Court Opinion

ID: 9714268
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:33:59.803115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:24.764846
License: Public Domain

RODOWSKY, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from Part II.A of the Court’s opinion, holding that the judgment on the claims against Renee Cole in one of the friendly suits should be vacated for lack of jurisdiction over her person. In my view Renee Cole’s motion to vacate does not present a case or controversy. Further, because the Court affirms the denial of the motion to vacate made by the co-defendant, the Estate of Henry Norman Cole, II, the motion to vacate by Renee Cole is moot. Accordingly, all of the judgments deciding the Renee Cole motion should be vacated, and the matter remanded to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County with instructions to dismiss Renee Cole’s motion. In any event, even if Renee Cole’s motion were justiciable, Renee Cole has failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that her attorney, engaged for her by her personal automobile liability insurer, GEICO, was not authorized to settle the claims against her within policy limits by the friendly suit procedure.
*447I
Henry Norman Cole, II was driving a van, owned by Renee Cole and insured by GEICO, that collided with a telephone pole. Henry Norman Cole, II was killed in the accident and passengers were injured, including two minors, Russell Cole and Arouna Koroma. On December 23, 1993, a friendly suit was filed in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County in order to bind the minor children to a settlement effected by GEICO. The cases of both minor plaintiffs claimed against the driver’s estate. Renee Cole was a defendant only in the Koroma friendly suit, but not in Russell Cole’s friendly suit against the Estate of Cole, even though all of the claims were joined in one action. Renee Cole’s liability, if any, in the Koroma case could be only vicarious.1 Also on December 23, 1993, general denial answers were filed and an order for judgment by consent was signed. The precise identity of the parties and the judgments, set forth in the judgments docketed January 3,1994, are as follows:
“[1] Judgment ... in favor of the plaintiff, Marie Kamara, as mother and next friend of Arouna Koroma, against the defendants, Estate of Henry Norman Cole, II and Renee J. Cole in the amount of $29,296.80[;] ... [2] Judgment ... in favor of the plaintiff Marie Kamara, individually, against the defendants Estate of Henry Norman Cole, II and Renee J. Cole in the amount of $15,053.20[;] ... [3] Judgment ... in favor of the plaintiff, Henry [Reverend] Cole, as father and next friend of Russell Cole against the defendant Estate of Henry Norman Cole, II in the amount of $5,508.27[; and] ... [4] Judgment ... in favor of the plaintiff Henry [Reverend] Cole, individually against the defendant Estate of Henry Norman Cole, II in the amount of $8,741.73.”
When Renee Cole and the Cole Estate moved to vacate the judgments against them, they filed in support of those motions affidavits by Russell Cole and Arouna Koroma who at that *448time had reached their majority. Each of them stated that he had no objection to opening the judgments against Renee Cole and the Cole Estate, and each affiant stated that, contemporaneously with the making of the affidavit, he had executed a release naming Renee Cole, the Cole Estate, and GEICO as releasees.
Maryland Rule 2-535(b) provides that a party may reopen an enrolled judgment only on the grounds of “fraud, mistake, or irregularity.” “Mistake” refers to a jurisdictional defect, including improper service of process. Pickett v. Noba, Inc., 114 Md.App. 552, 558, 691 A.2d 268, 271 (1997). A defendant seeking to reopen an enrolled judgment must show, in addition to fraud, mistake, or irregularity that the party has “acted with ordinary diligence, in good faith, and has a meritorious defense or cause of action.” Tandra S. v. Tyrone W., 336 Md. 303, 314, 648 A.2d 439, 444 (1994) (citing J.T. Masonry Co. v. Oxford Constr. Servs., Inc., 314 Md. 498, 551 A.2d 869 (1989)); see Weitz v. MacKenzie, 273 Md. 628, 631, 331 A.2d 291, 293 (1975) (reversing the trial court’s decision to vacate a judgment because the movant had failed to make this showing). Defendants who move to open judgments against them are required to show a meritorious defense because, in the ordinary scenario where there is a genuine case or controversy, reopening is sought for the purpose of litigating the underlying merits of the case. Renee Cole and the Cole Estate cannot possibly seek to litigate the merits of the claims of the former minors against them because those claimants, as adults, have released the judgment debtors. Instead, their motions seek to reopen the judgments in order to avoid an asserted preclusive effect in a separate suit. Compounding the lack of adverseness, at least as to Renee Cole, is that she is not an interested person in the Cole Estate. See Maryland Code (1974, 1991 Repl.Vol.), § 7-104(a) of the Estates and Trust Article (requiring the personal representative to “advise the register of the names and addresses of the heirs of the decedent and of the legatees”); Maryland Rule 6-316.
