Court Opinion

ID: 9384333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-03 16:07:27.416607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:52.815333
License: Public Domain

J-A29013-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 JAQUEL SHAMON TIRADO                     :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 416 WDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 16, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
                        CP-25-CR-0003831-2016

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                          FILED: APRIL 3, 2023

      Appellant, Jaquel Shamon Tirado, appeals from the post-conviction

court’s order denying his timely-filed petition under the Post Conviction Relief

Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm.

      This Court previously detailed the facts of Appellant’s case in our

disposition of his direct appeal, which we need not fully reiterate herein. See

Commonwealth v. Tirado, 1225 WDA 2019, unpublished memorandum at

*1-5 (Pa. Super. filed Sept. 22, 2020). Briefly, Appellant was charged with

first-degree murder, third-degree murder, aggravated assault, conspiracy,

and various other charges related to the killing of Stephen Bishop in Erie. The

Commonwealth’s evidence, which included surveillance videos, showed

Appellant — who was a 17-year-old juvenile at the time — and two other

individuals approach Bishop and walk with him before the sound of eight

gunshots rang out. Appellant could then be seen on video fleeing from the
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scene. A subsequent search of his residence revealed clothing matching that

which Appellant was wearing at the time of the shooting, and that clothing

later tested positive for gunshot residue. Bishop died from a gunshot wound

that entered his left arm and traveled into his chest.

      Ultimately, a jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder and various

other, related offenses. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 42 years’

to life incarceration. We affirmed his judgment of sentence on direct appeal,

and our Supreme Court denied his subsequent petition for allowance of

appeal.       See Commonwealth v. Tirado, 240 A.3d 951 (Pa. 2020)

(unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 256 A.3d 420 (Pa. 2021).

      On July 7, 2021, Appellant filed a pro se [PCRA petition]….
      Therein, Appellant raised eleven (11) claims: a general claim of
      violation of the Constitution of this Commonwealth or the laws of
      the United States, nine (9) claims of ineffective assistance of
      counsel,4 and an illegal sentence claim. Appended to the pro se
      PCRA [petition was] his sixty-nine (69) page[,] pro se Brief.
          4 In his pro se [petition] and brief, Appellant raises the
          following nine (9) ineffectiveness claims: (1) failure of trial
          counsel to challenge probable cause for issuance of an arrest
          warrant; (2) failure of trial counsel to challenge the racial
          composition of the jury pool; (3) failure of trial counsel to
          move for suppression of Appellant’s statements to the police
          in the bedroom; (4) failure of trial counsel to “introduce a
          mere presence or negate intent defense”; (5) failure of trial
          counsel to object to jury instructions on accomplice liability;
          (6) failure of trial counsel to object to jury instructions for
          “the deadly weapon charge not being equally applied to both
          murder charges”; (7) failure of trial counsel to object to jury
          instructions as to “the ‘burden shifting’ charge that told the
          jury to infer specific intent from a deadly weapon”; (8)
          failure of appellate counsel to “federalize each claim on
          appeal”; and (9) failure of trial counsel to “challenge the
          sentence under the merger doctrine[.”]

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       On July 15, 2021, th[e] PCRA court appointed PCRA counsel who,
       on August 11, 2021[,] requested a sixty (60)-day extension of
       time within which to file a supplemental PCRA [petition] or a [‘]no-
       merit[’]letter.[1] On August 11, 2021, the PCRA court granted the
       request and directed PCRA counsel to file an appropriate response
       by October 12, 2021. On October 12, 2021, PCRA counsel filed a
       Supplemental Petition for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief. The
       supplemental PCRA [petition was] essentially a combination no-
       merit letter and a supplemental PCRA.5 On October 13, 2021, the
       PCRA court directed the Commonwealth to file a response to the
       supplemental PCRA [petition] within thirty (30) days.            The
       Commonwealth did so on November 12, 2021.
          5 The only claims expounded upon in [PCRA counsel’s]
          supplemental PCRA [petition] were the three claims alleging
          ineffectiveness for failure to object to jury instructions.
          PCRA counsel concluded the other claims were not
          meritorious.

PCRA Court Opinion (PCO), 4/27/22, at 10-11 (unnecessary capitalization and

internal citations to the record omitted).

