Court Opinion

ID: 9733603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:11:39.889558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:42.661117
License: Public Domain

KEM THOMPSON FROST, Justice,
concurring.
The majority reaches the correct result but errs in concluding that appellant failed to satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 *169L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). A criminal defense lawyer has an obligation to keep the accused advised of communications from the prosecutor regarding a possible plea bargain. See id., 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065; Ex parte Wilson, 724 S.W.2d 72, 73-74 (Tex.Crim.App.1987); 1 Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 4-6.2(a) (2d ed.1980). This obligation is especially important during the punishment phase of a trial. At that point, much of the uncertainty surrounding the outcome has been eliminated because the defendant has been convicted and knows for certain that some punishment will follow. Under these circumstances, trial counsel should relay to the accused all material communications regarding a possible plea bargain, not just those communications that constitute “firm offers.” Though, in many cases, it may be difficult to prove prejudice under the second prong of Strickland in the absence of a firm offer for a plea bargain, this difficulty should not affect the analysis under the first prong of Strickland as to the objective standard of reasonableness for relaying plea-bargain communications during the punishment phase.
The sentencing stage of any case, regardless of the potential punishment, is “the time at which for many defendants the most important services of the entire proceeding can be performed,” and thus, during this critical phase, it is crucial that defense attorneys follow the standards set out in the Texas Code of Professional Responsibility. Milburn v. State, 15 S.W.3d 267, 269 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd). An accused might not be willing to accept or even entertain a plea bargain before the guilt/innocence phase of a trial has been completed, but after a jury has returned a guilty verdict, the entire dynamic of the trial changes. Whatever communications may have transpired before conviction are of little relevance in the critical period after conviction and before sentencing. Because the posture of the case has changed dramatically, the defendant is much more likely to accept or consider a plea bargain.
Here, after the jury returned a guilty verdict, appellant’s trial counsel failed to advise appellant that, if she agreed to have the trial court assess punishment, the State would consider agreeing to a probated sentence, as long as there was some jail time as a condition of probation. This is the kind of information counsel representing a convicted criminal defendant facing punishment should convey to his client. Because appellant’s trial counsel failed to communicate this important information to appellant, counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. This failure satisfies the first prong of Strickland.
Appellant, however, has not satisfied the second prong of Strickland because she failed to demonstrate that she suffered any prejudice as a result of her counsel’s error. More specifically, appellant has not shown what plea bargain would have been acceptable to the prosecutor. Further, she never claimed that she would have accepted any plea offer in the punishment phase of the trial. Thus, appellant has not met the second prong of Strickland. See Ex parte Lemke, 13 S.W.3d 791, 796-98 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (holding that applicant satisfied second prong of Strickland by testifying that he would have accepted the prosecutor’s plea offer if his counsel had communicated it to him and that applicant did not have to show that the trial court would have accepted the plea bargain); Ex parte Wilson, 724 S.W.2d at 74 (finding prejudice where applicant testified he would have accepted the plea bargain offer his counsel failed to communicate to him); State v. Williams, 83 S.W.3d 371, 374-75 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 2002, no pet. h.) (defendant satisfied second prong of *170Strickland by testifying that he would have accepted the prosecutor’s plea offer if his trial counsel had fully explained the offer to him); Dickerson v. State, 87 S.W.3d 632, 637-38 (Tex.App.San Antonio 2002, no pet. h.) (appellant did not satisfy second prong of Strickland because he did not testify that he would have accepted the prosecutor’s plea offer); Paz v. State, 28 S.W.3d 674, 676 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.) (appellant satisfied second prong of Strickland by testifying that he would have accepted the prosecutor’s plea offer if his counsel had communicated it to him).
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals examined the prejudice requirement in Lemke and concluded that the applicant had shown prejudice under Strickland by testifying that he would have accepted the prosecutor’s plea offer had his counsel communicated it to him. See Ex parte Lemke, 13 S.W.3d at 796-98. The Court of Criminal Appeals explicitly held that the applicant did not have to show that the trial court would have accepted the plea bargain; rather, the court concluded the applicant was prejudiced by his missed opportunity to accept the plea bargain offer and present it to the trial court for consideration. See id. The Lemke court did not hold that a defendant whose counsel failed to tell him about a plea offer can show prejudice without proving he would have accepted the plea offer. See id. Cases decided after Lemke continue to require a defendant to show that he would have accepted the plea offer. See Williams, 83 S.W.3d 371, 374-75; Dickerson, 87 S.W.3d at 637-38; Paz, 28 S.W.3d at 676. Because appellant failed to demonstrate, among other things, that she would have accepted a plea bargain with some jail time as a condition of probation, she has not satisfied the second prong of Strickland. For this reason, appellant’s ineffectiveness claim is without merit. Accordingly, this court is correct in affirming the judgment.