Court Opinion

ID: 9863037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 02:55:44.035903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:46:35.687997
License: Public Domain

*331Justice RIVERA-SOTO,
dissenting.
Based on a mixed brew of principles of statutory construction leavened by the doctrine of lenity, the majority determines that defendant Jason Shelley cannot be held liable for violating the statute that proscribes the possession or distribution of drugs within a school zone, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7. It so concludes because— in the majority’s view—the school within that school zone does not qualify as an “elementary school” under the statute. I cannot agree and, therefore, respectfully dissent.
I.
A.
As part of the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-1 to -24,1 the Legislature adopted N.J.S.A 2C:35-7. In clear, simple and unmistakable language, that statute provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ny person who violates [.N.J.S.A 2C:35-5(a)]2 by distributing, dispensing or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog while ... within 1,000 feet of ... school property ... is guilty of a crime of the third degree!.]” That proscription is intended to be absolute; N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7(d)3 *332also specifically commands that:
It shall be no defense to a prosecution for a violation of this section that the actor was unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school property. Nor shall it be a defense to a prosecution under this section, or under any other provision of this title, that no juveniles were present on the school property at the time of the offense or that the school was not in session.
The straightforward prohibition against transacting in drugs within a school zone does not exist in a vacuum. The codified declaration of policy and legislative findings that introduces the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987 explicitly states:
It is also the policy of this State to afford special protection to children from the perils of drug trafficking, to ensure that all schools and areas adjacent to schools are kept free from drug distribution activities, and to provide especially stern punishment for those drug offenders who operate on or near schools and school buses, who distribute to juveniles, or who employ juveniles in a drug distribution scheme.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:35-1.1 (c).]
According to the Official Commentary to the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act (Laws 1987, Chapter 106) (Official Commentary), 9 Crim. Just. Q. 149, 151 (Fall 1987), “this declaration [of policy and legislative findings], by identifying the purposes to be achieved by this reform initiative, will aid the courts in interpreting and implementing the specific provisions of the act.” The Official Commentary further explains that N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7
creates a new third-degree crime to deal with persons who distribute, dispense or possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school____This section, which is roughly modeled after federal law found at 21 U.S.C. § 845a,4 effectively creates a drug “safety zone” around schoolyards in recognition not only that children, who are often the targets of distributors, congregate there, but also that areas surrounding schools must be kept drug free if they are to serve as the primary medium for educating young people as to the dangers of drug use.
[Official Commentary, supra, 9 Crim. Just. Q. at 157.]
*333The Official Commentary likewise informs that “[i]t does not matter in a prosecution under [N.J.S.A 2C:35-7] whether children were actually present or whether the school was in session at the time the offense occurred.” Ibid. It explains that “[r]ather, [N.J.S.A 2C:35-7] is intended to create a permanent, 24-hour drug safety zone around schools, in recognition that children routinely congregate on school property and schoolyards before and after the normal school day, and during summer recess and other vacation periods.” Ibid.
Moreover, “[i]t is not a defense to a prosecution under [N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7] that the actor was unaware that he was distributing [drugs] within a school zone[,]” noting that, “as to this element, the defendant will be held strictly liable for his illegal acts occurring within a zone.” Ibid. For that reason, “[i]t is thus incumbent upon drug traffickers to ascertain their proximity to schools and remove their illegal operations and activities from these specially protected areas, or assume the risk and stern consequences for their failure to do so.” Ibid.
That clear statement of policy consistently and repeatedly has found expression in our case law. State v. Maldonado, 137 N.J. 536, 582, 645 A.2d 1165 (1994) (stating that “the school zone statute aims to protect children by reducing drugs around school” (citation, internal quotation marks and editing marks omitted)); State v. Thomas, 132 N.J. 247, 253, 624 A.2d 975 (1993) (noting that “N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 was enacted to create a drug safety zone around schoolyards” (quoting Official Commentary, supra; internal quotation marks and editing marks omitted)); State v. Ivory, 124 N.J. 582, 594-95, 592 A.2d 205 (1991) (“Clearly, the Legislature intended to create drug-free zones of safety where children could be, learn and play free of the potential infection of drugs.”); State v. Soto, 385 N.J.Super. 257, 263, 896 A.2d 1153 (App.Div.) (explaining that “the school zone statute aims to protect children by reducing drugs around schools” (citation, internal quotation marks and editing marks omitted)), certif. denied, 188 N.J. 491, 909 A.2d 725 (2006); State v. Parker, 335 N.J.Super. 415, 424, 762 *334A.2d 690 (App.Div.2000) (quoting Maldonado, supra, 137 N.J. at 582, 645 A.2d 1165). As this Court most recently noted in State v. Lewis, 185 N.J. 363, 370, 886 A.2d 643 (2005):
The purpose of N.J.S.A 2C:35-7 (school zone) ... is essentially ... to protect those, predominantly children, in and around schools and public parks from exposure to the drug culture and perils of drug trafficking. In furtherance of that purpose, the Legislature mandated severe punishment for those who possess or distribute drugs in the safety zones established by those statutes.
Finally, “ ‘it does not matter for purposes of [N.J.S.A 2C:35-7] whether the school is public, private or parochial.’ ” Ivory, supra, 124 N.J at 588, 592 A.2d 205 (quoting Official Commentary, supra, 9 Crim. Just. Q. at 157).
B.
Properly framed by the context of a clear legislative mandate to protect children from the many ills drugs cause, the question presented in this appeal becomes deceptively simple: was defendant within one thousand feet of “school property” when he engaged in the illicit drug transactions that led to his arrest? In order to answer that question, the focus must shift to a more fundamental inquiry: does the school that triggered the designation of “school property” that thus defined the school zone within which defendant plied his illegal drug trade—the Goddard School—qualify as an “elementary or secondary school” under the statute? The majority concludes it is not; I disagree.
The path to the fair answer to that inquiry is familiar and well-trod:
