Court Opinion

ID: 9576203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:21:43.688824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:29.341583
License: Public Domain

Gerrard, J.,
dissenting.
There is no doubt that the state has an interest in removing drunk drivers from the road to promote highway safety. However, this interest must be advanced within the framework of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions. I dissent because, in my opinion, the driver’s license suspension provisions in the administrative license revocation (ALR) statutes, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 60-6,205 through 60-6,208 (Reissue 1993), constitute a civil sanction which cannot fairly be characterized as solely serving a remedial purpose and therefore “is punishment, as we have come to understand the term.” United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 104 L. Ed. 2d 487 (1989). Accordingly, since Hansen has been punished by the administrative revocation of his driver’s license for driving while under the influence (DUI), he cannot constitutionally be subjected to multiple punishment by criminal prosecution for the same offense of DUI.
HALPER AND AUSTIN ANALYSIS
I agree with the majority that Hansen’s double jeopardy *195argument must be analyzed in light of a trio of U.S. Supreme Court cases: United States v. Halper, supra; Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 125 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1993); and Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, _U.S. _, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 128 L. Ed. 2d 767 (1994). However, I disagree with the majority’s view that Austin is inapplicable to the resolution of the issues before us in the instant case. Instead, my view is that it is absolutely necessary to analyze and apply the holding of Halper in light of the Supreme Court’s analysis in Austin, as Austin is the only Supreme Court case which employs a Halper analysis to resolve this specific double jeopardy issue, i.e., whether a particular civil sanction can fairly be characterized as solely remedial. Moreover, Austin resolves any ambiguities that existed in Halper concerning when a civil sanction’s “sting of punishment” can no longer be fairly characterized as solely remedial and, instead, can only be considered punishment as defined by the Supreme Court. 490 U.S. at 447 n.7.
In Halper, the defendant was convicted of 65 separate violations of the criminal false-claims statute, sentenced to prison, and fined. Subsequent to his criminal conviction and concerning the same conduct which constituted the criminal convictions, the government filed 65 separate violations of the civil False Claims Act against Halper and recovered the statutorily authorized civil penalty of $2,000 for each violation. Halper complained that this $130,000 penalty bore no rational relationship to the government’s costs of investigation and prosecution and was thus not a civil sanction, but a second punishment for the same conduct..
The Court identified that the sole question before it was whether the statutory penalty authorized by the False Claims Act constituted a second punishment for the purposes of a double jeopardy analysis, i.e., “whether a civil sanction, in application, may be so divorced from any remedial goal that it constitutes ‘punishment’ for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis.” 490 U.S. at 443. In this context, the Court concluded that the government is entitled to rough remedial justice; however, when rough justice “authorizes a supposedly remedial sanction that does not remotely approximate the Government’s *196damages and actual costs, [then] rough justice becomes clear injustice.” 490 U.S. at 446. Accordingly, resolution of the question, whether and under what circumstances a civil sanction may be punishment for the purposes of double jeopardy, requires an assessment of “the character of the actual sanctions imposed on the individual by the machinery of the state. ” 490 U.S. at 447. Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated:
In making this assessment, the labels “criminal” and “civil” are not of paramount importance. It is commonly understood that civil proceedings may advance punitive as well as remedial goals, and, conversely, that both punitive and remedial goals may be served by criminal penalties. [Citation omitted.] The notion of punishment, as we commonly understand it, cuts across the division between the civil and the criminal law, and for the purposes of assessing whether a given sanction constitutes multiple punishment barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, we must follow the notion where it leads. [Citation omitted.] To that end, the determination whether a given civil sanction constitutes punishment in the relevant sense requires a particularized assessment of the penalty imposed and the purposes that the penalty may fairly be said to serve. Simply put, a civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the sanction as applied in the individual case serves the goals of punishment.
(Emphasis supplied.) United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 104 L. Ed. 2d 487 (1989).
Applying these principles to the case at hand, the Court in Halper held as follows:
From these premises, it follows that a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term. [Citation omitted.] We therefore hold that under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not *197fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.
