Court Opinion

ID: 9911472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-19 22:01:57.147947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:16.377339
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/19/23 P. v. Vargas CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F084670
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                             (Super. Ct. No. 22CMS-0303B)
                    v.

 EFRAIN VARGAS,                                                                           OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kings County. Michael J.
Reinhart, Judge.
         Hilda Scheib, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General,
Louis M. Vasquez and Jesica Y. Gonzalez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
                                       INTRODUCTION
          A jury convicted appellant Efrain Vargas of sexual penetration by force (Pen.
      1
Code, § 289, subd. (a)(1)(A), count 2); false imprisonment (§ 236, count 3); attempted
forcible rape (§§ 664, 261, subd. (a)(2), count 4); and resisting a peace officer (§ 148,
subd. (a)(1), count 5). The trial court sentenced Vargas to a term of eight years in state
prison.
          Vargas raises the following claims on appeal. First, the trial court failed to
properly instruct the jury on count 4. Second, there is insufficient evidence supporting
his conviction on count 4. Third, the trial court erred by failing to hold Vargas and his
codefendant jointly and severally liable for direct victim restitution. Acknowledging that
trial counsel did not challenge the restitution order below, Vargas contends that trial
counsel was constitutionally ineffective on this basis.
          Although the parties did not raise this issue, we have identified an error as to the
sentence imposed on count 4. We will therefore remand the matter back to the lower
court for a full resentencing. (See, People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.) At the
hearing, Vargas can raise his challenge to the direct victim restitution order. The
judgment of conviction is otherwise affirmed.
                                  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
          On March 17, 2022, the Kings County District Attorney filed an amended
information charging Vargas with assault with the intent to commit rape (§ 220, subd.
(a)(1), count 1); sexual penetration with a foreign object (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A), count 2);
false imprisonment by violence (§ 236, count 3); attempted forcible rape in concert/rape
by foreign object acting in concert (§§ 664/264.1, subd. (a), count 4); and resisting a

          1
         All undefined statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.

                                                2.
peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1), count 5). The information jointly charged Vargas’s
codefendant, Javier Vargas Ramirez, with counts 1, 3, and 4.
       On March 24, 2022, Ramirez entered an open plea of no contest to assault with
intent to commit rape (§ 220, subd. (a)(1), count 1), false imprisonment by violence
                                                                         2
(§ 236, count 3), and attempted rape in concert (§§ 664/264.1, count 4).
       On April 28, 2022, the jury found Vargas guilty on counts 2, 4, and 5, and found
him guilty of false imprisonment without violence on count 3. The trial court sentenced
him to a total term of eight years in state prison, and ordered him to pay $1,700 in direct
victim restitution.
       Vargas filed a timely notice of appeal.
                                 STATEMENT OF FACTS
       Vargas and Ramirez are brothers. Ramirez dated V.R. for approximately five
years before their relationship ended in 2016. They share two children together.
       On July 3, 2019, Ramirez texted V.R. and invited her to join him at a casino. V.R.
initially declined, but Ramirez kept insisting. V.R. agreed to go on the condition that it
would be just the two of them.
       At approximately 10:00 p.m., Ramirez picked V.R. up from her home. After
approximately five or 10 minutes of driving, V.R. noticed that Vargas was laying down
in the back seat.
       Vargas got up, sat right behind her, and began touching her, roughly. Vargas
touched V.R.’s breasts and thighs. He began whispering in V.R.’s ear, telling her that
“he liked [her] since [she] had gotten with his brother.”
       V.R. started crying and screaming, and repeatedly demanded that Ramirez let her
drive. Ramirez acted as if he did not hear V.R.; he laughed and continued driving.

