Court Opinion

ID: 9928297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 15:07:12.061812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:52:34.007400
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
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     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2429-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JESUS DEJESUS, a/k/a
JESUS T. FLORES,
JESUS DE JESUS,
JESUS FLORES,
JESUS TORRES-FLORES,
JESUS TORRES, and
JAMES DEJESUS,

     Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________

                   Submitted January 10, 2024 – Decided January 31, 2024

                   Before Judges Vernoia and Gummer.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Passaic County, Indictment No. 12-09-0693.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (Amira Rahman Scurato, Designated
                   Counsel, on the brief).
             Camelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor,
             attorney for respondent (Ali Y. Ozbek, Assistant
             Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

             Appellant filed pro se supplemental briefs.

PER CURIAM

      Defendant Jesus DeJesus appeals from an order dismissing his post-

conviction relief (PCR) petition following an evidentiary hearing on claims his

trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance and the trial court

committed errors resulting in a violation of his constitutional rights.

Unpersuaded by defendant's arguments, we affirm.

                                       I.

      A grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant with first-degree

armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1) and (2); second-degree possession of a

firearm for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); second-degree unlawful

possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); and second-degree possession of

a weapon by a convicted person, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b).         A jury convicted

defendant on all the charges and the court imposed an aggregate twenty-year

sentence subject to the requirements of the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A.

2C:43-7.2.   We affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence on his direct

appeal, State v. DeJesus, No. A-4464-15 (App. Div. May 24, 2018) (slip op. at

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                                        2
11), and the Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for certification, State

v. DeJesus, 236 N.J. 115 (2018).

      The evidence presented at defendant's trial established that on June 19,

2012, the victim was seated on a bench on a Paterson street when an individual

approached her from behind, held a gun to her face, and threatened to kill her if

she did not hand over her purse. When the victim refused, the individual pulled

her to the ground and attempted to wrestle the purse from her while dragging

her approximately one hundred feet down the sidewalk. The individual pulled

the bag off the victim's shoulder and began running. The victim testified she

began feeling severe pain the night of the incident and continued to feel chronic

pain at the time of trial.

      Two witnesses saw the altercation and chased the individual.          They

followed him as he ran down the street and through a Passaic County College

building, eventually catching the individual as he attempted to scale a wall. The

witnesses pulled him from the wall and held him until police arrived. He was

later identified as defendant.

      Police officers arrested defendant and retrieved the purse from where the

witnesses held defendant. The victim testified at trial that when she had been

asked during her police interview to make an identification, she had said, "I

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                                       3
didn't see him until the police came back and asked me if [the bag they had

retrieved] was my purse and there was a man inside [the police car] and [t]he

[officer said] was this the guy? I told him I think so" because "he has my purse,

so it must have been him."

       The witnesses positively identified defendant as the perpetrator when the

police arrived at the scene. A police officer returned to Passaic County College

and retrieved a gun from a campus security officer who had placed it under a

traffic cone after responding to a report an "item" was dropped and observing it

on the floor outside the college's cafeteria. It was later determined to be a pellet

gun.

       At the police station following defendant's arrest, Detective Robert

Pleasant conducted separate recorded interviews with the victim and each of the

witnesses. During their interviews, the witnesses identified defendant as the

perpetrator in a single photograph shown to them by Detective Pleasant. The

detective did not prepare a report following the interviews and, although the

State had made contact with him prior to trial, Detective Pleasant reportedly had

retired to Florida and refused to testify at trial.

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                                          4
       During the pretrial Wade1 hearing on defendant's motion to suppress the

witnesses' out-of-court photo identifications of him, his counsel noted that

recordings of the empty interview room during the minutes prior to one of the

witness's entry into the room for his recorded interview included audio of what

appeared to be a discussion by unidentified individuals.2 Trial counsel asserted

that although the recording picked up, in part, statements made prior to the

witness's entry into the room for his interview, the transcript of the recording

did not include those statements and that failure should be a fact considered by

the court in its determination of defendant's motion to suppress the out-of-court

identifications made during the recorded interviews of the witnesses.

