Court Opinion

ID: 9954200
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 20:03:18.263741+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:53.502693
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/25/24 P. v. Ruiz CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                            B323988

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Los Angeles County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. BA501067)
           v.

 MIGUEL ALBERTO RUIZ,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, H. Clay Jacke II, Judge. Affirmed.
      The Law Offices of Aaron J. Schechter and Aaron J.
Schechter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Roberta L. Davis and David A. Wildman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                _______________________________
       Miguel Alberto Ruiz appeals from a judgment entered after
a jury found him guilty of one count of stalking a victim and one
count of violating a protective order pertaining to a different
victim. Ruiz admitted two prior strike convictions, the trial court
found five aggravating factors relating to Ruiz’s prior convictions
to be true, and the jury found five other aggravating factors to be
true. The trial court sentenced Ruiz to six years in prison: the
upper term of three years on the stalking count, doubled based on
one of the prior strikes.
       Ruiz contends the trial court erred in imposing the upper
term sentence because, among other things, the trial court found
to be true three “subjective” aggravating factors that “cannot be
established by a certified record of conviction alone and should
have been submitted to the jury”; and the trial court relied on
“three aggravating factors that the jury did not specifically find
true as to the felony stalking count,” as opposed to the
misdemeanor count for violation of a protective order. For
reasons explained below, we conclude that any such error was
harmless. We also reject Ruiz’s challenge to a fine and
assessments the trial court imposed.
                          BACKGROUND
I.     Charges
       An amended information charged Ruiz with stalking
Abigail Rivaz between April 1, 2021 and September 21, 2021, a
felony. (Pen. Code,1 § 646.9, subd. (a); count 1.) The stalking
began about one month before Ruiz turned 25 years old. Count 2
charged Ruiz with violating protective orders pertaining to Arlen
Santos on or about February 2, 2022, a misdemeanor. (§ 166,

      1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                2
subd. (c)(1).) The amended information alleged Ruiz had two
prior strike convictions within the meaning of the “Three Strikes”
law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)): a February
2020 conviction for battery causing serious bodily injury (§ 243,
subd. (d)), and a February 2021 conviction for attempted first
degree burglary (§§ 459 & 664). As to count 1, the felony stalking
count, the amended information alleged numerous circumstances
in aggravation, some relating to the crime and some relating to
Ruiz.
II.    Overview of Evidence Presented at Trial
       A.     Prosecution case
              1.   Count 1 – stalking of Rivaz
       Rivaz’s mother met Ruiz at a grocery store. Beginning in
April 2021, Ruiz began coming over, uninvited, to the apartment
Rivaz shared with her mother. He would appear late at night,
roaming around the back of the building or in front of their
kitchen window. He would knock on their door or window and
call out Rivaz’s name. On one occasion, he had bricks in his
hands. On another occasion, he had a knife in his waistband.
One night, he yelled to Rivaz to come outside and told her he was
going to take her to Tijuana because people they both knew were
asking him to take her there. These incidents scared Rivaz. She
repeatedly told Ruiz to leave the property and not return.
       On September 1, 2021, after Ruiz had come to the home
around five times, Rivaz went to a police station and filed a
report. Thereafter, Ruiz returned to Rivaz’s home around five
more times. On the last occasion, Ruiz told Rivaz he had come by
to apologize to her. Rivaz informed him that she had filed a
police report. He stated he did not care and would be down the

                                3
street if somebody was looking for him. Rivaz contacted the
police, and Ruiz was arrested.
       In addition to Rivaz’s testimony, her mother and boyfriend
also testified at trial regarding their encounters with Ruiz at the
home they shared. On one occasion, Ruiz swung a piece of wood
at Rivaz’s mother when he confronted her as she returned home
from the grocery store.
             2.     Count 2 – violation of protective order
                    pertaining to Santos
       Santos testified at trial. She and Ruiz lived in the same
apartment building. Beginning in 2019, Ruiz made regular,
unwanted contact with Santos. He would regularly follow her off
the premises as she walked her dog; he would stand in front of
her door or window and look inside her apartment; and he would
place notes inside her locked car. She told him she was not
interested in having contact with him.
       Santos feared for her safety as Ruiz’s behavior escalated.
In March 2020, there was a physical confrontation between Ruiz
and Santos’s brother about Ruiz staring into Santos’s window.
According to Santos, Ruiz became violent and his family was
unable to calm him down, so Santos called the police. An officer
talked to Ruiz, but did not arrest him. Santos obtained a
restraining order, which was served on Ruiz on March 19, 2020.
       The next day, Ruiz attempted to gain access to Santos’s
apartment. He took the screen off the window and started to
slide the window open. She locked her windows and dialed 911.
As she waited for officers to respond, Ruiz went to her balcony
and attempted to remove the air conditioning unit from her
bedroom window. Officers took Ruiz into custody. After this

