Court Opinion

ID: 9897249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:14.06164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:41.748626
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                       Oct 26 2023, 8:55 am

                                                                           CLERK
                                                                       Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                          Court of Appeals
                                                                            and Tax Court

Attorneys for Appellant                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Valerie K. Boots                                           Theodore E. Rokita
Talisha Griffin                                            Indiana Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
                                                           George P. Sherman
                                                           Supervising Deputy Attorney
                                                           General
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Larry Lee Jackson, Jr.,                                    October 26, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                       Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           22A-CR-2955
        v.                                                 Appeal from the Marion Superior
                                                           Court
State of Indiana,                                          The Honorable Mark D. Stoner,
Appellee-Plaintiff                                         Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           49D32-2112-F1-37122

                                Opinion by Chief Judge Altice
                                Judges May and Foley concur.

Altice, Chief Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2955 | October 26, 2023                           Page 1 of 26
      Case Summary
[1]   Larry L. Jackson, Jr. was charged with attempted murder and, following a jury

      trial, was convicted of Level 3 felony aggravated battery. He appeals raising the

      following three restated issues:

              I. Did the trial court err when it gave, sua sponte and over
              Jackson’s objection, a jury instruction on aggravated battery as a
              lesser included offense of attempted murder?

              II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied
              Jackson’s tendered self-defense instruction?

              III. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it admitted
              certain evidence over Jackson’s objection?

[2]   We affirm.

      Facts & Procedural History
[3]   In December 2021, Jackson, sixty years old, was living in apartment 501 in

      Lugar Towers in Indianapolis. The Lugar Towers complex is known to be a

      “high crime” area, with Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD)

      receiving calls almost nightly. Transcript Vol. 2 at 183, 198. Jackson’s

      apartment, on the fifth floor, was the first apartment to the left of the elevator.

      There are fifteen stories in the towers, with cameras on every floor except floors

      thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen. There are no cameras in the elevators.

[4]   According to Jackson, a non-tenant named Adrian King Taylor, known to

      Jackson as “King,” was often seen loitering inside the building, harassing

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2955 | October 26, 2023         Page 2 of 26
      people for money or drugs, and sometimes robbing or beating up tenants.

      Transcript Vol. 3 at 75. Jackson reported that Taylor had robbed and threatened

      him on a couple of occasions in November 2021, and Jackson gave him money,

      which worked to “defuse the situation.” Id.

[5]   In the early morning hours of December 4, 2021, there was an encounter

      between Jackson and Taylor, recorded on a surveillance camera on the fifth

      floor, in which Jackson stabbed Taylor in the chest. Jackson ran down the

      stairs and out of the building, discarding the knife and walking toward a nearby

      gas station.

[6]   Meanwhile, Taylor walked toward the stairwell but came back and got on the

      elevator and made his way out of the building. He was in the backseat of a

      vehicle, with its door open, when emergency responders arrived. IMPD Officer

      Amanda Tatomirovich was the first to make contact with Taylor, who was

      grabbing his chest and was in distress, unable to clearly speak his name. Officer

      Tatomirovich performed a pat down on Taylor before he was taken away by

      ambulance, and no weapons were found, only some loose change in his hands

      and pockets. Forty-two-year-old Taylor received emergency surgery and

      survived.

[7]   IMPD Officer Jamie Hadley also responded to the dispatch about the stabbing,

      and she saw Jackson, who matched the description of the suspect, on foot a

      short distance from Lugar Towers. Officer Hadley stopped Jackson, whom she

      described as very calm and cooperative and not startled about being stopped by

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2955 | October 26, 2023    Page 3 of 26
      police. Jackson was transported to a police station. Officers looked for a knife

      in the area where Jackson had been but did not find one.

[8]   IMPD Detective Corey Shaffer conducted a recorded interview of Jackson.

      Jackson told Detective Shaffer that there had been a sudden banging on his

      apartment door, which came open, and Taylor entered, threatening Jackson

      that he was going to shoot him if Jackson did not “give [him] something.”

      Exhibit Vol. at 29 (State’s Exhibit 24, transcript of interview). Jackson described

      that Taylor told him that he better “go get [him] some Katy” 1 or else Taylor

      would “shoot [Jackson’s] motherf*cking ass.” Id. Jackson told Detective

      Shaffer that, to get Taylor out of his apartment, he agreed, and Taylor handed

      him a dollar bill and some change, totaling about five dollars. Jackson then

      went “straight downstairs” to the lobby, where he went outside and had a

      cigarette. Id. at 34.

