Court Opinion

ID: 9840649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-19 17:09:07.298333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:38:51.685333
License: Public Domain

J-A20019-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  YUNEY RIJO-HENRIQUEZ; SURETY:                :
  FINANCIAL CASUALTY AND SURETY,               :
  INC.                                         :   No. 1256 MDA 2022
                                               :
                       Appellant               :

                 Appeal from the Order Entered August 12, 2022
                 In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
                  Criminal Division at CP-06-CR-0001931-2020

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                          FILED SEPTEMBER 19, 2023

       Financial Casualty and Surety, Inc. (Appellant), which provided a bail

bond for Yuney Rijo-Henriquez (Defendant), appeals from the order denying

its petition to vacate bail forfeiture and exonerate surety. After careful review,

we affirm.

       The trial court summarized the relevant background as follows:

              Defendant was arrested on March 13, 2020, on charges
       related to an alleged conspiracy and potential delivery of a large
       quantity of fentanyl. … Bail was set … in the amount of $200,000,
       secured. On March 17, 2020, bail was posted by [Appellant]. …
       On October 10, 2020, a new and separate complaint for charges
       of fleeing and eluding police … was filed against the Defendant and
       the bail set at $250,000 secured in that matter. The Defendant
       was taken into custody when he was not able to post bail on the
       second set of charges and committed to Berks County Jail System
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A20019-23

       (“BCJS”). On Tuesday, October 22, 2020, [Appellant] brought a
       bail piece[1] in [the original case] before the sitting emergency
       motions judge … for signature.[2] … [Appellant] indicated on its
       request for bail piece that the sole reason was the Defendant’s
       failure to remain arrest free. On Friday, October 23, 2020, [the
       judge] issued an order scheduling a bail piece hearing on Monday,
       October 26, 2020 ….

              On October 26, 2020, the Defendant was brought before the
       court for two different proceedings. First, a bail reduction petition
       in [the second case] was heard. The bail in that case was reduced
       to $25,000 secured, and the Defendant remained in the custody
       of the [BCJS] on that matter. Second, in the above-captioned
       docket, the bail piece hearing was held. At that time, the bail
       piece of [Appellant] was dissolved.[3] Ethan Klein was present at
       the hearing on behalf of [Appellant]. He requested [Appellant] be
____________________________________________

1 “A bail piece is a warrant from the court that gives authority to a surety, or

other authorized person, to apprehend the Defendant and bring him before
the Court for an alleged violation of the bail.” Trial Court Opinion, 10/21/22,
at 4.

2 Pa.R.Crim.P. 536(B) provides “a surety or bail agency may apply to the court

for a bail piece,” and “[i]f the court is satisfied that a bail piece is required, it
may issue a bail piece authorizing the surety or bail agency to apprehend and
detain the defendant, and to bring the defendant before the bail authority
without unnecessary delay.” Here, the trial court signed the bail piece
authorizing Appellant

       to apprehend and detain the defendant … wherever the defendant
       may be found[] and bring the defendant without unnecessary
       delay before a Judge of the Court of Common Pleas at the Berks
       County Courthouse, Reading, Pennsylvania, to be further dealt
       with according to law, and for such purposes this shall be your
       sufficient warrant. The Surety shall inform the District Attorney’s
       Office of the need to place the Defendant on the Jail List for the
       next available court business day so that a hearing can be held.

Bail Piece, 10/22/20.

3 “The bail piece was dissolved by [the] court because the [D]efendant was

already in custody, albeit on other charges, and had been brought before the
court.” Trial Court Opinion, 10/21/22, at 5.

                                           -2-
J-A20019-23

       removed from the bail. The motion was specifically denied. …
       The [dissolution] order indicated that there was no motion
       before the court for any change of bail, and that any implied
       motion was a nullity and therefore denied. The dissolution
       order specifically indicated the court would entertain
       motions for changes to the bail or for release as surety
       should they be filed through counsel. The Defendant posted
       bail on the newly filed charges and he remained free in the
       community pending disposition of his charges. No motion was
       filed by [Appellant], or through counsel as directed, to be
       removed as surety on the Defendant’s bail in this docket. The
       District Attorney’s office also did not seek any bail modification or
       revocation.

