Court Opinion

ID: 9901478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 20:03:11.864525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:33.567792
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/21/23 In re S.D. CA2/6
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 In re S.D., a Person Coming                                2d Juv. No. B326396
 Under the Juvenile Court                                (Super. Ct. No. 2019034094)
 Law.                                                         (Ventura County)

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,

 v.

 S.D.,

      Defendant and Appellant.

      S.D. appeals an order transferring him from the juvenile
court to an adult court of criminal jurisdiction (Welf. & Inst.
Code,1 § 801, subds. (a) & (e)). He contends (1) the case must be
dismissed pursuant to Kellett v. Superior Court (1966) 63 Cal.2d

         1 Further unspecified statutory references are to the

Welfare and Institutions Code.
822 (Kellett), and (2) there was no substantial evidence to support
the transfer order. We affirm.
              FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
         The 2003 petition—offenses against K.B. and F.G.
      In 2003, S.D. admitted two counts in an amended section
602 petition alleging he sexually assaulted two girls, K.B. and
F.G. (Pen. Code, §§ 288.5, 289, subd. (a)(1)). The offenses
occurred between January 1, 2001, and September 30, 2002. S.D.
was about 15 years old and the girls were under 12 years old. He
was a youth leader and oversaw a church music group in which
the girls participated. He used an elaborate scheme to convince
the girls that he was a talent agent and coerced them to perform
sexual acts. S.D. committed these acts at the church they
attended.
      During the investigation of the sexual abuse against K.B.
and F.G., S.D.’s sister (Sister)2 accused him of molesting her.
However, she later recanted. Child Protective Services
investigated Sister’s allegations, but no charges were filed.
      S.D. was declared a ward of the court and ordered into
suitable placement. He was placed at a group home, where he
participated in 18 months of sex offender treatment. In
December 2004, his suitable placement order was vacated, and he
successfully completed probation in 2006.
     The 2020 petition—alleged offenses against S.D.’s sister3
      In 2019, Sister, who was then in her mid-20s, was
participating in therapy when she recalled S.D. had repeatedly

      2 Because S.D.’s sister has the same initials, we refer to her

as “Sister” to avoid confusion.

      3 The facts are taken from the probation report.

                                  2
sexually abused her about 16 years earlier. She texted S.D., who
was then 32 years old. S.D. apologized for touching her
inappropriately and calling her his “slave.”
       Sister had flashbacks and remembered S.D. molesting her
when she was as young as six years old. She estimated she was
forced to perform oral sex 100 times between the ages of seven
and 10. She estimated she was forced to have vaginal intercourse
10 times between the ages of eight and 10. She recalled one
“vivid” memory that occurred in the garage of their home when
she was eight years old. S.D. forced her to perform oral sex and
have vaginal intercourse with him. When she refused, he
threatened to “push the button,” which meant that he was going
to kill her.
       Sister did not tell anyone at the time about the ongoing
sexual abuse that occurred in their home because she was scared
that S.D. would kill himself, hurt her, or hurt their parents. She
recalled S.D. kept a steak knife hidden in a closet and would hold
it up to his own neck or her neck or thigh to make sure she would
not report him.
       Sister reported the abuse to law enforcement in 2019. She
made a pretext phone call, during which S.D. apologized
numerous times and admitted touching her private parts. S.D.
admitted sexually assaulting her in the closet, garage, and his
room. He said these incidents happened around the same time
he was abusing K.B. and F.G. between 2001 and 2002.
       S.D. was arrested. He admitted to police detectives that he
touched Sister’s vagina and that he threatened to kill himself if
she reported him. He said he kept a butter knife in the closet
and would show it to Sister, telling her that he would slice
himself if she told their parents. He also admitted he would

                                3
threaten to “press his button” while pointing to his neck, which
meant that he would kill himself.
       One week prior to S.D.’s arrest, Sister told her parents
about the sexual abuse for the first time. She did not report the
abuse to them when S.D. was arrested as a juvenile for the
crimes against K.B. and F.G.
       The Ventura County District Attorney filed an amended
petition under section 602, alleging that S.D. committed three
counts of forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)), three
counts of forcible oral copulation (Pen. Code, former § 288a, subd.
(c)(2)), and two counts of anal or genital penetration with a
foreign object (Pen. Code, § 289, subd. (a)(1)). As to each count,
the petition also alleged that the victim was under the age of 18
when the crime occurred and that the prosecution commenced
before her 40th birthday (Pen. Code, § 801.1, subd. (a)).
                         Kellett motion proceedings
       S.D. filed a Kellett motion to dismiss the case, arguing that
the prosecution was aware or should have been aware that the
crimes against Sister involved the same course of conduct as the
crimes against K.B. and F.G., such that all the offenses needed to
be prosecuted in 2003. (Kellett, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 827.)
       At the hearing, the juvenile court denied the Kellett motion
without prejudice. The court explained that it appeared that
though Sister was in a “group of potential victims back in the
early 2000’s, that she recanted and denied being a victim of any
kind of misconduct at that time, and therefore, there would not
have been an opportunity for the People to have presented the
case involving her.”

