Court Opinion

ID: 9740632
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:39:02.094432+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:19.360189
License: Public Domain

TOMUANOVICH, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. The majority decision violates the basic principles of due process of law guaranteed by both the Minnesota and United States Constitutions. See Minn.Const. art. I, § 7; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. The majority argues that regardless of the constitutional implications, it would be unfair to defendants with past Minnesota convictions if defendants with out-of-state convictions were not given “bonus” points for similar conduct. While this apparent attempt to ensure equal protection of the laws to Minnesota convicts is admirable, the majority has failed to consider the due process problems with its approach. In effect, the majority allows unproven facts to establish an element of an offense to justify enhancing Hill’s sentence. Such action cannot be justified under constitutional principles.
The majority claims that Hill’s convictions under the Federal False Statements Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, would constitute welfare fraud and theft under Minnesota *63law. As the majority points out, welfare fraud and theft both require a specific intent to defraud whereas the federal statute requires something less — a specific intent to deceive.1 Thus, a conviction under the federal statute does not necessarily establish an intent to defraud as the majority ultimately seems to believe. The defendant’s federal convictions merely establish that he filed false reports with a governmental agency with the intent to deceive. For the majority to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant intended to defraud the government is in fact broadening the crime to which the defendant actually pleaded guilty.
A comparison of the elements of welfare fraud and making false statements will further illustrate this point. The elements of welfare fraud are as follows:
1. Obtaining or attempting to obtain assistance;
2. To which one is not entitled;
3. By means of a false statement or representation; and
4. Defendant knew the statement or representation was false.
See CRIMJIG 24.16 (3rd ed. 1990). The elements of making a false statement are as follows:
1. Defendant knowingly made a false statement or representation to the government;
2. Defendant acted willfully in making the false statement or representation; and
3. The statement was material.
See Devitt, Blackmar & O’Malley, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, § 37.07 (4th ed. 1990). When comparing the elements, it is quite obvious that welfare fraud contains an additional one which was not proven in the federal case; namely, obtaining or attempting to obtain assistance. Hill probably did obtain assistance to which he was not entitled but “probably” is not good enough. The fact remains that this element was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. “[T]he due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution requires the state to prove each element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Merrill, 428 N.W.2d 361, 366 (Minn.1988) (Yetka, J.); see also State v. Brom, 463 N.W.2d 758, 768 (Minn.1990) (Wahl, J. dissenting).
Although State v. Briton was a pre-guidelines case, it pointed out the problems with the approach adopted by the majority. Briton concerned the enhancement of sentences under the Habitual Offender Act. The issue was the defendant’s prior conviction for larceny under an Iowa statute which classified a felony-level offense at more than $20. At that time, Minnesota’s larceny statute had a felony-level threshold of more than $25. Although the evidence was based on a theft of $46.26, this court refused to allow the conviction to count under the Act because the definitions of larceny differed as to value. This court reasoned:
[I]t is conceivable that a defendant in a felony prosecution may fail to contest the value of the property involved, only because in the particular jurisdiction where he is being tried the value charged and the value admitted constitute the same degree of the offense. The difference will not be material unless there is later occasion to determine whether the elements of the crime committed in one state constitute a felony in another state, a remote and unlikely ramification few offenders will have in mind.
Briton, 265 Minn. at 329, 121 N.W.2d at 579. Here, defendant had neither a motive nor an opportunity to contest whether he actually received or attempted to receive any benefits. Yet the majority is willing to find him guilty of doing so. To make such a finding without affording Hill an opportunity to defend himself violates due process.
The majority also believes that the sentencing judge will not have to convene a *64“mini-trial” in every case because the sentencing judge will normally be able to determine if the underlying offense would constitute a crime in Minnesota. But how, by gut reaction? Although the majority would subject the sentencing judge’s determination to an abuse of discretion standard, I believe a sentencing judge should be limited to the facts necessarily proven by a foreign or out-of-state conviction when applying the sentencing guidelines. This would provide the sentencing judge with a workable standard and avoid the problem of requiring a burdensome “mini-trial” in those cases where the sentencing court is unable to decide whether a foreign or out-of-state conviction should be considered for sentencing purposes.
As a final point, it is important to remember that Hill pleaded guilty to the underlying crime and was punished accordingly. This case only concerns how much “bonus” time the defendant should get based on his criminal history score. By pleading guilty, Hill saved the government the time and expense of a trial. In exchange, he was not required to admit any intent to defraud. Now the majority has decided to nullify his half of the bargain without the benefit of proof. This sort of trial by fiat is precisely what the due process clause is designed to prevent. The least the state could do in such a situation is prove that a foreign or an out-of-state conviction would, beyond a reasonable doubt, constitute a crime under Minnesota law.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s view that a sentencing judge may rely on unproven facts in determining whether a foreign or an out-of-state conviction would be a crime under Minnesota law.

. "Intent to deceive and intent to defraud are not synonymous. Deceive is to cause to believe the false or to mislead. Defraud is to deprive of some right, interest or property by deceit. * * * 18 U.S.C. § 1001 does not require that the government prove a specific intent to defraud.” United States v. Godwin, 566 F.2d 975, 976 (5th Cir.1978) (per curiam).