Court Opinion

ID: 9725491
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:49:57.63906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:15.720750
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BRESLIN, specially concurring: Although I agree with the majority’s analysis of CFSC’s constitutional argument, I write separately because I believe the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider this argument in the first instance. CFSC cited cases in its brief, which the majority relied upon, to support its argument that it may challenge any tax it chooses so long as it has paid a single tax under protest. But in each of the cited cases the taxpayers confined their arguments to issues related to the particular tax that had been paid under protest. CFSC has not cited any case, and my research has revealed no case, that holds that the payment of a tax under protest entitles the taxpayer to challenge a different tax that was not paid under protest. Accordingly, the cases cited by CFSC are not persuasive. I would analyze this issue by applying the plain language of section 2a of the State Officers and Employees Money Disposition Act (Protest Monies Act) (30 ILCS 230/2a (West 1994)). According to that statute, "[t]he judicial remedy herein provided *** relates only to questions which must be decided by the court in determining the proper disposition of the moneys paid under protest.” 30 ILCS 230/2a (West 1994). The only taxes paid under protest by CFSC were those associated with the Department’s disallowance of the deduction of subpart F income and the disallowance of the net operating loss claim. However, the Department returned the portion of the protest fund attributable to its disallowance of the subpart F deduction. Accordingly, the disposition of the remainder of the protest fund depended solely upon the propriety of the Department’s decision to disallow CFSC’s net operating loss claim. In order to determine whether that decision was proper, the trial court was not required to consider the constitutionality of the Department’s treatment of the royalties and interest payments. Thus, in my opinion, the plain language of section 2a of the Protest Monies Act precluded CFSC from challenging the Department’s treatment of the royalty and interest payments. Furthermore, even if the trial court found that the Department’s treatment of the royalties and interest payments was unconstitutional, CFSC would not have been entitled to a refund from the protest fund because that fund held only the taxes associated with the net operating loss claim. As a result, any ruling made by the trial court or this court regarding the constitutionality of the Department’s treatment of the royalties and interest payments would be advisory in nature. Illinois courts lack jurisdiction to render advisory opinions. See Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 9 (circuit courts have jurisdiction over justiciable matters); People ex rel. Black v. Dukes, 96 Ill. 2d 273, 276-77, 449 N.E.2d 856, 857-58 (1983) (cases that result in advisory opinions are not justiciable). Therefore, in my opinion, this appeal should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Moreover, in adopting the Protest Monies Act, the legislature intended to limit a taxpayer’s ability to challenge a tax in order to prevent the disruption of the state treasury. See Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 70 Ill. App. 3d 95, 101, 388 N.E.2d 235, 240 (1979). However, under the majority’s expansive reading of the Act, a taxpayer such as CFSC will be able to challenge virtually every tax it is required to pay as long as it pays a single tax under protest. This reading of the Protest Monies Act contravenes the legislature’s intent to limit tax challenges to the issues that must be decided to determine the proper disposition of the particular tax monies that were paid under protest. Accordingly, I would hold that, under section 2a of the Protest Monies Act, a taxpayer may challenge only the tax that was paid under protest.