Court Opinion

ID: 9783588
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:49:52.088488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:26.416751
License: Public Domain

SUMMERS, J.
Dissenting.
¶ 1 The Court concludes that the bond issue does not satisfy Article 10 § 16 of the Oklahoma Constitution because the “purpose” of the funds is not set forth with specificity. I respectfully dissent from that conclusion. The Oklahoma Constitution contains two provisions that require a law to specify the purpose for which public money is spent: Okla. Const. Art 10 § 16 (borrowed funds), and Art. 5 § 55 (appropriated funds). In arriving at a meaning for the former the Court declines to use our precedent on the latter. The result is that one standard will apply to laws authorizing the borrowing of money and a different one to appropriated funds. Further, I submit that the standard used by the Court today for Art. 10 § 16 is overly restrictive. Finally, I would reject the other legal challenges and approve the bonds.
I. The Purpose of the Bonds
¶ 2 Section 16 of Article 10 states as follows:
§ 16. Borrowing money — Specification of purpose — Use
All laws authorizing the borrowing of money by and on behalf of the State, county, or other political subdivision of the State, shall specify the purpose for which the money is to be used, and the money so borrowed shall be used for no other purpose.
Section 16 provides that “laws ... shall specify the purpose for which the money is to be used....”
¶3 Provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution are interpreted in conformity with their ordinary significance in the English language. In re Initiative Petition No. 363, State Question No. 672, 1996 OK 122, 927 P.2d 558, 570. The words of those provisions are given their plain, natural and ordinary meaning. A.E. v. State, 1987 OK 76, 743 P.2d 1041, 1046. This sensus literalis approach to the meaning of a particular word is followed unless the context furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge the meaning. State ex rel. Ogden v. Hunt, 1955 OK 125, 286 P.2d 1088, 1091. The context of the language in § 16 does not require a technical meaning for the phrase “laws ... shall specify the purpose for which the money is to be used....” The ordinary meaning of these words should be applied.
¶ 4 Section 55 of Article 5 states as follows:
§ 55. Appropriations — Necessity and requisites
No money shall ever be paid out of the treasury of this State, nor any of its funds, nor any of the funds under its management, except in pursuance of an appropriation by law, nor unless such payments be made within two and one-half years after the passage of such appropriation act, and every such law making a new appropriation, or continuing or reviving an appropriation, shall distinctly specify the sum appropriated and the object to which it is to be applied, and it shall not be sufficient for such law to refer to any other law to fix such sum.
(Emphasis added).
The term “object” for which funds are appropriated by law is also the “purpose” stated in that appropriation for which the money is to be expended. Sibel v. State Bd. of Public Affairs, 1952 OK 196, 244 P.2d 307, 310, quoting, Meyer, State Auditor, v. Clift, 1912 OK 201, 123 P. 1042, 1043. This definition is consistent with the definition of “purpose” in the Oklahoma Bond Oversight and Reform Act: “ ‘Purpose’ means the issuer’s principal intended use of the funds derived from the issuance of bonds or other obligations.” 62 O.S.2001 § 695.3(6).
¶ 5 The “object” requirement for appropriations in Art. 5 § 55 is similar to the “purpose” requirement for borrowed funds- in Art. 10 § 16.1 In Edwards v. Childers, 1924 *122OK 652, 228 P. 472, we looked at Art. 5 § 55 and approved a lump sum appropriation, via the creation of a special fund, to the State Highway Commission for building new highways and the repair and maintenance of highways already constructed. Id. 228 P. at 473. Although specific capital projects were not listed we said that
by the terms of the act, appropriated and directed to be expended for a special purpose and in an express manner, amounts to an appropriation of the entire fund so created, and where the amount accruing to and paid into said fund is capable of being definitely ascertained, it is sufficiently definite and certain to comply with the provisions of article 5, § 55, of the Constitution.
No set of lawmakers can sit in the Capitol of the state and intelligently specify for a year or two in advance the moneys to be expended in the different items of cost of the various projects or road business or just how that detailed work shall be done. The general object for these moneys are to be expended is designated in the statutes under consideration as “the construction of a primary system of highways” and “the repairing and maintenance of state highways.” No law could intelligently and successfully make detailed classifications and distinctions in a very extensive further subdivision of these objects specified in the statute. The term “object” may be satisfied by a descriptive designation without a complete description of its various possible subdivisions. Id. 228 P. at 476.
¶ 6 Our conclusion in Edwards was based upon three concepts: (1) That construction, maintenance, and repair of a system of highways was incapable of being itemized for exact amounts per project, (2) That funding for some of the capital projects would have a source other than the appropriation (such as bonds); and (3) That the Commission, as officials of the State, had its discretion controlled by other enactments involving the duties of the Commission. Id. 228 P. at 476.
¶ 7 As to the first element mentioned in Edwards, this Court is aware that appropriating or borrowing a specific amount of funds for constructing a specific road or highway sometimes is possible. See, e.g., Application of Oklahoma Turnpike Authority, 1966 OK 139, 416 P.2d 860, (turnpike bonds). But the issue in Edwards was whether the Legislature could approach the problem of capital improvements to the highways of the state as a system instead of the Legislature trying to determine the exact location of individual roads needed for the system. The Court concluded that (1) the specific amount appropriated, (2) a legislative purpose of creating and repairing highways (capital projects), and (3) statutes setting forth the nature of the state entity’s duties worked together to define the object of the appropriation sufficient to satisfy Art. 5 § 55. To hold otherwise would unnecessarily hinder the Legislature’s ability to address and fund problems on a system-wide basis that occur within a particular state agency’s sphere of responsibility.
¶ 8 Clearly, as the Court’s opinion states, money borrowed for one purpose or object may not be expended upon a different one. But, as the Court’s opinion indicates, the issue is how specific the Constitution requires the Legislature to be when stating the purpose or object of public borrowing.
¶ 9 The Court states that lump-sum amounts designated to specific state agencies for “capital projects” does not specify the purpose of the expenditure sufficient to satisfy Art. 10 § 16. The Court has discussed the meaning of phrases such as “capital expenditure” and “capital outlay”, and equated them with the act of constructing or building a capital improvement. Oklahoma Public Employees Association v. Oklahoma Dept. of Central Services, 2002 OK 71, ¶ 26, 55 P.3d 1072, 1083, explaining, City of Sand Springs v. Department of Public Welfare, 1980 OK 36, 608 P.2d 1139.
