Court Opinion

ID: 9774863
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:36:26.59072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:17.245804
License: Public Domain

OPINION
DAVIS, Commissioner.
Appeal is taken from a conviction for murder. Punishment was assessed at life.
The indictment alleged the offense occurred on or about September 2, 1973, and the record reflects that trial was in March, .1974.
The record reflects that the deceased, John Arthur Manson, was found in a severely wounded condition in his bedroom on September 3, 1973. Deceased was taken to Parkland Hospital, where he died eight days later.
Dr. William Sturner, medical examiner for Dallas County, testified that deceased died from “gunshot wounds, stab wounds and burns of the body.” Dr. Sturner stated that any one of the causes, in and of itself, could have caused death.
In a written confession, appellant stated that he shot and stabbed the deceased. An oral confession by appellant led police to the recovery of appellant’s knife. Appellant’s fingerprints were found on a bottle in the bedroom in which deceased was killed. Tests performed in the Criminal Investigation Laboratory reflected that bullets taken from the body of the deceased were fired from a gun that witness Jordan testified appellant brought to his house on September 2, 1973. Appellant was placed in possession of deceased’s automobile following the occasion in question.
Appellant complains that “the trial court erred in failing to enforce its orders after proper and timely filing by defendant and rulings by the court regarding disclosure of exculpatory evidence after admission at the time of trial by the prosecutor of ‘possible indications of another individual or individuals’ (as being participants in the murder) thus greatly prejudicing the appellant’s right to a fair trial and right of due process.”
It appears that appellant’s contention is directed to the failure of the State to reveal that another person or persons were named by deceased prior to death as his assailants.
The record reflects that before trial began appellant requested the court to order production of exculpatory evidence and in that connection the prosecutor was questioned by appellant relative to identification of one Dale Patrick Williams as having been identified “as a participant in the stabbing and shooting.” The prosecutor answered that there were some indications of possible participation by another individual or individuals, but that he could not verify the reliability of same and that Dale Patrick Williams was no-billed for this offense.
Police officer James Brigdon, who testified as to his investigation of the homicide, was recalled to the stand by appellant and stated that he attempted to talk to deceased in the hospital and, in response to his question “if it was one man,” the deceased “nodded his head yes.” Brigdon further testified that the deceased “nodded affirmatively” when asked if it was more than one man and that deceased “nodded affirmatively to everything I asked him.” In addition, the deceased nodded yes to questions relative to whether “two colored males and a female” were involved, and when asked if he could name the girl Brigdon stated “we wasn’t (sic) really sure what he said” but that he did seem to say Lynn or Linda.
*9James Barnwell, one of the officers who attempted to talk to the deceased in the hospital, testified on cross-examination by appellant that deceased was unable to speak but did nod his head when questions were asked him. According to Barnwell, the deceased nodded no when asked if Linda and two other named persons were involved in the attack on him, but did nod yes when asked if Williams had any part in the torture of him. The record reflects that the medical testimony adduced at the trial was in conflict relative to whether the deceased was able to answer questions calling for a yes or no answer.
The standard to be applied in cases of suppression or nondisclosure of evidence by the State is whether the testimony may have had an effect on the outcome of the trial. Napue v. People of State of Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217; Smith v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 516 S.W.2d 415; Crutcher v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 481 S.W.2d 113; Means v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 429 S.W.2d 490.
The evidence of appellant’s guilt was overwhelming and the evidence relative to other people’s involvement was not only conflicting but came from the deceased at a time when there was serious doubt as to whether the deceased was able to comprehend the questions asked him. Assuming, arguendo, that appellant be correct in his contention that he should have been furnished such information prior to trial, we cannot conclude that such evidence would have exonerated appellant or have been of material importance to the defense. Jackson v. Wainwright, 5 Cir., 390 F.2d 288; Brady v. State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215; United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815, 33 A.L.R.2d 1407, cert. denied, 345 U.S. 904, 73 S.Ct. 639, 97 L.Ed. 1341; Curran v. State of Delaware, 3 Cir., 259 F.2d 707, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 948, 79 S.Ct. 355, 3 L.Ed.2d 353. See Goldstein, “The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure,” 69 Yale L.J. 1149 (1960).
