Court Opinion

ID: 9782670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:04:29.575333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:28:00.655127
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/30/23 P. v. Palumbo CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                          D081085

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.
                                                                     (Super. Ct. No. ECR12126)
JOHN MICHAEL PALUMBO,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Robert O’Neill, Judge. Affirmed.
         Theresa Osterman Stevenson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Arlene A. Sevidal, Randal D. Einhorn and Andrew Mestman, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
         Defendant John Michael Palumbo filed a motion to initiate a
proceeding under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) to
preserve youth-related mitigation evidence to use at a future youth offender
parole hearing. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that Palumbo
has no right to a Franklin proceeding because: (1) Penal Code section 3051
denies youth offender parole hearings to inmates serving sentences of life in
prison without parole (LWOP) for offenses they committed after attaining age
18; and (2) Palumbo was no longer 18 when he committed his offense. In so
ruling, the court rejected Palumbo’s arguments that section 3051 violates the
United States and California Constitutions’ guarantees of equal protection
for similarly situated classes of offenders and freedom from cruel and/or
unusual punishment. We affirm the judgment.
                                      I.
                     Factual and Procedural Background
      Palumbo’s sentence arises from a botched robbery that caused the
death of an innocent passerby, some 28 years ago, when Palumbo was 22
years old. According to the prosecution:

         “On July 24, 1995, Darrell Ray Hawkins, Jr., 18, planned to
         spend the night with his girlfriend, who lived with her
         mother in a condominium complex. [S]hortly before
         midnight, [he] proceeded to his girlfriend’s residence.

         “At 12:15 a.m. [on July 25, 1995], as Hawkins was passing
         by unit 240, which was downstairs from his girlfriend’s
         unit, he was accosted by Palumbo. Palumbo had been
         hiding in the bushes along with a companion as part of a
         plan to rob the occupants of unit 240 and had become
         impatient. Palumbo placed a .357 magnum revolver to
         Hawkins’s head and ordered him to open the door to unit
         240. When Hawkins said he did not live there, Palumbo
         pulled the hammer back on the gun to intimidate Hawkins
         and reiterated his order. As Palumbo was using the gun to
         push Hawkins through the door, the gun accidentally fired.
         Hawkins died from a single gunshot wound to the back of
         his head. Soot and markings around the entrance wound
         indicated the gun was in contact with the head when it was
         fired.”

                                      2
(People v. Palumbo (April 30, 1998, D026419) [nonpub. opn.], review granted
July 29, 1998, S070875; review dismissed Oct. 18, 2000 (Palumbo). At trial,
Palumbo denied the prosecution’s account. (Palumbo, supra, D026419.)
However, he nonetheless was convicted of special-circumstances first degree

felony-murder (ibid.);1 and in June of 1996 the trial court, pursuant to

legislative mandate, sentenced him to LWOP.2
      Later that year Palumbo appealed the judgment, assigning error to the
conviction, but not to the sentence (Palumbo, supra, D026419); and in 1998
this court affirmed the judgment.
      According to the materials he submitted in support of his request for a
Franklin proceeding, Palumbo appears to have matured considerably over
the course of the next 24 years. Those materials include accolades from 10
correctional officers, some of high rank, who have observed Palumbo in the
institutions in which he has been housed over the years and who describe
him as a drug-free, humble, compassionate, selfless, role-model inmate with
an exceedingly positive influence on efforts of fellow inmates to rehabilitate
and improve themselves. Also in Palumbo’s submission are statements by
other correctional staff, by 15 fellow inmates, and by an inmate’s sister all to
similar effect, and writings of Palumbo acknowledging guilt, expressing
shame, remorse, and regret, and stating an intention to make of his life “a

1     The jury also convicted Palumbo of conspiracy to commit residential
robbery and attempted residential robbery, and further found the murder
had occurred during the commission of the attempted robbery for purposes of
a robbery-murder special circumstance allegation. (Palumbo, supra,
D026419.)

2     At sentencing, the trial judge stated: “[B]y law, pursuant to Penal Code
section[s] 189, 190 and 190.2, the punishment mandated is life in prison
without possibility of parole.”

