Court Opinion

ID: 9781490
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:40:39.335992+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:27.051961
License: Public Domain

NAHMIAS, Justice,
dissenting.
The Special Master recommended that a one-year suspension is the appropriate discipline in these cases. Although the majority opinion tracks the reasoning of the Special Master, it concludes that the suspension should instead be for three years. Based on the evidence in the record and consistent with our precedent, I believe that William M. Peterson should be disbarred, and so I dissent.
In addition to abandoning two clients, Peterson made false statements to both the Investigative Panel and the Office of General Counsel of the State Bar during the disciplinary process. We unanimously reiterated just last month that “[tjhis Court has little tolerance for attorneys who make false statements during disciplinary proceedings. . . . False statements by an attorney cause harm to the profession and the public.” In the Matter of Davis, 290 Ga. 857, 860-861 (725 SE2d 216) (2012) (disbarring Davis and citing two other cases in which lawyers who made such false statements were disbarred). See also In the Matter of O’Brien-Carriman, 288 Ga. 239, 240 (702 SE2d 635) (2010) (explaining that “[mjaking false statements to the Bar during the disciplinary process is a very serious matter which typically results in, at least, a significant suspension from the practice of law”). In my view, the Special Master did not give sufficient weight to Peterson’s multiple acts of intentional and deceitful misconduct, which are not mentioned in the Special Master’s brief discussion of the appropriate discipline. And despite our usual emphasis on this serious aggravating factor, the majority opinion does not even mention Peterson’s false statements in dis*797cussing the proper disciplinary sanction. To the contrary, the majority cites a single supporting letter which says that Peterson’s “word is his bond” — an attribute contradicted by his admitted lies during these disciplinary proceedings.
Similarly, while the Special Master’s factual findings note Peterson’s prior disciplinary history — two formal letters of admonition, including one issued in May 2010 — that history was given no apparent weight as an aggravating factor. See Bar Rule 4-103 (“A finding of a third or subsequent disciplinary infraction under these Rules shall, in and of itself, constitute discretionary grounds for suspension or disbarment.”). The majority opinion relegates this aggravating factor to a footnote.
Furthermore, based on the limited record before this Court, I would not give substantial weight to the two mitigating factors relied on by the Special Master and the majority — that Peterson “suffers from substantial physical disabilities and has furnished letters of support from knowledgeable attorneys practicing in his area.” See Bar Rule 4-217 (c) (“Any review undertaken by the Supreme Court shall be solely on the original record.”). As for the “substantial physical disabilities,” the only “evidence” in the record is the Special Master’s statement at the disciplinary hearing that, while calling around to find out if Peterson planned to attend the hearing (at which he did not appear), a secretary at another attorney’s office “stated that [Peterson] was frequently in and out of the hospital, for whatever that matters here,” and the statement in one of the supporting letters that, “as I understand it, [the complaints against Peterson] occurred sometime during the summer months of 2006, a time when his law practice was dissolving and he was experiencing medical issues that required hospitalization over an extended period of time.”
The majority opinion relies heavily on Peterson’s “physical impairment,” and even imposes a condition on his reinstatement on that ground, but this Court has not a clue as to what Peterson’s physical condition actually is, or was in the past, or how it affected his ability to practice law as the rules of professional conduct require. Notably, Peterson’s prior petition for voluntary discipline did not mention any physical disability as a mitigating factor, nor did the author of his second supporting letter. Moreover, even if he was hospitalized in the summer of 2006, that would not justify his false statement to the Bar’s Office of General Counsel, which occurred over a year later. As for the supporting letters, they merit some weight in mitigation, but they both emphasize that Peterson’s word *798“is his bond,” which, to repeat, is a point undermined by his admission that his words to the Bar during both of these disciplinary proceedings were in fact false.
Decided March 19, 2012.
Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Jonathan W. Hewett, Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Georgia.
The full Court agrees that the one-year suspension recommended by the Special Master is insufficient discipline. The three-year suspension that the majority imposes is more substantial, but I believe, based on the record and our precedent, that Peterson should be disbarred. See, e.g., In the Matter of Kimbrough, 286 Ga. 30 (685 SE2d 713) (2009); In the Matter of Eaton, 286 Ga. 28 (685 SE2d 279) (2009); In the Matter of Henry, 285 Ga. 871 (684 SE2d 624) (2009).
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Hunstein and Justice Melton join in this dissent.