Court Opinion

ID: 9953527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 14:19:03.045658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:14.252126
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 15, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                         Court of Appeals

                            NO. 2022-CA-0766-MR

WILLIAM JAMES SMITH, II                                           APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
v.             HONORABLE KELLY MARK EASTON, JUDGE
                      ACTION NO. 20-CR-00817

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                            APPELLEE

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                 ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; GOODWINE AND TAYLOR,
JUDGES.

TAYLOR, JUDGE: William James Smith, II, appeals Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, and Order of the Hardin Circuit Court, entered March 14,

2022, forfeiting his 1997 Chevrolet Blazer and 2007 Chevrolet Impala to the

Commonwealth. On appeal, he argues the Commonwealth failed to present
sufficient evidence to support the circuit court’s dispositive finding that he utilized

these vehicles to facilitate drug trafficking. Upon review, we affirm.

                                   BACKGROUND

             Pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.410(1)(h),

“vehicles . . . which are used, or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to

facilitate the transportation, for the purpose of sale or receipt of [controlled

substances in violation of this chapter]” are subject to forfeiture. To succeed on a

motion under this provision, “the Commonwealth bears the initial burden of

producing some evidence, however slight, to link the [property] it seeks to forfeit

to the alleged violations of KRS 218A. The burden only shifts to the opponent of

the forfeiture if the Commonwealth meets its initial tracing burden.” Brewer v.

Commonwealth, 206 S.W.3d 343, 348 (Ky. 2006). If that initial burden is met, the

defendant then bears the burden to rebut that presumption by clear and convincing

evidence. Smith v. Commonwealth, 339 S.W.3d 485, 487 (Ky. App. 2010) (citing

Osborne v. Commonwealth, 839 S.W.2d 281, 284 (Ky. 1992)).

             Applying this framework in its forfeiture order, the circuit court

summarized the relevant evidence in this matter and stated its findings and

conclusions as follows:

                    Detective Travis Mills with other officers
             conducted surveillance of the residence of the Defendant
             (“Smith”) for a period of four months. During this time,
             the officers observed multiple people, known to have

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drug histories, coming and going from Smith’s residence.
Smith was observed talking to people in vehicles for
short periods of time, although the police never directly
observed Smith selling drugs.

       Although tried for trafficking in this case, Smith
was found guilty of possession charges. The trial
evidence included the testimony of Gary Green, who was
staying at the Smith residence around the time of the
arrest for the drug activity. Green testified he saw lots of
partying and transactions. He saw people come to Smith,
buy drugs from him, and leave. He got a gram of meth
from Smith the night before the arrest.

       The trial evidence also included the contents of a
safe. The safe contained multiple doses of LSD and
other indications of drug trafficking. The key to that safe
was on the same keyring as the key for the Impala.
Smith was observed coming and going to his residence
during the surveillance period driving both of these
vehicles. Smith does not deny he used the vehicles to
come and go from this residence, but he says he only
used the vehicles to drive back and forth to work.

       Recorded jail calls with Smith as a participant
speak of selling dope and what the police did not find,
specifically a gun and some drugs. Again, Smith was not
seen conducting any transaction in the vehicles, but it is
noted that the Blazer had a surveillance camera on a
headrest. This fits in with other cameras on the property.
Although these cameras may serve a general security
purpose, they may also serve to watch for police to avoid
being caught for drug trafficking.

       Smith is no stranger to forfeiture. In similar
circumstances, this Court ordered forfeiture of money
from Smith who was previously charged with trafficking
but convicted of possession. Smith v. Commonwealth,
339 S.W.3d 485 (Ky. 2010). The law regarding
forfeiture then is still the same.

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Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order at 1-3.

             In light of the foregoing, the circuit court determined the

Commonwealth satisfied its initial, slight burden to show a connection between

Smith’s vehicles and drug violations. It then proceeded to Smith’s rebuttal:

                    The focus of Smith’s argument is there is no
             evidence he bought the vehicles with drug proceeds.
             Even that conclusion is suspect given Smith’s chronic
             issues of legitimate employment income. (He was unable
             to keep his child support current, owing approximately
             $50,000).

                    The source of purchase money is not the only
             question. It is sufficient for the Commonwealth to show
             Smith used the vehicles to facilitate his activities. See
             Martin v. Commonwealth, 586 S.W.3d 252 (Ky. App.
             2019). Smith used these vehicles to come and go from
             the place where the Commonwealth presented sufficient
             evidence of drug possession with trafficking intent, if not
             observed acts. These vehicles facilitated Smith’s drug
             activities.

                   For the reasons stated, both the 1997 Chevrolet
             Blazer and the 2007 Chevrolet Impala are forfeited to the
             Commonwealth.

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order at 3-4. This appeal follows.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             Upon appellate review of an order granting forfeiture, “[f]indings of

fact made by a trial court are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard[.]”

Commonwealth v. Coffey, 247 S.W.3d 908, 910 (Ky. 2008); Kentucky Rules of

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Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01. “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous only if they

are not supported by substantial evidence.” Mays v. Porter, 398 S.W.3d 454, 458

(Ky. App. 2013) (citing Black Motor Co. v. Greene, 385 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Ky.

1964)). Evidence is substantial when “the evidence, when taken alone, or in the

light of all the evidence, has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the

minds of reasonable persons.” Id. (citing Kentucky State Racing Comm’n v.

Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298, 308 (Ky. 1972)). Though we defer to a trial court’s

factual findings, rulings of law are reviewed de novo. Coffey, 247 S.W.3d at 910

(citing Jackson v. Commonwealth, 187 S.W.3d 300, 305 (Ky. 2006)).

                                     ANALYSIS

             As indicated at the onset, Smith’s sole argument is that the

Commonwealth failed to satisfy its initial burden to link the use of his vehicles to

any violation of KRS Chapter 218A, and that the circuit court’s forfeiture decision

therefore lacked sufficient evidentiary support. We disagree. Smith undisputedly

utilized both vehicles to come and go from the location where, as supported by

substantial evidence of record, he possessed and sold controlled substances in

violation of KRS Chapter 218A. Other evidence also linked Smith’s use of the

vehicles with his drug activities. For example, he kept the key to his Impala on the

same ring as the key to the safe in his apartment where he stored a significant

quantity of drugs. His Blazer, which he parked in the driveway of his apartment,

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also had a motion-activated surveillance camera attached to the headrest of the

front passenger seat which complimented other such cameras Smith had on his

property; and this Court has affirmed a prior determination – with respect to this

same defendant – that “a camera mounted for surveillance use” can, under roughly

the same circumstances presented here, qualify as evidence of illegal drug activity.

Smith, 339 S.W.3d at 488.

             “[A] trial court can draw inferences from the totality of the

circumstances within its knowledge to determine whether the requirement of slight

traceability has been met.” Commonwealth v. Doebler, 626 S.W.3d 611, 620 (Ky.

2021). Given the circuit court’s thorough analysis of the evidence and law, we

find no error in the circuit court’s determination that the evidence presented

satisfied the Commonwealth’s “slight” initial evidentiary burden for purposes of

KRS 218A.410(1)(h). See Brewer, 206 S.W.3d at 348; CR 52.01.

                                  CONCLUSION

             For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Hardin Circuit Court’s

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                         -6-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:    BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Erin Hoffman Yang        Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky      Attorney General of Kentucky

                         Courtney E. Albini
                         Assistant Solicitor General
                         Frankfort, Kentucky

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