Court Opinion

ID: 9941213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 06:07:00.795294+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:21.602055
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                   UNPUBLISHED
                                                                   February 15, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                  No. 360745
                                                                   Berrien Circuit Court
WILLIAM BOOKER, JR.,                                               LC No. 2019-002184-FH

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: LETICA, P.J., and CAVANAGH and SWARTZLE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of witness tampering,
MCL 750.122(7)(b), and assault and battery, MCL 750.81(1). He was sentenced as a fourth-
offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to serve concurrent terms of 46 months to 20 years’
imprisonment for witness tampering and 93 days’ in jail for assault and battery. We affirm.

                        I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

         This case stems from allegations made by defendant’s on-and-off girlfriend, RB, that in
June 2019, she answered the door for defendant at her apartment when he attacked her. During
this altercation, RB’s cousin, MB, and a third person, a friend, attempted to break up the attack,
resulting in defendant hitting MB. RB testified that this altercation ended after she retrieved a
knife from her kitchen and stabbed defendant in the neck. Defendant was charged with third-
offense domestic assault, MCL 750.81(2), assault and battery, MCL 750.81(1), and first-degree
home invasion, MCL 750.110(a), for this incident.

       After defendant was arraigned, his counsel requested a bond. In light of a prior failure to
appear and an escape from custody, the court imposed a $25,000 cash or surety bond that defendant
was unable to post. Additionally, defendant was ordered not to contact the victims. Nonetheless,
when defendant was incarcerated for the underlying charges, he called RB from jail and, over the
course of numerous phone calls between July 2019 and September 2019, told her not to come to
court. Defendant also promised to pay for the damages caused to RB’s property. When defendant
received treatment for his injuries, he made various threats to harm RB, that prompted medical
personnel to contact RB and warn her. RB was not scared because defendant was in jail; however,

                                               -1-
she felt harassed and intimidated by his repeated jail phone calls requesting that she not come to
court and for an affidavit. In light of defendant’s actions, the trial court granted the prosecution’s
request to amend the information to add a charge of witness tampering.

        Defendant was arraigned in June 2019, but his trial was delayed for a variety of reasons.
Defense counsel requested a forensic evaluation in the fall of 2019. A finding that defendant was
competent occurred in March 2020. A short time later, the trial court was shut down because of
the Covid-19 pandemic. Additionally, defendant requested court-appointed counsel, but
discharged the three public defenders that were assigned to him. Because defendant exhausted all
the public defenders, the trial court appointed a private attorney to represent him.1 During various
hearings, defendant became belligerent toward his counsel, the trial court, or both. He swore at
his counsel and the presiding judge and questioned their competency. Defendant refused to
participate in or attend hearings, fired his appointed counsel, failed to cooperate or listen to his
rights during the waiver of counsel and the appointment of standby counsel, and left the video
hearing room while hearings were in progress. As a result of defendant’s behavior, three hearings
were held to complete his preliminary examination for the witness tampering charge. Although
defendant claimed that his right to a speedy trial was violated, the trial court denied his motion.
Additionally, defendant’s request to be released on personal recognizance was denied, with the
trial court determining that defendant posed a danger to RB and the community.

        Defendant’s jury trial was held in December 2021. At defendant’s trial, the prosecution
played three of defendant’s jail phone calls to RB for the jury. RB testified that defendant’s phone
calls did not dissuade her from testifying at trial. Defendant testified that he made these phone
calls and told RB not to appear for trial because he was the victim and there was no reason for her
to come to court and perjure herself.

       Notably absent from defendant’s trial was Benton Harbor Public Safety Department
Sergeant William Althouse, who investigated the home invasion and assaults at RB’s apartment.2
Sergeant Althouse refused service of process for his subpoena to appear at trial. The prosecution
informed the trial court that Sergeant Althouse was sick and on medical leave from work at the
time. During the prosecution’s attempts to serve him, Sergeant Althouse refused to answer the
door. Ultimately, Sergeant Althouse did not appear for trial. Consequently, defendant requested
and received M Crim JI 5.12, permitting the jury to draw a negative inference from the witness’s
absence.

