Court Opinion

ID: 9536031
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:53:32.998952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:25.918012
License: Public Domain

*1268Justice LOHR
dissenting:
This case presents the issue of whether the People may prosecute a defendant by grand jury indictment after a county court previously dismissed a felony complaint charging the same offenses because the People failed to establish probable cause at a preliminary hearing. The district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the grand jury indictment, holding that the People did not comply with Crim. P. 5 or 7, and that those two rules of criminal procedure provided the sole avenues of relief from a county court’s dismissal of criminal charges for lack of probable cause. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed. People v. Noline, 894 P.2d 1, 5 (Colo.App.1994).
On certiorari review in this court, the majority holds that the People can seek indictment by a grand jury after a county court’s determination of no probable cause as an “alternate route” to a district court appeal of the county court’s decision. Maj. op. at 1267. Because our rules of criminal procedure provide for no such “alternate route,” and because our prior cases strongly indicate for good reasons that none is available, I respectfully dissent to the majority opinion. I agree with the court of appeals’ interpretation of the governing rules and case law, and would affirm the judgment of that court. See Noline, 894 P.2d at 1-5.
I.
On June 21, 1992, Raymond C. Noline broke into the victim’s home. Based on this conduct and the events that ensued, the People filed a complaint against Noline in the Denver County Court, charging one count of criminal attempt to commit first degree sexual assault pursuant to sections 18-2-101, 8B C.R.S. (1986), and 18-3-402, 8B C.R.S. (1986), and one count of second degree burglary pursuant to section 18-4r-203, 8B C.R.S. (1986). At a preliminary hearing on September 16, 1992, the People presented only one witness in support of the complaint. That witness, Detective Greg Lotspeieh, testified regarding his interview of Noline. Detective Lotspeieh testified that Noline had a delusional hope for a healthy relationship with the victim, but that Noline’s fantasy was shattered when he confronted the partially unclothed victim in her bedroom after breaking into her home and removing his own clothes:
Q. All right. And when you say he changed his mind, did he specifically indicate to you that he changed his intentions or that things worked out in a way different than he anticipated?
A. He stated that things had worked out differently, because she was now scared. She tried to run past him, and he grabbed her. He said, “I’m not going to hurt you.” She hit him in the head with a high-heeled shoe, which caused his head to bleed, caused a laceration to his head. She then ran out of the house via the front door, screaming for help. He, then, ran out the back door.
Detective Lotspeieh reinforced this account of the incident at a later point during the preliminary hearing:
Q. Mr. Noline told [the victim] that he was not going to hurt her, correct?
A. Correct.
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Q. Mr. Noline did not pursue her, did he?
A. No, he did not.
The People chose not to present any testimony by the victim at the preliminary hearing.
After hearing Detective Lotspeich’s testimony, the presiding judge held that the People had not presented evidence of the intent necessary to sustain the attempted first degree sexual assault or burglary counts. For this reason, the judge dismissed those counts for lack of probable cause but held that there was sufficient probable cause to sustain a criminal trespass charge:
At the time the defendant broke in, it had to have been for the purpose of sexually assaulting the victim. If he entered in *1269the delusional belief that his advances would be welcomed, I do not find that he had the requisite intent at the time of entry into the premises. I further do not find that he had the intent to violently assault or meet any of the other requirements for sexual assault. I find that he went in for a sexual liaison, one that is delusional and one which a reasonable person would not expect.
I don’t find that his interpretation of the facts is reasonable, but I’m not here to decide that. I’m here to decide whether or not the defendant committed a crime by conduct that was accompanied by the requisite intent, and I don’t find that the requisite intent was there.
I find that there was an intent to enter the premises without the permission of the homeowner and to remain upon that premises. I find that it fits first-degree trespass; I do not find that it fits burglary or attempted sexual assault.
After a recess, the judge explained the basis for his admittedly reluctant decision:
The only evidence offered by the People with regard to intent was that offered during the preliminary hearing, in which the defendant believed that he would have consensual sex, and he entered for that purpose .... I found that the only evidence offered by the People with regard to intent showed a lack of intent to commit a crime....
