Court Opinion

ID: 9939577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-10 17:11:11.637383+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:25.483097
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 ERNIE B FOSTER                           :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 627 MDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 1, 2022
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-35-CR-0002223-2020

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: FEBRUARY 8, 2024

      I agree with Appellant that the trial court erred by permitting the

Commonwealth to introduce, in its case-in-chief, text messages from

Appellant’s phone that had no relation to the instant crimes and served to

portray Appellant as a drug dealer. The Majority, perhaps recognizing that

the text messages had no connection to this incident, separately opines that

the messages were admissible to undermine Appellant’s “defense” that he

possessed the drugs for personal use. However, this “defense” was not at

issue at the time the trial court admitted the evidence.        I would award

Appellant a new trial and therefore respectfully dissent.

      Appellant was arrested after a confidential informant purchased drugs

from Rochelle Johnson.     Appellant was carrying a fanny pack, which had

several kinds of drugs inside. Appellant also told an arresting officer that the

drugs were for his personal use. As Detective Harold Zech explained at trial,
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none of Appellant’s drug charges pertained to items recovered from his co-

defendant:

      So the drugs that were ordered by the [CI] that we were
      anticipating to come, they did arrive. They were inside Miss
      Johnson’s purse.      So there was an ounce of crystal
      methamphetamine and there was several grams of Fentanyl inside
      her purse. These items are different. These items weren’t even
      discussed to be brought here through the [CI].

N.T., 12/7/21, at 87-88; see also id. at 90 (stating that Appellant was

“arrested for possession with the intent to distribute the drugs that were inside

his fanny pack. Nothing that was found on Miss John[son] was attributed to

him.”).

      The Commonwealth executed a search warrant on Appellant’s cell phone

and introduced, over Appellant’s objection, several text messages. Detective

Zech testified that he discovered “a lot” of text messages indicative of drug

dealing, and the Commonwealth chose to present “a handful” as illustrative.

Id. at 90. Screenshots of the text messages were displayed to the jury, with

Detective Zech explaining that drug dealers typically speak in code.         For

example, the Commonwealth elicited the following:

      Q. Detective, can you just walk us through—This one is a little bit
      more voluminous so I would just ask you to walk through the text
      messages with them. Explain to the jury why you singled these
      messages out for this case and for your investigation.

                                     ....

      A. If you look in the blue, that’s not going to be [Appellant]’s
      phone. This is going to be the incoming message. This is typical.
      [‘]This is Mina’s friend. Can I get eight?[’]? Just from your day-
      to-day occurrences you would normally identify who you are. This
      is basically another buyer who is friends with Mina [who is]

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      reaching out to [Appellant] to purchase eight—a total of eight
      dosage units or possibly eight grams of a certain substance.

      Q. And—

      A. And then you see on the green the reply is [‘A]re you on
      Springfield[,’] which is basically him replying, you know, what is
      your location. Springfield is an avenue in Philadelphia.

Id. at 96-97.

      The other messages were of similar character. See id. at 98 (“[This is]

another buyer. ‘Are you around? I need two. Are you close by? If not don’t

worry about it.’ So someone is trying to buy two dosage units of a certain

substance and asking for his proximity, if he’s going to be nearby.”); id. at 99

(“It says ‘bro is [it] possible I can get three till Wednesday and I will give you

fifty dollars.’ Basically that’s someone asking for an IOU. Somebody is short

on their money. They need three of whatever substance is being sold….”).

The Commonwealth also introduced messages where Appellant used a third

party. As Detective Zech explained, “[This message] means he’s sending a

third party or there’s a third[-]party associate of his that’s selling the drugs

on the street corner.” Id. The Commonwealth concluded this portion of the

testimony by asking, “And, again, why did you deem [these messages]

relevant to your investigation, Detective?” Id. at 100. He replied, “Because

if I was analyzing anybody’s cell phone, this would be readily apparent to me

that this was drug talk, this is [a] drug thread.” Id.

      All relevant evidence is admissible, see Pa.R.E. 402, and the text

messages were certainly relevant: evidence that Appellant was a drug dealer

made it more probable that he possessed the drugs with an intent to deliver.

