Court Opinion

ID: 9394142
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-12 15:00:21.954129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:57.554328
License: Public Domain

21-74-cr
United States v. Stephenson

                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                      SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY
FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST
CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
12th day of May, two thousand twenty-three.

Present:
            DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
                  Chief Judge,
            REENA RAGGI,
            WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
                  Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                          Appellee,

                 v.                                                21-74-cr

TYWON STEPHENSON,

                  Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________________

For Appellee:                             TIFFANY H. LEE, Assistant United States Attorney
                                          (Monica J. Richards, Assistant United States Attorney,
                                          on the brief), for Trini E. Ross, United States Attorney
                                          for the Western District of New York, Buffalo, NY.

For Defendant-Appellant:                  MURRAY E. SINGER, Port Washington, NY.

                                                1
         Appeal from a judgment of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York

(Arcara, J.).

         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

         Defendant-Appellant Tywon Stephenson (“Stephenson”) appeals from a December 30,

2020, judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Arcara,

J.), sentencing him principally to 98 months’ imprisonment after he pleaded guilty to one count of

being an unlawful user of a controlled substance in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).    On appeal, Stephenson challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to

withdraw his guilty plea. Additionally, in a supplemental letter brief, Stephenson challenges the

constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).         We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

                                           *       *       *

    I. Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3)

         Because Stephenson did not raise his argument about the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(3) before the district court or in his opening brief on appeal, we review only for plain

error.   See United States v. Miller, 263 F.3d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 2001).       “For an error to be plain, it

must, at a minimum, be clear under current law.        A reviewing court typically will not find such

error where the operative legal question is unsettled.      Whether an error is ‘plain’ is determined

by reference to the law as of the time of appeal.” United States v. Weintraub, 273 F.3d 139, 152

(2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).         Here, the contention that 18

U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) is unconstitutional is not clear under current law.     Accordingly, we discern no

plain error insofar as the district court did not consider the constitutionality of the statute.

                                                   2
   II. Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Plea

       We review a district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2)(B) for abuse of discretion. United States v. Schmidt, 373

F.3d 100, 102 (2d Cir. 2004).     Likewise, we review a district court’s determination that there is a

factual basis for a guilty plea, as required by Rule 11(b)(3), for abuse of discretion.   United States

v. Adams, 448 F.3d 492, 498 (2d Cir. 2006).       Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 11(b)(3)

requires that, “[b]efore entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must determine that there is a

factual basis for the plea.”    Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3).    This rule “requires the court to assure

itself simply that the conduct to which the defendant admits is in fact an offense under the statutory

provision under which he is pleading guilty.”      United States v. Maher, 108 F.3d 1513, 1524 (2d

Cir. 1997).

       Here, Stephenson argues that the evidence in the record does not establish that his use of

marijuana was “ongoing and contemporaneous” with his firearm possession and thus does not

form a factual basis for his plea.   See United States v. Yepez, 456 F. App’x 52, 54 (2d Cir. 2012)

(summary order) (“For the jury to convict [the defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3)], there must

have been evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that [the defendant] ‘engaged in

a pattern of use of controlled substances that reasonably covers the time of the events charged in

the superseding indictment.’” (alteration omitted) (quoting 2 Leonard B. Sand et al., Modern

Federal Jury Instructions–Criminal, Instruction 35–48.1 (2011))).        Stephenson further contends

that the district court erred insofar as it did not question Stephenson at the plea colloquy about

whether and to what extent he used marijuana at the time of his firearm possession. We disagree.

       In determining whether there is a factual basis, “the court is not limited to an examination

of the defendant’s plea allocution, but may look more broadly to any facts on the record at the time

                                                   3
of the plea proceeding.”    United States v. Garcia, 587 F.3d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, the signed plea agreement contains Stephenson’s

knowing and voluntary admission that, at the time of the charged act, he was an unlawful user of

marijuana. See A-258 to -261.      Furthermore, during his plea allocution, Stephenson agreed to

the terms of the plea after indicating that he had discussed its terms with standby counsel.   See

A-277; A-288 to -309.      Likewise, Stephenson did not object to the government’s proffered

evidence, either at the plea colloquy or afterward, in response to the government’s opposition to

his motion to withdraw the plea. See A-295; A-356 to -357.         To be sure, we have previously

expressed our preference for a plea colloquy in which the defendant does more than answer yes-

or-no questions, see United States v. Lloyd, 901 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2018), but we nevertheless

agree with the district court that Stephenson’s knowing and voluntary admission in his plea

agreement, corroborated by the uncontested proffer, establishes a factual basis that Stephenson’s

use of marijuana covered the same time period as his firearm possession. We discern no abuse

of discretion in the district court’s denial of Stephenson’s motion to withdraw the plea.

       We have considered Stephenson’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

                                                     FOR THE COURT:
                                                     Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

                                                 4