Court Opinion

ID: 9850063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:51:43.146403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:31.317301
License: Public Domain

BENHAM, Justice,
dissenting in part.
Although I agree with the rest of the majority opinion, I cannot concur with Division 2 of that opinion because I believe the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Chatfield (Husband) to pay AdkinsChatfield (Wife) $1,500 for each day that passes before he pays to her the sum of $14,593. While the evidence of willful disobedience of the trial court’s order to pay that sum was sufficient to support the trial court’s exercise of discretion in holding Husband in contempt, I believe the extent of the coercive efforts by the trial court was excessive under the circumstances of this case for two reasons: because there were less draconian options available and because the payment of such sums to Wife would constitute an inappropriate windfall.
The original obligation imposed on Husband was to provide Wife with transportation. Thus, since the obligation was one of support ordered to be provided from one party’s estate, it amounted to *196alimony. “Alimony is an allowance out of one party’s estate, made for the support of the other party when living separately. It is either temporary or permanent.” OCGA § 19-6-1 (a). An alimony obligation can be enforced, like other judgments for money, by writ of fieri facias (OCGA §§ 19-6-3 (d) and 19-6-4 (b)), so Wife could enforce that judgment by ordinary post-judgment collection efforts which would be as productive of results for Wife and much less disruptive and costly for Husband.
Decided June 4, 2007
Reconsideration denied June 25, 2007.
Veronica E. Brinson, for appellant.
Lewis J. Patterson, for appellee.
The obligation at the heart of this matter was to provide transportation to Wife. The jury’s verdict, incorporated into the divorce decree, specifically awarded Wife, as part of the division of property, a particular vehicle, so the need for which the original obligation was intended to provide has been met. Thus, Wife’s need for transportation has been met and the trial court has additionally imposed a cash award of $14,593. That being so, the trial court’s imposition of additional indebtedness of $1,500 for every day the original obligation is not met is a windfall for Wife, not intended to meet any need and not necessary to balance the parties’ ownership of marital property.
While I recognize and value the importance of trial courts having means available to ensure compliance with their judgments, there must be practical limits to the power wielded in that effort. Where, as here, less destructive means exist and the coercive method chosen results in a windfall that unbalances what a jury sought to balance in terms of the parties’ relative ownership of marital assets, a trial court abuses its discretion by choosing so draconian a measure. Because the trial court abused its discretion, I would vacate the order requiring Husband to pay $1,500 for every day of delay in paying the existing obligation. Because the majority opinion does not recognize that abuse of discretion, I must respectfully dissent.