Court Opinion

ID: 9883831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:21:20.305985+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:31.781082
License: Public Domain

Opinion by
Justice SCOTT
Concurring in part and dissenting in Part.
Although I concur with the majority’s opinion on the other issues, I must dissent on issue IIIA as the Commonwealth clearly pointed out to the jury the separate items of evidence supporting each of the seven charges; thus, the error was clearly harmless in this instance. I concede, however, that I, too, am displeased at the frequency with which our trial courts fail to differentiate multiple instructions from each other. This displeasure, however, is not sufficient to obviate the “harmless error” rule in instances like these; where there is no question that differentiating factors existed in the evidence and were pointed out to the jury in closing by the Commonwealth.
Thus, the majority’s reliance on Dixon v. Commonwealth, 263 S.W.3d 583 (Ky.2008) to overrule the harmless error analysis in Bell v. Commonwealth, 245 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Ky.2008),1 is simply inappropriate. As the court in Dixon acknowledged, “the issue [therein was] not whether the instructions were erroneous” — even though they did fail to differentiate which of the two “hammer blows” supported the separate offenses. Dixon, 263 S.W.3d at 592-93 (Ky.2008). Notably, Dixon only dealt with double jeopardy issues and affirmed the conviction discussed therein.
Moreover, the comment that “an attorney’s arguments do not constitute evidence,” has never been questioned. See, e.g., 75A Am.Jur.2d Trial § 443 (2008). Its purpose is to collate the evidence with the instructions, which is what occurred here. Thus, the commands of RCr 9.24, that “[n]o error ... in anything done or omitted by the court ... is ground for ... setting aside a verdict ... unless it appears to the court that the denial of such relief would be inconsistent with substantial justice,” should be followed.
Here, as in Bell, the majority acknowledges that, “[n]o doubt able counsel could — and in this case, did attempt to ‘flesh out’ the generic sexual abuse instructions in closing argument by telling the jury which specific act of sexual abuse was covered by which specific count of the charges.” These were reminders by counsel as to what the evidence was — not evidence itself. Now, by unequivocally holding “that a failure to include proper identifying characteristics in jury instructions is reversible error” and overruling Bell, the majority effectively prohibits the application of harmless error in these instances.
It is for this reason I respectively dissent on this issue.

. The majority opinion refers to the harmless error review in Bell as dicta, which it was clearly not. Dicta is a statement in an opinion which is unnecessary to the ultimate determination. Williams v. West, 258 S.W.2d 468, 471 (Ky.1953). The analysis referenced in Bell rendered the error harmless. Bell, 245 S.W.3d at 744.