Court Opinion

ID: 9388806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 17:07:39.37414+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:22.840570
License: Public Domain

J-S04008-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    AMEER MURPHY                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2263 EDA 2021

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 14, 2021
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                  Criminal Division at CP-51-CR-0005908-2015

BEFORE:      MURRAY, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                                FILED APRIL 21, 2023

        Ameer Murphy (Appellant) appeals from the order dismissing his first

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

        This Court previously detailed the underlying facts:

               On March 16, 2015, just before 10:00 p.m., Leon Williams
        [(Williams)] sat on his porch at 6053 Irving Street in West
        Philadelphia, between 60th and 61st Streets. As he sat on the
        porch smoking cigarettes, he noticed his nephew, the decedent
        Marquan Royster [(the decedent)], approaching him from the
        opposite side of Irving Street via 61st Street. After Williams called
        out, “Hey Nephew!” to the decedent, Appellant … and an
        unidentified individual walked onto the block from 61st Street and
        started following the decedent. In response, the decedent began
        to jog away from the pair. After the three passed Williams’ home,
        Appellant and his accomplice drew laser-sighted pistols and fired
        what Williams thought was three to four shots at the decedent in
        the middle of the street. As the decedent lay dying, Appellant and
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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     his accomplice turned around, ran past Williams’ house for a
     second time, entered a red vehicle parked on 61st Street, and
     drove away. Williams saw Appellant’s face after Appellant passed
     by the home for a second time.

            From his living room at 6052 Irving Street, across the street
     from Williams’ home, Norman Gay [(Gay)] heard gunfire as he
     watched television. After going onto his porch to investigate, Gay
     observed Appellant and his co-conspirator, wearing sweatshirts
     and hoodies, run towards his house from the middle of the street
     to the [] sidewalk, carrying laser-sighted pistols in their hands. As
     he ran past Gay’s home, Appellant’s hood came off his head,
     permitting Gay to observe [Appellant’s] face as he approached
     and ran under a streetlight. After Appellant reached the front
     stairs onto Gay’s porch, Gay’s wife pulled him inside the home.
     Minutes later, Gay returned to the porch and observed a crowd in
     the middle of the street.

           At 9:54 p.m., Philadelphia Police Officer Gary Mercando and
     Sergeant Mirriam Joseph received a radio call for a shooting near
     60th and Irving Streets. Upon arrival, the officers worked their
     way through a crowd of about eight people to the decedent’s body,
     which lay face down in the middle of Irving Street. After
     discovering that the decedent was non-responsive, the officers
     carried him into the back of their squad car and drove him to
     Presbyterian Hospital, where he was pronounced dead.

            Dr. Edwin Lieberman, a forensic pathologist formerly with
     the Philadelphia Medical Examiner’s Office, performed the
     decedent’s autopsy and generated a report.          The decedent
     suffered two gunshot wounds, including a perforating gunshot
     wound to the rear-left side of his head, which was immediately
     fatal, and a perforating gunshot wound to his right shin. Each
     gunshot wound was consistent with the decedent running away
     from his assailants. Assistant Medical Examiner Dr. Khalil Wardak,
     an expert in forensic pathology, conducted an independent review
     of Dr. Lieberman’s report and photographs associated with the
     instant offense. At trial, Dr. Wardak testified, to a reasonable
     degree of medical certainty, that the manner of death [was]
     homicide, caused by a gunshot to the back of the head.

           Officer Michael Lombardi arrived at Irving Street shortly
     after the shooting and secured the area. There, he discovered
     five fired cartridge casings (“FCCs”) on the street.       The

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     Philadelphia crime scene unit ultimately recovered three .380
     caliber FCCs and four .45 caliber FCCs and one .3[80] caliber []
     and .45 projectile, respectively. Ann Marie Barnes, an expert in
     ballistics, reviewed the ballistics recovered from the scene and
     determined that each .380 caliber FCC and each .45 caliber FCC
     were fired from the same weapon for each respective caliber.

           Homicide detectives Frank Mullen and Thorsten Lucke
     recovered a surveillance video from the Baez Grocery Store on
     61st Street near the scene of the shooting. While the video did
     not show the shooting itself, it does show a red vehicle parking
     near Irving Street before the shooting, and the decedent walking
     out of the store immediately prior to the shooting.

           At approximately 11:37 p.m. on [the night of the shooting],
     Appellant arrived at the Camden Medical Center in Camden, New
     Jersey, suffering from a gunshot wound to the foot. After he
     arrived, Officer Jeffrey Kostopolis of the Camden City Police
     Department interviewed [Appellant], who identified himself as
     Quateer Brown, and gave an address of 3133 Tasker Street in
     South Philadelphia. At the hospital, Appellant explained that he
     was waiting for his paramour[,] Jevana Robinson [(Robinson),] at
     4th and Erie Streets in Camden, where he was shot in the foot and
     after which Robinson drove him to the hospital. Camden City
     Police investigated the area around 4th and Erie and discovered
     no evidence of a shooting.

