Court Opinion

ID: 9635665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:58:59.879767+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:17:37.050857
License: Public Domain

BELL, C.J.,
Dissenting.
The respondent, Gary E. Thompson, was convicted, on a plea of guilty, of violating § 32-20 of the Montgomery County Code, which proscribes stalking,1 as a result of interactions he *333had with a 18-year old boy, as described by the hearing court and reported in the majority opinion. 367 Md. 317, 786 A.2d 765 (2001). He was sentenced to a six month suspended sentence, three years probation, one hundred hours of community service and a $1,000.00 fíne. The respondent’s conduct was not related to his law practice, neither involving a client, nor directly implicating honesty, trustworthiness, truthfulness and reliability, traits closely associated with the legal profession, see ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991 & Supp.1992) 5.112 (ABA Standards), or his technical competence to practice law.
Rather than charge the respondent with a violation of Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d),3 which prohibits engaging “in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice,” Bar Counsel charged him with violation of only Rule 8.4(b) and (c). The hearing court having concluded that the respondent did not violate either subsection charged, the petitioner excepted only to the finding as to subsection (b). The majority sustains that exception, 367 Md. at 322, 786 A.2d at 767-68, concluding that the respondent’s conduct fell within the proscription of that subsection.
The issue that this case requires this Court to resolve is whether a lawyer’s conviction of the subject Montgomery County Code provision, specifically when it involves a teenaged boy, establishes a violation of Rule 8.4(b). Resolution of *334the issue involves the interpretation of the applicable Rule and, in particular, the phrase, “fitness as a lawyer in other respects.”
It is well settled that interpretation of a rule of procedure is governed by the same rules and canons as are applicable to the construction of a statute. Pickett v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 365 Md. 67, 78, 775 A.2d 1218, 1224-25 (2001); Johnson v. State, 360 Md. 250, 264, 757 A.2d 796, 804 (2000); Lerman v. Heeman, 347 Md. 439, 443, 701 A.2d 426, 428 (1997); New Jersey v. Strazzella, 331 Md. 270, 274, 627 A.2d 1055, 1057 (1993); Beales v. State, 329 Md. 263, 271, 619 A.2d 105, 109 (1993). In addition to seeking to ascertain the intent of the promulgating authority in adopting the rule, we consider the rule in context and construe it so that no word, phrase, clause or sentence is rendered surplusage or nugatory. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 128, 756 A.2d 987, 991 (2000). Moreover, “[w]e are also to give effect to the entire rule, neither adding, nor deleting, words in order to give it a meaning not otherwise evident by the words actually used.” Strazzella, 331 Md. at 274-75, 627 A.2d at 1057. Nor are we to construe the rule .with “ ‘forced or subtle interpretations’ that limit or extend its application.” Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 491, 632 A.2d 753, 755 (1993) (quoting Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., 308 Md. 69, 73, 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986)).
Rule 8.4 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct has six subsections. In its entirety, it provides:
“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
“(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through acts of another;
“(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
“(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
*335“(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”
“(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official; or
. “(f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law.”
Subsections (a), (e) and (f) clearly are inapplicable to this case. While subsection (b) is the only one before the Court for interpretation, the petitioner not having excepted to the hearing court’s conclusion that subsection (c) does not apply, the meaning of subsection (d) nevertheless is relevant to the meaning, and scope, of subsection (b) because an interpretation of subsection (b) may not render subsection (d) meaningless. This Court has considered the meaning and effect of both. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Com’n of Maryland v. Post, 350 Md. 85, 710 A.2d 935 (1998) (as to Rule 8.4(b)); see also Attorney Grievance Com’n of Maryland v. Painter, 356 Md. 293, 739 A.2d 24 (1999) (as to Rule 8.4(d)).
In Post, the respondent was alleged to have violated Rule 8.4(b)4 by failing to file withholding income tax returns timely, to remit the taxes withheld, and to hold the withheld taxes in trust. The hearing court so concluded. 350 Md. at 88-89, 710 A.2d at 936. Despite acknowledging, and, indeed, finding, that the defaults were not related to, and did not adversely reflect on, the respondent’s honesty or trustworthiness, but rather only on the respondent’s “endeavors .to operate his office in a business-like manner,” 350 Md. at 94, 710 A.2d at 939, the court concluded that the respondent’s conduct adversely reflected on his fitness as an attorney, reasoning:
“One of the most fundamental of a lawyer’s functions is to give sound legal counsel to his or her clients, meaning that he or she must, when called upon to do so, advise the clients of their various lawful rights and duties, and concomitantly *336is bound to urge them to comply with those legal duties. An attorney, almost without regard to his reasons therefor, who does not ‘practice’ what he or she is required to ‘preach’ surely diminishes the stature and fitness of his role as a provider of legal counsel. Therefore, notwithstanding a degree of sympathy which Respondent’s quandary may create, it cannot be doubted that his conduct reflected adversely on his fitness as a lawyer and, consequently, that he is in violation of Rule 8.4(b).”
350 Md. at 94, 710 A.2d at 939.
Addressing the issue, we construed Rule 8.4(b), giving meaning to the phrase, “fitness to practice law in other respects,” as follows:
“Rule 8.4(b) recognizes, by its reference to character traits, rather than enumerating specific crimes, that commission of some crimes evidence or demonstrate a character flaw that, were the person committing them applying for admission to the bar, would constitute a significant impediment, if not outright prohibition, to his or her admission or, having been admitted, could result in his or her disbarment. The rule identifies two such traits. In addition to those traits, however, it includes as a catchall object, ‘fitness as a lawyer in other respects.’ Since the Rule is specific in the requirement that the criminal act reflect adversely on the character traits or fitness as a lawyer, it follows that what the Rule contemplates is that the-criminal act evidence another character trait, which, like honesty and trustworthiness, is relevant or critical to the practice of law.”
350 Md. at 97, 710 A.2d at 940-41. In so doing, we accepted the argument of the respondent in that case that, “as used in the Rule, ‘fitness’ connote[d] ‘something intrinsic to [his] conduct that implicated] his legal abilities,’ ” that “that [wa]s the only appropriate construction of the term when one considers that the conduct on which the court relied fits quite comfortably within the reach of Rule 8.4(d),” and that, for the rule to be applicable, there must be a connection between the conduct *337and the respondent’s fitness as a lawyer in the subject case. Id. at 96, 710 A.2d at 940.
We rejected the hearing court’s conclusion that the respondent had violated Rule 8.4(b). Significantly, in so doing, we opined:
“The only basis for the court’s conclusion that it does reflect adversely on his fitness as a lawyer is that failure to practice what one preaches undermines one’s credibility as a provider of legal counsel. But that is simply another way of saying that the administration of justice may be prejudiced. The court was specific in rejecting any suggestion that, by his actions, the respondent’s honesty or trustworthiness was compromised, the conclusion that one could most logically be expected to draw. Moreover, the court also diagnosed the problem as one involving the respondent’s office management skills rather than ‘his performance or abilities as an attorney.’ ”
350 Md. at 99, 710 A.2d at 942.
In Painter, the respondent was charged with violating Rule 8.4(b) and (d) by committing criminal acts of assault and battery, transporting a handgun, as well as committing acts of domestic violence against his wife and children. 356 Md. at 300, 302, 739 A.2d at 28, 29. The hearing court found by clear and convincing evidence that he had committed the acts charged. Id. at 296, 739 A.2d at 26. Neither party took exceptions to the court’s findings of fact or conclusions of law. Thus, the only issue before this Court was the appropriate sanction to be imposed. Id. at 306, 739 A.2d at 29. Nevertheless, we commented on what a violation of both Rule 8.4(b) and Rule 8.4(d) required, noting as to the former what we said in Post. 356 Md. at 306-07, 739 A.2d at 31. As to the latter, we said:
“ “ ‘conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice,’ delegates or confirms to the courts the power and duty to consider particular conduct of one who is an officer of the court, in relation to the privileges and duties of a public calling that specially invites complete trust and confidence.”
*338Rheb v. Bar Ass’n of Baltimore City, 186 Md. 200, 205, 46 A.2d 289, 291 (1946). We have recognized, in that regard,
“ “that conduct that impacts on the image or the perception of the courts or the legal profession, see Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Alison, 317 Md. 523, 536, 565 A.2d 660, 666 (1989) and that engenders disrespect for the courts and for the legal profession may be prejudicial to the administration of justice. Lawyers are officers of the court and their conduct must be assessed in that light.” ”
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Richardson, 350 Md. 354, 368, 712 A.2d 525, 532 (1998). See Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Poison, 569 N.W.2d 612, 613-14 (Iowa 1997). In that case, the Court held that an attorney’s convictions of contempt, because it defied the court’s orders, prejudiced the administration of justice and reflected adversely on his fitness to practice law.”
Id. at 306-07, 739 A.2d at 31.
The Court concluded that
“under the circumstances, an attorney, an officer of the court, who has committed acts of violence, to some of which he pled guilty, on both his wife and children, contrary to the policy of this State, which abhors such acts, and violated court ordered probation, at the very least, ‘engage[s] in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.’ ”
Id. at 307, 739 A.2d at 32. We cautioned, however,
“it is not all that clear that the criminal conduct in which the respondent engaged and to which he has pled guilty impacts his fitness to practice law. Thus, while
‘Disobedience of a court order, whether as a legal representative or as a party, demonstrates a lapse of character and a disrespect for the legal system that directly relate to an attorneys fitness to practice law and serve as an officer of the court,’
Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Garland, 345 Md. 383, 398, 692 A.2d 465, 472 (1997), quoting, with approval, In re Kelley, 52 Cal.3d 487, 276 Cal.Rptr. 375, 380, 801 P.2d 1126, 1131 *339(Cal.1990), not all violations of the law indicate a lack of fitness to practice law. As we pointed out in Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Post, 350 Md. 85-99, 710 A.2d 935, 941 (1998), if the only basis for the court’s conclusion that a particular violation of the law reflects adversely on an attorney’s fitness as a lawyer is that failure to practice what one preaches undermines one’s credibility as a provider of legal counsel, that is simply another way of saying that the administration of justice may be prejudiced.”
Id. at 307 n. 7, 739 A.2d at 32 n. 7.
To be sure, there are cases in which this Court has sustained hearing court findings and conclusions that conduct of an attorney wholly unrelated to his or practice violated Rule 8.4(b). See, e.g., Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Black, 362 Md. 574, 766 A.2d 119 (2001); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Gilbert, 356 Md. 249, 739 A.2d 1 (1999); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Garland, 345 Md. 383, 692 A.2d 465 (1997) (driving under the influence and driving on a suspended license convictions and subsequent failure to report to a D.W.I. facility); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Hamby, 322 Md. 606, 589 A.2d 53 (1991) (convictions for possession of cocaine and drug paraphernalia, resisting arrest, and assault and battery on a police officer).5
However, in none of these cases did the respondent in the case take exception to the conclusion that Rule 8.4(b) was applicable and, therefore, in none of them was there any analysis as to why, or how, the conduct reflected adversely on *340the attorney’s fitness. In Gilbert and Black, as in Painter, the respondent had been charged, and found to have violated, both Rule 8.4(b) and (d). Although we acknowledged that most courts sanctioning attorneys for the possession or use of drugs do so because of that conduct’s adverse reflection on the attorney’s fitness to practice, we felt no need to address the issue, particularly pointing out in Gilbert that, “[o]f course, to the extent that conduct of a lawyer adversely affects that lawyer’s fitness to practice law, it necessarily prejudices the administration of justice.” 356 Md. at 253, 739 A.2d at 3.
Not only was there no exception taken in Garland to the finding or conclusion that Rule 8.4(b) was violated, but the hearing court’s findings revealed a much greater concern than just the conviction in the case. Those findings were as follows:
“The evidence presented at the Respondent’s trial is both clear and convincing that on August 26, 1992 he operated a motor vehicle at night, erratically, while under the influence of alcohol. This was at least the Respondent’s third alcohol related driving offense. The Respondent violated Judge Rushworth’s probation by failing and refusing to enter into alcohol counseling, either through the D.W.I. facility or under the supervision of Mr. Vincent. Not only were the Respondent’s actions criminal, but they likewise demonstrated conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. In a situation where an attorney refuses to obey the lawful order of a court, it shows obvious contempt for the very same court of which the Respondent is an officer.
“The Respondent’s contention that he did not receive the judge’s order timely is totally void of any merit. The judge recited in open court at the time of sentencing his concerns about the Respondent’s need for treatment for alcoholism. The judge directed the Respondent to report to the D.W.I. Facility in Prince George’s County no later than 5:00 p.m. on October 8, 1993. Further, to ensure that the Respondent would comply with the Court’s Order, the sentencing judge set an appeal bond of $25,000.00 with the direction that he wanted to keep the Respondent off the street, *341describing the Respondent as a ‘loose cannon.’ Instead of complying with the Court’s Order, the Respondent flagrantly ignored the Order. Instead of reporting to the D.W.I. facility on October 8, 1993 or seeking counseling from the director of Lawyer Counseling for the Maryland State Bar, the Respondent went about his normal pursuits of practicing law in Baltimore County on the date he was required to seek treatment. His conduct was clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice and in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.”
345 Md. at 389-90, 692 A.2d at 469.
In Hamby, curiously, the only exception taken by the respondent attorney was to his being charged with a Rule 8.4(d) violation. The attorney misconduct involving children that we have considered that comes closest, factually, to the misconduct in this case occurred in Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Childress, 364 Md. 48, 770 A.2d 685 (2001). There, where the conduct involved pursuing a child on the internet, the respondent was only charged with a violation of Rule 8.4(d). Having sustained the violation, we imposed an indefinite suspension. In Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Mitchell, 308 Md. 653, 521 A.2d 746 (1987), the charged violations, which were sustained, were of DR 1-102(A)(1) and (3), proscribing the violation of a Disciplinary Rule and engaging in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude. The inappropriate conduct was performing fellatio on a thirteen year old boy. DR 1-102(A)(6) that prohibited engaging in conduct that reflects adversely on fitness to practice law was not charged.
In determining that the respondent’s conviction of stalking constituted evidence that he violated Rule 8.4(b), the majority rejects the notion that whether there has been a violation depends on the action occurring during an attorney client relationship or involved a member of the class of clients the attorney usually represented. Noting the inherent vulnerability of children, requiring their interaction with adults to be viewed with close scrutiny, it states the rationale for its position and holding:
*342“Respondent’s behavior in pursuing the child/victim in this case grossly overstepped the boundaries of appropriate adult-child relationships. In so doing, Respondent demonstrated, and even acknowledged to himself, that he may not be trusted around children in general.... Although adult-child interactions are not related directly to Respondent’s practice of law, the concept of trust is an inseparable element of any attorney’s practice. It is inconceivable, therefore, how we presently may authorize and entrust Respondent with the enumerable confidential, fiduciary, and trust-based relationships that attorneys, by their profession, are required to maintain in their dealings with their clients or the public.” (Footnotes omitted)
367 Md. at 327, 786 A.2d at 770-71.
The majority relies on the Comment to Rule 8.4, which states that “[m]any kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on [the] fitness to practice law ...,”6 the attitude in Maryland concerning the protection of children, 367 Md. at 325-26, 786 A.2d at 769-70, and cases from other States, e.g., In re Christie, 574 A.2d 845 (Del.1990); In re Conn, 715 N.E.2d 379 (Ind.1999); In re Buker, 615 N.E.2d 436 (Ind.1993); In re Kern, 551 N.E.2d 454 (Ind.1990); In re Fierro, 254 Kan. 919, 869 P.2d 728 (1994); In re Wilson, 251 Kan. 252, 832 P.2d 347 (1992); State v. Foster, 995 P.2d 1138 (Okla.2000); In re Richardson, 328 S.C. 161, 492 S.E.2d 788 (1997), interpreting their version of Rule 8.4(b) as including the kind of conduct in which the respondent engaged in this case.
I agree with the majority that violation of Rule 8.4(b) “does not depend on whether the misconduct occurred while representing a client or, as the hearing judge suggested, whether the misconduct involved an individual from the class of persons the attorney typically represented.” 367 Md. at 324, 786 A.2d at 769. I do not agree with its construction of Rule 8.4(b), *343however. Such a construction renders Rule 8.4(d) surplusage and nugatory.
Trust, to be sure, is a critical part of the stock and trade of a lawyer. A client must be able, to be sure, to trust his or her lawyer, and, in particular, his or her competence, discretion and advocacy — his or her willingness and ability to do so — on his or her behalf. It is the lawyer and his or her technical competence that must be trusted and that extends to the entire universe of those who would seek, and use, his or her services. When, for reasons unrelated to his or her technical competence, or even his or her profession, a lawyer, an officer of the court, cannot be trusted with a segment of that universe, of the population, his or her conduct reflective of the reason that he or she cannot be trusted with that segment of the population, because it impacts adversely on the public’s image of the courts and the legal profession, may be, and usually will be, prejudicial to the administration of justice. That is the case here.
We have held that it is not necessary that there be a criminal conviction to establish a violation of Rule 8.4(b), see Garland, 345 Md. at 390, 692 A.2d at 468-69; Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Deutsch, 294 Md. 353, 450 A.2d 1265 (1982), simply proof of the conduct. Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Proctor, 309 Md. 412, 524 A.2d 773 (1987). If all that is required to establish a violation of Rule 8.4(b), to demonstrate that conduct reflects adversely on a lawyer’s fitness to practice, is proof of aberrant behavior and a post hoc rationalization for why that conduct may reflect adversely on fitness, without tying the trait the conduct is indicative of to one that, like honesty and trustworthiness, is critical to the lawyer function, then there is no role for 8.4(d) to play; it has absolutely no independent basis for existence. That is what has occurred here: Rule 8.4(d) is rendered nugatory by the majority’s interpretation. Moreover, the majority’s is a strained construction that is reminiscent of the interpretation and rationalization this Court rejected in Post.
*344The cases on which the majority places heavy reliance are not helpful and, in fact, are inapposite.7 In none of the cases was an exception taken to the finding and conclusion that the respondent in that case violated Rule 8.4(b) or that State’s equivalent. For that reason, not unlike the majority’s criticism of the Respondent’s Reply to Petitioner’s Exceptions, in none of the cases was there any “effort to analyze critically,” 367 Md. at 322, 786 A.2d at 767, the rules’s scheme or why the particular conviction adversely reflected on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law. I do not find any of the cases persuasive.
The hearing judge was eminently and patently correct. I would overrule the exceptions of Bar Counsel. That the conduct clearly prejudices the administration of justice, which, unfortunately and inadvertently, was not charged, and is serious cannot, and does not, in my view, justify the interpretation the majority gives Rule 8.4(b). But that is the only basis I can discern for it.

