Court Opinion

ID: 9953283
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-21 18:02:56.001464+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:45:55.117507
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/21/24 Tomrose v. City of Petaluma CA1/3
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 WILLIAM TOMROSE et al.,
           Plaintiffs and Appellants,
 v.
 CITY OF PETALUMA et al.,                                               A165448
           Defendants and Respondents.
                                                                        (Sonoma County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. SCV265155)

         Plaintiffs William and Renee Tomrose appeal from a judgment
following the grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave
to amend. We affirm.
                            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
         A. The Complaint
         In 2016, plaintiffs filed an action (case no. SCV265155) against the City
of Petaluma and its Planning Division (collectively “defendants”), naming
Scott and Cailin Nelson (the Nelsons) as real parties in interest. The
following is a summary of the allegations in the complaint, which we accept
as true for purposes of assessing the judgment on the pleadings. (People ex
rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 772, 777
(People ex rel. Harris).)

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      Plaintiffs own real property with panoramic views of the city of
Petaluma. In 2005, the City Council approved a tentative subdivision map
for the Woodridge Planned Unit Development (PUD), which subdivided land
downhill from plaintiffs’ residence into five residential parcels, four of which
were undeveloped. The Nelsons and their friends, Tyler and Brienna
Doherty (the Dohertys), purchased these undeveloped parcels subject to the
PUD. The PUD allowed, on each lot, a single-family dwelling with an
attached garage, and tool or storage sheds. The PUD provided the new home
design plans were subject to approval by the Site Plan and Architectural
Review Committee with “ ‘sensitivity’ ” to neighboring properties regarding
potential privacy issues and view obstructions. The PUD included a 30-foot
setback requirement and building height limits.
      In addition to the PUD, the City of Petaluma’s Implementing Zoning
Ordinance (IZO) established a “Hillside Protection ordinance” regulating the
development of hillside and ridgeline properties. The City adopted the
Hillside Protection ordinance as part of the PUD in 2017. Both the PUD and
IZO contain diagrams governing the calculation of height limits on
developments.
      In 2017, the Nelsons presented plans to modify the PUD from four to
two lots (one for their residence and one for the Dohertys’) with common road
access via Olive Street. This plan established a 50-foot setback from
plaintiffs’ property line. The City approved the lot change and increased
setback, but the modifications never took effect because the Nelsons did not
record the tentative parcel map. Instead, in 2018, the Nelsons submitted a
new plan. Although the new plan would again modify the PUD from four to
two lots, it redesigned and enlarged the Nelsons’ home, reverted to a 30-foot

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setback, and contemplated alternative access to the two lots (one via a
proposed easement).
      In 2019, the Nelsons installed the story poles on their property.
Plaintiffs only then realized the proximity of the Nelsons’ planned home to
theirs and its effect on their views and privacy. The Planning Division
approved the plan over plaintiffs’ objections via resolution 2019-02. Plaintiffs
appealed to the City Council, arguing the plan was contrary to the PUD and
the IZO. In June 2019, the City Council upheld the Planning Division’s
approval of resolution 2019-02 with the caveat that the Nelsons’ roof height
be reduced a minimum of 40 inches prior to the issuance of a building permit.
      Based on these allegations, the complaint sought a writ of
administrative mandamus against the City of Petaluma to compel the City to
set aside the City Council’s rejection of plaintiffs’ appeal. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1094.5.1) Plaintiffs claimed that the Planning Division and City Council
abused their discretion in concluding the Nelsons’ plans complied with the
Woodridge PUD and IZO, and that their decisions were unsupported by the
facts and the law. Plaintiffs also sought declaratory relief, alleging a
controversy “concerning the obligations and duties of [the City] under the
Woodridge PUD and the IZO” and requesting a declaration of the parties’
rights and responsibilities under the PUD and IZO. Last, plaintiffs sought
injunctive relief, alleging that defendants’ refusal to comply with the PUD
and IZO caused or threatened to cause irreparable and substantial harm.
      Defendants and the Nelsons filed a joint answer to plaintiffs’ petition
and complaint. In 2020, the trial court granted plaintiffs’ request for a
preliminary injunction, enjoining defendants from issuing permits for the

1     All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure
unless otherwise specified.

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development of the Nelsons’ property, and enjoining the Nelsons from
developing their property. The court subsequently held a hearing, denied
plaintiffs’ petition for a writ of administrative mandamus, and dissolved the
preliminary injunction.
      B. Judgment on the Pleadings
      After prevailing on plaintiffs’ mandamus petition, defendants and the
Nelsons jointly filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings directed toward
plaintiffs’ declaratory relief claim. Observing that the claim “seeks only a
declaration related to the rights and responsibilities of the parties under the
Woodridge PUD and the IZO,” the motion contended an action for declaratory
relief was not a proper vehicle for reviewing an administrative decision.
Moreover, the motion argued, the declaratory relief action should be
dismissed as moot (and without leave to amend) because the trial court had
denied the mandamus petition, and so the requested declaratory relief was
barred as a matter of law.
      Plaintiffs opposed the motion, alleging their action for declaratory relief
was not moot because they could still seek relief “in the form of a judicial
declaration that they . . . possess an easement for vehicular ingress and
egress across the Nelsons’ property.” Plaintiffs asked for leave to amend in
the event the factual basis for their declaratory relief claim was insufficiently
developed in the complaint.
      Defendants and the Nelsons filed a reply arguing that plaintiffs’
complaint sought a declaration against the City concerning their rights
relative to the PUD and IZO, not potential easement rights against the
Nelsons, which was not addressed in the administrative proceeding.
Defendants and the Nelsons further contended the court should deny leave to

