Court Opinion

ID: 9891687
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-19 15:07:59.698857+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:00:08.742426
License: Public Domain

2023 IL 127535

                                           IN THE
                                 SUPREME COURT
                                              OF
                           THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

                                     (Docket No. 127535)

                THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
                          JAMES A. PACHECO, Appellee.

                                Opinion filed October 19, 2023.

         JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

        Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville and Overstreet concurred in the
     judgment and opinion.

       Justice Rochford specially concurred, with opinion, joined by Justices Holder
     White and O’Brien.

                                           OPINION

¶1       The defendant, James Pacheco, was found guilty of aggravated assault and other
     offenses after he tried to hit a Joliet police officer with his car. During the incident,
     the police officer shot and injured Pacheco. On appeal, the appellate court reversed
     Pacheco’s convictions finding that (1) the trial court violated Pacheco’s right to
     confrontation by prohibiting defense counsel from cross-examining the police
     officer who shot Pacheco as to whether the officer believed he could lose his job if
     the shooting was found to be unjustified and (2) the trial court erred in granting the
     State’s motion in limine to bar defense counsel from asking the officer and his
     partner why they did not write police reports regarding the incident. 2021 IL App
     (3d) 150880-B. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the appellate
     court and remand the cause to that court for further proceedings.

¶2                                     BACKGROUND

¶3       The State charged Pacheco with aggravated assault (720 ILCS 5/12-2(b)(4)(i),
     (c)(8) (West 2012)), attempted aggravated battery (id. § 12-3.05(d)(4)(i)),
     aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer (625 ILCS 5/11-
     204.1(a)(4) (West 2012)), criminal damage to property (720 ILCS 5/21-1(a)(1)
     (West 2012)), and two counts of driving under the influence (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-
     501(a)(1), (2) (West 2012)). All the charges related to an incident that began in the
     early morning hours of July 30, 2012. On that date, at approximately 2:20 a.m.,
     Joliet police officer Adam Stapleton and his partner, Eric Zettergren, responded to
     a call that Pacheco had broken the windows of a pickup truck and driven off in his
     car. When the officers arrived at the scene, Pacheco led them on a high-speed car
     chase through Joliet, eventually stopping when a train blocked his path. The officers
     got out of their squad car to make an arrest, but Pacheco drove his car toward
     Stapleton. Stapleton then fired several shots through Pacheco’s windshield, striking
     Pacheco. Although injured, Pacheco drove away. He was subsequently arrested
     after he lost control of his car and crashed into a stoplight pole.

¶4       Prior to trial, the State filed two motions in limine. In the first motion, the State
     sought to bar defense counsel from eliciting any testimony regarding the absence
     of police reports written by Stapleton and Zettergren about the pursuit and arrest of
     Pacheco. A hearing was held on the motion, during which the State noted that both
     Stapleton and Zettergren had testified at an earlier suppression hearing that, because
     Stapleton had discharged his firearm, both he and Zettergren were prohibited from
     preparing any police reports about Pacheco’s arrest. The State further noted that the
     officers had stated they believed the prohibition was imposed by the Joliet Police

                                               -2-
     Department for legal reasons and that, instead of preparing a police report, they
     were required to provide a separate, video recorded statement about the incident.
     The State argued that, in light of these facts, any testimony that the officers failed
     to prepare police reports would not show any bias or incompetence on their part
     and, therefore, should be barred.

¶5       The Will County circuit court granted the State’s motion in limine. Relying on
     the police officers’ testimony, the court found they had no discretion to prepare
     police reports and, therefore, the “absence of a report [was] not a bad act.” Given
     this fact, the court concluded that the proposed line of questioning was irrelevant
     because it had nothing to do with establishing the bias of the officers. The court
     noted that it would reconsider its ruling if defense counsel could provide contrary
     testimony that the officers did possess discretion to write police reports. Defense
     counsel, however, did not make any further representations to the court on the
     matter and did not provide any additional evidence.

¶6       The State’s second motion in limine concerned an interoffice memo prepared
     by the Joliet Police Department’s deadly force review panel. In this memo, the
     panel reviewed Stapleton’s discharge of his weapon and found it to be a justified
     use of force. In a separate section of the memo, the panel made certain policy
     recommendations regarding police officers’ use of force.

¶7       In its motion in limine, the State asked the trial court to prohibit defense counsel
     from making reference to any portion of the review panel’s memo that discussed
     the policy recommendations. The State maintained these policy recommendations
     were unrelated to the actions taken by Stapleton or Zettergren and were irrelevant
     to the crimes with which Pacheco was charged. During a hearing on the motion,
     defense counsel argued that the policy recommendations were, in fact, relevant and
     that he should be able to cross-examine Stapleton as to whether he knew that, as a
     result of what happened with Pacheco, certain changes had been suggested to the
     police department’s policy on the use of deadly force.

¶8       Addressing the motion, the trial court first noted the review panel’s finding that
     the use of “deadly force in this incident was justified.” The court then observed that
     it would “never” allow the State to present evidence that a “panel of people who
     weren’t there” determined that Stapleton’s discharge of his weapon “was a justified
     shooting. Never.” The court similarly concluded that defense counsel could not

                                              -3-
       present evidence of any policy recommendations because such recommendations
       simply were “not relevant” to the criminal charges at issue. The trial court then
       stated that it was granting the motion in limine as “to both the State and defense.”
       That is, defense counsel was prohibited from introducing any policy
       recommendations noted by the review panel, and the State was expressly
       “prohibited from bringing any findings that what the officers did on scene was all
       justified.”

¶9         Prior to trial, Pacheco pleaded guilty to criminal damage to property. The matter
       then proceeded to a jury trial on the remaining charges.

¶ 10       At trial, Ralph Gallup, his son, Jonathan Gallup, and their neighbor, Reginald
       Phillips, testified that they heard glass breaking at approximately 2:20 a.m. on July
       30, 2012. Investigating the sound, they saw a black car, being driven by Pacheco,
       in the alley behind their homes. Jonathan saw that the windows of Ralph’s pickup
       truck were broken, and he or Ralph then called the police.

¶ 11       Stapleton testified that he and Zettergren responded to the call. According to
       Stapleton, while driving to the scene of the complaint, they encountered a black
       Nissan, driven by Pacheco, facing north on Union Street at the intersection with
       Washington Street. Pacheco had his left turn signal on to go west on Washington
       but instead turned right. Stapleton activated his lights, and Pacheco then turned
       south on a side street, pulling over halfway down the block. The officers exited
       their squad car, but Pacheco sped off. After they returned to the squad car, the
       officers began pursuing Pacheco.

¶ 12       Stapleton stated that he activated his siren and used the squad car’s public
       address system to tell Pacheco numerous times to stop his vehicle because he was
       going to get hurt or hurt someone else. Pacheco did not comply. Pacheco then
       turned right on Washington Street, heading east, without stopping at the stop sign.
       Pacheco took off at a high rate of speed, well over the speed limit, and went through
       another stop sign. Shortly thereafter, according to Stapleton, Pacheco lost control
       of his car, sliding up onto the parkway and then getting back on Washington,
       heading east.

