Court Opinion

ID: 9726541
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:56:20.613255+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:28.257719
License: Public Domain

Tauro, C.J.
(dissenting). At the outset, I wish to emphasize that my dissent is addressed primarily to the narrow issue of whether, on the record before us, a judge of the Superior Court had jurisdiction to issue temporary injunctions prior to and pending an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised in the pleadings, including the question of jurisdiction. 1 Other matters are dealt with only by way of refutation of other contentions made by UFW. In other words, on the record before us, can it be said that the judge was wrong as matter of law in issuing temporary injunctions? In my opinion, we cannot so hold and I therefore dissent from the majority opinion.
For the purpose of these cases I accept the majority’s assertion that: “if the present cases were within [G. L. c. 214,] § 9A (1), then the judge of the Superior Court was without ‘jurisdiction’ to enter the injunctions.” Here it should be noted that the defendants apparently did not consider the cases to come within the terms of the statute. They *745did not raise that issue. It was first raised by the single justice of the Appeals Court, sua sponte.
In determining the jurisdictional question, some emphasis must be given to the present procedural posture of these suits. We have before us an appeal from an order of a single justice of the Appeals Court annulling preliminary injunctions entered by a judge of the Superior Court. Thus, we are reviewing interlocutory decrees which were entered in the Superior Court on the basis of records consisting solely of two verified bills of complaint. Because no evidence was taken, the propriety of the Superior Court judge’s decisions must be determined solely on the basis of the allegations of fact contained in the bills, Abeloff v. Peacard, 272 Mass. 56, 59 (1930), without giving any consideration to the allegations of law, Poirier v. Superior Court, 337 Mass. 522, 526 (1958).
The issue before us, then, is whether these suits, as they appear from the factual allegations of the bills are, as matter of law, “casefs] involving or growing out of a labor dispute, as defined in . . . [c. 149, § 20C].” G. L. c. 214, § 9A (1). I believe that the allegations of the bills of complaint do not require a holding that there is a labor dispute between UFW and the plaintiffs. In addition, I believe that the allegations of the bills do not require rulings that these suits “grow out of” any labor dispute which might exist between the UFW and grape and lettuce growers in California, or between the UFW and a rival union, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, AFL-CIO (Teamsters), in California. Thus, at this juncture, I would not disturb the Superior Court judge’s implicit determination that he was not deprived by § 9A of jurisdiction to grant interlocutory relief in these suits.
The allegations of fact pertaining to the issue of whether these suits involve or grow out of a labor dispute include the following:2 the defendants are members of, and represent*746ative of all other members of, the UFW (par. 3); the defendants have made demands on the plaintiff that it cease purchasing grapes and lettuce which have been harvested by employees represented by the Teamsters (par. 5); the UFW has been disputing for some years with the Teamsters regarding the representation of agricultural workers in California (actually it is rather definite that the entire dispute essentially is between the two unions) (par. 5); the defendants informed the plaintiff that they would picket the plaintiff’s stores until the plaintiff acceded to the defendants’ demands (par. 6); the purpose of the defendants’ activities is to pressure the plaintiff to cease doing business with wholesalers and growers of non-UFW picked grapes and lettuce, thereby forcing such growers to hire UFW members and to oust the Teamsters (par. 22); and the defendants have charged (falsely) that the plaintiff is selling “scab lettuce” and have asserted (falsely) that the plaintiff’s employees are on strike (par. 23). Thus, the only allegation of any dispute between the plaintiff and the defendants concerns the source of certain produce sold in the plaintiff’s stores. It is expressly alleged that the UFW does not represent, nor does it seek to represent, any of the plaintiff’s employees (par. 4). In addition, there is no allegation that the UFW is attempting to influence those employees. All of its activities are directed at influencing the plaintiff’s customers (pars. 10, 15, 18). Allegations that the defendants are engaged in a secondary boycott against the plaintiff are allegations of law and thus cannot be considered as facts. Poirier v. Superior Court, 337 Mass. 522, 526 (1958).
In addition to those just summarized, the bill of complaint contains numerous allegations of unlawful conduct of the defendants which would warrant injunctive relief. For example, it is alleged that the picketers have harassed customers and impeded their access to the stores, urging them to boycott the plaintiff’s supermarkets (par. 10).3 It is alleged *747that, in all cases, the defendants have been trespassing on private property (pars. 13, 14, 15, 16). It is further alleged that the defendants have roamed the parking lots in such a way as to constitute a safety hazard (par. 10) and have caused a litter problem with the leaflets they distribute (par. 18). As a result of these illegal activities by the defendants, the plaintiff alleges that it has suffered “substantial damages to its business and an irreparable loss of many customers” (par. 24).
