Court Opinion

ID: 9570998
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:28:18.571453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:57.501916
License: Public Domain

Justice WEBB
dissenting.
I dissent. I begin by referring .to article IV, section 13 of the Constitution of North Carolina, which says in pertinent part:
There shall be in this State but one form of action for the enforcement of private rights or the redress of private wrongs, which shall be denominated a civil action, and in which there shall be a right to have issues of fact tried before a jury.
*512I do not believe this section needs any interpretation in its application to this case. It plainly says that in this case, which is an action to enforce a private right to equitable distribution, the parties have a right to have issues of fact tried by a jury.
The majority has filed an opinion supported by much reasoning and history, as I suppose it must, if it is to hold that this constitutional provision which says that in a civil action to enforce a private right “there shall be a right to have issues of fact tried before a jury” does not mean a party may have issues of fact tried before a jury. One difficulty for me with the majority reasoning and history is that I believe it is irrelevant to the resolution of this case. If there is one principle which is well established in the interpretation of our Constitution it is that if the meaning is plain we do not go beyond the plain meaning. Elliott v. Board of Education, 203 N.C. 749, 166 S.E. 918 (1932). I do not see how the meaning of article IV, section 13 could be any more plain and I believe we have erred in ignoring it.
It may be that it is better not to try equitable distribution actions before juries. I do not believe this justifies us in revising the Constitution to reach this result. Judicial tyranny will be the consequence if we do not know and observe our limits.
The majority makes much of what it says is the procedural nature of article IV of our Constitution as opposed to the substantive rights enumerated by article I. I do not agree with this dichotomy, but if there is such a distinction, nowhere does the majority tell us why this should make a difference. If article IV deals only with procedure, the procedure requires that the parties be entitled to a jury trial in civil actions to enforce private rights and redress private wrongs.
After quoting Lee v. Pearce, 68 N.C. 76 (1873), which says that under our Constitution the abolishment of the distinction between law and equity affects only the mode of procedure and leaves the principles of law and equity intact, the majority says, “[accordingly, this section created no additional substantive rights to trial by jury in all civil cases, but rather assured that the jury trial rights substantively guaranteed by article I, section 19 (now article I, section 25) would apply equally to questions of fact arising in cases brought in equity as well as cases brought at law.” I do not believe such an inference arises “accordingly” or at all. The language from Lee v. Pearce, upon which the majority relies, was *513not written in regard to the question of whether there should be a jury trial but as to what remedies were available in a fraud case.
As I read the majority opinion, it takes a great deal of liberty with Lee v. Pearce. That case involved an action to set aside a deed on the ground it was procured by fraud. The plaintiff was granted a new trial because of errors in the charge. This Court discussed at length the rules regarding fraud as they existed in the common law courts and in chancery, and how these rules should be applied when they were enforced by our courts after the Constitution required that they be applied by our courts. The only reference I can find to jury trials in that opinion is in the last paragraph where it was said the Constitution required a jury trial in that case. I cannot find anything in that opinion which supports the assertion in the majority opinion in this case which says, “[t]his Court held in Lee v. Pearce, 68 N.C. 76, that as a result of article IV, section 1 of the Constitution of 1868 (now article IV, section 13 of the Constitution of 1971), the right to trial by jury established by article I, section 19 (now article I, section 25) would apply to all civil cases where the cause of action existed in 1868, regardless of whether the case was founded historically in equity or at law.”
It is true, as the majority says, and as we said in Faircloth v. Beard, 320 N.C. 505, 358 S.E.2d 512 (1987), that there have been many cases which interpret article I, section 25 and say that a party is entitled under our Constitution to a jury as a matter of right only if the right existed at common law or by statute when the Constitution of 1868 was adopted. I cannot explain all these cases. Many of them do not involve private rights or wrongs. None of them interpret article IV, section 13. At any rate I believe we should adhere to our statement in Faircloth that “[i]f we were to say that these cases hold Article IV, Sec. 13 does not apply in determining a right to a jury trial we would be amending the Constitution by eliminating this section.” Id. at 508, 358 S.E.2d 514. I believe we have today amended the Constitution of North Carolina.
In order to reach the result we want in this case we have overruled the reasoning of Faircloth v. Beard, 320 N.C. 505, 358 S.E.2d 512, the first time an opportunity has arisen. This can hardly contribute to confidence in the stability of the law as applied by this Court. The majority says the defendant asks us to construe Faircloth broadly. The defendant has done no such thing. He asks *514us to construe Faircloth as it was written, a unanimous opinion by this Court, and we have declined to do so. The majority has even adopted the remarkable proposition that some parts of the Constitution should be subject to different rules of construction than other parts. If this is to be the law it could come back to haunt us. At any rate the majority has not interpreted article I, section 25 expansively, as it says it must, but restrictively.
I vote to affirm the order of the District Court of Guilford County.