Court Opinion

ID: 9590965
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:00:34.124245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:30:07.547861
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-51105    Document: 00516866264        Page: 1    Date Filed: 08/21/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                            United States Court of Appeals
                                                                          Fifth Circuit
                               ____________                             FILED
                                                                  August 21, 2023
                                 No. 21-51105
                                                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                               ____________
                                                                        Clerk

   Ernest C. Trevino,

                                                          Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                     versus

   Derek Iden, Agent; John Brauchle, Agent,

                                         Defendants—Appellants.
                 ______________________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Western District of Texas
                           USDC No. 5:17-CV-1133
                 ______________________________

   Before Wiener, Higginson, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge:
         Defendants Derek Iden and John Brauchle, game wardens with the
   Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, appeal the district court’s denial of
   qualified immunity as to plaintiff Ernest Trevino’s § 1983 claims against
   them. Because we conclude that Trevino has not plausibly alleged that Iden
   and Brauchle violated his constitutional rights, we REVERSE and
   RENDER judgment for the defendants.
Case: 21-51105         Document: 00516866264               Page: 2      Date Filed: 08/21/2023

                                           No. 21-51105

                                                I.
            In 2016, plaintiff-appellee Ernest Trevino leased a piece of land in
   Atascosa County, Texas. 1            Trevino then placed an advertisement on
   Craigslist offering the opportunity to hunt on the property in exchange for a
   truck.       Two men, Kurt Stern and Bobby Wied, responded to the
   advertisement. In exchange for permission to hunt on the property, Stern
   and Weid paid $400 in cash and agreed to deliver a jet ski to Trevino. Stern
   delivered the jet ski and its certificate of title to the property but did not sign
   the back of the title so as to transfer title to Trevino. Wied also provided
   Trevino with taxidermy services. Stern and Wied hunted on the property
   from October through December 2016.
            On January 5, 2017, Wied and Stern complained to the Texas Parks
   and Wildlife Department (“TPWD”) that Trevino was engaged in illegal
   hunting activities on the leased property. Wied also complained that during
   a dispute with Trevino in late 2016, Trevino had brandished a long-rifle and

            _____________________
            1
              This is an appeal of the denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Our analysis
   is therefore governed by the facts as alleged in plaintiff’s operative pleading, which here is
   Trevino’s Fourth Amended Complaint. See Harmon v. City of Arlington, 16 F.4th 1159,
   1162 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). But we may consider non-complaint material
   submitted by 12(b)(6) movants if the documents are “referred to in the plaintiff’s
   complaint and are central to [the plaintiff’s] claim.” Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet,
   Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Here and in the district court,
   defendants cite two documents from outside the complaint: an Internal Affairs case report
   from the Texas Parks & Wildlife Department (“TPWD”), and a “Prosecutor’s Summary”
   prepared by Iden and Brauchle, which the parties call the “prosecution guide.” Trevino
   does not object to the court’s consideration of this material, and we find it appropriate to
   consider the documents because both documents are referred to repeatedly in Trevino’s
   complaint, and both are central to his claims regarding the defendants’ investigation of him.
   Id.

                                                 2
Case: 21-51105        Document: 00516866264             Page: 3      Date Filed: 08/21/2023

                                         No. 21-51105

   thereby committed the offense of deadly conduct. 2 Wied later recanted the
   deadly-conduct allegation.
           TPWD game wardens Derek Iden and John Brauchle, defendants-
   appellants in this case, investigated the complaint. Their investigation
   culminated in three distinct allegations of criminal conduct by Ernest
   Trevino: (1) illegal hunting activities, (2) forgery with respect to the title of
   the jet ski, and (3) forgery with respect to the title of a Chevrolet pickup truck.
   We summarize each allegation in turn.
           First, Iden and Brauchle found that Trevino did not have permission
   from the owners of the property to sell hunting opportunities on the land and
   did not have a hunting-lease license that might permit the sale. The Texas
   Parks and Wildlife Code prohibits hunting on land without the landowner’s
   consent, Tex. Parks & Wild. Code § 61.022(a), and further provides
   that the owner of a hunting lease “may not receive as a guest for pay or other
   consideration another person engaged in hunting unless the owner or agent
   has acquired a hunting lease license from the department,” id. § 43.042.
           Second, Iden and Brauchle learned that Trevino later traded the jet
   ski that he received from Stern to a man named Trung Nguyen in exchange
   for a Dodge pickup truck. On January 17, 2017, Nguyen gave a sworn
   statement that when Trevino came to his house to make the exchange and
   transfer title, Nguyen saw Trevino sign the back of the jet-ski title. The name
   on the back of the title was “Kurt Stern.” See Trevino v. State, 608 S.W.3d
   344, 348 (Tex. App. 2020) (summarizing Nguyen’s testimony at Trevino’s

