Court Opinion

ID: 9601591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:47:29.561421+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:10.892191
License: Public Domain

TOBRINER, J.,
Concurring and Dissenting. — I concur in the judgment of the court, which — it should be emphasized — affirms the trial court judgment placing defendant on probation. I do not agree, however, with the discussion in the lead opinion — technically dicta — which suggests that Penal Code section 1203.06 can properly be interpreted as abrogating a trial court’s power to strike a use of a firearm finding under Penal Code section 1385. As I shall explain, the lead opinion’s statutoiy interpretation directly conflicts with all of the prior California decisions which have construed similar sentencing statutes in relation to section 1385.
Moreover, the result reached by the lead opinion is plainly inconsistent with the opinion’s purported statutory interpretation. Although the lead opinion suggests that the language of section 1203.06 is so clear and absolute as to preclude trial courts from exercising the discretion explicitly afforded them by section 1385, its holding, by contrast, reveals that the statutory language has not been construed to preclude this court from exercising a nonstatutory, presumably inherent, discretion so as to relieve a defendant who has used a gun of a mandatory prison sentence. *523If section 1203.06’s language does not prevent this court from exercising discretion in order to avoid “injustice” or “unfairness” in the case of Mr. Tanner, then clearly that same statutoiy language may not reasonably be construed as abrogating a trial court’s statutorily authorized discretion under section 1385. The lead opinion thus represents a classic example of a court’s action speaking louder than its words.
The numerous flaws in the lead opinion are apparent from the outset. After explicitly acknowledging that “[t]his case arises because the Legislature in enacting section 1203.06 did not expressly state whether the mandatory provision of section 1203.06 would be subject to judicial discretion pursuant to section 1385” (italics added) {ante, p. 518), the opinion replicates the legislative omission by completely failing either to apply, to distinguish, to overrule — or, indeed, even to mention — the numerous California decisions that have specifically dealt with this precise issue in prior cases. As I discuss below, for the past 20 years — beginning with People v. Burke (1956) 47 Cal.2d 45 [301 P.2d 241] — California courts have repeatedly held that in light of the historically important role played by section 1385 in the sentencing process, an ostensibly “mandatory” sentencing statute will not be interpreted as abrogating the authority accorded by section 1385 in the absence of explicit statutory language curtailing such authority. In simply ignoring this line of controlling precedent, the lead opinion can only create uncertainty and confusion; lower courts, faced in the future with the responsibility of construing similar sentencing statutes, are provided no guidance whether to apply previously enunciated principles or the novel interpretation developed by the instant lead opinion.
Moreover, by closing its eyes to the prior authorities, the lead opinion ignores a fundamental canon of legislative interpretation which teaches that in construing a statute courts should properly presume that the Legislature was aware of existing judicial decisions interpreting similar provisions and drafted the statute in light of such decisions. When the Legislature enacted section 1203.06 in 1975, the controlling decisions made it clear that a sentencing statute would not be construed to abrogate a court’s section 1385 power unless the statute specifically so declared; since the draftsmen of section 1203.06 did not include any language specifically repealing or abrogating section 1385, under traditional principles the statute should not be interpreted as eliminating that power.
Indeed, as discussed more fully below, the legislative omission in this case is brought into sharp focus when the terms of section 1203.06 are *524compared with the provisions of Penal Code section 1203.08, a similar “no probation” statute, coauthored by one of the draftsmen of section 1203.06, and enacted just one year after section 1203.06. In section 1203.08, unlike section 1203.06, the Legislature specifically included a separate provision which, in cases falling within the ambit of section 1203.08, expressly limits a trial court’s power to strike under section 1385. That legislative action, coming close on the heels of the enactment of section 1203.06, indicates a legislative awareness of the governing California authorities and demonstrates that the Legislature is quite capable of expressing itself clearly when it intends to eliminate a trial court’s power to strike. In the face of the differing provisions of section 1203.08, this court cannot properly conclude that section 1203.06 evidences a clear abrogation of a trial court’s section 1385 power.
Furthermore, contrary to the lead opinion’s suggestion, by interpreting section 1203.06 in accordance with past authorities we would not be rendering the 1975 legislation a “nullity.” Prior to 1975, section 1203 — the general probation statute — included a provision specifically giving courts power to grant probation in an “unusual” gun use case; trial courts apparently accorded the “unusual case” provision of section 1203 a more expansive interpretation than the Legislature thought appropriate and in 1975 the Legislature eliminated the “unusual case” provision of section 1203 for such cases. That legislative action unquestionably evinced an intent to reduce the granting of probation in gun-use cases, a legislative policy decision that certainly has not been lost on trial courts and that has been and will continue to be reflected in a sharp decrease in the granting of probation in such cases. The legislative disapproval of the trial courts’ pre-1975 probation practice, however, is by no means irreconcilable with a legislative decision to leave the trial courts’ section 1385 power intact; the Legislature may well have desired to disapprove the trial courts’ quite liberal pre-1975 probation practice without completely stripping such courts of their traditional power to strike allegations or findings in the truly extraordinary or exceptional case.
Indeed, the lead opinion’s ultimate determination to relieve Tanner of a prison sentence is eloquent testimony to the strength of the traditional, underlying judicial policies in this area, recognizing that exceptional circumstances — unforeseen by the Legislature — may in rare cases warrant a departure from a generally appropriate sentence. As already noted, this holding demonstrates that the lead opinion has not, in fact, interpreted section 1203.06 as removing all judicial discretion; the disposition of this case with respect to the present defendant is clearly an exercise of just *525such discretion. While I, of course, agree with the affirmance of the judgment, I fear that the inconsistency of the lead opinion’s reasoning and result can only bring additional confusion to the lower courts; thus, for example, the opinion fails to illuminate whether its holding applies only to the present defendant, to all cases pending on appeal, or to all future cases in which a defendant is erroneously granted probation. The Legislature’s schizophrenia in drafting probation statutes (compare §§ 1203.06, 1203.07 with §§ 1203.08, 1203.09) is now reflected in the lead opinion’s parallel inconsistency in upholding probation for Tanner and casting into complete confusion the issue whether courts under facts like Tanner can grant probation at all.
Having reviewed the major deficiencies in the lead opinion, I explain the basis of my conclusion that the trial court judgment should be affirmed.

