Court Opinion

ID: 9764911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:43:32.286717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:02.238730
License: Public Domain

HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Because the majority incorrectly analyzes the recent amendments to OCGA § 48-5-41 (d) and fails to rely upon the plain language of the current statute in reaching its result, I must respectfully dissent.
1. OCGA § 48-5-41 (a) (4) provides that “[a]ll institutions of purely public charity” are exempt from ad valorem property taxes in Georgia. This Court has held that
[i]n determining whether property qualifies as an institution of “purely public charity” as set forth in OCGA § 48-5-41 (a) (4), three factors must be considered and must coexist. First, the owner must be an institution devoted entirely to charitable pursuits; second, the charitable pursuits of the owner must be for the benefit of the public; and third, the use of the property must be exclusively devoted to those charitable pursuits.
York Rite Bodies of Freemasonry of Savannah v. Bd. of Equalization of Chatham County, 261 Ga. 558 (2) (408 SE2d 699) (1991). Recent amendments to OCGA § 48-5-41 (d) have attempted to clarify the effect that income generated by property claimed to be exempt pursuant to OCGA § 48-5-41 (a) (4) has on the property’s status as either taxable or tax exempt. In November 2006, the following statewide referendum question was posed:
Shall the Act be approved which grants an exemption from ad valorem taxation on property owned by a charitable institution which generates income when that income is used exclusively for the operation of such charitable institution?
*400Ga. L. 2006, p. 377, § 2. Voter approval resulted in the amendment of OCGA § 48-5-41 (d) (the “2006 amendment”), effective January 1, 2007, to add the following as subsection (d) (2):
With respect to [OCGA § 48-5-41 (a) (4)], real estate or buildings which are owned by a charitable institution that is exempt from taxation under Section 501 (c) (3) of the federal Internal Revenue Code and used by such charitable institution for the charitable purposes of such charitable institution may be used for the purpose of securing income so long as such income is used exclusively for the operation of that charitable institution.
Ga. L. 2006 at 377, § 1. However, OCGA § 48-5-41 (d) (2) was subsequently amended by the General Assembly (the “2007 amendment”), effective May 23, 2007, as follows:1
With respect to [OCGA § 48-5-41 (a) (4)], a building which is owned by a charitable institution that is otherwise qualified as a purely public charity and that is exempt from taxation under Section 501 (c) (3) of the federal Internal Revenue Code and which building is used by such charitable institution exclusively for the charitable purposes of such charitable institution, and not more than 15 acres of land on which such building is located, may be used for the purpose of securing income so long as such income is used exclusively for the operation of that charitable institution.
(Emphasis supplied.) Ga. L. 2007, p. 341, §§ 1, 2. The emphasized changes are critical in that they plainly restrict the circumstances under which income-generating property will be exempt from taxation. They are also noteworthy in that they, in essence, encompass the provisions of York Rite, supra, 261 Ga. at 558 (2).2
The majority errs by addressing the separate 2006 and 2007 amendments to OCGA § 48-5-41 (d) as if they are one, Maj. Op. at 382, and by relying on the preamble to the 2007 amendment in an attempt to rebut the presumption that the addition of words therein *401was intended to effect a change in the law. Maj. Op. at 384; see East Georgia Land and Dev. Co. v. Baker, 286 Ga. 551, 553 (2) (690 SE2d 145) (2010) (“it is fundamental that the preamble or caption of an act is no part thereof and cannot control the plain meaning of the body of the act”).
2. As this Court has recently reiterated, “where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, judicial construction is not only unnecessary but forbidden.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Anthony v. American General Financial Svcs., 287 Ga. 448, 450 (1) (a) (697 SE2d 166) (2010). See also Telecom*USA v. Collins, 260 Ga. 362, 363-364 (1) (393 SE2d 235) (1990) (“golden rule” of statutory construction requires Court to follow literal language of statute unless it produces contradiction, absurdity or such an inconvenience as to insure that the legislature meant something else). The majority points to no ambiguity or conflict in the language of OCGA § 48-5-41.
The plain language of OCGA § 48-5-41 (d) (2) provides that property subject to the tax exemption for “institutions of purely public charity” may be used to secure income only if the following criteria are all met:
(1) the property is owned by a Section 501 (c) (3) charitable institution that is otherwise qualified as a purely public charity;
(2) the property is used by such charitable institution exclusively for the charitable purposes of such charitable institution; and
(3) such income is used exclusively for the operation of that charitable institution.
Pretermitting whether the first and third criteria have been met here, I agree with the Court of Appeals that the Foundation has failed to show that the Nugi’s Space property is used exclusively for its charitable purposes. See York Rite, supra, 261 Ga. at 559 (2) (a) (facts of each case must be viewed as a whole and property owner has the burden of proving entitlement to tax exemption).
Although there may be only limited circumstances under which a given use of property is both income-generating and “for the charitable purposes of [the] charitable institution,” OCGA § 48-5-41 (d) (2), I would recognize that the two need not be mutually exclusive. As this case demonstrates, Nugi’s Space obtains income from several sources that might be considered consistent with its purpose of providing a safe haven for musicians and others to gather, e.g., the receipt of donations at its coffee bar, the sale of limited music *402supplies, and the rental of rehearsal space.3 However, providing a venue for private birthday parties and wedding receptions cannot be viewed as advancing the Foundation’s mission. I would reject the Foundation’s argument that these events are consistent with its charitable purposes in that they serve to further “destigmatize” Nugi’s Space, as this stretches the definition of such purposes to include almost any use of the property. Because the Nugi’s Space property is not used by the Foundation exclusively for its charitable purposes, I would hold that the property is not entitled to exemption from ad valorem taxation and would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Decided November 8, 2010
Reconsideration denied December 14, 2010.
Timmons, Warnes & Anderson, James C. Warnes II, for appellant.
William C. Berryman, Jr., Amy S. Gellins, for appellee.
In briefs filed in support of the Foundation, amici argue that affirming the Court of Appeals would have “catastrophic” consequences for countless charitable organizations throughout Georgia, rendering many unable to continue their valuable work.4 However, the Legislature in its wisdom chose to amend OCGA § 48-5-41 (d) (2) in 2007 to restrict the circumstances under which income-generating property will be tax exempt, and I would hold that the Court is “constrained by the language of the statute to reach this result.” Beneke v. Parker, 285 Ga. 733, 735 (684 SE2d 243) (2009). Accordingly, I dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justices Benharn and Hines join in this dissent.
*403Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, Stanley S. Jones, Jr., Sarah A. Whalin, amici curiae.