       The court granted defendant's Wade motion. The court analyzed the

admissibility of the witnesses' recorded out-of-court identifications of defendant

during their interviews with Detective Pleasant under the principles established

by the Supreme Court in State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 (2011), and entered

1
    United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
2
   A third witness also made a pretrial out-of-court identification of defendant
based on a presentation of a photograph of defendant by Detective Pleasant. It
was unnecessary for the motion court to address the admissibility of that
witness's out-of-court identification because he was unavailable to testify at
trial. The parties also had agreed that the victim's identification of defendant
was not at an issue at the Wade hearing, and, as a result, the motion court did
not make any findings concerning the victim's identification of defendant.
                                                                            A-2429-21
                                        5
an order suppressing the witnesses' identifications of defendant during those

recorded interviews.

      Following our affirmance of defendant's convictions and sentence on his

direct appeal, and the Supreme Court's denial of his petition for certification,

defendant timely filed a pro se PCR petition. Defendant generally alleged trial

counsel was ineffective by failing to:       adequately confront the witnesses

presented by the State at trial; call favorable witnesses; object to the admissi on

in evidence of the victim's purse; call "a key witness," Detective Pleasant, and

question him "about material facts in his incident report"; and obtain an audio

expert to determine what, if anything, could be heard on the recording prior to

one of the witness's entry into the interview room for his interview with

Detective Pleasant.

      In a supplementary verified petition, defendant reprised the claims in his

initial petition and further asserted trial and appellate counsel were ineffective

by failing to: "review and attack substantial exculpatory evidence"; provide

defendant with complete discovery materials; challenge the admissibility of

evidence concerning the victim's alleged injuries; call certain witnesses

defendant claimed would have provided exculpatory testimony; and seek

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                                        6
vacatur of his sentence and a reversal of his conviction.          After reviewing

defendant's petitions, the court ordered an evidentiary hearing.

       Defendant testified at the hearing and called trial counsel as a witness.

Defendant testified trial counsel was ineffective by failing to provide him with

complete discovery and that, following his trial, he had obtained from the

Paterson Police Department—through service of an Open Public Records Act

(OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, request—documents he had not been provided

prior to trial. Defendant did not describe the information contained in the newly

obtained documents or offer any testimony, evidence, or arguments establishing

a reasonable probability that had he been provided the documents prior to trial,

the result of the trial would have been different.

       Defendant also testified counsel was ineffective by failing to object at trial

to the victim's testimony concerning injuries she had suffered during the robbery

and by failing to obtain records related to her injuries. Again, defendant neither

provided testimony, nor presented any other evidence, explaining the content of

the purported records or establishing that had he been provided the records prior

to the trial, there is a reasonable probability they would have altered the outcome

of the trial.

                                                                               A-2429-21
                                          7
      Defendant further testified that following trial, he had obtained a dispatch

record from the Paterson Police Department that did not show a particular

officer—whom defendant did not identify—had arrived at the scene of the

robbery. Defendant testified the dispatch record therefore contradicted a State

claim at trial that the officer was at the robbery scene. Defendant did not identify

the officer, explain the significance of the officer's presence at the scene, or

otherwise establish that had trial counsel obtained and provided him with the

dispatch record prior to trial, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.

      Defendant next testified trial counsel was ineffective by failing to obtain

an audio expert to extract otherwise indecipherable statements from the portion

of the recording of the empty interview room prior to the entry of one of the

witnesses into the room for his interview. However, other than defendant's

testimony that extraction of the otherwise indecipherable voices on the

recording might have yielded exculpatory evidence, defendant offered no

competent evidence the extraction was possible or would have been successful,

or that if it had been successful, there is a reasonable probability it would have

yielded evidence that would have changed the trial outcome.

                                                                              A-2429-21
                                         8
      During his testimony, defendant asserted trial counsel was ineffective by

losing the Wade motion, but the record shows defendant won the Wade motion

and the court had entered an order suppressing the challenged out-of-court

identifications—those which were provided by the witnesses during their

recorded interviews with Detective Pleasant.        Defendant further generally

testified trial counsel was ineffective by failing to:      move to dismiss the

indictment; challenge the witnesses' in-court identifications of him; and move

to suppress the victim's purse and photos of the gun. Other than defendant's

conclusory assertions trial counsel was ineffective based on those purported

errors, defendant neither offered testimony nor any other evidence establishing

trial counsel's alleged errors constituted a constitutionally deficient performance

or demonstrating a reasonable probability that but for the alleged errors, the

result of the trial would have been different.

