Court Opinion

ID: 9476921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:09:08.43476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:35.239957
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Circuit Judge:
In this habeas corpus proceeding, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida determined that Clayton Palmer was not entitled to credit for time served in Georgia and South Carolina prior to Palmer’s extradition to Florida. Consequently, the district court denied Palmer’s petition. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
I.
On March 28, 1982, Palmer was arrested in Georgia on fugitive arrest warrants stemming from a criminal information filed against him in Florida. He was held without bail in Georgia on these warrants for 148 days. On August 23, 1982, Palmer waived extradition to South Carolina to answer charges alleging South Carolina probation violations. On September 12, 1982, he was found not guilty of violating the terms of his probation. Palmer was arrested the next day and detained further in South Carolina solely on the basis of a Florida fugitive warrant. Initially no bail was set while Palmer awaited extradition. On October 7,1982, bail was set at $40,000. He was extradited to Florida on December 21, 1982, to face trial on the Florida charges.
Palmer was subsequently convicted by a Florida jury of sexual battery with slight force and false imprisonment, receiving the statutory maximum sentences of 15 and 5 years respectively. See Fla.Stat. §§ 775.-082(3)(c)-(d), 787.02, 794.011(5). The state sentencing judge gave Palmer credit against his sentence for his time served in the Florida jail between his extradition on December 21, 1982, and his sentencing on October 19, 1983, a total of 303 days. Based upon the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Kronz v. State, 462 So.2d 450 (Fla.1985), however, the judge refused to award him credit for the 268 days of jail time served in Georgia and South Carolina while awaiting extradition to Florida.
After exhausting his state habeas corpus remedies, Palmer filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court. The district court denied the petition and Palmer filed this timely appeal.
II.
As a general rule, a state prisoner has no federal constitutional right to credit for time served prior to sentence absent a state statute granting such credit. Jackson v. Alabama, 530 F.2d 1231, 1235 (5th Cir.1976); Gremillion v. Henderson, 425 F.2d 1293, 1294 (5th Cir.1970). But “[a]n exception to the general rule may be claimed by a criminal defendant who is confined before sentencing because his indigency prevents him from making bond. Because of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees against wealth discrimination, such a defendant is entitled to credit if he is sentenced to the statutory maximum term for his particular offense.” Martin *255v. Florida, 533 F.2d 270, 271 (5th Cir.1976) (per curiam); accord Crowden v. Bowen, 734 F.2d 641, 642 (11th Cir.1984) (per cu-riam) (“The equal protection clause does not allow a state to extend a prisoner’s sentence beyond the maximum period prescribed by law by refusing to give the prisoner credit for presentencing detention occasioned by the prisoner’s financial inability to make bail.”).
Thus, under the current law of this Circuit, a prisoner is entitled to credit for presentencing incarceration if three conditions are present: (1) the prisoner is held for a bailable offense; (2) the prisoner is unable to make bail because of indigence; and (3) upon conviction the prisoner is sentenced to the statutory maximum sentence for that offense.
A. The Georgia Time
The district court denied Palmer credit for the 148 days he was detained in Georgia because, according to Palmer’s own admission, he was held without bail. We agree with the district court’s analysis on this issue. Palmer was unable to make bail not because of his indigence, but because no bail was set. Consequently, Palmer’s indigence was irrelevant and he is not entitled to credit against his sentence for that pretrial jail time. Cf. Martin, 533 F.2d at 271-72 (prisoner not entitled to pretrial detention credit where confinement was not because of poverty but because bail was revoked).
B. The South Carolina Time
Palmer waived extradition to South Carolina to answer probation violation charges in that state. The district court reasoned that, because the South Carolina charges were factually and legally distinct from the Florida charges, Palmer’s detention in South Carolina did not constitute preconviction custody for the Florida offenses. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
1. Time Spent for South Carolina Charges
On August 23, 1982, Palmer waived extradition to answer charges alleging South Carolina probation violations. On September 12, 1982, Palmer was found not guilty of violating the terms of his probation. The district court properly concluded that Palmer is not entitled to credit against his sentence for that pretrial jail time. Palmer was not convicted of the offense for which the time was attributable.
2. Time Spent for Florida Charges Before South Carolina Set Bail
On September 13, 1982, Palmer was arrested and detained further in South Carolina solely on the basis of the Florida fugitive warrant. Initially no bail was set while Palmer awaited extradition. On October 7, 1982, bail was set. For the reasons set forth above in Section 11(A) of this opinion, Palmer is not entitled to credit against his sentence for the pretrial jail time between September 13 and October 6 inclusive.
3. Time Spent for Florida Charges After South Carolina Set Bail
After bail was set on October 7, Palmer was unable to post it because of his indigence. On December 21, 1982, after lengthy extradition proceedings, Palmer was turned over to Florida authorities. The district court concluded that Palmer was not entitled to credit against his sentence for the pretrial jail time between October 7 and December 21 inclusive. We reverse.
