Court Opinion

ID: 9942304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 20:04:29.677557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:55.820766
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/20/24 P. v. Jasso CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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               IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                          F085209
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                             (Super. Ct. No. LF013452A)
                    v.

 JOSE JASSO,                                                                            OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Brian M.
McNamara, Judge.
         Theresa Osterman Stevenson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Chung Mi
Choi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
       Appellant Jose Jasso was tried for crimes arising from two shootings taking place
two days apart against two separate victims: Yvonne Mendoza and Jaime Aguilar.1 He
was charged by information with two counts of attempted first degree murder (Pen.
Code,2 §§ 664/187, subd. (a); counts 1 [Mendoza] & 2 [Aguilar]); two counts of shooting
at an occupied vehicle (§ 246; counts 3 [Mendoza] & 4 [Aguilar]; two counts of assault
with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); counts 5 [Mendoza] & 6 [Aguilar]); one
count of being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1);
count 7); and one count of being a prohibited person in possession of ammunition
(§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 8). The information further alleged that as to count 1,
appellant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury
(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)); as to counts 1, 3, and 5, appellant inflicted great bodily injury
(§ 12022.7); as to counts 1 through 4, appellant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5,
subd. (a)); and as to all counts, appellant had suffered a prior serious felony (§ 1192.7,
subd. (c)(7)) and prior strike (§§ 667, subds. (c)-(j); 1170.12, subds. (a)-(e)) for a 2009
conviction.
       A jury found appellant guilty of counts 1 and 3 through 8 and not guilty of count 2.
The jury found true all enhancements. In a bifurcated court trial on the alleged prior
convictions, the court found appellant had suffered a prior strike conviction.
       The court sentenced appellant to prison as follows: for count 1, a term of 14 years
to life, plus 10 years for the firearm enhancement; and for count 4, the upper term of
14 years, plus four years for the firearm enhancement. The court stayed punishment for

1        The reporter’s transcript identifies Aguilar as Jaime Contreras. He testified he also
goes by the name Jaime Aguilar. Because most of the record, including the information,
and the parties on appeal refer to him as Aguilar, we will do so as well for the sake of
clarity.
2      All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                              2.
the remainder of the counts and enhancements. Appellant’s total prison term was
14 years to life, plus 28 years.
       On appeal, appellant contends: (1) the jury’s finding that the attempted murder in
count 1 was premeditated and deliberated was not supported by sufficient evidence;
(2) the jury’s finding that the firearm used in the assault in count 5 was semiautomatic
was not supported by sufficient evidence; (3) the trial court committed reversible error by
instructing the jury with the general assault with a firearm instruction rather than assault
with a semiautomatic firearm as to counts 5 and 6; and (4) the trial court committed
reversible error by failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of grossly negligent
discharge of a firearm as to count 4.
       We reduce count 5 to the lesser included offense of assault with a firearm (§ 245,
subd. (a)(2)) and remand the matter for the prosecutor to accept the reduction or retry
appellant on the greater offense. We affirm the judgment, as modified, in all other
respects.
                                          FACTS
June 22, 2021 Incident—Mendoza Shooting (Counts 1, 3 & 5)
       On June 22, 2021, Kern County deputy sheriffs responded to a gas station where
Mendoza was in her vehicle with several gunshot wounds. On her body, deputies found a
small caliber slug, either a .22 or .32 caliber, which could have come from a rifle or
shotgun, but no ballistics were performed. The deputy who reported to the hospital
where Mendoza was being treated testified that Mendoza had been injured in several
places in her chest and that her injuries appeared consistent with injuries from a shotgun
with pellets.
       Mendoza testified at trial that she remembered she was shot 15 times but did not
remember how; she could only remember driving, being shot, and then waking up in the
hospital. To most of the questions posed regarding the details of the shooting, she
answered that she did not remember. When asked if she wanted to be testifying, she