Because section 1203.06 does not in explicit terms restrict a trial court’s power to strike under section 1385, the provision cannot be interpreted to preclude a trial court’s exercise of such power in light of People v. Burke (1956) 47 Cal.2d 45 and its progeny.

From at least as early as 1850, trial courts in California have enjoyed broad authority to dismiss criminal actions in furtherance of the interests of justice. (Stats. 1850, ch. 119, p. 323; Stats. 1851, ch. 29, p. 279; see, e.g., People v. Tenorio (1970) 3 Cal.3d 89, 94 [89 Cal.Rptr. 249, 473 P.2d 993]; People v. Sidener (1962) 58 Cal.2d 645, 648-649, 658-663 [25 Cal.Rptr. 697, 375 P.2d 641].) For more than a century this judicial authority has been codified in section 1385 which provides in relevant part that “[t]he court may, either of its own motion or upon application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed.”
Although section 1385’s language refers explicitly to the dismissal of an entire criminal action, our court has long recognized that the section also authorizes a trial court to dismiss or “to strike” only a portion of the accusatory pleading, permitting the court, for example, to dismiss one or more counts of a multicount complaint or to strike allegations of prior convictions which may increase a defendant’s punishment or restrict the nature of his sentence. (See, e.g., People v. Ruiz (1975) 14 Cal.3d 163, 166 [120 Cal.Rptr. 872, 534 P.2d 712]; People v. Navarro (1972) 7 Cal.3d 248, 257 [102 Cal.Rptr. 137, 497 P.2d 481]; In re Cortez (1971) 6 Cal.3d 78, *52683-85 [98 Cal.Rptr. 307, 490 P.2d 819]; People v. Tenorio, supra, 3 Cal.3d 89, 94; People v. Burke, supra, 47 Cal.2d 45, 50-51.)
The relevant decisions additionally establish that a trial court may exercise its section 1385 power at the time of sentencing, as the trial court did here, and that a court may utilize this power to strike a count or an allegation even if the jury or court has found the defendant guilty of such count or has found the allegation to be true. As our court explained in People v. Burke, supra, 47 Cal.2d 45, 50-51; “The procedure of ‘striking’ or setting aside or dismissing, a charge of a prior conviction (or any of multiple counts or allegations of an indictment or information) at the time of sentence ... is commonly used in trial courts, not only where the prior conviction has not been legally established, but also where the fact of the conviction has been shown but the trial court has concluded that ‘in the interest of justice’ defendant should not be required to undergo a statutorily increased penalty which would follow from judicial determination of that fact. [Citations.]”
In the instant case, the trial court did not utilize its section 1385 power to strike an allegation of a prior conviction as in Burke or in many of our. other cases, but instead utilized its authority to strike a use of a firearm allegation and finding. As the above quotation from Burke demonstrates, however, in that case we explicitly recognized that the authority to strike conferred by section 1385 extends beyond allegations of prior convictions to other “allegations of an indictment or information” (47 Cal.2d at p. 50) which might subject a defendant to increased punishment. In People v. Dorsey (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 15 [104 Cal.Rptr. 326], the Court of Appeal specifically held that a trial court has authority under section 1385 to strike a use finding at the time of sentencing, at least for the purpose of avoiding the increased five-year punishment that would be otherwise mandated by section 12022.5.1 Since the People in this case do not challenge the trial court’s striking of the use allegation with regard to the application of section 12022.5, they apparently acknowledge that, at least in general, the power to strike conferred by section 1385 includes the power to strike a use allegation.2
*527The People argue, however, that even if the trial court may exercise its power to strike a use finding for purposes of avoiding an increased sentence under section 12022.5, the court may not utilize this section 1385 power to render an otherwise ineligible defendant eligible for probation.3 In the past, courts have utilized the section 1385 power to strike to achieve a number of purposes in the sentencing context: in some cases the power to strike has been utilized to render a defendant eligible for imprisonment in county jail rather than in state prison or to enable an otherwise ineligible defendant to participate in a narcotics rehabilitation program (see, e.g., People v. Burke, supra; People v. Navarro, supra, 7 Cal.3d 248, 258); in other cases section 1385 has been invoked to afford the defendant the benefit of a shorter minimum or maximum sentence (see, e.g., People v. Tenorio, supra, 3 Cal.3d 89, 95, fn. 1; People v. Dorsey, supra; see generally Burke, Striking Priors (1958) 33 State Bar J. 556); in still other cases, however, contrary to the implication of the People’s argument, the section 1385 power to strike has been explicitly exercised to render an otherwise ineligible defendant eligible for probation. (See, e.g., People v. Ruiz, supra, 14 Cal.3d 163, 166; In re Cortez, supra, 6 Cal.3d 78, 85; In re Gomez (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 728 [107 Cal.Rptr. 609].)
Indeed, in In re Cortez, supra, our court emphatically declared that “one of the paramount purposes of a motion to strike priors is to make the defendant eligible for probation. The thrust of the motion is to persuade the sentencing judge that, despite the existence of the prior, the petitioning [defendant] is a fit subject for probation.” (Italics added.) (6 Cal.3d at p. 85.) Hence, the fact that the trial court undertook its action in *528this case to render the defendant eligible for probation does not in any way indicate that the court did not appropriately exercise its power under section 1385.
The People additionally assert, however, that even if section 1385 authorizes a trial court to strike a use finding and even if, in general, section 1385 may be utilized to render an otherwise ineligible defendant eligible for probation, the trial court could not properly exercise such power for such a purpose in the instant case because of the specific provisions of section 1203.06. Section 1203.06, enacted in 1975, provides in part that “Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1203 [the general probation section] . . . [probation shall not be granted to, nor shall the execution or imposition of sentence be suspended for . . . any person who used a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of any of the following crimes. . . . (iii) Robbery, in violation of Section 211.” (Italics added.) Section 1203.06 goes on to define “used a firearm” to mean “to display a firearm in a menacing manner, to intentionally fire it, or to intentionally strike or hit a human being with it” (§ 1203.06, subd. (b)(3)), and also provides that in order to bar probation under the section the defendant’s use of the firearm must be alleged in the information or indictment and either be admitted by the defendant or be found true by the jury or the court. (§ 1203.06, subd. (b)(1).)4
*529The People argue that since the mandatoiy language of section 1203.06, emphasized above, denies probation without exception to any robber who has been found to have used a firearm in the. commission of his offense, it must follow that the trial court in the instant case retained no power under section 1385 to strike the use finding so as to render the present defendant eligible for probation.