*123¶ 10 As the Court’s opinion indicates, these capital projects are assigned to particular state agencies. We have recently explained that public officers possess only such authority as is granted by law, and that authority must be exercised in the manner provided by law. Oklahoma Public Employees Association v. Oklahoma Dept. of Central Services, 2002 OK 71, at ¶ 27, 55 P.3d at 1084. State agencies and their public officers are limited, as matter of law, upon what they spend public funds. This limit springs from several sources, and one of these is the nature of the authority vested in the agency or officer doing the spending.
¶ 11 For example, § 301(16)(p) provides $2,010,101.00 for the Department of Human Services. In Oklahoma Public Employees Association the Court examined at some length the contractual authority of the Department of Human Services. Id. at ¶¶ 22-39, 55 P.3d at 1081-1088. Section 301 authorizes the issuance of bonds but does not expand upon the authority of state agencies, such as DHS, that receive the funds.2 In other words, the capital projects funded by the bond issue must fund capital expenditures that are within the statutory and constitutional authority of the particular agency.
¶ 12 Linking capital expenditures to specific state agencies is also consistent with the “Oklahoma Program Performance Budgeting and Accountability Act.” 62 O.S.2001 § 45.1 et seq. This Act requires a state agency to “make a strategic plan for its operations” that includes: “A summary of the capital improvement needs of the agency which were provided to the Long-Range Capital Planning Commission as required by Section 901 of Title 62 of the Oklahoma Statutes.” 62 O.S.2001 § 45.3(A) & (B)(7).3 The amounts from the bond issue in the case before us are not mere numbers pulled from of the air, but reflect the Legislature’s considered judgment based upon particularized capital needs of the state agencies involved.
¶ 13 The stated purpose of § 301 is consistent with how the Legislature has approved past bond issues of the Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority. The Authority was created in 1959 as “an instrumentality of the State” and given the authority for the “construction, equipping, operation and maintenance of the state building or buildings.... ” 73 O.S.1961 § 152(a). These buildings were identified as those “for the use of state and/or federal agencies and departments”, with the Authority selecting the place of erection within the Capitol Improvement and Zoning District. 73 O.S.1961 § 153(a). The Authority could issue ten million dollars in bonds for the construction of the buildings.73 O.S.1961 § 153(b). The Authority had other powers relating to the erecting and maintaining these buildings. 73 O.S.1961 § 161.
¶ 14 The 1959 Act gave a statutorily stated purpose of providing office space to state agencies. 73 O.S.1961 § 151. However, the Authority possessed the discretion to determine the number of buildings and their size. 73 O.S.1961 §§ 153,161. The Authority possessed the discretion, jointly with the State Board of Public Affairs, to determine those state agencies which would use the new buildings. 73 O.S.1961 § 163. In other words, in addition to the dollar amount of the bonds, the Act specified only that the buildings (capital improvements) must be used by state or federal agencies, and that they be built within the Capitol Improvement and Zoning District. The Act did not specify how *124many or what kind of buildings, or which state agencies would use the buildings.
¶ 15 In 1971 the Authority was given a general authorization to erect, equip, operate, and maintain buildings for the use of state and/or federal agencies at any place or location within the State of Oklahoma. 73 O.S. 1971 § 153(a). The Legislature has also at various times given the Authority an authorization to construct and maintain buildings for specific agencies. For example, in 1971 the Authority was authorized to erect, operate, and maintain buildings for the Department of Public Safety on Northeast 36th Street in Oklahoma City. Id. The Authority has also been given an authorization for capital expenditures other than buildings. For example, in 1997 the Legislature added that: “It shall also be the purpose of this act to provide an improved and expanded highway infrastructure for the health, safety, and welfare of the traveling public in this state and for the continued economic development of this state.” 73 O.S.Supp.1997 § 151.
¶ 16 The legislative history of the Capitol Improvement Authority thus shows a purpose in its function. It was created and has been used for erecting, operating, and maintaining, certain projects for the State, i.e., capital projects that fulfill a public purpose. The legislation before the Court today continues that purpose.
¶ 17 The stated purpose of § 301 is similar to the legislatively expressed purposes in bond issues involving other Authorities. The Act before the Court today specifies dollar amounts for “capital projects” for specific state agencies. If other statutes are examined some have more specificity than § 301,4 some have the same, and some have both. For example, the “purposes” section of the 1961 Building Bonds Act states in part that:
... [the] Building Bonds Commission ... shall incur indebtedness to the extent of the sum of Thirty-five Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($35,500,000.00) as principal, for the purpose of constructing new buildings and other capital improvements, and for equipping, remodeling, modernizing and repairing any and all existing buildings and capital improvements, at the constituent institutions of the Oklahoma State System of Higher Education provided that Five Million Dollars ($5,000,-000.00) thereof shall be used to construct and equip a school and hospital for mentally retarded children in Northeastern Oklahoma .... ”
62 O.S.1961 § 57.32.
A state entity, State System of Higher Education, was provided with approximately thirty million dollars for “new buildings and other capital improvements, and for equipping, remodeling, modernizing and repairing any and all existing buildings and capital improvements, at the constituent institutions .... ” In sum, the purposes statement did not tell the state entity what individual projects would be funded, or how much money would be spent on the individual capital projects the state entity chose to build. In similar fashion, today’s § 301 identifies the state entity and the amount going to the state entity, but does not specify particular projects in that statute.
¶ 18 In sum, § 301 states that its purpose is to fund capital projects for particular state entities in specified amounts. Past bond issues have stated a purpose of funding capital projects for particular state entities. Those state agencies possess only that authority granted to them by statute and constitution. I must therefore conclude that Article 10 § 16 has been satisfied.
*125II. Other Arguments