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Pa.R.E. 401. “Regardless of relevancy, however, evidence of a defendant’s

prior bad acts ‘is not admissible … to show that on a particular occasion the

[defendant] acted in accordance with the character.’ However, such evidence

may be admissible when offered for another purpose, such as to prove the

defendant’s intent.”      Commonwealth v. Faison, 297 A.3d 810, 825 (Pa.

Super. 2023) (quoting Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1)).        In addition to intent, Rule

404(b)(2) permits admission of such evidence “for another purpose, such as

proving motive, opportunity, … preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,

absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2). “This list is non-

exclusive.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 320, 325–26 (Pa. Super.

2012).

       The threshold question in a Rule 404(b) analysis is whether the evidence

is relevant to something other than propensity. “[A]s Rule 404(b)(2) reflects,

evidence of ‘other crimes, wrongs, or acts’ may be admitted when relevant for

a purpose other than criminal character/propensity, including: proof of

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or

absence of mistake.” Commonwealth v. Dillon, 925 A.2d 131, 137 (Pa.

2007).

       The Majority concludes that the text messages “have a logical

connection with the crimes at issue.” Maj. Mem. at 7.1 The Majority also

____________________________________________

1 The trial court did not deem the text messages relevant for any particular

purpose, instead citing several distinct theories, stating: “Upon review, this
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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notes that “[Appellant] claimed he possessed the drugs for personal use, not

that he did not possess them.” Id. at 10. It is not entirely clear to what

degree the Majority finds that the “logical connection” exists due to its

assessment that Appellant raised a defense that the drugs were for his

personal use.      I submit that the theories are doctrinally distinct, and that

neither applies.

       Beginning with the “logical connection” theory, our precedents permit

the   introduction     of   prior-act   evidence   relevant   to   intent   in   some

circumstances, and intent does play a role in a PWID case:

       It is well settled that all the facts and circumstances surrounding
       possession are relevant in making a determination of whether
       contraband was possessed with intent to deliver.

       In Pennsylvania, the intent to deliver may be inferred from
       possession of a large quantity of controlled substance. It follows
       that possession of a small amount of a controlled substance
       supports the conclusion that there is an absence of intent to
       deliver.

       Notably, “if, when considering only the quantity of a controlled
       substance, it is not clear whether the substance is being used for
       personal consumption or distribution, it then becomes necessary
       to analyze other factors.”

Commonwealth v. Lee, 956 A.2d 1024, 1028 (Pa. Super. 2008) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Brown, 904 A.2d 925, 931-32 (Pa. Super. 2006)).
____________________________________________

[c]ourt found that the information was admissible to show Appellant’s motive,
opportunity, intent, and plan for his possession of the narcotics on the date of
the incident in the above-captioned matter. This [c]ourt also determined that
the probative value of said evidence did not outweigh its potential for unfair
prejudice. As such, this [c]ourt properly allowed the introduction of the
communications extracted from the black iPhone.” Trial Court Opinion,
11/15/22, at 14-15.

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      As highlighted by the Commonwealth’s insistence that Appellant offered

a defense of personal use, the key question is whether Appellant merely

possessed the drugs for his personal use or whether he intended to deliver

them. It is obvious that text messages showing that Appellant is a drug dealer

would naturally sway the jury towards the latter conclusion. “It is natural and

well-nigh inevitable that a juror considers a person to be a drug dealer when

told that the same person has dealt drugs multiple times in the past[.]”

Commonwealth v. Hicks, 156 A.3d 1114, 1157 (Pa. 2017) (Wecht, J.,

dissenting).   This raises the question of whether evidence of a history of

dealing drugs would ever be admissible under Rule 404(b) to prove a PWID

charge to show intent. On this point, the Majority discusses Commonwealth

v. Camperson, 612 A.2d 482 (Pa. Super. 1992), Commonwealth v. Kinard,

95 A.3d 279 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc), and Commonwealth v. Aguado,

760 A.2d 1181 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc). My assessment of these cases

differs from that of my colleagues.

