Court Opinion

ID: 9890992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-17 11:09:13.073654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:40.341899
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                        San Antonio, Texas

                                                 OPINION
                                            No. 04-23-00594-CV

    IN RE THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES

                                      Original Mandamus Proceeding 1

Opinion by:      Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Sitting:         Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
                 Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
                 Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: October 11, 2023

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS CONDITIONALLY GRANTED

           In the underlying dispute, the Department of Family and Protective Services is the

permanent managing conservator of four children. After an associate judge rendered a permanency

order for the children, the Department sought de novo review before the referring trial court, the

Honorable Mary Lou Alvarez (trial court). The trial court held a hearing; it affirmed the order’s

provisions that require the Department to pay a specific caregiver monthly financial assistance at

a specific rate for an extended period. The Department filed a petition for writ of mandamus and

an emergency motion to stay the trial court’s order. We granted the emergency motion and stayed

the order. Now, we conditionally grant the petition to rectify the order’s void provisions.

1
 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2020-PA-01747, styled In the Interest of Z.C., Z.T., Z.T., J.C., Children,
pending in the 45th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Mary Lou Alvarez presiding.
                                                                                                  04-23-00594-CV

                                                BACKGROUND

        In this petition for writ of mandamus, the Department complains that the trial court has

again violated the Separation of Powers Clause by ordering the Department to expend funds in a

particular manner. 2 The facts differ somewhat from previous Department cases before the same

trial court, but this trial court has again ruled “contrary to clear and determined law about which

there is no confusion or question as to its interpretation.” See In re Ginsberg, 630 S.W.3d 1, 8

(Tex. Spec. Ct. Rev. 2018) (quoting In re Barr, 13 S.W.3d 525, 545 (Tex. Rev. Trib. 1998)).

        In this case, the Department is the permanent managing conservator of Z.C., Z.T., Z.T.,

J.C. In September 2020, the Department placed the children with their maternal great-aunt S.C.,

who has been their caregiver ever since. In January 2023, a permanency hearing was held in the

underlying case before an associate judge, the Honorable Charles Montemayor, who ordered the

Department to do the following:

        [T]he Department must continue paying kinship funds to the children’s placement
        and those payments will continue to new relative placements if the children are
        moved to a new family placement. Payments are to continue until licensing of the
        placement occurs. The Department is to take funds from other sources if federal
        kinship funds are exhausted.

        Asserting the order violated applicable statutes and exceeded judicial authority, the

Department sought de novo review before the referring court. On March 10, 2023, the trial court

2
  See generally In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 660 S.W.3d 161 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, orig.
proceeding); In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 660 S.W.3d 248 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, orig.
proceeding); In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 04-22-00085-CV, 2022 WL 2820937 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio July 20, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 04-22-
00087-CV, 2022 WL 3219596 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 10, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re Tex.
Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 04-22-00091-CV, 2022 WL 2230720 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 22,
2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 04-22-00092-CV, 2022 WL
2230719 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 22, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re Tex. Dep’t of Family &
Protective Servs., No. 04-22-00094-CV, 2022 WL 3219924 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 10, 2022, orig.
proceeding) (mem. op.); In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 04-22-00165-CV, 2022 WL 2135534
(Tex. App.—San Antonio June 15, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs.,
No. 04-22-00166-CV, 2022 WL 3372425 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 15, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In
re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 04-22-00175-CV, 660 S.W.3d 175 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug.
3, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

                                                       -2-
                                                                                        04-23-00594-CV

held a hearing. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 201.015 (requesting a de novo hearing before the

referring court). During the hearing, the Department argued the associate judge’s order must be

vacated because it ordered the Department to pay monthly cash assistance beyond the statutory

guidelines to an ineligible caregiver. The attorney for the children conceded that S.C. no longer

qualifies for monthly cash assistance under the statutory scheme, but the attorney nevertheless

argued that S.C. was entitled to monthly cash assistance because it was in the best interest of the

children.

