Court Opinion

ID: 9908527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-09 01:00:37.079107+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:13.869026
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-20628   Document: 00516995600   Page: 1    Date Filed: 12/08/2023

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit                   United States Court of Appeals
                                                                Fifth Circuit
                           ____________                       FILED
                                                       December 8, 2023
                            No. 21-20628
                                                         Lyle W. Cayce
                           ____________                       Clerk

   Fidelis Johnson Badaiki,

                                                   Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                versus

   Cameron International Corporation,

                                                   Defendant—Appellee,

                        consolidated with
                          _____________

                            No. 22-20071
                          _____________

   Fidelis Johnson Badaiki,

                                                   Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                versus

   Schlumberger Holdings Corporation; Schlumberger
   Limited; Schlumberger Technology Corporation;
   Cameron International Corporation; Paal Kibsgaard;
   Olivier Le Peuch; Steve McKenzie; Jamilah Cummings;
   Marisa Henning; John Corkhill; Nathan Cooper; Ray
   Arbor; Jay Jurena; Ed Gaude; Henry Weissenborn,

                                               Defendants—Appellees.
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                       ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Southern District of Texas
                        USDC Nos. 4:19-CV-371, 4:20-CV-2216
                      ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Higginson, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Appellant Fidelis Johnson Badaiki worked for Appellee Cameron
   International Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of Appellee
   Schlumberger Holdings Corporation, from 2007 to 2016. After Badaiki was
   laid off, he initiated three lawsuits in state court against Cameron,
   Schlumberger, and individuals associated with the company. Appellees
   removed two of the cases to federal court.
          The district court dismissed both suits after determining that the
   parties entered into a binding settlement agreement under which Badaiki
   agreed to dismiss “all claims” against Cameron and Schlumberger in “all
   cases” in exchange for defendants’ agreement to forgo attorneys’ fees in
   those actions. Badaiki, proceeding pro se, now appeals the district court’s
   dismissal of these cases.
          We find that the parties entered into a binding settlement agreement
   which moots all issues on appeal. We dismiss the cases for lack of Article III
   jurisdiction.
                                                 I.
          Appellee Cameron International Corporation is an oil and gas
   company that is wholly owned by Appellee Schlumberger Holdings
   Corporation. In 2007, Cameron hired Appellant Badaiki as a senior designer

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

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   for its Drilling Systems unit out of Houston, Texas, but Badaiki was laid off
   on March 3, 2016.
                                               A.
           On December 12, 2018, Badaiki sued Cameron in Texas state court,
   asserting claims of unlawful retaliation and hostile work environment in
   violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Americans with
   Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 (“Badaiki I”).1 Cameron
   removed the case to federal court. Cameron and Badaiki later filed cross
   motions for summary judgment. The motions were referred to a magistrate
   judge who recommended the district court grant Appellees’ motion for
   summary judgment. On November 26, 2021, the district court adopted the
   magistrate judge’s recommendations and granted summary judgment to
   Cameron. Badaiki appealed the order on November 30, 2021 but also filed a
   motion to amend the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
   59 on December 10, 2021.
                                                B.
           While Badaiki I was pending, Badaiki filed a second suit in state court
   on February 28, 2020, which was removed to federal court (“Badaiki II”).2
   After Appellees moved to dismiss Badaiki’s amended complaint, the
   magistrate judge recommend the district court grant Appellees’ motion. The

           _____________________
           1
              Badaiki’s original complaint named Cameron International Corporation and
   Schlumberger Company as defendants. Cameron moved to dismiss Badaiki’s complaint on
   the basis that his claims were time-barred. The district court granted the motion in part and
   dismissed all claims “concerning acts or omissions committed by Cameron that precede
   February 25, 2016,” as well as all claims against defendant Schlumberger Company.
           2
           Badaiki amended his petition on or around June 8, 2020, and again on July 21,
   2020. As amended, Badaiki asserted claims against fourteen defendants, including: (1)
   Schlumberger Holdings Corporation; (2) Schlumberger Limited; (3) Schlumberger
   Technology Corporation; (4) Cameron; and (5) ten individuals associated with the
   companies.

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   district court adopted the recommendations and dismissed Badaiki’s claims
   with prejudice on November 26, 2021. On December 23, 2021, Badaiki
   moved to amend the judgment. Before the district court could rule on his
   motion, Badaiki appealed the dismissal order.
                                                 C.
           While both of Badaiki’s motions to amend were pending before the
   district court, the parties settled their dispute. On December 21, 2023,
   Appellees’ counsel sent Badaiki the following email with subject line,
   “Cameron-Badaiki: Settlement Offer made pursuant to TRE 408 and FRE
   408”:
           I have talked with my clients, and in exchange for a complete
           release on all claims in all cases you have filed, my clients will
           agree to forego pursuing their award of attorneys’ fees in the
           state court action and two federal court actions. As you are
           aware, the state court has already awarded some fees, and we
           are confident that the federal courts will also grant our requests
           for fees, which are in excess of $200,000. Should you not
           accept this offer, we will move forward with executing on all
           judgments. I hope you give this offer serious consideration.
           This offer will expire if not accepted by December 25, 2021.
           On December 25, 2021, Badaiki responded via email: “Accepted. We
   could discourse later.”
           The parties each filed notices of settlement. In his notice, Badaiki
   stated that “[t]he Defendant and Plaintiff Badaiki reach a settle [sic] by
   email,” attached the December 21 email from opposing counsel, and
   concluded “[o]n December 25, 2021 email, Badaiki ACCEPTED the above
   Settlement Offer.” After receiving the notices of settlement, the court stayed
   all deadlines until the parties filed their Rule 41 dismissals.3

           _____________________
           3
               The trial judge was the same in both cases.

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           Trouble shortly ensued. In January, Badaiki contacted Appellees and
   sought severance pay as part of the settlement agreement. Appellees refused
   on the basis that the severance pay was “never part of the settlement offer.”
   That same month, Badaiki filed a motion in the district court and argued that
   it lacked jurisdiction to stay deadlines in the case.4 Shortly thereafter,
   Appellees notified the district court that Badaiki “has agreed to resolve all
   litigation but has refused to sign a more detailed settlement agreement.” In
   response, the district court ordered the parties to file their settlement
   paperwork by April 18, 2022. When the parties did not comply, the district
   court ordered the parties to appear for a hearing on May 9, 2022.
           At the May 9, 2022, hearing, the trial court first found that it had
   jurisdiction to determine the validity of the settlement. Then, the court
   determined Appellees’ December 21, 2021, email was a valid settlement offer
   and Badaiki accepted that offer in his December 25, 2022 response. The
   district court concluded that the settlement terms obligated Appellees to

           _____________________
           4
              First, Badaiki argued Appellees’ motion to stay deadlines needed to be “jointly
   signed by all parties,” and that the motion was defunct because it was only signed by Jim
   Nye, Appellees’ counsel. Second, Badaiki contended the court “is without Plenary
   Jurisdiction to perform a FRCP 41 [sic], after this Court had already Dismissed this instant
   action with prejudice [sic] and the action is already on Appeal in the fifth circuit [sic].”
   Third, Badaiki asserted that the district court lacked jurisdiction because “All Removing
   Defendants” did not consent to removal because “a non-existing entity could not consent
   to nothing, in fact, both originally sued defendants were non-existing, ab initio.” He
   concluded that “this instant case does not satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement of
   article III, this case is moot, and must be dismiss [sic] for mootness without adjudicating
   the merits of the case.”
            Badaiki further questioned whether the settlement agreement was valid because
   “[s]ettlement of actions is between the ‘actual parties, clients’ not between attorneys, here,
   James H. Nye is an attorney, and he is not the ‘actual parties, clients,’” and accused
   Attorney Nye of “block[ing] Plaintiff Badaiki from negotiating and settling with the ‘actual
   parties, clients.’” Badaiki went on to accuse Nye of “threaten[ing]” and “extort[ing]” him
   and called the “instant actions in this Court [a] modern-day Lynching of a Black man.”

