Court Opinion

ID: 9831690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:17:41.304311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:26.926862
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
1. Both Clark and Padgett, appellants herein, have filed motions for rehearing. All of the issues raised in Clark’s motion for pe-*1045bearing were fuily discussed in the original opinion herein, and nothing in said motion has convinced us that we were in error as to appellant Clark.
In our findings of fact herein, we stated that the land in controversy was awarded' to appellant Clark on August 1, 1907. The sale io Altizer was canceled August 26th, and the sale to Clark was made August 30, 1907. •In so far as the issues were discussed in appellants’ original brief herein, the date of said award was immaterial, but appellant Padgett in his motion for rehearing has called our attention to the fact that the act of 1905 (Acts 29th Leg. e. 103), which was supposed to be the law governing this case, was amended by the act of 1907 (Acts 30th Leg. [1st Ex. Sess.) c. 20) and that said act went into effect 90 days after the adjournment of the Legislature, which occurred on May 12, 1907, and consequently said act went into effect August 11th. Attorneys. for appellant Padgett frankly confess that they did not know that the act of 1907 was in effect at the time Padgett was substituted as purchaser for Clark, to wit, on August 30, 1907, but they now call our attention to said fact, and insist that by reason thereof the judgment herein should be reversed as to said appellant.
[13] 2. The act of 1905 regulating the sale and purchase of school lands did not repeal article 4218k of the Revised Statutes. Clark v. Terrell, 100 Tex. 277, 98 S. W. 642. This is also true of the act of 1907. Said article 4218k, Rev. St., permits purchasers of school land to sell the same, and provides that the vendee shall file his own application with the Commissioner of the Land Office, together with the duly authenticated conveyance or transfer from the original purchaser, duly recorded in the county where the land lies, stating that ha desires to purchase the land for a home, etc., “and thereupon the original applications shall be surrendered or canceled or properly credited, as the case may be (if he has sold only a part of his land), and the vendee shall become the purchaser direct from the state, and be subject to all the obligations and penalties ¡prescribed by this chapter, and the original purchaser shall be absolved, in whole or in part, as the ease may be, from further liability thereon.” In such ease the substituted purchaser becomes an original purchaser from the state. Johnson v. Bibb, 32 Tex. Civ. App. 471, 75 S. W. 71; Reininger v. Pannell, 46 Tex. Civ. App. 137, 101 S. W. 816; Davis v. Yates, 138 S. W. 281; Goodwin v. Koonee, 130 S. W. 620.
[14] 3. Appellant Padgett insists that the attempted sale by Clark to him operated under the act of 1907 as an absolute and ipso facto forfeiture of the land in question, and that, as the substitute purchaser becomes the original purchaser, he acquired title to the land in controversy by reason of his purchase from the state, free of all claims against said land. We think this contention is correct. The statute of 1905 provided that, “A purchaser shall not transfer his land prior to his actual settlement thereon and evidence of that fact is filed herein; provided any attempt to so transfer by deed, bond for title or other agreement, shall operate as a forfeiture of the land to the fund to which the same belonged, together with all the payments made thereon; and when sufficiently informed of the facts which operate as a forfeiture, the commissioner shall note the fact of forfeiture upon the application and proceed to place the land on the market by notice to the proper county clerk and advertisement in the manner provided for canceled leases.”
Our Supreme Court in the case of Good v. Terrell, 100 Tex. 275, 98 S. W. 641, construing this provision of the act of 1905, said: “The effect of this provision is to make a sale not only before settlement but also before the affidavit thereof (which was the evidence required by law of the settlement) shall be filed in the general land office * * * work a forfeiture ipso facto, and to make it the duty of the commissioner to de: clare the forfeiture when informed of the fact. The words are too plain to admit of any other construction. * * * Whatever may have been the motive the law is so written, and it must be given effect' — the statute is imperative.”
The act of 1907, § 6d, provides that, “One who hereafter buys land on condition of settlement shall not sell any part of such purchase prior to one year after the date of award of the home tract.” The act of 1905 provided that no such sale should be made until the applicant had made his settlement and filed proof of same in the land office. The act of 1907, § 6e, provides that, “One who may hereafter purchase land * * * on condition of settlement in' the counties named in section 6a of this act (El Paso is one of said counties) * * * who executes a transfer contrary to the provisions of this act * * * shall forfeit the land and all payments made thereon to .the fund to which the land belongs; and when the commissioner shall be sufficiently informed of the facts which operate as a forfeiture, he shall cancel the award or sale by noting the act of forfeiture on the obligation, and mail notice of that fact to the proper county clerk.”
It will be seen that the language declaring a forfeiture for a violation of the act of 1901 is practically the same as that used in the act of 1905, and under the authority of Good v. Terrell, supra, we hold that, when Clark executed a deed to Padgett within less than 12 months after the sale to him by the state, the award to him bec'ame thereby ipso facto forfeited, and the land reverted to the state free of any incumbrance which Clark may have placed upon the same. Tillman v. Erp, 121 S. W. 551. The undisputed evidence shows that the land in controversy was awarded to W. G. Clark August 30, *10461907; that said Clark and wife on May 4, 1908, conveyed said land to Padgett; that said Padgett applied to purchase said land on May 4, 1908, and that the same was awarded to him on his said application; and that the sale to Padgett is now in good standing. Such being the fact, Padgett acquired the land as a purchaser from the state, free of all incumbrances.
For the reasons herein stated, we overrule the motion of appellant Clark for a rehearing, and grant a rehearing as to appellant Padgett, and, as to him, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and rendered in his favor.
Affirmed in part, and in part reversed and rendered.