Court Opinion

ID: 9733966
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:21:38.178039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:44.740552
License: Public Domain

ADKINS, Judge,
concurring.
The only questions presented in this case are (1) whether Md.Code (1984 Repl.Vol., 1987 Cum.Supp.) § 3-814(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article applies to a 17 year old juvenile charged with an offense outside the jurisdiction of a juvenile court, and (2) if so, the effect of noncompliance with the statute on the voluntariness of the juvenile’s confession. Since I agree with the majority that § 3-814(b) is inapplicable, I concur in the judgment. I write separately, nevertheless, to note my continuing adherence to the *409dissenting views I expressed in McIntyre v. State, 309 Md. 607, 626, 526 A.2d 30, 39 (1987) (Adkins, J., dissenting).
It is troublesome that the unilateral and preliminary-charging decision of a single police officer can remove a juvenile from the protections otherwise afforded by § 3-814(b). If, as here, the juvenile is charged with an offense that is both beyond the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and one that is not waivable back to juvenile court, then the juvenile never receives whatever benefit § 3-814(b) provides, even though more thorough investigation may show that his actual offense is a much lesser one, and even though more mature prosecutorial consideration concludes that an offense within juvenile court jurisdiction is the most appropriate charge.
This defect in the Juvenile Causes Act is, of course, subject to legislative cure if the General Assembly agrees that it presents a problem. The problem would be much less serious, however, if the principles I espoused in McIntyre were adopted. Adoption of these principles, I continue to believe, is constitutionally mandated and also in harmony with the philosophy expressed in the statutory protections the legislature has provided for juveniles.
In the McIntyre dissent I argued, first, that if a juvenile charged as an adult and under custodial interrogation asks to see a parent, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), requires that questioning must cease until the parent has been produced—just as it must cease when a suspect under custodial interrogation requests a lawyer. 309 Md. at 630-632, 526 A.2d at 41-42. In a proper case, I would extend that principle to a situation in which the juvenile under interrogation requests a grandparent or guardian. But in the case before us, Jones, unlike McIntyre, requested nobody, so that principle is not involved here.
The McIntyre dissent also asserted that with respect to a juvenile under the age of 14, no waiver of constitutional rights can be effective unless the juvenile has first consult*410ed with an “interested adult.” As to juveniles 14 years old or older,
“there should ordinarily be a meaningful consultation with the parent, interested adult, or attorney to ensure that the waiver is knowing and intelligent. For a waiver to be valid without such a consultation the circumstances should demonstrate a high degree of intelligence, experience, knowledge, or sophistication on the part of the juvenile.” .
Id. at 633, 526 A.2d at 43 (quoting Commonwealth v. A. Juvenile, 389 Mass. 128, 134, 449 N.E.2d 654, 657 (1983)). Jones was not permitted to consult with an “interested adult” although his grandmother/guardian was at the police station while he was being questioned. He was 17 years old. Under those circumstances, for his statement to have been admissible, the State should have been required to show that Jones had “a high degree of intelligence, experience, knowledge, or sophistication____” In short, the validity of his statement was subject to heightened scrutiny. The trial judge’s voluntariness review here arguably was sufficient to meet the totality standard of the McIntyre majority, 309 Md. at 621-626, 526 A.2d at 36-39. It was certainly more careful and focused more on the appropriate factors than the trial judge’s cursory analysis in McIntyre, id. at 634-637, 526 A.2d at 43-45. The judge here did consider Jones’s age, intelligence, level of maturity, the lack of physical coercion, and the somewhat exculpatory nature of the statement. But it is not clear that this would meet the heightened scrutiny I believe was required under the circumstances. That question is likewise not before us today, however.
The majority concedes that “great care must be taken to assure that statements made to the police by juveniles are voluntary before being permitted in evidence.” Maj.op. at 407, 535 A.2d at 476. Particularly when § 3-814 is not *411applicable, that “great care” requires invocation of the safeguards proposed in the McIntyre dissent.
Judge COLE has authorized me to say that he joins in this concurring opinion.