Court Opinion

ID: 9955615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 20:10:45.354889+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:08.119271
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Ramey v. Walmart, Inc., 2024-Ohio-1185.]

                                       COURT OF APPEALS
                                      KNOX COUNTY, OHIO
                                   FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

CHERYL RAMEY                                        :   JUDGES:
                                                    :   Hon. John W. Wise, P.J.
        Plaintiff-Appellant                         :   Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
                                                    :   Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
-vs-                                                :
                                                    :
WALMART, INC.                                       :   Case No. 23CA000012
                                                    :
        Defendant-Appellee                          :   OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                                Appeal from the Court of Common
                                                        Pleas, Case No. 22PI04-0077

JUDGMENT:                                               Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT:                                       March 28, 2024

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellant                                 For Defendant-Appellee

TERRY V. HUMMEL                                         KELLY GRIGSBY JONES
115 West Main Street, Suite 100                         REBECCA J. JOHNSON
Columbus, OH 43215                                      445 Hutchinson Ave. Suite 600
                                                        Columbus, OH 43235
Knox County, Case No. 23CA000012                                                         2

King, J.

       {¶ 1} Plaintiff-Appellant Cheryl Ramey appeals the decision of the Knox County

Court of Common Pleas which granted Defendant-Appellee Walmart Inc.'s motion for

summary judgment. We affirm the trial court.

                              Facts and Procedural History

       {¶ 2} On May 20, 2018, at approximately 6:00 p.m., Appellant arrived at a Knox

County Walmart to pick up a prescription. Appellant had visited this Walmart more than

50 times previously. On this occasion, it had been raining and the sky was overcast.

Appellant exited her car and started walking towards a shopping cart located in a

handicapped parking spot. As she did, her attention was focused on the cart, however,

she also noted puddles in different areas of the parking lot. Before Appellant reached the

cart, she stepped on the outside edge of a water-filled pothole, lost her balance and fell.

She sustained injury to her right knee and right elbow. Transcript of deposition of Cheryl

Ramey (T.), January 18, 2021 43-45, 59.

       {¶ 3} Appellant subsequently entered the store and filled out an incident report.

After leaving the store, Appellant took photos of the area where she fell, but took no

measurements. She then went to an urgent care where she was treated for injuries to her

knee and elbow.

       {¶ 4} In May, 2020, Appellant filed a complaint in the Knox County Court of

Common Pleas alleging Walmart, Inc. acted negligently, willfully, wantonly, and with

reckless disregard for the safety of its invitees by failing to warn of the pothole, block

access to the pothole, and properly maintain and repair the parking lot. Appellant alleged
Knox County, Case No. 23CA000012                                                       3

Walmart Inc. was therefore liable for her injuries and damages. In April 2020, the matter

was dismissed without prejudice.

      {¶ 5} Appellant refiled her complaint in April 2022. In July, 2023, Walmart, Inc.

filed a motion for summary judgment arguing it owed no duty to Appellant because her

claim was barred by the open and obvious doctrine. Appellant filed a motion in opposition

alleging attendant circumstances present at the time of her fall created a genuine issue

of material fact as to whether the danger was open and obvious.

      {¶ 6} On August 30, 2023, the trial court granted Walmart, Inc.'s motion for

summary judgment.

      {¶ 7} Appellant timely filed an appeal and the matter is now before this court for

consideration. She raises two assignments of error as follow:

                                            I

      {¶ 8} "WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHERE IT DETERMINED NO GENUINE

DISPUTES OF MATERIAL FACT REMAIN AS TO WHETHER THE POTHOLE WAS

OPEN AND OBVIOUS."

                                           II

      {¶ 9} "WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHERE IT DETERMINED NO GENUINE

DISPUTED OF MATERIAL FACT REMAIN AS TO WHETHER ATTENDANT

CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED THAT CONTRIBUTED TO CHERYL RAMEY’S FALL. "

                                          I, II
Knox County, Case No. 23CA000012                                                        4

       {¶ 10} For ease of discussion, we address Appellant's assignments of error

together. In her assignments of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in granting

summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact exists, specifically whether

the pothole was open and obvious and even if it was, whether attendant circumstances

contributed to her fall.

