Court Opinion

ID: 9955936
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 19:02:21.466627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:41.191524
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/29/24 State of California ex rel. Campfield v. Safelite Group CA1/4
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                            FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FOUR

 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ex
 rel. RICHARD CAMPFIELD,
           Plaintiff and Appellant,                           A168101

 v.                                                           (San Francisco City &
 SAFELITE GROUP, INC., et                                     County Super. Ct. No.
 al.,                                                         CGC-20-585404)
           Defendants and
           Respondents.

          Richard Campfield, as relator for the State of California,
appeals after the trial court sustained the demurrer of
defendants Safelite Group, Inc. and its subsidiaries, Safelite
Solutions LLC and Safelite Fulfillment, Inc. (collectively,
Safelite) without leave to amend on statute of limitations
grounds. Campfield contends he adequately alleged a cause of
action under the Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (Ins. Code,
§ 1871 et seq.) (IFPA) within the statute of limitations. We will
affirm the judgment on the alternative ground that Campfield’s
complaint fails to allege with particularity facts constituting a
cause of action under the IFPA.

                                                      1
                         BACKGROUND
      Because this appeal comes to us after the trial court
sustained Safelite’s demurrer without leave to amend, we draw
the relevant facts from the complaint. (Wilson v. Hynek (2012)
207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1002.)
      Campfield owns a windshield repair company that licenses
and sells products for repairing vehicle windshield cracks.
Safelite is the nation’s largest retailer of vehicle glass repair and
replacement services. Safelite also serves as the third party
administrator for over 175 insurance and fleet companies,
including 23 of the top 30 insurers in California and the country,
for processing and adjusting policyholders’ vehicle glass damage
claims, and it has direct electronic access to over 20 insurance
company databases.1
      Beginning in the 1970s, the windshield repair industry
believed it was infeasible to repair cracks longer than six inches
and that such a crack required replacement of the windshield.
Consistent with this belief, for years Safelite used this rule in its
marketing materials. In 2005, an industry standards committee
that included Campfield and a Safelite employee adopted a
standard allowing repair of cracks up to and including 14 inches
long. The American National Standards Institute approved the

      1 The complaint occasionally differentiates between Safelite

Fulfillment, Inc. as the windshield repair and replacement
service provider and Safelite Solutions LLC as the third party
administrator. At other times, however, the complaint refers
generically to Safelite as conducting both activities. We will also
refer generally to Safelite regardless of which subsidiary
performs any specific activity.

                                  2
14-inch standard in 2007 and approved an updated version in
2014.
        Windshield repair generally costs less than $150, while
windshield replacement in older cars costs less than $500 and in
newer cars can cost $1,500 or more. Windshield repair is also
safer than replacement because a windshield is important for
safety reasons and the factory seal between a windshield and a
vehicle is stronger than the seal on a replacement windshield.
Accordingly, as a result of the new 14-inch standard, insurers
began pushing for repair of cracks longer than six inches. But
because windshield replacement is more profitable for Safelite
than repair, Safelite continued to insist that repair of cracks
longer than six inches was not safe. Safelite maintained the six-
inch rule in discussions with insurers, educational materials for
insurance agents, and general marketing materials. Safelite’s
campaign was a success, as no insurer in the United States for
which Safelite acts as the third party administrator has adopted
the 14-inch standard.
        In 2015, Campfield sued Safelite in federal district court in
Ohio, alleging Safelite’s continued reliance on its six-inch rule
violated the Lanham Act’s (15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.) prohibition
on false advertising. Through discovery in that action, Campfield
uncovered internal Safelite documents demonstrating Safelite’s
knowledge that the six-inch rule was baseless. For example, in
2007, Safelite told insurers that it was not safe to repair a
windshield with a crack longer than six inches, even though it
privately admitted that safety was “not an issue.” In 2008,

                                   3
Safelite executives discussed that repair of windshield cracks up
to 24 inches long could be safe and viable. Safelite admitted in
responses to interrogatories in the Ohio action that it has never
conducted studies on the safety or viability of repair of cracks
longer than six inches.
      Discovery in the Ohio action revealed how Safelite flooded
the market with false statements about the six-inch rule.
Safelite makes these misrepresentations through statements to
the media by senior Safelite leadership, advertisements, news
releases, statements on Safelite’s website, videos on its website
and YouTube, brochures distributed to individual consumers and
insurance agents, and statements by call center representatives
and repair technicians. When Safelite acts as an insurer’s third
party administrator, a policyholder using the insurer’s website to
file a claim for windshield damage is forwarded to Safelite’s
website containing this misinformation. Safelite includes the
statements in materials it prepares for insurance companies that
it contracts with, which present the statements as their own.
Safelite also presents the information to insurance companies
and their agents in training bulletins.
      The owner of a windshield repair shop testified in a
deposition in the Ohio action. He interacts with large insurance
companies, including Farmers, Allstate, Liberty Mutual,
Progressive, Geico, Ameriprise, and 21st Century. Except for
Ameriprise, all of these companies use Safelite as their third
party administrator. None of these companies covers the repair
of windshield cracks longer than six inches due to Safelite’s false

                                 4
statements about the safety and durability of such repairs.
According to this shop owner, the insurance companies that use
Safelite to handle their glass claims do not know how “ruthless”
Safelite is.
      On July 15, 2020, Campfield filed under seal the complaint
in the present action against Safelite, alleging a single qui tam
cause of action for violation of the IFPA. The Insurance
Commissioner and the San Francisco County District Attorney
declined to intervene, so in September 2022 the trial court
unsealed the complaint. At the initial case management
conference, the trial court stayed all discovery pending decision
on a demurrer Safelite intended to file. Campfield therefore did
not attempt to enforce subpoenas he had issued to third parties.
      Safelite then demurred, arguing, among other things, that
the complaint failed to allege facts constituting a cause of action
under the IFPA, Campfield failed to plead his claim with
sufficient particularity, and the statute of limitations barred the
complaint. In support of the statute of limitations argument,
Safelite pointed out that Campfield had filed a lawsuit in 2003
against an insurer and its third party administrator raising the
same argument about the viability of repairing cracks longer
than six inches (Campfield v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
(10th Cir. 2008) 532 F.3d 1111, 1116), as well as two suits against
Safelite in 2004 and the 2015 Ohio action raising the same
allegations. After briefing and a hearing, the trial court
sustained the demurrer without leave to amend based on the
statute of limitations and noted that Safelite had raised

                                 5
“substantial arguments” that the complaint had not stated a
cognizable claim and that the action was barred by the IFPA’s
public disclosure bar. The trial court then dismissed the action.
                          DISCUSSION
I.    Legal Background and Standard of Review
      “The IFPA was enacted to prevent automobile and workers’
compensation insurance fraud in order to, among other things,
‘significantly reduce the incidence of severity and automobile
insurance claim payments and . . . therefore produce a
commensurate reduction in automobile insurance premiums.’ ”
(People ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Discovery Radiology Physicians,
P.C. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 521, 542 (Discovery Radiology).)
“[T]he IFPA contains a qui tam provision that allows any
interested person to bring an action for damages and penalties
for fraudulent insurance claims on behalf of the individual and
the State of California (Ins. Code, § 1871.7, subd. (e)(1)). The
person bringing the qui tam action, referred to as the ‘relator,’
stands in the shoes of the State of California, which is deemed to
be the real party in interest. [Citations.] The relator in an
Insurance Code section 1871.7 qui tam action does not personally
recover damages, but if successful receives a substantial
percentage of the recovery as a bounty.” (Ibid.)
      The sole cause of action in the complaint is based on
Insurance Code section 1871.7, subdivision (b), which allows for
the imposition of civil penalties and other remedies against
anyone who violates Insurance Code section 1871.7 or Penal Code
sections 549, 550, or 551. Campfield alleges Safelite violated

                                 6
Penal Code section 550, subdivision (b)(1) and (2), which make it
unlawful to “[p]resent or cause to be presented any written or
oral statement as part of, or in support of or opposition to, a claim
for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy,
knowing that the statement contains any false or misleading
information concerning any material fact” (id., subd. (b)(1)) or
“[p]repare or make any written or oral statement that is intended
to be presented to any insurer or any insurance claimant in
connection with, or in support of or opposition to, any claim or
payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy,
knowing that the statement contains any false or misleading
information concerning any material fact” (id., subd. (b)(2)).2
      “As in any action sounding in fraud, an IFPA action must
be pleaded with particularity. ‘In California, fraud must be pled
specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice.
[Citations.] . . . “This particularity requirement necessitates
pleading facts which ‘show how, when, where, to whom, and by
what means the representations were tendered.’ ” ’ [Citation.] [¶]

