Court Opinion

ID: 9663351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:35:49.319894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:48.246139
License: Public Domain

*430Griffin, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). We would hold that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, precludes the state from compelling the Emmanuel Baptist Preschool, a ministry of the Emmanuel Baptist Bible Church, to be licensed under the childcare organization act. We would also hold that defendants are exempt by virtue of the Free Exercise Clause from those provisions of the act which give the dss authority to inspect defendants’ finances in connection with the operation of their pervasively religious preschool/day-care program. With respect to the other issues raised in this appeal, we concur in the results reached by the Court, i.e., that dss administrative rules relating to director qualifications and program content may not be enforced as against these defendants, and that the administrative rule relating to corporal punishment is constitutional.
i
The four basic elements of the Free Exercise Clause standard of review applicable in this case are accurately described by Justice Cavanagh in the lead opinion. We agree with him that strict scrutiny is required, that "[Wisconsin v] Yoder [406 US 205; 92 S Ct 1526; 32 L Ed 2d 15 (1972)] remains good law, and must be applied here in the manner as described in Sheridan Road [Baptist Church v Dep’t of Ed, 426 Mich 462, 574-578; 396 NW2d 373 (1986)] (Riley, J.).” (Ante, p 398 Cavanagh, J.)1_
*431The principal free exercise claim advanced by defendants focuses on the licensure requirement contained in the childcare organization act, which states in part:
A person, partnership, firm, corporation, association or nongovernmental organization shall not establish or maintain a childcare organization unless licensed or registered by the department. . . . Before issuing or renewing a license, the department shall investigate the activities and proposed standards of care of the applicant and shall make an on-site visit of the proposed or established organization. If the department is satisfied as to the need for a childcare organization, its financial stability, the good moral character of the applicant, and that the services and facilities are conducive to the welfare of the children, the license shall be issued or renewed. [MCL 722.115(1); MSA 25.358(15)(1).]_
*432The act provides for criminal sanctions. A violation of its requirements is punishable as a misdemeanor by the imposition of a fine of no more than $1,000, or imprisonment for not more than 90 days, or both. MCL 722.125; MSA 25.358(25).
The dss has not directly disputed defendants’ claim that their objection to licensing is grounded in sincerely held religious belief. Ample evidence was introduced at trial to show that the Emmanuel Baptist Preschool program is part of the church’s ministry, and that the program is pervasively religious and was established by the church to impart its religious doctrine to the children of its members and to others who might attend. Witnesses for defendants testified that the preschool was established in response to a Biblical command, that the concept of "calling” is basic to fundamentalist ministries, and that this ministry —the preschool program — is "mandated” by the Lord. As the trial court found, and explained:
The evidence establishes that the child care program operated by Defendant Church is an integral part of the total educational ministry of the church. Defendant Church belongs to the fundamentalist Christian movement which believes that the operation of a school, including a preschool, is an extension of the Christian home and of the church. All aspects of the preschool program are permeated with religious doctrine. The children are taught to understand the philosophy of the scriptures about obedience to parents and those in authority.
It is determined that Defendant Church’s activity in operating the day care center is religiously grounded and, as such, it is protected by the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.
Concluding that the trial court was justified in *433finding that the church’s preschool/day-care program is rooted in its fundamentalist Baptist doctrine,2 we turn to consider whether the act’s licensure requirement burdens the free exercise by defendants of their religious beliefs.
A license has been defined as "the permission by competent authority to do an act which, without such permission, would be illegal.” People v Henderson, 391 Mich 612, 616; 218 NW2d 2 (1974). In this case, the church contends that "submitting to licensing places the state in sovereignty over the Lord in violation of its religious belief.” The church maintains that its preschool/day-care program was established in response to a Biblical command "to teach the precepts of the word of God to our children.” Dr. Rushdoony, an expert witness called by the church, described the religious nature of the church’s claim against licensing:
[T]he concept that the State has the right to govern what belongs to Christ is religiously offensive.
They see their right to operate a ministry as indeed a mandate from Jesus Christ who is Lord, who is sovereign, and therefore in that sense, it is absolute. . . . They are ready to recognize that there are legitimate health and fire requirements, but they do not see that beyond that . . . that there is any jurisdiction of the State._
*434As viewed by the church’s pastor, Rev. Harold Asiré, "the function of a license or the power to license is the power to withdraw the license. And the power to withdraw the license is the power to control whether or not we would have pre-school or not.”3
Licensing, by its very nature, is a prior restraint. Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296; 60 S Ct 900; 84 L Ed 1213 (1940); cf. Murdock v Pennsylvania, 319 US 105; 63 S Ct 870; 87 L Ed 1292 (1943), and Follett v McCormick, 321 US 573; 64 S Ct 717; 88 L Ed 938 (1944) (flat license taxes operated as a prior restraint on the exercise of religious liberty). "Whenever a prior restraint impinges upon First Amendment rights, it carries a heavy presumption against constitutional validity.” Int’l Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc v Rochford, 585 F2d 263, 271 (CA 7, 1978). In Cantwell, supra, the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance which required a Jehovah’s Witness to obtain a license before soliciting funds for religion purposes. The Court said,
[T]o condition the solicitation of aid for the perpetuation of religious views or systems upon a license, the grant of which rests in the exercise of a determination by state authority as to what is a religious cause, is to lay a forbidden burden upon the exercise of liberty protected by the Constitution. [310 US 307.]
The act’s requirement that defendants obtain a license from the dss before they may conduct their preschool/day-care program "affirmatively com*435pel[s] [defendants], by threat of sanctions, to refrain from religiously motivated conduct or to engage in conduct that they find objectionable for religious reasons.” Bowen v Roy, 476 US 693, 703; 106 S Ct 2147; 90 L Ed 2d 735 (1986); see also Sheridan Road, supra, p 554 (Riley, J.). From the perspective of these particular defendants, the act’s licensing provision requires submission to the authority of the state to decide whether this religious activity may be conducted.4 We conclude, as did the trial court, that the evidence adduced in this case demonstrates that defendants’ practice of their religion is burdened by the act’s licensing requirement. Accordingly, we turn now to consider whether such a burden is nevertheless outweighed by a compelling state interest which justifies denial of an exemption in this case.
The dss contends that the state has a "compelling interest in the health, safety and welfare of children in day-care facilities.” That the state has a fundamental interest in protecting its citizens, especially the young, is not contested. See Barsky v Bd of Regents of SUNY, 347 US 442, 449; 74 S Ct 650; 98 L Ed 829 (1954); Prince v Massachusetts, 321 US 158, 168-169; 64 S Ct 438; 88 L Ed 645 (1944).
Dss witnesses emphasized at trial that preschools and day-care centers may present hazards to children’s safety in the form of insufficient staff, improper nutrition, dangerous toys, the reception of sick children, and the specter of "child abuse, *436including excessively severe disciplinary practices.” Although that is true, the United States Supreme Court, nevertheless, "has consistently asked the Government to demonstrate that unbending application of its regulation to the religious objector 'is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest.’ ” Bowen v Roy, supra, 476 US 728 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The state does not meet its burden merely by showing a compelling interest in the general subject matter of its regulation. To override claims of religious exemption, the state must demonstrate a compelling need to apply the law in the particular case at bar:
[D]espite its admitted validity in the generality of cases, we must searchingly examine the interest that the State seeks to promote . . . and the impediment to those objectives that would £ow from recognizing the claimed . . . exemption. [Yoder, supra, 406 US 221. Emphasis supplied.]
Otherwise stated,
In applying the least restrictive alternative-compelling interest requirement, it is crucial to avoid the error of equating the state’s interest in denying a religious exemption with the state’s usually much greater interest in maintaining the underlying rule or program for unexceptional cases. Only the first interest — that in denying an exemption — is constitutionally relevant when an exemption is sought. [Tribe, American Constitutional Law (1st ed), p 855.][5]
In the instant case defendants concede that the *437state’s interest in protecting the health and safety of young children is of the highest order. Defendants do not object to regulations that directly relate to health, fire, sanitation, and other safety requirements; indeed, the church’s preschool would submit to licensing of its facilities for safety reasons. However, defendants reject the proposition that the state has constitutional authority to license the ministry activity itself.6 For the dss to argue, as it does, that it has a compelling interest in the broader purpose of "licensing and regulating day-care facilities” or "providing young children with quality preschool programs,” (see the Court of Appeals opinion, 150 Mich App 264, 267) is to beg the question in this case. As against defendants’ fundamental right of religious freedom, such a contention on the part of the dss falls short of identifying a recognized compelling state interest for purposes of First Amendment jurisprudence.
As in Wisconsin v Yoder, supra, the instant case
involves the fundamental interest of parents, as contrasted with that of the State, to guide the religious future and education of their children. The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition. If not the first, perhaps the most significant statements of the Court in this area are found in Pierce v Society of *438Sisters [268 US 510; 45 S Ct 571; 69 L Ed 1070 (1925)], in which the Court observed:
"The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.” 268 US at 534-535.
The duty to prepare the child for "additional obligations,” referred to by the Court, must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship. Pierce, of course, recognized that where nothing more than the general interest of the parent in the nurture and education of his children is involved, it is beyond dispute that the State acts "reasonably” and constitutionally in requiring education to age 16 in some public or private school meeting the standards prescribed by the State.
However read, the Court’s holding in Pierce stands as a charter of the rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children. [Yoder, supra, 406 US 232-233.][7]
There is even more reason here than in Yoder to accommodate the defendants’ free exercise claims. In this case, the state’s interest is of a decidedly different nature than the interest in compulsory education involved in Yoder and Sheridan Road, supra. Where a government undertakes to require parents to see that their children receive a certain level of education, regulation of the quality and content of the educational program may be necessary. See Sheridan Road, supra, pp 478-480. How*439ever, the state has never asserted an interest in requiring all children to be exposed to a state regulated preschool/day-care program in order to enhance their social, physical, intellectual or emotional development. Rather, as explained by the dss’ own expert, Mr. Class, the state’s interest in regulating preschool/day-care programs is preventive. He pointed to the regulation of public health as an analogy to the underlying purpose of licensing childcare centers. When such a broad prophylactic purpose has the effect of regulating protected activity in advance, it becomes suspect. NAACP v Button, 371 US 415, 438; 83 S Ct 328; 9 L Ed 2d 405 (1963).
To be sure, the power of the parent, even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject to limitation ... if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens. [Yoder, supra, 406 US 233-234.]
But in this case, nothing in the record indicates that exempting these particular defendants from the licensing requirement would pose a "grave and immediate” danger to the state’s interest in protecting the welfare of the children involved. West Virginia Bd of Ed v Barnette, 319 US 624, 639; 63 S Ct 1178; 87 L Ed 1628 (1943). This is not a case in which harm to the health or safety of those children attending defendants’ preschool/day-care program has been demonstrated or even implied. As noted above, defendants are more than willing to submit to health and safety requirements and have done so in the past.8_
*440Absent any evidence that it would interfere with the state’s interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of preschool children, a religious exemption from licensing is warranted under the particular circumstances of this case.
