Court Opinion

ID: 9961214
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 14:02:54.249725+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:28.124855
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11462     Document: 42-1      Date Filed: 04/18/2024   Page: 1 of 12

                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                     In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                  No. 23-11462
                            Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                        Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        DONNIE JOE SINGLETON,

                                                     Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeals from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Alabama
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cr-00104-KD-N-1
                            ____________________
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        2                     Opinion of the Court                 23-11462

                            ____________________

                                   No. 23-11464
                             Non-Argument Calendar
                            ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                         Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        DONNIE JOE SINGLETON,

                                                     Defendant-Appellant.

                            ____________________

                  Appeals from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Alabama
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:03-cr-00089-KD-C-1
                            ____________________

        Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Donnie Joe Singleton appeals the district court’s revocation
        of his supervised release and his 24-month split sentence that the
        district court imposed after revoking his supervised release.
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        23-11462                Opinion of the Court                           3

        Singleton ﬁrst argues that the district court erred in considering the
        results of his polygraph tests and the resulting admissions because
        his conditions of supervised release allowed only for non-supervi-
        sory polygraph tests for the purpose of his mental health treat-
        ment. Singleton next argues that the district court plainly erred in
        ﬁnding that he had violated the condition of supervised release lim-
        iting his access to the internet. Finally, Singleton asserts that his 24-
        month split sentence is substantively unreasonable. For the reasons
        discussed below, we aﬃrm.
                                           I.
                We review questions of law from a revocation proceeding
        de novo. United States v. Frazier, 26 F.3d 110, 112 (11th Cir. 1994). We
        review the revocation of a defendant’s supervised release for an
        abuse of discretion. Id. A district court’s ﬁndings of fact during a
        revocation of supervised release hearing “are binding on this
        [C]ourt unless clearly erroneous.” United States v. Almand, 992 F.2d
        316, 318 (11th Cir. 1993) (quotation marks omitted). “Where the
        evidence has two possible interpretations, the district court’s
        choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” United States v.
        Foster, 155 F.3d 1329, 1331 (11th Cir. 1998). But arguments not
        raised before the district court are reviewed for plain error. United
        States v. Moore, 22 F.4th 1258, 1264 (11th Cir. 2022.
               Issues not raised in an appellant’s initial brief are deemed
        abandoned and will not be addressed absent extraordinary circum-
        stances. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022)
        (en banc).
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11462

                A district court may revoke a defendant’s supervised release
        if it “ﬁnds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
        violated a condition of supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).
        The preponderance of the evidence standard “simply requires the
        trier of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable
        than its nonexistence.” United States v. Trainor, 376 F.3d 1325, 1331
        (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted).
               We have held that the Sixth Amendment does not apply in
        hearings for the revocation of supervised release, probation, or pa-
        role. United States v. Reese, 775 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th Cir. 2015). We
        have similarly held that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply
        in supervised release revocation hearings. Frazier, 26 F.3d at 114.
        “Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in supervised
        release revocation hearings…[d]efendants involved in revocation
        proceedings are entitled to certain minimal due process require-
        ments.” Id. (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (involving
        parole revocation) and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (in-
        volving probation revocation)).
               In examining the admissibility of polygraph tests at trial un-
        der the Federal Rules of Evidence, we have limited such evidence
        to two situations, namely: (1) where the parties have stipulated to
        the circumstances of the test and the scope of its admissibility; or
        (2) to impeach or corroborate witness testimony. United States v.
        Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1536 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc). However,
        in the context of supervised release, we have recognized that a dis-
        trict court may impose polygraph testing as a condition of
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        23-11462               Opinion of the Court                        5

        supervised release. United States v. Taylor, 338 F.3d 1280, 1283-84
        (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1089-90 (11th
        Cir. 2003).
               In Zinn, the district court imposed a special condition of su-
        pervised release that ordered Zinn to “participate as directed in a
        program of mental health treatment including a sexual oﬀender
        treatment program” and to “abide by the rules, requirements and
        conditions of the treatment program, including submitting to pol-
        ygraph testing…to aid in the treatment and supervision process.”
        Zinn, 321 F.3d at 1086. We held that the requirement was permis-
        sible as polygraph testing to ensure compliance with probationary
        terms was both reasonably related to Zinn’s oﬀense and personal
        history, and as the tests, when reasonably applied, would not un-
        duly burden his rights. Id. at 1090.
                In Taylor, the district court imposed a special condition of
        supervised release that ordered Taylor to “participate in a mental
        health program specializing in sexual oﬀender treatment approved
        by the probation oﬃcer, and abide by the rules, requirements and
        conditions of the treatment program, including submitting to pol-
        ygraph testing to aid in the treatment and supervision process.”
        Taylor, 338 F.3d at 1283. We held that the condition was permissible
        as it helped ensure Taylor’s compliance with the terms of super-
        vised release and helped ensure that he received the required men-
        tal treatment. Id. We noted that examinations of this kind help
        ensure compliance with the conditions of supervised release. Id.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11462

