Court Opinion

ID: 9940938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 17:20:00.962193+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:03.227277
License: Public Domain

Vermont Superior Court
                                                                                              Filed 12/22 23
                                                                                            Washington mt

 SUPERIOR COURT                             5E?     J?4                     CIVIL DIVISION
 Washington Unit                                                       Case N0. 88—2—20 Wncv
 65 State Street
                                                   f1
 Montpelier VT 05602
 802-828-2091                                 #5
 www.verm0ntjudiciary.org

                       Mountainside Condominium vs. Jamieson Risk Service

                   Opinion and Order on Plaintiff s Motion to Compel

       Mountainside Condominium Association (Mountainside) seeks to compel

Defendant Jamieson Risk Services, Inc. (J amieson) to respond to its pending

interrogatories.    J amieson has objected to the motion on various grounds.
Primarily, it maintains that two broad categories of the interrogatories that seek

the bases for the responses set out in its answer are not appropriate “contention

interrogatories,” seek solely work product, and are unduly oppressive. With regard

to contention interrogatories seeking the grounds for its affirmative defenses,

J amieson asserts that the requests are premature. For ease of reference, the Court
will accept and employ the three categories of interrogatories as referenced in

J amieson’s opposition. The speciﬁc interrogatories for each category are speciﬁcally
referenced in the opposition. The Court has considered the submissions and makes

the following determinations.

       I.      Contention Interrogatories Regarding Afﬁrmative Defenses

       J amieson maintains that courts often defer contention interrogatories to the
end of the discovery process. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Miller, No. 2:12-CV-184, 2019 WL

5558601, at *3 (D. Vt. Oct. 29, 2019). It argues that delaying its responses until
significant discovery has been conducted makes sense in this case. Mountainside,

relying on other cases, points out that contention interrogatories are not improper

at this stage and that they are a useful tool to bring focus to the discovery process

and the bases for any claimed defenses. See, e.g. Britton v. Marcus, Errico, Emmer

& Brooks, P.C., No. 18-CV-11288-IT, 2021 WL 3604841, at *2 (D. Mass. Aug. 13,

2021).

         The gateway to the discovery process is Vt. R. Civ. P. 26. Its overarching

guidance concerning the sequence and timing of discovery states: “Unless a

Superior Judge upon motion, for the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the

interests of justice, orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any

sequence ….” While courts had previously divided on the propriety of discovery

requests that called for the application of law to fact, Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 33 came down in favor of production. Vermont’s Rule 33, which tracks

the federal in this regard, states: “An interrogatory otherwise proper is not

necessarily objectionable merely because an answer to the interrogatory involves an

opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to fact ….” In

making that determination, the Rule also created a potential safety valve. Just

following the above statement, the Rule provides: “but the Presiding Judge may

order that such an interrogatory need not be answered until after designated

discovery has been completed or until a pretrial conference or other later time.” Vt.

R. Civ. P. 33

                                            2
      While there is no law on the issue from the Vermont Supreme Court, federal

district courts across the country have triaged such requests in different ways.

Those varying approaches are set out in the memorandums of the opposing parties.

Broadly speaking: one group of cases expresses a preference for delaying contention

interrogatories until late in the discovery process but allow arguments for allowing

them at an earlier time, see, e.g. Fischer & Porter Co. v. Tolson, 143 F.R.D. 93, 95

(E.D. Pa. 1992); others permit them at an early juncture but allow requests to delay

them, see In re One Bancorp Secs. Litigation, 134 F.R.D. 4, 7–8 (D. Me. 1991);

Firetrace USA, LLC v. Jesclard, No. CV-07-2001-PHX-ROS, 2009 WL 73671, at *2

(D. Ariz. Jan. 9, 2009) (party opposing contention interrogatory has burden to

establish need to delay response).

      In the Court’s view, the latter view most closely tracks the language and

approaches described in Rules 26 and 33. In other words, there is nothing improper

about early contention interrogatories. But, in certain cases, the party against

whom the discovery is sought may persuade the court to delay its responses. Accord

8B Charles Wright, et al., Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2167 (3d ed.) (power to delay

answers to contention interrogatories “should not be exercised automatically but

should be reserved for ‘appropriate cases’”); see Starcher v. Corr. Med. Sys., Inc., 144

F.3d 418, 421 n.2 (6th Cir. 1998) (“The general view is that contention

interrogatories are a perfectly permissible form of discovery, to which a response

ordinarily would be required.”), aff'd sub nom. Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty.,

Ohio, 527 U.S. 198 (1999).

                                           3
      With that in mind, the Court has considered whether to grant Jamieson’s

request to delay responses to these Interrogatories until later in the discovery

process. It asserts that providing responses now would serve no purpose. The

Court disagrees.

      No doubt, contention interrogatories can help narrow issues for trial at the

end of discovery. See Gamino v. KPC Healthcare Holdings, Inc., No.

