Court Opinion

ID: 9631812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:50:56.905856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:01.985095
License: Public Domain

CARTER, J.
I dissent.
I agree with Mr. Justice Schauer that the evidence produced at the trial of this case is sufficient to sustain the findings of the jury that decedent was of unsound mind at the time the will in question was executed and that the execution of the will was the result of the undue influence of appellants.
It should be remembered that in this ease we have not only the verdict of the jury holding the will invalid on both the above mentioned grounds but we have the rulings of *589the trial judge denying, first, a motion for a nonsuit; second, a motion for a directed verdict; third, a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; and fourth, a motion for a new trial. We also have the unanimous opinion of the District Court of Appeal holding that the evidence is sufficient to support. the finding of unsoundness of mind but that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support the finding of undue influence. • (See Estate of Lingenfelter, decided July 12, 1951 *(Cal.App.) 234 P.2d 125.) Now a majority of this court holds that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the finding of either unsoundness of mind or of undue influence. In so holding the majority of this court has, in my opinion, gone farther in this case than in any other reported decision in usurping the function of the triers of fact, and has in effect placed itself in the position of the trier of fact in weighing the evidence and passing upon the credibility of the witnesses.
A statute of this state expressly provides that: “Any issue of fact involving . . . the due execution and attestation of the will, or any other question substantially affecting the validity of the will, must be tried by a jury unless a jury is waived. . . .” (Italics added.) (Prob. Code, § 371.) The force and effect of this statute was recently emphasized by a unanimous decision of this court in the case of Swift v. Superior Court, S. F. No. 18503, decided March 7, 1952. But of what value is the right to have an issue of fact tried by a jury if a majority of this court is to usurp the function of the jury in weighing the evidence and passing upon the credibility of the witnesses as this court has done in this case? The answer is obvious. The effect of the majority decision in this case makes the above cited statute a dead letter, and emphasizes the oft-repeated statement by critics of our judicial system that the result in any case depends not upon the law as declared by the Legislature or prior decisions of the courts, but upon the philosophy or point of view of the majority who compose the court of last resort. In other words, we have a government of men and not of law.
I have heretofore stated that the majority decision in this case goes farther in disregarding the determination of the fact finding body than any other decision because it not only nullifies the determination of the jury that Vivian Lingenfelter was of unsound mind when she executed the will in *590question and was acting under the undue influence of the appellants, but it also disregards the rulings of the trial judge sustaining those findings and the holding of the District Court of Appeal as to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding of unsoundness of mind.
Without attempting to review all of the decisions of this court and the District Courts of Appeal which have refused to sustain the findings of juries that wills executed by. testators were invalid because of their unsoundness of mind or were procured by undue influence, my review of these decisions discloses that in almost every case where this court has refused to accept the determination of the jury in cases such as this, either the trial court had granted a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or the District Court of Appeal had reversed a judgment based upon a jury verdict vacating and setting aside the will. In Estate of Arnold, 16 Cal.2d 573 [107 P.2d 25], the trial court had granted a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the District Court of Appeal affirmed and this court likewise affirmed by a divided court. The same is true of Estate of Finkler, 3 Cal.2d 584 [46 P.2d 149], In Estate of Llewellyn, 83 Cal.App.2d 534 [189 P.2d 822, 191 P.2d 419], Estate of Russell, 80 Cal.App.2d 711 [182 P.2d 318], Estate of Agnew, 65 Cal.App.2d 553 [151 P.2d 126] and Estate of Hopkins, 136 Cal.App. 590 [29 P.2d 249], this court denied petitions for a hearing after a unanimous decision by the District Court of Appeal reversing the judgment in each of said cases. In Estate of Wright, 7 Cal.2d 348 [60 P.2d 434], this court by a bare majority of four justices reversed a judgment holding a will invalid on the sole ground of testamentary incapacity where the trial court denied a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict which determined that the deceased was of unsound mind at the time the will was executed. All of the foregoing cases hold that the evidence upon which the verdict was based was insufficient to show either unsoundness of mind or undue influence, although, to my mind, the conclusion reached by this court in each of said cases was based upon reasoning in conflict with the general rule that in cases where a trial by jury is a matter of right, all questions as to the weight of evidence and credibility of witnesses are within the sole province of the jury. There can be no doubt that the trend of decision both by this court and the District Courts of Appeal in will contest cases has been in direct conflict with the last mentioned settled rule which is generally applied in cases *591other than, those involving a will contest. Yet, we find in nearly every decision of this court and the District Courts of Appeal in will contest eases the statement that the appellate courts of this state are bound by the conflict of evidence rule and that questions as to the weight of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses are for the determination of the trier of fact. I think that any unbiased mind after reviewing these decisions will agree with me that in the decisions above referred to the conflict of evidence rule has not been applied and that this court and the District Courts of Appeal in deciding those cases have simply given lip service to that rule and then disregarded it in reaching its conclusion. Such is the situation in the case at bar.
