Court Opinion

ID: 9530641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:01:59.341425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:12.526859
License: Public Domain

HONORABLE R. V. BOTTOMLY, District Judge,
sitting in place of Mr. Justice Castles, dissenting.
The facts of this case stand as an appalling example of the *111extreme abuse of the powers of the State of Montana, and the dismal failure of justice to one of its citizens.
Article III, § 14 of the Montana Constitution requires the State of Montana to first pay or tender into court for an owner of property, its value prior to the taking. The State of Montana instead,, on or about the 1st day of June, 1960, after plaintiff had been fraudulently done out of his right to buy real property, went upon the same property, and at a time of day the plaintiff was engaged in operating his ready mix concrete business, bulldozed the business and plant into a highway fill. To this day, some three years later, despite the constitutional guarantee, the efforts of two able attorneys; the matter having been before the District Court on three occasions and the Supreme Court on two occasions, not one penny has been paid, nor any sum deposited in court for and on behalf of the plaintiff.
Now this court tells the plaintiff to begin again. If the plaintiff had a valuable right in the first instance, that right has for all practical purposes, vanished in the maze that followed.
The facts as they appear in this action, and the previous action of State Highway Comm’n v. Alexander, 140 Mont. 436, 372 P.2d 426, are generally as follows:
Prior to June 1, 1960, plaintiff was the owner of a concrete ready mix manufacturing plant located at Superior, Montana. Plaintiff purchased the material and equipment for the plant, leased land for the plant site, built it with his own hands, and operated it since April 1958, and continued to do so until the afternoon of June 1, 1960.
The land was uniquely situated, making it favorably positioned for a plant capable of a gravity feed operation.
Prior to June 1, 1960, the lessee of the property on which the plant was situated was willing to sell the land to plaintiff. However, the State of Montana, wanting the real property for highway purposes, induced the lessee to refrain from buying, and the lessor to sell the fee to the State on the basis the State *112would compensate lessee for Ms plant. The State Mstead waited until the lease expired, gave plamtiff notice to vacate. Plaintiff refusing to do so, the State brought an unlawful detainer action, abandoned this action and next proceeded with the quiet title action. During the pendancy of the quiet title action, or about June 1, I960, the State entered upon the land and bulldozed a concrete plant and equipment into a highway fill.
The district court quieted title to the land in question in the State of Montana, and in addition found the title in the State was subject to a claim against the said property in favor of Dee W. Alexander, the plaintiff herein, in the amount of the fair market value of the concrete mixing plant as it existed on said property as of June 1, 1960, on the basis plaintiff had been the victim of a fraud.
The State of Montana filed an appeal from this judgment. Such appeal was dismissed. (State Highway Comm’n v. Alexander, supra.) Prior to such appeal being determined, plaintiff filed this action, basing his cause upon a claim against the State of Montana for breach of a constitutional obligation: The taking of property without first paying for it or depositing a sum equivalent to its value, and a second cause based upon the judgment rendered by the district court in the quiet title action.
This case was heard by the court with a jury, which sat beginning January 29, 1962. The jury awarded $24,500. The appeal from the quiet title judgment giving plaintiff “a claim” was decided June 6, 1962, by the Supreme Court. This court dismissed that appeal. The judgment in the quiet title action then became a final one.
Defendants moved for a new trial of the case heard before the court and jury, claiming irregularities in the proceedings; in the form of the verdict submitted, errors of law, excessive verdict, influence by passion and prejudice, and that the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict. The district court *113ruled adversely on this motion. Defendants then appealed from the verdict and judgment.
Defendants briefed and argued nine specifications of error in this cause. Three of the specifications went to the rulings on the pleadings, one specification claimed that the .jury verdict was not supported by the evidence, and the balance of the specifications went to instructions given or refused.
The State' defends this action on the anachronic concept of sovereignty, or that the sovereign, which is the people, acting in their behalf, will not and, therefore, can not do any wrong. In other words, that tbe plaintiff could not sue the State of Montana.
I am in agreement with the majority opinion that Article III, § 14 of the Montana Constitution is mandatory, prohibitory, and self-executing. This provision of the organic law is directory — a direction to the courts for its enforcement, and not to the Legislature (Less v. City of Butte, 28 Mont. 27, 72 P. 140, 61 L.R.A. 601), although the Legislature may pass enabling legislation not inconsistent with the provision. The constitutional provision itself grants consent of the state to be sued for breach thereof. Upon such breach an immediate obligation arises for which there is redress. The provision does not contemplate that upon a failure to comply, that an injured party will have only a claim. (State ex rel. Rotwitt v. Hickman, 9 Mont. 370, 23 P. 740, 8 L.R.A. 403; State ex rel Buck v. Hickman, 10 Mont. 497, 26 P. 386; Root v. Butte, Anaconda & Pacific Ry., 20 Mont. 354, 51 P. 155; Less v. City of Butte, supra, 28 Mont. 27, 72 P. 140, 61 L.R.A. 601; Rose v. State, (Cal. 1940) 105 P.2d 302.)