490 U.S. at 448-49.
In Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 125 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1993), the Court revisited the issue of whether a civil sanction constituted punishment when it examined the specific issue of whether the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment applied to civil forfeitures of property. In this case, Austin was indicted on four counts of violating state drug laws. He ultimately pled guilty to one count of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute and was sentenced to 7 years’ imprisonment. Subsequent to Austin’s indictment, the United States filed an in rem action seeking forfeiture of Austin’s mobile home and auto body shop. The district court entered summary judgment for the United States, and this order was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
The Supreme Court stated: “The purpose of the Eighth Amendment, putting the Bail Clause to one side, was to limit the government’s power to punish. . . . The Excessive Fines Clause limits the Government’s power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, ‘as punishment for some offense.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) 509 U.S. at 609-10. The Court concluded that the question is not whether forfeiture is a civil or criminal sanction, but whether forfeiture is “punishment” in the constitutional sense. Continuing, the Court in Austin stated:
In considering this question, we are mindful of the fact that sanctions frequently serve more than one purpose. We need not exclude the possibility that a forfeiture serves remedial purposes to conclude that it is subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause. We, however, must determine that it can only be explained as serving in part to punish. We said in Halper that “a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term.”
(Emphasis supplied.) 509 U.S. at 610.
Similarly, four recent federal court of appeals cases have *198followed the guidance of Austin in applying the above-stated definition of “punishment” in the context of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and the reasoning of each circuit court is persuasive. See, U.S. v. Perez, 70 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 1995); U.S. v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 573 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that civil forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes because Austin “ ‘resolves the “punishment” issue with respect to forfeiture cases for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause as well as the Excessive Fines Clause’ ”); U.S. v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that Austin emphasized that sanction which is designed even in part to deter or punish will constitute punishment, regardless of whether it also has remedial purpose, under both Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause and Double Jeopardy Clause in context of civil forfeitures); U.S. v. Hudson, 14 F.3d 536, 540 (10th Cir. 1994) (in analyzing whether nonparticipation sanctions and monetary sanctions imposed against bank officials constituted double punishment when defendants were also prosecuted criminally, the Court stated: “Appellants contend that the above quoted language means that unless a sanction is ‘solely’ remedial, i.e., not serving deterrent or retributive ends, it is punishment. This position is confirmed by the recent Supreme Court decision in Austin v. U.S.”).
In conducting a Halper analysis, that is, in making a particularized assessment of the penalty imposed by forfeiture and the purposes that a civil forfeiture may fairly be said to serve, the Court in Austin examined three factors: (1) the historical understanding of forfeitures, (2) the focus of the federal forfeiture statute, and (3) if forfeiture is in part punishment, can the forfeiture, nonetheless, fairly be characterized as solely remedial. The Court eventually concluded that forfeiture pursuant to the federal statute at issue did not solely serve a remedial purpose and that, thus, it was punishment subject to the Excessive Fines Clause.
APPLICATION OF HALPER ANALYSIS
Thus, for Hansen, Halper and Austin require us to make a particularized assessment of the penalty imposed by a driver’s *199license suspension and of the purposes that such a suspension may fairly be said to serve. Accordingly, a resolution of the present issue requires: (1) an examination of the historical purpose of driver’s license suspensions in the context of drunk driving, (2) an examination of the focus of our ALR statutes, and (3) if suspension of a driver’s license within the statutes is in part punishment, may the statutes, nonetheless, be fairly characterized as solely remedial.

History of Driver’s License Suspension in Context of Drunk Driving.

An examination of our statutes reveals that, even before the enactment of Nebraska’s first motor vehicle licensing statute, the suspension of the privilege to drive had been utilized as a form of punishment for drunk driving in this state. The first laws governing use of motor vehicles upon our highways appeared in 1919. In that year, the Legislature made it “unlawful for any person under sixteen years of age, or for any intoxicated person to operate a motor vehicle.” 1919 Neb. Laws, ch. 190, § 27, p. 828 (codified at Comp. Stat. § 8391 (1922)). The penalty for violation of § 27 was a fine not exceeding $50 for the first offense, and not less than $50 nor more than $100, or imprisonment not exceeding 60 days in the county jail for each subsequent offense. 1919 Neb. Laws, ch. 190, § 32, p. 830 (codified at Comp. Stat. § 8396 (1922)).
In 1927, the penalty for driving while intoxicated was amended to include suspension of the privilege of driving. In addition to a fine and possible imprisonment generally applicable for other motor vehicle violations, any person found guilty of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated was to be ordered by the court not to drive a motor vehicle of any description within this state for a period of 1 year from the date of judgment. 1927 Neb. Laws, ch. 153, § 1, p. 411. These laws predate our first motor vehicle licensing statute. Thus, it is evident that even before this state enacted its first motor vehicle licensing statute, an order not to drive a motor vehicle was considered to be an effective punishment for the crime of drank driving.
