Court Opinion

ID: 9649815
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:10:07.249494+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:21.000739
License: Public Domain

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
                           In The Supreme Court

             The Kitchen Planners, LLC, Petitioner,

             v.

             Samuel E. Friedman and Jane Breyer Friedman and
             Branch Banking and Trust, Respondents.

             Appellate Case No. 2020-001669

       ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

                          Appeal from Richland County
                        Robert E. Hood, Circuit Court Judge

                                Opinion No. 28173
                  Submitted April 17, 2023 – Filed August 23, 2023

                           AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

             Christopher P. Kenney, of Columbia, Petitioner. 1

             Charles A. Krawczyk, of Finkel Law Firm LLC, of
             Columbia for Respondents.

1
  Petitioner's brief was prepared and filed by the late Jean Perrin Derrick of
Lexington prior to her unfortunate death in January, just as this Court was initially
preparing to consider this case.
JUSTICE FEW: The Kitchen Planners, LLC, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
asking this Court to review the court of appeals' decision in Kitchen Planners, LLC
v. Friedman, 432 S.C. 267, 851 S.E.2d 724 (Ct. App. 2020). In that decision, the
court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to the
Friedmans and dissolving Kitchen Planners' mechanic's lien. We granted Kitchen
Planners' petition in part and now affirm as modified. As we will explain, the court
of appeals incorrectly applied the wrong standard of decision for a motion for
summary judgment when the motion is based on insufficiency of the evidence.
Reviewing the circuit court's order using the correct standard of decision, however,
we nevertheless find the court of appeals reached the correct result in affirming the
summary judgment. 2

The court of appeals' opinion contains an exhaustive recitation of the facts. 432 S.C.
at 271-74, 851 S.E.2d at 726-28. Of importance, the Friedmans contracted with
Kitchen Planners to procure cabinets manufactured by Crystal Cabinets and install
the cabinets in the Friedmans' home. When Kitchen Planners delivered the cabinets,
the Friedmans refused to accept them and refused to pay the final one-third of the
contract price. Kitchen Planners attempted to perfect its mechanic's lien 3 by serving
on the Friedmans "a statement of a just and true account of the amount due" as
required by section 29-5-90 of the South Carolina Code (2007). Kitchen Planners
then filed this action to enforce the lien.

The Friedmans filed a motion for summary judgment contending Kitchen Planners
failed to perfect its lien because it did not serve the section 29-5-90 "statement"

2
 We find "oral argument would not aid the court in resolving the issues" before us
and thus consider this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
3
  A mechanic's lien arises automatically from the performance of work or the
provision of materials. See S.C. Code Ann. § 29-5-10(a) (2007) ("A person to whom
a debt is due for labor performed or furnished or for materials furnished . . . in the
erection, alteration, or repair of a building or structure upon real estate . . . shall have
a lien upon the building or structure . . . to secure the payment of the debt due to
him."); S.C. Code Ann. § 29-5-20(A) (2007) ("Every laborer, mechanic,
subcontractor, or person furnishing material for the improvement of real estate when
the improvement has been authorized by the owner has a lien thereon . . . to the value
of the labor or material so furnished . . . .").
within ninety days as required by the section. See id. ("Such a lien shall be dissolved
unless the person desiring to avail himself thereof, within ninety days after he ceases
to labor on or furnish labor or materials for such building or structure, serves upon
the owner . . . a statement of a just and true account of the amount due . . . ."). The
circuit court agreed and granted the motion for summary judgment.4

Rule 56(c) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the moving
party is entitled to summary judgment "if the [evidence before the court] show[s]
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." To survive the Friedmans' motion,
Kitchen Planners was required by Rule 56(c) to present evidence that it perfected its
lien by serving the section 29-5-90 statement on the Friedmans "within ninety days
after [Kitchen Planners] cease[d] to labor on or furnish labor or materials for such
building or structure." § 29-5-90. Sufficient evidence that Kitchen Planners timely
served the statement would have established a "genuine issue [of] material fact" as
to whether it perfected the lien. Whether Kitchen Planners presented sufficient
evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact that it met the ninety-day deadline
for serving the section 29-5-90 statement is the sole issue before the Court.

The following dates are important. The cabinets were delivered to the Friedmans'
home on May 20, 2015. Kitchen Planners' sole member—Patricia Comose—
accompanied an installer to the Friedmans' home on May 21 for the purpose of
installing the cabinets. The cabinets were not installed. On June 18, a Crystal
Cabinets representative informed Comose the Friedmans did not want Comose
involved any further. According to Comose, "In mid-June 2015 I was taken off the
job." On August 18, the Crystal Cabinets representative emailed Comose telling her
Crystal Cabinets had also been removed from the job. "We've been fired," the email
stated, "Everything is done." On September 29, Comose wrote a check for $550.61
to pay for parts of the cabinets she ordered on an unknown previous date. Kitchen
Planners served the section 29-5-90 statement on the Friedmans on November 17,
2015. Ninety days before November 17 is August 19.