Our goal in construing a statute is to discern and effectuate the Legislature’s intent. We start by considering the plain language of the statute. If the language is clear, we interpret the statute consistent with its plain meaning. If the meaning of the text is ambiguous, we construe a criminal statute in favor of the defendant. Nevertheless, in interpreting a criminal statute, whatever be the rule of construction, it is subordinate to the goal of effectuating the legislative plan as it may be gathered from the enactment when read in the full light of its history, purpose and context. Further, a court should strive to avoid statutory interpretations that lead to absurd or unreasonable results.
[Lewis, supra, 185 N.J. at 369, 886 A.2d 643 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).]
*335This process also is guided by core principles of statutory construction. First and foremost, the Legislature has mandated that,
[i]n the construction of the laws and statutes of this state, both civil and criminal, words and phrases shall be read and construed with their context, and shall, unless inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature or unless another or different meaning is expressly indicated, be given their generally accepted meaning, according to the approved usage of the language.
[N.J.S.A. 1:1-1.]
This Court has acknowledged its obligation to adhere to that legislative mandate. Burnett v. County of Bergen, 198 N.J. 408, 421, 968 A.2d 1151 (2009) (“At the outset of New Jersey’s statutory code, the Legislature reminds us that a statute’s ‘words and phrases shall be read and construed within their context’ and ‘given their generally accepted meaning.’ ” (quoting N.J.S.A. 1:1-1)). Also, when interpreting provisions of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, additional considerations apply. As Lewis, supra, 185 N.J. at 369, 886 A.2d 643, explains, “[t]he Code of Criminal Justice specifically declares that ‘when the language [of a provision] is susceptible of differing construction it shall be interpreted to further the general purposes stated in this section and the special purposes of the particular provision involved.’ ” (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:l-2(c); citations omitted).
These principles inform the discussion of the discrete question presented in this appeal: for purposes of the school zone statute, N.J.S.A 2C:35-7, what is an elementary school?
C.
Although dictionary definitions of the term “school” vary widely, common usage of the term tells us that it is “[a]n institution for the instruction of children.” Webster’s II New College Dictionary 988 (1995); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language—Unabridged 2031 (1966). N.J.S.A 2C:35-7, however, does not speak of any school; it governs drug transactions occurring within 1,000 feet of any “school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or *336secondary school or school board[.]” (emphasis supplied). That point is further made in the Official Commentary, swpra, which notes that “[t]he definition of school property is generally derived from current law at N.J.S.A 2C:33-15,5 and is limited to elementary and secondary (junior high and high) schools.” 9 Crim. Just. Q. at 157.
The record reflects that the Goddard School of North Brunswick opened its doors in 1999, “offering] year round programs for children as young as six weeks to six years of age.” In 2001, the Goddard School “started [its] private full day Kindergarten[.]” Its kindergarten program “holds 10 fulltime students and is taught by a Degreed, N.J. State Certified teaeher[,]” and it “works with [the] local [school] districts to ensure [the] child’s smooth transition between Kindergarten and First Grade.” It is uncontested in the record that the Goddard School unmistakably is identified by various large signs that identify it as a school—not as an academy or other place of instruction, but as a school.
In a more limited context, an “elementary school” frequently is defined as “[a] school for the first four to eight years of a child’s formal education, often including kindergarten.” The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 2004), accessed via http://www.answers.com/topic/primary-education (emphasis supplied). Given the breadth and scope the Legislature obviously intended the school zone law to have, it goes without saying that the Legislature certainly would conclude that a standalone kindergarten would be considered an “elementary school” and, hence, would come under the protection of N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.6 *337If that is so—and no one credibly asserts otherwise—then the fact that the Goddard School also serves children of pre-school age should be irrelevant: it qualifies as a school under N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 and, as a matter of plain logic, that status remains unaffected by the presence of younger children.
This result is further compelled by this Court’s own pronouncements in the area of compulsory public education. The New Jersey Constitution requires that the State “provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years[,]” N.J. Const. art. VIII, § IV, 11 1 (emphasis supplied), and one need not resort to any authority for the proposition that five-year-olds attend kindergarten, not first grade. To underscore the point, this Court has determined that “full day kindergarten is an essential part of a thorough and efficient education” and that those “essential” kindergarten programs are designed for five-year-olds, those at the earliest age for whom the constitutional guarantee is extended. Abbott v. Burke, 153 N.J. 480, 502-03, 710 A.2d 450 (1998).7 It is, therefore, ironic that this Court would determine that the provision of kindergarten is constitutionally required, yet deny those same kindergarten children the protections afforded by N.J.S.A. *3382C:35-7 simply because their kindergarten facility is not attached or part of a school offering first or later grades instruction.
II.
The intent of N.J.S.A 2C:35-7 is unmistakable: it is meant to protect school children without an arbitrary cut-off at first grade from which kindergarten is excluded. Kindergarten is a constitutionally required grade in our system of free public schools, yet the majority’s decision denies kindergarten students the protection it extends to those in the grade immediately above. That result lacks logic and common sense. It also runs counter to federal authority construing 21 U.S.C. § 845a—now codified at 21 U.S.C. § 860—a statute after which the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987 was “roughly modeled.” Official Commentary, supra, 9 Crim. Just. Q. at 157. See United States v. Echevaria, 995 F.2d 562, 564 (5th Cir.1993) (holding that private kindergarten satisfied definition of “elementary school” in 21 U.S.C. § 860, thereby triggering enhanced federal sentencing provisions for drug trafficking within 1,000 feet of elementary school).
Because the protections afforded by N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 rationally and logically extend to those in kindergarten, I must dissent from the majority’s decision holding otherwise. Furthermore, in light of the majority’s ruling, I add a straightforward plea: that the Legislature act promptly to amend N.J.S.A 2C:35-7 and eliminate this gap in needed protection.
For affirmance—Chief Justice RABNER and Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, HOENS, and STERN—6.
For reversal—Justice RIVERA-SOTO—1.

