Court Opinion

ID: 9910248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 14:02:17.176242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:51:40.380389
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                        SECOND DISTRICT

                           STATE OF FLORIDA,

                                Appellant,

                                     v.

                     MITCHELL WILLIAMS REDDIN,

                                 Appellee.

                              No. 2D22-3853

                           December 15, 2023

Appeal from the County Court for Pasco County; Debra Roberts, Judge.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Samuel R.
Mandelbaum, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Tosha Cohen, Assistant
Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellee.

LABRIT, Judge.
     The State appeals an order dismissing its case against Mitchell
Williams Reddin. The trial court dismissed the case midtrial after
concluding that the New Port Richey officer who arrested Mr. Reddin
lacked authority to stop and arrest Mr. Reddin outside of his territorial
jurisdiction. Because the officer was in fresh pursuit of Mr. Reddin and
was therefore authorized to make an extraterritorial arrest, we reverse
the dismissal and remand for a new trial.
                                       I.
      The State charged Mr. Reddin with reckless driving under section
316.192(1), Florida Statutes (2021), and resisting an officer without
violence under section 843.02, Florida Statutes (2021). The State alleged
that Mr. Reddin recklessly operated his motorcycle on U.S. Highway 19
in Pasco County and disobeyed commands from law enforcement. The
State's complaint filed in November 2021 identified the New Port Richey
Police Department as the arresting agency and Port Richey as the
location of the arrest.
      The case went to trial the following year and the State called the
arresting officer as its first witness. The officer testified that while on
patrol in New Port Richey, he observed a motorcycle speed by him on
U.S. Highway 19. The officer followed the motorcycle north and saw it
heavily accelerate, weave around and between cars, and drive over 100
miles per hour—more than twice the speed limit. The officer said that he
never lost sight of the motorcycle and that it eventually slowed, which
allowed the officer to catch up without jeopardizing the safety of other
motorists. After the motorcycle and the officer crossed municipal lines
into Port Richey, the officer activated his lights and sirens and pulled the
motorcyclist over on the side of U.S. Highway 19.
      During the defense's cross-examination and the State's redirect of
the officer, the officer testified that he had authority to stop the
motorcyclist in Port Richey because he was also a deputy with the Pasco
County Sheriff's Office (PCSO). The defense didn't challenge the officer's
authority, either before or during trial. But the trial court interrupted
the State's redirect of the officer to ask whether he had any
documentation to support his testimony regarding his authority to make
an arrest outside of New Port Richey. The officer said that he did but

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that it was in his vehicle. The trial court made the parties take a break
so the officer could get his documents, and it told the parties they would
need to recall the officer "because he's going to have to testify about this
jurisdiction with the Pasco County Sheriff's Office." The trial court then
sent the jury out of the room and—without any prompting from the
defense—told the State: "I need for you to show me that [the officer] has
unbridled discretion as a Pasco County Sheriff's deputy to handle any
kind of cases" in Port Richey.
      The State was unprepared for this challenge because the defense
never raised it. The State responded on the fly and provided the trial
court with the officer's PCSO credentials and a mutual aid agreement
between New Port Richey and Port Richey. The State also reminded the
trial court that the reckless driving charge began in New Port Richey and
that an officer in fresh pursuit has authority to make an arrest in
another jurisdiction.
      The trial court was unconvinced. It found that the officer was not
in fresh pursuit, so in its view the issue of the officer's authority turned
on the mutual aid agreement. And because the State did not have a
witness from the Port Richey Police Department available to testify at
trial that day, the trial court found that the State could not prove that
the New Port Richey officer complied with the mutual aid agreement
when he stopped Mr. Reddin. The trial court then dismissed the State's
case sua sponte, before the State rested its case-in-chief. The State
timely appealed.
      Mr. Reddin moves to dismiss this appeal, contending that it is
unauthorized and double jeopardy precludes it. We first address these
arguments and conclude that the State's appeal is properly before us.
We then address the trial court's error in dismissing the case.

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                                      II.
      According to Mr. Reddin, the order dismissing the case constitutes
a judgment of acquittal that the State cannot appeal. He correctly
argues that the State can only appeal a judgment of acquittal if it follows
a guilty verdict. See § 924.07(1)(j), Fla. Stat. (2022); Fla. R. App. P.
9.140(c)(1)(E); see also United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978) ("A
judgment of acquittal, whether based on a jury verdict of not guilty or on
a ruling by the court that the evidence is insufficient to convict, may not
be appealed and terminates the prosecution when a second trial would
be necessitated by a reversal."). This limitation on the State's right to
appeal was crafted with double jeopardy in mind, and it protects a
defendant's right against being tried twice for the same offense. See
State v. Lundy, 233 So. 3d 1252, 1253 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017); State v.
Stone, 42 So. 3d 279, 281 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); cf. Hudson v. State, 711
So. 2d 244, 246 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (explaining why the appeal of an
acquittal after a guilty verdict does not violate double jeopardy).
      But a retrial in this case would not offend double jeopardy because
the trial court dismissed the case "on grounds unrelated to guilt or
innocence." See Scott, 437 U.S. at 96. Our supreme court instructs that
"a trial court's actions constitute an acquittal for double jeopardy
purposes when 'the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually
represents a resolution [in the defendant's favor], correct or not, of some
or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.' " State v. Gaines,
770 So. 2d 1221, 1226 (Fla. 2000) (alteration in original) (quoting Scott,
437 U.S. at 97). On the other hand, where "the trial judge terminates the
proceedings favorably to the defendant on a basis not related to factual
guilt or innocence," it's not an acquittal and double jeopardy does not
preclude appellate review. See Scott, 437 U.S. at 92, 98–99.

