Court Opinion

ID: 9900931
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-20 19:03:36.21169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:22.563641
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/20/23 Marriage of C.D. and G.D. CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

In re Marriage of C.D. and                                   2d Civil Nos. B322858,
G.D.                                                                B325287
                                                            (Super. Ct. No. D388847)
                                                               (Ventura County)

C.D.,

     Appellant,

v.

G.D. et al.,

     Respondent.

       C.D. (Mother) appeals from the postjudgment order
granting G.D. (Father) therapeutic visitation with their minor
daughters and modifying a domestic violence restraining order
(DVRO) to permit such visitation. Mother contends the
therapeutic visitation order must be vacated because she has
exclusive authority to determine whether to permit such
visitation, Father did not obtain joint custody of his daughters
before seeking the order, and Father has not shown that
therapeutic visitation would be in the girls’ best interests. She
contends the DVRO modification must be vacated because Father
did not provide adequate notice and there is insufficient evidence
to support modification. We affirm.
             FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       Mother and Father married in 2013. Their twin daughters,
F.D. and S.D., were born four years later. Soon thereafter,
Mother petitioned to dissolve the marriage. The trial court
approved the dissolution petition and, after finding that Father
had sexually abused F.D. and S.D., granted Mother sole legal
custody. The court also barred Father from visiting his
daughters, and entered a DVRO forbidding him from contacting
them for five years. We affirmed the judgment on appeal. (In re
Marriage of C.D. & G.D. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 378, 387.)
       While that appeal was pending, Father requested that the
trial court stay the visitation provisions of the judgment and
DVRO to permit him weekly therapeutic visits and twice-weekly
supervised visits with his daughters. Therapeutic visits consist
of visits between the parent and the child, supervised by a
therapist or professional supervisor, as agreed upon by the child’s
therapist and minor’s counsel. In a declaration attached to his
request, Father said that he had not molested his daughters and
that visitation was in their best interests because it would ensure
“that there [would] not be an extended interruption to their
relationship with” him.
       Prior to the hearing on Father’s request, a mediator with
expertise on family custody issues recommended that the trial
court grant Father’s request for therapeutic visitation with F.D.
and S.D. At the hearing F.D. and S.D.’s appointed counsel said

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that she had spoken to the therapist who had worked with the
girls during the dissolution proceedings. Based on those
conversations, she too recommended therapeutic visitation. The
court agreed. It ordered twice-monthly therapeutic visits, and
modification of the DVRO to permit such visitation. It did not
grant Father’s request for supervised visitation.
                             DISCUSSION
                          Standard of review
       We review modifications of visitation orders and DVROs for
abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th
25, 32 [visitation orders]; Malinowski v. Martin (2023) 93
Cal.App.5th 681, 692 (Malinowski) [DVROs].) A court abuses its
discretion if its decision rests on a misapplication of the law. (In
re Marriage of McKean (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 1083, 1089.) A
court also abuses its discretion if “its findings are not supported
by substantial evidence.” (In re Marriage of Aninger (1990) 220
Cal.App.3d 230, 238, superseded by statute on another point as
stated in In re Marriage of O’Connor (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 877,
882.)
                         Therapeutic visitation
       Mother contends the trial court abused its discretion when
it granted Father’s request for therapeutic visitation with F.D.
and S.D. We disagree.
       A parent with “ ‘[s]ole legal custody’ . . . [has] the right and
the responsibility to make . . . decisions relating to the health,
education, and welfare of a child.” (Fam. Code, § 3006.) To
Mother, this provision of the Family Code grants her the
exclusive right to decide whether and under what conditions her
daughters will have therapeutic visitation with Father. Family
Code section 3006 is not so absolute. In dissolution matters, a

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court retains an interest in and jurisdiction over “the custody,
care, and maintenance of . . . minor children . . . during their . . .
minority.” (Moore v. Superior Court (1928) 203 Cal. 238, 242-
243.) This includes the power to order children to participate in
therapy for up to one year (see Fam. Code, § 3190, subd. (a)1) and
the power to modify an existing visitation arrangement (see, e.g.,
In re Marriage of Lucio (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1072
(Lucio)). We accordingly reject Mother’s first challenge to the
trial court’s therapeutic visitation order.
       Mother next claims Father was required to obtain joint
custody of F.D. and S.D. before seeking therapeutic visitation,
something he could not do without showing a significant change
in circumstances. (Cf. Burchard v. Garay (1986) 42 Cal.3d 531,
535 [once initial custody order is in place, court must “preserve
the established mode of custody unless some significant change in
circumstances indicates that a different arrangement would be in
the child’s best interest”].) But “the changed circumstance rule
does not apply when a parent requests only a change in the
parenting or visitation arrangement not amounting to a change

