Court Opinion

ID: 9704422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:34:56.804934+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:02.307325
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McNULTY, specially concurring in section III: The defense contends that the trial court committed reversible error by not excluding venireperson John Taylor for cause. It argues that the error is reversible because the defense was forced to use its last peremptory challenge to keep this potential juror from sitting on the jury. As the supreme court said, however, in 1887, "[w]e can not reverse [a] judgment for error committed in the lower court in overruling challenges for cause to jurors, even though [the] defendants exhausted their peremptory challenge unless it is further shown that an objectionable juror was forced upon them and sat upon the case after they had exhausted their peremptory challenges.” Spies v. People (1887), 122 Ill. 1, 258, 12 N.E. 865, 989, accord United States v. Tweed (7th Cir. 1974), 503 F.2d 1127, 1129. After the defense had exhausted its peremptories, eight additional venirepersons were examined by the court. The following colloquy took place regarding venireperson John L. Theisinger: "THE COURT: Do you want the card? MR. HOWARD [assistant State’s Attorney]: Yes. THE COURT: Here’s all of the cards. MR. HOWARD: We would accept them. THE COURT: Mr. Laurent [defense counsel], MR. LAURENT: Judge, I’m out of peremptories. I have no choice. I formally requested more. You have already denied my motion. THE COURT: Well, I’m asking if you have any challenges for cause. MR. LAURENT: Let me take a good look. Unless he lives next door to the guy that sings in the church choir I will formally make a motion for cause, although he did answer the question correctly. Okay. THE COURT: That motion for cause will be denied.” Whereupon Mr. Theisinger was sworn as the twelfth juror and two alternates were selected. I do not reach the question of whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing excused venireperson John Taylor for cause on the record before us. The defendant has made no showing that an "objectionable juror” was forced upon him after he exhausted his peremptory challenges to exclude venireperson Taylor. See People v. Marts (1994), 266 Ill. App. 3d 531, 540, 639 N.E.2d 1360, 1367; People v. Washington (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 386, 392, 432 N.E.2d 1020, 1024-25. An "objectionable juror” has been defined as "a juror who should have been dismissed for cause — one who would prejudice the case.” (Flynn v. Edmonds (1992), 236 Ill. App. 3d 770, 781-82, 602 N.E.2d 880, 887.) As the foregoing excerpt indicates, defense counsel made no showing whatever that juror Theisinger demonstrated any prejudice toward his client. Instead, he clearly indicated that his objection was pro forma to preserve the error for review and that the juror had answered the inquiries on the information card in a manner defense counsel found satisfactory. As Justice Wolfson aptly said in People v. Reid (1995), 272 Ill. App. 3d 301, 309, 649 N.E.2d 593, 599, "[t]he defendant takes the position that an 'objectionable juror’ is anyone she did not want on her jury. We do not agree. There must be some attempt to persuade the trial judge that a juror the defendant was required to accept could not be fair and impartial. The failure to make such a showing forecloses further consideration of the issue. [Citation.]” JUSTICE O’BRIEN concurs in the special concurrence.