                                              3.
answered, “I just want to go home.” When asked if she was scared testifying, she
responded, “I just want to go home. I want to be past this. I want to move on.” She
further testified that deputies picked her up from her house to take her to testify.
         The deputy who spoke to Mendoza at the hospital testified Mendoza identified
“Frog” as the person who shot her and gave appellant’s first and last name. She
described him as having several facial tattoos including tattoos below his eyes; appellant
has a tattoo below his left eye.
         A recorded interview Mendoza gave to deputies on June 24, 2021, was admitted
and played for the jury. During this interview, Mendoza picked appellant out of a photo
lineup and identified him as the shooter by first and last name and said he went by
“Frog.” She said she had seen appellant at her friend’s house, and he asked her for a ride
down the street, and she agreed. Appellant propositioned her for sex, and when she said
no, he got angry, and started cussing at her. She responded by saying “f[***] your
brother.” At that point, appellant shot her 15 times with a long gun, which she thought
was a dark grey rifle. She was in shock the first time appellant shot her, and she tried to
put the car in gear before realizing she still had it in drive. She was shot several more
times before pressing the gas and navigating to the gas station where deputies happened
to be.
         Mendoza testified that as a result of the shooting, her arm was broken in two
places, and she could no longer lift her arm due to a severed ligament. She had to have
two chest surgeries and had to have her mouth wired shut.
June 24, 2021 Incident—Aguilar Shooting (Counts 2, 4 & 6)
         On June 24, 2021, Aguilar encountered appellant inside a gas station. Appellant
wanted Aguilar to move so he could get by him, but Aguilar pointed out that appellant
already had enough room to pass him, to which appellant responded that he would wait
for Aguilar outside. When Aguilar got outside, appellant was there and told him “a bunch
of stuff” and was using profanity. At one point, appellant lifted his shirt to show Aguilar

                                              4.
he had a gun. Aguilar got into his truck, left, and called 911. Appellant followed Aguilar
onto the street on foot and shot towards him from about 30 to 40 feet away. Aguilar
heard about two shots. Neither he nor his truck were hit by any bullets. The incident was
caught on gas station surveillance footage, which was admitted and played for the jury.
       Following the shooting, deputies observed approximately seven to eight
.22 caliber shell casings in the street near the gas station.
Appellant’s June 24, 2021 Traffic Stop
       Later on June 24, 2021, appellant was subjected to a traffic stop during which a
deputy located a .22 caliber semiautomatic rifle loaded with several .22 rounds under the
passenger seat, which appellant admitted was his. The rifle had a 15 or 18 to 20 round
capacity, depending on whether regular or short caliber ammunition was loaded, and
weighed about five pounds. It did not shoot shotgun shells or pellets.
Appellant’s Testimony
       Appellant testified he had nothing to do with Mendoza being shot. He did not
know Mendoza though on cross-examination admitted she described the same firearm he
had. He explained he had had the firearm for about a week because he had just gotten
shot and did not want to go through that again. He believed Mendoza thought appellant
had something to do with her deceased husband, but he knew nothing about it. He does
not go by the name “Frog,” though he knows deputies refer to him as such.
       As to Aguilar, appellant admitted getting into a verbal altercation with him,
following him, and using the semiautomatic .22 caliber rifle deputies later seized to fire
two “warning shots” in the air around Aguilar’s truck. He does not know why he did it;
he was just mad and wanted Aguilar away from him. He admitted he originally told
police he did not shoot at Aguilar.

                                               5.
                                      DISCUSSION
I.     Sufficiency of the Evidence
       In assessing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, we review “the whole record
in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses
substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—
from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 66.) Reversal on insufficiency of the
evidence is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].” (People v. Redmond (1969)
71 Cal.2d 745, 755.) “If the circumstances reasonably justify the findings made by the
trier of fact, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances
might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.” (People v. Jennings (2010)
50 Cal.4th 616, 639.)
       A.     Premeditation and Deliberation (Count 1)
       Appellant contends the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support the
jury’s finding that the attempted murder of Mendoza in count 1 was willful, deliberated,
and premeditated. We disagree.
       In the context of premeditated and deliberate murder, “ ‘ premeditation means
“ ‘ considered beforehand’ ” [citation] and deliberation means a “ ‘careful weighing of
considerations in forming a course of action …’ ” [citation]. “The process of
premeditation and deliberation does not require any extended period of time.” ’ ” (People
v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 245.) “ ‘The true test is not the duration of time as
much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great
rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly….’ ” (People v.
Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 767, overruled on other grounds in People v. Scott
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 390, fn. 2.) Ultimately, a finding of deliberation and

