Court Opinion

ID: 9838188
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-05 16:12:13.713046+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:35:06.733930
License: Public Domain

J-S24007-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
              v.                      :
                                      :
                                      :
 RANDALL DOUGLAS BROOKS               :
                                      :
                   Appellant          :   No. 815 MDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 9, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-14-CR-0000141-2012

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
              v.                      :
                                      :
                                      :
 RANDALL DOUGLAS BROOKS               :
                                      :
                   Appellant          :   No. 816 MDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 9, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-14-CR-0002130-2010

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
              v.                      :
                                      :
                                      :
 RANDALL DOUGLAS BROOKS               :
                                      :
                   Appellant          :   No. 817 MDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 9, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-14-CR-0001515-2011

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
J-S24007-23

                                                 :
                v.                               :
                                                 :
                                                 :
  RANDALL DOUGLAS BROOKS                         :
                                                 :
                       Appellant                 :   No. 818 MDA 2022

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 9, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-14-CR-0000568-2011

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                   :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                                 :
                v.                               :
                                                 :
                                                 :
  RANDALL D. BROOKS                              :
                                                 :
                       Appellant                 :   No. 819 MDA 2022

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 9, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-14-CR-0001927-2010

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                         FILED SEPTEMBER 5, 2023

       Appellant, Randall Douglas Brooks, appeals from the post-conviction

court’s May 9, 2022 order denying in part, and granting in part, his petition

filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

After careful review, we are constrained to quash this appeal.

       The PCRA court summarized the pertinent facts and procedural history

of this case, as follows:

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

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     On April 20, 2012, [Appellant] … was found guilty[, in five
     separate cases that were consolidated for trial,] of attempted
     murder and numerous other criminal charges stemming from his
     alleged conduct during the early morning hours of December 29,
     2009. During that incident, according to prosecutors, he pulled
     up alongside a vehicle being driven by a Matthew Ross and fired
     three shots into [Mr.] Ross’s vehicle, one of which struck Mr. Ross
     in the left shoulder. Apparently, [Appellant] was angered by the
     ending of his romantic relationship with one[] Jessica Rooney, and
     her subsequent relationship with Mr. Ross. The other charges in
     the case stemmed from conduct directed toward Ms. Rooney and
     Mr. Ross[,] both prior to and after the shooting.

     At his trial, [Appellant] chose to represent himself. Karen Muir[,]
     Esq.[,] served as standby counsel. [Appellant] was found guilty
     of the charges[,] and on July 3[], 2012, the trial judge, [the]
     Hon[orable] Bradley P. Lunsford, sentenced … [Appellant] to an
     aggregate term of 35 to 73 years in prison. On appeal, the
     Superior Court remanded the matter for resentencing, concluding
     that the jury had failed to make the requisite factual finding of
     serious bodily injury with respect to at least one of the charges.
     [See Commonwealth v. Brooks, 122 A.3d 1120 (Pa. Super.
     2015) (unpublished memorandum).] Judge Lunsford retired from
     the Bench in 2015.         On July 13, 2016, … [Appellant] was
     resentenced before the Honorable Johnathan Grine to an
     aggregate sentence of 28 to 56 years. There then followed a post-
     sentence motion challenging the grading of an offense of stalking.
     In response, and after granting [Appellant’s] motion on December
     6[], 2016, Judge Grine resentenced [Appellant] to a term of 27
     years [and] 3 months to 54 years and 6 months. Following a
     withdrawal of counsel, Steven Trialonis, Esq.[,] was appointed to
     represent [Appellant]. He filed a post-sentence motion[,] which
     was denied by operation of law on September 6, 2017. In his
     motion, Attorney Trialonis asserted that the trial court had
     incorrectly applied an offense gravity score of 14 on the offense
     of [a]ttempted murder and had abused its discretion by increasing
     the sentence following remand from the Superior Court. On a
     subsequent appeal, the Superior Court found that the brief filed
     on behalf of [Appellant] failed to contain a concise statement of
     the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the
     discretionary aspects of sentencing[,] and … [Appellant’s] entire
     appeal was dismissed. [See Commonwealth v. Brooks, 195
     A.3d 1051 (Pa. Super. 2018) (unpublished memorandum).]