       2
           Ramirez is not a party to this appeal.

                                              3.
      Twenty minutes after Ramirez picked V.R. up, he drove into an orchard and
parked. Vargas and Ramirez dragged V.R. out of the car and removed her clothes,
including her bra and underwear. V.R. screamed for help. Ramirez grabbed her by her
face and hit her bottom. He asked Vargas, “isn’t this what you have been wanting[?]”
      Fearing for her life, V.R. began praying out loud, asking God to help her. As he
laughed, Vargas told V.R. that “they already had [it] all … planned out.” He covered
V.R.’s mouth, stifling her screams.
      V.R. told Ramirez to think about their children. Ramirez was unmoved. At one
point, V.R. ran but Ramirez chased her and grabbed her by her hair and face. He covered
her mouth, hard.
      While Ramirez was holding V.R.’s face, Vargas kissed her, bit her breast and
back, and inserted his fingers into her vagina. Ramirez told Vargas to “go ahead” and
“do it.” V.R. cried and asked them to let her go. Neither Ramirez nor Vargas listened.
      At some point during the attack, Ramirez had taken V.R.’s phone from her and
tossed it. V.R. told Ramirez and Vargas that she needed to use the restroom so that they
would leave her alone. When they did, V.R. retrieved her phone and dialed 911. She
kept the line open and continued talking.
      V.R. ran into the car and locked the doors, but Ramirez used his keys to unlock the
door. He pulled V.R. out of the vehicle by her hair.3
      Law enforcement officers arrived shortly thereafter. Ramirez hid behind the car.
Vargas fled. Police officers found Vargas lying down on the ground in the orchard. He
was apprehended with the assistance of a police K-9 after he failed to comply with an
officer’s commands.

      3 V.R. stated that she was undressed twice during the attack. She could not recall
the circumstances or the manner in which she re-dressed herself.

                                            4.
       V.R. was taken to the hospital. She had bite marks on her breast, neck, and
          4
shoulder. V.R.’s hand was in pain because Ramirez twisted it when she attempted to
escape.
                                      DISCUSSION
I.     Alleged Instructional Error on Count 4
       Vargas claims that his conviction for attempted forcible rape on count 4 must be
reversed because the jury was not instructed on the elements of section 264.1, attempt to
commit forcible rape and rape by a foreign object acting in concert, the offense originally
charged in the amended information. We conclude that Vargas has failed to show
prejudicial error.
       A.     Background
       The first amended information charged Vargas and his codefendant Ramirez with
the following in count 4:

       “On or about July 3, 2019, in the County of Kings, State of California, the crime
       of Attempt to Commit Forcible Rape [Acting in Concert] And Rape By Foreign
       Object Acting In Concert in violation of PC664/PC264.1(a), a Felony, was
       committed in that JAVIER VARGAS RAMIREZ AND EFRAIN VARGAS did
       unlawfully and voluntarily acting with another person, personally and by aiding
       abetting the other person, commit an act described in Section 261, 262, and 289,
       by force and violence and against the will of the victim, to wit V.R.”
       Section 264.1, subdivision (a) provides the following: “when the defendant,
voluntarily acting in concert with another person, by force or violence and against the
will of the victim, committed an act described in Section 261 [rape] or 289 [penetration
with a foreign object], either personally or by aiding and abetting the other person, that
fact shall be charged in the indictment … and if found to be true by the jury, upon a jury
trial, … the defendant shall suffer confinement in the state prison for five, seven, or nine
years.”

       4 V.R. had bite marks on her neck before the attack occurred.

                                             5.
       Prior to the commencement of trial, the prosecutor initially requested jury
instructions on the principles of aiding and abetting (CALCRIM Nos. 400 & 401),
evidence of an uncharged conspiracy (CALCRIM No. 416), and as to count 4, attempted
sexual penetration in concert (CALCRIM No. 1046). With respect to count 4, trial
counsel requested jury instructions on attempt (CALCRIM No. 460) and rape in concert
(CALCRIM No. 1001).
       The final instruction packet, assembled by the trial court, omitted the instructions
identified above. Following an in-chambers discussion about the jury instructions, the
parties confirmed that no further instructions were being requested, and that the final
instruction packet contained all required instructions. Thus, the jury was not instructed
on the crimes of rape in concert, sexual penetration in concert, aiding and abetting, or
evidence of an uncharged conspiracy.
       As to count 4, the jury was instructed on the elements of attempted rape by force
in violation of section 261, subdivision (a)(2). (See CALCRIM Nos. 460A & 1000).
       It appears that once Ramirez entered his plea of no contest, the prosecutor sought
to prove Vargas’s guilt as to the charged offenses based upon his liability as a direct
perpetrator, rather than by aiding and abetting, evidence of an uncharged conspiracy, or
acting in concert with Ramirez.
       The verdict forms and April 28, 2022 minute order reflect that Vargas was found
guilty of attempted forcible rape (§§ 664/261, subd. (a)(2)) on count 4. Vargas was
sentenced to the “upper term [sentence] of 54 months,” or 4.5 years, on this count. The
sentence was stayed pursuant to section 654.
       B.     Relevant Legal Principles
       “A claim of instructional error is reviewed de novo. [Citation.] An appellate court
reviews the wording of a jury instruction de novo and assesses whether the instruction
accurately states the law. [Citation.] ... The challenged instruction is viewed ‘in the

