Court Opinion

ID: 9789428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:36:15.392453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:22.445954
License: Public Domain

*386McInturff, J.
(concurring) — I agree with the majority, but wish to state additional reasons why I believe Mr. Vasquez timely filed his notice of appeal. First, Mr. Vasquez complied with the implicit jurisdictional requirements of RCW 51.52.110. The Washington State Constitution empowers the Legislature to determine and prescribe the appellate jurisdiction of the superior court. Const, art. 4, § 6 (amend. 65). Our Legislature declared the jurisdictional prerequisites for appeals from the Board of Industrial Appeals to superior court in RCW 51.52.110, which provides that within 30 days after a decision, the worker must perfect his appeal by filing with the clerk of the court a notice of appeal and by serving a copy thereof by mail, or personally, on the self-insurer. Since these are substantive, jurisdictional requirements, Spokane v. Department of Labor & Indus., 34 Wn. App. 581, 584, 663 P.2d 843, review denied, 100 Wn.2d 1007 (1983), civil rules are inapplicable here. See 4 L. Orland, Wash. Prac., Rules Practice 597 (1983 & Supp. 1984) (civil rules apply only to procedural matters, not substantive law which creates, defines, and regulates primary rights). Accordingly, Am-Fac's reliance upon the civil rule is inappropriate, especially where our Legislature has already provided the necessary detail to determine when service by mail is effective.
In 1911, when our Legislature first pronounced the jurisdictional requirements for industrial insurance appeals to superior court, it sanctioned both service by mail and personal service. RCW 51.52.110. While it did not expressly indicate when service by mail was complete, it incorporated the common practice in civil cases at that time. Laws of 1911, ch. 74, § 20, p. 368. The civil practice when RCW 51.52.110 was passed declared service by mail effective upon mailing. Rem. & Ball. Code § 247 provided:
"In case of service by mail, the papers shall be deposited in the post office, addressed to the person on whom it is served, at his place of residence, and the postage paid; and in such case the time of service shall be double that required in case of personal service."
*387State ex rel. Palmer Mt. Tunnel & Power Co. v. Superior Court, 63 Wash. 442, 443, 115 P. 845 (1911). Applying this rule, the court determined "service is made by mail when the paper to be served is deposited in the post office addressed to the person to be served, with postage prepaid, and the service is complete when so deposited ..." Palmer Mt., at 444. Hence, the Legislature exercised its constitutional powers by establishing the jurisdictional requirements for industrial insurance appeals. Those requirements should not be amended or restricted through a revisionist use of the civil rules, especially when it is in the province of the Legislature to define jurisdictional requirements, and because the civil rules were adopted to alleviate "anomalous, purely accidental, unnecessary but fatal procedural snare[s] for the unwary or less fleet of foot." Curtis Lumber Co. v. Sortor, 83 Wn.2d 764, 766, 522 P.2d 822 (1974).
Second, even if the Legislature did not incorporate civil practice in 1911 as part of the jurisdictional prerequisites, the current civil rules are not the most analogous principles by which we can determine when service by mail is effective. See, e.g., Coupeville Sch. Dist. 204 v. Vivian, 36 Wn. App. 728, 730, 677 P.2d 192 (1984) ("most analogous" rule used to define terms of different rule). Civil rules are not the most analogous because they are intended only for "civil actions" which invoke the general jurisdiction of the superior courts, and which are commenced by service of summons and complaint. Reeves v. Department of Gen. Admin., 35 Wn. App. 533, 537, 667 P.2d 1133, review denied, 100 Wn.2d 1030 (1983); see CR 1; CR 2; CR 3. Contrarily, an appeal from an administrative tribunal invokes the appellate, not general or original, jurisdiction of a superior court. MacVeigh v. Division of Unemployment Comp., 19 Wn.2d 383, 385-86, 142 P.2d 900 (1943); Reeves, at 537. Appeals from administrative agencies are distinctly different from the initial commencement of an action in superior court because in actions properly before an administrative tribunal, all parties have been notified of the dispute and have had an opportunity to present their case. *388But, in actions originally commenced in superior court, an opposing party has no knowledge of a claim or action until service of the summons and complaint is received. It can be argued, therefore, that a stricter application of rules governing service by mail and notice is justified when the superior court is exercising its general or original jurisdiction. But when an appeal from an administrative ruling is involved, I find it appropriate to apply a more analogous rule, a rule on appeal. RAP 18.6(b) provides in part:
[I]f the time period in question applies to a party serving a paper by mail, the paper is timely served if mailed within the time permitted for service. If the time period in question applies to the party upon whom service is made, the time begins to run 3 days after the paper is mailed to the party.
