Court Opinion

ID: 9448720
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:43:26.484106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:32.097021
License: Public Domain

KALODNER, Circuit Judge.
Does the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 19591 afford a remedy to a business agent of a union who has been removed from his elected office prior to the expiration of its term by the vote of the membership of the union ?
That issue, of first impression at the appellate level, is presented on this appeal from the judgment of the District Court2 granting money damages to the plaintiff, Paul J. Sheridan, against the defendant, the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local No. 626 (“Union”) following his ouster as its business agent.
The facts, as found by the District Court, may be stated as follows:
Plaintiff was elected business agent of Union on June 17, 1959, for a two-year term. One of his duties as business agent was to assign jobs, when available, to unemployed union members. A member could not obtain employment on a job at which Union’s members were working unless plaintiff issued him a referral slip.
On September 26, 1960, Richard Toy, Union’s shop steward on a construction project in New Castle County, Delaware, telephoned plaintiff, requesting that several carpenters be assigned to that job. Toy, knowing that Albert Burke, a member of Union, wanted to work at the project, asked that Burke be included among those to be assigned. Plaintiff replied that he would not honor this latter request because Burke had not been out of work long enough. The next day Burke, who knew that Toy had requested plaintiff to assign him to the job, came to the union hall and asked plaintiff for a referral slip. Plaintiff refused, stating that Toy had not asked for Burke and that the job had been filled. Although Burke had been unemployed for two weeks, plaintiff designated one William Lloyd for the job; Lloyd had been out of work only three days. Burke then left and saw Toy, who verified the fact that he had requested plaintiff to assign Burke to the job. Believing that plaintiff had prevented him from securing employment, Burke returned to the union hall, where he “pushed” or “knocked” plaintiff. Later that day plaintiff had Burke arrested, and on October 21, 1960, in the Municipal Court of Wilmington, Delaware, Burke was convicted of having assaulted plaintiff. The District Court found that plaintiff was acting in a “non-official capacity” when he had Burke arrested and prosecuted.
On October 6, 1960, Burke filed charges within Union alleging that plaintiff had violated sections 43L and 56A of the Constitution and Laws of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, the parent brotherhood of which Union is a local affiliate. These sections read:
Section 43L: “No member shall injure another member by undermining such member in prices or wages, nor commit any wilful act by which the reputation of the member is injured or employment jeopardized.”
Section 56A: “ * * * A member must exhaust all resources allowed by the Constitution and Laws *154of the United Brotherhood before taking a ease to the civil courts.”
Plaintiff was tried on these charges before a union trial committee on the evening of November 2, 1960. Burke, in testifying before the committee, made two contentions in support of the section 43L charge; first, that by keeping him off the job plaintiff had “jeopardized” his employment; and second, that by bringing the Municipal Court action plaintiff had injured Burke’s reputation so that he could not secure a Civil Service or Government job. In support of the charge under section 56A, Burke contended that plaintiff had carried his grievance with him to the Municipal Court before exhausting all the resources within the union provided by the Constitution of the United Brotherhood. The trial committee found plaintiff guilty of violating both sections. Later that same evening at a meeting of Union’s membership, the members, after receiving a report of the
trial committee’s action, voted to remove plaintiff from office. The trial judge found that “this penalty was imposed because of the two offenses and not with respect to either of the two offenses separately.” Plaintiff has received no compensation as business agent since his removal on November 2, 1960.
On January 4, 1961, plaintiff instituted this suit, seeking both reinstatement as business agent and recovery of back wages and employment benefits since his removal from office.3
Section 101(a) (4) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act provides that “no labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute an action in any court * *.”4 Section 609 provides that “it shall be unlawful for any labor organization * * to fine, suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline any of its members for exercising any right to which he is entitled *155under the provisions of this Act.”5 Section 609 is enforceable by a suit for “appropriate” relief under Section 102.6 The District Court held that plaintiff, in having Burke arrested and prosecuted, was exercising a right vouchsafed to him by Section 101(a) (4), and that Union, by removing plaintiff from office because he had exercised this right, had “disciplined” him in violation of Section 609. The District Court considered it “inappropriate”, however, to reinstate him as business agent, inasmuch as (1) “an untenable situation would be created if plaintiff were restored to office and the union membership were subjected to his decision in matters of importance when it did not want him” and (2) less than two weeks remained before the expiration of his term of office.7 Since Union had introduced no evidence to show that plaintiff could have mitigated his damages by obtaining other employment, the District Court awarded plaintiff his full salary as business agent for the period from his removal on November 2, 1960, until the expiration of his term of office on June 16, 1961.
