Court Opinion

ID: 9430596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:30:10.340061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:25.137464
License: Public Domain

Justice Blackmun,
with whom Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall, and Justice Stevens join, dissenting.
Although the Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant only “a fair trial [and] not a perfect one,” Lutwak v. United States, 344 U. S. 604, 619 (1953); Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, 135 (1968), this Court has stressed repeatedly in the decade since Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 (1976), that the Eighth Amendment requires a heightened degree of reliability in any case where a State seeks to take the defend*189ant’s life.1 Today’s opinion, however, reveals a Court willing to tolerate not only imperfection but a level of fairness and reliability so low it should make conscientious prosecutors cringe.
I
A
The Court’s discussion of Darden’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct is noteworthy for its omissions. Despite the fact that earlier this Term the Court relied heavily on standards governing the professional responsibility of defense counsel in ruling that an attorney’s actions did not deprive his client of any constitutional right, see Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U. S. 157, 166-171 (1986), today it entirely ignores standards governing the professional responsibility of prosecutors in reaching the conclusion that the summations of Darden’s prosecutors did not deprive him of a fair trial. See ante, at 178-183.
The prosecutors’ remarks in this case reflect behavior as to which “virtually all the sources speak with one voice,” Nix v. Whiteside, supra, at 166, that is, a voice of strong condemnation.2 The following brief comparison of established stand*190ards of prosecutorial conduct with the prosecutors’ behavior in this case merely illustrates, but hardly exhausts, the scope of the misconduct involved:
*1911. “A lawyer shall not . . . state a personal opinion as to . . . the credibility of a witness ... or the guilt or innocence of an accused.” Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.4(e) (1984); see also Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-106(0(4) (1980); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8(b)(2d ed. 1980). Yet one prosecutor, White, stated: “I am convinced, as convinced as I know I am standing before you today, that Willie Jasper Darden is a murderer, that he murdered Mr. Turman, that he robbed Mrs. Turman and that he shot to kill Phillip Arnold. I will be convinced of that the rest of my life.” App. 15. And the other prosecutor, McDaniel, stated, with respect to Darden’s testimony: ‘Well, let me tell you something: If I am ever over in that chair over there, facing life or death, life imprisonment or death, I guarantee you I will lie until my teeth fall out.” Id., at 18.
2. “The prosecutor should refrain from argument which would divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the *192evidence, by injecting issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused under the controlling law, or by making predictions of the consequences of the jury’s verdict.” ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8(d) (2d ed. 1980); cf. Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.4(e); Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-106(C)(7); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 3-6.1(c) (2d ed. 1980). Yet McDaniel’s argument was filled with references to Darden’s status as a prisoner on furlough who “shouldn’t be out of his cell unless he has a leash on him.” App. 16; see also, e. g., id., at 17,18, 23, 24, 26. Again and again, he sought to put on trial an absent “defendant,” the State Department of Corrections that had furloughed Darden. See, e. g., id., at 15, 17, 23, 32. He also implied that defense counsel would use improper tricks to deflect the jury from the real issue. See id., at 15, 26. Darden’s status as a furloughed prisoner, the release policies of the Department of Corrections, and his counsel’s anticipated tactics obviously had no legal relevance to the question the jury was being asked to decide: whether he had' committed the robbery and murder at the Turmans’ furniture store. Indeed, the State argued before this Court that McDaniel’s remarks were harmless precisely because he “failed to discuss the issues, the weight of the evidence, or the credibility of the witnesses.” Brief for Respondent 26.
3. “The prosecutor should not use arguments calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury. ” ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8(c) (2d ed. 1980); see Berger v. United States, 295 U. S. 78, 88 (1935). Yet McDaniel repeatedly expressed a wish “that I could see [Darden] sitting here with no face, blown away by a shotgun,” App. 20; see also, e. g., id., at 28, 29, 31. Indeed, I do not think McDaniel’s summation, taken as a whole, can accurately be described as anything but a relentless and single-minded attempt to inflame the jury.
*193B
The Court, see ante, at 181, relies on the standard established in Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U. S. 637, 643 (1974), for deciding when a prosecutor’s comments at a state trial render that trial fundamentally unfair. It omits, however, any discussion of the facts, so different from those in this case, that led the Court to conclude in DeChristoforo that that defendant had not been deprived of a fair trial.
