Court Opinion

ID: 9951863
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 14:08:41.378603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:43:11.434487
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0196-22

J.M.,1

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

A.M.,

     Defendant-Respondent.
__________________________

                   Submitted December 12, 2023 – Decided March 19, 2024

                   Before Judges Sumners and Smith.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County,
                   Docket No. FM-14-1364-15.

                   Harriet Kellman Gordon, attorney for appellant.

                   Heymann & Fletcher, attorneys for respondent (Alix
                   Claps, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

1
 We use initials to refer to the parties and the minor child to protect their privacy
and preserve the confidentiality of these proceedings. R. 1:38-3(d)(13).
      In this post-judgment matrimonial dispute, plaintiff J.M. appeals from the

trial court's denial of reconsideration of its June 29, 2022 order compelling that

plaintiff's parenting time be supervised at plaintiff's sole expense , and denying

plaintiff's request to appoint counsel for the parties' minor child C.M. 2 Plaintiff

argues the court committed error by not holding a plenary hearing. She argues

for the first time on appeal that the court erred by failing to recuse itself. We

affirm, essentially for the reasons set forth in the trial court's cogent statement

of reasons. We summarize the facts and add the following additional comments.

                                         I.

      After eight years of marriage, the parties divorced in March 2016. The

divorce was memorialized in an amended final judgment of divorce, which

incorporated a marital settlement agreement.        The parties have two minor

children together, C.M. and E.M. Since 2016, the record shows plaintiff has

been in a relationship with her fiancé, J.S.

      Since the divorce, the parties have repeatedly litigated the children's

custody.   On April 23, 2021, the trial court heard defendant's emergent

application seeking temporary suspension of plaintiff's parenting time and

2
  We identify the parties and child in this matter by initials and pseudonyms to
protect the confidentiality of court records relating to child custody. R. 1:38-
3(d)(13).
                                                                              A-0196-22
                                         2
barring J.S.'s contact with the minor children. Defendant sought relief after an

incident where J.S. allegedly put C.M. in a chokehold and lifted her off the

ground. The trial court granted the application, making findings of fact.

      The court issued three orders modifying the April 23 order, on April 29,

June 9, and August 13, 2021. The orders relaxed the restrictions on plaintiff's

parenting time, but they each maintained the prohibition against J.S.'s contact

with the children. The orders contained other mandates for the parties including:

compliance with DCPP strictures; therapy for the parties as well as their children

and partners; use of a co-parenting coordinator; and conditioning further contact

between J.S. and the children on a therapist's recommendation.

      The children enrolled in therapy with a licensed counseling agency in

early May 2021, but stopped attending once plaintiff filed a complaint against

the agency. On November 5, 2021, the trial court appointed Joseph P. Cadacina

Esq. as guardian ad litem (GAL) for both children. The court further ordered

that the parties equally share the GAL costs. In the same order, the court

directed the parties to retain a new co-parenting therapist.

      On May 9, 2022, defendant again sought emergent relief, seeking sole

legal and residential custody of the minor children and suspension of plaintiff's

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parenting time. The court denied the application, finding the children were not

under immediate threat of irreparable harm.

      A week later, defendant moved to hold plaintiff in violation of litigant's

rights for failing to comply with prior orders by permitting contact between the

children and Striharsky. Defendant sought the same relief as in his May 9

motion, alleging the following violations:           plaintiff permitted C.M. to

communicate with J.S. via text; J.S. was present when plaintiff exercised her

parenting time; plaintiff left the children unsupervised in J.S.'s care; and plaintiff

instructed the children to lie about their contact with J.S.

      Plaintiff opposed the motion, alleging that C.M. fabricated the choking

incident. Plaintiff conceded that C.M. used her phone to text J.S., however she

claimed that she did not encourage the communication. She denied living with

J.S. and explained that J.S.'s direct contact with the children was due to her

needing assistance for car trouble on multiple occasions. She also alleged that

defendant violated prior court orders by purposefully delaying the children's

therapy and "biasing their understanding of the parties' situation prior to therapy

sessions."

      On June 29, 2022, the court found plaintiff violated the April 23, 2021,

April 29, 2021, June 9, 2021, and August 13, 2021 "unambiguous" orders

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                                          4
prohibiting contact between the children and J.S. It rested its findings on

plaintiff "conced[ing] . . . the alleged violations . . . occurred," and also found

plaintiff's "cursory explanations" for the violations were unjustified. The court

ordered continued restraints—prohibiting contact between the children and J.S.

"until the minor children are re-enrolled in therapy and their therapist

recommends potential reunification." The court also noted any additional non -

compliance would result in sanctions.

      On the issue of custody and parenting time, the court found it would not

be in the best interest of the children to transfer sole legal and physical custody

to defendant, but that "maintaining the current parenting time arrangement

[would] also be inimical to the minor children's best interests." It partially

granted defendant's request to require supervised parenting time and ordered the

supervisors to serve at plaintiff's sole expense. Additionally, the court restrained

both parties "from communicating with the minor children regarding the . . .

litigation," from "making disparaging comments to the . . . children regarding

the other party . . . [and] from directing the . . . children to misrepresent or lie

regarding any interactions with [J.S.]"

