Court Opinion

ID: 9491504
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:15:58.164867+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:46.661818
License: Public Domain

FLETCHER, Circuit Judge,
Dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
Like the majority, I believe that we should hold to a high standard persons who have a role in seeing to the seaworthiness of ships, including crew.
The narrow issue presented in this ease, however, is whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of Dr. Ketehum. See General Electric Co. v. Joiner, — U.S. -, -, 118 S.Ct. 512, 517, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997) (“[Ajbuse of discretion is the proper standard of review of a district court’s evidentiary • rulings.”). Without Dr. Ketchum’s testimony, summary judgment in favor of Dr. Taus was appropriate since that testimony was Trinidad’s only evidence that the actions of Dr. Taus were the proximate cause of Trinidad’s injury-that is, the monetary loss Trinidad suffered because of liability to Mr. Sementilli resulting from his ship-board fall.
The Supreme Court has emphasized, particularly with regard to scientific expert testimony, that the district courts must act as “gatekeepers,” and the courts of appeals must respect the role of the district courts in that regard. See id.; accord Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993); see also McKendall v. Crown Control Corp., 122 F.3d 803, 806-07 & n. 1 (9th Cir.1997) (“[T]he Daubert Court is giving strong advice to district courts: in ruling on admissibility, trial judges are the gatekeepers and should pay particular attention to the reliability of the expert and his or her testimony.”).
The Supreme Court recently reiterated in General Electric that the district court “‘must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.’” — U.S. at -, 118 S.Ct. at 517 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786). The Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony regarding the causation of the plaintiffs lung cancer as “nothing more than speculation.” Id., 118 S.Ct. at 518. The Court emphasized that “nothing in either Davibert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.” Id. at 519.
In the case before us, the district court’s reasons for excluding Dr. Ketehum’s testimony were that Dr. Ketehum had not examined Mr. Sementilli (only Dr. Taus’ medical records), that Dr. Ketehum had not been present when the accident took place, and that Dr. Ketehum was not privy to Sementilli’s thought processes just prior to the accident. He concluded that the Dr. Ketchum’s opinion was too speculative to be admitted. I submit these are all good reasons for exclusion.
Nevertheless, the majority opinion holds that the district court abused its discretion in excluding Dr. Ketchum’s testimony. The authority cited by the majority provides no support for this holding. In two of the cases cited by the majority, it was held that there was no abuse of discretion in admitting expert testimony. See Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S. 107, 109, 80 S.Ct. 173, 4 L.Ed.2d 142 (1959); Omar v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir.1987). Just so, but the question *1142before us is whether it was an abuse of discretion to exclude the expert testimony.
In the other two cases cited by the majority, the expert whose testimony was excluded conducted extensive on-site investigations of the accident locations at issue. See Maffei v. Northern Ins. Co. of New York, 12 F.3d 892, 895 (9th Cir.1993) (on-site investigation of warehouse to determine possible cause of fire); Bieghler v. Kleppe, 633 F.2d 531, 533 (9th Cir.1980) (on-site investigation of tunnel where motorcycle accident occurred).
By contrast, here Dr. Ketehum never examined either Mr. Sementilli or the site of the accident. Although experts generally may rely on the reports of other physicians in developing their opinions, Dr. Ketehum couldn’t know whether Dr. Taus’s reports were accurate. (Perhaps Dr. Taus exaggerated the patient’s disabilities to get him disability pay just as he probably exaggerated how able he was to go to sea.) More importantly, Trinidad has not explained how Dr. Ketehum could possibly know, as he asserts that he does, that Mr. Sementilli’s mental state contributed to the accident.
Perhaps the district court would not have abused its discretion had it decided to admit Dr. Ketchum’s testimony. But that is not the question before us. The nature of our review of evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, as underscored by the Supreme Court in General Electric, involves substantial deference to the determinations of the district court. The majority has lost sight of the beacon lit by Daubert. We should be loathe to second guess the district court on such a call.
I would affirm.