Court Opinion

ID: 9960064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 10:09:34.51522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:09.833449
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued April 11, 2024

                                       In The

                               Court of Appeals
                                      For The

                           First District of Texas
                             ————————————
                               NO. 01-22-00929-CV
                             ———————————
                           ERIC D. BURNS, Appellant
                                          V.
      EMD SUPPLY INC. AND JAMES A.WHITE IN HIS OFFICIAL
        CAPACITY AS CEO OF EMD SUPPLY INC., Appellees

                    On Appeal from the 268th District Court
                           Fort Bend County, Texas
                     Trial Court Case No. 22-DCV-294981

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Eric D. Burns, proceeding pro se, appeals from the trial court’s

Rule 91a dismissal of his claims for breach of contract and violations of the Texas

Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (“DTPA”).            Burns also

appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to recuse.
      In eight issues, Burns argues the trial court erred because (1)-(2) the trial

court’s acts or admissions in an earlier lawsuit constituted conspiracy, bias, and

lack of competence; (3) the trial court had probable cause to believe Appellees

EMD Supply Inc. and James A. White violated the DTPA; (4) the trial court’s

failure to hear Burns’ motion for jury trial violated the Texas Constitution; (5)

other acts by the trial court violated the Texas Constitution; (6) the trial court

abused its discretion in its application of the DTPA’s two-year statute of

limitations; (7) the district court trial judge’s failure to recuse himself violated the

Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; and (8) the laws of fraud, fraudulent concealment,

and fraudulent inducement apply.

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                     Background

      This is the second lawsuit brought by Appellant Eric D. Burns in connection

with a purported contract between him and Appellees EMD Supply, Inc. and James

A. White involving a patent for a “Home Communicator.” Both lawsuits were

dismissed under Rule 91a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Burns appeals

from the dismissal of his claims in the second lawsuit.1

1
      It appears Burns also seeks to appeal certain rulings from the first lawsuit, but his
      challenges to that lawsuit were already appealed and decided adversely to Burns in
      Burns v. White, No. 14-20-00646-CV, 2022 WL 2311621, at *1 (Tex. App.—
      Houston [14th Dist.] June 28, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). Any issues related to the
      first lawsuit are thus not properly before us.

                                            2
A.    The First Lawsuit2

      In 2019, Burns sued White for breach of contract, alleging White entered

into a Letter of Intent to “build a functional prototype or financially fund a working

prototype” (“the First Lawsuit”). The Letter of Intent stated:

                              LETTER OF INTENT

                             (Preliminary Agreement)

      James A. White, CEO

      EMD Supply, Inc. located at 909 Industrial Blvd., Sugar Land, TX
      77478 has considerable interest in a concept created by Eric Burns of
      iBurns, Inc. 391 Highway 90 E. Sealy, TX and its creation “The
      Home Communicator”, (i.e. Home Communication) to fund a
      prototype which is functional. Upon availability of the prototype,
      EMD Supply, Inc. agrees to begin negotiations for licensing and
      distribution of the product per an agreed upon amount per unit with
      Eric Burns, Inventor A.K.A. iBurns, Inc.

White and Burns both signed the Letter of Intent, which was not dated. According

to Burns’ Original Petition, White told Burns after signing the Letter of Intent “not

to speak or discuss this with anyone. [Consequently, Burns was] [m]issing out on

other business deals.” Burns alleged that as of January 17, 2018, the prototype for

his invention had not been built or funded and White had “stopped all

communications with [Burns] for no apparent reason.”

2
      The First Lawsuit was styled Eric D. Burns v. James A. White, No. 19-DCV-
      268373, In the 268th District Court of Fort Bend County, Texas.

                                          3
      White moved for dismissal of Burns’ breach of contract claim under Rule

91a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. White asserted Burns’ claim had no

basis in law because the Letter of Intent lacked essential terms, it was indefinite,

and it did not indicate there had been a meeting of the minds. White also argued

the claim against him failed because White was not a party to the Letter of Intent in

his individual capacity. See Burns v. White, No. 14-20-00646-CV, 2022 WL

2311621, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 28, 2022, no pet.) (mem.

op.) (“Burns I”). The trial court granted White’s Rule 91a motion and dismissed

Burns’ breach of contract claim. Id. at *2. Burns appealed the dismissal of his

claim to the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, arguing (1) the trial court erred by being

“bias[ed] against the law,” (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and (3)

the trial court erred in granting White’s motion to dismiss.        Id. at *1.    The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal. Id.

      The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held Burns’ first issue was “unsupported

by the record, inadequately briefed, incomplete, and multifarious.” Id. at *4. The

court held Burns’ ineffective assistance of counsel argument lacked merit because

a party does not have “a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in

litigation involving a breach of contract.” Id. And as it concerned his third issue,

the court held the trial court properly dismissed Burns’ claims under Rule 91a

because the Letter of Intent did not create a binding contract. Id. at *6. The court

                                          4
held the Letter of Intent “lack[ed] essential terms, such as the price, the specific

performance promised, and the timing of said performance.” Id. It concluded the

Letter of Intent “failed[ed] for indefiniteness because [there were] no essential

terms providing how [a court] would enforce each of the parties’ rights.” Id. The

court continued, “[T]his letter of intent was no more than an indefinite indication

of interest in negotiating toward a contract in the future. As the trial court

concluded, the letter of intent does not demonstrate that the parties actually

intended to be contractually bound.” Id. Further, the court held the Letter of

Intent’s reference to creation of a functional prototype “was a condition precedent

to the parties’ formation of a binding contract.” Id. at *7.

