Court Opinion

ID: 9585018
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:55:16.389711+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:30.432444
License: Public Domain

Gehl, J.
(dissenting). As recently as in June of this year we said in State v. Cotter, ante, pp. 168, 171, 54 N. W. (2d) 43, with respect to unauthorized communications to a jury not made in open court, quoting from Havenor v. State, 125 Wis. 444, 446, 104 N. W. 116, the following:
“The result of the adjudications on this subject is to the effect that all proceedings in a case should be open and public *413and in the presence of the parties, whenever practicable, so as to afford them all reasonable opportunity to participate in the proceedings, and, if they are dissatisfied, to take such exception as the law allows. The due observance of this rule has led to a disapproval by the courts of any act by the judge, counsel, party, or stranger whereby communication is had with the jury after the case is submitted to them and they have retired for deliberation on their verdict, except it be in open court and with a due regard to the rights and privileges of the parties. Whenever such communications were had, though they were not prompted by improper motives, and though they may not have influenced the jury in arriving at their verdict, still they are generally treated as in themselves sufficient ground for setting aside the verdict rendered, for the reason that no party should be subjected to the burden of an inquiry before the court, regardless of whether or not its conduct in this respect, or that of its officers or that of the opposing party, has tended to his injury.”
And we added, in response to the contention of the state that the trial court in that case did not err in denying a new trial because no prejudice to the defendant had been shown, that, page 172, “the cases cited above hold that a defeated party is not required to show prejudice.” What we said in that case is not dictum. A new trial was granted upon the sole ground that there had been an unauthorized communication with the jury although no prejudice had been shown. It is obvious, therefore, that what we said in the Cotter Case was said deliberately and after due and full consideration.
True, the Cotter Case was a criminal action, but we found support for our conclusion in Wiedenhaupt v. Hoelzel, 254 Wis. 39, 35 N. W. (2d) 207, a civil action, decided as recently as in December of 1948, where we said (p. 41) :
“. . . it is the well-settled rule in this state that all proceedings in a case shall be open and public; that any communication with the jury, after the case is submitted to them and they have retired for deliberation on their verdict, by any person, shall be in open court, and in the presence of the *414parties or their representatives, where practicable. The rule is strict and any deviation from the rule has generally been treated as sufficient ground for setting aside the verdict, even though, as here, the communication was not prompted by improper motives and even though it has not influenced the jury in arriving at their verdict. A defeated party should not be required to show that a communication not made in open court was in fact prejudicial.”
Nor is what we said in the latter case dictum. The unauthorized communication was there also held to require a new trial.
Thus it appears that it has been firmly established by this court that an unauthorized communication with the jury, no matter by whom made, requires a new trial without the necessity that the party complaining show that such communication was in fact prejudicial.
I cannot agree that we should recede from the statement of a rule so recently declared; not because of pride of authorship, but because I consider that the previous rulings are correct.
The majority now says that to warrant a new trial prejudice to the person complaining must be shown and that because the plaintiff failed in that regard he is not entitled to a new trial.
Difficult as the task may be, the courts should be eager to give stability and certainty to the law'. They are essential to justice. Lonstorf v. Lonstorf, 118 Wis. 159, 95 N. W. 961. Judicial declarations are made for the guidance of the government and individuals. Both have the right to rely on announcements of the courts and to assume that a decision once made is a statement of the law and that it shall continue to exist as the law, at least until regularly amended or modified or until the court frankly expresses its purpose to recede from an earlier conclusion.
*415The majority does not withdraw what it said in the cases here cited. Rather it seeks to distinguish them from the one which we have before us upon a factual basis. Such distinction may not be attempted. We did not say in the earlier cases that the facts there appearing disclosed that the party complaining had been prejudiced by the unauthorized communication and that he was therefore entitled to a new trial. We said that in all cases where it appears that there has been an unauthorized communication with the jury, regardless of whether or not it appears that the communication tends to the injury of a party, that party may have a new trial.
The majority says that the trial judge’s communication to the jury carried to it by one of the bailiffs was in fact a refusal to communicate. It was no more than a refusal by the judge to communicate personally with the jury. There was unauthorized communication — that is conceded by all parties. Should we say that in the absence of a showing of prejudice a new trial must be granted only when the trial judge personally conducts an unauthorized communication with the jury? I think not. If we were required to distinguish upon that ground I should prefer to assume that the act of the trial judge would probably be less harmful than that of a bailiff.
It is true that the record does not disclose that the bailiff said anything to the jury to influence them in their deliberation. Assuming, however, that he did not, I do not believe that it would encourage the confidence in the courts which it is necessary to maintain to open the door to even the possibility that a jury might in any way be affected or influenced by matters or conduct unauthorized by the rules of proper procedure.
“All court proceedings should be in the open; there should be no opportunity for the doing of things in a corner, . . .” Hurst v. Webster Mfg. Co. 128 Wis. 342, 347, 107 N. W. 666.
*416I am of the opinion that a new trial should be granted because of the fact that it appears without dispute that there was an unauthorized communication with the jury.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Broadfoot and Mr. Justice Brown join in this dissent.