Court Opinion

ID: 9899743
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 17:01:52.201397+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:47.962696
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                         FILED
                      UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      NOV 17 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NIKOLA LOVIG, on behalf of himself, all          No.    22-16151
others similarly situated,
                                                 D.C. No. 4:18-cv-02807-PJH
                  Plaintiff-Appellant,

    v.                                           MEMORANDUM*

BEST BUY STORES, L.P., a Virginia
limited partnership; BEST BUY CO., INC., a
Minnesota corporation,

                  Defendants-Appellees.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Northern District of California
                     Phyllis J. Hamilton, District Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted November 14, 2023*
                              San Francisco, California

Before: S.R. THOMAS, FORREST, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges.

         Nikola Lovig sued his former employer, Best Buy Stores, L.P. and Best Buy

Co., Inc. (“Best Buy”)1, alleging several employment related claims. Now, Lovig

         *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
1
 Best Buy Stores, L.P. was Lovig’s employer. Best Buy Co., Inc. is the indirect
parent company of Best Buy Stores, L.P. and did not employ Lovig. Both entities
are referred to collectively as Best Buy.
appeals a district court order compelling arbitration and confirming the arbitration

award. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and reviewing de novo, see

Stover v. Experian Holdings, Inc., 978 F.3d 1082, 1085 (9th Cir. 2020), we affirm.

      Assuming without deciding that Lovig did not waive his right to appeal the

order compelling arbitration, Lovig’s appeal fails because he agreed to arbitrate.

Under California law, “a ‘clear agreement’ to arbitrate” can either be express or

implied. Davis v. Nordstrom, Inc., 755 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation

omitted). And “where an employee continues in his or her employment after being

given notice of the changed terms or conditions, he or she has accepted those new

terms or conditions.” Id.

      Here, Lovig impliedly agreed to arbitrate. The new arbitration agreement

was a condition of his employment, and it did not require any affirmative action for

assent. Lovig had actual notice of the arbitration agreement before it was

implemented; and Lovig continued his employment with Best Buy after the

arbitration agreement went into effect. See Diaz v. Sohnen Enters., 245 Cal. Rptr.

3d 827, 830 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (“California law in this area is settled: When an

employee continues his or her employment after notification that an agreement to

arbitration is a condition of continued employment, that employee has impliedly

consented to the arbitration agreement.”); DiGiacinto v. Ameriko-Omserv Corp, 69

Cal. Rptr. 2d 300, 304 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that an “employee who

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continues in the employ of the employer after the employer has given notice of

changed terms or conditions of employment has accepted the changed terms and

conditions. . . . [I]t would not be legally relevant if the employee also had

complained, objected, or expressed disagreement with the new offer . . . .”).

      As Lovig raises his “browsewrap” argument for the first time on appeal, we

may not consider it. See Yamada v. Nobel Biocare Holding AG, 825 F.3d 536, 543

(9th Cir. 2016) (“[A]n appellate court will not hear an issue raised for the first time

on appeal.”). Lovig’s request for a jury trial on appeal is also untimely. 9 U.S.C.

§ 4 (providing that a jury trial demand must be made “on or before the return day

of the notice of application.”)

      AFFIRMED.

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