        Even so, the jury convicted defendant of misdemeanor assault of MB and witness
tampering. But, he was acquitted of the home-invasion charge and domestic-assault charge
pertaining to the entry into RB’s apartment and his assault upon her. Defendant’s request for
postjudgment relief was denied. Defendant now appeals.

1
  Ultimately, defendant sought to be represented by out-of-state counsel. But, this proposed
counsel did not satisfy the requirements to be admitted pro hac vice.
2
  Sergeant Althouse was also scheduled to testify at the first preliminary examination but was
called away because of a “family matter.”

                                                 -2-
                                II. RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL

       Defendant asserts that he was denied his right to a speedy trial. We disagree.

        The question of whether a defendant was deprived of his right to a speedy trial presents a
question of constitutional law subject to de novo review. People v Williams, 475 Mich 245, 250;
716 NW2d 208 (2006). The trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. People v
Gilmore, 222 Mich App 442, 459; 564 NW2d 158 (1997). “Clear error occurs if the reviewing
court is left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake.” People v
Johnson, 502 Mich 541, 565; 918 NW2d 676 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

        Both the United States Constitution and Michigan Constitution guarantee a defendant the
right to a speedy trial. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. In Michigan, this right is
enforced by statute and by court rule. People v Williams, 475 Mich 245, 261; 716 NW2d 208
(2006), citing MCL 768.1 and MCR 6.004(A). The purpose of this guarantee is “to minimize the
possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial, to reduce the lesser, but nevertheless substantial,
impairment of liberty imposed on an accused while released on bail, and to shorten the disruption
of life caused by arrest and the presence of unresolved criminal charges.” People v Sierb, 456
Mich 519, 531 n 19; 581 NW2d 219 (1998) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Our Courts
apply the four-part balancing test articulated in Barker v Wingo, 407 US 514; 92 S Ct 2182; 33 L
Ed 2d 696 (1982), to determine if a pretrial delay violated a defendant’s right to a speedy trial.
Williams, 475 Mich at 261. This test requires the court to balance the following factors: “(1) the
length of delay, (2) the reason for delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right, and (4) the
prejudice to the defendant.” Id. at 261-262. No single factor is “either a necessary or sufficient
condition to” a meritorious speedy-trial claim. Barker, 407 US at 533. When a delay is 18 months
or more, prejudice is presumed and the burden is placed on the prosecution to rebut that
presumption. Williams, 475 Mich at 262; People v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 112; 605 NW2d 28
(1999).

        “The time for judging whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated runs from the
date of the defendant’s arrest.” Williams, 475 Mich at 261. “[T]he length of delay is not
determinative of a speedy trial claim . . . .” Cain, 238 Mich App at 112 (quotation marks and
citation omitted). In this case, defendant was already incarcerated for an alleged personal
protection order violation when he was arraigned for charges of home invasion, domestic assault,
and assault and battery on June 20, 2019. Likewise, defendant remained incarcerated when the
prosecution amended the information on October 31, 2019, to add a charge for witness tampering.
Defendant ultimately had his trial for all charges from December 7, 2021 through December 10,
2021. Accordingly, there was an approximate 29-month delay between defendant’s arraignment
for home invasion, domestic assault, and assault and battery, and his trial, and an approximate 25-
month delay between defendant being charged with witness tampering, and his trial. Because the
delays in this case were longer than 18 months, prejudice is presumed unless rebutted by the
prosecution and examination of the other three factors is required to determine whether defendant
was deprived of his right to a speedy trial. See id.

