Court Opinion

ID: 9560466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:49:31.800648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:56.083250
License: Public Domain

KAUGER, Justice,
concurring in part, dissenting in part:
I agree that the respondent, Bob Carpenter (Carpenter/attorney), engaged in conduct warranting discipline. It is uncontested that he: 1) commingled the funds of two clients with his own in violation of DR 9-102(A);1 2) failed to keep a proper account of his client’s funds in violation of DR 9-102(B)(3);2 and 3) failed to deliver promptly the funds of a client in violation of DR 9-102(B)(4).3 It is also uncontested that no client suffered economic detriment because of the attorney’s professional misconduct. There is also no assertion that the loans made by Carpenter bore any interest or that they were made for other than humanitarian reasons. Because attorneys committing similar infractions have been disciplined in the form of either a public or a private reprimand, I dissent. I also dissent to the Court’s finding that the making of loans to clients, under circumstances in which no interest was taken in the litigation, is conduct warranting discipline.
Before discipline is imposed upon an attorney, the charges must be established by clear and convincing evidence.4 In a bar disciplinary proceeding, we are not bound by the parties’ stipulations or the findings of the professional responsibility tribunal insofar as the imposition of discipline is concerned. The nondelegable, constitutional responsibility to regulate the practice, the ethics, the licensure, and the discipline of the practitioners of the law is vested solely in this Court.5 Our review therefore is de novo in considering the record presented as well as the trial panel’s disciplin*1132ary recommendations.6 When determining the appropriate discipline for attorney misconduct, we compare the circumstances with those of previous disciplinary proceedings and examine the attorney’s previous record of professional behavior. We must also determine how best to serve the welfare of the public and to preserve the integrity of the bar.7
The most recent case involving similar circumstances to be presented to this tribunal involved Attorney “X”.8 Attorney “X” took a total of $1,075.00 from clients for defense of a quiet title action. Service was never made on behalf of Attorney “X’s” clients, and the cause was not pursued. Several efforts at locating Attorney “X” were unsuccessful. When his clients finally found him, he told them, on more than one occassion, that he would refund the retainer and costs. The clients did not receive all their funds until after discipline was imposed by this tribunal. Attorney “X” was given a private reprimand, required to return fees to his clients, and the costs of the action were imposed. Here, Carpenter commingled his personal funds with his clients and was dilatory on one occassion in returning client monies. However, no detriment was suffered by the clients — all the monies have been accounted for. Additionally, Carpenter realized he had a problem with alcohol misuse long before the complaint was filed in the instant cause. Any lack of diligence related to his alcoholism has been corrected through his own effort at sobriety. Suspension is not warranted. The appropriate discipline in the instant cause is private censure coupled with the imposition of costs and continued association with the Lawyers Helping Lawyers Committee.9
Overreaching for pecuniary gain by an attorney should be vigorously investigated and discipline imposed if warranted. However, the provision of humanitarian, non-interest bearing loans to clients does not warrant discipline.10 Rule 1.8(e),11 of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct, prohibiting such loans, violates both the Oklahoma and the United States Constitutions.12 When I first called for the reexamination of Rule 1.8(e) and the adoption of a rule similar to § 48 to the Restatement *1133(Third) Governing Lawyers13 in my dissent to State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Smolen, 837 P.2d 894 (Okla.1992), I was joined by two of my colleagues — one of whom is the author of the majority opinion.14
I could not countenance the imposition of discipline based upon an unconstitutional rule in Smolen; I cannot do so today. I would subject Carpenter to a private reprimand, recommend a continued association with the Lawyers Helping Lawyers Committee, and impose costs. This disciplinary action is warranted solely by his mishandling of client funds.

. The questioned conduct occurred while the Code of Professional Responsibility was in effect. DR 9-102(A), 5 O.S.Supp.1983, Ch. 1, App. 3 provides:
"All Funds of Clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, excluding advances for costs and expenses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable bank or savings and loan association accounts maintained in the state in which the law office is situated and no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm shall be deposited therein except as follows:
(1) Funds reasonably sufficient to pay bank charges may be deposited therein.
(2) Funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently or potentially to the lawyer or law firm must be deposited therein, but the portion belonging to the lawyer or law firm may be withdrawn when due unless the right of the lawyer or law firm to receive it is disputed by the client, in which event the disputed portion shall not be withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved.”
The present Code of Professional Responsibility counterpart to DR 9-102(A) is Rule 1.15(a), 5 O.S.1991, Ch. 1, App. 3-A.

