Court Opinion

ID: 9966052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 21:00:38.750418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:07.938626
License: Public Domain

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                                             PUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 23-1344

        LESLIE ATKINSON,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        BRENT GODFREY, In his individual capacity as a law enforcement officer with the
        Harnett County Sheriff’s Office; WAYNE COATS, In his official capacity as Sheriff
        of Harnett County, North Carolina,

                            Defendants - Appellants,

                     and

        JOHN DOE, as Surety,

                            Defendant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
        Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:22-cv-00369-WO-LPA)

        Argued: January 23, 2024                                          Decided: May 2, 2024

        Before WILKINSON, QUATTLEBAUM, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

        Reversed and remanded in part, dismissed in part by published opinion. Judge Quattlebaum
        wrote the opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Rushing join. Judge Wilkinson
        wrote a concurring opinion.
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        Brian Florencio Castro, WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP, Raleigh, North
        Carolina, for Appellants. Russell Snow Thompson, IV, THOMPSON CONSUMER LAW
        GROUP, PC, Scottsdale, Arizona, for Appellee.

                                             2
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        QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge:

               The primary issue in this appeal is whether a law enforcement officer called to the

        scene of a private repossession of a vehicle is entitled to qualified immunity from a claim

        that the officer unreasonably seized the vehicle in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

        Neither the Supreme Court, our Court, the highest court of the state where the conduct

        occurred nor a consensus of other circuit courts of appeals have determined that conduct

        similar to that of the officer is unconstitutional. So, the right alleged to be violated was not

        clearly established. As a result, we reverse the district court’s denial of the officer’s motion

        to dismiss based on qualified immunity and remand with instructions to grant.

                                                       I.1

                                                      A.

               To purchase a 2003 Chevrolet Avalanche, Leslie Atkinson executed a retail

        installment sales contract that granted the seller a security interest in the vehicle. The seller

        assigned the sales contract, and the security interest, to Credit Acceptance Corporation. A

        few years later, Credit Acceptance engaged Primeritus Financial Services to repossess the

        vehicle. Primeritus, in turn, hired Carolina Repo to conduct the repossession.

               1
                 The facts as described are based on the allegations in the complaint. As this appeal
        involves an order denying a motion to dismiss, we accept the factual allegations of the
        complaint as true. De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 524 (4th Cir. 2013). However, the
        complaint also contains several irrelevant and inflammatory allegations about one
        defendant, which the district court described as “completely inappropriate.” J.A. 43. Like
        the district court, we do not credit those inappropriate allegations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f);
        Blair v. Shenandoah Women’s Ctr., Inc., 757 F.2d 1435, 1436 (4th Cir. 1985); Veney v.
        Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 2002).

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               When a Carolina Repo representative arrived at Atkinson’s house to conduct the

        repossession, he found the vehicle parked by the back door. The Carolina Repo

        representative backed his tow truck toward Atkinson’s vehicle. Noticing the repossession

        in progress, Atkinson exited her home. Atkinson jumped into her vehicle and attempted to

        drive off while the Carolina Repo representative “continued backing up [the truck] and slid

        its tow bar under the [v]ehicle.” J.A. 15. This lifted the vehicle’s back tires into the air.

        Concerned for her safety, Atkinson put the vehicle in park. The Carolina Repo

        representative walked over to her and demanded she exit the vehicle.

               After the Carolina Repo representative and Atkinson argued about the repossession,

        the representative called the Harnett County Sheriff’s Office for assistance. The

        representative asked whether Atkinson had any outstanding warrants. The Sheriff’s Office

        sent Brent Godfrey, a deputy, to Atkinson’s home. When he arrived, Godfrey saw Atkinson

        in the vehicle, the back end of which was still suspended in the air by the Carolina Repo

        truck’s tow bar. Godfrey ordered her out of the vehicle so that the Carolina Repo

        representative could repossess it. Because she was intimidated by Godfrey, Atkinson got

        out of the vehicle as requested.

