Court Opinion

ID: 9431457
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:32:19.82678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:28.623379
License: Public Domain

Justice Scalia,
with whom The Chief Justice and Justice .Kennedy join, dissenting.
The Court holds for the State because it finds that these suits do not seek money damages, and involve claims for which there is no “adequate remedy” in the Claims Court. I disagree with both propositions, and therefore respectfully dissent. ■
I
“The States of the Union, like all other entities, are barred by federal sovereign immunity from suing the United States in the absence of an express waiver of this immunity by Congress.” Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. and School Lands, 461 U. S. 273, 280 (1983). For this waiver, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (hereafter respondent) relies on a provision added to § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Áct (APA) in 1976:
“An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States or that the United States is an indispensable party.” 5 U. S. C. § 702 (emphasis added).
The Government contends that respondent’s lawsuits seek “money damages” and therefore § 702 is unavailing.
In legal parlanee, the term “damages” refers to money awarded as reparation for injury resulting from breach of legal duty. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary *914571 (1981); Black’s Law Dictionary 351-352 (5th ed. 1979); D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies §3.1, p. 135 (1973); W. Hale, Law of Damages 1 (Cooley 2d ed. 1912). Thus the phrase “money damages” is something of a redundancy, but it is, nonetheless, a common usage and refers to one of the two broad categories of judicial relief in the common-law system. The other, of course, is denominated “specific relief.” Whereas damages compensate the plaintiff for a loss, specific relief prevents or undoes the loss — for example, by ordering return to the plaintiff of the precise property that has been wrongfully taken, or by enjoining acts that would damage the plaintiff’s person or property. See 5A A. Corbin, Contracts § 1141, p. 113 (1964); Dobbs, supra, at 135.
The use of the term “damages” (or “money damages”) in a context dealing with legal remedies would naturally be thought to advert to this classic distinction. This interpretation is reinforced by the desirability of reading § 702 in pari materia with the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491, which grants the Claims Court jurisdiction over certain suits against the Government. Although the Tucker Act is not expressly limited to claims for money damages, it “has long been construed as authorizing only actions for money judgments and not suits for equitable relief against the United States. See United States v. Jones, 131 U. S. 1 (1889). The reason for the distinction flows from the fact that the Court of Claims has no power to grant equitable relief . . . .” Richardson v. Morris, 409 U. S. 464, 465 (1973) (per curiam); see Lee v. Thornton, 420 U. S. 139, 140 (1975) (per curiam) (Tucker Act jurisdiction empowers courts “to award damages but not to grant injunctive or declaratory relief”); United States v. King, 395 U. S. 1, 3 (1969) (relief the Claims Court can give is “limited to actual, presently due money damages from the United States”); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U. S. 530, 557 (1962) (Harlan, J., announcing the judgment of the Court) (“From the beginning [the Court of Claims] has been given jurisdiction only to award dam*915ages, not specific relief”). Since under the Tucker Act the absence of Claims Court jurisdiction generally turns upon the distinction between money damages and specific relief,1 it is sensible, if possible (and here it is not only possible but most natural), to interpret §702 so that the presence of district court jurisdiction will turn upon the same distinction. Otherwise, there would be a gap in the scheme of relief — an utterly irrational gap, which we have no reason to believe was intended.
