Court Opinion

ID: 9914030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 14:08:58.356978+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:53.866297
License: Public Domain

J-S39043-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    DAINA LYNN HEDGES                          :   No. 640 MDA 2023

                 Appeal from the Order Entered April 20, 2023
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Clinton County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-18-CR-0000319-2022

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                       FILED: DECEMBER 28, 2023

       The Commonwealth appeals from the order entered in the Clinton

County Court of Common Pleas, granting the pretrial motion to suppress filed

by Daina Lynn Hedges (Appellee).1              The Commonwealth contends the

suppression court erred or abused its discretion when it: (1) relied upon a

decision that has been overruled by statute; (2) rejected the arresting officer’s

uncontroverted testimony that reasonable suspicion existed to conduct the

vehicle stop; and (3) improperly considered Appellee’s explanation for leaving

her lane of travel. For the reasons below, we affirm.

____________________________________________

1 In the notice of appeal, the Commonwealth certified that the order “will
terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution.” Commonwealth’s Notice
of Appeal, 4/24/23. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) (permitting Commonwealth to file
interlocutory appeal in a criminal case “from an order that does not end the
entire case where the Commonwealth certifies in the notice of appeal that the
order will terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution”).
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       On April 30, 2022, following a vehicle stop, Appellee was arrested and

charged with two counts of driving while operating privileges suspended

(DUS), one count of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), and the

summary offense of driving on roadways laned for traffic.2     On March 14,

2023, Appellee filed a pretrial suppression motion challenging the stop of her

vehicle. The suppression court conducted a hearing on April 10, 2023, during

which both the arresting officer ─ Pennsylvania State Trooper Gage Fischer3 ─

and Appellee provided the following testimony.

       Trooper Fischer testified that, at the time of stop, he had been on the

force for more than two years, participated in approximately one to two

thousand citations for motor vehicle violations, and conducted approximately

40 DUI stops, with 29 resulting in arrests. See Suppression H’rg at 5, 7, 23.

He had received training in the Vehicle Code, detection of DUIs, and advanced

roadside impairment driving enforcement. See id. at 6.

       On April 30, 2022, at approximately 1:30 a.m., Trooper Fischer was

patrolling the area of Bellefonte Avenue in a marked vehicle when he observed

a white Ford F-250 truck, operated by Appellee, travelling approximately 10

miles below the posted speed limit of 35 miles per hour. See Suppression

____________________________________________

2 See 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1543(b)(1)(iii), (1.1)(iii), 3802(a)(1), and 3309(1),
respectively. This was Appellee’s second DUI offense within the past 10 years.
See Information, 9/6/22, at 1 (unpaginated).

3 At the time of the incident, Trooper Fischer was a Lock Haven City police

officer. See N.T. Suppression H’rg, 4/10/23, at 5.

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H’rg at 7-9. As he was driving behind the truck, he noticed Appellee “weaving

through the lane designators between the 300 Block through and until the 800

Block of Bellefonte Avenue[.]”           Id. at 8.   Specifically, Trooper Fischer

“observed [the truck] cross the yellow center line in the 900 Block of Bellefonte

Avenue as well as the 500 Block of High Street.”4 Id. at 9. He further stated

the truck did not cross the yellow line in a “minor” manner, but rather “it was

a large crossing.” Id. Based on his observations, Trooper Fischer conducted

a vehicle stop for two reasons: (1) Appellee violated the summary offense of

“roadways laned for traffic[;]” and (2) he suspected Appellee might be texting

while driving or driving under the influence. See id. at 10. He explained that

the time of the stop was “a normal time for individuals driving under the

influence of alcohol . . . because the bars close at approximately 2[ a.m.]” Id.

       Trooper Fischer’s patrol vehicle was equipped with a mobile video

recorder, which captured the incident. See N.T., Suppression H’rg, at 10-11.

The Commonwealth played the mobile video recording (MVR) for the

suppression court, while Trooper Fischer narrated. See id. at 11-15.

       Under cross-examination, Trooper Fischer acknowledged that Appellee

did not make any “corrective jerking movements” while driving, but instead

“smoothly drifted over the left and then smoothly drifted over to the right[.]”

____________________________________________

4 The road consisted of three lanes, one in each direction and a center turn

lane. See N.T., Suppression H’rg at 19, 26.

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N.T., Suppression H’rg at 21.      He stated that both “jerky driving” and

“[d]rifting” are indicators of DUI. Id.