           _____________________
           2
             Under Texas law, deadly conduct is the “reckless[] engage[ment] in conduct that
   places another in imminent danger of serious bodily injury.” Tex. Penal Code
   § 22.05(a). “Recklessness and danger are presumed if the actor knowingly pointed a
   firearm at or in the direction of another.” Id. § 22.05(c).

                                              3
Case: 21-51105      Document: 00516866264           Page: 4    Date Filed: 08/21/2023

                                     No. 21-51105

   forgery trial). Iden and Brauchle identified this information as supporting a
   felony charge of forgery. See Tex. Penal Code § 32.21(b) & (e)(2).
          Third, through the use of a search warrant on Trevino’s phone
   records, Iden and Brauchle came into contact with a man named Brian
   Russell, who had bought a 2000 Chevrolet pickup truck from Trevino. On
   March 23, 2017, Russell attested in a sworn and signed statement that, with
   respect to the truck transfer, he thought he witnessed Trevino sign the
   application for Texas title using the name “John Bissett.” The truck’s
   certified title history revealed that John Bissett was a prior owner of the truck
   in New Mexico. Trevino alleges that Bissett had sold the truck in February
   of 2016 and that the truck had changed hands multiple times before it reached
   Trevino. Iden and Brauchle identified Trevino’s signature of Bissett’s name
   as a violation of Texas Transportation Code § 501.155, which prohibits a
   person from “knowingly provid[ing] false or incorrect information or
   without legal authority sign[ing] the name of another person on . . . an
   application for a title.” Tex. Transp. Code § 501.155(a)(1).
          Iden and Brauchle summarized the findings from their investigation
   in a “prosecution guide.” The guide, sent to the District Attorneys of
   Atascosa and Bexar Counties, requested that the case be reviewed by
   prosecutors and, “if [their] office is in agreement,” that the case be presented
   to a grand jury for indictment. The guide primarily covers the illegal-hunting
   allegations and the forgery allegation with respect to the transfer of the jet
   ski. It refers once to the “Transportation Code case,” i.e., the forgery with
   respect to the Chevy truck, but states that the investigation “is detailed in a

                                          4
Case: 21-51105       Document: 00516866264             Page: 5      Date Filed: 08/21/2023

                                        No. 21-51105

   separate case package because it was not related to any hunting activity” on
   the properties at issue. 3
          On September 15, 2017, Trevino was indicted by an Atascosa County
   grand jury for hunting without the landowner’s consent (the “first
   indictment”). Appellants tell us that this case was dismissed in 2019. On
   September 25, 2017, Trevino was indicted by a Bexar County grand jury for
   forgery of a government document in relation to the jet-ski transfer to Trung
   Nguyen (the “second indictment”). Trevino was convicted at trial but had
   his conviction overturned on appeal in 2020 because the government had
   failed to prove that Trevino acted with an intent to defraud. Trevino, 608
   S.W.3d at 354. On December 15, 2017, Trevino was indicted by an Atascosa
   County grand jury for forgery in relation to the truck transfer to Brian Russell
   (the “third indictment”).         Appellants tell us that this case was later
   dismissed.
          In the meantime, Trevino began submitting complaints to TPWD
   alleging misconduct by Iden and Brauchle. The first such complaint was on
   January 24, 2017, a few weeks after Iden and Brauchle started their
   investigation. Trevino alleged that Iden was using his official position to
   intimidate and harass him and his neighbors because of Iden’s friendship with
   Bobby Wied, whose complaint had initiated the investigation. On March 28,
   Trevino submitted an open records request to TPWD. On April 27, he
   requested an independent investigation into Wildlife Major Jonathon Gray,
   one of the internal investigators of Trevino’s complaints, because Gray and
   Iden had been classmates in the training academy.                  In May, Trevino
   submitted more complaints, alleging that Iden and Brauchle were “spreading

          _____________________
          3
             Our record does not contain this “separate case package” describing the truck-
   forgery investigation.

