Court Opinion

ID: 9553071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:21:29.999448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:29:38.284314
License: Public Domain

SUMMERS, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part;
In a trial where the injured plaintiff will win or lose depending on whether the jury finds her injuries were due to the alleged negligence of the defendant, the trial court must give the jury some basic instructions on the law of negligence. Because no such instructions were given here I would reverse the judgment for the Okeene Public Schools and Okeene Public Works Authority, and remand for a new trial.
The instructions not given to the jury appear in the Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions booklet as numbers 9.1 and 9.2, and are as follows:
*1034NEGLIGENCE — ELEMENTS OF LIABILITY
A party claiming damages has the burden of proving each of the following propositions:
First, that he has sustained injury; Second, that the party from whom he seeks to recover was negligent;
And, third, that such negligence was a direct cause of the injury sustained by the claiming party.
NEGLIGENCE DEFINED
Since this lawsuit is based on the theory of negligence, you must understand what the terms “negligence” and “ordinary care” mean in the law with reference to this case.
“Negligence” is the failure to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to another’s person or property. “Ordinary care” is the care which a reasonably careful person would use under the same or similar' circumstances. The law does not say how a reasonably careful person would act under those circumstances. That is for you to decide. Thus, under the facts in evidence in this case, if a party failed to do something which a reasonably careful person would do, or did something which a reasonably careful person would not do, such party would be negligent.
These instructions had been requested by the plaintiff,1 by the defendant School District, and by the defendant Public Works Authority. There is no explanation in the record for the trial court’s failure to give them. It was likely an oversight. The majority holds that these negligence instructions were not required for two reasons: (1) because “this was not a negligence case”, but a “common law premises liability case,” and (2) because the instructions were adequate and Juvenal could not prove prejudice. I disagree with both conclusions.
As support for its first assertion, the majority cites Sutherland v. St. Francis Hospital, 595 P.2d 780 (Okla.1979) for the idea that premises liability is not based on the theory of negligence. That is not the holding of Sutherland, nor is it in line with the overwhelming majority of cases issued by this and other courts.2 The first sentence of Sutherland states that it was a “negligent-tort litigation, occasioned by an entrant’s fall on hospital premises.” Sutherland continues by pointing out that a landowner’s liability for accidents on premises is based on negligence principles and depends on the status of the entrant.3
To prove a case in landowner liability, the plaintiff must show duty on the part of the landowner, a breach of the duty, causation and injury. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 282, defines negligence to include harm which arises out of land ownership. The comments to this section specifically speak to the duties owed by landowners to avoid premises liability. See § 282, comment e. Our OUJI instructions and comments contemplate premises liability arising from negligence. See OUJI 11.10, regarding invitees on a defendant’s premises and its *1035Notes on Use, which cite as an example a slip and fall ease, and require that instructions 9.1, 9.2 and 9.6 dealing with negligence <be given. Professor Prosser, in The Law of Torts (5th Ed.1984), states that a landowner may be held liable under only three theories: (1) nuisance, (2) strict liability and (3) negligence. He goes on to say it is this last category — simple negligence — which covers the majority of premises liability lawsuits. Here, Juvenal did not assert strict liability or nuisance. Her claim was based on the negligent maintenance of the premises. In her amended petition, she claimed that injury occurred “[a]s a result of the negligence of the defendants.” O.R. at 86. It is clear that although plaintiffs injuries occurred on the premises of the defendant, the theory under which she sought recovery was negligence, the basic legal concepts of which were never explained to the jury.
Jury instructions are given to guide the jury regarding the applicable law during its deliberations. See Midland Valley R. Co. v. Pettie, 196 Okl. 52, 162 P.2d 543, 546 (1945). They are meant to help the jury understand their duty of analyzing the evidence in light of the controlling law. Id. The instructions need not be ideal, but they must fairly and accurately apprise the jury of the law governing the controversy. Dutsch v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 845 P.2d 187, 189 (Okla.1992); Messler v. Simmons Gun Specialties, Inc., 687 P.2d 121 (Okla.1984).
Defects in jury instructions generally take one of four forms: (1) the instruction incorrectly states the applicable law, (2) the instructions are confusing or conflicting, (3) the instruction, although legally correct, is not factually applicable, or (4) an applicable and needed instruction is not given. See Midland Valley R. Co. v. Pettie, 196 Okl. 52, 162 P.2d 543, 546 (1945) (reversible error to give an instruction which incorrectly stated the law); City of Ardmore v. Hendrix, 348 P.2d 497, 501 (Okla.1960) (reversible error to give two instructions that were in conflict with one another); Woolfolk v. Semrod, 351 P.2d 742, 744 (Okla.1960) (reversible error to give an instruction which was not supported by the evidence); McFarland v. Crabtree, 331 P.2d 379, 382 (Okla.1958) (reversible error to fail to give an instruction on contributory negligence since it was a critical issue presented by the defendant). It is the fourth category, an act of omission on the part of the court, which is presented in this case.
In Reinhart & Donovan Co. v. Williamson, 191 Okl. 539, 131 P.2d 765, 766-67 (1942) we stated the two things that could constitute reversible error in the giving of jury instructions:
The test of reversible error in connection with an instruction given is whether or not the jury were misled so that they reached a different result than they would have reached but for the error, or whether there is a serious misdirection in the charge, excluding from the consideration of the jury an issue properly in the case.