       The period of the delay and the party responsible for the delay, the prosecution or
defendant, must be examined. See id. at 113. “Although delays inherent in the court system, e.g.,
docket congestion, are technically attributable to the prosecution, they are given a neutral tint and

                                                  -3-
are assigned only minimal weight in determining whether a defendant was denied a speedy trial.”
Gilmore, 222 Mich App at 460 (quotation marks and citation omitted). In the context of the 180-
day rule, this Court has concluded that delay caused by the Michigan Supreme Court’s decision to
suspend jury trials during the COVID-19 pandemic was neutral or not attributable to either party.
See People v Witkoski, 341 Mich App 54, 63-64; 988 NW2d 790 (2022). A defendant’s request
for adjournments and time spent adjudicating defendant’s motions are attributable to defendant.
See Cain, 238 Mich App at 113. Further, the withdrawal of defense counsel is not attributable to
the prosecution. See People v Collins, 388 Mich 680, 691; 202 NW2d 769 (1972). The court may
hold the prosecution responsible for unexplained or otherwise unattributable delays. People v
Lown, 488 Mich 242, 262; 794 NW2d 9 (2011).

         Defendant was originally scheduled for trial in November 2019, but the trial was delayed
when defendant engaged in witness tampering and needed to be arraigned for the additional charge.
This first delay was attributable to defendant. Additionally, delay occurred between
November 2019 and March 2020, because of defendant’s competency examination and
determination. The record indicates that defense counsel requested this hearing. Accordingly, this
delay is also attributable to defendant. See Cain, 238 Mich App at 113.3 After defendant was
deemed competent for trial, Berrien County halted jury trials from April 2020 through at least
May 2021.4 The time that trial courts could not conduct jury trials because of COVID-19 is neutral
and unattributable to either party. See Witkoski, 341 Mich App at 63. The remainder of the delays
in this case were primarily attributable to defendant’s inability to cooperate with multiple attorneys
and his disruptions in the trial court. Accordingly, this factor does not favor defendant.

       The third factor is defendant’s assertion of the right. Defendant asserted his right to a
speedy trial several times in the trial court. Defendant first asserted his right to a speedy trial in
April 2020. However, the trial court did not rule on this motion because the attorney who
submitted it withdrew from representing defendant. Defendant next moved for release on personal
recognizance in September 2020, premised on a speedy-trial claim. The trial court denied this

3
  Defendant contends that he never challenged his competency. However, at the arraignment on
June 20, 2019, the trial court noted that the attempt to arraign defendant on June 19, 2019 failed
because defendant did not appropriately respond to questions and made questionable statements.
At that time, the trial court noted that defense counsel may have to raise the issue of competency,
and defense counsel did seek the forensic evaluation. And, at the arraignment hearing on
November 5, 2019, defendant failed to follow procedure to allow the hearing to occur. The trial
court noted that defendant refused to listen. Defendant responded, “[E]very time I come I’m gonna
mess up the record.” The court noted that it would try “another day” to address the matter. And,
when defendant began to represent himself, he sought to call other circuit judges as witnesses. The
trial court noted that defendant would have to submit an offer of proof to demonstrate the need to
call those witnesses. If the court found that the testimony of those witnesses was relevant, the trial
court noted that it would be disqualified from hearing the trial, and the case would be transferred
to another county. Defendant admitted on the record that the transfer of the case was his objective.
4
 During various hearings, the prosecutor explained that vaccination rates, social distancing issues,
and infection levels determined whether the state court administrator allowed jury trials to be held.

