Court Opinion

ID: 9692863
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:09:16.377155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:29:42.676728
License: Public Domain

J. R. Kirwan, J.
(dissenting). The authority of a probate judge to set aside or modify a parent’s release of parental rights is set forth in MCL 710.64(1); MSA 27.3178(555.64):
Upon the filing of a petition in probate court within 20 days after entry of any order under this chapter, and after due notice to all interested parties, the judge of probate may grant a rehearing and may modify or set aside the order.
This Court has interpreted this statute in a manner that vests the authority to revoke a release of parental rights in the sound discretion of the trial judge. DeBoer v Child & Family Services of Michigan, Inc, 76 Mich App 641; 257 NW2d 200 (1977).
In reviewing a trial judge’s exercise of discretion concerning such matters, the importance and seriousness of the decision to legally sever the parent-child relationship cannot be overemphasized. The natural ties that link the parent and child evolve majestically from the mystery of life itself. As the future lives of the new-born child and the parents of that child will be forever affected by the court’s ruling, the decision of the trial judge is truly of extraordinary importance. While it is true that there must be some finality in the release of parental rights, a brief delay in the finality of that decision should be countenanced if the interests of the parties and child are served. It follows that, when parents petition for a rehearing, the court should view the facts made known at the rehearing in a light supporting and even encouraging the idea that parental rights are fundamental and that a child’s best interests are ordinarily served *716when the natural parents will be the guiding influence in the life and growth of the child.
Therefore, a trial judge in considering a parent’s petition to revoke a parental release should liberally grant such petition if timely made. The legal reasoning that allows a defendant in a criminal case to withdraw his plea of guilty before sentencing is applicable in cases of this nature. Our Supreme Court has consistently held that even though a plea has been voluntarily and understandably made judges should exercise their discretion liberally in granting a defendant’s petition to withdraw a plea of guilty prior to sentencing. See People v Bencheck, 360 Mich 430, 433; 104 NW2d 191 (1960), wherein the Court, quoting from People v Banning, 329 Mich 1; 44 NW2d 841 (1950), stated:
The rationale behind these cases is apparent. The right to trial by jury in criminal cases is a substantial constitutional right, as are the attendant rights of confrontation, cross-examination, et cetera. While these rights may be waived by the defendant, the law has erected many safeguards to protect him against his own ignorance, or folly, and against the pressures that might be applied by others. In the case in which the defendant has pleaded guilty, and then desires to avail himself of his constitutional guaranties, the law will not punish him for his indiscretion.
As parental rights are both substantial and fundamental, the law should be equally protective of such rights and require the trial judges to liberally grant petitions to revoke a parental release if made within the time allowed by law.
When such petitions are timely made, they are made prior to the creation of any parental rights in prospective adoptive parents. As such, the real *717parties in interest at the time of the rehearing are the State of Michigan and the parents of the child. The state’s interest is to see that the child’s basic needs are met. The parents’ interest encompasses their obligation to provide for the many needs of their child. The interests of the state and the parents are therefore not necessarily in conflict; and the judge’s revocation of a parental release, if done within the time allowed by law, may very well serve the interests of both the parents and. the state. Further, as no rights of prospective adoptive parents have accrued at the time of the petition, a strong presumption must exist that at rehearing the child’s best interest would be served by allowing the parents to exercise their parental rights and obligations.
In the instant case the parents’ request to revoke the release they had signed was timely made. The parents made their request eighteen days after the release was signed, which was within the twenty-day period allowed by law. MCL 710.64(1); MSA 27.3178(555.64)(1).
At the hearing to consider the petition to revoke the parental release, evidence revealed that the parents when they signed the release were uncertain whether or not they would be financially able to support the new-born child due to the father’s unemployment. Yet, when the parents made their request to revoke, the father had obtained a part-time job and the mother’s employment did not conflict with the employment of the father. Further, several friends of the mother had signed a letter indicating their willingness to provide support for child care. Additionally, the mother stated that when she signed the release she was in a "sort of fog.” She claimed that she was recovering from surgery and taking medication that caused her emotional turmoil and made her vulnerable to *718the suggestions of others. Further, the father testified that he had talked the mother into signing the release even though she was reluctant to do so.
These facts and the fact that the parents at the time of the rehearing were united in their desire to keep the child, when considered in the light that petitions to revoke a parental release should be liberally granted when timely made, constituted sufficient good cause and change of circumstances to require the granting of the petition, and the trial judge’s refusal to do so was therefore an abuse of discretion.
I would reverse.