Court Opinion

ID: 9760201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:42:59.575289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:09.222023
License: Public Domain

*90Johnson, J.,
¶ 32. concurring and dissenting. I concur with the majority’s holding that Yosef was unlawfully detained and searched, but I would hold further that police exploited that unlawful detention and search to gain entry to Sequoya’s home and obtain evidence connected to the prior search. I find no legal rationale to support excluding evidence taken from an unlawful search of the targeted drug dealer, but then admitting related evidence obtained from the home of the suspect’s sister in a follow-up investigation mere minutes after the unlawful search. Under the applicable law, that latter evidence is plainly tainted by the unlawful search and therefore not admissible. Even if Sequoya’s consent could be considered voluntary under ordinary circumstances, it was insufficient to purge the taint resulting from the previous unlawful search that led police to her home. Accordingly, I would reverse both convictions.
¶ 33. As an initial matter, before addressing Sequoya’s claim that the evidence seized from her residence was tainted by the prior unlawful search of Yosef, I see no merit to the State’s contention that Sequoya lacks standing to make this claim. Assuming that Sequoya requires independent standing to rely upon an illegality already found by this Court in the companion case against Yosef, her standing under the circumstances of this case is apparent. To establish standing for the assertion of an Article 11 violation committed against another person, “a defendant need only assert a possessory, proprietary or participatory *91interest in the item seized or the area searched.” State v. Wood, 148 Vt. 479, 489, 536 A.2d 902, 908 (1987). This is a broader standard than the “expectation of privacy” test employed by the federal courts under the Fourth Amendment. As we explained in State v. Welch, 160 Vt. 70, 77, 624 A.2d 1105, 1109 (1992), “we look at the objective relationship of the person to the place searched or items seized, as opposed to a subjective evaluation of the legitimacy of the person’s expectation of privacy.”
¶ 34. In support of her standing claim, Sequoya asserts not only a possessory interest, but also a participatory interest, which we defined in Welch as “ ‘connot[ing] some involvement in the underlying criminal conduct’ that generated the seized evidence.” Id. (quoting State v. Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315, 1321 (N.J. 1989)). Sequoya’s alleged “involvement in the underlying criminal conduct that generated the evidence” is not difficult to discern from the record. The investigating officer readily acknowledged his suspicion that the cash and • drugs seized from Yosef represented evidence of “some kind of drug operation” potentially involving Sequoya, with whom Yosef was staying. Indeed, immediately following the illegal detention and search of Yosef, the officer approached Sequoya’s home to further his investigation of drug dealing and confirm his suspicions that had been further aroused by the evidence taken from Yosef. As it turned out, based on the discovery of drugs and other contraband subsequently seized from the house, which were linked to the evidence seized from Yosef minutes earlier, the investigating officer alleged in his affidavit of probable cause that “Miss Pitts . . . and [Yjosef Pitts are conspiring to transport large quantities of cocaine to Vermont for sale.” The record thus amply supports Sequoya’s claim to participatory standing to assert the illegal detention of Yosef as a basis to suppress all of the evidence that flowed therefrom.
¶ 35. Indeed, the State does not even contest that Sequoya has participatory standing, but rather argues only that she failed to claim participatory standing before the district court. This argument is unavailing. Sequoya explicitly claimed standing, citing the applicable test set forth in Wood and noted above. Although she did not specify why in this case she had participatory, as opposed to possessory, standing, the State did not contest her standing on any basis, and the district court ruled only that she did not have possessory standing. Under these circumstances, we should consider the argument properly preserved; but even if we did not, it *92would be plain error not to recognize her obvious participatory-standing. See State v. Mayo, 2008 VT 2, ¶ 9, 183 Vt. 113, 945 A.2d 846 (stating test for finding plain error).
¶ 36. Regarding the merits of Sequoya’s taint argument, the majority concludes that (1) the record does not establish a causal nexus between Yosefs illegal detention and the seizure of evidence from Sequoya’s home; and (2) the record supports the trial court’s finding that Sequoya voluntarily consented to the search of her home. In reaching these conclusions, the majority considers whether Sequoya voluntarily consented to police entering and searching her home as if her consent were completely independent of the prior illegal detention and search of her brother. That is inconsistent with the applicable standard of review:
Although, to be sure, evidence obtained by means of a valid consent following an illegal detention may in some circumstances be admissible where the causal nexus with the original illegality is sufficiently attenuated, the voluntary nature of any consent that follows must necessarily be established by the State with clear and positive evidence.
State v. Sprague, 2003 VT 20, ¶ 31, 175 Vt. 123, 824 A.2d 539 (emphasis added; citation omitted); see United States v. Sanchez-Jaramillo, 637 F.2d 1094, 1099 (7th Cir. 1980) (“The government bears a heavy burden of demonstrating that consent given subsequent to an illegal detention was properly obtained.”); State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687-88 (Utah 1990) (“When the prosecution attempts to prove voluntary consent after an illegal police action . . . the prosecution has a much heavier burden to satisfy than when proving consent to search which does not follow police misconduct.” (quotation omitted)).