                                   Standard of Review

       {¶ 11} Summary judgment motions are to be resolved in light of the dictates of

Civ.R. 56. Regarding summary judgment, the Supreme Court of Ohio stated the following

in State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Tompkins, 75 Ohio St.3d 447, 448, 663 N.E.2d 639 (1996):

              Civ.R. 56(C) provides that before summary judgment may be

              granted, it must be determined that (1) no genuine issue as to any

              material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled

              to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it appears from the evidence

              that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing

              such evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that

              conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for

              summary judgment is made. State ex rel. Parsons v. Fleming (1994),

              68 Ohio St.3d 509, 511, 628 N.E.2d 1377, 1379, citing Temple v.

              Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 4 O.O.3d 466,

              472, 364 N.E.2d 267, 274.
Knox County, Case No. 23CA000012                                                        5

      {¶ 12} As an appellate court reviewing summary judgment motions, we must stand

place of the trial court and review summary judgments on the same standard and

evidence as the trial court. Smiddy v. The Wedding Party, Inc., 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 506

N.E.2d 212 (1987).

      {¶ 13} As further explained by this court in Leech v. Schumaker, 5th Dist. Richland

No. 15CA56, 2015-Ohio-4444, ¶ 13:

             It is well established the party seeking summary judgment bears the

             burden of demonstrating that no issues of material fact exist for trial.

             Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986), 477 U.S. 317, 330, 106 S.Ct. 2548,

             91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The standard for granting summary judgment

             is delineated in Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280 at 293: "*

             * * a party seeking summary judgment, on the ground that the

             nonmoving party cannot prove its case, bears the initial burden of

             informing the trial court of the basis for the motion, and identifying

             those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a

             genuine issue of material fact on the essential element(s) of the

             nonmoving party's claims. The moving party cannot discharge its

             initial burden under Civ.R. 56 simply by making a conclusory

             assertion the nonmoving party has no evidence to prove its case.

             Rather, the moving party must be able to specifically point to some

             evidence of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) which affirmatively

             demonstrates the nonmoving party has no evidence to support the
Knox County, Case No. 23CA000012                                                           6

              nonmoving party's claims. If the moving party fails to satisfy its initial

              burden, the motion for summary judgment must be denied. However,

              if the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the nonmoving

              party then has a reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth

              specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial and, if the

              nonmovant does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,

              shall be entered against the nonmoving party." The record on

              summary judgment must be viewed in the light most favorable to the

              opposing party. Williams v. First United Church of Christ (1974), 37

              Ohio St.2d 150.

                                 Open and Obvious

       {¶ 14} There is no dispute that Appellant was a business invitee. Therefore,

Walmart, Inc. owed Appellant "a duty of ordinary care in maintaining the premises in a

reasonably safe condition so that its customers are not unnecessarily and unreasonably

exposed to danger." Paschal v. Rite Aid Pharmacy, Inc., 18 Ohio St.3d 203, 203, 480

N.E.2d 474 (1985) (Citation omitted). "Keeping the premises in a reasonably safe

condition generally means that a premises owner (1) must not create a dangerous

condition on its premises, and (2) must warn its invitees of latent or concealed dangers,

if the premises owner has actual or constructive knowledge of those dangers." Ray v.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 4th Dist. Washington No. 12CA21, 2013-Ohio-2684, 993 N.E.2d

808, ¶ 18 (Citation omitted).

       {¶ 15} In Armstrong v. Best Buy Company, Inc., 99 Ohio St.3d 79, 788 N.E.2d

1088, 2003-Ohio-2573 ¶ 13, the Supreme Court of Ohio explained:
Knox County, Case No. 23CA000012                                                           7

              By focusing on the duty prong of negligence, the rule properly

              considers the nature of the dangerous condition itself, as opposed to

              the nature of the plaintiff's conduct in encountering it. The fact that a

              plaintiff was unreasonable in choosing to encounter the danger is not

              what relieves the property owner of liability. Rather, it is the fact that

              the condition itself is so obvious that it absolves the property owner

              from taking any further action to protect the plaintiff.

