Court Opinion

ID: 9839123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-11 19:04:12.696552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:59.485626
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/11/23 P. v. Jones CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C095866

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. No. 20FE020561)

           v.

 KORTNEY LAMONT-DAR JONES,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         After the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence, defendant Kortney
Lamont-Dar Jones pleaded no contest to being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen.
Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and the trial court sentenced him to 16 months in state
prison. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress. We affirm the judgment.
                                                  BACKGROUND
         In the early morning hours of December 25, 2020, defendant was driving a car
with two defective lights when Sacramento County Sheriff’s Deputy Tahir Jones pulled
him over. Defendant gave his driver’s license to Deputy Jones, which Deputy Jones used
to conduct a records check using two different databases. The records showed defendant

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was on postrelease community supervision (PRCS) out of Los Angeles County until
October 2022.
       After conducting the records check, Deputy Jones returned to speak to defendant.
Defendant denied being on PRCS; Deputy Jones responded, “I can show you if you like
. . . come out real quick.” Deputy Jones stepped backward so defendant could get out of
the car. Defendant opened the door and continued talking to Deputy Jones before he got
out of the car. Deputy Jones then directed defendant to walk to the patrol car where he
conducted a patdown search of defendant.
       While conducting the patdown search, Deputy Jones asked defendant: “nothing in
the car, right?” Defendant responded: “I just got my little marijuana in the
[(indecipherable)], that’s it.”1 The two continued to talk and defendant continued to
express frustration with the records showing he was on PRCS: “I’ve been off that stuff
for so long, like come on.” Defendant explained he “got out of the pen,” they put him on
an ankle monitor, he was supervised for a year, and they released him.
       Deputy Jones asked defendant “how much weed in the bag?” Defendant
responded and Deputy Jones said, “not that much? You don’t care if I look through?”
and waved his hand toward the open car door. Defendant said no and waved his arm
toward the car in a sweeping motion. Deputy Jones walked to the open driver’s side door
and put gloves on his hand. At the same time, defendant leaned on the patrol car hood
and crossed his arms in front of his body.
       Deputy Jones searched the car. He found a semiautomatic handgun in the center
console and marijuana inside a backpack. The People charged defendant with being a
convicted felon in possession of a firearm. (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1).)

1      In the video defendant says something that sounds like bag or backpack or back
there. It is difficult to comprehend. A transcript of the video indicates the word is
“backpack,” but the court did not admit that transcript into evidence.

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Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized during that vehicle search. The People
opposed the motion.
       On August 30, 2021, the trial court heard defendant’s motion to suppress
contemporaneously with the preliminary hearing. Deputy Jones testified. Among other
things, Deputy Jones testified that he asked defendant for consent: “So the defendant
stated that he had lose [sic] marijuana in his vehicle. He told me that it was an amount
that was personal use. He stated that it was in the vehicle. [¶] I asked him if I could look
into the vehicle, and he said that I could.”
       The trial court also watched the recording of the traffic stop from Deputy Jones’s
dashboard camera (“the video”). Defendant’s counsel offered a transcript of the video;
the court rejected the transcript saying “[t]he evidence is the video.” The court also noted
the audio on the video “is barely discernable.”
       After engaging both counsel on who had the burden of proof regarding whether
the good faith exception applied, the court asked about defendant’s consent: Was it
voluntary or did defendant merely acquiesce? The court invited the parties to submit
supplemental briefs on that issue.
       The parties submitted their supplemental briefs. In addition to arguing the good
faith exception did not apply, defendant argued his consent was not voluntary; he only
acquiesced to the search “after an argument with the police over whether he was on
PRCS.”
       The parties returned to court in September and the People stipulated that
defendant’s PRCS was terminated on May 14, 2020. The court nevertheless denied
defendant’s motion. The court found Deputy Jones’s belief that defendant was on PRCS
at the time of the traffic stop to be in good faith. The court also found defendant’s
consent was voluntary: “[O]n the issue whether the consent of [defendant] lawfully
permitted [Deputy] Jones to search the car, I find that it does. On this issue, one only has