Reyes v. Prince George’s County, 281 Md. 279, 380 A.2d 12 (1977), is this Court’s leading case on justiciability. It was *449brought to test the validity of Prince George’s County revenue bonds to be issued to finance an arena. The arena paid counsel for the plaintiffs who were selected to challenge the legality of the issuance. Id. at 282-83, 380 A.2d at 14.
In light of the payment of counsel fees by the opposing party, this Court characterized the suit as “collusive,” and lacking in “true, as opposed to technical, adverseness between the parties.” Id. at 289, 380 A.2d at 18. The Court did not think itself bound to dismiss the case, however, because the policy of not rendering advisory opinions is a rule of decision rather than a constitutional mandate. Instead, we set forth procedures for rendering advisory declaratory judgments in those “rare instances which demonstrate the most compelling of circumstances.” Id. at 297, 380 A.2d at 22. This Court noted, however, that cases involving extraordinary circumstances must nevertheless present a justiciable issue in order for the Court to decide the case:
“A prerequisite to the adjudication of any action under the procedures we detail below [for rendering an advisory opinion in the circumstances noted] is its cognizability under the Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, and in this context ... a court has no right to make a determination in declaratory judgment cases in which no justiciable issue is presented.”
Id. at 287-88, 380 A.2d at 17 (citation omitted) (citing Harford County v. Schultz, 280 Md. 77, 86, 371 A.2d 428, 432-33 (1977)); see also Bishop v. Governor, 281 Md. 521, 525, 380 A.2d 220, 223 (1977) (characterizing the Reyes exception as a “justiciable declaratory judgment action, even though moot,” and noting that “an actual controversy did exist” in Reyes (emphasis added)).
In the instant matter the motions to vacate the judgments do not present a justiciable issue. Addressing that concept, the Court stated in Reyes:
“ ‘If the real and primary object of the suit is to redress the grievance of the plaintiff and there is an actual contro*450versy, involving real and substantial rights between the parties to the record, the suit [will] not be dismissed.
“It is only when the sole object of the suit is to affect third parties and when the interest of the parties to the suit is not adverse and when there is no real and substantial controversy between those who appear as adverse parties, that the principles [regarding collusive and fictitious suits] apply.’ ”
Reyes, 281 Md. at 284, 380 A.2d at 15 (alterations in original) (quoting Fitzjarrell v. Boyd, 123 Md. 497, 503, 91 A. 547, 548 (1914)). This passage suggests two requirements of justiciability: (1) that the plaintiff seek to redress her own harm rather than to affect a third party; and (2) that there be a “real and substantial controversy,” or true adverseness, between the parties.
Even if we assume that the Cole Estate meets the first of these requirements, because it is the plaintiff in the suit against WMATA, it does not meet the second as to the plaintiffs in the friendly suit. In any event, whether the Cole Estate meets these requirements is immaterial in light of the Court’s holding, with which I agree, that Reverend Cole ratified the friendly suit as to the Cole Estate.
Renee Cole’s motion to vacate the judgments against her fails to meet either of these requirements of justiciability. First, the sole object of her motion is to affect a third party, namely, the Cole Estate, by eliminating the asserted preclusive effect of these judgments in the estate’s federal suit against WMATA. Renee Cole is not an heir of the estate, and has no legally recognized interest in the federal suit. Second, there is no “real and substantial controversy” between Renee Cole and the plaintiff in the case that she seeks to reopen, ie., Marie Kamara, whether individually, or as mother and next friend of Arouna Koroma. Renee Cole has not alleged a meritorious defense in that case, and does not intend to litigate its merits. Renee Cole cannot “backfill” to meet the requirement for an actual controversy by relying on WMA-TA’s intervention in the friendly suit. Her motion to vacate *451the judgments must present a case that is actually adverse between herself and the original parties because such adverseness is “ ‘essential to the integrity of the judicial process.’ ” Reyes, 281 Md. at 286, 380 A.2d at 16 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305, 63 S.Ct. 1075, 1076, 87 L.Ed. 1413, 1415 (1943) (per curiam)). Failing to do so, Renee Cole’s motion is non-justiciable, and the asserted defect of service of process does not permit this Court to reopen the judgments against her.