       On February 9, 2022, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice

of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing. Appellant filed

a pro se response, asking for an extension of time to file a response to the

Rule 907 notice.2 The docket indicates that the pro se document was forward

to Appellant’s counsel and no further action was taken. On March 16, 2022,

the PCRA court issued an order denying Appellant’s petition without a hearing.

____________________________________________

1  See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc)
(setting out the procedure for counsel to withdraw in the PCRA context).
2 Nothing in Appellant’s pro se response indicated that he wished to assert a
challenge to the effectiveness of his PCRA counsel for abandoning several of
the trial-counsel-ineffectiveness claims he raised in his pro se petition.
Appellant also did not file any pro se document with this Court indicating he
wished to challenge the representation of his present counsel.

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      Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and he complied with the

court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal. The PCRA court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on April

27, 2022. Herein, Appellant states the following issues for our review:

      A. Whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to raise an
      objection to the jury instruction on accomplice liability?

      B. Whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to raise an
      objection to the jury instruction relating to the deadly[-]weapon
      charge not being equally applied to both murder counts?

      C. Whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to raise an
      objection to the burden[-]shifting impact of the jury instructions
      dictating that an inference could be drawn of specific intent from
      the deadly weapon?

      D. Whether PCRA counsel’s submission of a no-merit letter was
      appropriate as to the remaining pro se claims involving allegations
      that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge probable
      cause for issuance of an arrest warrant; that trial counsel was
      ineffective in failing to challenge the racial composition of the jury
      pool; that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move for
      suppression of … [A]ppellant’s statements to the police; that trial
      counsel was ineffective in failing to introduce a mere presence or
      negate intent defense; that trial counsel was ineffective in failing
      to federalize each claim for purposes of the direct appeal and that
      trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the sentence
      under the merger doctrine?

Appellant’s Brief at 2.

      We begin by recognizing that “[t]his Court’s standard of review from the

grant or denial of post-conviction relief is limited to examining whether the

lower court’s determination is supported by the evidence of record and

whether it is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Morales, 701 A.2d 516,

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520 (Pa. 1997) (citing Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 661 A.2d 352, 356 n.4

(Pa. 1995)).

      Appellant’s first three issues assert ineffective assistance of counsel

(IAC).

      It is well-established that counsel is presumed to have provided
      effective representation unless the PCRA petitioner pleads and
      proves all of the following: (1) the underlying legal claim is of
      arguable merit; (2) counsel’s action or inaction lacked any
      objectively reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s
      interest; and (3) prejudice, to the effect that there was a
      reasonable probability of a different outcome if not for counsel’s
      error. The PCRA court may deny an ineffectiveness claim if the
      petitioner’s evidence fails to meet a single one of these prongs.
      Moreover, a PCRA petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating
      counsel’s ineffectiveness.

Commonwealth v. Franklin, 990 A.2d 795, 797 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations

omitted).

      Appellant first argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not

objecting to the court’s jury instruction on accomplice liability for his murder

charges. Appellant explains that

      [t]he Commonwealth sought jury charges as to both first[-] and
      third[-]degree murder predicated on the theory that [Appellant]
      was the only person who fired the fatal and non-fatal gunshots.
      However, the Commonwealth then sought to introduce the
      alternate theory of accomplice liability predicated on [the fact
      that] if the jury did not accept the theory of [Appellant’s] direct
      involvement as the shooter[,] then [Appellant] should still be
      implicated and found guilty as an accomplice to the actual shooter,
      notwithstanding that neither of the other [two] individuals
      purportedly involved were … criminally charged[,] let alone even
      identified.

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Appellant’s Brief at 12.    Appellant notes that, “[i]t is well-settled that for

purposes of the attachment of accomplice culpability[,] the purported

accomplice must harbor the requisite specific intent to kill and it cannot be

transferred or imposed upon proof of intent to kill by the principal alone.” Id.

at 10. He insists that, here, the evidence failed to demonstrate, “beyond a

reasonable doubt[,] that [Appellant] had the shared intent to commit the

subject homicide.” Id. Thus, he contends that the record did not support a

jury instruction on accomplice liability for his murder charges and, accordingly,

his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to court’s providing this

instruction.

      No relief is due.    Initially, on direct appeal, Appellant challenged the

sufficiency of the evidence to support his first-degree murder conviction. This

Court explicitly held that the evidence proved Appellant possessed the specific

intent to kill. See Tirado, No. 1225 WDA 2019, unpublished memorandum

at *6, *8.     Thus, there is no arguable merit to Appellant’s claim that an

accomplice instruction was not supported by the record because there was no

evidence that he shared the specific intent to kill with his cohort(s).

