Court Opinion

ID: 2963574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:12:17.476759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:43.095152
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

          September 11, 1995    [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                         
                                 ____________________

          No. 95-1135

                                CAMERON K. WEHRINGER,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                                POWER AND HALL, P.C.,

                                 Defendant, Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                       [Hon. Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge]
                                           ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________
                           Selya and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
                                            ______________

                                 ____________________

               Cameron K. Wehringer on brief pro se.
               ____________________
               Raymond J. Kenney Jr., Kevin C. Reidy and  Martin, Magnuson,
               _____________________  ______________      _________________
          McCarthy & Kenney on brief for appellee.
          _________________

                                 ____________________

                                 ____________________

                      Per  Curiam.     Plaintiff-appellant,  Cameron   K.
                      ___________

            Wehringer, appeals pro se from the district court's dismissal
                               ___ __

            pursuant  to  Fed. R.  Civ.  P.  12(b)(6) of  his  complaint,

            "without  prejudice to  refiling,  if,  as  a result  of  the

            underlying lawsuit,  plaintiff is able  to state a  claim for

            legal malpractice."  He  also appeals from the denial  of his

            motion  for partial  summary judgment  and from  the district

            court's failure to grant his motion for default judgment.  We

            affirm  on the  basis of  the district  court's well-reasoned

            Memorandum and Order, dated January 5, 1994.  We add only the

            following few additional comments.

                      I.  Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim
                          ______________________________________

                      The district court ruled that Wehringer's claim for

            legal malpractice was  premature in that it  was filed before

            the outcome in the underlying litigation (in which defendant-

            appellant Powers & Hall, P.C. ("Powers") represented him) was

            determined.  The underlying case against four individuals who

            allegedly tape  recorded Wehringer's  voice  in violation  of

            state and federal wiretapping laws, is still pending in state

            court.     Powers   was  granted   leave  to   withdraw  from

            representing  Wehringer in the case  on April 21,  1989.  New

            counsel  entered  an  appearance  on  April  23,  1993.   The

            district   court  ruled   that,  even   assuming  negligence,

            Wehringer could not demonstrate  damages absent proof that he

            probably would have succeeded in the underlying action.  Such

                                         -3-

            proof  could  not be  offered until  the underlying  suit was

            completed.

                      On appeal,  Wehringer argues that  even before  the

            outcome is known in the underlying case, he has suffered harm

            as a result  of Powers' negligence.   The alleged harm  is as

            follows: 1) the inability to bring a new claim (now allegedly

            barred  by   the  statute  of  limitations)   against  Audrey

            Brannigan,  a  defendant   against  whom   all  claims   were

            previously  voluntarily  dismissed;  2)  Powers'  billing  of

            Wehringer for time spent  seeking to withdraw from  the case,

            forcing him to bring this lawsuit;  and 3) legal fees paid to

            counsel  hired by Powers in  April 1993, to  represent him in

            the  underlying litigation.   We  address each  allegation of

            harm separately.

                      A.  Claim Barred by Statute of Limitations
                          ______________________________________

                      Wehringer  argues on  appeal  that as  a result  of

            Powers'  negligence in failing  to even discuss  with him the

            feasibility of  amending the  complaint, he has  forever lost

            the opportunity  to pursue  a claim against  Audrey Brannigan

            ("Brannigan"),  as  to  which   the  statute  of  limitations

            allegedly has run.   This argument is doubly flawed.   First,

            it is not  at all clear  that the running  of the statute  of

            limitations would bar  the amendment of the  complaint to add

            Brannigan  as  a defendant.  "Massachusetts  has  long had  a

            liberal  policy allowing  amendments which add  or substitute

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            parties after the statute of limitations has expired." Bengar
                                                                   ______

            v.  Clark Equipment Co., 401 Mass. 554, 556 (1988); see Mass.
                ___________________                             ___

            R. Civ. P.  15(c); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P.  15(c).  Wehringer has
                               ___

            not  alleged that he ever attempted to amend the complaint to

            add the claim against Brannigan.

                      Second, even if Powers  was negligent in failing to

            amend  the complaint prior to  the running of  the statute of

            limitations, Wehringer has suffered no  loss therefrom unless

            the  claim   probably  would  have  succeeded.     Until  the

            underlying lawsuit is completed, Wehringer cannot offer  such

            proof.   Therefore, the complaint fails to allege harm as the

            proximate result of Powers'  alleged negligence in failing to

            amend the complaint.

                      B.  Billing for Time Spent Seeking to Withdraw
                          __________________________________________

                      Wehringer has failed to allege harm in this respect

            because in its  answer to the complaint, Powers admitted that

            Wehringer  does not owe fees for time Powers spent seeking to

            withdraw.  Therefore, any  potential claim  of harm  that may

            have  existed  in  this  regard  is now  moot.    Wehringer's

            argument that he has suffered harm in the form of filing fees

            and other  costs of bringing  this lawsuit solely  to protect

            against  Powers' attempt  to collect fees  for time  spent on

            withdrawal is belied by the continuation of this lawsuit long

            after that issue has become moot.