[9]   Jackson stated that when he came back inside to go to his apartment, Taylor

      was already in the elevator and that he tried to give the money back to Taylor

      but he refused it. Jackson described that Taylor had his “hands balled up,” and

      was “getting ready to try to hurt” Jackson, so Jackson, while on the elevator,

      pulled out the knife from his pocket and “poked” Taylor as Taylor was coming

      toward him. Id. at 36, 40. Jackson reported that, when the elevator opened on

      the third or fourth floor, he ran down a stairwell and out of the building, with

      1
       The record indicates Katy or Katie “is slang for a drug.” Transcript Vol. 3 at 39. It originally referred to
      commercially produced synthetic marijuana but now “could be a number of different” drugs. Id. at 40.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2955 | October 26, 2023                                 Page 4 of 26
       Taylor chasing him. Jackson told Detective Shaffer that he did not go to the

       fifth floor. Jackson said that he dropped the knife in an alley. Detective Shaffer

       looked for the knife, but it was never found.

[10]   On December 8, 2021, the State charged Jackson with attempted murder,

       alleging that Jackson attempted to kill Taylor by “stabbing Adrian Taylor in the

       chest with the specific intent to kill Adrian Taylor.” Appellant’s Appendix at 23.

[11]   Prior to trial, Jackson sought to exclude the second portion of Officer

       Tatomirovich’s body cam footage (Exhibit 15), which showed Taylor bloodied

       in the back of the vehicle and then falling to the ground as he stood up,

       requiring assistance onto the stretcher. Jackson argued that it had no

       evidentiary value and was highly prejudicial. The State maintained that the

       footage showing Taylor’s deteriorating condition was “very relevant” because

       Taylor’s injuries initially did not appear too serious on the surveillance video.

       Transcript Vol. 2 at 132. The State explained that the footage was important to

       illustrate to the jury “how someone who is walking and talking on the

       surveillance video after the incident, all of a sudden is minutes from death by

       the time he gets to the hospital.” Id. After viewing the portion of the video at

       issue, the court found that its relevancy outweighed any prejudice.

[12]   Also prior to trial, Jackson argued for the admission of statements he made

       about Taylor while alone in the interview room. The State intended to offer

       into evidence only that portion of the video that contained the interview

       (Exhibit 23) – stopping the video when the detective left the room. Jackson

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2955 | October 26, 2023        Page 5 of 26
       wanted the full video admitted under the doctrine of completeness, noting that

       Jackson was unaware he was being recorded and that the part not included in

       Exhibit 23 showed Jackson’s “subjective belief [about Taylor] at the time.” Id.

       at 137. The court found that Jackson’s statements were volunteered, not within

       a hearsay exception, and not admissible under the rule of completeness, but

       noted that the statements “do reflect [Jackson’s] state of mind” and that defense

       could present them in its case-in-chief, if desired. Id. at 139.

[13]   A jury trial was held on October 25, 2022. At trial, Lugar Towers surveillance

       camera footage, without sound, was admitted as State’s Exhibit 19. It showed

       the two men getting on and off the elevators in the lobby and on the fifth floor,

       sometimes together and sometimes not, a number of times between 3:42 and

       3:57 a.m. At 3:56 a.m., they both exit the elevator on the fifth floor and are

       seen standing next to it. Jackson is seen picking up small, indiscernible items

       off the floor, and trying to hand them to Taylor, who jerks his hand away and

       appears to refuse the items. Taylor, saying something to Jackson, begins to turn

       away, then turns back to Jackson, who suddenly reaches into his hoodie pocket,

       pulls out a knife, stabs Taylor in the chest, and runs away. Taylor leaves the

       camera view for some seconds then returns, pulls up his shirt to show dripping

       blood, talks and shows the injury to someone else, and then gets on the

       elevator. Taylor is seen getting off the lobby elevator and walking out of the

       building at 3:59 a.m.

[14]   Detective Shafer testified that, contrary to Jackson’s statement that the incident

       occurred in the elevator, the stabbing occurred on the fifth floor in the hallway

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2955 | October 26, 2023      Page 6 of 26
       near the elevator. Further, Taylor did not chase Jackson out of the building as

       Jackson had reported. The recorded interview with Detective Shaffer, which

       video ended when the detective left the room, was offered and admitted into

       evidence as Exhibit 23, over Jackson’s objection. 2

[15]   During Officer Tatomirovich’s testimony, the State sought to admit her

       bodycam footage as Exhibit 15. Jackson objected to the admission of the

       second portion that showed Taylor’s deteriorating condition before emergency

       personnel arrived. The court admitted the first portion of Exhibit 15 without

       objection and the second portion over Jackson’s objection.

[16]   Bryan Carr, M.D., the trauma surgeon who treated Taylor, testified that Taylor

       was minutes from dying when he arrived at the hospital. Surgery revealed that

       Taylor had a hole, about half an inch in size, in the left side of his heart and “a

       massive amount of hemorrhage” in a tissue sack surrounding the heart.

       Transcript Vol. 2 at 205. Taylor was on a ventilator for a period and required a

       second surgery. He was in the hospital for approximately fourteen days.

[17]   Jackson testified about the series of events, describing that he was chopping

       onions in his kitchen when Taylor banged on his apartment door and entered,

       despite Jackson trying to brace the door shut. He explained that he feared

       Taylor because he had witnessed Taylor beat up other people in the building at

       least twice and that Taylor had robbed Jackson on a couple of prior occasions.