Had the State complied with the constitutional provision, it would have had the benefit of the rules governing damages and procedures in eminent domain. Not having first paid or deposited money representing the plant taken, a different yardstick is used to measure damages for the breach of this constitutional obligation. This is so because the plaintiff has not had *114available a sum representing his business investment in order to relocate, rebuild, earn a profit or, at his option, place his money upon interest. The State, therefore, becomes liable for an amount which will compensate the plaintiff for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated or not. R.C.M. 1947, § 17-401.
The foregoing opinion has found that the testimony of an expert witness, one Basil Hunt, and that of the plaintiff, the owner, to be speculative and conjectural. This finding was not necessary to the court’s final conclusion, which was that the jury’s verdict was obviously and palpably out of proportion to the injury done, as to be in excess of just compensation as provided for by Article III, § 14 of the Montana Constitution. In other words, this court finds the verdict was excessive.
Basil Hunt testified as an expert witness, it is said that he exhibited some experience in the concrete business. He is “damned by faint praise.” He qualifies as follows: He has been in the concrete business for thirty-five years; designed, owned and operated two concrete mixing plants; had been awarded a number of major concrete jobs for both federal, state and private operators; has been called and testified as an expert witness in the concrete field at least on one occasion; had appraised one of the largest concrete plants in the State of Montana for a private concern; had been called to revamp other concrete plants; had built, designed and supervised at least two other concrete plants for private concerns. He was acquainted with the plant in Superior, Montana, and had examined it shortly before June 1, 1960. His original purpose of being in Superior was to locate a concrete source for a major bridge job in Missoula, Montana. Plaintiff’s plant was unavailable because it was involved in possible litigation. An estimate of a replacement plant was made under Hunt’s supervision. According to Hunt’s testimony, it “represents a plant, a duplicate. of what would do the job. He couldn’t operate there, he had nothing to sell, so I had to figure, put a figure together *115that would relocate the plant. And that’s what this is (referring to Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 2).” Hunt’s recent work was to make available for major concrete jobs a concrete source. To do" this he had to consider the plant, its capacity, its location and labor supply, and determine current market price. He was well qualified as an expert in his field. He stated, prior to Exhibit No. 2 being introduced, that plaintiff’s plant was worth $35,019. Hunt’s testimony, taken by its four corners, indicated that his appraisal of plaintiff’s plant and business was made on the basis of what its current market value would be, determined by a replacement cost, an equivalent of the business and plant taken.
Exhibit No. 2 set forth item by item his appraisal, showing the dollars and cents valuation of each item making up the replacement value. The exhibit showed a total evaluation of $35,-019. To this exhibit there was an objection on the grounds it contained items not a part of the original plant. This objection was overruled and the exhibit was admitted, and this is considered prejudicial error. I think it is not. Hunt’s testimony was not only a board by board, nail by nail appraisal of plaintiff’s plant added up to a value sum. There was no necessity that it should be so. There was more involved than the material. It was intended as a replacement valuation of a going business, plant and equipment of similar capacity at current market price. Hunt testified that should new materials, plus labor, go into his estimate, it would be five times higher. In other words, he had considered depreciation.
And taking the evidence as a whole, it was adequately clear from the evidence that most of the additional items were necessary, because the substitute plant would not have available to it the unique location of the original plant. In other words, gravity feed was not available. Therefore, ramps, pumps and other items were essential to raise the materials and equipment to the top of the unit. Even if Hunt’s testimony was to be considered an item by item estimate, the items and costs were *116clearly brought out on cross-examination so that no one was in doubt as to what was or was not contained in the original structure. The jury’s verdict of $24,500 was $10,518 less than the estimate of the owner and expert. It was, in fact, $103 less than-all of the items objected to as not being incorporated in some measure in the original plant. It was within the extreme limits of the evidence. This court has held:
“If the witnesses state the items separately, it requires only an arithmetical calculation to reach a determination of the net result. Does it really matter whether this is done by the witnesses or by the jury? When the witness has stated the facts upon which his opinion is based- — thus furnishing the jury the means of judging of its trustworthiness — the mental process necessary to arrive at the net result may as well be that of the witness as of the jury. * * *
“In this case the witnesses were questioned fully as to the basis of their opinions. The jury, under the instructions of the court, assessed the damages as required by the statute, finding the items well within the extreme limits of the testimony. * * * we do not see how any prejudice was suffered. * * *
“It is said that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the verdict. # * * Most of them [witnesses] were practical farmers and business men who knew the lands in controversy, and, while their statements are conflicting and unsatisfactory upon material points, we cannot say that the evidence all together does not give substantial support to the findings of the jury. That this court must, under these circumstances, accept them as final is too well settled to permit further discussion.” Emphasis supplied. (Yellowstone Park R. R. Co. v. Bridger Coal Co., 34 Mont. 545, 560, 87 P. 963, 967.)
