Court Opinion

ID: 9739552
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:17:25.492747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:12.940018
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the trial court’s decision and direct that the amendment be allowed. I. JURISDICTION UNDER RULE 304(a) I agree with Justice Appleton’s opinion that we have jurisdiction under Rule 304(a) because the trial court treated the proposed amendment as a separate claim. 364 111. App. 3d at 418. Whether the same claim is involved is also an issue on the merits: whether the amendment should be allowed under section 2 — 616(b) because it “grew out of the same transaction or occurrence.” 735 ILCS 5/2 — 616(b) (West 2004). It would be intolerable if we had jurisdiction to affirm (because there was a separate claim) but had no jurisdiction to reverse (because there was then not a separate claim). Once it is determined that the court has jurisdiction to determine the merits of the controversy, “its jurisdiction will not be destroyed by its exercise.” Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 392, 143 N.E.2d 673, 680 (1957) (considering long-arm jurisdiction if a person has committed a tortious act within the state); 3 R. Michael, Illinois Practice § 6.5, at 68 (1989) (Civil Procedure Before Trial). I disagree with Justice Steigmann’s special concurrence that we do not have jurisdiction under Rule 304(a) because only a single claim, only counts advancing the same theory of recovery, is involved here. Rule 304(a) is limited to cases where there is “a final judgment.” 155 111. 2d R. 304(a). The rule does not apply to evidentiary rulings, or other interlocutory orders, where there is no final judgment. The striking of a pleading with a denial of leave to amend, as here, is a final judgment. Many cases have allowed an appeal under Rule 304(a) and gone on to hold that amendment should be allowed under section 2 — 616(b) because it grew out of the same transaction or occurrence. See, e.g., Castro, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 396, 789 N.E.2d at 792 (only difference between vicarious liability complaints is identity of doctor); Avakian, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 157-58, 766 N.E.2d at 291 (same). When do we have the “multiple claims for relief” required for a Rule 304(a) final judgment? Do we look to the res judicata definition of “claim”? “Claim” is defined very broadly for res judicata purposes: “all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(1), at 196 & Comment c (1982). That broad definition comports with the goal of res judicata to require a plaintiff to seek all relief in a single action. For res judicata purposes, almost every case involves only a single claim; if that is the test for Rule 304(a), it is difficult to imagine any appeal that could be taken under Rule 304(a). For res judicata purposes, even separate theories do not give rise to separate claims. There is a single transaction, a single claim, despite different harms, substantive theories, measures, or kinds of relief. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24, Comment c (1982); Torcasso v. Standard Outdoor Sales, Inc., 157 Ill. 2d 484, 491, 626 N.E.2d 225, 228 (1993). “Claim” must have a different meaning for purposes of Rule 304(a) than it does for res judicata. The supreme court has taken a broad view of what constitutes a “claim” under Rule 304(a). “[Rule 304(a)] was intended to apply wherever a final judgment determines fewer than all the rights and liabilities in issue.” Cunningham v. Brown, 22 Ill. 2d 23, 25, 174 N.E.2d 153, 154 (1961) (court accepted jurisdiction and held that dramshop action was the only remedy against tavern operators). Cunningham made it clear that the res judicata definition of “claim” did not apply to Rule 304(a). “[I]t does not matter, in determining whether multiple counts allege multiple claims for relief, that recovery under one would bar recovery of additional damages under the others.” Cunningham, 22 Ill. 2d at 25, 174 N.E.2d at 154. All that is necessary for a Rule 304(a) appeal is that the bases for recovery under the counts that are dismissed be “different” than those under the counts left standing. Heinrich v. Peabody International Corp., 99 Ill. 2d 344, 348, 459 N.E.2d 935, 938 (1984). “This may occur when the grounds for recovery under the various counts derive from different statutes or common law doctrines (Cunningham v. Brown) or when the various theories of recovery require ‘different elements *** to establish a proper claim’ or involve ‘differing standards of plaintiffs conduct which will bar recovery.’ ” Heinrich, 99 Ill. 2d at 348, 459 N.E.2d at 938, quoting Freeman v. White Way Sign & Maintenance Co., 82 Ill. App. 3d 884, 891, 403 N.E.2d 495, 500 (1980). In Heinrich, the court accepted jurisdiction, holding that dismissal of a count seeking either contribution or indemnification is not rendered unappealable by survival of a count seeking the other. Under Cunningham and Heinrich, different theories of recovery were one way to show that different claims were involved, but not the only way. Later cases seem to have elevated the presence of different theories into an absolute requirement. “While the dismissed counts and the remaining counts deal with different acts or omissions, they advance the same theory of recovery — namely, negligence — and accordingly we conclude that the dismissal of counts VII and VIII did not determine the merits of a separate claim, and therefore is not a final order.” Rice, 230 Ill. App. 3d at 992, 596 N.E.2d at 108. I suggest that such rigidity is inappropriate. In the present case, the fact that the dismissed count sounded in negligence and the remaining counts sound in negligence should not bar a Rule 304(a) appeal. Where there is a final order, the discretion of the trial court under Rule 304(a) to allow immediate appeal should be recognized where the trial court concludes that immediate appeal will aid in the resolution of the