       2
           Exhibit 24 was a transcription of Exhibit 23 and was admitted for demonstrative purposes.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2955 | October 26, 2023                            Page 7 of 26
       Jackson stated that he and Taylor sat at his table, and Taylor gave him some

       dollars and change, instructing Jackson to go find him some “Katie or some

       crack or something.” Transcript Vol. 3 at 68.

[18]   Jackson stated that he left his apartment, with a knife in his pocket, and first

       took the elevator up to the thirteenth floor, looking for someone he believed

       might have drugs that he could buy for Taylor, and, unsuccessful with that, he

       took the elevator down to the first floor and exited the building briefly. He said

       that, having no success finding drugs, he got back on the elevator to return to

       his apartment and encountered Taylor. They exited together on the fifth floor,

       and Jackson testified that he tried to hand Taylor his money back, but Taylor

       refused it.

[19]   Jackson testified, “[Taylor] balled his fist up” and “hit my arm” and said “give

       me some motherf*cking money, or I’m going to shoot your motherf*cking ass.”

       Id. at 72, 76. Jackson testified that he “just panicked,” as he was afraid of

       Taylor, and “poked” him with the knife. Id. at 76, 93. Jackson acknowledged

       that did not see a weapon on Taylor but “truly believed he had a weapon,”

       adding that Taylor “has threatened me so many times.” Id. at 73. Jackson

       testified that he did not intend to kill Taylor. Id. at 76.

[20]   After the parties rested, the jury was excused and final jury instructions were

       discussed. The trial court asked if anyone objected “to the Court’s proposed

       finals.” Id. at 126. Jackson objected to Instructions 8 and 9, which defined the

       charged offense of attempted murder and stated that aggravated battery, also

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2955 | October 26, 2023      Page 8 of 26
defined in the instructions, was a lesser included offense of which the jury could

find Jackson guilty if the necessary elements were proven. Jackson’s counsel

stated repeatedly that the defense did not want “any mention of aggravated

battery” as Jackson did not want “any lesser” offenses mentioned at all. Id. at

127. The exchange with defense counsel continued, with the court asking for

the reason that Jackson’s counsel did not believe a lesser included instruction

should be given:

        Defense Counsel: Yes. I believe that even though a lesser Ag Bat
        can be -- I think there is a little bit of mixed caselaw on whether it
        is inherently included or not, but that aside, the elements of
        aggravated battery are almost identical to the attempt murder
        that we’re dealing with. By giving that instruction, I feel that this
        is going to reduce the burden of the State. They have a high
        burden, which is, to me, the specific intent for attempt murder,
        and since there are not really that much difference, if any,
        between the two, between the Ag Bat and the attempted murder,
        then I think, by offering an aggravated battery, that will be like a
        compromise, offering the jury a compromise verdict, which is --
        makes it easier for the State.

        Court: Okay. And do you believe as a matter of strategy, that
        you wish not -- the aggravated battery not be given?

        Defense Counsel: Correct.

Id. at 128. The trial court asked for the State’s position, with the State

responding:

        I think it’s appropriate given the facts, Judge. I think this is a
        factually inherent -- or factually included lesser. As [defense

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2955 | October 26, 2023         Page 9 of 26
               counsel] said, the elements are very similar. The facts are all the
               same. And if the Court finds that there’s been a serious
               evidentiary dispute about an element, which in this case, our
               understanding is it’s going to be the mens rea, the specific intent
               to kill, then the lesser included would be -- would be appropriate
               as a factually included lesser. So we do think it’s appropriate to
               give.

       Id. The court stated that the evidence reflected an evidentiary dispute as to

       Jackson’s intent, which supported giving the lesser included aggravated battery

       instruction.

[21]   The court asked Jackson’s counsel if he had discussed with Jackson “the risk he

       takes by an all-or-nothing strategy,” and counsel stated he had, but would do so

       again. Id. Following a recess, counsel for Jackson stated that he and Jackson

       had discussed the two charges and the penalties for each and that “[Jackson]

       told me that he wants to go all or nothing.” Id. at 131. The court, speaking

       directly to Jackson, asked if that is how he wished to proceed, and he responded

       in the affirmative.

[22]   After reviewing caselaw off the record, the court determined that “there is not

       an absolute right to refuse a valid lesser included offense instruction” where, as

       here, “there is a serious evidentiary dispute” on the element distinguishing the

       two offenses, in this case, the mens rea. Id. at 135.

               The aggravated battery, as the caselaw’s indicated, is an
               inherently included offense because the elements are virtually
               identical with the exception of the specific intent to kill. Court
               notes that aggravated battery doesn’t require a touching [and] . . .

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2955 | October 26, 2023      Page 10 of 26
               simply requires an inflicting of injury. And the language of the
               statute -- or charging information in this particular case is that the
               Defendant intentionally -- attempted to intentionally kill another
               human being by the stabbing.