B.    The Second Lawsuit

      On July 11, 2022, less than two weeks after the Fourteenth Court of Appeals

issued its opinion in the First Lawsuit, Burns filed another lawsuit involving the

same issues, this time against EMD Supply, Inc. and White in his capacity as CEO

of EMD Supply, Inc. (the “Second Lawsuit”). Burns asserted a claim for “breach

of verbal contract” based on an alleged oral agreement between the parties and a

claim for “deceptive trade practices” claiming he was misled into believing he had

executed a binding contract. We construe the latter as a claim for violations of the

DTPA.

      In the background section of his petition, Burns alleged that White, in his

                                           5
capacity as EMD’s chief executive officer, offered Burns “$30,000.00 in services

and 15% to 20% of royalties from the production and commercial sale of [Burns’]

invention.”3 Burns alleged he obtained a patent on his invention and that EMD

“agreed to produce a fully functional prototype of [Burns’] invention [] prior to the

patent’s expiration date” of August 18, 2017. Burns alleged EMD “failed to

produce a functional prototype before the expiration date of [his] patent” and that

said failure “constituted a breach of the oral contract agreement.”

      In support of his contract claim, Burns alleged that White orally offered him

$30,000 in services, a percentage amount of commercial sales, and to produce a

functional prototype of his invention before the expiration of his patent. He

alleged he orally accepted the offer and that as such, there was a meeting of the

minds. Burns alleged both parties “orally consented to the material and essential

terms,” there was consideration when White “exchanged an oral agreement to

produce a functional prototype along with the letter of intent for [Burns’]

intellectual property,” and White delivered the Letter of Intent to Burns and Burns

delivered the intellectual property to White. Burns alleged, “The parties mutually

agreed that the terms of the oral agreement were binding; and concluded with a

handshake to seal the deal.”

3
      The petition does not describe the purported invention but states it is called “The
      Home Communicator.”

                                           6
      In support of his DTPA claim, Burns alleged that White

      either misrepresented facts to mislead Plaintiff into believing that a
      binding oral contract existed between them; or, entered into an oral
      contract agreement with the Plaintiff with no intentions of keeping the
      oral contract portion of the agreement. That Plaintiff relied on
      Defendant’s promise is obvious.

      EMD and White filed a general denial asserting several affirmative defenses.

EMD and White also filed a specific denial alleging Burns had not satisfied all

conditions precedent to filing his claims, and a verified denial alleging both that

White was not liable in the capacity in which he was sued and that the purported

contract lacked consideration.

      EMD and White later filed a Rule 91a motion to dismiss Burns’ claims,

arguing Burns’ breach of contract lacked merit because it lacked essential terms.

They also argued the claim was barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the

statute of limitations. EDM and White also moved to dismiss Burns’ DTPA claims

arguing the claim was time-barred, the petition did not establish the elements of a

DTPA claim, and Burns failed to give notice to EMD and White of his claim

before filing suit as required under Section 17.505(a) of the Texas Business and

Commerce Code.4

4
      Section 17.505(a) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code states in pertinent
      part:
            As a prerequisite to filing a suit seeking damages under Subdivision
            (1) of Subsection (b) of Section 17.50 of this subchapter against any
            person, a consumer shall give written notice to the person at least 60
                                          7
      In his response to the motion to dismiss, Burns asserted fraud and conspiracy

for the first time. Burns argued EMD and White had committed fraud by making a

“material representation that the oral agreement and the letter of intent formed a

binding contract obligating [them] to produce a functional prototype before

[Burns’] patent expired.” Burns premised his conspiracy claim on his allegation

that his attorney in the First Lawsuit had conspired with defense counsel to

withdraw from his representation of Burns before raising the DTPA claim and

failing to advise Burns of his right to assert such a claim. Burns advanced these

arguments in response to EMD and White’s limitations argument. Burns’ response

did not address the other grounds raised in EMD and White’s motion to dismiss.

      The trial court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss. During the hearing,

EMD and White argued that Burns’ claims should be dismissed because they were

time-barred. They argued the statute of limitations for both claims began to run on

August 18, 2017—the date on which Burns’ patent expired and the date by which

he claimed he was owed goods or services.5 Because Burns did not file his suit

            days before filing the suit advising the person in reasonable detail of
            the consumer’s specific complaint and the amount of economic
            damages, damages for mental anguish, and expenses, including
            attorneys’ fees, if any, reasonably incurred by the consumer in
            asserting the claim against the defendant.
      TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.505(a).
5
      Later, during the hearing, EMD and Burns argued that even if a breach had
      occurred, it had occurred on August 19, 2017, the day after Burns’ patent expired.
      They argued the statute thus began to run on August 19, 2017.

