Court Opinion

ID: 9370347
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-13 09:09:49.300736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:20.893285
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
      ___________________________
           No. 02-22-00384-CV
      ___________________________

    IN THE INTEREST OF J.B., A CHILD

   On Appeal from the 325th District Court
           Tarrant County, Texas
       Trial Court No. 325-702195-21

  Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Walker, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth
                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                    I. Introduction

      J.B.1 tested positive for cannabinoids and amphetamine when he was born

and—according to an investigator for the Department of Family and Protective

Services (DFPS) and to statements in the medical records from J.B.’s birth—Mother

claimed that Appellant Father had made her use drugs while pregnant. However,

Father had been incarcerated in the Tarrant County Jail at J.B.’s June 2021 birth and

for several months before that.

      DFPS filed a conservatorship-and-termination petition, removed the child

before Mother left the hospital, placed the child into foster care, and developed

service plans for both parents, but Father was unable to participate in the services

while incarcerated. Neither parent testified during trial, and the trial court terminated

Father’s parental rights to J.B. based on the child’s best interest and the grounds of

endangerment, constructive abandonment, and failure to follow the court’s order

specifying the actions necessary for him to obtain J.B.’s return. See Tex. Fam. Code

Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), (2).2

      1
       To protect J.B.’s identity, we use aliases or initials to refer to him, his parents,
and others who may be connected to the case. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d);
Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).
      2
          The trial court also terminated Mother’s parental rights, but Mother did not
appeal.

                                            2
      In four issues, Father appeals, arguing that the evidence is legally and factually

insufficient to support the trial court’s endangering-conduct ground and factually

insufficient to support the trial court’s endangering-environment, failure-to-follow-

court-order, and constructive-abandonment findings. Because the evidence is legally

and factually sufficient to support the endangering-conduct ground, we affirm the trial

court’s judgment without reaching Father’s remaining issues. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

                                   II. Background

A. First day of trial: April 27, 20223

      Trial began with neither parent in attendance, although both were represented

by counsel.

      1. J.B.’s medical records

      The medical records from J.B.’s birth were not discussed in depth during the

trial, but because they were admitted into evidence, we have reviewed them.4 The

records contain the following statements made by Mother to medical personnel about

Father:

      3
       Trial occurred over three days in three separate months but testimony was
taken during only two of those days. Because the portion of trial between April 27
and September 2 has no bearing on this appeal, we do not include it.
      4
       The trial court admitted the medical records over Father’s objections that he
had not seen the records and that they might contain hearsay. Father does not raise
those objections on appeal.

                                          3
• Father “was abusive[,] used drugs[,] and [had] forced [Mother] to do things that
  she did not want to do.”5

• Mother called the police on Father and “that is why he [wa]s in jail.”

• “[Father was] in jail due to assault on her,” and since she was 18, he had made her
  “‘do things [she] normally wouldn’t do[,]’” including using “zbars,[6] cocaine,
  [THC7], and methamphetamine.” Mother was 31 years old when J.B. was born.

• Although Father was incarcerated, he was “helpful and supportive.”

• Mother “had no prenatal care and state[d Father] was angry at her for getting
  pregnant and not having an abortion” and that it had been “two months since she
  talked to him.”

• Mother had no supplies for the baby; Father “took it all back.”

      Mother’s medical records state that she suffers from schizoaffective disorder,

bipolar type, as well as the following “Active Problem[s]”: diabetes; amphetamine,

cocaine, and cannabis abuse; anxiety and depression; methamphetamine dependence;

and posttraumatic stress disorder.     Other evidence at trial reflected that all of

      5
       Mother also told medical personnel that she had not used drugs in a year,
which statement was contradicted by J.B.’s positive drug test results and her later
admission that she had used methamphetamine two to five days before giving birth.
      6
        “Zbar” is a street name for the anti-anxiety prescription drug Xanax. Pawlak v.
State, No. 13-10-00535-CR, 2012 WL 3612493, at *1 n.3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg Aug. 23, 2012) (mem. op., not designated for publication), vacated on other
grounds, 420 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Hernandez v. State, No. 13-06-357-CR,
2007 WL 2965527, at *2 n.3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Oct. 11, 2007, no
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
      7
        THC is an abbreviation for tetrahydrocannabinol, which is marijuana’s active
ingredient. Harper v. State, 508 S.W.3d 461, 466 n.7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015,
pet. ref’d).

                                          4
Mother’s previous cases with DFPS had also involved drug use; four of her children

lived with their maternal grandmother, and her parental rights to a fifth child had

been terminated on endangerment grounds.

      2. DFPS investigator

      Tayla Choice, the DFPS investigator who met Mother at the hospital after J.B.

tested positive for drugs, testified that Mother told her that Father made her use drugs

and that if she refused to use methamphetamine, Father would beat her. Choice did

not speak with Father or exchange any written communications with him but said that

DFPS had made contact with him before J.B.’s removal.

