Court Opinion

ID: 9623812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:44:01.051218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:35.027821
License: Public Domain

Finney, Justice
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. In my view, the solicitor’s conduct contributed materially to pretrial publicity and exacerbated prejudice to the appellant. Additionally, I would find that the solicitor failed to articulate a racially neutral reason for striking a black prospective juror, in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. (2d) 69 (1986). I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
First, the problem of pretrial publicity was compounded by dissemination of a memorandum filed by the solicitor.1 Counsel for appellant sought and obtained an agreement to prevent publicity surrounding the Notice of Evidence in Aggravation which would be served less than a week before jury selection and almost four months after the state announced its intention *478to seek the death penalty. The state agreed to provide the Notice to appellant’s counsel, who would acknowledge receipt, and the Notice would not be filed. On January 10,1989, the solicitor filed a memorandum with the Clerk of Court, which stated in part:
On Monday, I discussed with Pat Paschal certain evidence I intend to present in the penalty phase of Mr. Robinson’s trial. Because the evidence to be offered includes evidence of extensive criminal conduct, including other murder-for-Mres, Pat requested that I either not file the Notice of Evidence in Aggravation or that, if filed, I not detail the evidence to be offered ...
The memorandum was picked up by the press in routine checks of courthouse records and extensively publicized through the news media.
The solicitor was not mandated by law to file the Notice of Evidence in Aggravation with the court. The state is only required to furnish written notice of evidence in aggravation to an accused prior to trial. See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(B) (1976). Also noteworthy is the fact that the state did not file all other non-compulsory trial-related memoranda. When viewed in totality and under the unique circumstances of this case, it is clear from the record that filing of the memorandum was contrived to fuel publicity and further prejudice the accused.
Additionally, the news media reported statements by the solicitor which were, in my view, inflammatory. In comments concerning his plea bargain with appellant’s co-defendants, the solicitor stated, “it takes a crook to catch a crook.” He also indicated the timing of the arrest was due to “beatings,” “stabbings” and “dead bodies” attributable to the appellant.
In my opinion, this record is an egregious example of a prosecutor striving to obtain a conviction regardless of the costs. The solicitor’s conduct aggravated notoriety surrounding this case with the resulting effect that prospective jurors formed opinions based upon news accounts. One venireperson stated that he had formed the opinion that appellant was guilty based upon what he had read in newspapers.
In State v. Dawkins, 297 S.C. 386, 377 S.E. (2d) 298 (1989) (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S. Ct. 629, *479633, 79 L. Ed. 1314 (1935)), this Court reiterated the following cautionary note to prosecutors:
... He [the prosecutor] may prosecute with earnestness and vigor — indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much is duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
State v. Dawkins, 377 S.E. (2d) at 299.
I would hold that the solicitor’s conduct contributed substantially to circumstances of inherent or presumptive prejudice and created actual prejudice which deprived the appellant of the right to a fair and impartial trial.
Next, I would reverse on the ground that the solicitor violated Batson v. Kentucky, supra. The state exercised peremptory strikes against one black venireperson presented as a prospective juror, one black venireperson presented as an alternate and seated one black juror. In a Batson hearing, the solicitor stated that he struck the black prospective juror because of instability due to an erratic work history and parenting a child out of wedlock.
While an erratic work history may be a neutral reason, I find nothing in this record which indicates periods of unemployment or that the prospective juror was an undependable employee. When asked about her employment history, the prospective juror stated that she had been on her present job for four months, had worked for her preceding employer for a year, and had been on her prior job for a year and a half. ■
As to his second reason, I am unable to determine from the record before this Court how the circumstances of the birth of the prospective juror’s child bears any relationship to the particular case to be tried. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held generally that illegitimacy may not be used as a basis for unjustified discrimination. See Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 106 S. Ct. 2234, 90 L. Ed. (2d) 858 (1986).
A prosecutor is required to articulate a racially neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried. Such explanation must be a neutral, clear and reasonably specific explanation of a legitimate reason for exercising the challenges. Batson, 106 S. Ct. at 1724.
*480In my view, the solicitor’s articulated reason for striking the black prospective juror was neither racially neutral nor related to the particular case to be tried.
I would reverse the case and remand for a new trial.

 The solicitor acknowledged that the publicity surrounding this case was unprecedented.