Court Opinion

ID: 9676564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:27:24.46607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:48.971577
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). The defendant, Kenneth P. Little, was arrested for drunk driving and transported to the police station. On evidence tending to show that he struck a police officer while the officer was attempting to administer a Breathalyzer test, Littlé was charged1 with obstructing and resisting an officer in his "lawful acts, attempts and efforts to maintain, preserve and keep the peace, to wit: assisting in taking of breathalyzer . . . .”2
*762Little was bound over by the magistrate on the basis of the testimony of two police officers which tended to show that Little spat on the Breathalyzer, was about to spit on one of the officers who then raised his hand, and that Little then kicked the officer twice in the groin. Little was subdued by the officers.
Little moved to quash the information, claiming that administering a Breathalyzer test is not, unless the officer is "out on the road,” maintaining, preserving, and keeping the peace. The circuit judge agreed and quashed the information. She said that the purpose of the statute is to protect against interference with the performance in public places of the officer’s duties, and that it was not intended that the statute apply to the acts committed by Little while he was detained in a jail setting.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that "our research has failed to uncover precedent wherein the statute in question has been applied to a postarrest, in-custody defendant.” 179 Mich App 445, 448-449; 446 NW2d 309 (1989). The Court added that there is another statute3 applicable where an offense is committed by a person lawfully imprisoned or detained that "enhances the *763punishment for a simple assault” under the circumstances of the instant case. Id., p 449.4
The per curiam opinion reverses the decision of the Court of Appeals “because the plain language of the statute covers the events that are said to have taken place in this case.”5
i
The per curiam opinion appears to acknowledge that “ 'keep the peace’ ” are key words,6 but does not state what is the “plain meaning” of the "plain language” of the statute.
Nor, on somewhat hasty and inadequate research, have I found a definition of "preserve” or “keep the peace.”7 It appears, however, that there *764is plentiful authority concerning what constitutes "breaking the peace.” This Court said:
In general terms the offense is a violation of public order, a disturbance of the public tranquillity, by any act or conduct inciting to violence, or tending to provoke or excite others to break the peace. Each case where the offense is charged must depend upon the time, place, and circumstances of the act. [People v Johnson, 86 Mich 175, 177; 48 NW 870 (1891). Emphasis added.]
Reading that definition together with the statutory language, "maintain and preserve” or "keep the peace,”8 it appears that the act of the defendant must have occurred in a setting where the officer was seeking to maintain and preserve "public order” or "tranquility” and, thus, that the defendant’s conduct interfered with the officer’s "lawful acts, attempts and efforts to maintain, preserve and keep [public order or tranquility].”
The only persons in the room where the Breathalyzer was located were two police officers and Little. In that setting, the officers were not seeking to maintain and preserve public order or tranquility. Thus, Little’s acts did not interfere with the officer’s efforts to maintain and preserve public order or tranquility.
A different question might be presented if a number of persons had been arrested and the officers were maintaining and preserving, at the station house, the tranquility of those who had been arrested and others who may have been there with them._
*765II
In People v Krum, 374 Mich 356; 132 NW2d 69 (1965), the Court held that the defendant was properly convicted of obstructing an officer in his efforts to maintain, preserve, and keep the peace on evidence that he interfered with an officer who was conducting a roadblock.9
In People v John Weatherspoon, 6 Mich App 229; 148 NW2d 889 (1967), the defendant was convicted of violating the statute on evidence that he opened the door of a police car and assaulted an officer. The Court of Appeals, referring to Krum, said that the officer was engaged in preserving the peace when he was assaulted. The Court of Appeals explained:
[The defendant in Krum] interfered with a State trooper’s duty to inspect automobiles as they arrived at a blockade set up as part of a search for prison escapees. From a factual analysis, Officer Nevelle’s "acts, attempts and efforts” seem comparable to those being executed by the State trooper in People v Krum, supra. But more important *766than this parallel, is that on page 361 of the Krum Case, supra, the Court recognized the relationship between the statute and the general rule which provides:
" 'The obstruction of or resistance to a public officer in the performance of his duties is an offense at common law, and by statute in all jurisdictions.’ (39 Am Jur, Obstructing Justice, § 8, p 506.)” (Emphasis supplied [by the Court of Appeals].)
The emphasized language leads us to conclude that the broad statutory clause "maintain, preserve and keep the peace” includes all of the duties legally executed by a police officer. A police officer is expected to be, and should be, in a constant state of readiness to quell any disturbance. Officer Nevelle had parked his automobile at the intersection to watch for Elmer Weather-spoon who was wanted for assault. The mere fact that this officer was not in the act of making an arrest when he was assaulted does not necessarily mean that he was not preserving the peace. [Id., pp 231-232.]