As noted at the outset of this opinion, our court faced a very similar contention in People v. Burke, supra, 47 Cal.2d 45. In Burke, the defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana, then a felony. The information had alleged that defendant had previously been convicted of a similar marijuana offense, and at arraignment defendant admitted the existence of the prior conviction. At that time, section 11712 of the Health and Safety Code provided that “[a]ny person convicted under this division for having in possession any narcotic [defined to include marijuana]. . . shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year, or in the state prison for not more than 10 years. [If] If such person has been previously convicted of any offenses described in the division . . . the previous conviction shall be charged in the indictment or information and if found to be true by the jury, upon a jury trial, or if found to be true by the court, upon a court trial, or [if] admitted by the defendant, he shall be imprisoned in the state prison for not less than two years nor more than 20 years.” (Italics added.)
Notwithstanding section 11712, which ostensibly mandated a state prison sentence since defendant had admitted a prior marijuana conviction, the trial court at the time of sentencing struck the charge as to the prior conviction and sentenced the defendant to county jail. On appeal the People argued, as they do in the present case, that in light of the mandatory nature of section 11712’s prescriptions, the trial court-had no authority under section 1385 to strike the admitted prior for purposes of avoiding a state prison sentence.
*530In Burke, our court rejected the People’s contention, observing that the statutory language on which the People relied “[does] not purport to divest the trial court (or to hold that the court constitutionally could be divested) of the power to control the proceedings before it insofar as the essentials of the judicial process are concerned; i.e., to find the defendant guilty or not guilty of any offense charged, or of a lesser included offense, or to dismiss the action in toto or to strike or dismiss as to any or all of multiple counts or charges of prior convictions.” (47 Cal.2d at p. 52.) In the absence of an explicit statutory directive that the Legislature had intended to eliminate or restrict the trial court’s general power to strike under section 1385, the Burke court concluded that the statute should not be so construed. Accordingly, Burke upheld the trial court’s action in striking the prior conviction.
Subsequent decisions of this court have reaffirmed the Burke holding that, in the absence of an explicit legislative restriction of the trial court’s power under section 1385, a restriction on that power will not generally be implied. (See, e.g., People v. Superior Court (Howard) (1969) 69 Cal.2d 491, 502 [72 Cal.Rptr. 330, 446 P.2d 138] (“the discretion of the judge [under section 1385] is absolute except where the Legislature has specifically curtailed it”).) In People v. Dorsey, supra, 28 Cal.App.3d 15, the Court of Appeal reiterated this established principle in finding that the mandatory sentencing provisions of section 12022.5 (see fn. 4, ante) did not preclude a court’s exercise of its section 1385 power to strike a use finding.
As the Dorsey court explained, in California “[t]he imposition of sentence and the exercise of sentencing discretion” (28 Cal.App.3d at p. 18) have traditionally been viewed as “fundamentally judicial in nature” (see, e.g., People v. Tenorio, supra, 3 Cal.3d 89, 94; People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho) (1974) 11 Cal.3d 59, 66 [113 Cal.Rptr. 21, 520 P.2d 405]), and section 1385 has long been recognized as an essential tool to enable a trial court “to properly individualize the treatment of the offender.” (28 Cal.App.3d at p. 18; see generally Burke, Striking Priors (1958) 33 State Bar J. 556.)5 Emphasizing the significance of the section 1385 power with respect to the court’s fulfillment of its traditional judicial *531responsibility in the sentencing context, the Dorsey court put the Legislature on notice that the judiciary would not infer a legislative intent to restrict a court’s power to dismiss or to strike under section 1385 in the absence of an explicit legislative restriction of the section 1385 power. The Dorsey court stated in this regard: “If the Legislature intends that the provisions of Penal Code section 12022.5 not be subject to dismissal, it could and should so indicate. ” (Italics added.)
The People concede that section 1203.06, enacted several years after the Burke, Howard and Dorsey decisions, contains no provision which purports expressly to eliminate or restrict a trial court’s power to strike under section 1385. The People argue, however, that despite the absence of an explicit statutory restriction on the power to strike, the legislative history of section 1203.06 demonstrates that the Legislature generally intended to curtail trial courts’ discretion in this area, and that, as a consequence, a limitation on a trial court’s power to strike is necessarily implied in the legislative action. In this regard, the People point to a number of statements by both legislative and executive spokesmen to demonstrate that a principal purpose behind the enactment of section 1203.06 was the elimination of the limited discretion trial courts had previously enjoyed under section 1203 to grant probation in a case in which a gun was used in the commission of a serious offense.6
The legislative history upon which the People rely unquestionably indicates — as indeed, does the introductory language of section 1203.06 itself — that one of the main purposes of the enactment of section 1203.06 was to curtail, in the specific instances enumerated in section 1203.06, the discretion to grant probation which had previously been accorded trial *532courts under section 1203. None of the legislative materials to which the People refer, however, makes any mention of the specific question presented by this case, namely whether the provisions of section 1203.06 additionally purported to repeal a trial court’s traditional section 1385 power to strike priors7 or use allegations.8 In this regard, it should be emphasized that unlike other recently enacted sentencing statutes limiting probation in designated circumstances, section 1203.06 declares only that its provisions are applicable “[notwithstanding the provisions of section 1203”; the section contains no language explicitly displacing all other relevant statutes.9
It is well settled in this state, of course, that “[rjepeals by implication are not favored . . . .” (See, e.g., Rextrew v. City of Huntington Park (1942) 20 Cal.2d 630, 634 [128 P.2d 23].) Furthermore, as we have seen, at the time of the enactment of section 1203.06 in 1975, the Burke, Howard *533and Dorsey decisions had made it quite clear that no matter how “mandatory” the terms of a sentencing provision appear, such a provision would not be interpreted to curtail a trial court’s power under section 1385 to strike in the absence of explicit statutory language that specifically and unambiguously restricted such power. A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation proclaims, of course, that “in adopting legislation the Legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of existing domestic judicial decisions and to have enacted and amended statutes in the light of such decisions as have a direct bearing on them.” (Fn. omitted.) (Buckley v. Chadwick (1955) 45 Cal.2d 183, 200 [288 P.2d 12, 289 P.2d 242]; see, e.g., In re Phyle (1947) 30 Cal.2d 838, 845 [186 P.2d 134].) Accordingly, inasmuch as section 1203.06 contains no provision purporting to restrict a trial court’s section 1385 power to strike, we must assume that the Legislature recognized that the statute would not be interpreted as eliminating such power. (See Yegan, Penal Code Section 12022.5 Circa 1977 (1977) 52 L.A. Bar. J. 462, 469; cf. Uelman, California’s New Marijuana Law (1976) 51 State Bar J. 27, 82.)
Other sentencing provisions, enacted in the same legislative session as section 1203.06, make it quite clear that the Legislature has no difficulty explicitly restricting a trial court’s power to strike when it intends to do so. (See Veh. Code, § 23102, subd. (g) enacted Stats. 1975, ch. 385, § 1, p. 859.)10 Indeed, in 1976, just a year after the enactment of section 1203.06, the Legislature — in apparent recognition of the Burke-Dorsey line of decisions — expressly included a separate subdivision which does limit a trial court’s power to strike or dismiss when it enacted section 1203.08 of the Penal Code,11 an analogous “no probation” statute which, in other respects, is generally patterned after section 1203.06.12
*534The legislative history of section 1203.08, moreover, demonstrates quite clearly that the inclusion of this separate subdivision, subdivision (b)(2), was by no means inadvertent. As originally introduced on April 7, 1976, the bill which ultimately was enacted as section 1203.08 did not contain this subdivision. (Sen. Bill No. 2137 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.).) On June 1, 1976, however, the bill was amended in the Senate to add subdivision (b)(2). On the same date, Senator Robbins, a coauthor of section 1203.06, was added as a coauthor of section 1203.08. Thus, the legislative draftsmen of section 1203.08, obviously aware of the language of section 1203,06, evidently recognized the necessity of including additional language in section 1203.08 to restrict a trial court’s power to strike or dismiss allegations under Penal Code section 1385.
Inasmuch as section 1203.06, unlike section 1203.08, contained no language expressly restricting a trial court’s power to strike, at least some legislators may have been willing to accede to the seemingly inflexible provisions of section 1203.06 precisely because of their awareness that the section did not remove all “safety valves” to further the ends of justice in a particular case, either through a trial court’s exercise of the section 1385 power or by virtue of a prosecutor’s exercise of his traditional discretion. (See fn. 6, ante.)13 In accepting the Attorney General’s proposed *535interpretation of section 1203.06, the lead opinion in essence concludes that the Legislature was both totally ignorant of the controlling decisions of this court and the Court of Appeal when it enacted section 1203.06 in 1975, and then engaged in a meaningless and idle act when it added subdivision (b)(2) to section 1203.08 the following year.
Although the People make much of the fact that the legislative history of section 1203.06 demonstrates that the Legislature enacted the section for the purpose of curtailing discretion previously enjoyed by trial courts, this circumstance in no way distinguishes the present case from the situation prevailing in People v. Burke, supra. As we have seen, in Burke our court held that the provisions of Health and Safety Code section 11712, which prescribed a mandatory state prison sentence for anyone convicted of a narcotics offense who had been previously convicted of a similar narcotics offense, did not prohibit a trial court from striking the prior conviction and sentencing the defendant to county jail. As the Burke court noted (47 Cal.2d at p. 51), section 11712 derived from a statute first enacted in 1929. (Stats. 1929, ch. 216, § 7, p. 385.) As initially enacted, the section provided that a first offender could be confined in county jail or state prison for not more than six years, and that one convicted of a second or subsequent offense could be confined in county jail or state prison from six months to ten years.14 Thus, this initial version explicitly afforded a trial judge discretion to sentence a defendant with a prior to either county jail or state prison.
In 1935, the statute was amended to provide, inter alla, that a second or subsequent offender “shall be imprisoned in the State prison for not less than six months nor more than 10 years” (italics added) (Stats. 1935, ch. 813, § 5c, p. 2208),15 and it was this version that ultimately became *536Health and Safety Code section 11712. Although the 1935 amendment, like the enactment of section 1203.06, appears to have been specifically intended to eliminate the trial court’s prior discretion to sentence a second offender to county jail, our Burke decision made clear that such a revision, without an explicit restriction of the section 1385 power to strike, would not preclude a trial court from striking the prior conviction. Accordingly, the Burke decision cannot be distinguished from the instant case.16
In essence, the People maintain that section 1203.06 presents a “special case” in which a trial court’s section 1385 power should be curtailed because of the assertedly clear legislative intent to remove all trial court discretion in granting probation. In reality, however, acceptance of the People’s argument in this case would logically preclude a trial court from striking priors or other allegations for purposes of sentencing in most of the circumstances in which the section 1385 power has traditionally been invoked.
As already noted, our decisions in Ruiz, Navarro, Cortez, Tenorio and Burke establish that “one of the paramount purposes” of a trial court’s authority to strike is to enable the court in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances to render a defendant eligible for probation or for county jail or for a less severe prison sentence, notwithstanding some other statutory sentencing provision that, standing alone, would bar such a disposition. If section 1203.06’s limitation on trial court discretion impliedly eliminates the court’s power to strike either a use finding or a prior for purposes of granting probation, a similar unstated implication would logically flow from all other mandatory sentencing provisions and *537would virtually eliminate the traditionally important role played by section 1385 in the sentencing context.17
As discussed above, we explicitly refused in People v. Burke, supra, to draw such a broad inference from similar statutory language, and instead indicated that if the Legislature intended to restrict a court’s section 1385 power it should do so with unmistakable clarity. Inasmuch as section 1203.06 contains no such explicit restriction on a trial court’s section 1385 power, I conclude that the trial court in the instant case retained authority to strike the use finding and to place defendant on probation notwithstanding the provisions of section 1203.06.
In sum, past California decisions have established that in light of the historically important role played by section 1385 in the sentencing process, a sentencing statute will not be interpreted as abrogating the authority accorded by section 1385 in the absence of explicit statutory language mandating that result. The Legislature, presumably aware of this well-established line of California authority, enacted section 1203.06 but failed specifically to provide that a trial court’s traditional authority under section 1385 was to be eliminated in this context. Consistent with past decisions, I can only conclude that the enactment does not eliminate the trial court’s power to strike under section 1385.
If the Legislature had meant to strip the courts of the powers set forth in section 1385 it should have specifically so declared. A myriad of interpretations of section 1203.06 cannot substitute for a single legislative statement that the latter section should overcome the former. Such a legislative statement is lacking, and I do not believe that we should supply or construct it, thereby arbitrarily removing a time-honored judicial function, long and universally recognized by the decisions.
Newman, L, concurred.