                                           8
until 2022, Appellees argued his claims ran afoul of the four-year statute of

limitations for contract claims and the two-year statute of limitations for DTPA

claims.6

      Although Burns did not argue the Letter of Intent was a contract,7 he argued

the oral contract “induced” him to proceed with the Letter of Intent. He argued

that White “fraudulently induced” him to give him his intellectual property. Burns

argued that after White obtained Burns’ intellectual property, White “totally cut off

all communications[.]” Turning to EMD and White’s limitations argument, Burns

then argued his breach of contract claim was not time-barred because there was an

oral contract that led to the Letter of Intent. He also argued his DTPA claim was

not time-barred because the statute of limitations began to run when the trial court

dismissed his claims in the First Lawsuit. EMD and White responded that Burns

      understood that this contract wasn’t a contract when it wasn’t
      performed on that August 18th, 2017 day, [] the day after the patent
      expired, and he didn’t collect anything from either that oral contract or
      that letter of intent, or those alleged contracts. And that’s the date
      when the statute begins running. . . . [W]hether or not he claimed it

6
      See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.051 (four-year statute of limitations for
      breach of contract actions); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.565 (two-year statute of
      limitations for DTPA claims).
7
      Burns conceded that the Letter of Intent, which formed the basis of his claims
      against White in the First Lawsuit, is not a contract. In his request for permission
      to proceed in forma pauperis in the present lawsuit, Burns stated that “The letter of
      intent, though not a binding contract agreement per se, was preceded by an oral
      agreement[.]” And during the hearing on Appellees’ Rule 91a motion to dismiss,
      Burns stated, “I agree . . . that the letter of intent is not a binding, enforceable
      contract.”

                                            9
      was fraud, he knew that the contract wasn’t performed and now that
      he’s alleging those same actions gave rise to fraud.                 His
      misunderstanding that it was fraud versus a breach of contract []
      shouldn’t change the date that that statute starts running. Because,
      essentially, the same thing is, there was an act that didn’t happen.

EMD and White argued that even if there had been a breach, the breach would

have occurred at the latest, on August 19, 2017. Similarly, to the extent there was

any fraud, they argued Burns would have known or should reasonably have known

of any fraud by August 19, 2017. EMD and White also argued res judicata and

collateral estoppel barred the claims.

      At the end of the hearing, the trial court orally granted EMD and White’s

Rule 91a motion. Later, on October 31, 2022, the court issued a written order of

dismissal. The order of dismissal does not state the grounds for the trial court’s

ruling.

      After the Rule 91a hearing but before the trial court issued its written order

of dismissal, Burns filed an unverified “Motion to Recuse and Disqualification for

Lack of Competence in the Law and Racial Discrimination” seeking the recusal of

Associate Judge Lisa Gonzalez Rogers from the case.8 Burns alleged the trial

court, defense counsel, and the district clerk’s office “conspired together . . . to

deprive [Burns] of the right to jury trial.” Burns acknowledged that his motion was

“based primarily on the erroneous rulings of [the] judge,” which demonstrated the
8
      Associate Judge Lisa Gonzalez Rogers, an associate judge for the 268th District
      Court, heard and ruled on the Rule 91a motion in the Second Lawsuit.

                                         10
judge “lacked impartiality and discriminated against [Burns] based on race,” that

her acts reflected a “lack of competence in the law,” and that she “intentionally and

knowingly conspired with Defendant’s attorney and at least one clerk, acting under

color of law, to prevent the successful prosecution of Plaintiff’s claim against

EMD Supply Inc., et al.” Associate Judge Gonzalez Rogers orally granted Burns’

motion to recuse during a hearing on November 2, 2022.

      On November 30, 2022, Burns filed a second unverified motion to recuse,

this time seeking the recusal of District Judge R. O’Neill Williams.9 Burns argued

the trial court’s “lack of impartiality [was] demonstrated by rulings directly

contradicted by the facts, the record and the applicable laws.” Burns based his

motion in part on the trial court’s order permitting Burns’ former attorney to

withdraw in the First Lawsuit.       Burns alleged the district court judge had

“deliberately conspired” with defense counsel and Burns’ former counsel to

“interfere, intervene, sabotage and otherwise prevent” Burns from recovering

damages from EMD. District Judge Williams orally denied Burns’ second motion

to recuse during an attorney’s fee hearing on December 2, 2022.

      This appeal ensued.

9
      District Judge R. O’Neill Williams presided over the First Lawsuit. It is unclear
      whether he presided over any portion of the Second Lawsuit prior to Judge
      Gonzalez Rogers’ recusal.

