Court Opinion

ID: 9672206
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:50:46.959914+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:14.910081
License: Public Domain

STONE, Special Judge
(dissenting).
Reduced to the role of deferential dissent as the author of one of the rejected opinions, both of which reached a contrary conclusion to the principal opinion, I have no difficulty or hesitation in joining heartily in the familiar language of that opinion disallowing defendant’s preliminary contention, outlining the facts, and dealing with Assignments I and II. But, although entertaining appropriate respect for my brethren of the judiciary who grace the bench of this high court and have honored me by inviting my participation in consideration of this cause, I am moved by settled conviction to record my views concerning *402Assignment III and disposition of the case on appeal.
Although I share the belief that the law imposed upon defendant Harrison no obligation to undertake the maintenance or repair of the old Cape-Jackson road [Winston & Co. v. Clark County, 178 Ky. 447, 199 S.W. 51, 53; Sumner County v. Interurban Transportation Co., 141 Tenn. 493, 213 S.W. 412, 414 (6), 5 A.L.R. 765, 768], I am of the further opinion that the evidence reasonably would have permitted a finding that defendant voluntarily assumed that obligation during the period relevant to this discussion.
Many years ago Mr. Justice Cardozo declared “[i]t is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all.” Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275, 276, 23 A.L.R. 1425; Marks v. Nambil Realty Co., 245 N.Y. 256, 157 N.E. 129 (2). Soundly bottomed on that principle, there is substantial authority that “[o]ne may render himself liable for the safety of a highway or sidewalk by the voluntary construction of improvements, the performance of work, or the assumption of some duty with respect to the maintenance or repair of the way.” 39 Am.Jur.2d Highways, Streets, and Bridges § 361, p. 745. See Trigg v. H. K. Ferguson Co., 30 Tenn.App. 672, 209 S.W.2d 525, 533 (10, 11); Cummings v. Henninger, 28 Ariz. 207, 236 P. 701, 703, 41 A.L.R. 207; McMahon v. Second Avenue Railroad Co., 75 N.Y. 231, 235, 238. Quoting Mr. Justice Cardozo’s happily-formulated statement and citing Bartlett v. Taylor, 351 Mo. 1060, 174 S.W. 2d 844, this court held in Berry v. Emery, Bird, Thayer Dry Goods Co., 357 Mo. 808, 818-819, 211 S.W.2d 35, 40-41 (2, 3), that, having assumed the responsibility of ownership, control and maintenance of light standards set in the sidewalk, the named defendant had the duty to exercise due care in maintaining them in a reasonably safe condition for travelers.
The “felicitous aphorism” [Logsdon v. Duncan, Mo., 293 S.W.2d 944, 950] of Mr. Justice Cardozo also has been quoted with approval in several other Missouri cases, and the principle affirmed therein has found application in a variety of circumstances. Thus, if a landlord, having no obligation to keep demised premises in repair, nevertheless undertakes to make repairs, “he must exercise reasonable care in doing so and is liable to his tenant for injuries caused by his negligence or unskill-fulness in making the repairs or in leaving the premises in an unsafe condition.” Bartlett v. Taylor, supra, 351 Mo. at 1066, 174 S.W.2d at 847-848(2); Fitzpatrick v. Ford, Mo., 372 S.W.2d 844, 851 (7); Stewart v. Zuellig, Mo., 336 S.W.2d 399, 402 (2) ; Nuckols v. Andrews Investment Co., Mo.App., 364 S.W.2d 128, 135 (2). See Kennedy v. Bressmer, Mo.App., 154 S.W.2d 401 (1); Marks v. Nambil Realty Co., supra. In this connection, it is appropriate to note that the appellate courts of Missouri, as well as those in some other jurisdictions [e. g., Olsen v. Mading, 45 Ariz. 423, 45 P.2d 23, 25-26; Janofsky v. Garland, 42 Cal.App.2d 655, 109 P.2d 750, 751 (3) ; annotation 150 A.L.R. 1373, 1378], have followed the Court of Appeals of New York [Marks v. Nambil Realty Co., supra, 157 N.E. at 130 (3)] in refusing to limit the liability of a landlord voluntarily undertaking repairs “by the requirement of making the premises more dangerous or changing the physical condition of the premises for the worse or by giving a deceptive appearance of safety * * *.” Bartlett v. Taylor, supra, 351 Mo. at 1068, 174 S.W.2d at 849 (4). See Malon v. Service and Management Co., Mo.App., 416 S.W.2d 44, 47; Nuckols v. Andrews Investment Co., supra, 364 S.W.2d at 135— 136; Kennedy v. Bressmer, supra, 154 S.W.2d at 405, 406 (2). Of course, the landlord’s “ ‘negligent act must be the real cause of the injury, and it is for that alone that he is liable.’ ” Stewart v. Zuellig, supra, 336 S.W.2d at 402.'