 At the time of Dorsey, section 12022.5 provided in relevant part: “Any person who uses a firearm in the commission or attempted commission of a robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, murder, rape, burglary, or kidnapping, upon conviction of such crime, shall, in addition to the punishment prescribed for the crime of which he has been convicted, be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a period of not less than five years. Such additional period of imprisonment shall commence upon expiration or other termination of the sentence imposed for the crime of which he is convicted and shall not run concurrently with such sentence.”

 Subsequent to the trial court’s ruling in this case, the Legislature amended section 12022.5 to effectively codify the Dorsey rule. (See Stats. 1976, ch. 1139, § 305, p. 5162.) *527Section 1170.1, subdivision (g), enacted in 1977 as part of the so-called “Boatwright Amendments” to the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976, now provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the-court may strike the additional punishment for the enhancements provided in . . . [section] 12022.5 . . . if it determines that there are circumstances in mitigation of the additional punishment and states on the record its reasons for striking the additional punishment.”
While the recently enacted provisions of the Determinate Sentencing Act confirm the Dorsey result, the new legislation does not purport to affect the granting or denial of probation. Section 1170, subdivision (a)(2) (Stats. 1977, ch. 165, § 15, p. 647) provides in this regard that “[n]othing in this article shall affect any provision of law . . . which authorizes or restricts the granting of probation or suspending the execution or imposition of sentence. . . .”