¶ 13       Stapleton testified that Pacheco eventually stopped his car near a company
       called the Filtration Group because a train was blocking the street. Pacheco then

                                               -4-
       turned his car to the left facing north in the westbound lane of Washington Street.
       Stapleton stated that he pulled the squad car parallel with Pacheco’s. Believing
       Pacheco had given up, Stapleton then exited the squad car and went around to the
       rear of the car to get a better look at Pacheco. Zettergren also exited the squad car.
       Stapleton stated that he told Pacheco to stop his car. Pacheco then said, “what the
       f*** did you pull me over for” and that he “didn’t do anything.”

¶ 14       Stapleton testified that Pacheco began backing up his vehicle, attempting to
       head west on Washington Street by making a left turn. Stapleton repeatedly told
       Pacheco to stop his car. Pacheco’s car stopped and then started to roll forward as if
       Pacheco had taken his foot off the brake. Stapleton stated he was in the roadway
       attempting to block Pacheco’s escape as the car came toward him. Stapleton said
       he continued to order Pacheco to stop the car but that Pacheco instead accelerated
       toward him and the rear of the squad car.

¶ 15       Stapleton testified that when Pacheco’s car did not stop, he was afraid he was
       going to be killed. Believing Pacheco would run him over, Stapleton discharged his
       firearm in the direction of Pacheco. Stapleton stated he knew he was standing in
       front of Pacheco’s vehicle when he fired his weapon.

¶ 16       Stapleton testified that Pacheco then headed west on Washington Street, driving
       past him at a high rate of speed. Stapleton stated that Pacheco drove close enough
       to him that he could feel the wind from the car as it drove by. Stapleton then turned
       around and headed back to his squad car.

¶ 17       Stapleton testified that he and Zettergren reentered the squad car and pursued
       Pacheco west on Washington Street. Additional squad cars then joined in the
       pursuit. Pacheco ran through stoplights and stop signs and continued to drive
       through residential streets at a high rate of speed. Eventually, according to
       Stapleton, Pacheco lost control of his car and struck a stoplight pole. Several
       officers then told Pacheco to get out of the car and tried to remove him, but he
       resisted. Stapleton stated that another officer asked if anyone had a Taser. Stapleton
       had one, and he deployed it against Pacheco. Pacheco then got out of his car, was
       arrested, and was given medical treatment. Stapleton testified that it was never his
       intention to hurt Pacheco and he only wanted to stop him from hurting anybody
       else.

                                               -5-
¶ 18        The State introduced an audio recording captured by surveillance equipment at
       the Filtration Group into evidence. The recording, which was played for the jury,
       is largely consistent with Stapleton’s testimony. On the recording, after sirens are
       heard, a voice can be heard yelling, “I didn’t do anything.” Another voice repeats
       “stop the car” several times. Seven gunshots can then be heard. The gunshots begin
       approximately one second after the voice says “stop the car” for the last time. After
       that, a vehicle can be heard accelerating. Then, sirens and the sound of another
       vehicle accelerating can be heard.

¶ 19       The State also introduced a video recording of the encounter into evidence,
       which was also captured by surveillance equipment at the Filtration Group. The
       video recording, which is largely consistent with Stapleton’s testimony, was also
       played for the jury. In the video recording, a dark-colored car can be seen driving
       past a parked semitruck. A squad car with its sirens and lights activated follows
       closely behind. The two vehicles drive off the screen, and voices can be heard.
       Seven gunshots can then be heard in rapid succession. Shortly after the last shot,
       the dark-colored car drives back into the screen. A person appears close to the car
       and then can be seen running away. The car drives away, and approximately 15 to
       20 seconds later, the squad car follows. Stapleton testified at trial that he was the
       person running in the video.

¶ 20       On further direct examination, Stapleton repeated that he was standing in front
       of Pacheco’s car the entire time he discharged his firearm. He also stated that once
       he fired his weapon, he had enough time to get out of the car’s path.

¶ 21       Defense counsel cross-examined Stapleton at length, attempting to undermine
       Stapleton’s credibility regarding the shooting and whether he was in reasonable
       apprehension of being struck by Pacheco’s car. Counsel tested Stapleton’s memory
       of events, including the location and movement of Pacheco’s car and how many
       shots Stapleton fired. He also repeatedly questioned Stapleton regarding his
       location and position during the shooting, suggesting that Stapleton was not in front
       of Pacheco’s car and was not in fear of being struck but was, instead, firing at
       Pacheco as he drove by. Stapleton continued to maintain, however, that Pacheco
       accelerated toward him and that he fired his weapon to stop Pacheco from running
       him over.

                                               -6-
¶ 22       During defense counsel’s cross-examination, the parties had a discussion with
       the trial court outside the presence of the jury. Defense counsel stated that he
       planned to ask Stapleton whether he was afraid he would lose his job if it was
       determined that he improperly used deadly force when he shot at Pacheco. Counsel
       explained that whether Pacheco was guilty of aggravated assault turned on whether
       Stapleton was in the path of Pacheco’s car and was in reasonable apprehension of
       being hit. According to counsel, whether Stapleton believed he could face negative
       employment consequences from an unjustified shooting would tend to show a
       motive for testifying falsely. Specifically, it would tend to show that Stapleton was
       lying about Pacheco trying to hit him so that he would not lose his job.

¶ 23       The State, in response, argued it would be improper for defense counsel to argue
       that Stapleton had “a motive to testify falsely out of a desire or motivation to protect
       his job.” The trial court agreed with the State and prohibited the proposed question.
       The court reasoned that, pursuant to the holding in People v. Adams, 2012 IL
       111168, “[y]ou cannot tie perjury or sworn testimony to employment in a criminal
       case.”

¶ 24       Zettergren offered testimony that was largely consistent with Stapleton’s.
       Zettergren stated that he and Stapleton pursued Pacheco’s vehicle until it stopped
       where the train was blocking the road. Zettergren then exited the squad car from
       the front passenger side of the car. At that point, Pacheco began backing up his car,
       and Zettergren and Stapleton yelled at Pacheco to stop. According to Zettergren,
       Pacheco continued to back up and pointed his car at the two of them. Zettergren
       told Pacheco to stop, but the car began rolling toward him. Pacheco then turned the
       wheel to the left, and the car started to turn away from him, toward the rear of the
       squad car and in the direction of Stapleton.

¶ 25       Zettergren testified that Stapleton ordered Pacheco to stop. Pacheco did not
       comply but, instead, accelerated his car. Zettergren heard Stapleton give more
       commands and then heard shots being fired. According to Zettergren, he could not
       see Stapleton at that point. Zettergren stated he then saw Pacheco’s vehicle drive
       away at a high speed. He and Stapleton returned to their squad car and pursued
       Pacheco until he crashed.

                                                -7-
¶ 26      On cross-examination, Zettergren confirmed that he did not see Stapleton at the
       time he fired his weapon, nor did he know Stapleton’s situation. Zettergren
       explained that this was because he was fixated on Pacheco and his car.