                                        3
living amends” for the behavior that led to his incarceration. In addition, the
submission includes evidence of Palumbo’s voluntary participation—as a
student, a mentor, a facilitator, and a leader—in educational and
rehabilitative programs that appear to have been substantial in number and

in depth.3
      In 2022 Palumbo filed the motion that is the subject of this appeal. The
motion contends that Palumbo is entitled to a Franklin evidence-preservation
proceeding (also known as a Franklin hearing) and the appointment of
counsel to help effectuate his rights in connection with such a proceeding. As
noted ante, the trial court issued an order denying the motion; and on
October 13, 2022 Palumbo timely appealed the order.
                                       II.
                                  Discussion
      Palumbo bases his claimed entitlement to a Franklin proceeding on two
arguments that challenge the constitutionality of Penal Code section 3051:
(1) an argument that section 3051 “violates his state and federal
constitutional rights of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment
and article I, section 7 of the California Constitution;” and (2) an argument
that section 3051 “renders his sentence unconstitutionally cruel and/or
unusual under article I, section 17 of the California Constitution and the
Eighth Amendment [to] the United States Constitution.” To place these
arguments in context, we begin with a discussion of the provenance and

3     These programs include prison course work focused on self-
improvement topics such as substance abuse, anger management,
alternatives to violence, victim awareness, criminal thinking, gangs,
recidivism, vocational training, parole suitability, and the like. They also
include classes that have led to Palumbo being awarded a G.E.D. and five
associate degrees.

                                       4
substance of Penal Code section 3051, youth offender parole hearings, and
Franklin proceedings. Then we turn to an assessment of Palumbo’s
constitutional challenges.

A.    Penal Code Section 3051 and Youth Offender Parole Hearings

      Penal Code section 3051 came into existence in 2013 as a legislative
response to a series of watershed opinions by the United States and
California Supreme Courts mandating, as a matter of constitutional law, that
certain attributes of youth be considered in the sentencing of persons
convicted of crimes they had committed when they were juveniles—meaning
under the age of 18. (See Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 1; Franklin, supra, 63
Cal.4th at p. 277; County of San Diego v. Commission on State Mandates
(2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 625 (Commission on State Mandates).)
      These watershed opinions included: Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S.
551 (Roper), in which the United States Supreme Court (the Supreme Court
or the Court) held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits death sentences for
juveniles); Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, in which the Court held
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits LWOP sentences for juveniles
convicted of nonhomicide offenses; Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460
(Miller), in which the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders and requires that a
juvenile’s age and various other mitigating factors be taken into account
when imposing sentence; and People v. Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, in
which the California Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits de facto LWOP sentences for juveniles convicted of nonhomicide
offenses.
      Among the elements underpinning each of these opinions was the
Court’s conclusion, based in large measure on scientific and sociological

                                       5
studies, that juveniles are different from adults inasmuch as: (1) juveniles
lack maturity and thus are more prone to impetuous and ill-considered
actions; (2) juveniles are more susceptible to negative influences and outside
pressures, including peer pressure; and (3) the character of a juvenile is not
as well formed as that of an adult and thus has a heightened capacity for
change. (See, e.g., Roper, supra, 543 U.S. at pp. 569-570.)
      Motivated by these opinions, the Legislature enacted a set of reforms
that included Penal Code section 3051. (People v. Acosta (2021) 60
Cal.App.5th 769, 776 (Acosta).)
         “As originally enacted, [Penal Code] section 3051 required
         the Board of Parole Hearings (hereafter, the Board), a state
         agency, to conduct parole hearings known as youth offender
         parole hearings for most juvenile offenders who were under
         the age of 18 when they committed their controlling
         offenses.[4] (Pen. Code, former § 3051, subds. (b), (d), added
         by Stats. 2013, ch. 312, § 4.) The law required the Board to
         hold a youth offender parole hearing during a juvenile
         offender’s 15th year of incarceration in cases where the
         offender was sentenced to a determinate sentence, during a
         juvenile offender’s 20th year of incarceration in cases where
         the offender was sentenced to a life term of less than 25
         years to life, and during a juvenile offender’s 25th year of
         incarceration in cases where the offender was sentenced to
         25 years to life. (Id., subd. (b)(1)-(3).)”

