Court Opinion

ID: 9929344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 15:07:38.620818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:07:17.766370
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JANUARY 26, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                    TO BE PUBLISHED

          Commonwealth of Kentucky
                   Court of Appeals
                    NO. 2022-CA-0935-MR

TIMOTHY WILLIAMS                                    APPELLANT

            APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
v.        HONORABLE JAMES R. SCHRAND, II, JUDGE
                  ACTION NO. 15-CI-01028

CABINET FOR HEALTH AND
FAMILY SERVICES                                      APPELLEE

AND

                    NO. 2022-CA-1360-MR

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND
FAMILY SERVICES                                     APPELLANT

            APPEAL FROM BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
v.        HONORABLE JAMES R. SCHRAND, II, JUDGE
                  ACTION NO. 15-CI-01028

TIM WILLIAMS                                         APPELLEE
                            OPINION
           AFFIRMING IN APPEAL NO. 2022-CA-0935-MR AND
      AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING
                  IN APPEAL NO. 2022-CA-1360-MR

                                     ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, GOODWINE, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

GOODWINE, JUDGE: Timothy Williams (“Williams”) appeals the June 30, 2022

judgment of the Boone Circuit Court denying his claims under the Kentucky Open

Records Act (“KORA”). The Cabinet for Health and Family Services (“Cabinet”)

separately appeals the July 25, 2022 judgment awarding Williams $2,000,000 in

punitive damages under the Kentucky Whistleblower Act (“KWA”). The Cabinet

also appeals the trial court’s February 18, 2022, and October 25, 2022 orders.

After careful review, we affirm the judgment in appeal No. 2022-CA-0935-MR. In

appeal No. 2022-CA-136-MR, we affirm, in part; reverse, in part; and remand.

                                    BACKGROUND

              Williams has been employed by the Cabinet in the Department for

Community Based Services (“DCBS”) since 2001. He has been a Family Services

Office Supervisor (“FSOS”) since 2012.1 Williams has worked in the Northern

Bluegrass Region for the entirety of his tenure with DCBS and remains employed

1
  Within DCBS, an FSOS supervises social workers, the Service Region Administrator Associate
(“SRAA”) supervises the FSOSs, and the Service Region Administrator (“SRA”) supervises the
SRAAs.

                                            -2-
there as an FSOS. He lives in Boone County, Kentucky and works at an office in

Gallatin County, Kentucky.

              In early 2015, Williams and another FSOS found that ninety-three

cases in Boone County were assigned to social workers who were no longer

employed by the Cabinet, meaning the cases had no ongoing social worker. Of the

ninety-three, twelve cases were never initiated, meaning a social worker had not

contacted the subject-family. At the time, Boone County was experiencing high

turnover and was struggling to keep the office staffed. Williams described the

state of the office as chaotic. He reported the unassigned and uninitiated cases to

the SRA. Soon thereafter, staff in the region began working to resolve the backlog

of cases. As part of the Cabinet’s response to the case backlog, Williams was

temporarily reassigned to the Boone County office on April 2, 2015, for a period of

sixty days.

              In April 2015, Paula Brun, an FSOS in Boone County, interviewed for

a vacant SRAA position. She was promoted to the position on May 5, 2015. After

her promotion, because of staffing issues in the Boone County office, she

continued to perform the duties of both an FSOS and SRAA. After her promotion,

Brun was Williams’ supervisor during his temporary reassignment.

              On April 27, 2015, Williams sent a letter of concern to the Cabinet’s

Office of Inspector General (“OIG”). He expressed concern about management of

                                         -3-
the Northern Bluegrass Region. He informed the OIG of the uninitiated and

unassigned cases. He specifically named Brun and alleged she lied about her case

consult notes. On May 21, 2015, Williams sent a letter to the Commissioner’s

office alleging retaliation by his supervisors, Brun and Lisa Prewitt, the SRA.

             When he was reassigned, Williams was given a new team of social

workers to supervise. His Boone County team was less experienced than his prior

Gallatin County team. Williams alleged, despite their inexperience, his workers

were assigned more cases than other teams. His team was required to work 3.5

hours of overtime per week. The Cabinet argued every team, including Williams,’

with past due cases was required to work overtime. While he was assigned to

Boone County, two of Williams’ supervisors entered his office when he was not

present and removed case files. He claimed they left his office in disarray. He

also alleged he was “micromanaged” by his supervisor after sending the letter to

the OIG.

             Brun resigned from her position with the Cabinet on June 1, 2015.

Also in June, the Cabinet extended Williams’ temporary reassignment to Boone

County for an additional sixty days. Williams claims he received an email on May

4, 2015, from the SRA informing him his transfer would be permanent. However,

at the end of his reassignment, Williams returned to Gallatin County on August 3,

                                         -4-
2015. Williams was never permanently transferred, either voluntarily or

involuntarily.

              On August 4, 2015, Williams filed a complaint in the Boone Circuit

Court alleging violations of the KWA by the Cabinet. On September 8, 2015, he

amended his complaint to request a writ of mandamus for alleged violations of the

KORA.2 The Cabinet unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment on both

counts.

              First, the court conducted a four-day bench trial to adjudicate

Williams’ KORA claim. The court heard testimony from Jacqueline Ligon

(Lafollette), Kathy Sansbury, Kelly Pompilio, Jason Mellenkamp, Williams, Linda

Wilson, Jennifer Wolsing, Wade Hester, Prewitt, Lisa Dennis, and James Cundy,

Ph.D. At trial, Williams claimed he made several open records requests to which

the Cabinet responded improperly in violation of the KORA. He claimed his

requests were “thwarted, refused, subverted, destroyed, or outright refused” by the

Cabinet. Record (“R.”) at 1560. The Cabinet argued it “took reasonable steps to

respond to Williams’ numerous and complex requests.” Id. Based upon the

evidence presented at trial and memoranda of the parties, the trial court found,

              As noted above the [c]ourt cannot find [the Cabinet’s]
              actions in responding to and/or failing to provide
              requested documents pursuant to Williams’ KORA

2
  The trial court dismissed Williams’ claims of emotional distress and humiliation. They are not
at issue on appeal.

                                              -5-
             requests were willful. As [the Cabinet] admits, they were
             negligent in certain of their responses, however for
             Williams to prevail on his claim in Count II, that [the
             Cabinet] violated the KORA, he must prove their conduct
             was willful, which he did not do. Additionally, as to any
             claim that records Williams alleges still have not been
             provided, [the Cabinet] claims they have produced all
             records that exist. Wolsing testified she has reviewed
             approximately 6,000 pages of documents and produced
             between 4,000-5,000 pages in response to Williams’ 15-
             20 open records requests or in discovery that are
             responsive to his requests. The [c]ourt cannot find
             Williams has made a prim[a] facie showing any
             additional records exist.
Id. at 1576-77. The parties did not file post-judgment motions. Appeal No. 2022-

CA-0935-MR followed.

