Court Opinion

ID: 9727531
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:41:55.672665+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:39.809291
License: Public Domain

SAUFLEY, C.J.,
with whom DANA, J., joins, dissenting.
[¶ 12] Although I do not disagree with the Court’s conclusion that it has insufficient facts to reach a Swanson analysis, I must respectfully dissent because I do not believe that dismissal at this stage in the proceeding is warranted.
[¶ 13] We review a judgment entered upon a motion to dismiss by examining “the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether it sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal theory.” In re Wage Payment Litig., 2000 ME 162, ¶ 3, 759 A.2d 217, 220. A complaint “should not be dismissed unless it is beyond doubt that no relief can be granted under any facts that might be proved to support the plaintiffs claim.” Bowen v. Eastman, 645 A.2d 5, 6 (Me.1994).
[¶ 14] Here, Napieralski alleges in her complaint that she was sexually assaulted on Church property, that the Church knew or should have known of prior sexual assaults on parishioners committed by Williamson, and that the Church failed to warn or protect her. Napieralski’s complaint could be read to state a claim for negligent supervision.2 Further discovery is required to ascertain whether there are sufficient facts to support these allegations. Without specific facts, it is impossible to fully consider the merits of adopting the tort of negligent supervision as it is articulated in the Restatement or in some alternative form.
[¶ 15] More important, the dearth of facts in the record makes it difficult to gauge whether Napieralski’s lawsuit is barred by constitutional considerations. In Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, the plaintiffs were a couple who sought marriage counseling from their priest, and they alleged that the priest initiated a consensual sexual relationship with the wife during individual counseling sessions. 1997 ME 63, ¶¶ 2-3, 692 A.2d 441, 442. We concluded that, on the specific facts of the case, “imposing a secular duty of supervision on the church and enforcing that duty through civil liability would restrict its freedom to interact with its clergy in the manner deemed proper by ecclesiastical authorities and would not serve a societal interest sufficient to overcome the religious freedoms inhibited.” Id. ¶ 13, 692 A.2d at 445.
[¶ 16] We have since indicated that there may be circumstances where the balancing of interests test articulated in Swanson might effect a different result. See Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 1999 ME 144, ¶ 9 n. 2, 738 A.2d 839, 843. Here, Napieralski alleges that she was forced to perform sexual acts by Williamson, making her a victim of alleged criminal conduct. She further alleges that the Church was aware of other incidents of sexual misconduct committed by Williamson, possibly assaultive, possibly in his clerical capacity, and possibly on Church property, and that it failed to take action to prevent Williamson from using his position with the Church to assault women congregants. There is thus a potentially stronger public interest at stake in this case than was apparent in Swanson. Without more specific facts, however, we cannot determine whether the societal in-' terest in permitting the case to go forward is sufficient to justify an intrusion into ecclesiastical affairs. Moreover, absent *395discovery it is impossible to ascertain the extent to which church doctrine is implicated. See Graffam v. Wray, 437 A.2d 627, 631 (Me.1981) (holding that the application of neutral principles of law to property disputes does not implicate religious doctrine); Drevlow v. Lutheran Church, Mo. Synod, 991 F.2d 468, 471-72 (8th Cir.1993) (holding that on a motion to dismiss, the court cannot “predict that the evidence offered at trial will definitely involve ... an impermissible inquiry into the Synod’s bylaws or religious beliefs.... If further proceedings reveal that this matter cannot be resolved without interpreting religious procedures or beliefs, the district court should reconsider the Synod’s motion to dismiss.”).
[¶ 17] Although Napieralski’s complaint may not withstand a motion for summary judgment either on constitutional grounds or regarding her claim for negligent supervision, given the present posture of this case, we must read the complaint “in the light most favorable to” Napieralski. See Webb v. Haas, 665 A.2d 1005, 1010-11 (Me.1995). I would remand the case for limited discovery to determine whether the facts propounded by Napieralski are of a nature that would justify permitting the case to go forward against a religious institution and, if so, whether they warrant the recognition of a claim for negligent supervision.3

. These allegations would be sufficient to state a claim for negligent supervision pursuant to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317 (1965).

. Unlike in Swanson, where the parties had engaged in "considerable discovery activity,” 1997 ME 63, ¶ 5, 692 A.2d at 442, Napieral-ski’s complaint was dismissed before any discovery took place.