II
As Reyes noted, the adverseness aspect of justiciability shades into the concept of mootness. See id. at 289, 380 A.2d at 18 (noting that the lack of true adverseness between the parties may require dismissal of the case under the principal that “ ‘courts will not decide moot or abstract questions, or, in the absence of constitutional mandate, render advisory opinions’ ” (quoting Harford County, 280 Md. at 80, 371 A.2d at 429)). Renee Cole’s motion to vacate the judgments against her in the Koroma friendly suit is moot because, even if her motion to vacate presents an actual controversy, and even if the judgments against her in the Koroma friendly suit were vacated, the Court upholds all of the judgments in the friendly suits against the Cole Estate. Specifically, today’s decision leaves standing the judgments against the Cole Estate in favor of Marie Kamara, individually and as mother and next friend of Arouna Koroma, and in favor of Reverend Cole, individually and as father and next friend of Russell Cole.2
This Court, like the Court of Special Appeals, need not decide “the preclusive effect of a judgment in a friendly suit brought for the sole purpose of binding a minor to a settlement agreement.” Chapman v. Kamara, 118 Md.App. 418, 426, 702 A.2d 977, 981 (1997). Decision of that issue is for the *452federal court in the action against WMATA. The point is simply that, even if the judgments in the Koroma suit against Renee Cole were vacated, the remaining judgments against the Cole Estate would exert the same preclusive effect (if any) as the vacated judgments with respect to the negligence of the driver of the van, Henry Norman Cole, II. That effect would remain unchanged even if the vicarious liability of Renee Cole were not alleged in the Koroma friendly suit. The possible benefit to a third party, the Cole Estate as plaintiff in the federal action, in avoiding the possible preclusive effect of a judgment against it, if otherwise sufficient to make Renee Cole’s motion justiciable, is mooted by affirming the continued validity of the judgments against the Cole Estate.
“The test for mootness is whether, when it is before the court, a case presents a controversy between the parties for which, by way of resolution, the court can fashion an effective remedy.” Adkins v. State, 824 Md. 641, 646, 598 A.2d 194, 197 (1991). In Adkins the Court held that an appeal challenging the process by which the appellant had been tried for a parole violation, after the appellant had completed his sentence during the appeal’s pendency, was not moot because the finding of a parole violation had collateral consequences as to the challenger similar to those of a criminal conviction. Id. at 656, 598 A.2d at 202. In addition to noting that the asserted harm would continue, the Court stated that a “successful due process challenge by the petitioner would remove from his record any blemish of a violation of probation finding.” Id. at 651, 598 A.2d at 199. This removal is, of course, the “effective remedy” that rendered the harm redressable and the controversy live.
Here, the movants request that, after the judgments are vacated, the circuit court should dismiss the friendly suits, as if they never had been filed. By a parity of reasoning, a divorced couple, who reconcile, could, by their agreement, require the judgment rendering court to vacate the decree of divorce, not for the purpose of litigating the merits of the divorce, but so that the parties could revert to their prejudg*453ment status as married, without the need of any second marriage ceremony.
This Court, in rejecting a mootness argument, has said that “ ‘the doctrine of mootness applies to a situation in which past facts and occurrences have produced a situation in which, without any future action, any judgment or decree the court might enter would be without effect.’ In short, where it appears that our decision could have no effect on what has occurred, or the questions before us have become academic or reduced to abstract propositions, we will generally regard the case as moot.”
Bethesda Management Servs., Inc. v. Department of Licensing & Regulation, 276 Md. 619, 625-26, 350 A.2d 390, 393-94 (1976) (quoting Hayman v. St. Martin’s, 227 Md. 338, 343, 176 A.2d 772, 775 (1962) (citations omitted)).
Here, the circuit court cannot fashion an “effective remedy” for Renee Cole. The “harm” that she seeks to redress is not the lack of jurisdiction over her person in the friendly suit, but the asserted preclusive effect that the judgments against her might have in the federal suit. As already noted, however, even if her motion were granted, the remaining judgments would exert the same preclusive effect, if any. Vacating the judgments against her will be “without effect” with regard to the harm that Renee Cole’s motion actually seeks to redress. The motion is moot and the merits of the motion should not be decided by this Court. See Harford County, 280 Md. at 80, 371 A.2d at 429 (noting that the Court “will not decide moot or abstract questions, or, in the absence of constitutional mandate, render advisory opinions”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hammond v. Lancaster, 194 Md. 462, 471-72, 71 A.2d 474, 478 (1950)).
Ill
A final reason why the judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County should be affirmed is that Renee Cole failed to prove that counsel for GEICO was not authorized to settle the claims of the two minor plaintiffs against her within *454policy limits and to utilize the friendly suit procedure to effect that settlement. I agree with the thorough and well reasoned opinion by the Court of Special Appeals. Chapman v. Kamara, 118 Md.App. 418, 702 A.2d 977 (1997).
The motion to vacate was heard on its merits by the circuit court on a record consisting of the pleadings and other papers, including affidavits and deposition extracts, and on the general facts agreed upon by counsel and represented to the court. Those general background facts are that Renee Cole’s GEICO policy carried liability limits per occurrence of $100,000. There were seven passengers in the van, including the two minor claimants. The adjuster for GEICO threw in the policy, if that would settle all of the claims, and proposed apportioning the $100,000 among the seven claimants based on the ratio that a particular claimant’s special damages bore to the total special damages. That was acceptable to all of the claimants, including the two minors, who were each represented by their own counsel. GEICO then apparently sent the matter to counsel for the purpose of having the two minors bound by their respective settlements.