             Following the four-day bench trial on Williams’ KORA claims, a

four-day jury trial was conducted on Williams’ KWA claims. The parties

presented testimony from Andrea Day, Jacqueline Lafollette, Karey Cooper,

Felicia Ross, Jennifer Hauser, Jason Mellenkamp, Lisa Dennis, Brun, Prewitt,

Williams, and Howard Klein. During the trial, the Cabinet twice moved for a

mistrial and moved for a directed verdict both at the close of Williams’ case and at

the close of evidence. All were denied by the trial court.

             After deliberation, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Williams.

The jury found: (1) Williams made good faith reports to an appropriate authority;

(2) the Cabinet took or threatened to take action to discourage or punish Williams

for his reports; (3) Williams’ reports were a contributing factor to the actions the

                                          -6-
Cabinet took against him; and (4) the Cabinet did not prove Williams’ reports were

not a material factor in the actions taken against him. The jury awarded Williams

$2,000,000 in punitive damages.

                The Cabinet moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict

(“JNOV”) which was denied by the trial court. Appeal No. 2022-CA-1360-MR

followed.

                Additional facts will be developed as necessary in the analysis below.

                                       ANALYSIS

                Because these appeals arise from distinct statutes, rely on discrete

facts, and were independently briefed, we will address them separately.

                             APPEAL NO. 2022-CA-0935-MR

                Williams appeals from the trial court’s June 30, 2022 judgment

finding he did not prove the Cabinet willfully withheld any records he requested

under KRS3 61.882(5).

                Before we reach Williams’ arguments, we will address the Cabinet’s

claim that his brief is deficient under the Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure

(“RAP”) and, as such, should be stricken under RAP 10(B)(3). Specifically, the

Cabinet alleges (1) Williams does not cite to the video record as required by RAP

24(A)(4); (2) his statement of the case erroneously cites to his brief’s appendices

3
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                            -7-
rather than the record in violation of RAP 32(A)(3); and (3) his brief does not

contain a word count certificate as required by RAP 15. The Cabinet argues it

“cannot readily ascertain what issues Williams appeals herein.” Appellee’s Brief

at 8.

             Appellate procedural rules, including those for briefing, cannot be

ignored by appellate advocates. See Hallis v. Hallis, 328 S.W.3d 694, 696 (Ky.

App. 2010) (citation omitted). “They are lights and buoys to mark the channels of

safe passage and assure an expeditious voyage to the right destination.” Id.

Because of the importance of adherence to these rules, this Court may penalize a

party, including striking his brief or portions thereof, for failure to substantially

comply with the rules. RAP 10(B).

             Here, although Williams’ brief does not strictly comply with the rules,

it does substantially comply with them. The Cabinet is correct that his citations are

to transcripts of the video record rather than to the record itself. “The official

electronic recording of court proceedings is the official record for appeal.” RAP

24(A)(3). “A transcript included in the evidentiary appendix does not take the

place of an official video record.” RAP 24(A)(4). Parties should cite to the

official video record of proceedings in their briefs. In choosing to cite to

transcripts which far exceed the length allowed for an evidentiary appendix rather

than to the video record, Williams violated RAP 24(A), RAP 32(A)(3), and RAP

                                           -8-
32(E)(2). Despite these violations, Williams provides the necessary citations to

allow our review to proceed.

             Furthermore, on the cover of his brief, Williams’ counsel certified

“this Brief contains 5,963 words, as measured by a word-processing application.”

Appellant’s Brief at 1. Although counsel failed to include all information required

by RAP 15(E), we find Williams has substantially complied with the rule.

             Although we will proceed with our review of the merits of Williams’

appeal because he substantially complied with the RAP, we caution counsel to be

mindful of the importance of compliance with all procedural rules.

             On appeal, Williams argues: (1) he timely appealed the Attorney

General’s opinion relating to Sansbury’s emails; (2) the trial court misapplied the

appropriate legal standard in its order; and (3) the trial court’s finding that the

Cabinet did not willfully withhold records was clearly erroneous. A trial court’s

decision as to whether an agency acted willfully under KRS 61.882(5) will not be

disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous. Bowling v. Lexington-Fayette Urban

County Government, 172 S.W.3d 333, 343-44 (Ky. 2005) (citations omitted).

             First, Williams argues he timely appealed the Attorney General’s

opinion relating to Sansbury’s emails. See In re: Kelly Wiley/Cabinet for Health

and Family Services, Ky. Op. Att’y Gen. 15-ORD-144, 2015 WL 4850428 (Aug.

6, 2015). “A party shall have thirty (30) days from the day that the Attorney

                                           -9-
General renders his or her decision to appeal the decision.” KRS 61.880(5)(a).

The Attorney General opinion was rendered on August 6, 2015. Williams argues

he appealed the opinion in his amended complaint filed on September 8, 2015.

Because the thirtieth day fell on a weekend and Labor Day was September 7, 2015,

Williams is correct that he filed his amended complaint within the time allowed by

statute.

                However, his amended complaint does not contain an appeal of the

Attorney General’s opinion. “A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief . . .

shall contain (a) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief and (b) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems

himself entitled.” CR4 8.01(1). We must liberally construe a complaint to

determine whether it states a cause of action. Russell v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc.,

610 S.W.3d 233, 241 (Ky. 2020) (citation omitted). While it is unnecessary to

“state a claim with technical precision[,]” a complaint must give fair notice to the

defendant. Id. (citation omitted).