This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that less burdensome alternative means are available by which the dss could fulfill its stated interest. Although not required to do so under the strict scrutiny standard, defendants have convincingly pointed out that the state could accomplish its legitimate objective through a program of registration, such as that allowed for family day-care homes where six or fewer children are cared for at a time. MCL 722.111(f)(iii), (1), (m) and (n); MSA 25.358(ll)(f)(iii), (1), (m) and (n). Defendants recognize that application of the act’s more limited requirement of registration, rather than licensure, would still subject their preschool program to some state control. For example, the state could make periodic inspections and enforce standards relating to the safety, health, and welfare of the children. See MCL 722.111(1), (m); MSA 25.358(11) (1), (m), MCL 722.115; MSA 25.358(15). However, as defendants see it, the less obtrusive procedure of registration would accommodate defendants’ fundamental religious objection to the concept that the state, through its power to grant or withhold a license, is to decide whether the pervasively religious activity of this ministry is to be conducted.9
*441It is noteworthy that under the existing statutory scheme a childcare center which is operated by the state or by a local unit of government within this state need not be licensed, but only
evaluated and approved at least once every 2 years, using this act and rules promulgated thereunder for similar nongovernmental organizations licensed under this act. A report of the evaluation shall be furnished to the funding body for each child care organization. Unless child care organizations are approved, or provisionally approved, as meeting the appropriate administrative rules, state funds shall not be appropriated for their continued operation. [MCL 722.116; MSA 25.358(16).]
As the Court of Appeals discussed in Erickson v Dep’t of Social Services, 108 Mich App 473, 479; 310 NW2d 428 (1981):
Although a state or local government run facility is subject to the same rules of operation as its private counterpart, including criminal penalties for failure to comply with such standards, MCL *442722.125; MSA 25.358(25), the state’s formal approval of the facility does not constitute a similar prerequisite to operation. In fact, the language of MCL 722.116; MSA 25.358(16) discloses that the state’s only recourse against unapproved government run facilities, which are not otherwise subject to the criminal penalties noted above, is to withhold state funds.
That a different scheme of regulation exists for state and local government-operated facilities serves to demonstrate that the dss could be more flexible in the instant case.10
Thus, while it is conceded that the state has a fundamental interest in the health, safety, and welfare of children in preschool/day-care programs, the record presented warrants the conclusion that the state’s legitimate purposes could be achieved in the case of these defendants by utilizing a "less obtrusive form of regulation” than licensing. Sherbert, supra, 374 US 407.
For these reasons, we would hold that the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause precludes the dss from requiring the defendants’ preschool/daycare program to be licensed under the childcare organization act.11
ii
We turn now to defendants’ claims that, in *443addition to the licensing requirement, certain regulations promulgated by the dss pursuant to the childcare organization act also impinge upon their First Amendment rights.
A
Rule 400.5104(2)(a), issued by the dss, requires that the "program director [of a childcare center] shall have completed a minimum of 60 semester hours of credit at an accredited college or university . . . .”12 (Emphasis added.)
No one disputes that in the view of the church and its members the program director of its preschool/day-care program is considered to be an "underpastor” of the church. At trial, Rev. Harold Asiré, testified that the "number one qualification” of a program director is that the person be a "Born Again Christian.” He said the defendants looked to the fundamentalist Christian colleges to find a program director because such colleges teach a Biblically-based philosophy of education. It was pointed out that some of these colleges forgo state accreditation on the ground of religious belief. Rev. Asiré conceded the possibility that a person who had attended an accredited college could be acceptable as a program director, if that person were a "Born Again Christian.” According to Rev. Asiré, the religious beliefs of the applicant would be the paramount criterion for selection.
The dss does not contest that the choice of a program director by these defendants would be severely circumscribed if they were limited in the *444selection to graduates of accredited colleges. We believe the record clearly establishes that the accreditation limitation places a burden upon defendants’ free exercise rights. As held by the court in Rayburn v General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F2d 1164, 1168 (CA 4, 1985):
[Perpetuation of a church’s existence may depend upon those whom it selects to preach its values, teach its message, and interpret its doctrines both to its own membership and to the world at large.
Any attempt by government to restrict a church’s free choice of its leaders thus constitutes a burden on the church’s free exercise rights. [See also Kedroff v St Nicholas Cathedral, 344 US 94; 73 S Ct 143; 97 L Ed 120 (1952).]
The dss nevertheless contends that "the State has a compelling interest in assuring that program directors have the minimum level of knowledge, which will enable them to adequately supervise child care staff and to design and maintain programs which are appropriate to the needs of preschool age children.” At trial, the dss introduced the deposition testimony of Dr. Norris Class, an expert witness. Dr. Class discussed the vulnerability of small children and listed risks related to childcare centers. Regarding staff qualifications, Dr. Class testified ás follows:
There are risks relating to the character defect of staff and to the lack of qualifications of staff to carry out role assignments properly and/or responsibly.
Other experts gave similar testimony on behalf of the state on the importance of director training. However, none of the expert testimony offered by *445the dss concerned the importance of program director training at an accredited college, rather than an unaccredited fundamentalist Christian school. Dr. Ruopp specifically testified that it is the type of training received that is most important, rather than the number of years involved:
We tested the hypothesis that years of education made a difference and discovered that years of education by themselves made no difference. What made a difference . . . was that caregivers had specific training in child development and daycare ....
The testimony of Mr. Gazan, another dss witness, indicates that the interest of the dss in having an accreditation requirement is to make sure that a person selected for director has in fact attended a college, rather than a diploma mill:
We at the Department of Social Services have neither the responsibility nor the ability to go around and evaluate . . . whether or not that college is or is not providing a level of academic learning that is on a college level. . . . [W]e want to be sure that the credits earned are not something that were earned by way of a hundred dollar fee with some paper mill college ....
Such testimony undercuts plaintiff’s argument that the accreditation requirement is closely related to director qualifications. Rather, it suggests that accreditation is utilized to ensure that a director’s training is not completely counterfeit. Moreover, there is record evidence that the department has issued alternative guidelines which would allow the hiring of directors from unaccredited colleges, a development which further demonstrates that the accreditation requirement is not essential to the dss’ interests.
*446We conclude that the dss has failed to sustain its burden to show a compelling basis for its refusal to recognize in the case of these defendants an exemption from the accreditation requirement of Rule 400.5104(2)(a). Accordingly, we would hold the accreditation requirement unconstitutional as applied to these defendants.
B
Another of the challenged dss regulations is Rule 400.5106(l)(c), which provides:
(1) A center shall provide a program of daily-activities and relationships that offers opportunities for the developmental growth of each child in the following areas:
(c) Emotional development, including positive self-concept. [Emphasis supplied.][13]
With respect to this regulation, we join in the reasoning and conclusion of Justice Cavanagh, and add the following.
This Court said in Woll v Attorney General, 409 Mich 500, 533; 297 NW2d 578 (1980), that
A statute may be challenged for vagueness on the grounds that it
—is overbroad, impinging on First Amendment freedoms, or_
*447—does not provide fair notice of the conduct proscribed, or
—is so indefinite that it confers unstructured and unlimited discretion on the trier of fact to determine whether an offense has been committed. [Citing Grayned v City of Rockford, 408 US 104, 108-109; 92 S Ct 2294; 33 L Ed 2d 222 (1972).]
Moreover, when a law impinging on First Amendment freedoms is assailed on grounds of vagueness, a heightened standard of scrutiny is required:
"Vague laws in any area suffer a constitutional infirmity,” Ashton v Kentucky, 384 US 195, 200; 86 S Ct 1407, 1410; 16 L Ed 2d 469 (1966) (footnote omitted), and commonly in the First Amendment area doubly so. There, perhaps more than elsewhere, statutory vagueness and statutory over-breadth are constitutional vices often related and sometimes functionally inseparable. See, e.g., NAACP v Button, 371 US 415, 423-433; 83 S Ct 328; 9 L Ed 2d 405 (1963). For "where a vague statute 'abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms’ it 'operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms,’ ” Grayned v City of Rockford, 408 US 104, 109; 92 S Ct 2294, 2299; 33 L Ed 2d 222 (1972), quoting in turn Baggett v Bullitt, 377 US 360, 372; 84 S Ct 1316; 12 L Ed 2d 377 (1964) and Cramp v Board of Public Instruction, 368 US 278, 287; 82 S Ct 275; 7 L Ed 2d 285 (1961); and "[uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to ' "steer far wider of the unlawful zone” . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden area were clearly marked.’ ” [Citations omitted.] "The danger of that chilling effect upon the exercise of vital First Amendment rights must be guarded against by sensitive tools which clearly inform [citizens of] what is being proscribed.” Keyishian v Board of Regents, supra, 385 US [589] 604; 87 S Ct [675] 684 [17 L Ed 2d 629 (1967)].
Consequently, "standards of permissible statu*448tory vagueness are strict in the area of free expression.” NAACP v Button, supra, 371 US at 432 .... "Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity,” id. at 433; 83 S Ct at 339; "[precision of regulation must be the touchstone in [that] area . . . .” Id. at 438 ... . [Buckley v Valeo, 171 US App DC 172, 225-226; 519 F2d 821, 874-875 (1975), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 424 US 1; 96 S Ct 612; 46 L Ed 2d 659 (1976).]
A statute is vague when the conduct it forbids is so unclear that persons "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” Connally v General Construction Co, 269 US 385, 391; 46 S Ct 126; 70 L Ed 322 (1926).
Attempting, presumably, to justify the regulation, one of the dss witnesses, Dr. Ruopp, testified that it was
written as a sign post rather than as a prescription, you really — you can justify just about anything you do with children that is reasonable and intelligent, all the way from, I suppose, secular humanism on the one hand to the most rigorous kind of religious training that you can give.
We agree with defendants that such testimony serves to demonstrate that because the rule is subject to such wide and varied interpretations, it is vague to the point that persons of ordinary intelligence must "guess at its meaning.” Connally, supra, 269 US 391. "Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to ' "steer far wider of the unlawful zone” . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.’ ” Grayned v Rockford, supra, 408 US 109.
Particularly where First Amendment freedoms *449are at stake, such vagueness in a regulation is constitutionally intolerable.
c
Defendants also claim that their First Amendment rights are violated by certain provisions of the childcare organization act which purport to give the dss authority to investigate the financial condition of a childcare center.14
The dss argues that its interest in insuring that basic services are provided to children in childcare centers necessitates such regulation. Yet, it is undisputed that in a policy memorandum issued by the dss on September 10, 1974, the requirement that license applicants submit financial statements was discontinued:
This is to inform you that the Financial Statement form (DSS-3603) is no longer to be used in connection with the application requirements for licensure or approval. Both the format and the information required is of dubious value, and provides no rule related information pertinent to determining a licensing recommendation._
*450It is expected that new applicants may desire consultation with respect to the fiscal management of a child care center. Consultation can be provided by using other sources of information, or resources much more appropriately than the aforementioned form.
Defendants contend that inspection of their financial status could entail disclosure of their funding sources. We agree that such compelled disclosure could affect free exercise rights:
[T]he invasion of privacy of belief may be as great when the information sought concerns the giving and spending of money ... for "[financial transactions can reveal much about a person’s activities, associations, and beliefs.” [Buckley v Valeo, supra, 424 US 66.]
Even though the dss has rescinded the practice of requiring financial disclosure by license applicants, the statutory provisions authorizing such regulation remain in effect. The potential, alone, for such inspection to occur in the future is a sufficient burden to chill defendants’ decision-making process for their religiously based programs. See Catholic Bishop of Chicago v NLRB, 559 F2d 1112 (CA 7, 1977), aff’d on statutory grounds 440 US 490; 99 S Ct 1313; 59 L Ed 2d 533 (1979); Surinach v Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F2d 73 (CA 1, 1979).
The dss has effectively conceded, through its policy memorandum, that it does not have a compelling interest in initial financial disclosure of license applicants. Further, the record in this case shows that the dss is able to make a determination regarding whether basic services are being provided at childcare centers without financial inspection. One dss witness, Mr. Gazan, testified:
The only time that the financial status of a *451center would be a matter of concern would be if it was obvious it was interfering with the ability of that center to provide adequate staff. To pay the heat bills — and by the way, we have had actual cases where, because a licensee was not paying their heat bill, ultimately it was turned off. They were continuing to try to care for children so they could receive the income, hopefully be able to pay their bills. Then it becomes a legitimate area of our concern.
It appears that the dss’ purpose in reviewing finances is to ascertain otherwise observable facts, i.e., whether adequate staff, heat, and the like is provided. Particularly in view of the fact that the dss has introduced no evidence to show that any such problem has ever existed with respect to defendants’ preschool/day-care programs, we conclude that application of the financial inspection and disclosure requirements of the act to these defendants would violate their right to free exercise of religion under the First Amendment.
D
Finally, defendants follow a literal interpretation of the Biblical admonition, "Spare the rod, spoil the child.” The preschool/day-care staff uses a Ping-Pong paddle to spank children when such discipline is deemed necessary.15
The childcare organization act authorizes the dss to promulgate rules for "discipline of children.” MCL 722.112(3)©; MSA 25.358(12X3)©. Rule 400.5107(2Xa) provides:
(2) Staff shall be prohibited from ... (a) [h]it-*452ting, shaking, biting, pinching, or inflicting a form of corporal punishment.[16]
Defendants assert that the plain language of this rule burdens the exercise of their religious belief that the use of corporal punishment to discipline children is required by the Bible. While conceding that the rule "may well be burdensome on Defendants’ free exercise of religion,” the state contends that its interest in protecting the health and well-being of children overrides any burden placed on defendants’ rights. As stated by the Court of Appeals:
The state’s interest is clear and compelling. The rule protects very young children from physical harm by prohibiting potentially abusive forms of discipline. Child abuse by adults is a major risk to children receiving daily out-of-home care in daycare centers. Children in age ranges to 6 are not likely to protest abusive punishment. Thus, although the prohibition against spanking with a Ping-Pong paddle burdens the church’s free exercise of its religious beliefs, the state’s interest in protecting its very young outweighs the burden. In so holding, we recognize that some practices rooted in religious principle may be dangerous to the health and welfare of certain members of society. [150 Mich App 271.]
Other courts have recognized the profound interest of the state in preventing the infliction of physical or emotional harm to children in childcare center facilities by means of corporal punishment. See, e.g., Forest Hills Early Learning Center, Inc v Lukhard, 661 F Supp 300, 312-313 (ED Va, 1987), rev’d on other grounds 846 F2d 260 (CA *4534, 1988); State ex rel Pringle v Heritage Baptist, 236 Kan 544; 693 P2d 1163 (1985); Johnson v California State Dep’t of Social Services, 123 Cal App 3d 878; 177 Cal Rptr 49 (1981).
In this instance, we agree with the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, and we conclude that Rule 400.5107(2)(a) may be constitutionally applied to defendants despite the possible burden on religious conduct.
Accordingly, we would affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Riley, C.J., and Levin, J., concurred with Griffin, J.
Boyle, J.
INTRODUCTION
We conclude that a compelling state interest in protecting children in childcare centers from physical and emotional harm justifies the imposition of the licensure requirement. We would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals to the extent it holds compliance with the licensure requirement does not violate the defendants’ constitutional rights under the Free Exercise or the Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, and that the defendants must comply with the regulation prohibiting corporal punishment.
We would vacate that portion of the opinion addressing the program content regulation, finding the rule void on its face because it is overbroad and presents a realistic danger that the rule will compromise First Amendment rights, specifically the freedoms of religion and speech. We would also vacate those portions addressing the program director regulation, finding any issues relating to the *454rule not ripe for review,1 and the financial inspection regulation, finding any issues relating to the rule moot.
i
The Court must determine whether the State of Michigan, Department of Social Services, may constitutionally require the Emmanuel Baptist Church to obtain a license and comply with certain administrative rules in the childcare organization act, 1973 PA 116, in order to operate its preschool and day-care programs,2 or whether the requirement that the defendants comply with the act constitutes a violation of defendants’ rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The defendants’ request for exemption is premised on a sincerely held belief which is asserted as being in conflict with and thus burdened by the state requirement. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d ed), § 14-12, p 1242. The free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed "a substantial burden,” United States v Lee, 455 US 252; 102 S Ct 1051; 71 L Ed 2d 127 (1982), on the observation of a central religious belief or practice; if so, the state will prevail only if a compelling interest justifies the burden. Hernandez v Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 490 US —; 109 S Ct 2136; 104 L Ed 2d 766 (1989).
*455We recognize that "[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.” Hernandez v Comm’r of Internal Revenue, supra, p 786, citing Thomas v Review Bd Ind Employment Security Div, 450 US 707, 716; 101 S Ct 1425; 67 L Ed 2d 624 (1981). The standard for' evaluating free exercise claims has not been consistently articulated by the United States Supreme Court. However, unless an allegation of a burden on a sincerely held religious belief is to automatically require invalidation of a licensing regulation and an entitlement to exemption, a court cannot analyze the purpose or compelling interest of the state without fully addressing the nature and extent of the burden on a claimant’s First Amendment rights.
Thus, we agree fully with Justice Cavanagh’s view that before a court applies the strict scrutiny, compelling state interest, and no less restrictive alternative formulation, the significance of the burden on the activity must be evaluated. Ante, pp 394-395. Lupu, Where rights begin: The problem of burdens on the free exercise of religion, 102 Harv L R 933, 934 (1989).3 In weighing the state’s interest and the claimant’s request for exemption, circumspection is the watch word.4_
*456Two recent controversies resolved by the United States Supreme Court highlight the significance of defining a constitutionally significant cognizable burden upon free exercise. See Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 US 439, 464-465; 108 S Ct 1319; 99 L Ed 2d 534 (1988); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v California Bd of Equalization, 493 US —; 110 S Ct 688; 107 L Ed 2d 796 (1990). In these cases the conclusion that the harms inflicted by the challenged government policies were not the sort that would trigger the protection of the Free Exercise Clause made further constitutional analysis unnecessary. Lupu, supra, p 935.
The extent of the required showing is not clear or articulated the same in each case. What is clear from the analysis employed by the United States Supreme Court in Lyng and Swaggart is that neither Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 205; 92 S Ct 1526; 32 L Ed 2d 15 (1972), nor Sherbert v Verner, 374 US 398; 83 S Ct 1790; 10 L Ed 2d 965 (1963), set the standard for all claims of violation of the free exercise of religion and that the existence of an effect on a sincerely held religious belief does not in and of itself require the state to demonstrate a compelling state interest and no less restrictive alternative.5
*457In Sherbert v Verner, supra, the Court applied traditional strict scrutiny and held that plaintiff’s disqualification for workers’ compensation benefits abridged her right to the free exercise of religion. Although the burden was "indirect,” the ineligibility ruling forced plaintiff to choose between forfeiting benefits or abandoning one of the precepts of her religion. "Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.” Id., p 404. In Wisconsin v Yoder, supra, p 219, the Amish persuasively established a practice which pervaded their mode of life and which "would [have been] gravely endangered] if not destroy[ed],” by the state’s requirement of compulsory formal education after the eighth grade.
Despite the fact that the United States Supreme Court has consistently reiterated the strict scrutiny test, application of the test to situations other than government benefits or the Yoder case suggest distinct, although as yet not fully articulated, methodology. The Court has not employed a mechanistic approach to all free exercise claims and a multifactored balancing process is at work.
When this Court recently addressed the Free Exercise Clause in Sheridan Road Baptist Church v Dep’t of Ed, 426 Mich 462, 486; 396 NW2d 373 *458(1986), cert den 481 US 1050 (1987), the central focus of the plaintiff’s general objection was, as in this case, that licensure itself interfered with the church’s sovereign right to minister.6 Our effort here, as it was then, is to articulate the appropriate method to resolve the claim, stemming from our conviction that Supreme Court precedent does not mandate unvarying application of the strict scrutiny applied in Yoder.7
ii
The conclusion that the United States Supreme Court would apply the Yoder test to the licensing requirement on the record before us ignores the fact that the Court has expressly distinguished Yoder as a case that involved not merely an effect on religious activity, but a compulsion by the state to coerce the plaintiffs to act contrary to their religious beliefs.
The claimant’s showing of sincerity that its religious beliefs are burdened if its organization is required to abide by the state requirements at issue will not always be sufficient unless it can *459also demonstrate a significant burden.8 See Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v Secretary of Labor, 471 US 290; 105 S Ct 1953; 85 L Ed 2d 278 (1985). Thus, initially the inquiry is whether
"[the] government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice . . . .” [Emphasis added. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, supra, 107 L Ed 2d 806, citing Hernandez, supra, 104 L Ed 2d 786.][9]
In addition, even in circumstances in which the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that the claimant’s beliefs are sincere and that the government’s proposed actions would have severe adverse effects on the practice of its religion, "incidental effects of government programs, which may make it more difficult to practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, [do not] require [the] government to bring forward a compelling justification for its otherwise lawful actions.” Lyng, supra, pp 450-451.
*460The defendants’ religious objection to the licensing requirement is not that their religion precludes having a license but, rather, that the "function” of the license implies that the state is sovereign and could withdraw permission for religious activity that is mandated by religious belief.10 Dr. Asire’s testimony carefully focused on his belief that the "function” of licensing is to imply the state’s authority to forbid the day-care ministry.11 He also testified, however, that a parishioner who enrolled a child in a licensed day-care center would not be violating a fundamental tenet of the faith. Defendants’ expert Dr. Rushdoony testified that there was no religious objection to having a driver’s license. Thus, it is not licensure that violates defendants’ belief, but the symbolic significance of the license in relation to the ministry of childcare.12 The state’s guideline precluding the *461use of spanking except with the open palm, by contrast, directly conflicts with and substantially burdens appellant’s belief that to spare the rod is to spoil the child.
In its most recent decision in the free exercise area, Swaggart, supra, the United States Supreme Court reiterated that a regulation neutral on its face may offend the constitutional requirement if it unduly burdens the rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause. Noting the distinction between the sales tax at issue and a flat license tax imposed as a restraint in advance of press and religion, the Court observed that the tax at issue applied to all sales and was not a tax on the right to disseminate religious ideas, information, or beliefs per se. More significantly for the instant case, Justice O’Connor further observed for the unanimous Court:
[B]ecause appellant’s religious beliefs do not forbid payment of the . . . tax, appellant’s reliance on Sherbert v Verner, 374 US 398 (1963), and its progeny is misplaced .... Appellant has never alleged that the mere act of paying the tax, by itself, violates its sincere religious beliefs.
We therefore conclude that the collection and payment of the generally applicable tax in this case imposes no constitutionally significant burden on appellant’s religious practices or beliefs. [Swaggart, supra, 107 L Ed 2d 810-811.]
While we acknowledge the obviously distinct factual context, we observe that licensure, like the *462tax in Swaggart, involves a neutral regulation and a less direct conflict between defendants’ belief and the statute than those established in Sherbert and Yoder. The defendants do not object to licensure because licensure places any restriction on what they may believe or what they may do. Bowen v Roy, 476 US 693; 106 S Ct 2147; 90 L Ed 2d 735 (1986). Licensure, qua licensure, does not force the defendants to choose between a religious duty and enjoyment of government benefits or coerce the defendants to give up their religious beliefs on pain of prosecution.13 Thus, reliance on Yoder and Sherbert for the proposition that the licensure requirement imposes a constitutionally significant burden seems misplaced.14 Ante, p 393.
