Court Opinion

ID: 9575017
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:10:41.073937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:46.603203
License: Public Domain

Justice Exum
concurring.
I agree with the Court that the State’s evidence negated defendant’s culpability. I add these additional observations:
General Statute 20-28 (a) does not specify whether one must operate a motor vehicle knowing that his license has been suspended before he commits a violation of the section. Our traditional rule, however, is that when the General Assembly does not specify whether guilty knowledge, or mens rea, is required, the necessity of its existence will nonetheless be implied. State v. Welch, 232 N.C. 77, 59 S.E. 2d 199 (1950); State v. Elliott, 232 N.C. 377, 61 S.E. 2d 93 (1950); State v. Powell, 141 N.C. 780, 53 S.E. 515 (1906); accord, Sweet v. Parsley, [1969] 1 All E.R. 347 (House of Lords); see A. Loewy, Criminal Law in a Nutshell § 7.04B (1975).
The rule was first announced in State v. Powell, supra, where defendant had been convicted of retailing intoxicating liquor. The trial judge refused to admit evidence that defendant honestly and reasonably thought that what he sold was not alcoholic in nature. For this error this Court ordered a new trial holding that such evidence ought to be received and the jury properly instructed upon it. In a lengthy and well-reasoned opinion Justice Connor made these points: (1) General defenses to criminal liability are, as a matter of statutory construction, read into criminal statutes. (2) If the courts did not recognize these defenses then courts and statutes alike should be abated as public nuisances. (3) While ignorance of the law is no defense to a criminal accusation, mistake of fact is a complete *274defense. (4) Punishment of one who acts under an honest and reasonable mistake of fact would serve as no deterrent to crime but would inflict a grievous injustice and would shock the moral sense of the community. (5) This defense has been applied to regulatory offenses as well as more heinous crimes. (6) The objection that the presence of the defense would facilitate evasions of the statute was rejected. (7) The State need’ not initially prove guilty knowledge. The burden is on the defendant to raise the issue of an honest and reasonable mistake of fact. (It is now, of course, uncertain whether Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) would require the State to prove knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt once the issue is properly presented. Compare State v. Hankerson, 288 N.C. 632, 220 S.E. 2d 575 (1975) (self-defense and heat of passion) with State v. Hammonds, 290 N.C. 1, 224 S.E. 2d 595 (1976) (insanity).)
In State v. Welch, supra at 80, 59 S.E. 2d at 202, Justice Ervin said with reference to a claim of mistake of fact, “[i]t is axiomatic at common law that a crime is not committed if the mind of the person doing the act is innocent. The statutes relating to the unlawful transportation of intoxicating liquor are to be construed in the light of this common law principle, and the existence of guilty knowledge on the part of the accused is to be regarded as essential to criminality, even though it is not required by the statutes in express terms.”
In Poultry Co. v. Thomas, 289 N.C. 7, 15, 220 S.E. 2d 536, 542 (1975) we recently said of another traffic violation:
“G.S. 20-150 (c) is a safety statute enacted by the Legislature for the public’s common safety and welfare. The statute does not contain the words ‘knowingly,’ ‘willfully’ or any other words of like import. It was the obvious intent of the Legislature to make the performance of a specific act a criminal violation and to thereby place upon the individual the burden to know whether his conduct is within the statutory prohibition.”
That, however, was a civil case in which the only issue was whether plaintiff could recover from a negligent defendant when plaintiff passed at an intersection within city limits without knowledge or reason to know that he was within city limits. Criminal liability was not in issue. This difference is crucial. The only North Carolina criminal case cited by the majority in Poultry Co. was State v. McLean, 121 N.C. 589, 28 S.E. 140 *275(1897), which really involved ignorance of law rather than mistake of fact. Poultry Co. may be further distinguished in that the offense there considered, even if criminal, was a petty one punishable at most by a fine of $100 and imprisonment in jail for 60 days. N. C. Gen. Stat. 20-176 (b). A violation of General Statute 20-28(a), however, is a general misdemeanor punishable by two years imprisonment, or a fine of not less than $200, or both. We said in Poultry Co., “[w]e would not extend the rationale of this rule [due process does not require guilty knowledge] beyond petty offenses involving light punishment nor'... to any crime involving moral delinquency.” 289 N.C. at 15, 220 S.E. 2d at 542.
There are, of course, well recognized limits to a mistake of fact defense. It is not, for example, generally available to negate an element of a crime which merely aggravates what would otherwise be criminal or immoral conduct. State v. Wade, 224 N.C. 760, 32 S.E. 2d 314 (1944) (rape of a child under 12 — mistake as to age is no defense); Regina v. Prince, 13 Cox Crim. Cas. 138 (Cr. App. 1875) (abduction of girl under age of 16 without father’s consent — mistake as to age is no defense).
While allowing mistake of fact as a defense where the legislature is silent as to the requirement of guilty knowledge is perhaps contrary to the trend of recent authority in other states and England, see cases cited in Poultry Co. v. Thomas, supra at 13-14, 220 S.E. 2d at 541; Regina v. Miller, [1975] 2 All E.R. 974 (Ct. App. Crim. Div.), I believe to do so accords more with the ends of justice and well-reasoned North Carolina decisions to which I have already referred.
Mistake of fact as a defense does not seem to be required by the Federal Constitution. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922); Cf. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975). Whether strict criminal liability of a substantial nature when expressly mandated by the General Assembly would be viola-tive of the Law of The Land Clause of the North Carolina Constitution, Article 1 § 19, need not now be determined. See Comm. v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 155 A. 2d 825 (1959), for persuasive authority that such an enactment would be unconstitutional.
Applying the foregoing principles to a prosecution under General Statute 20-28 (a) where the suspension or revocation *276was a discretionary act, I believe that when the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was operating a motor vehicle on a public highway while his license was lawfully suspended or revoked, notice of such suspension or revocation having been given pursuant to General Statutes 20-16 and 20-48, nothing else appearing, the jury should be instructed to find the defendant guilty. Guilty knowledge,, in other words, is not a necessary element of the crime to be proved in the state’s case in chief. Neither is receipt of notice necessary in order for the suspension or revocation to be effective or lawful. Defendant’s lack of knowledge of the suspension or revocation is a mistake of fact defense which ordinarily is raised by defendant.
Where, however, as here, the State’s own evidence is that defendant drove honestly and reasonably without knowledge of the suspension or revocation, nonsuit is proper because the State has made out a mistake of fact defense. In a case where only the defendant’s evidence tends to prove an honest and reasonable mistake of fact, the State should not be nonsuited. Rather the issue of mistake of fact should be presented to the jury upon proper instructions. Important on this issue would be the rebuttable presumption that a duly mailed notice of suspension or revocation was duly received. While proof of mailing of the notice and the expiration of four days thereafter is proof of a valid suspension or revocation, N. C. Gen. Stats. 20-16, 20-48, this proof may or may not satisfy a jury, even with the presumption, that defendant actually knew of the suspension if his evidence tends to show he did not.