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      Discretionary review was not sought in the Pennsylvania Supreme
      Court.

      The aforementioned Superior Court dismissal was by way of an
      unpublished memorandum decision dated August 31, 201[8]. The
      instant PCRA petition, initially pro se, was [timely] filed in
      September of 2019.

PCRA Court Opinion (PCO), 5/9/22, at 1-2.

      In Appellant’s 2019 PCRA petition, he alleged that Judge Lunsford had

engaged in ex parte communications with the prosecutor in Appellant’s case,

former District Attorney Stacy Parks Miller, “during the timeframe surrounding

[Appellant’s] attempted murder trial.” Id. at 2. Appellant maintained that

these ex parte communications violated his constitutional rights, “which, in

the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining

process such that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have

taken place.”   Id. at 5 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(i)).      Additionally,

Appellant sought the reinstatement of his direct appeal rights, arguing that

his counsel on his 2018 direct appeal, Attorney Trialonis, had acted

ineffectively by not including a Rule 2119(f) statement in the appellate brief,

thereby waiving Appellant’s sentencing challenge for our review.

      In ruling on Appellant’s claims, the PCRA court first addressed his

allegation that there were ex parte communications between Judge Lunsford

and Ms. Parks Miller:

      In the course of the development of a factual record in [an
      unrelated] case [alleging ex parte communications between Judge
      Lunsford and Ms. Parks Miller], … an affidavit was taken from
      Maggie Miller, a Centre County Court Reporter concerning the trial
      of [Appellant], the matter sub judice. Again, as noted in the PCRA
      [p]etition and consistent with the transcript appended thereto, Ms.

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      Miller testified that “during a recess in trial in the instant matter,
      presiding [J]udge … Lunsford told her that he and [Ms.] Parks
      Miller were texting one another. According to Ms. Millers [sic]
      affidavits, during the break[,] Judge Lunsford stated to Ms. Miller
      that Ms. Parks Miller (the DA who was trying the case) was
      “bitching to him” in text messages about the way [Judge] Lunsford
      was handling some objections and handling the trial…. Ms. Miller
      stated in her affidavit that she was disgusted by what Judge
      Lunsford had revealed to her and approached [Judge] Lunsford’s
      secretary, Joan Parsons[,] who informed her that [Judge]
      Lunsford would regularly bring his cell phone to the bench and
      that Ms. Parson’s [sic] also viewed it as a problem.[] Thus[,] it is
      fair to conclude that[,] in the instant case[,] there were ex parte
      text communications between the District Attorney and the trial
      judge[,] and that at least some of those communications involved
      the trial of [Appellant].

Id. at 4-5.

      However, the court ultimately disagreed “that the law requires or even

suggests that the ethical improprieties in this case entitle [Appellant], per se,

to a new trial.” Id. at 6. The court explained:

      The rule appears to be that even if there were ex parte
      communications, there is no basis for the grant of a new trial “in
      the absence of evidence of influence.” Com[monwealth v.]
      Barnyak, 639 A.2d 40, 44 (Pa. Super. 1994). Admittedly, the
      Barnyak case does not cite to a wealth of appellate authority for
      this proposition. Nonetheless, it is an observation made by our
      Superior Court and one which common sense would seem to more
      than support. Texting involves “communication” and is by any
      understanding improper when conducted ex parte between a
      judge and attorney during the course of a trial. On the other hand,
      messages sent do not, in and of themselves, evidence an
      understanding that the judge has agreed to act improperly or even
      favorably to the party sending them. In fact, the messages sent
      in this case, as reported by Ms. Miller, were complaints that the
      judge’s trial rulings were not to the Commonwealth’s liking.

