Court Opinion

ID: 9488781
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:55:33.898946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:06.085179
License: Public Domain

GREENBERG, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Although I agree with Judge Rosenn’s conclusions, I have a few reservations about his opinion that I note here.
First, regarding our standard of review: as Judge Rosenn indicates, after a jury verdict, the court cannot substitute its view of the evidence for that of the jury; accordingly, all evidence and inferences therefrom must be taken in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. See Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 691-92 (3d Cir.1993) (as amended on petition for rehearing). In addition, we have noted that a court of appeals in exercising plenary review over an order granting or denying a motion for judgment as a matter of law must apply the same standard as did the district court. Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir.1993); Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1496 (3d Cir.1993). We recently outlined the relevant standard:
In deciding whether to grant a motion for JNOV, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the *1144non-moving party, and determine whether the record contains the ‘minimum quantum of evidence from which a jury might reasonably afford relief.’ Keith v. Truck Stops Corp., 909 F.2d 743, 745 (3d Cir.1990) (citations omitted). The court may not weigh the evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses or substitute its version of the facts for that of the jury. Blair v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 692 F.2d 296, 300 (3d Cir.1982). The court may, however, enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict if upon review of the record, it can be said as a matter of law that the verdict is not supported by legally sufficient evidence. Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 422 F.2d 1205, 1210 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826, 91 S.Ct. 51, 27 L.Ed.2d 55 (1970).
Parkway Garage, 5 F.3d at 691-92.
I join in Judge Rosenn’s opinion because I believe that, even viewed in the light most favorable to Doe, the verdict winner in the district court, the facts of this case cannot, as a matter of law, support the jury’s verdict. I support this holding because factors six and seven of the balancing test announced in United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir.1980), namely SEPTA’s need for access to the prescription information and “whether there is an express statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognizable public interest militating toward access,” outweigh Doe’s limited privacy interests in the information. It is here that, in my view, the district court in its opinion denying SEPTA’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial misapplied the Westinghouse balancing test. The court decided that, because Pierce “never articulated a need to know what Doe’s medications were used for or a reason that she did not put the report aside or black out the names when she saw them,” and because there was testimony that “the names of the individual employees were irrelevant to the issues they were examining,” the jury reasonably could have found factor six to weigh in favor of a violation of Doe’s privacy right. See Doe v. SEPTA, et al., No. 93-5988, slip op. at 19, 1995 WL 334290 (E.D.Pa. June 1, 1995). Likewise, because “the financial need to control prescription benefit costs ... does not include a need to have the names of employees linked with their medications, at least until an abuse of the benefit has been established,” the district court decided that the jury also could have found factor seven to weigh in Doe’s favor. See id. slip op. at 20.
However, the district court’s emphasis on SEPTA’s need to have the names of employees linked with their medications was misplaced. The focus of factors six and seven-of the Westinghouse balancing test in this case should not be on appellants’ need to have the names of employees linked with their medications, but instead should be on their need to have access to prescription utilization data in the first place. As Judge Rosenn’s opinion notes, it is essential in this era of escalating health care costs that self-insured employers be able to review their benefits programs for proper usage, cost-cutting possibilities, and fraud and abuse, among other factors. Thus, I agree with his conclusions.
However, I do not believe that Judge Ro-senn’s opinion reflects the facts of the case in the light most favorable to Doe. For example, in describing Pierce’s actions with respect to the Rite-Aid report, he states that she highlighted the names on the report whose medications she was unfamiliar with “for her research purposes,” see majority opinion at 1139, and that she “discreetly never mentioned Doe by name” to Dr. Van de Beek. Id. at 5. Yet, Pierce’s motivations for highlighting the names of the employees, in particular Doe’s, was a primary factual issue in the case, as was her possible carelessness. Clearly, Doe did not claim that Pierce highlighted the names merely for her research purposes, nor would he have described her behavior as “discreet.” The jury’s verdict for Doe, then, might reflect its agreement with his assertions that her motivations, as well as her conduct, were improper. In any case, it does not seem that Judge Rosenn’s opinion paints the issue in the light most favorable to a verdict for Doe. Although I regard this point as somewhat academic because of my analysis of the Westinghouse factors, it is worth noting because of our clear mandate to view the facts in the most favorable light to the verdict-winner in re*1145viewing a denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law.
