Court Opinion

ID: 9943530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 19:01:02.335808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:11.815031
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-40331            Document: 68-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 02/23/2024

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                   ____________                                       Fifth Circuit

                                                                                    FILED
                                     No. 23-40331                           February 23, 2024
                                   ____________                                Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                    Clerk
Dorothy Smith-Hubbard,

                                                                  Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                          versus

AMICA Mutual Insurance Company, doing business as AMICA
General Agency, L.L.C.,

                                             Defendant—Appellee.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Texas
                             USDC No. 3:21-CV-316
                   ______________________________

Before Elrod, Willett, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
       Dorothy Smith-Hubbard sued her insurance carrier, AMICA Mutual
Insurance Company, for benefits under her insurance policy. Her counsel
failed to respond to AMICA’s discovery requests and motion for summary
judgment. The district court denied her Rule 60(b) motion for relief from the

       _____________________
       *
           This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-40331         Document: 68-1      Page: 2   Date Filed: 02/23/2024

                                  No. 23-40331

judgment entered against her. She now appeals that decision and challenges
the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
       We AFFIRM.
                                       I
       Smith-Hubbard was hit by a car in a marked crosswalk. In September
2021, she sued AMICA in Texas state court, seeking to recover under the
underinsured motorist provision in her insurance policy. AMICA removed
the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. Smith-Hubbard
moved to remand, arguing that because AMICA consented to jurisdiction in
Texas, diversity jurisdiction was not satisfied. The district court denied the
motion, explaining that Smith-Hubbard apparently confused personal
jurisdiction with subject-matter jurisdiction.
       In February 2022, AMICA served Smith-Hubbard with discovery
requests, including requests for admissions under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 36. It also sent opposing counsel a copy of the discovery requests
via email and filed a “Notice of Compliance” via the court’s electronic case
management system (CM/ECF), informing the court that it electronically
served discovery requests on Smith-Hubbard’s counsel. Although Smith-
Hubbard’s counsel communicated with AMICA a few times over email,
including in June 2022 when AMICA notified Smith-Hubbard’s counsel
that it had not received any written discovery responses, he never responded
to the requests. Because he did not respond to the request for admissions
within 30 days, each matter was deemed admitted under Rule 36. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3).
       AMICA moved for summary judgment based on the deemed
admissions in July 2022. Smith-Hubbard did not respond. The district court
granted the motion and entered a final judgment on December 12, 2022. On
March 6, 2023, Smith-Hubbard filed a Rule 60(b) motion, seeking to vacate

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                                  No. 23-40331

the judgment and withdraw the deemed admissions. The district court
denied the motion. Smith-Hubbard now appeals the denial of her Rule 60(b)
motion and the denial of her motion to remand.
                                       II
       “[T]he decision to grant or deny relief under Rule 60(b) lies within
the sound discretion of the district court and will be reversed only for abuse
of that discretion.” Lyles v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, USA, Inc., 871 F.3d
305, 315 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Hesling v. CSX Transp. Inc., 396 F.3d 632,
638 (5th Cir. 2005)). “A district court abuses its discretion if it bases its
decision on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment
of the evidence.” Id. (quoting Hesling, 396 F.3d at 638).
       The district court denied Smith-Hubbard relief under Rule 60(b)(1)
and Rule 60(b)(6). We address each in turn.
                                       A
       Rule 60(b)(1) provides relief from a judgment for “mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).
       In the district court, Smith-Hubbard argued that she was entitled to
relief under Rule 60(b)(1) for two reasons: (1) the district court made a
mistake by granting the motion for summary judgment and denying her
motion to remand; and (2) her counsel did not receive the discovery requests,
summary judgment motion, or final judgment. The district court denied the
motion, concluding that it did not make a mistake and that a party’s failure
to respond to a motion could be the basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(1) as
excusable neglect, but Smith-Hubbard’s motion specifically disclaimed
reliance on excusable neglect. On appeal, Smith-Hubbard focuses only on her
counsel’s conduct as the basis for relief.

