Court Opinion

ID: 9625914
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:55:36.905843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:17.335838
License: Public Domain

COLEMAN, Judge,
dissenting.
In this custody proceeding, the trial court had to decide as between the two parents, both of whom were fit to have custody of their minor sons, ages five and seven, which parent would, under the current circumstances, foster or serve the children’s best interest if granted custody. Neither parent *167was found to be unfit, and neither parent claimed the other was unfit. While the trial court noted allegations of earlier acts of spousal abuse by the father against the mother, the court also noted that there was “no evidence before it to suggest that there is a continuing pattern of abuse that involves these children or that any abuse ever involved the children.” After considering all of the circumstances, the trial court determined that the wife was living in an ongoing adulterous relationship with her boyfriend, Michael Kopeski. Such a finding constituted a change in circumstance. Although the majority finds the evidence insufficient to prove a change in circumstance, for the reasons stated in my dissent in Hughes v. Hughes, 33 Va.App. 141, 531 S.E.2d 645 (2000), in my opinion, ample evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Ruth Hughes committed adultery. Moreover, the trial court ruled that, as between the two parents, the children’s best interest would be served by the father having custody. I find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in making that ruling.
The trial court determined that a change of circumstance had occurred, because the wife was found to be living in an ongoing adulterous relationship. The trial court properly exercised its discretion, in my opinion, by finding that the children’s best interest would be served by being with the father. See Brown v. Brown, 218 Va. 196, 199, 237 S.E.2d 89, 91 (1977) (“An illicit relationship to which minor children are exposed cannot be condoned. Such a relationship must necessarily be given the most careful consideration in a custody proceeding.”).
By disregarding the evidence and clear inferences that support the trial court’s finding that the wife is committing adultery, the majority, when finding the evidence insufficient to prove adultery, substituted its factual finding for that of the trial court. Thus, the majority is incorrect, in my opinion, in finding that no material change of circumstances occurred. Furthermore, the majority substitutes its exercise of discretion for that of the trial court in determining, as between two fit parents, which parent would serve the best interest of the *168children. The trial judge had the opportunity to personally observe the conduct and demeanor of the parents and is familiar with the history of this case. Because we cannot say the judgment of the trial court was clearly wrong or without evidence to support it, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court. Thus, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion.