Court Opinion

ID: 9931216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 17:16:11.211794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:15.250108
License: Public Domain

This opinion is subject to revision before final
                     publication in the Pacific Reporter
                                2024 UT 3

                                   IN THE

      SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

               PARK CITY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,
                          Respondent,
                                      v.
                      ROBERT EVAN WOODHAM,
                             Petitioner.

                            No. 20230112
                      Heard December 13, 2023
                       Filed February 8, 2024

            On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

                  Third District, Silver Summit
                The Honorable Richard E. Mrazik
                         No. 225500023

                                Attorneys:
    Margaret D. Plane, Tricia Lake, Park City, for respondent
            Robert Evan Woodham, pro se petitioner

  JUSTICE POHLMAN authored the opinion of the Court, in which
    CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE PEARCE,
           JUSTICE PETERSEN, and JUSTICE HAGEN joined.

   JUSTICE POHLMAN, opinion of the Court:

                          INTRODUCTION
    ¶1 Park City Municipal Corporation cited Robert Evan
Woodham for failing to yield to stationary emergency vehicles in
violation of Utah Code subsection 41-6a-904(2) (emergency vehicle
statute). After the justice court found Woodham guilty, he
appealed his conviction and received a trial de novo in the district
court. At that trial, Woodham presented evidence in an effort to
show that he properly yielded to the emergency vehicles. At the
                      PARK CITY v. WOODHAM
                        Opinion of the Court

end of his closing argument, Woodham mentioned that “the
question” in the case was whether he was “able to avoid” liability
“by invoking the due process clause limitation on all statutes.” The
district court found Woodham violated the emergency vehicle
statute.
    ¶2 Woodham appealed to the court of appeals, which
summarily dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The court of
appeals cited the statute governing appeals from cases originating
in justice court, which permits appellate review of a district court
decision only if the district court rules on the constitutionality of a
statute or ordinance. See UTAH CODE § 78A-7-118(11). The court of
appeals concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because the district
court had not made such a ruling.
   ¶3 We granted Woodham’s petition for certiorari to address
his contention that the court of appeals erred in dismissing his
appeal. He concedes that the district court did not expressly rule on
the constitutionality of a statute, but he maintains that the court of
appeals should have heard his appeal based on the district court’s
implicit rejection of his due process argument.
    ¶4 We agree with Woodham that a district court’s implicit
ruling on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance permits
appellate review of the district court’s decision in a case originating
from justice court. But we reject his assertion that the district court
implicitly ruled on the constitutionality of the emergency vehicle
statute. Because Woodham did not preserve a constitutional
challenge to the emergency vehicle statute, the district court could
not—and did not—implicitly rule on its constitutionality.
Accordingly, the court of appeals did not err in dismissing
Woodham’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
                          BACKGROUND
    ¶5 Around 1:30 a.m. one winter morning, a Park City police
officer pulled over Woodham after he failed to slow down and
move over for stationary emergency vehicles. Park City charged
him with one count of failing to yield to an emergency vehicle in
violation of Utah Code section 41-6a-904. That statute provides that
when approaching a stationary emergency vehicle with its
emergency lights flashing, a driver must: (1) “reduce the speed of
the vehicle”; (2) “provide as much space as practical”; and (3) “if
practical, with due regard to safety and traffic conditions, make a
lane change into a lane not adjacent to the authorized emergency
vehicle.” UTAH CODE § 41-6a-904(2)(a). The justice court

