Court Opinion

ID: 9755849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:55:30.020078+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:12.208192
License: Public Domain

Burling, J.
(dissenting). The defendant in this case is a public body having corporate form and attributes. It was created by the Township of Pennsauken under the “Sewerage Authorities Law,” L. 1946, c. 138, sec. 1 et seq., N. J. S. A. 40.14A-1 et seq. The defendant was created to perform a public duty, namely to provide for sewerage service, and this duty expressly entailed the performance of services to be paid for by the user in the form of a service charge. Examples of comparable statutory provisions to those contained in the Sewerage Authorities Law are the Incinerator Authorities Law, L. 1948, c. 348, sec. 1 et seq., N. J. S. A. 40:66A-1 et seq., the Parking Authority Law, L. 1948, c. 198, sec. 1 et seq., N. J. S. A. 40:11A-1 et seq., and the New Jersey Turnpike Authority Act of 1948, L. 1948, c. 454, as amended and supplemented by L. 1949, cc. 40, 41, L. 1950, c. 1, L. 1951, cc. 264, 286, and L. 1952, c. 35, N. J. S. A. 27:23-1 et seq. Authorities created under the foregoing examples of comparable statutes have been held to be independent entities, *472Scatuorchio v. Jersey City Incinerator Authority, 14 N. J. 72, 89 (1953); De Lorenzo v. City of Hackensack, 9 N. J. 379, 384-387 (1952); and New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Parsons, 3 N. J. 235, 243-244 (1949). The defendant is designed to “sell” its services to all having need thereof, on a self-liquidating basis. In fact, upon the defendant’s failure to meet its obligation on its outstanding bonded indebtedness, the plant may be acquired by a receiver and operated on behalf of the bondholders. I perceive no substantial deviation in the Sewerage Authorities Law from the controlling factors expressed in the Scatuorchio, De Lorenzo and New Jersey Turnpike Authority cases, and the statutes construed therein, supra. Therefore they are controlling decisions of this court and their application results in the conclusion that the defendant is an independent entity “in but not of” the parent township. Cf. New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Parsons, supra (3 N. J., at p. 244).
The principal question involved in this case is the scope of the defendant’s power concerning the establishment of rates. Whether the defendant be independent under the views hereinabove expressed, or captive under the views expressed in the opinion of the majority of the court, it is nevertheless bound to act solely within the confines of the delegated legislative power. “It is axiomatic that municipal bodies in this State have no powers other than those delegated by the Legislature, and must perform their prescribed activities within the statutory ambit.” Scatuorchio v. Jersey City Incinerator Authority, supra (14 N. J., at p. 85); Grogan v. De Sapio, 11 N. J. 308, 314-317, 321 (1953); Edwards v. Mayor, etc. of Borough of Moonachie, 3 N. J. 17, 21-22 (1949).
Under the express terms of the statute I am constrained to determine that the exemptions accorded the Township of Pennsauken and other public or gwasi-public bodies by the defendant are ultra vires and should be vacated. The power to make the discriminatory rates is not only absent from the statute but is expressly barred thereby. L. 1948, c. 138, sec. 26, par. (b), N. J. S. A. 40:14A-26(b) provides:
*473“(b) Each county, municipality and other public body shall promptly pay to any sewerage authority all service charges which the sewerage authority may charge to it, as owner or occupant of any real property, in accordance with section eight of this act, and shall provide for the payment thereof in the same manner as other obligations of such county, municipality or public body.”
It is further expressly provided in the statute that the discretion of the authority in the establishment of rates shall be limited to certain specific formulae. L. 1946, c. 138, sec. 8, par. (b), N. J. S. A. 40:14A.-8(b) provides:
“(b) Such rents, rates, fees and charges, being in the nature of use or service charges, shall as nearly as the sewerage authority shall deem practicable and equitable be uniform throughout the district for the same type, class and amount of use or service of the sewerage system, and may be based or computed either on the consumption of water on or in connection with the real property, making due allowance for commercial use of water, or on the number and kind of water outlets on or in connection with the real property, or on the number and kind of plumbing or sewerage fixtures or facilities on or in connection with the real property, or on the number of persons residing or working on or otherwise connected or identified with the real property, or on the capacity of the improvements on or connected with the real property, or on any other factors determining the type, class and amount of use or service of the Sewerage system, or on any combination of any such factors, and may give weight to the characteristics of the sewage and other wastes and any other special matter affecting the cost of treatment and disposal thereof, including chlorine demand, biochemical oxygen demand, concentration of solids and chemical composition.”
The detailed provisions of this act unambiguously require charges of the defendant authority to be related to the use. They may not be interpreted to grant the power to relieve any user from all charges.
The majority of the court have approved the principle that a municipal agency save as restricted by statute is free reasonably to fix the terms and conditions of service rendered by it. It seems to me that this conclusion is a departure from the established law of this State that municipal agencies have no inherent powers. See, for example, the Edwards case, supra. Were this not so, and the statute authorized the municipal body to fix reasonable rates without particularization, I could *474in all justice find that rates determined according to the philosophy of preferment of local public facilities expressed in the majority opinion are within the limits of liberal construction as being necessary, fairly implied or incidental to the express power. N. J. Const. 1947, Art. IV, Sec. VII, par. 11; L. 1946, c. 138, sec. 35 (N. J. S. A. 40:14A-35). The statute in the present ease is specific and detailed and delegates a limited power. We have recently held that liberal construction of statutes does not connote an extension of the boundaries delineated by the statutory phraseology. Grogan v. De Sapio, supra (11 N. J., at pp. 316-317).
Since in the present matter some categories of users were relieved of any charges, the end result was rates not only ultra vires but also unfair to the users who are required to pay.
Upon this basis it is unnecessary to enter into a discussion of constitutional rights.
For the reasons expressed in this opinion I would reverse the judgment of the Superior Court, Appellate Division, and remand this matter to that court with directions for further remand by it to the Superior Court, Law Division, for entry of an appropriate judgment consistent with the views expressed in this dissent, resulting in rescheduling of the rates.
For affirmance — Chief Justice Vanderbilt, and Justices Heher, Oliphant, Wacheneeld, Jacobs and Brennan — 6.
For reversal — Justice Burling — 1.