 In this regard, the People assert that the striking of a use finding for purposes of section 12022.5 does not necessarily eliminate the use finding for purposes of section 1203.06. In this case, however, we have no occasion to decide whether the striking of a use finding (or a prior) to achieve one sentencing objective necessarily eliminates the finding for all sentencing purposes or whether a trial court retains discretion to limit the effect of such striking, for here the trial court made it clear that it was exercising its discretion to strike the use finding for purposes of both section 12022.5 and section 1203.06.

 Section 1203.06 provides in full: “Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1203:
“(a) Probation shall not be granted to, nor shall the execution or imposition of sentence be suspended for, any of the following persons:
“(1) Any person who used a firearm during the commission or attempted commission of any of the following crimes:
“(ij Murder.
“(ii) Assault with intent to commit murder in violation of Section 217.
“(iii) Robbery, in violation of Section 211.
“(iv) Kidnapping, in violation of Section 207.
“(v) Kidnapping for ransom, extortion, or robbery, in violation of Section 209.
“(vi) Burglary of the first degree, as defined in Section 460.
“(vii) Rape by force or violence, in violation of subdivision (2) of Section 261.
“(viii) Rape by threat of great and immediate bodily harm in violation of subdivision (3) of Section 261.
“(ix) Assault with intent to commit rape, the infamous crime against nature, or robbery, in violation of Section 220.
“(x) Escape, in violation of Section 4530, or Section 4532.
“(2) Any person previously convicted of a felony specified in subparagraphs (i) through (x) of paragraph (I), who is convicted of a subsequent felony and who was armed with a firearm at any time during its commission or attempted commission or was unlawfully armed with a firearm at the time of his arrest for the subsequent felony.
“(b)(1) The existence of any fact which would make a person ineligible for probation under subdivision (a) shall be alleged in the information or indictment, and either admitted by the defendant in open court, or found to be true by the jury trying the issue *529of guilt or by the court where guilt is established by plea of guilty or nolo contendere or by trial by the court sitting without a jury.
“(2) This subdivision does not prohibit the adjournment of criminal proceedings pursuant to Division 3 (commencing with Section 3000) or Division 6 (commencing with Section 6000) of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
“(3) As used in subdivision (a) ‘used a firearm’ means to display a firearm in a menacing manner, to intentionally fire it, or to intentionally strike or hit a human being with it.
“(4) As used in subdivision (a) ‘armed with a firearm’ means to knowingly carry a firearm as a means of offense or defense.”

