Court Opinion

ID: 9573989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:01:12.097956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:53.497562
License: Public Domain

OPINION
RABINO WITZ, Justice.
Jane Doe petitions for review of an order by the superior court granting respondent Samaritan Counseling Center (“Samaritan”) 1 summary judgment on her respon-deat superior claim.

Introduction.

Jane Doe argues that Samaritan should be held liable for the acts of one of its pastoral counselors, Reverend/Dr. John Garvin. Doe went to Samaritan for emotional and spiritual counseling. During two of her sessions with Garvin, kissing and fondling allegedly took place. After Doe cancelled her counseling sessions with Garvin, the two allegedly met and had sexual intercourse. Doe claims that she suffered emotional harm as a result of Gar-vin’s abuse of their therapist-patient relationship. On summary judgment the superior court held that Samaritan could not be held liable for Garvin’s actions on grounds of respondeat superior. We granted Doe’s petition for review, and reverse.

Facts and Proceedings.

The relevant facts are undisputed. Doe began seeing Garvin for “emotional and spiritual therapy” in September of 1984. She went to see Garvin on advice from her minister that she seek counseling at Samaritan.2 Doe had attended “approximately 34” sessions with Garvin by June of 1985.
In an affidavit Doe averred that:
5. In mid-June, 1985, Reverend Gar-vin announced suddenly that I was in need of no more therapy. This confused and upset me as I felt that I was still in turmoil and needed to resolve some issues. At the end of the session, I was feeling very vulnerable and asked him to hold me. He did, but began touching and fondling other parts of my body. Shortly thereafter, I had another session with Dr. Garvin at SCO during which he fondled and kissed me.
6. Dr. Garvin convinced me that we should meet outside his office. I did not want to lose him as a counselor so I continued to see him outside the office. I believed he still had my best interests at heart and would not do anything to harm me.
7. As I continued to meet with him, Reverend Garvin became more aggressive sexually. I confronted him about his conduct and he agreed he was wrong. However, the sexual contact continued until mid-July, when sexual intercourse occurred.
In December of 1985, Doe began seeing another counselor, Anne Nevaldine. Ms. Nevaldine testified that “[Doe] comes from an extremely unstable background. Any reasonable practitioner would have been able to see that she was easy prey for the kind of conduct reportedly engaged in by Dr. Garvin. As a result of Dr. Garvin’s negligence, [Doe] has suffered substantial emotional and psychological damage.” She also stated that Garvin negligently handled the “transference phenomenon” — a type of parent-dependent relationship which developed during counseling.
*346In June of 1987 Doe filed a complaint against Samaritan and two members of Samaritan’s board of directors. Her complaint alleged a claim for relief against Samaritan based on a theory of respondeat superior. Doe also asserted claims based on “negligent hire, negligent supervision, and breach of contract” against Samaritan and the two directors. Thereafter Samaritan moved for summary judgment on the issues of respondeat superior, negligent hire, and negligent supervision. Doe filed a cross-motion for summary judgment as to Samaritan’s liability in respondeat superi- or.
The superior court granted Samaritan’s motion for summary judgment on the re-spondeat superior claim.3 Thereafter we granted Doe’s petition for review. We have concluded that the superior court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Samaritan should be reversed.
DID THE SUPERIOR COURT ERR IN RULING THAT SAMARITAN COULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE ON THE THEORY OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR?
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer will be held liable for the tort of its employee if the employee’s act was committed within the “scope of the employment.” W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 70, p. 502 (5th ed. 1984). While most authorities concur with this basic principle, there is disagreement over the meaning of the term “scope of employment.” See id.
We have adopted a flexible, multi-factored test to determine whether an employer is liable for injuries caused by its employees. Our approach to questions of respondeat superior evolved as an alternative to an overly technical “control” approach, which limited vicarious liability to circumstances where “the act of the employee was committed with the implied authority, acquiescence, or subsequent ratification of the employer.” Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 140 (Alaska 1972).
In Fruit, an insurance salesman who was attending a convention as required by his employer struck and crippled a pedestrian while operating an automobile. 502 P.2d at 136. The accident occurred at 2:00 a.m., while the salesman was returning to his hotel room. He had been looking for out-of-state salesmen so that he could make sure they were enjoying themselves. The employer in that case argued that it should not be held liable because it was not in “control” of its employee’s activities at the time of the accident, and because Fruit’s acts had no business purpose. Id. at 139.
In Fruit we observed that
