Court Opinion

ID: 9542211
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:32:02.646014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:09.421013
License: Public Domain

Justice LOHR
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
The majority holds that under the principles of City & County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764 (Colo.1990), the interest of the State of Colorado (State) in the training and certification of Denver deputy sheriffs is insufficient to permit the State to prescribe such training and certification. Accordingly, the majority holds that the Peace Officers Standards and Training Act, §§ 24-31-301 to -307, 10A C.R.S. (1996 Supp.) (POST Act), which purports to apply to all peace officers, does not govern the training and certification of Denver deputy sheriffs. I would hold, as the trial court determined, that the State has a substantial interest in protecting the public from inadequately trained peace officers, including Denver deputy sheriffs, and that the POST Act is applicable to such officers under the principles of Denver v. State. Therefore, although I concur with the analytical framework employed by the majority, I dissent to the result.
I.
The Colorado General Assembly adopted the POST Act in 1992, after determining and declaring that the Act was “necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, and safety.” Ch. 167, sec. 14, §§ 24-31-301 to -307, 1992 Colo. Sess. Laws 1091, 1102. The POST Act requires that any “peace officer” in the State of Colorado receive certification from the POST Board that he or she complies with the training and qualification standards adopted by that Board. Maj. op. at 585 & nn. 2, 3 (citing various POST Act provisions). Denver deputy sheriffs are “peace officers” for POST Act purposes. See id. at 585 & n. 3.
On two occasions in June of 1992, the POST Board wrote the Director of Corrections and Undersheriff for the Denver County Jail and expressed concern that Denver deputy sheriffs were not POST-certified. Denver maintained in response that its deputy sheriffs were not subject to POST Act training and certification requirements. This action was then brought by Fraternal Order of Police, Colorado Lodge #27; Fraternal Order of Police, Colorado State Lodge; and Larry Nead, a Denver deputy sheriff (collectively F.O.P.), seeking a declaratory judgment that Denver deputy sheriffs are subject to the POST Act certification requirements. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district court entered a declaratory judgment in favor of F.O.P. after holding that “there is a substantial state concern to protect the public from inadequately trained peace officers.” The district court noted that Denver deputy sheriffs “have limited powers to make arrests,” the deputy sheriffs “do come in contact with the citizens of this state and others in the course of performing their duties,” and the deputy sheriffs “are armed and authorized to use weapons” in performing their duties.
On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed. Fraternal Order of Police v. City & County of Denver, 914 P.2d 483, 484, 488 (Colo.App.1995). The court of appeals relied on the analytical framework outlined in Passarelli v. Schoettler, 742 P.2d 867, 872 (Colo.1987), and determined that Denver’s constitutional home rule authority1 takes *594precedence over any statewide statutory requirement relating to the qualifications of Denver’s peace officers. Fraternal Order, 914 P.2d at 487. We then granted certiorari review. See maj. op. at 584 n. 1 (setting forth the issues on which we granted certiorari).
II.
In Part II of its opinion, the majority outlines the relevant analytical framework that applies “where a state statute and a home rule provision seek to govern the same conduct.” Maj. op. at 586. The majority determines that the court of appeals “improperly fashion[ed] an absolute rule that when a state statute and home rule provision of the constitution are in conflict, the constitution always controls.” Maj. op. at 588. I agree, and therefore concur in part II of the majority opinion. See maj. op. at 586-589.
“[Wjhere a home rule provision of the constitution conflicts with a statutory enactment of the General Assembly,” I agree with the majority that “the determination that a matter is of local concern, statewide concern, or of mixed state and local concern controls the ultimate resolution of such a conflict.” Maj. op. at 587 (footnote omitted). We outlined the applicable standard of review in Denver v. State:
In matters of local concern, both home rule cities and the state may legislate. However, when a home rule ordinance or charter provision and a state statute conflict with respect to a local matter, the home rule provision supersedes the conflicting state provision. In matters of statewide concern, the General Assembly may adopt legislation and home rule municipalities are without power to act unless authorized by the constitution or by state statute. Finally, we have held that in matters of mixed local and state coneem, a charter or ordinance provision of a home rule municipality may coexist with a state statute as long as there is no conflict, but in the event of conflict the state statute supersedes the conflicting provision of the charter or ordinance.