 Recently, in Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 602 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 988, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2963-2964], Chief Justice Burger took note of a trial court’s traditional authority to individualize sentences: “[T]he concept of individualized sentencing in criminal cases generally, although not constitutionally required, has long been accepted in this country. See Williams v. New York [(1949)] 337 U.S. [241], 247-248 . . . ; Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe [(1937)] 302 U.S. [51] .... Consistent with that concept, sentencing judges have traditionally taken a wide variety of factors into account. . . .”

 Prior to enactment of the 1975 legislation, section 1203 generally prohibited the granting of probation to a defendant who committed a serious offense while armed with a deadly weapon, but provided an exception for “unusual cases where the interests of justice demand” the granting of probation. (Former § 1203, enacted Stats. 1971, ch. 706, § l,p. 1368.)
The 1975 legislation eliminated section 1203’s “unusual case” exception in instances in which a defendant uses a firearm in the commission of a serious offense, but contrary to the arguments of the People and of the Governor’s press release quoted in the lead opinion, the legislation did not guarantee that every person who uses a firearm in the commission of a serious felony would automatically be denied probation. As noted above, the denial of probation under section 1203.06 follows only if the use of the firearm is specifically alleged in the complaint; the section does not purport to preclude a prosecutor, in his discretion, from declining to plead such an allegation in “an unusual case” nor does it purport to forbid plea bargaining in appropriate cases to avoid ineligibility for probation. (Cf. People v. Flores (1971) 6 Cal.3d 305, 308-309 [98 Cal.Rptr. 822, 491 P.2d 406].) Consequently, the legislation does not have nearly as “automatic” an effect in denying probation as the People suggest.

 In addition to denying probation to anyone convicted of an enumerated offense who is found to have used a firearm, section 1203.06 also purports to deny probation to anyone who has suffered a prior conviction of one of the enumerated offenses and who is found to have been armed during the commission of a subsequent felony. (§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(2), quoted in fn. 4, ante.) Although the Legislature must have been aware, under prior decisions of this court (e.g., In re Cortez, supra), that a trial court possessed the power under section 1385 to avoid the denial of probation under subdivision (a)(2) by.striking an allegation of such a prior conviction, the Legislature failed to include any statutory language to preclude such striking. This omission provides additional support for our conclusion that the trial court’s power to strike is not affected by section 1203.06.

 Significantly, although the Attorney General’s office communicated with the legislative committees considering the 1975 legislation on several occasions, advocating the passage of the legislation to supplement, inter alla, the sentencing provisions of section 12022.5 (which, of course, had already been held to be subject to the trial court’s power to strike (People v. Dorsey, supra)), at no time did the Attorney General or his staff indicate that the provisions of the proposed legislation would eliminate a trial court’s power to strike under section 1385. Since the Attorney General’s office had directly participated in all of the earlier litigation involving the section 1385 issue, the Attorney General surely would have suggested a modification of the legislation to specifically restrict a trial court’s section 1385 power to strike had such a restriction been intended.
Indeed, at oral argument the Attorney General conceded that nothing in section 1203.06 prevents a trial court — upon motion of a district attorney — from striking a use finding under section 1385 if the district attorney determines, in the exercise of his discretionary judgment, that the evidence is insufficient to support the use allegation. (Under People v. Tenorio, supra, 3 Cal.3d 89, of course, a trial court could similarly strike a use allegation or finding for insufficient evidence on its own motion, without the concurrence of'the district attorney.) Having conceded that the trial court retains such a power to strike a use finding under section 1385 notwithstanding section 1203.06, the Attorney General fails to explain why a trial court cannot exercise all of its traditional section 1385 power in such a case. Section 1203.06, of course, contains no provision which purports to permit a trial court to exercise only a portion of its authority under section 1385.

 By contrast, the introductory clauses of sections 1203.08 and 1203.09 provide that those sections are applicable “[notwithstanding any other provision of law.” (Italics added.)

 Section 23102 subdivision (g) provides: “Except in unusual cases where the interests of justice demand an exception, the court shall not strike a prior [drunk driving] conviction . . . for purposes of sentencing in order to avoid imposing as part of the sentence or term of probation the minimum time in confinement in the county jail [48 hours] and the minimum fine [$250] as provided in subdivision (f).” (Italics added.)

