Court Opinion

ID: 9616946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:50:51.344966+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:03.871252
License: Public Domain

RAPER, Chief Justice,
dissenting in part and concurring in part, with whom BENTLEY, District Judge, joins.
I dissent as to the court’s holding that appellee Malovich, a state agent has no immunity; it should not have reached that issue because appellants’ complaint fails to state a claim, aside from any issue of immunity, assuming the facts there stated are true, in that an agent has no personal liability when acting for a disclosed principal.
I point out that the majority has decided this case upon the basis that the action is one in negligence and that Malovich, as a state employee, has no immunity from tort liability. The district court found that the motion to dismiss should be allowed because the defendants “are immune from suit because of sovereign immunity.” No particular type of action was mentioned. The trial *1054judge never considered the matter of tort liability or any other point. The general rule is that this court will not reverse on a question not considered by the trial court. Roush v. Roush, Wyo.1979, 589 P.2d 841; Knudson v. Hilzer, Wyo.1976, 551 P.2d 680; Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., Wyo. 1974, 519 P.2d 972; see also, Key No. 169, Appeal & Error, West’s Wyoming Digest, for other cases. However, it is one thing to reverse a district court on questions not considered by it and another to affirm for reasons not there considered, as will be further developed herein.
The appellants take the position that the appellees’ motion to dismiss was converted to a motion for summary judgment and the appellees indicate that it makes no difference because only a question of law is presented. If only a question of law is presented, this court has said, at least as to summary judgments, the matter is treated as if being originally before this court because it has exactly the same material before it as does the trial court and no fact-finding function is involved. Centrella v. Morris, Wyo.1979, 597 P.2d 958. Since a motion to dismiss, as present here, only attacks the complaint in an effort to determine whether a claim is stated, only a question of law is presented. Since only a question of law is presented, we may dispose of it.
The district court does not acquire jurisdiction unless a claim-a cause of action-is stated in the plaintiffs’ complaint. Buckman v. United Mine Workers of America, 1959, 80 Wyo. 199, 339 P.2d 398, reh. den. 80 Wyo. 216, 342 P.2d 236. Failure of a complaint to state a claim-a cause of action-may be raised for the first time in the supreme court and the point is never waived. Claughton v. Johnson, 1934, 47 Wyo. 447, 38 P.2d 612, reh. den. 47 Wyo. 536, 41 P.2d 527. That case was under code pleading, but a motion to dismiss under the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure performs the same office as a demurrer. It is the duty of this court to notice and act on jurisdictional matters even though not raised by the parties or the district court. Tobin v. Pursel, Wyo.1975, 539 P.2d 361.
While this court has said that immunity from suit is a threshold question, it is my view that at least an equally threshold question is whether a claim is otherwise stated. One cannot stand without the other. If no claim is stated in that light, neither the district court nor this court has jurisdiction. The first and fundamental question in every appeal is jurisdiction. Gardner v. Walker, Wyo.1962, 373 P.2d 598. Aside from any question of immunity and negligence, plaintiffs’ complaint fails to state a claim. Immunity and negligence must, therefore, retire to the background as unnecessary to a determination of the appeal. Because the failure to state a claim is decisive, it is unnecessary to either discuss or decide the other contentions although they may be of academic interest or potentially determinative of other such cases since they are not requisite to adjudication of this case. Wallace v. Casper Adjustment Service, Wyo.1972, 500 P.2d 72; Druley v. Houdesheldt, 1956, 75 Wyo. 155, 294 P.2d 351, reh. den. 296 P.2d 251. For an infinite supply of other cases to this effect, see Key No. 843(1), Appeal & Error, West’s Digest System.
The majority has structured a fantasized cause of action-a claim-against a state agent as an individual for negligence. Ergo, state employees may now be sued in their individual capacities for negligent conduct. The majority, in its opinion, states that the question is “whether or not, and under what circumstances, the State’s employees are or are not immune from tort liability.” The majority also holds, “Where a public officer acts in the absence of or in excess of his authority, he may be held personally liable for his wrongdoing.” There is no allegation in the amended complaint that Malovich acted outside of his authority. The majority assumes and concludes that the appellants’ amended complaint states a cause of action-a claim-in tort. The majority has not stopped with the single question of immunity as its threshold question. It has bound immunity inseparably with a tort action, and then held there is no immunity for those officers *1055“who work their wrongful ways against those who deserve neither their wrath or their negligence.” The whole of the majority opinion is couched in terms of tort.
The majority winds up saying that “there is nothing on the face of the pleadings or in supporting affidavits (as was the case with the other defendant, The State of Wyoming) which-at this stage-permits any court or fact finder to draw a liability conclusion one way or the other.” Not so!
The amended complaint filed by the appellants in the district court presented two claims for relief. The first one alleged that “[t]he offer of employment extended by Defendant Malovieh on behalf of the Defendant the State of Wyoming was accepted by Plaintiff Jess Oyler” and that, thus, a binding, express and implied employment contract came into existence; and further, the appellees’ refusal to perform was a breach of the contract which injured the appellants. As a result, appellants stated a claim for breach of contract accrued to their benefit.
