Court Opinion

ID: 9832304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:47:59.055224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:45.410079
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Upon consideration of a motion for rehearing filed by appellant, we have again examined the record, and have reached the conclusion that we erred in our former opinion herein in holding that the jury were not misled by the erroneous statements of the law contained in the charge of the court. The charge complained of by the fourth assignment of error is as follows: “If you believe that the Martin rice was injured because it did not receive the proper amount of water within proper time, and if you believe that the Poutra lateral was so constructed that it did not supply proper amount of water to said land within proper time, and if you believe that was the proximate cause of the damage, if any, to said rice, yet, if you believe that Martin, at a moderate expense, could have avoided the damage, if any, to said crop, in whole or in part, by rearranging said lateral, and if you further believe that Martin was financially able to incur such expense, and you further believe that, under the circumstances which you find existed, a reasonably prudent man would have rearranged said lateral, you are instructed that the duty to rearrange said lateral was upon said Martin. If you believe that Poutra knew in time to have said lateral remedied so as to furnish sufficient water in sufficient time that said lateral was Insufficient, if it was insufficient, or if you believe that Poutra’s means of acquiring such knowledge was equal to that possessed in that respect by Martin, and if you believe that Poutra’s opportunity to rearrange was equal to that possessed by Martin, or if you believe that Poutra refused to permit Martin to properly construct said lateral, if it was not properly constructed, or if you believe that Martin could not make such lateral sufficient, if it was not sufficient, without trespassing upon land upon which he had no authority to go, then you are instructed that it was not Martin’s duty to rearrange said lateral.”
Both the pleadings and evidence raised the issue of negligence on the part of defendant Martin in failing to use reasonable care to protect himself from the loss and damages occasioned by the defective construction of the lateral. This issue was properly submitted in the first paragraph of the charge above quoted, but in the succeeding paragraph the jury are told', in effect, that no duty developed upon him to use any care to prevent the damage to his crop on account of the insufficient lateral, if appellant knew of its defects and had an opportunity to repair same, or if his means of acquiring such knowledge and his ability to remedy the defects was equal to that of Martin. This was an affirmative misstatement of the law and in direct conflict with the rule as stated in the preceding paragraph of the charge, and was not a mere “inaccuracy,” as we designated in our former opinion. Such being the case, we cannot say that the jury was not misled thereby, notwithstanding the fact that other portions of the main charge and several special charges requested by appellant contained a correct statement of the law-The charge being contradictory, we cannot tell which view of the law may have been adopted by the jury. It will not do to assume that, because the correct statement of the law was several times repeated, the jury followed the correct rather than the incor*729rect instructions. Baker v. Ashe, 80 Tex. 856, 16 S. W. 36; Railway Co. v. Rodgers, 89 Tex. 675, 86 S. W. 248; Railway Co. v. Robinson, 73 Tex. 277, 11 S. W. 327; Railway Co. v. Welch, 86 Tex. 203, 24 S. W. 390, 40 Am. St. Rep. 829.
We adhere to the conclusion expressed in our former opinion that the plaintiff Martin was not precluded by his pleadings from showing that the water in the barrow pits on the outside of the lateral prevented him from repairing the lateral by raising its banks with earth taken from the outside. After expressing our views upon this question we say in our former opinion: “If, however, we are wrong in this conclusion, the assignment should not be sustained because the existence and condition of the barrow pits on the outside of the lateral was shown by other evidence which was not objected to and some of which was brought out by the plaintiff. Having allowed evidence of this character to go to the jury without objection, plaintiff will not be heard to say that he was injured by similar evidence admitted over his objection.” This paragraph of the opinion is not sound. The general rule that the admission of incompetent evidence will not authorize a reversal when other evidence of the same kind has been admitted and allowed to go to the jury without objection is manifestly inapplicable when the question of whether the evidence is admissible depends upon whether the pleading raises the issue upon which it is offered. If the pleading does not raise an issue, no amount of evidence can put such issue in the case, and it is immaterial that the evidence raising such issue is admitted without objection. This rule is so well established as to render the citation of authority unnecessary.
Upon another trial of the case the pleadings will doubtless be amended, and this question will not likely arise, but we desire to make this modification of our former opinion.
Because of the error in the charge before pointed out, the motion for rehearing is granted, our former judgment set aside, and the judgment of the court below reversed and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.