Court Opinion

ID: 9832564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:00:13.108311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:48.075046
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing and to Certify.
Appellant has called our attention, in his motion for rehearing, to the fact that we were in error in our original opinion in stating that the motion to permit the filing of the transcript was not filed in the Dallas court until the 91st day after the overruling of the motion for a new trial.
After an examination of the transcript, we have concluded that in that statement we were in error.
We mistook the filing date on the amended motion for a new trial to be the filing date on the .order overruling the motion. However, the record shows that the motion for a new trial was overruled on March 4, 1932, and that the motion to permit the filing of' the transcript in the Dallas court was not filed there until May 5,1932.
In the motion for leave to file, it is alleged! that 60 days were allowed to go by without the transcript being filed and that on May. 4, 1932, the 61st day, the transcript was delivered to the clerk of that court.
The question involved is, therefore, the same as it would have been if the transcript had been filed, as we stated in opr original opinion, on the 91st day.
We agree with appellant that the jurisdiction of an appellate court does not depend upon the filing of the transcript therein, and we did not so hold in our former opinion.
We merely held that the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals had no power to consider the motion filed before it in view of the provisions of amended article 1839.
Appellant further argues that we should not presume that the order overruling the motion for new trial was entered in the minutes of the lower court not later than March 5,1932, but should, in the absence of a definite showing as to the date it was actually entered, indulge the presumption that it was entered at a later date, as was done by the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals in Hamilton Motor Company v. Muckleroy, 46 S.W.(2d) 451.
In the present case, however, we find that appellant himself, in his motion for leave to file the transcript, admits that the transcript was tendered after the statutory period.
There also appears in the record the following notation in connection with the motion for a new trial: “Entered as of March 4, 1932.” With these facts in the record, there appears to be no ground upon which we might presume that the transcript was filed within the 60-day period.
Appellant in his motion to certify has asserted that our decision is in conflict with City of Eagle Lake v. Lakeside Sugar Refining Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 144 S. W. 709 (writ refused); Warren v. Pace (Tex. Civ. App.) 259 S. W. 627; Evans v. Galbraith-Foxworth Lbr. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 43 S.W. (2d) 481; Walker v. Lyles (Tex. Civ. App.) 45 S.W. (2d) 315; Hamilton Motor Co. v. Muckleroy, supra.
We have carefully examined these authorities, and find that they are not in such conflict with our holding as would, in our opinion, call for a certification of the question to the Supreme Court. While the Dallas court, in the Muckleroy Case, held that a motion could be considered after the expira*198tion of the’ 60 days, yet, it had already held that the transcript had been timely filed, leaving the holding on the question of when the motion should be filed, and from which Chief Justice Jones dissented, unnecessary.
The motions for rehearing and to certify will both be overruled.