Court Opinion

ID: 9662851
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:19:59.485207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:43.281307
License: Public Domain

SUE WALKER, Justice,
dissenting.
I. Introduction
I respectfully dissent. Because the federal courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over Appellant Vernon F. Minton’s legal malpractice suit against Appellees Jerry W. Gunn, individually; Williams Squire & Wren, LLP; James E. Wren, individually; Slusser & Frost, L.L.P.; William C. Slus-ser, individually; Slusser Wilson & Partridge, L.L.P.; and Michael E. Wilson, individually, I would grant Minton’s motion to dismiss, vacate the trial court’s order granting summary judgment for Appellees, and remand the case to the trial court for disposition in accordance with this opinion.
II. FACTS
A. Minton’s Patent Infringement Suit in Federal Court
In the underlying litigation giving rise to Minton’s legal malpractice claim, Minton sued NASD and NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc. in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas for patent infringement.1 The federal trial court granted NASD and NASDAQ’s “Motion for Summary Judgment that [the '643 Patent] is Invalid under the ‘On Sale’ Bar Provision of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).” See 35 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (West 2001). The trial court granted summary judgment for NASD and NASDAQ based on the on sale bar rule, and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment. See Minton v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 336 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed.Cir.2003).
B. Minton’s Legal Malpractice Suit in State Court
Minton subsequently filed a legal malpractice suit in state court; his original petition asserted that Appellees, his attorneys in the underlying federal patent infringement suit, negligently did not plead or brief the experimental use exception to the on sale bar rule in an amended petition, in Minton’s summary judgment response, or in the response to the trial court’s request for briefing. These allegations are the sole basis for Minton’s legal malpractice suit; he pleaded that Appel-lees owed a duty to represent him in his patent infringement suit within the applicable standard of care and that they breached their duty to him by “[flailing to *716timely plead and brief the experimental use defense.”
Appellees filed two joint combined traditional and no-evidence motions for summary judgment in Minton’s state legal malpractice action asserting that “the record establishes as a matter of law that Defendants’ conduct did not proximately cause Minton’s alleged damages because Minton would not have been able to successfully defeat the on sale bar either at the summary judgment stage or at trial.” The trial court granted both Appellees’ joint motions for summary judgment. This appeal followed, and Minton filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the federal courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over his legal malpractice suit.
III. The Law ConceRning Section 1338 Jurisdiction
The United States Code provides that “[tjhe district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to pat-ents_Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent ... cases.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338(a) (West 2006).2 The United States Supreme Court has for nearly 100 years recognized that in certain cases federal question jurisdiction will lie over state law claims that implicate significant federal issues. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312, 125 S.Ct. 2363, 2367, 162 L.Ed.2d 257 (2005).
A significant federal issue is implicated when a well-pleaded complaint establishes that the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law in that federal law is a necessary element of the well-pleaded complaint. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809, 108 S.Ct. 2166, 2174, 100 L.Ed.2d 811 (1988). The well-pleaded complaint rule is the starting point in analyzing Section 1338 jurisdiction in suits involving patents. See, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). Under this “well-pleaded complaint” rule, whether the claim arises under federal patent law “ ‘must be determined from what necessarily appears in the plaintiffs statement of his own claim ... unaided by anything alleged in anticipation or avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose.’ ” Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809, 108 S.Ct. at 2174 (quoting Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76, 34 S.Ct. 724, 724, 58 L.Ed. 1218 (1914)). The complaint must do more than demonstrate that a question of federal patent law is “lurking in the background.” Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 12, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2847, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983). A complaint successfully establishes that a plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends on a substantial question of patent law and that federal law is a necessary element of the well-pleaded complaint when from the plaintiffs pleading, it appears that some right or privilege will be defeated by one construction or sustained by the opposite construction of patent laws. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 807-08, 108 S.Ct. at 2173.3 *717But a pleaded claim supported by alternative theories in the complaint may not form the basis for Section 1338 jurisdiction unless patent law is essential to each of those theories. Id. at 812, 108 S.Ct. at 2175-76 (recognizing, in applying well-pleaded complaint doctrine, that although the patent issue could be an element of the plaintiffs monopolization antitrust theory and plaintiffs group-boycott antitrust theory, plaintiffs complaint also pleaded reasons completely unrelated to the provisions and purposes of federal patent law why the plaintiff might be entitled to the relief sought so that plaintiffs claims did not “arise under” Section 1338).
