Court Opinion

ID: 9955064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 16:12:40.97195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:14.401590
License: Public Domain

No. 183                March 27, 2024                     561

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

               CYNTHIA ANN GWYNNE,
                   Petitioner-Appellant,
                             v.
                      Paula MYERS,
                     Superintendent,
           Coffee Creek Correctional Institution,
                  Defendant-Respondent.
            Washington County Circuit Court
                   19CV14026; A175324

   Patricia A. Sullivan, Senior Judge.
   Argued and submitted January 11, 2023.
   Jason Weber argued the cause for appellant. Also on the
brief was O’Connor Weber LLC.
   Erin K. Galli, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause
for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum,
Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
  Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Lagesen, Chief
Judge, and Powers, Judge.
   LAGESEN, C. J.
   Reversed and remanded.
562   Gwynne v. Myers
Cite as 331 Or App 561 (2024)                                                  563

           LAGESEN, C. J.
         Petitioner appeals a judgment denying her peti-
tion for post-conviction relief. She assigns error to the
post-conviction court’s denial of relief on her claim that her
probation-revocation counsel provided inadequate and inef-
fective assistance of counsel, in violation of Article I, section
11, of the Oregon Constitution, and the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Lujan v. Myrick, 288
Or App 763, 407 P3d 966 (2017) (granting post-conviction
relief based on inadequate assistance of probation-revocation
counsel). Petitioner’s probation was revoked for contacting
her husband by email in violation of the terms of probation,
and she was sentenced to 20 months in prison as a result.
Petitioner contends that her probation-revocation coun-
sel performed inadequately by not pointing out to the trial
court that petitioner had only contacted her husband once,
after the trial court indicated a mistaken belief that peti-
tioner had contacted her husband multiple times. The post-
conviction court denied relief, concluding that petitioner had
not demonstrated that she was prejudiced by any inadequacy
in counsel’s performance. We reverse and remand because, in
denying relief, the post-conviction court applied an incorrect
legal standard in assessing prejudice and because, under the
correct legal standard, petitioner will be entitled to relief, if
the post-conviction court were to resolve yet-to-be-addressed
factual issues in petitioner’s favor.1
     1
       Petitioner has completed her probation revocation sentence, and defendant,
the superintendent of the Coffee Creek Correctional Institution, moved to dismiss
this case as moot. In response, petitioner pointed out that, among other things,
under established Oregon law, she must obtain “exoneration” from the probation-
revocation judgment as a prerequisite to pursuing her malpractice claim. Stevens
v. Bispham, 316 Or 221, 239, 851 P2d 556 (1993) (malpractice claim against crimi-
nal defense lawyer does not accrue until the plaintiff is “exonerated of the criminal
offense through reversal on direct appeal, through post-conviction relief proceed-
ings, or otherwise”); Johnson v. Babcock, 206 Or App 217, 224, 136 P3d 77, rev den,
341 Or 450 (2006) (holding that a plaintiff could pursue a legal malpractice claim
based on counsel’s negligence at sentencing, when negligence results in the plain-
tiff “serv[ing] more of the sentence than was legally permissible” and the plaintiff
“obtain[s] post-judgment relief from the sentence”). In view of the effect a grant
of relief would have on petitioner’s ability to pursue a malpractice claim under
established Oregon law, the court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that
the superintendent had not met her burden of demonstrating mootness. See State
v. K. J. B., 362 Or 777, 785-86, 416 P3d 291 (2018) (explaining the burden placed
on the proponent of a motion to dismiss an appeal on mootness grounds); see also
Dept. of Human Services v. T. J. N., 371 Or 650, 656-58, 540 P3d 540 (2023) (same).
564                                             Gwynne v. Myers

         We review the post-conviction court’s judgment for
legal error and accept the court’s supported implicit and
explicit factual findings. Green v. Franke, 357 Or 301, 312,
350 P3d 188 (2015).
         Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree
criminal mistreatment and two counts of fourth-degree
assault. She was sentenced to probation, a downward depar-
ture sentence. Petitioner was pregnant at the time, and the
objective of the court and the parties was to allow for peti-
tioner to be out of custody when she had her baby. As a con-
dition of probation, petitioner was prohibited from having
contact with her husband, Carl (who was in jail), outside of
court proceedings. The prohibition on contact included con-
tact through third parties.
         Not long after petitioner was sentenced, Carl began
corresponding by email with an account bearing the name
of his brother, Shanon. At one point, Shanon, who lives in
Australia, passed on a message that is undisputedly from
petitioner:
   “I saw you today Nov 6th please eat and drink lots of water,
   I have been staying with really nice people that own and
   run a church [and] are letting me stay in a section of the[i]r
   house[.] I have a really nice room, and I bought a car se[at]
   and baby seat and more baby stuff. I found 300 $ on the
   beach someone left in the sand I felt like I was rich[.] [K]
   is getting really big he kicks my stomach and makes me
   choke on my stomach juices. I have a sinus infection and
   stomach acid and taking medicine for it[.] I want you to
   know I will be on I will always be love you forever!! I will
   fight for you forever[.]”
The balance of the emails do not, on their face, appear to
involve communications from petitioner, and petitioner
denies that any of the other messages contained in that cor-
respondence were from her.
         The jail notified petitioner’s probation officer that
petitioner had contacted Carl through the jail’s email sys-
tem. Based on that violation of the terms of her probation—
and one other alleged violation—the probation officer recom-
mended a 15-day jail sanction. The state nonetheless moved
to revoke petitioner’s probation.
Cite as 331 Or App 561 (2024)                                565

