Court Opinion

ID: 9808027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:25:27.872453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:52.637603
License: Public Domain

Montgomery; J.,
dissenting. For a violation of an ordinance of tbe town of Plymouth tbe defendant was convicted in tbe Mayor’s court, sentenced to pay tbe fine imposed by tbe ordinance, and appealed to tbe Superior Court of Washington County. In that Court tbe jury rendered a special verdict, tbe material facts found being as follows: That on June 1, 1903, tbe town commissioners passed an ordinance as follows: “On livery stables and persons keeping a horse or horses for hire, or doing any livery business or hiring of horses in tbe town, $7.50. This shall include any person making contracts for hire in tbe town, or carrying any person with a vehicle out of tbe town for hire.” That tbe defendant was a resident on July 20, 1903, of Roper, N. C., a village nine miles from Plymouth, and was engaged in tbe livery business at that time at Roper, having obtained license from tbe county and State to engage in tbe business, and that tbe defendant received a letter at Roper from a Mr. Balfour, posted at Elizabeth City, in which letter tbe *7defendant was asked to meet Balfour at Plymouth and convey him thence to Roper and thence to other places, which the defendant did, making his customary charge for such service. Judgment of guilty was rendered upon the verdict, and the defendant appealed.
The defendant, in this Court, through his counsel, rested his defense on the grounds, first, that the town commissioners did not have the power to pass the ordinance; and second, that it was unreasonable and oppressive. Under the first line of defense the contention was that in the articles of incorporation of Plymouth, chapter 213 of the Private Laws of 1903, there was no specific power granted to the town to levy such a privilege tax as that mentioned in the ordinance, and that as that power was not specifically granted in the charter, the act of the commissioners in enacting the ordinance Was ultra vires, and therefore null and void. And numerous cases, like Pullen v. Raleigh, 68 N. C., 451, and Latta v. Williams, 87 N. C., 126, were cited in support of the position. But at the time those decisions were made, the power to levy such a tax as that imposed by the ordinance was not authorized by the general law, as it was when the commissioners in the case before us passed the ordinance. In the last-mentioned case Judge Ashe, for the Court, said: “The construction we have given to the charter of the town of Davidson College is in consonance with the policy of the Legislature in regard to powers of taxation by municipal corporations, as indicated in the act entitled ‘Towns,’ Bat Rev., ch. 111, sec. 16. There it declares that towns may levy a tax on real estate situated within the corporation, on such polls as are taxed by the General Assembly for public purposes, on all persons (apothecaries and druggists excepted) retailing or selling liquors or wines of the measure of a quart or less a tax not exceeding $25, on all such shows and exhibitions for reward as *8are taxed by the General Assembly, on all dogs and on swine, borses and cattle running at large within the town. There is nothing in the act to authorize the right to tax trades or occupations) and when the Legislature has refrained from granting such power in a general law, it would not be reasonable to presume, in the absence of any express declaration to that effect, it intended to do so when it was granting special power of taxation.” Section 16 of chapter 111 of Battle’s Revisal, was brought forward in The Code, and with an addition thereto, made by the Code Commissioners, is now section 3800 of The Code, and that addition made by the Code Commissioners confers on the town authorities the power to levy such privilege taxes. The language is: “They may also lay taxes for municipal purposes on all persons, property, privileges and subjects within the corporate limits, which are liable to taxation for State and county purposes.” Under Schedule B of the Revenue Act of 1903 the imposition of a license tax on the livery business was provided for; and besides, in the act of incorporation of the town of Plymouth, chapter 213 of Private Acts of 1903, by section 10, it is specially declared that section 3800 of The Code shall apply to the town of Plymouth.
In Guano Co. v. Tarboro, 126 N. C., 68, and State v. Irvin, 126 N. C., 989, this Court has held that under section 3800 of The Code, although such a power may not exist in the subjects of taxation enumerated in their charters, towns and cities may tax trades and professions and other privileges.
The second ground of defense, that is, that the tax is void on the ground that it is unjust, oppressive and unreasonable, cannot be maintained. The fact that the defendant is a non-resident of Plymouth cannot, in my opinion, relieve him from liability to pay the tax prescribed by the ordinance if he undertakes to do the livery business in Plymouth by carrying passengers out of the town. If so, he might *9keep his vehicles and stables just outside tbe town limits and thereby escape the privilege tax, as well as by competition injure or destroy the business of other livery-men -who live inside the town and pay the tax. “The Legislature may authorize municipal corporations to impose taxes upon persons whose ordinary avocations are pursued within the corporate limits, although residing beyond those limits, the same as upon residents.” 2 Dillon Mun. Corp. (4 Ed.), sec. 791. And the same principle is decided in City of Memphis v. Battaile & Co., 55 Tenn., 524, 24 Am. Rep., 285. In Winston v. Taylor, 99 N. C., 210, Judge Davis, for the Court, in illustrating the decision in that case, said: “If a livery-man or drayman resident in Greensboro should send his omnibus and hacks or drays into the towm of Winston, and claim and be allowed the privilege of doing business there without the payment of taxes because he was a nonresident, it would be deemed a very unjust discrimination by the resident livery-men and draymen”; and we adopt his reasoning on that point in the case before us.