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... From the evidence, right up to the point at which — right up to the point at which she confronted him, he believed that he was going to succeed; right up to that point. And that is the point at which he realized he wasn’t going to proceed, and he made no attempt then to force himself upon her; none whatsoever. The statement that he grabbed her by the arm as she went by, I determined, in the light most favorable to the People, was to calm her and tell here [sic] that he wasn’t doing to hurt her, and that’s how I viewed that.... I find that the defendant lacked the requisite intent, and that was my ruling.
In view of the county court’s ruling, thé People had two explicit options under this court’s rules of criminal procedure. See maj. op. at 1258. First, they could appeal the decision of the county court pursuant to Crim. P. 5(a)(4)(IV). Second, they could file a direct information in the district court pursuant to Crim. P. 5(a)(4)(V) if they could establish that “evidence exists which for good cause was not presented by the prosecutor at the preliminary hearing.” Crim. P. 5(a)(4)CV)-1 However, the People chose instead to present the matter to a grand jury the next day, and then to move for dismissal of the criminal trespass count, which the district court granted based upon the grand jury’s indictment of Noline on charges arising out of the same criminal episode.
The People presented very different evidence to the grand jury. But see maj. op. at 1258 (“Although the victim testified before the grand jury and did not testify at the preliminary hearing, the People do not assert that they presented additional or new evidence to the grand jury that was not presented to the county court.”). The grand jury heard testimony by the victim, who gave an account of the incident involving Noline that differed dramatically from the comparatively benign version of events to which Detective Lotspeich testified at the preliminary hearing. The victim testified:
A. I said, “What are you doing in my house?” He immediately bounced across the bedroom floor and grabbed me by the wrists. He didn’t say anything. It was real obvious what his intent was, though. He grabbed both my wrists.
Q. What did — how would you describe his demeanor that would lead you to believe what his intentions were?
*1270A. He — he didn’t say anything — he just grabbed me. And it seemed — he was naked. He had waited until I was getting undressed. It was obvious that his purpose was to rape me.
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Q. What happened [after you hit him with your shoe]?
A. Well, there — I had a knife that I keep on the other side of the bed. I was on the wrong side of the bed from it. I tried to crawl over the bed to get it. He grabbed me again from the back. I decided at that point that I could get away from him.... And I got out the bedroom door, and tried to get down the hall. He kept trying to hang on to me from behind.
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Q. Where was he during this whole time [that you were attempting to proceed the thirty feet from the bedroom to the front door]?
A. I was literally dragging him down the hall. I was — most of the time I was on my hands and knees. And he was trying to hang on to me — on to me and keep me from doing that.
Q. When he was hanging on to you, what part of your body was he hanging on to?
A. The waist or the hips.
Q. Did he make any statements to you?
A. Yes, he did.
Q. What did he say?
A. He said, “I could sure use some cooperation.”
The victim continued to testify that Noline’s intentions were “quite clear,” in that “[h]e had broken into the house to rape me.” The grand jury indicted Noline for attempt to commit first degree sexual assault and for burglary, specifically relying on the victim’s account of the incident. Noline objected by filing a motion to dismiss with the district court claiming that the People had not complied with the procedures for an appeal of a county court’s probable cause determination or a filing of a direct information in district court, and that the People had presented new evidence to the grand jury without any showing of good cause.
The district court granted Noline’s motion to dismiss, based on the People’s failure to adhere to Crim. P. 5 and 7. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the grand jury indictment. Noline, 894 P.2d at 5. Relying on our rules of criminal procedure, the court of appeals held:
[O]nee the People fail to establish the existence of probable cause to believe that a defendant has committed an offense, such a defendant cannot be subjected to subsequent refilings, unless the People can demonstrate the existence of additional evidence not previously considered [for good cause].
Id. at 4. On certiorari review, the majority now holds that “absent a rule or statute to the contrary, the People are not precluded from pursuing the course of action taken here,” maj. op. at 1266, and concludes that “presentment to the grand jury is simply an alternate route to an appeal of the county court’s probable cause determination,” maj. op. at 1267-1268. I disagree.
II.