On this appeal Union contends, as it did in the court below, that the District Court lacked “jurisdiction” of the subject matter for these reasons: (1) The Act does not apply to a union-employee or officer relationship with the union; and
(2) Plaintiff failed to exhaust intra-union appellate procedures before starting the instant suit.8
This opinion will relate only to the first of the two points stated, viz., the sweep of the Act with respect to union members who are employees or officers of their union: that of Judge Hastie will deal with the second point, relating to exhaustion of intra-union remedies.
In support of its first point, Union urges that Title I of the Act, which contains the right-to-sue provision (Section 101(a) (4) ), protects the rights of union members as members and not as officers or employees of unions; that Union “had the right to discharge the Plaintiff for any reason which to its members appeared sufficient and that the Act conferred no jurisdiction on the District Court to inquire into the * * * reason for Plaintiff’s removal from office”; and that “no employer must account to a Federal Court under any provision of the Act for discharging an employee.” Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that while “as a general proposition” it is true that the Act does not protect officers or employees of unions, jurisdiction nevertheless does exist here inasmuch as the disciplinary sanction of removal from office was imposed on him for his conduct as a member.
*156Initially, it must be pointed out that the parties have erred in labeling this as a jurisdictional issue. As we stated in Hughes v. Local 11 of International Ass’n of Bridge Workers, 3 Cir., 287 F.2d 810, 814 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 829, 82 S.Ct. 51, 7 L.Ed.2d 32 (1961), which also arose under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, “the well established * * * practice * * * has been that the assertion of a substantial claim under a federal statute gives a United States court jurisdiction of that claim even though that court may determine ultimately that no cause of action on which relief could have been granted was alleged.” Accordingly, we will treat Union’s contention as an assertion that plaintiff has failed to plead or prove a violation of the Act.
Plaintiff claims that he was exercising a right protected by Section 101(a) (4) when he had Burke prosecuted, and that Union disciplined him in violation of Section 609 by removing him from office for his having exercised this right. Union does not controvert the proposition that Section 101(a) (4) protects plaintiff’s right to institute criminal proceedings against Burke. Our inquiry on this score is therefore narrowed to the question whether the removal of plaintiff from office was a form of “discipline” as that term is used in Section 609. As earlier noted, the Section declares it unlawful for a labor organization to “fine, suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline any of its members” for exercising a right protected by the Act. The word “discipline” is not defined in the statute. This term appears to have been selected as a catchall to cover various sanctions other than fine, suspension, and expulsion. But to say that a word is a catchall does not “define what it catches”. Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 149, 80 S.Ct. 630, 4 L.Ed.2d 623 (1960).
The language of the Section affords no support for the view that the term “discipline” encompasses removal from office. The three disciplinary sanctions that are specifically enumerated in that section — fine, suspension, and expulsion —manifest an intention by Congress to protect members qua, members. Removal from office, on the other hand, is a sanction that can be directed only against the limited group of members who happen to be officers. We see no violation of Section 609 in plaintiff’s removal from his office.
Neither does Section 101(a) (4), the right-to-sue provision, support plaintiff’s claim that the Act protects his status as an officer. Section 101(a) (4) is part of Title I of the Act. This title, captioned “Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations”,9 and particularly Section 101, are designed to protect the rights of union members. The rights are repeatedly described as the rights of “any member” or “every member”. No-mention is made of rights of union officers or employees. It is of particular interest to note that the right-to-sue provision of the bill that was originally passed by the Senate provided that a. labor organization shall not limit “the right of any member or officer thereof to institute an action in any court. * * *” (emphasis added).10 The corresponding provision of the bill that was subsequently passed by the House did not contain the word “officer”.11 In commenting on this difference between the-Senate and House bills, a document prepared by Senator Goldwater’s staff and’ inserted at his request in the Congressional Record states that “the Senate bill extends protection of the right to sue expressly to union officers.” 105 Cong. Rec. 16487 (1959). The Conference Committee adopted the House version,12 and accordingly Section 101(a) (4) a® *157finally enacted by Congress speaks only of the right of members, thus conforming to the terminology used in the other provisions of Section 101.
