Court Opinion

ID: 9680863
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:40:01.79027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:30.996437
License: Public Domain

George Howard, Jr., Justice, dissenting. I am compelled to dissent from the posture taken by the majority in the resolution of the issue raised in this case. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1209(2) (Repl. 1977), in material part, provides as follows: “A suspension or probation shall not be revoked except after a revocation hearing. Such hearing shall be conducted by the court that suspended imposition of sentence on defendant or placed him on probation within a reasonable period of time, not to exceed 60 days, after the defendant’s arrest. ...” (Emphasis added) The record before us reflects that appellant was convicted of second degree battery on November 21, 1977, and received a suspended sentence of three years. On November 29, 1977, eight days after he received his suspended sentence, appellant was charged with public intoxication, disorderly conduct, assaulting a police officer and resisting arrest. On December 13, 1977, appellant was fined in the Municipal Court of Hot Springs the sum of $10.00 for public intoxication, $50.00 for disorderly conduct, and $50.00 for assaulting a police officer and resisting arrest. No jail sentence was imposed. Appellant was immediately incarcerated in the Garland County jail where he remained until March 13, 1978, the date of the probation revocation hearing. Appellant’s parole officer filed a violation report on December 19, 1977, and recommended revocation of probation. The State filed a petition to show cause why appellant’s sentence should not be revoked on December 29, 1977. A bench warrant was issued for appellant on December 29, 1977, but was not served on appellant until the 23rd day of February, 1978, and his revocation hearing was scheduled for March 13, 1978. Consequently, appellant spent a total of 90 days in the Garland County jail before he received any type of hearing at all relating to his parole violation. The majority has stated in its opinion that “although the record is not clear about what part of Haskins’s confinement was due to the Municipal Court conviction, we will assume that as a result of the petition to revoke the suspension, he was confined for more than 60 days before the revocation hearing.” It is plain from this record that there is no other posture that the majority can take in this case other than what it has assumed. Appellant was convicted in the Municipal Court of Hot Springs on the misdemeanor charges and, therefore, it is logical to assume that if he was going to be confined for the nonpayment of his fines, appellant would have been incarcerated in the city jail of Hot Springs rather than the Garland County jail. But for the sake of argument, let us assume that appellant was required to pay off his fine by confinement to the Garland County jail, it is further apparent that due process has not been afforded to appellant. For example, appellant’s fines came to $100.00 plus the cost of court; under Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1103(2), appellant would have been entitled to the rate of $10.00 a day for each day spent in jail to be applied to his fines, thus appellant would have had to serve no more than 16 days in lieu of paying his fines. Having been incarcerated on December 13, 1977, he would have been entitled to be released from the Garland County jail on December 29, 1977. Therefore, under the assumption, appellant remained in the Garland County jail 74 days after he had liquidated his fines and court costs by doing time in the county jail. The State has not made an effort to explain why appellant remained in jail 74 days, really, based upon the record 90 days, without affording appellant a hearing as required under law. The majority seeks to confer a liberal interpretation upon this provision in supporting its conclusion that the 60-day limitation was not intended to be jurisdictional and that it must be considered in terms of “reasonableness.” But it is elementary that criminal statutes must be strictly construed and closely followed; and that nothing can be added or taken away from precise or express language of the act. Holford v. State, 173 Ark. 989; Giles v. State, 190 Ark. 218. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has stated that due process requires that a person on parole or probation be given a hearing before his probation or parole is revoked. Such a hearing must be provided within a reasonable time, which the Court stated in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) as follows: “. . . The revocation hearing must be tendered within a reasonable time after the parolee is taken into custody. A lapse of two months, as respondents suggest occurs in some cases, would not appear to be unreasonable.” It is apparent that Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1209(2) (Repl. 1977) was enacted by the Arkansas General Assembly to conform to the Morrissey standard quoted above. On September 19, 1977, we decided Walker v. State, 262 Ark. 215, 555 S.W. 2d 228, where it was necessary for the court to deal with Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1209 (2). There, the State contended that the 60 day time limit under the statute runs from the date of the arrest of the parolee. This Court in giving sanction to the State’s position stated: “When we give a rational interpretation to the 60 day limitation, in accordance with the intent and purposes of the statute, we must agree with the State’s interpretation of the statute. . . ” It is plain and beyond debate that appellant-petitioner was incarcerated in the Garland County Jail on December 13, 1977, and his revocation hearing was not held until March 13, 1978. Finally, the majority asserts that petitioner’s “. . . failure to object, has waived his right to insist that the revocation hearing be held within 60 days.” In White v. State, 260 Ark. 361, 538 S.W. 2d 550, we held that an issue that goes to thejurisdiction of the trial court, the issue could be raised at any time even after a guilty plea by certiorari. We further stated that in construing penal provisions, nothing will be taken as intended which is not clearly expressed and all doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused.