Court Opinion

ID: 9907391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 15:02:54.105856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:02:54.285538
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                       SECOND DISTRICT

                                M.D.M.,

                               Appellant,

                                   v.

                          STATE OF FLORIDA,

                                Appellee.

                             No. 2D22-3945

                           December 6, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Kim Brennan,
Judge.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Caroline Joan S. Picart,
Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and William C. Shelhart,
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

KHOUZAM, Judge.
     We affirm the order on appeal, which finds M.D.M., a juvenile,
guilty of possession of a weapon on school property and trespass on
school property with a weapon. We write to discuss M.D.M.'s contention
that the trial court erroneously admitted hearsay testimony, without
which the evidence would have been insufficient to establish that he
possessed a deadly weapon. Although we agree with M.D.M. that the
challenged statement should not have been admitted, we hold that, in
the context of this case, the error was harmless as a matter of law.
                             BACKGROUND
     With respect to the two counts relevant to this appeal,1 a petition
for delinquency alleged that M.D.M had committed one count of
possession of a weapon on school property, in violation of section
790.115(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2022), and one count of trespass on
school property with a weapon, in violation of section 810.095, Florida
Statutes (2022).
     At the bench trial, a high school student testified that he knew
M.D.M. because they had played football together at school. The witness
testified that M.D.M. had previously told him that M.D.M. "had got
kicked out of school, and that he no longer went to" their high school.
The witness clarified that by "kicked out," he meant "expelled." M.D.M.
told the witness he was attending "another educational system."
     The witness testified that in August 2022 at the high school,
M.D.M. approached him when he was alone in a bathroom. M.D.M.
asked the witness if he wanted to buy "a gun" or knew someone who did.
The witness declined the offer but asked to see the "gun." M.D.M.
complied and showed the witness the back half of what appeared to be a
handgun in M.D.M.'s bookbag.
     After the bathroom encounter ended, the witness reported it to the
school office. The school was locked down and, following a chase, law
enforcement apprehended M.D.M. During the chase, M.D.M. had thrown

     1 Although M.D.M. was also charged with disrupting a school

campus or function, he was found not guilty of that charge.

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an object over a railing. The object was soon located and determined to
be the "gun" that M.D.M. had attempted to sell the witness.
     In fact, the "gun" was not a firearm; it was a BB gun that looked
like a firearm. None of the officers who testified at the bench trial were
very familiar with or used BB guns. But they knew from their experience
with actual firearms that this was merely a BB gun.
     Although there was no dispute below that the BB gun was found
loaded with BBs, a major dispute arose about whether or not it was
found with a CO2 cartridge, which would provide the propulsion
mechanism to fire the BBs. No officer who testified saw any cartridge.
Neither is a cartridge depicted in any of the photographs of the BB gun in
the record nor mentioned in the criminal report affidavit.
     The officer who authenticated photographs of the BB gun testified
they were taken by Deputy Lupco. But when Deputy Lupco was on the
stand himself, he gave conflicting testimony about who took those
photographs. Although Deputy Lupco initially testified unequivocally
that he took the photographs, when the issue was later explored further,
he denied taking one of them. He did not reconcile the testimony.
     Deputy Lupco testified that a BB gun can be a dangerous weapon if
it is loaded, has a CO2 cartridge, and is fired into someone's eye. The
State then asked: "Now you said a CO2 cartridge. Is that the same
cartridge that was found in this gun?" He answered "Yes, ma'am."
     On cross, Deputy Lupco admitted that he "didn't personally
inspect" the BB gun. Regarding a CO2 cartridge, Deputy Lupco testified:
"I didn't personally see one. I was told that it did have a CO2."
     Over objection, Deputy Lupco testified that another officer named
"Deputy Steward" stated while inspecting the BB gun "that it had the
CO2 cartridge along with BB rounds." No further information was

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provided about this inspection, such as when or how it occurred. Nor
was any information provided about Deputy Steward, such as his full
name or his experience with BB guns. Deputy Steward did not testify.
     A motion for judgment of dismissal was denied as to the two counts
for which M.D.M. was found guilty. This appeal followed.
                                ANALYSIS
     M.D.M. challenges as hearsay the introduction of the testimony
that the BB gun had a CO2 cartridge and claims that, without this
improper testimony, the State failed to establish that the BB gun
qualified as a deadly weapon. The State responds that the testimony was
properly admitted under the spontaneous statement exception to the
hearsay rule or, alternatively, that any error was harmless.
     We hold that the challenged statement was inadmissible hearsay,
not admissible under the spontaneous statement exception. However,
we also conclude that this error was harmless because, even without the
hearsay, the State independently established with other evidence that the
BB gun qualified as a deadly weapon under Florida law.
     Hearsay Testimony
     A trial court's ruling admitting evidence is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion, which discretion is limited by the rules of evidence. See, e.g.,
Padgett v. State, 73 So. 3d 902, 904 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). The separate
question of whether a statement is hearsay is reviewed de novo. Id.
     Under section 90.801(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2022), "hearsay" is "a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted." It is inadmissible, except as provided by statute. § 90.802.
     To that end, "[t]he provision of s. 90.802 to the contrary
notwithstanding," section 90.803 sets forth many hearsay exceptions,

