Court Opinion

ID: 9475382
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:25:39.183148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:40.990861
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The majority’s cost/benefit analysis does not provide an adequate basis for rejecting the holding in Chicago Economic Fuel Gas Co. v. Myers, 168 Ill. 139, 146, 48 N.E. 66, 68-69 (1897), in which the Illinois Supreme Court held that employers of independent contractors owe a nondelegable duty to the contractor’s employees when those employees are involved in inherently dangerous work or work which carries with it a peculiar risk of injury. Although the majority is correct that Myers involved a finding of alter ego, that finding was merely an alternative holding to the one set forth above and therefore does not undermine its validity.
*943The majority suggests that the position taken by the Illinois Supreme Court in Myers is now untenable in light of recent developments, most notably the advent of worker’s compensation. But other jurisdictions have continued to adhere to the rule reiterated in Myers even after worker’s compensation developed, the reason being that there are policy considerations apart from worker’s compensation coverage that come to play in cases such as the one at bar. See discussion in Johns v. New York Blower Co., — Ind.App. —, —, 442 N.E.2d 382, 387 (1984) (quoting Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, 68 Cal.2d 245, 66 Cal.Rptr. 20, 25, 437 P.2d 508, 513 (1968)); see also Johns, — Ind.App. at —, 442 N.E.2d at 388 (Staton, J., concurring) (“[Cjoverage by Workmen’s Compensation is irrelevant to the issue of liability. If there is a non-delegable duty, a third party is liable for the injuries and damages resulting regardless of Workmen’s Compensation cover-age_ Workmen’s Compensation coverage in many cases may be grossly inadequate where a nondelegable duty is involved.”).
i Given this, we ought to think very carefully before rejecting Myers out of hand. This is particularly true since another district court sitting in Illinois found, although admittedly without much explanation, that qnder Illinois law the employer’s nondele-gable duty runs to the contractor’s employees. See Fried v. United States, 579 F.Supp. 1212, 1216 (N.D.Ill.1983). Moreover, application of Myers only gives the plaintiff a cause of action. It does not subject Marathon to automatic liability. The jury must first determine that the sandblasting involved here was “inherently dangerous” and that Marathon breached its nondelegable duty before Marathon will be held liable. Thus, the majority’s dire prediction that homeowners will be subject to unlimited liability is highly unlikely to come true since juries are unlikely to find that routine household maintenance is an inherently hazardous activity.
Thus, the question becomes whether sandblasting is “peculiarly or inherently dangerous.” In Illinois the question whether an instrumentality or conduct is inherently or peculiarly dangerous is not answered by looking solely at its inherent nature, but also at the manner of its particular use at the time and place of the occurrence. See Donovan v. Raschke, 106 Ill.App.2d 366, 370, 246 N.E.2d 110, 113 (1st Dist.1969); Snow v. Judy, 96 Ill.App.2d 420, 423, 239 N.E.2d 327 (4th Dist.1968); Johnson v. Central Tile & Terrazzo Co., 59 Ill.App.2d 262, 276-77, 207 N.E.2d 160, 167 (1965). At trial the plaintiffs presented the following expert testimony. Their medical expert testified that
silica in the lungs is a toxic poison, and that in an area of really intense exposure, where there is not good ventilation, where the particle concentration is extremely high, the only acceptable kind of prevention is an external air source used throughout the procedure with a tight fitting hood [and] external oxygen source or backpack oxygen ... [where the concentration of silica particles is intense], you have to use more and more rigorous methods to protect against exposure.
In this case, there was also additional evidence that Anderson sandblasted three to four times a week in tanks no more than twelve feet in diameter and fifteen feet high, using approximately 2000-2500 pounds of sand, and that Anderson used only a tarpaulin head covering with no fresh air supply. In Illinois, the question of whether an activity is inherently or peculiarly dangerous is one for a jury, see, e.g., Snow, 96 Ill.App.2d at 423-24, 239 N.E.2d at 329-30, and the Andersons certainly presented sufficient evidence to reach the jury on this issue.
Thus, because I agree with the majority that there was insufficient evidence of Marathon’s negligent retention of the independent contractor, the order of the district court directing a verdict in favor of Marathon on the issue of its alleged breach of its nondelegable duty should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.