Denver v. State, 788 P.2d at 767 (citations omitted). As the majority observes, a critical factor in determining the correct classification is the interest of the state in regulating the matter. Maj. op. at 588. Furthermore, I agree with the majority that several general factors apply to our consideration of the sufficiency of the state’s interest in regulating a matter that otherwise falls within the scope of constitutional home rule authority:
These factors include: (1) the need for statewide uniformity of regulation; (2) the extraterritorial impact—i.e., the impact of the municipal regulation or home rule provision on persons living outside the municipal limits; (3) any other state interests; and (4) the asserted local interests in the municipal regulation contemplated by the home rule provision.
Maj. op. at 589 (citing Denver v. State, 788 P.2d at 768); accord maj. op. at 588 (quoting Denver v. State, 788 P.2d at 768). The majority correctly considers whether the State has a sufficient interest in the training and qualifications of Denver deputy sheriffs according to principles of “uniformity,” maj. op. at 589-590, “extraterritorial impact,” maj. op. at 590-591, the state concern for “public safety,” maj. op. at 591, and “local interests,” maj. op. at 591-592. Although the four “general factors” relied upon by the majority are relevant to any inquiry regarding the magnitude of the state’s interest, maj. op. at 587-588, 589, these four factors are neither mutually exclusive nor comprehensive. See Denver v. State, 788 P.2d at 767-68; accord maj. op. at 588, 589 n. 9. There is significant overlap among the four factors in the present case, illustrating the need to consider those factors as part of a broader inquiry relating to the strength of the State’s interest in imposing a POST certification requirement upon Denver deputy sheriffs.
Although I agree with the majority’s mode of analysis, I disagree with its ultimate conclusion under that analytical framework. I therefore respectfully dissent from parts III, IV, and V of the majority opinion. See maj. op. at 589-593.
*595III.
The State has a significant interest in setting minimum training and qualification standards applicable to peace officers who serve as Denver deputy sheriffs. Denver’s work description for its deputy sheriffs clarifies that Denver deputy sheriffs are in constant contact with prisoners held pursuant to state criminal charges. The deputy sheriffs are responsible for preventing escapes, apprehending escaped prisoners, and other pressing matters of public safety, and the deputy sheriffs act as guardians of the general public in the course of transporting criminal defendants to and from court. In order to perform their other duties, deputy sheriffs must qualify in the use of weapons. Denver prescribes the official duties of its deputy sheriffs in a work description:
Primary Duties: Maintains security of prisoners confined in detention, holding, court, and medical facilities by enforcing rules and regulations, inspecting prisoners and detention quarters for contraband and safety hazards, supervising and instructing prisoners assigned to work details, observing prisoner behavior and physical condition, and controlling movement of prisoners and the public within the facilities. Acts as agent of County or District Courts executing warrants and serving court processes and orders. Ensures process paper and supporting documents are accurate and complete, locates individual to be served, and serves the papers in the proper manner. Takes individuals into custody. Transports prisoners between detention facilities, district police stations and headquarters, to and from courts, medical facilities, and other jurisdictions. Verifies identity of each prisoner and authority to hold and transport. Secures prisoners with appropriate equipment, searches transport vehicle and holding cells for contraband, checks vehicle for safety, and verifies proposed route of travel.... Assigns prisoners housing and work details. Reviews inmate charges, court orders, and legal status to ensure proper custody and disposition. Computes good time and release dates for sentenced prisoners. Informs prisoners of possible means of release or detention policies. Verifies the satisfaction of all charges. Ensures security and return of appropriate inmate property. Secures, inventories, and controls disposition of all equipment, supplies, prisoner uniforms and personal clothing, keys and/or weapons.... Dispatches sheriff vehicles by radio and/or monitors movement and current locations. Dispatches sheriffs to courtrooms and various other assignments or patrols_ Testifies in court as required.
