Court Opinion

ID: 9580251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:03:31.117382+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:10.091722
License: Public Domain

Soltéis, J.
(concurring in part). This is an appeal, on our grant of leave (379 Mich 755), from dismissal by the Court of Appeals of a claim of appeal filed by the defendant surety.
The claim of appeal, filed October 24, 1966, recites that defendant sought review of (1) a default judgment, (2) an order denying defendant’s motion to set aside the default judgment, and (3) an order denying defendant’s petition for rehearing of its motion to set aside the default judgment.
The circuit court’s docket entries disclose that the default judgment was entered on May 25, 1966. No motion for new trial or rehearing ever was filed. GCR 1963, 803.1 provides that an appeal as of right from such a judgment, absent a motion for new trial or rehearing, must be taken not later than 20 days after its entry. No claim of appeal having been taken within such 20-day period, defendant was not entitled to claim an appeal as of right in *111October from the default judgment entered in May; therefore, the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of defendant’s claim of appeal, insofar as it sought review of the default judgment, manifestly was correct.
That does not end the matter, however, for defendant also claimed a right of appeal from the circuit judge’s denial of its motion to vacate the default judgment, made pursuant to GCR 1963, 520.4 and 528.3, and from his denial of defendant’s motion for rehearing thereof.
It is not disputed that defendant had a right to appeal denial of its motion to vacate the default judgment. What is disputed is the timeliness of defendant’s claim of appeal. The docket entries show that the motion was filed in June of 1966, just barely one month after entry of the default judgment. In July, the circuit judge announced from the bench his decision to deny the motion to vacate the judgment. However, the order denying the motion was not entered until August. After the circuit judge’s announcement of his decision to deny the motion, but before entry of the order of denial, defendant filed a petition for rehearing thereof. That petition was denied from the bench by the circuit judge on October 3, but the order • denying rehearing was not entered until October 10. Defendant’s claim of appeal from the denial of its motion to vacate the default judgment and from denial of its petition for rehearing was filed 14 days later.
The decision of the Court of Appeals was that defendant’s claim of appeal was not timely filed, and with this decision, as it relates to review of denial of the motion to vacate and of the motion for rehearing thereof, I disagree.
*112GCR 1963, 803.1 provides, in part:
“.1 Appeal as of Right. Appeal to the Court of Appeals as of right in civil cases, shall he taken not later than 20 days after the entry of the judgment or order appealed from, or within 20 days after the entry of an order denying a motion for a new trial or rehearing, provided such motion is made and served (a) within 20 days after the entry of the judgment or order appealed from, or (b) within such further time as may be allowed by the trial court during such 20-day period.”
It should be noted carefully that the rule measures the timeliness of the filing of a claim of appeal from the date of entry of the various judgments or orders referred to in the rule. GCR 1963, 522.2 defines “entry” to mean the date of signing an order or judgment:
“.2 Noting on Docket. All judgments or orders signed by the clerk or judge in accordance with these rules shall be noted on the docket. The date of signing an order or judgment shall be the date of entry thereof.”
In this case defendant’s petition for rehearing, filed even before entry of the order denying its motion to vacate, satisfied proviso clause (a) of subrule 803.1 and thereby extended the time within which a claim of appeal as of right could be taken from denial of defendant’s motion to vacate the default judgment until “20 days after the entry of an order denying [the] motion for * * * rehearing”. Inasmuch as defendant’s claim of appeal was filed on the fourteenth day after entry of the order denying its motion for rehearing, its claim of appeal, as it concerned the circuit judge’s order denying its motion to vacate the default judgment and its motion for rehearing thereof, was timely *113and in those respects should not have been dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
From a review of this record it is apparent that the Court of Appeals determined that the claim of appeal of the defendant was not timely filed by computing the time allowed for filing claims of appeal, not from the date of entry of the order appealed from or the order denying rehearing but, rather, from the dates the circuit judge’s decisions thereon were announced from the bench. The timeliness of an appeal filed pursuant to subrule 803.1 is determined by reference to the dates of entry of judgments and orders, which subrule 522.2 defines as the date of signing thereof, and not from the date decision thereof is announced from the bench.
The Court of Appeals’ order of dismissal should be reversed to the extent indicated in this opinion and defendant should be allowed to tax its costs.
T. M. ICavaNagh and Adams, JJ., concurred with SouRis, J.