Court Opinion

ID: 9949240
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-09 19:00:53.365594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:13.469619
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Before
WALKER, EWING,' PARKER
Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Chief Warrant Officer Two ANDRE X. TATE
United States Army, Appellant

ARMY 20200590

Headquarters, 82nd Airborne Division
J. Harper Cook, Military Judge
Colonel Jeffrey S. Thurnher, Staff Judge Advocate

For Appellant: Robert Feldmeier, Esquire (on brief and reply brief).

For Appellee: Lieutenant Colonel Jacqueline J. DeGaine, JA; Major Chase C.
Cleveland, JA; Captain Vy T. Nguyen, JA (on brief).

8 March 2024

This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent.

EWING, Judge:

This is our second opinion in this case. Previously, we held that we did not
have jurisdiction over this appeal because The Judge Advocate General (TJAG) had
not taken personal action on appellant’s petition under Article 69, UCMJ. United
States v. Tate, ARMY 20200590, 2022 CCA LEXIS 543 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 9
Sep. 2022) (mem. op.) (“Tate I’). Following Tate I, TJAG personally denied
appellant relief. We now hold that we have jurisdiction to reach the merits of
appellant’s claims, and that one of appellant’s claims warrants both discussion and
relief. Specifically, we find that the government’s trial evidence was insufficient to
show appellant’s membership in a criminal gang and therefore set aside his
convictions for violating Articles 92 and 133, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10
U.S.C. §§ 892 and 933 [UCMJ]. Appellant does not contest his separate conviction

! Judge EWING decided this case on active duty.
TATE — ARMY 20200590

for assaulting his wife in violation of Article 128, UCMJ, and we affirm that
conviction and resulting sentence.”

JURISDICTION

We discussed the background of appellant’s court-martial conviction and
sentence in Tate J and need not repeat that here, other than to the extent necessary to
address appellant’s assignments of error herein. Tate J, 2022 CCA LEXIS 543, at
*1-2.

But first we return to jurisdiction, without which we “cannot proceed at all,”
because jurisdiction is the prerequisite to our “power to declare the law.” Roberts v.
United States, 77 M.J. 615, 616 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2018) (cleaned up).

We held in Tate I that we did not have jurisdiction to hear appellant’s appeal
because appellant’s sentence fell below the threshold triggering automatic review
and TJAG had, at that time, not taken personal action on appellant’s petition under
Article 69, UCMJ. Tate I, 2022 CCA LEXIS 543, at *7-13. Following Tate I, TIAG
took personal action in appellant’s case and denied appellant relief under Article 69.
TJAG’s personal action thus resolves the Tate J jurisdictional question.

We now address a second jurisdictional issue we left open in Tate I, where we
were grappling with an updated version of Article 69. While this question is
important here, the landscape has changed again since Tate I, with the new version
of Article 66 allowing for any defendant convicted of any offense at a general or
special court-martial—regardless of sentence—to petition this court directly for
appellate review. See UCM] art. 66, 10 U.S.C. § 866 (2018 & Supp. IV 2023); Pub.
L. No. 117-263, §544(d), 136 Stat. 2395, 2583-84 (2022) (stating jurisdictional
amendments to Article 66 are only applicable to cases submitted to a Court of
Criminal Appeals on or after 23 December 2022). This will greatly simplify the
jurisdictional inquiry for future cases and make the following analysis largely a
legacy issue.

But as to the jurisdictional scheme applicable here, we noted the following
issue in Tate I:

Article 69(d) requires a TJAG “action” under Article 69(c)
to vest this court with jurisdiction. But all of the “actions”
listed in Article 69(c) are favorable to an appellant, giving
rise to the question of whether a denial of relief (as here)

? Appellant was acquitted of one specification of violating Article 112a, UCMJ, for
wrongful possession of steroids.
TATE — ARMY 20200590

constitutes a TJAG “action” under Article 69(c), even if
personally acted on by TJAG.

Tate I, 2022 CCA LEXIS 543, at *13 n.9.

Specifically, Article 69(c)(1)(A) provides that in cases reviewed under Article
65, TJAG:

[May set aside the findings or sentence, in whole or in part,
on the grounds of newly discovered evidence, fraud on the
court, lack of jurisdiction over the accused or the offense,
error prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused, or
the appropriateness of the sentence.

But what if TJAG does none of these things, but rather, as here, denies relief?
Could it be that Article 69 provides this court with jurisdiction where TJAG takes
some favorable action on an appellant’s case, but does not provide jurisdiction when
TJAG denies relief?

