Court Opinion

ID: 9953555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 14:19:33.168714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:24.439495
License: Public Domain

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SJC-08464

                 COMMONWEALTH   vs.   CHARLES ROBINSON.

         Barnstable.    September 11, 2023. - March 22, 2024.

     Present:     Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Kafker, Wendlandt,
                            & Georges, JJ.1

Homicide. Practice, Criminal, Appeal, Competency to stand
     trial, Assistance of counsel, Presumptions and burden of
     proof, Judicial discretion, New trial. Evidence,
     Competency, Expert opinion. Constitutional Law, Assistance
     of counsel.

     Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court
Department on May 1, 2000.

     Following review by this court, 482 Mass. 741 (2019), a
second amended motion for a new trial, filed on September 2,
2020, was considered by Mark C. Gildea, J.

     Joseph F. Krowski for the defendant.
     Rose-Ellen El Khoury, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.

     1 Justice Lowy participated in the deliberation on this case
prior to his retirement.
                                                                       2

    BUDD, C.J.    On August 21, 2000, the defendant, Charles

Robinson, was convicted of murder in the first degree in

connection with the shooting death of Edward Figueroa.     The

defendant appealed from the conviction.   He also filed a motion

for a new trial alleging multiple errors by trial counsel, which

we remanded to the Superior Court.   The direct appeal was argued

before the motion for a new trial was heard and decided.       After

plenary review, we affirmed the conviction and declined to grant

extraordinary relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.     See

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 482 Mass. 741, 742 (2019).     The

defendant's motion for a new trial thereafter was denied.        He

appealed from the denial, arguing that the judge erred in

concluding that the defendant was not entitled to a new trial

due to incompetency and ineffective assistance of counsel.        We

now affirm that ruling.

    Background.   We present the relevant factual and procedural

background as taken from the record, reserving certain details

for later discussion.

    1.   The homicide.2   The victim sold marijuana for the

defendant and relied on friends to drive him to the defendant's

    2  The evidence presented in the defendant's trial is
summarized in Commonwealth v. Robinson, 482 Mass. 741, 742-744
(2019). We provide a condensed version of events as the jury
could have found them.
                                                                     3

home to pick up the marijuana.    On the evening of the murder,

the defendant went to the victim's apartment, where he scolded

the victim and threatened to slap and punch him because he did

not have access to a car.    When the victim's girlfriend returned

to the apartment later that evening, she found the victim dead

with multiple gunshot wounds.

     2.   The lockup conversation.   On the fifth day of trial,

trial counsel had a conversation with the defendant in the court

house lockup area about whether the defendant would testify.

During the conversation, the defendant made various

nonresponsive comments.3    However, the defendant ultimately

     3 Trial counsel had a stenographer present for the
conversation. The following is excerpted from the transcript:

     Trial counsel: "What is your -- what do you -- what do you
     want to say about whether or not you will testify?"

     . . .

     The defendant: "Well, I feel that I shouldn't take part --
     excuse my English on that one. This is not my court."

     Trial counsel: "No. I understand. . . . Do you have any
     -- do you have any questions for me about what we're doing
     now, what I'm asking you to comment on?"

     The defendant: "Well, it's just this is -- this is a very
     Godly, Christly, Jesus Christ type of situation. And I'm
     not sure you're representing me correctly here."

     . . .

     Trial counsel: "And the question I'm asking now of you
     about whether or not you wish to give testimony, I
     personally don't think there is much you could say that
                                                                     4

stated that he was "clear on" what trial counsel was asking and

"would not like to take the stand."   During the conversation,

trial counsel suggested to the defendant that he might require a

    could assist you in the trial; and that's why I'm asking
    you these things."

    The defendant:   "My testimony would be in my music."

    . . .

    Trial counsel: "Well, Charles, do you know what you're
    here for? I mean, you understand my function and the
    District Attorney's and the Judge's function, right? I
    mean, you're not getting into something --"

    The defendant:   "All right."

    Trial counsel:   "-- where you're confused, are you?"

    The defendant:   "No."

