Court Opinion

ID: 9686520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:52:33.713739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:44:01.108408
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.
(dissenting). A unanimous court of appeals held that the attorney’s fee of $29,410 which the trial court awarded to Standard was not reasonable. Based on its independent review, the court of appeals determined that a reasonable attorney’s fee in this case was $7,600. However, the majority of this court reinstates the full award under a statute that requires the state to pay “reasonable attorney fees’’ to a prevailing party in a condemnation action. The majority approves as “reasonable” an hourly fee of up *753to $150 per hour1 thereby approving a total attorney’s fee of $29,410 (which includes a sizable amount for travel time2) that must be paid by the state. This is allowed despite evidence in the record that various attorneys outside the locality where Standard’s attorney in this case normally practices (which is not the locality where this condemnation action was brought) indicated that their normal fees for this type of litigation would be based on an hourly rate of approximately $60 to $75, depending on the attorney’s experience and the complexity of the litigation.
The issue in this case is not whether the fees charged by Mr. Daly (Standard’s attorney) are reasonable with *754respect to the fees normally charged by him or his firm, or to fees charged for similar services by other firms in the locality where Mr. Daly normally practices (Milwaukee). Unquestionably the cost of practicing law differs from locality to locality, and even from law firm to law firm within the same locality. The issue does not concern the quality of services that Mr. Daly rendered. Rather, the issue is whether the fees charged by Mr. Daly, which are based on hourly rates of between $100 and $150, are “reasonable” and therefore fully reimbursable, within the meaning of sec. 32.28(1), Stats., which entitles a condemnee, under certain circumstances, to recover reasonable attorney fees “. . . necessary to prepare for or participate in actual or anticipated proceedings. . . .”
The majority opinion fully addresses the issue of whether the fees requested by Mr. Daly were necessary for the preparation and participation in “. . . actual or anticipated proceedings . . .”, and I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the hours Mr. Daly spent in the preparation and participation in the proceedings were necessary. Travel time was also necessary, but I do not address the question whether the majority’s awarding the full hourly rate for the travel time is appropriate. See dissenting op. at n. 2.
However, based on the record before this court, and the legislative intent as clearly reflected in the words of the statute, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion and rationale that the fees awarded to Standard were “reasonable” within the meaning of sec. 32.28(1), Stats. I would therefore remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
Assume for purposes of analysis that a state employee takes a necessary business trip for which he or she will seek reimbursement for the travel expenses incurred. Under sec. 20.916(1), Stats., state officers and employees “. . . shall be reimbursed for actual, reasonable *755and necessary traveling expenses incurred in the discharge of their duties in accoradnce with s. 16.535. . . .” (Emphasis added.) Section 16.535(1) (b) defines “reasonable” as “. . . not extreme or excessive.” Assume further that the employee flies first class even though other classes are available, eats only the most expensive meals, and stays at only the most expensive hotels. The employee then requests reimbursement from the state for the full costs of the flight, meals, and accommodations. Would that employee obtain full reimbursement for those costs? Obviously not.
Reason and experience teaches us that, assuming more moderately priced accommodations were available, the most the state employee could be reimbursed for would be the cost of more moderately priced flight arrangements, meals and accommodations. If the state employee chooses to travel in an expensive fashion, the state employee would be free to do so but only at his or her own additional expense. However, under the majority’s holding and rationale in this case, the results of the above hypothetical would be to allow the state employee to recover the full cost of the first-class flight, meals and accommodations (or at least allow full reimbursement if the employee’s personal use of first-class travel and accommodations was of long-standing duration).
Such results are inconsistent with the meaning of “reasonable” as that word is commonly used. “Reasonable” as defined as: “4.a) not extreme, immoderate, or excessive b) not expensive.” Webster’s New World Dictionary 1183 (1972). When the legislature chose to modify the words “attorney fees” with the word “reasonable,” it evinced a clear legislative intent that is contrary to the conclusion of the majority opinion. The conclusion of the majority renders the word “reasonable” surplusage.
The majority’s holding that the $29,410.00 in attorney’s fees awarded to Standard were reasonable under *756sec. 32.28(1), Stats., is based, in part, on its conclusion that the counsel Standard retained in this case has represented Standard for thirty years. See supra at p. 743 and p. 750. The majority also notes that Standard’s attorney had experience in eminent domain proceedings “. . . in excess of twenty years. . . .” Supra at 743. The majority then concludes, without analysis of the meaning of the word “reasonable” as used in the statute, that the fees charged by Standard’s attorney were reasonable.
The majority’s emphasis on the long-standing professional relationship between Standard and Mr. Daly to support its conclusion that the fees awarded to Standard were reasonable creates problems for future cases. Suppose a condemnation action is brought in one county, and the condemnee retains counsel from another county who has represented the condemnee only once before in another type of action, and whose hourly rates range between $150-$200. Would full reimbursement of the attorney fees charged by counsel under those circumstances be allowed? Suppose counsel in the above hypothetical had a professional relationship with the con-demnee for three years. Would full reimbursement of attorney fees be allowed at that point?
A further problem created by the majority’s focus on the long-term professional relationship between Standard and its attorney arises under circumstances in which a condemnee previously has utilized only the professional services of an attorney charging moderate hourly rates. If the condemnee now wishes to retain the services of an attorney who charges $100-$150 per hour to represent him or her in a condemnation proceeding because he or she believes that price reflects the quality of legal services rendered, will the condemnee be precluded from obtaining full reimbursement of attorney’s fees at the rates charged by that attorney merely because he or she has not been fortunate enough *757to establish a long-term professional relationship with that attorney? Under the majority’s analysis, only those individuals used to having the most expensive legal representation (and perhaps the “best” if cost is any indication of quality) may be able to obtain full reimbursement of attorney’s fees under sec. 32.28(1), Stats., at the rates charged by that attorney. However, those persons used to lower priced representation, or those who have never utilized legal services before, may be restricted to moderately priced representation in a condemnation action unless they are willing to pay the difference in fees between moderately priced counsel and more expensive counsel. I recognize that the nature and length of a professional relationship between an attorney and client is a factor that may be considered in determining whether fees charged by the attorney are reasonable. See SCR 20.12(2) (f). However, I disagree with the majority that merely because Standard and its attorney have a long-standing relationship, and because the attorney had prior experience in eminent domain proceedings, it automatically follows that the fees charged by Mr. Daly were “reasonable” within the meaning of the statute, and therefore fully reimbursable.