In People v Stiles, 99 Mich App 116; 297 NW2d 631 (1980) (per curiam), police officers were investigating a domestic dispute between the defendant and his wife. An officer entered one of the rooms in the apartment to talk to the defendant and to keep the parties separated; a scuffle ensued, and the defendant assaulted one of the officers. The Court of Appeals said:
It is clear that the officer was legally performing his duty when he approached the apartment in response to the call that a family disturbance was occurring therein. It further appears that the officer was accomplishing a lawful and proper police function of preserving law and order by attempting to ascertain whether defendant was still present in the apartment and by attempting to keep the parties separate. [Id., pp 119-120.]
*767In Krum, Weatherspoon, and Stiles, the officers were seeking to preserve the tranquility of the citizenry. In Krum, they were seeking to apprehend two prison escapees. In Weatherspoon, the officer was looking for the defendant’s brother who was wanted for assault and battery, was "in a constant state of readiness to quell any disturbance,” and was thereby acting to maintain, preserve and keep the tranquility. In Stiles, the officers were attempting to prevent a recurrence of the domestic dispute that had necessitated their arrival on the scene.
In the instant case, however, the officers were not on patrol or in a place where other citizens were present. At the police station, they were not seeking to maintain, preserve and keep public order or tranquility, but rather were seeking to administer a Breathalyzer test.
hi
The gist of the offense is not assault — the defendant in Krum did not assault the officer — but rather the "obstruction of justice” that results from interference with the performance of speciñc law enforcement activities, originally the service of process10 or execution of a city or township ordinance,11 and only later "keeping the peace.”12
The statute does not proscribe obstruction, resistance, or opposition to all "lawful acts, attempts and efforts” of an officer. Refusing to take a Breathalyzer test, even assaulting a police officer, is not necessarily "obstruction of justice” within the intendment of this statute. The obstruction must occur while the officer is attempting to serve *768process or execute a city or township ordinance or is acting to maintain, preserve or keep the peace— public order or tranquility.
Any assault on an officer while on patrol in a public setting might be seen as an interference with his ongoing efforts to maintain and preserve public order or tranquility. An officer on patrol tends to keep the peace by his presence. Citizens tend to slow down for a police car. It is reassuring to see police officers. Their mere presence is generally sufficient to maintain and preserve public order or tranquility. An interference with an officer on patrol might thus be seen as obstructing and resisting an ongoing effort to maintain and preserve public order or tranquility.
When, however, the officer is at the station house, his mere presence does not ordinarily tend to maintain and preserve public order or tranquility. The police generally separate the public from a person who is being detained, and thus there generally is no public to be tranquilized by the presence of the officer. While sitting at his desk or administering a Breathalyzer test, an officer is, to be sure, performing a police function. He is not, however, truly "in a constant state of readiness to quell any disturbance” — he is not at that time keeping the peace.
The statement in Weatherspoon that the "statutory clause 'maintain, preserve and keep the peace’ includes all of the duties legally executed by a police officer” must be read in context. In Weatherspoon, the officer was assaulted while looking for a person who was wanted for assault and battery. The statement in 39 Am Jur, p 506, quoted in Krum, supra, p 361, that "obstruction of or resistance to a public officer in the performance of his duties is an offense at common law, and by *769statute in all jurisdictions” is another generalization that cannot properly be read as excising from § 479 the qualification that the officer has been obstructed, resisted, opposed, or assaulted while "in [his] lawful acts, attempts and efforts to maintain, preserve and keep the peace . . . .”13 Reading the statute as including all "duties legally executed by a police officer” reads out of the statute everything after the words "lawful acts, attempts and efforts,” i.e., reads out of the statute "to maintain, preserve and keep the peace.”
I do not wish to be understood as belittling the spittle of Little. It is not, however, a violation of the statute to fail to obey every command or direction given by a police officer.
iv
"Breaking the peace” may not be the other side of the coin of "keeping the peace.” The prosecutor may be right, and the Court of Appeals, in the instant case, wrong.
There is at least a conflict in the decisions of the Court of Appeals, and the law is not settled. Peremptory disposition is not appropriate.
I adhere to the view that peremptory reversal should be reserved for those cases in which the *770law is settled and no factual assessment is required.14
I would either grant or deny leave to appeal.