                The only reference Williams makes to the Attorney General’s opinion

in his amended complaint is as follows:

                Those requests for records, related to his complaints and
                those of a co-worker have been thwarted, refused,
                subverted, destroyed or outright refused by the Cabinet

4
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                           -10-
             for Health and Family Services. (See Attached Attorney
             General Opinion 15-ORD-144).
R. at 39. At best, this single reference reads as a citation to evidence supporting

another claim, not a separate claim or appeal of the opinion. Even with the most

liberal construction, this does not comply with CR 8.01(1). Because Williams

failed to appeal the opinion, it now has the “force and effect of law” and is

enforceable in the trial court. KRS 61.880(5)(b).

             Next, Williams argues the trial court misapplied the appropriate legal

standard in its order. However, he does not identify either the legal standard

erroneously applied by the court or the standard which should have been applied.

He also refers us to no supportive authority for this argument. See RAP 32(A)(4).

It is not the place of an appellate court to research and construct a party’s legal

argument or to “go on a fishing expedition to find support for their underdeveloped

argument.” Jones by and though Jones v. IC Bus, LLC, 626 S.W.3d 661, 686 (Ky.

App. 2020). We decline to do so here.

             In order for Williams to prevail, he had to prove the Cabinet willfully

withheld documents in violation of KORA. KRS 61.882(5). The trial court

concluded it was unable to find the Cabinet’s “actions in responding to and/or

failing to provide requested documents to Williams’ KORA requests were willful.”

R. at 1576. Therefore, the trial court applied the correct standard.

                                         -11-
               Finally, Williams argues the trial court’s finding that the Cabinet did

not willfully withhold documents was clearly erroneous. Within this argument,

Williams claims: (1) the ombudsman’s report was not preliminary and should

have been provided upon his request; (2) the Cabinet withheld emails from Kelly

Pompilio, Pam VonHandorf, and Karey Cooper; and (3) it is “facially implausible”

that Kathy Sansbury’s emails were destroyed 28 days after her employment with

the Cabinet ended. We will consider each of these allegations individually.

              First, Williams contests the Cabinet’s characterization of the

ombudsman’s report as preliminary under KRS 61.878(1)(i). As noted in the trial

court’s order, Williams testified at the May 24, 2015 hearing that he was not

contesting the Cabinet’s invocation of these exceptions. Video Record (“V.R.”) at

5/24/2022 at 1:26:00-15.5 Perhaps because of this admission, in its judgment, the

trial court notes Williams’ testimony and the Cabinet’s arguments relating to the

report but does not make findings as to whether KRS 61.878(1)(i) applies to the

report. The record does not show that Williams ever requested such findings. It is

incumbent on a party to move for specific findings where a trial court’s findings

are incomplete. CR 52.04. Without such a request, Williams’ argument is deemed

5
  The Cabinet’s counsel questioned Williams about his answer to the Cabinet’s interrogatory
which asked, “For each open records request identified in your answer Interrogatory No. 8
(above) please identify what documents you or your attorney received and how you believe the
response to be deficient.” R. at Envelope XVII, Plaintiff’s Exhibit 39.1. Williams lists thirty
alleged deficiencies in his answer. He does not allege the Cabinet improperly withheld the
ombudsman’s report as preliminary under KRS 61.878(1)(i).

                                              -12-
waived, precluding our review. Polley v. Allen, 132 S.W.3d 223, 230 (Ky. App.

2004) (citation omitted).

              Next, Williams claims the Cabinet withheld emails from Kelly

Pompilio, VonHandorf, and Cooper. He alleges he received only a single email in

response to this request. Without citing to the record or any supportive authority,

Williams argues that more emails exist and should have been provided to him.

Williams cites to the trial court’s findings which state, “Pompilio, Sansbury, and

Williams testified that there would have been multiple emails a day between them

and Cooper in early 2015 and then the same would be true when VonHandorf

began assigning cases after Sansbury left.” R. at 1566-67.6 The court then

determined it “cannot find [the Cabinet] willfully withheld any of the requested

documents. The [c]ourt finds Wolsing conducted a reasonable search for all

documents requested by asking people directly to provide documents, as well as

obtaining help from the Commonwealth Office of Technology to search for

emails.” Id. at 1570-71.

              Regardless of conflicting evidence, the weight of the
              evidence, or the fact that the reviewing court would have
              reached a contrary finding, due regard shall be given to
              the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility
              of the witnesses because judging the credibility of

6
 The Cabinet counters this argument by citing to exhibits containing many more emails the
Cabinet provided in response to Williams’ requests. Our review indicates the Cabinet provided
Williams with more than one of Karey Cooper’s emails. R. at Envelope XVI, Defendant’s
Exhibit 10.

                                             -13-
             witnesses and weighing evidence are tasks within the
             exclusive province of the trial court.
Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003) (internal quotation marks and

footnotes omitted). The trial court acted within its exclusive authority in finding

Wolsing’s testimony credible and relying on it. This is not clearly erroneous.

             Finally, Williams argues it is “facially implausible” that Sansbury’s

emails were destroyed 28 days after she left the Cabinet. He cites to no evidence

in the record supporting this allegation but generally urges us to consider “the

record, taken in its totality[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 25. We will not grant relief

based upon a party’s unsupported, conclusory statements. See Jones v. Livesay,

551 S.W.3d 47, 52 (Ky. App. 2018).

             Based on the foregoing, the trial court’s judgment under KRS

61.882(5) is not clearly erroneous.

                         APPEAL NO. 2022-CA-1360-MR

             The Cabinet appeals from the jury verdict finding it violated

provisions of the KWA and awarding Williams $2,000,000 in punitive damages.

On appeal, the Cabinet argues: (1) Williams failed to prove any personnel action

on the part of the Cabinet because he did not experience a materially adverse

change to the terms and conditions of his employment; (2) Williams should have

been barred from presenting evidence of personnel actions which occurred before

May 6, 2015 under KRS 61.103(2); (3) the jury instructions were erroneous

                                         -14-
because they did not include “personnel action”; (4) Williams failed to preserve his

request for punitive damages; (5) the $2,000,000 punitive damages award was

grossly excessive; (6) punitive damages exceeded what is permissible by statute;

(7) the Cabinet was entitled to a mistrial because of statements made by Williams’

counsel during opening and closing statements; and (8) at trial, the Cabinet met its

burden under KRS 61.103(3).