                                             6.
premeditation requires the existence of “preexisting reflection, of any duration.” (People
v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 813.)
       Our California Supreme Court outlined three categories of evidence helpful in
determining whether evidence is sufficient to support a finding of deliberation and
premeditation in People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15 (Anderson). They are: (1) facts
of activity “directed toward, and explicable as intended to result in, the killing” or
planning evidence; (2) motive to kill evidence; and (3) evidence that the manner of
killing was “so particular and exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed
according to a ‘preconceived design.’ ” (Id. at pp. 26‒27.) These factors are meant to be
used as a guide in examining the sufficiency of the evidence of deliberation and
premeditation, and “[u]nreflective reliance on Anderson for a definition of premeditation
is inappropriate.” (People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 517.)
       Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, we conclude the
jury could have reasonably inferred the attempted murder was willful, deliberated, and
premeditated. There was evidence that appellant shot Mendoza 15 times at close range,
and because we also conclude there was substantial evidence appellant used a
semiautomatic firearm as discussed below, this would have required appellant to pull the
trigger 15 separate times. The number of times appellant shot Mendoza supports a
finding of some planning to kill, even if appellant made the calculation quickly. It
appears appellant was motivated out of frustration or anger at Mendoza for rebuffing his
advances or insulting him. Appellant also mentioned during his testimony that Mendoza
thought he had something to do with her husband’s death, which could have given him
further motive to kill. Though appellant testified he learned this from a report and did not
know Mendoza, the jury may have discounted this part of his testimony based on
Mendoza’s testimony she knew appellant as well as her ability to identify him by first and
last name.

                                              7.
       While we appreciate appellant’s position that the evidence supports a finding that
appellant acted out of a rash impulse rather than premeditation, the jury could have
reasonably concluded that even if appellant initially acted out of a rash impulse by
shooting Mendoza the first time, appellant’s successive pulls of the trigger indicate some
reflection and calculated decision to kill not only out of anger but potentially to avoid
detection for wounding her as she was clearly able to identify him.
       For these reasons, we conclude the jury’s finding is supported by sufficient
evidence.3
       B.     Semiautomatic Firearm (Count 5)
       Appellant contends the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support a
finding that the firearm he used in the Mendoza shooting was semiautomatic to support
his conviction for assault with a semiautomatic firearm in count 5. We disagree.
       Our high court has stated: “A semiautomatic firearm ‘fires once for each pull on
the trigger and reloads automatically, but requires the shooter to release the trigger lever
before another shot can be fired.’ ” (In re Jorge M. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 866, 874, fn. 4.)
       Again, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, we
conclude substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that appellant used a
semiautomatic firearm in the Mendoza shooting. Appellant was found with a
semiautomatic .22 caliber rifle two days after the shooting, and he admitted he had it on
him for the previous week which included the day he shot Mendoza. Mendoza’s
description of the gun appellant shot her with matched that of the semiautomatic rifle,

3      Appellant briefly argues the evidence was insufficient to support his identity as the
shooter. Mendoza’s out-of-court statements, which appellant does not assert were
erroneously admitted, identifying him as the shooter constitute substantial evidence
supporting the jury’s finding that appellant was the shooter. Appellant’s pointing out that
Mendoza described appellant as being shorter and thinner than he was, that Mendoza did
not remember the details of the shooting during trial, and that appellant denied shooting
Mendoza amounts to no more than reweighing the evidence.

                                              8.
which appellant also admitted. Mendoza testified she was shot 15 times, and the round
capacity of the semiautomatic rifle was 16 rounds according to appellant and 15 or 18 to
20 according to one of the deputies. Though one of the deputies testified Mendoza’s
wounds were consistent with injuries from shotgun pellets, he also testified that it was
possible they came from a small caliber rifle. Further, appellant testified he did not own
and never carried a shotgun. It can be reasonably inferred the semiautomatic rifle he had
on the day of the Aguilar shooting was the same gun he used in the Mendoza shooting.
       For these reasons, we conclude a finding appellant used a semiautomatic firearm
in count 5 is supported by sufficient evidence.
II.    Instructional Error
       A.     Failure to Instruct on Use of a Semiautomatic Firearm in Counts 5 & 6
       For the assault charges in counts 5 and 6, the court instructed the jury with
CALCRIM No. 875. The jury was instructed:

       “The defendant is charged in Counts 5 and 6 with assault with a firearm, in
       violation of Penal Code section 245(b).

       “To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove
       that:

              “1.    The defendant did an act with a firearm that by its nature
                     would directly and probably result in the application of force
                     to a person;

              “2.    The defendant did that act willfully;

              “3.    When the defendant acted, he was aware of facts that would
                     lead a reasonable person to realize that his act by its nature
                     would directly and probably result in the application of force
                     to someone;

              “AND

              “4.    When the defendant acted, he had the present ability to apply
                     force with a firearm to a person.”

