Court Opinion

ID: 9701326
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:15:48.33357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:22.469084
License: Public Domain

WH. “Dub” Arnold, Chief Justice. This case presents an appeal from an interlocutory order of the Pulaski County Circuit Court granting appellee, Nora Harris, injunctive relief from appellants’ assessment and collection of any real property tax as a result of or based upon the 1996 reappraisal of the real property located within Pulaski County, Arkansas. Significantly, the Court of Appeals certified the case to this court as an issue of substantial public interest, solely to determine whether the circuit court erred by enjoining appellants’ continued tax assessment and collection. Accordingly, our jurisdiction is authorized pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. Rule l-2(d) (1999), and Ark. R. App. P. — Civ. 2(a)(6) (1999). Notably, the parties urge us to consider related, substantive issues, including (1) whether the circuit court erred in finding that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over this action, and (2) whether Harris stated an illegal-exaction claim. However, we decline to reach issues not properly before us on appeal. Moreover, we reiterate that our appellate jurisdiction in this matter is confined to a review of the circuit court’s interlocutory order granting an injunction. See Ark. R. App. P. — Civ. 2(a)(6) (1999). In fact, the trial court stated that certain issues remain unresolved in this proceeding, including damages and class certification. Given that the issue before this court is whether the circuit court possessed the jurisdiction to grant an injunction, we hold that the circuit court erred and we reverse. Background Pursuant to its obligation to equalize real-property values in the county, the Pulaski County Board of Equalization held a special meeting in 1994 and approved a contract with an outside appraisal firm. The contract was executed by the county judge, the appraisals were performed, and reappraised values were placed on the tax rolls in 1996. Nora Harris, a property owner and taxpayer, appealed her reassessment to the Board of Equalization. Subsequently, on August 14, 1996, Harris filed a complaint in the Pulaski County Court alleging that Pulaski County Judge Floyd Villines, III, and other county officials violated Arkansas statutory requirements and Pulaski County property owners’ federal due-process rights via the county-wide, real-property assessment. As a result, she sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction to prevent appellees from collecting any new taxes based upon the reappraised values. After hearing arguments, Special County Judge Russ Hunt concluded that the county court lacked the power to grant an injunction pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. section 14-14-1002(a), which permits the issuance of an injunction only in the absence of a chancellor from the county. However, he granted summary judgment in favor of Harris and found that appellants violated her due-process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment because they failed to follow the proper Arkansas statute. Importantly, appellants failed to appeal the county court’s March 21, 1997, order. Further, appellants continued to collect taxes based upon the reappraisal.1   On April 1, 1997, Harris filed a new action in the Pulaski County Chancery Court and sought an injunction prohibiting the county from issuing tax statements and collecting taxes based on the reappraisals. Pursuant to Ark. Const, art. 7, § 15, and Ark. Code Ann. section 16-113-306, chancery courts have jurisdiction to grant injunctions against illegal or unauthorized taxes or assessments. Priest v. Polk, 322 Ark 673, 912 S.W.2d 902 (1995); Pockrus v. Bella Vista Village Property Owners Assn., 316 Ark. 468, 872 S.W.2d 416 (1994). Although the Pulaski County Chancery Court apparently had subject-matter jurisdiction over Harris’s claim, the parties transferred the action to circuit court. At the Pulaski County Circuit Court, Harris again sought injunctive relief. She alleged that appellants’ continued tax collection constituted an illegal exaction and violated Pulaski County property owners’ constitutional rights. She also sought money damages. In response, appellants filed a motion to dismiss and argued that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Harris’s claim. After reviewing the pleadings and counsels’ arguments, Special Circuit Judge John S. Patterson found that the circuit court had jurisdiction over Harris’s claim, which it deemed an illegal-exaction claim. Moreover, the circuit court concluded that it had the authority to issue an injunction in light of the county court’s final and unappealed order and