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to listen to the conversation from the body worn camera between the two men. It was
conversational, almost jocular. It was not confrontational.”
       After the court denied his motion to suppress evidence, defendant pleaded no
contest to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court sentenced defendant to 16
months in state prison and awarded him one day of custody credit. Defendant filed a
timely notice of appeal.
                                        DISCUSSION
       On appeal, defendant claims the court erred twice in denying his motion to
suppress. First, he contends the trial court erred in finding the “good faith exception”
applied to Deputy Jones’s belief that defendant was on PRCS out of Los Angeles County.
Second, he argues the trial court erred when it found defendant’s consent to a search
extended beyond his backpack to the entire vehicle. We agree with the first contention
but not the second. We will affirm the judgment.
A.     Standard of Review
       “In reviewing a trial court’s decision to grant a motion to suppress evidence, we
rely on the trial court’s express and implied factual findings, provided they are supported
by substantial evidence, to independently determine whether the search was
constitutional. [Citation.] ‘Thus, while we ultimately exercise our independent judgment
to determine the constitutional propriety of a search or seizure, we do so within the
context of historical facts determined by the trial court.’ [Citation.] It is the trial court’s
role to evaluate witness credibility, resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the
evidence, and draw factual inferences. [Citation.] We review those factual findings
under the deferential substantial evidence standard, considering the evidence in the light
most favorable to the trial court’s order.” (People v. Moore (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 291,
296-297.)

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B.     Good Faith Exception
       When applicable, the exclusionary rule “forbids the use . . . of evidence obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” (People v. Pearl (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1280,
1292.) The suppression of evidence gathered as a result of an unlawful seizure, however,
is not automatic. (Herring v. United States (2009) 555 U.S. 135, 137 [172 L.Ed.2d 496]
(Herring).) Under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, “evidence will not
be suppressed if the police officer had an objectively reasonable belief the search or
seizure was constitutionally permissible.” (Pearl, at p. 1292.) The burden is on the
prosecution to establish the exception applies, including the burden of proving that a
recordkeeping error that led to the unlawful search was not the fault of any part of the law
enforcement team. (Id. at pp. 1292-1293; People v. Willis (2002) 28 Cal.4th 22, 36-37.)
       In Herring, the United States Supreme Court addressed the applicability of the
good faith exception where police officers arrested the defendant based on information
from a computer database showing an outstanding arrest warrant. (Herring, supra,
555 U.S. at p. 137.) The officers learned the information was incorrect only after they
arrested and searched the defendant. (Id. at pp. 137-138.) The Court held the
exclusionary rule in such cases “turns on the culpability of the police and the potential of
exclusion to deter wrongful police conduct.” (Id. at p. 137.) The Court explained, “ ‘an
assessment of the flagrancy of the police misconduct constitutes an important step in the
calculus’ of applying the exclusionary rule” (id. at p. 143) and requires consideration of
“the actions of all the police officers involved,” including those who provided
information material to the probable cause determination (id. at p. 140).
       The Court thus reasoned that application of the good faith exception in cases
involving police mistakes turns on whether the mistakes resulted from negligence “rather
than systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional requirements.” (Herring,
supra, 555 U.S. at pp. 147-148; see People v. Robinson (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1104, 1126.)
“If the police have been shown to be reckless in maintaining a warrant system, or to have