      Following the evidentiary hearing, the court issued a written decision,

detailing defendant's testimony supporting his ineffective assistance of counsel

claims and concluding defendant had failed to sustain his burden of establishing

his claims under the two-pronged standard established by the United States

Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and adopted

by our Supreme Court for application under the New Jersey Constitution in State

                                                                             A-2429-21
                                        9
v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987).      The motion court entered an order denying

defendant's PCR petition, and this appeal followed.

      Defendant's counsel's brief presents the following arguments for our

consideration:

               POINT I

               BECAUSE        DEFENDANT      RECEIVED
               INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, THE
               PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
               PETITION FOR PCR.

               A.     LEGAL   STANDARDS                 GOVERNING
               APPLICATIONS FOR [PCR].

               B. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE.

               C. APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE.

      Defendant's pro se supplemental letter brief presents the following

arguments 3:

3
   Defendant's pro se reply brief includes additional arguments not properly
incorporated in point headings as required by Rule 2:6-2(a)(6), including claims
concerning third-party guilt, chain-of-custody, fruit of the poisonous tree,
prosecutorial misconduct, suggestive identification, and a lack of evidence
supporting his convictions. Although we are not obligated to consider legal
arguments that are not properly presented in accordance with Rule 2:6-2(a),
Almog v. Isr. Travel Advisory Serv., Inc., 298 N.J. Super. 145, 155 (App. Div.
1997), or that are improperly asserted for the first time on appeal in a reply brief ,
Bacon v. N.J. State Dep't of Educ., 443 N.J. Super. 24, 38 (App. Div. 2015), we
nonetheless have considered all the arguments asserted in defendant's pro se
briefs, as well as those in his counsel's brief.
                                                                               A-2429-21
                                        10
POINT I

JURY'S   VERDICT    AND    [DEFENDANT'S]
CONVICTION W[ERE] AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF
THE EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION AND ALSO TO ARTICLE
I PARA[S] 9, 10 OF THE NEW JERSEY
CONSTITUTION AND [ARE] THE [RESULT] OF
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

POINT II

JUDGE FAILED [THEIR] DUTY AS [AN]
IMPARTIAL       TRIBUNAL      VIOLATING
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND A
FAIR TRIAL BY GIVING ERRONEOUS JURY
INSTRUCTIONS INCLUDING MISINSTRUCTION
ON ELEMENTS OF [THE] OFFENSE AND TRIAL
COUNSEL FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE ABSENCE
OF PROPER JURY INSTRUCTIONS.

POINT III

JUDGE'S ERROR WAS CONTRARY TO APPRENDI
V. NEW JERSEY, [530 U.S. 466 (2000)]. IN HIS
IMPLEMENTING [OF] [DEFENDANT]'S JURY
CHARGE, JURY INSTRUCTION ON FLIGHT
WITHOUT THERE BEING ANY FORM OF
INDICTMENT ON SUCH CHARGE WITH NO
ADMISSION FROM [DEFENDANT] HIMSELF ON
SAID   CHARGE,    TRIAL    COUNSEL      WAS
INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO SAID
ERRONEOUS JURY INSTRUCTION.

                                               A-2429-21
                    11
      POINT IV

      DEFENSE    COUNSEL     FAILED DUTY AS
      UNTRAMMELED LITIGANT ON DEFENDANT'S
      BEHALF VIOLATING DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO
      EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS
      GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO
      THE U.S. CONSTITUTION.

In defendant's pro se reply brief, he presents the following arguments:

      POINT I

      [DEFENDANT] SUBMITS THAT THE CHARGE TO
      HIS JURY WAS ILLEGAL AND FLAWED IN
      ADDRESSING THE POSSESSION CHARGE []
      SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION ON
      ALLEGED "POSSESSION OF A GUN" THUS HIS
      CONVICTION AND SENTENCE MUST BE
      REVERSED WITH PREJUDICE. THE ERRONEOUS
      JURY CHARGE DEPRIVED [DEFENDANT] AND
      HIS JURY OF A "PROXIMITY CHARGE" AS THE
      N.J. SUPREME CT. [H]AD DEALT WITH IN STATE
      V. PENA, [178 N.J. 297 (2004)].