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   forego any claims to attorneys’ fees they may have in exchange for Badaiki’s
   release of all claims against Appellees in all pending actions, including
   Badaiki I and II and the pending state court suit. On May 12, 2022, the district
   court issued a written order and final judgment dismissing Badaiki I and II
   with prejudice.
          Badaiki continued to file motions for relief from judgment before the
   district court and amended his notices of appeal before this Court. On June
   17, 2022, the district court denied Badaiki’s motions for relief. This Court
   consolidated the appeals.
                                         II.
          Badaiki now appeals multiple orders from Badaiki I, including: (1) the
   district court’s January 27, 2021 order denying Badaiki’s motion to compel
   mediation; (2) the district court’s November 26, 2021 order adopting the
   magistrate judgement’s report and recommendations and denying Badaiki’s
   various motions, as well as the final judgment issued in pursuit thereof; and
   (3) the district court’s proceedings on the May 9, 2022, order, and the final
   judgment entered in pursuit of the findings made at the proceeding.
          As to Badaiki II, Badaiki appeals: (1) the July 20, 2020 notice of
   transfer indicating the case was transferred from Judge Gray H. Miller to
   Judge Charles Eskridge; (2) the district court’s June 10, 2021 order adopting
   the magistrate judge’s recommendation to deny Badaiki’s motion to
   disqualify Judge Eskridge and Magistrate Judge Sheldon; (3) the magistrate
   judge’s October 22, 2020 recommendation that Badaiki’s motion to remand
   be granted; (4) the district court’s November 20, 2020 order denying
   Badaiki’s “Motion to Show Authority;” (5) the district court’s January 8,
   2021 order adopting the magistrate’s amended recommendation to deny
   Badaiki’s motion to remand; (6) the district court’s December 6, 2021 order
   granting Badaiki’s voluntary motion to dismiss several unserved defendants;
   (7) the district court’s December 6, 2021 order adopting the magistrate

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   judge’s recommendation to dismiss Badaiki’s claims; and (8) and all orders
   issued pursuant to the May 9, 2022 hearing.
                                                A.
          We must first address Badaiki’s contention that the district court
   lacked jurisdiction to evaluate the purported settlement agreement. “Subject
   matter jurisdiction is a question of law; our review is plenary.” 5
          First, Badaiki asserts the district court lacked Article III standing
   because Appellee Cameron is “not real.” This argument has no factual basis.
   As the district court found, Badaiki served Appellee Cameron with process,
   which could not have occurred if Cameron did not exist. Moreover, the
   record reflects that Cameron is real legal entity. Badaiki’s related argument
   that Cameron, a “nonexistent entity,” could not remove the case to federal
   court is meritless for the same reason.6
          Second, Badaiki is incorrect that the district court lacked jurisdiction
   to review the “purported settlement email negotiation.” Badaiki argues that
   the email exchange was “protected by FRE 408” and that the district court
   could not consider the exchange “without a separate federal question or
   diversity cases or controversy.” As an initial matter, Federal Rule of
   Evidence 408 is inapplicable here. The Rule prohibits introducing evidence
   of a compromise to “prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed
   claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction.” 7
   Badaiki introduced the settlement to terminate litigation, not to “prove or
   disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach” another

          _____________________
          5
              Ceres Gulf v. Cooper, 957 F.2d 1199, 1204 (5th Cir. 1992).
          6
              Furthermore, based on a review of the record, Cameron did not waive its right to
   removal.
          7
              Fed. R. Evid. 408(a).

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   party.8 Moreover, under Rule 408(b), a court may admit compromise or
   settlement evidence for “another purpose,” which includes determining the
   validity of that settlement.9
           Finally, the district court retained jurisdiction notwithstanding its
   dismissal of Badaiki I and Badaiki II pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
   Procedure 12(b)(6) and 56. Although “a dismissal ordinarily—and
   automatically—strips the district court of the power to hear that dispute,” 10
   Badaiki’s subsequent motions to amend the judgments under Rule 59 allowed
   the district court to retain its jurisdiction over the cases.11 “It is well-
   established that a timely motion for reconsideration renders the underlying
   judgment nonfinal until the district court disposes of that post-judgment
   motion.”12 If this were not true, no district court could rule on Rule 59
   motions. Therefore, the initial dismissals were not finalized, the district court
   retained jurisdiction over the cases, and it could properly determine whether
   a settlement agreement existed.13

           _____________________
           8
                Id.
           9
                Fed. R. Evid. 408(b).
           10
              Vikas WSP, Ltd. v. Econ. Mud Prods. Co., 23 F.4th 442, 451 (5th Cir. 2022)
   (citation and quotation omitted).
           11
               Simmons v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co. of Tex., 310 F.3d 865, 868 (5th Cir.
   2002) (“[U]ntil the district court addresses all post-judgment motions specified by the
   rule, it has not entirely finished with a case. On the contrary, a district court responding to
   a motion for reconsideration ‘necessarily has discretion . . . to reopen a case’ and may
   change its ruling on the merits.”) (citation omitted).
           12
              Id. at 867 (citing United States v. Ibarra, 502 U.S. 1, 5 (1991)); see also Fed. R.
   App. P. 4(a) (suspending time to file an appeal until the district court has disposed of
   specified post-judgment motions, including motions under Rule 59 and 60).
           13
              For this reason, Badaiki’s argument that the district court could not enforce the
   settlement pursuant to Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375
   (1994), is unpersuasive. Kokkonen held that federal district courts do not automatically have
   jurisdiction to enforce settlements. Id. at 378 (“Enforcement of the settlement agreement,