In determining whether the fees awarded to Standard were reasonable within the meaning of sec. 32.28(1), Stats., I would look to the factors set forth in SCR 20.12(2), and particularly, SCR 20.12(2) (c). That provision states in pertinent part: “ (2) ... Factors to be considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: ... (c) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.” Although SCR 20.12 does not specify what is meant by “the locality” in SCR 20.12(2) (c), I believe it is reasonable to conclude that under most circumstances, “the locality” for purposes of SCR 20.12(2) (c) refers to the locality where the action is brought, or a *758similar locality, or a locality within a reasonable proximity to the site where the action is brought.3 Under this analysis, the reasonableness of the fees charged by the attorney retained by a condemnee ordinarily would be judged in light of fees charged for similar services by attorneys in the locality as I have defined that term. However, a different situation might arise if the con-demnee can demonstrate circumstances indicating that it was reasonable to retain counsel from outside the locality. Such circumstances include the fact that competent counsel was unavailable in that locality, or that, consistent with SCR 20.12(2) (a), a particular attorney or firm was needed because of the complexity of the matter or because it required special expertise. If the condemnee demonstrates such mitigating circumstances, the trial court could decide in its discretion to base an award of attorney’s fees on prevailing rates for similar legal services in the locality where that attorney normally practices.
I believe that to interpret SCR 20.12(2) (c) as referring to fees for similar services charged by attorneys in the locality, unless the condemnee can demonstrate mitigating circumstances, is a more effective means of ensuring that the ultimate award of attorney’s fees under sec. 32.28(1), Stats., will be “reasonable” within the meaning of the statute. If reasonable fees are determined, in part, by looking at fees charged for similar services by attorneys in the locality, this could discourage a condemnee from doing what Standard did in this case, namely, going far beyond that locality and retaining more expensive counsel. This could also discourage the situation in which, for example, a client from New York has property in Wisconsin that is subject to a con*759demnation action, and that client retains counsel from a large Chicago or New York law firm who charges hourly rates in excess of $300. Finally, this could avoid extensive and expensive travel costs that may be incurred, and that were incurred in this case, when counsel is retained from far beyond the locality.
I do not dispute that a condemnee is free to retain out-of-town (i.e., outside the locality as I have defined that term) or out-of-state counsel if he or she so desires. If the condemnee does retain outside counsel, however, the trial court might well conclude in its discretion that the fees charged are not fully reimbursable if they are higher than the fees charged for similar services in the locality, and if the condemnee cannot demonstrate any mitigating circumstances to justify retaining outside counsel. Under those circumstances, the state should not be required to fully subsidize the condemnee’s choice of attorney.
This analysis of SCR 20.12(2) (c) is consistent with the way some federal courts have analyzed Disciplinary Rule 2-106 (B) (3) of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, which is identical to SCR 20.12(2) (c), and other criteria similar to SCR 20.12 (2) (c). In Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1982), the court noted that in determining whether attorney’s fees awarded under sec. 706 (k) of Title VII, 42 USC sec. 2000e-5 (k) were reasonable, it was relevant to consider the fees customarily charged for similar services in the locality where the attorney normally practices. However, the court also noted that “the fee customarily charged for similar services in the locality where services are rendered is . . . relevant even where the attorney normally practices elsewhere. . . .” 670 F.2d at 769. The court stated:
“We think that a judge, in allowing an attorney’s fee under Title VII or similar statute, has discretion to question the reasonableness of an out of town attorney’s *760billing rate if there is reason to believe that services of equal quality were readily available at a lower charge or rate in the area where the services were to be rendered.
“If, however, a party does not find counsel readily available in that locality with whatever degree of skill may reasonably be required, it is reasonable that the party go elsewhere to find an attorney. . . .” Id.
In Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 689 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1982), the court considered whether an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 USC sec. 1988 was reasonable. The court cited factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), including the factor that a reasonable hourly rate is the “ordinary fee ‘for similar work in the community.’ ” 689 F.2d at 140, quoting Johnson, 488 F.2d at 718. The court stated that if a plaintiff “ ‘. . . can show he has been unable through diligent, good faith efforts to retain local counsel, attorney’s fees under 42 USC sec. 1988 are not limited to the prevailing rate in the district where the case is tried.’ ” 689 F.2d at 140-41, quoting Donaldson v. O’Connor, 454 F. Supp. 311, 315 (N.D. Fla. 1978). In Avalon, the plaintiff retained counsel from Los Angeles to represent it in an action brought in Little Rock, Arkansas. The court approved as reasonable an hourly rate less than that charged by plaintiff’s counsel, concluding that plaintiff could have found competent counsel closer to the site of the case for a substantially lower hourly rate.
The record in this case indicates that the hourly rates charged by Standard’s attorney exceeded the rates charged for similar services by attorneys in localities similar to the locality where the condemnation action was brought. It is unclear from the record whether Standard attempted, but was unable, to retain competent counsel from the locality in which the action was brought, or from a similar locality, or a locality within a reasonable proximity to the site where the action was *761brought. It is also unclear whether there were other mitigating circumstances that would support a conclusion that Standard’s choice of counsel from outside that locality was reasonable, and that the fees charged were reasonable. Therefore, I would reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand to the circuit court with directions to reconsider the reasonableness of the fees charged by Mr. Daly in light of the factors in SCR 20.12, and particularly, the analysis of SCR 20.12(2) (c) set forth in this dissent.
On a concluding note, I fear the long range implications for the practicing bar as well as the public could be negative. Justice is effectively denied when access to justice is denied because an aggrieved party cannot afford the cost of legal services. The legislature has recognized that problem and provided in some instances, such as here, that a prevailing party is entitled to be reimbursed for the cost of reasonable attorney fees. Because the majority opinion is contrary to law and the clear legislative intent expressed therein, I fear their conclusion could well evoke a negative response from the legislature which could cause grave harm to that concept.4

