Court Opinion

ID: 9688764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:04:04.774285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:06:44.980598
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/24/23 P. v. Perez CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                         B326458

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                 (Los Angeles County
                                                                     Super. Ct. No. BA298659)
           v.

 RODRIGO PEREZ,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Kerry R. Bensinger, Judge. Affirmed.
      Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                           ______________________________
       In 2007, a jury convicted Rodrigo Perez (Perez) of the
attempted murder of Los Angeles Police Department Officer
Rodolfo Fuentes. The trial court sentenced Perez to 40 years to
life in prison.
       Perez now asks us to reverse the trial court’s order denying
his petition filed pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6 (formerly
section 1170.95),1 which permits a defendant convicted of
“attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine” to petition for resentencing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
       Perez’s appointed appellate counsel filed a brief identifying
no issues on appeal and requesting that we follow the procedures
outlined in People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
(Delgadillo). Perez filed a supplemental brief in which his
primary contention is that he lacked the requisite intent to
support an attempted murder conviction because he had no
specific target victim in mind when he fired at Officer Fuentes.
       Our Supreme Court, however, foreclosed this argument
in its opinion in Perez’s prior appeal. (See People v. Perez (2010)
50 Cal.4th 222, 225 (Perez II) [“ ‘[t]he mental state required
for attempted murder is the intent to kill a human being, not
a particular human being’ ”].) Moreover, the record establishes
that the jury did not convict Perez pursuant to the natural and
probable consequences doctrine.

      1 Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references are
to the Penal Code.
      Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered
section 1170.95 as section 1172.6 (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10),
without changing the statute’s content. We hereafter cite to
section 1172.6 for ease of reference.

                                    2
      We therefore conclude that Perez is ineligible for
section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law and affirm the trial court’s
denial of his petition.

  FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
      On July 3, 2005, an unidentified male fired a single bullet
from a car at a group of eight people—seven peace officers and
one civilian—standing approximately 60 feet away in a dimly lit
parking lot. The bullet struck Officer Fuentes in the hand, but
caused no deaths or other injuries. Through subsequent
investigation, detectives identified Perez as the shooter.
      The district attorney charged Perez with, inter alia,
eight counts of premeditated attempted murder of a peace officer
(§§ 664, subds. (e) & (f), 187, subd. (a)) and one additional count
of premeditated attempted murder of the civilian victim (§§ 664,
187, subd. (a).) The jury convicted Perez on eight of the nine
attempted murder counts.3

      2 We summarize only the facts and procedural history
relevant to our resolution of this appeal. Because the record
here does not contain a complete transcript of Perez’s trial, we
consulted portions of the record submitted in connection with
Perez’s direct appeal in drafting this factual and procedural
summary. (See People v. Perez (Aug. 21, 2008, B198165) [nonpub.
opn.] (Perez I), affd. in part and revd. in part July 29, 2010,
S167051; Evid. Code, 452, subd. (d)(1) [permitting judicial notice
of “[r]ecords of . . . any court of this state”].)
      3 The jury acquitted Perez of the attempted murder
of Officer William Monahan. The prosecution argued at trial that
“Officer Mon[a]han [was] a little bit further from the group” into
which Perez fired, and that, as a result, “it [might] very well be
[that] the attempted murder count [could not] be attached to
him.”

                                     3
       The trial court sentenced Perez to a total prison term
of 40 years to life on count 1 (the attempted murder of Officer
Fuentes). The court ordered the sentences for each of Perez’s
other convictions and firearm enhancements either stayed or to
run concurrently with his sentence on count 1.
       Perez appealed, and we affirmed his eight convictions for
attempted murder. (See Perez I, supra, B198195.) Our Supreme
Court, however, concluded that “the evidence [in Perez’s case
was] sufficient to sustain only a single count of premeditated
attempted murder of a peace officer”—namely, the attempted
murder of Officer Fuentes. (Perez II, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 225.)
In all other respects, the court affirmed the judgment. (Id. at
p. 234.) The court therefore remanded the case to us “with
directions to conform the judgment to reflect [Perez’s] conviction
of a single count of premeditated attempted murder of a peace
officer, and for further proceedings consistent with the views
expressed [in its opinion].” (Ibid.)
       Consistent with the Supreme Court’s directions,
“we reverse[d] [Perez’s] remaining seven attempted murder
convictions and remand[ed] for resentencing, but otherwise
affirm[ed].”4 (People v. Perez (Oct. 8, 2010, B198165) [nonpub.
opn.] (Perez III).)
       On February 22, 2022, Perez, representing himself, filed
a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. The trial court
appointed counsel for Perez and set a briefing schedule. The
district attorney opposed the petition, and Perez’s appointed
counsel filed a reply on his behalf. The court conducted a hearing