                                                     B.

               Atkinson sued Godfrey and Sheriff Wayne Coats under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging

        violations of the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States

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        Constitution.2 Relevant here, she alleges Godfrey, in his individual capacity, violated her

        Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures of property by improperly

        facilitating Carolina Repo’s repossession. Atkinson maintains that despite her objections

        to the seizure of the vehicle, Godfrey actively took part in its repossession. She alleges

        Godfrey told her that Carolina Repo was taking the vehicle despite her protests. She also

        contends that Coats, in his official capacity as the sheriff and final policy maker of the

        sheriff’s office, failed to train officers and created policies and customs that deprived her

        of the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable seizures of property.

               Godfrey and Coats moved to dismiss Atkinson’s § 1983 claim under Federal Rules

        of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). They asserted (1) that Atkinson’s § 1983 claim

        should be dismissed because she did not allege facts showing they acted under color of

        law, (2) that Godfrey was entitled to qualified immunity and (3) that, without an underlying

        constitutional violation, Atkinson failed to bring an actionable claim against the Sheriff’s

        Office through Coats in his official capacity. The district court denied the motion, finding

        it could not determine as a matter of law (1) that Godfrey’s actions did not constitute state

        action, (2) that Godfrey was entitled to qualified immunity and (3) that the Sheriff’s

               2
                 Atkinson also sued Credit Acceptance, Primeritus, Carolina Repo and John Doe,
        as Surety, alleging violations of various debt collection statutes, and the Uniform
        Commercial Code. The claims against all defendants—except the § 1983 claim (Count X
        of the complaint) against Godfrey and Coats—have been dismissed in favor of arbitration.
        Also, the district court noted that while Atkinson mentioned a violation of the Fifth
        Amendment in her § 1983 count for unlawful seizure against Godfrey and Coats, it
        concluded that the allegation was immaterial to the analysis and appeared to have been
        abandoned in the briefing. Neither party challenges this finding on appeal.
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        Office’s liability could be ruled out. Godfrey and Coats timely appealed the district court’s

        denial of their motion.

                                                      II.

               Before addressing the merits of the defendants’ appeal, we consider our federal

        appellate jurisdiction.3 Our jurisdiction is generally limited to the review of final decisions.

        28 U.S.C. § 1291. Generally, the denial of a motion to dismiss does not constitute a “final

        decision” and, therefore, most of the time is not the proper basis of an appeal. Davis v. City

        of Greensboro, 770 F.3d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 2014). But under the collateral order doctrine,4

        “[w]hen a district court denies a motion to dismiss that is based on qualified immunity, . . .

        the action is a final order reviewable by this court” to the extent it turns on an issue of law.

        Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1159 (4th Cir. 1997); Davis, 770 F.3d at 282.

               3
                 The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) as well as under Rule
        12(b)(6). Construing the complaint in the light most favorable to Atkinson, the district court
        concluded that she had alleged active participation by Godfrey sufficient to find state action
        and, thus, subject matter jurisdiction. It then proceeded to address the nature of Godfrey’s
        involvement in conjunction with its Rule 12(b)(6) analysis. We too have “an independent
        obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a
        challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). Without
        addressing whether state action is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction or an essential
        element to a § 1983 claim, we agree with the district court and conclude that we have
        subject matter jurisdiction based on the allegations in the complaint. Even so, as described
        below, we ultimately conclude Godfrey is entitled to qualified immunity.
               4
                “Under the collateral order doctrine, an order is final for purposes of § 1291, even
        if it does not terminate proceedings in the district court, so long as it conclusively
        determines the disputed question, resolves an important issue completely separate from the
        merits of the action, and would be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
        judgment.” Gray-Hopkins v. Prince George’s Cnty., 309 F.3d 224, 229 (4th Cir. 2002).
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               We begin with our jurisdiction to consider the defendants’ challenge to the district

        court’s order denying the motion to dismiss the claim against Godfrey. The defendants’

        motion to dismiss accepts Atkinson’s factual allegations from the complaint as true but

        contends that, even so, Godfrey is entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. Thus,

        since the defendants’ challenge to the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to

        Godfrey turns on a legal question, we have jurisdiction to review it.