Were the state, to assert a right to determine *463whether there is a need for defendants’ day-care center, for example, an intrusion into defendants’ evangelical activities analogous to that presented by the corporal punishment guideline would be presented. Having reviewed the record, mindful that " 'First Amendment questions of "constitutional fact” compel [the] Court’s de novo review,’ ”15 we conclude that the requirement of a license in this case does not impose a "constitutionally significant” burden on defendants’ religious practices or beliefs.
Alternatively, assuming the United States Supreme Court would find that licensure, qua licensure, is a constitutionally cognizable burden in these circumstances, we agree with Justice Cavanagh that the burden is clearly not unconstitutional.16 This state recognizes that the governmental interest involved, "the care and protection of *464children, has long been a matter of utmost state concern.”17 See, for example, Fisher v Fisher, 118 Mich App 227, 232; 324 NW2d 582 (1982). Further, should the Court focus on the purpose of the licensure requirement, the same conclusion must be reached.18
*465The defendants concede that the state’s interest in protecting the health and safety of young children "is of the highest order,” but dispute that the state has identified a compelling interest in licensing and regulating day-care facilities or regulating preschool programs. The defendants’ conclusion is based on the fact that, unlike the interest in compulsory education in Yoder, the "state has never asserted an interest in having all children exposed to a preschool/day-care program in order to advance and enhance their social, physical, intellectual, and emotional development.”19 The fact that an activity is mandated by the state is evidence of the state’s interest. But the opposite is not true. The fact that the state has not mandated an activity is not dispositive of the state’s interest in the subject matter.
Finally, while we observe it is difficult to under*466stand how registration which would also function to imply the state’s approval to operate the daycare center is less burdensome than licensure,20 we acknowledge that the "incomprehensibility of a religious belief,” is not a "reason to refuse to accord it the protection of the First Amendment.” Opinion by Justice Cavanagh, ante, p 406. Rather, we point out only that if the burden on the defendants’ free exercise of religion is the power to withdraw approval, and a day-care center can operate only with the state’s approval under either registration or licensure, this argument would admit of no limitation.21
Therefore, on the basis of the minimal and indirect burden the licensure requirement imposes on the defendants’ exercise of religion, and of the substantial state interest in protecting the health and welfare of preschool children being cared for outside their homes and the logical nexus between the interest to be attained and the means of attaining it, or on the basis that there is no less restrictive alternative to satisfy the state’s compelling interest, we would hold that the state may *467constitutionally require the defendants to comply with the licensure requirement of 1973 PA 116.
III. THE REGULATIONS
In addition to the licensing requirement itself, the defendants contend that particular regulations promulgated pursuant to the childcare organization act impinge upon their First Amendment rights. Although the lower courts addressed the merits of this issue, it must first be observed that these regulations have never been applied to the defendants. This presents an additional issue which this Court has a duty to address, that is, whether the condition precedent to the relief sought by the defendants regarding these regulations has been shown.22 Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554; 267 NW2d 72 (1978).
Contrary to the assertions made by the defendants the free exercise claims regarding the regulations are not ripe for review.23 The dss has never brought any action to compel the defendants to comply with the regulations, either in order to be licensed or to prevent revocation of a license.24 *468Thus, there is not an adequate factual record upon which to determine the validity of the claims made by the defendants that the
factual record is too well developed to have any valid basis for conjecture as to the defendants’ "fear of prosecution” arising from the possibility that the plaintiff will deny a license for their failure to comply with Rule 104. By maintaining this action, and by its prior enforcement actions, the plaintiff has provided a "palpable basis” for assuming the license will be revoked.[25] [Opinion of Justice Cavanagh, ante, p 411.]
We are compelled to emphasize that this is not a situation in which the defendants have been denied a license or threatened with revocation of their license unless they comply with the express terms of the regulations. In fact, the defendants themselves informed the dss that they refused to be licensed. Thus, there is no support for the claim that after extensive consultations with the defen*469dants regarding the accreditation aspects of the rule, "[t]he dss refused to provide a license to defendants, in part because they employed program directors who had received degrees from unaccredited schools (and who, as a result, were found not to be in compliance with 1979 AC, R 400.121[3]).” Opinion of Justice Cavanagh, ante, p 408.
In this case when the defendants informed the dss that they refused to be licensed, the state brought an action to prevent them from operating the childcare center without a license and requested the court to declare that the defendants were subject to the childcare act. The state has never brought an action to compel strict compliance with the regulations and, further, although the act provides for exemptions from the regulations, the defendants have made no attempt to secure an exemption from any of the rules.26
Since the state has never applied the regulations and the defendants have never applied for the exemption, there is not a developed factual background against which this Court can intelligently assess the defendants’ claim that any of the regulations place a significant burden on their free exercise of religion, or that the state would not exempt the defendants from the regulations in a manner which would not burden the free exercise *470of their religion. Thus, it is not possible for the Court to determine the validity of the defendants’ claims that compliance with the terms of the regulations involves direct "coercive” burdens on their free exercise of religion.
While a declaratory judgment is intended to provide a broad flexible remedy to make the courts more serviceable to the people, the prudent use of judicial resources requires sufficient pleading and proof to present the court with a defined issue, shaped and sharpened by the adversarial posture of the parties. Here, where both the activity suggested and the reaction to it are merely hypothesized, we would find declaratory relief inappropriate because the decision requested would be purely advisory and the issues are not ripe for review.27 In addition, MCR 2.605, the actual controversy requirement, requires that the Court not decide moot questions in the guise of giving declaratory relief. See McMullen v Secretary of State, 339 Mich 175; 63 NW2d 599 (1954).
A. PROGRAM DIRECTOR
This Court has been asked to determine whether an exemption to the program director requirement is constitutionally mandated because the accreditation limitation in selecting a director places a burden on the defendants’ free exercise of their religious beliefs.28
The defendants believe the accreditation require*471ment directly conflicts with their religious beliefs because the very act of proscribing any standard burdens the defendants’ right to free exercise of religion.29 We do not reach the merits of this issue since we conclude that the defendants’ claim regarding the program director regulation is not ripe for review.
The complaint filed by dss did not seek "inter alia, to enjoin the operation of the preschool until the defendants would supply documentation of the fact that their program directors complied with Rule 104 in conformity with its interpretation of the predecessor regulation, R 400.121(3). ”30 Opinion of Justice Cavanagh, ante, p 409. Further, there is nothing in the record which supports the conclusions that the credentials of defendant’s current program director were the occasion for the state’s requested injunctive action, or that the state will force defendants to cease operations if at some future time they hire a director whose credentials are not as expressly required under Rule 104.31
*472There is no evidence that if defendants decided to comply with the licensure requirement, that the state would deny them a license on the basis that the program director did not attend an accredited college or university.32 The regulation simply reflects the state’s intention to guard against the risk of operating a childcare center under the guidance of an unqualified individual, and Rule 400.5118(1), which provides for exemptions if used by the defendant, provides a method of avoiding any burden imposed by the rule.33
B. FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE
MCL 722.115(1); MSA 25.358(15X1) requires the dss to investigate the financial responsibility of an applicant for a childcare center license. We agree with the Court of Appeals that there is a lack of *473evidence in the record to show an actual infringement upon the free exercise of defendants’ religion resulting from the enforcement of this regulation in 1974. Therefore, we find that the defendants’ claims that their rights of freedom of religion and freedom of association have been violated by the mere existence of the regulation relating to financial disclosure are not ripe for review.34
Further, since the requirement for applicants to submit a financial statement was discontinued by a policy memorandum issued on September 10, 1974, we also find that the issue is moot.35 We do not agree with Justice Griffin’s conclusion that the "potential, alone, for such inspection to occur in the future is a sufficient burden to chill defendants’ decision-making process for their religiously based programs.”36 Ante, p 450.
Further, Catholic Bishop of Chicago v NLRB, 559 F2d 1112 (CA 7, 1977), aff’d 440 US 490; 99 S Ct 1313; 59 L Ed 2d 533 (1979), does not provide any authority for the conclusion that the claimant need only make a showing of a remote possibility of a conflict with the religious clauses of the First *474Amendment to demonstrate a sufficient burden. In NLRB, the court addressed charges that had actually been filed, thus providing the necessary factual background against which the church’s claims could be assessed.37 See Tribe, supra, § 14-11, p 1230.
In any event, the requirement for applicants to submit a financial statement has been discontinued, and thus, the defendants’ challenge to this regulation is moot.
C. PROGRAM CONTENT
Although we have found the program director and financial disclosure requirements inappropriate subjects for declaratory action, we consider defendants’ facial challenge to the regulation regarding program content ripe for review and hold it constitutionally invalid.38
The defendants claim that Rule 400.5106(l)(c), *475concerning "positive self-concept” is unconstitutional on its face, has the potential as applied to the religious ministry of the defendants to impose a significant burden on the defendants’ free exercise of religion, and is unconstitutionally vague.39 While we would conclude that the question regarding application of the rule is not ripe for review, we agree with Justice Cavanagh that whether the regulation is void on its face can be addressed prior to enforcement.40 Ante, p 419.
While Justice Cavanagh concludes that Rule 106 is unconstitutionally " 'overbroad, impinging on First Amendment freedoms,’ ”41 and further that "[t]he overbreadth doctrine provides an independent, and wholly distinct, ground for deciding *476that Rule 106 is unconstitutionally vague,”42 we do not reach the issue whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague since we find that it is void under the overbreadth doctrine.43 Ante, p 422.
A statute will be considered unconstitutionally overbroad when it is written so broadly that there is a realistic danger the statute will compromise recognized First Amendment rights not before the Court.44 The record supports the defendants’ asser*477tion that the rule would allow the state to determine what type of religious doctrine may appropriately be taught to preschool children and may compromise the defendants’ freedoms of speech and religion.45 Thus, we would hold that the program content rule is unconstitutional on its face because it is overbroad, and, as such, may not be applied to the defendants.
IV. ESTABLISHMENT clause
Throughout the proceedings, the defendants have contended that the licensing requirements of 1973 PA 116 and the administrative rules promulgated thereunder violate the defendants’ rights guaranteed by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. However, while we recognize that the violation of the Establishment Clause does not require a coercive act on the part of the state, in this case the licensing and regulations at issue do not constitute impermissible state involvement with the defendants’ religious ministry, nor impermissible excessive government entanglement with religion.46 Lemon v Kurtzman, 403 US 602; 91 S Ct 2105; 29 L Ed 2d 745 (1971).
*478CONCLUSION
The dss may constitutionally require the defendants to comply with the licensure requirements of the childcare organization act, MCL 722.111 et seq.; MSA 25.358(11) et seq., and certain administrative rules promulgated thereunder, in order to operate the preschool and day-care programs. Li-censure and regulation are part of a neutral legislative scheme providing minimum standards to protect young children in care outside their own homes.
We would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals that defendants are required to operate a licensed day-care center and to comply with the regulation prohibiting the use of corporal punishment. We would vacate those portions of the opinion addressing the regulations regarding program director qualifications, financial inspection, and program content.
Brickley, J., concurred with Boyle, J.