                                             6.
context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a
reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.’ ”
(People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.)
       C.     Analysis
              1.       Vargas Has Not Shown Instructional Error
       Vargas contends the jury was never instructed on the offense charged in count four
of the amended information and that his conviction under section 264.1 must therefore be
reversed. Although there is a variance between count 4 as it is charged in the amended
information and the offense upon which the jury instructions were based, the variance
was not prejudicial.
       The record shows that Vargas was charged by amended information with
attempted forcible rape in concert/rape by foreign object acting in concert (§ 264.1, subd.
(a)). However, as to count 4, the jury was instructed only as to attempted forcible rape
(§ 261, subd. (a)(2)). This was the only offense included on the verdict form on count 4.
Thus, the jury found Vargas guilty of an attempted violation of section 261, subdivision
(a)(2), and not, as Vargas claims, a violation of section 264.1.
       The record does not explicitly show why the parties omitted attempted forcible
rape in concert/rape by a foreign object while acting in concert as a basis for criminal
liability. We surmise however that based upon the evidence adduced at trial and the fact
that Ramirez had resolved his case by plea, this was an intentional omission.
       At the time of Vargas’s trial, Ramirez’s guilt was a foregone conclusion. Prior to
the commencement of trial, Ramirez entered a plea of no contest to the crimes of assault
with the intent to commit rape (§ 220, subd. (a)(1), count 1), false imprisonment by
violence (§ 236, count 3), and attempted rape in concert (§§ 664/264.1, count 4). Thus,
the prosecutor did not need to prove that Vargas had acted in concert with Ramirez
during the commission of the attempted rape of V.R.

                                             7.
       Further, because evidence of Ramirez’s plea could cause prejudice to Vargas, the
trial court instructed the parties not to mention Ramirez’s plea, admission, or sentence to
the jury. Under the circumstances, the prosecutor likely elected to prove Vargas’s guilt
on count 4 based upon Vargas’s personal commission of the crime of attempted forcible
rape. This would also explain why, as Vargas observes, instructions on aiding and
abetting were requested in the prosecutor’s pretrial motions but were ultimately omitted
from the final instruction packet assembled by the trial court.
       Following our independent review of the record, the only error we have found is
that the amended information fails to reference the Penal Code section for the crime of
                                                                    5
attempted forcible rape, versus attempted forcible rape in concert. The amended
information was never amended to omit reference to attempted rape in concert or
penetration by a foreign object in concert.
       However, Vargas does not raise a due process challenge to the information on this
basis. Nor would the record support such a claim. Vargas clearly had adequate notice
that he was being charged with attempted forcible rape. The prosecutor merely elected
not to prove the “in concert” element of the offense and not to proceed on a theory of
rape by a foreign object. Based upon the forgoing, we reject Vargas’s claim of
instructional error.
              2.       Remand for Resentencing is Required
       Vargas was sentenced to the upper term of 54 months in state prison on count 4,
which amounts to 4.5 years. However, the upper term for a conviction for the attempted
forcible rape of a non-minor victim which did not result in great bodily injury
(§§ 664/261, subd. (a)(2)) is four years. (See, § 264, subd. (a) [the sentencing triad for

       5 The jury was instructed on lesser included offenses, including assault with the
intent to commit rape and simple assault. However, after clarifying the elements of the
crime of attempted forcible rape, it found Vargas guilty of the greater offense. Under the
circumstances, it is difficult to imagine how Vargas could have been prejudiced.

