Court Opinion

ID: 9761193
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:34:06.888126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:20.855321
License: Public Domain

FINCH, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the principal opinion which concludes that Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, does not require that we examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the confrontation conducted in this case was so suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification as to make the in-court identification of Dorothy Burns inadmissible as a matter of law.
Clearly, as the principal opinion holds, the Wade1 and Gilbert2 cases do not entitle defendant to relief herein because he had counsel at the lineup, which is what those cases require. Defendant makes the point that counsel available to him at the lineup was not the same attorney as the one who tried his case. Trial counsel was not appointed until some time subsequent to the lineup, and I find nothing in Wade or Gilbert which indicates that the attorney at the lineup must be the person who subsequently tries the case.
*506In Stovall the Supreme Court held that Wade and Gilbert would not be given retrospective effect. Nevertheless, as the principal opinion recognizes, it went on to hold that, even so, defendant was entitled to a determination as to whether the confrontation in that case “was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that he was denied due process of law.” 388 U.S. 1. c. 302, 87 S.Ct. 1972. The principal opinion concludes that a defendant is entitled to such a determination only where (as in Stovall) the Wade and Gilbert cases do not apply. In other words, if the defendant had counsel at the lineup, the principal opinion concludes that the determination which was made in Stovall is not required.
I do not so interpret the applicable cases. In the first place, the majority opinion in Stovall, after recognizing the right of the defendant to a determination as to whether the confrontation was so suggestive as to amount to a denial of due process of law, thereby making the identification inadmissible as a matter of law, goes on to say, 388 U.S. 1. c. 302, 87 S.Ct. 1972: “This is a recognized ground of attack upon a conviction independent of any right to counsel claim.” (Emphasis supplied.) In other words, the court is saying, as I read this language, that this right is not dependent for its assertion on the absence of counsel. It is available independently of and regardless of the existence of any claim for relief based on the absence of counsel.
It is to be noted that Wade and Gilbert are dealing with a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. They hold that the confrontation is a critical stage at which the defendant is entitled to be represented by counsel. If, after the date of the Wade and Gilbert decisions, the defendant does not have counsel at such confrontation, the in-court identification by those observing the lineup is inadmissible unless the court determines from clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification was based upon observations of the suspect other than the lineup identification. In Stovall the court was not dealing with a Sixth Amendment right at all, but rather was dealing with the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. That is recognized in the previously noted language from Stovall wherein the court, in speaking of this latter right, said: “This is a recognized ground of attack upon a conviction independent of any right to counsel claim.” Where, in considering this ground of attack, the court concludes from the totality of the circumstances that the confrontation conducted was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that the defendant was denied due process of law, then, as a matter of law, under the Stovall decision, the in-court identification by the persons observing the lineup is inadmissible unless the court finds, under the rule in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065, that the error was harmless. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 444, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 1129, 22 L.Ed.2d 402, 407.
I cannot conclude that the Wade, Gilbert and Stovall decisions present an either/or situation. In other words, I cannot conclude that the court meant that the defendant should have counsel at the lineup, and that if he did, the due process question considered in Stovall would not be available to that defendant. The court is dealing with two different constitutional provisions, each conferring separate rights, and, in my judgment, intended to indicate that where the questions are raised, a defendant is entitled to a determination as to whether either of those constitutional rights have been violated.
The principal opinion points out that the rule in Missouri, as in most states, has been that this question regarding identification evidence has been one of credibility for the jury rather than admissibility. I agree that this has been the situation, and this, of course, is the treatment contended for by Mr. Justice Black in his dissent in Stovall. Even though I may be inclined to agree with our earlier decisions and with the dissent of Mr. Justice Black on this *507question, I am compelled to follow the opinions in Stovall and Foster wherein the majority of the Supreme Court adopt and apply the totality of circumstances test for determining admissibility of evidence on identification under the due process clause.
Consequently, I would hold that we must decide whether, under the totality of circumstances, the confrontation in this case was so bad as to make the in-court identification of Dorothy Burns inadmissible as a matter of law. By stating that we are compelled to decide this question, I do not mean to infer that I would hold that, under the facts in this case, the in-court identification of Dorothy Burns is inadmissible. I express no opinion whatsoever on that question. It has not been considered or decided by the principal opinion. Consequently, I do not reach it for consideration. I am saying only that, in my judgment, Mr. Justice Brennan in the court’s opinion in Stovall did mean that we must decide the question as to whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant was denied due process by a suggestive and improper lineup, even though the accused had counsel present at the lineup.

. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149.

. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178.