Court Opinion

ID: 9525250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:01:16.878606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:02.556867
License: Public Domain

WOLLMAN, Justice
(dissenting).
I would affirm. It strikes me that what the Department did was no more than to put a permissible interpretative gloss upon the statute, much as we did with respect to other portions of the unemployment compensation statutes in Matter of Yaroch, 333 *372N.W.2d 448 (S.D.1983); Matter of Appeal of Fickbohm, 323 N.W.2d 133 (S.D.1982); and Red Bird v. Meierhenry, 314 N.W.2d 95 (S.D.1982). The majority opinion implies that the phrase “able to work, and is available to work” is so clear and self-explanatory as to admit of no additional definitional interpretation. In so doing,, the majority opinion succumbs to what has been termed the false appearance of deductive rationality in the interpretation and application of legal rules. See White, “The Invisible Discourse of the Law: Reflections on Legal Literacy and General Education,” 54 U.Colo.L.Rev. 143, 148 (1983). We would do well to remember that the unemployment insurance benefits fund is not a cornucopia to be disbursed with avuncular indulgence. The Department has given a reasonable reading to the statute in its effort to carry out the intent of the legislature that some semblance of economic security be provided those who are unemployed despite their readiness and willingness to accept employment.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice FOSHEIM joins in this dissent.