Court Opinion

ID: 9913036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-26 18:00:57.429103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:52.158700
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-6052     Document: 010110974010         Date Filed: 12/26/2023         Page: 1
                                                                                      FILED
                                                                          United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                             Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                            December 26, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                             Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                 Clerk of Court
  STEPHEN RANDALL CHRISTENSEN,
  JR.,

        Petitioner - Appellant,

  v.                                                            No. 22-6052
                                                         (D.C. No. 5:21-CV-00782-J)
  STEVEN HARPE, ∗                                               (W.D. Okla.)

        Respondent - Appellee.
                       _________________________________

             ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY ∗∗
                     _________________________________

 Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, KELLY, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                    _________________________________

        Stephen Randall Christensen, Jr., an Oklahoma state prisoner proceeding pro se, 1

 seeks a certificate of appealability (“COA”) to appeal from the district court’s order

 denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition seeking habeas corpus relief from his state

        ∗
             Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Steven Harpe, the current Director of
 the Oklahoma Department of Corrections, is automatically substituted as Respondent in
 this case.

        ∗∗
                This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the
 case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive
 value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
        1
               Because Mr. Christensen litigates this matter pro se, we construe his filings
 liberally; however, we do not act as his advocate. See United States v. Parker, 720 F.3d
 781, 784 n.1 (10th Cir. 2013).
Appellate Case: 22-6052     Document: 010110974010         Date Filed: 12/26/2023       Page: 2

 conviction and sentence. We deny Mr. Christensen’s COA request and dismiss this

 matter.

                                              I

                                              A

        In 2014, Mr. Christensen was convicted of one count of sexual abuse of a child

 and two counts of procuring child pornography in Canadian County District Court in

 Oklahoma. The state district court sentenced Mr. Christensen to life imprisonment on the

 child sex abuse count and twenty years’ imprisonment on each of the two counts of

 procuring child pornography, ordering those two counts to run concurrently with each

 other but consecutively with the life imprisonment sentence.

        Mr. Christensen appealed to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”),

 which affirmed his conviction on January 6, 2016. He then filed two motions in state

 district court challenging his sentence. First, on January 15, 2016, Mr. Christensen filed

 a motion for suspended or modified sentence, which the state district court denied on

 April 12, 2016. Second, on June 13, 2016, he filed a motion to set a judicial review

 hearing, which the state district court denied on July 25, 2016.

        Next, Mr. Christensen filed two applications for postconviction relief. He filed the

 first application on August 22, 2016, which the state district court denied on February 6,

 2017. The OCCA affirmed the denial on August 8, 2017. Mr. Christensen filed the

 second application for postconviction relief on November 13, 2017, which the state

 district court denied on January 12, 2018.

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        The state district court, however, failed to mail to Mr. Christensen a copy of its

 January 12 decision, denying Mr. Christensen’s second application for postconviction

 relief. And, thus apparently unaware of the denial, Mr. Christensen continued filing

 letters and amendments to his second application for post-conviction relief. On July 12,

 2018, Mr. Christensen filed a motion for a writ of mandamus in the OCCA to compel the

 district court to rule on his second application for post-conviction relief. The OCCA

 declined jurisdiction and dismissed the matter on July 30, 2018. On August 27, 2018,

 Canadian County District Judge Paul Hesse sent a letter to Mr. Christensen, notifying

 him that his second application for post-conviction relief had been denied in January.

        On October 15, 2018, Mr. Christensen requested an appeal out of time for his

 second application for post-conviction relief because he did not receive notice of the

 denial of his application until after the appeal window had passed. On July 11, 2019, the

 state district court entered an order recommending that the OCCA grant Mr.

 Christensen’s request because he was effectively denied the right to appeal his second

 application for post-conviction relief through no fault of his own due to the lack of notice.

 Yet, the state district court did not mail Mr. Christensen a copy of this recommendation

 until November 15, 2019. Thus, by the time Mr. Christensen received notice that his first

 request for an appeal out of time had been granted, the deadline for him to file such an

 appeal had passed.

        On August 6, 2020, approximately nine months later, Mr. Christensen filed a

 second motion requesting an appeal out of time for his second application for post-

 conviction relief. The state district court recommended granting this motion on October

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 23, 2020. The OCCA granted the appeal out of time on December 22, 2020, and

 subsequently affirmed the denial of Mr. Christensen’s second application for post-

 conviction relief on May 18, 2021.

