Court Opinion

ID: 9370139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-10 21:03:23.306655+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:19.713088
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 210821-U
                                         No. 1- 21-0821
                                  Order filed February 10, 2023
                                                                                    Sixth Division
 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
 limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
 ______________________________________________________________________________
                                             IN THE
                               APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                        FIRST DISTRICT
 ______________________________________________________________________________
 AMERICAN GUARANTEE AND LIABILITY                             )   Appeal from the Circuit Court
 INSURANCE COMPANY,                                           )   of Cook County, Illinois
                                                              )
        Plaintiff-Appellee,                                   )   No. 2019 CH 1639
                                                              )
    v.                                                        )   The Honorable
 EXP US SERVICES,                                             )   Allen P. Walker
                                                              )   Judge Presiding
                                                              )
        Defendant-Appellant.

        JUSTICE C.A. WALKER delivered the judgment of the court.
        Presiding Justice Mikva and Justice Oden Johnson concurred in the judgment.

                                           ORDER

       Held: The grant of summary judgment in favor of insurer is affirmed where
             insurer was an excess insurer that did not owe a duty to defend until all
             primary coverage was exhausted.

¶1     Plaintiff American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Company (AGLIC) filed a complaint

for declaratory judgment against Defendant EXP US-Services (EXP). AGLIC and EXP filed cross-

motions for summary judgment (735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2018)). The circuit court granted
No. 1- 21-0821

AGLIC’s motion for summary judgment and denied EXP’s motion to reconsider. EXP appeals

arguing the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of AGLIC. For the following

reasons we affirm.

¶2                                    I. BACKGROUND

¶3     The Illinois Department of Transportation engaged F.H. Paschen, S.N. Nielsen &

Associates, LLC (Paschen) as a general contractor and EXP as an engineering firm for construction

work on the Algonquin Bypass Project in Algonquin, Illinois. Paschen entered into a subcontract

with Arrow Road Construction Company (Arrow Road). The subcontract between Paschen and

Arrow Road provided in part:

       “Insurance to be Provided * * *

       2) Commercial General Liability Insurance

       Commercial General Liability Insurance with a single limit of not less than

       $2,000,000.00 per occurrence and $2,000,000 in the aggregate. Such insurance

       shall include a designated construction project general aggregate limit

       endorsement. Such insurance shall provide coverage for bodily injury, personal

       injury, property damage, premises and operations, explosion, collapse and

       underground hazards, products and completed operations, contractual liability,

       independent contractors, broad form property damage (including products and

       completed operations). F.H. Paschen, S.N. Nielsen & Associates LLC and its

       related entities, The Illinois Department of Transportation, EXP. shall be included

       as additional insured, with coverage no more restrictive than Insurance Services

       Office (ISO) Form Number CG 20 10 10 01 and CG 20 37 10 01. Coverage

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No. 1- 21-0821

      provided the additional insured shall be on a primary, non-contributory basis for

      any liability arising directly or indirectly from the work of the Subcontractor. If

      subcontractor has work within 50 feet of the railroad, subcontractor shall obtain

      endorsement CG 24 17 10 01 Contractual Liability Railroads, to obtain coverage

      under its General Liability Policy for work within 50 feet of railroad tracks. The

      insurance carrier shall provide a waiver of subrogation for all above listed

      additional insureds. Products/Completed Operations shall extend for two years after

      Final Completion. ***

      4) Professional Liability

      When any architects, engineers or consulting firms perform work in connection

      with the subcontract, Professional Liability Insurance shall be maintained with

      limits of $5,000,000. The policy shall have an extended reporting period of two

      years. When policies are renewed or replaced, the policy retroactive date must

      coincide with or precede start of work pursuant to the contract. ***

      8) Umbrella Liability Insurance

      This coverage is to follow the form of all primary coverage requirements as outlined

      above and shall be provided in an amount not less than ($5,000,000) each

      occurrence and annual aggregate on a per project basis excess of the underlying

      policy limits. Subcontractor must have its Umbrella/Excess insurance endorsed to

      include as an additional insured F.H. Paschen, S.N. Nielsen & Associates LLC and

      its related entities, The Illinois Department of Transportation, EXP.”