 Recently the United States Supreme Court reiterated that
'[a] regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, *431nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.” Wisconsin v Yoder, 406 US 205, 220 (1972). Our cases have established that "[t]he free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the burden.” Hernandez v Commissioner, 490 US — [109 S Ct 2136; 104 L Ed 2d 766] (1989) (citations omitted). [Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v California Bd of Equalization, 493 US —, —; 110 S Ct 688; 107 L Ed 2d 796, 806 (1990).]
We concur with Justice Cavanagh’s reasoning that the so-called "objective” analysis of burdens proposed by the dissent is not warranted by either existing precedent or the present circumstances. We share his views regarding the reach and meaning of Lyng v Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 US 439; 108 S Ct 1319; 99 L Ed 2d 534 (1988). Ante, pp 393-400. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that differences concerning the meaning of Lyng, have developed in the federal courts of appeal. For example, cf. United States v Means, 858 F2d 404 (CA 8, 1988), cert den 492 US —; 109 S Ct 3227; 106 L Ed 2d 575 (1989), Yonkers Racing Corp v City of Yonkers, 858 F2d 855 (CA 2, 1988), cert den 489 US 1077; 109 S Ct 1527; 103 L Ed 2d 833 (1989), and Messiah Baptist Church v Jefferson Co, 859 F2d 820 (CA 10, 1988), cert den 490 US 1005; 109 S Ct 1638; 104 L Ed 2d 154 (1989).