       At the end of the hearing, the trial court ruled on the Department’s motion. Its “Order

Granting in Part and Denying in Part Petitioner’s Request for De Novo Hearing Before the

Referring Court,” which it signed on March 27, 2023, includes these provisions:

       4.1.1      The Department is ordered to continue to pay the equivalent of monthly
                  “kinship funds” to any and all caregivers / placements for the (4) children
                  in its care so that the Department shall meet the needs of all (4) children in
                  its care as required by law.
       4.1.2      Any and all funds in arrears that have not been paid to the caregiver shall
                  be tendered no later than March 15, 2023 at 5:00 PM.
       4.1.3      The Court finds the equivalent of “kinship funds” to be a monthly financial
                  assistance of $1520.00.

       The Department filed this original proceeding; it argues that the trial court’s order violates

the Separation of Powers Clause because the order usurps the Department’s authority to set and

regulate the relative caregiver program. The Department also argues that it cannot legally comply

with the order.

       We requested responses from the trial court and the children’s attorney, but neither filed a

response.

                                        STANDARD OF REVIEW

       Generally, to obtain mandamus relief, “the Department must show the trial court

committed a clear abuse of discretion and the Department has no adequate remedy by appeal.” In

                                                   -3-
                                                                                       04-23-00594-CV

re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 660 S.W.3d 161, 164 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022,

orig. proceeding) (citing In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d 315, 317 (Tex. 2005) (orig.

proceeding) (per curiam)). A trial court abuses its discretion if it clearly fails to correctly analyze

or apply the law. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). In

that case, if the challenged order is void, the Department does not have to show a lack of an

adequate appellate remedy. In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (orig.

proceeding) (per curiam). “A judgment is void only when it is apparent that the court rendering

judgment had no jurisdiction of the parties, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to

enter the judgment, or no capacity to act as a court.” Mapco, Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703

(Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (citing Cook v. Cameron, 733 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex.

1987)).

                                       SEPARATION OF POWERS

          “The separation of the powers of government into three distinct, rival branches—

legislative, executive, and judicial—is the absolutely central guarantee of a just Government.” Fin.

Comm’n of Tex. v. Norwood, 418 S.W.3d 566, 569 (Tex. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Texas Constitution divides the branches’ powers:

          The powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be divided into three
          distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate body of
          magistracy, to wit: those which are Legislative to one; those which are Executive
          to another, and those which are Judicial to another; and no person, or collection of
          persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly
          attached to either of the others, except in the instances herein expressly permitted.

TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1; see Henry v. Cox, 520 S.W.3d 28, 38 (Tex. 2017). Authority entrusted in

one branch of government cannot be exercised by another branch “unless expressly permitted by

the constitution.” See Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993).

                                                  -4-
                                                                                    04-23-00594-CV

A.     Violations

       “The Separation of Powers Clause is violated (1) when one branch of government assumes

power more properly attached to another branch or (2) when one branch unduly interferes with

another branch so that the other cannot effectively exercise its constitutionally assigned powers.”

In re D.W., 249 S.W.3d 625, 635 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.).

B.     The Powers of our Co-Equal Branches of Government

       Although the Separation of Powers Clause “appears on its face to be rigid and absolute . . .

such a construction would be impossible to implement in all cases because not every governmental

power fits logically and clearly into any particular ‘department.’” Tex. Comm’n on Env’t Quality

v. Abbott, 311 S.W.3d 663, 671 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, pet. denied) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Thus, Texas courts have never held that the three branches of government operate with

absolute independence; instead, courts have “long held that some degree of interdependence and

reciprocity is subsumed within the separation of powers principle.” Id. at 672. Accordingly, the

separation of powers doctrine “enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence,

autonomy but reciprocity.” Id.

       But where one branch of government assumes powers more properly attached to another

branch or unduly interferes with the powers of another, any resulting order is void. See State v.

Ferguson, 125 S.W.2d 272, 274 (Tex. 1939) (orig. proceeding) (noting the availability of

mandamus relief from a void order where one branch of government usurps the power of another);

In re D.W., 249 S.W.3d at 635.

C.     Judicial Branch

       The power of the judiciary is “divided among . . . various named courts by means of express

grants of ‘jurisdiction’ contained in the constitution and statutes.” Eichelberger v. Eichelberger,

582 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tex. 1979). “In addition to the express grants of judicial power to each

                                               -5-
                                                                                      04-23-00594-CV

court, there are other powers which courts may exercise though not expressly authorized or

described by constitution or statute.” Id.

