Court Opinion

ID: 9528266
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:39:00.24675+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:22:20.760419
License: Public Domain

M. S. Coleman, J.
(dissent). The thrust of the prevailing opinion is prophylactic, sending to all judges the message: "Use the Standard Jury Instructions verbatim”. As substantial compliance is deemed insufficient, the wise judge from this date forward will read a SJI with no tailoring to fit the peculiar facts of the case. I see two flaws in the rule as applied to this case. (1) It was the duty of the trial judge to determine whether the facts of the case supported the SJI on "impeachment”, (whether a witness is telling the truth and is or is not to be believed). The judge did not err in his finding that the facts failed to support an impeachment instruction. (2) In any event, the instructions as given incorporated the demands of the plaintiff and were not ipso facto error. I think we could have delivered a message to the judges without putting the parties and the county to the added trauma and expense of a new trial.
1.
It is not reasonable to bring into issue the *706veracity of a witness whose estimates at trial (concerning the accident) were so close to those given in a deposition a year or so earlier (i.e., "about five miles an hour” as opposed to "five or less, around there”; "something around seven seconds” as opposed to "I believe it’s less than seven seconds now that I think about it and have been out there driving that road again.”)
I doubt that any of us could have come so close —unless we had deliberately memorized the deposition of long ago or had rehearsed under the aegis of the attorney (a/k/a "woodshedding”). The processes of recall, memory and articulation normally prevent one from being precisely uniform in describing an event long past. The issue is not whether the witness was lying, but how accurately he remembered these fine points.
From the record, I am left with the abiding belief that this witness consistently was trying to reconstruct the accident as best he could. There were no facts upon which the jury of integrity could find that he was lying. I agree with the judge that an instruction on impeachment was not required.
Nevertheless, the judge did instruct:
"Now, as to the witnesses that appeared before you, you are the sole judges of the facts in the case and you must determine what or which witnesses you’ll believe * * *
"You may take into account in determining what weight you’ll place on the testimony of the witnesses, what they said in court and also any statements they may have made previously either in depositions or other times.* * * ”
*707Under the circumstances, I find the instructions fair as to that point.
2.
From the record of the pre-instruction conference, it appears that defense counsel was most anxious for an instruction that the deposition statements as well as trial statements of defendant Baltzell be considered by the jury as evidence (as in SJI 3.01[A]) of the facts to be determined by the jury. To this end, the judge gave the following instruction:
"In this case, also, we had certain evidence presented by the reading of depositions. I believe I told you just before the depositions were read that the depositions are a record of the sworn testimony of the persons who were disposed [sic] This was taken before an authorized person and all parties and their attorneys had a right to be present and to examine and cross-examine the witnesses. So, this evidence is entitled to the same consideration as you give the testimony as if the witness testified in open court from the witness stand.”
Compare this with the pertinent portion of SJI 3.01(A):
"Because he is a party, what he (said) (did) earlier may be considered * * * as evidence of the facts in this case.”
The judge said the same thing in different words. I can see no prejudice to plaintiffs. To the contrary, the instruction given was clearer.
In my opinion, the cause of justice has not been *708promoted when we so completely have forsaken the long-established concept that it is not error (certainly not prejudicial error) for the trial judge to refuse a requested charge when the charge actually given states correctly the law applicable to the case and covers the points which were proper.1 If the instruction gives the law in such a way that the jury will understand and not be misled, it seems a futile exercise to send the case back for a new trial. The prevailing opinion, however, provides as to the mandatory nature of GCR 1963, 516.6:
"Such a result would not ignore the harmless error of GCR 1963, 529.1, but rather would construe the specific requirements of GCR 1963, 516.6 as controlling over the general provisions of the harmless error rule.”

Conclusion

The Standard Jury Instructions were intended to provide some assurance of reviewably safe instructions when such were applicable and to this end I would urge trial judges to employ SJI when appropriate. However, lawsuits cannot always fit into straightjackets without injury to justice.
This judge did not find the impeachment instruction applicable to the facts of the case — nor do I. Veracity is not the ability to estimate perfectly. The judge did, however, instruct according to plaintiffs’ request as to use of the deposition as evidence of the facts to be determined by the jury. *709Half of SJI 3.01(A) would have been less illuminating in the context of this case than the instruction actually given and the other half (impeachment) was inapplicable. As to the requirement for verbatim instructions, we should not become such slaves to little words that large meanings are sacrificed to their sanctity.
I would affirm.

 Fisher v People, 20 Mich 135 (1870); McGinnis v Kempsey, 27 Mich 363 (1873); Joslin v Le Baron, 44 Mich 160; 6 NW 214 (1880); People v Beverly, 108 Mich 509-512; 66 NW 379 (1896); People v Sauerbier, 173 Mich 521; 139 NW 260 (1913); People v Auerbach, 176 Mich 23; 141 NW 869 (1913).