Court Opinion

ID: 9375734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-28 18:06:47.444824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:01.227799
License: Public Domain

J-A22038-21

                                   2023 PA Super 30

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
    JOHN MICHAEL PERZEL                        :
                                               :
                       Appellee                :       No. 182 MDA 2021

               Appeal from the Order Entered December 31, 2020
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0002589-2010

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

OPINION BY KING, J.:                               FILED: FEBRUARY 28, 2023

        Appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, appeals from the

restitution order entered in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas,

following this Court’s remand for a new hearing on the amount of restitution

sought by the Commonwealth in connection with the guilty plea of Appellee,

John Michael Perzel, to multiple counts of criminal conspiracy, theft by failure

to make required disposition of funds, and restricted activities.1 We affirm.

        The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. In

2009, the Commonwealth charged Appellee with various offenses in

connection with Appellee’s use of public funds, government staff, equipment,

and facilities to pay for and to perform campaign activities while Appellee was

a member of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives from 1978 to 2010

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1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903; 3927(a); and 65 Pa.C.S.A. § 1103(a), respectively.
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and/or while serving as its Speaker from 2003 to 2007. On August 31, 2011,

Appellee entered an open guilty plea to two counts each of restricted activities,

conspiracy to commit restricted activities, theft by failure to make required

disposition of funds, and conspiracy to commit theft by failure to make

required disposition of funds. Appellee admitted at the time of his guilty plea

that he would be subject to pay restitution as part of his sentence. (See N.T.

Guilty Plea Hearing, 8/31/11, at 10).            The amount of restitution was not

discussed at that time. (See id.)

        On March 21, 2012, the court sentenced Appellee to an aggregate term

of 2½ to 5 years’ incarceration, five years’ probation, $30,000.00 in fines, and

$1,000,000.00 in restitution to the Commonwealth under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106

(governing restitution for injuries to person or property). Appellee did not file

a direct appeal.

        On March 21, 2013, Appellee filed a timely pro se Post Conviction Relief

Act (“PCRA”)2 petition, challenging the restitution portion of his sentence as

illegal because the Commonwealth was not a “victim” entitled to restitution

under Section 1106. The court appointed counsel, who subsequently filed an

amended PCRA petition. On July 16, 2014, following appropriate notice per

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, the court denied Appellee’s petition. On May 4, 2015, this

Court affirmed.      Nevertheless, on February 9, 2017, our Supreme Court

____________________________________________

2   42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

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vacated and remanded to this Court to reconsider its decision in light of

Commonwealth v. Veon, 637 Pa. 442, 150 A.3d 435 (2016) (holding

Commonwealth      cannot   be   considered   direct   victim   or   reimbursable

compensating government agency under version of restitution statute in effect

at that time, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106; therefore, restitution order directing

payment to Commonwealth as victim of crime constitutes illegal sentence).

See Commonwealth v. Perzel, 116 A.3d 670 (Pa.Super. 2015), appeal

granted and order vacated, 641 Pa. 174, 166 A.3d 1213 (2017).

      On remand, based on Veon, this Court held that the $1,000,000.00

restitution constituted an illegal sentence because the Commonwealth was not

a “victim” for purposes of Section 1106. See Commonwealth v. Perzel,

169 A.3d 1138 (Pa.Super. 2017) (unpublished memorandum).                Without

disturbing the convictions, this Court vacated Appellee’s judgment of sentence

and remanded for resentencing in toto, where vacating the restitution

sentence might have disrupted the court’s overall sentencing scheme. Id.

      Prior to resentencing, the Commonwealth notified Appellee that it

intended to rely on several different statutes to support its renewed claim for

restitution. The Commonwealth contended that restitution was proper under

43 P.S. § 1314(a) of the Public Employee Pension Forfeiture Act (stating that

whenever any public official or public employee who is member of any pension

system funded by moneys enters plea of guilty or nolo contendere to any

crime related to public office or public employment, and which plea is accepted

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by court, court shall order defendant to make complete and full restitution to

Commonwealth or political subdivision of any monetary loss incurred as result

of criminal offense), and/or as a condition of probation pursuant to 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9754(c)(8) (stating court may order as condition of probation that

defendant make restitution of fruits of his crime or make reparations, in

amount he can afford to pay, for loss of damage caused thereby), 3 and/or

under 65 Pa.C.S.A. § 1109(c) of the Public Official and Employee Ethics Act

(stating any person who commits crime of restricted activities and obtains

financial gain from violating any provision of this chapter, in addition to any

other penalty provided by law, shall pay sum of money equal to three times

amount of financial gain resulting from such violation into State Treasury or

treasury of political subdivision).

