Court Opinion

ID: 9548456
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:03:47.034674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:59.617917
License: Public Domain

DOOLIN, Justice
(dissenting).
Despite the obvious intent of the Legislature in enacting 12 O.S.1971 § 1289(b) to make it mandatory for every divorce decree to provide that support alimony shall terminate upon the marriage of recipient unless extenuating circumstances are timely shown, the Court today permits a judge to circumvent the statute and enter a judgment in complete contravention of the law of the State of Oklahoma. In so doing the Court attempts to persuade us the law of waiver justifies relegating this portion of the statute into oblivion. The attempt is wholly unconvincing. I therefore dissent.
Pielsticker v. Callahan, decided prior to the adoption of this statute, is cited by the majority as standing for the proposition a decree providing that alimony payments shall not terminate upon remarriage of wife does not contravene public policy. We do not read it in this manner. Piel-sticker was an appeal from a suit to enforce a contract of property settlement and alimony. The Court enforced the contract holding contracts of property settlement under the then existing statutes are not against public policy. With this we agree. In Pielsticker, however, there was no issue of continuing alimony payments after remarriage. This is a matter of public policy which has now been codified into our statutes.
The statute uses the mandatory “shall”. The word “shall” is usually given its common meaning of “must” and interpreted as implying a command. Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Board v. Moss, 509 P.2d 666 (Okl.1973). It has been held that such a statute founded on public interest and prescribing manner in which public interests are to be performed is mandatory and cannot be waived. State v. Smith, 320 P. *2592d 719 (Okl.Cr.1958). Ordinarily a party to a contract may waive any of its provisions that are for his benefit, but when a statute contains provisions that are founded upon public policy, those to whom it applies are not permitted to waive such provisions. Spruell v. Blythe, 215 Md. 117, 137 A.2d 183 (1957), Heim v. American Alliance Ins. Co. of New York, 147 Minn. 283, 180 N.W. 225 (1920). A statutory right conferred on a private party effecting public policy may not be waived or released if such waiver or release thwarts legislative policy which it was designed to effectuate. Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 65 S.Ct. 895, 89 L.Ed. 1296 (1945). Also see Brennan v. Veterans Cleaning Service, 482 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1973).
We agree with the holding of the cases cited by the majority that parties may voluntarily waive a known right. However, none of them deal with waiver of statute. If the provision in the statute were optional and did not affect matters of public policy there would be no doubt Husband waived his right to have alimony terminated. But here we deal with judicial disregard of a statutory expression of public policy, not a waiver of an optional right. No cases are quoted to us wherein such a statutory mandate is waived.
It is the duty of courts to give effect to legislative acts, not to amend, repeal or circumvent them. Champlin Refining Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 25 F.Supp. 218 (W.D.Okl. 1938). A court is not justified in ignoring the plain words of a statute. Twaits v. State Board of Equalization, 93 Cal.App.2d 796, 210 P.2d 40 (1949); Schroder v. Kansas State Highway Commission, 199 Kan. 175, 428 P.2d 814 (1967).
Other jurisdictions support this view. In Miller v. Miller, 317 Ill.App. 447, 46 N.E.2d 102 (1943) the circumstances and statutes were nearly identical to those in our case. The Court held even though a divorce decree provided remarriage should not be a cause for modification of alimony payments, it was proper for the trial court to cancel all alimony payments because the statute made it mandatory upon the court to cancel alimony payments in all cases where recipient had remarried. The provision made a part of the decree providing that remarriage should not affect monthly payments was a nullity. See also Tomkins v. Tomkins, 89 Cal.App.2d 243, 200 P.2d 821 (1940).
We believe the reasoning of the Illinois Court to be the better view, and would reverse with instructions to terminate Wife’s alimony payments absent some showing of need on her part for their continuance, assuming timely application therefor.
I am authorized to state that HODGES, V. C. J., and LAVENDER and SIMMS, JJ., concur in the views herein expressed.