¶ 27        Michael McAbee, a semitruck driver, testified that he and his adult son, Jamie
       Kirk, were sleeping on bunks in McAbee’s semitruck in the early morning hours
       on the date of the incident. They were parked at the Filtration Group waiting for the
       plant to open to drop off their freight. McAbee stated that, at approximately 2:45
       a.m., he heard sirens, which woke him up. He then saw a black car drive up to the
       train tracks where a train was parked. A squad car then passed with its lights on and
       stopped. When the black car turned around, the squad car pulled up at an angle to
       it, and two police officers exited the squad car. According to McAbee, the officers
       yelled at the driver of the black car several times, telling him to stop his car.

¶ 28       McAbee testified that the black car backed up and then started driving back in
       the direction from which it had come. The officers were still yelling at the driver of
       the black car, telling him to “stop the f’ing car or they gonna shoot.” At one point,
       the driver of the black car yelled at the officer to get out of his way but did not
       otherwise respond. McAbee stated that one officer drew his gun and yelled at the
       driver to stop the vehicle. McAbee could see the officer “a little bit” at that point.
       The black car did not stop. Rather, “he acted as an old person; drove easy.” McAbee
       testified that he heard five gunshots, covered his face, and took cover. When he
       looked up again, both vehicles were gone.

¶ 29       Kirk testified that he was 19 years old. In the early morning hours on the date
       of the incident, he heard McAbee exclaim, and he woke up. Kirk stated that he saw
       one police officer standing by the squad car on the driver’s side near the trunk but
       did not see a second officer. The officer near the trunk told the man driving the
       black car “to stop the car or he’d effing shoot.” The officer was holding a gun
       pointed at the black car. Kirk stated that he heard the person in the black car “say
       to the cop to get the—out of his way, F-word.” According to Kirk, and contrary to
       the testimony of the other eyewitnesses, the black car remained stationary and did
       not move until after the officer fired his gun. Kirk acknowledged that it was possible
       the black car was moving so slowly that he could not tell it was moving. Kirk
       believed the officer fired six shots.

                                               -8-
¶ 30       A firefighter paramedic testified that he responded to the scene where Pacheco
       had crashed into the stoplight pole and that he transported Pacheco to the hospital
       in an ambulance. A phlebotomist testified she drew Pacheco’s blood when he was
       at the hospital. The phlebotomist stated that she took the blood to the hospital’s
       laboratory for testing and the test showed Pacheco’s blood alcohol content was
       0.183.

¶ 31       Police officer Chris Delaney testified that he was a crime scene technician and
       that he photographed Pacheco’s car after the incident. Delaney stated that the
       photographs showed there were six bullet holes in Pacheco’s windshield and one
       bullet hole on the hood of the vehicle. According to Delaney, there was no bullet
       damage to either the passenger or driver’s side of the car.

¶ 32       After the State rested, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict. The motion
       was denied. Defense counsel then asked the trial court to revisit its ruling on the
       issue of whether he could ask Stapleton if he believed the shooting could have a
       potential negative impact on his employment. The State responded there was no
       evidence of improper discharge and reminded the court that, in fact, the deadly
       force review panel of the Joliet Police Department had found Stapleton’s conduct
       proper. Following argument, the trial court reaffirmed its previous ruling that it
       would not allow defense counsel’s question.

¶ 33       Defense counsel called several police officers to testify about Pacheco’s pursuit
       and arrest. Sergeant Thomas Grutzius examined data from Stapleton’s Taser, which
       showed it had been fired twice. A camera connected to the Taser recorded a portion
       of Pacheco’s arrest, and that video was played for the jury.

¶ 34       During closing argument, defense counsel asserted that Stapleton’s testimony
       was not credible and that the evidence did not establish that Pacheco attempted to
       hit Stapleton. Counsel stated:

              “Ladies and gentlemen, I think the whole case boils down to credibility,
          credibility and an understanding of human nature. If you believe that Officer
          Stapleton was out of control that day, do not believe him. If you believe the
          officers are not consistent with each other, do not find [defendant] guilty. If you
          think Officer Stapleton was purposely abuseful, don’t believe a word out of his
          mouth. If you think he was exaggerating here in [c]ourt, be offended, and then

                                               -9-
          don’t believe him. If you think he was acting to protect his own interests, don’t
          believe him. If you think he lied when he said all the shots came from the front,
          don’t believe him.

              And, ladies and gentlemen, if you don’t believe him, if you don’t believe
          the officers, some of the officers in this case, there is not proof beyond a
          reasonable doubt.”

¶ 35       During jury deliberations, the jury asked to have the video and audio recordings
       replayed. After discussion, the recordings were replayed for the jury in the
       courtroom with everyone removed except the parties and court staff. Subsequently,
       the jury found Pacheco guilty of aggravated assault, aggravated fleeing or
       attempting to elude a peace officer, and DUI. The jury found Pacheco not guilty of
       attempted aggravated battery.

¶ 36       After denying Pacheco’s motion for a new trial, the court sentenced him to four
       years’ imprisonment for aggravated assault and three years’ imprisonment for
       aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer, to be served concurrently.
       The court entered “straight judgments of conviction” for criminal damage to
       property and DUI and found the sentences for those offenses merged with the
       sentences for aggravated assault and aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a
       peace officer.

¶ 37        Pacheco appealed, contending (1) the trial court erred in replaying the video
       and audio recordings for the jury in the courtroom rather than in the jury room,
       (2) the trial court violated his right to confrontation by limiting cross-examination
       of Stapleton, (3) the trial court abused its discretion in granting the State’s motion
       in limine regarding Stapleton and Zettergren’s failure to write a police report,
       (4) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, and
       (5) Pacheco was entitled to monetary credit for time spent in presentence custody.

¶ 38        Over a dissent, the appellate court reversed and remanded, agreeing with the
       first three of Pacheco’s arguments and not reaching the fourth and fifth. People v.
       Pacheco, 2019 IL App (3d) 150880. This court subsequently vacated the judgment
       of the appellate court and directed it to reconsider its decision in light of People v.
       Hollahan, 2020 IL 125091, on the issue of whether the trial court erred in playing

                                               - 10 -
       the recordings in court. People v. Pacheco, No. 125191 (Ill. Nov. 18, 2020)
       (supervisory order).

¶ 39       With one justice dissenting, the appellate court again reversed and remanded.
       2021 IL App (3d) 150880-B. The appellate court first found the trial court
       committed no error when it replayed the recordings for the jury in the courtroom,
       rather than the jury room. Id. ¶ 46. The court then addressed Pacheco’s contention
       that the trial court violated his right to confrontation by barring his cross-
       examination of Stapleton as to whether he was afraid he would lose his job if the
       shooting was found to be unjustified. Id. ¶ 56. The appellate court concluded this
       was a proper subject of cross-examination because it went to Stapleton’s potential
       bias or motive to testify falsely. Id. For this reason, according to the appellate court,
       Pacheco’s right to confrontation had been violated. Id. The appellate court then
       found Adams, which the trial court had referenced, distinguishable and concluded
       that the confrontation clause violation was not harmless. Id. ¶¶ 57-63.

¶ 40       The appellate court next concluded that the trial court abused its discretion and
       committed plain error when it granted the State’s motion in limine barring defense
       counsel from questioning Stapleton and Zettergren about their failure to write
       police reports. Id. ¶¶ 65-67. According to the appellate court, the failure to write
       reports was relevant to the officers’ credibility since it could support an inference
       that they sought to insulate themselves from potential scrutiny regarding their
       actions that day. Id. ¶ 67.