In determining whether federal question jurisdiction exists, in addition to examining whether a well-pleaded complaint establishes that the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law in that federal law is a necessary element of the well-pleaded complaint, courts must also conduct a federalism analysis. Grable, 545 U.S. at 313-14, 125 S.Ct. at 2367-68. That is, courts must also examine whether federal court jurisdiction over a state claim implicating a substantial question of federal law is consistent with congressional judgment regarding the proper division of labor between state and federal courts. Id. 125 S.Ct. at 2367. Stated another way, courts must inquire whether a federal forum may entertain the state claim raising a disputed, substantial federal issue without disturbing any congres-sionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities. Id. at 314, 125 S.Ct. at 2368. When Congress has not provided a federal, private remedy for the violation of a particular federal statute, the presence of an issue concerning that statute as an element of a state tort claim is not ordinarily considered “substantial” enough to confer federal question jurisdiction. See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 21-22, 103 S.Ct. at 2852 (holding federal question jurisdiction did not exist over a declaratory judgment suit brought by state taxing authorities concerning the application of a state statute to an ERISA qualified trust); see also Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 814, 106 S.Ct. 3229, 3235, 92 L.Ed.2d 650 (1986) (holding federal question jurisdiction did not exist over state tort claim that pharmaceutical company had misbranded drug Bendectin in violation of Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).
IV. Section 1338 Juuisdiction over Minton’s Legal Malpractice Claim
A. Minton’s Well-Pleaded Complaint
Starting with a well-pleaded complaint analysis, Minton’s petition does establish that his right to relief in his state legal malpractice suit necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law. See Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809, 108 S.Ct. at 2174. As Appellees and the Majority Opinion acknowledge, to prevail in his legal malpractice claim, Minton must prove a “suit within a suit.” See Alexander v. Turtur Assocs., Inc., 146 S.W.3d 113, 117 (Tex.2004) (articulating suit within a suit requirement). That is, to prevail when the asserted legal malpractice involves the results of prior *718litigation, the plaintiff bears the additional burden of proving that, “but for” the attorney’s breach of duty, he would have won in the underlying litigation and would have been entitled to judgment. See, e.g., Schlager v. Clements, 939 S.W.2d 183, 186-87 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
Turning specifically to Minton’s original pleading, he asserted one cause of action against Appellees — negligence. He asserted as the sole basis for his negligence pleading one theory of negligence by Ap-pellees — the failure to timely plead and brief the experimental use exception in response to Appellees’ assertion of the on sale bar rule. Thus, in his state legal malpractice claim, Minton must prove that “but for” Appellees’ alleged negligence, he would have prevailed on every element of his patent infringement suit against NASD and NASDAQ, including application of the experimental use exception to the on sale bar rule and damages from NASD and NASDAQ’s alleged infringement and continued infringement of claims 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the '643 Patent.
B. A Disputed, Substantial Issue of Federal Patent Law
When a state legal malpractice claim requires the hypothetical adjudication of the merits of an underlying federal patent infringement lawsuit — that is, trial of the patent infringement suit within the legal malpractice suit — the legal malpractice case presents a disputed, substantial question of federal patent law conferring Section 1338 jurisdiction on the federal courts. See, e.g., Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v.
Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 504 F.3d 1262, 1272-73 (Fed.Cir. 2007)4 (holding federal courts possessed exclusive Section 1338 jurisdiction over Texas state legal malpractice claim stemming from underlying federal patent infringement suit); Immunocept, LLC v. Fulhright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281, 1284 (Fed.Cir.2007) (same, stemming from underlying claims for patent infringement, comparison of patent application, and patent scope). That is, when the plaintiff must plead and prove his entire underlying patent infringement suit to satisfy the “but for” causation requirement of his state legal malpractice claim, the state legal malpractice claim presents a disputed, substantial issue of federal patent law. See AMT, 504 F.3d at 1272 (explaining that “patent infringement is disputed, for there is no concession by Akin Gump that the [defendants] infringed AMT’s patents, and the issue is substantial, for it is a necessary element of the malpractice case”); Immunocept, 504 F.3d at 1285 (holding that “[b]eeause it is the sole basis of [plaintiffs state law legal malpractice claim], the claim drafting error is a necessary element of the malpractice cause of action” and triggers Section 1338 jurisdiction). Numerous courts have followed the holdings of AMT and Immunocept; federal courts have denied motions to remand state legal malpractice claims stemming from underlying patent litigation and state courts have dismissed such actions, holding Section 1338 jurisdiction existed.5
In summary, it is clear from Minton’s legal malpractice pleading that his right to recover from Appellees in his legal mai-*719practice suit will be defeated by one construction or sustained by the opposite construction of the patent laws concerning the on sale bar rule, concerning the experimental use exception, and ultimately concerning NASD’s and the NASDAQ’s alleged infringement to claims 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the '643 Patent.6 See Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809, 108 S.Ct. at 2174. Minton pleaded no alternative “theories” of recovery in his legal malpractice suit — the sole allegation of negligence against Appellees is that in Minton’s patent infringement suit they negligently failed to plead and brief the experimental use exception after NASD and NASDAQ moved for summary judgment on the basis of the on sale bar rule. Thus, application of the well-pleaded complaint doctrine and examination of whether Minton’s right to relief in his state legal malpractice suit necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law both compel the conclusion that Minton’s state legal malpractice claim raises a disputed, substantial issue of federal patent law. See AMT, 504 F.3d at 1269 (holding, “[bjecause proof of patent infringement is necessary to show AMT would have prevailed in the prior litigation, patent infringement is a ‘necessary element’ of AMT’s malpractice claim and therefore apparently presents a substantial question of patent law conferring § 1338 jurisdiction”); Immunocept, 504 F.3d at 1285 (recognizing “a determination of patent infringement serves as the basis of § 1338 jurisdiction over related state law claims”); see also Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809, 108 S.Ct. at 2174; accord Marsh v. Austin-Fort Worth Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 744 F.2d 1077, 1079 (5th Cir.1984) (holding Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit possessed exclusive jurisdiction over summary judgment granted by federal district court for defendants on the basis that plaintiff “lost his patent rights” under 35 U.S.C. § 102 — the on sale bar rule — by displaying his invention at a convention before he applied for a patent even though plaintiff asserted state law claims and filed in federal court based on diversity of citizenship).
C. Disagreement with the Majority Opinion’s Federal Question Analysis
The Majority Opinion holds that in Min-ton’s legal malpractice claim “the federal *720issue is insubstantial.” To reach this holding, despite the plethora of ease law specifically addressing Section 1338 jurisdiction in state claims alleging legal malpractice during federal patent litigation,7 the Majority Opinion chooses to follow Singh v. Duane Morris, L.L.P, 538 F.3d 334, 338 (5th Cir.2008). Singh is a Fifth Circuit case in which legal malpractice was alleged to have occurred during trademark litigation. Id. The Singh opinion itself limited its holding to Section 1338 jurisdiction in suits alleging malpractice during trademark litigation and expressly declined to extend its holding to suits alleging malpractice during patent litigation. The Fifth Circuit stated,
It is possible that the federal interest in patent cases is sufficiently more substantial, such that it might justify federal jurisdiction. But we need not decide the question before the Federal Circuit [in AMT ], because it is not before us. We conclude only that jurisdiction does not extend to malpractice claims involving trademark suits like this one.
Id. at 340. I cannot agree with the Majority Opinion that the Singh opinion, having expressly declined to extend its holding to malpractice claims involving patent suits, has any application to the Section 1338 jurisdictional analysis of Minton’s malpractice claim involving a patent suit.
D. Federalism Analysis
A determination that a state law claim presents a disputed, substantial issue of federal patent law does not end a Section 1338 jurisdictional query. Grable, 545 U.S. at 314, 125 S.Ct. at 2367. As previously mentioned, courts must also examine whether federal court jurisdiction over a state claim implicating a substantial question of federal law is consistent with congressional judgment regarding the proper division of labor between state and federal courts. Id. at 314, 125 S.Ct. at 2368.