        n.2 (citing Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1364, 1369-70 (11th
        Cir.1982)).
                We have “recognized the vital role probation oﬃcers fulﬁll
        in eﬀectuating the district court’s sentence.” Zinn, 321 F.3d at 1092.
        We have held that a probation oﬃcer is an “arm of the court” and
        a “liaison between the sentencing court . . . and the defendant.”
        United States v. Bernardine, 237 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2001) (quo-
        tation marks omitted). A probation oﬃcer is statutorily mandated
        to perform enumerated duties and any other duty that the court
        may designate. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 3603(10).
                As an initial matter, the government argues on appeal that
        Singleton’s arguments about his post-polygraph statements should
        be reviewed for plain error as he failed to raise them before the dis-
        trict court. But during his revocation hearing, Singleton objected
        to both the consideration of the polygraph results and the things
        leading from it. This was suﬃcient to preserve his current chal-
        lenge. Additionally, on appeal Singleton challenges the district
        court’s consideration of his polygraph test results only on the
        ground that the use of supervisory polygraph testing was not
        within the scope of his conditions of supervised release. He has
        not challenged the general admissibility of polygraph results at a
        revocation hearing nor raised any constitutional challenges arising
        from the use of the polygraph testing in revoking his supervised
        release. Accordingly, he has abandoned any such arguments.
        Campbell, 26 F.4th at 873.
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        23-11462               Opinion of the Court                        7

               Here, we conclude that the district court did not err in con-
        sidering the polygraph test results and the resulting admissions.
        Singleton’s terms of supervised release mandated that he “shall
        participate in a program of mental health treatment/sex oﬀender
        treatment, evaluation, testing, clinical polygraphs and other assess-
        ment instruments, as directed by the Probation Oﬃce.” While less
        clearly stated than in Zinn or Taylor, the condition authorizes the
        probation oﬃce to order polygraph testing, as was conducted in
        this case. Even assuming, arguendo, that “clinical polygraphs” were
        limited to polygraphs used solely for Singleton’s mental health, the
        polygraphs here fall within the catch-all provision of “other assess-
        ment instruments.” Accordingly, the district court did not err in
        considering the polygraph test results and Singleton’s later admis-
        sions as the polygraph tests were authorized by his conditions of
        supervised release. We thus aﬃrm as to this issue.
                                         II.
              The Sentencing Guidelines provide special conditions of su-
        pervised release. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d). The Guidelines recommend
        a “computer” or “interactive computer service” restriction for a de-
        fendant who has committed a sex oﬀense, including coercion and
        enticement of a minor and receipt and transportation of child por-
        nography, in which the defendant used such items. Id.
        § 5D1.3(d)(7)(B); id. § 5D1.2, comment. (n.1(A)(ii)).
               We have “uniformly upheld conditions prohibiting defend-
        ants convicted of sex oﬀenses from accessing a computer or the
        Internet for the duration of their supervised release.” United States
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 23-11462

        v. Carpenter, 803 F.3d 1224, 1239 (11th Cir. 2015). In Zinn, we held
        that a special condition restricting the defendant’s internet usage
        was not overly broad because he could still use the internet for valid
        purposes by obtaining his probation oﬃcer’s prior permission. 321
        F.3d at 1093. In doing so, we recognized the importance of the in-
        ternet in society, but noted that “the particular facts of [the] case
        highlight the concomitant dangers of the Internet and the need to
        protect both the public and sex oﬀenders themselves from its po-
        tential abuses.” Id. Additionally, in Taylor, we concluded that a spe-
        cial condition restricting the defendant’s internet usage was “unde-
        niably related” to the § 3553(a) factors, especially considering that
        the defendant “used the internet as a tool” in the underlying of-
        fense. 338 F.3d at 1285. We have favorably cited Zinn and Taylor to
        uphold computer and internet use restrictions, including life-time
        restrictions on computer and internet use. See, e.g., United States v.
        Bobal, 981 F.3d 971, 976 (11th Cir. 2020) (applying Zinn); Carpenter,
        803 F.3d at 1239 (applying Zinn and Taylor).
               Because Singleton failed to challenge the district court’s in-
        terpretation and application of his supervisory conditions before
        the district court, we review only for plain error. Moore, 22 F.4th at
        1264.
               Here, we conclude that the district court did not plainly err
        in ﬁnding that Singleton had violated his conditions of supervised
        release by using an online streaming service. Singleton’s terms of
        supervised release stated that he “shall not possess or use a com-
        puter with access to any on-line computer service at any location
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        23-11462                Opinion of the Court                          9

