Court Opinion

ID: 9445621
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:34:43.382227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:21.232403
License: Public Domain

MEDINA, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
Section 9 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 722, 15 U.S.C.A. § 49, provides:
“That for the purposes of this Act the commission, or its duly authorized agent or agents, shall at all reasonable times have access to, for the purpose of examination, and the right to copy any documentary evidence of any corporation being investigated or proceeded against; and the commission shall have power to require by subpoena the attend-*617anee and testimony of witnesses and the production of all such documentary evidence relating to any matter under investigation.” (Emphasis added.)
I think it clear beyond cavil, and my brothers seem to agree, that the phrase “such documentary evidence” is susceptible of no interpretation other than “documentary evidence of any corporation being investigated or proceeded against.” Were the words capable of some other interpretation, it should not be adopted, for “the plain, obvious and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden sense that nothing but the exigency of a hard case and the ingenuity and study of an acute and powerful intellect would discover.” Old Colony R. Co. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 560, 52 S.Ct. 211, 213, 76 L.Ed. 484; Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364, 370, 45 S.Ct. 274, 69 L.Ed. 660. See also Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6, 67 S.Ct. 1047, 91 L.Ed. 1301.
Nevertheless, my brothers have concluded that the word “such” crept into the statute inadvertently and that we have power to “eliminate” it in applying the statute. This they do, referring to the process as one of “construction.” But the Supreme Court has indicated the proper bounds of “construction,” declaring it permissible “To let general words draw nourishment from their purpose,” but not “To draw on some unexpressed spirit outside the bounds of the normal meaning of words.” Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products Co., 332 U.S. 607, 617, 64 S.Ct. 1215, 1221, 88 L.Ed. 1488. The Court condemned legislation in the guise of “construction,” saying in 332 U.S. at page 618, 64 S.Ct. at page 1221:
“While the judicial function in construing legislation is not a mechanical process from which judgment is excluded, it is nevertheless very different from the legislative function. Construction is not legislation and must avoid ‘that retrospective expansion of meaning which properly deserves the stigma of judicial legislation.' Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 522, 62 S.Ct. 1116, 1119, 86 L.Ed. 1638. To blur the distinctive functions of the legislative and judicial processes is not conducive to responsible legislation.”
And the Court said in Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago B. & Q. R. R. Co., 257 U.S. 563, at pages 588-589) 42 S.Ct. 232, at pages 237-238, 66 L.Ed. 371:
“Great stress is put on the legislative history * * *. Committee reports and explanatory statements of members in charge made in presenting a bill for passage have been held to be a legitimate aid to the interpretation of a statute where its language is doubtful or obscure. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 475, 41 S.Ct. 172, 65 L.Ed. 349. But when taking the act as a whole, the effect of the language used is clear to the court, extraneous aid like this cannot control the interpretation. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184, 198, 33 S.Ct. 893, 57 L.Ed. 1446; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490, 37 S.Ct. 192, 61 L.Ed. 442. Such aids are only admissible to solve doubt and not to create it.”
As the Court said in Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, at page 201, 66 S.Ct. 494, at page 501, 90 L.Ed. 614, “This case presents an instance of ‘the most explicit language" which leaves no room for questioning congress’ intent.”
My brothers seek to justify departure from this rule by finding that limiting the powers of the Commission to those granted by the statute “would lead to absurd or futile results.” With this conclusion I cannot agree.
First, it is said that it would be “absurd or futile” to provide that witnesses may be subpoenaed to produce only certain documents, whereas the provision of 15 U.S.C.A. § 49, that “Any person *618may be compelled td appear añd depose and to produce documentary evidence * * *” “contains no limitation on the origin of the ‘documentary evidence.’ ” This “incongruity,” it is said, provides sufficient excuse and authority for a court to grant to the Commission a power not contained in the statute .defining its powers. But the premise is faulty. My brothers’ construction fails to take into account the qualifying words immediately following that part of the statute quoted above. The entire sentence reads as follows: “Any person may be compelled to appear and depose and to produce documentary evidence in the same manner as witnesses may be compelled to appear and testify and produce documentary evidence before the commission as hereinbefore provided.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, there is no “incongruity,” “absurdity” or “futility”: the power to require production of documents in connection with depositions is precisely the same as the power to require production of documents by subpoena; it is unlimited only if the subpoena power is unlimited.
It is further said that it would be “absurd” for the Congress to authorize the Commission to subpoena only those documents to which it had access, for this “would in effect render the subpoena power useless.” But my brothers’ construction must fall before the same argument that engenders it, for if the point has merit would not then the access power be useless, and would this not be “an absurd result never contemplated by the Congress”? The language of the statute and the legislative history make it clear, however, that the Congress considered the powers of access and of subpoena separate and distinct. For example, different penalties are provided for violation’s of these powers. 15 U.S.C.A. § 50. I see no force in the argument that the subpoena power must be broadr er than the. access power.