                                              B

        Mr. Christensen filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the

 United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma on August 4, 2021. He

 brought eighteen grounds for relief. The State moved to dismiss his action as time-

 barred.

        On referral, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”)

 concerning the motion seeking the dismissal of Mr. Christensen’s habeas petition. See

 Christensen v. Crow, No. CIV-21-782-J, 2022 WL 1214750 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 28, 2022).

 In the R&R, the magistrate judge recommended dismissing Mr. Christensen’s § 2254

 petition as untimely. Specifically, the magistrate judge calculated that, absent tolling,

 Mr. Christensen’s statutory year to file a habeas petition under § 2244(d)(1)(A) would

 have expired on April 6, 2017—one year after his convictions became final on April 6,

 2016. However, the magistrate judge identified four periods of tolling that extended Mr.

 Christensen’s time to file a habeas petition until August 2, 2018.

        First, the magistrate judge gave Mr. Christensen the benefit of tolling between

 January 15, 2016, and April 12, 2016, while Mr. Christensen’s motion for a suspended or

 modified sentence was pending. Second, the magistrate judge gave Mr. Christensen the

 benefit of tolling between June 13, 2016, and July 25, 2016, while Mr. Christensen’s

                                               4
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 motion to set a judicial review hearing was pending.2 Third, the magistrate judge found

 that the statute of limitations was tolled between August 22, 2016, and August 8, 2017,

 while Mr. Christensen’s first application for post-conviction relief was pending. Lastly,

 the magistrate judge found that the statute of limitations was tolled between November

 13, 2017, and February 1, 2018, while Mr. Christensen’s second application for post-

 conviction relief was pending.3 Because Mr. Christensen did not file his habeas petition

 until August 4, 2021, she concluded that his petition was untimely by a period of “just

 over three years.” Id. at *5.

        The magistrate judge then addressed Mr. Christensen’s argument that his filing

 period should have been tolled under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B) because two state actions

        2
                 The magistrate judge noted that the government objected to tolling Mr.
 Christensen’s statutory year for these two periods. See Christensen, 2022 WL 1214750,
 at *4 n.5 (“It remains an open question in the Tenth Circuit whether Petitioner’s motion
 for a suspended or modified sentence or his later motion to set a judicial review hearing,
 both presumably filed pursuant to OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 982a, tolled the § 2244
 limitations period. . . . This Court need not decide that issue because Petitioner’s habeas
 petition was untimely filed even if given the benefit of the time when both motions were
 pending.”). For the same reason, we will also give Mr. Christensen the benefit of tolling
 during these periods.
        3
                The magistrate judge noted that the state district court denied Mr.
 Christensen’s second application for post-conviction relief on January 12, 2018.
 However, she determined that his statutory year began to run again on February 1, 2018.
 See Christensen, 2022 WL 1214750, at *5. As we have noted, “the limitations period is
 tolled during the period in which the petitioner could have sought an appeal under state
 law.” Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 804 (10th Cir. 2000). Under the OCCA’s
 appellate rules, state appellants have a twenty-day period to appeal from final judgments
 to the OCCA. See Rule 5.2(C)(1), Rules of the Okla. Ct. of Crim. App., OKLA. STAT. tit.
 22, Ch. 18, App. (2018) (allowing twenty days to appeal from final judgment to OCCA
 by filing a Notice of Post-Conviction Appeal). Therefore, Mr. Christensen’s statutory
 year began to run again on February 1, 2018, twenty days after January 12, 2018.
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 impeded his ability to file a habeas petition. Section 2244(d)(1)(B) provides that the

 Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (“AEDPA”) one-year limitations

 period is tolled if an unconstitutional or illegal state action creates an impediment to

 filing a habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B). The tolling period under

 § 2244(d)(1)(B) runs until “the date on which the impediment to filing an application

 created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

 removed.” Id.

        Mr. Christensen argued that the state’s delay in responding to his requests for trial

 transcripts and the state court’s failure to notify him of its ruling on his motion for an

 appeal out of time for his second application for post-conviction relief constituted state-

 imposed impediments to filing under this section. The magistrate judge refrained from

 reaching the question of whether these were unconstitutional or illegal state actions that

 would merit tolling under § 2244(d)(1)(B) because, even if Mr. Christensen received the

 benefit of tolling during these periods, his statutory year still would have expired before

 he filed his § 2254 petition.

