Court Opinion

ID: 9584273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:46:13.927448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:20.485011
License: Public Domain

Dolliver, J.
(dissenting) — I cannot accept the view of the majority that defendants did not knowingly waive their right to jury trial nor that Seattle Municipal Court Rule (SMCR) 2.08 is not applicable in this case. The majority states the court is faced with a silent record. It is not. In addition to the colloquia recorded by the majority, there is further information in the record.
In the case of defendant Nugent on a document entitled "Plea of Not Guilty Giving up the Right of Formal Arraignment", the following language appears: "I have been advised of my rights by the court and have discussed them with a lawyer." This document is signed by defendant Nugent and by her attorney who is designated as "Attorney for Defendant for Arraignment only". In the case of *458defendant Williams on a form provided by the Public Defender (who now brings this appeal) which is entitled "Plea of Not Guilty and Demand for Trial" the following language appears:
I have talked to a lawyer from the Public Defender Association about my case. I accept the services of that attorney for today's hearing. I have been advised of my rights by the court.
This form is signed by defendant Williams and by his attorney who is designated as "Attorney for Defendant Arraignment".
Defendants now appear before this court and, citing Seattle v. Crumrine, 98 Wn.2d 62, 653 P.2d 605 (1982), claim they did not waive their rights to a jury trial. The majority agrees and reverses. There is no allegation by defendants that they were somehow deficient in their understanding of the English language, that they could not or did not in fact read what they had signed, or that they were other than sentient beings. Here, both "arraignment attorneys" have submitted affidavits indicating they had never intended to advise defendants to waive their right to a jury trial. However, it seems reasonable, in accordance with standards of this court, and public expectations, for the attorneys who were present and who signed the documents relating to a jury trial, to have advised defendants of their constitutional right of trial by jury. This seems particularly true in the case of Nugent where the attorney signed the document in which Nugent states she had been advised of her rights by the court and had " discussed them with a lawyer." In the case of Williams, although the document does not say he had discussed his rights with his attorney, he does state, with the signed concurrence of his attorney, that he had "talked to a lawyer from the Public Defender Association" — the very group of attorneys bringing this appeal.
To suggest that the defendants, based on this record, were not fully informed of their constitutional rights and the import of SMCR 2.08 is to involve this court in a vast *459charade. If arraignment counsel now claim they did not advise defendants of their rights, at the very least, they should receive substantial sanctions and terms from this court. No such claim, however, was made.
In her affidavit arraignment counsel for Nugent states:
[I]t was never the intent of the Associated Counsel for the Accused to advise people to permanently waive their jury trial right, but, to postpone the decision until they have had sufficient time to talk to their trial attorney.
Counsel for Williams states: " [A]t no time was the defendant told that failure to request a jury trial at arraignment would waive his right to a jury trial." I note that neither counsel avers defendants were not advised of their rights. This being so, it is the inescapable conclusion from this record that defendants knew their rights and simply chose to sleep on them.
This is corroborated by the colloquia recounted by the majority in which each defendant was advised, in the presence of arraignment counsel and the judge, that a jury trial could be had for the asking within 10 days and if the request was not made during that time "you can't get a jury trial any longer" (Williams) and "you've waived your right to get a jury trial" (Nugent). In the case of Williams, he said "I understand"; and Nugent, when asked if she understood, said "Yes."
Defendants now arrive at this court post-Crumrine claiming ignorance and constitutional infirmity of the municipal court rules. This claim is belied by the record. It should not be allowed.
I dissent.
Brachtenbach and Dimmick, JJ., concur with Dolliver, J.
Reconsideration denied June 18, 1984.