           In March 2015, Philadelphia homicide detectives received
     information identifying a phone number associated with Appellant.
     Detective John Verrecchio [(Detective Verrecchio)] prepared a
     search warrant for the phone number (215) 251-3547, associated
     with Appellant[,] and on March 31, 2015, Detective Verrecchio
     received the cell phone records. Detective Thorsten Lucke also
     reviewed the records and discovered that at 7:15 p.m. on March
     16, 2015, the user of the cell phone texted an unidentified contact,
     “This is Meer Meer.” The phone further contained selfies of
     Appellant and a photo of Appellant in the hospital with a foot
     wound. The internet search history of the phone also revealed
     that the user, on March 17, 2015, searched for a news article
     concerning the instant shooting. The [p]hone’s user history was
     further littered with images of dirt bikes and pornographic videos.

           At 6:00 a.m. on April 1, 2015, Philadelphia police officers
     obtained and executed a search warrant for Appellant’s home at

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       3138 Tasker Street in South Philadelphia. There, officers
       recovered the iPhone 5c associated with the (215) 251-3547
       number and detained Appellant to question him at the homicide
       unit within the Police Administration Building. That morning,
       homicide detective Thomas Gaul Mirandized[1] and interviewed
       Appellant, who gave detectives consent to search the phone.

             During the interview, Appellant denied any involvement in
       the homicide, but explained to the detective that the decedent
       was killed in retaliation for the murder of [Appellant’s] best friend
       Damien James [(James)]. Appellant further claimed that he shot
       himself on the corner of 25th and Moore Streets in South
       Philadelphia, that he went to Camden, New Jersey[,] for medical
       treatment, and gave doctors a fake name while he was there, but
       did not explain why. Detective Gaul examined police reports for
       that night and discovered a complaint about two males who were
       shot on the 1600 block of South Taylor Street in South
       Philadelphia.

             At 8:00 p.m. that evening, Detective Verrecchio re-
       Mirandized Appellant and conducted a second interview. Then,
       Appellant described how he was in South Philadelphia at the time
       of the shooting, and that there was an ongoing conflict between a
       group of males from 20th Street against a group from 24th Street.
       Appellant identified himself as a member of the 20th Street
       group[] and described the decedent as a member of the opposing
       faction. James, whose death Appellant described as a catalyst for
       the conflict between the groups and the instant shooting, was a
       member of the 20th Street group with Appellant.

             Before the interview, Detective Verrecchio examined the
       phone records for the 3547 number, which contained geolocation
       information for each phone call. By entering the coordinates into
       a Google Maps search, Detective Verrecchio was able to create a
       map for each phone call, demonstrating that the user was in West
       Philadelphia near [] 61st and Irving Streets at the time of the
       shooting. When Detective Verrecchio confronted Appellant with
       this map during the interview, Appellant exclaimed that “[his] life
       [was] over,” and asked Detective Verrecchio if [Appellant] could
____________________________________________

1  See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (a defendant subject to
custodial interrogation must be advised of his constitutional right to remain
silent and his right to a lawyer in clear and unequivocal language).

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     [accept culpability for] the whole case himself without naming any
     other associates. After further questioning, Appellant refused to
     sign a written statement, but Detective Verrecchio prepared his
     own summary of the interview.

            After Appellant’s arrest, Detective James Dunlap, an expert
     in cell phone tower analysis, analyzed the records for the phone
     associated with Appellant and identified more than three dozen
     connections on March 16, 2015. Between 7:50 p.m. and 9:21
     p.m., the phone associated with Appellant made seven
     connections at the tower located at 63rd and Walnut Streets, near
     the scene of the shooting. At 9:53 p.m., the phone associated
     with Appellant made a call from a different sector of the same
     tower. From 9:56 p.m. to 10:05 p.m., the phone travelled from
     a series of towers further west, connecting with towers in Upper
     Darby, Pennsylvania, the 6700 block of Baltimore Avenue in West
     Philadelphia, 58th and Springfield Streets, and on 67th and
     Essington Streets. By 10:19 p.m., the phone connected with a
     tower on Passyunk Avenue in South Philadelphia. Between 10:19
     and 11:18, the phone connected with numerous towers in an area
     between Broad Street and Interstate 76 west east to west [sic]
     and from South Street down to Passyunk Avenue north to south.
     At 11:27 p.m., the phone connected with a tower in Camden, New
     Jersey, near the Camden Medical Center. At trial, Detective
     Dunlap testified that the time and location of the connections
     indicate that the use of the phone was in the area of the shooting
     at the time it occurred, and then was inside a vehicle that travelled
     between the identified towers.

            At trial, Appellant’s mother, Questina Woods [(Woods)],
     testified that the 3547 numbered phone belonged to her daughter,
     but that [Woods] was in possession of the phone on the evening
     of the shooting, and the phone was in [Woods’] possession while
     she was visiting a prospective new home at 57th and Hazel
     Avenue in West Philadelphia, blocks from where the shooting
     occurred.       On cross-examination, when confronted about
     pornography discovered on the phone, Woods testified that she
     often used her phone to search for pornography, but could not
     explain answers to text messages identifying the user as “Meer
     Meer,” Appellant’s nickname.