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     The latter situation presents itself here because the trial court
terminated the case on an issue unrelated to Mr. Reddin's guilt or
innocence. It dismissed the case because it believed that the arresting
officer did not have authority to conduct a traffic stop in Port Richey.
This finding focuses solely on the officer, his credentials, and authority
and not on Mr. Reddin's actions or the charges against him.
     Mr. Reddin nonetheless points to language in the trial court's order
that "adjudge[d]" Mr. Reddin not guilty, in addition to "dismiss[ing]" the
case. Mr. Reddin submits that this adjudication equates to an acquittal.
However, " 'the trial judge's characterization of his [or her] own action
cannot control the classification of the action' for purposes of double
jeopardy." Gaines, 770 So. 2d at 1226 (alteration in original) (quoting
Scott, 437 U.S. at 96).
     Further, while the trial court's characterization is not dispositive,
its reasoning here is telling. In discussing its decision to sua sponte
dismiss the case, the trial court had the following exchange with the
State:
     THE COURT: I'm just going to make a decision about
     jurisdiction because jurisdiction is going to control this case,
     although I think there are some other issues that also may
     control this case if we pass jurisdiction and just talked about
     the elements of the offense, but I'm just sticking right now
     just to the jurisdiction of [the New Port Richey officer] to be
     able to stop this defendant in Port Richey and not comply
     with the requirements of this [mutual aid] agreement. That's
     where we are right now, State, and so unless you can tell me
     something else to change my mind, I'm going to be dismissing
     this case for lack of jurisdiction. So --
     THE STATE: Your Honor, the facts of the reckless driving did
     take place in New Port Richey --
     THE COURT: What we've got to do, we've got to have
     jurisdiction before we can get to the facts of the case.

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The trial court similarly told the jurors the following after it dismissed
the State's case:
      THE COURT: This case . . . did not turn on -- on the facts of
      the case. This was a legal issue that came up, and I make all
      the legal decisions in the case. This officer was a New Port
      Richey police officer. He didn't even try to stop this person
      until he was in a different city, Port Richey. He's not a Port
      Richey police officer.
      The trial court correctly viewed the issue of the officer's authority
as distinct from the facts of the case relating to Mr. Reddin's guilt or
innocence. What's more, the very basis for the trial court's dismissal—
the mutual aid agreement—was not a fact in evidence but a document
the trial court had the State produce during a break. "This is scarcely a
picture of an all-powerful [S]tate relentlessly pursuing a defendant who
had either been found not guilty or who had at least insisted on having
the issue of guilt submitted to the first trier of fact." Scott, 437 U.S. at
96. The State was willing and able to continue trial, but the trial court,
with support from the defense, abruptly ended it.
      Because the trial court terminated the proceedings without any
consideration of Mr. Reddin's guilt or innocence, "[n]o interest protected
by the Double Jeopardy Clause is invaded," id. at 100, and the State's
appeal of the dismissal is authorized, see § 924.07(1)(a); Fla. R. App. P.
9.140(c)(1)(A), see also State v. Young, 936 So. 2d 725, 728 (Fla. 1st DCA
2006) ("Because the purported 'JOA' entered by the trial court is actually
a dismissal based on the alleged insufficiency of the information, not a
decision on the merits, the State is allowed to appeal the dismissal . . . ,
and double jeopardy does not bar further proceedings."); State v. James,
626 So. 2d 259, 262 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) ("The trial court's [midtrial]
dismissal . . . was unrelated 'to factual guilt or innocence,' Scott, and

                                       6
thus did not constitute an acquittal barring an appeal."). For these
reasons, we deny Mr. Reddin's motion to dismiss this appeal.
                                    III.
     Turning to the merits, the trial court concluded that the arresting
officer from New Port Richey lacked authority to conduct a traffic stop in
Port Richey. It also believed that the mutual aid agreement between the
two municipalities was the deciding factor. But we needn't delve into the
terms of the agreement or what proof of compliance the State offered
because the officer was in fresh pursuit of Mr. Reddin when the officer
stopped him in Port Richey.1
     Section 901.25(2), Florida Statutes (2021), provides that "[a]ny duly
authorized state, county, or municipal arresting officer is authorized to
arrest a person outside the officer's jurisdiction when in fresh pursuit."
This statute expands on the common law rule that "an officer may
pursue a felon or a suspected felon, with or without a warrant, into
another jurisdiction and arrest him there." Porter v. State, 765 So. 2d
76, 78 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). And the statute plainly defines "fresh
pursuit" to include "the pursuit of a person who has violated a county or
municipal ordinance or chapter 316 or has committed a misdemeanor."
§ 901.25(1).
     The trial court found that the officer was not in fresh pursuit
because he testified that he "did not pursue [Mr. Reddin]." The officer
explained: "[Mr. Reddin] was not fleeing from me, so therefore I wasn't

