Court Opinion

ID: 9527648
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:32:15.104656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:01.311980
License: Public Domain

OP ALA, Justice,
dissenting.
The court assumes original cognizance and holds that the incumbent commissioner, Bennie Cox [Cox], has title to position number 2 on the Oklahoma Mining Commission [Commission] for a seven-year term that expires January 1, 2002. The court’s pronouncement, which rests on its construction of 45 O.S.Supp.1995 § l,1 declares that by that section’s provisions all gubernatorial appointments to the Commission, to be made after October 1,1986, are intended to extend for a term of seven years.
*283I cannot accede to the court’s analysis of this controversy. Much too much is decided by today’s opinion. It is impossible to afford full relief on Cox’s plea in the nature of a writ of quo warranto. Were I to measure Cox’s right to his office solely by the plain language of 45 O.S.Supp.1995 § 1, his two-year term did not expire until January 1, 1996. Until Cox’s successor is legally appointed and qualified, he may not be removed from office except for cause.2 In the meantime, he must be allowed to participate fully in all matters before the Commission. That is all I would settle for now.
I

HISTORY OF SUCCESSION

The text of 45 O.S.Supp.1995 § 1(A)3 provides that an appointment to the Commission’s position number 2 shall be for a two-year term. Thus far five appointments have been made to that post: (a) Amzi Gossard was initially appointed for a two-year term (ending January 1, 1988);4 (b) Charles Campbell was then appointed for a seven-year term (ending January 1, 1995);5 (e) Bennie Cox, the petitioner herein, was first appointed October 8, 1993 to fill Campbell’s unexpired term6 and then reappointed on November 18, 1994 for a new seven-year term (ending January 1, 2002);7 and (d) Ralph Dawson [Dawson] was appointed October 16, 1995 for a “term ending October 16, 1996”.8
Cox urges: (1) by the provisions of 45 O.S.Supp.1995 § 1 the legislature had intended that, following the initial gubernatorial appointments, all commissioners will serve staggered seven-year terms, and (2) his appointment in 1994 was for a seven-year period, to begin January 1, 1995 and to end *284January 1, 2002.9 According to Dawson (as well as to Governor Keating),10 the plain language of 45 O.S.Supp.1995 § 1 unequivocally establishes a two-year term for the post here in contest (position number 2).11
II
DAWSON WAS APPOINTED TO AN OFFICE THAT WAS LEGALLY OCCUPIED BY ANOTHER
A.
A de facto officer is one who (a) occupies an office that is in existence,12 (b) under color of title by virtue of an otherwise valid appointment, and (c) has become disqualified to hold that position.13 In contrast, a de jure officer is one who is legally appointed and qualified to exercise the duties of the office.14 A de jure officer who occupies the post beyond the prescribed legal (statutory or constitutional) term falls into the latter (de jure) category. This is so because by legislative mandate a holdover is legally in office until a successor is appointed and qualified.15 An appointment for a term longer than that provided by statute does not transform the appointee into a de facto officer.16 The governor’s power to fill vacancies created by the resignation of a state officer does not include the authority to limit, enlarge or otherwise condition the term during which the appointee is to serve.17
Assuming that, as Dawson claims, the term of office for position number 2 is only two years, the office in question was vacant when Cox was appointed in 1993 (for the remainder of his predecessor’s term) and later in 1991 (at the expiration of a perceived seven-year term). Although Cox may be subject to removal after the end of his legal *285term (January 1, 1996), an appointment for a longer period than the legally prescribed term does not per se transmute one’s de jure into a defacto status.
Even if there were an infirmity in Cox’s claim to the office, Dawson has to prevail on the strength of his own demand, not on the weakness of Cox’s title.18 Dawson’s claim is far from superior to Cox’s. Regardless of whether Cox was holding a two-year or a seven-year term, Dawson’s appointment is void because at its effective date (October 16, 1995) no vacancy was in existence in the post to which he was appointed. Governor Keat-ing clearly was mistaken in his belief that Cox’s two-year term had expired January 1, 1995 instead of 1995.19
I would declare that Cox is now in (or should be restored to) office. Dawson is without a viable claim. The latter was appointed to fill an office when no vacancy existed. There is no justiciable20 controversy before us over the expiration of Cox’s term for want of a contender with colorable title or standing21 to demand the office instanter. Until Dawson has received a presently effective appointment and qualifies for the office as Cox’s successor, Cox's claim to a longer term than that indicated by the plain language of § 122 need not be reached for judicial settlement. That controversy presents, at this juncture, nothing more than an academic or abstract issue.23
B.
Cox informs us that Dawson has participated at the 1995 November and December Commission meetings. Cox’s ouster from the Commission proceedings was apparently accomplished sans legal advice from the Attorney General.24 In the event that the Commission is indeed depriving the incumbent of his right to participate, I would declare that Cox is now in office as a de jure commissioner. I would also hold that Cox stands entitled to vote at all Commission meetings.
Nothing more need be decided today. Whether Cox’s term does extend for two or seven years should be saved for the day when Dawson arms himself with a presently effective gubernatorial appointment giving him at least some color of title and passes muster as qualified to take the office.
*286SUMMARY
I would confine today’s pronouncement to declaring that (a) Cox has a presently effective claim to the office; (b) Dawson is sans colorable title and (c) Cox must be allowed to participate in Commission proceedings. I would not, as the court does today, settle the controversy over the length of Cox’s term of office. That issue is not presently justicia-ble,25

