Court Opinion

ID: 9527965
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:35:52.02416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:19.248685
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
specially concurring.
This criminal cause has brought me to course over the dissenting opinion in State v. Hoak, 107 Idaho 742, 750-67, 692 P.2d 1174, 1182-89 (1984), which carefully and thoroughly detailed the constitutional fault and factual inapplicability of the so-called independent source doctrine, Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984). In Hoak, one lonely voice in the wilderness reminded the majority that this Court has an obligation to uphold the independent provisions of our Idaho Constitution, see Justice Herman Taylor’s opinion in State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P. 788 (1927), especially in cases where the United States Supreme Court has cut back on the protection afforded by an analogous federal constitutional provision. The majority in Hoak did not deem it appropriate to consider the state constitutional implications of the independent source doctrine, instead deciding the case on Fourth Amendment grounds only. Thus, to this day, the question of whether the independent source doctrine is ingrained in Idaho constitutional jurisprudence has yet to be decided.
It is clear that the Idaho Constitution in some instances confers broader protections against unreasonable searches and seizures than does the Fourth Amendment as is evidenced by the Court’s well-received re*31cent opinion in State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992) (rejecting a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule under Article 1, § 17), and the cases cited therein. It is also clear that a party must sufficiently raise and argue the state constitutional issue before we will address it. State v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 406-07, 825 P.2d 501, 503-04, (1992) (refusing to address issue of whether the rule in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), should be rejected under Idaho Const, art. 1, § 17). Accordingly, this Justice agrees with the majority that to date there is no occasion to visit the state constitutional issue.
An exceptionally astute practitioner running across this case or Hoak might consider whether the independent source doctrine is therefore open to a properly raised challenge on state constitutional grounds. That dedicated practitioner might then ponder the question of whether the rationale of the independent source doctrine, which is really just another exception to the federal exclusionary rule, was and is consonant with the independent purposes of the Idaho exclusionary rule as set forth in the Guzman case. Finally, that practitioner might then look to the Wheaton case for some “some guidance ... on how one might fully develop an independent state constitutional claim.” Wheaton, 121 Idaho at 407, 825 P.2d at 504 (Bistline, J., specially concurring). The above cases, along with Justice Stevens’s dissent in Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. at 817-40, 104 S.Ct. at 3391-3405, and Professor LaFave’s commentary on Segura in his treatise, 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 11.4(f) (2d ed. 1987), are recommended reading for the practitioner who is dedicated to the nourishing of an independent body of law in Idaho.
However, because only a federal constitutional issue is raised as to the patently illegal search and seizure, presently I am constrained to concur with the majority’s conclusion that there is no remedy for the appellants under the Fourth Amendment.