Court Opinion

ID: 9385606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-07 16:00:38.118178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:03.343383
License: Public Domain

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                                                        [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                        In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                           For the Eleventh Circuit

                            ____________________

                                   No. 22-11056
                             Non-Argument Calendar
                            ____________________

        RICHARD JOHN LUCIBELLA,
                                                           Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        TOWN OF OCEAN RIDGE,

                                                                  Defendant,

        RICHARD ERMERI,
        Officer,
        NUBIA PLESNIK,
        Officer, a.k.a. Nubia Savino,
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11056

                                                     Defendants-Appellants.

                             ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Florida
                      D.C. Docket No. 9:20-cv-82156-AMC
                            ____________________

        Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               After an altercation between Plaintiff Richard Lucibella and
        a couple of Ocean Ridge, Florida, police officers, Lucibella sued
        under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officers violated his Fourth
        Amendment rights. A district court denied Officer Richard Ermeri
        and Officer Nubia Plesnik’s motion for summary judgment. The
        officers now appeal, arguing that the district court erred by denying
        them qualified immunity on Lucibella’s unreasonable search and
        excessive force claims. Because we agree that Officers Ermeri and
        Plesnik are not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the
        proceedings, we affirm.
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        22-11056                  Opinion of the Court                               3

                                      I.      Background
                   a. Factual Background 1
               On October 22, 2016, Lucibella and Steven Wohlfiel, an off-
        duty lieutenant for the Ocean Ridge Police Department, met at
        Lucibella’s house to socialize. After attending a cocktail party at a
        neighbor’s house, Lucibella and Wohlfiel returned to Lucibella’s
        house and sat on Lucibella’s backyard patio with alcoholic
        beverages. While sitting and discussing “family issues,” Wohlfiel
        suddenly fired his handgun five times into the ground around ten
        to twelve feet in front of him. Wohlfiel then placed the firearm on
        a table, and Lucibella picked up the firearm and put it on his lap.
               Soon thereafter, the Ocean Ridge Police Department
        received a 911 call reporting shots in the area. Officer Ermeri
        responded to the call. Unsure of the gunshots’ origin, he spoke to
        a group of people walking in the area, who directed him to the area

        1 At the summary judgment stage, “we view all evidence and factual
        inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party—here,
        [Lucibella]—and we resolve all issues of material fact in [Lucibella’s] favor.”
        Perez v. Suszczynski, 809 F.3d 1213, 1217 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted);
        see also Cantu v. City of Dothan, Ala., 974 F.3d 1217, 1228 (11th Cir. 2020)
        (“When considering a motion for summary judgment, including one asserting
        qualified immunity, courts must construe the facts and draw all inferences in
        the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and when conflicts arise
        between the facts evidenced by the parties, [they must] credit the nonmoving
        party’s version.” (quotations omitted)). Thus, although the facts are hotly
        disputed, the record supports the following factual account when viewed in
        the light most favorable to Lucibella.
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        4                         Opinion of the Court                     22-11056

        of Lucibella’s and his neighbor’s homes. Officer Ermeri first
        investigated the house next to Lucibella’s but left after he observed
        that the situation appeared normal. Sergeant William Hallahan,
        who also responded to the 911 call, joined Officer Ermeri, and the
        two officers approached Lucibella’s backyard, looked through the
        wrought iron gate, and saw Lucibella and Wohlfiel sitting on the
        patio. 2 The patio area was dark with no outside lighting. Officer
        Plesnik, another responder, met Sergeant Hallahan and Officer
        Ermeri outside the gate but left two or three seconds later. Officer
        Plesnik left because she knew Lucibella and Wohlfiel and “thought
        at the time [that the officers were] wasting [their] time.” Officer
        Ermeri asked if Lucibella and Wohlfiel had heard any gunfire, and
        Wohlfiel responded: “get the fuck out of here.” Sergeant Hallahan
        took that response to mean that “they didn’t see anything” and,
        because he “didn’t see anything out of the ordinary,” Hallahan left
        too. Officer Ermeri, however, entered Lucibella’s backyard
        through the gate without a warrant and without permission.
               As Officer Ermeri approached the men, he saw shell casings
        on the ground and told Lucibella that he saw Lucibella sitting on a
        firearm. Officer Ermeri radioed Sergeant Hallahan and told him

