Court Opinion

ID: 9616387
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:46:27.587971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:58.050668
License: Public Domain

Justice Meyer
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the letter sent by defendant company to several of plaintiffs’ business associates constitutes libel per se because it contains the assertion, “[w]e at Northern Star Company did not authorize such a price list.” I do not believe that the phrase in question, when given its ordinary, everyday meaning, can only be interpreted as defamatory. Rather, the most that can be said is that the words can fairly and reasonably be interpreted in two ways, one of which is defamatory and the other of which is not.
In order to find a publication to be libelous per se, a court must construe the writing alone, without innuendo, colloquium or explanatory circumstances and find that the publication (1) charges that a person has committed an infamous crime; (2) charges a person with having an infectious disease; (3) tends to impeach a person in that person’s trade or profession; or (4) otherwise tends to subject one to ridicule, contempt or disgrace. Renwick v. News and Observer and Renwick v. Greensboro News, 310 N.C. 312, 312 S.E.2d 405, reh’g denied, 310 N.C. 749, 315 S.E.2d 704, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858, 83 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1984); Flake v. News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938). “[DJefamatory words to be libelous per se must be susceptible of but one meaning and of such nature that the court can presume as a matter of law that they tend to disgrace and degrade the party or hold him up to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or cause him to be shunned and avoided.” Flake, 212 N.C. at 786, 195 S.E. at 60 (emphasis added). I cannot conclude that this letter is susceptible of but one interpretation, which is defamatory when considered alone without innuendo or explanatory circumstances. The worst that can be said of the letter is that it is reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning. See Renwick, 310 N.C. 312, 312 S.E.2d 405. I find that the letter is, at the very least, equally susceptible of a nondefamatory interpretation. It therefore cannot be libelous per se.
*229The principle of common sense requires that courts shall understand [publications] as other people would. The question always is how would ordinary men naturally understand the publication. The fact that supersensitive persons with morbid imaginations may be able, by reading between the lines of [a publication], to discover some defamatory meaning therein is. not sufficient to make it libelous.
Flake, 212 N.C. at 786, 195 S.E. at 60 (citations omitted).
The assertion, “[w]e at Northern Star Company did not authorize such a price list,” when read by a typical recipient of this letter, could very reasonably be interpreted to mean that there was a simple breakdown in communications or an inadvertent mistake in the price list through the fault of either or both parties. I concede that if such a statement imputes a lack of qualities which the ■public, in this case the buyers of defendant’s product, has a right to expect of a plaintiff in its calling, it is properly labeled libel per se. Such would be the case if defendant indicated that plaintiffs habitually published price lists without defendant’s authorization, or repeatedly made mistakes in the transmission of those prices. However, the fact that defendant informed its customers that on one occasion its broker sent a price list that defendant did not authorize does not rise to the level of accusing that broker of incompetence or untrustworthiness, nor would a typical buyer automatically reach that conclusion.
Our case law defines the applicable category of libel per se as those publications which tend to “impeach a person in that person’s trade or profession.” Renwick, 310 N.C. at 317, 312 S.E.2d at 409. Although this category could be interpreted as encompassing a wide spectrum of perceived wrongs, my research of North Carolina case law reveals that our courts have tended to recognize more blatantly derogatory statements than the one at issue here as defamatory per se in the business context. The words must contain an imputation which is necessarily harmful in its effect on plaintiffs’ business. See, e.g., Badame v. Lampke, 242 N.C. 755, 89 S.E.2d 466 (1955) (where plaintiff alleged that defendant, a business competitor, spoke words over the telephone to a customer which imputed to plaintiff the reputation of engaging in “shady deals,” the words were slander per se); Lay v. Publishing Co., 209 N.C. 134, 183 S.E. 416 (1936) (it was libel per se for newspaper to publish that plaintiff was the leader of a strike and had been arrested *230for trespassing on mill property); Broadway v. Cope, 208 N.C. 85, 179 S.E. 452 (1935) (statement by butcher that his competitor had slaughtered a mad-dog-bitten cow was defamatory per se); Pentuff v. Park, 194 N.C. 146, 138 S.E. 616 (1927) (newspaper article labeling minister an “immigrant ignoramus” and calling him discourteous to those who disagreed with him on the subject of evolution affected his calling and was libelous per se); U v. Duke University, 91 N.C. App. 171, 371 S.E.2d 701, disc. rev. denied, 323 N.C. 629, 374 S.E.2d 590 (1988) (statements by defendant to plaintiff’s colleague that plaintiff was a liar, deceitful, absolutely useless, and a fraud impeached plaintiff in his profession and constituted slander per se); Talbert v. Mauney, 80 N.C. App. 477, 343 S.E.2d 5 (1986) (allegations that president of bank published statements that one of borrowers forged his letters of credit and that he was drug dealer constituted allegations of slander per se); Morris v. Bruney, 78 N.C. App. 668, 338 S.E.2d 561 (1986) (defendant’s statements that plaintiff was immature, unintelligent, and unfit as mother were not slander actionable per se as statements made to affect plaintiff in her trade or business as nursery school worker); Matthews, Cremins, McLean, Inc. v. Nichter, 42 N.C. App. 184, 256 S.E.2d 261, cert. denied, 298 N.C. 569, 261 S.E.2d 123 (1979) (letters, which were sent to television stations and which asserted that advertising agency breached its contracts and failed to pay its bills, tended to injure agency’s business reputation, making the letters libelous per se).
The trial court treated defendant’s letter as libel per se and charged the jury that if it found that the letter was “understood by the third person in a defamatory way, that is, that the statement reasonably tended to impeach or injure the Plaintiff in his trade or profession,” then it would be the jury’s duty to answer the issue “yes.” In my opinion, defendant’s letter was clearly not defamatory per se, and the issue should not have been submitted to the jury.
Instructions on middle-tier libel, libel per quod, or both would have been appropriate in this case had they been properly alleged in plaintiffs’ complaint. However, plaintiffs’ complaint failed to bring the letter within the second class of libel, since it did not allege that the letter is susceptible of two interpretations, one defamatory, and that the defamatory meaning was intended and was so understood by those to whom the publication was made. Renwick, 310 N.C. at 316-17, 312 S.E.2d at 408; Cathy’s Boutique v. Winston-*231Salem Joint Venture, 72 N.C. App. 641, 325 S.E.2d 283 (1985). Further, the complaint failed to bring the letter within the libel per quod category because plaintiffs did not allege special damages. Renwick, 310 N.C. at 317, 312 S.E.2d at 408. While certain allegations of the complaint might be interpreted to allege special damages, the complaint refers to those allegations as supporting only a libel per se. If, as I have concluded, the writing does not constitute libel per se, defendant is entitled to remand of this case directing the entry of an order granting its motion for directed verdict on the libel issue.
Justice WHICHARD joins in this dissenting opinion.