               After a series of continuances and back up trial dates, on
       November 9, 2021, the Defendant’s case was set for a primary
       trial to occur on December 9, 2021. Subsequently, at the request
       of counsel for the Defendant, a date was requested prior to the
       trial date for a guilty plea and sentence. The date for a guilty plea
       and sentencing was set for December 7, 2021. When the
       Defendant failed to appear, a bench warrant was requested,
       authorized, and ultimately issued on December 8, 2021. On
       December 17, 2021, a notice of intention to forfeit the bail was
       generated and served on [Appellant]. On March 4, 2022, counsel
       for [Appellant] filed the petition to vacate bail forfeiture and
       exonerate surety. Hearings on the petition of [Appellant] were
       held on June 2, 2022 and August 3, 2022. The motion was denied
       on August 12, 2022.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/21/22, at 2-4 (footnotes and emphasis added; original

footnotes and some capitalization omitted).4

       Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and court-ordered concise

statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant presents the following

question for review:

____________________________________________

4 Berks County indicated that Defendant had not been apprehended at the
time it filed its brief. Appellee’s Brief at 11.

                                           -3-
J-A20019-23

      Did the trial court err in granting full forfeiture of the $200,000.00
      bail after [Appellant] obtained a bail piece and requested to be
      relieved of its bail obligation while the [D]efendant in the
      underlying case was still in custody on charges in a new case?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (some capitalization omitted).

      Appellant   argues    it   “is   inconsequential   that   [D]efendant    was

incarcerated” on the second set of charges when Appellant obtained the bail

piece. Id. at 12. Appellant emphasizes its prompt attainment of the bail piece

to prevent Defendant’s release.        Id. at 14, 17.    Appellant claims that by

obtaining the bail piece, it “insured the [D]efendant’s [c]ourt appearance

regardless of what could have transpired in the second case.” Id. at 12-13.

Appellant acknowledges Defendant willfully breached the bail conditions. Id.

at 16. However, Appellant maintains the trial court did not properly consider

its efforts to keep the Defendant incarcerated after his arrest in the second

case. Id. at 17. Appellant concludes the trial court abused its discretion in

denying Appellant relief while Defendant was in custody. Id. at 18.

      We adhere to the following standard of review:

      The decision to allow or deny a remission of bail forfeiture lies with
      the sound discretion of the trial court. Trial courts unquestionably
      have the authority to order the forfeiture of bail upon the breach
      or violation of any condition of the bail bond. In bond forfeiture
      cases, an abuse of that discretion or authority will only be found
      if the aggrieved party demonstrates that the trial court misapplied
      the law, exercised its judgment in a manifestly unreasonable
      manner, or acted on the basis of bias, partiality, or ill-will. To the
      extent the aggrieved party alleges an error of law, this Court will
      correct that error and our scope of review in doing so is plenary.

                                        -4-
J-A20019-23

In re Hann, 111 A.3d 757, 760 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations, quotation marks,

and brackets omitted).

      Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 536(A) provides for forfeiture

as a sanction for violation of bail:

         (2) Forfeiture

            (a) When a monetary condition of release has been imposed
            and the defendant has violated a condition of the bail bond,
            the bail authority may order the cash or other security
            forfeited and shall state in writing or on the record the
            reasons for so doing. When the surety is a third party, the
            cash or other security may be ordered forfeited only when
            the condition of the bail bond violated is that the defendant
            has failed to appear for a scheduled court proceeding.

            (b) Written notice of the forfeiture shall be given to the
            defendant and any surety, either personally or by both first
            class and certified mail at the defendant’s and the surety’s
            last known addresses.

            (c) The forfeiture shall not be executed until 90 days after
            notice of the forfeiture order.

            (d) The bail authority may direct that a forfeiture be
            set aside or remitted as provided by law or if justice
            does not require the full enforcement of the forfeiture
            order.

