Court Opinion

ID: 9797864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:31:02.610873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:59:16.987049
License: Public Domain

*66DURHAM, Chief Justice,
dissenting:
1 41 The majority opinion declares that the petitioner is not entitled to an extraordinary writ procedure because he has failed to comply with a statute whose requirements he challenges as an unconstitutional deprivation of his rights to due process. The result is that the father of a child, with whom he lived and whom he supported for the first five months of its life, and whom the child's mother unilaterally and clandestinely removed from his home and their resident state, has no legal means to prevent, or even require a hearing on, the placement of that child with strangers for adoption in Utah.
[ 42 Neither our constitutional system nor our national network of laws respecting jurisdiction over children and their parents permit such a result.
148 Frank Osborne has characterized his situation as a catch-22. When the district court granted the motion of the Adoption Center of Choice ("Adoption Center") to allow its Petition For Determination of Birth Father's Rights under Utah Code section 78-30-4.24 to be heard without notice to Osborne, and subsequently terminated Osborne's parental rights,1 Osborne feared that to appeal the court's decision would be to subject himself to Utah's personal jurisdiction. This was precisely the result that Osborne sought to avoid when he initially refused to accept service of process on the Adoption Center's petition. Osborne acted out of the conviction that North Carolina, rather than Utah, was the proper forum for determining his parental rights. Osborne's efforts to avoid subjecting himself to the jurisdiction of Utah courts led him first to challenge Utah's subject matter jurisdiction over his child's adoption, then to federal district court, and finally to his petition for extraordinary relief from the court of appeals in the proceeding below. Addressing Osborne's request for a writ of mandamus to prevent the finalization of his child's adoption, together with an order allowing him to intervene in the child's adoption proceeding without waiving his objection to personal jurisdiction, the court of appeals first held that Osborne had not "fully and strictly compl[{ied]" with Utah Code section 78-30-4.14(2)'s statutory requirements in order to satisfy Utah Code section 78-380-4.14(5). The court of appeals then proceeded to examine whether Osborne had nevertheless acquired parental rights under a different Utah Code section, which makes certain allowances for unmarried biological fathers who do not reside in Utah. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4). Similar to section 78-30-4.14(5)'s strict compliance requirement, however, this statute requires that the father comply with "the most stringent and complete requirements of the state where the mother previously resided or was located." Utah Code Ann. § 78-80-4.15(4)(d). The court of appeals held that Osborne had not satisfied this requirement.
T44 A complex array of interests are involved whenever a putative father seeks to challenge an interstate adoption. The state has a legitimate interest, dictated by a concern for the best interests of a child, in ensuring the stability of the adoption process and avoiding uprooting a child who has lived for a significant period with adoptive parents. See In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686, 691 (Utah 1986). At the same time, one state's statutory law must not be allowed to infringe unfairly on the constitutional rights of an unmarried biological father who resides in another state. See id. The majority's application of Utah adoption laws when deciding the rights to which Osborne is entitled tilts the balance too far toward the interests of private adoption agencies, ignoring the uniform laws already in place to regulate interstate child custody and adoptions and *67the due process rights of a biological father. Because I believe that Utah courts have no subject matter jurisdiction to determine Frank Osborne's parental rights, and that applying the Utah Adoption Code here violates Osborne's right to due process, I respectfully dissent.
I. SUBJECT MATTEii JURISDICTION
T 45 Utah Code section 78-80-4.24, part of Utah's Adoption Code, allows "[alny interested party" to "petition the court for a determination of the rights and interests of any person who may claim an interest in a child under this chapter, at any time prior to the filing of a petition for adoption." Utah Code Ann. $ 78-30-4.24 (2002). In the original district court proceeding, the court interpreted this statute as giving it subject matter jurisdiction over a Utah adoption agency's attempt to terminate an out-of-state putative father's parental rights. However, this interpretation conflicts with provisions in the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children ("Interstate Compact"), Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-701 (2000), and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45c-101 to -818 (2002).
