Court Opinion

ID: 9681922
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:01:14.682188+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:36.635063
License: Public Domain

ONION, Judge
(concurring in the result).
I concur in the result reached for I am unable to find any evidence in the record that the jury, at appellant’s second trial on November 13, 1968, was even aware that the appellant had been previously tried for the same offense and had secured a new trial at his behest. Neither do I understand appellant to insist that the retrial jury had such knowledge and was motivated thereby in assessing an increased penalty, nor do I understand appellant to aver that there were no new facts to justify the increased punishment. I cannot conclude that North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 659 (June 23, 1969), calls for reversal in this particular case. I do not therefore reach the question of the retroactivity of North Carolina v. Pearce, supra.1 I am not yet ready, however, to join the flat statement of the majority that the principle of Pearce can never have application where the punishment upon retrial is assessed by the jury rather than a judge, though I am aware of the decisions of Spidle v. State (Mo.), 446 S.W.2d 793, and Pinkard v. Henderson (Tenn.Ct.Crim.App.), 6 Cr.L. 2148. This writer did join in the opinion on rehearing in Branch v. State, Tex.Cr.R., 445 S.W.2d 756, but there was considerably more there than the simple fact the defendant had chosen the jury to assess punishment at his retrial.
The Supreme Court in Pearce apparently overlooked and did not discuss Pearce’s application to Texas and other jurisdictions where the jury is permitted in many instances to assess punishment. This was indeed regrettable.
It is difficult to believe though that the constitutional rule laid down in Pearce was meant to have application only where the assessor of punishment at the retrial is the judge.2 Certainly, I would need more to convince me than what the majority offers today, even without regard to the effect of today’s holding upon a defendant’s choice upon retrial of the judge or jury as the assessor of punishment.
For the reason initially stated, however, I concur in the result reached.

. See Ex Parte Ferrell, Tex.Cr.R., 445 S.W.2d 729, where Pearce was applied retroactively without a discussion of the question.

. See Judge Galbreath’s dissent in Pinkard v. Henderson, supra.