Court Opinion

ID: 9732612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:28:02.545034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:06.779110
License: Public Domain

Johnson, J.,
dissenting. I respectfully dissent. For years we have stated that acceptance of a road by a town may be inferred from evidence that the town, acting through its proper officials, has voluntarily assumed the burden of maintaining a road. Town of Springfield v. Newton, 115 Vt. 39, 43-44, 50 A.2d 605, 608-09 (1947). By allowing acceptance to be inferred, we resolved the problem that is in evidence here, i.e., that later select boards will balk at continuing to repair roads, or in this case, a bridge, at town expense as those expenses increase, despite the fact that the road or bridge has actually been accepted de facto by a lengthy course of conduct.
Today’s opinion rejects the law of Newton by stating that the trial judge is not compelled to draw the inference of acceptance, even though the facts were particularly strong in this case. The bridge was built in 1957 and has been repaired by the Town a number of times. The trial court found that in the 1960’s the Town made necessary repairs such as replacing planking and gravel. The court further found that in 1973 the Town rebuilt the bridge almost entirely, at its own expense. Minutes of the select board meeting in August 1973 record that “the selectmen will honor the past decisions and will rebuild and maintain this bridge in the future.” For twenty years, later boards behaved as though they were bound to maintain the bridge. In September 1987, the board voted to repair the railing on the bridge. In Fall 1989, the Town road crew made further repairs to the planking and railings. In September 1993, the Town board voted again to repair the bridge. And in 1995, plaintiffs were contacted by the chairman of the Town board who told them the Town had budgeted for further repairs. Finally, at the board meeting on April 1,1996, the bridge was discussed again. Page two of the minutes of that meeting contains the entry: “Mr. Orr wants to condemn the Bruce Smith Bridge. This is a town maintained bridge that connects to a private drive. There is *556an obligation by the Town to fix this bridge. This commitment was made by the Select Board in 1984.” The board then obtained an estimate of the cost of repairs and, at that point, decided not to repair the bridge because it was too expensive.
Although the forty-year history of repairs in this case is so strong as to make me find that an inference of acceptance is compelled, this case does not require an inference of acceptance to be drawn. The Town made an expliet commitment, noted in the minutes of the board meeting in August 1973, to “rebuild [the bridge] and continue maintenance in the future.” Furthermore, in 1996, the board referred to having made a similar commitment in 1984. Although the select board did not use the word “accept,” its intent could not have been clearer. It was not for later boards to set aside because the repairs became too expensive. The trial court found that the 1973 decision was ambiguous and therefore not an acceptance because the board added the caveat that the decision to rebuild and maintain the bridge in future would not “obligate the Town to maintain the drive leading to the bridge summer and winter.” While I agree that it is unclear what “the drive” refers to, the board was accepting responsibility for the bridge in future.
The rationale of the majority opinion has nothing to do with our law and everything to do with whether it makes sense for the Town to maintain a bridge that goes to a single residence. But that was the Town’s decision to make, and it made the decision affirmatively in 1973.* The property owner has presumably relied upon it since then. Whether the decision was wise or in the public interest is not the issue. The mischief that is worked by the opinion is that road maintenance disputes, which are frequently between towns and residents who are stranded on little-used spurs, or on roads that lead to a single house, will now be decided on a “common sense” basis, rather than under our law of dedication and acceptance. Because I believe plaintiffs proved acceptance, I would reverse.

The majority also makes the assumption that the bridge must be a class 4 highway and concludes the Town may therefore choose to cease maintaining it, limited only by the necessity of the Town, the public good and convenience of residents. This issue was not raised before the trial court and was not a part of the trial court’s decision; the trial court ruled that there was no acceptance, and our review should be limited to that issue.