Court Opinion

ID: 9787388
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:15:33.509337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:55.524368
License: Public Domain

Judge ROTHENBERG
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I agree with part I of the majority opinion addressing the issue of jurisdiction, I respectfully dissent from part II, which affirms the trial court's order dismissing the two burglary counts against defendant. I conclude the prosecution met its burden at the preliminary hearing of establishing defendant's involvement as a complicitor in the burglary, and I would reverse the trial court's order and remand for trial on those counts.
Probable cause is established when the People present evidence sufficient to induce a reasonable person to believe that a crime was committed and that the defendant participated in its commission. It is not a heavy burden, and in determining whether the People have met it, the trial court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable *642to the prosecution. People v. Thornton, 929 P.2d 729 (Colo.1996). If the evidence is conflicting, the trial court must draw the inferences most favorable to the prosecution. People v. Hall, 999 P.2d 207 (Colo.2000).
Section 18-1-608, C.R.8.2000, defines complicity:
A person is legally accountable as principal for the behavior of another constituting a criminal offense if, with the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense, he or she aids, abets, advises, or encourages the other person in planning or committing the offense.
A formal agreement is not required to establish the defendant's complicity, Harris v. People, 139 Colo. 9, 335 P.2d 550 (1959), nor is the defendant required to perform all acts necessary to the offense to be charged as a complicitor. Reed v. People, 171 Colo. 421, 467 P.2d 809 (1970). Further, the elements of the defendant's complicity may be established by reasonable inference from other established facts and circumstances. Harris v. People, supra.
Numerous appellate decisions have rejected claims by defendants that there was insufficient evidence of their intent or knowledge to sustain their convictions. For example, in Keller v. People, 153 Colo. 590, 387 P.2d 421 (1963), the supreme court rejected the defendant's argument that there was insufficient evidence to support his burglary conviction because he lacked the requisite intent. The court stated that:
"More frequently than not, burglary must be established by circumstantial evidence...."
The defendant contends that no evidence of the intent requisite to the crime of burglary was produced by the People. The answer to this contention is that an accused is presumed to intend the necessary or the natural and probable consequences of his unlawful voluntary acts, knowingly performed.
Keller v. People, supra, 153 Colo. at 594, 387 P.2d at 424 (quoting Wilcox v. People, 152 Colo. 173, 380 P.2d 912 (1963)).
Likewise, in Nunn v. People, 177 Colo. 87, 88, 493 P.2d 6, 7 (1972), the defendant admitted he was in the getaway car with the perpetrators of a burglary, but claimed he was drunk, asleep, and unaware of the happenings. The supreme court acknowledged that the People's evidence that the defendant was guilty of burglary and theft was "wholly cireumstantial," but nevertheless rejected the defendant's argument, concluding that "the question of whether the defendant's explanation was to be believed was a question of fact for the jury." Nunn v. People, supra, 177 Colo. at 90-91, 493 P.2d at 9. See People v. Coca, 185 Colo. 10, 132, 521 P.2d 781, 783 (1974)(although defendant testified at trial that he knew nothing of a planned burglary, court stated that "the jury was not bound to believe this assertion, but was free to accept or reject whatever portions of his testimony it chose").
Here, defendant admits he drove his three companions to and from the burglary. He claims, however, that the evidence showed nothing more than his mere presence at the scene. I disagree.
Other jurisdictions have addressed the factual cireumstances under which the actions of the driver of a getaway car progress from mere presence at a crime scene to complicity. In Commonwealth v. Finley, 477 Pa. 382, 383 A.2d 1259 (1978), for example, the court held that the prosecution's evidence was insufficient to show the defendant's complicity because it showed little more than his mere presence. The court initially stated that:
There is no doubt that one who acts as lookout and driver of a getaway car is as guilty as those who carry out the planned crimes. The evidence, however, must be sufficient to establish that [the defendant] had knowledge of the planned crimes and aided and abetted the commission of the crimes.
Commonwealth v. Finley, supra, 477 Pa. at 385, 383 A.2d at 1260 (citation omitted; emphasis added). The court in Finley then explained that such knowledge was not established because there was no evidence that the car in which the defendant was observed outside the victim's home was waiting for anyone, nor did the evidence show that the defendant actually drove the car away after the crime was committed.
*643In contrast, here, an officer testified at the preliminary hearing that defendant admitted: (1) he was with the three identified burglars before the crime and they were drinking at a bar together; (2) one of them asked him to drive them to the address at which the burglary took place; (8) he drove the three men to the scene of the offense in his car; (4) he was aware there were three guns in the car; (5) he parked the car and remained in it while the other three men exited and entered the victim's home; (6) he waited outside the victim's home until he heard a gunshot, at which time he became frightened and fled the scene; (7) he did not go home or to another place, but drove to a dead end; (8) he somehow picked up his companions shortly after they had fled from the crime scene; and (9) he drove away with the three fleeing felons in his car. When the police arrested the men, defendant was driving the getaway car, and the police found three guns in the car. See also Lincoln v. State, 459 So.2d 1030 (Fla.1984)(evidence sufficient to sustain conviction of wife who drove husband from the scene of a robbery because she knew in advance he was intending to commit the robbery); State v. Glaze, 37 N.C.App. 155, 245 S.E.2d 575 (1978)(evidence insufficient to show defendant aided and abetted the actual perpetrators of a burglary where there was no evidence he was actually present at the scene or in a position to render assistance at the time the crimes were being committed).
Of course, it is within the jury's prerogative at trial to accept defendant's self-serving assertion that he was unaware of his companions' intentions and did not intend to assist them by driving them to or from the crime scene. However, the trial court here was not at liberty to do so. See People v. Coca, supra. At the preliminary hearing, it was required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and to apply the inferences most favorable to the prosecution. See People v. Thornton, supra. Under that standard, I conclude defendant's knowledge can be inferred from these circumstances. See White v. MacFarlane, 713 P.2d 366, 369 (Colo.1986)("evidence of state of mind is rarely available and intent may be inferred").
Because I conclude the People presented sufficient evidence of probable cause to implicate defendant as a complicitor in the burglaries, I would reverse the order dismissing the two counts of first degree burglary and remand the case for trial.