The second claim for relief charged that:
“Defendant Anthony Malovieh, individually and acting on behalf of Defendant the State of Wyoming with gross disregard of his duty toward Plaintiffs, negligently induced Plaintiffs into financial obligations made by Plaintiffs in reliance upon Defendants’ promise of employment, and/or negligently stood by with full knowledge that Plaintiffs were incurring said financial obligations without making any attempt to advise Plaintiffs of their potential risk.”
The appellants have argued, and the majority has agreed, that this claim is a negligence action and that governmental tort immunity can no longer be used as a bar to tort actions brought against either the State or its employees; however, I do not accept that this claim for relief sounds in negligence.
In order to be liable for negligence, a defendant must have failed to perform a duty owed to the plaintiffs. Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co., Wyo.1974, 527 P.2d 832, 835. This duty can arise by virtue of statute, common law, or contractual relationship. Brubaker v. Glenrock Lodge International Order of Odd Fellows, Wyo. 1974, 526 P.2d 52.
Here, the appellants did allege that the appellees breached a duty by negligently inducing the appellants to rely on the promise of employment and/or negligently failing to warn the appellants of the risks inherent in the reliance. But, nowhere in the complaint did the appellants say what was the origin of appellees’ duty. On close inspection it would appear to have sprung from the alleged promise; however, under contract law unless the promise becomes a contract there is no duty to perform. And if there is no duty to perform, then no liability can be incurred if performance is not tendered. As stated by Corbin:
“An informal promise without consideration, in any of the senses of that term, creates no legal duty and is not enforceable. * * * ” 1 Corbin on Contracts § 114, p. 498.
Thus, in the second claim for relief there was no duty since there was no contract.
However, in order to ameliorate the harshness of this general rule, an exception, known as the doctrine of promissory estop-pel, was recognized in Hanna State & Savings Bank v. Matson, 1938, 53 Wyo. 1, 77 P.2d 621, 625. There the court quoted the Restatement of Contracts § 90 with approval:
“A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.”
Under this exception, then, the promise is treated as if it were a binding contract. 1A Corbin on Contracts §§ 193-209, pp. 187-271. Clearly the allegations made by appellants do include the necessary elements that must be shown under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
Nonetheless, the complaint stated numerous times that the defendant Malovieh was *1056acting on behalf of the State. In Kure v. Chevrolet Motor Division, Wyo.1978, 581 P.2d 603, 609, this court held:
“ * * * An agent who contracts on behalf of a .disclosed principal, in the absence of some other agreement to the contrary or other circumstances showing that he has expressly or impliedly incurred or intended to incur personal responsibility, is not liable to the other contracting party. * * * ”
In other words, an agent for a disclosed principal does not become a party to the contract. Since, in the facts alleged, Malo-vich’s promise was known to be on behalf of the State, and there is nothing to indicate that he intended to assume the promise of employment personally, Malovich cannot be held to be a party to the contract arising by operation of law, nor for that matter under the express contract alleged in the first cause of action. There is no reason to impose liability on a state employee, an agent of the State, where in private enterprise there is no such liability. Since, in my view, the dismissal of this suit would be appropriate on remand for failure to state a claim, I would affirm the dismissal. The action the court takes here seems to be a waste of judicial time. There is no need to decide issues not necessary to a disposition of the appeal and that are dicta.
I am not concerned about the rule that we will not consider matters raised for the first time on appeal as to the position I take. The reason for my lack of concern is not only that a court has no jurisdiction if a claim is not stated but because of the equally well-recognized rule that in our jurisdiction a judgment will be affirmed on appeal if sustainable on any legal ground appearing in the record. Wightman v. American National Bank of Riverton, Wyo.1980, 610 P.2d 1001; P & M Cattle Co. v. Holler, Wyo.1977, 559 P.2d 1019; Crockett v. Lowther, Wyo.1976, 549 P.2d 303; Zitterkopf v. Roussalis, Wyo.1976, 546 P.2d 436; Peters Grazing Association v. Legerski, Wyo.1975, 544 P.2d 449, reh. den. 546 P.2d 189; for citations to other eases, see also, Key No. 854(1), Appeal & Error, West’s Wyoming Digest. The trial court’s ultimate decision carries with it a presumption of correctness.
I concur in dismissal of the cause alleged against the State on the ground of immunity. In reference to the suit against the State upon a contract, it should be noted that though Biscar v. University of Wyoming Board of Trustees, Wyo.1980, 605 P.2d 374, mandates the dismissal of the action in contract against the State on the basis of sovereign immunity, on March 7, 1980 § l-39-104(a), W.S.1977 was amended to waive the defense of sovereign immunity in contract actions. The statute now reads:
“(a) A governmental entity and its public employees while acting within the scope of duties are granted immunity from liability for any tort except as provided by W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112. Any immunity in actions based on a contract entered into by a governmental entity is waived except to the extent provided by the contract if the contract was within the powers granted to the entity and was properly executed. The claims procedures of W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112 apply to contractual claims against governmental entities.”
Since this action was commenced prior to the passage of the amendment, the statute does not provide the controlling law for this case. But it should be noted that in the future Biscar will no longe'r control and actions on contract against the State will be permissible within the statutory limits.
I would have affirmed the dismissal of both suits.