Court Opinion

ID: 9765283
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:57:59.399173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:07.842852
License: Public Domain

HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Glossing over the facts and relevant law, the majority neglects to address the real issue in this case, namely, the interpretation and application of OCGA § 19-6-15 (f) (1) (D). This statute provides for the treatment of income that may vary as to amount and/or timing when calculating gross income for purposes of determining child support as follows:
Variable income such as commissions, bonuses, overtime pay, military bonuses, and dividends shall be averaged by the court or the jury over a reasonable period of time consistent with the circumstances of the case and added to a parent’s fixed salary or wages to determine gross income. When income is received on an irregular, nonrecurring, or one-time basis, the court or the jury may, but is not required to, average or prorate the income over a reasonable specified period of time or require the parent to pay as a one-time support amount a percentage of his or her nonrecurring income, taking into consideration the percentage of recurring income of that parent.
(Emphasis supplied.) Id. Because the provision of the modification order at issue, which awards child support based on a percentage of commissions received in addition to Stowell’s monthly recurring obligation, is in accordance with the option to order a “one-time support amount” specifically provided for in the language of OCGA § 19-6-15 (f) (1) (D), I must dissent.
The facts of this case illustrate how, in enacting OCGA § 19-6-15 (f) (1) (D), the Legislature reasonably determined that under certain circumstances it is appropriate to order a “one-time support amount” representing a percentage of variable income received during a defined period, e.g., an annual payment. At the time of the parties’ 2005 divorce, Stowell had historically earned a significant portion of his income through commissions or other irregular payments. After he suffered a loss of employment in 2008, he obtained consulting work that paid $3,500 per month plus sales commissions. Although Stowell testified at the May 2009 bench trial on his modification petition that he had received no commission income during approximately four months in his then-current consulting position, the record established that he was eligible to earn such commissions, which would be paid as the employer is paid for business secured by Stowell. In making its oral ruling, the trial court *634stated that it was “concerned about a lot of these jobs where bonuses may or may not come. And in this economy, a lot of people who have historically gotten huge bonuses aren’t getting them.” Thus, utilizing the plain language of OCGA § 19-6-15 (f) (1) (D), the trial court provided for the possibility of Stowell receiving commission income, see Evans v. Evans, 285 Ga. 319 (676 SE2d 180) (2009) (trial court must consider variable income, even if not guaranteed), without averaging commissions previously received under entirely different employment circumstances. See OCGA § 19-6-15 (f) (1) (D) (irregularly received or nonrecurring variable income may be averaged over reasonable period and added to fixed salary to determine gross income).
Decided February 28, 2011.
In concluding that the trial court committed reversible error because the award at issue is an unsupported deviation, the majority recites the procedure for completing a child support worksheet and then reasons, in essence, that any item not included on that worksheet constitutes a deviation. Op. at. 629. However, this approach elevates a worksheet promulgated by the Georgia Child Support Commission, see OCGA § 19-6-15 (m) (2), above the plain language of the statute itself. To simply ignore OCGA § 19-6-15 (f) (1) (D) would violate the fundamental principles of statutory construction. See Handel v. Powell, 284 Ga. 550, 554-555 (670 SE2d 62) (2008) (statute must be construed to give sensible and intelligent effect to all of its provisions and to refrain from an interpretation that renders any part meaningless). And if, as the majority posits, construing this statute in a manner that would uphold the award at issue is contrary to the legislative intent in enacting the child support guidelines, op. at. 630, it is unclear what the correct interpretation of “requiring] the parent to pay as a one-time support amount a percentage of his or her nonrecurring income” could be. Even if the award at issue had been referenced somehow as a deviation on Schedule E, the majority sheds no light on how a deviation that is undetermined as to amount and timing could possibly be incorporated into the mathematical calculation of Stow-ell’s monthly recurring child support obligation. This is, of course, because it cannot be done. A statute must not be interpreted in a manner that leads to an absurd result, see Haugen v. Henry County, 277 Ga. 743 (2) (594 SE2d 324) (2004), and when a practical, workable method for dealing with situations such as that presented here is authorized by the plain language of the statute, there is no reason to hold otherwise.
*635Gibson, Deal, Fletcher & Dunham, William A. Fletcher, Jr., for appellant.
David S. Walker, Jr., for appellee.