Court Opinion

ID: 9364630
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-19 20:00:58.519517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:39.445346
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10851    Document: 23-1     Date Filed: 01/19/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-10851
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,
       versus
       HOWARD DEWAYNE LAWSON,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 8:16-cr-00163-RAL-AAS-1
                           ____________________
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       2                       Opinion of the Court                 22-10851

       Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Howard Dewayne Lawson, a federal prisoner proceeding
       pro se, is serving a 180-month sentence as an armed career criminal
       for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. See 18 U.S.C.
       §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e)(1). He appeals the district court’s order deny-
       ing his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C.
       § 3582(c)(1)(A), as modified by § 603(b) of the First Step Act of 2018,
       Pub. L. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194. He argues that the district court
       abused its discretion in denying his motion because he established
       extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranting relief
       based on the ongoing threats from, and the BOP’s inadequate re-
       sponse to, the COVID-19 pandemic, combined with the BOP’s neg-
       ligence in treating his pre-existing health conditions, including high
       blood pressure and paraplegia. He further argues that the 18 U.S.C.
       § 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of compassionate release because
       of his good conduct while incarcerated and that, given his paraple-
       gia and the minor threat he poses to the public, he should be re-
       leased. Because the district court acted within its discretion in
       denying Mr. Lawson’s motion, we affirm.
              We review the district court’s denial of an eligible movant’s
       request for a reduced sentence under the First Step Act for an abuse
       of discretion. See Diveroli v. United States, 803 F.3d 1258, 1262
       (11th Cir. 2015). A district court abuses its discretion when it “ap-
       plies an incorrect legal standard, applies the law in an unreasonable
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       22-10851                 Opinion of the Court                          3

       or incorrect manner, follows improper procedures in making a de-
       termination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.”
       Id. (citation omitted).
              A district court has no inherent authority to modify a de-
       fendant’s sentence, and it may do so only when authorized by a
       statute or rule. See United States v. Puentes, 803 F.3d 597, 605-06
       (11th Cir. 2015). Under § 3582(c), a court may not modify a term
       of imprisonment once it has been imposed except under certain
       circumstances.
               In the context of compassionate release, the statute provides
       that:
               [T]he court, upon . . . motion of the defendant after
               the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative
               rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to
               bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse
               of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the
               [W]arden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is ear-
               lier, may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . after
               considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.] section
               3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds
               that—extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant
               such a reduction.

       § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
             Any sentence reduction must be consistent with applicable
       policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. See
       § 3582(c)(1)(A), (2). As relevant here, § 1B1.13 of the Sentencing
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       4                        Opinion of the Court                   22-10851

       Guidelines provides the applicable policy statement for
       § 3582(c)(1)(A). See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. After considering the
       § 3553(a) factors, a district court may grant a motion for compas-
       sionate release to the extent that (1) extraordinary and compelling
       reasons warrant the reduction; (2) “the defendant is not a danger
       to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided
       in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)”; and (3) the reduction is consistent with the
       policy statement within § 1B1.13. See § 1B1.13.
               The application notes to § 1B1.13 list four categories of ex-
       traordinary and compelling reasons: (A) the defendant’s medical
       condition; (B) his age; (C) his family circumstances; and (D)
       “[o]ther [r]easons.” See id., cmt. (n.1(A)-(D)). To qualify under
       subsection (A), the defendant must be currently suffering from ei-
       ther (i) a terminal illness or (ii) a serious condition that substantially
       diminishes his ability to provide self-care in prison and from which
       he is not expected to recover. See id., cmt. (n.1(A)). Subsection
       (D) serves as a “catch-all” provision, providing that a prisoner may
       be eligible for relief if, as determined by the Director of the Bureau
       of Prisons, there exists in the defendant’s case an extraordinary and
       compelling reason other than, or in combination with, the reasons
       described in subdivisions (A) through (C). See id., cmt. (n.1(D)).
              In United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2021), we
       concluded that § 1B1.13 is applicable to all motions for compassion-
       ate release filed under that statute, including those filed by prison-
       ers, and, thus, a district court may not reduce a sentence unless a
       reduction would be consistent with § 1B1.13’s definition of
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       22-10851               Opinion of the Court                         5