      2 The complaint also alleges Safelite violated Penal Code

section 550, subdivision (a)(1), (4), and (5). However, in his
opening brief Campfield argued only that his complaint properly
stated a claim based on Penal Code section 550,
subdivision (b)(2). Safelite argued in its respondent’s brief that
Campfield had abandoned his reliance on Penal Code section 550,
subdivision (a)(1), (4), and (5). In his reply, Campfield mentioned
only Penal Code section 550, subdivision (b)(1) and (2). We
conclude from this that Campfield has abandoned his theory
based on Penal Code section 550, subdivision (a)(1), (4), and (5).
However, even if Campfield intended to preserve that theory, the
complaint fails to state a claim based on that theory for the same
reasons explained post.

                                  7
‘ “The specificity requirement serves two purposes. The first is
notice to the defendant, to ‘furnish the defendant with certain
definite charges which can be intelligently met.’ [Citations.] The
pleading of fraud, however, is also the last remaining habitat of
the common law notion that a complaint should be sufficiently
specific that the court can weed out nonmeritorious actions on the
basis of the pleadings. Thus, the pleading should be sufficient
‘ “to enable the court to determine whether, on the facts pleaded,
there is any foundation, prima facie at least, for the charge of
fraud.” ’ ” ’ ” (Discovery Radiology, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 548–549.) The particularity requirement also serves “ ‘ “to
deter the filing of complaints as a pretext for the discovery of
unknown wrongs, to protect [defendants] from the harm that
comes from being subject to fraud charges, and to prohibit
plaintiffs from unilaterally imposing upon the court, the parties
and society enormous social and economic costs absent some
factual basis.” ’ ” (State of California ex rel. McCann v. Bank of
America, N.A. (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 897, 909 [discussing
heightened pleading standard in context of California False
Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 12650 et seq.)]; State ex rel. Wilson v.
Superior Court (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 579, 596 [IFPA’s qui tam
procedures were modeled on California False Claims Act].)
      “ ‘ “On appeal from an order of dismissal after an order
sustaining a demurrer, the standard of review is de novo: we
exercise our independent judgment about whether the complaint
states a cause of action as a matter of law. [Citation.] First, we
give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a

                                  8
whole and its parts in their context. Next, we treat the demurrer
as admitting all material facts properly pleaded. Then we
determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. [Citation.] [¶] We do not, however,
assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of
law.” ’ ” (Discovery Radiology, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 532.)
When a trial court sustains a demurrer without leave to amend,
the plaintiff has the burden of proving a reasonable possibility of
curing the defect by amendment. (Id. at pp. 532–533.)
II.   Analysis
      To state his IFPA cause of action, Campfield must allege
facts showing that Safelite presented or caused to be presented a
false statement “as part of, or in support of or opposition to, a
claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance
policy” (Pen. Code, § 550, subd. (b)(1)) or prepared or made a false
statement “intended to be presented to any insurer or any
insurance claimant in connection with, or in support of or
opposition to, any claim or payment or other benefit pursuant to
an insurance policy” (id., subd. (b)(2)). Campfield alleges Safelite
violated these provisions when it prepared and presented false
statements to insurance companies either as insurers’ third party
administrator or as a windshield repair and replacement service.
The complaint fails to allege facts constituting a cause of action
based on either activity.3

      3 The trial court sustained Safelite’s demurrer on statute of

limitations grounds. We, too, have serious doubts that Campfield
can avoid the statute of limitations bar without any direct
allegations of activity in the period by relying entirely on

                                  9
   A.    Third party administrator
        As Campfield acknowledges, “an insurer is not ‘subject to a
qui tam action under [Insurance Code] section 1871.7 based on
its marketing and claims handling practices.’ ” (State of
California ex rel. Metz v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2007)
156 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1068; accord, State of California ex rel. Nee
v. Unumprovident Corp. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 442, 450–451
(Nee).) This is because “the IFPA expressly targets only
deceptive conduct directed at insurers, not improper conduct by
insurers.” (People ex rel. Ellinger v. Magill (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
287, 294; accord, Nee, at pp. 449–450.) This principle also
extends to insurers’ agents. Insurance Code section 1871.7,
subdivision (b) “must be viewed as excluding the insurer that
receives and handles an insured’s claim, as well the insurer’s
agents and affiliates aiding in the processing of the claim.” (Metz,
at p. 1071.)
        Campfield alleges Safelite acts as a third party
administrator for scores of insurers, including 23 of the top 30
insurers. When policyholders file claims for windshield damage
on their insurers’ websites or via phone, they are forwarded to
Safelite to handle the claim. Safelite provides claims

Safelite’s statements preceding the limitations period, in some
cases by a decade. We also agree with the trial court that Safelite
raises a substantial argument that the complaint is barred by the
IFPA’s public disclosure rule, given the lawsuits Campfield has
already filed against Safelite. (Ins. Code, § 1871.7, subd. (h)(2).)
But we need not address these issues given our conclusion that
Campfield’s complaint fails to allege facts constituting a cause of
action.

                                  10
management services with direct access to insurers’ computer
systems. For the purposes of the IFPA, then, when Safelite is
approving or denying claims for an insurer, it is not making or
preparing statements in support of or opposition to them, either
to insurers or policyholders, in a way that Penal Code section
550, subdivision (b)(1) or (2) prohibits. As Nee explained,
“Insurers do not ‘support’ or ‘oppose’ claims, they ‘approve’ or
‘deny’ them. Nor do insurers submit ‘statements’ as part of ‘a
claim for payment.’ ” (Nee, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 450.)
The same is true of Safelite in its work as a third party
administrator, so that activity cannot support liability under the
IFPA.
   B.    Windshield repair and replacement service provider
        It is theoretically possible to state an IFPA cause of action
against Safelite as a service provider for submitting windshield
replacement claims to insurers for which Safelite does not act as
the third party administrator. However, Campfield has not
alleged facts to support such a claim.
        Penal Code section 550, subdivision (b)(1) makes it
unlawful to “[p]resent or cause to be presented any written or
oral statement as part of, or in support of or opposition to a claim
for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy
knowing that the statement contains any false or misleading
information concerning any material fact.” Subdivision (b)(2) of
that statute similarly makes it unlawful to “[p]repare or make
any written or oral statement that is intended to be presented to
any insurer or any insurance claimant in connection with, or in

                                   11
support of or opposition to any claim or payment or other benefit
pursuant to an insurance policy knowing that the statement
contains any false or misleading information concerning any
material fact.” Thus, to allege an IFPA claim based on a violation
of these provisions, a relator must allege a nexus between a false
statement and a claim for benefits. Because of the particularity
requirement, the relator must allege facts demonstrating this
nexus with specificity. (Discovery Radiology, supra,
94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 548–549.)
      Discovery Radiology demonstrates the types of allegations
that satisfy this requirement. The relator in that case, an
insurance company, alleged that several medical corporations
held themselves out as providers of radiology services and
appeared to be owned by licensed physicians as required by state
law. (Discovery Radiology, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 527.) But
in reality, the corporations were radiology brokers that were
owned by a non-physician and sent patients to radiologists in
exchange for kickbacks. (Id. at pp. 529–530.) The Court of
Appeal held that the relator’s complaint pled IFPA claims based
on this scheme with sufficient particularity. (Discovery
Radiology, at p. 549.) The complaint identified the role each
defendant played in the scheme, including the defendant
physicians who agreed to appear on paper as owners of the
medical corporations despite exercising no significant control and
the defendant non-physician who actually controlled the
corporations. (Ibid.) The complaint alleged how the non-
physician entered into contracts with radiology facilities to

                                  12
perform magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans and with
radiologists to interpret the scans, recruited patients from
personal injury attorneys, referred the patients to the contracted
radiology facilities and radiologists, and prepared and sent bills
under the name of the medical corporation to the attorneys,
knowing that the attorneys would present the bills to the
insurance company. (Ibid.) The complaint “identifie[d] each
allegedly false insurance claim by claim number, and additionally
provide[d], for each claim, the date of treatment, the provider
name that appeared on the claim, the amount billed, and the
name of the attorney who submitted the claim” to the insurance
company. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal rejected an argument that
the complaint should have alleged the dates of each false bill,
noting that the complaint already alleged the date of treatment
and claim numbers from which the false claims could be
identified. (Id. at p. 550.) The court also found the complaint
adequately alleged what was false about the claims, noting that
the complaint alleged the claims were deceitful because the
medical corporations on whose behalf the attorneys submitted
the bills were owned by a non-physician and the medical
corporations falsely represented that they had performed and
read the MRI scans. (Ibid.)
      Campfield’s complaint does not allege anything close to
this. The complaint describes numerous statements over the
span of two decades by Safelite about the safety of repairing
windshield cracks longer than six inches, including statements to
insurers and their agents about the technical feasibility of

