Court Opinion

ID: 9882745
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:19:25.534247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:03:40.387776
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Parrish, 2023-Ohio-3356.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                      :

                 Plaintiff-Appellant,               :
                                                              No. 111990
                 v.                                 :

CORTEZ PARRISH,                                     :

                 Defendant-Appellee.                :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 21, 2023

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Case No. CR-21-662648-A

                                              Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Carl M. Felice, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellant.

                 Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
                 Michael V. Wilhelm, Assistant Public Defender, for
                 appellee.

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J.:

                The state of Ohio appeals the trial court’s judgment granting defendant-

appellee, Cortez Parrish’s (“Parrish”) motion to suppress evidence. For the reasons

that follow, we affirm.
                    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

             On September 9, 2021, Parrish was indicted on Count 1, having

weapons while under disability, a third-degree felony (F3), and Count 2 carrying

concealed weapons, a fourth-degree felony (F4). On December 7, 2021, Parrish filed

a motion to suppress evidence, which was heard on July 21, 2022.

             The state’s sole witness was Patrol Officer Carolyn Field, (“Field”) of the

Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority Police Department. Field testified that

on August 20, 2021, while patrolling Cedar Estates at approximately 11:23 p.m., she

observed, from across the street, 15 or 20 men, including Parrish, participating in a

dice game.

             Field called for backup and waited in her parked vehicle. Field testified

that upon approaching the group with backup, the men scattered. Parrish, wearing

a black shirt, was seen moving away from the group towards the basketball courts.

Field stated Parrish was the focus of the investigation because he was part of the

gambling group, he had his hand on his waistband, and he headed away from

officers once he saw them. Field did not detain Parrish nor find any weapons.

Parrish was detained by Officers Vidal and Jochum and placed in cuffs, while Field

and other officers searched for weapons. The discovery of firearms along Parrish’s

route ultimately led to his arrest. Parrish was subsequently charged with having

weapons while under disability and carrying concealed weapons. After Parrish was

arrested, he admitted to Field that one gun belonged to him. Parrish filed a motion

to suppress the weapons and his statements.
                The testimony revealed that Field initially implied guns were found on

Parrish. Field later clarified that the guns were found on the side of a building, not

on Parrish’s person. The state attempted to introduce body-cam videos depicting

statements made by Parrish once he was detained in handcuffs. Parrish objected to

the portion of the videos containing incriminating statements.

      [Defense Attorney]: Your Honor, I would object to anything beyond
      this point being shown to the trier of fact as potentially prejudicial.
      From this point on, he just incriminates himself, I believe, and starts
      confessing to things, and it has nothing to do with why we’re here for a
      motion to suppress.

      ***

      The Court: All right. I’ll sustain the objection.

(Tr. 24, 26.)

                The trial court granted Parrish’s motion to suppress on September 22,

2022. The state appeals the trial court’s judgment raising one assignment of error.

                                Assignment of Error

      The trial court erred when it granted appellee’s motion to suppress.

Standard of Review and Crim.R. 12

                An appellate review of a motion to suppress ruling involves a mixed

question of fact and law. State v. Harrison, 166 Ohio St.3d 479, 2021-Ohio-4465,

187 N.E.3d 510, ¶ 11. A reviewing court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact

when they are supported by competent, credible evidence; however, questions of law

are reviewed de novo without consideration of the lower court’s legal conclusion. Id.,

citing State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8.
When factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its

essential findings on the record. Crim.R. 12(F). When the essential findings of fact

are absent, a reviewing court will affirm the trial court’s ruling when there is

sufficient evidence in the record demonstrating that the trial court’s decision is

justified. Bedford v. McLeod, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94649, 2011-Ohio-3380, ¶ 16.

             As a preliminary matter, it is undisputed that the trial court did not

state its findings of fact on the record, as required by Crim.R. 12.(F). Also, the state

failed to request essential findings of fact. Nonetheless, the state attempts to

complain that there are no findings of fact from the trial court.                     A

party cannot complain of a trial court’s failure to state its findings pursuant

to Crim.R. 12(F) when no request for such findings was made. See State v. Miller,

12th Dist. Butler No. CA86-09-134, 1987 Ohio App. LEXIS 9708, ¶ 12 (Nov. 23,

1987). The state’s complaint of the trial court’s noncompliance with Crim.R. 12(F)

has not been preserved and will not be addressed. Moreover, the record can be

reviewed to ascertain the facts.