            (e) When a magisterial district judge orders bail forfeited
            pursuant to this rule, the magisterial district judge shall
            generate a check in the amount of the bail monies he or she
            has on deposit in the case, and shall send the check and a
            copy of the docket transcript to the clerk of courts for
            processing and disbursement as provided by law.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 536(A)(2) (emphasis added).

      Rule 536 further provides:

                                       -5-
J-A20019-23

       (C) Exoneration

          (1) A bail authority, as provided by law or as justice requires,
          shall exonerate a surety who deposits cash in the amount of
          any forfeiture ordered or who surrenders the defendant in a
          timely manner.

          (2) When the conditions of the bail bond have been satisfied,
          or the forfeiture has been set aside or remitted, the bail
          authority shall exonerate the obligors and release any bail.

Pa.R.C.P. 536(C).5

       Under Rule 536(A)(2)(a), the Commonwealth may petition for forfeiture

when the defendant breaches a condition of release. See Commonwealth

v. Hann, 81 A.3d 57, 71 (Pa. 2013).              The court has discretion to order

forfeiture and provide written notice to the defendant and his surety. Id. The

forfeiture may not be executed before 20 days have passed.              Id.   After

receiving notice, the defendant or his surety may oppose forfeiture, and

“[o]nly then may the court direct that a forfeiture be set aside or remitted if

justice does not require the full enforcement of the order.” Id. (citation and

quotation marks omitted).

       Accordingly, in a case where the Commonwealth has sought
       forfeiture, and the defendant or his surety opposes it, a hearing
       should be held. At the hearing, the Commonwealth has the
       burden of proving the conditions to bail forfeiture as aforesaid,
       upon which the burden will shift to the defendant or his surety to
       justify full or partial remission of bail forfeiture.

____________________________________________

5 Rule 536 also permits revocation as a sanction for violating bail.  As the trial
court observed, the District Attorney did not seek revocation in this case. Trial
Court Opinion, 10/21/22, at 3.

                                           -6-
J-A20019-23

Id. at 71-72. Again, the Commonwealth did not pursue forfeiture in this case.

      Rule 536(A)(2)(d) provides that a court may set aside or remit bail

forfeiture “if justice does not require the full enforcement of the forfeiture

order.” Historically, Pennsylvania courts relied on considerations expounded

by the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania:

      When the defendant breaches a bail bond, without a justifiable
      excuse, and the government is prejudiced in any manner, the
      forfeiture should be enforced unless justice requires otherwise.
      When considering whether or not justice requires the enforcement
      of a forfeiture, a court must look at several factors, including: 1)
      the willfulness of the defendant’s breach of the bond, 2) the cost,
      inconvenience and prejudice suffered by the government, and 3)
      any explanation or mitigating factors.

Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 827 A.2d 462, 468 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citing

United States v. Ciotti, 579 F. Supp. 276, 278 (W.D.Pa. 1984)).

      In 2013, our Supreme Court rejected a strict application of the Mayfield

factors.   Hann, 81 A.3d at 66.       The Court reviewed practices in other

jurisdictions and concluded the language of Rule 536(A)(2)(d) “implicates a

case-by-case analysis of when forfeiture is or is not proper, and whether that

forfeiture should be for the full sum of the bail or some reduced amount.” Id.

at 67. The Court referenced the “non-exclusive list” of factors identified by

the New Jersey Supreme Court:

      (1) whether the applicant is a commercial bondsman; (2) the
      extent of the bondsman’s supervision of the defendant; (3)
      whether the defendant’s breach of the recognizance of bail
      conditions was willful; (4) any explanation or mitigating factors
      presented by the defendant; (5) the deterrence value of
      forfeiture; (6) the seriousness of the condition violated; (7)
      whether forfeiture will vindicate the injury to public interest

                                     -7-
J-A20019-23

      suffered as a result of the breach; (8) the appropriateness of the
      amount of the recognizance of bail; and (9) the cost,
      inconvenience, prejudicial or potential prejudice suffered by the
      [s]tate as a result of the breach. That list is not exhaustive, and
      trial courts may consider other factors as interests of justice
      require.