Other Duties Performed: Conducts preliminary investigations of accidents, fights and other incidents and documents findings. Places telephone calls for prisoners - Informs prisoners, prisoner family members, attorneys, and other agencies or jurisdictions of prisoner status, court schedules, and department polices [sic]- Prepares various legal documents and provides testimony in court proceedings- Escorts juries, ensures inmates appear in court as ordered, and performs other duties as ordered by the court. Monitors closed circuit television and motion detectors and notifies supervisor of security violations and take immediate corrective action.... As required, meets certification standards and qualifies in the use of weapons, physically subdues violent prisoners, and chases inmates on foot to apprehend them.
Performs related work as required.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that “because we can find no pervading state interest in regulating the training of Denver’s deputy sheriffs, we find the matter to be one of local concern.” Maj. op. at 592. According to Denver’s own work description for deputy sheriffs, Denver deputy sheriffs maintain security in Denver detention facilities, and inspect, supervise, observe, instruct, search, and control prisoners in such facilities. The deputy sheriffs “physically sub-duet ] violent prisoners,” “chase[ ] inmates on foot to apprehend them,” “control or apprehend violent or fleeing prisoners,” lift “injured or ill prisoners,” execute warrants, serve process, and take individuals into custody. Denver deputy sheriffs testify in court, advise prisoners of court proceedings, *596and prepare legal documents. Furthermore, Denver deputy sheriffs are responsible for members of the general public during visits to detention facilities and may have to transport prisoners to public medical facilities or protect members of the general public who serve as jurors. Denver even specifically requires Denver deputy sheriffs to transport prisoners to and from “other jurisdictions” if need be. Accord, e.g., Roll v. Davis, 85 Colo. 594, 598-600, 277 P. 767, 769 (1929) (trial court has power to direct Denver deputy sheriffs to proceed to a county other than Denver, receive a defendant held in that county, and remove that defendant for placement in a Denver jail). In short, Denver deputy sheriffs are intimately associated with “public safety” and have substantial “extraterritorial impact” in performing their duties as peace officers in Denver, the State capital and center of commerce. I would affirm the trial court’s determination that the State has a sufficient interest in creating minimum uniform standards for armed peace officers who interact with criminal defendants from throughout this state and other jurisdictions to require that Denver deputy sheriffs comply with POST Act certification provisions.2
In my opinion, the majority unduly minimizes the extraterritorial impact and public safety implications that stem from the work of Denver deputy sheriffs. The majority first determines that because Denver deputy sheriffs do not have the same responsibilities as police officers, there is no need in terms of “uniformity” for Denver’s deputy sheriffs to be subject to the POST Act certification requirement. Maj. op. at 589-590; accord maj. op. at 591. The majority concludes by quoting our 1974 summary of the Denver deputy sheriffs’ responsibilities, found in International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local No. 127 v. City & County of Denver, 185 Colo. 50, 54, 521 P.2d 916, 918 (1974), determining that “the current duties and responsibilities of Denver deputy sheriffs ... do not establish any different or additional responsibilities that are intended to or would create a significant impact beyond Denver’s boundaries,” and holding that “we do not perceive a need for statewide uniformity of training that would include Denver deputy sheriffs.” Maj. op. at 590 (footnotes omitted). Although Denver deputy sheriffs are not police officers and therefore do not perform the same law enforcement duties as police officers, it does not follow that there is no need for statewide uniformity relating to minimum training and qualification standards for both police officers and Denver deputy sheriffs. See maj. op. at 589-590, 591. In addition, I believe that the majority errs in relying on our 1974 summary of the responsibilities of Denver deputy sheriffs, see Local No. 127, 185 Colo. at 54, 521 P.2d at 918, as an undisputed and comprehensive description of the work activities of Denver deputy sheriffs. See maj. op. at 590 & n. 11.3 As previously noted, supra pp. 595-596, Denver requires its deputy sher*597iffs to act as agents of County or District Courts in executing arrest warrants, and the responsibilities of Denver deputy sheriffs necessarily require the deputy sheriffs to interact with the general public.