             “[A] trial court’s failure to provide its ‘essential findings’ on

the record in a case may not be fatal to a review of the trial court’s ruling on the

motion    when    the record provides    a sufficient basis   to   review   appellant’s

assignments of error.” Bedford v. Clarke, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95594, 2011-Ohio-

941, ¶ 8, citing State v. Bennett, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86962, 2006-Ohio-4274,

¶ 16; S. Euclid v. Njoku, 2022-Ohio-4388, 203 N.E.3d 147, ¶ 47 (8th Dist.).
               The state argues the trial court granted the motion to suppress based

on the court’s mood as opposed to the reasonable articulable suspicion and probable

cause standards. Upon review of the record, we find sufficient facts to conduct our

analysis of the state’s assignment of error.

Law and Analysis

              The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and

Section 14, Article, I, of the Constitution of Ohio, prohibit unreasonable searches of

persons and seizure of their property. The Fourth Amendment declares:

      The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
      and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
      violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
      supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
      to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. USCS Const.
      Amendment Four.

              Evidence obtained by the state in violation of the Fourth Amendment

must be suppressed and prohibited from use by the state in its criminal prosecution

of the person from whom it was seized, as the fruit of the poisonous tree. State v.

Boulis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86885, 2006-Ohio-3693, ¶ 22. The nature and

quality of the intrusion on an individual’s Fourth Amendment interests must be

balanced against the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1, (1985). “The purpose

of suppression is not to vindicate the rights of the accused person, who may very

well have engaged in illegal conduct, but to deter the state from such acts in the

future.” State v Stagger, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 85617, 2005-Ohio-4586, ¶ 11.
“Confirmation of the commission of an alleged criminal act by the detained person

should not overshadow the purpose of suppression.” State v. Byrd, 2022-Ohio-

4635, 204 N.E.3d 681, ¶ 32 (8th Dist.).

              An individual’s detention, without a warrant, must be based on

reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person being detained is directly

involved or about to engage in criminal activity. State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 100300, 2014-Ohio-2763, ¶ 21. Here, Field testified that she initiated the

investigatory stop of Parrish because he was part of a group of 15 or 20 men she

believed were gambling. Field observed them gathered in a circle, crouching down

one by one to throw what appeared to be dice and or money in the courtyard. Field

could not remember if Parrish was running or walking toward the basketball courts

after seeing officers but stated he headed away from officers while holding his side.

Field said this was indicative of an individual carrying a weapon. As a result of this

observation, Parrish became a subject of investigation.

               Interactions between police and individuals can fall into three

distinct categories: 1) a consensual encounter, 2) an investigative detention, or 3)

an arrest. State v. Thomas, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23979, 2011-Ohio-1292, ¶ 9.

The state argues that Parrish was detained for an investigatory stop because Field

suspected he was gambling.

               An investigative stop is a warrantless search and seizure that is

violative of the Fourth Amendment and Ohio law unless it falls under one of the

well-established exceptions. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 19 L.Ed.2d
576, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967). The exception for investigative stops is outlined in Terry

v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968). Before making an

investigatory stop, law enforcement must have an “articulable and reasonable

suspicion” that the detained individual is engaged or about to engage in criminal

activity. See Terry, supra. Reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop exists if there is

at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop. State v.

Debrossard, 4th Dist. Ross No. 13CA3395, 2015-Ohio-1054, ¶ 12. To possess

a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity, a “‘police officer must be able

to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational

inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant’” a search and seizure. State v.

Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 181, 524 N.E.2d 489 (1988), quoting Terry at 21. In the

present case, the alleged criminal activity that was the subject of Parrish’s detention

was gambling, in violation of R.C. 2915.02(A)(2). “No person shall * * * establish,

promote, or operate or knowingly engage in conduct that facilitates any game of

chance conducted for profit or any scheme of chance.” Field testified that Parrish

became the focus of the investigatory stop because she observed that Parrish was

part of a large group of men that she believed were gambling. The following

exchange occurred:

      [Defense Attorney]: If you see a group of — focus on this evening in
      question — of 15 to 20 black males and you observe that some of them
      may be gambling, does that give you a right to arrest all 15 to 20 of
      them?

      Field: It gives you the right to detain them for further investigation.
      [Defense Attorney]: That’s your testimony? You believe that’s the law?

      Field: To then find out if there is more to the commission of the crime.

      [Defense Attorney]: Commission of the gambling crime, right. So when
      you approached, you and the other officers approached the defendant,
      did you see any gambling paraphernalia?

      Field: I did not detain him at first, no.

      [Defense Attorney]: Did you see any dice?

      Field: Again, I was not the first one to detain him.

              Given Field’s testimony of her observations leading to Parrish’s

detainment, reasonable articulable suspicion was established for an investigatory

stop for gambling. Now, our analysis requires additional evidence to justify further

detainment and or arrest. The continued detention after the purpose for the original

stop has ended constitutes an illegal seizure where there are no articulable facts that

give rise to further suspicion of illegal activity. State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d

234, 240, 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997). A thorough review of the record reveals Field

observed Parrish holding his side as he was headed away from officers. She

acknowledged that Parrish was doing nothing illegal as he headed toward the

basketball courts. However, she could not remember if he walked or ran when

officers approached. She did not note either in her report. If Parrish had run after

seeing officers, while not illegal, running is one consideration justifying an

investigatory stop under the totality of circumstances. State v. Banks, 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 09AP-1087, 2010-Ohio-5714, ¶ 43-44. Field did not have any contact

with Parrish until after the guns were found and Parrish was formally arrested for
the weapons charges. Field indeed had a reasonable belief that Parrish had a

weapon because he was holding his side, but there is no articulable fact in the record

that would create a reasonable suspicion that Parrish possessed an illegal weapon.

Parrish’s act of holding his waistband, without more, only justified a pat down for

weapons so that the officers could conduct their investigation into gambling without

fear of harm. It is well settled that “[t]he purpose of this limited search is not to

discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation

without fear of violence* * *.” State v. Barcus, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2022-Ohio-

2491, ¶ 11. Field’s testimony failed to clarify the circumstances under which the guns

were found or how an investigation for gambling converted into an arrest for

weapons offenses. Initially, Field testified that Parrish had marijuana and a

Springfield XD handgun gun in his possession. On cross-examination, she admitted

the guns were not in Parrish’s possession, but were found on the side of a building.

Since Field had no contact with Parrish until he was formally arrested, the record is

devoid of any additional evidence to justify the gambling allegation and arrest.

Additionally, neither the arresting officer nor the officer who found the weapons

testified and Field could not articulate any facts that supported a reasonable

suspicion that Parrish had committed a weapons crime.

             In Glaspie, the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence was

reversed because “there was no valid arrest preceding the search nor any recitation

of facts that would draw the police action within the ring of protection against a

claim of an unlawful search.” Cincinnati v. Glaspie, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-74139,
1975 Ohio App. LEXIS 7556, 5 (Feb. 18, 1975). Although there were other officers

involved, Field was the sole witness. Therefore, the recitation of facts leading up to

Parrish’s arrest is absent. There is no testimony that Parrish had any evidence of

gambling on his person or weapons on him when he was detained. There is no

testimony regarding how the guns were observed, secured, or linked directly to

Parrish. Although there is a reference to a backpack, there was no evidence that

Parrish was observed with a backpack. Yes, the body-cam verifies the presence of

the guns. But the connection of Parrish to the guns is absent. We find that the state

failed to meet its burden of articulating specific facts creating a reasonable suspicion

that Parrish committed or was about to commit an arrestable offense, after his initial

detainment. Under the totality of circumstances, there is insufficient evidence to

support a reasonable suspicion to further pursue, search, or seize Parrish. “‘[A]ll

evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is * * *

inadmissible * * *.’” State v. Kiraly, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92181, 2009-Ohio-4714,

¶ 26, quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1865, 6L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).