case. Olympia Hotels Corp. v. Johnson Wax Development Corp., 908 E2d 1363, 1367 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying Fed. R. Civ. E 54(b), the federal counterpart to Rule 304(a)); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 n.2, 64 L. Ed. 2d 1, 11 n.2, 100 S. Ct. 1460, 1465 n.2 (1980) (immediate appeal of certified claims would facilitate settlement of remaining claims). Immediate appeal will certainly aid in the resolution of the present case. Consider how the amendment issue would have to be presented if we did not accept jurisdiction under Rule 304(a). We would dismiss the appeal and the case would return to the circuit court for trial. After the trial was completed, the case would again be appealed, at which time we would decide whether the amendment should have been allowed. If we decided the amendment should have been allowed, the case would return to the trial court for a second trial. A great deal of time and money would have been wasted. We can easily decide the question of the amendment now, and we should proceed to do so. The trial court properly exercised its discretion to find “that there is no just reason for delaying *** appeal” (155 Ill. 2d R 304(a)) in this case. The bases for recovery under the dismissed count are “different” from those under the counts left standing. Heinrich, 99 Ill. 2d at 348, 459 N.E.2d at 938. Even if the bases for recovery are not different, the trial court believes they are and must intend for its ruling to have some consequences at trial. II. AMENDMENT UNDER SECTION 2 — 616(b) Section 2 — 616 carries forward the policy of the Code of Civil Procedure that formalism in pleadings is to be avoided, that no pleading is bad in substance that contains such information as reasonably informs the opposite party of the nature of the claim or defense that he or she is called upon to meet. 735 ILCS 5/2 — 612(b) (West 2004). Under section 2 — 616, pleadings may be amended at any time, even after judgment. Under section 2 — 616, pleadings may even be amended after the statute of limitations has expired, so long as “the cause of action asserted *** grew out of the same transaction or occurrence set up in the original pleading, even though the original pleading was defective.” 735 ILCS 5/2 — 616(b) (West 2004); Castro, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 390, 789 N.E.2d at 787 (purpose is to insure fairness, not enhance technical considerations of common-law pleadings). The concern here is whether plaintiff is “ ‘ “attempting to slip in an entirely distinct claim in violation of the spirit of the limitations act.” ’ ” Sompolski v. Miller, 239 Ill. App. 3d 1087, 1091, 608 N.E.2d 54, 57 (1992), quoting Simmons, 32 Ill. 2d at 497, 207 N.E.2d at 444, quoting O. McCaskill, Illinois Civil Practice Act Annotated 126-27 (Supp. 1936). For example, if I sue my neighbor over a boundary-line dispute, I am not at liberty to add a count against him for an earlier automobile accident on which the statute of limitations had run. There is no “entirely distinct claim” in this case. Dr. Greenberg performed the colonoscopy on January 18, 2001. Drs. Orcutt and Tender performed the emergency surgery that same day. The events in the present case occurred during a single stay in the hospital, involved only a single patient, and occurred during a relatively brief period of time. (Plaintiff left the hospital on January 27, 2001.) “Among the factors relevant to a determination whether the facts are so woven together as to constitute a single claim are their relatedness in time, space, origin, or motivation, and whether, taken together, they form a convenient unit for trial purposes.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24, Comment b, at 199 (1982). The original complaint alleged negligence against the hospital for the actions of Orcutt and Tender under a theory of respondeat superior and set out acts and omissions that took place during the Greenberg surgery. The amended complaint again alleged negligence against the hospital under a theory of respondeat superior but this time added the assertion that Green-berg’s use of the wire snare was inappropriate and constituted negligence. The amendment would have been proper even if the original complaint had not named any employees. Avakian, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 158, 766 N.E.2d at 293. Section 2 — 616(b), which allows amendments so long as the cause of action asserted “grew out of the same transaction or occurrence” (735 ILCS 5/2 — 616(b) (West 2004)), anticipated the supreme court’s adoption of the more liberal transactional test for res judicata purposes. “[T]he transactional test permits claims to be considered part of the same cause of action even if there is not a substantial overlap of evidence, so long as they arise from the same transaction.” River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 184 Ill. 2d 290, 311, 703 N.E.2d 883, 893 (1998), citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24, Comment b, at 199 (1982). The 1933 amendment that created the predecessor of section 2 — 616(b) shifted from the common-law requirement that the amended pleading set up the same cause of action as the original pleading to a test of identity of transaction or occurrence. Zeh, 111 Ill. 2d at 272, 489 N.E.2d at 1345 (1933 amendment omitted the words “and is substantially the same as”); Avakian, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 154, 766 N.E.2d at 290 (section no longer required that the original and amended pleadings state the same cause of action). Under River Park, transaction and cause of action are now the same thing. The two complaints here were the same cause of action. It is clear that plaintiffs could not have filed a respondeat superior action against the hospital for the actions of Orcutt and Tender and, after that action was resolved, filed a new respondeat superior action against the hospital for the actions of Greenberg. River Park, 184 Ill. 2d at 311-12, 703 N.E.2d at 