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No. 1- 21-0821

¶4     Arrow Road was required to maintain commercial general liability (CGL) insurance in the

amount of $2 million per occurrence and in the aggregate for Paschen, IDOT, and EXP as

additional insureds. Arrow Road procured the primary CGL insurance policy from BITCO General

Insurance Corporation (BITCO), effective from March 1, 2014, to March 1, 2015. Arrow Road

was also required to maintain umbrella liability insurance, with a minimum of $5,000,000 of

coverage, to follow the form of all primary coverage requirements. AGLIC issued the $5,000,000

commercial umbrella policy to Arrow Road for the effective period of March 31, 2014 to March

1, 2015.

¶5     On June 3, 2014, Paul Sitz was injured when his motorcycle struck a raised manhole in the

Algonquin Bypass construction zone. Sitz subsequently filed an action against Paschen, Arrow

Road, and EXP, among other defendants. In the first amended complaint, Sitz alleged, inter alia

negligence on the part of the named defendants. Arrow Road settled with Sitz for $225,000.

¶6     EXP was the insured on a CGL policy issued by XL Catlin (Catlin). EXP sought coverage

under the policy, but Catlin denied coverage based on a professional services exclusion.

Additionally, EXP had a claims-made professional liability insurance policy issued by "Lloyd's

Syndicate - Beazley Furlonge Group (Syndicate AFB623-2623)" (Beazley). Beazley did not

dispute coverage relating to the claims made against EXP in the Sitz lawsuit.

¶7     EXP contended that it was an additional insured under the BITCO policy because of an

endorsement entitled “Transportation Contractors Extended Liability Coverage,” that allowed

additional insureds to qualify under the policy if Arrow Road was required to declare the entity as

an additional insured. BITCO disputed EXP’s coverage under the policy and initiated a declaratory

action regarding its obligation to defend or indemnify EXP and Paschen. The issue was later

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No. 1- 21-0821

resolved in a settlement. Bitco General Ins. Corp. v. Exp Us Services, Inc., No. 2016 CH 15119,

2017 (Ill.Cir.Ct. Oct. 24, 2017). As a result of the settlement, BITCO paid $125,000 to EXP for

the Sitz settlement.

¶8     EXP also sought coverage from the AGLIC policy because the AGLIC policy identified

the BITCO policy as underlying insurance in an endorsement. EXP claimed that, because it was

an insured on the BITCO policy, it also qualified as an insured on the AGLIC policy. EXP sent

multiple letters to AGLIC seeking indemnification and defense in the Sitz lawsuit prior to the

settlement with Sitz. After the settlement with Sitz and BITCO, EXP sought the remaining $2.45

million from AGLIC. AGLIC denied coverage for the Sitz lawsuit on October 11, 2018.

¶9     On February 7, 2019, AGLIC filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against EXP and

sought a declaration that AGLIC did not owe EXP any amount in connection with the Sitz action.

AGLIC argued (1) there was not a valid assignment from Beazley to EXP regarding a right to

recovery; (2) the professional services exclusion in the AGLIC umbrella policy negates any

coverage EXP may claim; (3) the settlement payment made by Beazley was not “caused, in whole

or in part,” by Arrow Road’s conduct; and (4) the AGLIC umbrella policy is excess to the Beazley

policy. EXP denied all material allegations. AGLIC filed a motion for summary judgment, and

EXP filed a cross motion for summary judgment.

¶ 10   On March 2, 2021, the circuit court granted AGLIC’s motion for summary judgment and

denied EXP’s cross-motion. The circuit court found that the AGLIC policy was excess to the

Beazley policy, and while the court found that EXP’s liability could have been caused, in whole

or in part, by Arrow Road’s conduct, the professional services exclusion in the AGLIC policy

negates any coverage for EXP.

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No. 1- 21-0821

¶ 11   Subsequently, the circuit court denied EXP’s motion to reconsider the grant of summary

judgment in favor of AGLIC. The court declined to consider EXP’s argument that the AGLIC

policy was required to pay $1 million because the Arrow Road’s CGL policy did not meet the

requisite $2 million limit. The court reasoned that EXP failed to assert the argument earlier in the

proceedings, despite the information being available to EXP.

¶ 12   EXP now appeals.