Now, the state argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it failed to

apply the appropriate legal standard in this case. In support of their argument, the

state relies on the trial court’s statement that it was “in a generous mood” when the

court granted Parrish’s motion to suppress. However, this statement was not made

on the day testimony was taken. After hearing the evidence and taking the matter

under advisement, the court reconvened on September 22, 2022, to announce its

ruling. At that time, the trial court stated,
      In any event, the court did hear testimony that day and has had more
      than ample time to reflect on it, and, you know, the court is in a
      generous mood. The court is going to grant the motion to suppress, All
      right?

               The state contends the statement demonstrates the trial court’s

failure to consider the “reasonable articulated suspicion standard.” We find the

state’s argument unpersuasive. In response to the state’s argument that the court’s

statement demonstrated a lack of consideration of the appropriate standard, we note

that the record reflects the trial court’s careful consideration of the appropriate legal

standard.

                The court stated that it had ample time to reflect on the testimony.

“[A] trial judge is presumed to know the applicable law and apply it accordingly.”

State v. Thacker, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 04CA12, 2005-Ohio-1057, ¶ 19. More

importantly, during the suppression hearing, the court asked questions that

indicated considerations of the appropriate legal standard. During oral argument,

the court considered arguments from the defense attorney concerning reasonable

suspicion.

      [Defense Attorney]: The length of time has nothing to do with the
      constitutionality of the suppression or the evidence that’s found. It’s
      whether or not there is reasonable suspicion of a crime is the only
      standard we’re worried about here. So if the reasonable suspicion has
      not happened by the time he’s been handcuffed, they can’t develop it
      after the fact.

      The Court: That’s a good point.

(Tr. 26.)
               The state has failed to meet its burden. We find the record reveals

that the trial court properly applied substantive law to the facts of this case. We

further find the search and seizure of the weapons was in violation of Parrish’s

Fourth Amendment rights. As a result, the firearms are subject to exclusion under

the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine and must be suppressed.

              Finally, this lead opinion would be remiss if it failed to address the

dissent opinion. The dissent opines the gun and statement were secured legally.

However, it fails to identify how the prohibited evidence is drawn within the ring of

protection against an unlawful seizure. The mere presence of the guns along the

path, absent facts connecting Parrish to them, is insufficient to eliminate the

protection against unreasonable searches. Notably, Field testified that Officers

Vidal and Jochum arrested Parrish (tr. 36.) before she encountered him in the police

car. Nonetheless, the dissent relies upon Parrish’s post-arrest statement to establish

probable cause. Otherwise, there is nothing to connect Parrish to the gun.

              The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, JUDGE

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J., CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY;
LISA B. FORBES, J., DISSENTS (WITH SEPARATE OPINION)

LISA B. FORBES, J., DISSENTING:

               I respectfully dissent from the lead opinion affirming the trial court’s

judgment entry granting Parrish’s motion to suppress evidence. I agree with the

lead opinion’s conclusion that a “reasonable articulable suspicion was established

for an investigatory stop” and detainment of Parrish. I further agree with the lead

opinion’s conclusion that the responding police officers “had a reasonable belief that

Parrish had a weapon because he was holding his side * * *.” However, while the

lead opinion finds that the sole alleged criminal activity in this case was gambling, I

would find that the CMHA officers involved in this case also had a reasonable,

articulable suspicion that Parrish was carrying a concealed weapon,1 which was

illegal at the time of Parrish’s detainment.2

       1 The CMHA Complaint Summary, which Officer Field referred to as the “police

report” at the suppression hearing, states that, on August 20, 2021, at 11:23 p.m., officers
observed 15-20 people gambling. The report further states as follows: “[O]fficers
observed a male later identified as * * * Parrish holding what appeared to be a heavy object
in his waistband. Parrish observed officer presence and changed course of his direction
and started running.”

