Court Opinion

ID: 9622797
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:23:38.370978+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:19.836387
License: Public Domain

CARLEY, Justice,
concurring specially.
I fully concur in Divisions 1, 2, and 4 of the majority opinion, and in the judgment of affirmance. I also agree with Division 3 that the justification charge of which Preston complains does not require the evidence offered by the defendant to raise reasonable doubt, “but expressly directs consideration of the evidence as a whole. In addition, the charge has been held by this Court to be a correct statement of the law that does not shift the burden of proof to the defendant. [Cit.]” Without citing any authority, however, the majority also suggests that the charge should not be given in the future.
Discouraging the use of a particular jury instruction is not a matter which can be taken lightly or with less than full and careful consideration. Indeed, such a statement effectively informs the bench and bar of the potential for this Court to take the further step of holding that the giving of the charge is error. Harris v. State, 273 Ga. 608, 610 (2) (543 SE2d 716) (2001).
The majority disregards a very similar portion of an alibi instruction which is found in the Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases (3rd ed.), 3.11.10 and which was unanimously approved by this Court. Patterson v. State, 233 Ga. 724, 730 (7), fn. 2 (213 SE2d 612) (1975). See also Pattillo v. State, 250 Ga. 510, 513 (2) (299 SE2d 710) (1983); Robinson v. State, 229 Ga. 319, 320-321 (2) (191 SE2d 41) (1972). Furthermore, this Court specifically approved the latter part of the charge as a proper instruction for the jury “to *215consider the evidence as a whole in determining if it had a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.” Anderson v. State, 226 Ga. 35, 37-38 (5) (172 SE2d 424) (1970). Thus, our precedent indicates that the justification charge which was given in this case should not be labeled “confusing” merely because it “contains two truisms. ...” (Maj. op., p. 213.)
Decided June 25, 2007.
Zell & Zell, Rodney S. Zell, for appellant.
Gwendolyn Keyes Fleming, District Attorney, Daniel J. Quinn, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, David A. Zisook, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Furthermore, the majority erroneously states that, “[s]ince the instruction is so general, it could be seen to dilute the message of other more specific charges concerning affirmative defenses.” (Maj. op., p. 213.) The mere fact that one charge is general and others are specific is quite common and hardly cautions against their use. Instead, both should be encouraged where, as here, they are complementary. See Mallory v. State, 271 Ga. 150, 152 (2) (517 SE2d 780) (1999) (Benham, C. J.); Malone v. State, 277 Ga. App. 694, 697 (3) (627 SE2d 378) (2006). My review of the charges in this case does not reveal that the general charge diluted the specific charges in any manner or otherwise could cause the jury to misunderstand them. See Gordon v. State, 210 Ga. App. 224, 226 (2) (435 SE2d 742) (1993), overruled on other grounds, Strickland v. State, 223 Ga. App. 772, 775 (1) (a) (479 SE2d 125) (1996).
The maj ority’s criticism of the justification charge at issue in this case is wholly without support. Nevertheless, the majority does not find any reversible error. Accordingly, although I strongly disagree with the criticism of the instruction in Division 3 of the majority opinion, I concur in the affirmance of the trial court’s judgment.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hines joins in this special concurrence.