Court Opinion

ID: 9713825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:23:16.962042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:20.662208
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Bowen, J.
I cannot agree with the majority opinion in this case. The majority opinion recognizes that “a union’s attempt to organize a group of employees and the unwillingness of such employees to be organized constitutes a labor dispute” within the meaning of the Anti-Injunction Act, §40-501, et seq. Burns’ 1952 Replacement. By the definition of terms contained in such Act, §40-513, Burns’ 1952 Replacement, it is stated:
“The term ‘labor dispute’ includes any controversy concerning any terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or repre*68sentation of persons . . . seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.” (Our emphasis)
For this court to hold that the appellants in the instant case were not engaged in any controversy concerning the association or representation of persons seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment seems, in my humble opinion, to constitute a denial of the undisputed evidence in the record before us. About a year ago the appellant union had received membership applications of all persons then employed by the appellee, and at the time of the picketing still there was one employee who held a membership card in the union. Considering the circumstances of the termination'" of employment of those who had signed cards, and the fact that the payroll of the appellee consisted of only eight to ten employees, the fact that there was one employee, or if there had been seven or eight employees who held membership in the union does not make any difference in principle. Our statute defining a labor dispute specifically provides that it makes no difference whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. There is certainly undisputed evidence in the record which shows organizational activities prior to the time of this picketing by the union, with specifically named employees of the appellee.
Furthermore, the court found that the picketing in question was enjoined contrary to the provisions of the Anti-Injunction law of Indiana, was “peaceful and without violence and consisted of not more than six persons at one time, with only two pickets the majority of said time.” The lower court’s finding and decision does not furnish a basis for the decision of this court on appeal by reason of the fact that the lower court in *69Finding No. 22 asserted “That there was no labor dispute between the plaintiff and its employees and the defendant union or its members”. Such finding wholly ignores organizational picketing which is clearly recognized by the Anti-Injunction statute, and the finding that there was no labor dispute between the company and its employees or between the union and its members was not a finding that there was no labor dispute cr controversy concerning the association or representation of persons seeking collective bargaining with the appellee. As to the real issue involved herein, such findings were wholly immaterial, and they do not constitute findings that there was not a labor dispute based upon the right to organizational picketing under the Anti-Injunction statute. The lower court seems to have based its decision upon the ground that the picketing, although peaceful and lawful, should be enjoined because it tended to create some economic coercion if permitted to continue, and the decision of this court in upholding such injunction, in my opinion, is directly contrary to the legislative policy of this state and the uniform decisions of the higher courts of this state in passing upon such matters and in interpreting the Anti-Injunction statute. The public policy of this state in such matters to guide courts in the interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act is declared by our legislature as follows:
“Whereas, under prevailing economic conditions,, developed with the aid of governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate and other forms of ownership associations, the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, though he should be free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-*70organization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; therefore, the following definition of, and limitations upon, the jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the state of Indiana are hereby enacted.”
Acts 1933, ch. 12, §2, p. 28, §40-502, Burns’ 1952 Replacement.
The constitutional right of peaceful picketing is clearly recognized by an unbroken line of decisions in this state. In the first pronouncement of this court on this subject, Vonderschmitt v. McGuire (1935), 100 Ind. App. 632, 195 N. E. 585, involving a case in which movie operators who were not employees of a theatre in Bloomington, Indiana, picketed such theatre carrying signs bearing the inscription that the theatre was unfair to organized labor, Judge Curtis, writing the opinion of this court, overruled the contentions of the employer in the following words:
“There is no allegation that the appellees were going beyond the scope of peaceful picketing. This they had a right to do. There is no allegation that the picketing was accompanied by any unlawful acts.”
The Supreme Court speaking through Judge Treanor in Scofes v. Helmar (1933), 205 Ind. 596, 187 N. E. 662, stated:
“That the receipts from their business were reduced $50 to $60 per day was the result experienced by appellants and desired by appellees in order to attain what, it is agreed, was the ultimate objects of the picketing, to cause appellants to agree to employ only union members and to pay *71the rate of compensation and conform to the working conditions adopted by the union.”
It is also stated in this opinion that the evidence established “that the immediate purpose in picketing was to cause appellants’ employees to quit their employment and to cause appellants’ patrons to withhold their patronage, and to render more difficult the obtaining of supplies with which to' conduct appellants’ business,.... We are of the opinion that the foregoing objects legally justify picketing, if lawfully conducted, even though such picketing may cause pecuniary loss to the business picketed.” (Our emphasis). Citing Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated, etc., Union (1905), 165 Ind. 421, 75 N. E. 477. Judge Treanor further stated:
“We think the present state of the law in Indiana respecting picketing is substantially in accord with the following judicial expressions:
“‘The court of appeals has for many years been disposed to leave the parties to peaceful labor disputes unmolested when economic rather than legal questions were involved. The employer, if threatened in his business life by the violence of the unions or by other wrongful acts might have the aid of the court to preserve himself from damage threatened by recourse to unlawful means, but the right of workmen to organize to better their conditions has been fully recognized. The fact that such action may result in incidental injury to the employer does not in itself constitute a justification for issuing an injunction against such acts. The interests of capital and labor are at times inimical and the courts may not decide controversies between the parties so long as neither resorts to violence, deceit or misrepresentation to bring about the desired results. Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v. Kaplan (1932), 259 N. Y. 405, 182 N. E. 63.
“ ‘Economic organization today is not based on the single shop. Unions believe that wages may be increased, collective bargaining maintained only if union conditions prevail, not in some single factory, but generally. That they may prevail it may *72call a strike and picket the premises of an employer with the intent of inducing him to employ only union labor. And it may adopt either method separately. Picketing without a strike is no more unlawful than a strike without picketing. Both are based upon a lawful purpose. Resulting injury is incidental and must be endured. Exchange Bakery & Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin (1927), 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130.
“ ‘Whether picketing is unlawful or lawful, depends in each particular case upon the conduct of the pickets themselves. . . . Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated, etc., Union, supra.’ ”
This court held in Spickelmier v. Chambers (1943), 113 Ind. App. 470, 47 N. E. 2d 189, a case in which the appellant’s employees were not members of any union and had no desire to become members of any union, that nevertheless the necessary elements of a labor dispute existed as defined by the statutes in force then. Such statutes are now in force for our consideration in the instant case. Furthermore, Judge Draper upheld the right of peaceful picketing, stating in such opinion that .“picketing is a form of economic coercion which can be upheld only when some lawful justification for its exercise exists.” (Our emphasis). The picketing in the Spickelmier case, which consisted of pickets carrying the banner “This Place is Unfair to Organized Labor” was held to be entirely lawful in the following words of such opinion: “In our opinion the evidence in this case does not show that the picketing was conducted for such an unlawful purpose as to taint and render unlawful the acts done in the furtherance thereof.”
The United States Supreme Court in the case of American Federation of Labor v. Swing (1941), 312 U. S. 321, said:
“A state cannot exclude working men from peácéfully exercising the right of free communication by *73drawing the circle of economic competition between employers so small as to contain only an employer and those directly employed by him..... The right of free communication cannot therefore be mutilated by denying it to workers, in a dispute with an employer, even though they are not in his employ.”
In Thornhill v. Alabama, (1940), 310 U. S. 88, the court struck down an anti-picketing statute in a state which attempted to prohibit organizational picketing in cases where the pickets were not employees of the business, and extended the constitutional safeguards announced in the Swing case, supra.
As the law now exists in this state, in my opinion, this court is without authority by reason of the Supreme Court decisions of this state and the overwhelming weight of authority in the country to enjoin lawful peaceful picketing merely because of the fact that it will indirectly result in economic coercion. In fact it can hardly be conceived in any case where peaceful picketing is employed that it would not result in economic coercion. Courts have uniformly held that picketing is an exercise of a right of free speech guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. Building Service Union v. Gazzam (1950), 339 U. S. 532; Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos (1943), 319 U. S. 778; Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local v. Wohl (1942), 315 U. S. 769; American Federation of Labor v. Swing, supra; Carlson v. California (1940), 310 U. S. 106; Thornhill v. Alabama, supra; Senn v. Tile Layers Union (1937), 301 U. S. 468.
