Court Opinion

ID: 9644685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:01:48.544991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:16.447477
License: Public Domain

OPINION
ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
PHILLIPS, Judge.
The offense is unlawful possession of a narcotic drug, marihuana; the punishment, assessed under the Controlled Substances Act, $100.00 fine.
The facts surrounding the instant offense are set forth in the opinion on original submission and need not be restated here.
On rehearing appellant asks us to reconsider whether the facts and information known to Bruce at the time he detained appellant justified the stop of appellant’s automobile. As stated in the opinion on original submission, circumstances which do not constitute probable cause for arrest may justify a lesser intrusion upon the personal security of an individual, such as temporary detention for purposes of investigation. See Mann v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 525 S.W.2d 174. If Bruce lawfully stopped appellant’s automobile, testimony concerning the contraband was admissible because marihuana was in open view of the officer when appellant emerged from the vehicle. Long v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 532 S.W.2d 591; Hunnicutt v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 531 S.W.2d 618.
Bruce stated he did not observe appellant committing any traffic violations or any offense. Cf. Hampton v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 511 S.W.2d 1. Bruce testified he stopped appellant as part of the investigation of the suspected burglary. He admitted that at the time he stopped appellant’s car he did not have any affirmative facts that a burglary or an offense had been committed. During voir dire examination of Bruce, the following occurred:
“THE COURT: Just tell me why Mr. Kinkaid thinks there was a burglary?
A. Well, I don’t know, Judge. He just—he said he had seen the cars up there at the house, and he thought they had gone in one that was supposed to have permission to go in there. He was watching the house for these people.”
The record does not contain any other evidence to support Kinkaid’s belief that a burglary or attempted burglary occurred. It appears Bruce detained appellant’s automobile because Kinkaid thought someone had entered a house while the owners were away and be believed appellant’s car was one of the vehicles that had been at the house. Although Bruce testified he stopped appellant at about 7:00 or 7:30 p. m., the record does not indicate when Kinkaid observed the vehicles at the house. The record also does not reveal how many cars and people Kinkaid saw at the house, if he was able to give a description of any of the persons or other vehicles, or if he described any activity which would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe a burglary had been committed. See and compare Casarez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 504 S.W.2d 847.
The information received from Kin-kaid and Bruce’s subsequent investigation of the house are not circumstances which reasonably show a felony had been committed so as to justify appellant’s detention under either Art. 14.03 or 14.04, V.A.C.C.P. The inarticulate hunch, suspicion or good faith of an arresting officer is insufficient to constitute probable cause for an arrest, search or temporary detention. Talbert v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 489 S.W.2d 309.
The record does not reveal specific and articulable facts and circumstances such as to justify Officer Bruce’s initial stop of appellant’s vehicle. The trial court erred in permitting Officer Bruce to testify as to *398what he observed after he detained appellant.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is granted. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.