                                 4
incident, Santos obtained a three-year, permanent restraining
order against Ruiz, which was served on him in April 2020.
      Ruiz continued to contact Santos. Charges were brought
against him. A protective order was issued in that case on July 9,
2021, preventing him from having contact with her, including
personal, electronic, telephonic, or written. Thereafter, in
September 2021, Santos’s security camera captured video of Ruiz
pacing in front of her window, while holding a rock and shaking it
at the camera. He also approached her door and moved the
doorknob.
      Count 2 in this case, for misdemeanor violation of
protective and stay away orders, relates to a February 2022
incident when Santos received a Valentine’s Day card from Ruiz,
the contents of which scared her.
      B.     Defense Case
       Ruiz testified at trial. He stated that since he was 13
years old, he used methamphetamine daily. He also began
drinking alcohol at 13 and became addicted at 15. He was using
these substances at the time of the offenses in this case. He
further testified that he had prior convictions for attempted
burglary and battery causing great bodily injury.
      A psychologist who interviewed Ruiz testified that he
suffered from a stimulus use disorder due to methamphetamine
and alcohol use. The psychologist opined that Ruiz “was
experiencing an amphetamine induced psychosis and alcohol
intoxication around the time of the offense conduct which
influenced his decision making, his judgment and ultimately his
behavior.” Further, “he may have been experiencing” an
erotomaniac delusion, or “fixed false belief” that someone was in
love with him.

                                5
III.   Ruiz’s Admission of Prior Strike Convictions and the
       Jury’s Verdicts on the Charged Offenses
       Prior to the reading of the jury’s verdicts, Ruiz waived his
right to a jury trial on the prior strike conviction allegations in
the amended information. He admitted the 2020 strike
conviction for battery causing serious bodily injury and the 2021
strike conviction for attempted first degree residential burglary.
He indicated he understood these prior convictions were “factors
that would be used to increase” his sentence.
       The jury found Ruiz guilty of count 1, stalking Rivaz, a
felony, and guilty of count 2, violating a protective order, a
misdemeanor.
IV. Trial on Aggravating Factors
       As the trial court and the parties prepared for the jury trial
on the aggravating factors, the prosecutor told the court that both
sides agreed, “the aggravating factors that have to do specifically
with the defendant’s prior convictions and performance on
probation or parole is something that the court himself can
decide.” Defense counsel added, “It’s [section] 1170[, subdivision]
(b)(3), Your Honor. It’s within the purview of the court.” (See §
1170, subd. (b)(3) [“the court may consider the defendant’s prior
convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record
of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury”].)
       The trial court informed the jury it had to decide whether
the following five factors were true, based on proof beyond a
reasonable doubt: (1) the “crime involved a threat of great bodily
injury”; (2) “defendant was armed with or used a weapon, to wit:
a knife or bricks, at the time of the commission of the crime”; (3)
“defendant showed lack of remorse with respect to count 1 or
count 2”; (4) “defendant committed the crimes in and around

                                 6
[v]ictim Abigail Rivaz’[s] and [v]ictim Arlen [] Santos’[s] homes”;
and (5) “defendant made statements indicating an intent to
kidnap [v]ictim Abigail Rivaz.”
       During closing argument regarding the aggravating factors,
the prosecutor gave the jury an explanation of how the evidence
presented at trial supported each of the aggravating factors. The
prosecutor argued that aggravating factors 1, 3, and 4 listed
above applied to both the crime against Rivaz (stalking) and the
crime against Santos (violation of a protective order). As part of
his closing argument, defense counsel asserted, among other
things: “I would just posit that I don’t believe that the jury
should find any aggravating factors as to count 2, because these
are only relevant to felony charges, and there is only one felony
charge, the count of stalking.” Neither the prosecutor nor the
trial court commented on this assertion by defense counsel.
       The jury found the five aggravating factors submitted to it
to be true. The jury’s verdict form does not indicate that any true
finding relates to a particular count(s).
V.     Sentencing
       Defense counsel filed a sentencing memorandum, arguing
in pertinent part that Ruiz is entitled to the statutory
presumption of a lower term sentence because (1) he “has
experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma” within
the meaning of section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A), which he
described as methamphetamine use since the age of 13,
constituting substance abuse disorder, and methamphetamine
induced psychosis at the time he stalked Rivaz; and (2) he was a
youth at the time he committed the offenses (§ 1170, subd.
(b)(6)(B)), i.e., under 26 years of age (§ 1016.7, subd. (b)). Ruiz
further asserted that the five aggravating factors found true