The Court agrees that “the words ‘money damages’ [were not intended to] have any meaning other than the ordinary understanding of the term as used in the common law for centuries,” ante, at 897, and that §702 encompasses “the time-honored distinction between damages and specific relief,” ibid. It concludes, however, that respondent’s suits seek the latter and not the former. The first theory the Court puts forward to support this conclusion is that, “insofar as [respondent’s] complaints sought declaratory and injunctive relief, they were certainly not actions for money damages,” ante, at 893, and since the District Court simply reversed the decision of the Departmental Grant Appeals Board, “neither of [its] orders in this case was a ‘money judgment,’” ante, at 909. I cannot agree (nor do I think the Court really agrees) with this reasoning. If the jurisdictional division established by Congress is not to be reduced to an absurdity, the line between damages and specific relief must surely be drawn on the basis of the substance of the claim, and not its mere form. It does not take much lawyerly inventiveness to convert a *916claim for payment of a past due sum (damages) into a prayer for an injunction against refusing to pay the sum, or for a declaration that the sum must be paid, or for an order reversing the agency’s decision not to pay. It is not surprising, therefore, that “in the "murky’ area of Tucker Act jurisprudence . . . one of the few clearly established principles is that the substance of the pleadings must prevail over their form,” Amoco Production Co. v. Hodel, 815 F. 2d 352, 361 (CA5 1987), cert. pending, No. 87-372. All the Courts of Appeals that to my knowledge have addressed the issue, 12 out of 13, are unanimous that district court jurisdiction is not established merely because a suit fails to pray for a money judgment. See, e. g., Massachusetts v. Departmental Grant Appeals Bd. of Health and Human Services, 815 F. 2d 778, 783 (CA1 1987); B. K. Instrument, Inc. v. United States, 715 F. 2d 713, 727 (CA2 1983); Hahn v. United States, 757 F. 2d 581, 589 (CA3 1985); Portsmouth Redevelopment & Housing Authority v. Pierce, 706 F. 2d 471, 474 (CA4), cert. denied, 464 U. S. 960 (1983); Alabama Rural Fire. Ins. Co. v. Naylor, 530 F. 2d 1221, 1228-1230 (CA5 1976); Tennessee ex rel. Leech v. Dole, 749 F. 2d 331, 336 (CA6 1984), cert. denied, 472 U. S. 1018 (1985); Clark v. United States, 596 F. 2d 252, 253-254 (CA7 1979) (per curiam); Minnesota ex rel. Noot v. Heckler, 718 F. 2d 852, 859, n. 12 (CA8 1983); Rowe v. United States, 633 F. 2d 799, 802 (CA9 1980); United States v. Kansas City, 761 F. 2d 605, 608-609 (CA10 1985); Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 217 U. S. App. D. C. 397, 405, 672 F. 2d 959, 967 (1982); Chula Vista City School Dist. v. Bennett, 824 F. 2d 1573, 1579 (CA Fed. 1987). The Court cannot intend to stand by a theory that obliterates § 702’s jurisdictional requirements, that permits every Claims Court suit to be brought in district court merely because the complaint prays for injunctive relief, and that is- contrary to the law of all 12 Circuits that have addressed the issue. . Therefore, although the Court describes this first theory as an “in*917dependent' reaso[n]” for its conclusion, ante, at 909, I must believe that its' decision actually rests on different grounds.
The Court’s second theory is that “the monetary aspects of the relief that the State sought are not ‘money damages’ as that term is used in the law,”' ante, at 893; see ante, at 910. This at least focuses on the right question: whether the claim is in substance one for money damages. But the reason the Court gives for answering the question negatively, that respondent’s suits are not “seeking money in compensation for the damage sustained by the failure of the Federal Government to pay as mandated,” ante, at 900, is simply wrong. Respondent sought money to compensate for the monetary loss (damage) it sustained by. expending resources to provide services to the mentally retarded in reliance on the Government’s statutory duty to reimburse, just as a Government contractor’s suit seeks compensation for the loss the contractor sustains by expending resources to provide services to the Government in reliance on the Government’s contractual duty to pay. Respondent’s lawsuits thus precisely fit the classic definition of suits for money damages.2 It is true, of course, that they also fit a general description of a suit for spe*918cific relief, since the award of money undoes a loss by giving respondent the very thing (money) to which it was legally entitled. As the Court recognizes, however, the terms “damages” and “specific relief” have been “used in the common law for centuries,” ante, at 897, and have meanings well established by tradition. Part of that tradition was that a suit seeking to recover a past due sum of money that does no more than compensate a plaintiff’s loss is a suit for damages, not specific relief; a successful plaintiff thus obtains not a decree of specific performance requiring the defendant to pay the sum due on threat of punishment for contempt, but rather a money judgment permitting the plaintiff to order “the sheriff to seize and sell so much of the defendant’s property as was required to pay the plaintiff.” Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 1145, 1152 (1970). Those rare suits for a sum of money that were not suits for money damages (and that resulted at common law in an order to the defendant rather than a judgment executable by the sheriff) did not seek to compensate the plaintiff for a past loss in the amount awarded, but rather to prevent future losses that were either incalculable or would be greater than the sum awarded. Id., at 1154; 5A A. Corbin, Contracts § 1142, pp. 117-126 (1964); H. McClintock, Principles of Equity §60, p. 149 (2d ed 1948); T. Waterman, Specific Performance of Contracts §20, p. 25 (1881). Specific relief was available, for example, to enforce a promise to loan a sum of money when the unavailability of alternative financing would leave the plaintiff with injuries that are difficult to value; or to enforce an obligor’s duty to make future monthly payments, after the obligor had consistently refused to make past payments concededly due, arid thus threatened the obligee with the burden of bringing multiple damages actions. Almost invariably, however, suits seeking (whether by judgment, injunction, or declaration) to compel the de*919fendant to pay a sum of money3 to the plaintiff are suits for “money damages,” as that phrase has traditionally been applied, since they seek no more than compensation for loss resulting from the defendant’s breach of legal duty. The present cases are quite clearly of this usual sort.
The Court’s second theory, that “the monetary aspects of the relief that the State sought are not “money damages,’” ante, at 893, is not only wrong, but it produces the same disastrous consequences as the first theory. As discussed above, see supra, at 913-915, and as the Court recognizes, see ante, at 905, and n. 40, the Claims Court has jurisdiction only to award damages, not specific relief. But if actions seeking past due sums are actions for specific relief, since “they undo the [Government’s] refusal” to pay the plaintiff, ante, at 910, then the Claims Court is out of business. Almost its entire docket fits this description. In the past, typical actions have included suits by Government employees to obtain money allegedly due by statute which the Government refused to pay. See, e. g., Ellis v. United States, 222 Ct. Cl. 65, 610 F. 2d 760 (1979) (claim under 5 U. S. C. § 8336(c), entitling law.enforcement officers and firefighters to special retirement benefits); Friedman v. United States, 159 Ct. Cl. 1, 30-31, 310 F. 2d 381, 396-397 (1962) (claim under 10 U. S. C. §1201 et seq., entitling servicemen to disability -retirement benefits), cert. denied sub nom. Lipp v. United States, 373 U. S. 932 (1963); Smykowski v. United States, 227 Ct. Cl. 284, 285, 647 F. 2d 1103, 1104 (1981) (claim under *92042 U. S. C. §§3796-3796c, granting survivors’death benefits for public safety officers). Another large category of the Claims Court’s former jurisdiction consisted of suits for money allegedly due under Government grant programs that the Government refused to pay. See, e. g., Missouri Health & Medical Organization, Inc. v. United States, 226 Ct. Cl. 274, 277-279, 641 F. 2d 870, 873 (1981) (grant awarded by Public Health Service); Idaho Migrant Council, Inc. v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 85, 88 (1985) (“The United States, for public purposes, has undertaken numerous programs to make grant funds available to various governmental and private organizations. Many hundreds of grants are made each year to states, municipalities, schools and colleges and other public and private organizations. . . . Obligations of the United States assumed in [grant] programs... are within this court’s Tucker Act jurisdiction”). All these suits, and even actions for tax refunds, see, e. g., Yamamoto v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 207 (1985), are now disclosed to be actions for specific relief and beyond the Claims Court’s jurisdiction, since they merely seek “to enforce the statutory mandate. . . which happens to be one for the payment of money,” ante, at 900.