        Specifically, the magistrate judge found that, during the time that Mr. Christensen

 was waiting for the court to mail him his transcripts between June 28, 2016, and August

 31, 2016, the statute of limitations was already tolled between June 13, 2016, and July 25,

 2016, (while Mr. Christensen’s motion to set a judicial review hearing was pending), and

 between August 22, 2016, and August 31, 2016, (while Mr. Christensen’s first

 application for post-conviction relief was pending). Therefore, “applying

 § 2244(d)(1)(B) for the delayed receipt of transcripts would only have given [Mr.

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 Christensen] twenty-eight more days to file his habeas petition, which he in fact filed

 three years late.” Christensen, 2022 WL 1214750, at *5.

        As to the notification delays, the magistrate judge found that Mr. Christensen had

 181 days remaining in his statutory year at the time he filed his second application for

 post-conviction relief on November 13, 2017. If Mr. Christensen received the benefit of

 tolling while he was awaiting notification of the denial of his second application for post-

 conviction relief, his statutory year would have been tolled until August 28, 2018, the day

 after Judge Hesse sent him the letter notifying him of the denial of his second application

 for post-conviction relief. Mr. Christensen’s statutory year would then have run until

 October 15, 2018, when Mr. Christensen filed his request for an appeal out of time,

 leaving 134 days remaining in his statutory year. If Mr. Christensen received the benefit

 of the notification delay for this motion, his statutory year would have been tolled until

 November 15, 2019, when the state district court mailed Mr. Christensen a copy of its

 July 11 recommendation. Mr. Christensen’s statutory year would have expired 134 days

 later, on March 28, 2020, “well before he filed his petition on August 4, 2021.” Id. at *6.

 Even though Mr. Christensen “eventually filed a second motion for an appeal out of time

 on August 6, 2020,” that motion did not toll his statutory year because the year had

 already expired. Id.

        Lastly, the magistrate judge addressed Mr. Christensen’s argument that he was

 entitled to equitable tolling. Mr. Christensen had argued that he was entitled to equitable

 tolling because of his delayed receipt of the state court post-conviction rulings; his

 diminished mental capacity due to an “anoxic brain injury”; and his lack of access to

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 transcripts or evidence that he requested to support his second application for post-

 conviction relief. Id. However, the magistrate judge disagreed and found that Mr.

 Christensen was not entitled to equitable tolling.

        Regarding the delayed receipt of the state court post-conviction rulings, the

 magistrate judge found that Mr. Christensen was not entitled to equitable tolling because

 he received notice of the rulings on November 15, 2019, yet declined to file his habeas

 petition until August 4, 2021. As such, “the Court . . . need not determine whether

 Petitioner acted with sufficient diligence to obtain equitable tolling.” Id. at *7.

 Regarding the “anoxic brain injury” that Mr. Christensen allegedly received from a

 suicide attempt in November 2018, the magistrate judge found that “the Tenth Circuit

 ‘has yet to apply equitable tolling on the basis of mental incapacity.’” Id. (quoting Berry

 v. Haddon, No. 2:20-CV-729, 2022 WL 326991, at *2 (D. Utah Feb. 3, 2022)). Further,

 Mr. Christensen “ha[d] proven ‘capable of pursuing his own claim’ in spite of injuries

 sustained from his suicide attempt[,]” including making “numerous filings in state and

 federal courts.” Id.

        Next, the magistrate judge found that Mr. Christensen “likewise [was] not entitled

 to equitable tolling on the ground that the state court did not acknowledge his requests for

 transcripts or other case-related documents necessary to filing his second application for

 post-conviction relief,” because “the unavailability of trial transcripts and unspecified

 case-related documents ‘to canvas the record for possible error does not constitute

 “extraordinary circumstances” that would entitle [a petitioner] to equitable tolling.’” Id.

 (quoting Bhutto v. Wilson, 669 F. App’x 501, 503 (10th Cir. 2016)).
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        Finally, the magistrate judge found that Mr. Christensen was not entitled to

 equitable tolling on the basis of actual innocence because Mr. Christensen “ha[d] not put

 forth new evidence or alleged facts amounting to actual innocence,” only “claims of

 constitutional and legal error.” Id. at *8. Accordingly, the magistrate judge

 recommended that the district court grant the state’s motion to dismiss Mr. Christensen’s

 habeas petition as untimely filed under § 2244(d)(1)(D).

        On March 21, 2022, after considering Mr. Christensen’s objections, the district

 court adopted the R&R. See Christensen v. Crow, No. CIV-21-782-J, 2022 WL 834964

 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 21, 2022). In that same order, the district court denied Mr. Christensen

 a COA. Mr. Christensen then filed a motion to reconsider, which the district court denied

 on May 9, 2022. This appeal and application for a COA followed.