The appellee in the instant case relies on the case of Building Service Union v. Gazzam, supra. However, Justice Minton in writing the opinion in the Gazzam case distinguishes it from the Swing case, supra, and states:
*74“Peaceful picketing for any lawful purpose is not prohibited by the decree under review. The state has not here, as in Swing relied on the absence of an employer-employee relationship. Thus the State has not, as was the case there, excluded ‘workmen from peacefully exercising the right of free communication by drawing the circle of economic competition between employers and workers so small as to contain only an employer and those directly employed by him.’ ”
The opinion further recites that “There was no injunction against picketing generally.” In the Gazzam case, supra, the only difference existing between the employer and the union was the refusal of the employer to sign a contract requiring his employees to join the union, which act would have been in violation of a Washington statute. By the express words of the Supreme Court the Swing case, supra, was not overruled nor is it authority for the injunction issued in the instant case.
Furthermore, this court a little more than a year ago, in a case which involved similar facts, in my opinion, held directly opposite to the holding in the instant case. Teamsters Local No. 364, etc. v. Stewart’s Bakery (1955), 125 Ind. App. 174, 123 N. E. 2d 468. In the Stewart case this court stated:
“If we consider these allegations in aid of the temporary injunction involved it is clear that it enjoins the appellant from picketing the appellee’s place of business in a peaceful manner and for a lawful purpose as well as otherwise. Such an injunction, even if only temporary, is contrary to law as it has long since become the settled law of this state that picketing, in connection with a labor dispute, without resort to threats, force, intimidation, fraud or other unlawful means is a proper exercise of the right of free speech and peaceable assemblage. Roth v. Local Union No. 1460 of Retail Clerks Union (1940), 216 Ind. 363, 24 N. E. 280; Vonderschmitt v. McGuire (1935), 100 Ind. App. 632, 195 N. E. 585.” (Our emphasis).
*75This court recognized the existence of a labor dispute in the Stewart case, supra, under circumstances in which this court could very well have employed the same reasoning as has been applied to the facts of the case at bar. In the instant case, as in the Stewart’s Bakery case, supra, the injunction enjoins the appellant “from continuing and maintaining the picket line existing in front of the driveway and warehouse premises of the appellee”. There can be no question that it enjoins the appellant from picketing the appellee’s place of business in a peaceful manner and for a lawful purpose as well as otherwise; and as this court, less than a year ago, in the Stewart’s Bakery case, supra, using the same language as contained in the sentence last above, went on to say: “Such an injunction, even if only temporary, is contrary to law as it has long since become the settled law of this state that picketing, in connection with a labor dispute, without resort to threats, force, intimidation, fraud or other unlawful means is a proper exercise of the right of free speech and peaceable assemblage.” Citing cases. (Our emphasis.) The court in the case at bar found that “the picketing was peaceful and without violence” nor was there a finding of any other acts other than the so-called “economic coercion” present in the facts before us.
There are no specific unlawful acts enjoined in the instant case, and as this court stated in the Stewart’s Bakery case, supra, “Ordinarily an injunction which does not specify what specific acts are under restraint is too vague and uncertain to be enforcible.” Citing 43 C. J. S., Injunctions, §§206b, p. 932.
To hold that there must be some resistance on the part of the employer or an unwillingness on the part of the employees to organizational efforts on the part of a *76union would lead to a complete denial of the right of peaceful picketing and would tend to encourage rather than discourage peaceful organizational measures. There would be no need for peaceful picketing in the event the employees were willing to join the union. Hidden within the verbiage of this present decision is an indirect result, that organizational efforts under the circumstances of this record, would have to be confined to visits to the individual employees since the unions have no right to enter upon the premises of the employer to engage in organizational activities, and to deny the right of peaceful picketing as this court has done in this case, in my opinion, constitutes a prohibition against peaceful picketing. By reason of the fact that such right of peaceful picketing is recognized by the guarantee of free speech in our federal and state constitutions, by the declared public policy of this state, and the decisions of our courts of last resort in this state and in the country generally, in my opinion, this court has fallen into error and inconsistency.
In my opinion the judgment of the lower court herein should have been reversed.
Kelley, J., concurs in dissent.
Note. — Reported in 132 N. E. 2d 715.
Transfer denied, Achor, Acting C. J.