Court Opinion

ID: 9812592
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:42:33.170489+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:25:25.485664
License: Public Domain

Stacy, C. J.,
dissenting:
The telegram in question is rendered actionable by the factual situation, fully set out in the complaint, and the innuendo, “the defendant by said writing charging the plaintiff and intending to charge the plaintiff, with a crime punishable in the State’s Prison, to wit, . . . embezzlement, . . . larceny, . . . fraud, or other immoral conduct, tending to disgrace or degrade the plaintiff.” Wozelka v. Hettrick, 93 N. C., 10; Lay v. Publishing Co., 209 N. C., 134, 183 S. E., 416; Broadway v. Cope, 208 N. C., 85, 179 S. E., 452; Hamilton v. Nance, 159 N. C., 56, 74 S. E., 627; Gudger v. Penland, 108 N. C., 593, 13 S. E., 168; Watts v. Greenlee, 13 N. C., 115; McIntosh, N. C. Prac. & Proc., 363; 17 R. C. L., 394. The colloquium is no longer necessary in pleading. C. S., 542.
The publication is alleged to be libelous per se, and the language used is susceptible of such construction. 36 C. J., 1229. This saves the complaint from the charge of defectiveness, and the jury was justified in drawing the inference it did. Oates v. Trust Co., 205 N. C., 14, 169 S. E., 869; McCurry v. McCurry, 82 N. C., 296.
There is a distinction between language susceptible of two interpretations, one libelous the other not, and a colloquialism or code expression which is without meaning except to those who understand it. Sowers v. Sowers, 87 N. C., 303. This difference was pointed out in Sasser v. Rouse, 35 N. C., 143, where it was held (as stated in the syllabus, which accurately digests the opinion) :
“In an action of slander a plaintiff has no right to ask a witness what he considers to be the meaning of the words spoken, except in the cases :
“First. Where the words in the ordinary meaning do not import a slanderous charge, if they are susceptible of such a meaning, and the plaintiff avers a fact, from which it may be inferred that they were used for the purpose of making the charge, he may prove such averment, and *90then tbe jury must decide whether the defendant used the words in the sense implied or not.
“Secondly. The exception is, where a charge is made by using a cant phrase, or words having a local meaning, or a nickname, when advantage is taken of a fact known to the person spoken to, in order to convey a meaning which they understood by connecting the words (of themselves unmeaning) with such fact, then the plaintiff must make an averment to that effect, and may prove not only the truth of the averment, but also that the words were so understood by the person to whom they were addressed; for otherwise they are without point, and harmless.”
It is well established that “when the words spoken are ambiguous and fairly admit of a slanderous interpretation, it is then a question for the jury to determine on the sense in which the words were used and whether they amounted to the slanderous charge to the reasonable apprehension of the hearers.” Reeves v. Bowden, 91 N. C., 29, 1 S. E., 549; Lucas v. Nichols, 52 N. C., 32; Simmons v. Morse, 51 N. C.,, 6; McBrayer v. Hill, 26 N. C., 136; Emmerson v. Marvell, 55 Ind., 265. And it is not competent to show by parol testimony that the hearers understood the “speaker to mean differently from the common import of the words.” Pitts v. Pace, 52 N. C., 558; S. v. Howard, 169 N. C., 312, 84 S. E., 807; Minton v. Ferguson, 208 N. C., 541, 181 S. E., 553.
In the case at bar, the language used, if not actionable per se as a matter of law, is susceptible of a libelous construction. The result of the trial is supported by the record.