DeChristoforo concerned “two remarks made by the prosecutor during the course of his rather lengthy closing argument to the jury.” Id., at 640. One remark was “but one moment of an extended trial.” Id., at 645. And even the more objectionable remark was so “ambiguous,” ibid., that it provided no basis for inferring either that the prosecutor “intend[ed] [it] to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, [would] draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations,” id., at 647. Finally, the trial judge in DeChristoforo expressly instructed the jury to disregard the improper statements. Id., at 645. This Court’s holding thus rested on its conclusion that the prosecutor’s comments were neither so extensive nor so improper as to violate the Constitution.
Far from involving “ambiguous” statements that “might or might not” affect the jury, id., at 647, the remarks at issue here were “focused, unambiguous, and strong.” Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320, 340 (1985). It is impossible to read the transcript of McDaniel’s summation without seeing it as a calculated and sustained attempt to inflame the jury. Almost every page contains at least one offensive or improper statement; some pages contain little else. The misconduct here was not “slight or confined to a single instance, but. . . was pronounced and persistent, with a probable cumulative effect upon the jury which cannot be disregarded as inconsequential.” Berger v. United States, 295 U. S., at 89.
*194C
The Court presents what is, for me, an entirely unpersuasive one-page laundry list of reasons for ignoring this blatant misconduct. First, the Court says that the summations “did not manipulate or misstate the evidence [or] . . . implicate other specific rights of the accused such as the right to counsel or the right to remain silent.” Ante, at 182. With all respect, that observation is quite beside the point. The “solemn purpose of endeavoring to ascertain the truth ... is the sine qua non of a fair trial,” Estes v. Texas, 881 U. S. 532, 540 (1965), and the summations cut to the very heart of the Due Process Clause by diverting the jury’s attention “from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence that should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 490 (1976).
Second, the Court says that “[m]uch of the objectionable content was invited by or was responsive to the opening summation of the defense.” Ante, at 182, citing United States v. Young, 470 U. S. 1 (1985). The Court identifies four portions of the defense summation that it thinks somehow “invited” McDaniel’s sustained barrage. The State, however, did not object to any of these statements, and, to my mind, none of them is so objectionable that it would have justified a tactical decision to interrupt the defense summation and perhaps irritate the jury. Cf. id., at 13-14.
The Court begins by stating that defense counsel “blamed” the Sheriff’s Office for a lack of evidence. Ante, at 179. The Court does not identify which, if any, of McDaniel’s remarks represented a response to this statement. I cannot believe that the Court is suggesting, for example, that defense counsel’s one mention of the “almost crimina[l] negligence] on the part of the Polk County Sheriff’s Office,” Tr. 728, justified McDaniel’s express and repeated wish that he could try the Department of Corrections for murder. See, e. g., App. 15, 17, 23, 32.
*195Next, the Court notes that defense counsel “alluded” to the death penalty. Ante, at 179. While this allusion might have justified McDaniel’s statement that “you are merely to determine his innocence or guilt, nothing else,” App. 17, it could hardly justify, for example, McDaniel’s expressions of his personal wish that Darden be “blown away by a shotgun,” id., at 20; see also id., at 28, 29, 31.
Moreover, the Court says, defense counsel twice referred to the perpetrator as an “animal.” Ante, at 179; see Tr. 717, 732. It is entirely unclear to me why this characterization called for any response from the prosecutor at all. Taken in context, defense counsel’s statements did nothing more than tell the jury that, although everyone agreed that a heinous crime had been committed, the issue on which it should focus was whether Darden had committed it.
Finally, the Court finds that Darden brought upon himself McDaniel’s tirade because defense counsel gave his “personal opinion of the strength of the State’s evidence.” Ante, at 179. Again, the Court gives no explanation of how the statement it quotes — a single, mild expression of defense counsel’s overall assessment of the evidence — justified the “response” that followed, which consisted, to the extent it represented a comment on the evidence at all, of accusations of perjury, see App. 18-19, and personal disparagements of opposing counsel, see id., at 15, 26. In sum, McDaniel went so far beyond “respond[ing] substantially in order to ‘right the scale,’” Young, 470 U. S., at 13, that the reasoning in Young provides no basis at all for the Court’s holding today.
The third reason the Court gives for discounting the effects of the improper summations is the supposed curative effect of the trial judge’s instructions: the judge had instructed the jury that it was to decide the case on the evidence and that the arguments of counsel were not evidence. Ante, at 182. But the trial court overruled Darden’s objection to McDaniel’s repeated expressions of his wish that Darden had been killed, App. 31, thus perhaps leaving the jury with the *196impression that McDaniel’s comments were somehow relevant to the question before them. The trial judge’s instruction that the attorneys were “trained in the law,” and thus that their “analysis of the issues” could be “extremely helpful,” Tr. 714, might also have suggested to the jury that the substance of McDaniel’s tirade was pertinent to their deliberations.
Fourth, the Court suggests that because Darden enjoyed the tactical advantage of having the last summation, he was able to “tur[n] much of the prosecutors’ closing argument against them.” Ante, at 182. But the issue before the jury was whether Darden was guilty, not whether McDaniel’s summation was proper. And the question before this Court is not whether we agree with defense counsel’s criticism of the summation but whether the jury was affected by it. Since Darden was ultimately convicted, it is hard to see what basis the Court has for its naked assertion that “[djefense counsel were able to use the opportunity for rebuttal very effectively.” Ibid.; cf. Young, 470 U. S., at 18, n. 15 (the defendant’s acquittal of the most serious charge “reinforces our conclusion that the prosecutor’s remarks did not undermine the jury’s ability to view the evidence independently and fairly”).
Fifth, the Court finds, in essence, that any error was harmless: “The weight of the evidence against petitioner was heavy; the ‘overwhelming eyewitness and circumstantial evidence to support a finding of guilt on all charges,’ 329 So. 2d, at 291, reduced the likelihood that the jury’s decision was influenced by argument.” Ante, at 182. The Court rejects the “no effect” test set out in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320 (1985), see ante, at 183, n. 14, but it does not identify the standard it does use to decide the harmlessness of the error.3
*197Every harmless-error standard that this Court has employed, however, shares two salient features. First, once serious error has been identified, the burden shifts to the beneficiary of the error to show that the conviction was not tainted. Second, although different formulations of the harmless-error standard differ in the level of confidence in the outcome required to overcome that burden, the question before a .reviewing court is never whether the evidence would have been sufficient to justify conviction, absent an error, but, rather, whether the error undermines its confidence in the outcome of the proceeding to an unacceptable degree. See, e. g., United States v. Young, 470 U. S., at 20; Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18, 24 (1967); Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U. S. 750, 765 (1946).
Regardless of which test is used, I simply do not believe the evidence in this case was so overwhelming that this Court can conclude, on the basis of the written record before it, that the jury’s verdict was not the product of the prosecutors’ misconduct. The three most damaging pieces of evidence — the identifications of Darden by Phillip Arnold and Helen Turman and the ballistics evidence — are all sufficiently problematic that they leave me unconvinced that a jury not exposed to McDaniel’s egregious summation would necessarily have convicted Darden.
*198Arnold first identified Darden in a photo array shown to him in the hospital. The trial court suppressed that out-of-court identification following a long argument concerning the reliability and constitutionality of the procedures by which it was obtained. See Tr. 487-488.4
Mrs. Turman’s initial identification was made under even more suggestive circumstances. She testified at trial that she was taken to a preliminary hearing at which Darden appeared in order “[t]o identify him.” Id., at 215. Instead of being asked to view Darden in a lineup, Mrs. Turman was brought into the courtroom, where Darden apparently was the only black man present. See id., at 220-221. Over defense counsel’s objection, after the prosecutor asked her whether “this man sitting here” was “the man that shot your husband,” ibid., she identified Darden.5 Cf. Moore v. Illinois, 434 U. S. 220, 229-230 (1977).