       On May 30, 2018, the court resentenced Appellee to the same initial

aggregate sentence of 2½ to 5 years’ incarceration plus five years’ probation,

granted him time served, and ordered that he pay $1,000,000.00 in

restitution. In support of the restitution award, the trial court stated it was

authorized to impose restitution to be paid to the Commonwealth under any

of the above statutes on which the Commonwealth had relied.

       On Monday, June 11, 2018, Appellee filed a timely post-sentence

motion, which the court denied on June 28, 2018. Following another appeal,

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3Following amendments to the statute, Section 9754(c) was deleted by 2019,
Dec. 18, P.L. 776, No. 115, § 4.

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this Court held that the trial court had the authority to impose restitution

pursuant to Section 1314(a) of the Pension Forfeiture Act, but it lacked

authority to impose restitution under the other statutes cited by the

Commonwealth.           Notwithstanding the trial court’s authority to impose

restitution, this Court held that Appellee’s additional challenge to the amount

of restitution imposed ($1,000,000.00) had merit, where the trial court had

failed to conduct a new hearing upon this Court’s 2017 remand decision. This

Court    noted   that    a    hearing   was   particularly   necessary   where   the

Commonwealth had asserted new legal authority for imposing restitution

under different legal standards.

        Thus, this Court vacated the judgment of sentence once again and

remanded for a new hearing to determine the Commonwealth’s loss that

flowed from the charges to which Appellee pled guilty. This Court specified

that upon remand, to be entitled to restitution, the Commonwealth would be

required to introduce “non-speculative testimony” setting forth the factual

basis for the amount sought; Appellee could then challenge the amount

imposed. See Commonwealth v. Perzel, 209 A.3d 1074 (Pa.Super. 2019),

appeal denied, 655 Pa. 70, 217 A.3d 206 (2019).

        On September 2, 2020, the trial court conducted a resentencing hearing

regarding restitution.       At the hearing, the Commonwealth introduced GCR

Invoices and Payments, and a House Republican Caucus balance sheet that

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totaled $8,640,403.76.4 (See Commonwealth’s Resentencing Exhibit 7, dated

9/2/20, at 19). The Commonwealth also introduced a 188-page grand jury

presentment, the guilty plea agreement, the guilty plea transcript, the bill of

information, the case docket, and the original criminal complaint.                  The

Commonwealth did not call any witnesses or introduce any expert testimony.

       On December 31, 2020, the trial court issued an order and opinion

deciding that the Commonwealth did not prove its entitlement to restitution

based on the specific charges to which Appellee pled guilty. Consequently,

the court did not impose any restitution as part of Appellee’s sentence. The

Commonwealth did not file a post-sentence motion.                 The Commonwealth

timely filed a notice of appeal on Monday, February 1, 2021. On February 16,

2021, the court ordered the Commonwealth to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal, and the Commonwealth timely

complied.

       On appeal, the Commonwealth raised the following issue: “Did the [trial]

court err in denying requested mandatory restitution, the amount of which is

established by the record?” (Commonwealth’s Principal Brief at 6). On May

11, 2022, this Court held that the Commonwealth’s issue on appeal was a

challenge     to   the    discretionary        aspects   of   sentencing,   which   the

Commonwealth did not properly preserve before the trial court in a post-

____________________________________________

4GCR & Associates, Inc. was an entity that Appellee illegally paid to conduct
campaign work and/or other personal, non-public purposes.

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sentence motion. Therefore, this panel decided the sole issue on appeal was

waived.   Nevertheless, on July 20, 2022, we withdrew our May 11, 2022

decision and granted panel reconsideration to re-consider our waiver holding

in light of legal authority cited in the Commonwealth’s application for

reargument. We further directed the parties to submit supplemental briefs

limited to argument on whether the Commonwealth waived its sentencing

challenge on appeal by failing to preserve it at the trial court level. The parties

have filed supplemental briefs as directed.