(Commission on State Mandates, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 634.)
      Over time, the Legislature extended the reach of the sentencing
reforms embodied in section 3051 by expanding the section’s scope in a
manner that rendered youth offender parole hearings available not just to
most juvenile offenders, but also to most persons convicted of crimes they had

4     “ ‘ “Controlling offense” means the offense or enhancement for which
any sentencing court imposed the longest term of imprisonment.’ ” (Pen.
Code § 3051, subd. (a)(2)(B)).

                                       6
committed when they were young adults—meaning older than juveniles but
under the age of 26 (Commission on State Mandates, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 634-635). Thus, for example:
             “ ‘In 2015, the Legislature expanded [Penal Code]
          section 3051 to apply to offenders who committed crimes at
          the age of 23 or younger.’

             “Then, in 2017, the Legislature further amended Penal
          Code section 3051 to apply ‘to offenders who committed the
          controlling offense when 25 years old or younger.’ ”
(Commission on State Mandates, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 634-635, italics
added.)
          “In addition, in the 2017 legislation raising the threshold
          age to 25, the Legislature extended youth parole hearings
          in the 25th year of incarceration to [persons] sentenced to
          life without the possibility of parole for a controlling offense
          committed before the age of 18.’ ”
(Commission on State Mandates, at p. 635.)
      As a result of the foregoing, as presently constituted (and subject to
certain exceptions): Subdivision (b)(1)-(3) of section 3051 operate to afford a
youth offender parole hearing to an offender who was either a juvenile or a
young adult at the time that he committed a controlling offense for which he

has been sentenced to a determinate or life term; subdivision (b)(4)5 operates
to afford such a hearing to an offender who was a juvenile—but not to such an
offender who was a young adult—at the time that he committed a controlling
offense for which he has been sentenced to LWOP; and subdivision (h)

5     Subdivision (b)(4) of Penal Code section 3051 states in pertinent part
that: “A person who was convicted of a controlling offense that was
committed before the person had attained 18 years of age and for which the
sentence is life without the possibility of parole shall be eligible for release on
parole at a youth offender parole hearing during the person’s 25th year of
incarceration.

                                         7
reinforces the carve out of LWOP-sentenced young adults (like Palumbo)
from the benefits of subdivision (b)(4) by stating that such offenders are not

eligible for a youth offender parole hearing at all.6 (See People v. Jackson
(2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 189, 194-195 (Jackson); Commission on State
Mandates, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 636.)
      Certain aspects of section 3051 have led to expressions of misgivings by
reviewing courts. (See, e.g., Acosta, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at pp. 780-781;
Jackson, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at pp. 201-202 (conc. opn. of Dato, J.); id., at
p. 202 (stmt. of Liu, J).) For example, in reviewing section 3051’s legislative
history, a panel from the second division of this court expressed a concern as
to whether excluding LWOP-sentenced young adults from the youth offender
parole hearing process is consistent with section 3051’s purpose and
legislative history.
         “We do have some reservations . . . . After all, in amending
         section 3051 to encompass young adult offenders, the
         Legislature expressly recognized that cognitive brain
         development continues into the early 20s or later, and the
         parts of the brain that are still developing during this
         process affect judgment in ways that are highly relevant to
         criminal behavior. Since the Legislature has determined a
         17-year-old who is sentenced to life or LWOP for
         committing a crime when his or her brain is not yet fully
         developed should receive a youth offender parole hearing
         after 25 years of incarceration, a 21-year-old sentenced to
         LWOP for committing a crime when his or her brain is not
         yet fully developed should arguably receive the same
         hearing. We are also mindful of the public policy purpose
         of the statute, which is to permit the eventual evaluation of

6       Subdivision (h) of Penal Code section 3051 states in pertinent part:
“This section shall not apply to cases . . . in which an individual is sentenced
to life in prison without the possibility of parole for a controlling offense that
was committed after the person had attained 18 years of age.”