               So the Court does believe, one, it’s inherently included; secondly,
               that it is factually included; third, that based on the evidence the
               Court’s previously cited, that there is a serious evidentiary
               dispute.

       Id. at 136. The court gave the lesser included aggravated battery instruction

       over Jackson’s objection.

[23]   Jackson also took issue with the court’s decision regarding what self-defense

       instruction would be given. Specifically, the court determined that it would

       give the court’s self-defense instruction, Final Instruction 3, which was

       consistent with pattern jury instruction 10.03. The court declined to give

       Jackson’s tendered instructions 1 and 6, finding that instruction 1 was already

       covered by the court’s Final Instruction 3 and that instruction 6 (Defense

       Instruction 6) contained language that the Indiana Supreme Court had

       determined was unnecessary and misleading.

[24]   The jury found Jackson guilty of Level 3 felony aggravated battery. The court

       sentenced him to eight years with six executed and two suspended with no

       probation. Jackson now appeals. Additional facts will be supplied as needed.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2955 | October 26, 2023        Page 11 of 26
       Discussion & Decision

       I. Aggravated Battery Instruction
[25]   It is well settled that when a party asks a trial court to instruct the jury on an

       alleged lesser included offense of the crime charged, the court must conduct a

       three-part analysis to determine whether the instruction is appropriate. Watts v.

       State, 885 N.E.2d 1228, 1231 (Ind. 2008).

               First, the trial court must compare the statute defining the crime
               charged with the statute defining the alleged lesser included
               offense to determine if the alleged lesser included offense is
               inherently included in the crime charged. Second, if a trial court
               determines that an alleged lesser included offense is not
               inherently included in the crime charged under step one, then it
               must determine if the alleged lesser included offense is factually
               included in the crime charged. If the alleged lesser included
               offense is neither inherently nor factually included in the crime
               charged, the trial court should not give an instruction on the
               alleged lesser included offense. Third, if a trial court has
               determined that an alleged lesser included offense is either
               inherently or factually included in the crime charged, “it must
               look at the evidence presented in the case by both parties” to
               determine if there is a serious evidentiary dispute about the
               element or elements distinguishing the greater from the lesser
               offense and if, in view of this dispute, a jury could conclude that
               the lesser offense was committed but not the greater. “[I]t is
               reversible error for a trial court not to give an instruction, when
               requested, on the inherently or factually included lesser offense”
               if there is such an evidentiary dispute.

       Webb v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1103, 1106 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Wright v. State, 658

       N.E.2d 563, 566-67 (Ind. 1995)).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2955 | October 26, 2023       Page 12 of 26
[26]   Here, Jackson does not dispute that aggravated battery was a lesser included

       offense of attempted murder or that a serious evidentiary dispute existed as to

       the mens rea element, that is, whether Jackson possessed specific intent or

       whether he acted knowingly and intentionally. Rather, Jackson’s argument is

       that the Wright three-part analysis applies only when a party has requested an

       instruction – and not when, as here, a trial court gives a jury instruction sua

       sponte.

[27]   This court faced a similar instructional challenge in Washington v. State, 685

       N.E.2d 724 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), where the defendant was charged with

       murder and, over the defendant’s objection, the trial court sua sponte instructed

       the jury on voluntary manslaughter, of which he was convicted. In addressing

       whether it was proper to give the sua sponte instruction, this court applied the

       Wright test, first finding that, under step one of the test, voluntary manslaughter

       is an inherently included offense of murder 3 and, under the third step, there was

       “sufficient evidence of sudden heat” to warrant the giving of the instruction. 4

       3
         The Washington court cited Griffin v. State, 644 N.E.2d 561, 562 (Ind. 1994), for the proposition that
       “voluntary manslaughter is simply murder mitigated by sudden heat.” Our Supreme Court later clarified in
       Watts v. State that, “even though under Indiana law voluntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of
       murder, a conviction for murder does not mean that a defendant could also have been convicted of voluntary
       manslaughter” and “[s]udden heat must be separately proved.” 885 N.E.2d 1228, 1233 (Ind. 2008).
       “Therefore, if there is no serious evidentiary dispute over sudden heat, it is error for a trial court to instruct a
       jury on voluntary manslaughter in addition to murder,” and to the extent that Griffin and a number of other
       cases were inconsistent with that, they were overruled. Id. The Watts Court’s overruling of Griffin does not
       affect the validity of Washington’s relevancy to our case.
       4
        Judge Staton dissented. He found that, contrary to the majority’s conclusion, there was “an absolute
       absence” of a serious evidentiary dispute regarding Washington’s sudden heat and that the instruction on
       voluntary manslaughter over the defendant’s timely objection was reversible error. 685 N.E.2d at 729.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2955 | October 26, 2023                                  Page 13 of 26
       Id. at 728. The Washington court thus applied the Wright analysis even though

       no party had requested the instruction. 5 Jackson urges that Washington was

       “wrongly decided” and asks us not to repeat that court’s mistake. Reply Brief at

       5.

[28]   However, Washington was not alone in applying the Wright analysis when a trial

       court sua sponte gave a lesser included instruction. In Ross v. State, 877 N.E.2d

       829 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied, this court, while addressing the denial of

       petition for post-conviction relief, evaluated whether the defendant received

       ineffective assistance of trial counsel for counsel’s failure to object to the trial

       court’s sua sponte instruction on Class A felony voluntary manslaughter as a

       lesser included offense of murder. In Ross, the defendant’s argument was that

       the only proper voluntary manslaughter instruction that could have been given

       was for Class B felony manslaughter (because the offense is a Class A felony if

       it is committed by means of a deadly weapon and the charging information

       against Ross did not specify that he committed murder by means of a deadly

       weapon).

[29]   Although the instruction was given sua sponte, the Ross court stated that, per

       Wright, “[f]or jury instruction purposes, if one offense is inherently included

       within another, it is proper for a trial court to give an instruction on the lesser

       5
         This includes the dissent. That is, although Judge Staton disagreed with the majority about the existence of
       a serious evidentiary dispute as to sudden heat and opined that “[t]he court-induced voluntary manslaughter
       instruction undermined the defendant’s defense of self-defense,” he explained that “the reversible error here
       was created by the trial court failing to follow the third prong of the analysis set forth in Wright.” Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2955 | October 26, 2023                             Page 14 of 26
included offense if there is a serious evidentiary dispute regarding the element

that distinguishes the greater offense from the lesser offense.” Id. at 835. Thus,

as in Washington, the Ross court applied Wright in evaluating the

appropriateness of the court’s sua sponte instruction. The crux of the

discussion – about the appropriateness of the sua sponte lesser included

instruction – concerned the existence, or not, of any serious evidentiary dispute

as to sudden heat. Ultimately, the Ross court determined that, based on the

ineffective assistance of counsel standard of review, the defendant failed to

establish that his counsel was ineffective for failing to lodge an objection to the

Class A felony instruction. 6 Washington and Ross lead us to the conclusion that,

regardless of whether a party requested the lesser included instruction or it was

given sua sponte, the relevant inquiry is whether the instruction was properly

given pursuant to the Wright analysis. 7

6
  In Ross, the trial court proposed giving a voluntary manslaughter instruction. The State did not object, but
Ross’s counsel did, asserting there was no evidence of sudden heat. The trial court overruled this objection
and gave a pattern jury instruction for both Class A felony and Class B felony voluntary manslaughter. Trial
counsel did not lodge a separate objection to the inclusion of Class A felony voluntary manslaughter in the
instruction.
7
  In Young v. State, 30 N.E.3d 719, 728 (Ind. 2015), the Court addressed the principle that defendants must
have “fair notice” of the charges of which they may be convicted, including inherently or factually included
lesser offenses. There, two defendants were charged with murder by a shooting, and at the conclusion of the
evidence at the bench trial, the trial court found that the evidence showed that defendants had planned a
group beating of the victim but that there was insufficient evidence that defendants knew any member of the
group would shoot the victim. The court dismissed the murder charges but left “all the possible batteries on
the table” as lesser included offenses -- although neither party had requested consideration of such. Id. at
721. Following argument, the court found the defendants guilty of Class B felony attempted aggravated
battery for planning the beating. On transfer, our Supreme Court observed that the inherent and factual
inclusion tests established in Wright “are a necessary piece of the larger fair-notice puzzle” but are not always
dispositive, concluding that “fair notice” was lacking in that case because, although the elements of
attempted aggravated battery were inherently included in murder, the convictions were based on a

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2955 | October 26, 2023                               Page 15 of 26
[30]   In further support of his position, Jackson makes the broader policy argument

       that if a trial court sua sponte instructs a jury on a lesser included offense, over a

       defendant’s objection, the court fails to act in an impartial manner because the

       court is interfering with a party’s strategic maneuvering. His argument in that

       regard is not lost on us. Clearly, giving a lesser included instruction can affect a

       defendant’s desire to pursue an all-or-nothing trial strategy.

[31]   Our Supreme Court recognized this consequence in Watts. There, the Court

       determined that defense counsel’s objection to a voluntary manslaughter

       instruction should have been sustained because there was no serious evidentiary

       dispute over sudden heat. In its decision, the Court expressly acknowledged

       that lesser included instructions may detrimentally affect a defendant’s trial

       strategy:

                One legitimate trial strategy for the defendant in a murder trial is
                an “all-or-nothing” one in which the defendant seeks acquittal
                while realizing that the jury might instead convict of murder. In
                a situation where a jury must choose between a murder
                conviction and an acquittal, the defendant might well be
                acquitted. But if the jury has voluntary manslaughter as an
                intermediate option, the defendant might be convicted of
                voluntary manslaughter as a “compromise.” Such a verdict is
                not appropriate if unsupported by any evidence of sudden heat;
                moreover, an unsupported voluntary manslaughter instruction

       completely different “means used” (beating) than was alleged in the charging informations (shooting). Id. at
       728. While Jackson does not raise a fair notice argument, we find that Young’s discussion of Wright
       nevertheless informs our decision today, as it reflects that the Wright test is applicable in situations where the
       trial court acts sua sponte to propose consideration of lesser-included offenses.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2955 | October 26, 2023                                 Page 16 of 26
               deprives the defendant of the opportunity to pursue a legitimate
               trial strategy.