        2 Lucibella’s backyard was surrounded by tall hedges and a five-foot concrete
        wall and was accessible through a short, wrought iron gate. Officer Ermeri
        recognized Lucibella from prior, friendly interactions and knew that Lucibella
        was the town commissioner. Although Officer Ermeri knew Wohlfiel as a
        superior officer with the Ocean Ridge Police Department, he did not
        recognize Wohlfiel until he entered the backyard and approached the men.
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        22-11056                Opinion of the Court                           5

        that he located the weapon, and Sergeant Hallahan and Officer
        Plesnik reported to Lucibella’s backyard. 3 Officer Ermeri asked
        Lucibella about the firearm, and Lucibella gave it to Officer Ermeri
        without resistance. Lucibella also emptied his pockets and told
        Officer Ermeri that he did not want to speak with him and asked
        him to “get off [his] property.”
               Sergeant Hallahan informed Lucibella and Wohlfiel that
        they were investigating a report of gunshots in the area. Lucibella
        did not respond to Sergeant Hallahan, and Wohlfiel stated: “we
        don’t have to say anything.” Sergeant Hallahan then stepped away
        from the situation and called the police chief. The police chief
        stated that there was no cause to arrest anyone and—considering
        that neither Lucibella nor Wohlfiel would talk to them—advised
        the officers to leave Lucibella’s home and take the gun and the
        casings back to the department to do a report and reevaluate the
        situation.
               During this time, Lucibella wanted to go into his house to
        retrieve a drink. Officer Ermeri blocked Lucibella’s path to the
        door, so Lucibella asked his significant other, Barbara Ceuleers,
        who was in the doorway, to get him a drink. Ceuleers maintains
        that Officer Plesnik permitted her to get Lucibella a drink. When
        she returned with the drink, although Officer Ermeri told Ceuleers

        3 When Officer Plesnik heard Officer Ermeri ask Sergeant Hallahan to come
        to the backyard over the radio, she went as well.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11056

        not to hand Lucibella the drink, Lucibella and others heard Officer
        Plesnik say “[l]et him have a drink.”
               When Lucibella attempted to retrieve the drink, Officer
        Ermeri pushed him away. In an angry response, Lucibella poked
        Officer Ermeri’s chest two or three times and said, “[t]ake your F-
        ing hands off me.” Then, as Lucibella reached for the drink again,
        Officer Ermeri grabbed each of Lucibella’s arms and performed a
        “botched leg sweep,” causing Lucibella to fall face first into the
        marble floor, which he alleges rendered him unconscious, broke
        his glasses, and caused bleeding, swelling, the blackening of his left
        eye socket, and a laceration above his eyebrow.
              Once Lucibella was on the ground, Officer Plesnik
        performed a “knee drop,” asserting her full weight onto Lucibella’s
        back, which he alleges broke three of his ribs and rendered him
        bedridden.
               After Lucibella was handcuffed, he refused to follow Officer
        Ermeri’s instructions and called him names. Eventually, Officer
        Plesnik escorted Lucibella to a patrol vehicle to be transported to
        the Ocean Ridge Police Department.
                  b. Procedural History
               In response to the altercation, Lucibella was charged with
        (1) battery on a law enforcement officer (a felony); (2) resisting
        arrest with violence (a felony); and (3) using a firearm while under
        the influence of alcoholic beverage (a misdemeanor). The
        prosecutor later dismissed the charge for using a firearm while
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        22-11056                  Opinion of the Court                              7

        under the influence. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on
        the remaining two felony charges but found Lucibella guilty of a
        lesser included offense—misdemeanor battery on Officer Ermeri.
        Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed Lucibella’s
        conviction.
               Lucibella then filed a civil complaint against Officer Ermeri
        and Officer Plesnik under § 1983. 4 Officers Ermeri and Plesnik
        jointly moved for summary judgment on Lucibella’s claims for
        excessive force and unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth
        Amendment based on qualified immunity. The district court
        denied the officers’ motion for summary judgment as to both
        claims.
                                 II.     Standard of Review
              We review de novo the district court’s denial of summary
        judgment and determination that Officers Ermeri and Plesnik are
        not entitled to qualified immunity. Perez v. Suszczynski, 809 F.3d
        1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 2016). And, as mentioned above, “[w]e