                                         11
      Burns’ notice of appeal indicates he is appealing from: (1) the trial court’s

order granting EMD and White’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss and request for

attorney’s fees signed on October 31, 2022; (2) District Judge Williams’ denial of

Burns’ second motion to recuse; and (3) the trial court’s order granting EMD and

White’s request for attorney’s fees signed on December 2, 2022.10

                                Standard of Review

A.    Rule 91a Motion to Dismiss

      Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a allows a party to move for early dismissal

of a cause of action that “has no basis in law or fact.” See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a;

Seger v. Branda, No. 01-21-00224-CV, 2022 WL 17981559, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 29, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.). “A cause of action has

no basis in law if the allegations, taken as true, together with inferences reasonably

drawn from them, do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought.” TEX. R. CIV. P.

91a.1; see also Seger, 2022 WL 17981559, at *3.            There are generally two

circumstances in which a court may determine a cause of action has no basis in

law: (1) when the plaintiff fails to plead a viable, legally cognizable cause of

action, or (2) when the plaintiff has alleged facts that negate entitlement to the

relief requested. See Reaves v. City of Corpus Christi, 518 S.W.3d 594, 608 (Tex.

10
      Burns also seeks to appeal from an order dated November 12, 2022 granting EMD
      and White’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss and request for attorney’s fees. The
      record, however, does not include any order signed on November 12, 2022 either
      granting Appellees’ Rule 91a motion or any other motion.

                                         12
App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2017, no pet.). We review a trial court’s decision

on a Rule 91a motion to dismiss de novo. Bethel v. Quilling, Selander, Lownds,

Winslett & Moser, P.C., 595 S.W.3d 651, 654 (Tex. 2020).

      A court may not consider evidence in ruling on a Rule 91 a motion. It must

“decide the motion based solely on the pleading of the cause of action, together

with any pleading exhibits” allowed by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. TEX.

R. CIV. P. 91a.6; see also Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 654. A Rule 91a motion, however,

may be premised on affirmative defenses. Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 656; Seger, 2022

WL 17981559, at *10 (affirming Rule 91a dismissal based on affirmative defense

of statute of limitations); Smale v. Williams, 590 S.W.3d 633, 635–36 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2019, no pet.) (affirming Rule 91a dismissal based on res

judicata). If an affirmative defense on which a Rule 91a motion is based cannot be

“conclusively established” by the facts pled in the plaintiff’s petition and requires

evidentiary consideration, the defense is “not a proper basis for a [Rule 91a]

motion to dismiss.” Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 656.

B.    Motion to Recuse

      An order denying a motion to recuse is reviewed for abuse of discretion. In

re M.C.M., 57 S.W.3d 27, 33 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied);

TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(j)(1)(A) (“An order denying a motion to recuse may be

reviewed only for abuse of discretion on appeal from the final judgment.”). A trial

                                         13
court abuses its discretion by acting in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner without

reference to any guiding rules or principles. Bowie Mem’l Hosp. v. Wright, 79

S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002). If a party appeals the denial of a motion to recuse

based on alleged bias or impartiality, “the party must show that this bias arose from

an extrajudicial source and not from actions during the pendency of the trial court

proceedings, unless these actions during proceedings indicate a high degree of

favoritism or antagonism that renders fair judgment impossible.” In re M.C.M., 57

S.W.3d at 33.

                                     Analysis

A.    Rule 91a Motion to Dismiss

      At the end of the hearing on EMD and White’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss,

the trial court judge orally granted the motion, stating she found “in favor of the

defense for the statute of limitations regarding the breach of contract and the

DTPA claim[.]” The written order of dismissal later signed by the trial court,

however, states only that EMD and White’s motion to dismiss “is hereby

GRANTED in its entirety.” When, as here, an order granting a Rule 91a motion to

dismiss does not specify the grounds for dismissal, an appellant seeking reversal of

the order “must negate the validity of each ground” on which the trial court could

have granted the motion.     Buholtz v. Gibbs, No. 05-18-00957-CV, 2019 WL

3940973, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 21, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.). “A

                                         14
written order that does not specify grounds controls over any oral pronouncement

made by the court during the hearing.” Estate of Savana, 529 S.W.3d 587, 592–93

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.); see also Shumway v. Whispering

Hills of Comal Cty. Tex. Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc., No. 03-15-00513-CV, 2016

WL 4429939, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 16, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.)

(holding that even though trial court orally pronounced it was granting Rule 91a

motion based on limitations, judge’s written order, which did not specify court’s

reasons for granting motion, controlled for purposes of appellate review).

      1.    DTPA Claim

      In their motion to dismiss, EMD and White argued Burns’ DTPA claim

should be dismissed because Burns had not pled facts addressing the elements of a

DTPA claim or provided EMD and White the statutory notice required before

filing his claim. Burns does not address these asserted grounds for dismissal on

appeal. For this reason alone, his challenge on appeal as to his DPTA claim fails.

See Smart v. Prime Mortg. & Escrow, LLC, 659 S.W.3d 155, 164 (Tex. App.—El

Paso 2022, pet. denied) (affirming Rule 91a dismissal because appellant failed to

challenge every ground upon which trial court could have relied in granting motion

to dismiss), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 533 (2022); see also Emmanuel v. Izoukumor,

611 S.W.3d 453, 458 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (“Since

[appellant] has not challenged every ground upon which the trial court could have

                                         15
relied when granting the motion to dismiss, we must affirm the trial court’s

decision.”).