I agree with the majority that “[a]s accurately set out by the court of appeals, the rules of criminal procedure explicitly describe two courses of action the People can take after a felony complaint has been dismissed by the county court for lack of probable cause.” Maj. op. at 1260. First, the People can appeal the county court’s probable cause determination to the district court. Crim. P. 5(a)(4)(IV); maj. op. at 1260-1261. Second, the People can seek to file a direct information in the district court. Crim. P. 5(a)(4)(V); maj. op. at 1260-1261; see Crim. P. 7(c)(2). Furthermore, the People may not file a direct information in the district court after a count has been dismissed by the county court unless “the information [is] ac-*1271eompanied by a written statement from the prosecutor alleging facts which establish that evidence exists which for good cause was not presented by the prosecutor at the preliminary hearing.” Crim. P. 5(a)(4)(V); see Crim. P. 7(c)(2).2
However, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the People can refile charges through an “alternate option” or “alternate route” that our rules do not “specifically permit,” maj. op. at 1265, 1267, 1263, simply because those rules “do not foreclose the course of action taken by the People in this ease,” maj. op. at 1263. The legislature explicitly provided that “[t]he procedures governing felony complaints filed in the county court ... shall be in accordance with and as required by the applicable provisions of the rules of criminal procedure promulgated by the supreme court of Colorado.” § 16-5-101(2), 8A C.R.S. (1986) (emphasis added). In this case, the People did not comply with either Crim. P. 5(a)(4)(IV) or Crim. P. 5(a)(4)(V), which respectively provide that upon a county court’s determination of lack of probable cause, the people can appeal the ruling to the district court or refile a direct information in the district court charging the defendant with the same offense after showing that evidence exists which for good cause was not presented at the preliminary hearing. We should not permit parties to craft their own “alternate” rules of criminal procedure, see maj. op. at 1265, 1267, when this court has not explicitly forbidden such practices but has provided the parties with sufficient procedural options.3
My position finds support in the precedent of this court, and I further disagree with the majority’s belabored interpretation of our analogous case law. See maj. op. at 1261-1265. In Holmes v. District Court of Summit County, 668 P.2d 11, 13 (Colo.1983), a county court dismissed felony complaints against two defendants for lack of probable cause after the prosecution “made a tactical decision not to call the informant as a witness at the preliminary hearing.” The district attorney subsequently obtained district court permission to refile the identical charges by an information in that court based on the district attorney’s assertion that the informant’s testimony would constitute new and additional evidence. This court issued a rule to show cause and later made that rule absolute, thereby reversing the district court’s decision to permit the filing of the charges. We held that “[wjhen the county court dismisses a felony complaint after holding a preliminary hearing pursuant to Crim. P. 5(a)(4)(IV), the sole remedy available to the prosecution is requesting permission of the district court to file a direct information in accordance with Crim. P. 7(c)(2).” Id. at 13-14 (footnote omitted).4 We stated that “[t]he district attorney candidly admits he made a tactical decision not to call the informant and subject him to cross-examination. The People, rather than the [defendants], must bear the burden of that decision.” Id. at 14-15. *1272The basis for our decision was that the sanctioning of refilings without requiring compliance with our rules of criminal procedure would (1) encourage the People to present as little evidence as possible at preliminary hearings by providing the People with the security of two bites at the apple, (2) unnecessarily tax already strained judicial resources, (3) unfairly subject the accused to oppression and discrimination, and (4) create little incentive for the People to comply with the rules governing preliminary hearings. Id. at 15. I agree with the court of appeals that Holmes is applicable to the case at hand. Noline, 894 P.2d at 5. But see maj. op. at 1262,1264-1265.