                                 4
                     Transfer motion proceedings
       In May 2020, the prosecution moved to transfer the case to
an adult court of criminal jurisdiction (§ 707, subd. (a)(2)). At the
hearing, the prosecution relied on a report from psychologist Dr.
Anthony Urquiza and the probation report. Dr. Urquiza’s report
evaluated the five criteria for transfer under section 707,
subdivision (a)(3) and concluded that S.D.’s case “should be
transferred to the adult legal system.”
       At the hearing, Dr. Urquiza testified that the criterion
regarding the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by S.D.
weighed in favor of transfer to an adult court. Dr. Urquiza
testified S.D. “engaged in a patterned behavior that included a
tremendous amount of forethought.” As an example, Dr. Urquiza
noted that in the 2003 case, S.D. prepared himself by bringing a
black bag of props that he used to coerce K.B. and F.G. into
sexual conduct. In the crimes alleged against Sister, the doctor
testified that S.D. exhibited sophistication in the way he avoided
detection. He noted that S.D. would wait for opportunities when
he and Sister were alone to sexually molest her and chose
locations in the house that would conceal his activities.
Moreover, the prolonged nature of the sexual abuse without
detection inferred there was “[s]ome effort to conceal, and that
involves planning.” Dr. Urquiza also testified that S.D. used
threats, including threatening to “push the button” and storing a
knife in the closet, to coerce Sister into sexual acts and to keep
her from reporting.
       With respect to whether S.D. could be rehabilitated prior to
the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, Dr. Urquiza
opined that S.D. needed treatment, which would take several
years, and that there would be insufficient time for him to

                                  5
complete such treatment under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.
The doctor observed that after S.D.’s previous group home
placement, S.D. did not engage in the recommended follow-up
treatment. Dr. Urquiza also testified that S.D. exhibited a
general lack of veracity and remorse, and that he minimized the
severity and frequency of his sexual victimization of Sister.
Moreover, Dr. Urquiza was concerned with S.D.’s current
involvement in a youth ministry group (Youth Empowerment
Society), considering S.D.’s history of molesting young girls when
he was in a “roughly parallel” position with a youth music group
in 2001 to 2002. Dr. Urquiza was also concerned with S.D.’s
connection to the adult film industry and marriage to someone in
the pornography industry because S.D. had previously identified
excessive use of pornography as an issue for him.
       With respect to the circumstances and gravity of the
present offense, Dr. Urquiza opined this criterion supported the
transfer to an adult criminal court of jurisdiction. The doctor
testified about the level of harm Sister suffered because of S.D.’s
sexual abuse. Sister had a “pattern of devastating and
unremitting mental health symptoms,” which included
psychiatric hospitalizations, suicide attempts, and problems in
relationships.
       The defense presented a report from their expert
psychologist Dr. Gary Zinik and psychological assessments from
two other psychologists. Dr. Zinik opined that S.D.’s case should
remain in the juvenile court. He testified that he believed S.D.
was rehabilitated, noting that S.D. completed a treatment
program, went on to become a “pro-social adult,” and did not
commit further crimes.

                                 6
      At the time of the transfer hearing, the evidentiary
standard of proof was a preponderance of evidence. Applying this
standard, the juvenile court found the prosecution met its burden
of proof and ordered the case transferred to a court of criminal
jurisdiction.
      Effective January 1, 2023, Assembly Bill No. 2361 (2021-
2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 2361) amended section 707 to
change the evidentiary standard of proof for a juvenile transfer.
Section 707 now provides that a minor may be transferred from
the juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction only where
the court finds clear and convincing evidence that the minor is
not amenable to rehabilitation under the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3), as amended by Stats. 2022, ch.
330, § 1.) The case was returned to the juvenile court for a new
hearing to determine transfer to a criminal jurisdiction.
      At that hearing the juvenile court considered the evidence
presented at the prior transfer hearing. The court applied the
new clear and convincing standard of proof and ordered the case
transferred to the superior court for criminal proceedings. The
court considered all five transfer criteria under section 707,
subdivision (a)(3) and found the prosecution met their burden
with respect to three criteria—the degree of criminal
sophistication, whether S.D. could be rehabilitated prior to the
expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, and the
circumstances and grievous nature of the alleged offenses. The
court noted that of “the three elements . . . degree of
sophistication and circumstances of gravity of the offense are
probably the most overwhelming, most concerning to the Court.”