Id. at 67-68 (citing State v. Korecky, 777 A.2d 927, 934-35 (N.J. 2001)).

The Supreme Court instructed “that courts should look to these as well as

other factors as justice dictates on a case-by-case basis, understanding that

the parameters of each will be applied differently to each individual forfeiture

proceeding.” Id. at 68.

      Instantly, the trial court addressed the Mayfield factors and stated it

had also considered the factors set forth in Hann. See Trial Court Opinion,

10/21/22, at 7-14. The trial court addressed the willfulness of Defendant’s

breach, stating:

              The purpose of bail is to assure the Defendant’s appearance
      in court, while being an amount that is potentially able to be
      posted for the Defendant to allow the Defendant to remain in the
      community in keeping with the presumption of innocence, while
      still acknowledging the seriousness of the charge before the court
      and community protection. As the main purpose of bail is to
      assure court appearances, the failure to appear in court as
      required is a serious violation of bail. The Defendant, through
      [Appellant], posted bond on March 17, 2020. While this docket
      was pending, the [D]efendant was arrested on additional (and
      unrelated) charges. After posting bail in the second case, after
      the modification on October 26, 2020, the Defendant continued to
      appear as required in this docket. The Defendant set his case for
      a primary trial set to occur on December 9, 2021. Within a week
      of the scheduled trial date, the Defendant met with his attorney
      in his office, on November 30, 2021, and determined the best
      course of action was to enter a guilty plea. The paperwork was
      prepared, and the case was set for a plea on December 7, 2021.
      The Defendant failed to appear for the plea at which time a bench

                                     -8-
J-A20019-23

      warrant was issued.        The Defendant has not yet been
      apprehended. Even giving the Defendant the benefit of the doubt
      that perhaps he was unaware of the December 7, 2021 date, as
      no scheduling order was issued, he still ultimately failed to appear
      at the December 9, 2021 date that had been set for trial; a date
      for which he had been provided a scheduling order.               The
      Defendant has not yet been apprehended on the bench warrant
      that was issued for his failure to appear. Absent any justifiable
      excuse, the [D]efendant’s failure to appear was willful.

Id. at 8-9.

      The trial court next considered the cost, inconvenience, and prejudice

suffered by the government, recognizing that Appellant

      alleges a deficiency as to testimony as to this prong. The assigned
      district attorney and [D]efendant’s trial counsel gave testimony at
      the hearing about the circumstances of the Defendant’s case
      leading up to the issuance of the bench warrant.             As the
      [D]efendant was a fugitive, no trial was able to occur as scheduled
      on December 9, 2021. The government has no obligation to
      furnish a bill of costs, nor can the cost and inconvenience factor
      be dismissed, against the government, simply because they may
      not be substantial. A financial detriment is not required under the
      rule, as courts have applied the second prong of the forfeiture
      framework … as factors the trial court must consider, not
      conjunctive elements the Commonwealth must prove.               The
      Mayfield and Hann framework are factors to be considered but
      are not a required checklist.

            The Defendant failed to appear at his guilty plea[,] which
      was set two days prior to trial at the request of his attorney. Had
      the guilty plea not occurred for reasons beyond the failure to
      appear, the trial of the Defendant would have occurred as
      scheduled. … The Commonwealth prepared its case for trial on
      December 9, 2021, which would include issuing subpoenas for
      witnesses, although the witnesses were released upon the
      authorization for the bench warrant.

            The allegations against the Defendant are of the most
      serious nature. Specifically, he was alleged to have committed a
      conspiracy to deliver and then the delivery of approximately 100
      grams of fentanyl, and other related charges under the Drug,

                                     -9-
J-A20019-23

      Device and Cosmetic Act, along with receiving stolen property (a
      gun). The high dollar amount of the bail is proportional to the
      seriousness of his charges and in [an] amount that should have
      assured his appearance, as even posting a portion should be a
      significant expense for an average defendant.         There is an
      intangible element of injury to the public interest in almost any
      case where a defendant deliberately breaches a condition of his
      bail bond. The Commonwealth was prejudiced by [Defendant’s]
      disappearance, which has delayed the disposition of his underlying
      charges as he remains at large.

