Court Opinion

ID: 9705261
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:00:53.780766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:09.311105
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.
¶ 42. (dissenting). This is a very harsh result for Mr. Kierstyn. It is also, in my opinion, an incorrect result.
¶ 43. The Kierstyns asked a public official for advice, the answer to which was in the statutes. The public official gave them an erroneous answer. The Kierstyns, unfortunately, followed that advice. It was a very costly error to Mr. Kierstyn: the difference between approximately $1100 a month, and $400 a month for the rest of his life. The majority says Mr. Kierstyn will have to live with it.
¶ 44. In this case, the benefits specialist, Michael Farrell, undertook to do what he had no legal obligation to do — give the Kierstyns information regarding WRS benefits. Because the statute regarding when to apply for WRS disability benefits leaves no room for interpretation, I would conclude that once Farrell, in his discretion, decided to give the information, he had a ministerial duty to give correct information. Accordingly, I dissent.
*101¶ 45. As the majority accurately states, public officers or employees are immune from liability for injuries arising from any discretionary act which the officer or employee performs as part of his or her governmental employment. Majority op. at 88. The majority also accurately points out that there are exceptions to public officer or employee immunity. Because I conclude that Farrell was performing a ministerial rather than discretionary action in giving the Kierstyns information regarding when to apply for WRS disability benefits, I believe his actions fall within an exception to public official immunity.
¶ 46. As explained in the majority opinion:
A public officer's duty is ministerial only when it is absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely the performance of a specific task when the law imposes, prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion for its performance with such certainty that nothing remains for judgment or discretion.
Majority op. at 91 (quoting Lister v. Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 301, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976)). However, if a public officer or employee chooses, in his or her discretion, to undertake a task, he or she may have a ministerial duty to carry out that task in accord with given rules or statutes. Chart v. Dvorak, 57 Wis. 2d 92, 100-01, 203 N.W.2d 673 (1973) (relying on Firkus v. Rombalski, 25 Wis. 2d 352, 130 N.W.2d 835 (1964)). For example, in Chart, the court determined that once the highway commissioners made the discretionary decision to place a highway warning sign, "they had the duty to place it and maintain it without negligence." Chart, 57 Wis. 2d at 100-01.
¶ 47. Similarly, in Major v. County of Milwaukee, 196 Wis. 2d 939, 539 N.W.2d 472 (Ct. App. 1995), the *102court of appeals determined that Milwaukee County had discretion whether to sell a parcel of property, but "[o]nce those terms of sale were set and reified in the contract,.. .the County was under a ministerial duty to comply." Id. at 944-45. The County was under an "absolute, certain and imperative duty" to not make a representation that it had no knowledge of the presence of toxic materials or conditions affecting the property unless such representation was true. Id. at 945.
¶ 48. The case now before the court presents a similar situation. The majority is correct to point out that the District had no legal obligation to hire a benefits specialist and the benefits specialist, once hired, had no legal obligation to provide District employees with information regarding WRS benefits. Majority op. at 92. However, as in Chart and Major, once the benefits specialist chose, in his discretion, to provide such information, and where the statute leaves no room for interpretation, he had a ministerial duty to give the unambiguous information provided in the statute.
¶ 49. The majority attempts to distinguish Chart and Major by asserting that once the governmental officials in these cases chose to act, they had "a specific legal obligation to do so in a proscribed manner." Majority op. at 93. In Chart, once the public officers chose to erect certain signs, they were obligated to do so in accord with the manner specified by certain rules and statutes. Id. In Major, once the public officers chose to sell a parcel of land and entered a sales contract, they were under a ministerial duty to follow the terms of the contract. Id. The majority attempts to reason in this case, that once Farrell chose to provide benefits information to the Kierstyns "he was under no legal duty to do so in a particular manner or according *103to any particular rules." Id. The majority reaches its conclusion despite the very clear directive of Wis. Stat. § 40.63(8)(f) (reprinted below)1 that a participant in the WRS may apply for a disability annuity as if the last day worked were the last day paid though the employee continues to receive payment for sick time after the last day worked. The majority reaches its conclusion despite the very clear directive of § 40.63(8)(h) (reprinted below)2 that an application for disability benefits is deemed valid only if the department receives the application before the applicant's death. In this case, the unambiguous statutes, *104§ 40.63(8)(f) and (h), leave nothing for judgment or discretion. Cf. Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 301.
¶ 50. I do not see the distinction that the majority attempts to create between this case and Chart and Major. In Chart, the public officials had no legal obligation to erect the highway sign; in Major, the public officials had no legal obligation to sell the parcel of land; in the present case, the benefits specialist had no legal obligation to provide information regarding when to apply for WRS disability benefits to the Kierstyns. In each case the decision to take on the specific task was discretionary.
¶ 51. Similarly, in each case the performance of the undertaken task was ministerial. In Chart, the court determined that it was a factual question whether the placement of the sign complied with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways which required that signs be placed " 'about 750 feet in advance of the hazard or condition warned of. . . .'" Chart, 57 Wis. 2d at 100 (quoting the Manual). In Major, the County represented in its sales contract that it had " 'no notice or knowledge of. . .the presence of any dangerous or toxic materials or conditions affecting the property.'" Major, 196 Wis. 2d at 945 (quoting the sales contract). The court determined that the County had a ministerial duty to not make this representation unless true. "Simply put, Milwaukee County should not have made the representation without checking its files." Id. In the present case, the statute unambiguously provides that an applicant may file an application for a disability annuity before his or her sick leave has been exhausted, Wis. Stat. § 40.63(8)(f), and failure to do so before the applicant's death deems the application invalid, § 40.63(8)(h). The benefits specialist represented to the Kierstyns that *105Mrs. Kierstyn could not apply for a disability annuity until after her sick leave was exhausted. Simply put, Farrell should not have made the representation without checking the unambiguous statute.
¶ 52. Once Farrell, in his discretion, took on the task of providing the Kierstyns with information about when to apply for WRS disability benefits, information provided in an unambiguous statute, I conclude that Farrell had a ministerial duty to provide the correct information. Accordingly, I dissent, and would reverse the court of appeals' decision and remand the case to the circuit court for proceedings on the merits.
¶ 53. I am authorized to state that Justice N. Patrick Crooks joins this dissent.

 Wisconsin Stat. § 40.63(8)(f) provides:
(f) If an employer certifies that an employe's date of termination of employment is being extended past the last day worked due to any payment for accumulated sick leave, vacation or compensatory time, a participating employe may file an application for a disability annuity as if the last day worked were the last day paid. Regardless of the application date for a disability annuity, the date of termination of employment for effective date purposes shall be deemed to be the last day for which the participant was paid, including any payment for accumulated leave, but if a disability annuity application whose application has been approved dies before the last day paid, but after the last day worked, the effective date is the date of death.

 Wisconsin Stat. § 40.63(8)(h) provides:
(h) If an applicant dies prior to the date a decision regarding the approval or disapproval of an application for a disability benefit becomes final under sub. (5), the application is deemed to have been approved prior to the applicant's death if:
1. The applicant was eligible for the disability benefit;
2. The department received an application for the disability benefit in the form approved by the department and at least one written qualifying medical certification required under sub. (l)(d); and
3. The applicant dies on or after the date which would have been the effective date of the disability benefit.