Court Opinion

ID: 9366767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-27 21:00:54.351968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:55.079014
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12835   Document: 15-1    Date Filed: 01/27/2023   Page: 1 of 9

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 22-12835
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       SHERRI JEFFERSON,
                                                   Plaintiff-Appellant,
       versus
       STATE BAR OF GEORGIA,
       SHARON L. BRYANT,
       in her official capacity,
       CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, STATE BAR OF GEORGIA,
       WILLIAM COBB,
       in his official capacity as Bar Counsel,
       PATRICK LONGAN,
       in his official capacity as review panel
       chairman, et al.,
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       2                       Opinion of the Court                  22-12835

                                                      Defendants-Appellees.

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-01883-TCB
                           ____________________

       Before JORDAN, BRASHER, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Plaintiff Sherri Jefferson is a former member of the State Bar
       of Georgia who was disbarred by the Georgia Supreme Court on
       October 7, 2019. See In re Jefferson, 834 S.E.2d 73 (Ga. 2019).
       Jefferson, proceeding pro se, sued the State Bar of Georgia and
       certain officials (collectively, “State Bar”) alleging, inter alia, that
       they acted improperly when they disciplined and ultimately
       disbarred her (and other African American lawyers).
               The district court denied Jefferson’s motion to recuse,
       granted the State Bar’s motion to stay discovery pending resolution
       of its motion to dismiss, and later granted the State Bar’s motion to
       dismiss. Jefferson appeals these three rulings. After careful review,
       we affirm the district court’s denial of the recusal motion, its
       staying of the discovery, and its dismissal of Jefferson’s claims.
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       22-12835                   Opinion of the Court                               3

                            I.      MOTION TO RECUSE
              On appeal, Jefferson challenges the district court’s denial of
       Jefferson’s motion to recuse. We review a denial of a motion for
       recusal for abuse of discretion. In re Walker, 532 F.3d 1304, 1308
       (11th Cir. 2008).
              Under 28 U.S.C. § 455, a judge “shall disqualify himself in
       any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
       questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). A judge shall also disqualify
       himself if “he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party,
       or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
       proceeding.” Id. § 455(b). “[T]he general rule is that bias sufficient
       to disqualify a judge must stem from extrajudicial sources.”
       Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging Co., 293 F.3d 1306, 1329 (11th Cir.
       2002) (quotation marks omitted). “The exception to this rule is
       when a judge’s remarks in a judicial context demonstrate such
       pervasive bias and prejudice that it constitutes bias against a party.”
       Id. (quotation marks omitted).
               Here, Jefferson moved to recuse the district court judge
       because he previously had presided over two of her cases.1 The
       district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jefferson’s

       1 In Jefferson v. Deal, Case No. 1:15-cv-02069-TCB (N.D. Ga. June 9, 2015),
       Jefferson challenged the constitutionality of several Georgia criminal statutes
       without success. In Doe v. Deal, Case No. 1:15-cv-02226-TCB (N.D. Ga. June
       19, 2015), Jefferson initially listed herself as the attorney representing “Jane
       Doe” but later sought to be the plaintiff, and she again challenged the
       constitutionality of certain Georgia statutes without success.
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       4                       Opinion of the Court               22-12835

       motion to recuse for three reasons. First, the alleged bias raised by
       Jefferson pertained to the district court judge’s capacity as a judge
       and was not extrajudicial in nature. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b); Thomas,
       293 F.3d at 1329. Second, there was no evidence of remarks
       suggesting, much less constituting, bias. Third, Jefferson provided
       no other reason to suggest the district court judge’s impartiality
       could reasonably be questioned. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
                         II.    STAY OF DISCOVERY
              On appeal, Jefferson also challenges the district court’s
       staying of discovery pending the resolution of the State Bar’s
       motion to dismiss. We review matters pertaining to discovery
       under an abuse of discretion standard. Josendis v. Wall to Wall
       Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1306 (11th Cir. 2011).
              District courts have “broad discretion to stay discovery
       pending a decision on a dispositive motion.” See Panola Land
       Buyers Ass’n v. Shuman, 762 F.2d 1550, 1560 (11th Cir. 1985); see
       also Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1366 (11th
       Cir. 1997) (“[D]istrict courts enjoy broad discretion in deciding how
       best to manage the cases before them.”). As outlined later, the
       State Bar’s motion to dismiss raised numerous legal reasons why
       Jefferson’s case must be dismissed. Jefferson has shown no abuse
       of discretion in the district court’s staying discovery pending a
       ruling on the State Bar’s motion to dismiss.
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       22-12835                   Opinion of the Court                      5

                           III.    MOTION TO DISMISS
              The district court granted the State Bar’s motion to dismiss
       on many grounds including: (1) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (2) a
       lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (3) the statute of limitations;
       (4) judicial, prosecutorial, and qualified immunity; (5) collateral
       estoppel; and (6) failure to state a claim.
              On appeal, Jefferson challenges both a procedural aspect and
       the substantive merits of the district court’s order on the State Bar’s
       motion to dismiss. We begin with Jefferson’s procedural
       argument.
       A.     Procedural
               In its order granting the State Bar’s motion to dismiss, the
       district court noted—in a footnote—Jefferson’s prior actions
       regarding her disbarment ruled on by the United States Supreme
       Court and the Georgia Supreme Court:
              Jefferson petitioned the Supreme Court of the United
              States for a writ of certiorari, which was denied on
              February 24, 2020. Jefferson v. Sup. Ct. of Ga., 140 S.
              Ct. 1148 (mem.), reh’g denied, 140 S. Ct. 2637 (2020)
              (mem.). She has since filed two unsuccessful actions
              with the Georgia Supreme Court seeking the
              reinstatement of her law license. See In re Jefferson,
              No. S22O0785 (Ga. Apr. 19, 2022); In re Jefferson, No.
              S22Y0949 (Ga. June 1, 2022).
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12835

       Jefferson argues the district court erred by considering cases
       outside the instant litigation without converting the motion to
       dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. We disagree.
              Generally, a district court must convert a motion to dismiss
       into one for summary judgment if it considers materials outside the
       complaint. SFM Holdings, Ltd. v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 600 F.3d
       1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2010). But there are exceptions to this general
       rule. For example, a district court may consider matters of which
       a court may take judicial notice. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
       Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2509 (2007).
               As relevant here, a district court may take judicial notice of
       another lawsuit to establish the fact of such lawsuit and related
       filings, but not for the truth of the matters asserted in the other
       lawsuit. See United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir.
       1994) (“[A] court may take notice of another court’s order only for
       the limited purpose of recognizing the ‘judicial act’ that the order
       represents or the subject matter of the litigation.”). Here, by
       referring to cases outside the instant litigation, the district court
       merely noted the existence of those cases and whether they were
       successful. The district court did not reference those cases for the
       truth of the matters asserted in those cases. We thus conclude the
       district court did not err in this respect.
       B.    Merits of Motion to Dismiss
              Jefferson also challenges each substantive ground given by
       the district court for granting the State Bar’s motion to dismiss.
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       22-12835                  Opinion of the Court                               7

              We begin with the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars
       federal district courts from reviewing state-court decisions. 2 Behr
       v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206, 1208 (11th Cir. 2021). It applies to “cases
       brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by
       state-court judgments rendered before the district court
       proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
       rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
       Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1521–22 (2005).
              On appeal, Jefferson does not appear to dispute that she
       qualified as a “state-court loser” and her October 2019 disbarment
       was “rendered before the district court proceedings commenced”
       in May 2022 in the instant case. Id. Rather, Jefferson claims she
       was not seeking to overturn the state court judgment. So the
       question is whether or not her instant claims are “inviting district
       court review and rejection of [the state court] judgment[].” Id.
             A careful review of Jefferson’s amended complaint in this
       case shows that she is seeking review and rejection of the state

       2 This doctrine is named after two Supreme Court cases: Rooker v. Fidelity
       Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149 (1923), and District of Columbia Court
       of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S. Ct. 1303 (1983). In Rooker, the
       Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs, who had lost in state court, could not
       ask the federal district court to declare the state court judgment “null and
       void.” 263 U.S. at 414–15, 44 S. Ct. at 149–50. Similarly, in Feldman, the
       Supreme Court said that lower federal courts lacked jurisdiction to review a
       decision by the District of Columbia’s highest court denying a waiver of a bar
       admission rule that requires applicants to the District of Columbia Bar to have
       graduated from an approved law school. 460 U.S. at 482, 103 S. Ct. at 1315.
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       8                         Opinion of the Court                      22-12835

       court judgment that disbarred her. Jefferson’s amended complaint
       asked the district court to enjoin the State Bar from “[f]ailing or
       refusing to take such steps as may be necessary to restore . . . the
       victims of Defendants’ unlawful practices to the position they
       would have been in but for the discriminatory conduct.” Jefferson
       thus essentially asked the district court to overturn the state court
       judgment and reinstate her law license. 3 See Feldman, 460 U.S. at
       482 n.16, 103 S. Ct. at 1315 n.16 (“Orders of a state court relating to
       the admission, discipline, and disbarment of members of its bar
       may be reviewed only by the Supreme Court of the United States
       on certiorari to the state court, and not by means of an original
       action in a lower federal court.” (quotation marks omitted)).
              Further, by claiming that during her disciplinary
       proceedings the State Bar treated her unlike other similarly situated
       individuals, Jefferson essentially asked the district court to reject
       the state court judgment on the basis that it was rendered
       incorrectly. That is akin to requesting a declaration that the state

       3 Jefferson attempts to distinguish “restore” from “reinstate” by arguing that
       restore means “to reestablish,” while reinstate means “to put somebody to a
       former position or rank.” We are unpersuaded. There is little daylight
       between restore and reinstate. Compare Restore, Merriam-Webster Online
       Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/restore (last
       visited Jan. 9, 2023) (defining restore as “to bring back to or put back into a
       former or original state”), with Reinstate, Merriam-Webster Online
       Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reinstate (last
       visited Jan. 9, 2023) (defining reinstate as “to place again . . . in a former
       position” or “to restore to a previous effective state”).
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       22-12835              Opinion of the Court                      9

       court judgment was arbitrary and capricious, which this Court
       recently held is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Behr,
       8 F.4th at 1211. We thus affirm the district court’s dismissal of
       Jefferson’s claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
              Because we affirm for this substantive reason, we need not,
       and do not, address whether the other, alternate grounds relied on
       by the district court for dismissal—lack of subject matter
       jurisdiction; statute of limitations; judicial, prosecutorial, and
       qualified immunity; collateral estoppel; and failure to state a
       claim—were likewise correct.
             AFFIRMED.