Court Opinion

ID: 9942434
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 01:06:43.325464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:04.944218
License: Public Domain

02/20/2024

                                          DA 22-0185
                                                                                         Case Number: DA 22-0185

              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
                                          2024 MT 35N

STATE OF MONTANA,

               Plaintiff and Appellee,

         v.

DEVIN DERUSKY LANDUCCI,

               Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM:           District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
                       In and For the County of Cascade, Cause No. BDC-14-126
                       Honorable Elizabeth A. Best, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

                For Appellant:

                       Joseph P. Howard, Joseph P. Howard, P.C., Helena, Montana

                For Appellee:

                       Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Michael P. Dougherty,
                       Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

                       Joshua A. Racki, Cascade County Attorney, Matthew Robertson, Deputy
                       County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana

                                                  Submitted on Briefs: December 20, 2023

                                                             Decided: February 20, 2024

Filed:

                                 Vir-6A.-if
                       __________________________________________
                                         Clerk
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1     Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana

Reports.

¶2     Devin Derusky Landucci (Landucci) appeals a May 24, 2021 Judgment entered by

the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, imposing a revocation sentence of

twenty-five years in Montana State Prison, with ten years suspended, after his original

deferred imposition of sentence was revoked after a hearing on May 3, 2021. Landucci

argues the District Court’s original imposition of a deferred sentence was illegal as beyond

its statutory authority and, therefore, the State’s petition for revocation and subsequent

resentencing were improper. We affirm.

¶3     In 2014, Landucci pled guilty to one count of sexual intercourse without consent

after engaging in sexual intercourse on multiple occasions with a twelve-year-old female.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State agreed to recommend that the District Court defer

imposition of sentence for six years. Landucci also agreed to complete sexual offender

treatment and to cover various costs associated with his prosecution.

¶4     The District Court accepted the plea agreement and, on August 6, 2014, sentenced

Landucci in accordance with the agreed terms, including a deferred imposition of sentence

for six years with credit for sixty-one days of pretrial incarceration. The District Court

required payment of the following: a surcharge of the greater of $20 or 10% of the fine for
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each felony offense under 46-18-236(1)(b), MCA; a surcharge of $50 for each

misdemeanor or felony charge for victim and witness advocate programs under § 46-18-

236(1)(c), MCA; and a $10 court information technology fee for each charged count under

§ 3-1-317, MCA. Landucci additionally agreed to multiple other conditions that were

imposed by the District Court, including that he would abide by all city, state, and federal

laws and ordinances. Landucci did not object to any aspect of his plea agreement or

sentence, and he did not appeal.

¶5     Almost six years later, in January 2020, Landucci was charged with sexual

intercourse without consent and aggravated assault in Park County, Montana. He was still

on probation at the time. These charges were ultimately reduced by way of a plea

agreement to a single count of criminal endangerment. Thereafter, the State petitioned to

revoke Landucci’s 2014 sentence, asserting the 2020 charges violated the terms and

conditions of his deferred imposition of sentence. An evidentiary hearing was held on the

State’s petition, and the District Court revoked Landucci’s 2014 sentence. On May 24,

2021, the District Court entered a Judgment sentencing Landucci to twenty-five years in

Montana State Prison, with ten years suspended. Landucci appeals.

¶6     “We review a district court’s revocation of a suspended sentence for abuse of

discretion.” State v. Tirey, 2010 MT 283, ¶ 19, 358 Mont. 510, 247 P.3d 701. “We review

a criminal sentence for legality to determine whether the sentence is within statutory

parameters.” State v. Adams, 2013 MT 189, ¶ 11, 371 Mont. 28, 305 P.3d 808. “Such a

determination of legality is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo.” Adams, ¶ 11.

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¶7     Landucci raises no legal error with regard to the revocation sentence he received in

2021, and from which he has appealed. Instead, he argues the District Court erred in 2014

by then deferring imposition of his sentence for the period of six years. Specifically, he

asserts that, under the then-governing statute, § 46-18-201(1)(a)(i)-(ii), MCA (2013), the

District Court was prohibited from deferring his sentence for more than three years

because—according to his argument—no “financial obligations” were imposed, only

“statutorily mandated surcharges.” Consequently, in his view, because the original 2014

deferred sentence was erroneous, the State’s petition to revoke that sentence was untimely

filed, and the subsequent revocation and resentencing by the District Court was illegal.

However, we disagree.

¶8     Although Landucci frames his appeal as a challenge to his 2021 revocation and

resentencing, he identifies no flaw on the face of this judgment. Rather, his challenge is to

the interpretation of “financial obligations” under § 46-18-201(1)(a)(ii), MCA (2013),

made by the District Court in 2014. Accordingly, as argued by the State, the threshold

inquiry is whether Landucci can now challenge the legality of the District Court’s 2014

Judgment, which he then failed to appeal. Under the many cases in which we have

addressed this issue, he may not.