                                13
repairing cracks longer than six inches and advertisements and
marketing materials aimed at insurers, their agents, and
individual consumers. These communications include text and
videos on Safelite’s website; YouTube videos; Safelite brochures,
including those distributed to third party organizations like AAA;
statements by Safelite’s call center employees and repair
technicians; and TV, radio, and print interviews. Campfield
provides examples of each kind of communication, but none of the
communications described concerns a claim for insurance benefits
by an individual consumer. Instead, as Campfield summarizes,
they amount to a broad-based, years-long public relations
campaign to change the overall perception in the market about
the feasibility of repairing windshield cracks longer than six
inches. Even if this campaign were in bad faith or duplicitous, as
Campfield alleges, and regardless of whether it violated any
other laws4, it does not support a cause of action under the IFPA
because Campfield has not alleged that the campaign was
connected to or in support of any specific claims for insurance
benefits, as the statute requires. (Discovery Radiology, supra,
94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 548–549 [plaintiff must allege “ ‘ “facts
which ‘show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the
representations were tendered’ ” ’ ”]; cf. People ex rel. Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Weitzman (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 534, 539–542 [describing

      4 The Ohio district court granted summary judgment for

Safelite on Campfield’s claim of false advertising under the
Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.), but on January 16, 2024,
the Sixth Circuit reversed that ruling. (Campfield v. Safelite
Group, Inc. (6th Cir. 2024) 91 F.4th 401.)

                                  14
IFPA claims founded upon submission of false claims to two
insurance companies based on at least 126 “staged” automobile
accidents resulting in at least 416 fraudulent insurance claims].)
Allowing a claim like Campfield’s to proceed in the absence of
such concrete factual allegations would in effect convert the IFPA
into a law prohibiting false advertising to insurers, which is not
the IFPA’s purpose. (Weitzman, at p. 548 [legislature amended
IFPA to apply to automobile insurance fraud based on evidence of
“ ‘complex rings of dishonest lawyers, health professionals,
“cappers” and insureds’ ” who defrauded insurers “ ‘by staging
accidents, filing claims for “paper” accidents and padding medical
and legal bills with treatment and services never rendered’ ”].)
      Campfield argues that he need not identify any specific
claim submitted to an insurer because Penal Code section 550,
subdivision (b)(2) makes it unlawful to prepare a statement
merely with the intent that it be presented to an insurer, even if
the statement is never actually presented to an insurer.
Campfield is correct that he need not allege a claim was actually
presented to support liability under Penal Code section 550,
subdivision (b)(2). But he still must satisfy the statute’s nexus
requirement by identifying some individual claim to which a
statement was connected, such as by providing a claim number,
name of insurer, name of insured, date, amount of claim, or type
of repair involved. (See Discovery Radiology, supra,
94 Cal.App.5th at p. 549 [“complaint identifies each allegedly
false insurance claim by claim number, and additionally provides,
for each claim, the date of treatment, the provider name that