To be contrasted with the Title I rights are the provisions in Title IV relating to union elections. There, in dealing with candidacy for union office, the statute refers to the “right of any candidate”, the right of “every bona fide candidate”, and the obligations of a union to “any bona fide candidate”.13 Thus when Congress wanted to grant protection to a specific category of union members, appropriate language was used in the statute.
Several district court cases, although distinguishable on their facts from the case at bar, also support the view that plaintiff’s status as business agent is not protected by the Act. Strauss v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 179 F.Supp. 297 (E.D.Pa.1959), was a case involving a union employee who had been discharged from his position as business agent. In denying reinstatement, Judge Clary there stated:
“ * * * [Title I] deals with the union-member relationship and in no way supports jurisdiction of a suit involving the employer (union)employee (business agent) relationship which is the essence of the present suit. Such a case turns more properly on the common law of employment contracts, or employment ‘status’ as a property right, matters which are outside the scope of Title I.” 179 F.Supp. at 300.
In Jackson v. Martin Co., 180 F.Supp. 475 (D.Md.1960), where an elected union committeeman who had been removed from his position by the union’s executive board sought to be restored to office, Chief Judge Thomsen denied relief, stating:
“* * * Title I of the Act * * * deals with the union-member relationship, not with the union-officer or union-employee relationships.” 180 F.Supp. at 480.
See also Mamula v. Local 1211 United Steelworkers, 202 F.Supp. 348 (W.D.Pa. 1962); Kelly v. Streho, 42 CCH Lab. Cas. 24,127 (E.D.Mich.1961); Bennett v. Hoisting and Portable Engineers, Local 701, 207 F.Supp. 362 (D.Ore.1960).
Thus, neither under the “Bill of Rights” provisions of Title I, nor under Section 609, proscribing disciplinary sanctions against union members, is plaintiff’s status as business agent protected by the Act. It is the union-member relationship, not the union-officer or union-employee relationship, that is protected.
Plaintiff does not wholly disagree with the proposition that the pertinent provisions of the Act deal with the rights of members qua members. It is his position, however, that inasmuch as he was acting in his capacity as an individual member rather than as business agent when he had Burke arrested, the “penalty” of removal from office was unlawful,14 just as it would have been unlawful for Union to expel him from membership for his having had Burke arrested. What plaintiff overlooks, however, is the fact that an officer’s conduct, whether in his individual or official capacity, affects the confidence reposed in him by the union membership, and his effectiveness as an officer.
Thus, a meaningful distinction cannot be drawn on the basis of the capacity in which plaintiff was acting when he had Burke arrested. The facts of the instant case illustrate quite clearly the invalidity *158of such a distinction. Plaintiff himself, in an affidavit filed in support of his motion for preliminary injunction, recognized the important responsibilities of his office. His affidavit states:
“* * * [T]he duties of Business Agent involve the assigning of men to various construction projects and in such assignment the Business Agent is given wide discretion to determine the qualifications of the 1300 members of the Local 626 for particular jobs. The Business Agent is also given broad discretion in selecting job stewards and foremen for union projects. If a successor is elected to hold the office of Business Agent, even temporary, the members of Local 626 will regard this successor as a person of considerable authority and will no longer look upon Sheridan as a person of authority and responsibility in the Union.”
The District Court, although holding that plaintiff’s removal was illegal, nevertheless said:
“An untenable situation would be created if plaintiff were restored to office and the union membership were subjected to his decision in matters of importance when it did not want him. Internal bickerings and disagreements would almost certainly occur.” 194 F.Supp. at 669.
Yet if we accepted plaintiff’s contention, we would be holding that the Act made it unlawful for Union to rid itself of the “untenable situation” and “internal bick-erings” that would result if “the union membership were subjected to * * * [plaintiff’s] decision in matters of importance when it did not want him.”
There remains this to be said. Plaintiff was removed from his office as business agent by the vote of the membership of Union. The most precious and critical ingredient of the democratic process is the right to select those who govern us and those who administer our affairs. The overriding purpose of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act was to insure to members of unions their right to self-government and union democracy. The legislative history of the Act is replete with statements that its purpose was to return the control of unions to the rank and file members.15 It has been said that “the *159election of officers is the heart of union democracy”.16 Title IV of the Act17 deals specifically with the conduct of union elections and is designed to guarantee to union members their freedom of choice in the selection of their officers. Further, there is even a provision in the Act18 enabling the members of a union to remove an officer under certain circumstances when the constitution and bylaws of the union do not provide adequate means for removal.
The judgment of the District Court will be reversed.