. For the terms of 45 O.S.Supp.1995 § 1, see infra note 3.

. See the terms of 45 O.S.Supp.1995 § 1(B), infra note 3.

. The pertinent terms of 45 O.S.Supp.1995 § 1 are:
"A. There is hereby created the Oklahoma Mining Commission. The Commission shall be composed of nine (9) members to be appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate.
The Commission shall constitute a body corporate of the State of Oklahoma, and exercise by the Commission of the powers conferred by this act shall be deemed and shall be held to be an essential governmental function of the State of Oklahoma. Beginning January 1, 1986, one member shall be appointed for a term of one (1) year; one member shall be appointed for a term of two (2) years; one member shall be appointed for a term of three (3) years; one member shall be appointed for a term of four (4) years; one member shall be appointed for a term of five (5) years; two members shall be appointed for a term of six (6) years; and two members shall be appointed for a term of seven (7) years. Each member shall be a qualified elector of this state.
⅜ ⅜ * ijt ⅜ ⅝
B. The Commission shall meet at least six times annually. A majority of the Commission shall constitute a quorum. Commission members may be removed only for cause.
Whenever a vacancy shall occur, the Governor shall appoint a person to fill the unexpired term of the vacant office. Each member of the Commission shall take and subscribe to the constitutional and statutory oath of office prior to the performance of any duties as a Commission member.” (Emphasis added.)

. Governor George Nigh made the first appointment to position number 2 on the Commission, which was confirmed by the Senate (Senate Journal for the Second Regular Session of the Fortieth Oklahoma Legislature, pp. 563-565 (1986)).

. Order of Appointment (by Governor Henry Bellmon), filed May 19, 1988; confirmed by the Senate (Senate Journal for the Second Regular Session of the Forty-first Oklahoma Legislature, pp. 938-939 (1988)). The order provides that Campbell’s appointment is for "an initial seven (7) year term ending January 1, 1995.” (Emphasis mine.) Campbell resigned in 1993.

. Order of Appointment (by Governor David Walters), filed October 8, 1993; confirmed by the Senate on May 24, 1994 (Senate Journal for the Second Regular Session of the Forty-fourth Oklahoma Legislature, pp. 902-908 (1994)).

. Order of Appointment (by Governor David Walters), filed November 18, 1994; confirmed by the Senate on April 11, 1995 (Senate Journal for the First Regular Session of the Foriy-fifth Oklahoma Legislature, pp. 731-733 (1995)).

. Order of Appointment (by Governor Frank Keating), filed October 16, 1995. The Senate has not been in session since Dawson’s appointment, which states that “Dawson is succeeding Bennie Cox.” The Governor's September 19, 1995 letter to Cox notes that his two-year Commission term expired January 1, 1995. This date is clearly in error. Cox's term, if indeed for two years, expired January 1, 1996.

. Support for this view, Cox urges, is found in the legislature’s failure to reject Commission rules which contemplate seven-year terms and in the Senate's confirmation of several seven-year appointments for not only position number 2 but also other positions on the Commission. Because he was reappointed November 18, 1994 for a seven-year term ending January 1, 2002, Cox argues, there was no vacancy in position number 2 at the time of Dawson’s appointment. According to Cox, he has committed no act or dereliction that would justify his removal or ouster from that office.

. Governor Keating's September 19, 1995 letter to Cox explains that (a) he was appointed to a position which by law has a two-year term and (b) his term expired January 1, 1995 [sic]. The order of appointment (filed October 16, 1995) states that Dawson is "to serve a term, ending October 16, 1996.”

. Dawson argues that Cox’s initial 1993 appointment is inefficacious because the governor was without authority to appoint anyone to that position in excess of the statutory term. According to Dawson, until Governor Keating appointed Dawson in 1995 to fill an unexpired two-year term ending January 1, 1996, Cox was acting merely as a de facto officer under a defective appointment.