 The fees charged by Standard’s attorney were based on hourly rates of $100 to $110 per hour for 1978; $110 to $120 per hour for 1979; $130 to $135 per hour for 1980; and $150 per hour for 1981 and 1982.

 Travel time between Milwaukee and Vilas county was apparently charged at the full hourly rate. The record reveals at least three conferences for which travel time was billed and approved by the majority of this court. At a two hour hearing held in October, 1981, Mr. Daly’s billing reads as follows: “10/19, 20, 1981, — Appearance in Vilas County Circuit Court and travel; return trip and telephone conference J. Ling; 14.0 hours, $2100.”
The billing for November 27, 28 and 29, 1978, reads: “11/27, 28 and 29/78 — Telephone conference D. Hankins; preparation for hearing; conferences D. Hankins and R. Bourguignon at Eagle River in preparation for hearing; conference with J. Ling in preparation for hearing; attendance at hearing before County Condemnation Commissioners; 16.0 hours, $1760”.
The billing for October 10, 1979 states: “10/10/79 — Conference with appraiser in Eagle River and Rhinelander; 10.0 hours, $1200”.
The record also reveals charges of $990 for 9 hours for an “Attendance at pretrial conference” on April 13, 1979. Although the record does not indicate the location of this conference, based on the amount charged it is possible that this charge also included an amount for travel time.
The majority opinion approves these billings, which total $6050, in full.

 For the remainder of this dissent, the word “locality” means the locality where the action is brought, or a similar locality, or a locality within a reasonable proximity to the site where the action is brought.

 Recent legislative history indicates that the legislature as a body has little understanding of the economic costs of practicing law. In 1981, despite this author’s protestations, the legislature provided that privately appointed counsel for indigents could be reimbursed no more than $35 per hour for court time and $26 an hour for all other time. Those amounts remain law today. See sec. 977.08 (4m), Stats. 1981-82. This author argued then that those amounts were totally inadequate in that they were barely sufficient to cover overhead costs, if that.