      In his third issue, Burns merely argues the trial court had probable cause to

believe EMD and White violated the DTPA, and in his sixth issue, he argues the

trial court abused its discretion in failing to properly apply the DTPA’s two-year

statute of limitations.   Burns does not provide any analysis or any detailed

discussion to support his arguments. Burns thus waived his DTPA claim on

appeal. See Guimaraes v. Brann, 562 S.W.3d 521, 537–38 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (stating that failure to provide substantive analysis of

issues presented results in waiver of complaint on appeal); Marin Real Estate

Partners, L.P. v. Vogt, 373 S.W.3d 57, 75 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.)

(“A failure to provide substantive analysis of an issue waives the complaint.”);

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (requiring appellant’s brief to contain “a clear and concise

argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to

the record”). And even if Burns had not waived his complaint, we overrule his

issues on this point.

        Even liberally construing Burns’ arguments on appeal, we hold the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Burns’ DTPA claim.11 To prevail

11
      Li v. Pemberton Park Cmty. Ass’n, 631 S.W.3d 701, 706 (Tex. 2021) (per curiam)
      (stating that courts should review and evaluate pro se pleadings with “liberality
      and patience”).

                                          16
on a DTPA claim, the plaintiff must prove (1) he is a consumer; (2) the defendant

engaged in false, misleading, or deceptive acts specifically enumerated in Section

17.46(b) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code,12 engaged in an

unconscionable course of action,13 breached an express or implied warranty, or

violated Chapter 541 of the Texas Insurance Code,14 and (3) the defendant’s act

was a producing cause of the plaintiff’s injury.            TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE

§ 17.50(a); Malik v. GEICO Advantage Ins. Co., Inc., No. 01-19-00489-CV, 2021

WL 1414275, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 15, 2021, pet. denied)

(mem. op.); Bus. Staffing, Inc. v. Jackson Hot Oil Serv., 401 S.W.3d 224, 236

(Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, pet. denied).

      The DTPA defines “consumer” as “an individual . . . who seeks or acquires

by purchase or lease, any goods or services[.]”             TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE

§ 17.45(4); Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 649 (Tex. 1996). To

establish status as a DTPA consumer, the plaintiff must establish he (1) “sought or
12
      Section 17.46(b) of the Business and Commerce Code enumerates a “laundry list”
      of thirty-four “false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices” that are prohibited
      by the DTPA. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.46(b).
13
      An “[u]nconscionable action or course of action” is “an act or practice which, to a
      consumer’s detriment, takes advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability,
      experience, or capacity of the consumer to a grossly unfair degree.” Malik v.
      GEICO Advantage Ins. Co., Inc., No. 01-19-00489-CV, 2021 WL 1414275, at *7
      (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 15, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing
      TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.45).
14
      Chapter 541 of the Insurance Code prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices
      in conducting the business of insurance.” Malik, 2021 WL 1414275, at *7 (citing
      TEX. INS. CODE § 541.003).

                                            17
acquired goods or services by purchase or lease,” and (2) “the goods and services

in question must form the basis of the plaintiff’s complaint.”        Jones v. Star

Houston, Inc., 45 S.W.3d 350, 356 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.)

(quoting Thompson v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 902 S.W.2d 13, 19 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ)).15 The consumer must allege the defendant

violated a specific provision of the DTPA in his petition. Amstadt, 919 S.W.2d at

649.

       In support of his DTPA claim, Burns’ original petition states only:

       [E]ither James A. White was authorized to enter into an oral contract
       agreement with Plaintiff as the CEO of EMD Supply Inc. or James A.
       White lacked the authority.

       i.    Moreover, James A. White either misrepresented facts to
             mislead Plaintiff into believing that a binding oral contract
             existed between them; or, entered into an oral contract
             agreement with the Plaintiff with no intentions of keeping the
             oral contract portion of the agreement. That Plaintiff relied on
             Defendant’s promise is obvious.

       ii.   In either case, EMD Supply Inc. is liable for the $60,000 in
             damages caused by the failure of James A. White to produce a
             functional prototype of Plaintiff’s invention; under: Respondeat
             Superior.

Burns’ petition does not establish he is a consumer for purposes of the DTPA. He

does not establish he “sought or acquired goods” by purchase or lease from EMD

15
       The determination of whether one is a consumer under the DTPA is a question of
       law. Marshall v. Enter. Bank, No. 10-16-00379-CV, 2018 WL 4224078, at *3
       (Tex. App.—Waco Sept. 5, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

                                         18
and White. Nor does the petition identify any provision of the DTPA that Burns

claims EMD and White violated or allege Burns relied to his detriment on any of

the actionable representations identified in Section 17.46. See TEX. BUS. & COM.

CODE § 17.46(b) (identifying “laundry list” of thirty-four “false, misleading, or

deceptive acts or practices” prohibited by DTPA). Given these shortcomings, the

trial court properly dismissed his DTPA claim under Rule 91a. See DeVoll v.