       885 N.E.2d at 1233 (emphases added).

[32]   A few years later, this court, in True v. State, 954 N.E.2d 1105 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2011), addressed the propriety of an instruction for Class A misdemeanor

       battery as a lesser included of Class D felony domestic battery, being given at

       the State’s request and over the defendant’s objection. The True court echoed

       the Watts Court’s observations regarding the potential impact of a lesser

       included instruction on a defendant’s “all or nothing” strategy, stating that

       “such a defense can be improperly undermined by the State obtaining a lesser

       included offense instruction where the evidence does not warrant such an

       instruction[.]” Id. at 1110 (emphasis added). The True court continued that,

       under Watts, “neither the State nor a defendant may seek to have a jury enter a

       ‘compromise’ verdict, based on the giving of a lesser included offense

       instruction that is not supported by the evidence.” Id. (emphasis added). Because

       there was no serious evidentiary dispute as to whether the battery was

       committed in the presence of children (required by the Class D felony), the True

       court found that the instruction “improperly invited the jury to reach a

       ‘compromise’ verdict.” Id. at 1111. Watts and True suggest to us that it is when

       a lesser included instruction is not supported by the evidence that a defendant is

       improperly deprived of his choice to pursue an all-or-nothing strategy.

[33]   Granted, in Watts and True, the State had made the request that the court give a

       lesser included instruction, making it distinguishable from here, where the
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2955 | October 26, 2023       Page 17 of 26
       instruction was given sua sponte. However, the common thread woven

       throughout the cases, including when a lesser included instruction was given

       sua sponte, is whether – pursuant to the Wright analysis – a serious evidentiary

       dispute existed on the element distinguishing the lesser and greater offenses.

[34]   In sum, we agree with the State that, while trial courts are not required to give

       an instruction on a lesser included offense sua sponte, they are not precluded

       from doing so given the proper circumstances. Here, the trial court found, and

       it is undisputed, that a serious evidentiary dispute existed as to Jackson’s mens

       rea, that is, the distinguishing element between the charged attempted murder

       and the lesser aggravated battery. For the reasons discussed above, we find the

       trial court did not err in instructing the jury on aggravated battery.

       II. Self Defense Instruction
[35]   Jackson next claims that the trial court erred when it refused one of his tendered

       self-defense instructions. This Court reviews a trial court’s manner of

       instructing the jury for an abuse of discretion. Treadway v. State, 924 N.E.2d

       621, 636 (Ind. 2010). When reviewing a trial court’s refusal to give an

       instruction, the reviewing court looks to whether the tendered instruction

       correctly states the law, whether there is evidence in the record to support

       giving the instruction, and whether the substance of the proffered instruction is

       covered by other instructions. Id.

[36]   “To employ self-defense, ‘a defendant must satisfy both an objective and

       subjective standard: he must have actually believed deadly force was necessary

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2955 | October 26, 2023      Page 18 of 26
to protect himself, and his belief must be one that a reasonable person would

have held under the circumstances.’” Passarelli v. State, 201 N.E.3d 271, 276

(Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Littler v. State, 871 N.E.2d 276, 279 (Ind. 2007)),

trans. denied. Here, the trial court gave Final Instruction 3 8 concerning self-

defense, which was based on pattern jury instruction 10.03. 9 No party objected

to Final Instruction 3. However, as is relevant to this appeal, Jackson asked the

court to also give his Defense Instruction 6, which the court refused. It stated:

           With regard to the defense of self-defense, the existence of the
           danger, the necessity or apparent necessity of using force, as well
           as the amount of force required to resist the attack or criminal

8
    Final Instruction 3 read:

           It is an issue in this case as to whether the defendant acted in self-defense.
           A person may use reasonable force against another person to protect himself from what he
           reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.
           A person is justified in using deadly force, and does not have a duty to retreat, only if he reasonably
           believes the deadly force is necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to himself or the commission
           of a forcible felony. [H]owever, a person may not use force if:
                    (1) he is committing a crime that is directly and immediately connected to the
                    confrontation between the defendant and Adrian Taylor;
                    (2) he is escaping after the commission of a crime that is directly and immediately
                    connected to interaction between the defendant and Adrian Taylor;
                    (3) he provokes a fight with another person with intent to cause bodily injury to that person
                    or;
                    (4) he has willingly entered into a fight with another person or is the initial aggressor,
                    unless he withdraws from the encounter and communicates to the other person the intent
                    to do so and the other person nevertheless continues or threatens to continue the fight.
           The burden is upon the state to disprove this defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
     Appendix at 122-23.

