Court Opinion

ID: 9556230
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-16 16:09:25.238339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:38.948608
License: Public Domain

J-S22034-23

    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    IN RE: T.S., A MINOR                       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: K.S., MOTHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 365 WDA 2023

                 Appeal from the Decree Entered March 15, 2023
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County
                   Orphans’ Court at CP-03-DP-0000015-2022

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                          FILED: August 16, 2023

       K.S. (Mother) appeals from the decree granting the petition of

Armstrong County Children, Youth and Family Services (CYF) to involuntarily

terminate her parental rights to T.S. (Child).1 We affirm.

       The orphans’ court recounted the following case history:

           [Child] was born [] February [], 2021, at Armstrong County
       Memorial Hospital (“ACMH”).

             Mother and Father were the parents of another son; their
       parental rights to [the other son] were involuntarily terminated in
       2017[,] due to the parents’ living conditions and mental health
       issues, and their lack of progress on the goals outlined in the
       family service plan provided to them.
____________________________________________

1 Child’s father, D.S. (Father) “passed away on September 20, 2021, after
[Child] was taken into protective custody, but before the filing of the
[termination] petition.” Orphans’ Court Findings and Memorandum, 3/15/23,
at 1. In discussing Mother’s appeal, the orphans’ court notes that it “mentions
[Father’s] diagnoses to illustrate one of the reasons various services were
initiated and continued to be offered to Mother.” Id. at 3 n.2.
J-S22034-23

           On February 11, 2021, due to the fact that Mother’s parental
     rights to another child had been terminated, CYF filed an
     Application for Emergency Protective Custody of [Child], which the
     [c]ourt granted. The [c]ourt entered a Shelter Care Order on
     February 16, 2021, and adjudicated [Child] dependent on May 26,
     2021. [Child] was placed into kinship care with his maternal
     grandparents, where he continues to reside.

          Mother and Father at the time lived in a trailer found to be
     unsafe. Mother did not secure other housing until March 2022.

          A permanency plan was put in place, and CYF referred
     Mother to Dr. Carol Patterson for Psychological and Parenting
     Assessments.

           On    March    11,    2021,    Dr.   Patterson   conducted
     Psychological/Parenting Assessments on Mother and Father. She
     administered standard tests, and read everything to Mother to
     insure she understood. She diagnosed Mother with Bipolar I
     Disorder and concluded that all factors placed Mother at risk with
     regard to her ability to parent a child.       ... Dr. Patterson
     recommended that Mother receive mental health services, a
     psychiatric evaluation, and parenting services.

             In late February 2021, Mother began receiving services with
     Alternative Community Engagement Solutions (“ACES”). Those
     services consisted of parenting instruction and conducting
     supervised visits between Mother and [Child]; the services were
     initially provided at CYF’s offices, but were later held at Mother’s
     residence. Services were fully supervised until May 17, 2022, and
     were then provided several times a week for short amounts of
     time. ACES services continued to December 6, 2022.

           Teaching Mother parenting skills consisted of a nurturing
     packet and a parenting packet. The nurturing packet consisted of
     hands-on parenting instruction, such as telling Mother to change
     [Child’s] diaper and wiping food from [Child’s] face. The parenting
     packet consisted of different scenarios and ways of dealing with
     things like stressful days. Some sections of the parenting packet
     required a choice between true and false, and Mother would often
     answer “both.” During one incident on July 14, 2022, Mother was
     asked to choose between true and false, but broke down. [The
     ACES parenting instructor,] Ms. Hauser[,] would not have

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     expected that reaction almost a year after ACES began providing
     services.

           Mother exhibited progress in fulfilling [Child’s] emotional
     needs [to feel] loved and secure. The most concerning thing to
     Ms. Hauser was Mother’s very black-and-white thinking and
     Mother’s [in]ability to make decisions under pressure.        Ms.
     Hauser’s initial concern was that if anything medical came up with
     [Child] and Mother had to make a snap decision, whether Mother
     would be able to do that.