      We have reviewed the lengthy transcribed record of the trial in
      this case. In our view, Judge Lunsford navigated the shoals
      between a vigorous and sometime petulant prosecutor and an
      untrained pro se litigant with impartiality. We are unable to

                                      -5-
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      discern any evidence of an improper outside influence, let alone
      one that proved detrimental to [Appellant]. In fact, Judge
      Lunsford dealt with … [Appellant’s] legal missteps with
      considerable patience and equity. We can find no evidence of bias
      in either his rulings or his charge to the jury. Thus, we find no
      reason to require a new trial.

Id. at 6-7 (footnote omitted).

      The PCRA court then went on to address Appellant’s request for the

reinstatement of his direct appeal rights based on Attorney Trialonis’s

ineffectiveness, stating:

      The only other issue pursued by … [Appellant] at our recent
      hearing involved a claim of the ineffective assistance of prior
      appellate counsel. Specifically, counsel is faulted for failing to file
      a concise statement of reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal
      with respect to the discretionary aspects of [Appellant’s]
      sentence.    The Commonwealth has not taken issue with …
      [Appellant’s] contention that prior counsel’s failure to include a
      Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement did, in fact, cause the Superior Court
      to conclude that all claims raised by appellate counsel were
      waived. Our courts have distinguished between situations where
      counsel’s ineffectiveness may have waived one or more issues,
      and where it entirely denies the [p]etitioner’s right of direct
      appeal. See Commonwealth v. Halley, 870 A.2d 795 (Pa.[]
      2005). In the latter instance, counsel’s inactions have been
      deemed to be ineffective per se, entitling the defendant to an
      appeal nunc pro tunc. Id. at 801. Accordingly, we will reinstate
      [Appellant’s] right of direct appeal.

Id. at 7.

      Ultimately, the PCRA court entered the following order, which was filed

on May 9, 2022, disposing of Appellant’s petition:

      AND NOW, this 29th day of April, 2022, the Petition of the
      Defendant for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief in the nature of a
      request for a new trial is DENIED. The PCRA Petition of the
      Defendant in the nature of a request for reinstatement of his right
      to appeal is GRANTED and his right to file a Direct Appeal is
      REINSTATED nunc pro tunc.

                                       -6-
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Order, 5/9/22, at 1 (single page).

       On May 24, 2022, Appellant filed five notices of appeal, one for each

docket number, from the court’s May 9, 2022 PCRA order denying, in part, his

PCRA petition.     See Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 977 (Pa.

2018) (holding that “the proper practice under Rule 341(a) is to file separate

appeals from an order that resolves issues arising on more than one docket”).

Each notice of appeal has a different trial court docket number in its caption,

with the other four consolidated docket numbers listed below.1 The notices

were docketed in this Court at Nos. 815-819 MDA 2022, and were

consolidated, sua sponte, by order of September 27, 2022. Appellant timely

complied with the PCRA court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
____________________________________________

1 Because Appellant’s five notices of appeal contain multiple docket numbers,

this Court’s rulings in Commonwealth v. Creese, 216 A.3d 1142, 1144 (Pa.
Super. 2019), and Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141 (Pa. Super.
2020) (en banc), are implicated. In Creese, a panel of this Court construed
Walker to mean that this Court “may not accept a notice of appeal listing
multiple docket numbers, even if those notices are included in the records of
each case[,]” and that “a notice of appeal may contain only one docket
number.” Creese, 216 A.3d at 1144. But that pronouncement was expressly
overruled in Johnson, where this Court held that although the appellant filed
multiple notices of appeal, each listing multiple lower court docket numbers,
the appeals should not be quashed because the appellant filed an appropriate
number of appeals. Johnson, 236 A.3d at 1148. The Johnson panel was
also persuaded by the fact that the appellant had italicized only one trial court
docket number in each notice of appeal, noting that this made it clear that the
clerk of courts did not play a role in typing separate notices of appeal. Id.