In Wolfmeyer v. Otis Elevator Co., Mo., 262 S.W.2d 18, 22 (2), another instance in *403which this court approvingly quoted Mr. Justice Cardozo’s classic pronouncement [262 S.W.2d at 23], it was said that “whatever it was defendant undertook to do which it knew or should have known or foreseen would affect plaintiff’s safety, the defendant had the duty to do it carefully,” although that principle was there inapplicable because “our problem [was] not one involving an act or omission in doing what defendant had undertaken (or assumed) to do.” 262 S.W.2d at 23. In Swanson v. Godwin, Mo., 327 S.W.2d 903, 908 (3), it was held that, where the owner and operator of a small office building and a parking lot in the rear had undertaken to light the lot at night, “they thereby assumed the duty to exercise reasonable care in furnishing adequate light.” And I am reminded that a physician, though motivated only by humanitarian considerations and acting as a good Samaritan, who voluntarily undertakes gratuitous treatment of an injured person, thereby becomes charged with the duty of exercising the same degree of professional care and skill as he would in the treatment of any other patient. 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 52, p. 975; Id. § 46, p. 954; 41 Am.Jur. Physicians and Surgeons § 71, 1. c. 193; Parkell v. Fitzporter, 301 Mo. (banc) 217, 227, 256 S.W. 239, 242, 29 A.L.R. 1305; Persten v. Chesney, Mo.App., 212 S.W.2d 469, 473 (2).
Granting that the liability of one who assumes some duty with respect to maintenance or repair of a highway “is no broader than the assumption of duty” [39 Am.Jur .2d Highways, Streets, and Bridges § 361, p. 745], in my view of the record it may not be said as a matter of law that, during the period relevant to this discussion, defendant Harrison had not assumed the obligation of maintaining the old Cape-Jackson road at and near the Heuer hole. It will be remembered that from November 1, 1961, to the date of accident, to wit, December 22, 1961, about ten of defendant’s tandem dump trucks were steadily engaged in the hauling operation over the old Cape-Jackson road; that “in two or three days” or “the first week, maybe” the asphalt surface began to break and defendant moved a motor patrol, i. e., a road grader, onto the road; that thereafter defendant’s employees hauled chat for the road “every day,” spread it on the broken areas, and undertook to keep the road “level” and “smooth” by grading it with the motor patrol which was “on the job all the time,” was at the Heuer hole “every day at some time,” and bladed it “at least three times a week”; and that “they fixed it [the Heuer hole or ditch] before they ever got the truck out” after the accident.
Neither can I agree that the record dictates the conclusion that defendant Harrison “was simply trying to keep the road usable, primarily for its trucks.” On the contrary, the joint brief of defendants does not present either of them in that posture. There are three points in that brief. The first point is that plaintiff’s motion for new trial was too general to preserve the question of submissibility for appellate review. The second point, underscored both in the trial court and on appeal, is that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The third point, to which counsel cite no supporting authority, is: “Defendants were not guilty of any negligence. Defendants continuously hauled gravel or rock every day and were constantly trying to maintain the road as best they could under the conditions.” (Emphasis mine)
True, defendant Harrison’s maintenance was “temporary” in that continuing traffic on the road required frequent refilling of holes that “wallowed out” and necessitated repeated reblading of the road. However, the established and admitted fact that defendant “continuously hauled gravel or rock every day” and “constantly [tried] to maintain the road as best [it] could under the conditions” simply buttresses the conclusion (to me logical and inescapable) that the triers of the facts reasonably might have found that defendant undertook and assumed the obligation of main*404taining the road during the period relevant to this discussion; and, if that obligation was assumed, the “temporary” character of the work done by defendant could not have altered or affected the nature and scope of that assumed obligation, which was to exercise ordinary care for the safety of those lawfully using that road and to act reasonably and with due regard for their rights. Joshmer v. Fred Weber Contractors, Inc., Mo.App., 294 S.W.2d 576, 582 (2), and authorities there cited; Grab v. Davis Construction Co., 233 Mo.App. 819, 826, 830, 109 S.W.2d 882, 885 (4), 887 (11); 40 C.J.S. Highways § 254, p. 291; 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 203, l.c. 1030.
I am persuaded that the evidence upon trial raised and presented submissible issues as to whether or not, during the period relevant to this discussion, defendant (a) had voluntarily assumed the obligation of repairing and maintaining the old Cape-Jackson road at and near the Heuer hole and (b) had breached the aforesaid duty imposed by law upon such voluntary assumption of the obligation to repair and maintain. That the Cape Special Road District also may have had a duty to repair and maintain the road did not alter the rule of liability as to defendant. Robinson Oil Corp. v. Davis, 171 Okl. 557, 43 P.2d 754, 757 (2). Accordingly, I would hold that plaintiff’s case was submissible under the third pleaded assignment of negligence.