           Appellant elected to testify at [his jury] trial and explained
     that he was at 24th and Morris Streets from 6:00 to 10:30 p.m.
     Then, while Appellant and his friend Lawrence Shiver sat in a Buick

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      LeSabre, an unidentified vehicle pulled up next to them and fired
      into the passenger compartment, striking Appellant in the foot.
      After that shooting, Appellant went to Woods’ home, and had her
      drive him to a hospital in Camden, New Jersey. Appellant elected
      to check into a New Jersey hospital and provided a pseudonym,
      he explained, because he feared being arrested for a probation
      violation if he treated his wound in Philadelphia. Appellant further
      claimed that Woods had the 3547 numbered cell phone from 6:00
      p.m. until [Appellant’s] arrival at the Camden Medical Center.

Commonwealth v. Murphy, 222 A.3d 847 (Pa. Super. 2019) (unpublished

memorandum at 1-10) (footnote added; citation and some brackets omitted).

      In April 2015, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with murder and

related offenses. Prior to trial, on January 8, 2018, the Commonwealth offered

Appellant a negotiated plea of an aggregate 25 - 50 years in prison, in

exchange for pleading guilty to third-degree murder, conspiracy, and firearms

offenses. As discussed below, Appellant repeatedly rejected the offer, which

the trial court confirmed in a colloquy on the record. See N.T., 1/8/18, at 40-

44, infra; N.T., 4/2/18, at 12-18, infra.

      The case proceeded to trial in April 2018. George S. Yacoubian, Esquire

(Trial Counsel), represented Appellant.     On April 6, 2018, the jury found

Appellant guilty of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder,

possession of an instrument of crime, and two firearms offenses. The trial

court sentenced Appellant to life in prison that same day. Appellant did not

file post-sentence motions.

      Appellant filed a direct appeal claiming the trial court erred in admitting

a witness’s prior written statement into evidence.         This Court rejected

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Appellant’s claim and affirmed the judgment of sentence. See Murphy, 222

A.3d 847 (unpublished memorandum at 11-15).               Appellant petitioned for

allowance of appeal, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied.

Commonwealth v. Murphy, 227 A.3d 311 (Pa. 2020). Appellant did not

seek review with the United States Supreme Court.

       On June 9, 2021, Appellant filed the instant, timely PCRA petition,2 his

first, through Attorney Todd M. Mosser (PCRA Counsel). Appellant claimed he

       is entitled to relief based on [T]rial [C]ounsel’s failure to renew his
       motion for a mistrial after the Commonwealth repeatedly asked
       [Commonwealth] witnesses if they knew a group of young men
       seated in the gallery [at trial,] in an attempt to create the
       inference of witness intimidation.

PCRA Petition, 6/9/21, ¶ 9.

       On August 19, 2021, the Commonwealth filed a response in which it

argued that Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim lacked merit. A week later, the

PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss Appellant’s

petition without a hearing. Appellant did not respond. By order and opinion

____________________________________________

2 PCRA petitions must be filed within one year of when the petitioner’s
judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); see also
id. § 9545(b)(3) (a judgment of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of
direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the
United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of
time for seeking the review.”). Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence
became final on June 14, 2020, ninety days after the expiration of time to
seek certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. Thus, Appellant’s June
9, 2021, petition is timely. See also PCRA Court Order and Opinion,
10/14/21, at 7 (concluding Appellant’s “instant petition is timely.”).

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entered October 14, 2021, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA

petition.

       Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. On November 9, 2021, the

PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of

errors. Appellant timely complied, through PCRA Counsel, on November 30,

2021.3

       On March 14, 2022, Appellant pro se filed a petition in this Court seeking

permission to proceed pro se and a hearing pursuant to Commonwealth v.

Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). Appellant further claimed he was entitled

to relief

       in light of the recent PA Supreme Court decision in
       Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021)[,] where
       the Court held that [a] PCRA petitioner may raise claims of PCRA
       counsel’s ineffectiveness at [the] first opportunity to do so, even
       when on appeal.

Petition for Grazier Hearing, 3/14/22, ¶ 1.

       On April 14, 2022, PCRA Counsel filed an application to withdraw based

on   Appellant’s    stated    intention    to    raise   claims   of   PCRA   Counsel’s

ineffectiveness pursuant to Bradley. Application, 4/14/22, ¶¶ 2-3; see also

id. Ex. A (Appellant’s April 5, 2022, correspondence to PCRA Counsel). PCRA

____________________________________________

3 Appellant asserted the same claim raised in the PCRA petition, i.e., Trial
Counsel was ineffective for “failing to renew his motion for a mistrial after the
Commonwealth repeatedly asked witnesses if they knew a group of young
men seated in the gallery in an attempt to create the inference of witness
intimidation.” Concise Statement, 11/30/21, at 1.

