Court Opinion

ID: 9767101
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:09:40.60903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:28.620464
License: Public Domain

CAVANAUGH, Judge,
dissenting.
I most respectfully dissent. I see the threshold issue before us as a question different from the one posed by the majority at the outset of its opinion.
Should the superior court undertake to substantially modify the policy adopted in a supreme court decision where there is no principled rationale for distinguishing the case from the supreme court decision and where the effect is to overrule or abrogate a series of decided cases which have been promulgated and published in the four-year interim between the supreme court decision and today’s decision?
Although no principle should be less in need of enunciation and repetition, our court has engaged in frequent self-reminders of our duty of obeisance to supreme court opinions. See Aivazoglou v. Drever Furnaces, 418 Pa.Super. 111, 613 A.2d 595 (1992) (deferring to our supreme court as policy making court of this Commonwealth); see also Foflygen v. R. Zemel, M.D., 420 Pa.Super. 18, 615 A.2d 1345 (1992); Preiser v. Rosenzweig, 418 Pa.Super. 341, 614 A.2d 303 (1992), allocatur granted, 535 Pa. 637, 631 A.2d 1009 (1993); DeFrancesco v. Western Pa. Water Co., 329 Pa.Super. 508, 478 A.2d 1295 (1984); Commonwealth v. Edrington, 317 Pa.Super. 545, 464 A.2d 456 (1983). Of course, the supreme court has not hesitat*316ed to remind our court of its confines when it felt that our court had stepped beyond its proper boundaries. See two cases decided the same day: Municipal Publications, Inc. v. Court of Common Pleas; Appeal of Edgehill, 507 Pa. 194, 489 A.2d 1286 (1985) and Reilly by Reilly v. SEPTA 507 Pa. 204, 489 A.2d 1291 (1985).
In Miller v. Berschler, 423 Pa.Super. 405, 621 A.2d 595 (1993) we examined the applicability of Muhammad v. Strassburger, et al, 526 Pa. 541, 587 A.2d 1346 (1991) to a case involving circumstances similar to the instant matter and opined:
We find the appellant’s argument unpersuasive. Muhammad, speaking in straightforward terms, bars litigants who have entered a settlement agreement from subsequently maintaining a suit against their attorney for legal malpractice unless fraud is alleged in the inducement of the agreement. While it may be argued that this is a fundamentally problematic holding, we are obliged to follow the pronouncements of our highest court. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Dugger, 506 Pa. 537, 545, 486 A.2d 382, 386 (1985) (“The formal purpose of the Superior court is to maintain and effectuate the decisional law of [the Supreme] Court as faithfully as possible.”)
... the Supreme Court sua sponte promulgated a rule affording attorneys broad protection in malpractice cases.
Simply stated, we will not permit a suit to be filed by a dissatisfied plaintiff against his attorney following a settlement to which the plaintiff agreed, unless that plaintiff can show he was fraudulently induced to settle the original action. An action should not lie against an attorney for malpractice based on negligence and/or contract principles when the client has agreed to a settlement. Rather, only cases of fraud should be actionable.
Id., 526 Pa. at 546, 587 A.2d 1346. The court gave the following rationales for this rule: the court declared that the essence of settlement is contractual in nature, and similar to a contract, the time for questioning whether a settlement agreement is advantageous is before settlement, *317id. at 547-548, 587 A.2d at 1349; the contract principle of caveat emptor applies similarly to settlements, so that a person entering into a settlement agreement is locked into whatever compromise he agreed to once the settlement becomes effective, id. at 548, 587 A.2d at 1349; the Court found that overriding principles of public policy supported its result, as lawyers might be reluctant to settle a case if they feared a client might later find a way to sue them for something that “ ‘cold have been done, but was not,’ ” id. at 548, 587 A.2d at 1349; the court was concerned with the lack of finality and delay in already overcrowded courts and believed: “we [the court] should view ‘litigation concerning litigation’ cases with a jaundiced eye,” id. at 549-550, 587 A.2d at 1350; litigation over settlements is of particular concern, because settlement is an essential part of the efficient operation of our judicial system, id. at 550, 587 A.2d at 1349; and finally, there are distinct societal advantages to a judicial system which is not adversarial in nature but attempts to resolve disputes by compromise or concession, id. at 551-552, 587 A.2d at 1351.
It appears that, given the broad policy rationales employed by the Supreme Court and the unqualified articulation of its “simply stated” holding, Muhammad proclaims a clear, bright line rule which, absent fraud, shields attorneys from legal malpractice claims sounding in negligence or contract where they involve cases concluded by completed settlement.
Miller v. Berschler, 423 Pa.Super. 405, 406-07, 408-09, 621 A.2d 595, 596, 597.
The dissent in Miller argued that Muhammad should be limited cases where the dispute was as to the amount of money involved in the settlement.
The present majority conspicuously fails to refer to any language in the supreme court opinion which would suggest that the Muhammad decision should be interpreted as it is today. Although the majority twice suggests revisitation to the “amount” of dollars as a basis for distinction, the court later would draw the line between Muhammad and cases *318where there was a failure to advise a client about well-established principles of law and the “impact on future obligations” or, as declaratively stated by the majority, where there is a “deficiency in the lawyers exercise of his or her professional judgment”. If these statements (which could well be used as a definition of all legal malpractice) are to be taken as the basis for differentiation from Muhammad, it is clear that the majority not only improperly limits Muhammad, but that our court has now in fact nullified the policy enunciated by our supreme court.
Thus, the majority opinion not only emasculates Muhammad but, also it overrules or effectively overrides, four published decisions of this court which followed the reasoning and policy of Muhammad. These decisions which involve nine judges of this court, are but a part of the hegemony which may reasonably be attributed to the pivotal decision by our highest court.1 For example, we do not know the number of unpublished memoranda by our court which have applied the immunity policy or the number of cases in the trial courts2 which have applied Muhammad in its literal terms or followed the authorities discussed above which have now been virtually discountenanced. Nor can we measure the effect that Muhammad, as previously applied by our cases and its own broad language, has had upon counsel and their advice to prospective litigants previous to today.
In sum, I would apply the doctrine of stare decisis as eloquently described by Judge Rowley:
*319Furthermore, it is not necessary to us to explore the extent and impact of a particular analysis. Such determinations are the prerogative of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Rather, we are compelled to follow the Supreme Court’s decision in Carrender [v. Fitterer, 503 Pa. 178, 469 A.2d 120 (1983) ] in factual situations of the same class, which we find the present case to be. Where the Supreme Court has spoken on a particular subject, it is our obligation, as an intermediate appellate court, to follow and apply that decision so as to establish some measure of predictability and stability in our case law. In the absence of a legally relevant distinction between the facts of a previous case and the case before us, we are obliged to follow the dictates of the Supreme Court’s decision in the prior case. Resolving cases by attempting to create irrelevant, factual distinctions impedes application of the doctrine of stare decisis, the principal function of which is to imbue the judicial system with some measure of predictability and stability, and places the development of the law in a constant, uncertain state of flux such that neither practitioners nor trial judges can, with any degree of predictability, determine the proper application of the law to each new case involving similar facts that comes before them. It also is not our prerogative to apply different methods of analysis where our Supreme Court has made clear which particular analysis it believes should be applied to a particular situation.
Malinder v. Jenkins Elevator & Mach. Co., 371 Pa.Super. 414, 421-22, 538 A.2d 509, 513 (1988).
Or, on an earlier day by Mr. Justice Paxson:
It was admitted by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, that the current of authority was against his view of the case, and we were urged to review the previous decisions of this court and recast them in harmony with the state of public opinion at the present day. We see no reason why the law should change to suit the barometer of public opinion. On the contrary, we see many reasons why it should not. And especially are we not disposed, for such *320reason, to overturn a long line of cases, solemnly decided, which have, to some extent, become rules of property, and upon the faith of which investments have been made and rights have grown up. It is our duty to apply the maxim stare decisis.
Struthers v. Dunkirk, Warren & Pittsburgh Rwy. Co., 87 Pa. 282, 286 (1878) (cited in Black’s Law Dictionary 4th Edition 1976-Stare Decisis).
Respectfully, I would conclude that the present case is controlled by the holding in Muhammad v. Strassburger, et al.; and also that the new rule adopted by the majority is artificial, unworkable, and not based on any principled distinction attributable to the supreme court decision and, accordingly, I, therefore, Dissent and would Affirm the order of the trial court.3
CIRILLO, POPOVICH and HUDOCK, JJ., join.

