Court Opinion

ID: 9452810
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:52:46.437677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:22.169671
License: Public Domain

McLAUGHLIN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
It is conceded that the new evidence could change the trial result. It follows that the lower court seriously erred in denying plaintiff’s motions because while the Court noted that “ * * * plaintiff was aware another crew had been working at this scene prior to the arrival of his crew” and that “Plaintiff only called as witnesses the members of his own crew.”, the Court in denying the motion relied upon the theory that plaintiff and his crew at the trial “ * * * had a full and ample opportunity to describe the condition of the ground at the point where plaintiff fell.” What the Court *18utterly failed to take into account was that plaintiff and his witnesses thought the icy, etc. condition of the ground was natural. They had no idea that it may very well have been created artificially by the railroad’s action in melting the snow which in turn froze into the resultant ice.
The trial judge considered the matter both under plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and under Rule 60(b), based on the newly discovered evidence. He denied the 60(b) motion squarely on his mistaken theory that the new evidence would not have produced a different result. His thought regarding this was as he stated in his opinion on the motions for a new trial:
“Plaintiff testified that he fell on ice, that it was an icy condition where he fell. The other witnesses describe the ground in much the same terms.
“In this sense the testimony of the new witness could only be cumulative. The duty of the railroad to provide a safe place to work is an affirmative non-delegable duty, and is not changed by these circumstances.”
The majority opinion relies wholly upon the proposition that the new evidence could have and should have been discovered through reasonable diligence by trial time. I do not think the record justifies that finding.
Very briefly, on the afternoon of December 12, 1962, there was a derailed locomotive of defendant railroad on property of Continental Can Co., near the Monongahela Junction Yard of the railroad which is in the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania area. The temperature at the time was twelve degrees above zero. Plaintiff was a fireman for the defendant. He and four other employees went to where the engine was to help move it. The ground around the engine was cov-red with shiny, packed snow and ice. Plaintiff had to go down a slope and in so doing slipped, fell and was hurt. Suit was commenced on his behalf. Plaintiff’s interrogatories to the railroad, filed April 20, 1964, had as their first question the following:
“1. State the names and addresses of all witnesses or persons who have knowledge of the accident complained of and list them as follows:
a) Witnesses who have knowledge of facts and events immediately preceding the accident;
b) Eyewitnesses to the accident;
c) Witnesses who have knowledge of facts or events immediately subsequent to the accident.”
The railroad answered this giving only the names of the men with plaintiff and nothing else.
The case was tried on the understanding that the ground was covered with natural ice, etc. There was a verdict in favor of the defendant. Sometime after the trial on February 1, 1966, a report of plaintiff losing his claim appeared in the railroad newsletter. Numerous railroad employees telephoned plaintiff’s attorney about this. The attorney had a meeting with those men at which time he learned that another railroad crew had been on the scene earlier and to quote him “I further learned that the icy condition which caused my client’s fall was artificially created by railroad employees with the railroad’s knowledge.” Thomas C. Askey, a brakeman with that first crew, made an affidavit which, inter alia, told how that crew had used a flame thrower in and around the vicinity of the derailed engine to loosen it from “ * * the ice and snow on the ground which was frozen solid.” He described how the instrument was operated by the men walking back and forth, etc. and that as they moved away from the melted spot it would freeze up immediately. He said this created a sheet of ice on the slope to the left of the engine about 20 by 60 feet and that was where plaintiff fell. He said that after he had seen the story in the railroad paper he called plaintiff’s attorney and asked him if any of his crew had testified and that the attorney said *19“ * * * he did not know of these men and had not been given their names.” “I then offered to give this affidavit since I felt that very important facts were missing from the trial testimony.” His affidavit does not mention one word about ever telling plaintiff he was a witness to the accident. That story in fact comes from one Finley who describes himself as “Chief Claim Agent for the Union Railroad Company”. After plaintiffs attorney filed the Askey affidavit, Finley had Askey come to his office. There he interrogated Askey for twenty-eight pages of the printed appendix, allegedly using some sort of a recording device. His main effort throughout that questioning was to have Askey say that he specifically told plaintiff he was a witness to the latter’s accident. After