 A law reducing or repealing an exemption granted to institutions of purely public charity need only be approved by two-thirds of the members of each branch of the General Assembly. Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. VII, Sec. II, Par. IV.

 Specifically, the requirement that the charitable organization itself be qualified as a purely public charity tracks the language of the first two York Rite factors, i.e., that the property owner be an institution devoted entirely to charitable pursuits and that those charitable pursuits be for the benefit of the public. The requirement that the organization’s property be used exclusively for its charitable purposes tracks that of the third York Rite factor.

 I disagree with the Court of Appeals to the extent it held that the rental of rehearsal space within the Nugi’s Space facility constitutes a use that is inconsistent with the charitable purposes of the Foundation. The Court relied in part on Cobb County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Marietta Educational Garden Center, 239 Ga. App. 740 (2) (521 SE2d 892) (1999), which predates OCGA § 48-5-41 (d) (2), citing it for the proposition that the rental of a facility owned by a nonprofit organization precludes application of the ad valorem property tax exemption. Athens-Clarke County Bd. of Tax Assessors v. Nuci Phillips Memorial Foundation, 300 Ga. App. 754, 755 (686 SE2d 371) (2009). This reading oí Marietta Educational Garden Center is overly broad and I would emphasize that the specific facts of each case must be analyzed.

 The record reflects that Nugi’s Space opened in September 2000 and filed its application for an exemption from ad valorem property taxes on February 28, 2007, after the January 1, 2007 effective date of the 2006 amendment to OCGA § 48-5-41 (d).