Court Opinion

ID: 9675335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:49:38.318281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:33.439046
License: Public Domain

Holmes, J.,
dissenting.
The majority opinion holds as a matter of law that even though the appellee may have been guilty of negligence in violating the statute prohibiting the leaving of a car unattended and with the key in the ignition switch, nevertheless, the act of the thief in running a red light at a reckless rate of speed was an intervening agency which caused the accident complained of and superseded the original act of negligence of the appellee. I am, with deference, unable to bring myself in accord with this view.
*405I am cognizant of the fact that the weight of authority in outside jurisdictions supports the majority view. On the other hand, as pointed out in the majority opinion, there is respectable and well reasoned authority to the contrary in other outside jurisdictions. Our solution of the question should be in accordance with fundamental principles announced by our own decisions and with our own system of jurisprudence.
The appellee’s negligence is conceded. The question is whether at the time of the commission of the original act of negligence the appellee should have reasonably foreseen or anticipated the probability that the car might be stolen and that the thief, in his effort to get away with it, would exercise less than reasonable care in driving it and thereby cause injury to another. If such should have been reasonably anticipated, then the original act of negligence combined with that of the thief to bring about the injury and became a contributing proximate cause of the injury. This is true notwithstanding the intervention of the thief’s negligence if such should have been reasonably anticipated. This principle is firmly embedded in our own decisions.
In the case of D’Antoni v. Albritton, 156 Miss. 758, 126 So. 836, the Court, in discussing liability for a negligent act, said: “The act must be of such character that the person doing it should reasonably anticipate that some injury to another will probably result therefrom.” The converse of this is inescapably true that liablity attaches to the actor if the act be of such character that the person doing it should reasonably anticipate that some injury to another will probably result therefrom. It is not every intervening cause that insulates the original act of negligence.
In the case of Russell v. Williams, 168 Miss. 181, 150 So. 528, suggestion of error overruled, 168 Miss. 181, 151 So. 372, the Court held that if the occurrence of the intervening cause might reasonably have been anticipated *406it will not interrupt the connection between the original cause and the injury.
In the case of Oliver Bus Lines v. Skaggs, 174 Miss. 201, 164 So. 9, the Court held that an independent intervening cause which will interrupt the connection between the original cause and the injury is a cause which could not have been reasonably foreseen by the defendant while exercising due care.
The case of Solomon, et al v. Continental Baking Company, 172 Miss. 388, 167 So. 732, involved an action for damages. The driver of a truck stopped his car on the side of the highway at night when it was not equipped with a rear red light as was required by statute. A motorist ran into the truck and sustained injuries. It was contended in that case that the negligence of the motorist in driving his vehicle was the sole proximate cause of the collision. The Court said: “One of the purposes of the statute requiring an automobile to be equipped with a rear red light is to prevent collisions of the character here, and the driver of an automobile violating this statute should realise the probability that one driving another automobile would approach him from the rear without himself observing the requirements of the law of the road.” (Emphasis ours)
In the case of Gulf Refining Company v. Brown, 196 Miss. 131, 16 So. 2d 765, a motorist stopped his automobile on a bridge after passing an automobile parked near the entrance of the bridge, his purpose being to render aid to a pedestrian. One car passed him and the second ran into him. The case was submitted to the jury and a verdict rendered for the plaintiff wherein the award was reduced to the extent of twenty-five percent on account of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff’s truck driver. The Court in that case quoted with approval 29 Cyc. 492-496, as follows: “If a defendant is negligent and this negligence combined with that of another, or with any other independent intervening cause, *407lie is liable, although his negligence was not the sole negligence, or the sole proximate cause, and although his negligence without such other independent intervening cause would not have produced the injury.” (Emphasis ours)
Thus it appears firmly settled by our own decisions that if the occurrence of the intervening cause might reasonably have been anticipated, it will not interrupt the connection between the original cause and the injury.
Whether or not in this case the intervention of the thief’s act in stealing the car and driving it recklessly in his effort to get away with it might reasonably have been anticipated by the appellee is, in my humble opinion, a question for the determination of the jury under all of the facts and circumstances. This in the main is the point of difference between my view and' that of the majority. The question is one which involves negligence. Under our system of jurisprudence, all questions of negligence and contributory negligence have by legislative enactment been declared for the determination of the jury. Section 1455 of the Mississippi Code of 1942 provides: “All questions of negligence and contributory negligence shall be for the jury to determine. ’ ’
Aside from the statute, this Court has held in the case of American Creosote Works of La. v. Harp, 215 Miss. 5, 60 So. 2d 514, 35 A. L. R. 2d 603, that when reasonable minds might differ on the matter, questions of proximate cause and of negligence and of contributory negligence are generally for the determination of the jury. In the ease of Magers v. Okolona, Houston and Calhoun City R. Co., 174 Miss. 860, 165 So. 416, the Court held that where reasonable men might have a difference of opinion as to whether the negligence of the actor continued as a substantial factor in bringing about the injury, the question of plaintiff’s recovery is for the jury.
That the question whether the appellee in the commission of the original act of negligence should have *408reasonably anticipated the acts of the thief which combined with the negligence of the appellee to bring abont the injury in this case is one on which reasonable men may differ, is emphasized by the division of authorities among the courts in outside jurisdictions, and indeed by the division of opinion among the members of this Court in this case.
It is accordingly my humble opinion that the demurrer to the declaration should have been overruled, and in the event the proof sustains the allegations of the declaration, the case should be submitted to the jury under proper instructions, leaving to the determination of the jury the question as to whether the appellee in the commission of the original act of negligence should have reasonably anticipated the acts of a thief in stealing the car and driving it recklessly in his efforts to get away, resulting in injury.
In these times when frequent car thefts, congestion of automobile traffic, daily fatalities on the highways, and too frequent non-observance of traffic regulations and rules of the road, are matters of common knowledge, the jury might well be warranted under the facts of this case in finding that the appellee in the commission of the original act of negligence should have reasonably anticipated the probability that the car might be stolen, and that the thief in his effort to get away with it would exercise less than reasonable care in driving it, and thereby cause injury to another.
Certainly the question is one for the jury under our statute, which requires that all questions of negligence or contributory negligence shall be for the jury to determine.
I am authorized to say that Justices Lee and Arrington concur in this dissent.