Court Opinion

ID: 9729764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:48:12.524023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:01.054445
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
I would affirm. Like all the tribunals who have previously reviewed this case, I would apply § 7409. By employing a strict reading of § 7409 in isolation, the lead opinion would render § 7409 inapplicable and would make this case appear uncomplicated. Yet, this case is anything but simple. The lead opinion purports to be constrained by principles *83of justice, but its treatment of this case is anything but just.
The text of § 7409, when viewed alone, arguably supports the lead opinion. However, we are not constrained to view the text of § 7409 in a vacuum. Statutes should be construed to prevent absurd or illogical results, injustice, or prejudice to the public interest. McAuley v General Motors Corp, 457 Mich 513, 518; 578 NW2d 282 (1998); Gross v General Motors Corp, 448 Mich 147, 158-159, 160, 164; 528 NW2d 707 (1995). A statute that appears facially unambiguous may nonetheless be ambiguous when read in relation to other statutes. People v Jahner, 433 Mich 490, 496; 446 NW2d 151 (1989). Justice requires that we attempt to reconcile Michigan’s conspiracy statute with § 7409.
Although conspiracy is a distinct offense, it is necessarily linked to a substantive offense. To be punishable, conspiracy involves an agreement to commit an act prohibited by law, or an agreement to commit a legal act in an illegal manner. MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1). In the present case, the defendants were charged, under MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i); MSA 14.15(7401) (2) (a) (i) and MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1), with conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute more than 650 grams of cocaine. Thus, in order to be guilty of the crime charged, it had to be proven that each defendant “conspire[d] together with 1 or more persons,” MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1), to “manufacture, create, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture, create, or deliver a controlled substance . . . classified in schedule 1 or 2 that is a narcotic drug or a drug described in § 7214a(a)(iv) and . . . [w]hich is in an amount of *84650 grams or more of any mixture containing that substance . . . MCL 333.7401(1), (2)(a)(i); MSA 14.15(7401)(1), (2)(a)(i).
I submit that conspiracy comes within article 7 of the Public Health Code because it would be impossible to charge conspiracy to violate article 7 without incorporating an article 7 offense into the conspiracy charge. Although conspiracy to commit a crime may be charged as an offense distinct from the actual perpetration of the underlying crime, but for the underlying crime, there could be no conspiracy.
Further, the use of the phrase “this article” in § 7409 is subject to more than one interpretation. Article 7 of the Public Health Code regulates controlled substances. Yet, the Public Health Code otherwise deals with a variety of topics, including the regulation of health professions, the administration of public health programs, and the regulation of hospitals. See MCL 333.1101 et seq.; MSA 14.15(1101) et seq. The Public Health Code addresses a broad variety of topics, and various articles of the code contain subject-matter limitations. In fact, almost every article of the Public Health Code limits its terms, at some point, to “this article.”1 It is reasonable to conclude that the use of the phrase “this article” indicates only that the provisions of article 7 are limited to offenses related to controlled substances. Conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute more than 650 grams of cocaine is a controlled substances offense necessarily arising out of article 7. The interpretation of the *85lead opinion of “this article” contravenes the purposes of § 7409, and produces an illogical result.2
I am further unpersuaded by the lead opinion’s theory that conspiracy does not come within the purview of article 7 simply because the article uses the words “solicit” and “induce” rather than the word “conspire.” The lead opinion correctly acknowledges the fact that conspiracy to possess a controlled substance can be charged under the penal code. It is unnecessary to incorporate conspiracy into the Public Health Code, because the incorporation occurs naturally when conspiracy is charged.
When one reads the entire text of § 7409, it is obvious that § 7409 is designed to prohibit the dual prosecution of an act already prosecuted under federal law or the law of another state. Prohibiting dual prosecutions for a conspiracy arising out of the “same act” comports with both the spirit and the language of § 7409.
In my dissent in People v Denio, 454 Mich 691, 714; 464 NW2d 13 (1997), I wrote:
It seems obvious that the conspiracy statute’s reference to the underlying substantive offense is simply a shortcut for allotting prison terms without having to enact separate statutory provisions for conspiracy that are merely repetitions of the allowable prison terms or fines enumerated for *86every underlying substantive offense in the Penal Code and the controlled substances act.
Similarly, the conspiracy statute is linked to the underlying substantive offenses of the Public Health Code even though the Public Health Code does not explicitly incorporate conspiracy into article 7.3 Even the Denio majority recognized a link between the Public Health Code and the conspiracy statute—the majority held that subsection 7401(3) fell within the penalty provision of the conspiracy statute. Denio, supra at 703.
In the name of “justice,” we are asked to hold that the Public Health Code and the conspiracy statute should be read collectively when dually punishing a defendant, but that a collective reading is impermissible when the defendant seeks statutorily afforded protection. It is illogical to conclude that § 7409 can be used as a sword to attack a defendant’s actions under a conspiracy theory, but that the same defendant cannot raise § 7409’s dual prosecution protections as a shield. I am troubled by the resulting rule if the lead opinion were read in consolidation with Denio. So read, at least three separate sentences would be *87imposed for the same criminal act: the defendant would receive a state sentence for possession, he would receive a consecutive state sentence for conspiracy to possess, and he would receive a dual federal sentence for conspiracy to possess. The lead opinion’s casual dismissal of Denio fails to negate the fact that its result would comport neither with the purposes of § 7409 nor with this Court’s jurisprudential rejection of the dual sovereignty doctrine.