      Appellee testified that she was driving two drunk friends home when she

was stopped by Trooper Fischer. See N.T., Suppression H’rg, at 28.           She

explained that she drifted in the lane to avoid hitting “storm grates” and

“manhole covers[, several of which] are deep . . . in the pavement of the

road[,]” and would have caused damage to her older vehicle. Id. at 28-30.

Appellee also stated she “was trying to figure out where [her passengers] were

staying” so that she could take them home. Id. at 35.

      At the conclusion of the hearing, the suppression court took the matter

under advisement and directed the parties to file briefs in support of their

positions. See N.T., Suppression H’rg, at 44. Thereafter, on April 20, 2023,

the court filed an order, and accompanying opinion, granting Appellee’s

suppression motion. See Order, 4/20/23. In its findings of fact, the court

stated that it viewed the MVR of the incident, and observed the following:

      [Appellee’s] vehicle traveled over the yellow line twice, which
      yellow line separated [Appellee’s] vehicle’s lane of travel from a
      center lane that was restricted as a turning lane.

      [Appellee’s] vehicle’s movements over the yellow line were
      momentary, not erratic, and did not endanger anyone.

                                  *       *   *

      [Appellee’s] vehicle’s movement within the vehicle’s own lane is
      not found by [the c]ourt “to be weaving within [the vehicle’s] lane”
      as alleged by Trooper Fischer. [Appellee] is not required to drive
      a vehicle in a straight line, and the deviations observed by [the
      c]ourt on the MVR are insignificant.

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Suppression Ct. Op. & Order, 4/20/23, at 2-3. Moreover, the suppression

court determined Appellee’s “vehicle speed was appropriate during the

nighttime house for traveling in the various commercial areas and residential

neighborhoods” and rejected “Trooper Fischer’s allegation . . . that driving

below the speed limit is an indicator of” DUI.           Id. at 2.     This timely

Commonwealth appeal follows.5

       The Commonwealth purports to raise five claims for our review:

       1. Whether the suppression court committed an error of law /
       abuse of discretion in its reliance upon Commonwealth v.
       Gleason, . . . 785 A.2d 983 ([Pa.] 2001), which has been
       specifically overruled by statute, in granting the suppression
       motion?

       2. Whether the suppression court committed an error of law /
       abuse of discretion in failing to find that the arresting officer had
       reasonable suspicion to believe that . . . Appellee had committed
       violations of the Motor Vehicle Code when conducting the motor
       vehicle stop in this matter?

       3. Whether the suppression court committed an error of law /
       abuse of discretion in rejecting the arresting officer’s
       uncontroverted testimony regarding indicators of [DUI] / texting
       while driving in its analysis of whether reasonable suspicion /
       probable cause existed for the motor vehicle stop in this matter?

       4. Whether the suppression court committed an error of law /
       abuse of discretion in mischaracterizing the actions of . . . Appellee
       as “momentary” vehicle movements over the yellow line that “did
       not endanger anyone” when the MVR recording clearly showed
____________________________________________

5 The Commonwealth complied with the suppression court’s directive to file a

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. The court
then filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on May 4, 2023. See
Suppression Ct. Op. Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellant Procedure No.
1925(a), 5/4/23 (Rule 1925(a) Op.), at 1-7. We note Appellee did not file a
responsive brief.

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     multiple significant and extensive instances of . . . Appellee
     drifting over the yellow line into a turning lane?

     5. Whether the suppression court committed an error of law /
     abuse of discretion in crediting Appellee’s testimony in any
     manner, as the determination of probable cause / reasonable
     suspicion for a motor vehicle stop is based upon the objective
     totality of the circumstances from a reasonable law enforcement
     officer’s observations and not . . . Appellee’s intentions in leaving
     her lane of travel?

Commonwealth’s Brief at 7-8.

     Our review of a suppression order is limited to determining “whether the

record supports the suppression court’s factual findings and whether the

inferences and legal conclusions drawn by the suppression court from those

findings are appropriate.” Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 63 A.3d 294, 298

(Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (citations omitted).

     When, as here, the defendant

     prevailed in the suppression court, we may consider only the
     evidence of the defense and so much of the evidence for the
     Commonwealth as remains uncontradicted when read in the
     context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the
     factual findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those
     facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn
     therefrom are in error. However, where the appeal of the
     determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of
     legal error, the suppression court’s conclusions of law are not
     binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the
     suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.

Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, we note:

     It is within the suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to
     pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to
     their testimony. The suppression court is free to believe all, some
     or none of the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. . . .

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Commonwealth v. Bozeman, 205 A.3d 1264, 1270 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citation omitted).

