Court Opinion

ID: 9957309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 14:00:51.819245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:15.575492
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-14221     Document: 13-1      Date Filed: 04/04/2024   Page: 1 of 10

                                                     [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                     In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                            ____________________

                                  No. 23-14221
                            Non-Argument Calendar
                            ____________________

        JERMAINE ALFONSO HARMON,
                                                        Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        FLETCHER SAMS,
        Chief Superior Court Judge, in individual capacity and
        oﬃcial capacity,
        STEPHEN DOUGLASS OTT,
        Juvenile Court Judge, in individual capacity and
        oﬃcial capacity,
        LLOYD WALKER,
        Guardian Ad Litem, in individual capacity and
        oﬃcial capacity,
        HOLLY LINE,
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 23-14221

        Director of Fayette County DFCS, in individual capacity and
        oﬃcial capacity,
        JILLIAN MOORE,
        Supervisor, in her individual capacity and
        oﬃcial capacity, et al.,

                                                      Defendants-Appellees.

                             ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Georgia
                      D.C. Docket No. 3:23-cv-00155-TCB
                            ____________________

        Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               This is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case brought by Jermain Harmon,
        a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Harmon alleges that various
        state actors violated his constitutional rights throughout his
        conviction process and the subsequent placement of his children in
        foster care. The district court dismissed his complaint for failure to
        state a claim and improper joinder. Because we cannot grant
        Harmon’s requested relief, we aﬃrm.
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        23-14221               Opinion of the Court                        3

                                I.     Background
               In August 2023, Harmon, proceeding pro se, filed an
        amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Harmon alleged that
        various state actors—Fayette County Superior Court Judge
        Fletcher Sams, Juvenile Court Judge Steven Douglas Ott, Guardian
        Ad Litem Lloyd Walker, Director of Fayette County Division of
        Family and Children Services (“DFCS”) Holly Line, DFCS
        Supervisor Jillian Moore, and Social Worker Charell Nesbitt—
        violated his constitutional rights throughout his conviction process
        and the subsequent placement of his children in foster care.
               Specifically, Harmon alleges that Judge Sams (1) denied
        Harmon the right to be heard during his pretrial proceedings; (2)
        had Harmon “removed from the court without addressing the
        merits of [Harmon’s] consti[tut]ional claims”; (3) ignored his claims
        “before jury commencement”; (4) attempted to “procure
        jurisdiction through means of fraud by conducting a[n] on the spot
        arraignment”; (5) “enter[ed] a fraudulent plea”; (6) illegally
        empaneled a jury; and (7) “forced him into trial in a court that
        lacked subject matter jurisdiction.” As to the other five
        defendants—Judge Ott, Guardian Ad Litem Walker, Director Line,
        Supervisor Moore, and Social Worker Nesbitt—Harmon alleged
        that they aided and abetted Judge Sams and “authorized, initiated,
        or enforced the placement of his minor children into” foster care.
               Harmon alleges that, because of his “unlawful prosecution
        and incarceration,” his children were “kidnapped and placed in
        foster care,” and Harmon “suffered mental abuse, psychological
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        4                         Opinion of the Court                    23-14221

        abuse, trauma, fear, anxiety, insomnia, decreased appetite,
        depression, destruction of [his] family and marriage,” loss of his
        income and home, and slander of his character. As to relief,
        Harmon requested that (1) the state court judgment be voided 1 or
        vacated with prejudice, (2) further prosecution be barred, and (3)
        he receive “reimbursements for all legal fees and all [monetary] and
        punitive damages accrued as a result of this unlawful act[.]”
               The magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation
        (“R&R”) recommending that (1) Harmon’s complaint be dismissed
        without prejudice for failure to state a claim and improper joinder,
        and (2) his motion to void his state court judgment be denied. The
        magistrate judge separated his analysis by defendant—first
        analyzing the claims against Judge Sams, and then analyzing the
        claims against the other five defendants.
               The magistrate judge stated that Judge Sams was “entitled
        to absolute immunity from [Harmon’s] claim for money
        damages.” Then, citing to Heck v. Humphrey,2 the magistrate judge
        said that Harmon could not “obtain any relief based on his
        allegedly unlawful conviction” because his conviction had not been
        reversed or otherwise questioned. Finally, citing to Preisser v.