                                              5
Case: 21-51105      Document: 00516866264          Page: 6   Date Filed: 08/21/2023

                                    No. 21-51105

   disinformation” about Trevino to his neighbors. Trevino also alleges that,
   while investigating, Iden would improperly interview witnesses before
   recording them so he could “poison[] witnesses” against him, and then redo
   the interview while recording. In July, TPWD Internal Affairs informed
   Trevino that his complaints against Iden and Brauchle had been dismissed.
   Trevino continued to submit open records requests and complaints,
   including to Governor Greg Abbott and a state representative, throughout
   the rest of 2017, as well as through 2018 and 2019.
          On November 6, 2017, Trevino filed this lawsuit, pro se, in the United
   States District Court for the Western District of Texas, naming as defendants
   TPWD, Iden, Brauchle, and other individual officers. The case was referred
   to a magistrate judge. Trevino, later assisted by counsel, amended his
   complaint multiple times and ultimately alleged claims under 42 U.S.C.
   § 1983 and state law. On January 16, 2021, Iden, Brauchle, and other
   individual officers moved to dismiss Trevino’s then-latest complaint,
   asserting that Iden and Brauchle were entitled to qualified immunity. The
   magistrate judge issued a Report & Recommendation (“R&R”),
   recommending dismissal of Trevino’s claims as to some officers, as well as
   dismissal of all state-law claims. As to Iden and Brauchle, the magistrate
   judge granted Trevino leave to (1) replead his First Amendment retaliatory-
   prosecution claim to cure a deficiency and to (2) replead to specify the
   constitutional basis—Fourth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment—for
   his wrongful-prosecution claim. Iden and Brauchle objected to the R&R, but
   the district court summarily adopted the R&R over their objections.
          Trevino then filed a Fourth Amended Complaint, asserting only
   § 1983 claims against defendants Iden and Brauchle. Trevino alleged that
   Iden and Brauchle had violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating
   against him for filing grievances against them and seeking open records, and
   had otherwise violated his civil rights by pursuing three criminal prosecutions

                                         6
Case: 21-51105      Document: 00516866264           Page: 7   Date Filed: 08/21/2023

                                     No. 21-51105

   without probable cause. Trevino did not specify the constitutional text
   supporting the latter claim.
          On June 4, 2021, Iden and Brauchle again moved to dismiss the
   complaint on the basis of qualified immunity. As to the First Amendment
   retaliation claim, the magistrate judge recommended granting the motion in
   part and denying it in part. The court noted that Trevino’s allegedly
   protected activity—his grievances and public-records requests—did not
   begin until after Iden and Brauchle had already initiated their investigation of
   Trevino, so it was improbable that their conduct was retaliatory as to
   Trevino’s complaints.      Because both the first and second indictments
   resulted from this investigation, Trevino could not maintain a retaliatory-
   prosecution claim as to those two indictments. The magistrate judge thus
   recommended dismissing the retaliation claim vis-à-vis the first and second
   indictments.
          But, according to the magistrate judge, the third indictment appeared
   “wholly attenuated from the initial investigation,” supporting the inference
   that Trevino’s protected activity was a but-for cause of that prosecution.
   The magistrate judge thus recommended denying the motion to dismiss as to
   the retaliation claim vis-à-vis the third indictment.
          With respect to the wrongful-prosecution claim, the magistrate judge
   noted that while Trevino had not heeded its previous instruction that he
   specify whether his wrongful-prosecution claim was a Fourth or Fourteenth
   Amendment claim, his complaint “appear[ed] to state a Fourteenth
   Amendment claim.” The court permitted Trevino to proceed on this claim,
   “construed as an allegation of prosecution without due process under the
   Fourteenth Amendment.”
          Iden and Brauchle again objected to the R&R, but again the district
   court summarily adopted the R&R over their objections, confining both of

                                          7
Case: 21-51105      Document: 00516866264             Page: 8   Date Filed: 08/21/2023

                                       No. 21-51105

   Trevino’s claims to the third indictment only. Iden and Brauchle timely
   appealed.