                                         8
          a young offender who committed a serious offense before
          reaching full cognitive and emotional maturity with an eye
          toward determining whether that individual has become fit
          to return to society. Arguably an LWOP offender and a
          non-LWOP offender are equally capable of gaining
          maturity, so we question whether the exclusion for young
          adult LWOP offenders from this process is consistent with
          the statute’s purpose and legislative history.”
(Acosta, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at pp. 780-781.) Other jurists noting this
same tension (including a member of this panel) have in recent years
expressed an “invit[ation] [to] the Legislature to reconsider whether our
evolving knowledge of brain development suggests that unalterable
judgments about individuals based on what they did between age 18 and 25
may be unjustifiable.” (Jackson, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at pp. 201-202 (conc.
opn. of Dato, J.); id., at p. 202 (stmt. of Liu, J).) However, most (though not

all7) of these jurists have nonetheless held back from concluding that section
3051 is in any aspect unconstitutional. (See, e.g., Jackson, supra, at p. 202
(conc. opn. of Dato, J.).)

B.    Franklin Proceedings

      As noted ante, the kind of proceeding Palumbo requested in his motion,
and that the trial court denied, is not a youth offender parole hearing before
the state’s Board of Parole Hearings. Instead it is an altogether different
kind of proceeding—a Franklin proceeding—before an altogether different
organ of the government: the trial court itself.
      As this court recently explained, the term “Franklin proceeding”
derives from “a seminal case” in which the California Supreme Court
“address[ed] the interplay between the State’s youth offender parole hearing

7     (See, e.g., People v. Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 273, review granted
Jan. 11, 2023, S277487 (Hardin).)

                                        9
system and juvenile offenders’ claims of constitutional error under Miller.”
(Commission on State Mandates, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 635.) In that
case—Franklin—the Court “observe[d] that the youth offender parole system
‘contemplate[s] that information regarding the juvenile offender’s
characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense will be available
at a youth offender parole hearing to facilitate the Board’s consideration,’ . . .
[citations],” but that “[a]ssembling such statements ‘about the individual
before the crime’ is typically a task more easily done at or near the time of
the juvenile’s offense rather than decades later when memories have faded,
records may have been lost or destroyed, or family or community members
may have relocated or passed away.” (Commission on State Mandates, supra,
at p. 636, citing Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 283-284.)
      Thus the Court devised a formal process for the purpose of gathering
and preserving such evidence that has since come to be known as a Franklin
proceeding.

         “[T]he Franklin court remanded the matter for the trial
         court . . . to receive submissions from the parties and
         testimony, if appropriate. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
         p. 284.) The Franklin court determined that the defendant
         may, at the proceeding, ‘place on the record any documents,
         evaluations, or testimony (subject to cross-examination)
         that may be relevant at his eventual youth offender parole
         hearing, and the prosecution likewise may put on the
         record any evidence that demonstrates the juvenile
         offender’s culpability or cognitive maturity, or otherwise
         bears on the influence of youth-related factors.’ (Ibid.)
         According to the Franklin court, the goal of such a
         proceeding is ‘to provide an opportunity for the parties to
         make an accurate record of the juvenile offender’s
         characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense
         so that the Board [of Parole Hearings], years later, may
         properly discharge its obligation to “give great weight to”
         youth-related factors [citation] in determining whether the

                                        10
           offender is “fit to rejoin society” despite having committed a
           serious crime ‘while he was a child in the eyes of the law’
           [citation].’ (Ibid.) These proceedings are commonly known
           as Franklin proceedings.”

(Commission on State Mandates, supra, at pp. 636-637. See also In re Cook
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 449.) In other words, the sine qua non of a Franklin
proceeding is the offender’s entitlement to a future youth offender parole
hearing.
      It is for this reason that the trial court concluded that Palumbo’s
LWOP sentence—which precludes him from receiving such a parole hearing
in the future (see Penal Code § 3051(h))—defeats his claimed entitlement to a
Franklin proceeding. And it is for the same reason that the primary focus of
Palumbo’s appeal is the constitutionality of section 3051.

