Court Opinion

ID: 9949051
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 18:00:30.495091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:34.584923
License: Public Domain

PRECEDENTIAL

        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
             FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                 _______________

                      No. 23-1192
                    _______________

            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

                            v.

                     DANNY CRUZ,
                             Appellant
                    _______________

      On Appeal from the United States District Court
           for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
                (D.C. No. 1:20-cr-00161-001)
      District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner
                      _______________

                Argued: November 6, 2023

Before: RESTREPO, BIBAS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

                  (Filed: March 8, 2024)

Craig E. Kauzlarich          [ARGUED]
ABOM & KUTULAKIS
2 West High Street
Carlisle, PA 17013
   Counsel for Appellant
Christian T. Haugsby          [ARGUED]
U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE
1501 North 6th Street, 2nd Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17102
   Counsel for Appellee
                      _______________

                 OPINION OF THE COURT
                    _______________

BIBAS, Circuit Judge.
    Prosecutors must keep their promises. And if they do not,
they must make things right quickly, clearly, and fully. The
prosecution here did not do that. Though it promised to support
a total offense level of 14 at sentencing, it later endorsed an
extra enhancement. After the defendant objected, the prosecu-
tion changed course and took no position on the enhancement.
But that was not enough. The prosecution neither retracted its
erroneous position unequivocally nor fulfilled its promise to
the defendant. So we will vacate the sentence and remand to
let a different judge consider the right remedy.
              I. CRUZ PLEADED GUILTY TO A
                 CELLPHONE CONSPIRACY
    Danny Cruz wanted to make money behind bars. So he
hatched a plan to smuggle cell phones into prison and sell them
to his fellow inmates. To get the phones in, he bribed a prison
guard. Unfortunately for him, the government caught on to his
scheme.

                              2
    Cruz was charged with conspiring to violate the Travel Act
(by bribing a prison guard) under 18 U.S.C. § 371. Facing up
to five more years in prison, he took a plea deal. He pleaded
guilty in exchange for the prosecution’s “agree[ment] to rec-
ommend … that the total offense level is 14, which is based on
a [base offense] level 12 per U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(a)(2) (bribery of
a public official) and a two-level increase per U.S.S.G.
§ 2C1.1(b)(1) (more than one bribe).” App. 29. Yet “[e]ach
party reserve[d] the right to make whatever remaining argu-
ments it deem[ed] appropriate” about how to “appl[y] … the
… Sentencing … Guidelines to [Cruz’s] conduct.” App. 29–
30. And if the court asked for briefing, argument, or evidence
on how to apply the Guidelines, the prosecution was free to
respond.
    Though the parties agreed on these calculations, the Proba-
tion Office did not. It called for a four-level enhancement
because the crime involved “a[ ] public official in a … sensi-
tive position.” U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(3). That enhancement
would make the adjusted offense level 18:
       • Base offense level for bribery (agreed-upon)        12
       • Plus enhancement for multiple bribes
         (agreed-upon)                                       +2
       • Plus enhancement for bribing public official
         in sensitive job (disputed)                         +4
                                   Adjusted offense level    18
       • Minus acceptance-of-responsibility discount
         (undisputed)                                        -3
                                       Final offense level   15

                               3
    Cruz objected that the sensitive-public-official enhancement
did not apply and did not reflect the plea agreement. So, he
said, “if the Government endorses the enhancement[,] that …
would contravene the Plea Agreement.” App. 74. The prosecu-
tion then allegedly breached the agreement three times.
    First alleged breach: To discuss Cruz’s objections, the Dis-
trict Court held a presentence conference by phone in July
2022. Though there is no transcript, both parties agree on what
happened during that call: the prosecution supported the extra
four-level enhancement. Cruz objected that this support
breached the plea agreement.
    To sort out the confusion, the court asked the parties to brief
whether the disputed enhancement applied and whether the
prosecution had breached the agreement. In his brief, Cruz
sought to withdraw his guilty plea. He argued that the prosecu-
tion had breached the deal both by not opposing the four-level
enhancement and by supporting a total offense level of 18.
    Second alleged breach: Responding to Cruz’s brief, the
prosecution changed course. Its September 2022 brief took no
position on whether the four-level enhancement applied. Instead,
it summarized the law on the issue neutrally. Thus, the court
found no breach and denied Cruz’s motion to withdraw his
plea. In January 2023, at the start of the sentencing hearing, the
prosecution reiterated that it was taking no position on the
enhancement.
    Third alleged breach: At sentencing, the District Court
found that the four-level enhancement did apply. So did a
three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. That
made Cruz’s final offense level 15 and his final Guidelines