                                           II.
          Because qualified immunity is a defense to both liability and the
   obligation “to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation,” a district
   court’s denial of qualified immunity is appealable despite the absence of a
   final judgment. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 671–72 (2009) (quoting
   Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). We therefore have jurisdiction
   over the officers’ appeal.
          We review de novo a district court’s denial of 12(b)(6) dismissal on the
   basis of qualified immunity. Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 370 (5th Cir.
   2011) (en banc). In conducting this review, the plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts
   are accepted as true. Harmon, 16 F.4th at 1162 (citation omitted). But we do
   not accept as true legal conclusions, mere labels, conclusory statements, or
   “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. at 1162–63
   (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

                                          III.
          Iden and Brauchle assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity.
   To defeat a defendant’s assertion of qualified immunity, the plaintiff must
   show “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and
   (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged
   conduct.” Shaw v. Villanueva, 918 F.3d 414, 417 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting
   Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013)). Again, with respect to
   both the retaliatory-prosecution and wrongful-prosecution claims, only
   Trevino’s third indictment is at issue.

                                            8
Case: 21-51105     Document: 00516866264          Page: 9   Date Filed: 08/21/2023

                                   No. 21-51105

         For the following reasons, we conclude that Trevino’s claims fail at
   the first prong of the qualified-immunity inquiry. We therefore do not reach
   whether he has identified “clearly established law,” as required by the
   second prong.
         Iden and Brauchle assert that they have not violated a constitutional
   right because they are protected by the independent-intermediary doctrine.
   The independent-intermediary doctrine “becomes relevant when . . . a
   plaintiff’s claims depend on a lack of probable cause.” Buehler v. City of
   Austin/Austin Police Dep’t, 824 F.3d 548, 553 (5th Cir. 2016) (citations
   omitted). Here, both of Trevino’s claims implicate the doctrine because both
   depend on an absence of probable cause to prosecute him. His First
   Amendment retaliatory-prosecution claim requires him to plead and prove
   the absence of probable cause supporting the underlying criminal charge.
   Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 263 (2006); see also Keenan v. Tejeda, 290
   F.3d 252, 260 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[R]etaliatory criminal prosecutions in
   violation of the First Amendment are actionable only if a plaintiff can also
   prove the common-law elements of malicious prosecution, including the
   absence of probable cause to prosecute.” (citations omitted)). The same is
   true for his second claim, which has been construed as a Fourteenth
   Amendment claim for “prosecution without probable cause.” And while
   Iden and Brauchle contend that this claim should instead be asserted under
   the Fourth Amendment, such a claim would similarly require the absence of
   probable cause. See Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332, 1337 (2022) (“[T]he
   gravamen of the Fourth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution . . . is
   the wrongful initiation of charges without probable cause.”).
         Under the independent-intermediary doctrine, “if facts supporting an
   arrest are placed before an independent intermediary such as a magistrate or
   grand jury, the intermediary’s decision breaks the chain of causation . . .

                                        9
Case: 21-51105        Document: 00516866264              Page: 10       Date Filed: 08/21/2023

                                          No. 21-51105

   insulating the initiating party.” 4 Wilson v. Stroman, 33 F.4th 202, 208 (5th
   Cir. 2022) (quoting McLin v. Ard, 866 F.3d 682, 689 (5th Cir. 2017)).
           Here, Iden and Brauchle presented the results of their investigation to
   the Atascosa County District Attorney in May of 2017. In December, a grand
   jury indicted Trevino in Case Number 17-12-0654 in the 81st Judicial District
   Court in Atascosa County. This grand jury qualifies as an independent
   intermediary, 5 whose “decision breaks the chain of causation” and, absent

