Court Opinion

ID: 9639178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:06:52.261964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:34:13.210767
License: Public Domain

*285SPAETH, President Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I believe we should affirm on the basis of the able opinions of the trial court. I add these further comments only because, subsequent to the filing of the trial court opinions, the Supreme Court has again addressed the issue of the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony. See Commonwealth v. Smoyer, 505 Pa. 83, 476 A.2d 1304 (1984). I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Smoyer requires that we reach a different result than that of the trial court.
The trial court concluded, on the basis of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170 (1981), that the testimony of all four witnesses who had been hypnotized should be excluded. It reached this conclusion after a three part analysis. It first asked whether the testimony that was hypnotically-adduced, that is, wholly the result of hypnosis, was admissible. It next asked whether the witnesses who had been hypnotized were competent to testify as to their pre-hypno-sis recollections. It finally asked whether these pre-hypno-sis recollections had been preserved in a sufficiently reliable way to render them independently admissible. Slip op. of tr. ct. at 4-5.
In answer to its first question, the trial court held that hypnotically-adduced testimony is inadmissible. The majority affirms this holding, and as to this point, I join the majority. See Commonwealth v. Smoyer, supra; Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, supra; Majority at 282-284; Slip op. of tr. ct. at 6.
In answer to its second question, the trial court concluded, after a thorough analysis of the reasoning in Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, supra, and the authorities cited therein, that the four witnesses were not competent to testify as to their pre-hypnotic recollections. In Nazaro-vitch, the Supreme Court addressed the threshhold issue of whether hypnotically-refreshed testimony was competent. It applied the test announced in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923), for determining whether evidence *286adduced by a particular scientific method is sufficiently reliable to be competent, i.e., it asked whether “the thing from which the deduction is made [is] ... sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” Id. at 1014, cited in Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, supra, 496 Pa. at 101, 436 A.2d at 172 (emphasis omitted). In applying this test, the Supreme Court expressed its concern with the conclusion of medical experts, summarized by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981), that previously hypnotized witnesses have difficulty in distinguishing between pre- and post-hypnotic recollection:
“[a] subject often will incorporate into his response his notion of what is expected of him.... Because of the unpredictability of what will influence a subject, it is difficult even for an expert examining a videotape of a hypnotic session to identify possible cues.
“Perhaps [the] most troubling phenomenon is the tendency to confound memories evoked under hypnosis with prior recall.
“Typically, a subject is told he will remember what he has recalled under hypnosis after he awakes from the trance. In response to this post-hypnotic suggestion, most subjects will indiscriminately mix their hypnotic recall with their waking memory. Many experts believe that the subject is then unable to evaluate critically the resulting memory to determine what he himself believes is the accurate version... Furthermore he will have a strong subjective confidence in the validity of his new recall, which will make it difficult for an expert or a jury to judge the credibility of his memory. [ (citations and footnotes omitted)]”
Id. at 539, 432 A.2d at 93.
Cited in Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, supra, 496 Pa. at 107-08, 436 A.2d at 176.
*287On the basis of such considerations, the Supreme Court concluded that “we do not believe that the process of refreshing recollection by hypnosis has gained sufficient acceptance in its field” to meet the Frye test of reliability, and it held: “While we do not want to establish a per se rule of inadmissibility at this time, we will not permit the introduction of hypnotically-refreshed testimony until we are presented with more conclusive proof than has been offered to date of the reliability” of hypnosis. Id., 496 Pa. at 110-11, 436 A.2d at 177, 178. The trial court relied on this analysis to conclude that here, “[s]ince the Court, the defense and jury cannot discern whether the witness is relating a historically accurate account of events free from the taint of hypnotic suggestion, the more reasoned approach requires that all witnesses who underwent hypnosis as an aid to [the] criminal investigation shall be incompetent to testify at trial regarding the criminal episode.” Slip op. of tr. ct. at 8-9.
The question we must decide is whether Commonwealth v. Smoyer, supra, requires that we disturb this conclusion. I do not believe it does. In Smoyer, the Supreme Court was required to decide whether hypnotically-adduced testimony had been improperly admitted at trial. It concluded that it had been improperly admitted, and in doing so, strongly reaffirmed both the holding in Nazarovitch and the policy concerns that underlay that holding:
In Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, supra, Mr. Chief Justice O’Brien examined at length the scientific state of hypnotism and found it wanting as a source of admissible evidence. Whatever its value in other disciplines, it cannot be relied upon to produce evidence untainted by untraceable factors. It is of no moment that all evidence is ultimately delivered by fallible human agency. Such fallibility is a known quantity, understood and expected in ordinary human experience. It is at least only the fallibility of the witness and not the added dimension of another stirring his psyche, waking who knows what fanciful ghosts.
*288Hence, again we hold that testimony adduced by hypnotism is inadmissible as evidence. Therefore, the hypnotically adduced testimony herein was improperly admitted.
Id., 505 Pa. at 87, 476 A.2d at 1306.
Because the Court concluded that the admission of the testimony had not been harmless error, it remanded for a new trial. At that trial, it noted, the question of whether the witness was incompetent for all purposes was likely to arise. It held that in such a case there might be an exception to the presumption of incompetence, provided the Commonwealth could satisfy certain stringent conditions designed to obviate the concerns expressed in Nazarovitch. If the Commonwealth could prove that the session had been conducted by a trained hypnotist, thereby minimizing the danger of suggestiveness, and if it could “show that the testimony ... was established and existed previous to any hypnotic process,” then it would be within the discretion of the trial court to admit the testimony. Id., 505 Pa. at 90, 476 A.2d at 1308.
I cannot agree that this language requires us to reach a result different from that reached by the trial court. The trial court has determined that the Commonwealth cannot satisfy the requirements of Smoyer. The court has found as a fact, and the finding is supported by the record, see N.T. 12/21/81 at 12, 14, 20, that “[n]one of the statements of any of the four witnesses [who were subsequently hypnotized] were recorded or preserved verbatim except as a loose synopsis in the police notes [of the investigating officer.]”, slip op. of tr. ct. at 2, and that the Commonwealth “failed to employ even the most minimal safeguards to preserve the testimony of those witnesses for use at trial,” id. at 11. It therefore ruled that the prior statements of those witnesses, preserved only in the notes of the investigating officer, were inadmissible for use at trial. Slip op. of tr. ct. at 12. Compare Commonwealth v. Taylor, 294 Pa.Super. 171, 439 A.2d 805 (1982) (pre-hypnotic identification by victim of her assailants properly preserved where victim had made positive identification in pre-hypnotic photo *289arrays). Under Smoyer, the Commonwealth therefore has no competent evidence by means of which it may “show that the testimony ... was established and existed previous to any hypnotic process.” Commonwealth v. Smoyer, supra, 505 Pa. at 90, 476 A.2d at 1308.
I should accordingly affirm the order of the trial court.