      1 For the first time in her reply brief, Mother argues the
trial court did not comply with the provisions of Family Code
section 3190, which requires us to nullify the therapeutic
visitation order. We decline to resolve this argument because the
order, now more than one year old, has expired. (MHC Operating
Limited Partnership v. City of San Jose (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th
204, 215 [appellate court generally declines to resolve moot
questions that are “essentially factual in nature”].) And even if it
hadn’t, we generally do not resolve arguments raised for the first
time in a reply brief (Gund v. County of Trinity (2020) 10 Cal.5th
503, 525) or those not raised during proceedings in the trial court
(Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 184,
fn. 1).

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from joint custody to sole custody, or vice versa.” (Lucio, supra,
161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1072.) “Instead, the trial court considers a
request to change the parenting or visitation arrangement under
the best interests of the child standard.” (Ibid.) Here, Father
requested therapeutic visitation with F.D. and S.D., not joint
custody of them. The “best interests of the child” standard
therefore applies.
       Mother claims Father did not meet it because the only
evidence supporting therapeutic visitation was the declaration
attached to his request. (Cf. Lucio, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at pp.
1077-1080 [parent requesting change in visitation bears burden
of showing change would be in child’s best interest].) But she
does not explain why that declaration provides an insufficient
basis to uphold the trial court’s finding that therapeutic
visitation would be in F.D.’s and S.D.’s best interests. (In re
Marriage of Alexander (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 677, 682
[declaration of party may constitute substantial evidence]; see
also Reifler v. Superior Court (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 479, 483-484
[Code of Civil Procedure section 2009 permits courts to determine
motions on declarations alone].) Moreover, Mother ignores that
the mediator also recommended that the court approve Father’s
therapeutic visitation request. Because Father’s declaration and
the mediator’s recommendation provide substantial evidence to
support the trial court’s finding that therapeutic visitation would
be in F.D.’s and S.D.’s best interests, there was no abuse of
discretion.
                         DVRO modification
       Mother contends the order modifying the DVRO must be
vacated because Father did not provide notice he was seeking
modification. She argues such notice is required by Code of Civil

                                 5
Procedure section 533. But as our colleagues in the First District
recently explained, that section does not set forth the exclusive
means by which a DVRO can be modified. (Malinowski, supra,
93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 690-697.) “[A] trial court is not necessarily
obligated to proceed under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 533
before modifying a [DVRO] to allow for exceptions consistent with
child visitation ordered in a parallel dissolution case.” (Id. at p.
685.)
       Moreover, Mother had notice that Father was seeking
modification: His request asked the court to stay the visitation
provisions of the DVRO to permit therapeutic visits with F.D.
and S.D. And staying or modifying portions of the DVRO would
obviously be required to “avoid inconsistent rulings” if the court
were to grant Father’s request for therapeutic visits.
(Malinowski, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 693, fn. 7.) It is easily
inferred that Mother recognized this; she argued against Father’s
request by noting that the “domestic violence restraining
order . . . was issued for a reason.”
       Alternatively, Mother contends there is insufficient
evidence to support modification of the DVRO. We reject this
contention for the same reasons we reject her sufficiency-of-the-
evidence challenge to the therapeutic visitation order. (See p. 5,
ante.)
                            DISPOSITION
       The order granting G.D.’s request for therapeutic visitation
with F.D. and S.D., entered October 4, 2022, is affirmed. The
order modifying the domestic violence restraining order solely to

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permit such visitation, entered October 25, 2022, is also affirmed.
G.D. shall recover his costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                     BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.

             YEGAN, J.

                                 7
                      Rocky J. Baio, Judge

                Superior Court County of Ventura

                 ______________________________

      Law Offices of Jeffrey A. Slott, Jeffrey A. Slott; The Law
Office of Greg May and Greg May for Appellant.
      Taylor, McCord, Praver & Cherry, Patrick G. Cherry;
Ventura Coast Law and Douglas K. Goldwater for Respondent.