¶ 19 Section 301 is also challenged as violating the separation oí powers principle. Respondents also allege that:' (1) Legislators sitting on the Legislative Bond Oversight Commission violate the dual-office holding principle; (2) the Legislative Bond Oversight Commission is unconstitutional; (3) the Legislative Bond Oversight Commission exercises an improper delegation of power; (4) a bond approval proceeding involving the Legislative Bond Oversight Commission is unconstitutional; (5) the acts of the Legislative Bond Oversight Commission are void;' and (6) that the Court’s ruling on these bonds must be effective retrospectively.
¶ 20 We have recently said that “the approval of the LBOC [Legislative Bond Oversight Commission] in the note-approval process, constitutes a usurpation by the Legislature of the powers of the executive branch and violates Oklahoma’s constitutional separation of powers provision.” In re Oklahoma Dept. of Transp. for Approval of Not to Exceed $100 Million Oklahoma Dept. of Transp. Grant Anticipation Notes, Series 2002, 2002 OK 74, ¶ 21, 64 P.3d 546, 552.
¶21 The issue then becomes whether the bond issue may proceed although the acts of the Legislative Bond Oversight Commission were unconstitutional. The Attorney General says yes, it may, because the bond issue was also submitted to the Council of Bond Oversight. In response, the constitutionality of the Council of Bond Oversight is challenged. In reply, the Capitol Improvement Authority argues that even if the Council of Bond Oversight is unconstitutional, the Capitol Improvement Authority may proceed with issuing the bonds.
¶ 22 The Council of Bond Oversight was created to act and fulfill the duties of the Legislative Bond Oversight Commission in the event the latter was determined to unconstitutional.5 In re Oklahoma Dept. of *126Transp. for Approval of Not to Exceed $100 Million Oklahoma Dept. of Transp. Grant Anticipation Notes, Series 2002, 2002 OK 74, ¶ 28, 64 P.3d 546, 553-554. Therein this Court expressed no opinion on whether the make-up of the Council of Bond Oversight might present the same constitutional difficulties relating to separation of powers as did the Legislative Bond Oversight Commission. Id. at n. 19, 64 P.3d at 555. However, we did note that unlike the Legislative Bond Oversight Commission, the Council of Bond Oversight is not made up of a majority of legislators, nor could the members appointed by either the President Pro Tempore of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives effectively block bond approval. Id.
¶23 Constitutionality of the Council of Bond Oversight is challenged based upon the fact that two appointees to the Council are not appointed by the Governor. The power of appointment is not an exclusive function of the executive, legislative or judicial departments. Keating v. Edmondson, 2001 OK 110, ¶ 16, 37 P.3d 882, 889. We also said that the Governor’s appointment powers do not arise from any inherent power vested in the office. Id. I also note that those challenging the legislative appointments do not point to any “appointments clause” of our State Constitution. See, e.g., Seymour v. Elections Enforcement Commission, 255 Conn. 78, 762 A.2d 880, 895 (2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 951, 121 S.Ct. 2594, 150 L.Ed.2d 752 (2001), (appointments to state commission by legislature did not violate state constitutional principle of separation of powers because the constitution did not contain an appointments clause similar to that in U.S. Constitution, art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and the exercise of the power by the legislature did not significantly interfere with the essential functions of the executive branch).6 The challenge to the appointments to the Council by members of the Legislature is without merit.
¶24 Section 301 allocates approximately fifty-two million dollars to the Department of Central Services for capital projects. Petitioners challenge this allocation because the discretion of the Department of Central Services to make the capital projects is dependent upon the approval of the Governor. The Governor does not possess unfettered discretion to decide upon what the purpose of the funds. The funds are allocated to a specific state agency with its duties established by law. The Governor must work within the framework of capital expenses for capital projects within the scope of the Department’s duties. For example, one of the duties of the Department is:
B. The Department of Central Services shall have charge of the construction, repair, maintenance, insurance, and operation of all buildings owned, used, or occupied by or on behalf of the state including buildings owned by the Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority where such services are carried out by contract with the Authority. Whenever feasible, the Department of Central Services may utilize the Construction Division of the Department of Corrections for the construction and repair of buildings for the Department of Corrections.
C. The Director of the Department of Central Services shall have authority to purchase all material and perform all other duties necessary in the construction, repair, and maintenance of all buildings under its management or control, shall make all necessary contracts by or on behalf of the state for any buildings or rooms rented for the use of the state or any of the officers thereof, and shall have charge of the arrangement and allotment of space in such buildings among the different state officers.
74 O.S.2001 § 63(B) & (C).
Allocating a large portion of the bond funds to the state agency actually responsible for constructing, repairing, and maintaining *127state buildings, including those owned by the Capitol Improvement Authority appears to be consistent with the purpose of spending the bond funds on capital projects.
¶25 If, as I have previously argued, a specific lump-sum amount may be constitutionally allocated to a particular state agency for the construction of capital projects, then only one issue is involved in this challenge: Whether the Legislature may place the Department of Central Services under the administrative control of the Governor for the purpose of making the capital expenditures.
¶26 The Department of Central Services is part of the Executive Department. 74 O.S.2001 § 61.2.7 The Governor appoints the Director of the Department. 74 O.S.2001 § 61.1. The Director of the Department of Central Services, as part of the Executive Department, performs those duties designated in the Oklahoma Constitution “or prescribed by law.” Okla. Const. Art. 6 § 1.
¶ 27 Many executive powers of the Governor find their source in legislative enactments. For example, the Governor has the power to remove certain officials. 74 O.S. 2001 § 2.8 Power exercised thereunder is statutorily granted and does not spring from the Governor’s constitutional powers. Wentz v. Thomas, 1932 OK 636, 15 P.2d 65, (Governor’s power to remove a statutory executive officer did not arise from the.State Constitution, but was statutory and did not include the removal of highway commissioners).
¶28 This Court has explained that the Legislature has the power to define the executive powers of those executive officials statutorily created. Wentz v. Thomas, 1932 OK 636, 15 P.2d 65. The Legislature also possesses the power to vest Executive Authority in those officials, such the Governor, listed in Article 6 of the Oklahoma Constitution. See, e.g., Norris v. Cross, 1909 OK 316, 105 P. 1000, (a writ of mandamus will issue to the Secretary of State to compel performance with a mandatory statutory duty). Thus, the Executive Authority exercised by the Department of Central Services as it relates to the Governor may be statutorily defined by the Legislature.
