Court Opinion

ID: 9676289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:20:34.933096+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:15:38.152418
License: Public Domain

GUITTARD, Justice
(dissenting).
Although I agree that the existence of a general plan of development is not essential to establish a covenant running with the land at common law, I do not agree that such a plan is relevant only when enforcement of a restrictive covenant is sought on an equitable servitude theory and under that theory is only a circumstance showing an intention that successors in interest should be bound. In my view, a general plan of development may concern also the inducement and consideration for the covenant and thus may be relevant to the enforceability of the restriction, even though the covenant may satisfy all requirements of a covenant running with the land.
If a restriction imposed by a covenant in one isolated deed burdens the land in question for the benefit of the grantor’s adjoining land without any indication of a corresponding benefit to the burdened land, then I would agree that no general plan need be established. See Thomson v. Dozier, 168 S.W.2d 319 (Tex.Civ.App. — El Paso 1942, writ ref’d w. o. m.). In such a case the conveyance itself is presumably the entire inducement and consideration for the restriction. On the other hand, if the restriction is intended as part of a general plan of development of a subdivided tract, then the inducement and consideration for the restriction may be presumed to include the mutual benefits expected from imposition of similar restrictions on other lots in the subdivision. Hooper v. Lottman, 171 S.W. 270 (Tex.Civ.App. — El Paso 1914, no writ). Consequently, if those benefits are never realized because no similar restrictions are imposed on any other lots, it would be inequitable to enforce it by the drastic remedy of mandatory injunction, even though the restriction may qualify technically as a covenant running with the land.
Whether the particular restriction is an isolated covenant or part of a general plan of development should be determined according to the intention of the parties at the time of imposition of the restriction. The primary evidence of that intention is the language of the deed imposing the restriction. In the present case the language imposing the restriction on appellants’ lot was clearly intended as part of a general development plan. The original deed from the developers to appellants’ predecessor in title describes the land as a certain lot and part of another in “the First Installment of Greenway Parks, an addition to the City of Dallas.” It contains various restrictions besides the setback requirement now in controversy, including limitation of buildings to single-family residences, minimum cost of construction, specification of types of materials to be used for houses and fences, and approval of building plans by *925the grantors or by a commission appointed by the grantors. The deed recites that the purpose of these requirements is “to cause this Installment to develop into a beautiful harmonious, private residential section.” Provision is made for an annual charge to be assessed against the lot for the purpose of creating a maintenance fund for the addition, and release of the restrictions is authorized at certain intervals by owners of not less than two-thirds of the lots in the installment. The restrictions are not imposed for the sole benefit of grantors’ remaining land, but are expressly made to inure to the benefit of all purchasers and subsequent grantees of any lots in the addition.
There is no evidence, however, that the restriction with respect to fences within twenty-five feet of the rear boundary of appellants’ lot was part of the plan as actually implemented. The deed to the original purchaser of appellee’s adjoining lot contains no such restriction, and, so far as this record shows, no other lot in the entire subdivision is so restricted. I think it would be inequitable to grant appellee a mandatory injunction requiring appellants to remove their fence, and, consequently, the swimming pool that cannot legally be maintained without the fence, unless appellants would be entitled under the facts shown to similar relief against appellee or other lot owners.
The theory on which courts of equity enforce against later purchasers restrictive covenants which, though not covenants running with the land at common law, are part of a general development plan is that an earlier purchaser, no less than a later purchaser, relies on the plan to impose similar restrictions on other lots. 2 American Law of Property § 9.30 (1952). Similar reasoning would deny equitable relief to a later purchaser if the earlier purchaser relies on a plan of similar restrictions on other lots, but those restrictions were never imposed, even if the restriction would otherwise be enforceable against him as a covenant running with the land. The controlling question is not the existence of a common-law covenant running with the land, or which deed was the earlier, but the propriety of the extraordinary equitable relief of mandatory injunction.
