Court Opinion

ID: 9428843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:24:57.339875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:15.553587
License: Public Domain

Justice Powell,
with whom The Chief Justice joins as to Part II, dissenting.
The Court holds that the limitations on federal judicial power embodied in the Eleventh Amendment and in the doctrine of sovereign immunity are not jurisdictional. I con*520sider this holding to be a serious departure from established constitutional doctrine.
I dissent also from the Court’s rejection of the rule of “flexible” exhaustion of state administrative remedies developed and stated persuasively by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc. In disagreeing with the 17 judges of the Court of Appeals who adopted the flexible exhaustion principle, this Court places mistaken reliance on the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1997 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV). I disagree with both portions of the Court’s holding and therefore dissent.
I. The Eleventh Amendment.1
A
In this “reverse discrimination” action, petitioner, an employee of the Florida International University, brought suit under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 against the Board of Regents of the State of Florida.2 She did not name the individual Regents as defendants. She sued for $500,000 in damages, and for injunctive and other equitable relief. See ante, at 498-499, n. 2. The Board filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that petitioner’s suit was premature in light of her failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. The District Court agreed and granted the motion to dismiss.
*521On petitioner’s appeal, the Board added the bar of the Eleventh Amendment to its defense.3 It argued that as an instrumentality of the State, the Board could not be subjected to suit in federal court absent a waiver of immunity.4 *522And it asserted that there had been no waiver. Although the Board of Regents was created as a body corporate with power “to sue and be sued ... to plead and be impleaded in all courts of law and equity,” Fla. Stat. §240.205(4)(1) (1981), it is well established that language such as this does not operate to waive the defense of the Eleventh Amendment.5 In *523reply, petitioner argued that whether or not the statute creating the Board amounted to a waiver — and petitioner believed that it did — the Eleventh Amendment simply was irrelevant to the equitable claims she had lodged against the State. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 3-4.
Neither the Court of Appeals panel nor the Court of Appeals en banc addressed the Board’s Eleventh Amendment defense. They directed their attention solely to the question of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The panel held that there was no exhaustion requirement in §1983 suits and remanded to the District Court for consideration of the Board’s Eleventh Amendment argument. Patsy v. Florida International University, 612 F. 2d 946 (1980). The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, reversed, holding that §1983 plaintiffs must exhaust available and reasonable administrative remedies. Patsy v. Florida International University, 634 F. 2d 900 (1981). Again the court did not consider the Board’s Eleventh Amendment defense.
The Eleventh Amendment question was raised before this Court, at the first opportunity after the Court of Appeals’ decision, in the Board’s response to the petition for writ of cer-tiorari. The Board argued, as it had on appeal, that it was an arm of the State and that it had not waived its immunity from suit in federal court.6 Again petitioner answered that *524at most the Eleventh Amendment defense would bar her claim for damages. And, even as to this claim, petitioner now argued that the Amendment would not bar damages if the Board could meet the claim out of its “own funds” — e. g., from gifts and bequests — rather than from the state treasury. These arguments were repeated at oral argument.7
B
The Court views the jurisdictional question presented by the Eleventh Amendment as if it were of little or no importance. Its entire discussion of the question is relegated to a conclusory note at the end of the opinion. See ante, at 515-516, n. 19. The Court concedes that the Amendment and the bar of sovereign immunity are “jurisdictional,” but only in the sense that the State may raise the claim at any point in the proceedings. The statement is then made that the Amendment is not jurisdictional “in the sense that it must be raised and decided by this Court on its own motion.” Ibid.8 The Court cites to no authority in support of this statement,9 and *525it would be surprising if any existed. The reason that the Eleventh Amendment question may be raised at any point in the proceedings is precisely because it places limits on the basic authority of federal courts to entertain suits against a State. The history and text of the Eleventh Amendment, the principle of sovereign immunity exemplified by it, and the well-established precedents of this Court make clear that today’s decision misconceives our jurisdiction and the purpose of this Amendment.
