Court Opinion

ID: 9408577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-13 07:08:51.704981+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:44.745981
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS
                                      EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                           EL PASO, TEXAS

    GUILLERMO ARTURO SALAS,                                 §                  No. 08-22-00154-CR

                                     Appellant,             §                     Appeal from the

    v.                                                      §              County Court at Law No. 1

    THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                     §               of El Paso County, Texas

                                     Appellee.              §                  (TC# 20200C07457)

                                       MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, Appellant Guillermo Arturo Salas

pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated (DWI) with a blood-alcohol concentration (BAC) of

greater than or equal to 0.15. Appellant challenges his conviction in one issue, arguing that the

trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to suppress. For the following reasons, we

affirm.

          I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

             A. Factual background 1

          On September 3, 2020, El Paso Police Department (EPPD) Officer Tory Bradford was

traveling on a public street in El Paso when she observed a vehicle traveling eastbound in the

1
  The facts recounted here are derived from the complaint affidavit admitted during the hearing on Appellant’s motion
to suppress.
westbound lane. Bradford conducted a traffic stop and made contact with the driver of the vehicle,

who was later identified as Appellant. When speaking to Appellant, Bradford smelled alcohol on

his breath and noticed his speech was slurred. Bradford asked Appellant where he was driving and

whether he had consumed any alcohol, to which he replied he was “heading home from a

friends [sic] house” and had consumed “2 Dos Equis.” Bradford ordered Appellant to leave his

vehicle and had him sit on the curb.

       EPPD Officer Edwin Montoya subsequently arrived on scene and noticed Appellant had

“glossy eyes, slurred speech and an odor of an unknown alcoholic beverage emitting from his

person and breath.” Montoya asked Appellant if he had had anything to drink. Appellant denied

drinking and stated that only his friends had consumed alcohol. Appellant agreed with Montoya’s

request to perform standardized field sobriety tests (SFSTs), whereupon Appellant demonstrated

the following clues of intoxication: (1) six out of a possible six clues on the horizontal-gaze-

nystagmus (HGN) test; (2) eight out of a possible eight clues on the walk-and-turn test; and (3)

two out of a possible four clues on the one-leg-stand test. Appellant was arrested for driving while

intoxicated and consented to provide a breath sample. Subsequent testing of Appellant’s breath

yielded BAC results of 0.191 and 0.186. Montoya also discovered that Appellant had a 2017 DWI

conviction.

              B. Procedural history

       The State of Texas charged Appellant by information with DWI with a BAC of greater

than or equal to 0.15. Appellant then filed a motion to suppress the evidence associated with the

DWI investigation, arguing that the warrant for arrest and probable-cause affidavit both lacked a

magistrate’s signature as required by Article 15.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. At

the hearing on the motion, the State introduced the information, complaint signed by an assistant

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district attorney, Montoya’s complaint affidavit, and a signed magistrate warning into evidence.

The State did not present witness testimony in opposition to the motion.

        The trial court denied the motion by written order. Appellant filed a motion to reconsider

the court’s ruling, and following another hearing, the court denied that motion as well. Appellant

subsequently pleaded guilty to the charged offense and received one year of incarceration,

probated for twelve months, and was placed on community supervision. The trial court also

assessed a $750 fine and various terms and conditions of community supervision. This appeal

followed.

        II. DISCUSSION

        Appellant challenges his conviction in one issue, arguing that the trial court abused its

discretion by denying his motion to suppress because (1) the complaint affidavit was “fatally

defective because it lacked the magistrate’s signature, date, oath or affirmation,” and (2) the State

failed to establish reasonable suspicion to support the traffic stop of Appellant or probable cause

to support his arrest.

              A. Standard of review

        Appellate courts review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated

standard. State v. Arellano, 600 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). A trial court’s findings of

historical fact and determinations of mixed questions of law and fact that turn on credibility and

demeanor are afforded almost total deference if reasonably supported by the record. See Sims v.

State, 569 S.W.3d 634, 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). Nonetheless, “[w]e review de novo a trial

court’s determination of legal questions and its application of the law to facts that do not turn upon

a determination of witness credibility and demeanor.” Arrellano, 600 S.W.3d at 57.