No error is shown.
Appellant next contends “the trial court committed a reversible error in making comments upon the weight of the evidence and the conduct of trial counsel in questioning prosecution witnesses, in violation of Article 38.05, C.C.P.”
Appellant directs our attention to eighteen instances in the record in which he claims the court made improper comments.
This ground of error and the argument thereunder do not comply with the requirements of Art. 40.09, Sec. 9, V.A.C.C.P., which requires that the appellant’s brief “. . . shall set forth separately each ground of error of which defendant desires to complain on appeal.” Washington v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 500 S.W.2d 485; Smith v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 481 S.W.2d 886. We recognize that Sec. 9 of Art. 40.09, supra, further provides that this Court shall review a ground of error . . . notwithstanding any generality, vagueness or other technical defect that may exist in the language employed to set forth such ground of error’ ” if “ ‘in light of arguments made in support thereof’ ” it can be determined “ ‘. . . what point of objection is sought to be presented by such ground of error.’ ” Hunt v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 492 S.W.2d 540. Appellant directs our attention to numerous comments of the court without developing the context in which the same were made and concludes this ground of error by generally briefing the law relating to improper comments by a judge upon the weight of the evidence.
We cannot determine the specific ground of error relied upon by appellant and decline to further consider same because of the failure to comply with Art. 40.09, Sec. 9, V.A.C.C.P.
Appellant contends “the prosecutor made several attempts to improperly impeach appellant’s witnesses, even after appellant’s objection was properly sustained and the prosecutor was instructed to adhere to the court’s ruling: and, further, that the *10court improperly refused to grant appellant’s motion for a mistrial.”
Appellant urges that the “prosecutor attempted to impeach the witness by asking the witness concerning misdemeanor convictions not involving moral turpitude” and cites us to “page 994 line 10 through page 999, line 8” without identifying or setting forth the complained-of conduct of the prosecutor in such a way that the objection can be identified and understood. Art. 40.09, Sec. 9, V.A.C.C.P.; Pitts v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 478 S.W.2d 555. No error is shown.
Appellant contends “that the trial judge committed a reversible error in refusing to allow appellant to test the good faith of the prosecutor’s impeachment of appellant’s character by cross-examination and bill of exception.”
The record reflects that Mrs. Dorothy Jean Nash was called as a witness by appellant at the punishment stage of the trial and in response to a question on direct examination about knowing appellant’s reputation in the community, the witness answered in the affirmative and stated “everybody seemed to like him,” that appellant and his family were staying at her house, and that she would be willing to provide him with a place to stay and help him get started again when he gets out of prison.
On cross-examination, the witness was asked if she had heard that appellant was arrested for rape and fondling of a juvenile on December 19, 1967, and the witness answered “No.” At this juncture, appellant asked that the jury be excused so that the State “can show the good faith.” After testimony was concluded at the punishment stage of the trial, appellant requested the court to conduct a hearing on the prosecutor’s good faith in asking the question. In response to the court’s inquiry, the prosecutor stated that appellant’s arrest record reflected that on December 19, 1967, appellant “was arrested for rape and fondling a juvenile female and released to juvenile authorities.” The court then stated: “The Court sees the record and the Court holds that the State’s attorney acted in good faith.” Appellant requested that he be allowed to cross-examine the prosecutor, the request was denied by the court, and such denial forms the basis of appellant’s contention.
Appellant argues that the prosecutor could not cross-examine appellant’s character witness by asking have you heard questions which related to offenses committed when appellant was a juvenile.
V.T.C.A. Family Code, Section 51.13(b) (effective January 1,1974), like its forerunner, Art. 2338-1, Sec. 13(e), V.A.C.S., prohibits the admission into evidence of the disposition of a juvenile proceeding. This Court has held that such prohibition in no way affects the qualification of a witness who acquired knowledge of the defendant’s general reputation when he was a juvenile. See Fortson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 474 S.W.2d 234; Walker v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 454 S.W.2d 415. In Lee v. State, Tex.Cr. App., 470 S.W.2d 664, this Court held that it was not improper in cross-examining a character witness to inquire about acts when defendant was a juvenile. See Hart v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 447 S.W.2d 944. We find no merit in appellant’s complaint that he was not allowed to cross-examine the prosecutor to show the State’s bad faith since such claim appears to have been bottomed on the premise that the State could not cross-examine a character witness about acts when appellant was a juvenile.