Estate of Teel, 25 Cal.2d 520 [154 P.2d 384], marks a clear departure from the rule followed in the cases hereinabove cited and similar cases. In the last cited case this court said, at page 525: “Proponent on the other hand produced an array of witnesses who testified as to the soundness of decedent’s mind and contradicted other evidence offered by contestant. Attorneys with whom decedent consulted during 1940 regarding the disposition of her property including Mr. Ricks, the draftsman of the will, and other persons acquainted with her, testified that her mind was sound. Evidence is pointed to which it is asserted explains the instances of decedent’s conduct above referred to. The value or credibility of those explanations was for the trier of fact. Reference is made to evidence that she handled her first husband’s business affairs for many years, he being blind, and that she was a careful and cautious business woman. To review those conflicts is not the function of this court. The trier of fact is the sole judge of the credibility and weight of the evidence in a will contest the same as in any other case. (Estate of Bristol, 23 Cal.2d 221 [143 P.2d 689] ; Estate of Miller, 16 Cal.App.2d 154 [60 P.2d 498] ; Estate of Barney, 62 Cal.App. 413 [217 P. 135] ; Estate of Gill, 14 Cal.App.2d 526 [58 P.2d 734]; Estate of Doolittle, 153 Cal. 29 [94 P. 240]; Estate of Snowball, 157 Cal. 301 [107 P. 598] ; Estate of Cashion, 27 Cal.App.2d 689 [81 P.2d 628]; Estate of Allan, 15 Cal.App.2d 272 [59 P.2d 425]; Estate of Caspar, 172 Cal. 147 [155 P. 631] ; Estate of Arnold, 147 Cal. 583 [82 P. 252]; Estate of Webster, 43 Cal.App.2d 6 [110 P.2d 81, 111 P.2d 355] ; Estate of Ross, 199 Cal. 641 [250 P. 676] ; Estate of Johnson, 200 Cal. 299 [252 P. 1049]; Estate of Barr, 69 Cal.App. 16 [230 P. 181] ; Estate of Russell, 189 Cal. 759 [210 P. 249].) *592An excellent statement of the rule appears in Estate of Bristol, supra. Although the issue was whether a codicil had been destroyed by the testator, the general rule is stated at page 223:
“ ‘The rules of evidence, the weight to be accorded to the evidence, and the province of a reviewing court, are the same in a will contest as in any other civil case. . . . The rule as to our province is: “In reviewing the evidence ... all conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent, and all legitimate and reasonable inferences indulged in to uphold the verdict if possible. It is an elementary . . . principle of law, that when a verdict is attacked as being unsupported, the power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uneontradieted, which will support the conclusion reached by the jury. When two or more inferences can be reasonably deduced from the facts, the reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court.” (Italics added.) . . . The rule quoted is as applicable in reviewing the findings of a judge as it is when considering a jury’s verdict. The critical word in the definition is “substantial”; it is a door which can lead as readily to abuse as to practical or enlightened justice.’
“A somewhat different theory was expressed in Estate of Casarotti, 184 Cal. 73, 78 [192 P. 1085], where this court said: ‘The testimony of proponent’s witnesses must be taken into account in weighing the sufficiency of contestant’s ease. Evidence which standing by itself might be sufficient to sustain a verdict may in the light of all the facts be wholly inadequate, and that without invading the province of the jury as the judges of the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. ’ This statement was quoted in Estate of McDonough, 200 Cal. 57 [251 P. 916], The last quoted excerpt cannot be considered as an accurate statement of the law inasmuch as it is contrary to the foregoing declaration in Estate of Bristol, supra, which has been announced so frequently that it must be considered as controlling. Of course, all of the evidence must be examined, but it is not weighed. All of the evidence most favorable to the respondent must be accepted as true, and that unfavorable discarded as not having sufficient verity to be accepted by the trier of fact. If the evidence so viewed is sufficient as a matter of law, the judgment must be affirmed.” I submit that the majority opinion in the ease at bar is in direct conflict with the foregoing declaration by this court.
*593As Mr. Justice Schauer has made a correct summation of the evidence in his dissenting opinion in this case I shall not attempt to do so, but wish to add my unqualified concurrence with his statement that the evidence disclosed by the record is amply sufficient to sustain the findings of the jury as to the invalidity of the will.
I would, therefore, affirm the judgment denying probate of the will here involved.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied April 3, 1952. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

A hearing by the Supreme Court was granted on Sept. 7, 1951.