*199The use of showups has long been condemned by this Court, precisely because they can result in unreliable identifications. See, e. g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 302 (1967). Similarly, the Court has condemned the use of photo arrays in which the suspect’s photograph “is in some way emphasized.” Simmons v. United States, 390 U. S. 377, 383 (1968). While the question whether the various in- and out-of-court identifications ought to have been suppressed is not now before the Court,6 my confidence in their reliability is nonetheless undermined by the suggestiveness of the procedures by which they were obtained, particularly in light of Mrs. Turman’s earlier difficulties in describing the criminal.
Finally, the ballistics evidence is hardly overwhelming. The purported murder weapon was tied conclusively neither to the crime nor to Darden. Special Agent Cunningham of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Firearms Identification Unit testified that the bullets recovered at the scene of the crime “could have been fired” from the gun, but he was unwilling to say that they in fact had come from that weapon. *200Tr. 347, 357. He also testified, contrary to the Court’s assertion, that rebored Smith & Wessons were fairly common. See id., at 350-351, 357-358. Deputy Sheriff Weatherford testified that the gun was discovered in a roadside ditch adjacent to where Darden had wrecked his car on the evening of the crime. But the gun was discovered the next day, id., at 503, and the ditch was also next to a bar’s parking lot. Id., at 531.
Darden testified at trial on his own behalf and denied any involvement in the robbery and murder. See id., at 571-660. His account of his actions on the day of the crime was contradicted only by Mrs. Turman’s and Arnold’s identifications. Indeed, a number of the State’s witnesses corroborated parts of Darden’s account. The trial judge who had seen and heard Darden testify found that he “emotionally and with what appeared on its face to be sincerity, proclaimed his innocence.” App. 34. In setting sentence, he viewed the fact that Darden “repeatedly professed his complete innocence of the charges” as a mitigating factor. Id., at 35.
Thus, at bottom, this case rests on the jury’s determination of the credibility of three witnesses — Helen Turman and Phillip Arnold, on the one side, and Willie Darden, on the other. I cannot conclude that McDaniel’s sustained assault on Darden’s very humanity did not affect the jury’s ability to judge the credibility question on the real evidence before it. Because I believe that he did not have a trial that was fair, I would reverse Darden’s conviction; I would not allow him to go to his death until he has been convicted at a fair trial.
I — ( I — I
Even if Darden had been convicted fairly, however, I believe his death sentence should be vacated because of the improper exclusion for cause of a member of the venire who was qualified to serve under this Court’s decisions in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510 (1968), and Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U. S. 412 (1985). In Davis v. Georgia, 429 U. S. 122 (1976), *201the Court held that the improper exclusion of one juror renders a death sentence constitutionally infirm per se. In Darden’s case, the potential prejudice is palpable. Even though it was stripped of members expressing reservations about the death penalty, this jury could not agree unanimously that a death sentence was appropriate. See Tr. 908; 699 F. 2d, at 1041 (dissenting opinion).
Witherspoon concerned an Illinois statute that excused for cause “ ‘any juror who shall, on being examined, state that he has conscientious scruples against capital punishment, or that he is opposed to the same.’” 391 U. S., at 512, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, §743 (1959). The Court held that the Constitution barred the execution of a defendant sentenced to death by a jury from which such persons had been excluded for cause. That holding rested in large part on the Court’s recognition that even some jurors who oppose the death penalty can set aside their personal beliefs and follow the court’s instructions to consider whether death is an appropriate penalty. See 391 U. S., at 514-515, n. 7, 515-516, n. 9, 519, 520. As recently as last Term, we held once again that trial courts must distinguish between “prospective jurors whose opposition to capital punishment will not allow them to apply the law or view the facts impartially and jurors who, though opposed to capital punishment, will nevertheless conscientiously apply the law to the facts adduced at trial.” Witt, 469 U. S., at 421; see also id., at 422, n. 4; Adams v. Texas, 448 U. S. 38, 44-45 (1980); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U. S. 478, 483-484 (1969).
The Court’s discussion of Darden’s claim rests on a premise that the claim depends entirely on the wording of a single question asked by the trial judge prior to the exclusion of ve-nire member Murphy. See ante, at 176. That premise is mistaken. The trial court’s error lay in its misunderstanding of the proper standard for exclusion under Witherspoon. This misunderstanding influenced both the question the court *202asked Murphy and its evaluation of his answer. On this record, I cannot say with any assurance that Murphy was properly excluded.