                                7
beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury do not outweigh the
mitigating factors of his substance abuse and youth. Ruiz
attached several documents to the sentencing memorandum,
including two psychological reports and a paralegal’s summary of
an interview with Ruiz’s family members, all detailing his history
of methamphetamine and alcohol abuse.
      The prosecution filed a sentencing memorandum, asserting
eight aggravating factors. In addition to the five aggravating
factors found true by the jury, the prosecution cited three
additional aggravating factors based on Ruiz’s criminal history:
(1) Ruiz’s prior convictions are numerous and of increasing
seriousness; (2) Ruiz served prior county jail and prison terms;
and (3) Ruiz’s prior performance on probation and parole was
poor. The prosecution argued there are no factors in mitigation,
stating, “voluntarily taking drugs does not qualify as a mental or
physical condition that significantly reduced culpability for the
crimes.” The prosecution recommended the trial court sentence
Ruiz to eight years in prison: the upper term of three years for
stalking (count 1),2 doubled to six years for one of the prior strike
convictions, plus one year for violating the protective order (count
2), and one year for violating his probation in another case. The
prosecution attached to the sentencing memorandum a victim
impact letter from Santos.
      At the outset of the sentencing hearing on September 27,
2022, the prosecutor asked the trial court to make findings on the
aggravating factors alleged in the amended information that
relate to Ruiz’s criminal history—i.e., the factors the parties

      2 The lower term for felony stalking is 16 months, and the

middle term is two years. (§§ 18 & 1170, subd. (h)(1).)

                                 8
previously agreed the court, rather than the jury, could
determine. Using records to which Ruiz did not object, the court
found the following five factors to be true: (1) Ruiz has engaged in
violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society (Cal.
Rules of Court,3 rule 4.421(b)(1)); (2) Ruiz’s prior convictions as
an adult or sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency
proceedings are numerous or of increasing seriousness (rule
4.421(b)(2)); (3) Ruiz has served a prior term in prison or county
jail (rule 4.421(b)(3)); (4) Ruiz was on probation, mandatory
supervision, post release community supervision, or parole when
the crime was committed (rule 4.421(b)(4)); and (5) Ruiz’s prior
performance on probation or parole was unsatisfactory (rule
4.421(b)(5)). The court asked defense counsel if he had any
“questions or comment regarding the court’s findings,” and
counsel responded in the negative.
       Ruiz waived a hearing on whether he violated his probation
in another case because of his convictions in the present case.
The trial court found him in violation of his probation.
       Regarding sentencing, defense counsel reiterated the
arguments made in Ruiz’s sentencing memorandum, as
summarized above. The prosecutor referenced one of the
psychological reports attached to Ruiz’s sentencing
memorandum, noting, in pertinent part: “[Ruiz] denied ever
being physically or sexually abused. He denied history of
witnessing violence in the family. He denied having problems
with learning. Denied ever being in special ed classes. [¶] He
seemed to have a normal childhood playing football, basketball,

      3 Undesignated rules references are to the California Rules

of Court.

                                 9
soccer, gymnastics, piano, guitar. He had jobs that he had for a
good amount of time. [¶] He denied history of psychiatric
treatment, being prescribed psychiatric medication. He was
never hospitalized for mental problems. He denied most
symptoms of distress. He denied having problems with sleep or
appetite. He did not show signs of low self-esteem. He denied
ever attempting suicide or having suicidal thoughts, denied panic
attacks, den[ied] hearing voices or seeing things that others did
not see.”
       In sentencing Ruiz, the trial court acknowledged defense
counsel’s arguments regarding a presumptive lower term
sentence under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). The court
commented:
       “Now, while the court notes there was testimony about a
psychosis and the like and a history of drug and alcohol abuse,
the court also takes note of the aggravating factors found true
beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury[:] that the case involved a
threat of great bodily injury; that the defendant was armed with
or used weapons, being a knife and bricks; three, the defendant
showed a lack of remorse[;] the crimes [were] committed in or
around the house of Ms. R[ivaz] as well as Ms. Santos; and five,
defendant made statements indicating his intent to kidnap Ms.
Rivaz.
       “The court finds that the factors in aggravation
significantly outweigh any mitigation present in this case and
that it would be [sic] a sentence of the low term or the mid-term
would be contrary to the interest of justice.
       “Hearing the witnesses testify about what they went
through and the steps they took to avoid conflict and the what I’ll
call reign of terror that was placed upon them by the defendant, I

