Court Opinion

ID: 9829733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:34:15.868952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:04.943252
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
Instead of a 15-acre royalty conveyance out of Manziel as erroneously stated in the original petition, he conveyed off to Baker ½, Hughes ¾, and Pinkston ½ of 15/1440-acre interest in the 144-acre tract or only .1.5 acre. This correction in the acreage involved in above conveyance calls for a discussion of the 3.5-acre royalty interest acquired in December, 1941, by Neill and Stephens, Trustee, from Manziel.
At the time Neill and Stephens bought, the lis pendens notice then on file in the county clerk’s «office constituted notice of the pendency of the suit then on file which involved the 144-acre tract, wherein plaintiffs in a formal trespass to try title action were asserting the title and possession to the tract as against MacDonald, Manziel, Kraker and one Skipper. Arts. 6640 and 6643, R.C.S., Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. art. 6640, 6643. It was not until May 3, 1944, long after Neill and Stephens had acquired their interest, that plaintiffs for the first time in an amended original petition plead alleged facts as a basis for cancellation of their deed into MacDonald and for the first time prayed for a cancellation of such deed.
We are in accord with the contention that plaintiffs under .their third amended original petition, filed May 3, 1944, for the first time plead facts as a basis for and sought affirmative equitable relief, namely, the cancellation of a deed, regular on its face.
It is asserted by Neill and Stephens that they holding the legal record title and plaintiffs as against them asserting affirmative equitable relief, grounded on an equitable title, the burden of proof rested upon plaintiffs to prove that Neill and Stephens were not innocent purchasers. Above rule reannounced in Dixon v. Cargill, supra, citing a host of decisions, would govern here were it not for the fact that Neill and Stephens puchased pendente lite.
“If a purchaser pendente lite believes he is entitled to protection under the statute as a goo-d-faith purchaser, it is incumbent upon him to establish that fact.” Hartel v. Dishman, 135 Tex. 600, 145 S.W.2d 865, 868, and authorities therein cited.
This record is silent whether they purchased the 3½ acres “for a valuable consideration and without other notice, actual or constructive.” Art. 6642, R.C.S.
The conclusions reached under the present status of the evidence in this record renders unnecessary the determination of whether or not the lis pendens notice of a. formal trespass to try title action then pending constituted notice of an action for affirmative equitable relief sought in amended pleading filed after-the purchase.
■ In all other respects we adhere to the views as expressed in our original opinion, and all other motions are respectfully overruled. The decree as. announced in the original opinion will stand.