Court Opinion

ID: 9809638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:19:21.707402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:51:08.652275
License: Public Domain

MANNING, J.,
dissenting: I concur in the opinion of the majority of the Court, that the petitioner has invoked the proper remedy to have the legality of his imprisonment inquired into. Upon a bill of indictment charging the petitioner with the larceny of goods and merchandise of the value of less than $20, the petitioner was tried and convicted. The judge sentenced him to serve a term of five years on the public roads of Guilford County. He prosecuted no appeal from that judgment, and before seeking his discharge from the punishment, in excess of 12 months, he, after having served a term of 18 months, applied to this Court for the writ of certiorari in the nature of and as a substitute for an appeal. This Court denied him relief by this writ. The' petitioner then sued out the writ of habeas corpus; and the legality of the sentence pronounced upon him by Judge Long is the only matter of inquiry. It seems to me this Court, in Davidson's case, 124 N. C., 839, has determined that the petitioner is entitled to his discharge. In that ease the Court said: “The Code, sec. 1187 (Revisal, sec. 3249), prescribes that when a second conviction is punished with other or greater punishment than for a first conviction, the first conviction shall be charged in the manner therein set out, and what proof shall be sufficient evidence thereof. When the property stolen is charged of loss value than $20 (or when charged at more than that value, if it is found-by the jury to be of less value than $20) no punishment greater than one year’s imprisonment can be inflicted, unless it is charged in the indictment that the defendant has been formerly convicted of larceny, except that, should the proof show that the larceny was from the person or breaking and entering a dwelling-house in the daytime, the defendant cannot claim the protection of this statute, and hence it is not necessary to charge in the indictment the manner of the larceny.”
*173In tbe present case tbe larceny was not committed in one of tbe excepted ways, i. e., from tbe person or by breaking and entering a dwelling-house in tbe daytime. His Honor does not make any sucb finding, nor does be base bis judgment upon any sucb fact. His judgment is rested upon a finding of tbe value of tbe stolen property to be in excess of $20 (and tbis finding is made by tbe judge and not by tbe jury), and upon the conviction of tbe petitioner of other offenses at tbe same term of tbe court. The omission of tbe indictment to charge tbe conviction of a previous larceny would prevent a punishment based upon a second conviction. S. v. Davidson, supra; Revisal, sec. 3249. As tbe indictment charged tbe value of the stolen property to be less than $20, why should tbe defendant ask for a finding by tbe jury that tbis allegation of tbe State was untrue ? Tbe value of tbe stolen property was not involved; tbe State in tbe indictment fixed it; tbe defendant asked no finding to confirm what tbe State alleged or to enhance tbe value of the stolen property, so as, if convicted, to increase bis punishment. I cannot believe tbe Legislature intended any sucb result. It is undoubtedly true that, under tbe statute, tbe value of tbe stolen property does not change tbe character of tbe crime; it is as much larceny to steal property of tbe value of $5 as it is to steal property of tbe value of $20 or more. Tbe Legislature has, however, deemed it wise to make tbe punishment upon conviction determinable by tbe value of tbe stolen property; and it bad tbe unquestioned power to do so.
Tbis decision is tbe more important for it is not clear what effect it-may have upon tbe acts establishing inferior criminal courts for certain cities, towns, and counties in tbe State, in which the larceny of goods of tbe value of less than $10 is made a petty misdemeanor. Under these acts, which have been sustained by several decisions of tbis Court, tbe value of tbe stolen property determines not only tbe punishment- that can be legally inflicted, but also tbe grade of tbe crime. . Tbe Legislature, in ¡massing tbe act in 1895, incorporated a provision which enabled tbe defendant to call in question tbe value of tbe stolen property as charged in tbe indictment; but tbis was obviously done for tbe benefit of tbe tbe defendant where tbe value was *174charged to be in excess of $20. In that case the defendant, if be controvert the value, may have the jury (not the judge) determine as a fact, and so find, the value of the property. In my opinion, the petitioner, having served the maximum punishment prescribed by the statute, should be discharged.
Walker, J., did not sit on the hearing of this appeal.