                                10
cannot justify the -- albeit there’s mitigation presented and
testified to -- I cannot justify a low term or mid-term sentence.
       “And -- and I’m also taking into consideration the
defendant’s youth, relative youth, I should say.”
       The trial court sentenced Ruiz to six years in prison: the
upper term of three years on count 1 (stalking), doubled based on
one of the two prior strike convictions Ruiz admitted. The court
declined the prosecution’s recommendation to impose a
consecutive one-year term for count 2 (violation of a protective
order), and instead imposed a concurrent one-year term. The
court also declined the prosecution’s recommendation to impose a
consecutive one-year term for the probation violation, and the
court terminated Ruiz’s probation in the other case. The court
issued protective orders for Rivaz and Santos.
       Regarding fines and assessments, the trial court asked
defense counsel, “Are there any financial issues regarding -- for
the defendant regarding payment of the restitution fine, parole,
and . . . the court security fee, criminal conviction facilities
assessment[?]” The following exchange occurred between defense
counsel and the court:
       “[Defense counsel]: . . . I will just make the record, Your
Honor, that my impression -- Mr. Ruiz has been borderline or
actually homeless in the last few years. I know he held out that
he worked, but I’ve never seen any confirmation of that. He’s
represented by the Office of the Public Defender which means
he’s presumptively indigent.
       “The Court: Well, that doesn’t mean the defendant couldn’t
earn or have earnings such that he couldn’t pay for a restitution
fine or court security fee or criminal conviction facilities
assessment just because he’s represented by your office.

                               11
      “[Defense counsel]: True. But I also have nothing -- so my
representation to the court would be as I’ve already made it and
that the court has discretion to waive those fines and fees as it
deems appropriate subject to an ability to pay hearing. I’m not
really prepared to go forward on an ability to pay hearing, Your
Honor, but if the court wants to calendar one, happy to do it.”
      The trial court proceeded and imposed the following fines
and assessments: the minimum restitution fine of $300 (§ 1202.4,
subd. (b)), which the court stayed;4 a $300 parole revocation fine,
which was stayed unless parole was revoked (§ 1202.45); a $30
court facilities assessment for each of the two convictions, or $60
(Gov. Code, § 70373); and a $40 court operations assessment for
each of the two convictions, or $80 (§ 1465.8). Accordingly, the
total amount due was $140. The court further commented, “I do
think he would have the ability to pay based upon any earnings
he would accrue in state prison.”
                           DISCUSSION
I.     Upper Term Sentence
       Section 1170, subdivision (b) provides, in pertinent part:
“(b)(1) When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and
the statute specifies three possible terms, the court shall, in its
sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the
middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2). [¶]

      4 The trial court stated on the record at the sentencing

hearing: “As to the restitution fine, the court’s going to impose
the minimum of $300 -- as to count 1. And I’m going to either
stay or strike it as the law permits.” The court’s September 27,
2022 minute order from the sentencing hearing states that the
court stayed the restitution fine imposed under section 1202.4,
subdivision (b).

                                12
(2) The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term
only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime
that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding
the middle term, and the facts underlying those circumstances
have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial. . . .”
       Subdivision (b)(6) of section 1170 provides, in pertinent
part: “Notwithstanding paragraph (1), and unless the court finds
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be
contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order
imposition of the lower term if any of the following was a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense: [¶] (A) The
person has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood
trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation,
or sexual violence. [¶] (B) The person is a youth, or was a youth
as defined under subdivision (b) of Section 1016.7 [under 26 years
of age] at the time of the commission of the offense. . . .”
       Ruiz contends the trial court erred in imposing the upper
term on count 1 for stalking because (1) the trial court found to be
true three “subjective” aggravating factors that “cannot be
established by a certified record of conviction alone and should
have been submitted to the jury”; (2) the trial court relied on
“three aggravating factors that the jury did not specifically find
true as to the felony stalking count,” as opposed to the
misdemeanor count for violation of a protective order (count 2);
and (3) the trial court relied on lack of remorse, as found by the
jury, but “lack of remorse is not a valid circumstance in
aggravation.”