      In Camperson, the defendant was charged with, inter alia, PWID for

drugs that were seized from his home pursuant to a search warrant, which

was issued based on conduct occurring that very same day. A man named

Brian Wynn was arrested for selling drugs and informed the arresting officer

that he had purchased the drugs from Camperson. Wynn then agreed to act

as an informant and, under police surveillance, delivered $3,500 upfront to

Camperson in exchange for drugs later that evening.       The police watched

Camperson leave his home around the designated time and attempted a traffic

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stop. Camperson fled and, after a lengthy chase, was apprehended. He had

238.8 grams of methamphetamine on his person.          He was arrested and

charged with several crimes, including PWID for those drugs. Based on this

arrest, a search warrant was obtained for Camperson’s home, leading to the

discovery of more methamphetamine and a second set of charges.

     The trial court denied the Commonwealth’s motion to consolidate the

charges and Camperson was found guilty of crimes arising out of his police

chase. Camperson then successfully moved to exclude evidence concerning

those crimes in his trial for the drugs in his home.    The Commonwealth

appealed and we reversed, explaining:
     In the instant case, the defendant was charged with crimes
     involving a specific intent. He was charged with possessing
     controlled substances with the intent of delivering them to other
     persons. Therefore, it was clearly relevant to show that a few
     hours before police found controlled substances in Camperson’s
     residence, he had agreed to sell drugs to a third person.

Id. at 484–85.   We further concluded that the evidence was not unduly

prejudicial because of the Commonwealth’s need to prove that the

“methamphetamine found in the defendant’s home was intended for

distribution to others. Although this intent may be proved in several ways,

one of the strongest and most compelling pieces of evidence is that the

defendant, in fact, had been distributing methamphetamine on the same day

on which methamphetamine and cocaine were found in his home.” Id. at 485.

     In Commonwealth v. Aguado, 760 A.2d 1181 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en

banc), we distinguished Camperson and granted a new trial. Police officers

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had observed Aguado handing items from a small paper bag to another male.

Suspecting a drug deal, officers drove towards Aguado. He tossed the bag on

the ground, which contained ten vials of crack cocaine. The Commonwealth

charged him with PWID. Aguado filed a motion in limine to preclude a prior

conviction for “possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver[,] … [which]

took place nine months earlier, in the same neighborhood.” Id. at 1185. The

trial court held that the evidence          could not be introduced in the

Commonwealth’s     case-in-chief,    but   deferred   ruling   on   whether   the

Commonwealth could introduce the evidence on rebuttal depending on

Aguado’s testimony. The parties discussed the matter again shortly before

Aguado took the stand. The trial court then “stated its predisposition to admit

Aguado’s prior conviction as evidence of intent” regardless of what he stated

during his testimony. Id. at 1186.

      Aguado declined to testify and, on appeal, claimed that this ruling

interfered with his constitutional right to testify. We agreed, holding that the

court erred in preemptively determining that the evidence was admissible:

      Here, the trial court indicated that Aguado’s prior criminal conduct
      could be admissible to establish the element of intent. In order
      for evidence of prior crimes to be admissible to show intent, “the
      evidence must give sufficient ground to believe that the crime
      currently being considered grew out of or was in any way
      caused by the prior set of facts and circumstances.” …
      Camperson, … 612 A.2d [at] 484 … (emphasis added). In this
      case, the Commonwealth presented no evidence that Aguado’s
      conviction “grew out of or was in any way caused by” his prior
      drug activity. Moreover, we cannot conclude that Aguado could
      form and maintain his “intent” over the nine-month period
      between the two incidents.

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      We also note that the trial court never weighed the
      Commonwealth’s need for the evidence against its potential
      prejudicial effect. See Commonwealth v. Steele, … 596 A.2d
      225, 227 ([Pa. Super.] 1991) (holding that even where evidence
      of prior criminal conduct is within one of the enumerated
      exceptions to the prohibition against prior crimes evidence, the
      trial court must balance the Commonwealth’s need for the
      evidence against its potential prejudice). Although Aguado had
      not yet testified when the trial court stated its predisposition, his
      defense was clear.

