Court Opinion

ID: 9683850
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:38:02.567107+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:50.621183
License: Public Domain

Holt, J., dissenting. I cannot agree with the majority view in this case. Our present adoption statutes [Ark. Stats. 1947, §§ 56-101-56-109, et seq.] and those preceding, have clearly, in my opinion, made an adopted child the same as the bodily heir of adopting parents. In the present case, the adoption law in effect at the time R. S. Davis (father of Homer Gr. Davis, Sr., the adopting parent of Homer Gr. Davis, Jr.) executed the deed here, provided: ‘ ‘ The Court shall make an order that such child be adopted, and from and after the adoption of such child it shall take the name in which it is adopted, and be entitled to and receive all the rights and interest in the estate of such adopted father or mother by descent or otherwise, that such child would do if the natural heir of such adopted father or mother,” (then C. & M. Digest, § 254). The adoption law in effect at the time Homer Gr. Davis, Sr. adopted Homer, Jr. was § 262, Pope’s Digest, par. 3, (Act 137 of 1935) and provided: “The child shall be invested with every legal right, privilege, obligation, and relation in respect to education, maintenance, and the right of inheritance to real estate or the distribution of personal estate on the death of the adopting parents as if born to them in legal wedlock.” The adoption law in effect now, and when Homer G-. Davis, Sr. died, appears as § 56-109, supra, and provides: “The person adopted shall have every legal right, privilege, and obligation and relation in respect to education, maintenance, and the rights of inheritance to real estate or the distribution of personal estate on the death of the adopting parents as if born to them in legal wedlock.” It seems obvious to me that the clear intent of the lawmakers by the above legislation was to eliminate completely any possible distinction between legally adopted, and natural children. The last two statutes, above, use the identical words in making an adopted child the same as a natural child, “born to them in legal wedlock. ’’ How could legislative intent be made plainer. There was no provision in the deed here specifically denying the adopted Homer, Jr. the right to inherit from his adopted father as a natural child. Our decisions following the above legislation, I think, clearly sustained my views. In Grimes v. Jones, 193 Ark.' 858, 103 S. W. 2d 359, we held: (Headnote 4) “A child adopted in 1911 which was three years after the adopting parents had made a will stands in the position of a natular child born subsequent to the execution of a will and, under the statutes, inherits accordingly. Crawford & Moses’ Dig., §§ 254,10506 and 10507.” (Ark. Stats. 1947, § 60-119 and § 60-120), and in Scmclers v. Taylor, 193 Ark. 1095,104 S. W. 2d 797, we said: “We think that the effect of our late decisions, previous to the passage of Act No. 137, supra, places the legal status of adopted children exactly as those born in wedlock. Both classes are to be deemed children within the spirit and meaning of our law, but on this question there can now be no doubt. Act No. 137, sitpra, provides (by § 8) that the child adopted * * * ‘ shall be invested with every legal right, privilege, obligation and relation in respect to education, maintenance and the right of inheritance to real estate, or the distribution of personal estate on the death of the adopting parents as if born to them in leg*al wedlock. ’ In the recent case of Grimes v. Jones, 193 Ark. 858, 103 S. W. 2d 359, we had occasion to construe the statute relating to the execution of wills with reference to the rights of an adopted child. The statute provided that where a child is born to the testator after the making of a will and shall die leaving such child unprovided for in any settlement or in the will and unmentioned therein, the child shall succeed to that portion of the testator’s estate to which it would have been entitled under the law regardless of the will. We there said, in substance, that where a testator, subsequent to the execution of a will adopts a child which is not provided for by settlement or mentioned in the will, such child is entitled to inherit as a natural child. Under the plain provisions of Act No. 137, supra, and the authority of Grimes v. Jones, supra, the trial court correctly declared the law to be that adopted children are in the same class as natural children. ’ ’ So we have positively proclaimed in language that needs no judicial construction that the legal status of adopted children shall be ‘ ‘ exactly ’ ’ the same as those born in wedlock. Why, now, in effect, attempt to place an entirely different meaning on what we have said. I would reverse and hold that Homer, Jr. here is in the identical position as a natural child or bodily heir and should take under the deed here involved accordingly.