      In its principal brief, the Commonwealth argues that Appellee admitted

to causing a loss of $7.6 million dollars by entering into the guilty plea, and

the court erred by failing to order restitution in that amount.                The

Commonwealth maintains that it established the $7.6 million restitution

amount when it presented evidence at the September 2, 2020 hearing

consisting of the case docket, the original criminal complaint, the presentment

returned by the grand jury, the criminal information, the written guilty plea

agreement, the transcript of the guilty plea hearing, and a spreadsheet

summarizing numerous relevant invoices.         The Commonwealth insists that

those exhibits support the Commonwealth’s requested amount of restitution.

      The Commonwealth further claims the court was required to impose

restitution under the Public Employee Pension Forfeiture Act, and the court’s

failure to impose mandatory restitution implicates the legality of sentencing.

To the extent its claim could implicate the discretionary aspects of sentencing,

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the Commonwealth avers that this Court’s 2019 remand decision was limited

to ordering a new restitution hearing and not for resentencing.      Thus, the

Commonwealth claims it was not required to file a post-sentence motion

because the court did not resentence Appellee, and there was no new sentence

to challenge in a post-sentence motion.

      In its supplemental brief following the grant of panel reconsideration,

the Commonwealth reiterates its argument that it was not required to file a

post-sentence motion where this Court’s 2019 remand decision was limited to

ordering   a    new   restitution   hearing    and   not    for   resentencing.

(Commonwealth’s Supplemental Brief at 6).        Likewise, the Commonwealth

repeats its argument that following the September 2, 2020 remand hearing,

the court did not re-impose sentence. The Commonwealth claims the trial

court would have been prohibited from resentencing Appellee after that

hearing, as doing so would have violated this Court’s 2019 remand decision.

(Id. at 7).    Thus, the Commonwealth claims it preserved its restitution

challenge “in the only manner available to it: by litigating in the manner

directed by this Court in its remand order.” (Id.) Following the trial court’s

December 31, 2020 order denying the Commonwealth’s claim for restitution,

the Commonwealth contends that all claims, arguments, and issues between

the parties were resolved, and the trial court’s order was final and immediately

appealable.    (Id. at 8).   According to the Commonwealth, “no Rule of

Evidence, Rule of Criminal Procedure, or Rule of Appellate Procedure requires

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further action by the Commonwealth under these circumstances.” (Id.)

        Although not cited by the Commonwealth in its principal brief, the

Commonwealth now directs our attention to Rule of Criminal Procedure

721(A), governing post-sentence motions by the Commonwealth.5           The

Commonwealth contends that this Rule renders post-sentence motions by the

Commonwealth optional. The Commonwealth further quotes the Comment to

the Rule, which provides that “the Commonwealth’s motion for modification

of sentence is optional, as long as any discretionary sentencing issue is

properly preserved at the time sentence was imposed….” (Id. at 9) (quoting

Pa.R.Crim.P. 721, Comment). In light of this language, the Commonwealth

submits:

           The problem with applying this Rule to the instant
           circumstances is that no new sentence was imposed. The
           sentencing court simply issued an order making a finding
           that the Commonwealth had not met its burden. There was
           no sentencing hearing at which the Commonwealth could
           object, and no new sentence imposed as to which the
           Commonwealth could file post-sentence motions. If this
           Court takes the view that the Commonwealth must take
           some further action, it would have to remand to the
           sentencing court for the imposition of a new sentence to
           give the Commonwealth the opportunity to comply with an
           otherwise inapplicable Rule of Criminal Procedure.

(Id.)    Under these circumstances, the Commonwealth insists this Court’s

initial waiver analysis was flawed. The Commonwealth concludes this Court

____________________________________________

5 The Commonwealth referenced Rule 721(A) for the first time in its
application for reargument following this Court’s now-withdrawn May 11, 2022
decision.

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must reverse the order denying its request for restitution and impose a new

sentence including the amount of restitution sought by the Commonwealth.

Alternatively, the Commonwealth asks this Court to direct the trial court to

impose a sentence without an order of restitution so that the Commonwealth

may comply with Rule 721(A).

      In response to the Commonwealth’s arguments in its supplemental

brief, Appellee argues that the record makes clear “that the vacated portion

of the sentencing court’s order, imposing $1,000,000.00 in restitution, was

reduced by the sentencing court to $0 at the new resentencing hearing” based

on the Commonwealth’s failure to introduce non-speculative testimony in

support of the restitution sought.     (Appellee’s Supplemental Brief at 5).