                                                      III.

               With our jurisdiction to review the district court’s ruling on Atkinson’s § 1983 claim

        for unlawful seizure against Godfrey established, we turn to his assertion of qualified

        immunity.5

                                                      A.

               “Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability

        unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at

        the time of the challenged conduct.” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012). The

        immunity balances two important interests: “the need to hold public officials accountable

        when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment,

        distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan,

               5
                 “We review de novo the denial of a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity,
        accepting as true the facts alleged in the complaint and viewing them in the light most
        favorable to the plaintiff.” Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d 292, 306
        (4th Cir. 2006).

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        555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). The protection applies regardless of whether the government

        official’s error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact or a mistake based on mixed questions

        of law and fact. Id. It gives “government officials breathing room to make reasonable but

        mistaken judgments, and protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

        violate the law.” Stanton v. Sims, 571 U.S. 3, 6 (2013) (per curiam) (internal quotes and

        citation omitted). While qualified immunity provides a defense to liability, it is also

        intended to free officials from litigation concerns and disruptive discovery. Ashcroft v.

        Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009).

               In reviewing a district court’s decision rejecting a defendant’s assertion of qualified

        immunity, we apply a two-step analysis. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).

        Under the first prong of the analysis, we ask “whether a constitutional violation occurred.”

        Melgar ex rel. Melgar v. Greene, 593 F.3d 348, 353 (4th Cir. 2010). The plaintiff bears the

        burden of proof on this question. Stanton v. Elliott, 25 F.4th 227, 233 (4th Cir. 2022). Under

        the second prong, we ask whether the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of

        the events in question. Id.; see also Danser v. Stansberry, 772 F.3d 340, 346 (4th Cir.

        2014). The officer bears the burden on this question. Stanton, 25 F.4th at 233.

               We may address these questions in the order that would best facilitate the fair and

        efficient disposition of the case. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. That means that we may grant

        qualified immunity on the ground that the purported right was not clearly established

        without resolving the “often more difficult question whether the purported right exists at

        all.” Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664. The flexibility in approaching the questions “comports with

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        [the Supreme Court’s] usual reluctance to decide constitutional questions unnecessarily.”

        Id.

                                                    B.

               Exercising the analytical discretion permitted for considering qualified immunity,

        we begin with prong two. Under that prong, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity if,

        at the time of the challenged conduct, the law did not clearly establish that the officer’s

        conduct was unconstitutional. See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63

        (2018).

               Atkinson claims Godfrey violated her Fourth Amendment right, made applicable to

        the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, to be free from unreasonable seizures. She

        contends that, during Carolina Repo’s repossession efforts, Godfrey crossed the line from

        keeping the peace into actively participating.

               The Fourth Amendment forbids unreasonable searches and seizures.6 But the

        defendants contend that the Fourth Amendment does not apply here, asserting that Carolina

        Repo, a private company, repossessed the car and that Godfrey’s involvement was de

        minimis. And it is true that the Fourth Amendment only proscribes government action. It

        does not apply “to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private

        individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge

               6
                Applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, the
        Fourth Amendment relevantly provides that the “right of the people to be secure in their
        persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
        be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some
        meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” United
        States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
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        of any governmental official.” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)

        (quoting Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).

                 Typically, government officials are not required to answer for private parties’

        actions. See Cochran v. Gilliam, 656 F.3d 300, 306 (6th Cir. 2011). But in Soldal v. Cook

        County, 506 U.S. 56 (1992), the Supreme Court recognized the potential for law

        enforcement to become so enmeshed in a forceable seizure conducted by a private party to

        constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Relying on Soldal, Atkinson claims the

        law clearly establishes that law enforcement officials violate the Fourth Amendment by

        actively participating in a repossession.

