Court Opinion

ID: 9963238
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 20:00:52.549164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:43.865881
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10224    Document: 46-1     Date Filed: 04/24/2024   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-10224
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       NATHAN COOPER,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-20286-BB-1
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10224

       Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Nathan Cooper appeals his conviction for one count of pos-
       session of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon. Cooper
       argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion to
       suppress because there was not reasonable suspicion that he com-
       mitted a crime or that he was armed and dangerous. Cooper ar-
       gues that because Officer Ramirez did not have reasonable suspi-
       cion, the Officer violated his Fourth Amendment rights when she
       stopped and frisked him. Cooper argues that because his rights
       were violated, the firearm found should be suppressed.
                We review the denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress
       under a mixed standard, assessing the lower court’s factual ﬁndings
       for clear error and its application of law to those facts de novo.
       United States v. Vargas, 848 F.3d 971, 973 (11th Cir. 2017). When
       considering a ruling on a motion to suppress, “all facts are con-
       strued in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below.”
       United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000). A fac-
       tual ﬁnding is clearly erroneous if, after reviewing all the evidence,
       we have a deﬁnite and ﬁrm conviction that the district court made
       a mistake. United States v. Villarreal, 613 F.3d 1344, 1349 (11th Cir.
       2010). We accept the district court’s credibility determination “un-
       less it is contrary to the laws of nature, or is so inconsistent or im-
       probable on its face that no reasonable factﬁnder could accept it.”
       United States v. Holt, 777 F.3d 1234, 1255 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation
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       23-10224               Opinion of the Court                          3

       marks omitted). Questions of probable cause and reasonable sus-
       picion are reviewed de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,
       699 (1996).
              Under the Fourth Amendment, individuals have the right
       “to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and
       seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A court must examine the total-
       ity of the circumstances to determine reasonableness under the
       Fourth Amendment. United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1303
       (11th Cir. 2012).
               The exclusionary rule prohibits the use of evidence seized
       during, or as a result of, an unlawful search. Murray v. United States,
       487 U.S. 533, 536 (1988). “[T]he exclusionary rule serves to deter
       deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some cir-
       cumstances recurring or systemic negligence.” Herring v. United
       States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009).
               Oﬃcers “may brieﬂy detain a person as part of an investiga-
       tory stop if they have a reasonable articulable suspicion based on
       objective facts that the person has engaged in criminal activity.”
       United States v. Bruce, 977 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing,
       inter alia, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Although a mere hunch
       that criminal activity is afoot is not enough to establish reasonable
       suspicion, the standard is a less demanding one than probable
       cause, and requires a showing less than preponderance of the evi-
       dence. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).
              The Supreme Court has held that an oﬃcer may frisk a le-
       gally stopped individual for weapons if he reasonably believes that
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10224

       his or others’ safety is threatened. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. This belief
       must be based on a reasonable suspicion that the individual is
       armed and dangerous. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 332 (2009).
       Deﬁnitive evidence of a weapon or an absolute certainty that the
       individual is armed is not required. United States v. Bishop, 940 F.3d
       1242, 1250 (11th Cir. 2019). Instead, we evaluate the totality of the
       circumstances to determine whether such suspicion was reasona-
       ble. United States v. Johnson, 921 F.3d 991, 998 (11th Cir. 2019) (en
       banc). Circumstances considered include “the time of day, the lo-
       cation of the scene, the lighting at the scene, the number of oﬃc-
       ers, and the nature of the alleged crime.” Id. A person’s nervous,
       argumentative, or evasive behavior are relevant factors to be con-
       sidered. Bishop, 940 F.3d at 1248-49. The reasonable suspicion in-
       quiry “allows oﬃcers to draw on their own experience and special-
       ized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cu-
       mulative information available to them that might well elude an
       untrained person.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)
       (quotation marks omitted).
              Here, the court did not err when it denied Cooper’s motion
       to suppress because the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop
       and frisk Cooper. First, the court properly found that Officer
       Ramirez, based on her training and experience inferred based on
       the information presented to her that criminal activity was about
       to or did occur. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273. As the court properly ex-
       plained, there was reasonable suspicion based on the dispatch call
       and Jenema Phillips’ statements to Ramirez when Ramirez arrived
       on scene. The dispatch call informed Ramirez that Phillips (the
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       23-10224               Opinion of the Court                         5