¶ 13                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14   On appeal, EXP argues that the circuit court erred by (1) finding AGLIC’s umbrella

insurance policy provides only excess insurance coverage and was excess to EXP’s Beazley

insurance policy; (2) finding the professional services exclusion in AGLIC’s policy excluded

coverage for EXP despite allegations in the underlying Sitz lawsuit alleging EXP was liable for

non-professional services; and (3) denying EXP’s cross-motion for summary judgment. EXP also

contends that $1 million of the AGLIC policy must be treated as primary insurance coverage

because Arrow Road did not procure the $2 million CGL insurance required by the contract with

Paschen. AGLIC responds that the AGLIC policy does not provide indemnity coverage for

Beazley’s settlement payment because the payment was made to resolve a professional liability

claim against EXP. Given that the AGLIC policy contains professional services exclusions,

coverage for the payment is negated. AGLIC argues that even if some portion of the settlement

payment was conceivably covered under the AGLIC policy, the AGLIC policy would be excess

insurance to the Beazley policy for purposes and amounts paid on behalf of EXP.

¶ 15   “The construction of an insurance policy and a determination of the rights and obligations

thereunder are questions of law for the court which are appropriate subjects for disposition by way

                                               -6-
No. 1- 21-0821

of summary judgment.” Crum & Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 156 Ill.2d

384, 391 (1993). Here, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The filing of cross-

motions for summary judgment constitutes an implicit agreement between the parties that there

are no genuine issues of material fact and only a question of law is presented to the court. Rushton

v. Department of Corrections, 2019 IL 124552, ¶ 13, 160 N.E.3d 929. Summary judgment is

appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file, viewed in a light

most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveal no genuine issue of material fact and the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2020); General

Casualty Insurance Co. v. Lacey, 199 Ill. 2d 281, 284, 769 N.E.2d 18 (2002). We review the grant

of summary judgment de novo. Kajima Construction Services, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine

Insurance Co., 227 Ill. 2d 102, 106 (2007).

¶ 16   “Contracts of insurance are subject to the same rules of construction applicable to other

types of contracts.” International Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,

168 Ill. App. 3d 361, 370 (1988). While construing an insurance policy, this court’s primary

function is to ascertain and enforce the intentions of the parties as expressed in the agreement. De

Los Reyes v. Travelers Insurance Cos., 135 Ill. 2d 353, 358 (1990). “To ascertain the intent of the

parties and the meaning of the words used in the insurance policy, the court must construe the

policy as a whole, taking into account the type of insurance for which the parties have contracted,

the risks undertaken and purchased, the subject matter that is insured and the purpose of the entire

contract.” Crum & Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 156 Ill. 2d 384, 391 (1993).

¶ 17    When the terms of an insurance policy are clear and unambiguous, they are given their

plain and ordinary meaning. American States Insurance Co. v. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d 473, 479 (1997).

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No. 1- 21-0821

If the terms in a policy are susceptible to multiple meanings, the terms are considered ambiguous

and will be construed strictly against the insurer. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Krishna Schaumburg

Tan, Inc., 2021 IL 125978, ¶ 31. “Where competing reasonable interpretations of an insurance

contract exist, a court is not permitted to choose which interpretation it will follow; rather, in such

circumstances, the court must construe the insurance contract in favor of the insured and against

the insurer that drafted the contract.” Id.

¶ 18    EXP specifically claims the circuit court erred in finding that the AGLIC policy did not

apply until EXP’s Beazley policy limit was exhausted. EXP argues that the minimum insurance

coverage requirement in the contract between Arrow Road and Paschen, along with AGLIC’s and

BITCO’s policy terms, leads to a finding that Beazley’s policy is excess to AGLIC’s policy.

Furthermore, EXP argues that AGLIC’s policy should apply regardless of the professional services

exclusion because the underlying complaint was not limited to allegations of professional

negligence.

¶ 19                                          A. Waiver

¶ 20    As a preliminary matter, we address AGLIC’s claim that EXP waived any recovery claim

as Beazley’s assignee. AGLIC argues recovery was waived on two grounds. First, although Arrow

Road’s BITCO policy was required to provide primary insurance coverage of $2 million, it

provided for only $1 million of coverage. EXP failed to assert, in prior response and cross motion

to AGLIC’s motion for summary judgment, that the AGLIC policy should cover the additional $1

million in primary coverage not included in the BITCO policy. EXP argues that it cited the

subcontract in its motion for summary judgment to claim that the AGLIC policy is primary because

$1 million of the AGLIC policy will satisfy the CGL insurance required by the subcontract.

