Court Opinion

ID: 9583594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:40:17.100769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:02.684504
License: Public Domain

HEFFERNAN, CHIEF JUSTICE
(dissenting). I dissent from the majority opinion upholding Officer Zarse's frisk of Guy absent a particularized suspicion that Guy was armed and posed a danger to the police. The majority justifies its relaxed reading of the fourth amendment on the high incidence of drug related violence. While fully mindful of the enormity of the drug related problem that confronts this country's police officers, I nonetheless disagree with the majority's utter disregard for the state and federal constitutions' prohibition of unjustified governmental intrusions upon the rights of citizens.
The law of search and seizure is well documented in legal treatises and established case law, nevertheless, before proceeding with the facts of the instant dispute, I briefly recapitulate some of the law's most fundamental tenets. First, although the majority quotes Officer Zarse's statement that she was directed to frisk Guy for "contraband and weapons" (majority Op. at 91), the United States Supreme Court clearly distinguishes between the probable cause necessary to initiate a search for contraband and the reasonable suspicion needed to support a limited self-protective search for weapons.1 Specifically, in Ybarra v. Illinois, the Court prohibited the police from searching the occupants of the premises for contraband absent probable cause that those objects named in the warrant were on the person of the occupant. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979).2 I under*104stand the majority opinion to address only the question of the appropriateness of Officer Zarse's search for weapons, even the state does not assert that probable cause existed to conduct a police search of Guy for concealed contraband. Hence we are confronted only with the question of the appropriateness of the initial Terry search.3 .
Second, the scope of a self-protective search is narrowly circumscribed under the rule set forth in Terry v. Ohio.4 In order to initiate a search for weapons, the police officer executing the frisk must be able to articulate a suspicion that the person subject to frisk is armed and dangerous.5 The Court has defined this standard to mean that an officer may undertake a protective frisk of an individual if the officer is "justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investi*105gating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others_" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968). Commentators such as Professor LaFave suggest that a looser interpretation of "reasonable suspicion" for situations involving residential search warrants may be justified only because of the arguably heightened risks resulting from the lengthier, confined contact between the police officers and the persons present during the search.6 Nevertheless, despite these arguably increased risks, the Court in Ybarra v. Illinois reaffirmed its earlier rulings prohibiting "a frisk for weapons on less than reasonable belief or suspicion directed at the person to be frisked, even though that person happens to be on premises where an authorized narcotics search is taking place." Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. at 94 (1979).
Neither the state nor the majority maintains that the police had particularized grounds for believing Guy to be "armed and dangerous" as required by Terry.7 Indeed, Officer Zarse testified at the suppression hearing that "as she approached the defendant, the defendant *106stood motionless and did not appear to be armed." (majority Op. at 91, emphasis added.)8 Furthermore, as stated in the opinion, the police officers present during the search outnumbered by a margin of at least two-to-one the occupants of the residence, all of whom were already handcuffed on the porch. Given these facts, even the state does not assert that the police officers executing the search warrant "reasonably believed" themselves to be endangered by Guy.
The majority recognizes the implausibility of its position and thus is obliged to broaden the Terry doctrine by ignoring the absence of particularized suspicion that Guy was armed and dangerous and relies instead on the generalized danger attending drug related searches. In support of its newly sanctioned policy authorizing a protective frisk of all persons found on the premises during the execution of a residential search warrant for cocaine, the majority asserts that one's presence at a place allegedly used in the drug trade is sufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion that the person is associated with *107the alleged trafficking, and thus presumably armed and dangerous.9
The logic of the majority invokes a presumption that all persons living in areas infiltrated by drug traffickers could be considered armed and dangerous. The Fifth Circuit, however, recognized the dangers that inhere in this kind of inferential leap and cautioned that it would not endorse the "right to frisk anyone on the street at night in a high crime neighborhood." United States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572, 1575 (5th Cir. 1992). To the contrary, thé Fifth Circuit requires a particularized suspicion of the individual by police prior to executing a protective frisk.10 In the instant dispute, the majority relies on case law from other jurisdictions to avoid the *108fact that this court, too, has universally required police to articulate a particularized suspicion of danger before frisking a suspect.
The majority mistakenly cites State v. Williams and State v. Richardson as examples of cases in which we found the violence associated with drug trafficking sufficient grounds for police to formulate a reasonable belief that they were in danger. (Majority Op. at 96.) However, in both cases, we considered the totality of the police officers' knowledge about the dangers posed by the particular individuals involved in the searches and concluded that "a person in possession of both firearms and large quantities of illegal drugs poses a significant threat to the safety of law enforcement officers . . .." State v. Williams, 168 Wis. 2d 970, 985, 485 N.W.2d 42 (1992). In Williams, the informant specifically told the police that the suspect drug trafficker possessed a gun and carried it with him. Id. at 977 (1992). Likewise, in Richardson, the police had information that the suspect subjected to the frisk had a prior drug related conviction. State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 144, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990).
In the instant case, the police had no knowledge that firearms or other weapons would be present at the scene of the search. Nor did the police have any information about Guy — let alone any information linking Guy to the alleged criminal violations. Instead, the police relied solely on Guy's presence at the suspect's home as grounds for believing her to be armed and dangerous. This is not a case in which the police frisked the suspected drug dealer named in the warrant; nor is it a case in which the police had any facts supporting a belief that *109Guy might be armed or involved in the suspect's drug trafficking — Guy just happened to be present at the home of "John Doe" during the execution of the search warrant.
Wisconsin courts have "rejected a blanket approach in narcotics cases ..Williams, Id. at 982 (citing State v. Cleveland, 118 Wis. 2d 615, 628, 348 N.W.2d 512 (1984)). In dissenting from the majority's holding, I do not dismiss the dangers confronting our cities' police officers. I cannot, however, accept the majority's willingness to attribute the incidents of violence surrounding drug transactions generally to all non-suspect individuals who are present at a drug raid. Despite Wisconsin's neighborhoods' increasing entanglement in the country's drug trade, this court must remain resolute in protecting against these "severe . . . intrusions] upon cherished personal security ...." Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25 (1968).
In view of my understanding of the facts and law in the instant dispute, I see no purpose for the majority to indulge in dicta as to whether the seizure of drugs made following Officer Zarse's illegal frisk of Guy was constitutional. Because the search itself was illegal any subsequent seizure must be suppressed. It is purposeless in the instent case to hypothesize that if the search had been legally undertaken the seizure would have been also. I dissent from the majority's opinion and would affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
I am authorized to state that JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. Abrahamson joins in this dissent.

