Court Opinion

ID: 9751553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:35:30.711687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:51.174370
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, J.
I respectfully dissent.
Mr. Cummings began work as a probation officer with the Los Angeles County Probation Department (Probation Department) in August 1976. Prior to the incidents at issue in this case he received three minor disciplinary actions, the most severe of which was a three-day suspension more than nine years earlier. None of those incidents involved dishonesty. Since those incidents, the civil service commission found, Cummings had “an exemplary record . . . and his last evaluation was outstanding.”
The incidents which resulted in Cummings’s discharge arose in 1992 when, for personal reasons, he used the color of his authority as a probation officer to obtain confidential information from the California Department of Corrections and the Riverside Police Department regarding the husband of a woman with whom Cummings had a romantic relationship. Cummings then lied to his supervisor about obtaining this information.
The undisputed evidence showed Cummings obtained this information because he had been threatened by the husband who had a gun, a car, and the *1654keys to Cummings’s apartment and, Cummings believed, was mentally unbalanced. The record also shows, without dispute, Cummings first went to his supervisor with his concerns but the supervisor told Cummings “he didn’t want to hear about it.” It was after being rebuffed by his supervisor that Cummings decided to take matters into his own hands. There was no evidence Cummings actually used the information he obtained about the husband or that he obtained the information for personal financial gain. All the evidence points to the conclusion Cummings obtained the information out of fear for his safety and the safety of those with whom he worked.
After receiving a notice of discharge from the Probation Department, Cummings requested a hearing by the Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission (Commission). The hearing officer found the facts described above and recommended the discharge be rescinded and Cummings be given a 60-day suspension without pay instead. The Probation Department objected to the héaring officer’s proposed decision. The Commission adopted the hearing officer’s findings of fact but sustained the discharge. Cummings then initiated this action for administrative mandamus. The only issue in the trial court and on appeal is whether the Commission abused its discretion in sustaining the discharge. For the reasons explained below, I conclude there was an abuse of discretion in this case.
The infractions Cummings committed, all of which were first offenses, carry a range of punishment from a warning or a few days’ suspension to discharge from employment. Such a broad range of punishment for a first offense clearly evidences an intent dismissal should result only under the most egregious circumstances. Otherwise there would be no point to providing more severe punishment for second offenses and mandatory discharge for a third offense.
Our Supreme Court has stated in considering whether an abuse of discretion has occurred in the context of public employee discipline, “. . . the overriding consideration ... is the extent to which the employee’s conduct resulted in, or if repeated is likely to result in ‘[hjarm to the public service.’. . . Other relevant factors include the circumstances surrounding the misconduct and the likelihood of its recurrence. . . .” (Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194, 218 [124 Cal.Rptr. 14, 539 P.2d 774], internal citations omitted.)
Consideration of these principles in the present case leads me to conclude the discipline imposed on Mr. Cummings was clearly excessive.
As to “harm to the public service,” Cummings committed two acts of dishonesty: improperly using his office to obtain confidential information *1655regarding a parolee and lying about his actions to his supervisor. Dishonesty is clearly a serious offense in the workplace, especially among employees imbued with the public’s trust. However, I have found no case, and the Commission has not cited one, upholding the firing of a public employee for dishonesty not involving personal financial gain.5 (Cf. Barber v State Personnel Bd. (1976) 18 Cal.3d 395 [134 Cal.Rptr. 206, 556 P.2d 306] [theft of a wristwatch]; (Paulino v. Civil Service Com. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 962 [221 Cal.Rptr. 90] [filing false sick leave reports]; Ackerman v. State Personnel Bd. (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 395 [193 Cal.Rptr. 190] [theft of state property for personal use]; Wilson v. State Personnel Bd. (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 865 [130 Cal.Rptr. 292] [filing false travel claims; use of state vehicle for personal business].) It is also worth noting on the issue of honesty or lack of it, Paul Higa, the Probation Department official who authorized Cummings’s discharge, was never told by Cummings’s supervisor that Cummings first had come to him for assistance and been refused. Mr. Higa testified had he known this he might have changed his mind about discharging Cummings.
Turning to the circumstances surrounding the misconduct and the likelihood of its recurrence, I conclude the mitigating circumstances surrounding Cummings’s misconduct demonstrate his discharge was an abuse of discretion. Cummings was faced with a jealous husband who was not only under psychiatric care but had a criminal record, was armed, had transportation and had the keys to Cummings’s apartment. Cummings went to his supervisor for assistance but was rebuffed. With hindsight, the Commission suggests other steps Cummings could have taken to protect himself such as going to the police to report the threats against him and identify the person making them. The action Cummings did take, however, was nonviolent, did no harm to the husband or the Probation Department and is unlikely to recur.
The majority’s reliance on Talmo v. Civil Service Com. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 210 [282 Cal.Rptr. 240] is misplaced. Taimo, a sheriff’s deputy, was discharged for “bizarre behavior and unprofessional conduct.’ ” (Id. at p. 214.) This conduct included abuse of jail inmates'and lying about these acts to his superiors. In one instance, Taimo lifted up the bed of a sleeping prisoner and tipped it over, causing the prisoner to fall to the floor face first and suffer a bloody nose. Taimo lied about this incident, claiming the prisoner had tipped the bed over himself in his sleep. In another incident Taimo placed a dead gopher in a prisoner’s pocket. He not only lied about doing this but attempted to get another deputy to lie on his behalf. Talmo *1656had previously served a two-day suspension for having inhumanely handcuffed two inmates in a holding cage. Taimo also had telephoned a jail guard and called him a “fucking snitch” and “nigger” and had poured dirt into the gas tank of a county vehicle. (Id. at pp. 214-215.) It was clear from Talmo’s behavior he was not mentally suited to hold a position of power and public trust such as deputy sheriff. The fact Taimo lied about his abuse of prisoners was not the justification for his firing. His abusive and bizarre behavior was sufficient in itself to demonstrate Taimo was not qualified to serve in a position of power and public trust such as deputy sheriff.
Therefore, I would reverse the judgment in this case.

The one possible exception is Nicolini v. County of Tuolumne (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 619 [235 Cal.Rptr. 559] (deputy sheriff altered Valium prescription to an increased amount). However, Nicolini’s firing was based on charges in addition to dishonesty.