Court Opinion

ID: 9660598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:16:36.586355+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:20.822740
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
NYE, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The Cameron County Attorney, relator in the instant case, challenges the majority’s interpretation of Hobson v. Moore, 734 S.W.2d 340 (Tex.1987). I also question the majority’s interpretation and use this opportunity to explain how the majority has misinterpreted the Hobson decision.
In Hobson, two police officers, investigating a person named Davis, were served by Davis with interrogatories seeking information about the officers’ investigation. The officers refused to answer the interrogatories, claiming the information sought was privileged because it pertained to an ongoing criminal investigation. The Hob-son Court concluded that the information was exempt from disclosure according to section 3(a)(8) of the Texas Open Records Act, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-17a (Vernon Supp.1989). However, the Hobson Court concluded that the officers waived the privilege by not objecting to the interrogatories within thirty days after the interrogatories were served upon them.
The majority’s opinion concludes that the Hobson decision is “not in point” and states, regarding the instant case: “Here, there is no evidence that there is an ongoing investigation and, as previously stated, relator has made no attempt to show damage to law enforcement by revealing the information ordered produced.” This statement suggests that the information sought by the real party in interest, Kip Van Johnson Hodge, would not be discoverable if it pertained to an “ongoing investigation.” This logic contradicts the Hobson decision and section 3(a)(8) of the Texas Open Records Act. In Hobson, our Supreme Court neither stated nor implied that information (exempted from disclosure by section 3(a)(8) of the Texas Open Records Act) pertaining to an ongoing investigation suddenly becomes discoverable once the investigation ceases.
Section 3(a)(8) provides in relevant part that “records ... of prosecutors that deal with the detection, investigation, and prosecution of crime and the internal records and notations of ... prosecutors which are maintained for internal use in matters relating to law enforcement and prosecution” are exempt from disclosure. I do not interpret this section to mean that information, in order to be exempt from disclosure, must pertain to an ongoing investigation. The majority has incorrectly determined that the information sought by Hodge is discoverable because it does not pertain to an ongoing investigation. The majority has failed to cite any authority to support their proposition.
I would grant the relator’s motion for rehearing.