           _____________________
           4
              The independent-intermediary rule is often articulated in terms of probable cause
   for arrest because most of the cases involve false-arrest claims. E.g., Buehler, 824 F.3d at
   553–54; Cuadra v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 813 (5th Cir. 2010); Russell v.
   Altom, 546 F. App’x 432, 436-37 (5th Cir. 2013). But the doctrine’s application is not
   confined to claims styled as false arrest. See, e.g., Curtis v. Sowell, 761 F. App’x 302, 304
   (5th Cir. 2019) (applying the doctrine to a Fourth Amendment claim for “arrest[] and
   prosecut[ion]” without probable cause and a First Amendment claim for retaliatory
   prosecution); see also Shields v. Twiss, 389 F.3d 142, 150 (5th Cir. 2004) (including
   “malicious prosecution” among plaintiff’s § 1983 claims and resolving the issue under the
   independent-intermediary doctrine).
           5
             Fifth Circuit law is inconsistent as to whether the District Attorney may also be
   an independent intermediary whose charging decision breaks the chain of causation. In
   Cuadra, we wrote that “both [the DA] and two separate grand juries qualified as
   independent intermediaries” and proceeded to assess whether the plaintiffs had challenged
   “[the DA’s] independent decision to seek . . . indictments or either grand jury’s decision
   to return the indictments.” 626 F.3d at 813. But the Cuadra court assumed without
   discussion that the DA—in many ways not analogous to the prototypical “magistrate or
   grand jury” contemplated by the doctrine—qualifies as an intermediary. And in Russell v.
   Altom, an unpublished per-curiam decision that postdates (and cites) Cuadra, the court
   expressly rejected the proposition that the DA counts under the doctrine. The Russell panel
   wrote that “prosecutors are often involved in charging decisions, and they themselves are
   not the ‘impartial intermediary’ capable of insulating an officer from liability—that is the
   grand jury to whom the prosecutor, an inherently biased party, presents the information.”
   546 F. App’x 432, 437 (5th Cir. 2013). Russell’s “impartiality” requirement finds support
   in the caselaw. See, e.g., Hand v. Gary, 838 F.2d 1420, 1427 (5th Cir. 1988) (referring to
   “an impartial intermediary”). In any event, we need not resolve the issue here because the
   grand jury that indicted Trevino indisputably qualifies as an independent (and “impartial”)
   intermediary. Whether the DA also counts has no bearing on the outcome of this case.

                                                10
Case: 21-51105      Document: 00516866264            Page: 11   Date Filed: 08/21/2023

                                      No. 21-51105

   an exception to the doctrine, insulates Iden and Brauchle from liability as the
   initiating parties. See id.
          Trevino argues that this case falls within the doctrine’s “taint”
   exception. Under this exception, an officer loses his protection from liability
   if he “withhold[s] any relevant information or otherwise misdirect[s] the
   independent intermediary by omission or commission.” McLin, 866 F.3d at
   689 (citation omitted).       “To satisfy the taint exception, omissions of
   exculpatory information must be ‘knowing.’” Buehler, 824 F.3d at 555
   (cleaned up) (quoting Cuadra, 626 F.3d at 813–14). Our case law also
   imposes a materiality requirement—that is, even knowing misstatements or
   omissions will not satisfy the taint exception if the misstated or omitted
   information would not have altered the intermediary’s probable-cause
   finding.   Id. at 555–56 (rejecting the plaintiff’s invocation of the taint
   exception because his evidence “d[id] not show that the grand jury’s findings
   of probable cause . . . were tainted by the officers’ knowing misstatements or
   omissions,” and noting that the alleged inconsistencies in the evidence
   against him were “not material to the grand jury’s findings of probable
   cause”); see also Loftin v. City of Prentiss, 33 F.4th 774, 782 (5th Cir. 2022)
   (noting that, in the context of a warrant affidavit that allegedly omitted
   material information, an officer is not protected if he “taints the
   intermediary’s decision by ‘deliberately or recklessly providing false,
   material information for use in an affidavit’” (cleaned up) (citation omitted)
   (emphasis added)). At the motion-to-dismiss stage, “mere allegations of
   taint” may be adequate “where the complaint alleges other facts supporting
   the inference.” McLin, 866 F.3d at 690.
          Accordingly, to avoid application of the independent-intermediary
   doctrine and state a constitutional violation against Iden and Brauchle,
   Trevino must plausibly allege, with facts supporting the inference, that Iden
   and Brauchle tainted the deliberations of the grand jury that returned the

