Court Opinion

ID: 9717887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:12:14.056067+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:13:51.724487
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MILLER, also dissenting: I do not agree with the court that the legislature lacked the authority to revive the plaintiff’s cause of action. The majority’s result in this case rests on a fundamental misapprehension of the nature of limitations provisions, and grants the defendant an unwarranted windfall while requiring the surviving family members of a victim of the defendant’s crimes to go uncompensated. In Board of Education of Normal School District v. Blodgett (1895), 155 Ill. 441, this court declined to follow the contrary authority of Campbell v. Holt (1885), 115 U.S. 620, 29 L. Ed. 483, and held, on State constitutional grounds, that a cause of action may not later be revived once it has been barred by a statute of limitations. The Blodgett court believed that the bar created by the running of a limitations period was a vested right, which, once established, could not later be removed. (Blodgett, 155 Ill. at 447.) The majority relies on Blodgett, concluding that the plaintiff’s action, having already been barred, cannot now be revived by legislative action. I believe that the time is ripe to reexamine Blodgett, and I would reconsider in this case our adherence to that rule. As a preliminary matter, I note that two of our recent cases have suggested that the doctrine announced in Blodgett is a matter of statutory interpretation, not constitutional proscription. Thus, in People v. Lansing (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 247, 250, in declining to give retroactive effect to a statute extending the time for bringing an action, the court stated, "We find nothing in the language of the amendment indicating an intent on the part of the legislature to revive an action which had been previously barred ***.” Similarly, in Arnold Engineering, Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 161, 167, the court said, "Assuming, but not deciding, that the legislature can, in certain cases, constitutionally revive previously barred statutorily created remedies, such revival should not result unless the legislature expressly indicates that intention.” Although our recent decisions on this issue are not uniform, Lansing and Arnold Engineering may be seen as recasting the rule in Blodgett from a constitutional proscription to a principle of statutory construction. Indeed, the statements quoted above are without meaning unless the court believed that it was leaving open the question whether legislation expressly declaring an intent to revive a previously barred claim would be enforceable and would not violate the Illinois Constitution. The majority dismisses those portions of Lansing and Arnold Engineering, insisting that the cases simply reflect the familiar rule that a court will not decide constitutional questions unnecessarily. (See, e.g., In re Estate of Longeway (1989), 133 Ill. 2d 33, 44.) Analyzing the decisions in those terms, however, undermines the majority’s assertion that our case law on this subject is "established,” "well developed,” "uniform,” and "well settled,” as the majority opinion maintains elsewhere. (162 Ill. 2d at 253, 254, 255.) If the constitutional proscription against the revival of time-barred actions was already well established when Lansing and Arnold Engineering were decided, then one must wonder at the court’s reluctance to invoke the doctrine in those cases. It is apparent that the legislature has accepted our invitation and has specifically chosen to make this measure applicable retroactively, eliminating the bar of the statute of limitations as a defense to the present action. The Federal Constitution does not prohibit this result (Campbell v. Holt (1885), 115 U.S. 620, 29 L. Ed. 483), and, with the State constitutional prohibition expressed in Blodgett in question, we should enforce the clear mandate of the statute. Even without Lansing and Arnold Engineering, however, I would not hesitate to apply the new limitations period to this case. To the extent that Blodgett survives as an interpretation of our State constitution, I would overrule the decision and adopt instead the view of the United States Supreme Court, which better reflects the nature and purposes of statutes of limitations. As Justice Jackson explained in his opinion for the Court in Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson (1945), 325 U.S. 304, 314, 89 L. Ed. 1628, 1635, 65 S. Ct. 1137, 1142: "Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in logic. They represent expedients, rather than principles. They are practical and pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from being put to his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared, and evidence has been lost. [Citation.] They are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does not discriminate between the just and the unjust claim, or the [a]voidable and unavoidable delay. They have come into the law not through the judicial process but through legislation. They represent a public policy about the privilege to litigate. Their shelter has never been regarded as what now is called a 'fundamental’ right or what used to be called a 'natural’ right of the individual. He may, of course, have the protection of the policy while it exists, but the history of pleas of limitation shows them to be good only by legislative grace and to be subject to a relatively large degree of legislative control.” The Chase Securities Court reaffirmed its decision in Campbell and found no Federal constitutional bar to State legislation that retroactively extended a limitations period and revived previously barred claims. As the Supreme Court noted, " 'multitudes of cases have recognized the power of the Legislature to call a liability into being where there was none before, if the circumstances were such as to appeal with some strength to the prevailing views of justice, and if the obstacle in the way of the creation seemed small.’ ” Chase Securities, 325 U.S. at 315, 89 L. Ed. at 1636, 65 S. Ct. at 1143, quoting Danforth v. Groton Water Co. (1901), 178 Mass. 472, 476, 59 N.E. 1033, 1034 (opinion for the court by Holmes, J.). This rationale is persuasive, and I would conclude that the running of a statute of limitations does not grant a vested right to the party in favor of whom the statute operates. I would thus overrule Blodgett and interpret our State constitution as erecting no greater barrier to the legislation at issue here than is found in the United States Constitution. In the present case, the defendant has not pointed to any particular hardship that might result from the revival of claims such as the plaintiffs. "This is not a case where [the defendant’s] conduct would have been different if the present rule had been known and the change foreseen.” (Chase Securities, 325 U.S. at 316, 89 L. Ed. at 1636, 65 S. Ct. at 1143.) The defendant certainly cannot be heard to argue that he committed the crimes involved here in reliance on the earlier statute of limitations. While the defendant would now be disappointed in the failure of his statute of limitations defense, "the existence of the policy at the time the action was commenced did not, under the circumstances, give [him] a constitutional right against change of policy before final adjudication.” (Chase Securities, 325 U.S. at 316, 89 L. Ed. at 1637, 65 S. Ct. at 1143.) Moreover, the requirement in the new limitations provision that the action be based on a criminal conviction establishes a particularly strong bulwark against the prosecution of unfounded claims. (See 735 ILCS 5/13 — 202.1(a) (West 1992).) For these reasons, I would enforce the new provision and hold that the plaintiffs cause of action is not barred by the State constitution, just as it is not barred by the Federal constitution. Nor do I agree with the defendant’s further contention that application of the new legislation to the present case would violate the separation of powers doctrine. (See Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, § 1.) As a general principle, when the applicable law has been changed during trial or on appeal, the trial judge or reviewing court will apply to the case the law that is in effect at the time the decision is rendered. (Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond (1974), 416 U.S. 696, 711-12, 40 L. Ed. 2d 476, 488, 94 S. Ct. 2006, 2016; United States v. Schooner Peggy (1801), 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110, 2 L. Ed. 49, 51; People v. Fernetti (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 19, 22; Kujawinski v. Kujawinski (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 563, 571; Rios v. Jones (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 488, 494-95; People ex rel. Bauer v. Elmhurst — Villa Park — Lombard Water Comm’n (1960), 20 Ill. 2d 139, 144.) As the court stated in Hughes v. Illinois Public Aid Comm’n (1954), 2 Ill. 2d 374, 378, "Where no vested rights are involved this court must decide the issues on the law as it stands at the time of our decision and not as of the time the cause of action accrued or the time of the trial court’s decision.” Legislative elimination of the statute of limitations defense does not implicate any vested rights in the case at bar. (Chase Securities, 325 U.S. at 314, 89 L. Ed. at 1635, 65 S. Ct. at 1142.) Accordingly, I believe that the new limitations provision governs the present case, and I would remand the matter for further proceedings.