Court Opinion

ID: 9602095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:51:51.65376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:00.745545
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
concurring specially.
I will deal with enumerations of error numbers 3, 4, 5 and 6, in that sequence. While the majority reverses, and I am in full accord, there are certain enumerations of error not dealt with, as to which I feel comment should be made, especially as Code Ann. § 6-701 requires that "all judgments, rulings, or orders rendered in the case which are raised on appeal, and which may affect the proceedings below, shall be reviewed and determined by the appellate court.”
3. The most flagrant error in this entire record is set forth in Enumeration number 3, and which is not treated by the majority opinion.
The trial judge excused himself from the courtroom for a few minutes, by consent of counsel, while the voir dire examination of prospective jurors continued. Plaintiffs counsel inquired of Mr. Harold Martin, a prospective juror, if by reason of his social acquaintance with one of the defendants, Doctor Mitchell, it would be embarrassing to him as a juror to return a fair and impartial verdict for the plaintiff, to which Mr. Martin replied as follows: "I can’t say it would be embarrassing to me, but it would be very difficult to convince me that a man of Doctor Mitchell’s reputation, skill, ability and character, that he has established over the years, could be guilty of malpractice. ” (Emphasis supplied.)
This was high praise, indeed, as to the defendant, and was altogether uncalled for and improper! It was more than a tremendous compliment, it was a subtle appeal to the other jurors on the panel not to find Dr. Mitchell guilty of malpractice. The prospective juror was no novice, no novitiate, but was an experienced man of the world, and was an editiorial writer for The Atlanta Constitution. The prestige which attends that position naturally caused his auditors to lend more credence to his statements than to sayings by one from the ordinary walks of life. The prospective juror did not accidentally stumble into saying the wrong thing; he knew full well what he was saying, and what his reasons were! This was nothing more or less than a calculated, deliberate *335attempt to improperly influence the jury as to its verdict in the case on trial.
Illustrative of the zeal of the prospective juror in Dr. Mitchell’s behalf, he then requested permission to make further comment, and delivered the following unsolicited and altogether improper remarks, to wit: "I believe in cases of this sort, that the jury system as we know it today, does not apply, that none of us are competent to judge the skills of a physician in a case like this, and it should be judged by physicians or by experts in the field. ’’(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, this juror, with one purpose in mind, that of bringing aid and comfort to his friend who was being sued, with fulsome praise extolled the greatness of the doctor, as to reputation, skill ability and character, and let it be known by all of the listening jurors that he, Martin, would be very difficult to convince in writing a verdict against the doctor for malpractice; and then proceeded to make an unwarranted attack on our system of jurisprudence, not only seeking to undermine trial by jury, but also to instruct the listening jurors that none of them was competent to even sit as a juror in a case like the one on trial; and that only physicians should be allowed to sit on a jury in a court of law where a physician is on trial for malpractice. In short, he was telling the jurors, with consummate skill, not to return a verdict for malpractice against the defendant physicians.
When the trial judge returned to the courtroom, plaintiff’s counsel related what had taken place, and moved that the two panels of jurors in attendance be excused and new jurors brought to court in their place. The trial judge was faced with a situation when it was time to call a spade a spade! The two panels of jurors, through no fault of their own, had become disqualified because of the prejudicial statements set forth above by one who sought to poison their minds against the plaintiff. The only possible way to have cured this grave infraction of court decorum and propriety was to disqualify all of the jurors in attendance, or to take prompt, firm, and stern disciplinary action against the offending juror, in the presence of the other jurors. The trial judge was empowered by law with the tools for *336controlling and dealing with conduct that tends to disrupt the orderly processes of court, or so near thereto as to disturb, interrupt or hinder same; and he was further empowered to control the conduct of each and every person connected with the judicial proceeding before the court as to each and every matter appertaining to said proceeding. See Code §§ 24-104, 24-105.
But the trial judge merely announced that Mr. Martin was disqualified as a juror, and later instructed the jury not to be influenced by his remarks. This did not even amount to a reprimand or rebuke — nor was it equivalent to a slap on the wrist.