Moving to the required examination of whether a federal court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over Minton’s state legal malpractice claim is consistent with congressional judgment regarding the proper division of labor between state and federal courts, the answer is clearly that it is. See id. at 314, 125 S.Ct. at 2368. As recognized by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in determining that Section 1338 jurisdiction existed over a Texas legal malpractice claim stemming from an underlying patent infringement suit — like Minton’s,
There is a strong federal interest in the adjudication of patent infringement claims in federal court because patents are issued by a federal agency. The litigants will also benefit from federal judges who have experience in claim construction and infringement matters. See Grable, 545 U.S. at 315, 125 S.Ct. 2363; see also Lacks Indus., Inc. v. McKechnie Vehicle Components USA, Inc., 322 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed.Cir.2003) (stating that patent infringement involves a two-step process where the court first determines the scope and meaning of the asserted claims and then compares the construed claims to the accused product). Under these circumstances, patent infringement justifies “resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal issues.” Grable, 545 U.S. at 312, 125 S.Ct. 2363. In § 1338, Congress considered the federal-state division of labor and struck a balance in favor of this court’s entertaining patent *721infringement. For us to conclude otherwise would undermine Congress’s expectations.
AMT, 504 F.3d at 1272. Likewise, in Im-munocept, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reiterated that Congress’s intent to remove non-uniformity in patent law, as evidenced by its enactment of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, was further indicium that Section 1338 jurisdiction existed over a Texas state legal malpractice claim stemming from attorneys’ alleged negligent claim drafting in a patent application. 504 F.3d at 1285. For the reasons articulated in the AMT and the Immunocept opinions, by enacting Section 1338, Congress considered the federal-state division of labor and struck a balance in favor of the federal courts for patent infringement issues. AMT, 504 F.3d at 1272; Immunocept, 504 F.3d at 1285.
Minton’s state suit, unlike the state litigation Franchise Tax Board and MerreM Doiu Pharmaceuticals, Inc., is not based on a violation of a federal statute for which Congress has provided no private federal remedy. See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 21-22, 103 S.Ct. at 2852 (ERISA); Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 478 U.S. at 814, 106 S.Ct. at 3235 (FDCA). Minton’s suit is based on alleged malpractice during the pursuit of an authorized, private, exclusively federal remedy for patent infringement. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338(a) (granting federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over patent cases). In fact, Minton must prove his entire private, federal cause of action for patent infringement as an element of his state law claim. Thus, a federalism analysis of Minton’s state legal malpractice claim weighs in favor of the congressional intent expressed in Section 1338 that federal courts exercise original, exclusive jurisdiction over patent infringement issues. See AMT, 504 F.3d at 1272; Immunocept, 504 F.3d at 1285.
E. Disagreement with the Majority Opinion’s Federalism Analysis
The Majority Opinion holds that “the exercise of federal jurisdiction over this [Minton’s] state-law malpractice claim would disturb the balance between federal and state judicial responsibilities.” Majority Op. at 708-09. In reaching this conclusion, the Majority Opinion expressly declines to follow AMT’s and Immunocept ⅛ federalism analysis for three reasons. First, the Majority Opinion chooses to give no precedential value to the jurisdictional determinations of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Second, the Majority Opinion claims that in both AMT and Im-munocept, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit “misapplied United States Supreme Court precedent by disregarding the federalism analysis that the Supreme Court has applied to restrict the scope of federal ‘arising under jurisdiction.’ ” Majority Op. at 709-10. And third, the Majority Opinion summarily concludes that application of the on sale bar rule and the experimental use exception in Minton’s state legal malpractice suit are fact-bound and situation-specific issues. I cannot agree with any of these propositions.
Concerning the precedential value to be given the jurisdictional determinations of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the Majority Opinion cites Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams, 868 S.W.2d 294 (Tex.1993), in support of its decision to give no precedential value to AMT’s and Immunocept’s federalism analysis. Pen-rod Drilling, however, does not support the Majority Opinion’s position. Penrod Drilling actually holds that a court of appeals erred by following Fifth Circuit precedent and by summarily disregarding all contrary federal authority, just as the Majority Opinion here does by following the Fifth Circuit’s Singh decision and disre*722garding contrary federal authority. Majority Op. at 708-10; see Penrod Drilling, 868 S.W.2d at 296-97.