 The information charged that Little
on or about June 1, 1988 did knowingly and wilfully obstruct, resist, oppose, assault, beat or wound Christopher Helgert, a police officer with the Wolverine Lake Police Department, while said officer was engaged in lawful acts, attempts and efforts to maintain, preserve and keep the peace, to-wit: assist ing in taking of breathalyzer; Contrary to the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the People of the State of Michigan.
Sec. 750.479, CL 1979; MSA 28.747. [750.479-B], Misdemeanor: 2 Years or $1,000.00
Resisting and obstructing police officer preserving peace

 Any person who shall knowingly and wilfully obstruct, resist or oppose any sheriff, coroner, township treasurer, constable or other officer or person duly authorized, in serving, or attempting to serve or execute any process, rule or order made or issued by lawful authority, or who shall resist any officer in the execution of any ordinance, by law, or any rule, order or resolution made, issued, or passed by the common council of any city board of trustees, or common council or village council *762of any incorporated village, or township board of any township or who shall assault, beat or wound any sheriff, coroner, township treasurer, constable or other officer duly authorized, while serving, or attempting to serve or execute any such process, rule or order, or for having served, or attempted to serve or execute the same, or who shall so obstruct, resist, oppose, assault, beat or wound any of the above named officers, or any other person or persons authorized by law to maintain and preserve the peace, in their lawful acts, attempts and efforts to maintain, preserve and keep the peace, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more than two years, or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars. [MCL 750.479; MSA 28.747.]

 MCL 750.506a; MSA 28.774(1).

 The Court concluded:
As we conclude the instant defendant should have been charged under MCL 750.506a; MSA 28.774(1), we therefore find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s dismissal of the resisting and obstructing charge. [Id]
I agree with the majority that the consecutive sentencing so provided has no bearing on the question whether Little was properly charged under § 479 of the Penal Code and that the question whether he was properly charged is not one that is confided to the discretion of the circuit judge when reviewing the magistrate’s exercise of discretion.

 Ante, p 753. The body of the opinion repeats that statement:
[T|t is clear that the events alleged in this case fall within the plain language of the statute. [Ante, p 759.]

 Moreover, there is ample authority that an officer’s efforts to "keep the peace” include ordinary police functions that do not directly involve placing a person under arrest. People v Krum [374 Mich 356, 362; 132 NW2d 69 (1965)], People v John Weatherspoon [6 Mich App 229, 232; 148 NW2d 889 (1967)]. [Ante, p 759.]

 It appears that the expression "keep the peace” was originally "keep the King’s peace.”

 See In re Richter, 226 Neb 874, 876; 415 NW2d 476 (1987) (the phrase, "[preservation of the peace,” in an obstructing and resisting statute, was defined as "maintaining the tranquillity enjoyed by members of a community where good order reigns”).

 Krum and two companions were returning from a fishing trip and were stopped at the Mackinac Bridge by state police who were looking for prison escapees. A passenger responded to a trooper that they could not search the car without a search warrant. The trooper ordered the car driven to the side of the bridge out of the line of traffic. An argument ensued between the defendant and the trooper.
The trooper then, resumed his station where he was observing cars as they crossed the bridge, and Krum returned to his car. Krum then approached the trooper again. The trooper testified that in this second encounter, Krum
interposed himself between the trooper and the car to be inspected, finally brushing against the trooper and moving the automatic carbine from the position in which it was held by the trooper; that the trooper told defendant he was under arrest and ordered him to go to the police car; that defendant answered, "I don’t have to and you can’t make me”; that the trooper than took him by the wrist and, when he wouldn’t move, pulled him over to the police car. [Id., p 359.]

 1840 PA 39; 1846 RS, ch 156, § 23.

 1863 PA 202.

 1869 PA 24; 1931 PA 328, § 479.

 In this regard, the following passage from 58 Am Jur 2d, Obstructing Justice, § 69, p 1120, is instructive:
The obstruction of or resistance to a public officer in the performance of his duties is an offense at common law, and by statute.
Observation: The various statutes have the same purpose, but may differ in their description of the offense. Their wording varies to such an extent that each statute must be read to determine just what acts constitute the crime in the particular jurisdiction. [Emphasis added.]

 Roek v Chippewa Valley Bd of Ed, 430 Mich 314, 322; 422 NW2d 680 (1988) (Levin, J., separate opinion); Grames v Amerisure Ins Co, 434 Mich 867; 451 NW2d 304 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting).
See Schweiker v Hansen, 450 US 785, 791; 101 S Ct 1468; 67 L Ed 2d 685 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("A summary reversal is a rare disposition, usually reserved by this Court for situations in which the law is settled and stable, the facts are not in dispute, and the decision below is clearly in error”); Leis v Flynt, 439 US 438, 457-458; 99 S Ct 698; 58 L Ed 2d 717 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Summary reversal 'should be reserved for palpably clear cases of . . . error.’ Eaton v Tulsa, 415 US 697, 707 [94 S Ct 1228; 39 L Ed 2d 693 (1974)] [Rehnquist, J., dissenting]”).