Id. at 9-10 (citations omitted).

      In discussing any relevant explanation or mitigating factors, the trial

court opined:

            It should be noted that [Appellant] is a commercial
      bondsman. Courts have uniformly held that a surety’s status as
      a bondsman tends to lead in favor of forfeiture. Hann, [81 A.3d
      at 69; see also id. (“In making the business decision of whether
      to take a bail bond, it is not unreasonable to conclude that a
      bondsman should have been fully cognizant of his responsibilities
      and the consequences of a defendant’s breach of the conditions of
      the bond.” (citation, quotation marks and brackets omitted)]. The
      driving force behind a surety’s provision of a bond is the profit
      motive. This is the basis for the burden being placed on the
      aggrieved party, the bondsman, to show that the court misapplied
      the law, exercise manifestly unreasonable judgment, or acted on
      the basis of bias, partiality, or ill-will to that party’s detriment on
      appellate review.

             [Appellant] asserts that its actions within the first ninety
      (90) days to ascertain the whereabouts of [Defendant] were done
      promptly and in good faith as required by 42 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 5747.1,
      and therefore the forfeiture and remittal should be set aside. In
      support of their position, [Appellant] presented testimony that
      they attempted to be removed from the Defendant’s bail by the
      filing of the bail piece on October 22, 2020, before the emergency
      motions judge, after the Defendant was arrested on fleeing and
      eluding charges. As previously discussed, the bail piece was
      dissolved six days later, on October 26, 2020, with the issue of
      removal of the surety addressed. The request to be removed from
      the bail was denied on the record and again addressed specifically

                                      - 10 -
J-A20019-23

     in the Dissolution Order.   The [c]ourt communicated to
     [Appellant] that it needed to file a motion through counsel
     asking to be removed as surety. No further action was
     taken by [Appellant] to be removed from the bail. There
     was no further attempt to remove [Appellant] as surety,
     only the request for a bail piece.

            At the first hearing on [Appellant’s] motion, on June 2,
     2022, Ms. Sheila Smith indicated the belief of [Appellant] that the
     Defendant immediately absconded on October 27, 2020, following
     the posting of the bail in the second matter and shortly after the
     dissolution of the bail piece by the court. This was an unsuccessful
     attempt to shift the responsibility for the Defendant’s appearance
     (or lack thereof) on the [c]ourt or the District Attorney’s Office.
     Additionally, contrary to Ms. Smith’s testimony, court records
     indicate the Defendant had approximately a full year of proper
     court attendance before his failure to appear and the issuance of
     the warrant. There was testimony from the Defendant’s attorney,
     Mr. Nigrini, that there was no contact from [Appellant], that he
     recalls, from the time he filed the bail motion in the second case
     until after the bench warrant was issued.             This was not
     contradicted by [Appellant]. This establishes the lack of the
     extent of the bondman’s supervision of the Defendant considering
     the large amount of the surety posted.

            Further, the court file includes the preliminary arraignment
     form of the Magisterial District Judge…. This form indicates the
     Defendant was twenty-seven (27) years old, was not a U.S. citizen
     (although he was a permanent resident)[] and had only part-time
     employment (outside of Berks County) to support his family that
     included six children. Further, the Clerk of Courts file reveals a
     “pretrial defendant assessment,” dated March 13, 2020 (four days
     prior to bail being posted by [Appellant]), … which indicated the
     Defendant was from the Dominican Republic and had resided
     there for twenty-four (24) years. This establishes significant ties
     to his home country, and fairly recent immigration, which is
     information [Appellant] should have been aware of when making
     its determination of risk in posting the high amount of bail.
     Further, [Appellant] did not present any testimony that they
     attempted to secure [Defendant’s] passport as a condition of their
     agency in posting the bail. There is no support for claims that the
     Commonwealth’s failure to file modification or revocation of the
     bail of the [D]efendant, or the court’s failure to impose a higher
     bail (or in this case, the decision to reduce bail in a second

                                    - 11 -
J-A20019-23

     docket), mitigates a surety’s duty to fully investigate          a
     defendant’s background before issuing a bail bond.

