Court Opinion

ID: 9788397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:49:07.975946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:10.202820
License: Public Domain

Lockett, J.,
dissenting. Further, I join the dissent of Justice Allegrucci.
As Justice Allegrucci points out in his dissent, statutes are to be liberally construed to carry out the intent of the legislature. The legislature is presumed to have expressed its intent through the language of the statute. In re Marriage of Killman, 264 Kan. 33, 42-43, 955 P.2d 1228 (1998).
In reaching its conclusion that a school teacher is not prohibited by statute from serving as a member of the board of education of a school district, the district court was required to use the statutory rule of strict construction. That rule requires that ordinary words are to be given their ordinary meaning. The statute was not to be read to add that which is not readily found in the statute or to be read to take out what as a matter of ordinary English language is in the statute. Director of Taxation v. Kansas Krude Oil Reclaiming Co., 236 Kan. 450, 455, 691 P.2d 1303 (1984).
The district court noted that the legislature specifically stated in K.S.A. 78-8202b, K.S.A. 78-8202c, and K.S.A. 78-8202d, that superintendents, assistant superintendents, supervisors, principals, board clerks, and board treasurers shall not be members of the board. The district court further noted that K.S.A. 72-8202e provides for the board of education to set the compensation for the officers provided for in the act or appointed by the board and then states that “[n]o member of a board of education shall receive compensation from the school district for any work or duties performed by him.” The district court concluded that the statute clearly prohibits a member of the board of education from receiv*255ing compensation from the school district for any work or duties performed while acting in the capacity of a board member.
The majority disregards the rules of statutory interpretation and the action of the legislature to amend the statute, and then, under the guise of the common law, the majority rewrites the statute so that a member of the board of education cannot receive compensation from the school district for any work or duties contracted to perform for the school district. The majority’s interpretation of the statute prohibits a member of the board of education from contracting to perform any work or service for or to sell any goods to the school district.