¶ 29 There are many examples of the Governor’s statutory powers.9 One type relevant to this controversy occurs when the Legislature creates an executive authority in a particular official of the Executive Department, and makes the exercise of that authority under the direction of the Governor. For example,
The Director of State Finance shall have the power, and it shall be his duty under the direction of the Governor: (1) to prepare the budget document and assist in the drafting of legislation to make it effective, (2) to make field surveys and studies of governmental agencies, looking toward economy and greater efficiency, (3) to make allotments to control expenditures, (4) to authorize transfers of appropriation authorized by law, (5) to study accounting and other reports rendered by the Central Accounting and Reporting Division, (6) to enter into agreements with the United States Secretary of the Treasury for the purpose of implementing the Cash Management Improvement Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-453), and (7) to aid the Governor in the economical management of state *128affairs. In addition to his other duties the Director of State Finance shall, upon request, advise and consult with members of the Legislature and legislative committees concerning income and expenditures of state agencies.
62 O.S.2001 § 41.4, (emphasis added).
The authority exercised by the Director of State Finance is similar to that created by § 301. The exercise of statutory Executive Authority possessed by the Department of Central Services is limited by the statutory Executive Authority granted to the Governor. The Governor is aware of the State’s capital needs. As part of the State Capital Improvement Planning Act: “The Governor shall prepare at the same time as the state budget document is prepared, a capital budget. The capital budget shall be prepared and submitted by the Governor or Governor-elect in accordance with the procedures for preparing the state budget document.” 62 O.S.2001 § 901(D)(3). Including the Governor as part of the Department’s exercise of authority does not violate the Oklahoma Constitution.
¶ 30 The next challenge is that the Oklahoma Capital Improvement Authority is without power to authorize municipalities and counties to spend funds generated by the sale of bonds. The allegedly offending portion states:
L. The Legislature finds that several functions of state government are properly performed through the delivery of state services by use of political subdivisions. In order to facilitate the delivery of essential state services and in furtherance of state governmental functions by the construction, acquisition or improvement of assets which may be located within the corporate limits of a municipality of the State of Oklahoma or which may be located in unincorporated areas of the state and subject to the jurisdiction of a board of county commissioners, but which nonetheless serve an important function of state government, the State of Oklahoma finds that the use of the proceeds from the issuance of obligations pursuant to this section effectuates the performance of essential state governmental functions, including, but not limited to:
1. Fire protection services;
2. Roads, bridges and highways located either partially within or completely within the corporate limits of a municipality or in an unincorporated area of the state;
3. Historic preservation;
4. Recreational facilities;
5. Air transportation infrastructure;
6. Facilities for the housing and care of the elderly;
7. Juvenile delinquency prevention and treatment facilities;
8. Agricultural and horticultural event facilities;
9. Health care facilities, including, but not limited to facilities the primary purpose of which is the treatment or prevention of communicable diseases or illness;
10. Promotion of tourism;,
11. Promotion of economic development and business site selection; and
12. Public safety.
73 O.S.2001 § 301(L).
This language does not authorize any specific amount of funds to go to any municipality or county. The provisions of § 301 authorizing specific funds identify specific state entities to receive those funds for capital projects.
¶ 31 The State may not pledge or lend its credit to a municipal corporation. Okla. Const. Art. 10 § 15(A);10 Reherman v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 1984 OK 12, 679 P.2d 1296, 1302 The state agencies receiving the funds may not violate Article 10 § 15, a provision of the our Constitution, upon a mere grant of legislative authority. Section 15 is a substantive limitation upon the Legislature’s power. By that I mean that an Act of the Legislature stating that a *129particular expenditure is a state function (and thus not for a municipal purpose) is not determinative of the issue of whether § 15 is violated by the enactment. It is the unique duty of the judiciary to preserve our constitution and, when a legislative enactment conflicts with its provisions, to declare the statute unconstitutional. State ex rel. York v. Turpen, 1984 OK 26, 681 P.2d 763, 767; State ex rel. Tharel v. Board of Commissioners of Creek County, 1940 OK 468, 107 P.2d 542, 547, 550. See also Reed v. State Election Bd., 1962 OK 37, 369 P.2d 156, 158, (syllabus by the court).
¶ 32 Our inquiry is based upon whether the attack challenges the statute upon its face, or as applied by a particular official. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Getty Oil Co., 1989 OK 139, 782 P.2d 915, 917, (discussing attacks upon a statute as applied); Tulsa County Deputy Sheriff's Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge Number 188 v. Board of County Commissioners of Tulsa County, 2000 OK 2, ¶¶ 9-10, 995 P.2d 1124, 1136, (Opala, J., dissenting), (discussion of facial and “as applied” constitutional attacks upon a statute). The present controversy is not framed as a facial attack upon the statute. For example, there is no argument that the Legislature has impermissibly defined building of all roads geographically located in a municipality as a state function. This Court hag stated that: “We are of the opinion that the sections referred to by plaintiffs confer authority on the State Highway Commission to make expenditures to improve streets within a city where they are a part of the Highway System, and also to participate with cities in the improvement of such streets.” Ambrister v. City of Norman, 1959 OK 172, 344 P.2d 665, 668. Underlying this approach is the concept that a particular capital project had characteristics of both local and state concern.
¶ 33 The attack in this proceeding is based upon the allegation that some officials may eventually use the bond proceeds for purely municipal expenditures. Deciding whether § 15 is violated by a particular expenditure requires an examination of that particular transaction. See, e.g., Petition of University Hospitals Authority, 1997 OK 162, ¶ 21, 953 P.2d 314, 321, where we cited Children’s Home & Welfare Association v. Childers, 1946 OK 180, 171 P.2d 613, and explained that a contract between the state and a children’s home for the care of orphaned children did not violate § 15, and that the payment of appropriated funds in return for these services was not a prohibited transfer of public funds to a private organization. The particular transactions by the state agencies spending the funds at some future date are not before the Court.11
