Court Opinion

ID: 9662679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:15:11.106628+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:39.580548
License: Public Domain

LUNDSTEN, J.
¶ 43.
(concurring). Although I agree with part of the majority opinion and the result, I disagree with the majority's analysis under the heading "Continuance to Consult on Substitution of Judge" and, therefore, write separately.
¶ 44. The majority finds that Judge VanDeHey erred when he failed to "advise Kelley at the initial hearing of her right to request a continuance to consult with her attorney on substitution of the judge." Majority at ¶ 35. While it is patently a good idea for trial judges to advise parents in termination cases of their various rights, I cannot fault Judge VanDeHey for failing to provide the above advisement in this case. Indeed, the judge's comments suggest he would have provided the information if Kelley had not been represented by counsel. Regardless, the question here is whether the judge was required to provide the advisement.
¶ 45. As the majority acknowledges, Judge Van-DeHey correctly observed that Wis. Stat. § 48.422 (2001-02)1 does not on its face require a judge to advise a parent of his or her right to seek a continuance for the purpose of deciding whether to request substitution of the judge. Majority at ¶ 31. Both the majority and Judge VanDeHey considered language in M.W. and I.W. v. Monroe County Department of Human Services, 116 Wis. 2d 432, 342 N.W.2d 410 (1984), saying that § 48.422 does require this advisement. The majority concludes that the M.W. and I.W. statement is a supervisory directive by the supreme court. Judge VanDeHey *268concluded, in essence, that the M.W. and I.W. statement is in error and is dictum. I agree with Judge VanDeHey.
¶ 46. In M.W. and I.W., the supreme court addressed whether a trial judge erroneously failed to assure that parents in a termination of parental rights action were either represented or had waived representation. M.W. and I.W., 116 Wis. 2d at 433, 436-40. The court determined that the trial judge erred by erroneously assuming the parents were represented when, at best, there was merely an indication that the parents had contacted an attorney to request representation. Id. at 441.
¶ 47. In the course of deciding the matter at hand, the M.W. and I.W. court spoke on a topic that was not disputed or necessary to its decision, that is, whether the statutes required a judge, at an initial hearing, to inform a represented parent of certain rights. The M.W. and I.W. court stated:
A party may be his or her own counsel, but, in any event, whether represented or not, a party must be told of the right to trial by jury and the right to a substitution of judge. Whether a party exercises those rights personally, if there is a waiver of counsel or through counsel is irrelevant; but the statutes clearly afford a party to a termination proceeding the option to exercise those rights.
Id. at 440. Later, the court spoke a little more specifically:
The statutory direction is unequivocal: A parent has the right to representation in court unless there is a waiver; and, in any case, the trial court has the duty to make a full explication of the statutory rights — the right to representation, the right to a continuance, the right to request a jury trial, and the right to request a substitution of judge.
*269Id. at 441.2
¶ 48. However, this "statutory direction" is far from "unequivocal." The statute referred to by the supreme court in M.W. and I.W. contains no such directive. Wisconsin Stat. § 48.422 reads, in pertinent part:
Hearing on the petition. (1) The hearing on the petition to terminate parental rights shall be held within 30 days after the petition is filed. At the hearing on the petition to terminate parental rights the court shall determine whether any party wishes to contest the petition and inform the parties of their rights under sub. (4) and s. 48.423.
*270(4) Any party who is necessary to the proceeding or whose rights may be affected by an order terminating parental rights shall be granted a jury trial upon request if the request is made before the end of the initial hearing on the petition.
(5) Any nonpetitioning party, including the child, shall be granted a continuance of the hearing for the purpose of consulting with an attorney on the request for a jury trial or concerning a request for the substitution of a judge.
(Emphasis added.) Thus, § 48.422(1) directs trial judges to advise parties of the right to a jury trial because that right is specified under subsection 4. But neither the right to a continuance nor the right to substitution is mentioned in subsection 4. Subsection 5 does specify that a continuance shall be granted for the purpose of consulting with an attorney about substitution, but that subsection does not direct judges to advise parties of any right.
¶ 49. The majority declines to find the M.W. and I.W. language dicta. In State v. Koput, 142 Wis. 2d 370, 418 N.W.2d 804 (1988), Chief Justice Heffernan, the author of M.W. and I.W., explained:
The court of appeals declined the invitation of defense counsel to disregard [a statement in our prior opinion] as dicta, apparently believing that it was required to give equal weight to every statement in our opinions. While such deference is gratifying, we would not consider it inappropriate for the court of appeals or a circuit court to evaluate statements in our opinions on the basis of whether they constitute dictum. We point out, however, that, in our superintending and administrative capacity, some pronouncements that are technically obiter dictum are nevertheless administrative or supervisory directions that are intended for the guidance of the court system and are to he followed.
*271Koput, 142 Wis. 2d at 386 n.12.
¶ 50. While there is some lack of consistency,3 Chief Justice Heffernan's statement in Koput seems to be the generally accepted view of the supreme court. See State v. Sartin, 200 Wis. 2d 47, 60 n.7, 546 N.W.2d 449 (1996) ("Dicta is a statement or language expressed in a court's opinion which extends beyond the facts in the case and is broader than necessary and not essential to the determination of the issues before it."); Sunnyslope Grading, Inc. v. Miller, Bradford & Risberg, Inc., 148 Wis. 2d 910, 917, 437 N.W.2d 213 (1989) ("Today we explicitly recognize that the language of the La Crosse opinion was broader than necessary to determine the issue before the court and was therefore dicta."); American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shannon, 120 Wis. 2d 560, 565, 356 N.W.2d 175 (1984) ("a statement not addressed to the question before the court or necessary for its decision" is dictum); Reiter v. Dyken, 95 Wis. 2d 461, 474, 290 N.W.2d 510 (1980) ("[T]he court's statements regarding that issue were reduced to mere dicta."); Miller v. Mauston Sch. Dist., 222 Wis. 2d 540, 554, 588 N.W.2d 305 (Ct. App. 1998) (the supreme court "has made clear it. . . does not 'consider it inappropriate for the court of appeals or a circuit court to evaluate statements in [its] opinions on the basis of whether *272they constitute dictum.'" (quoting Koput, 142 Wis. 2d at 386 n.12)); State ex rel. Schultz v. Bruendl, 168 Wis. 2d 101, 112, 483 N.W.2d 238 (Ct. App. 1992) ("Language broader than necessary to determine the issue before the court is dicta.").
¶ 51. I conclude that the above-quoted statements from M.W. and I.W. are non-binding dictum. The pronouncements are not relevant to the disputed issues in that case, and there is no indication that the M.W. and I.W. court intended to issue a directive based on administrative or supervisory authority. To the contrary, the M.W. and I.W. court seems simply to be asserting that it is stating the obvious meaning of the statutes. My non-exhaustive review of case law indicates that when the supreme court issues a directive utilizing its administrative or supervisory authority, it normally provides some indication that it is doing so.4
¶ 52. Our own decision in Burnett County Department of Social Services v. Kimberly M.W., 181 Wis. 2d 887, 512 N.W.2d 227 (Ct. App. 1994), does not change my opinion. In Kimberly M.W., we assumed that the language from M.W. and I.W. that we focus on here was *273not dicta. See Kimberly M.W., 181 Wis. 2d at 892-93. But that assumption was unnecessary to our decision in Kimberly M.W. because we concluded that, regardless of the circuit court's obligation to provide information, the parent was not entitled to relief because she had not made the required allegation that she did not understand the information. Id. at 893. In my view, any suggestion in Kimberly M.W. that M.W. and I.W. is binding precedent on this point is also dicta.
¶ 53. Accordingly, because the language Kelley relies on from M.W. and I.W. is non-binding dictum, and because the rule expressed in that language is not supported by the statutes, I would affirm Judge VanDe-Hey on the ground that he was not required to advise Kelley at the initial hearing of her right to request a continuance for the purpose of consulting with her attorney about substitution. Further, while I agree with the majority's harmless error analysis, under my view such analysis is unnecessary.
¶ 54. Having said all this, I hasten to add it would appear desirable that the supreme court impose the sort of advisement requirements which the court in M.W. and I.W. assumed was required by the statutes. The termination of a person's parental rights is a drastic measure, and courts should take great care to be sure parents understand their rights.
¶ 55. Therefore, I respectfully concur in the result, but I do not join paragraphs 31 to 42 of the majority opinion.