A basic principle of our constitutional system is that the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Their authority extends only to those matters within the judicial power of the United States as defined by the Constitution. In language that could not be clearer, the Eleventh Amendment removes from the judicial power, as set forth in Art. Ill, suits “commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States.” When an Amendment to the Constitution states in plain language that “the judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend” to suits against a State, from what source does the Court today derive its jurisdiction? The Court’s “back-of-the-hand” treatment of this threshold issue offers no answer. Questions of jurisdiction and of the legitimate exercise of power are fundamental in our federal constitutional system.10
*526C
The Eleventh Amendment was adopted as a response to this Court’s assumption of original jurisdiction in a suit brought against the State of Georgia. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). Relying upon express language in Art. Ill extending the judicial power to controversies between a State and citizens of another State, the Court found that it had jurisdiction. The decision is said to have created a shock throughout the country. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 11 (1890). The Amendment was adopted shortly thereafter, and the Court understood that it had been overruled: “‘the amendment being constitutionally adopted, there could not be exercised any jurisdiction, in any case, past or future, in which a State was sued by the citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.’” Ibid.
In light of the history and wording of the Amendment, the Court has viewed the Amendment as placing explicit limits on the judicial power as defined by Art. III. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U. S. 410, 421 (1979). But more than that, and beyond the express provisions of the Amendment, the Court has recognized that the Amendment stands for a principle of sovereign immunity by which the grant of authority in Art. Ill itself must be measured.11 Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana, supra, the Court held that the federal judicial power did not extend to a suit against a nonconsenting State by one of its own citizens. Although the Eleventh Amendment by its terms does not apply to such suits, the Court found that *527the language of the Amendment was but an illustration of a larger principle: Federal jurisdiction over , suits against a State, absent consent, “was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States.” Id., at 15.12 Sée Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436 (1900).
Similarly, in Ex parte New York, 256 U. S. 490 (1921), the Court found that despite the Eleventh Amendment’s specific reference to suits in “law or equity,” the principle of sovereign immunity exemplified by the Amendment would not permit the extension of federal admiralty jurisdiction over a nonconsenting State. The Court applied the same approach in Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313 (1934), in which the Court refused to take jurisdiction over a suit against a State by a foreign state. On its face, Art. Ill provided jurisdiction over suits “between a State . . . and foreign States.” Nor did the Eleventh Amendment specifically exempt the States from suit by a foreign state. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the judicial power of the United States, granted by Art. Ill, did not extend so far: “We think that Madison correctly interpreted Clause one of §2 of Article III of the Constitution as making provision for jurisdiction of a suit against a State by a foreign State in the event of the State’s consent but not otherwise.” Id., at 330.
In this case a resident of the State of Florida has sued a Board exercising a major function of the State’s sovereign authority. As prior decisions have held, whether this case is viewed only under the Eleventh Amendment — with its *528explicit limitation on federal jurisdiction — or under Art. Ill, the analysis must be the same. Absent consent, the “judicial power of the United States,” as defined by Art. Ill and the Eleventh Amendment, simply does not extend to suits against one of the States by a citizen of that State:13
“That a State may not be sued without its consent is a fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the United States that it has become established by repeated decisions of this court that the entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a State without consent given: not one brought by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification.” Ex parte New York, supra, at 497 (emphasis added).
The Court does not distinguish these unquestioned precedents. They are wholly and inexplicably ignored. Quite *529simply the Court today disregards controlling decisions and the explicit limitation on federal-court jurisdiction in Art. Ill and the Eleventh Amendment. The Court does recognize that the Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional “in the sense” that the State may raise the bar of the Amendment for the first time on appeal. Yet the Court misses the point of this statement. The reason that the bar of the Amendment may be raised at any time — as the Court previously has explained— is precisely because it is jurisdictional:
“The objection to petitioner’s suit as a violation of the Eleventh Amendment was first made and argued ... in this Court. This was in time, however. The Eleventh Amendment declares a policy and sets forth an explicit limitation on federal judicial power of such compelling force that this Court will consider the issue arising under this Amendment . . . even though urged for the first time in this Court.” Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U. S. 459, 467 (1945).14
Despite these precedents, and apparently because of an unexplained anxiety to reach the exhaustion issue decided by the Court of Appeals, this Court remands the issue of its own jurisdiction to the courts below.
D
I believe that the Eleventh Amendment question must be addressed and that the answer could hardly be clearer. This is an action under § 1983.15 Petitioner seeks relief from the *530Board of Regents of the State of Florida, a major instrumentality or agency of the State. Petitioner’s argument that the statute incorporating the Boárd should be understood to waive the Eleventh Amendment is foreclosed by numerous decisions of this Court and is unsupported by State law. See, e. g., Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147 (1981); n. 5, supra. Similarly, petitioner’s suggestion that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar her equitable claims against the Board must be rejected. The Amendment applies to suits “in law or equity. ” All suits against an unconsenting State — whether for damages or injunctive relief — áre barred. See Cory v. White, ante, p. 85.16 Finally, the rule in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), permitting a federal court to order state officials to obey federal law in the future, is simply irrelevant to this case.17 Petitioner did not sue the members of the Board of *531Regents. She sued the Board itself, an arm of the State of Florida.
In my view, the Eleventh Amendment — and the principle of sovereign immunity exemplified by the Amendment and embodied in Art. Ill — clearly bar the suit in this case. The Court’s refusal to address the question of its own jurisdiction violates well-established precedents of this Court as well as the basic premise that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Even had the parties neglected to address the Eleventh Amendment question, it would have been our responsibility to consider it on our own motion. In fact, the question has been fully briefed to the Court of Appeals and *532raised in this Court. See n. 8, supra. Cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 396, n. 2 (1975). I would dismiss this suit and vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction.
II. Exhaustion of Remedies.
In view of my belief that this case should be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, I address the exhaustion question only briefly. Seventeen judges joined in the Court of Appeals’ persuasive opinion adopting a rule of “flexible” exhaustion of administrative remedies in § 1983 suits. Other Courts of Appeals have adopted a similar rule. See, e. g., Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F. 2d 560 (CA2 1969); Secret v. Brierton, 584 F. 2d 823 (CA7 1978). The opinion for the en banc court carefully reviewed the exhaustion doctrine in general and as applied to § 1983 actions. It found that the prior decisions of this Court did not clearly decide the question.18 See Barry v. Barchi, 443 U. S. 55, 63, n. 10 (1979); Gibson v. Berry hill, 411 U. S. 564, 575, n. 14 (1973). And it concluded that the exhaustion of adequate and appropriate state administrative remedies would promote the achievement of the rights protected by § 1983.
I agree with the Court of Appeals’ opinion. The requirement that a § 1983 plaintiff exhaust adequate state administrative remedies was the accepted rule of law until quite recently. See Eisen v. Eastman, supra, at 567. The rule rests on sound considerations. It does not defeat federal-court jurisdiction, it merely defers it.19 It permits the States *533to correct violations through their own procedures, and it encourages the establishment of such procedures. It is consistent with the principles of comity that apply whenever federal courts are asked to review state action or supersede state proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971).
Moreover, and highly relevant to the effective functioning of the overburdened federal court system, the rule conserves and supplements scarce judicial resources. In 1961, the year that Monroe v. Pape, 365 U. S. 167, was decided, only 270 civil rights actions were begun in the federal district courts. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts, 238 (1961). In 1981, over 30,000 such suits were commenced.20 Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts 63, 68 (1981). The result of this unprecedented increase in civil rights litigation is a heavy burden on the federal courts to the detriment of all federal-court litigants, including others who assert that their constitutional rights have been infringed.
