Court Opinion

ID: 9364786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-20 06:04:14.142337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:40.332581
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
               revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                         STATE OF MICHIGAN

                         COURT OF APPEALS

JOSEPH DAVIS, SR.,                                              UNPUBLISHED
                                                                January 19, 2023
            Plaintiff,

and

VHS OF MICHIGAN, INC., doing business as
DETROIT MEDICAL CENTER,

            Intervening Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                               No. 359313
                                                                Wayne Circuit Court
METLIFE INSURANCE COMPANY and                                   LC No. 21-007401-NF
MICHIGAN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
PLACEMENT FACILITY,

            Defendants-Appellees.

JOSEPH DAVIS, SR.,

            Plaintiff-Appellant,

and

VHS OF MICHIGAN, INC., doing business as
DETROIT MEDICAL CENTER,

            Intervening Plaintiff,

v                                                               No. 360265
                                                                Wayne Circuit Court

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METLIFE INSURANCE COMPANY and                                      LC No. 21-007401-NF
MICHIGAN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
PLACEMENT FACILITY,

              Defendants-Appellees.

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and O’BRIEN and Rick, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        In Docket No. 359313, intervening plaintiff, VHS of Michigan, Inc., doing business as
Detroit Medical Center, appeals as of right the order granting summary disposition in favor of
defendants, MetLife Insurance Company (defendant MetLife) and Michigan Automobile
Insurance Placement Facility (defendant MAIPF). In Docket No. 360265, plaintiff, Joseph Davis
Sr. (plaintiff Davis), appeals by delayed leave granted the same order granting summary
disposition in favor of defendants. We affirm.

                                      I. BACKGROUND

       Plaintiff Davis sustained injuries when he was involved in a motor vehicle accident while
driving a vehicle owned by his girlfriend, Regina Edwards. Plaintiff Davis received medical
treatment for his injuries at intervening plaintiff’s facility.

         Defendant MetLife insured Edwards’s vehicle. As part of its investigation into plaintiff
Davis’s eligibility for no-fault insurance coverage, defendant MetLife requested that plaintiff
Davis participate in an examination under oath (EUO). Plaintiff Davis stated during the EUO that
at the time of the accident in June 2020 he lived with his mother and his stepfather. He did not
have a driver’s license and had not owned a vehicle for 10 years. Plaintiff Davis stated that he
would drive Edwards’s vehicle once per week before the accident occurred. On the day of the
accident, plaintiff Davis became impatient while waiting for Edwards to return to her home to
drive him to the store. Plaintiff Davis took the keys for Edwards’s vehicle from a table in
Edwards’s house and “went to do what [he] had to do.” Plaintiff Davis stated that Edwards called
him and asked where he had taken her vehicle. According to plaintiff Davis, he and Edwards
argued and Edwards “was mad and upset that I took the car.” The accident occurred when plaintiff
Davis was on his way to return the vehicle to Edwards. In response to the question whether he
had permission to operate Edwards’s vehicle at the time of the accident, plaintiff Davis replied,
“No, not that day I didn’t.”

        Defendant MetLife denied plaintiff Davis’s claim for no-fault insurance benefits under
MCL 500.3113(a) because it determined that at the time of the accident plaintiff Davis was
willingly operating a motor vehicle that was taken unlawfully. Defendant MetLife also denied the
claim because other insurance coverage was reportedly available to plaintiff Davis through
relatives in his household. Defendant MAIPF also denied plaintiff Davis’s claim for no-fault
insurance benefits on the ground that plaintiff Davis had no-fault insurance benefits through
relatives in his household.

                                               -2-
        Plaintiff Davis filed a complaint alleging breach of contract for MetLife’s unreasonable
refusal to pay personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits and for MAIPF’s failure to appoint an
insurer to immediately pay no-fault insurance benefits owed to him. Intervening plaintiff also filed
a complaint alleging that it was entitled to reimbursement for all reasonable charges incurred for
the services and products provided for plaintiff Davis’s care, recovery, or rehabilitation arising out
of the subject accident.

       Defendant MAIPF filed an answer to plaintiff Davis’s and intervening plaintiff’s
complaints, denying that it unreasonably refused payment of no-fault insurance benefits.
Defendant MetLife moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10) in lieu of
answering the complaints, arguing that plaintiff Davis was not entitled to no-fault benefits because
there was no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff Davis took and operated Edwards’s vehicle
unlawfully at the time of the subject accident. Defendant MAIPF concurred with defendant
MetLife’s motion. In response to the motion, intervening plaintiff and plaintiff Davis asserted that
a question of fact existed regarding whether plaintiff Davis was “prohibited” from taking
Edwards’s vehicle on the date of the accident.