¶ 34 The language in § 301(L) defines certain state governmental functions. This language does not require a particular a state agency to use bond proceeds in violation of § 15 for purely municipal functions. In deciding the constitutionality of statutes, a legislative act is presumed to be constitutional and will be upheld unless it is clearly, palpably and plainly inconsistent with the Constitution. Reherman v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 679 P.2d at 1300. Whenever possible, statutes should be construed so as to uphold their constitutionality. Id. There is no reason to assume that a public official will take an unconstitutional view, as opposed to a constitutional view, of § 301.12
¶ 35 Section 301 is also challenged as violating Article 10 § 20.13 This section prohibits the Legislature from imposing taxes for the purpose of a county, city, town or other *130municipal corporation. This challenge also assumes that the “debt retirement payments” as specified in § 301 will be derived from “taxes” imposed by the Legislature. Assuming for the purpose of argument that this is correct, the same response to this claim could be made as that to the claim that § 301 violates Art. 10 § 15: Section 301 does not require state officials to use bond funds for a municipal purpose.
¶ 36 Section 301 is challenged with the argument that “SB 973 does not clearly express in its title the subjects of the Act.” Article 5 § 57 of the Oklahoma Constitution14 and John Deere Plow Co. v. Owens, 1943 OK 284, 147 P.2d 149 are the authorities cited. In Mistletoe Express Service v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 1983 OK 27, 674 P.2d 1, the Court quoted from Jones v. State, 1975 OK CR 222, 542 P.2d 1316, and said the following:
In numerous cases the courts of this state have held that the purpose of this constitutional provision is to prevent the blending of repugnant objects in one act and the inclusion of provisions not indicated by the title in order that those interested may not be misled or misinformed as to the contents of the statute. (Citations omitted.) Additionally, it has been repeatedly held that this section is not to be construed in such a manner as to hamper or unreasonably restrict the Legislature in the performance of its duty. (Citations omitted.) It has repeatedly been held that this section is general and comprehensive in nature and where the body of the act is germane, relative and cognate to the title of the act, it is sufficient to meet the requirements of the constitution. (Citations omitted.) Also, if the clauses of the statute are referable and cognate to the subject expressed in the title, the title need not set out each clause of the act. (Citations omitted.) Neither need the title of a statute embrace an abstract of its contents when the title otherwise fairly indicates the general purpose of the statute. (Citations omitted.)
Mistletoe, 674 P.2d at 6.
¶ 37 S.B. No. 973 does have a title. See 2000 Okla. Sess. Laws, Ch. 376 (West) & 2000 Okla. Sess. Laws, 1st Extraordinary Session, Ch. 7 (West). The titles are germane to the provisions of the statute. The challenge to the Act’s title is not specific as to the flaw perceived and need not be addressed further.
¶ 38 Finally, the major argument in this litigation is the petitioners’ argument that the Court should reverse itself on two opinions: Application of Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, 1998 OK 25, 958 P.2d 759, and Fent v. Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, 1999 OK 64, 984 P.2d 200. This argument is broader than just these two opinions. This is so because the heart of petitioners’ argument addresses the reasoning of the Court in Application of Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, 1960 OK 207, 355 P.2d 1028.
¶ 39 In Application of Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, 1960 OK 207, 355 P.2d 1028, this Court examined whether the bonds were a state debt. The bond funds were used to build office buildings, and the money to repay the bonds came “solely from the revenues from the office buildings.” Application of Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, 355 P.2d at 1030. The Authority, with Public Affairs, could require state agencies to use and lease the office buildings. The same statutes stated that the debt created was not that of the State. The Court did not examine the nature of the revenue source the state agencies would use in making the lease payments. In our case today, petitioners assert that the Court must determine if the state agencies will retire the indebtedness via funds from future general appropria*131tions or a state fund already in existence.15 We declined to do this forty years ago, or in the intervening years when the Authority was used to construct other buildings for state agencies.
¶ 40 In Application of Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, 1960 OK 207, 355 P.2d 1028, the payments made by the state agencies were used to retire the debt. Today under § 301 payments made by the state agencies are used to retire the debt. The Legislature and this Court has followed this type of analysis for more than forty years, and the Legislature has relied upon this interpretation in creating financing for the needs of state government.
¶ 41 This Court does not, as a rule, inquire into the construction of a constitutional provision or the constitutionality of a statute when this question was ruled on in previous decisions by a court of last resort, unless such previous decisions are manifestly erroneous, and there are cogent reasons for overruling them; and this is especially true where such decisions have been long relied on as authoritative. In re Real Property of Integris Realty Corp., 2002 OK 85, ¶ 12, 58 P.3d 200, 204-205, quoting, Oklahoma County v. Queen City Lodge No. 197, I.O.O.F., 1945 OK 55, 156 P.2d 340. Thus, I would deny the petitioners’ request for this Court to overrule its opinions on this subject.
III. Conclusion
¶ 42 The Court should use a definition for “purpose” in Art. 10 § 16 for borrowing that would also satisfy the purpose requirement in Art. 5 § 55 for appropriations. Capital projects may utilize both appropriated moneys and bond-funding, and the same requirement for the separate funding sources should be construed similarly. The history of funding for bonds in this State shows that bonds are approved when lump-sum amounts are provided to a particular state entity for capital expenditures.
¶ 43 The Court may approve of the bonds in this proceeding without hypothesizing whether state officials will attempt to read into § 301 a greater authority than they possess because of the limits imposed by Okla. Const. Art. 10 §§ 15 and 20. We are asked to approve of a class of funding capital expenditures in specific amounts for state entities-that which is present on the face of § 301, and not potential unauthorized transfers to municipalities. State officials could not read anything into our approval other than what is actually before us. In sum, I would approve the bonds, and once again decline the petitioners’ invitation to revisit Application of Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, 1960 OK 207, 355 P.2d 1028.

