Court Opinion

ID: 9741351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:54:01.816471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:23.636969
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE LEWIS, specially concurring: I am very concerned about the conduct of the State in this case, and, so, while I agree with the majority ruling, I feel it necessary to express my misgivings. The Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the State of Illinois of 1970, article I, section 15, provides: "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation as provided by law. Such compensation shall be determined by a jury as provided by law.” (111. Const. 1970, art. I, § 15.) The legislature provided by law that any party may have a trial by jury to determine the just compensation for damages upon application made to the court. 735 ILCS 5/7 — 101 (West 1992). The State in this case agreed, as part of the compensation for the taking and damage to plaintiffs’ land, to build an overpass on plaintiffs’ land. If the State had not induced the plaintiffs into settling, the plaintiffs would have been able to submit the amount of compensation to a jury. Now the State is blatantly attempting and persisting in denying the plaintiffs their constitutional right to a trial by jury to determine "just compensation” for the land and the damage to the remainder that the State has seized by reneging on the contract and arguing that only the Court of Claims can now set the just compensation. We should not and cannot sanction a circumvention of the constitutional rights of a citizen of this State. This issue could arise frequently, and so we should put a stop to it here and now, not only for the benefit of future landowners, whose land is taken involuntarily, but also because we should not, as a matter of public policy, allow the State to renege on its promises. The State may agree in many instances to provide access, drainage, landfill, leveling of the land, a lake where dirt or rock was excavated, and so forth, as part of the compensation to the landowner for land taken or damaged. The landowner may take less cash or even no cash for the land taken in return for the State’s promise to provide certain improvements to the remainder. We do not know in this case, for instance, if the plaintiffs settled for less than they would have, because they believed that the overpass would possibly increase the value of the remainder of their land. Without the overpass, two pieces of property with roads that dead-end at Interstate 255 might be worth considerably less than two pieces of property connected by a highway and an overpass. If the State reneges on its promise, then, according to the State’s argument, the only recourse for the property owner is to liquidate his loss through the Court of Claims. The State could bypass a landowner’s right to a trial by jury to determine just compensation for property taken or damaged simply by duping or suckering a landowner into signing a contract whereby the State promises to do many wonderful things on the landowner’s property in lieu of cash. The Court of Claims does not have jurisdiction to determine just compensation for land taken or damaged by the State in eminent domain cases. However, what the State is asking this court to do in reality is to transfer the jurisdiction of setting the just compensation for the damage to the plaintiffs’ land from the jury to the Court of Claims. We also are aware of cases where claims have been denied in the Court of Claims because of insufficient funding by the legislature. (See State Employees’ Retirement System v. State (1984), 37 Ill. Ct. Cl. 288; Board of Education of the Illinois Valley Central Unit District No. 321 v. State (1982), 35 Ill. Ct. Cl. 716; Loewenberg| Fitch Partnership v. State (1986), 38 Ill. Ct. Cl. 227.) So, not only is the State attempting to maneuver the landowner into a position whereby the Court of Claims determines the just compensation, the State may also be maneuvering the landowner into a position whereby the landowner receives no compensation for the taking or damaging of his land by the State. If the State does not wish to meet its contractual obligations to build the overpass, then it should at least have the decency to afford the property owner his constitutional right to a trial by jury by refiling the eminent domain action. If we had ruled in favor of the State in this case, what sensible and cautious property owner would dare enter into a settlement with the State in eminent domain proceedings?