                                                 -8-
No. 1- 21-0821

However, the record shows that EXP did not argue Arrow Road failed to procure the requisite $2

million CGL coverage until EXP filed its motion to reconsider the circuit court’s summary

judgment ruling. The law is clear that issues cannot be raised for the first time before the circuit

court in a motion to reconsider, and issues raised for the first time in a motion to reconsider cannot

be raised on appeal. American Chartered Bank v. USMDS, Inc., 2013 IL App (3d) 120397, ¶ 13,

987 N.E.2d 818.

¶ 21   Lastly, AGLIC argues that because Beazley settled the claims against EXP without

contending that other carriers should have contributed to the settlement, Beazley waived recovery.

The failure of a paying insurer to reserve its rights against a nonpaying insurer may constitute a

waiver of the right to equitable remedies. Home Ins. Co. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 213 Ill. 2d 307,

326–27 (2004). Waiver can be expressed or implied, arising from acts, words, conduct, or

knowledge of the insurer. Id. at 326 An implied waiver arises when conduct of the insurer is

inconsistent with any intention other than to waive it. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Westfield

Insurance Co., 301 Ill. App. 3d 49, 53, 703 N.E.2d 439 (1998). In its reply brief, EXP argues that

Beazley did not waive any recovery claim against AGLIC because EXP “is not seeking equitable

remedies.” The basis of EXP’s argument is that EXP has demonstrated the AGLIC policy is

primary to the Beazley policy. EXP further argues that Beazley assigned its rights to EXP after

the settlement was paid, and there was no waiver. However, prior to assigning their rights to EXP

one year after settling the Sitz complaint, Beazley had not sent a reservation of rights letter in

connection with the Sitz complaint. Beazley settled the underlying case without alleging other

insurers were required to contribute. Beazley’s failure to reserve its rights against AGLIC could

constitute waiver and bar recovery for EXP as Beazley’s assignee.

                                                -9-
No. 1- 21-0821

¶ 22   Although, a party’s failure to raise an issue or argument results in waiver or forfeiture of

that issue or argument, waiver is a limitation on the parties, not the court. Cent. Illinois Light Co.

v. Home Ins. Co., 213 Ill. 2d 141, 152 (2004). Here, we choose to address the issues and arguments

raised on appeal in the interest of preserving a sound and uniform body of precedent. Id.

¶ 23                              B. Primary and Excess Coverage

¶ 24   We note the difference between a “primary” coverage insurance policy and an “excess”

coverage insurance policy. Primary insurance coverage is coverage whereby, under the terms of

the policy, liability attaches immediately upon the happening of an event that gives rise to liability.

Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Cent. Mut. Ins. Co., 2014 IL App (1st) 133145, ¶ 2.

Excess insurance coverage only attaches after the predetermined primary amount has been

exhausted, and it provides a secondary level of coverage designed to protect the insured in

situations where a judgment or settlement exceeds the primary policy limit of liability. Kajima,

227 Ill. 2d at 114 citing Roberts v. Northland Insurance Co., 185 Ill.2d 262, 275 (1998). “True”

excess coverage also known as “following form” or “specific” excess coverage, is purchased by

the insured in separate contracts that are written by design. Id at 115. An umbrella insurance policy

is a form of excess liability insurance coverage, and it may offer broader coverage than the

underlying primary carrier in some circumstances Id. “Other insurance” provisions attempt to

render a policy that otherwise would be considered “primary” as “excess,” usually with statements

declaring the insured's coverage to be excess over any other valid and collectible insurance the

insured has obtained.” (Internal quotation marks omitted) Capitol Constr. Sols., Inc. v. Selective

Ins. Co. of S.C., 2022 IL App (1st) 200808-U, ¶ 22.