No authorities have been cited which I consider contrary to this view. It seems to me to be supported by Humphreys v. Ibach, 110 N.J.Eq. 647, 160 A. 531, 85 A.L.R. 980 (N.J.Ct.Err. & App.1932), in which the facts were similar to those here. There complainants sued to quiet title to their lots as against restrictions asserted by defendants, who owned lots in the same subdivision. The complainants had purchased their lots from the developer several years before the lots purchased by defendants. Each of the earlier deeds contained building setback requirements and restricted the number of dwellings on each lot, and the deeds provided that these covenants should run with the land and be enforceable by other owners of property in the neighborhood deriving title from the same grantor. The later deeds to defendants included similar, though not identical setback restrictions, but varied with respect to the number of dwellings allowed. The vice chancellor issued a decree upholding the setback restrictions, but refused to enforce those concerning the number of dwellings. His reasons are stated in an opinion which was approved and adopted on appeal. The existence of a general neighborhood plan, he said, was a question of fact, and he found various indicia of such a plan. Accordingly, he held that in order for the restrictions to be enforced they must be generally uniform. He did not require them to be identical, and he presumed that the variation between a 60-foot setback along one street and a 75-foot setback along another was reasonable in absence of any evidence to the contrary, but he found no justification for the lack of uniformity concerning the number of dwellings permitted. On this latter point his reasoning seems applicable to the case now before us:
The reason that uniformity is required is to afford to each lot owner a protec*926tion equal to the restriction. It would be inequitable to restrain an owner from building two houses on his lot when his neighbor is at liberty to build two on a similar lot. The plan and the protection it gives to those who have made their homes on the tract in reliance thereon fail only so far as the plan is inequitable. Beyond that, it remains valid and enforceable.
Although the restrictions in that case appear to have met the requirements for covenants running with the land, the court made no reference to that theory or to the theory of equitable servitudes and was concerned only with the requirement of reasonable uniformity in enforcing a restrictive covenant which appeared to be part of a general plan for development. In my opinion, this approach is sound and should be followed here. Respectfully, I submit that our decision should not turn on use of the ancient words “covenant running with the land” in the petition, or on the chronology of the original conveyances. The propriety of equitable relief should be determined by the intentions of the parties to the original transactions as evidenced by the language in their deeds. It is clear to me that the restrictive covenant now before us was not intended as an isolated burden on the lot now owned by appellants, but rather as a part of a general plan of development for which appellants’ predecessor, and appellants as well, were justified in expecting mutual benefits, and without a showing that such benefits were realized by implementation of the plan, the covenant should not be enforced against them. Accordingly, I would hold that appellants’ point complaining of appellee’s failure to establish implementation of the plan is applicable to appellee’s theory of covenant running with the land as well as to his alternative theory of equitable servitude.
In response to the motion for rehearing, appellee argues that the general plan of development, of which the covenant here involved appears to have been a part, is shown to have been implemented in other deeds by various covenants not relating to fences. He insists that restrictions in a general plan need not be uniform to be enforceable. I concede that complete uniformity is not required when there is a valid general plan, but I do not agree that other and different restrictions would necessarily justify enforcement of the restriction here in question. In my view, a restrictive covenant should not be enforced unless it is shown to be a part of the plan as actually implemented. If appellants’ lot is the only lot subject to a restriction on fences within twenty-five feet of its rear boundary, and no reason is shown why such a restriction has any relevance to a general plan without a corresponding restriction on other lots, I would presume that the original purchaser accepted the restriction in expectation that a corresponding restriction would be imposed on other lots. I would not presume that he was content with assurance that other lots would have restrictions that had no relation to fences. If all other owners are free to build fences within twenty-five feet of their rear boundaries, and no reason appears why this restriction on appellants’ lot alone would further the general plan of development, then I do not think that a court of equity should enforce such an isolated and unrelated restriction. That is the situation in this case, if my interpretation of the record is correct. Denial of enforcement of this restriction would not prevent enforcement of the plan to the extent actually implemented. See Humphreys v. Ibach, 110 N.J.Eq. 647, 160 A. 531, 85 A. L.R. 980 (NJ.Ct.Err. & App.1932), above discussed.
For the reasons given I would reverse the mandatory injunction and remand for further proceeding so that the facts in this respect may be fully developed. I do not reach appellants’ alternative contention that balancing the equities requires reversal of the decree, and I express no opinion on that question.