¶ 41       The appellate court again did not reach Pacheco’s arguments that the State
       engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument and that he was
       entitled to monetary credit for time spent in presentence custody. This appeal
       followed. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2021).

¶ 42                                        ANALYSIS

¶ 43       The State challenges the appellate court’s rulings that the trial court violated
       Pacheco’s right to confrontation by limiting the cross-examination of Stapleton and
       that the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion in limine regarding the police
       reports. We address each issue in turn.

                                                - 11 -
¶ 44                         Cross-Examination of Officer Stapleton

¶ 45       The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment of the United States
       Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VI) guarantees a defendant the right to cross-
       examine a witness. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974); People v.
       Klepper, 234 Ill. 2d 337, 355 (2009). This includes the right to cross-examine the
       witness for the purpose of showing bias, interest, or motive to testify falsely. “[T]he
       exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function
       of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.” Davis, 415 U.S. at
       316-17.

          “[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by
          showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-
          examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the
          witness, and thereby ‘to expose to the jury the facts from which . . . could
          appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’ ”
          Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (quoting Davis, 415 U.S.
          at 318).

¶ 46       Relying on this principle, the appellate court in this case determined that
       Pacheco’s right to confrontation was violated. 2021 IL App (3d) 150880-B, ¶¶ 55,
       61. The appellate court noted that defense counsel’s proposed question went to
       Stapleton’s motive to testify falsely about whether Pacheco accelerated toward him.
       Id. ¶ 56. Because this question was not allowed, the appellate court reasoned, there
       was a constitutional violation. Id. ¶ 63. In other words, according to the appellate
       court, the fact that the trial court prohibited a question that went to Stapleton’s
       motive to lie was, standing alone, sufficient to violate Pacheco’s right to
       confrontation. This was error by the appellate court.

¶ 47        A trial court may impose limitations on a defense counsel’s cross-examination
       into the potential bias of a prosecution witness without offending the defendant’s
       sixth amendment right to confrontation. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679; Klepper, 234
       Ill. 2d at 355. The trial court possesses wide latitude to impose reasonable
       limitations on cross-examination based on concerns about harassment, prejudice,
       confusion of the issues, the witness’s safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or of
       little relevance (Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679), and it may impose certain
       restrictions on cross-examination so long as those restrictions serve “ ‘legitimate

                                                - 12 -
       interests in the criminal trial process’ [citation] and are not ‘arbitrary or
       disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.’ ” United States v.
       Almonte, 956 F.2d 27, 30 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44,
       55-56 (1987)). As the United States Supreme Court has observed, “the
       Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination,
       not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the
       defense might wish.” (Emphasis in original.) Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15,
       20 (1985); see also, e.g., United States v. Whyte, 928 F.3d 1317, 1334-35 (11th Cir.
       2019) (“ ‘the mere fact that [the defendant] sought to explore bias on the part of a
       prosecution witness does not automatically void the court’s ability to limit cross-
       examination’ ” (quoting United States v. Diaz, 26 F.3d 1533, 1540 (11th Cir.
       1994))).

¶ 48       Accordingly, when reviewing a confrontation clause challenge, we do not
       “isolate the particular limitation on cross-examination to determine whether
       reversible error has occurred.” People v. Harris, 123 Ill. 2d 113, 145 (1988).
       Instead, we look to the record as a whole (id.), including the necessity for the
       limitation and the alternative means open to the defendant to impeach the witness.
       “[I]f a review of the entire record reveals that the [fact-finder] has been made aware
       of adequate factors concerning relevant areas of impeachment of a witness, no
       constitutional question arises merely because the defendant has been prohibited on
       cross-examination from pursuing other areas of inquiry.” Id. Ultimately, the
       question in each case must be “ ‘whether defendant’s inability to make the inquiry
       created a substantial danger of prejudice by depriving him of the ability to test the
       truth of the witness’s direct testimony.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Rogers, 475
       F.2d 821, 827 (7th Cir. 1973)). Whether cross-examination has satisfied
       constitutional scrutiny is a question of law we review de novo. People v. Williams,
       238 Ill. 2d 125, 141 (2010).

¶ 49       In this case, defense counsel wanted to ask Stapleton whether he feared that he
       would lose his job if the shooting was found to be unjustified. Had counsel asked
       the question, Stapleton’s answer would certainly have been, “no.” The Joliet Police
       Department’s deadly force review panel had determined that Stapleton’s conduct
       was appropriate. Stapleton thus could not have been in fear that his testimony would
       have negative consequences for his job.

                                               - 13 -
¶ 50        Importantly, however, that would not have ended the matter. Having asked the
       question, the door would then have been opened for the State to address the issue
       of employment consequences, thereby allowing the State to introduce the finding
       of the review panel that the shooting was justified. See, e.g., People v. Manning,
       182 Ill. 2d 193, 216 (1998) (“in a criminal case, where the door to a particular
       subject is opened by defense counsel on cross-examination, the State may, on
       redirect, question the witness to clarify or explain the matters brought out during,
       or to remove or correct unfavorable inferences left by, the previous cross-
       examination”). This is the result the trial court expressly stated should “never”
       happen, since it would be wholly improper for the jury to hear that a “panel of
       people who weren’t there” determined that Stapleton’s discharge of his weapon
       “was a justified shooting” and, by implication, that he was in reasonable
       apprehension of being struck by Pacheco’s car. In short, the limitation the trial court
       imposed on the cross-examination of Stapleton was necessary to avoid a highly
       prejudicial outcome to Pacheco. Given these circumstances, we cannot say that the
       trial court erred.

¶ 51        Further, defense counsel was not otherwise limited in his cross-examination of
       Stapleton. Counsel repeatedly tested Stapleton’s memory of events, including his
       location and position during the shooting and how many shots he fired. He also
       challenged the reasonableness of firing his weapon and whether he harbored any
       animus toward Pacheco. Finally, in closing argument, counsel repeatedly asserted
       that Stapleton’s testimony should not be believed, that he was “out of control,” and
       that “he was acting to protect his own interests.” Although counsel did not identify
       what those interests were, the jury would certainly have been aware that they
       included his employment. Indeed, defense counsel himself, when arguing to the
       trial court that he should be allowed to ask his proposed question, noted that “[i]t is
       pretty obvious to everybody if you do not do your job properly as a police officer,
       there can be consequences. This is simple common sense.” The jury in this case
       was made amply aware of facts that bore upon the reliability and credibility of
       Stapleton’s testimony and the propriety of his conduct on the day of Pacheco’s
       pursuit and arrest. The jury simply chose to accept Stapleton’s version of events
       over Pacheco’s.

¶ 52       Having reviewed the record as a whole, we conclude that the trial court did not
       violate Pacheco’s right to confrontation when it denied defense counsel’s request

                                               - 14 -
       to inquire of Stapleton as to whether he believed he could lose his job if the shooting
       was found to be unjustified. For similar reasons, we also find that the trial court did
       not abuse its discretion when it prohibited the question. See People v. Blue, 205 Ill.
       2d 1, 13-14 (2001).

