Court Opinion

ID: 9496438
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:26:52.880345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:35.083915
License: Public Domain

MELLOY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I believe that the portion of the challenged hearsay statement in which Malik allegedly threatened to harm police officers should have been redacted as unduly prejudicial. However, given other properly admitted testimony and evidence in the case, I believe the error was harmless, and thus I concur in affirming the judgment.
Malik was charged and convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e) (2000). The essential elements of this offense are: (1) that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm; (2) that the defendant had previously been convicted of a felony; and (3) that at some time prior to the defendant’s possession of the firearm, it was transported across state lines. United States v. Horsman, 114 F.3d 822, 824 (8th Cir.1997). Malik stipulated to the second and third elements, and thus the only disputed issue for trial was whether Malik knowingly possessed a firearm.
At trial, the district court allowed the officers to testify that an unidentified male approached them and reported overhearing the defendant say he had a gun and would be willing to use it against police if necessary. The court admitted the hearsay testimony in its entirety on the ground that it was offered not for the truth of the matter asserted but to explain the police officers’ motivation in approaching the defendant.
*1003The majority concludes that the entire statement was relevant and admissible for two reasons. First, to explain the police officers’ conduct in approaching and stopping Mr. Malik and, secondly, to bolster the officers’ credibility.
As to the first reason, I agree that in certain circumstances a statement may be admitted in order to explain why a police officer took certain action. See,e.g., Suggs v. Stanley, 324 F.3d 672, 681-82 (8th Cir.2003); United States v. Brown, 110 F.3d 605, 609 (8th Cir.1997). Thus, I agree that the district court did not abuse its broad discretion in admitting that portion of the statement in which the unidentified informant advised the police officer that Malik possessed a gun. However, I see no justification for admission of that part of the hearsay statement in which Malik allegedly threatened to use the gun on police. Use of hearsay to explain a police officer’s actions should be the exception, not the general rule, and carefully limited to the facts of the case.
Under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. “ ‘Unfair prejudice’ ... means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” See Fed. R.Evid. 403 advisory committee’s note, quoted in United States v. Lupino, 301 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir.2002). Here, the suggestion that Malik is a potential cop-killer is irrelevant to the crime charged which turns only on knowing possession of a firearm. Otherwise inadmissible hearsay does not become admissible merely to establish probable cause. Whether a police officer had probable cause to commence an investigatory stop is not an issue for the petit jury. Accordingly, the hearsay testimony should have been redacted to avoid admission of what I perceive as an unduly inflammatory statement. See id. (finding abuse of discretion by district court where admitted hearsay testimony that assault suspect offered to sell undercover officer marijuana “unnecessarily created a risk of unfair prejudice that outweighed its probative value” and noting no conceivable reason why the evidence, if assumed relevant to arrest context, could not have been redacted).
The majority also concludes that the statement is admissible to bolster the officers’ credibility on the issue of whether Malik possessed a gun. The credibility dispute in this case concerns whether the officers truthfully testified when they said they saw Malik remove and drop a silver gun. It seems to me that this is the type of hearsay that is clearly excluded by the hearsay rule. An out of court statement (the unidentified male statement that he saw Malik with a gun) is used to prove the truth of the matter asserted (that Malik possessed a firearm). The fact that Malik challenged the credibility of the officers’ testimony on this issue does not make the statement admissible. Under the majority’s holding, the police officers would be allowed to testify about a statement made by any third party, even weeks after the incident, who claim to have seen Malik with a gun. I believe that clearly violates the hearsay rule and raises serious Sixth Amendment constitutional concerns.
I concur in the judgment, however, because I believe admission of the statement was harmless error. See United States v. Fletcher, 322 F.3d 508, 518 (8th Cir.2003) (applying harmless error review to erroneous admission of hearsay testimony); Lupino, 301 F.3d at 645 (“Even where we find that the district court has abused its discretion with respect to an evidentiary ruling, we will not reverse the conviction if the error was harmless.”). “The test for harmless error is whether the erroneous *1004evidentiary ruling ‘had a “substantial influence” on the jury’s verdict.’ ” Id. (quoting Peterson v. City of Plymouth, 60 F.3d 469, 475 (8th Cir.1995)).
In this case, the improper statement went only to the police officers’ motivation in approaching Malik. The crux of this case, as relevant to the offense charged, turns on what happened after the officers’ initial approach, and it is clear that the evidence and testimony from that point on were unaffected by the erroneously admitted statement. In other words, absent the improper testimony, the trial would have proceeded in exactly the same manner, and the jury would have evaluated exactly the same evidence as relevant to the felon-in-possession charge. See id. at 646 (finding harmless error in erroneous hearsay admission “because there was abundant evidence to sustain [the defendant’s] conviction without [the improperly admitted testimony]”).
I also note as significant the fact that the final jury instructions included a limiting instruction cautioning the jury to consider the hearsay statements only for purposes of evaluating the police officers’ subsequent conduct and not as proof of possession. See Jury Instruction No. 13, Clerk’s record at 222. While such an instruction is not in itself sufficient to render the improper statement admissible, it further supports a conclusion that the error had no substantial influence on the jury, and therefore was, in this particular case, harmless. See Fed.R.Evid. 403 advisory committee’s note (explaining that a Rule 403 determination on unfair prejudice should include consideration of the possible effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a limiting instruction). In sum, given the substantive offense at issue, and viewing the error in the context of the entire trial, I see little risk that the jury’s verdict was based on the improper testimony rather than the rest of the evidence before it. See Lupino, 301 F.3d at 647 (concluding that even if the jury believed that Lupino was a drug dealer based on improperly admitted hearsay, “such a belief would not make the other evidence of his guilt more credible or less credible” and finding it “doubtful that the jury reached its verdict on that basis and not on the basis of the other overwhelming evidence of his guilt”); United States v. Byler, 98 F.3d 391, 394 (8th Cir.1996) (affirming conviction on harmless error grounds where “the [erroneously admitted hearsay] had no, or only slight, influence on the verdict”).