Court Opinion

ID: 9643137
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:20:34.776035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:57.772334
License: Public Domain

HANDLER, J.,
concurring.
I dissented from this Court’s decision in State v. Des Marets, 92 N.J. 62, 88 (1983), disagreeing with the Court’s several rulings. One ruling related to whether the Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c, repeals the sentencing provisions applicable to young adult offenders. I concluded that it did not. 92 N.J. at 92-100. That holding is not implicated in the present case. The Court in Des Marets also determined the nature of “possession” of a firearm for purposes of applying the Graves Act. The Court held “that simple possession of a weapon — that is a bare possession-without any intent to use it — is covered by the Graves Act and triggers its mandatory sentencing provisions.” 92 N.J. at 101. I disagreed with this interpretation.
My understanding of the Graves Act was that the general Code definition of “possession” under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-1c, adopted by the majority, was “never intended to define ‘the mens rea or mental element with which the possession must take place to make possession criminal.’ ” Id. at 102 (quoting II The New Jersey Penal Code: Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission 39 (1971)). I determined that the Graves Act “focuses upon purposeful criminal action of a violent or threatening kind,” id., and that, in terms of the crimes covered, “the Legislature clearly tied the presence of a gun to the commission of the crime, * * * strongly sug*609gestpng] that the involvement of the gun in the crime would be purposeful or intentional.” Id. at 103. I concluded that “[t]he Act makes the best sense and achieves the greatest degree of cogency if it is construed to cover the purposeful possession of firearms with an intent to use them against persons in the course of committing a crime that itself causes or threatens actual or potential violence to individuals, or, is so possessed in the course of escaping from the commission of such crimes.” Id. at 104.
There is a chasm between my view of “possession” under the Graves Act and that of the majority in Des Marets. I believed, in light of the extreme penal consequences of the Graves Act, that the defendant must be culpable in the sense of being guilty of an intentional, purposeful or wilful possession or use of a gun in connection with the underlying crime. The Court believed “that the Graves Act sanctions apply upon a showing of possession of a firearm, without any need to demonstrate intent to use * * *." Id., 92 N.J. at 68. According to the Court, “p]t is the mere presence of guns at the scene of crimes that this statute seeks to end.” Id. at 70. In effect, the majority created a status offense under the Graves Act, mandating a three-year state prison term upon a status offender.
I am constrained to join the Court’s opinion in this case. It is clearly dictated by its holding in Des Marets, which unmistakably eliminated intent as a constituent element of Graves Act possession. Further, the Court in Des Marets was aware of the Appellate Division opinion in the present case, State v. Stewart, 186 N.J.Super. 517, which I found persuasive in my dissenting opinion, urging, unsuccessfully, that it be followed by the Court. Des Marets, supra, 92 N.J. at 104-05. It is rather plain that the reasoning and result of the Appellate Division in this case, now expressly rejected by the Court, was also disapproved in Des Marets.
Finally, I subscribe to the Court’s meticulous and circumscribed definition of possession in this case, albeit without the element of “intent.” In this case the majority holds that
*610possession of a firearm for purposes of the Graves Act includes not only actual possession but constructive possession that the defendant is able to convert practically immediately to actual possession. * * * Under our holding today, a Graves Act sentence will be imposed only where defendant’s ability to exercise actual control over the firearm is imminent. [Ante at 604.]
As already noted, the Court in Des Marets opted to apply, for Graves Act purposes, the conventional interpretation of “possession,” as defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c. In this case, it looks beyond traditional precedent to determine the meaning of “possession.” It concludes that the “goal of the Graves Act is to remove guns from the scene of crimes. Any gun within easy reach of any participant in a criminal episode invites violence”; the “ability to exercise imminent control over the firearm” is substantially similar to “actual possession from the standpoint of danger.” Ante at 604.
I agree with the majority, that, aside from the element of intent, possession must be an actual physical possession of the weapon, or the imminent and effective control of the weapon— control that can be transformed immediately into actual physical possession by the defendant. Possession must be a knowing one, and, it must be personal to the defendant. These requirements in some measure redress the elimination of intent from the definition of “possession.” While the possessory offense under Des Marets, as defined by the Court, is still one applied essentially to a status offender, it is likely that in most cases that offender would also be culpable in the sense of having a criminal state of mind.
Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the Court.
Justice SCHREIBER, who joined the dissent in Des Marets, joins in this concurring opinion.
For modification and remandment—Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, SCHREIBER, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN and GARIBALDI—7.
Opposed—None.