                                           11
Case: 21-51105     Document: 00516866264            Page: 12   Date Filed: 08/21/2023

                                     No. 21-51105

   third indictment.     In invoking the exception, Trevino argues that his
   “pleading includes many instances [when] Appellants either withheld
   information from or provided false information to the various prosecutors,”
   and then cites multiple paragraphs from his complaint. But our review of
   Trevino’s complaint reveals no viable allegations of taint as to the third
   indictment.
          Nearly all the allegations that Trevino cites as supporting the taint
   exception correspond to his first and second indictments, which are not at
   issue here. Specifically, Trevino alleges, inter alia, that Iden initially denied
   to TPWD Internal Affairs that he knew Bobby Wied and later recanted that
   claim, admitting that Wied had mounted ducks for him. Trevino also alleges
   that Wied later recanted his deadly-conduct allegation against Trevino, and
   that Iden did not disclose Wied’s “lack of veracity” to the prosecutors. But
   Wied’s reliability as the complaining witness and his connection to Iden are
   relevant only—if at all—to the first and second indictments. The truck-
   forgery allegation underlying the third indictment has no discernible
   connection to Wied.
          Similarly, Trevino alleges that Iden knew that Trevino had permission
   from agents of the property owner to hunt on the property. He also alleges
   that, when shown a map and asked where they had hunted, Stern and Wied
   did not identify the relevant property. Here, setting aside that Trevino fails
   to allege that Iden and Brauchle withheld this information from the
   intermediary, these allegations pertain only to the first indictment.
          Trevino also alleges that Iden and Brauchle falsely stated in their
   prosecution guide that Trung Nguyen, the purchaser of the jet ski, was
   unable to title the jet ski in his name or register it without Kurt Stern’s
   signature. Trevino also alleges that Stern said in a written statement to Iden
   that he had attempted three times to transfer title of the jet ski to Trevino and

                                          12
Case: 21-51105     Document: 00516866264            Page: 13   Date Filed: 08/21/2023

                                     No. 21-51105

   that Iden concealed this fact from prosecutors. These allegations relate to
   the second indictment.
          Finally, Trevino alleges that Iden improperly influenced witnesses
   while investigating. Specifically, he alleges that Iden “would speak with
   witnesses first without recording or documenting his contacts,” and that “if
   the witness gave damaging information, Iden would then re-interview and
   record his interview,” and “strongly suggest to the witness what to say to
   support prosecuting [Trevino].”        But Trevino does not connect this
   allegation of witness “poison[ing]” with the third indictment. Indeed, the
   investigation underlying the third indictment involved only one witness,
   discussed infra, and Trevino does not allege that Iden or Brauchle influenced
   that witness’s statements.
          Because the foregoing allegations relate only to the first and second
   indictments, which are not at issue here, they cannot support application of
   the taint exception to the independent-intermediary doctrine as to the third
   indictment.
          We turn, finally, to Trevino’s allegations regarding the third
   indictment, in search of any plausible allegation that Iden or Brauchle tainted
   the deliberations or decision of the grand jury.
          Trevino asserts that Iden submitted to the DA a prosecution guide
   alleging that Trevino “violated Tex. Transportation Code § 501.155 by
   purportedly signing an application for Texas Title without the legal authority
   of John Bissett.” He claims that Iden “included a certified copy of a Texas
   Motor Vehicle Title history for a 2000 Chevrolet pickup truck,” and that the
   “certified title history reveal[ed]” that Bissett endorsed the truck title in
   New Mexico in February of 2016.             Trevino asserts that, after Bissett
   endorsed the title, “he had no authority over the commercial paper, namely,
   the title or the vehicle,” and thus “lacked standing to complain about the title

                                          13
Case: 21-51105      Document: 00516866264             Page: 14   Date Filed: 08/21/2023

                                       No. 21-51105

   eight months later when it reached [Trevino]’s hands.” According to
   Trevino, therefore, when Iden sought and obtained the third indictment, he
   “kn[ew] an element of the offense was missing”—namely, that Trevino
   lacked Bissett’s legal authority.
          Trevino also alleges that Brian Russell, the man who purchased the
   truck from Trevino, “could not identify with certainty that [Trevino] signed
   the application for Texas Title as alleged.” Russell had said in a signed and
   sworn statement: “I highlighted in yellow a copy of the ‘Application for
   Texas Title’ the man wrote in my presence. I thought he signed his name,
   John Bissett.”
          Next, Trevino alleges that Iden did not, as part of his investigation,
   collect handwriting samples from Trevino and have a handwriting expert
   analyze them alongside the alleged forgery. He alleges that Iden thus “knew
   before he sought an indictment that the State could not prove the element
   that it was [Trevino] who signed the application for vehicle title.” Trevino
   further alleges that he submitted handwriting examples to an expert whose
   professional opinion was that the signature on the application was not penned
   by Trevino.
          Finally, Trevino alleges that, had there been an irregularity in the
   application for title, the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles would have
   rescinded the truck’s registration, but no such recission ever happened.
          Taken together and distilled to their essentials, Trevino’s taint
   allegations as to the truck-forgery investigation and indictment are threefold.
   First, Bissett had relinquished his legal claim to the truck, meaning that
   Trevino did not act without Bissett’s legal authority. Second, the State could
   not have proven that Trevino signed the application because (i) Russell only
   “thought” that he saw Trevino sign Bissett’s name and could not say so with
   certainty and (ii) neither defendants nor the DA obtained an analysis by a

