Court Opinion

ID: 1002263
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 18:08:20.175211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:54.631136
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
                                                                         No. 99-4305
RICKY DALE PICKRAL, a/k/a Ricky
Dale Pickeral,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, at Lynchburg.
Norman K. Moon, District Judge.
(CR-98-40059)

Submitted: July 14, 2000

Decided: August 15, 2000

Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges,
and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

J. Patterson Rogers, 3rd, Danville, Virginia, for Appellant. Robert P.
Crouch, Jr., United States Attorney, Joseph W.H. Mott, Assistant
United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Ricky Dale Pickral appeals his 188-month sentence imposed upon
his guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute cocaine, cocaine base, and
marijuana, see 18 U.S.C. § 846 (1994), and causing, or threatening to
cause, bodily injury to a witness to a federal offense, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 1513(b)(2) (1994). We find no merit to the sole issue raised on
appeal and therefore affirm.

Pickral was a mid-level distributor in a drug trafficking organiza-
tion run by Brian Doss. The operation was responsible for distributing
large quantities of cocaine, cocaine base, and marijuana in Pitt-
sylvania County, Virginia. As a mid-level distributor in the organiza-
tion, Pickral received drugs from Doss, and in turn sold them himself
or supplied them to other conspirators, including Kevin Maddox and
Clarence Barbour, for resale. At sentencing, the district court adopted
the presentence report, which identified eighteen separate drug pur-
chases and seizures from members of the Doss organization, includ-
ing Pickral. The marijuana equivalency of those transactions was
5363.56 kilograms. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1,
comment. (n.10) (1998) (differing controlled substances are converted
to marijuana equivalents to obtain combined offense level).

At sentencing, Pickral argued that the court should hold him
accountable only for the amount of drugs for which he was "directly"
responsible, or roughly the equivalent of 563 kilograms of marijuana.
On appeal, he continues this argument, stating that he should not be
held accountable for the conduct of his coconspirators.

We review the district court's factual finding as to the weight of
drugs for clear error. See United States v. Lipford, 203 F.3d 259, 271
(4th Cir. 2000). Where, as here, the defendant's conduct occurred
within a conspiracy, the court may sentence the defendant for acts

                    2
committed by coconspirators, so long as the acts were in furtherance
of the conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. See
USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B); United States v. Williams, 986 F.2d 86, 90-
91 (4th Cir. 1993). The Government bears the burden of proving the
drug quantity for which a defendant is responsible by a preponderance
of the evidence. See United States v. Estrada , 42 F.3d 228, 231 (4th
Cir. 1994).

Here, the district court did not clearly err in attributing to Pickral
drugs with a marijuana equivalency of over 5363 kilograms. The
drugs clearly were distributed in furtherance of the conspiracy. As a
mid-level dealer in the Doss organization, this amount of drugs was
foreseeable to Pickral. Finally, the amount for which Pickral was held
accountable was well documented as the result of undercover drug
purchases and seizures.

We therefore affirm Pickral's sentence. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately pre-
sented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

                    3