C.    The Constitutional Challenges

      As mentioned ante, in support of his contention that the trial court
erred in denying his motion for a Franklin proceeding, Palumbo advances two
arguments, each of which is rooted in the California and United States
Constitutions. Palumbo’s first argument is predicated on state and federal
constitutional requirements mandating equal protection for similarly
situated classes of persons, and his second argument is predicated on state
and federal constitutional requirements proscribing cruel and/or unusual
punishment.
      In advancing these arguments, however, Palumbo is not merely seeking
a judicial determination that he is entitled to a Franklin proceeding. More
fundamentally, he is seeking a judicial determination that he is entitled to a
parole hearing. For while this appeal may appear on the surface to challenge
only the denial of Palumbo’s request for a Franklin proceeding, in practical
effect it is the equivalent of a petition that Palumbo be adjudged (in the

                                        11
words of section 3051, subdivision (b)(4)) to be “eligible for release on parole
at a youth offender parole hearing” notwithstanding (1) the fact that
subdivision (b)(4) renders only juvenile LWOP offenders “eligible for release

on parole,”8 (2) the fact that Palumbo is a young adult, not a juvenile, and
(3) the fact that subdivision (h) of section 3051 unambiguously states that
young adult LWOP offenders are ineligible for release on parole. Indeed,
absent such an adjudication, what would be the point of the requested
Franklin proceeding (or, for that matter, of a subsequent youth offender
parole hearing) for an incarcerated offender who, by virtue of an LWOP
sentence, is not eligible for release on parole?

      1.    The Equal-Protection Challenge

      Turning to Palumbo’s argument that Penal Code section 3051 violates
his state and federal constitutional rights to equal protection, we begin by
noting that this is an argument that many courts of appeal in California have
considered and as to which, at least in its federal constitutional dimension,
we understand briefing to have been recently completed in an appeal
currently pending before the California Supreme Court. (Cf. Hardin, supra,
84 Cal.App.5th 273, rev. granted.)
      Insofar as the jurisprudence of this court of appeal is concerned, in
February of 2021 a panel of this division expressly concluded in Jackson that
“the carve out to section 3051 for offenders . . . serving an LWOP sentence for
special circumstance murder is not an equal protection violation.” (Jackson,
supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 192; see also id., at pp. 200-201 (conc. opn. of
Dato, J.) [“I agree with the majority that the exception in . . . section 3051,

8      In keeping with the discussion of section 3051 ante, the phrase “eligible
for release on parole,” as used in section 3051, does not mean entitled to be
released on parole; rather, it means entitled to be considered for parole.

                                        12
subdivision (h) for persons who were between 18 and 25 when they
committed their offense and were sentenced to . . . LWOP . . . does not violate
the equal protection guarantees of the United States and California
Constitutions.”].) Thus we view Palumbo’s equal protection argument as, in
essence, a request that this court reconsider the reasoning of the panel that
decided Jackson.
      The problem with this request, however, is that Palumbo has presented
us with neither evidence nor binding precedent to warrant a departure from
the opinion that this court expressed, just two and a half years ago, in
Jackson. We certainly respect the well-reasoned opinions of our fellow jurists
who have arrived at conclusions at odds with the conclusion this court
reached in Jackson. (See Hardin, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 288-291, rev.
granted.) And we add our voices to those of jurists in this district, in other
districts, and beyond who, as noted ante, have expressed misgivings
regarding section 3051’s exclusion of LWOP-sentenced young adults from
eligibility for youth offender parole hearings.
      But, having been presented with no new information (such as, for
example, studies shedding light on further advances in the science of brain
development) or new binding precedent, we are unwilling to disturb the well-
reasoned opinions (Jackson, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th 189 [maj. opn.]) and id., at
p. 200 [conc. of Dato, J.]) expressed by our colleagues in that case. As this
court has stated:
         “Respect for our colleagues and the orderly administration
         of justice—as well as the need of the trial bench, bar and
         litigants for certainty in the development of the . . . law—
         dictate that there be a compelling reason before we
         overrule a decision of another panel of this court. Mere
         disagreement with the result or reasoning of an earlier
         decision does not, in our view, constitute a compelling
         reason.”