Concerning the Majority Opinion’s conclusion that in both AMT and Immunocept the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit “misapplied United States Supreme Court precedent by disregarding the federalism analysis that the Supreme Court has applied [in Grable and Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh8] to restrict the scope of federal ‘arising under jurisdiction,’ ” I simply cannot agree. Both AMT and Immunocept were decided in 2007 after Grable and Empire. See Grable, 545 U.S. at 308, 125 S.Ct. at 2363 (decided in 2005); Empire, 547 U.S. at 677, 126 S.Ct. at 2136-37 (decided in 2006). Moreover, as set forth above, both AMT and Immunocept actually cite Grable and expressly discuss the federalism analysis required by G'rable and Empire. See AMT, 504 F.3d at 1272; Immunocept, 504 F.3d at 1285. The Majority Opinion does not posit exactly how the federalism analysis of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is purportedly deficient in AMT and in Immunocept; no deficiency is apparent to me.
In conducting the required federalism analysis in AMT, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit expressly recognized “a strong federal interest in the adjudication of patent infringement claims in federal court because patents are issued by a federal agency.” AMT, 504 F.3d at 1272; see also Immunocept, 504 F.3d at 1285. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit explained that “[t]he litigants will also benefit from federal judges who have experience in claim construction and infringement matters.” AMT, 504 F.3d at 1272 (citing Grable, 545 U.S. at 315, 125 S.Ct. at 2363); see also Immunocept, 504 F.3d at 1285 (citing Grable and explaining, “Litigants will benefit from federal judges who are used to handling these complicated rules”). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit explicitly stated that a state claim requiring proof of patent infringement justifies “resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal issues.” AMT, 504 F.3d at 1269; see also Immunocept, 504 F.3d at 1285 (recognizing that the intent of Congress to remove non-uniformity in the patent laws via the enactment of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 is a further indication of federal question jurisdiction in a state legal malpractice suit requiring the proof of an entire underlying patent infringement lawsuit). The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit noted that “[i]n § 1338, Congress considered the federal-state division of labor and struck a balance in favor of this court’s entertaining patent infringement.” AMT, 504 F.3d at 1272; Immunocept, 504 F.3d at 1286. Finally, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in AMT held that “[f]or us to conclude otherwise would undermine Congress’s expectations.” AMT, 504 F.3d at 1272. Thus, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in AMT and in Immunocept did conduct the required federalism analysis and reached the exact opposite conclusion of the Majority Opinion’s holding that “the exercise of federal jurisdiction over this state-law malpractice claim would disturb the balance between federal and state judicial responsibilities.” Majority Op. at 708-09. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the exercise of state jurisdiction over a state legal malpractice claim like Minton’s requiring a “trial within a trial” of the underlying patent infringement suit would disturb the eongressionally mandated balance between federal and state judi*723cial responsibilities. See AMT, 504 F.3d at 1272; Immmnocept, 504 F.3d at 1285-86.
Finally, the Majority Opinion holds that Section 1338 jurisdiction is not triggered because application of the on sale bar rule and the experimental use exception in Minton’s legal malpractice claim are “fact-bound and situation-specific” issues. Majority Op. at 709 (citing Empire, 547 U.S. at 699-701, 126 S.Ct. at 2136). The “fact-bound and situation-specific” aspect of the Majority Opinion’s analysis is clearly incorrect. It puts the cart before the horse; a court cannot look past the jurisdictional issue, examine the merits of state court summary judgment evidence, decide that issues are fact-bound and situation-specific, and then use its decision on the merits to retroactively defeat Section 1338 jurisdiction. Instead, as outlined above, Section 1338 jurisdiction is to be determined based on the well-pleaded complaint doctrine and a federalism analysis, not on summary judgment evidence or non-evidence or the fact that the case was subsequently disposed of by summary judgment. See Lockwood, 93 Cal.Rptr.3d at 228-29 (explaining that trial court should have dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, not granted summary judgment, and rejecting defense’s argument that these two outcomes are equivalent). For these reasons, I cannot agree with the Majority Opinion’s federalism analysis.
V. Conclusion
I would hold that the federal courts possess Section 1338 jurisdiction over Min-ton’s state legal malpractice suit that requires proof of every element of his underlying patent infringement suit. I would grant Minton’s motion to dismiss, vacate the trial court’s order granting summary judgment for Appellees, and remand the case to the trial court for disposition in accordance with this opinion.

