Court Opinion

ID: 9583842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:42:32.965285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:57.904388
License: Public Domain

Ruffin, Judge,
dissenting.
Because no admissible evidence in the record shows these offenses occurred in Fulton County, I would reverse Graves’ conviction and remand this matter for a new trial.
1. First, contrary to the majority’s opinion, the record does not show that Graves waived the right to challenge his conviction on grounds that the State failed to prove venue. The transcript reflects that Graves’ counsel attempted to move for a “directed verdict”5 at the close of the State’s case, and the trial court overruled the motion before Graves’ attorney stated his grounds for the motion. When Graves’ attorney then asked whether he would have an opportunity to argue his motion, the court replied, “I’m not sure why you want to, but you certainly may if you wish to.” Apparently realizing the futility of the effort, Graves’ counsel declined the opportunity. Under these circumstances, I would not find a voluntary waiver. The trial court’s comment showed it had no intention of considering the attorney’s arguments.
Moreover, Graves’ enumeration regarding the State’s failure to prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt attacks the sufficiency of the evidence. In criminal cases such as this, “[t]he proof of venue is an essential element in proving guilt in a criminal case. [Cit.] Like every other material allegation in the [accusation], it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [Cit.] Where venue is not established by the State, any ensuing judgment is void, although reversal of a conviction on this basis does not prevent retrial in a court where venue is proper and proven. [Cit.]” (Punctuation omitted.) Thayer v. State, 189 Ga. App. 321, 322 (1) (376 SE2d 199) (1988). A void judgment may be held to be such in any court. OCGA § 17-9-4. Therefore, Graves was not required to move for a directed verdict or take other measures to preserve this argument. See Lee, supra. Even where a challenge to venue has not been raised in the trial court, the Georgia authority relied upon by the majority still requires that venue be proved, even if by slight evidence. See Minter v. State, 258 Ga. 629 (1) *635(373 SE2d 359) (1988) (“when the evidence is not conflicting and when no challenge to venue is raised at trial, slight evidence is sufficient to prove venue. [Cit.]” (Emphasis supplied.)).6
2. Here, no admissible evidence showed venue in Fulton County. The only venue testimony presented at trial showed the incident occurred at “Northside and Magnolia” in the City of Atlanta. We have previously rejected any notion that a court may take judicial notice that a specific street location in the City of Atlanta is in Fulton County. See Smith v. State, 138 Ga. App. 692 (1) (227 SE2d 468) (1976). The majority now finds evidence of venue in the “uniform traffic citations” (UTCs) contained in the file. These hearsay documents, which were never admitted in evidence at trial, are not sufficient to prove venue even under the “slight evidence” standard employed by the majority.
First, the UTCs in this case were employed by the State as substitutes for formal written accusations. This procedure is proper under OCGA § 40-13-1, which states that the UTC may serve as the “citation, summons, or other instrument of prosecution of the offense or offenses for which the accused is charged.” But like an accusation or indictment, the UTC is not evidence; it is merely a document outlining the charges against the defendant. See Crowe v. State, 265 Ga. 582, 591 (16) (458 SE2d 799) (1995) (indictment is not evidence); Perkins v. State, 151 Ga. App. 199, 206 (8) (259 SE2d 193) (1979) (accusation is not evidence).
Because the UTC is not evidence, the majority’s argument that the trial court could “take judicial notice of its own records for evidentiary purposes” is misplaced and meaningless.7 In Petkas v. Grizzard, 252 Ga. 104 (312 SE2d 107) (1984), cited by the majority, the trial court took judicial notice that a pleading had been filed. There is nothing in Petkas indicating the court made any judgment about the truth of the factual allegations contained in that pleading. Applying the majority’s rationale, a trial judge conducting a bench trial on a felony indictment need not hear any testimony; rather, he may simply read the indictment to determine what crime the defendant has committed. Similarly, the affidavit attached to a search warrant, like this UTC, is a sworn statement often found in the trial court’s record but usually not admissible as evidence at trial. See, e.g., Reed v. State, 150 Ga. App. 312, 314 (2) (257 SE2d 380) (1979). The mere fact *636that it is in the court’s record does not mean the trial judge may use it as evidence at a bench trial. This holding violates Graves’ due process rights by dispensing with the requirement that the State present evidence proving every material allegation of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Postell v. State, 200 Ga. App. 208, 210 (2) (407 SE2d 412) (1991), rev’d on other grounds, 261 Ga. 842 (412 SE2d 831) (1992).
To justify its evidentiary reliance on the UTCs, the majority cites the oft-repeated principle that this Court searches the “entire record” when it reviews the sufficiency of the evidence. This principle, however, has no application to the present case. Almost every record in every criminal case before this Court contains material which, for one reason or another, was never admitted into evidence. Although the information in these UTCs was “sworn to” by the officer, they constituted “ex parte affidavits” which were not tendered as business records or admitted under any other exception to the hearsay rule. See Miller v. State, 266 Ga. 850, 856 (7) (472 SE2d 74) (1996). The majority opinion refers to the admissibility of “exemplified” public records, OCGA § 24-7-21; even if this statute applied, at the time the trial court heard this matter these UTCs were not “certified under seal” as the statute requires. See King v. State, 194 Ga. App. 69, 71 (5) (389 SE2d 500) (1989). Therefore, the UTCs were not admissible evidence. This Court certainly does not review inadmissible evidence when determining the sufficiency of the evidence. See Shaver v. State, 199 Ga. App. 428, 430 (1) (405 SE2d 281) (1991). Information contained in these hearsay documents cannot be used to sustain Graves’ convictions.
Finally, even if this Court could use information contained in the UTCs to find the State had proven venue, the UTCs do not clearly show in which county the offenses occurred. In the section of each UTC marked “location” is the statement: “In the City of Atlanta, County of Fulton/Dekalb,” followed by a blank for the street or address. On each citation, the arresting officer circled “Fulton,” but in each case the circle also encompasses part of “Dekalb.” Despite the, fact that we have no. testimony from the officer explaining his marks or specifying which county he intended to circle, the majority opinion concludes the officer intended to circle only “Fulton.” To rely on these vague and unexplained markings, which Graves had no ability to cross-examine, deprives Graves of due process. See Miller, supra.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Birdsong and Judge Blackburn join in this dissent.
*637Decided July 10, 1997
Reconsideration denied July 28, 1997
Patterson & Patterson, Jackie G. Patterson, Yasma M. Patterson, for appellant.
June D. Green, Solicitor, Steven E. Rosenberg, Assistant Solicitor, for appellee.

 Of course, as we have previously noted, “[t]here is no verdict in a bench trial. [Cit.] The issue, then, is simply whether the evidence met the test of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).” Lee v. State, 201 Ga. App. 827, 828 (1) (412 SE2d 563) (1991).

 As I urged in Brinkworth v. State, 222 Ga. App. 288, 290-291 (474 SE2d 9) (1996) (Ruffin, J., dissenting), I question the appropriateness of a rule allowing “slight evidence” to prove venue. Such a rule abrogates the State’s burden of proving every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Even applying this rule, however, the State’s proof in this case was clearly insufficient to prove venue.

 Of course, nothing in the record indicates the trial court did, in fact, take judicial notice of the UTC.