Court Opinion

ID: 9963847
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 14:05:28.93859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:02.266040
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 19, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2023-CA-0372-MR

JULIE TUCKER                                                         APPELLANT

                  APPEAL FROM BOYD CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE GEORGE W. DAVIS, III, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 21-CI-00528

WESLEY TUCKER                                                          APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, CETRULO, AND JONES, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: Julie Tucker appeals from the Boyd Circuit Court’s orders

resolving timesharing and debt allocation in a divorce action. We affirm.

                                     FACTS

            In late 2021, Appellee Wesley Tucker (“Wes”) filed a petition for

divorce from Appellant Julie Tucker (“Julie”). The parties have two children, born

in 2016 and 2017. Initially the parties had temporary joint legal custody with both
parties having some parenting time with the children. Due to Wes working out of

town during the weekdays, his parenting time generally occurred on weekends.

             In the fall of 2022, the Boyd Circuit Court entered a decree dissolving

the parties’ marriage. However, the trial court reserved for later adjudication

issues including child custody, timesharing or visitation, child support, and

property division. See generally Putnam v. Fanning, 495 S.W.2d 175 (Ky. 1973).

             Shortly after entry of the Putnam v. Fanning-type divorce decree, in

October 2022, the parties appeared before a Domestic Relations Commissioner

(“DRC”) for an evidentiary hearing. They presented evidence relating to custody,

timesharing, and property issues.

             Each party testified about their current living arrangements and

employment. Wes testified he was laid off at that time following a health-related

absence. He also testified he generally worked out of town on weekdays. He

admitted he was currently living in a camper in his brother’s yard. He testified that

during his parenting time on weekends, he and the children sometimes stayed in

the camper and sometimes stayed at his parents’ house.

             Julie testified to her concerns about Wes having an equal say in

decision-making and equal parenting time. She believed Wes was not well-

informed when making medical and other decisions due to failure to research

issues. She also believed Wes did not supervise the children sufficiently during his

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parenting time and stated the children sometimes had scratches or bruises after

spending time with Wes.

             The parties also testified about financial matters. They had recently

sold the marital residence and agreed to split the proceeds – albeit with some

disputes about details. Both parties testified to Wes having recently bought a

refrigerator, despite the fact there were two other refrigerators on the premises.

And both parties testified that Wes consulted Julie about possibly buying a new

refrigerator after the refrigerator in the kitchen stopped working and she told him

to do what he wanted to do.

             About four months after the evidentiary hearing, the DRC filed her

report and recommendations. She recommended the parties have joint legal

custody and equal timesharing to the extent practicable. While Wes continued to

live in the camper and work out of town, she recommended he continue to have

weekend visitation. If he obtained other housing and started working in town, she

recommended the parties have equal timesharing on a weekly basis – meaning they

take turns having parenting time for a week at a time. As for the refrigerator debt,

the DRC recommended that this be allocated equally between the parties. The

DRC stated child support would be determined later under statutory guidelines.

             Both parties filed exceptions to the DRC’s report and

recommendations. Julie asserted that Wes had made a unilateral decision to buy

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the new refrigerator despite the two other refrigerators in the house and that he

controlled all marital funds. She also contended that equal or nearly equal

timesharing was not in the children’s best interests since Wes had not previously

had the children for more than a weekend at a time and he did not, in her view,

have suitable housing.

              Julie asserted in her exceptions that there was a pending investigation

into allegations that one of the children had been sexually assaulted by Wes’s

neighbor while the children were in Wes’s care. She also claimed that Wes

allowed the children around this neighbor after the alleged assault despite being

informed of the incident. She argued Wes’s timesharing should be restricted due

to his failure to properly supervise the children while in his care. However, no

affidavit or documentation about the investigation or sexual abuse allegations was

attached to her exceptions.

              The trial court entered an order confirming the DRC’s report and

adopting the DRC’s recommendations. It also entered an order overruling the

parties’ exceptions.

              Julie filed a timely appeal from the trial court’s orders regarding the

DRC’s report and recommendations.1 The same day that she filed her notice of

1
  Julie’s notice of appeal also stated that she appealed from the DRC’s report and
recommendations. But a DRC’s report and recommendations have no legal effect unless
formally confirmed or adopted by the trial court. See Pennington v. Marcum, 266 S.W.3d 759,

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appeal, she also filed a motion for emergency relief regarding sexual abuse

allegations. She requested the trial court grant her temporary emergency custody

of the children and restrict Wes’s time with the children to supervised visitation

once a week. She also requested that the record be sealed regarding the sexual

abuse allegations.

