Court Opinion

ID: 9585024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:55:18.895871+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:35.880354
License: Public Domain

Smith, Justice,
dissenting.
The sole issue presented to this court is whether an attorney who is also a member of the Georgia General Assembly must be disqualified from representing a client in a superior court when the opposing party is the State of Georgia. Although the majority concedes that nothing in the Code of Professional Responsibility would be violated by Hill’s representation of the Sistrunks, it interprets Art. I, Sec. II, Par. I of our Constitution (Code Ann. § 2-201) to prohibit “a legislator from representing a client for his own financial gain, in any civil transaction or matter wherein the State of Georgia shall be an opposing party.” (Emphasis supplied.) I cannot agree that any provision of our constitution was intended to achieve such a result.
When the colony of Georgia was chartered in 1732, there were no lawyers, as it was the plan of the trustees of the colony that Georgia should be “ ‘a happy, flourishing colony ... free from that pest and scourge of mankind called lawyers.’ ” Coulter, Georgia — A Short History, UNC Press 1947, p. 74. The colony failed to thrive however, and the return of the charter to the King in 1752 brought in a new government. The same year, Georgia’s first lawyers arrived. Id. at 83. Lawyers have been involved in Georgia government ever since, and in my opinion rightly so. “Lawyers often serve as legislators or as holders of other public offices. This is highly desirable, as lawyers are uniquely qualified to make significant contributions to the improvement of the legal system.” EC 8-8, Code Ann. Title 9 Appendix.
“[Statistics indicate that most . . . legislators are lawyers, farmers, merchants, or insurance or real estate brokers. Of these, all except lawyers frequently have a direct personal interest in state legislation . . . [I]t would seem undesirable for the imposition of [restrictions on legislators’ outside activities] to result in a further narrowing of the occupational classes from which legislators will be drawn ... [T]here is hardly an item of concern to any state employee or officer which does not fall under the aegis of the legislature. Included are many subjects perennially under its scrutiny which affect every legislator no matter what his occupation, such as tax rates, auto license fees, and utility rates; other concerns such as ‘blue sky’ laws, teachers’ qualifications, or barbers’ licenses are likely to affect certain lawmakers in their chosen fields.” Note, Conflicts of Interest of State Legislators, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1209, 1210 (1963) (Emphasis supplied, footnotes omitted).
*553Outside activity in the pursuit of careers is an inevitable result of having, as most states do, a part-time legislature.1 Additional regulation of potential conflicts of interest of state legislators might be desirable, but such regulation, if hastily imposed and not closely tailored to the circumstances of those whose behavior is to be governed, could easily result in far fewer attorneys being able or willing to serve in our General Assembly.
The broad rule we establish today is, I submit, not only not closely tailored to the circumstances of legislators who also happen to be attorneys — more importantly, we are not merely establishing a rule which may be modified or abolished if experience shows it to be unwise: The rule we establish today is imposed as a matter of Georgia constitutional law. Thus, not only are we taking a step the legislature has chosen not to take,2 we are foreclosing any future legislative action on the subject short of a constitutional amendment.
We presently have a directory rule regarding behavior of lawyers who are public officials. “A lawyer who holds public office shall not: (1) use his public position to obtain, or attempt to obtain, a special advantage in legislative matters for himself or for a client under circumstances where he knows or it is obvious that such action is not in the public interest; (2) use his public position to influence, or attempt to influence, a tribunal to act in favor of himself or of a client; (3) accept anything of value from any person when the lawyer knows or it is obvious that the offer is for the purpose of influencing his action as a public official.” DR 8-101, Code Ann. Title 9 Appendix. Directory rules have the effect of law. Cambron v. Canal Ins. Co., 246 Ga. 147, 151 (269 SE2d 426) (1980). The Attorney General does not allege any violation of DR 8-101. Rather, the Attorney General’s position is that it is improper per se for a member of the General Assembly to represent a private party in litigation against the State or a State agency, because Art. I, Sec. II, Par. I of the Georgia Constitution (Code Ann. § 2-201) states: “All government, of right, originates with the people, is founded upon their will only, and is instituted solely for the good of the whole. Public officers are trustees and servants of the people, and at all times, amenable to them.” The *554Attorney General’s argument, accepted by the majority, is that by representing the Sistrunks in this action against the Department of Human Resources, Hill violates a fiduciary duty owed to the people of Georgia.3
My response is that in Georgia, “the supreme power resides in the people,” not in any institution of government. Beall v. Beall, 8 Ga. 210, 215 (1850). Representative Hill owes no more of a fiduciary duty to the Department of Human Resources or any of its bureaucrats than the members of this Court owe to the Attorney General or any of his assistants, and Hill is no more required to agree with a position taken by the Department of Human Resources than we are required to agree with the Attorney General.