¶ 37. Neither the trial court nor the majority have examined Sequoya’s consent under this more onerous standard in light of the prior illegal activity. Cf. Sprague, 2003 VT 20, ¶ 31 n.2 (concluding that defendant’s multiple consents to search following illegal police conduct were tainted and ineffective, and noting that trial court found consents to be voluntary without considering them “in the context of the immediately preceding illegal seizure”). Examined in light of the proper standard, the record reveals that the State has faded to meet its heavy burden of demonstrating by clear and positive evidence that police obtained *93from Sequoya’s home, via her consent, evidence that was not tainted by the unlawful detention of Yosef immediately preceding the search of her home.
¶ 38. The leading commentator on search and seizure law has noted that, when confronted with the question of whether to admit physical evidence obtained by a purported consent following some form. of illegal police activity, some courts have focused on the voluntariness of the consent, while others have sought to determine if the evidence was tainted by., the prior illegality. 4 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 8.2(d), at 76 (4th ed. 2004). Professor LaFave has emphasized that the issues are not identical and that evidence obtained by a purported consent following illegal police activity “should be held admissible only if it is determined that the consent was both voluntary and not an exploitation of the prior illegality.” Id. Thus, while consent certainly could be deemed involuntary due to the taint of prior unlawful police conduct and other relevant circumstances, the consent need not be involuntary for the taint from the prior unlawful conduct to be sufficient to require suppression of evidence obtained as the result of that consent. Id. at 76-77; see Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601-02 (1975) (rejecting notion that confession obtained after illegal arrest is untainted merely because it was voluntary in Fifth Amendment sense); United States v. Furrow, 229 F.3d 805, 813 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The mere fact of voluntariness does not mean that a consent is not tainted by a prior Fourth Amendment violation.”). The latter situation may occur “when the pressure upon the person from the prior illegality is not so great that his will has been overborne . . . , but yet it cannot be said . . . that his consent was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.” 4 LaFave, supra, at 77-78 (quotation omitted). The ultimate question is whether the challenged evidence was obtained by exploitation of previous unlawful police conduct or by means sufficiently distinguishable so as to purge the primary taint of the prior illegality. Id. at 76; see State v. Phillips, 140 Vt. 210, 218, 436 A.2d 746, 751 (1981) (courts must determine whether challenged evidence resulted from exploitation of prior illegality or rather from “ ‘means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’ ” (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963))).
¶ 39. Several factors come into play in making this determination in the context of a consent to search following unlawful police conduct. Chief among them are (1) the temporal proximity of the *94illegal detention in relation to the consent, and (2) the presence of any intervening circumstances occurring between the illegal activity and the consent sufficient to erase the taint from the illegal activity. See Sprague, 2003 VT 20, ¶ 31; see also United States v. Hernandez, 279 F.3d 302, 308-09 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing as factors temporal proximity, intervening circumstances, and whether police conduct was flagrant); 4 LaFave, supra, at 82-84 (noting factors that United States Supreme Court has cited in determining whether consent is tainted by prior police illegality: proximity of consent to illegal conduct; whether illegal conduct resulted in police observation of object to which consent to search was obtained; whether illegal conduct was flagrant; whether consent was volunteered or requested; whether person consenting was aware of right to refuse to consent to search; whether significant intervening events occurred; and whether purpose underlying illegality was to obtain consent to search).
¶ 40. Each of these factors militate in favor of Sequoya in this case, precluding the State from meeting its heavy burden of demonstrating that its prior illegal activity did not taint its subsequent search of Sequoya’s home. This is not a situation, as in Phillips, 140 Vt. at 219, 436 A.2d at 751, where the police obtained the challenged evidence through a search “made with probable cause, based on information received totally independently of’ the claimed illegality. To the contrary, the record reveals, as acknowledged by the trial court and the majority, that the investigating officer approached Sequoya’s home immediately following his unlawful investigatory detention and search of Yosef, during which he discovered evidence that further aroused his suspicions of drug activity at Sequoya’s home. The officer testified at trial that he approached Sequoya’s home to verify information that Yosef had provided during the illegal detention and to “continue investigating whether this was some kind of illegal drug operation.” It could not be more plain that the illegal detention and search of Yosef, and the resulting recovery of drugs and cash on his person, led police to approach Sequoya’s residence and make further investigatory inquiries based on aroused suspicions of a drug operation at the house. See 4 LaFave, supra, at 88 (“If ... the prior illegal search provides a significant lead in terms of indicating what other evidence [police] ought to seek or where they ought to seek it, or if the illegal search provided the means of gaining access to the person from whom the consent was *95obtained, then a consent obtained by exploitation of that information would constitute a fruit of the earlier illegal search”).
