Court Opinion

ID: 9586088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:07:05.848931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:20.182041
License: Public Domain

Townsend,- Judge,
concurring specially on rehearing.
1. As is pointed .out. in the motion, to rehear,'.the entire salary of the claimant was not included in.the actual remuneration upon which the policy premiums are computed, in that it appears that the premium was based, on a $1,600 .salary to the claimant for a 16-week period, w'hereas he testified that his gross salary was $600 per month. It is accordingly contended that the duties of the claimant as president of the corporation were not included in the remuneration on which the premium basis was figured, and th.at as to such duties he is not covered under' the policy.
Code § 114-608 provides, “Every policy for the insurance of the compensation herein provided, or against liability therefor . . . shall be deemed to be made subject to the provisions of this Title.” Accordingly, a policy of insurance covering the workmen's compensation field is by law made subject to all the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Code § 114-101 defines “employee” as “every person in the service of another under any contract of hire or apprenticeship.” Here, the insurance carrier specifically accepted as an employee in the capacity of salesman a person known to it to be' the president of the employer corporation. Whether or not the insurance company attempted to insure this man as a salesman and not as a president is not clear, but it did accept premiums on the claimant as an employee of the company, which he was, at all times involved here. Under Code § 114-607 an insurer issuing to an employer a policy of insurance covering an employee who is otherwise exempt is estopped from pleading the exemption as a defense.
The general rule is that where the statute requires an instrument to be drawn, and the instrument as executed for the purpose of complying with statutory requirements does not, in all respects, meet them, “whatever is included in the bond which is not thereby required must be read out, and whatever is not expressed and ought to have been incorporated must be read in, so as to conform to the requirements of the law.” Collins v. U.S.F. & G. Co., 72 Ga. App. 875, 880 (35 S. E. 2d 474); Talmadge v. General Cas. Co. of America, 88 Ga. App. 234 (76 S. E. 2d 562). The statement in the policy that the “remuneration *267of the president - -. . - . [includes] - the remuneration - of anyone or more of such-designated officers who-are actually performing such duties as -áre ordinarily-undertaken by a superintendent”, etc., must be construed -not-only in-favor-of the-claimant against the insurance company preparing the policy,-but construed in conformity with the statutory, provisions. So -Construed, I am of the opinion that the policy covered the -claimant, whether he was in the first instance exempt from its provisions or not,- -and whether the company figured his entire salary in fixing the premium-rate or-not, and whether he was actually engaged in the act of selling equipment at the time of his injury or not, so long as his-injuiy arose out of .and in the course of his employment ■by the employer.
2. Under Code § 22-101 a corporation is ah artificial person created by law. The- corporate identity is entirely separate from the identity of its officers and stockholders, and a corporation and the sole owner thereof are two separate and distinct persons. Waycross Air-Line R. Co. v. Offerman & Western R. Co., 109 Ga. 827, 828 (35 S. E. 275); Newton Mfg. Co. v. White, 42 Ga. 148; Shingler v. Shingler, 184 Ga. 671 (3) (192 S. E. 824). The contention that the claimant here was in fact the employer of himself because he was the president and owner of the corporation, for which reason he will not be permitted to sue himself, entirely overlooks the fact that the corporation and the claimant are distinct and separate entities. This is not true of a partnership, which has no legal entity aside from that of the persons who unite as partners, for which reason nothing in United States Fidelity &c. Co. v. Neal, 188 Ga. 105 (3 S. E. 2d 80), which deals with a partnership, is pertinent to' this case. The rights and liabilities of partnerships and corporations differ greatly in legal effect, and these differences often form the basis for an individual choice as to the manner of setting’up and operating a business’. Where the legal consequences differ, it is obvious that partnership law is not good authority in cases involving a corporation, and vice versa. Foreign authorities on pertinent legal questions may be persuasive, but they, too, are not binding. It is therefore my conclusion that the court should adhere to its judgment of reversal in this case.