Court Opinion

ID: 9630041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:58:17.124783+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:30.154715
License: Public Domain

McGHEE, Justice (dissenting). I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion holding the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the defendants. Without question, according to the testimony of the plaintiff himself, he knew and appreciated all of the hazards and dangerous conditions present at the feed grinder; he made no complaint to the employer, and could not say for sure the employer actually knew of the dangers and defective condition of the platform; but I say the employer must have known of them. The platform on which the hammermill rested was patched and rough. When asked why he did not repair the platform, the plaintiff answered that the employer did not say fix the platform, he said grind the feed. I class the risk in this case as an extraordinary one; that is, one created or allowed to exist by the employer, and there is no question the employer did not furnish the servant a safe place to work. The majority opinion cites the case of Singer v. Swartz, 1916, 22 N.M. 84, 159 P. 745, 747, for support. That was a laundry mangle case where the safety guard was not properly adjusted and the thirteen year old girl who had worked on the mangle only a few days testified she did not know it was improperly adjusted. In that case it is stated: “* * * There is no presumption that a servant knows and appreciates the extraordinary risks of the service (3 Labatt’s Master & Servant, § 1201), unless, perchance, the circumstances are such as to charge her with full knowledge thereof, in which event the question becomes one of law, rather than fact. 2 Bailey, Per. Inj. § 388. This case, in my opinion, is strong authority for the action of the court in directing a verdict here, in view of the testimony of the plaintiff that he knew and appreciated all dangers. We said only recently in Jones v. Adams, 1952, 56 N.M. 510, 245 P.2d 843, 844, in quoting approvingly from Van Kirk v. Butler, 1914, 19 N.M. 597, 145 P. 129, where ,we in turn quoted approvingly from Labatt’s Master & Servant, § 1186a: “ ‘ “The servant assumes all the ordinary risks of the service and all of the extraordinary risks — i. e., those due to the master’s negligence — of which he knows and the dangers of which he appreciates.” “ ‘This is a comprehensive statement of the rule which thus qualified the general rule that it is the duty of the master to provide a reasonably safe place for the servant to work.’ ” In the Van Kirk case it is said [19 N.M. 597, 145 P. 133]: “It is our conclusion that the state of facts here ¡presented for our consideration did not constitute an ordinary risk, but rather an extraordinary one, resulting from the negligence of the owner and master, and, as the case is now presented to us, it does not appear that the servant knew of the condition, and therefore assumed the risk, for which reason we necessarily conclude that the trial court was in error in directing a verdict for the defendant, * * (My emphasis.) In Thayer v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 1916, 21 N.M. 330, 363, 154 P. 691, 701, it is stated: “Labatt’s Master and Servant, § 1186a, summarizes the rule as to the assumption of risk in the following language: “ ‘The servant assumes all the ordinary risk of the service, and all of the extraordinary risk; that is, those due to the master’s negligence of which he knows and the dangers of which he appreciates.’ ” The opinion goes on to say. the plaintiff was employed as a laborer icing cars and he was not a brakeman; that it could not be contended with any degree of logic that he assumed.the risk of a defective brake shoe on the car he was told to ride down the track and set the brakes on, unless it appeared he was an experienced brakeman. In the case under consideration the plaintiff testified he had had long experience grinding feed in a hammermill; that he knew the muddy condition around the mill had existed for a considerable period of time; that he also knew his overshoes were muddy and slick; that the platform was rough and patched; and that he knew the knives in the mill were unguarded and dangerous. “One who knows of a danger from the negligence of another, and understands and appreciates the risk therefrom, and voluntarily exposes himself to it, is precluded from recovering for an injury which results from the exposure.” Fitzgerald v. Connecticut River Paper Co., 1891, 155 Mass. 155, 29 N.E. 464, 465. See also: O’Maley v. South Boston Gas Light Co., 1893, 158 Mass. 135, 32 N.E. 1119, 47 L.R.A. 161; Indiana Nat. Gas & Oil Co. v. O’Brien, 1903, 160 Ind. 266, 65 N.E. 918, 66 N.E. 742. In 2 Shearman and Redfield on Negligence (Rev.Ed., 1941), § 231, it is said: “A servant who, with actual or constructive notice of a defect, due to the master’s fault, and of the danger to which he is exposed thereby, and either fully comprehending the risk, or by his own fault failing to do so ‘voluntarily takes his chance’ and continues in work which exposes him to such danger, without reasonable excuse and without complaint or objection, though ordinary prudence might require him to refuse the risk, is held to assume the risk.” Generally the question of contributory negligence should he submitted to the jury, but more often than not the question of assumption of risk is a matter of law, as shown by the following quotation from 2 Shearman and Redfield, op. cit. supra, at §229: “The better opinion would seem to be that the servant’s assumption of risks caused by the master’s negligence is solely referable to thé maxim volenti non fit injuria. The application by the court of this defense so as effectually to defeat the servant’s action for personal injuries often becomes a matter of law, while, on the other hand, the defense of contributory negligence must generally be submitted to the jury. The principle is, of course, the same in both classes of cases, viz.: that the defense should be submitted to the jury unless the fact of contributory negligence or assumption of risk is so clear upon the evidence that reasonable minds cannot differ. But it is readily seen that in the case of an experienced employee where the fact of his knowledge of the defect is established beyond question, it must often occur that his appreciation of the risk and voluntary acceptance of it will be equally apparent; in such case his assumption of the risk becomes a peremptory inference of law. * * *” All of the testimony on the points here discussed came from the lips of the plaintiff. The majority opinion also relies on the case of Maestas v. Alameda Cattle Co., 1932, 36 N.M. 323, 14 P.2d 733, for support. As I analyze that case the facts are materially different there and here and its rationale supports the’ action of the trial court. There the servant was attempting to oil an unguarded pump jack with an ordinary tomato can instead of an oil can with a long neck. There was a gust of wind when the servant got his hand in the cog wheels, but there the similarity of the cases ends. In that case the servant was inexperienced and had poor eyesight; he had complained of the lack of a guard and the employer had promised to equip the pump with a guard to protect the plaintiff from the cog wheels, but had not done so— the foreman had told the servant he need not be afraid, to continue work and he, the foreman, would fix it right away. I believe admiration for Thompson because he told the truth on the witness stand has caused a majority to see jury questions on the assumed risk and contributory negligence issues where none in fact exist; therefore, I dissent.