Court Opinion

ID: 9730086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:00:38.482932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:04.006500
License: Public Domain

SCHULTZ, Justice
(dissenting).
Because I cannot agree with the majority’s holding that defendant’s confession was inadmissible, I respectfully dissent.
In the circumstances of this case, I would affirm the trial court’s finding that the officers’ efforts complied with Iowa Code section 232.11(2). I do not believe the officers moved too rapidly or that the record supports an inference that this particular defendant was confused by the written waiver he voluntarily executed. In sum, I would affirm the trial court’s ruling denying defendant’s motion to suppress his confession.
My first disagreement with the majority opinion concerns its overriding of the district court’s finding of fact concerning compliance with section 232.11(2). The pertinent portion of this section prevents a child of sixteen years of age or older from waiving the assistance of counsel unless
a good faith effort has been made to notify the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian the child has been taken into *245custody and of the alleged delinquent act for which the child has been taken into custody, the location of the child, and the right of the parent, guardian, or custodian to visit and confer with the child.
What does this section require from the officer? Plainly, it calls for a “good faith effort” by the officer to locate and inform the proper person. “Good faith” describes “that state of mind denoting honesty of purpose” and generally means “being faithful to one’s duty or obligation.” Black’s Law Dictionary (5th Ed.1979). “Effort” is defined as “an attempt; an endeavor; a struggle directed to the accomplishment of an object.” Id. A “good faith effort” does not require success. It requires an honest attempt to locate the person and pass on the required information. When the delivery of the message is thwarted by the recipient’s outright refusal to accept the information, the requirements are met. Such a rebuff need not be an express rejection but may be inferred from the recipient’s statements, actions and conduct. Whether or not a “good faith effort” has been made is an issue of fact for determination by the fact finder, here the trial court.
The trial court summarized the facts concerning the father’s reception of the officer’s phone calls to him as follows:
The fact that the officer did not specifically detail the nature of the alleged delinquent act under the circumstances in this case would not constitute a less than good faith effort to notify. It is apparent from the evidence that the defendant’s father was very busy at the time he was contacted on the phone. He indicated he would be unable to get off work. He did not in any way indicate that he would come to the station to confer with his son or visit with him at any specific time. His reaction to the information given to him when he did come to the station indicates his lack of interest in conferring or visiting with his son in regard to the criminal or delinquent act involved in this case.
The trial court ultimately found that a good faith effort was made to notify the child’s parents as required under Iowa Code section 232.11(2).
Without specifically stating its mode of review, the majority rejects this finding and makes an independent determination that the State did not meet its burden to prove its officers complied with the statute and obtained a valid waiver of counsel. Where a statutory violation is alleged, rather than a constitutional violation, de novo review is inappropriate. See State v. Brant, 253 N.W.2d 253, 256 (Iowa 1977).
In reviewing the trial court’s disposition, we accord its fact-findings the effect of a jury verdict. See State v. York, 293 N.W.2d 13,14 (Iowa 1980). We examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, accept all legitimate inferences that may reasonably be deducted thereon and uphold the findings if there is any substantial evidence in the record to support it. E.g., State v. Rich, 305 N.W.2d 739, 741 (Iowa 1981). Guided by these principles, a review of the record is in order.
The facts demonstrate a concerted effort to locate and notify the parents. Defendant arrived at the police station at 3:41 p.m. The police knew the defendant, age seventeen and one-half, was in the sole custody of his mother. They took steps to locate her by calling her home ten times. When they learned that she might be in Sioux City seeking advice concerning drug rehabilitation treatment for the defendant, they unsuccessfully tried to contact the Department of Social Services since they thought the Department secured a ride for her or knew her designation. They contacted her parents, who only knew that she had gone to Sioux City. They also dispatched a car to her home without success.
The officer knew of the father, but was not aware he was in town. On a previous arrest, only the mother had been contacted. Defendant told the officer where his father was employed, and at 5:00 p.m. the officer called him. He was an employee of the local Hardee’s restaurant that is normally *246open until 11:00 p.m. or midnight. When they contacted Mr. Walker, he indicated that he could not possibly leave work and expressed no interest in talking to his son. He did say he would come down after work. The officer indicated that the father did not specify the time, and he was not sure the father would show up.