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         When, as here, the trial court does not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law

associated with its motion-to-suppress ruling, we infer the necessary fact-findings that support the

trial court’s ruling if the evidence in the record (viewed in the light most favorable to the ruling)

supports those implied factual findings. State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2008). Thus, the prevailing party “is afforded the strongest legitimate view of the evidence

and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.” Id. We may affirm a trial

court’s ruling on a motion to suppress if it is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case

and it is supported by the record, even if that theory was not raised by the prevailing party in the

trial court. State v. Stevens, 235 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see Alford v. State, 400

S.W.3d 924, 928 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (recognizing that the procedural-default rules in Article

33.1(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure do not apply to the prevailing party regarding a

motion to suppress).

                 B. Sufficiency of complaint affidavit

         Appellant argues that the complaint affidavit was not supported by probable cause because

“the Magistrate failed to have a Peace Officer to swear, under oath, to that Affidavit, as well as[]

failed to sign and date that Affidavit, as required under the statutes.” Appellant seems to rely on

Articles 15.01, 15.02, 15.03, and 18.04(5) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure to argue that

any warrant for Appellant’s arrest was defective due to the lack of a magistrate’s signature on the

complaint affidavit.

         While Appellant relies on statutes and authority that only apply in situations where there

was an arrest or search pursuant to a warrant 2, the record indicates that Appellant was subjected to

2
  Appellant uses Wheeler v. State and Dunn v. State to argue that because there was no probable-cause determination
or magistrate judge’s signature on the complaint affidavit, the complaint affidavit itself is defective and should have
been suppressed. However, those cases are inapposite because they involved an arrest or search warrant that lacked
an officer’s or magistrate’s proper signatures, and no such arrest or search warrant is at issue in this case. See Wheeler
v. State, 616 S.W.3d 858, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (suppression issue concerned lack of an officer’s sworn oath

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a warrantless arrest and none of the evidence from this case was derived from the execution of a

search warrant. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 15.01–.03; 18.04. The requirements

associated with a magistrate’s signature in the statutes Appellant relies on are therefore

inapplicable here.

          Moreover, to the extent Appellant argues that the complaint affidavit at issue does not meet

the statutory requirements under the Code of Criminal Procedure, we also reject that argument. A

complaint must comport with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 15.05 requirements:

          1. It must state the name of the accused, if known, and if not known, must give
          some reasonably definite description of him.

          2. It must show that the accused has committed some offense against the laws of
          the State, either directly or that the affiant has good reason to believe, and does
          believe, that the accused has committed such offense.

          3. It must state the time and place of the commission of the offense, as definitely as
          can be done by the affiant.

          4. It must be signed by the affiant by writing his name or affixing his mark.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.05. Here, the complaint contains Appellant’s name; alleges

a violation of Texas law by stating that Appellant committed the criminal offense of DWI with a

BAC greater than or equal to 0.15 3 ; states that the offense occurred at “0204 hours” at 2000

Gateway East in the City and County of El Paso, Texas; includes an affidavit containing all of the

aforementioned information signed by Montoya with his name printed underneath and notarized;

and was made before an assistant district attorney in accordance with Texas Code of Criminal

before a magistrate in support of a search warrant); Dunn v. State, 951 S.W.2d 478, 479 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)
(suppression issue concerned lack of a magistrate’s signature on an arrest warrant). In addition, the complaint affidavit
itself is not illegally obtained evidence subject to suppression under the exclusionary rule set forth in Article 38.23 of
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure because the complaint affidavit standing alone does not constitute an
infringement of Appellant’s privacy rights or property interests. See Miles v. State, 241 S.W.3d 28, 36 n.33 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007) (“Only those acts which violate a person’s privacy rights or property interests are subject to the state
or federal exclusionary rule.”).
3
    See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04(a), (d).

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Procedure Article 15.04. Thus, the complaint and associated complaint affidavit comply with the

statutory requirements, and Appellant’s argument on that basis must fail. See id.

              C. Reasonable suspicion and probable cause

       Appellant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to

suppress because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him and probable cause to arrest

him. We consider each ground separately.

