Court Opinion

ID: 9788336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:41:47.727053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:08.338227
License: Public Domain

RUSSON, Associate Chief Justice,
dissenting:
81 I dissent for the same reasons I dissented in In re Marriage of Gonzales,1 the case relied upon by the majority opinion. We may not like the result of the statute in question, but it is not our function to rewrite the statute for a result more to our liking. The statute in question is perfectly clear: In order for an unsolemnized marriage to be legal and valid, a court or administrative order recognizing such marriage must occur during the relationship or within one year following termination of that relationship.2 The exact wording of the statute states:
The determination or establishment of a marriage under this section [by court or administrative order] must occur during the relationship described in subsection (1), or within one year following the termination of that relationship ....
Utah Code Ann. § 80-1-4.5(2) (1998) (emphasis added).
132 Despite the plain language of the above statute, the majority opinion today reaffirms this court's holding in In re Marriage of Gonzalez, construing subsection two of section 30-1-4.5 as requiring only the Ailing of a petition for adjudication of marriage within one year after the termination of the relationship.3 In doing so, the majority *545opinion ignores the well-accepted principle of statutory interpretation that courts must look to the plain language of the statutes and apply the same regardless of whether a better result could be obtained by rewording the statute. - Indeed, this court has consistently held that
"tlhe primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of Utah, 853 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1998). To discover that intent, we look first to the plain language of the statute. State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1998). ... "Only when we find ambiguity in the statute's plain language need we seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy considerations." World Peace Movement v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994).
Harmon City, Inc. v. Nielsen & Semior, 907 P.2d 1162, 1167-68 (Utah 1995) (emphasis added); see also, eg., Dairy Prod. Servs., Inc. v. Wellsville, 2000 UT 81, ¶ 20, 18 P.3d 581 ("When we interpret a statute, we must look first to the statute's plain language to determine the legislative intent and we look no further if the language is unambiguous on its face."); State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, ¶ 25, 4 P.3d 795 ("[Olur primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve. We need look beyond the plain language only if we find some ambiguity." (citation omitted)); State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 373 (Utah 1996) ("When interpreting a section of the Utah Code, we are guided by the principle that a statute is generally construed according to its plain language. Only if we find ambiguity in the statute's plain language need we resort to other methods of statutory interpretation." (citation omitted)); Hanchett v. Burbidge, 59 Utah 127, 135, 202 P. 377, 380 (1921) ("When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction.").
'I 33 Moreover, the above principles of statutory interpretation have been consistently applied in other jurisdictions, As is well-stated in American Jurisprudence:
That a statute will produce a hardship which probably was not within the contemplation of the legislature is not sufficient basis for departing from the terms thereof. A court may not extend a statute, or construe it otherwise than as written, to avoid a hardship. If the law as written works a hardship in a special class of cases, the remedy is to be effected by the legislature, and not by judicial action in the guise of interpretation. - Hence, where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous and the intention plain, it is the duty of the court to expound the statute as it stands, even if the consequence is a hardship, or if the statute is thereby rendered susceptible to abuse.
73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 264 (1974) (emphasis added); see also Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 498, 60 S.Ct. 363, 84 L.Ed. 416 (1940) (stating that the plain meaning of a statute cannot be sacrificed for the exigencies of a hard case); Rigopoulos v. Kervan, 140 F.2d 506, 507 (2d Cir.1948) (stating that harshness is no escape from plain statutory language); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 318 (1999) ("If the language of the statute is clear and expresses the intention of the legislature, the *546statute must be construed to give effect to that intention regardless of the consequences, even though it may cause a hardship."). -
134 Accordingly, although section 30-1-4.5's requirement relating to conclusion, rather than commencement, of legal proceedings may be unusual, its language is clear and unambiguous-leaving no room for construction. Therefore, because it is undisputed that the court order establishing a common law marriage in the instant case was not entered within the one-year adjudication period set forth by section 30-1-4.5(2), I would overrule our recent decision in In re Marriage of Gonzalez and, in doing so, reverse the court of appeals' decision concerning Cecil's motion for relief from judgment due to lack of jurisdiction.
11 85 Chief Justice HOWE concurs in Associate Chief Justice RUSSON's dissenting opinion.

. 2000 UT 28, 152, 1 P.3d 1074 (Russon, J., dissenting, joined by Howe, C.J.).

. Obviously, the reason for the statute is to require an order establishing marriage during the relationship, but protect children conceived during the relationship but born after its termination.

. I fully understand and respect the principle of stare decisis, which gives stability to our body of law. However, we should not perpetuate a law that is clearly wrong for the sake of stare decisis,
*545especially where the said case law is less than one year old and was a three-two decision. This court has "not hesitated ... to reverse case law when we are firmly convinced that we have erred earlier." - Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 424 n. 5 (Utah 1990); see, eg., State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994); State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1985).
As Justice Felix Frankfurter aptly noted: We recognize that stare decisis embodies an important social policy. It represents an element of continuity in law, and is rooted in the psychologic need to satisfy reasonable expectations. But stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience
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This Court, unlike the House of Lords, has from the beginning rejected a doctrine of disability at self-correction.
Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119, 121, 60 S.Ct. 444, 84 L.Ed. 604 (1940).