 See generally, Wayne R. LaFave, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, 2d. ed., § 4.9 (c), (d) [hereinafter Search and Seizure].

 In his treatise, Professor LaFave notes that Ybarra was an "easy case" on its facts and that "when the warrant is for private *104premises and the requisite notice is given prior to entry, it is fair to say that such a case does necessitate a somewhat different assessment than was permissible on the facts of Ybarra." Nevertheless, Professor LaFave continues, "this is not to suggest, contrary to Ybarra, that a search of the person for the property may be undertaken upon less than probable cause/ Id. at 296-97.

 The court of appeals in the instant case, relying on Ybarra, correctly and succinctly stated, "... the frisk must be for weapons, not contraband." Guy, 165 Wis. 2d 333, 339.

 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).

 In Terry, the majority stated a two-part test to determine whether the police officer acted within permissible, constitutional grounds for initiating the search: (1) whether the officer was rightfully in the presence of the party frisked; and (2) whether the officer suspected the party was armed and dangerous. In the case of a frisk undertaken pursuant to a warranted search, the first part of the Terry test is rendered superfluous. See generally, Search and Seizure at § 9.4(a).

 See LaFave, Search and Seizure at § 4.9(d). Professor LaFave goes on to suggest that the risks attending a residential search might best be defused by having one police officer watch the suspects while fellow officers conduct the search. Id.

 In contrast, federal courts often require particularized suspicions before finding a "reasonable belief" that the suspect was armed and dangerous. See e.g., United States v. Post, 607 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1979) (DEA computer indicated suspect had history of narcotics trafficking); U.S. v. Pajari, 715 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir. 1983) (suspect bent down while sitting in the car as if to grab a weapon); U.S. v. McNeal, 955 F.2d 1067 (6th Cir. 1992) (suspect reached with his right hand toward his left armpit as if for a concealed weapon); U.S. v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572, 1575 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[w]hen approached and asked his name, [the suspect] did not respond but appeared nervous and, critically, backed away. ... [as if] to give himself time and space to draw a weapon").

 The record indicates that Officer Zarse had no belief at all, let alone a reasonable or articulable belief, that Guy was armed. Officer Zarse executed the frisk because she was told to do so, not because she thought herself to be in danger. While the majority opinion in effect takes the position that had the judges who join in the opinion been in the place of Officer Zarse they could have reached an articulable and reasonable suspicion, based on the dubious legal proposition they now espouse, it is not the mental attitude that members of this court can now vicariously arrive at under their understanding of the facts — the reasonable suspicion must be that of the person at the scene. The record is clear that Officer Zarse had no suspicion, reasonable or not, articulable or not. The trial court made no finding that Officer Zarse had any suspicion whatsoever.

 The majority begs the question by assuming, without any supporting facts whatsoever, that Guy was a drug dealer, albeit not a major one. There is no evidence of record that would support an inference that Guy was a dealer at all. We do not here have reason to dispute the majority's assertion that drug dealers, major or minor, should be treated alike, but the record is as bereft of any evidence, prior to the intrusions on her person, of prior drug dealing as it is of evidence that she was armed. The majority applies after-the-incident facts to justify an intrusion when there are no relevant prior facts. This is similar to stating, because a search revealed what was searched for, there was probable cause for the search even in the absence of any prior information or evidence. The fact is that prior to this event Guy was unknown to the police. The rationale that because she was not a "major" drug dealer she was a "minor" or insignificant drug dealer is fatuous.

 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit, in upholding the protective search of a person who happened to arrive at a suspected drug dealer's house during the execution of a search warrant, specifically noted that:
[W]e do not countenance the search of any individual who happens to be no more than on the premises where a narcotics warrant is being executed. The mere presence of an individual on such premises *108with nothing more does not suffice to justify a stop and frisk search under Terry.
U.S. v. Harvey, 897 F.2d 1300, 1304 n.2 (5th Cir. 1990).