Court Opinion

ID: 9642963
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:13:50.084222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:55.344839
License: Public Domain

*194NIX, Chief Justice,
concurring.
Once again a majority of this Court is suggesting a need to abrogate the requirements of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 319 1 and Commonwealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198, 316 A.2d 77 (1974), in favor of a “totality of the circumstances” approach to appellate review of plea proceedings. The instant case provides no basis to support a departure from the salutary requirements of the Ingram standard. An examination of the record of the guilty plea colloquy reveals that the appellee was adequately informed of the nature of the charges against him. Thus there is no need to resort to extrinsic evidence in order to determine that appellee’s plea was knowingly and voluntarily tendered.
The essence of the Ingram rule is that a certain quantum of information is required to be provided to the accused to enable him to understand the nature of the charge against him and its relationship to the acts he committed. In the instant case, the record reveals that the Commonwealth informed both the hearing judge and the accused that the following conduct provided the basis of the robbery charge:
These occurrences took place on the 22nd of January of 1978. They took place at approximately 9:40 p.m. at the A & P store at the South Hills Village. On that date the defendant entered the store and gave the cashier a note demanding money. A struggle then arose. He had a weapon in his hand which discharged several times. The defendant then fled from the store.
This explanation, coupled with the definition of the offense given to the defendant during the plea proceeding, was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Ingram.2 Having *195been informed that this conduct was the basis of the charge against him, the appellee tendered a guilty plea and thereby admitted that he had in fact committed the offense. Thus the hearing judge was able to make an informed judgment, on the basis of the plea proceeding, that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered, and that the accused intelligently waived his constitutional rights. There is therefore no reason to seek justification for the court’s ruling from facts dehors the record of the guilty plea proceedings.
I also disagree with the suggestion that Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 498 Pa. 342, 446 A.2d 591 (1982), was a departure from Ingram. In Shaffer, the prosecution had rested after presenting its entire case and the defense had called two witnesses, when the plea of not guilty was withdrawn and the guilty plea entered. The failure of the court in that case to explain the elements of the offense during the colloquy was of no moment since the defendant had heard the entire evidence against him presented in the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief. Indeed, the Shaffer decision emphasized that we did not intend to abrogate the Ingram requirement, but merely sought to relax strict application of the rule in certain limited situations.3 Specifically, it was noted:
*196While we do not by today’s holding intend to abolish the requirement laid down in Ingram that the elements of the crime must be explained on the record to the defendant prior to the acceptance of a guilty plea, it is clear that strict application of Ingram, under the facts of this case, would not promote the interests which Ingram sought to protect.
Id,., 498 Pa. at 353-54, 446 A.2d at 597.
Clearly, Shaffer does not lend support to the majority’s attempt today to reinstate the totality of the circumstances approach in lieu of a sufficient on-the-record inquiry.
Rule 319(a) and Ingram were designed to require the judge accepting the plea to be in a position to determine the propriety of the plea prior to its acceptance. The effect of today’s decision is to remove any meaningful basis upon which the court accepting the plea must make the judgment as to whether the plea is entered knowingly and voluntarily. The focus is again shifted to some later date when a challenge is raised and the decision at that time must rely on the vagaries of the totality of the circumstances approach.
Ingram and Rule 319(a) attempted to establish a contemporaneous record upon which the subsequent challenge could be examined. The majority today ignores the wisdom of such an approach and in lieu thereof reverts back to the uncertainty of the past. The enduring validity of the purposes Ingram and Rule 319 sought to effectuate, the assurance of fairness to the defendant, the facilitation of appellate review and the promotion of finality of guilty pleas, mandate the continued adherence to the minimum requirements of that standard and I disagree with any departure therefrom.

. Rule 319(a) provides inter alia:
(a) ... The judge may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept it unless he determines after inquiry of the defendant that the plea is voluntarily and understanding^ tendered. Such inquiry shall appear on the record____

. Appellee affirmatively answered defense counsel’s following inquiry during the plea proceeding:
*195Do you understand the government is charging at CC7804611 the crime of robbery. The government is alleging that on or about July 22 of 1978 you entered the A & P store and put store employees in threat of immediate serious bodily harm at the A & P store in the South Hills Village. Do you understand that that is a felony of the first degree and if found guilty you could receive a sentence of up to ten to twenty years on that.
Although this explanation does not specifically identify attempted theft as an element of the offense of robbery, the hearing judge could properly determine that the defendant understood this to be an element of the offense from the prosecution’s recitation of the factual basis of the charge.

. Although I agreed with the result in Commonwealth v. Shaffer, supra, I did not join in the opinion because, in my judgment, an analysis based upon a showing of "manifest injustice” was misplaced. Ingram and Rule 319 go to the question as to whether the plea was knowingly and intelligently entered. Where a plea is not knowingly or intelligently entered, it is immaterial whether the prosecution was *196prejudiced. It is a question of the validity of the plea and not whether fairness justifies its withdrawal. Moreover, Shaffer never contended that his plea was entered unknowingly or involuntarily but merely that the guilty plea colloquy was technically defective.