In view of these allegations of fact, it cannot be said, as matter of law, that the judge was wrong in concluding that this suit was not one “involving or growing out of a labor dispute.” See Bosse v. Leonard & Barrows Shoe Co. 343 Mass. 207 (1961). Moreover, the bill on its face makes out a strong case for injunctive relief. The injuries alleged by the plaintiff constitute substantial harm to its business interests by loss of its customers, to competing markets. Here it is well to emphasize that a preliminary injunction serves primarily to maintain the status quo pending a full evidentiary hearing on the merits. Thayer Co. v. Binnall, 326 Mass. 467, 479 (1950). “An injunction is proper to prevent the threatened extinction of a business . . . and to prevent disruption of a company’s relationship with its dealers.” Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier Ltd. 454 F. 2d 527, 531 (1st Cir. 1972). On the basis of this record the judge was justified in entering a preliminary injunction to prevent continuing injury to the plaintiff’s business until a factual determination could be held to determine the substantial factual issues raised by the allegations. If the law were to the contrary a judge would be powerless to issue a preliminary injunction (pending evidentiary hearing) to restrain the most atrocious type of illegal conduct if the pleadings simply raised a possible issue involving a labor dispute. Common sense and logic dictate against any such rule.4
*748In addition, the fact that the defendants at no time in the Superior Court and in the Appeals Court contended that this suit involved a “labor dispute” is of such significance that it bears repetition. At the hearing on the preliminary injunction they raised only the constitutional arguments and made no request for the procedural safeguards of G. L. c. 214, § 9A, or for a three-judge court.5 The failure of the defendants to raise the issue supports the conclusion that the judge was not clearly wrong in determining that he had jurisdiction to enter an interlocutory order in this suit to afford preliminary protection in the face of serious misconduct extremely detrimental to the plaintiff.
In any case, even if the bill of complaint on its face raised the jurisdictional issue, it cannot be said that it was improper to issue the preliminary injunction. It has long been held that a trial court has “the power to preserve existing conditions while it . . . [is] determining its own authority to grant injunctive relief.” United States v. United Mine Wkrs. of America, 330 U. S. 258, 293 (1947). Ford v. Boeger, 362 F. 2d 999 (8th Cir. 1966). This suit presents a bona fide question of jurisdiction. As the majority recognize, it has never been decided in Massachusetts that a secondary boycott is a “labor dispute” as defined in G. L. c. 149, § 20C (c)6 (see *749discussion below). More importantly, it is not clear from the present record that this suit involves a secondary boycott at all. Whether the UFW is engaged in a lawful secondary boycott, an unlawful secondary boycott, or a secondary boycott at all is a factual determination that can be made only on the basis of evidence. It was not incorrect for the judge to “preserve existing conditions” until he could hear such evidence. If, at any time after the commencement of an evidentiary hearing, the judge determines that this suit does grow out of a labor dispute, then he should decline jurisdiction and vacate the preliminary injunction. The suit would then proceed de nova before a three-judge court to determine the propriety of a temporary injunction as well as the merits of the case. But until such hearing has taken place before a Superior Court judge there is no basis on the record before us for a holding that the judge’s preliminary exercise of his general equitable jurisdiction was improper.
Apart from the problems raised by the majority’s determination that the jurisdictional issue is ripe for our review, I also have difficulty with their conclusion that the dispute at hand, even assuming that it is clearly a “secondary boycott,” is a “labor dispute” and that this suit is a case which “involve [s] or . . . grow[s] out of a labor dispute.” G. L. c. 149, § 20C (a).
The statute defines “labor dispute” to include “any controversy arising out of any demand of any character whatsoever concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating ... or seeking to arrange, terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in proximate relation of employer and employee.” § 20C (c). The majority’s analysis of this definition quickly glosses over *750(in a single sentence) the requirements that there be a “controversy” and a “demand” and focuses principally on the implications of the “regardless” clause. It is my belief, however, that this issue requires greater caution of analysis. There is indeed a controversy here between the plaintiff and the defendants, and that controversy certainly arises out of a “demand,” that is, the UFW’s demand that the plaintiff cease selling Teamster picked grapes and lettuce. But that demand is not of the type referred to in the statute: it concerns neither terms of employment nor representation of persons in negotiating. The majority attempt to elude this difficulty by looking to California and finding the required demands in the disputes between the UFW and the growers and producers of lettuce and grapes. I have two problems with this approach. In the first place, there is nothing in the record before us from which we can conclude that UFW has made demands of any character on California employers. More importantly, even if the existence of such demands were clear from the record, I do not believe that the record establishes a connection between those demands in California and the present controversy in Massachusetts of sufficient substance to require a holding that the latter grows out of the former. If the majority are correct, then the UFW could create a labor dispute simply by (for example) picketing the Massachusetts Bay United Fund in order to pressure the Fund to make a contribution in support of the union’s organizing activities in California. A more sensible and logical construction would be to read the statutory definition as referring only to the “demand” which is the immediate cause of the controversy between the disputants. In the case before us, then, the operative demand is that directed by the UFW at the plaintiff. Since that demand does not concern terms of employment or involve representation in negotiating, I would conclude that there is no labor dispute between the plaintiff and the UFW.7
