Court Opinion

ID: 9634763
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:22:52.612307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:58.306694
License: Public Domain

*230OPINION ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
FLAHERTY, Justice.
The sole issue raised on this appeal is whether appellant Doswell was denied effective assistance of counsel when his trial attorney failed to object to the prosecutor’s attempt to impeach the credibility of a defense witness with an unsentenced criminal charge.
On August 4, 1989, Doswell was convicted by a jury sitting in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County of two counts of rape, two counts of incest, and one count of attempted rape. On September 14, 1989, he was sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of ten to twenty years. Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence and we granted allocatur solely to address Doswell’s claim that one of his witnesses was improperly impeached.
The allegations on which this case is based are that in June, 1987 Doswell raped his daughter; in August, 1987, he attempted to rape her; and in July, 1988 he again raped her. Ms. Doswell lived at 314 Collins Street in Pittsburgh, which was also the residence of Doswell’s girlfriend. Ms. Doswell testified that in August of 1987, two months after the first rape, her father entered her room, threw her on the bed and attempted to penetrate her. As Doswell was attempting to rape his daughter, his girlfriend’s son, one Poindexter, entered the house and called Doswell’s name, whereupon Doswell jumped up and zipped up his pants. Doswell instructed the victim to quit crying and be quiet. Poindexter then came to the victim’s room, where Ms. Doswell sat with her back to the two men, and Poindexter left after two or three minutes. She testified that she did not seek Poindexter’s help because the assault was over.
At trial, Poindexter testified that he did not enter the room where Ms. Doswell lived in August of 1987 and that he never entered her bedroom and saw her alone with her father. Poindexter was the only non-party defense eyewitness.
*231Prior to Poindexter’s testimony, defense counsel questioned Poindexter for impeachment purposes about his prior criminal record. After talking with Poindexter and Poindexter’s mother, defense counsel informed the court that Poindexter had been convicted of receiving stolen property and agreed that this conviction could be used to impeach Poindexter’s credibility.
On cross examination, the Commonwealth questioned Poindexter as follows:
Q. Have you ever been arrested?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. For what?
A. Receiving stolen goods.
Q. What did you do for that?
A. They are going to tell me about it in September. Q. Are you awaiting sentencing in September for stealing? A. Receiving.
Q. Receiving Stolen goods?
A. Yes.
N.T. 118. After this exchange, the prosecutor did not pursue the impeachment further, except that at closing the prosecutor stated:
I suggest to you it’s fabrication. You will also be mindful of the fact that [Poindexter] did admit he had a receiving stolen goods charge, and you are allowed to consider that in assessing his credibility. There are only certain types of crimes we can introduce to you, the fact finders, but they are crimes that intend to show dishonesty, and that is why we are allowed to introduce them to you and why we went to such great length to do that.
N.T. 192. (Emphasis added.)
Contrary to Doswell’s formulation of the issue in this case,1 it does not concern an unsentenced conviction; rather, as the Commonwealth has pointed out in a motion to amend *232the record and its brief, it concerns only a criminal charge.2 Poindexter, it seems, at the time of Doswell’s trial, had been merely charged with a crime. Four months after Doswell’s trial, Poindexter pled guilty to one count of receiving stolen property and was sentenced to a term of probation of five years. Doswell’s claim, molded to these new facts, is that his counsel was ineffective in not objecting to the prosecutor’s use of a criminal charge to impeach Poindexter, the defense’s witness, and the only third-party eyewitness in the case.
As a general rule, a conviction on which sentence has not yet been imposed may not be used to impeach a witness. Commonwealth v. Zapata, 455 Pa. 205, 314 A.2d 299 (1974). The rationale for this rule was stated in Zapata:
“A conviction, using the word in its legal sense, of such crime is admissible because it tends to show the defectiveness of the moral character of the witness in respect of truthfulness, which is relevant in impeachment..A verdict of guilty, without more, stands on a different plane. The most it establishes is that the jury believed the accused to be guilty. But until sentence is pronounced the issue is not necessarily closed; a new trial may be granted or judgment be [sic] arrested. In either event the verdict goes for naught. It may injure the witness in the estimation of the jury, just as in a less degree the mere indictment of the witness would. But as evidence that the moral character of the witness for truth is bad it is unreliable because of its incompleteness.”
455 Pa. at 211-12, 314 A.2d at 303 (1974).
In Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987), we stated that in order to establish ineffectiveness of *233counsel, a petitioner must show (1) the underlying claims have arguable merit; (2) there was no reasonable basis for counsel’s conduct; (3) petitioner was prejudiced by counsel’s ineffectiveness.
Applying the requirements of Pierce to Doswell’s claim, there is clearly arguable merit to his argument that counsel should have objected to the use of a criminal charge to impeach a defense witness. We express no opinion on whether Zapata remains sound law, since we need not reach that question. With respect to impeachment based on a criminal charge, however, we have no difficulty concluding that it was error to utilize a criminal charge to impeach. It is fundamental that a person who has been charged with a crime and has not been tried “is presumed innocent until proven guilty in a court of law,” Commonwealth v. Pierce, 451 Pa. 190, 198, 303 A.2d 209, 214 (1973) (Emphasis in original).
Having established that Doswell’s underlying claim has arguable merit, we now consider whether there was a reasonable basis for counsel’s failure to object. Counsel failed to object because Poindexter and Poindexter’s mother told him that Poindexter had been convicted of receiving stolen property. However, counsel did not verify the conviction or the charge, and once he knew through cross examination that sentencing had not occurred, he did not object at closing when the prosecutor referred to the fact that Poindexter “had a receiving stolen goods charge.” There was no reasonable basis for these failures to object. To be effective, counsel must verify the accuracy of the criminal record at issue by checking with counsel who was involved with the trial or by checking court records. Compare, Zapata, 455 Pa. at 212, 314 A.2d at 303.
Further, we have no difficulty concluding that Doswell was prejudiced by trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. Poindexter was the only non-party eyewitness in the case. His failure to corroborate Ms. Doswell’s claim that he was present in her room in August of 1987 may well have cast doubt upon her testimony in general. But when Poindexter’s credibility was attacked by reference to a non-existent conviction, Poindex*234ter’s value as a defense witness was undoubtedly diminished, and Doswell was impermissibly prejudiced.
Order of Superior Court is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.
NIX, C.J., joins this opinion and files a concurring opinion.
PAPADAKOS, J., files a concurring opinion which is joined by LARSEN, J.
CAPPY, J., files a concurring opinion which is joined by MONTEMURO, J.

. Doswell formulates the issue in this case as follows:
Was Mr. Doswell denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to object when the commonwealth impeached *232Robert Lee Poindexter, a key defense witness, through the use of an unsentenced conviction?

. We deferred ruling on the motion until time of oral argument. However, because the case was submitted, not argued, we have not previously addressed the motion. We now grant the motion to correct and modify the record and to modify the Commonwealth’s brief. The essence of the modification is that at the time of trial, Poindexter had not been convicted of a crime with which his testimony could be impeached.