                                             9.
       The jury was further instructed: “A firearm is any device designed to be used as a
weapon, from which a projectile is discharged or expelled through a barrel by the force of
an explosion or other form of combustion.”
       Thus, instead of inserting the words semiautomatic firearm where appropriate, the
trial court only used the word firearm. In addition, the jury was not instructed with the
bracketed definition of semiautomatic firearm as it appears in CALCRIM No. 875: “A
semiautomatic pistol extracts a fired cartridge and chambers a fresh cartridge with each
single pull of the trigger.”
       Appellant contends the court’s failure to instruct on the semiautomatic firearm
element of assault with a semiautomatic firearm allowed the jury to convict him of counts
5 and 6 without the prosecution proving every element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt in violation of his constitutional due process rights. In addition, he
contends the jury was not provided with a jury form for the lesser included offense of
assault with a firearm precluding them from being able to make a determination on
whether he was guilty of the lesser included offense.
       Respondent agrees the trial court gave the wrong instruction but asserts any error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
       We agree with the parties that the trial court erred and further conclude, as to
count 6, the error was harmless; but as to count 5, appellant’s conviction must be reduced
to the lesser included offense of assault with a firearm.
       “ ‘The trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the essential
elements of the charged offense.’ [Citation.] Failure to do so is a ‘very serious
constitutional error because it threatens the right to a jury trial that both the United States
and California Constitutions guarantee. [Citation.] All criminal defendants have the right
to “a jury determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with
which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th
306, 332‒333.)

                                              10.
       Here, as the parties appear to agree, the court failed to instruct on the element of
use of a semiautomatic firearm and therefore erred. (See People v. Le (2015) 61 Cal.4th
416, 427 [“the use of a semiautomatic firearm is a necessary element of section 245,
subdivision (b)”].) We turn to the more pressing question of whether the error was
harmless.
       The error of failing to instruct the jury on an element of the offense “is reversible
unless ‘it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have rendered the
same verdict absent the error.’ ” (People v. Rivera, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 332‒333.) In
making this determination, a reviewing court does not reweigh the strength of each
party’s evidence; it does not “ ‘become in effect a second jury to determine whether the
defendant is guilty.’ ” (Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 19.) Even when the
prosecution’s case is strong, the error is not harmless if the record contains evidence that
could rationally lead to a contrary finding. (Ibid.) We do not focus exclusively on the
evidence favorable to the verdict, and we do not presume the existence of any facts the
jury might reasonably infer in favor of the prosecution. (People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th
400, 418.) “If a thorough review of the record shows there is any evidence that a rational
juror could find as a basis for reasonable doubt as to any erroneously omitted element,
then the error requires reversal, even when there is ‘ample evidence’ to support a finding
of guilt.” (People v. Madrigal (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 219, 243.)
       Applying the above principles, we have no trouble concluding that it is clear
beyond a reasonable doubt the jury would have convicted appellant of the assault against
Aguilar in count 6 absent the error. Appellant admitted to using the semiautomatic
firearm found in his possession the day of the Aguilar shooting. We reject appellant’s
contention the jury may not have accepted the deputy’s testimony that the firearm
recovered from appellant was semiautomatic. Such a conclusion is not reasonable. The
deputy who testified that the firearm recovered was semiautomatic had been a peace
officer for 20 years and was a certified firearm instructor, which required, in addition to

                                             11.
the academy, a 32-hour class. During his testimony, the deputy demonstrated the parts of
the firearm which caused him to form his opinion it was semiautomatic, including the
mechanism which caused the chamber to be loaded with the next round and the part of
the gun from which the shell casings were ejected. The deputy’s conclusion was not
challenged in any way by the defense, and the jury was able to examine the firearm for
themselves to confirm the deputy’s testimony. In addition, .22 caliber expended shell
casings were found in the street where the Aguilar shooting took place. There was no
evidence to support reasonable doubt that the firearm was not semiautomatic.
       We cannot reach the same conclusion regarding the assault against Mendoza in
count 5. As we have explained above in the context of appellant’s sufficiency of the
evidence claim, while there was sufficient evidence to support the firearm was
semiautomatic, the jury was required to make inferences in order to conclude as such. In
addition, there was testimony that the wounds could have been made by shotgun pellets,
with one of the deputies testifying he knew the difference between shotgun wounds and
small caliber rifle wounds and that they appeared to be from a shotgun. In the context of
this instructional error, we cannot presume the existence of facts the jury could
reasonably infer, and the deputy’s testimony may have raised a reasonable doubt in the
mind of a juror. Thus, we cannot say the error as to count 5 was harmless.
       We reduce appellant’s conviction on count 5 to the lesser included offense of
assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) and remand the matter where the People shall
be given the option of “retrying the greater offense, or accepting a reduction to the lesser
offense.” (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 528; § 1260.)4