[N]o categorical statement can delimit the meaning of “scope of employment” once and for all time. Applicability of respondeat superior will depend primarily on the findings of fact in each case.
Id. at 140-41. We held that the superior court had correctly denied the employer’s motion for Judgment NOV because “[tjhere was evidence from which the jury could find that [the salesman] was at least motivated in part by his desire to meet with the out-of-state guests and thus to benefit from their experience so as to improve his abilities as a salesman.” Id. at 142.
While it might be inferred from Fruit that there can be no respondeat superior liability where employee acts are not “motivated” by a desire to benefit the employer, our subsequent cases have left unresolved the question whether this motivation is a prerequisite to recovery based on a claim of respondeat superior. The instant case presents the issue squarely, for it is Samaritan’s contention that since Garvin’s tor-tious acts were not motivated by a desire to serve his employer, there cannot be liability based on a theory of respondeat superior.
A. Can an Employer be Held Liable Under the Doctrine of Respondeat Superior Where the Employee’s Acts Were Not Motivated by a Desire to Serve the Employer?
Our decision in the Fruit case was closely followed by Luth v. Rogers and Babler *347Construction Company, 507 P.2d 761 (Alaska 1973). In Luth we explained that questions of “control” and “motivation” were relevant factors to be considered in deciding whether an employee’s act was “sufficiently related to his employer’s enterprise.” Id. at 764. However, we emphasized that “control” was not a prerequisite for respondeat superior liability, and that “[wjhile the employer’s benefit from the employee’s activity is relevant ..., it is not its sole determinant.” Id. Instead, we held that various other factors set forth in Section 228 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency (1958) (“Second Restatement”) are relevant to the employee’s vicarious liability. That section provides:
(1) Conduct of a servant is unthin the scope of employment if, but only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the master.
(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master.
Id., § 228 (quoted in Luth, 507 P.2d at 764 n. 14.) In Luth we expressly rejected the Second Restatement’s view that each of the § 228(l)(a)-(d) factors must be satisfied prerequisite to recovery, and noted instead that the importance of various factors was to be weighed by the jury in each case. Id. at 764 & n. 14. We also noted that the question of the employee’s “motivation to serve the employer” would be relevant in that case, but did not state whether that factor was an independent prerequisite. Id.4 Thus, Luth stands for the proposition that the Second Restatement’s factors are relevant considerations, but are not determinative of the respondeat superior analysis.
Subsequently, in Williams v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., 650 P.2d 343 (Alaska 1982), we referred to the criteria set forth in § 228 of the Second Restatement as “guidelines which are useful in making ... the determination as to when an employee’s tort will be attributed to the employer.” Id. at 349.
B. “Motivation to Serve”.
A number of courts holding that “motivation to serve” is a prerequisite to any recovery in respondeat superior have held that employers cannot be held liable for the sexual acts of their employed therapists or doctors, since sexual acts, though perhaps motivated by desire, are not motivated by a desire to serve the employer. E.g., Andrews v. United States, 732 F.2d 366, 370 (4th Cir.1984) (under South Carolina law, employer not liable for acts of therapist in inducing patient to have sex because therapist acted on own, and not in furtherance of employer’s interest); Hoover v. University of Chicago Hospitals, 51 Ill.App.3d 263, 9 Ill.Dec. 414, 366 N.E.2d 925, 929 (1977) (hospital not liable under theory of respondeat superior because doctor’s act of raping patient was not committed in furtherance of hospital’s interests); Cosgrove v. Lawrence, 214 N.J.Super. 670, 520 A.2d 844, 846-48 (1986) (therapist’s act of sex with patient was not motivated by desire to serve hospital), aff'd 215 N.J.Super. 561, 522 A.2d 483, 484-85 (1987) (affirmed on ground that act not of the type therapist was employed to perform).
In contrast, other courts employing the “motivation to serve” analysis have concluded that employers may be held liable for the sexual behavior of their therapist employees towards their patients. One line of authority, exemplified by Judge Friendly’s opinion in Ira S. Bushey & Sons v. United States, holds that an employer may be held liable for employee acts that are *348“foreseeable” in light of the nature of the employment. 398 F.2d 167, 171-72 (2d Cir.1968) (“motivation to serve” test discarded in favor of “foreseeability” approach).5 These courts reason that while the sexual acts themselves are purely self-serving, or caused by an unjustifiable loss of control by the aggressor, they have nonetheless been precipitated by the employee’s performance of assigned duties.6
In Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir.1986), a case factually similar to the instant litigation, the Ninth Circuit held that an employer could be liable on grounds of respondeat superior for the tortious sexual conduct of a therapist. Id. at 1371. The patient had sought “mental health counseling” from a social worker. Id. at 1364. A “transference phenomenon” similar to the one which is alleged to have occurred in the case at bar caused the patient to feel dependent upon the social worker. Id. at 1364-65. The social worker then began a sexual relationship with the patient, and this relationship was found to have caused the patient emotional problems so devastating that years later she attempted to commit suicide. Id. at 1364-65. The Simmons court held the social worker’s employer liable in respondeat superior for its employee’s misfeasance. Id. at 1371.
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis turned on whether the sexual conduct was actuated to “further[ ] ... the employer’s interest ..., or benefit the employer.” Id. at 1369. The court explained:
In the instant case, Mr. Kammers was employed to provide mental health counseling and although he was not authorized to become sexually involved with his clients, that contact occurred in conjunction with his legitimate counseling activities....
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... The centrality of transference to therapy renders it impossible to separate an abuse of transference from the treatment itself. The district court correctly found that the abuse of transference occurred within the scope of Mr. Kammers’ employment.
Id. at 1369-70. Thus, the Simmons court rejected the employer’s contention that the social worker’s conduct was not performed in furtherance of the employer’s interests.
This reasoning persuades us that where tortious conduct arises out of and is reasonably incidental to the employee’s legitimate work activities, the “motivation to serve” test will have been satisfied. Given the transference phenomenon that is alleged to have occurred in this case, we hold that it could reasonably be concluded that the resulting sexual conduct was “incidental” to the therapy.7
We are not unmindful of the force of those authorities which hold that an employee’s tortious sexual behavior is impelled by motivations other than a desire to further the interests of the employer.8 *349However, we are of the view that the “motivation to serve” test, so construed, would too significantly undercut the enterprise liability basis of the respondeat superior doctrine we have previously articulated. In Fruit, we discussed this basis for the doctrine, saying,
“Scope of employment” as a test for application of respondeat superior would be insufficient if it failed to encompass the duty of every enterprise to the social community which gives it life and contributes to its prosperity.... The basis of respondeat superior has been correctly stated as “the desire to include in the costs of operation inevitable losses to third persons incident to carrying on an enterprise, and thus distribute the burden among those benefited by the enterprise.”
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Although not usually enunciated as a basis for liability, in essence the enterprise may be regarded as a unit for tort as opposed to contract liability purposes. Employees’ acts sufficiently connected with the enterprise are in effect considered as deeds of the enterprise itself. Where through negligence such acts cause injury to others it is appropriate that the enterprise bear the loss incurred.
502 P.2d at 140-41.
C. Did The Tort Occur Within Authorized Time and Space Limits?
The final requirement for responde-at superior liability set forth in § 228(2) is that the tortious conduct must not be “far beyond ... authorized time or space limits.”
(i) Time.
Garvin’s fondling of Doe occurred during two counseling sessions, but the intercourse occurred during the month following Doe’s cancellation of therapy, and other “sexual conduct” occurred at unspecified times. Nonetheless, Dr. Nevaldine characterizes Garvin’s conduct during counseling as the initiation of a “sexual relationship.” Thus, a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that Garvin’s tortious conduct occurred within authorized time limits, and there was evidence to support the view that this conduct caused Doe damage.
(ii) Space.
Samaritan further contends that since the sexual intercourse occurred after counseling had been terminated and took place away from its “premises,” Samaritan should not be held accountable in damages for this occurrence. Doe argues that Samaritan should be held liable for the damage resulting from the sexual intercourse, as well as the fondling which occurred during counseling sessions.
A trier of fact might reasonably conclude that the sexual intercourse, which occurred roughly one month after counseling, was so connected with the tortious misuse of the transference phenomenon during counseling that it was not “too far” removed from authorized time and space limits. See Simmons, 805 F.2d at 1370 (negligence in mishandling of transference phenomenon leads to sexual intercourse); see also Marston, 329 N.W.2d at 311.9 On remand, the superior court should determine the extent to which the intercourse was connected with misuse of the transference phenomenon.
Inherent in our disposition of this petition is our further conclusion that Doe is not entitled to summary judgment on her respondeat superior claim given the existence of genuine issues of material fact relevant to this claim.
*350The superior court’s grant of summary-judgment in favor of Samaritan on Doe’s respondeat superior claim is REVERSED and the matter REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
MOORE, J., dissents.