         At the hearing on the alleged probation violations,
the state introduced the email correspondence that included
the message from petitioner to her husband, and petitioner
admitted that she had contacted her husband. Based on that
email correspondence, the court revoked petitioner’s pro-
bation; the court found that petitioner had not violated the
terms of probation in the other manner alleged. In conclud-
ing that revocation was appropriate, the court determined
that petitioner was responsible for all the email communi-
cations between Carl and Shanon, apparently believing that
petitioner was using Shanon’s name to communicate with
Carl: “And it wasn’t * * * isolated. We’re not talking about one
email. The content of these emails is abundantly clear. This
isn’t Shanon. This is you. And you admitted that.” Petitioner’s
probation-revocation counsel did not intervene to clarify that
petitioner had only admitted to sending one of the messages,
argue to the court that the balance of the emails were not
attributable to petitioner, or point out to the court that attrib-
uting the additional emails to petitioner would require find-
ings of fact beyond the scope of petitioner’s admission.
         Petitioner subsequently petitioned for post-
conviction relief. She asserts that her probation-revocation
counsel was inadequate and ineffective, in violation of the
state and federal constitutions, for failing to present “miti-
gation” evidence at the revocation hearing, namely, for fail-
ing to alert the trial court that she admitted to sending only
one of the messages. In response, the superintendent did not
dispute petitioner’s claim that she had sent only a single
message or argue that counsel’s performance had met con-
stitutional standards. Instead, the superintendent argued
that petitioner had not demonstrated that she was preju-
diced by her probation-revocation counsel’s failure to bring
that fact to the trial court’s attention. The superintendent’s
theory was that, regardless of the fact that petitioner might
have sent only one message, petitioner’s single contact with
her husband, standing alone, was sufficient to permit revo-
cation. That is, the superintendent argued that the trial
court would have revoked petitioner’s probation even if it
had understood that petitioner had sent only one message.
The superintendent argued further that, even if petitioner’s
probation would not have been revoked for a single message,
566                                            Gwynne v. Myers

petitioner was unlikely to comply with the terms of her pro-
bation, so it would have been revoked eventually anyway.
The post-conviction court agreed with that theory and ruled
that petitioner had not demonstrated prejudice for the rea-
sons argued by the superintendent:
   “Petitioner has failed to show that any additional ‘mitiga-
   tion’ evidence would have changed the outcome of the pro-
   bation violation hearing. The Trial Judge made this abun-
   dantly clear. Petitioner has not shown prejudice. Petitioner
   is simply unwilling to avoid contact with her husband, even
   if it results in imprisonment or loss of her children, making
   revocation inevitable.”
Petitioner appealed, assigning error to the post-conviction
court’s denial of relief on her claim challenging her probation-
revocation counsel’s performance.
          We review a post-conviction court’s grant or denial of
relief for legal error, accepting the court’s implicit and explicit
factual findings if there is evidence to support them. Green,
357 Or at 312. As noted, petitioner asserts parallel claims of
inadequate assistance of probation-revocation counsel under
Article I, section 11, and ineffective assistance of probation-
revocation counsel under the Sixth Amendment. To estab-
lish that her counsel rendered inadequate assistance under
the state constitution, petitioner must prove two elements:
(1) a performance element, that trial counsel “failed to exer-
cise reasonable professional skill and judgment”; and (2) a
prejudice element, that “petitioner suffered prejudice as a
result of counsel’s inadequacy.” Johnson v. Premo, 361 Or
688, 699, 399 P3d 431 (2017). A functionally equivalent
two-element standard governs petitioner’s claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Id.
To prevail on that claim, petitioner must demonstrate that
“trial counsel’s performance ‘fell below an objective stan-
dard of reasonableness’ ” and also that “there was a ‘reason-
able probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” Id.
at 699-700 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668,
694, 104 S Ct 2052, 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984)).
        In this instance, the post-conviction court denied
relief based on its conclusion that petitioner had not
Cite as 331 Or App 561 (2024)                                              567

