Court Opinion

ID: 9582207
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:23:51.910416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:32.031511
License: Public Domain

Justice Huskins
dissenting:
Defendant was convicted of drunken driving. Upon the facts in this record his guilt is so obvious that reasonable men, women or children could not arrive at a different conclusion. Therefore, unless his1 rights have been prejudicially violated, amounting to a denial of due process, his conviction should be sustained.
The record shows: (1) Officer Tierney arrived on the scene two minutes after defendant had driven his 1964 Lincoln Continental into the Stroupe vehicle, which Mr. Stroupe had stopped at the right curb on a four-lane street in an effort to avoid the collision; (2) defendant told the officer he was driving the Lincoln, a fact already known to Mr. Stroupe; (3) defendant’s speech was slow, his face was red, the odor of alcohol was on his breath, he staggered when he walked — in short, he was drunk; (4) the officer arrested him without a warrant for drunken driving, advised him of his rights, took him to the Forsyth County Jail and again advised him of his rights, whereupon he stated that he was all right and didn’t need a lawyer; (5) defendant then consented to take the Breathalyzer test and it “indicated a reading between .28% and .24%”; (6) immediately thereafter defendant was served with a warrant charging him with drunken driving; (7) a few minutes after midnight defendant telephoned his lawyer who went to the jail and arranged bond, but the jailer refused to release defendant until he sobered up and also refused to allow counsel to see defendant, stating that “the s.o.b. is so drunk he can’t stand up”; (8) at his trial defendant did not testify and offered no evidence; (9) defendant makes no attack whatsoever on the accuracy of the Breathalyzer test and makes no contention that the test was improperly administered; (10) defendant contends, but does not reveal in what way, the failure to permit counsel to talk to him at midnight prejudiced his defense.
*557On the facts outlined, I am unwilling to “let the criminal go free because the constable blundered.” The determinative question is not whether defendant was denied access to his counsel at a critical stage of the proceeding against him. Rather, the question is whether denial of temporary access to counsel prejudiced this defendant in the preparation and trial of his case? Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 26 L. Ed. 2d 387, 90 S.Ct. 1999 (1970). I say not. Admittedly, defendant’s constitutional right to counsel was violated by an arrogant, overbearing jailer whose discharge might well serve the orderly administration of criminal justice. Even so, every violation of a constitutional right is not prejudicial. Some constitutional errors are deemed harmless in the setting of a particular case, not requiring the automatic reversal of a conviction, when the court can declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824 (1967); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 23 L. Ed. 2d 284, 89 S.Ct. 1726 (1969); Coleman v. Alabama, supra; State v. Brinson, 277 N.C. 286, 177 S.E. 2d 398 (1970). See: Note, Harmless Constitutional Error: A Reappraisal, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 814 (1970).
In fashioning a harmless error rule in Chapman, the Court said: “We prefer the approach of this Court in deciding what was harmless error in our recent case of Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 11 L. Ed. 2d 171, 84 S.Ct. 229. There we said: ‘The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.’ ” In Coleman v. Alabama, supra, defendant was not provided counsel at his preliminary hearing and, in remanding the case to the state court to determine whether defendant had been prejudiced by the absence of counsel, the Court said: “The test to be applied is whether the denial of counsel at the preliminary hearing was harmless error under Chapman v. California. . . . ” Applying that test to the facts in this case, I see no reasonable possibility that temporary exclusion of defendant’s counsel on the night in question could have contributed even remotely to his conviction. Under statutory law of this State, .10% alcoholic content in the blood raises a legal presumption that the person is under the influence of intoxicants. G.S. 20-139.1. Here, in the face of an unchallenged Breathalyzer reading of .23% to .24% alcoholic content in defendant’s blood, corroborated by slow speech, a red face, alcoholic breath and a staggered gait, it *558is not perceived how denial of access to “midnight counsel” was prejudicial in the slightest degree. He had access to counsel from 7 a.m. the following morning until his trial was completed in •Forsyth Superior Court in January 1970 — twenty-two months later! Had his lawyer been admitted, he would have seen only a client with a red face, a thick tongue, smelling of alcohol, too drunk to stand, and probably half asleep. Had his lawyer called a doctor and other witnesses, their eyes would have fallen upon the same cheerful sight. How, then, did the jailer’s blunder deprive this defendant of “his only opportunity to obtain evidence which might prove his innocence?” (Emphasis ours) The truth is, it did not. I believe it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and defendant’s conviction should stand. Where an officer’s conduct does not adversely affect the outcome of a trial and does not result in a miscarriage of justice, courts should not reverse just to penalize erring authorities.
In the following cases, even though the defendant’s right to consult with his counsel had been delayed or denied, the appellate court held that in the absence of evidence that such misconduct on the part of the authorities adversely affected the outcome of the trial or resulted in a miscarriage of justice, defendant’s conviction should stand: Welk v. State, 99 Tex. Crim. 235, 265 S.W. 914 (1924); Ellis v. State, 149 Tex. Crim. 583, 197 S.W. 2d 351 (1946); Sims v. State, 194 Ark. 702, 109 S.W. 2d 668 (1937); Guerin v. Commonwealth, 339 Mass. 731, 162 N.E. 2d 38 (1959). Accord: Coleman v. Alabama, supra; Vanater v. Boles, Warden, 377 F. 2d 898 (1967); State v. Youngblood, 217 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1968). See Annotation: Right to Counsel—Communication, 5 A.L.R. 3d 1360 (1966).
It is significant that after defendant had freely consulted with his counsel for twenty-two months, and after he and his counsel had heard the State’s evidence during the trial, defendant has never claimed that he did, in fact, have a defense to the charge against him, or that, had he been permitted to see his counsel on the night of his arrest, he could have presented evidence tending to prove his innocence. He just elected to try the jailer instead.
“The basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth_” Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 15 L. Ed. 2d 453, 86 S.Ct. 459 (1966). The truth has been determined in this case by the verdict of the jury. Yet the majority permits defendant to use the Constitution not as a shield against injustice but as *559a sword to avoid the penalty of the law. Such rigid application of constitutional principles is inappropriate in this instance and encourages the vicious habit of drunken driving which has become all too prevalent throughout the State. “There is danger that the criminal law will be brought into contempt — that discredit will even touch the great immunities assured by the Fourteenth Amendment — if gossamer possibilities of prejudice to a defendant are to nullify a sentence pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction in obedience to local law, and set the guilty free.” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 78 L. Ed. 674, 54 S.Ct. 330, 90 A.L.R. 575 (1934).
For these reasons I respectfully dissent from the majority view and vote to affirm the well-reasoned opinion of Chief judge Mallard in the Court of Appeals upholding defendant’s conviction.