                                               II

        A COA is a prerequisite to our appellate review. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537

 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). To obtain a COA where, as here, the district court dismissed a

 habeas petition on procedural grounds, Mr. Christensen must show both “that jurists of

 reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a

 constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district

 court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

 “Rather than addressing these two threshold requirements in order, we may ‘resolve the

 issue whose answer is more apparent from the record and arguments.’” Frost v. Pryor,

 749 F.3d 1212, 1230–31 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Slack, 529 U.S. at 485). With that

 guidance in mind, we review Mr. Christensen’s arguments in support of a COA and

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  conclude that no reasonable jurist would find the correctness of the district court’s

  procedural dismissal of Mr. Christensen’s petition to be debatable.

                                                  A

         Mr. Christensen contends that “[t]he district court . . . erred in its calculation of

  both statutory and equitable tolling, and incorrectly barred [his] habeas corpus petition as

  untimely.” Aplt.’s Combined Opening Br. & Appl. for a COA at 9. Mr. Christensen

  offers three additional tolling periods that the magistrate judge did not include.

  Primarily, Mr. Christensen argues that the statute of limitations should have been tolled

  for the entire period between when he filed his second application for post-conviction

  relief on November 13, 2017, and when the OCCA affirmed the denial of his second

  application for post-conviction relief on May 18, 2021. Secondarily, Mr. Christensen

  argues that the statute of limitations should also have been tolled an additional twenty

  days each after the district court denied his motion for a suspended or modified sentence

  on April 12, 2016, and after the district court denied his motion to set a judicial review

  hearing on July 25, 2016.

         To begin, Mr. Christensen offers three arguments in support of the conclusion that

  the statute of limitations should have been tolled between November 13, 2017, and May

  18, 2021. First, Mr. Christensen argues that the state created an “extraordinary”

  “impediment” that stood in his way and prevented timely filing of his habeas petition. Id.

  at 10. Specifically, “despite the fact that the district court . . . denied [his] post-

  conviction application on the 12th of January, 2018[,] [Mr. Christensen] was not provided

  any order or document proclaiming this fact.” Id. at 14. Yet, “[d]ue to [his] efforts[,]

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  district court judge Hesse mailed a letter to the petitioner on the 27th of August, 2018.”

  Id. However, as Mr. Christensen reasons, “this ‘letter’ although it did inform the

  petitioner of the denial[,] it did nothing to enable the petitioner to appeal [] since the letter

  did not include the denial order or even state why the application was denied.” Id. At

  that point, he says, it was also too late to appeal, and he had to show that he was denied

  an appeal “through ‘no fault of his own.’” Id. at 15.

         On October 15, 2018, Mr. Christensen requested the right to appeal out of time,

  which the district court granted on July 11, 2019. As Mr. Christensen observes,

  “[u]nfortunately[,] the district court failed to send the July 11th ruling to the petitioner

  until November 15th, 2019. Again the petitioner was forced out-of-time[.]” Id. at 16.

  Mr. Christensen emphasizes that he was forced to “backtrack” to show the district court

  that he was again denied an appeal through no fault of his own. Id. Therefore, in his

  view, the magistrate judge and district court erred in concluding that his statutory year

  resumed upon receipt of the August 27, 2018, letter, because the state-created

  impediment to filing continued until at least November 15, 2019.

         Second, Mr. Christensen argues that the statute of limitations should have been

  tolled between the time he filed his second application for post-conviction relief on

  November 13, 2017, until at least December 22, 2020, because, under Gibson v. Klinger,

  232 F.3d 799, 804 (10th Cir. 2000), “the statutory limitations period is tolled during the

  period in which the petitioner ‘could have’ sought an appeal ‘under state law,’” and Mr.

  Christensen was unable to seek an appeal of the denial of his second application for post-

  conviction relief until the OCCA granted the appeal out of time on December 22, 2020.

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  Id. at 18–19. Stated otherwise, irrespective of the almost nine month period spanning his

  receipt on November 15, 2019, of the state district court’s July 11, 2019, decision, and his

  second motion for an appeal out of time on August 6, 2020, Mr. Christensen believes that

  he was unable, under Gibson, “to appeal the denial of his second application for post-

  conviction relief” until December 22, 2020, when the OCCA granted his second appeal

  out of time. Id. at 20; see Gibson, 232 F.3d at 804. From there, Mr. Christensen reasons

  that his statutory year was tolled until May 18, 2021, when the OCCA affirmed the state

  district court’s denial of the second application for post-conviction relief.