A. Conflicts Between the Adoption Code and the Interstate Compact
46 Under the Interstate Compact, a child is not supposed to be sent or brought into another state for placement until the "sending agency," here, the mother,2 notifies the public authorities in the receiving state of the identity of the child and parents, the ageney to which the child will be brought, and the reasons for this action, and the authorities then "notify the sending agency, in writing, to the effect that the proposed placement does not appear to be contrary to the interests of the child." Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-7Ol(Article IID(2)(®); In Re Adoption of R.N.L., 918 P.2d 761, 764 (Utah Ct.App.1996) ("The purpose of the Interstate Compact is to inform state authorities of the proposed adoption so they can protect the child's interest by ascertaining and evaluating the circumstances of the proposed. placement."). Under the Adoption Code, if a child was born in another state, the petition for adoption must affirm compliance with the requirements of the Interstate Compact. Utah Code Ann. § 78-80-15.1. Here, however, this requirement was avoided because the child was born in Utah, after the mother flew here apparently intending to give the child up for adoption at birth and a doctor induced labor (on August 6, 2001). The Interstate Compact still applies, however, because the mother returned to North Carolina with the infant after spending only one day in Utah and did not return to Utah with the five-month-old child until January 2002, again with the intention of giving the child up for adoption,
T47 One purpose of the Interstate Compact is to promote "[alppropriate jurisdictional arrangements for the care of the children" who eross state lines in the course of interstate adoptions or © relingquishments. Id. § 62A-4a-701(Article 1)(4). Under the Interstate Compact, the "sending agency" "retain[s] jurisdiction over the child sufficient to determine all matters in relation to the custody, supervision, care, treatment, and disposition of the child which it would have had if the child had remained in the sending agency's state, until the child is adopted. . . . Such jurisdiction shall also include the power to effect or cause the return of the child or its transfer to another location and custody pursuant to law." Id. § 62A-4a-01 (Article V)).
{48 Here, the "sending agency" is the child's mother, who relinquished the child to the Adoption Center and, under the terms of the relinquishment contract, terminated "all [her] rights to the custody" of the child. *68Assuming that such a contract would be valid in North Carolina, the mother's relinquishment of custody likely would entail termination of jurisdiction over her under the Interstate Compact if the terms of the Interstate Compact had otherwise been met. Since the requirements of the Interstate Compact were not otherwise met, however, the mother's attempt to transfer jurisdiction to Utah as a receiving state is flawed. Jurisdiction over the child thus still follows the mother, not the Adoption Center, and Osborne should be entitled to sue the mother in North Carolina for custody or a parental rights determination since both he and the mother are North Carolina residents.
(49 Under the Adoption Code, the adoption agency has "the right to the custody and control of the child," onee the child has been relinquished to the agency. Id. § 78-80-4.22(2). However, this provision must be read together with the provisions of the Interstate Compact when an interstate transfer of the child is involved. The adoption agency is not entitled to custody unless there has been compliance with the Interstate Compact. Otherwise the Interstate Compact can simply be bypassed, and its purposes defeated, by relying on conflicting state law.
150 Under a reading consistent with the Interstate Compact, then, the Adoption Center has no interest in the child that would allow it to bring an action to terminate Osborne's parental rights under Utah Code Ann. § 78-80-4.24.
B. Conflicts Between the Adoption Code and the UCCJEA
1[ 51 Similarly, under the UCCJEA, a Utah court has no lacks jurisdiction to terminate Osborne's parental rights. The UCCJEA considers a proceeding regarding paternity or for termination of parental rights to be one in which a child's custody ("legal custody, physical custody, or parent-time") is an issue. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-102(3),(4). The UCCJEA gives a Utah court jurisdiction to make "an initial child custody determination" only if (1) Utah is the child's home state on the date the proceeding begins, (2) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction or is not a more appropriate forum, (8) all other courts that might have jurisdiction under the preceding provisions have declined to exercise it, or (4) no state would otherwise have jurisdiction. Id. § 78-45c-201(1). The "home state" is "the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding," or for a child less than six months old, "the state in which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned." Id. § 78-45e-102(7). Thus, Utah was not the child's home state when the Adoption Center initiated its proceeding. North Carolina was the child's home state, and North Carolina courts did not refuse to exercise jurisdiction. In fact, a North Carolina court has ruled that it has exclusive jurisdiction over the question of Osborne's parental rights and issued a temporary restraining order against the Adoption Center to prevent it from proceeding with the child's adoption3 Osborne v. Baker, No. 02-CvD-478 (N.C. Gen. Ct. of Justice, Dist. Ct. Div. July 1, 2002).
T52 A Utah court could exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction "if the child is present in this state and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child, or a sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to or threatened with mistréatment or abuse." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-204(1). Here, the child may be viewed as abandoned by the mother, although not by Osborne. Even so, any child custody determination made by a Utah court is only in effect until a court of a state having non-emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA issues an order regarding the child's custody. Id. § 78-45c-204(2).