demonstrated prejudice.2 As noted, it did so based on its
determinations that (1) petitioner did not demonstrate that
the outcome of the revocation hearing “would have changed”
if counsel had pointed out to the court that petitioner sent
only one message; and (2) that, in all events, it was inevi-
table that petitioner would keep violating the terms of her
probation and have it revoked. Those determinations reflect
that the post-conviction court applied a legal standard for
assessing prejudice that was erroneous in three respects.
         First, the post-conviction court’s standard required
petitioner to show that the outcome of the probation-
revocation hearing would have changed: “Petitioner has
failed to show that any additional ‘mitigation’ evidence
would have changed the outcome of the probation viola-
tion hearing.” (Emphasis added.) But, to establish prej-
udice for purposes of Article I, section 11, and the federal
constitution, a post-conviction petitioner need only show
that counsel’s (alleged) deficiency “could have tended to
affect the outcome of the case.” Green, 357 Or at 323 (inter-
nal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). That stan-
dard is met if there is “ ‘more than a mere possibility’ ” that
the outcome of the proceeding could have been different if
counsel’s performance was not deficient. Pike v. Cain, 303
Or App 624, 634, 465 P3d 277, rev den, 367 Or 75 (2020)
(quoting Monfore v. Persson, 296 Or App 625, 636, 439 P3d
519 (2019)); Richardson v. Belleque, 362 Or 236, 263-68, 406
P3d 1074 (2017) (explaining that the prejudice standard in
this context is the same under both the state and federal
constitutions). A post-conviction petitioner need not show, as
the post-conviction court concluded, that, absent counsel’s
deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would
have been different.

    2
      The post-conviction court’s judgment does not specifically address the per-
formance element of petitioner’s claim but does state that “[w]ith regard to any
issues not specifically addressed above, the Court relies on and adopts the facts
and law in Defendant’s trial memorandum as the Court’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law.” The superintendent’s trial memorandum did not specifically
address the performance element either, arguing instead that petitioner could
not show that a correct understanding of the extent of petitioner’s correspon-
dence with her husband “would” have changed the court’s mind. For that reason,
we do not understand the post-conviction court to have ruled on the performance
element of petitioner’s claim.
568                                          Gwynne v. Myers

         Second, the post-conviction court’s standard incor-
rectly focused on whether the particular judge handling
petitioner’s case would have made a different decision, had
counsel explained that petitioner had only sent a single
email: “Petitioner has failed to show that any additional
‘mitigation’ evidence would have changed the outcome
of the probation violation hearing. The Trial Judge made
this abundantly clear.” (Emphasis added.) Contrary to that
approach, the prejudice standard is objective and does not
take into account the identity of the decisionmaker or how
particular factors may or may not have influenced that par-
ticular person’s decision. Pike, 303 Or App at 636; see also
Bacon v. Cain, 327 Or App 673, 678, 536 P3d 634 (2023)
(“The [post-conviction] court’s focus on the impact of the
omitted evidence on the particular sentencing judge rather
than on an objective factfinder was in error.”). The question
is “whether the omitted information is the type that could
have affected the outcome if presented to an objective, rea-
sonable factfinder.” Pike, 303 Or App at 636.
          Third, the post-conviction court also determined
that petitioner did not demonstrate prejudice because, in
its view, revocation of petitioner’s probation was inevita-
ble, even if the trial court would not have revoked petition-
er’s probation based on her email to her husband, had the
court understood that petitioner had only sent one. But,
as explained above, the prejudice standard requires an
analysis of how deficiencies in a lawyer’s performance could
have affected the decision in the particular proceeding; in
this case, the probation-revocation proceeding. Green, 357
Or at 323 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omit-
ted). If counsel performed deficiently and the deficiency had
“more than a mere possibility” of affecting the outcome of
the probation-revocation proceeding, then petitioner was
entitled to relief on her claim. Id. at 322-23 (reversing denial
of post-conviction relief because the post-conviction court
“applied the wrong legal standard for prejudice”). The preju-
dice standard does not require a petitioner to show, in addi-
tion, that the petitioner will never again violate the terms
of probation or be subject to future probation-revocation
proceedings.
Cite as 331 Or App 561 (2024)                                            569

         We therefore reverse and remand for the post-
conviction court to consider petitioner’s claim under the cor-
rect legal standard. On this record, there are factual dis-
putes regarding the extent of petitioner’s role in the email
correspondence to her husband that the post-conviction
court did not need to reach in light of its erroneous applica-
tion of the prejudice standard.3 Although petitioner would
be entitled to relief if all factual disputes were resolved in
her favor, the resolution of those factual issues is for the
post-conviction court in the first instance. See Green, 307 Or
at 323 (“Because the post-conviction court appears to have
applied the wrong legal standard for prejudice, it is inap-
propriate to affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment on
prejudice grounds on the record before us.”).
           Reversed and remanded.

    3
      Petitioner submitted a declaration denying sending any of the communi-
cations beyond the one she admitted to sending. In his deposition, petitioner’s
probation-revocation counsel testified that petitioner “admitted to me that she
was receiving and sending the e-mails from the jail to Carl Gwynne.” The post-
conviction court did not resolve that apparent factual dispute.