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                                                  B.
           The next question is whether the district court abused its discretion
   when it found that the parties’ December 21–25, 2021, email exchange
   constituted a binding settlement agreement. 14 Consistent with the district
   court’s “inherent power to recognize” settlements, this determination is
   reviewed for an abuse of discretion.15 “A district court abuses its discretion
   if it: (1) relies on clearly erroneous factual findings; (2) relies on erroneous
   conclusions of law; or (3) misapplies the law to the facts.” 16 We find that it
   did not abuse its discretion.

           _____________________
   however, whether through award of damages or decree of specific performance, is more
   than just a continuation or renewal of the dismissed suit, and hence requires its own basis
   for jurisdiction.”). This is logical. Settlements are contracts. Contracts are governed by
   state law. The settlement enforcement action in Kokkonen was akin to a breach of contract
   suit; as with any state law claim, the parties needed a jurisdictional hook to litigate in federal
   court. Thus, Kokkonen instructs that “the breach of an agreement that produced the
   dismissal of an earlier federal suit” is too “tenuous” to provide subject matter jurisdiction
   and did not fall within the court’s ancillary jurisdiction. Id. at 379. Here, the district court
   retained its subject matter jurisdiction over the cases because its dismissals were not yet
   finalized.
           14
                See generally supra note 30.
           15
               Bell v. Schexnayder, 36 F.3d 447, 449 (5th Cir. 1994); In re Omni Video, Inc., 60
   F.3d 230, 232 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted) (“Federal courts have the inherent power
   to enforce settlement agreements entered into by the parties.”); Cia Anon Venezolana De
   Navegacion v. Harris, 374 F.2d 33, 35 (5th Cir. 1967) (“Where the parties, acting in good
   faith, settle a controversy, the courts will enforce the compromise without regard to what
   the result might, or would have been, had the parties chosen to litigate rather than settle.”);
   Wise v. Wilkie, 955 F.3d 430, 434 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Harmon v. Journal Publ’g Co., 476
   F. App’x 756, 757 (5th Cir. 2012) and Deville v. United States, 202 F. App’x 761, 762 (5th
   Cir. 2006) as establishing the abuse of discretion standard for decisions to enforce a
   settlement agreement).
           16
                Wise, 955 F.3d at 434.

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           Settlement agreements are contracts,17 and “once entered into,
   cannot be repudiated by either party and will be summarily enforced.” 18
   Whether the agreement is a valid contract is determined by the state
   substantive law governing contracts.19 This case was heard in the Southern
   District of Texas, and Texas law applies. Under Texas law, contracts require:
   (1) an offer; (2) acceptance of that offer; (3) mutual assent to the terms, i.e.,
   a “meeting of the minds;” (4) consent; and (5) that the contract be executed
   and delivered with the intent that it be mutually binding. 20 Finally, Texas law
   requires settlement agreements to “be in writing, signed and filed with the
   papers as part of the record.”21
           On December 21, 2021, Attorney Jim Nye emailed Badaiki and stated,
   “I have talked with my clients, and in exchange for a complete release on all
   claims in all cases you have filed, my clients will agree to forego pursuing their
   award of attorneys’ fees in the state court action and two federal court
   actions.” Badaiki responded via email, saying “Accepted. We could
   discourse later.” At the May 9, 2022 hearing, the district court found that
   Attorney Nye acted as his client’s agent and, as such, that his email was a

           _____________________
           17
              Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 871 F.2d 1279, 1284 (5th Cir. 1989) (“The
   settlement agreement is a type of contract whose formation and goals are familiar to the
   court, and the parties were sophisticated and represented throughout by skilled counsel.”);
   White Farm Equip. Co. v. Kupcho, 792 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1986) (“A settlement
   agreement is a contract, but, when incorporated into a judgment, becomes a court
   decree.”).
           18
            United States v. City of New Orleans, 731 F.3d 434, 439 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing
   White Farm, 792 F.2d at 530).
           19
                White Farm, 792 F.2d at 529.
           20
                USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 501 n.27 (Tex. 2018).
           21
                Tex. R. Civ. P. 11.