*751If there is no labor dispute between the plaintiff and the defendants, the issue then becomes whether it can be said that this suit involves or grows out of whatever labor dispute the UFW might be involved in with the growers and the rival Teamsters in California. The majority conclude that two of the alternatives of § 20C (a) apply: that the UFW and the plaintiff are both involved in the same “food industry,” and that they are “ ‘persons participating or interested’ ” in a labor dispute with “conflicting or competing interests.” I cannot agree with either proposition.
To say that the parties to this suit are “engaged in the same industry” is to define “industry” so broadly as to deprive the statutory language of any limiting effect whatsoever. From the bill of complaint we know that the UFW is a labor organization engaged in the representation of agricultural workers, principally in California. The plaintiff operates in Massachusetts a chain of retail supermarkets selling thousands of different products, of which the sale of grapes and lettuce amounts to less than .05% of its total gross sales. If these parties are to be deemed to be in a single industry, then the same logic would also put the plaintiff in the “same industry” as oil drillers (sale of plastic and petro-chemical products), as glassblowers (sale of bottled products), as miners (sale of aluminum foil), as lumberjacks (sale of paper products), as longshoremen, railroad engineers, and truck drivers (transportation and sale of retail goods). On the other hand, if there exists a “food industry” which binds together the plaintiff and UFW, then it also must include such disparate elements as fisheries, cattle ranches, bakeries, distilleries, restaurants, barrooms, cocktail lounges, airlines serving meals, and food concessions at athletic events. In fact, it is difficult to conceive of a labor dispute involving any business enterprise in which the plaintiff could not legitimately be embroiled under the majority’s definition of “the same industry.”
None of the cases cited in the majority opinion is persuasive in support of the contention that the plaintiff and UFW are engaged in the same industry. In fact, several of the *752cases cited suggest the contrary conclusion in that they involve definitions of “industry” which are narrower and more concrete than the majority’s amorphous “food industry.” E.g., Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union, Local No. 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Prod. Inc. 311 U. S. 91 (1940) (dairies, drivers of milk delivery wagons, and retail outlets of milk are all in the same industry); Donnelly Garment Co. v. Dubinsky, 154 F. 2d 38 (8th Cir. 1946) (manufacturer of ladies’ garments, seller of ladies’ garments, and the ladies’ garment union are all in the same industry); Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281 (1937) (kosher meat supplier, kosher meat market, and butchers’ union all in the same industry); and Alliance Auto Serv. Inc. v. Cohen, 341 Pa. 283 (1941) (petroleum and automobile accessory supply company, chain of automobile service stations in contractual relation with the supplier, and a union of petroleum delivery drivers all in the same industry). Each of these cases involved businesses dependent on either a single product or a narrow range of specialized products, with the retail business (the subject of the union pressure) having a direct relationship with the producing business (which is involved in the underlying labor dispute). The facts of these cases indicate also that these industries, for the most part, tend to be organized on a rather local basis. Such is not the case before us. Here, the plaintiff deals in many thousands of products other than grapes and lettuce, and apparently has no direct relationship with the California producers of those products (as they are separated in the economic chain by processors, packers, shippers, jobbers, and so forth).
Perhaps uncomfortable in its reliance on the “same industry” language, the majority look to the “more expansive” alternative of § 20C (a) which says that a case grows out of a labor dispute when it involves conflicting or competing interests in the labor dispute of persons interested therein. Unfortunately, the majority opinion contains no analysis of this alternative but merely restates the statutory language and asserts that the requirements are satisfied. I, of course, disagree. In the first place, § 20C (a) requires that the con*753flicting interests be “in” the labor dispute. The only labor dispute appearing on the present record is that in California among the UFW, the Teamsters, and the grape and lettuce growers. The single justice of the Appeals Court concluded that the plaintiff is a “neutral third party” as to that dispute. If the plaintiff has no interest at all “in” the labor dispute, then it obviously has no conflicting or competing