Court Opinion

ID: 9685752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:00:55.203961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:09.383987
License: Public Domain

FOSHEIM, Retired Justice
(concurring in result in part and dissenting in part).
I agree with the majority that Cement Plant may be estopped from raising a statute of limitations defense to contractual causes of action. As I stated in my Arcon Const. Co. v. Cement Plant, 349 N.W.2d 407 (S.D.1984) dissent, Cement Plant’s contractual sovereign immunity waiver emi-nates from Article XIII, § 11 of the South Dakota Constitution wherein the state is expressly authorized to pledge its credit in connection with the plant. Because I agreed with the Arcon majority that Cement Plant has contractual liability exposure, I also agree with the current majority that the plant should not be allowed to defeat this constitutionally supplied concept by conduct sufficiently inequitable to operate an estoppel against it. See Sander v. Wright, 394 N.W.2d 896 (S.D.1986) (Fosheim, C.J., concurring in result).
I part with the majority, however, as to which statute of limitation applies to contractual actions pursued against Cement Plant. As my Arcon dissent also noted, the UCC does not govern the period of limitation in which Cement Plant is exposed to contractual liability. Instead, the more specific SDCL 21-32-2 should apply. See Arcon (Fosheim, C.J., dissenting). That statute provides that “[ajction on any claim on contract or tort against the state shall be commenced within one year after same has arisen.” Because I disagree as to which statute of limitations applies, I concur only in the result of that portion of the majority’s opinion which holds Cement Plant may be estopped from presenting a statute of limitations defense.
I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which extends the Arcon sovereign immunity waiver for Cement Plant to “commercial torts.” Contrary to the assertion made therein, I did not intend by my Arcon dissent to imply that I believed “the constitutional provision on sovereign immunity is wholly inapplicable to Cement Plant’s commercial operations.” (399 N.W. 2d at 347.) To the contrary, there is a fundamental difference between Cement Plant’s contractual and tort liability which makes it logical to interpret Article XIII, § 11 * as waiving immunity for the former liability, but not the latter.
As the Arcon majority stated:
*352How can the state pledge its credit for cement plant operations if its credit obligations are not legally enforceable, or what business would contract with the cement plant if the cement plant is shielded from satisfying its contractual obligations? There can be no pledge of state credit without an obligation which is legally enforceable against the state.
349 N.W.2d at 411 (citations omitted). This basis which dictates that Cement Plant be amenable to its contracts does not exist regarding the plant’s tort liability.
Because our constitution does not abolish Cement Plant’s tort liability, only the legislature may do so. As the Arcon majority again stated:
Article III, section 27 of the South Dakota Constitution provides: ‘The Legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in what courts suits may be brought against the state.’ Accordingly, we have consistently held that it is the exclusive province of the legislature and not the courts to abrogate or limit the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In the absence of an express statutory waiver, we strictly adhere to this constitutionally mandated doctrine.
349 N.W.2d at 410 (citing Kringen v. Shea, 333 N.W.2d 445 (S.D.1983); Merrill v. Birhanzel, 310 N.W.2d 522 (S.D.1981); High-Grade Oil Co., Inc. v. Sommer, 295 N.W.2d 736 (S.D.1980); Arms v. Minnehaha County, 69 S.D. 164, 7 N.W.2d 722 (1943)).
The only statutory provision the present majority cites as supporting its tort immunity erasure is SDCL 57A-2-701. This UCC provision provides: “Remedies for breach of any obligation or promise collateral or ancillary to a contract for sale are not impaired by the provisions of this chapter.” This language is obviously a far cry from an express abolition of tort immunity. By holding such a waiver exists, the majority does precisely what this court announced in Arcon and cases cited therein that it would not do — abrogate sovereign immunity by judicial fiat.
I am authorized to state that WUEST, C.J., joins in this concurrence in result in part and dissent in part.

 S.D. Const, art. XIII, § 11 states:
The state may pledge such cement plants and all of the accessories thereto, and may pledge the credit of the state, to provide funds for the purposes enumerated in § 10 of this article, any *352provision in this Constitution to the contrary notwithstanding.