We have not discovered, and the parties have not shown us, any case dealing with the precise issue raised by Palmer’s appeal. Specifically, does the Fourteenth Amendment require that credit be granted for presentencing incarceration in another jurisdiction where the criminal defendant has been given the statutory maximum sentence and could not, because of his indigence, make bail pending extradition? 1
*256This Circuit has recently followed and expanded the general rule stated in Jackson that a defendant who is unable to post bond because of his indigence and who is given the statutory maximum sentence for his offense is entitled to credit for time spent in jail prior to sentencing. In Crowden v. Bowen, supra, 734 F.2d 641, we held that a defendant in such circumstances is also entitled to credit for time spent in postconviction custody pending appeal. We perceived “no distinction in principle between a denial of credit for time spent in presentencing custody that results in the detention of indigents longer than the maximum period which can be imposed by law and a similar denial when the detention occurs after sentencing, pending appeal.” Id. at 642. Similarly, we perceive no distinction in principle between the presen-tencing incarceration of an indigent criminal defendant in the state where he will be tried and his presentencing detention in another state while awaiting extradition.
Dugger argues that the question of whether Palmer receives credit for this time is a matter of Florida law. Dugger contends that Kronz, supra, 462 So.2d 450, governs Palmer’s request for time credit and consequently that Palmer is not entitled to such credit.
In Kronz, the Florida Supreme Court examined the state statute providing that “the court imposing a sentence shall allow a defendant credit for all the time spent in the county jail before sentence.” Fla.Stat. § 921.161(1). Kronz was arrested and held in South Carolina on a fugitive warrant for an escape from a Florida jail. He unsuccessfully fought extradition and eventually pleaded guilty to the escape charge. Kronz sought credit for time served in South Carolina. The Florida Supreme Court concluded that Section 921.161(1) “requires the trial judge to give credit only for time served in Florida county jails pending disposition of criminal charges. The trial judge does, however, have the inherent discretionary authority to award credit for time served in other jurisdictions while awaiting transfer to Florida.” 462 So.2d at 451.
Dugger’s argument addresses the issue of whether a state, as an act of legislative grace, has provided for time credit. That is not the issue in the present case — the issue is whether not giving credit violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, Dug-ger’s reliance on Kronz is misplaced; Kronz plays no part in answering the constitutional question presented by this case. As noted above, the general rule that time credit requires state statutory support gives way, as required by the equal protection clause, when the defendant receives the statutory maximum and cannot meet bail because of indigence. As the Supreme Court recognized in Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 241-42, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 2022-23, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970), the general rule gives way because Fourteenth Amendment protections are triggered and the state has no countervailing interest: “[0]nce the State has defined the outer limits of incarceration necessary to satisfy its penological interests and policies, it may not then subject a certain class of convicted defendants to a period of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum solely by reason of their indigence.”
Similarly, we reject the notion that our holding infringes Florida’s sovereignty by giving credit for jail time imposed by another state when that state set the bail pending extradition. South Carolina itself did not impose the jail time; rather, it imposed the jail time because Florida had requested South Carolina to hold Palmer. In addition, no infringement has occurred. Williams recognizes that a state has a right to set maximum sentences to achieve penological interests. But the Supreme Court went on to hold that this state interest is not infringed when a state seeks to impose a penalty upon a defendant that *257exceeds the state-created statutory maximum and that penalty results from the defendant’s indigence. Lastly, the fact that South Carolina set bail pending extradition is irrelevant; the offenses included in the Florida fugitive warrant were bailable offenses in Florida, see Fla. Const, art. 1, § 14, and the warrant itself contemplated that bail would be set.
Finally, we reject the notion that Palmer could have avoided the South Carolina jail time by waiving his right to contest extradition. We hold Crowden controlling on this point. In that case,
[u]nder Alabama law a criminal defendant who appeals his conviction has the option of being transferred to the penitentiary pending appeal of having his sentence suspended and either going free on bail, if eligible and financially able, or remaining in county jail. A person taking the former route receives credit on his sentence for this detention, while one pursuing the latter course does not.... [T]he state argues that only by petitioner’s voluntary act of sitting out the appeal in county jail rather than state prison was he denied postsentencing credit. What is at issue here, however, is not whether petitioner unilaterally chose to be detained in county jail once his inability to post bond mandated his continued incarceration pending appeal, but whether he may be detained at all without credit while wealthier defendants go free on bail, with the result that petitioner and other indigents serve terms beyond the statutory maximum. We hold that he may not.
734 F.2d at 643. Similarly, we hold that Palmer need not have waived his right to contest extradition in order to receive credit against his sentence.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part.

. One court has implicitly addressed the question. In Faye v. Gray, 541 F.2d 665 (7th Cir.1976), the petitioner, whose indigence prevented him from posting bail, argued that, pursuant to *256the equal protection clause, he should receive credit for his presentence confinement. He sought credit for time spent in a Nebraska jail while awaiting extradition to Wisconsin and for time spent in a Wisconsin jail prior to his con-vlction. In concluding that the sentencing judge had not credited the presentence confinement, the court made no distinction between the time spent in Nebraska awaiting extradition and the time spent in Wisconsin.