Court Opinion

ID: 9890004
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 21:03:41.466393+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:56.963363
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/11/23 R.J. v. Superior Court CA1/1
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

 R.J.,
             Petitioner,
 v.                                                                      A168229
 THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 ALAMEDA COUNTY,                                                      (Alameda County
                                                                      Super. Ct. Nos.
             Respondent;
                                                                   JD02419102,
 ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL                                             JD02419202,
 SERVICES AGENCY et al.,                                           JD02419002)
             Real Parties in Interest.

         R.J., alleged and biological father1 of now 16-year-old Iz.R. and 10-year-
old twins In.R., and Ir.R. (minors), seeks extraordinary relief from the
juvenile court’s order terminating reunification services for mother and
setting the matter for a permanency planning hearing pursuant to Welfare
and Institutions Code section 366.26.2 Father challenges the termination of
reunification services and contends minors should remain in their present
placements. Because father lacks standing to challenge the termination of

         1    Mother is not a party to this petition.
       All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
         2

Code unless otherwise indicated.

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mother’s reunification services and because the court has not yet made a
determination on the minors’ placement making father’s challenge
premature, we dismiss his petition.
                                 BACKGROUND
      In December 2021, the Alameda County Social Services Agency
(Agency) filed a section 300 petition alleging minors Iz.R., In.R., and Ir.R.,
came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under subdivisions (b) and
(g).3 Specifically, the petition alleged minors “were exposed to unsafe housing
conditions that place them at risk of serious health conditions while living
with mother”; mother “does not provide the minors with adequate care,
support, or supervision”; and alleged father “is incarcerated” and is “unable
or unwilling to provide the minors with the adequate care, support, or
supervision at this time.”
      Four months later, the court adjudged minors dependents of the court
after an uncontested jurisdictional hearing, and found the minors were
persons described by section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g). After a contested
disposition hearing, the court ordered the Agency to provide services to
mother, but stated it was “not required to provide reunification services” to
father as an “alleged father, unless and until he establishes a legal basis for
receiving those services.” The minors had been placed with two nonrelative

      3 The petition also made allegations as to a fourth child, J.R., however,
between the time of the disposition hearing and the six-month review
hearing, J.R. turned 18 years old. Accordingly, the Agency recommended the
court terminate mother’s reunification services as to him, and that J.R.
remain in his current placement as a nonminor dependent. Although J.R.’s
supervised independent living placement had been approved, he had “left his
approved placement” and had begun living with his older brother O.R. J.R. is
not a party to this petition.

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extended family members, and the court found the placement “necessary and
appropriate.”
      In its six-month status review report, the Agency explained both
mother and father were now incarcerated.4 The minors were “doing well and
have adjusted nicely to their placement.” However, although the twins’ (In.R.
and Ir.R.) current caregiver cared “for the girls deeply,” she was “unable to
provide long-term housing to them.” Additionally, Iz.R.’s caregiver had
previously reported she “could only provide support through the end of July,”
although Iz.R. continued to remain in her care. Accordingly, the Agency
performed an “extensive relative search” and concluded “mother’s maternal
cousin, . . . located in San Diego County was the only relative willing and able
to care for the children.” Maternal cousin had begun the resource family
approval process. However, only the twins were to be placed with him
because his home was not large enough for all three minors.
      At the six-month status review hearing, the court continued the minors’
out-of-home placement, determined mother had made no progress toward
alleviating the causes necessitating the placement, and ordered continued
reunification services for mother.
      In the 12-month review report, the Agency recommended continuation
of services to mother. In.R. and Ir.R. were now placed with maternal cousin,
and they felt “safe in their placement” and wanted to “remain in their
placement” until reunification with mother, or if reunification was
unsuccessful. Iz.R. remained in his original placement and wanted to remain
in that placement until mother could “get better” or if reunification was

      4 In March 2022, the Agency was “informed that the mother [had]
pleaded guilty to felony evasion of the police and would be sentenced to two
years.” In September, the Agency spoke with mother who was unsure of her
release date.