893. (Plaintiffs, however, could file a subsequent action against new parties not named in the original action. See Saichek v. Lupa, 204 Ill. 2d 127, 137, 787 N.E.2d 827, 833 (2003).) The hospital’s argument that “the original complaint did not focus on the actions of Greenberg but instead focused on the actions of Tender and Orcutt” (364 Ill. App. 3d at 420), is a formalistic pleadings argument inconsistent with modern practice. The true question is whether defendant was on notice, before the expiration of the statutory time period, of the facts on which the claim set out in the amended complaint is based. Castro, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 391, 789 N.E.2d at 788; McArthur v. St. Mary’s Hospital of Decatur, 307 Ill. App. 3d 329, 335, 717 N.E.2d 501, 505 (1999). In McArthur, the allegations of respondeat superior were not made in the original complaint, but we allowed them to be made in the amended complaint after the statute of limitations had run. “Because these allegations were made against the hospital’s codefendants and were at the heart of plaintiffs’ case, the hospital was aware of them and knew the extent of the involvement of its own personnel.” McArthur, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 335, 717 N.E.2d at 505. A similar argument was addressed in Castro. “Though Family Medicine claims to have been prejudiced by the lack of focus on the actions of Dr. Belluci-Jackson, we find that it was nevertheless supplied with the essential information necessary to prepare a defense to a claim related to her part in the same occurrence ***.” Castro, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 395, 789 N.E.2d at 791. It is inconceivable that the hospital here was unaware of the actions of Greenberg, its employee, who performed the surgery in its operating room. From the very beginning, the hospital had knowledge of those actions, better knowledge than did plaintiffs. It is interesting to contrast the obligations imposed on plaintiffs to proceed with litigation despite their imperfect knowledge. There is a discovery rule that tolls the running of the statute of limitations; however, “[t]he rule does not mandate that a plaintiff know with precision the legal injury that has been suffered, but anticipates that plaintiff be possessed of sufficient information to cause plaintiff to inquire further in order to determine whether a legal wrong has occurred.” Martin v. A&M Insulation Co., 207 Ill. App. 3d 706, 710, 566 N.E.2d 375, 378 (1990). Just as precise knowledge should not be required for plaintiffs, precise knowledge should not be required for defendants. I disagree with the statements in McCorry and Bailey that the original complaint must provide the defendant “with all of the information necessary for preparation of the defense for the claim asserted later.” (Emphasis added.) McCorry, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 944, 775 N.E.2d at 599. Again, those statements take a view of pleadings that has now been discarded. “Today the function of informing an opponent of one’s position is largely accomplished through discovery, a function that was largely fulfilled by the pleadings at an earlier time.” 3 R. Michael, Illinois Practice § 23.1, at 300 (1989) (Civil Procedure Before Trial); Wolf v. Meister-Neiberg, Inc., 143 Ill. 2d 44, 46-48, 570 N.E.2d 327, 328-29 (1991) (defendants provided with notice of correct location of occurrence before expiration of statute of limitations through depositions and production requests). McCorry concedes that discovery may satisfy the notice requirement but adds a further requirement, that “the defendant must have notice not only of the operative facts, but also of the plaintiffs intention to assert a claim on the basis of those facts.” McCorry, 332 Ill. App. 3d at 946, 775 N.E.2d at 601. There is no support in the statute or the decisions of the supreme court for that additional requirement. A litigant investigating a case does not limit his investigation to his opponent’s allegations but attempts to learn everything he can about the incident. We should not encourage litigants to close their eyes to facts that are readily apparent. I disagree with the argument that if the amendment sets up a new theory or a new focus, it cannot be allowed. Illinois is a fact-pleading state. It is not necessary to plead any specific theory of recovery. “A complaint need only allege facts which establish the right to recovery; not only are allegations of law or conclusions not required, they are improper.” Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 488-89, 639 N.E.2d 1282, 1291 (1994); 3 R. Michael, Illinois Practice § 24.2, at 340 (1989) (Civil Procedure Before Trial). “A motion to dismiss does not lie as long as a good cause of action is stated even if that cause of action is not the one intended to be asserted by the plaintiff.” Illinois Graphics, 159 Ill. 2d at 488, 639 N.E.2d at 1291. Precise pleadings are not required. Amendment may be allowed “even though the original pleading was defective.” 735 ILCS 5/2 — 616(b) (West 2004). The relation-back doctrine is predicated upon a defendant’s awareness of the occurrence or transaction that is the basis for the claim and not upon what diligence a plaintiff exerts. Avakian, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 158, 766 N.E.2d at 293. Finally, what will now happen on remand under the majority’s order? Will plaintiffs be limited in the evidence they present at trial? Will they be foreclosed from discussing the conduct of Dr. Greenberg? Will the damages be limited to that caused by the other defendants? I suggest not. The injury to Richard appears to be an indivisible one for which all defendants are jointly liable. See Burke v. 12 Rothschild’s Liquor Mart, Inc., 148 Ill. 2d 429, 438-39, 593 N.E.2d 522, 525-26 (1992). Plaintiff is entitled to present a complete picture of his injury. Evidence of Dr. Greenberg’s conduct would certainly be admissible to explain the conduct of the other defendants.