. It appears from Doe’s brief that the other co-defendants-below, Kenneth Walch and Nancy Sydnam, directors at Samaritan, were not charged with respondeat superior liability. Thus, they are not respondents in this proceeding.

. Reverend/Dr. Robert Nelson, who supervises Samaritan counselors and acts as a consultant for the clinic, testified that the service offered to Doe was a combination of "psychology ... with the traditional healing practices of the church.”
Reverend Nelson testified that he had attended conferences addressing the problem of sexual relations between pastoral counselors and patients since 1974. He further stated that the problem has received serious attention “for the last ... four or five years.” Reverend Nelson also testified that Garvin was asked by Samaritan to resign because of his conduct in counseling Doe.

. Summary judgment was denied as to all other claims for relief.

. In Luth we noted that "[c]onduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time and space limits, or too little actuated, by a purpose to serve the master." 507 P.2d at 764 n. 14 (emphases added).

. See also Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry, 329 N.W.2d 306, 311 (Minn.1983) (clinic could be held liable for the tortious sexual conduct of a psychologist towards a patient during and following therapy).

. In Turner v. State, 494 So.2d 1292 (La.App.1986), the Louisiana Court of Appeals employed a multi-factored test and concluded that the National Guard would be liable for the unauthorized sexual conduct of a recruiting officer during the conduct of a physical examination. Id. at 1296. The fact that the act was "motivated” by personal desires was not considered determinative; rather, the court premised its finding of liability on the ground that the sexual act was "incidental" to the employment, and "attributable" to the employer. Id.

. Restatement § 228(2) provides in part that the employee’s act may not be "different in kind from that authorized.” See also Luth, 507 P.2d at 764 n. 14. An employee is rarely authorized to commit a tort. We therefore construe this provision to mean only that the act which leads to the tortious behavior cannot be different in kind from acts the employee is authorized to perform in furtherance of the employer’s enterprise.
Employing this construction, we hold that a jury might reasonably find that Garvin's tor-tious conduct arose out of, and was reasonably incidental to counseling activities authorized by and of potential benefit to Samaritan.

.See, e.g., John R. v. Oakland Unified School District, 48 Cal.3d 438, 256 Cal.Rptr. 766, 774, 769 P.2d 948, 956 (1989) (risk of sexual misconduct not "within range of risks allocable to ... a[n] employer”).

. In applying the criteria set forth in sections 228(1) and 229 of the Restatement, the trier of fact must determine whether the particular facts of the case lead to the conclusion that an act was or was not within the employee’s “scope of employment.” See Luth, 507 P.2d at 764 & n. 14. Since the § 228(2) criteria are also included as factors to be considered under §§ 228(1) and 229 of the Restatement, and since á trier of fact could reasonably find that the § 228(2) factors have been satisfied, we hold that a trier of fact could also reasonably conclude that the corresponding §§ 228(1) and 229 factors have been satisfied, and that consideration of all relevant factors therfore could result in respondeat superior liability in the instant case.