        4 Lucibella’s nine-count complaint, which was filed in state court, also named
        the Town of Ocean Ridge as a defendant. After the Town of Ocean Ridge
        removed the case to federal court, Defendants moved to dismiss seven of the
        claims in Lucibella’s amended complaint, and the district court dismissed six
        of the claims with prejudice. The parties then filed a joint stipulation
        dismissing another claim, meaning that only Count II (excessive force in
        violation of the Fourth Amendment against Officers Ermeri and Plesnik) and
        Count VII (unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment against
        Officers Ermeri and Plesnik) remained.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                22-11056

        review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.”
        Wade v. United States, 13 F.4th 1217, 1223 (11th Cir. 2021).
        “Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the movant shows that there
        is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
        entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
        P. 56(a)).
               Accordingly, the legal question of whether Officers Ermeri
        and Plesnik are entitled to qualified immunity must be determined
        under Lucibella’s version of facts as the non-movant. Perez, 809
        F.3d at 1218. “We must review the evidence in this manner
        because the issues appealed here concern not which facts the
        parties might be able to prove, but, rather, whether or not certain
        given facts showed a violation of clearly established law.” Id. at
        1217 (quotation omitted). Indeed, “what are considered the ‘facts’
        may not turn out to be the ‘actual’ facts if the case goes to trial;
        rather, they are the ‘facts’ at this stage of the proceedings.” Id.
                                   III.   Discussion
                “Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, ‘government
        officials performing discretionary functions[] generally are shielded
        from liability [or suit] for civil damages insofar as their conduct
        does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
        rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Wade,
        13 F.4th at 1225 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
        (1982)). Here, the parties do not dispute that Officers Ermeri and
        Plesnik were performing a job-related function and acting in their
        discretionary authority during the October 22, 2016, events.
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        22-11056                Opinion of the Court                         9

        Accordingly, the burden shifted to Lucibella to establish that the
        officers were not entitled to qualified immunity by showing that
        (1) taken in the light most favorable to Lucibella, the facts show
        “that [the officers] violated a constitutional right and (2) that the
        right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.”
        Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th Cir. 2019).
               Under the clearly established prong, “the dispositive
        question is whether the law at the time of the challenged conduct
        gave the government official fair warning that his conduct was
        unconstitutional.” Wade, 13 F.4th at 1225. “Thus, we consider
        what an objectively reasonable official must have known at the
        pertinent time and place and ask whether it would be clear to a
        reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation
        [he] confronted.” Id. at 1226 (quotations omitted).
               A plaintiff may show that the law was clearly established in
        three ways. Patel v. City of Madison, Ala., 959 F.3d 1330, 1343
        (11th Cir. 2020). First, a plaintiff can point “to a materially similar
        case [that] has already been decided.” Echols v. Lawton, 913 F.3d
        1313, 1324 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation omitted). “Second, if the
        plaintiff cannot find a materially similar factual case from the
        Supreme Court, our Court, or, in this case, the Supreme Court of
        [Florida], a plaintiff can show that a broader, clearly established
        principle should control the novel facts in this situation.” Patel, 959
        F.3d at 1343 (quotation omitted). This broader principle “must
        establish with ‘obvious clarity’ that ‘in the light of pre-existing law
        the unlawfulness [of the official’s conduct is] apparent.’” Echols,
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11056

        913 F.3d at 1324 (quoting Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1353
        (11th Cir. 2002)). “Third, a plaintiff may rely on the obvious clarity
        path, which applies when the official’s conduct lies so obviously at
        the very core of what the Fourth Amendment prohibits that the
        unlawfulness of the conduct was readily apparent to the official,
        notwithstanding the lack of caselaw.” Patel, 959 F.3d at 1343
        (quotations omitted).
                  a. The officers are not entitled to qualified immunity
                     on Lucibella’s unreasonable search claim
                         i. Officers Ermeri and Plesnik violated
                            Lucibella’s Fourth Amendment rights by
                            executing an unreasonable search
               Beginning with Lucibella’s unreasonable search claim,
        Officers Ermeri and Plesnik argue that their entry and search of
        Lucibella’s curtilage was justified, and therefore lawful, because
        exigent circumstances existed. The officers maintain that they
        “had an objectively reasonable basis for believing that medical
        assistance was needed, that persons were in danger, or both when
        they entered [Lucibella’s] back[]yard.” We disagree.
               “[W]hen it comes to the Fourth Amendment, the home is
        first among equals.” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013). “At
        the Amendment’s ‘very core’” is the right of a person “to retreat
        into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
        governmental intrusion.” Id. (quotation omitted). This protection
        extends to a home’s “curtilage,” which is “the area immediately
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        22-11056               Opinion of the Court                      11