Prior to the voir dire of individual venire members, the trial judge announced his intention to excuse, not only any potential juror whose religious or moral principles made him unable to impose the death penalty, but also any potential juror who, if he did follow the court’s instructions, “would be going against his principles” (emphasis deleted). App. 6.7 This standard is essentially indistinguishable from the standard employed by Illinois and expressly disapproved by this Court in Witherspoon. If a juror who has reservations about the wisdom or morality of the death penalty nonetheless follows the court’s instructions, he has not been “ ‘prevented] or substantially impair[ed in] the performance of his duties as *203a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath,’” Witt, 469 U. S., at 424, quoting Adams, 448 U. S., at 45. To permit only those individuals who have no reservations about exercising “the truly awesome responsibility of decreeing death for a fellow human,” McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 208 (1971), to serve on capital juries would surely mark' a return to the empaneling of juries “uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die,” Witherspoon, 391 U. S., at 521.
This case is thus entirely unlike Witt. Witt’s statement that determinations of juror bias cannot be reduced to a catechism, 469 U. S., at 424, and its reliance on the peculiar ability of trial judges to observe the demeanor and credibility of potential jurors, id., at 428, make sense when there is “every indication that the judge . . . applied the correct standard.” Id., at 431. But the record before us today provides no such indication. It is impossible to determine whether the judge’s finding of bias reflected a belief that Murphy would be unable to follow the court’s instructions or a belief that Murphy would have to set aside his personal beliefs to do so. In fact, Murphy never gave any indication that he could not follow the court’s instructions. The burden of proving Murphy’s bias rested on the State. Id., at 423-424. The Court’s present heavy reliance on “the context surrounding Murphy’s exclusion,” ante, at 176, simply cannot support its conclusion because the trial court’s improper interpretation of Wither-spoon infected that context.
The Court’s statement that “the trial court could take account of the fact that Murphy was present throughout an entire series of questions that made the purpose and meaning of the Witt inquiry absolutely clear,” ante, at 178, suffers from a similar defect.8 I find implausible the Court’s assumption *204that Murphy followed closely the daylong questioning of other jurors. But if that assumption were correct, then the Court should also assume that Murphy anticipated being asked whether his beliefs would prevent or substantially impair performance of his duties as a juror, as other jurors expressing similar sentiments had been asked. That three other jurors, under somewhat more extensive questioning, explicitly stated that they did not think they could vote for the death penalty, see Tr. 44 (juror Varney); id., at 107 (juror Carn); id., at 109-110 (juror Maher), says nothing about whether Murphy shared their inability to put aside personal beliefs and obey his oath as a juror. Witt may be right that “many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made ‘unmistakably clear,’” 469 U. S., at 424-425; here, however, the judge did not even ask the one question that might have given him real insight into Murphy’s ability to serve. The wrong answer is what no question at all begets. Cf. A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 103 (1962).
A close reading of the lengthy voir dire transcript leads me to conclude that the trial court’s behavior is more easily explained by Murphy’s appearance in the jury box at the end of a long day of questioning and the desire to finish jury selection expeditiously than by any definite impression on the part of the trial judge that Murphy was unqualified. But neither the trial court’s eagerness to get the trial started, nor this Court’s impatience with the progress of Darden’s constitutional challenges to his conviction and death sentence, see, e. g., 473 U. S. 928, 929 (1985) (Burger, C. J., dissenting *205from the grant of certiorari because 12 years had elapsed since Darden’s conviction and sentence and no fewer than “95” judges had reviewed the case),9 renders Murphy’s exclusion justifiable or harmless.
