Court Opinion

ID: 9897270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:29.795017+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:42.055920
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        Sep 29 2023, 8:52 am

                                                                            CLERK
                                                                        Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                           Court of Appeals
                                                                             and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS                                   ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Sarah Graziano                                             PEKIN INSURANCE COMPANY
Jennifer Risser                                            Stephen C. Wheeler
Eileen Archey                                              Fisher Maas Howard Lloyd &
Hensley Legal Group, PC                                    Wheeler, PC
Fishers, Indiana                                           Carmel, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Michael Hesser, as the guardian                            September 29, 2023
of David Gonzalez, and David                               Court of Appeals Case No.
Gonzalez,                                                  23A-CT-773
Appellants-Plaintiffs,                                     Appeal from the Marion Superior
                                                           Court
        v.                                                 The Honorable Tim Oakes, Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
John Abney and Pekin Insurance                             49D02-1912-CT-050217
Company,
Appellees-Defendants.

                                  Opinion by Judge Brown
                                Judges Crone and Felix concur.

Brown, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-773 | September 29, 2023                           Page 1 of 12
[1]   Michael Hesser, as the guardian of David Gonzalez, and David Gonzalez

      (“Appellants”) appeal the trial court’s entry of summary judgment. We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History

[2]   Dowell Masonry employed Gonzalez for work on a job site in Ladoga,

      Indiana. Gonzalez had worked there for at least a week when, on September 5,

      2018, he was driving a Mazda Miata to the site and was involved in a motor

      vehicle collision with John Abney, an uninsured driver. Gonzalez was insured

      by an automobile policy issued by Geico Casualty Company which included

      uninsured motorist benefits.

[3]   As of the date of the accident, Mike Dowell had an insurance policy (the

      “Pekin Policy”) with Pekin Insurance Company (“Pekin”), which included a

      Declarations Page identifying the insured as “Dowell Masonry Mike Dowell

      DBA.” Appellants’ Appendix Volume II at 181. The Pekin Policy identified

      two “units” on the Declarations Page under “Vehicle Information,” a “99 Ford

      F350 SD” and “10 Ford F150,” and it listed serial numbers for both vehicles.

      Id. In the section titled “Coverages,” the Declarations Page identified the

      declared vehicles by their unit numbers and listed limits of liability for each

      vehicle for uninsured and underinsured motorists claims. Id. The Pekin Policy

      further stated as follows:

              Part I – WORDS AND PHRASES WITH SPECIAL
              MEANING

              The following words and phrases have special meaning
              throughout this policy and appear in boldface type when used:
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-773 | September 29, 2023     Page 2 of 12
        A. “You” and “your” mean the person or organization shown as
        the named insured in ITEM ONE of the declarations.

                                               *****

        D. “Auto” means a land motor vehicle, trailer or semitrailer
        designed for travel on public roads but does not include mobile
        equipment.

                                               *****

        F. “Insured” means any person or organization qualifying as an
        insured in the WHO IS INSURED section of the applicable
        insurance. Except with respect to our limit of liability, the
        insurance afforded applies separately to each insured who is
        seeking coverage or against whom a claim is made or suit is
        brought.

                                               *****

        PART II – WHICH AUTOS ARE COVERED AUTOS

        A. ITEM TWO of the declarations shows the autos that are
        covered autos for each of your coverages.

        B. OWNED AUTOS YOU ACQUIRE AFTER THE POLICY
        BEGINS.

                 1. An auto you acquire will be a covered auto for that
                 coverage only if:

                          a. We already insure all autos that you own for that
                          coverage or it replaces an auto you previously
                          owned that had that coverage; and

                          b. You tell us within 30 days after you acquire it
                          that you want us to insure it for that coverage.

