Court Opinion

ID: 9775638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:05:32.635944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:29.871348
License: Public Domain

SHANNON, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In point of error seven appellant complains that in the argument to the jury the attorney for the State stated, “As you know, in handling anything for the State, I’m just not handling my property or your property, or anybody else’s property, I’m handling the property and the money of all the people.” Counsel for the State also said, “. . . and if you were handling it, which you are now, the people’s money, how it should be put.” No objection was made at the time of the argument and the court gave no instruction to disregard it.
In her brief appellant maintains that the quoted argument is to be condemned for *567the reason that it was a direct appeal to the self-interest and prejudice of the jury and that it was an invitation to the members of the jury to align themselves with a party in the case.
Counsel’s argument did invite the jurors to consider their own self-interest in returning the verdict. As such, the argument was plainly improper and should not have been made. Robards v. State, 285 S.W.2d 247 (Tex.Civ.App.1955, writ ref’d n. r. e.), West v. State, 150 S.W.2d 363 (Tex.Civ.App.1941, no writ), State v. Bryan, 518 S.W.2d 928 (Tex.Civ.App.1975 no writ), 33 A.L.R.2d 442, 19 A.L.R.3rd 694, 702.
The question raised by appellant’s point is whether a reversal should be ordered in the absence of a timely objection by appellant to counsel’s improper argument. The Supreme Court has stated the problem in Otis Elevator Company v. Wood, 436 S.W.2d 324 (Tex.1968):
“Improper jury arguments are usually referred to as one of two types: ‘curable’ or ‘incurable.’ A jury argument is ‘curable’ when the harmful effect of the argument can be eliminated by a trial judge’s instruction to the jury to disregard what they have just heard. The error is ‘cured’ and rendered harmless by the instruction. On the other hand, an argument may be so inflammatory that its harmfulness could not be eliminated by an instruction to the jury to disregard it. The prejudicial nature of the argument is so acute that it is ‘incurable.’
“If the argument is of a ‘curable’ nature, an objection to it must be promptly made and an instruction requested or the error is waived. But if the argument is ‘incurable,’ the failure to object does not result in a waiver. The reasoning is that ‘counsel making the argument is the offender so the law will not require opposing counsel to take a chance on prejudicing his cause with the jury by making the objection.’ Smerke v. Office Equipment Co., 138 Tex. 236, 158 S.W.2d 302 (Tex.Com.App.1941).”
I am of the opinion that appellee’s argument was of the “curable” variety. By not objecting to the argument, appellant waived her right to complain on appeal. Had timely objection been made and overruled, I would vote to reverse the judgment.
Upon confrontation with an improper jury argument, counsel has to make one of a trial lawyer’s immediate and difficult decisions, whether or not to object. In the case at bar appellant’s counsel must have chosen to try to answer the argument on rebuttal. He must have concluded that to object and ask for an instruction to disregard would have emphasized the argument in the minds of the members of the jury. See McNeil v. Current, 484 S.W.2d 394 (Tex.Civ.App.1972, writ ref’d n. r. e.).
An instruction to disregard of course, would not make the jury ignorant of the argument. No one pretends that it would. We must assume, however, that, having knowledge of the argument and the matters involved in it, the jury would have obeyed the court’s instruction and would not have permitted that knowledge to affect their verdict. The prejudice in counsel’s argument would then have been eliminated. When improper argument is of the “curable” variety the question of harm is not reached, if the proper steps are taken to remove its prejudicial effect (an objection and instruction to disregard) no prejudice remains to be harmful. And if no objection is made, thus calling forth remedial measures from offending counsel and the court, the complaining party is held to have waived his right to have the question of harm reviewed. Southern Pacific Company v. Hubbard, 156 Tex. 525, 297 S.W.2d 120, 131 (1956), (Dissenting Opinion of Justice Robert Calvert).
Appellant’s forth point of error complains of the trial court permitting appellee to introduce into evidence the inheritance tax return and the inventory of the estate *568of appellant’s deceased husband, Sam Sil-berstein. Counsel for appellee tendered that evidence pursuant to Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. Art. 3726.
Art. 3726 permits the placing into evidence certain instruments which are permitted or required by law to be recorded by the county clerk without proof of execution. That article requires the party, offering such instrument in evidence, to file the same among the papers of the suit at least three days before the commencement of the trial, and to give notice of such filing to the opposite party or counsel. Ap-pellee did not comply with Art. 3726 by filing the inheritance tax return and the inventory of the estate or by giving notice to appellant.
Because appellee did not comply with Art. 3726, it was error for the court to admit appellee’s evidence. Hinton v. Uvalde Paving Co., 77 S.W.2d 733 (Tex.Civ.App.1934, writ ref’d), Johnson v. Stickney, 152 S.W.2d 921 (Tex.Civ.App.1941, no writ), Watson v. Toler, 153 S.W.2d 506 (Tex.Civ.App.1941, no writ), Mata v. Rangel 432 S.W.2d 146 (Tex.Civ.App.1968, writ ref’d n. r. e.).
The majority opinion treats the error of the court in the following fashion, “. . . under the record before us while this was error, it was harmless error. Rule 434, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.” I cannot agree that the error was harmless.
In this case, as in most condemnation cases, opinion testimony as to valuation of the property was of great importance. One of the legitimate objects of opposing counsel is to undermine the credibility of the value witness in the view of the jury. In my judgment appellee’s counsel employed the valuation figures in the inventory and inheritance tax return in a telling and an effective manner calculated to discredit the testimony of George Reed. Reed had testified on direct that the value of the whole property before the taking was $368,489. Appellee’s counsel required Reed to read to the jury the value of the same property contained in the inventory and tax return and to “adjust” that figure to the date of the taking. The “adjusted” figure given by Reed was $145,622, a difference of $222,867 from the figure he gave on direct examination. The jury answered that the value of the whole tract before the taking was $208,235.20, a difference of $160,253.80 from the value assigned by Reed.
In argument appellee’s counsel naturally emphasized the apparent inconsistency of appellant’s placing one value on the property for inheritance tax purposes and another value for condemnation purposes. It doubtless seemed incongruous to the jury that there would be so much difference “. . . between the receiving end in damages, and the paying end in taxes .” Rayburn, Texas Law of Condemnation, § 144(1) (1960).
Had appellee complied with Art. 3726, appellant would have had notice that appel-lee intended to use the inventory and inheritance tax return. Appellant then would have had the opportunity to prepare to meet and explain away, if she could, the inconsistency between the tax figures and her position as to value in the condemnation suit.
The evidence admitted in violation of Art. 3726 was important and, in my opinion, convincing to the jury. It was not merely cumulative as in Hinton v. Uvalde Paving Co., supra. The error of the court was made in direct contravention of the statute, and should, under the circumstances of this case, require reversal.