        1 In addition to requesting the state court judgment be voided in his amended

        complaint, Harmon also filed a separate motion “for an order voiding the
        judgment entered against him” in the state court case because the court
        “lacked and continues to lack subject matter jurisdiction over” his case. The
        district court denied this motion.
        2 Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994).
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        23-14221                    Opinion of the Court                                5

        Rodriguez, 3 the magistrate judge said that it could not “declare
        [Harmon’s] state court criminal conviction void because such relief
        is available only in a federal habeas corpus action.”
               As to the remaining five defendants, the magistrate judge
        stated that they could not be joined to the lawsuit because
        Harmon’s claims against them were “not sufficiently related to his
        challenge to his state court criminal conviction.”
               The district court adopted the R&R, dismissing Harmon’s
        claims and denying Harmon’s motion to void his state court
        criminal judgment. As to the claims against Judge Sams, the district
        court held that the Rooker-Feldman 4 doctrine prevented the court
        from voiding Harmon’s state court judgment. And the district
        court held that Judge Sams had absolute immunity from Harmon’s
        claim for money damages. Finally, the district court held that
        Harmon’s request for equitable relief—vacating his criminal
        conviction and preventing the state from prosecuting him again—
        was unavailable under § 1983.
                The district court also dismissed the claims against the
        remaining five defendants. It held (1) that those claims failed
        because it could not find that the state court criminal judgment was
        defective, (2) that Harmon’s claims against these other defendants
        failed to state viable claims for relief, and (3) that Harmon failed to

        3 Preisser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).

        4 Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460

        U.S. 462 (1983).
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        6                             Opinion of the Court                     23-14221

        show how his children’s placement in foster care violated his rights
        when both he and his wife were in prison. 5
                Harmon appealed.
                                II.      Standard of Review
               We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
        § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
        be granted using the same standards that govern Fed. R. Civ. P.
        12(b)(6) dismissals. Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1278
        (11th Cir. 2001). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), despite any filing
        fee that may have been paid, the court must dismiss a case at any
        time if it determines that the action is frivolous or fails to state a
        claim upon which relief may be granted.                28 U.S.C. §
        1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii). While pro se pleadings are liberally construed
        and held to less stringent standards than those drafted by lawyers,
        they must still suggest some factual basis for a claim. Jones v. Fla.
        Parole Comm’n, 787 F.3d 1105, 1107 (11th Cir. 2015). And we can
        affirm the district court’s judgment “on any basis supported by the
        record,” whether or not the district court decided the case on that
        basis. Club Madonna, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 924 F.3d 1370, 1378
        (11th Cir. 2019).

        5 After the magistrate judge filed its R&R, but before the district court’s order,

        Harmon moved for summary judgment. For the reasons discussed in
        dismissing Harmon’s amended complaint, the district court stated that
        “Harmon ha[d] not established that he [was] entitled to summary judgment”
        and denied his motion as moot.
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        23-14221                  Opinion of the Court                              7

                                    III.    Discussion
                  On appeal, Harmon argues that exceptions to Heck and
        absolute judicial immunity apply to his case, that he did not seek to
        circumvent § 1983 by challenging his conviction, and that he did
        not need to appeal the state court’s judgment or seek habeas corpus
        relief. 6
               Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, no person acting under color of state
        law may deprive another of “any rights, privileges, or immunities
        secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. See
        Emory v. Peeler, 756 F.2d 1547, 1554 (11th Cir. 1985). A prisoner in
        state custody, however, cannot use a § 1983 claim to challenge the
        fact or duration of his confinement, and if the relief he seeks is a
        determination that he is entitled to immediate release or faster
        release from prison, then “his sole federal remedy is to seek a writ
        of habeas corpus.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499–500
        (1973). Additionally, “a state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred . . .
        no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief) . . . if
        success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity
        of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74