     1 The State raises other arguments for reversal, but Mr. Reddin

contends that some of the State's arguments are unpreserved and that
"[t]he State should be limited to the arguments made below." We agree
with Mr. Reddin, see State v. Fernandez, 335 So. 3d 784, 786 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2022), and limit our review accordingly.

                                     7
pursuing him. . . . The definition if I look at the pursuit is if I were to
charge him with fleeing to elude. We did not." The officer did not offer
this testimony in the context of a fresh pursuit discussion, but the trial
court found it determinative of the issue. Mr. Reddin urges us to affirm
this finding, arguing that the trial court simply held the officer to his
word. But the officer's testimony does not impact the statutory definition
of "fresh pursuit," which was for the court—not the officer—to interpret
and apply. See Mathews v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 139 So. 3d 498,
500 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) ("The interpretation of a statute is a question of
law . . . ." (citing W. Fla. Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. See, 79 So. 3d 1, 8 (Fla.
2012))).
      Here, the record establishes that the officer pursued Mr. Reddin for
suspicion of reckless driving, which is both a violation of chapter 316
and a misdemeanor. The pursuit began in the officer's municipality and
carried over to a neighboring municipality because of the speed at which
Mr. Reddin was allegedly driving. Under these circumstances, section
901.25(2) authorized the officer "to arrest [Mr. Reddin] outside the
officer's jurisdiction," regardless of the mutual aid agreement or the
officer's PCSO credentials. See State v. Potter, 438 So. 2d 1085, 1086–87
(Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (holding that an officer who stopped a vehicle beyond
his city limits, where the officer first observed the vehicle within his city
limits weaving and crossing the center line in violation of chapter 316,
was authorized "to arrest on fresh pursuit across jurisdictional lines");
State v. Joy, 637 So. 2d 946, 947–48 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (concluding that
an officer who observed a truck speed by him, and who left his
jurisdiction while following the truck at an unusually high rate of speed,
was "engaged in fresh pursuit of a suspected speeder" and was
authorized to make the stop under section 901.25).

                                        8
     Thus, the trial court erred in dismissing the State's case based on
the officer's purported lack of authority.2
                                     IV.
     Because the trial court erred in finding that the arresting officer
lacked authority to stop Mr. Reddin, we reverse the order dismissing the
State's case. We also conclude that retrying Mr. Reddin would not

     2 We also caution trial courts against the actions that led to

dismissal of this case. Although courts are duty-bound to investigate
potential defects in their subject matter jurisdiction, see Polk County. v.
Sofka, 702 So. 2d 1243, 1245 (Fla. 1997), this duty does not extend to
other legal issues such as the officer's territorial jurisdiction and his
authority to stop Mr. Reddin in this case. As we have explained, "[a]
judge must not independently investigate facts in a case and must
consider only the evidence presented." DiGiovanni v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l
Tr. Co., 226 So. 3d 984, 988 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (quoting Fla. Code of
Jud. Conduct, Canon 3B(7), cmt.). Likewise, a "court is not authorized
to become a party's advocate and raise a legal issue sua sponte." Bank of
N.Y. Mellon v. Barber, 295 So. 3d 1223, 1225 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020). And
"[e]very litigant, including the State in criminal cases, is entitled to
nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." Livingston v.
State, 441 So. 2d 1083, 1086 (Fla. 1983) (quoting State ex rel. Mickle v.
Rowe, 131 So. 331, 332 (Fla. 1930)).
       In light of these guiding principles, we have serious concerns with
the events that unfolded below. The record shows that the trial court
independently raised the issue of the officer's authority, required the
State to produce documents the defense didn't request, then dismissed
the State's case sua sponte based on that issue and those documents.
These actions create the appearance of partiality and cast a shadow
upon judicial neutrality. See DiGiovanni, 226 So. 3d at 988. We
therefore emphasize our supreme court's words from nearly a century
ago that "[i]t is the duty of courts to scrupulously guard th[e] right of the
litigant" to a neutral and impartial judiciary and that anything less than
cold neutrality "tends to discredit and place the judiciary in a
compromising attitude which is bad for the administration of justice."
State ex rel. Mickle, 131 So. at 332.

                                      9
violate his right against double jeopardy, as the trial court dismissed the
case on grounds unrelated to factual guilt or innocence.
     Reversed and remanded.

NORTHCUTT and KHOUZAM, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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