Id. at 186 (some emphasis omitted).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-773 | September 29, 2023          Page 3 of 12
[4]   In the section titled “Endorsements Applicable to Units Indicated Below,” it

      listed Endorsements modifying the policy and the units to which each

      Endorsement applied, including a ninety-four-dollar premium for

      “Comprehensive Auto Coverage,” which was listed only next to “Units 001,”

      and “Indiana Uninsured Motorists Coverage/UMPD 25,000/0,” which applied

      to both units for a forty-two-dollar premium. Id. at 181-182. The Pekin Policy

      included an Endorsement titled “Comprehensive Auto Coverage,” which

      provided:

              With respects [sic] to Part IV - Liability Insurance[,] Part V -
              Medical Payments Insurance and Part VI - Uninsured Motorists
              Insurance including Underinsured Motorist, the definition shown
              under part II, sections A and B, which autos are covered autos, is
              deleted and replaced by the following:

                       A. Description of covered autos.

                                Any auto.

                       B. Owned autos you acquire after the policy begins.

                                1. You have coverage for autos that you acquire for
                                the remainder of the policy period. Autos acquired
                                during a policy period will be covered autos only if
                                the auto is specifically described in the Declarations.

      Id. at 196 (emphasis omitted).

[5]   The Indiana Uninsured Motorists Coverage Endorsement modified the Pekin

      Policy beginning on April 29, 2015, with respect to uninsured motorist

      coverage, applied to units 001 and 002, and provided:

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-773 | September 29, 2023          Page 4 of 12
        With respect to coverage provided by this endorsement, the
        provisions of the policy apply unless modified by the
        endorsement.

        This endorsement replaces PART VI – UNINSURED
        MOTORISTS INSURANCE (including Underinsured Motorist)
        effective on [4/29/15] . . . .

                                               *****

        A. Coverage

                 1. We will pay all sums the insured is legally entitled to
                 recover as compensatory damages from the owner or
                 driver of an uninsured motor vehicle. The damage must
                 result from:

                          a. Bodily injury sustained by the insured and
                          caused by an accident, with an uninsured motor
                          vehicle; or

                          b. Property damage caused by an accident with an
                          uninsured motor vehicle if the Schedule or
                          Declarations indicates that both bodily injury and
                          property damage Uninsured Motorists Insurance
                          apply.

                 The owner’s or driver’s liability for these damages must
                 result from the ownership, maintenance or use of the
                 uninsured motor vehicle.

        B. Who Is An Insured

                 If the Named Insured is designated in the Declarations as:

                 1. An individual, then the following are insureds:

                          a. The Named Insured and any family members.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-773 | September 29, 2023          Page 5 of 12
                                  b. Anyone else occupying a covered auto or a
                                  temporary substitute for a covered auto. The
                                  covered auto must be out of service because of its
                                  breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction.

                                  c. Anyone for damages he or she is entitled to
                                  recover because of bodily injury sustained by
                                  another insured.

                         2. A partnership, limited liability company, corporation,
                         or any other form of organization, then the following are
                         insureds:

                                  a. Anyone occupying a covered auto or a
                                  temporary substitute for a covered auto. The
                                  covered auto must be out of service because of its
                                  breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction.

                                  b. Anyone for damages he or she is entitled to
                                  recover because of bodily injury sustained by
                                  another insured.

                                  c. The Named Insured for property damage only.

      Id. at 212-213 (some emphasis omitted).

[6]   On December 3, 2019, Hesser filed a complaint on behalf of Gonzalez against

      John Abney, Geico Casualty Company, and Pekin. 1 On October 24, 2022,

      Pekin filed a motion for summary judgment arguing the Pekin Policy did not

      provide uninsured motorist coverage for Gonzalez. On October 25, 2022,

      1
        The complaint states Hesser was appointed guardian of Gonzalez because he “is currently medically
      incapacitated due to the injuries sustained in the collision at issue in this case,” and Hesser will serve as
      guardian “until such time as his incapacity ends, if ever.” Appellants’ Appendix Volume II at 24.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-773 | September 29, 2023                                 Page 6 of 12
      Appellants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing the Pekin Policy

      provided uninsured motorist coverage for Gonzalez. The trial court granted

      Pekin’s motion for summary judgment and denied Appellants’ motion for

      summary judgment.

