Court Opinion

ID: 9725186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:34:02.303039+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:12.114654
License: Public Domain

*130DARDEN, Judge,
dissenting.
I commend Judge Barnes on his thought-provoking and thorough analysis, but I must respectfully dissent.
Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 113 S.Ct. 517, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992), certainly lends flavor to our consideration of what the effect is when a defendant who pled guilty later seeks to have that plea vacated on post-conviction relief because it is “impossible” to reconstruct the guilty plea hearing to show that he was advised of those rights mandated by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). But I believe we must continue to use Boykin as our starting point. As the majority explained in Hall v. State, 819 N.E.2d 102 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), transmitted on transfer March 10, 2004,
the Boykin decision requires that the record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which shows, that the defendant was informed of, and waived, three specified federal constitutional rights: the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment rights to trial by jury and to confront one’s accusers. 395 U.S. at 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274. The Boykin Court held that the waiver of the defendant’s rights cannot be presumed from a silent record.
Id. at 105. With the import of the Boykin rights and Boykin’s mandate in mind, I agree with the majority in Hall that we must be mindful of an important distinction between the legal landscape of applicable Kentucky law in Parke and that of Indiana: in Indiana, the only avenue available for challenging a guilty plea is by a petition for post-conviction relief. See Tumulty v. State, 666 N.E.2d 394 (Ind.1996) (defendant who pleads guilty 'may not challenge the validity of plea upon direct appeal but must pursue post-conviction procedures).
It is also worth noting that Indiana gives greater protections to criminal defendants than required by the U.S. Constitution. See e.g. Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind.1999) (Indiana’s double jeopardy protection); Sims v. State, 274 Ind. 495, 413 N.E.2d 556 (1980) (defendant in custody must be advised of right to counsel before being asked to consent to search); Vaughan v. State, 446 N.E.2d 1 (Ind.Ct.App.1983) (“Indiana has historically afforded the defendant more protection than is mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
In the context of Boykin’s mandate that certain advisements to a defendant contemplating a' guilty plea must not only be made but also be evidenced, I note that our supreme court rules require that records of convictions be maintained and, more particularly, that transcripts of felony guilty plea hearings be maintained for fifty-five years. See'Iná. Criminal Rule 5. I believe this properly reflects the premium placed by public policy on keeping such records, and I believe this record-keeping is a small price to pay when weighed against the potential consequences that a defendant will likely pay if convicted as a recidivist.
Finally, while I risk being thought unduly skeptical of fellow practitioners, it is difficult for me to envision the judge or attorney who will come into court and admit having done something improper in a court proceeding. Thus, I am troubled by the fact that the result of the majority’s conclusion is that if a witness comes into court and testifies that it was his or her practice to follow a certain procedure, this will suffice to establish as a matter of law compliance with a Constitutional requirement. Giving due regard to the effect of time on the human memory, it seems to me that relying on this nonspecific report—that “it was my practice” to do what *131should have been done—is unacceptable to establish a matter having the Constitutional dimensions of Boykin.
For the foregoing reasons, I cannot agree with the burden shifting that the majority has found acceptable until such time as our supreme court adopts this approach, and I would follow the reasoning of the majority in Hall.