                                                 -4-
motion.5 Finally, in April 2021, defendant moved in propria persona to dismiss because he was
denied a speedy trial, but the trial court denied the motion. Defendant did assert his right although
his forensic evaluation and repeated firings of his appointed counsel prevented his trial from being
held.6

        The final factor is prejudice to the defendant. A defendant may face two types of prejudice,
“prejudice to his person and prejudice to the defense.” Williams, 475 Mich at 264 (quotation marks
and citation omitted). Prejudice to the defense is the more serious inquiry of the two. People v
Simpson, 207 Mich App 560, 564; 526 NW2d 33 (1994). “[I]n determining prejudice to a
defendant, we do not look at how the prosecutor’s case was improved during the delay, but to
whether the defendant’s defense was degraded.” People v Holtzer, 255 Mich App 478, 494; 660
NW2d 405 (2003). General allegations of prejudice are insufficient to establish prejudice. See
Gilmore, 222 Mich App at 462. Further, “anxiety, alone, is insufficient to establish a violation of
defendant’s right to a speedy trial.” Id.

        Defendant asserts that he was personally prejudiced because excessive pretrial
incarceration led to stress, loss of contact with family and friends, and loss of income. Specifically,
defendant asserts that he was financially limited to retain his own attorney and cites to the inability
to retain out-of-state counsel. However, the record indicates that out-of-state counsel was removed
from this case because he could not find local counsel to comply with pro hac vice requirements
as opposed to defendant’s inability to pay for representation. See MCR 8.126. Aside from
defendant’s unsupported assertion that he could not afford to pay this attorney, defendant’s claims
regarding personal prejudice are general. Accordingly, defendant has failed to establish prejudice
such that he was denied a speedy trial in relation to his person. See Gilmore, 222 Mich App at 462.

       Defendant also asserts that the delay caused a crucial witness, Sergeant Althouse, to be
absent from trial. Specifically, he contends that Sergeant Althouse would testify that RB lied to
Sergeant Althouse when she provided a statement to him and that Sergeant Althouse’s signature
on the complaint and warrant was essentially a forgery. Finally, defendant submits that cross-

5
 The trial court determined that defendant was arraigned on June 18, 2019. However, the criminal
action was tolled on November 18, 2019, until defendant was deemed competent on March 6,
2020. The trial court determined that defendant was in jail for 190 days, or just over six months,
when the Covid-19 restrictions that precluded jury trials took effect. The trial court also denied
defendant’s request to be released on personal recognizance, determining that defendant posed a
danger to the victim and the community.
6
  Defendant claimed that he did not request a competency examination or the appointment of
counsel, and therefore, the delays caused by the forensic evaluation and the firing and appointment
of new counsel should not be attributed to him. Defendant’s claim is belied by his acceptance of
appointed counsel and his acceptance and participation in the forensic evaluation. Indeed,
defendant repeatedly refused to come to or continue to participate in hearings when he did not
want to do so.

                                                 -5-
examination of Sergeant Althouse was necessary for his defense of the witness-tampering
conviction. None of these assertions support a finding of prejudice.

        Even before addressing defendant’s assertions of prejudice, we note that there is
insufficient evidence in the record to connect Sergeant Althouse’s refusal to appear for trial to the
delay in proceedings. Defendant did not assert that testimony that Sergeant Althouse could provide
was diminished by loss of memory. Instead, the record indicates that the parties knew where
Sergeant Althouse was, he was on medical leave, and that he simply refused to appear for trial.

       Assuming without deciding that Sergeant Althouse’s refusal to appear for trial was caused
by the delay, his investigation of the purported domestic assault and home invasion for which
defendant was acquitted was unrelated to defendant’s witness-tampering charge. As such,
defendant was not prejudiced by his inability to examine Sergeant Althouse on that charge.
Defendant was charged with witness tampering for phone calls that he made to RB between
July and September 2019, during his incarceration. Nothing in the record suggests that Sergeant
Althouse had any knowledge of the circumstances behind the investigation of defendant’s witness-
tampering conviction.7