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Counsel averred, “in light of the claims that Appellant wishes to pursue, the

undersigned counsel is required to withdraw from further representation in

this matter.” Id. ¶ 5; see also Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121,

132 (Pa. 2011) (as a general rule, counsel cannot raise their own

ineffectiveness).

       On April 25, 2022, this Court remanded the case for the PCRA court to

conduct a Grazier hearing to determine whether Appellant’s request to

proceed pro se was knowing and voluntary. Order, 4/25/22. The PCRA court

then held a Grazier hearing at which Appellant announced he “does not wish

to represent himself.” Order, 5/31/21. The PCRA court granted PCRA Counsel

permission to withdraw and appointed Joseph Schultz, Esquire, to represent

Appellant.4 Id. The PCRA court returned the record to this Court. Appellant,

through Attorney Schultz, presents two issues for review:

       [1.] Whether PCRA [C]ounsel was ineffective under the Sixth
       Amendment for failing to identify and raise the claim that [T]rial
       [C]ounsel was ineffective for failing to adequately consult with
       [Appellant] about the wisdom of accepting the Commonwealth’s
       offer to plead guilty?

       [2.] Whether PCRA [C]ounsel was ineffective under the Sixth
       and Fourteenth Amendments for failing to identify and raise the
       claim that [T]rial [C]ounsel was ineffective for failing to object to
       the trial court’s defective jury instruction on accomplice liability in
       that the court failed to instruct that for [Appellant] to be convicted
       of first-degree murder as an accomplice, the Commonwealth must
____________________________________________

4 See Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C) (providing “when an unrepresented defendant
satisfies the judge that the defendant is unable to afford or otherwise procure
counsel, the judge shall appoint counsel to represent the defendant on the
defendant’s first petition for post-conviction collateral relief.”).

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      prove that [Appellant] shared the shooter’s specific intent to kill?

Appellant’s Brief at viii.

      “When reviewing the denial of a PCRA petition, an appellate court must

determine whether the PCRA court’s order is supported by the record and free

of legal error.”   Commonwealth v. Drummond, 285 A.3d 625, 633 (Pa.

2022) (citation, quotations, and footnote omitted).

      Preliminarily, we recognize that in Bradley, our Supreme Court held “a

PCRA petitioner may, after a PCRA court denies relief, and after obtaining new

counsel or acting pro se, raise claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at the

first opportunity to do so, even if on appeal.” Bradley, 261 A.3d at 401; see

also Commonwealth v. Crumbley, 270 A.3d 1171, 1175 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(under Bradley, “layered claims of ineffective PCRA counsel may now be

raised for the first time on appeal if that is the earliest practical opportunity

to do so.”).

      The Supreme Court recently expanded on Bradley, stating:

      We recognized that the structure of appeal and collateral review
      “places great importance on the competency of initial PCRA
      counsel,” and reasoned that “it is essential that a petitioner
      possess a meaningful method by which to realize his right to
      effective PCRA counsel.” Bradley, 261 A.3d at 401. We stated
      that “this approach best recognizes a petitioner’s right to effective
      PCRA counsel while advancing equally legitimate concerns that
      criminal matters be efficiently and timely concluded.” Id. at 405.
      We further explained:

           In some instances, the record before the appellate court
           will be sufficient to allow for disposition of any newly-
           raised ineffectiveness claims.       Commonwealth v.
           Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 577 (Pa. 2013). However, in

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          other cases, the appellate court may need to remand to
          the PCRA court for further development of the record and
          for the PCRA court to consider such claims as an initial
          matter. Consistent with our prior case law, to advance a
          request for remand, a petition would be required to
          provide more than mere “boilerplate assertions of PCRA
          counsel’s ineffectiveness,” Commonwealth v. Hall, 872
          A.2d 1177, 1182 (Pa. 2005); however, where there are
          “material facts at issue concerning claims challenging
          counsel’s stewardship and relief is not plainly unavailable
          as a matter of law, the remand should be afforded[.]”
          Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 740 n.2 (Pa.
          2002) (Saylor, J., concurring).

      Id. at 402. We also stated that [Pa.R.A.P.] 302(a), which provides
      that “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot
      be raised for the first time on appeal,” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), “does not
      pertain to these scenarios.” Id. at 405.

Commonwealth v. Parrish, 273 A.3d 989, 1002 (Pa. 2022) (some brackets

omitted and citations modified).

      Instantly, we conclude Appellant “adequately raised and preserved his

layered claim[s] of the ineffective assistance of [T]rial … [C]ounsel by raising

[them] at the first opportunity to do so, specifically in … his brief filed with

this Court in this appeal.” Id. at 1002. The Commonwealth concedes that

Appellant “is permitted to raise these claims on appeal because it was his ‘first

opportunity to do so.’”   Commonwealth Brief at 11 (quoting Bradley, 261

A.3d at 401); cf. Commonwealth v. Womack, 2022 WL 17099016 (Pa.