153 The UCCJEA does not govern "an adoption proceeding." Id. § 78-45e-103(1).4
*69However, the proceeding at issue here was brought under Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.24, which allows an interested party to petition the court to determine a father's parental rights "at any time prior" to a petition for adoption. (emphasis added). This is not an "adoption proceeding," but a separate proceeding that precedes an adoption proceeding. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, considering a similar action brought under Oklahoma state law, held that a pre-adoption proceeding to terminate parental rights is ancillary to an adoption proceeding (even though the trial court had declined jurisdiction over the actual adoption proceeding in favor of the state where the adoptive parents resided), so the UCCJEA did not apply. White v. Adoption of Baby Boy D., 10 P.3d 212, 220-21 (Okla.2000) (holding that the trial court properly exercised emergency jurisdiction over the proceeding). Five Oklahoma justices joined the majority opinion, one concurred in the result, and three dissented. Id. at 223. Two of the dissenting justices argued that the majority's expansive application of emergency jurisdiction "effectively eviscerate[s] any subject matter jurisdictional requirements for adoption and termination proceedings." Id. at 225. They continued:
A birth mother from any state in the nation may now travel to Oklahoma with prospective adoptive parents and place a child with an ageney for adoption in Oklahoma. Because she is deemed to have abandoned her child, the courts of this state may assume emergency jurisdiction and then proceed to terminate the parental rights of the father no matter how attenuated or non-existent his connection with this state. '
Id.
{54 Here, the majority has not even reached the question of emergency jurisdiction, presumably: under the belief that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction under Utah Code sections 78-30-4.24 and 78-33-1 and that the UCCJEA does not apply. However, such an understanding in effect allows one parent and a Utah adoption agency to make an end run around the jurisdictional requirements of the UCCJEA, to the disadvantage of the other parent. If a proceeding to terminate parental rights is considered an indistinguishable part of an adoption proceeding, rather than an independent proceeding governed by the UCCJEA, the underlying purposes of the UCCJEA are defeated.
T55 The UCCJEA has a provision that explicitly governs a situation where two courts in different states have initiated potentially conflicting proceedings regarding a birth parent's parental rights and the custody of a child. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-206. The North Carolina court complied with this provision and determined that, under the UCCJEA, it and not Utah was the appropriate forum for the determination of Osborne's parental rights. This court's failure to address Utah's subject matter jurisdiction over the Adoption Center's action and to interpret Utah Code section 78-30-4.24 in a manner consistent with the UCCJEA will eviscerate the UCCJEA's purpose of preventing the very conflict that now exists between the Utah and North Carolina courts.
T56 Both the Interstate Compact and the UCCJEA have been designed specifically to govern interstate transfers of children and avoid the unfair exercise of jurisdiction over the various parties involved. An interpretation of Utah Code section 78-80-4.24 that allows a Utah adoption agency to terminate the parental rights of a child's putative father when the father may well be entitled to parental rights under the law of his and the *70child's home state is inconsistent with both the Interstate Compact and the UCCJEA. These conflicts can be avoided simply by recognizing that an action under section 78-30-4.24 for the determination of an out-of-state birth father's rights is a custody determination independent of an adoption proceeding and is governed by the UCCJEA.
II. DUE PROCESS-PERSONAL JURISDICTION
157 The UCCJEA's rational scheme assigning default jurisdiction to a child's home state does not require that state to have personal jurisdiction over both parents of the child in order to make a parental rights termination decision. If we forego the provisions of the UCCJEA when making pre-adoption parental rights determinations, however, due process requires that, in such a proceeding as this, a Utah court at least have personal jurisdiction over the parent whose rights it is terminating.5
~ (58 Contrary to the Adoption Center's argument, I do not believe that this court's decisions in D.4. v. State (In re W.A.), 2002 UT 127, 68 P.3d 607, and State v. F.A. (In re W.A.), 2002 UT 126, 63 P.3d 100, lead to the conclusion that Utah can assert jurisdiction over Osborne under the status exception to the minimum contacts requirement. The rationale underlying these cases in fact leads to the opposite conclusion. As the analysis in that opinion makes clear, the status exception may apply when a plaintiff is seeking determination of his or her status with respect to an out-of-state defendant. D.4., 2002 UT 127 at 1120-21, 63 P.3d 607. The court quotes Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-85, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877), as observing that "cases involving the status of a plaintiff are unique and can be pursued in the plaintiffs home state even if that judicial forum does not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant." D.A4., 2002 UT 127 at 120, 63 P.3d 607 (emphasis added); see id. at 121 (quoting similar language in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 201, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 688 (1977)). The point of the status exception is to allow individuals residing in one state to resolve their own legal relationship with others who are not within the state. Otherwise, such individuals would be left in limbo or would be forced, at substantial inconvenience and expense, to travel to the defendant's home state to file their action.