      Here, Appellant filed the appropriate number of notices of appeal, with
each one bearing a “lead” docket number and four other docket numbers
appearing below it. Because Appellant filed the appropriate number of notices
of appeal, we conclude that quashal is unwarranted under our rationale in
Johnson.

                                           -7-
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statement of errors complained of on appeal, and the court thereafter filed a

Rule 1925(a) statement indicating that it was relying on the rationale set forth

in the opinion accompanying its May 9, 2022 order.

      In Appellant’s brief, he raises two issues for our review:

      1. Whether the [PCRA] court erred as a matter of law when it
      utilized “harmless error” analysis after concluding there were ex
      parte text message communications between the Centre County
      District Attorney and the trial judge during trial in the instant
      matter and that “at least some” of this ex parte communication
      involved the trial of Appellant?

      2. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law when it denied
      Appellant’s [PCRA] claim that his conviction resulted from a
      violation of the Constitution of this Commonwealth or the
      Constitution or laws of the United States which, in the
      circumstances of the instant case, so undermined the truth-
      determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or
      innocence could have taken place where the PCRA court concluded
      there were ex parte … text message communications between the
      Centre County District Attorney and the trial judge during trial in
      the instant matter and that “at least some” of this ex parte
      communication involved the trial of Appellant?

Appellant’s Brief at 7 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

      Before we may address Appellant’s issues, we must sua sponte consider

whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal.       See Commonwealth v.

James, 69 A.3d 180, 184 (Pa. 2013) (stating an appellate court “may raise

the issue of jurisdiction sua sponte”) (citation omitted).

      When a PCRA court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of a
      petition, we likewise lack jurisdiction to consider an appeal from
      disposition of the petition. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79
      A.3d 649, 654 (Pa. Super.2013) (citation omitted). A PCRA court
      lacks jurisdiction to consider a PCRA petition when a petitioner’s
      judgment is not final. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d
      462, 464 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). Once [a] PCRA

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      court grant[s a petitioner] the right to seek further review nunc
      pro tunc, [the petitioner’s] sentence [is] no longer final and the
      PCRA court lack[s] jurisdiction to rule on [the petitioner’s] other
      requests for relief. See Commonwealth v. Donaghy, 33 A.3d
      12, 14 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2011); see also [Commonwealth v.]
      Holmes, [79 A.3d 562 (Pa. 2013)].           Accordingly, until [a
      petitioner’s] judgment of sentence becomes final in accordance
      with the procedural mechanisms recognized in 42 Pa.C.S.[] §
      9545(b)(3), we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of [the
      petitioner’s] remaining … claims.

Commonwealth v. Harris, 114 A.3d 1, 6 (Pa. Super. 2015).

      As Harris makes clear, a PCRA court generally lacks jurisdiction to rule

on the merits of a petitioner’s remaining claims once the court has determined

that the petitioner’s direct appeal rights must be reinstated. Here, the PCRA

court granted the reinstatement of Appellant’s direct appeal rights, yet it then

ruled on the merits of his ex parte communication claim by denying it. As the

court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the merits of that claim, see id., this Court

issued an order on September 30, 2022, directing Appellant to show cause

why the instant appeals from the May 9, 2022 order denying the remainder

of Appellant’s PCRA claims should not be quashed.

      Appellant filed responses on October 10th and 21st, 2022. In his October

10th response, Appellant explained that he no longer wishes to pursue a direct

appeal challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence; rather, Appellant

wants review of the PCRA court’s denial of his claim stemming from the ex

parte communications. Appellant acknowledged Harris, but argued that the

exception in Holmes applies, which permits unitary review of ineffectiveness

claims on direct appeal when accompanied by knowing, voluntary, and

                                      -9-
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express waiver of PCRA claims. Appellant contended that because he is willing

to waive his right to a direct appeal nunc pro tunc, review of his remaining

PCRA claim is permissible at this juncture. He further argued that quashing

the appeal would not be judicially expedient, as it would necessitate the filing

of a new PCRA petition, PCRA court opinion/order, and notices of appeal.

