Court Opinion

ID: 9587578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:23:51.63328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:09.523344
License: Public Domain

Ruffin, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur with the majority opinion. I write separately to elaborate on my views of (1) why Watson v. State1 should be revisited and overruled, and (2) why the dissent’s analysis of the officer’s investigation is flawed. The inquiry is, as defined by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio,2 “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”
1. Were the officers’ actions in this case and in Watson justified at their inception?
The relevant facts in Watson are identical to the facts in this case. There, as here, an officer conducted a brief investigative stop of an automobile after noticing that the vehicle displayed drive-out tags. In this case, as in Watson, the officer justified the stop based upon his experience that many cars with drive-out tags are stolen.3 In Watson, we found that this constituted an “objective manifestation that the persons stopped may be engaged in criminal activity” and therefore concluded that the stop was authorized.4
Both the majority and dissent in this case begin their inquiry on common ground. It is undisputed that such stops implicate the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures.5 We also agree that because the detention was not supported by probable cause, the stop must have been “justified by specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational infer*884enees from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.”6
The facts here, and in Watson, did not warrant such intrusion. The videotape in this case shows that it was the mere presence of the drive-out tag on Berry’s car, coupled with the officer’s experience that “a lot of times” these tags appear on stolen vehicles, that precipitated the stop. Thus, the officer decided to “run a quick check” on Berry’s license “to make sure everything [was] alright,” and he called in the vehicle identification number (VTN) on the car.7
There is no evidence of record which indicates whether the officer in this case and his department have a policy of stopping all cars displaying temporary tags or whether they merely spot check such cars to determine whether they are stolen. Both scenarios are troubling. Assuming the officer stops all such cars, I question how many cars he must stop to find one stolen car. Aside from the officer’s statement that temporary tags appear on stolen cars “a lot of times,” there is no evidence indicating the rate of incidence. However, common sense dictates that the percentage of stolen cars on the road displaying temporary tags is very small and that the number of vehicles displaying temporary tags which will be stopped in order to find one stolen vehicle will be, in comparison, very large.8 Under these circumstances, the contribution to crime prevention will be marginal at best.9
The second scenario presented above, that the officer and his department merely spot check cars displaying temporary tags to determine whether they are stolen, is equally disturbing. There is nothing indicating how the officer would decide which cars to stop, and the United States Supreme Court has counseled against the “grave danger” and “evil” presented by “[t]his kind of standardless and unconstrained discretion.”10
Although I do not dispute that states have a legitimate interest in preventing car theft, that alone is insufficient to justify the intrusion at issue. “[T]he permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.”11 The hypothesis at work under both scenarios presented above is that “stopping apparently [compliant] drivers is *885necessary only because the danger presented by some drivers is not observable at the time of the stop.”12 That hypothesis did not survive the United States Supreme Court’s balancing test in Delaware v. Prouse,13 and I can discern no reason why it should survive here. Indeed, this Court has previously held that such stop is impermissible,14 and my research of cases from several jurisdictions did not reveal a single court which upheld a stop under the circumstances.15
For these reasons, I agree with the majority that Watson should be overruled and agree with Presiding Judge Pope that Burtts v. State16 should be overruled.17 I disagree with the dissent that the officer was justified in stopping Berry. Probable cause is not satisfied by a policeman’s proclivity to pry.
2. Were the officers’ actions in this case reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place? The majority answers with a nonnegotiable “no.” The dissent, with equal passion responds with a dubious “yes.” For reasons which follow, I cannot enter that door of doubt with the dissent.
In light of my conclusion in Division 1 that the stop was not justified at its inception, I would usually dispense with considering whether the scope of the officers’ investigation was impermissibly broad. However, because I believe the dissent has misconstrued Terry and its progeny, and because it recommends overruling Smith v. State,18 I believe it is necessary to comment on these matters.
In Terry, the Court addressed the constitutionality of an investigative stop and recognized that “the scope of the particular intrusion, in light of all the exigencies of the case, [is] a central element in the *886analysis of reasonableness.”19 Indeed, the Court advised that “[t]he scope of the search must be ‘strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.”20 Thus, the Court framed the inquiry as “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”21
Fifteen years after its decision in Terry, the Court, with no less fervor, continued to circumscribe the scope of warrantless searches in Florida v. Royer22 In Royer, the Court reiterated that “the search must be limited in scope to that which is justified by the particular purposes served by the exception.”23 In other words, the Court explained, “[t]he scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.”24 Although the “scope of the intrusion permitted will vary to some extent with the particular facts and circumstances of each case,” the Court in Royer made it clear that
an investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time.25
Based on these principles, this Court found the stop in Smith v. State26 was impermissibly broad. In Smith, the officer stopped the defendant, Smith, to investigate why his car was weaving. Upon being satisfied that Smith was not driving under the influence of alcohol, the officer probed into whether Smith possessed any narcotics. We held that “[a]t the point the officer initiated this later probe, he went beyond the permissible scope of the investigation and his further detention of Smith went beyond that permitted by Terry and its progeny.”27 The reasons underlying our decision are clearly supported by Terry and its progeny. The scope of the officer’s detention was not carefully tailored to investigate why Smith was weaving. The investigative methods used, interrogating Smith about whether he possessed drugs, were totally unrelated to his driving and could not *887confirm or dispel the officer’s suspicion that Smith was driving under the influence of alcohol. Likewise, the period of detention was unnecessarily long because the officer delved into these other matters.
The circumstances in the instant case are even more compelling. The officer had no reason to stop Berry in the first place. Moreover, the officer’s investigative method was not the “least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel [his] suspicion” that the car was stolen, and Berry’s detention lasted “longer than [was] necessary” to determine whether the car was stolen.28
The video reveals that the officer focused his investigation on virtually everything except whether the car was stolen. The officer took Berry’s driver’s license at the beginning of the stop and proceeded to ask him questions about where he came from, the weather, and Berry’s son. The officer displayed particular interest in Berry’s son, investigating where he lived, whether he was sick, his age, whether he was in school or working, and whether he had ever been in any trouble. It is not until after the officer interrogated Berry on all these unrelated personal matters, that the officer even bothered to copy the VTN on the suspected stolen vehicle and call it in, a task that took only 35 seconds. And, after completing this brief task directed toward determining whether the car was stolen, the officer resumed his totally unrelated interrogation into Berry’s private life, now focusing his investigative efforts on searching Berry’s personal belongings. The invective of the dissent notwithstanding, we judges should be able to distinguish between the particular and the peculiar.
If the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the car was stolen, his investigative methods should have been tailored to verify or dispel his suspicion. Interrogation about Berry’s family matters and travel itinerary, even if seemingly benign to the casual observer, constituted a substantial and unnecessary intrusion into Berry’s personal security. Berry was not free to leave, and there is nothing indicating that his participation in this interrogation was consensual. Had the officer “diligently pursue [d] [his] investigation”29 into whether the car was stolen, and limited his investigation into that matter, the detention would have been brief, and Berry would have been spared the unnecessary intrusion into his personal affairs. Terry is instructive:
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all *888restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.30
The officer had no such authority in this case. An unlawful arrest is the contraband of liberty. To curtail our liberty is to steal our liberty, and to steal our liberty is to steal our future as well as our freedom. Accordingly, I concur with the majority.
I am authorized to state that Judge Miller and Judge Phipps join in this special concurrence.

