Court Opinion

ID: 9926004
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-23 17:13:58.056228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:58.262319
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

            Present: Judges Chaney, Callins and White
PUBLISHED

            Argued at Alexandria, Virginia

            UNITED CONTINENTAL HOLDINGS, INC.
                                                                                 OPINION BY
            v.      Record No. 0164-23-4                                  JUDGE DOMINIQUE A. CALLINS
                                                                               JANUARY 23, 2024
            MOLLY SULLIVAN

                        FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION

                            Jennifer Ramey Helsel (Danielle A. Takacs; Franklin & Prokopik,
                            P.C., on brief), for appellant.

                            Kathleen Grace Walsh (Law Office of Kathleen Grace Walsh, on
                            brief), for appellee.

                    United Continental Holdings, Inc., appeals the Commission’s judgment awarding Molly

            Sullivan temporary total disability benefits and medical benefits for her left ankle, right knee, and

            right arm injuries. United argues that the evidence failed to prove that Sullivan sustained a

            compensable injury by accident that arose out of and in the course of her employment. Finding no

            error, we affirm the Commission’s judgment.

                                                      BACKGROUND

                    In June 2021, Sullivan worked as a customer service representative for United Airlines at

            the Dulles Airport. In the past, airline employees parked in lots some distance from the terminal.

            Buses then transported the employees from those parking lots to the airport’s terminal. After the

            COVID-19 pandemic, however, employees began parking in Garage 2, a lot located closer to the

            terminal and typically used by airport customers and the public. Although employees could park in

            other lots, the Metropolitan Washington Airport Authority (“MWAA”) provided free parking for

            employees in Garage 2.
        To access the airport terminal from Garage 2, employees could either walk along a covered

walkway that extended from the garage’s third level, or they could leave through the garage’s first

floor exit and walk across a street to enter the airport. United employees would clock into work on

the third level of the terminal, so using the walkway was generally the most direct route for United

employees. Sullivan also preferred the walkway because it avoided vehicular traffic.

        The walkway connected to the garage by a “silver threshold.” The walkway then extended

for 80 yards away from the threshold before turning right and ending about 30 feet from the United

terminal entrance. It existed as a single path between Garage 2 and the section of the terminal to

which United employees reported, and it had no connecting or branching walkways leading to

alternate locations of the garage or the terminal. The MWAA owned, operated, and maintained the

garage, the walkway, and other areas surrounding the terminal. United was not responsible for the

walkway’s maintenance.

        On June 20, 2021, Sullivan parked in Garage 2 and entered the third-floor walkway to reach

the terminal. After passing the silver threshold, she slipped on water, “twisted [her] left foot,” and

fell, striking her right knee and arm. An ambulance transported Sullivan to a local hospital; she later

received follow-up care from her primary care physician and an orthopedist for injuries to her left

foot, right knee, and right arm. She participated in physical therapy, and her primary care physician

released her to full duty at work on September 20, 2021.

        Sullivan filed a claim seeking temporary total disability benefits from the date of injury

through her return to full duty and seeking medical benefits for her injuries. The parties stipulated

that Sullivan was totally disabled during the claimed timeframe, but United contested that Sullivan

had sustained a compensable injury. After a hearing, the deputy commissioner ruled that Sullivan’s

injury did not arise in the course of her employment. The deputy commissioner found that “the

subject walkway was not the sole means of ingress and egress to her place of employment,” the

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employer did not control the parking garage or the walkway, and Sullivan was not required to park

there. The deputy commissioner further found that the area where Sullivan fell was not sufficiently

near the entrance to United’s terminal so that the area was an extension of United’s premises.1

       On review, the Commission reversed the deputy commissioner’s judgment. The

Commission found that, under the extended premises doctrine, an employee may suffer a

compensable injury even though the accident was on property not owned by the employer because

the property was “in such proximity and relation to the space leased by the employer as to be in

practical effect the employer’s premises.” Considering the configuration of the garage and the

walkway in relation to the Dulles Airport, the Commission found that the accident was in sufficient

proximity to the terminal that it occurred on United’s extended premises.2 Accordingly, the

Commission remanded the matter to the deputy commissioner to determine whether Sullivan’s

injuries were otherwise compensable.