    Trial counsel: "I know you're an extremely intelligent
    man. So you're not confused about what's going on this
    week, right?"

    The defendant:   "Well, yes, I am rather confused."

    Trial counsel:   "What are you confused about?"

    The defendant:   "Excuse me.    Excuse my English.   Nothing."

    Trial counsel: "Your English isn't bad. What do you mean?
    What's the matter with your English? I'm having no trouble
    understanding you."

    The defendant [to stenographer]:     "Put down some laughs."

    . . .

    Trial counsel: "[T]his concerns me when you start talking
    like this, laughing like you don't really know what's going
    on. You almost seem to me to [be] calling out for me to
    get a psychiatrist or something to talk to you."
                                                                    5

psychiatric examination.   However, trial counsel did not raise

any concerns related to the defendant's competency or mental

health with the judge after the lockup conversation or at any

time during trial.

    3.   Postconviction.   On August 22, 2000, the day after his

conviction, and at the request of his appellate counsel, Dr.

Carol E. Montgomery evaluated the defendant and concluded in her

report that he had no symptoms of mental illness and that no

follow up was necessary.   A little over seven months later, the

defendant was committed involuntarily to Bridgewater State

Hospital (Bridgewater) for "symptoms of a manic psychosis."     See

G. L. c. 123, § 18 (a).    Later that year, the defendant filed a

motion for a new trial alleging that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence on

the defendant's lack of competency to stand trial.

    The defendant was transferred back and forth between

Bridgewater and State prison over the next few years.    In

December 2003, Dr. David Rosmarin diagnosed the defendant with

schizoaffective disorder and "periods of mania" that could be

controlled with medication.   Rosmarin also opined that a

psychiatric evaluation at the time of trial "would have clearly

shown [the defendant] to be incompetent."    In June 2004, at an

evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion for a new trial

based on the issue of competency, the judge suspended the
                                                                   6

hearing and ordered a psychological evaluation for the defendant

due to the defendant's behavior.   See G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a).

Because proceedings were delayed due to the defendant's ensuing

periods of incompetency and consequent institutionalizations, on

March 16, 2011, the judge issued an order:

    (a) "that the court will take no further action on the
    prior motions";

    (b) "that the defendant may file an amended motion . . .
    that clearly sets forth the factual and legal bases for
    relief";

    (c) "that the amended motion must be accompanied by either
    a detailed supporting affidavit of an appropriate mental
    health professional or the affidavit of counsel together
    with the detailed clinical report of an appropriate mental
    health professional"; and

    (d) "that in the event the court conducts a hearing on the
    amended motion[,] said hearing will commence anew, without
    reliance upon the testimony and arguments presented on past
    occasions."

    In support of his amended motion submitted in 2014, the

defendant employed Dr. Ronald S. Ebert to evaluate the

defendant's competency.   Based on his "clinical opinion to a

reasonable degree of psychological certainty," Ebert concluded

in his report that the defendant "was not competent to stand

trial on [the day of the lockup conversation]."   He also noted

that the defendant "was demonstrating signs of major mental

illness" during the lockup conversation "but was, as usual,

trying to hide them."
                                                                     7

    In 2016 and 2019, respectively, the Commonwealth and

appellate counsel each had an expert assess whether the

defendant was competent at the time of trial.    They arrived at

nearly opposite conclusions.    The Commonwealth's expert, Dr.

Martin J. Kelly, concluded that the defendant "did not suffer

from a mental disease, mental defect or other psychiatric

condition that resulted in the inability to have a rational and

factual understanding of the proceedings and to cooperate with

his attorney."    The defendant's expert, Dr. Frank DiCataldo,

concluded that the defendant was psychotic at the time of trial,

and that his psychosis "likely" distorted his ability to

understand the proceedings and impaired his ability to consult

with his attorney.

