Court Opinion

ID: 9419333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:48:52.799505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:42:04.913580
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Rutledge:
I concur in the result and also in the opinion except as it relates to the taxes for 1938 and thereafter, levied and collected under the 1937 Act. I agree that the exemption extended for these years to Wosey John Deere’s grantees, but for different reasons and with the limitation, which I think should be stated, that under presently effective legislation the exemption extends only to 1956.
As I understand the ruling, the opinion grounds the exemption for grantees squarely on the 1937 Act, without reference to whether they were also exempt under the 1936 Act, a question not decided. With that I cannot agree. The later statute amended the earlier one. Both its terms and its legislative history* 1 show it had only one purpose. That was to cut down the amount of land exempted. “All homesteads” took the place of “all lands.” There were other changes in language, but they were matters of style, not of substance. There is not a word in the Act of 1937 itself, or in the Committee reports to Congress, to show that any other change was in mind. I find, *720therefore, no evidence of purpose to enlarge the protected class at the same time the amount of land exempted was being reduced. Nor is mere absence of language expressly limiting the exemption to a class defined in the Act a sufficient basis for implying an intent to enlarge the protected class. Nullifying the power of a state to tax land within its borders held by or for private individuals is too important and delicate a matter to hang on such an implication. In my opinion, therefore, the sole purpose and effect of the 1937 Act was to reduce the quantity of land for which exemption could be claimed. Consequently, if grantees were within the benefit, it was because they were so by virtue of the 1936 Act.
A literal reading of that Act possibly would lead to the conclusion that grantees were excluded and the protection was personal to the Indian with whose funds the lands were purchased. But the language is not absolutely conclusive to this effect, and, in my opinion, the legislative history2 shows that the purpose again was not to enlarge or restrict the classes to which the benefit applied, but rather was to bring within the scope of preexisting exemptions lands not covered by them. Any other view would create as to the lands covered by the 1936 Act, which were acquired with restricted funds, a different and a preferred exemption as compared with that applicable to originally allotted lands, from the sale of which in large part the funds were derived. No intent can be imputed to Congress to give the substituted lands preferential treatment as compared with original allotments. The language does not require this, and nothing in the legislative history gives a basis for believing it was intended. There is no sufficient reason in either for thinking that Congress *721intended to create new classes of beneficiaries or new kinds of exemptions, whether in duration or otherwise. There was a preexisting and defined general policy in both respects, no problem of either sort was presented by the situation the Act was intended to cure, and the sole purpose, in my opinion, was to make sure the preexisting exemptions would extend to the lands specified in the Act. Accordingly, whether grantees were exempted and, if so, for how long is to be determined not by implication or construction from the terms of the 1936 Act alone, but by reference to the law as it existed in respect of grantees of original allottees prior to 1936.
There is no need to go back of 1928, except to say that, for our purposes, the effect of prior legislation was that grantees of original allottees were not within the existing tax exemptions,3 which were, for the most part, to expire at the latest in 1931.4 In some instances, restrictions extended to lands held by heirs of allottees, but for the limited period.5 In 1928, Congress extended existing restrictions on some lands — both allotted and inherited — to 1956, but at the same time removed existing restrictions on others. 45 Stat. 495. The existing tax exemption was cut down in scope to one hundred sixty acres of each Indian’s holding, but was also extended more clearly to cover the land in the hands of “any full blood Indian heir or devisee,” though not beyond 1956. 45 Stat. 495, as amended by 45 Stat. 733-4.
In 1933, probably by reason of the discovery of oil on Indian lands, consequent sale or lease of original allotments under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, *722and numerous suits by Indians claiming the proceeds free from his restrictive power, Congress enacted another statute, 47 Stat. 777, which made all Indian funds then in or later coming to the Secretary’s hands restricted. It contained the following proviso, which is the last word, for our purposes, on exemption of Eive Civilized Tribe Indian lands prior to 1936:
“Provided, That where the entire interest in any tract of restricted and tax-exempt land belonging to members of the Eive Civilized Tribes is acquired by inheritance, devise, gift, or purchase, with restricted funds, by or for restricted Indians, such land shall remain restricted and tax-exempt during the life of and as long as held by such restricted Indians, but not longer than April 26, 1956. . . . Provided further, That such restricted and tax-exempt land held by anyone, acquired as herein provided, shall not exceed one hundred and sixty acres.”
In a number of respects, the meaning of the provision is unclear. But, without attempt to clarify them, the general purpose seems to have been to exempt lands belonging to members of the Eive Civilized Tribes during their lives, but not beyond 1956 and not exceeding 160 acres, if “acquired by inheritance, devise, gift, or purchase, with restricted funds, by or for such restricted Indians.” The proviso is awkwardly drawn, and some of the language could be taken to limit the exemption to the Indian with whose restricted funds the lands are acquired. But-other language contradicts this and the legislative history shows it was contemplated the exemption would extend to heirs, devisees, donees and purchasers with restricted funds.6 In short, as to the lands covered, Indian heirs, devisees, donees and grantees were within the protection. That the proviso covers directly the lands in question in the hands *723of Wosey John Deere’s grantees may be doubted.7 But, whether or not the statute applies specifically to this case, it shows the latest phase of Congressional policy, prior to 1936, as to the.kind of exemption given to members of the Creek Nation and the persons entitled to its benefit.
In this background, the 1936 Act was adopted. In my opinion, it incorporated the previously existing exemption, as it related to duration and grantees, but extended it to “all lands” rather than merely the homestead. The 1937 Act returned to the homestead limit, but without change in other respects. In my view, therefore, and for these reasons, the grantees of Wosey John Deere were entitled to the benefit of the exemption, but, unless it is extended further by Congress, only to 1956.
Mr. Justice Roberts joins in this opinion.

 See H. R. Rep. No. 562, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. Rep. No. 332, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.

 See H. R. Rep. No. 2398, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.; S. Rep. No. 2168, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. See also 80 Cong. Rec. 9159 and Meriam Report to the Secretary of the Interior on the Problem of Indian Administration (Brookings Institute, 1928) 795-8.

 Cf. Act of June 30, 1902, c. 1323, § 16, 32 Stat. 500, 503; Act of April 26, 1906, c. 1876, § 19, 34 Stat. 137, 144; Act of May 27, 1908, c. 199, §§ 4, 9, 35 Stat. 312, 313, 315; Act of April 12, 1926, c. 115, 44 Stat. 239.

 34 Stat. 144; 35 Stat. 315; 44 Stat. 239.

 See 35 Stat. 315; 44 Stat. 239.

 See H. R. Rep. No. 1015, 72d Cong., 1st Sess.; S. Rep. No. 873, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.; see also 75 Cong. Rec. 8163, 8170.

 They are homestead lands. They were bought with her restricted funds. She, if anyone, was a “restricted Indian,” though that term is new in this Act and unclear. She acquired the lands by purchase. Her children took them by deed, whether by gift or by “purchase” is not material. They, too, were “restricted Indians,” if she was. At any rate, they were full blood. All these things would fit the statute to the present case. On the other hand, the tax exemption in the proviso apparently extends only to newly acquired lands which prior to their acquisition were tax exempt and restricted. See 75 Cong. Rec. 8170. Nothing in the record indicates that the lands here involved were either tax exempt or restricted when Wosey John Deere purchased them. However, the precise significance of the apparent requirement that the lands shall have been tax exempt before they were acquired is obscured by the context of the proviso in a statute addressed primarily to the problem of restricting funds (in the hands of the Secretary) obtained largely from the sale of interests in restricted lands.