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amend because plaintiffs filed another lawsuit, case no. SCV267853, against
the Nelsons concerning the easement issue.
      The trial court issued a tentative ruling granting the motion for
judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend, reasoning that an action
for declaratory relief is not appropriate for review of an administrative order.
(Hostetter v. Alderson (1952) 38 Cal.2d 499, 500.) In tentatively rejecting
plaintiffs’ belated contention that their declaratory relief action instead
pertained to the easement issue, the court observed that defendants (the City
of Petaluma and its Planning Division) did not own the property where the
alleged easement is located, and that the word “easement” appeared only
once in the petition and complaint and referenced a different easement than
the one to which plaintiffs presently claimed a right. In the court’s view,
plaintiffs “failed to establish justiciable questions as to the controversy of the
easement in the Petition” and the matters judicially noticed did not repair
the pleading deficiency.2
      At the hearing on the motion, plaintiffs sought leave to amend to
specifically allege the easement issue, indicating the Nelsons were planning
to build a cabana in the middle of the plaintiffs’ deeded easement. Plaintiffs
noted that their easement was at least mentioned in the administrative
record and described in a previously filed trial brief, though they
acknowledged they had another lawsuit concerning the easement issue.
Defendants and the Nelsons argued plaintiffs never brought up the easement
issue in their administrative challenge thereby waiving it, they already filed

2     The trial court took judicial notice of the petition for administrative
mandamus and complaint, the answer, the order denying the petition for writ
of administrative mandate, the order granting and dissolving the preliminary
injunction, a city employee’s 2019 report, and portions of the administrative
record.

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a separate action against the Nelsons and Dohertys concerning the easement
issue, and both the Nelsons’ and Dohertys’ properties were burdened by
plaintiffs’ easement so the Dohertys were also necessary parties who had not
been named in the instant action. Plaintiffs’ counsel indicated that he
wanted leave to amend because he wanted to go to trial, this action had been
pending for longer than the other one, and he was unsure which action would
get to trial faster (though he acknowledged he already had a trial date in the
other case and none in the present case). Plaintiffs’ counsel also expressed
uncertainty whether the Dohertys were a necessary party to the easement
issue, though he admitted they were a necessary party in the other case.
      Ultimately, the trial court adopted its tentative ruling as its final order
and entered judgment against plaintiffs. This appeal followed.
                                   DISCUSSION
      A court may grant judgment on the pleadings in favor of a defendant
when “[t]he complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action against that defendant.” (§ 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(ii).) The court may
grant the motion with or without leave to amend the complaint. (§ 438,
subd. (h)(1).) “ ‘A motion for judgment on the pleadings is equivalent to a
demurrer and is governed by the same de novo standard of review.’
[Citation.] ‘All properly pleaded, material facts are deemed true, but not
contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law . . . .’ ” (People ex rel.
Harris, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 777.)
      Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in granting the motion for
judgment on the pleadings because they adequately pleaded the easement
issue. We disagree.
      A complaint must contain “[a] statement of the facts constituting the
cause of action, in ordinary and concise language” and “[a] demand for

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judgment for the relief to which the pleader claims to be entitled.” (§ 425.10,
subd. (a).) “These requirements force parties ‘to give fair notice of their
claims to opposing parties so they can defend’ [citation] and to ‘ “ ‘set forth
the essential facts of [the] case with reasonable precision and with
particularity sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and
extent of [the] cause of action’ ” ’ [citation].” (Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th
1225, 1238–1239.)
      Section 1060, governing declaratory relief, provides: “Any person
interested under a written instrument . . . or under a contract, or who desires
a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another, or in
respect to, in, over or upon property . . . may, in cases of actual controversy
relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an
original action or cross-complaint in the superior court for a declaration of his
or her rights and duties in the premises, including a determination of any
question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or contract.”
      Here, the complaint—which is 30 pages long and mentions the word
“easement” only once—is plainly directed at the City’s approval of the
Nelsons’ plans for their home (with particular focus on the Nelsons’ 30-foot
setback and the height of the home) in claimed contravention of the PUD and
IZO. Reasonably viewed, the complaint neither addresses the Nelsons’
alleged interference with plaintiffs’ claimed easement nor seeks relief on that
basis. Notably, the complaint’s singular mention of the word “easement” is to
a proposed easement in the Nelsons’ 2018 plans for the Dohertys to access
their parcel. The complaint does not allege that plaintiffs have a deeded
easement on the Nelsons’ property, much less plead any facts showing the
existence of an actual controversy regarding the rights and duties of plaintiffs
and the named defendants concerning the supposed easement. (Tiburon v.

