result if a new trial is granted.
Commonwealth v. Mason, 559 Pa. 500, 741 A.2d 708, 717 (1999), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 81, — L.Ed.2d - (2000). Further, the majority aptly describes our standard of review as being limited to whether the PCRA court’s determination was “ ‘supported by evidence of record.’ ” Commonwealth v. Bronsh-tein, 561 Pa. 611, 752 A.2d 868, 870 n. 4 (2000) (quoting Commonwealth v. Morales, 549 Pa. 400, 701 A.2d 516, 520 (1997)).
¶ 3 A close examination of the record indicates that the discrepancies in testimony are not nearly as egregious as the PCRA court implies. First, my reading of the record indicates that Officer Rose testified at both the trial and during his deposition that he was not able to identify appellee “immediately after the actor jumped from the window” as the majority opinion states. Majority Opinion, at 934. At trial, Officer Rose testified as follows:
Q: Did you see the person that came out the window?
A: Not at that time.
What I did, I was familiar with the area. And I began to run down Viola to Milroy Street.
At that point as I was going down Milroy Street, an individual came running out of the office — I mean out of the woods.
Q: And did you get a look at that individual?
A: Yes, I did.
N.T. Trial, 8/2/95, at 158 (emphasis added). The officer then identified appellee as being that individual. See id. His deposition testimony was remarkably similar:
Q: You don’t have a clue, do you? All you know is a body came out of that window; you can’t describe it at all, can you?
A: No.
Q: All right. So the body goes into the woods?
A: Yes.
Q: What did you do?
A: I ran down the street to head off the person running through the woods.
Q: What did you do as you moved down the street?
*936A: Well, as I ran down the street, the individual ran out in front of me out of the woods.
Q: Were you able to tell at that point whether it was a white man or a black man?
A: Yes.
N.T. Deposition of Deputy Sheriff Edward Rose, III, 4/29/97, at 33, 34, 36, 43. Officer Rose proceeded to describe the individual’s features. See id. at 43-44. The only contradiction in his testimony was that at trial he testified that he was stationed at the side of the building, see N.T. Trial, at 156, and during his deposition he testified that he was at the back of the building, see N.T. Deposition, at 16. Significantly, he testified at both proceedings that after being radioed that the suspect was in custody, he went to the front of the dwelling where he observed the suspect crash through the window. See N.T. Trial, at 156-57; N.T. Deposition, at 22-23. The officer’s inconsistent statements about where he was stationed before the suspect fell through the window surely has no bearing in his ability to identify the perpetrator as appel-lee.
¶ 4 Further, the majority mischaracterizes Officer Foley’s deposition testimony as being significantly different from his trial testimony. At trial, the officer testified that, after the crash, “[he] saw the defendant picking himself up from the ground and running into the woods.” N.T. Trial, at 191. In his deposition testimony two years after trial, Officer Foley testified that he did not recall if he saw the suspect’s face after the fall. See N.T. Deposition of Officer Thomas Foley, 6/16/99, at 44. While certainly different from what he said at trial, this testimony would only be useful to impeach the officer’s testimony regarding whether he could identify appel-lee as the individual who crashed through the window. As stated above, this does not provide appellee relief under the PCRA. See Mason, 741 A.2d at 717.
¶ 5 Finally, the majority’s emphasis on the testimony of two officers who may or may not have been able to identify appellee in a few brief seconds before he allegedly ran into the woods ignores the testimony of Officers Daniel Pratt and Derick Long who were in the building attempting to apprehend the intruder. They both unambiguously testified that they caught appel-lee in a closet and got a clear view of his face and identified him in the courtroom. See N.T. Trial, at 36 (testimony of Daniel Pratt) (“A: At this time the actor stood straight up from the closet, looked me and Officer Long right in the face. Q: So you got a good look at him? A: Very good.”); N.T. Trial, at 117 (testimony of Derick Long) (“Q: Were you able to see this person? A: Yes. I looked at him eye to eye.”). Even assuming, arguendo, that Officers Rose and Foley’s deposition indicated that they did not tell the truth at appellee’s trial, given this uncontradicted testimony, I believe that this evidence does not “compel a different outcome if it had been introduced at trial.” Commonwealth v. Small, 559 Pa. 423, 741 A.2d 666, 673 (1999), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 80, — L.Ed.2d - (2000). Because I feel that the trial court’s determination was not supported by evidence of record, I must dissent.