           Ms. Hauser was at Mother’s residence a number of times
     from July to October 2022. She would walk through the entire
     residence; Mother had safety gates and electrical covers in place.
     However, Ms. Hauser had cleanliness concerns. Over time, Ms.
     Hauser observed clutter, cat throw-up on the floor, dried food all
     over the stovetop, sinks and counters full of dirty dishes, and
     garbage on the kitchen floor. She also smelled cat urine. Ms.
     Hauser discussed these concerns with Mother and recommended
     getting more litter boxes and using baking soda to soak up the
     odor. Mother expressed cooperation and a willingness to do those
     things, but she never did. At one point the cat urine smell was so
     prominent that Ms. Hauser asked Mother to clean the carpet;
     Mother did so.

            Ms. Hauser testified that Mother had received “the whole
     gamut” of services available to anyone in Mother’s situation. After
     a year of services, Ms. Hauser would expect Mother to be able to
     multitask, keep the kitchen and bathroom clean, and provide for
     [C]hild’s needs. Mother’s decision making was a concern, such as
     whether she should give [Child] baby food or what he should eat
     for a snack. Several times Mother would call her own mother first
     for her opinion or suggestion.

          As noted in her ending report of November 11, 2022, Ms.
     Hauser observed a number of troubling conditions in Mother’s
     home during the review period from July through October 2022.
     …

Orphans’ Court Findings and Memorandum, 3/15/23, at 2-6 (paragraph

numbers and footnotes omitted).

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J-S22034-23

      On November 21, 2022, CYF filed a petition to terminate Mother’s

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (5), (8) and (b). The

orphans’ court held hearings on February 17 and 28, 2023. By decree entered

March 15, 2023, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (5), (8) and (b).

      Mother timely filed a notice of appeal and concise statement of matters

complained of on appeal.      The orphans’ court stated that “[b]ased upon

[Mother’s]   Concise   Statement,    the   court   reiterates   its   Findings   and

Memorandum filed on March 15, 2023, in support of its decision.”                 Rule

1925(a) Memorandum, 3/30/23.

      Mother presents the following questions for review:

      I. Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion, and err as a matter
      of law[,] as [CYF] failed to present clear and convincing evidence
      supporting termination of parental rights?

      II. Did the [orphans’] court err in determining it is in the Child’s
      best interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights?

Mother’s Brief at 7.

      In considering Mother’s issues,

      our standard of review requires [this Court to] accept the findings
      of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are
      supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported,
      appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an
      error of law or abused its discretion. As has been often stated, an
      abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing
      court might have reached a different conclusion. Instead, a
      decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon
      demonstration     of     manifest   unreasonableness,      partiality,
      prejudice, bias, or ill-will.

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      [T]here are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion
      standard of review in these cases. We [have] observed that,
      unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the
      fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial
      judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and
      often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child
      and parents. Therefore, even where the facts could support an
      opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and
      termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to
      second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility
      determinations and judgment; instead, we must defer to the trial
      judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record
      and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of
      law or an abuse of discretion.

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted).

      CYF has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that its

asserted grounds for termination are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276

(Pa. Super. 2009). “[T]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined

as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the

trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of

the precise facts in issue.” Id. Under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, “the court must

engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental rights.” In re

L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007).       Initially, the focus is on the

conduct of the parent pursuant to Section 2511(a). Id.

                               Section 2511(a)

      Mother challenges the termination of her rights under Section

2511(a)(1), (5), and (8).     This Court need only agree “as to any one

subsection in order to affirm the termination of parental rights.” In re A.S.,

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11 A.3d 473, 478 (Pa. Super. 2010).        Accordingly, we address subsection

(a)(5), which provides for termination when:

      The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the
      court … for a period of at least six months, the conditions which
      led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the
      parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a
      reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably
      available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions
      which led to the removal or placement of the child within a
      reasonable period of time and termination of the parental rights
      would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5).

      Termination “under Section 2511(a)(5) requires that: (1) the child has

been removed from parental care for at least six months; (2) the conditions

which led to removal and placement of the child continue to exist; and (3)

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the

child.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).

      The statute permitting the termination of parental rights outlines
      certain irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents
      must provide for their children, and a parent who cannot or will
      not meet the requirements within a reasonable time following
      intervention by the state may properly be considered unfit and
      have his parental rights terminated.

Id. (citation omitted).

