Court Opinion

ID: 9484391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:52:12.652098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:50:13.323091
License: Public Domain

ROVNER, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I agree that we must remand this case to the district court for further consideration of the amended version of Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c). I also agree that the amended rule should apply retroactively to cases pending before the district court on the amendment’s effective date so long as retroactive application is feasible and would not work an injustice. I write separately, however, because I believe that the majority’s discussion of the crucial issues of notice, mistake, and prejudice under Rule 15(e) will foster confusion rather than clarity below.
Both the old and new versions of Rule 15(c) permit relation back to add a new defendant so long as the proposed defendant:
(A) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.
The majority resolves the second prong of this two-part inquiry, leaving only what it perceives to be the distinct questions of notice and prejudice for the district court on remand. I would also have left for the district court the question of whether Woods made a mistake concerning the identity of the proper parties and whether the individual defendants knew or should have known that, but for that mistake, they would have been named as defendants.
The majority first concludes that Woods made a legal mistake and that because of the nature of the mistake, the individual defendants necessarily knew or should have known of it. On the question of mistake, the majority writes:
Nor, properly understood, is there an issue as to whether plaintiff made a “mistake” as to the identity of the proper party for this Section 1983 action, or as to whether Woods would have sued the proper party but for that mistake (cf., e.g., our opinion in Hill, 924 F.2d at 1374-78, and the explicit statements in Hampton v. Hanrahan, 522 F.Supp. 140, 144 (N.D.Ill.1981) *891and cases cited there (“mistake” as used in Rule 15(c) applies to mistakes of law as well as fact)).
(Ante at 886-87.) The majority then assumes that because the mistake was one of law, the individual defendants “should have known” that he intended to sue them:
Where as in this case ... the plaintiffs mistake was one of law, the proper analysis of that factor poses a question much like that of determining qualified immunity in Section 1983 actions: whether the legal proposition at issue was “clearly established.” As taught by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 [102 S.Ct. 2727, 2736-39, 73 L.Ed.2d 396] (1982), Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) and their numerous progeny, for that purpose the inquiry is objective and not subjective — in essence, all public officials are presumed to know clearly established law, whether or not they have in fact ever cracked a law book. Here there can be no doubt that every state’s sovereign immunity from, and all state employees’ personal exposure to, Section 1983 liability for constitutional torts was clearly established when this lawsuit was filed (even though that realization came only belatedly to Woods’ lawyer).
(Id. at 887.)
Although I agree that the concept of “mistake” can encompass mistakes of law, there is no support for the majority’s matter-of-fact application of qualified immunity principles to Rule 15(c)’s “knew or should have known” requirement. The section 1983 cases cited elsewhere in the majority opinion make no reference to qualified immunity or to whether the legal proposition at issue was clearly established. See Hill v. Shelander, 924 F.2d 1370, 1375-78 (7th Cir.1991); Kirk v. Cronvich, 629 F.2d 404, 408-09 (5th Cir.1980). Nor do those cases view the “knew or should have known” inquiry as purely objective. Instead, both Hill and Kirk look to the allegations in the original complaints to determine what the defendants knew or should have known. See Hill, 924 F.2d at 1377-78; Kirk, 629 F.2d at 407-09; see also Lovelace v. O’Hara, 985 F.2d 847, 850-51 (6th Cir.1993). If the majority’s analysis were proper, the courts in Hill and Kirk would not have undertaken such a fact-based inquiry, for they could simply have assumed knowledge on the basis of a mistake relating to a clearly established legal principle. Yet neither Hill nor Kirk adopted this approach.
The majority’s analysis effectively eviscerates the “knew or should have known” requirement, for subpart B of Rule 15(c)(3) is satisfied once the plaintiff makes a legal mistake with respect to a “clearly established” legal proposition. (See ante at 887.) Under the majority’s approach, the knowledge requirement is thus met whenever the added defendant was aware of the lawsuit, regardless of whether the complaint named him or cited to any of his conduct. Simply because public officials are presumed to know that state entities have sovereign immunity and that state officials may be sued in their individual capacities for constitutional torts (see ante at 887) does not permit us to assume that state employees would know that whenever a state entity has been sued, a mistake has been made and they were the proper parties. That approach avoids any factual inquiry into whether the added party “knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(3)(B). I therefore find the majority’s approach unfaithful to the language of the rule.