                 But even if we assume, without deciding, that principle is clearly established as a

        general matter, we must decide whether it is specific enough to foreclose Godfrey’s

        qualified immunity defense on its second prong. That is because “[a] clearly established

        right is one that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood

        that what he or she is doing violates that right.” Adams v. Ferguson, 884 F.3d 219, 226 (4th

        Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). The way in which an alleged right is described matters. “[C]ourts

        must not ‘define clearly established law at a high level of generality . . . .’” Wesby, 583 U.S.

        at 63–64 (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014)). Defining the right at a

        high level of generality, “avoids the crucial question whether the offic[er] acted reasonably

        in the particular circumstances that he or she faced.” Id. (quoting Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at

        779). Instead, we must identify the specific right the plaintiff alleges was infringed at a

        “high level of particularity.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 250–51 (4th Cir.

        1999).

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               Thus, for Atkinson’s right to be clearly established, there must be case law not just

        about the general principle that law enforcement officials violate the Fourth Amendment

        by actively participating in a wrongful repossession; the law must establish that conduct

        similar to Godfrey’s is unconstitutional. Although a case directly on point is not required,

        existing precedent “must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond

        debate.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018) (per curiam) (quoting Pauly, 580 U.S.

        at 79). And again, the clearly established right must be viewed with reference to the

        particular facts of the case. Pauly, 580 U.S. at 79. “Otherwise, plaintiffs would be able to

        convert the rule of qualified immunity into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply

        by alleging violation of extremely abstract facts.” Id. (cleaned up). In the end, the key

        inquiry is whether “the law provided ‘fair warning’ that [the officer’s] conduct was

        unconstitutional.” Booker v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 538 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting

        Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).

               Applying these principles, the right Atkinson asserts is too general to have clearly

        established that Godfrey’s conduct was unconstitutional at the time of the repossession.

        Merely knowing that law enforcement officials can violate the Fourth Amendment by

        actively participating in a wrongful repossession would not put Godfrey on notice that his

        particular conduct was unconstitutional. To the contrary, it begs the critical question—what

        conduct crosses the line in a private repossession from peacekeeping to actively

        participating?

               To answer that question, we must see whether the law clearly established that

        conduct similar to that of Godfrey was unconstitutional. And for that inquiry, we consider

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        decisions of the Supreme Court, this Court and the highest court of the state in which the

        case arose. Edwards, 178 F.3d at 251.7

               Beginning with the Supreme Court, Atkinson claims Soldal clearly establishes the

        right she asserts. We disagree. That case involved a landlord who sought to evict a family

        by removing their trailer home from a rented lot in a mobile home park. Soldal, 506 U.S.

        at 57–58. Under state law, a tenant could not be removed absent a judgment of eviction.

        Id. at 58. Instead of waiting for the legal process underway to run its course, the landlord

        notified the sheriff’s department that it intended to remove the trailer home from the park

        and requested the sheriff’s department’s assistance to “forestall any possible resistance.”

        Id. A sheriff’s deputy arrived at the home with employees of the park owner. The

        employees then “wrench[ed] the sewer and water connections off the side of the trailer

        home, disconnect[ed] the phone, [tore] off the trailer’s canopy and skirting, and hook[ed]

        the home to a tractor.” Id. The sheriff’s deputy also told the tenant that he was there to

        make sure that the tenant did not interfere with the eviction work. Id. Another deputy who

        later arrived on the scene refused to accept any criminal trespass complaint from the tenants

        despite knowing that the landlord did not have an eviction order. Id. at 58–59.