                                       13
(Opsal v. United Services Auto. Assn. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1203-1204
(Opsal); see also Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal. App. 5th 86, 109, fn. 9 [“Absent
a compelling reason, the Courts of Appeal are normally loath to overrule prior
decisions from another panel of the . . . same division.”]).
      “In view of this court’s commitment to stare decisis—particularly where
it concerns opinions by other panels of this court—we do not believe the
current case should serve as a forum for rearguing the merits” of the equal
protection issue that was decided in Jackson. (Opsal, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1204; Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 639, 666
[“ ‘ “[i]t is, of course, a fundamental jurisprudential policy that prior
applicable precedent usually must be followed even though the case, if
considered anew, might be decided differently by the current justices”],
quoting Sierra Club v. San Joaquin Local Agency Formation Com. (1999)
21 Cal.4th 489, 503-504 and citing Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 288
[“a party urging us to overrule a precedent faces a rightly onerous task”], and
Kisor v. Wilkie (2019) 139 S.Ct. 2400, 2422 [“any departure from [stare

                                        14
decisis] demands ‘special justification’ ”].)9 Moreover, we are further
confirmed in our belief that it would be imprudent for us to disturb our
Jackson precedent by the fact that the California Supreme Court is soon to
consider and resolve this very issue. (See Hardin, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th 273,
rev. granted.) Hence we here reiterate the conclusion in Jackson that “the

9      As illustrated in the recent opinion of the court of appeal in In re Delila
D. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 953 (Delila D.) and in this court’s opinion in CPF
Vaseo Associates, LLC v. Gray (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 997 (CPF Vaseo), the
principle of stare decisis does not always prevent us from reconsidering a rule
of law expressed in a previous decision. In Delila D., the majority of a panel
in another division in this district concluded it was compelled to deviate from
a previous decision because the previous decision (a) “departed from earlier
decisions of our court,” (b) was “based on a plain error of statutory
construction that is easily corrected” and that, if not corrected, “would
significantly undermine the purpose of ” the statutes therein at issue, and (c)
was “of recent origin, meaning neither courts nor the public have yet placed
significant reliance on it.” (Delila D., at pp. 975-976.) In the present
circumstances, it cannot reasonably be said that the opinion of the panel
deciding Jackson departed from jurisprudence then in effect or that Jackson
is premised on a misconstruction of section 3051. As to whether courts or the
public might reasonably be said to have placed significant reliance on
Jackson, we are not in a position to say. We do, however, note that the
conclusion expressed in Jackson to the effect that “the carve out to section
3051 for offenders . . . serving an LWOP sentence for special circumstance
murder is not an equal protection violation” (see ante) appears to be the
prevailing view among the district courts of appeal.
       In CPF Vaseo, a panel of this division deviated from a decision—San
Diegans for Open Government v. City of San Diego (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th
1306 (San Diegans for Open Government)—in which the earlier panel
interpreted Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5. In so doing, the court in
CPF Vaseo noted that “the decision to reach a legal conclusion that differs
from an opinion by another panel of this court is not one we make lightly,”
but that it was persuaded to make that decision “[i]n light of the legislative
history of—and especially the significance of the subsequent clarifying
amendment to—[the Code of Civil Procedure provision in issue].” (CPF
Vaseo, at p. 1005.) No such legislative change or amendment is presented
here.

                                       15
carve out to section 3051 for offenders . . . serving an LWOP sentence for
special circumstance murder is not an equal protection violation,” and, on
that basis, we decline to disturb the conclusion of the trial court in the
present case that Palumbo’s ineligibility for a youth offender parole hearing
under section 3051 is not a denial of equal protection.
      Having addressed Palumbo’s equal-protection challenge, we now turn
to his cruel-and/or unusual-punishment challenge.