The Court argues that past decisions of the Court categorically hold that there is no exhaustion requirement in § 1983 suits. But as the Court of Appeals demonstrates, and as the Court recognizes, many of these decisions can be explained as applications of traditional exceptions to the exhaustion requirement. See McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U. S. 668 (1963). Other decisions speak to the question in an offhand and conclusory fashion without full briefing and argument. See Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249, 251 (1971) (unargued per curiam); Damico v. California, 389 U. S. 416 (1967) (unargued per curiam). Moreover, a cate*534gorical no-exhaustion rule would seem inconsistent with the decision in Younger v. Harris, supra, prescribing abstention when state criminal proceedings are pending. At least where administrative proceedings are pending, Younger would seem to suggest the. appropriateness of exhaustion. Cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, supra, at 574-575. Yet the Court today adopts a flat rule without exception.
The Court seeks to support its no-exhaustion rule with indications of congressional intent. Finding nothing directly on point in the history of the Civil Rights Act itself, the Court places primary reliance on the recent Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U. S. C. § 1997 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. IV). This legislation was designed to authorize the Attorney General to initiate civil rights actions on behalf of institutionalized persons. § 1997a. The Act also placed certain limits on the existing authority of the Attorney General to intervene in suits bégun by institutionalized persons. See § 1997c. In addition, in § 1997e, the Act sets forth an exhaustion requirement but only for § 1983 claims brought by prisoners.
On the basis of the exhaustion provision in § 1997e, and remarks primarily by Representative Kastenmeier, the Court contends that Congress has endorsed a general no-exhaustion rule. The irony in this reasoning should be obvious. A principal concern that prompted the Department of Justice to support, and the Congress to adopt, § 1997e was the vast increase in § 1983 suits brought by state prisoners in federal courts. There has been a year-by-year increase in these suits since the mid-1960’s. The increase in fiscal 1981 over fiscal 1980 was some 26%, resulting in a total of 15,639 such suits filed in 1981 as compared with 12,397 in 1980. The 1981 total constituted over 8.6% of the total federal district court civil docket. Although most of these cases present frivolous claims, many are litigated through the courts of appeals to this Court. The burden on the system fairly can be described as enormous with few, if any, benefits that would not *535be available in meritorious cases if exhaustion of appropriate state administrative remedies were required prior to any federal-court litigation. It was primarily this problem that prompted enactment of § 1997e.21
Moreover, it is clear from the legislative history that Congress simply was not addressing the exhaustion problem in any general fashion. The concern focused on the problem of prisoner petitions. The new Act had a dual purpose in this respect. In addition to requiring prior exhaustion of adequate state remedies, Congress wished to authorize the Attorney General to act when necessary to protect the constitutional rights of prisoners, but at the same time minimize the need for federal action of any kind by requiring prior exhaustion. Both sponsors of the Act in the Senate made this clear. Senator Hatch explained § 1997e as follows:
“In actions relating to alleged violations of the constitutional rights of prisoners, such persons may be required to exhaust internal grievance procedures before the Attorney General can become involved pursuant to [the Act]” 126 Cong. Rec. 3716 (1980) (emphasis added).22
Senator Bayh, the author of the Act, described the exhaustion provision in similar terms:
*536“[I]n the event of a prison inmate’s rights being alleged to be violated . . . then before the Justice Department could intervene or initiate suits, the prison inmate or class of inmates would have to pursue all of their administrative remedies within the State law before the Justice Department could intervene under the provisions of [the Act].” Id., at 3970.
In short, in enacting the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act Congress was focusing on the powers of the Attorney General, and the particular question of prisoners’ suits, not on the general question of exhaustion in § 1983 actions. Also revealing as to the limited purpose of § 1997e is Congress’ consistent refusal to adopt legislation imposing a general no-exhaustion requirement. Thus, for example, in 1979, a bill was introduced into the Senate providing:
“No court of the United States shall stay or dismiss any civil action brought under this Act on the ground that the party bringing such action failed to exhaust the remedies available in the courts or the administrative agencies of any State.”' S. 1983, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., § 5 (1979).
The bill was never reported out of committee.
The requirement that plaintiffs exhaust available and adequate administrative remedies — subject to well-developed exceptions — is firmly established in virtually every area of the law. This is dictated in § 1983 actions by common sense, as well as by comity and federalism, where adequate state administrative remedies are available.
If the exhaustion question were properly before us, I would affirm the Court of Appeals.