      Additionally, we agree with the PCRA court that the instruction provided

on accomplice liability sufficiently notified the jury that it must find that

Appellant himself possessed the specific intent to kill in order to convict him

of first-degree murder as an accomplice. The PCRA court explained:

      In pertinent part, the court instructed the jury:

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         THE COURT: A person can also be guilty of first[-]degree
         murder when he did not cause the death personally, when
         the Commonwealth proves beyond a reasonable doubt that
         he was an accomplice in the murder.

         To be an accomplice in the murder, the defendant must
         have himself, intended that a first[-]degree murder
         occur, and that the defendant then encourages, aids or
         attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing
         it.

         To sum up, a defendant may not be found guilty of the crime
         of first[-]degree murder where the death is caused by
         another, unless the defendant himself, as a
         conspirator or an accomplice, has the specific intent
         or goal of bringing about a murder in the first degree.

      [N.T. Trial (Day 4), 8/3/17, at] 197-[]98 (emphasis added). The
      court also properly defined specific intent, and what the jury
      should consider in determining whether a defendant had a specific
      intent to kill at Count One. [Id. at] 185-187, 222-[]23.

      As there was no legal basis to object to the instructions on
      accomplice liability and specific intent as it relates to accomplice
      liability, the ineffectiveness claims lack arguable merit. Further[,]
      no prejudice ensued.

PCO at 24-25 (some emphasis added by PCRA court; some emphasis added

by this Court). As Appellant does not identify how any specific language of

the accomplice-liability instruction was improper, we discern no error in the

PCRA court’s rejection of his claim that counsel should have objected to the

instruction.

      Next, Appellant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not

objecting to the court’s jury instruction regarding the use of a deadly weapon

as circumstantial evidence of the specific intent to kill. Again, Appellant does

not set forth the language of, or cite to, the specific jury instruction he is

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challenging.    However, the PCRA court interpreted Appellant’s claim as

challenging the following charge:

      THE COURT: If you believe that the defendant intentionally used
      a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim’s body, you may
      regard that as an item of circumstantial evidence from which you
      may, if you choose, infer that the defendant had the specific intent
      to kill.

PCO at 26 (quoting N.T. Trial (Day 4) at 186) (emphasis added by PCRA court

omitted).

      According to Appellant, the court erred by “failing to … ensure that the

jury comprehended that the deadly weapon use also equally applied to a

finding of third[-]degree murder[,]” as well as first-degree murder.

Appellant’s Brief at 14. Appellant insists that

      [t]he impact of the failure to ensure that the deadly[-]weapon
      element applied to both degrees of [murder] was that the court
      was implicitly reiterating that it applied to first[-]degree murder,
      which could have had the actual impact of focusing the jury on
      that criminal charge and discounting the third[-]degree murder
      option, whether unwittingly or negligently. The trial [c]ourt
      repeated this specific instruction some five times[,] thereby
      reinforcing the resultant prejudice to … [A]ppellant and imposing
      undue emphasis on first[-]degree murder as opposed to rendering
      a true and fair verdict as to first[-]degree murder or third[-
      ]degree murder if [Appellant] was to be found guilty.

Id. at 14-15.

      Appellant’s argument is unconvincing. When reviewing a challenge to a

jury instruction:

         [W]e must review the jury charge as a whole to determine
         if it is fair and complete. A trial court has wide discretion in
         phrasing its jury instructions, and can choose its own words
         as long as the law is clearly, adequately, and accurately

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        presented to the jury for its consideration. The trial court
        commits an abuse of discretion only when there is an
        inaccurate statement of the law.

     Commonwealth v. Baker, 963 A.2d 495, 507 (Pa. Super. 2008),
     appeal denied, … 992 A.2d 885 ([Pa.] 2010) (internal citation
     omitted).

        A jury charge will be deemed erroneous only if the charge
        as a whole is inadequate, not clear or has a tendency to
        mislead or confuse, rather than clarify, a material issue. A
        charge is considered adequate unless the jury was palpably
        misled by what the trial judge said or there is an omission
        which is tantamount to fundamental error. Consequently,
        the trial court has wide discretion in fashioning jury
        instructions.