                                4
range 41 to 51 months. The prosecution then said that range
was “fair and appropriate.” App. 116, 118. The court sentenced
him to 51 months in prison, the top of the range.
    On appeal, Cruz alleges all three breaches of the plea agree-
ment. But we need not reach the second and third ones because
his first theory correctly identifies an uncured breach. The par-
ties agree on the facts and dispute only whether the prosecu-
tion’s actions amounted to a breach. That is a pure issue of law,
so we review de novo. United States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d
1357, 1360 (3d Cir. 1989).
       II. THE PROSECUTION BROKE THE PLEA DEAL
   A. The appeal waiver does not bar our review
    Plea bargains are contracts between prosecutors and de-
fendants. Id. at 1361. Each side agrees to certain charges or
sentence calculations and gives up its right to take other posi-
tions. Yet these are not ordinary contracts. The stakes are not
goods or money, but liberty and justice. So public policy limits
what lawyers, as officers of the court, can say and do in court.
    Because defendants give up many constitutional rights by
entering plea bargains, “courts must carefully scrutinize [them]
to insure that the government has fulfilled its promises.”
United States v. Williams, 510 F.3d 416, 422 (3d Cir. 2007).
And lawyers do not find the defendant guilty or sentence him;
the court does that, after hearing the lawyers out. To do that
fairly, judges need to understand the facts and the law. In a plea
bargain, lawyers may agree to take certain plausible positions
in litigation. But no matter what the plea agreement says, they

                                5
may not lie to or mislead the court. See Wharton v. Superinten-
dent, Graterford SCI, No. 22-2839 (3d Cir. Mar. 8, 2024).
    Nor may they breach the agreement. See Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). If they do, they may not insu-
late their own breaches from judicial review. True, the parties
here waived their right to appeal. Those appeal waivers are
generally valid—but not always. United States v. Khattak, 273
F.3d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 2001). For instance, they do not bar us
from reviewing whether Congress authorized a particular sen-
tence. United States v. Yung, 37 F.4th 70, 82 (3d Cir. 2022).
And they do not stop us from policing the prosecution’s
breaches of its own obligations under a plea agreement. United
States v. Schwartz, 511 F.3d 403, 405 (3d Cir. 2008). Judges
must independently verify that the parties have followed the
law and their agreements. So we may proceed to consider
Cruz’s claim.
   B. The prosecution was not free to seek the sensitive-
      public-official enhancement
    The parties dispute what the plea agreement means by
“total offense level.” App. 29. Cruz reads it “to mean the final,
aggregate offense level.” Appellant’s Br. 14. The government
disagrees, saying that it could not be the final calculation
because it leaves out the three-level reduction for acceptance
of responsibility.
    The government is wrong for three reasons. First, the gov-
ernment admits that it drafted the plea agreement and that the
phrase “total offense level” was “inartful.” Appellee’s Br. 20
n.4. So we read the agreement contra proferentem: “[T]o the
extent there is ambiguity caused by the ‘little bit of poor

                               6
draftsmanship’ conceded by the prosecutor, we must construe
the agreement against the government as drafter.” United
States v. Rivera, 357 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 2004), abrogated
on other grounds by Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129,
134 (2009); accord United States v. Floyd, 428 F.3d 513, 516
(3d Cir. 2005). Second, the plain meaning of “total offense
level” is that it reflects the “total,” which includes all enhance-
ments. Third, we “must read [Cruz’s] plea bargain in a manner
that gives meaning to each provision.” Floyd, 428 F.3d at 516.
Yet the government’s reading would make that term meaning-
less.
    The government also notes that the plea agreement left it
free to make “whatever remaining arguments it deems appro-
priate” about the Guidelines. App. 30. Thus, it argues, the
plea deal let it seek the four-level enhancement identified by
the Probation Office. But “remaining arguments” are only
those left after specific ones run out. The specific stipulation
(recommending a total offense level of 14) trumps the general
permission. Rivera, 357 F.3d at 295. So that provision of the
deal does not get the prosecution out of its duty to stick to a
total offense level of 14 or less.
   In short, the plea agreement barred the prosecution from
advocating a total offense level above 14. It remained free to
respond to the court’s inquiries neutrally and accurately. But it
could not support the four-level enhancement for bribing a
public official in a sensitive job.

                                7
   C. By supporting the enhancement, the prosecution
      broke the plea deal
    At the July 2022 presentence conference, the prosecution
supported the four-level enhancement for bribing a public
official in a sensitive job. The government admits that. It thus
supported a total offense level of 18, or 15 with the acceptance-
of-responsibility reduction. Either way, it had promised to
recommend a total offense level no higher than 14. So it
breached the agreement.
    The government argues that there was no breach under
United States v. Larkin, 629 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2010). But there,
“the government [did] not cross the line between providing an
analysis, which [was] expressly permitted by [the agreement],
and impermissibly advocating for application of the enhance-
ment.” Id. at 191. Here, by contrast, the prosecution crossed
that line by endorsing the enhancement. Larkin is inapt.
    III. THE PROSECUTION DID NOT CURE ITS BREACH
    Shortly after its breach, the prosecution backtracked, taking
no position on the four-level enhancement. This attempted cure
raises two questions: (1) Can the prosecution cure breaches of
plea agreements? (2) If so, did the prosecution cure its breach?
    We hold that the prosecution can cure some breaches of
plea agreements. And we adopt a two-step framework for eval-
uating cures. First, we gauge whether cure is needed or even
possible. Second, we decide whether the attempted cure suf-
ficed to remedy any harm from the breach. To suffice, at a min-
imum, the prosecution must promptly and unequivocally retract
its erroneous position and give the defendant the benefit of his