On this aspect of the case the majority holds, necessarily as a matter of law and contrary to the fact-finding by the circuit court, that there was no personal jurisdiction over Renee Cole because she did not know of the friendly suit and was not served with the suit papers.
In my opinion that conclusion cannot withstand analysis. The burden was on Renee Cole, as the movant, to prove that there was no personal jurisdiction over her. See Home Indem. Co. v. Killian, 94 Md.App. 205, 216, 616 A.2d 906, 911 (1992) (noting that, when a party seeks to revise a judgment, “[i ]t must show that the judgments were entered by fraud, mistake, or irregularity” (emphasis added)). Because she sought to vacate an enrolled judgment, the burden of persuasion on that issue was to the standard of clear and convincing evidence. See Tandra S., 336 Md. at 314, 648 A.2d at 444 (“[I]t is well established that there must be clear and convincing evidence of the ... mistake ... before a movant is entitled *455to have a judgment vacated under Rule 2-535(b).”). Renee Cole did not show that GEICO, acting through counsel, was not authorized to settle the claims against her within policy limits by appearing for her in the friendly suit, denying liability, and then consenting to the settlement judgment which was promptly paid.
This conclusion is not defeated by the absence from the record of the form of policy issued by GEICO to Renee Cole. Professor Keeton has said:
“By the terms of the typical liability insurance policy it is provided that the company shall ‘defend any suit against the insured ... even if such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent; but the company may make such investigation, negotiation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient....”’
R.E. Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 Harv. L.Rev. 1136, 1137 (1954) (emphasis added; footnote omitted). See also R.E. Keeton & A.I. Widiss, Insurance Law: A Guide to Fundamental Principles, Legal Doctrines, and Commercial Practices § 7.8(a), at 875 (Practitioner’s ed. 1988) (“Liability insurance policies customarily provide that the insurer ‘may make such investigation, negotiation, and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient.’ ” (citing policy forms) (footnote omitted)); E.S. Pryor, The Tort Liability Regime and the Duty to Defend, 58 Md. L.Rev. 1, 21 (1999) (noting that “standard commercial and individual liability policies contain language along the following lines: ... ‘We will settle or defend, as we consider appropriate, any claim or suit asking for [bodily injury or property] damages’ ” (quoting Alliance of American Insurers, Policy Kit for Insurance Professionals 3 (1993-94))).
Sweeten v. National Mutual Insurance Co. of D.C., 233 Md. 52, 194 A.2d 817 (1963), dealt with another aspect of the insurer’s authority to settle, namely, the failure to settle. There this Court said:
“The prevailing view appears to be that recovery should be rested on the theory of bad faith, because the insurer has *456. the exclusive control, under the standard policy, of investigation, settlement and defense of any claim or suit against the insured, and there is a potential, if not actual, conflict of interest giving rise to a fiduciary duty.”
Id. at 55,194 A.2d at 818 (emphasis added).
This language from Sweeten has been quoted regularly by this Court, as recently as March of this year. See Mesmer v. M.A.I.F., 358 Md. 241, 259-63, 725 A.2d 1053, 1061-64 (1999); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 334 Md. 381, 395, 639 A.2d 652, 658-59 (1994); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 308 Md. 315, 318, 519 A.2d 202, 204 (1987); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. White, 248 Md. 324, 329, 236 A.2d 269, 271-72 (1967).
The recognition by this Court of what standard policies provide was not based on any evidence of an industry survey. Rather, it represents what is in effect judicial notice of that which is common knowledge at the bench and bar. If Renee Cole’s policy required her consent for the insurer to settle within policy limits, then, in addition to her general burden as movant, Renee Cole should have come forward with the policy provision that was out of the ordinary. Further undermining the majority’s conclusion is the legal presumption that attorneys who enter an appearance on behalf of a party in litigation are authorized to do so. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Devers, 389 F.2d 44, 45 (4th Cir.1968); Lovering v. Lovering, 38 Md.App. 360, 362, 380 A.2d 668, 670 (1977).
Finally, the undisputed facts on which the majority relies, namely, that Renee Cole was not served with and had no knowledge of the suit, do not establish that the entry of the judgment was unauthorized. That evidence, being entirely consistent with a friendly suit which is authorized under the typical or standard policy, proves nothing.
Judge WILNER has authorized me to state that he joins in the views expressed herein.

. Renee Cole is the stepmother of Henry Norman Cole, II (the driver) and, I infer, of Russell Cole who was represented in his friendly suit by his father, Reverend Cole.

. Renee Cole could not have standing to challenge the judgments against the Cole Estate in favor of Russell Cole because the latter did not claim against her and no judgment has been entered against her on Russell Cole’s claims.