Court Opinion

ID: 9766233
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:37:49.836301+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:20.531487
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge
(dissenting):
I disagree on both points: I find no counterclaim for partition; and if I did, 1 should strike it as improper.
-1-
The “Counterclaim” consists of paragraphs 46 through 52. Paragraph 46 “incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 20 of the Answer and paragraphs 21 through 45 of New Matter as though same were fully set forth therein.” Paragraphs 47 through 49 allege that appellee has in various ways not properly cared for the parties’ children, and that she has denied appellant’s “requested custody.” Paragraphs 50 through 52 allege that appellee has in various ways “deceitfully and fraudulently” not complied with the separation agreement. There then follows this prayer:
WHEREFORE, defendant respectfully prays that the Honorable Court
1. Declare the agreement of September 21, 1971 null, void and terminated.
2. Award custody of the children to defendant.
3. Order partition of jointly owned real estate at 752 St. George’s Road, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
When this prayer is read against the allegations preceding it, the following is apparent: Arguably, paragraphs 50 through 52 pertain to the prayer that the agreement be declared null and void, and paragraphs 47 through 49 to the prayer for custody. The only paragraph left as possibly pertaining to the prayer for parti*468tion is paragraph 46, but that does nothing except “incorporate by reference” the entire answer and new matter.
We hardly “exalt form over substance” when we require some slight recognition of the rule that “[t]he material facts on which a cause of action or defense is based shall be stated in a concise and summary form.” Pa.R, Civ.P. 1019(a), 1501. Here, appellant incorporates forty-five paragraphs into a forty-sixth. With respect to eight of the forty-five, the lower court properly sustained appellee’s preliminary objection in the form of a motion for more specific pleading. The majority nevertheless holds that a cause of action in partition has been pleaded.
In my view, this is not a liberal application of the rules. Pa.R.Civ.P. 126. It is no application at all. Even- in federal practice where notice pleading is the rule, a party is entitled to an allegation to which he may respond. Here, there is nothing to respond to. There is not a single reference to the real estate in the answer, and neither is there in the new matter, except for an oblique allusion in paragraph 44, which alleges that “[pjlaintiff and defendant understood and agreed that one-half of the principal amortized by the mortgage payments made by defendant would be considered alimony payments to plaintiff.” There is nothing except the prayer that the court “[ojrder partition of the jointly owned real estate at 752 St. George’s Road, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.” One does not respond to a prayer, especially not to a prayer unsupported by a single allegation of fact. So far as any allegation of fact is concerned, it does not appear that the parties still own any real estate to be partitioned.
-2-
A counterclaim must arise “from the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences *469from which the plaintiff’s cause of action arose.” Pa.R. Civ.P. 1510(a). The majority says that appellant’s counterclaim
clearly arises from the same transaction or occurrence. If the agreement is declared void, the disposition of the jointly-owned property contained in the agreement is likewise void and the property is properly the subject-matter of a partition action.
At 365.
This reasoning represents a non, sequitur. If A is true (agreement is void), then, to be sure, B may also be true (provisions in agreement concerning property are void). It does not follow, however, that A and B arise from the same transaction, as may be seen by changing the identification of B. If A is true (agreement is void), then B may also be true (provisions in agreement concerning custody of the children are void). I take it, however, that the majority agrees that the lower court properly held appellant’s counterclaim for custody improper. Similarly, if A is true (agreement is void), then B may also be true (provisions in agreement concerning support of wife are void). I take it, however, that the majority would agree that if appellant had included in his counterclaim a claim regarding support, the counterclaim would be improper.
Nor does the majority cite any authority for its conclusion, undertaking only to distinguish Lykiardopoulos v. Lykiardopoulos, 453 Pa. 290, 309 A.2d 548 (1973). I submit, however, that that case is controlling. There, after a divorce, the former husband sued the former wife in partition, and the former wife counterclaimed for support for herself and her children. The court below ordered partition but held the counterclaim improper. Affirming, the Supreme Court said:
Concerning the appellant’s [the former wife’s] claim for support for herself and her minor children, the *470court below was correct in holding that these personal obligations of the appellee cannot be considered as part of the partition proceedings in this case.
Id. at 293, 309 A.2d at 551.
Not so closely in point but similar are Brenner v. Su-kenik, 410 Pa. 324, 189 A.2d 246 (1963), and Schomaker v. Schomaker, 247 Pa. 444, 93 A. 460 (1915). In Brenner a wife sued in equity for support,, and her husband counterclaimed for the termination of a joint savings account. Said the Court:
Since the plaintiff’s complaint was solely a cause of action for support, the counterclaim of the defendant regarding the true ownership of the savings account was not germane in that the wife-plaintiff could obtain support from the husband’s property whether it was held by them as tenants by the entireties or whether the husband was the sole owner of the property . . . . [citation omitted].
Brenner v. Sukenik, supra at 329, 189 A.2d at 248-249.
In Schomaker a husband sued in equity to recover his separate property, and his wife counterclaimed (filed a “cross-bill”) for a decree requiring her husband to keep an alleged agreement to pay her a fixed allowance as well as certain taxes on her real estate. The cross-bill was held to present “ ‘questions . . . entirely distinct from those presented in the original bill . . . ”
Schomaker v. Schomaker, supra at 448, 93 A. at 461.
So here. By her complaint appellee seeks to compel appellant to make various allegedly promised payments in support, or payments related to support (e. g., for private school tuition, Blue Cross and Blue Shield, medical bills, and life insurance premiums); she makes no alie-gation nor prays for any relief with respect to any real *471estate. These in personam claims are entirely distinct, and do not arise, from appellant’s in rem, statutory, claim for partition.
The order of the lower court should be affirmed.
JACOBS, J., joins in this opinion.