Court Opinion

ID: 9930102
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 13:06:37.250931+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:03:28.920893
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                   No. COA23-365

                               Filed 6 February 2024

Wake County, Nos. 19 CRS 213338–39; 21 CRS 1031

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

              v.

JAMES DIA’SHAWN ROBINSON, Defendant.

        Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 27 May 2022 by Judge Rebecca

W. Holt in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 October

2023.

        Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Heidi M.
        Williams, for the State.

        Marilyn G. Ozer, for Defendant-Appellant.

        CARPENTER, Judge.

        James Dia’Shawn Robinson (“Defendant”) appeals from judgment entered

after a jury found him guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and four counts of

discharging a weapon into an occupied vehicle causing serious bodily injury. On

appeal, Defendant argues the trial court erred by: (1) allowing certain text messages

into evidence; and (2) denying his challenge to the selection of the jury pool. After

careful review, we dismiss Defendant’s first argument and disagree with his second

argument. Accordingly, we discern no error.

                    I.     Factual & Procedural Background
                                 STATE V. ROBINSON

                                  Opinion of the Court

      On 12 August 2019, a Wake County grand jury indicted Defendant for two

counts of first-degree murder.   On 24 August 2021, a Wake County grand jury

indicted Defendant for four counts of discharging a weapon into an occupied vehicle

causing serious bodily injury. Beginning on 13 May 2022, the State tried Defendant

in Wake County Superior Court.

      During jury selection, Defendant raised a fair-cross-section challenge under

the Sixth Amendment, arguing that members of Defendant’s race were

underrepresented in the jury pool. Of the fifty-member jury pool, thirty-nine were

White, eight were Black, and three were Hispanic. Defendant is a Black male.

      Defendant     offered   statistical     evidence   tending   to   show   Black

underrepresentation in the jury pool for his trial, but Defendant admitted that he

lacked evidence “that the underrepresentation was due to systematic exclusion of the

group in the jury selection process.” The trial court denied Defendant’s challenge to

the jury pool.

      At trial, evidence relevant to this appeal tended to show the following. On 16

July 2019, Ryan Veach, an admitted drug dealer, drove Defendant to the parking lot

of a skating rink in Raleigh, North Carolina to meet Brendan Hurley and Anthony

McCall.   During the encounter, Defendant shot and killed Hurley and McCall.

Defendant also sustained three gunshot wounds. Defendant and Veach disposed of

the bodies and other evidence in various locations around Raleigh.

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                                 STATE V. ROBINSON

                                  Opinion of the Court

      In order to prove that Defendant and Veach met with Hurley and McCall in

order to rob Hurley and McCall, the State sought to introduce text messages between

Veach and a third party. The third party was one of Veach’s drug customers, to whom

Veach allegedly owed money.       The challenged text messages concerned Veach’s

alleged scam of the third party, which was the alleged reason why Veach owed money

to the third party. The State offered the text messages to show that Defendant,

through Veach, was motivated to rob Hurley and McCall because Veach owed money

to the third party.

      Defendant objected to the introduction of the text messages because the

messages were hearsay, were not illustrative, and lacked a proper foundation. The

trial court ruled that only Veach’s messages, not the third party’s, could be admitted,

and the State agreed to allow Veach to read the messages aloud, rather than

publishing the document to the jury.

      On 27 May 2022, the jury found Defendant guilty of two counts of first-degree

murder and four counts of discharging a weapon into an occupied vehicle causing

serious bodily injury. The trial court sentenced Defendant to two consecutive terms

of life imprisonment without parole for each first-degree murder count. The trial

court consolidated the four counts of discharging a weapon into an occupied vehicle

causing serious bodily injury and sentenced Defendant to the between sixty and

eight-four months of imprisonment, to run concurrently with his life sentences.

Defendant gave oral notice of appeal in open court.

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                                  STATE V. ROBINSON

                                   Opinion of the Court

                                 II.      Jurisdiction

       This Court has jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(1) (2021).

                                       III.    Issues

       The issues on appeal are whether the trial court erred by: (1) allowing Veach’s

text messages into evidence; and (2) denying Defendant’s challenge to the selection

of the jury pool.

                                   IV.        Analysis

       A. Text Messages

       First, Defendant challenges the admission of Veach’s text messages on several

grounds.    Defendant argues that: (1) they are irrelevant;(2) they are unfairly

prejudicial; (3) they violate the Confrontation Clause; and (4) they violate Defendant’s

“right to a fair trial.”   After careful review, we dismiss Defendant’s arguments

because they are not properly before this Court.

       “In order to preserve an issue for appellate review, the appellant must have

raised that specific issue before the trial court to allow it to make a ruling on that

issue.” Regions Bank v. Baxley Com. Props., LLC, 206 N.C. App. 293, 298–99, 697

S.E.2d 417, 421 (2010) (citing N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1)); State v. Harris, 253 N.C. App.

322, 327, 800 S.E.2d 676, 680 (2017) (quoting Weil v. Herring, 207 N.C. 6, 10, 175 S.E.

836, 838 (1934)) (“The specific grounds for objection raised before the trial court must

be the theory argued on appeal because ‘the law does not permit parties to swap

horses between courts in order to get a better mount in the [appellate court].’”).

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                                  STATE V. ROBINSON

                                   Opinion of the Court

      This rule applies equally to unraised constitutional issues. State v. Hunter,

305 N.C. 106, 112, 286 S.E.2d 535, 539 (1982); State v. Lloyd, 354 N.C. 76, 86–87, 552

S.E.2d 596, 607 (2001) (citing State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 322, 372 S.E.2d 517, 519

(1988)) (“Constitutional issues not raised and passed upon at trial will not be

considered for the first time on appeal.”).

      The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, “has elected to review

unpreserved issues for plain error when they involve either (1) errors in the judge’s

instructions to the jury, or (2) rulings on the admissibility of evidence.” State v.

Gregory, 342 N.C. 580, 584, 467 S.E.2d 28, 31 (1996) (citing State v. Sierra, 335 N.C.

753, 761, 440 S.E.2d 791, 796 (1994)).

      But when an appellant is limited to plain-error review and fails to make a

plain-error argument, we will “only address the grounds under which the contested

admission of evidence was objected, as any other grounds have been waived.” Harris,

253 N.C. App. at 327, 800 S.E.2d at 680; State v. Frye, 341 N.C. 470, 496, 461 S.E.2d

664, 677 (1995) (citing N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(4)) (holding that an appellant “waived

appellate review of those arguments by failing specifically and distinctly to argue

plain error”); N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(4) (allowing certain unpreserved arguments in

criminal appeals only “when the judicial action questioned is specifically and

distinctly contended to amount to plain error”).

      Furthermore, “[i]t is well-settled that arguments not presented in an

appellant’s brief are deemed abandoned on appeal.” Davignon v. Davignon, 245 N.C.

                                          -5-
                                STATE V. ROBINSON

                                 Opinion of the Court

App. 358, 361, 782 S.E.2d 391, 394 (2016) (citing N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6)); State v.

Evans, 251 N.C. App. 610, 625, 795 S.E.2d 444, 455 (2017) (deeming an argument

abandoned because the appellant did “not set forth any legal argument or citation to

authority”).

       At trial, Defendant objected to Veach’s text messages because they were

hearsay, were not illustrative, and lacked a proper foundation.      But on appeal,

Defendant fails to argue about hearsay, illustration, or foundation. Thus, any such

arguments are now abandoned. See Davignon, 245 N.C. App. at 361, 782 S.E.2d at

394.

       Rather than pressing his trial-court arguments, Defendant now attempts to

“swap horses” on appeal. See Harris, 253 N.C. App. at 327, 800 S.E.2d at 680. And

because Veach’s text messages were admitted evidence in a criminal trial, Defendant

may press a different argument—so long as he argues plain error. See Gregory, 342

N.C. at 584, 467 S.E.2d at 31; Harris, 253 N.C. App. at 327, 800 S.E.2d at 680.

