Court Opinion

ID: 9766890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:01:29.683956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:26.942262
License: Public Domain

*280Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Cohen :
Defendants’ petition for a rule to show cause why these proceedings should not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter stated that “the actions alleged by the plaintiff against the defendants are unfair labor practice charges within the meaning of section 8(b)(1) and 8(b)(2) of the said Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.” ' The plaintiff replied: “Admitted in part. Admitted that said actions of the defendants are unfair labor practices within the meaning of the Labor Management Relations Act of but are only applicable to instances where labor contracts containing Union Security clauses between a Union and employer of labor are in effect.” (Emphasis supplied).
For purposes of this appeal we must therefore assume that the actions of the defendants herein complained of constitute unfair labor practices cognizable under the National Labor Law.1 The plaintiff’s qualification of her admission with respect to the absence of a labor contract containing union security clauses does not militate against this assumption; indeed, it confirms it. Further confirmation that we are here dealing with alleged union actions which, if proved, would constitute unfair labor practices is found in the fact that the plaintiff had previously filed unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board against the defendant union and against Charles Cardonick, d/b/a, Dorice Blouse and Dress Co. The subject matter of those charges is the same as that which furnishes the basis of this action.
*281We therefore come to grips with the problem whether the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 has given the National Labor Relations Board such exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the common law tort action for damages from tortious conduct which also constitutes an unfair labor practice under the national act so as to preclude the courts of this Commonwealth from hearing and determining the cause. I believe that it has because the decision in Garner v. Teamsters Unions, 346 U.S. 485 (1953), rather than in United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954), controls the present case.
In Garner the Supreme Court of the United States held that an action to enjoin peaceful picketing which was allegedly an unfair labor practice under the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act, Act of June 1, 1937, P.L. 1168, §6, as amended, 43 P.S. §211.6, and which was also allegedly an unfair labor practice under the national act, could not be maintained in the tribunals of this state.
In finding federal pre-emption, the Court in Garner differentiated the facts of that case from situations in which state action was permitted. Thus, the Court distinguished International Union, U.A.W. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1949), by stating “This [Garner] is not an instance of injurious conduct which the National Labor Relations Board is without express power to prevent and which therefore either is ‘governable by the State or it is entirely ungoverned.’ ” 346 U.S. at 488.
So also, in this case, if the state is prevented from exercising its jurisdiction, plaintiff is not without remedy, for the National Labor Relations Board is spécifically empowered to award back wages under Section 10(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 147, 29 U.S.C.A. §160(c) (1952).
*282' The Supreme Court in the Garner opinion also distinguished Allen-Bradley Local, U.E.R.M.W. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740 (1942) : “Nothing suggests that' the activity enjoined threatened a probable breach of the state’s peace or would call for extraordinary police measures by state or city authority.” 346 U.S. at 488.
Here, plaintiff’s complaint does not allege a breach of the state’s peace or the need for extraordinary police measures.
Therefore, I conclude that the holding in the Garner case that a state court is precluded from exercising jurisdiction over activities prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act is applicable to the facts of the instant case and controls our disposition thereof.
The case of United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) cited by the majority, is distinguishable and does not control the outcome of the present case.
In Laburnum, while the plaintiff corporation was performing construction work, agents of the defendant labor unions demanded that plaintiff’s employes join one of the defendant’s unions. Upon the refusal of plaintiff, and many of its employes to accede to the union’s demands, the defendant’s agents threatened plaintiff and its employes with such violence that plaintiff was compelled to abandon its project. Plaintiff sued in the state courts for damages and obtained a judgment. That judgment was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in the face of the contention that the state court lacked jurisdiction of the controversy by virtue of federal pre-emption. Mr. Justice Frankfurter explained why in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 477 (1955) : “[Laburnum] was an action for damages based on violent conduct, which the state court found to be a common law-tort. *283While assuming that an unfair labor practice under the Taft-Hartley Act was involved, this Court sustained the: state judgmeht on the theory that there was' no compensatory relief under the federal Act and no federal administrative relief with which the state remedy conflicted.” (Emphasis supplied).
Such is not the situation in the present case. Here there is compensatory relief under Section 10(c) of the Labor Management Relations Act. To permit an alternative state remedy would prevent the uniformity of result contemplated by the federal act. For, different rules relating to such matters as the burden of proof, the mitigation of damages, the availability of a jury trial and the award of punitive damages would be invoked in each forum and produce a. variety of results.
" My conclusion in this case is strengthened by the compelling public policy stated by Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting in Laburnum: “I think that for each wrong which the federal Act- recognizes the parties have only the remedy supplied by that Act — and for a simple reason. The federal Act was designed to decide labor-management controversies, to bring them to a péaceful, orderly settlement, to put the parties on the basis of equality which the rules designed by Congress envisaged. If= the parties not only have the remedy Congress provided but the right to sue for damages as well,: the controversy is not settled by what the federal agency does, It drags on and on in the courts, keeping old wounds open, and' robbing the administrative remedy of the healing effects it was intended to have.” 347 U.S. at 671.
I would reverse the order of the lower court, make the rule absolute and dismiss the action.

 The parties agree that all the employers referred to by the plaintiff in her complaint are engaged in interstate commerce within the jurisdictional requirement of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947.