Super.   2022)    (unpublished     memorandum       at   2-3)   (agreeing    with

Commonwealth’s waiver argument where PCRA petitioner raised PCRA

counsel’s ineffectiveness for the first time in his appellate brief, but not his

court-ordered Rule 1925(b) concise statement). Further, our review of the

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record reveals that it is “sufficient to allow for disposition of [Appellant’s]

newly [] raised ineffectiveness claims.” Parrish, supra.

       In his first issue, Appellant claims PCRA Counsel was ineffective for

“failing to identify and raise the claim that [T]rial [C]ounsel was ineffective for

failing to adequately consult with [Appellant] about the wisdom of accepting

the Commonwealth’s offer to plead guilty.”            Appellant’s Brief at 9.5   Our

Supreme Court has instructed that for “a petitioner to properly raise and

prevail on a layered ineffectiveness claim, sufficient to warrant relief if

meritorious, he must plead, present and prove” the ineffectiveness of

appellate/PCRA counsel, which “necessarily reaches back” to the actions of

trial counsel. Commonwealth v. McGill, 832 A.2d 1014, 1022 (Pa. 2003)

(emphasis omitted).         Counsel “is presumed effective, and to rebut that

presumption,      the   PCRA     petitioner    must   demonstrate   that   counsel’s

performance was deficient and that such deficiency prejudiced him.”

Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121, 132 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted);

see also Commonwealth v. Charleston, 94 A.3d 1012, 1019 (Pa. Super.

____________________________________________

5 Appellant correctly avers that this claim is cognizable under the PCRA. See
Appellant’s Brief at 14-15 (citing Commonwealth v. Lynch, 820 A.2d 728,
732 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“If the ineffective assistance of counsel caused the
defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea, the PCRA will afford the
defendant relief.”); see also id. at 14 (citing Commonwealth v. Albert, 561
A.2d 736, 738-39 (Pa. 1989) (recognizing, “at the very least, appellant must
be allowed the right to have an appeal aided by competent counsel. The
guidance and representation of an attorney should assure that meritorious
legal issues are recognized and addressed, and that meritless claims are
foregone.”)).

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2014) (to establish prejudice, a petitioner must show that absent counsel’s

conduct, there is a “reasonable probability” that the outcome of the

proceedings would have been different). “In determining a layered claim of

ineffectiveness, the critical inquiry is whether the first attorney that the

defendant asserts was ineffective did, in fact, render ineffective assistance of

counsel.” Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1270 (Pa. Super. 2010).

“If that attorney was effective, then subsequent counsel cannot be deemed

ineffective for failing to raise the underlying issue.”       Id.   Finally, when

“evaluating ineffectiveness claims, judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance

must be highly deferential.” Commonwealth v. Lesko, 15 A.3d 345, 380

(Pa. 2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

       Appellant argues Trial Counsel “was ineffective for failing to adequately

advise or urge [Appellant] to accept the plea offer, [and] PCRA [C]ounsel was

ineffective for not raising this claim in his amended petition.” Appellant’s Brief

at 14. With respect to Trial Counsel’s representation, Appellant avers it “is

not enough for counsel to merely repeat the plea terms, the sentence

possibilities, and the chances of trial success.” Id. at 11.6 Appellant claims

“[n]ot only did [T]rial [C]ounsel fail to discuss the plea offer fully, but he also

deprived [Appellant] of the opportunity to make a reasonably informed

____________________________________________

6 According to Appellant’s counsel, he contacted Trial Counsel, “who stated
that he has no recollection of the details about the plea offer.” Appellant’s
Brief at 9 n.2 (citing November 3, 2022, email from Trial Counsel, Ex. B).

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decision on whether to accept the plea offer or go to trial.” Id. at 12-13; see

also id. at 12 (asserting Trial Counsel “took a neutral position on the plea.”).

In the alternative, Appellant claims Trial Counsel “should have accepted on

[Appellant’s] behalf when the trial court offered to keep the plea [offer] open

for another week.”    Id. at 12.   Appellant contends “PCRA Counsel had no

reasonable basis for failing to raise [T]rial [C]ounsel’s ineffectiveness,” id. at

15, and such failure prejudiced Appellant, who “is willing to testify that he

would have accepted the [plea] offer.” Id. at 16.

      The Commonwealth counters:

             [Appellant’s] argument is fatally undermined by his
      unequivocal rejection of the plea offer following two thorough
      colloquies, during which the trial court generously described just
      how favorable the plea offer was as well as the risks of going to
      trial.

                                     ***

             [Appellant’s] resolute rejection of the plea offer belies his
      current claim that he would have accepted it if only [T]rial
      [C]ounsel had urged him more forcefully. [Appellant] confirmed
      that he knew he risked a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment
      without parole for first-degree murder by taking his case to trial.
      [Appellant] was unmoved by the prospect of [being released on]
      parole in his mid-40’s or stories about others who had been in his
      position and regretted going to trial. The trial court offered
      [Appellant] multiple occasions to change his mind, and [he]
      rejected each one. … The strength of [Appellant’s] resolve to go
      to trial was established by the record and conclusively establishes
      that [T]rial [C]ounsel could not have prevailed upon [Appellant]
      to accept the plea offer. For that reason, this claim fails for lack
      of prejudice.