 In Wisconsin v Yoder, supra, traditional work was accepted as part of the religious activity of the Amish. The Court noted that the State of Wisconsin did not contest "the claim that the Amish mode of life and education is inseparable of their religion — indeed, as much a part of their religious belief and practices as baptism, the confessional, or a sabbath may be for others.” See also State v Heart Ministries, Inc, 227 Kan 244, 253-254; 607 P2d 1102 (1980); New Jersey State Bd of Higher Ed v Bd of Directors of Shelton College, 90 NJ 470, 481-483; 448 A2d 988 (1982); Roloff Evangelistic Enterprises, Inc v State, 556 SW2d 856 (Tex Civ App, 1977), app dis 439 US 803 (1978), reh den 439 US 998 (1978).

 Several courts have concluded that a church’s exercise of religious beliefs is not burdened by such a licensing requirement, e.g. see Roloff Evangelistic Enterprises v State, n 2 supra, p 859; State v Fayetteville Street Christian School, 42 NC App 665; 258 SE2d 459 (1979); vacated on different issue 299 NC 351; 261 SE2d 908 (1980), On Rehearing 299 NC 731; 265 SE2d 387 (1980), app dis 449 US 807 (1980).

 The act provides that a license shall be issued only if the dss is "satisfied as to the need” for a childcare organization. MCL 722.115(1); MSA 25.358(15)(1).
Mr. Gazan, witness for the dss, testified at trial that the department had no criteria by which it evaluated "need.” See Cantwell, supra at 305, where in considering a free exercise of religion claim, the United States Supreme Court struck down a licensing requirement after focusing on the discretionary power left to a government official to grant or withhold the license.

 In a later edition of his treatise, Professor Tribe suggests that post- Yoder decisions have reduced the burden of persuasion imposed upon the state. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d ed), pp 1260 ff.

 The state questions the doctrinal consistency of accepting state authority to license in the fire and safety areas, but rejecting the authority of the state to license the activity which is the ministry itself. But "[defendant] drew a line, and it is not for [the court] to say that the line [it] drew was an unreasonable one. Courts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs . . . .” Thomas v Review Bd Ind Employment Security Div, 450 US 707, 715; 101 S Ct 1425; 67 L Ed 2d 624 (1981).

 In Yoder, the Court exempted members of the Amish faith from the state’s requirement of compulsory secondary school attendance until age sixteen.

 Moreover, the state’s witness, Mr. Gazan, testified that seventy-five to eighty percent of the license applicants are in fact issued licenses. He stated that the remainder of the applicants withdraw their applications of their own accord. In other words, no significant *440prescreening occurs which would indicate that the licensing scheme is essential to the state’s ability to weed out unfit day-care centers and protect the health and welfare of children. However, such a rational basis analysis is not a sufficient standard in this free exercise case. See Sherbert v Verner, 374 US 398, 406; 83 S Ct 1790; 10 L Ed 2d 965 (1963), and Yoder, supra, p 215.

 We find it instructive that the concept of licensing or the exercise by government of approval power over religious schools has been struck down by courts in several other states. For example, see Kentucky State Bd for Elementary & Secondary Ed v Rudasill, 589 *441SW2d 877 (Ky, 1979), cert den 446 US 938 (1980) (a state regulatory scheme imposed on private religious schools was found to be violative of the state’s constitution); State v Whisner, 47 Ohio St 2d 181; 351 NE2d 750 (1976) (state imposition of "minimum standards” on private church schools was held to be unconstitutional as violative of both the Free Exercise Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); State v LaBarge, 134 Vt 276; 357 A2d 121 (1976) (parents were held not to be subject to truancy violations for sending their children to a private Christian school which was not "approved”); Forest Hills Early Learning Center, Inc v Grace Baptist Church, 846 F2d 260 (CA 4, 1988) (a state’s statutory exemption of church operated childcare centers from licensing regulations was held not to offend the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment).
Moreover, evidence introduced at trial included reference to statutes of other states which have accommodated religious organizations with respect to licensing childcare facilities. See, e.g., Ala Code, § 38-7-3; 111 Pub Act 82-982; Ind Code Ann, § 12-3-2-12.7; La Rev Stat Ann, §46.1404; Miss Code Ann, §43-14-9; Mo Rev Stat, §210.516(5); NC Gen Stat, § 131D-10.4(1); SC Code, §§ 20-7-2700, 2900-2990; Va Code, § 63.1-196.3.

 In an article entitled State regulation of social services ministries of religious organizations, 16 Valparaiso ULR 1, 27-28 (1981), Professor Esbeck has advanced a regulatory scheme for childcare centers based on a registration system. The scheme would accommodate the religious tenets of a church-run center while requiring periodic safety and health inspections by the state. Such a proposal suggests the availability to the state of a less restrictive means for protecting its legitimate interests.

 Disposition on this basis would make it unnecessary to address the claim that licensing creates a potential for excessive government entanglement in church affairs in violation of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.

 In this appeal the dss has not argued that we should avoid reaching the merits on the ground of lack of ripeness. To the extent that focus upon the ripeness issue is nevertheless justified, we join in the analysis and views expressed by Justice Cavanagh. Ante, pp 409-413.

 In its brief on appeal, defendants also contend that Rule 400.5107(2)(c), which prohibits "[ijnflicting mental or emotional punishment, such as humiliating, shaming or threatening a child,” is unconstitutionally vague. Defendants failed to raise this claim in the trial court, the Court of Appeals, or in their application for leave to appeal in this Court. The record has thus not been developed regarding this issue, and we decline to address it. The issue has not been properly preserved. See Napier v Jacobs, 429 Mich 222, 227; 414 NW2d 862 (1987).

 MCL 722.112; MSA 25.358(12) provides in pertinent part:
(1) The department of social services ... is responsible for the development of rules for the care and protection of children in organizations covered by this act and for the promulgation of these rules ....
(3) The rules promulgated under this act shall be restricted to:
(c) The general financial ability and competence of applicants to provide necessary care for children and to maintain prescribed standards.
Further, MCL 722.115(1); MSA 25.358(15)(1) makes the granting of a license to a childcare organization dependent upon dss satisfaction as to the "financial stability” of the organization.

 We would note, however, that Pastor Harold Asiré testified at trial that he did not recall corporal punishment being administered at the preschool more than "half a dozen times in those whole eight years [since the start of the preschool].”

 The dss issued an interpretative guideline for Rule 400.5107(2)(a) on May 19, 1980, which permitted the use of spanking with the open hand in childcare centers under certain conditions. The guideline was rescinded on December 18,1986.

 The dss never has brought action to compel the defendants to comply with the express terms of the regulations in order to be licensed or to revoke the defendants’ license for failure to comply with any of the regulations, thus subjecting them to possible criminal prosecution.

 The preschool and day-care programs do not meet the exemption criteria for religious organizations in the childcare organization act, as amended by 1980 PA 510, MCL 722.111(e)(i); MSA 25.358(ll)(e)(i), because the programs operate for longer than three hours a day.

 While Professor Lupu criticizes the prevailing judicial definitions of burden, fearing the creation of an intolerable risk of discrimination against unconventional religious practices and beliefs and threatens to narrow the protection of religious liberty overall, he recognizes this is the manner in which such claims are addressed in recent cases by the Supreme Court. Id., p 936.

 Professor Tribe also observes in Supreme Court holdings "a recurring polarity” between
those government measures (1) that put an individual to a choice between adherence to religious duties and enjoyment of government benefits . . . and (2) those government measures *456that are not triggered by the religious choice in question but burden religious activity only in a manner ancillary to an undeniable secular choice. Rules in the first category are subject to higher scrutiny. . . .
In contrast, rules in the second category, although they do have an incidental effect of burdening religiously motivated choices, are neither cast in terms of religious faith nor triggered by religiously motivated choices. ... In this second category, there is more room for courts to balance the state’s interests against the religious adherents’ interest without imposing on the state a burden of proving that granting exemptions would sacrifice a crucial state policy. [Tribe, supra, § 14-13, pp 1262-1263.]

 In addition, as we observed in Sheridan Road Baptist Church v *457Dep’t of Ed, 426 Mich 462, 486; 396 NW2d 373 (1986), and as Professor Tribe has explained:
[Previous cases required the state to show that it was pursuing a compelling interest, narrowly defined, and that an exemption would defeat that interest; [United States v Lee, 455 US 252; 102 S Ct 1051; 71 L Ed 2d 127 (1982)] seems to require the state to show only that it is pursuing a compelling interest, broadly defined, and that an exemption would "unduly interfere” with the interest. [Tribe, supra, § 14-13, pp 1261-1262.]
See also note, Burdens on the free exercise of religion: A subjective alternative, 102 Harv L R 1258 (1989).

 In Sheridan Road, this Court considered whether a statute requiring nonpublic school teachers to be certified was constitutional. An equally divided Court affirmed the holding of the Court of Appeals that the certification requirement violated neither the Free Exercise nor the Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The plurality position concluded the burden on the plaintiff’s religious beliefs to be minimal or, as we noted in the concurrence, "indirect and minimal” in relationship to the state’s paramount interest in education. Alternatively, the opinion of Justice Riley, joined by Justice Cavanagh and Justice Levin, indicated that any burden on free exercise could only be justified by a showing on the part of the state that the regulation in question was not only essential in order to fulfill its interest in education, but that no less burdensome alternatives existed.

 There is no talisman for resolution of free exercise claims and that "[t]he difficulty in articulating a standard . . . pales considerably in comparison to the difficulty encountered in the application of the standard.” Sheridan Road, pp 489-490.

 For example, a state’s refusal to award unemployment benefits was held to violate the First Amendment where a worker was discharged for refusing to work on her sabbath. Hobbie v Unemployment Appeals Comm of Florida, 480 US 136; 107 S Ct 1046; 94 L Ed 2d 190 (1987).

 Admittedly, facially neutral legislation may give rise to a burden on religion if it forces individuals to choose between abandoning their religious beliefs or sacrificing an important government benefit. See New Jersey State Bd of Higher Ed v Shelton College Bd of Directors, 90 NJ 470; 448 A2d 988 (1982).
The New Jersey court determined the statute, which prohibited the conferring of degrees or the furnishing of instruction for that purpose except by licensed institutions, did require the defendant to choose between a tenet of its religion and the privilege of conferring baccalaureate degrees. However, the court concluded that although the licensing statutes as applied to Shelton College imposed some burden on the exercise of religion, and as such the defendant’s freedom of religion could suffer from this legislation the constitutional balance nonetheless favored the state interest in uniform application of higher laws. Id., pp 482-483.

