Court Opinion

ID: 9447575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:38:05.77794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:05.948387
License: Public Domain

SMITH, Judge
(dissenting).
The majority opinion seems to me to place an undue emphasis on the strictly legal aspects of the issue before us. It is my opinion that all we are required to do under the express language of section 8 of the Lanham Act is to decide a simple fact issue: Is the mark “Ni-Tensyl” still in use ?
In arriving at its decision, the majority opinion attaches more significance than I do to the name used on the label specimens showing the mark and does not give as much legal effect as I would to the sworn allegations of use in the affidavit filed by appellant.
It is significant to me that the affidavit of use, after referring to the registration of the mark “Ni-Tensyl” states:
“ * * * that the mark shown in the aforesaid registration has been continuously used by said corporation and related companies of said corporation, in interstate and/or foreign commerce, on goods and/or in advertising, for five consecutive years, from July 2, 1951 to the present, in connection with the following goods recited in the registration: nickel-containing iron castings * * *
The labels referred to in this affidavit show the mark “Ni-Tensyl” to be still “in use,” as that term is used in section 8. I do not regard the addition of the descriptive word “iron” on the labels as evidence which justifies cancellation of registration for non-use of the mark “Ni-Tensyl” under section 8(b) of the Lanham Act.
It is unfortunate that the affidavit filed on behalf of appellant was not more explicit as to the facts contemplated by Rule 2.162(a) (3), and upon which the positive averments of use were made. It is seen particularly in the failure of the affidavit to recite such pertinent facts as may have a bearing on the question of non-use of the registered mark. It seems clear to me from the affidavit that appellant considers its use of “NiTensyliron” to constitute a use of its mark “Ni-Tensyl.”
However, in view of the opposite factual conclusion reached by the Patent Office and by the majority, from their reading of the same affidavit, prudence suggests that in every case where the specimens of a mark deviates in any manner whatsoever from the mark as *959registered the section 8 affidavit required by Rule 2.161 should be most explicit in its recital of the facts of use. Rule 2.-162(a) (3) enumerates the facts required to show that the mark as described in the registration is still in use and to show that in using the changed specimens there is no intent to abandon the mark.
For these reasons, I am unable to agree with the conclusion reached by the majority and respectfully dissent from the same. I would find as a factual matter the mark “Ni-Tensyl” is still in use for the reasons more fully set forth in the dissenting opinion of Judge RICH. I would therefore reverse the decision below.
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