        Balancing these four factors, defendant has not demonstrated that his convictions should
be vacated based on a violation of his right to a speedy trial. In defendant’s favor, there were
delays of 25 and 29 months between his arraignments and his trial. Further in his favor, defendant
asserted his right to a speedy trial several times throughout the lower court proceedings. But the
reasons for the delay and the lack of prejudice weigh heavily against defendant given that the
prosecutor rebutted the presumption of prejudice. The reasons for the delay were mostly
attributable to COVID-19, a neutral factor, see Witkoski, 341 Mich App at 63, and defendant’s
inability to cooperate with his attorneys or participate in the trial court proceedings without causing
disruptions by swearing at the participants and leaving the proceedings. These latter reasons for
delay are attributable to defendant. Finally, defendant was unable to show that his defense was
prejudiced by the delay and only claimed general prejudice to his person. When balancing these
factors, defendant has not established a violation of his right to a speedy trial. Accordingly, the

7
  Curiously, defendant represented himself during the continuation of the preliminary examination.
At that time, defendant sought to call circuit court judges and the prosecutor as witnesses. He
never sought to call Sergeant Althouse as a witness, and thus, preserve the testimony in the event
Sergeant Althouse was later unavailable at trial. Moreover, although defendant makes blanket
assertions addressing an inability to cross-examine Sergeant Althouse regarding RB’s statements
and the signature on the complaint, defendant failed to obtain an affidavit to substantiate his
theories. His blanket assertions are insufficient to support his claim. See People v Payne, 285
Mich App 181, 195; 774 NW2d 714 (2009). And, the claim that the testimony was necessary to
prevent an “illogical” acquittal of home invasion and domestic assault is without merit. A jury
may render an inconsistent verdict. See People v Putnam, 309 Mich App 240, 251; 870 NW2d
593 (2015). Finally, we note that RB turned a letter over to the prosecutor that supported the
witness tampering claim. And, the jail phone calls were presented to the prosecutor through jail
staff. There is no record evidence correlating Sergeant Althouse to an investigation of the witness
tampering charge such that his failure to appear at trial could be deemed prejudicial.

                                                 -6-
trial court did not clearly err in denying defendant’s speedy-trial challenge. Williams, 475 Mich
at 262; Cain, 238 Mich App at 112.

                                        III. SENTENCING

       Next, defendant contends that the trial court imposed a retaliatory sentence in response to
defendant’s rejection of a plea deal and the exercise of his right to a jury trial. We disagree.

        A defendant’s assertion that a sentence is retaliatory in response to him exercising his right
to a jury trial is a constitutional issue that we review de novo. See People v Brown, 294 Mich App
377, 389; 811 NW2d 531 (2011). “A sentencing court cannot base its sentence on a defendant’s
decision to exercise his constitutional right to a jury trial.” Id. But, “[i]t is not per se
unconstitutional for a defendant to receive a higher sentence on a trial conviction than was
promised him if he would plead guilty.” People v Rivers, 147 Mich App 56, 60-61; 382 NW2d
731 (1985).

        The record does not support defendant’s contention that the trial court imposed a harsher
sentence because defendant rejected a plea deal and chose to proceed to trial. The prosecution
offered defendant several pleas, including a final plea deal in which defendant would plead no
contest to third-offense domestic assault in exchange for the dismissal of all other charges,
including a fourth-offense habitual offender supplement. In this plea deal, the prosecution
estimated that defendant’s minimum sentencing range was 10 to 23 months’ imprisonment. The
trial court also offered defendant a Cobbs agreement8 that would have permitted him to be
sentenced to time served. When the trial court attempted to discuss the Cobbs agreement,
defendant repeatedly interrupted the trial court. In an attempt to prevent further interjections and
to capture defendant’s attention, the trial court noted that the Cobbs agreement would allow
defendant to go home and sleep in his own bed. Defendant rejected these offers. Ultimately,
defendant was convicted of assault and battery and witness tampering. The trial court sentenced
defendant to 46 months to 20 years’ imprisonment for witness tampering. The trial court
explained:

         This defendant, not satisfied . . . with the criminal justice system manipulated,
         cajoled, and encouraged this alleged victim [RB] not to testify against him. This
         will not be tolerated and that’s why the Legislature in Michigan has decided that
         this is a felony, and that’s why this defendant deserves punishment for this
         behavior.

