Court Opinion

ID: 9744266
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:58:57.469635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:48.114485
License: Public Domain

*661RATLIFF, Judge, concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion and also concur for the additional reasons stated in this opinion.
The fallacy of Patton's argument in reliance upon Bearden v. Georgia, (1983) - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 is that Bearden is a case involving revocation of probation previously granted. This case involves the initial sentencing and the factors which a trial court may consider at the time of pronouncing sentence.
Our statute, Indiana Code section 35-88-1-7 (formerly § 85-4.1-4-7), provides that in determining what sentence to impose the court may consider as mitigating cireum-stances or as favoring suspending the sentence and imposing probation that the defendant has made or will make restitution. Thus, under this statute, the trial court legitimately could consider whether Patton had made restitution in determining what sentence to impose. Such is precisely what Patton bargained for. I do not read Bear-den as prohibiting the court from considering whether or not restitution had been made in pronouncing sentence initially. In fact, the Supreme Court stated in Bearden:
"Thus, when determining initially whether the State's penological interests require imposition of a term of imprisonment, the sentencing court can consider the entire background of the defendant, including his employment history and financial resources. (Citation omitted.)"
- U.S. at -, 103 S.Ct. at 2071, 76 L.Ed.2d at 231.
"[A] sentencing court can consider a defendant's employment history and financial resources in setting an initial punishment. Such considerations are a necessary part of evaluating the entire background of the defendant in order to tailor an appropriate sentence for the defendant and the crime."
- U.S. at -, 103 S.Ct. at 2072, 76 L.Ed.2d at 232.
Likewise, the trial court here, under our statute (Ind.Code 385-38-1-7, formerly Ind. Code 85-4.1-4-7), could consider whether, at the time of sentencing, Patton had made restitution in order to tailor an appropriate sentence for him and the crime. Nothing in Bearden prohibits this.
There is no right to probation or a suspended sentence. Granting of suspended sentences and probation is an act of grace and is wholly discretionary. Farmer v. State, (1971) 257 Ind. 511, 275 N.E.2d 783; Davis v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 58, 267 N.E.2d 63. In determining whether to exercise that discretion in favor of granting probation as a matter of grace, the trial court may consider all relevant factors. Whether the defendant had made restitution is a relevant factor.
This is not a case where probation, once granted, was revoked for failure to make restitution without any showing of either ability to pay or a good faith effort to do so. Had that been the case, Bearden would be applicable and controlling. Such, however, is not the case. This case involves the initial sentencing pursuant to a plea bargain. Bearden does not prohibit what happened here.