Appellee points out that the trial court expressly referred to the September 2,

2020 proceeding as a “resentencing hearing” in its December 31, 2020 order

and opinion denying relief.   Appellee insists that the sentencing court, as

directed by this Court on remand, conducted a resentencing hearing on

September 2, 2020 to address the vacated portion of the sentencing court’s

order awarding $1,000,000.00 in restitution.      Appellee further highlights

language from this Court’s February 19, 2019 remand decision expressly

vacating “the portion of the sentencing court’s order imposing $1,000,000.00

in restitution” and concluding “Judgment of sentence vacated and case

remanded with instructions.”     (Id. at 6-7).    Appellee submits that the

Commonwealth seems to acknowledge that this Court vacated the judgment

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of sentence in the February 19, 2019 remand decision, but then “seems to

change course” by claiming that this Court did not impose a new sentence.

(Id. at 7).

      Appellee further disputes the Commonwealth’s claim that it preserved

its sole claim by presenting evidence related to restitution at the hearing “in

the time and manner directed by this Court.” (Id. at 8). Appellee emphasizes

that the Commonwealth did not comply with this Court’s remand directive

because it failed to offer non-speculative evidence in support of its claim by

declining to call any witnesses or introduce any expert testimony. Appellee

insists the Commonwealth’s challenge is properly construed as an attack on

the discretionary aspects of sentencing, which the Commonwealth failed to

properly preserve before the trial court.      Appellee also objects to the

Commonwealth’s omission of a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement.             Appellee

concludes the Commonwealth has waived its sentencing challenge, and this

Court must affirm the order declining to award restitution. For the following

reasons, we agree with Appellee’s position.

      Initially, we must decide whether the Commonwealth’s issue implicates

the legality of the sentence, as alleged by the Commonwealth in its principal

brief, or the discretionary aspects of sentencing. A challenge to the legality

of a sentence raises a question of law. Commonwealth v. Smith, 956 A.2d

1029, 1033 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc). In reviewing this type of claim, our

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.

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Commonwealth v. Childs, 63 A.3d 323, 325 (Pa.Super. 2013). “An illegal

sentence must be vacated…” Commonwealth v. Ramos, 197 A.3d 766, 769

(Pa.Super. 2018) (citation and quotation marks omitted).            Moreover,

assuming jurisdiction is proper, “a challenge to the legality of the sentence

can never be waived and may be raised by this Court sua sponte.”

Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 106 A.3d 800, 801 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation

omitted).

      In contrast, challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not

entitle an appellant to an appeal as of right. Commonwealth v. Evans, 901

A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303

(2006). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue:

         [W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
         appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal[;] (2) whether
         the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a
         motion to reconsider and modify sentence[;] (3) whether
         appellant’s brief has a fatal defect[;] and (4) whether there
         is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is
         not appropriate under the Sentencing Code[.]

Id. (internal citations omitted).

      In Commonwealth v. Weir, ___ Pa. ___, 239 A.3d 25 (2020), our

Supreme Court reiterated that “a challenge to the sentencing court’s authority

to order restitution raises a non-waivable legality of sentencing issue.     A

challenge to the manner in which the sentencing court exercises that authority

in fashioning the restitution implicates the discretionary aspects of the

sentence.” Id. at ___, 239 A.3d at 37. Therefore, when an appellant claims

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that the trial court lacked statutory authority to impose restitution, it is a

legality of sentencing issue. Id. Conversely, where an appellant “challenges

only the amount of the award based on the sentencing court’s consideration

of the evidence of loss presented by the Commonwealth, it is a challenge to

the discretionary aspects of sentencing.” Id. at ___, 239 A.3d at 38.

       Instantly, the Commonwealth’s claim is that the court erred in

determining the proper amount of restitution, which the Commonwealth

characterized as at least $7.6 million. Because the Commonwealth disputes

“only the amount of the award based on the sentencing court’s consideration

of the evidence of loss presented by the Commonwealth,” rather than the

court’s authority to impose restitution (which this Court previously decided

the trial court was authorized to impose under 43 P.S. § 1314), it is a challenge

to the discretionary aspects of Appellee’s sentence.6 See Weir, supra.