      Mother concedes that Child has been removed from her care for more

than six months. However, Mother argues

      no evidence was presented to substantiate that the conditions that
      led to the removal or placement continue to exist, that [Mother]
      will not remedy those conditions in a reasonable time, and the
      services or assistance available will not remedy the conditions that

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      led to removal. By the time termination was filed … Mother had
      changed housing to a suitable home and likewise had sought and
      continued to participate in mental health treatment. Although it
      would appear that Mother had a backslide in November of 2022,
      all the prior reports reflect that Mother had made substantial
      strides and had the ability to continue in making more strides with
      the proper support in place. Perhaps most importantly, the
      parental bond with the Child appears to be strong. The testimony
      … reflects that even CYF’s own witnesses testified that Mother
      clearly loved the Child and was bonded to the Child, Mother
      maintained almost all visits, Mother clearly took direction from all
      parties and tried her best to complete all tasks and goals.

Mother’s Brief at 25-26.

      CYF counters, “Each of the findings of fact made by the [o]rphans’ court

were supported by the evidence of record and the application of the law was

appropriate to the facts.” CYF’s Brief at 8. CYF observes that despite Mother

moving to a new residence, “there remain ongoing concerns about the

condition of the home,” which reflect “issues that continue to exist concerning

[M]other’s ability to maintain a safe and clean home for [C]hild.” Id. at 14-

15. According to CYF, “Parenting was another issue that led to the placement

of [C]hild and despite services being provided by ACES and Justice Works[,]

this issue continues to exist.”     Id. at 15 (citing testimony from three

psychologists: Carol Patterson, M.Ed., Dr. Carolyn Menta, and Dr. Douglas

Della Toffalo). CYF also asserts that Mother continues to experience mental

health issues.   Id. at 16-17 (referencing Dr. Della Toffolo’s diagnoses and

opinions). Thus, CYF avers Mother “cannot or will not remedy the situation

that led to the placement of [Child] within a reasonable amount of time,” such

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that termination would best serve Child’s needs and welfare. Id. at 17, 19.

See also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5).2

       The record supports termination under Section 2511(a)(5). The court

granted CYF protective custody of Child shortly after Child’s birth in February

2021, and placed Child with his maternal grandparents, where he continues

to live. CYF provided Mother with a parenting plan and a variety of services,

with minimal success.         In November 2022, CYF petitioned to terminate

Mother’s parental rights.

       At the termination hearing, Dr. Della Toffalo testified to conducting an

initial neuropsychological evaluation of Mother in February 2022, and a

supplemental evaluation in July 2022. N.T., 2/17/23, at 8; Petitioner’s Exhibit

3.   Dr. Della Toffalo explained that “a neuropsychological evaluation goes

above and beyond the typical psychological evaluations … to assess more in

depth … specific cognitive functions.” Id. at 11. Dr. Della Toffalo addressed

Mother’s “parenting deficiencies,” which include an IQ of 92, “in the very lower

limit of the average range,” autism, and resistance to change. Id. at 14, 19.

Dr. Della Toffalo opined that Mother “could not overcome the deficiencies in

the eight- or nine-month period” between the evaluation and the termination

hearing. Id. at 19, 32. He expressed

____________________________________________

2 Child’s guardian ad litem (GAL), Paula C. LaStrapes, Esquire, stated her
agreement “with the Findings of the trial court,” and “the Counter-Statement
of the Case of” CYF. Participant Brief at 3.

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      concern about parenting skill development and even outpatient
      counseling meant to slowly develop or to improve her insight, self-
      monitoring, her ability to interpret gray areas and be less rigid in
      her thought processes, that is a very long-term type of process.

Id. at 32-33. Dr. Della Toffalo concluded “there is not a good prognosis for a

substantial improvement in those skills.” Id. at 33.

      Jillian Hauser, a “recovery specialist” with ACES, testified that between

May 2021 and December 2022, she provided Mother with parenting instruction

and supervised Mother’s visits with Child. Id. at 61. Specifically, Ms. Hauser

“supervised visits between [Mother] and [Child] two times a week for two

hours … and [provided parenting] instruction with [Mother] for at least one

hour a week.” Id. Although Ms. Hauser did not doubt Mother’s love for Child,

she stated her concern that Mother remained unable to provide for Child’s

“physical needs, the simple shelter, clothing, food, water, stuff like that….”

Id. at 69.