       On remand, the deputy commissioner found that Sullivan suffered a compensable injury by

accident and awarded her temporary total disability benefits for the claimed timeframe and medical

benefits for the left ankle, right knee, and right arm injuries. United requested that the Commission

review the deputy commissioner’s judgment, challenging only the Commission’s prior ruling that

the injury arose in the course of Sullivan’s employment, and specifically, the Commission’s

application of the extended premises doctrine. Relying on its previously stated grounds, the

Commission affirmed the judgment of the deputy commissioner.

       1
        In so finding, the deputy commissioner contrasted the facts with those presented in an
unpublished opinion of this Court, Cap. Area Pediatrics, Inc. v. Eken, No. 1557-12-4, 2013 WL
1897827 (Va. Ct. App. May 7, 2013).
       2
         One commissioner dissented, emphasizing that the accident occurred more than 80
yards from the terminal.
                                           -3-
       United appeals to this Court, arguing that the Commission erred by finding that Sullivan’s

injury occurred in the course of her employment. United maintains that the extended premises

doctrine does not apply because Sullivan slipped on a walkway that was more than 80 yards from

the terminal and connected to a parking lot that United had “no control over.” Accordingly, United

asks this Court to reverse the Commission’s judgment.

                                             ANALYSIS

       Liability under the Workers’ Compensation Act is distinct from traditional tort liability.

Thus, we find it necessary to consider the purpose of the law. “The Workers’ Compensation

Act, now over a century old, ‘reflects a legislative “quid pro quo” that gave workers the right to

assert no-fault liability against their employers . . . and took from them the right to sue their

employers in tort for negligence.’” Lopez v. Intercept Youth Servs., Inc., 300 Va. 190, 196

(2021) (quoting Jeffreys v. Uninsured Emp.’s Fund, 297 Va. 82, 93 (2019)). “To be effective,

the Act must be interpreted to maintain that delicate balance of competing policies.” Id. “A

view of the Act’s coverage that is too broad would authorize an award of compensation benefits

but would bar a tort recovery, and a view that is too narrow would authorize a tort recovery but

would bar an award of compensation benefits.” Jeffreys, 297 Va. at 93. It is this “delicate

balance” we seek to strike in considering whether an injury sustained by an employee as she

begins to walk a path that leads to her workplace is compensable under the Act.

       Generally, a compensable injury “means only [an] injury by accident arising out of and in

the course of the employment or occupational disease.” Code § 65.2-101. This definition

“polices the border between coverage and noncoverage” under the Act. Lopez, 300 Va. at 196.

“[A]n accident occurs in the ‘course of employment’ when it takes place within the period of

employment, at a place where the employee may be reasonably expected to be, and while [she] is

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reasonably fulfilling the duties of [her] employment or is doing something which is reasonably

incidental thereto.” Clifton v. Clifton Cable Contracting, L.L.C., 54 Va. App. 532, 539 (2009).

       Whether an injury arises out of and in the course of employment is a mixed question of

law and fact. Kendrick v. Nationwide Homes, Inc., 4 Va. App. 189, 190 (1987). The Supreme

Court has evaluated this question in two contexts: when an employee is going to or coming from

a workplace, Kent v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 143 Va. 62, 66 (1925), and when an injury

occurs at a location in such proximity to a workplace that the location is “in practical effect a part

of the employer’s premises,” Brown v. Reed, 209 Va. 562, 565 (1969) (quoting Bountiful Brick

Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 158 (1928)).

       Under long-standing precedent, injuries sustained while going to or from work generally

are not compensable under the Act. See Kendrick, 4 Va. App. at 190-91; Kent, 143 Va. at 66.

This is what we have come to recognize as the “general rule of ‘going and coming.’” Hunton &

Williams v. Gilmer, 20 Va. App. 603, 606 (1995). The basis for the rule is that an employee

going to or coming from work “is not engaged in performing any service growing out of and

incidental to [her] employment.” Boyd’s Roofing Co. v. Lewis, 1 Va. App. 93, 94 (1985)

(quoting Kent, 143 Va. at 66). Because the employee is not yet “on the job,” the injury does not

arise in the course of employment. Cleveland v. Food Lion, LLC No. 0578, 43 Va. App. 514,

519 (2004) (quoting Sentara Leigh Hosp. v. Nichols, 13 Va. App. 630, 636 (1992) (en banc)).

