Court Opinion

ID: 9519694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:22:58.229417+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:36.720182
License: Public Domain

Adams, J.
(dissenting). This action was begun on January 28, 1959 by the State Bar of Michigan *213charging the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, through the operation of its Legal Aid Department (subsequently renamed Department of Legal Counsel), with unlawfully and improperly soliciting large numbers of cases and claims of members of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and directing those cases to Regional Counsel Henslee and associates in Chicago, Illinois.
The defendants admitted that in many instances, but not in all, a “member of the defendant Trainmen calls upon, contacts, or in some other manner explains to an injured member employee, or his bereaved family, the advisability of obtaining a lawyer, or the opinion of a lawyer, and recommends that they consult with the legal counsel designated, and further recommends that the legal counsel be retained if a lawyer is to be retained.”
The issue as framed by Mr. Phillip C. Kelly, acting as attorney for the State Bar, was “whether or not a large volume of these cases arising in Michigan reached the office of Regional Counsel Henslee and associates in Chicago over a period of several years during the operation of this legal department.”
On June 27, 1961, a hearing was held before the circuit judge at which time Mr. David J. Walsh, supervisor of the clearinghouse for the Claims Research Bureau, General Claims Division, of the Association of American Railroads, testified. The testimony of Mr. Walsh consisted of records of FELA claims compiled by the Association of American Railroads and tended to establish that during the period July 1, 1953, through the year 1960 there were 482 such cases and that 218 were handled by the Henslee firm.
Additional history of this case is contained in State Bar of Michigan v. Brotherhood of Railroad *214Trainmen (1965), 374 Mich 152, and in the opinion of Justice Black upon this present appeal.
In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, ex rel. Virginia State Bar (1964), 377 US 1 (84 S Ct 1113, 12 L Ed 2d 89), the United States Supreme Court said (p 8):
“We hold that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right of the members through their Brotherhood to maintain and carry out their plan for advising workers who are injured to obtain legal advice and for recommending specific lawyers. Since the part of the decree to which the Brotherhood objects infringes those rights, it cannot stand; and to the extent any other part of the decree forbids these activities it too must fall. And, of course, lawyers accepting employment under this constitutionally protected plan have a like protection which the State cannot abridge.” (Emphasis added.)
On December 5, 1967, the United States Supreme Court spoke again in the case of United Mine Workers of America, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Association (1967), 389 US 217 (88 S Ct 353, 19 L Ed 2d 426). In that case the United States Supreme Court held (pp 221, 222):
“We hold that the freedom of speech, assembly, and petition guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments gives petitioner the right to hire attorneys on a salary basis to assist its members in the assertion of their legal rights.”
I agree with Justice Black that when the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in 1967 to review Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Commonwealth of Virginia, ex rel. Virginia State Bar (1966), 207 Ya 182 (149 SE2d 265), that act made no precedent. I disagree with Justice Black that the decretal judgment entered May 27, 1968, by the *215Jackson County Circuit Court is consistent with 1964 Brotherhood or 1967 United Mine Workers.
Even if the decree could be sustained under the decision in Railroad Trainmen, it seems clearly evident that the decree is in plain violation of the holding of the United States Supreme Court in United Mine Workers.
I would vacate the judgment for the further reason that this is a chancery case in which the State Bar of Michigan seeks injunctive relief. The State Bar failed to amend or update its complaint upon remand by this Court and it failed to produce any proofs, other than the testimony of Mr. Walsh relating to the period from July 1,1953 through the year 1960. Neither the trial court nor this Court should afford injunctive relief upon proofs as stale as these, the very most recent of which relate to a period 10 years ago. Furthermore, the evidence is wholly inadequate to sustain the injunctive relief which was granted.
We have repeatedly cautioned against granting injunctive relief prior to full hearing and clear and convincing proofs. See: Cross Company v. UAW Local No 155 (AFL-CIO) (1963), 371 Mich 184; School District for the City of Holland v. Holland Education Association (1968), 380 Mich 314.
I would reverse the trial court and vacate the decretal judgment which it entered.
T. M. Kavanagh and T. Gr. Kavanagh, JJ., concurred with Adams, J.