      Aguado claimed that he was arrested simply because he was
      proximate to the drugs. Thus, the parties disputed the element
      of possession, not intent, and the Commonwealth’s need for the
      prior crimes evidence in order to establish “intent” was
      nonexistent. Contrary to the trial court’s statement, evidence of
      Aguado’s prior drug transaction, which occurred nine months
      earlier, was not necessary to rebut his defense.

Aguado, 760 A.2d at 1186–87 (emphasis in original).

      In Commonwealth v. Kinard, 95 A.3d 279 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en

banc), we held that Camperson supported the trial court’s ruling permitting

the Commonwealth to introduce evidence from recorded jail conversations in

which Kinard generally discussed dealing drugs. Kinard was charged as a co-

conspirator with his cousin, Jessica Morrison, who was the co-defendant in the

case. Officers had observed Morrison making several drug deals and obtained

a warrant to search her home. When the warrant was executed, Kinard was

the only person present. Morrison testified at trial that Kinard gave her the

cocaine found in her home to sell on the street. The trial court concluded that

the jail phone calls were “relevant to establish a chain of events and a course

of criminal conduct that would demonstrate [his] presence in Morrison’s home

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where the police located drugs was not an innocent coincidence or accident as

the defense alleged.” Id. at 285. We agreed, opining:

      The telephone calls demonstrate [Kinard]’s knowledge and
      awareness of drug trafficking and support Morrison’s testimony
      that [Kinard] is the supplier and that he was not innocently in
      Morrison’s home, but rather was there conducting business. The
      calls also reveal a common plan, scheme, and design. As the trial
      court stated, the calls demonstrated that [Kinard] was engaged in
      ongoing drug transactions even after he was arrested. The drug
      transactions were similar, if not identical, to the drug transactions
      for which he was charged. The calls also reveal [Kinard]’s
      knowledge of and use of coded language. Again, Morrison testified
      that she used coded language when she asked [Kinard] for drugs.
      Morrison asked [Kinard] for “ten twenties.” [Kinard], in turn, met
      her request and supplied the drugs. The coded language used
      during the taped phone calls was similar and demonstrated not
      only that [Kinard] understood the code used by others but
      [Kinard] also used the language himself.

Id.

      I find that the instant case is more like Aguado than Camperson and

Kinard. Indeed, in the latter two cases, we determined that the other-act

evidence was admissible because it “grew out of” the offenses that were

charged. In Camperson, we explicitly cited the closeness in time of the prior

offense, stressing that “it was clearly relevant to show that a few hours before

police found controlled substances in Camperson’s residence, he had agreed

to sell drugs to a third person.” Camperson, 612 A.2d at 484. The fact that

an informant had arranged for Camperson to deliver drugs indicates that the

relevant point is that the other-act evidence established a plausible link to the

same stash of drugs. This is further supported by the fact that the drugs

found on Camperson after the crash and the drugs found in his home were

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both methamphetamine. Thus, the second set of charges pertaining to the

drugs in the home grew out of the earlier sale in the sense that the two were

part of a common scheme, as the authorities knew that Camperson was on

his way to deliver drugs for which he had previously received thousands of

dollars. Camperson, thus in truth, does not rely on the “intent” exception to

Rule 404(b) as an independent basis for admitting the evidence but, instead,

permitted the introduction of a common scheme as a means of establishing

intent.   See Hicks, supra at 1146 (Donohue, J., dissenting) (stating that

“invocation of the    common scheme exception should be limited to

circumstances from which a true plan or motive can be inferred”).

      That the other-act evidence in the PWID context must be part of a

common scheme to the charges at issue is corroborated by how Aguado

distinguished Camperson. In Aguado, we noted that “the Commonwealth

presented no evidence that Aguado’s conviction ‘grew out of or was in any

way caused by’ his prior drug activity.”     Aguado, 760 A.2d at 1186-87.

Moreover, we stated that we could not “conclude that Aguado could form and

maintain his ‘intent’ over the nine-month period between the two incidents.”