      POINT II

      NEW JERSEY STATE COURTS MUST BECOME IN
      COMPLIANCE     WITH    5[TH]    AMEND.
      COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RULE[—]IN
      ORDER TO PROTECT [DEFENDANT]'S STATE
      AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO A
      FUNDAMENTALLY FAIR JURY TRIAL AND TO
      BE   LEGALLY    ABLE  TO    ARTICULATE
      SUCCESSFUL MERITORIOUS ARGUMENT[S]
      SURROUNDING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
      COUNSEL CLAIMS.

                                                                    A-2429-21
                                12
POINT III

[DEFENDANT] SUBMITS THAT THE PROFFER
HEREIN VALIDATES HIS GROSS INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS FROM
TRIAL COUNSEL, APPEAL COUNSEL AND PCR
COUNSEL CONTRARY TO HIS 6[TH] AND 5[TH]
AMEND.      U.S.    CONST.   RIGHTS,     AS
ARTICULATED AS WELL IN N.J. CONST. ART. I,
PARA[S]. 1, 8, 9 & 10 – WHERE [DEFENDANT]
WAS ILLEGALLY DEPRIVED RECORDINGS OF
THE     CONVERSATIONS      OUTSIDE     THE
INTERROGATION ROOM AS PART OF THE
RECORDED RECORD ON THE [FOUR] DVD[]S
THAT [WERE] PROVIDED WHERE COMMENTS
OVERHEARD WERE VERY REVEALING OF
OFFICERS       ATTEMPTING     TO     ELICIT
PREJUDICIAL COMMENTS FROM WITNESSES
AND COERCING WITNESSES IN WHAT TO SAY,
THIS WAS A VIOLATION OF [DEFENDANT]'S
FUNDAMENTAL        LIBERTY  INTEREST    TO
PREPARE FOR A FAIR JURY TRIAL WITH
UNHAMPERED INTERFERENCE SUFFICING A
DEFENSE         AGAINST      RESPONDENT'S
ALLEGATIONS CONTRARY TO THE U.S. CONST.
14[TH] AMEND.

A. [DEFENDANT] SUBMITS THAT CONTENT OF
INTERNAL THE INTERNAL CONVERSATIONS &
EXTERNAL     CONVERSATIONS    REPRESENT
EFFICIENT, ACCURATE & RELIABLE DATA ON
THE [FOUR] DVD[]S, AND DENIAL WAS A
DEPRIVATION TO HIS DEFENSE—CONTRARY
TO     HIM     BEING     LEGALLY    AND
CONSTITUTIONALLY ENTITLED TO HAVE
TRANSCRIPTION     OF    BOTH   INTERNAL
CONVERSATIONS        [AND]     EXTERNAL
CONVERSATIONS PURSUANT TO HIS 5[TH]

                                              A-2429-21
                    13
AMEND. [AND] 14[TH] AMEND. U.S. CONST. AND
N.J. CONST. ART. I, PARA[S]. 1, 8, 9 & 10.

B. THE PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE (CENTRAL
OFFICE/ APPELLATE SECTION) RENDERED
GROSS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
IN ALLOWING [DEFENDANT]'S COUNSEL [] TO
START A JURY TRIAL WITH SIGNIFICANT
INADEQUACIES IN THE TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS
[AND]     RECORDS          CONTRARY    TO
[DEFENDANT]'S 14[TH] AMEND. U.S. CONST.
RIGHTS VIOLATING DUE PROCESS CLAUSE,
EQUAL     PROTECTION           CLAUSE AND
FUNDAMENTAL PROTECTIONS OF THE N.J,
CONST. ART. I, PARA[S]. 1, 8, 9 & 10.

POINT IV

THE PROSECUTOR[]S IN THE CASE AT BAR
CREATED AN ATMOSPHERE OF MISCONDUCT
IN VIOLATION OF [DEFENDANT]'S U.S. CONST.
14[TH] AMEND. RIGHTS TO A FUNDAMENTAL
FAIR JURY TRIAL, GRAVELY CONTRARY TO
THE SEMINAL HOLDING IN MOONEY V.
HOLOHAN, [294 U.S. 103 (1935)].

A. THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE COMMITTED
GRAVE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN
KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY [AND] WITH
DELIBERATE ILL-INTENTION, ALLOW[ING]
[DEFENDANT]'S TRIAL TO PROCEED WITH
SIGNIFICANT INADEQUACIES IN THE TRIAL
EVIDENCE, TRANSCRIPTS/RECORDS [AND]
SAME WAS NEVER CORRECTED PRIOR TO THE
START OF TRIAL.