¶ 53                        Motion In Limine Regarding Police Reports

¶ 54        The State contends the trial court properly granted its motion in limine to bar
       defense counsel from asking Stapleton and Zettergren about their failure to write
       police reports and that the appellate court erred in reversing the trial court on this
       issue. Motions in limine are encouraged in criminal cases to exclude collateral or
       extraneous matters. City of Naperville v. Watson, 175 Ill. 2d 399, 409 (1997). A
       motion in limine is addressed to the trial court’s inherent power to admit or exclude
       evidence, and a reviewing court will not reverse the trial court’s decision to grant
       or deny a motion in limine absent a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Williams,
       188 Ill. 2d 365, 369 (1999). The trial court abuses its discretion when “its decision
       is ‘fanciful, arbitrary, or unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable person
       would agree with it.’ ” People v. Kladis, 2011 IL 110920, ¶ 23 (citing People v.
       Ortega, 209 Ill. 2d 354, 359 (2004)). A trial court properly exercises its discretion
       to preclude repetitive or unduly harassing testimony or to exclude evidence of bias
       that is too remote or uncertain. People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 357 (1992). A
       trial court also properly exercises its discretion to preclude nonrelevant evidence
       that would confuse or mislead the jury. People v. Prevo, 302 Ill. App. 3d 1038,
       1048 (1999).

¶ 55       Here, Pacheco concedes he forfeited any challenge on this question but requests
       review under the first prong of the plain error doctrine. The plain error doctrine
       allows a reviewing court to address a forfeited claim where a clear or obvious error
       occurred and (1) “ ‘the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone
       threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the
       seriousness of the error’ ” or (2) the “ ‘error is so serious that it affected the fairness
       of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process,
       regardless of the closeness of the evidence.’ ” People v. Galarza, 2023 IL 127678,
       ¶ 45 (quoting People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007)). The defendant
       carries the burden of persuasion under either prong of the plain error doctrine.

                                                 - 15 -
       People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 43 (2009). The first step in our analysis is
       determining whether a clear and obvious error occurred. People v. Hutt, 2023 IL
       128170, ¶ 29.

¶ 56       The trial court granted the State’s motion in limine on the basis of Stapleton’s
       and Zettergren’s testimony that they were prohibited by the Joliet Police
       Department from preparing police reports because a weapon had been discharged
       during the pursuit and arrest of Pacheco. The court reasoned that, absent any
       discretion on their part, Stapleton’s and Zettergren’s failure to write reports could
       not be considered bad acts and, therefore, could not suggest any bias or
       incompetence.

¶ 57        Rejecting this reasoning, the appellate court below stated that defense counsel
       called Stapleton’s and Zettergren’s testimony “into question by presenting a portion
       of the police department policy manual stating that an officer who discharges his
       or her weapon is to write a police report unless he or she is physically unable” (2021
       IL App (3d) 150880-B, ¶ 65) and that nothing in “the manual would have prohibited
       Zettergren from writing a report” (id. ¶ 65 n.2). This is incorrect. As Pacheco
       acknowledges before this court, defense counsel did not present a policy manual to
       the trial court but, instead, only referenced the interoffice memo prepared by the
       deadly force review panel that discussed proposed policy changes. And, as was
       noted at the time the memo was discussed in court, there was no evidence that any
       of those proposals were in effect at the time of Pacheco’s offenses or if they had
       ever been adopted at all. Stapleton’s and Zettergren’s testimony that they were
       prohibited from writing police reports was uncontradicted. The trial court did not
       abuse its discretion in relying on that testimony when ruling on the motion
       in limine.

¶ 58       The appellate court also found that, even if it was true that the officers were
       prohibited from preparing police reports, the trial court should nevertheless have
       permitted cross-examination on this issue because such a practice “indicates a lack
       of transparency” on the part of the Joliet Police Department and deprived Pacheco
       of the “valuable impeachment tool that police reports provide.” Id. ¶ 67. We
       disagree.

¶ 59      Whether the Joliet Police Department’s practice of having another officer
       prepare the police report when a weapon has been discharged indicated a “lack of

                                               - 16 -
       transparency” on the part of the Department was not relevant to the criminal charges
       before the jury. The “credibility” of the Department or the wisdom of its practices
       was not at issue. The credibility of the individual officers was what mattered.
       Because the individual officers had no choice in the matter, their failure to write
       police reports was irrelevant to any question of bias or credibility. Further, any
       inquiry into police department policies and practices would necessarily have
       resulted in a “minitrial” on the issue, requiring the testimony of officials from the
       Joliet Police Department to explain how those practices worked and why they were
       in place. None of this would have been relevant to the individual credibility of
       Stapleton’s or Zettergren’s testimony and would have distracted the jury from the
       question of determining the guilt or innocence of Pacheco.

¶ 60       Finally, Stapleton and Zettergren were required to and did, in fact, give video
       recorded statements regarding the incident. The trial court specifically advised
       defense counsel that these recordings were available for his use at trial for
       impeachment purposes. Counsel did not use them. Contrary to the appellate court’s
       conclusion, Pacheco was not denied a valuable impeachment tool.

¶ 61        The trial court’s granting of the State’s motion in limine was not “ ‘fanciful,
       arbitrary, or unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable person would agree with
       it.’ ” Kladis, 2011 IL 110920, ¶ 23 (quoting Ortega, 209 Ill. 2d at 359).
       Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State’s
       motion in limine. Because the trial court did not commit a clear or obvious error,
       there was no plain error.

¶ 62                                     CONCLUSION

¶ 63      For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed. This
       cause is remanded to the appellate court to address Pacheco’s claim of prosecutorial
       misconduct during closing argument and presentence monetary credit.

¶ 64      Appellate court judgment reversed.

¶ 65      Cause remanded.

                                              - 17 -
¶ 66      JUSTICE ROCHFORD, specially concurring:

¶ 67       I agree with my colleagues that the appellate court’s judgment should be
       reversed. However, I disagree with the majority’s confrontation clause analysis. I
       would hold that the trial court erred in foreclosing all inquiry into whether Officer
       Stapleton had a motive to lie. However, I would hold the error harmless beyond a
       reasonable doubt.

¶ 68       The majority states most of the governing principles correctly. As the United
       States Supreme Court held in Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986)
       (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974)),

          “a criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing
          that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-
          examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the
          witness, and thereby ‘to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could
          appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.’ ”

       A “defendant has the right to inquire into a witness’ bias, interest, or motive to
       testify falsely.” People v. Coleman, 206 Ill. 2d 261, 278 (2002); see also People v.
       Triplett, 108 Ill. 2d 463, 475 (1985) (“cross-examination to show bias, interest, or
       motive to testify falsely is a matter of right”). “[T]he court should afford a defendant
       the widest latitude to establish the witness’ bias or hostile motivation.” People v.
       Blue, 205 Ill. 2d 1, 14 (2001). Although exposing a witness’s motivation in
       testifying is an “important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-
       examination” (Davis, 415 U.S. at 316-17), it does not follow that a trial judge may
       not place any limits on defense counsel’s exploration of bias on the part of a
       prosecution witness (Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679). Trial courts retain wide latitude
       under the confrontation clause to place reasonable limits on cross-examination,
       “based on concerns about *** harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the
       witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Id.
       The confrontation clause guarantees the accused “an opportunity for effective
       cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to
       whatever extent, the defense might wish.” (Emphasis in original.) Delaware v.
       Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam). This court recognized these same
       principles in Blue, 205 Ill. 2d at 13, where we noted that the trial court’s discretion
       to place reasonable limits on cross-examination arises “only after the court has

                                                - 18 -
       permitted sufficient cross-examination to satisfy the confrontation clause.” See also
       People v. Frieberg, 147 Ill. 2d 326, 357 (1992) (circuit court has no discretionary
       power to deny the defendant the right to cross-examine a witness as to biases,
       interests, or motives to testify but retains discretion to preclude repetitive or unduly
       harassing questions on these matters).