 The Eleventh Amendment provides:
“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”

 As the Court notes, see ante, at 498, n. 1, petitioner originally named the Florida International University as defendant. Because the Florida International University lacks the capacity to sue or be sued, the District Court found that it was not a proper defendant. Petitioner was permitted to amend her complaint, and she simply substituted the Board of Regents.
In addition to racial discrimination, petitioner also claimed that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her sex.

 The Court repeatedly has held that the defense of the Eleventh Amendment may be raised for the first time on appeal. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 678 (1974) (“Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar so that it need not be raised in the trial court”).
The Board’s brief on appeal was divided into three parts. Part III was devoted to the argument that “the Eleventh Amendment precludes subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s complaint.” Brief for Defendant-Appel-lee in No. 79-2965 (CA5), p. 17. A lengthy statutory addendum was attached in support of the arguments advanced in this section of the brief. After the case was scheduled for rehearing en bane, the parties filed short — i. e., 4- and 10-page — supplemental briefs to be considered in addition to the main briefs already submitted to the Court of Appeals. The supplemental briefs did not add to the discussion of the Eleventh Amendment issue. But the question was placed before the Court of Appeals en banc, as it had been placed before the panel, through the thorough discussion in the main briefs.
This Court’s explanation for not addressing the Eleventh Amendment issue is that it was not considered below. See ante, at 515-516, n. 19. But contrary to the implication in the Court’s explanation, the issue — as shown here — was urged by the Board and argued here.

 The Board of Regents of the Division of Universities of the Department of Education is established by the Florida Education Code as a part of the State University System. Fla. Stat. §240.2011 (1981). The Board consists of the Commissioner of Education and 12 citizens appointed by the Governor. § 240.207. The Board has general supervisory authority over the State University System. § 240.209. Among its duties are the appointment of university presidents, the review of budget requests of each university in the state system, the preparation of an aggregated budget for the State University System, the development of a master plan, and the establishment of a systemwide personnel classification and pay plan. Ibid.
The Board is an agency of the State of Florida. § 216.011. See Relyea v. State, 385 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. App. 1980). It may claim the defense of sovereign immunity in suits under state law. See ibid.
Numerous Courts of Appeals have held state universities or state Boards of Regents immune from suit in federal court by reason of the Elev*522enth Amendment. See, e. g., Rutledge v. Arizona Board of Regents, 660 F. 2d 1345, 1349 (CA9 1981); Brennan v. University of Kansas, 451 F. 2d 1287 (CA10 1971); Ronwin v. Shapiro, 657 F. 2d 1071 (CA9 1981).

 See, e. g., Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147, 150 (1981); Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm’n, 359 U. S. 275, 276-277 (1959) (“The conclusion that there has been a waiver of immunity will not be lightly inferred. . . . And where a public instrumentality is created with the right ‘to sue and be sued’ that waiver of immunity in the particular setting may be restricted to suits or proceedings of a special character in the state, not the federal courts”); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm’n, 327 U. S. 573 (1946) (language in state statute providing for suit in “any court of competent jurisdiction” will not be understood as a waiver of the Eleventh Amendment); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U. S. 459 (1945) (same); Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1944) (“a clear declaration of the state’s intention to submit its fiscal problems to other courts than those of its own creation must be found”); Jagnandan v. Giles, 538 F. 2d 1166, 1177 (CA5 1976). Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, supra, at 673 (“In deciding whether a State has waived its constitutional protection under the Eleventh Amendment, we will find waiver only where stated ‘by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction' ”). It is difficult to reconcile' the Court’s consistent requirement of an express waiver with the approach advocated by Justice White. See ante, at 519, n.
At oral argument here counsel for respondent stated that the Florida Legislature had not waived the Eleventh Amendment and had waived the defense of sovereign immunity “only in selected tort cases.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 26. See Bragg v. Board of Public Instruction, 36 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 1948) (“The mere fact that the Board of Public Instruction is created as a body corporate with power to sue and be sued does not affect its immunity from tort”); Relyea v. State, supra (Board of Regents retains defense of sovereign immunity); Fla. Stat. § 111.071(l)(b)(4) (1981) (provision for payment by the State of civil rights judgments against state officers— including judgments under 42 U. S. C. §1983 (1976 ed., Supp. IV) — does not waive sovereign immunity “or any other defense or immunity” to such lawsuits). Cf. Long v. Richardson, 525 F. 2d 74, 79 (CA6 1975) *523(state university’s immunity from suit under state law disposes of Eleventh Amendment question).

 See Brief in Opposition 23 (“Should this Court grant the writ, the Board respectfully submits that review should be limited to the jurisdictional issues discussed below and this Court should vacate the Fifth Circuit’s decision with instructions to dismiss [petitioner’s] suit for lack of jurisdiction”).
The Court, ante, at 516, n. 19, attaches importance to the statement at oral argument by counsel for the Board that the Board wanted the exhaustion issue decided. This must be viewed, however, in light of the Board’s unsuccessful attempt to have this Court first decide the Eleventh Amendment issue. Moreover, a party’s request — short of a binding waiver — cannot relieve this Court of its duty to resolve a jurisdictional question.

 Tr. of Oral Arg. 25-28, 40-41. At oral argument, the Board’s counsel stated that the Eleventh Amendment question had not been addressed in its main briefs to this Court “because of the grant of certiorari.” Id., at 27.

 In view of the Board’s repeated efforts to raise the Eleventh Amendment question, and its specific request that this Court vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction, see n. 6, supra, it is hardly correct to say that the Court must now raise the question of jurisdiction on its own motion. Cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 396, n. 2 (1975). In any event, “we are obliged to inquire sua sponte whenever a doubt arises as to the existence of federal jurisdiction.” Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274, 278 (1977).

 The Court cites, with a “compare” signal, to Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, supra, at 279. The Mt. Healthy Court in no way suggested that the Eleventh Amendment and the principle of sovereign immunity embodied in Art. Ill were less than jurisdictional. Indeed, the Court found it necessary to resolve the Eleventh Amendment question in that case prior to reaching the merits.
On the contrary, the Court consistently has viewed the Amendment as jurisdictional. In Sosna v. Iowa, supra, at 396, n. 2, the Court raised the *525question of the Eleventh Amendment even though the State had asserted the bar of the Amendment only in its answer to the complaint and had thereafter abandoned this defense. Unlike the Board of Regents in this case, the State of Iowa had not advanced the defense in this Court. Even so, the Sosna Court raised and addressed the question. These precedents are ignored by the Court today.

 “Because of their unusual nature, and because it would not simply be wrong but indeed would be an unconstitutional invasion of the powers reserved to the states if the federal courts were to entertain cases not within their jurisdiction, the rule is well settled that the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court must demonstrate that the case is within the competence of that court.” C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3522, p. 45 (1975).

 “[T]he Eleventh Amendment was introduced to clarify the intent of the Framers concerning the reach of the federal judicial power.. . . The Eleventh Amendment served effectively to reverse the particular holding in Chisholm, and, more generally, to restore the original understanding .... Thus, despite the narrowness of the language of the Amendment, its spirit has consistently guided this Court in interpreting the reach of the federal judicial power generally. . . .” Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 291-292 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in result).

 The Hans Court quoted at some length from the constitutional debates concerning the scope of Art. III. In the eighty-first number of the Federalist, for example, Hamilton sought to dispel the suggestion that Art. Ill extended federal jurisdiction over suits brought against one of the States: “ ‘It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual mthout its consent. This is the general sense and the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union.’ ” As quoted in 134 U. S., at 13 (emphasis in original).

 Unlike other limitations on federal jurisdiction, the limitation imposed by the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity may be waived by consent unequivocally expressed. This was the understanding of the doctrine at the time the Constitution was adopted, see n. 11, supra, and the Court has interpreted the “judicial power of the United States” as used in the Eleventh Amendment and Art. Ill accordingly. But the fact that the State or the United States may consent to federal jurisdiction, does not render the Eleventh Amendment or the doctrine of sovereign immunity embodied in Art. Ill “quasi” jurisdictional. Quite simply, where there has not been consent, there is no jurisdiction. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584, 586 (1941) (“The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued, . . . and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit”); United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U. S. 506, 514 (1940) (“Consent alone gives jurisdiction to adjudge against a sovereign. Absent that consent, the attempted exercise of judicial power is void”>.

 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 678; Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S., at 396, n. 2; Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S., at 278. The Court has consistently viewed the Eleventh Amendment question as jurisdictional. See Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S., at 51 (“A state’s freedom from litigation was established as a constitutional right through the Eleventh Amendment”) (emphasis added); Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U. S. 313, 320 (1934) (Question is “whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit brought by a foreign State against a State without her consent”) (emphasis added).