        surrounding and associated with the home.”          Id. (quotation
        omitted).
               Warrantless searches of a home’s curtilage are
        presumptively unreasonable. United States v. Walker, 799 F.3d
        1361, 1363 (11th Cir. 2015). This general rule is “subject only to a
        few jealously and carefully drawn exceptions.” McClish v. Nugent,
        483 F.3d 1231, 1240 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). One such
        exception is made for “exigent circumstances.” Id. “The exigent
        circumstances exception recognizes a warrantless entry by criminal
        law enforcement officials may be legal when there is compelling
        need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.” United
        States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation
        omitted).
                The most urgent of these exigencies—known as the
        emergency aid exception—excuses police compliance with the
        warrant requirement in order “to protect or preserve life.” Id. at
        1335; Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011). “Under the
        ‘emergency aid’ exception, . . . ‘officers may enter a home without
        a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant
        or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.’” United States
        v. Timmann, 741 F.3d 1170, 1178 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Brigham
        City, Utah, v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)). “In order for the
        exception to apply, officers must have an objectively reasonable
        belief that someone inside is ‘seriously injured or threatened with
        such injury,’ and is in need of immediate aid.” Id. (quoting
        Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403–04). “The officer’s subjective
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        12                        Opinion of the Court                      22-11056

        motivation is irrelevant.” Id. (quotation omitted). And “[t]he
        government bears the burden of demonstrating that the exception
        applies.” Id. at 1178–79.
                 Officer Ermeri contends that the emergency aid exception
        justified his entry into Lucibella’s backyard. When Officer Ermeri
        entered Lucibella’s backyard without permission and without a
        warrant, Lucibella and Wohlfiel were sitting on the patio.
        According to Lucibella, no tumultuous scene or chaos existed.
        Officer Ermeri did not observe any violence, threatening behavior,
        or an injured person. There was nothing to suggest the presence
        of illicit or dangerous activity. Indeed, under Lucibella’s version of
        the facts, at this point, Officer Ermeri did not see anything that
        indicated that this was the house from which the gunshots
        originated because Officer Ermeri did not see Lucibella with a
        firearm until Officer Ermeri entered the backyard. 5 Indeed,
        Sergeant Hallahan and Officer Plesnik had already peered through
        the gate and left to continue the investigation elsewhere because
        they did not see anything out of the ordinary in Lucibella’s
        backyard.
              This situation bears none of the typical “indicia of an urgent,
        ongoing emergency.” Timmann, 741 F.3d at 1180. Considering

        5 We note that whether Officer Ermeri saw the firearm before or after he
        entered Lucibella’s backyard is a point that the parties vigorously dispute. At
        this stage of the proceedings, we must credit Lucibella’s version of the facts.
        See Cantu, 974 F.3d at 1228.
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        22-11056               Opinion of the Court                      13

        the circumstances, it was not objectively reasonable for Officer
        Ermeri to believe that someone inside of Lucibella’s house or in
        Lucibella’s backyard was in danger or in need of immediate aid.
        Accordingly, we conclude that under these facts, the emergency
        aid exception did not justify Officer Ermeri’s warrantless entry
        onto Lucibella’s curtilage.
               And we reach the same conclusion with respect to Officer
        Plesnik—who also relies on the emergency aid exception—for
        largely the same reasons. Soon after Officer Ermeri entered
        Lucibella’s property, he radioed Sergeant Hallahan that he located
        the weapon, and both Sergeant Hallahan and Officer Plesnik
        arrived on scene. Under Lucibella’s version of the facts, the scene
        that Officer Plesnik entered was largely the same as the one that
        Officer Ermeri first encountered. Although Officer Plesnik now
        arrived with the knowledge that there was a firearm on site, the
        mere presence of a firearm—without more—did not transform the
        non-exigent scene into an exigent circumstance and trigger the
        emergency aid exception. Indeed, by the time Officer Plesnik
        arrived, Officer Ermeri had already taken the firearm from
        Lucibella without incident. Accordingly, under these facts, it was
        not objectively reasonable for an officer to believe that an ongoing
        emergency existed or that anyone was in need of protection,
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        14                         Opinion of the Court                        22-11056

        injured, or in danger of imminent injury. As such, we conclude
        that Officer Plesnik cannot satisfy the emergency aid exception.6
              Without an exception to justify their entry onto and search
        of Lucibella’s property, Officers Ermeri and Plesnik’s warrantless
        search violated Lucibella’s Fourth Amendment rights.