The court of appeals’ decision in this case is also in accordance with Thomas v. County Court, 198 Colo. 87, 596 P.2d 768 (1979), and People v. Freiman, 657 P.2d 452 (Colo.1988). Noline, 894 P.2d at 4-5. But see maj. op. at 1261-1265. In both of those cases, the prosecution responded to a determination of lack of probable cause by pursuing procedural options for which our rules of criminal procedure did not explicitly provide. In Thomas, 198 Colo. at 90, 596 P.2d at 770, the issue was “whether a district attorney can file a criminal complaint in a county court charging a defendant with the identical offense for which he has previously been indicted in the district court, where that indictment was dismissed by the district court for lack of probable cause.” We held that such a procedure would violate a defendant’s due process rights, and that our rules of criminal procedure at the time allowed for such refilings only after the prosecution affirmatively asserted and a district court found that new or additional evidence existed which might establish probable cause. Id. at 90-91, 596 P.2d at 770-71. Similarly, in Freiman, 657 P.2d at 453, the People unsuccessfully appealed a county court determination of lack of probable cause to the district court. The question before this court was whether the People could “circumvent the first ruling of the district court” by refiling the identical charges in another division of the district court, without alleging that new or additional evidence was available. Id. This court rejected the People’s tactic as amounting to “‘consecutive bites of the apple,’” holding that the remedies available to the prosecution when a case is dismissed in the county court for lack of probable cause are limited to those procedures for which our rules of criminal procedure explicitly provide. Id. at 453-54 (quoting trial judge’s ruling).
Holmes, Freiman, and Thomas and the rules of criminal procedure upon which they are based reflect the importance that we have attached to preliminary hearings. A preliminary hearing is an early screening device conducted before an impartial judge to assure that only those charges for which the prosecution has evidence rising to the level of probable cause shall be permitted to proceed to trial. E.g., Holmes, 668 P.2d at 15; Maestas v. District Ct., 189 Colo. 443, 446, 541 P.2d 889, 891 (1975); People ex rel. Farina v. District Ct., 185 Colo. 118, 121, 522 P.2d 589, 590 (1974). Preliminary hearings conserve judicial resources and protect an accused from being forced to defend against charges for which the prosecution’s evidence is scant. In order to serve these purposes, the prosecution must be required to demonstrate at the preliminary hearing that probable cause exists. If the court errs in determining that probable cause is lacking, the error can be rectified on appeal. If additional evidence exists or is later discovered, and if the prosecution can demonstrate good cause why it was not presented at the preliminary hearing, charges may be refiled. Until today, however, the prosecution has not been permitted to withhold evidence available at the preliminary hearing with the assurance that if a charge is dismissed for lack of probable cause the withheld evidence can then be presented to a grand jury and an indictment can be obtained on the basis of that evidence. In my opinion this new avenue for reactivation of dismissed charges seriously undercuts the usefulness of preliminary hearings as a screening device and is inconsistent with our rules of criminal procedure, the eases interpreting and applying those rules, and the spirit and policy underlying those cases and rules.
*1273III.
The majority also relies on decisions from other jurisdictions to support its conclusion that even absent a showing of new or additional evidence that was not previously presented for good cause, a grand jury indictment is permissible after a county court’s dismissal of the same criminal charges for lack of probable cause. Maj. op. at 1265-1267. I agree with the court of appeals’ determination that these cases “are not persuasive as to the manner in which our statutes and rules should be interpreted.” No-line, 894 P.2d at 5.
First, Colorado specifically provides for appellate review of a judicial dismissal of charges for lack of probable cause. See Crim. P. 5(a)(4)(IV); Crim. P. 7(h)(4); § 16-12-102, 8A C.R.S. (1986 & 1995 Supp.). In those jurisdictions that do not provide for such appellate review, resubmission of previously dismissed charges to the grand jury may be the only method of remedying an improper judicial determination of a lack of probable cause. Burke v. Commonwealth, 373 Mass. 157, 365 N.E.2d 811, 813 (1977) (“Where, as here, no appeal lies from the District Court decision, the grand jury is the only mechanism to ensure that the criminal proceeding has been terminated correctly.”). Otherwise, “[i]t would leave a class of cases, many of which involve serious crimes, lost either to further prosecution or any appellate review.” Id. 365 N.E.2d at 813. For example, in Burke v. Commonwealth, and the cases cited therein, the applicable state laws did not provide for appellate review of a court’s finding of a lack of probable cause. Id. 365 N.E.2d at 814. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Burke limited its decision in holding that “absent a right to appeal an adverse determination of probable cause, the prosecutor may seek a grand jury indictment.” Id. 365 N.E.2d at 814 (emphasis added). Because Colorado law specifically provides the People with the right to appellate review of a judicial determination of a lack of probable cause, the rationale relied upon in states such as Massachusetts does not apply. But see maj. op. at 1266 (“We acknowledge that some cases, as for example Burke, permit the prosecution to proceed by grand jury indictment partially on the basis that no appeal lies from the trial court’s finding of no probable cause.”), 24 (“In Colorado, the General Assembly has provided an avenue of appeal from the county court’s probable cause determination. Nevertheless, we believe that absent a rule or statute to the contrary, the People are not precluded from pursuing the course of action taken here.”). Accordingly, the majority’s reliance on cases from other jurisdictions which do not provide such appellate review is misplaced. See maj. op. at 1266.