Most of these suits will now have to be brought in the district courts, as suits for specific relief “to undo the Government’s refusal to pay.” Alas, however, not all can be. The most regrettable consequence of the Court’s analysis is its effect upon suits for a sum owed under a contract with the Government. In the past, the Claims Court has routinely exercised jurisdiction over a seller’s action for the price. See, e. g., Dairylea Cooperative, Inc. v. United States, 210 Ct. Cl. 46, 535 F. 2d 24 (1976); Northern Helex Co. v. United States, 197 Ct. Cl. 118, 455 F. 2d 546 (1972); Paisner v. United States, 138 Ct. Cl. 420, 150 F. Supp. 835 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U. S. 941 (1958); R. M. Hollingshead Corp. v. United States, 124 Ct. Cl. 681, 111 F. Supp. 285 (1953). But since, on the Court’s theory, such a suit is not a suit for money damages but rather for specific relief, that jurisdiction *921will have to be abandoned. Unfortunately, however, those suits will not lie in district court either. It is settled that sovereign immunity bars a suit against the United States for specific performance of a contract, see Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682 (1949), and that this bar was not disturbed by the 1976 amendment to § 702, see Spectrum Leasing Corp. v. United States, 246 U. S. App. D. C. 258, 260, and n. 2, 262, 764 F. 2d 891, 893, and n. 2, 895 (1985); Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Brown, 600 F. 2d 429, 432-433 (CA3 1979); American Science & Engineering, Inc. v. Califano, 571 F. 2d 58, 63 (CA1 1978). Thus, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, applying the logic (which the Court has today specifically adopted as its own, ante, at 894-896, 901) of its earlier decision in Maryland Dept. of Human Resources v. Department of Health and Human Services, 246 U. S. App. D. C. 180, 763 F. 2d 1441 (1985), has held that a contractor cannot sue the Government in district court for the amount due under a contract, not because that would be a suit for money damages within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Claims Court, but because it is a suit for specific performance of the contract. Spectrum Leasing Corp. v. United States, supra, at 262, 764 F. 2d, at 895. But since the Claims Court is also barred from granting specific performance, the Court’s theory, in addition to leaving the Claims Court without a docket, leaves the contractor without a forum.
I am sure, however, that neither the judges of the Claims Court nor Government contractors need worry. The Court cannot possibly mean what it says today — except, of course, the judgment. What that leaves, unfortunately, is a judgment without a reason.
II
I agree with the Court that sovereign immunity does not bar respondent’s actions insofar as they seek injunctive or declaratory relief with prospective effect. An action seeking an order that will prevent the wrongful disallowance of fu*922ture claims is an action seeking specific relief and not damages, since no damage has yet occurred. Cf. United States v. Testan, 424 U. S. 392, 403 (1976) (distinguishing “between prospective reclassification, on the one hand, and retroactive reclassification resulting in money damages, on the other”).
I do not agree, however, that respondent can pursue these suits in district court, as it has sought to, under the provisions of the APA, since in my view they are barred by 5 U. S. C. §704, which is entitled “Actions reviewable,” and which reads in relevant part:
“Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.”
The purpose and effect of this provision is to establish that the APA “does not provide additional judicial remedies in situations where the Congress has provided special and adequate review procedures.” Attorney General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act § 10(c), p. 101 (1947); see Estate of Watson v. Blumenthal, 586 F. 2d 925, 934 (CA2 1978); Alabama Rural Fire Ins. Co. v. Naylor, 530 F. 2d, at 1230; International Engineering Co. v. Richardson, 167 U. S. App. D. C. 396, 403, 512 F. 2d 573, 580 (1975); Warner v. Cox, 487 F. 2d 1301, 1304 (CA5 1974); Mohawk Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 117 U. S. App. D. C. 326, 329 F. 2d 894 (1964); Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 278 F. 2d 912, 914 (CA2 1960); K. Davis, Administrative Law §211, p. 720 (1951). Respondent has an adequate remedy in a court and may not proceed under the APA in the District Court because (1) an action for reimbursement may be brought in the Claims Court pursuant to the Tucker Act, and (2) that action provides all the relief respondent seeks.