        6 The officers attempt to analogize this case to Holloway, but their argument
        is unavailing. In Holloway, officers responded to emergency calls reporting
        gunshots and arguing overheard at a mobile home. 290 F.3d at 1332. While
        on their way to the scene, the officers received a second dispatch indicating
        that a 911 caller reported continuing gunshots and arguing. Id. When they
        arrived, the officers found Mr. and Mrs. Holloway on the porch of the mobile
        home, and an officer “drew his service weapon as he exited his vehicle” “[d]ue
        to the high-risk nature of the 911 call” and instructed the couple “to raise their
        hands into view.” Id. Mrs. Holloway did not comply with the officer’s
        instructions, prompting the officer to threaten to use his pepper spray. Id.
        Eventually, a sergeant who had arrived to provide additional support “stepped
        in to secure Mrs. Holloway.” Id. at 1333.
                 The Holloway circumstances are markedly different from those that
        Officers Ermeri and Plesnik encountered. Neither officer even knew which
        house the gunfire came from, and Officer Plesnik left Lucibella’s house to
        continue searching for the source of the gunfire after observing that nothing
        abnormal was occurring in Lucibella’s backyard. Unlike Holloway, where the
        officer drew his weapon and threatened to use pepper spray, here, the officers
        encountered no threat upon their arrival and had no occasion to draw their
        weapons. Indeed, Lucibella obeyed Officer Ermeri’s instructions—unlike Mrs.
        Holloway—and relinquished his gun without resistance.
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        22-11056                Opinion of the Court                        15

                         ii. Lucibella’s right to be free from an
                             unreasonable search was clearly established
               Turning to the second prong of the qualified immunity
        analysis, we conclude that the prohibition against warrantless
        searches of a home’s curtilage, which is clearly established by the
        Fourth Amendment and our caselaw, put Officers Ermeri and
        Plesnik on notice that their conduct was unlawful and that no
        reasonable officer would have believed that he faced exigent
        circumstances that justified acting without a warrant. Patel, 959
        F.3d at 1343 (explaining that a plaintiff may establish that the law is
        clearly established by pointing to a “broader, clearly established
        principle that should control the novel facts in [the] situation”
        (quotation omitted)).
               “The touchstone of qualified immunity is notice.” Moore v.
        Pederson, 806 F.3d 1036, 1046 (11th Cir. 2015). “The violation of a
        constitutional right is clearly established if a reasonable official
        would understand that his conduct violates that right.” Id. at 1046–
        47. As an initial matter, the Fourth Amendment and our caselaw
        clearly establish that the warrantless search of a home’s curtilage is
        presumptively unreasonable. See Walker, 799 F.3d at 1363. Even
        so, we have repeatedly ruled that the emergency aid exception is
        met when an officer enters a home “to render emergency
        assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from
        imminent injury.” Timmann, 741 F.3d at 1178 (quoting Brigham
        City, 547 U.S. at 403). And we have explained that, “[i]n order for
        the exception to apply, officers must have an objectively reasonable
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        16                     Opinion of the Court               22-11056

        belief that someone inside is seriously injured or threatened with
        such injury, and is in need of immediate aid.” Id. (quotation
        omitted). The parameters of this exception were well-established
        at the time of this incident: “the police [must] reasonably believe
        an emergency exists which calls for an immediate response to
        protect citizens from imminent danger.” Holloway, 290 F.3d at
        1337.
                Here, viewing the facts in Lucibella’s favor, the situation
        that the officers confronted—two men quietly sitting on a back
        patio—bears none of the indicia of an urgent, ongoing emergency.
        Indeed, there are no facts indicating that there was an emergency
        at all—much less one involving endangerment to life, an injured
        person, or even imminent injury. Illustratively, Sergeant Hallahan
        and Officer Plesnik left Lucibella’s house after observing that
        everything appeared normal. Accordingly, no officer would have
        had an objectively reasonable belief that someone “faced an
        emergency that justified acting without a warrant.” Missouri v.
        McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 149 (2013). The officers’ decision to
        proceed onto Lucibella’s property—without a warrant and without
        a justification for a warrantless entry—violated clearly established
        law. See Moore, 806 F.3d at 1046.
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        22-11056               Opinion of the Court                         17

