Court Opinion

ID: 9520229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:34:08.783006+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:48.283531
License: Public Domain

Simmons, C. J.,
dissenting.
Plaintiff pleaded for a construction of the will and for a decree quieting title in her. Defendants pleaded that plaintiff acquired only a life estate and that the fee was in them. They prayed only for a dismissal of the petition.
I disagree with the court’s construction of the will.
The plaintiff testified in this case in the trial court. Without objection, and in patent violation of many basic rules of evidence, plaintiff by leading and suggestive questions testified as to conclusions of not only her in*519tent in making the will but as to the intent of her deceased husband. By that process she was led down the pathway of a theory of simultaneous death, as in the minds of both the makers of the will, which nullifies many of its provisions.
The court properly holds that that evidence was inadmissible, but it was admitted without objection. The court rejects the evidence and construes the will in accord with it. The suggestion of simultaneous death intentions is not found in the will. It is in the testimony of the plaintiff.
The defendants offered no evidence.
On appeal here defendants cite section 76-205, R. R. S. 1943, as to the construction of instruments. They then cite Annable v. Ricedorff, 140 Neb. 93, 299 N. W. 373, point out its differences and similarities with the instant case, and conclude that it “would appear” that the defendants receive the fee under the will and the plaintiff the life estate.
The court states that it becomes necessary to ascertain the true intent of the testator (singular) from what is contained within the “four corners of the will” and give the words employed their “generally accepted literal and grammatical meaning.”
The court construes the will to be the will only of the first testator to die, except in the case of simultaneous deaths of both testators. It reaches that conclusion although stating that it will not be presumed that the parties intended anything less than “a full and complete disposition of their separate estates.” The survivor is without a will, although she is the maker of a “joint and mutual” will. It is now a nullity. No such intent can be gathered from this “joint and mutual” will.
We have held that simultaneous means taking place at the same time. Securities Credit Corp. v. Pindell, 153 Neb. 298, 44 N. W. 2d 501.
I readily agree that a will could provide for the dis*520position, of property in the event of simultaneous deaths. There is always the possibility of simultaneous deaths of a husband and wife who live and often travel together. Common knowledge, however, is that such deaths happen rarely.
Had the makers of the will contemplated such a situation and revealed that intent to the scrivener, a few simple words would have sufficed to state it. But they were not used.
The will does not suggest the intent to devise to meet that contingency. It is only by starting with that premise dehors the will that the conclusion is reached which the court sustains.
The court states the necessity of examining what is contained within the four corners of the will and yet it sets out only the opening paragraph and the first three numbered paragraphs of the will. It states that the others are not necessary to be stated.
The court omits two1 paragraphs which comprise over 40 percent of the body of the will. Both bear number 5. I state them as 5 (a) and 5 (b):
5 (a). “At his request, we have made no provision for our son William McLaughlin of Atchison, Kansas, and for reasons best known to him and to us; however, we rely upon our said daughters to see to it that he is well provided for during the term of his natural life. We have full confidence in our said daughters to carry out this request.” (Emphasis supplied.)
5(b). “The one dying first hereby appoints the other executor or executrix hereof, and upon the death of both of us, the joint makers of this Will, we appoint our daughters, Mrs. Arthur H. Hudson, Helen McLaughlin, and Mrs. Charles M. Hauptman, as executrices hereof, and we further empower Edward P. McLaughlin or Loretto McLaughlin, if appointed as executor or executrix hereof, and our said three daughters if appointed executrices under this Will to sell and convey without the order of any Court any real estate wheresoever lo*521cated belonging to this estate(Emphasis supplied.)
These two paragraphs contain provisions that go to the question of the intent of the makers. I would go to the entire will and to its four corners.
The opening sentence of the will begins with “We” followed by “both” and later by “our joint and mutual Will.” The language does not indicate an intent that the makers were drafting a will applicable only to the estate of the first to die except in the case of simultaneous deaths of the two makers. No such suggestion appears in that provision.