                                       3
unsuccessful. Maternal cousin reported he “would like to pursue legal
guardianship” of the twins if reunification did not occur, and Iz.R.’s caregiver
now reported she would be “happy to continue caring for [him] as long as he
needs.” An adoption assessment was completed and the minors were found to
be adoptable. The Agency recommended legal guardianship, if “reunification
should fail.”5
      The court determined reasonable services had been provided, mother
had made minimal progress, and ordered continued services for mother.
      In its 18-month status review report and subsequent addendum report,
the Agency recommended the minors remain dependents of the court, that
the court terminate services for In.R. and Ir.R. and set a section 366.26
hearing. As to Iz.R., the Agency recommended that he “remain in his
placement with the plan of [a]nother [p]lanned [p]ermanent [l]iving
[a]rrangement” to be made.
      At the 18-month hearing, father remained incarcerated6 and mother’s
whereabouts were unknown.7 Father’s counsel submitted on the reports.
The court terminated services for mother, and observed it had previously
ordered reunification services need not be provided to father “because he’s
alleged.” The court ordered an assessment pursuant to section 366.21,

      5Mother was released from prison in January 2023, had “secured
housing,” and in March she had entered a substance use disorder treatment
program.
      6 Counsel for father stated father was “currently in custody in state
prison doing a life sentence.”
      7  Although mother had been “actively engaged” in her substance abuse
program for two months, she left the program without notice and was
arrested. She had been released but was now facing two misdemeanor and
four felony charges. She had “not returned to her housing facility.”

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subdivision (i) or 366.22, subdivision (c) and set the matter for a hearing
pursuant to section 366.26.
                                  DISCUSSION
      In his writ petition, father checked a series of boxes requesting this
court: (1) “[v]acate the order for hearing under section 366.26”; (2) “[r]emand
for hearing”; (3) “[o]rder that reunification services be” “provided” or
“continued”; (4) “[o]rder visitation between the child and petitioner”; (5)
“[r]eturn or grant custody of the child to petitioner”; (6) “[t]erminate
dependency”; and (7) “[i]ssue order for alleged father to appear via Zoom.”
      To the extent father is challenging the court’s termination of mother’s
reunification services, his challenge fails because he lacks the standing to do
so. As respondent asserts, father, as a mere biological father was never
entitled to reunification services, and as such, he is “not aggrieved by the
court’s . . . order terminating reunification services to mother.”
      “Standing to challenge an adverse ruling is not established merely
because a parent takes a position on an issue that affects the minor [citation];
nor can a parent raise the minor’s best interest as a basis for standing
[citation]. Without a showing that a parent’s personal rights are affected by a
ruling, the parent does not establish standing.” (In re D.S. (2007)
156 Cal.App.4th 671, 674; see Code Civ. Proc., § 902 [only an “aggrieved”
party may appeal].)
      “Although standing to appeal is construed liberally, and doubts are
resolved in its favor, only a person aggrieved by a decision may appeal.
[Citations.] An aggrieved person, for this purpose, is one whose rights or
interests are injuriously affected by the decision in an immediate and
substantial way, and not as a nominal or remote consequence of the decision.”
(In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 236; In re Holly R. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th

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1261, 1265 [standing requires “ ‘a legally cognizable immediate and
substantial interest which is injuriously affected by the court’s decision’ ”].)
      To have standing, father must show how the termination of mother’s
reunification services affected his interests. And, he has not done so.
      Father is not entitled to reunification services. He was considered an
alleged father until the January 2022 hearing, at which time the juvenile
court elevated him to a biological father. Neither an alleged nor biological
father is entitled to reunification services.
      “The Welfare and Institutions Code differentiates between ‘alleged,’
‘biological’ or ‘natural,’ and ‘presumed’ fathers. [Citations.] ‘The extent to
which a father may participate in dependency proceedings and his rights in
those proceedings are dependent on his paternal status. “A man who may be
the father of a child, but whose biological paternity has not been established,
or, in the alternative, has not achieved presumed father status, is an ‘alleged’
father. [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] An alleged father has limited due
process and statutory rights. ‘ “Alleged fathers have less rights in
dependency proceedings than biological and presumed fathers. [Citation.]
An alleged father does not have a current interest in a child because his
paternity has not yet been established. [Citation.]” [Citation.] As such, an
alleged father is not entitled to appointed counsel or reunification services.
[Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘ “Presumed father status ranks highest.” [Citation.]
“[O]nly a presumed, not a mere biological, father is a ‘parent’ entitled to
receive reunification services under section 361.5. [Citation.]” [Citation.]
However, a biological father may be offered reunification services if the
juvenile court determines such services will benefit the child.’ ” (In re D.P.
(2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 689, 695, fn. omitted.)

                                         6
      At the disposition hearing, the court ordered that the Agency is “not
required to provide reunification services to [father] because he is an alleged
and bio father, unless and until he establishes a legal basis for those services
and also request[s] them.”
      Father did not attempt to show he was a presumed father. Nor is there
any indication in the record that suggests father made any request for
services or to elevate his status to that of presumed father. As a biological
father, he did not have a current interest in the issue presented at the time
the juvenile court set the matter for a permanency planning hearing, namely,
whether mother should receive additional reunification services. Thus,
father lacks standing to challenge the termination of mother’s family
reunification services by extraordinary writ. In short, he lacks standing to
assert error on mother’s behalf. (See In re Carissa G. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th
731, 734-737.)
      To the extent father may now be requesting reunification services for
himself or seeking review of the order denying him family reunification
services, such a challenge also fails.
      Father, who was represented by counsel at the disposition hearing,
made no objection to the court’s order, nor did he appeal from the disposition
order. (Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1018 [“ ‘an
unappealed disposition or postdisposition order is final and binding and may
not be attacked on an appeal from a later appealable order’ ”]; In re Janee J.
(1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 198, 206 [same].) Nor has father affirmatively sought
or provided any authority in support of receiving reunification services—
rather, his memorandum of points and authorities in support of his petition
focuses solely on placement. In any case, “if a man fails to achieve presumed
father status prior to the expiration of any reunification period in a

                                         7
dependency case, whether that period be 6, 12, or 18 months as is the case, he
is not entitled to such services under section 361.5. . . . [After] the
termination of reunification services . . . [h]is only remedy [is] to file a motion
to modify under section 388.” (In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 453.)
“While a biological father is not entitled to . . . reunification services under
section 361.5 if he does not attain presumed father status prior to the
termination of any reunification period, he may move under section 388 for a
hearing to reconsider the juvenile court’s earlier rulings based on new
evidence or changed circumstances.” (Id. at p. 454, fn. omitted.)
      Finally, to the extent father challenges the placement of the minors, his
challenge is premature. In his memorandum of points and authorities, father
cites to section 366.26 and In re Amelia S. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1060,8 to
assert disruption of “the minors’ present placement would be detrimental to
their well-being.” He notes both he and mother agree with the present
placement, as do the minors. Further, he notes both foster parents have
agreed to become legal guardians.
      At the close of the status review hearing, the court ordered the minors
to remain in their current placements and ordered the Agency to conduct an
assessment and make a recommendation to the court. As the Agency has not

      8 Father’s reliance on Amelia S. is misplaced. In that case, the father
appealed from orders terminating his parental rights to his 10 minor
children, asserting there was no evidence to support the court’s finding the
children were adoptable and therefore termination of his rights was
premature. (In re Amelia S., supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 1061.) The Court of
Appeal reversed, concluding there was no evidence of the required “ ‘high
probability’ ” of adoption of the 10 children—who suffered from various
developmental, emotional, and physical problems—where the permanency
hearing report merely “indicated a few foster parents were considering
adoption.” (Id. at pp. 1063, 1065.) Here, the section 366.26 hearing has not
yet taken place, and father’s parental rights have not been terminated.

                                         8
yet conducted its assessment or made its recommendation, and the court has
not yet determined whether to terminate father’s parental rights or ordered a
permanent plan for the minors, father’s challenge is premature.
                                  DISPOSITION
      The petition is dismissed. Our decision is final immediately as to this
court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452(i), 8.490(b)(2)(A).

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                                         _________________________
                                         Banke, J.

We concur:

_________________________
Margulies, Acting P.J.

_________________________
Getty, J.*

**Judge of the Solano County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

A168229, RJ v. Superior Court

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