Court Opinion

ID: 9954607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 17:03:58.651572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:58.662464
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/26/24 P. v. Bates CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,                                              B322346

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                       (Los Angeles County
                                                          Super. Ct. No. BA332778)
          v.

 DEVERON LAMARR BATES,

          Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed.
      James S. Donnelly-Saalfield, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Irvi, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Gabriel Bradley, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      The trial court denied defendant and appellant Deveron
Bates’s (defendant’s) petition for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95) at the prima facie stage
based on its conclusion that the record of conviction demonstrates
defendant was the victim’s actual killer.1 On appeal, we are
asked to decide whether trial court improperly made factual
findings to deny defendant’s resentencing petition without
issuing an order to show cause.

                       I. BACKGROUND
      A.    The Murder
      On March 4, 2006, at approximately 1:15 a.m., Jennifer
Parsons (Parsons) was driving to her mother’s house with
defendant, who was then her boyfriend. She and defendant had
used crack cocaine earlier that night.
      The car Parsons was driving was nearly out of gas, but she
did not have any money to refill the tank. She pulled into a gas
station she was familiar with and told defendant she was going to
ask the attendant, who she knew, if he would give her a small
amount of gas so she could reach her mother’s house. After the
attendant refused to give Parsons the gas, she went back to the
car and told defendant they needed to see if they could find
someone to ask for change.
      Parsons was successful in obtaining funds to pay for some
gas, but when she returned to her car, defendant was gone. As
she was pumping the gas, Parsons saw defendant running across
nearby streets and saw a minivan driving along a similar route,

1
     Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.

                                2
stopping and starting as if the driver were looking for someone.
Defendant ultimately returned to the gas station and jumped into
the back seat of the car Parsons was driving. Defendant was
breathing hard and looked exhausted, and he did not answer
when Parsons asked him what was wrong. As they drove away,
Parsons heard sirens and saw an ambulance.
      The same night, around the same time, two bystanders
separately observed a taller man (later identified as defendant)
attack a shorter man, Faustino Narvaes (Narvaes), and attempt
to take a bag away from him. One of the bystanders, Felix
Hernandez (Hernandez), saw defendant stab Narvaes multiple
times with what appeared to be a kitchen knife.2 Hernandez
attempted to dissuade defendant from continuing to harm
Narvaes and then pursued defendant in his van after defendant
took Narvaes’s bag and fled.
      Narvaes died, and an autopsy found he had been stabbed
with a knife in two places.

      B.    Trial
      Defendant was charged with Narvaes’s murder. At trial,
the only theory of murder upon which the jury was instructed
was felony murder. During closing argument, the prosecution
relied on Hernandez’s testimony (identifying defendant as the
man who stabbed Narvaes) to argue defendant was guilty of
Narvaes’s murder. Defendant argued the eyewitness testimony

2
      Hernandez initially identified another man as the person
who stabbed Narvaes before he identified defendant as the
culprit.

                               3
was unreliable and contended the jury did not have corroborating
evidence necessary to convict defendant.
       The jury convicted defendant of one count of first degree
felony murder and one count of attempted second degree robbery.
As to the murder count, the jury found true the allegation that
the murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the
commission of an attempted robbery. As to both counts, the jury
found true a special allegation that defendant personally used a
deadly and dangerous weapon, a knife, when committing the
offenses.
       Defendant was sentenced to life without the possibility of
parole plus one year. A prior panel of this court affirmed his
conviction. (People v. Bates (Feb. 7, 2011, B223341) [nonpub.
opn.]).

       C.    Petition for Resentencing
       In the fall of 2021, defendant filed a section 1172.6 petition
for resentencing. Defendant asserted an information or
indictment was filed against him that allowed the prosecution to
proceed under a theory of felony murder and he could not now be
convicted of first degree murder because of changes made to
sections 188 and 189. The trial court appointed counsel for
defendant.
       The People opposed defendant’s section 1172.6 petition and
argued he was ineligible for relief because the record of conviction
established he was Narvaes’s actual killer, had the intent to kill,
and was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference
to human life. Submitted with the People’s opposition were this
court’s prior opinion affirming defendant’s conviction, the
amended information filed against him, the reporter’s transcript

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of the criminal trial, and a probation officer’s pre-sentencing
report. The People’s opposition did not include, however, a
transcript of defendant’s police interview that had been played
during his trial.
       The trial court held a hearing and denied the petition
because defendant had not made a prima facie case for relief.
The court found defendant was Narvaes’s actual killer based on
the jury’s true finding that defendant used a knife, the absence of
another suspect, and defendant’s admission—made during the
police interview for which no transcript or recording had been
submitted with the People’s opposition—that defendant had a
knife and at least swung it toward the victim.

                         II. DISCUSSION
      Even without consideration of defendant’s police interview
admission, which defendant argues was improper, the other
record of conviction materials establish the jury must have
concluded defendant was Narvaes’s actual killer. Defendant’s
jury was not instructed on accomplice liability, it is undisputed
Narvaes died of a stab wound, the jury found defendant
personally used a knife in the commission of the murder, and
there was no argument at trial suggesting anyone else
participated in the stabbing or the attempted robbery. As the
actual killer, defendant is not entitled to section 1172.6 relief.
And defendant’s associated ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claim is meritless because he had no constitutional right to
counsel at the hearing from which he appeals.