The Legislature enacted our first motor vehicle licensing *200statute in 1929. 1929 Neb. Laws, ch. 148, pp. 512-20. Section 1 proscribed operation of a motor vehicle on the streets, alleys, or public highways without a license obtained from the Department of Public Works. Comp. Stat. § 60-401 (1929). If a motorist was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol or a narcotic drug, § 12 mandated that a motorist’s license be suspended for a period of 1 year from the date of conviction. Importantly, in § 13, the Legislature also gave the director of an administrative agency, the Department of Public Works, the discretionary power to suspend a driver’s license for a period of 1 year, if the person was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or narcotic drags. Comp. Stat. § 60-413 (1929). This discretionary authority vested in the department director was repealed in 1937 and replaced with the mandatory responsibility to revoke a driver’s license upon receiving a record of the operator’s criminal conviction of driving while under the influence of alcohol. 1937 Neb. Laws, ch. 141, pp. 506-26.
Of course, under this statutory scheme, courts had the option to suspend a sentence and place an individual on probation, and, therefore, the convicted drank driver did not always facé the mandatory sanction of loss of driving privileges. In response, the Legislature passed 1982 Neb. Laws, L.B. 568, which mandated that courts impound driving privileges for certain minimum time periods after a DUI conviction, whether or not probation is granted in a particular case. Thus, historically, driver’s license suspensions in the context of drank driving have been predicated upon an underlying DUI criminal conviction.
In 1992, our statutory scheme regarding license revocation changed dramatically with the enactment of the ALR statutes. Unlike our prior statutes, §§ 60-6,205 through 60-6,208 vest in the director of the Department of Motor Vehicles the authority to revoke a driver’s license prior to a motorist’s criminal conviction for DUI. Moreover, the statutes require the director to impose a sanction of license revocation upon a motorist that is in excess of the sanction imposed upon a motorist if he or she is subsequently convicted of a criminal charge of DUI as a first- or second-time offender and *201sentenced to probation.
For example, § 60-6,206 requires the director to revoke the driver’s license of a first-time offender for a period of 90 days and to revoke the license of a second-time offender for a period of 1 year. In contrast, subsequent to a criminal conviction for DUI, a first-time offender who is placed on probation with a minimum sentence is subject to having his or her license impounded by the court for a period of 60 days. A second-time offender who is placed on probation with a minimum sentence is subject to having his or her license impounded by the court for a period of 6 months. Thus, the “remedial” sanction under this scenario is 30 days longer than the “criminal” sanction for the first-time offender, and 6 months longer for the second-time offender. Given this practical reality and the fact that the revocation period arbitrarily increases from 90 days to 1 year between a first-time offender and a second-time offender, it is difficult to glean the “remedial” portion of the ALR sanction.
This type of result is not surprising when we consider the legislative history behind the federal statute that encouraged states to adopt ALR statutes. Chapter 23 U.S.C. § 408(e)(1)(A) (1994) provides grants to states for alcohol traffic safety programs if the state provides for the “prompt suspension . . . of the driver’s license [for a minimum of 90 days for a first offender and 1 year for a repeat offender] of any individual who a law enforcement officer has probable cause ... to believe has committed an alcohol-related traffic offense.”
The Congressional intent of this statute is clearly illustrated throughout the legislative history by statements such as: “Historically, license revocation has been treated as a discretionary criminal sanction. This bill, however, recognizes that license revocation is a highly effective deterrent against drunk driving that should not be used exclusively as a criminal penalty imposed only after lengthy court proceedings.” 128 Cong. Rec. 26949 (1982) (statement of Sen. Danforth). Further illustration comes from the statement that “the main aim of the bill is deterrence [and] [p]unishment is justified after the fact.” 128 Cong. Rec. 25966 (1982) (statement of Rep. Howard). Finally, when the Senate debated amendments to 23 U.S.C. § 408, it was noted that “in 1982 we enacted Public Law *20297-364 [23 U.S.C. § 408] ... to prevent, detect and punish drunk driving.” 130 Cong. Rec. 18657 (1984) (statement of Sen. Mathias).
There is little question what Congress had in mind when it handed out inducements to the states to pass ALR statutes in order to combat drunk driving. Seasoned prosecutors and astute legislators know that driver’s license revocations are among, the most effective tools to punish offenders and deter drivers from operating vehicles when drunk. It is in this context that we will analyze the focus of Nebraska’s ALR statutes.

Focus of ALR Statutes.

The focus of Nebraska’s ALR statutes can be found in § 60-6,205(1), as follows:
Because persons who drive while under the influence of alcohol present a hazard to the health and safety of all persons using the highways, a procedure is needed for the swift and certain revocation of the operator’s license of any person who has shown himself or herself to be a health and safety hazard by driving with an excessive concentration of alcohol in his or her body and to deter others from driving while under the influence of alcohol.