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       Whether Smith-Hubbard argues that her failure to respond to the
motion for summary judgment was mistake, inadvertence, or excusable
neglect, she is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(1). See Davis v. Scott,
157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[We] may affirm a judgment upon any
basis supported by the record.”); Su v. Wilmington Tr., Nat’l Ass’n, 839 F.
App’x 884, 887 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (applying Davis when reviewing
a denial of a Rule 60(b) motion). “Gross carelessness, ignorance of the rules,
or ignorance of the law are insufficient bases for 60(b)(1) relief.” Edward H.
Bohlin Co. v. Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 357 (5th Cir. 1993). We have repeatedly
explained that parties have “a duty of diligence to inquire about the status of
a case.” Id.; see also Trevino v. City of Fort Worth, 944 F.3d 567, 571 (5th Cir.
2019) (per curiam); Pryor v. U.S. Postal Serv., 769 F.2d 281, 287 (5th Cir.
1985). “In fact, a court would abuse its discretion if it were to reopen a case
under Rule 60(b)(1) when the reason asserted as justifying relief is one
attributable solely to counsel’s carelessness with or misapprehension of the
law or the applicable rules of court.” Trevino, 944 F.3d at 571 (quoting
Edward H. Bohlin Co., 6 F.3d at 357).
       In Long v. James, 667 F. App’x 862 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam), we
considered a case with facts almost identical to this one. There, we affirmed
a district court’s denial of Rule 60(b)(1) relief where the plaintiff claimed that
his counsel did not receive the CM/ECF emails notifying him of the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Id. at 863–64. We noted
counsel’s duty of diligence and concluded that counsel had “ample
opportunity to check the district court docket” in the 79 days between the
motion’s filing and the district court’s judgment. Id. at 863. We have also
held that “[e]mails mistakenly going to a spam folder,” Trevino, 944 F.3d at
572, and emails that are not received due to faulty computer settings do not
merit Rule 60(b) relief. Onwuchekwe v. Okeke, 404 F. App’x 911, 912 (5th Cir.
2010) (per curiam); cf. Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 396–97 (5th

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                                 No. 23-40331

Cir. 2021) (explaining a party’s duty of diligence and collecting cases
rejecting arguments of email failures where the parties should have checked
the docket).
       This case is no different. AMICA served all discovery requests and
the motion for summary judgment via CM/ECF, on which it was entitled to
rely. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(E); Rollins, 8 F.4th at 396–97 (“Rule
5(b)(2)(E) provides for service ‘by filing [the pleading] with the court’s
electronic-filing system’ and explains that ‘service is complete upon filing or
sending.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(E))).
“[W]e do not question the good faith of [Smith-Hubbard]’s counsel,” see
Rollins, 8 F.4th at 396, but whatever the reason he did not receive the emails,
it did not relieve him of his duty of diligence to inquire about the status of
Smith-Hubbard’s case. Counsel’s declaration states that he was under the
care of a doctor since December 27, 2022, and checked the docket shortly
thereafter, in preparation for filing a motion to continue. Only then did he
realize a judgment had been entered against his client. This does not explain
why he did not check the docket in the four months between when AMICA
moved for summary judgment on July 29, 2022, and the district court entered
judgment on December 12, 2022. Counsel had “ample opportunity to check
the district court docket in this intervening period.” Long, 667 F. App’x at
863.
       Smith-Hubbard argues that the district court erred because it did not
analyze the equitable factors set out in Pioneer Investment Services Co. v.
Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S. 380 (1993). AMICA argues that the Pioneer
factors only apply to excusable neglect, on which Smith-Hubbard disclaimed
reliance. But we need not decide that question because we have held that the
district court need not “rigorously apply each of these factors in every case.”
See Silvercreek Mgmt., Inc. v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 534 F.3d 469, 472 (5th
Cir. 2008) (holding that it is not an abuse of discretion to find no excusable

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                                   No. 23-40331

neglect—even when not explicitly discussing the Pioneer factors—“if the
court has considered the moving party’s proffered evidence”); Razvi v. Dall.
Fort Worth Int’l Airport, No. 21-10016, 2022 WL 4298141, at *2 (5th Cir.
Sept. 16, 2022) (per curiam).
                                        B
       Rule 60(b)(6) allows relief from a judgment for “any other reason that
justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). We have “consistently held that
relief under 60(b)(6) is mutually exclusive from relief available under sections
(1)-(5).” Hesling, 396 F.3d at 643. That means that “an action cannot be
brought through the catch-all provision of Rule 60(b)(6) if it could have been
brought through one of the Rule’s first five subsections.” United States v.
Fernandez, 797 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 2015).
       Smith-Hubbard claims she is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) for
the same reasons she claims she is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(1): her
attorney did not receive the discovery requests, motion for summary
judgment,    or   the     final   judgment.       “This   claim   falls   squarely
within . . . Rule 60(b)(1),” see Fernandez, 797 F.3d at 319–20, and Smith-
Hubbard “has not alleged a separate basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(6),” see
D.R.T.G. Builders, L.L.C. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 26
F.4th 306, 313 (5th Cir. 2022). Thus, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying relief under Rule 60(b)(6).
                                       C
       Because we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Smith-Hubbard’s motion for relief from the judgment, we need not
consider her argument that it should have considered her motion to withdraw
the deemed admissions.

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                                  No. 23-40331

                                       III
       Finally, Smith-Hubbard contends that the district court did not have
jurisdiction over her case and should have remanded it to state court. Because
Smith-Hubbard failed to timely file a notice of appeal, we lack jurisdiction to
consider the district court’s denial of her motion to remand.
       “A notice of appeal must be filed ‘within 30 days after entry of the
judgment or order appealed from.’” Frew v. Young, 992 F.3d 391, 395 (5th
Cir. 2021) (quoting Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A); 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a)).
“[The Supreme] Court has long held that the taking of an appeal within the
prescribed time is ‘mandatory and jurisdictional.’” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S.
205, 209 (2007) (quoting Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56,
61 (1982) (per curiam)) (collecting cases). So “if an appeal is untimely, we
lack jurisdiction to entertain it.” Frew, 992 F.3d at 395; see also Bowles, 551
U.S. at 210 (“[C]ourts of appeals routinely and uniformly dismiss untimely
appeals for lack of jurisdiction.”).
       Here, Smith-Hubbard attempts to challenge the district court’s denial
of her motion to remand. “The denial of a motion to remand is an
interlocutory order” that is generally only appealable after a final judgment.
Alvarez v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 585 F.3d 890, 893 (5th Cir. 2009);
Burden v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 60 F.3d 213, 216 (5th Cir. 1995). To challenge
the remand order, Smith-Hubbard needed to file a notice of appeal within 30
days of the final judgment, which was entered on December 12, 2022. See
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A); 28 U.S.C. § 2107. But she did not file her
notice of appeal until June 1, 2023—more than five months after entry of final
judgment.
       There are exceptions to this rule, but they do not save Smith-
Hubbard’s appeal. A Rule 60 motion can toll the appellate deadline if the
party files the motion “within the time allowed for filing a motion under

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Rule 59,” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(vi), which is “28 days after the entry
of judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. In such cases, “the time to file an appeal
runs . . . from the entry of the order disposing of [the motion].” Fed. R.
App. P. 4(a)(4)(A). Smith-Hubbard’s Rule 60(b) motion was filed on March
6, 2023, over two months after the entry of judgment, so the appellate
deadline was not tolled.
       Accordingly, we have no jurisdiction to consider whether the district
court correctly denied her motion for remand.
       Nevertheless, we write briefly to make clear the distinction between
personal jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction because a great deal of
time was given to this issue at oral argument and once again in Smith-
Hubbard’s 28(j) letter of February 8. As a general matter, a court must have
both personal jurisdiction and subject-matter jurisdiction to enter a binding
judgment on a case. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp.,
549 U.S. 422, 431–32 (2007) (“[A] federal court generally may not rule on
the merits of a case without first determining that it has jurisdiction over the
category of claim in suit (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the parties
(personal jurisdiction).”). Although it is true that a corporation may consent
to personal jurisdiction in a state by purposefully availing itself of that forum,
see generally Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 359
(2021), purposeful availment does not have any bearing on the federal court’s
analysis of whether diversity jurisdiction gives that court subject-matter
jurisdiction over the case.
       A federal court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a case based on
diversity when there is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties
and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, as required by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332. It is well established that a corporation is only a citizen of the state in
which it is incorporated, as well as the state in which it has its principal place

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of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); see also Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S.
77, 80 (2010). In other words, a corporation does not become a citizen of a
state by availing itself of doing business in that state. Thus, diversity
jurisdiction may still exist where a corporation does business in the same state
where the other party is a citizen. Id.
       We AFFIRM.

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