¶ 69       Thus, when a defendant is alleging that his confrontation rights were violated
       by a trial court’s denial of the opportunity to explore a prototypical form of bias on
       the part of a witness, the first inquiry is whether the trial court foreclosed the area
       of inquiry entirely. In Van Arsdall, the Supreme Court held that the trial court had
       erred in prohibiting all inquiry into the possibility that a prosecution witness may
       have been biased because of the dismissal of his pending criminal charge. “By thus
       cutting off all questioning about an event that the State conceded had taken place
       and that a jury might reasonably have found furnished the witness a motive for
       favoring the prosecution in his testimony, the court’s ruling violated respondent’s
       rights secured by the Confrontation Clause.” Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679. In Blue,
       this court held that the trial court had erred in barring all inquiry into the gang
       affiliation of prosecution witnesses. Blue, 205 Ill. 2d at 18. Doing so “unreasonably
       limited the defense from exploring these witnesses’ biases.” Id. This court also
       cautioned that trial courts should hesitate to grant motions in limine when “ ‘the
       result will be, for all practical purposes, an evisceration of the defendant’s theory
       of the case.’ ” Id. at 22 (quoting People v. Prevo, 302 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 1050
       (1999)).

¶ 70        Here, the appellate court applied these same principles in determining that the
       trial court erred by foreclosing all inquiry into whether Officer Stapleton had a
       motive to lie. Defendant’s theory of the case was that Officer Stapleton was lying
       about the incident because he feared the employment consequences of engaging in
       an unjustified shooting. Relying on Van Arsdall, the appellate court held that the
       trial court had erred in foreclosing this area of inquiry:

           “This was a proper subject of cross-examination, as it went to Stapleton’s
           potential bias or motive to testify falsely. By barring defense counsel from
           pursuing this line of questioning, the court improperly prevented defendant
           from ‘ “engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show
           a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness.” ’ ” 2021 IL App (3d)

                                                - 19 -
          150880-B, ¶ 56 (quoting Blue, 205 Ill. 2d at 14, quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.
          at 680).

       The court also noted that, although defense counsel was able to challenge Officer
       Stapleton’s credibility based on inconsistencies between his testimony and other
       evidence, defense counsel was not able to explore any motivation Officer Stapleton
       might have had to testify falsely. By contrast, the State was allowed to present
       argument that Officer Stapleton’s only motivation was “to do his job and keep the
       community safe.” Id. ¶ 62.

¶ 71        The majority rejects the appellate court’s confrontation clause analysis,
       contending that the proper analysis is found in an older case of ours, People v.
       Harris, 123 Ill. 2d 113 (1988). Supra ¶ 48. According to this decision, we do not
       “isolate the particular limitation on cross-examination to determine whether
       reversible error has occurred,” but rather we review the “entire record” to determine
       if the fact-finder was made aware of “adequate factors concerning relevant areas of
       impeachment.” Harris, 123 Ill. 2d at 145. The court “look[s] to the record as a
       whole and the alternative means open to the defendant to impeach the witness.” Id.
       According to this decision, no confrontation clause violation occurs in prohibiting
       a particular area of inquiry on cross-examination if the defendant was permitted to
       pursue other areas of inquiry. Id. The majority also cites United States v. Rogers,
       475 F.2d 821, 827 (7th Cir. 1973), for the proposition that the relevant question is
       “ ‘ “whether defendant’s inability to make the inquiry created a substantial danger
       of prejudice by depriving him of the ability to test the truth of the witness’s direct
       testimony.” ’ ” Supra ¶ 48 (quoting Harris, 123 Ill. 2d at 145, quoting Rogers, 475
       F.2d at 827).

¶ 72       There are several problems with employing the Harris analysis here. First, the
       Harris test directly contradicts the test set forth earlier in the majority opinion. It
       cannot be the case both that a defendant “ ‘states a violation of the Confrontation
       Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate
       cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the
       witness’ ” (supra ¶ 45 (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679)) and that a defendant
       who is prohibited from engaging in cross-examination designed to show a
       prototypical form of bias does not state a violation of the confrontation clause if a
       review of the entire record shows that he was able to pursue other areas of inquiry

                                               - 20 -
       (supra ¶ 48 (citing Harris, 123 Ill. 2d at 145). These are fundamentally
       incompatible inquiries.

¶ 73       Second, a Harris-type analysis was foreclosed by the Supreme Court in Van
       Arsdall. In that case, the Supreme Court explained that “ ‘the exposure of a witness’
       motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally
       protected right of cross-examination.’ ” Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 678-79 (quoting
       Davis, 415 U.S. at 316-17). When the Court looked at whether the defendant was
       denied his confrontation clause rights, the Court looked only to the fact that the
       defendant was denied the right to inquire into the witness’s potential bias. The
       Court did not base its finding of a confrontation clause violation on whether the
       defendant was able to cross-examine the witness on other matters:

          “[T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is
          concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on
          concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the
          issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally
          relevant. And as we observed earlier this Term, ‘the Confrontation Clause
          guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-
          examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the
          defense might wish.’ Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U. S. 15, 20 (1985)
          (per curiam) (emphasis in original).

              In this case, however, the trial court prohibited all inquiry into the
          possibility that Fleetwood would be biased as a result of the State’s dismissal
          of his pending public drunkenness charge. By thus cutting off all questioning
          about an event that the State conceded had taken place and that a jury might
          reasonably have found furnished the witness a motive for favoring the
          prosecution in his testimony, the court’s ruling violated respondent’s rights
          secured by the Confrontation Clause.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 679.

       After holding this, the Supreme Court did not consider whether defense counsel
       was able to cross-examine the witness on other matters or to otherwise test the
       truthfulness of his testimony. Rather, the Court held that the defendant was denied
       his confrontation clause rights because he was “prohibited from engaging in
       otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of
       bias on the part of the witness.” Id. at 680. The Supreme Court then remanded the

                                              - 21 -
       case to the Delaware Supreme Court to determine whether the error was harmless
       beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 684.

