Court Opinion

ID: 9739228
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:10:52.864317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:10.810909
License: Public Domain

PAGE, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. While the facts of this ease are disturbing and sordid, I, unlike the court, cannot allow myself to be swept away by them in order to ignore the clear language of the statute to reach the conclusion that there is probable cause sufficient to charge Koenig with solicitation of a child to engage in sexual conduct under Minn.Stat. § 609.352 (2002). As the court has noted above, the purpose of a Florence hearing is to determine whether there are sufficient grounds to establish probable cause to believe that the defendant is guilty of a charged offense, not to decide his guilt in the matter. See State v. Schwartz, 266 Minn. 104, 108, 122 N.W.2d 769, 772 (1963). To satisfy this burden, the state must establish probable cause for each element of the charged offense. Thus, in this case, the state’s failure to establish probable cause as to each element under Minn.Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2 (2002), means that Koenig’s actions, while despicable, are not criminal.
We have long held that “[e]very law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.” Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2002); State v. Larivee, 656 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Minn.2003). To sustain Koenig’s charge of solicitation of a child to engage in sexual conduct, there must be evidence to establish that (1) he “solicitfed] a child * * ⅜ to engage in sexual conduct” and (2) that he had the “intent to engage in sexual conduct.” The statute defines the first required element for a violation of section 609.352, “solicit,” as “commanding, entreating, or attempting to persuade a specific person in person, by telephone, by letter, or by computerized or other electronic means.” Minn.Stat. § 609.352, subd. 1 (2002).1 Because the statute does not provide a special definition for “commanding,” “entreating,” or “attempting to persuade,” these words must be read “according to their common and approved usage.” Minn.Stat. § 645.08 (2002). In the Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary (2d. ed.2001), “command” is defined as “to direct with specific authority or prerogative; order”; “entreat” is defined as “to ask (a person) earnestly; beseech; implore; beg”; and “persuade” is defined as “to prevail on (a person) to do something, as by advising or urging.” Id. at 410, 649, 1446. Implicit in the statute’s use of each of these words is a requirement that the accused take some affirmative step to pressure a child to engage in sexual conduct. There is no evidence in this record that Koenig directed with specific authority, asked earnestly, beseeched, implored, begged, sought to prevail upon, or pressured R.P. in any way to engage in sexual conduct. Therefore, there is no evidence that Koenig, as required to support a charge under the statute, took any action to command, entreat, or attempt to persuade R.P. to engage in sexual conduct. Without any evidence with respect to this first element of the crime, the state has failed to meet its burden under Florence *377because without such evidence it cannot establish probable cause to believe that Koenig . violated Minn.Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2.
The court attempts to avoid the statute’s requirements by relying on facts that shed no light on whether Koenig commanded, entreated, or attempted to persuade R.P. to engage in sexual conduct. For the court, it is enough that the facts suggest that he intended, if possible, to engage in sexual conduct with R.P. the evening in question and that he likely knew or should have known that R.P. was younger than 15 years of age. However, each, of the incidents relied on by the court merely support the conclusion that Koenig desired to engage in sexual conduct that evening and he likely knew or should have known that R.P. was younger than 15 years of age.
The court begins its analysis relying on R.P.’s question regarding what age -was too young for Koenig to engage in sexual conduct and his response of, <cWell you’re over 16 right?” The court found this to be “significant” evidence of Koenig’s attempt to persuade R.P. to engage in sexual conduct. However, this question and its response go to whether Koenig knew that R.P. was a child under the age of 15, a fact that has no relevance to the solicitation charge. Nothing about either the question or response say anything either implicitly or explicitly about whether Koenig commanded, entreated, or attempted to persuade R.P. to do anything;
The court also relies on Koenig’s discussion with R.P. regarding whether she would call him back after taking another call, including what it describes as Koe-nig’s “attempt[] to persuade” R.P. to call him back, and R.P.’s eventual promise that if she did not call him back within five minutes he could have a sexual favor. The court concludes from this discussion that Koenig’s “earnest” attempts to persuade R.P to continue talking to him are the equivalent of an attempt by Koenig to persuade R.P. to engage in sexual conduct. However, the statute requires a showing that the accused attempted to persuade the child to engage in sexual conduct, not that the accused attempted to persuade the child to continue a sexually explicit conversation. Thus, Koenig’s efforts to keep R.P. on the telephone do not provide probable cause to believe that he solicited R.P. to engage in sexual conduct.