               The trial court later entered an agreed order between the parties in

which both promised to offer in-sight supervision of the children when in their

care. However, there is no order resolving Julie’s motion for emergency relief in

the record on appeal.

               Julie argues in her appellant brief that the trial court’s custody and

timesharing decision must be reversed due to Wes’s unsuitable living arrangements

and his neglecting the children in her view. She also asserts this Court must

reverse the allocation of the refrigerator debt to her due to Wes unilaterally

purchasing the refrigerator despite having other refrigerators in the home. (The

adopted report called for allocating the refrigerator debt equally between the

parties.) Lastly, Julie argues in her brief that this Court should adopt a bright-line

rule that a parent’s time with children must be restricted and supervised whenever

771 (Ky. 2008) (“The trial commissioner acts only to further judicial economy by assisting the
trial court; the commissioner’s report is a recommendation and is not binding. It is the trial court
itself that makes findings of fact, either by adopting those recommended by the commissioner or
by acting anew.”).

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a parent is being investigated for “uncontroverted allegations of neglect and/or

exposure to the risk of harm relating to children being sexually assaulted” until the

investigation is complete.

                                       ANALYSIS

                Before we address the custody and timesharing arguments, we address

Julie’s arguments about the refrigerator debt.

                No Reversible Error in Allocation of Refrigerator Debt

                We review the trial court’s allocation of the refrigerator debt equally

between the parties for abuse of discretion. Rice v. Rice, 336 S.W.3d 66, 68 (Ky.

2011) (“Questions of whether property or debt is marital or nonmarital are left to

the sound discretion of the trial court, as is the equitable division of any marital

property, and will be reviewed for abuse of discretion[.]”).

                Unlike property acquired during a marriage, there is no presumption

that debt acquired during a marriage is marital. See id. See also KRS2 403.190. In

adopting the DRC’s recommendation to split the refrigerator debt evenly between

the parties, the trial court evidently implicitly concluded that this debt was marital

and that it was equitable to divide this debt equally.

                The DRC’s report adopted by the trial court noted that Julie argued

that Wes should be responsible for paying the refrigerator debt since he bought the

2
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

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refrigerator. It also noted that Wes requested this debt be paid off from the marital

home sale proceeds. The DRC recommended that the parties each pay half of the

debt on the refrigerator before receiving their half of the marital home sale

proceeds. Or the parties could also elect to have their respective share of the

refrigerator debt deducted from marital home sale proceeds prior to their checks

for their respective shares of the proceeds being written.

             Though not explicitly discussed in the DRC report, both parties

testified that Wes consulted Julie before buying the refrigerator and that she told

him to do what he wanted to do. So, this is not a case in which a spouse incurred a

great deal of debt without the knowledge or consent of the other spouse. Compare

Rice, 336 S.W.3d at 69. And no one has pointed to any testimony that when

consulted by Wes, Julie told him that she opposed buying a new refrigerator.

Despite Julie’s contention on appeal that she did not see any benefit to buying a

new refrigerator, she does not point to any evidence that she expressed this opinion

to Wes before the refrigerator purchase.

             Furthermore, not only does the evidence support a finding that Julie

was aware of, and seemingly consented to, the refrigerator purchase, but the

evidence supports a finding that the refrigerator was bought as marital property to

be used in the marital home. Compare id. (Husband’s incurring large debt for

benefit of adult child was not to buy marital property.)

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             Given these circumstances, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the

allocation of half of this debt to Julie – especially as Wes was held responsible for

all debt on the camper and both parties shared in the home sale proceeds. In short,

there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court allocating half of the refrigerator

debt to Julie. Next, we address timesharing issues.

                   No Reversible Error in Timesharing Decision

             We review the trial court’s custody and timesharing decisions for

abuse of discretion. Jones v. Livesay, 551 S.W.3d 47, 51 (Ky. App. 2018). We

discern no abuse of discretion in these matters based on the evidence in the record.

             Citing no authority other than a general reference to KRS Chapter

403, Julie argues in her appellant brief that the trial court erred in failing to find

that the presumption for equal timesharing was overcome. She contends this made

no sense as, in her view, the trial court found that Wes lacked suitable living

arrangements and/or stable housing and was unable to exercise equal timesharing

due to generally working out of town.

