Court Opinion

ID: 9406070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-29 18:03:54.801462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:40.778388
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/29/23 P. v. Colon CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                  IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         H050141
                                                                    (Santa Clara County
             Plaintiff and Respondent,                               Super. Ct. No. 122562)

             v.

 JOSE ANTHONY COLON,

             Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT1
         Defendant Jose Anthony Colon appeals from an order denying his petition for
resentencing under former Penal Code section 1170.95.2 For the reasons set forth below,
we will affirm the order.
                                       I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
         Colon was convicted by a jury of first degree murder (§ 187; count 1) in 1990. 3
The jury found true the special circumstance that the murder was committed while Colon
was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a robbery (§ 211). Colon
was also convicted of robbing the murder victim on the night of the murder. (§ 211–
212.5, subd. (a); count 2.) As to counts 1 and 2, the jury found true that Colon personally

         1
          Before Grover, J., Greenwood, P.J., and Lie, J.
         2
          Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Effective June 30,
2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered section 1172.6, with no changes to the text.
(Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
        3
          We omit the facts of the offense as they are not relevant to the analysis and
disposition of the appeal.
used a deadly and dangerous weapon (knife) during the commission of the offenses.
(§ 122022, subd. (b).) Colon was convicted of numerous other offenses at trial: two
counts of possessing stolen property (§ 496; counts 4 and 7); three counts of automobile
theft (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); counts 6, 13, and 14); four counts of first degree
burglary (§ 459–460.1; counts 8, 9, 11, and 12); and two counts of petty theft (§ 484–488;
counts 10 and 15). The trial court sentenced Colon to life in prison without possibility of
parole on count 1, consecutive to a 10-year prison term imposed on the remaining felony
counts, and a county jail term (deemed served) on the petty theft counts. On appeal, this
court reversed one conviction for receiving stolen property and otherwise affirmed the
judgment. (People v. Colon (May 12, 1992, H007298) [nonpub. opn.])
       On January 27, 2022, Colon petitioned for resentencing under former
section 1170.95. Colon’s petition alleged that he had been convicted of murder under the
felony murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine and could not be
presently convicted of murder because of changes made to sections 188 and 189.
       The trial court ruled that Colon was not entitled to relief as a matter of law, and it
denied the petition without issuing an order to show cause. The court noted that the jury
instructions provided a path to first degree murder under both felony murder and willful,
premeditated, and deliberate murder, but not based on a natural and probable
consequences theory. In reaching its decision, the trial court stated that it relied on:
(1) Colon’s testimony at trial that he was the actual killer and that he personally inflicted
the fatal blows; (2) this court’s previous opinion, which showed that Colon’s liability for
the murder was predicated on him being the actual killer and that his defense was an
unsuccessful attempt to negate malice; and (3) the jury’s finding that Colon personally
used a knife during the commission of the murder. The court found that because Colon’s
testimony did not reveal the participation of a third party in the killing, the jury
instructions necessarily premised his first degree murder liability either on a malice
theory or on a felony murder theory with Colon as the actual killer. The court noted
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further that the jury was instructed that the special circumstance allegation was not
established unless the defendant “has killed in cold blood in order to advance the
robbery.”
       After a timely notice of appeal, counsel filed an opening brief pursuant to People
v. Serrano (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 496 (Serrano). We notified Colon that he could file a
supplemental brief on his own behalf, and that failure to do so would result in dismissal
of the appeal as abandoned. (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 231–232.)
Colon has filed a timely supplemental brief.
                                       II. DISCUSSION
       In his supplemental brief, Colon requests leave to file a habeas corpus petition so
that he can seek relief under the statutory changes effected by Assembly Bill No. 256
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.). He does not raise an arguable issue in this appeal. An issue is
arguable if it has a reasonable potential for success, and, if resolved favorably for the
appellant, the result will either be a reversal or a modification of the judgment. (People
v. Johnson (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 106, 109.)
       Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) amended
sections 188 and 189, which pertain to the definition of malice and the degrees of murder.
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §§ 2–3.) As amended, section 188 provides: “Except as stated in
subdivision (e) of Section 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime
shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely
on his or her participation in a crime.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2; § 188, subd. (a)(3).)
The changes to the law were enacted to “amend the felony murder rule and the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, … to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on
a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
participant of the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.”
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)

                                               3
       Senate Bill No. 1437 also added former section 1170.95, “which permits a person
with an existing conviction for felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine to petition the sentencing court to have the murder conviction
vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts if he or she could not have been
convicted of murder as a result of the other legislative changes implemented by Senate
Bill No. 1437.” (People v. Flores (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 985, 992.) “If the petitioner
makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the court must issue an order to
show cause and, absent a waiver and stipulation by the parties, hold a hearing to
determine whether to vacate the murder conviction, recall the sentence, and resentence
the petitioner.” (Id. at p. 992.)
       During its prima facie review, a trial court “may look at the record of
conviction … to determine whether a petitioner has made a prima facie” showing.
(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971 (Lewis).) However, the prima facie inquiry
under section 1172.6, subdivision (c) is “limited.” (Lewis, at p. 971.) The court
“ ‘ “takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations
were proved.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “ ‘[A] court should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations
on credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.’ [Citation.]
‘However, if the record, including the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting
the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Although the court may rely on the
record of conviction (including any appellate opinion) in determining whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie showing, “ ‘an appellate opinion might not supply all
answers,’ ” and the court “should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of
evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (Id. at p. 972.)
       Colon does not dispute the trial court’s conclusion that he was not entitled to
resentencing relief under section 1172.6. Instead, he seeks to file a claim in this court
                                              4
related to alleged racial discrimination at his trial under the amendments to sections 745
and 1473 as effected by Assembly Bill No. 256. That is not a cognizable claim in an
appeal from the order denying his resentencing petition pursuant to section 1172.6. As
Colon raises no arguable issue in his supplemental brief, we must affirm the order
denying his section 1172.6 petition. (Serrano, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 503–504.)
                                    III. DISPOSITION
       The order denying the resentencing petition is affirmed.

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