Court Opinion

ID: 9699393
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:22:07.434469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:49.600022
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
MURPHY, J.
I agree that, on the facts of the case at bar, “the trial court properly granted HMA’s motion for summary judgment.” I am persuaded that there are two reasons why Mrs. Crickenberger needed expert testimony to generate a jury question on the issue of whether HMA was in breach of warranty: (1) “[t]he record of this case does not indicate what, if any, maintenance the Hertz Corporation performed on the vehicle while in its ownership, or its repair record, or whether it was *54in any accidents[,]” and (2) “in proffering service records for the vehicle, Ms. Crickenberger established that the engine oil services she obtained were erratically obtained and failed generally to conform to HMA’s frequency of oil change recommendations.” Under these circumstances, expert testimony was necessary “to create an inference that her Hyundai malfunctioned as a result of a defect existing at the time it left HMA’s control.” I write separately, however, out of concern that the majority opinion will be cited as authority for the incorrect propositions that—in every breach of warranty action—the defendant is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff produces expert testimony on the issues of (1) whether the product was defective, and (2) the precise nature of the defect.
To resolve the issue of when expert testimony is needed in a warranty action, it may be helpful to hypothesize an implied warranty action asserted against an automobile manufacturer by a plaintiff who testifies that, “I bought the car new, it’s still under warranty, it hasn’t been involved in a fire, it hasn’t been involved in a flood, it hasn’t been stolen or broken into, I have complied with all of the manufacturer’s maintenance recommendations, I have made no modifications to the car, but it won’t go more than 15 miles per hour.” Must this plaintiff produce expert testimony to generate a jury question on the issue of whether the manufacturer is in breach of warranty? I am persuaded that, under Maryland law, the answer to this question is “no.”
I agree with the majority that, under Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976), “it is beyond cavil that when a new vehicle malfunctions, a reasonable inference of a defect may be drawn from the circumstances.” In Phipps, while answering two questions of law certified by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland as a result of warranty and strict liability claims asserted in that court as a result of an accident that allegedly occurred when the accelerator of a Pontiac “became stuck without warning, causing the automobile to accelerate suddenly at a high rate of speed and leave the road,” this Court stated:
*55For example, the steering mechanism of a new automobile should not cause the car to swerve off the road, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., ,supra[32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960)]; the drive shaft of a new automobile should not separate from the vehicle when it is driven in a normal manner, Elmore v. American Motors, Corporation, 70 Cal.2d 578, 75 Cal.Rptr. 652, 451 P.2d 84, 33 A.L.R.3d 406 (1969); the brakes of a new automobile should not suddenly fail, Sharp v. Chrysler Corporation, 432 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. Civ.App.1968); and the accelerator of a new automobile should not stick without warning, causing the vehicle suddenly to accelerate.
Id. at 345-46, 363 A.2d at 959. The same conclusions should be applicable to not-so-new automobiles that have been (1) properly used, (2) properly maintained, (3) not modified, and (4) not involved in an event that might reasonably explain the malfunction.
In a breach of warranty action asserted by a plaintiff/owner whose no longer “new” car has malfunctioned while still under warranty, the plaintiff can generate a jury question on the issue of whether the manufacturer is in breach of the warranty by producing evidence that the car (1) has been maintained in compliance with the manufacturer’s maintenance recommendations, (2) has not been subjected to abnormal use, (3) has not been modified, and (4) has not been involved in any event that might reasonably explain the malfunction. The first element of proof is required by the majority opinion in the case at bar. The other elements of proof are required by Ford v. General Accident, 365 Md. 321, 779 A.2d 362 (2001), in which this Court reinstated a judgment entered in favor of the manufacturer of a chassis cab that (1) was sold to a purchaser who converted the cab into a tow truck, and (2) caught fire while being used as a tow truck, on the ground that “[t]he Court of Special Appeals improperly shifted the plaintiffs burden of proof onto the manufacturer to demonstrate that the event causing injury or property damage was not caused by any defect that originated with the manufacturer.” Id. at 333, 779 A.2d at 369. If all four elements of proof are satisfied, *56the plaintiff has produced evidence that would permit a reasonable inference of a defect to be drawn from the circumstances, and therefore judgment should not be entered against the plaintiff on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to produce expert testimony.
As to the issue of whether the plaintiff must produce evidence identifying the specific flaw that caused the product to be defective, in Eaton Corp. v. Wright, 281 Md. 80, 375 A.2d 1122 (1977), while reinstating a circuit court judgment entered in favor of the distributor of a fuel canister that exploded while in the process of being attached to a propane torch, this Court rejected the distributor’s argument that “the plaintiffs [who asserted strict liability and breach of implied warranty claims] have failed to establish the exact nature of the defect and are therefore precluded from recovery.” Id. at 88, 375 A.2d at 1126. In that case, the plaintiffs did present expert testimony, but this Court made it clear that they were not required, to do so.1 Writing for a unanimous Court, Judge Eldridge stated:
The plaintiffs in this case, by their own testimony, presented sufficient evidence to support the judgments in their favor based on the theory of strict liability. Their testimony shows that the canister was used within one hour of purchase, without any unusual handling or alterations, and according to the instructions on the label. A standard torch head, which the canister was designed to accept, was used in conjunction with the canister. When the torch head was removed from the canister, as recommended by the manufacturer, highly flammable gas continued to be released from the canister. There can be little doubt that a propane canister, used immediately after purchase ac*57cording to instructions on the label, which continues to allow gas to be released after an appliance has been removed, is defective and unreasonably dangerous. Under circumstances such as these, the plaintiffs presented a prima facie case. There was no necessity for them to show more concerning the precise nature of the defect. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., supra, 278 Md. at 345-346, 363 A.2d 955; Giant Food, Inc. v. Wash. Coca-Cola, 273 Md. 592, 609, 332 A.2d 1 (1975); Powell and Hill, Proof of a Defect or Defectiveness, 5 U.Balt.L.Rev. 77, 89-90 (1975).
H* * ❖
Also, we think that it could be reasonably inferred from these facts that the canister was in the defective condition and unreasonably dangerous when sold by [the distributor] to the retailer.... As previously pointed out, the testimony of the plaintiffs themselves supported an inference of no consumer misuse.
Id. at 89-90, 375 A.2d at 1127 (emphasis supplied).
I recognize that in Ford v. General Accident, supra, this Court also stated:
The Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that proof of a specific product defect is not required to maintain a claim for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. This Court long has held that a plaintiff asserting a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability must prove that the product was defective.
Id. at 333, 779 A.2d at 369. In an implied warranty action arising out of the malfunction of an automobile (that swerved off the road, that had a drive shaft that separated from the vehicle, that had an accelerator that stuck without warning, that caught fire and is no longer operable) the “product” is the automobile rather than the component of the automobile that has caused the malfunction. Therefore, the second of the above quoted sentences is correct. A careless reading of the first quoted sentence, however, would suggest that Eaton Corp. v. Wright has been overruled and a warranty plaintiff must now *58prove “the precise nature of the defect.” For this reason, it is important to emphasize that, because “specific product defect” is not synonymous with “precise nature of the defect,” Ford v. General Accident did not overrule Eaton Corp. v. Wright.
In the above hypothetical, the “specific product defect” is the fact that the car “won’t go faster than 15 miles per hour,” a condition that renders the car unfit for the ordinary purposes for which a car is used. This defect can be established by the testimony of the plaintiff, who would be entitled to the following jury instruction:
When products are sold, there is an implied warranty, or a promise that the products are fit for ordinary purposes for which such products are used.
In order to find in favor of the Plaintiff on his claim that the defendant breached its implied warranty of merchantability, you must find by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the defect about which the Plaintiff complains—that his car cannot go faster than 15 miles per hour—is a defect that made the car unfit for the ordinary purpose for which a car is used; and (2) this defect existed when it left the Defendant’s control. You may find that the defect existed when it left the Defendant’s control if you are persuaded that the defect is not the result of abnormal use or another independent cause.
In an implied warranty of merchantability action based upon product defect, the plaintiff need not prove the precise nature of the defect, or any specific act of negligence on the part of the Defendant, as the focus is not on the conduct of the manufacturer, but upon the product itself.
The first paragraph of this instruction is adapted from MPJI-Cv 26:7. The second paragraph is adapted from Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Civil No. 185.05 (2007), the Comment to which makes it expressly clear that the “Plaintiff may prove that the product was defective and that the defect existed when it left defendant’s control either through expert testimony or by excluding abnormal use and reasonable secondary causes for the problems with the product.” The third *59paragraph is adapted from MPJI-Cv 26:11 and Eaton Corp. v. Wright, supra.
Although MPJI-Cv 26:11 was drafted for use in “Strict Liability In Tort” actions, this instruction can be modified for use in warranty actions because a breach of implied warranty of merchantability action against a manufacturer is the functional equivalent of a strict liability action,2 the only essential difference being that (1) in a strict liability action, the plaintiff must prove that the defect in the product renders the product “unreasonably dangerous,” while (2) in an implied warranty of merchantability action, the plaintiff must prove that the defect in the product renders the product “unfit for the ordinary purposes for which the product is used.” In either of these actions, however, the plaintiff is not required to present expert testimony on the “precise nature of the defect.”

. Other cases that have also come to this conclusion include: Spain v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 872 So.2d 101, 111 (Ala.2003); Evans v. Evans, 153 N.C.App. 54, 569 S.E.2d 303, 307 (2002); DeWitt v. Eveready Battery Co., Inc., 355 N.C. 672, 565 S.E.2d 140, 151 (2002); Alvarez v. American Isuzu Motors, 321 Ill.App.3d 696, 255 Ill.Dec. 236, 749 N.E.2d 16, 23 (2001); Plas-Tex, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 444-45 (Tex. 1989).

. This observation has been expressly stated in the following cases: Haglund v. Philip Morris Inc., 446 Mass. 741, 847 N.E.2d 315, 321-22 (2006); Alvarez v. American Isuzu Motors, 321 Ill.App.3d 696, 255 Ill.Dec. 236, 749 N.E.2d 16, 23 n. 2 (2001); Hyundai Motor Co. v. Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez, 995 S.W.2d 661, 664-66 (Tex. 1999); Wainwright v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 903 F.Supp. 133, 140 (D.D.C.1995); Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 427 (2d Cir.1969); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 126 (9th Cir.1968).