       Nothing in the record suggests that the trial court imposed the sentence of 46 months to
20 years’ imprisonment in retaliation for defendant’s decision to reject the final plea deal and
proceed with trial. Witness tampering, MCL 750.122(7)(b), is a Class D offense with a typical
maximum sentence of 10 years, MCL 777.16f. However, because defendant was sentenced as a
fourth-offense habitual offender, the maximum sentence was enhanced to 20 years. See
MCL 777.21(3)(c). Defendant’s minimum sentencing guidelines range was 10 to 46 months’

8
    People v Cobbs, 443 Mich 276; 505 NW2d 208 (1993).

                                                 -7-
imprisonment. Defendant was sentenced within that range. Sentences within the minimum
sentence guideline are presumed to be reasonable. People v Posey, 512 Mich 317, 351-352;
___NW2d ___ (2023). Defendant risked being sentenced to a lengthy prison term when he rejected
the various plea offers while on notice of his status as a habitual fourth-offender. Ultimately, the
trial court articulated a nonretaliatory reason on the record for imposing defendant’s sentence, and
the plea deals that the prosecution and trial court offered defendant was for third-offense domestic
assault and not witness tampering. Nothing in the record supports defendant’s contention that the
trial court sentenced defendant more harshly in retaliation for rejecting a plea deal and proceeding
to trial. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to correct an invalid
sentence.

                             IV. MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT

       Next, defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of witness
tampering under MCL 750.122(6) because he believed that he was innocent of the underlying
charges and he merely requested that RB not attend court. We disagree.

        We review de novo a trial court’s decision denying a motion for a directed verdict. People
v Quinn, 305 Mich App 484, 491; 853 NW2d 383 (2014). Specifically, we review “to determine
whether the evidence presented by the prosecutor, viewed in the light most favorable to the
prosecutor, could persuade a rational trier of fact that the essential elements of the crime charged
were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court
must elicit all reasonable inferences and make credibility determinations that support the jury
verdict. People v Thurmond, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket
No. 361302), slip op at 2. Further, proof of the elements of the crime may be satisfied by
circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising therefrom. Id. These standards,
traditionally applied to challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, also apply to motions for a
directed verdict or motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Id. “Due process requires
that the evidence show guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in order to sustain a conviction.” People
v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 222; 749 NW2d 272 (2008).

       Defendant was charged with witness tampering under MCL 750.122(6).9 To convict an
individual under this subsection, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant:

         (1) committed or attempted to commit (2) an act that did not consist of bribery,
         threats or intimidation, or retaliation as defined in MCL 750.122 and applicable
         case[]law, (3) but was any act or attempt that was done willfully (4) to impede,
         interfere with, prevent, or obstruct (5) a witness’s ability (6) to attend, testify, or

9
    MCL 750.122(6) states:
                A person shall not willfully impede, interfere with, prevent, or obstruct or
         attempt to willfully impede, interfere with, prevent, or obstruct the ability of a
         witness to attend, testify, or provide information in or for a present or future official
         proceeding.

                                                   -8-
       provide information in or for a present or future official proceeding (7) having the
       knowledge or the reason to know that the person subjected to the interference could
       be a witness at any official proceeding. [People v Greene, 255 Mich App 426, 442-
       443; 661 NW2d 616 (2003).]

In Greene, this Court defined a “witness’s ability” for purposes of the subsection:

       Ability is the power or capacity to do or act physically, mentally, legally, morally,
       or financially. This is a broad description of the human facility to act, not at all
       limited to the logical ways in which a tamperer might try to interfere with a witness,
       including the witness’s ability to travel, appear at the place designated for an
       “official proceeding,” or biological ability to recall information or provide
       testimony, whether spoken, written, signed, or communicated in another manner.
       This breadth implies that subsection 6 makes illegal any act or attempt, no matter
       its form, to keep the witness from “attend[ing], testify[ing], or provid[ing]
       information in or for a present or future official proceeding by affecting the
       witness’s ability to do so. [Id. at 441 (alterations in original; footnote omitted).]