       {¶ 16} Further, "the landowner's duty is not to be determined by questioning

'whether the [condition] could have been made perfect or foolproof. The issue is whether

the conditions that did exist were open and obvious to any person exercising reasonable

care and watching where she was going.' " Jackson v. Pike County Board of

Commissioners, 4th Dist. Pike No. 10CA805, 2010-Ohio-4875, ¶ 18, quoting Orens v.

Ricardo's Restaurant, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 70403, 1996 WL 661024 (Nov. 14, 1996).

"Open and obvious dangers are not hidden, are not concealed from view, and are

discoverable upon ordinary inspection." Zambo v. Tom–Car Foods, 9th Dist. Lorain No.

09CA009619, 2010-Ohio-474, 2010 WL 520804, ¶ 8.

       {¶ 17} When determining whether a danger is open and obvious, the law uses an

objective, not subjective, standard. Freeman v. Value City Dept. Store, 5th Dist. Stark No.

2010 CA 00034, 2010-Ohio-4634 at paragraph 17. The fact that a particular appellant is

not aware of the hazard is not dispositive of the issue. Id. It is the objective, reasonable

person that must find the danger is not obvious or apparent. Id. The determinative issue
Knox County, Case No. 23CA000012                                                       8

is whether the condition is observable. Aycock v. Sandy Valley Church of God, 5th Dist.

Tuscarawas No. 2006AP090054, 2008-Ohio-105, 2008 WL 115829.

                                Attendant Circumstance

      {¶ 18} Appellant argues that even if the pothole was open and obvious, attendant

circumstances existed to negate the open and obvious doctrine. As explained the Twelfth

District in Vanderbilt v. Pier 27, LLC, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2013–02–029, ¶ 19:

             Attendant circumstances are an exception to the open and obvious

             doctrine. Colvin v. Kroger Co., Inc., 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2005–

             07–026, 2006–Ohio–1151, 2006 WL 589381, ¶ 15; McGuire v.

             Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 Ohio App.3d 494, 498, 693 N.E.2d 807

             (1st Dist.1998). Attendant circumstances are "distractions that

             contribute to an injury by diverting the attention of the injured party

             and reduce the degree of care an ordinary person would exercise at

             the time." Galinari v. Koop, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2006-10-086,

             2007-Ohio-4540, 2007 WL 2482673, ¶ 21; Armentrout v. Meyer's

             Garden Ctr. & Landscaping, Inc., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2004–12–

             315, 2005–Ohio–5901, 2005 WL 2936698, ¶ 11. In turn, for this

             exception to apply, "[a]n attendant circumstance must divert the

             attention of the injured party, significantly enhance the danger of the

             defect, and contribute to the injury." Forste v. Oakview Constr., Inc.,

             12th Dist. Warren No. CA2009-05-054, 2009-Ohio-5516, 2009 WL

             3350450, ¶ 22; Isaacs v. Meijer, Inc., 12th Dist. Clermont No.
Knox County, Case No. 23CA000012                                                       9

             CA2005-10-098, 2006-Ohio-1439, 2006 WL 766692, ¶ 16. Attendant

             circumstances may include such things as the time of day, lack of

             familiarity with the route taken, and lighting conditions. Hart v.

             Dockside Townhomes, Ltd., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2000–11–222,

             2001 WL 649763, *2 (June 11, 2001).

                                     Analysis

      {¶ 19} During her deposition, Appellant testified it had been raining when she

arrived at Walmart, and she observed puddles in the parking lot. Specifically, she stated

"I just got out of the car and started towards the door. And it had been raining. I saw

puddles. Stepped on the edge of the puddle. I was going towards the cart to use the cart.

And that’s when it happened, and I fell." T. 43. Questioned regarding her intent when she

saw the puddle, Appellant stated "I remember stepping on the edge and that's when I lost

my balance and fell down." T. 44.

      {¶ 20} Appellant was also questioned regarding the lighting in the parking lot as

well as additional questioning regarding her intent when encountering the puddle:

             Q. How was the lighting in the area where you fell? Was it adequately

             lit?