                                15
appeared on the claim, the amount billed, and the name of the
attorney who submitted the claim”].)
      Campfield further contends, based on a few federal district
court decisions, that he need not identify any specific claims as
long as he alleges a scheme that raises a strong inference that
fraudulent claims were actually submitted. (United States v.
Crescendo Bioscience, Inc. (N.D.Cal. May 23, 2020, No. 16-cv-
02043-TSH) 2020 U.S. Dist. Lexis 90940, *26–*29; United States
ex rel. Puhl v. Terumo BCT (C.D.Cal. Sept. 12, 2019, No. CV 17-
8446 PSG (JPRx)) 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 220813, *6–*9; United
States v. CardioDx, Inc. (N.D.Cal. May 17, 2019, No. 15-cv-01339-
WHO) 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 83784, *23–*25 (CardioDx).) He also
argues that pleading requirements should be relaxed because
relevant information about specific claims is in Safelite’s hands.
(See CardioDx, at *16–*20 [applying federal heightened pleading
standard].) Campfield essentially asks us to infer that because
Safelite made false statements in its public relations campaign
about the repairability of cracks longer than six inches, that in its
capacity as a windshield repairer, it is continuing to tell insurers
that specific policyholders’ windshields require replacement
rather than repair.
      One of the federal decisions Campfield cites, United States
ex rel. Puhl v. Terumo BCT, supra, 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 220813,
at *9, actually dismissed a qui tam action because the plaintiff
failed to include “more information about how the scheme
functioned, including ‘what claims were submitted to the federal
government; when such claims were submitted to the federal

                                 16
government; or who submitted such claims to the federal
government.’ ” These are precisely the kind of factual allegations
that Discovery Radiology, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 549–550,
found sufficient but that are missing in Campfield’s complaint.
Similarly, the plaintiff in United States v. Crescendo Bioscience,
Inc. identified the managed care companies harmed by the
defendant’s alleged fraud and the health plans they served, while
Campfield has identified no such specific victims. (United States
v. Crescendo Bioscience, Inc., supra, 2020 U.S. Dist. Lexis 90940,
at *38–*39.)
      Campfield quotes CardioDx as holding that an IFPA
plaintiff did not have to “identif[y] which private insurers
received claims for payments (from [the defendant]), when those
claims were submitted, or how the specific requirements of those
private insurance contracts were violated.” (CardioDx, supra,
2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 83784, at *23–*24.) However, CardioDx
made this remark about an IFPA claim under Insurance Code
section 1871.7, subdivision (a), not subdivision (b). The difference
is significant because, as CardioDx noted, “it is the employment
of others to ‘procure clients’ that violates” Insurance Code section
1871.7, subdivision (a), not the submission of any specific claims.
(CardioDx, at *24, citing State ex rel. Wilson v. Superior Court,
supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 593.)
      CardioDx did also find that relator’s complaint adequately
plead a cause of action based on subdivision (b) of Insurance Code
section 1871.7 and Penal Code section 550, subdivision (a)(1),
(a)(5), and (a)(6), when it alleged that medical providers who

                                 17
ordered and administered a company’s test received an illegal
kickback. (CardioDx, supra, 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 83784, at *8–
*9, *25.) But the relator in CardioDx alleged the illegal
kickbacks affected every claim submitted to a government
insurance program based on the administration of the test.
(Ibid.)
      We have no quarrel with CardioDx’s conclusion that a
plaintiff adequately pleads an IFPA claim by alleging a
defendant’s fraudulent scheme affected every claim the defendant
submitted to insurers, even without identifying specific claims.
Thus, had Campfield alleged here that Safelite’s fraud affected
every windshield replacement claim it submitted to insurers, his
complaint might well pass muster. But the complaint indicates
that Safelite’s alleged fraud affected only those claims involving
cracks from 6 to 14 inches long that would otherwise have been
eligible for repair. Even the industry standard that Campfield
cites as evidence of the falsity of Safelite’s six-inch standard,
however, indicates that some cracks of any size cannot be
repaired, depending on the type of crack and its location on the
windshield. The standard notes 11 circumstances in which
windshields should not be repaired, including when (1) a crack
penetrates both layers of laminated glass, (2) damage occurs in
the driver’s primary viewing area and is longer than one inch, (3)
damage or its repair will affect features such as rain sensors or
heads-up displays, or (4) a crack’s repair will, in the technician’s
judgment, affect the proper operation of the vehicle. Because,
unlike the scheme in CardioDx, Safelite’s alleged statements did

                                  18
not affect the entire universe of claims submitted to insurers for
reimbursement and there is apparently a variety of factors
impacting the decision to repair or replace a windshield,
Campfield needed to identify with specificity one or more claims
affected to allow Safelite to meet Campfield’s charges
intelligently.5 (Discovery Radiology, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at
p. 548 [one purpose of the specificity requirement for IFPA claims
is to “ ‘furnish the defendant with certain definite charges which