      Choice said that Father provided some placement options but not to her. She

called T.H.-B., one of Father’s adult children, whom Father had listed as a placement

option, but received no response. She ran a background search on T.H.-B. and found

nothing unfavorable that would prevent pursuing her as a placement. Nevertheless,

Choice said that DFPS does not pursue a placement option who is not amenable to

placement.

      Choice testified that at the end of her investigation, she and her supervisor

determined that a removal was proper, and her disposition of the case was “reason to

believe”8 for neglectful supervision by Mother. DFPS filed its original petition on

June 24, 2021, and the trial court entered its emergency order on removal that day.

      8
        See 40 Tex. Admin. Code § 707.495(b) (Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective
Servs., How do we make dispositions after completing the investigation?) (listing the

                                           5
      3. Caseworker

      Joan Hall, an OCOK9 permanency specialist, testified that she had been the

case’s only caseworker. As of April 27, 2022, Father had been incarcerated during the

entire case, and Hall had visited Father in person twice: in November 2021 and April

2022. She had also sent him five to six letters, but he told her that he did not receive

them. When asked whether she had any reason to disbelieve Father’s claim that he

had not received her letters, Hall replied, “Potentially.” She stated, “I have had other

cases where sometimes the [letters] – I have mailed them and the inmates said that

they didn’t receive them.”

      When asked how many children Father had told her that he had, Hall stated,

“He approximated 13,” most of whom were minors.10             He denied having ever

engaged in domestic violence and did not talk with Hall about other assaults, drug use,

following dispositions: reason-to believe based on a preponderance of the evidence,
ruled-out, unable to complete, unable-to-determine, and administrative closure).
      9
       OCOK (Our Community Our Kids) is a contractor that provides
conservatorship services for DFPS. See In re A.G., No. 02-21-00297-CV, 2022 WL
488924, at *8 n.14 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 17, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
      10
         When asked whether she knew if Father had been involved in the lives of any
of his other children, Hall replied, “To my knowledge it’s been sporadic, his
involvement,” but she agreed that she had no personal knowledge of his involvement
in any of his other children’s lives. She had spoken with Father’s adult child R. about
R.’s then-current relationship with Father but not about R.’s childhood: “She said that
they talk.” Father’s other adult child, T.H.-B., told Hall that she did not believe that
he was responsible “for what he’s been charged with currently.” T.H.-B. and Hall did
not talk about T.H.-B.’s relationship with Father during her childhood. Hall testified
that the first time she spoke with T.H.-B. was the week before the April trial began.

                                           6
how long he had been in jail, or how many times he had been to jail.11 When Hall

asked Father why—in April 2022—he was in jail, Father told her that he had never

assaulted Mother and that “the fraudulent identities in his car were actually [Mother’s,]

not his.”

      Father told Hall that Mother had mental-health issues and said that he was in

jail on a misunderstanding. According to Father, his trial date on the pending charges

was set for May 2022. Hall agreed that Father had been in jail for several months

before J.B.’s birth and had never been around the infant. During cross-examination,

when asked whether—because of his incarceration—it was impossible for Father to

have ever put J.B. in danger, Hall replied, “Correct.” However, on redirect, Hall

clarified that Father’s forcing Mother to use drugs while pregnant would have put J.B.

in danger and that she did not know if Father had been incarcerated for the entirety of

Mother’s pregnancy.

      Hall testified that DFPS had created a service plan in which Father was

supposed to

      complete . . . batterer’s intervention classes, to complete a drug and
      alcohol assessment and follow all recommendations, to engage in
      random drug testing or comply with random drug testing, to engage [in]
      and complete individual counseling, to engage [in] and complete a
      FOCUS for Fathers[] class, [to] attend all visitation that was possible,

      11
        Hall testified that she had reviewed Father’s criminal history, and when asked
“how many charges” he had accrued over the years, she replied, “[A]pproximately
20.” Hall also stated that Father had a prior DFPS case, but she provided no details
about the case or its outcome.

                                           7
       and [to] notify the department or OCOK if he was ever released from
       jail.[12]

According to Hall, Father was also supposed to take a parenting class. The service

plan also required that upon his release from incarceration, Father would “maintain

safe, stable and appropriate housing with working utilities,” free from safety hazards,

and that he would maintain stable and legal employment, demonstrating the ability to

meet J.B.’s financial needs. The trial court entered an order making the service plan a

court order, which included supervised visitation. The service plan listed the date by

which Father was to achieve his permanency goals as June 27, 2022, which was the

case’s original dismissal date.