¶41. The majority attempts to deny the apparent connection between the illegal police conduct and the search of Sequoya’s home by pointing to a single line of testimony by the investigating officer, who initially agreed that he would not have had any reason to go to Sequoya’s home if he had not talked to Yosef, but then appeared to qualify that response by stating: “Well, other than the cab driver telling me.” This single statement is not “ample” information demonstrating an independent basis for police to approach and search Sequoya’s home, as the majority states, ante, ¶ 21, and hardly satisfies the State’s heavy burden of showing, by clear and positive evidence, the absence of taint following the illegal police conduct. On the whole, the record does not support speculation that the police would have approached Sequoya’s house to confirm Yosefs identification or further investigate drug dealing based solely on the cab dispatcher’s statement, absent the statements made by Yosef and the evidence seized from him following his unlawful detention. This is borne out by the fact that, upon arriving at the house, the officer immediately told Sequoya that he had her brother outside and had found drugs and a significant amount of money on him. In any event, it is undisputed that the police approached Sequoya’s house immediately following the unlawful detention and search of Yosef; thus, the temporal proximity factor must be weighed in favor of Sequoya.
¶ 42. Nor can the State reasonably claim that there were any intervening factors that purged the taint. While the investigating officer noticed what he believed to be a marijuana roach in plain view once he crossed the threshold of the house, the evidence is equivocal at best from the State’s perspective — certainly not clear and positive — as to what the officer said before Sequoya consented to his entry into her home. On this point, the officer testified, “I asked her if I could come in and talk to her. She said yes. And I told her what it was about. You know, that Yosef was coming up there, and he had a large amount of money and marijuana.” Later, however, on cross-examination, the officer testified that when he asked Sequoya if he could come in, she asked “what was it about. I told her it was about Yosef.” According to the officer, he told Sequoya that Yosef “had a little weed on him, and he was coming upstairs.”
*96¶ 43. While not absolutely clear, the record thus fairly indicates that, before seeking entry, the officer informed Sequoya that he was there because of the money and drugs seized from Yosef. This interpretation of the officer’s testimony is further supported by Sequoya’s testimony, who recalled that, when she came to the door, the officer informed her that “he had [her] brother downstairs,” that she then asked him “ ‘For what? What happened?’ And he said, um, ‘He had weed on him, and a large amount of money.’ ” The officer then asked her for identification, she found a learner’s permit to show him, and “that’s when he asked if he could come in, maybe.” She explained that she acquiesced to his request because she was afraid that her brother was going to jail. Although the trial court’s findings suggest, without explicitly stating, that the officer stepped “across the threshold” before explaining the reasons for his visit, the record does not support this sequence of events.
¶44. But even if it did, the State failed to meet its heavy burden of demonstrating that the extension of the police investigation to Sequoya’s home and the subsequent discovery of drugs there did not result from exploitation of the immediately preceding unlawful detention and search of Yosef. The record plainly reveals that the police gained entry to Sequoya’s home largely through exploitation of the original illegality — by using the fruits of the illegal detention and search of Yosef as leverage to obtain Sequoya’s acquiescence in the officer’s request. Cf. Hernandez, 279 F.3d at 308-09 (concluding that although defendant voluntarily consented to having police search her suitcase, the consent and ensuing search resulted from exploitation of prior unlawful police conduct related by temporal proximity and unbroken by intervening events); United States v. Oaxaca, 233 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that sister’s consent for police to search her home immediately following her brother’s illegal arrest was voluntary but tainted by illegal police conduct). In short, absent the drugs and money recovered illegally from Yosef, it is difficult to imagine that the police would have sought permission to enter the house so persistently, or that consent would have been obtained so readily.
¶ 45. Given the record before us, there is some doubt about the voluntariness of Sequoya’s consent to search her home. The investigating officer testified that he told Sequoya he had probable cause to obtain a search warrant and seize her apartment in the *97interim. In his affidavit of probable cause, he stated: “I told her that [seeing the roach] gives me probable cause to believe that there may be more drugs here. We have a problem with people from NY bringing large amounts of drugs here.” He further averred as follows:
I continued explaining to her that I believed that I had probable cause to seize the apartment. She could consent to a search or request that I write an affidavit for a search warrant. If you chose that route it does not mean that I am going to leave you alone here for two hour[s] while I go write an affidavit. ... I asked her how she wants to do this.
Sequoya testified that she consented to the search because her son was coming home soon and she did not want him to witness the search and be locked out of his home.
¶ 46. These facts make the voluntariness of Sequoya’s consent at least questionable, but even assuming that the trial court correctly ruled that there was no coercion and that the consent was voluntary, surely the State has failed to demonstrate an absence of taint resulting from the prior illegal search. For these reasons, I would conclude that the evidence seized from the house was illegally obtained and should have been suppressed.
¶ 47. I am authorized to state that Justice Skoglund joins this dissent.