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knowingly made false entries to lay the groundwork for future false arrests, exclusion
would certainly be justified under our cases should such misconduct cause a Fourth
Amendment violation.” (Herring, at p. 146; id. at pp. 137, 147-148.) That burden was
satisfied in Herring by evidence that the court clerk or judge’s chambers normally called
the warrant clerk when a warrant was recalled, and the clerk would then enter the
information in the sheriff’s computer database. (Id. at pp. 137-138.) Although “[f]or
whatever reason” that had not happened (id. at p. 138), the arresting investigator testified
he had no reason to question the information he received about the warrant, and, further,
two county warrant clerks testified that they could remember no similar failures ever
having happened on their watch (id. at p. 147). The prosecution evidence thus
established that the failure to update the arrest warrant database resulted from “isolated
negligence” as opposed to systemic error or reckless disregard of constitutional
requirements. (Id. at pp. 137, 147-148.)
       The prosecution made no such showing in this case. The burden was squarely on
the prosecution to establish the error did not result from deliberate, reckless, or grossly
negligent conduct or recurring or systemic negligence. (People v. Willis, supra,
28 Cal.4th at pp. 36-37; People v. Pearl, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1292-1293.) It
did not do so. Indeed, the prosecution failed to introduce any evidence related to the
circumstances of the error, the frequency of such errors, or any practices the Los Angeles
County Probation Department employs to ensure the accuracy of its records. Absent such
evidence, the People failed to prove the good faith exception applied.
C.     Consent to Search
       “Consent to a search is a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement. [Citation.] The prosecution bears the burden to prove that a
warrantless search was within the scope of the consent given. [Citation.] ‘A consensual
search may not legally exceed the scope of the consent supporting it. [Citation.]’
[Citation.] ‘The standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth

                                              6
Amendment is that of “objective” reasonableness--what would the typical reasonable
person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?
[Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘Whether the search remained within the boundaries of the
consent is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of circumstances.
[Citation.] Unless clearly erroneous, we uphold the trial court’s determination.’ ”
(People v. Cantor (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 961, 965.)
       In ruling on defendant’s motion to suppress, the trial court observed one could
discern the voluntary nature of defendant’s consent simply by watching the video: in the
video, defendant and Deputy Jones appear “conversational, almost jocular.” The issue on
appeal, however, is the scope of defendant’s consent, not whether his consent was
voluntary. As a result, the trial judge’s remarks do not establish facts that are undisputed.
To the contrary, the scope of defendant’s voluntary consent is a question of disputed fact
and in order to resolve the issue on appeal, we must consider not just the tone of the
conversation between Deputy Jones and defendant, but the actual words they exchanged
as well as Deputy Jones’s testimony at the hearing.
       At the combined preliminary hearing/motion to suppress, Deputy Jones testified
that he asked defendant for consent to search “the car.” A review of the video supports
this recollection. In the video, you can hear Deputy Jones ask defendant to step out of the
car. He then asked defendant if there was anything illegal “in the car.” Defendant
acknowledged he had marijuana in the car, perhaps in a bag or a backpack. They had
further conversation about defendant’s PRCS status. Deputy Jones then asked if he could
“look through” and motioned with his arm toward the vehicle’s open door. Defendant
answered in the affirmative and waved his arm toward the car in a sweeping motion.
Nowhere in their brief exchange did Deputy Jones or defendant indicate the search would
be limited to a backpack or a bag in the car. Deputy Jones then conducted his search of
the car without objection from defendant.

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       In sum, based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude there is sufficient
evidence to uphold the trial court’s determination that defendant gave Deputy Jones
consent to search the vehicle.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                   /s/
                                                  WISEMAN, J.*

I concur:

 /s/
MAURO, Acting P. J.

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

                                              8
MESIWALA, J., Dissenting.
       In this search case, we have a dash cam video that both sides agree accurately
records the consent given. Where this is the case, I believe we review the video
independently and should not consider Deputy Jones’s testimony as to his understanding
of the consent. Applying this standard, the scope of defendant’s consent was limited to
searching his backpack that was in his car to determine the amount of marijuana inside.
Because Deputy Jones’s search of the center console exceeded the scope of defendant’s
consent, the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress.
A.     The Video and Deputy Jones’s Testimony
       In the video, Deputy Jones started by asking defendant: “Nothing in the car,
right?” Defendant responded: “Just a little marijuana in my backpack, that’s it.”1 After
discussing defendant’s post-release community supervision status,2 Deputy Jones
returned to the topic of marijuana: “How much weed in the bag?” Defendant responded,
and Deputy Jones continued: “Not that much? You don’t care if I look through, right?”
Defendant gestured towards his car: “No, no problem.”
       At the motion to suppress hearing, Deputy Jones provided his interpretation of
defendant’s consent: “So the defendant stated that he had lo[o]se marijuana in his
vehicle. He told me that it was an amount that was personal use. He stated that it was in
the vehicle. [¶] I asked him if I could look into the vehicle, and he said that I could.”
B.     Standard of Review
       We conduct an “independent review” where “[t]he facts . . . are undisputed to the
extent the interview is tape-recorded.” (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1177;
People v. Ayon (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 926, 943 [conducting independent review of video