“This being so, and the court having approved the findings of the jury by denying appellants’ motion for a new trial, we must accept the result as conclusive. Helena & Livingston Smelting & Reduction Co. v. Lynch, 25 Mont. 497, 65 Pac. 919.” Interstate Power Co. v. Anaconda Copper Min. Co., 52 Mont. *117509, 516, 159 P. 408, 411. See also State Highway Comm’n v. Peterson, 134 Mont. 52, 328 P.2d 617.
To add cumulation to the speculative factor, it is said there was something wrong with evidence that the plaintiff salvaged some equipment from the plant. And at the same time there was no evidence from which a jury could determine salvage value. This evidence first appeared on cross-examination of the plaintiff by the State. The plaintiff had no duty to produce this evidence, or to show how he may have been benefited, if at all, or how much. The burden of this showing was upon the State. The State offered an instruction upon this, and essentially that instruction was given. No error could be predicated upon this point.
The majority holds that the owner’s testimony ivas not clear and convincing, so as to sustain his burden of proof. Basically this was his testimony, given without objection: He acquired the site by lease. The site was unique. He put together the plant piece by piece. He continued to improve the plant up until the State tore it down. He acquired and purchased all the materials that went into the plant. He owned and operated the plant since 1958. He testified the concrete plant had a value as a going business of $35,000. He testified that the plant and business would mix, deliver and pour one hundred yards of concrete in eight hours; that concrete was selling for $16 a yard, and his profit ivas $6 per yard in the year 1959. He testified concerning an exhibit showing figures, which by the transcript indicated that the materials in the plant were valued by him at $15,000. It is in this connection, concerning a $15,000 figure, that his testimony is said to be unclear and, therefore, not to sustain his burden of proof. This is the complete testimony as it relates to that figure:
“Q. Do you have an idea what it would cost you on June 1st, 1960, * * * to reproduce that building, yourself, if you were to do it yourself? A. Now? * * *
“Q. You have no idea what it would cost to reproduce that *118structure? A. It would cost $15,000 or better to build it, material alone * * *
“Q. Would cost how much? A. Would cost $15,000 or better, besides all the work and stuff.
“Q. How do you determine that, on what do you base your estimate? A. The materials and stuff in it, and labor and so forth, and the value of the water and everything, it takes all to make a concrete plant.” Emphasis supplied.
It is clearly inferable to me as a trial judge that in his answer the plaintiff thought the State wanted to know how a person made an estimate on a concrete plant, and plaintiff tried to explain, rather than to' infer, that plaintiff was including labor in his $15,000 figure. This is so because such fact was first implanted in his mind, what it would cost to build a plant if the labor supplied was his own. The plaintiff twice stated that, separately from labor, the cost would be $15,000. He goes on to state again:
“Q. You had no idea what the reproduction cost of the structure would be? * # * A. I don’t think you could start to do it for $15,000. *■ * *
“Q. What I mean, if the existing location were still there in the state you knew it before, do you have any idea what it would cost to reproduce the structure that you had there? * * * A. I think it Avould cost $15,000.
“Q. Hoav do you reach this $15,000 figure you stated? A. I think we had the figures on that. * * *
“Q. Mr. Alexander, have you had a chance to think how you Avould come to an evaluation. * * * How do you value something like this, hoAv did you reach this figure?
“PLAINTIFF: Objection. Counsel will state which figure he is referring to.
“STATE: $15,000 I believe.
“A. The figures are all on that paper as nearly as I could give them to you.
*119:“Q. Hid you prepare these figures? A. My wife wrote them down.
“Q. * * * You are familiar with these? A. Yes, I am.” Emphasis supplied.
Thereafter the State cross-examined extensively as to all the particulars concerning the plant. Pictures were introduced, and then the following:
“Q. You are saying that it would cost $15,000 to reproduce that? A. It would probably take more than that now.
“Q. Hid you give any amount for depreciation? A. I don’t think there would be any depreciation.
“Q. You don’t think so? A. I hope not. I tried to make it better all the time.
“Q. You never went to a contractor to get an estimate you said? A. I went to a contractor * * * and asked him what he would take to do the rough work. * * *
“Q. I see, you think a buyer on June 1st would be willing to pay $15,000 for that?
“PLAINTIFF: Objected to as assuming a fact not yet answered.
“Q. What do you think a buyer would pay for that? A. I think $35,000 for my plant because it was actually worth it.
“Q. Your opinion is $35,000? A. If I were to sell it.” Emphasis supplied.
What could be more clear and convincing as to what plaintiff meant?
The remaining portion of this opinion deals with the qualifications of an owner to testify as to value of property taken. Nowhere in the pleadings, in the transcript, in the brief or argument was this question ever raised. No objection was made to plaintiff’s testimony on the basis of his right to testify as to value, nor was any motion made to have it stricken. Nor was it raised by specification of error. It was not essential in any way to the decision herein.
In this case plaintiff was testifying only to the use to which *120he had been putting his property. He fully and amply demonstrated his qualifications to testify as an owner urider the test given by the majority opinion. Plaintiff’s testimony, in my opinion, was fully adequate to support the verdict in and of itself. It is not for this court to weigh the evidence of either Hunt or the plaintiff. That was the province of the jury.