Thus, an injury resulting from an individual traveling a route between her home and her place of

work is not considered to have arisen “in the course of the employment.”

       The going and coming rule has recognized exceptions. An injured employee can

nonetheless recover when “going to” or “coming from” the workplace:

               (1) where the means of transportation used to go to and from work
               is provided by the employer or the employee’s travel time is paid
               for or included in wages; (2) where the way used is the sole means
               of ingress and egress or is constructed by the employer; and
                                                -5-
                (3) where the employee is charged with some duty or task
                connected to his employment while on his way to or from work.

Id. at 519 (quoting Sentara Leigh, 13 Va. App. at 636); see also Kent, 143 Va. at 66.

        Distinct from the going and coming rule is the extended premises doctrine. The extended

premises doctrine is best exemplified in the seminal case Brown v. Reed. In Brown, the

employer maintained on its premises a company parking lot, a shower, and a locker room for the

convenience of its employees. Brown, 209 Va. at 563. After Brown parked in the parking lot,

went to the locker room, and “started back across the parking area en route to . . . where he

would punch the time clock,” Reed’s automobile struck and injured Brown “as he was walking

in the passageway between the spaces in the parking area.” Id.

        The Court considered whether Brown’s injury arose “out of and in the course of

employment.” Id. at 563-64. In doing so, the Court relied on the “time, location and

circumstances of the accident place,” stating “[t]here is no such thing as ‘instantaneous exit’”

when an employee “punches a time clock.” Id. at 564-65. Rather,

                employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a
                reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in
                passing to and from the place where the work is to be done. . . .
                [T]he employment may begin in point of time before the work is
                entered upon and in point of space before the place where the work
                is to be done is reached.

Id.; accord Scott v. Willis, 150 Va. 260, 268 (1928). As we have since recognized, “the Supreme

Court of Virginia drew a ‘bright line’ at the employer’s door in Brown v. Reed.” Gilmer, 20

Va. App. at 605. “[I]f an employee is injured while going to and from . . . work and while on the

employer’s premises, the injury is treated at law as though it happens while the employee is

engaged in his work at the place of its performance.” Id. This is because an employee may be

injured in such proximity to her jobsite that the site of the injury is “in practical effect a part of

                                                  -6-
the employer’s premises.” Brown, 209 Va. at 565 (quoting Bountiful Brick Co., 276 U.S. at

158).

        Under the extended premises doctrine, the door to a workplace location “extends to

include adjacent premises used by the employee as a means of ingress and egress with the

express or implied consent of the employer.” Bountiful Brick Co., 276 U.S. at 158. The

“employer’s door” may represent a time or space in advance of a physical entry to the workplace

where such time or space is a means of ingress or egress to the physical entry. See Scott, 150 Va.

at 268 (“In other words, the employment may begin in point of time before the work is entered

upon and in point of space before the place where the work is to be done is reached.”).

        Injuries occurring in places where an employer “has some kind of right of passage” to

and from a building, such as “common stairs, elevators, lobbies, vestibules, concourses,

hallways, walkways, ramps, footbridges, driveways, or passageways through which the employer

has something equivalent to an easement” are “generally considered to have taken place on the

employer’s premises.” Prince v. Pan Am. World Airways, 6 Va. App. 268, 273-74 (1988)

(quoting 1 A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law § 15.43 (1985)). This is true “even if the

employer did not own or lease the particular place where the injury occurred.” Id. at 273; accord

Brown, 209 Va. at 565. Under these circumstances, the injury arises in the course of

employment, and it is compensable.

        We have considered the extended premises doctrine in two contexts—injuries occurring

in passageways and injuries occurring in parking lots. When an employee is injured on the

employer’s extended premises, the employee is not transiting to the workplace so as to implicate

the “going and coming” rule. Rather, the employee has in fact already arrived at the workplace.

