Court Opinion

ID: 9653420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:46:32.046157+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:59.083812
License: Public Domain

Conley Byre, Justice. The record here shows a controversy between appellee Ova Lea Keifer and appellant Jack Bowlin to a tract containing 270 acres more or less in the Ozark District of Franklin County and to one-seventh of the proceeds of a IT. S. Government check for $25,500, deposited in the registery of the court. It is not disputed that George T. Wade was the father of Ova Lea Keifer and Guy G. Wade, together with other children. On April 26, 1947, Guy G. Wade executed the following instrument. “Glendora, California April 26,1947 “AGREEMENT OF SALE “NOTICE: For the sum of $300.00 cash in hand, paid, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, I, Guy G. Wade, sell to Ova Lea Keifer, all my rights, title and interest in the estate of my father George T. Wade, deceased. I also agree to render proper and legal conveyance at any time up.on request of said Ova Lea Keifer. Guy G. Wade Signed: Guy G. Wade Subscribed and Sworn to before me this 26th day of April, 1947. Edna Graves, Notary Public In and for the County of Los Angeles, State of California My Commission Expires August 27, 19 ” After execution of this instrument, Guy G. Wade died on Sept. 10, 1948, leaving as his sole and only heir Victor Grady Wade. The testimony shows that after the Oorp of Engineers begin making surveys for the Ozark Dam area, Victor Grady Wade and wife, on Dee. 5, 1966, conveyed one-seventh interest in the lands to his step-sister’s husband, appellant Jack Bowlin. This deed recites a consideration “of one dollar and other valuable considerations”. In offering this deed into evidence counsel for appellant stated, “Our stipulation is only to the extent that it is unnecessary to bring the clerk up to prove the deed”. The record also shows that Victor Grady Wade was present in the court room but did not testify, and that the appellant Jack Bowlin neither testified nor attended the trial. I agree with the majority opinion that the description contained in the agreement of sale is insufficient to constitute notice to a bona fide purchaser for value, HOWEVER, I do not agree that the description is void as between Ova Lea Keifer and Guy G. Wade. In Varner v. Rice, 44 Ark. 236 (1884), we permitted evidence aliunde to show what was meant by the description “the plantation called the Varner place”. In Thomason v. Abbott, 217 Ark. 281, 229 S.W. 2d 660 (1950), we pointed out that a description “a part of the east half of south east one quarter of Section 31, 6 acres” was void for indefinitehess insofar as record title was concerned but that as between the grantor and grantee evidence aliunde might be introduced to establish what lands were intended to bo conveyed. Based upon the foregoing authorities it is perfectly obvious that as between appellee Ova Lea Keifer and Guy G. Wade evidence could have properly been introduced to show what the estate of George T. Wade consisted of. Does Victor Grady Wade stand in anj^ better position than his father? We held in Turner v. Rust, 228 Ark. 528, 309 S.W. 2d 731 (1958), that a grantor, or an heir claiming through him, is estopped to claim or assert anything in derogation of his deed or assignment. Certainly the heir could convey no better interest to one with notice than he himself had and since he himself paid no consideration for the inheritance from his father, the title in him was no better than the title in his father. Did the deed from Victor Grady Wade to the husband of his step-sister, reciting only a consideration “of one dollar and other valuable consideration,” make Jack Bowlin a bona fide purchaser for value without notice'? Since the only evidence in the record is the deed and since the record shows that Jack Bowlin was not present at the trial and did not testify, the issue turns upon who had the burden of proof. In Osceola Land Company v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Company, 84 Ark. 1, 103 S.W. 609 (1907), we said: “The plaintiff contends that the railroad company and Chatfield were both bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the Rozell title, and the question is presented whether the burden to show notice was on the defendant or not. In the recent case of Steele v. Robertson, 75 Ark. 228, where parties came in as interveners and in order to obtain protection alleged affirmatively that they were bona fide purchasers for value without notice, we said that the