Court Opinion

ID: 9744841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:18:38.35965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:52.384128
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE INGLIS, dissenting: I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred by allowing the opinion testimony of Drs. Kaushol and Stone and therefore respectfully dissent. The majority opinion is an overly technical approach to Supreme Court Rule 220 (134 Ill. 2d R. 220) and focuses on form over substance. The record shows that plaintiff knew the identity of the two doctors, the opinions they held regarding plaintiff’s injuries, and that defendant was likely to call them to testify at trial. However, defendant did not inform plaintiff that he intended to call either or both doctors to testify. The real question is whether a litigant must inform opposing counsel which experts, of those that have been identified and fully deposed, he intends to call to testify at trial. In this case, plaintiff’s counsel supplied the names of the two doctors to defendant in answer to pretrial interrogatories. Plaintiff knew their qualifications and opinions regarding plaintiff’s injuries since both were deposed by defendant. In fact, defendant took an evidence deposition of Dr. Kaushol which should have alerted plaintiff to the possibility that defendant would use Dr. Kaushol’s testimony at trial. Lastly, plaintiff vigorously argued a motion in limine on the first day of trial to bar all opinion testimony of the two doctors, which is an indication that plaintiff had anticipated that their testimony would be offered by defendant. In its most basic form, Rule 220 requires each party to inform the other of the identities of testifying experts and allow for the discovery of their opinions regarding the case. (134 Ill. 2d R. 220.) All that plaintiff was missing was a sheet of paper from defendant 60 days before trial stating that pursuant to Rule 220 he was going to call the two doctors to testify at trial. I do not believe a reversal is an appropriate sanction in this case, since plaintiff has failed to show prejudice or surprise. See Vallejo v. Mercado (1991), 220 Ill. App. 3d 1, 8 (“purpose of a sanction for a violation of Rule 220 is not to punish but to insure fair discovery and a trial on the merits”). Since the majority reversed on this issue alone, I limit my dissent to it notwithstanding the other issues raised.