Demonbreun, No. 04-14-00116-CV, 2014 WL 7440314, at *2 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio Dec. 31, 2014, no pet.) (holding Rule 91a motion properly granted as to

DTPA claim when plaintiff failed to alleged facts showing he was consumer as to

goods or services provided by defendant); Teel v. Autonation Motors, LLC, No. 02-

20-00419-CV, 2022 WL 123217, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 13, 2022, no

pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming trial court’s Rule 91a dismissal of DTPA claim when

plaintiff failed to allege he relied on any Section 17.46(b) representation to his

detriment).

      We overrule Burns’ third and sixth issues.

      2.      Breach of Contract

      Although the trial court’s dismissal of Burns’ contract claim is not

specifically identified in his appellate issues, Burns complains on appeal that

Associate District Judge Gonzalez “failed to analyze and apply the law correctly to

the facts of this case.” Burns argues that his “legal position is based on an ORAL

                                        19
CONTRACT AGREEMENT. Said oral contract agreement happened prior to the

letter of intent.” We liberally construe Burns’ argument as complaining of the trial

court’s order granting Appellees’ motion to dismiss his contract claim.

      EMD and White argued in their Rule 91a motion to dismiss that Burns’

breach of contract claim failed because the alleged oral contract lacked the

essential terms required for contract formation. To establish a claim for breach of

contract, a plaintiff must establish (1) the existence of a valid contract between the

plaintiff and defendant, (2) the tender of performance by plaintiff, (3) defendant’s

breach of the contract terms, and (4) damages resulting from the breach. AMS

Const. Co., Inc. v. K.H.K. Scaffolding Houston, Inc., 357 S.W.3d 30, 41 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. dism’d). The elements of a written or oral

contract consist of (1) an offer, (2) acceptance of the offer, (3) a meeting of the

minds, (4) consent by each party to the terms, and (5) execution and delivery of the

contract with the intent it be mutual and binding. Tyco Valves & Controls, L.P. v.

Colorado, 365 S.W.3d 750, 771 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012), aff’d on

other grounds, 432 S.W.3d 885 (Tex. 2014).

      For a contract to be enforceable, “the terms of the contract must be

sufficiently certain to enable a court to determine the rights and responsibilities of

the parties.” APMD Holdings, Inc. v. Praesidium Med. Prof’l Liab. Ins. Co., 555

S.W.3d 697, 707 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.); see Fort Worth

                                         20
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Fort Worth, 22 S.W.3d 831, 846 (Tex. 2000) (“In

general, a contract is legally binding only if its terms are sufficiently definite to

enable a court to understand the parties’ obligations.”). In Fort Worth Independent

School District, the Supreme Court held:

      [A]n agreement to make a future contract is enforceable only if it is
      “specific as to all essential terms, and no terms of the proposed
      agreement may be left to future negotiations.” It is well settled law
      that when an agreement leaves material matters open for future
      adjustment and agreement that never occur, it is not binding upon the
      parties and merely constitutes an agreement to agree.

Id. “Essential terms” are terms the parties “would reasonably regard as vitally

important elements of their bargain.” Gen. Metal Fabricating Corp. v. Stergiou,

438 S.W.3d 737, 744 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Further,

even if the parties’ intent to agree is clear, “the agreement’s terms must be

sufficiently definite to permit the court to understand the parties’ obligations and

give an appropriate remedy for a breach.” Burns I, 2022 WL 2311621 at *5 (citing

Fischer v. CTMI, L.L.C., 479 S.W.3d 231, 237 (Tex. 2016)).

      The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held in Burns I that the Letter of Intent

lacked essential terms “such as the price, the specific performance promised, and

the timing of said performance.” 2022 WL 2311621 at *6. The court concluded

the Letter of Intent “fail[ed] for indefiniteness” because it lacked “essential terms

providing how [the court] would enforce each of the parties’ rights.” Id. It held

                                         21
the Letter of Intent “was no more than an indefinite indication of interest in

negotiating toward a contract in the future.” Id.

       Like the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, we conclude Burns’ claim for breach

of an oral contract fails because to the extent there was any such contract, the

contract lacks essential terms. Burns alleged in his petition that EMD and White

“orally offered” him “(i) $30,000.00 in services; (ii) 15% to 20% of commercial

sales; and (iii) [to p]roduce a functional prototype before the expiration date of

[Burns’] patent.” These terms are not “sufficiently definite” to allow a court to

understand the parties’ obligations and provide an appropriate remedy for the

breach. See id. at *5.

      As EMD and White stated in their motion to dismiss, the first term of the

purported contract refers to a payment of $30,000 in “services,” but Burns’ petition

does not “specify, clarify, or define what services” Appellees offered under the

alleged contract. Burn’s petition refers only to an offer to provide “$30,000 in

services.” There is no indication what services were offered.