. Section 301 does define certain state functions. 73 O.S.2001 § 301(L). A particular state agency created by law possesses that authority vested in the agency by law. Oklahoma Public Employees Association v. Oklahoma Dept, of Central Services, supra. An activity legislatively defined as a "state function" does not, by itself, give any particular state entity the authority to perform that activity. The specific state agency must be vested with the authority for the specific function, either express or implied, in order for that particular agency to perform the function. Id. The definition of a "state function” is addressed subsequently herein in the context of a different constitutional challenge.

. Capital improvements are defined by 62 O.S. 2001 § 45.3(F):
"F. In this section, "capital improvement” means any building or infrastructure project that will be owned by the state and built with direct appropriations or with the proceeds of state-issued bonds or paid from revenue sources other than general revenue at a cost of at least Twenty-five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00) and has a useful life of at least five (5) years.”

. An example of a higher degree of specificity in the form of a bond issue is found in 70 O.S.2001 § 23-109. That statute requires the Oklahoma Educational Television Authority (OETA) to provide "by resolution” for the issuance of revenue bonds to pay the costs for its projects, "but each project shall be covered by a separate resolution and separate bond issue or issues.” Id.
The substance of the authority of the OETA to issue the bonds is similar to the Capitol Improvement Authority. The Capitol Improvement Authority possesses a general authorization to erect, equip, operate, and maintain buildings for the purpose of fulfilling capital needs of state agencies (73 O.S.2001 § 153), and the OETA also possesses a general authorization to plan, construct, repair, maintain and operate educational television facilities for fulfilling the capital needs of OETA (70 O.S.2001 § 23-101).

