Court Opinion

ID: 9562357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:26:59.64941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:18.407943
License: Public Domain

Justice MULLARKEY
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The majority in this case holds that “an employee sustaining a work-related injury who is subsequently terminated for fault from the employment out of which the injury arose prior to reaching maximum medical improvement is not automatically barred from receiving temporary total disability benefits.” Maj. op. at 547. The court also remands to determine “whether the alleged wage loss was caused in part by the injury or rather was caused only by the termination for fault.” Maj. op. at 548. While I agree that an injured employee is eligible for temporary total disability benefits if the injury is work-related and temporarily causes total disability, I disagree with the majority’s holding that the issue of fault must be addressed. Based upon the plain language of the statute, I would hold that a claimant is entitled to temporary total disability benefits for the loss of earning capacity caused by the work-related injury.
In construing a statute, “we seek to determine the intent of the legislature as expressed in the language it selected.” Triad Painting Co. v. Blair, 812 P.2d 638, 644 (Colo.1991). Where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the statute should be applied as written. Griffin v. S.W. Devanney & Co., Inc., 775 P.2d 555, 559 (Colo.1989).
Section 8-42-105(1), 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.), specifically states, in relevant part:
In case of temporary total disability of more than three regular working days’ duration, the employee shall receive sixty-six and two-thirds percent of said employee’s average weekly wages so long as such disability is total, not to exceed a maximum of ninety-one percent of the state average weekly wage per week. Except where vocational rehabilitation is offered and accepted as provided in section 8-42-111(3), temporary total disability payments shall cease upon the occurrence of any of the events enumerated in subsection (S) of this section.
(emphasis added). Subsection (3) of the same section terminates temporary total disability benefits upon the occurrence of any one of the following conditions:
(a) The employee reaches maximum medical improvement;
(b) The employee returns to regular or modified employment;
(e) The attending physician gives the employee a written release to return to regular employment; or
*550(d) The attending physician gives the employee a written release to return to modified employment, such employment is offered to the employee in ■writing, and the employee fails to begin such employment.
§ 8-42-105(3), 3B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.).
Under this section, a claimant is entitled to temporary total disability payments once an injury occurs which lasts longer than three days’ duration. None of the exceptions terminates benefits based upon fault or termination of employment. Temporary total disability benefits are only limited by the occurrence of one of the four listed conditions. I see no basis for creating additional disqualifying factors not found in the statute.
Limiting disqualification to the four statutory factors is important because the disability is total although limited in time. If a person suffers a work-related injury and cannot work, he or she must be compensated for the loss of opportunity and ability to continue working for the current employer or to seek similar employment in another place of business. The temporary total disability provision of the statute is the method selected by the legislature to compensate the injured person for that temporary inability to work and to seek work. If the worker can obtain modified or other work, temporary total disability payments end under section 8-42-105(3)(b).
The issue of fault, then, is irrelevant to the inquiry. Regardless of whether Stanberg was terminated from his position or not, the fact remains that he was not able to continue his work at PDM Molding or to perform similar tasks elsewhere as a result of his work-related injury. Because of his loss of ability caused by the work-related injury, the workers’ compensation law entitles him to compensation.1
Accordingly, I would hold that Stanberg is entitled to workers’ compensation for temporary total disability until one of the four conditions articulated in the statute is satisfied. I would reverse the court of appeals with instructions to affirm the award of benefits ordered by the Industrial Claim Appeals Office.
SCOTT, J., joins in this dissent.

. My analysis is inconsistent with the court of appeals’ holding in Monfort of Colorado v. Husson, 725 P.2d 67 (Colo.App.1986). Monfort held that when a temporarily disabled employee is determined to be at fault for his termination, subsequent wage loss is caused by the employee's act which led to termination rather than the injury he sustained. I would expressly overrule the holding of Monfort based upon the plain language of the workers' compensation statute.