Court Opinion

ID: 9710339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:07:15.062625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:55.998340
License: Public Domain

DANA, J.,
with whom SAUFLEY, J. joins, dissenting.
[¶ 13] I respectfully dissent. Athough I agree that the Waterboro Board of Selectmen retains discretion not to bring an enforcement action, I do not agree that a judicial determination as to the meaning of the Waterboro ordinance is therefore advisory and not a judicial function. The Wa-terboro ZBA exists, inter alia, “to receive hear, and decide appeals from interpretations of this ordinance.... ” WateRboeo Zoning Ordinance § 10.01. The Waterboro ordinance expressly provides that the ZBA’s “interpretation of any word, phrase, or provision of this ordinance called in question shall be ... subject ... to judicial review.” Waterboro Zoning Ordinance § 13.02, supra note 1 of the Court’s opinion. By contrast, in Pepperman v. Town of Rangeley, 659 A.2d 280 (Me.1995), we held that the Rangeley ordinance did not provide for judicial review of a CEO’s violation determination. Id. at 281-82.
[¶ 14] When a municipality refuses to bring an enforcement action because it believes that its ordinance has not been violated, we permit a neighbor to challenge that legal (as distinguished from discretionary) determination. See, e.g., Richert v. City of South Portland, 1999 ME 179, 740 A.2d 1000 (successful appeal from a city’s refusal to bring an enforcement action because of the mistaken belief that the ordinance was not being violated); Toussaint v. Town of Harpswell, 1997 ME 189, 698 A.2d 1063 (same).
[¶ 15] Courts in other jurisdictions recognize their responsibility in this regard. The Missouri Court of Appeals considered a case in which a neighbor requested the Code Enforcement Officer to issue a stop order to a game hunting facility that was using clay pigeons for target shooting. Ode v. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment of Platte County, 796 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Mo.Ct.App.1990). The CEO denied the request, and the Board of Zoning Adjustment affirmed. The circuit court vacated, holding that the activity violated the special use permit that allowed only live bird hunting at the facility. Id. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that “[t]he Board’s failure to require enforcement of the limitations contained within the special use *1163permit granted [the game hunting facility] a de facto special use permit to establish a shooting range to shoot clay pigeons.” Id. at 84. Here, it could be argued that the Board of Selectmen granted Foglio a permit to reestablish an abandoned gravel pit.
[¶16] When the ordinance expressly provides that the ZBA’s interpretation of the ordinance is subject to judicial review, and the ZBA bases its decision on an interpretation of the ordinance, there is clear precedent for review of that interpretation. The Court should, therefore, review and correct the ZBA’s interpretation and then remand for the Board of Selectmen to determine whether to commence an enforcement proceeding based on a legally correct interpretation of the ordinance. See, e.g., Richert, 1999 ME 179, ¶ 9, 740 A.2d at 1008. I do not assume, as the Court may, that the Board of Selectmen will not bring an enforcement action when we inform it that the Foglio gravel pit violates the Town’s ordinance.
[¶ 17] I would take the appeal and affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.