Court Opinion

ID: 9717429
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:03:25.22259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:53.155847
License: Public Domain

D. F. Walsh, P.J.
(dissenting). Respectfully, I dissent.
The majority first finds that each of defendant’s *89convictions must be reversed because the prosecuting attorney "simply listed [defendant’s prior] convictions and left the decision whether to admit them to the trial judge”.
I agree with the majority that the prosecution has the burden of proving that evidence of prior convictions is admissible. It is the function of the reviewing court, however, to examine not how vigorously the prosecuting attorney sought admission of the evidence, but rather whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence. People v Jackson, 391 Mich 323; 217 NW2d 22 (1974).
In my judgment, there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling in this case. Clearly recognizing the discretionary nature of the issue, the court ruled that evidence of only four of defendant’s eleven prior convictions was admissible: a 1971 burglary conviction, a 1973 grand larceny conviction, a 1976 falsification conviction, and a 1980 nonsufficient funds check conviction. Those convictions are not similar to the crimes with which defendant was charged, and each bears significantly on credibility. See People v Crawford, 83 Mich App 35, 39; 268 NW2d 275 (1978). I find no reversible error in admission of this evidence.
Second, the majority finds error in the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on incitement to commit second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit second-degree murder.
I agree with the majority that the trial court should have granted defendant’s request for a jury instruction on incitement to commit second-degree murder, since I am persuaded that that offense is necessarily included in the offense of incitement to commit first-degree murder. People v Richendollar, 85 Mich App 74; 270 NW2d 530 (1978), lv den 405 *90Mich 820 (1979). See People v Adams, 416 Mich 53; 330 NW2d 634 (1982). I, therefore, would reverse defendant’s incitement convictions and would remand for entry of judgments of conviction of incitement to commit second-degree murder and for resentencing on those convictions.1
I find no error, however, in the court’s refusal to instruct on conspiracy to commit second-degree murder. I am persuaded that there is no crime of conspiracy to commit second-degree murder. People v Hamp, 110 Mich App 92; 312 NW2d 175 (1981) ; People v Jackson, 114 Mich App 649; 319 NW2d 613 (1982), lv gtd 417 Mich 885 (1983); People v Perry, 115 Mich App 533; 321 NW2d 719 (1982), remanded on other grounds 417 Mich 908; 330 NW2d 852 (1983).
The majority next finds reversible error in the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury that incitement to commit first-degree murder is a specific intent crime.
I agree with the majority that incitement to commit first-degree murder is a "specific intent” crime in that the accused must have intended that the crime urged be in fact committed. People v Shafou, 416 Mich 113, 122; 330 NW2d 647 (1982) (opinion of Fitzgerald, J.).
In this case, however, the jury was instructed that the prosecution was required to prove that defendant intended by his urging to bring about the commission of the crime urged. CJI 10:2:01(5). In my judgment, the jury was thus correctly advised of the intent element of the offense of incitement.
*91Fourth, the majority holds that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for directed verdict on the incitement charges since there was not sufficient evidence "that the defendant urged imminent action”. Again, I disagree.
In my judgment, there was sufficient evidence that defendant incited, induced, or exhorted another to commit a crime; the constitutionally required "imminence of action” was, therefore, proved. People v Chapman, 80 Mich App 583, 588; 264 NW2d 69 (1978). Defendant’s conduct cannot be fairly characterized as mere abstract advocacy of lawlessness. See Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US 444; 89 S Ct 1827; 23 L Ed 2d 430 (1969).
The majority does not resolve the issue of whether evidence of the "hit man’s” actual intent to carry out the urged crimes was required to support defendant’s convictions of incitement. In my judgment, such evidence is not required. People v Shafou, 416 Mich 113, 122; 330 NW2d 647 (1982) (opinion of Justice Fitzgerald); People v Dennis, 128 Mich App 235; 340 NW2d 81 (1983).2
And finally, based on my resolution of the foregoing issues, I vote to affirm revocation of defendant’s probation._

 I note that the Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal in People v Snyder, 417 Mich 1039 (1983), to consider whether the Legislature intended the crime of incitement to commit first-degree murder to be punishable by mandatory life imprisonment and, if so, if such punishment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment or a denial of equal protection of the laws.

 See People v Rehkopf, 417 Mich 1040 (1983), where the Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal, limited to the issue of whether the inciting must have occurred under circumstances that would be likely to produce the result incited.