Court Opinion

ID: 9708025
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:27:44.750627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:41.347209
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE WOODWARD, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the opinion of this court. This dissent is based upon the failure of the trial court to follow the procedures prescribed in the Unified Code of Corrections in sentencing. Though defendant did not specifically contest the trial court’s failure to follow the statutory requirement to state on the record factors in mitigation, the issue is of sufficient importance to serve as the basis of this dissent. Section 5 — 4—1(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 4—1(c)) provides: “In imposing a sentence for a felony ***, the trial judge shall specify on the record the particular evidence, information, factors in mitigation and aggravation or other reasons that led to his sentencing determination. The full verbatim record of the sentencing hearing shall be filed with the clerk of the court and shall be a public record.” (Emphasis added.) The legislative purpose in enacting this provision was to eliminate speculation regarding the basis of the trial court’s sentencing decision so as to enable the reviewing court to determine more intelligently whether the sentence was properly predicated on statutory criteria. People v. Goodman (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 743, 751; People v. Meeks (1979), 75 Ill. App. 3d 357, 364. In the case before us, the only findings made by the trial court were those in aggravation, namely, that the particular offense is most repugnant to society and that the defendant’s sexual assault could very well leave a permanent scar on the victim. The trial court made no mention of any evidence or factors in mitigation. Certain of those factors are statutorily defined. Defendant’s only police record consists of a term of probation for one year without reporting on the traffic violation of unlawful use of a license (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 5—3.1(a)(7)). Defendant was found by the Adult Court Services for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit to meet “intensive probation supervision” eligibility criteria (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 5—3.l(a)(10)). Defendant is primarily responsible for the financial support of his wife, their one child, and three of her children from a previous marriage (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 5— 3.1(a)(ll)). There were also other mitigating factors that the court did not address. The defendant demonstrated remorse and regret over the charges at bar. When the charges arose, he underwent counseling and ceased his consumption of alcohol on his own volition. He was fully cooperative with the police and offered a complete statement of his culpability. He fully complied with the juvenile court order to stay out of the house while the victim was present. He was out on bond throughout the legal proceedings without incident. He entered a blind plea of guilty, apparently due to his interest in saving his marriage and saving his family the burden of having to undergo a trial. His wife believed in the sincerity of his remorse and wanted him to be given probation. He had an excellent employment record, most recently working as an independent trucker contracting with the U.S. Postal Service. Here, the State argues and the majority concurs, that it is sufficient for the trial judge to state that he considered the factors listed in the presentence report and argued by defense counsel. This does not comply with section 5 — 4—1(c) of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 4—1(c)), nor does it comply with the observations of this court in People v. Goodman (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 743, where the court stated as follows: “We do not read Smith, however, as dispensing altogether with the statutory and constitutional requirement that the trial court affirmatively indicate in the record that it has considered mitigation factors and rehabilitative potential at some stage of the sentencing proceeding. Nor should the supreme court’s decision in Meeks that not every fact in evidence need be recited and assigned a value be construed to mean that no recitation of mitigation and rehabilitation evidence is ever necessary. Such a rule would, in some cases, compromise the appellate process by substituting mere speculation for informed judicial review of the basis for a trial court’s sentence. Moreover, it would render even more difficult our task of determining whether the lower court abused its discretion. As the cases cited earlier in this opinion persuasively demonstrate, the requirement of disclosure on the record was meant to facilitate, not to impede this inquiry.” 98 Ill. App. 3d 743, 752. The majority cites People v. Baker (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 803, as dispositive of the issue in this case. On its facts, Baker is clearly distinguishable from the instant case. In Baker neither the State nor the defendant offered any evidence in aggravation or mitigation. The presentence report indicated that the defendant had spent most of his life in penal institutions and that he had an explosive personality. The report also set forth the many offenses which he had committed over the years. Here we have a defendant who has put forth a number of mitigating factors and who has a police record limited to probation for a traffic violation. The majority finds that it must be presumed that the trial court considered the mitigating evidence that was presented. This substitutes a presumption for informed judicial review of the basis for a trial court’s sentence, and, thus, as stated in People v. Goodman, it compromises the appellate process. From this record, it can’t be determined what, if anything, the trial court considered in mitigation of the sentence. In light of the fact that the State asked for the four-year minimum sentence and also that the Adult Court Services for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit found that the defendant met intensive probation supervision eligibility criteria, it is not certain that the trial court considered any factors in mitigation as required by section 5 — 4—1(c). A new sentencing hearing would determine whether the proper criteria were considered; it does not necessarily dictate a different result, but the record should be clarified on this requirement. For the above-stated reasons, I would vacate the sentence and remand to the circuit court of Kane County for a new sentencing hearing consistent with the statutory requirements.