4
  The court of appeals addressed issues other than timeliness. However, none of
those issues were necessary for the court of appeals to address to affirm the order
granting summary judgment. In light of our holding the circuit court properly
granted the Friedmans' motion for summary judgment on the ground Kitchen
Planners did not serve the section 29-5-90 statement within ninety days, and thus did
not perfect its lien, we also need not address any other issues.
In the section of its opinion entitled "Standard of Review," the court of appeals
stated, "[I]n cases applying the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof, the
non-moving party is only required to submit a mere scintilla of evidence in order to
withstand a motion for summary judgment." 432 S.C. at 275, 851 S.E.2d at 729
(alteration in original) (quoting Hancock v. Mid-S. Mgmt. Co., 381 S.C. 326, 330,
673 S.E.2d 801, 803 (2009)). As we explain below, Comose's statement she wrote
a check on September 29 to pay for parts of the Friedmans' cabinets is a scintilla of
evidence the November 17 service of the section 29-5-90 statement was "within
ninety days after [Kitchen Planners] cease[d] to labor on or furnish labor or
materials." Applying the so-called "mere scintilla" standard, therefore, the court of
appeals should have reversed the order granting summary judgment. As we now
clarify, however, the "mere scintilla" standard is not the correct standard for decision
under Rule 56(c).

Rule 56(c) became effective in 1985. Rule 86(a), SCRCP.5 In most cases applying
Rule 56(c), this Court and our court of appeals have applied the "genuine issue of
material fact" standard set forth in the Rule, requiring the party opposing the motion
show a "reasonable inference" to be drawn from the evidence, and we have rejected
the "mere scintilla" standard. See, e.g., Vaughan v. Town of Lyman, 370 S.C. 436,
448, 635 S.E.2d 631, 638 (2006) (reversing an award of summary judgment and
stating "the evidence is susceptible to more than one reasonable inference, and
therefore should be submitted to the jury"); Russell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 353
S.C. 208, 219 n.4, 578 S.E.2d 329, 334 n.4 (2003) ("The standard for summary
judgment 'mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Rule 50(a)' [SCRCP]."6
(quoting Baughman v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 306 S.C. 101, 115, 410 S.E.2d 537, 545
(1991))); Baughman, 306 S.C. at 115, 410 S.E.2d at 545 (holding a party opposing
summary judgment "must . . . 'do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts' but 'must come forward with 'specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" (quoting Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89

5
  See also Rule 44, Rules of Practice for the Circuit Courts of South Carolina, 1962
S.C. Code Ann., Vol. 15 (Supp. 1975) (adopted 1969; repealed 1985) (stating the
"genuine issue [of] material fact" standard for summary judgment motions based on
insufficiency of the evidence).
6
 The standard for directed verdict under Rule 50(a) requires the evidence support a
"reasonable inference" in favor of the non-moving party. Mullinax v. J.M. Brown
Amusement Co., 333 S.C. 89, 92, 508 S.E.2d 848, 849 (1998).
L. Ed. 2d 538, 552 (1986));7 Shelton v. LS & K, Inc., 374 S.C. 294, 297, 648 S.E.2d
307, 308 (Ct. App. 2007) ("The existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support
of the nonmoving party's position is not sufficient to overcome a motion for
summary judgment." (citing Bravis v. Dunbar, 316 S.C. 263, 265, 449 S.E.2d 495,
496 (Ct. App. 1994))); Dickert v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 306 S.C. 311, 313, 411 S.E.2d
672, 673 (Ct. App. 1991), rev'd in part on other grounds, 311 S.C. 218, 428 S.E.2d
700 (1993) (stating "the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the
nonmoving party's position is not sufficient to overcome a motion for summary
judgment" (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S. Ct. at 2512, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 214
)). 8 But see Anders v. S.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 307 S.C. 371, 375, 415 S.E.2d
406, 408 (Ct. App. 1992) ("At the summary judgment stage of the proceeding, it was
only necessary for the Defendant to submit a scintilla of evidence warranting a
determination by the jury." (citing nothing)).

In 2009 in Hancock, however, this Court made the statement quoted by the court of
appeals in this case, "that in cases applying the preponderance of the evidence burden
of proof, the non-moving party is only required to submit a mere scintilla of evidence
in order to withstand a motion for summary judgment." 381 S.C. at 330, 673 S.E.2d
at 803. In other cases even after Hancock, we continued to impose the "genuine
issue of material fact" and "reasonable inference" standard that appears inconsistent