Previous cases of this court establish that a public officer may not “use his trust to promote his own personal interest.” Caruthers v. Corbin, 38 Ga. 75 (1868); DeKalb County v. Wilson, 217 Ga. 566 (124 SE2d 273) (1962); Malcom v. Webb, 211 Ga. 449 (86 SE2d 489) (1955); City of Macon v. Huff, 60 Ga. 221 (1878); Harrison v. McHenry, 9 Ga. 164 (1850). I cannot understand how, in the absence of any allegation of a violation of DR 8-101, supra, it can be said that Hill is using his trust to promote his own personal interest simply by representing the Sistrunks against the Department of Human Resources, any more than he would be using his trust to promote his own personal interest by representing any client against any adverse party.4
The Attorney General cites no authority from any jurisdiction for the proposition that representation by a legislator of a private party in litigation against the State violates the legislator’s fiduciary duty to the public.5 Even the federal government, which has enacted comprehensive conflict of interest legislation, allows congressmen to handle, for a fee, court cases in which the federal government is a party or has a direct and substantial interest.6 18 USCA § 203. This right of congressmen is not shared by other federal public officials. Compare, 18 USCA § 205. The resulting discrimination in favor of *555congressmen has been characterized as “justifiable.” Perkins, The New Federal Conflict-of-interest Law, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1113, 1144 (1963). In my opinion, if congressmen can handle, for a fee, court cases in which the federal government is a party, our Georgia part-time legislators ought to be able to handle, for a fee, court cases in which our State government is a party.
All of us have a variety of interests and are influenced in innumerable ways. This is inevitable. Our only alternative would be to live in a vacuum. I cannot say that Bobby Hill’s status as a legislator will have absolutely no influence on the trial court, any more than I can say that big advertisers have absolutely no influence on the editorial policies of the news media. I do say that the trial judge is just as capable of rendering a fair decision in this case as we are. Anyone claiming the contrary “must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators.” DOT v. Del-Cook Timber Co., 248 Ga. 734, 741 (285 SE2d 913) (1982) (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U. S. 35 (95 SC 1456, 43 LE2d 712) (1975)).
The constitutional provision relied on by the majority has been carried down unchanged from its first appearance in the Constitution of 1877. For over 100 years since its first adoption, lawyer-legislators have represented private clients against the State. This practice has not been challenged until now. “While neither length of time nor legislative action, though oft repeated, will sanction a violation of the organic law, . . . contemporaneous construction of a constitutional provision by the legislature, continued and followed, is a safe guide as to its proper interpretation, and should not be departed from unless manifestly erroneous.” 16 AmJur2d, Constitutional Law § 125, pp. 485-6 (footnotes omitted). “Similarly, the fact that for many years a certain construction has been assumed to apply to a constitutional provision is of important force in determining its meaning.” Id., § 124, p. 482 (footnotes omitted). It cannot be said that no doubt exists as to the meaning of Art. I, Sec. II, Par. I of the 1976 Constitution. It certainly cannot be said that the Constitution compels the result reached by the majority. I would not overturn a practice sanctioned by more than two centuries of usage.
I have found from my service in all three branches of state government that, with rare exceptions, men and women in public service are conscientious, honest and fair. The rule adopted by the majority will be but another obstacle placed in the path of potential public servants. Absent undeniable legislative misconduct and except where clear constitutional or statutory guidelines have been *556established, I do not think this court has any business trying to police the outside activities of members of a separate and co-equal branch of our state government. I therefore dissent.

 Legislators in Georgia receive a salary of $7,200 per year plus $44 a day for expenses while the General Assembly is in session and a mileage allowance for not more than one round trip per calendar week. Code Ann. § 47-107.

 Certain statutes have been enacted regulating the conduct of members of the General Assembly. See, e.g., Code Ann., Ch. 26-23 (Abuse of Governmental Office). The Attorney General does not contend that any of the Code sections in this chapter have been or will be violated by Hill’s representation of the Sistrunks.

 The majority properly rejects the argument that Hill’s representation of the Sistrunks would violate Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: “A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety.” Rule 3-109, Code Ann. Title 9 Appendix. See Blumenfeld v. Borenstein, 247 Ga. 406 (276 SE2d 607) (1981).

 The cited cases establish the proposition that a public official may not in his public capacity deal with himself in his private capacity. There are no allegations of self-dealing in this case.

 Hill claims that only in Oregon are lawyer-legislators prohibited from representing an individual in a lawsuit against the state and there the prohibition is expressly incorporated into the state constitution. Oregon Const. Art. XV, Sec. 7.

 Congressmen may not practice, for a fee, before federal departments or agencies; the restrictions of 18 USCA § 203 do not apply when the tribunal is a court of law.