(Emphasis supplied.) Thus, the focus of the statutes is ostensibly twofold: to protect the public from unsafe drivers and to deter drivers from operating a vehicle when drunk.
Unlike the majority, I am unable to come to the conclusion that by this statement, the legislative intent is primarily to protect the public and secondarily to deter drunk driving. Moreover, even if the legislative intent to deter was secondary, such an inquiry is irrelevant. The relevant inquiry for our purposes is whether the . civil sanction can fairly be characterized as solely remedial. See, Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 125 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1993); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 104 L. Ed. 2d 487 (1989). Even if a particular sanction was intended to deter as a secondary effect, if this secondary effect precludes characterizing the sanction as solely remedial, then the sanction is punishment as the U.S. Supreme Court has defined the term. Austin v. U.S., supra; United States v. Halper, supra.
*203Let us examine the first stated purpose of the ALR statutes, that is, to protect the public from unsafe drivers. I find nothing in this record that allows one to leap to the conclusion that Hansen is presumptively “a hazard to the health and safety of all persons using the highways” for the next 90 days because he was stopped for a burned out taillight and eventually tested .143 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath on a November 1994 evening. If those facts are proved beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law, then Hansen should be punished for the crime of DUI under the laws of the state. However, there is no basis in the ALR statutes or the prior decisions of this court for concluding in every case, regardless of circumstances, that the driver is unsafe for an arbitrary period of 90 days or that recidivism is likely during that period of time.
The underlying premise that every first-offense drunk driver is presumed to be “a hazard to the health and safety of all persons using the highways” for an arbitrary 90-day time period is not based on sound reasoning or any evidence in this record. Notably, the arbitrary length of the administrative law revocation (90 days for a first offender) ensures that it is both longer than necessary to allow the driver time to sober up and become a safe driver — and shorter than necessary to allow any meaningful rehabilitation to occur.
In addition, pursuant to § 60-6,205(4), a license revocation is not effective until 30 days after the date of the arrest in order to allow the offender an opportunity to exercise his or her rights in an administrative hearing. While such a 30-day waiting period is probably constitutionally necessary, it hardly serves the “remedial” goal of swiftly removing an unsafe driver from the highway when he or she is likely to be the most unsafe in the hours or days immediately after the arrest.
Moreover, in contrast to several other states that have adopted ALR statutes, our ALR statutes have no requirement of alcohol evaluation, substance abuse treatment, or alcohol abuse education in conjunction with the revocation time period, or as a prerequisite to reinstatement of a revoked license for first- or second-time offenders. Compare Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 60-6,205 and 60-6,211.05 (Reissue 1993) with Alaska Stat. § 28.35.030(h) (Cum. Supp. 1995) (requiring person convicted *204of DUI to satisfy screening, evaluation, referral, and program requirements of authorized rehabilitation agency); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-692.01(A) (Cum. Supp. 1995) (requiring person convicted of DUI to complete alcohol screening and any necessary additional treatment); Cal. Veh. Code § 23161(b) (West Cum. Supp. 1996); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 286-261(d) (1993) (mandating that offender be referred to certified substance abuse counselor for assessment of offender’s alcohol abuse or dependence and need for treatment; if counselor recommends treatment for offender, offender may be ordered to comply); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 29-A, § 2502 (West Supp. 1995); and Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 1209a (Cum. Supp. 1995) (requiring first-time offenders to submit to alcohol assessment screening to determine whether reinstatement of license should be conditioned on satisfactpry completion of therapy program; even if treatment is not ordered, offender must complete alcohol and driving education program at own expense).
If our ALR statutory scheme is really intended to protect the public or remedy the problem of drunk driving in some form, other than swift punishment or deterrence, it is woefully inadequate in that regard.

ALR Solely Remedial?

One does not have to go beyond the plain language of § 60-6,205(1) to determine that our ALR statutes were intended to serve both a remedial and a punitive goal by acting to deter drivers from operating a vehicle when drunk. While the deterrence of drunk driving is unquestionably a proper societal goal, a deterrent purpose in a civil sanction is punishment as we have come to understand the term. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 125 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1993); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 104 L. Ed. 2d 487 (1989). Thus, the final inquiry is, notwithstanding the stated punitive purpose and clear punitive effect, whether our ALR statutory scheme is still capable of being fairly characterized as solely serving a remedial purpose. United States v. Halper, supra.