The Court further explained that “a request, alone, not to attend a hearing or a stated desire that a
witness not attend a hearing would be unlawful under MCL 750.122(6).” Id. at 447. But, a
question of fact may exist when a defendant attempts to dissuade a witness from providing
testimony but the witness appears at the hearing anyway. Id. at 447-448. Specifically, when a
defendant was aware that a witness would present preliminary examination or trial testimony and
then willfully attempted to interfere with the witness’s intent to attend the hearing, by explicitly
telling the witness not to attend, by exploiting the witness’s feelings for the defendant, and by
downplaying the consequences of disobeying a subpoena, the fact-finder must determine whether
the defendant’s conduct “fit” within the witness intimidation statute’s attempt language. Id.

        Examining the evidence presented at trial in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a
rational trier of fact could find defendant guilty of witness tampering under MCL 750.122(6).
Defendant was ordered not to have contact with RB as a condition of bond. After defendant was
arraigned and told not to have contact with RB, defendant called her from jail. Three of these
recordings from July 3, 2019, July 26, 2019, and September 21, 2019, were played at trial. During
these three calls, defendant told RB numerous times not to come to court, using varying tactics.
These tactics included claiming that RB would be subject to a perjury charge and a substantial
prison term, appealing to RB’s sympathy in light of defendant’s potential penalty, applying social
pressure by having other individuals contact RB, and asserting that the judicial system was out to
get both defendant and RB.

        Witness tampering prohibits conduct by a defendant that acts to impede, interfere with,
prevent, or obstruct the witness’s ability to testify at trial. See id. at 440-441. However,
defendant’s actions need not be successful to be criminalized under MCL 750.122(6) because this
subsection includes both successful interference and an attempt to interfere. See id. at 440. The
witness’s “ability” to testify includes her “power of capacity to do or act physically, mentally,
legally, morally, or financially.” Id. at 441. In this case, defendant’s conduct was aimed at RB’s
moral ability to testify when he attempted to convince her that she would face perjury charges if
she testified and that the judicial system was out to get both defendant and RB. He also attempted

                                                -9-
to play on her sympathy for him by repeatedly asserting the possible penalties that he faced, and
he engaged in social pressure when he had other community members contact RB to pressure her
not to appear in court. A reasonable trier of fact could determine that each of these tactics was an
attempted interference with RB’s moral ability to attend court by persuading her that the right thing
to do was skip the criminal proceedings.10

                           V. GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE

       Next, defendant contends that his guilty verdict for witness tampering was against the great
weight of the evidence because he steadfastly believed that he was innocent of home invasion and
domestic assault and that he was calling the person who assaulted him to tell her not to come to
court. We disagree.

        “The test to determine whether a verdict is against the great weight of the evidence is
whether the evidence preponderates so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage
of justice to allow the verdict to stand.” People v Anderson, 322 Mich App 622; 632; 912 NW2d
60 (2018). “Generally, a verdict may be vacated only when the evidence does not reasonably
support it and it was more likely the result of causes outside the record, such as passion, prejudice,
sympathy, or some other extraneous influence.” People v Lacalamita, 286 Mich App 467, 469;
780 NW2d 311 (2009). Determining whether a verdict is against the great weight of the evidence
requires review of the whole body of proofs. People v Herbert, 444 Mich 466, 475; 511 NW2d
654 (1993), overruled in part on other grounds in People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625; 576 NW2d
129 (1998). Absent exceptional circumstances, however, a reviewing court may not substitute its
view of the credibility of witnesses for that of the jury. See Lemmon, 456 Mich at 642.

