Court Opinion

ID: 9580219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:03:16.860705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:08.745357
License: Public Domain

AMUNDSON, Justice.
The State of South Dakota appeals from an order dismissing without prejudice the information filed against David Bale (Bale) on the grounds that the statutory authority and factual background did not constitute the crime of third degree rape (incest). We affirm.
FACTS
The facts are not in dispute. Between November 1, 1991 through January 1992, Bale engaged in sexual intercourse with his adopted daughter, A.B., who was 19 years of age or older at the time.
The information filed against Bale provided, in part that:
BALE did commit the public offense of THIRD DEGREE RAPE (ALSO KNOWN AS INCEST) in that he did then and there accomplish an act of sexual penetration with Jane Doe, a person to whom he was not legally married and with whom he was within a degree of consanguinity within which marriages are by the laws of this State declared void, in violation of SDCL 22-22-1(6) and SDCL 26-1-6.
Bale filed a motion to dismiss the information contending that the legal relationship created by adoption is not covered by SDCL 22-22-1(6) because it is not a relationship of consanguinity. The trial court agreed.
ISSUE
WHETHER SEXUAL PENETRATION BETWEEN AN ADOPTIVE PARENT AND CHILD CONSTITUTES INCEST?
Incest is a statutory crime. 2 Charles E. Torcía, Wharton’s Criminal Law § 242 (14th ed. 1979). Its definition varies in details under different statutory schemes. 42 C.J.S. Incest § 2(a) (1991).
In South Dakota incest is defined as “an act of sexual penetration accomplished with any personjs]” “who are not legally married and who are within degrees of consanguinity within which marriages are by the laws of this state declared void[.]” SDCL 22-22-1(6).
While SDCL 25-1-8 declares bigamous marriages null and void and SDCL 26-1-7 declares marriages between stepparents and stepchildren null and void, SDCL 26-1-6 defines those relationships, including relationships of consanguinity, which render marriages null and void:
Marriages between parents and children, ancestors and descendants of every degree, and between brothers and sisters of the half as well as the whole blood, and between uncles and nieces, or aunts and nephews, and between cousins of the half *166as well as of the whole blood, are null and void from the beginning, whether the relationship is legitimate or illegitimate.
In this ease, sexual penetration occurred between Bale and his adopted daughter. Because adoption creates the “legal relation of parent and child” with “all the rights and ... duties of that relation” SDCL 25-6-16, the State argues that there is a relation by “legal consanguinity” between an adoptive parent and child; consequently, intercourse between the two would constitute incest under SDCL. 22-22-1(6). We disagree.
Consanguinity is a blood relationship which is either lineal (father/son) or collateral (uncle/nephew). Brian A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage 142 (1987); Black’s Law Dictionary 303 (6th ed, 1990). An adoption statute cannot erase lineal consanguinity and then create a new lineal consanguinity. Hendry v. State, 571 So.2d 94 (Fla.App. 2d Dist.1990). “It of course is impossible to nullify by legislative declaration the fact that the biological parents continue to be blood relatives of the child; the link of consanguinity cannot be erased by enactment.” Bohall v. State, 546 N.E.2d 1214, 1215 (Ind.1989).
Statutes of other states extend the crime of incest to sexual relations between relatives by affinity, relatives by adoption and relatives by consanguinity. Ex parte Bourne, 300 Mich. 398, 2 N.W.2d 439 (1942). See Model Penal Code § 230.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). In South Dakota, however, SDCL 22-22-1(6) specifically limits the crime of incest to sexual penetration between those related by consanguinity. The legislature could have easily prohibited sexual relations between relatives by affinity and by adoption, but did not do so. SDCL 22-22-1(6). This Court will not enlarge a statute beyond its face where the statutory terms are clear and unambiguous in meaning. State v. Fryer, 496 N.W.2d 54 (S.D.1993). Consequently, the information did not describe a public offense and was properly dismissed pursuant to SDCL 23A-8-2.
Affirmed.
MILLER, C.J., and HENDERSON, and SABERS, JJ., concur.
WUEST, J., concurs in result.