Court Opinion

ID: 6603378
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-20 20:09:51.493265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:58:05.912012
License: Public Domain

TayloR, J.
It is clearly shown by the evidence that it was not only convenient but necessary for the agent, Otis, to have the use of horses and carriages in order to transact the business he was employed to transact; and the only question is, whether he could bind his principals by hiring them upon their credit. Otis was the agent of the defendants for the purpose of traveling about the country with samples of their merchandise, contained in trunks, which rendered it necessary to have a team and carriage to transport him and his samples from place to place, with full authority to sell their merchandise by sample to customers, and direct the same to be delivered according to his orders. The defendants not having furnished their agent the necessary teams and carriages for transportation, he clearly had the right to hire the same and pay their hire out of the funds in his hands belonging to them. This is admitted by all parties. The real question is, Can the agent, having the money of his principals in his possession for the purpose of paying such hire, by neglecting to pay for it, charge them with the payment to the party furnishing the same, such party being ignorant at the time of furnishing the same that the agent was furnished by his principals with money and forbidden to pledge their credit for the same?
There can be no question that, from the nature of the busi*230ness required to be done by their agent, the defendants held out to those who might have occasion to deal with him, that he had the right to contract for the use of teams and carriages necessary and convenient for doing such business, in the name of his principals, if he saw fit, in the way such service is usually contracted for; and we may, perhaps, take judicial notice that such service is usually contracted for, ¿>ayment to be made after the service is performed. It would seem to follow that, as the agent had the power to bind his principals by a contract for such service, to be paid for in the usual way, if he neglects or refuses to pay for the same after the service is performed, the principals must pay. The fault of the agent in not paying-out of the money of his principals in his hands cannot deprive the party furnishing the service of the right to enforce the contract against them, he being ignorant of the restricted authority of the agent. If the party furnishing the service knew that the agent had" been furnished by his principal with the money to pay for the service, and had been forbidden to pledge the credit of his principals for such service, he would be in a different position. Under such circumstances, if he furnished the service to the agent, he would be held to have furnished it upon the sole credit of the agent, and he would be compelled to look to the agent alone for his pay. We think the rule above stated as governing the case is fully sustained by'the fundamental principles of law which govern and limit the powers of agents to bind their principals when dealing with' third persons. Judge Story, in his work on Agency, § 127, says: “The principal is bound by all acts of his agent within the scope of the authority which he holds him out to the world to possess, although he may have given him more limited private instructions unknown to the persons dealing with him.” In section 133 he says: “ So far as an agent, whether he is a general or special agent, is in any case held out to the public at large, or to third persons dealing with him, as competent to contract for and bind the principal, the latter will be bound *231by the acts of the agent, notwithstanding, he may have deviated from his secret instructions.” And again, in section 73, in speaking of the power of an agent acting under a written authority, he says: “In each case the agent is apparently clothed with full authority to use all such usual and appropriate means, unless, upon the face of. the instrument a more restrictive authority is given, or must be inferred to exist. In each case, therefore, as to third persons innocently dealing with his agent, the principal ought equally to be bound by acts of the agent executing such authority by any of those means, although he may have given to the agent separate private and secret instructions of a more limited nature, or the agent may be secretly acting in violation of his-duty.” In the case of Pickering v. Busk, 15 East, 38-43, Lord Ellbnboe-ough, speaking of the power of an agent to bind his principal, says: “It is clear that he may bind his principal within the limits of the authority with which he has been apparently clothed by the principal in respect to the subject-matter; and there would be no safety in mercantile transactions if he could not.” These general principles have been illustrated and applied by this and other courts in the following cases: Young v. Wright, 4 Wis., 144; Whitney v. State Bank, 7 Wis., 620; Long v. Fuller, 21 Wis., 121; Houghton v. Bank, 26 Wis., 663; Kassion v. Noltner, 43 Wis., 646; Smith v. Tracy, 36 N. Y., 79; Andrews v. Kneeland, 6 Cow., 354.
In this view of the case it was immaterial what the orders of the principal were to the agent, or that he furnished him money to pay these charges, so long as the person furnishing the service was in ignorance of such facts. In order to relieve himself from liability, the principal was bound to show that the plaintiff had knowledge of the restrictions placed upon his agent, or that the custom to limit the powers of agents pf this kind was so universal that the plaintiff must be presumed to have knowledge of such custom. Under the decisions of this court, the custom offered to be proved was not sufficiently uni*232versal to charge the plaintiff with notice thereof. See Scott v. Whitney, 41 Wis., 504, and the cases cited in the decision, and Hinton v. Coleman, 45 Wis., 165. And there being no proof of actual notice to the plaintiff, the only issue left in the case, which was not clearly disposed of in favor of the plaintiff by the evidence, was submitted to the jury, viz.: whether the credit was, in fact, given by the plaintiff to the agent or to the firm. The jury found against.the defendants upon this issue. From reading the evidence in the record, I should have been better pleased with a different verdict upon this issue; but as there is some evidence to support the verdict, and as this court has held substantially in Champion v. Doty, 31 Wis., 190, that charging the service in the plaintiff’s books to the agent is not conclusive that the credit was given to him, but might be explained, it was the province of the jury to say whether the explanation given by the plaintiff was reasonable and satisfactory. We cannot, therefore, set aside the verdict as against the evidence.
By the Cov/rt.— The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.