                                              8.
rape under section 261 is three, six, or eight years in prison]; § 664, subd. (a) [with the
exception of murder, attempted crimes are punishable “for one-half the term of
imprisonment prescribed upon conviction of the offense attempted”].)
       By imposing a prison sentence of 54 months on count 4, it appears that the trial
court was relying on the probation officer’s report which represented the applicable
sentencing triad as 30 months (2.5 years), 42 months (3.5 years), and 54 months (4.5
years). That is the sentencing triad for a conviction for attempted rape in concert.
(§§ 664/264.1, subd. (a)). As discussed, Vargas was not convicted of attempted rape in
concert. Thus, the trial court committed sentencing error.
       Based upon this error, we will remand this matter back to the lower court for a
new sentencing hearing. (See, People v. Massengale (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 689, 693
[“[w]hen a court pronounces a sentence which is unauthorized by the Penal Code, that
sentence must be vacated and a proper sentence imposed”].)
II.    The Evidence Supporting Vargas’s Conviction on Count 4
       Vargas further contends there is insufficient evidence supporting his conviction on
count 4 for attempted forcible rape. The record belies his assertion.
       A.     Relevant Legal Principles
       “When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘ “[t]he court must
review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine
whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible,
and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.] ‘Substantial evidence includes
circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that
evidence. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] We ‘ “ ‘presume in support of the judgment the
existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ ”
[Citation.]’ ” (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 942-943.)

                                              9.
       “In deciding the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court resolves neither
credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts. [Citation.] Resolution of conflicts and
inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact. [Citation.]
Moreover, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable,
testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction.” (People v.
Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.) Reversal is unwarranted “unless it appears ‘that
upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the
conviction].” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.)
       Vargas was convicted of attempted forcible rape on count 4. “ ‘Conviction of the
crime of attempted forcible rape requires proof the defendant formed the specific intent to
commit the crime of rape and performed a direct but ineffectual act, beyond mere
preparation, leading toward the commission of a rape.’ ” (People v. Letner and Tobin
(2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 162.)
       “A defendant’s specific intent to commit rape may be inferred from the facts and
circumstances shown by the evidence. [Citation.] As for the requisite act, the evidence
must establish that the defendant’s activities went ‘ “beyond mere preparation’ and that
they show the defendant was ‘putting his or her plan into action.” (People v. Clark,
supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 948.) “ ‘When, by reason of the defendant’s conduct, the situation
is “without any equivocality,” and it appears the design will be carried out if not
interrupted, the defendant’s conduct satisfies the test for an overt act.’ ” (Ibid.) “An
actual element of the offense … need not be proven.” (People v. Guerra (2006) 37
Cal.4th 1067, 1130, overruled in part on other grounds in People v. Rundle (2008) 43
Cal.4th 76, 151.)
       B.     Analysis
       The evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, supports the conclusion that Vargas’s actions went beyond “ ‘mere

                                             10.
preparation.’ ” (People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 948.) Vargas and Ramirez
clearly had an unspoken plan. Ramirez lured V.R. into his vehicle where Vargas was
lying down in the backseat. When Vargas began touching and kissing V.R., Ramirez said
nothing. He drove to an isolated location, parked, and he and Vargas pulled V.R. out of
the vehicle and removed her clothes.
        Both Ramirez and Vargas made statements supporting the conclusion that there
was a preconceived plan. Ramirez pushed V.R. into the vehicle and asked Vargas, “Isn’t
this what you have been wanting[?]” While V.R. pleaded with Ramirez to think about
their children, Vargas laughed and told V.R. that they had it all planned out.
        Although Vargas did not specify what specifically had been planned, his goal was
reasonably inferable from the fact that he had removed V.R.’s clothes, digitally
penetrated her, and fondled, kissed, and bit her. Vargas’s plan was thwarted solely due to
V.R.’s swift thinking and the timely reaction of law enforcement upon receiving her 911
call.
        Had V.R. not managed to call for help, we have no doubt that Vargas would have
forcibly raped her. Vargas’s assertions to the contrary are unpersuasive. We conclude
that substantial evidence supports his conviction for attempted forcible rape.
III.    The Restitution Order
        Finally, Vargas contends the trial court abused its discretion by making him liable
for the full amount of direct victim restitution. He contends that the trial court erred by
not imposing joint and several liability with Ramirez, his codefendant. Insofar as trial
counsel failed to object to the restitution order below, Vargas asserts that his attorney
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.
        Although trial counsel did not object to the restitution order, we exercise our
discretion to reach this issue. (People v. Young (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 451, 463 [fact that
a party may forfeit a right to present a claim does not mean the appellate court is deprived