     Id. Additionally, “[t]he Suggested Standard Jury Instructions
     themselves are not binding and do not alter the discretion afforded
     trial courts in crafting jury instructions; rather, as their title
     suggests, the instructions are guides only.” Commonwealth v.
     Eichinger, … 108 A.3d 821, 845 ([Pa.] 2014).

Commonwealth v. Postie, 200 A.3d 1015, 1026 (Pa. Super. 2018).

     Here, the trial court instructed the jury, in pertinent part, as follows:

     THE COURT: The defendant has been charged with the offense of
     first-degree murder.    First[-]degree murder occurs when a
     perpetrator has the specific intent to kill. To find the defendant
     guilty of this offense, you must find that the following three
     elements have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt:

        First, that Steven Bishop is dead.

        Second, that the defendant killed him.

        And third, that the defendant did so with the specific intent
        to kill and with malice.

     A person has a specific intent to kill if he has fully formed the
     intent to kill, and is conscious of his own intention. As my earlier
     definition of malice indicates, a killing by a person who has the
     specific intent to kill is a killing with malice.

                                     ***

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     When deciding whether the defendant had a specific intent to kill,
     you should consider all of the evidence regarding his words and
     conduct and the attending circumstances that may show his state
     of mind. If you believe that the defendant intentionally used a
     deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim’s body, you may regard
     that as an item of circumstantial evidence from which you may, if
     you choose, infer that the defendant had the specific intent to kill.

                                     ***

     Third[-]degree murder is any killing with malice that is not first[-
     ]degree murder. The defendant has been charged with third[-
     ]degree murder. In order to find the defendant guilty of this
     offense, you must find that the following three elements have
     been proven beyond a reasonable doubt:

        First, that Steven Bishop is dead.

        Second, that the defendant killed him.

        And third, that the defendant did so with malice.

     The word malice as I am using it, has a special legal meaning. It
     does not mean simply hatred, spite, or ill will. Malice is a
     shorthand way of referring to any of the three different mental
     states that the law regards as being bad enough to make a killing
     murder.

     For murder of the third degree, a killing is with malice if the
     perpetrator’s actions show his wanton and willful disregard of an
     unjustified and extremely high risk that his conduct would result
     in death or serious bodily injury to another.

     In this form of malice, the Commonwealth need not prove that the
     perpetrator specifically intended to kill another.            The
     Commonwealth must prove, however, that he took action while
     consciously, that is knowingly, disregarding the most serious risk
     he was creating, and that by his disregard of that risk, he
     demonstrated his extreme indifference to the value of human life.

N.T. Trial (Day 4) at 185-86.

     We do not discern anything inadequate, unclear, misleading, or

confusing about the court’s charge as a whole. The jury was not “palpably

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misled by what the trial judge said” and there was no “omission which is

tantamount to fundamental error.” Baker, 963 A.2d at 507. We recognize

that the court could have instructed the jury that, for the offense of third-

degree murder, it could infer the requisite intent of malice from Appellant’s

use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim’s body.               See

Commonwealth v. Cruz-Centeno, 668 A.2d 536, 540 (Pa. Super. 1995)

(“Malice is properly implied when a deadly weapon is directed to a vital part

of the victim’s body.”) (citations and brackets omitted). However, we do not

conclude that this omission, in and of itself, caused Appellant prejudice, where

the court clearly and accurately defined the requisite mens rea necessary for

third-degree murder (i.e., malice).

      Additionally, contrary to Appellant’s argument, we do not discern

anything in the court’s deadly-weapon instruction that would have improperly

swayed the jury to convict him of first-degree rather than third-degree

murder. The instruction does not indicate any emphasis on one degree of

murder over the other but, instead, clearly and accurately defines each offense

and the elements thereof. Moreover, Appellant does not quote or cite to where

in the record the court purportedly repeated the deadly-weapon instruction

“some five times[,]” thereby stressing the first-degree murder charge.

Appellant’s Brief at 14. We decline to scour the record for him.

      Consequently, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that the deadly-

weapon instruction improperly emphasized the crime of first-degree murder,

or somehow influenced the jury to convict Appellant of that offense rather

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than murder of the third degree. In other words, Appellant has not proven

that the jury would have convicted him of third-degree murder, but for the

court’s deadly-weapon instruction. Consequently, he has not demonstrated

that his counsel acted ineffectively by not objecting thereto.

