Court Opinion

ID: 9778257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:57:06.950472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:05.997926
License: Public Domain

POWERS, Justice,
dissenting.
Barber holds for stare decisis purposes that hair-length disputes in the public schools he outside the range of justiciable controversies. Barber v. Colorado Indep. Sch. Dist., 901 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex.1995). The grounds given for this holding indicate its intended scope: the state judiciary is less competent than local school officials or parents to resolve such disputes, and the nature of the grooming interest involved does not justify the burden placed upon state courts should they be required to decide such questions of local administration.1 Id. These grounds represent fundamental and important decisions of judicial policy. Nothing in Barber suggests they vanish in the face of a statutory claim (Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code § 106.001(a) (West 1986)) but reappear in response to a claim resting upon the Equal Rights Amendment (Tex. Const, art. I, § 3a). I cannot agree that the Barber policies are so ephemeral and its holding so restricted. It is true that Barber refers only to the Equal Rights Amendment, but this merely reflects the fact that the Amendment was the sole basis for the trial-court judgment enjoining *658enforcement of the school district regulation. Barber, 901 S.W.2d at 449.
Because I so understand the Barber decision, I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the judgment below and order the cause dismissed for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.

. Even the Commissioner of Education may not revise the student-discipline decisions of a local school board. See Tex.Educ.Code Ann. § 7.057(e)(2) (Pamph.1996).