Court Opinion

ID: 9882715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:18:58.131483+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:09.278126
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Sal's Heating & Cooling, Inc. v. Harbour View Assocs., Ltd., 2023-Ohio-3632.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

SAL’S HEATING AND COOLING, INC., :

                 Plaintiff-Appellant,                  :
                                                                             No.112490
                 v.                                    :

HARBOUR VIEW ASSOCIATES, LTD., :

                 Defendant-Appellee.                   :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 5, 2023

            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                Case No. CV-21-955574

                                            Appearances:

                 Dan Morell & Associates, LLC, Dan A. Morell, Jr., and
                 John J. Schneider, for appellant.

                 Howard J. Krantz, for appellee.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:

                Plaintiff-appellant, Sal’s Heating and Cooling, Inc. (“Sal’s”), appeals an

order awarding it a money judgment plus interest at the statutory rate instead of the

alleged contract rate and denying Sal’s claim for costs and attorney fees. Sal’s claims

the following errors:
      1. The trial court erroneously applied Minster Farmers Coop. Exch. Co.
      v. Meyer, 117 Ohio St.3d 459, 2008-Ohio-1259, 884 N.E.2d 1056, ¶ 25
      to the matter at hand when the present dispute does not involve
      unsigned invoices but rather contracts signed by the party to be
      charged.

      2. The trial court correctly held that the customer acknowledgment was
      not a separate contract but erroneously held that the customer
      acknowledgment was not supported by consideration disregarding the
      consideration that supported the whole contract and further
      acceptance of extended financing.

      3. The trial court disregarded the previous Eighth district decision in
      Paul Davis Restoration of Cleveland Metro West v. Karaman, 8th
      Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84824, 2005-Ohio-4017, that held a work
      authorization and an emergency authorization signed separately but
      during the same service call and part of one contract that authorized
      attorney fees was an enforceable contract, and thus the trial court’s
      failure to award Sal’s attorney fees, 18% interest, and costs was clear
      error.

            We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                      I. Facts and Procedural History

            Sal’s, an Ohio corporation located in North Royalton, Ohio, provides

heating and cooling installations and plumbing repair services. Defendant-appellee,

Harbour View Associates, Ltd. (“Harbour View”), owns and operates a 131-unit

apartment complex in Lakewood, Ohio. The two parties had an ongoing business

relationship whereby Sal’s periodically performed repairs at the apartment complex

when such repairs were needed.

            In November 2021, Sal’s filed a complaint against Harbour View,

claiming that Harbour View failed to pay for services rendered in October 2020. The

complaint stated three claims for relief arising from service calls completed on
October 10, 2020, and October 18, 2020. Sal’s attached copies of invoices for each

of the three service calls (“the invoices”), marked as exhibits one through three. Two

invoices indicated that Sal’s charged Harbour View $1,227.96 on October 10, 2020,

and another $1,227.96 October 18, 2020. The third invoice represented a charge of

$743.04, for a total unpaid balance of $3,198.96.

             With respect to its claim for contractual interest, Sal’s alleged that

“[p]ursuant to Invoices and Agreement signed by Defendant, Plaintiff is entitled to

contractual interest in the amount of 1.5% per month (18% per annum) from thirty

(30) days after said debt became due and owing, plus all costs and its reasonable

attorney fees.” (Complaint ¶ 8, 14, 20.) Each of the invoices contained a “customer

acknowledgment,” that provided, in relevant part:

      Acceptance of Proposal — The above prices, specifications and
      conditions are satisfactory and are hereby accepted. Sal’s Heating &
      Cooling, Inc. is authorized to do the work specified. * * *

      My signature above constitutes acceptance of the referenced work as
      being satisfactory and that all equipment has been left in good
      condition. A finance charge of 1.5% per month (18% per annum) will
      be charged on all accounts 30 days past due. A $40.00 fee will be
      charged for all returned checks. * * * Customer agrees to be
      responsible for all costs and reasonable attorney fees if suit is filed to
      collect upon any balance owed under this invoice and agreement,
      including but not limited to payment of any lien fees associated with
      the filing and removal of said lien to be paid prior to removal.

Thus, in its prayer for relief, Sal’s requested a total of $3,880.26, which included its

claim for contractual interest, plus costs and attorney fees.

