Court Opinion

ID: 9404254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-22 17:04:04.538433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:12.737112
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/22/23 P. v. Jimenez CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B321784

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. BA446047)
           v.

 CHAD WILLIAMS JIMENEZ,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Fred Wapner, Judge. Affirmed.
      Richard B. Lennon, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Amanda V. Lopez,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                     ——————————
       This is Chad Williams Jimenez’s second appeal to this
court. In his first appeal, we affirmed Jimenez’s convictions for
assault with a firearm, possession of a firearm by a felon, and
attempted robbery, but remanded the matter for the limited
purpose of allowing the trial court to decide whether to exercise
its discretion to strike a five-year prior serious felony
enhancement imposed under Penal Code1 section 667,
subdivision (a)(1). At the resentencing hearing, the trial court
struck the section 667, subdivision (a)(1) enhancement, but
declined exercise its discretion to strike several personal firearm
use enhancements imposed under sections 12022.5, subdivisions
(a) and (d), and 12022.53, subdivision (b). In this appeal,
Jimenez argues that the trial court’s refusal to strike the firearm
enhancements was an abuse of discretion. We affirm the
judgment.
                               FACTS2
First Assault
      On April 20, 2016, at approximately 5:15 p.m., Fredy
Gonzalez was driving home in his truck on Elm Street, with his
window down. Gonzalez stopped at the stop sign at the
intersection of Elm Street and Cypress Avenue behind another
car. He felt something being pressed against the ribs on the left
side of his body. When Gonzalez turned to look left, a man whom
he later identified as Jimenez asked him, “Where you from?” and
called him a “motherfucker.” Gonzalez told Jimenez that he did

      1 All   further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
      2
      The facts are taken from our prior opinion in People v.
Jimenez (Jun. 4, 2019, B289894) [nonpub. opn.].

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not speak English and that he was from Mexico. Jimenez
responded, “Oh, so you’re a Paisa [a Mexican from Mexico].”
Jimenez told Gonzalez that he was “from Cypress.” Gonzalez saw
that the object pressing into him was a small, black,
semiautomatic gun. Jimenez stepped down from the truck’s
running board, walked around to the passenger side of the truck,
and told Gonzalez to park and wait for him. Gonzalez parked.
Jimenez did not approach him again. He put the gun in his
waistband and walked toward Cypress Avenue. The entire
exchange between Jimenez and Gonzalez lasted about two
minutes.
Second Assault
       Approximately 15 minutes after the incident involving
Gonzalez, at 5:30 p.m., Ricardo Guardado stopped his vehicle at a
traffic light at the intersection of Future Street and Cypress
Avenue, about one block away from the location where the first
incident took place. Guardado had his windows rolled down. In
his rearview mirror, Guardado saw a man whom he later
identified as Jimenez start running toward Guardado’s car on the
right side of the street. Guardado was several cars back from the
light and there were more cars behind him. Jimenez ran up to
Guardado’s car and banged hard on the passenger door. Jimenez
leaned through the passenger window and pointed a gun to
Guardado’s head. He repeatedly asked Guardado which gang he
was from. Guardado told Jimenez he was not a “Cholo” and did
not belong to a gang. Jimenez demanded Guardado’s wallet.
Guardado told Jimenez he did not have it with him, and Jimenez
left. The incident lasted approximately one minute.
       Guardado started to drive away, but returned when he saw
the officers. He spoke with police between 5 and 10 minutes after

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the incident took place. Officers took him to look at several
suspects who had been detained within an approximately one
block radius of the crime scene. Guardado identified Jimenez as
the perpetrator, approximately 10 minutes after the incident
occurred.
                   PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       The jury found Jimenez guilty of two counts of assault with
a firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); counts 1 & 4), possession of a firearm
by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 2), and attempted second
degree robbery (§§ 211, 664; count 5).3 The jury found true the
allegations that Jimenez committed the offenses for the benefit of
a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)–(C)), and that he
personally used a firearm in commission of the offenses
(§§ 12022.5, subds. (a) & (d), 12022.53, subd. (b)). In a bifurcated
proceeding, the trial court found true the allegation that Jimenez
had suffered a prior strike conviction. (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i),
1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)), and a prior serious felony conviction
within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1).
       The trial court sentenced Jimenez to a total of 32 years four
months, calculated as follows: in count 1, the midterm of six
years, doubled to 12 years under the “Three Strikes” law, plus 10
years for the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5), plus a stayed
term of five years for the gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd.
(b)(1)(B)); in count 4, a consecutive sentence of two years, (one-
third the midterm of six years), doubled to four years pursuant to
the Three Strikes law, plus 16 months (one-third the midterm of
four years) for the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5), plus a

