Court Opinion

ID: 9856380
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:46:23.944931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:42.572205
License: Public Domain

LOHR, Justice,
dissenting:
The majority extends the rationale of United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974), to uphold the search of Boff’s backpack as a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest. However, Edwards applies to a search of a person and any item immediately associated with that person. Under federal constitutional law, searches of a person pursuant to a lawful custodial arrest are distinguished from searches of possessions within an arrestee’s immediate control. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 16 n. 10, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 2486 n. 10, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977). Under Chadwick, “[o]nce law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no *653longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident of the arrest.” 433 U.S. at 15, 97 S.Ct. at 2485. In my view, Chadwick controls the present case. Because the reasoning and result reached by the majority are inconsistent with Chadwick, I dissent.
I.
The majority views the issue presented as “whether a warrantless search of containers found on or within the possession of the person which is not contemporaneous with an arrest falls outside of the judicially recognized exception of search incident to a lawful arrest.” Maj. op. at 649 (emphasis added). This formulation of the issue fails to acknowledge the different categories of search incident to arrest and the different requirements to justify a war-rantless search in each category. Among the different categories that have been developed under federal constitutional standards are (1) a search of the person and property carried on the person as an incident of a lawful arrest, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974); (2) a search of the occupant of an automobile and the passenger compartment of the automobile incident to a lawful arrest, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981); and (3) a search of possessions within an arrestee’s immediate control incident to a lawful arrest, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969).1
The case before us presents the issue of a search of a person’s possessions incident to a lawful arrest. The evidence in the record indicates that Boff was not wearing the backpack at the time of his arrest. The police, and not Boff, transported the backpack to the police station. See Edwards, 415 U.S. at 803, 94 S.Ct. at 1237 (police may search property that suspect brings with him to police station). Additionally, this is not a case controlled by the rules governing warrantless automobile searches. Instead, the search at issue here is a search of possessions within an arrestee’s immediate control, and not the search of the arres-tee’s person, incident to a lawful arrest.
In Chadwick, the suspects were arrested while loading a footlocker into the trunk of a car. The arresting officers took control of the footlocker, transported it to a different location, opened it, and discovered large quantities of marijuana within. The suspects were securely in custody when the search was conducted. The United States Supreme Court held that the search, which took place more than an hour after federal agents had seized the footlocker and while the footlocker was in the exclusive control of the federal agents, violated the fourth amendment. 433 U.S. at 15-16, 97 S.Ct. at 2485-2486. The facts in Chadwick are remarkably similar to the facts in the present case.2 Here, instead of a footlocker, Boff *654had a backpack.3 The backpack was near Boff when he was arrested, but it was taken to the sheriff’s office by the officers and was not opened and searched until after Boff had been placed in custody. As in Chadwick, Boff’s backpack had been reduced to the exclusive control of law enforcement officers. Therefore, “a search of that [backpack] is no longer an incident of the arrest.” 433 U.S. at 15, 97 S.Ct. at 2485. Despite these similarities, the majority finds no violation of the fourth amendment in this instance. Such a result is contrary to the established federal law that the majority purports to be applying.
II.
To reach its conclusion that the warrant-less search of Boff s backpack was justified as a search incident to a lawful arrest, the majority relies on United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974). In Edwards, an arres-tee was jailed and continued to wear the same clothing in which he had been arrested. A day after the arrest, officers searched that clothing. The United States Supreme Court upheld the search on the ground that since the arrestee’s clothing could have been lawfully searched without a warrant at the time of his arrest, it was not a fourth amendment violation to do so later even though a substantial period of time had elapsed. 415 U.S. at 805, 94 S.Ct. at 1238. As the majority states, Edwards allows “[a] search at the police station of a suspect, his clothes, and personal property immediately associated with his person ... to the same extent that such a search could have been made at the time and place of arrest.” Maj. op. at 651. This reading of Edwards is supported by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977). In Chadwick, however, the Court distinguished Edwards as applying only to searches of a person and personal property (e.g., clothing) “immediately associated with the person of the arrestee.” 433 U.S. at 15, 16 n. 10, 97 S.Ct. at 2485, 2486 n. 10;4 see also 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.3(a), at 479 (1987) (under Edwards rationale, courts have allowed war-rantless searches of arrestee’s pockets, wallet, containers on the person, and underclothing). It is contrary to the rationale of Edwards, as interpreted by Chadwick, to hold, as the majority does here, that a search of an item such as a backpack not worn by the suspect at the time of arrest can be justified as a search incident to arrest when that search is conducted later at a location to which the police have transported the backpack.
The majority also cites People v. Bischofberger, 724 P.2d 660 (Colo.1986), and People v. Tottenhoff, 691 P.2d 340 (Colo.1984), to support its broad interpretation of the scope of searches incident to arrest. Specifically, the majority cites these cases for the proposition that such a search may include containers found within the reach *655of the arrestee. Each of these cases, however, involved items removed from a pocket of clothing worn by the suspect at the time of arrest. Neither involved “closed containers found ... within the reach of the person arrested,” as the majority implies. Maj. op. at 651. These cases, therefore, are inapposite.
The majority cites New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 461 n. 5, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2865 n. 5, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), as “rejecting the notion that an item can no longer be searched incident to an arrest once it is reduced to the exclusive control of the police.” Maj. op. at 651. However, the Court in Belton was rejecting the “exclusive control” argument only as it applied to a search as in Belton conducted at the scene of the arrest. See 453 U.S. at 460, 101 S.Ct. at 2864; 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.5(a) at 535 (under Belton, search must be “contemporaneous” with the arrest). Thus, when an officer seizes an item from an arrestee during the arrest and proceeds to search it at that time, the “exclusive control” argument will not invalidate this warrantless search. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 461-62 n. 5, 101 S.Ct. at 2864-65 n. 5 (“[Ujnder this fallacious [exclusive control] theory no search or seizure incident to a lawful custodial arrest would ever be valid; by seizing an article even on the arrestee’s person, an officer may be said to have reduced that article to his ‘exclusive control.’").
The Court in Belton clearly distinguished the Chadwick delayed search situation as one where the “exclusive control” argument would still have force. In Belton, the Court distinguished Chadwick by noting that the search in Chadwick “was conducted more than an hour after federal agents had gained exclusive control of the footlocker and long after respondents were securely in custody; the search therefore cannot be viewed as incidental to the arrest or as justified by any other exigency.” Belton, 453 U.S. at 462, 101 S.Ct. at 2865 (quoting Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15, 97 S.Ct. at 2485). Thus, the full text of the Court’s opinion in Belton indicates that the Chadwick “exclusive control” rule is still binding law which should be applied to the search of Boff’s backpack. Moreover, as noted above, Belton was an automobile search case and is therefore distinguishable from the search of Boff’s backpack in the present case. See 453 U.S. at 460 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. at 2864 n. 3 (limiting holding of Bel-ton to automobile searches).
III.
In sum, the majority has incorrectly analyzed the search of Boff’s backpack under the framework of federal law applicable to the search of an arrestee’s possessions incident to arrest. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977), provides the controlling federal law in this area. Under Chadwick, the Dolores County sheriff’s officers were required to obtain a warrant to search Boff’s backpack once the officers reduced the backpack to their exclusive control. Because the majority finds no such requirement here, I dissent.
QUINN, C.J., and KIRSHBAUM, J., join in this dissent.