       manager of the restaurant) had called 911 and said that her em-
       ployee, Cooper, had threatened her, that she thought he had a gun,
       and that she would be waiting for the officer outside the restaurant.
       Ramirez arrived and talked to Phillips outside the restaurant. Phil-
       lips explained the dispute with Cooper, that he was aggressive and
       was slinging a metal poker around, and that he grabbed the book-
       bag in which she thought he carried a gun. Based on this infor-
       mation, the court did not err in its finding that there was reasonable
       suspicion that Cooper had engaged in or was about to engage in
       criminal activity. Taken as a whole, in light of the officers’ experi-
       ence and knowledge, these circumstances were enough to create
       reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Bruce, 977
       F.3d at 1116.
             Second, the court properly found that Ramirez had reason-
       able suspicion to stop and frisk Cooper as she had reasonable
       grounds to believe that Cooper was armed and dangerous. Terry,
       392 U.S. at 27-29. As the court properly found, Ramirez was in-
       formed by the dispatch call and by Phillips when Ramirez arrived
       on scene that Cooper and Phillips had a dispute which resulted in
       Cooper cursing, behaving aggressively, and slinging a metal poker
       around. Ramirez was also informed by Phillips, whom the court
       found was reliable, that Cooper would carry a gun in his bookbag
       and that he told her that he had previously sold a gun to another
       employee. Phillips also conveyed to Ramirez that during the dis-
       pute Cooper grabbed his bookbag in which she believed he kept a
       gun. Ramirez had been informed by the dispatch call that Phillips
       had reported that Cooper had threatened her, that he had a gun,
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       6                          Opinion of the Court                       23-10224

       and that she would be waiting for the officers outside the restau-
       rant. We agree with the district court that Ramirez’s own conver-
       sation with Phillips outside the restaurant when Ramirez arrived
       on the scene did not disabuse the Officer of her reasonable belief
       that Phillips felt threatened and concerned for her safety and that
       of her employees.1 Additionally, Ramirez testified that this call oc-
       curred at night in a high crime area. Johnson, 921 F.3d at 998. Based
       on the information presented to Ramirez and on her training and
       experience, the court properly found that she had reasonable sus-
       picion that Cooper was armed and dangerous.
              Additionally, the court found that Phillips was reliable be-
       cause of her relationship with Cooper and her actions on the day
       of the incident. This finding is not inconsistent or improbable on

       1 In his brief on appeal, Cooper asserts in conclusory fashion that when Phillips

       spoke to Ramirez at the scene, she specifically denied that Cooper had threat-
       ened her. Cooper argues that the Officer should have realized that the threat
       mentioned in the dispatch call was in error and therefore that there was not a
       reasonable suspicion that Cooper was armed and dangerous. On the basis of
       our careful review of the colloquy between Ramirez and Phillips at the scene
       (as recorded on the body cam video), we reject Cooper’s assertion and argu-
       ment. Although Phillips did acknowledge that Cooper never threatened her
       “directly,” in the same breath she clearly implied that she felt threatened when
       he grabbed his bookbag in which she thought he carried a gun. And the to-
       tality of the colloquy conveyed to Ramirez that Phillips felt threatened by
       Cooper’s aggressive actions and her knowledge that he kept a gun in his book-
       bag, and that Phillips was concerned for her safety. The fact that Phillips, the
       manager of the restaurant, waited outside the restaurant for the officers and
       did not reenter with them when they went to confront Cooper was also con-
       firmation for Ramirez that Phillips was concerned for her safety.
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       23-10224                   Opinion of the Court                                7

       its face and is supported in the record. Holt, 777 F.3d at 1255. Based
       on Phillips’s conversation with Ramirez when she arrived on scene
       as well as her 911 call, there is evidence that a reasonable factfinder
       could accept that demonstrates that Phillips was credible. Id.
               Therefore, based on the totality of the circumstances, the
       court did not err when it found that Ramirez had reasonable suspi-
       cion that Cooper was armed and dangerous, and thus, properly
       stopped and frisked him to search for weapons. Terry, 392 U.S. at
       27-29. As the court properly noted, it did not matter that Ramirez
       was not absolutely certain that Cooper had a weapon but only that
       she had reasonable suspicion. Bishop, 940 F.3d at 1250. Therefore,
       it did not matter that neither Phillips nor Ramirez saw Cooper with
       a gun on the day of the incident.
              For the foregoing reasons, the district court did not err when
       it denied Cooper’s motion to suppress. 2
       AFFIRMED.

       2 We reject Cooper’s argument that Terry frisks are unconstitutional because

       they are contrary to the Fourth Amendment’s original meaning. We are
       bound by the Supreme Court’s decisions until they overrule them. United
       States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 567 (2001)( “[I]t is the Supreme Court’s preroga-
       tive alone to overrule one of its precedents.”).