The communication between the officer and the father and the impressions made on the officer by the father are important in our determination of the sufficiency of the evidence. Defendant’s father in his testimony described the call as follows:
Q. Did you ask what offense had been charged?
A. No. All I know is that — because we are busy at the time, when you are working like that they won’t let you — you are not allowed to have any. Unless it is a real emergency they won’t let — allow you to have any kind of calls.
Q. Okay. But you didn’t ask what offense he had been charged with?
A. All I know is they told me they picked him up.
Q. And you were in a hurry to get off the telephone?
A. Yes, because it is a rush.
Q. Because it was a rush?
A. Between 5:00 and 7:00 there is always a pretty good rush at Har-dee’s.
Q. But they did ask you to come down; right?
A. Yes. I said I would be down there shortly after I got off work.
The officer testified concerning the impressions he received from the father as follows:
Q. Mr. Walker testified, I believe, that you called at a time when he was busy?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you get that impression?
A. Yes, sir. This was my impression.
Q. Did Mr. Walker seem to want to stay on the phone and talk to you about this?
A. No, sir.
Q. Other than saying he would come down after work, whenever that might be, did he make — did he express any interest at all in what was going on?
A. No, sir. My impression was that he really didn’t care.
Q. And he did refuse to come even though you asked him?
A. At that particular time; yes, sir.
The officer’s impression of disinterest and lack of care was later confirmed. When the father did come to the police station at approximately 7:30 p.m. and was informed of the actual charge, he did not exercise his right to visit with his son because he did not want to see him.
After a phone conversation with the father, the officer consulted with his superiors and the county attorney. These individuals decided that a good faith effort had been made to comply with the statutory requirements. With this assurance, at approximately 6:00 p.m., the officer confronted defendant with his glasses that were found in the burglarized drug store. Defendant had previously been advised of his “Miranda rights” and at this time made admissions and signed a written statement.
I would not hold as a matter of law that the officer failed to make a good faith effort to notify both parents as required by section 232.11(2). The mother was unavailable. It is clear the father’s first concern was his job. He made it plain that he had little interest in visiting and conferring with his son. Although the-officer did not specify the charge against the defendant, the totality of the evidence shows the father did not wish to take the time from his work to discuss this matter and that detailing the charge would not have resulted in an immediate visit by the father with the defendant. The trial court could properly infer that the officer in good faith attempted to comply with section 232.11(2) but was thwarted from completing his message by *247the father’s indifference to his son’s plight and his preoccupation with his work.
Additionally, I do not agree with the majority’s assessment that the officers moved more rapidly than was reasonably necessary. They made extensive efforts to notify both parents and took the statement over two hours after defendant was taken into custody. They did not know when the mother would appear. They did not know when the father’s shift ended or even if he would appear. In these circumstances, I believe the trial court correctly determined that the State met its burden of compliance with the statute.
Finally, the majority holds that the defendant did not waive his right to counsel because the police officers made an error in obtaining the waiver. The officers had the child execute a printed acknowledgement of his rights which included an admonition that he could not give up his right to have his lawyer present during questioning. This is a right that is presently available to children under 16 and formerly was available to all juveniles until amendment of section 232.11(2). See Acts 1982 (69 G.A.) Chapter 1209, section 2. The majority indicates we must infer that he understood he had a right that could not be waived unless the parent also signed the waiver. Stated otherwise, defendant did not understand his rights and could not waive them due to this misinformation. I cannot agree with this conclusion for two reasons.
First, nowhere in defendant’s brief does he raise any issue concerning the voluntariness of either his waiver of rights or his confession. Rather, his attack is confined to the State’s failure to comply with the requirements of section 232.11(2). The majority has ruled on an issue that defendant has not raised.
Secondly, the totality of the evidence shows that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel and to remain silent. Defendant is experienced with dealing with the police and the courts. He was in juvenile court at age 12, has been under juvenile court supervision and has been arrested several times before. He had the benefit of court-appointed counsel in prior court hearings. The trial court found he was of normal intelligence, and he possessed a G.E.D. He himself testified that he is aware of his right to counsel and is familiar with the “Miranda Rule” and his rights under this doctrine. His probation officer testified that his rights had* been given to him eight to ten times. Additionally, defendant stated that he was not coerced and voluntarily wrote out his own statement. I find nothing in the record to indicate he was confused. There is no justification for an inference that he misunderstood his rights.
In summary, since I agree with the trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress and find no error in the trial court’s refusal to instruct on trespass, I would affirm defendant’s conviction.
REYNOLDSON, C.J., and LARSON, J„ join in this dissent.