Being of that mind, I would proceed to consideration of the contention, upon which defendant principally relied both in the trial court and on appeal, i. e., that a verdict was properly directed against plaintiff because his evidence established contributory negligence as a matter of law. It is true that, as defendant emphasizes, when dangers are either reasonably manifest or known to a guest who has an adequate opportunity to influence the situation for his safety, he is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law if he sits by without warning and permits himself to be driven carelessly to his injury. Thurman v. St. Louis Public Service Co., Mo., 308 S.WRd 680, 684; Ezell v. Kansas City, Mo., 260 S.W.2d 248, 250 (3); Kaley v. Huntley, 333 Mo. 771, 63 S.W..2d 21, 24 (10). However, a guest in a motor vehicle is required to exercise only ordinary care for his own safety [Happy v. Blanton, Mo., 303 S.WRd 633, 638 (8); Taylor v. Taylor, 360 Mo. 994, 232 S.W.2d 382, 385 (4) ; State ex rel. Alton R. Co. v. Shain, 346 Mo. (banc) 681, 143 S.W.2d 233, 238 (9)], whereas the driver is charged with the duty of exercising the highest degree of care. V.A.M.S. § 304.010 (1); Swinger v. Bell, Mo., 373 S.W.2d 30, 35. Although the law does not permit a guest to intrust his safety absolutely to the driver regardless of impending danger or apparent lack of caution on the driver’s part, it does not require the guest to exercise the same vigilance as the driver [Cotton v. Pyle, Mo., 400 S.W.2d 72, 77 (7); Buehler v. Festus Mercantile Co., 343 Mo. (banc) 139, 119 S.W.2d 961, 965; Smith v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 321 Mo. 105, 9 S.W.2d 939, 946 (6)], and it has long been considered “a matter of common knowledge that under ordinary circumstances such occupants do largely rely upon the driver, who has the exclusive control and management of the vehicle, exercising the required degree of care, and for that reason courts are not justified in adopting a hard and fast rule that they are guilty of negligence in doing so.” Boland v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., Mo., 284 S.W. 141, 144 (5); Fann v. Farmer, Mo.App., 289 S.W.2d 144, 148 (4), and cases collected in note 1.
The conduct of a guest with respect to the exercise of care in operation of a vehicle must be judged primarily with reference to the driver’s conduct and the guest’s ability to control the driver [Boland v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., supra, 284 S.W. at 144 (1); Fann v. Farmer, supra, 289 S.WRd at 148 (8)]; and, since “[njegligence depends upon the surrounding circumstances, as well as the particular conduct involved, because an act or omission which would clearly be negli*405gence in some circumstances might not be so in other situations” [Fortner v. St. Louis Public Service Co., Mo., 244 S.W. 2d 10, 13 (2); Rentfro v. Wheelock Brothers, Inc., Mo.App., 364 S.W.2d 55, 58], each case must rest upon its own particular facts. Ketcham v. Thomas, Mo., 283 S.W.2d 642, 646; Knox v. Weathers, 363 Mo. 1167, 257 S.W.2d 912, 916 (6); Wilson v. Cade, Mo.App., 375 S.W.2d 577, 581.
Instant plaintiff was riding in a truck driven by his cousin John, then a member of the State Highway Patrol, who was familiar with the road and aware of the Heuer hole. A timely warning was the only practical means by which plaintiff could have influenced the driver’s conduct or his operation of the truck. Cf. Wolfe v. Harms, Mo., 413 S.W.2d 204, 213. Plaintiff testified that he gave a specific warning when the truck was 75 yards from the hole and John agreed that he and plaintiff “were discussing” the hole as the truck approached it. According to John, he “kicked” the truck transmission down to a lower gear which slowed the truck “rather rapidly” — “I thought I slowed down enough”; but nevertheless he lost control of the truck when its left front wheel went into the hole at an approximate speed of 25 miles per hour, which incidentally was within the estimated range of 20 to 25 miles per hour at which plaintiff had safely traversed the hole in an automobile only a short time previously.
Judicial declaration that a plaintiff has been contributorily negligent as a matter of law is permissible and proper only where it may be said on the whole evidence and all inferences deducible therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to him, that the only reasonable conclusion is that he was guilty of negligence which was a proximate cause of his injury. Combellick v. Rooks, Mo. (banc), 401 S.W.2d 460, 462 (1); Bennett v. Kitchin, Mo., 400 S.W.2d 97, 101; Dye v. Geier, Mo., 345 S.W.2d 83, 87 (3); Kickham v. Carter, Mo., 314 S.W.2d 902, 908 (8); Day v. Mayberry, Mo.App., 421 S.W.2d 34, 42 (17). Appropriate respect for this and the other principles noted in discussion of this point would constrain my conclusion that the issue as to plaintiff’s contributory negligence was for the jury.
I would affirm the judgment as to defendant Potashnick but, as to defendant Harrison, would set aside the judgment and remand the cause for retrial.