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Commonwealth Brief at 13, 14-15. The Commonwealth further observes that

Appellant “never explains what [Trial C]ounsel could or should have told him

differently….” Id. at 15.

      “A criminal defendant has the right to effective counsel during a plea

process as well as during a trial.” Commonwealth v. Kehr, 180 A.3d 754,

760 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted); see also Lafler v. Cooper, 566

U.S. 156, 162 (2012) (“Defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel,

a right that extends to the plea-bargaining process” (citations omitted)).

      However,

             a post-conviction petitioner seeking relief on the basis that
      ineffective assistance of counsel caused him or her to reject a
      guilty plea must demonstrate the following circumstance:

          [B]ut for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a
          reasonable probability that the plea offer would have
          been presented to the court (i.e., that the defendant
          would have accepted the plea and the prosecution
          would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening
          circumstances), that the court would have accepted its
          terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both,
          under the offer’s terms would have been less severe than
          under the judgment and sentence that in fact were
          imposed.

Commonwealth v. Steckley, 128 A.3d 826, 832 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(emphasis added) (quoting Lafler, 566 U.S. at 164).

      Here, the trial court advised Appellant, prior to trial, as follows:

      [THE COURT]: The bottom line is, [Appellant,] you are being
      given an opportunity. It then becomes in your control, if the
      parole board would parole you, to be released in your late 40s.
      Am I correct in my math?

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     [Trial Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.

     THE COURT: Versus dying in prison. That is not my decision, that
     is not your attorney’s decision, that is not the Commonwealth’s
     decision, other than making the offer, as to whether or not to
     accept that offer.

     Do you understand that, sir?

     [Appellant]: Yes.

     THE COURT: You, and you alone, can make a decision about
     whether or not you wish to enter into that plea. Do you
     have any questions, first of all, about the plea?

     [Appellant]: No.

     THE COURT: Do you understand what the Commonwealth has to
     prove to convict you?

     [Appellant]: Yes.

     THE COURT: Do you understand what the possible penalties
     are?

     [Appellant]: Yes.

     THE COURT: And have you had sufficient opportunity to discuss
     the defenses in your case? I know your attorney has filed an alibi
     defense. In essence, as I understand it, you were shot in the foot
     that day, and the defense is, I was not shot at the scene of this
     crime. I was shot at the scene of another crime.

     Am I correct, counsel?

     [Trial Counsel]: That’s correct.

                                    ***

     THE COURT: … [H]as [Trial] [C]ounsel reviewed with you all
     possible defenses?

     [Appellant]: Yes.

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     THE COURT:     Has he reviewed the conditions of this plea
     with you?

     [Appellant]: Yes.

     THE COURT: And has he given you … his opinion, or his
     advice, as to whether or what you should consider before
     you make up your mind?

     [Appellant]: Yes.

     THE COURT: Okay. Has he answered all questions that you
     had in that regard?

     [Appellant]: Yes.

     THE COURT: So are you prepared to make a decision as to
     whether or not you wish to enter into this plea or whether you
     wish to proceed for trial? I was assuming you wanted to go to
     trial because that was what your attorney was telling me, so that’s
     why we went through all of these dates. But I apologize for that.
     Now, … I should have asked you, first, whether or not you
     wish to plea or accept that negotiation. I was assuming that
     you were not, but do you understand I shouldn’t assume
     anything?

     [Appellant]: I don’t want to accept it.

     THE COURT: Okay. So you’re rejecting it?

     [Appellant]: Yes.

     THE COURT: I am going to give you an opportunity, if you
     want it. I will request that the DA hold off and keep that
     offer open for another week or so if you want more time to
     talk with your family members or anyone else, or are you
     adamant that you’re ready to make that decision today?

     [Appellant]: Yes, I’m ready to make it today.

     THE COURT: Then what is your decision, sir?

     [Appellant]: I’m not taking it.

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N.T., 1/8/18, at 40-44 (emphasis added; some capitalization modified).

      Again, prior to the commencement of trial, the trial court thoroughly

colloquied Appellant about his decision to reject the plea offer:

      THE COURT: … [F]or many years I’ve sat where your counsel sat,
      and I know there’s a misimpression in the prison where guys
      will talk to other guys and say, [“]Don’t worry about it, go
      to trial, because if you lose, you’ll get reversed on
      appeal.[”]

               My response to them was, [y]ou’re listening to people
      who couldn’t save themselves? You’re listening to people in prison
      that got convicted already? You should listen to me.

               I don’t know what happened [the] day [of the shooting].
      I’m not your attorney. You have a fine attorney. And I don’t know
      what your communications have been between the two of you,
      but he’s there to give you advice. Ultimately, you make the
      decision because you do the time. …

                                     ***

      [THE COURT]: I’m telling you this for a variety of reasons, but we
      have a few more minutes before we get started.