                                         -5-

                      C.  Legal Fees Paid to Replacement Counsel 
                          ______________________________________

                      This  argument  is raised  for  the  first time  on

            appeal.  The complaint  does not allege that any  legal costs

            were  incurred  as  a  result  of  Powers'  negligence.    In

            Wehringer's   Opposition  to   Powers'  Motion   to  Dismiss,

            Wehringer  stated that he couldn't  afford to hire counsel in

            the underlying case after Powers withdrew:

                      Lawyers  are  just  too   expensive,  and
                      plaintiff  is  without  the resources  to
                      engage  counsel.   This  is true  in  the
                      underlying case and  in this federal case
                                      ___
                      against Powers & Hall, P.C.

            Appellant's Appendix,  p. 62 (emphasis in  original).  Having

            not  presented  his  legal   fees  as  harm  argument  below,

            Wehringer cannot raise it for the  first time on appeal.  See
                                                                      ___

            National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 749
            _________________________    ______________

            (1st Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 115 S. Ct. 2247 (1995).
                        _____ ______

                      Even  if we were to  consider the claim  of harm in

            the  form of legal  fees, the argument  has no merit.   Under

            Massachusetts law,  a cause  of action for  legal malpractice

            may accrue at the time that legal expenses  are incurred as a

            result of  the alleged  malpractice, notwithstanding  that an

            underlying action is still pending.  See Levin v. Berley, 728
                                                 ___ _____    ______

            F.2d 551, 554 (1st Cir. 1984) (applying Massachusetts law and

            holding  that  legal  malpractice  cause  of  action  against

            attorney  who drafted plaintiff's will accrued when plaintiff

                                         -6-

            suffered harm in the  form of additional legal  fees incurred

            to ameliorate  harm  caused by  defendant attorney's  error);

            Cantu  v. St.  Paul  Cos., 401  Mass.  53, 57  (1987)  (legal
            _____     _______________

            malpractice   cause  of   action  accrued   while  underlying

            litigation was still pending  on appeal where plaintiff hired

            attorney to advise him  regarding personal financial exposure

            resulting from defendant attorney's  negligence in failing to

            timely  notify  excess  insurer  of  the  underlying  claim);

            Massachusetts Elec. Co. v.  Fletcher, Tilton & Whipple, P.C.,
            _______________________     ________________________________

            394  Mass. 265, 268 (1985) (cause of action accrued for legal

            malpractice  when  plaintiffs   incurred  substantial   legal

            expenses in defense of a claim based in part on the negligent

            conduct   of  their   attorneys,  notwithstanding   that  the

            underlying litigation was still pending). 

                      This  case  is distinguished  from the  cases cited

            above, however, by  the failure of  Wehringer to allege  that

            legal  expenses  were incurred  as  the  proximate result  of

            Powers'  alleged  negligence.     After  Powers'  withdrawal,

            Wehringer entered an appearance  pro se.  Replacement counsel
                                             ___ __

            did  not enter an  appearance in the  underlying action until

            April,  1993.  In his  reply brief, Wehringer  argues that he

            sustained harm in the form of  legal fees paid to the counsel

            he eventually hired to represent him in the underlying action

            four years after Powers' withdrawal.  This harm,  however, is

            not the result of Powers' alleged negligence.  The legal fees

                                         -7-

            for  pursuit of  the  underlying litigation  would have  been

            incurred by Wehringer  even in the absence of  any negligence

            by  Powers.  Therefore, the district court did not err either

            in dismissing the action without prejudice as premature or in

            denying the appellant's motion for partial summary judgment.

                      II.  Default Judgment
                           ________________

                      The district court  did not err in failing to grant

            Wehringer's motion  for default  judgment on the  ground that

            Powers failed to  file an  answer to the  complaint on  time.

            Wehringer served  the summons and complaint  on September 27,

            1991.  On October 17, 1991,  Powers filed a motion to dismiss

            for insufficiency of service of process.  See Fed. R. Civ. P.
                                                      ___

            12(b)(5).  On February 14, 1992, Wehringer moved for  default

            judgment  for failure to file  an answer to  the complaint on

            time.   At that moment, the district  court had not yet ruled

            on Powers' motion to dismiss and, therefore, the deadline for

            filing  an answer had  not yet passed.   See Fed.  R. Civ. P.
                                                     ___

            12(a)(4)(A)  (service of  motion  under Fed.  R.  Civ. P.  12

            postpones the deadline  for filing  an answer  until 10  days

            after notice of the court's action on the motion).

                      Wehringer argues that Powers' motion to dismiss was

            denied  "de facto" by the issuance of a discovery schedule on

            January 9, 1992, by the magistrate judge to whom the case was

            referred.  As  Wehringer freely  admits,  there  is no  legal

            authority to  support his argument.   Therefore, the district

                                         -8-

            court  committed  no  error in  failing  to  enter a  default

            judgment.

                      Accordingly, the district court's dismissal of this

            action is affirmed.
                      ________

                                         -9-