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       A.      Legal Background
       “Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate
Bill 1437 [(SB 1437)] ‘to amend the felony murder rule and the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to
murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a
person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch.
1015, § 1, subd. (f).)” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959.)
To this end, the law specifically provided that a “person’s
culpability for murder must be premised upon that person’s own
actions and subjective mens rea,” and a conviction for murder
“requires that a person act with malice aforethought.” (Stats.
2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (g).)
       At the prima facie stage of section 1172.6 review, a trial
court must determine whether the petitioner would be entitled to
relief if his or her allegations were proven. If so, the court must
issue an order to show cause. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 971.)
At the prima facie stage, the court should not make credibility
determinations or engage in “factfinding involving the weighing
of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’’ (Id. at 974.) “‘However,
if the record, including the court’s own documents, “contain[s]
facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,” then “the
court is justified in making a credibility determination adverse to
the petitioner.’”’ (Id. at 971; see also People v. Jenkins (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 924, 935 [record of conviction includes the charging
document, verdict forms, transcript of closing arguments, and
jury instructions].) We review de novo the trial court’s
determination that a petitioner failed to make a section 1172.6

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prima facie showing. (People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
1244, 1251; People v. Eynon (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 967, 975.)

       B.     The Trial Court Properly Denied the Petition
       The jury found defendant guilty of first degree felony
murder. “[D]efendants convicted of felony murder are not eligible
for relief [under section 1172.6] if they were the actual killer.”
(People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 53.) “The key
question in determining whether the trial court properly denied
[the defendant’s] petition” as the actual killer “is whether it was
possible for a juror to have” “found [him] guilty of felony
murder . . . without also finding [he] personally killed the
victim[.]” (Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at 54.)
       The record of conviction here rules out this possibility. The
only theory of murder on which the trial court instructed
defendant’s jury was felony murder, which the instructions
defined as the “unlawful killing of a human being, whether
intentional, unintentional or accidental, which occurs during the
commission or attempted commission of the crime of attempted
robbery.” (CALJIC No. 8.21.) The court did not instruct the jury
on accomplice liability by virtue of aiding and abetting. And the
jury found true the allegation that defendant personally used a
knife in the commission of the offense.3 In addition, defendant

3
       Defendant contends the jury’s true finding that he used a
knife during the commission of the crime does not establish he
was the actual killer. While that finding may not alone establish
defendant actually killed Narvaes, it nevertheless indicates the
jury found defendant used a knife in the commission of the crime.
And, in the context of the entire record of conviction, the finding
supports the conclusion that the jury could not have convicted
defendant as anything other than the actual killer.

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was the sole defendant at trial and he was prosecuted as the sole
perpetrator. There was no argument suggesting defendant had
an accomplice, much less one who could have stabbed Narvaes.4
Nor was there any argument Narvaes’s death was caused by
anything other than the stab wounds he suffered. The record of
conviction accordingly demonstrates no possibility the jury could
have convicted defendant of murder on a theory other than as
Narvaes’s actual killer. (See, e.g., People v. Mares (2024) 99
Cal.App.5th 1158, 1173 [“No record evidence shows [the
defendant] was an accomplice, and uncontradicted record
evidence shows he was the killer”].)
      In arguing the contrary, defendant appears to believe the
record of conviction cannot refute a section 1172.6 petitioner’s
allegations at the prima facie stage unless the jury made a
specific factual finding that the defendant was the actual killer.
None of the cases on which defendant relies stands for such a

       People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, upon which
defendant relies, does not hold otherwise. That case merely
concluded a jury’s finding that the defendant personally
discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death was
not, in the context of the record of conviction, sufficient to
demonstrate the defendant acted with malice aforethought. (Id.
at 589.)
4
      In his reply brief, defendant asserts that the People
acknowledged he argued at trial that someone else was the
robber or actual killer. Defendant misreads the People’s
argument, which in fact asserts defendant made no such
argument at trial. Moreover, defendant provides no citations to
the record establishing he made that argument at trial. To the
extent he contends he argued mistaken identity below, the jury
clearly rejected that theory by convicting him.

                                8
broad proposition.5 Nor does that argument square with
authority holding courts may rely on the entire record of
conviction, not just the jury’s verdict.
      Relying on Descamps v. U.S. (2013) 570 U.S. 254 and
People v. Gallardo (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120, defendant also argues
that because a sentencing court considering a defendant’s prior
conviction is limited to identifying facts the jury was necessarily
required to find to render a guilty verdict in the prior case, the
same rule should apply here. This argument is unpersuasive.
The limitation in the sentencing context derives from the Sixth
Amendment, and is intended to ensure a jury, not a court, finds
true the facts that could lead to an increase in a defendant’s
maximum sentence. (Gallardo, supra, at 134.) The section
1172.6 resentencing process, in contrast, is a legislative “act of
lenity” that does not (and cannot) result in increased
punishment. (People v. Hernandez (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 94,
111.)

      C.    Defendant’s Ineffective Assistance Claim Fails
      Defendant argues his counsel below rendered
constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to object to the

5
       In the cases defendant cites, the record of conviction left
open the possibility that the defendant had not actually killed the
victim—either because there was evidence other individuals were
at least present during, if not actively involved in the commission
of, the crime (see, e.g., People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1;
People v. Garcia (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123, 155) or because there
was another potential cause of the victim’s death altogether
(People v. Vang (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 64, 80-81). Neither of
these scenarios is possible in this case.

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     trial court and the prosecutor’s reliance on the statement of facts
     in the prior appellate opinion. There is no general constitutional
     right to the effective assistance of counsel in a section 1172.6
     proceeding at the prima facie stage, however. (People v.
     Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 226, 228.) Even if there were,
     defendant cannot show prejudice in light of our holding that his
     section 1172.6 petition was appropriately resolved at the prima
     facie stage.

                             DISPOSITION
     The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.

         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                            BAKER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

     MOOR, J.

     LEE, J.*

     *
           Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court,
     assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
     the California Constitution.

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