Court Opinion

ID: 6633831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-20 20:38:55.347101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:59:01.362099
License: Public Domain

Campbell J.
In this case, the parties in the court below consented to a reference of the matters put in issue by the pleadings to a referee of their own nomination, who heard the case and made his report. Exceptions were taken to it, which were overruled, and judgment was entered on the finding. The cause is now brought before this court on questions chiefly relating to the validity of the reference, and the authority of the referee.
It is first objected that the referee was not sworn. The statute does not require this, but it is claimed that the constitution of this state requires all executive and judicial officers to be sworn, before they assume their duties.— Const. Art. 18, §1. The oath required is the oath of allegiance to the United States and to the state, and an oath to perform faithfully the duties of the office. The term “officer,” as there used, can only be taken to refer to such offices as have some degree of permanence, and are not created by a temporary nomination for a single and transient purpose. A' designation of a person to do *367some one act of duty, with no official tenure except as incident to that transitory function, can not make him a public officer, without involving a great absurdity. Every public office includes duties which are to be performed constantly, or as occasion arises, during some continuous tenure. And no public office can depend upon the will of private persons, who may call it into existence for their own purposes, and at their own pleasure. In the proceedings under consideration, a referee is appointed only when parties consent, or waive their right to a jury, and the designation may be made by their private stipulation, and is confined to the particular suit. We have no difficulty in holding that such a referee can not be within the operation of the constitution as an officer of any kind.
It is also urged that the statute creating the existing system of references is invalid as not in any proper sense an amendment of the prior statutes, although purporting to be such. The constitution declares that no law shall be amended or altered by reference to its title only, but that the sections altered or amended “shall be re-enacted and published at length.” The law in question was designed to remodel the entire system of references, and in lieu of several sections of the former statutes, a series of new sections was adopted, each in the room of an old one. The objection pointed out is, that some of the new sections bear no resemblance to those superseded, but relate to a different class of details. We can see no illegality in this. There is no principle which can prevent the legislature from substituting any provision they please for any other provision, whether cognate or not, if the new section is not foreign to the subject indicated by the title of the law in which it is inserted, There is no other constitutional check that we have been able to discover, and in the absence of any, it certainly belongs to the legislative power to exercise its discretion in the matter.
*368The principal objection to these proceedings is claimed to be found in the clauses of the constitution which vest all the judicial power of the state in courts, and which provide how those courts shall be constituted, and, as is argued, leave no room for judicial action elsewhere. The judicial power, even when used in its widest and least accurate sense, involves the power to “hear and determine” the matters to be disposed of; and this can only be done by some order or judgment which needs no additional sanction to entitle it to be enforced. No action which is merely preparatory to an order or judgment to be rendered by some different body, can be properly termed judicial. A master in chancery often has occasion to consider questions of law and of fact, but no one ever supposed him to possess judicial power. A jury in a court of record determines all the facts in the case, but the judicial power is in the court which enforces the verdict by judgment. This view is very clearly explained by Kent C. J. in Tillotson v. Cheetham, 2 Johns. 63, where it was held that the sheriff himself, when presiding over a jury of inquest, acted ministerially, because he had no power to give judgment. See, also, Story on Const. § 1640 and seq.; Daniels v. People, 6 Mich. 381; Chandler v. Nash, 5 Mich. 409. It is the inherent authority not only to decide, but to make binding orders or judgments, which constitutes judicial power; and the instrumentalities used to inform the tribunal, whether left to its own choice or fixed by law, are merely auxiliary to that power, and operate on persons or things only through its action, and by virtue of it.
Our constitution, in ordinary civil cases, dispenses with a jury unless demanded. The facts, therefore, must usually be settled by other than common -law means. The cause may be, and in most cases will be, heard by the court itself upon facts and law, and we are not now required to consider how far this right may be restricted. But *369it is unquestionably within the power of the parties to stipulate upon the facts, or for the amount of judgment, and thus save the court the labor of determining anything but the law, or even of doing anything beyond entering the judgment. This substitution of the private agreement for the verdict can not be seriously claimed to be an invasion or usurpation of judicial functions. Should the parties even agree that certain facts would appear if certain testimony were admissible, and by their stipulation submit the cause upon more than one hypothesis, according as certain proofs should be received or rejected, there would certainly be no such usurpation. This statute does nothing-more, in reference to preparing facts for submission to the judgment of the court, than if the parties themselves determined them by stipulation. Instead of doing- this, they agree that they will allow a common agent or arbiter to examine into the facts, and present his various conclusions, and, if required, the means and principles whereby he was enabled to arrive at them. They accept the machinery provided by the statute, in lieu of imposing any conditions of their own devising. The court receives the conclusions of this arbiter of the parties, gives each of them an opportunity of showing whether he has kept within the rules of the authority conferred upon him, in receiving or rejecting evidence, or in any other action, and, if satisfied he has complied with his duty, gives judgment accordingly. "We can perceive no difference in law between an agreement that a fact exists and an agreement that the determination of a chosen umpire shall decide upon its existence. The conclusion in either case is the result of a stipulation, in one instance acting directly, and in the other by an intermediate agency.
When this common agent has performed his duty, and submitted his conclusions to the court, then the judicial power is exercised upon all that the parties have seen fit to leave to its action, by giving a binding judgment such *370as in law is warranted by this finding. But, until this judgment is given, it has precisely the same force as if the parties had joined in a written stipulation, embracing the findings of the referee and the statutory provisions determining what effect should be given them. No one has ever questioned the power of the legislature to allow judgments by confession; and if such judgments, where the parties settle their own conclusions, do not infringe the judicial power, we can see no more reason for objection to references, where the consent of the parties is a condition precedent to the proceedings.
We are not required in this case to consider whether any, and if so, what, compulsory authority might be granted to referees in invitum. No party who has consented to their appointment can object to their conclusions except where they violate the rules of law; and then he must follow the statute which he has by his own consent made the rule of proceeding.
We do not think the constitution prevents such references by consent. And we think there is no error in the proceedings. The judgment must be affirmed, with costs.
The other Justices concurred.