                                7
                           DISCUSSION
                           Kellett motion
       S.D. argues the juvenile court erred when it denied his
Kellett motion. We disagree.4
       Under Penal Code section 654, an “acquittal or conviction
and sentence under any one [provision of the law] bars a
prosecution for the same act or omission under any other.” In
Kellett, our Supreme Court held that where “the prosecution is or
should be aware of more than one offense in which the same act
or course of conduct plays a significant part, all such offenses
must be prosecuted in a single proceeding unless joinder is
prohibited or severance permitted for good cause. Failure to
unite all such offenses will result in a bar to subsequent
prosecution of any offense omitted if the initial proceedings
culminate in either acquittal or conviction and sentence.”
(Kellett, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 827.) We review de novo the issue
of whether Kellett and Penal Code section 654 barred prosecution
of the 2020 petition. (People v. Valli (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 786,
794 (Valli).)
       Courts have developed two tests under Kellett to determine
whether multiple offenses occurred during the same course of
conduct and are therefore subject to the multiple prosecution bar.
(People v. Sanchez (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 961, 986.) Under one
line of cases, multiple prosecutions are not barred if the offenses
were committed at different times and at different places. (Ibid;
People v. Cuevas (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 620, 624.) Under a
second line of cases, two offenses must be prosecuted together if

      4 The Attorney General contends S.D. forfeited his claim by

failing to press for a ruling in the trial court. Because we address
the merits, we do not address the forfeiture argument.

                                 8
the evidence needed to prove one offense necessarily supplies
proof of the other. (Sanchez, at p. 986; People v. Hurtado (1977)
67 Cal.App.3d 633, 636.)
       Here, Kellett is inapplicable under either test. The events
giving rise to both cases occurred during the same time frame of
2001 to 2002, but the alleged offenses in this case involve a
different victim, Sister, and they occurred when she and S.D.
were alone in their own home. In contrast, the offenses against
K.B. and F.G. occurred at church. (See People v. Ward (1973) 30
Cal.App.3d 130, 136 [Kellett inapplicable where the defendant
committed sexual offenses “at different locations, at different
times, against different victims, and with different objectives”
even when the offenses took place the same night].)
       Nor does evidence of the crimes S.D. committed against
K.B. and F.G. supply proof of the crimes he allegedly committed
against Sister. The 2003 case involved S.D. in a position of
leadership in a church music group and creating an elaborate
scheme to coerce K.B. and F.G. into sexual acts. But in this case,
S.D. allegedly threatened harm to himself, Sister, or their
parents to coerce Sister into sexual acts. Moreover, the use of
facts from the 2003 case to prosecute the present case does not
trigger the application of Kellett. (See Valli, supra, 187
Cal.App.4th at p. 799 [“Simply using facts from the first
prosecution in the subsequent prosecution does not trigger
application of Kellett”].)
       In our view, Kellett and Penal Code section 654 do not bar
the prosecution of the instant offenses involving Sister because
the prosecutor in the 2003 case was “ ‘ “ ‘unable to proceed [with
the current case] at the outset because the additional facts
necessary to sustain [the] charge have not occurred or have not

                                9
been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence.’ ” ’
[Citation.]” (People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal. 4th 510, 558.) The
facts necessary to prosecute the offenses involving Sister were not
disclosed by Sister to the police until 2019. The record reflects
that despite due diligence, there were insufficient facts in 2003 to
sustain the allegations that S.D. molested Sister. Notably, at the
time, Sister recanted her allegations, and Child Protective
Services investigated the matter, but no charges were filed. We
reject S.D.’s argument that there was a lack of due diligence in
discovering the sexual abuse against Sister. The Kellett motion
to dismiss was properly denied.
                         Substantial evidence
       S.D. contends the transfer order must be reversed because
there was no substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s
finding that he was not amenable to rehabilitation under the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction. We again disagree.
       As amended in January 2023, section 707, subdivision
(a)(3) provides that to “find that the minor should be transferred
to a court of criminal jurisdiction, the court shall find by clear
and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.”
In making its decision, the court shall consider the following five
criteria: (A) “The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by
the minor,” (B) “Whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to
the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction,” (C) “The
minor’s previous delinquent history,” (D) “Success of previous
attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor,” and (E)
“The circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in the
petition to have been committed by the minor.” (§ 707, subd.
(a)(3)(A)-(E).) “If the court orders a transfer of jurisdiction, the

                                10
court shall recite the basis for its decision in an order entered
upon the minutes, which shall include the reasons supporting the
court’s finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation
while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (§ 707, subd.
(a)(3).)
       The minor’s amenability to rehabilitation under the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction is “the ultimate question for the court
to decide.” (In re E.P. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 409, 416.)
“Nevertheless, in deciding that question, the amendment
requires the court to consider the same five factors listed in the
previous version [of section 707.]” (Ibid.) Now, however, “[t]he
analysis of the five criteria set forth in the statute should be
focused through the lens of amenability to rehabilitation.” (In re
S.S. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1288.)
       We review the juvenile court’s order transferring a case to
an adult court of criminal jurisdiction for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 680.)
And we review the trial court’s factual findings as to the five
fitness criteria under section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(A)-(E) for
substantial evidence. (People v. Superior Court (Jones), at p.
681.) Under that deferential standard, we review the record most
favorably to the judgment (In re Jerry M. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th
289, 298) and give deference to how the trier of fact evaluated the
credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and
derived reasonable inferences from the evidence.
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011-1012.) The
testimony of a single witness is sufficient to constitute
substantial evidence. (People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284, 296.)
       The juvenile court here did not abuse its discretion in
ordering the transfer of S.D.’s case to an adult court of criminal

                                 11
jurisdiction. In determining S.D. was not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, the
court based its ruling on three criteria weighing in favor of the
transfer and emphasized the degree of criminal sophistication
exhibited by S.D. and the gravity of the offenses. Substantial
evidence supports these findings.
       Dr. Urquiza testified that S.D. exhibited criminal
sophistication in the way he planned his crimes and avoided
detection. For example, S.D. waited for opportunities when he
was alone with Sister and chose locations in their home where he
could avoid detection. S.D. also threatened Sister by creating the
phrase “push the button” and using a knife, which he stored in a
closet, to coerce Sister into sexual acts and to ensure she stayed
quiet. Moreover, the prolonged nature of the abuse without
detection indicates that S.D. put effort into planning his crimes.
       Substantial evidence also supports the juvenile court’s
finding that S.D. could not be rehabilitated prior to the expiration
of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. In evaluating this criterion,
the “juvenile court may give weight to any relevant factor,
including, but not limited to, the minor’s potential to grow and
mature.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(ii).) Here, if the case remained in
the juvenile court, the court’s jurisdiction would expire two years
after the sustained petition. (§ 607.) However, Dr. Urquiza
opined that treatment for S.D. would take several years and
there was insufficient time for such treatment before the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction expired. Dr. Urquiza also testified that
despite completion of sex offender treatment years ago, S.D. did
not participate in the recommended follow up treatment. He
further noted that S.D. continued to exhibit a general lack of

                                12
veracity and remorse, and S.D. minimized the severity and
frequency of the crimes against Sister.
       Dr. Urquiza also identified S.D.’s involvement with the
Youth Empowerment Society and the adult film industry as a
concern given his criminal history. According to the probation
report, progress reports from S.D.’s group home indicated that
one key to his success would be to avoid sexually arousing
triggers and avoid being in “a manipulative controlling position.”
Nonetheless, the doctor opined that S.D.’s involvement in the
Youth Empowerment Society paralleled his previous involvement
in the church music group, in which he used a position of
leadership to manipulate and coerce his younger victims. S.D.
was also connected to the adult film industry and married to an
adult film actress, despite his self-reported addiction and
previous admission that pornography influenced his behavior
when he committed the 2003 offenses. The juvenile court
apparently found Dr. Urquiza’s testimony credible. It could
reasonably infer from these facts that S.D. had not grown and
matured years after receiving treatment, and that two year’s
treatment under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction was insufficient
to treat S.D.’s underlying behavioral issues.
       Substantial evidence also supports the juvenile court’s
finding that the circumstances and gravity of the offense weighed
in favor of the transfer to adult court. The seriousness of S.D.’s
alleged offense is not in dispute. S.D. allegedly sexually abused
Sister for a prolonged period and threatened to hurt himself and
Sister if she did not acquiesce. Dr. Urquiza’s testimony and
report detailed the “severe and long-lasting” psychological harm
Sister suffered because of the abuse. Dr. Zinik also
acknowledged the gravity and seriousness of the offenses.

                               13
      Because substantial evidence supports the findings on the
three fitness criteria weighing in favor of transfer, the court did
not abuse its discretion in finding S.D. was not amenable to
rehabilitation under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.
                           DISPOSITION
      The transfer order pursuant to section 801 is affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                      BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.

             CODY, J.

                                 14
                 Ferdinand Inumerable, Judge

               Superior Court County of Ventura

               ______________________________

      Laini Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez and Michael C. Keller, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.