Court Opinion

ID: 9960547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 16:00:41.801042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:36.456872
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-9593      Document: 010111032723      Date Filed: 04/16/2024    Page: 1
                                                                                  FILED
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                                       PUBLISH                                Tenth Circuit

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        April 16, 2024

                                                                         Christopher M. Wolpert
                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          Clerk of Court
                          _________________________________

  CIRILO OLMEDO MARTINEZ,

        Petitioner,

  v.                                                          No. 23-9593

  MERRICK B. GARLAND, United States
  Attorney General,

        Respondent.
                          _________________________________

                             Petition for Review of a Decision
                           of the Board of Immigration Appeals
                          _________________________________

 Submitted on the briefs:*

 Margaret W. Pascual, Pascual Law, PLLC, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Petitioner.

 Lindsay Dunn, Trial Attorney, and Kiley Kane, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of
 Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.,
 for Respondent.
                         _________________________________

 Before EID, KELLY, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                     _________________________________

 KELLY, Circuit Judge.
                          _________________________________

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellate Case: 23-9593   Document: 010111032723       Date Filed: 04/16/2024      Page: 2

       Petitioner Cirilo Olmedo-Martinez seeks review of the Board of Immigration

 Appeals’ (BIA) denial of his motion to reopen and remand, arguing that he is eligible

 for cancellation of removal and that the BIA applied an incorrect legal standard. We

 exercise jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) and deny the petition for review.

                                     Background

       The Department of Homeland Security charged Mr. Olmedo-Martinez, an

 alien, with removability. R. 638. Mr. Olmedo-Martinez applied for cancellation of

 removal, and on April 3, 2019, the Immigration Judge (IJ) denied relief due to Mr.

 Olmedo-Martinez’s failure to demonstrate his removal would result in exceptional

 and extremely unusual hardship to family members. Id. at 163–64, 389–401.

       Mr. Olmedo-Martinez appealed to the BIA and moved to remand the

 proceedings, arguing that the IJ did not adequately consider the evidence of hardship

 and asserting that previously unavailable evidence would likely change the result. Id.

 at 54–55, 93–102. Specifically, Mr. Olmedo-Martinez presented evidence that (1) a

 different IJ granted his brother’s withholding of removal due to ongoing familial

 violence in Mexico, and (2) his wife gave birth to a daughter. Id. at 57–59. On

 October 11, 2022, the BIA dismissed the appeal and declined to remand the case,

 concluding that Mr. Olmedo-Martinez failed to show, first, how his brother’s case

 established anything beyond what he previously presented to the IJ, and second, how

 his newborn daughter would change the outcome of the IJ’s disposition. Id. at 41–43.

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Appellate Case: 23-9593    Document: 010111032723        Date Filed: 04/16/2024       Page: 3

       Mr. Olmedo-Martinez then filed a motion to reopen and remand the case based

 on additional new evidence: his son’s diagnosis with a complex medical condition

 and an educational impairment. Id. at 9–10. On September 14, 2023, the BIA denied

 the motion “for failure to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for cancellation of

 removal[.]” Id. at 2. The Board held Mr. Olmedo-Martinez could not demonstrate

 that the condition was particularly serious or that his child could not continue

 treatment in his absence, and he failed to sufficiently address how his removal would

 affect his child’s educational hardship. Id. at 2–3. He seeks review of this decision.

                                       Discussion

       As a threshold matter, the government argues that we lack jurisdiction to

 review Mr. Olmedo-Martinez’s petition because 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)

 “precludes our review of an ‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’

 determination under § 1229b(b)(1)(D),” which, consequently, bars our review of the

 BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen. Resp. Br. at 9–10 (quoting Alzainati v. Holder,

 568 F.3d 844, 849 (10th Cir. 2009)). While this case was pending, the Supreme

 Court clarified that “application of the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship

 standard to a given set of facts is reviewable as a question of law under

 § 1252(a)(2)(D).” Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S.__, 2024 WL 1160995, at *5

 (2024). In doing so, the Supreme Court abrogated our decision in Galeano-Romero

 v. Barr where we held that application of the exceptional and extremely unusual

 hardship standard does not raise questions of law under § 1252(a)(2)(D). 968 F.3d

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Appellate Case: 23-9593    Document: 010111032723        Date Filed: 04/16/2024      Page: 4

 1176, 1182–84 (10th Cir. 2020).1 Under Wilkinson, we have jurisdiction to review

 the underlying hardship determination, and therefore we review the BIA’s denial of

 Mr. Olmedo-Martinez’s motion to reopen. See Alzainati, 568 F.3d at 848–49.2

       We typically review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of

 discretion. Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 242 (2010); Maatougui v. Holder, 738