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No. 1- 21-0821

¶ 25   If an insured has more than one primary insurance carrier, Illinois law grants the insured

the right to “tender defense of an action to one insurer alone,” also known as the targeted tender

rule. John Burns Construction Co. v. Indiana Insurance Co., 189 Ill. 2d 570, 578 (2000). The

targeted tender rule allows for an insured with multiple primary policies to choose one of the

carriers to defend and indemnify the insured against any claim. Kajima, 227 Ill. 2d at 107. Despite

the targeted tender rule only applying to primary coverage, we again note that “other insurance”

provisions attempt to render coverage that would otherwise be considered “primary” as “excess.”

River Valley I, LLC v. Central Insurance Companies, 396 Ill. App. 3d 480, 487 (2009).

       “Other insurance clauses came about in response to the targeted tender doctrine. [Citation.]

       The targeted tender doctrine allows an insured who is covered by multiple and concurrent

       primary insurance policies to select, or target, which insurer he wants to defend and

       indemnify him regarding a specific claim. The insured essentially can choose which insurer

       among his several co-insurers will participate in the claim against him; he can elect one

       insurer over another, or, even deactivate coverage with an insurer he previously selected in

       order to invoke exclusive coverage with another. This allows an insured who has paid for

       multiple forms of coverage to protect his interests, namely, keeping future premiums low,

       optimizing loss history and preventing policy cancellation among the insurers he chooses.”

       In an effort to override the right of the insured to choose among co-insurers, insurers

       developed "other insurance" excess provisions in their policies. These provisions attempt

       to render otherwise primary insurance as excess over any other collectible insurance, most

       often with statements in the policy that declare the insurer's coverage to be excess over any

       other valid and collectible insurance available to the insured. In such instances, the other

                                              - 11 -
No. 1- 21-0821

       insurance excess provision requires the insured to exhaust the policy limits of the other co-

       insurers before being able to trigger a defense and indemnification duty in that insurer. Id.

¶ 26   Here, EXP argues that AGLIC’s other insurance provision acted as a primary policy when

Arrow Road’s agreement with Paschen required $2 million in CGL coverage, and the BITCO

policy accounted for only $1 million of the CGL coverage. EXP contends Coverage A insured

damages in excess of the BITCO policy and the Other Insurance Provision states the AGLIC is the

primary policy. In response, AGLIC argues that EXP’s recovery is barred by the doctrine of

horizontal exhaustion, neither AGLIC’s “other insurance” provision nor the Arrow Road

subcontract establish that AGLIC is responsible for primary coverage, and the Beazley policy is a

primary policy that attempts to become an excess policy by including an “other insurance”

provision.

¶ 27   To support their argument, AGLIC cites North River Ins. Co. v. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance

Co., 369 Ill. App. 3d 563 (1st Dist. 2006). In North River, a subcontractor listed as an additional

insured, brought an action claiming the named insured was obligated to contribute to the settlement

because the subcontract required the named insurer to provide CGL coverage that was primary

and umbrella coverage for the additional insured. Id at 566-568. The additional insured argued that

the umbrella coverage was meant to provide coverage that was primary and dropped below the

additional insured’s own CGL policy. The court held that nothing in the subcontractor agreement

could be construed as requiring the excess coverage to be exhausted before the additional insured’s

CGL coverage. Id at 570.

¶ 28   Similar to the additional insured in North River, EXP has failed to demonstrate where the

subcontract indicates the umbrella coverage was required to drop down below the primary policies

                                              - 12 -
No. 1- 21-0821

maintained by additional insureds. AGLIC’s excess policy is entitled “Coverage A - Excess Follow

Form Liability Insurance.” The policy provides:

       “Under Coverage A, we will pay on behalf of the insured, those damages covered

       by this insurance in excess of the total applicable limits of underlying insurance.

       With respect to Coverage A, this policy includes:

                1.    The terms and conditions of underlying insurance to the extent

                      such terms and conditions are not inconsistent or do not conflict

                      with the terms and conditions referred to in Paragraph 2 below;

                      and

                2.    The terms and conditions that apply to Coverage A of this policy.

                      Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained above, if

                      underlying insurance does not apply to such damages, for reasons

                      other than exhaustion of applicable limits of insurance by payment

                      of loss, then Coverage A does not apply to such damages.” (C 41)

¶ 29   AGLIC’s other insurance provision states:

       “If other insurance applies to damages that are also covered by this policy, this

       policy will apply excess of the other insurance. However, this provision will not

       apply:

                a.    If the other insurance is written to be excess of this policy; or

                b.    With respect to Coverage A only, if the named insured has agreed

                      in a written contract to carry insurance to apply prior to and be

                      non­contributory with that of another person or organization's

                                              - 13 -
No. 1- 21-0821

                      insurance, but only as respect to damages arising out of the insured

                      operations or work on behalf of the named insured performed

                      under such written contract. The limits available to the other

                      person or organization will be the lesser of the policy limits or the

                      minimum limits required by such written contract. In that case,

                      other insurance of that person or organization will apply as excess

                      and not contribute prior to the insurance afforded by this policy.