         Third, and finally, Mr. Christensen argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling.

  Citing Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010), he argues that he “did everything he

  could to pursue his rights ‘diligently’ and that ‘extraordinary circumstances’ [] ‘stood in

  his way.’” Aplt.’s Combined Opening Br. & Appl. for a COA at 20 (quoting Holland,

  560 U.S. at 649). In particular, he “suffered a traumatic brain injury and was in a coma

  for 9 days[.]” Id.

         As to Mr. Christensen’s argument that the statute of limitations should have been

  tolled an additional twenty days each after the district court denied his motion for a

  suspended or modified sentence on April 12, 2016, and denied his motion to set a judicial

  review hearing on July 25, 2016, Mr. Christensen invokes the same language in Gibson v.

  Klinger that “the limitations period is tolled during the period in which the petitioner

  could have sought an appeal under state law.” Id. at 17 (quoting 232 F.3d at 804).

  Therefore, even though he declined to appeal these two district court decisions, he avers

  that his statutory year was tolled an additional twenty days each after these motions were

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  decided—until May 2, 2016, and August 14, 2016, respectively. Given the additional

  forty days of tolling from these motions, and the entire tolling period between November

  13, 2017, and May 18, 2021, Mr. Christensen calculates that “142 days remained in his

  statutory year” at the time he filed his habeas petition. Id. at 19.

                                                B

         We conclude that jurists of reason could not debate that the district court was

  correct in its procedural ruling that Mr. Christensen’s habeas petition was untimely. See

  Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. Even if we were to give Mr. Christensen the benefit of the

  additional forty days he calculates for his state district court motions in 2016, and the

  benefit of § 2244(d)(1)(B) for a state-created impediment to filing, his statutory year

  would have expired before he filed his second motion for an appeal out of time on August

  6, 2020, and long before he filed his § 2254 motion on August 4, 2021.

         Assuming arguendo that the August 27, 2018, letter did not resume Mr.

  Christensen’s statutory year, the state-created impediment to filing would have expired

  on November 15, 2019, when Mr. Christensen was provided a copy of the district court’s

  recommendation to grant his first motion for an appeal out of time. At that time, under

  Mr. Christensen’s calculation, he would have had 181 4 days remaining in his statutory

  year, or 221 days with the benefit of the additional forty days for his 2016 motions.

         4
                Mr. Christensen actually calculates that he had 179 days remaining in his
  statutory year at the time he filed his second application for post-conviction relief on
  November 13, 2017 (or 219 days with the benefit of the additional forty days). We note
  that the magistrate judge calculated that Mr. Christensen would have had 181 days
  remaining in his statutory year when he filed his second petition for post-conviction relief
  on November 13, 2017, if he received the benefit of statutory tolling under
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         Mr. Christensen’s argument that, under Gibson, his statutory year should have

  been tolled further because he was unable to effectively seek an appeal until December

  22, 2020, is unavailing. Gibson holds only that “regardless of whether a petitioner

  actually appeals a denial of a post-conviction application, the limitations period is tolled

  during the period in which the petitioner could have sought an appeal under state law”

  after the post-conviction application was denied. Gibson, 232 F.3d at 804. The

  magistrate judge already included in her calculation the period in which Mr. Christensen

  could have sought an appeal under Oklahoma law after his second application for post-

  conviction relief was denied. See Christensen, 2022 WL 1214750, at *5 (“The district

  court denied his second application for post-conviction relief on January 12, 2018.

  Because Petitioner did not timely appeal, his statutory year began to run again after his

  time to appeal expired twenty days after the district court’s decision, on February 1,

  2018.”). Mr. Christensen points to no law that suggests that statutory tolling under

  AEDPA extends until a petitioner can effectively appeal the denial of an application for

  post-conviction relief in their post-conviction state.

         To be sure, under the text of Gibson, the limitations period is tolled during the

  period in which the petitioner could have sought an appeal under state law, and Mr.