Second, the majority determines that any “extraterritorial impact of Denver deputy sheriffs is, at best, de minimis,” because Denver deputy sheriffs “are not authorized to make warrantless arrests” and “any contact [the deputy sheriffs] have with people outside of the City and County of Denver in the performance of their duties ... is merely incidental.” Maj. op. at 591. In my opinion, it is misleading to summarize that the deputy sheriffs’ contact with “people outside of the City and County of Denver” is “merely incidental.” Maj. op. at 591. Denver detention facilities are not limited to residents of Denver, and any supervising law enforcement officers in the detention facilities have daily interactions with individuals who are not residents of Denver but who have become subject to jurisdiction of the criminal courts in Denver. Furthermore, although in the great majority of their activities, Denver deputy sheriffs will not interact “with people outside of the City and County of Denver,” maj. op. at 591, Denver deputy sheriffs are authorized to execute arrest warrants, a function that can bring them in contact with persons who are not Denver residents.
Third, the majority reasons that “Denver deputy sheriffs do not have the authority to impact significantly any circumstances outside of the Denver courts or jails, and, as a consequence, will not substantially impact public safety beyond the boundaries of Denver.” Maj. op. at 591. I cannot agree with the majority that Denver deputy sheriffs “will not substantially impact public safety beyond the boundaries of Denver” because those deputy sheriffs have few responsibilities “outside of the Denver courts or jails.” Maj. op. at 591. As previously discussed, supra pp. 595-596, Denver deputy sheriffs must qualify in the use of weapons, and their prescribed duties involve interaction with both the general public and criminal defendants who face state charges. Additionally, the state has a substantial interest in the welfare and safety of all of its citizens, including residents of Denver.
Finally, the majority maintains that “Denver has a substantial interest in the qualifications of its own public officers.” Maj. op. at 592. Since Denver does have a constitutional grant of authority over the qualifications of its officers, see Colo. Const, art. XX, § 2, and because the majority “can find no pervading state interest in regulating the training of Denver’s deputy sheriffs,” the majority concludes that the training and qualifications of Denver’s deputy sheriffs are matters of “local concern.” Maj. op. at 592. I disagree. I conclude that the State has a sufficient interest in outlining minimum training and qualification requirements for Denver deputy sheriffs to support the legislature’s imposition of a uniform POST Act certification requirement applicable to Denver deputy sheriffs.4
*598rv.
I would reverse the court of appeals and affirm the district court’s holding that there is a sufficient state interest to support the General Assembly’s requirement that Denver deputy sheriffs comply with POST Act certification provisions. For the aforementioned reasons, I respectfully concur in part II and • dissent from parts III, IV, and V of the majority opinion.

. Article XX, section 6, of the Colorado Constitution grants home rule authority to "[t]he people of each city or town of this state, having a population of two thousand inhabitants as determined by the last preceding census taken under the authority of the United States, the state of Colorado or said city or town,” including cities such as Denver. Colo. Const, art. XX, § 6; accord maj. op. at 586-587 (citing Robertson v. City & County of Denver, 874 P.2d 325, 350 (Colo. 1994) (Erickson, J., dissenting)). Article XX, section 2, of the Colorado Constitution confers on Denver the specific authority to provide by its charter for "the jurisdiction, term of office, *594duties and qualifications” of its officers. Colo. Const. art. XX, § 2; accord maj. op. at 591-592.