Id. at 1187. In other words, in Camperson, there was a sound basis to link

the drugs found on Camperson to the drugs found in his home as part of the

same scheme. The same could not be said in Aguado. Hence the Aguado

Court’s skepticism that acts occurring nine months before the instant offense

could establish an ongoing “intent” to sell the drugs at issue. In contrast, in

Camperson, the same “intent” existed for both incidents because the

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evidence established that the two events were all part of an overarching

scheme to sell that particular quantity of drugs.

      Kinard lends some support to the Commonwealth’s position because

the recorded phone calls did not appear to relate to a common stash of drugs,

so to speak. Indeed, this was the principal focus of the four dissenting judges.

Kinard, 95 A.3d at 296 (Donohue, J., dissenting) (“[T]he recordings …cover

a variety of topics…. There are references to broad drug distribution activity,

including mentions of the sale of drugs generally and of various amounts of

money….”).    The case is nonetheless distinguishable.      The Kinard Court

concluded that “the calls demonstrated that [Kinard] was engaged in ongoing

drug transactions even after he was arrested. The drug transactions were

similar, if not identical, to the drug transactions for which he was charged.”

Id. at 285.    The Kinard Dissent argued that this was not an accurate

characterization of the facts, but as a matter of law, the Kinard Court

accepted that the other-act evidence would need to be “similar, if not

identical” in character. Id.

      Here, the text messages displayed and narrated to the jury simply do

not have any kind of connection whatsoever to the present charges. Nor do

the messages establish any kind of similar, ongoing scheme specific to the

drugs Appellant possessed. As quoted, Detective Zech’s narration of the text

messages showed that the messages referred to generic “units” or “dosages”

of unspecified drugs, and the Commonwealth also introduced messages

showing that Appellant directed third parties to deliver drugs. Thus, the text

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messages did not relate to the drugs recovered from Appellant’s fanny pack,

nor did the messages have anything to do with the circumstances that led the

police to arrest Appellant. The text messages also all apparently related to

drug deals taking place in Philadelphia. These facts all strongly indicate that

the only reason the Commonwealth sought to introduce the evidence was to

portray Appellant as a drug dealer in general. This conclusion is underscored

by the fact that the Commonwealth signaled to the jury that Appellant’s cell

phone contained much more evidence than that which it presented, as the

Commonwealth told the jury it chose to introduce “[j]ust a handful” of the

messages that Detective Zech reviewed. N.T., 12/7/21, at 95.

      Additionally, in Kinard, the Commonwealth charged Kinard as a

conspirator, and the Kinard Court cited the need to establish conspiratorial

liability. Specifically, the Kinard Court opined that “[t]he … case also involves

a conspiracy charge. Thus, it was also necessary to establish [Kinard’s] intent

to promote or facilitate PWID.” Kinard, 95 A.3d at 286. This again contrasts

with the instant facts, where the Commonwealth freely admitted that the

event precipitating Appellant’s arrest—the arranged deal between the CI and

Johnson—had nothing to do with Appellant.

      In sum, there is no association between the drugs at issue and the prior-

act evidence, making this case much closer to Aguado. The Aguado Court

was skeptical of the proposition that evidence from nine months ago bore any

relation to an ongoing “intent” to deliver drugs. The same point applies here.

Moreover, in Aguado, the other-act evidence was related to the crimes

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because the prior conviction concerned drugs being sold in the same area.

Here, the evidence merely established that Appellant was a generic drug

dealer. Thus, I believe that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding

that this evidence was relevant for anything other than showing Appellant’s

propensity to deal drugs.