. Although the majority undertakes to avoid overruling in haec verba Goodman v. Kotzen, 436 Pa.Super. 71, 77-79, 647 A.2d 247, 250 (1994); Spirer v. Freeland & Kronz, 434 Pa.Super. 341, 344-46, 643 A.2d 673, 675 (1994) and Martos v. Concilio, 427 Pa.Super. 612, 629 A.2d 1037 (1993), they are in fact indistinguishable and a reading of the majority opinion discloses that there is no reasoned basis upon which these opinions may be distinguished from Muhammad or Miller. These cases all followed the supreme court’s decision in Muhammad and do not provide any support for the reasoning of the present majority.

. See for example, Phelps v. Williams (No. 83-5499-14-2 C.C.P. Bucks Co., Oct. 30, 1991); Estate of Andrews v. Newman (no. 88-06167 C.C.P. Montgomery Co., Oct. 8, 1991); Dries v. Holko (No. 86-C-1942 C.C.P. Lehigh Co., Sept. 27, 1991) (bench opinion).

. Of course, the application of the Stare decisis doctrine does not preclude judicial statements which, while recognizing the governance of a supreme court majority, undertake to question- the practical wisdom of the holding. The present rule is an example. See dissent in Muhammad ("It’s Christmastime for Pennsylvania Lawyers”) and concurrence in Gordon ([the immunity granted in Muhammad is] "well nigh absolute” [and may be an unmerited shield]).