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determined Woodham violated the statute and ordered him to pay
a $160 fine.
   ¶6 Woodham appealed and received a trial de novo before
the district court. Proceeding pro se, Woodham explained in his
opening statement that the evidence would show he was driving
slowly at the time of the incident and that the officer had not
“gotten a good look” at the speed of his vehicle. Further, he stated
that there was “an interesting question of weather conditions . . .
and exactly where the line [is] between needing to make the lane
change [and not needing to change lanes].”
    ¶7 Park City called its first and only witness, the officer who
conducted the traffic stop. The officer testified that, at the time of
the incident, three emergency vehicles were parked in a line on the
side of the highway with their emergency lights flashing. The
officer testified further that it was a “clear” and “dry” night, that
the traffic was “fairly light,” and that Woodham did not slow down
or move over as he approached the emergency vehicles.
    ¶8 Woodham took the stand in his own defense and refuted
the officer’s statements. He testified that he had, in fact, “reduced
[his] speed.” And while Woodham acknowledged that he had not
switched lanes upon approaching the emergency vehicles, he
testified that switching lanes earlier would have been “dangerous.”
He explained that, as he approached the emergency vehicles, the
road was “downhill,” “curving,” and “not well lit”; he perceived a
“slight loss of tire traction” because the outside temperature was
below freezing; and he was concerned there could be a vehicle in
his “blind spot.”
   ¶9 In his closing argument, Woodham again told the district
court that he was driving “slowly” and “very cautious[ly],” and
that he “reduc[ed] [his] speed” and “did yield” to the emergency
vehicles. As reflected in the trial transcript, Woodham then stated:
       I think the case really just comes down to whether
       [Park City] can get the defendant on a technicality on
       the third prong . . . . And so the question is was the
       defendant able to avoid the technicality by invoking
       the due process clause limitation on all statutes. So --
       and a famous case from [the] New York Court of
       Appeals, the common law rule that comes from the
       due process of law is that if an action would be more
       dangerous -- if compliance with the statute would be

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                        Opinion of the Court

       more dangerous than non-compliance, the statute is
       (inaudible) applied.
               And so in this case, you have to . . . do a
       balancing test. So it’s really obvious that defendant
       posed absolutely no risk to the officers on the side of
       the road from a common sense perspective . . . . Who
       is holding zero risk here? In my view, that’s the only
       legal question in this case, and I would request that
       you find the statute (inaudible) applied or in the
       alternative, I don’t totally understand . . . Utah
       statutes, maybe the statute’s kind of ambiguous for
       me. It’s in line with that constitutional rule and it’s
       saying the same thing that -- and is respecting what
       -- is following (inaudible) exact same lines as the
       constitutional (inaudible). That’s all.[1]
    ¶10 After considering the evidence, the district court
determined that the “safety and traffic conditions” permitted
Woodham to make the lane change upon approaching the
emergency vehicles and, consequently, that Woodham was guilty
of an infraction for failing to comply with the emergency vehicle
statute. The court did not impose a fine but ordered Woodham to
complete a four-hour driving course. Before adjourning, the court
asked, “Mr. Woodham, anything else today, sir?” Woodham
replied, “No.”
    ¶11 Woodham appealed his conviction to the Utah Court of
Appeals. In an unpublished order, the court summarily dismissed
the case for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the district court
“did not rule on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance.” The
court of appeals cited Utah Code section 78A-7-118, which provides
that the district court’s decision arising from a justice court appeal
is final “unless the district court rules on the constitutionality of a
statute or ordinance.” UTAH CODE § 78A-7-118(11). 2

__________________________________________________________
   1 As shown above, some of Woodham’s statements were
inaudible and thus not transcribed. Woodham has not tried to
supplement the record to fill in any of the blanks.
   2 When Woodham filed his appeal with the court of appeals, a

prior version of the statute was in effect. We cite the current version
because the relevant provision of the statute has not changed.