HH I — I l-H
Twice during the past year — in United States v. Young, 470 U. S. 1 (1985), and again today — this Court has been faced with clearly improper prosecutorial misconduct during summations. Each time, the Court has condemned the behavior but affirmed the conviction. Forty years ago, Judge Jerome N. Frank, in dissent, discussed the Second Circuit’s similar approach in language we would do well to remember today:
“This court has several times used vigorous language in denouncing government counsel for such conduct as *206that of the [prosecutor] here. But, each time, it has said that, nevertheless, it would not reverse. Such an attitude of helpless piety is, I think, undesirable. It means actual condonation of counsel’s alleged offense, coupled with verbal disapprobation. If we continue to do nothing practical to prevent such conduct, we should cease to disapprove it. For otherwise it will be as if we declared in effect, ‘Government attorneys, without fear of reversal, may say just about what they please in addressing juries, for our rules on the subject are pretend-rules. If prosecutors win verdicts as a result of “disapproved” remarks, we will not deprive them of their victories; we will merely go through the form of expressing displeasure. The deprecatory words we use in our opinions on such occasions are purely ceremonial’ Government counsel, employing such tactics, are the kind who, eager to win victories, will gladly pay the small price of a ritualistic verbal spanking. The practice of this court —recalling the bitter tear shed by the Walrus as he ate the oysters — breeds a deplorably cynical attitude towards the judiciary” (footnote omitted). United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F. 2d 631, 661, cert, denied, 329 U. S. 742 (1946).
I believe this Court must do more than wring its hands when a State uses improper legal standards to select juries in capital cases and permits prosecutors to pervert the adversary process. I therefore dissent.

See, e. g., Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320, 328-329 (1985); California v. Ramos, 463 U. S. 992, 998-999 (1983); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625, 637-638 (1980); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S. 349, 358-359 (1977) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion).

 Every judge who has addressed the prosecutors’ behavior has condemned it. See Darden v. State, 329 So. 2d 287, 290 (Fla. 1976) (“[T]he prosecutor’s remarks under ordinary circumstances would constitute a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility”); id., at 291-295 (dissenting opinion); Darden v. Wainwright, 513 F. Supp. 947, 955 (MD Fla. 1981) (“Anyone attempting a text-book illustration of a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility . . . could not possibly improve upon [prosecutor White’s final statement]”); Darden v. Wainwright, 699 F. 2d 1031,1035-1036 (CA111983); id., at 1040-1043 (dissenting opinion). Even the State’s Attorney concedes that prosecutor McDaniel’s summation was an “unnecessary tirade,” Supp. App. 46, that “[n]o one has ever even weakly suggested that McDaniel’s closing remarks were anything but *190improper,” Supplemental Answer in Darden v. Wainwright, Case No. 79-566-Civ. T. H. (MD Fla.) (June 1, 1979), p. 12, and that much of the summation consisted of “inflammatory irrelevancies,” Answer to Pet. for Habeas Corpus in Darden v. Wainwright, Case No. 79-566-Civ. T. H. (MD Fla.) (May 22, 1979), p. 11.
It is true that the Florida Supreme Court, the Federal District Court, and the Court of Appeals each ultimately concluded that Darden had not been deprived of a fair trial. But the grounds on which each rested its conclusion are troubling indeed. The Florida Supreme Court’s “careful review of the ‘totality of the record,”’ as this Court now would describe it, ante, at 181, n. 13, consists of three paragraphs. The first of these discusses evidence that petitioner “was a career criminal,” who stayed with a woman other than his wife while on furlough, and used her ear to visit various bars and a pool hall contrary to the conditions of his furlough. The second paragraph notes, among other things, that petitioner “admitted speeding in a rainstorm and creating great danger to other motorists” on the night of the murder. And the last describes the heinousness of the events that occurred at the Turmans’ store, but says absolutely nothing about the evidence tying petitioner to those events. 329 So. 2d, at 290. (The court earlier had noted that Mrs. Turman and Phillip Arnold had identified petitioner as the perpetrator. Id., at 288.)
The crux of the Florida Supreme Court’s analysis, however, is that it was not “possible to use language which is fair comment about these crimes without shocking the feelings of any normal person[.] The language used by the prosecutor would have possibly been reversible error if it had been used regarding a less heinous set of crimes. The law permits fair comment. This comment was fair.” Id., at 290. Since the prosecutors had “reasonably deserib[ed] what happened and what should be done to the guilty party,” their comments were not erroneous. Id., at 291.