                      Nothing herein will be construed to make this policy subject to the

                      terms, conditions and limitations of such other insurance.”

¶ 30   “An examination of the premiums generally charged for umbrella coverage * * * reflects

an intent that umbrella policies serve a different function. [Citation] [E]xcess premiums are lower

because excess coverage is, by its very nature, not supposed to be triggered until the underlying

policy has been exhausted up to its limits. [Citation.]” Kajima 227 Ill. 2d 102, 116 (2007). Arrow

Road maintained a CGL policy with BITCO and an umbrella policy with AGLIC. The subcontract

required that the CGL coverage have limits of $2 million and umbrella coverage with limits of $5

million. Under Kajima, there is a presumption that the umbrella policy is true excess. Id.

¶ 31   Furthermore, the BITCO policy stated that “coverage provided to the additional insured

shall be on a primary, non-contributory basis,” but the AGLIC policy did not have such a provision.

EXP is asking this court to find the “other insurance” provision in the AGLIC policy to be evidence

that AGLIC was required to provide primary coverage, but we find the provisions in the Beazley

policy more significant. Beazley’s policy contains a provision titled “Defense, Settlement, And

Investigation of Claims.” The provision states that Beazley has “the right and the duty to defend

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No. 1- 21-0821

*** any claim against the insured seeking damages which are payable under the terms of this

policy.” Beazley has an “other insurance” provision that states:

       “This Insurance shall apply in excess of:

        A. any other valid and collectible insurance available to any Insured, including,

       but not limited to, any project specific professional liability and/or contractors

       pollution liability insurance; and

       B. any self insured retention or deductible portion thereof

       unless such other insurance is written only as specific excess insurance over the

       Limit of Liability of this Policy”.

¶ 32   We find this court’s analysis in Capitol Constr. Sols., Inc. v. Selective Ins. Co. of S.C., 2022

IL App (1st) 200808-U, instructive. In Capitol, a contractor sought defense from a subcontractor’s

insurer after a workplace injury. Id ¶6-11. The insurer refused to tender a defense, and

subsequently another subcontractor’s insurer accepted defense on the contractor’s behalf. Id ¶11-

12. The contractor filed suit seeking an order declaring the initial subcontractor’s insurer breached

its duty to defend and indemnify the contractor. Id ¶13. The circuit court entered an order granting

summary judgment in favor of the subcontractor’s insurer. Id ¶14. On appeal, this court held that

the targeted tender rule did not allow the contractor to tender its defense to an insurer that only

provided excess coverage. The court analyzed the subcontract at issue and found that the

subcontract only required the subcontractor’s insurer to provide excess coverage. Id ¶37.

¶ 33   Like the subcontract in Capitol, the subcontract here required AGLIC to provide umbrella

liability insurance, and the language in the subcontract does not require the umbrella coverage to

serve as primary insurance. Instead, the subcontract stated the umbrella coverage will follow the

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No. 1- 21-0821

form of the primary coverage and “shall be *** excess of the underlying policy limits.” Following

Illinois case law, we find that the AGLIC policy was “true” excess coverage and was not required

to provide primary insurance coverage based on either Arrow Road’s failure to procure the

requisite $2 million CGL coverage or Beasley’s settlement of claims against EXP.

¶ 34   Having determined that the AGLIC policy was a “true” excess insurance policy providing

no coverage until all primary policies are exhausted, we do not need to address EXP’s argument

that the circuit court erred in finding the professional services exclusion negated coverage for EXP.

¶ 35                                    III. CONCLUSION

¶ 36   For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court granting AGLIC’s motion for

summary judgment and denying EXP’s cross motion for summary judgment is affirmed.

¶ 37   Affirmed.

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