Court Opinion

ID: 9803701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 15:54:32.809029+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:02:21.399365
License: Public Domain

Roman, J.,
concurs in part, and dissents in part, and votes to affirm the judgment, with the following memorandum: I agree with the majority’s determination that the defendant’s convictions should not be disturbed. However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of 20 years to life imposed upon the defendant’s conviction of burglary in the second degree was excessive and would, therefore, affirm the judgment of conviction.
Generally, the determination as to what constitutes an appropriate sentence is a matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the sentencing court, “after due consideration given to, among other things, the crime charged, the particular circumstances of the individual before the court and the purpose of a penal sanction, i.e., societal protection, rehabilitation and deterrence” (People v Farrar, 52 NY2d 302, 305 [1981]; see People v Appelgate, 176 AD2d 888, 890 [1991]; People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80, 83 [1982]; People v Junco, 43 AD2d 266, 268 [1974], affd 35 NY2d 419 [1974]). The sentencing court “is in the most advantageous position to determine the proper sentence, having observed the defendant and being intimately familiar with the facts and circumstances underlying the conviction” (People v Junco, 43 AD2d at 268; see People v Suitte, 90 AD2d at 85).
Here, the defendant was convicted of burglary in the second degree and criminal trespass in the third degree after he broke into his neighbor’s home, and, upon being seen by her relatives, who were house guests visiting from Texas, fled from the premises and into another neighbor’s backyard. As a persistent violent felony offender, the defendant faced a sentencing range of between 16 and 25 years to life imprisonment on his conviction of burglary in the second degree, a class C violent felony offense (see Penal Law §§ 70.02 [1] [b]; 70.08 [2], [3] [b]). At sentencing, the People requested that the Supreme Court impose the maximum sentence, which was an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 25 years to life. The court, noting, among other things, the “unsettling” nature of the defendant’s act of burglarizing the home of his next-door neighbor “in broad daylight with People actually in the house,” as well as the defendant’s significant criminal history, sentenced the defendant, as a persistent violent felony offender, to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 20 years to life on his conviction of burglary in *1263the second degree and 90 days on his conviction of trespass in the third degree.
The defendant’s instant convictions represent his latest in a criminal history that spans almost three decades, and includes six arrests and multiple felony convictions. According to the presentence investigation report, in February 1984, the defendant was sentenced to concurrent indeterminate terms of imprisonment of 1 to 3 years in connection with two separate convictions of attempted robbery in the second degree. The defendant was released to parole in August 1985. However, his parole was revoked one year later, due to a violation. In June 1986, the defendant was convicted of robbery in the second degree, and sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 4 to 8 years. He was paroled again in November 1989, and discharged in March 1993. In April 1998, the defendant was convicted of attempted burglary in the second degree and attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, and sentenced to concurrent indeterminate terms of imprisonment of 12 years to life and 2 years to life, respectively. The defendant was placed on lifetime parole in November 2009.
The record thus reflects that, between 1984 and the commission of the instant offenses in August 2011, the defendant spent more than 15 years in prison in connection with the aforementioned convictions. The escalating sentences that the defendant received during that time clearly did not deter him from engaging in further criminal activity. Notably, the defendánt committed the instant offenses while on lifetime parole.
Moreover, the record reveals that the defendant did not express any remorse for his actions. To the contrary, he denied guilt of the burglary charge by impugning the character of one of the members of the household of the home that he entered. In this regard, he told the New York City Department of Probation that he “was having an affair” when “the woman’s husband came home,” so he left the house and went into another neighbor’s yard, which was why he was also charged with criminal trespass. The defendant's account of the events was contrary to the overwhelming evidence at trial, which established that, at the time of the incident on August 4, 2011, the female homeowner had left for work, and the defendant entered the house without permission and fled upon being seen by her house guests, who had arrived from Texas the evening before the burglary.
Under the circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that the sentencing court improvidently exercised or abused its discretion in sentencing the defendant to an indeterminate term *1264of imprisonment of 20 years to life upon his conviction of burglary in the second degree, which was five years less than the maximum permissible sentence for a persistent violent felony offender convicted of a class C violent felony offense, and four years greater than the minimum (see Penal Law §§ 70.02 [1] [b]; 70.08 [3] [b]). Moreover, the defendant failed to establish the existence of any “extraordinary circumstances that would warrant disturbing the sentence imposed” in the interest of justice (People v Bussey, 67 AD3d 819, 820 [2009]; see People v McCants, 73 AD3d 1086 [2010]).
Accordingly, I find that the sentence imposed on the defendant’s conviction of burglary in the second degree was not excessive, and would affirm the judgment of conviction.