      A police officer’s statutory authority for a motor vehicle stop is set forth

in Section 6308(b) of the Motor Vehicle Code:

      (b) Authority of police officer. ─ Whenever a police officer is
      engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers
      or has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is occurring
      or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal,
      for the purpose of checking the vehicle’s registration, proof of
      financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine
      number or the driver’s license, or to secure such other information
      as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce
      the provisions of this title.

75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b).

      Accordingly, when an officer suspects a driver has committed or is

committing a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code, “but a stop is necessary to

further investigate whether a violation has occurred, an officer need only

possess reasonable suspicion to make the stop.” Commonwealth v. Salter,

121 A.3d 987, 993 (Pa. Super. 2015). However, “[i]f it is not necessary to

stop the vehicle to establish that a violation of the Vehicle Code has occurred,

an officer must possess probable cause to stop the vehicle.” Id. This Court

has provided the following examples:

      Illustrative of these two standards are stops for speeding and DUI.
      If a vehicle is stopped for speeding, the officer must possess
      probable cause to stop the vehicle. This is so because when a
      vehicle is stopped, nothing more can be determined as to the
      speed of the vehicle when it was observed while traveling upon a
      highway. On the other hand, if an officer possesses sufficient
      knowledge based upon behavior suggestive of DUI, the officer
      may stop the vehicle upon reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code

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      violation, since a stop would provide the officer the needed
      opportunity to investigate further if the driver was operating under
      the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance.

Id.

      In order to establish reasonable suspicion to justify a stop, “an officer

must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which led him to

reasonably suspect a violation of the” Vehicle Code; the standard “is an

objective one, based on the totality of the circumstances.” Commonwealth

v. Shaw, 246 A.3d 879, 883 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citations omitted). “Probable

cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge

are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an

offense has been or is being committed.” Commonwealth v. Luv, 735 A.2d

87, 90 (Pa. 1999) (citation omitted). “[A] police officer has probable cause to

stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code violation, even if it is

a minor offense.”    Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1019 (Pa.

Super. 2017).

      Thus, in the present case, the Commonwealth was required to

demonstrate Trooper Fischer possessed reasonable suspicion that Appellee

was either committing DUI or texting while driving to justify the stop on either

of those bases. However, it was required to establish the trooper had probable

cause to justify the stop of Appellee’s vehicle on the basis of a violation of

Section 3309(1) of the Vehicle Code. See Salter, 121 A.3d at 993.

      Turning to the first issue on appeal, the Commonwealth argues the

suppression court’s ruling should be reversed because the court relied upon

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the Supreme Court’s decision in Gleason, supra, “which was overturned by

statute nearly [20] years before the present matter[.]” Commonwealth’s Brief

at 13. It insists any reliance on Gleason is “clearly misplaced.” Id.

       In Gleason, the Supreme Court, interpreting a prior version of 75

Pa.C.S. § 6308(b),6 “held the statutory standard for stops based on potential

Vehicle Code violations was probable cause, even if an investigative stop

would be constitutionally permitted in a non-vehicle situation based on

reasonable articulable suspicion.” Commonwealth v. Chase, 960 A.2d 108,

112 (Pa. 2008) (emphases omitted).               Following Gleason, however, the

legislature amended Section 6308(b), which, in its current form permits

vehicle stops, depending upon the circumstances, based upon both reasonable

suspicion and probable cause. An en banc panel of this Court explained:

       Traffic stops based on a reasonable suspicion: either of criminal
       activity or a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code under the
       authority of Section 6308(b) must serve a stated investigatory
       purpose. In effect, the language of Section 6308(b) — “to secure
       such other information as the officer may reasonably believe to be
       necessary to enforce the provisions of this title” — is conceptually
       equivalent with the underlying purpose of a Terry stop. [See
       Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).]

             Mere reasonable suspicion will not justify a vehicle stop
       when the driver’s detention cannot serve an investigatory purpose
       relevant to the suspected violation. In such an instance, it is
       encumbent [sic] upon the officer to articulate specific facts
       possessed by him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would
____________________________________________

6 In its prior form, Section 6308(b) permitted police officers to stop a vehicle

if they had “articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of”
the Vehicle Code. 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b) (1990, Feb. 2, P.L. 2, No. 2, § 2,
effective in 60 days) (emphasis added).

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      provide probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver
      was in violation of some provision of the Code.

Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc)

(some citations, quotation marks, emphasis, & footnote omitted).