                   b. The officers are not entitled to qualified immunity
                      on Lucibella’s excessive force claim
                          i. Officers Ermeri and Plesnik violated
                             Lucibella’s Fourth Amendment rights by using
                             excessive force
               Turning to Lucibella’s second claim, Officers Ermeri and
        Plesnik argue that their use of force against Lucibella was
        objectively reasonable, not excessive, and that the amount of force
        they used “was well within proportion to the need for application
        of force to gain control of Lucibella and effectuate the arrest.” We
        disagree.
               “The Fourth Amendment’s freedom from unreasonable
        searches and seizures encompasses the plain right to be free from
        the use of excessive force in the course of an arrest.” Brown v. City
        of Huntsville, Ala., 608 F.3d 724, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lee
        v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1197 (11th Cir. 2002)). “Determining
        whether an officer’s use of force is reasonable ‘requires a careful
        balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
        individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the
        countervailing governmental interests at stake.’” Prosper v.
        Martin, 989 F.3d 1242, 1251 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Graham v.
        Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). “We measure excessive-force
        claims under the Fourth Amendment under an objective-
        reasonableness standard.” Patel, 959 F.3d at 1338. “That standard
        requires us to ask whether the officer’s conduct was objectively
        reasonable in light of the facts confronting the officer.” Id.
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        18                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11056

        (alteration adopted and quotation omitted).             In assessing
        reasonableness, “we judge the officer’s use of force on a case-by-
        case basis from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,
        rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Johnson v. City of
        Miami Beach, 18 F.4th 1267, 1272 (11th Cir. 2021).
               “Our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long
        recognized that the right to make an arrest . . . necessarily carries
        with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat
        thereof to effect it.” Baxter v. Roberts, 54 F.4th 1241, 1268–69 (11th
        Cir. 2022). Therefore, during an arrest, “the application of de
        minimis force, without more, will not support a claim for excessive
        force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 1269.
                To balance “the necessity of using some force attendant to
        an arrest against the arrestee’s constitutional rights,” the Supreme
        Court has directed that we consider (1) the severity of the crime at
        issue; (2) whether the individual poses an immediate threat to the
        safety of officers or others; and (3) whether the individual is actively
        resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Lee, 284
        F.3d at 1197–98. We also consider the need for the use of force, the
        relationship between the need for force and the amount of force
        used, and “the extent of the injury inflicted.” Mobley v. Palm
        Beach Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015)
        (quotation omitted).
              We have held that an officer violates the Fourth
        Amendment and is denied qualified immunity when he uses
        “gratuitous and excessive force against a suspect who is under
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        22-11056                  Opinion of the Court                             19

        control, not resisting, and obeying commands.” Patel, 959 F.3d at
        1339 (quotation omitted).
               Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Lucibella,
        as we must, we conclude that a jury could reasonably find that the
        officers used excessive force during arrest. According to Lucibella,
        when the officers approached him, he was peacefully sitting on his
        patio. The officers were investigating alleged gunshots in the area
        but were not aware of Lucibella committing any crime. When
        asked, Lucibella readily surrendered the firearm to Officer Ermeri,
        emptied his pockets, and did not attempt to evade arrest. And
        although Lucibella admits to angrily poking Officer Ermeri in the
        chest in response to Officer Ermeri pushing him, Lucibella
        contends that he not otherwise pose any threat to the officers’
        safety. Then, without notice, Lucibella claims that Officer Ermeri
        grabbed him by the arms and kicked his legs out from under him
        so that Lucibella fell face first into the marble floor. According to
        Lucibella, this fall knocked him unconscious, broke his glasses, and
        caused bleeding, swelling, bruising, and a laceration above his
        eyebrow. Then, while he was in an unconscious state, Lucibella
        claims that Officer Plesnik performed a “knee drop” on him by
        asserting her full weight on his back and broke three of his ribs. 7