The Tucker Act grants the Claims Court
“jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the .United States founded either upon the Constitution, *923or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U. S. C. § 1491(a)(1).
The Claims Court has not always clearly identified which of the several branches of jurisdiction recited in this provision it is proceeding under. It has held that Government grant instruments, although not formal contracts, give rise to enforceable obligations analogous to contracts. See, e. g., Missouri Health & Medical Organization, Inc. v. United States, 226 Ct. Cl., at 278, 641 F. 2d, at 873; Idaho Migrant Council, Inc. v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct., at 89. The Medicaid Act itself can be analogized to a unilateral offer for contract — offering to pay specified sums in return for the performance of specified services and inviting the States to accept the offer by performance. But regardless of the propriety of invoking the Claims Court’s contractual jurisdiction, I agree with the Secretary that respondent can assert a claim “founded . . . upon [an] Act of Congress,” to wit, the Medicaid provision mandating that “the Secretary (except as otherwise provided in this section) shall pay to each State which has a plan approved under this subchapter” the amounts specified by statutory formula. 42 U. S. C. § 1396b(a) (emphasis added).
We have held that a statute does not create a cause of action for money damages unless it “ ‘can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained.’” United States v. Testan, supra, at 400, quoting Eastport S. S. Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 599, 607, 372 F. 2d 1002, 1009 (1967). Although § 1396b(a) does not, in so many words, mandate damages, a statute commanding the payment of a specified amount of money by the United States impliedly authorizes (absent other indication) a claim for damages in the defaulted amount. See, e. g., Bell v. United States, 366 U. S. 393, 398 *924(1961) (claim brought under statute providing that captured soldiers “shall be entitled to receive” specified amounts); Sullivan v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 70, 72 (1983) (claim brought under 5 U. S. C. § 5595(b)(2), providing that employees are “entitled to be paid severance pay” in specified amounts), aff’d, 742 F. 2d 628 (CA Fed. 1984) (per curiam); Ellis v. United States, 222 Ct. Cl. 65, 610 F. 2d 760 (1979) (claim under 5 U. S. C. § 8336(c), entitling law enforcement officers and firefighters to special retirement benefits); Friedman v. United States, 159 Ct. Cl., at 30-31, 310 F. 2d, at 396-397 (claim under 10 U. S. C. § 1201 et seq., entitling servicemen to disability retirement benefits), cert. denied sub nom. Lipp v. United States, 373 U. S. 932 (1963); Smykowski v. United States, 227 Ct. Cl., at 285, 647 F. 2d, at 1104 (claim under 42 U. S. C. §§3796-3796c, granting survivors’ death benefits for public safety officers); Biagioli v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 304, 306-307 (1983) (claim brought under 5 U. S. C. §5596, providing that employees subject to unjustified personnel action are “entitled ... to receive” backpay); see also Testan, supra, at 406 (dicta) (“Congress . . . has provided specifically ... in the Back Pay Act [5 U. S. C. § 5596] for the award of money damages for a wrongful deprivation of pay”).
I conclude, therefore, that respondent may bring an action in the Claims Court based on § 1396b(a). The Court does not disagree with this conclusion but does comment that “[i]t seems likely that while Congress intended ‘shall pay’ language in statutes such as the Back Pay Act to be self-enforcing— i. e., to create both a right and a remedy — it intended similar language in § 1396b(a) of the Medicaid Act to provide merely a right, knowing that the APA provided for review of this sort of agency action.” Ante, at 906, n. 42. I fail to understand this reasoning, if it is intended as reasoning rather than as an unsupported conclusion. The only basis the Court provides for treating differently statutes with identical language is that Congress knew “that the APA provided for review of this sort of agency action [i. e., denial of *925Medicare reimbursement].” Ibid. But that does not distinguish the Medicaid Act from any statute enacted after 1946 when the APA became effective, including the Back Pay Act, 5 U. S. C. § 5596, and most other statutory bases for Claims Court jurisdiction.