       Hall noted that, as far as she knew, none of the services were available to

Father in jail, and she characterized his participation in the case as “very limited due to

hi[s] being incarcerated.”        Hall stated that Father had indicated a willingness to

participate in the services if they were available, and she acknowledged that he had

done everything service-plan-wise that he could while incarcerated. Hall said that to

her knowledge, the jail did not perform any random drug testing, stating, “I don’t

think they do that.” Hall also testified that it was uncommon for DFPS to arrange

visits with incarcerated parents and that she had never seen it happen.

       12
         Father’s service plan required him to notify OCOK within 72 hours of being
released from incarceration. On the trial’s third day, in September 2022, Hall testified
that Father had contacted her “about three days” after his late June or early July 2022
release.

                                              8
      Father did not send J.B., an infant, any letters, but he asked Hall for

photographs of the child, and she told him that she would send some.13 He told Hall

that he wanted to be involved in J.B.’s life and that he did not want his rights to be

terminated. Father gave Hall potential placements for J.B. with two of his adult

children—R. and T.H.-B.—but R. denied being able to be a placement, and T.H.-B.

admitted that she was unable to care for J.B.’s medical needs14 and did not have

appropriate options for child care. Hall also said that T.H.-B. “had a history of not

being protective in other investigations,” but she did not elaborate on who had been

investigated or why.

      Over Father’s objection, the trial court admitted into evidence a copy of

Father’s indictment for his then-pending family-violence assault charge relating to

Mother.15 The first count of the indictment alleged that on or about January 12, 2021,

      13
         Hall testified that she had mailed some photographs to Father but that he had
said he did not receive them. Hall stated that she “had planned to go in” person to
deliver some photographs to Father later in April, “after th[e] hearing.”
      14
         J.B. has a weak immune system and reactive airway disease (which, according
to Hall, means that he will be diagnosed with asthma when older). He suffers from
frequent ear infections, had to have breathing treatments, and had been hospitalized
twice due to illness. He had been seen by a pulmonologist and an ear-nose-throat
specialist, and at one point he saw a specialist about a kidney infection that
subsequently cleared up.
      15
         Father’s counsel raised a Rule 403 objection to the indictment’s admission,
complaining that its prejudice substantially exceeded its probative value because “it is
nothing more than just an allegation.” Father does not complain about the trial
court’s ruling on appeal.

                                           9
Father had intentionally or knowingly caused bodily injury to Mother, a member of

his family or household or with whom he had a dating relationship, by “impeding the

normal breathing or circulation of the blood” by applying pressure to Mother’s throat

or neck with his hand or hands.

       The second count of the indictment alleged that Father had pushed Mother,

grabbed her, or struck her with his hand, squeezed her throat or neck with his hand or

hands, scratched her with his hand, or kicked her with his foot. The indictment

contained an enhancement alleging that Father had a 2005 conviction for family-

violence assault and a habitual-offender notice reciting his prior felony convictions for

unlawful possession of a firearm in 2014 and possession of cocaine (more than one

but less than four grams) in 2005. Hall agreed that because J.B. was born in June and

had not been born early, Mother would have been pregnant at the time of the January

12, 2021 assault alleged in the indictment. Hall believed the indictment’s allegations

and said, “Yes,” when asked whether she had based her belief on what “somebody

else says . . . [Mother] told them.”

       Hall testified that she did not believe Father could meaningfully participate in

J.B.’s life from prison and stated that he had not meaningfully participated in J.B.’s life

since the case began. She stated that it was in J.B.’s best interest to terminate Father’s

parental rights because he “has a significant history not only of violent crimes but also

domestic violence and assaults against almost all of the mothers of his other

children.” Hall believed that Father “would not be a safe caregiver for [J.B. because

                                            10
e]ven if he were [to be] released . . . there would not be enough time in this case for

him to be able to participate in services and address all of these concerning issues for

him to safely care for [J.B.]” She did not elaborate on Father’s criminal history.

      Hall testified that DFPS’s plan was for J.B. to be adopted by his foster parents,

who were safe, stable, and appropriate and met J.B.’s physical and emotional needs.16

Hall testified that neither Mother nor Father had shown the ability to be safe and

appropriate with J.B. or the ability to provide him with a safe and stable home and

financial support.

      4. DFPS investigative supervisor

      Jessica Eastman, DFPS’s investigative supervisor on the case, testified that she

met Father prior to J.B.’s removal and conversed with him about the allegations in the

case regarding Mother’s drug use.       “[Father] stated that he had knowledge that

[Mother] . . . had been using methamphetamine[] heavily [and] that he had had a

discussion with her about stopping and the impact it could have on the child.”

Eastman did not speak with him at that time about Mother’s allegations regarding his

having forced her to use methamphetamine.          Eastman and Father discussed his

criminal history, and he told her that he had been on parole or bond for a prior

family-violence charge when he and Mother argued about her drug use, an argument

      16
          During the third day of trial, in September 2022, Hall added that J.B. was
“doing really well” in foster care, was receiving ECI therapy, and had a surgical
procedure to install tubes in his ears because of his frequent ear infections. He was
still sick on a regular basis, but the ear infections had become less frequent.

