Court Opinion

ID: 9470684
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:13:07.94681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:03.023010
License: Public Domain

FAIRCHILD, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring.
In substance, the district court found that Greene’s conversation with Smith at the Department of Labor was, although oral, an unequivocal assertion, or “charge,” that defendant had discriminated against Greene on account of age. In the light of all the circumstances, I agree that the finding of an unequivocal oral charge was clearly erroneous. I also agree that a case was not made out for tolling the 180 day filing requirement.
There having been no unequivocal oral charge of age discrimination, it seems unnecessary to decide whether a charge of age discrimination must be presented in writing in order to have been “filed.” Cf. the fact situation presented in Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276, 283-84 (8th Cir.1983).
If, however, the matter of written versus oral form is to be decided, it seems to me that the reasons for deeming an unequivocal oral charge sufficient preponderate.
Judge, now Chief Judge, Feinberg stated those reasons well in dissent in Reich v. Dow Badische Co., 575 F.2d 363, 375-76 (2d Cir.1978).
It must be conceded at the outset that use of the word “filed” implies that the notice should be in writing. But the section does not make that requirement explicit and there are compelling reasons for not reading it into the statute. The ADEA is remedial legislation whose enforcement in large part depends upon the efforts of laymen. The terms of this statute should be liberally construed ... to avoid frustrating potentially meritorious claims on hypertechnical grounds. See Bonham v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 569 F.2d 187, 193 (3d Cir.1977); Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 525 F.2d 92, 93-94 (8th Cir.197[5]); cf. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 527, 92 S.Ct. 616 [619], 30 L.Ed.2d 679 (1972) (Title VII case). Moreover, the sparse legislative history on this point indicates that unequivocal oral notice should be sufficient. The Act as a whole reflects “a congressional desire to avoid some of the administrative logjams experienced under Title VII” and to simplify enforcement mechanisms. Comment, Procedural Prerequisites to Private Suit Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 44 U.Chi.L.Rev. 457, 467 (1977).... See also 113 Cong. Rec. 7076 (1967) (testimony of Sen. Javits before the Labor Subcommittee of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee regarding the ADEA). Thus, in enacting the ADEA, Congress declined to require that notice “shall be in writing under oath or affirmation .. .,” as was done in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). Additionally, the Department of Labor, the agency charged with administering the ADEA, has urged that oral notice can satisfy section 626(d). See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Shell Oil Co. v. Dartt, 434 U.S. 99, 98 S.Ct. 600, 54 L.Ed.2d 270 (1977) (leave to file denied). In light of the strong policy favoring a simplified construction of procedural requirements under the ADEA, the pertinent legislative history and the Department of Labor’s administrative interpretation, I would hold that unequivocal oral *132notice can satisfy section 626(d). See, e.g., Woodford v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 369 F.Supp. 911, 914 (N.D.Ga.1973); Bishop v. Jelleff Assoc., 398 F.Supp. 579, 593 (D.D. C.1974); and Sutherland v. SKF Industries, Inc., 419 F.Supp. 610, 615-16 (E.D. Pa.1976).
Reich involved the statute when it required filing of a “notice of intent to sue.” The change to the term “charge” was part of an amendment intended to make it more likely that courts would reach the merits of the cases of aggrieved individuals. S.Rep. No. 493, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in [1978] U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 515; H.Rep. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in [1978] U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 533-34. Therefore the reasoning of Judge Feinberg applies even more forcefully now.