      2.    The Cruel-and/or Unusual-Punishment Challenge

      The thrust of Palumbo’s cruel and/or unusual punishment challenge is
an argument that the advent (via amendments to section 3051) of young
adults with sentences less severe than LWOP being eligible for youth
offender parole hearings has rendered Palumbo’s LWOP sentence cruel
and/or unusual, and that Palumbo should be adjudged eligible for parole on

this basis.10 But there are several problems with this argument.
      First, nothing in section 3051 alters the sentence that the trial court
imposed on Palumbo in 1998. That sentence, by its terms, rendered Palumbo
ineligible for release on parole, and neither the introduction of section 3051
nor any amendment to section 3051 changes this fact. Thus, the time for

10    Elaborating on this argument, Palumbo contends: (a) that the fact that
the Legislature, via its amendments to section 3051, “has embraced the
concept that certain classes of offenders who were under 26 years of age at
the time of commission of the offense and received lengthy sentences should
be given the possibility of parole,” means that “the Legislature has implicitly
determined that youthful offenders committing offenses when they are under
26 years of age are less culpable than those committing offenses after they
turn 26;” and (b) that “[t]he fact [that a] death occurred during the
commission of a robbery does not alter the Legislative recognition that
youthful offenders under the age of 26 have an immature mentality, as
discussed in Miller and its progeny, that requires [that] the youthful offender
be given the opportunity to demonstrate he should one day be paroled.”

                                       16
Palumbo to have appealed from the parole-precluding aspect of the sentence
that the trial court meted out to him in June of 1996 was in 1996, via the
same direct appeal with which he elected to challenge his conviction—not 26

years later, in 2022, via the current appeal.11 By failing to challenge his
sentence as cruel and/or unusual as part of the direct appeal he initiated in
1996, Palumbo has forfeited his ability to challenge the sentence now.

      Second, the Eighth Amendment12 component of Palumbo’s argument
has, in essence, already been foreclosed by the California Supreme Court. As
the Second District Court of Appeal has in recent years observed in
considering an Eighth Amendment challenge being mounted by a young
adult LWOP offender who had committed his controlling offense at age 21
(i.e., one year younger than the age at which Palumbo committed his
controlling offense):
         “To the extent petitioner contends an LWOP sentence is an
         unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment when
         imposed on any 21-year-old defendant, we observe our
         Supreme Court has essentially rejected that very argument
         in the context of the death penalty. In People v. Flores
         (2020) 9 Cal. 5th 371, 429, the court acknowledged research
         that youths ages 18 to 21 share many of the same cognitive
         and developmental deficiencies as adolescents under age
         18. [But] . . . the court nonetheless held that 18 is ‘ “the age

11     We express no opinion as to whether the filing in state or federal court
of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (as distinguished from the filing of
this appeal) for the purpose of mounting a challenge to Palumbo’s sentence or
to Penal Code section 3051, subdivisions (b)(4) or (h) on the basis of the
Eighth Amendment or of article I, section 17 of the California Constitution
would be timely or otherwise appropriate at this juncture.

12    The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”

                                       17
         at which the line for death eligibility ought to rest.” ’ If the
         Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a sentence of death
         for 21 year olds, then most assuredly, it does not prohibit
         the lesser LWOP sentence.”
(In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 439 (Williams).)
      Third, the component of Palumbo’s argument that is based on article I,

section 17 of the California Constitution13 is almost wholly unsupported. As
a threshold matter, in considering article I, section 17, it is important to note
that, whereas the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
forbids punishment that is “cruel and unusual” (italics added), article I,
section 17 of the California Constitution by contrast forbids punishment that

is “cruel or unusual”14 (italics added); and this distinction matters.
         “Unlike its federal counterpart, [article I, section 17]
         forbids cruel or unusual punishment, a distinction that is
         purposeful and substantive rather than merely semantic.
         [Citations.] For that reason, it is construed separately from
         the federal prohibition against cruel and unusual
         punishment.”

13   Article I, section 17, of the California Constitution provides that:
“Cruel or unusual punishment may not be inflicted or excessive fines
imposed.”

14     California is not the only state with an Eighth Amendment analog that
renders a sentence unconstitutional if it is cruel, irrespective of whether it
also is unusual. (See, e.g., Mich. Const. art. I, § 17 (“cruel or unusual
punishment”), People v. Parks (Mich. Sup. Ct. 2022) 987 N.W.2d 161, 169
(Parks)), Wash. Const. art. I, § 14 (“cruel punishment”), Pers. Restraint of
Monschke (2021) 482 P.3rd 276, 279, fn. 6 (Monschke).)

