Court Opinion

ID: 9853553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:50:18.782258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:51.103702
License: Public Domain

BOOCHEVER, Chief Justice,
with whom RABINOWITZ, Justice, joins, dissenting.
I believe that Casperson should remain liable on his implied promise of quiet enjoyment and habitability, and that his liability is secondary to that of Ferguson, who is primarily liable.
Sec. 16.3 of the Restatement (Second) of the Law, -Property (1977) states in Subpara-graph 1:
An obligation that is imposed on one of the parties to a lease without the aid of an express promise may rest on an implied promise found to exist from the facts and circumstances of the lease transaction. That implied promise is treated the same as an express promise in applying the rules of §§ 16.1 and 16.2.
Sec. 16.1 states:
(1) A transferor of an interest in leased property, who immediately before the transfer is obligated to perform an ex*223press promise contained in the lease that touches and concerns the transferred interest, continues to be obligated after the transfer if:
(a) the obligation rests on privity of contract, and he is not relieved of the obligation by the person entitled to enforce it; or .
Since Sec. 16.3 imposes the same obligation in the case of an implied promise, the only question to be resolved is whether there was an implied promise of quiet enjoyment for the full term of the Casperson-Meech lease. In the comments to Sec. 16.3, it is stated that the implied promise of the landlord:
is interpreted as not including a disturbance of the tenant by an assignee of the landlord’s reversionary interest, so that after a transfer, the landlord remains liable on his implied promise only for disturbances of the tenant by himself, or someone whose conduct is attributable to him.
Furthermore, in Restatement (Second) of Property Sec. 16.3 at 146 (1977), it is stated:
No authority has been found on the precise issue of whether the original landlord’s liability on the implied promise of quiet enjoyment continues after transfer of the reversion.
In support of this statement, the comment cites Gribbie v. Toms, 70 N.J.Law 522, 57 A. 144 (1904), which does not seem directly in point. Moreover, the comment states that there is no clear authority as to whether the landlord’s obligation under an implied warranty of habitability continues after the transfer of his interest, the problem presented by the case we are considering. The comment refers to Old Town Development Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744 (Ind. App.1976), which indicates that the implied warranty of habitability is considered to be an implied promise but does not discuss the landlord’s continuing liability after transfer.
The real question in this case is whether, by entering the lease, Mr. Casperson impliedly promised quiet enjoyment and habitability of the premises during the term of the lease. In that regard, I think we should look to the terms of the lease. There are no agreements spelled out on behalf of the lessor touching on this issue with the exception of Paragraph 8 which states:
If, and only if, Lessor is then the owner of and has not sold said premises Lessor grants to Lessees an option to renew said lease for a term of one year beginning January 1975, at a rent-of Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) per month payable monthly in advance. If, and only if, Lessor has not sold said premises at the expiration of said option then Lessor grants to Lessees a second option to renew said lease for an additional year commencing January 1,1976, at a rent to be negotiated and agreed upon by the parties.
It is thus apparent that where Casperson wished to have his obligations under the lease (for granting an option of renewal) terminated in the event that he sold or transferred his interest, he expressly so provided. It seems to me that he should be charged with the same burden if he wants to avoid his liability on the implied promise of quiet enjoyment and habitability. I also believe that those promises should be considered as extending for the full term of this lease.
We are not confronted with a situation involving a very long term lease, such as a 99-year lease. In that situation, it might be construed that the implied promise would last only during a period prior to the landlord’s transfer of his interest. I would not favor that construction, however, as it seems that one entering into a 99-year lease can take sufficient care to set forth specifically that his obligations would not continue after the transfer of his interests.
The court made findings of fact specifically stating: “Under such lease, the Meeches were entitled, to quiet enjoyment of the property until at least January 1, 1975.” If the covenant extended for the full period to January 1, 1975, even under the Restatement comment, there Would be liability. The whole question is the length of time that the quiet enjoyment was implied, and in the case of a short term lease *224such as this, I cannot conceive that the parties did not intend the promise of quiet enjoyment to apply for the full term of the lease. I conclude that Casperson should be held liable for the breaches of the implied promises, but that such liability is secondary to that of Ferguson who was primarily responsible for the damage.