Court Opinion

ID: 9388874
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 21:00:23.334822+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:23.530327
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 21-1348

        HILDA ESTEL SANCHEZ-DIAZ,

                            Petitioner,

                     v.

        MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

                            Respondent.

        On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

        Argued: January 24, 2023                                          Decided: April 20, 2023

        Before NIEMEYER and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit
        Judge.

        Remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ARGUED: Abdoul Aziz Konare, KONARE LAW, Frederick, Maryland, for Petitioner.
        Abigail Evelyn Leach, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington,
        D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
        Attorney General, Anthony C. Payne, Assistant Director, Liza S. Murcia, Senior Litigation
        Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES
        DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Petitioner Hilda Estela Sanchez-Diaz entered the United States via Hidalgo, Texas,

        in 2014. On June 11, 2015, the Department of Homeland Security commenced removal

        proceedings against her, charging her with removability as an immigrant who, at the time

        of application for admission, was not in possession of valid travel documents, in violation

        of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C.

        § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). In November 2016, Sanchez-Diaz, through her attorney, admitted

        to this charge and conceded removability before an immigration judge (IJ). She then

        applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against

        Torture (CAT). She submitted that, after she erased MS-13 gang graffiti from the outside

        wall of her home, gang members began extorting and threatening her. She asserted that

        the gang’s threats and extortion were retribution for her perceived anti-gang political

        opinion. Additionally, she contended that she possessed a well-founded fear of future

        persecution based on her membership in a particular social group consisting of her mother’s

        family members.

               On March 18, 2019, the IJ found Sanchez-Diaz removable as charged and denied

        her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. It found that

        Sanchez-Diaz did not allege past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution

        on a protected ground. Rather, it explained, MS-13 only sought to extort money from her

        to enhance its financial status. As a result, the IJ concluded that she did not qualify for

        asylum or withholding of removal. It also denied CAT relief, explaining that the record

        did not demonstrate that she would more likely than not experience torture with the consent

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        or acquiescence of a Salvadoran official if she returned to El Salvador. Sanchez-Diaz

        appealed this decision, and on March 10, 2021, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and

        dismissed the appeal.      Like the IJ, the BIA explained that Sanchez-Diaz did not

        demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of an

        anti-gang political opinion or family membership. Further, it agreed with the IJ that

        Sanchez-Diaz did not establish that she would more likely than not experience torture with

        the acquiescence of a Salvadoran government official. It added that Sanchez-Diaz never

        reported MS-13’s threats to the Salvadoran police, and therefore, “[t]here [was] insufficient

        evidence [that] the authorities knew of or turned a blind eye to the gang’s criminal activities

        perpetrated against [her].” A.R. 4.

               Sanchez-Diaz timely sought this Court’s review of the BIA and IJ’s decisions. On

        August 10, 2021, the government moved to remand the case to the BIA. It did not concede

        error on the agency’s part, instead arguing only that remand would provide the BIA an

        opportunity to better explain its findings. Sanchez-Diaz opposed the motion, contending

        that the Court should permit the parties to fully brief and argue the appeal.              We

        subsequently denied the motion.

               Now, Sanchez-Diaz asks us to reverse and remand the agency’s final order of

        removal. She asserts that the BIA and IJ erred in denying her application for asylum,

        withholding of removal, and CAT relief, and she requests that we vacate these decisions

        and remand for further proceedings. For its part, the government—without confessing

        error—again asks that the Court remand the case to the BIA for more detailed analysis and

        explanation of its decision “in light of intervening precedent.” Resp. Br. 21. First, it argues

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        that remand is warranted for the BIA to clarify and further explain its finding that Sanchez-

        Diaz did not demonstrate a well-founded fear of future harm on account of her family

        membership. Resp. Br. 22. It continues that remand would also enable the BIA to apply

        Perez Vasquez v. Garland, 4 F.4th 213 (4th Cir. 2021), and Toledo-Vasquez v. Garland,

        27 F.4th 281 (4th Cir. 2022), which we published after the BIA’s decision in this matter.

        Resp. Br. 22–26.      Both cases help to clarify the nexus analysis for family-based

        persecution. Second, the government also asserts that the remand would permit the BIA

        to further analyze and explain its conclusion that Sanchez-Diaz did not demonstrate that

        MS-13 gang members threatened and extorted her on account of her actual or imputed anti-

        gang political opinion. Resp. Br. 27. Third, it asserts that remand would enable the BIA

        to further explain its denial of CAT relief on the ground that Sanchez-Diaz did not establish

        that she would more likely than not be tortured by or with the acquiescence of a Salvadoran

        government official if removed to El Salvador. Resp. Br. 31. In particular, it explains,

        remand would allow the BIA an opportunity to address this Court’s intervening decision

        in Portillo Flores v. Garland, 3 F.4th 615 (4th Cir. 2021) (en banc). There, in relevant

        part, we rejected a per se requirement that a petitioner seek police assistance to be eligible

        for asylum. Portillo Flores, 3 F.4th at 636.

               As a general matter, when the BIA errs, “the proper course . . . is to remand to the

        agency for additional investigation or explanation.” INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12,

        16 (2002) (per curiam) (quotation omitted). And, although the government does not

        concede agency error, the proper course in this instance is to remand to allow the agency

        additional opportunity to analyze and clarify the issues. See id. at 16–17 (“Generally

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        speaking, a court of appeals should remand a case to an agency for decision of a matter that

        statutes place primarily in agency hands. This principle has obvious importance in the

        immigration context.”); SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 254 F.3d 1022, 1028–29 (Fed. Cir.

        2001) (describing remand as “generally required” when an intervening event may affect

        the validity of an agency action and “usually appropriate” when an agency does not

        concede error but nevertheless has a “substantial and legitimate” concern).           After

        considering the parties’ submissions and hearing oral argument in this matter, we remand

        to the BIA for further consideration and analysis of Sanchez-Diaz’s asylum, withholding,

        and CAT claims.

                                                                                      REMANDED

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