Court Opinion

ID: 9516711
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:50:07.633097+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:01.490892
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE WELCH, dissenting: Is a school principal determining policy when making a decision with respect to an individual student on a single occasion? I think so; the majority thinks otherwise. The only question we are called upon to answer, today, is whether Principal Brumley was determining policy when denying Joshua’s request to be dismissed early. The elements of discretion and public employment are conceded by the parties in our determination of tort immunity. See Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 341 (1998) (interpreting section 2 — 201 (745 ILCS 10/2— 201 (West 1994)), regarding determination of policy and exercise of discretion under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Immunity Act)). In West v. Kirkham, 147 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (1992), our supreme court addressed governmental policy decisions in the context of municipal tort immunity for failure to provide traffic signs and signals under section 3 — 104 of the Immunity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 85, par. 3—104 (now 745 ILCS 10/3 — 104 (West 1998))). The court reasoned that policy decisions require the balancing of a host of competing interests and the making of a judgment as to what solution will best serve each of those interests. Kirkham, 147 Ill. 2d at 11. Thus, Kirkham instructs us to consider each interest, to balance the multiple interests, and then to arrive at a conclusion. In Harinek, the court applied Kirkham’s reasoning regarding policy decisions to section 2 — 201 of the Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/ 2 — 201 (West 1994)). Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 342. In Harinek, an office worker was struck by a door and injured during a fire drill after a fire marshal told her to stand near the door. The court held that the fire marshal was “determining fire department policy” in planning, controlling, operating, and implementing the fire drill. Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 342. The court reasoned that the fire marshal was responsible for planning and conducting fire drills, and in doing so the marshal balanced competing interests, including the interests of efficiency and safety, which competed for the time and resources of the department. The marshal’s decisions regarding the placement of the fire drill participants served to balance those interests, and the marshal’s “acts and omissions were undertaken in determining policy within the meaning of the statute.” Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 342-43. In Johnson v. Decatur Park District, 301 Ill. App. 3d 798, 809 (1998), a student in a power tumbler’s group was injured in a fall and alleged that the park district, which had hired his coach, had willfully and wantonly failed to warn of the danger and failed to provide certain safety equipment and measures. The Fourth District Appellate Court affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the park district pursuant to section 2 — 201 of the Immunity Act. It reasoned that the park district, via its coach, determined what tumbling maneuvers would be performed, whether a tumbler was capable of performing the maneuver, and what equipment and safety precautions were needed. Thus, the coach considered the abilities of each tumbler, balanced those interests against the resources of the park district, and made a policy decision as to how to best perform his coaching duties. In this case, the school had an existing policy regarding individual student requests for early dismissal. Generally, such requests were denied. Exceptions were permitted when the individual student’s parents called the school to request early dismissal or when the individual student called a parent to seek parental permission to leave school early. Brumley testified that a student’s request to call home under the second exception might be denied if the entire school was to be dismissed early. In determining that policy with respect to Joshua, Brumley was called upon to consider Joshua’s circumstance, to balance competing interests in deciding whether to dismiss Joshua early, and to come to a conclusion. We do not know Brumley’s thoughts, but he was called upon to consider, among other things, Joshua’s safety, the weather conditions at the time, the expected future weather conditions, Joshua’s lack of driving experience, Joshua’s questionable driving abilities, Joshua’s prior requests to leave early, and the lack of a telephone call from Joshua’s parents or from his grandfather. Brumley was to then balance Joshua’s early dismissal against the entire school’s early dismissal. Thus, Brumley was not only exercising discretion, but he was determining policy and making a policy decision when he told Joshua that he would have to wait for the entire school to be dismissed early. Therefore, I believe that the circuit court acted properly in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant.