Court Opinion

ID: 9363614
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-17 13:03:30.109223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:32.892359
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                          2023-NCCOA-7

                                          No. COA22-414

                                      Filed 17 January 2023

     Johnston County, Nos. 19 CRS 51874-76, 19 CRS 628

     STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

                   v.

     ROBERT LINWOOD MASSEY, JR.

            Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 21 July 2021 by Judge James F.

     Ammons, Jr., in Johnston County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals

     15 November 2022.

            Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General
            Jonathan R. Marx, for the State.

            Patterson Harkavy LLP, by Christopher A. Brook, for defendant.

            ARROWOOD, Judge.

¶1          Robert Linwood Massey, Jr., (“defendant”) appeals from judgments following

     jury verdicts of guilty for possession of marijuana paraphernalia, simple possession

     of marijuana, assault on a government official, possession with intent to sell or deliver

     methamphetamine,1 intentionally maintaining a dwelling which is resorted to by

     1 We note that although defendant’s indictment alleged he “unlawfully . . . possess[ed] with
     intent to sell and deliver a controlled substance, namely [m]ethamphetamine,” we defer to
                                           STATE V. MASSEY

                                               2023-NCCOA-7

                                           Opinion of the Court

     persons using controlled substances, and for attaining the status of habitual felon.

     Defendant argues the trial court erred by improperly admitting prior bad act

     evidence, denying his motion to dismiss the charges of marijuana possession,

     possession of marijuana paraphernalia, and maintaining a dwelling which is resorted

     to by persons using controlled substances. Defendant also argues the trial court

     committed plain error by giving conflicting jury instructions.             For the following

     reasons, we find no error in part and arrest judgment in part.

                                          I.      Background

¶2          On 29 March 2019, after receiving information from a confidential informant

     that defendant possessed methamphetamines, Johnston County Sheriff’s Office

     (“JCSO”) executed a search warrant on defendant’s home. Based on the recovered

     evidence, defendant was indicted by a Johnston County Grand Jury for possession of

     marijuana and marijuana paraphernalia, assault on a government official, resisting

     a public officer, possession of methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver,

     maintaining a dwelling resorted to by persons using methamphetamine, and for being

     a habitual felon on 6 May 2019. The matters came on for trial on 19 July 2021, Judge

     Ammons presiding. The evidence at trial tended to show the following:

     the statutory definition set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(a)(1), which states it is a felony
     to “sell or deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture, sell or deliver, a controlled
     substance[,]” throughout this opinion.
                                       STATE V. MASSEY

                                         2023-NCCOA-7

                                       Opinion of the Court

¶3         In the morning of 29 March 2019, defendant was outside working on his

     vehicle when he saw officers from JCSO arrive. Upon seeing the law enforcement

     vehicles, defendant ran inside his residence. Officers entered and found defendant

     sitting in a recliner “reaching” his left hand “between the seat cushion and arm

     rest[.]” Defendant was “noncompliant” and refusing “to show his hands clearly.”

     Defendant was “combative[,]” “kicking[,]” “flailing[,]” and “really hard to control[.]”

     After this brief physical altercation, defendant was subsequently arrested and taken

     outside, where he, again, attempted to flee.

¶4         During the search of defendant’s person, officers recovered a cellphone and

     what they identified as a bag of marijuana. Forensic scientist Lauren Adcox of the

     North Carolina State Crime Laboratory (“NCSCL”) testified that she did not quantify

     the percentage of tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”) in the substance, thus unable to

     determine if the substance was marijuana as opposed to legal hemp. On direct

     examination, JCSO officer testimony initially identified the substance as marijuana,

     however, during cross-examination the officer equivocated whether the substance

     was marijuana or hemp.

¶5         During search of the residence, officers found a “Hide-A-Key” device inside the

     recliner defendant was sitting in, which contained “five baggies” of a “crystal

     substance.”    Subsequent testing indicated one bag contained 2.81 grams of

     methamphetamine; consistent with NCSCL policy, the remaining bags were not
                                         STATE V. MASSEY

                                           2023-NCCOA-7

                                         Opinion of the Court

     tested. Two digital scales were also seized, one containing a “white powder residue[.]”

     Officer testimony indicated that the division of the substance into five baggies, along

     with the presence of the scales were consistent with selling drugs. On defendant’s

     coffee table, officers recovered:    suspected marijuana, “rolling papers,” “a one-

     hitter[,]” which is “a little device that they smoke marijuana out of[,]” and “some clear

     plastic baggies[.]”

¶6          As an individual “suspected of dealing drugs,” certain items from defendant’s

     cellphone were also admitted into evidence via a “Cellebrite extraction [report][,]”

     (“the extraction report”). Officers were able to recover a series of text messages and

     photographs the State argued were “relevant information” to show knowledge,

     motive, and intent to commit the charged offenses. The text messages ranged from

     20 October 2018 to 25 February 2019.        Each photo was undated, except for one

     picture of a crystalline substance taken 25 December 2018. Defendant filed a motion

     to exclude the evidence from the extraction report as violative of Rule 404(b) of the

     North Carolina Rules of Evidence, which the trial court denied.

¶7          On 21 July 2021, the jury found defendant guilty of possession with intent to

     sell or deliver methamphetamine, intentionally maintaining a dwelling resorted to

     by persons using controlled substances, simple possession of marijuana, possession

     of marijuana paraphernalia, and assault on a government official.            Thereafter,

     defendant pled guilty to being a habitual felon. The court consolidated all of the
                                        STATE V. MASSEY

                                          2023-NCCOA-7

                                       Opinion of the Court

     charges for sentencing purposes. Defendant was sentenced to 58 to 82 months, which

     is the lowest possible sentence in the mitigated range for these charges. Defendant

     filed a notice of appeal on 27 July 2021.

                                       II.       Discussion

¶8         On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred by (1) admitting text

     messages and photographs from the extraction report in contravention of Rule 404(b),

     (2) denying his motion to dismiss the charges of marijuana possession, possession of

     marijuana paraphernalia, and maintaining a dwelling resorted to by persons using

     methamphetamine, and (3) providing the jury with inconsistent jury instructions.

     Defendant does not raise any issues on appeal with respect to his conviction of assault

     on a governmental official. We address each argument in turn.

                             A.     Rule 404(b) Prior Act Evidence

¶9         Defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial error by admitting

     prior bad act evidence in violation of Rule 404(b). Specifically, defendant argues the

     extraction report should have been excluded as the challenged text messages and

     photographs are too temporally attenuated and lack sufficient similarity to the

     current controversy and that their admission was inherently prejudicial under Rule

     403. Thus, defendant asserts the challenged evidence was admitted in error as it

     tended to show defendant’s general propensity to deal in controlled substances. We

     disagree.
                                           STATE V. MASSEY

                                             2023-NCCOA-7

                                          Opinion of the Court

¶ 10         This Court reviews whether prior bad act evidence is admissible under Rule

       404(b) de novo. State v. Beckelheimer, 366 N.C. 127, 130, 726 S.E.2d 156, 159 (2012).

       If admissible, we then “determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in

       balancing the probative value of the evidence under Rule 403.” State v. Martin, 191

       N.C. App. 462, 467, 665 S.E.2d 471, 474 (2008).

¶ 11         Rule 404(b) provides:

                    Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible
                    to prove the character of a person in order to show that he
                    acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
                    admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
                    opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
                    identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.

       N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (2021). Rule 404(b) is a “general rule of inclusion

       of relevant evidence[,]” but it operates to exclude evidence if “its only probative value

       is to show that the defendant has the propensity or disposition to commit an offense

       of the nature of the crime charged.” State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 278-79, 389 S.E.2d

       48, 54 (1990) (emphasis in original).

¶ 12         When evidence is introduced pursuant to Rule 404(b), there is a “natural and

       inevitable tendency” for the judge or jury “to give excessive weight [to the challenged

       evidence]” and “allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge[s][,] . . . justifying

       a condemnation [of the accused], irrespective of the accused’s guilt of the present

       charge[s].” State v. Carpenter, 361 N.C. 382, 387-88, 646 S.E.2d 105, 109-10 (2007)
                                           STATE V. MASSEY

                                             2023-NCCOA-7

                                          Opinion of the Court

       (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In order to protect a party from such

       “perils inherent in introducing” evidence under Rule 404(b), the admissibility of the

       evidence is constrained by the requirements of “similarity and temporal proximity.”

       Id. at 388, 646 S.E.2d at 110 (quoting State v. Al–Bayyinah, 356 N.C. 150, 154, 567

       S.E.2d 120, 123 (2002)). “Prior acts are sufficiently similar if there are some unusual

       facts present in both crimes that would indicate that the same person committed

       them, but the similarities need not rise to the level of the unique and bizarre.” State

       v. Pierce, 238 N.C. App. 537, 545, 767 S.E.2d 860, 866 (2014) (citation and internal

       quotation marks omitted).

¶ 13         Although Rule 404(b) has a temporal limitation, our Supreme Court has

       established “remoteness in time is less significant when the prior conduct is used to

       show intent, motive, [or] knowledge . . . [;] remoteness in time generally affects only

       the weight to be given such evidence, not its admissibility.” State v. Stager, 329 N.C.

       278, 307, 406 S.E.2d 876, 893 (1991) (citation omitted). “[W]hile a . . . lapse in time

       between the prior and present acts generally indicate a weaker case for admissibility

       under Rule 404(b) . . . remoteness . . . must be considered in light of the specific facts

       of each case[.]” State v. Pabon, 380 N.C. 241, 2022-NCSC-16, ¶ 63 (citations and

       internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 14         The proffered evidence “must also be relevant to a material issue in the case.”

       State v. Thomas, 268 N.C. App 121, 134, 834 S.E.2d 654, 664 (2019) (citation omitted),
                                         STATE V. MASSEY

                                           2023-NCCOA-7

                                         Opinion of the Court

       disc. review denied, 374 N.C. 434, 841 S.E.2d 531 (2020). Evidence is relevant if it

       has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the

       determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without

       the evidence.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 401 (2021).

¶ 15         In the instant case, the challenged evidence includes a series of text messages

       ranging from October 2018 to February 2019. Defendant concedes that these text

       messages, generally speaking, illustrate defendant’s interest in 1) purchasing

       marijuana from an unidentified source; or 2) possessing marijuana. The challenged

       photos include 1) defendant’s face; 2) money; and 3) a photo of a crystalline substance

       dated 25 December 2018.

¶ 16         The State introduced the challenged evidence to prove motive, intent, and

       knowledge. The State argued the messages using colloquial terms for marijuana (i.e.

       “bud”) and marijuana smoking devices (i.e. “blunt” and “bowl”) illustrated that

       defendant was in possession of marijuana, not hemp, on the day of the offense. The

       State also argued the messages referencing giving some type of controlled substance

       to a woman, indicated defendant’s intent to sell or deliver methamphetamine. With

       respect to the foregoing reasons, the trial judge gave the following limiting

       instruction:

                      Now, ladies and gentlemen, evidence has been received
                      which might show some possible criminal conduct on the
                      part of the defendant. The phone–the phone records is
                                         STATE V. MASSEY

                                           2023-NCCOA-7

                                         Opinion of the Court

                    what I’m talking about. This evidence was received solely
                    for the following purposes: To show that the defendant had
                    a motive for the commission of the crime which is charged
                    in this case and/or to show that the defendant had the
                    intent, which is a necessary element of some of the crimes
                    charged in this case, and/or that the defendant had the
                    knowledge, which is a necessary element of some of the
                    crimes charged in this case. If you believe this evidence,
                    the cell phone evidence, you may consider it, but only for
                    the limited purposes for which I have just stated which it
                    was received. You may not consider it for any other
                    purpose. You may not convict the defendant in this case
                    solely because of something he may have done in the past.

¶ 17         Initially, we note that the challenged text message evidence is relevant as it

       reflects defendant’s guilty knowledge, an element of the charged crimes, of the

       substances he possessed on 29 March 2019. See State v. Weldon, 314 N.C. 401, 406,

       333 S.E.2d 701, 704 (1985) (“ ‘[W]here guilty knowledge is an essential element of the

       crime charged, evidence may be offered of such acts or declarations of the accused as

       tend to establish the requisite guilty knowledge, even though the evidence reveals the

       commission of another offense by the accused.’ ”) (emphasis in original) (citation

       omitted). Because knowledge was at issue during trial, the challenged evidence is

       relevant as it corroborated the State’s contention that the substance defendant

       possessed was indeed marijuana and not legal hemp. Therefore, admission of the

       text message portion of the extraction report was permissible with respect to

       knowledge.
                                         STATE V. MASSEY

                                           2023-NCCOA-7

                                         Opinion of the Court

¶ 18         Having determined the evidence was relevant, the next part of our Rule 404(b)

       analysis involves determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in

       admitting the evidence under Rule 403. Pursuant to Rule 403, “evidence may be

       excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

       prejudice[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 403 (2021). “An abuse of discretion occurs

       when a trial judge’s ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason.” State v. Golden,

       224 N.C. App. 136, 145, 735 S.E.2d 425, 432 (citation and internal quotation marks

       omitted).

¶ 19         Here, the admission of the text message portion of the extraction report

       survives a Rule 403 determination. Prior to admitting the evidence, the trial court

       considered defendant’s motion to exclude the challenged evidence and heard

       arguments from the State as well as defense counsel outside the presence of the jury.

       The trial judge asked clarifying questions and also considered the interval of time the

       digital data stemmed from. Defense counsel argued that since all, with the exception

       of one photo was undated, and there were no text messages in the immediate days

       preceding the offense, that the admission of the extraction report was simply

       indicative of someone using drugs, not selling them.        The trial court was not

       persuaded by defendant’s arguments, stating “weight [of the evidence] rather than

       credibility” was impacted by the lack of messages surrounding the date of the offense.
                                          STATE V. MASSEY

                                            2023-NCCOA-7

                                          Opinion of the Court

       Accordingly, the trial court’s decision was supported by reason and does not reflect

       an abuse of discretion.

¶ 20         Although we find the challenged text message evidence is admissible, we reject

       the State’s arguments on appeal that similarity and temporal connection are not

       necessary requirements to admit evidence under Rule 404(b). Our case law is clear

       that similarity and temporal proximity are the “twin north stars” to guide the

       evidentiary considerations inherent to a Rule 404(b) analysis. Pabon, ¶ 63.

¶ 21         With respect to the photographs that are also a portion of the extraction report,

       assuming arguendo, that the photographic evidence fails the Rule 404(b) analysis and

       was admitted in error, we find such error harmless because of the substantial amount

       of unchallenged evidence introduced, including:           two scales, 2.81 grams of

       methamphetamine, five separate bags of methamphetamine, and items of marijuana

       paraphernalia.

¶ 22         Because we find that the trial court did not err in admitting the text messages

       and the admission of the photographic evidence was at most harmless error,

       defendant’s argument is overruled.

                                     B.      Motion to Dismiss

¶ 23         Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to

       dismiss the charges of simple possession of marijuana, possession of marijuana

       paraphernalia, and maintaining a dwelling resorted to by persons using
                                         STATE V. MASSEY

                                           2023-NCCOA-7

                                         Opinion of the Court

       methamphetamine because there was insufficient evidence from which a reasonable

       jury could reach a conviction. For the following reasons, we agree in part, and vacate

       defendant’s conviction for maintaining a dwelling resorted to by persons using

       methamphetamine.

¶ 24         We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo. State v.

       Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007) (citation omitted). “In ruling

       on a motion to dismiss, the trial court need determine only whether there is

       substantial evidence of each essential element of the crime and that the defendant is

       the perpetrator.” State v. Winkler, 368 N.C. 572, 574, 780 S.E.2d 824, 826 (2015)

       (citations omitted).   Substantial evidence is defined as “ ‘relevant evidence as a

       reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’ ” Smith, 186 N.C.

       App. at 62, 650 S.E.2d at 33 (citation omitted). “In making its determination, the

       trial court must consider all evidence admitted, whether competent or incompetent,

       in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every

       reasonable inference and resolving any contradictions in its favor.” State v. Rose, 339

       N.C. 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d 211, 223 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1135, 132 L. Ed. 2d.

       818 (1995) (citation omitted). “The trial court is not required to determine that the

       evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence before denying a

       defendant’s motion to dismiss.” State v. Barfield, 127 N.C. App. 399, 401, 489 S.E.2d

       905, 907 (1997).
                                           STATE V. MASSEY

                                             2023-NCCOA-7

                                           Opinion of the Court

¶ 25         On appeal, the question for this Court is “whether there is substantial evidence

       (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included

       therein, and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator of the offense. If so, the motion

       is properly denied.” State v. Barnes, 334 N.C. 67, 75, 430 S.E.2d 914, 918 (1993)

       (citation omitted).

                   1.        Possession of Marijuana and Marijuana Paraphernalia

¶ 26         Our statutes state that a person who possesses marijuana, a Schedule VI

       controlled substance, shall be guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-

       95(d)(4) (2021). Thus, in order to convict a defendant of marijuana possession, the

       State has the burden of proving “(1) that the defendant knowingly possessed a

       controlled substance and (2) that the substance was marijuana.” State v. Johnson,

       225 N.C. App. 440, 454-55, 737 S.E.2d 442, 451, mandamus denied, 366 N.C. 566, 738

       S.E.2d 395 (2013) (citation omitted). It is also a separate Class 3 misdemeanor for a

       person “to possess with the intent to use, [marijuana] drug paraphernalia[.]” N.C.

       Gen. Stat. § 90-113.22(a) (2021).

¶ 27         At the time of defendant’s alleged offenses, marijuana was defined as “all parts

       of the plant of the genus Cannabis, whether growing or not; the seeds thereof; the

       resin extracted from any part of such plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt,

       derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds or resin[.] . . . The term

       does not include industrial hemp as defined in [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 106-568.51[.]” N.C.
                                          STATE V. MASSEY

                                            2023-NCCOA-7

                                          Opinion of the Court

       Gen. Stat. § 90-87(16) (2019). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 106-568.51 is no longer in effect and

       has since been replaced by Session Law 2022-32, which states the distinction between

       marijuana and hemp rests on the percentage of THC; hemp contains “no[] more than

       three-tenths of one percent (0.3%) [of THC] on a dry weight basis.”

¶ 28         Here, defendant argues that by failing to introduce evidence of the chemical

       composition of the seized substance, the State is unable to provide substantial

       evidence that the substance found was marijuana, as opposed to legal hemp.

       Defendant is correct that the evidence at trial did not establish the chemical

       composition of the seized substance and thus did not definitively establish that the

       substance was marijuana. However, our analysis on appeal is limited to analyzing

       the sufficiency of the evidence in order to submit the case to the jury.

                    In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
                    criminal conviction, the evidence must be considered in the
                    light most favorable to the State; the State is entitled to
                    every reasonable intendment and every reasonable
                    inference to be drawn therefrom. In other words, if the
                    record developed before the trial court contains substantial
                    evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, or a
                    combination, to support a finding that the offense charged
                    has been committed and that the defendant committed it,
                    the case is for the jury and the motion to dismiss should be
                    denied.

       State v. Osborne, 372 N.C. 619, 626, 831 S.E.2d 328, 333 (2019) (citations and

       quotation marks omitted).
                                          STATE V. MASSEY

                                            2023-NCCOA-7

                                          Opinion of the Court

¶ 29         Thus, the distinction between the admissibility of the evidence and the

       sufficiency of the evidence is imperative. See id. at 630-31, 831 S.E.2d at 334-35. “[I]t

       simply does not matter whether some or all of the evidence contained in the record

       should not have been admitted[,] . . . all of the evidence, regardless of its

       admissibility, must be considered in determining the validity of the conviction[.]” Id.

       at 630, 831 S.E.2d at 335 (citation omitted).

                    For that reason, a reviewing court errs to the extent that it
                    determines whether the evidence suffices to support a
                    defendant’s criminal conviction by ascertaining whether
                    the evidence relevant to the issue of the defendant’s guilt
                    should or should not have been admitted and then
                    evaluating whether the admissible evidence, examined
                    without reference to the allegedly inadmissible evidence
                    that the trial court allowed the jury to hear, sufficed to
                    support the defendant’s conviction.

       Id. at 630, 831 S.E.2d at 336.

¶ 30         In State v. Duncan, 2022-NCCOA-699 (2022) (unpublished), this Court

       reiterated the principal established in State v. Osborne. There, as defendant in this

       case argues, the defendant alleged the trial court erred in denying her motion to

       dismiss marijuana possession and marijuana paraphernalia charges. Duncan, ¶ 12.

       In Duncan, the defendant contended an officer’s opinion identifying a substance as

       marijuana, as opposed to hemp, was insufficient to raise more than “a suspicion or

       conjecture of [her] guilt[,]” due to a lay person’s inability to distinguish between

       marijuana and hemp. Id. ¶ 14. In that case, the officer’s lay opinion was the only
                                          STATE V. MASSEY

                                            2023-NCCOA-7

                                          Opinion of the Court

       evidence identifying the substance found as marijuana. Id. ¶ 23. Because our review

       focused on the sufficiency of evidence to support a criminal conviction, we declared,

       “[the officer’s] lay opinion identification of marijuana must be considered when

       evaluating all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the State.” Id. ¶ 26. Based

       on the officer’s testimony, we found the State presented sufficient evidence that the

       defendant possessed marijuana and marijuana paraphernalia.            Id. We find the

       reasoning of Duncan instructive.

¶ 31         In the case sub judice, we are persuaded based upon our review of all the

       evidence introduced under the Osborne and Duncan analysis that when viewed in the

       light most favorable to the State, the State produced sufficient evidence establishing

       the substance was marijuana and the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s

       motion to dismiss. “The trial court’s function is to determine whether the evidence

       allows a ‘reasonable inference’ to be drawn as to the defendant’s guilt of the crimes

       charged.” State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 67, 296 S.E.2d 649, 652 (1982) (citation

       omitted) (emphasis in original). The trial court need only determine “whether the

       evidence presented constitutes substantial evidence” and thus “is a question of law

       for the court.” Id. at 66, 296 S.E.2d at 652 (citation omitted). It is for the jury to

       “weigh evidence, assess witness credibility, [and] assign probative value to the

       evidence . . . and determine what the evidence proves or fails to prove.” State v.
                                           STATE V. MASSEY

                                             2023-NCCOA-7

                                           Opinion of the Court

       Moore, 366 N.C. 100, 108, 726 S.E.2d 168, 174 (2012) (citation omitted).              Our

       established precedent illustrates

                    the great deference which our courts, whether at trial or
                    appellate level, must give to the vital role of the citizens of
                    our state’s local communities who are selected to serve as
                    jurors. Once the trial court decides that a reasonable
                    inference of defendant’s guilt may be drawn from the
                    circumstances, then it is for the jury to decide whether the
                    facts, taken singly or in combination, satisfy it beyond a
                    reasonable doubt that the defendant is actually guilty.

       State v. Taylor, 379 N.C. 589, 2021-NCSC-164, ¶ 51 (citation omitted) (quotation

       marks and brackets omitted) (emphasis in original).

¶ 32         Here, the State’s evidence included digital data indicating that the seized

       substance was marijuana; defendant referred to it as “bud,” and he attempted to

       procure “bud” from someone he was messaging. The substance was also found with

       methamphetamine, an illegal substance, and found within single plastic bags,

       commonly associated with drugs.           Additionally, the arresting officer initially

       identified the seized substance as marijuana. That the officer later equivocated as to

       identity of the substance goes to the weight the jury should give the evidence, not to

       whether it is sufficient to take the case to the jury. This evidence is sufficient to allow

       the jury to determine whether the substance was marijuana or hemp. With respect

       to defendant’s argument regarding the necessity of a chemical analysis of the

       substance to exclude hemp as a potential substance, our courts have never held this
                                          STATE V. MASSEY

                                            2023-NCCOA-7

                                          Opinion of the Court

       is necessary and we decline to establish a new requirement in this case. Because our

       review is limited to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction,

       the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the marijuana-

       related charges.

         2.     Maintaining a Dwelling Resorted to by Persons Using Methamphetamine

¶ 33          Defendant also contends it was error for the trial court to deny his motion to

       dismiss maintaining a dwelling resorted to by persons using methamphetamine for

       insufficient evidence. We agree.

¶ 34          Our statutes declare “it shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o knowingly

       keep or maintain any . . . dwelling house . . . which is resorted to by persons using

       controlled substances[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-108(a)(7) (2021). Thus, in order to

       survive a motion to dismiss, the State has the burden of providing substantial

       evidence that defendant intentionally allowed others to resort to his house to use

       controlled substances. State v. Simpson, 230 N.C. App. 119, 121, 748 S.E.2d 756, 759

       (2013) (emphasis added).

¶ 35          Here, the State failed to establish that anyone outside of defendant, used

       defendant’s home to consume controlled substances. Defendant cannot “resort to” his

       own residence.     Id. at 122, 748 S.E.2d at 759.         In an effort to prove defendant

       committed the offense charged, the State attempts to rely solely on ambiguous text

       messages that do not explicitly refer to methamphetamine nor prove defendant
                                           STATE V. MASSEY

                                             2023-NCCOA-7

                                          Opinion of the Court

       knowingly allowed others to use his home in such manner. This argument is not

       convincing as these text messages fail to rise above the level of creating a mere

       suspicion of methamphetamine use. As this Court has established previously, “we do

       not believe the General Assembly intended ‘resorted to,’ as used in N.C. Gen. Stat. §

       90-108(a)(7), to include persons who own the [dwelling] at issue.” Id.

¶ 36         Because we find that the State failed to provide any, much less substantial

       evidence, we vacate defendant’s conviction of maintaining a dwelling resorted to by

       persons using methamphetamine. As defendant’s third issue on appeal related to the

       jury instruction given for this offense, we do not reach that issue as we have vacated

       that conviction.

¶ 37         Remanding defendant’s case for resentencing on the vacated conviction is not

       necessary, however, since all of the offenses for which defendant was convicted was

       consolidated into a single judgment and defendant received the lowest possible

       sentence in the mitigated range.       “[W]e do not remand for resentencing where

       [d]efendant has already received the lowest possible sentence[.]” State v. Cromartie,

       257 N.C. App. 790, 797, 810 S.E.2d 766, 772 (2018) (citation omitted). Remanding is

       necessary after arresting judgment only if we are “unable to determine what weight,

       if any, the trial court gave to each of the separate convictions[.]” Id. (quoting State v.

       Moore, 327 N.C. 378, 383, 395 S.E.2d 124, 127-28 (1990)).           However, we arrest

       judgment “so as to avoid any collateral consequences.” Cromartie, at 797, 810 S.E.2d
                                         STATE V. MASSEY

                                          2023-NCCOA-7

                                        Opinion of the Court

       at 772.

¶ 38         Accordingly, we arrest judgment on defendant’s maintaining a dwelling

       resorted to by persons using controlled substances conviction.

                                        III.   Conclusion

¶ 39         For the reasons set forth above, we conclude the trial court erred in denying

       defendant’s motion to dismiss maintaining a dwelling resorted to by persons using

       methamphetamine, in all other respects we find no error.

             NO ERROR IN PART, VACATED AND ARRESTED IN PART.

             Judges MURPHY and CARPENTER concur.