 Since its enactment, the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1987 has been amended several times, with its last section, N.J.SA. 2C:35-24, having been added by L. 1999, c. 90, § 9 (eff. May 3, 1999). None of those amendments or additions is implicated in this appeal.

 N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a) provides that:
Except as authorized by [law], it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or purposely:
(1) To manufacture, distribute or dispense, or to possess or have under his control with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance or controlled substance analog; or
(2) To create, distribute, or possess or have under his control with intent to distribute, a counterfeit controlled dangerous substance.

 At the time defendant committed his offenses in 2005, N.J.SA. 2C:35-7 was not subdivided into subsections; this provision, however, was a separate but *332undifferentiated part of the statute as originally enacted. In Januaiy 2010, NJ.S.A. 2C:35-7 was amended and reorganized, and this provision—unchanged—was re-codified as subsection (d). See L. 2009, c. 192, § 1 (eff. Jan. 12, 2010).

 Now recodified as 21 U.S.C. § 860.

 That statute proscribes the underage consumption of alcoholic beverages "in any school, public conveyance, public place, or place of public assembly, or motor vehicle!.]” N.J.S.A. 2C:33-15(a). The reference to that statute in the Official Commentary, however, is not helpful; neither that statute nor the few cases interpreting it have defined either a "school” or "school property.”

 At oral argument, the Attorney General advised that there is at least one stand-alone public kindergarten in this State, one that cannot lose its protected character under NJ.S.A. 2C:35-7 simply because it is attended only by kinder*337garten students. Although it may be claimed that a stand-alone public kindergarten is protected under the school zone act because, as "property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to ... a [public] school board,” NJ.S.A. 2C:35-7, it falls under another provision of the act, that claim simply begs the question: in light of the clear purpose of the school zone act to protect all schools, be they " 'public, private or parochialf,]' ” Ivory, supra, 124 N.J. at 588, 592 A.2d 205 (quoting Official Commentary, supra, 9 Crim. Just. Q. at 157), there is no reason and even less logic supporting the proposition that the children at a public stand-alone kindergarten should receive the protection of the school zone act while the children at a stand-alone private or parochial kindergarten would" not.

 Indeed, that decision further extended the constitutional obligation to require, in certain special needs school districts, the provision of pre-school to three- and four-year-olds, id. at 507-08, 710 A.2d 450, who, under the Court's decision today, also would be without the protections of the school zone law.