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   ¶12 Woodham petitioned this court for review. We granted
certiorari on the question of whether the court of appeals erred in
concluding that the district court had not ruled on the
constitutionality of the emergency vehicle statute.
             ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶13 Woodham contends that the court of appeals erred in
concluding it did not have jurisdiction over his appeal. “Whether
appellate jurisdiction exists is a question of law, which we review
for correctness.” EnerVest, Ltd. v. Utah State Eng’r, 2019 UT 2, ¶ 12,
435 P.3d 209 (cleaned up).
                            ANALYSIS
    ¶14 Utah Code section 78A-7-118 governs appeals from the
justice court. In general, the statute provides criminal defendants
the right to appeal a justice court conviction and receive a trial de
novo in the district court, see UTAH CODE § 78A-7-118(2), but it
limits a defendant’s ability to seek review of the district court’s
decision, see id. § 78A-7-118(11). Once a defendant receives a trial
de novo, “[t]he decision of the district court is final and may not be
appealed unless the district court rules on the constitutionality of a
statute or ordinance.” Id.
    ¶15 Here, the court of appeals concluded it “lack[ed]
jurisdiction” over Woodham’s appeal because “[t]he district court
did not rule on the constitutionality” of the emergency vehicle
statute. Attempting to read between the lines of the court of
appeals’ order, Woodham posits that this conclusion was premised
on the lack of an “explicit” ruling by the district court. (Emphasis
added.) He contends the district court implicitly ruled on his
“constitutional objection” and that the court of appeals erred in
failing to so recognize.
    ¶16 For its part, Park City maintains that Woodham “did not
sufficiently raise or develop a constitutional issue for the trial
judge’s consideration” and, consequently, “the trial court did not
rule” on the constitutionality of the emergency vehicle statute. And
even if Woodham adequately raised a constitutional challenge,
Park City cites Murray City v. Timmerman to argue that “an implied
ruling does not confer jurisdiction” under Utah Code subsection
78A-7-118(11). (Citing 2012 UT App 110, ¶¶ 3–4, 276 P.3d 1240 (per
curiam).)
   ¶17 As the parties’ arguments suggest, it is unclear from the
text of the court of appeals’ order on what basis the court concluded

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                        Opinion of the Court

it lacked jurisdiction over Woodham’s appeal. One possibility is
that the court determined that the district court did not rule on a
constitutional challenge to the emergency vehicle statute because
Woodham did not adequately raise one. Another possibility is that
the court did not consider whether the district court implicitly
rejected a challenge to the emergency vehicle statute because,
under Timmerman, an implied ruling would not suffice to permit
appellate review. See 2012 UT App 110, ¶ 4 (holding an implied
ruling “is insufficient to confer [appellate] jurisdiction”). In any
event, what is clear is that the court of appeals correctly dismissed
Woodham’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. But we take this
opportunity to clarify that a district court’s implicit ruling on the
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance suffices to permit
appellate review under Utah Code subsection 78A-7-118(11). We
therefore disavow Timmerman’s holding to the contrary.
    ¶18 In other contexts, we have recognized that courts can rule
“expressly or by necessary implication.” Zions First Nat’l Bank v.
C’Est Bon Venture, 613 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah 1980); see also, e.g., City of
Grantsville v. Redevelopment Agency, 2010 UT 38, ¶ 34 n.5, 233 P.3d
461 (concluding that, in granting summary judgment to
defendants, the district court implicitly denied plaintiff’s motion
for leave to amend its complaint); Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass’n v.
Watts, 737 P.2d 154, 157 (Utah 1987) (recognizing that the district
court necessarily granted defendants’ motions to strike when it
granted their summary judgment motion). And we have explained
that “[w]hen a final disposition of a case is entered by a district
court, any unresolved motions inconsistent with that disposition
are deemed resolved by implication.” State v. Mullins, 2005 UT 43,
¶ 8, 116 P.3d 374. In light of this, we see no reason why Utah Code
subsection 78A-7-118(11)’s use of the word “rule” would not
encompass both express and implied rulings, where the language
of the statute does not suggest otherwise. To allow for appellate
review of a district court decision, the statute requires only that the
district court “rule[] on the constitutionality of a statute or
ordinance.” UTAH CODE § 78A-7-118(11). Contrary to the court of
appeals’ conclusion in Timmerman, we hold that such a ruling can
be either express or implied.
   ¶19 But in reaching this conclusion, we emphasize that our
usual requirements of preservation apply in this context. This
means that for a district court to rule impliedly on the
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance, a party must first raise
the issue “to a level of consciousness such that the trial court can