      4 The record on appeal does not disclose the sentence the
trial court imposed on remand.

                                    4
on the petition on October 3, 2022, and took the matter under
submission.
       On October 12, 2022, the court denied Perez’s petition for
resentencing, concluding that he had failed to make a prima facie
case for relief because the jury instructions demonstrated as a
matter of law that the jury found that Perez personally harbored
the intent to kill when he committed the attempted murder of
Officer Fuentes.
       Perez timely appealed the court’s denial of his petition,
and we appointed counsel to represent him. On May 22, 2023,
Perez’s appointed counsel filed a brief raising no issues and
requesting that we follow the procedures set forth in Delgadillo,
including that we evaluate the arguments in any supplemental
brief Perez might file. Perez filed a supplemental brief on
June 21, 2023.

                          DISCUSSION
      A.    Law Governing Delgadillo Appeals
       In Delgadillo, the Supreme Court established the procedure
for cases in which counsel determines that an appeal from an
order denying postconviction relief lacks merit. (Delgadillo,
supra, 14 Cal.5th 216.) In such cases, “(1) counsel should file
a brief informing the court of that determination, including
a concise recitation of the facts bearing on the denial of the
petition; and (2) the court should send, with a copy of counsel’s
brief, notice to the defendant, informing the defendant of the
right to file a supplemental letter or brief and that if no letter or
brief is filed within 30 days, the court may dismiss the matter.”
(Id. at pp. 231–232.) If the defendant files a supplemental brief
or letter, we are “required to evaluate the specific arguments
presented in that brief and to issue a written opinion.” (Id. at

                                     5
p. 232.) But “[t]he filing of a supplemental brief or letter does not
compel an independent review of the entire record to identify
unraised issues.”5 (Ibid.)

      B.     Law Governing Section 1172.6 Petitions
        “Murder has long been defined as ‘the unlawful killing of
a human being . . . with malice aforethought.’ ” (People v. Offley
(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 595 (Offley), quoting § 187, subd. (a).)
“ ‘Malice aforethought may be express or implied. [Citation.]
“Express malice is an intent to kill. . . . Malice is implied
when a person willfully does an act, the natural and probable
consequences of which are dangerous to human life, and the
person knowingly acts with conscious disregard for the danger
to life that the act poses.” ’ [Citation.]” (Offley, supra, at p. 595.)
        “Prior to the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437, however,
a defendant who aided and abetted a crime that ended in a
victim’s death could be convicted of murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine even if the defendant
personally did not act with malice aforethought. The natural
and probable consequences doctrine provides that ‘ “[a] person
who knowingly aids and abets criminal conduct is guilty of not
only the intended crime [target offense] but also of any other
crime the perpetrator actually commits [nontarget offense] that
is a natural and probable consequence of the intended crime.” ’
[Citation.]” (Offley, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 595.)

      5 We therefore decline the request of Perez’s appointed
counsel that we conduct an independent review of the entire
record on appeal.

                                      6
      “Senate Bill No. 1437 was enacted to abolish this doctrine
in cases of murder.[6] It amended section 188 to require that,
when the felony-murder rule does not apply, a principal in the
crime of murder ‘shall act with malice aforethought,’ and that
‘[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his
or her participation in a crime.’ [Citations.] As a result, the
natural and probable consequences doctrine can no longer
support a murder conviction.” (Offley, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th
at p. 595, fn. added & omitted.)
       Senate Bill No. 1437 also enacted section 1172.6, which
provides a procedure whereby “convicted murderers who could
not be convicted under the law as amended” may petition to have
the conviction vacated and be resentenced on any remaining
counts. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957; see § 1172.6,
subd. (a).) In 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 775
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), which, among other changes, extended
the application of section 1172.6 to defendants convicted of
“attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); see People v. Coley (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 539, 548.)
       If a section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
information, including “[a] declaration by the petitioner that
the petitioner is eligible for relief ” (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A), the
trial court must appoint counsel, if requested (id., subd. (b)(3));

      6 The bill “also amended section 189 by adding a
requirement to the felony-murder rule that a defendant who
was not the actual killer or a direct aider and abettor must
have been a major participant in the underlying felony and
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Offley, supra,
48 Cal.App.5th at p. 595, fn. 4, citing Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3.)
This aspect of the law is not relevant to Perez’s appeal.

                                      7
the prosecutor must “file and serve a response” to the petition,
to which the petitioner may reply (id., subd. (c)); and “[a]fter
the parties have had an opportunity to submit briefings, the
court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner
has made a prima facie case for relief.” (Ibid.)
       “ ‘ “[I]f the record . . . ‘contain[s] facts refuting the
allegations made in the petition,’ then ‘the court is justified in
making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner’ ” ’ ”
and denying the petition at the prima facie stage. (People v.
Hurtado (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 887, 893 (Hurtado).) “ ‘The
record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s
prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing the court
to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that
are clearly meritless.’ [Citation.]” (Hurtado, supra, at p. 893.)