                                             A-2429-21
                   14
                                        II.

      We review a PCR court's conclusions of law de novo. State v. Nash, 212

N.J. 518, 540-41 (2013). Where, as here, the court has conducted an evidentiary

hearing on a PCR petition, we defer to the "court's factual findings based on its

review of live witness testimony," id. at 540, because of its "'opportunity to hear

and see the witnesses and to have the feel of the case, which a reviewing court

cannot enjoy,'" State v. Nuñez-Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129, 141 (2009) (citations

omitted). We must affirm the PCR court's factual findings unless they are not

supported by "sufficient credible evidence in the record" and "'are so clearly

mistaken "that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction."'"

Ibid. (citations omitted).

      The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution guarantee a defendant in a criminal

proceeding the right to the assistance of counsel in their defense. The right to

counsel requires "the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Nash, 212

N.J. at 541 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686).

      To establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

defendant must show a "reasonable likelihood" of success under the two-prong

test outlined in Strickland. State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 463 (1992); see also

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                                       15
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58. The Strickland test requires

that defendant show (1) "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment" and (2)

counsel's "deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). "With respect to both prongs of the

Strickland test, a defendant asserting ineffective assistance of counsel on PCR

bears the burden of proving his or her right to relief by a preponderance of the

evidence." State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012) (citations omitted). If a

defendant fails to sustain his burden under either prong of the standard, a

defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687.

       Under the first prong, a defendant must show "counsel's acts or omissions

fell outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance considered in

light of all the circumstances of the case." State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 366

(2008) (citation omitted). Our analysis under the first prong is highly deferential

to counsel. State v. Arthur, 184 N.J. 307, 318-19 (2005) (citing Strickland, 466

U.S. at 689). There is "'a strong presumption' that [counsel] provided reasonably

effective assistance" and counsel's "decisions followed a sound strategic

approach to the case[,]" State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 578-79 (2015) (quoting

                                                                             A-2429-21
                                       16
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689), even when a strategic decision turns out to be a

mistake, State v. Buonadonna, 122 N.J. 22, 42 (1991). A defendant may rebut

the presumption of effectiveness by proving trial counsel's actions were not

"sound trial strategy." Arthur, 184 N.J. at 319 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

689).

        Under the second Strickland prong, a defendant must "affirmatively

prove" "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors,

the result of the proceeding would have been different." State v. Gideon, 244

N.J. 538, 551 (2021) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94). "A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."

Id. (citations omitted). Proof of prejudice under Strickland's second prong "is

an exacting standard."     Id. at 551 (quoting Allegro, 193 N.J. at 367).         A

defendant "must affirmatively prove prejudice" in a PCR petition to satisfy the

second prong of the Strickland standard. Ibid. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

693).

        Defendant's counseled and pro se briefs include numerous arguments, all

of which we have carefully considered. For purposes of clarity, we consider

them separately as claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and of alleged

violations of his constitutional rights, including claims of ineffective assistance

                                                                             A-2429-21
                                       17
of appellate counsel as they pertain to the alleged violations of constitutional

rights. We consider the arguments included in each of those categories in turn.

                                        A.

      Defendant argues trial counsel was ineffective by failing to conduct a

proper pretrial investigation. More particularly, defendant claims trial counsel

failed to:   consult with an audio or sound expert to determine if any

communications that were otherwise inaudible or indecipherable on the

recordings from the interview room could be recovered or extracted from the

recordings; obtain reports from the Paterson Police Department that defendant

procured following his trial pursuant to an OPRA request; investigate facts in

the police officers' incident reports; challenge testimony regarding the victim's

injuries; and investigate "third-party guilt."

      Where a defendant alleges trial counsel inadequately investigated a case,

the defendant must present competent evidence establishing what an

investigation would have revealed. State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013).

And, as noted, a defendant must present evidence establishing an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim by a preponderance of the evidence. See Gaitan,

209 N.J. at 350.

                                                                           A-2429-21
                                        18
      Here, defendant did not present any evidence at the evidentiary hearing

establishing what the claimed omitted investigations would have revealed. That

is, defendant presented no evidence establishing that had his counsel consulted

with an audio expert, pertinent information could have been, or would have

been, extracted from the recordings. Similarly, defendant failed to demonstrate

what investigations of "third-party guilt," the reports from the Paterson Police

Department, and police incident reports would have revealed. And defendant's

conclusory claims—in his testimony and briefs on appeal—that counsel should

have conducted those investigations are insufficient to sustain his burden of

proving by a preponderance of the evidence trial counsel's performance was

deficient under Strickland's first prong. See State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super.

