Court Opinion

ID: 9720143
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:17:57.42236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:32.042288
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part
I concur in the conclusion of the majority that probable cause existed for the arrest of Edwards for an offense such as false reporting or some other crime involving the use of false names and/or permitting unlawful use of his identification by the driver of the vehicle. I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority's conclusion that the strip search of Edwards was constitutional merely because it was incident to his arrest. It is true that the police may conduct a warrantless search of the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control. Culpepper v. State, 662 N.E.2d 670, 675 (Ind.Ct.App.1996); *383Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 452, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), reh'g denied. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of Edwards's arrest on a minor offense does not justify the jail-house strip search here involved.
In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), inmates at a federally operated short-term custodial facility designed primarily to house pretrial detainees were required to expose their body cavities for visual inspection as a part of a strip search conducted after every contact visit with a person from outside the institution. The Bell court, citing security concerns about the smuggling of contraband into the jail, held that such searches were reasonable even though they were based upon less than probable cause. Id. at 559-60, 99 S.Ct. 1861.
However, as many courts have since ree-ognized, the Bell decision does not validate strip searches of all arrestees. Wilson v. Shelby County, Ala., 95 F.Supp.2d 1258, 1262 (N.D.Ala.2000). Indeed, most federal Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that individuals arrested for relatively minor offenses may not be routinely strip searched.7 In Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 423 F.2d 1268, 1273 (Tth Cir. 1983), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that, absent reasonable suspicion that an offender was concealing weapons or contraband, the police could not routinely strip search misdemeanor offenders detained awaiting the posting of bond. I would adopt the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit and hold that, before the police may strip search an individual detained for a minor offense, such as Edwards, they must have a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was in the possession of weapons or contraband.8
Here, there was no reasonable suspicion that a strip search and visual inspection of Edwards's buttocks would reveal any evidence or contraband in connection with the offense for which Edwards was apparently arrested, ie. False Reporting,9 a Class B misdemeanor. Nor was there even a hint that Edwards had drugs or weapons secreted on or about his person.
Prior to the jail-house strip search, Edwards was patted down and searched at the scene of the traffic stop. Nothing was found. Likewise, a search of the car at the scene revealed no sign of drugs or contraband. Edwards even consented to a search of his apartment, where a police canine unit found nothing. Only when Edwards was returned to the jail and strip searched was the cocaine found.
*384Any suspicion which may have existed when the police discovered cocaine on the driver was dissipated by subsequent events. One might with good reason say, with respect to continued detention and multiple searches, that enough is enough. The strip search, despite being incident to Edwards's arrest, was not reasonable with regard to either the Fourth Amendment or Article 1, Section 11.
I would therefore reverse the trial court's decision and hold that any evidence discovered in the course of the unreasonable search of Edwards be suppressed.

. See, eg., Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1997); Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 800 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1020, 107 S.Ct. 3263, 97 LEd.2d 762 (1987); Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (4th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 942, 102 S.Ct. 1435, 71 L.Ed.2d 653 (1982); Stewart v. Lubbock County, Tex., 767 F.2d 153, 156-57 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1066, 106 S.Ct. 1378, 89 L.Ed.2d 604 (1986); Masters v. Crouch, 872 F.2d 1248, 1255 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 977, 110 S.Ct. 503, 107 L.Ed.2d 506; Tinetti v. Wittke, 479 F.Supp. 486, 491 (E.D.Wis.1979), aff'd 620 F.2d 160 (7th Cir.1980) (per curiam); Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 742 (8th Cir.1985); Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1446 (9th Cir.1991); Hill v. Bogans, 735 F.2d 391, 394 (10th Cir. 1984); Justice v. City of Peachtree City, 961 F.2d 188, 192 (11th Cir.1992); see also Wayne R. LaFave, SearcH anp Seizure. A TrRa-TISE oN THE Fourth AmEnpmENt § 5.3(c) at 143-45 (3d ed.1996).

. Of course, the case would be different if Edwards had been arrested for a crime such as drug possession or assault, which itself might give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the defendant may be concealing weapons or contraband. See Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1273.

. Ind.Code § 35-44-2-2(c) (Burns Code Ed. Repl. 1998).