Court Opinion

ID: 9493134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:58:59.788159+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:40.140975
License: Public Domain

VAN GRAAFEILAND, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
On this appeal, my colleagues suggest that I join them in holding that Rafael Flores has been incarcerated wrongfully for the past ten years and that the responsibility for this great wrong rests on the shoulders of his former attorney, Robert Katz. In short, the issue, as my colleagues frame it, is not whether Flores sodomized Miguel S.; the evidence is clear that he did. In effect, therefore, we are asked to pass judgment on the lawyer, Robert Katz, not the defendant, i.e., “to grade counsel’s performance,” a task we are not authorized to perform in this habeas corpus proceeding. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (“The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s performance.”). As the competent and widely respected former district judge, Edward Weinfeld, put it in United States ex rel. Butler v. Schubin:
Rosario is grounded in the State’s common law, and if petitioner was wrongly denied tapes he was entitled to receive under that doctrine, no violation of federal constitutional rights is presented. Thus, assuming the State courts were in fact in error in interpreting the scope of the Rosario rule, it was one of state law that is not subject to a review under a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus charging infringement of federal constitutional rights.
376 F.Supp. 1241, 1247 (S.D.N.Y.1974), aff'd, 508 F.2d 837 (2d Cir.1975) (footnotes omitted).
It is evident from the cases hereafter cited that the doctrine, as thus set forth, is concurred in by a long line of consistent federal authority. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (“[Fjederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law” (citations and internal quotations omitted)); *306Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982) (“A federally issued writ of habeas corpus, of course, reaches only convictions obtained in violation of some provision of the United States Constitution”); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21, 96 S.Ct. 175, 46 L.Ed.2d 162 (1975) (necessary predicate for granting of federal habeas relief is determination that custody violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States); Quartararo v. Hanslmaier, 186 F.3d 91, 97 (2d Cir.1999), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 120 S.Ct. 1196, 145 L.Ed.2d 1100 (2000) (“[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” (quoting Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67, 112 S.Ct. 475)); Headley v. Tilghman, 53 F.3d 472, 474 (2d Cir.1995) (“A state prisoner is entitled to habeas relief only if he is being held in custody in violation of a federal right.” (citations omitted)); Manning v. Warden, 786 F.2d 710, 712 (5th Cir.1986) (“Whether the state followed its own procedure is not the concern of a federal habeas court.”); Stephens v. Costello, 55 F.Supp.2d 163, 167 (W.D.N.Y.1999) (“[F]ailure to turn over Rosario material is not a basis for habeas relief as the Rosario rule is purely one of state law.” (quoting Green v. Artuz, 990 F.Supp. 267, 274 (S.D.N.Y.1998))); Morrison v. McClellan, 903 F.Supp. 428, 429 (E.D.N.Y.1995) (“Any error under Rosario at trial would be a violation of state law, and, thus, not subject to review under a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.”); Camara v. Scully, 624 F.Supp. 106, 108 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (“A federal court on a petition for writ of habeas corpus may interfere in state criminal proceedings only to correct errors of constitutional dimension.” (citations omitted)).
Flores does not strengthen his Rosario argument by clothing it in the garb of ineffective assistance of counsel. A violation of Rosario does not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel. Boyd v. Hawk, 965 F.Supp. 443, 453 (S.D.N.Y.1997); Colson v. Mitchell, 798 F.Supp. 966, 973 (E.D.N.Y.1992); People v. Nuness, 159 A.D.2d 970, 970, 555 N.Y.S.2d 633 (N.Y.App.Div.1990). The standard for deciding whether habeas relief must be granted is whether the error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)) (internal quotations omitted). My colleagues distort this principle by arguing that a state appellate court might make a Rosario grant of a new trial despite the absence of a showing that the jury was improperly influenced in any manner. I believe there must be a showing of actual prejudice before a federal court can act. Cousart v. Hammock, 745 F.2d 776, 778 (2d Cir.1984).
I write this dissent because I want Mr. Katz to know that one judge believes he is being unfairly stigmatized by an opinion issued in excess of our authority.