 190 Ga. App. 696 (379 SE2d 817) (1989).

 392 U. S. 1, 20 (88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889) (1968). See also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U. S. 675 (105 SC 1568, 84 LE2d 605) (1985).

 Watson, supra, 190 Ga. App. 696.

 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 696-697.

 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 653 (99 SC 1391, 59 LE2d 660) (1979).

 (Punctuation omitted.) McSwain v. State, 240 Ga. App. 60, 61 (522 SE2d 553) (1999) (quoting Terry, supra, 392 U. S. at 21).

 Of course, the officer’s investigation went far beyond this documentation check. I address the issues raised by his other conduct in Division 2 of this special concurrence.

 See Prouse, supra, 440 U. S. at 659-660 (considering the marginal contribution of stopping all drivers to find only one unlicensed driver).

 See id.

 Id. at 661-662.

 Id. at 653-654.

 Id. at 661.

 See id.

 See State v. Aguirre, 229 Ga. App. 736 (494 SE2d 576) (1997).

 See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 205 F3d 720 (4th Cir. 2000); State v. Butler, 343 S.C. 198 (539 SE2d 414) (App. 2000); State v. Childs, 242 Neb. 426 (495 NW2d 475) (1993); State v. Chatton, 11 Ohio St.3d 59 (463 NE2d 1237) (1984).

 211 Ga. App. 840 (440 SE2d 727) (1994).

 According to a study conducted by the National Insurance Crime Bureau (NICB), a not-for-profit insurance organization committed to combating vehicle theft and insurance fraud, the ten most commonly stolen vehicles in the United States in 1999 were: 1. Honda Accord, 2. Toyota Camry, 3. Oldsmobile Cutlass, 4. Chevrolet full-size pickup, 5. Honda Civic, 6. Toyota Corolla, 7. Jeep Cherokee, 8. Chevrolet Caprice, 9. Ford Taurus, Í0. Chevrolet Cavalier. See NICB, Top Stolen Cars (November 14, 2000), http://www.nicb.org/services/ top_stolen_cars.html. If we continue to subscribe to the law established by Watson and Burtts, and relied upon by the dissent here, perhaps retailers of these top-ten stolen cars should include a disclaimer on the window sticker providing that “any person observed driving the vehicle may be detained by police at any time because this model car is stolen a lot of times.” Seemingly absurd, under Watson and Burtts an officer could stop a person driving one of these cars based upon his specific knowledge that the particular car is often stolen. See Watson, supra.

 216 Ga. App. 453 (454 SE2d 635) (1995).

 Terry, supra, 392 U. S. at 19, n. 15.

 Id.

 Id. at 20.

 460 U. S. 491 (103 SC 1319, 75 LE2d 229) (1983).

 Id. at 500.

 Id.

 Id.

 Supra, 216 Ga. App. at 454-455.

 Id. at 455.

 Royer, supra, 460 U. S. at 500.

 Sharpe, supra, 470 U. S. at 685.

 (Punctuation omitted.) Terry, supra, 392 U. S. at 9.