Court Opinion

ID: 9896333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 21:09:28.256908+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:44.825675
License: Public Domain

STATE OF LOUISIANA

                                 COURT OF APPEAL

                                   FIRST CIRCUIT

                               NUMBER 2023 KA 0162

                                STATE OF LOUISIANA

                                       VERSUS

                          THOMAS CHISTOPUER RIDER

                                                Judgment Rendered:        NOV 0 9 2023

                                  Appealed from the
                       Twenty -Second Judicial District Court
                       In and for the Parish of St. Tammany
                                   State of Louisiana
                              Docket Number 3846-F- 2021
                  The Honorable Scott Gardner, Judge Presiding

Warren L. Montgomery                           Counsel for Appellee
District Attorney                              State of Louisiana
Matthew Caplan
Assistant District Attorney
Covington, Louisiana

Katherine M. Franks                            Counsel for Defendant/ Appellant
Madisonville, Louisiana                        Thomas Christopher Rider

             BEFORE: GUIDRY, C.J., CHUTZ AND LANIER, JJ.
GUIDRY, C.J.

          The   defendant,    Thomas     Christopher     Rider,                           bill
                                                                  was    charged     by          of

information with unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, a violation of La. R. S.

14: 68. 4, and initially pled not guilty. Thereafter, pursuant to a plea agreement, he

withdrew his initial plea and pled guilty as charged. Subsequently, the State filed a

habitual offender bill of information against the defendant alleging he was a

fourth -felony habitual offender.'        The defendant moved to withdraw his guilty
plea, but the motion was denied.         Following a hearing, he was adjudged a fourth -

felony habitual offender and initially sentenced to thirty years imprisonment at
hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. He moved to

correct an illegal sentence, and the motion was deemed satisfied after the court

vacated the previously imposed sentence and sentenced the defendant to twenty

years at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence.                  The

defendant now appeals contending the State breached the plea agreement, the State

failed to prove his identity as the person previously convicted in predicate number

3,    and the trial court erred in overruling his objection to testimony offered to

establish that the cleansing period had not elapsed between predicate numbers 1

and 2.      For the following reasons, we set aside the conviction, habitual offender

adjudication,     and   sentence,   and remand for further proceedings, allowing the

defendant the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.

                                            FACTS

          No trial testimony was presented concerning the facts of the offense because

the defendant pled guilty.           At the habitual offender hearing,           the defendant

stipulated a factual basis existed for the offense.

     Predicate number 1 was set forth as the defendant' s September 3, 2015 conviction, under
Twenty -Fourth Judicial District Court docket number 15- 2394, for simple burglary. Predicate
number 2 was set forth as the defendant' s August 18, 2008 conviction, under Twenty -Fourth
Judicial District Court docket number 07- 6759, for burglary of an inhabited dwelling. Predicate
number 3 was set forth as the defendant' s February 13, 2003 conviction, under Twenty -Fourth
Judicial District Court docket number 02- 5120, for burglary of an inhabited dwelling.

                                                2
                                 BREACH OF PLEA AGREEMENT

          In assignment of error number one, the defendant contends the trial court

erred in failing to order specific performance of the plea agreement or, in the

alternative, failed to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea because the State' s
 failure to appear" edict was not part of the plea agreement.                       A criminal plea

agreement is analogous to a civil compromise.               State v. O' Conner, 11- 1696 ( La.

App. 1st Cir. 9/ 21/ 12), 2012 WL 4335425, * 4 ( unpublished), writ denied, 12- 2163

 La. 411113),    110 So. 3d 138; see La. C. C. arts. 3071- 3083. The four elements of a

valid     contract   are:   1)   the parties'   capacity to contract;      2) the parties'   mutual

consent that is freely given; 3) the existence of a certain, lawful object for the

contract;     and 4) the existence of a lawful purpose,               or   cause,   of the contract.

O' Conner, 2012 WL 4335425 at * 4; see La. C. C. arts. 1918, 1927, 1966, & 1971.

          Upon motion of the defendant and after a contradictory hearing, which may

be waived by the State in writing, the court may permit a plea of guilty to be

withdrawn at any time before sentence.                 La. C. Cr.P.    art.   559( A).   Under this

Article, a defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a previously entered plea of

guilty.    The trial court' s decision is discretionary, subject to reversal only if that

discretion is abused or arbitrarily exercised. State v. Carmouche, 589 So. 2d 53, 55

La. App. 1 st Cir. 1991).

          Pursuant to La. R.S. 15: 529. 1( D)( 3), the trial court filed written reasons for

the habitual offender adjudication. The court noted that in November of 2021, the

State and the defendant agreed the defendant would enter guilty pleas in exchange

for the State withholding filing a habitual offender bill of information against him.

The State and the defendant further agreed to a sentence of thirty months to be

imposed in January of 2022.              The court noted, "[ t]he State made clear that if

d] efendant did not appear for sentencing, it would not be bound by its agreement

as to the sentence and the filing of a habitual offender bill."                     Thereafter, the

                                                   3
defendant failed to appear for sentencing in January of 2022, and the State filed a

habitual offender bill of information against him, alleging he was a fourth -felony
habitual offender.