        7 We emphasize that the parties’ versions of events directly conflict at every
        turn. Officer Ermeri contends that Lucibella was “belligerent,” “very
        confrontational,” and “recognizably intoxicated” when Officer Ermeri
        approached him, and Lucibella disputes each of these assertions and maintains
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        20                        Opinion of the Court                    22-11056

               Under this version of events—where Lucibella was not
        evading or resisting arrest and posed no threat to the officers—a
        jury could reasonably find that Officer Ermeri used unnecessary
        and excessive force during arrest when he performed a “botched
        leg sweep” with no notice that rendered Lucibella unconscious and
        that Officer Plesnik used unnecessary and excessive force during
        arrest when she knee dropped Lucibella while he was unconscious,
        breaking three of his ribs. See Patel, 959 F.3d at 1339 (explaining
        that in cases where an officer uses “gratuitous and excessive force
        against a suspect who is under control, not resisting, and obeying
        commands,” we have “ruled that the officer violates the Fourth
        Amendment and is denied qualified immunity”).
                           ii. Lucibella’s right to be free from an excessive
                               use of force was clearly established
               Turning to the second prong of the qualified immunity
        analysis, under Lucibella’s account of the facts, he can show that

        that he and Wohlfiel were peacefully sitting on the patio when Officer Ermeri
        entered Lucibella’s backyard. The same goes for the parties’ accounts of the
        force used during Lucibella’s arrest. Officer Ermeri maintains that Lucibella
        “aggressively” “attempted to walk through” Officer Ermeri, yelled at Officer
        Ermeri, grabbed Officer Ermeri behind the head, and scratched Officer Ermeri
        before Officer Ermeri restrained Lucibella. Lucibella vehemently denies this
        occurred and instead alleges that Officer Ermeri performed a botched leg
        sweep on Lucibella with no notice. As explained, we cannot resolve these
        factual disputes on summary judgment and are restrained to apply the law to
        the facts viewed in the light most favorable to Lucibella.
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        22-11056                  Opinion of the Court                             21

        the officers violated clearly established law. 8 See Patel, 959 F.3d at
        1343 (explaining that a plaintiff can show that the law is clearly
        established by showing “that a broader, clearly established
        principle should control the novel facts in this situation” (quotation
        omitted)).
               Lucibella relies on Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272,
        1289 (11th Cir. 2011), to argue that our cases clearly establish that
        certain “force is excessive where the suspect is non-violent and has
        not resisted arrest.” In Fils, we concluded that the officers should
        have known that their conduct clearly violated the plaintiff’s
        Fourth Amendment rights when the officers tased the plaintiff
        “even though he committed at most a minor offense; did not resist
        arrest; he did not threaten anyone; and he did not disobey any
        instructions . . . .” 647 F.3d at 1292. We reasoned that the facts in
        Fils were “sufficiently similar to the facts of [Priester v. City of
        Riviera Beach, Florida, 208 F.3d 919 (11th Cir. 2000)] and [Vinyard
        v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1353 (11th Cir. 2002)] [such that the
        officers] were on notice that their conduct violated [the plaintiff’s
        rights].” Id. “In Priester, the [officer] set his attack dog on the
        plaintiff even though the plaintiff had submitted to the [officer’s]

        8 Although the district court did not decide whether the law was clearly
        established as to Lucibella’s excessive force claim, it ultimately denied
        qualified immunity to the officers. Where a district court does “not state the
        facts upon which it based its decision to deny summary judgment, we conduct
        our own review of the record to determine what facts the district court likely
        assumed.” Perez, 809 F.3d at 1218.
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        22                         Opinion of the Court                       22-11056

        every command and was laying flat on the ground.” Id. (citing
        Priester, 208 F.3d at 927). And in Vinyard, “the [officer] sprayed
        pepper spray into the eyes of a non-violent plaintiff, who was
        handcuffed safely in the back seat of the [officer’s] police car, and
        had threatened no one.” Id. (citing Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1347–48).
        We concluded that “[t]hese two cases clearly establish[ed] that such
        force is excessive where the suspect is non-violent and has not
        resisted arrest.” Id. “While these cases [were] not identical to [the
        Fils plaintiff’s] case,” we explained that “they need not be
        ‘materially similar’; the precedent need only provide the [officers]
        with ‘fair warning.’” Id. (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741
        (2002)).
              Accepting Lucibella’s version of the facts at this stage, a jury
        could reasonably find that Officer Ermeri violated this principle.9

