Court Opinion

ID: 9954569
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 16:11:25.368526+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:59.247155
License: Public Domain

J-S44027-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  MAURICE LEWIS                                :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1792 EDA 2021

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 13, 2021
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0002434-2008

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                             FILED MARCH 26, 2024

       Appellant Maurice Lewis appeals from the order denying his timely first

Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA) petition.1 On appeal, Appellant claims that

both trial counsel and prior PCRA counsel were ineffective.        After careful

review, we vacate the PCRA court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

       The PCRA court set forth the following factual history:

       On December 6, 2005, Sabrina Clyburn overheard Kenny Shields,
       [Appellant], and Stephen Bennett discussing robbing Thomas
       Faison (the victim). Clyburn saw the three outside of the victim’s
       house wearing masks and gloves. [Appellant] entered the house
       alone; sounds of an argument and a gunshot were heard; Shields
       and then Bennett ran into the house; and a second gunshot went
       off.

       [Appellant], who had been shot, was taken by Shields to a nearby
       apartment building where Shields’ cousin lived. Following an
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
J-S44027-23

         emergency call, [Appellant] was taken to the hospital, claiming
         that he had been shot getting off of a bus.

         A neighbor found the victim dead in his home amidst the scene of
         a struggle. The Assistant Medical Examiner testified that the
         victim sustained one gunshot wound to the chest and one to his
         hand, that death was caused by the gunshot wound to the chest,
         and that the manner of death was homicide. Crime scene
         investigation uncovered a strike mark from a bullet along with
         seven distinct blood splatter patterns and some hair. Forensic
         analysis later identified Appellant as the source of the
         bloodstained fibers found at Mr. Faison’s home.        Ballistics
         determined that a 9mm handgun and a 45-caliber handgun were
         both fired in the home.

         In the following days, Shields and [Appellant] relayed to various
         people the story of how Shields saved [Appellant’s] life after
         [Appellant] was shot struggling with the victim.          Rasheda
         DeShields, Shields’ sister, gave a statement in which she reported
         that Shields made statements to her, inter alia, that [Appellant]
         shot the victim in the hand and that Shields[] took [Appellant’s]
         weapon to hide it at [Appellant’s] grandmother’s home before the
         police arrived in response to the 911 call that led to [Appellant]
         being taken to the hospital. Arlo Spruell gave a statement that
         Shields told him that Shields and [Appellant] went to the victim’s
         house to rob the victim because the victim was selling cocaine for
         someone named Mike, whom Shields and [Appellant] did not like,
         and they wanted to get Mike’s money and cocaine.

PCRA Ct. Op., 1/26/23, at 1-2 (citing Commonwealth v. Lewis, 1588 EDA

2010, at 3-4 (Pa. Super. filed Dec. 6, 2011) (unpublished mem.)). On January

12, 2010, Appellant was convicted of second-degree murder following a jury

trial.   The trial court imposed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment

without the possibility of parole. On appeal, this Court affirmed Appellant’s

judgment of sentence and our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for

allowance of appeal. See Lewis, 1588 EDA 2010, appeal denied, 55 A.3d 523

                                       -2-
J-S44027-23

(Pa. 2012).   Appellant did not file a petition for writ of certiorari with the

Supreme Court of the United States.

      On December 4, 2012, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition.

PCRA counsel subsequently filed amended petitions on Appellant’s behalf. On

June 21, 2021, the PCRA court entered a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent

to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition without a hearing. Appellant did not file

a response. On August 13, 2021, the PCRA court issued an order dismissing

Appellant’s PCRA petition.

      Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Although the PCRA court did

not order Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, the PCRA court filed

a Rule 1925(a) opinion explaining the reasons for dismissing Appellant’s

petition.

      On appeal, James R. Lloyd, III, Esq., entered his appearance on

Appellant’s behalf. Attorney Lloyd filed an application for relief in this Court

requesting remand to permit Appellant to raise claims of prior PCRA counsel’s

ineffectiveness in a Rule 1925(b) statement. See Appl. for Relief, 11/17/22.

On December 28, 2022, this Court remanded the matter for the PCRA court

to allow Appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) statement and for the PCRA court to

issue a supplemental opinion. Appellant subsequently filed a Rule 1925(b)

statement in which he alleged, for the first time, ineffective assistance of prior

PCRA counsel for failing to raise trial counsel's failure to utilize medical records

that would have undermined and contradicted the prosecution, and Appellant

claims that a new trial is warranted. See Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement,

                                       -3-
J-S44027-23

1/17/23, at 3-4.2 The PCRA court issued a supplemental Rule 1925(a) opinion

addressing Appellant’s claims and requested a remand to hold an evidentiary

hearing after reviewing Appellant’s counseled Rule 1925(b) statement. See

PCRA Ct. Op., 1/26/23, at 5.

       On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

       1. Did the PCRA court err and/or abuse its discretion when it
          denied Appellant’s PCRA petition seeking a new trial, without
          conducting an evidentiary hearing, based upon a claim that
          counsel was ineffective for failing to utilize [Appellant’s]
          medical records to undermine key elements of the
          Commonwealth’s case?

       2. Did the PCRA court err and/or abuse its discretion when it
          denied Appellant’s PCRA petition seeking a new trial, without
          conducting an evidentiary hearing, where PCRA counsel were
          ineffective for failing to raise a claim that a new trial is
          warranted because the Commonwealth violated [Appellant’s]
          constitutional rights as set forth in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S.
          264 (1959), and its progeny, where the Commonwealth was in
          possession of [Appellant’s] medical records prior to trial and
          still advanced the theories in support of [Appellant’s] guilt to
          the jury knowing the information to be false and misleading?