      Why don’t you tell me for a second while you think I’m
      telling you all this?

      [Appellant]: Because you know how serious it can get.

      THE COURT: Right. And this is the time that you have to make
      the best decision for you. And you have to consider your options,
      weigh the advantages of pleading and the disadvantages. I’ll tell
      you what I tell everyone. I don’t want anyone ever in this
      courtroom to plead guilty when they didn’t do it or plead no
      contest or plead anything else.

               But I would like someone who is your age, young, who, if
      they did do something and made a serious mistake, I don’t want
      to send you to jail for the rest of your life. I don’t want to do it.
      There are certain cases that as a judge, yeah, maybe, I would
      send someone to jail for the rest of their lives without thinking

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     twice. Generally speaking, it’s not a 20-year-old, because I realize
     that things happen on the street that shouldn’t happen. But I
     have to do that.

              You know, now that I’ve been practicing here in the city
     for almost 40 years, I have a better sense of what that time is
     like. Before, when I was still practicing [law], I would get letters
     from people that would tell me … I should have listened to you;
     I’d be out by now. Those were hard letters to read.

            Again, it’s your call. We’re taking the time to make
     sure you understand everything. I think you do. We’ve had
     conversations in the past. Do you have any questions?

     [Appellant]: No.

     THE COURT: All right. Now, what the Commonwealth is
     saying, even though you didn’t ask for it, you know, they
     would give you 25 to 50 years. That’s their bottom line. They
     think that’s what the case is worth. Take a look.

             Sheriff, can [Appellant] look around and see if there’s
     anyone in the room other than the family?

              Do you trust those people in the courtroom?

     [Appellant]: Yes.

                                   ***

     [THE COURT]: The bottom line is … we’re going to start picking
     the jury. If you’re innocent, by all means, please, go to trial.
     That’s what the system is about. That’s your constitutional right.
     You’ll get a fair trial. … So do you have any questions about
     the negotiations?

     [Appellant]: No.

                                   ***

     [THE COURT]: You have counsel. You’re going to have some
     more time to talk to him about it. But as of now, do you
     want a trial or do you want a non[-]trial?

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      [Appellant]: I want a trial.

      THE COURT: Okay. We will get the jurors in the room.

               [Trial] Counsel, why don’t you take a little more
      time to talk to [Appellant]. I’m assuming that his decision is
      final unless you tell me something differently ….

N.T., 4/2/18, at 12-17, 18 (emphasis added; some capitalization modified).

      The exchanges between the trial court and Appellant belie Appellant’s

claim of Trial Counsel’s ineffectiveness. Appellant has failed to prove he would

have accepted the Commonwealth’s plea offer if Trial Counsel had advised him

differently.   See Steckley, supra.     As Trial Counsel was not ineffective,

Appellant’s layered claim of PCRA Counsel’s ineffectiveness fails.           See

Burkett, 5 A.3d at 1270 (if trial counsel was effective, “then subsequent

counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise the underlying

issue.”).

      In Appellant’s second issue, he raises a layered ineffectiveness claim

based on Trial Counsel’s failure to object to the trial court’s purportedly

“defective” jury instruction on accomplice liability. See Appellant’s Brief at

17-23; see also id. at 22 (“Because it is unknown which shooter fired the

fatal shots, it is exceedingly likely that the jury convicted [Appellant] as an

accomplice, believing that it did not matter who fired the fatal shots.”).

      Where a party challenges the propriety of a jury instruction, an appellate

Court must review

      the relevant portion of the trial court’s charge in context, as a
      whole, and mindful of the trial court’s broad discretion in phrasing

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      jury instructions as well as the principle that unless a particular
      instruction is fundamentally erroneous or would have “misled or
      confused the jury” no relief is due.

Commonwealth v. Simpson, 66 A.3d 253, 268 (Pa. 2013) (citation

omitted).   Simply put, “an appellate court must consider the charge in its

entirety, rather than discrete portions of the instruction.” Commonwealth

v. Montalvo, 244 A.3d 359, 368 (Pa. 2021). “The trial court has broad

discretion in phrasing the charge and the instruction will not be found in error

if, taken as a whole, it adequately and accurately set forth the applicable law.”

Commonwealth v. Daniels, 963 A.2d 409, 430 (Pa. 2009).               “Where an

instruction is alleged to be ambiguous, the standard for review is whether

there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied it in a manner that

violates the Constitution.” Commonwealth v. Markman, 916 A.2d 586, 613

(Pa. 2007).

      Appellant assails the following statement by the trial court in instructing

the jury that

      the defendant is an accomplice of another for a particular crime if
      the following two elements are proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
      The defendant had the intent to promote or facilitate the
      commission of that crime and the defendant solicits, commands,
      encourages or requests the other person to commit it, aids, agrees
      to aid or attempts to aid the other person in committing the crime
      or plan.

N.T., 4/6/18, at 26; see also Appellant’s Brief at 17.