 There are currently two provisions of the Penal Code which the Legislature has designated Penal Code section 1203.08. The provision referred to in the present context was enacted as section 1203.11 by Statutes of 1976, chapter 1135, section 1, page 5052, and was renumbered and amended by Statutes of 1977, chapter 735, section 1, page 2325. All references to “section 1203.08” are to that provision.
The additional section 1203.08 was enacted by Statutes of 1977, chapter 1153, section 1, page 3700. References to that statute will be designated “section 1203.08 (1977).”

 Section 1203.08 (see fn. 11, ante) reads in full:
“(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, probation shall not be granted to, nor shall the execution or imposition of sentence be suspended for, any adult person convicted of a designated felony who has been previously convicted as an adult under charges separately brought and tried two or more times of any designated felony or in any *534other place of a public offense which, if committed in this state, would have been punishable as a designated felony, if all the convictions occurred within a 10-year period. Such 10-year period shall be calculated exclusive of any period of time during which the person has been confined in a state or federal prison.
“(b) (1) The existence of any fact which would make a person ineligible for probation under subdivision (a) shall be alleged in the information or indictment, and either admitted by the defendant in open court, or found to be true by the jury trying the issue of guilt or by the court where guilt is established by plea of guilty or nolo contendere or by trial by the court sitting without a jury.
“(2) Except where the existence of such fact was not admitted or found to be true pursuant to paragraph (1), or the court finds that a prior conviction was invalid, the court shall not strike or dismiss any prior convictions alleged in the information or indictment.
“(3) This subdivision does not prohibit the adjournment of criminal proceedings pursuant to Division 3 (commencing with Section 3000) or Division 6 (commencing with Section 6000) of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
“(c) As used in this section, ‘designated felony’ means any felony specified in Section 187, 192, 207, 209, 211, 217, 245, 288, or subdivision (2), (3), or (4) of Section 261, subdivision 1 of Section 460, or when great bodily injury occurs in perpetration of an assault to commit robbery; mayhem, or rape, as defined in Section 220.” (Italics added.)

 In Rockwell v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 420, 441-445 [134 Cal.Rptr. 650, 556 P.2d 1101], we held that the Legislature had not intended to permit trial courts to exercise discretion under section 1385 in sentencing defendants under a death penalty statute enacted subsequent to the United States Supreme Court decision in Furman v. Georgia (1972) 408 U.S. 238 [33 L.Ed.2d 346, 92 S.Ct. 2726], but in reaching that conclusion we relied heavily on pervasive indications that the Legislature had believed that any such *535sentencing discretion would have rendered the statute unconstitutional under Furman. No similar evidence suggests that in enacting section 1203.06 the Legislature thought that removal of all discretion from the trial courts was necessary to sustain the constitutionality of the enactment.

 The 1929 legislation provided: “Any person convicted under this act for having in possession any of the drugs . . . mentioned in section 1 [including marijuana]. . . shall upon conviction for the first offense be punished by imprisonment in the county jail or in the State prison for not more than six years, for the second and each subsequent o fíense of which said person so convicted shall be found guilty, said person shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail or in the State prison for not less than six months'nor more than 10 years.”

 The 1935 legislation provided: “Any person convicted under this act for having in possession any of the drugs or substances mentioned in section 1 . . . shall upon conviction be punished by imprisonment in the county jail or in the State prison for not more than six years; provided, however, that any such person convicted under this act . . . shall be imprisoned in the State prison for not less than six months nor more than ten years if such person has been previously convicted of a felony . . . , and such previous *536conviction of a felony is charged in'the indictment or information and found to be true by the jury, upon a jury trial, or found to be true by the court, upon a court trial, or is admitted by the defendant.”

 Although the People contend that section 1203.06 is a “specific” statute which should take precedence over the more “general” terms of section 1385, it is not at all clear in this context which statute is “specific” and which “general.” While section 1203.06 deals directly with the question of probation, as we have seen that section does not address the question of a trial court’s power to strike. Thus, with respect to the narrow class of cases which may properly invoke the court’s traditional power to strike, section 1385 may constitute the more “specific” statute, and section 1203.06 may be viewed as the provision dealing with the more “general” rule.
In any event, the provisions of section 1203.06 are clearly no more “specific” than the provisions of Health and Safety Code section 11712 at issue in Burke, or the provisions of section 12022.5 at issue in Dorsey, or, indeed, the provisions of any of the other mandatory sentencing provisions which, in the past, have not been found to work a repeal of section 1385.

 For example, in People v. Ruiz, supra, we held that a trial court could strike a prior narcotics conviction so as to render a defendant eligible for probation, notwithstanding Health and Safety Code section 11370, which at that time provided that “[a]ny person convicted of violating [designated narcotics offenses] shall not, in any case, be granted probation by the trial court or have the execution of sentence imposed upon him suspended by the court, if he has been previously convicted of [designated narcotic offenses].” (Italics added.) Under the People’s analysis, the Ruiz case would have unquestionably been decided differently.