Court Opinion

ID: 9861446
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 00:03:02.494689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:28:29.304613
License: Public Domain

KAUFMAN, J.
I concur in the well-reasoned opinion authored by Mr. Justice McDaniel, but in view of appeal to consumerism in the result-oriented dissenting opinion, I think it appropriate to emphasize a point or two mentioned but perhaps not fully developed in the majority opinion.
In the first place, what is at stake here is the right of a party to limit the controversies in respect to which the prevailing party will be entitled to recover attorney fees. Although the dissent would answer “no,” it does not cite a single authority or give any persuasive reason why the liberty of private parties to contract should be so restricted.
Secondly, everyone agrees that the purpose of Civil Code section 1717 is to transmute a unilateral provision for recovery of attorney fees into a reciprocal one. (Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 124, 128 [158 Cal.Rptr. 1, 599 P.2d 83].) So the question that has to be answered before it can legitimately be concluded that plaintiffs here are entitled to attorney fees under section 1717 is whether the defendant contractor would have been entitled to tecover attorney fees under the contract had plaintiffs not prevailed.
There is an apparent tendency to consider contractors “bad” guys and consumers “good” guys, and had the contractor prevailed below and sought attorney fees from plaintiffs, I am virtually certain that the author of the dissent would have enthusiastically applauded the “restrictive interpretation” of the attorney fee provision adopted by the majority and now roundly criticized by him, for the result would have been to deny the contractor any such recovery.
The irony is that by concluding that plaintiffs here have a reciprocal right under Civil Code section 1717 to recover attorney fees, the dissent necessarily indicates that in a future case involving a like attorney fee provision, the contractor would be entitled to recover attorney fees from the “consumer” should the latter not prevail at trial. Thus, the effect of the holding proposed by the dissent would not be to help “poor” consumers, but to enlarge the liability of both parties for attorney fees beyond what they agreed to. Such was never the legislative intent.
*454The determination of the trial court was correct and is properly affirmed.