        The trial court, after a hearing, granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition and
dismissed plaintiffs’ claims. The court found that there was no evidence that plaintiff Davis had
Edwards’s permission to use the vehicle on the date of the accident. The court concluded that
under MCL 500.3113(a), plaintiff Davis was disqualified from receiving PIP benefits because he
willingly operated a vehicle that was unlawfully taken, and he knew or should have known that
the vehicle was unlawfully taken.1

                                  II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        “This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition.”
Powell-Murphy v Revitalizing Auto Communities Environmental Response Trust, 333 Mich App
234, 242; 964 NW2d 50 (2020) (citation omitted). Although the trial court did not specify the
grounds for granting defendant MetLife’s motion for summary disposition, it relied on
documentary evidence to support its decision. Accordingly, MCR 2.116(C)(10) is the appropriate
basis for review. BC Tile & Marble, Inc v Multi Bldg Co, Inc, 288 Mich App 576, 582; 794 NW2d

1
  The trial court denied plaintiff Davis’s motion for reconsideration, which asserted that the trial
court granted defendants’ motion without any development of facts regarding whether plaintiff
Davis took Edwards’s vehicle unlawfully. Plaintiff Davis asserted that the appropriate question
when determining whether the vehicle was taken unlawfully was not whether plaintiff Davis had
permission to take the vehicle but, rather, whether plaintiff Davis committed a criminal act when
he took the vehicle. Plaintiff attached to his motion an affidavit signed by Edwards and an affidavit
signed by himself. Any reliance that intervening plaintiff or plaintiff Davis place on the affidavits
in support of their arguments on appeal is misplaced because the affidavits were not signed until
November 2, 2021, which was after the hearing on defendants’ motion for summary disposition.
The affidavits were not presented to the trial court until November 24, 2021, which was after the
court had entered the November 5, 2021 order granting summary disposition in favor of
defendants.

                                                 -3-
76 (2010). The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of defendant MAIPF under
MCR 2.116(I)(2). Because defendant MAIPF concurred in defendant MetLife’s motion for
summary disposition, in analyzing the trial court’s decision to grant summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(I)(2), we will utilize the standard of review that applies to a motion under
MCR 2.116(C)(10).

        A trial court may properly grant a motion for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(10) “when the affidavits or other documentary evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the moving party is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Lowrey v LMPS & LMPJ,
Inc, 500 Mich 1, 5; 890 NW2d 344 (2016). “If the moving party properly supports his or her
motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish that a genuine issue of material fact
exists.” Redmond v Heller, 332 Mich App 415, 438; 957 NW2d 357 (2020). “A genuine issue of
material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party,
leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “Where the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue rests on a nonmoving party,
the nonmoving party may not rely on mere allegations or denials in pleadings, but must go beyond
the pleadings to set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists.”
Lowrey, 500 Mich at 7, quoting Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 362; 547 NW2d 314
(1996) (quotation marks omitted). “If the opposing party fails to present documentary evidence
establishing the existence of a material factual dispute, the motion is properly granted.” Lowrey,
500 Mich at 7, quoting Quinto, 451 Mich at 363 (quotation marks omitted). This Court’s “review
is limited to the evidence that had been presented to the circuit court at the time the motion was
decided.” Innovative Adult Foster Care, Inc v Ragin, 285 Mich App 466, 475-476; 776 NW2d
398 (2009).

                                          III. ANALYSIS

        Plaintiff Davis and intervening plaintiff argue that the trial court erred by granting summary
disposition in favor of defendants because a genuine issue of material fact remained regarding
whether plaintiff Davis unlawfully took Edwards’s vehicle.

        At issue here is MCL 500.3113(a), which bars recovery for PIP benefits if, at the time of
the accident, “[t]he person was willingly operating or willingly using a motor vehicle that was
taken unlawfully, and the person knew or should have known that the motor vehicle was taken
unlawfully.” For no-fault insurance benefits to be barred under MCL 500.3113(a), plaintiff Davis
must have (1) willingly operated or used Edwards’s vehicle, (2) taken Edwards’s vehicle
unlawfully, and (3) known or should have known that Edwards’s vehicle was taken unlawfully.
The first element is not in dispute in this case.

                                                 -4-
       Regarding the second element, in Spectrum Health Hosps v Farm Bureau Mut Ins Co of
Mich, 492 Mich 503, 516-517; 821 NW2d 117 (2012), the Court interpreted the phrase “taken
unlawfully”2 in the context of MCL 500.3113(a):

                In determining the Legislature's intended meaning of the phrase “taken
        unlawfully,” we must accord the phrase its plain and ordinary meaning, and we may
        consult dictionary definitions because the no-fault act does not define the phrase.
        The word “unlawful” commonly means “not lawful; contrary to law; illegal,” and
        the word “take” is commonly understood as “to get into one's hands or possession
        by voluntary action.” When the words are considered together, the plain meaning
        of the phrase “taken unlawfully” readily embraces a situation in which an individual
        gains possession of a vehicle contrary to Michigan law. [Citations omitted.]