       1.      Constitutional Authority

       Here, the trial court derives its constitutional power from Article V, section 8 of the Texas

Constitution. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8 (“District Court jurisdiction consists of exclusive,

appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where

exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution or other law on

some other court, tribunal, or administrative body[.]”). District courts in Texas are invested with

the powers explicitly defined in the constitution. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn. v. Mayfield, 923

S.W.2d 590, 594 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d at 398).

       2.      Statutory Authority

       The trial court’s statutory power derives from the Texas Family Code. The associate judge

rendered his order under Chapter 263 of the Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 263.501(b) (requiring court to conduct permanency hearing within ninety days of the date of

termination order and at least every six months thereafter); see also id. § 263.5031(a)(4) (requiring

court to review permanency progress report to determine, inter alia, child’s placement with a

relative caregiver, continued necessity for placement, and appropriateness of placement); id.

§ 263.502(a-1) (requiring Department to include certain information in permanency progress

report); id. §§ 155.001–.003 (establishing court’s continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over child—

including to render and modify orders—after rendition of final order in Title 5 cases, under which

Chapter 263 falls).

       After the associate judge rendered his order, the Department sought a de novo hearing

before the referring court. The Department sought review of the portions of the order relating to

financial kinship assistance. See id. § 201.015 (requesting a de novo hearing before the referring

                                                -6-
                                                                                      04-23-00594-CV

court); see also id. § 201.204 (detailing the general powers of an associate judge in a child

protection case). Because the Department did not seek or otherwise challenge the remainder of the

associate judge’s order, the unchallenged portions of the associate judge’s order became the final

order of the trial court. See id. § 201.2041(a). Accordingly, the trial court had the statutory duty

and power to review and modify the order.

       3.      Inherent Authority

       A trial court may also exercise powers “not expressly authorized or described by

constitution or statute.” Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d at 398.

       These powers are woven into the fabric of the constitution by virtue of their origin
       in the common law and the mandate of [the Texas Constitution’s] separation of
       powers between three co-equal branches.
       ....
           The inherent judicial power of a court is not derived from legislative grant or
       specific constitutional provision, but from the very fact that the court has been
       created and charged by the constitution with certain duties and responsibilities. The
       inherent powers of a court are those which it may call upon to aid in the exercise of
       its jurisdiction, in the administration of justice, and in the preservation of its
       independence and integrity. Inherent power . . . springs from the doctrine of
       separation of powers between the three governmental branches . . . [and] exists to
       enable our courts to effectively perform their judicial functions and to protect their
       dignity, independence[,] and integrity.

Id. at 398–99 (footnote omitted); see Henry, 520 S.W.3d at 36 (recognizing that a trial court’s

constitutionally-derived inherent authority “is not boundless” and it does not extend to allow a trial

court to “usurp legislative authority”).

D.     Legislative Branch

       The power to make the law of the people is vested in the legislative branch through Article

3, section 1 of the Texas Constitution. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Legislative power of this

State shall be vested in a Senate and House of Representatives, which together shall be styled ‘The

Legislature of the State of Texas.’”); see also Diaz v. State, 68 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. App.—El

                                                 -7-
                                                                                      04-23-00594-CV

Paso 2000, pet. denied). “The power of the legislature includes the power to make, alter, and repeal

laws, when such power is not expressly or impliedly forbidden by other provisions of the state

Constitution.” Diaz, 68 S.W.3d at 685.

       The legislative branch is empowered to create agencies and “may delegate its powers to

agencies established to carry out legislative purposes, as long as it establishes ‘reasonable

standards to guide the entity to which the powers are delegated.’” Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication

Found., Inc. v. Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 467 (Tex. 1997) (quoting Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.

v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 740–41 (Tex. 1995)); see also FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of

Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 873 (Tex. 2000) (“Defining what legislative power is or when it has been

delegated is no easy task.”). The legislature is not required “to include every detail and anticipate

unforeseen circumstances [as such obligation] would . . . defeat the purpose of delegating

legislative authority.” Edgewood, 917 S.W.2d at 740.

E.     Department of Family and Protective Services

       In this case, the Department is a state agency, administered by the Health and Human

Services Commission, that is legislatively designated to, inter alia, provide support and services to

children through state and federal funding. See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 40.002; Tex. Dep’t

of Family & Protective Servs. v. Parra, 503 S.W.3d 646, 651 n.5 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, pet.

denied) (“The Health and Human Services Commission oversees the Texas Health and Human

Services system, which is composed of five state agencies, including [the Department].”). As a

state agency, the Department’s “powers are limited to (1) powers expressly conferred by the

Legislature, and (2) ‘implied powers that are reasonably necessary to carry out the express

responsibilities given to [the Department] by the Legislature.’” Tex. Mun. Power Agency v. Pub.

Util. Comm’n of Tex., 253 S.W.3d 184, 192–93 (Tex. 2007) (quoting Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex.

v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, 53 S.W.3d 310, 315 (Tex. 2001)).

                                                -8-
                                                                                      04-23-00594-CV

F.     Relative, Caregiver Placement Program

       In delegating its authority, the legislature directed the Department to create a program “to

promote continuity and stability for children for whom the [D]epartment is appointed managing

conservator by placing those children with relative or other designated caregivers.” TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 264.752(a)(1). The program is required to “facilitate relative or other designated

caregiver placements by providing assistance and services to those caregivers in accordance with

[guidelines set by the legislature] and rules adopted by the [Department’s] executive

commissioner.” Id. § 264.752(a)(2).

       1.      Qualifications for Assistance

       For a caregiver to receive assistance under the program, the children must be in the

managing conservatorship of the Department and the caregiver must

       (1) be related to the children or have a longstanding and significant relationship
           with the children or the family of the children;
       (2) be formally approved by [the Department] as a caregiver;
       (3) sign and abide by a written caregiver assistance agreement, which includes a
           commitment to:
               (A) be available as a continuing placement for the children for at least six
                   months;
               (B) participate in specialized kinship training as recommended and
                   provided by [the Department];
               (C) comply with [Department] requirements limiting or facilitating contact
                   between the parents and the children;
               (D) apply for other forms of assistance, including financial and medical,
                   for which the children may be eligible; and
               (E) comply with any other child specific requirements or limitations; and
       (4) not be a licensed or verified foster home or group foster home.

40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 700.1003(a), (b). If the caregiver satisfies the above statutory

requirements, in addition to having a family income that does not exceed 300% of poverty as

determined by federal guidelines, the caregiver will be eligible to receive cash assistance under the

                                                -9-
                                                                                        04-23-00594-CV

program. Id. § 700.1003(a)–(c); see also id. § 700.1007(a) (reiterating the eligibility requirements

for assistance under the program).

        2.      Additional Assistance

        As alluded to above, an eligible caregiver may receive various forms of assistance from the

Department, including limited cash assistance. See 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 700.1001 (“Subject to

availability of funds and eligibility requirements, caregiver assistance may include case

management services, training, referrals to appropriate services and assistance programs, family

counseling, child-care services, limited cash assistance, and other support services. Funding for

this program is limited to the state and federal funds allocated to [the Department] for this

program.”); id. § 700.1005 (detailing what types of cash assistance are available to eligible

caregivers).

        3.      Monthly Cash Payment

        A caregiver’s monthly cash payment is distributed in the same manner foster care

reimbursement payments are and the payment to the caregiver may not exceed 50% of the

Department’s daily Basic Foster Care Rate. Id. § 700.1007(b)–(c). The daily Basic Foster Care

Rate is set by the Department based on a rate-setting methodology. Id. § 700.1753 (detailing the

Department’s rate-setting methodology); id. § 700.1007(c) (“The amount of the monthly cash

payment will be published on the [Department’s] website, and is paid per child in the managing

conservatorship of [the Department] who is placed in the home of the eligible caregiver.”).

        4.      Limited Period for Payments

        An eligible caregiver receives a monthly cash payment for a twelve-month period. Id.