       In Appellant’s third issue, he contends that “the jury instructions as

constituted impermissibly shifted the burden of proof unto [sic] the defense

as to a funding [sic] of specific intent relative to first[-]degree murder.”

Appellant’s Brief at 16. More specifically, Appellant claims that “the [c]ourt[’s]

instruction as to use of a deadly weapon had the effect of improperly shifting

the burden of proof and was constitutionally defective and counsel was

ineffective in failing to assert an objection thereto.” Id. at 17. He continues:

       The [trial c]ourt repeatedly instructed the jury that the use of a
       deadly weapon on a vital body part could be used to infer a specific
       intent to commit first[-]degree murder.          … [A]ppellant has
       challenged the conduct of the [c]ourt in this regard as … unduly
       emphasizing and influencing the jury by limiting the supplemental
       instructions in response to jury questions to first[-]degree murder
       alone and omitting third[-]degree murder.[3] … [A]ppellant further
       posits now that the application of this instruction was
       constitutionally defective[,] resulting in a burden shifting that
       undermines the efficacy of the trial and the verdicts. [Appellant]
       argues that any instruction that permitted malice aforethought or
       specific intent to commit murder to be inferred from the use of a
       deadly weapon was constitutionally infirm. The impact of the
       burden[-]shifting nature of this form of instruction serve[d] to
       alleviate the Commonwealth from its burden of proof to satisfy
       every element of first[-]degree murder[,] including the requisite
       intent.

Id.
____________________________________________

3Appellant does not cite to what “supplemental instructions” or jury questions
he is referring.

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      Appellant’s confusing and undeveloped argument warrants no relief.

From what we can glean, it seems Appellant is claiming that the evidence

failed to demonstrate that he had the specific intent to kill, or that he aimed

a weapon at a vital part of the victim’s body. See id. (stating “the weapon

was no[t] aimed at a vital part of the [victim’s] body” and “[t]here were no

other factual elements that existed directly or circumstantially to demonstrate

specific intent to kill”). Therefore, Appellant apparently concludes that the

court’s deadly-weapon instruction was inappropriate, and it somehow

impermissibly shifted the burden of proof onto Appellant to disprove that he

had the specific intent to kill, rather than requiring the Commonwealth to

prove that element of first-degree murder. See id. (“In the absence of the

burden[-]shifting nature of the jury instructions, the jury would not have been

able to issue a verdict of first[-]degree murder on the facts of the case[.]”).

      Again, on direct appeal, this Court determined that the evidence was

sufficient to prove that Appellant possessed the specific intent to kill the victim

in this case. See Tirado, No. 1225 WDA 2019, unpublished memorandum at

*6, *8. We also concluded that, “[a]lthough the bullet entered [the v]ictim’s

left arm, it penetrated his chest, suggesting that killing [the v]ictim was the

shooter’s intention all along.” Id. at *8. Clearly, we determined that the

victim was shot in a vital part of his body, which supports the trial court’s

deadly-weapon instruction and demonstrates that Appellant possessed the

specific intent to kill.    Thus, the trial court’s jury instruction did not

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impermissibly shift the burden of proof, and Appellant’s counsel was not

ineffective for failing to object to that charge.

      Finally, in Appellant’s fourth issue, his PCRA counsel sets forth the

remaining ineffectiveness claims that Appellant asserted in his pro se petition.

However, rather than developing an argument in support of these claims,

counsel instead discusses why each of them are meritless. See Appellant’s

Brief at 18-22. Thus, counsel has effectively decided to waive/abandon these

claims for our review, which is within counsel’s discretion to do.         See

Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“When

briefing the various issues that have been preserved, it is an appellant’s duty

to present arguments that are sufficiently developed for our review. The brief

must support the claims with pertinent discussion, with references to the

record and with citations to legal authorities.     … [W]hen defects in a brief

impede our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, we may dismiss

the appeal entirely or find certain issues to be waived.”); see also

Commonwealth v. Jones, 815 A.2d 598, 613 (Pa. 2002) (“[A]ppellate

counsel is not constitutionally obliged to raise every conceivable claim for

relief. Counsel may forego even arguably meritorious issues in favor of claims

which, in the exercise of counsel’s objectively reasonable professional

judgment, offered a greater prospect of securing relief”).

      Order affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/3/2023

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