154, 170 (App. Div. 1999) (explaining "bald assertions" are insufficient to

support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim). Counsel's performance is

not deficient by failing to conduct an investigation that would have not revealed

anything that mattered. See, e.g., State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 619 (2007)

(holding "[i]t is not ineffective assistance of counsel for defense counsel not to

file a meritless motion").

      Defendant's claims trial counsel was ineffective by failing to conduct the

investigations and challenge the victim's testimony about her injuries also fail

                                                                            A-2429-21
                                       19
because defendant did not affirmatively establish there is reasonable probability

that but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of defendant's trial would have

been different. Gideon, 244 N.J. at 551. Indeed, defendant did not present any

evidence at the hearing, and points to no evidence in his briefs on appeal,

establishing that he suffered prejudice under Strickland's second prong as a

result of trial counsel's alleged failures to investigate any of the matters or issues

he raised in his petition or the evidentiary hearing. For those reasons, we affirm

the PCR court's rejection of defendant's claim his trial counsel was ineffective

by failing to conduct proper pretrial investigations.

      Defendant's other claims regarding trial counsel's ineffectiveness fail for

similar reasons. Defendant argues the PCR court erred by rejecting his claim

trial counsel had been ineffective by failing to object on chain-of-custody

grounds to the admission of the purse the victim identified at trial as having been

stolen from her during the robbery and the gun recovered from the building the

witnesses testified they had chased defendant through, and by failing to object

to the admissibility of the purse and gun on grounds they should have been

suppressed as "fruits of the poisonous tree."         We find the claims without

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(2),

beyond the following brief comments.

                                                                               A-2429-21
                                         20
      The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine requires the suppression of

evidence seized as the result of a constitutional violation or based on evidence

seized as the result of a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United

States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963); State v. Hemenway, 239 N.J. 111, 139 (2019).

Defendant argues trial counsel should have moved to suppress the purse and gun

as fruits of the poisonous tree because the court had determined at the Wade

hearing that the witnesses' out-of-court identifications of defendant were

inadmissible. The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, however, is inapplicable

to the seizure of the gun and purse because they were recovered by the police

prior to the witnesses' out-of-court identifications and, therefore, could not have

been fruits of those improperly obtained identifications.

      Lacking any factual or legal bases supporting a valid suppression motion

under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, trial counsel's failure to move to

challenge the admissibility of the gun and purse on those grounds was not

deficient performance under Strickland's first prong. O'Neal, 190 N.J. at 619;

see also State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 625 (1990). Defendant therefore also

could not, and did not, demonstrate prejudice under Strickland's second prong

based on counsel's purported errors.

                                                                             A-2429-21
                                       21
      Similarly, defendant presented no evidence establishing a valid basis for

an objection to the admission of the gun and purse on chain-of-custody grounds.

"To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence,

the proponent of the evidence must present evidence sufficient to support a

finding that the item is what its proponent claims." N.J.R.E. 901. The State

bore that burden as to the gun and purse.

      To establish a proper foundation for admission of gun and purse, the State

was required to "show[ ]. . . an uninterrupted chain of possession" of each. State

v. Brunson, 132 N.J. 377, 393 (1993). "[W]here the incriminating object has

passed out of the possession of the original receiver and into the possession of

others, the 'chain of possession' must be established to avoid any inference that

there has been substitution or tampering." State v. Brown, 99 N.J. Super. 22, 27

(App. Div. 1968) (citation omitted).

      The hearing record lacks any evidence establishing a valid basis

supporting an objection to the admission of the gun and purse on chain -of-

custody grounds. The police maintained possession of the gun following its

recovery after the robbery, and the victim retained the purse after it had been

returned to her following the robbery. Again, trial counsel was not ineffective

by failing to interpose a baseless objection to the admission of the evidence,

                                                                            A-2429-21
                                       22
Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170, and defendant did not present evidence

establishing a reasonable probability that but for counsel's failure to interpose

the objection, the result of his trial would have been different, Gideon, 244 N.J.

at 551.

