Court Opinion

ID: 9782370
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 18:26:22.049486+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:15:53.898566
License: Public Domain

BENCH, Judge
(dissenting):
139 In straining to reach its desired result, the main opinion refuses to follow controlling precedent.
140 The approach outlined by the main opinion is unattainable because this court lacks jurisdiction to even consider the substance of the appeal. As recited in the main opinion, Lara filed a timely notice of appeal from the juvenile court's bind-over order on January 31, 2001. Subsequently, pursuant to Lara's own motion, we dismissed the appeal on February 15, 2001. Lara filed no timely motion to reinstate his appeal or to withdraw his motion. Consequently, on March 21, 2001, we remitted Lara's appeal of the bind-over order to the juvenile court. This remit-titur ended our jurisdiction over any appeal relating to bind-over.
141 For us to take any action with regard to the juvenile court's bind-over order, we would have to recall the remittitur. Howeyver, our jurisdiction to recall a remittitur is extremely limited. We can recall a remitti-tur only "upon a showing that the remittitur was issued through fraud or inadvertence or was issued prematurely or otherwise improperly, or to correct an irregularity or error in the issuance of the remittitur." Miller v. Southern Pacific Co., 82 Utah 307, 24 P.2d 380, 381 (1933); see also Hi-Country Estates v. Foothills Water Co., 942 P.2d 305 (Utah 1996). Because this court did not erroncously remit the case, when we remitted, we lost appellate jurisdiction over all issues relating to bind-over. Lara's remedy, if any, can now only be sought through an extraordinary writ.
142 State v. Clark, 913 P.2d 360 (Utah Ct.App.1996), is fully consistent with these bedrock principles. In Clark, this court held that onee a criminal appeal has been remitted to the district court, the appellate court loses all jurisdiction over the matter. See id. at 363. We went so far as to say that a dismissal for failure to timely file a brief on appeal acted as an adjudication on the merits, and that defendant could challenge his sentence only by extraordinary writ. See id.
¶ 43 In attempting to save this appeal, the main opinion erroneously relies on State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703 (Utah 1985). By its own *959terms, however, Tuttle applies only to appeals dismissed because of a criminal's escape. In Tuttle, the supreme court allowed for reinstatement of a eriminal appeal because the escapee's intent regarding his appeal could only be inferred. In contrast, here, Lara's intent in withdrawing his appeal of the juvenile court's bind-over order is undeniable. His motion to withdraw, "made on the grounds that [Laral does not want to pursue an appeal," was supported by an affidavit. In his affidavit, Lara stated as follows:
I, MIGUEL A. LARA, being first duly sworn according to law, on my oath depose and say:
1. I am the Defendant/Appellant in the above-entitled case.
2. It is my desire to withdraw my appeal at this time.
3. I am aware that I have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of Appeals; however, I do not wish to pursue this appeal.
4. I understand that onee this appeal is withdrawn, it cannot be reinstated.
5. It is my desire to waive any and all rights to the appeal docketed in this case.
6. I am doing this knowingly and voluntarily and have not been threatened or otherwise induced in any way to withdraw this appeal.
7. I have consulted with my attorney with respect to this withdrawal and feel that it will not benefit me to pursue this appeal.
{44 This case is directly controlled by State v. Houskeeper, 2002 UT 118, 62 P.3d 444, which was decided while Lara's case was still being briefed. Like Lara, Houskeeper was charged in juvenile court under the Serious Youth Offender Act (SYOA). See id. at ¶ 1. Like Lara, Houskeeper was transferred to district court after the juvenile court found that he had not proven the three SYOA retention factors by clear and convincing evidence. See id. at ¶¶-3. Also like Lara, Houskeeper timely appealed the juvenile court's transfer order, but later filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss the appeal, which the court of appeals granted. See id. at ¶ 3. Houskeeper, like Lara, then filed a motion in district court to quash the juvenile court's bind-over order. See id. at ¶ 4. When the district court denied the motion, Houskeeper petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for interlocutory review of that decision. See id. The supreme court denied the petition. See id. After a jury convicted Houskeeper of a lesser included offense, he appealed to the Utah Supreme Court arguing, inter alia, that the juvenile court had erred in finding that he had not proven all three retention factors. See id. at ¶¶ 9-10, 23.
{ 45 The unanimous Houskeeper court held that "[blecause the [Juvenile court] bind-over order was not timely appealed, we have no jurisdiction to hear challenges to the order." Id. at ¶ 23. Citing M.C. v. State, 916 P.2d 914, 916 (Utah Ct.App.1996), the supreme court observed that juvenile court bind-over orders are "final, appealable orders." Houskeeper, 2002 UT 118 at ¶ 23, 62 P.3d 444. The supreme court recognized that Houskeeper, like Lara here, had filed a timely notice of appeal from the juvenile court's bind-over order, but had then voluntarily withdrawn that appeal. See id. "Consequently, defendant waived his right to appeal the bind-over order, and [the supreme court had] no jurisdiction to consider his contentions." Id.
{46 Just as Houskeeper waived his right to appeal a juvenile court bind-over order when he voluntarily dismissed his timely appeal, so too Lara waived his right to challenge the juvenile court's bind-over order. The main opinion claims that Lara's case is different from Houskeeper's because Lara did not voluntarily withdraw his appeal. His affidavit, however, plainly demonstrates otherwise. In Bruner v. Carver, 920 P.2d 1153, 1156 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court ruled that an affidavit even less comprehensive than Lara's sufficiently demonstrated a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to appeal.
T47 As recognized by the main opinion in footnote two, there have been instances where our supreme court has set aside "unequivocal statements of knowing and voluntary waiver." However, it is critical to note that these cases addressed the voluntariness *960of a guilty plea, rather than the withdrawal of an appeal and, as demonstrated by our supreme court in Bruner, there is a fundamental distinction between the two types of waivers. See Bruner, 920 P.2d at 1156. "Guilty plea affidavits are significantly more complex and philosophically different than withdrawals of direct appeals. Because a defendant gives up far less by withdrawing an appeal than by entering a guilty plea, the protections accorded the former process are logically more limited." Id. (emphasis added). The supreme court explained that, with a guilty plea, the defendant forfeits a "panoply of constitutional rights," whereas with an appeal waiver, the defendant is "simply ending further review of his case." Id.
148 In sum, the approach of the main opinion cannot be reconciled with our prior case law. By straining to salvage Lara's appeal, my colleagues have created countless complications for the future. I therefore dissent.