                                           11
that led to her calling the police and his arrest. He did not tell Eastman that he had

choked Mother as alleged in the indictment, but that allegation concerned her because

choking a pregnant woman can harm the fetus.

       Father gave Eastman the name of one of his adult daughters as a possible

placement for J.B., but the adult daughter demanded DNA evidence of Father’s

paternity first.17 Father told Eastman that the last time DFPS was involved in his life,

three of his other children had been removed while he had been incarcerated.

B. Last day of trial: September 2, 2022

       Before testimony resumed, Father’s counsel stated that he had filed a motion

for continuance when Father was briefly out of jail, but he noted that Father had since

been reconfined “for a circumstance that he was not involved in, and he expect[ed] to

be released soon.” Father’s counsel asked for a continuance until Father could be

released, and the trial court denied it.

       The trial court then admitted into evidence over Father’s Rule 403 objection18 a

certified copy of a complaint alleging that on or about July 12, 2022, Father had

intentionally or knowingly threatened bodily injury to L.B.19 and used or exhibited a

        The record does not contain Father’s DNA test, but in its December 9, 2021
       17

order, the trial court determined that Father was J.B.’s biological father “as
determined by DNA testing.”

        Father does not challenge this ruling on appeal.
       18

        Hall testified that L.B. was Father’s daughter’s boyfriend or ex-boyfriend.
       19

                                           12
deadly weapon (a firearm) during the assault’s commission. The complaint also

contained a habitual-offender notice regarding the same 2014 and 2005 convictions

that were listed in the habitual-offender notice in the previously admitted indictment.

           Hall then testified that shortly after Father was released from jail at the end of

June or in July—she did not recall the exact date—and before his confinement on the

new charges, he called her, told her that he was staying with his sister, and gave her his

sister’s address. She gave him the information to set up services and was told that

Father had contacted one of the contractors to start his FOCUS class. However,

Father had trouble contacting his probation officer, so Hall tried to contact the

probation officer, without success. She stated that her understanding was that Father

had been released on an ankle monitor, and she had tried to contact Father’s

probation officer to find out the exact restrictions on Father’s movement. She agreed

that it would be difficult for Father to move around freely on an ankle monitor

without communication with his probation officer.

           Hall tried to send Father for a drug test but did not hear back from him, and

she learned, after Father failed to attend the FOCUS class he had set up, that he “had

been arrested again.” Father had been arrested before he was able to participate in

any services. And Father also had no visitation with J.B. in the short time he was out

of jail.

           Hall testified that Father had been back in jail since the end of July but that she

had not been able to speak with him since his new arrest. She described the difficulty

                                               13
she had experienced in making contact with him at the jail, stating, “They told me that

I needed to go to a different building, and then when I went there the entrance was

closed, and so I tried to come back another day but I didn’t have time.” At trial, she

did not “remember offhand which building they pointed [her] toward.”

       Hall stated that Father had been out of jail for less than a month before

returning on felony charges. Regarding Father’s more recent arrest, her understanding

was that “there was a shooting involved at the apartment complex where he was

staying at with his sister, and . . . . there’s the allegation that he shot at his daughter’s

boyfriend or ex-boyfriend.” However, she did not know what evidence supported the

State’s allegation that Father had fired a firearm.

       Hall testified that she believed Father had engaged in a continuing course of

violent criminal conduct since the case started, that she had no reason to believe that

course of conduct would stop, and that, in her opinion, it presented a danger to J.B.

       J.B.’s ad litem argued during closing that Father had a continuing course of

conduct leading to a life of instability for J.B. and that it was in J.B.’s best interest to

have a safe and stable home.

                                     III. Sufficiency

       Father’s four issues challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support

terminating his parental rights on grounds listed in Section 161.001(b)(1).20 DFPS was

       For a trial court to terminate a parent–child relationship, DFPS must prove
       20

two elements by clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the parent’s actions satisfy

                                             14
required to prove its grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. See

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b); Z.N., 602 S.W.3d at 545.21 Evidence is clear and

convincing if it “will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or

conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Tex. Fam.

Code Ann. § 101.007; Z.N., 602 S.W.3d at 545.