¶9     A defendant has sixty days from the entry of judgment to file an appeal challenging

a sentence. M. R. App. P. 4(5)(b)(i). “If a defendant does not appeal, he is generally

precluded from later challenging the legality of the sentence.” Adams, ¶ 15 (quoting State

v. Muhammad, 2002 MT 47, ¶ 22, 309 Mont. 1, 43 P.3d 318). We have explained under

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what circumstances a sentencing court can correct a sentence alleged to be illegal. As

Justice Cotter wrote for the Court:

       [A] sentencing court’s authority to re-sentence a criminal defendant based
       upon an illegal sentence depends upon when the illegal sentence is
       discovered and challenged. If the illegal sentence is challenged while the
       defendant is serving the sentence, the court has the authority to correct the
       sentence by imposing a sentence that was statutorily authorized . . . . If,
       however, the illegal sentence is challenged during a revocation proceeding
       held while the defendant is serving the suspended portion of the illegal
       sentence, the court, upon sentencing in the revocation proceeding, is
       constrained by the particulars of [the revocation sentencing provisions].

State v. Seals, 2007 MT 71, ¶ 15, 336 Mont. 416, 156 P.3d 15 (emphasis in original). One

year later, we again emphasized that a defendant could not use a revocation proceeding as

a vehicle to challenge an earlier sentence not appealed within the sixty-day limit. See State

v. White, 2008 MT 464, ¶ 20, 348 Mont. 196, 199 P.3d 274 (“[The Defendant] may not,

within the context of the [2007] revocation proceeding, challenge the legality of the

conditions imposed on her 1997 suspended sentence, as such a challenge is untimely.”)

(overruled on other grounds).

¶10    Our decisions in Muhammad and Adams likewise illustrate this principle. In

Muhammad, the defendant was sentenced for sexual intercourse without consent pursuant

to a plea bargain in May of 1999. Muhammad, ¶¶ 8, 11. Similar to this case, he received

a six-year deferred sentence, conditioned on compliance with various probation

requirements. Muhammad, ¶ 11. In January 2000, the State filed a petition to revoke the

defendant’s sentence. Muhammad, ¶ 14. After a hearing, the District Court revoked his

sentence and imposed a twenty-year commitment with fifteen years suspended.

Muhammad, ¶ 15. The Defendant appealed, challenging both his 1999 original sentence
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and his 2000 revocation sentence. Muhammad, ¶¶ 15-16. We held that we were “without

jurisdiction to review” the 1999 sentence because that issue was untimely raised.

Muhammad, ¶ 22.

¶11    In Adams, the Defendant argued the District Court did not have legal authority to

order his adult criminal sentence to run consecutively to his juvenile disposition. Adams,

¶ 13. However, he never challenged this provision of his adult sentence until years later,

when the State filed a petition to revoke it. Adams, ¶ 9. We held that, because his

underlying sentence had not been appealed, he was precluded from attempting to “overturn

the [original] bargain because he once again faces prison for failing to follow the terms of

his probationary sentence.” Adams, ¶ 21. We further explained that this holding was

consistent with our general principle to “not put a district court in error for an action in

which the appealing party acquiesced or actively participated.” Adams, ¶ 21 (citation

omitted).

¶12    Landucci responds by citing State v. Lenihan, 184 Mont. 338, 602 P.2d 997 (1979),

where we acknowledged a “narrow sentence-specific exception to the contemporaneous

objection/waiver rule.” State v. Thibeault, 2021 MT 162, ¶ 9, 404 Mont. 476, 490 P.3d

105 (citing Lenihan, 184 Mont. at 342-43, 602 P.2d at 999-1000). The Lenihan Rule

provides that “unpreserved assertions of error that a particular sentence or sentencing

condition was either facially illegal . . . or facially legal but authorized by a facially

unconstitutional statute, are subject to review for the first time on appeal.” Thibeault, ¶ 9.

However, Lenihan does not stand for the proposition that an untimely appeal can be taken

from a years-old judgment simply because it pertains to sentencing. Lenihan preserves the
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right of a defendant to challenge a facial illegality in his sentence that he did not

contemporaneously object to—within a timely filed appeal. Lenihan does not release a

defendant from the requirement to file a timely appeal from a judgment.

¶13    Landucci argues that Muhammad and Adams “cannot be read to preclude this Court

from reviewing the district court’s revocation of Landucci’s sentence and its imposition of

a new MSP sentence, where Landucci timely appealed the same.” Landucci is correct that

we are not prohibited from reviewing the 2021 revocation judgment; however, Landucci’s

challenge is not to the legality of the 2021 judgment. Rather, he is challenging the

underlying judgment by arguing the District Court erred in 2014 by imposing a deferred

sentence that was longer than three years. The time for appealing that alleged error passed

years ago. Seals, ¶ 15.

¶14    We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the

Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law.

¶15    Affirmed.

                                                 /S/ JIM RICE

We concur:

/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON

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