Appellant’s Brief at 5-6 (some formatting altered).

       In his first issue, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing “to use Appellant’s medical records to challenge key points of

inculpatory evidence introduced by the Commonwealth at trial.” Id. at 37.
____________________________________________

2 We note that PCRA petitioners may “raise claims of ineffective PCRA counsel

at the first opportunity, even if on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261
A.3d 381, 405 (Pa. 2021); see also Commonwealth v. Parrish, 273 A.3d
989, 1002 (Pa. 2022) (holding that a PCRA petitioner “adequately raised and
preserved his layered claim of the ineffective assistance of trial and initial
PCRA counsel by raising it at the first opportunity to do so, specifically in his
[Rule] 1925(b) Statement and in his [appellate] brief”).

                                           -4-
J-S44027-23

Specifically, Appellant asserts that trial counsel should have used the medical

records “in an effort to undermine the evidence of the in-hospital confessions

or DNA on the bullet fragment.” Id. at 41. Additionally, Appellant contends

that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing because

“genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to the claims of trial

counsel’s ineffectiveness and, thus, a remand is appropriate to resolve these

claims on the merits.” Id. at 37. Appellant further alleges that PCRA counsel

was ineffective for failing to argue that Appellant’s conviction was the result

of arguments advanced by the Commonwealth “that are not supported[] or

factually accurate[.]” Id. at 46.

      Our review of the denial of PCRA relief is limited to “whether the record

supports the PCRA court’s determination and whether the PCRA court’s

decision is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4

(Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted).        “The PCRA court’s credibility

determinations, when supported by the record, are binding on this Court;

however, we apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal

conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 105 A.3d 1257, 1265 (Pa. 2014)

(citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Davis, 262 A.3d 589, 595

(Pa. Super. 2021) (stating that “[t]his Court grants great deference to the

findings of the PCRA court if the record contains any support for those

findings” (citation omitted)).

      We must first determine whether this case should be remanded for an

evidentiary hearing.   The decision of whether to hold a PCRA evidentiary

                                     -5-
J-S44027-23

hearing is an exercise of discretion on the part of the PCRA court, and we

review for an abuse of that discretion. Commonwealth v. Maddrey, 205

A.3d 323, 327 (Pa. Super. 2019).

      [T]he right to an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition
      is not absolute. It is within the PCRA court’s discretion to decline
      to hold a hearing if the petitioner’s claim is patently frivolous and
      has no support either in the record or other evidence. It is the
      responsibility of the reviewing court on appeal to examine each
      issue raised in the PCRA petition in light of the record certified
      before it in order to determine if the PCRA court erred in its
      determination that there were no genuine issues of material fact
      in controversy and in denying relief without conducting an
      evidentiary hearing.

                                  *    *      *

      Generally, if there are factual issues to be resolved, the PCRA
      court should hold an evidentiary hearing.

Commonwealth v. Grayson, 212 A.3d 1047, 1054-55 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citations omitted and formatting altered).

      In Bradley, our Supreme Court reaffirmed the Court’s preference for

evidentiary hearings and explained:

      In some instances, the record before the appellate court will be
      sufficient to allow for disposition of any newly-raised
      ineffectiveness claims. However, in other cases, the appellate
      court may need to remand to the PCRA court for further
      development of the record and for the PCRA court to consider such
      claims as an initial matter. Consistent with our prior case law, to
      advance a request for remand, a petition would be required to
      provide more than mere boilerplate assertions of PCRA counsel’s
      ineffectiveness; however, where there are material facts at issue
      concerning claims challenging counsel’s stewardship and relief is
      not plainly unavailable as a matter of law, the remand should be
      afforded.

                                      -6-
J-S44027-23

Bradley, 261 A.3d at 402 (citations and footnote omitted and formatting

altered).

       In his Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant contends that his trial counsel

was ineffective by failing “to object[,] to obtain[,] and utilize [Appellant’s]

medical records because those medical records were readily available and

would have directly contradicted important—if not essential—allegations

proffered by the Commonwealth at trial.”            Appellant’s Rule 1925(b)

Statement, 1/17/23, at 1-2. Additionally, Appellant alleges that all prior PCRA

counsel were ineffective for failing to raise a claim that the Commonwealth

advanced several false or misleading theories to the jury. Id. at 3-4. In its

supplemental Rule 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court agreed with Appellant,

stating that following its review of Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement, that

remand is appropriate and “respectfully request[ed] this case be remanded so

that an evidentiary hearing may be held.” PCRA Ct. Op., 1/26/23, at 5.

       Following our review of the record, we agree with the PCRA court that

Appellant’s challenge rises to the level of a genuine issue of material fact, as

resolution in Appellant’s favor could entitle him to relief. See Grayson, 212

A.3d at 1054-55. Accordingly, we reverse the PCRA court’s order and remand

this case for the PCRA court to hold an evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s

PCRA petition.3

____________________________________________

3 In light of our disposition remanding the instant case to the PCRA court for

an evidentiary hearing, we do not reach the merits of Appellant’s remaining
issue.

                                           -7-
J-S44027-23

     Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 3/26/2024

                                  -8-