    In September 2020, the defendant amended his motion for a

new trial, submitting DiCataldo's report to support his claim of

incompetency.    In addition to claiming ineffective assistance of

counsel for failing to raise the incompetency issue, the

defendant included three additional reasons that his trial

counsel was ineffective:    (1) failure to move to dismiss the

case based on an error in the grand jury proceedings, (2)

failure to move to suppress cell site location information

(CSLI) that tied the defendant to the crime scene at the

relevant time period, and (3) failure "reasonably to

communicate" with the defendant.    On July 30, 2021, a different
                                                                    8

judge (motion judge) denied the motion without a hearing, and

the defendant appealed.

    Discussion.   1.   Scope and standard of review.    The

defendant's direct appeal initially was stayed so that his first

motion for a new trial could be decided.     When the hearing on

that motion was suspended, the stay on the direct appeal was

lifted, and we heard and decided the direct appeal.     Because the

defendant filed his first motion for a new trial prior to the

issuance of the rescript for the direct appeal, he need not

petition the single justice as gatekeeper for leave to appeal

from the denial of the claims in that original motion.        See

G. L. c. 278, § 33E.   See also Commonwealth v. Raymond, 450

Mass. 729, 729 n.1 (2008).    However, the claims added to the

defendant's amended motion for a new trial after the direct

appeal was decided -- namely, the ineffective assistance of

counsel claims unrelated to his competency to stand trial -- are

not reviewable without first seeking leave from the gatekeeper.

See G. L. c. 278, § 33E.     We review the remaining claims

underlying the defendant's first motion for a new trial for an

abuse of discretion.   See Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 Mass.

491, 498 (2020) ("A motion for a new trial is addressed to the

sound discretion of the judge.    '[A]n appellate court will

examine the motion judge's conclusion only to determine whether
                                                                       9

there has been a significant error of law or other abuse of

discretion'" [citation omitted]).

    2.   Evidentiary hearing.    As an initial matter, the

defendant claims that the motion judge erred by denying the

motion without an evidentiary hearing on the question of the

defendant's competency to stand trial.     Like the decision on a

motion for a new trial, the decision whether to hold an

evidentiary hearing or to decide the motion based on affidavits

and other documents "is left largely to the sound discretion of

the judge."    Commonwealth v. Toney, 385 Mass. 575, 579 (1982),

quoting Commonwealth v. Stewart, 383 Mass. 253, 257 (1981).

    A judge may decide a motion for a new trial on the papers

alone "if no substantial issue is raised by the motion or

affidavits."    Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (3), as appearing in 435

Mass. 1501 (2001).   "In determining whether a 'substantial

issue' meriting an evidentiary hearing under rule 30 has been

raised, we look not only at the seriousness of the issue

asserted, but also to the adequacy of the defendant's showing on

the issue raised."     Stewart, 383 Mass. at 257-258.   Although the

judge recognized the question of the defendant's competency as a

serious issue, he determined that an evidentiary hearing was not

required based on the defendant's submissions.    There was no

abuse of discretion.
                                                                    10

     The documents presented to the judge included, among

others, expert reports and other evaluations of the defendant's

mental health, the trial transcript, and the transcribed

conversation in the lockup between the defendant and trial

counsel.4

     The judge determined that an evidentiary hearing was not

necessary to decide the motion where the dispute centers on the

conclusion each party draws from an undisputed record.   See

Commonwealth v. Shuman, 445 Mass. 268, 279 (2005) (dispute among

experts does not automatically require evidentiary hearing).

This is especially true here, where the defendant requested an

evidentiary hearing in 2021 that would involve the testimony of

expert witnesses who opined in 2016 and 2019 respectively on the

defendant's competency at a trial that took place in 2000.     See

Commonwealth v. Wheeler, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 631, 640 (2001)

("Given the passage of time, the dimming of memories, and the

deaths of the primary witnesses . . . an evidentiary hearing was

likely to be of more theoretical than actual assistance").     At

bottom, there was no showing that, in addition to the evidence

     4 The defendant also submitted affidavits from the
defendant's mother and the mother of his children, describing
the defendant's unusual behavior in the years prior to the
murder. The judge concluded that testimony from these affiants
would be unhelpful as there was no indication that they would
provide information beyond what was contained in the affidavits.
See Commonwealth v. DeVincent, 421 Mass. 64, 68 (1995).
                                                                     11

submitted, an evidentiary hearing would have aided the judge in

deciding the issue.      See Commonwealth v. Goodreau, 442 Mass.