      C.    Perez Is Ineligible for Section 1172.6 Relief as a
            Matter of Law
      Perez is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter
of law because the record of conviction establishes that the
jury did not convict him pursuant to the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.
      At trial, the prosecutor argued that Perez committed
attempted murder when he personally aimed and fired a gun
at Officer Fuentes with “the intent to kill.” The trial court
instructed the jury that, to find Perez guilty of attempted
murder, it must conclude that he “intended to kill.” The
court did not instruct the jury on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, any other theory of imputed malice,
or even on aiding and abetting.
      In addition, the jury determined that Perez committed
the attempted murder willfully, and with deliberation and
premeditation—findings that the court instructed the jurors

                                    8
they could make only if they concluded that Perez “intended to
kill when he acted,” and that he “decided to kill before acting”
after “carefully weigh[ing] the considerations for and against
his choice.”
       Finally, the jury concluded that Perez “personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm” in the commission of the
crime. Accordingly, we conclude that Perez is ineligible for
section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law. (See Hurtado, supra, 89
Cal.App.5th at p. 893 [“[a]s the attempted murderer, [petitioner]
is ‘ineligible for relief ’ as ‘a matter of law’ ”]; People v. Cortes
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198, 205 [“[a]s [the defendant] concedes,
the jury was not instructed on any theory of liability for murder
or attempted murder that required that malice be imputed to
him. He is therefore ineligible for resentencing”].)
       None of the arguments in Perez’s supplemental brief
persuades us otherwise. First, Perez contends that he lacked
the requisite intent to kill Officer Fuentes because the record
demonstrates that he had no specific “target victim” in mind
when he fired the shot. The Supreme Court, however, expressly
has foreclosed such an argument, reiterating in Perez II that
“ ‘[t]he mental state required for attempted murder is the intent
to kill a human being, not a particular human being.’ [Citation.]”
(Perez II, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 225.)
       Next, relying on People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591
(Canizales), Perez appears to argue that the jury might have
convicted him pursuant to the “kill zone” theory,7 which he

      7 Pursuant to “the so-called kill zone theory, . . . a
defendant may be convicted of the attempted murder of
an individual who was not the defendant’s primary target.”
(Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 596.)

                                     9
characterizes as “a sort of natural and probable consequences
theory” or “theory of implied malice.”
        But Canizales—in which the Supreme Court clarified
certain aspects of the kill zone theory—has no application here.
As an initial matter, nothing in the record suggests that the jury
might have relied on the kill zone theory in convicting Perez.
The trial court did not instruct the jury on the kill zone theory,
and the Supreme Court expressly disclaimed any reliance on the
theory in affirming Perez’s conviction for the attempted murder
of Officer Fuentes. (See Perez II, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 232
[“[t]he facts of this case do not establish that [Perez] created a
‘kill zone’ ”].)
        Moreover—in contrast to the natural and probable
consequences doctrine—the kill zone theory does not involve
imputing malice to a defendant based solely on that defendant’s
participation in another crime. Instead, “[t]he kill zone theory
looks to circumstantial evidence to support a permissive
inference regarding a defendant’s intent.” (Canizales, supra,
7 Cal.5th at p. 606.) The theory “permits the jury to infer
that the defendant harbored the requisite specific intent to kill
the primary target and everyone within the zone of fatal harm.
Thus, the jury would have found a specific intent to kill [even]
were it to have relied . . . on the kill zone theory of attempted
murder liability.” (Id. at p. 618.) We therefore find Perez’s kill
zone theory argument unpersuasive.
        Finally, Perez urges that we should vacate his conviction
for the attempted murder of Officer Fuentes because “the
record contain[s] no evidence [he] intended to kill anyone.”
This argument fails because section 1172.6 “does not afford
the petitioner a new opportunity to raise claims of trial error

                                   10
or attack the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s
findings.” (People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 947.)
      Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Perez’s
section 1172.6 petition.8

      8 In a declaration appended to his supplemental
brief, Perez seeks substitute appellate counsel pursuant
to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118. Having reviewed
Perez’s declaration, we conclude that he has not raised an
issue cognizable under Marsden. Accordingly, we deny his
request for substitute counsel on appeal.

                                    11
                        DISPOSITION
      We affirm the October 12, 2022 order denying Perez’s
section 1172.6 petition. We deny Perez’s request for substitute
appellate counsel.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                          ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

                  CHANEY, J.

                  WEINGART, J.

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