Court Opinion

ID: 9750135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:22:21.977586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:03.263901
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice O’Brien :
I do not agree with the conclusion of the majority that “the initial pleading indicates that the claim asserted cannot be established.” I cannot, of course, quarrel with the decision of the majority of the court en banc to sustain the demurrer in view of the pleadings then on file. Nor can I disagree with the majority’s statement of disapproval of the procedure followed by appellant. In view of the fact, however, that I believe that a cause of action can be made out and that the proposed second amended complaint makes out such a cause of action, I am loath to prevent its proper determination in view of the fact that appellee would in no wise be prejudiced by reaching the substantive issue.
In Quaker City v. Delhi-Warnock, 357 Pa. 307, 53 A. 2d 597 (1947), we said that “where there appears a possibility of recovery under a better statement of the facts an opportunity to file an amended [complaint] must be granted.” In the instant case the majority of the court en banc concluded and the majority of this court concludes that appellant’s two unsuccessful attempts to state a cause of action indicate that there is “no reasonable ground to believe that a second amended complaint would rectify” the basic deficiencies and they, therefore, refuse to allow leave to amend the complaint. I am in agreement with the dissenting judge of the court en banc, who concluded that appellant should be given leave to amend because the facts indicated that a properly drafted complaint could distinguish appellant’s situation from that in Wahl v. Strous, 344 Pa. 402, 25 A. 2d 820 (1942). That case *113is cited in the opinion of the majority, but as indicated above, the instant case could by proper pleading be distinguished therefrom. In Wahl we said:
“Plaintiff produced no evidence tending to prove that the railroad company procured or attempted to procure any breach of the contract between him and his clients. It did not, in order to induce her to settle, tell her not to pay her attorney, nor did it misrepresent to her what her obligations were in that regard. An action for interference with another’s contract is, in a way, analogous to the old action for alienation of affections, in which, of course, there was no liability if the affections, though lost, were not alienated by the alleged tortfeasor.
“Plaintiff apparently labors under the impression that the mere negotiation of a settlement directly with his clients made the company liable to him. Probably it is now more difficult for him, as a practical matter, to secure the payment of the fees to which he may be entitled, but his power of attorney did not, either expressly or by implication, limit the right of Mrs. Strous and her son to settle their claim. Even though an agent’s compensation is made contingent upon his success in accomplishing the purpose of his agency, the principal does not thereby restrict his own right to transact the business for which the agent was employed: Restatement, Agency, Section 449.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In appellant’s second proposed amended complaint, he urges that the cab company “with malice towards [appellant] wrongfully used threats, promises and assurances ... to Walton C. Warman to cause him to wrongfully breach his written agreement with [appellant] .”
The complaint then alleges specifically that the cab company’s claims manager, a cousin of Walton C. War-*114man,- threatened Warman with family.ostracism if he did not breach his written agreement with appellant, that appellee’s, elaim manager knew Warman was suffering from chronic alcoholism and threatened. to use this knowledge to Warman’s harm and detriment if he did not breach his written agreement with appellant, arid that the appellee knew Warman was under the influence;-of'.alcohol when he was .enticed-into entering into.the release agreement and into breaking his written agreement -.with appellant. - •
.; - The appellee admits that these new averments, not contained in appellant’s previous .amended complaint, now distinguish this case from Wahl. The proposed amended complaint for the first time introduces averments-of coercion and intimidation, which,.if true,- as admitted by appellee’s brief, would bring the case within the ambit of Richette v. Pennsylvania. R.R., 410 Pa. 6, 187 A. 2d 910 (1963).
However, the appellee contends that the complaint is...still, defective because the appellant avers, in Paragraph' ; 13 of the. proposed amended complaint that: “13. / Defendant promised Walton C. Warman that his, obligation under written agreement with plaintiff would be. discharged, by them and defendant directed Walton-C.- Warman not to honor his written agreement with plaintiff.” .
. According to appellee, with whom the court en banc majority and the majority of this court agreed,.. this averment, constitutes an admission by.appellant that appellee voluntarily -recognized appellant’s right to be. pajd'.a fee by Warman; and that, without an, averment and. proof that appellee' represented to Warman that he was under no obligation to pay a fee to appellant, appellant cannot establish a cause of action based on an .intentional interference by appellee with the con*115tractual relationship existing between appellant and Warman.
The mere fact that the appellee agreed to pay reasonable counsel fees, which in effect is a recognition by it of a valid power of attorney, does not absolve it of responsibility for inducing the breach of contract between lawyer and client. A statement of willingness to pay damages does not negate wrongdoing. . ,
According to appellant’s first amended complaint,, the appellee only assumed to pay “reasonable counsel fees,” which term was not defined. Warman’s obligation was to pay “forty per cent of any sum' realized by settlement, suit or otherwise,” whether or not appellee thought such fees were “reasonable.” If appellee told Warman that its payment of what it alone defined as “reasonable fees” to appellant would satisfy Warmah’s obligation to appellant, it was engaging in a deception.'
Moreover, in Richette v. Pennsylvania R.R., supra, we allowed a recovery of punitive damages where ..the facts established coercion inducing tlm ^breach- of an attorney-client relationship. Such facts might be present in this case, although this cannot be ascertained except by' proof at trial. In any event, the offer by appellee to pay “reasonable counsel fees” would not necessarily absolve appellee of the culpability for which such punitive damages would be imposed; '
Accordingly, this case is exactly the kind of cáse to which the rule enunciated in Quaker City v. Delhi-Warnock, supra, should apply, to wit: “Where there appears a possibility of recovery under a better statement of the facts an opportunity to file an amended statement of claim must be granted.” . , .
I would reverse the judgment of the court below and remand the record with directions to allow the filing of a second amended complaint.
Mr. Justice Roberts joins in this dissent.