Court Opinion

ID: 9964136
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-27 17:12:02.376567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:10.964356
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-23-00260-CR

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                     CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

ANTONIO JESUS FLORES,                                                      Appellant,

                                              v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                         Appellee.

             ON APPEAL FROM THE 377TH DISTRICT COURT
                    OF VICTORIA COUNTY, TEXAS

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION
               Before Justices Benavides, Tijerina, and Silva
                 Memorandum Opinion by Justice Tijerina

      Appellant Antonio Jesus Flores challenges his conviction of indecency with a child

by contact. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11. Appellant received a sentence of four and

one-half years’ imprisonment. By one issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred

by finding that a jury could determine beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the

extraneous offense of aggravated sexual assault. We affirm.
                                            I.       BACKGROUND

        The State charged appellant with the offense of indecency with a child by contact

by engaging in sexual contact with M.L., a child younger than seventeen years of age, by

touching her breast with the intent to arouse or gratify appellant’s sexual desire.1 See id.

At trial, M.L. testified that when she was fifteen years old, appellant cuddled up with her

while she sat watching television. According to M.L., appellant attempted to put his hand

in her pants, but she “stiffed up,” so he was unable to get his hands into her pants. M.L.

testified that appellant then lifted her shirt with his left hand and caressed her breasts over

and underneath her bra. M.L. reported the incident, and appellant was arrested.

        Prior to trial, the State notified appellant that it would introduce extraneous

evidence that appellant had sexually assaulted K.G. when she was nine years old. K.G.,

who was fourteen years old at the time of appellant’s trial, testified outside the presence

of the jury that when she was nine, appellant touched her “in” her “private part,” which

she specified is “the part you pee out of?” According to K.G., she felt appellant touching

the skin of her vagina with his hand as she slept, and she “kept moving” so that he would

stop. K.G. said that she was lying on her backside and moved to her stomach and then

side, but “he wouldn’t stop.”

        On cross-examination, K.G. stated she told her mother about the incident when

she was thirteen, but she also said she “didn’t want to go forward with anything.” K.G.

        1 We identify the complainant by her initials to protect her privacy. See TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 30(a)(1)

(providing that a crime victim has “the right to be treated . . . with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy
throughout the criminal justice process”).

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testified that the prosecution “made” her change her mind, so she decided to testify

against appellant in this case. Appellant argued that the trial court should exclude K.G.’s

testimony because the police report of the incident contradicted her testimony.

Specifically, appellant stated, “Not once did she say [to the police officer] that [appellant]

was touching [her]. . . . She was in a deep sleep. And then she woke up, and she saw

him at the door.” Appellant continued, “Never does she say, [appellant] was touching me.”

Appellant argued that K.G. missed several scheduled advocacy center appointments, and

the case was eventually dismissed. The trial court allowed K.G. to testify at appellant’s

trial. At trial, K.G. relayed the incident to the jury. This appeal followed.

                     II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

       We review the trial court’s admission of extraneous offense evidence for an abuse

of discretion. Devoe v. State, 354 S.W.3d 457, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Prible

v. State, 175 S.W.3d 724, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). “Unless the trial judge’s decision

[is] outside the ‘zone of reasonable disagreement,’ an appellate court should uphold the

ruling.” Oprean v. State, 201 S.W.3d 724, 726 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). If there are no

written or oral findings of fact, we “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial

court’s ruling and assume that the trial court made implicit findings of fact that support its

ruling as long as those findings are supported by the record.” Id. A trial court’s evidentiary

ruling is not an abuse of discretion if it is supported by the record and by any theory of

law. Bezerra v. State, 485 S.W.3d 133, 138 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2016, pet. ref’d) (citing

Osbourn v. State, 92 S.W.3d 531, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)).

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       In cases involving sexual offenses against children, including indecency with a

child, article 38.17 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes the admission of

extraneous offense evidence concerning a defendant’s prior sexual offense, including

aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child, “for any bearing the

evidence has on relevant matters, including the character of the defendant and acts

performed in conformity with the character of the defendant.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

art. 38.37 § 2(b). However, prior to admission of such evidence, the trial court must

conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury to “determine that the evidence likely

to be admitted at trial will be adequate to support a finding by the jury that the defendant

committed the separate offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. art. 38.37

§§ 1(a)(1)(A), 2(b), 2-a.

