Court Opinion

ID: 9670893
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:27:53.416904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:07.108206
License: Public Domain

412 Mich 343
(Levin, J.,

concurring).

That justice additionally concluded that such clauses were void and unenforceable on other grounds. Three justices agreed that the no-fault act did not require portable coverage when the owner drives another insured vehicle, but would have held that the clause was enforceable. 412 Mich 353-354 (Coleman, C.J., for reversal).
In the instant case, DAIIE’s complaint alleged that the Todd vehicle was uninsured. Widling’s answer denied that the Todd vehicle was unin*552sured. Widling filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that the exclusionary clause was void under Ruuska.
The circuit judge denied Widling’s motion and granted summary judgment to DAIIE. The file does not contain a motion by DAIIE for summary judgment. Inexplicably, the judge said that it was "undisputed” that the Todd vehicle was uninsured. Widling twice filed for rehearing, arguing inter alia that the judge had granted summary judgment on the basis of facts that were disputed, including whether the Todd vehicle was insured. These motions were denied.
The judge erred in granting summary judgment where there was a disputed question of fact.
The question reserved in Ruuska — whether portable residual liability coverage is required by the no-fault act when the insured drives another vehicle that is uninsured — should not be addressed unless it is determined that the Todd vehicle was uninsured.
If it were to be determined that the Todd vehicle is insured, it may be necessary to reconsider the holding in State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co v Sivey, 404 Mich 51; 272 NW2d 555 (1978), that an exclusion from liability coverage for bodily injury to an insured or any family member residing in the same household as the insured was violative of the Motor Vehicle Code. Shortly before Sivey was decided,1 the Legislature amended § 3131 of the no-fault act to provide that residual liability coverage is not required "in this state other than that required by section 3009(1).” 1978 PA 460, MCL 500.3131; MSA 24.13131. Section 3009(1) does not include the language of the Motor Vehicle Code *553relied on in Sivey. MCL 500.3009(1); MSA 24.13009(1).
If the authority of Sivey was vitiated by the 1978 amendment of § 3131 of the no-fault act and §3009(1) does not require residual liability coverage when the vehicle is being operated by an authorized driver and the exclusionary clause in issue is valid, then the no-fault act may not require residual liability coverage unless an insured vehicle is being driven by the owner-insured. The result could be that often there would be no residual liability insurance applicable to an insured vehicle.
This suggests that whether there are limitations on residual liability coverage when the insured is driving an uninsured vehicle and when an insured vehicle is being driven by a person other than the insured are questions of considerable importance in the application of the no-fault act.
Widling has not filed a brief in this Court. We should not decide questions of such importance to owners, drivers, and injured persons without adequate briefing on both sides of the question, which might be obtained by inviting amicus briefs from the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ bars.
We vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Williams, C.J., and Levin, Ryan, Brickley, Cavanagh, and Boyle, JJ., concurred with Kav-ANAGH, J.

 Sivey was decided on December 26, 1978. 1978 PA 460 was approved October 16, 1978.