. Section 32-20 of the Montgomery County Code, as pertinent, provides:
"Sec. 32-20 Stalking, (a) In this section to stalk means to engage in a persistent pattern of conduct which:
"(1) alarms, annoys, intimidates, frightens, or terrorizes a person; and
"(2) causes the person to reasonably fear for his or her safety, or that of any third person.”

. Standard 5.11 provides:
“Disbarment is generally appropriate when:
“(a) a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct a necessary element of which includes intentional interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution or importation of controlled substances; or the intentional killing of another; or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of another to commit any of these offenses; or
“(b) a lawyer engages in any other intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice.”

. At oral argument, the petitioner informed the Court that the omission was inadvertent, rather than deliberate.

. The hearing court also found that the respondent had violated Rule 8.4(d). The respondent did not except to that finding. Indeed, he agreed with it. Post, 350 Md. at 92, 710 A.2d at 938.

. These cases are to be contrasted with those involving an attorney’s failure to timely file employee withholding tax returns, to remit the taxes withheld, and to hold the withheld taxes in trust, which cases, depending on the findings, may indeed reflect on the attorney’s fitness to practice law because the omission may reflect on the attorney's honesty and trustworthiness. See Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Atkinson, 357 Md. 646, 745 A.2d 1086 (2000); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Wal-man, 280 Md. 453, 374 A.2d 354 (1977). In Walman, the respondent had been convicted of “willful failure to file income tax returns.” Id. at 463, 374 A.2d at 360. The Court stated that, "the crime of which respondent stands convicted represents conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and, under the particular circumstances of this case, reflects upon his fitness to practice law is beyond debate.” (Emphasis added)

. The rest of the sentence is, ", such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income tax return.” Read in its entirety, the Comment supports the Post interpretation of Rule 8.4(b).

. In In the Matter of Gene E. Conn, 715 N.E.2d 379 (Ind.1999), the case was submitted on a Conditional Agreement for Discipline, as was In the Matter of Jan R. Buker, 615 N.E.2d 436 (Ind.1993). Moreover, in Conn, there was an element of concealment of information relevant to the issue of the respondent’s admission to the bar.