Court Opinion

ID: 9845766
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:27:58.683963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:21.386339
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting.
I must dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which holds that Mrs. Evans § 1983 action does not survive her death. The majority states that “this case is controlled by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Robertson [v. Wegmann] case, and ‘the fact that a particular action might abate surely would not adversely affect § 1983’s rule in preventing official illegality____’” Op. at 218, 796 P.2d at 95 (1990). Unfortunately, the majority has taken this quote from Robertson completely out of context. The result is that the majority’s holding is skewed one-hundred eighty degrees in the wrong direction. In Robertson the United States Supreme Court held:
Despite the broad sweep of § 1983, we can find nothing in the statute or its underlying policies to indicate that a state law causing abatement of a particular action should invariably be ignored in favor of a rule of absolute survivor-ship. The policies underlying § 1983 include compensation of persons injured by deprivation of federal rights and prevention of abuses of power by those acting under color of state law____ No claim is made here that Louisiana’s survivorship laws are in general inconsistent with these policies, and indeed most Louisi*221ana actions survive the plaintiffs death. See La.Code Civ.Proc.Ann., Art. 428 (West 1960); La.Civ.Code Ann., Art. 2315 (West 1971). Moreover, certain types of actions that would abate automatically on the plaintiffs death in many States — for example, actions for defamation and malicious prosecution — would apparently survive in Louisiana. In actions other than those for damage to property however, Louisiana does not allow the deceased’s personal representative to be substituted as plaintiff; rather, the action survives only in favor of a spouse, children, parents, or siblings____ But surely few persons are not survived by one of these close relatives, and in any event no contention is made here that Louisiana’s decision to restrict certain survivorship rights in this manner is an unreasonable one.
It is therefore difficult to see how any of § 1983’s policies would be undermined if Shaw’s action were to abate. The goal of compensating those injured by a deprivation of rights provides no basis for requiring compensation of one who is merely suing as the executor of the deceased’s estate. And, given that most Louisiana actions survive the plaintiffs death, the fact that a particular action might abate surely would not adversely affect § 1983’s role in preventing official illegality, at least in situations in which there is no claim that the illegality caused the plaintiff’s death. A state official contemplating illegal activities must always be prepared to face the prospect of a § 1983 action being filed against him. In light of this prospect, even an official aware of the intricacies of Louisiana survivorship law would hardly be influenced in his behavior by its provisions.
It is true that § 1983 provides ‘a uniquely federal remedy against incursions under the claimed authority of state law upon rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the Nation.’ Mitchum v. Foster, supra, 407 U.S. [225] at 239, 92 S.Ct. [2151] at 2160 [32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972) ]. That a federal remedy should be available, however, does not mean that a § 1983 plaintiff (or his representative) must be allowed to continue an action in disregard of the state law to which § 1988 refers us. A state statute cannot be considered ‘inconsistent’ with federal law merely because the statute causes the plaintiff to lose the litigation. If success of the § 1983 action were the only benchmark, there would be no reason at all to look to state law, for the appropriate rule would then always be the one favoring the plaintiff, and its source would be essentially irrelevant. But § 1988 quite clearly instructs us to refer to state statutes; it does not say that state law is to be accepted or rejected based solely on which side is advantaged thereby. Under the circumstances presented here, the fact that Shaw was not survived by one of several close relatives should not itself be sufficient to cause the Louisiana survivorship provisions to be deemed ‘inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.’ 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
Our holding today is a narrow one, limited to situations in which no claim is made that state law generally is inhospitable to survival of § 1983 actions and in which the particular application of state survivorship law, while it may cause abatement of the action, has no independent adverse effect on the policies underlying § 1983. A different situation might well be presented, as the District Court noted, if state law ‘did not provide for survival of any tort actions’[Skaw v. Garrison], 391 F.Supp. [1353], at 1363 [ (E.D.La.1975) ], or if it significantly restricted the types of actions that survive____ We intimate no view, moreover, about whether abatement based on state law could be allowed in a situation in which deprivation of federal rights caused death____
Here it is agreed that Shaw’s death was not caused by the deprivation of rights for which he sued under § 1983, and Louisiana law provides for the survival of most tort actions. Respondent’s only complaint about Louisiana law is that it would cause Shaw’s action to abate. We conclude that the mere fact of abatement of a particular lawsuit is *222not sufficient ground to declare state law ‘inconsistent’ with federal law.
Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590-95, 98 S.Ct. 1991, 1995-97, 56 L.Ed.2d 554 (1978) (emphasis added) (footnotes and citations omitted).
The case before this Court is precisely the kind of “different situation” which the Supreme Court indicated would yield a different result than that reached in Robertson. As the majority has clearly stated, the general rule in Idaho is that actions personal to an individual do not survive that individual’s death. And, states the majority, violations of constitutional rights for which compensation is sought under § 1983 are personal actions. It is therefore eminently reasonable to state that Idaho law has “significantly restricted the types of actions that survive.” Robertson, 436 U.S. at 594, 98 S.Ct. at 1997. The rationales which were offered by the Robertson Court to justify its “narrow” holding were based on the liberality of Louisiana’s survivorship statutes. Those rationales simply do not apply in Idaho, where the harsh and unforgiving rule of the common law regarding survival of actions still prevails. It is quite likely that the United States Supreme Court would find that Mrs. Evans’ § 1983 action should survive her death. This Court should have the jurisprudential foresight to rule likewise.