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   valid settlement offer.22 The court then determined that Badaiki “manifested
   an expressed [sic] acceptance of that settlement agreement” by responding
   “Accepted.” Because Appellees provided valid consideration by foregoing
   any potential claims to attorneys’ fees, the district court concluded the email
   exchange established a binding settlement agreement.
           Badaiki failed to show that the district court’s factual finding was
   clearly erroneous. Attorney Nye extended an offer and Badaiki unequivocally
   manifested his acceptance of the offer. To quote the district court: “one
   cannot enter into a contract and say, accepted, and then perhaps believe that
   that is not actually something that’s binding.”23
           Furthermore, the parties’ intent to be bound by the terms is evidenced
   by their subsequent filings in the district court.24 On December 29, 2021,

           _____________________
           22
             See Chalker Energy Partners III, LLC v. Le Norman Operating LLC, 595 S.W.3d
   668, 669 (Tex. 2020) (“The common law has long recognized that an agreement can be
   expressed in multiple writings exchanged between the parties. Emails are such writings.”).
           Badaiki suggests the “protected private settlement email discussion between the
   Appellant and a purported counsel named Jim H. Nye” is not a binding contract because
   “FRE 408 said such document is not admissible and its use is prohibited.” Federal Rule of
   Evidence 408 does not apply in this situation, supra Section II.A. Emails are evidence of
   contracts, Chalker Energy, 595 S.W.3d at 669, and the district court properly evaluated
   whether the elements of a contract were met, supra Section II.B.
           23
             At the May 9, 2022, hearing, Badaiki disputed the validity of the agreement.
   However, his arguments were directed towards the underlying merits of the case, not
   whether a contract was formed.
           24
              To the extent Badaiki contends the agreement lacked consideration, he is wrong.
   “The general rule is that mutual reciprocal obligations between contracting parties are
   sufficient consideration to create a binding contract.” In re Windsor Props., Inc., 987 F.2d
   771 (5th Cir. 1993) (unpublished). “It is well accepted that the mere exchange of promises
   is ordinarily sufficient to satisfy the requirement of consideration.” Johnson v. Seacor
   Marine Corp., 404 F.3d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Claude D. Rohwer &
   Anthony M. Skrocki, Contracts in a Nutshell § 2.24 (5th ed. 2000)).
   Appellees pledged to forego any potential award of attorneys’ fees in exchange for a
   Badaiki’s release of claims in all pending litigation. This constitutes consideration.

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   Badaiki filed a notice of settlement in Badaiki I; an identical notice was filed
   in Badaiki II on January 3, 2022.25 In these filings, Badaiki informed the court
   of the settlement, attached the email exchange, and concluded “[o]n
   December 25, 2021 email, Badaiki ACCEPTED the above Settlement
   Offer.” Appellees likewise filed notices of settlement which reflected their
   understanding that the parties settled.26
           Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
   Badaiki released his claims in all pending suits.27 The terms of the offer were
   clear: Appellees would forego any claim to attorneys’ fees “in the state court
   action and two federal court actions” in exchange “for a complete release on
   all claims in all cases you have filed.” 28 Badaiki unambiguously accepted
   these terms. In doing so, we concur that he “manifested . . . a complete
   release on all claims in all cases you have filed.” Therefore, “[e]vidence was
   presented that, by all outward appearances, the settlement negotiations were

           _____________________
           25
               On appeal, Badaiki contends that he provided a counteroffer on December 27,
   2021. This argument is contradicted by Badaiki’s December 29, 2021, and January 3, 2022
   filings in which he stated that he accepted the settlement offer on December 25, 2021.
           26
              Because the email exchange was in writing and filed by Badaiki in his notices of
   settlement, it is therefore part of the record. The agreement thus satisfies Rule 11 and is
   valid under Texas law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 11 (“Unless otherwise provided in these rules,
   no agreement between attorneys or parties touching any suit pending will be enforced
   unless it be in writing, signed and filed with the papers as part of the record, or unless it be
   made in open court and entered of record.”).
           27
              The record indicates that Appellees attempted to formalize the agreement, but
   that Badaiki refused. Although parties often formalize their agreement, the email exchange
   was sufficient to establish a binding contract. See Chalker Energy, 595 S.W.3d at 669.
           28
            Although Mr. Nye’s email was sent to an address designated as “Maxwell
   Johnson,” the record reflects that the johnson747@hotmail.com email address belongs to
   Badaiki.