There remains to be considered whether the relief available in the Claims Court, damages for failure to pay a past due allocation, is an “adequate remedy” within the meaning of §704. Like the term “damages,” the phrase “adequate remedy” is not of recent coinage. It has an established, centuries-old, common-law meaning in the context of specific relief — to wit, that specific relief will be denied when damages are available and are sufficient to make the plaintiff whole. See, e. g., 1 W. Holdsworth, A History of English Law 457 (7th ed. 1956) (by the 18th century “it was settled that equity would only grant specific relief if damages were not an adequate remedy”). Thus, even though a plaintiff may often prefer a judicial order enjoining a harmful act or omission before it occurs, damages after the fact are considered an “adequate remedy” in all but the most extraordinary cases. See, e. g., Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U. S. 92, 94 (1932); Gaines v. Miller, 111 U. S. 395, 397-398 (1884); 5A A. Corbin, Contracts § 1136, pp. 95-96, § 1142, pp. 117-120 (1964); H. Hunter, Modern Law of Contracts: Breaches and Remedies ¶6.01[3], pp. 6-7 to 6-8 (1986); Farnsworth, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 1154; cf. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U. S. 986, 1017 (1984). There may be circumstances in which damages relief in the Claims Court is available, but is not an adequate remedy. For example, if a State could prove that the Secretary intended in the future to deny Medicaid reimbursement in bad faith, forcing the State to commence a new suit for each disputed period, an action for injunctive relief in district court would lie. See, e. g., Franklin Telegraph Co. v. Harrison, 145 U. S. 459, 474 (1892). Or if a State wished to set up a new program providing certain services that the Secretary had made clear his intention to dis*926allow for reimbursement, an action seeking a declaration as to the correct interpretation of the statute would lie, since it would be necessary to prevent the irreparable injury of either forgoing a reimbursable program or mistakenly expending state funds that will not be reimbursed. But absent such unusual circumstances, the availability of damages in the Claims Court precludes suit in district court under the provision of the APA permitting review of “agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy.” See Estate of Watson v. Blumenthal, 586 F. 2d, at 934 (emphasis omitted); Warner v. Cox, 487 F. 2d, at 1304; Mohawk Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 117 U. S. App. D. C. 326, 329 F. 2d 894 (1964); Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 278 F. 2d, at 914; cf. Monsanto, supra, at 1019 (equitable relief to enjoin taking barred since Tucker Act provides an “adequate remedy”).4
The Court does not dispute that in the present cases an action in Claims Court would provide respondent complete relief. Respondent can assert immediately a claim for money damages in Claims Court, which if successful will as effectively establish its rights as would a declaratory judgment in district court. Since there is no allegation that the Secretary will not honor in the future a Claims Court judgment that would have not only precedential but collateral-estoppel effect, see Montana v. United States, 440 U. S. 147, 157-158, 162-163 (1979), the ability to bring an action in Claims Court *927with regard to disallowance decisions already made provides effective prospective relief as well.