A. Standards of Review

      To determine whether the evidence is legally sufficient in parental termination

cases, we look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding

to determine whether a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction

that the finding is true. Z.N., 602 S.W.3d at 545. The factfinder may draw inferences,

but they must be reasonable and logical. Id. We assume that the factfinder settled any

evidentiary conflicts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could have done

so. Id. We disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved,

one ground listed in Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1); and (2) that termination is in
the child’s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b); In re Z.N., 602 S.W.3d
541, 545 (Tex. 2020).
      21
         Due process demands the heightened standard of clear and convincing
evidence because “[a] parental rights termination proceeding encumbers a value ‘far
more precious than any property right.’” In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552, 555 (Tex. 2012)
(quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1397 (1982)); In re
J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002); see also In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex.
2012). The State must observe “fundamentally fair procedures” when it seeks to
terminate a parent’s rights. E.R., 385 S.W.3d at 554 (citing Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747–
48, 102 S. Ct. at 1391–92). We carefully scrutinize termination proceedings and
strictly construe involuntary termination statutes in the parent’s favor. E.N.C., 384
S.W.3d at 802; E.R., 385 S.W.3d at 563.

                                            15
and we consider undisputed evidence even if it is contrary to the finding. Id.; J.F.C.,

96 S.W.3d at 266.       That is, we consider evidence favorable to the finding if a

reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable

factfinder could not. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). The factfinder is

the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d

336, 346 (Tex. 2009).

      With regard to a factual-sufficiency challenge to the termination grounds, we

must perform “an exacting review of the entire record.” See In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d

498, 500 (Tex. 2014). We nevertheless give due deference to the factfinder’s findings

and do not supplant the judgment with our own. In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108

(Tex. 2006). As pertinent to Father’s issues, we review the whole record to decide

whether a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that DFPS

proved that Father constructively abandoned J.B., endangered J.B., or failed to follow

court orders with which he was required to comply for J.B.’s return to him. See Tex.

Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex.

2002). If the factfinder reasonably could form such a firm conviction or belief, then

the evidence is factually sufficient. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 18–19. But if a factfinder

reasonably could not—because the disputed evidence that could not reasonably

support the finding is too significant—then the evidence is factually insufficient.

H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108.

                                          16
      Along with a best-interest finding, a finding of only one ground alleged under

Section 161.001(b)(1) is sufficient to support termination. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355,

362 (Tex. 2003). However, because Subsection (M) of Section 161.001(b)(1) allows a

trial court to terminate the parental rights of a parent whose parent–child relationship

with another child was terminated based on a finding under Subsection (D) or (E),

when a parent challenges a Subsection (D) or (E) finding, due process and due course

of law demand that we address the finding and detail our analysis. See Tex. Fam.

Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (M); In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 235, 237 (Tex.

2019); see also In re Z.M.M., 577 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Tex. 2019) (relying on N.G. to hold

that the court of appeals erred by not addressing the father’s sufficiency challenge to

the trial court’s Subsection (D) finding). Accordingly, we begin our analysis by

reviewing endangerment first.

B. Endangerment

      In his second issue, Father argues that there is no evidence or insufficient

evidence to support the Subsection (E) finding that he engaged in conduct that

endangered his child.

      “‘[E]ndanger’ means to expose to loss or injury” or “to jeopardize.” In re J.F.-

G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727

S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987)).      Under Subsection (E), a parent’s rights may be

terminated if he “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who

engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the

                                          17
child.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). The endangering conduct need not

be directed at the child, nor must the child actually suffer injury. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d

at 312. The relevant inquiry is whether evidence exists that the endangerment was the

direct result of the parent’s conduct, including acts, omissions, or failures to act. See

In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). Scienter is

required under Subsection (E) only when a parent places a child with others who

engage in a course of conduct that endangers the child. In re A.B., 412 S.W.3d 588,

599 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013), aff’d, 437 S.W.3d at 500. A parent’s conduct that

subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the child’s physical

and emotional well-being. A.B., 412 S.W.3d at 599.

      Termination under Subsection (E) must be based on more than a single act or

omission; a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by the parent is

required. J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125. However, under Subsection (E), the court may

consider acts occurring both before and after a child’s birth––and after removal––in

determining a course of conduct. In re C.Y., No. 02-21-00261-CV, 2022 WL 500028,

at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 18, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Such acts may

“create an inference that similar conduct could recur and further jeopardize a child’s

well-being.” Id. (quoting In re M.W., No. 02-21-00146-CV, 2021 WL 3679247, at *4

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 19, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.)). A parent’s lack of

significant contact with a child may also endanger the child’s physical or emotional

                                           18
well-being. In re A.J.D., No. 02-13-00183-CV, 2013 WL 5781478, at *4 (Tex. App.––

Fort Worth Oct. 24, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.).