9
 Our Supreme Court has stated, “Although we have not formally approved [Indiana Pattern Jury
Instructions] for use, we have recognized their existence and given them some preferential status.” Clay City
Consol. Sch.. Corp. v. Timberman, 918 N.E.2d 292, 295 (Ind 2009).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2955 | October 26, 2023                                 Page 19 of 26
               interference with property can only be determined from the standpoint
               of the defendant at the time and under the then existing circumstances.

               Ordinarily, one exercising the right to self-defense is required to
               act upon the instant and without time to deliberate and
               investigate, and under such circumstances a danger which exists
               only in appearance, is as real and imminent to him as if it were
               actual. A person has a right to act upon appearances of actual
               and immediate danger if they sincerely believe such apparent
               danger exists. A person’s belief of apparent danger does not
               require the danger be actual, but only that the belief be in good
               faith. It need be only apparent to a reasonable person under the
               then existing circumstances of the defendant.

               A defender will not be accountable for an error in judgment as to the
               amount of force necessary, provided they acted honestly. The law protects
               persons who feel compelled to act at such times even though in retrospect
               may prove they have erred.

               The defendant’s perception and belief must be subjectively
               [made] in good faith and objectively one that a reasonable person
               would have under the same circumstances of the defendant, at
               the time.

               Authority: French v. State, 403 N.E.2d 821 (Ind. 1980).

       Appendix at 117 (emphases added). The trial court refused this tendered

       instruction on the basis that our Supreme Court had found certain language in

       it to be “not necessary” and “misleading.” Transcript Vol. 3 at 143-44.

[37]   Jackson claims that the court’s Final Instruction 3 “did not address

       consideration of danger from the defendant’s standpoint or that the defendant is

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2955 | October 26, 2023          Page 20 of 26
       entitled to a mistake in judgment if he acted honestly.” Appellant’s Brief at 35.

       In Washington v. State, 997 N.E.2d 342 (Ind. 2013), a defendant similarly

       claimed that the trial court erred in failing to give his proposed instruction that

       focused on the standpoint of the person experiencing the danger and stated that

       the person would not be accountable for an error in judgment, provided he

       acted honestly. In reviewing whether the trial court was required to use the

       defendant’s proposed final instruction, the Washington Court held that it was

       not, as the additional language in the instruction was “superfluous.” Id. at 350.

[38]   Furthermore, our court, in Passarelli, recently confirmed that the objective

       component of self-defense, as adopted by our courts, is analyzed from the

       standpoint of an ordinary “reasonable person.” 201 N.E.3d at 279. There, we

       explained,

               the question being presented to the jury is whether an ordinary
               reasonable person would have responded with deadly force if
               confronted with the same circumstances that [the defendant]
               confronted. The issue is not whether a person just like
               Passarelli—who also suffers from PTSD caused by military
               combat—would have responded as Passarelli did. In short, the
               standard of what constitutes an “ordinary man” does not change
               on a case-by-case basis.

       Id. at 278-79. To the extent that Jackson’s Defense Instruction 6 asked the jury

       to consider otherwise, it was not a correct statement of the law.

[39]   Jackson also complains that the trial court’s Final Instruction 3 “does not

       explain that ‘reasonably believes’ encompasses a subjective and objective

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2955 | October 26, 2023      Page 21 of 26
       standard like Jackson’s tendered instruction.” Appellant’s Brief at 35. However,

       in Schermerhorn v. State, this court addressed the propriety of a pattern self-

       defense jury instruction, largely the same as that before us, and found that it

       “sufficiently instructed the jury on both components.” 61 N.E.3d 375, 383

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (stating that our Supreme Court, in Washington,

       determined that the jury instruction on self defense in that case, which tracked

       the court’s jury instruction in Schermerhorn’s case with respect to a defendant’s

       reasonable belief in the use of imminent unlawful force, sufficiently instructed

       the jury on both the subjective and objective components), trans. denied.

[40]   Jackson has failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion in

       instructing the jury on self-defense.

       III. Admission of Evidence
[41]   Jackson asserts that the trial court erred when it admitted, over his objections,

       (1) the second portion of Exhibit 15, Officer Tatomirovich’s body cam footage

       showing Taylor in the backseat of the car until medical personnel arrived, and

       (2) Exhibit 23, the recorded interrogation up through the point when the

       detective completed his questioning and left the room but not including

       statements Jackson made while left alone in the room.

