Court Opinion

ID: 9750501
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:01:54.202526+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:11.186664
License: Public Domain

BUCKLEY, Acting P. J.
I respectfully dissent.
I must acknowledge that in the first opinion in this case prior to remand, I had concurred in the majority. However, upon a re-review of the facts and the applicable law, I am convinced I was wrong, as is the present majority.
*406Drawing from the facts as set forth by the majority and cognizant of certain additional and significant facts not set forth, I conclude there was a reasonable suspicion to detain the vehicle.
Officer Carmesco testified that he had contacted Leon Anderson on at least five occasions previously. On each occasion, he was in the company of admitted East Side Crips gang members. Moreover, he testified the driving pattern occurred for a distance of over one-half mile. Officer Heredia testified that he saw the three vehicles in a very tight formation criss-cross each other in the different lanes while maintaining their group.
It would appear obvious that the drivers (and occupants) of the vehicles knew each other and were driving in tandem. Given Officer Carmesco’s expertise as a street gang expert, his familiarity with the East Side Crips and his knowledge of Anderson’s proclivity to associate primarily, if not exclusively, with fellow gang members, it was certainly reasonable to assume the vehicles were carrying East Side Crips gang members.
With this reasonable assumption and the awareness that the East Side Crips would be armed for protection from retaliation by Country Boy Crips, the officers would have been remiss in failing to detain the vehicles to determine if the occupants were armed or at least the reason why they were driving in the manner in which they were. “The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur .. ..” (Adams v. Williams (1972) 407 U.S. 143, 145 [32 L.Ed.2d 612, 92 S.Ct. 1921] [a case involving detention of a person seated in an automobile based on information the detainee had a gun].) The Supreme Court further opined that a brief stop of a suspicious person, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at that time. (Id. at p. 146.)
The majority sets forth a list of seven “inferences and deductions,” presumably of the police officers, and then dissects the conclusions.
The majority acknowledges the first conclusion (that the vehicles were together) is “minimally supported” but then states that it was for such a short distance that the observations were really insufficient. I disagree. The manner in which the vehicles were proceeding, for a distance of over one-half mile leads to only one reasonable conclusion: They were together.
Next, the majority, singling out the identity of Leon Anderson, finds insufficient the conclusion that the other occupants in Anderson’s vehicle were East Side Crips. The majority decision gives no credence to the *407testimony of Carruesco that on every occasion (over five) in which contact had been made with Anderson, admitted East Side Crips were with him. Carruesco’s testimony and expertise were unchallenged in the trial court. Accordingly, we are bound to accept it.
Likewise, it would be reasonable to conclude the occupants in the other two vehicles were fellow gang members.
While I would agree with the majority that there was no direct evidence to show that the vehicles’ occupants had learned of the shooting six hours previously and therefore would neither expect retaliation nor be armed accordingly, it would be highly unlikely that a gang shooting in an adjacent neighborhood would not be common knowledge on the streets within hours, if not minutes, of the shooting.
In conclusion, given the circumstances, if the officers had not detained the vehicle and further gang violence were to have occurred, the officers would have been justifiably criticized by their superiors and/or the public. I would uphold the detention and affirm the conviction.
Respondent’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied September 22, 2004. George, C. J., did not participate therein. Baxter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.