(Emphasis Added). If the instructions, either by way of commission or omission, deprive a party of a substantial right, the error is reversible. Winn v. Corey, 179 Okl. 305, 65 P.2d 522, 525 (1937). Failing to instruct on a vital issue in the case amounts to a violation of a substantial right. Id.
It has long been the rule that the trial court must instruct on the primary issues in the case, and that failure to do so is reversible error. McFarland, 331 P.2d at 382; Roadway Express Inc. v. Baty, 189 Okl. 180, 114 P.2d 935, 938 (1941).4 The trial court has a duty to instruct on the decisive issues raised by the pleadings and the evidence. Timmons v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 653 P.2d 907, 915 (Okla.1982). This rule is consistent with the function of jury instructions as well as the concept of fairness. See Oklahoma Trans. Co. v. Green, 344 P.2d 660 (Okla.1959); Garner v. Myers, 318 P.2d 410 (Okla.1957). The plaintiff has a right to have his or her theories of recovery presented to the jury; the defendant has a similar right with regard to defenses. Timmons v. Royal *1036Globe Ins. Co., supra, at 915; Garner v. Myers, supra, at 414. As stated in Williamson, excluding a critical issue from the jury’s consideration is reversible error.-
In Garner, 318 P.2d at 414, and Green, 344 P.2d at 665, new trials were granted because the trial court failed to instruct on critical theories in the case. The “failure of the trial court to instruct the jury on his own initiative with reference to said fundamental issue was prejudicial error.” Green, 344 P.2d at 665. In Green, we continued by stating that when the a specific defense is pleaded and evidence is introduced to support the defense, the defendant is entitled to the instruction explaining to the jury the legal elements of the defense. Id. at 664-5.
In McKee v. Neilson, 444 P.2d 194 (Okla.1968) and McFarland v. Crabtree, supra, we affirmed the general rule that critical issues must be presented to the jury. Id. at 199. In those cases the trial court failed to instruct on contributory negligence. We agreed that such instruction was necessary because it was a “fundamental issue” in the case. McKee, 444 P.2d at 199.5 Both cases required a new trial.
In Sellars v. McCullough, 784 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Okla.1989) we commented that if fundamental error occurred the appellate court would reverse even if the appealing party had not objected to prevent it:
The trial court’s duty is to state the law correctly, but not to frame the issues. If the nisi prius judge does not accurately state the law, “fundamental error” occurs, which is reviewable even if no exception has been taken.
Here we need not invoke the fundamental error doctrine to review the matter. Plaintiff, in requesting the instructions, objecting at trial to their not being given, raising the issue on appeal and again on certiorari, has amply protected her record for review. Furthermore, in Thomas v. Gilliam, 774 P.2d 462, 465 (1989), we held that the giving of applicable OUJI instructions was mandatory. Failure to use the uniform instruction without appropriate explanation is error. Id. at 466.
In the present case the facts were in dispute. Juvenal claimed that she fell from the building when she was shocked by a wire; the defendants alleged that she simply fell. Juvenal offered evidence which indicated that the school knew of the wire and had done nothing to prevent injury to school children. The defendants offered evidence to prove that the wiring met professional standards. “Because the facts are in dispute, the jury instructions are especially important so the trier of fact has an accurate understanding of the applicable law and can apply that law to the facts it finds the evidence supports.” Cimarron Feeders v. Tri-County Elec. Coop, 818 P.2d 901, 902 (Okla.1991) citing Bechard v. Concrete Mix & Const., Inc., 218 Kan. 597, 545 P.2d 334 (1976).
The defendants urge that the error does not require reversal because plaintiff has not shown prejudice. Citing the general rule that erroneous instructions do not require reversal unless the opposing party was prejudiced, the defendants claim that any error was harmless. Again I must disagree. In those cases dealing with the trial court’s failure to instruct on a critical issue, we do not require an independent showing of prejudice. See McFarland v. Crabtree, 331 P.2d at 382; Liberty Nat’l Bank v. Semkoff, 184 Okl. 18, 84 P.2d 438 (1938). The Williamson test is satisfied if either (1) the jury is so misled that they probably reached a different result or (2) an issue properly in the case has been excluded from the jury’s consideration by failure to instruct on it. Williamson, supra 191 Okl. 539, 131 P.2d at 766, 767. Rather than following the ruling in William*1037son, the majority holds that there must always be a showing of prejudice. As authority, Dutsch v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 845 P.2d 187 (Okla.1992) is cited. But Dutsch did not deal with a situation where the entire theory of recovery was omitted from the jury’s consideration. In Dutsch we were faced with the question of whether the instructions adequately presented the defense of the defendants. We held that they did. Unlike Dutsch, here the plaintiffs theory of recovery was not given to the jury. Contrary to the majority’s position, Dutsch did not require a showing of prejudice for a theory wholly omitted by the instructions.
Prejudice is implicit when a party’s basis for recovery or defense is not explained to the jury. The court gave a one line instruction defining “ordinary care”, another defining “direct cause,” and a third explaining Brandy’s incapacity for negligence due to her age. But the jury was not told of the consequences of the lack of “ordinary care”, or what “direct cause” had to do with the case, or even what “negligence” was in the eyes of the law. In other words, the plaintiffs theory on which she sought to recover was never explained. No other showing of prejudice need be demonstrated. I would reverse and remand as to the defendants Okeene Public Schools and Okeene Public Works Authority.
I concur in the Court’s affirmance of the directed verdict for the City of Okeene.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice HODGES, Justice WILSON and Justice KAUGER join in these views.