. 62 O.S.2001 § 695.11A:
Council of Bond Oversight — Validation of actions and obligations — Members—Quorum—Voting — Vacancy
A. In the event either the Executive or Legislative Bond Oversight Commission is found unconstitutional by a final, unappealed order of a court of competent jurisdiction, all of the powers, duties and responsibilities of the Commissions shall devolve upon the Council of Bond Oversight, and previous joint or individual actions, approvals and disapprovals of the Executive and Legislative Bond Oversight Commissions are hereby confirmed, ratified, validated and deemed incontestable. In the event the Executive or the Legislative Bond Oversight Commission or the Council of Bond Oversight is found unconstitutional by a final, unappealed order of a court of competent jurisdiction, such determination shall not nullify joint or individual actions, approvals and disapprovals of the Executive and Legislative Bond Oversight Commissions or the Council of Bond Oversight and any obligations entered into by the Oklahoma Development Finance Authority pursuant to provisions of the Oklahoma Development Finance Authority Act and the Credit Enhancement Reserve Fund Act with approval by the Bond Oversight Commissions or the Council of Bond Oversight and such obligations are hereby confirmed, ratified, validated and deemed incontestable.
B. The Council shall consist of five (5) non-legislative members. One member shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, one member shall be appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, two members shall be appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate and one member shall be the Director of State Finance. Three members of the Council shall constitute a quorum. The affirmative vote of three members present and voting shall be necessary for any action taken by the Council. Appointed members shall serve a term of two (2) years and may be removed for cause by the appointing authority. Members may be appointed for additional terms.
C. A vacancy on the Council shall be filled in a like manner as the original appointment, but only for the remainder of the term. The Council shall elect one of its members chairman and may elect such other officers as it deems necessary. No vacancy in the membership of the Council shall impair the right of the Council to exercise all rights and duties of the Council.
D. If the powers, duties and responsibilities of the Commissions devolve upon the Council pursuant to this section, the person serving as the Oklahoma State Bond Advisor on the date of such devolution shall continue to serve in that position until the Governor appoints a new Oklahoma State Bond Advisor from a list of candidates provided by the Council and said appointee has been confirmed by the Senate. Thereafter, and in the case of a vacancy, the Oklahoma State Bond Advisor shall be appointed, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, by the Governor from a list of candidates provided by the Council and shall serve a term of office coterminous with that of the appointing Governor. The Oklahoma State Bond Advisor may be removed by the Council for cause, after a public hearing.

