Court Opinion

ID: 9766577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:53:46.23411+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:23.814551
License: Public Domain

•MARTIN, Justice
(dissenting-).
Plaintiff’s cause of action is founded upon a liquidated demand represented 'by a promissory note executed by defendant and payable to plaintiff and by a stated account as executed by defendant and due the plaintiff with credits thereon as acknowledged by the plaintiff. Defendant’s pleadings admit his agreement to pay plaintiff the said sum of $10,250 in issue and also reveal his liability therefor in that defendant admits a consummation of the ranch sale to B. K. Construction Company as a grantee in the chain of title of B. R. Sheffield to said ranch —defendant’s defense being that the sale was not made to B. R. Sheffield. Defendant is designated herein as appellant and th'e plaintiff is designated as appellee.
The majority opinion abating the cause of action under the principle of nonjoinder of necessary parties plaintiff must rest solely upon a finding here that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to abate the cause of action upon the issue of non-joinder. It must be recognized that the trial court has great discretion upon the question of joinder of parties. Wilson v. Ammann & Jordan, Tex.Civ.App., 163 S.W.2d 660, Syls. 2, 3; Montgomery v. Willbanks, Tex.Civ.App., 202 S.W.2d 851, Syl. 1, second case; Rules No. 37 to 43 inclusive, Vernon’s Annotated Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
The record with reference to the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting appellant’s theory of nonjoin-der reveals that no plea in abatement was •filed by appellant as defendant in the trial court. Further, after introduction of all the evidence pertinent to the issue of non-joinder of necessary parties plaintiff, the trial court ruled that if defendant so desired the court would require plaintiff to file a trial amendment and include George L. Aycock and H. M. Alexander as plaintiffs in the cause to meet the objections of the defendant. Upon such suggestion by the court, defendant’s attorney waived his objection to any nonjoinder of said parties and as to the issue 'by stating to the court:
“Well, we take the position that without proper showing by the plaintiff, it would be improper for them to inter-plead either of these parties.”
The rule governing the above issue is found in 1 C.J.S., Abatement and Revival, § 193.b, page 250:
“In accordance with the general rules above stated in § 193 a, unless defendant raises his objection within the proper time and in due order of pleading, he will be regarded as having waived his right to urge an abatement because of defects, and objections * * as to the parties, * *
Safeway Stores, Inc. of Texas v. Rutherford, 130 Tex. 465, 111 S.W.2d 688, Syls. 1-3; Railroad Commission v. Shell Oil Co., Inc., Tex.Civ.App., 164 S.W.2d 773 (writ refused), Syls. 1-2-5; 1 Tex.Jur., Abatement and Revival, Section 122, Page 167.
The written instruments as executed by appellant and on which appellee founded his suit will support the trial court’s rejection of the issue of nonjoinder. But, George L. Aycock and H. M. Alexander executed an assignment of their claims to the appellee and were not necessary and indispensable parties to the suit. Such written assignments are detailed in Plaintiff’s Exhibits 9, 10 and 11 and contain the following allegation as to assignment of all said parties’ claims to appellee:
“This real estate fee and note obligation belongs to you * *
The trial court’s findings of fact on the issue of nonjoinder and upon the facts revealed by plaintiff’s numbered exhibits are as follows:
“12. No objection to proper parties plaintiff was timely made by the De*617fendant in this action. Upon the suggestion of possible question by the Defendant of the right of Plaintiff to proceed in his own name, then thereupon Plaintiff offered in evidence Plaintiff’s Exhibits Nine (9), Ten (10), and Eleven (11) which reflected the assignment of rights of other realtors into Walter Jackson and which likewise supplement-tally authorized Walter Jackson in his own name to pursue for all of the interested parties the rights in the name of Plaintiff, Walter Jackson. Thereupon, in open court the trial court authorized an election of Defendant, Mark Hor-tenstine, to insist upon the insufficiency of parties plaintiff and to at the same time permit trial amendment to incorporate the elements within Plaintiff’s Exhibits Nine (9), Ten (10), and Eleven (11), but that Defendant, Mark Hortenstine, did not elect to insist upon this requirement and Defendant, Mark Hortenstine, by his conduct evident to the court factually waived any objection to this action being urged and continued in the name of Walter Jackson only.”
The above-numbered exhibits as pertinent to the issue outlined in the above findings of'fact by the trial court are included in the statement of facts. The above quoted excerpt from such exhibits reveals why the defendant was averse to a trial amendment ■ of plaintiff’s pleadings setting up such exhibits and to their presentation in evidence on the issue of nonjoinder and why defendant in open court waived his theory of non-joinder and permitted the cause to proceed to judgment. Since defendant chose to reject the issue of nonjoinder in the face of the above proof subject to trial amendment and introduction in evidence, he cannot now complain and particularly so in the absence of his filing any plea in abatement in the trial court. Antwine v. Reed, 145 Tex. 521, 199 S.W.2d 482, Syl. 4; Connally v. Continental Southland Savings & Loan Ass’n, Tex.Com.App., 121 Tex. 565, 51 S.W.2d 293, Syl. 9; McDonald v. Alvis, Tex., 281 S.W.2d 330, Syls. 2-3.
The issue discussed in detail in the above paragraph presents only one of the various legal principles sustaining the trial court’s correct determination of the issue of non-joinder of parties plaintiff. The written instruments as executed by appellant and delivered to appellee and upon which the cause of action is founded reveal that W. M. Alexander and George L. Aycock are neither necessary nor indispensable parties to the cause of action. As stated at the inception of this dissenting opinion, the suit is founded upon a promissory note executed and delivered by appellant to appel-lee as the sole payee therein and upon an account stated as executed by appellant to appellee. The credits as placed upon such account stated are signed solely by the ap-pellee. The promissory note and account stated are indisputably agreements executed solely by appellant to appellee. The appellant owes to appellee the obligations as represented by such written instruments and any disposition of the funds as collected thereunder by appellee could not affect in any manner the liability of the appellant. Appellant’s contention as to nonjoinder, if any issue of such nature was ever properly raised in the trial court, was correctly ■ determined by the trial court as being without merit on this evidence alone. Antwine v. Reed, supra; Connally v. Continental Southland Savings & Loan Ass’n, supra; McDonald v. Alvis, supra.
Upon the above issues and authorities cited thereunder, the trial court correctly refused to abate the cause of action on the appellant’s theory of nonjoinder of George L. Aycock and W. M. Alexander as parties plaintiff. Judgment was correctly entered for appellee in the trial court upon the written instruments revealing 'a liquidated demand and such judgment should have been affirmed by this Court.