Appellant contends “the trial court committed a reversible error in not allowing testimony concerning the homosexual involvement of the deceased with various persons, such relationships being material to the case in chief as well as to the issue of mitigation of punishment.”
By way of bill of exception, it was developed that the deceased had been observed in bed with another male on top of him. Appellant urges that he should have been allowed to explore the relationship between the deceased and Dale Williams since Wil-*11Hams’ clothes had been found at deceased’s home. Appellant admits that he knows of no authority to support this contention but suggests that great latitude should be taken in admitting potentially material evidence. We perceive no error in the court’s refusal to allow appellant to present testimony concerning homosexual involvement of the deceased with various persons. See C. McCormick & Ray, Texas Evidence, Sec. 1493 (2d ed. 1956).
Appellant contends the prosecutor was in error in arguing facts outside the record.
The following argument of the prosecutor gives rise to appellant’s contention:
“Now you know you have been treated to a great big helping of Defense tactics, what we call a smoke screen, here and I have to admit that Mr. Zimmerman [appellant’s counsel] has come up with possibly the most novel tactic I have ever seen.”
Appellant objected “to what is novel to Mr. Eubanks as his personal opinion,” the court overruled the objection, and appellant urges that such action by the court requires reversal. The prosecutor then argued that while it was the usual thing for a defense lawyer to attack the prosecutor, it was unusual for counsel to attack the court and suggested that other tactics of counsel were unusual. We perceive no reversible error in the complained-of argument. See Joshlin v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 468 S.W.2d 826.
Appellant complains that the prosecutor was in error in arguing that an extraneous offense occurred.
The record reflects the following occurred during the prosecutor’s argument which gives rise to this contention:
“MR. EUBANKS: ... an attempted burglary; you could see how the items were moved around, a robbery; it’s a reasonable deduction from the evidence.
“MR. ZIMMERMAN: Your Honor—
“MR. EUBANKS: His billfold was empty-
“MR. ZIMMERMAN: Object to the extraneous offense being related before the jury-
“THE COURT: Go ahead counsel.”
Evidence before the jury reflects that deceased’s wallet was found on the dresser in deceased’s room and that there was no money in the wallet. In addition, there was evidence which placed appellant in possession of the deceased’s car following the occasion in question. All of the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense on the occasion in question are admissible before the jury on the question of guilt and may be considered in determining punishment to be assessed. Dunlap v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 462 S.W.2d 591; Taylor v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 420 S.W.2d 601. Thus, if a robbery or burglary occurred at the time of the attack on the deceased, argument referring to the same would not be improper. We conclude that the argument that a burglary or robbery occurred on the occasion in question was a reasonable deduction from the evidence. See Jackson v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 486 S.W.2d 764.
Appellant further complains of still another argument of the prosecutor where it is contended that the prosecutor injected unsworn facts before the jury.
The record reflects that the prosecutor argued:
“Mr. Prather and I are not trophy hunters or out to do anything that we don’t feel is right, under the facts of the case
Appellant objected to the prosecutor expressing “his personal opinion as to what he believes is right,” and the same was overruled by the court.
The record reflects that appellant had previously pointed out in his argument that it is the primary duty of prosecutors not to convict but to see that justice is done, and questioned the prosecutor’s conduct about suppressing evidence and the fairness of the trial.
*12We conclude that the complained-of argument of the prosecutor was invited by the argument of appellant. See Allen v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 513 S.W.2d 556.
Lastly, appellant urges “cumulative error.” Appellant complains that the court displayed “an insouciant attitude toward all participants” and that “the depths of the prosecutor’s inexorable pursuit of victory is appalling.” Appellant points to numerous rulings of the court, comments by the court and conduct of the prosecutor. This ground of error is clearly not in compliance with Art. 40.09, Sec. 9, V.A.C.C.P., and will not be reviewed.
Finding no reversible error, the judgment is affirmed.
Opinion approved by the Court.