Court Opinion

ID: 9687197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:18:28.283009+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:24.768932
License: Public Domain

SCHULTZ, Justice
(concurring specially).
Although I agree with the majority’s disposition of this case, I believe that it overstates the power of conservation officers to conduct searches to determine whether persons are transporting loaded guns in their vehicles. The majority opinion states that a conservation officer has “the right and duty to check a hunter’s gun and magazine to see if a violation had occurred.” While I agree that the officer in this case acted properly, the fourth amendment does not allow this type of search under any set of circumstances as the majority opinion suggests.
Once it is determined that the initial investigatory stop was lawful, the issue becomes quite narrow: When a conservation officer makes a lawful stop of a vehicle and sees a gun case in plain view, may that officer check to see if the gun in the case is loaded even though he has no reasonable basis to believe that it is loaded and has no reason to believe that he is in any danger? I conclude that this type of search is reasonable under the fourth amendment.
It should be pointed out that, given the lawfulness of the initial stop, the officer’s observation of the gun does not implicate *47fourth amendment concerns because observation of an item in plain view is not a search. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738 n. 4, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1541 n. 4, 75 L.Ed.2d 502, 511 n. 4 (1983). Thus, fourth amendment concerns were not implicated until the officer checked the gun to see if it was loaded. It is the intrusion caused by checking the gun that must be analyzed.
The constitutionality of this search depends upon a balancing of the degree of intrusion on defendant’s privacy interests against the State’s interest in enforcing its own legitimate governmental interests. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667-68 (1979); State v. A-1 Disposal, 415 N.W.2d 595, 598-99 (Iowa 1987).
Under the facts of this case, the intrusion on defendant’s privacy interests was minimal. He had already been lawfully stopped by the officer and been required to show his fur harvester’s license. The gun case was in plain view of the officer and was located in defendant’s vehicle. Case law is clear that a person has a lesser expectation of privacy in the passenger compartment of a vehicle than in a home or office. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112-13, 106 S.Ct. 960, 965, 89 L.Ed.2d 81, 89-90 (1986); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-93, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 2068-70, 85 L.Ed.2d 406, 412-14 (1985). One court has held that by applying for a license, a hunter tacitly consents to a checkpoint vehicle stop to check for game. See State v. Halverson, 277 N.W.2d 723, 724-25 (S.D.1979). While the hunter’s license application may not constitute implicit consent to a search of this type, it is a legitimate factor to consider in determining the defendant’s expectation of privacy. Similarly in a vehicle weight violation case, we considered the motor carrier’s knowledge of our weight and road regulations in determining the reasonableness of the State’s intrusion by a stop for a weight inspection without any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. A-l Disposal, 415 N.W.2d at 600.
Against this minimal intrusion, we must balance the State’s interest in enforcing its wildlife and game laws. The Oregon Supreme Court, in a case involving a roadblock for checking game law violations, stated:
[T]he governmental interest in the enforcement of laws for the preservation of wildlife in this state is sufficiently substantial to justify the minimal intrusion upon the Fourth Amendment rights of those stopped for brief questioning and a visual inspection of their vehicles.
State v. Tourtillott, 289 Or. 845, 859, 618 P.2d 423, 430 (1980). Under the facts of this case, I believe that the State’s interest is substantial enough to outweigh the slight impairment of defendant’s privacy interests. I agree that the search was reasonable.
Instead of analyzing the issue according to the principles outlined above, the majority suggests that checking a person’s gun to see if it is loaded is proper under all circumstances. Ordinarily, to be reasonable under the fourth amendment, a search must be premised on some reasonable suspicion. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667-68 (1979); United States v. Munoz, 701 F.2d 1293, 1301 (9th Cir.1983) (investigatory stop by roving game officers must be based on individualized suspicion when primary purpose is detection of criminal activity). I have serious doubts whether a game officer has authority to stop vehicles in order to check for a loaded gun when there is no reason to suspect that a violation exists. Munoz, 701 F.2d at 1301; Commonwealth v. Palm, 315 Pa.Super. 377, 383, 462 A.2d 243, 246 (1983).
The result reached by the majority is correct. However, in reaching that result, the majority opinion grants more authority to conservation officers than the fourth amendment allows and does so by addressing a broader issue than the facts require. For these reasons I am not able to join in that part of the opinion dealing with this issue.
NEUMAN, Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur in the majority’s reinstatement of defendant’s conviction but I depart from *48its gratuitous assertion that the search of defendant’s gun case “would have been proper with or without Keehner’s consent.” Nor can I join the advisory opinion offered by Justice Schultz’ special concurrence.
The facts reveal that Keehner, albeit reluctantly, consented to the inspection of his cased gun. Given this circumstance, there is no reason to use this case as a vehicle for granting conservation officers carte blanche to search hunters without regard to the customary prerequisites for warrant-less searches. I think even Officer Rowley would be surprised at the allowance of such an unconstitutional intrusion. He requested that Keehner accompany him to obtain a warrant rather than force the issue. This court would be wise to follow his conservative lead.
McGIVERIN, C.J., and LAVORATO, J., join this special concurrence.