Court Opinion

ID: 93469
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-28 16:07:20+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:50.578792
License: Public Domain

147 U.S. 36 (1893)
STREETER
v.
JEFFERSON COUNTY BANK.
No. 81.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued December 7, 1892.
Decided January 3, 1893.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.
*40 Mr. Watson M. Rogers for plaintiff in error.
Mr. John Lansing for defendant in error.
*43 MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS delivered the opinion of the court.
John C. Streeter, the plaintiff in error, contends that the record discloses, as matter of fact, that the Jefferson County National Bank, being the holder of certain promissory notes *44 made by the firm of H.V. Cadwell & Co. entered into a collusive arrangement with said firm, who were insolvent at the time, and who were shortly afterwards adjudged bankrupts, whereby the bank was, by procuring judgment on said notes, to obtain an illegal preference over other creditors of the firm; that, by reason of this collusive arrangement, the bank disabled itself from proving its claim on these notes against the estate of the bankrupts, and thereby discharged Streeter, who was an accommodation endorser, from liability to the bank.
The assignee in bankruptcy brought an action in the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York, to test the validity of the bank's judgment, and it was adjudged by that court that the judgments were void as against the assignee, and, on appeal, this judgment was affirmed by the Circuit Court.
The case will be found reported as Brown v. Jefferson County National Bank, in 19 Blatchford, 315.
An examination of that case discloses that the judgment in favor of the bank was held an illegal preference, within the purview of the bankrupt law, because the attorneys employed to represent the bank in bringing the suit and obtaining the judgment had been the attorneys of H.V. Cadwell & Co., and, as such, had obtained knowledge of their insolvent condition and of their desire that the bank should obtain a preference.
The question that was presented to the New York Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals was, whether the fraud imputed to the bank, arising from the knowledge of its attorneys of the insolvent condition of H.V. Cadwell & Co. at the time the judgments were obtained, was such a case of fraud as to disable the bank from proving its claim in bankruptcy, and thus to effect a discharge of Streeter as endorser.
The provision of section 5084 of the Revised Statutes of the United States is as follows:
"Any person who, since the second day of March, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, has accepted any preference, having reasonable cause to believe that the same was made or given *45 by the debtor contrary to any provisions of the act of March two, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, chapter one hundred and seventy-six, to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy, or to any provisions of this Title, shall not prove the debt or claim on account of which the preference is made or given, nor shall he receive any dividend therefrom until he shall first surrender to the assignee all property, money, benefit or advantage received by him under such preference."
Section 5021, as amended in 1874, (act of June 22, 1874, 18 Stat. 178, 181, c. 390, § 12,) is as follows:
"Provided, That the person receiving such payment or conveyance had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent, and knew that a fraud on this act was intended and such person, if a creditor, shall not, in cases of actual fraud on his part, be allowed to prove for more than a moiety of his debt, and this limitation on the proof of debts shall apply to cases of voluntary as well as involuntary bankruptcy."
It is contended, on behalf of the plaintiff in error, that the bank did not, within the meaning of the law, surrender its preference, and hence could not prove its claim; and that the case was one of "actual fraud" on the part of the bank, which could not, therefore, in any event prove for more than a moiety of its debt.
To sustain the contention that the bank did not surrender its preference, it is urged that the bank did not at once, on demand of the assignee, turn over the goods levied on, but litigated the matter with the assignee in both the District and Circuit Courts, and that the proceeds of the executions were not relinquished until final judgment was entered against the bank.
It was the opinion of the state court that as the sheriff, having custody of the goods seized on execution was, with the consent of the bank's attorneys, appointed special receiver, and was ordered to sell the goods and pay the proceeds into court, to await the result of the litigation between the bank and the assignee in bankruptcy, and that as the proceeds were finally turned over to the assignee, and thus became subject to distribution as bankruptcy assets, the transaction amounted *46 to a surrender under section 5084. In so holding we think the state court was right.
As the bank did not, at any time, receive any money or property from the insolvent firm, but pursued only a lawful remedy in a lawful manner, it was not under any legal obligation to abandon its executions, and to turn over their fruits to the assignee immediately upon demand. We do not perceive that the course of the bank, in resisting the claim of the assignee by setting up a defence, is subject to just criticism, or thereby estopped itself from proving its claim after the assignee had prevailed in his suit.
The endeavor of the bank to maintain its executions would, if successful, have been for the benefit of the endorser, who would, in that event, have been the last to complain, and it is certainly not apparent why the endorser should be discharged from his liability by the effort of the bank to legally collect a debt in his exoneration.
The decision of the state court, that the facts did not make out a case of actual fraud on the part of the bank so as to deprive it of a right to prove for more than a moiety of its debt, and thus relieve the endorser of liability, in whole or in part, seems to be well founded in reason. There was no actual knowledge by the bank or its officers that the insolvent firm had done anything whatever to facilitate the procurement of the judgments. There was no giving and accepting of any security. There was no finding in the District Court of the United States of actual fraud.
The state court cites with approval the case In re Riorden, 14 Nat. Bank. Reg. 332, in which it was held by Mr. Justice Blatchford, then sitting as District Judge, that a mere fraud on the bankrupt law, by the acceptance of a preference, was not, in itself, actual fraud-;-and, commenting on this decision, the court said: "Such conclusion seems just and equitable. The bringing of an action by a creditor in the ordinary mode of procedure in the state courts, and procuring a judgment, may be, as in this case, constructive fraud, for which the lien will be set aside. But even that will depend upon the further fact that bankrupt proceedings shall be instituted within the *47 limited time provided by law. If such proceedings are not so begun, the lien would be valid and effectual. How, then, can it be construed to be actual fraud to pursue a legal remedy which may be efficacious, and especially when no action of the bankrupt debtor gives the creditor the obnoxious preference?" [Record. This case is not reported. See 36 Hun, 640.]
It follows that, as the bank was not precluded from proving its claim, Streeter, the endorser, could, by paying and lifting the notes, have participated in the distribution of the bankrupt estate, and hence, has failed to show any defence to the suit of the bank. The judgment of the court below is therefore
Affirmed.