Court Opinion

ID: 9677036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:41:38.667114+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:53.266943
License: Public Domain

JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, Judge, . dissenting. Despite the majority’s heavy-handed efforts to demonize Ms. Krass, the simple fact is that the record in this case is completely devoid of even a suggestion that Ms. Krass in any way abused her children or that Ms. Krass was even aware of any abuse at the time that it allegedly took place. Moreover, the record indicates that Ms. Krass had good reason to doubt that the alleged abuse actually took place. The so-called abuse about which the majority rails is merely an allegation made by the now nearly fifteen-year-old alleged victim, C.K., against her now former stepfather. Despite the trial judge’s repeated efforts to keep this information out of the record, we know that these allegations were belied by the physical evidence. For instance, the alleged victim claimed that her ex-stepfather had repeatedly subjected her to full penetration sex, yet a forensic medical examination revealed that she had a “normal” hymen, and despite her claims that her ex-stepfather had caused her room to “smell like sperm,” crime scene investigators were unable to recover any physical evidence in that room. | mFurthermore, Ms. Krass proffered testimony that C.K. had recanted to two of her friends, and Ms. Krass also managed to get into the record that she knew her daughter had a propensity for prevarication. A taped interview of D.K., C.K’s now ten-year-old brother, was purported to be corroboration of C.K’s allegations, but on cross-examination, it was revealed that D.K. never professed to witness any sexual abuse.1  Additionally, C.K’s former counselor, Donna Sheppard, who is no longer practicing in that field, revealed on cross-examination that C.K. was surprised and angered when she found out that her stepfather was not her biological father. Only then did C.K. make her allegations. It was also revealed at the hearing, much to the trial judge’s obvious irritation, that the Garland County prosecuting attorney had declined to prosecute the alleged perpetrator.2 Nonetheless, the trial court found — and the majority has concurred— that ADHS had made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate Ms. Krass because it had offered Ms. Krass counseling that required her to believe allegations that were directly contradicted by the medical evidence and to “support” C.K. in making these allegations. But the most _Jjj disturbing aspect of this scenario is that Ms. Krass was summarily dismissed from this “counseling” when she did not immediately subscribe to these requirements. But the story gets worse. It seems that the counseling sessions conducted by Sheppard and her erstwhile employer involving Ms. Krass and her children were terminated after the so-called “taping incident.” Apparently, Ms. Krass had become so concerned about how the so-called “therapy” sessions were being conducted that she decided to surreptitiously tape a session. When Ms. Krass attempted to use a transcript of the session to impeach Sheppard at the termination hearing, the trial judge prodded the attorney ad litem and the attorney for ADHS into objecting.3 Perhaps not surprisingly, when those officers of the court got around to offering an objection, the trial judge sustained it. I cannot accept that it was wholly frivolous to argue that it was an abuse of discretion to prevent Ms. Krass’s trial counsel from impeaching the witnesses who testified that the only efforts that ADHS made to “rehabilitate” Ms. Krass would be futile and even counter-productive. However, there is more. The trial judge, through more than a half-dozen evi-dentiary rulings, many made sua sponte, denied Ms. Krass the right to even present her case in anything approaching a cohesive fashion. It was Ms. Krass’s theory of the case that her actions in not embracing her now former daughter’s accusations were rationally based, therefore her dismissal from counseling could not be ascribed to simple recalcitrance. 112However, the trial judge apparently concluded that any evidence that did not support termination of Ms. Krass’s parental rights was “not relevant.” I disagree with the majority’s dismissal of these evidentia-ry rulings as being merely an effort to attack the adjudication. These rulings comprehensively denied Ms. Krass her right to put on a case in defense of ADHS’s effort to strip her of her parental rights. The record is clear that Ms. Krass at least physically availed herself of every so-called reunification service that was foisted upon her. She did not quit the counseling, the counseling quit her when she did not join in the counselor’s blatant advocacy of C.K’s abuse allegations. I submit that an argument challenging the adequacy of the so-called “services” offered by ADHS would not be wholly frivolous. In Adams v. Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services, 375 Ark. 402, 291 S.W.3d 172 (2009), the supreme court recently stated what it believed to be the procedural blueprint promulgated in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), the seminal case that its progeny, Linker-Flores v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 359 Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d 739 (2004), purports to follow. The Adams court stated: [Counsel’s] role as advocate requires that he support his client’s appeal to the best of his ability. Of course, if counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court and request permission to withdraw. That request must, however, be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal. A copy of counsel’s brief should be furnished the indigent and time allowed him to raise any points that he chooses; the court — not counsel — then proceeds, after a full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous. If it so finds it may grant | ^counsel’s request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal insofar as federal requirements are concerned, or proceed to a decision on the merits, if state law so requires. On the other hand, if it finds any of the legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not frivolous) it must, prior to decision, afford the indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the appeal. (Emphasis added.) With the instant case becoming the new definition of what errors may be considered “wholly frivolous,” we have indeed moved into a new era of constitutional law in termination-of-parental-rights cases. The fact that the majority has found it necessary to advocate so passionately for the termination of Ms. Krass’s parental rights certainly begs the question about whether we should have allowed this case to be submitted in no-merit format.  . The tape was introduced into evidence and included in the record, but not abstracted or copied for the addendum. The majority does not explain why this violation of the requirements set out in Supreme Court Rule 6-9 does not mandate rebriefing, as is routinely the case in criminal cases where Rule 6-9’s counterpart, Rule 4-3, governs.   . In a manner customary to similar inquisitions in seventeenth century Salem, Massachusetts, the trial judge stated: "[Y]ou do not need forensic evidence or medical evidence that nationally we have many times had convictions without that, [sic] Just because this particular county doesn’t follow what is the national best practice I don't see how that’s relevant at all.” (Emphasis added.)   . The trial judge asked, "Now are you guys going to agree to admit this even though it was with unclean hands obtained?”