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6  We recognize this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Deweese, No.
1811 MDA 2018 (Pa.Super. Apr. 28, 2020) (unpublished memorandum), in
which this Court considered the Commonwealth’s challenge to the trial court’s
failure to order restitution under 43 P.S. § 1314 as a challenge to the legality
of sentencing. In Deweese, the trial court awarded no restitution due to its
interpretation of the statute as prohibiting an order of restitution in addition
to the forfeiture of pension benefits. In other words, the trial court believed
it lacked statutory authority to impose restitution under Section 1314 where
the defendant had already forfeited his pension.              On appeal, the
Commonwealth asserted that the trial court possessed authority to impose
restitution under the statute.        The panel majority agreed with the
Commonwealth, holding that Section 1314 authorized imposition of restitution
in addition to the forfeiture of pension benefits. Thus, Deweese involved a
challenge to the legality of sentencing because the trial court’s authority to
impose restitution under the statute was the relevant issue. In this case,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       In general, “[i]ssues challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence

must be raised in a post-sentence motion or by presenting the claim to the

trial court during the sentencing proceedings.            Absent such efforts, an

objection to a discretionary aspect of a sentence is waived.” Commonwealth

v. Lamonda, 52 A.3d 365, 371 (Pa.Super. 2012) (citing Commonwealth v.

Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1273-74 (Pa.Super. 2006)).                   Where a post-

sentence motion is granted and a new sentence is then imposed, a challenge

to the discretionary aspects of the new sentence must be preserved either

through a second post-sentence motion or at the time of the resentencing.

See Commonwealth v. Levy, 83 A.3d 457, 467 (Pa.Super. 2013) (holding

failure to file post-sentence motion after resentencing waived defendant’s

challenge to discretionary aspects of sentence concerning second judgment of

sentence).

       Pennsylvania      Rule     of   Criminal    Procedure   721    governs   the

____________________________________________

however, the parties and the trial court agree that the court had authority to
impose restitution under Section 1314. The relevant inquiry here is whether
the Commonwealth proved its entitlement to restitution by presenting non-
speculative testimony/evidence to support its claim. Consequently, this case
is distinguishable from Deweese.

Further, the fact that restitution is “mandatory” under Section 1314 (see id.)
does not mean every challenge to the amount of restitution under that statute
implicates the legality of sentencing. See, e.g., Weir, supra (acknowledging
that restitution is “mandatory” under Section 1106(c), but that challenge to
amount of restitution based on sentencing court’s consideration of loss
presented by Commonwealth is challenge to discretionary aspects of
sentencing).

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Commonwealth’s challenge to a defendant’s sentence, in pertinent part as

follows:

           Rule 721. Procedures for Commonwealth Challenges
           to Sentence; Sentencing Appeals

           (A) Commonwealth Challenges to Sentence

           (1) The Commonwealth may challenge a sentence by filing
           a motion to modify sentence, by filing an appeal on a
           preserved issue, or by filing a motion to modify sentence
           followed by an appeal.

           (2) Sentencing issues raised by the Commonwealth at the
           sentencing proceeding shall be deemed preserved for
           appeal whether or not the Commonwealth elects to file a
           motion to modify sentence on those issues.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 721(A). The Comment to the Rule further explains:

           Historically, the Commonwealth has been required to raise
           a discretionary sentencing issue at the sentencing hearing
           or in a post-trial motion to modify sentence in order to
           preserve the issue for appellate review. Challenges to the
           legality of a sentence, however, are not waived if the
           Commonwealth fails to timely file a motion for modification.

           Under Rule 721, the Commonwealth’s motion for
           modification of sentence is optional, as long as any
           discretionary sentencing issue is properly preserved
           at the time sentence was imposed. Before forgoing
           trial court review and proceeding with a direct appeal,
           the attorney for the Commonwealth must therefore
           be sure that the record created at the sentencing
           proceeding is adequate for appellate review of the
           issue, or the issue may be waived.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 721, Comment (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

      Instantly, we initially reject the Commonwealth’s claim that the

proceeding which took place on September 2, 2020 following this Court’s

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remand decision was not a resentencing hearing. The court expressly referred

to the proceeding as a sentencing hearing multiple times on the record,

without objection from the Commonwealth. (See N.T. Hearing, 9/2/20, at

21). Further, the record makes clear the court’s initial restitution award was

imposed as part of Appellee’s direct sentence. Indeed, this Court’s February

19, 2019 remand decision concluded its disposition with “Judgment of

sentence vacated…”     Thus, any restitution the court would have imposed

following the September 2, 2020 hearing would have been part of Appellee’s

sentence.      See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Boone, 862 A.2d 639, 643

(Pa.Super. 2004) (explaining: “An order of restitution is a sentence…”). The

fact that the court declined to award restitution does not change the fact that

restitution was part of Appellee’s sentence.

