Court Opinion

ID: 9731474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:46:48.375801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:18.449457
License: Public Domain

MAY, Judge,
concurring in result.
Although I concur in large part with the majority opinion, I depart from the majority’s reasoning for why the State may not retry Moore for Class A felony rape, Class A felony criminal deviate conduct, and Class B felony criminal confinement.
The State asserts, and I agree, the trial court did not “acquit” Moore of those crimes. See Black’s Law Dictionary at 24 (7th ed. 1999) (An acquittal is the “legal certification, usu. by jury verdict, that an accused person is not guilty of the charged offense.”). Rather, the court declined to instruct the jury on the enhanced charges because the facts underlying the enhancements to rape, criminal deviate conduct, and criminal confinement — unspecified injuries to C.S.' — were the same facts underlying Moore’s guilty plea to battery enhanced to a Class C felony. The court was concerned about the double jeopardy implications of Moore being found guilty of additional crimes based on the same injuries, but it expressed no doubt C.S. received the injuries underlying the enhancements. Cf. Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S . 140, 106 S.Ct. 1745, 90 L.Ed.2d 116 (1986) (Fifth Amendment prohibited retrial after a trial court had determined “as a matter of law the State’s evidence is insufficient to establish his factual guilt.”); State v. Goodrich, 504 N.E.2d 1023, 1024 (Ind.1987) (State appealed a directed verdict).8
Neither was there an “implied acquittal” by the jury. An implied acquittal is an “acquittal in which a jury convicts the defendant of a lesser-included offense without commenting on the greater-offense.” Black’s Law Dictionary at 24. Here, the court did not instruct on the enhanced charges, so the jury could not convict Moore of those greater offenses. Therefore, we cannot infer from the jury’s verdicts that it believed Moore was innocent. Cf. State v. Morrison, 165 Ind. 461, 75 N.E. 968, 969 (Ind.1905) (guilty plea to lesser-included offense was an acquittal of the greater offense).
Because I believe Moore was not acquitted, I cannot agree the State is appealing “a question reserved by the state, [when] *799the defendant is acquitted,” see slip op. at 15 n. 6 (citing Ind.Code § 35-38-4-2(4)).
Nevertheless, I concur in the result because the State has not demonstrated we have jurisdiction over its cross-appeal. “The right of the state to appeal from criminal proceedings is strictly limited to authorization by statute.” State v. Harrier, 450 N.E.2d 1005, 1005 (Ind.1983), overruled on other grounds by Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563 (Ind.1995). The State’s argument regarding acquittal removed its cross-appeal from the portion of Ind.Code § 35-38-4-2 relied on by the majority, but the State has not provided citation or argument demonstrating it was otherwise authorized to appeal the trial court’s decision not to instruct the jury on the enhanced offenses. Therefore, I would dismiss the State’s cross-appeal. See State v. Eakins, 169 Ind.App. 390, 348 N.E.2d 681, 682 (Ind.Ct.App.1976) (dismissing where State’s only explanation of appellate court’s jurisdiction was erroneous).

. A directed verdict is a “judgment entered on the order of a trial judge who takes over the fact-finding role of the jury because the evidence is so compelling that only one decision can reasonably follow or because it fails to establish a prima facie case.” Black's Law Dictionary at 1555.