. Plaintiffs' requested version of No. 9.2 also contained an additional sentence relating to the duty of care toward children.

. Stills v. Mayor, 438 P.2d 477 (Okla.1968) (plaintiff sued building owner in negligence): Henryetta Constr. Co. v. Harris, 408 P.2d 522 (Okla.1965) (plaintiff sued construction company for negligence in leaving a drainage inlet uncovered during construction); St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Witty, 327 P.2d 453 (Okla.1958) (plaintiff sued railroad in negligence for the accident which occurred on railroad track). See also Maxymow v. Lake Maggiore Baptist Church, 212 So.2d 792 (Fla.App.1968) (plaintiff sued for negligence in the maintenance of a canopy on a building); Crosby v. Savannah Elec. & Power, 114 Ga.App. 193, 150 S.E.2d 563 (1966) (plaintiff sued in negligence for the failure to insulate an electrical wire on the premises); Coleman v. Baker, 382 S.W.2d 843 (Ky.1964) (shop owner sued for negligence in the maintenance of his premises); Miller v. Miller, 373 Mich. 519, 129 N.W.2d 885 (1964) (social guest sued on the theory of negligence for a slip and fall accident); Richey v. Kemper, 392 S.W.2d 266 (Mo.1965) (landowner sued in negligent for failure to upkeep property); Felix v. O'Brien, 413 Pa. 613, 199 A.2d 128 (1964) (plaintiff sued homeowner for the failure to warn of a danger on the premises); Wolf v. Des Moines Elevator Co., 126 Iowa 659, 98 N.W. 301 (1905); Fort Wayne Copperage Co. v. Page, 170 Ind. 585, 84 N.E. 145 (1908).

.In The American Law of Torts, Volume 3, § 14.3, the authors state that Sutherland held that negligence principles apply within the restrictions of status-based duties. In other words, the standards of care vary depending on the status of the victim.

. See also Smicklas v. Spitz, 846 P.2d 362 (Okla.1992); Young v. First State Bank, 628 P.2d 707 (Okla.1981); Phillips v. Barker, 269 P.2d 337 (Okla.1954); Pechacek v. Hightower, 269 P.2d 342 (Okla.1954); Evlo Refining & Marketing Co. v. Moore, 192 Okl. 576, 137 P.2d 911 (1943); City of Altus v. Martin, 185 Okl. 446, 94 P.2d 1 (1939); Liberty Nat’l Bank of Weatherford v. Semkoff, 184 Okl. 18, 84 P.2d 438 (1938A).

. We have also reversed and remanded for a new trial for the failure to instruct on critical issues in Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1377 (Okla.1975) (fundamental error for the trial court to fail to give instructions on causation in a products liability case); Pacific Ins. Co. v. Frank, 452 P.2d 794 (Okla.1969) (fundamental error for the trial court to fail to give an instruction dealing with the defendant's theory of arson); Linde-mann v. Randolph, 414 P.2d 257 (Okla.1966) (failure to instruct on a vital defense presented by defendant even though there was conflicting evidence was fundamental and reversible error); Subscribers At Cas. Reciprocal Exch. v. Sims, 293 P.2d 578 (Okla.1956) (the absence of an instruction dealing with “right of way” was "fatal” error requiring reversal).