¶ 74        Van Arsdall thus makes clear that, when the Supreme Court spoke of the
       confrontation clause’s guarantee of the opportunity for effective cross-examination
       in the context of exploring a witness’s bias or motive to lie, the Court was speaking
       of the opportunity for effective cross-examination on that particular matter, not the
       opportunity for cross-examination in general. And, indeed, that is how this court
       applied the confrontation clause in Blue. After determining that the trial court had
       erred in cutting off all cross-examination on a subject crucial to determining witness
       bias, this court proceeded to determine whether the error was harmless. Blue, 205
       Ill. 2d at 18. This court did not consider whether the defendant was able to cross-
       examine these witnesses on other matters or otherwise test the truth of their
       testimony. By contrast, the majority opinion suggests that the opportunity for
       effective cross-examination referenced by the Supreme Court in Van Arsdall
       simply means that defendant had the opportunity for effective cross-examination in
       general and, if he did, then it is perfectly appropriate for the trial court to prohibit
       him from engaging in cross-examination designed to expose a prototypical form of
       bias on the part of the witness. Supra ¶ 47. This view cannot be squared with Van
       Arsdall or Blue.

¶ 75       Third, this court in Harris relied on federal cases that predated Van Arsdall and
       addressed a different type of confrontation clause challenge. See Harris, 123 Ill. 2d
       at 145 (citing United States ex rel. Blackwell v. Franzen, 688 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.
       1982), Rogers, 475 F.2d 821, and Fountain v. United States, 384 F.2d 624 (5th Cir.
       1967)). These cases involved a defendant’s right to cross-examine a witness who
       had asserted a privilege for part of his testimony. Both Rogers and Fountain
       involved a witness who asserted the fifth amendment privilege against self-
       incrimination for part of his or her testimony. See Rogers, 475 F.2d at 826;
       Fountain, 384 F.2d at 627; see also U.S. Const., amend. V. In this situation, the
       court needs to determine if the assertion of the privilege violates the defendant’s
       right of confrontation to the extent that the witness’s testimony must be stricken.
       As Rogers noted, the proper analysis for determining whether a defendant’s sixth
       amendment right has been violated because of a witness’s assertion of the fifth
       amendment privilege was stated in Fountain:

                                                - 22 -
              “Where the privilege is legitimately invoked by a witness during cross
          examination, all or part of that witness’s direct testimony may be subject to a
          motion to strike. The ultimate inquiry is whether the defendant has been
          deprived of his right to test the truth of the direct testimony. United States v.
          Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606, 611 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 822, 84 S.Ct. 60,
          11 L.Ed.2d 55 (1963). If he has, so much of the direct testimony as cannot be
          subjected to sufficient inquiry must be struck. The distinction is generally
          drawn between invoking the privilege as to ‘collateral matters,’ not requiring
          the striking of direct testimony, and invoking it as to ‘direct’ matters.
          [Citations.] But the line between ‘direct’ and ‘collateral’ is not clear, and the
          question in each case must finally be whether defendant’s inability to make the
          inquiry created a substantial danger of prejudice by depriving him of the ability
          to test the truth of the witness’s direct testimony.” Fountain, 384 F.2d at 628.

       See also U.S. Const., amend. VI.

¶ 76       Similarly, in Franzen, the defendant wished to cross-examine a state witness on
       a matter that was within the witness’s attorney-client privilege. Franzen, 688 F.2d
       at 498-500. The court analyzed the issue by citing the analysis used by the courts
       in Rogers and Fountain and stated that the ultimate determination is “whether the
       probative value of the alleged privileged communication was such that the
       defendant’s right to effective cross-examination was substantially diminished.” Id.
       at 501.

¶ 77       In Harris, this court quoted the above cases out of context when determining
       whether the defendants’ confrontation rights were violated when they were not
       allowed to engage in cross-examination designed to expose a witness’s bias or
       motive to testify falsely. Harris, 123 Ill. 2d at 143-45. Harris did not involve a
       witness who had asserted a privilege for part of his testimony. In Harris, the
       defendants sought to question a witness about (1) his expectations that his good-
       time credit would be restored in exchange for his testimony against the defendants
       and (2) certain correspondence allegedly exchanged between the witness and the
       Director of Corrections about a transfer out of Stateville prison. Id. at 143-44.
       Although this court cited the inapposite analysis from the above federal cases, we
       ultimately resolved the issue on the bases that (1) the defendants had been given
       sufficient latitude to explore the witness’s bias and (2) they had not been completely

                                               - 23 -
       precluded from cross-examining the witness about the good-time credits. Id. at 148.
       This is the type of inquiry that Van Arsdall requires. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at
       678-80.

¶ 78       Clearly, then, the federal cases this court cited and quoted in Harris were
       addressing a different type of confrontation clause challenge. As the Seventh
       Circuit itself has explained, the situation is different when a defendant’s challenge
       implicates the confrontation clause’s “core values”:

          “When a district court limits cross-examination, the first question is whether
          the limitation ‘directly implicates the Confrontation Clause’s core values’
          triggering de novo review. United State v. Groce, 891 F.3d 260, 267 (7th Cir.
          2018); United States v. Williamson, 202 F.3d 974, 978 (7th Cir. 2000).
          Embedded in that question are two more—what are ‘core values’ under the
          Confrontation Clause, and when are they ‘directly’ implicated? This court has
          recognized that, among others, ‘[e]xposing a witness’s motivation, biases, or
          incentives for lying’ and ‘[i]mpeaching a witness’ are core values. Groce, 891
          F.3d at 267 (quotation omitted). And core values are ‘directly’ implicated when
          the district court denies a defendant a ‘reasonable opportunity’ to elicit
          impeaching or discrediting testimony. United States v. Trent, 863 F.3d 699, 705
          (7th Cir. 2017). We have held that an opportunity is reasonable if the defendant
          ‘merely ha[s] the chance to present a motive to lie,’ Trent, 863 F.3d at 705, or
          to elicit impeachment testimony. See United States v. Clark, 657 F.3d 578, 584
          (7th Cir. 2011).” (Emphasis added.) United States v. Hart, 995 F.3d 584, 589
          (7th Cir. 2021).

¶ 79       In later cases such as Blue, this court would correctly cite the Van Arsdall test
       as the proper analysis when assessing a claim that a defendant was denied the right
       to cross-examine a witness on bias or motivation to testify. See Blue, 205 Ill. 2d at
       3-14. There is no reason for this court to revive the mistaken and inapposite Harris
       test. Rather, since the defendant has raised a challenge that directly implicates the
       confrontation clause’s core values, we should be considering whether the trial court
       improperly cut off all inquiry into whether Officer Stapleton had a motive to lie. As
       Hart explains, this is a low bar to clear. The trial court merely has to give a
       defendant a chance to present a motive to lie before the trial court’s discretion to
       further limit cross-examination arises. See Hart, 995 F.3d at 589. Here, the

                                              - 24 -
       appellate court found a confrontation clause violation because defendant did not get
       that chance. See 2021 IL App (3d) 150880-B, ¶¶ 55-59, 62.

¶ 80       Having framed the confrontation clause analysis incorrectly, the majority does
       not focus on the proper question: whether the trial court foreclosed all inquiry into
       whether Officer Stapleton had a motive to lie. Rather, the majority finds no
       confrontation clause violation because (1) allowing defendant to question Officer
       Stapleton about whether he feared the potential employment consequences of an
       unjustified shooting would have opened the door to prejudicial evidence being
       introduced against defendant and (2) defendant was not otherwise limited in his
       cross-examination of Officer Stapleton. Neither reason is a valid basis to reverse
       the appellate court.