Rather than trying to argue that the Claims Court remedy is inadequate in this case, the Court declares in a footnote that “[s]ince, as a category of case, alleged ‘improper Medicaid disallowances’ cannot always be adequately remedied in the Claims Court, as a jurisdictional, or threshold matter, these actions should proceed in the district court.” Ante, at 907, n. 43. This novel approach completely ignores the well-established meaning of “adequate remedy,” which refers to the adequacy of a remedy for a particular plaintiff in a particular case rather than the adequacy of a remedy for the average plaintiff in the average case of the sort at issue. Although the .Court emphasizes that the phrase “money damages” should be interpreted according to “the ordinary understanding of the term as Used in the eommon law for centuries,” ante, at 897, it appears to forget that prescription when it turns to the equally ancient phrase “adequate remedy.” Evidently, whether to invoke “ordinary understanding” rather than novel meaning depends on the task at hand. In any event, were the Court’s rationale taken seriously, it would (like the Court’s novel analysis of “money damages” in § 702) divest the Claims Court of the bulk of its docket. It is difficult to think of a category of case that can “always be adequately remedied in the Claims Court.” Nor is a categorical rule for challenges to Medicaid disallowance decisions justifiable on the basis that in most (not just some) such cases prospective or injunctive relief is required, and therefore it is efficient to have a bright-line rule. The traditional legal presumption (and the common-sense presumption) with respect to all other statutes that obligate the Government to pay money is that money damages are ordinarily an adequate remedy. I am aware of no empirical evidence to rebut that presumption with respect to Medicaid. Among the reported disallowance decisions, there appear to be none where a State has asserted a basis for prospective injunctive relief.
*928Nor can Medicaid disallowance cases be singled out for special treatment as a group because, as the Court declares, “Managing the relationships between States and the Federal Government that occur over time and that involve constantly shifting balance sheets requires a different sort of review and relief process” than is provided in Claims Court, ante, at 904-905, n. 39, since the Medicaid Act is a “complex scheme . . . that governs a set of intricate, ongoing relationships between the States and the Federal Government,” ante, at 901, n. 31. All aspects of this assertion are without foundation. The area of law involved here, Medicaid, is indistiguishable for all relevant purposes from many other areas of law the Claims Court routinely handles. Medicaid statutes and regulations are not more complex than, for example, the federal statutes and regulations governing income taxation or Government procurement, and the Government’s relationship with the States is neither more intricate and ongoing nor uses a different kind of balance sheet than its relationship with many defense contractors or with large corporate taxpayers subject to perpetual audit. And I cannot imagine in what way district courts adjudicating Medicaid disallowance claims would apply “a different sort of review and relief process” so as to “manag[e] the relationships between States and Federal Governments.” Just like the Claims Court, district courts adjudicate concrete cases, one at at a time, that present discrete factual and legal disputes.
Finally, the Court suggests that Medicaid disallowance suits are more suitably heard in district court with appeal to the regional courts of appeals than in the Claims Court with appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, because (1) disallowance decisions have “state-law aspects” over which the regional courts of appeals have a better grasp, ante, at 908, (2) it is anomalous to have Medicaid compliance decisions reviewed in the regional courts of appeals while reviewing disallowance decisions in Claims Court, ibid., and (3) it is “highly unlikely that Congress intended to designate an *929Article' I court as the primary forum for judicial review of agency action that may involve questions of policy,” ante, at 908, n. 46. I do not see how these points have anything to .do with the question before us (whether the Claims Court can provide an adequate remedy in these cases), but even if relevant they seem to me wrong. (1) Adjudicating a disallowance decision does not directly implicate state law. As the present cases illustrate, the typical dispute involves only the interpretation of federal statutes and regulations. I suppose it is'conceivable that a state-law issue could sometimes be relevant — for example, the Government might contend that the State was, under state law, entitled to reimbursement for a particular expenditure from some third party and thus could not<claim it against the Government. • But there is no area of federal law that does not contain these incidental references to state law, and perhaps none does so as much as federal tax law, which is, of course, routinely adjudicated in the Claims Court. (2) It is not at all anomalous for the Claims Court to share jurisdiction over controversies arising from Medicaid. In fact, quite to the contrary, the Claims Court never exercises exclusive jurisdiction over any body of law, but only over particular types of claims. (3) It is not more likely that Congress intended disputes involving “questions of policy” to be heard in district court before appeal to an Article III court, since it is the business neither, of district courts nor of Article III appellate courts to determine questions of policy. It is the norm for Congress to designate an Article I judge, usually ah administrative law judge, as the initial forum for resolving policy disputes (to the extent they are to resolved in adjudication rather than by rulemaking), with the first stop in an Article III court being a court of appeals such as the Federal Circuit — where, of course, the policy itself would not be reviewed but merely its legality and the procedures by which it was pronounced. Ordinarily, when Congress creates a special judicial review mechanism using district courts, it is to get an independent adjudication of the facts, not an *930unconstitutional judicial determination of policy. See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 405(g).