“Finally,” my brothers assert, “the respondent’s narrow construction of the ■words ‘such documentary evidence’ as used in the first paragraph of Section 9 of the Act would impair the proper functioning of the Commission.” This conclusion stems, I think, from an erroneous reading of the Act as it stands. The Commission is undoubtedly empowered to subpoena documents of corporations “being investigated.” My brothers give this term a narrow meaning; they consider that a corporation is “being investigated” only if the Commission is contemplating a proceeding against it. Yet Section 6(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 721, 15 U.S.C.A. § 46, authorizes the Commission “to investigate from time to time the organization, business, conduct, practices, and management of any corporation engaged in commerce.” Is not a corporation “being investigated” if it is the subject of a: proper exercise of the Commission’s powers under this section ? It has been held that it is, F. T. C. v. Bowman, D.C.N.D.Ill., 149 F.Supp. 624, decided February 15, 1957, and appellee agrees that this decision is correct. Nothing to the contrary may be found in F. T. C. v. Hammond, Snyder & Co., 276 U.S. 586, 45 S.Ct. 461, 69 L.Ed. 800, affirming D.C. 284 F. 886, and F. T. C. v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 44 S.Ct. 336, 68 L.Ed. 696; those cases merely condemned “fishing expeditions into private papers on the- possibility that they may disclose evidence of crime,” 264 U.S. at page 306, 44 S.Ct. at page 337, “when it [the Commission] has no reason to believe that any violation of law has been committed,” 284 F. at page 888. Thus, there is no need for a judicial redrafting of the statute, since the Commission is given ample power to obtain the documents of corporations. And this power is available in the case at bar. To the extent the Commission finds it necessary to investigate other corporations in connection with its proceeding against Spalding, it is empowered to subpoena their papers relating to the matter under investigation. The subpoena need not be addressed to the corporation being investigated; any person, including natural persons and partnerships, may be compelled to produce “such *619documentary evidence.” Although there is a requirement that the documents belong to a “corporation being investigated or proceeded against,” there is none that they be in the possession of such a corporation. Hence I would reverse the decision below and direct the enforcement of the subpoena insofar as it relates to documentary evidence of the member corporations pertinent to the matter at hand.
My brothers seem to be convinced that the word “such” was accidentally inserted by the Conference Committee and was unwittingly adopted by both Houses and by the President. While such a series of mistakes is of course not beyond the realm of possibility, it is not the only reasonable explanation for the late introduction of the word. As my brothers point out, in the earlier versions of the Act the access power and the subpoena power were found in different sections in different parts of the Act. It is not unlikely that when the Conference Committee incorporated both powers into a single section they noticed for the first time that the power to subpoena documents was broader than the access power and, since there was no apparent reason why that should be so, they deliberately correlated the two.
Although I agree there do exist indications that the Congress omitted to grant a power it had intended to grant, I am nevertheless unable to adopt the position taken by my brothers, for I do not understand that the intention of the legislators is law even though that intention has not found expression in legislation, or that the courts are free to grant to administrative agencies powers in excess of those specifically enacted by the Congress. “Legislation introducing a new system is at best empirical, and not infrequently administration reveals gaps or inadequacies of one sort or another that may call for amendatory legislation. But it is no warrant for extending a statute that experience may disclose that it should have been made more comprehensive.” Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products Co., supra, 332 U.S. at page 617, 64 S.Ct. at page 1221. Under our Constitution, that is the business of the Congress and the President, not of federal judges. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distilling Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 396, 397, 71 S.Ct. 745, 751, 95 L.Ed. 1035 (concurring opinion):
“The Rules of the House and Senate, with the sanction of the Constitution, require three readings of an Act in each House before final enactment. That is intended, I take it, to make sure that each House knows what it is passing and passes what it wants, and that what is enacted was formally reduced to writing. It is the business of Congress to sum up its own debates in its legislation. Moreover, it is only the words of the bill that have presidential approval, where that approval is given. It is not to be supposed that, in signing a bill, the President endorses the whole Congressional Record. For us to undertake to reconstruct an enactment from legislative history is merely to involve the Court in political controversies which are quite proper in the enactment of a bill but ■ should have no place in its interpretation.
“Moreover, there are practical reasons why we should accept whenever possible the meaning which an enactment reveals on its face. Laws are intended for all of our people to live by; and the people go to law offices to learn what their rights under those laws are. * * * Aside from a few offices in the larger cities, the materials of legislative history are not available to the lawyer who can afford neither the cost of acqui- ■ sition, the cost of housing, or the cost of repeatedly examining the whole Congressional history. Moreover, if he could, he would not know anyway of anticipating what would impress enough members of the Court to be controlling. To accept legislative debates to modify statutory *620provisions is to make the law inaccessible to a large part of the country.
“By and large, I think our function was well stated by Mr. Justice Holmes: ‘We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means.’ Holmes, Collected Legal Papers, 207.”
My brothers find support in the statement of the Supreme Court that “administrative practice, consistent and generally unchallenged, will not be overturned except for very cogent reasons if the' scope of the command is indefinite and doubtful.” Norwegian Nitrogen Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315, 53 S.Ct. 350, 358, 77 L.Ed. 796. I fully subscribe to this principle, but it has no application here, for' the words of the statute “construed” are neither “indefinite” nor “doubtful.” More in point are the accompanying statement that “administrative practice does not avail to overcome a statute so plain in its commands as to leave nothing for construction,” and the language of the Court in United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, at page 647, 70 S.Ct. 357, 366, 94 L.Ed. 401:
“The fact that powers long have been unexercised may well call for close scrutiny as to whether they exist; but if granted, they are not lost by being allowed to lie dormant, any more than nonexistent powers can be prescripted by an unchallenged exercise.” (Emphasis added.)
Hence I dissent from the broad ruling by my brothers but would reverse and remand the case with directions to require appellant to comply with the subpoena duces tecum only to the extent of producing documentary evidence of the various corporations which I believe fall into the classification of “any corporation being investigated,” as I have defined that phrase in what I have already written, and in accord with the ruling of Judge Hoffman in the Bowman case. This interpretation of Section 9 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 49, harmonizes the various clauses of the Section and accords to the words, “such documentary evidence,” their natural and plain meaning in their context.