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which "are not inadmissible as evidence, even though the declarant is
available as a witness." The first such exception reads:
           (1) Spontaneous statement.--A spontaneous statement
     describing or explaining an event or condition made while the
     declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or
     immediately thereafter, except when such statement is made
     under circumstances that indicate its lack of trustworthiness.
     Until 2008, this exception required the declarant "to be laboring
under the influence of a startling event at the time that the statement is
made." Deparvine v. State, 995 So. 2d 351, 369 (Fla. 2008) (quoting
Hutchinson v. State, 882 So. 2d 943, 951 (Fla. 2004)). But that
requirement was ultimately lifted as being "contrary to the underlying
principles embodied in section 90.803(1)." Id. (abrogating Hutchinson).
     Under current Florida law, the spontaneous statement exception
requires that the statement be made not only contemporaneously, but
also spontaneously, or "without the declarant first engaging in reflective
thought." Id. (quoting Ibar v. State, 938 So. 2d 451, 467 (Fla. 2006)). In
Deparvine, see id., the supreme court cited favorably to J.M. v. State, 665
So. 2d 1135, 1137 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), where the Fifth District
explained:
            While the language in the statutory exception
     specifically includes the requirement that the purported
     spontaneous statements be made while the declarant
     perceives the event or condition, or immediately thereafter,
     contemporaneity is not the only requirement, but instead, the
     statement must also, of course, be spontaneous; that is, the
     statement must be made without the declarant first engaging
     in reflective thought.
(Emphasis added.) Borrowing language from Professor Ehrhardt, the
Fifth District clarified that "the spontaneity of the statement negatives
the likelihood of conscious misrepresentation by the declarant and
provides the necessary circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness to

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justify the introduction of the evidence." Id. (quoting Charles W.
Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence, § 803.1, at 612 (1995)).
     In J.M., the statement at issue was witness McAllister's
identification of the defendant in response to police questioning. Id. at
1136-37. In concluding that the "statement of identification does not fall
within the definition of a spontaneous statement," the Fifth District
reasoned as follows:
     In this regard, the trial evidence established that, by the time
     McAllister made the statement implicating the defendant, he
     had been approached by a uniformed police officer who
     questioned him; he had admitted to committing a crime; and
     he had moved about in his wheelchair as if to assist the
     officer in recovering the cocaine. These events enabled
     McAllister to engage in the very type of reflective thought that
     is inconsistent with aspects of reliability upon which the
     spontaneous statement exception is founded. Accordingly,
     McAllister's statement should not have been admitted into
     evidence during the defendant's trial.
Id. at 1137 (emphasis added).
     Thus, the spontaneity requirement is more than merely temporal,
focusing also on the absence of reflective thought. Cf. Monfiston v. State,
924 So. 2d 61, 64 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (reasoning in analyzing related
exception for excited utterances that, despite the witness's "nervous
excitement, . . . under the circumstances it is hard to conclude that the
statement was made before there was time for reflective thought" where
"[a]n investigation of the crime had already commenced [and] the officer
was seeking out information and interrogating witnesses").
     Here, the statement at issue was made by one officer to another,
after the defendant was in custody, while inspecting evidence for the
purpose of preserving it and investigating a crime. Specifically, it was a
description of a static condition of a BB gun in police possession:
whether it included a CO2 cartridge that would enable it to shoot BBs.