¶ 81       The majority contends that the trial court was essentially saving defendant from
       himself by not allowing him to cross-examine Officer Stapleton about whether he
       feared that he would lose his job if the shooting was found to be unjustified.
       According to the majority, this would have opened the door to the results of the
       Joliet Police Department’s deadly force review panel being admitted against
       defendant. Thus, the trial court’s ruling was “necessary to avoid a highly prejudicial
       outcome to Pacheco.” Supra ¶ 50. This was, of course, not the trial court’s reason
       for barring defendant from cross-examining Officer Stapleton on this matter.
       Rather, as the appellate court explained, the trial court’s sole basis for denying the
       questions was the trial court’s misreading of People v. Adams, 2012 IL 111168.
       2021 IL App (3d) 150880-B, ¶¶ 57-59. Moreover, it is not at all clear that the door
       would have been opened for the review panel’s decision to be admitted. Without
       knowing what questions the trial court would have allowed, we simply do not know.
       For instance, defense counsel at one point asserted that he wanted to ask Officer
       Stapleton whether, in his mind, after he shot defendant, he was concerned that the
       shooting could have had a detrimental impact on his employment. Counsel then
       stated, “if he says no, fine. If he says yes, fine. But I am asking him did your actions
       on that day give you a reason to lie.” If defense counsel had merely asked Officer
       Stapleton a question about his state of mind in the aftermath of the shooting, it is
       not clear why this would have opened the door to the results of the review board’s
       decision being admitted. And, as the majority notes, the trial court had stated its
       intention not to allow those results to be admitted, so presumably the trial court

                                                - 25 -
       would have exercised its discretion to limit cross-examination on this matter before
       the door was opened.

¶ 82       More importantly, though, the majority never explains what any of this has to
       do with the confrontation clause. Either defendant had a right to explore this area
       on cross-examination, or he did not. Either the trial court was entitled to cut off all
       inquiry into this matter, or it was not. Even if the door was opened to the review
       panel’s decision being admitted, this was the defense’s strategic choice to make.
       Presumably, since defendant’s theory of the case was that Officer Stapleton had
       fabricated a false story to cover up an unjustified use of force, defense counsel
       would have argued that Officer Stapleton was lying to the review panel, too.
       Regardless, however, the majority simply fails to explain how this is relevant to
       whether defendant’s confrontation rights were violated.

¶ 83       The majority also points out that defense counsel was not otherwise limited in
       his cross-examination of Officer Stapleton. Supra ¶ 51. As I will explain, I find this
       relevant to whether the confrontation clause error was harmless, not to whether
       there was error in the first place. The majority highlights other questions that
       defense counsel asked that went to Officer Stapleton’s credibility and the
       reasonableness of his actions. Supra ¶ 51. The majority also points out that defense
       counsel was allowed to argue to the jury that Officer Stapleton was “ ‘out of
       control’ ” and acting to protect his own interests. Supra ¶ 51. Thus, the “jury in this
       case was made amply aware of facts that bore upon the reliability and credibility of
       Stapleton’s testimony and the propriety of his conduct on the day of Pacheco’s
       pursuit and arrest.” Supra ¶ 51. This reasoning is a direct result of the majority’s
       application of the Harris test, where this court looks to the record as a whole to
       determine if the defendant was adequately able to test the truth of the witness’s
       testimony. As explained above, this test was designed to address a different type of
       confrontation clause challenge. It has no place here, where defendant is alleging
       that the trial court’s limitation of cross-examination directly implicated the
       confrontation clause’s core values. Here, this court’s initial focus must be on
       whether the trial court foreclosed all inquiry into whether Officer Stapelton had a
       motive to lie. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 678-80.

¶ 84      Because the trial court completely denied defendant the opportunity to explore
       whether Officer Stapleton had a motive to lie, I agree with the appellate court that

                                               - 26 -
       defendant’s right of confrontation was violated. See 2021 IL App (3d) 150880-B,
       ¶¶ 55-56. However, that does not end the inquiry. As the Supreme Court explained
       in Van Arsdall, the denial of a defendant’s right to impeach a witness for bias is
       subject to harmless error analysis. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684. Factors that
       reviewing courts should consider include “the importance of the witness’ testimony
       in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or
       absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on
       material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of
       course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” Id. The first two of these
       factors weigh in defendant’s favor. Officer Stapleton was the most important
       witness in the prosecution’s case, and there was no other testimony about whether
       he had a motive to lie.

¶ 85       The final three factors, however, weigh in favor of finding the error harmless.
       As the majority notes, there was other evidence that tended to corroborate Officer
       Stapleton’s account of the shooting. Supra ¶¶ 18-26. Moreover, the factors that the
       majority finds relevant to determining whether there was a confrontation clause
       error, I believe are relevant in considering whether the confrontation clause error
       was harmless. See supra ¶ 51. As the majority explains, defense counsel was not
       otherwise limited in his examination of Officer Stapleton. He was able to question
       him extensively about his memory of events, including his position and location
       during the shooting. He also “challenged the reasonableness of firing his weapon
       and whether he harbored any animus toward Pacheco.” Supra ¶ 51. Defense
       counsel also argued to the jury that Officer Stapleton should not be believed
       because he was “out of control” and acting to protect his own interests. But the jury
       clearly did not believe this. The jury obviously found Officer Stapleton credible
       and believed his account of the shooting.

¶ 86      Finally, the case against defendant was strong. 1 Officer Stapleton’s testimony
       was corroborated by other evidence, including the testimony of two witnesses who
       confirmed that defendant’s car was moving before Officer Stapleton began firing.

           1
             The majority claims as a matter of established fact that defendant “tried to hit a Joliet police
       officer with his car.” Supra ¶ 1. However, it was a contested factual issue at trial whether defendant’s
       car was even moving when Officer Stapleton discharged his weapon. And the jury’s acquittal of
       defendant on the charge of attempted aggravated battery of Officer Stapleton is a strong indication
       that the jury did not believe defendant was trying to hit Officer Stapleton with his car.

                                                       - 27 -
       And as the State points out, although neither witness testified that they saw Officer
       Stapleton standing in front of defendant’s car, that is a reasonable inference from
       the evidence that Officer Stapleton was yelling at defendant to stop, that defendant
       was yelling to get out of his way, that Officer Stapleton can be seen in surveillance
       video running away from defendant’s car, and the photographs showing that Officer
       Stapleton shot through defendant’s windshield. Given all of this, it is difficult to
       believe that defense counsel being allowed to ask Officer Stapleton whether he
       believed that the shooting could have had a detrimental impact on his employment
       would have made a difference in the outcome of the trial. Thus, I would find the
       trial court’s error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 87       Accordingly, I agree with my colleagues that the appellate court’s decision
       should be reversed. However, I would resolve the confrontation clause issue on the
       basis of harmless error. I agree with the majority’s resolution of the second issue.

¶ 88      JUSTICES HOLDER WHITE and O’BRIEN join in this special concurrence.

                                              - 28 -