                                           14
Case: 21-51105     Document: 00516866264            Page: 15   Date Filed: 08/21/2023

                                     No. 21-51105

   handwriting expert. And third, the absence of a recission of title by the DMV
   undermined the allegation.
          These allegations do not avail Trevino of the taint exception to the
   independent-intermediary doctrine. Critically, even accepting all of the
   above allegations as true, Trevino does not allege that Iden and Brauchle
   “withh[eld]” any of this information or “otherwise misdirect[ed] the
   independent intermediary” along these lines. McLin, 866 F.3d at 689. He
   further fails to allege that any such omission was “knowing.” Buehler, 824
   F.3d at 555.
          Indeed, at least with respect to his allegation that Bissett had no legal
   claim to the truck, Trevino denies that Iden and Brauchle withheld this
   information. He writes in his complaint that defendants’ prosecution guide
   “included” the certified title history, which allegedly “reveal[ed]” that
   Bissett “had no authority over the commercial paper” and therefore “lacked
   standing to complain.” Similarly, Trevino alleges that “[t]he State’s file . . .
   indicates John Bissett delivered the truck and title of the truck to his agent to
   sell the truck.”    These allegations negate the inference that Iden and
   Brauchle tainted the grand jury’s decision by withholding facts surrounding
   Bissett’s relinquishment of the truck, and indeed suggest that the
   intermediary considered the evidence that Trevino holds out as exculpatory.
          Moreover, even if Trevino had alleged—though he does not—that the
   officers knowingly failed to disclose that (i) the State lacked firm proof that
   Trevino signed the application and (ii) the DMV never rescinded the truck’s
   title, the truth of these allegations would be immaterial to the grand jury’s
   probable-cause finding. See Buehler, 824 F.3d at 555. Probable cause
   “requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an
   actual showing of such activity.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577,
   586 (2018) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983)); see also

                                          15
Case: 21-51105     Document: 00516866264            Page: 16    Date Filed: 08/21/2023

                                     No. 21-51105

   Buehler, 824 F.3d at 556 n.8 (“Probable cause exists when the totality of facts
   and circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge at the moment of
   arrest are sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had
   committed or was committing an offense.” (quoting United States v. Ramirez,
   145 F.3d 345, 352 (5th Cir. 1998))). Trevino’s arguments here go to the
   weight of the evidence and the ultimate strength of the State’s case against
   him. Trevino does not allege through these assertions that the grand jury
   might have declined to indict him were it not for defendants’ actions. As we
   explained in Buehler, our court has rejected taint arguments where, for
   example, the prosecutor did not present potentially exculpatory evidence to
   the grand jury because “the grand jury sits not to determine guilt or
   innocence, but to assess whether there is adequate basis for bringing a
   criminal charge.” Id. at 556 (quoting Russell v. Altom, 546 F. App’x 432, 437
   (5th Cir. 2013)). Russell’s credibility as an eyewitness, the findings of a
   handwriting expert, and the implications of the absence of a DMV title
   recission are matters suited for a trial of Trevino’s guilt, not the grand jury’s
   inquiry into whether to indict him.
          Because Trevino does not allege that Iden and Brauchle knowingly
   withheld relevant, material information from the grand jury, he has not
   shown that the independent intermediary’s deliberations or decisions were
   tainted.   Accordingly, the independent-intermediary doctrine defeats
   Trevino’s allegations that there was no probable cause to prosecute him and
   insulates Iden and Brauchle from liability. This conclusion applies with equal
   force to Trevino’s claims for both retaliatory prosecution and prosecution
   without probable cause.
          Because Trevino has not stated a constitutional violation, he fails at
   prong one of the qualified-immunity analysis. Shaw, 918 F.3d at 417. Iden
   and Brauchle are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.

                                          16
Case: 21-51105   Document: 00516866264       Page: 17   Date Filed: 08/21/2023

                              No. 21-51105

                                 IV.
         We accordingly REVERSE the order of the district court and
   RENDER judgment for Iden and Brauchle.

                                   17