Court Opinion

ID: 9856600
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:51:55.211507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:48.881807
License: Public Domain

NEELY, Justice,
dissenting:
I dissent to the majority’s holding today because I find that W.Va.Code, 61-7-1 [1975] is facially unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Choat due to its indefinite language describing deadly weapons. In criminal law, the cynosure of due process is that criminal statues provide fair notice of the offending conduct being proscribed. W. Va.Code, 61-7-1 [1975] provides in pertinent part:
If any person, without a state license therefor or except as provided elsewhere in this article and other provisions of this Code, carry about his person any revolver or pistol, dirk, bowie knife, slung shot, razor, billy, metallic or other false knuckles, or other dangerous or deadly weapon of like kind or character, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, ... [Emphasis Added].
The two prong test for determining whether a statute is “void for vagueness,” was laid out in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972).1 Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, held that a municipal vagrancy ordinance was void for vagueness, both in the sense that it “fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute,” and “because it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions.” 405 U.S. at 162, 92 S.Ct. at 843. These two tests are taken from a synthesis of U.S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S.Ct. 808, 811-12, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940); and, Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 57 S.Ct. 732, 81 L.Ed. 1066 (1937). Therefore, to pass constitutional muster, a statute must: (1) provide definite notice of the offending conduct; and, (2) not invite arbitrary and selective application by prosecutors and police. The statute under consideration, W.Va. Code, 61-7-1 [1975] flunks both tests.
In the present case, the appellant was convicted of carrying a dangerous weapon, described as a lock blade, buck knife with a five inch blade. The majority found that the appellant’s weapon, although not specifically enumerated in W.Va.Code, 61-7-1 [1975], was deadly within the catchall phrase “or deadly weapon of like kind or character.” This indefinite language, as now interpreted by the Court, will allow this statute to be selectively construed and enforced by police, prosecutors and triers-of-fact: as interpreted by the majority, the statute invites discrimination against the poor, minorities, and those disfavored by the authorities.
“No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.” Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L.Ed. 888 (1939). See Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926); Cline v. Frink Dairy, 274 U.S. 445, 465, 47 S.Ct. 681, 687, 71 L.Ed. 1146 (1927); Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U.S. 210, 243, 52 S.Ct. 559, 568, 76 L.Ed. 1062 (1932); United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 41 S.Ct. 298, 65 L.Ed. 516 (1921); 14 A.L.R. 1045.
In United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 214, 23 L.Ed. 563 (1875), the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a broad criminal statute enacted by Congress, holding:
“It would certainly be dangerous if the Legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say *618who could be rightfully detained, and who should be set at large.”
92 U.S. at 221. The majority’s interpretation of W. Va. Code, 61-7-1 [1975] creates the exact scenario that the Supreme Court warned about in Reese. Furthermore, because today this Court has erred in a matter of significant federal constitutional dimensions, this case should be reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States.

. For a discussion of the void-for-vagueness doctrine in the area of fundamental rights see note, "The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,” 109 U.Pa.L.Rev. 67, 104 et seq. (1961).