        (including employment) without the permission of the Probation
        Oﬃce.” Despite this, he admitted in a signed aﬃdavit to using a
        device connected to the internet to stream documentaries contain-
        ing naked children from an internet based streaming platform,
        namely Netﬂix. This constitutes a clear breach of his supervisory
        conditions and, to the extent that he argues that such a condition
        exceeds the permitted scope of supervisory conditions, his argu-
        ments are meritless. See Zinn, 321 F.3d at 1093. We thus aﬃrm as
        to this issue.
                                          III.
               The substantive reasonableness of a sentence imposed upon
        the revocation of supervised release is normally reviewed under
        the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Trailer,
        827 F.3d 933, 935 (11th Cir. 2016). A defendant may preserve an
        objection to the substantive reasonableness of a sentence by advo-
        cating for a shorter sentence before the district court, thereby argu-
        ing that a shorter sentence would have been suﬃcient, and a longer
        sentence greater than necessary, to comply with statutory purposes
        of punishment. Holguin-Hernandez v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 762,
        767 (2020).
               We will vacate the sentence “if, but only if, [it we are] left
        with the deﬁnite and ﬁrm conviction that the district court com-
        mitted a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors
        by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable
        sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Irey, 612
        F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation marks
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  23-11462

        omitted). We may not “set aside a sentence merely because [it]
        would have decided that another one is more appropriate,” because
        the district court’s sentence need only be “a reasonable one.” Id. at
        1191. The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of
        showing it to be unreasonable in light of the record and the
        § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Langston, 590 F.3d 1226, 1236 (11th
        Cir. 2009).
                The district court must issue a sentence “suﬃcient, but not
        greater than necessary” to comply with the purposes of 18 U.S.C.
        § 3553(a)(2). 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). These purposes include the need
        for a sentence to reﬂect the seriousness of the oﬀense, promote re-
        spect for the law, provide just punishment, deter criminal conduct,
        and protect the public from future criminal conduct. Id.
        § 3553(a)(2). Additional considerations include the nature and cir-
        cumstances of the oﬀense, the history and characteristics of the
        defendant, the applicable guideline range, the need to avoid unwar-
        ranted sentence disparities among similarly situated defendants,
        and the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commis-
        sion. Id. § 3553(a)(1)-(7). The weight due each § 3553(a) factor lies
        within the district court’s sound discretion, and we will not substi-
        tute its judgment for that of the district court. United States v. Jo-
        seph, 978 F.3d 1251, 1266 (11th Cir. 2020). However, a district court
        can abuse its discretion when it (1) fails to consider relevant factors
        that were due signiﬁcant weight, (2) gives signiﬁcant weight to an
        improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judg-
        ment by balancing the proper factors unreasonably. United States v.
        Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1326-27 (11th Cir. 2013). Nevertheless, a
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        23-11462               Opinion of the Court                       11

        district court may reasonably attach great weight to a single factor.
        Id. at 1327. We have “upheld large upward deviations based solely
        on an oﬀender’s extensive criminal history.” United States v. Osorio-
        Moreno, 814 F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2016).
               Here, we conclude that the district court’s 24-month split
        sentence is substantively reasonable. On appeal, Singleton argues
        that the district court placed too much weight on his prior criminal
        history, inﬂating his sentence beyond what was reasonable given
        his violations. However, a district court may reasonably attach
        great weight to a single factor and we have upheld large upward
        deviations based solely on an oﬀender’s extensive criminal history.
        Kuhlman, 711 F.3d at 1327; Osorio-Moreno, 814 F.3d at 1288. In this
        case, Singleton’s extensive criminal history involved the abuse of
        children and various child pornography oﬀenses, one of which he
        committed while on supervised release. Despite this, less than two
        months after being released from custody Singleton again violated
        his conditions of supervised release, establishing a residence within
        2,000 feet of a daycare and accessing the internet. Given this, we
        conclude that the district court did not commit a “clear error of
        judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors” by imposing a 24-
        month split sentence. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190. Accordingly, we af-
        ﬁrm in this respect as well.
                                         IV.
              For all these reasons, we affirm the district court’s revoca-
        tion of Singleton’s supervised release and the 24-month split
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        12                    Opinion of the Court                23-11462

        sentence imposed by the district court after the revocation of Sin-
        gleton’s supervised release.
              AFFIRMED.