Finally, qualified immunity principles are ill-suited for application to Rule 15(c)’s “knew or should have known” requirement. Qualified immunity allows a public official to fulfill her duties free from potential liability except in those instances where the official violates a “clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). In other words, the doctrine limits the potential liability of public officials to the extraordinary circumstance in which a clearly established right has been violated. The majority’s application of similar principles here has the opposite effect— radically expanding exposure while limiting the available defenses of public officials who *892were not originally named as defendants and who otherwise may not have suspected that their conduct was the subject of a lawsuit.
I also am uncomfortable with singling out the “mistake” prong of the Rule 15(c) inquiry for summary disposition. Our decisions interpreting the requirements of notice and mistake under the old version of the rule, which apply with equal force to the amended version, suggest a relationship between the two branches of Rule 15(c) — that is, we are much more likely to allow an amendment that cures a “mistake” where the defendant is already before the court in some other capacity or where he had notice that he was intended as a defendant.1 See, e.g., Hill, 924 F.2d at 1376; Wood v. Worackeck, 618 F.2d 1225, 1229 (7th Cir.1980) (“amendment with relation back is generally permitted in order to correct a misnomer of a defendant where the proper defendant is already before the court and the effect is merely to correct the name under which he is sued. But a new defendant cannot normally be substituted or added by amendment after the statute of limitations has run.”) (emphasis added).2 Mere knowledge of Woods’ lawsuit is therefore not sufficient. Rather, a plaintiff also must show that the individuals knew or should have known that they were intended defendants. The existence of a legal mistake on a clearly established legal proposition does not automatically satisfy this requirement.
Our decision in Hill v. Shelander is instructive. In that case, the plaintiff attempted to amend his complaint in order to sue a prison sergeant in his individual as opposed to his official capacity. 924 F.2d at 1371. The defendant had notice of the suit because he was already before the court, although in a different capacity. Id. at 1375, 1378.3 The court therefore concerned itself solely with the requirements of prejudice, mistake, and knowledge. In considering those issues, the court focused on the original complaint and found that its allegations should have notified the defendant that an individual capacity suit was intended. The original complaint in Hill had focused on the defendant’s specific conduct, including the injuries he allegedly inflicted on the plaintiff. Id. Thus, the court found that the defendant “knew at all times that the suit against him was for the alleged constitutional injuries he personally inflicted on the plaintiff.” Id. at 1377; see also id. at 1378 (“We reiterate that whether the suit was against him in his official or individual capacity, Sergeant Shelander always knew that the lawsuit was being brought against him.”). Moreover, although the plaintiff purported to state an official capacity claim, he had not identified “an official policy or custom adopted by the county and carried out by Sergeant Shelander” on which to base such a claim. Id. at 1378. In short, because the complaint focused on the defendant’s own conduct and did not allege an official policy or custom, it provided sufficient notice that the plaintiff intended to sue the defendant individually.
Hill therefore requires that we look to the original complaint to determine whether, despite the mistake, the individual defendants knew or should have known that they were intended as defendants. The majority here fails to consider the allegations of Woods’ original complaint and relies instead on the *893existence of a “presumptively known mistake” (see ante at 887) — that is, a mistake on a clearly established legal proposition such that the individual defendants should have known that they were the proper parties. In contrast to that in Hill, this complaint makes no mention of the individual defendants, let alone of their specific conduct.4 Instead, the complaint broadly alleges that the defendant entities violated plaintiffs rights by discriminating against him on account of his race. For example, the complaint seeks a declaratory judgment, as well as preliminary and permanent injunctions, prohibiting the termination of Woods’ employment. (Complaint ¶3.) It does not identify particular actors other than the university entities themselves. Even the majority concedes that the original complaint “was filed not against any individuals