 Dr. Asiré, the pastor and administrator of the school, testified he did not consider it to be against the fundamental tenets of the Baptist fundamentalist faith to enroll a child in a licensed day-care center. He also noted that whether a child should be placed in a day-care center licensed by the dss was a decision to be made by the individual parent.

 The defendants have shown that they abhor licensure as a general proposition, and assert that the operation of the preschool is a religious ministry, that "it is the function of a license that causes the religious objection.” However, the defendants have not shown that it violates the tenets of their faith to obtain a license, nor have the defendants presented evidence that the dss has ever attempted to regulate the religious program or suppress the exercise of religious beliefs at the preschool. In sum, the burden in this case is the result of a rule that is as Professor Tribe has stated:
[A]n incidental effect of burdening religiously motivated choices, are neither cast in terms of religious faith nor triggered by religiously motivated choices. [Tribe, supra, § 14-13, p 1263.]

 Similar facts have led other courts to an opposite conclusion, State ex rel Pringle v Heritage Baptist Temple, Inc, 236 Kan 544; 693 P2d 1163 (1985). In Heritage Baptist, the reviewing court upheld the trial court’s finding that defendant’s genuine belief that it should maintain a day-care center was not a religious belief, based on the *461lower court’s findings that Heritage Baptist Temple, Inc., had been licensed for nine years, the change in the church’s position coincided with changes the new minister had initiated, and the existence of the childcare center was in part based on economic necessity. Additionally, the court noted that the church was unable to show that independent Baptist doctrine mandated all churches to have day-care centers. Id., p 547.

 In no sense has the state conditioned receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or denied such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, or thereby putting pressure on the defendants to modify their behavior or violate their beliefs. See Hobbie v Unemployment Appeals Comm of Florida, 480 US 136, 141; 107 S Ct 1046; 94 L Ed 2d 190 (1987), citing Thomas v Review Bd Ind Employment Security Div, supra, pp 717-718.

 There is no support in the record for the statement that the licensing law requires a church applicant to violate its religious beliefs by obtaining the license. Opinion of Justice Cavanagh, ante, p 399.
In fact, there are no cases in which the courts have found that a licensing requirement similar to that at issue in this case is a violation per se of the free exercise of religion, and that consistently, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the state’s power to regulate secular activities of religious organizations extends to private, religious schools. Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510, 534; 45 S Ct 571; 69 L Ed 1070 (1925).
Further, on appeal, the United States Supreme Court and state supreme courts have upheld lower courts’ decisions enforcing licensing requirements for day-care and residential childcare centers. See Heritage Baptist, n 12 supra; Kansas v Heart Ministries, Inc, 227 Kan 244; 607 P2d 1102 (1980); Texas v Corpus Christi People’s Baptist Church, Inc, 683 SW2d 692 (Tex, 1984); Roloff Evangelistic Enterprises, Inc v State, 556 SW2d 856 (Tex Civ App, 1977). In Heart Ministries, Corpus Christi, and Roloff, the United States Supreme Court dismissed appeals for want of a substantial federal question, which, unlike a denial of a petition for writ of certiorari, is a ruling on the merits of the case. Hicks v Mirandez, 422 US 332, 343-344; 95 S Ct 2281; 45 L Ed 2d 223 (1975).

 New Life Baptist Church Academy v East Longmeadow, 885 F2d 940, 941 (CA 1, 1989), cert den 494 US —, citing Rosenbloom v Metromedia, Inc, 403 US 29, 54; 91 S Ct 1811; 29 L Ed 2d 296 (1971).

 See United States v Lee, supra, p 259. In Lee, the Court stated that "[t]he state may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest.” Id., pp 257-258. See also Tribe, supra, § 14-13, p 1262. Another commentator describes the balancing process as follows:
In balancing the interests the court must first determine the degree of burden on the religious practice. Then, in assessing the state’s interest, the court will have to determine the importance of the secular interest and the extent to which that interest would be impaired by an exemption for the religious practice. If the state interest is truly compelling, there will be no requirement that the state diminish the effectiveness of its regulation by granting the exemption. However, if the state could achieve its goal as well by a means which would not burden the religious practice, it will be required to adopt the alternative means. If the state’s interest is of a lesser magnitude it will be required to grant the exemption and accept a less effective means of fulfilling its goal. [Nowak, Rotunda & Young, Constitutional Law (3d ed), § 17.6, p 1069. Emphasis added.]

 If the exemption were granted, the result could be substantial deregulation of childcare centers. There are approximately 2,300 childcare centers in the State of Michigan with approximately 120,000 children in care. Nearly twenty percent of these childcare centers are operated by churches. Thus, 24,000 children might be affected. As noted during the trial, there are major risks to preschool age childem in day care:
(1) The more obvious catastrophic risks relating to fire, improper sanitation and improper building construction;
(2) Risks deriving from the location of the childcare facility, including environmental hazards such as traffic and pollution;
(3) Risks associated with plant operation, including lighting, heating and ventilation;
(4) Risks arising from insufficient staff;
(5) Risks related to the lack of character or qualifications of staff to carry out their responsibilities;
(6) Risks relating to improper nutritious care of the children while in day-care facilities;
(7) Risks related to the health of the staff and children under their care;
(8) Risks related to the lack of proper planning, “especially in relation to active and passive play and the imbalance of activity and rest”;
(9) Risks of "child abuse, including excessively severe disciplinary practices”;
(10) Risks related to "insufficient and improper equipment and toys, including those which are hazardous and inappropriate to the ages of the children”;
(11) Operational risks, "including the reception of sick children . . . the improper release of children and the transportation of children.”

 One of the concerns prior to passage of the act was that agencies were being given regular licenses although they had not proven they could adequately care for children. House Legislative Analysis, HB 4321, May 7,1973.
It is unnecessary that the state produce evidence of harm to the health or welfare of those children attending the defendants’ preschool/day-care program in order to justify the denial of a religious exemption from the licensing requirement. Justice Griffin, ante, pp 438-439. We note that the deficiencies of an alternative to licensure, *465or an exemption from licensure entirely, would be discovered only after the damage had occurred — harm to the health and welfare of preschool children.
As Chief Justice Williams observed in Sheridan Road, when addressing standardized testing of private school students as a proposed less restrictive alternative to the requirement of certification for teachers in nonpublic schools:
We are also satisfied that there is no less intrusive method by which the state could satisfy its interest in the education of its citizens. The only alternative which has been proposed is standardized testing of private school students. This is an inadequate substitute because deficiencies in teaching would be discovered only after the damage has occurred. State v Shaver, 294 NW2d 883 (ND, 1980). Further, we are not persuaded that testing would guarantee less intrusion by the state into the functioning of the private schools. See, e.g., [State v Rivinius, 328 NW2d 220, 229 (ND, 1982)]. [Sheridan Road, supra, p 484.]

 For example, the state has never asserted an interest in having all people over seventy years of age exposed to nursing home day-care programs. It is difficult to imagine, however, that the state would not have a compelling interest in a licensure requirement for nursing homes. Thus, it is simply a non sequitur to define the nature of the state’s interest in terms of whether the state itself has affirmatively been involved in supplying the services sought to be regulated.

 The alternative to licensure offered by the defendants is a registration program, similar to that allowed for family day-care centers, where six or less children are cared for at any one time. Under the registration program, a home day-care center can begin operation after notification of the state of the intention to do so, and within a ninety-day period the state will conduct an inspection of the home. The state can take action in the event it finds the home is not providing the services in a manner that guarantees the health and safety of the children by revoking or refusing to renew a certificate of registration. MCL 722.115, 722.121; MSA 25.358(15), 25.358(21).

 The registration requirement undeniably involves and implicates the defendants, at least to a degree, in the very process to which it objects, i.e., the defendants will have to obtain the state’s approval for the day-care center and the conditions of the center even if it were registered rather than licensed.
Further, the defendants, while asserting that registration is less intrusive, have not concluded that registration is acceptable, but only that the "registration program there is much closer to an arrangement which would be an acceptable arrangement.” (Emphasis added.)

 The defendants have anticipated this concern and have addressed the issue in their brief.

 Justice Cavanagh incorrectly concludes the challenged agency action in Detroit Base Coalition for Human Rights of the Handicapped v DSS, 431 Mich 172; 428 NW2d 335 (1988), was the intention of the dss to implement telephone hearing procedures. Ante, p 410, n 42. However, the action challenged was the failure of the agency to follow "the notice and public-hearing requirements of §§ 41 and 42 of the apa before issuing the directive mandating the telephone hearings.” Coalition for Human Rights, p 191. This Court determined the challenge to the new procedures was not speculative or without a factual basis, which is why we determined that the parties had standing to contest the implementation of a rule without following correct procedures. The issue was not whether the claim was ripe for review, and the analysis employed in that case has no application to the present case.

 Initially, the defendants informed the dss that they no longer wished to be licensed. Subsequent to this decision, the dss sought *468injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent the defendants from operating an unlicensed childcare center and to declare the defendants subject to the requirements of the childcare organization act pertaining to the licensing of childcare centers. In response to the action taken by dss, the defendants sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of both the licensure requirement of 1973 PA 116 and certain regulations promulgated thereunder.