1 Both sides on appeal agree that defendant said “backpack.”

2 Defendant was indeed correct when he told Deputy Jones he was no longer on
probation or parole. But Deputy Jones (incorrectly) insisted that defendant was.

                                              1
evidence in appeal from denial of motion to suppress].) In this situation, “there is no
reason to conclude the trial court has the same special purchase on the question at issue;
as a practical matter, ‘[t]he trial court and this court are in the same position in
interpreting’ ” the video. (People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 528.) I am mindful
that independent review is not the equivalent of de novo review. (Id. at p. 527.) Under
this standard, we do not second-guess factual findings that are based on the trial court’s
own observations, such as the credibility of witnesses. (Ibid.)
       The majority considers “the tone of the conversation,” “the actual words they
exchanged,” and “Deputy Jones’s testimony” in determining the scope of consent. (Maj.
opn. ante, at p. 7.) But the video is clear and speaks for itself. Neither Deputy Jones’s
credibility nor his recollection of the exchange add anything to the circumstances
surrounding defendant’s consent. I therefore do not believe we consider his testimony in
determining the scope of consent.
C.     The Scope of Consent
       A consent-based search is a recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
proscription against warrantless searches. (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S.
218, 219.) The scope of a consensual search is limited by “the terms of its
authorization.” (Walter v. United States (1980) 447 U.S. 649, 656.) “The standard for
measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of
‘objective’ reasonableness—what would the typical reasonable person have understood
by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?” (Florida v. Jimeno (1991)
500 U.S. 248, 251.) “ ‘Whether the search remained within the boundaries of the consent
is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of [the] circumstances. [Citation.]
Unless clearly erroneous, we uphold the trial court’s determination.’ ” (People v. Tully
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 983-984.)
       Here, the exchange between Deputy Jones and defendant established that
defendant consented to the search of only his backpack. By requesting to “look through”

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immediately after asking how much marijuana defendant had in his backpack, a
reasonable person would have thought that Deputy Jones limited the scope of the search
to defendant’s backpack to determine the amount of marijuana inside. And defendant
consented to this limited search by responding “no problem” and gesturing towards his
car where the backpack was located.
       The search of the center console exceeded the scope of defendant’s consent
because there was no probable cause to believe that defendant’s backpack would be
found in the center console. (United States v. Ross (1982) 456 U.S. 798, 824 [the scope
of a warrantless search is “defined by the object of the search and the places in which
there is probable cause to believe that it may be found”]; see People v. Superior Court
(Arketa) (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 122, 127 [consent to enter house to search for burglary
suspects did not extend to search of closets to uncover crowbar].)
       The People argue defendant did not attempt to limit Deputy Jones’s search by
retracting his consent. But after defendant agreed that Deputy Jones could search his
backpack that was located inside his car, he proceeded to lean against the patrol car in
front of the dash cam. From the dash cam’s angle, which was also defendant’s angle, it
was impossible to tell which part of the car Deputy Jones was searching. There was also
no reason for defendant to believe that Deputy Jones would open the center console while
looking for his backpack. Therefore, defendant had no basis to retract, limit, or clarify
his consent. Because Deputy Jones exceeded the scope of defendant’s consent, the
search violated defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court erred in denying
defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.

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       I would reverse the judgment, vacate the conviction, and remand the matter with
directions to the trial court to enter a new order granting defendant’s motion to suppress
the evidence.

                                                  /s/
                                                 MESIWALA, J.

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