             To prevail under the KWA, an employee must prove:

             (1) the employer is an officer of the state; (2) the
             employee is employed by the state; (3) the employee
             made or attempted to make a good faith report or
             disclosure of a suspected violation of state or local law to
             an appropriate body or authority; and (4) the employer
             took action or threatened to take action to discourage the
             employee from making such a disclosure or to punish the
             employee for making such a disclosure.

Davidson v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Military Affairs, 152 S.W.3d 247, 251 (Ky.

App. 2004) (footnotes omitted). On appeal, the Cabinet does not contest Williams’

proof of the first three elements.

             In contesting the fourth Davidson element, the Cabinet argues it was

entitled to summary judgment because Williams could not, as a matter of law,

prove the Cabinet took any “materially adverse” personnel action against him to

discourage or punish him for his disclosure. We review the trial court’s denial of

summary judgment without deference to its assessment of the record or

conclusions “[b]ecause summary judgment does not require findings of fact but

                                         -15-
only an examination of the record to determine whether material issues of fact

exist[.]” Hammons v. Hammons, 327 S.W.3d 444, 448 (Ky. 2010) (citation

omitted).

             The KWA requires an employee to

             show by a preponderance of evidence that the disclosure
             was a contributing factor in the personnel action. Once
             a prima facie case of reprisal has been established a
             disclosure determined to be a contributing factor to the
             personnel action, the burden of proof shall be on the
             agency to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
             the disclosure was not a material fact in the personnel
             action.
KRS 61.103(3) (emphasis added). To evaluate the Cabinet’s argument, we must

first define “personnel action” and then decide whether such an action must be

materially adverse to the terms and conditions of the employee’s employment

under the KWA. Statutory construction is an issue of law which we review de

novo. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. v. Fell, 391 S.W.3d 713, 718 (Ky. 2012)

(citation omitted).

             The primary goal of statutory construction is to give effect to the

intent of the legislature. Bell v. Bell, 423 S.W.3d 219, 223 (Ky. 2014) (footnote

omitted). We cannot consider a singular provision but must construe the statute in

its entirety. Samons v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 399 S.W.3d 425, 429

(Ky. 2013) (footnote omitted). We begin with the text of the statute itself and give

terms their plain meaning. Kentucky Heritage Land Conservation Fund Board v.

                                        -16-
Louisville Gas and Electric Company, 648 S.W.3d 76, 85 (Ky. App. 2022)

(citations omitted). Where a term is undefined by statute, “the plain meaning is

determined by reference to the common usage of the language used by the

[l]egislature.” Id. (citation omitted).

             In Commonwealth Department of Agriculture v. Vinson, 30 S.W.3d

162, 165 (Ky. 2000), the Supreme Court of Kentucky acknowledged that

“personnel action” is not defined in the KWA. Without providing a definition, the

Court held KRS 61.102(1) “recognizes the overt retaliatory act of reprisal as well

as the subtle exercise of official authority or influence in the relationship between

state employee and state government.” Id. at 164. The Court also acknowledged

that the definition of “personnel action” is limited by the exclusions contained in

KRS 61.102(3). Id. at 165. Since Vinson, “personnel action” has otherwise

remained undefined.

             In defining “personnel action,” we will first consider the KWA as a

whole. Samons, 399 S.W.3d at 429 (footnote omitted). It mandates,

             [n]o employer shall subject to reprisal, or directly or
             indirectly use, or threaten to use, any official authority or
             influence, in any manner whatsoever, which tends to
             discourage, restrain, depress, dissuade, deter, prevent,
             interfere with, coerce, or discriminate against any
             employee who in good faith reports, discloses, divulges,
             or otherwise brings to the attention of . . . [the]
             appropriate body or authority, any facts or information
             relative to an actual or suspected violation of any law,
             statute, executive order, administrative regulation,

                                          -17-
             mandate, rule, or ordinance . . . , or any facts or
             information relative to actual or suspected
             mismanagement, waste, fraud, abuse of authority, or a
             substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.

KRS 61.102(1) (emphasis added). Without directly referencing “personnel action,”

this provision makes clear the legislature’s intention to broadly prohibit actions

which might discourage an employee from making a good faith report or interfere

with such a report. With this in mind, we now turn to the plain meaning of

“personnel action.”

             To discern the plain meaning of “personnel action” we will consider

the common definition of each of the two words. “Personnel” is defined as “a

body of persons usually employed (as in a factory or organization).” Personnel,

MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/

personnel (last accessed Dec. 4, 2023). “Action” is defined as “the process of

doing something, conduct or behavior.” Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th

ed. 2019). Taken together, “personnel action” can be defined as any conduct or

behavior relating to persons working for an organization.

             Therefore, considering both KRS 61.102(1) and the plain meaning of

the language employed by the legislature, we construe “personnel action” to mean

any act relating to a state employee which tends to discourage, restrain, depress,

dissuade, deter, prevent, interfere with, coerce, or discriminate against an employee

who has made a good faith report under the KWA. Some actions, such as

                                         -18-
termination or demotion, are clearly encompassed by this definition. See

Consolidated Infrastructure Management Authority, Inc. v. Allen, 269 S.W.3d 852,

854 (Ky. 2008) (employee was terminated); see also Harper v. University of

Louisville, 559 S.W.3d 796, 804 (Ky. 2018) (employee’s position was eliminated);

see also Cabinet for Health and Families and Children v. Cummings, 163 S.W.3d

425, 430 (Ky. 2005) (employee was removed from his position on a research

study); see also Vinson, 30 S.W.3d at 163 (employees were demoted). However,

as the record in this case demonstrates, some actions may not fit as clearly within

this definition.

              To better understand what may qualify as a “personnel action,” we

look to persuasive federal authority. The KWA and the federal Whistleblower

Protection Act (“WPA”) mirror one another, and Kentucky appellate courts have

previously looked to the WPA and the federal courts’ interpretations thereof as

persuasive authority. See Harper, 559 S.W.3d at 802; see also Vinson, 30 S.W.3d

at 169. The purpose of both the KWA and WPA is to protect employees from

retaliation for disclosure of evidence of wrongdoing by their employers. See

Davidson, 152 S.W.3d at 255 (footnote omitted). Similar to the KWA, the WPA

prohibits

              [a]ny employee who has authority to take, direct others to
              take, recommend, or approve any personnel action, shall
              not, with respect to such authority –

                                        -19-
                ...