      Defendant also failed to sustain his burden under Strickland on his

conclusory claims counsel had been ineffective by failing to properly cross-

examine witnesses and by failing to anticipate that the State would introduce

evidence concerning the victim's injuries. Defendant does not point to any

evidence establishing trial counsel did not properly cross-examine witnesses or

did not anticipate the State would present evidence concerning the victim's

injuries.   But, even if he had, defendant did not affirmatively prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that he suffered any prejudice under Strickland's

second prong as a result of the purported errors. Ibid.

      In sum, defendant's claims trial counsel was ineffective consist of nothing

more than conclusory assertions. See Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170. None

of the claims is supported by evidence establishing trial counsel did not function

"as the 'counsel' guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment" or that counsel's

alleged errors "prejudiced the defense."       Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52 (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Defendant failed to establish by a preponderance

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of the evidence that trial counsel had been ineffective under the Strickland

paradigm. We therefore affirm the PCR court's rejection of those claims.

                                         B.

      Defendant also vaguely argues he is entitled to PCR because he was

denied his right to a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct, errors in the jury

charge on the possessory weapons offenses, a lack of sufficient evidence

supporting his convictions, and the absence of DNA or fingerprint evidence

establishing he had possessed the gun that was recovered and introduced in

evidence. We reject the claims for a number of separate but equally dipositive

reasons.

      First, defendant's claim he was denied his right to a fair trial due to alleged

prosecutorial misconduct—alleged inflammatory remarks by the State during

closing arguments at trial—is barred under Rule 3:22-5, which provides that "[a]

prior adjudication upon the merits of any ground for relief [in a PCR petition] is

conclusive whether made in the proceedings resulting in the conviction or in any

post-conviction proceedings brought pursuant to" Rule 3:22. Under the Rule,

an argument is precluded from consideration "if the issue raised is identical or

substantially equivalent to that adjudicated previously on direct appeal." State

v. Marshall, 173 N.J. 343, 351 (2002) (citations omitted).

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      Defendant raised his prosecutorial misconduct claim on direct appeal. He

argued that the prosecutor's inflammatory comments during summation,

including "[i]t's your turn, get involved, convict on all charges, ladies and

gentlemen" amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. DeJesus, slip op. at 6. We

"strongly condemn[ed]" the prosecutor's comments, id. at 8, but determined they

had been fleeting and "not so egregious as to have deprived defendant of a fair

trial[,]" id. at 9 (citing State v. Smith, 167 N.J. 158, 181 (2001)). Thus, because

we considered and rejected the claim the comments had deprived defendant of

a fair trial, he is precluded from relitigating the issue on his PCR petition.

Marshall, 173 N.J. at 351; R. 3:22-5.

      We are unpersuaded by defendant's remaining claims that he was denied

his right to a fair trial. We discern no error in the court's jury instructions on

the possessory weapons offenses. The absence of DNA evidence or fingerprint

evidence showing defendant possessed the gun presented a jury issue as to the

strength of the State's evidence, but it did not deny defendant a fair trial. And,

defendant makes no showing that any purported failure to provide him with

discovery—certain police reports—prior to trial resulted in a violation of his

right to a fair trial because defendant did not establish that the alleged failure to

provide the reports deprived him of exculpatory evidence or prevented him from

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                                        25
presenting an available defense. Cf. State v. Szemple, 247 N.J. 82, 100-01

(2021) (citation omitted) (finding "suppression by the prosecution of evidence

favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is

material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith o r bad

faith of the prosecution").

      We also reject defendant's claim he was deprived of a fair trial as result

of the trial court's cumulative errors. Because we have determined defendant

was not deprived of any rights affecting his entitlement to a fair trial, he is unable

to establish there is any cumulative error that rendered either his trial or the

jury's verdict unfair. State v. Jenewicz, 193 N.J. 440, 473 (2008).

      We note defendant also argues appellate counsel was ineffective by failing

to assert on direct appeal the claims he now makes in support of his contention

he was denied a fair trial. The argument fails because appellate counsel was not

ineffective by failing to make meritless arguments on appeal, see, e.g., O'Neal,

190 N.J. at 619, and, for the reasons we have explained, defendant's claims he

was denied a fair trial lack support in the law and facts.

      To the extent we have not expressly addressed any of defendant's

remaining arguments, we find they are without sufficient merit to warrant

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

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Affirmed.

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