Court Opinion

ID: 9756182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:12:42.869459+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:23.558711
License: Public Domain

McAULIFFE, Judge,
dissenting.
This case, while clearly moot, presents a textbook example of when an appellate court should express its view on the merits of the questions involved. Squarely presented and ably briefed and argued are important questions of substantial public concern “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” So. Pac. Terminal Co. v. Int. Comm. Comm., 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 283, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911). See Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 125, 94 S.Ct. 1694, 712-13, 40 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125, 93 S.Ct. 705, 1699, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973).
*566This Court has made it clear that where there is an urgency to establish a rule of future conduct on a matter of public concern, we will express our views on the questions presented by a moot case. Jones v. State, 302 Md. 153, 158, 486 A.2d 184 (1985). The general rule was well stated by Judge Davidson for the Court in Attorney Gen. v. A.A. Co. School Bus, 286 Md. 324, 328, 407 A.2d 749 (1979):
[A] court may decide a moot question where there is an imperative and manifest urgency to establish a rule of future conduct in matters of important public concern, which may frequently recur, and which, because of inherent time constraints, may not be able to be afforded complete appellate review.
See also State v. Ficker, 266 Md. 500, 507, 295 A.2d 231 (1972); Lloyd v. Supervisors of Elections, 206 Md. 36, 43, 111 A.2d 379 (1954).
In Hamilton v. McAuliffe, 277 Md. 336, 353 A.2d 634 (1976), this Court refused to permit the resolution by declaratory judgment of issues similar to those involved here, pointing out that the petitioner had not sought certiorari after dismissal of his direct appeal. Commenting on the failure of petitioner to seek certiorari, the Court said, “[w]e note that, in a proper case, mootness need not prevent appellate review of the merits.” 277 Md. at 341 n. 3, 353 A.2d 634. Cited as authority for that statement, among other cases, were Roe v. Wade, supra, and John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971). Interestingly, Heston involves similar issues, and represents a determination by the Supreme Court of New Jersey that the public importance of the issues justified a decision even though the case was moot.
I do not understand the majority to say that this case fails to bring before us matters of important public concern. Indeed, the Court concedes that resolution of the issues here presented necessarily involves the weighing and balancing of substantial state interests against fundamental individual rights of constitutional dimension. Certainly the issues generated by this case are more compelling than the *567question of whether an accessory before the fact might be convicted of a greater crime than that of which his principal was convicted, and yet this Court just last year found it appropriate to address the latter issue through the vehicle of a moot case. Jones v. State, supra.
I do not read the majority opinion as suggesting that these issues are likely to come before us for resolution in a case that is not moot. These cases arise under emergency conditions, usually requiring a decision by a trial judge within a matter of hours. The procedures of this Court, even when expedited to accommodate matters that must be decided promptly, are incapable of bringing about adequate briefing, oral argument, and a decision within the time required for proper resolution of these cases. See Roe v. Wade, supra, 410 U.S. at 125, 93 S.Ct. at 712-13. Moreover, where the issues are as complex and as difficult as those inevitably involved in a case of this kind, we should embrace the procedure that permits unhurried contemplation over that which mandates a rush to judgment.
I conclude, then, that the Court’s concern must be that the issues involved in this case are not likely to recur. I disagree. The precise facts of this case may not recur, but the fundamental issues will. While there is a regrettable paucity of authority from state courts of last resort in cases of this type, the literature demonstrates that the problem is a recurring one, and that trial judges, attorneys, health care providers, and other interested persons are in immediate need of guidance.
That we cannot resolve every issue in a single case is hardly reason to refuse to begin. No single search and seizure case serves as a rosetta stone to translate the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to every other case. Some areas of the law do not lend themselves to resolution by broad legislation, but are best developed through a case by case approach. This case affords the Court an excellent opportunity to address major issues that need to be resolved.
*568It is ironic that the feature which dissuades the majority—the involvement of “difficult constitutional questions not capable of easy resolution”—is precisely that which persuades me there is a pressing need for guidance from this Court. Each party and amicus seeks a decision, and none has suggested we avoid the difficult issues on the ground of mootness, or that the issues are likely to reach us in a case that is not moot. At an earlier stage Appellee suggested mootness, but she has withdrawn that argument in express recognition of the public interest involved in the resolution of this case. We exist as a certiorari court to grapple with just such difficult issues, and we ought not turn aside from them.
I am authorized to state that SMITH, J., concurs with the views expressed herein.