appellants’ subsequent conduct. Reserving the issues of damages and class certification, the circuit court entered an interlocutory order on December 28, 1998, enjoining appellants’ assessment and collection of taxes based upon the 1996 reappraisal. From that order, comes the instant interlocutory appeal. I. Interlocutory appeal  First, we consider the scope of the instant appeal. As a general rule, an appeal from an interlocutory decision brings up for review only the decision from which the appeal was taken, here, the granting of an injunction. See generally, 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 738 (1993 & Supp. 1999). Conversely, an appellate court will not review another interlocutory decision from which no appeal was taken. Id. For example, where an appeal was certified to consider an interlocutory appeal from the dismissal of a counterclaim and third-party complaint, the court of appeals concluded that the defendant could not bring up for review unrelated issues pertaining to the primary suit that was still pending in the trial court. See Coleman’s Service Center, Inc. v. Southern Inns Management, Inc., 44 Ark. App. 45, 866 S.W.2d 427 (1993); see also Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Specifically, the appellate court noted that when a trial court permits an interlocutory appeal on one issue, when other issues remain to be decided, the issues raised in the appeal must be reasonably related to the order appealed from. Significantly, the interlocutory appeal may not be used as a “vehicle to bring up for review matters which are still pending before the trial court.” Coleman’s, 44 Ark. App. at 49, 866 S.W.2d at 429.  The mere fact that a significant issue is involved, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for this court to accept jurisdiction of an interlocutory appeal. Scheland v. Chilldres, 313 Ark. 165, 167, 852 S.W.2d 791, 792 (1993). Here, Harris suggests that appellees’ conduct rises to the level of an “illegal exaction” in a manner never before considered by the court. She frankly requests that we extend existing law and find that a flaw in the assessment procedure can rise to an illegal exaction. Arguably, this is a significant issue. Nevertheless, we may not reach the merits of her argument. When an appeal reaches a court via an order granting a preliminary injunction, the appellate court will not delve into the merits of the case further than is necessary to determine whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in granting the injunction. Special Sch. Dist. v. Speer, 75 F.2d 420 (8th Cir. 1935). The sole question before the appellate court is whether the trial court “departed from the rules and principles of equity in making the order,” and not whether the appellate court would have made the order. Special Sch. Dist., 75 F.2d at 421-22.  Moreover, when the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to an action, the trial court’s ruling that it has proper jurisdiction does not render that order appealable, even if that ruling is erroneous. Signa Ins. v. Brisson, 294 Ark. 504, 744 S.W.2d 716 (1988). In such a case, this court retains the independent duty to raise the issue of our own jurisdiction because a final order is a jurisdictional requisite for this court to act. Id.; see also Mueller v. Killam, 295 Ark. 270, 748 S.W.2d 141 (1988). Despite the lack of final order, however, we may exercise our appellate jurisdiction over “an interlocutory order by which an injunction is granted,” pursuant to Ark. R. App. P. — Civ. 2(a)(6). The rule providing for appeals from injunctions is an exception to the general rule that appeals may be taken only from a “final judgment or decree.” See Ark. R. App. P. — Civ 2(a)(1).  Here, we have a distinct basis and specific authority to hear the appeal from an injunction, and the extent of our review is dependent on the decision appealed from. Although we may regret our lack of ability to give a trial court sufficient guidance on remand so that it might avoid error, we cannot precipitately prevent such error by preempting the trial court’s action. We have long held that our role, for better or worse, is to decline to issue advisory opinions. See Seeco, Inc. v. Hales, 330 Ark. 402, 414, 954 S.W.2d 234, 241 (1997). We are limited to a review of the record before us. In light of our jurisdictional grounds, we decline to reach the following issues: (1) whether the circuit court erred in finding that it has subject-matter jurisdiction over this action, (2) whether Harris stated an illegal-exaction claim, (3) whether the circuit court erred in finding that appellant’s attempts to relitigate the merits of the County-court order are barred by res judicata, (4) any issues relating to summary judgment, (5) any issues relating to the, as yet, unawarded