             A. It was gloomy. The sun was not shining. It wasn't dark, dark. There

             was still some light.
Knox County, Case No. 23CA000012                                                         10

             q. Were overhead lights on at all?

             A. I don't recall.

             Q. Could you see your surroundings with the lights as it was?

             A. Yes.

             Q. Was there any reason that, because of the light, you felt you

             couldn't see to walk through the parking lot?

             A. No.

             Q. And so you indicated just before that you intended to step outside

             the puddle. Correct?

             A. Yes.

             Q. Did you trip on anything?

             A. No.

             Q. That caused this fall?

             A. No.

      {¶ 21} T. 44-45

      {¶ 22} After making a report of the incident inside the store and receiving first aid,

Appellant returned to the parking lot and took photos of the area where she fell. She did

not take any measurements of the pothole.

      {¶ 23} We first find the trial court correctly found the puddle was an open and

obvious danger. Appellant argues Walmart, Inc. failed to address what she sees as the

operative question, whether the pothole itself, and not the collection of water was open

and obvious. However, Appellant testified she observed standing water in several areas
Knox County, Case No. 23CA000012                                                          11

of the parking lot, that she actively attempted to avoid the puddle where she fell, but then

lost her balance and fell. Viewing the matter objectively, the collection of water, in and of

itself, serves as a warning that the surface of the asphalt under the water is at least

marginally lower that the surface of the water.

       {¶ 24} As noted by our brethren in the Sixth District Court of Appeals: "[a]

reasonable person would appreciate that the area near standing water always presents

a danger." Madison v. Raceway Park, Inc., 6th Dist. Lucas No. 2009-Ohio-4068 ¶ 23,

appeal not allowed, 123 Ohio St.3d 1524, 918 N.E.2d 526 (Table), 2009-Ohio-6487.

While it might be arguable that the depth of the puddle is a latent danger, that is not the

issue before us. Appellant argues Madison addressed potentially muddy conditions under

standing water and is thus inapplicable here. However, we find this argument to be a

distinction without difference. The pothole was not hidden from view and was

discoverable upon ordinary inspection based on the collection of standing water.

Likewise, whether the depth of the puddle was observable is an issue without impact on

the situation before us.

       {¶ 25} Failing an open and obvious finding, Appellant argues attendant

circumstances existed to negate the open and obvious doctrine. She argues her focus

was on the direction in which she was walking and on the shopping cart near the puddle

which she intended to take into the store. She argues therefore, it is unreasonable to

assume she should have been staring at the ground as she walked toward the cart. She

additionally argues the puddles were obscured by shadows cast by light posts in the

parking lot.
Knox County, Case No. 23CA000012                                                           12

       {¶ 26} We first note Appellant's deposition testimony contradicts her arguments

here. As outlined above, Appellant's attention was on the puddles in the parking lot. She

not only noticed them, she attempted to avoid the puddle where she lost her balance and

fell. Moreover, she testified that when she arrived at Walmart, the sun was not shining. It

was overcast and gloomy. In support of her contention here that shadows contributed to

her fall, Appellant points to the photos taken of the area which depict a sun-lit parking lot.

The photos, however, were taken after her fall. T. 67–68, deposition of Shari Devinney,

13.

       {¶ 27} Moreover, even if shadows had been present in the parking lot, in Gordan

v. Dziak, 8th Dist. No. 88882, 2008-Ohio-570 at ¶ 50 the Eighth District Court of Appeals

flatly rejected the argument that shadows constitute attendant circumstances. In that

sidewalk trip and fall case the court noted "an argument that an undisclosed presence of

shadows near a residence could be dangerous, stretches the attendant circumstances

rule beyond reasonable comprehension. France, supra at 8. This is because a person

should not be held liable where he or she had no control over shadows caused by the

sun. Hess v. One Americana Ltd. Partnership (Mar. 14, 2002), 10th Dist. No. 01AP-1200,

2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1071 at 7, 2002 WL 392368."

       {¶ 28} Based on the forgoing, Appellant's two assignments of error are overruled.

The decision of the Knox County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

By King, J.,

Wise, P.J. and

Baldwin, J. concur.