                                13
       Ruiz further contends the asserted errors require remand
for resentencing because the trial court must determine whether
to impose the upper term based on the remaining, valid
aggravating factors. He argues that the lower term was the
presumptive term under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), because
he was 24 years old when he began stalking Rivaz, and his
substance abuse and methamphetamine induced psychosis
constitute psychological, physical, or childhood trauma within the
meaning of section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(1).
       A.    Aggravating factors not in dispute
       In this appeal, Ruiz does not challenge the trial court’s use
of the following two aggravating factors found true by the trial
court: (1) Ruiz has served a prior term in prison or county jail;
and (2) Ruiz was on probation, mandatory supervision, post
release community supervision, or parole when the crime was
committed.
       Moreover, Ruiz does not challenge the trial court’s reliance
on the following two aggravating factors found true beyond a
reasonable doubt by the jury: (1) Ruiz “was armed with or used a
weapon, to wit: a knife or bricks, at the time of the commission of
the crime”; and (2) Ruiz “made statements indicating an intent to
kidnap [v]ictim Abigail Rivaz.” He concedes that these two
aggravating factors apply only to the felony stalking count.
       Thus, Ruiz challenges the use of three aggravating factors
found true by the trial court and three aggravating factors found
true by the jury to impose the upper term sentence. We address
each of the challenged factors below, beginning with the factors
the jury found to be true.

                                14
      B.      Challenge to the trial court’s reliance on
              certain aggravating factors found true by the
              jury
       To impose an upper term sentence for a crime based on
circumstances in aggravation, the circumstances in aggravation
must relate to that particular crime. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) We
agree with Ruiz that here, in imposing the upper term on the
stalking count, the trial court expressly relied on certain
aggravating factors when it was not clear that the jury found
those factors true as to the stalking count.
       First, the jury found to be true the aggravating factor that
the “crime involved threat of great bodily injury.” The verdict
form does not indicate whether the jury found this factor true as
to count 1 (stalking) or count 2 (violation of protective order).
The prosecutor argued to the jury that this factor applied to both
counts 1 and 2. The trial court did not instruct the jury that the
aggravating factors applied only to the felony stalking count as
opposed to the misdemeanor count for violating a protective
order. On the record before us, we cannot discern whether the
jury found this factor true as to the stalking count.
       Second, the jury found to be true the aggravating factor
that Ruiz “showed lack of remorse with respect to count 1 or
count 2.” (Italics added.) Again, on the record before us, we
cannot determine if the jury found this factor true as to the
stalking count.
       The third aggravating factor Ruiz challenges here is that
he “committed the crimes in and around [v]ictim Abigail Rivaz[’s]
and [v]ictim Arlen [] Santos[’s] homes.” (Italics added.) While
Ruiz is correct that the verdict form does not specify to which
count this finding pertains, it is clear that this finding applies to

                                 15
both counts. If Ruiz committed a crime in and around Rivaz’s
home, as the jury clearly found, that crime could only have been
the stalking count, based on the evidence presented to the jury.
Thus, we conclude the trial court properly relied on this
aggravating factor in imposing the upper term on the stalking
count.
       Next, we address Ruiz’s contention that the trial court
improperly relied on certain aggravating factors that the court
found to be true. Thereafter, we address whether there was any
cumulative prejudice from the court’s reliance on improper
factors in imposing the upper term sentence.
       C.     Challenge to use of aggravating factors found
              true by the court
       Ruiz contends the following three aggravating factors that
the trial court found to be true are “subjective” aggravating
factors that “cannot be established by a certified record of
conviction alone and should have been submitted to the jury”: (1)
Ruiz has engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious
danger to society (rule 4.421(b)(1)); (2) Ruiz’s prior convictions as
an adult or sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency
proceedings are numerous or of increasing seriousness (rule
4.421(b)(2)); and (3) Ruiz’s prior performance on probation or
parole was unsatisfactory (rule 4.421(b)(5)).
       The Attorney General argues Ruiz forfeited this contention
because defense counsel agreed with the prosecutor’s statement
to the trial court that “the aggravating factors that have to do
specifically with the defendant’s prior convictions and
performance on probation or parole is something that the court
himself can decide.” In support of this agreement, defense
counsel cited to the trial court section 1170, subdivision (b)(3),