§ 700.1007(d). The Department may, if it determines good cause exists, provide a one-time six-

month extension. Id.; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 264.755(b-1) (“The [D]epartment may not provide

monetary assistance to an eligible caregiver . . . after the first anniversary of the date the caregiver

                                                 - 10 -
                                                                                                        04-23-00594-CV

receives the first monetary assistance payment from the [D]epartment” and “[t]he [D]epartment,

at its discretion and for good cause, may extend the monetary assistance payments for an additional

six months.”). “‘Good cause’ refers to circumstances in which it is in the child’s best interest to

remain in the home of a caregiver who is receiving monthly cash payments and is generally

comprised of actions and steps necessary in order to achieve positive permanency for the child.” 3

40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 700.1007(d).

           Thus, the legislature authorized the Department to determine the monthly cash assistance

a caregiver receives, but it limited the monthly cash assistance payments the Department may

make to twelve months after the caregiver began to receive cash payments unless the Department

determines good cause exists. Id.

                                    TRIAL COURT’S ABUSE OF DISCRETION

           We now apply the clear and determined law to the specific facts of this case. See In re

Ginsberg, 630 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Spec. Ct. Rev. 2018).

A.         Monthly Cash Payments to S.C.

           In this case, the Department is the children’s managing conservator. S.C., the children’s

maternal great-aunt, became the children’s caregiver in September 2020 and began receiving cash

payments under the program in November 2020. S.C. received approximately $1,500 a month in

3
    The statute includes examples of good cause:
           (1) the identification, release, or location of a previously absent parent of the child;
           (2) awaiting the expiration of the timeline for an appeal of an order in a suit affecting the parent-
               child relationship;
           (3) the provision of additional time for the caregiver to complete the approval process for adoption
               of the child;
           (4) awaiting the approval of a child’s placement from another state pursuant the Interstate Compact
               on the Placement of Children, as provided in Subchapter B, Chapter 162, Texas Family Code;
           (5) a delayed determination of the child’s Indian Child status, or awaiting the approval of the Indian
               Child’s Tribe, pursuant the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §1901, et seq.; and
           (6) any other circumstance surrounding the child or the caregiver that [the Department] deems to
               necessitate the extension.
40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 700.1007(d).

                                                           - 11 -
                                                                                     04-23-00594-CV

cash assistance for the children. Because S.C.’s first cash payment was in November 2020, she

would receive her final cash payment under the program in November 2021 absent a good cause

extension from the Department. See 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 700.1007(d); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.

§ 264.755(b-1). Finding good cause to do so, the Department granted S.C. a six-month extension.

B.     Additional Benefits to S.C.

       In addition to the monthly cash payments, S.C. received other forms of assistance under

the program. For example, the Department purchased a computer and printer for S.C. to help her

with training and licensing so her home could become a verified foster home. A caregiver, such as

S.C., who wishes to receive assistance under the program beyond the statutory limit may apply to

have her home become a verified foster home. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 264.755(a-1)(1)

(requiring, if applicable, the Department to inform a caregiver of the option to become a verified

foster home).

C.     Foster Home Screening

       To operate a foster home, an applicant must be verified by a licensed child-placing agency.

Id. To acquire verification, a prospective foster home applicant must, among other things, complete

a foster home screening. 26 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 749.2445(a). A foster home screening requires

the licensed child-placing agency to obtain twenty-three categories of information about the

prospective foster home, including a “criminal history and central registry background check” for

the prospective foster parent and “any person over fourteen years of age or older who will regularly

or frequently be staying or present at the home.” Id. § 749.2447(7).

       The Department referred S.C. to four separate licensed child-placing agencies to complete

the verification process. Two agencies could not assist S.C. due to staffing and resource issues.

The remaining two agencies, however, could not complete the foster home screening because S.C.

                                               - 12 -
                                                                                                  04-23-00594-CV

refused to disclose who frequented her home and further refused to agree to background checks

on those individuals. 4

D.      Trial Court’s Role

        As we noted above, the legislature charges trial courts with reviewing permanency progress

reports to ensure the needs of children under the Department’s care are being adequately addressed.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.5031; In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 660 S.W.3d

248, 257 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, orig. proceeding). But that charge presupposes the trial

court will faithfully follow the applicable laws. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (oath of office);

TEX. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, CANONS 2(A), 3(B), 3(B)(2), reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit.