      EMD and White also argued in their Rule 91a motion that Burns’ allegation

he would receive fifteen to twenty percent of sales under the purported contract

indicates only “that there would be a future conversation and contract with defined

terms.” In other words, they argue the oral promise was merely an agreement to

agree in the future and not a binding contract. We agree. “It is well settled law

                                         22
that when an agreement leaves material matters open for future adjustment and

agreement that never occur, it is not binding upon the parties and merely

constitutes an agreement to agree.” Fischer, 479 S.W.3d at 237 (quoting Fort

Worth Indep. Sch. Dist., 22 S.W.3d at 846). An agreement to make a future

agreement is “nugatory” if it is not “sufficiently definite as to all of the future

agreement’s essential and material terms.” Fischer, 479 S.W.3d at 237 (citing

Radford v. McNeny, 104 S.W.2d 472, 474–75 (Tex. 1937)). To be enforceable, an

agreement to agree “must specify all its material and essential terms, and leave

none to be agreed upon as the result of future negotiations.” Fischer, 479 S.W.3d

at 237 (quoting Radford, 104 S.W.2d at 475).

      Assuming without deciding there was an oral agreement between the parties,

we conclude it was merely an agreement to agree on some definite terms in the

future, and not a binding contract. Indeed, Burns almost alleges as much when he

states in his petition that “it was mutually understood that a functional prototype

had to be produced before the expiration date of Plaintiff’s patent; and, that after

Defendant had produced the functional prototype a more formal written contract

agreement, between Plaintiff and Defendant, would be drafted; which would

include all peripheral costs for mass production, packaging, advertising and

distribution.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, even if there was an oral agreement, the

                                        23
agreement was no more than an indefinite indication of interest in negotiating

toward a contract in the future.

      We hold the trial court did not err in granting EMD and White’s motion to

dismiss Burns’ breach of contract claim. We overrule Burns’ issue.

B.    The Motion to Recuse

      In his seventh issue, Burns complains of District Judge Williams’ failure to

recuse himself. Although there is no written order denying Burns’ motion to

recuse District Judge Williams, the trial court orally denied the motion during a

hearing on December 2, 2022. Burns argues in his appellate brief that the trial

court’s “acts or omissions in “Appellant’s earlier breach of contract claim”

constituted conspiracy, bias against Burns, “[b]ias against the law,” and “[l]ack of

[c]ompetence in the law.” He further argues that District Judge Williams’ “failure

to act” violated the Texas Constitution and violated Rule 18b of the Texas Rules of

Civil Procedure.16

      Burns waived this issue because his motion to recuse was not verified as

required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a(a)(1). Failure to comply with Rule

18a results in waiver of the appeal of a judge’s failure to recuse himself. See

Vickery v. Tex. Carpet Co. Inc., 792 S.W.2d 759, 763 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (“[A] party who fails to comply with Rule 18a waives his

16
      Rule 18b enumerates the grounds for which a judge must recuse himself from a
      case. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18b(b).

                                        24
right to complain of a judge’s failure to recuse himself.”); Barron v. State Atty.

Gen., 108 S.W.3d 379, 382 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2003, no pet.) (“The procedural

requisites for recusal in Rule 18a(a) are mandatory, and a party who fails to

conform waives his right to complain of a judge’s failure to recuse himself.”);

Garcia v. Tex. Workforce Comm’n, No. 09-18-00375-CV, 2020 WL 5805950, at

*3 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 30, 2020, no pet.) (“[B]ecause Garcia failed to file

a verified motion to recuse the judge, he waived any right to complain about the

ruling the trial court made on his motion to recuse.”); McElwee v. McElwee, 911

S.W.2d 182, 185 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (“Recusal

may be waived if it is not raised by a proper motion.”).

      We overrule Burns’ seventh issue.

C.    Burns’ Remaining Issues on Appeal

      While we liberally construe pro se briefs, pro se litigants are held to the

same standards as licensed attorneys and are required to comply with all applicable

rules of procedure. Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex.

1978); Garrett v. Lee, No. 01-21-00498-CV, 2021 WL 5702177, at *2 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 2, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (same); see also

Hopes-Fontenot v. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co., No. 01-12-00286-CV, 2013

WL 4399218, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 15, 2013, no pet.) (mem.

op.) (pro se litigant must properly present case on appeal; reviewing court “may

                                         25
not make allowances or apply different standards for litigants appearing without

. . . counsel”). A pro se appellant “bears the burden of discussing his assertions of

error and pointing the appellate court to the portions of the record that support his

complaints.” Yoonessi v. D’Arcy, No. 05-07-00689-CV, 2008 WL 4981631, at *1

(Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 25, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

      Burns raised eight issues on appeal and devoted only three pages of his brief

to summarize and explain his arguments. Burns’ arguments, which at times are

difficult to understand, do not correspond to his remaining issues on appeal. See

Hornbuckle v. State Farm Ins., No. 02-15-00387-CV, 2016 WL 5957020, at *2–3

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 13, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding complaints

waived due to inadequate briefing where, among other things, arguments did not

correspond to issues asserted); M.D. Mark, Inc. v. PIHI P’ship, No. 01-98-00724-

CV, 2001 WL 619604, at *12 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 7, 2001, no

pet.) (not designated for publication) (holding complaints were not properly before

appellate court where brief did not contain argument and authority section

corresponding to points of error).