       2 Asked if it was “legal for a firearm to be carried in [the] manner” the officers

suspected Parrish was carrying one, Officer Field testified, “At that time, no.” Further the
              “Where a police officer, during an investigatory stop, has a reasonable

suspicion that an individual is armed based on the totality of the circumstances, the

officer may initiate a protective search for the safety of himself and others.” State v.

Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 181, 524 N.E.2d 489 (1988). This protective search is often

referred to as a Terry stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d

889 (1968). Investigatory stops also allow the police to “detain the person briefly to

investigate the circumstances that provoked the suspicion.” State v. Mays, 119 Ohio

St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 13. “Typically, this means that the

officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his

identity and try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s

suspicions.” Id. at ¶ 14.

              In the case at hand, Parrish’s detainment was memorialized by body-

camera footage from one of the officers who apprehended him, which was played at

the suppression hearing. This footage clearly shows that the officers on scene asked

Parrish, who was in handcuffs and being detained for suspicion of gambling and

carrying a concealed weapon, what his name and social security number were.

Immediately after Parrish gave the police his social security number, an officer said

over the police radio, “Got the firearm” and “Got two and marijuana.” The guns and

marijuana were found on the ground approximately two minutes after the police

detained Parrish. Officer Field testified that she “observed the [firearms and

CMHA Complaint Summary lists the “Primary Offense” for Parrish’s arrest as
“[R.C.] 2923.12(A) Offender carried or concealed weapon or ordnance.”
marijuana] that were found on the side of the building through [Parrish’s] path of

travel.” It is undisputed that the guns were not found on Parrish’s person.

              A second body-camera video was presented at the suppression

hearing. This video, which was timestamped approximately 13 minutes after the

police recovered the firearms and marijuana, showed Officer Field informing

Parrish of his Miranda rights while he was in the back of a police car. Officer Field

testified that she interviewed Parrish after advising him of his rights. In this second

video, Officer Field asked Parrish about the guns, inquiring “Are those yours, man?

* * * The guns we found in your exact track * * * next to your weed?” Another police

officer asked Parrish, “Which one is yours? The Glock or the other one?” Parrish

responded, “XD9,” which matches the description of the Springfield XD9 recovered

from the scene.

              I disagree with the lead opinion’s statement in this case that Officer

“Field testified that Officers Vidal and Jochum arrested Parrish before she

encountered him in the police car.” Rather, Officer Field testified that Parrish “was

placed under arrest after being Mirandized and after we located all of the firearms.”

Officer Field further testified about Parrish’s arrest as follows:

      Q: Officer Field, who arrested [Parrish] that night?

      A: It would be Officer Vidal and Officer Jochum.

      Q: Who Mirandized him?

      A: I did.

      [Videotape played in open court]
      Q: Did you hear an interaction between yourself and [Parrish]?

      A: Yes.

      Q: What were you doing?

      A: I was Mirandizing him.

      Q: What did you do after that?

      A: I then interviewed him after he was Mirandized.

                Other than Officer Field’s testimony quoted above, there is nothing in

the record regarding the precise timeline of Parrish’s arrest.

                Furthermore, I also disagree with the lead opinion’s statement that

this dissent “relies upon Parrish’s post-arrest statement to establish probable

cause.” Rather, this dissent concludes that, as officers were approaching Parrish to

investigate suspected illegal gambling, a reasonable, articulable suspicion arose that

Parrish was illegally carrying a concealed weapon. Approximately two minutes

later, two weapons were found on the ground in Parrish’s path of travel. The

reasonable, articulable suspicion that Parrish was carrying a concealed weapon

arose well before he voluntarily admitted that one of the weapons belonged to him.

                I would find that the investigatory stop and detainment of Parrish did

not violate his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and

seizures.   Police detained Parrish to investigate their reasonable articulable

suspicion that Parrish had been gambling and carrying a concealed weapon. During

this brief investigation, the police recovered two firearms on the ground within
Parrish’s “path of travel.” There is no evidence in the record that the police illegally

prolonged the investigatory stop of Parrish. Therefore, I would reverse the trial

court’s decision to grant Parrish’s motion to suppress evidence.