The standard apparently applied by Florida is wholly unacceptable. A defendant’s right to a fair trial cannot depend on the nature of the crime of which he is accused. And “what should be done to the guilty party” cannot be relevant to the determination of guilt.
The District Court’s conclusion suffers from a similar error. In addition to advancing many of the arguments adopted by the Court today — none of which is persuasive, see infra, at 194-200 — the District Court found no prejudice because the offensive statements were not “keyed to arouse prejudice against the accused on any basis other than the horror of the crimes *191themselves.” 513 F. Supp., at 956, n. 12. But at the guilt phase of this bifurcated trial, horror about the crimes was irrelevant. The sole issue was whether Darden committed them. The Court of Appeals merely quoted and approved the analysis of the District Court. See 699 F. 2d, at 1036-1037.
In its catalog of the number of judges who have found petitioner’s trial to have been fair, the Court fails to include the Magistrate before whom petitioner’s federal habeas proceedings were actually conducted, and who recommended that the District Court grant petitioner habeas relief on the basis of his claim of prosecutorial misconduct. Magistrate Paul Game, Jr., correctly recognized that this ease essentially turned on the relative credibility of three witnesses, Mrs. Turman, Phillip Arnold, and Willie Darden, and that the prosecutors’ concerted attack on Darden’s humanity could well have affected the jury’s assessment of his credibility. See App. 214. He also recognized that the remarks occurred “[i]n the context of the emotionally charged trial of Darden, a black man, accused of robbery, the brutal murder of a white man, the repeated shooting of a defenseless white teenager and vile sexual advances on a white woman.” Id., at 215. Notably, the Court today ignores the context in which the trial took place, including the fact that petitioner’s motion for a change of venue was granted, and contents itself instead with hypothesizing reasons why the prosecutors’ shameful conduct should not deprive them of a hanging verdict.

 The Court finds Caldwell inapposite because the offending comment in Caldwell occurred at the sentencing stage of the defendant’s trial and misled the jury as to its role in the sentencing process. Ante, at 183, n. 14. But Caldwell’s Eighth Amendment underpinnings clearly extend to guilt *197determinations in capital cases as well as to sentencing. Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S., at 637-638. And under the circumstances of this case, where the sentencing hearing followed immediately upon the jury’s return of a guilty verdict and the State’s summation consisted of less than a full page of transcript, see Tr. 894, I think the State must have assumed that its attacks on the Department of Corrections and repeatedly expressed wish that Darden die would affect the jury’s sentencing decision as well as its determination of guilt. Indeed, the District Court found that the summations during the guilt phase were “in effect [the State’s] principal argument in support of the death penalty.” 613 F. Supp., at 953, and n. 10. Moreover, I do not see why misleading a jury as to the relevant issues in a capital trial is somehow less pernicious than misleading a jury as to its role.

 Of the six photographs in the array, Arnold immediately rejected four because “[t]hey just didn’t fit the description” he had earlier given the police. Tr. 457. Darden’s photograph was one of no more than two that identified the subject by name, and under the name on Darden’s photograph was the notation “Sheriff’s Department, Bartow, Florida” and the date “9/9/73.” Id., at 476-477. Arnold was aware at the time of the identification on September 11 that a suspect recently had been arrested. Id., at 459.

 Mrs. Turman’s identification took place after the following colloquy between the court, the prosecutor (Mr. Mars), and the defense attorney (Mr. Hill):
“THE COURT: Ask her to identify.
“MR. MARS: Yes, sir.
“Q: Can you see this man sitting here?
“MR. HILL: Your Honor, I am going to object to that type of identification.
“THE COURT: I am not. Sit down.
“MR. HILL: Judge-
“THE COURT: Not under these circumstances, Mr. Hill.
“MR. HILL: Judge, even as a defense attorney, that shows no respect in court, much less for the Court, and I—
“THE COURT: I appreciate—
“MR. HILL: And the objection, I want on the record.
*199“THE COURT: I appreciate that. It’s on the record. This woman has had a traumatic experience and she—
“MR. HILL: Judge, I appreciate that. I still have an obligation to my client.
“THE COURT: I appreciate that. Now if you want to be held in contempt, you pardon me. Alright, go ahead.