but rather against defendants that could only be construed as Indiana University and its police department.” (Ante at 883.) The original complaint also differs from the Hill complaint in its use of traditional official capacity language — that of official custom and policy. The complaint’s prayer for relief, for example, speaks in terms of “unlawful practices and policies” which have resulted in a violation of plaintiffs constitutional rights. (Complaint at 5.) This too suggests an intention to assert official capacity claims against the named entities, as opposed to claims against unnamed individuals.5 In view of these policy allegations and the failure to mention specific individuals or individual conduct, Woods’ original complaint neither would nor should have put the individuals on notice that but for the mistake, they would have been named as defendants in the original complaint.6
Although the majority shies away from the allegations in the original complaint, it briefly touches on the knowledge problem in discussing notice. (See ante at 888.) The majority suggests that even if the original pleading did not reveal the nature of the intended amendment, it is sufficient that the defendant “ ‘was made aware of the matters to be raised by the amendment from sources other than the pleadings.’” (Id. at 888 (quoting 6A Charles Wright, Arthur Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1497, at 92 (2d ed. 1990)).)7 I agree, for example, that if Woods had notified one of the university police officers within the limitations period or within the 120-day period for service of process that he intended to name the individual officer as an additional defendant (e.g., in the course of a deposition), there would be no question that the officer received adequate notice and possessed the requisite knowledge regardless of the nature of the allegations in the original complaint. But I have seen no evidence to that effect in this record. At most, Woods has suggested that the individual defendants knew of the existence of the original lawsuit against the university entities. In light of the original complaint’s general allegations, however, knowledge of the lawsuit proves very little because it would not have caused a reasonably prudent police officer to expect to be named as a defendant. Our precedents *894require something more than simple knowledge of the lawsuit.
In Wood v. Worachek, 618 F.2d 1225, 1228 (7th Cir.1980), for example, the plaintiff alleged that certain police officers and city officials, as well as other unidentified police officers, had conspired to deprive him of his constitutional rights. When the plaintiff subsequently amended his complaint to substitute actual police officers for the previously unidentified defendants, the district court found the new claims barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, we observed that although one of the added defendants was deposed by the plaintiffs counsel within the limitations period, so that he had knowledge of the lawsuit and that it somehow involved his conduct, the officer “did not receive such notice that he would not be prejudiced in defending the suit on the merits.” In other words, the deposition did not place the officer on notice “that he would be named as a defendant in the action.” Id. at 1230. Thus, in Wood, the officer knew of the incident at issue and that a lawsuit had been filed, yet we declined to apply Rule 15(c) because he did not know that he would be named as a defendant.
Norton v. International Harvester Co., 627 F.2d 18 (7th Cir.1980), also supports the view that notice of the lawsuit alone is insufficient. In Norton, the plaintiff filed suit against International Harvester (“IH”) when her husband died in an accident involving an IH tractor-trailer. After the statute of limitations expired, the plaintiff amended her complaint to add as a defendant the gear division of TRW, Inc. (“TRW”), which had manufactured the steering gear mechanism in the IH tractor-trailer. We did not apply the relation-back doctrine to this additional claim, despite the fact that TRW had knowledge of a potential problem with its steering mechanism and that a negligence action had been filed against IH. Because the plaintiffs original pleadings had focused on IH and failed to mention TRW or its alleged negligence, we concluded that “neither the initial pleadings nor the fact that TRW conducted an inspection of the gear mechanism provided TRW with sufficient notice that it might be named as a defendant.” Id. at 21.8
In sum, I agree that the district court must consider anew the issues of notice and prejudice. I would also leave for the district court the related questions of mistake and knowledge. Depending on the nature of any notice provided here, Norton and Wood may be controlling, for they clearly hold that knowledge of the lawsuit alone is insufficient.9 My overriding concern, and the concern of those cases, is not whether the individual defendants merely had notice of the lawsuit, but whether each defendant had notice sufficient to indicate to a reasonably prudent person that he eventually might be named as a defendant.