. Minton alleged that NASD and NASDAQ have "infringed and continued to infringe claims 1, 2, 3 and 4” of U.S. Patent No. 6,014,643 (the '643 Patent).

. Hereinafter referred to as “Section 1338.”

. See also Univ. of W. Va. Bd. of Trs. v. Van-Voorhies, 278 F.3d 1288, 1295 (Fed.Cir.2002) (holding Section 1338 jurisdiction existed over state law claim alleging breach of duty to assign a patent because claim required resolution of the disputed patent application); U.S. Valves, Inc. v. Dray, 212 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed.Cir.2000) (holding Section 1338 jurisdiction existed over state law breach of contract claim requiring proof of patent infringement); Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed.Cir.1998) (holding Section 1338 jurisdiction existed over state law claim of injurious falsehood *717when plaintiff was required to prove invalidity of patent), overruled in part on other grounds bv Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1358-59 (Fed.Cir.1999), and cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1143, 119 S.Ct. 1037, 143 L.Ed.2d 45 (1999); Scherbatskoy v. Halliburton Co., 125 F.3d 288, 291 (5th Cir.1997) (holding Section 1338 jurisdic-lion existed over state law breach of contract claim when plaintiff was required to prove patent infringement); Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc., 986 F.2d 476, 477-78 (Fed.Cir.1993) (holding Section 1338 jurisdiction existed over state law business disparagement claim that required proof of patent non-infringement).

. Hereinafter referred to as “AMT."

. See, e.g., Tomar Elecs., Inc. v. Watkins, No. 2:09-cv-00170-PHX-ROS, 2009 WL 2222707, at *1-2 (D.Ariz. July 23, 2009) (order on motion to remand) (holding federal courts possessed exclusive Section 1338 jurisdiction over state law legal malpractice stemming from patent infringement suit); see also, e.g., LaBelle v. McGonagle, No. 07-12097-GAO, 2008 WL 3842998, at *2-4 (D.Mass. Aug. 15, 2008) (opinion and order, not reported) (same, stemming from negligent failure to file patent application); Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP, No. 2: 08-102-DCR, 2008 *719WL 3833699, at *4-5 (E.D.Ky. Aug. 13, 2008) (mem. op. and order, not reported) (holding federal courts possessed exclusive Section 1338 jurisdiction over state legal malpractice claim stemming from patent infringement suit); Lockwood v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton, 173 Cal.App.4th 675, 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 220, 228-29 (2009) (holding federal courts possessed exclusive Section 1338 jurisdiction over state law claims stemming from opposing attorney's alleged action in obtaining patent reexamination); TattleTale Portable Alarm Sys. v. Calfee, Halter & Griswold, L.L.P., No. 08AP-693, 2009 WL 790314, at *4-5 (Ohio Ct.App. Mar. 26, 2009) (holding federal courts possessed exclusive Section 1338 jurisdiction over state law legal malpractice claim stemming from failure to pay patent maintenance fees or to seek revival of patent).

. Both the on sale bar rule and the experimental use exception to the application of the on sale bar rule are part and parcel of Minton’s patent infringement lawsuit. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 102(b); Allen Eng'g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1353 (Fed.Cir.2002). They are not stand-alone doctrines or claims that may be plucked from a federal patent infringement lawsuit and, somehow, not present substantial issues of federal patent law when a patent infringement lawsuit itself ■.presents a substantial question of federal patent law triggering Section 1338 jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1338(a) (providing exclusive, original federal court jurisdiction over "any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents”); AMT, 504 F.3d at 1270 (recognizing that in the case-within-a-case context the on sale bar rule is "not the sort of jurisdiction defeating defense[] contemplated by Christianson ").

. See, e.g., AMT, 504 F.3d at 1272; Immunocept, 504 F.3d at 1285; see also Tomar Elecs., Inc., 2009 WL 2222707, at *1-2; LaBelle, 2008 WL 3842998, at *2-4; Byrne, 2008 WL 3833699, at*4-5; TattleTale Portable Alarm Sys., 2009 WL 790314, at *4-5.

. 547 U.S. 677, 699-701, 126 S.Ct. 2121, 2137-37, 165 L.Ed.2d 131 (2006).