Finally, Appellant argued that the instant matter is one of public importance

because of the gravity of the issue, which this Court should review at the

earliest opportunity.      In Appellant’s October 21st response, he provided a

signed statement confirming that, although his direct appeal rights have been

reinstated, he wishes to appeal from the denial of his remaining PCRA claim.

By order of December 2, 2022, this Court discharged the show-cause order

and referred the issue to this merits panel.

       Under our rationale in Harris, we are compelled to disagree with

Appellant that we may (or must) consider the merits of his challenge to the

PCRA court’s denial of his ex parte communication claim.2 The PCRA court’s

May    9,   2022    opinion    notes,    with   respect   to   Appellant’s   ex   parte

communications claim, “we find no reason to require a new trial.” PCO at 7.
____________________________________________

2 See also Commonwealth v. Miller, 868 A.2d 578, 580-81 (Pa. Super.
2005) (acknowledging the confusion that results when a PCRA court reinstates
direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc and is permitted to “address,” but not
“reach,” the merits of any remaining PCRA claims, and suggesting that in such
a scenario, the PCRA court should follow the procedure set forth in
Commonwealth v. Miranda, 442 A.2d 1133 (Pa. Super. 1982), whereby the
PCRA court may address the remaining claims to the extent necessary to
provide a complete record for appellate review, but such review is merely
“advisory” and is not considered final).

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While this language could be interpreted as either “addressing” the issue or

“reaching” the merits of the issue, the language in the accompanying PCRA

order makes clear that the PCRA court intended to issue a ruling on the merits

of that claim. See PCRA Court Order, 5/9/22, at 1 (“[T]he Petition of the

Defendant for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief in the nature of a request for a

new trial is DENIED.”). However, the court’s order also explicitly reinstated

Appellant’s direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc. See id. (“The PCRA Petition of

the Defendant in the nature of a request for reinstatement of his right to

appeal is GRANTED and his right to file a Direct Appeal is REINSTATED nunc

pro tunc.”). Pursuant to Harris, once the PCRA court reinstated Appellant’s

direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc, it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the merits

of his remaining claim. Thus, the ruling Appellant wishes to challenge via the

instant appeals is a nullity.

      While Appellant argued in his response to our rule to show cause that

we should consider his ex parte communication claim under the rationale of

Holmes, we disagree. The Holmes Court permitted review of

      multiple or prolix claims of counsel ineffectiveness, including non-
      record-based claims, on post-verdict motions and direct appeal, …
      but only if (1) there is good cause shown, and (2) the unitary
      review so indulged is preceded by the defendant’s knowing and
      express waiver of his entitlement to seek PCRA review from his
      conviction and sentence, including an express recognition that the
      waiver subjects further collateral review to the time and serial
      petition restrictions of the PCRA.

Holmes, 79 A.3d at 564 (footnote omitted). The purpose of Holmes was to

“adopt a paradigm whereby unitary review may be available in such cases

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only to the extent that it advances (and exhausts) PCRA review in time….”

Id.

      Holmes clearly did not involve, or instruct on, the circumstances at

hand, where a PCRA court reinstates the petitioner’s direct appeal rights, yet

proceeds to rule on the merits of other post-conviction claims. In cases such

as this, Harris and Miller hold that the PCRA court lacks jurisdiction to rule

on the remaining PCRA claims. Appellant’s after-the-fact attempt to waive his

right to the reinstated direct appeal does not create an exception to these

decisions, or return jurisdiction to the PCRA court. Because the court lacked

jurisdiction to rule on Appellant’s ex parte communications claim, we likewise

lack jurisdiction to consider his appeal from that disposition. See Harris, 114

A.3d at 6. Consequently, we are compelled to quash Appellant’s appeal.

      Appeal quashed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 09/05/2023

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