      After Ms. Hauser’s services ended in December 2022, Mother agreed to

receive additional parenting services from Justice Works Youth Care. Id. at

69, 81. Brittany Marshall, who is a family resource specialist, testified she

“was informed by the previous caseworker that a parenting program had just

ended and [CYF] wanted to give [Mother] a chance at yet another parenting

program.” Id. at 82. Ms. Marshall began working with Mother on December

9, 2022, and continued to do so through the time of the termination hearing

in February 2023. Id. at 83. Ms. Marshall prepared a written summary of her

services, in which she wrote that Mother “has struggled to comprehend what

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was being taught and would repeatedly inform [Ms. Marshall] that she took

[the instruction] in a different way or misread [Ms. Marshall’s] question.” Id.

at 85; Petitioner’s Exhibit 5.

      Based in part on the above evidence, the orphans’ court concluded that

Child had been removed from Mother’s care for at least six months; the

conditions which led to Child’s removal and placement continued to exist; and

termination would best serve Child’s needs and welfare. See In re Z.P., 994

A.2d at 1118 (discussing termination § 2511(a)(5)).        The orphans’ court

explained:

            CYF removed [Child, who was just a few days old,] from
      Mother’s care on February 12, 2021[.] [Child] was removed …
      because Mother’s home was unsafe, and she had not progressed
      in addressing her mental health issues that had been ongoing and
      had been a factor in the 2017 termination of her rights to another
      son. Since CYF obtained protective custody of [Child],
      Mother has continued to receive mental health services
      from multiple providers, without significant progress, and
      she has continued to live in conditions unsuitable for a
      child.

            CYF had developed a permanency plan, and referred Mother
      to Carol Patterson, a psychologist, for Psychological and Parenting
      Assessments. Dr. Patterson conducted her evaluation on March
      11, 2021, and recommended that Mother receive mental health
      services, a psychiatric evaluation, and parenting services.

            As early as March 2021, Dr. Patterson diagnosed Mother
      with Bipolar I Disorder and concluded that all factors placed
      Mother at risk with regard to her ability to parent a child. Several
      providers commented on Mother’s rigid thinking and questioned
      whether she could make decisions under pressure.

            Furthermore, Dr. Menta had significant concerns about
      Mother being easily manipulated and having limited protective
      capacity. Dr. Menta’s concerns are similar to those expressed by

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      Dr. [Della] Toffalo, who said that autistic individuals such as
      Mother are extremely naive, and are at great risk for being in
      situations where they can be victimized — they can miss signs of
      “stranger danger.” The [c]ourt is troubled by this profile of
      Mother, considering that a parent’s job is to protect their children.

            Also troubling to the [c]ourt are the observations of various
      service providers of the conditions of Mother’s home. No child
      should reside in a home filled with extreme clutter, cat feces and
      vomit, odor of cat urine, dried-up food on the stove and garbage
      on the kitchen floor (these conditions are depicted in the
      photographs taken … in October 2022). Despite being advised to
      purchase more litter boxes and apply baking soda to soak up the
      urine odor, Mother never did so.

           After more than two years of [Child’s] placement in
      protective custody, the conditions which led to his
      placement continue to this day. As Ms. Hauser testified,
      Mother had received “the whole gamut” of services available to
      anyone in Mother’s situation.

            Because of Mother’s failure to remedy the deficiencies
      in her living conditions and her little to no progress in
      addressing her mental health issues, termination of
      Mother’s parental rights would best serve [Child’s] needs
      and welfare. Since he was taken into protective custody,
      [Child] has been in the custody of his maternal
      grandparents. The maternal grandparents have provided good
      care to [Child]. All of [Child’s] needs, including food, shelter,
      getting to all his doctors’ appointments, are being met.

Orphans’ Court Findings and Memorandum, 3/15/23, at 17-19 (emphasis

added).

      We must defer to trial judges when factual findings are supported by

the record. In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. As the orphans’

court did not err or abuse its discretion, termination of Mother’s parental rights

under Section 2511(a)(5) was proper.

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                               Section 2511(b)

      In her second issue, Mother argues the trial court erred in terminating

her parental rights under Section 2511(b), which requires the court “give

primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs

and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Mother emphasizes she

“maintained almost all visits with Child,” and states that “it would appear []

all service providers testified that Mother had a positive bond with the Child.”