      Regarding whether the Commonwealth properly preserved its challenge

to the amount of restitution, we reiterate that “[u]nder Rule 721, the

Commonwealth’s motion for modification of sentence is optional, as long as

any discretionary sentencing issue is properly preserved at the time

sentence was imposed.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 721, Comment (emphasis added).

Here, there is no dispute that the Commonwealth did not file post-sentence

motions following the court’s December 31, 2020 decision declining to award

restitution.   Although the Commonwealth contends that it preserved its

sentencing challenge at the September 2, 2020 proceeding based on the

arguments it advanced at that time, the Comment to the Rule plainly states

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that a party must preserve its sentencing challenge at the time the sentence

was imposed.        See id.      The purpose of requiring a party to object to a

sentence after it is imposed, is to give the trial judge an opportunity to

reconsider or modify the sentence imposed; failure to do so deprives the trial

court of this chance. See generally Commonwealth v. Mann, 820 A.2d

788, 794 (Pa.Super. 2003), appeal denied, 574 Pa. 759, 831 A.2d 599 (2003).

       Had the trial court declined to impose restitution at the conclusion of the

September 2, 2020 proceeding, and the Commonwealth objected to the

court’s decision on the record, such action would have been sufficient to

preserve the Commonwealth’s claim of error without the need to file a post-

sentence     motion.       See    Pa.R.Crim.P.     721(A).   Here,   however,   the

Commonwealth could not preserve an objection to the restitution portion of

Appellee’s sentence at the September 2, 2020 proceeding, because the court

had deferred its ruling and no decision on restitution was made at that time.

Therefore, we conclude that the Commonwealth did not properly preserve its

sentencing challenge before the trial court, and its sole issue on appeal is

waived.7

____________________________________________

7 Other than its citation to Rule 721(A) and the Comment to that Rule, the
Commonwealth cites only one case in support of its assertion that it did not
have to file post-sentence motions. (See Commonwealth’s Principal Brief at
2). The case on which the Commonwealth relies, Interest of J.B., 630 Pa.
124, 106 A.3d 76 (2014), involved a juvenile’s failure to preserve a challenge
to the weight of the evidence in a post-dispositional motion. The Supreme
Court explained that “the current Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure—which
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Further, Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2119(f) requires an

appellant who challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence to set forth

in a separate section of the brief a concise statement of the reasons relied

upon for allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of a

sentence. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). “The requirement that an appellant separately

set forth the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal furthers the purpose

evident in the Sentencing Code as a whole of limiting any challenges to the

trial court’s evaluation of the multitude of factors impinging on the sentencing

decision to exceptional cases.” Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830 A.2d

1013, 1017 (Pa.Super. 2003) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks

and internal citation omitted).

       This Court has explained:

          The seminal case discussing the mandatory nature of Rule
          2119(f) statements is Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki,
          513 Pa. 508, 522 A.2d 17 (1987). There, the [defendant]
          pled guilt[y] to violations of the Controlled Substance, Drug,
          Device and Cosmetic Act, 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(16), (30),
____________________________________________

‘govern delinquency proceedings in all courts’—are utterly silent as to how a
weight of the evidence claim must be presented to the juvenile court so that
it may rule on the claim in the first instance, which is, … a necessary
prerequisite for appellate review.” Id. at 160, 106 A.3d at 99 (internal
footnote omitted). Under the circumstances of that case, the Supreme Court
declined to find waiver of the weight claim.

Here, the rules of criminal procedure and interpretive case law require a party
to preserve a challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing in the trial
court by preserving the challenge on the record at the sentencing proceeding
after the sentence is imposed or by filing a timely post-sentence motion. See
Pa.R.Crim.P. 721(A); Lamonda, supra. Thus, the Commonwealth’s reliance
on J.B. is misplaced.

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       and was sentenced to pay a $1,000 fine and to serve five
       years’ probation. The Commonwealth appealed. However,
       the Commonwealth failed to comply with Rule 2119(f) and
       the [defendant] argued “that the Commonwealth was
       required to set forth in a separate section of its brief reasons
       why its appeal should be granted.” Id. at [512, 522 A.2d
       at 19].

