Court Opinion

ID: 9638330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:41:17.442893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:52.610941
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
In its motion for rehearing, Dal-Mac contends that we erred in stating that Hanson objected to the special issue concerning damages on the basis that it required the jury to pass on a quantum meruit rather than a contract measure of damages. After reviewing the record, we must concede that Hanson did not properly object on that basis to the special issue submitted. The objection was made to a proposed special issue proposed by Dal-Mac which was similar although not identical, to the issue actually submitted. The reversal of the judgment was, however, based upon the court’s error in admitting the exhibit on which the jury apparently based its finding of damages. Consequently, our discussion of the special issue is for the purpose of aiding the trial court in the event of a retrial.
We also note that in our discussion of the measure of damages we did not construe the contract with respect to any profits that Dal-Mac may have had on the contract. Dal-Mac now asserts that it is entitled to a profit of eleven percent on all work performed and services rendered. We cannot agree. First, there is no evidence that Dal-Mac would have made a profit on the contract had it not been terminated by Dal-Mac for nonpayment of draw requests by Hanson Southwest. Second, the contract provision under which Dal-Mac seeks recovery does not specifically provide for profits. That provision states:
In the event the contractor shall terminate the . . . agreement and declare the same null and void, neither party shall thereafter be under further obligation to the other, except that the con*725tractor shall have the right to receive and the owner shall be obligated to pay all sums due to the contractor for work previously performed and materials previously supplied to or ordered for the project. (Emphasis added).
As we read this language, it only provides for restitution to the contractor “for work previously performed and materials previously supplied to or ordered for the project." No mention is made of profits. We conclude, therefore, that profits are not included within its provision. We do not pass, however, on the question of whether the contract excludes the usual measure of damages for breach by the owner, namely, the loss of the contractor’s anticipated profit if the job had been completed (contract price, less expenditures allowing for materials on hand). Dal-Mac has not pleaded for such a recovery in this case or even for a pro rata profit on the work done, and there is no proof that such a profit would have been realized if the job had been completed.
Dal-Mac also attacks our holding that exhibit 47 was not admissible because its comptroller did not have knowledge that the services and materials represented by the invoices were actually furnished to the Masters Village project. It argues that this information was furnished to the comptroller by other Dal-Mac employees through the delivery tickets attached to the invoices, citing University Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Security Lumber Co., 423 S.W.2d 287 (Tex.1967). Assuming that it was shown that all invoices had delivery tickets attached, Dal-Mac still failed to satisfy the requirements of article 3737e. There is no testimony that a Dal-Mac employee with personal knowledge that the materials were furnished or the services were rendered made any notation on the delivery tickets or transmitted information to another employee for notation on the delivery ticket, nor is there any testimony that delivery tickets are made in the regular course of Dal-Mac’s business. At best, the evidence shows that delivery tickets were attached to some invoices. This evidence is hearsay as to Hanson, without proof that they meet the requirements of article 3737e. By contrast, there was testimony in Security Lumber Co. concerning the usual course of business and the knowledge of employees preparing the documents.
Dal-Mac contends that Hanson did not object to plaintiff’s exhibit 47 on the basis that the underlying documents were hearsay and that it has, therefore, waived the objection. Prior to offering plaintiff’s exhibit 47, Dal-Mac’s attorney questioned the comptroller concerning a few of the larger invoices which were summarized in plaintiff’s exhibit 47. The first invoice which the comptroller testified about was from Southwest Steel and exceeded $170,-000. When the comptroller attempted to testify concerning this invoice, Hanson’s counsel objected on the basis that he was testifying from documents not in evidence. The trial judge asked the witness if he was testifying from the records of his company and, when the witness said yes, overruled the objection. Hanson’s attorney then objected that the invoices were the records of Southwest Steel, rather than of Dal-Mac. After the trial court overruled this objection, Hanson’s attorney specifically called the trial court’s attention to the fact that the invoices had not been proved up under article 3737e. We hold that a sufficient hearsay objection was leveled at this invoice. To the extent that plaintiff’s exhibit 47 was based on this invoice, which was for almost half the total amount of plaintiff’s exhibit 47, it stands on no better ground than the invoice itself. Once the objection was raised that the invoice was not shown to be a record of Dal-Mac but rather that of Southwest Steel, Hanson was not required to object again as to the summary insofar as the summary was based on this invoice. Cooper Petroleum Co. v. LaGloria Oil & Gas Co., 436 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex.1969). Since the verdict appears to have been based directly on plaintiff’s exhibit 47 and that exhibit is only a summary of various invoices, including this $170,000 invoice from Southwest Steel, we adhere to our holding that admission of this exhibit was reversible error. It is, therefore, unnecessary to discuss whether a proper objection was raised as to the remaining underlying invoices.
*726Accordingly, we adhere to our original opinion and overrule Dal-Mac’s motion for rehearing.