. 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C.A. § 401 et seq.

. The Opinion of the District Court is reported at 194 F.Supp. 664 (D.Del.1961). Earlier Opinions granting plaintiff’s motions for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction are reported at D.C., 191 F.Supp. 347 (1961).

. Plaintiff also sought and obtained a temporary restraining order, followed by a preliminary injunction, preventing Union from electing a new business agent. 191 F.Supp. 347. Union’s president had been acting as business agent since plaintiff’s removal, and an election for a successor had been scheduled for January 6, 1961.
In the complaint plaintiff alleged, not only that he had been removed from office, but also that he had been suspended from membership. In the Opinion of the District Court granting plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, the trial judge stated:
“Plaintiff was temporarily suspended as a union member as appears from my prior opinion [on plaintiff’s motion for temporary restraining order]. However, since the evidentiary status with respect to such suspension is different from that before the Court when the application for the temporary restraining order was heard, that aspect of the matter is not the subject of this opinion.” 191 F.Supp. at 352 note 3.
“The evidentiary status” to which the Court referred apparently resulted from an affidavit filed by Union stating that plaintiff’s suspension as a member had been “lifted” on December 6, 1960. Plaintiff does not appear to have pursued this part of his claim thereafter in the
District Court, and no issue with respect to his suspension from membership has been raised on appeal.

. Section 101(a) (4) provides, in pertinent part:
“Protection of the right to sue. — No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to institute an action in any court, or in a proceeding before any administrative agency, irrespective of whether or not the labor organization or its officers are named as defendants or respondents in such action or proceeding, or the right of any member of a labor organization to appear as a witness ' in any judicial, administrative, or legislative proceeding, or to petition any legislature or to communicate with any legislator: Provided, That any such member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such organization, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings against such organizations or any officer thereof * * 73 Stat. 522, 29 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (4).
The District Court held that the proviso, which by its terms applies only to proceedings against labor organizations or their officers, does not apply to the Municipal Court action against Burke. 191 F.Supp. at 349.

. Section 609 provides:
“It shall be unlawful for any labor organization, or any officer, agent, shop steward, or other representative of a labor organization, or any employee thereof to fine, suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline any of its members for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of this Act. The provisions of section 102 shall be applicable in the enforcement of this section.” 73 Stat. 541, 29 U.S.C.A. § 529.

. Section 102 provides:
“Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this title have been infringed by any violation of this title may bring a civil action in a district court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate. Any such action against a labor organization shall be brought in the dis-
trict court of the United States for the district where the alleged violation occurred, or where the principal office of such labor organization is located.” 73 Stat. 523, 29 U.S.C.A. § 412.
The words “this title”, as used in Section 102, refer to Title I of the Act. Although Section 101(a) (4), the right-to-sue provision, is in Title I, Section 609 is not located in that title. The second sentence of Section 609, however, provides that Section 102 shall be applicable in the enforcement of Section 609. See note 5, supra.

