Court Opinion

ID: 9390795
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 17:03:15.873365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:36.790716
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JAVAGHN WAPLES,                              §
                                             §
         Defendant Below, Appellant          §      No. 368, 2021
                                             §
         v.                                  §      Court Below: Superior Court
                                             §      of the State of Delaware
STATE OF DELAWARE,                           §
                                             §      Cr. ID No. S1812013426B
         Appellee.                           §

                               Submitted: April 19, 2023
                               Decided:   April 28, 2023

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and TRAYNOR, Justices,
constituting the qualified and available members of the Court en Banc.1

                                            ORDER

         On this 28th day of April 2023, it appears to the Court that:

         (1)    This appeal comes to the Court following remand. In our remand order,

we requested that the Superior Court expand the record and hold a hearing on

defendant Javaghn Waples’ constitutional claim under Batson v. Kentucky that the

sole black member of the jury was allegedly struck from the panel because of her

race.2 After the remand hearing, the Superior Court held that Waples had not

demonstrated a Batson violation.            We agree and affirm the Superior Court’s

judgment.

1
    Supreme Court Rule 4(f) and Internal Operating Procedure XVII(2).
2
    Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986).
       (2)    A Superior Court jury convicted Waples of Possession of a Firearm by

a Person Prohibited. While selecting the jury, the State exercised peremptory

challenges against two jurors with criminal records, one of which was the only black

person called to be seated as a juror. Defense counsel moved to strike the all-white

jury because black jurors were not represented in the jury array. The State responded

that it had a neutral reason for striking the black juror – a criminal record that might

cause bias against the State – and thus it had not violated Batson. The Superior Court

denied the motion.

       (3)    On appeal from his conviction, Waples contended that he made a prima

facie showing that the State engaged in purposeful discrimination by striking the

only black juror. More specifically, he argued that the Superior Court erred by not

analyzing his motion under Batson.3 Under Batson, the court applies a three-part

test to determine whether a party exercised a peremptory challenge for a racially

discriminatory purpose:

       First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the
       prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race . .
       . . Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to
       the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the
       jurors in question . . . . Finally, the trial court must determine whether
       the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful
       discrimination.4

3
 See id. at 85.
4
 Robertson v. State, 630 A.2d 1084, 1089 (Del. 1993) (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S.
352, 358–59 (1991)).
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         (4)    After briefing and oral argument, this Court decided that an expansion

of the record was appropriate and remanded the case to the Superior Court for a

hearing on the defendant’s Batson claim. We instructed that:

         [t]he hearing should be conducted in a courtroom with the defendant
         present. The State should inform the Superior Court and the defendant
         of the specific nature of the black juror’s misdemeanor criminal record.
         The State should also inform the Superior Court and the defendant as
         to whether any of the 14 white jurors who were seated on the jury or
         the one white juror it struck had misdemeanor criminal records, and, if
         so, the specific nature of those records. If any of the 14 white jurors
         who were seated had a misdemeanor criminal record, the State should
         be offered an opportunity to explain why it did not strike that juror. The
         Superior Court should make any other inquiries the court deems
         appropriate. After both parties have had an opportunity to be fully
         heard, the Superior Court judge should perform the three-step Batson
         analysis and make a determination as to each of the three steps.5

         (5)    On December 1, 2022, the Superior Court held the remand hearing with

the defendant present. First, the court inquired into the existence and nature of the

criminal records of the black juror and the fourteen seated white jurors. The

prosecutor in Waples’ case testified that he used a peremptory challenge to strike a

white juror because he had a fourth driving under the influence conviction, a Title

21 felony. The prosecutor explained that he generally only strikes jurors with Title

21 convictions when the offense was for driving under the influence.

         (6)    The prosecutor then used a peremptory challenge to strike the black

juror who replaced the struck white juror. The black juror had two Title 11 criminal

5
    Waples v. State, No. 368, 2021 (Del. Aug. 23, 2022) (ORDER).
                                               3
convictions – a 1995 conviction for disorderly conduct and a 1987 conviction for

shoplifting. The prosecutor testified that he does not consider the age of Title 11

criminal convictions when considering peremptory challenges, and that his practice

is to strike potential jurors with such convictions due to bias they may have against

the State in a criminal matter. No other jurors had Title 11 convictions. Some had

Title 21 traffic violations that did not qualify as misdemeanors.