341, 348 (2004).    Thus, the judge did not abuse his discretion

by deciding the motion without one.5

     3.   Claims.   a.    Incompetency claim.   It is

unconstitutional under both the Fourteenth Amendment to the

United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts

Declaration of Rights to try (and convict) a person who is not

competent to stand trial.     See Commonwealth v. Chatman, 473

Mass. 840, 846 (2016) (Chatman II).      Rather than being dependent

upon the "presence or absence of any particular psychiatric

diagnosis," whether a defendant is competent to stand trial

depends on his or her "functional abilities."      Id. at 846-847,

quoting Goodreau, 442 Mass. at 350.      That is, a defendant is

competent to stand trial if he or she (1) has "sufficient

present ability to consult with his [or her] counsel with a

reasonable degree of rational understanding," and (2) has a

     5 The defendant also argues that he is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing because the 2011 order directing the
defendant to file an amended motion for a new trial "presumed a
future hearing." This argument is misplaced. The order
provides that "in the event the court conducts a hearing on the
amended motion[,] said hearing will commence anew" (emphasis
added). Thus, contrary to the defendant's contention, there was
never an underlying presumption that a new hearing would be held
on his motion.
                                                                     12

"rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings"

(citation omitted).    Chatman II, supra at 847.

    If a defendant raises the issue of his competency before or

during trial, the Commonwealth has the burden to prove both

prongs by a preponderance of the evidence.      See Commonwealth v.

Brown, 449 Mass. 747, 760 (2007).    However, where, as here, the

defendant failed to raise the issue until after his conviction,

it is he who has the burden of proof.      The defendant must

demonstrate "by a preponderance of the evidence that the

Commonwealth would not have prevailed had the issue been raised

at trial."   Chatman II, 473 Mass. at 847, quoting Commonwealth

v. Chatman, 466 Mass. 327, 336 (2013) (Chatman I).      That is, the

"defendant bears the burden of establishing that, had the issue

been raised before or during trial, the Commonwealth could not

have proved either the first or the second prong of the

competency test."     Chatman II, supra.   To satisfy this burden,

"the defendant need not make a showing that he was incompetent;

instead, [he] may satisfy his . . . burden by showing 'that the

weight of the evidence of competenc[y] and the weight of the

evidence of incompetenc[y] are in equipoise.'"      Id., quoting

Chatman I, supra at 336 n.7.     The judge concluded that the

defendant did not make such a showing.      We agree.

    The defendant and the Commonwealth each engaged an expert

to render an opinion as to whether the transcribed lockup
                                                                  13

conversation evidenced that the defendant had a mental illness

at that time affecting his competency to stand trial.

     The defendant's expert, DiCataldo, contended that the

defendant's unusual statements during the lockup conversation

were "indicative of underlying psychotic thinking."   DiCataldo

concluded that the defendant was "psychotic" at the time of

trial, and that the "psychosis likely distort[ed] his rational

understanding of the proceedings against him and significantly

impair[ed] his ability to meaningfully consult with his

attorney."6

     Although DiCataldo referenced Montgomery's report, in which

she arrived at the opposite conclusion after examining the

defendant four days after the lockup conversation, he made no

attempt to explain the variance.   Moreover, in noting that other

evaluators subsequently opined that the defendant was mentally

ill, DiCataldo did not contend with the fact that the first such

diagnosis did not occur until almost eight months after his

trial.

     The Commonwealth's expert, Kelly, opined that the lockup

conversation was not an indication that the defendant was

     6 DiCataldo did not reach a conclusion regarding the
defendant's competency to stand trial, stating, "To observe his
psychosis would have required directly talking with him and
asking him about his perceptions and beliefs about the trial
proceedings."
                                                                   14

mentally ill, and that he was competent to stand trial.

Remarking that an acute psychiatric condition would have

manifested itself during the trial, Kelly noted that there was

nothing in the trial transcript indicating that the defendant

behaved in an unusual manner at all.