                                              11.
of authority to reach the merits of the issue].) This matter is being remanded back to the
lower court for resentencing based upon the unauthorized sentence imposed on count 4.
On remand, we will direct the trial court to clarify the restitution order imposed below,
specifically, whether it intended to impose joint and several liability upon Vargas and
Ramirez.
       A.     Background
       The probation officer recommended that Vargas be ordered to pay $1,700 to the
California Victim Compensation Board. The report did not recommend that restitution
be imposed jointly and severally.
       During sentencing, the trial court ordered Vargas to pay $1,700 in victim
restitution to the Victim Compensation Board. The trial court did not expressly make
Vargas jointly and severally liable, nor does the abstract of judgment or the order for
victim restitution indicate joint and several liability as to the restitution amount ordered.
Based on the available record, it is not clear what Ramirez was ordered to pay as
compensation for direct victim restitution.
       B.     Relevant Legal Principles
       Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f) provides the following, in relevant part:
“[I]n every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the
defendant’s conduct, ... the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the
victim or victims.” Victim restitution is not only required by statute; it is mandatory
under the California Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(13)(A)-(B).)
       Section 1202.4, subdivision (f) “does not expressly authorize joint and several
liability restitution orders, neither does its provision prohibit such orders.” (People v.
Arnold (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1099.) Thus, the trial court has discretion to make
the obligation of multiple codefendants joint and several. (People v. Neely (2009) 176

                                              12.
Cal.App.4th 787, 800; People v. Madrana (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1049, 1051-
1052.)
         The benefit of holding codefendants jointly and severally liable for the full amount
of a crime victim’s economic loss is that it avoids the problem of double recovery.
(People v. Leon (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 620, 622 [“a court may impose liability on each
defendant to pay the full amount of the economic loss, as long as the victim does not
obtain a double recovery”].) A restitution order is intended to compensate the victim for
the actual loss, but it is not intended to provide the victim with recovery greater than that
amount. (People v. Chappelone (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1172; People v. Fortune
(2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 790, 795-796; see § 1202.4, subd. (f) [court shall require
defendant make restitution to victim in an amount based on the amount of loss claimed
by the victim or any other showing made to the court].)
         Here, the trial court ordered Vargas to reimburse the California Victim
Compensation Board for a $1,700 payment made to V.R. from the restitution fund for
relocation expenses. The record contains no indication of what amount Ramirez was
ordered to pay, if any, at his sentencing hearing. Because Vargas was not held jointly
and severally liable, it is possible that direct victim restitution may potentially be paid
twice—once by Ramirez and once by Vargas. However, because the available record
contains insufficient information to permit us from making a conclusive determination on
this point, no abuse of discretion has been shown.
         On remand for Vargas’s resentencing hearing, we will direct the trial court to
clarify whether Vargas is solely responsible or jointly and severally liable for the $1,700
victim restitution award. If the trial court intended to impose joint and several liability
for the award, it must correct the order for victim restitution and the abstract of judgment.

                                              13.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The judgment of conviction is affirmed. The sentence is vacated and the matter is
remanded back to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing. On remand, the trial court
shall clarify whether it intended to impose joint and several liability on the direct victim
restitution award.

                                                                                   SMITH, J.

WE CONCUR:

HILL, P. J.

DE SANTOS, J.

                                             14.