                          (8) take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to
                          take, a personnel action with respect to any
                          employee or applicant for employment because of
                          –
                                 (A) any disclosure of information by an
                                 employee or applicant which the employee
                                 or applicant reasonably believes evidences –

                                         (i) any violation of any law, rule, or
                                         regulation[.]

5 U.S.C.7 § 2302(b). Pertinent to this matter, the WPA also specifically defines

“personnel action” as

                (i)       an appointment;

                (ii)      a promotion;

                (iii)     an action under chapter 75[8] of this title or other
                          disciplinary or corrective action;

                (iv)      a detail, transfer, or reassignment;

                (v)       a reinstatement;

                (vi)      a restoration;

                (vii) a reemployment;

                (viii) a performance evaluation under chapter 43 of this
                       title or under title 38;

7
    United States Code.
8
  Chapter 75 governs certain removals, suspensions, reductions in grade, reductions in pay, and
furloughs. 5 U.S.C. § 7512.

                                                 -20-
              (ix)    a decision concerning pay, benefits, or awards, or
                      concerning education or training if the education
                      or training may reasonably be expected to lead to
                      an appointment, promotion, performance
                      evaluation, or other action described in this
                      subparagraph;

              (x)     a decision to order psychiatric testing or
                      examination;

              (xi)    the implementation or enforcement of any
                      nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement; and

              (xii) any other significant change in duties,
                    responsibilities, or working conditions;

              with respect to an employee in, or applicant for, a
              covered position in an agency[.]

5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A). Just as we have broadly construed the meaning of

“personnel action” under KWA, federal courts have described this definition as

“necessarily[] broad.” Mangano v. United States, 529 F.3d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir.

2008) (citation omitted). Although the federal definition is not binding on our

interpretation of the KWA, it is illustrative of the actions it may prohibit.9

               A plaintiff must also prove any alleged personnel action amounted to

“materially adverse” changes to the terms and conditions of his employment.

9
  Williams urges us to rely on the definition of “penalization” contained in KRS 18A.005 as a
definition for “personnel action.” At trial, Williams also heavily relied on this definition in
arguing he was retaliated against by the Cabinet. The KWA does not use “penalization” or
referred to KRS 18A.005. See KRS 61.101-61.103. Since the trial, the legislature amended
KRS 18A.005 to remove penalization as a defined term. We decline to rely on a since-removed
definition for an inapplicable term in defining “personnel action.”

                                             -21-
Although this is not explicitly required under the statute, Kentucky courts have

established this requirement in the context of retaliation under the Kentucky Civil

Rights Act (“KCRA”).10 The KCRA and KWA have similar purposes regarding

retaliation. Under the KCRA, it is unlawful for any person “[t]o retaliate or

discriminate in any manner against a person because he has opposed a practice

declared unlawful by this chapter . . . or participated in any manner in any

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter[.]” KRS 344.280(1)

(emphasis added). Just as the KWA broadly prohibits any action which tends to

discourage an employee from making a good faith disclosure, the KCRA prohibits

retaliation “in any manner.”

              Despite the legislature’s expansive prohibition on retaliation, the

Supreme Court of Kentucky has construed the KCRA to require that a plaintiff

establish “a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of his

employment” to prove retaliation. Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County

Housing Authority, 132 S.W.3d 790, 802 (Ky. 2004). A “materially adverse”

change is defined as

              more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an
              alteration of job responsibilities. A materially adverse
              change might be indicated by a termination of

10
  This Court has cited to the KCRA in holding a personnel action must be materially adverse
under the KWA in two unpublished decisions. See Jones v. Oldham County Sheriff’s Dep’t, No.
2009-CA-000350-MR, 2010 WL 1508150, *10-11 (Ky. App. Apr. 16, 2010); see also Arnold v.
Holmes, No. 2009-CA-000514-MR, 2010 WL 3810191, *2-3 (Ky. App. Oct. 1, 2010).

                                           -22-
             employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in
             wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss
             of benefits, significantly diminished material
             responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a
             particular situation.
Id. at 802 (citation omitted). In Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway

Company v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415, 165 L. Ed. 2d 345

(2006) (citation omitted), the Supreme Court of the United States held that an

action is materially adverse if it “might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from

making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” The Court emphasized the

importance of differentiating between significant and trivial harms. Id.

Recognizing that some acts may be “immaterial in some situations [and] material

in others[,]” the Court held the significance of an act depends on context, making

whether an alleged personnel action is materially adverse a question of fact for the

jury to decide. Id. at 68, 70, 126 S. Ct. at 2415, 2416.

             The Cabinet argues it was entitled to summary judgment as a matter

of law because none of the personnel actions alleged by Williams were materially

adverse to the terms and conditions of his employment. In denying the Cabinet’s

motion, the trial court held there were genuine issues of material fact as to the

following alleged personnel actions: (1) the Cabinet’s attempt to force Williams to

permanently transfer to Boone County without his consent and without following

proper procedures; (2) supervisors entering Williams’ office without his

                                         -23-
knowledge to find case files; (3) removal of Williams’ duty to assign work to two

social workers from Scott County; (4) asking him to produce timesheets and other

documents relating to social workers he supervised in Gallatin County; (5) removal

of the investigation log from Williams’ duties; (6) mandating overtime for the staff

in Boone County when there was no such mandate for other offices in the region;

(7) assigning Williams a team of less experienced staff than he had in Gallatin

County; (8) changing the code to the Boone County office door without informing

him; (9) requiring him to begin his day at his workstation; and (10) although they

expressed concerns about his mental health, Williams’ supervisors did not refer

him to the employee assistance program. R. at 1307-10. In addition to claiming

none of these actions were materially adverse, the Cabinet offered non-retaliatory

explanations for each alleged personnel action.

               While we question whether some of these actions would be sufficient

on their own to survive summary judgment, we may not judge each alleged action

in isolation.11 Instead, we must consider all the circumstances surrounding the

alleged conduct. White, 548 U.S. at 71, 126 S. Ct. at 2417. At a minimum,

Williams’ allegations of reassignment of duties, removal of supervisory

responsibilities, the change of the office door code, and mandatory overtime are

11
   For example, had Williams alleged the only personnel action was the threat of a temporary
transfer, it would be difficult to prove a materially adverse change where no change occurred.