. DR 9-102(B)(3), 5 O.S.Supp.1983, Ch. 1, App. 3 provides:
"A lawyer shall:
(3) Maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to his client regarding them.”
The present Code of Professional Responsibility counterpart to DR 9 — 102(B)(3) is Rule 1.15(a), 5 O.S.1991, Ch. 1, App. 3-A.

. DR 9-102(B)(4), 5 O.S.Supp.1983, Ch. 1, App. 3, provides:
"A lawyer shall:
(4)Promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client the funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer which the client is entitled to receive."
The present Code of Professional Responsibility counterpart to DR 9-102(B)(4) is Rule 1.15(b), 5 O.S.1991, Ch. 1, App. 3-A.

. Rule 6.12, 5 O.S.1991, Ch. 1, App. 1-A provides in pertinent part:
"... To warrant a finding against the respondent in a contested case, the charge or charges must be established by clear and convincing evidence ...”
State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Gasaway, 810 P.2d 826, 830 (Okla.1991): State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Braswell, 663 P.2d 1228, 1232 (Okla.1983).

. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Downing, 804 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Okla.1991): State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Raskin, 642 P.2d 262, *1132265-66 (Okla. 1982); Tweedy v. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n, 624 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Okla.1981).

. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Gasaway, see note 4 at 831, supra; State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Stubblefield, 766 P.2d 979, 982 (Okla.1988).

. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Downing, see note 5, supra.

. OBAD #2057, SCBD 3823. The attorney’s name is not revealed because the only discipline imposed is a private reprimand and a return of client funds.

. In another recent case, State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Evans, 64 O.B.J. 1494 (May 11, 1993), the attorney was given a public reprimand for commingling personal funds with his clients and putting client funds in jeopardy in a garnishment. Although Carpenter's trust account fell below the amount finally determined to be owing to one client, no client was financially injured. Evans would support the imposition of only a public reprimand.

. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Smolen, 837 P.2d 894 (Okla.1992) (Kauger, J„ dissenting). The only difference between courting clients with receptions and dinner parties and helping a destitute client through a non-interest bearing loan is one of compassion — in either instance the attorney is feeding the client.

. Rule 1.8(e), Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct, 5 O.S.1991, Ch. 1, App. 3-A provides:
"While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to a client, except that a lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, including court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examination, and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the client remains ultimately liable for such expenses.”
When this rule was adopted by the Court in 1988, I dissented from this portion of the proposed rules.

. Rule 1.8(e), see note 11, supra, potentially violates several sections of both the United States Constitution and the Oklahoma Constitution — the equal protection clause, United States Const, amend. XIV, § 1; access to courts, Okla. Const art. 2, § 6; the special law clause, Okla. Const, art. 5, 46, the privileges and immunities clause, Okla. Const, art. 5, § 51; the First Amendment of the United States Constitution; *1133the Okla. Const, art. 1, § 2; and the Okla. Const, art. 2, § 15.

. The Restatement (Third) Governing Lawyers, tentative draft no 4, § 48 (April 10, 1991) provides in pertinent part:
"§ 48. Forbidden Client-Lawyer Financial Arrangements
(1) A lawyer may not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation that the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:
(a) Acquire a lien as provided by § 55 to secure the lawyer’s fee or expenses; and
(b) Contract with a client for a contingent fee in a civil case except when prohibited as stated in § 47.
(2) A lawyer may not make or guarantee a loan to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation that the lawyer is conducting for the client, except that the lawyer may:
(a) Advance or guarantee a loan covering court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which to the lawyer may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and (b) Make or guarantee a loan on fair terms, the repayment of which to the lawyer may be contingent on the outcome of the matter, if the loan is needed to enable the client to withstand delay in litigation that otherwise might unjustly induce the client to settle or dismiss a case because of financial hardship rather than on the merits_”
It is worth noting that both Louisiana and California have adopted positions which allow advances to clients for living expenses. See, Louisiana State Bar Ass’n v. Edwins, 329 So.2d 437, 445 (La.1976) and Rule 5-104 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct.

. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass’n v. Smolen, see note 10 at 901, 906. Justice Opala wrote:
“I would, as the dissent urges, favor a reexamination of Rule 1.18(e) in light of the quoted tentative draft of Restatement (Third) (Emphasis Justice Opala’s.)