      Discussion

[7]   Appellants argue the Pekin Policy provided uninsured motorist coverage for

      Gonzalez because, “[b]ased on the plain language of the Pekin Policy,

      Gonzalez qualifies as an insured – at the time of the collision, he was ‘anyone’

      occupying ‘any auto.’” Appellants’ Brief at 15. They argue that finding

      Gonzalez was not covered is contrary to Indiana law and public policy. Pekin

      asserts Gonzalez was not covered under the Pekin Policy and that public policy

      does not require Gonzalez to be covered.

[8]   We review an order for summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard

      as the trial court. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). The

      moving party bears the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that there

      are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a

      matter of law. Manley v. Sherer, 992 N.E.2d 670, 673 (Ind. 2013). Summary

      judgment is improper if the moving party fails to carry its burden, but if it

      succeeds, then the nonmoving party must come forward with evidence

      establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. We construe

      all factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and resolve all doubts as

      to the existence of a material issue against the moving party. Id. Our review of

      a summary judgment motion is limited to those materials designated to the trial
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-773 | September 29, 2023     Page 7 of 12
      court. Mangold ex rel. Mangold v. Ind. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 756 N.E.2d 970, 973

      (Ind. 2001). “Parties filing cross-motions for summary judgment neither alters

      this standard nor changes our analysis—we consider each motion separately to

      determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

      law.” Erie Indem. Co. for Subscribers at Erie Ins. Exch. v. Est. of Harris by Harris, 99

      N.E.3d 625, 629 (Ind. 2018), reh’g denied. Matters involving disputed insurance

      policy terms present legal questions and are particularly apt for summary

      judgment. Id.

[9]   “Insurance policies are contracts ‘subject to the same rules of judicial

      construction as other contracts.’” Id. at 630 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

      Co. v. Jakubowicz, 56 N.E.3d 617, 619 (Ind. 2016)). When construing the

      language of an insurance policy, a court “should construe the language of an

      insurance policy so as not to render any words, phrases or terms ineffective or

      meaningless.” Id. “‘[F]ailure to define a term in an insurance policy does not

      necessarily make it ambiguous’ and thus subject to judicial construction.” Id.

      (quoting Wagner v. Yates, 912 N.E.2d 805, 810 (Ind. 2009)). Further, “failing to

      define a policy term merely means it has no exclusive special meaning, and the

      courts can interpret it.” Id. “[P]arties to an insurance contract may not invite

      judicial construction by creating ambiguity.” Id. They may not make a term

      ambiguous by simply offering different policy interpretations. Id. “Rather,

      insurance policy provisions are ambiguous only if they are ‘susceptible to more

      than one reasonable interpretation.’” Id. (quoting Holiday Hosp. Franchising, Inc.

      v. AMCO Ins. Co., 983 N.E.2d 574, 578 (Ind. 2013)).

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-773 | September 29, 2023          Page 8 of 12
[10]   “When evaluating alleged ambiguities—whether there exist two reasonable

       interpretations for one policy term—courts read insurance policies ‘from the

       perspective of . . . ordinary policyholder[s] of average intelligence.’” Id.

       (quoting Allgood v. Meridian Sec. Ins. Co., 836 N.E.2d 243, 246-247 (Ind. 2005)).

       “If reasonably intelligent policyholders would honestly disagree on the policy

       language’s meaning, then we will find the term ambiguous and subject to

       judicial construction.” Id. “Conversely, if reasonably intelligent policyholders

       could not legitimately disagree as to what the policy language means, we deem

       the term unambiguous and apply its plain ordinary meaning.” Id. However,

       when a case involves a dispute between a third party and an insurer, we

       determine the general intent of the contract from a neutral stance. Burkett v.

       Am. Fam. Ins. Grp., 737 N.E.2d 447, 452 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Ind.

       Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Statesman Ins. Co., 260 Ind. 32, 291 N.E.2d 897

       (1973), and Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Ins. Ass’n, 577 N.E.2d 969 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 1991).

[11]   The record reveals that the Indiana Uninsured Motorists Coverage

       Endorsement replaced Part VI of the Pekin Policy, and the Endorsement stated

       in part that an insured included “[a]nyone occupying a covered auto or a

       temporary substitute for a covered auto,” and “[t]he covered auto must be out

       of service because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction.”