      Having determined that the evidence was not admissible to prove

Appellant’s intent with respect to the specific drugs he possessed, I now

address the alternative theory that the Commonwealth was permitted to

anticipatorily undermine Appellant’s “defense” that he possessed the drugs for

personal use. In Hicks, supra, then-Chief Justice Saylor’s concurring opinion

approvingly cited decisions from other jurisdictions discussing the “intent”

exception.    I find the following discussion from one of those cases to be

persuasive:

      The intent exception in [Indiana Rule of Evidence] 404(b) will be
      available when a defendant goes beyond merely denying the
      charged culpability and affirmatively presents a claim of particular
      contrary intent. When a defendant alleges in trial a particular
      contrary intent, whether in opening statement, by cross-
      examination of the State’s witnesses, or by presentation of his
      own case-in-chief, the State may respond by offering evidence of
      prior crimes, wrongs, or acts to the extent genuinely relevant to
      prove the defendant’s intent at the time of the charged offense.
      The trial court must then determine whether to admit or exclude
      such evidence depending upon whether “its probative value is
      substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
      confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
      considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of
      cumulative evidence.” [Indiana Rule of Evidence] 403.

                                     ....

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      Because, as discussed above, the “intent” exception in [Indiana
      Rule of Evidence] 404(b) applies when the defendant presents a
      claim of particularly contrary intent, the determinative factor in
      the present case is whether the prior conduct evidence was
      admitted before the defendant presented any such claim. The
      State’s case-in-chief included evidence that the defendant, in
      response to police questions as to whether he touched the victim’s
      penis, responded that he was not a “devious character.” This
      statement does not constitute an assertion of particular contrary
      intent so as to permit the State to utilize the intent exception of
      [Indiana Rule of Evidence] 404(b) to present prior conduct
      testimony.

Wickizer v. State, 626 N.E.2d 795, 799-800 (Ind. 1993) (some internal

citations omitted).

      I agree with this reasoning. The validity of admitting other-act evidence

to counter a defense cannot be based on the Commonwealth’s desire to

anticipatorily rebut said defense. The defense must be placed into issue by

the defendant. Here, the only indication that Appellant intended to assert that

he possessed the drugs for personal use was his statement to the arresting

officers. As Appellant observes, “the pure act of going to trial is the rest of

pleading [n]ot [g]uilty,” and the Commonwealth cannot introduce “irrelevant

allegations as … rebuttal to the defendant’s natural claim of innocence.”

Appellant’s Brief at 13. Moreover, possession of the drugs for personal use is

not an affirmative defense to the charge; had Appellant convinced the jury

that the drugs were for his personal use, it simply would have negated the

element of possession with intent to deliver. Allowing the Commonwealth to

establish that a defendant must have intended to commit a crime due to

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having previously committed said crimes is the core propensity purpose that

Rule 404(b) prohibits.

       Finally, I express no opinion on whether the text messages would be

relevant in rebuttal had Appellant testified in his own defense and claimed

personal use. I acknowledge that Appellant ultimately did so. However, it is

impossible to determine whether Appellant would have made the same choice

had the trial court correctly excluded the text messages from evidence.

       For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the trial court abused its

discretion. I would therefore grant a new trial.2
____________________________________________

2 The Commonwealth did not address whether the error was harmless beyond

a reasonable doubt. As our Supreme Court held in Commonwealth v.
Hamlett, 234 A.3d 486 (Pa. 2020), we may invoke the doctrine sua sponte.
Additionally, “when an appellate court deems it appropriate to exercise its
discretion to undertake a harmless error analysis of its own accord in close
cases, it has the ability to enhance fairness to the defendant and facilitate its
own review by directing that there be supplemental briefing.” Id. at 494.

     Assuming that this authority extends to allowing the Commonwealth to
remedy its defect when we are prepared to rule in favor of an appellant, I
would decline to do so, as I am convinced that the error was not harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. Harmless error is found in three situations:
       (1) the error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was
       de minimis;

       (2) the erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of
       other untainted evidence which was substantially similar to the
       erroneously admitted evidence; or

       (3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt
       was so overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was
       so insignificant by comparison that the error could not have
       contributed to the verdict.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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____________________________________________

Commonwealth v. Wright, 961 A.2d 119, 143 (Pa. 2008) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Young, 748 A.2d 166, 193 (Pa. 1999)). Telling the jury
that Appellant was a habitual drug dealer plainly prejudiced Appellant, and it
was not de minimis. The evidence was not cumulative of anything else.
Finally, I cannot say as a matter of law that the evidence of guilt was
overwhelming.

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