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                                          5
      On August 26, 2022, the court denied plaintiff's motion for

reconsideration, requesting the court review its order of supervised parenting

time. This appeal followed.

                                        II.

      The decision of whether to deny a motion for reconsideration under Rule

4:49-2 is left to the trial judge's discretion. Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244

N.J. 567, 582 (2021). We will not disturb denial of a motion for reconsideration

absent a clear abuse of discretion. Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging

Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015). An abuse of discretion

arises "when a decision is 'made without rational explanation, inexplicably

departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Flagg

v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (citation omitted). We will

not overturn a determination of the trial court "unless the court abused its

discretion, failed to consider controlling legal principles or made findings

inconsistent with or unsupported by competent evidence." Storey v. Storey, 373

N.J. Super. 464, 479 (App. Div. 2004) (citations omitted).

      Our review of family court decisions is limited. Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J.

Super. 102, 111 (App. Div. 2007). We accord deference to the family courts

due to their "special jurisdiction and expertise" in the area of family law. Cesare

                                                                             A-0196-22
                                        6
v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). The court's findings are binding as long as

they are “supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence.” Id. at 411-12

(citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).

      Pursuant to the plain error rule, where an error has not been brought to the

trial court's attention, the appellate court will not reverse on the ground of such

error unless the error is "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-

2; see State v. Montalvo, 229 N.J. 300, 320 (2017).

      We review a trial court's decision not to hold a plenary hearing by an abuse

of discretion standard. See Costa v. Costa, 440 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div.

2015). It is well established "a plenary hearing is only required if there is a

genuine, material and legitimate factual dispute." Segal v. Lynch, 211 N.J. 230,

264-65 (2012). The burden is on the movant to make a "prima facie showing

that a plenary hearing is necessary." Hand, 391 N.J. Super. at 106.

                                       III.

      Plaintiff argues the trial court should have conducted a plenary hearing.

We disagree. The record shows the parties' dispute was not over a change in

custody, but rather a modification of plaintiff's parenting time conditions. Even

if we were to accept that the order reflected a change in custody, and we do not,

a plenary hearing would not be required as plaintiff failed to make a prima facie

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                                        7
case showing that it was necessary. The trial court correctly noted that differing

versions of the choking incident were irrelevant to its findings. The incident

was the subject of the April 23, 2021 order, where the court initially prohibited

contact with J.S. The continued prohibitions in the April 29, 2021, June 9, 2021,

and August 13, 2021 orders reflect the court's finding that further contact

between the children and J.S. warranted close monitoring.

      Plaintiff conceded she violated those orders by permitting such contact.

This alone is a sufficient basis for the court's order of third-party supervised

parenting time, and the court properly exercised its discretion to bar further

contact until recommended by a new therapist. We defer to the court's exercise

of discretion to proceed without a plenary. See Jacoby v. Jacoby, 427 N.J.

Super. 109, 123 (App. Div. 2012).

      Plaintiff argues for the first time before us that the court should have

recused itself in accordance with Rule 1:12-1, because of "the systematic denial

of plaintiff's rights." "Whether a judge should disqualify himself must, in the

first instance, be left to his sound discretion." State v. Flowers, 109 N.J. Super.

309, 311-12 (App. Div. 1970). "Fundamental to any consideration of possible

judicial disqualification is a showing of prejudice or potential bias.” Id. at 312.

In addition, a party may motion for a judge's recusal under Rule 1:12-2.

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                                        8
      We note that we do not "consider questions or issues not properly

presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation [was]

available unless the questions so raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the

trial court or concern matters of great public interest." Selective Ins. Co. of Am.

v. Rothman, 208 N.J. 580, 586 (2012). For completeness, we briefly address the

question. Our standard of review is whether the judge abused his discretion in

not recusing himself. Cf. P.M. v. N.P., 441 N.J. Super. 127, 140 (App. Div.

2015) (where a motion for disqualification was made "[w]e review de novo

whether the proper legal standard was applied." (quoting State v. McCabe, 201

N.J. 34, 45 (2010) (alteration in original))). We note the plaintiff did not raise

recusal below to allow the trial court a chance to address the question. Had

plaintiff done so, we discern no evidence of prejudice or bias in the record which

would warrant recusal.

      In sum, the denial of reconsideration was proper. We find no abuse of

reasoned discretion by the court, which made factual findings supported by

adequate, substantial, and credible evidence in the record, and properly applied

the law. To the extent that we have not addressed any of plaintiff's remaining

arguments, we find they are so lacking in merit as to not warrant further

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

                                                                             A-0196-22
                                        9
Affirmed.

                 A-0196-22
            10