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consider it.” See Neese v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 2017 UT 89,
¶ 16, 416 P.3d 663 (cleaned up).
    ¶20 As we have explained, “[p]reservation requires that an
issue be presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court
has an opportunity to rule on it.” Salt Lake City v. Kidd, 2019 UT 4,
¶ 32, 435 P.3d 248 (cleaned up). This demands that a party
specifically and timely raise the issue with supporting evidence or
relevant legal authority. See id. “Mere mention of a constitutional
right, phrase, or principle does not raise a constitutional claim.” Id.
¶ 35; see also Neese, 2017 UT 89, ¶ 16 (“[T]he mere fact that a party
mentioned an issue without introducing supporting evidence or
relevant legal authority doesn’t suffice . . . .” (cleaned up)). And if
we are to give meaning to implicit rulings for purposes of
subsection 78A-7-118(11), we must ensure that the alleged
constitutional challenge is preserved. Otherwise, we have no
assurance that the court was on notice of the challenge or that it
intended, in its silence, to resolve it. Cf. Kidd, 2019 UT 4, ¶ 32 (“[T]he
preservation requirement puts the trial judge on notice of the
asserted error and allows for correction at that time in the course of
the proceeding.” (cleaned up)).
    ¶21 Here, because Woodham did not preserve a constitutional
challenge to the emergency vehicle statute, the district court could
not have implicitly rejected that challenge. To begin, in his opening
statement, testimony, and closing argument, Woodham made fact-
based arguments: he argued that he reduced his speed when
approaching the emergency vehicles and that switching lanes
would have been dangerous. In other words, Woodham argued
that he did not violate the emergency vehicle statute, not that the
statute was unconstitutional.
    ¶22 It is true that, at the end of his closing argument,
Woodham mentioned that his defense was a “legal” challenge
under the “constitutional” “due process clause,” and he also
alluded to “a famous case from [the] New York Court of Appeals.”
But characterizing a factual argument as “legal” in nature does not
make it so. And one cannot utter a few words with constitutional
flavor and point to the court’s silence as an implicit denial. See supra
¶ 20. Among other things, Woodham did not specify which due
process clause—state or federal—he intended to invoke, nor did he
explain what made the emergency vehicle statute unconstitutional.
Moreover, Woodham did not support his purported constitutional
challenge with relevant legal authority. Although he referenced “a

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                      PARK CITY v. WOODHAM
                       Opinion of the Court

famous case from [the] New York Court of Appeals,” he did not
provide the court with a case name, a citation, or an explanation of
how it applied to his case.
    ¶23 Further, it was far from evident that Woodham even
intended to challenge the constitutionality of the emergency
vehicle statute. Woodham asserted that the issue before the court
was whether he was “able to avoid” liability under the statute “by
invoking the due process clause limitation on all statutes.” A
challenge under the due process clause—were it adequately
raised—implicates a constitutional issue, but that is not necessarily
the same as challenging the constitutionality of the statute. And it
is possible that, when Woodham stated that the statute was
“(inaudible) applied,” he said it was unconstitutional as applied.
But his surrounding statements were that the statute is “in line with
that constitutional rule and it’s saying the same thing” and
“following” the “exact same lines as the constitutional” rule. These
statements suggest that, as Woodham saw it, the statute comported
with the constitution. 3
    ¶24 In sum, had Woodham preserved a challenge to the
constitutionality of the emergency vehicle statute and the court
implicitly rejected it, we would not hesitate to decide that the
jurisdictional requirement of Utah Code subsection 78A-7-118(11)
was met. But Woodham’s stray mentions of constitutional due
process were inadequate to raise a constitutional challenge to the
emergency vehicle statute, and the district court could not have
implicitly ruled on a challenge that was never made.
                          CONCLUSION
    ¶25 We disavow the court of appeals’ conclusion in Murray
City v. Timmerman, 2012 UT App 110, ¶ 4, 276 P.3d 1240 (per
curiam), that a district court’s implied ruling rejecting a challenge
to the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance is insufficient to
confer jurisdiction under Utah Code subsection 78A-7-118(11). But
we ultimately conclude that the district court here did not make an
implied ruling. This is because Woodham did not preserve a
challenge to the constitutionality of the emergency vehicle statute.
Without a ruling—express or implied—on the constitutionality of
__________________________________________________________
   3 Woodham apparently still sees it this way. In his brief on

appeal, he states that his “final claim was that the constitutional
necessity argument was basically the same as the necessity
‘defense,’ or exception, created by the statute.”

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the statute, the court of appeals properly dismissed Woodham’s
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm.

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