. In my view, no clear distinction exists between the concepts of notice and what a defendant "knew or should have known.” They are interrelated concepts that should not be separately analyzed. For example, after the majority has determined that the individual defendants "should have known” they were the proper parties, how is the district court to conclude that those defendants had inadequate notice? If they knew or should have known they were intended defendants, then presumably there was adequate constructive notice.

. Similarly, a district court decision on which the majority relies (see Hampton v. Hanrahan, 522 F.Supp. 140, 143-44 (N.D.Ill.1981), also involved the joinder of governmental entities that were named as defendants in the original proceeding and that clearly had notice of the action from its inception.

.The majority in fact concedes that Hill was an easier case than this precisely because the defendant was named in the original complaint. (See ante at 888 n. 11.) Yet the majority finds that significant "only as it hears upon the question of prejudice resulting from relation back.” (Id.) I think it also is relevant to the related question, as delineated in the rule, of whether the individual knew or should have known that he was intended as a defendant.

. Although the first and second amended complaints mention and identify the individuals, they do not define individual roles in the allegedly discriminatory conduct.

. In fact. Woods’ counsel acknowledged at oral argument that he knew the identities of the individual defendants when he filed the original complaint. Thus, if Woods had intended to sue the individuals rather than the entities, he could have done so at that time. See Lovelace, 985 F.2d at 850.

. Yet the majority’s "objective” rule would sweep in these defendants anyway simply because sovereign immunity is a clearly established legal principle. As I have explained above, I find this approach incompatible with the language of the rule and with the case law.

.Although used by the majority here to support the addition of a new party defendant, the quoted passage actually refers to a situation in which a plaintiff has significantly altered its claims against a defendant who is already before the court. See 6A Wright, Miller & Kane § 1497, at 84. The rationale for such a rule in the context of a significantly altered claim or defense is that the adverse party already knows that a particular transaction or occurrence is at issue and that discovery may be conducted on all of its different aspects. Id. Thus, the party would not be prejudiced if the nature of the claim is subsequently altered. This is not necessarily so if claims are added against completely new defendants who may have had no reason to expect that they might be added to the case.

. The majority obliquely suggests that Wood and Norton were somehow limited by our later decision in Hill, and that it is Hill, and not the earlier decisions, that we must follow here. (See ante at 888 n. 10.) The majority alludes to a conflict that does not exist. The approach in Hill is perfectly consistent with our earlier decisions, for as in Wood and Norton, the Hill court considered subjective facts in determining what the defendant knew or should have known. In fact, not only did Hill not break from Wood, but it extensively relied on Wood's discussion of Rule 15(c). See Hill, 924 F.2d at 1376. It is the majority's decision here, not that in Hill, that diverges from our earlier interpretations of the rule.

. Unlike the majority, I do not believe the relation-back doctrine can be applied here solely _ based upon an "identity of interest” between the university entities and the individual defendants. (See ante at 889.) The identity of interest doctrine is most often applied to parent and subsidiary or closely related corporations. See Tones Ramirez v. Bermudez Garcia, 898 F.2d 224, 229 (1st Cir.1990); see also Norton, 627 F.2d at 21. If it were to apply to lower-level employees whenever a supervisory entity or official is named a defendant, then presumably it would have applied to the claim against the added officer in Wood v. Worachek, supra. It did not. 618 F.2d at 1230. The nature of a custom or policy claim against a governmental entity is far removed from an individual capacity claim against lower-level employees. Although supervisory officials such as Chief Mulvey may have had reason to monitor the action against the entities (see Kirk, 629 F.2d at 408 n. 4), it is unlikely that lower-level employees would have had the same responsibility or incentive, especially when they were neither named as defendants nor mentioned anywhere in the original complaint.