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On this record, we cannot "conclude that the statement was made before
there was time for reflective thought." Monfiston, 924 So. 2d at 64.
     Whereas the State focuses on the contemporaneity of the
statement, at no point has it persuasively explained how the statement
also meets the separate requirement of spontaneity. Nor has the State
attempted to distinguish this particular statement from any other
statement officers might make to one another while inspecting evidence
in their possession after the defendant is apprehended.
     Not only would the State's broad interpretation of the spontaneous
statement exception effectively swallow the rule, but also, the type of
routine post-arrest evidentiary inspection described here—which was not
alleged to have involved any exigency or safety concerns—appears to
involve "the very type of reflective thought that is inconsistent with
aspects of reliability upon which the spontaneous statement exception is
founded." J.M., 665 So. 2d at 1137. Accordingly, Deputy Lupco's
testimony about what he overheard Deputy Steward say about the BB
gun was inadmissible hearsay.
     Harmless Error
     Under the harmless error test, the State is required, "as the
beneficiary of the error, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict or, alternatively
stated, that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed
to the conviction." State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (Fla. 1986).
     Here, the improper hearsay went to the issue of whether the BB
gun qualified as a deadly weapon under Florida law. But there was other
properly admitted evidence that independently established the same
point. So the erroneous admission was harmless in the context of the
case. See id. (explaining that the harmless error test "requires an

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examination of the entire record by the appellate court including a close
examination of the permissible evidence on which the jury could have
legitimately relied" (emphasis added)).
     The 2022 versions of both statutes cited in Counts I and II
specifically addressed weapons "as defined in s. 790.001(13)." §§
790.115(2)(b); 810.095(1). In turn, that statute defined "Weapon" as "any
dirk, knife, metallic knuckles, slungshot, billie, tear gas gun, chemical
weapon or device, or other deadly weapon except a firearm or a common
pocketknife, plastic knife, or blunt-bladed table knife." § 790.001(13)
(emphasis added).
     Here, it is undisputed that the BB gun at issue does not qualify as
a firearm or any of the other items specifically identified in the 2022
version of section 790.001(13). Thus, in order to violate either statute
the BB gun must have qualified as a "deadly weapon."
     On that issue, the Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly and
unequivocally "held that whether a BB gun—loaded or unloaded—is a
deadly weapon is a jury question." Mitchell v. State, 703 So. 2d 1062,
1062 (Fla. 1997) (citing Dale v. State, 703 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 1997)). And
with respect to the BB gun's operability, the supreme court has also
specified that "[t]he fact that the gun was recovered without BBs, pellets,
or gas cartridge is not dispositive." Dale, 703 So. 2d at 1047.
     More recently, in another juvenile appeal, this court canvassed
Florida law addressing "[w]hether a particular BB gun qualifies as a
deadly weapon under section 790.001(13)." C.W. v. State, 205 So. 3d
843, 845 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016). We observed that "[i]n the cases where
Florida courts have determined that a BB gun qualifies as a deadly
weapon, there has been evidence that the particular BB gun was capable

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of causing great bodily harm or that the gun was used in a manner likely
to result in great bodily harm." Id. at 844 (collecting cases).
      One such case was the supreme court's decision in Mitchell
approving this court's "holding that a BB gun was a deadly weapon when
the defendant implied through his words and actions that the BB gun
was loaded and operable." C.W., 205 So. 2d at 844 (citing Mitchell v.
State, 698 So. 2d 555, 562 (Fla. 2d DCA), approved, 703 So. 2d at 1062
(Fla. 1997)). Ultimately in C.W., we reversed a finding that a BB gun was
a deadly weapon because "the State presented no evidence that the BB
gun was loaded or operable or that C.W. implied or otherwise
represented that the BB gun was operable, loaded, or capable of inflicting
death or great bodily injury through his actions." Id. at 845 (emphasis
added); see also Gartner v. State, 118 So. 3d 273, 277 (Fla. 5th DCA
2013) ("A jury can conclude that a [BB gun] is either dangerous or deadly
if it is implied by the defendant's words or actions.").
      Here, although there is no dispute that the BB gun was found with
pellets in it and was thus "loaded," there was no admissible evidence that
it also had a CO2 cartridge necessary to shoot them. But the lack of a
cartridge is not dispositive, and there was evidence that M.D.M. implied
that the BB gun was operable by attempting to sell it. There was no
evidence that in doing so, M.D.M. suggested that it was inoperable or
that it needed repair or additional parts in order to work.
      Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, see, e.g., T.A.K. v.
State, 258 So. 3d 559, 561 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018), M.D.M.'s advertising the
BB gun for sale as "a gun" without mentioning any operability problems
constituted at least an implication that it was operable. Indeed, in
denying the motion for judgment of dismissal, the trial court expressly
relied on the fact that "the gun was being marketed as operational,"

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which was sufficient in the context of this case to establish its deadly-
weapon status even absent admissible evidence of a CO2 cartridge.
     At bottom, even though the trial court erred in admitting the
hearsay statement, the error was harmless as a matter of law in the
particular context of this case. Accordingly, we affirm.
     Affirmed.

LUCAS and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.

                       __________________________

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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