Court Opinion

ID: 9770326
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 15:58:31.657586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:16.477215
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
If the Court deems this case an appropriate marker to draw the line on what constitutes “unassigned error which in the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals should be reviewed in the interest of justice,” Article 40.09, § 13, V.A.C.C.P., so be it. However, it ought to do better than allude to Bellah v. State, 415 S.W.2d 418 (Tex.Cr.App.1967) for the pretension that the line has already been drawn.1
Hardly a Wednesday goes by that this Court does not hand down a fist full of opinions, mostly per curiam to be sure, reciting that nothing has been found in the record “that might arguably support the appeal,” sometimes adding that discussing contentions in a pro se brief “would add nothing to the jurisprudence of the State.” Only recently a Court Panel, invoking the theory that there is no right to hybrid representation, bluntly stated a pro se brief “presents nothing for review,” but still routinely examined the contentions made for error “that should be considered in the interest of justice,” Rudd v. State, 616 S.W.2d 623 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). Apparently if any standard exists it is a much more flexible one than the majority now suggests. See, e. g., Klueppel v. State, 505 S.W.2d 572, 574-575 (Tex.Cr.App.1974) — “in view of the gravity of the error” in a prosecutorial argument; Felder v. State, 564 S.W.2d 776, 778 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) — though the ground of error did not comply with Article 40.09, the contention under it referring “to a specific instance of allegedly improper argument by the prosecutor” considered, found improper but cured by instruction; cf. Rae v. State, 423 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex.Cr.App.*1281968); Ritchey v. State, 407 S.W.2d 506 (Tex.Cr.App.1966) — no brief filed, but objection to action of trial court in permitting appellant’s former wife to testify reviewed and upheld; see also the host of cases annotated following Article 40.09, supra, at notes 607-618, from which no bright line rule is readily perceived.
Thus, what is reviewable “in the interest of justice” seems to depend on the particular collective judgment of the affected members of the Court at any given moment, the outer limits perhaps having been reached by a majority of the Court, writing through Presiding Judge Onion, in Armstrong v. State, 550 S.W.2d 25, 29 2 (Tex.Cr. App.1977) (Opinion on State’s Motion for Rehearing). Accordingly, in addressing it, I could not then, and still cannot, say with the confidence exuded by the majority that appellant’s pro se ground of error five is “not what was envisioned by that statutory provision” in Article 40.09, § 13, supra. Indeed, the considerable argument over its proper disposition suggests that it is.3
I adhere to the panel opinion on original submission and, therefore, dissent to the judgment of the Court.
ROBERTS and ODOM, JJ., join.

. Without any appearance of setting a standard the Court in Bellah v. State, supra, merely stated the obvious: A claimed error in not having jurors’ names placed in a receptacle and well shaken in compliance with Article 35.11, V.A.C.C.P., is “not one of constitutional dimension, nor does it present such a serious question of law” that requires discussion under § 13, supra. (All emphasis is mine unless otherwise indicated.)

. In note 1 it was explained that on original submission the record made clear that there was “a serious question as to the legality” of a search of a motor vehicle, and indicated there had been a hearing on a motion to suppress. The transcription of the reporter’s notes of the motion hearing was not in the record, but was ultimately obtained from the trial court through efforts of a staff member of the Court at the instance of the judge to whom the cause had been assigned. The Court pointed to several earlier cases and found “adequate precedent” for consideration of the search question which had not been assigned as error in appellant’s motion for new trial or in his brief.

. The local prosecuting attorney presents a motion for rehearing and supporting brief which commendably confront the rationale and result of the panel opinion headon. A briefer presentation with respect to the merits is made by the State Prosecuting Attorney, and it is he who questions our addressing the pro se ground of error. However, he does not complain of reviewing the ground in the interest of justice; rather, he asserts that to consider it is to allow “dual representation on appeal” contrary to the lesson of the opinion on rehearing in Landers v. State, 550 S.W.2d 272, 275 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).
(Whether Landers v. State, supra, was correctly decided is a serious question that we are not called on here to decide. Suffice it to say that the major fallacy in the opinion on rehearing is the utter failure of the Court to do what it said should be done — to interpret the constitutional provision “in light of conditions existing at the time of its adoption.” In Texas that “the accused shall have the right of being heard, by himself, or counsel, or both” first appeared in the Sixth Declaration of Rights in the 1836 Constitution of the Republic of Texas. The Court somehow assumes that the Framers were drawing from the common law of England, not mentioning at all their understanding of the criminal law of the former combined State of Coahuila and Texas. Without developing the matter in full at this time, I would now simply point out that pursuant to Decree No. 277, “A Plan for the Better Regulation of the Administration of Justice in Texas,” 1 Gam-mel’s Laws of Texas 364 ff, in criminal cases “the parties shall have the privilege of being heard by themselves, without employing an agent or attorney, at their option,” Article 31, id., at 368, but “where the accused may not be able to procure a lawyer or attorney to defend his cause, the judge shall appoint one for that purpose,” Article 32, ibid.; furthermore, at the Trial Criminal Plenario, after opening statements and declaration of the defendant upon the accusation, “after having concluded the relation [sic] which he shall make by himself,” the accused “shall be questioned by his attorney, as he may see proper,” Article 67, id., at 372, and at the conclusion of all testimony the complaining party “shall make a verbal plea” and the accused “shall also make his defence [sic] in the same manner,” Article 71, id., at 372. Thus, before the Framers drafted and the people adopted the 1836 Constitution, they had been living under a criminal justice system in which the accused had the right to be heard by himself, by counsel or both. Since as Landers points out, the common law rule forbidding participation of counsel in felony cases was not abrogated until 1836, obviously our forebearers did not draw their Declaration of Right to be heard from that source.)