Court Opinion

ID: 9456475
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:54:23.246372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:59.737329
License: Public Domain

*916REYNOLDS, District Judge
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I concur in the result because this case involves the appeal from a denial of temporary injunction. There is a virtually unanimous body of judicial opinions refusing to intervene in the punitive activation of “civilian-soldiers” for having long hair. See cases at page 915 herein. Hence, although the equities appear to be heavily in appellant’s favor and it is a convincing case of immediate, irreparable harm, nonetheless, in light of the case law, the trial judge was justified in concluding that the appellant’s chances of ultimate success on the merits were slim indeed.
In spite of the fact that the majority opinion, holding, in effect, that a civilian-soldier may be ordered into active duty because he has long hair, is backed by considerable legal authority, I must, nevertheless most respectfully take exception with that portion of the opinion which deals with appellant’s First and Ninth Amendment rights.
The right to wear one’s hair in any style one desires is “an ingredient of personal freedom protected by the United States Constitution,” Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1036 (7th Cir.1969), and “[t]o limit or curtail this or any other fundamental right, the state has a ‘substantial burden of justification.’ ” Breen v. Kahl, supra, at 1036. The state should be held to this burden of justification even where the military is involved. In a recent selective service case, the Supreme Court stated:
“ * * * a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. * * * ” United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1679, 20 L. Ed.2d 672 (1968). (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the Ninth Amendment, the Government including the military, has no right to unnecessarily interfere with the private lives of citizens whether they be in the military or not.
The majority opinion herein implies that the appellant’s assertion of his constitutional rights and his right to enjoy them absent substantial justification would be persuasive only if he were “completely in civilian status.” One does not lose the right to constitutionally-protected freedoms absent substantial justification even in the military. A soldier may lose certain liberties, otherwise constitutionally protected, when serving in the military. Raderman v. Kaine, 411 F.2d 1102 (2d Cir.1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 976, 90 S.Ct. 467, 24 L.Ed.2d 447. The loss of these rights while in military service is presumably attended in each instance by “substantial justifications” inherent in the nature of military duty.
After noting that appellant apparently failed to raise, either below or on this appeal, the issue of whether differing treatment should be accorded a reservist, as opposed to an active duty soldier, the majority opinion states categorically that “no differing treatment should be accorded the part-time soldier” because the appellant has undertaken this form of military duty “voluntarily” and “cannot be heard to complain if the legitimate requirements of necessity do curtail to some extent the manner of his appearance in civilian life.” I must respectfully disagree. The majority assumes the legitimacy and necessity of the requirements at issue merely because the appellant has “voluntarily” associated himself with the military. Whether it is correct to typify the appellant’s joining the national guard as “voluntary” aside, the majority appears to me to absolve the military of any burden of justification with regard to the abrogation of appellant’s constitutional rights. The military has such a burden. *917Furthermore, the civilian-soldier status should be taken into account because the constitutional rights that circumstances may require an active duty soldier to give up to complete his mission efficiently and successfully may not be necessary for a civilian soldier to give up to complete his mission efficiently and successfully. I can think of many real examples but will cite just one. In Wisconsin, we have members of the national guard who are leaders in both of our political parties and take a very active role in politics. If they were on active duty, this would not be permitted by the military. I think it could be argued that while on active duty, they forego their constitutional rights in that area. But no one would seriously argue that as civilian-soldiers in the national guard they have to give up such rights.
A civilian-soldier is neither a civilian nor a soldier. He stands somewhere in between. Accordingly, it is not axiomatic that because a soldier on active duty surrenders certain liberties, a civilian-soldier in the national guard also surrenders the same liberties to the same degree merely because both are somehow connected with the military. I am concerned that the majority opinion appears to hold that because the appellant is not “completely civilian” he is, therefore, to be treated as though he were completely military and that nothing more need be shown to justify an interference with his private life by a reserve commander.
The military has not met its burden to justify its interference with the private life of this particular type of “soldier.” I do not say that they could not ever meet the burden. However, I am presently unconvinced that short hair in the national guard is sufficiently important to the orderly administration of our armed forces to warrant the punitive activation of a guardsman who asserts the right to determine the length of his own hair.