               The Supreme Court held that the unlawful disposition of the home was a “seizure

        invoking the protection of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 61. But it did not decide whether

        the seizure violated the Fourth Amendment, noting that was “a different question that

               7
                 To be sure, our precedent refers to decisions from the highest court of the state in
        which the case arose. But we have not explained how state court decisions might clearly
        define federal constitutional rights. This appeal does not require us to answer this question,
        so we do not address it.
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        requires determining if the seizure was reasonable,” which was an “inquiry [that] entails

        the weighing of various factors” not before the Court. Id. at 61–62. Thus, Soldal establishes

        the general principle that forcible removal of property carried out by a private party but

        supported by government officials can constitute a “seizure” within the meaning of the

        Fourth Amendment. But in doing so, the Court noted the unique circumstances in that case,

        which it described as no “‘garden-variety’ landlord-tenant or commercial dispute.” Id. at

        72. The Court explained that the complaint alleged “that [law enforcement], acting under

        color of state law, dispossessed the Soldals of their trailer home by physically tearing it

        from its foundation and towing it to another lot.” Id.

               The Court also limited the scope of its decision, recognizing that “numerous

        seizures of this type will survive constitutional scrutiny,” and noting the need to balance

        carefully governmental and private interests in determining reasonableness. Id. at 71; see

        also id. (noting that if the officers were acting pursuant to a court order, for example,

        showing unreasonableness under the facts presented would be a “laborious task indeed”).

               So, while Soldal may support the general principle Atkinson advances—that law

        enforcement officials may violate the Fourth Amendment by actively participating in a

        wrongful repossession—that principle is too broad to clearly establish that Godfrey’s

        conduct was unconstitutional. And from a factual standpoint, Soldal is very different from

        the facts Atkinson alleges here. It involved an eviction from a mobile home park, not the

        repossession of a car. And unlike Godfrey’s conduct, the Soldal deputies worked with the

        mobile park owners from the beginning of the eviction efforts to the end. Because the facts

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        in Soldal greatly differ from the facts here, that decision would not have provided fair

        warning to Godfrey that his conduct was unconstitutional.

               Atkinson also contends the Supreme Court’s decision in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.

        67 (1972), clearly established that Godfrey’s conduct violated her Fourth Amendment

        rights. But her reliance on that case is even less compelling. There, the Court held that

        certain state statutes authorizing the seizure of property without prior notice and an

        opportunity to be heard violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id. at

        90–92. So, Fuentes does not even involve the same alleged unlawful seizure that we

        consider here. What’s more, Fuentes does not address what a law enforcement officer is

        lawfully permitted to do when he arrives on the scene of a repossession in progress. Id. at

        96 n.32 (characterizing its holding as narrow and declining to reach the question of whether

        the statutory procedures violated the Fourth Amendment made applicable to the states by

        the Fourteenth Amendment). Therefore, it would not have placed Godfrey on notice that

        his conduct violated the Fourth Amendment.

               With no Supreme Court authority, we would typically look to our Court’s precedent

        and to decisions of the Supreme Court of North Carolina. But the parties agree that neither

        we nor the Supreme Court of North Carolina have addressed the issue presented here.

               Absent decisions from the Supreme Court, our Court and the Supreme Court of

        North Carolina, we may look to a “‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority’ from other

        jurisdictions, if such exists.” Owens ex rel. Owens v. Lott, 372 F.3d 267, 280 (4th Cir. 2004)

        (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999)). But none exists here. Other circuits

        that have addressed this question for the most part agree that “officers are not state actors

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        during a private repossession if they act only to keep the peace, but they cross the line if

        they affirmatively intervene to aid the repossessor.” Marcus v. McCollum, 394 F.3d 813,

        818 (10th Cir. 2004). But there is no consensus on where to draw that line. As recognized

        by the Second Circuit, “no bright line has been drawn delineating the exact point at which

        an officer’s presence and activities at the scene of a repossession become state action in aid

        of the repossession.” Barrett v. Harwood, 189 F.3d 297, 302 (2d Cir. 1999). In fact,

        decisions from other circuit courts are not consistent at all about when an officer’s conduct

        constitutes assistance in the repossession as opposed to peacekeeping. Compare, e.g., id.