Mother’s Brief at 28. Mother further claims: “Critically lacking in this case is

evidence from any licensed professional regarding the strength of the bond

between [M]other and [C]hild and the effect [] termination of that bond would

have on [C]hild.” Id.

      CYF asserts that “there is ample clear and convincing evidence” of

termination serving Child’s “developmental, physical and emotional needs and

welfare.” CYF’s Brief at 19. CYF observes that Child’s needs are being met in

his foster placement with maternal grandparents, where Child has lived “for

over two years and essentially since birth,” along with his brother, “who was

adopted by the maternal grandparents.” Id. at 19-20. CYF also references

evidence that Child’s “primary attachment is to the maternal grandparents.”

See id. at 20. We agree that the evidence supports termination under Section

2511(b).

      When the court determines a parent’s conduct warrants termination

pursuant to Section 2511(a), it must then “engage in the second part of

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the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and

welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child.” In re

L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007). The “extent of any [parental]

bond analysis ... necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular

case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 763 (Pa. 2008). In addition to a bond

examination,

     the trial court can equally emphasize the safety needs of
     the child, and should also consider the intangibles, such as the
     love, comfort, security, and stability the child might have with the
     foster parent.

In re A.S., 11 A.3d at 483 (emphasis added).

     Here, CYF caseworker Maria Boltz testified to observing Child in his pre-

adoptive foster home with maternal grandparents. Ms. Boltz confirmed Child

was two years old and had lived with maternal grandparents, as well as his

brother, “the entire time.” N.T., 2/17/23, at 105. She stated:

     All of [Child’s] needs are being met, [such as] food, shelter, [and]
     getting to all of his doctors’ appointments. Grandma makes sure
     she has everything scheduled, ready to go and knows what’s going
     on.

Id. at 93. Ms. Boltz had no concerns about maternal grandparents adopting

Child. Id. at 106.

     Mother testified she lives “a few blocks down” from maternal

grandparents, and still sees her older son, who her parents adopted. Id. at

162. Mother is not employed, and collects disability “due to bipolar … [and]

autism ….” Id. at 160-61.

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     After Mother testified, Child’s GAL addressed the court. The GAL stated:

           Your Honor, I have watched this case for quite a long time,
     throughout [Mother’s] first child’s termination and through this
     time period of two years for [Child]. … [I]t does seem that
     [M]other loves her children, loves [Child]. But for whatever
     reasons, [Mother] doesn’t seem to be able to change things, [and]
     be able to put [Child] first, do things that she needs to do to make
     sure everything is taken care of for [Child].

                                     ***

            As far as [whether termination is] in [Child’s] best interest,
     I would say that it would be. He has been in the home of his
     grandparents, along with his sibling, for his entire life, for his two
     years, and he has fit in. He’s comfortable there. He’s always been
     well taken care of. He doesn’t have any issues there ….

N.T., 2/28/23, at 165-66.

     Consistent with the foregoing evidence, the orphans’ court concluded

Child’s needs and welfare were best served by terminating Mother’s parental

rights. The court explained:

     Mother has limited decision-making capacity, difficulty
     interpreting social cues, is vulnerable, and can miss signs of
     “stranger danger.” Mother has difficulty understanding a child’s
     progress or growth, a crucial skill for a parent, especially the
     mother of a two-year-old.

            Moreover, despite being counseled many times on
     unsanitary and unsafe living conditions, Mother has failed to follow
     through on suggestions for remedying those conditions. Mother
     simply does not recognize the health and safety risks to a child
     living in such a household.

           [Child] was placed with his maternal grandparents from the
     beginning. They meet all of [Child’s] needs, including providing
     food, shelter, and seeing that he gets medical care when needed.
     After Mother’s rights to her older son were terminated, the
     maternal grandparents adopted him, and they would like to adopt

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     [Child]. Raising [Child] in a clean, loving home with his older
     brother can only benefit [Child].

Orphans’ Court Findings and Memorandum, 3/15/23, at 20-21.

     Our review reveals no error or abuse of discretion by the trial court in

terminating Mother’s parental rights under Section 2511(b). Accordingly, we

affirm decree terminating Mother’s parental rights.

     Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/16/2023

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