While this is a possible black letter reading of the statute, we do not believe it
is the best reading, for at least two reasons. First, it would be deeply counter-
intuitive for Congress to have provided an appellant who receives favorable action
from TJAG the ability to petition for additional appellate review but deny that same
ability to an appellant to whom TJAG denies relief. This is particularly true in light
of the Report of the Military Justice Review Group —the group responsible for the
bulk of the changes Congress ultimately adopted in the Military Justice Act of
2016—which explained that the purpose of this change to Article 69 was to
“improve the appellate process by providing an accused who believes that his case
includes legal error with an opportunity to apply directly to a court for appellate
review.” Report of the Military Justice Review Group, Part I: UCMJ
Recommendations, at 636 (last visited 23 Feb. 2024), https://jsc.defense.gov/Portals/
99/MJIRG%20Part%201 .pdf.

Second, we believe it is implicit in the language of Article 69(c) that while
TJAG may, in his discretion, provide one of the listed favorable actions, he may
likewise deny relief under that same provision and thus trigger this court’s
discretionary jurisdiction. This reading is buttressed by the fact that Article 69
elsewhere uses the term “decision” when referring to TJAG’s action. See UMCJ art.
69(d)(2)(B)(ii) (“the decision”). We therefore hold that TJAG’s personal action—
either to grant or deny relief—under Article 69(c) is the jurisdictional prerequisite to
this court’s review of courts-martial like this one.

Thus we hold that we have jurisdiction to proceed to the merits of appellant’s
claims.
TATE — ARMY 20200590
LEGAL SUFFICIENCY

Appellant’s convictions for violating Article 92, failure to obey an order or
regulation, and Article 133, conduct unbecoming an officer, rested on his allegedly
unlawful membership in the Outcast Motorcycle Club (“OMC”). Appellant contends
that the government did not prove at trial that his membership in this group
constituted membership in a “criminal gang” as defined by Army regulation and, as
such, the government’s evidence for these two charges was legally insufficient. We
agree.

Because our review is under Article 69 and not Article 66, we review for legal
sufficiency only. Article 69(e) provides that, in cases where we grant review of
appellant’s petitions under Article 69(d), we “may take action only with respect to
matters of law.” UCMJ art. 69(e).

We review questions of legal sufficiency de novo, and ask “whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” United States v. Wilson, 76 M.J. 4, 6 (C.A.A.F. 2017) (quoting Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)) (citation omitted).

A. Article 92

At the times relevant here, Army Regulation 600-20, Army Command Policy,
provided that “[p]articipation in criminal gangs ... by Army personnel is
inconsistent with the responsibilities of military service,” and that “Soldiers are
prohibited from participation in gangs or their activities.” Army Reg. 600-20,
Personnel-General: Army Command Policy, para. 4-12(g) and (g)(3) (6 Nov. 2014)
[AR 600-20].? The regulation defines “[c]riminal gangs and activities” as “ones that
advocate the planning or commission of one or more criminal offenses, by persons
who share a group identity, and may share a common name, slogan... clothing style
or color.” AR 600-20, para. 4-12(g)(1).

Appellant does not contest his membership in OMC, nor does he contest that
the group shared an identity, name, and clothing style. Thus, for Article 92
sufficiency purposes, the question is whether the government proved OMC was a
group that “advocate[d] the planning or commission of one or more criminal
offenses” and thus constituted a “criminal” gang as defined by the Army Regulation.

3 While the regulation refers first to “criminal gangs” and then later only to “gangs,”
the government conceded at oral argument in this case that the regulation prohibited
soldiers from participating only in “criminal” gangs as defined by the regulation.
We agree, as otherwise the regulation would sweep far too broadly—e.g., the
“Tuesday Morning PT Gang” or the “JAG Officers’ Coffee Gang.”
TATE — ARMY 20200590

Simply put, the government failed to prove that OMC met this regulatory
definition. The government presented no evidence of appellant advocating,
planning, or committing any crime associated with his OMC membership.

Moreover, the government presented no evidence at trial of any OMC member
committing any specific crime, nor did they provide evidence of any OMC member
advocating for the commission of any specific crime. This wds a strange way to go
about proving that OMC was a criminal gang, as one would think it would have been
pretty easy to give a couple of examples of OMC members committing crimes if they
were doing so on a regular basis. The only specific OMC-related crime mentioned
in the government’s case was an instance in which an OMC member in South
Carolina (where appellant had not been associated with the group) had himself been
a murder victim, as opposed to a perpetrator.

The government did present copious evidence that appellant was an OMC
member and wore OMC regalia, including the so-called “1%” patch. The
government’s expert testified that this patch, at least originally, referred back to a
1947 magazine article that labeled 99% of motorcycle riders as “good” and 1% as
“outlaws.” But that same expert said there were numerous ways to earn the 1%
patch in a motorcycle group that did not involve committing crimes, and that the
patches could be purchased on eBay. The government’s expert also testified by
responding “yes” to a single leading question of whether the Fayetteville OMC
chapter had a “reputation for violent acts.” But (1) the government did not show
that appellant was ever associated with the Fayetteville OMC chapter; (2) the
government’s expert testified that he did not know what information the Fayetteville
police knew about the OMC chapter; and (3) the government put no meat on the
bone regarding what the alleged “violent acts” were, and whether they were criminal
in nature.* On the opposite side of the proof ledger, the defense presented the OMC
bylaws which stated that committing a crime was grounds for expulsion from the
club, and appellant fully admitted he was a member of the club but denied any
criminal involvement related to his club membership.°

“ While “violent acts” could suggest violent crimes, this is not necessarily so, as
certain lawful activities including boxing and football could be considered “violent.
Appellant makes the point that the United States Army could be considered a
“criminal gang” if all that was required was “violent acts.”