Thus, the application of either the “going and coming” rule or the extended premises doctrine

relies wholly upon the factual circumstances of the case.

                                               -7-
       Although the extended premises grants a “reasonable margin of time and space,” the

doctrine has its limitations. In Cleveland, we recognized that parking lots are distinct from

sidewalks. Cleveland, 43 Va. App. at 520-21 (recognizing that “[i]n [that case],” the “parking lot

is not the equivalent of the sidewalk”). When a parking lot is not owned nor controlled by the

employer, the Commission’s application of the doctrine “rests on a combination of criteria,

including but not limited to proximity, authority, and responsibility for maintenance.” Id. at 519.

Accordingly, we have held that when an employee voluntarily paid to park in a garage owned by

her employer’s landlord and located across the street from the workplace, the injury she

sustained from slipping inside the garage did not arise in the course of her employment. Gilmer,

20 Va. App. at 604, 607-08.

       Where an employee’s injury occurs on a passageway or walkway, the analysis shifts. In

Prince, we held that an employee suffered an injury in the course of her employment when she

slipped on an icy walkway that extended from a public sidewalk to a building where her

employer was a tenant. Prince, 6 Va. App. at 273-74. Since the walkway constituted an

essential means of ingress and egress to the workplace, we held that it was “in practical effect a

part of the employer’s premises.” Id. at 274 (quoting Barnes v. Stokes, 233 Va. 249, 252

(1987)). When an employee’s presence on such walkway is “required and expected by virtue of

her employment,” the employer impliedly consents to the employee’s use of the walkway to

access the workplace, and an injury occurring thereon arises in the course of her employment.

Id. at 273. Conversely, we have held that a publicly-used traffic lane connecting a parking lot to

an employer’s workplace did not extend the employer’s workplace under the doctrine. See

Cleveland, 43 Va. App. at 520-21. “[W]hen a court has satisfied itself that there is a distinct

‘arising out of’ or causal connection between the conditions under which [the] claimant must

approach and leave the premises and the occurrence of the injury, it may hold that the course of

                                               -8-
employment extends as far as those conditions extend.” Gilmer, 20 Va. App. at 608 (emphasis

added).

          Similarly, we have held that an employee suffered an injury under the extended premises

doctrine when he slipped on an icy “concrete apron” that connected a public street, where the

employee parked, to the driveway of his jobsite. Wetzel’s Painting & Wallpapering v. Price, 19

Va. App. 158, 159, 161 (1994). Because the employee was “required to traverse the concrete

apron leading from the public street into the driveway,” we held that the concrete apron was “in

practical effect a part of the employer’s premises,” and “it was irrelevant that other entrances into

the building were available.” Id. at 161; see also Prince, 6 Va. App. at 274 (holding that because

the injury occurred on property that was “in practical effect” a part of the employer’s premises

under the extended premises doctrine, it was “irrelevant” that the employee could have used

another path to enter the building).

          The extended premises doctrine also applies here. On the date of the accident, MWAA

directed Sullivan and other airport employees to Garage 2 as the only free parking option.3 From

the garage, the walkway located beyond the parking lot provided Sullivan and other United

employees “some kind of right of passage” to reach the terminal. Prince, 6 Va. App. at 273

(quoting 1 Larson, supra, § 15.43). Indeed, the walkway led directly to the terminal, stopping

short of the terminal entrance by 30 feet. Like in Prince, although the walkway was not the only

way to get to the destination, the walkway was an essential means of ingress and egress from the

airport terminal. Further, Sullivan’s presence on the walkway was required and reasonably

expected by virtue of her employment within the terminal. See id. at 271, 274; Wetzel’s

          3
         In Barnes v. Stokes, the Supreme Court held that the parking lot was a part of the
workplace’s extended premises when the employer did not own the lot but “required” the
employees to park there. 233 Va. at 252-53. Although the fact that a parking lot is free is
certainly not dispositive, compulsion or an incentive—such as free parking—is a factor to
consider in this analysis.
                                               -9-
Painting, 19 Va. App. at 161 (holding that the concrete apron was on an essential path to the

jobsite even though “other entrances . . . were available”). The circumstances present a

sufficient “causal connection between the conditions under which [Sullivan] must approach and

leave the [terminal] and the occurrence of the injury” to establish that the injury occurred in the

course of her employment. Gilmer, 20 Va. App. at 608. Once Sullivan crossed the “silver

threshold” from Garage 2 onto the walkway that led directly and exclusively to the United

terminal, Sullivan effectively entered United’s workplace under the extended premises doctrine.