      1. Father’s arguments

      Father argues that “[t]he only evidence [DFPS] put on regarding [his]

knowledge of [Mother’s] drug use was his statement to the caseworker that he did

everything within his power to get [Mother] to stop using drugs during her

pregnancy.” He contends that Mother’s testimony that he would beat her if she did

not use drugs was not credible because he was incarcerated well before J.B.’s birth and

not available to force her to take illicit drugs during that time.22 Father argues that he

      22
         A parent’s knowledge of the other parent’s drug use during pregnancy and
corresponding failure to attempt to protect the unborn child from the effects of that
drug use can contribute to an endangering environment and thus support an
endangerment finding under Subsection (D). In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 749–50 (Tex.
2022). That is, a parent cannot remain willfully ignorant of the significant risk that a
pregnant mother’s drug use poses, but a court may not attribute any and all known
dangers posed to a child during the mother’s pregnancy to the other parent because
“the inquiry is necessarily dependent on the facts and circumstances.” Id. The
supreme court has stated that “if a parent actively participates in creating or
maintaining a dangerous environment during pregnancy, e.g., does drugs with the
pregnant mother, encourages her drug use, or supplies drugs, we see no reason why
such conduct would not qualify as endangerment under Subsection (D).” Id. at 750
n.13. J.W. was a recent 5–4 decision in which the majority concluded that legally
sufficient evidence supported the Subsection (O) finding but not the jury’s Subsection
(D) finding such that the broad-form jury charge containing both subsections required
a new trial. Id. at 752. The opinion drew two dissents. See id. at 756–57 (Boyd, J.,
dissenting) (reiterating majority’s holding that Subsection (D) protects unborn
children from dangerous conditions caused by their parents but objecting that the
majority ignored evidence that the father had repeatedly minimized, denied, and
enabled the mother’s conspicuous and continuous drug use throughout pregnancy),
759–60 (Blacklock, J., dissenting) (objecting that DFPS’s case against the father under
Subsection (O) “amounted primarily to speculation that he might not provide a safe

                                           19
“should not lose his child because of [Mother’s] failings” and that he must be judged

by his actions, not hers. Father further states that although DFPS contended that he

had a history of behaving violently, possessing controlled substances, and using drugs,

DFPS produced no evidence to support its contentions because it produced no

evidence of criminal convictions and no evidence to show that incarceration resulted

from his conscious and voluntary course of conduct or that he had possessed or used

controlled substances.

      Father acknowledges the family-violence-assault indictment and the aggravated-

assault criminal complaint introduced by DFPS but points out that these instruments

are based on a probable-cause standard and not clear and convincing evidence. See

Ex parte Plumb, 595 S.W.2d 544, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (“The return of an

indictment establishes probable cause as a matter of law.”). He complains that the

remaining testimony that he had been convicted of assault, that he had been in prison,

that he had a long history of violent crime, and that he was on parole or bond was

conclusory, ambiguous, or unproven.

      2. Endangering course of conduct

      Evidence of incarceration and its effect on a parent’s ability to parent may

establish an endangering course of conduct. In re S.M., 389 S.W.3d 483, 492 (Tex.

home for his son in the future,” which is not a predicate ground for termination); see also
id. at 752 (Young, J., concurring) (“One dissent argues that the Court has not gone far
enough; the other contends that the Court has gone too far.”).

                                            20
App.––El Paso 2012, no pet.); In re A.J.M., 375 S.W.3d 599, 606 (Tex. App.––Fort

Worth 2012, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g en banc) (“When incarceration affects the

parent’s ability to care for his child, to provide safe living conditions, or to ensure her

safety and well-being, then such incarceration can be a part of a course of continuing

conduct.”).     While mere imprisonment, standing alone, will not constitute

endangering conduct, when all of the evidence—including imprisonment—shows an

endangering course of conduct, a finding under Subsection (E) is supportable. Walker

v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 312 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex. App.––Houston [1st

Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). Routinely subjecting a child to the probability that he will be

left alone because his parent is in jail is endangering. Id.; see also In re M.R., 243 S.W.3d

807, 819 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 2007, no pet.).23             “The State need not show

incarceration was a result of a course of conduct endangering the child; it need only

show incarceration was part of a course of conduct endangering the child.” In re D.M.,

       23
         In M.R., the father had been incarcerated for burglary of a habitation after
violating his community supervision by possessing methamphetamine. 243 S.W.3d at
819. The burglary offense had occurred before he knew the child’s mother was
pregnant, but he violated his community supervision for that offense a few months
after the child’s birth, and he received a two-year sentence. Id. By the time of the
termination trial, he had been incarcerated for 26 months of the child’s 36-month life,
which affected his ability to ensure the child’s proper care. Id. Moreover, his
incarceration prevented him from obtaining better living conditions and from
providing financial support for the child. Id. The evidence showed that the father
had been aware that the mother lived with drug users and that, instead of avoiding a
criminal lifestyle, his decisions had prevented him from having a role in his son’s life
or from providing any support. Id. We concluded that the evidence was factually
sufficient to support the trial court’s endangerment-by-conduct ground. Id.