                                              -24-
personnel actions under the plain meaning of KRS 61.103(3). Considering all the

actions in their full context and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

Williams, there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the alleged

personnel actions amounted to materially adverse changes to the terms and

conditions of his employment. The trial court did not err in denying the Cabinet’s

motion for summary judgment.12

               Second, the Cabinet claims Williams was statutorily barred from

presenting evidence of alleged personnel actions by the Cabinet which occurred

before May 6, 2015. An employee alleging a violation of the KWA “may bring a

civil action for appropriate injunctive relief or punitive damages, or both, within

ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the alleged violation.” KRS 61.103(2).

The Supreme Court of Kentucky reasoned that “[i]n light of the significant policy

concerns surrounding such awards, the General Assembly’s decision to limit the

right to collect punitive damages from public entities is rational and harmonizes

with the overall intent of the [KWA].” Allen, 269 S.W.3d at 856.

               Williams filed his complaint on August 4, 2015. Under the plain

meaning of the statute, his cause of action must be limited to personnel actions

which occurred no earlier than May 6, 2015. Williams introduced a May 4, 2015

12
  Although the Cabinet raised this issue again in its motion for directed verdict and motion for
JNOV, it does not appeal the trial court’s denial of those motions. Therefore, we will not
consider whether a directed verdict or JNOV would have been warranted.

                                              -25-
email from Prewitt informing him that he would be permanently transferred to

Boone County. Staff, including Williams, received an email on May 5, 2015,

informing them of Brun’s promotion to SRAA, making her Williams’ supervisor.

Williams argues the evidence he presented regarding these actions was admissible

even if he was not entitled to recover damages because they occurred outside the

time allowed by KRS 61.103(2). This is unsupported by law. Williams

specifically alleges both the threat of a permanent transfer and Brun’s promotion

were personnel actions taken against him under KRS 61.103(3). The trial court’s

decision to allow this evidence into the record was in error. On remand, Williams

is prohibited from presenting evidence of these or any other alleged personnel

actions which occurred outside the time allowed by KRS 61.103(2).

               Third, the Cabinet claims the jury instructions improperly failed to

include the term “personnel action.”13 The Cabinet proposed an instruction which

asked the jury to “[s]tate whether you are satisfied from the evidence as follows (if

you are not so satisfied, answer NO): . . . That Mr. Williams being _______ was a

personnel action that was a material change in the terms and conditions of his

employment.” R. at 1507 (emphasis added). The instruction asked the jurors to

fill in the blank with the specific action which they found did or did not constitute

13
   The Cabinet also alleges the jury instructions should have included a list of alleged personnel
actions. However, such a list was not included in its proposed instructions, and it did not raise
this argument in its motion for JNOV. Therefore, we will not address it herein.

                                               -26-
a personnel action. The Cabinet’s proposed instructions consistently use

“personnel action.” Id. at 1507-09. In the final instructions, Instruction No. 2

states

             In order for [Williams] to prevail on his claim of
             retaliation, he must establish the following:

             ...

             (3) [Williams] must demonstrate by a preponderance of
             the evidence that his reports or disclosures were a
             contributing factor in the retaliation and penalization
             taken against him. . . .

             (4) If [Williams] sufficiently demonstrates that his
             disclosures were a contributing factor for the acts of [the
             Cabinet], [the Cabinet] can avoid liability only if it shows
             by clear and convincing evidence that [Williams’]
             reports, or disclosures were not a material factor in the
             acts of retaliation or penalization.

R. at 1618 (emphasis added). The final instructions do not include the term

“personnel action.” We review alleged errors regarding jury instructions de novo.

Carmical v. Bullock, 251 S.W.3d 324, 328 (Ky. App. 2007).

             While a trial court has some discretion as to what instructions are

supported by the evidence, it has none “to give an instruction that misrepresents

the applicable law.” Sargent v. Shaffer, 467 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Ky. 2015),

overruled on other grounds by University Medical Center, Inc. v. Shwab, 628

S.W.3d 112 (Ky. 2021). Here, the trial court failed to instruct the jury to find

Williams proved a “personnel action” and instead instructed on the terms

                                         -27-
“retaliation” and “penalization” which do not appear in the KWA. Throughout the

trial, Williams argued he was penalized by the Cabinet under KRS 18A.005. As

previously addressed, reliance on this definition was erroneous. KRS 61.103(3)

clearly sets out the parties’ burdens of proof using the term “personnel action.”

The repeated use of the irrelevant term “penalization” at trial and again in the jury

instructions along with “retaliation” where the statute unambiguously uses

“personnel action” is an error demanding reversal.

             Next, the Cabinet raises several arguments relating to punitive

damages, including (1) Williams did not preserve punitive damages; (2) the

punitive damages award is grossly excessive; and (3) the punitive damages award

exceeds the scope allowed by statute.

             First, the Cabinet claims Williams both failed to properly amend his

answer to its interrogatory regarding punitive damages and did not comply with the

trial court’s order requiring him to file an itemization of monetary damages sixty

days before trial. “When a claim is made against a party for unliquidated damages,

that party may obtain information as to the amount claimed by interrogatories. If

this is done, the amount claimed shall not exceed the last amount stated in

interrogatories[.]” CR 8.01(2). This rule, read together with CR 26.05, can be

construed to impose a “‘seasonable’ time limit on a party’s ability to supplement

an answer to interrogatories for claims for unliquidated damages.” Fratzke v.

                                         -28-
Murphy, 12 S.W.3d 269, 272 (Ky. 1999). The purpose of CR 8.01(2) is to put the

defendant on notice of the amount of unliquidated damages sought by the plaintiff.

Thompson v. Sherwin Williams Co., Inc., 113 S.W.3d 140, 143 (Ky. 2003).

             In his answer to the Cabinet’s interrogatory, Williams stated he was

seeking in excess of one hundred million dollars in compensatory and punitive

damages. R. at 1606. While the Cabinet is correct that the trial court subsequently

dismissed Williams’ claims for emotional distress and humiliation, his failure to

supplement his answer thereafter does not bar his claim for punitive damages. The

Cabinet had notice of the damages at stake and was able to “advise the trier of fact

as to what amounts are fair and reasonable as shown by the evidence.” CR

8.01(2).