£59 D.A. provides a suitable example of this rationale. In that case, a minor, one of whose parents had abused him and both of whom had been forced to relinquish custody of him six years earlier when they were facing felony charges, had been brought to Utah by his aunt and had lived here with her for a significant time. Id. at % 4. The minor's guardian ad litem, together with the State, filed a motion to terminate the parents' parental rights, Id. at 112-5. The guardian ad litem and the State, both charged with protecting the minor's best interests, thus acted on his behalf to determine his status with respect to his parents.
T 60 In the original trial court proceeding at issue here, in contrast, the Adoption Center, a for-profit adoption agency, sought to terminate a biological father's parental rights in order to proceed with its business of facilitating the adoption of a child whose "home state" had never been Utah. The Adoption Center is a private entity under no public obligation to protect a child's best interests. These interests are not served by unfairly preventing a biological parent who has developed a relationship with his child from asserting his parental rights. It is the role of the courts to protect the interests of both parent and child by considering further whether "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" have been satisfied. See id. at 1 16.
61 Having decided that the status exception applied in D.4., the court nevertheless found it necessary to determine "if exercising jurisdiction in this case otherwise meets the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 128. The court listed two reasons for its decision that due process was otherwise satisfied: First the court found it "clear" that Utah was the most *71suitable jurisdiction for resolving the minor's status with respect to his parents because "all relevant information" concerning the minor was in Utah, Utah had supported the minor for a number of years, and, "[plerhaps most importantly," there was good reason to believe that if the Court refused to exercise jurisdiction, "no other state would be able to assert jurisdiction to resolve W.A.'s status." Id. at 129. Second, the court noted that the parents' procedural due process rights were satisfied because they had received actual notice of the termination proceeding and had an opportunity to present evidence at the hearing. Id. at 1 30.
T 62 I have explained above my belief that, under the UCCJEA, Utah is not the most appropriate jurisdiction for the resolution of Osborne's parental status in regard to his child. (In light of the proceedings that have already taken place in North Carolina, we surely cannot claim that Utah is the only state that can determine this issue.) I also believe that the lower court rulings allowing Osborne's parental rights to be terminated without notice unfairly deprived him of due process.
III. DUE PROCESS-NOTICE
{63 The particular facts of this case lead to the conclusion that the district court's decision to terminate Osborne's parental rights without notice and to allow the child's adoption to proceed without notifying Osborne or obtaining his consent violated Osborne's due process rights. The court of appeals' decision raises similar concerns. Osborne should not be held to strict adherence to statutory requirements, whether those of Utah Code Ann. § 78-80-4.14(2)(b) or Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15(4), when Osborne has, according to the facts he presents,6 developed a substantial relationship with his child.
{64 In Lehr v. Robertson, the United States Supreme Court held that due process did not mandate notice of an adoption proceeding to a putative father, a New York resident, who had failed to register with New York's putative father registry and who had never lived with or provided financial support to the child. 463 U.S. 248, 252, 264, 108 S.Ct. 2985, T7 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983). The Court characterized the putative father's parental interest in that case as "inchoate" because of the father's failure to establish a relationship with the child and concluded that New York's registry requirement adequately protected this inchoate interest. Id. at 265, 108 S.Ct. 2985.
T 65 The Lehr Court specifically declined to rule on the registry requirement's adequacy as applied to a developed father-child relationship. Id. at 262, 108 S.Ct. 2985. To the contrary, the Court stated: "When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by 'coming] forward to participate in the rearing of his child, his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the due process clause. At that point it may be said that he 'act[s] as a father toward his children. " Id. at 261, 108 S.Ct. 2985 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 n. 7, 890, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979)).
T66 Strict compliance with legal requirements is simply an inadequate measure of paternal rights where a father has provided support to the mother since the commencement of her pregnancy and lived with the mother and the child for nearly the entire five-month period before the mother came to Utah and relinquished the child for adoption. See In re Adoption of S.L.F., 2001 UT App 183, ¶¶28-31, 27 P.3d 583 (Utah Ct.App.2001) (Davis, J., concurring) (arguing that applying the full and strict compliance requirement of Adoption Code § 78-80-4.14(5) to deprive a putative father with a substantial relationship with his child of his right to notice violates due process).
{67 Utah's putative father registry provision, codified at Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.13(8), requires an unmarried biological father who wishes to preserve his rights of notice and consent in regard to his child's *72adoption to register his claim to paternity prior to the birth mother's relinquishment of the child to an adoption agency. We have previously upheld the facial validity of this requirement and its application to putative fathers who are Utah residents. See Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 795 P.2d 687 (Utah 1990); Wells v. Children's Aid Soc'y, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984); Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 680 P.2d 758 (Utah 1984). This court also upheld the registry requirement as applied to an out-of-state father who had substantial notice of the mother's presence in Utah and her intention to place the child for adoption. See In re Adoption of B.B.D., 1999 UT 70, 984 P.2d 967 (Utah 1999).
