Court Opinion

ID: 9475956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:43:39.371641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:02.763802
License: Public Domain

HATCHETT, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Although I join wholeheartedly in the majority opinion regarding the fee award, I dissent from the majority’s decision not to order the district court to adjust the lodestar amount upward due to delay.
Citing Johnson v. University College, 706 F.2d 1205 (11th Cir.1983), we stated on the previous appeal that “the district court should consider whether to take into account the long delay in any payment to the plaintiff or his counsel (it has been five years since this case was filed).” Carmichael I at 1138. In Johnson we stated that delay obviously dilutes the eventual award and may convert an otherwise reasonable fee into an unreasonably low one. As a result, district courts should take into account inflation and interest, *594perhaps by adjusting the contingency factor to reflect delay, not just contingency, or perhaps by compensating at current, not historical, rates. See Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 893 (D.C. Cir.1980) (en banc); Northcross v. Board of Education, 611 F.2d 624, 640 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911, 100 S.Ct. 3000, 64 L.Ed.2d 862 (1980). We do not prescribe any set method for correcting for delay in payment, but some form of correction must be undertaken.
Johnson, 706 F.2d at 1210-11. After careful review, the magistrate recommended that the lodestar amount be adjusted upward due to the delay in its payment. The district court rejected the recommendation without explanation. In light of our admonition on the previous appeal and directive in Johnson, I would hold that, in so doing, the district court abused its discretion. The district court’s refusal to adjust the lodestar amount to reflect the delay in receipt of the award is especially puzzling when contrasted with its treatment of Carmichael’s backpay. The district court determined that Carmichael’s backpay should be calculated in accordance with Memorandum GC-84-8 issued by the National Labor Relations Board Office of the General Counsel. This memorandum ordered that interest on backpay and other monetary awards be computed at the adjusted prime rates used by the Internal Revenue Service in calculating interest on the under payment or over payment of taxes. Under this authority, the rates were set at 12-percent in 1981, 20-percent in 1982, 13.5-percent in 1983, 11-percent in 1984, and 11-percent in 1985. It is difficult to discern why the district court would, in effect, provide for adjustments in Carmichael’s backpay due to delay, but fail to do the same for Carmichael’s attorney.
The magistrate recommended adjusting the award by using an hourly rate in excess of that which would have been applicable without “enhancement.” * This is a reasonable approach.

 The magistrate recommended that the award be "enhanced" due to the contingency fee arrangement and the delay factor. We note, however, that the adjusting of awards to account for delay does not ordinarily constitute “enhancement." See Morgado v. Birmingham-Jefferson City Civil Defense, 706 F.2d 1184, 1194 (11th Cir.1983).
Although we stated in Carmichael I that the award should "probably" be enhanced due to the contingency fee arrangement, on this record, we are unable to find that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to enhance the award due solely to the contingency arrangement.