                   (1) Appellant did not preserve his complaint regarding reasonable suspicion

       Appellant argues that Bradford lacked reasonable suspicion to effectuate the traffic stop or

investigative detention of Appellant. The State responds that because Appellant did not raise this

basis for suppression in the trial court, he has not preserved this issue for our review and it is

waived.

       To preserve an issue for appellate review, an appellant has the burden to make a timely and

specific objection in the trial court. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); see Dixon v. State, 595 S.W.3d 216,

223 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (noting that the appealing party has the burden to bring forth a record

showing that error was preserved). “In making the objection, terms of legal art are not required,

but a litigant should at least ‘let the trial judge know what he wants, why he thinks himself entitled

to it, and to do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him at a time when the trial court is

in a proper position to do something about it.’” Ortiz v. State, No. 08-15-00344-CR, 2017 WL

3667829, at *4 (Tex. App.—El Paso Aug. 25, 2017, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication)

(quoting Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). This requirement

applies to appellate complaints regarding specific bases for suppressing evidence raised in a

motion to suppress. See Urquhart v. State, 128 S.W.3d 701, 704 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2003, pet.

ref’d) (applying the error-preservation rule in Article 33.1(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate

Procedure to specific grounds asserted in a motion to suppress).

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         Here, Appellant’s written motion to suppress complained about the issue regarding the lack

of the magistrate’s signature addressed above, but the motion did not contain a specific complaint

regarding Bradford’s lack of reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop. Neither did Appellant

raise the reasonable-suspicion argument during the hearing on the motion to suppress or the

hearing on the motion to reconsider. Because Appellant did not raise this argument in the

proceedings below, we hold that Appellant has not preserved this specific argument for our

review. 4 See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Urquhart, 128 S.W.3d at 704 (defendant failed to preserve

his arguments regarding specific grounds for suppressing evidence where he did not raise those

grounds in his written motion or during a hearing on his motion to suppress).

                        (2) Appellant’s warrantless arrest was supported by probable cause

         Appellant also argues that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him without a warrant

and that the evidence associated with his illegal arrest should have been suppressed. An officer

may conduct a warrantless arrest “only if probable cause exists with respect to the individual in

question and the arrest falls within one of the exceptions set out in TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.

14.01–14.04.” Torres v. State, 182 S.W.3d 899, 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). “[P]robable cause

for a warrantless arrest exists when facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge and

about which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a person of

4
  Even if Appellant had preserved his reasonable-suspicion argument, we would nonetheless find that argument to be
without merit. To establish reasonable suspicion justifying a traffic stop, the State must show, based on the totality of
the circumstances, that the officer has specific, articulable facts that when combined with rational inferences from
those facts, he could reasonably conclude that the person is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Al-
Hanna v. State, No. 08-17-00037-CR, 2019 WL 156779, at *3 (Tex. App.—El Paso Jan. 10, 2019, no pet.) (not
designated for publication). Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion is an objective standard that disregards the
subjective intent of the officer. Id. According to the uncontroverted evidence within Montoya’s complaint affidavit,
Bradford stopped Appellant at approximately 2:00 a.m. after she saw him driving eastbound in the westbound lane in
an “unsafe” manner. We agree with the State that the trial court could have reasonably concluded that Bradford had
reasonable suspicion Appellant had committed a traffic violation or was driving while intoxicated. See TEX. TRANSP.
CODE ANN. § 545.051(a) (a motorist is required to drive on the right side of the roadway); Curtis v. State, 238 S.W.3d
376, 379-80 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (officer’s observation of driver’s erratic driving given the totality of the
circumstances rationally supported an inference that the driver was intoxicated and constituted reasonable suspicion
to justify a traffic stop).

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reasonable caution to believe that an offense was or is being committed.” Id. We determine the

existence of probable cause by considering the totality of the circumstances based on the collective

knowledge of all officers when viewed from an objective standpoint, and we disregard the

subjective beliefs of the arresting officers. State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 569 (Tex. Crim. App.

2013); Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

       Under one of the statutory exceptions justifying a warrantless arrest, an officer may make

a warrantless arrest if the suspect is found in a “suspicious place” and under circumstances that

reasonably show the suspect is guilty of a “breach of the peace.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

14.03(a)(1). Courts have determined places to be “suspicious” based on the facts and

circumstances of the case and reasonable inferences therefrom, and a DWI suspect present near a

motor vehicle in a public place is considered to be in a suspicious place. See State v. Morales, No.