                                 16
which provides that “the court may consider the defendant’s prior
convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record
of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.”
       Ruiz argues that to the extent his trial counsel was
incorrect, and he had a right to a jury trial on some of the
aggravating factors the trial court found, his waiver of that right
had to be made personally, knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently, which did not occur here. (See People v. Hall (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1096 [“There are two exceptions to a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial on aggravating
facts—facts admitted by the defendant and the fact of a prior
conviction. [Citations.] Otherwise, the defendant must waive his
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial in order for the trial court to
find aggravating circumstances that increase the defendant’s
sentence beyond the statutory minimum”].) Ruiz further argues
we may review his contention in the absence of his objection
below because the issue “affected [his] substantial rights.” (§
1259.) In light of these arguments, we review the contention on
the merits.
       As Ruiz acknowledges, there is case law supporting the
position defense counsel took on this issue in the trial court. For
example, in People v. Pantaleon (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 932, the
Court of Appeal, in discussing the scope of section 1170,
subdivision (b)(3), explained, “the fact of a prior conviction
includes ‘other related issues that may be determined by
examining the records of the prior convictions.’ [Citation.] As
relevant to this appeal, the fact of a prior conviction encompasses
a finding that prior convictions are numerous or of increasing
seriousness . . . .” (Pantaleon, at p. 938, quoting People v. Black
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 799, 819, and citing People v. Towne (2008) 44

                                17
Cal.4th 63, 70-71.) In other words, the appellate court in
Pantaleon concluded that a court may decide the aggravating
factor that a defendant’s prior convictions are numerous or of
increasing seriousness; the factor need not be submitted to a jury.
(Pantaleon, at p. 938.) Similarly, in People v. Wiley (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 676, 683, review granted March 12, 2024, S283326,
the Court of Appeal concluded that “the Sixth Amendment did
not require that a jury make the determinations . . . whether [the
defendant]’s convictions were of increasing seriousness and
whether his previous performance on probation was poor (to the
extent that performance was established by his record of
convictions).”
       Based on the foregoing authorities, we conclude the trial
court could determine based on the record of convictions whether
Ruiz’s prior convictions were numerous or of increasing
seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)) and whether his prior performance
on probation or parole was unsatisfactory (rule 4.421(b)(5)). Ruiz
does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
these findings. He only contends that the jury, and not the trial
court, was permitted to make these findings—a contention we
reject. We note it is unlikely the trial court found Ruiz’s prior
convictions were “numerous,” as the record shows he has a total
of two prior convictions. (See, e.g., People v. Berry (1981) 117
Cal.App.3d 184, 191 [two prior convictions “cannot be
‘numerous’ ”].) We presume the court found his two prior
convictions—battery causing serious bodily injury and attempted
first degree residential burglary—were of increasing seriousness.
       We agree with Ruiz that the trial court could not properly
determine based on his record of convictions the aggravating
factor that he engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious

                                18
danger to society within the meaning of rule 4.421(b)(1). This is a
subjective factor that should have been submitted to the jury. A
certified record of Ruiz’s convictions for battery causing serious
bodily injury and first degree residential burglary, by itself,
cannot establish whether Ruiz presents a serious danger to
society, without impermissible factfinding by the court. (Cf.
People v. Ross (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1346, 1352-1353, review
granted Mar. 15, 2023, S278266 [“the record on appeal includes
certified records of defendant’s prior convictions which support
the court’s consideration of the rule 4.421(b)(1), (2), (3) and (5)
aggravating factors. Specifically, the certified records document
defendant’s conviction of multiple crimes—robbery, burglary,
assault with a deadly weapon, drug possession—over the last
decade and a half, as well as the prior prison sentences he
served”].)
       D.    Prejudice
             1.     Harmless error standard
       The trial court’s error in relying on aggravating factors that
do not comply with section 1170, subdivision (b) is subject to
harmless error review, but the precise standard is not settled,
and the issue is pending in our Supreme Court. (People v. Ruiz
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1076, review granted Mar. 12, 2024,
S283504 (Ruiz).)
       The majority of the published cases addressing the
standard have done so in the context of retroactively applying
amendments to section 1170 (Sen. Bill No. 567) to a defendant’s
upper term sentence.
       In People v. Flores (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 495, 500, for
example, the Court of Appeal concluded: “ ‘If a reviewing court
concludes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury, applying the