* * *
Nothing is more wasteful than litigation about where to litigate, particularly when the options are all courts within the same legal system that will apply the same law. Today’s decision is a potential cornucopia of waste. Since its reasoning cannot possibly be followed where it leads, the jurisdiction of the Claims Court has been thrown into chaos. On the other hand, perhaps this is the opinion’s greatest strength. Since it cannot possibly be followed where it leads, the lower courts may have the sense to conclude that it leads nowhere, and to limit it to the single type of suit before us. Even so, because I think there is no justification in law for treating this single type of suit differently, I dissent.

 In 1972 the Tucker Act was amended to give the Claims Court jurisdiction to issue “orders directing restoration to office or position, placement in appropriate duty or retirement status, and correction of applicable records,” and “[i]n any case within its jurisdiction,... to remand appropriate matters to any administrative or executive body or official with such direction as it may deem proper and just.” 28 U. S. C. § 1491(a)(2). In 1982 the Tucker Act was again amended to give the Claims Court exclusive jurisdiction to grant declaratory and equitable relief “on any contract claim brought before the contract is awarded.” 28 U. S. C. § 1491(a)(3).

 The Court points out that “the specific agency action that reverses a disallowance decision is described as ‘restitution’ in the statute [42 U. S. C. § 1316(c)}.” Ante, at 893. I doubt that the term in the statute is a term of art, or has anything to do with the issue before us here. But if the Court means to.suggest otherwise, I point out that “restitution” in the judicial context commonly consists of money damages. See E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 12.20, p. 911 (1982). Accordingly, in Acme Process Equipment Co. v. United States, 171 Ct. Cl. 324, 357-358, 347 F. 2d 509, 529 (1965), the Court of Claims held that it had jurisdiction over claims for restitution, since they are not claims for specific relief. Although we reversed that judgment on the merits, we did not question its jurisdictional holding, but rather ourselves described the suit as one “to recover damages for breach of a contract.” United States v. Acme Process Equipment Co., 385 U. S. 138 (1966). The Court of Claims has continued to exercise jurisdiction over claims for restitutionary “damages” for breach of contract. See, e. g., Kurz & Root Co. v. United States, 227 Ct. Cl. 522, 531-532 (1981); Arizona v. United States, 216 Ct. Cl. 221, 237-238, 575 F. 2d 855, 864-865 (1978).

 Suit for a sum of money is to be distinguished from suit for specific currency or coins in which the plaintiff claims a present possessory interest. Specific relief is available for that, through a suit at law for replevin or detinue, see generally, D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 5.13, p. 399 (1973); J. Cribbett, Cases and Materials on Judicial Remedies § 3, pp. 94-116 (1954), or through a suit in equity for injunctive relief, if the currency or coins in question (for example, a collection of rare coins) are “unique” or have an incalculable value. That is obviously not the ease here. Respondent seeks fungible funds, not any particular notes in the United States Treasury.

 Of course, many suits, both for specific relief and for damages, reach district court under the APA because they come within the more specific rubric of § 704, “[ajgency action made reviewable by statute.” See, e. g. 42 U. S. C. § 405(g) (Social Security benefits); 42 U. S. C. § 1395oo(f) (reimbursement of Medicare providers). And even where no special review statute exists, the vast majority of specific-relief suits challenging agency action will reach district court because they are unaffected by the “other adequate remedy” provision of § 704, since they challenge the application of statutes or regulations that cannot be regarded as providing for damages. See, e. g., Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U. S. 136 (1967) (suit challenging drug-labeling regulations).