The majority relies to some degree on authority from seven other states which have held that their particular ALR statutory schemes do not constitute punishment for double jeopardy *205purposes. However, the majority fails to adequately address the relevant issue. It is not whether another state’s ALR statutory scheme is considered punitive or remedial in nature, but whether this state’s ALR statutory scheme can fairly be characterized as solely remedial.
In fact, of the jurisdictions cited by the majority, all administratively suspend a motorist’s license for DUI for the same or a lesser length of time and under similar conditions as the concomitant criminal sanction of driver’s license suspension for DUI. See Alaska Stat. § 28.15.165(d) (1994). Compare, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-692.01 with § 28-694 (Cum. Supp. 1995); Cal. Veh. Code § 23160 with § 13352 (West Cum. Supp. 1996); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 286-261 with § 291-4 (1993); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32:414 with § 32:667 (West Cum. Supp. 1995); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 29-A, § 2453 with § 2411 (West Supp. 1995); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 1205 (Cum. Supp. 1995) with §§ 1206 (1987) and 1208 (Cum. Supp. 1995). Also, as stated previously, six of the jurisdictions require some type of alcohol evaluation and substance abuse education or treatment as part of their remedial sanctions.
The majority also cites several pre-1989 cases for the propositions that (1) driving a motor vehicle is not a fundamental right, but a privilege granted by the state, and (2) the purpose of license revocation was historically considered to be remedial in nature. The cites to cases that predate United States v. Halper, supra, are of minimal assistance in making a particularized assessment of the penalty imposed in this case.
The view that it is somehow important to characterize a driver’s license as a right or a privilege is misplaced. The U.S. Supreme Court has referred to the revocation of an operator’s license, for procedural due process purposes, as an “entitlement,” and not as a mere privilege that could be summarily revoked by a state for cause. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S. Ct. 1586, 29 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1971). This court has acknowledged the U.S. Supreme Court’s classification in Bell by referring to the revocation of a license as the denial of an entitlement because it oftentimes results in a loss of livelihood to the licensee. See, Bosselman, Inc. v. State, 230 Neb. 471, 432 N.W.2d 226 (1988); State v. Michalski, 221 Neb. *206380, 377 N.W.2d 510 (1985). Unfortunately, this court continues to revert back to erroneously labeling driver’s licenses as privileges, and it does nothing to advance the notion of whether the revocation of a license is considered “remedial” or “punitive” in these post-Halper times.
Further, in light of Halper and Austin, the majority’s reliance on Durfee v. Ress, 163 Neb. 768, 81 N.W.2d 148 (1957), and Neil v. Peterson, 210 Neb. 378, 314 N.W.2d 275 (1982), for the proposition that revocation of motorists’ licenses has historically been considered a civil action remedial in nature, is outmoded and unhelpful. We are to make a particularized assessment of the penalty imposed, as mandated by the rules of law announced in Halper and Austin, and the purposes that the penalty may fairly be said to serve.
A particularized assessment of Nebraska’s ALR statutes reveals that the administrative sanction (1) is tied directly to the guilt of the accused for the underlying DUI; (2) imposes greater periods of revocation than the concomitant criminal sanction for DUI in many instances; (3) has an arbitrary 90-day license revocation that is longer than necessary for an individual to sober up and become a safe driver, and shorter than necessary for meaningful alcohol rehabilitation to occur; (4) increases the license revocation from an arbitrary 90-day period for first offenders to an arbitrary 1-year period for multiple offenders; and (5) provides for no alcohol evaluation or remedial alcohol education during the revocation period. The ALR statutes are not a model of “remedial” legislation. At least, the Legislature honestly set forth its purpose in § 60-6,205(1) and did not hide the fact that deterring drunk drivers from operating motor vehicles was one of its clear intentions.
Given these characteristics, the driver’s license revocation provisions in the ALR statutes cannot be jfairly characterized as solely serving a remedial purpose and should be deemed punishment as that term is now defined by the U.S. Supreme Court. However, a determination that imposition of an ALR and a subsequent criminal prosecution for the same underlying offense constitutes double jeopardy is not to say that drunk drivers can or will avoid prosecution. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450, 109 *207S. Ct. 1892, 104 L. Ed. 2d 487 (1989):
Nothing in today’s ruling precludes the Government from seeking the full civil penalty against a defendant who previously has not been punished for the same conduct . . . . Nor does the decision prevent the Government from seeking and obtaining both the full civil penalty and the full range of statutorily authorized criminal penalties in the same proceeding.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Halper and its progeny simply mean that the government’s interest in removing drunk drivers from the road must be advanced within the well-established framework of the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions.
White, C.J., and Fahrnbruch, J., join in this dissent.