Court Opinion

ID: 9778440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:04:33.183495+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:08.943989
License: Public Domain

FINCH, Senior Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the principal opinion which reverses the judgment in favor of St. Louis Children’s Hospital and remands the case for a new trial on plaintiff’s claim against the hospital.
Plaintiff’s petition asserts that excessive amounts' of oxygen were administered between the dates of May 19 and May 24, 1969, while plaintiff was a patient in Children’s Hospital under the care of Dr. Boles. As a result, says plaintiff, he suffered retro-lental fibroplasia which caused total blindness in plaintiff’s right eye and the loss of all sight in the left eye except for simple light perception. Recovery therefor is sought from both the doctor and the hospital.
Plaintiff was discharged from the hospital on June 26,1969 and was not back in the hospital until readmitted on November 17, 1969, for examination under anesthesia by Dr. Boniuk. At that time Dr. Boniuk performed an operation on the left eye to prevent total detachment of the retina. Only simple light perception remained at that time in the left eye. No operation was performed on the right eye because plaintiff had no sight in that eye.
During the time plaintiff was in Children’s Hospital in May and June of 1969, the doctrine of charitable immunity existed in this state. Under that doctrine hospitals such as Children’s Hospital were immune from liability for tort. Hence, even if excessive oxygen was administered by the hospital as alleged, Children’s Hospital was not liable therefor. Such charitable immunity continued to exist in 1969 until this court abolished the doctrine in Missouri on November 10, 1969, in the cases of Abernathy v. Sisters of St. Marys, 446 S.W.2d 599 (Mo. banc 1969) and Garnier v. St. Andrew Presbyterian Church of St. Louis, 446 S.W.2d 607 (Mo. banc 1969). Those cases abolished the doctrine prospectively only. Thereafter, there could be recovery against those previously immune only as to causes of action arising after November 10, 1969.
The principal opinion recognizes that the doctrine was abolished only prospectively and that when Abernathy speaks of permitting recovery in causes of action arising after November 10,1969, it has reference to causes of action wherein the negligent act for which recovery is sought occurred after November 10, 1969. However, having so recognized, the principal opinion then proceeds to hold that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of the hospital on the theory that recovery against Children’s Hospital was barred by the doctrine of charitable immunity. It so holds on the basis of plaintiff’s contention that the hospital had a continuing duty to advise plaintiff’s parents that as a result of the excessive oxygen administered there “ ‘had begun an insidious course of visual deterioration known as retrolental fibroplasia which in the months ahead would, as it *153progressed, cause detachment of the retinas resulting in blindness.’ ” Under such theory the hospital had a continuing duty on November 11, 1969, to so advise plaintiff’s parents and if the jury finds that it breached that duty and such breach caused or contributed to cause plaintiff’s damage, then plaintiff can recover against Children’s Hospital.
I cannot concur in such a conclusion. In the first place it imposes a duty on the hospital which is unrealistic and which the hospital should not have. By its holding, the principal opinion thrusts the hospital in the middle of the physician-patient relationship on the theory that the hospital, as well as the doctor, had a duty to examine plaintiff and ascertain his condition and the likely progress of his condition and to advise plaintiff’s parents thereof. It cites no case which has imposed such a duty. We should not do so now. People are admitted to hospitals as patients of a doctor. He examines and advises the patient and prescribes the treatment to be administered. The hospital does not diagnose patients’ ailments or give them medical advice or prescribe treatment. To do so would constitute the practice of medicine and hospitals are not authorized to do those things.
Absent this theory of a right of recovery based on a continuing duty of the hospital to diagnose and advise plaintiff’s parents as to his condition and likely progress and the need for them to act, there is no basis for recovery against the hospital. All of the acts of the hospital of which plaintiff complains occurred while plaintiff was in the hospital in May and June, 1969. The doctrine of charitable immunity, then in effect, prevents recovery therefor.
Even if I could agree that hospitals should have this new duty to diagnose, consult and advise which the principal opinion imposes, I still could not concur in the principal opinion. It seems to hold that if, on remand, there is evidence that the hospital breached this continuing duty to advise plaintiff’s parents, and the jiiry finds that such breach caused or contributed to cause the loss for which recovery is sought, the jury may return a verdict for plaintiff against both the doctor and the hospital for all of plaintiff’s loss. The result would be to permit recovery from the hospital for damages incurred during a period of time beginning when oxygen was first administered in May, 1969, when without question the doctrine of charitable immunity made the hospital immune from liability.
