Court Opinion

ID: 9664997
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:35:59.889521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:12.015349
License: Public Domain

D. E. Holbrook, Jr., J.
Plaintiff appeals by leave granted from the directed verdict entered in favor of defendant. Plaintiff is the widow of James Adkins, who died as a result of an automobile accident. Mr. Adkins’s life was insured by defendant in the amount of $6,500. The policy also included a double indemnity clause for accidental death. Defendant paid plaintiff $6,500 but refused to pay the additional $6,500 as provided under the double indemnity clause. A blood alcohol level test taken from Mr. Adkins shortly after his death revealed his alcohol level to be 0.22 percent. On the morning of the date set for trial, the court accepted Mr. Adkins’s blood alcohol level into evidence, applied the presumption that intoxication occurs at 0.10 percent, and, when the court learned that the only *827evidence to rebut the presumption of intoxication would be the testimony of plaintiff, who was not present at the accident that resulted in her husband’s death, granted defendant a directed verdict. The trial court reasoned that driving while intoxicated constituted a crime sufficient to invoke defendant’s exclusionary clause, which provides that benefits are not paid for any losses sustained while committing a crime.
On appeal plaintiff contends that error occurred in the granting of the directed verdict. We agree.
The trial court applied the presumption that a blood alcohol level of 0.10 percent constitutes intoxication. We do not find this presumption to be applicable in civil actions. Due to the trial court’s acceptance of this presumption, plaintiff was not given an opportunity to present her case. While the trial judge was willing to afford her an opportunity to rebut the presumption of intoxication, we find that application of this presumption was incorrect and impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to plaintiff. The burden of proving intoxication of the decedent belonged to defendant. The defendant would be permitted to place the blood alcohol level of decedent into evidence,1 however, the burden would be on defendant to prove by expert testimony and other evidentiary means what the blood alcohol level meant. Defendant is not entitled to the benefit of the presumptions created by statute for criminal proceedings. MCL 257.625a; MSA 9.2325(1).
See MCL ' 257.625a(3)(c); MSA 9.2325(l)(3)(c), which provides for the presumption of intoxication.
"(3) Except in a prosecution relating solely to a *828violation of section 625(2), the amount of alcohol in the driver’s blood at the time alleged as shown by chemical analysis of the person’s blood, urine, or breath shall give rise to the following presumptions:
"(c) If there was at the time 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant’s blood, it shall be presumed that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.”
The Legislature has said that these presumptions do not arise in a prosecution relating solely to a violation of § 625(2). This action appears to be solely within that section which provides that:
"(2) A person, whether licensed or not, whose blood contains 0.10% or more by weight of alcohol, shall not operate a vehicle upon a highway or other place open to the general public, including an area designated for the parking of vehicles, within the state.” MCL 257.625(2); MSA 9.2325(2).
Accordingly, we find reversible error to have occurred in the admission of these presumptions.
The trial court and defendant also believe that since the decedent’s blood alcohol level was greater than 0.10 percent, he was intoxicated and this constituted a crime sufficient to trigger the life insurance policy’s exclusion that:
"Benefits are not provided under this coverage for any loss which results from, or is caused directly or indirectly, wholly or partly, by * * * committing or attempting to commit a crime * *
We cannot agree with this. What constitutes a crime that would invoke this exclusion is ambiguous.
"An insurance contract which is ambiguous must be *829liberally construed in favor of the insured. Foremost Life Ins Co v Waters, 88 Mich App 599, 604; 278 NW2d 688 (1979).” Usher v St Paul Fire & Marine Ins Co, 126 Mich App 443, 447; 337 NW2d 351 (1983).
"A contract is said to be ambiguous when its words may reasonably be understood in different ways.” Raska v Farm Bureau Mutual Ins Co of Michigan, 412 Mich 355, 362; 314 NW2d 440 (1982).
Certainly defendant had the option to place an exclusion in its insurance policy that would have excluded coverage for losses sustained while under the influence of drugs or intoxication. 13 ALR2d 987.
In our opinion a reasonable person would not think that driving while under the influence would constitute a crime sufficient to invoke this exclusion. Mindful of the rule that an insurance policy should be strictly construed against the insurer, we conclude that this exclusion would not apply in the instant action. Celina Mutual Ins Co v Citizens Ins Co, 136 Mich App 315, 320-321; 355 NW2d 916 (1984), and Nickerson v Citizens Mutual Ins Co, 393 Mich 324; 224 NW2d 896 (1975).
Reversed and remanded for trial.

 Hubenschmidt v Shears, 403 Mich 486; 270 NW2d 2 (1978).