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-02 version, unless otherwise noted.

 I note that this statement in M.W. and I.W. does not precisely track the error found by the majority. The majority reads M.W. and I.W. as holding that a trial judge must "advise [a parent] at the initial hearing of [his or her] right to request a continuance to consult with [his or her] attorney on substitution of the judge." Majority at ¶ 35. The language of M.W. and I.W. only states that "the trial court has the duty to make a full explication of the statutory rights— ... the right to a continuance, . .. and the right to request a substitution of judge." M.W. and I.W. v. Monroe County Dep't of Human Servs., 116 Wis. 2d 432, 441, 342 N.W.2d 410 (1984). Also, in the context of discussing an unrepresented parent, the M.W. and I.W. court stated:
[I]t is implicitly the duty of the judge not only to advise of the right to have counsel, but to state that the statutes give the right to a continuance for the purpose of consulting an attorney. As a matter of law, a waiver of counsel could not be knowledgeable under the parental-termination statutes unless the party is told by the judge the specific nature of a party's inquiries which may be directed to counsel, i.e., trial by jury and substitution of judge.
Id. at 439-40. Because this language plainly applies to unrepresented parents, it need not be addressed here.

 See Chase v. American Cartage Co., 176 Wis. 235, 238, 186 N.W. 598 (1922) ("[W]hen a court of last resort intentionally takes up, discusses, and decides a question germane to, though not necessarily decisive of, the controversy, such decision is not a dictum but is a judicial act of the court which it will thereafter recognize as a binding decision."); see also State v. Hansen, 2001 WI 53, ¶ 59 n.4, 243 Wis. 2d 328, 627 N.W.2d 195 (Wilcox, J., dissenting); State v. Kruse, 101 Wis. 2d 387, 392, 305 N.W.2d 85 (1981); Beloit Corp. v. DILHR, 63 Wis. 2d 23, 31, 216 N.W.2d 233 (1974).

 In all of the following cases, the supreme court expressly relied on its superintending or administrative authority. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hass v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 2001 WI 128, ¶ 10, 248 Wis. 2d 634, 636 N.W.2d 707; Arneson v. Jezwinski, 206 Wis. 2d 217, 219-20, 556 N.W.2d 721 (1996); State v. Resio, 148 Wis. 2d 687, 696-97, 436 N.W.2d 603 (1989); State v. Koput, 142 Wis. 2d 370, 399, 418 N.W.2d 804 (1988); D.S. v. Racine County, 142 Wis. 2d 129, 136-37, 416 N.W.2d 292 (1987); State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 267-71, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986); Eberhardy v. Circuit Court, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 578, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981); State v. Coble, 100 Wis. 2d 179, 206-07, 301 N.W.2d 221 (1981); State v. Jenich, 94 Wis. 2d 74, 82-83, 288 N.W.2d 114, modified per curiam, 94 Wis. 2d 97a, 292 N.W.2d 348 (1980).