             Harbour View denied the allegations in the complaint, and the case

proceeded to a bench trial after which the trial court issued findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Sal’s did not file a trial transcript, but Harbour View does not

dispute the fact that Sal’s performed the work described in the invoices attached to

the complaint or that the charges for the three service calls totaled $3,198.96. The

controversy lies in the trial court’s finding that Sal’s is not entitled to interest at a

contractual interest rate of 1.5% per month (18% per annum) nor is it entitled to the

costs and attorney fees incurred in the prosecution of its claims. Sal’s now appeals

the trial court’s judgment denying its request for contractual interest, costs, and

attorney fees.

                                II. Law and Analysis

                               A. Standard of Review

             An appellate court generally reviews a trial court’s judgment following

a bench trial under a manifest weight standard of review. Huntington Natl. Bank v.

Slodov, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110113, 2021-Ohio-2932, ¶ 47.                However, as

previously stated, Sal’s did not file a trial transcript, but the facts are not in dispute.

The issues in this case involve the interpretation of statutes and written contracts,

which are questions of law subject to de novo review. Loury v. Westside Automotive

Group, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111319, 2022-Ohio-3673, ¶ 19, citing State v. Straley,

139 Ohio St.3d 339, 2014-Ohio-2139, 11 N.E.3d 1175, ¶ 9 (statutory interpretation is

a matter of law reviewed de novo); Hyde Park Circle L.L.C. v. Cincinnati, 2016-

Ohio-3130, 66 N.E.3d 99, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.) (the interpretation of contracts is reviewed

de novo).
                                    B. Invoices

             In the first assignment of error, Sal’s argues the trial court misapplied

Minster Farmers Coop. Exch. Co. v. Meyer, 117 Ohio St.3d 459, 2008-Ohio-1259,

884 N.E.2d 1056, ¶ 25, to the facts of this case when it found that the invoices did

not constitute a written contract. In the second assignment of error, Sal’s argues the

trial court erred in finding that the customer acknowledgment was not a binding

contract due to a lack of consideration. We discuss these assigned errors together

because they are interrelated.

             In Minster Farmers, two debtors had running accounts with Minster

Farms for the purchase of farm supplies. The debtors each received invoices for

their purchases, but neither debtor signed any of the invoices. Minster Farms

assessed a finance charge on both accounts since their inception, but it later

increased the finance charges unilaterally. After each debtor had accumulated

substantial outstanding balances, Minster Farmers sued them to recover on their

accounts, including the increased interest charges. In the two consolidated cases,

the debtors challenged the enforceability of the interest charges on the invoices, and

the Ohio Supreme Court held that notations on invoices and account statements that

unilaterally set forth an interest did not constitute a “written contract” for purposes

of R.C. 1343.03(A). Id. at ¶ 1.

              R.C. 1343.03 governs interest on accounts and other written

instruments when the interest rate is not stipulated and states, in relevant part:
      In cases other than those provided for in sections 1343.01 and 1343.02
      of the Revised Code, when money becomes due and payable upon any
      bond, bill, note, or other instrument of writing, upon any book account,
      upon any settlement between parties, upon all verbal contracts entered
      into, and upon all judgments, decrees, and orders of any judicial
      tribunal for the payment of money arising out of tortious conduct or a
      contract or other transaction, the creditor is entitled to interest at the
      rate per annum determined pursuant to section 5703.47 of the Revised
      Code, unless a written contract provides a different rate of interest in
      relation to the money that becomes due and payable, in which case the
      creditor is entitled to interest at the rate provided in that contract.

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 1343.03(A). Thus, to be entitled to an interest rate different

from the statutory rate of interest, R.C. 1343.03(A) requires a written contract

setting forth an agreed-upon interest rate that applies when the balance owed

becomes due and payable. Capital One Bank, N.A. v. Heidebrink, 6th Dist. Ottawa

No. OT-08-049, 2009-Ohio-2931, ¶ 37, citing Yager Materials v. Marietta Indus.

Ents., 116 Ohio App.3d 233, 235-236, 687 N.E.2d 505 (4th Dist.1996); Hobart Bros.

Co. v. Welding Supply Serv., Inc., 21 Ohio App.3d 142, 144, 486 N.E.2d 1229 (10th

Dist.1985); United Collections, L.L.C. v. Tucholski, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-04-1314,

2005-Ohio-2495, ¶ 7.

