Court Opinion

ID: 9387035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-14 16:01:36.379069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:10.815751
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11267    Document: 27-1     Date Filed: 04/14/2023   Page: 1 of 5

                                               [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-11267
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,
       versus
       JOSHUA MANLEY WILLIAMS,
       a.k.a. Marcus Limark Rivers,
       a.k.a. Kevin,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11267

                      D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20058-RNS-1
                           ____________________

       Before WILSON, LUCK, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
             Prior to filing an initial brief, Joshua Manley Williams moves
       for summary reversal of his total sentence.
               In 2021, a grand jury charged Williams with, in relevant part,
       one count of attempt to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams
       or more of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (Count 2); and one
       count of illegal reentry, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(1) (Count 3). He
       later pled guilty to these charges pursuant to a written plea agree-
       ment. At sentencing, he objected to being disqualified for “safety
       valve” relief based on having a prior three-point offense. The dis-
       trict court overruled his objection and sentenced him to the mini-
       mum total sentence of 60-months’ imprisonment for Count 2 and
       24 months for Count 3, set to run concurrently, for a total of 60
       months’ imprisonment. This appeal follows.
              In his motion for summary reversal, Williams asserts a re-
       cently decided case, United States v. Garcon, 54 F.4th 1274 (11th
       Cir. 2022) (en banc) petition for cert. filed No. 22-851 (U.S. Mar. 6,
       2023), applies to him, meaning that he now qualifies for “safety
       valve” relief. Additionally, he asserts that time is of the essence.
       The Government responds by conceding that our decision in Gar-
       con means that Williams is eligible for “safety valve” relief,
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       22-11267               Opinion of the Court                        3

       although it also notes it believes the Garcon decision was wrongly
       decided.
               “Safety valve relief allows for sentencing without regard to
       any statutory minimum, with respect to certain offenses.” United
       States v. Milkintas, 470 F.3d 1339, 1344 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotations
       omitted). The statutory basis for “safety valve” relief, however,
       imposes certain conditions on defendants to be eligible. 18 U.S.C.
       § 3553(f)(1). One of those conditions, in relevant part, is that the
       defendant does not have a prior three-point offense in his criminal
       history. Id. § 3553(f)(1) (B). Other conditions in that subsection
       include the defendant not having: (1) more than 4 criminal history
       points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-
       point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and
       (2) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentenc-
       ing guidelines. Id. § 3553(f)(1)(A), (C).
              In Garcon, we held Garcon qualified for “safety valve” relief
       despite having a prior 3-point offense in his criminal history. Gar-
       con, 54 F.4th at 1276. We looked at the text of the statute and ap-
       plied the ordinary meaning of the word “and” to it, meaning that
       the disqualifying list in § 3553(f)(1)(A)–(C) was conjunctive. Id. at
       1277–78. We held to be ineligible for “safety valve” protections, a
       defendant needs to meet all three disqualifying conditions. Id. at
       1279–80.
            We grant Williams’ motion for summary reversal. See
       Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir.
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       4                          Opinion of the Court                      22-11267

       1969) 1 (explaining summary disposition is appropriate where “time
       is truly of the essence[, or] the position of one of the parties is
       clearly right as a matter of law so that there can be no substantial
       question as to the outcome of the case”). Under our en banc deci-
       sion in Garcon, the district court erred by finding the disqualifying
       list for “safety valve” protections was disjunctive. See id. at 1277–
       78. Additionally, as Williams had only one disqualifying condi-
       tion—a past offense of three criminal history points—and not the
       other conditions, he qualified for “safety valve” protections, and
       the district court stated it would have sentenced him below the
       mandatory minimum for Count 2.2 Id. at 1279–80.
             We conclude Williams is correct as a matter of law.3 Groen-
       dyke Transp., Inc., 406 F.2d at 1162. Finally, we note Williams is

       1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),
       this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Cir-
       cuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981.
       2 At sentencing and before the en banc opinion in Garcon was issued, the dis-
       trict court noted Williams had been in state custody and immigration custody,
       and if there had not been a mandatory minimum sentence, it would have
       given him a variance based on that time served. It explained it would have
       considered sentencing him to 41 months’ imprisonment if he had been eligible
       for “safety valve” relief, and then varied downward by 9 months, due to the
       time he had already spent in custody, for a total sentence of 32 months’ im-
       prisonment.
       3 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Pulsifer v. United States, No. 22-
       340, on February 27, 2023. Pulsifer presents the question our en banc court
       answered in Garcon--specifically, whether the “and” in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)
       means “and,” so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not
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       22-11267                   Opinion of the Court                                5

       set to be released from custody in December of 2024. This, when
       considered along with comments made by the district court at his
       sentencing, show us that time is of the essence as well. Id.
             Based on the foregoing, we GRANT Williams' motion, sum-
       marily reverse his total sentence, and remand his case for resen-
       tencing consistent with this opinion.
               REVERSED and REMANDED.

       have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, and (C) a
       2-point offense (as the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits hold), or whether the
       “and” means “or,” so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does
       not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, or (C) a
       2-point violent offense (as the Seventh and Eighth Circuits hold). Pulsifer is
       scheduled to be argued in the October 2023 Term. “The grant of certiorari on
       an issue does not suggest a view on the merits,” Schwab v. Sec., Dept. of Corr.,
       507 F.3d 1297, 1299 (11th Cir. 2007), and “a grant of certiorari does not change
       the law,” Rutherford v. McDonough, 466 F.3d 970, 977 (11th Cir. 2006). Gar-
       con is the law of this Circuit.