Similarly, the court relies on the evidence that Koenig called R.P. when she did not immediately show up at the designated meeting place; picked up R.P and J.L; drove to several hotels, which R.P. and J.L could not have done on their own; arranged for a room; and asked about, the sexual favor that R.P. had promised him earlier in the evening as further evidence of the process of persuasion. Each of these pieces of evidence provides support for the proposition that Koenig intended to engage in sexual conduct with R.P., but they do not provide probable cause to believe that Koenig commanded, entreated, or attempted to persuade R.P. to engage in sexual conduct. Nor do any of Koenig’s words or acts related to that evidence support probable cause.
Rather, the record establishes that R.P. willingly left a sexually explicit message on the hotline; responded to Koenig’s sexually explicit postings in response to her initial posting; gave him her direct number so he could call her at home; engaged in sexually explicit phone conversations with Koenig; before interrupting one of these conversations to take another phone call, promised him a sexual favor if she did not call back within five minutes; called him back approximately 20 minutes later; met him at a gas station; got into his car; went with him to several hotels as he tried to find a room; once a room was found, *378went to it with Mm; and engaged in sexual conduct with him.
As indicated, there is no evidence of solicitation unless one reads the statute and the record, as the court does here, and concludes that a defendant may be charged with a violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.352 solely on the basis that the accused had a sexually explicit conversation with a child with intent to engage in sexual conduct. This reading collapses the two required elements of the statute into one and fails to give effect to the part of the statute that requires the defendant to “solicit” the child. Indeed, the court’s interpretation of the statute is so broad that I cannot imagine any sexually explicit conversation between an individual 18 years or older and a child under the age of 16 that would not be punishable under Minn. Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2. Because we have long held that “[e]very law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions,” Minn.Stat. § 645.16, I cannot but conclude, based on the language of the statute, that there needs to be more than just proof of a sexually explicit conversation between the accused and a child to establish probable cause to believe that the accused solicited the child to engage in sexual conduct.
While agreeing to and then engaging in sexual conduct with a child is despicable and may subject the accused to a criminal sexual conduct charge, that alone does not satisfy the requirements for bringing a charge under section 609.352, subdivision 2. In its efforts to avoid placing blame on R.P., the court has completely taken Koe-nig’s actions out of context and placed them into a vacuum from which it then reviews the record and applies the law. This skews the lens through which we must look to find evidence of solicitation. More properly, the accused’s conduct must be viewed in context with the child’s behavior to determine whether or not solicitation has indeed occurred. Doing so does not equate to or require blaming the child. Nor does it use the child’s conduct to justify the defendant’s actions. Rather, it merely places Koenig’s conduct in the proper context to determine whether or not probable cause exists as to each element of section 609.352, subdivision 2.
This raises the question: Can a willing child be solicited under Minn.Stat. § 609.352. The answer of course is yes, but only if the accused commands, entreats, or attempts to persuade the child to engage in sexual conduct with the intent to engage in sexual conduct. If there was any evidence showing that R.P. did not want to engage in any of the conversations with Koenig, did not want to meet Koenig, or expressed that she was unwilling to engage in sexual conduct with Koenig, after which Koenig commanded, entreated, or attempted to persuade her to do otherwise, then the first element required for a solicitation charge would be satisfied. However, if the child acts voluntarily, as R.P. did in this case, and the accused does not need to and therefore does not command, entreat, or attempt to persuade the child to do anything, as the record here indicates, there can be no solicitation. Although Koenig’s conduct is abhorrent, I cannot in good conscience read out of the statute, as the court does, the requirement that the defendant take some action, however minimal, that constitutes commanding, entreating, or attempting to persuade the child to engage in sexual conduct. Nor can I read the record, as the court does, to justify its result. Therefore, I would affirm the dismissal of the solicitation charge for lack of probable cause.
Finally, I do not understand the court’s review of legislative history given its holding that Koenig’s actions fit within the “plain meaning” of the statute. We have *379stated over and over again that “[w]hen the words of the law in their application to an existing situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.” Minn.Stat. § 645.16. Here, the statutory definition of “solicit” is unambiguous. The only possible reason for the court to engage in an examination of legislative history is in an effort to bring its expansive reading of the facts within its expansive reading of the statute’s “plain meaning.” Doing so violates our rules of statutory construction. If Minn.Stat. § 609.352, subd. 2, is ambiguous and requires the court to resort to consideration of legislative history in order to give its provisions meaning, we are required to “resolve ambiguity concerning the ambit of the statute in favor of lenity” towards the defendant. State v. Stevenson, 656 N.W.2d 235, 239 (Minn.2003). Here, that would require that the district court and the court of appeals be affirmed. Either section 609.352, subdivision 2, is ambiguous or it is not. The court cannot have it both ways.