The dual sovereignty doctrine provides that the same underlying transaction can give rise to separate state and federal prosecutions without violating the federal Double Jeopardy Clause. Bartkus v Illinois, 359 US 121; 79 S Ct 676; 3 L Ed 2d 684 (1959), and Abbate v United States, 359 US 187; 79 S Ct 666; 3 L Ed 2d 729 (1959). This Court expressly rejected the dual sovereignty doctrine in People v Cooper, 398 Mich 450, 461; 247 NW2d 866 (1976). When the present case was first appealed to this Court, a minority of justices voted to overrule Cooper and adopt the dual sovereignty doctrine. Although Cooper survived, today’s case brings Cooper one step closer to becoming a “hollow shell.” People v Childers, 459 Mich 216, 227; 587 NW2d 17 (1998) (Cavanagh, J., dissenting). In the throws of Mezy’s Cooper discussion, the constitutional double jeopardy challenges brought by the defendants were arguably cast aside so that the case could be statutorily resolved. See People v Mezy, 453 Mich 269, 280, 286; 551 NW2d 389 (1996). Today, the lead opinion would carve out yet another exception to the rule that dual prosecutions are not permitted for the same transaction.
*88I
Because the prior remand of this case was appropriate, I would reach the issues raised by the parties themselves and addressed by the courts below. This Court reviews a trial court’s construction of statutes and constitutional provisions de novo. Cardinal Mooney High School v Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n, 437 Mich 75; 467 NW2d 21 (1991). Findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. MCR 2.613(C).
Section 7409 provides as follows: “If a violation of this article is a violation of a federal law or the law of another state, a conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.” In applying § 7409, it becomes important to determine whether a single conspiracy existed in these cases because a single conspiracy would tend to indicate that the defendants were prosecuted for the “same act” under state and federal law.
The “single conspiracy” issue has been discussed at length during the various stages of these cases. In an amended opinion and order denying defendant’s joint motion to quash dated March 17, 1992, the trial court applied the Thomas4 test and concluded that a single conspiracy existed. The court explicitly stated:
In order to determine whether there was just one conspiracy or multiple conspiracies, this Court must apply the “totality of the circumstances” test, which considers the following factors: 1) time; 2) persons acting as co-conspirators; 3) the statutory offenses charged in the indictments; 4) the overt acts charged by the government or any other description of the offenses charged which indicate *89the nature and scope of the activity which the government sought to punish in each case; and, 5) places where the events alleged as part of the conspiracy took place.
After applying the test, the court wrote, “The Court, after laboriously considering all these factors, finds that the Federal indictments and the indictments in Oakland County all arose out of the same conspiracy. Thus, Michigan is barred from prosecuting these Defendants unless they can satisfy the requirements laid out in Cooper, supra." The trial court then held that dual prosecution was permissible under Cooper because the state and federal interests at stake were substantially different.5
Separate panels of the Court of Appeals held that the trial court applied the wrong test for determining that a single conspiracy existed, but nonetheless found that neither defendant was placed twice in jeopardy. Both panels concluded that the trial court should have applied the “same transaction test” when determining whether a single conspiracy existed. The same transaction test provides that “the prosecutor must join at one trial all charges that grow out of a ‘continuous time sequence,’ and that demonstrate ‘a single intent and goal.’ ”6 Under the single transaction test, the Court of Appeals panels held that more than one conspiracy existed.
This Court then remanded both Hermiz7 and Konja8 stating that the totality of the circumstances test should be applied, and ordering that the test be *90considered in a manner that put the burden of proof for overcoming § 7409 on the defendants. At that time, the focus of this case shifted from Cooper and double jeopardy to an analysis of § 7409. Yet, the nature of the conspiracy undertaken remained at issue.
On remand, the trial court rightfully adopted its previous findings regarding the existence of a single conspiracy. The trial court’s original Thomas analysis would be applicable under § 7409 just as it was applicable under Cooper. The people argue that the trial court applied Thomas incorrectly, and urge this Court to adopt Justice Brickley’s conclusion that two distinct conspiracies existed. I disagree.
The “same act,” conspiring to possess and distribute large quantities of drugs, gave rise to both the federal and state prosecutions of Hermiz and Konja. Section 7409 bars prosecution under the totality of the circumstances test. I am persuaded by the trial court’s findings that the period covered by both prosecutions was nearly identical, that the persons associated with each indictment were the same, that the state and federal prosecutions were brought under the guise of nearly identical statutes, that the federal and state governments worked together toward the same end, and that both the federal and state indictments focused on a Florida-Michigan conspiracy. Now that the issue has been fully briefed, argued, and appealed, I agree with Chief Justice Weaver’s Mezy view that “The people have not demonstrated that the trial court committed any clear error in its findings of fact, or that it erred in its application of the constitutional test under Thomas in concluding that the peo*91pie failed to carry their burden.”9 Thus, the conspiracies were the “same act” for the purposes of § 7409, and dual prosecution was barred. Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Kelly, J., concurred with Cavanagh, J.