. Another category of warrantless searches that might justify a search of containers possessed by an arrestee is inventory searches. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 107 S.Ct. 738, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987); 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.5(b) (1987). As noted by the majority, the People do not argue here that the search of Boff s backpack can be justified as an inventory search. See maj. op. at 648 n. 7.

. The majority attempts to distinguish Chadwick factually based on the characteristics of the luggage searched. See maj. op. at 650-651, 651 n. 9. However, distinctions as to the fourth amendment protection to be accorded various items of luggage based on characteristics such as size, weight, and whether the luggage was locked have been specifically rejected by the United States Supreme Court. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762-63 n. 9, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 2592-93 n. 9, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979) (relatively small, unlocked suitcase is afforded same protection as footlocker in Chadwick). The key inquiry is not the size of the luggage or its locked or unlocked status, but whether the item has a "fundamental character as a repository for personal, private effects.” Id. Here, Boffs backpack is similar enough to a small unlocked suitcase that it can be fairly characterized as a repository for personal, private effects. By placing his possessions in his backpack, Boff "manifested an expectation that the contents would remain free from public examination." Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11, 97 S.Ct. at 2483. "Once placed within such a container, a diary and a dishpan are equally protected by the Fourth Amendment.” Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 426, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 2846, 69 *654L.Ed.2d 744 (1981) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion). Furthermore, an effort to distinguish the relative privacy interests in different types of containers is not fruitful; ‘‘[w]hat one person may put into a suitcase, another may put into a paper bag." Id. In sum, Chadwick cannot be factually distinguished based on the characteristics of the container at issue.

. Despite the majority's characterization, the record does not indicate whether Boff was wearing the backpack when he was first stopped. The record reveals only that the backpack was on the ground near Boff when the second officer arrived. Furthermore, there is no indication in the record as to what type of backpack Boff had, e.g., whether it was a small daypack or a full-size framepack. Thus, no inference can be drawn regarding the location of the backpack when Boff was first stopped. For instance, Boff may have been wearing the backpack when he was first stopped, or the backpack may have been attached to his motorcycle. The record is simply silent on this point.

. In Chadwick, the United States Supreme Court stated:
Unlike searches of the person, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 [94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427] (1973); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 [94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771] (1974), searches of possessions within an arrestee’s immediate control cannot be justified by any reduced expectations of privacy caused by the arrest. Respondents' privacy interest in the contents of the footlocker was not eliminated simply because they were under arrest.
433 U.S. at 16 n. 10, 97 S.Ct. at 2486 n. 10.