2, subtit. G, app. C; Tesco Am., Inc. v. Strong Indus., Inc., 221 S.W.3d 550, 555 (Tex. 2006)

(emphasizing that “judges are advocates only for the law”); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833,

840 (Tex. 1992) (“A trial court has no ‘discretion’ in determining what the law is or applying the

law to the facts. Thus, a clear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the law correctly will

constitute an abuse of discretion.”).

        We turn now to the trial court’s March 27, 2023 order.

E.      Trial Court’s Order

        Despite S.C.’s failure to have her home approved as a verified foster home, on March 27,

2023, the trial court ordered the Department to pay a $1,520 monthly cash payment to S.C. It also

ordered the Department to pay arrears to S.C. to cover the period after S.C. became statutorily

ineligible to receive monthly cash payments under the program.

        When the trial court rendered its order, S.C. was no longer eligible to receive assistance

under the program, and her home was not a verified foster home because she refused to complete

4
 At the de novo hearing, a Department representative testified that, after an investigation, it was determined that
undisclosed individuals frequented or resided in S.C.’s home.

                                                      - 13 -
                                                                                       04-23-00594-CV

the verification process. We have not been directed to, nor have we found, any other basis on which

a trial court has the authority to extend monthly cash payments under the program. Moreover, even

assuming S.C. was still eligible to receive a monthly cash payment, the legislature has vested the

authority to set the amount for the monthly cash payment in the Department. See 40 TEX. ADMIN.

CODE §§ 700.1007(b)–(c), .1753.

       As explained above, Family Code section 263.5031(4) requires a trial court to “review” the

permanency progress report prepared by the Department. The term “review” is not defined in

Chapter 263. Therefore, we look to the ordinary and plain meaning of the term, with a preference

to harmonize and find consistency with the statutory scheme as a whole. See Greater Houston

P’ship v. Paxton, 468 S.W.3d 51, 58 (Tex. 2015). To “review” means to consider, inspect, or

reexamine a subject or thing. Review, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). “The inclusion

of ‘review’ within the text of section 263.5031(4) allows the court to inspect, consider, or

reexamine the Department’s permanency progress report.” In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective

Servs., 660 S.W.3d 161, 171 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, orig. proceeding).

       However, absent from section 263.5031(4) is an avenue whereby a court may extend the

duration of assistance to a caregiver beyond the statutory limit at a specific rate. Nor does the trial

court hold any authority to do either of these functions independently. Instead, as we have

recognized, the legislature set specific time limits and requirements on the Department and

delegated the power to establish and regulate the program and foster home verification to the

Department.

F.     Joint Pursuit of Child’s Best Interest

       We recognize the trial court’s ongoing statutory and inherent responsibility to act in the

children’s best interest. But the trial court does not act alone; it acts with “some degree of

interdependence and reciprocity [alongside the Department] within the separation of powers

                                                 - 14 -
                                                                                      04-23-00594-CV

principle.” See Tex. Comm’n on Env’t Quality v. Abbott, 311 S.W.3d 663, 672 (Tex. App.—Austin

2010, pet. denied) (“Co-ordination or co-operation of two or more branches or departments of

government in the solution of certain problems is both the usual and expected thing.” (quoting

State Bd. of Ins. v. Betts, 308 S.W.2d 846, 852 (Tex. 1958))). Further, the trial court’s authority to

act in the children’s best interest is not boundless. Cf. Henry, 520 S.W.3d at 37. To the contrary,

its authority is limited. E.g., In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 660 S.W.3d at 172

(granting the Department mandamus relief because this same trial court’s order “unduly interfered

with the powers of the legislative branch”).