        6 Even liberally construing Harmon’s brief, Harmon has abandoned his claims

        against all defendants except Judge Sams. Harmon only mentions Judge Ott
        once, and never mentions the other four of defendants by name; nor does he
        address any of the reasons the district court dismissed his claims against any
        defendant other than Judge Sams. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385
        F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir.2004) (“[T]he law is by now settled in this Circuit
        that a legal claim or argument that has not been briefed before the court is
        deemed abandoned and its merits will not be addressed.”).
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        8                          Opinion of the Court                          23-14221

        (2005) (emphasis omitted) (extending Heck, 512 U.S. 477 to cover
        claims for equitable relief).
               “Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from
        damages for those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial
        capacity unless they acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”
        Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks
        omitted). Factors that determine whether actions were made in a
        judicial capacity include whether: “(1) the act complained of
        constituted a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in
        the judge’s chambers or in open court; (3) the controversy involved
        a case pending before the judge; and (4) the confrontation arose
        immediately out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity.”
        Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005). “This
        immunity applies even when the judge’s acts are in error,
        malicious, or were in excess of his or her jurisdiction,” so long as
        they were not in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.7 Id.

        7 An example illustrates the difference between acting in “clear absence of all

        jurisdiction,” which would defeat absolute immunity, and acting in “excess of
        jurisdiction,” which would not defeat absolute immunity. The Supreme
        Court has stated:
               if a probate judge, with jurisdiction over only wills and estates,
               should try a criminal case, he would be acting in the clear
               absence of jurisdiction and would not be immune from
               liability for his action; on the other hand, if a judge of a criminal
               court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he
               would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction and would
               be immune.
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        23-14221                   Opinion of the Court                                9

               Harmon’s claims fail because we cannot grant his requested
        relief. Recall that Harmon requested that (1) the state court
        judgment be voided or vacated with prejudice, (2) further
        prosecution be barred, and (3) he receive “reimbursements for all
        legal fees and all [monetary] and punitive damages accrued as a
        result of this unlawful act[.]” We discuss each in turn.
               First, as to Harmon’s request that his state court judgment
        be voided or vacated, § 1983 is not the proper vehicle for such relief.
        Instead, when “challenging the very fact” of his imprisonment and
        requesting “immediate release,” Harmon’s “sole federal remedy is
        a writ of habeas corpus.” Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500.
               Second, Harmon’s request to bar further prosecution
        against him runs into at least two problems. First, Harmon has
        presented no evidence indicating that he is likely to be prosecuted
        again, and we do not enjoin future prosecutions in state court
        based on speculation that such prosecution might occur. See
        Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971) (“A federal lawsuit to stop
        a prosecution in a state court is a serious matter. And persons
        having no fears of state prosecution except those that are imaginary
        or speculative, are not to be accepted as appropriate plaintiffs in
        such cases.”). And second, to obtain such an injunction, Harmon
        must show, in part, “that he has prevailed in establishing the

        Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357 n.7 (1978) (citing Bradley v. Fisher,
        80 U.S. 335, 352 (1871)).
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        10                         Opinion of the Court                        23-14221

        violation of the right asserted in his complaint.”8 Thomas v. Bryant,
        614 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2010). To do so here would require
        Harmon to prove that his state court conviction was
        unconstitutional, which “would necessarily demonstrate the
        invalidity of [his] confinement[.]” And if success on his claim
        “would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of [his
        confinement,” his “§ 1983 action is barred.” Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at
        74–75.
                Third, Harmon’s claim for money damages against Judge
        Sams is barred by judicial immunity because Harmon’s allegations
        all relate to Judge Sams’s actions taken in his judicial capacity. See
        Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239; Sibley, 437 F.3d at 1070. As the district court
        noted, “[p]residing over a criminal trial is clearly acting in a judicial
        capacity[.]” And a superior court judge trying a criminal case does
        not act in “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 357
        n.7 (citing Bradley, 80 U.S. at 352).
              Because we cannot grant Harmon’s requested relief, his
        claims must be dismissed.
                AFFIRMED.

        8 Harmon would also need to show that “(2) there is no adequate remedy at

        law for the violation of this right; (3) irreparable harm will result if the court
        does not order injunctive relief; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be
        adverse to the public interest.” Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1317. We do not discuss
        these additional elements, because, as discussed, Harmon’s need to prove the
        first element is sufficient to bar his claim.