“Q: Is this the man that shot your husband?
“A: Yes, sir.”
See Pet. for Habeas Corpus in Darden v. Wainwright, Case No. 79-566-Civ. T. H. (MD Fla.) (May 21, 1979), pp. 18-19; Tr. 218-219.

 Challenges to the admissibility of the various identifications were presented in Darden’s petition to this Court for direct review of his conviction and sentence. See Brief for Petitioner in Darden v. Florida, O. T. 1976, No. 76-5382, pp. 2-3 (second and third questions presented raising issues concerning the witnesses’ identifications). Although that petition for cer-tiorari was granted, 429 U. S. 917 (1976), the Court later limited its grant to the issue of the prosecutor’s closing argument, 429 U. S. 1036 (1977), and ultimately dismissed the writ as improvidently granted, 430 U. S. 704 (1977).

 In denying Darden’s pretrial motion to limit voir dire concerning jurors’ attitudes towards the death penalty, the trial court stated:
“It is my ruling if a prospective juror states on his voir dire examination that because of his moral, religious or conscientious principles and belief he would be unwilling to recommend a death penalty, even though the facts and circumstances meet the requirements of law, then he in effect has said he would be unwilling to follow the law the court shall charge upon it and disregard and be unwilling to follow it or if he did follow it, it would be going against his principles, and therefore, I would rule that would be disqualification. If that exists, I intend to disqualify for cause.” App. 6 (emphasis deleted).
The Court’s statement that “the judge correctly stated the general standard for dismissal,” ante, at 177, n. 2, comes immediately on the heels of a truncated quotation of the trial judge’s ruling which omits the critical phrase, “if he did follow it, it would be going against his principles, and therefore, I would rule that would be disqualification.”
The court gave petitioner a continuing objection to its proposed voir dire questioning. App. 7. Even if this continuing objection were not enough standing alone to preserve petitioner’s claim — and the Court does not so hold — the statement that “[n]o specific objection was made to the exeusal of Murphy by defense counsel,” ante, at 178, is flatly contradicted by the trial transcript. Immediately following Murphy’s exeusal, the court directed the stenographer to “note the defendant’s object to him being excused for cause.” Tr. 165.

 Even to refer to the “Witt inquiry” reflects inattention to chronology. This ease was tried about a dozen years before Witt sought to dispel the “general confusion surrounding the application of Witherspoon" under which courts across the country had labored for 15 years. 469 U. S., at 418. How the purpose and meaning of Witt could be clear to a layman like *204Murphy when they were unclear to the judge trying this case and to federal and state appellate courts is nowhere explained. Moreover, from Murphy’s perspective, the purpose of the inquiry was to obtain from him truthful answers regarding his background and beliefs. His oath as a juror required him to reveal his strong feelings about the death penalty, even if he believed that he could follow the judge’s instructions notwithstanding those feelings.

 A public dissent from a grant of certiorari is extremely rare. Indeed, I know of no other recent case in which a Justice has dissented on the ground that the claims raised by the petitioner — which at least four Justices must have found worthy of full consideration — were meritless. See also Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U. S. 246, 247, n. 1 (1959) (memorandum of Bhennan, J.) (finding only one instance of such a dissent — the extraordinary case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 937 (1952), where certiorari was granted prior to the Court of Appeals’ judgment). The concurrence filed by The Chief Justice today, see ante, p. 187, to justify his dissent from the grant of certiorari in this case shows why. As Justice BRENNAN persuasively explained in Price, a public dissent from a grant of certiorari poses dangers both to the actual workings of the adjudicatory process and to public respect for that process. 360 U. S., at 247-248. By reprinting his dissent in its entirety and emphasizing once again the number of times this Court has been asked to review Darden’s claims, The Chief Justice suggests that he irrevocably had committed himself to rejecting those claims before he had received the benefit of the full briefing, oral argument, access to the record, and discussion of the issues by other Members of the Court that followed our grant of certio-rari. To me, the fact that this Court has granted certiorari three times is hardly a reason for concluding Darden’s claims are meritless, or that the undoubted interest in finality should outweigh our duty to ensure that Darden receives due process.