damages, and (6) any issues concerning the motion for class certification. However, we are aware that at the conclusion of the instant litigation, marked by the entry of a final order, these issues may be ripe for appeal. Accordingly, while these issues are beyond the scope of this interlocutory appeal, nothing in this opinion shall be construed as a bar to a subsequent appeal of any or all of these issues. II. Injunctive relief Next, we consider the circuit court’s finding that it had the authority to grant appellee injunctive relief. In support of affirming the decision, appellee cites the county court’s inability to grant her an injunction. Specifically, appellee posits that the presence of circuit-court authority derives from the absence of county-court authority. This argument amounts to a logical fallacy in reasoning.2 It also fails to account for the fact that the chancery court had the authority to grant her an injunction.3 Alternatively, appellee maintains that because jurisdiction over injunctions has not been given exclusively to courts of equity, a circuit court may have the power to issue an injunction in a case properly before it when ancillary to its jurisdiction or as necessary to grant complete relief. See Arkansas State Medical Bd. v. Leipzig, 299 Ark.71, 770 S.W.2d 661 (1989); Daley v. Digby, 272 Ark. 27, 613 S.W.2d 589 (1981); and Pinckney v. Mass Merchandisers, Inc., 16 Ark. App. 151, 698 S.W.2d 310 (1985).  On the other hand, appellants argue that the circuit court was wholly without authority to issue an injunction. We agree. In the early case of Monette Road Improvement Dist. v. Dudley, 144 Ark. 169, 222 S.W. 59 (1920), we held that the creation of our chancery courts left no vestige of equity jurisdiction in the circuit courts.4 Injunctions are historically equitable and fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of chancery court. Id. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the circuit court’s order enjoining appellants from collecting any tax based on the 1996 county-wide reappraisal. Special Justice MARTHA MILLER HARRIMAN and Special Justice W. Kelvin Wyrick join. Special Justice KENNETH R. REEVES and Special Justice HOWARD W. Brill concur. Special Justice Richard A. Lusby and Special Justice James E. BAINE concur in part and dissent in part.   In the absence of a complete evidentiary record, we remain bewildered by appellees’ conduct. Their initial failure to comply with the statutory procedures, coupled with their subsequent conduct, (failing to appeal, and then ignoring the final and binding county-court order), creates a disturbing picture. Nevertheless, we are wholly without jurisdiction to instruct the circuit court how it should proceed on the pending damages issue.    The structure of appellee’s argument takes the form of a “conditional syllogism”: A cannot grant an injunction B is not A; therefore, B can grant an injunction. Although some forms of conditional syllogisms may yield a valid argument (e.g., the modus ponens, and the modus tollens), the instant form reaches an invalid conclusion by denying the antecedent. Notably, the fallacy of “denying the antecedent” fails to account for other possibilities, here, that C can grant an injunction. For a thorough discussion of this and other logical fallacies in the context of reasoning in the law, see Andrew Jay McClurg, Logical Fallacies and the Supreme Court: A Critical Examination of Justice Rehnquist’s Decisions in Criminal Procedure Cases, 59 U. Colo. L. Rev. 741, 774-75 (1988).    Unfortunately, and inexplicably, the parties agreed to transfer the action from chancery to circuit court. From the limited record before us, it appears that the action could and should have remained in chancery court where that court could have granted an injunction and awarded damages pursuant to the clean-up doctrine.    Since Monette, only three Arkansas cases have sanctioned a circuit court granting injunctive relief. See Arkansas state Medical Bd. v. Leipzig, 299 Ark. 71, 770 S.W.2d 661 (1989); Daley v. Digby, 272 Ark. 267, 613 S.W.2d 589 (1981); and Pinckney v. Mass Merchandisers, Inc., 16 Ark. App. 151, 698 S.W.2d 310 (1985). Notably, the majority opinions is Leipzig, Daley, and Pinckney fail to cite Monette or to explain why the longstanding constitutional rationale of Monette was inapplicable. Moreover, in his concurring opinion in Cummings v. Fingers, 296 Ark. 276, 281-82, 753 S.W.2d 865, 868 (1988), Justice Newbern observed that in Daley, the authority of a circuit court to grant an injunction was not even an issue on appeal. See Cummings, 296 Ark. at 281-82, 753 S/W2d at 868 (Newbern, J., concurring). Therefore, the court’s acquiescence to the circuit court’s action resulted not from a deliberation on the merits but from the scope of the appeal.