520CV01126SBSHKX, 2021 WL 1731673, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2021).

They can also serve useful purposes at the outset of a case to gain understanding of

the nature of claims or defenses, identify documents or actors, focus discovery, or

test such claims and defenses for compliance with Vt. R. Civ. P. 11. See, e.g., Kew v.

Town of Northfield, No. 5:19-CV-78, 2020 WL 13857283, at *7 (D. Vt. Oct. 21, 2020);

Zysman v. Zanett Inc., No. C-13-02813 YGR (DMR), 2014 WL 1320805, at *4 (N.D.

Cal. Mar. 31, 2014); Advantage Industrial Sys., LLC v. Aleris Rolled Prod., Inc., No.

418CV00113JHMHBB, 2020 WL 4432415, at *3 (W.D. Ky. July 31, 2020) (citing Dot

Com Entm’t Group, Inc. v. Cyberbingo Corp., 237 F.R.D. 43, 46 (W.D. N.Y. 2006).

      It is unclear whether, as Mountainside asserts, Jamieson is taking the

position that Rule 11 does not apply to its assertion of affirmative defenses or

denials. See Opposition at p.6. In any event, Rule 11 plainly applies to “claims,

defenses, and other legal contentions” and requires filers to certify that such

assertions are warranted and supported by “evidentiary support, or, if specifically

so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity

for further investigation or discovery.” Vt. R. Civ. P. 11; Bridge Publications, Inc. v.

                                           4
F.A.C.T.Net, Inc., 183 F.R.D. 254, 263 (D. Colo. 1998) (Rule 11 requires that there

be “a colorable claim based on the facts and law at issue”). Hopes and prayers are

important, but they do not provide sufficient bases for claims or defenses set out in

a pleading.

      Contrary to Jamieson’s contention, it would not be prejudiced by the failure

to assert an affirmative defense that is not presently supportable. If discovery later

shows the existence of a new affirmative defense, the proper remedy is to seek

amendment and add the defense at that time. Vt. R. Civ. P. 15; See Gomez v. J.

Jacobo Farm Lab. Contractor, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 3d 986, 994 (E.D. Cal. 2016) (“If a

defendant can allege no facts in support of a defense, that defendant must not plead

it. If a defendant later discovers facts that might indicate that an affirmative

defense might apply, it may seek leave to amend to add that affirmative defense.”).

      The Court sees no persuasive reason to defer responses to the interrogatories

concerning Mountainside’s affirmative defenses until a later point. Kew, 2020 WL

13857283, at *7 (making similar ruling). The potential benefits of early contention

interrogatories exist in this case, and Jamieson has not persuaded the Court that it

is necessary to delay its responses. It should provide the present bases for its

affirmative defenses. If additional evidentiary support for them arises during

discovery, the responses may be supplemented. Accord In re One Bancorp Sec.

Litig., 134 F.R.D. at 7–8.

      Responses should be provided.

                                          5
      II.    Contention Interrogatories Seeking Bases for Denials

      Nearly all of the above analysis applies with equal force to the contention

interrogatories seeking the evidentiary bases for Jamieson’s denials of certain

allegations of the complaint. Jamieson’s additional argument that these are

improper contention interrogatories that seek legal conclusions or core attorney

work product is not accurate. The interrogatories, reasonably read, seek only the

existing evidentiary bases for the various denials. As such, the Court views them as

standard contention interrogatories within the permissible ambit of Rule 33.1

      Nor does Jamieson take anything from its argument that producing answers

to these interrogatories would be unduly burdensome. The questions are focused

solely on discovering the evidence on which the denials are based. Such a request

should not tax Jamieson beyond the standard exertion needed to respond to

discovery in the context of commercial litigation.

      Responses should be provided.

      III.   Contention Interrogatories Concerning Lack of Information

      Jamieson argues that Mountainside’s interrogatories that attempt to suss out

why it lacks sufficient information to either admit or deny certain allegations in the

complaint are improper. Jamieson has more traction with this point.

      Unlike the contention interrogatories that seek the evidentiary support for

affirmative defenses or denials, these interrogatories ask Mountainside to establish

1 To the extent the interrogatories can be read more broadly, nothing in this ruling

precludes a specific objection limiting any response to materials not protected by
attorney work product.
                                          6
a negative. In a sense, it asks Mountainside to assemble all possible evidence and

then state why that accumulation does not allow it to admit or deny an allegation.

Such a request is unduly burdensome, and it seeks to obtain an analysis of evidence

that would tread near to or directly upon core attorney work product.

      Mountainside need not respond to these interrogatories.

      IV.   Conclusion

      In light of the foregoing, Mountainside’s motion to compel is granted, in part,

and denied, in part. Supplemental responses should be provided within 30 days.

      Electronically signed on Monday, December 11, 2023, per V.R.E.F. 9(d).

                                              _______________________
                                              Timothy B. Tomasi
                                              Superior Court Judge

                                          7