       Appellants’ Appendix Volume II at 212-213 (emphasis omitted). There is no

       dispute that Gonzales occupied a Mazda when he was involved in the accident

       on September 5, 2018. Thus, we must determine whether the Mazda was a

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-773 | September 29, 2023      Page 9 of 12
       “covered auto” under the Pekin Policy. The original terms of the Pekin Policy

       provided that a covered auto included those vehicles listed on the declarations

       page and certain autos acquired by the Named Insured after the start of the

       policy. The Comprehensive Auto Coverage Endorsement stated that a covered

       auto was “[a]ny auto” and “[a]utos acquired during a policy period . . . only if

       the auto is specifically described in the Declarations.” Id. at 196.

[12]   We observe that an interpretation finding that “any auto” refers to any vehicle,

       even if the vehicle was not listed on the declarations page, owned or acquired

       by the named insured, or a temporary substitute for such a vehicle, would result

       in an absurd outcome and render other portions of the Pekin Policy

       meaningless. In particular, it would render superfluous Section B of the

       Comprehensive Auto Coverage Endorsement, which states that “[y]ou have

       coverage for autos that you acquire for the remainder of the policy period” and

       “[a]utos acquired during a policy period will be covered autos only if the auto is

       specifically described in the Declarations,” as well as the language of the

       Indiana Uninsured Motorists Coverage Endorsement providing that an insured

       includes “[a]nyone else occupying a covered auto or a temporary substitute for

       a covered auto” and “[t]he covered auto must be out of service because of its

       breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction.” Id. at 196, 212. See

       Jakubowicz, 56 N.E.3d at 619 (we should construe an insurance policy “so as

       not to render any words, phrases or terms ineffective or meaningless”). We

       need not determine whether the reference to “any auto” in Section A of the

       Comprehensive Auto Coverage Endorsement was intended to refer to any auto

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-773 | September 29, 2023      Page 10 of 12
       listed on the Declarations page, any auto owned or acquired by Dowell or

       Dowell Masonry, or a temporary substitute because there is no question that

       the Mazda in which Gonzales was traveling did not constitute a covered auto

       under any of these possible definitions. We conclude that Gonzales was not

       operating a covered auto at the time of the accident. See Carrier v. Reliance Ins.

       Co., 759 So.2d 37, 44 (La. 2000) (“It simply is not reasonable to ascribe to the

       contracting parties an intention to provide [uninsured motorist] insurance

       worldwide to any person occupying any auto. Although it would be reasonable

       . . . to limit UM coverage to employees driving their own vehicles in the scope

       of employment, the literal language . . . does not do so and therefore leads to

       unreasonable and even absurd consequences.”). Accordingly, we affirm the

       entry of summary judgment in favor of Pekin.

[13]   With respect to Appellants’ assertion that public policy and Ind. Code § 27-7-5-

       2 require that Gonzalez be covered by uninsured motorists’ insurance in the

       Pekin Policy, we note that “language in an insurance policy which limits or

       diminishes the protection required by the uninsured motorist statute is contrary

       to public policy only if it specifically limits uninsured motorist protection as to

       [a] person who would otherwise qualify as insured for liability purposes.”

       Progressive Paloverde Ins. v. Arnold, 16 N.E.3d 993, 997 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)

       (quoting Jackson v. Jones, 804 N.E.2d 155, 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)). Ind. Code

       § 27-7-5-2 provides in part that the insurer must make available in the liability

       policy of insurance “for the protection of persons insured under the policy who

       are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-773 | September 29, 2023     Page 11 of 12
       or underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury . . . .” Gonzalez did

       not qualify as an insured because he was not operating a covered auto and

       therefore was not entitled to uninsured motorist protection according to the

       Pekin Policy. We cannot say that the Pekin Policy limits the protection

       required by Ind. Code § 27-7-5-2 or that it violates public policy.

[14]   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s ruling.

[15]   Affirmed.

       Crone, J., and Felix, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-773 | September 29, 2023   Page 12 of 12