Under Abernathy the hospital could be liable only for damages resulting from the alleged negligent act of failing on November 11, 1969, to advise plaintiff’s parents. Only damages occurring after breach of the duty on November 11,1969, would be recoverable. A theory of a continuing duty to advise cannot result in liability of the hospital for things which occurred and injury which resulted during a time when the hospital was immune from such liability. Clearly, Abernathy did not so intend. On the contrary, it clearly was intended to authorize recovery only for damages flowing from things occurring subsequent to November 10, 1969.
It is obvious that all of plaintiff’s damage occurred before November 11, 1969. In October plaintiff’s parents brought him back to Dr. Boles. He referred plaintiff to Dr. Kolker, an ophthalmologist. He found on November 5, 1969, the plaintiff then had retrolental fibroplasia. Dr. Kolker referred plaintiff to Dr. Boniuk, another ophthalmologist, who attempted unsuccessfully on that date to examine plaintiff. He then scheduled an examination of plaintiff under anesthesia for November 17, 1969. After the examination, Dr. Boniuk operated on plaintiff’s left eye. On that date plaintiff was blind in the right eye and had only light perception in the left eye. Thus it is evident that the damage to plaintiff’s eyes had already occurred by November 11, 1969.
In support of the decision to reverse and remand the principal opinion cites and relies on Thatcher v. DeTar, 351 Mo. 603, 173 S.W.2d 760 (1943). That is a case involving interpretation and application of a statute of limitations. In such a situation liability exists for damages caused by negligence but for a statute of limitations which may bar the right of recovery. If the statute of limitations is tolled the pre-existing liability continues to exist. In contrast, where, as *154here, a pre-existing immunity such as charitable immunity is abolished prospectively, there is no pre-existing liability. Therefore, prospective abolition cannot result in continuation of a pre-existing liability. There was none. Hence, principles applicable to statutes of limitations are not controlling.
The principal opinion recognizes at page 150 that such principles are not applicable. However, having done that, it proceeds on page 152 to cite Thatcher v. DeTar, supra, as authority supporting remand of the case for determination as to possible recovery from the hospital for the loss for which damages are sought. In so holding the opinion says, “If, upon remand, plaintiff-appellant can adduce evidence to support his contention that the continuing negligence of the Hospital caused or contributed to cause the loss for which he now seeks damages, and that said negligence continued to a date beyond November 10, 1969, when the doctrine of charitable immunity was abrogated, we are of the opinion that his cause of action would be viable and would not have arisen until such time as the treatments for the disease terminated, Thatcher v. DeTar, supra.”
I am not certain that I know what that statement means. I think it says that on the authority of Thatcher the accrual of the right to sue was postponed until after November 10, 1969, and that in such a situation there can be recovery for all of plaintiff’s damages, not just any occurring after charitable immunity was abolished on November 10, 1969.
If my interpretation is correct, the principal opinion is contrary to what this Court held in Abernathy about prospective application of the abolition of the doctrine. In cases decided subsequent to Abernathy and Gamier this Court reiterated its holding with reference to prospective application, refusing to extend the benefit of the abrogation to other cases already pending when the doctrine was abolished. Bodard v. Culver-Stockton College, 471 S.W.2d 253 (Mo.1971); Burns v. Owens, 459 S.W.2d 303 (Mo.1970). See also Swinford v. Bliley, 513 S.W.2d 381 (Mo.1974); Varnal v. General Hospital and Medical Center, 502 S.W.2d 332 (Mo.1973). It would be completely inconsistent with all of those decisions to now allow this plaintiff to recover for injuries and damages which occurred and accrued prior to November 10, 1969.
If, on the other hand, my interpretation of the language of the opinion is incorrect and it is intended to permit recovery only for any damage shown by the evidence to have resulted after November 10,1969, as a result of a failure to advise and warn on November 11, 1969 then the language of the opinion should be clarified so as to clearly and explicitly so state. It is possible to state such a ruling so that neither the trial court nor counsel will have any doubt that this is what the Court means. It doesn’t make that clear as it is presently written and it is obvious from plaintiff’s brief filed in this Court after the opinion of the Court of Appeals had been written that plaintiff does not so interpret the language and that plaintiff will seek on retrial to recover all damages shown to have occurred from and after the time oxygen was administered in May of 1969.
For the reasons hereinabove stated, I would affirm the judgment in favor of Children’s Hospital, reversing and remanding for retrial only as against Dr. Boles.