                                             21
58 S.W.3d 801, 812 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) (emphasis added); see also

In re P.M.M.K., No. 04-19-00786-CV, 2020 WL 1695499, at *3 (Tex. App.––San

Antonio Apr. 8, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

      Under Subsection (E), charges themselves can be relevant; they do not

necessarily have to result in convictions.24 In re E.S.T., No. 01-22-00404-CV, 2022

WL 17096713, at *15 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 21, 2022, no pet.) (mem.

op.) (“Furthermore, even non-violent, misdemeanor offenses, and arrests for criminal

conduct that do not result in conviction will support a finding of endangerment.”

(citations omitted)); In re S.A., No. 12-22-00111-CV, 2022 WL 16558456, at *5 (Tex.

App.—Tyler Oct. 31, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Criminal acts that also constitute

domestic violence need not lead to indictment or conviction in order to be considered

under the family code.”); In re C.W., No. 02-17-00025-CV, 2017 WL 2289115, at *1–2,

*7 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth May 25, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that at time of

trial, father with extensive criminal history was jailed on pending aggravated-sexual-

assault-of-a-child charges and parole warrant); In re T.G.R.-M., 404 S.W.3d 7, 15–16

(Tex. App.––Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (noting that mother “continued to

      24
         DFPS took a bare-bones approach to meeting its burden of proof but could
have called Father to testify about his criminal history, could have called a
recordkeeper with certified copies of Father’s judgments of convictions, or could have
called one or more of Father’s alleged victims, any of which would have made this a
stronger case. Nonetheless, we are constrained by the standards of review, which
require us, for legal sufficiency, to look at the evidence in the light most favorable to
the trial court’s findings, see Z.N., 602 S.W.3d at 545, and for factual sufficiency, to
give due deference to the factfinder’s findings, see A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 500.

                                           22
place herself in situations that risked her imprisonment even though she knew her

parental rights were in jeopardy on the occasion of both arrests because the

Department already had custody of T.G.R.-M” and that “[a]lthough the charges

stemming from these two arrests were ultimately dismissed, each time the mother was

jailed, she was absent from T.G.R.-M.’s life and was not able to provide for T.G.R.-

M.’s physical and emotional needs”); In re V.V., 349 S.W.3d 548, 553–54 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (op on reh’g en banc).25 In addition, the

failure to work a service plan––even because of incarceration––is a factor a trial court

may consider in a Subsection (E) analysis. See In re Z.J., No. 02-19-00118-CV, 2019

      25
        In V.V., the court held that

      [t]he record—sparse though it is—reveals the father’s assault on the
      child’s mother days before the parental termination hearing, his bad
      choices leading to repeated imprisonment, his wholesale lack of
      parenting beyond the moment of conception, and a child left in the care
      of the state at birth because the father was in jail and the mother had
      ingested opiates during the pregnancy. The child was born with opiates
      in her system, and her mother later voluntarily relinquished her own
      parental rights. In ruling a parenting forfeit, the trial court reasonably
      credited the evidence of the parenting void in this child’s life and the
      father’s inability to safeguard the child’s physical and emotional well-
      being. A lack of all contact with a child without any proffered excuse
      and no effort to ensure her safety—coupled with multiple episodes of
      incarceration and an assault on the mother—is legally sufficient to
      support a termination finding based on endangerment. An infant who is
      not looked after by either of her parents, as this one was not, undeniably
      is in serious danger of physical and emotional injury. Settled authorities
      have upheld termination based on endangerment in these circumstances.

349 S.W.3d at 553–54.

                                          23
WL 6205252, at *11 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth Nov. 21, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.);

see also In re M.R., No., 2022 WL 4545534, at *6–7 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth Sept. 29,

2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).26

      The evidence shows not only that Father had been charged with and jailed for

alleged assaultive acts against Mother before J.B. was born but also that

• Mother was pregnant in January 2021, when the State alleged Father assaulted her;

• After J.B.’s birth and before his removal, Father told Eastman that he had known
  Mother was pregnant and that she had been using meth “heavily” and also that he
  had discussed with Mother the impact her drug use could have on the child,27 in
  contrast to Mother’s assertions that Father had forced her to use drugs since she
  was 18, i.e., for 13 years by the time of J.B.’s birth;

• Father was aware that Mother had mental-health problems as she later reported to
  the hospital staff (in addition to her drug use), and J.B.’s medical records show that
  Mother was a drug addict who suffered from schizoaffective disorder and PTSD
  and who told the DFPS investigator that Father would beat her if she did not use
  methamphetamine, but she did not say when he did this or if he did so while she
  was pregnant;

      26
          M.R. has similar facts to Father’s case but is distinguishable as a stronger case
for termination because, among other things, the trial court took judicial notice of its
file, the father had been convicted and was serving time at the time of termination, the
father had disclaimed paternity and did not attempt to see the child before his
incarceration, the father had some history of drug use, and––importantly––the
evidence accounted for the possibility that—unlike in the case before us—the father
could have worked services at the facility where he was housed. 2022 WL 4545534, at
*3–7.
      27
        Mother had a long history of endangering her other children with her drug
use, so even without Father’s secondhand statements from Eastman, it is likely that
Father was aware of Mother’s drug problem even if he did not force her to use drugs.