             Furthermore, a trial court has the “inherent authority to enforce its

own orders.” Boland-Maloney Lumber Co., Inc. v. Burnett, 302 S.W.3d 680, 688

(Ky. App. 2009) (citation omitted). We must defer to the trial court’s

interpretation of its own order. See VP Louisville, LLC v. NBH Bank, N.A., 578

S.W.3d 753, 757 (Ky. App. 2019) (citation omitted). While Williams did not file

an itemization of damages, the Cabinet was on notice regarding punitive damages.

For this reason, the trial court’s interpretation and enforcement of its trial order

was not manifestly unreasonable. Id.

                                          -29-
             Next, the Cabinet claims the jury’s punitive damages award is grossly

excessive. Under the KWA, an employee may bring an action for “appropriate

injunctive relief or punitive damages, or both[.]” KRS 61.103(2). In such an

action, a court may order “reinstatement of the employee, the payment of back

wages, full reinstatement of fringe benefits and seniority rights, exemplary or

punitive damages, or any combination thereof.” KRS 61.990(4). Punitive

damages may be appropriately awarded even when compensatory damages have

not been proven. Vinson, 30 S.W.3d at 166 (citations omitted). An award of

punitive damages in the absence of compensatory damages is not a per se violation

of due process. We review the constitutionality of punitive damages de novo.

McDonald’s Corp. v. Ogborn, 309 S.W.3d 274, 298 (Ky. App. 2009) (citation

omitted).

              A punitive damages award violates the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment when it is “grossly excessive.” Id. (citing BMW of North

America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1595, 134 L. Ed. 2d 809

(1996)). The Supreme Court of the United States has given us the following

“guideposts” to help us to determine what “grossly excessive” means in any given

case:

             (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s
             conduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential
             harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages
             award; and (3) the difference between the punitive

                                        -30-
             damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties
             authorized or imposed in comparable cases.
Ragland v. DiGiuro, 352 S.W.3d 908, 917 (Ky. App. 2010) (citing State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1520, 155 L.

Ed. 2d 585 (2003) (citation omitted)). The Supreme Court has further identified

the following factors for evaluating the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct:

             the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic;
             the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a
             reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the
             target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the
             conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated
             incident; and the harm was the result of intentional
             malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.

Id. (quoting Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419, 123 S. Ct. at 1521) (citation omitted)).

             Herein, we cannot describe the Cabinet’s conduct as having a high

degree of reprehensibility. Williams experienced no physical harm, nor did he

experience economic harm. The Cabinet did not act in a way that reflected

indifference or reckless disregard for the health or safety of Williams or any other

employee. Williams did not allege nor show he had any particular financial

vulnerability where he was not threatened with, nor did he experience economic

harm. The Cabinet’s actions may be described as repeated but there is no evidence

they were the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit. The weight of these

factors is against finding the Cabinet’s behavior reprehensible.

                                        -31-
            Additionally, there is a significant disparity between the actual harm

Williams suffered and the jury’s $2,000,000 punitive damages award. Often courts

employ a ratio of punitive to compensatory damages in assessing this factor. See

Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425, 123 S. Ct. at 1524 (“Our jurisprudence and the

principles it has now established demonstrate . . . few awards exceeding a single-

digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree,

will satisfy due process.”). While we cannot reduce our decision on this factor to a

simple mathematical equation, we must recognize the significance of the fact that

Williams suffered no actual harm. See Ragland, 352 S.W.3d at 921 (citing Gore,

517 U.S. at 582, 116 S. Ct. at 1602). Where a “particularly egregious act” results

in only a small amount of economic harm, a proportionately higher award of

punitive damages may be appropriate. Id. However, Williams did not prove a

particularly egregious act, as demonstrated by our analysis of the low degree of

reprehensibility. He was not terminated nor demoted. His salary was not reduced,

and he lost no benefits. At most, he proved only minor to moderate changes to his

work environment and assigned duties. Therefore, the vast disparity between the

award and the harm Williams suffered is without justification.

            Finally, there is a substantial difference between the punitive damages

awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable

cases. “Because they are paid with taxpayer dollars, it is common that punitive

                                        -32-
damage awards are either unavailable or heavily restricted when sought against a

public entity.” Allen, 269 S.W.3d at 856 (citation omitted). Unlike many statutes,

including the KCRA, the KWA expressly allows recovery of punitive damages.

KRS 61.103(2). However, the restrictions on recovery of punitive damages from

government agencies, as well as the infrequency of punitive damage awards under

the KWA leave us with only one case for comparison. Therein, two employees

were awarded one million dollars in punitive damages because they were demoted

in violation of the KWA after making a good faith report. Vinson, 30 S.W.3d at

163. However, the constitutionality of the punitive damages award was not at

issue in Vinson. Otherwise, “[a]ny person who willfully violates the provisions of

KRS 61.102(1) shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.” KRS 61.990(3). The

maximum fine for a Class A misdemeanor is $500. KRS 534.040(2)(a).

             Based on the standard established in Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418, 123

S. Ct. at 1520, the $2,000,000 punitive damages award is grossly excessive and

must be reversed.

             We cannot know the jurors’ thoughts when they awarded Williams’

punitive damages, but they may have been reacting to the allegations which formed

the basis of Williams’ report. We agree that failure to investigate or follow up on

numerous claims of neglect and abuse is an inexcusable violation of the Cabinet’s

mandate to protect children. However, no matter how egregious the Cabinet’s

                                        -33-
conduct may have been, those actions are not the subject of this case. The purpose

of the KWA is to protect employees from reprisal when they make good faith

reports of wrongdoing. See Davidson, 152 S.W.3d at 255 (footnote omitted). It is

not the responsibility of juries in these proceedings to adjudicate the merits of

allegations in the underlying reports. Williams may only recover damages for the

harm he experienced not for the perceived harm experienced by the children and

families he alleged the Cabinet failed to serve.

             We need not address the Cabinet’s argument that the punitive

damages award is arbitrary and exceeds what is allowable by the KWA because

our determination that the award was grossly excessive mandates reversal.

Because reversal could result in a retrial and the Cabinet’s remaining allegations of

error may be repeated, we address those allegations.

             The Cabinet contends the trial court erred by denying its two motions

for mistrial based on Williams’ counsel’s inflammatory statements made during

opening and closing statements. We review a denial of a motion for mistrial for

abuse of discretion. Knuckles v. Commonwealth, 315 S.W.3d 319, 322 (Ky. 2010).

