Court Opinion

ID: 9844861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:10:32.989791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:45.637019
License: Public Domain

TROUT, Justice,
concurring in part and concurring in the result of part III.
I concur in all parts of the Court’s opinion except part III in which I concur in the result only. I write separately to express my disagreement with the reasoning employed by the Court in reaching the conclusion that a mistake Oar might have made as to the age of the victims is no defense to I.C. § 18-1508A By relying upon an “immemorial tradition of the common law” to justify this result despite the statute’s express requirement that the accused possess a specific criminal intent, the Court manifests a paternalism that conflicts with the requirement of I.C. § 18-201(1). Moreover, any heightened duty the Court might extend toward younger children to support an exception to the requirement of specific intent is unnecessary in this case. The district court’s order may be affirmed without blindly accepting the proposition that mistake of fact as to a minor victim’s age in sexual offenses is never a defense.
As Justice Johnson correctly points out in his dissent, specific intent is certainly an element of I.C. § 18-1508A; however, that fact does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that a mistake of fact the defendant might have made as to the victim’s age must be presented to the jury as a cognizable defense.
In determining whether a mistake of fact can be a defense to a crime, we should not simply characterize the offense as a general or specific intent crime and make this determinative of the issue. The analysis should instead proceed beyond that to whether a particular state of mind is an element required by the statute’s terms and, if a mistaken belief of fact negates the existence of the required mental state, only then should it serve as a defense. I.C. § 18-201(1); see also LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.1 (1986). The question is whether the state of mind of the accused defines an *345essential element of the crime, and whether a mistake of fact would negate that essential element. In this case the state of mind of the defendant does define an essential element of the crime. The mental element required by the statute is that the defendant have “the intent of arousing, appealing to or gratifying the lust, passion, or sexual desires of such person, minor child, or third party.” Here, a mistake as to the victim’s age would not in any way negate the existence of the specific intent element; that is, Oar’s intent to arouse, appeal to, or gratify- his carnal desires. Thus mistake of fact is irrelevant to the criminal charge here and cannot serve as a defense to the crime. I agree that the district court was correct in not instructing the jury on the mistake of fact defense, although I do so for a different reason than that articulated by the Court.