Court Opinion

ID: 9860010
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:06:53.147683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:12:57.311513
License: Public Domain

ENGLISH, J., specially concurring: I should like to make clear the nature of the two suits which were consolidated by the trial court: The first complaint asked for a declaratory judgment that Chicago’s traffic ordinances were invalid because in conflict with the limitations on its authority in this field, as set forth in the pertinent statute. Ill Rev Stats (1963), c 95%, §§ 122 and 123. This complaint sought only prospective relief— namely, the sequestration and refund of fines thereafter paid for violation of these ordinances during pendency of the litigation. The second complaint concerned traffic fines paid prior to January 1, 1964, on traffic ticket complaints which were issued in the name of the People of the State of Illinois rather than in the name of the City of Chicago, in violation of both the constitution (art VI, § 33) and the Municipal Code of 1961 (c 24, § 1-2-7). It was alleged that all judgments based thereon were void, and plaintiffs sought refund of all such fines paid during the prior five-year period. In each complaint plaintiffs sued on behalf of themselves individually and as representatives of a class consisting of all persons licensed by the State of Illinois to operate motor vehicles, being residents of Chicago in the first suit and of Cook County in the second. By the order appealed from, the chancellor made his decision clear that each complaint stated a cause of action as to the plaintiffs in their individual capacities. And he made it equally clear that he intended to dismiss the parts of the complaints in which plaintiffs alleged that they were suing on behalf of a class. Consistent with this decision of the chancellor, plaintiffs in this court raise only one basic point — that the court erred in dismissing the class actions. (They also contend that the cases should not have been consolidated. With this I agree, but under the circumstances the point is of no consequence.) Therefore, except in a minor and incidental way, the only point on which we have been briefed by plaintiffs is on the question of class actions. Defendants devote a few pages in responding to this point, but the major part of the brief deals with their proposition that the relief sought by plaintiffs constitutes an unauthorized collateral attack on valid, existing judgments. Here, the parties are squarely at issue since plaintiffs claim that the judgments in question are open to such attack because of their being completely void under this court’s decision in City of Chicago v. Berg, 48 Ill App2d 251,199 NE2d 49. Now, it is apparent that this last-mentioned point of contention can have nothing to do with the first suit which only questions the validity of the traffic ordinances, and does not purport to attack judgments, void or otherwise. So the one arena in which the parties have drawn a general battle line is precisely the area in which the trial court made its decision. But our majority opinion does not cover that issue and makes no decision on the propriety of class actions under the circumstances set forth in the two complaints. Instead, it sustains the chancellor’s dismissal of the first complaint as having been justified by this court’s interpretation of the declaratory judgment statute, and it affirms as to the second complaint on the theory of irrecoverability of voluntary fine payments, absent any allegations of duress.*  In my view, we should not base our decision on either of the points which form the basis for the majority opinion, partly because we have not been briefed on them and therefore might be missing something which the able counsel on both sides of this case might call to our attention, but more importantly because they are not issues which were raised in the trial court. I am mindful of the broad rule that while an appellant is limited on review by his assignment of errors at trial, an appellee is free to support the judgment by arguments which the record may indicate were not in the mind of the trial judge at the time or were not accepted by him as grounds for the judgment. I believe, however, that this rule must be precisely held within the bounds of the issues raised by the pleadings, or, as stated by the Supreme Court, “an appellee may sustain the lower court decree by any argument based upon issues appearing in the record.” (Emphasis supplied.) In re Estate of Leichtenberg, 7 Ill2d 545, 549, 131 NE2d 487. See also Consoer, Townsend & Associates v. Addis, 37 Ill App2d 105,110,185 NE2d 97. Section 45 of the Practice Act requires that alleged defects in a complaint be pointed out specifically, and that was done by defendants in this case. Ill Rev Stats (1965), c 110, §45(1). They did not, however, raise in this manner the points on which the majority opinion is grounded. Nor, as I have mentioned, did they argue these points in this court. It follows, therefore, that defendants, even though appellees, would not be entitled to have the judgment reviewed on those grounds. Admiral Oasis Hotel Corp. v. Home Gas Industries, Inc., 68 Ill App2d 297, 216 NE2d 282; Lango v. Division Paint & Garden Supply Co., 75 Ill App2d 384, 221 NE2d 47. And it then follows, I should think, that we ought not to base our decision thereon. I would uphold the chancellor’s decision that neither complaint presents a proper class action under the circumstances. Also, as to the first suit I would hold that the City’s traffic ordinances are not in conflict with the statute, and as to the second suit I would hold that the rule of the Berg case, supra, should not be applied to the extent of making all the unappealed, satisfied traffic judgments subject to collateral attack. Thus, I concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court in its dismissal of both complaints in so far as they allege class actions. I also concur in the decision to dismiss defendants’ cross-appeal.   The opinion also states that it is based upon the lack of an allegation that the fine judgments had been appealed. This seems unrealistic, since if all had been appealed and reversed the suit would not have been brought, and if all had been appealed and affirmed there would be no basis for plaintiffs’ contention that the judgments are void. Plaintiffs do, of course, rely on the fact that one of the judgments was appealed and held to be void in the Berg case, supra.