More substantively, I do not agree with Judge Rosenn’s analysis regarding Pierce’s contact with Dr. Press. While it is true that Dr. Press did not acquire any new information from Pierce’s actions, the focus of an inquiry into an alleged violation of the constitutional right to privacy should be on whether there was a disclosure. As an initial matter, Pierce showed Dr. Press the highlighted list containing Doe’s name and prescription information. Pierce did not know whether Dr. Press had any prior knowledge regarding Doe’s condition; nevertheless, she presented the information to Press. The constitutional right to privacy is intended to prevent certain disclosures. Thus, ordinarily individuals have the power to determine to whom they disclose their most personal matters. Here, Pierce impinged on Doe’s right with the disclosure to Press in the same way that she did so with respect to the disclosure to Aufschauer. As Judge Rosenn’s opinion states, “[a] disclosure occurs in the workplace each time private information is communicated to a new person.... ” Majority opinion at 1139.
Yet Doe himself already had informed Dr. Press voluntarily of his condition. Pierce’s disclosure to Press, then, should not lead to Doe’s recovery of damages, since the disclosure left Doe in the same position as before it occurred. This issue is one of damages alone, however, and does not affect the existence of a disclosure to Press. Thus, the court must weigh this disclosure as well as those involving Pierce and Aufschauer in order to determine whether a constitutional violation occurred. Accordingly, in my view it is not enough simply to state that because no damages were incurred there could not have been a violation of Doe’s privacy right. In the end, though, the existence of a third disclosure in the case does not alter my analysis of the Westinghouse factors and therefore does not change my ultimate conclusion that we should reverse the judgment of the district court.
I also want to make a clear distinction between an impingement into privacy rights that is justified according to the Westinghouse factors, and an unconstitutional violation of the right to privacy. We have held that questions seeking personal medical information included in a police department questionnaire for use in selecting applicants for a special investigations unit “[did] not unconstitutionally impinge upon the applicants’ privacy interests.” Fraternal Order of Police v. Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 114 (3d Cir.1987) (footnote omitted). We also have held that the strong public interest in facilitating the research and investigations of a government agency into a potentially hazardous work area “justiffied] [the] minimal intrusion into the privacy which surrounds ... employees’ medical records-” Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 580. However, in neither case did we deny that an intrusion into privacy interests occurred. Likewise, here we do not deny that Pierce’s disclosures impinged upon Doe’s privacy interests in his prescription information. We do find, however, that the disclosures were justified according to the Westinghouse balancing test because of SEPTA’s strong interest in having access to utilization review data from its prescription drug program. Thus, although there was an impingement into Doe’s privacy rights, there was not here an unconstitutional violation of those rights.
Finally, regarding specific applications of the Westinghouse factors: Westinghouse factor four, “the injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was generated,” would seem to me to apply to the relationship between Doe and SEPTA, not the relationship between Doe and Rite-Aid, as Judge Rosenn’s opinion states. The relationship between Doe and his employer underlies the prescription benefits package in the first place; were it not for that benefits package, Doe would not have filled his prescription at Rite-Aid, nor would his name have been on the Rite-Aid report. In this regard, the injury from disclosure to “the relationship in which the record was generated” obviously could be much greater if the relevant relationship is that between Doe and his employer and not the Doe-Rite-Aid relationship. Thus, the factor may have weighed more heavily in favor of Doe in the jury’s analysis than Judge Rosenn’s opinion indicates. Nev*1146ertheless, because of my conclusions regarding Westinghouse factors six and seven, I still believe that Doe cannot recover for the disclosures made in this case.
Westinghouse factor five, “the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure,” also could have weighed more heavily in favor of Doe in the jury’s analysis than Judge Rosenn indicates. While it is true that Pierce and SEPTA did not request such information as would put them on notice that they would need to pre-arrange for its confidential handling, it would not have been unreasonable for the jury to conclude that SEPTA should have had some sort of policy regarding the confidentiality of employee medical information that would have put Pierce on notice of the sensitivity of the information she received. Moreover, it also would have been reasonable for the jury to •expect Pierce to act more carefully with the information regardless of the existence of an official SEPTA policy, especially because of her high executive level in the company, in addition to her experience as a former government attorney. Thus, although factor five does not change my ultimate conclusion in the case, perhaps it weighed more heavily in favor of Doe, at least in the jury’s consideration, than Judge Rosenn’s opinion would suggest.
I make one final point. As Judge Rosenn notes, SEPTA did not request the names of its employees obtaining prescription drugs. Consequently, the case has been decided on the assumption that it did not need the names. Nevertheless, I do not understand that there is any legal impediment to an employer who pays for prescriptions or other benefits for employees and their dependents insisting on knowing the identity of the person obtaining the prescriptions or benefits. After all, an employer might need this information to determine whether the person obtaining the prescriptions or benefits was eligible for them. Judge Rosenn makes this important point, majority opinion n. 5, and I particularly want to emphasize it. In accordance with the foregoing comments, I join in Judge Rosenn’s opinion with the caveats I have stated and join in the judgment of the court.