                               8
bargain. But here, at the second step, the prosecution’s cure fell
short.
   A. Step one: this breach was neither too big nor
      too small
    “[S]ome breaches may be curable upon timely objec-
tion….” Puckett, 556 U.S. at 140; see also U.C.C. § 2-508 (let-
ting sellers cure improper tenders or deliveries). But not every
breach requires cure. Some are extremely minor, causing no
meaningful harm. United States v. Vaval, 404 F.3d 144, 155
(2d Cir. 2005). And a “slip of the tongue or typographical
error” may not even be a breach. See United States v. Alcala-
Sanchez, 666 F.3d 571, 576 (9th Cir. 2012).
    Other breaches are too profound to cure. For instance, if a
prosecutor agrees to support a lower sentence but then
“strong[ly] commit[s] to a sentence at the high end of the
guidelines,” the cat may be out of the bag. United States v.
Diaz-Jimenez, 622 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2010). At that point,
the trial court can avoid a full appeal and reversal only with an
immediate remedy, like letting the defendant withdraw the
plea or be resentenced before a different judge. Puckett, 556
U.S. at 140.
    But we suspect that most breaches fall between these two
extremes and call for some cure. That includes this breach.
Supporting a higher offense level was much more than a tech-
nical error. Yet the prosecution did not strongly commit to
applying the enhancement. Diaz-Jimenez, 622 F.3d at 696.
And the prosecution soon changed course, explaining its “con-
fusion surrounding the terms of the plea agreement.” App. 92.
So it could have cured its breach.

                                9
   B. Step two: the cure was prompt but not unequivocal
      or sufficient
    If a breach can and must be cured, we ask next if the pros-
ecution did cure it. At a minimum, the prosecution must retract
its erroneous position promptly and unequivocally. See United
States v. Ligon, 937 F.3d 714, 720 (6th Cir. 2019); Diaz-
Jimenez, 622 F.3d at 696; United States v. Amico, 416 F.3d
163, 165 (2d Cir. 2005). And for courts to even consider a cure,
a defendant must get the benefit of his bargain. See Alcala-
Sanchez, 666 F.3d at 576; see also Vaval, 404 F.3d at 155.
Meeting these requirements is necessary to cure a breach but
may not be sufficient.
    Though the breach was curable, the prosecution did not
cure it. Its September 2022 brief was prompt enough. But the
prosecution did not retract its erroneous position unequivocally.
Rather than endorsing a total offense level of 14 or retracting its
earlier statement, it stayed neutral. And after the court applied
the enhancement, the prosecution said the resulting range was
“fair and appropriate.” App. 116, 118. Thus, far from counter-
balancing its breach, the prosecution may have compounded it.
    Nor did Cruz get the benefit of his bargain. He bargained
for both sides to “present a united front” to the court about the
total offense level. Alcala-Sanchez, 666 F.3d at 576; see also
United States v. Purser, 747 F.3d 284, 290 (5th Cir. 2014)
(Higginbotham, J.). Yet the prosecution did not back him up.
   This analysis may differ from harmless-error review. One
court has distinguished the two, explaining that “with a cure of
breach, the government abides by the plea agreement, while
harmless error excuses a lapse of government performance.”

                                10
Purser, 747 F.3d at 294. So, the court reasoned, the question is
not whether the breach was “excuse[d]” but whether the legal
error was “remov[ed]” or “correct[ed].” Id.
    Plus, it is an open question whether we may excuse these
errors as harmless when, as here, the defendant objected
promptly. See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 141 n.3. True, we have held
that, at least when a habeas petitioner failed to object in the trial
court, this type of error is neither structural nor defies harmless-
error review. See Lacombe v. Warden James T. Vaughn Corr.
Ctr., No. 21-1886 (3d Cir. Mar. 8, 2024). Yet we leave that
question open because, under any test, the government has not
shown that its breach was harmless. The court applied the dis-
puted enhancement, though it could have chosen not to. And
the prosecution did not correct its legal error. So under any
standard, the prosecution loses.
    Cruz immediately objected to the prosecution’s breach.
Though the prosecution changed course, it never retracted its
erroneous position unequivocally. And Cruz never got the ben-
efit of his bargain. So the prosecution did not cure its July 2022
breach.
                IV. ON REMAND, A NEW JUDGE
                 MUST CHOOSE THE REMEDY
    Because the prosecution did not cure its breach, we will
“remand the case to the district court for a determination
whether to grant specific performance or allow withdrawal of
the plea.” United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 241
(3d Cir. 1998). We have no reason to question the experienced
judge’s impartiality. But Cruz might understandably fear that
the prosecution’s breach will still ring in the judge’s ears. So

                                 11
“to avoid even the appearance of such harm, when we do
remand for breach of a government obligation [to engage or]
not to engage in sentence advocacy, we direct the case to a dif-
ferent judge.” Vaval, 404 F.3d at 155.
                             *****
   If prosecutors break their agreements, they must make
amends. Because the prosecution did not do that here, we will
vacate Cruz’s sentence and remand.

                              12