G.     Previous Opinions by Our Court

       Our numerous mandamus decisions have clarified the limits of the trial court’s authority in

similar cases. E.g., In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 660 S.W.3d at 257. We have

determined and made clear that “[the trial court] does not have the power to order the Department

to provide specific goods and specific services to specific children at specific rates.” Id. Our

opinions and orders should have eliminated any confusion or question about those limits. See In

re Ginsberg, 630 S.W.3d at 8 (considering whether a legal error was “made contrary to clear and

determined law about which there is no confusion or question as to its interpretation” (quoting In

re Barr, 13 S.W.3d 525, 545 (Tex. Rev. Trib. 1998)); In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective

Servs., 660 S.W.3d at 257; In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 660 S.W.3d at 164; In

re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 04-22-00085-CV, 2022 WL 2820937 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio July 20, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re Tex. Dep’t of Family &

Protective Servs., No. 04-22-00087-CV, 2022 WL 3219596 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 10,

2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 04-22-

00091-CV, 2022 WL 2230720 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 22, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem.

op.); In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 04-22-00092-CV, 2022 WL 2230719

                                                - 15 -
                                                                                     04-23-00594-CV

(Tex. App.—San Antonio June 22, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re Tex. Dep’t of Family

& Protective Servs., No. 04-22-00094-CV, 2022 WL 3219924 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 10,

2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 04-22-

00165-CV, 2022 WL 2135534 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 15, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem.

op.); In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 04-22-00166-CV, 2022 WL 3372425

(Tex. App.—San Antonio June 15, 2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re Tex. Dep’t of Family

& Protective Servs., No. 04-22-00175-CV, 660 S.W.3d 175 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 3,

2022, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); see also In re L.L., 65 S.W.3d 194, 196 (Tex. App.—Amarillo

2001, pet. dism’d) (“Under the doctrine of separation of powers among the executive, legislative,

and judicial branches of state government, Texas courts do not dictate to the Legislature how it

should discharge its duty.”).

H.     Application of Our Court’s Precedent

       During the de novo hearing, the trial court affirmed on the record that it was familiar with

our previous rulings. However, the trial court again issued an order that “usurp[ed] legislative

authority by substituting [its] policy judgment for that of the [Department’s which was] acting as

a legislative body.” See Henry, 520 S.W.3d at 37; In re Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs.,

No. 04-22-00196-CV, 2022 WL 2442169, at *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 6, 2022, orig.

proceeding) (mem. op.) (noting that, in issuing its order, “[this same trial court] figuratively

removed her judicial robe and stepped into the role of directing Department operations”); see also

TEX. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, CANONS 2(A), 3(B)(2).

       Given (1) our numerous previous opinions explaining the limits of the trial court’s

authority, (2) our orders requiring the trial court to vacate portions of its orders in similar

Department cases on the same or similar grounds, and (3) the record in this case, we necessarily

conclude that the trial court clearly abused its discretion and “use[d] the powers of [its] judicial

                                               - 16 -
                                                                                                     04-23-00594-CV

office to accomplish a purpose which [it] knew or should have known was beyond the legitimate

exercise of [its] authority.” See In re Ginsberg, 630 S.W.3d at 8.

I.         Challenged Provisions are Void

           As we have explained, the trial court disregarded mandatory precedent and unduly

interfered with the powers of the legislative branch when its March 27, 2023 order required the

Department (1) to pay arrears after the statutory time frame expired and (2) to continue to make

monthly cash payments to S.C. at a specific rate. 5 Because the challenged portions of its order

violate the Separation of Powers Clause of the Texas Constitution, they are void. See In re D.W.,

249 S.W.3d at 635. Accordingly, the Department is entitled to mandamus relief without a showing

of no adequate remedy by appeal. See Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d at 605.

                                                    CONCLUSION

           The trial court lacked the authority—constitutional, statutory, inherent, or otherwise—to

(1) order the Department to continue to pay the equivalent of monthly kinship funds beyond the

statutory timeframe, (2) order the Department to pay kinship arrears for any funds that are beyond

the statutory timeframe, or (3) make any findings regarding the monthly financial equivalent of

kinship fund assistance. These portions of its order are void.

           We conditionally grant the Department’s petition for writ of mandamus. We order the trial

court to vacate, no later than fifteen days from the date of this opinion and order, decretal

paragraphs 4.1.1, 4.1.2, and 4.1.3 of its March 27, 2023 “Order Granting in Part and Denying in

Part Petitioner’s Request for De Novo Hearing Before the Referring Court.” Our writ of mandamus

will issue only if we are informed that the trial court has failed to comply.

                                                            Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

5
    Because this issue is dispositive, we do not reach the Department’s remaining argument. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

                                                         - 17 -