                                 19
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, unquestionably would have
found true at least a single aggravating circumstance had it been
submitted to the jury,’ the error is harmless.”
        Thereafter, in People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459,
465-466, the Court of Appeal explained: “In order to conclude
that the trial court’s reliance on improper factors that were not
found true by a jury or admitted by [the defendant] was not
prejudicial, we would have to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that a jury would have found true beyond a reasonable doubt
every factor on which the court relied, because the amended
statute requires that every factor on which a court intends to rely
in imposing an upper term, with the exception of factors related
to a defendant’s prior conviction(s), have been admitted by the
defendant or proven to a jury (see § 1170, subd. (b)).” The
appellate court went on to explain: “If the answer to this
question is ‘yes,’ then the defendant has not suffered prejudice
from the court’s reliance on factors not found true by a jury in
selecting the upper term. However, if the answer to the question
is ‘no,’ we then consider the second question, which is whether a
reviewing court can be certain, to the degree required by People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, [(Watson)], that the trial court
would nevertheless have exercised its discretion to select the
upper term if it had recognized that it could permissibly rely on
only a single one of the aggravating factors, a few of the
aggravating factors, or none of the aggravating factors, rather
than all of the factors on which it previously relied. If the answer
to both of these questions is ‘no,’ then it is clear that remand to
the trial court for resentencing is necessary.” (Lopez, at p. 467,
fn. 11.)

                                20
       Later, in People v. Dunn (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 394, 409-
410, review granted October 12, 2022, S275655, the Court of
Appeal concluded: “In sum, we think the correct standard for
harmless error lies between the standards articulated in Flores
and Lopez; Flores sets too low a standard for harmlessness and
Lopez too high. We instead apply a version of the standard
articulated in Lopez, modified to incorporate [People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818] in the first step: The reviewing court
determines (1)(a) beyond a reasonable doubt whether the jury
would have found one aggravating circumstance true beyond a
reasonable doubt and (1)(b) whether there is a reasonable
probability that the jury would have found any remaining
aggravating circumstance(s) true beyond a reasonable doubt. If
all aggravating circumstances relied upon by the trial court
would have been proved to the respective standards, any error
was harmless. If not, the reviewing court moves to the second
step of Lopez, (2) whether there is a reasonable probability that
the trial court would have imposed a sentence other than the
upper term in light of the aggravating circumstances provable
from the record as determined in the prior steps. If the answer is
no, the error was harmless. If the answer is yes, the reviewing
court vacates the sentence and remands for resentencing
consistent with section 1170, subdivision (b).” (Fn. omitted.)
       In Ruiz, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th 1068, the Court of Appeal
reviewed a defendant’s upper term sentence that was imposed
after the amendments to section 1170 in Senate Bill No. 567 had
taken effect, like the sentence at issue here. The People conceded
in Ruiz that four of seven aggravating factors that the trial court
found to be true, and on which the trial court relied in imposing
the upper term sentence, “ ‘were not found true beyond a

                                21
reasonable doubt by the jury, and . . . it cannot be said with
certainty that a jury would . . . conclude [they were true] beyond
a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Ruiz, at p. 1075.) Of the remaining three
factors the trial court found, the defendant challenged one as not
being supported by the certified record of conviction. (Id. at p.
1076.) The appellate court engaged in a two-step process to
assess prejudice: First, it determined whether “the jury would
have found true beyond a reasonable doubt” the aggravating
factor that the defendant challenged. (Id. at p. 1077.) Second,
having concluded the jury would have so found, the Court of
Appeal determined “whether the trial court would have selected
the upper term had it known that it could rely solely on” the “four
applicable aggravating factors” (three of the seven factors the
court found, plus the fact of the defendant’s prior strike
conviction). (Id. at pp. 1077-1078.) The appellate court added,
“the matter should not be remanded for resentencing if the record
clearly indicates that the trial court would have imposed the
upper term had it known that it could rely solely on the four
applicable aggravating factors . . . . ” (Id. at p. 1078.)
      We reject the test in Flores because it ignores the crucial
second step—a determination of whether the trial court would
have imposed the upper term based on the permissible
aggravating factors before it. Because our analysis focuses on
step two, and the other tests are similar in their step two
analyses, we need not adopt a particular test here.
             2.     Harmless error analysis
      As set forth above, we have concluded the trial court’s
reliance on the following three aggravating factors in imposing
the upper term sentence was problematic: (1) the crime involved
the threat of great bodily injury; (2) Ruiz showed lack of remorse;