                                            24
• At some point––presumably in January 2021 but before Father was jailed and
  while Mother and Father knew she was pregnant––Mother and Father argued
  “about her drug use,” she called the police, and he was arrested;

• Mathematically and physically, Father could not have forced Mother to take drugs
  immediately before J.B.’s birth when he had been incarcerated for several months by
  that time,28 but the trial court could have found that he had forced her to take
  drugs while pregnant, which would have endangered J.B.;

• At the time of their argument, Father––by his own admission to Eastman––was
  either on parole or on bond29 for “a prior family violence charge”; in other words,
  when he and Mother argued, he either already had a family-violence conviction or
  a pending charge;

• When asked in April 2022 if Father had told her “why he is currently in jail,” Hall
  said that Father told her “that he never assaulted [Mother] and that the fraudulent
  identities in his car were actually [Mother’s] not his”; thus, there is some evidence
  Father possessed fraudulent identities;

• Father was arrested on new, gun-related charges before he could work any services
  even though he had made an attempt to start;

• The new charges, according to Hall’s understanding, allegedly occurred where
  Father was living with his sister, the living arrangements he had made upon his
  release (and which, to be in compliance with his service plan, were to be safe and
  stable);

      28
         Mother’s medical records reflect that she was pregnant for 40 weeks,
indicating that she became pregnant during September 2020 and was approximately
17 weeks’ pregnant at the time of the alleged assault.
      29
         Parole and bond are not the same thing. Bond is posted by an accused as a
security for his appearance to answer a criminal accusation against him. See generally
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 17.01–.53 (discussing bail). Parole, on the other
hand, is for someone whose charge has become a conviction; it is the discretionary
and conditional release of an eligible inmate “so that the inmate may serve the
remainder of [his] sentence under the supervision of the pardons and paroles
division.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 508.001.

                                          25
• According to Hall’s testimony, Father had at least one conviction for a domestic-
  violence-related assault (as of April 2022, i.e., before his June 2022 release and
  resolution of his then-pending charges);

• Hall also testified, over no objections, that Father had approximately 20 criminal
  charges, and she testified that he had a “significant history” of violent crimes,
  domestic violence, and assaults “against almost all of the mothers of his other
  children,” which numbered “approximate[ly] 13,” most of whom were minors;

• Father had a prior CPS case; and

• Father told Eastman before J.B.’s removal that three of his other children had
  been removed while he was incarcerated.

      From the above, the factfinder could have inferred that Father had been

convicted of something (assaultive behavior or identity-fraud-related behavior)

stemming from his pre-June 2021 through June 2022 incarceration; that he served the

entire first year of J.B.’s life for that offense; and that before serving his time and

being released in June or early July 2022, he had racked up around 20 charges and at

least one assault conviction and had been incarcerated when three of his other

children had been taken into CPS custody.

      Further, during the limited time that he was not incarcerated during the case,

Father was again arrested for a violent crime. See In re A.W., No. 02-18-00147-CV,

2018 WL 5074770, at *12 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 18, 2018, pet. denied) (mem.

op.) (rejecting parent’s argument that his conduct had no bearing on his arrests or on

his indictments and noting that even if he was ultimately acquitted, he had not learned

how to avoid situations that lent themselves to arrests and indictments); see also In re

                                          26
A.M., No. 02-16-00208-CV, 2016 WL 7046858, at *1–3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

Dec. 2, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that although parent, who was incarcerated

for choking child’s mother while she was pregnant, blamed his incarceration for his

inability to complete his court-ordered service plan, this evidence, among other things,

was legally and factually sufficient to defeat his best-interest challenge).

       Although this record is sparse, the trial court, as the factfinder, was the sole

judge of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor, J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346, and

viewed in the light most favorable to its endangerment-by-conduct finding, we

conclude that a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the

finding is true, Z.N., 602 S.W.3d at 545. Likewise, having performed an exacting

review of the entire record, we conclude that the evidence is factually sufficient to

support the trial court’s endangerment-by-conduct finding. See A.B., 437 S.W.3d at

500. Accordingly, we overrule Father’s second issue without reaching his remaining

issues. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

                                     IV. Conclusion

       Having overruled Father’s dispositive endangerment-by-conduct issue, we

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                       /s/ Bonnie Sudderth

                                                         Bonnie Sudderth
                                                         Chief Justice

Delivered: February 9, 2023

                                             27