Court Opinion

ID: 9657537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:29:46.169988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:46.201252
License: Public Domain

T. E. Brennan, J.
{concurring). I concur in the result reached by Mr. Justice T. M. Kavanagh.
I would hold:
(1) That a deed to two persons who are not husband and wife cannot and does not create a tenancy by the entireties, even though the grantees are described as husband and wife. It could create a tenancy in common.
(2) One who purchases land in reliance on the record title thereof, for a valuable consideration, who took title from grantors as husband and wife or from the survivor of them, without knowledge or notice that his grantors were in fact tenants in common, takes a title which is valid as against anyone whose claim is based upon the tenancy in common.
This, as I understand it, is nothing more or less than the application of the traditional doctrine of bona fide purchaser in real estate transactions.
In Jacobs v. Miller (1883), 50 Mich 119, defendants argued that the wife in the conveyance was a bona fide purchaser. The Court merely recited that a deed was made to her without mentioning whether *58she paid value or had notice. On page 126, the Court said, “On this question no opinion is intimated [referring to the rights of a bona fide purchaser]”. The Jacobs Case should be overruled.
Hawley v. Dibble (1915), 184 Mich 298, did not involve a bona fide purchaser. Hawley was the lawyer for Sarah Fitzgibbons. He had represented her in In re Fitzgibbons’ Estate (1910), 162 Mich 416. He made no claim that he purchased without notice or knowledge of the claims of defendants’ predecessors in title. This ease should be limited to its facts. A jury found in Fitzgibbons’ Estate that the mate of the bigamous marriage was ignorant of the first marriage, and was in fact the legal widow of Fitzgibbons by reason of the prior death of the first wife. As his widow, the second wife was entitled to an inheritance out of Fitzgibbons’ undivided one-half interest in any event, not to mention her dower in it, her homestead rights, widow’s allowance, and a possible action against the estate for fraud. It was a case of a bigamous marriage validated by the later removal of the impediment, and at best stands for the proposition that in such eases there may be a nunc pro tunc creation of a tenancy by the entireties.
Young v. Young (1918), 200 Mich 236, did not involve a conveyance of land to persons not husband and wife describing them as such. It was a will contest, and has nothing to do with the cases presently under consideration.
Stone v. Culver (1938), 286 Mich 263, was an attempt to create a tenancy by the entireties without the use of a “straw man” prior to the adoption of PA 1955, No 3. The Court stated the common-law rule that lacking the unities of time and title, an estate by the entireties was not created. Plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser for value. The Court held that plaintiff was not to be put on notice from *59the record title that Louise Greeley, the grantor, was one and the same person as Louise Haney, one of the grantees. Stone v. Culver correctly states and applies the law of bona fide purchaser, and it is interesting to note that no reference whatever is made therein to either Hawley or Jacobs.
In Porter v. Landis (1950), 329 Mich 76, plaintiff, Henry Porter, acquired title from his brother Ernest, the apparent survivor of himself and Bessie Porter, by a deed deposited in escrow and delivered upon Ernest’s death. There was no claim by plaintiff that anything of value was paid for the property. He was not a bona fide purchaser. Porter should be overruled.
Franklin v. Franklin (1958), 354 Mich 543, involved a bill by a claimed widow and surviving grantee, and a cross-bill by one claiming to be the sole heir of the deceased grantee. There was no bona fide purchaser involved. Franklin should be overruled.