       extraordinary and compelling reasons. See id. at 1252-62. Next, we
       concluded that the “catch-all” provision in the commentary to §
       1B1.13 did not grant to district courts the discretion to develop
       other reasons outside those listed in § 1B1.13 that might justify a
       reduction in a defendant’s sentence. See id. at 1248, 1263, 1265.
               Under § 3582(c)(2), the district court may, after considering
       the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), “reduce the term of imprison-
       ment . . . to the extent that they are applicable.” See United States
       v. Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 2017). In par-
       ticular, the district court must consider: the nature and circum-
       stances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the de-
       fendant; the need for the sentence to afford adequate deterrence,
       protect the public from the defendant’s further crimes, and provide
       the defendant with needed education or treatment; the kinds of
       sentence and applicable guideline range under the Sentencing
       Guidelines; any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentenc-
       ing Commission; the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing dispar-
       ities between similarly situated defendants; and the need to provide
       restitution to any victims of the offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1),
       (2)(B) (D), (4)-(7), 3582(c)(2). The sentence must also reflect the
       seriousness of the offense, promote justice for the law, and provide
       just punishment for the offense. See § 3553(a)(2)(A).
               In sum, a district court may reduce a term of imprisonment
       if the § 3553(a) factors favor doing so, there are extraordinary and
       compelling reasons for doing so, and the reduction would not en-
       danger any person or the community. See United States v. Tinker,
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       6                      Opinion of the Court               22-10851

       14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2021). All of these necessary condi-
       tions must be satisfied before it can grant a reduction. See id.
       Therefore, the absence of even one condition forecloses a sentence
       reduction. See id. at 1238.
               Here, the district court did not err in denying Mr. Lawson’s
       motion for compassionate release. In denying the motion, the dis-
       trict court concluded that Mr. Lawson had not established extraor-
       dinary and compelling circumstances justifying compassionate re-
       lease as required by § 1B1.13 and its accompanying application
       notes. We agree.
               Mr. Lawson has been a paraplegic for over 12 years and has
       been incarcerated since 2017. Despite alleging for the first time on
       appeal that the BOP has negligently treated or accommodated his
       various medical conditions, he provided no evidence to support his
       contentions, and the record is otherwise silent on the matter. As
       such, there is no indication that the BOP has, for example, system-
       ically deprived him of medical treatment or been unable to provide
       him adequate medical care over the last five-plus years. Given his
       conclusory, non-specific allegations concerning the COVID-19
       pandemic, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding
       that Mr. Lawson has not established extraordinary and compelling
       circumstances warranting compassionate release. See Bryant, 996
       F.3d at 1252; U.S.S.G § 1B1.13.
             Additionally, the district court concluded that Mr. Lawson’s
       motion was due to be denied because the § 3553(a) factors coun-
       seled against his release. Specifically, the court stated that,
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       22-10851                Opinion of the Court                          7

       notwithstanding his physical limitations, it would be “derelict in its
       duty to safeguard the community by granting him early release”
       given his extensive criminal history. See D.E. 55 (paperless order
       of dismissal). Indeed, according to the PSI, Mr. Lawson has 19
       criminal history points and a corresponding criminal history cate-
       gory of VI from numerous drug-related offenses, not including
       even more unscored offenses spanning nearly 20 years. Moreover,
       given the 12-year duration of his paraplegia, we can infer that Mr.
       Lawson committed some of those offenses while disabled, refuting
       any claim that his condition would curtail the risk of future crimi-
       nality. Therefore, his lengthy criminal history clearly supports the
       district court’s evaluation of the § 3553(a) factors and alone justified
       denying him relief. See Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237. Accordingly, the
       district court acted within its discretion in denying Mr. Lawson’s
       motion for compassionate release.
              The district court’s order is affirmed.
              AFFIRMED.