Court Opinion

ID: 9534145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:37:11.248015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:42.152711
License: Public Domain

*372CONNOR T. HANSEN, J.
(concurring). I concur with the result reached by the majority in this case. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the basis that the action of the plaintiffs was barred on the principles of res judicata by the Racine county probate court’s order of March 28, 1966, which discharged and released the defendant Kuehnl of all obligations and liability as co-trustee, and the order of April 1,1966, which approved the sale of the stock.
The plaintiffs, although they contend otherwise, are clearly bringing a collateral attack against both orders of the probate court. Before any liability in tort may be imposed upon defendant Kuehnl, the plaintiffs must prove that the orders of the probate court discharging and releasing him of all obligations and liability and approving the sale of the stock were procured by a fraud upon the court. If the plaintiffs’ assertions of self-dealing and failure to disclose pertinent facts on the part of the co-trustees are subsequently borne out, the orders of the probate court were both necessarily obtained by virtue of a fraud perpetrated upon the probate court.
A judgment or order of a competent court tainted by the perpetration of actual or constructive fraud upon the court in its procurement is open to either direct or collateral attack. In re Estate of Boots, 73 Wis.2d 207, 215, 216, 243 N.W.2d 225 (1976); Sinnott v. Porter, 57 Wis.2d 462, 466, 204 N.W.2d 449 (1973); Kriesel v. Kriesel, 35 Wis.2d 134, 138, 139, 150 N.W.2d 416 (1967); Zrimsek v. American Automobile Ins. Co., 8 Wis.2d 1, 3, 98 N.W.2d 383 (1959); Estate of Penney, 225 Wis. 455, 471, 274 N.W. 247 (1937).
While a direct attack should be initiated in the court which entered the initial judgment or order, a collateral attack based upon actual or constructive fraud upon the court may be brought in a different court.1
*373The plaintiffs maintain that they do not wish to disturb the order of the probate court affirming the sale; yet they clearly raise in their affidavit and other proof matters which, if proved at trial, may constitute actual or constructive fraud on the part of the co-trustees in the procurement of the orders. In my opinion, the holding of the majority is not intended to be interpreted as an expression as to the ultimate truth or provability of the factual matters averred to in the affidavit. The factual issues should be left to the determination of the circuit court at trial. It would also seem that the plaintiffs should be given the opportunity to amend their pleadings to reflect an allegation of fraudulent conduct if they so desire.
It is reemphasized that it is incumbent upon the plaintiffs to first prove actual fraudulent practices conducted by the co-trustees in the procurement of the orders of the probate court before the plaintiffs may succeed on their cause of action.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice ROBERT W. HANSEN joins in this concurring opinion.

 See: Section 806.07(2), Stats., Rules of Civil Procedure, effective January 1, 1976.