             In Minster Farmers, the court reiterated longstanding Ohio law

holding that “in order for a written contract to exist for purposes of R.C. 1343.03(A),

there must be a writing to which both parties have assented.” Id. at ¶ 27. The court

also held that “[a]n invoice or monthly statement does not constitute such a writing.”

Id. Therefore, “invoices setting forth an interest rate ‘d[o] not meet the written-

contract requirement of [R.C.] 1343.03(A).” Id., quoting Scotts Co. v. Cent. Garden

& Pet Co., 403 F.3d 781, 791 (6th Cir.2005).
              To be enforceable, a contract must consist of an offer, an acceptance,

and consideration. Starlion Electronics Distrib., L.L.C. v. Zoran Med., L.L.C., 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112133, 2023-Ohio-2876, ¶ 21, citing Kauffman Family Trust v.

Keehan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99423, 2013-Ohio-2707, ¶ 8. Consideration is the

promise of one party to do something he or she is not obligated to do in exchange

for another party’s promise to do something in exchange. Id., citing Raasch v. NCR

Corp., 254 F.Supp.2d 847 (S.D.Ohio 2003); Mooney v. Green, 4 Ohio App.3d 175,

446 N.E.2d 1135 (12th Dist.1982) (consideration may be either a detriment to the

promisee or a benefit to the promisor). To constitute consideration, the benefit or

detriment must be “bargained for.” Carlisle v. T & R Excavating, Inc., 123 Ohio

App.3d 277, 283, 704 N.E.2d 39 (9th Dist.1997).

              A representative from Harbour View signed the invoices. Although

Sal’s did not file a trial transcript, and there is no testimony in the record indicating

when the Harbour View representative signed the invoices with the attendant

“customer acknowledgements,” the trial court found the representative signed them

after services had already been rendered. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

¶ 11, 16.) In the absence of a transcript, we must presume regularity in the trial court

proceedings and accept the trial court’s factual findings as true. Burke v. Mayfield

Brainard Auto Servs., LLC, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 2023-Ohio-446, ¶ 19, citing In

re G.J.A., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 107220 and 107575, 2019-Ohio-1768, ¶ 20, citing

Miranda v. Saratoga Diagnostics, 2012-Ohio-2633, 972 N.E.2d 145, ¶ 26 (8th

Dist.); Bailey v. Bailey, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98173, 2012-Ohio-5073, ¶ 8.
              Accepting the trial court’s findings as true, we must conclude that the

Harbour View representative signed the invoices after the services were complete.

Although there was an agreement between the parties authorizing Sal’s to perform

the services before the work was performed, the provisions in the “customer

acknowledgment” assessing contractual interest, costs, and attorney fees were

executed after the services were already rendered. Thus, the trial court properly

found that these new terms were not “bargained for” and that there was no

consideration to bind Harbour View to the new provisions, which were presented

unilaterally after the services were complete. Therefore, the trial court’s conclusion

is consistent with the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Minster Farmers.

              Accordingly, the first and second assignments of error are overruled.

                            C. Unilateral Provisions

              In the third assignment of error, Sal’s argues the trial court erred in

disregarding this court’s decision in Paul Davis Restoration of Cleveland Metro W.

v. Karaman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84824, 2005-Ohio-4017.

             In Paul Davis, this court sustained an award of attorney fees pursuant

to provisions in a work authorization and emergency authorization to remediate

damage caused by a flood in the defendants’ home. However, the defendant-

homeowners in that case signed the work authorization and the emergency

authorization before any services were performed, and the attorney-fee provision

was a bargained-for term of the parties’ contract. The facts of Paul Davis are,

therefore, distinguishable from the facts of the instant case where the customer,
Harbour View, signed the “customer acknowledgement” after the service contracts

were already complete. While the attorney-fee provision was a negotiable term of

the parties’ contract in Paul Davis, the statutory-interest and attorney-fee

provisions in the invoices in this case constituted unilateral modifications of the

parties’ service agreement. Therefore, the trial court properly disregarded Paul

Davis as distinguishable and inapplicable.

             The third assignment of error is overruled.

             Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the common pleas court to carry

this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

ANITA LASTER MAYS, A.J., and
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., CONCUR