Court Opinion

ID: 9839060
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-11 16:01:05.08058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:37.992613
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13225    Document: 20-1     Date Filed: 09/11/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-13225
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       EDWIN SYLVAIN,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 0:14-cr-60313-DPG-1
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court               22-13225

       Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Edwin Sylvain appeals the district court’s denial of his mo-
       tion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. section 3582(c)(2).
       The government has moved for summary affirmance because
       there is no substantial question as to the outcome of Sylvain’s ap-
       peal. We agree, grant the summary affirmance motion, and affirm
       the district court’s order.
                                       I.
             Sylvain pleaded guilty to conspiring to commit Hobbs Act
       robbery, Hobbs Act robbery, use of a firearm during a crime of vi-
       olence, kidnapping, and carjacking. In 2015, the district court sen-
       tenced Sylvain to 408 months’ imprisonment.
             Between May 2021 and September 2022, Sylvain moved
       more than a dozen times to reduce his sentence. Relevant here:
             • In May 2021, he moved for compassionate release under
               section 3582(c)(1)(A) based on the Covid-19 pandemic.
             • In June 2022, he moved for reduction of his sentence un-
               der section 3582(c)(2), arguing plain error under Federal
               Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) and misapplication of
               guideline section 2K2.4 and guideline amendments 599
               and 600.
             • In July 2022, he moved for compassionate release under
               section 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that he saved the life of a
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       22-13225                Opinion of the Court                          3

                  corrections officer in medical distress by providing im-
                  mediate assistance and calling other officers for help.
              On August 16, 2022, the district court denied Sylvain’s sec-
       tion 3582(c)(2) motion for reduced sentence because he failed to
       show “how the guidelines were misapplied to him,” noting that he
       and the government jointly recommended a sentence of thirty-
       four years’ imprisonment. That same day, the district court denied
       Sylvain’s May 2021 and July 2022 section 3582(c)(1)(A) compassion-
       ate release motions because the section 3553(a) factors didn’t sup-
       port his release, he failed to demonstrate an extraordinary and
       compelling reason for his early release, and he remained a danger
       to the safety of the community.
                 On September 13, 2022, Sylvain moved to reduce his sen-
       tence under section 3582(c)(2), reiterating his arguments from his
       June 2022 and July 2022 motions. The next day, the district court
       described the motion as “another collateral attack on his convic-
       tions and sentence” and denied it “for the reasons already stated
       . . . in its previous [o]rders.”
           Sylvain timely appealed, and the government has moved for
       summary affirmance and a stay of the briefing schedule.
                                         II.

              Summary disposition is appropriate where “the position of
       one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can
       be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case.” Groen-
       dyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). We
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       4                        Opinion of the Court                   22-13225

       review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions about the scope
       of its authority under section 3582(c)(2). United States v. Lawson,
       686 F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 2012). If section 3582(c)(2) applies,
       we review the district court’s decision to grant or deny a sentence
       reduction for abuse of discretion. United States v. Caraballo-Mar-
       tinez, 866 F.3d 1233, 1238 (11th Cir. 2017). “While we read briefs
       filed by pro se litigants liberally, issues not briefed on appeal by a pro
       se litigant are deemed abandoned.” Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d
       870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
                                          III.

              Section 3582(c)(2) allows a district court to modify a defend-
       ant’s term of imprisonment if the defendant was sentenced based
       on a sentencing range that subsequently has been lowered by the
       Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). A district court
       considering a motion under this section must determine (1) what
       sentence it would’ve imposed based on the subsequently lowered
       sentencing range, and (2) whether, in its discretion, it should re-
       duce the defendant’s sentence accordingly considering the section
       3553(a) factors and whether the defendant poses a threat to the
       safety of the community. United States v. Williams, 557 F.3d 1254,
       1256 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 780–81
       (11th Cir. 2000); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, cmt. n.1(B)(ii)–(iii).
             In his notice of appeal, Sylvain specified that “[t]his notice is
       for my 3582(c)(2) that was denied 9/14/2022.” No other orders or
       motions were mentioned.
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       22-13225                Opinion of the Court                         5

              But, in his brief, Sylvain doesn’t mention section 3582(c)(2).
       He doesn’t address whether the district court abused its discretion
       when it denied his section 3582(c)(2) motion. And he identifies no
       amendment to the guidelines that was made after he was sentenced
       and that would have subsequently lowered his guideline range.
       Sylvain has therefore abandoned these arguments.
               What Sylvain does mention is his July 2022 motion for com-
       passionate release under section 3582(c)(1)(A), which he calls the
       “instant motion on appeal.” But where an appellant makes an ex-
       press statement limiting the scope of the appeal, we have jurisdic-
       tion to review only the judgments or orders that are specified in
       the notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(6); Osterneck v. E.T. Bar-
       wick Indus., Inc., 825 F.2d 1521, 1528 (11th Cir. 1987) (“The general
       rule in this circuit is that an appellate court has jurisdiction to re-
       view only those judgments, orders or portions thereof which are
       specified in an appellant’s notice of appeal.”), aff’d sub nom. Oster-
       neck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169 (1989). We liberally construe
       this requirement. Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992) (“When
       papers are technically at variance with the letter of [Rule 3], a court
       may nonetheless find that the litigant has complied with the rule if
       the litigant’s action is the functional equivalent of what the rule re-
       quires.” (quotation omitted)). But even under the most liberal con-
       struction possible, Sylvain’s notice shows no overriding intent to
       appeal anything other than the September 14 ruling. See Nichols v.
       Ala. State Bar, 815 F.3d 726, 730 (11th Cir. 2016) (“We liberally con-
       strue the requirements of Rule 3, however, and an appeal is not lost
       if a mistake is made in designating the judgment appealed from
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       6                          Opinion of the Court                      22-13225

       where it is clear that the overriding intent was effectively to ap-
       peal.” (quotation omitted)). We therefore lack jurisdiction to con-
       sider his arguments related to his earlier motions. See Fed. R. App.
                                                   1
       P. 3(c)(6); Osterneck, 825 F.3d at 1528.
              The government argues that Sylvain has abandoned his
       challenge to the denial of his section 3582(c)(2) motion by not brief-
       ing it on appeal. Because the government is clearly correct as a
       matter of law, it is entitled to summary affirmance. See Groendyke
       Transp., 406 F.2d at 1162.
               But even if it weren’t, the outcome would be the same. Syl-
       vain’s section 3582(c)(2) motion didn’t rely on any amendment to
       the guidelines that retroactively reduced his guideline range. Ra-
       ther, he relied on amendments 599 and 600, which went into effect
       November 1, 2000, well before the district court sentenced him.
       The other grounds he cited in support of his motion—saving the
       life of the corrections officer, the district court’s alleged “misappli-
       cation” of section 924(c), and the “ambiguity” of that statute—

       1
         Even if we could review the district court’s order denying compassionate
       release, we would still grant the government’s summary affirmance motion.
       “[T]he only circumstances that can rise to the level of extraordinary and com-
       pelling reasons for compassionate release are limited to those extraordinary
       and compelling reasons as described by [s]ection 1B1.13.” United States v. Gi-
       ron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1346 (11th Cir. 2021). But the reasons Sylvain gave for com-
       passionate release were not described in section 1B1.13. So there was no basis
       for the district court to grant relief.
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       22-13225              Opinion of the Court                       7

       aren’t reasons for a sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(2).
       The district court therefore could not have abused its discretion.
             MOTION FOR SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE GRANTED;
                    2
       AFFIRMED.

       2
        The government’s motion to stay the briefing schedule is DENIED AS
       MOOT.