 In Clements v Fashing, 457 US 957, 962; 102 S Ct 2836; 73 L Ed 2d 508 (1982), the Court addressed a situation in which the performance of the challenged action automatically triggered sanctions unlike the present case. See opinion of Justice Cavanagh ante, p 410, n 43.
While it is true that one does not have to expose oneself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge the statute, persons having no fear of prosecution except those that are imaginary or speculative are not accepted as appropriate' plaintiffs. See Steffel v Thompson, 415 US 452, 459; 94 S Ct 1209; 39 L Ed 2d 505 (1974); Younger v Harris, 401 US 37, 42; 91 S Ct 746; 27 L Ed 2d 669 (1971); Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 US 102, 138; 95 S Ct 335; 42 L Ed 2d 320 (1974); Pacific Gas & Electric Co v State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Comm, 461 US 190; 103 S Ct 1713; 75 L Ed 2d 752 (1983).

 1980 AACS, R 400.5118(1) provides:
Upon written request of an applicant or licensee, the department may grant an exemption from an administrative rule if there is clear and convincing evidence that the alternative to the rule complies with the intent of the administrative rule from which exemption is sought.
Contrary to Justice Cavanagh’s conclusion, I believe that there is an adequate administrative alternative to challenging the constitutionality of all the rules, including 1980 AACS, R 400.5104. Ante, pp 415-417.

 We do not include the cases noted in Justice Cavanagh’s opinion, p 412, n 47, in the context of our discussion of why defendants’ claims regarding the regulations are unripe because we find that, aside from the fact that they involve declaratory judgment actions, the holdings and discussion are simply not significant to resolution of the questions in the case now before this Court.

 1980 AACS, R 400.5104(2)(a) provides that a childcare center "program director shall have completed a minimum of 60 semester hours of credit at an accredited college or university.”

 The trial court held Rule 400.5104(2) usurps the defendants’ prerogative to select staff for the ministerial program and thus prevents the defendants from selecting a director from a college that holds beliefs compatible with theirs and concluded that application of the regulation to be an impermissible burden on the defendants’ free exercise of religion.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, finding the rule posed a constitutionally insignificant burden on the defendants’ free exercise of religion.

 There is no factual basis for this conclusion. In fact, the complaint only contains information that following an inspection of the defendants’ day-care center, on November 29, 1978, the defendants were found to be in violation of the act due to the failure, in part,
[t]o provide documentation to establish that the center was in compliance with Administrative Rule R 400.121(3) requiring the director or person in charge of a day care center to have a minimum of two years of study at the college level.
The wording of the complaint does not even mention anything regarding an accredited university, only that the defendants must at least supply some information regarding the director’s qualifications.

 As support for the conclusion that defendants claim is ripe for *472review, Justice Cavanagh notes:
The result of granting the state’s prayer for declaratory relief would be that the court could immediately order, pursuant to this litigation, that the defendants cease operation of their preschool until such time as they comply with Rule 104.
Therefore, the result of the plaintiff’s filing of these proceedings is that defendants face a real and immediate threat of irreparable injury to the constitutional rights they alleged (in their answer to plaintiff’s complaint) to be infringed by Rule 104. [Ante, p 409.]

 Further, there is no basis for the conclusion or assumption that the state will prevent the defendants from selecting a director from a college that holds beliefs compatible with their beliefs.

 The evidence also makes clear that the dss has sought to accommodate certain fundamental Christian groups in regard to this requirement. First, the dss would determine whether the college in question is accredited by a list of accrediting agencies, including the American Association of Bible Colleges. Second, if the first step fails, the dss would determine whether any of the state colleges or universities in Michigan would accept credits from the college in question on a transfer basis. Third, if the second step fails, the dss would determine whether any of the state colleges or universities from the state where the college in question is located would accept credits from a college on a transfer basis.

 On August 8, 1974, the defendants completed the financial statement of the dss as part of the application for a license to operate the preschool as a childcare center. At no time have the defendants claimed that complying with the requirement itself infringed upon the free exercise of religion, nor have the defendants shown that the potential for an inspection in the future creates excessive administrative entanglement.

 The defendants assert that there is a potential for an inspection to occur because even though the dss has indicated that the financial records of the defendants will not be investigated, the statutory provision remains in effect.

 Nor do we agree with Justice Cavanagh’s conclusion that "defendants’ claims regarding the financial disclosure provisions were timely raised below and are justiciable now” and thus this situation constitutes an exception to the mootness doctrine. Ante, p 425.
The cases cited in the opinion are inapplicable to the facts presented in the present case. In these cases the challenged regulation was withdrawn or repealed during litigation. See United States v W T Grant Co, 345 US 629; 73 S Ct 894; 97 L Ed 1303 (1953); Los Angeles v Lyons, 461 US 95; 103 S Ct 1660; 75 L Ed 2d 675 (1983).

 The summary in one of the briefs is as follows:
Three unfair labor practices charges have been filed with respect to the very schools involved in this case. In Case No. 25 — CA—7932—3 filed May 7, 1976, with NLRB Region 25, Indianapolis, Indiana, for example, the Union charged that the Diocese committed an unfair labor practice when it refused to offer a teacher a contract. The Diocese responded that the teacher’s contract was not renewed because inter alia she exposed biology students to sexual theories of Masters and Johnson that were contrary to the teachings of the Catholic Church. In Case No. 25 — CA—7932, filed May 4, 1976, with NLRB Region 25, Indianapolis, Indiana, to cite another example, a similar charge was filed because the Diocese refused to renew a teaching contract. The Diocese responded that the teacher’s contract was not renewed because the teacher married a divorced Catholic and was no longer in good standing with the Church. [NLRB, supra, p 1125.]

 The childcare organization act authorizes the nss to promulgate rules regarding "programs ... to assure the healthy physical, emotional, and mental development of children served.” MCL 722.112(3) (f); MSA 25.358(12)(3)(f). More specifically, under 1980 AACS, R 400.5106(1) a childcare center,
*475[sjhall provide a program of daily activities ... in the following areas:
(a) Physical development, including large and small muscles.
(b) Social development, including communication skills.
(c) Emotional development, including positive self-concept.
(d) Intellectual development.

 The Court of Appeals rejected the defendants’ claim that the program rules were unconstitutionally vague, holding that Rule 400.5106(l)(c) was not contrary to the defendants’ religious beliefs and only provided for the way children are to be handled, i.e., whether they are to be subjected to belittlement or demeaned by adults or made to feel inferior to other children. The panel concluded the defendants’ concerns were about the potential for abuse in the "positive self-concept” rule and had failed to show any actual infringement, refusing to invalidate a statutory scheme merely because it might be subject to an unconstitutional interpretation. DSS v Emmanuel Baptist Preschool, 150 Mich App 254, 274-275; 388 NW2d 326 (1986).

 When a law is attacked facially on the grounds it is constitutionally overbroad, a claimant may successfully challenge a statute without the Court addressing the claimant’s particular concerns. Justice Cavanagh declines to address the defendants’ concern that the program content regulation imposes an impermissible burden of the free exercise of their religion, instead finding that the vagueness of the regulation threatens the constitutionally protected freedoms of speech and association.

 In this case the defendants do not claim that the regulation that childcare centers provide programs which assure healthy "emotional development, including positive self-concept,” is unconstitutional in every conceivable application.

 It is true that where a statute abuts the sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms the considerations which support the overbreadth doctrine may merge with those underlying a vagueness analysis. See Kolender v Lawson, 461 US 352, 359; 103 S Ct 1855; 75 L Ed 2d 903 (1983).
However, it is not clear whether the expanded scrutiny of a statute suggested in Kolender necessarily applies when facial challenges under the religion clauses are at issue, or is limited to laws which might "chill” rights to expression protected by the First Amendment. Blackwelder v Safnauer, 689 F Supp 106, 126, n 19 (ND NY, 1988), citing Kolender, 461 US 358, n 8.
In Kolender the United States Supreme Court held a loitering statute unconstitutionally vague on its face. The Court recognized that facial challenges to laws are permitted if a law reaches a "substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct,” seeming to reject the requirement that a statute must be found vague in all of its possible applications. See also Keyishian v Bd of Regents of the State Univ of New York, 385 US 589, 609; 87 S Ct 675; 17 L Ed 2d 629 (1967).

 Whether a statute is unconstitutional on its face can be determined on grounds either of vagueness or overbreadth, two closely related doctrines which are particularly important in dealing with free speech issues. Nowak, Rotunda & Young, Constitutional Law (3d ed), § 16.8, p 840. In addressing defendants’ facial challenges of the rules, we would first determine whether the enactment of the program content regulation reaches a "substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct,” and, if so, the facial vagueness challenge need not be addressed. See Village of Hoffman Estates v The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc, 455 US 489, 494; 102 S Ct 1186; 71 L Ed 2d 362 (1982); Boos v Barry, 485 US 312; 108 S Ct 1157, 1168; 99 L Ed 2d 333 (1988).

 Members of City Council v Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 US 789, 796-801; 104 S Ct 2118; 80 L Ed 2d 772 (1984).

 We find that the rule that their center includes activities which provide for a preschooler’s "emotional development, including a positive self-concept” could give the state the right to determine what religious doctrine may appropriately be taught to the children at the center. Further, it is not mere speculation to fear that the state will interfere with defendants’ religious program, since a consultant who inspected the school twice felt compelled to comment on the religious nature of the program.

 The Court of Appeals held that this case presented no Establishment Clause issue because that clause is only violated by aid to or sponsorship of religion. It has been argued, though, that an act as applied to a religious group can create excessive church-state entan*478glement, thus permitting a religious organization to use the Establishment Clause, like the Free Exercise Clause, as a shield from government intrusion. See NLRB, supra.