       This Court rejected the [defendant’s] argument and
       reviewed the Commonwealth’s brief and arguments on the
       merits, and determined that a substantial question existed
       and allowed the appeal. Id. However, upon further appeal,
       the Supreme Court reversed, holding that it had been an
       error for this Court to consider the merits when the
       Commonwealth had failed to comply with Rule 2119(f). Id.

       In the wake of Tuladziecki, this Court grappled with the
       mandatory nature of Rule 2119(f) and whether it is a
       procedural or jurisdictional requirement, i.e., a fatal or
       waivable defect. In Commonwealth v. Krum, [533 A.2d
       134, 137 (Pa.Super. 1987) (en banc)], a divided en banc
       [C]ourt held that inclusion of a Rule 2119(f) statement was
       a procedural requirement. This Court’s primary rational[e]
       was based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Tuladziecki
       to remand for resentencing because “[t]he [defendant]
       properly preserved his challenge to this procedural
       violation.” Id. (emphasis added).

       To this Court, the quoted passage from Tuladziecki
       indicated that a failure by the appellee to object to an
       omission of a [Rule] 2119(f) statement constitutes a waiver
       of objection, permitting the court to overlook the omission
       and determine whether a substantial question has been
       presented for review. Id. at 138.

       Although we concluded in Krum that an objection to a
       failure to comply with [Rule] 2119(f) can be waived, the
       Supreme Court later held that the courts have the power to
       enforce compliance with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) sua sponte.
       Commonwealth v. Gambal, 522 Pa. 280, [285,] 561 A.2d
       710, 713 (1989). The Supreme Court reasoned “that it is
       untenable to argue that a party, by not objecting to
       deficiencies in the opposing party’s brief, has waived the
       court’s right to receive a proper brief.” Id. [(emphasis in

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          original)].

          Therefore, when the appellant has not included a Rule
          2119(f) statement and the appellee has not objected, this
          Court may ignore the omission and determine if there is a
          substantial question that the sentence imposed was not
          appropriate, or enforce the requirements of Pa.R.A.P.
          2119(f) sua sponte, i.e., deny allowance of appeal. Id. at
          [285-86, 561 A.2d at] 713-14. However, this option is lost
          if the appellee objects to a 2119(f) omission. In such
          circumstances, this Court is precluded from reviewing the
          merits of the claim and the appeal must be denied.
          Tuladziecki[, supra at 513, 522 A.2d at 19;]
          Commonwealth v. Hunter, 768 A.2d 1136, 1144
          (Pa.Super. 2001); Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, [673
          A.2d 962, 968 (Pa.Super. 1996)]; Commonwealth v.
          Shartle, [652 A.2d 874, 875 (Pa.Super. 1995)];
          Commonwealth v. Birdseye, [637 A.2d 1036, 1044
          (Pa.Super. 1994)].

Commonwealth v. Kiesel, 854 A.2d 530, 532-33 (Pa.Super. 2004).

       Instantly, the Commonwealth did not include a Rule 2119(f) statement

in its principal or supplemental brief setting forth in a separate section of the

brief a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal

with respect to the discretionary aspects of Appellee’s sentence.           See

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). The Commonwealth’s failure to comply with Rule 2119(f)

is another reason why the Commonwealth’s challenge to the restitution

portion of Appellee’s sentence is waived.8 See id. Accordingly, we decline to

____________________________________________

8 We note that Appellee objected to the Commonwealth’s failure to include a
Rule 2119(f) statement for the first time in his supplemental brief. Had
Appellee objected to this defect in his principal brief, we would have deemed
the Commonwealth’s sentencing challenge waived on this ground, regardless
of whether the Commonwealth had preserved its restitution challenge in the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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reach the merits of the Commonwealth’s discretionary aspects of sentencing

challenge, and we affirm.

       Order affirmed.

       Judge Olson joins this opinion.

       Judge Bowes concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/28/2023

____________________________________________

trial court and we would have declined to grant panel reconsideration in this
case. See Kiesel, supra. We further note that our order granting panel
reconsideration expressly limited supplemental briefing “to argument on
whether the Commonwealth waived its issues by failing to preserve them at
the trial court level.” (Order, filed 7/20/22) (emphasis added). Thus, to
the extent that Appellee’s objection is beyond the scope of our supplemental
briefing directive, we deny allowance of appeal sua sponte, based on our
conclusion that the Commonwealth failed to preserve its sentencing claim both
at the trial court level, and now on appeal. See Kiesel, supra.

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