“A mistrial is appropriate only where the record reveals a manifest necessity for

such an action or an urgent or real necessity.” Id. (footnote omitted). The

determination of whether a manifest necessity exists is within the “sound discretion

                                         -34-
of the trial court.” Sneed v. Burress, 500 S.W.3d 791, 793 (Ky. 2016) (citation

omitted).

             Herein, Williams’ counsel began her opening statement by telling the

jury

             this case started with 93 incidents of child abuse and
             neglect that were sent to CPS in Boone County and not
             acted on for as much as 18 months. These incidents
             included sexual abuse of a child, babies being born drug
             addicted and suffering from withdrawal, hungry children
             being locked out of their home in the cold with no food,
             and children exposed to domestic violence.

V.R. 7/5/2022 at 1:11:12-33. The trial court overruled the Cabinet’s objection to

counsel discussing the details of the underlying Cabinet investigations. At the end

of her statement, counsel said “. . . when a government agency does something

wrong, like leave children in dangerous situations and go after the person who

brings this to light, that wrong got reported. The agency should have

consequences. . . . We need you to send a message.” Id. 7/5/2022 at 1:36:00-13.

The Cabinet objected and moved for a mistrial for counsel’s “send a message”

statement. The trial court sustained the objection but denied the motion for

mistrial. The Cabinet did not request the trial court admonish the jury to disregard

counsel’s statement and the trial court did not do so of its own accord.

             In her closing argument, Williams’ counsel told the jury, “You have

more power today than you might ever have in your life to make sure that there’s

                                        -35-
not going to be another child or another giant, big problem at the Cabinet.” Id.

7/8/2022 at 12:25:00-14. The trial court overruled the Cabinet’s objection to this

statement. She then told the jury they had to be “the voice of the community” and

“send a message” to the Cabinet. Id. 7/8/2022 at 12:33:05, 12:33:20. The trial

court again sustained the Cabinet’s objection to the “send a message” statement

and admonished the jury not to consider it. The trial court denied the Cabinet’s

second motion for mistrial.

             As a general rule, counsel is given “wide latitude” in both opening

and closing statements. Pauly v. Chang, 498 S.W.3d 394, 412 (Ky. App. 2015)

(citation omitted). However, counsel “may not encourage the jury to return a

verdict based on passion or prejudice, or for reasons not reasonably inferred from

the evidence.” Bush v. Commonwealth, 839 S.W.2d 550, 557 (Ky. 1992) (citation

omitted). The Cabinet asks us to apply the criminal law prohibition on “send a

message” statements to this matter. In criminal law, the appellate courts have

“repeatedly indicated that ‘send a message’ statements are improper in the

Commonwealth and prosecutors should not engage in such argument[.]” Hall v.

Commonwealth, 551 S.W.3d 7, 19 (Ky. 2018) (footnote omitted). While

prosecutors may not use these statements to put the pressure of the community on

the jury, they may ask the jury to send a message to deter the defendant from future

misconduct. Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 288 S.W.3d 291, 299 (Ky. 2009).

                                        -36-
               Herein, we agree with the Cabinet that Williams’ counsel conflated

the Cabinet’s actions which formed the basis of Williams’ report with its actions

toward him. However, the Cabinet moved for a mistrial solely on the grounds of

counsel’s “send a message” statements. Counsel asked the jury to send a message

to this defendant, the Cabinet, to deter it from future misconduct. This does not

amount to a prohibited statement under Cantrell, 288 S.W.3d at 299. Despite this,

the trial court sustained the Cabinet’s objections and admonished the jury to

disregard counsel’s statement during her closing argument. “A jury is presumed to

follow an admonition.” Jefferson v. Eggemeyer, 516 S.W.3d 325, 338 (Ky. 2017)

(citations omitted). Under these circumstances, there was no manifest necessity for

a mistrial and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.

               Finally, the Cabinet argues that, even if Williams met his burden

under KRS 61.103(3), it proved by clear and convincing evidence that Williams’

letter to the OIG was not a material fact in the personnel actions. The Cabinet cites

to evidence it claims prove non-retaliatory reasons for the personnel actions taken

against Williams. In his brief, Williams cites to contradictory evidence.14

14
  Williams is correct that the Cabinet fails to state whether this issue is properly preserved for
our review and, if so, in what manner. RAP 32(A)(4). Although it is not our responsibility to do
so, we reviewed the record and found the Cabinet preserved this issue in its motion for JNOV.
See Gasaway v. Commonwealth, 671 S.W.3d 298, 311 (Ky. 2023).

                                              -37-
             The standard for granting a motion for JNOV is a challenging one for

an appellant to meet. Estate of Moloney v. Becker, 398 S.W.3d 459, 461 (Ky. App.

2013) (citation omitted). We can reverse the trial court’s denial only if the Cabinet

has proven “the verdict was palpably or flagrantly against the evidence such that it

indicates the jury reached the verdict as a result of passion or prejudice.” Id.

(citation omitted). Viewing the totality of the evidence in the light most favorable

to Williams and drawing “every fair and reasonable inference” therefrom in his

favor, we cannot find there was “a complete absence of proof” on the issue of

whether the Cabinet met its burden under KRS 61.103(3). Id. (citation omitted).

Because reasonable people could disagree on this issue, the trial court’s denial of

the motion for JNOV was not clearly erroneous. Id. (citation omitted).

                                  CONCLUSION

             Based on the foregoing, we affirm the June 30, 2022 judgment of the

Boone Circuit Court denying Williams’ KORA claims in appeal No. 2022-CA-

0935-MR. In appeal No. 2022-CA-1360-MR, we affirm the trial court’s February

18, 2022 and October 25, 2022 orders. However, we reverse the trial court’s July

25, 2022 judgment on the grounds that the jury instructions were improper,

Williams was permitted to present evidence outside the 90-day limitation in KRS

61.103(2), and the punitive damages award was grossly excessive. We remand this

matter for a new trial on Williams’ KWA claims consistent with this Opinion.

                                         -38-
          ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR TIMOTHY        BRIEFS FOR CABINET FOR
WILLIAMS:                 HEALTH AND FAMILY
                          SERVICES:
Kelly A. Wiley
Covington, Kentucky       Blake A. Vogt
                          Lucas Roberts
Jeffrey A. Lawson         David T. Lovely
Covington, Kentucky       Frankfort, Kentucky

                        -39-