        at 302–03 (recognizing the spectrum of police involvement at the scene of a repossession,

        and finding no state action where an officer was dispatched for the purposes of maintaining

        the peace and informed the plaintiff after he struck tow truck operator that “if you start any

        trouble here, you’ll be going in the back seat of my car”), with, e.g., Hensley v. Gassman,

        693 F.3d 681, 691 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding indicia of state action where the officers arrived

        at the property with the repossessor, ordered one plaintiff not to stand between tow truck

        and vehicle, ignored both plaintiffs’ protests and demands to leave the property and told

        one plaintiff that the repossessor was taking the vehicle). So, decisions from our sister

        circuits do not “place[] the . . . constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,

        563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).

               The district court properly recognized that our Court has not addressed the question

        presented here. Even so, it found the Western District of Virginia’s decision in Goard v.

        Crown Auto, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 3d 915 (W.D. Va. 2016), persuasive. But Goard is a district

        court decision from a different state. District court opinions, unlike those from the courts

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        of appeals, do not necessarily settle constitutional standards with respect to claims of

        qualified immunity. Booker, 855 F.3d at 545 (citing Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709

        n.7 (2011)). Such opinions do not have precedential value. Id. And while Goard relies on

        Soldal and Fuentes, we have already explained that neither of those cases provides notice

        of a violation of a clearly established right here.

               Lastly, Atkinson argues that the combination of Soldal, Fuentes and North Carolina

        case law makes clear that the right she alleges was clearly established. But that is not how

        the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis works. We do not decide whether a

        right is clearly established like a customer in a buffet line selectively picking items and

        declining others to come up with the ideal meal. And the reason for this should be clear.

        The second prong of the qualified immunity analysis examines if the law fairly warned an

        officer that his conduct violated the Constitution. Mixing and matching parts of dissimilar

        decisions does not provide fair warning.

               To sum up our qualified immunity analysis, neither the Supreme Court, our Court

        nor North Carolina’s high court has provided fair warning that conduct like Godfrey’s was

        unconstitutional. Nor is there a consensus from other courts of appeals that would have

        provided fair warning to a reasonable officer standing in Godfrey’s shoes. Godfrey is,

        therefore, entitled to qualified immunity.

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                                                    IV.

               We turn next to the defendants’ appeal of the district court’s order denying the

        motion to dismiss the claim against Coats. And we start, as we must, with whether we have

        appellate jurisdiction over that claim.

               To begin, interlocutory review of a denied qualified immunity claim does not

        automatically confer jurisdiction over all other issues in the case. See Swint v. Chambers

        Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 43–51 (1995). Atkinson sued Coats in his official capacity,

        not his individual capacity. Official capacity suits are treated as suits against the

        municipality, Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 688 (4th Cir. 2019), so qualified immunity

        does not apply to such claims, Owens v. Balt. City State’s Att’ys Off., 767 F.3d 379, 402

        (4th Cir. 2014) (“Unlike public officials, municipalities do not enjoy qualified immunity.”).

        That is why “claims against municipalities are measured against current law, without

        regard to whether municipalities’ obligations were clearly established at the time of the

        alleged violations.” Id. Under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694

        (1978), a municipality “may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its

        employees or agents.” In other words, “a municipality cannot be held liable under §1983

        on a respondeat superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Instead, a municipality is only

        liable under § 1983 for following a custom, policy or practice by which local officials

        violate a plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Owens, 767 F.3d at 402 (citing Monell, 436 U.S.

        at 694).

               Normally, Coats’ appeal would not be subject to immediate interlocutory review.

        But pendent appellate jurisdiction is available when an issue is “(1) inextricably

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        intertwined with the decision of the lower court to deny qualified immunity or (2)

        consideration of the additional issue is necessary to ensure meaningful review of the

        qualified immunity question.” Bellotte v. Edwards, 629 F.3d 415, 427 (4th Cir. 2011).