168 On the other hand, we struck down the registry requirement's application to an out-of-state father when the father, relying on the mother's misrepresentation of her intentions, was in the process of moving to Arizona to establish a home for them and their child at the time the mother gave the child up for adoption. In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686, 690-91 (Utah 1986). Similarly, in Ellis v. Social Services Department, 615 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Utah 1980), we held that an out-of-state putative father was entitled to a hearing to determine his parental rights, even though he had not complied with the registry requirement, when he did not know of the child's birth in Utah.
T 69 The current version of the Utah Adoption Code does allow an exception to the registry requirement for out-of-state unmarried biological fathers, based on the legislative finding that such a father "may not, in every cireumstance, be reasonably presumed to know of, and strictly comply with, the requirements of this chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 78-80-4.15(4). The court of appeals here applied the requirements of that section and held that Osborne was ineligible for this exeeption because he had not, in the language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-80-4.15(4)(d), "complied with the most stringent and complete requirements of" his home state, North Carolina.
T 70 However, more than Osborne's out-of-state status is relevant here. The crucial fact is Osborne's five-month relationship with this child. In none of the above cases had the putative father developed any kind of relationship with the child, who in all cases was relinquished by the mother within days of its birth. Our precedent thus fails to address the situation at hand. In fact, in Wells, we specifically indicated that we were applying the same "rationale of variable parental rights" developed in Lehr, suggesting that this line of cases only applies to "unwed fathers 'whose relationships to their children are merely biological or very attenuated." " 681 P.2d at 2083 (quoting In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1375 (Utah 1982)). That is not the case here. To terminate Osborne's fully developed parental rights without notice and a hearing, based on strict application of statutory requirements, violates notions of fundamental fairness, and I therefore decline to join with the majority.

. The district court held that, under Utah Code section 78-30-4.14(5), plaintiff had "waived and surrendered any right in relation to the [minor] child, including the right to notice of any judicial proceeding in connection with the adoption of the child, and his consent to the adoption of the child is not required." This holding was based on the language of section 78-30-4.14(5), which requires an unmarried biological father to "fully and strictly comply" with statutory requirements in order to preserve his parental rights. Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(5) (2002). In the case of a child less than six months old, these requirements include registration with Utah's putative father registry before the birth mother relinquishes the child for adoption. See id. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b).

. Included in the statutory definition of "sending agency" is "a person ... which sends, brings, or causes to be sent or brought any child to another party state." Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-701(Ar-ticle ID(2). The statute specifically excludes [tlhe sending or bringing of a child into a receiving state by his parent, step-parent, grandparent, adult brother or sister, adult uncle or aunt, or his guardian and leaving the child with any such relative or nonagency guardian in the receiving state." Id. § 62¥-4a-701(Article VIID(1). A parent who brings a child into a receiving state for the purpose of relinquishing it to an adoption agency for adoption therefore qualifies as a "sending agency."

. The court subsequently replaced the restraining order with a preliminary injunction. See supra T7 n. 2.

. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws amended the UCCJEA in. 1999 to exclude adoption proceedings. Unif. Child Custody Jurisdiction & Enforcement Act § 103 (1999). This provision was enacted in Utah in 2000. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-103. Prior to its enactment, the UCCJEA was widely *69held to apply to adoption proceedings. See, eg., In re L.S., 943 P.2d 621, 624 (Okla.1997); E.E.B. v. D.A., 89 N.J. 595, 446 A.2d 871, 873 (N.J. 1982). The provision appears to result from unfortunate situations such as that in In re Clausen, 442 Mich. 648, 502 N.W.2d 649, 656 (1993), where applying the UCCJA (predecessor of the UCCJEA) in the adoption context had resulted in a child's removal from its adoptive parents, after living with them for two and a half years, in order to give custody to the biological father, who had never had any contact with the child. Such a rationale only strengthens the argument that the UCCJEA should apply in pre-adoption parental rights proceedings, especially where the parent in question has developed a relationship with the child, so that parental rights can be determined as quickly as possible in the most appropriate jurisdiction.

. According to the majority, the trial court did not exercise personal jurisdiction over Osborne and did not need to because Osborne had no parental rights under Utah law. In my opinion, this conclusion simply begs the constitutional question that Osborne has raised.

. Since no trial court has made findings of fact in this case, my opinion rests on the assumption that the facts as presented by Osborne, which do not appear significantly different from those presented by the Adoption Center, are correct.