interest therein. This also indicates that the plaintiff is not “a person participating or interested in” the labor dispute.8 § 20C (b). Whether or not both the UFW and the plaintiff are parties against which relief is sought, it seems clear to me that the plaintiff is not engaged in the same industry in which such dispute occurs (see discussion above) nor does the plaintiff have a direct or indirect interest in such labor dispute. The majority seem to rely heavily on the word “indirect,’’.but it cannot be read so broadly as to make meaningless the requirement that there be some relatively substantial and proximate interest in the labor dispute. Unless some reasonable limitation is placed on the word “indirect,” it could be used to trace any number of irrational “indirect” connections to the California labor dispute. The majority’s analysis of the plaintiff’s “self-interest” in that dispute, i.e., that the plaintiff will gain a competitive advantage by selling less expensive non-UFW harvested produce, is entirely unsupported by the record before us. Similarly, because we know so little from the record of the true nature of the California labor disputes, the majority’s quotation (fn. 15) from Fortenbury v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 16 Cal. 2d 405 (1940) is inapposite. We cannot assume that the plaintiff is “allying” itself with the growers. We only know that it refuses to take sides in a dispute between the Teamsters and the UFW. In fact, the only conclusion that may fairly be drawn from the record is that the plaintiff is disinterested in the source of its supply of lettuce and grapes and merely wants to ensure that it will continue to receive such produce from some source. This hardly gives the plaintiff an interest *754in the ultimate outcome of the dispute between the Teamsters and UFW concerning which will represent the California agricultural workers.
Finally, some consideration is due the majority’s reliance on the Federal Norris-LaGuardia Act and the case law interpreting that act. The majority argue that several of the pertinent Massachusetts statutory provisions are substantially identical to provisions of the Federal act,9 that the jursidictional restriction imposed by the Federal act clearly extends to suits involving secondary boycotts, and that, therefore, the Massachusetts “anti-injunction” statute should be interpreted as applying to suits involving secondary boycotts. I reject the premises upon which their argument is based.
First, while it is true that the State and Federal statutes are in some respects identical, it is also true that the Massachusetts Legislature did not import verbatim the NorrisLaGuardia Act. Particularly significant are the differences in the “definitions” sections of the State and Federal statutes. While the definitions in G. L. c. 149, § 20C, of “case . . . growing] out of a labor dispute,” “persons . . . interested in a labor dispute,” and “labor dispute” are identical to the Federal definitions, the Massachusetts statute also contains definitions of “lawful labor dispute,” “unlawful labor dispute,” and “unlawful secondary boycott” not found in the Federal legislation. The inclusion of a definition of “unlawful secondary boycott” (which includes a definition of “lawful” secondary boycott) separate from the definition of “labor dispute” suggests to me that the Legislature intended that a secondary boycott is distinct from, and not an aspect of, a labor dispute. It is particularly persuasive that the Legislature distinguished secondary boycotts not only from labor disputes but from “unlawful” and “lawful” labor disputes as well. It would seem that the Legislature exhausted the possible descriptions of types of “labor disputes” without including secondary boycotts. Thus, court decisions applying Federal law which conclude *755that secondary boycotts are “labor disputes” are not persuasive in interpreting Massachusetts law because of the differences in statutory contexts.
Second, the majority confidently assert that the protections of the Norris-LaGuardia Act extend to Federal suits involving secondary boycott activity. I believe that this conclusion is more doubtful than the majority suggest, and that there may at least be limitations on the type of secondary boycott activity which will be held to be a “labor dispute” under the Federal statute. For direct authority to support their conclusion, the majority rely only on a dictum by Justice Frankfurter from a decision, Bakery Sales Drivers Local Union No. 33 v. Wagshal, 333 U. S. 437 (1948), in which the court held the Norris-LaGuardia Act to be inapplicable because of the absence of any labor dispute, and an opinion by Chief Judge Tuttle of the Unites States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in which it was admitted that “there appears to be no authoritative Supreme Court holding to this effect [i.e., that secondary boycott activity is protected under the Norris-LaGuardia Act]” and which was affirmed only by an equally divided Supreme Court. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. 362 F. 2d 649, 653 (5th Cir. 1966), affd. by an equally divided court, 385 U.S. 20 (1966).