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   intended to resolve all claims and release the defendants from all liability
   relating to the subject matter of the suit.”29
           Therefore, the email exchange and notices of settlement evince an
   offer, acceptance, mutual assent to the terms, consent and intent to be bound
   by those terms.30 “A deal is, of course, a deal,”31 and a “settlement
   agreement, once entered into, cannot be repudiated by either party and will
   be summarily enforced.”32 The record reflects Appellees upheld their end of
   the bargain. Badaiki was obligated to do the same. For that reason, the district
   court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the suits with prejudice. 33
                                                 C.
           Because the parties entered into a valid settlement agreement, this
   Court must determine whether the settlement deprives this Court of
   jurisdiction to address Badaiki’s remaining issues on appeal.34 Federal courts
   possess limited power, and our jurisdiction is limited to the “cases” and
   “controversies” defined by Article III of the United States Constitution.35
   “To qualify as a case fit for federal-court adjudication, an actual controversy

           _____________________
           29
                Bell, 36 F.3d at 450.
           30
                See USAA Tex. Lloyds Co., 545 S.W.3d at 501 n.27.
           31
                Chalker Energy, 595 S.W.3d at 669.
           32
                City of New Orleans, 731 F.3d at 439 (citing White Farm, 792 F.2d at 530).
           33
              Badaiki argues that the district court violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
   41(a) by dismissing the case with prejudice without notifying Badaiki of his intent to do so.
   But the district court did not dismiss the case based on Rule 41(a). Instead, the case was
   dismissed because the settlement agreement mooted the issues and, by the terms of the
   agreement, required dismissal.
           34
              Goldin v. Bartholow, 166 F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir. 1999) (“We are obligated to
   address issues of jurisdiction, including mootness, prior to addressing the merits of an
   appeal.”).
           35
                U.S. Const. art. III § 2.

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   must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is
   filed.”36 The mootness doctrine accounts for this requirement by
   “ensur[ing] that the litigant’s interest in the outcome continues to exist
   throughout the life of the lawsuit . . . including the pendency of the appeal.” 37
   “If a case has been rendered moot, a federal court has no constitutional
   authority to resolve the issues that it presents.”38
            A case becomes moot “when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’
   or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” 39 Parties lack
   a legally cognizable interest in the outcome when “it is impossible for a court
   to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.”40 Logically,
   then, “settlement of a dispute between two parties renders moot any case
   between them growing out of that dispute”41 because once parties have
   “completely settled their differences, [] there is no relief left for us to
   award.”42 If the parties entered into a legally valid settlement agreement that
   resolves all claims in these cases, the appeals are moot, and this Court lacks
   jurisdiction to hear Badaiki’s appeals.

            _____________________
            36
             Arizonans for Off. Eng. v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997) (quoting Preiser v.
   Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
            37
                 See McCorvey v. Hill, 385 F.3d 846, 848 (5th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted).
            38
              Env’t Conservation Org. v. City of Dallas, 529 F.3d 519, 525 (5th Cir. 2008)
   (citation omitted).
            39
             Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013) (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455
   U.S. 478, 481 (1982)).
            40
                 Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Loc. 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012) (citation
   omitted).
            41
                 ITT Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 651 F.2d 343, 345 (5th Cir. Unit B July 1981).
            42
                 Green Valley Special Util. Dist. v. City of Schertz, 969 F.3d 460, 469 (5th Cir.
   2020).

                                                   14
Case: 21-20628          Document: 00516995600           Page: 15      Date Filed: 12/08/2023

                                           No. 21-20628
                                         c/w No. 22-20071

           Settlement extinguishes any live interests in a dispute. 43 The parties
   entered into a valid settlement agreement wherein Badaiki agreed to release
   “all claims” in exchange for Appellees forgoing their right to pursue
   attorneys’ fees related to any successful defenses. The settlement mooted
   these cases, “no matter how vehemently [Badaiki] continue[s] to dispute the
   lawfulness of the conduct that precipitated the lawsuit.” 44 Because the
   parties have “completely settled their differences, [] there is no relief left for
   us to award” and this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Badaiki’s
   remaining arguments on appeal.45
                                                 III.
           For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of both
   Badaiki I and Badaiki II.

           _____________________
           43
             Already, LLC, 568 U.S. at 91 (citing Murphy, 455 U.S. at 481); ITT Rayonier, 651
   F.2d at 345.
           44
                Already, LLC, 568 U.S. at 91.
           45
                Green Valley, 969 F.3d at 469.

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