. The Court has explained that the Governor's power of appointment was limited when the Oklahoma Constitution was created. Keating v. Edmondson, 2001 OK 110, n. 41, 37 P.3d 882, 890. The Constitution states that: "The Governor shall commission all officers not otherwise commissioned by law.” Art. 6 § 13, emphasis added. This language was taken from a similar provision in the Constitution of Missouri. R.L. Williams, The Constitution of Oklahoma and Enabling Act, Art. 6 § 13 (2d ed.1941).

. 74 O.S.2001 § 61.2:
There is hereby created in the Executive Department, a Department of Central Services, under the administrative control of the Director of Central Services. Whenever the terms "Board of Affairs”, "State Board of Public Affairs”, "Board” when used in reference to the Board of Public Affairs or "Office of Public Affairs”, appear in the Oklahoma Statutes they shall mean the Department of Central Services. Whenever the term "Director of Public Affairs” appears in the Oklahoma Statutes it shall mean the Director of Central Services.

. 74 O.S.2001 § 2:
The Governor shall have the power to remove any officers appointed by him, in case of incompetency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office; and may then fill the same as provided in cases of vacancy.

.An additional type of Executive statutory power occurs when the Legislature authorizes the Governor to delegate a Governor's statutory duty to another official in the Executive Department. See, e.g., 2 O.S.2001 § 16-37 (Governor, as administrator of the South Central Interstate Forest Fire Protection Compact, "shall have authority to delegate the exercise of the powers and duties to the Director of Forestry, Division of Forestry, State Board of Agriculture”).

. Okla. Const. Art. 10 § 15 states in part:
A. Except as provided by this section, the credit of the State shall not be given, pledged, or loaned to any individual, company, corporation, or association, municipality, or political subdivision of the State, nor shall the State become an owner or stockholder in, nor make donation by gift, subscription to stock, by tax, or otherwise, to any company, association, or corporation.

. Proposed expenditures by individual officials, which may, or may not, ultimately receive approval by the governing state board or commission present hypothetical controversies. This Court does not provide advisory opinions on hypothetical questions. Dank v. Benson, 2000 OK 40, 5 P.3d 1088, 1091; Ethics Commission v. Keating, 1998 OK 36, n. 8, 958 P.2d 1250, 1259.

. This Court assumes that when a public official knows his or her duties then the official will act in good faith in the performance of those duties. unless some reason to the contrary is shown. State ex rel. Haning v. Department of Public Welfare, 1952 OK 229, 245 P.2d 452, 455, (court stated rule in the context of mandamus).

.Okla. Const. Art. 10 § 20:
The Legislature shall not impose taxes for the purpose of any county, city, town, or other municipal corporation, but may, by general laws, confer on the proper authorities thereof, respectively, the power to assess and collect such taxes.

. Okla. Const. Art. 5 § 57:
Every act of the Legislature shall embrace but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, except general appropriation bills, general revenue bills, and bills adopting a code, digest, or revision of statutes; and no law shall be revived, amended, or the provisions thereof extended or conferred, by reference to its title only; but so much thereof as is revived, amended, extended, or conferred shall be re-enacted and published at length: Provided, That if any subject be embraced in any act contrary to the provisions of this section, such act shall be void only as to so much of the laws as may not be expressed in the title thereof.

. See Application of Oklahoma Ed. Television Authority, 1954 OK 219, 272 P.2d 1027, 1033, (court discussed the distinction between a self-liquidating debt [defined therein as a debt paid from revenue generated from the facility built using the bond funds], and a debt against an existing permanent fund of the state and its future revenues).