Court Opinion

ID: 9774100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:08:36.926114+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:01.944326
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, dissenting. The majority holds that the juvenile in this case suffered no prejudice by the special trial judge’s surprise hearing on the motion to transfer the case from juvenile court to circuit court. I respectfully disagree. When the special judge announced that he was going to proceed with the transfer hearing, the defense counsel made the following objection: Your Honor, if that will be subject to defense objection, I would like to note for the record that the motion to transfer was filed on February 22,1991. Whereas we had initially made plans to file an answer to the motion, we were not afforded the proper length of time to prepare an answer, nor — as I understand it, we were tentatively set to have a hearing scheduled for today. I understand if the Court wants to go ahead and hear it before, but for the record, I feel compelled to have my objection noted. The special judge then stated that he would call up the transfer motion on his own motion and added, “so that takes care of your time problem.” The hearing commenced over defense counsel’s objection, and the prosecutor sought to introduce a psychological evaluation of the appellant juvenile. The defense counsel objected again and said: Your honor, we would object to the introduction of State’s Exhibit No. 1 on the following grounds: One, as this hearing has certainly sped up these matters, we have not had a chance to review the report in full detail. My understanding from the Code is that we are to be provided three days before any such reports are introduced to the Court. Ms. Merritt has indicated that this is a part of the Court’s file. I have no way of ascertaining that. I do not have Mr. Smith’s prior files with me at this time. In sum, the transfer motion had not been set for hearing on this date, and the defense counsel was caught up short. He thought he had ten days from the filing of the motion to respond, and, indeed, the rules provide for that amount of time. Some prejudice to counsel and his client was evidenced by the lack of time in which to review the psychological report. But the real prejudice lay in foreclosing counsel from responding to the prosecutor’s motion to transfer and in denying him adequate time tp prepare his case. The defense counsel objected before the hearing began and renewed that objection at the end of the hearing. What else could he had done to preserve his objection? It is true that he had no witnesses present and that he presented the court with no names of prospective witnesses whom he might have called had he been afforded appropriate notice. But he, admittedly, was unprepared due to the surprise hearing. Failure to proffer his case due to these circumstances should not be fatal to his appeal when the appellant had, under our rules, six more days to develop his case. The majority cites civil cases to support its theory of lack of prejudice. In one case cited, we held that there was no prejudice to the appellant because he had a chance to respond to the motion for summary judgment and argue his position. See Keenan v. American River Transportation Co., 304 Ark. 42, 799 S.W.2d 801 (1990). In the case before us, the appellant had neither responded to the motion to transfer nor prepared his case. In a second case cited by the majority, we affirmed a damage award even though the judge had improperly instructed the jury on punitive damages in a negligence case. See Robinson v. Abbott, 292 Ark. 630, 731 S.W.2d 782 (1987). Because the jury did not award punitive damages, we held that this error was technical and resulted in no prejudice. In still another case cited, we held that a statement in oral argument concerning which bank would bear a loss involving an unauthorized endorsement was not presumptively prejudicial. See Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Wallace, 290 Ark. 589, 721 S.W.2d 659 (1986). That is clearly distinguishable from thé facts of this case. Finally, the majority cites a case where the trial court entered a premature summary judgment, thereby preventing the appellant from filing counter affidavits. See Purser v. Corpus Christi St. Nat’l Bank, 258 Ark. 54, 522 S.W.2d 187 (1975). There, the trial court stated that the appellant had no meritorious defense available to him. Here, no such finding could be made by the trial court until the appellant’s counsel had prepared and presented his case on the statutory factors relating to juvenile transfer cases. Transferring a case from juvenile to circuit court is a serious matter. The procedural rules must be followed, especially when fundamental due process is at issue. That was not done in this case. The resulting prejudice to the defendant is obvious. I would remand for a new transfer hearing. Holt, C.J., Newbern, J., join.