        As stated in the previous issue, sufficient evidence supported defendant’s conviction of
witness tampering. Nothing in the elements of MCL 750.122(6), see Greene, 255 Mich App
at 442-443, suggests that defendant’s personal belief that he was innocent of the underlying crimes
that he was charged with excused his attempt to interfere with a witness testifying in the criminal
case. Accordingly, we reject defendant’s contention that the jury’s verdict was against the great
weight of the evidence.

                                    VI. JURY INSTRUCTION

       Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to include defendant’s theory
for why Sergeant Althouse refused to appear at trial in its recitation of M Crim JI 5.12. Defendant
waived this issue and, therefore, extinguished any error.

        Waiver is distinct from forfeiture. Waiver is “the intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right.” People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000)
(quotation marks and citations omitted). Whereas forfeiture is the “failure to make the timely
assertion of a right.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). A defendant “who waives his

10
   Defendant also alleged that witness tampering was a predicate offense for the other charges.
However, he abandoned this claim by failing to cite any authority in support or rationalize his
claim. See Payne, 285 Mich App at 195.

                                                -10-
rights under a rule may not then seek appellate review of a claimed deprivation of those rights, for
his waiver has extinguished any error.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).

        The Michigan Supreme Court explained that a defendant must affirmatively express
satisfaction with the trial court’s conduct to waive:

       In People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511, 518-519, 583 NW2d 199 (1998), the trial
       court denied the jury’s request for a transcript of the testimony of one of the
       witnesses. The court explained that it did not have a transcript and instructed the
       jury to remember the testimony as best it could. Both attorneys indicated that they
       had no objection to the trial court’s decision. Id., 519. Rejecting the defendant’s
       argument that this constituted an error requiring reversal pursuant to
       MCR 6.414(H), the Court of Appeals explained, defense counsel expressly
       acquiesced to the court’s handling of the jury’s request. [Carter, 462 Mich at 214
       (quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis added).]

         This Court has concluded that “[w]hen the trial court asks whether a party has any
objections to the jury instructions and the party responds negatively, it is an affirmative approval
of the trial court’s instructions.” People v Miller, 326 Mich App 719, 726; 929 NW2d 821 (2019).
The Michigan Supreme Court has also affirmed a waiver when the discussion and decision to
provide jury instructions occurred at both the start and end of the jury trial. See People v Kowalski,
489 Mich 488, 503; 803 NW2d 200 (2011).

        In the instant case, defendant waived appellate review of this issue. When examining the
entire record, defendant affirmed the trial court’s recitation of M Crim JI 5.12 at various times
throughout the trial. First, defendant requested that the trial court read M Crim JI 5.12 to the jury.
In response, the trial court stated the following:

       Sergeant William Althouse is a missing witness whose appearance was the
       responsibility of the prosecution, and may infer that this witness’s testimony would
       have been unfavorable to the prosecution’s case. Is that the instruction you’re
       requesting?

Defendant stated, “Yes, your Honor,” to affirm this instruction. Later, the prosecution sought to
call a witness to explain to the jury why Sergeant Althouse refused to appear for trial. Defendant
objected to the prosecution’s request. After both parties rested, the parties reviewed the jury
instructions with the trial court once more. The discussion included the trial court reading M Crim
JI 5.12 again, and asking both parties whether they wanted anything else added to the jury
instructions. Both parties affirmed that the full jury instructions were sufficient. Defendant
affirmed the proposed jury instruction a final time during jury deliberations when the jury inquired
why Sergeant Althouse was not present.

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        This record shows that defendant affirmatively approved the jury instructions twice before
the instructions were read to the jury. Defendant specifically approved M Crim JI 5.12 a third time
when the trial court reread it to the jury in response to its question. Based on this record, defendant
waived any appellate challenge to the instruction. See Kowalski, 489 Mich at 504 n 26.

       Affirmed.

                                                               /s/ Anica Letica
                                                               /s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
                                                               /s/ Brock A. Swartzle

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