4      For the reasons set forth in the body of this opinion by which we concluded there
was no evidence to support reasonable doubt that a semiautomatic firearm was used in
the Aguilar shooting, we also conclude there is not substantial evidence to support a
finding that the lesser offense of assault with a firearm was committed but the greater
offense of assault with a semiautomatic firearm was not. (See People v. Shockley (2013)
58 Cal.4th 400, 403.) Accordingly, the trial court was not required to instruct on assault

                                             12.
       B.     Failure to Instruct on Lesser Included Offense of Grossly Negligent
              Discharge of a Firearm as to Count 4
       Appellant contends the court erred by failing to instruct on the offense of grossly
negligent discharge of a firearm (§ 246.3) as a lesser included offense of shooting at an
occupied vehicle (§ 246) in count 4. We disagree.
       The trial court has a sua sponte duty to “instruct fully on all lesser necessarily
included offenses supported by the evidence.” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th
142, 148–149, disapproved of on other grounds by People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th
237, 255‒261.) “ ‘This venerable instructional rule ensures that the jury may consider all
supportable crimes necessarily included within the charge itself, thus encouraging the
most accurate verdict permitted by the pleadings and the evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he
rule prevents either party, whether by design or inadvertence, from forcing an all-or-
nothing choice between conviction of the stated offense on the one hand, or complete
acquittal on the other. Hence, the rule encourages a verdict, within the charge chosen by
the prosecution, that is neither “harsher [n]or more lenient than the evidence merits.” ’ ”
(People v. Smith (2013) 57 Cal.4th 232, 239–240.) “ ‘ “The rule’s purpose is … to
assure, in the interest of justice, the most accurate possible verdict encompassed by the
charge and supported by the evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 96.)
       An instruction on a lesser included offense is not warranted unless it is supported
by “substantial evidence,” meaning “evidence from which a reasonable jury could
conclude that the defendant committed the lesser, but not the greater, offense.” (People v.
Shockley, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 403.)
       “On appeal, we independently review whether a trial court erroneously failed to
instruct on a lesser included offense.” (People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227, 271.)

with a firearm as a lesser included offense as to count 6. Because of this conclusion, as
well as our conclusion appellant’s conviction in count 5 must be reduced, we need not
reach appellant’s claim the instructional error deprived the jury of deciding whether he
committed the lesser included offense of assault with a firearm.

                                             13.
       The “only difference between” the crimes described in section 246 and
section 246.3 is that section 246 “ ‘requires that an inhabited dwelling or other specified
object be within the defendant’s firing range.’ [Citation.] Section 246.3, subdivision (a)
is a necessarily included lesser offense of section 246.” (People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th
70, 108.)
       Our high court has explained: “ ‘The crime of shooting at an occupied vehicle “is
not limited to shooting directly at [the] occupied target.” [Citation.] Rather, the
applicable statute “proscribes shooting either directly at or in close proximity to an …
occupied target under circumstances showing a conscious disregard for the probability
that one or more bullets will strike the target or persons in or around it.” ’ ” (People v.
Bell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 109.) Thus, to find appellant guilty of section 246.3,
subdivision (a), but not section 246, the jury would have had to find that appellant’s shots
were not aimed at or “ ‘ “in close proximity to” ’ ” Aguilar’s truck. (See Bell, at p. 109.)
       Here, the evidence did not support a finding that appellant committed the lesser
but not the greater offense. The surveillance footage shows appellant shooting straight in
the direction of Aguilar’s truck a few moments after Aguilar drove away. Appellant
described his act as shooting “warning shots, you know, like, up in the air, like, around
him.” (Italics added.) He shot “to the right and then … one in the air.” (Italics added.)
While appellant denied shooting at Aguilar or his vehicle, he described the shots as being
directed “around [Aguilar].” Though appellant avoided directly stating he shot “at”
Aguilar’s vehicle, his testimony shows he fired at least one shot towards the vehicle. The
surveillance footage combined with appellant’s testimony demonstrates appellant shot “in
close proximity to” Aguilar’s truck and leaves no possibility the jury would find appellant
guilty of section 246.3 but not section 246 as to count 4.
       We find no error with regard to the instructions for count 4.

                                             14.
                                     DISPOSITION
       Appellant’s conviction for assault with a semiautomatic firearm against Mendoza
in count 5 is reduced to assault with a firearm. The matter is remanded to give the
prosecution the opportunity to determine whether it will retry appellant on count 5. In all
other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

                                                          DE SANTOS, J.
WE CONCUR:

POOCHIGIAN, Acting P. J.

SNAUFFER, J.

                                            15.