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Northwestern P. R. Co. (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 160, 170.) As defendants point
out, the cause of action for declaratory relief was specifically directed at them
and entitled “Declaratory Relief Against Respondent City of Petaluma, C.C.P.
Section 1060.” (Boldface omitted.)
      Plaintiffs contend the Nelsons knew about the easement dispute and
therefore were adequately apprised that the declaratory relief cause of action
concerned such dispute and that it was targeted at the Nelsons. This is
unpersuasive. The fact remains that plaintiffs’ complaint did not adequately
plead a cause of action for declaratory relief based on the easement issue, and
it contained no factual allegations acquainting the Nelsons with the nature,
source and extent of plaintiffs’ newly proposed cause of action pertaining to
the easement.
      In sum, we conclude the trial court did not err in granting the motion
for judgment on the pleadings.
      This brings us to the question of whether the trial court erred in
denying leave to amend. “[A plaintiff] bears the burden of showing the
defects in its complaint are capable of being cured by amendment.
[Citations.] ‘ “To satisfy that burden on appeal, a plaintiff ‘must show in
what manner he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will
change the legal effect of his pleading.’ [Citation.] The assertion of an
abstract right to amend does not satisfy this burden.” [Citation.] The
plaintiff must clearly and specifically state “the legal basis for amendment,
i.e., the elements of the cause of action,” as well as the “factual allegations
that sufficiently state all required elements of that cause of action.” ’ ”
(Vanacore & Associates, Inc. v. Rosenfeld (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 438, 454.)
The plaintiff must demonstrate “that a reasonable possibility exists that
amendment can cure the defects,” and “neither the trial court nor this court

                                         8
will rewrite a complaint.” (Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000)
81 Cal.App.4th 39, 44.)
      Plaintiffs contend they could have amended their “cause of action” for
declaratory relief by pleading the same facts concerning the easement issue
as in their other action, case no. SCV267853. In making this argument,
plaintiffs point to the first amended complaint in case no. SCV267853, which
is included in the record. In short, that complaint names the Nelsons and
Dohertys as defendants and seeks to quiet title to plaintiffs’ alleged easement
on the Nelsons’ and Dohertys’ properties. The complaint also seeks an
injunction and damages against defendants for nuisance, due to alleged
interference with use of the easement. We are not persuaded.
      “Although . . . great liberality will ordinarily be allowed in the
amendment of a complaint after the sustaining of a demurrer, it is settled
law that a party may not file an amended complaint which states such an
entirely new and different cause of action.” (Warden v. Kahn (1979) 99
Cal.App.3d 805, 810, and cases cited; see People v. $20,000 U.S. Currency
(1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 682, 691 [the rules applicable to a demurrer apply to a
motion for judgment on the pleading].) Put another way, a plaintiff may not
allege the “violation of an entirely different primary right . . . based upon an
entirely different set of facts.” (Warden, at pp. 809–810.) Under California’s
primary rights theory, a cause of action “ ‘is comprised of a “primary right” of
the plaintiff, a corresponding “primary duty” of the defendant, and a wrongful
act by the defendant constituting a breach of that duty.’ ” (Hayes v. County of
San Diego (2013) 57 Cal.4th 622, 630.)
      Our review of the complaint at bar discloses it pertains to the City’s
approval of the Nelsons’ proposed home in contravention of the PUD and

                                         9
IZO.3 Thus, we agree with the trial court’s determination that plaintiffs’
proposed amendment would allege an entirely new injury based on new
facts—i.e., the Nelsons and Dohertys disputing and willfully and maliciously
interfering with plaintiffs’ easement rights. As such, we find no abuse of
discretion in the court disallowing an amendment that seeks to raise an
entirely new cause of action.4
                                 DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are entitled to costs on appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278.)

3      Plaintiffs fail to challenge the trial court’s ruling that an action for
declaratory relief could not properly be used to obtain for review of
defendants’ approval of the Nelsons’ proposed home. Accordingly, plaintiffs
effectively concede they could not amend their complaint so as to obtain
declaratory relief against defendants based on the facts originally pleaded.
4      We note section 473 offers a mechanism by which a party may obtain
the trial court’s permission to amend a complaint to state a new claim. (Weil
& Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter
Group 2023) ¶ 7:148.1b [“To raise claims unrelated to those pleaded in an
earlier complaint (i.e., a wholly distinct and different legal obligation of the
defendant), plaintiffs should file either a new lawsuit or a motion for leave to
amend (or supplement) their earlier complaint.”].) Plaintiffs, however, did
not avail themselves of this mechanism. Nothing in our opinion precludes
plaintiffs from seeking to amend their complaint in their other action.

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                                        _________________________
                                        Fujisaki, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Tucher, P. J.

_________________________
Rodríguez, J.

Tomrose v. City of Petaluma (A165448)

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