Court Opinion

ID: 9750550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:06:44.534993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:12.498880
License: Public Domain

WOODS, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that use of a starter pistol, which a robbery victim reasonably believed was a real gun, does not constitute use of a dangerous weapon within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (b) (statutory references are to the Penal Code).
The majority reach their erroneous result by relying upon People v. Reid (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 354 [184 CaLRptr. 186], a case which misread and misstated the holding of People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518 [47 CaLRptr. 353, 407 P.2d 265]. I explain.
In Aranda, Justice Traynor considered two disparate weapons provisions that might arise upon retrial. One involved then section 211a which provided *1576that robbery “perpetrated . . . by a person being armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon" is robbery of the first degree. The other was section 3024, subdivision (b) and involved minimum sentences for defendants “armed with a deadly weapon.”
As to the latter provision Justice Traynor stated: “Section 3024, subdivision (b), of the Penal Code provides that a person with a prior felony conviction is subject to a minimum sentence of four years if at the time of the offense he was ‘armed with a deadly weapon.’ The disjunctive word ‘dangerous’ is not used, but the words ‘deadly weapon’ are defined in subdivision (f) to include ‘any . . . pistol, revolver, or any other firearm . . . and any metal pipe or bar used or intended to be used as a club.’ Although this definition includes any firearm whether loaded or not, it does not include a toy pistol unless the toy was made of metal and was ‘used or intended to be used as a club.’ If the weapon cannot be found, the jury may be instructed by the court that it may draw an inference from the circumstances surrounding the robbery that the gun was not a toy. Testimony to the effect that the defendant was flourishing the pistol or pointing it at the victim and was using threatening words or conduct indicating that he intended to fire it if his demands were not met would be evidence from which the inference could be drawn.” (63 Cal.2d at p. 533.)
As is obvious, this section 3024 discussion is irrelevant to section 12022, subdivision (b) because the former involves only “deadly” weapons while the latter involves “deadly or dangerous weapons.” Since section 3024 specified that to qualify as a “deadly weapon” a nonfirearm metal object must be “used or intended to be used as a club”—of course, Justice Traynor, in construing this section, said a toy pistol satisfies the definition only if it was “ ‘used or intended to be used as a club.’ ” In other words, section 3024 means what section 3024 says.
As to the “armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon” provision of section 211a, Justice Traynor’s discussion is apposite because the issue was not “armed" (different from section 12022, subdivision (b) “use”) but rather whether a nonfirearm, a metal toy gun, qualified as a “dangerous weapon.” This is the identical issue in the instant case.
As to this issue Justice Traynor stated: “Both defendants contend that the evidence does not support findings that they were guilty of first degree robbery or that they were armed with a deadly weapon. Section 211a of the Penal Code provides that robbery ‘perpetrated . . . by a person being armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon’ is robbery in the first degree. The words ‘dangerous or deadly’ are used disjunctively and are not equivalents. . . . *1577Thus, it is not necessary to show that the weapon is deadly so long as it can be shown that it is dangerous. . . . When the weapon involved is a gun, the prosecution need not produce it. Testimony by witnesses who state that they saw what looked like a gun, even if they cannot identify the type or caliber, will suffice. . . . The prosecution does not have to prove either that the gun was loaded ... or that it was real (People v. Ward [(1948)] 84 Cal.App.2d 357, 360 [190 P.2d 972]). Any pistol, even a short one, may be a ‘dangerous’ weapon within the meaning of the statute since it is capable of being used as a bludgeon. (See People v. Hood ([1958]) 160 Cal.App.2d 121, 122 [324 P.2d 656].) It is not necessary to show that defendant intended to use it. . . . A jury may be instructed that if it finds that the gun was real, whether loaded or not, then the crime committed is robbery in the first degree. If it finds that the gun was a toy, it may still find that the robbery is of the first degree if it determines from the circumstances that the toy gun could have been used as a club.” (63 Cal.2d at p. 532, italics added, some citations omitted.)
Thus, Justice Traynor made clear that an object which was not a real gun, such as a metal toy gun, qualified as a “dangerous weapon” if it “could have been used as a club.”
Noteworthy in this discussion of “dangerous weapon” (in stark contrast to the discussion of “deadly weapon” within the meaning of section 3024) is the omission of “used or intended to be used as a club.” It is omitted because, unlike § 3024, it is absent as a requirement of “dangerous weapon.” (People v. Ward (1948) 84 Cal.App.2d 357 [190 P.2d 972] [A metal toy gun resembling a .32-caliber automatic is a “dangerous weapon.”]; People v. Coleman (1942) 53 Cal.App.2d 18, 29 [127 P.2d 309] [A toy pistol resembling a .45-caliber pistol is a “dangerous weapon.”]; People v. Hood (1958) 160 Cal.App.2d 121, 122 [324 P.2d 656] [“A kit of tools . . . ; an unloaded gun . . . ; or a toy gun . . . may be a ‘dangerous’ weapon within the meaning of the statute because capable of being used as a bludgeon or club.”]; see also People v. Nelums (1982) 31 Cal.3d 355, 359 [182 Cal.Rptr. 515, 644 P.2d 201] [an inoperable gun may be a “firearm” within the meaning of sections 12022, subd. (a) and 12022.5. Such a weapon creates “substantial risks of harm by a resisting victim or third person . . . .”]; People v. Bland (1995) 10 Cal.4th 991, 1005 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 77, 898 P.2d 391] [“. . . an inoperable gun still creates a risk of harm because its passive display ‘may stimulate resistance’ ”].)
People v. Reid misread and misstated Aranda.
Reid, apparently unaware Aranda separately considered two disparate weapons statutes, states: “The court in Aranda held that a toy pistol could *1578not be considered deadly or dangerous unless the toy was made of metal and was used or intended to be used as a club. ([Aranda., supra,] at p. 533.) The court in Aranda was interpreting former Penal Code section 3024, subdivisions (b) and (f). These sections provided that a person with a prior felony conviction is subject to a minimum sentence of four years if at the time of the offense he or she was armed with a deadly weapon. Deadly weapon was defined to include ‘any . . . pistol, revolver, or any other firearm . . . and any metal pipe or bar used or intended to be used as a club.’ (Id., at p. 533.)
“While not discussing the effect of the use of a toy pistol in a Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (b) enhancement, the Supreme Court’s discussion of when a toy gun may be considered deadly is pertinent here.” (People v. Reid, supra, 133 Cal.App.3d 354, 366, original italics.)
Thus, Reid wrongly indicates Aranda was concerned with a “deadly weapon” when considering degree of robbery on the cited page 533. In fact, Aranda was then solely concerned with “dangerous weapon.” Similarly, Reid seems unaware that in discussing section 3024 Aranda was not concerned with “dangerous weapon” but only “deadly weapon.”
By errantly combining separate discussions of disparate statutes, Reid ascribes to Aranda a holding opposite to its actual holding.
The majority, by uncritically adopting Reid's construction of Aranda, are in error.
The petitions of both respondent and appellant for review by the Supreme Court were denied February 26, 1997.