        9 The Supreme Court and our Court have explained that “officials can still be
        on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual
        circumstances,” Hope, 536 U.S. at 741, but cautioned that clearly established
        law should not be defined “at too high a level of generality,” City of
        Tahlequah, Okla. v. Bond, 142 S. Ct. 9, 11 (2021). See Mercado v. City of
        Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1159–60 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining that “a broader,
        clearly established principle [can] control the novel facts in [a] situation” and
        relying on the broad principle that “[u]sing deadly force in a situation that
        clearly would not justify its use is unreasonable under the Fourth
        Amendment” to conclude that an officer was not entitled to qualified
        immunity where the officer pointed to no “controlling case law” with
        materially similar facts). Accordingly, in Fils—which involved the use of a
        taser—we concluded that the law was clearly established based on cases
        involving factually distinguishable circumstances (a dog attack and pepper
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        22-11056                  Opinion of the Court                              23

        Namely, a jury could reasonably find that Lucibella acted in a non-
        violent manner, did not resist arrest, 10 and obeyed Officer Ermeri’s
        commands to turn over the firearm and empty his pockets and that
        Officer Ermeri used unprovoked and excessive force when he
        grabbed Lucibella’s arms and threw him on the ground without
        notice. See Fils, 647 F.3d at 1292; see also Patel, 959 F.3d at 1343
        (explaining that a jury could reasonably find that an officer violated
        clearly established Fourth Amendment law if it believed the
        plaintiff’s version of events—under which the plaintiff was not
        resisting and was complying with the officer’s commands when the
        officer executed a leg sweep on the plaintiff). Thus, at this stage,
        Lucibella satisfies his burden to show that Officer Ermeri violated
        clearly established law.
               And the same goes for Officer Plesnik. A jury could find that
        Officer Plesnik used excessive force against a suspect who was non-
        violent and had not resisted arrest when she performed a knee drop

        spray). Fils, 647 F.3d at 1292; see also Hope, 536 U.S. at 743 (explaining that
        “[t]he reasoning, though not the holding” in a prior case may “sen[d] the same
        message to reasonable officers in that Circuit”). Likewise, we apply the rule
        clearly established in Fils to this case.
        10 We note that although Lucibella acknowledges that he poked Officer
        Ermeri two or three times in the chest, Lucibella maintains that he did not act
        violently or resist arrest when he poked Officer Ermeri’s chest. At the
        summary judgment stage, we must “view all evidence and factual inferences
        in the light most favorable to” Lucibella and conclude that a jury could
        reasonably find that Lucibella was not using violence or resisting arrest when
        he poked Officer Ermeri. Perez, 809 F.3d at 1217.
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        24                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11056

        on Lucibella—while he was lying on the ground unconscious—
        with such force that she broke three of his ribs and he was rendered
        bedridden. See Fils, 647 F.3d at 1292.
              Considering the circumstances in this case and crediting
        Lucibella’s version of events and the severity of his injuries, we
        conclude that Officers Ermeri and Plesnik had fair warning that use
        of excessive force on a suspect when that “suspect is non-violent
        and has not resisted arrest” violates the Fourth Amendment but
        nonetheless violated this clearly established principle. Fils, 647 F.3d
        at 1292. Accordingly, we conclude that summary judgment was
        properly denied to both officers at this stage in the proceedings.
                                   IV.    Conclusion
                Although we affirm the district court, our holding does not
        mean that the officers will ultimately be precluded from enjoying
        qualified immunity. See Perez, 809 F.3d at 1223. Numerous
        disputed issues of material fact exist—issues that we cannot resolve
        but that a factfinder may ultimately resolve in the officers’ favor.
        Id.; see Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416, 1417 (11th Cir. 1997) (“This
        court . . . avoids all credibility judgments.”). Accordingly, at this
        stage of litigation, we must view the facts only in the light most
        favorable to Lucibella and affirm the district court’s denial of
        summary judgment.
               AFFIRMED.