Court Opinion

ID: 9540688
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:18:56.600083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:10.773147
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE KARNS, dissenting: This decision will effectively prevent future representation of two or more defendants by individual counsel, or separate counsel from one office, such as a public defenders office as in the instant case, as some “potential conflict,” between defendants, to use the expression in the majority opinion, may always be invented or conjured up through chimerical fancy prior to the trial of any criminal case. The only point worthy of consideration by this court is whether defendant’s motion for severance made on the day of trial should have been allowed. We have held that a defendant is prejudiced by a joint trial when a co-defendant’s defense is clearly antagonistic to that of defendant or where evidence admissible against a co-defendant only is admitted against the defendant. (See People v. Miner 46 Ill. App. 3d 273, 360 N.E.2d 1141, and cases therein cited.) Defendant never demonstrated the nature of any prejudice prior to trial and in fact there was none. That defendant and Aitken may have blamed each other because they were caught in the act of burgling the Smoot home may be true, but this is not the kind of “antagonism” that necessitates separate trials. That Aitken might present a defense of intoxication would not suggest that Aitken’s testimony would incriminate Meng. Meng mentioned Aitken’s statement incriminating him but did not urge a severance on that grounds, and it was not suggested that the incriminating part of the statement would be introduced in evidence. While the pretrial ar guments of counsel may have suggested the spectre of antagonistic defenses, the defenses presented at trial were not antagonistic. Defendant’s co-defendant, Aitken, did not present a defense of intoxication. In fact, Aitken’s counsel did not represent to the court that this defense would necessarily be inconsistent or antagonistic. His testimony at trial exonerated both himself and defendant. Contrary to the majority opinion, there was no defense presented on behalf of Aitken that incriminated Meng. While a potential Bruton problem was possible (Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476, 88 S. Ct. 1620), this was remedied by the removal of the offending sentence from the statement, and in fact Aitken did testify and was subject to cross-examination (Nelson v. O’Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 29 L. Ed. 2d 222, 91 S. Ct. 1723). While Aitken might complain that the deletion was harmful to his defense, this furnishes no basis for complaint by Meng. The type of conflict of interest present in People v. Stoval, 40 Ill. 2d 109, 239 N.E.2d 441; People v. Kester, 66 Ill. 2d 162, 361 N.E.2d 569; and People v. Coslet, 67 Ill. 2d 127, 364 N.E.2d 67, is certainly not present here, as the discussion of those cases in the majority opinion demonstrates. Those cases can truly be described as presenting a potential conflict of interest. This is not a conflict of interest situation. The only legitimate inquiry here is whether Meng received the effective assistance of counsel and whether a severance should have been granted. An examination of the record shows that, in fact, he received vigorous representation by court appointed counsel. Unfortunately for defendant, the evidence of his guilt was overwhelming, and no amount of supposition can change the fact that both defendants were apprehended at the back door of the Smoot home. I have accepted the majority reasoning that because each defendant was represented by an assistant public defender, the case must be viewed as though both defendants were represented by single counsel, presumably the public defender. I know of no authority so holding, and in fact, the record clearly demonstrates that each defendant received the vigorous representation and undivided loyalty of his individual counsel. In any event, the majority observes, quite properly, that the fact that two or more defendants are represented by a single attorney is insufficient to “raise the possibility of a conflict of interest” (People v. Durley, 53 Ill. 2d 156, 290 N.E.2d 244). People v. Johnson, 46 Ill. 2d 266, 265 N.E.2d 869, and People v. Ware, 39 Ill. 2d 66, 233 N.E.2d 421, are clearly distinguishable, and were distinguished in our opinion in People v. Dickens, 19 Ill. App. 3d 419, 311 N.E.2d 705, which I believe states the logical and proper rule that an actual showing of substantial antagonism must be demonstrated before a defendant is entitled to separate counsel and separate trials. In Dickens we quoted with approval the following language from People v. Chapman, 66 Ill. App. 2d 124, 127, 214 N.E.2d 313, 315: “It is only when the interests of the joint defendants are in fact antagonistic that the court must grant separate trials or require separate legal representation. People v. Dolgin, 415 Ill. 434, 448, 114 N.E.2d 389 (1953). A finding of adverse interest or incompetency or incompatibility of counsel cannot be based solely on mere assertions. People v. Wolff, 19 Ill. 2d 318, 322, 167 N.E.2d 197 (1960). Unless defendant properly establishes that a conflict of interest actually exists, or this fact becomes apparent during the trial itself, the court will not indulge in speculation to determine whether separate counsel, in the interest of justice and a fair trial, is required. People v. Rose, 348 Ill. 214, 180 N.E. 791 (1932) and People v. Bopp, 279 Ill. 184, 116 N.E. 679 (1917).” I do not believe that the “subtle effect,” whatever that means, of some undescribed conflict of interest should be the basis for requiring separate counsel or separate trials. I would affirm defendant’s conviction.