      In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the suppression court explained that it cited

Gleason “for the proposition that a mere instance or two of moving a vehicle

beyond the marked lane of travel over a very brief period of time is not

sufficient to justify the stop of a vehicle.” Rule 1925(a) Op. at 3. The court

did not cite Gleason for the proposition that an officer must possess probable

cause to conduct a vehicle stop for an investigatory purpose. As the court

opined, it “reviewed the facts of this case under both a probable cause

standard and a reasonable suspicion standard and concluded that the

arresting officer did not possess either reasonable suspicion or probable

cause.” Id.

      Upon our review, we conclude that, under the circumstances, the

suppression court’s citation of Gleason was appropriate. First, contrary to

the Commonwealth’s characterization, the suppression court did not rely

upon the holding in Gleason in granting Appellee’s suppression motion.

Rather, as noted in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court cited Gleason for the

sole proposition that Appellee’s “mere instance or two of weaving beyond [her]

marked lane of travel” for a brief period was insufficient to establish probable

case for a stop based upon Section 3309.        See Rule 1925(a) Op. at 3;

Suppression Ct. Op. & Order at 5. See also 75 Pa.C.S. § 3309(1) (“A vehicle

shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall

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not be moved from the lane until the driver has first ascertained that the

movement can be made with safety.”).

       Second, the court’s reliance on Gleason for this singular purpose was

proper. The Gleason Court held that an officer’s observation of a vehicle

crossing over a “the berm line by six to eight inches on two occasions for a

period of a second or two over a distance of approximately one quarter of a

mile” absent any evidence that the driving “created a safety hazard” was

insufficient to establish probable cause justifying a stop for a violation of

Section 3309(1). See Gleason, 785 A.2d at 983, 989. Thus, the suppression

court did not err when it cited                 Gleason     in   its opinion, and    the

Commonwealth’s first issue fails.

       The Commonwealth addresses its next three issues together.                   See

Commonwealth’s Brief at 13-14. It insists the suppression court erred when

it determined Trooper Fischer did not possess reasonable suspicion to conduct

a vehicle stop of Appellee based upon his suspicion that she was either driving

under the influence or texting while driving.7                   See id. at 14.      The

Commonwealth argues the              court     “blindly   rejected”   Trooper   Fischer’s

“uncontroverted” testimony that the following factors provided him with the

requisite reasonable suspicion: (1) the incident took place at 1:28 a.m.; (2)

the vehicle was traveling 25 miles per hour in a 35 mile per hour zone; (3)
____________________________________________

7 See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3316(a) (prohibiting a driver from operating a vehicle
“while using an interactive wireless communication device to send, read or
write a text-based communication while the vehicle is in motion”).

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the vehicle was “drifting . . . from its lane of travel over a solid yellow line into

a designated turning lane multiple times;” and (4) the vehicle was “weaving .

. . within its lane of travel.” Id. at 14-15. It maintains the suppression court

failed to consider the trooper’s “training and experience in DUI detection, . . .

and inserted its own reasoning” for concluding reasonable suspicion was

lacking. Id. at 15 (footnote omitted).

       Here,    the   suppression      court   concluded     “[t]he   totality    of   the

circumstances . . . did not support a reasonable suspicion that [Appellee] was

. . . texting while driving or driving under the influence[.]” Suppression Ct.

Op. & Order at 7. The court reviewed the MVR of the incident and determined

that Appellee’s movements within her own lane ─ which Trooper Fischer

described as weaving ─ were “insignificant” and that she only deviated from

her lane on two occasions. See id. at 6. In fact, the court noted Appellee

“only crossed the line marking [her] lane of travel twice over a considerable

distance” and the lane she crossed into was a center turn lane in which no

other vehicles were traveling. Id. at 5.             Moreover, the suppression court

found Appellee’s speed was “appropriate” for the time and area in which she

was traveling. See id. at 2. While our standard of review requires us to

consider    the    Commonwealth’s         evidence     to   the   extent   it    “remains

uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole[,]”8 neither

this Court, nor the suppression court, are obligated to “accept the
____________________________________________

8 See Cartagena, 63 A.3d at 298.

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Commonwealth’s interpretation of the evidence it presented ─ particularly

when the incident and surrounding circumstances were captured on video.”

See Commonwealth v. Sinkiewicz, 293 A.3d 681, 690 (Pa. Super. 2023).

       With regard to Trooper Fischer’s experience in detecting DUI, the court

questioned the trooper’s testimony that both “drifting into another lane of

travel [and] jerking the vehicle into another lane of travel are . . . indicators

of driving under the influence or texting while driving.” See Rule 1925(a) Op.

at 4 (emphasis added).         The suppression court explained that it was not

required to “just accept the officer’s unsupported testimony of what is or is

not an indicator [of DUI or driving while texting] without the Commonwealth

laying some foundation that the officer’s training included those principles.” 9

Id.