       Defendant, however, has made no plain-error argument on appeal. Defendant

failed to explain the plain-error standard in his brief; indeed, Defendant never even

mentioned “plain error” in his brief.     In other words, Defendant has failed to

“specifically and distinctly . . . argue plain error.” See Frye, 341 N.C. at 496, 461

S.E.2d at 677.   Therefore, Defendant waived his unpreserved arguments and is

limited to “the grounds under which the contested admission of evidence was

                                        -6-
                                 STATE V. ROBINSON

                                  Opinion of the Court

objected.” See Harris, 253 N.C. App. at 327, 800 S.E.2d at 680; Frye, 341 N.C. at 496,

461 S.E.2d at 677.

      But as we detailed above, Defendant failed to make any hearsay, illustration,

or foundation arguments on appeal.         With those arguments also abandoned,

Defendant has no horse left. See Harris, 253 N.C. App. at 327, 800 S.E.2d at 680.

Therefore, we dismiss Defendant’s arguments concerning Veach’s text messages

because they are not properly before this Court. See Davignon, 245 N.C. App. at 361,

782 S.E.2d at 394; Harris, 253 N.C. App. at 327, 800 S.E.2d at 680.

      B. Fair Cross Section Challenge

      In his final argument, Defendant asserts that his right to an impartial jury

was violated, and the trial court erred in denying his fair-cross-section claim. After

careful review, we disagree.

      “A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be tried by a jury of his or

her peers.” State v. Blakeney, 352 N.C. 287, 296, 531 S.E.2d 799, 808 (2000) (citing

U.S. CONST. amend. VI; N.C. CONST. art. I, §§ 24, 26). “This constitutional guarantee

assures that members of a defendant’s ‘own race have not been systematically and

arbitrarily excluded from the jury pool which is to decide [his] guilt or innocence.’”

State v. Bowman, 349 N.C. 459, 467, 509 S.E.2d 428, 434 (1998) (quoting State v.

McNeill, 326 N.C. 712, 718, 392 S.E.2d 78, 81 (1990)).

      This constitutional right is known as the “fair cross section requirement,” and

it has three elements:

                                         -7-
                                 STATE V. ROBINSON

                                  Opinion of the Court

             (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive”
             group in the community; (2) that the representation of this
             group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair
             and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons
             in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is
             due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-
             selection process.

Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S. Ct. 664, 668, 58 L. Ed. 2d 579, 587 (1979).

      Concerning the third element, “statistical evidence indicating a disparity

between the number of minorities serving on a jury in relation to the number of

minorities in the community, standing alone, is insufficient to prove that the

underrepresentation is a product of systematic exclusion of the minority group.”

State v. Corpening, 129 N.C. App. 60, 64, 497 S.E.2d 303, 306 (1998) (citing State v.

Harbison, 293 N.C. 474, 481, 238 S.E.2d 449, 453 (1977)).

      Here, Defendant only offers statistical evidence tending to show disparities to

prove systematic exclusion. Indeed, at trial, Defendant admitted that he “lacked the

third factor: that the underrepresentation was due to systematic exclusion of the

group in the jury selection process.”     To compensate for this missing element,

Defendant now points to several fair-cross-section cases and asserts that “[r]acial

disparity in jury pools has been a pervasive, uncured problem in our State which

North Carolina’s dependence on Duren has failed to remedy, affecting the

community’s sense of justice.”

      Defendant, however, only offers statistical evidence as proof of systematic

exclusion, and without more, he fails to establish a fair-cross-section claim under

                                         -8-
                                 STATE V. ROBINSON

                                  Opinion of the Court

Duren. See Duren, 439 U.S. at 364, 99 S. Ct. at 668, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 587; Corpening,

129 N.C. App. at 64, 497 S.E.2d at 306. Therefore, the trial court did not err in

denying Defendant’s challenge to the jury pool.

                                 V.     Conclusion

      We dismiss Defendant’s first issue concerning Veach’s text messages because

Defendant’s arguments are not properly before this Court, and we conclude the trial

court did not err in denying Defendant’s fair-cross-section claim.

      NO ERROR.

      Judges TYSON and HAMPSON concur.

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