What could be more harmful—more devastating—to any litigant’s case than for a presumptively disinterested juror to stand up in the courtroom in the presence of all other jurors, and disparage, down-grade and smear the position of that litigant by telling the jurors they are not competent to make a finding in his favor? Suppose, in every case, one of the jurors took it on himself to stand up and make a speech in the courtroom, and with skilful words and false logic, instruct the listening jurors that they are not competent to render a verdict against his friend? That is what was done here — not accidentally, not awkwardly, but with deliberation and zeal. Such conduct ought never to be tolerated! If a similar situation ever arises again, it is the duty of the trial judge to promptly interfere to prevent; and to act with such a singleness of purpose as to leave no would-be offender under any misapprehension as to the sanctity of judicial proceedings, and of the decorum and order which must obtain in our courts. And, most important, all of us must be forever kept on notice that the stream which flows swift and free from the fountain-head of justice, the jury system, must never be allowed to become polluted.
4. I fully concur with the majority opinion in holding that plaintiff was entitled to make the concluding argument. It is made plain by the following authorities, cited by the majority, that where there are two or more defendants, and only one of the defendants introduces evidence, the right of each and all defendants to conclude the argument is lost and the plaintiff is entitled to open and conclude. Doster v. State, 25 Ga. App. 723 (1) (104 SE *337642); Co-op Cab Co. v. Preston, 67 Ga. App. 580, 581 (4) (21 SE2d 251); King v. King, 37 Ga. 205.
5. I concur with the majority opinion in holding that the trial court erred in failing to charge that one verdict for the same amount should be rendered against all joint defendants found to be liable. I further concur with the majority in holding that where there is a concert of action by defendants in the infliction of the injury or damage, a joint verdict is authorized; and further that even where there is no concert of action, but the actions of joint defendants concur to produce an injury as to which no rational apportionment of the damages can be made, a joint verdict is authorized.
But I go a step further and point out that Georgia has only one statute which authorizes a recovery of different amounts against different defendants in one suit, and that is Code § 105-2011. This statute is limited to trespass upon realty. Action for personal injuries are not covered by said statute. Eidson v. Maddox, 195 Ga. 641, 643 (24 SE2d 895); Hightower v. Landrum, 109 Ga. App. 510 (5a) (136 SE2d 425). Further, in Georgia, where suit is brought against joint defendants for homicide or injury to the person, each defendant is liable for the whole or entire damage, even though one defendant may have committed only simple negligence, while the other defendant committed wilful and wanton misconduct, and thus contributed in a greater degree to the injury. Each is liable for the whole damage, and if one of the wrongdoers is not sued, the one who is sued shall be liable for all of the damage. Wilson v. Ray, 64 Ga. App. 540, 543 (13 SE2d 848); Gooch v. Ga. Marble Co., 151 Ga. 462 (107 SE 47).
6. The majority opinion does not deal with Enumeration number 6, which relates to the trial judge’s charge on accident. This enumeration should be considered, as it may arise at the next trial of this case. Code Ann. § 6-701 provides that when an appeal is taken, "all judgments, rulings, or orders rendered in the case which are raised on appeal, and which may affect the proceedings below, shall be reviewed and determined by the appellate court.”
None of the defendants pleaded accident, nor was *338there any evidence introduced to suggest accident. "Accident is an event that takes place without one’s foresight or expectation; that which takes place or begins to exist without design.” Code § 102-103.
In Johnson v. National Life &c. Co., 92 Ga. App. 818 (1) (90 SE2d 36), it was held that ". . . for an injury to result from accidental means it must be the unexpected result of an unforeseen or unexpected act which was involuntarily and unintentionally done.” The acts of the physicians here were not involuntarily or unintentionally done; they were done intentionally and of the doctors’ own volition. The acts of the doctors were not unforeseen or unexpected; to the contrary the acts (not necessarily the results) of the doctors were foreseen and expected by them. The defendants were given the full benefit of law to which they were entitled, when the trial judge charged that they could not be held liable unless they were negligent. Accident should not be charged at the next trial. As this question most assuredly will arise at the next trial, there is no excuse for our not deciding it here and now.