 The States consented to a diminution of their sovereignty by ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment. In its exercise of the powers granted to it *530by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may lift the bar of sovereign immunity. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976). Thus, if petitioner had brought this suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, there would have been no jurisdictional problem. But petitioner did not do so, and the Court has held that Congress has not removed the bar of sovereign immunity in § 1983 actions. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979).

 “It would be a novel proposition indeed that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit to enjoin the State itself simply because no money judgment is sought. . . . [T]he Eleventh Amendment by its terms clearly applies to a suit seeking an injunction, a remedy available only from equity.” Cory v. White, ante, at 90-91.

 Under the theory of Ex parte Young the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against state officer? because when a state officer “comes into conflict with the superior authority of [the] Constitution, ... he is . . . stripped of his official or representative character.” 209 U. S., at 159-160. The rationale of that decision has no application to suits against the State or its agencies. Although an individual official may be viewed as acting on his own and without state authority when acting against federal law, the State — or an agency of the State — cannot act other than in its official state capacity. Similarly, an action for damages against the State, or an arm of the State, seeks damages that must be paid from the State’s own coffers — whether the damages come directly from the State’s general fund *531or from some other state fund. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm’n, 327 U. S. 573 (1946) (segregated funds of the State Tax Commission are state moneys subject to the Eleventh Amendment).
Moreover, the fact that the Board is a corporate entity under state law does not permit application of the rule in Ex parte Young to the Board itself — as if the Board were an official. This Court repeatedly has held the Eleventh Amendment to bar suit against such state corporate agencies. See Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147 (1981); Great Northern Insurance Co. v. Read, supra; Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U. S. 459 (1945); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm’n, supra.
Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 636 (1911), is not to the contrary. In that case suit was brought against astate college-in state court to recover damages caused by the college’s construction of a dyke. Although the Court discussed the Eleventh Amendment in some detail, there was simply no Eleventh Amendment question in that case. It was clear before Hopkins that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply to bar review in this Court of any federal question presented in a suit against a State in state court. See Chandler v. Dix, 194 U. S. 590, 592 (1904). Cf. University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978). Moreover, the Hopkins Court did not consider the college’s activities in that case to be governmental. 221 U. S., at 647. In short, no Eleventh Amendment question was presented to the Court. The opinion in Hopkins has never been cited by this Court for the proposition that the Eleventh Amendment is no bar to suit against a state corporate agency in federal court. See Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., supra; Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978); Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U. S. 184 (1964).

 “[I]n all the cases in which the Supreme Court has articulated its no-exhaustion rule, the state administrative remedies were sufficiently inadequate that exhaustion would not have been appropriate in any event.” Developments in the Law, Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1133, 1274 (1977).

 Cf. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100, 136 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (exhaustion requirement in § 1983 cases can be justified by “a somewhat lesser showing . . . where ... we are concerned not with the displacement of the § 1983 rem*533edy, but with the deferral of federal court consideration pending exhaustion of the state administrative process”).

 Of the approximately 30,000 civil rights suits filed in fiscal year 1981, 15,639 were filed by state prisoners under § 1983. The remainder involved a variety of civil rights suits. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts 63, 68 (1981). See Parrott v. Taylor, 451 U. S. 527, 554, n. 13 (1981) (POWELL, J., concurring in result).

 The exhaustion requirement in § 1997e only becomes effective if the Attorney General or a federal district court determines that the available prison grievance procedures comply with standards set forth in subsection (b) of § 1997e. As of this date, the Department of Justice has not certified the inmate grievance procedures of even a single State.

 Senator Hatch offered the same explanation on several other occasions in the course of the debate. See 126 Cong. Rec. 9227 (1980) (“Section 7 would establish specific procedures that would be applicable before the Attorney General could enter into an action in behalf of an imprisoned or incarcerated person. Such person would first have had to fully exhaust all internal grievance mechanisms that existed in the institution in which he was confined”); id., at 10005 (“Section 7(D) further clarifies that the administrative grievance procedures established in section 7 are only for the purposes of requiring prisoners to exhaust internal grievance mechanisms before the Attorney General can litigate on his behalf”).