7
  The Baughman Court also cited Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
250, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 213 (1986). 306 S.C. at 115, 410
S.E.2d at 545. In Anderson and Matsushita, the Supreme Court of the United States
rejected the "mere scintilla" standard for Rule 56, Fed. R. Civ. P., Anderson, 477
U.S. at 252, 106 S. Ct. at 2512, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 214, and held "the issue of fact must
be 'genuine,'" meaning "the nonmoving party must come forward with 'specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87, 106
S. Ct. at 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 552 (quoting Rule 56, Fed. R. Civ. P.).
8
 In Dickert, the court of appeals found "the circuit court correctly decided this issue"
and "direct[ed] the circuit court's order to be printed, with minor deletions, as the
opinion of this Court." 306 S.C. at 313, 411 S.E.2d at 673. We find it significant
that the circuit judge whose order became the opinion of the court of appeals was
retired Chief Justice C. Bruce Littlejohn, sitting by designation as a special circuit
judge. Chief Justice Littlejohn served as Chief Justice of this Court in January 1985
when the Court submitted the new Rules of Civil Procedure—including Rule
56(c)—to the General Assembly. Bruce Littlejohn, LITTLEJOHN'S HALF CENTURY
AT THE BENCH AND BAR (1936-1986) 168 (1987).
with the "mere scintilla" standard Hancock purported to set. See Town of Hollywood
v. Floyd, 403 S.C. 466, 477, 744 S.E.2d 161, 166 (2013) (stating as to the summary
judgment standard "it is not sufficient for a party to create an inference that is not
reasonable or an issue of fact that is not genuine"); see also Callawassie Island
Members Club, Inc. v. Martin, 437 S.C. 148, 157, 877 S.E.2d 341, 345 (2022)
(stating as to a motion for summary judgment, "When determining if any triable
issues of fact exist, the evidence and all reasonable inferences must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party." (quoting Fleming v. Rose, 350 S.C.
488, 493-94, 567 S.E.2d 857, 860 (2002))); Bluestein v. Town of Sullivan's Island,
429 S.C. 458, 462, 839 S.E.2d 879, 881 (2020) (same); Bell v. Progressive Direct
Ins. Co., 407 S.C. 565, 576, 757 S.E.2d 399, 404 (2014) (reciting the "mere scintilla"
standard from Hancock, but stating, "Nevertheless, 'when the evidence is susceptible
of only one reasonable interpretation, summary judgment may be granted.'" (quoting
Brooks v. Northwood Little League, Inc., 327 S.C. 400, 403, 489 S.E.2d 647, 648
(Ct. App. 1997))).

We acknowledge there may be disagreement as to whether the "mere scintilla"
standard is inconsistent with the Rule 56(c) "genuine issue [of] material fact"
standard. See Taylor v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 78 S.C. 552, 556, 59 S.E. 641, 643
(1907) ("A scintilla of evidence is any material evidence that if true would tend to
establish the issue in the mind of a reasonable juror."). The position that the two
standards are the same would explain this Court's recitation of both at various times
since 1985. In the minds of many, however, the standards are inconsistent. See
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S. Ct. at 2512, 91 L. Ed. 2d at 214 (rejecting the
mere scintilla standard for Rule 56, Fed. R. Civ. P., and stating, "The mere existence
of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient;
there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff");
see also Bethea v. Floyd, 177 S.C. 521, 529, 181 S.E. 721, 724 (1935) ("Saying that
there 'may be a scintilla of evidence' to go to the jury . . . is certainly a very weak
contention. 'Scintilla' means. . . 'a gleam,' 'a glimmer,' 'a spark,' 'the least particle,'
'the smallest trace.'" (quoting 56 Corpus Juris 863-64 (1932))); Rogers v. Norfolk S.
Corp., 356 S.C. 85, 95, 588 S.E.2d 87, 92 (2003) (Burnett, J., dissenting) ("A
scintilla is defined as 'a trace' of evidence." (quoting Scintilla, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999))).

We now clarify that the "mere scintilla" standard does not apply under Rule 56(c).
Rather, the proper standard is the "genuine issue of material fact" standard set forth
in the text of the Rule. As we stated in Town of Hollywood v. Floyd, "it is not
sufficient for a party to create an inference that is not reasonable or an issue of fact
that is not genuine." 403 S.C. at 477, 744 S.E.2d at 166. To the extent what we said
in Hancock is inconsistent with our decision today, Hancock is overruled.

Turning back to the evidence Kitchen Planners presented in this case, and analyzing
that evidence using the proper standard for decision, we find Kitchen Planners failed
to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Kitchen Planners served
the section 29-5-90 statement on November 17. The only event within ninety days
before November 17 is the September 29 check Comose wrote to pay for cabinet
parts she previously ordered. Ordering parts for the cabinets may very well qualify
as "to labor on or furnish labor or materials for" under section 29-5-90, and if that
event occurred within ninety days of serving the section 29-5-90 statement, the
statement would have been timely and the lien perfected. Writing a check to pay for
parts previously ordered, however, does not qualify as "to labor on or furnish labor
or materials for." While the writing of the check on September 29 is some
evidence—a scintilla—of when she ordered the parts, it does not provide a
meaningful factual basis on which a factfinder could determine if the parts were
ordered within or before the ninety-day time frame. Comose specifically testified
she did not remember why she wrote the check on September 29, and she did not
know the date the parts were ordered. The writing of the check on September 29
does not create a reasonable inference that she ordered the parts within ninety days
of the service of the section 29-5-90 statement. Thus, the factfinder would be
required to speculate to determine whether Kitchen Planners perfected its lien in a
timely manner. Under this circumstance, Kitchen Planners failed to establish a
genuine issue of material fact, and the Friedmans were entitled to summary judgment
as a matter of law.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, JAMES, JJ., and Acting Justice Kaye G.
Hearn, concur.