 The following articles of the Public Health Code are limited by the phrase “this article”: 5, 6, 7, 12, 15, 17. The phrase “this article” is used no less than 199 times.

 The lead opinion incorrectly asserts that I am “content to issue an opinion that would rewrite the statute.” Ante at 80, n 13. Under my approach, conspiracy need not be written into article 7, because it is inextricably linked to article 7. The Legislature’s intent is carried out by respecting the terms of Michigan’s conspiracy law and § 7409. A collective reading of § 7409 and Michigan’s conspiracy statute clearly illustrates that conspiracy to violate article 7 falls within § 7409’s reference to “this article.”

 In Denio, I dissented on the grounds that sentencing should be imposed according to the terms of the conspiracy statute, rather than by the terms of the Public Health Code. I continue to believe that the conspiracy statute is written in general terms because it will always be linked to the underlying substantive offense. Even though conspiracy is not listed as an article 7 offense, for example, conspiracy permeates article 7 by implication. In cases involving conspiracy, it often becomes necessary to compare the language of the conspiracy statute with the language of the statute creating the underlying offense. In the present case, it is necessary to determine whether § 7409 envisions a conspiracy charge, and whether the conspiracy statute mandates a different result than § 7409 would provide.

 United States v Thomas, 759 F2d 659 (CA 8, 1985).

 Both Hermiz and Kor\ja were parties to the motion to quash, so the quoted language was applicable in both cases.

 People v Hermiz, 207 Mich App 449, 451; 526 NW2d 1 (1994).

 Mezy, supra at 286.

 453 Mich 953 (1996).

 In Mezy, Chief Justice Weaver was referring to the constitutional double jeopardy challenge, id. at 278, but the same conclusion can now be drawn in the § 7409 context.