Court Opinion

ID: 9926366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-24 17:05:24.506439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:43.986986
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                     No. 23-1838
                               Filed January 24, 2024

IN THE INTEREST OF J.R.,
Minor Child,

W.R., Father,
      Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Floyd County, Karen Kaufman-Salic,

District Associate Judge.

      A father appeals the termination of his parental rights. AFFIRMED.

      Ann M. Troge, Charles City, for appellant father.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney

general, for appellee State.

      Mark Milder, Denver, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.

      Considered by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Buller, JJ.
                                          2

AHLERS, Judge.

       The father of a five-year-old child appeals the termination of his parental

rights to that child. The issues leading to termination related to the father’s mental

health, substance abuse, health, poorly managed anger, lack of stable housing,

inability to address the child’s special needs, and lack of insight into his parenting

deficiencies.   In this appeal, the father challenges the statutory grounds for

termination found by the juvenile court, contests the juvenile court’s finding that

termination is in the child’s best interests, and alleges the Iowa Department of

Health and Human Services did not make reasonable efforts toward reunification.

He asks us to reverse the order terminating his rights.

       We review orders terminating parental rights de novo. In re Z.K., 973

N.W.2d 27, 32 (Iowa 2022). We give weight to the juvenile court’s findings of fact,

especially regarding witness credibility, but we are not bound by them. Id. Our

review follows a three-step process that involves determining whether a statutory

ground for termination has been established, whether termination is in the child’s

best interests, and whether any permissive exceptions should be applied to

preclude termination. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 294 (Iowa 2021). But if a parent

does not challenge a step, we need not address the unchallenged step on appeal.

See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010).

       As to the statutory grounds, the juvenile court terminated the father’s

parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) and (g) (2023). The father

argues the State failed to establish either ground for termination. However, he fails

to make any substantive challenge to the ground for termination under

paragraph (g). Instead, his argument centers exclusively on whether the child
                                         3

could have been returned to his custody—an element of termination under

paragraph (f) but not paragraph (g).1 Compare Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f), with id.

§ 232.116(1)(g). We find that, by failing to articulate any challenge to termination

under section 232.116(1)(g), the father has waived his challenge to termination on

that ground. See In re W.J., No. 21-1991, 2022 WL 610559, at *1 n.4 (Iowa Ct.

App. Mar. 2, 2022) (noting our unwillingness to advocate for a party and finding

waiver of a challenge to a statutory ground when the challenge is unsupported by

any substantive argument). And, since the juvenile court terminated on more than

one ground, we affirm on the ground not sufficiently challenged—in this case

section 232.116(1)(g). See In re R.S., No. 22-0196, 2022 WL 4362192, at *1 (Iowa

Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2022) (holding that when a parent’s rights are terminated under

multiple grounds and the parent fails to challenge one of the grounds, we affirm on

that ground); see also In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 20212) (holding we

may affirm on any one of the grounds relied upon by the juvenile court when

multiple grounds are found).2

       Before leaving the topic of the statutory grounds, we note that the father

contends the department did not make reasonable efforts toward reunification

1 Termination under section 232.116(1)(g) requires clear and convincing proof that

(1) the child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance, (2) the parent’s
rights to another child who is a member of the same family have been terminated
previously, (3) the parent continues to lack the ability or willingness to respond to
services, and (4) an additional period of rehabilitation would not correct the
situation.
2 Although our decision to affirm termination under section 232.116(1)(g) negates

any requirement that we address the father’s challenge to termination under
section 232.116(1)(f), we note that we have conducted a de novo review of the
entire record. Following that review, we agree with the juvenile court that the child
could not be returned to the father’s custody safely, so termination is also
authorized under section 232.116(1)(f).
                                         4

because it did not offer him services to help him with his health issues and did not

raise concerns about his health until a few months before the termination hearing.

While not a strict substantive requirement for termination, “where the elements of

termination require reasonable efforts by [the department], the scope of [the

department]’s efforts after removal impacts the burden of proving those elements.”

In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 527 (Iowa 2019). So the State must establish the

department made reasonable efforts to provide the parent with reunification

services as part of its ultimate proof of a statutory ground when that ground

requires such efforts. See id. Essentially a parent’s reasonable-efforts challenge

functions as a challenge to a component of the statutory grounds.

       However, a parent must alert the juvenile court of any perceived deficiency

in services “at the removal, when the case permanency plan is entered, or at later

review hearings.” In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 2002). When a parent

fails to timely request additional or different services, the parent waives any

reasonable-efforts challenge. Id. The father did not ask for services to address

his health problems before the termination hearing.3 While the father’s poor health

became a more significant issue as this case progressed, the department

discussed the father’s mobility issues far enough in advance of the hearing that

the father could have raised a related reasonable-efforts challenge prior to

termination if he viewed the lack of services provided as an impediment to

3 The father’s health issues include being overweight, which contributes tohis
inability to stand more than five minutes at a time and hampers his ability to
properly supervise an active five-year-old child.
                                          5

reunification. He did not do so. We find the father has waived his reasonable-

efforts challenge and a statutory ground for termination ultimately satisfied.

       We next turn to whether termination of the father’s parental rights is in the

child’s best interests.   When making a best-interests determination, we “give

primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the

long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and

emotional condition and needs of the child.” P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 40 (quoting Iowa

Code § 232.116(2)).

       The father argues termination is not in the child’s best interest because the

child has a strong bond with him and would suffer serious emotional harm if the

parent-child relationship were severed.4 Our review of the record convinces us

that the child has a bond with his father, the father loves the child, the child enjoys

spending time with his father, and the child is upset when he leaves his father.

Even so, the child needs permanency. The father has not shown that he can

provide a safe and clean place for the child to live, properly supervise the child, or

provide for the child’s basic needs. Preservation of the father’s parental rights

would put the child at risk of harm. We are also concerned by the way this case

progressed. The father was making strides and progressing toward reunification,

but then he had a physical altercation with a roommate and had to quickly leave

his apartment and could not have the child in his care. Since that time, the father

4 We are aware that there is a permissive exception to termination when a parent

establishes that termination would be detrimental to the child due to the closeness
of the parent-child relationship. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c). However, the
father does not cite this Iowa Code section and makes no argument that it applies,
so we do not address it.
                                            6

has not progressed past fully supervised visits. See In re J.H., 952 N.W.2d 157,

170 (Iowa 2020) (“[T]here is a substantial difference between meeting a child’s

needs under the supervision and guidance of other people and being able to

independently care for a child . . . .”). Even if the father could adequately care for

the child now, history leaves us with little confidence that, if life presented another

stumbling block, the father could continue to provide sufficient care.

       We recognize that the father has made improvements and may one day

reach a point where he could properly parent the child. But the child has been out

of the father’s custody for over a year, and the department has been involved for

over two years. We will not make the child continue to wait for permanency. In re

D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010) (“We do not ‘gamble with the children’s

future’ by asking them to continuously wait for a stable biological parent . . . .”

(quoting In re D.W., 385 N.W.2d 570, 578 (Iowa 1986))). It would not be in the

child’s best interests to delay permanency any longer. Termination of the father’s

parental rights is in the child’s best interests.

       We affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights.

       AFFIRMED.