Court Opinion

ID: 9721777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:09:15.05094+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:28.633282
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McGLOON, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the decision of my colleagues on the issue of whether defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated. As the majority indicates, the trial court’s entry on the memorandum of orders clearly discloses that on February 17, 1981, the court continued the case “by order of court.” Thereafter, two continuances were granted on motion of the State until March 9, 1981. Defendant filed his petition for discharge based upon the fact that 175 days had elapsed since he answered ready for trial. The petition was denied and the order of February 17, 1981, was altered to indicate that a continuance was granted on defendant’s motion. In People v. Fosdick (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 524, 224 N.E.2d 242, the Illinois Supreme Court established the criteria which this court must follow in determining whether a defendant’s acts contributed to delay in bringing him to trial. The court, in Fosdick, held that the provisions of section 103 — 5 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 103 — 5(a) through (f)) were designed to implement the speedy trial rights and must be liberally construed. The facts of each case must be carefully examined to prevent a “mockery of justice” either by technical evasion of the right to a speedy trial by the State or by a delay truly caused,by defendant. Fosdick. Having examined the facts of the instant case under the liberal construction doctrine in Fosdick, I conclude that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s petition for discharge. The instant case was not scheduled for trial on February 17, 1981. The State did not indicate it was ready to proceed to trial on that date. Furthermore, the very next day, the State indicated that it was not ready and requested a continuance. At the hearing on the petition to discharge, defendant’s attorney testified that he was prepared to go to trial on February 17, 1981. However, when he called his office his secretary informed him that she had received several calls from the court clerk, Mr. Kerr, and had been advised that the matter was being held on call until February 18, 1981, by order of the court. Most importantly, my examination of the record fails to disclose that defendant made a motion for continuance on February 17, 1981. (People v. House (1957), 10 Ill. 2d 556, 141 N.E.2d 12; People v. Wyatt (1962), 24 Ill. 2d 151, 180 N.E.2d 478.) In the instant case, the court informed defendant that his attorney was not present and stated “*** we hold your case on call until tomorrow ***.” (Emphasis added.) Similarly, in House and Wyatt, the defendants appeared at arraignment without counsel and the trial judge suggested that their cases be continued. I am unable to see, as was the supreme court in Wyatt, how the fact that defendant was willing to take advantage of the court’s offer to hold the case converted the offer into a request for delay on motion of defendant. The court in House concluded: “The constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial would be a mockery, indeed, if this court were to permit the State’s Attorney and trial court *** to ascribe to the defendant, when appearing for arraignment and without counsel, a motion for continuance which he did not make, and thereby toll the running of this statute.” (10 Ill. 2d 556, 559, 141 N.E.2d 12, 14.) Accordingly, I believe that the delay which occurred was attributable to the court rather than defendant. The trial court should have granted defendant’s petition for discharge.