Court Opinion

ID: 9684740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:09:57.719466+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:59.228898
License: Public Domain

Beilfuss, J.
(dissenting in part). I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion which holds, “the immunity of the attorney’s work product in respect to a written ,v statement ceases to exist when the person making the statement is placed on the stand as a witness at the trial.”
In Hickman v. Taylor (1947), 329 U. S. 495, 510, 67 Sup. Ct. 385, 91 L. Ed. 451, cited by the majority, it is stated, persuasively:
“Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound to work for the advancement of justice while faithfully protecting the rightful interests of his clients. In performing his various duties, however, it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary *461intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel. Proper preparation of a client’s case demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and needless interference. That is the historical and the necessary way in which lawyers act within the framework of our system of jurisprudence to promote justice and to protect their clients’ interests. This work is reflected, of course, in interviews, statements, memo-randa, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways— aptly though roughly termed by the Circuit Court of Appeals in this case as the ‘work product of the lawyer.’ Were such materials open to opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten. An attorney’s thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served.”
I do not criticize the cases, cited in the majority opinion, upon their facts, dealing with latitude of pretrial discovery.
The trial of an action is not the same as pretrial discovery. The credibility of the witness and the integrity of counsel are matters constantly before the trier of the fact, be it a jury or a judge.
To require counsel in the presence of a jury upon demand to produce a part of his work product may place a trial attorney in a most difficult dilemma. The use and the nature of material taken from his file by the opposing counsel might well, in some instances, require an explanation by counsel in response to his obligation to his own client. But before he takes the stand to offer necessary explanation he finds himself confronted with Canon 19 of the Canons of Ethics, which provides:
*462“19. Appearance of Lawyer as Witness For His Client. When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters, such as the attestation or custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to other counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client.”
Not only does the canon criticize this practice but so has this court in several cases,1 some of which are cited in the footnote below.
In Roys v. First National Bank (1924), 183 Wis. 10, 21, 197 N. W. 237, we stated:
“This rule is not to be followed simply because the American Bar Association has adopted it, but with better reason because it states ethical considerations that may appeal to every lawyer as sound. A lawyer has a retainer— as a witness he is not entitled to such. He will find it hard to disassociate his relation to his client as a lawyer and his relation to the party as a witness. This case bears witness of that fact.”
I would hold the statement of the witness taken by an attorney is a part of his work product and as such is privileged and not subject to demand to produce. This rule would not be unduly restrictive upon the opposing party — for impeachment purposes he still has his traditional right of cross-examination including prior inconsistent statements, written or oral, made to persons other than opposing counsel.

 Zeidler v. State (1926), 189 Wis. 44, 206 N. W. 872; Baumgartner v. State (1929), 198 Wis. 180, 223 N. W. 419, 224 N. W. 474; Borger v. McKeith (1929), 198 Wis. 315, 224 N. W. 102; Interior Woodwork Co. v. Buhler (1932), 207 Wis. 1, 238 N. W. 822; Estate of Weinert (1962), 18 Wis. (2d) 33, 117 N. W. (2d) 685; Mack Truchs, Inc., v. Sunde (1963), 19 Wis. (2d) 129, 119 N. W. (2d) 321.