Court Opinion

ID: 9750342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:51:40.59481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:08.051628
License: Public Domain

*410DEL SOLE, Judge,
dissenting.
I must dissent from the Majority’s decision to uphold the trial court’s dismissal of additional defendants in this medical malpractice suit. I believe that in focussing on the reasonableness or justification for the delay in joining the additional defendants, we have lost sight of the general purpose of the rule and the objectives sought to be achieved in allowing unseasonable joinder of additional defendants “upon cause shown.” Pa.R.C.P., No. 2253, 42 Pa.C.S.A.
In Zakian v. Liljestrand, 438 Pa. 249, 256, 264 A.2d 638, 641 (1970), the Supreme Court stated:
The rule does not specify that is sufficient cause for an extension nor does it delineate the factors that the court should take into consideration when deliberating upon such a petition for extension. The court, therefore, should be guided by the objectives sought to be achieved by use of the additional defendant procedure, in conjunction with the purpose for which a 60-day limitation was placed on its unrestricted use. In a capsule, these rules are an attempt to provide a means to simplify and expedite the disposition of matters involving numerous parties [citation omitted], without subjecting the original plaintiff to unreasonable delay in the prosecution of his portion of the litigation.
In other words, the reason for allowing joinder of additional defendants is to expedite the proceedings, and the reason for the 60-day limitation is to protect the original plaintiff from unreasonable and prejudicial delay. For instance, prejudice might arise from this delay if it resulted in postponing trial or requiring repetitious discovery to the plaintiffs’ detriment. Therefore, the decision whether to allow unseasonable joinder should rest on an assessment of the effect joinder will have on the plaintiff’s prosecution of the litigation, and whether joinder will result in the expeditious disposition of the matters in issue. In contrast, the objectives of efficiency and fairness to the plaintiff are not well served by this court’s reliance on a three-part test which focuses on whether the reasons offered for late *411joinder are reasonable. This test does not protect against abuses of Pennsylvania’s liberal joinder policy. Rather, such protection is best guaranteed by focussing on the party who may be harmed by the late joinder of additional defendants.
The Majority did not determine whether the plaintiffs would be prejudiced by this joinder because they found that the defendants did not have “good cause” for the delay. Appellants assert that the joinder of these additional defendants will not postpone this matter from coming to trial in normal course and this is not disputed. They also assert that the joinder will not require that any discovery held to date be repeated. The proposed additional defendants have been represented at the deposition of the plaintiffs, the only depositions taken to date, and interrogatories and materials produced in requests for production have been provided to counsel.
I believe that the Majority’s reliance on Riccobono v. Keystone Helicopter Corp., 352 Pa.Super. 186, 507 A.2d 834 (1986) is misplaced. There, the appeal was from a denial by the trial court of a request to permit the joinder of additional defendants. In the case before us, the trial court had permitted the joinder. It was only after the additional defendants objected that the trial court dismissed them from the case. The focus of the court in joinder matters must depend on the status of the parties raising the issue. It is appropriate to examine the “cause” question when the objection to joinder is from other parties presently involved in the litigation. The trial court must be satisfied that the attempted joinder will not delay the ultimate resolution of the case. However, once the joinder has been permitted and it is the joined party objecting, the trial court’s only concern should be that the joined party has not been prejudiced by the untimeliness. The cause for the lateness in joining is no longer a factor.
Moreover, it would be a waste of judicial resources to sustain the dismissal of these additional defendants. Although the statute of limitations has run on the plaintiffs’ *412direct cause of action against them, the original defendants would have a right of contribution or indemnity against the additional defendants. Oviatt v. Automated Entrance System Co., 400 Pa.Super. 493, 583 A.2d 1223 (1990). To permit the enforcement of this right in this litigation would eliminate the need of a second trial on many of the same issues. As was mentioned above, the purpose of Pennsylvania’s third party procedures is to avoid multiplicity of suits by adjudicating in one suit the rights and liabilities of all of the parties in the cause of action. Martinelli v. Mulloy, 223 Pa.Super. 130, 299 A.2d 19, 21 (1972). Joinder should be allowed to expedite the proceedings and conserve judicial resources.
In sum, I would find, consistent with the purposes of the Rule providing for late joinder of third parties, that the additional defendants, Dr. Hodess and Associates, should be joined in this proceeding.