        The Spectrum Court went on to explain two examples of a taking “contrary to Michigan
law”:

                The Michigan Penal Code contains several statutes that prohibit “takings,”
        including two that prohibit “joyriding,” MCL 750.413 and MCL 750.414.
        MCL 750.413 states that “[a]ny person who shall, wilfully and without authority,
        take possession of and drive or take away . . . any motor vehicle, belonging to
        another, shall be guilty of a felony . . . .” Similarly, MCL 750.414 provides in
        pertinent part that “[a]ny person who takes or uses without authority any motor
        vehicle without intent to steal the same, or who is a party to such unauthorized
        taking or using, is guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .” Thus, both joyriding statutes make
        it unlawful to take any motor vehicle without authority, effectively defining an
        unlawful taking of a vehicle as that which is unauthorized. [Id. at 517-518 (citations
        omitted).]

        “Because a taking does not have to be larcenous to be unlawful, the phrase ‘taken
unlawfully’ in MCL 500.3113(a) applies to anyone who takes a vehicle without the authority of
the owner.” Id. at 518. Thus, “any person who takes a vehicle contrary to a provision of the
Michigan Penal Code—including MCL 750.413 and MCL 750.414, informally known as the
‘joyriding’ statutes—has taken the vehicle unlawfully within the meaning of MCL 500.3113(a).”
Id. at 537. See also Ahmed v Tokio Marine America Ins Co, 337 Mich App 1, 10-11; 972 NW2d
860 (2021) (stating that “[a]s used in MCL 500.3113(a), the word ‘unlawfully’ means contrary to
the criminal law, for example, any violation of the Michigan Penal Code.”). The relevant inquiry
into the determination of an unlawful taking is whether the taking was “without authority.”

2
 While the operative language in MCL 500.3113(a)—“taken unlawfully”—has not changed since
Spectrum, other parts of that statute have changed.               When Spectrum was decided,
MCL 500.3113(a) stated that a person was not entitled to PIP benefits if the person “was using a
motor vehicle or motorcycle which he or she had taken unlawfully, unless the person reasonably
believed that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle.”

                                                 -5-
MCL 500.3113(a) “examines the legality of the taking from the driver’s perspective . . . . .” Id.
at 522.

        We agree with the trial court that there was no question of fact that plaintiff Davis’s taking
of Edwards’s vehicle was without authority. Plaintiff Davis took the keys to Edwards’s vehicle
and drove off. When asked whether he had permission to operate Edwards’s vehicle at the time
of the accident, plaintiff Davis stated, “No, not that day I didn’t.” There is nothing in the record
to support that plaintiff Davis had permission to take and use the vehicle, and reasonable minds
could not differ that his taking of the vehicle on the night of the accident was without authority
and was, therefore, an unlawful taking.3

        The third element of MCL 500.3113(a) requires looking at plaintiff Davis’s state of mind
and whether he “knew or should have known” that the vehicle was taken without authority. Under
the facts of this case, no reasonable juror could conclude that plaintiff Davis did not know that he
took the vehicle without authority. By his own statement, plaintiff Davis did not have permission
to take the vehicle, and so he knew that his taking of the vehicle was unauthorized. Reasonable
minds could not disagree that plaintiff Davis knew or should have known that he was using the
vehicle unlawfully—since he was the one who knowingly took it without authorization, and so the
requirement in MCL 500.3113(a) that “the person knew or should have known that the motor
vehicle . . . was taken unlawfully” is satisfied.

       Accordingly, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, showed that the
vehicle was taken unlawfully by plaintiff Davis, and that plaintiff Davis knew the vehicle was
taken unlawfully, leaving no genuine issue of fact for a jury to consider. Consequently, under
MCL 500.3113(a), plaintiff Davis is not eligible for PIP benefits, and the trial court did not err by
granting summary disposition in favor of defendant MetLife.

       Finally, plaintiff Davis and intervening plaintiff are barred from recovering no-fault
insurance benefits through defendant MAIPF under MCL 500.3173. MCL 500.3173 provides:

               A person who because of a limitation or exclusion in sections 3105 to
       3116 . . . is disqualified from receiving personal protection insurance benefits under
       a policy otherwise applying to his accidental bodily injury is also disqualified from
       receiving benefits under the assigned claims plan.

        Because, under MCL 500.3173, an individual who is disqualified from receiving no-fault
insurance benefits under an insurance policy pursuant to MCL 500.3113 is also disqualified from
receiving no-fault insurance benefits under the assigned claims plan, neither plaintiff Davis, nor

3
  Contrary to plaintiff Davis’s and intervening plaintiff’s assertions, MCL 500.3113(a) does not
require a vehicle to be taken against the express prohibition of the vehicle’s owner. In Spectrum,
the Court considered “whether a person injured while driving a motor vehicle that the person had
taken contrary to the express prohibition of the owner may avail himself or herself of” no-fault
insurance benefits. Spectrum, 492 Mich at 508. However, the Court did not establish a
requirement that a vehicle owner must expressly prohibit the use of the vehicle for a taking to be
unlawful under MCL 500.3113(a).

                                                 -6-
intervening plaintiff, can recover no-fault insurance benefits through defendant MAIPF. Thus, the
trial court also did not err by granting summary disposition in favor of defendant MAIPF.

       Affirmed. Defendants, being the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.

                                                           /s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
                                                           /s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
                                                           /s/ Michelle M. Rick

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