[42]   The admission and exclusion of evidence is within the discretion of the trial

       court. Jackson v. State, 973 N.E.2d 1123, 1127 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans.

       denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly

       against the logic and effects of the facts and circumstances before it. Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2955 | October 26, 2023       Page 22 of 26
       Exhibit 15

[43]   Jackson asserts that the second portion of Exhibit 15, which included images of

       Taylor in the vehicle and then struggling to stand, should not have been

       admitted because it was “overly prejudicial and cumulative of other evidence”

       and “likely [] inflamed the jury’s sympathy for Taylor[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 36,

       39. Relevant evidence can be excluded “if its probative value is substantially

       outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Ind. Evidence Rule 403. As

       our courts have observed, “[A]ll relevant evidence is ‘inherently prejudicial’ in a

       criminal prosecution, so the inquiry boils down to a balance of probative value

       against the likely unfair prejudicial impact the evidence may have on the jury.”

       Carter v. State, 766 N.E.2d 377, 382 (Ind. 2002). When determining the likely

       unfair prejudicial impact, courts will look for the dangers that the jury will

       substantially overestimate the value of the evidence or the evidence will arouse

       or inflame the passions or sympathies of the jury. Id. “‘Unfair prejudice . . .

       looks to the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means, or the

       tendency of the evidence to suggest decision on an improper basis.’” Hall v.

       State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1193 (Ind. 2021) (quoting Camm v. State, 908 N.E.2d

       215, 224 (Ind. 2009)).

[44]   Jackson argues that Officer Tatomirovich’s testimony of her observations of

       Taylor when she arrived on scene in conjunction with the surgeon’s testimony

       of Taylor’s condition at the hospital would have been sufficient to show the

       deterioration of Taylor’s condition. We have recognized, however, that

       “[g]enerally, photographs that depict a victim’s injuries or demonstrate the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2955 | October 26, 2023     Page 23 of 26
       testimony of a witness are admissible.’” Jackson, 973 N.E.2d at 1127 (quoting

       Ward v. State, 903 N.E.2d 946, 958 (Ind. 2009)). “Even gory and revolting

       photographs may be admissible as long as they are relevant to some material

       issue or show scenes that a witness could describe orally.” Id. (quoting

       Amburgey v. State, 696 N.E.2d 44, 45 (Ind. 1998)).

[45]   Furthermore, as the State argued at trial, the portion of the bodycam that

       Jackson sought to exclude served to connect the dots, so to speak, between the

       surveillance video, where Taylor was seen after the stabbing talking and

       walking out of the building – such that his injuries did not appear severe – and

       the surgeon’s testimony that Jackson was near death by the time he arrived at

       the hospital. The challenged portion of Exhibit 15 thus had probative value,

       and while it showed his deteriorating condition – clearly in physical distress and

       needing considerable assistance to get out of the car and on the stretcher – the

       footage was not particularly graphic or gruesome. Jackson has not persuaded

       us that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Exhibit 15.

       Exhibit 23

[46]   Jackson asserts that Exhibit 23 improperly “cut out the portion of the interview

       when Detective Shaffer left Jackson alone in the room and Jackson began

       talking to himself about the incident” and that the excluded portion of the

       recording should have been admitted under the doctrine of completeness,

       embodied in Ind. Evid. Rule 106. Appellant’s Brief at 39. Evid. R. 106 provides:

               If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded
               statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2955 | October 26, 2023     Page 24 of 26
               time, of any other part--or any other writing or recorded
               statement--that in fairness ought to be considered at the same
               time.

       The purpose of the doctrine of completeness “is to provide context for

       otherwise isolated comments when fairness requires it.” Sanders v. State, 840

       N.E.2d 319, 323 (Ind. 2006). It is “designed to avoid misleading impressions

       caused by taking a statement out of its proper context or otherwise conveying a

       distorted picture by the introduction of only selective parts of a statement.”

       Barnett v. State, 916 N.E.2d 280, 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. He

       argues that “[i]t was necessary for the jury to see the entire interview to insure a

       fair and impartial understanding of the admitted portion[.]” Appellant’s Brief at

       40.

[47]   Here, we find no error for a couple of reasons. First, to the extent that Jackson

       argues that what was excluded was a portion of the interview and “an extension

       of [his] confession,” Appellant’s Brief at 39, we disagree. Detective Shaffer did

       not leave and return. Rather, he completed his questioning and left. The

       interview had concluded. On these facts, the trial court did not abuse its

       discretion in concluding that Evid. R. 106 did not require admission of the

       recorded segment at issue.

[48]   Second, although the trial court declined to admit the recording of Jackson

       talking to himself under the doctrine of completeness, the court stated that

       Jackson’s “volunteered statements” after the detective left the room “do reflect

       [Jackson’s] state of mind,” and if Jackson wished to present that portion of the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2955 | October 26, 2023      Page 25 of 26
       recording in his case-in-chief, he could do so. Transcript Vol. 3 at 139. He did

       not, and therefore he has no cause to complain.

[49]   Accordingly, Jackson has not established that the trial court abused its

       discretion in admitting Exhibit 23, which did not include Jackson’s statements

       made after the detective concluded his questioning and left the room.

[50]   Judgment affirmed.

       May, J. and Foley, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2955 | October 26, 2023       Page 26 of 26