      According to Appellant, it “is likely the jury convicted [Appellant] with

an improper jury instruction.”    Appellant’s Brief at 23.    Appellant claims,

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“[w]ithout advising the jury about the ‘specific intent to kill’ requirement, the

instant jury could have wrongly concluded that just ‘bringing about the death’

of the victim as an accomplice was sufficient for first-degree murder.” Id. at

18; see also id. at 20 (“Instead of the standard instruction, the trial court

should have offered the jury the accomplice liability instruction for first-degree

murder.”). Appellant further argues

      the trial court’s instruction was vague and undefined. The court
      informed the jury that for accomplice liability, the jury must find
      that [Appellant] had “the intent to promote or facilitate the
      commission of that crime.” N.T., 4/06/2018, at 26 (emphasis
      added). “That crime,” however, was undefined. [Appellant] was
      charged with multiple crimes.

Id. at 18.

      Conversely, the Commonwealth states:

      [Appellant] cannot show prejudice because the jury could not
      have convicted him based on a faulty theory of accomplice
      liability. The evidence of [Appellant’s] role as the principal killer
      was overwhelming, and the record conclusively established
      [Appellant’s] specific intent to kill.

            Indeed, [Appellant] interposed an alibi defense – i.e., he
      defended not on the basis that he may have been involved but did
      not intend to kill, but on the basis that he was not present or
      involved in the incident at all. The evidence starkly proved
      otherwise.

Commonwealth Brief at 18 (italics in original).

      Appellant concedes “the trial court later instructed the jury on the

mens rea for first-degree murder and that first-degree murder requires a

specific intent to kill….” Appellant’s Brief at 19; see also N.T., 4/6/18, at 30-

33. Further, our review discloses that the challenged jury instruction, viewed

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as a whole, was not so “fundamentally erroneous” as to have “misled or

confused the jury[.]” Simpson, supra; see also Daniels, 963 A.2d at 432

(“Considering the instructions in their entirety, and not an excerpt in isolation,

it is apparent that the trial court instructed the jury on accomplice liability

consistent with this Court’s case law.”). Thus, there is no reasonable likelihood

that the jury applied the jury instruction “in a manner that violates the

Constitution.” Markman, supra.

      Even if the trial court had erred in instructing the jury on accomplice

liability, the error would be harmless. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has

explained:

      The harmless error doctrine, as adopted in Pennsylvania, reflects
      the reality that the accused is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect
      trial. We have described the proper analysis as follows:

           Harmless error exists if the record demonstrates either:
           (1) the error did not prejudice the defendant or the
           prejudice was de minimis; or (2) the erroneously
           admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other
           untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the
           erroneously admitted evidence; or (3) the properly
           admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so
           overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was
           so insignificant by comparison that the error could not
           have contributed to the verdict.

Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 671-72 (Pa. 2014) (citations

omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Noel, 104 A.3d 1156, 1169 (Pa.

2014) (“If a trial error does not deprive the defendant of the fundamentals of

a fair trial, his conviction will not be reversed.” (citation omitted)).

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         Any prejudice from the trial court’s jury instruction would have been de

minimis, as “the uncontradicted evidence of [Appellant’s] guilt was so

overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant by

comparison that the error could not have contributed to the verdict.”

Hairston, 84 A.3d at 672. In deciding Appellant’s direct appeal, this Court

concluded that the Commonwealth presented overwhelming evidence of

Appellant’s guilt. We explained:

                Both Williams and [] Gay identified Appellant as the shooter
         at trial and in earlier statements to the police. The prosecution
         presented records from a phone that was at the location of the
         shooting at the time it had occurred. The phone contained selfies
         of Appellant and text messages sent from “Meer Meer” a few hours
         before the shooting occurred. N.T., 4/4/18, at 144-45.

               The phone’s geolocation records also showed the phone was
         brought back to Appellant’s home after the shooting and
         eventually taken to a Camden hospital, where Appellant
         admittedly checked in with a gunshot wound to the foot. Appellant
         gave a fake name to the Camden medical personnel[] and
         indicated he had been shot in Camden. However, Camden police
         found no evidence of a shooting in the area Appellant reported.
         When confronted with his phone records, Appellant exclaimed [to
         police] that his “life [was] over” and indicated that he would take
         responsibility for the murder if no one else was prosecuted. N.T.,
         4/4/18, at 97.

                Moreover, the Commonwealth presented evidence that
         would allow the jury to infer that Appellant had a motive to kill the
         [decedent]; Appellant admitted the [decedent] was a member of
         a rival gang who was suspected to have murdered Appellant’s best
         friend.

Murphy, 222 A.3d 847 (unpublished memorandum at 14-15).

         Consistent with the foregoing, Appellant’s second ineffectiveness issue

fails.   See Commonwealth v. Bishop, 936 A.2d 1136, 1140 (Pa. Super.

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2007) (stating where “evidence of guilt is overwhelming, counsel’s purported

ineffectiveness fails the prejudice prong”) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we

affirm the PCRA court’s dismissal of Appellant’s first PCRA petition.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/21/2023

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