       Under § 22.021 of the Texas Penal Code, a person commits the offense of

aggravated sexual assault of a child if the person intentionally or knowingly causes the

penetration of the sexual organ of a victim younger than fourteen years of age. TEX. PENAL

CODE ANN. § 22.021(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B). A person commits the offense of indecency with

a child under § 21.11 of the penal code if that person engages in sexual contact with the

child or causes the child to engage in sexual contact with that person and the child is

younger than “17 years of age, whether the child is of the same or opposite sex and

regardless of whether the person knows the age of the child at the time of the offense.”

Id. § 21.11.

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                                    III.    DISCUSSION

       By his sole issue, appellant contends “[t]he trial court erred by finding that the

alleged extraneous act of aggravated sexual assault upon witness K.G. was committed

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Specifically, appellant argues that there is no evidence of

penetration therefore, the trial court should have excluded K.G.’s testimony.

       “A child victim’s testimony alone is sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated

sexual assault of a child or indecency with a child.” Keller v. State, 604 S.W.3d 214, 226

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, pet. ref’d). Evidence that the slightest penetration occurred is

sufficient to uphold a conviction, so long as it has been shown beyond a reasonable doubt.

Luna v. State, 515 S.W.2d 271, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); see also Bates v. State, No.

13-18-00493-CR, 2020 WL 2079094, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 30,

2020, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

       Here, the State asked, “When you were at your [aunt’s] house, is that when

[appellant] touched you?” K.G. replied, “Yes, ma’am.” The State asked, “And how did he

touch you?” K.G. said, “In my private part.” (emphasis added). K.G. explained that her

private part is the “part” that she uses to pee and that she felt appellant touch the skin of

her “private part.” From this evidence, the trial court could have reasonably inferred that

appellant penetrated K.G.’s sexual organ. See Cantu v. State, 678 S.W.3d 331, 358 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 2023, no pet.) (“‘Any penetration, no matter how slight, is sufficient to

satisfy the requirements’ of the aggravated sexual assault statute.”); see also In, Merriam-

Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/in (last visited on April 15,

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2024) (defining “in” as “that is located inside or within”). Thus, we conclude that the State

met its burden of producing sufficient evidence from which the trial court could have

determined that the evidence that was likely to be admitted at trial would be adequate to

support a finding by the jury that appellant committed the separate offense of aggravated

sexual assault of a child beyond a reasonable doubt. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

art. 38.37 § 2-a(1); Cantu, 678 S.W.3d at 359 (“We conclude A.C.’s testimony that Cantu

put his tongue in her ‘butt’ is legally sufficient evidence of penetration.”).

        Moreover, the trial court stated: “The court also finds that the State has proven the

elements of the offense of indecency with a child . . . .” We can affirm the trial court’s

ruling to admit or exclude evidence on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Ramos

v. State, 245 S.W.3d 410, 417–18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Thus, we further conclude that

the State met its burden of producing sufficient evidence from which the trial court could

have determined that the evidence that was likely to be admitted at trial would be

adequate to support a finding by the jury that appellant committed the separate offense

of indecency with a child beyond a reasonable doubt.2 See id.; see also TEX. PENAL CODE

ANN. § 21.11 (defining sexual contact as being “any touching by a person, including

touching through clothing, of the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of a child” with

the intent to gratify the actor’s sexual desires). We overrule appellant’s sole issue.3

        2 Appellant does not challenge this finding on appeal.

        3  To the extent that appellant complains that the charges against him concerning K.G. were
dismissed, we note that a defendant does not have to have been charged with, tried for, or convicted of the
separate offense for the extraneous offense evidence to be admissible. See Castillo v. State, 573 S.W.3d
869, 880–81 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d) (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.37,
§§ 2(b), 2-a) (noting that “Texas appellate courts have affirmed the admission of or reliance on evidence

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                                         IV.     CONCLUSION

        We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                                 JAIME TIJERINA
                                                                                 Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the
25th day of April, 2024.

that the defendant committed a separate sexual offense against another child under article [38.37] despite
the dismissal of charges concerning those separate offenses”).

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