                                        18
(People v. Carmony (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1085 (Carmony).)15
      Under California’s Constitution, “ ‘no prisoner can be held for a period
grossly disproportionate to his or her individual culpability for the
commitment offense’ ” because “ ‘[s]uch excessive confinement . . . violates the
cruel or unusual punishment clause (art. I, § 17) of the California
Constitution’ ” (Williams, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 437; see also Carmony,
supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 1085), and “[w]hether a sentence is ‘grossly
disproportionate’ to an offense is measured by ‘circumstances existing at the
time of the offense’ ” (Williams, at p. 437), rather than by circumstances
existing at some time in the future. Courts typically consider three
techniques for evaluating a claim of cruel or unusual punishment. (Carmony,
at p. 1085. [discussing In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424–427.) “ ‘ “[A]
petitioner attacking his sentence as cruel or unusual must demonstrate his
punishment is disproportionate in light of (1) the nature of the offense and
defendant’s background, (2) the punishment for more serious offenses, or

15    Notably, the distinction between punishment that is “cruel or unusual”
(or simply “cruel”) on the one hand and punishment that is “cruel and
unusual” on the other hand has been held by the highest courts in at least
two states to be the determining legal factor in deciding whether a
mandatory LWOP sentence meted out to a young adult is constitutional or
unconstitutional. (See, Parks, supra, 987 N.W.2d at p. 183 [stating “that
mandatorily subjecting 18-year-old defendants convicted of first-degree
murder to a sentence of life without parole . . . constitutes unconstitutionally
cruel punishment under . . . art. 1, § 16” of the Michigan Constitution],
Monschke, supra, 482 P.3rd at pp. 306, 325-326 [stating that, “[w]hen it
comes to mandatory LWOP sentences,” the state of Washington’s
constitutional proscription against the imposition of cruel sentences requires
that “Miller’s constitutional guaranty of an individualized sentence—one that
considers the mitigating qualities of youth—must apply to defendants at
least as old as [20] at the time of their crimes”].)

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(3) punishment for similar offenses in other jurisdictions.” ’ ” (Williams,
supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 437.)
      But, in this case, Palumbo has made no showing (other than his age at
the time of the offense, plus a few scattered references to his upbringing) to
enable a court to make a meaningfully informed assessment as to technique
number one, and he has made no showing at all regarding technique
numbers two and three. Nor has he supplied the court with any scientific or
sociological evidence more current than that considered in Roper (indeed, he
has not supplied any such evidence at all) regarding advances in experts’

understanding of brain development16 that could help us evaluate whether
subdivisions (b)(4) and (h) of section 3051 might be unduly restrictive to the
point of violating article I, section 17 of the California Constitution.
                                       III.
                                    Conclusion
      Though it may seem like cold comfort to one who has been incarcerated
for as many years as Palumbo has, we nonetheless commend the commitment
Palumbo has exhibited to personal growth—both his own and that of his
fellow inmates. This commitment is of enormous and abiding value
irrespective of whether the Legislature ends up “reconsider[ing] . . . ‘whether
our evolving knowledge of brain development suggests that unalterable
judgments about individuals based on what they did between age 18 and 25
may be unjustifiable’ ” (Jackson, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 202 (stmt. of Liu,

16    We note from our review of the majority opinions in Parks, supra, 987
N.W.2d 161 (decided in 2022) and Monschke, supra, 482 P.3rd 276 (decided in
2021), as well as from the dissenting opinion in Dorsey v. State (Iowa Sup. Ct.
2022) 975 N.W.2d 356, 365-380 (dis. opn. of Appel, J.), that evidence of such
more recent advances may be available. But that evidence is not before us on
this appeal.

                                        20
J. [quoting in part id., at pp. 201-202 (conc. opn. of Dato, J.)])). On this note,
we do not foreclose the possibility that a path to the Board of Parole Hearings
may one day become open to Palumbo. That path, however, is not through
the present appeal.
                                        IV.
                                   Disposition
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                                      KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, ACTING P.J.

DO, J.

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