            This is not to say that [Appellant] made no effort to find
     their client following his failure to appear. [Appellant] presented
     testimony from Mr. Mikhaeil, a bounty recovery agent, that he had
     been given the case file for the Defendant on December 7, 2021,
     which was the date of the [D]efendant’s failure to appear. This
     was prompt action by [Appellant]. The bounty recovery agent met
     with the Defendant’s “wife” who indicated that the last time she
     heard from him was on November 30, 2021, or perhaps early
     December, and that she believed he went to the Dominican
     Republic. Although he could not give the name of the person to
     whom he spoke, the bounty recovery agent indicated that he
     placed a call to the warrants division of the Sheriff’s department
     indicating that he had information that the Defendant was in the
     Dominican Republic. He also further indicated that in mid-
     December of 2021, he came to see the “DEA” detective from this
     case and the arresting officer in the Defendant’s second case to
     give them this information as well. The Defendant’s attorney in
     this case, Mr. Nigrini, also indicated that after the bench warrant
     was issued for the Defendant, Ms. Smith[, on behalf of Appellant,]
     contacted him with the information provided by Defendant’s wife
     that he had absconded to the Dominican Republic.

Id. at 10-13 (some citations and quotation marks omitted).

     Finally, the trial court concluded:

           Absent any justifiable excuse, the [D]efendant’s failure to
     appear was willful. The question here is not whether [Appellant]
     made any effort to recover [Defendant], but whether their efforts
     had a substantial impact on his return. The efforts of [Appellant,]
     while done promptly in response to the failure to appear[,] have
     not had any impact on the [D]efendant’s apprehension or return,
     as he remains at large. The Commonwealth was prejudiced by
     [Defendant’s] disappearance, which delayed the disposition of his
     underlying charges. It is no defense to the forfeiture of bail
     given for an absconding defendant that the surety applied
     for a bail piece. The Defendant was in custody on another
     matter. [Appellant] made no further effort to file a motion
     to be removed from the Defendant’s bail despite specific
     direction from the court. As previously noted, this court
     specifically prompted [Appellant] to file a proper motion upon the

                                    - 12 -
J-A20019-23

      dissolution of the bail piece if they wished to be removed from the
      [D]efendant’s bail. Accordingly, there is a deterrence value to the
      forfeiture[, for Appellant] to be aware of court orders issued
      prompting a process[,] even when they view such as a “non-
      preferred” method. [Appellant], a commercial surety, took a
      calculated business risk when it agreed to post bail for a defendant
      with ties out of the country. Having applied the factors delineated
      in Mayfield and in consideration of the additional factors of Hann,
      justice requires full enforcement of the forfeiture order in this
      matter.

Id. at 13-14 (emphasis added; paragraph break omitted).

      We discern no abuse of the trial court’s discretion. The record reflects

the trial court considered the totality of the circumstances in reaching its

conclusion that justice required full forfeiture. See Hann, 81 A.3d at 67.

      To the extent Appellant argues its efforts in seeking the bail piece should

be considered part of the “explanation and mitigating factors” prong of

Mayfield, this argument is unavailing. Following remand from the Supreme

Court in Hann, this Court observed “that ‘mitigating factors’ refer to any

explanation for the defendant’s conduct in violating the terms of his

bail bond, i.e., the defendant failed to appear for a court date because he

was caring for his sick child.” In re Hann, 111 A.3d at 762-63 (emphasis

added). Appellant cannot shift blame to the trial court for reducing the amount

of bail in the Defendant’s second case.

      Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s petition to

vacate bail forfeiture and exonerate surety.

      Order affirmed.

                                     - 13 -
J-A20019-23

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 09/19/2023

                          - 14 -