Court Opinion

ID: 9768011
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:38:20.236664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:35.532040
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
Witnesses called by the State testified that Arnette Lee entered a liquor store owned and operated by Troy Davis in Dallas County and asked Davis to cash his paycheck for $152 and some change. Davis agreed, Lee endorsed the check, and Davis stamped it and placed it on the ledge in front of the register.1 Davis went to the office for the bulk of the money, then back to the register for the coins. He counted out the money, placing it on the counter in front of Lee. Lee did not reach for the cash.
Davis then turned and began walking away to get some beer, which Lee had indicated he wished to purchase. As Davis took his first step away from the cash, he looked over his shoulder and saw appellant reach around from behind Lee, grab some of the cash, and run out of the store.
Confusion ensued regarding the proper disposition of the forty dollars remaining on the counter in front of Lee. The policeman who arrived at the scene radioed his substation and advised Lee to take the cash, which Lee did. Lee telephoned his employer, who that same day fully compensated Lee for the money stolen. Davis deposited the check in his bank, but it was not honored because Lee’s employer had stopped payment. Davis testified that he turned the matter over to his attorney and that he “believed” there was a suit pending against Lee’s employer.
Prior to trial the State presented a motion in limine regarding “anything in any civil proceeding.” The trial court’s ambiguous ruling, as I understand it, was that defense counsel would be permitted to question the witness about “filing a lawsuit and against whom it was filed;” however, he would not be permitted to introduce an unverified pleading. Appellant took “exception” to that ruling.
At trial Davis answered affirmatively when the prosecutor asked, “Did you in fact cash his [Lee’s] check?” However, Davis also claimed at trial that he was the owner of the cash when it was snatched from the counter.
As the State says in its brief:
“In an attempt to impeach the testimony of Troy Davis, Appellant sought to introduce the pleadings from a civil trial in which Troy Davis took a position inconsistent with his claim here that he was the owner of the money in question.2 The record indicates the trial court ruled Appellant’s impeachment evidence was inadmissible and prevented Appellant from laying the proper predicate for the introduction of such evidence.3 Appellant contends the above ruling of the trial court constituted reversible error.”
The record makes it clear that upon objection by the prosecutor, and once sua sponte, the trial court prevented defense counsel from laying the predicate for impeachment of Davis with allegations in the civil pleading that are inconsistent with the position taken by Davis at trial in this case. Defense counsel was not permitted to introduce the pleading or even to elicit from Davis whether he authorized his attorney to file it.
Prior inconsistent statements made by witnesses may be used for impeachment. Ray, Texas Law of Evidence, 3rd ed. 1980, *709§ 687, et seq. 1 Texas Practice 625.4 The court erred in not permitting appellant to impeach Davis with the prior inconsistent stance taken by him in the civil case.
Appellant also contends that a fatal variance developed between the allegation of ownership in the information and the evidence adduced at trial. The information alleged that Davis was the owner of the cash, but the proof established that Davis had cashed the check for Lee before the theft.
In addressing this ground of error the majority opinion merely sets out the definitions of “owner” and “possession” in V.T. C.A. Penal Code, §§ 1.07(a)(24) and (28),5 respectively, and then concludes that Davis was “an owner” as defined by the statutes. The majority does not attempt to explain how, after Davis had cashed the check for Lee, Davis still could have “title” to or “possession” of the cash, or “a greater right to possession” of it than appellant. Davis could not own both the check and the cash on the counter at the same time.6
The evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Davis was the owner of the cash when it was snatched from the counter.
I respectfully dissent.
ODOM, TEAGUE and MILLER, JJ., join this dissent.

.A photocopy of both sides of the check, included in appellant’s bill of exceptions, shows that it was stamped:
“FOR DEPOSIT ONLY BON-TON LIQUORS
2216 Second Dallas, Texas”

. The pleading appears in the record in appellant’s bill of exception.

. All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.

. This rule is separate from the one involving admissions made by a party opponent in prior proceedings. The State’s reliance upon the fact that Davis is not a “party” in this case is misplaced.

. Section 1.07(a)(24), supra, defines “owner” as “a person who has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor.”
Section 1.07(a)(28), supra, defines “possession” as “actual care, custody, control, or management.”

. V.T.C.A.Bus. & C., § 3.302(a) reads as follows:
“A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument
(1) for value;
(2) in good faith; and
(3) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any person.
Section 3.303, supra, states in pertinent part:
“A holder takes the instrument for value
(1) to the extent that the agreed consideration has been performed....”