. See generally, e.g., Robertson v. City & County of Denver, 874 P.2d 325, 350-51 (Colo. 1994) (Erickson, J., dissenting) (regulation of assault weapons is a statewide concern); Walgreen Co. v. Charnes, 819 P.2d 1039, 1046-47 (Colo. 1991) (appellate process governing locally imposed sales and use taxes is of statewide concern); National Advertising Co. v. Department of Highways, 751 P.2d 632, 636-38 (Colo. 1988) (regulation of highway advertising signs is a mixed statewide and local concern, subject to state statutory enactments); City of Colorado Springs v. Industrial Comm'n, 749 P.2d 412, 416-17 (Colo.1988) (unemployment benefits are a statewide concern); Century Elec. Serv. & Repair, Inc. v. Stone, 193 Colo. 181, 183-84, 564 P.2d 953, 955 (1977) (licensure of electricians is a statewide concern); Huff v. May or of Colorado Springs, 182 Colo. 108, 112-13, 512 P.2d 632, 634 (1973) (pension plans for firemen are a statewide concern); Kelly v. City of Fort Collins, 163 Colo. 520, 523, 431 P.2d 785, 787 (1967) (regulation of liquor is a statewide concern); Spears Free Clinic & Hospital v. State Bd. of Health, 122 Colo. 147, 149-50, 220 P.2d 872, 874 (1950) (licensing of hospitals a statewide concern); see also, e.g., Gold Star Sausage Co. v. Kempf, 653 P.2d 397, 401 (Colo.1982) (limitations period for tax appeals is a statewide concern); City & County of Denver v. Thomas, 176 Colo. 483, 486, 491 P.2d 573, 574 (1971) (worker’s compensation is a statewide concern); Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 52, 329 P.2d 441, 447 (1958) (income tax is a statewide concern); City of Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 182, 323 P.2d 614, 621 (1958) (driving under the influence is a statewide concern); Keefe v. People, 37 Colo. 317, 325, 87 P. 791, 793 (1906) (maximum workday of employees engaged in construction of municipal public works a statewide concern).

. To the contrary, the description of the Denver deputy sheriffs' responsibilities found in International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local No. 127 v. City & County of Denver, 185 Colo. 50, 54, 521 P.2d 916, 918 (1974), is anything but an *597undisputed summary of those responsibilities. See maj. op. at 590. First, in Local No. 127, we described the duties of Denver deputy sheriffs "as delineated under the existing regulations.” 185 Colo, at 54, 521 P.2d at 918. We noted that the powers and responsibilities of the Denver deputy sheriffs could be expanded "by charter or ordinance or by deputization from the Manager of Safely.” Id. Indeed, "[d]epartmental rules and directives of the Manager of Safety govern a deputy sheriff's duties in Denver." Id.
Second, in F.O.P.’s “Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,” F.O.P. attached as an appendix the official work description for Denver deputy sheriffs, obtained from Denver during discovery. See supra pp. 595-596 (summarizing official work description). This attachment belies any claim that the description of the responsibilities of Denver deputy sheriffs found in Local No. 127, 185 Colo, at 54, 521 P.2d at 918, is an undisputed summary. See maj. op. at 590. The majority's reliance on a 1974 description of the Denver deputy sheriffs' responsibilities is misplaced. See maj. op. at 589-590.

. Our inquiry is simply whether POST certification for Denver deputy sheriffs is a matter of local concern, statewide concern, or of mixed state and local concern. City & County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764, 767 (Colo.1990); accord maj. op. at 587. The majority places great emphasis on the existence of a training program for Denver deputy sheriffs within the Denver Sheriff Department in concluding that the training of Denver deputy sheriffs is solely a matter of local concern. See maj. op. at 586 & n. 5, 591. The majority determines that in part “because Den*598ver's deputy sheriffs receive extensive training prior to their assignments, we conclude that the state does not have a sufficient interest in their qualifications." Maj. op. at 591. In my opinion, the Denver Sheriff Department's existing training program for Denver deputy sheriffs does not eliminate the state’s interest in setting minimum training standards for peace officers who interact with citizens who are not Denver residents, escort prisoners from other jurisdictions to Denver, execute arrests pursuant to warrant, carry arms, and protect members of the general public in the course of those citizens' jury duty or visits to the Denver jails. The state’s interest in these matters is not to be determined by the adequacy or inadequacy of any particular training program Denver may have adopted.