Court Opinion

ID: 9675107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:42:21.757775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:31.531851
License: Public Domain

White, C.J.,
dissenting.
The majority affirmed the district court’s granting of a summary judgment in favor of Auto-Owners Insurance Company. Because I find the term “unfair competition” set forth in the “Advertising Offense Liability” portion of the contract ambiguous, I respectfully dissent.
An ambiguous term in an insurance policy will be construed in favor of the insured. Design Data Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 243 Neb. 945, 503 N.W.2d 552 (1993). An ambiguity in an insurance policy exists when the policy can be interpreted to have two or more reasonable meanings. Lumbard v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 221 Neb. 804, 381 N.W.2d 117 (1986).
The majority sets forth two different interpretations of the phrase “unfair competition.” The majority first refers to an expanded definition as found in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, and then references to the narrower, common-law definition. These are two reasonable meanings, and the phrase “unfair competition” is therefore an ambiguous term in the parties’ insurance contract. John Markel Ford should have been entitled to the broader definition. Nonetheless, the majority found no ambiguity and applied the common-law definition.
Applying the broader definition of “unfair competition,” at the very least, creates a question of material fact as to whether the suit brought by the State of Iowa against John Markel Ford was one of unfair competition, therefore requiring Auto-Owners Insurance Company to defend and indemnify. Summary judgment should have been denied.
Lanphier, J., joins in this dissent.