twelve pages, Finley got around to asking “Did you ever talk to Mr. Plisco ■ about this accident?” Askey said he did on a number of occasions that “I mentioned it to him before trial and he knew I was present.” On the next page Askey said he “ * * * talked with plaintiff at work twice possibly 3 times about the accident.” He was interested in how plaintiff felt and sitting with him “Brought up a recollection of this event.” Finley asked Askey if he had ever talked with an investigator from the office of plaintiff’s attorney and Askey told him “No, sir.” Finley asked “Well, did you tell him that you would be a witness for him?” Askey answered “I don’t remember ever volunteering that.” Finley asked “What made you volunteer in 1966? A. In 1966 Union Railroad published a Management Newsletter in which they said that. Q. Mr. Plisco had lost his case? A. Yes. Words to that effect.” According to Mr. Askey, that news “seemed to have excited a lot of talk among the men.” Askey talked with the representative of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and went with him to the attorney’s office. As Askey said, “And that was how I came to see Mr. Hickton [plaintiff’s attorney].” From Mr. Hickton, Askey found out there had been no mention of the work of the Maintenance of Way men, the people who used the flame throwers. Askey said “And when we had talked about these things, I volunteered the information that I have in this, that he put into this affidavit which I have signed.” Finley continued to try and have Askey say he categorically told him “that you were a witness in this accident?” Askey said “I thought Mr. Plisco was perfectly aware that I was there, and.” “Q. But you told him? I think you told me earlier on the record you told him at least 2 or 3 times? Is that correct? A. I think I, I think I told you that, yes, sir. But I didn’t come out and say, ‘John, I was a witness to your accident.’ ” Again .Askey said “But I never emphasized it because it was my assumption that he knew these things.” Finley asked him questions about what the lawyer had said to him. Askey said the lawyer had told him things about the trial but he didn’t remember what they were. Finley said:
“Q. Well he must have. He must have indicated to you that some testimony you had would be different than anybody else had said. Did he indicate that?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. What was that all about? What did he indicate there?
A. The fact that the mobile unit never been mentioned. The torches had never been mentioned. The frigid temperature, I think. Because he questioned me somewhat along the lines you have about this iced condition and what caused it. The only explanation 1 had for it. I think the true explanation was that the torches were responsible.” (Emphasis supplied).
Throughout all of the twenty-eight pages of questions, Finley never once asked Askey if the latter ever told plaintiff that the first railroad maintenance squad had used a flame thrower which had caused the ice on which plaintiff had slipped.
The above gives the simple, uncontra-dicted and in truth uncontradictable *20answer to the failure to have Askey and the other first crew members at the trial. Plaintiff never had the slightest idea that they knew any more or anything different than he and his men knew. Askey makes a magnificent, straightforward showing under that long pressure badgering by his employer’s chief claim agent. Askey had mistakenly assumed Plisco knew everything that he did of the conditions at the time of the accident and therefore never intruded with the special knowledge he possessed. The railroad never mentioned Askey or that first crew as witnesses or anything about the flame thrower either in the answers to interrogatories or in the defense pretrial statement. Absent' the' unknown flame thrower information, Askey and the first unit would have been undoubtedly merely cumulative witnesses and of no importance. There is nothing in the record giving the slightest intimation of what now develops as the vital part of the claim on its merits. Plaintiff’s attorneys are not amateurs; they are top trial lawyers. And with the railroad stating that the only witnesses were with the plaintiff, with no suggestion whatsoever of the unusual additional element of what was seemingly an ordinary snow and ice situation, there was nothing in the suit that warrants plaintiff’s attorneys being characterized as so lacking in reasonable diligence as to deny a trial of this case on its plainly substantial merits. Plaintiff has been the victim of an unfortunate mischance, it is nothing else. This honest cause of action as it stands has every right to be fairly heard.
There was no finding whatsoever by the trial judge that plaintiff and his attorneys were lacking in diligence by not having Mr. Askey and his first crew associates as witnesses. The denial of the new trial as has been above quoted was solely because the judge held that the new evidence would be cumulative. As is admitted, the new evidence was not cumulative but new in all respects. It completely changed the cause of action. It showed that the active, proximate negligence which created the slippery condition and brought about plaintiff’s fall was the direct, immediate responsibility of the defendant railroad. The denial of plaintiff’s motion was clearly wrong as a matter of law.