08-09-00137-CR, 2010 WL 819126, at *3 (Tex. App.—El Paso Mar. 10, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication) (DWI suspect found sitting on a motorcycle in the middle of the

road was in a suspicious place under Article 14.03(a)(1)). And courts have also recognized DWI

as an offense constituting a breach of the peace under Article 14.03(a)(1). See Gallups v. State,

151 S.W.3d 196, 201 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Sandoval v. State, 35 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. App.—

El Paso 2000, pet. ref’d). Because the officers stopped Appellant while he was driving his vehicle

on a public road and arrested him for DWI following their investigation, we conclude that Article

14.03(a)(1) provided a valid basis for the warrantless arrest.

       As for the existence of probable cause, it is uncontroverted that Bradford observed

Appellant driving on the wrong side of the public road at approximately 2:00 a.m. See TEX.

TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.051(a) (a motorist is required to drive on the right side of the roadway).

After conducting a traffic stop and making contact with Appellant, Bradford detected the odor of

alcohol coming from his breath and noticed that his speech was slurred. Appellant initially

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admitted to consuming two beers, but he later denied drinking after Montoya arrived at the scene

and asked him the same question. Montoya smelled alcohol on Appellant’s breath and person, and

he noticed that Appellant had “glossy eyes” and slurred speech. Appellant subsequently agreed to

perform SFSTs and in those tests exhibited many clues of intoxication: six out of six possible clues

on the HGN test; eight out of eight possible clues on the walk-and-turn test; and two out of four

clues on the one-leg-stand test. Montoya subsequently arrested Appellant for DWI.

       Given the officers’ collective knowledge of Appellant driving on the wrong side of the

road, the time of night/early morning Appellant was driving, Appellant’s admission that he had

consumed alcohol that night, Appellant’s physical signs of intoxication, and Appellant’s poor

performance on the SFSTs, we find that based on the totality of the circumstances, the officers had

sufficient probable cause to believe Appellant had committed DWI and that his arrest was valid

under Article 14.03(a)(1). See Amador v. State, 275 S.W.3d 872, 879 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)

(suspect’s violation of traffic law and poor performance on SFSTs weigh in favor of a finding of

probable cause to arrest for DWI); Al-Hanna v. State, No. 08-17-00037-CR, 2019 WL 156779, at

*7 (Tex. App.—El Paso Jan. 10, 2019, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (odor of alcohol

emanating from a suspect’s person, bloodshot eyes, and slurred speech are “classic signs that a

person’s mental and physical faculties might be impaired” and relevant evidence to support a

finding of probable cause to arrest for DWI).

       Appellant also argues that the State failed its burden to establish that his arrest was

supported by probable cause because the State did not present the officers’ testimony to establish

probable cause to arrest Appellant. However, the State is not required to present witness testimony

during a suppression hearing and may meet its burden to prove the reasonableness of a search or

seizure through the admission of other types of evidence, including a complaint affidavit. See TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.01(1)(6) (allowing a trial court to hold a hearing and decide a

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motion to suppress based “on the motions themselves, or upon opposing affidavits, or upon oral

testimony, subject to the discretion of the court.”) (emphasis added); State v. Miller, 116 S.W.3d

912, 915 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.) (Under Article 28.01 section 1(6), “if a trial court

chooses to determine a pretrial motion without hearing testimony, a court of appeals may not treat

the absence of testimony as being determinative on appeal.”). Here, the State did not call witnesses

but did provide the complaint, including the affidavit to oppose the motion to suppress. The trial

court ruled on the motion without receiving witness testimony. We hold that the trial court was

within its discretion to do so and that the absence of testimony from State’s witnesses does not

invalidate the trial court’s ruling on the motion.

       We overrule Appellant’s sole issue in its entirety.

       III. CONCLUSION

       We affirm the judgment supporting Appellant’s conviction.

                                               LISA J. SOTO, Justice

June 29, 2023

Before Rodriguez, C.J., Palafox, and Soto, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)

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