Court Opinion

ID: 9543984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:51:04.447337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:40.721221
License: Public Domain

Utter, J.
(dissenting) — I must dissent, inasmuch as I can not agree that the trial court’s brief recitation complies with the requirements of RCW 7.21.050. The statute requires the judge to certify that he saw or heard the contempt. RCW 7.21.050(1). As noted by the majority, the only writing which might constitute the judge’s certification is the order, which recites Appellant’s "failure to respond to questions propounded during trial in this cause”.
There is no express certification that the contempt was seen or heard by the judge. The only fact set forth in the order is the failure to respond to questions asked during trial. While it might be inferred that a refusal to answer questions would necessarily be in the court’s presence, In re Stewart, 121 Wash. 429, 209 P. 849 (1922) does not support that the recitation here was sufficient. In Stewart, the court in dicta addresses sufficiency of effectual recitation in an order of contempt under the statute requiring that facts be set forth in the contempt order. There a witness claimed the privilege not to answer on the grounds of self-incrimination. The court in dicta said the recitation of facts that the witness refused to answer questions propounded to her when directed to do so by the court was sufficient. In addition to that discussion being dicta, the degree of detail in the order in Stewart is greater than here. For example, the present order does not say that the refusal followed the judge’s direction to answer, as it did in Stewart.
In State v. Buddress, 63 Wash. 26, 114 P. 879 (1911), the court stated that, "the orderly administration of justice makes it indispensable that the facts found by the court shall be conclusive in a judgment for contempt committed in the presence of the court. If the facts found show jurisdic*305tion and are sufficient in law to constitute contempt, further inquiry is foreclosed.” Buddress, 63 Wash. at 34.
RCW 7.21.050(1) clearly states the facts must appear in the order. Inasmuch as the order did not say that refusal followed the judge’s direction to answer, I believe it does not clearly show that Appellant’s refusal to answer was without authority of law, and therefore contempt under RCW 7.21.010(l)(c). These requirements are not onerous and should be strictly complied with.
Having concluded that the court failed to comply with the summary sanction statute, the question must still be answered whether the contempt order is justified under the court’s inherent powers as a constitutional court. I believe it is not. The rule is established that a court cannot resort to inherent power to punish or remedy contempt unless the statutory remedies are inadequate in a particular case. State ex rel. Herron v. Browet, Inc., 103 Wn.2d 215, 218, 691 P.2d 571 (1984). Had the statute been properly followed, the remedy provided would have been adequate for this particular case. Therefore, exercise of the court’s inherent power would not lie.
For these reasons, I would reverse the sentence of contempt.
Johnson, J., concurs with Utter, J.