                                22
and (3) Ruiz engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious
danger to society. We need not engage in the first step analysis,
as outlined in Lopez, Dunn, or Ruiz, because even if we remove
these three factors from the equation, we would conclude Ruiz
suffered no prejudice because the record indicates the trial court
would have imposed the upper term sentence based on the other
seven applicable and valid factors:5 (1) Ruiz was armed with a
weapon, a knife or bricks, at the time of the commission of the
crime; (2) Ruiz committed the crime in and around Rivaz’s home;
(3) Ruiz made statements indicating an intent to kidnap Rivaz;
(4) Ruiz’s convictions are of increasing seriousness; (5) Ruiz
served a prior term in prison or county jail; (6) Ruiz was on
probation, mandatory supervision, post release community
supervision, or parole when the crime was committed; and (7)
Ruiz’s prior performance on probation, mandatory supervision,
post release community supervision, or parole was
unsatisfactory.
       Based on the record before us, including the trial court’s
comments in sentencing Ruiz, we are convinced the court would
not have imposed a lower or middle term sentence in the absence
of the three (out of 10) aggravating factors. We have no reason to
believe the court would have found that the seven applicable and
valid factors did not outweigh the mitigating circumstances of
Ruiz’s age (24-25 years old when he stalked Rivaz) and his
substance abuse. (See § 1170, subd. (b)(6).) Ruiz stalked Rivaz
repeatedly at her home, he was armed with a weapon, and he

      5 Based on this resolution of the issue, we need not address

Ruiz’s additional contention that lack of remorse is not a valid
circumstance in aggravation.

                                23
threatened to kidnap her and take her to Mexico. Based on these
three aggravating factors alone, we have every reason to believe
the court still would have found that imposition of a lower or
middle term sentence would be contrary to the interests of
justice. (See ibid.)
II.    Fines and Assessments
       Citing People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157
(Dueñas), Ruiz contends the trial court “abused its discretion by
arbitrarily and irrationally determining that [he] is able to pay”
the fines and assessments imposed. He states that the court
ordered him to pay a $300 restitution fine, plus $140 in
assessments. As discussed above, the reporter’s transcript and
minute order from the sentencing hearing reflect that the court
stayed the $300 restitution fine. Regardless, even if the court
had ordered him to pay a total of $440 in fines and assessment,
there would be no error here.
       In Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, the Court of Appeal
held “due process of law requires the trial court to conduct an
ability to pay hearing and ascertain a defendant’s present ability
to pay before it imposes court facilities and court operations
assessments under Penal Code section 1465.8 and Government
Code section 70373.” (Id. at p. 1164.) The Dueñas court further
held “the execution of any restitution fine imposed under [Penal
Code section 1202.4] must be stayed unless and until the trial
court holds an ability to pay hearing and concludes that the
defendant has the present ability to pay the restitution fine.”
(Ibid.) We have previously disagreed with Dueñas (People v.
Kingston (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 272, 279-281), and the issue is
currently pending in our Supreme Court. (People v. Kopp (2019)
38 Cal.App.5th 47, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S257844.)

                               24
       The facts in Dueñas were unique. The defendant was an
unemployed, homeless mother with cerebral palsy, who lost her
driver’s license because she was unable to pay more than $1,000
assessed against her for three juvenile citations. Thereafter, she
sustained multiple misdemeanor convictions related to driving
with a suspended license, each time receiving a jail term and
having additional fees she could not afford to pay imposed.
(Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1160-1162.) Ultimately,
she requested a hearing on her ability to pay the fees, and the
trial court imposed an additional fine and assessments—the
same fine and assessments at issue here. (Id. at pp. 1162-1163.)
In reversing the trial court’s imposition of the assessments and
ordering the trial court to stay execution of the restitution fine,
the Court of Appeal pointed out that Dueñas’s current situation
“ ‘doesn’t stem from one case for which she’s not capable of paying
the fines and fees,’ but from a series of criminal proceedings
driven by, and contributing to, Dueñas’s poverty.” (Id. at p.
1164.) The appellate court in Dueñas referenced “the
counterproductive nature of this system and its tendency to
enmesh indigent defendants in a cycle of repeated violations and
escalating debt.” (Id. at p. 1164, fn. 1.)
       Even assuming Dueñas was correctly decided and
applicable to the facts of this case, we would reject Ruiz’s
challenge to the minimum restitution fine and assessments. Ruiz
was 26 years old when he was sentenced to prison. A
psychological report he submitted to the trial court with his
sentencing memorandum indicates that as an adult, he worked in
construction, gardening, remodeling hotels, and in a restaurant.
He reported to the psychologist that he last worked in
construction around March 2021, about a year and a half before

                                25
he was sentenced. In assessing a defendant’s ability to pay, a
court may consider a defendant’s “past income-earning capacity.”
(See People v. Johnson (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 134, 139.)
Moreover, a court may consider whether a defendant has the
ability to satisfy the fine and assessments through prison wages
and future earnings after release from custody. (People v. Aviles
(2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1076.) Given Ruiz’s age and self-
reported work history, there is no reason to believe he will be
unable to earn money at some point in the future to pay the
amount he owes.
                            DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                               CHANEY, J.

We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

             WEINGART, J.

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