  Christensen’s argument is that, between February 1, 2018, and December 22, 2020, he

  § 2244(d)(1)(B). See Christensen, 2022 WL 1214750, at *5. We give Mr. Christensen
  the benefit of the magistrate judge’s calculation of how many days would have remained
  in Mr. Christensen’s statutory year if he received the benefit of § 2244(d)(1)(B), but also
  note that these two days are immaterial to our conclusion that Mr. Christensen’s petition
  is time-barred.
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  could not have sought an appeal because of the state’s delays in notifying him of the

  court’s opinions. If anything, Gibson could toll the statute of limitations for the twenty

  days after the court granted Mr. Christensen’s first request for an appeal out of time (July

  11, 2019, through July 31, 2019), because the window to appeal under state law was re-

  opened, but the magistrate judge already included the benefit of tolling during that period

  in her calculation because the court did not mail Mr. Christensen a copy of its July 11

  decision until November 15, 2019. See Christensen, 2022 WL 1214750, at *5–6.

         Therefore, at the latest, the statute of limitations began running again on

  November 16, 2019. Without opining on the merits of Mr. Christensen’s § 2244(d)(1)(B)

  argument or his argument for twenty additional days after each of his 2016 motions, the

  most days Mr. Christensen could have had remaining in his statutory year on November

  16, 2019, is 221 days. Yet, Mr. Christensen did not file his second request for an appeal

  out of time until August 6, 2020—264 days after November 16, 2019. Therefore, his

  statutory year had already expired when he filed his second request for an appeal out of

  time, and long before he filed his habeas petition on August 4, 2021.

         This court requires habeas petitioners to diligently pursue their state remedies. See

  Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998) (“The one-year time period begins to

  run in accordance with individual circumstances that could reasonably affect the

  availability of the remedy, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B), (D) . . . .” (citation omitted));

  Moore v. Gibson, 250 F.3d 1295, 1299 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Moore claims he was denied

  counsel to appeal his December 1993 resentencing. However, even crediting his account

  of the events, he did not initiate his state post-conviction proceedings until April 1997.

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  This delay does not demonstrate that Moore was pursuing his claims diligently.”); see

  also Linn v. Kiowa Cnty. Dist. Ct., 191 F. App’x 790, 793 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Linn did not

  file any action for post-conviction relief in state court until seven years after his

  conviction became final, and his only claim as to why this delay occurred is that his

  attorney never responded to his letters and phone calls . . . . Such allegations do not

  satisfy his obligation to diligently pursue his appeal.”); Campbell v. Roberts, 143 F.

  App’x 110, 112 (10th Cir. 2005) (“As evidence that Campbell had not diligently pursued

  his claims, the court cited his failure to seek appellate review of the denial of his first

  state post-conviction motion and the more than two-year period between that denial and

  his filing of a second state post-conviction motion. . . . These arguments do not excuse

  Campbell’s lengthy delay in seeking federal relief.”).

         Mr. Christensen failed to exercise diligence in taking corrective measures after

  learning on November 15, 2019, that the state district court granted his first motion for an

  appeal out of time. Mr. Christensen could have moved for a second appeal out of time

  soon thereafter. Instead, he waited nearly nine months before moving for a second appeal

  out of time, which he filed on August 6, 2020. As we have already discussed, his

  statutory year expired well before that date.

         For the same reason, Mr. Christensen cannot prevail under equitable tolling.

  Equitable tolling “is only available when an inmate diligently pursues his claims and

  demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary circumstances

  beyond his control.” Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000). Even if we

  give Mr. Christensen the benefit of the nine days in which he was in a coma following his

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Appellate Case: 22-6052      Document: 010110974010         Date Filed: 12/26/2023      Page: 17

  traumatic brain injury, Mr. Christensen makes no argument on appeal as to why he did

  not diligently pursue filing a second motion for an appeal out of time, and “[w]e cannot

  make arguments for him.” United States v. Yelloweagle, 643 F.3d 1275, 1284 (10th Cir.

  2011). 5

                                                     ***

         In sum, we conclude that jurists of reason would not find debatable the correctness

  of the district court’s decision denying as time-barred Mr. Christensen’s habeas motion.

                                               III

         For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Mr. Christensen’s request for a COA and

  dismiss this matter. 6

                                                Entered for the Court

                                                Jerome A. Holmes
                                                Chief Judge

         5
                As the district court correctly noted, because the magistrate judge already
  gave Mr. Christensen the benefit of statutory tolling for the state’s delays in notifying
  him of the court’s decisions, he is not entitled to “duplicative tolling under an equitable
  tolling theory” for those periods. Christensen, 2022 WL 834964, at *2.
         6
              We summarily GRANT Mr. Christensen’s motion for leave to proceed in
  forma pauperis, concluding that such relief is appropriate.
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