The last two words of the will are “this estate.” That indicates that the makers of the will contemplated one estate (not estates). By the will they were, in intent, merging their separate estates and making a complete disposition of “this estate.”
This is a common provision in wills of husband and wife. Clearly, so far as paragraph 2 is concerned, there is no basis for reading a simultaneous death intent into the will. This provision by its clear language applies only in the event of a nonsimultaneous death.
Paragraph 3 of the will clearly contemplates that “this estate” shall vest in the three daughters “On the death of both of the joint makers.” The language used is “all our real and personal property.” The court construes this to mean as providing for the disposition of the estate only in case of simultaneous deaths. Had such an intent been revealed to the scrivener, the easy statement could have been: “In the event of the simultaneous deaths of the joint makers.” Such language was not used and such an intent is not suggested by the will. The paragraph is one making an all-inclusive, general disposition of “our” property. The court construes it to be a paragraph applicable only in the event of the possible contingency of simultaneous deaths.
Paragraph 5(a) explains the omission of a son from the benefits of the will. It is a statement that came from the heart of parents. It expresses a trust in the *522daughters, who are beneficiaries in the will, to care for the brother. It expresses the desire of each testator by the use of the word “we” repeatedly in the paragraph.
As the court construes the will that natural desire of the parents and the trust in the daughters were intended to be made effective only in the case of simultaneous deaths. In the absence of simultaneous deaths this court, in result, holds that it was the intent of the makers that the survivor was free to make “no provision for our son.” The daughters, although they may later inherit their mother’s estate are likewise free from the moral obligations of the trust. I find no suggestion in the will of such an intent. The desire of the father that his son be “well provided for during the term of his natural life” is now optional with the mother.
Paragraph 5(b) starts: “The one dying first * * This clearly does not contemplate simultaneous deaths. It recognizes the natural probability of nonsimultaneous deaths. The paragraph, and as a part of the same sentence, provides that “upon the death of both of us” the daughters are appointed as executrices of the will. Taken together these two clauses clearly indicate a quite natural desire and intent that when the first of the makers dies and the will is probated as to that joint maker, the other maker is to be executor of the “joint and mutual will”; and that when the other joint maker dies and the will is probated as to that maker the daughters are to be executrices. It is a normal provision and one that does not in anywise suggest an intent to have it apply only in the event of the simultaneous deaths of the two makers.
The remaining provision of paragraph 5(b) is a general grant of power to sell and convey. It goes first to either of the two makers who survives. It obviously excludes the contingency of simultaneous deaths. If it was the intent of the makers that paragraph 3 was only to apply in the event of simultaneous deaths and that in the event of nonsimultaneous deaths the fee title to *523the property vested in the surviving maker, then the survivor would have the power of sale as a matter of law and this provision would be surplusage.
If the daughters were to take under the will only in the event of simultaneous deaths, then they would be receiving a fee title with a like power of sale as a matter of law.
It was suggested in oral argument that this power of sale was included so as to permit a sale to pay debts and costs of administration. Had that been the intent it could have been quite easily expressed in the will. It was not so expressed. It is also obvious that the value of this estate is such that a power of sale for that purpose was not necessary and was not contemplated.
As the court construes the will, except in the case of simultaneous deaths, only paragraphs 1 and 2 are effective and then only as to the “joint and mutual” maker first to die. A “full and complete disposition of their separate estates” is not had. The “four corners” of the will are reduced to include only these two paragraphs:
“1. The first to die directs that his or her funeral expenses, just debts and the costs and expenses of administration of his or her estate be first paid.
“2. The first to die hereby gives, devises and be-, queaths to the survivor absolutely and forever the remainder of his or her estate, both real and personal, after the payment of the obligations referred to in Paragraph 1 hereof.”
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause with directions to render judgment holding that the plaintiff was devised a life estate and that the defendants were devised the fee title subject to the plaintiff’s life estate, and I would do that although the defendants did not pray for such a construction of the will.