 F.3d 1230, 1239 (10th Cir. 2013); Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359, 1362 (10th

 Cir. 2004). And under § 1252(a)(2)(D), “[w]e review any valid constitutional claims

 or questions of law de novo.” Alzainati, 568 F.3d at 851. Of course, in Wilkinson

 the Court clarified that we review the hardship determination as a question of law

 under § 1252(a)(2)(D). 2024 WL 1160995, at *5. However, the Supreme Court

 explained that “[b]ecause this mixed question is primarily factual, that review is

 deferential.” Id.; see also Yanez-Olivo v. Garland, No. 23-3653, 2024 WL 1282607,

 at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 26, 2024) (applying Wilkinson’s deferential standard of review in

 considering IJ’s determination of eligibility for cancellation). Thus, we apply a

 deferential standard to review the BIA’s hardship determination.

       A. Exceptional and Extremely Unusual Hardship

       The BIA denied the motion due to Mr. Olmedo-Martinez’s failure to establish

 “a reasonable likelihood . . . that the statutory requirement of exceptional and

       1
          In addition to Galeano-Romero, the Supreme Court’s decision partially
 abrogated Alzainati, 568 F.3d at 847–50, on the same ground.
        2
          We still lack jurisdiction to review agency factfinding. Wilkinson, 2024 WL
 1160995, at *9 (“The facts underlying any determination on cancellation of removal
 therefore remain unreviewable.”). For example, “the seriousness of a family
 member’s medical condition” would be unreviewable. Id.
                                            4
Appellate Case: 23-9593    Document: 010111032723         Date Filed: 04/16/2024    Page: 5

 extremely unusual hardship would be met in reopened proceedings.” R. 2. Under

 this standard, the applicant must establish hardship that is “substantially different

 from, or beyond, that which would normally be expected from the deportation of an

 alien with close family members here.” In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56,

 65 (B.I.A. 2001) (en banc). For example, the BIA has noted that an applicant whose

 child has “very serious health issues, or compelling special needs in school” might

 qualify. Id. at 63. But economic detriment and diminished educational opportunities

 are insufficient. In re Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319, 323 (B.I.A. 2002).

       Given the high standard, the BIA did not err in denying the motion to reopen.

 The Board recognized that Mr. Olmedo-Martinez’s son was diagnosed with a

 complex bowel issue, but relying upon a medical article proffered with the motion,

 found that it could be ameliorated by a variety of treatments including behavioral

 modification. R. 2–3. Similarly, though his son has been placed in an Individualized

 Education Program (IEP) at school, Mr. Olmedo-Martinez failed to show how his

 removal would cause his son’s educational impairments to rise to the level of

 extremely unusual hardship. Id. at 3. His generic statement that his son would

 require increased time, attention, and resources was insufficient. Id. at 13.

       Finally, contrary to Mr. Olmedo-Martinez’s argument that the BIA failed to

 address the cumulative effects of all the evidence presented, Pet. Br. at 13–14, the

 Board reasoned that “the documents submitted, even when considered in the

 aggregate with other evidence of record, do not make a prima facie case for

 hardship[.]” R. 3 (emphasis added). Therefore, the BIA properly considered all Mr.

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Appellate Case: 23-9593     Document: 010111032723        Date Filed: 04/16/2024        Page: 6

 Olmedo-Martinez’s proffered evidence, including potential violence in Mexico and

 problems stemming from his separation from his children and financial loss. Pet. Br.

 at 13. While the hardships faced by Mr. Olmedo-Martinez and his family are

 undoubtedly difficult, they do not rise to the level of exceptional or extremely

 unusual hardship.

       B. The BIA’s Application of the Legal Standard

       Applying de novo review, we conclude that Mr. Olmedo-Martinez’s remaining

 argument fails. He claims that the BIA’s September 2023 denial “appears” to

 substitute the “reasonable likelihood” standard for a higher standard — whether the

 new evidence “would likely” establish exceptional and extremely unusual hardship in

 a reopened proceeding. Pet. Br. at 2. This argument is inconsistent with the record;

 the BIA’s September 2023 order uses only the “reasonable likelihood” standard. See

 R. 2–3.

       To the extent Mr. Olmedo-Martinez argues that an incorrect legal standard was

 applied in the IJ’s April 2019 decision or the BIA’s October 2022 order, he failed to

 raise such arguments in his initial appeal of the IJ’s decision, id. at 88–103, in a

 motion to reconsider, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6), or elsewhere. Before advancing a

 specific legal theory in court, the alien must first present that same specific legal

 theory to the BIA. Miguel-Pena v. Garland, 94 F.4th 1145, 1154 (10th. Cir. 2024).

       Accordingly, the Petition for Review is DENIED.

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