Second, the majority overlooks the markedly different role and power of grand juries in the federal system in applying federal easelaw to the question of Colorado criminal procedure before us today. The majority cites several federal cases for the proposition that “the grand jury is a unique body with unique characteristics, some of an independent nature,” maj. op. at 1266, such that “presentment to the grand jury is simply an alternate route to an appeal of the county court’s probable cause determination,” maj. op. at 1267. In Colorado, section 16-5-204(4)(k), 8B C.R.S. (1986), allows the district court to “dismiss any indictment of the grand jury if such district court finds ... that the grand jury finding of probable cause is not supported by the record.” The court of appeals highlighted the importance of this provision:
[I]n the federal system, unlike the procedure established by § 16-5-204(4)(k), a court has no authority to go behind a grand jury indictment to determine whether such indictment is based on probable cause; the return of the indictment constitutes a conclusive determination that probable cause exists. Hence, a [United States] [Commissioner's determination to the contrary cannot preempt the grand jury’s function.
Noline, 894 P.2d at 5 (citing United States v. Kysar, 459 F.2d 422 (10th Cir.1972)). In other words, grand jury proceedings in Colorado are not truly independent and are subject to appellate review in the district courts. It is anomalous to characterize “presentment *1274to the grand jury [as] simply an alternate route to [a district court] appeal,” maj. op. at 1267, where the grand jury determination itself is subject to appeal in the district court.
IV.
In this ease, the People chose not to appeal the county court’s probable cause determination to the district court pursuant to Crim. P. 5(a)(4)(rV), and the People asserted at oral argument before us that they did not attempt to refile the charges in district court pursuant to Crim. P. 5(a)(4)(V) because the “requirement that we show good cause why we had not presented [the new evidence] before ... was problematic.” I would hold that the procedure followed by the People is not permitted by our rules of criminal procedure, and for the aforementioned reasons, I respectfully dissent to the majority opinion.
KIRSHBAUM and SCOTT, JJ., join in this dissent.

. Crim. P. 7(c)(2) and 7(h)(4) provide like alternatives of refiling or appeal in the event a direct information filed in district court is dismissed for lack of probable cause following a preliminary hearing.

. Similarly, the General Assembly chose to prohibit the refiling of a complaint before a second grand jury absent a showing that the People discovered additional evidence subsequent to the initial grand jury’s decision not to indict:
Once a grand jury has returned a no true bill based upon a transaction, set of transactions, event, or events, a grand jury inquiry into the same transaction or events shall not be initiated unless the court finds, upon a proper showing by the prosecuting attorney, that the prosecuting attorney has discovered additional evidence relevant to such inquiry.
§ 16-5-204(4)(e), 8A C.R.S. (1986); see also People v. Noline, 894 P.2d 1, 3 (Colo.App.1994).

. See also People v. Noline, 894 P.2d 1, 5 (Colo. App.1994) ("If the People considered the county court’s dismissal to be erroneous, they could have appealed from that order to the district court. Not having done so, they cannot recommence the prosecution of defendant, irrespective of the means chosen for such prosecution, without demonstrating that they possess further evidence not previously considered by the county court [for good cause]. Because they admittedly failed to make such a demonstration, the trial court properly prohibited their further prosecution of defendant.’’).

.The alternative remedy of appeal was not adopted as part of our rules of criminal procedure until after Holmes was decided. See Crim. P. 5, 7B C.R.S. (1995 Supp.) (noting that the rule was amended March 31, 1988, effective January 1, 1989).