Court Opinion

ID: 9571717
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:34:33.671032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:50.704380
License: Public Domain

Judge McCRODDEN
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence » *697of the cocaine seized from defendant because it was the fruit of a constitutionally impermissible search in light of Minnesota v. Dickerson, — U.S. —, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993). In my opinion, Dickerson is not dispositive of the question raised by defendant’s appeal.
The majority opinion concludes that Deputy Sheriff John Gregory’s actions in questioning what defendant had in his pockets and in asking him to “rabbit-ear” them violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The majority bases this conclusion on a misapprehension of and, therefore, an erroneous reliance on, Dickerson, leading it to conclude that, because it was not immediately apparent to Deputy Gregory that the item in defendant’s pocket was contraband, the deputy was not justified in continuing a warrantless search, to wit, questioning defendant and requesting that defendant “rabbit-ear” his pockets. This reliance is wrong because the questioning of defendant following the pat down search was not a search and hence not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.
A close examination of the facts reveals several key differences between Dickerson and the case at hand. In both Dickerson and the instant case, law enforcement officers stopped suspects and performed protective pat down searches which failed to reveal any weapons. The officer in Dickerson testified that during the pat down search he felt a lump in the defendant’s pocket, and the deputy in the case at hand testified that he “felt what appeared to be a plastic baggie in [defendant’s] left front pant’s pocket.” At this point in the proceeding, however, the officer in Dickerson took a course clearly distinguishable from the one the deputy took in this case. In Dickerson, the officer determined that the lump in the defendant’s pocket was contraband only after he “squeezed, slid, and otherwise manipulated the pocket’s contents” during the pat down. Id. at —, 124 L.Ed.2d at 340. After feeling the lump in Dickerson’s pocket, the officer reached into it and pulled out a bag of cocaine. The manipulation of the defendant’s pockets is what the United States Supreme Court found objectionable in Dickerson, when it stated that the police officer “overstepped the bounds of the ‘strictly circumscribed’ search for weapons allowed under Terry.” Id. at —, 124 L.Ed.2d at 347 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 908 (1968)).
*698In the case before us, there is no evidence that Deputy Gregory manipulated the defendant’s pockets or continued a physical invasion of defendant’s privacy, actions that would have amounted to overstepping the bounds of Terry. To the contrary, after frisking the defendant for weapons and feeling what appeared to be a plastic baggie in his pocket, the deputy terminated the Terry search. Dickerson, which refined Terry, simply is not an issue here.
In my view, the decisive question of this appeal is whether Deputy Gregory’s actions subsequent to the pat down constituted a search. If no search is necessary or conducted, the constitutional guaranty of the Fourth Amendment is not applicable. State v. Kinley, 270 N.C. 296, 297, 154 S.E.2d 95, 96 (1967). A search implies both an examination of one’s premises or person with a view to the discovery of contraband, and an exploratory investigation or quest. State v. Reams, 277 N.C. 391, 400, 178 S.E.2d 65, 70 (1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 840, 30 L.Ed.2d 74 (1971) (quoting Haerr v. United States, 240 F.2d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 1957)). When evidence is delivered to a police officer upon request and without compulsion or coercion, there is no search within the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. See State v. Reams, 277 N.C. at 396, 198 S.E.2d at 68 and cases cited therein. From the facts of this case, it is apparent that no additional search was conducted after the pat down.
Deputy Gregory testified:
I asked [defendant] what he had in his pocket. [Defendant] said money and pulled out some money. ... I told him that I could still see something in his jeans, they were tight to his body. I asked him to pull his pockets rabbit-ear out, he did. I noticed at that point that he was about — that he was about to start laughing. I then noticed he was palming something in his hand. I asked him what was in his hand. He turned it over. I saw a plastic bag with a small amount of white powder on it. The powder looked to be cocaine.
(Emphasis added). There is nothing in the record to dispute Deputy Gregory’s testimony that, in response to his asking defendant what was in his pocket and requesting that he “rabbit-ear” his pockets, defendant voluntarily exhibited the package of cocaine. The record is devoid of any evidence that the deputy coerced the defendant into revealing the cocaine. See Reams, 277 N.C. at 400, 178 S.E.2d at 70. On the contrary, there was evidence that the *699process by which defendant displayed the cocaine was free of coercion, intimidation, and force.
Moreover, defendant’s intoxication did not negate the element of voluntariness when he exposed the cocaine to the officer. This Court, in State v. Colson, 1 N.C. App. 339, 343, 161 S.E.2d 637, 640 (1968), stated that “drunkenness provides the drinker with no constitutional cloak of privacy not available to his sober brothers.” Nothing in the record indicates that the defendant’s intoxication caused him to be incapable of voluntary and intelligent action.
Finally, I would point out that defendant could have exercised his constitutional right to refuse the deputy’s request that he “rabbit-ear” his pockets and show him the contraband. Under constitutional scrutiny, such refusal would not have given the deputy probable cause either to search or arrest the defendant. Cf. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. —, —, 115 L.Ed.2d 389, 398-90 (1991) (a suspect’s refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure). The facts in the case at hand, however, provide no indication that the defendant felt that he could not refuse to display the cocaine or that he would have been arrested if he refused to do so.
I realize that my conclusion, that what transpired between Deputy Gregory and the defendant after the pat down was not a search, is contrary to the reasoning of the trial court. Even though I reject the trial court’s analysis, I believe that it reached the correct result in this case and that the result should be affirmed. Defendant’s attack on the legality of the search has required us to review the record to determine whether the search was lawful. In so doing, we may review the trial court’s order for errors of law pertaining to the issue. Cf. State v. Kirby, 276 N.C. 123, 171 S.E.2d 416 (1970) (defendant’s exception to the judgment presents the face of the record for review). If the trial court reached the correct result, i.e., denial of defendant’s motion to suppress, the ruling will not be disturbed even though the court may not have assigned the right reason for the order entered. State v. Austin, 320 N.C. 276, 290, 357 S.E.2d 641, 650, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 916, 98 L.Ed.2d 224 (1987).
In conclusion, because defendant voluntarily showed the cocaine to Deputy Gregory, I vote to uphold the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress and to affirm the judgment.