. In at least one case this court treated the occupant of a non-existent judicial office as a de facto judge. State ex rel. Rucker v. Tapp, Okl., 380 P.2d 260, 268 (1963).

. Wixson v. Green, Okl., 521 P.2d 817, 818 (1974); Ajax Contractors, Inc. v. Myatt, Okl., 424 P.2d 30, 33-34 (1967) ("an 'officer de facto' is one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the public and third persons, where the * * * functions of the office are exercised by one who was in the actual possession of it under color of title”); Rucker, supra note 12 at 268; Mid-Continent Building Co. v. Board of Equalization, 184 Okl. 525, 88 P.2d 626 (syl.3) (1939) (a board member who forfeits his right to office by accepting an incompatible office is still a de facto member of the board); Sheldon v. Green, 182 Okl. 208, 77 P.2d 114, 115 (1938) (if the office actually exists, possession plus color of title to the office is sufficient to make the incumbent a de facto officer; a judge de facto differs from a mere usurper of the office who undertakes to act without any color of right).

. Sheldon, supra note 13 at 115.

. The pertinent terms of 51 O.S.1991 § 15 provide that “[e]very appointed officer shall hold his office until the end of the term for which the officer whom he succeeds was elected or appointed, and until his successor is elected and qualified." (Emphasis added.) Abitbol v. Priore, Okl., 797 P.2d 335, 336-337 (1990).

. The length of time an appointee can serve as successor office holder, which is fixed by law, is not a factor to be considered in the process of assessing whether an officer is serving de jure or de facto. Abitbol, supra note 15 at 336; Burford v. Board of Com’rs, 63 Okl. 42, 162 P. 780, 782 (1917).

. Abitbol, supra note 15 at 336.

. Wood v. Sympson, Okl., 833 P.2d 1239, 1248 (1992); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State, Okl., 659 P.2d 930, 934-935 (1983); Bearing v. State, Okl., 642 P.2d 226, 229 (1982).

. See text supra note 8.

. To be appropriate for judicial inquiry, a controversy must be justiciable. Included within the rubric of justiciability is a controversy which (a) is definite and concrete, (b) concerns legal relations among parties with adverse interests, and (c) is real and substantial so as to be capable of a decision granting or denying specific relief. Hendrick v. Walters, Okl., 865 P.2d 1232, 1238 (1993); Application of State ex rel. Dept, of Transp., Okl., 646 P.2d 605, 609 (1982); Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-242, 57 S.Ct. 461, 464-465, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 324-325, 56 S.Ct. 466, 472-473, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936); Hatfield v. King, 184 U.S. 162, 165-166, 22 S.Ct. 477, 478, 46 L.Ed. 481 (1902).

. Standing refers to a person's legal right to seek relief in a judicial forum. Hendrick, supra note 20 at 1236; Application of State ex rel. Dept, of Transp., supra note 20 at 609; Underside v. Lathrop, Okl., 645 P.2d 514, 517 (1982). It must be predicated on an injury to an interest which is "direct, immediate and substantial.” Toxic Waste Impact Group, Inc. v. Leavitt, Okl., 890 P.2d 906, 913 (1995) (Opala, X, concurring); Democratic Party of Oklahoma v. Estep, Okl., 652 P.2d 271, 274 (1982); Application of State ex rel. Dept. of Transp., supra note 20 at 609; Underside, supra at 517; Cleary Petroleum Corp. v. Harrison, Okl., 621 P.2d 528, 530 (1980).

. For the terms of 45 O.S.Supp.1995 § 1, see supra note 3.

. Hughey v. Grand River Dam Auth., Okl., 897 P.2d 1138, 1143 (1995); Northeast Okl. Elec. Coop. v. State, Okl., 808 P.2d 680, 683 n. 7 (1991); Morton v. Adair County Excise Bd., Okl., 780 P.2d 707, 711 (1989); Westinghouse Elec. v. Grand River Dam Auth., Okl., 720 P.2d 713, 718 (1986).

. Whether the legal advice of the Attorney General be considered binding or merely advisory, a state official or agency is deemed protected from liability when heeding the advice given by the chief law officer of the state, at least until a clear judicial pronouncement would indicate a different course of conduct. See 74 O.S.1991 §§ 18 and 18b(A)(5); Hendrick, supra note 20 at 1243; Allen v. State, Okl., 769 P.2d 1302, 1308 n. 33 (1988).

. Application of State ex rel. Dept, of Transp., supra note 20 at 609; Hendrick, supra note 20 at 1238.