Court Opinion

ID: 9720549
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:35:12.283446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:19.471370
License: Public Domain

Opinion
KINGSLEY, J.
Plaintiff appeals from an adverse judgment in an action for false imprisonment.1 We affirm.
*830In the light of the jury verdicts, the sole issue on this appeal is whether the county may be held liable for false imprisonment by reason of the failure of the sheriff’s department more promptly to advise the deputy district attorney in charge of plaintiff’s criminal case of the existence of a favorable blood test. We agree with the trial court that there existed no duty on the sheriff or his deputies to act in a manner other than the one here followed and, therefore, that the county is not liable for any delay in the ultimate release of plaintiff.
The facts, so far as are material to this appeal, are as follows; Plaintiff was stopped, early in the morning of May 2, 1972, while driving on a freeway, because deputy sheriffs observed him driving too slowly and weaving. He refused to take the field sobriety tests for balance and coordination, but did elect to take the blood test provided for in section 13353 of the Vehicle Code. Blood for that test was drawn at Doctor’s Hospital prior to his delivery to the police station, where he was booked for drunk driving.
The examination of the blood sample was conducted on May 5, 1972, by a criminologist employed by the sheriff’s department. There is no evidence or offer of proof as to how or through whom this report was transmitted to the district attorney. Plaintiff asserted, and the county counsel admitted, that the district attorney received the results on May 18, 1972. Plaintiff was arraigned on the drunk driving complaint on May 2, 1972, prior to the time the blood test results had become available. On that date the case was set for jury trial May 23, and plaintiff was remanded to the custody of the sheriff. On May 23 the public defender was appointed, and the trial continued to June 1, on which date the case was dismissed “due to lack of prosecution.”
The original incarceration of plaintiff has been found to be lawful by the jury verdict in this case, and that determination is not attacked on this appeal. His incarceration after the May 2 arraignment was pursuant to orders of the court before which his case was pending and plaintiff cannot, in this proceeding, charge the county or its sheriff with that incarceration.  However, an imprisonment originally lawful and court ordered may become actionable if release is delayed beyond lawful limits. (Shakespeare v. City of Pasadena (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 375, *831383-384 [40 Cal.Rptr. 863].)  Based on that situation, plaintiff’s theoiy is, as we understand it, as follows: When the favorable blood test reports were finally made known to the court, it immediately ordered his release; had those results been made known to the court earlier, the order of release would have come earlier;2 therefore, plaintiff contends, there is liability for not bringing the test results to the attention of the court as soon as they became known.
On the facts as we see them from the record before us, two agencies were involved in the delay. On an earlier appeal,3 we held that section 821.6 of the Government Code gave immunity to the deputy district attorneys involved for their part of the delay. Plaintiff’s theory rests on the contention that the sheriff had a duty to establish some system whereby such favorable blood test results would (a) be brought affirmatively to the direct attention of the district attorney or to the deputy in charge of the case; and (b) be brought to the immediate attention of the arrestee and/or his counsel if any.
We are cited to no authority, and we know of none, that imposes such duty. It would put an impossible burden on law enforcement officers to take such action every time they learn of some piece of evidence that might be favorable to a person under arrest.
Once the district attorney has filed a complaint, it is his responsibility to gather and present such evidence as will convict the guilty or exonerate the innocent. There is no suggestion that anyone in the sheriff’s department did anything to suppress or conceal the result of the blood test. Ordinarily, both the defendant and the district attorney will be aware that within a short time after the arrest the results of a chemical test will be available as evidence of guilt or innocence. (See Veh. Code, § 13353.) The law does not impose any duty upon the sheriff to tell the parties and their counsel what shall be done with that evidence.
The judgment is affirmed.
Files, P. J., concurred.

 At the trial, plaintiff sought to recover: (1) For false arrest; (2) for failure to advise of the blood test results; and (3) for undue delay in his release after the case against him was *830dismissed. The trial court refused to allow the second matter to go to the jury; the jury returned verdicts in favor of defendants on the first and third matters. As a result, we have now before us only the second theory.

 In the view that we take of this case, we need not, and do not, determine that an earlier dismissal would necessarily have occurred had the test results been more promptly called to the attention of the court. Plaintiff points to some evidence from which a jury might have found in his favor on that issue.

 2d Civ. 44691, filed July 17, 1975.