In addition, the majority opinion contains citations to two other Federal cases, one a decision of the Supreme Court, Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union, Local No. 753 v. Lake Valley Farm Prod. Inc. 311 U. S. 91 (1940), which involved a multisided dispute among two dairies, two labor unions, a cooperative association which supplied milk to the dairies, and retail sellers of milk. The defendant union of milk wagon drivers attempted to unionize certain independent milk wagon drivers and the employees of the dairies who dealt with those independent drivers. Failing this (the independent drivers and the dairy employees in fact formed their own separate union), the defendant union began to picket stores which sold milk delivered by the independent drivers. The court’s opinion, however, tells us nothing about those stores *756and what ties they might have had with the dairies, because those stores were not parties to the suit. The parties before the court included the dairies and the union of independent drivers as plaintiffs and the original drivers’ union as defendant. That the court had little difficulty in finding a “labor dispute” among the parties before it does not necessarily signify that it would have found a labor dispute if plaintiffs had been the stores which were the subject of the picketing. Chief Judge Tuttle, at least, clearly did not believe that this decision was an “authoritive Supreme Court holding” for the proposition that a secondary boycott is a labor dispute under the Norris-LaGuardia Act since he did not even cite it in his opinion in the Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen case, supra, at 653.
The final case interpreting the Norris-LaGuardia Act relied on by the majority is Amalgamated Ass’n of St. Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees of America v. Dixie Motor Coach Corp. 170 F. 2d 902 (8th Cir. 1948). The court held that secondary boycott activity by the employees of a bus company directed at a bus depot which provided services to the bus company’s buses did arise out of a labor dispute and was protected by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The court asserted that the “law was firmly settled by many decisions,” 170 F. 2d at 905, but supported that assertion principally with citations to the Milk Wagon Drivers’ Union case, discussed above, and to two other Supreme Court decisions, Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co. 303 U. S. 323 (1938); New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co. 303 U. S. 552 (1938), neither of which involved secondary boycott activity at all.
Thus, there appears to be no definitive ruling that secondary boycott activity is within the scope of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. There is some authority for precisely the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., Gomez v. United Office & Professional Wkrs. of America, CIO, Local 16, 73 F. Supp. 679 (D. D. C. 1947); Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. 85 F. Supp. 65 (D. Minn. 1949); Erie R.R. v. Local 1286, Inti. Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 117 F. Supp. 157 (W. D. N. Y. 1953); I.P.C. Distribs. Inc. v. *757Chicago Moving Picture Mach. Operators Union, Local 110, 132 F. Supp. 294 (N. D. Ill. 1955). However, even if it is conceded that the provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (and thus G. L. c. 214, § 9A, as well) extend to some secondary boycott activity, there is no justification in logic or in precedent for extending the reach of that act to situations, such as the present one, where the subject of the boycott activity (i.e., Demoulas Super Markets, Inc.) has no interest in and no ability to influence the conduct of the primary employer (i.e., the California grape and lettuce growers). In fact, each of the cases relied on by the majority involved a boycott directed either at secondary employers with close economic ties to the primary employer or at secondary employers who used the products of the primary employer and whose employees were members of the disputant union. For example, the two cases the reaction to which led to the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921), and Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters’ Assn. of No. America, 274 U.S. 37 (1927), both involved boycotts of the primary employer’s product by secondary employees who were members of the union which was engaged in the primary labor dispute. In the Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen case, 362 F. 2d 649 (5th Cir. 1966), the court applied “traditional economic self-interest justification concepts,” id. at 654, in determining that a union’s boycott of a secondary employer grew out of the union’s labor dispute with the primary employer. This determination was reached only after a factual inquiry which revealed that the secondary employer (which was partly owned by the primary employer) had “aligned himself with the primary employer in some substantial manner — ... by providing certain essential services and facilities to the primary employer.” Id. at 655. And in the Amalgamated Ass’n of St. Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees of America case, 170 F. 2d 902 (8th Cir. 1948), there was a similar substantial alignment of the interests of the secondary employer with those of the primary employer.
It is clear that the suit now before us presents a factual *758situation quite different from those in the cases just discussed. The employees of the plaintiff are members of neither the UFW nor the Teamsters. The plaintiff, on the record before us, has no substantial economic ties with the primary employers in California. The plaintiff is disinterested in the outcome of the dispute between the Teamsters and the UFW with regard to representation of the California agricultural workers. I do not belief, therefore, that the plaintiff has that minimum stake in the dispute among the UFW, the Teamsters, and the lettuce and grape growers which would amount to an “interest” in a “labor dispute” within the intent of both the Norris-LaGuardia Act and G. L. c. 149, § 20C.
If the question were properly before us, I would conclude that properly read and construed together, G. L. c. 214, § 9A, and c. 212, § 30,10 are inapplicable to these suits.

