Court Opinion

ID: 9649141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:43:14.642124+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:08.099825
License: Public Domain

PRICE, J.,
delivered a concurring opinion,
in which MEYERS, JOHNSON and KEASLER, JJ., joined.
I write separately because I believe the majority fails to properly address whether *262the Court of Appeals worked injustice in this cause by applying a newly enacted rule of appellate procedure.
This Court directed in a written order that the revised Rules of Appellate Procedure would become effective on September 1, 1997. See Final Approval of Revisions to the Texas Rules of Appellate PROCEDURE, 948-949 S.W.2d (Texas Cases) XLI-II-IV (Aug. 15, 1997). We further directed that the revised rules “should govern all proceedings thereafter brought, and in all such proceedings then pending except to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application in a particular proceeding then pending would not be feasible or would work injustice.” (emphasis added).
Pursuant to this provision, appellant contends that the application of Rule 44.2 in this particular case worked injustice. The majority avers that appellant’s sole argument is that injustice occurred because his conviction would have been overturned had the Court of Appeals utilized former Rule 81(b)(2) instead of the rule that superseded it, revised Rule 44.2. It disposes of this argument by comparing the holding of the Court of Appeals (appellant’s cause is properly reviewed under new Rule 44.2) with dicta in that opinion (under former Rule 81(b)(2), “we could not say beyond a reasonable doubt that the testimony did not contribute to the conviction”). The majority concludes that the
Tenth Court of Appeals applied the harmless error standard of Rule jj.2 in appellant’s case because that was the rule in effect at the time of appellant’s appeal. ... Appellant was entitled to nothing more than an appellate review of his convivtion. Appellant’s contention that he is entitled to a reversal of his conviction is also without merit. Appellant suffered no injustice by virtue of the Tenth Court’s application of the harmless error rule in effect at the time of the disposition of his appeal.
In other words, through somewhat circular reasoning, the majority opinion determines that the revised rule was appropriate in this case because it did not work injustice, and it did not work injustice because appellant was only entitled to review under the appropriate revised rule. This conclusion renders the aforementioned injustice language — contained within our written order — meaningless, as every cause brought after September 1, 1997 would be entitled to review under only the revised rules, and therefore could not work injustice.
Thus, the question remains as to whether or not injustice was worked in this cause. Appellant argued that utilizing a new standard of appellate review worked injustice because it did not allow him time to adequately brief and argue such on appeal. Appellant cited Chase Commercial Corp. v. Datapoint, Corp., 774 S.W.2d 359 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989), as persuasive authority for this proposition.
In Chase, the issue confronting the Court of Appeals was whether or not it should apply a new appellate review standard articulated in a recent opinion, Qantel Business Systems Inc. v. Custom Controls Co., 761 S.W.2d 302 (Tex.1988). Chase, 774 S.W.2d at 361. Chase had relied upon the former appellate standard in the preparation and presentation of its appeal and did not address the new Qantel standard. Id. at 362. The Chase Court determined that the change was not sufficiently foreseeable to appellant for proper preparation and argument and that it would be unfair to punish appellant for relying on the previous standard. Id.
In the cause before us, it is difficult to see how appellant was unfairly surprised by the change in appellate procedure. The exact language of the new rules was at appellant’s disposal for weeks. We established our approval of the revised Rules of Appellate Procedure, including Rule 44.2, on August 15, 1997, almost six weeks before oral arguments occurred in this case.1 *263Rule 44.2 took effect on September 1, 1997, fully one month before oral arguments in this case were held.2 Thus, appellant had ample time to prepare and submit supplemental briefs on this issue, as well as orally argue such before the Court of Appeals. See Tex.R.App. P. 38.6(d) (appellate court may extend time for filing briefs and may postpone submission of the case); Tex.R.App. P. 38.7 (brief may be amended or supplemented when justice requires).3 He cannot use his own inaction to bolster a finding of injustice now. Therefore, the change in the law was sufficiently foreseeable to appellant that no injustice was worked by unfair surprise.
Appellant also argued that he possessed a substantial, vested right in the prior appellate review standard, because applying the revised rule curtailed his appeal and led to the opposite result. The majority addressed this argument in the same manner that it addressed appellant’s first argument: by concluding that the Court of Appeals used the proper rule in effect at the time of the appeal. However, this conclusion does not actually reach the crux of appellant’s argument.
I would hold that appellants do not have a right to one certain appellate review standard over another. A revised rule should be utilized on and after its effective date unless it would work injustice to do so.4 As the previous discussion illustrates, no injustice was worked in this case.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur only in the judgment of this Court.

. The New Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure were tentatively released for review in *263March of 1997, over six months from the date of oral arguments in this case.

.Oral argument was originally scheduled for September 17, 1997, but was reset for October 1, 1997. Nevertheless, under the originally scheduled hearing date appellant would have had almost one month notice of the changes and the new rules would have been in effect for over two weeks.

. Certainly justice would require that appellant be given the chance to brief and argue a new law applicable to his case if he had requested the opportunity to do so. However, appellant did not pursue this option.

. This conclusion is why we included such precautionary language in our order approving of the revised rules.