      Burns also fails to identify the arguments for each of his remaining issues

and he does not analyze or cite specific authority in support of his remaining

issues. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i) requires an appellant’s brief to

contains “a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate

                                         26
citations to authorities and to the record.” TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). “This is not

done by merely uttering brief conclusory statements, unsupported by legal

citations.” Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 106 S.W.3d 118,

128 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). “A failure to provide

substantive analysis of an issue or cite appropriate authority waives a complaint on

appeal.”   Hooks v. Brenham Hous. Auth., No. 01-17-00602-CV, 2018 WL

6061307, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 20, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(holding appellate issues waived because, among other things, argument did not

correspond to questions designated as issues on appeal).

      Because Burns’ remaining issues on appeal do not correspond to his

arguments, and because he further failed to adequately brief his issues and cite to

relevant authority, we hold Burns waived his remaining issues on appeal. And

even if his remaining issues were not waived, we conclude they lack merit.

      In his first and second issues, Burns complains of purported acts or

omissions by District Judge Williams in the First Lawsuit. Burns’ challenges to

the First Lawsuit were already appealed and decided adversely to Burns by the

Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Burns I. We thus lack jurisdiction to review

Burns’ first and second issues. See Hassell Constr. Co. Inc. v. Springwoods Realty

Co., No. 01-17-00822-CV, 2023 WL 2377488, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] Mar. 7, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding argument regarding previous

                                        27
lawsuit, which was fully adjudicated in separate appeal, was not properly before

appellate court).

      In his fourth issue, Burns complains of the trial court’s failure to “hear or

rule on Appellant’s Motion to Strike Non-Jury Trial and Demand for Jury Trial.”

Because there is no order from which to appeal, we have nothing to review. And

even if the motion was implicitly denied,17 the issue is not before us because it was

not identified in Burns’ notice of appeal. See Ortiz v. St. Teresa Nursing & Rehab.

Ctr., LLC, 579 S.W.3d 696, 702 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, pet. denied) (“[W]e

are precluded from considering an appeal from an order never identified in the

notice of appeal.”) (quoting TEX. R. APP. P. 25.1(b) (“The filing of a notice of

appeal by any party invokes the appellate court’s jurisdiction over all parties to the

trial court’s judgment or order appealed from.”) (emphasis in original)). We

overrule Burns’ fourth issue.

      In his fifth issue, Burns complains that Associate Judge Gonzalez Rogers

violated the Texas Constitution by her failure to “preserve, protect and defend.”

17
      During the hearing on EMD and White’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss, the trial
      court stated the motion for jury trial was “moot because the case is dismissed.”
      Cf. Houston v. State, No. 06-11-00115-CR, 2012 WL 1939796, at *2 (Tex. App.—
      Texarkana May 30, 2012, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
      (“When an objection is brought to the trial court’s attention, we will find the trial
      court made an implicit ruling on the objection only when ‘the trial court’s
      subsequent action clearly addressed the complaint.’”) (citation omitted); West v.
      SMG, 318 S.W.3d 430, 436 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.)
      (holding when trial court granted motion for summary judgment, it implicitly
      overruled nonmovant’s motion for continuance).

                                           28
Here again, there is no order from which to appeal and no indication of how or

why Judge Gonzales Rogers “violated” the Constitution or failed in any respect.

To the extent this issue relates to an order of Judge Gonzalez Rogers, such order is

not identified in Burns’ notice of appeal. See Ortiz, 579 S.W.3d at 702; Jones v.

Port Arthur Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 09-16-00374-CV, 2018 WL 3149162, at *1 n.2

(Tex. App.—Beaumont June 28, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (declining to address

issue related to order that was not identified in notice of appeal) (citing TEX. R.

APP. P. 25.1(d)). We overrule Burns’ fifth issue.

      Finally, Burns complains in his eighth issue that fraud, fraudulent

concealment, and fraudulent inducement “apply to this case.” These arguments

concern Burns’ arguments that his claims were not time-barred and thus not

subject to dismissal under Rule 91a based on limitations.            We have already

concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Burns’ claims

because (1) his breach of contract claim lacked essential terms; and (2) Burns

failed to plead facts addressing the elements of his DTPA claim. We thus need not

reach Burns’ eighth issue concerning fraud, fraudulent concealment, and fraudulent

inducement, which related to his limitations arguments.18

18
      In his Notice of Appeal, Burns also complains about the trial court’s order
      granting EMD and White’s request for attorney’s fees signed on December 2,
      2022. But in his appellate brief, Burns does raise any issues concerning the
      attorney’s fee award. That issue is thus not before us. See San Jacinto River Auth.
      v. Duke, 783 S.W.2d 209, 209–10 (Tex. 1990) (noting “well-established rule that
                                          29
                                     Conclusion

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                Veronica Rivas-Molloy
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Landau and Rivas-Molloy.

      grounds of error not asserted by points of error or argument in the court of appeals
      are waived”); Jacobs v. Satterwhite, 65 S.W.3d 653, 655–56 (Tex. 2001) (holding
      failure to raise issue on appeal waives error).

                                           30