      3   The information did not include a count 3.

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stayed term of 10 years for the gang enhancement (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)(1)(C)); in count 2, a concurrent sentence of two years,
plus three years for the gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd.
(b)(1)(A)); in count 5, the midterm of two years, plus 10 years for
the gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)), plus 10 years
for the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), stayed
pursuant to section 654; and five years for the prior serious felony
conviction enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
       Jimenez timely appealed. We affirmed his convictions but
remanded the matter for the limited purpose of allowing the trial
court to decide whether to exercise its discretion to strike a five-
year enhancement imposed under section 667, subdivision (a)(1).4
      In connection with the resentencing, Jimenez requested
that the court strike the sentencing enhancement for his prior
conviction and, additionally, that the court stay or strike any
other enhancements previously imposed. At the resentencing
hearing, the prosecutor did not oppose striking the five-year prior
felony enhancement, but argued against any further reduction in
sentence. The court struck the prior felony enhancement, but
declined to strike any other enhancements. Jimenez was
resentenced to 27 years four months in prison. Jimenez timely
appealed.

      4  Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) amended
sections 667 and 1385 to provide the trial court with discretion to
strike five-year enhancements pursuant to section 667,
subdivision (a)(1), in the interests of justice. (Stats. 2018, ch.
1013, §§ 1, 2.) The new law took effect on January 1, 2019, after
the sentencing hearing but before Jimenez’s appeal was final.

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                           DISCUSSION
       A trial court has discretion to dismiss a firearm allegation
imposed under sections 12022.5 or 12022.53 pursuant to section
1385 in the interests of justice. (§§ 12022.5, subd. (c), 12022.53,
subd. (h).) We review the trial court’s refusal to strike a firearm
enhancement for abuse of discretion. (People v. Pearson (2019)
38 Cal.App.5th 112, 116.)
       On appeal, Jimenez argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by refusing to dismiss the firearm enhancements. He
argues that “given the lack of a prior serious record, the brevity of
two crimes committed in a short time span, the fact that the
firearm was neither discharged nor used to strike either victim,
the fact that no injury was inflicted, the fact that appellant left
the victims after they rejected his demands, and the current
reassessment of the objectives and components of rational
sentencing, the interests of justice would have best been served
by striking the enhancements.”
       Jimenez has not shown that the trial court abused its
discretion. Jimenez minimizes the seriousness of his prior
conviction. He does not lack a serious criminal history—he was
convicted of a strike offense. Although the prior strike was
committed 11 years earlier, Jimenez was incarcerated for nine of
those years and did not have the opportunity to reoffend during
that time. He may have been only 20 years old at the time he
committed the strike, but Jimenez was well into adulthood when
he committed the instant crimes a decade later. Jimenez
emphasizes the brevity of his offenses, but he ignores that after
assaulting the first victim he did not cease his criminal conduct,
but assaulted a second victim within 15 minutes. Jimenez was
apprehended approximately 10 minutes after the second assault

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and attempted robbery. There is no indication that he would
have abandoned his attempts at robbery had the police not
intervened so quickly. Jimenez’s use of the firearm in two
incidents presented a clear threat to public safety. He did not
merely display a firearm; he held it to one victim’s head and the
other victim’s chest. As the trial court observed at the first
sentencing hearing, Jimenez was “one pull of the trigger away
from a murder.”
       Jimenez briefly mentions Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.), which requires a trial court to afford “great weight”
when considering whether to strike an enhancement to the fact
that multiple enhancements were found true and that the
enhancements would cause the sentence imposed to exceed 20
years. Although these factors are to be given great weight,
amended section 1385 does not divest the trial court of discretion
to impose an enhancement. (People v. Walker (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 386, 396–398.) Jimenez does not contend that the
trial court failed either to consider these factors or afford them
sufficient weight. Absent a contrary indication in the record, we
presume the trial court understood and exercised its discretion.
(People v. Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1021.) There is no
indication that the trial court did not understand its discretion in
the present case. The opposite is true. Jimenez’s presentencing
memorandum discussed Senate Bill No. 81 and the factors that
the court should consider at length, and the trial court expressly
stated that it reviewed the presentencing memorandum.

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                        DISPOSITION
     We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                       MOOR, J.
We concur:

             BAKER, Acting P. J.

             KIM, J.

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