Court Opinion

ID: 9953234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-21 17:02:55.936735+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:45:46.919645
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                     STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

                                        v.

                    LARRY JAMES RADY, JR., Petitioner.

                         No. 1 CA-CR 23-0458 PRPC
                              FILED 3-21-2024

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                        No. CR2018-144942-001
                 The Honorable John R. Hannah, Judge

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Douglas Gerlach
Counsel for Respondent

Dumond Law Firm PLLC, Phoenix
By Samantha Kelli DuMond
Counsel for Petitioner
                             STATE v. RADY
                           Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the court, in
which Presiding Judge Anni Hill Foster and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1             Larry James Rady seeks review of the trial court’s order,
which denied his petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”) filed under
Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 33.1. We have considered the
petition for review and, for the reasons stated, grant review but deny relief.

                 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2            In July 2018, Rady was shot in the leg. While at the hospital
receiving treatment for his wound, Rady was interviewed by the police.
Rady told police officers that he was shot by an unknown subject while
smoking a cigarette on his back porch. Officers were dispatched to Rady’s
residence and, shortly after arrival, they encountered Rady’s roommate.
The roommate told the officers that Rady had shot himself. Later, Rady
contradicted his initial statement and told police the shooting occurred
when he was moving a safe and a gun fell out, hit the floor, and discharged.
At the time of the shooting, Rady was on probation for a felony conviction
and was prohibited from possessing firearms.

¶3           Based on these events, the police obtained an arrest warrant
for Rady. Officers conducting surveillance in the area where Rady resided
observed Rady get into a vehicle and shortly after stopped the vehicle to
execute the warrant. A search of the vehicle revealed a knife inside the map
pocket on the rear side of the passenger seat, which was within Rady’s
reach. The knife was a dagger type, with a blade length of approximately 3
inches and an overall length of 7.5 inches. A detective opined that the knife
was designed for lethal use.

¶4           The state charged Rady with two counts of misconduct
involving weapons occurring on different dates, both class 4 felonies, and
unlawful discharge of a firearm, a class 6 felony. Rady entered a plea
agreement, resolving one count of misconduct involving weapons
concerning the knife, and the count of unlawful discharge of a firearm.
Under the plea agreement, he would be sentenced to a ten-year prison term

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                               STATE v. RADY
                             Decision of the Court

for the count of misconduct involving weapons concerning the knife and
the count of unlawful discharge of a firearm would be dismissed. The ten-
year presumptive term sentence would run concurrently with any
sentencing resulting from the trial on the remaining count of misconduct
involving weapons.

¶5            The jury found Rady guilty as charged and the trial court
sentenced him to a presumptive ten-year prison term, which was to run
concurrent with the ten-year prison term resulting from the plea agreement.
Rady timely appealed, and this court affirmed his convictions and
sentences. State v. Rady, 1 CA-CR 20-0118, 2021 WL 244357 (App. Jan. 26,
2021) (mem. decision).

¶6             Rady then petitioned for PCR. In his petition, he claimed that
he received ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) because his trial
counsel did not research the knife’s design to discover that it was not
designed for lethal use and thus was not a “deadly weapon” as defined in
A.R.S. § 13–3101(A)(1). Instead, relying on the online retailers’ description
of the knife, he argued that the knife was designed for utility purposes. To
support his claim, he provided an affidavit from his roommate that
explained her use of the knife as a tool. The affidavit said nothing about
Rady’s counsel’s failure to research the knife’s design. He also claimed
actual innocence because no jury would have convicted him if it knew that
the knife was designed for utility purposes.

¶7             The trial court found that Rady’s actual innocence claim failed
as a matter of law because this court had held in State v. Clevidence that a
similar knife to the one here clearly qualified as a deadly weapon. 153 Ariz.
295, 301 (App. 1987). It also found that Rady’s IAC claim failed because the
petition offered no proof that his counsel had failed to investigate the
knife’s design. It therefore summarily dismissed his PCR petition. This
petition for review followed. This court has jurisdiction under A.R.S.
§ 13–4239(C) and Rule 33.16(a)(1).

                                 DISCUSSION

¶8             This court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a PCR petition for
an abuse of discretion. State v. Bigger, 251 Ariz. 402, 407 ¶ 6 (2021). This court
will affirm a trial court’s ruling if “it is legally correct for any reason.” State
v. Roseberry, 237 Ariz. 507, 508 ¶ 7 (2015) (citing State v. Perez, 141 Ariz. 459,
464 (1984)).

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                              STATE v. RADY
                            Decision of the Court

I.     Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶9           Rady argues that the trial court erred in finding that he did
not present a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. “If a
defendant presents a colorable claim, he is entitled to a hearing to determine
whether counsel rendered effective assistance.” Bigger, 251 Ariz. at 407 ¶ 9
(citations omitted). To determine whether a defendant is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing, we ask “whether he has alleged facts which, if true,
would probably have changed the verdict or sentence.” Id. (citing State v.
Amaral, 239 Ariz. 217, 220 ¶ 11 (2016)).

¶10            To prove an IAC claim, a defendant must show that
“counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
that he was prejudiced thereby.” Id. at 407 ¶ 8 (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984); State v. Denz, 232 Ariz. 441, 443 ¶ 6
(App. 2013)). When a defendant claims counsel was ineffective by failing to
investigate evidence, the defendant must show that counsel’s advice to
plead guilty without having first pursued those actions “rendered that
advice outside the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases.” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 268 (1973) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). And “[t]o establish prejudice in the context of
a plea agreement, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that
except for his lawyer’s error he would not have waived his right to trial and
entered a plea.” State v. Ysea, 191 Ariz. 372, 377 ¶ 17 (1998), superseded on
other grounds by statute as recognized by State v. Martinez, 196 Ariz. 451, 462
¶ 44 (2000).

¶11           Here, Rady has not carried his burden of showing that the
trial court abused its discretion in finding that the record did not support
his IAC allegations to require an evidentiary hearing. As the court
explained in its dismissal order, he offered no proof that his counsel failed
to investigate the design of the knife to establish a defense. Rady has shown
no error.

II.    Actual Innocence

¶12            Rady also argues that the trial court erred in finding that he
did not present a colorable claim of actual innocence. A defendant is
entitled to relief under Rule 33.1(h) if he can show “by clear and convincing
evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish
that no reasonable fact-finder would find the defendant guilty of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Rady did not do so. The knife here, despite
also being advertised as a utility tool, meets the definition of a deadly

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                             STATE v. RADY
                           Decision of the Court

weapon under A.R.S. § 13–3101(A)(1). See State v. Williams, 110 Ariz. 104,
105 (1973) (“A knife is a deadly weapon.”); see also Clevidence, 153 Ariz. at
300–01 (holding that a knife six inches long was a “deadly weapon” under
A.R.S. § 13–3101). The trial court did not err.

                                  CONCLUSION

¶13          We grant review but deny relief.

                          AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                          FILED: AA

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