             In adopting the DRC’s report, the trial court determined that joint

custody was in the child’s best interest and found: “There were no allegations that

would overcome the presumption of shared parenting.” And the court also

recognized that totally equal shared parenting was not feasible due to Wes’s

working out of town most of the week. So long as Wes was working out of town

                                           -8-
and still living in the camper, he would have parenting time mainly on the

weekends although a more equal, weekly exchange of parenting time was to take

place if his working and living arrangements changed. But the adopted DRC

report did not find that Wes lacked stable housing or suitable living arrangements

as Julie suggests.

             Furthermore, though Wes and the children admittedly stayed in the

camper or his parents’ house during his parenting time, Julie has not cited any

testimony or other evidence of deplorable living conditions in either the camper or

Wes’s parents’ house. And Julie testified to living in her mother’s home at the

time of the hearing. Julie also testified she suspected Wes did not supervise the

children well and she claimed they had bruises or scratches after spending time

with him. However, she does not point to any medical evidence or other evidence

indicating the nature of how any bruises or scratches were acquired.

             Considering the evidence presented at the DRC hearing, we discern

no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s custody and timesharing decision.

     No Evidence in Record of Sexual Assault Allegations or Investigation

             In addition to her arguments that the timesharing decision must be

disturbed due to Wes’s allegedly unsuitable living arrangements, Julie argues that

the timesharing decision must be disturbed due to an investigation of sexual abuse

allegations. As Julie asserts, this argument was preserved by her raising this issue

                                         -9-
in her exceptions. See MV Transp., Inc. v. Allgeier, 433 S.W.3d 324, 331 (Ky.

2014) (“[T]he critical point in preservation of an issue remains: was the question

fairly brought to the attention of the trial court.”).

              But while Julie raised the issue to the trial court through her

exceptions, she does not point to any evidence in the record about sexual abuse

allegations or an investigation thereof. Based on our review of the videorecording

of the DRC hearing in October 2022, we are unaware of any testimony about

allegations of sexual assault during Wes’s parenting time. Julie’s appellant brief

makes no specific citations to the videorecording of the October 2022 DRC

hearing and Julie designated only this October 2022 videorecording to be included

in the record. So, we could not review the scheduled hearing on exceptions, for

example.

              Though Julie asserted that an investigation about sexual abuse

allegations was ongoing when she filed her exceptions, she does not point to any

affidavits, other testimony, or documentary proof in the record. Her exceptions

were not evidence as mere allegations in court filings are not evidence. See T.C. v.

M.E., 603 S.W.3d 663, 684 (Ky. App. 2020) (allegations in pleadings are not

evidence).

              Perhaps Julie later presented sealed evidence about a sexual abuse

investigation after she filed her notice of appeal and the contemporaneously filed

                                           -10-
motion for emergency relief relating to sexual assault allegations. However, there

is no evidence in the record before us about any investigation into allegations of

sexual abuse. Furthermore, the appellant bears the burden of ensuring that the

record is complete with everything the appellate court needs to decide the issues

raised on appeal. Smith v. Smith, 450 S.W.3d 729, 731 (Ky. App. 2014).

             Given the lack of evidence about a sexual assault investigation in the

record, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in adopting the DRC’s

recommendation of joint custody and shared parenting time. And given this lack

of evidence about whether or when an investigation into sexual assault allegations

occurred, we need not reach Julie’s argument urging this Court to adopt a bright-

line rule requiring restricted or supervised visitation upon uncontroverted

allegations of sexual assault of a child while under a parent’s care until an

investigation is completed. In the absence of any evidence about such an

investigation in the record, this would be entertaining a theoretical question and we

must not issue advisory opinions even on important issues. See Philpot v. Patton,

837 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Ky. 1992) (“Our courts do not function to give advisory

opinions, even on important public issues, unless there is an actual case in

controversy.”).

             Furthermore, the interests of children allegedly subjected to sexual

assault while in a parent’s care are protected under current statutes. See, e.g., KRS

                                         -11-
Chapter 620 (Dependency, Neglect, and Abuse); KRS 403.270 (initial custody

determination requiring finding of child’s best interest considering several factors

including physical and mental health and the child’s relationship with parents and

others). Notably, a court may modify custody even less than two years after an

initial custody determination based on affidavits indicating serious endangerment

to the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health. KRS 403.340(2)(a).

Similarly, a court may restrict visitation based on serious endangerment to the

child’s physical, mental, or emotional health. See KRS 403.320(3).

             Thus, we decline to adopt Julie’s proposed bright-line rule.

             Further arguments in the parties’ briefs not discussed herein have been

determined to lack merit or relevancy to our resolving this appeal.

                                  CONCLUSION

             For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Brandon M. Music                           Tracy D. Frye
Grayson, Kentucky                          Marie E. Troxler
                                           Russell, Kentucky

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