      (7)    After hearing the testimony, the Superior Court conducted the Batson

analysis. The court held that Waples did not make a prima facie showing that the

prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge based on race. According to the court,

the prosecutor struck the black juror for potential bias against the State based on her

criminal record. The court supported its finding by pointing to the prosecutor’s use

of a peremptory challenge against the white juror. For the other Batson factors, the

court found that the prosecutor’s concern about juror bias was a sufficient race

neutral explanation for striking the black juror. In response to the State’s race-

neutral explanation, the Superior Court also found that Waples had not carried his

burden of proving purposeful discrimination.

      (8)    On appeal after remand, Waples argues that the Superior Court mis-

applied Batson. According to Waples, the fact that the court struck the only black

juror was sufficient for a prima facie showing of a race-based peremptory challenge.

Further, according to Waples, the State’s race-neutral explanation for the peremptory

                                          4
strike was unreasonable as it did not account for all jurors who could have developed

negative biases against the justice system. Waples argues that the Department of

Justice does not conduct out-of-state record checks for the jury pool, meaning that

any of the white jurors could have had one or more misdemeanors on their record

like the black juror who was struck. Waples also contends that a juror’s interactions

with the court system through traffic violations are as likely to engender negative

biases towards the justice system as criminal convictions. Lastly, Waples argues the

Superior Court should have consulted statistical information when determining

whether Waples met his burden of proving intentional discrimination.

         (9)     The State responds by noting that the Superior Court followed this

Court’s instructions and had sufficient reasons for rejecting Waples’ Batson claim.

According to the State, even if there was a prima facie showing that race was a factor

in the State’s peremptory challenge, the court’s ultimate finding that there was no

racial discrimination was correct because (a) Waples provided no supporting

evidence of racial discrimination and (b) the prosecutor provided a credible

explanation for the peremptory strike.

         (10) When evaluating the trial court’s Batson analysis, “we apply a more

deferential standard of review to the trial court’s ultimate conclusion on

discriminatory intent.”6 In other words, “where the trial court properly conducts the

6
    Jones v. State, 938 A.2d 626, 635 (Del. 2007).
                                                     5
three part Batson analysis, we review its findings under a clearly erroneous standard

of review.”7 After considering the parties’ arguments, we conclude that, even if

Waples made a prima facie showing of a race-based peremptory strike, the court

properly found that the State articulated a race neutral explanation for the

peremptory strike – that an individual with criminal conviction might harbor

negative feelings against the State – and Waples did not prove purposeful

discrimination.

       (11) Waples’ attempts to discredit the State’s explanation for the peremptory

strike are unpersuasive. The State has no duty to undertake nationwide criminal

record checks as a counterweight to the proper exercise of peremptory challenges.

Waples also provides no support for his contention that a traffic violation is as likely

to produce lasting negative biases against the justice system as a criminal conviction.

Finally, the “statistical evidence” Waples relies on – that one out of two of the State’s

challenges was to a black juror – is just one factor the court reviews to determine

whether the defendant made a prima facie showing of discrimination, and whether

the State acted with discriminatory intent.8 After hearing from the prosecutor and

considering all of the evidence, the Superior Court concluded that the State did not

7
  Id.
8
  See id. at 633–35 (State’s exercise of 75% of its peremptory strikes – a rate more than double
the percentage of minorities in the original jury pool – supported a prima facie case and was
relevant to Batson’s third prong but is only one factor in the overall analysis).
                                                6
act out of purposeful discrimination. That factual finding was not clearly erroneous.

The Superior Court did not err when it found that no Batson violation occurred.

      NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior

Court is AFFIRMED.

                                             BY THE COURT:

                                             /s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr.
                                                  Chief Justice

                                         7