°°

> The government’s expert also testified that OMC appeared in a National Crime
Information Center (NCIC) national database of criminal gangs. Appellant raises a
free-standing Confrontation Clause claim regarding the admission of this testimony.
We need not address that claim here, for two reasons. First, in this court, the
government no longer relies on this database information on the question of legal
sufficiency. See Appellee’s Br. 9, n.5 (14 Sep. 2023). Second, even if we were to

(continued . . .)
TATE — ARMY 20200590

Unlike other inherently criminal activities, associating with groups of people
based on common interests, like riding motorcycles, is presumptively lawful. See,
e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) (holding
that the First Amendment protects freedom of association). Thus, the Army
Regulation here delineates lawful from unlawful associations for those in military
service. In this context, the government must “turn square corners” to show that the
conduct at issue falls on the unlawful side of this line. Niz-Chaves vy. Garland, 141
S. Ct. 1474, 1486 (2021). The government’s evidence that appellant violated Article
92 did not meet this standard and was legally insufficient to sustain his conviction.
In so holding, we take no position on whether OMC is actually a “criminal gang” as
defined by the Army regulation or any other definition. Rather, we simply hold that,
even if it is, the government did not prove it here.

B. Article 133

The sufficiency inquiry into appellant’s Article 133 conviction is similar. The
court-martial found appellant guilty by exceptions and substitutions of violating
Article 133 for “promot[ing], support[ing], and endors[ing]” OMC, “which conduct
constituted conduct unbecoming an officer.” Article 133 has two elements: “1) that
the accused did or omitted to do certain acts; and 2) that, under the circumstances,
these acts or omissions constituted conduct unbecoming an officer.” United States
v. Franks, 76 M.J. 808, 819 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2017). In the face of this
circularity, we have explained that the “focus of Article 133... is the effect of the
accused’s conduct on his status as an officer.” Id.

In its response to appellant’s Rule for Courts-Martial 917 motion at trial on
the Article 133 charge, the government argued that “one of the ways that conduct is
unbecoming is if it’s lawless[].” While this may be true, as we set out above, the
government failed to show that appellant’s OMC membership was, in fact, contrary
to law. Thus, they could only sustain an Article 133 conviction if his OMC
membership was otherwise conduct unbecoming an officer. The government’s case
was wholly devoid of any evidence that appellant’s OMC membership somehow

(. . .continued)

consider the database information, we note that, according to the government’s own
expert at trial, (1) the database’s definition of criminal gang, of “three or more
individuals with common activity and criminal acts or delinquent conduct” was
different from the applicable regulatory definition here and was concerned with
ensuring officer safety when interacting with gang members; (2) the information had
been last “validated” in the database in 2018; (3) the database information related to
the Fayetteville chapter of OMC with which appellant was not associated; and (4)
the government’s testifying expert did not know any of the underlying information
the Fayetteville police used to validate OMC as a criminal gang in the database.
TATE — ARMY 20200590

detrimentally affected his “status as an officer” within his unit or otherwise.
Franks, 76 M.J. at 819. As such, we likewise find that the government’s evidence
was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction for Article 133.

THE SENTENCE

Appellant’s overall sentence was six months’ confinement and a reprimand.
Segmented sentencing rules applied at appellant’s court-martial, and the military
judge sentenced appellant to the full six months of confinement for assaulting
appellant’s wife in violation of Article 128, UCMJ. The court did not sentence
appellant to any confinement for either the Article 92 or the Article 133 convictions.
Appellant has never challenged his assault conviction on appeal.

In light of this backdrop we find that we are able to reassess appellant’s
sentence. United States v. Winckelmann, 73 M.J. 11 (C.A.A.F. 2013); United States
v. Sales, 22 M.J. 305 (C.M.A. 1986). We set aside appellant’s reprimand and affirm
his six months of confinement.

CONCLUSION

Appellant’s convictions for Charge I and its specification and Charge IV and
its specification are SET ASIDE and DISMISSED. The remaining finding of guilty
is AFFIRMED. We affirm only so much of the sentence as provides for confinement
for six months. All rights, privileges, and property of which appellant has been
deprived by virtue of that portion of his sentence set aside by this decision are
ordered restored. See UCMJ art. 75(a).

Senior Judge WALKER and Judge PARKER concur.

FOR THE COURT:

JAMES W. HERRING, JR.,
Clerk of Court