       United argues that this case is analogous to Gilmer. But we find this case and Gilmer to

be factually distinguishable. Here, Sullivan did not slip in a parking lot; instead, she slipped

after passing the threshold that divided the parking lot from the walkway that led to her

workplace. See also Cleveland, 43 Va. App. at 521 (“[the] parking lot is not the equivalent of

the sidewalk”). In Gilmer, we explained that whether the extended premises doctrine

encompasses an injury that occurred in a parking lot does not primarily turn on “proximity, or

reasonable distance, or even the identifying of surrounding areas with the [employer’s]

premises.” Gilmer, 20 Va. App. at 608. Rather, as previously stated, the doctrine applies “when

a court has satisfied itself that there is a distinct ‘arising out of’ or causal connection between the

conditions under which claimant must approach and leave the premises and the occurrence of the

injury.” Id.

       United also emphasizes that Sullivan’s accident occurred more than 80 yards from the

terminal but “only two steps” removed from the parking lot.4 Those circumstances do not

       4
          In making this point, United argues that it is unfair to hold an employer accountable for
premises it cannot see. But that is a concern for tort liability, not liability under the Workers’
Compensation Act. The Workers’ Compensation Act allows compensation for many unseen
hazards. Indeed, a vital part of the “legislative quid pro quo” is that employees may assert “no-
fault liability against their employers.” Lopez, 300 Va. at 196 (quoting Jeffreys, 297 Va. at 93).
Thus, applicability of the extended premises doctrine does not turn on whether the injury

                                                 - 10 -
require reversal. As in Prince, whether a location constitutes an extension of an employer’s

workplace does not turn on the distance from the passageway to the workplace but on the

character of the passageway on which the claimant fell. Prince, 6 Va. App. at 273-74. The

walkway in Prince was “in practical effect a part of the employer’s premises,” id. at 274 (quoting

Barnes, 233 Va. at 252), because it “was a common avenue of passage over the grounds and an

essential means of ingress and egress from the public [location] to [the employer’s] place of

business,” id. Similarly, in Wetzel’s Painting, we relied primarily on the fact that the concrete

apron formed part of an essential and “required” path leading from the public street to the jobsite

without reference to the distance from the jobsite that the injury occurred. Wetzel’s Painting, 19

Va. App. at 161. In Brown, the Supreme Court did not even describe the distance between the

jobsite and the injury. See Brown, 209 Va. at 563. The distance between the injury and the

premises is not dispositive. Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether the employee is on “adjacent

premises used by the employee as a means of ingress and egress.” Bountiful Brick Co., 276 U.S.

at 158. Once Sullivan crossed the silver threshold onto the walkway, she was no longer in the

parking lot. Instead, she was on the walkway, using it as a means of ingress and egress

consistent with the implied consent of her employer. Thus, under the extended premises

doctrine, Sullivan’s injury occurred on property that was in practical effect part of United’s

premises.5 Therefore, the Commission did not err in finding that Sullivan’s injury arose out of

and in the course of her employment.

occurred within visibility of the workplace, but whether the injury location is sufficiently
essential as to constitute the workplace.
       5
         United also argues that this result creates an “airport exception” to the going and
coming rule because the distance between the site of the injury and United’s terminal was over
80 yards. We find no support for that argument. Many workplaces expand over large distances
or occupy space within large buildings. Whether at an airport or in an office building, the
relevant inquiry is whether, at the time of injury, the employee has crossed the threshold between

                                               - 11 -
                                       CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Commission’s judgment.

                                                                                      Affirmed.

a “common area” onto property that serves as a means of direct ingress to her workplace. See
Cleveland, 43 Va. App. at 520.
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