      5 Campfield also needed to identify claims with specificity

to establish two other elements of his IFPA claim, that Safelite
misrepresented a material fact (Pen. Code, § 550, subd. (b)(1) &
(2)) and that it acted with intent to defraud (People ex rel.
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Cruz (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th
1184, 1193). The only insurer identified in the complaint for
whom Safelite does not act as a third party administrator,
Ameriprise, apparently refuses as a general policy to cover
repairs of windshield cracks longer than six inches. Thus, so far
as we can tell from the complaint, the insurance industry has
adopted a blanket policy of not covering such repairs. We cannot
see, then, how Safelite’s view that any individual cracked
windshield could not be repaired would be material to an insurer.
(Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th
951, 977 [misrepresentation is material “if ‘a reasonable man
would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in
determining his choice of action in the transaction in question’ ”].)
Nor is it apparent how Safelite can deceive insurers that a
windshield must be replaced because of a crack longer than six
inches, since the insurers already believe replacement is
necessary. Indeed, Campfield’s original complaint in the Ohio
action suggests that insurers refuse to cover repairs of such
cracks to save themselves money: Crack repairs are not subject
to policy deductibles so insurers pay the full cost, while they pay
for windshield replacements only after deductibles are exhausted.
We need not delve into such issues, however, given Campfield’s
failure to identify any specific claims affected by Safelite’s alleged
misrepresentations.

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can be intelligently met’ ”].) The standard is not onerous; we do
not mean to suggest that Campfield must identify every
fraudulent claim at the pleadings stage, as did the plaintiffs in
Discovery Radiology. (Discovery Radiology, at p. 549.) But he
does need to identify one or more examples of specific fraudulent
claims so that Safelite has concrete allegations to defend against,
instead of having to guess about when the alleged fraud occurred
and who the alleged victims were. “[G]eneral and conclusory
allegations” like those in Campfield’s complaint “do not suffice.”
(Id. at p. 548.)
      We would normally be willing to give Campfield leave to
amend his complaint to identify, if he can, specific claims to
insurers affected by Safelite’s misrepresentations. But Campfield
conceded in the trial court that he could not amend the complaint
to identify any such claims, and he does not attempt to retract
that concession on appeal. Instead, he suggests at various points
that he cannot identify specific claims because the trial court
prevented him from conducting third-party discovery from
insurers, the putative victims of Safelite’s fraud, while the
demurrer was pending. The only place in his opening brief that
he actually argues with citations to authority that the trial court
erred in staying discovery is in a footnote in his recitation of the
background of the case. While he discussed the issue under its
own heading and in more detail in his reply brief, Campfield
forfeited the argument by failing to raise it properly in his
opening brief. (Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County of San
Diego (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 467, 554–555, 559 [arguments are

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forfeited when raised only in a footnote, not under a separate
heading, or for the first time in reply brief].)
      In any case, a lack of discovery cannot excuse Campfield’s
failure to plead his IFPA claim with sufficient detail. The
heightened pleading standard exists in part “ ‘ “to deter the filing
of complaints as a pretext for the discovery of unknown
wrongs . . . and to prohibit plaintiffs from unilaterally imposing
upon the court, the parties and society enormous social and
economic costs absent some factual basis.” ’ ” (State of California
ex rel. McCann v. Bank of America, N.A., supra, 191 Cal.App.4th
at p. 909.) Similarly, as Safelite notes, qui tam actions like
Campfield’s under the IFPA “are meant to encourage private
whistleblowers, uniquely armed with information about false
claims, to come forward. These insiders should have adequate
knowledge of the fraudulent acts to comply with the [heightened]
pleading requirement.” (McCann, at p. 907.) One aspect of the
IFPA, the public disclosure bar, exists for just this reason, to
ensure that relators bring actions based on their own knowledge,
not information from certain public sources. (See People ex rel.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Weitzman, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 564
[the IFPA was intended to permit recovery only by those who
“contributed or assisted in a material way in exposing the
fraud”].) The IFPA is not intended to provide a mechanism for
those with general suspicions of wrongdoing like Campfield to
engage in discovery seeking to confirm their suspicions.
                           DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

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                                                        BROWN, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GOLDMAN, J.
SMILEY, J.

State of California, ex rel. Richard Campfield v. Safelite Group, Inc., et al. (A168101)

        
        Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of
Alameda, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,
section 6 of the California Constitution.

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