        The transcript of the BOkin2 hearing indicates that at the beginning of the

hearing, defense counsel set forth the defendant would withdraw his previous not

guilty pleas and enter guilty pleas " as per our pretrial discussions." Thereafter, the

defendant was advised of and waived his rights, and defense counsel advised the

court that sentencing was set for January 5,                2022.    After the defendant was

questioned by the court and entered his guilty pleas, the State put on the record

that, should the defendant fail to appear for sentencing, it would file a multiple

offender bill of information against him. Defense counsel stated, "[ u] nderstood."

       In determining the validity of plea bargain agreements, Louisiana courts

generally refer to rules of contract law, while recognizing at the same time that a

criminal defendant' s constitutional right to fairness may be broader than his or her

rights under contract law.       A plea bargain agreement requires the consent of the

State and the defendant.     State v. Porche, 20- 0246 ( La. App. 1 st Cir. 12130/ 20), 318

So. 3d 184, 187- 88; see also La. C. C. art. 1927.         Error, fraud, or duress may vitiate

consent.   La. C.C. art. 1948.      Where the plea agreement calls for a legal sentence

and the trial court agrees, the trial court is bound by the terms of the agreement.

Under substantive criminal law, there are two alternative remedies available for a

breach of a plea bargain: ( 1)         specific       performance   of the    agreement,   or (   2)

nullification or withdrawal of the plea.          Porche, 318 So. 3d at 187- 88.      The party

demanding performance of a plea bargain agreement has the burden of proving its

existence and the terms thereof. Porche, 318 So. 3d at 188. In this case, the State

demanded specific performance of the amended plea bargain agreement.

a Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 ( 1969).

                                                  4
         The State argues in brief that defense counsel, acting as the defendant' s

agent,        accepted    the    State' s   plea   agreement    offer (   including    the   additional

requirement of appearing for sentencing) and the defendant' s inaction and/ or

failure to ask questions was indicative of his consent thereto.                       Defense counsel

cannot consent to a guilty plea on his client' s behalf, nor can a defendant' s tacit

acquiescence in the decision to plead guilty render the plea valid.                       Instead, the

jurisprudence requires the trial court to conduct a colloquy with the defendant, on
the   record,     to determine the guilty plea is entered with the defendant' s full

knowledge of its consequences. See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U. S. 175, 187- 188, 125

S. Ct. 551, 560, 160 L.Ed.2d 565 ( 2004); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-

244, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1712- 1713, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 ( 1969); United States v. Gu                       on,

37 F. Supp.3d 840,            853 ( E. D. La. 2014).         There is no colloquy in this case

indicating       the     defendant     himself      either   consented     to   or    understood   the

consequences of the additional condition the State attempted to impose after the

defendant had already pled guilty.

         The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the defendant to

withdraw his guilty plea. The plea agreement signed by the defendant specifically

provided:

         8.    1 further declare my plea of guilty is free and voluntary, that no
         additional       understandings,          promises,   or conditions         have been
         entered       into     other than     that contained in the plea colloquy
         conducted in open court on the record ( emphasis added)

         At no point during the plea colloquy conducted in open court did the

defendant agree to be charged as a habitual offender should he fail to appear for

sentencing.       To the contrary, according to the trial court, the defendant pled guilty

specifically to avoid being charged as a habitual offender. The record indicates the

court asked the defendant if he had been promised or offered anything in return for

his guilty plea, either by defense counsel, by the State, or by anyone else, and the

                                                      5
defendant answered negatively.            Thus,    no   additional   conditions,   including the

condition that the defendant' s failure to appear for sentencing would result in the

filing of a habitual offender bill of information against him, were set forth in the

plea colloquy.      The State only added that the agreement not to file a habitual

offender bill was conditioned on the defendant' s appearance at sentencing after the

defendant entered his guilty plea. Thus, the State unilaterally changed the terms of

the plea agreement after the plea had been entered. A plea agreement requires the

freely given mutual consent of the State and the defendant. See La. C. C. art. 1927

   O' Conner, 2012 WL 4335425 at * 4.              The defendant performed his part of the

plea agreement by pleading guilty to the instant offense; the State did not,

       The record is devoid of evidence that the defendant agreed to the filing of a

habitual offender bill of information against him if he failed to appear for

sentencing.    Since there was no existing plea agreement providing for the filing of

a habitual offender bill, there was no plea agreement for which to demand specific

performance, and the trial court should have allowed the defendant to withdraw his

guilty plea.     Accordingly, the conviction, habitual offender adjudication, and

sentence are set aside, and the case is remanded for further proceedings, allowing

the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea.'

       This assignment of error has merit.

       CONVICTION,           HABITUAL          OFFENDER          ADJUDICATION,             AND
SENTENCE SET ASIDE; REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
TO ALLOW THE DEFENDANT THE OPPORTUNITY TO WITHDRAW
HIS GUILTY PLEA.

3 Our disposition of this assignment of error causes us to pretermit consideration of assignment
of error number two, which challenges the sufficiency of the State' s proof of the defendant' s
identity as the person convicted in Twenty -Fourth Judicial District Court docket number 02- 5120
predicate number 3), and assignment of error number three, which challenges the overruling of
the defendant' s objection to Officer Wall' s testimony concerning whether or not the cleansing
period between predicate numbers 1 and 2 had elapsed.

                                               M