               One way we might have pendent jurisdiction over the defendants’ appeal of the

        district court’s rulings on the claim against Coats is if our disposition of the claim against

        Godfrey necessarily resolved the claim against Coats. On that point, it is true that “a

        municipality cannot be liable in the absence of a constitutional violation by one of its

        agents.” Altman v. City of High Point, 330 F.3d 194, 207 n.10 (4th Cir. 2003); see also

        Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 654 & n.11 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Because we hold that all

        plaintiffs failed to state predicate § 1983 claims against the individual officers, we must

        also hold that all plaintiffs have failed to state supervisory liability, Monell liability, and

        ‘stigma-plus’ claims.”).

               But we have not concluded that Godfrey did not violate Atkinson’s Fourth

        Amendment rights. Instead, under prong two of the qualified immunity analysis, we held

        that the constitutional rights Atkinson claimed Godfrey violated were not clearly

        established at the time of Godfrey’s conduct. And since we have not held that Godfrey did

        not violate Atkinson’s constitutional rights, our disposition of the claim against Godfrey

        does not necessarily resolve the claim against Coats. While it may be less likely that a

        municipality may be found liable when the constitutional terrain was as murky as that here,

        the rules of pendent jurisdiction counsel staying our hand. For that reason, we decline to

        exercise jurisdiction over the appeal with respect to Coats as the issues it presents are not

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        inextricably intertwined with our resolution of the qualified immunity issues.8 Rux v.

        Republic of Sudan, 461 F.3d 461, 475 (4th Cir. 2006) (pendent appellate jurisdiction is an

        exception of limited and narrow application).

                                                    V.

               Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order and remand with instructions to

        grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to the claim against Godfrey. We

        dismiss the appeal with respect to the claim against Coats.

                                 REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART

               8
                 In contrast, we have exercised pendent appellate jurisdiction for Monell claims
        where we ruled at prong one of the qualified immunity analysis that no constitutional
        violation occurred. See e.g., Evans, 703 F.3d at 654 n.11; Altman, 330 F.3d at 207 n.10;
        see also Saunders v. Sheriff of Brevard Cnty., 735 F. App’x 559, 563 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[I]f
        officers violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights but those rights were not ‘clearly
        established,’ then Monell liability could survive even though qualified immunity would
        preclude individual liability.”). Of course, our refusal to exercise jurisdiction over the
        Monell claim should not be construed to suggest any view as to its merits.
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        WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, concurring:

               Municipal budgets are strained. Public schools face deferred maintenance costs.

        Local roads need repair. The fire department may need new equipment. The police

        department may be understaffed. Teachers may be underpaid. Sanitation workers may

        deserve a raise. The perennially starved parks and recreation department may welcome an

        infusion.

               Municipal liability is not easily established. As the majority makes clear, the

        Supreme Court in Monell explicitly rejected respondeat superior liability, meaning that

        municipal liability in turn does not follow a ruling on qualified immunity as a matter of

        course. Municipalities, of course, do not have qualified immunity. Yet the whole idea of

        fair notice that lies at the heart of qualified immunity for individuals need not be wholly

        abandoned when policymakers are concerned. In other words, it is not immediately

        apparent why the municipal fisc should be burdened in the absence of any ascertainable

        federal standards by which municipal policies can be gauged. While municipal bodies may

        have more time or legal advice at their disposal than individual officials do, they are also

        uniquely taxed with devising workable and even novel solutions to their own sets of

        pressing problems.

               The majority notes, “While it may be less likely that a municipality may be found

        liable when the constitutional terrain was as murky as that here, the rules of pendent

        jurisdiction counsel staying our hand.” Maj. Op. at *18. I agree with that statement and I

        thus concur in Judge Quattlebaum’s excellent opinion for the majority.

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