       Here, as mentioned above, the suppression court viewed the MVR of the

incident, and it simply disagreed with the trooper’s characterization of

Appellee’s driving.      The court was not required to accept the trooper’s

____________________________________________

9 We note that Trooper Fischer explained drifting within a lane may indicate

an impaired driver because “[a]lcohol is a central nervous system
suppressant[,]” which causes the muscles to “become more relaxed” so that
the driver is “not in full control of [the] vehicle.” N.T., Suppression H’rg, at
21. However, it appears the court discredited the trooper’s testimony because
he stated that both drifting into another lane and jerking into another lane
could be signs of impaired driving ─ so that any brief movement in or out of a
lane could support a vehicle stop.

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testimony, and we detect no error or abuse of discretion based upon its failure

to do so.10 See Bozeman, 205 A.3d at 1270.

       In its final claim, the Commonwealth contends the suppression court

erred or abused its discretion when it considered Appellee’s testimony

regarding the reasons for her “erratic driving,” including the fact that “she

moved to avoid manhole covers that could potentially damage her large pick-

up truck.”    Commonwealth’s Brief at 17.          It maintains the court “outright

reject[ed]” Trooper Fischer’s “uncontroverted testimony” that “his training

and experience dictated that DUIs are more frequent during the hours prior

to bars closing[.]”     Id.   The Commonwealth asserts that Appellee’s stated

reason for leaving her lane “does not and should not fall into a court’s

consideration of whether reasonable suspicion existed.” Id. at 18. Indeed,

the Commonwealth concludes Trooper Fischer “fully provided specific and

articulable facts which led him to reasonably suspect a violation of the Motor

____________________________________________

10  We note that while the Commonwealth’s fourth issue, as framed in its
statement of questions, challenges the suppression court’s determination that
Trooper Fischer had no probable cause to stop Appellee for a violation of
Section 3309(1), the Commonwealth does not elaborate on this issue in the
argument section of its brief. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 7. Therefore,
this claim is waived for our review. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (argument must
include discussion and citation of pertinent authorities). Moreover, we note
that Section 3309(1) does not preclude a driver from leaving her lane of travel
if she “first ascertain[s] that the movement can be made with safety.” 75
Pa.C.S. § 3309(1). Here, after viewing the MVR, the suppression court found
that “there was no other traffic in the turning lane . . . and [Appellee’s]
entrance into the turning lane was momentary at best.” See Rule 1925(a)
Op. at 5.

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Vehicle Code, providing him reasonable suspicion to conduct a motor vehicle

stop of” Appellee. Id.

      As explained supra, the suppression court found the Commonwealth

did not demonstrate Trooper Fischer had reasonable suspicion to suspect

Appellee was driving while intoxicated or texting. See Suppression Ct. Op. &

Order at 6-7. Upon viewing the MVR, the court observed Appellee was not

operating her vehicle in a “dangerous fashion” and only left her lane two times

during the long period the trooper followed her.     See id. at 6.   The court

further described Appellee’s movements within her lane as “insignificant.”

See id. It concluded: “There are no specific or articulable facts that would

lead this [c]ourt to conclude that reasonable suspicion existed that [Appellee]

was operating [her] vehicle under the influence or texting while driving, nor

is this [c]ourt able to determine that a particularized and objective basis

existed for suspecting that [Appellee] was operating this vehicle under the

influence or texting while driving.”   Id. at 6-7.   Furthermore, in its Rule

1925(a) opinion, the suppression court clarified that it did not accept

Appellee’s testimony concerning her reasons for leaving her lane as true and

did not rely upon her testimony in reaching its decision. See Rule 1925(a)

Op. at 6.

      We detect no error or abuse of discretion in the suppression court’s

ruling. The Commonwealth appears to suggest that the court was required to

accept the trooper’s testimony concerning Appellee’s driving and his reasons

for the stop because “Pennsylvania law demands that ‘[r]easonable suspicion

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. . . must be viewed [from] the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police

officer.”   Commonwealth’s Brief at 17 (citations omitted).       However, we

reiterate that the suppression court has the sole discretion to “pass on the

credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony” and “is

free to believe all, some of none of the evidence presented[.]” Bozeman,

205 A.3d 1270. Here, the court simply did not credit the officer’s “suspicion”

based upon its own viewing of the MVR. Thus, no relief is warranted.

      Order affirmed.

      Judge Dubow joins the memorandum.

      Judges McLaughlin notes dissent.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 12/28/2023

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