    Kelly also found relevant the results of Montgomery's

evaluation of the defendant the day after he was convicted (four

days after the lockup conversation).   Specifically, Montgomery

observed that the defendant was calm and cooperative, his speech

was "well modulated," and his thought process was "organized"

and "goal oriented."   She also noted that the defendant did not

complain of problems with sleep, concentration, or

hallucinations.   Montgomery concluded that the defendant did not

suffer from any mental illness at that time and that a follow-up

appointment was not necessary.   As a result, it was Kelly's

opinion that rather than documenting a "delusional or psychotic

mental condition," the transcribed lockup conversation reflected

a realization on the part of the defendant that "it was not

particularly in his interest" to have the conversation recorded.

    Given the record, the judge credited the opinion of Kelly,

the Commonwealth's expert, which was based on the information

closest in time to the defendant's condition at trial, and thus
                                                                    15

the most salient.7   The judge ultimately concluded that the

defendant made a logical decision not to testify in his own

defense and communicated that decision to his attorney.     There

was no abuse of discretion.

     b.   Ineffective assistance of counsel.    The defendant

contends that his counsel was ineffective on a number of fronts,

including counsel's (1) failure to raise the competency issue,

(2) failure to "reasonably . . . communicate with" the

defendant, (3) failure to move to dismiss the case based on an

error in the grand jury proceedings, and (4) failure to move to

suppress CSLI that tied the defendant to the crime scene at the

relevant time period.   However, as mentioned supra, only claims

raised before the issuance of the rescript for the direct appeal

are reviewable under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, without a preliminary

determination by a gatekeeper.     As the first motion for a new

trial raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for

trial counsel's failure to raise the competency issue at trial,

we limit our review accordingly.

     When reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

under § 33E, we evaluate whether a substantial likelihood of a

     7 As for the affidavits from the family members, the judge
considered the credibility of the affidavits in light of the
family members' motives and ultimately afforded them little, if
any, weight. See Commonwealth v. Grant, 426 Mass. 667, 673
(1998).
                                                                     16

miscarriage of justice occurred.     See Commonwealth v. Yat Fung

Ng, 489 Mass. 242, 249 (2022), S.C., 491 Mass. 247 (2023).     That

is, we determine whether any error on the part of defense

counsel was likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion.

See id.    In order to prevail on the theory that failing to raise

competency as an issue constituted ineffective assistance of

counsel, the defendant must show that the claim "would have been

successful."    Commonwealth v. Comita, 441 Mass. 86, 91 (2004).

As the motion judge correctly concluded that the competency

claim lacked merit, the defendant failed to make the necessary

showing.   There was no error.

    Relatedly, the defendant contends that trial counsel was

ineffective because he failed "reasonably to communicate with

[the defendant]."    Although the defendant's argument encompasses

the entire attorney-client relationship, for the reasons

explained supra, we focus on trial counsel's work during and

after the lockup conversation.     According to the defendant, had

trial counsel "better appreciated [the defendant's] psychosis

during the lockup conversation," counsel would have requested a

mental health evaluation and the defendant would not have been

convicted.     This argument is without merit for reasons stated

supra.

    Moreover, "to provide a ground for a new trial, the

breakdown of the attorney-client relationship must be such that
                                                                       17

it leads to an apparently unjust verdict, prevents an adequate

defense or threatens the defendant's right to a fair trial"

(citations and quotation omitted).    Commonwealth v. Tuitt, 393

Mass. 801, 806 (1985).    The defendant's unusual comments

notwithstanding, the lockup conversation provides no evidence of

a breakdown of the attorney-client relationship at all, much

less one that requires a new trial.

    4.    Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.    The defendant

requests relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, in the form of a new

trial.    We reviewed the entire record of this case when it was

before this court on direct appeal and rejected the defendant's

request for extraordinary relief under § 33E at that time.       See

Robinson, 482 Mass. at 753.    We see no basis to revisit that

ruling.

    Conclusion.    For the foregoing reasons, the order denying

the defendant's motion for a new trial is affirmed.

                                      So ordered.