Court Opinion

ID: 9737557
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:28:39.270262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:59.785212
License: Public Domain

Heffernan, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully disagree with my colleagues who would affirm the conviction.
To sustain a criminal conviction the state “must prove all the essential facts entering into the description of the offense.” Kreutzer v. Westfahl (1925), 187 Wis. 468, 478, 204 N. W. 595. In Koscak v. State (1915), 160 Wis. 255, 265, 152 N. W. 181, we said, “It is elementary that every essential of the offense charged must be established to constitute a violation of the criminal law.”
One of the elements of the crime of prostitution is nonmarital intercourse. In the instant case, not only was there no proof that the proffered connection was non-marital, but in fact there was no attempt at such proof. The majority opinion reasons that proof of this essential fact was made by circumstantial evidence. Even a cursory reading of the record should reveal that there was no attempt to circumstantially show the omitted fact. There was an utter failure of proof either direct or circumstantial.
As soon as the state rested, the defense moved to dismiss for failure of proof. The record shows that the *35district attorney asked the judge to permit the recall of the officer, who was apparently still present in the courtroom, to supply the omitted testimony. The judge, however; ignored this offer of testimony and proceeded to make a finding of guilty. It would appear, under these circumstances, we should not now shore up a shoddy job by conjuring up circumstantial evidence to sustain the state’s case. It is well recognized that circumstantial evidence should not be resorted to when there is direct evidence available, as clearly there was here. 29 Am. Jur. 2d, Evidence, p. 312, sec. 264, points out, “When it is disclosed that direct evidence of a material fact is probably in existence, circumstantial evidence of that fact cannot be resorted to . . . .”
It is clear that the state negligently failed to prove the essential elements of the crime. When the omission became apparent and could readily (we assume) have been rectified, it was error for the judge, knowing of this omission, to proceed with a finding of guilty. If the trial judge concluded that the case ought not to have been dismissed, it was well within his discretion, under these circumstances, to permit the state to recall its witnesses to prove the missing elements of the crime.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Wilkie joins in this dissent.