burden was on them to make out their case, and to show, not only that they had paid for the land, but that they did so without notice of plaintiffs’ light. When in such a case there are circumstances that tend to show notice, or tend to raise an inference of notice, and the party who claims to be a bona fide purchaser fails in his testimony to deny notice, this may be, as we held in that case, a controlling circumstance against him, without regard to who has the burden of proof. This was probably as far as we should have gone in that case, although the law as there stated is supported by a number of cases. Bell v. Pleasants, 145 Cal. 410; Beattie v. Crewdson, 124 Cal. 577; Wilhoit v. Lyons, 98 Cal. 409, Farley v. Bateman, 40 W. Va. 542; Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 117 Mo. 261. But a further consideration o£ the case has convinced us that the statement that the burden is on the party claiming to be a bona fide purchaser to show want of notice is not correct as a general rule; for, when the party relies on the defense of being a bona fide purchaser, and shows that he has paid a valuable consideration, the burden of showing that he purchased with notice is on the party alleging it or who relies on the notice to defeat the claim of bona fide purchaser.” In 92 CJS page 228, Vendor & Purchaser, § 323(c), it is pointed out that a person who purchases property for a nominal or grossly inadequate consideration is not a bona fide purchaser, and in 92 CJS page 308, Vendor & Purchaser, § 373, it is pointed out that the recital of a consideration in the conveyance is not sufficient evidence that the grantee therein was a purchaser for value, without other evidence, to establish the defense of bona fide purchaser. To the same effect, see Hood v. Webster, 271 N.Y. Supp. 57, 2 N.E. 2d 43, 107 ALR 497, and the subsequent annotation at page 513, wherein it is said, “In accordance with the general rule . .. tire numerical weight of authority is to the effect that one claimiug to be a bona fide purchaser as against the holder of a prior unrecorded conveyance or encumbrance has the burden of showing that he paid a valuable consideration for the conveyance to him, and this by other evidence than the recitals in his deed.” Thus, as I view the instrument, here involved, it was sufficient to pass title as between the parties and the description contained therein was sufficient to permit evidence of what the estate of George T.- Wade consisted. In this situation Victor Grady Wade as an heir of his father, Guv G. Wade, stood in the same position as his father Guy G. Wade, under the authority of Turner v. Rust, supra. Furthermore, since the appellant Jack Boudin failed to sustain his burden of proof by showing that he paid a valuable consideration for the deed from Victor Grady Wade, appellant Jack Bowlin stands in no better position than his grantor. Consequently I would, affirm the decree of the Chancellor holding the title good in appellee. The majority opinion places much emphasis on Turrentine v. Thompson, 193 Ark. 253, 99 S.W. 2d 585 (1936). There Will Turrentine had conveyed to Zazelle Turrentine on the 4th day of May 1927. The description in Will’s deed to Zazelle is as follows, “All the right, title, interest, equity, and/or claim of every kind of character, which I may now or hereafter have, as heir of Richard Turrentine, deceased, in and to all moneys, credits, chattels, effects, insurance funds, choses iu ac-1ion, and/or real, personal or mixed property of every kind or nature and wherever situated.” Subsequently on the 4th day of June 1927, Will Turrentine conveyed by particular description the 40 acre tract to W. C. Thompson. In turn W. C. Thompson conveyed the 40 acres by particular description to Earl Thompson on Nov. 15, 1927. All conveyances were recorded. Since all the instruments in the Turrentine case wore recorded the sole issue on appeal was by stipulation of the parties — i.e., whether the description in the deed from Will to Zazelle on the 4th day of May, was sufficiently definite to convey a fee simple title in an undivided % interest in the “SW % of NE% of sec. 8, twp. 12 S. R. 25 W.” Thus we see that by a stipulation the parties had excluded the issue of whether other evidence could be introduced as between the parties to show what lands were included in the description in the deed from Will to Zazelle. Consequently I do not consider the Turrentine case as authority for the proposition for which the majority opinion cites the case. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.