Court Opinion

ID: 9535582
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:51:03.477627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:16.944019
License: Public Domain

GORDON, Justice
(specially concurring):
I disagree with the majority’s disposition of appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Although I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the performance of appellant’s attorneys did not fail to meet any of the suggested standards discussed within the opinion, I believe that the “sham and mockery” standard is outmoded and ought to be abandoned in this jurisdiction.
The “sham and mockery” standard originated from interpretation of the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, not from the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel guarantee. Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974). Subsequently, courts did consider “sham and mockery” the appropriate standard for review of Sixth Amendment claims. See, e. g., Mitchell v. United States, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 57, 259 F.2d 787 (1958); State v. Kruchten, 101 Ariz. 186, 417 P.2d 510 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1043, 87 S.Ct. 784, 17 L.Ed.2d 687 (1967). A line of cases culminating in McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970), however, undercut the premise that the Sixth Amendment mandates nothing more than appointment of counsel and that counsel’s conduct need only pass due process scrutiny. See, Beasley, supra, and Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978). See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967).
Largely in response to McMann, supra, most of the circuit courts of appeals have abandoned or modified the “sham and mockery” standard in favor of a less stringent, more objective standard demonstrating inadequacy of counsel: United States v. DeCoster, 159 U.S.App.D.C. 326, 487 F.2d 1197 (1973) (“reasonably competent assistance”); Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3rd Cir. 1970) (“normal competency”); Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977) (“normal competency”); Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1974) (“reasonably effective assistance”); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974) (“reasonably likely to render and rendering effective assistance”); United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1975) (“expected professional standard of competent counsel”); United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1976) (“customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances”); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (“reasonably competent and effective representation”).
These variously worded standards, differing in phraseology but not in substance, comport with the Sixth Amendment requirement suggested by the language of McMann, supra, 397 U.S. 759, 770-771, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1448-49, 25 L.Ed.2d 763, 773:
“Whether a plea of guilty is unintelligent and therefore vulnerable when motivated by a confession erroneously thought admissible * * * depends as an initial matter, not on whether a court would retrospectively consider counsel’s advice to be right or wrong, but on whether that advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. * * * [Defendants facing felony charges are entitled to the effective assistance of competent counsel.” (Emphasis added.)
*155See also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 90 S.Ct. 1458, 25 L.Ed.2d 785 (1970).
I believe that the foregoing language in McMann indicates that the “sham and mockery” standard is no longer compatible with the quality of legal representation required under the Sixth Amendment. Accordingly, I would adopt the following standard: Counsel must afford defendant reasonably effective representation, within the range of professional conduct customarily expected of an attorney in a criminal case.
It would be impossible to set out in advance and in the abstract a complete list of things that counsel for the defense must or must not do in order to pass constitutional muster. No two criminal cases are identical on their facts. Thus, counsel’s preparation for and trial of two different cases are necessarily never identical. As a starting point, however, for the development of clearer guidelines on an ad hoc basis, I would set forth some of the minimal duties owed by counsel to a client in order to afford reasonably effective representation. The list of duties proffered in Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849, 89 S.Ct. 80, 21 L.Ed.2d 120 (1968), and mentioned in the majority opinion, provides just such a starting point:
“Counsel for an indigent defendant should be appointed promptly. Counsel should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to prepare to defend an accused. Counsel must confer with his client without undue delay and as often as necessary, to advise him of his rights and to elicit matters of defense or to ascertain that potential defenses are unavailable. Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to determine if matters of defense can be developed, and to allow himself enough time for reflection and preparation for trial.”
If a defendant could demonstrate a substantial violation of any such requirement, I would conclude that he had been denied reasonably effective representation unless the state could show a lack of prejudice. Two factors require that the burden of proof be upon the state once a violation is established. First, it is the state’s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Requiring the defendant to show prejudice would shift the burden to him and force him to establish the likelihood of his own innocence. Additionally, proof of prejudice may well be lacking in the record for the very reason that counsel has been ineffective. United States v. DeCoster, 159 U.S. App.D.C. 326, 487 F.2d 1197 (1973).
Turning to the application of the foregoing principles to the facte of this case, the state has ably demonstrated that counsels’ challenged conduct did not operate to prejudice appellant’s defense. I, therefore, concur with the majority’s conclusion that appellant was not denied effective assistance of counsel.