Court Opinion

ID: 9723935
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:38:31.627904+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:53.496002
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE HEIPLE, concurring in part and dissenting in part: This is my second dissenting opinion in this case. The first precipitated some shoring up of the majority opinion, thereby necessitating the revision of this dissent. This case involves the brutal torture murder of a 16-year-old girl, Bridgette Regli. The vicious killers were three depraved teenagers. Their names are Phillip Kline, Arthur Garza and Glenn Schultz, Jr. After indictment, each defendant filed motions for separate trials. Separate trials were ordered. Kline, opting for a bench trial, was tried in June of 1979 before Judge Robert Buchar and convicted. Kline elected to be sentenced under the former indeterminate sentencing act. On July 20, 1979, Judge Buchar imposed an indeterminate sentence of 50-100 years. Garza, opting for a jury trial, was tried before Judge John F. Michela in August of 1979 and convicted. Garza elected to be sentenced under the former indeterminate sentencing act. On October 19,1979, Judge Michela imposed an indeterminate sentence of 15-25 years. Schultz, opting for a bench trial, was tried before Judge Robert Buchar in November of 1979 and convicted. Schultz elected to be sentenced under the former indeterminate sentencing act. On March 14, 1980, Judge Buchar imposed an indeterminate sentence of 20-25 years. Kline, in his appeal, claimed that his sentence was excessive and should be reduced, the rationale being that Garza and Schultz received lesser sentences. The majority of this court has decided to reverse the sentence imposed on Kline for the sole reason of disparity. No suggestion is made that Kline is a nice person or that his conduct on the day of the torture murder was commendable. Neither is it suggested that the sentence standing alone is excessive. Rather, and contrary to law, logic and fact, a majority of this court has concluded that Kline “ought to have received similar treatment to that afforded Garza and Schultz.” They reverse and remand the sentence. It is significant to note that Kline was the first of the three defendants to be tried and the first to be sentenced. Thus, at the time Judge Buchar sentenced Kline to 50-100 years, Garza and Schultz had neither been tried nor sentenced. Judge Buchar had no way of knowing whether Garza and Schultz would even be convicted, let alone what their sentences would be. He was not privy to the facts that were later to be brought out at the trials of Garza and Schultz. Nor was he privy to the facts that were later to be brought out at the sentencing hearings of Garza and Schultz. Judge Buchar did have the benefit, however, of sitting through Kline’s 12-day bench trial. He had the further benefit of sitting through an evidentiary sentencing hearing on Kline before he imposed the 50-100 year sentence. Considering the brutality of the murder and the circumstances surrounding it, and considering further the background and rehabilitative potential of this defendant, which was utterly lacking in mitigating circumstances, not even the majority of this court would be able to conclude that the sentence was excessive standing alone. What the majority is saying here is that Judge Buchar’s sentence was correct when it was imposed on July 20, 1979, but that it became retroactively incorrect three months later when a different judge in a different case imposed a lesser sentence on a different defendant. The latter date was when Judge Michela sentenced Arthur Garza to 15-25 years. The majority opinion thus gives a greater power to Judge Michela than is possessed by either Judge Buchar who sentenced Kline or by this appellate court which is reviewing the sentence imposed on Kline. How so? Because on the date of Garza’s sentencing, Kline’s case was on appeal and Judge Buchar, the sentencing judge, had lost jurisdiction to reconsider or amend the sentence he had imposed on Kline. And it is a greater power than this appellate court has because, but for the lesser sentence imposed on Garza, this court lacked authority to reduce a sentence that was not excessive and did not involve an abuse of discretion by the sentencing judge. And there was no abuse of discretion and no excessive sentence imposed on Kline. The effect of this court’s ruling is to delegate an ex post facto sentence reduction power to a trial judge who has only a collateral connection with the case at hand. It would follow logically from this line of reasoning that if Garza and Schultz had been acquitted at later trials, that Kline’s conviction itself would have to be reversed. After all, they were similarly involved in the same crime and had similar backgrounds. As the majority has stated in their opinion, would not fundamental fairness, under such circumstances, require a reversal of Kline’s . . . conviction? Our supreme court has consistently held that it is not the function of a reviewing court to serve as a sentencing court. A sentence within statutory limits should not be reduced merely because the reviewing court would have imposed a different penalty. (People v. Cox (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 268; People v. Perruquet (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 149.) We should not disturb a sentence unless it clearly appears that the penalty constitutes a great departure from the fundamental law and its spirit and purpose. In this State, the spirit and purpose of the law are upheld when a sentence reflects the seriousness of the offense and gives adequate consideration to the rehabilitative potential of the defendant. A review of the record reveals that the trial judge carefully considered all the available evidence presented at the presentence hearing. No mitigating circumstances were presented at the hearing or in the presentence report. One primary factor in sentencing is the nature and circumstances of the offense. The 12 days of testimony at Kline’s trial revealed a most repugnant story of the prolonged torture murder of a young girl. It could not be concluded on the basis of the record, that the trial judge erred in sentencing Kline to 50-100 years. Such sentences are not uncommon for a brutal murder, albeit a first offense. People v. Collins (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 815 (50-100 years); People v. Lykins (1978), 65 Ill. App. 3d 808 (70-150 years); People v. Belvedere (1979), 72 Ill. App. 3d 998 (75-200 years); People v. Hayes (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 811 (75-100 years). Reversal of a sentence should only occur when we find abuse of discretion by the trial judge not merely because we would have balanced the appropriate factors differently if the task of sentencing had been ours. The actions of the majority, however, go even one step further and this is the most troublesome part of the majority’s conclusion. The crux of their reasoning pivots on so-called disparity arising retroactive to Kline’s sentencing. The defendant complains of no error during sentencing. The majority cites no error during sentencing. How then can a sentence, proper and reasonable when imposed, become wrong later? Is this sentence wrong because of another judge’s leniency to another person in a later trial? The majority concludes that the lesser sentence imposed on any one defendant must control the ultimate disposition of the other two. This is so even if the latter are tried in separate proceedings, with different witnesses, judges, or juries. In short, where multiple trials and multiple defendants are involved, a trial judge who believes a stiffer sentence is warranted cannot impose it. Inexplicably, the majority gives no reason why the lesser penalty as opposed to a higher one is proper. Moreover, no explanation is offered why the trial judge imposing the lesser sentence was more astute or better informed in his assessment of the evidence before him, than the judge meting out the higher penalty. Justice Alloy, writing for the majority, cites a string of 10 cases culled from Shepard’s Citations for authority. Two of the 10 cases were authored by Justice Alloy himself. Two were participated in by Justice Barry, who joins with Justice Alloy in the majority opinion. Further analysis discloses that several of the 10 cases incestuously cite each other for authority. Not all stand for the proposition claimed. There is a general rule of long standing in litigation that the weaker the position, the more important it is to cite lots of authority. Liberal use of Shepard’s Citations makes this job simpler. Following the lengthy list of citations, the majority opinion goes on to point out that, “The issue is one of ‘equal justice under law,’ a legend which is carved in stone at the entrance to the United States Supreme Court Building.” The type of stone is not indicated. But we may presume it was granite. Of course, it might be limestone, a much softer material, I understand, but one commonly used in public buildings. Or it could be marble. Softer yet. The majority opinion sheds no light on this point. We can only conjecture. But, carved it is, and “in stone.” That is clear. Justice Alloy particularly emphasizes the cases of People v. Martin and People v. Johnson to reach the conclusion that his ruling in the instant case is correct. Interestingly, both of these cases cite and rely on a former case written by Justice Alloy to reach their conclusions. That is People v. Steg (1966), 69 Ill. App. 2d 188. This is a clear case of pulling one’s self up by one’s own bootstraps. Even Steg, however, is distinguishable. For in Steg, the lesser sentence was imposed in the first trial by the first judge to impose a sentence. The reverse is true in the instant case. While Steg itself was a meretricious ruling, the present ruling is even worse by making all sentences on several defendants conform to the least sentence imposed on any defendant at any time and by any judge. In the case at bar, the co-indictees could have been tried together but willfully chose otherwise. The motions to sever were filed shortly after indictment. Separate trials elicit different evidence and each judge, naturally, can only consider the evidence he heard in imposing sentence on the individual before him. Kline willfully chose the sentencing scheme which permitted the widest possible variance in sentencing. In so choosing, Kline protected himself from a possible natural life sentence without parole as provided by the other sentencing statute. I have great difficulty in accepting the shorthand rendition of equal protection espoused by the majority opinion. That is, co-partners in crime should receive equal sentences. Reasons lawful and proper exist for varying sentences. Far more variance in sentencing is permissible under the statute elected by Kline than under the new statute, but judicial discretion in sentencing, nonetheless, is a time-honored principle and is to be affirmed barring abuse. The trial judge’s firsthand observance of the witnesses, testimony, and the accused cannot be duplicated nor second-guessed. Moreover, if disparity ultimately results after the several trials of co-indictees, the defendant has the burden to show that there are factual reasons why the sentences should be identical. This Kline has not done. Why are we to conclude that all sentences should be the same as the lowest sentence given? Why not the highest sentence? The obvious folly of this demonstrates how such a blind quest for uniformity contorts both equal protection and individuality of sentencing. Equal justice under law, or equal protection, means that justice shall be applied equally to the rich and the poor alike without regard to one’s station, sex, class, race or position in life. It is fantasy to suggest that the statement stands for the proposition that where three convicted murderers have three separate trials, that the most lenient sentence imposed on any of the three controls what the maximum sentence shall be on the others convicted. Equal protection means that each defendant shall be afforded the same rights and guarantees as provided by law. It does not mean that all trial judges, when dealing with co-indictees or defendants in similar cases, must reach the same conclusions regarding the sentence to be imposed. Each trial judge is free to make his own independent determination of the sentence to be imposed. This should not be disturbed on review unless there was clearly an abuse of discretion. The United States Supreme Court has held that disparity among sentences given to co-defendants does not violate the equal protection clause. The court reasoned that undue leniency in one case does not transform a reasonable punishment in another to a cruel one. Howard v. Fleming (1903), 191 U.S. 126, 48 L. Ed. 121, 24 S. Ct. 49. The sentence of 50-100 years imposed on Kline for the torture murder of Bridgette Regli is reasonable. I cannot see how later lenient sentencing of his cohorts Schultz and Garza can transform Kline’s reasonable sentence into an unreasonable one. I concur with that part of the majority opinion which affirms the defendant’s conviction. I dissent from that part which reverses his sentence and remands for resentencing.