On the record before us I believe it is premature to discuss the First Amendment rights of the defendants. When all the facts are established it will be time enough to weigh the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs as well as those of the defendants.

Although there are two separate bills of complaint involved, they are in substance virtually identical. Thus, this analysis, although applicable to both cases, is based on the bill filed by Demoulas Super Markets, Inc. The parenthetical references are to the paragraphs of that bill.

In light of this allegation, Justice Braucher’s characterization of the defendants’ activities in his concurring opinion as a “product” boycott is unjustified. Whether those activities constitute a product boycott or any type of labor dispute is a factual issue, to be determined on the basis of evidence at a trial on the merits.

Analogously, under the Federal statutes which forbid a single judge of the United States District Court from issuing an injunction until the application therefor is heard by a three-judge court (e.g., 28 U. S. C. §§ 2281-2283 [1970]), the single judge nevertheless is empowered to grant a temporary restraining order to prevent irreparable damage. 28 U. S. C. § 2284 (3) (1970). The policy reasons underlying that statutory provision apply with equal force to the situation before us.

At this stage we are reviewing only the procedural issues, not the constitutional questions. Thus, Justice Braucher’s suggestion that the injunctions issued here violated the defendants’ First Amendment rights should have been deferred until after a determination of the facts.

In his concurring opinion, Justice Braucher asserts that this question was settled a generation ago when the “old-fashioned labor injunction” was legislatively “abolished.” He thus assumes the answer to the question which is the focus of the dispute, i.e., whether this case involves a “labor dispute.” Since this assertion is unsupported by citation or by analysis of the statutes, it is impossible to know the source from which Justice Braucher draws his conclusion. I suspect, however, that he is citing the right history for the wrong proposition. As I see it, the principal evil of the “old-fashioned labor injunction” was that it was used as a strikebreaking device, that is, to disrupt primary labor disputes between employee and employer. In the primary strike situation the effect of a preliminary injunction was devastating because it forced the strikers back to work. Even if labor subsequently won the trial on the merits it often proved most difficult to overcome for a second time the normal reluctance of the workers to endure lost wages and job insecurity resulting from a strike. Because a secondary boycott involves no confrontation between employee and employer and no threats to the economic well-being of those who boycott, the effect of a preliminary injunction is not nearly so devastating as in a primary strike. It is therefore unlikely that secondary boycott activity was foremost *749among the motivations of the sponsors of anti-injunction legislation. And in any event, such legislation did not “abolish” labor dispute injunctions, as asserted by Justice Braucher. It merely imposed certain procedural requirements on their issuance. Although Justice Braucher suggests otherwise, it is clear to me, and I think to the majority, that on remand a three-judge court may still issue an injunction in this case if it adheres to the procedures and makes the findings required by G. L. c. 214, § 9A.

If there is no labor dispute, then the adjuration contained in St. 1950, c. 452, § 7 cited at p. 734, infra of the majority opinion, is of no consequence to the resolution of the issues before us.

The final clause of § 20C (a) is redundant. If a party has a conflicting or competing interest in a labor dispute then he clearly is a person interested therein.

General Laws c. 214, § 9A, and c. 149, § 20C (a)-(c), are substantially identical to 29 U. S. C. § 101 and § 113 (a)-(c) (1970), respectively.

I am aware that G. L. c. 212, § 30, requires a three-judge panel-in “any action or proceeding involving . . . [c. 149, § 20C].” I do not believe, however, that this provision should be read to require a three-judge panel in a case which does not involve c. 214, § 9A, because it does not grow out of a labor dispute. Section 30 was inserted by St. 1959, c. 600, which was entitled, “An Act providing for. a panel of three associate justices of the superior court to act upon labor dispute cases. ” Thus, the applicability of § 30 to the case before us depends, as does the applicability of § 9A of c. 214, on whether this case involves a labor dispute. To repeat, on the record before us, a decision that a labor dispute existed was not warranted.