By analogy, when one is appealing a decision of the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals, service by mail should be effective upon mailing.
Third, if the civil rules are applicable to the instant case, I believe interpretations given CR 5, which render service incomplete until 3 days after mailing, are incorrect. Principled obedience to interpretations of CR 5(b)(2)(A) need not prevent awareness that they may be ripe for reevaluation or renunciation. In following a rule of common law, an intermediate court of appeals may appropriately analyze the factors which cast doubt upon the viability of past decisions. While ordinarily the court rules have been approached as if they had been drafted by the Legislature, our court has engaged in a substantive examination of the rule to obtain its intended and commonsense interpretation. Compare State ex rel. Schillberg v. Everett Dist. Court, 90 Wn.2d 794, 585 P.2d 1177 (1978) with Heine-mann v. Whitman Cy., 105 Wn.2d 796, 802-03, 718 P.2d 789 (1986). A substantive examination of CR 5(b)(2)(A) reveals that past interpretations are incorrect. In Moore v. Wentz, 11 Wn. App. 796, 525 P.2d 290 (1974), we examined whether a motion for reconsideration under CR 59(b) was timely served. The defendant mailed the motion on the last *389day of a 5-day motion period. Without examining the underlying purpose of the civil rules, we concluded the mailing was too late because CR 5 purportedly required mailing 3 days before the end of the motion period. This view was adopted without discussion in Citizens Interested in the Transfusion of Yesteryear v. Board of Regents, 86 Wn.2d 323, 330, 544 P.2d 740 (1976).
At the time of the Moore v. Wentz, supra, decision, our attention was not called to the objectives of the civil rules or the problems which can occur if the method of service is changed from proceeding to proceeding. As the law stands now, one pressing an administrative appeal is destined to be lost in the shifting sands of procedure, since during administrative proceedings, service is effective upon mailing, WAC 296-08-130, yet ineffective until 3 days after mailing when the same action is brought on appeal to superior court. The rule changes again on appeal, however, because RAP 18.6(b) deems service effective upon mailing. I find it improbable that the judicial committee drafting the civil rules intended, or would have provided, one procedure for notice during administrative proceedings, while denying the use of the same procedure when the administrative decision was appealed to superior court. Such a rule forms a fatal procedural trap which flies in the face of the objectives for adopting the civil rules.
The Supreme Court adopted the civil rules to accomplish the following objectives:
(2) To conform to the federal practice in all situations where there are no compelling reasons for perpetuating Washington practice, especially in the many situations where the Washington statutes, rules, and case law are confusing, obscure, or nonexistent;
(3) To preserve the Washington practice in all situations where the Washington practice is believed to be superior or where the matter is not adequately covered by federal rules;
(4) To eliminate many procedural traps now existing in Washington practice;
(5) To conform the Civil Rules for the Superior Court to *390the Civil Rules for the Justice Courts which also follow the format of the federal rules;
(6) To make available a ready reference to all authorities discussing the comparable federal rules.
Order Adopting Civil Rules for Superior Court, 71 Wn.2d xvii, xxiv (1967). Before these rules were adopted, the state practice regarding service by mail mirrored the federal rule. Service by mail was effective upon mailing. Rem. & Ball. § 247; Palmer Mt.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 5. How is it our civil rules regarding service by mail changed with the adoption of the civil rules in 1967? I do not believe the new rule changed the old one. Making service by mail ineffective until 3 days after mailing would alter rather than "preserve the Washington practice," and would conflict with rather than "conform to federal practice." Order Adopting Civil Rules for Superior Court, supra. Instead of altering historical precedent and ignoring the stated objectives for adopting the civil rules, I believe the judicial council drafted CR 5(b)(2)(A) in 1967 to maintain past practice.
Accordingly, service by mail should be effective upon mailing when the time period in question applies to a party serving by mail. But when a time period applies to a party upon whom service is made, the time begins to run, and the service is "deemed complete", 3 days after the paper is mailed to the party. See, e.g., RAP 18.6(b). For these reasons, I also hold Mr. Vasquez complied with RCW 51.52-.110.