. The Opinion below was filed on June 5, 1961, and plaintiff’s two-year term of office was due to expire on June 16, 1961.

. The facts pertaining to this issue are set forth in the Opinions below. 194 F.Supp. at 667-668; 191 F.Supp. at 349-50, 353-355.

. 73 Stat. 522.

. S. 1555, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (a) (4) (1959), as passed by Senate, reprinted in Legislative History of the Labor-Managment Reporting and Disclosure Het of 1959, Vol. 1, p. 520.

. H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (a) (4) (1959), 105 Cong.Rec. 15884 (1959).

. The Conference Report is reprinted at 105 Cong.Rec. 18116-24 (1959).

. Section 401(c) of the Act, 73 Stat. 532, 29 U.S.O.A. § 481(e).

. The District Court accepted this reasoning. Two other district courts have also followed this theory. Burton v. Independent Packinghouse Workers, 199 F.Supp. 138 (D.Kan.1961); Hamilton v. Guinan, 199 F.Supp. 562 (S.D.N.Y.1961). In another case, Alvino v. Bakery and Confectionery Workers, 41 CCH Lab.Cas. 23,102 (D.D.C.1960), it was held, without discussion, that the defendant union, by removing and suspending the plaintiffs from their offices, had disciplined them for engaging in activity protected by the Act.

. Remarks of Representative Landrum, who with Representative Griffin sponsored the substitute bill that ultimately prevailed :
“I would call to the Members’ attention that the interim report of the McClellan committee found that there has been a significant lack of democratic processes in certain unions, that one-man dictatorships have thrived — in some instances for 20 to 30 years — and that through intimidation and fear, the rank-and-file union member has been deprived of a voice in his own union affairs.” 105 Cong. Roc. 14342 (1959).
“One of the basic underlying principles of both the Wagner Act of 1935 and the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 has been the rights of employees — under the first to be free from employer domination, under the second to be free from union domination. That further legislation, however, dealing with union democracy is needed in 1959 cannot be challenged. As one union official put it in his testimony:
“We believe that the control of the union by its membership is the best way to insure its democracy and keep the officers in line — I believe that the best demonstration of democracy in action is where the people directly handle their own union business.
“This the substitute bill seeks to accomplish, by insuring effective membership control.” 105 Cong.Rec. 14343 (1959).
“It is a bill which would restore the control of union affairs to union members.” 105 Cong.Rec. 14344 (1959). Remarks of Representative Griffin:
“[Ulnions should be governed by, and should exist for the benefit of the union members — unions should not be the convenient vehicle or tool for despots and racketeers.” 105 Cong.Rec. 15531 (1959). Statement appearing in the Senate committee report:
“It needs no argument to demonstrate the importance of free and democratic union elections. Under the National Labor Relations and Railway Labor Acts the union which is the bargaining representative has power, in conjunction with the employer, to fix a man’s wages, hours, and conditions of employment. * * * The *159Government which gives unions this power has an obligation to insure that the officials who wield it are responsive to the desires of the men and women whom they represent. The best assurance which can be given is a legal guaranty of free and periodic elections. The responsiveness of union officers to the will of the members depends upon the frequency of elections, and an honest count of the ballots.” S.Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), 2 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News, pp. 2318, 2336 ,(1959) (a similar statement appears in H.Rep. No. 741, 86th Gong., 1st Sess. (1959), 2 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News, pp. 2424, 2438 (1959)). And see 105 Cong.Rec. 17912 (1959) (remarks of Senator Ervin); 105 Cong.Rec. 17914 — 15 (1959) (remarks of Senator Mundt).

. Cox, “Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under tbe Labor Reform Act of 1959,” 58 Mich.L.Rev. 819, 842 (1960).

. Sections 401-404 of the Act, 73 Stat. 532, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 481-483.

. Section 401(h) of the Act, 73 Stat. 533, 29 U.S.C.A. § 481(h).