Court Opinion

ID: 9388047
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-19 18:02:46.126044+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:17.126082
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/19/23 In re M.M. CA2/6
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 In re M.M., a Person Coming                                 2d Juv. No. B319031
 Under the Juvenile Court                                  (Super. Ct. No. MJ24144)
 Law.                                                        (Los Angeles County)

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,

 v.

 M.M.,

      Defendant and Appellant.

      M.M. appeals from an order adjudicating him a ward of the
court after it sustained allegations he committed second degree
murder (Pen. Code, § 187; count 1) and vehicular manslaughter
with gross negligence (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (c)(1); count 2;
Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 602). The court ordered M.M. committed to
a secure youth treatment facility (SYTF) with a baseline term of
six years and six months and a maximum term of confinement of
15 years to life.
       M.M. contends (1) there was insufficient evidence to
support the true finding on murder, and (2) the juvenile court
abused its discretion when it committed him to SYTF. We affirm.
            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       While on patrol, two Los Angeles County Sheriff’s deputies
saw a burgundy sports utility vehicle (SUV) pull out of a parking
lot. M.M. was driving the SUV. The deputies conducted a
warrant inquiry on the license plate and learned the SUV was
connected to a recent burglary.
       The SUV entered a freeway, and the deputies followed.
While driving in the center lane, the SUV made an abrupt right
turn in front of another car and crossed a lane of traffic to exit
the freeway. The deputies activated their lights and sirens and
continued to follow the SUV. The SUV sped up, ran a red light
without slowing down, and weaved in and out of traffic, nearly
colliding with several other vehicles on the road. M.M. was
driving about 100 to 110 miles per hour. At one point, the
deputies stopped their pursuit of M.M. due to public safety
concerns.
       There were four other people in the SUV. One of the
passengers testified that all the passengers screamed at M.M. to
stop the car. M.M. screamed “no” and drove faster.
       The SUV sped through another red light and made a fast
right turn onto another street. The deputies saw a “big cloud of

      1Further unspecified statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                2
dust” when they approached the street. The SUV was flipped on
its side in the bike path and had hit a nearby brick wall.
       The deputies walked in front of the SUV and saw the body
of V.R. in the bike lane; the SUV had hit and killed V.R. Her
body was split into two at the abdomen.
       A detective arrived on scene and saw M.M. crawl out of the
sunroof of the SUV. M.M. said, “kill me, kill me.” The detective
placed M.M. in the backseat of a patrol car and checked to see if
he was injured. M.M. said he was “not okay” and that “his life
was over.” He repeatedly said that “he believed he killed
somebody and that he had cut her in half.” The detective advised
M.M. of his Miranda2 rights and questioned him. M.M. admitted
to driving the SUV and fleeing from the deputies because he was
scared.
       M.M. was taken to a hospital and a deputy advised him of
his Miranda rights. The deputy asked: “Did you know driving in
a reckless manner can put people’s lives in danger? Were you
aware of that?” M.M. replied: “Yes, sir.” The deputy also asked:
“[D]id you know that you could have possibly got into a car
accident and possibly seriously injured somebody. Did you know
that?” M.M. replied: “Yes, sir.” Later, the deputy asked M.M.:
“So, before the car accident happened, before any collision
happened . . . did you know that driving recklessly could have
seriously hurt somebody?” M.M. responded: “Yes, sir.”
       A deputy investigating the crash site observed the speed
limit was 55 miles per hour. Based on measurements of the area
and skid marks at the scene, a detective opined the SUV was

     2   Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.

                                 3
traveling at about 105 miles per hour when the driver lost control
and the SUV began to skid.
                           DISCUSSION
                     Sufficiency of the evidence
      M.M. contends the true finding for murder must be
reversed because there was insufficient evidence he acted with
implied malice. We disagree.
      We review the trial court’s true finding for substantial
evidence. We review “the whole record in the light most
favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses
substantial evidence—that is evidence that is reasonable,
credible and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (In
re Sylvester C. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 601, 605.) “ ‘Substantial
evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable
inferences drawn from that evidence. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 943.)
      Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with
malice aforethought. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) Malice is
implied when the circumstances of the killing show it was done
with an “abandoned and malignant heart.” (Pen. Code, § 188,
subd. (a)(2).) Malice may be implied when the defendant acts
with wanton disregard of the high probability of death. (People v.
Fuller (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 618, 628 (Fuller); People v. Moore
(2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 937, 941 (Moore).) A vehicular homicide
may be prosecuted as second degree murder where the facts
support a finding of implied malice. (People v. Watson (1981) 30
Cal.3d 290, 298-299.) The facts must demonstrate the defendant
had a subjective awareness of the risk because “the defendant
actually appreciated the risk involved.” (Id. at p. 296-297.) It is

                                 4
not enough that a reasonable person would have been aware of
the risk. (Ibid.)
       Here, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
finding that M.M. acted with implied malice. M.M. led deputies
on a high-speed chase while endangering other vehicles and
people on the road. He abruptly changed lanes on the freeway,
ran through multiple red lights, and weaved in and out of traffic,
almost hitting other vehicles on the road. He ignored the pleas
from his passengers to stop the vehicle, and instead increased his
speed. M.M. drove about 100 miles per hour in a 55 mile-
per-hour zone. At that speed, M.M. tried to make a right turn,
resulting in him losing control of the vehicle and striking V.R.
with such speed and force that the collision split her body into
two. Additionally, M.M. admitted to a deputy that even before
the collision, he was aware that driving in such a reckless
manner could put people’s lives in danger. In sum, this evidence
supports the court’s finding that M.M. appreciated the risk of his
actions.
       This case is similar to Moore, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th 937,
in which we upheld a conviction for second degree murder.
There, we concluded substantial evidence supported a finding of
implied malice where the defendant drove 70 miles per hour in a
35 mile-per-hour zone, crossed into the opposing traffic lane,
caused oncoming drivers to avoid him, ran a red light, and struck
a car in the intersection without any attempt to brake. (Id. at p.
941; see also Fuller, supra, 86 Cal.App.3d 629 [the defendant
acted with implied malice where he “drove at high speeds
through main thoroughfares” in an attempt to evade officers,
drove on the wrong side of the road causing oncoming cars to
swerve, ran a red light, drove 60 to 70 miles per hour at oncoming

                                5
police vehicles, and did not slow down when he ran a red light
and killed another driver in an intersection].)
                        Commitment to SYTF
       M.M. contends the juvenile court abused its discretion
when it committed him to SYTF and found that a less restrictive
alternative disposition was unsuitable. We conclude otherwise.
                             1. Relevant law
       A juvenile court may order commitment to a secure facility
if the following criteria are met: “(1) The juvenile is adjudicated
and found to be a ward of the court based on an offense listed in
subdivision (b) of Section 707 that was committed when the
juvenile was 14 years of age or older. [¶] (2) The adjudication
described in paragraph (1) is the most recent offense for which
the juvenile has been adjudicated. [¶] (3) The court has made a
finding on the record that a less restrictive, alternative
disposition for the ward is unsuitable.” (§ 875, subd. (a)(1)-(3).)
       At issue here is the third criterion. To determine whether
a less restrictive alternative disposition is unsuitable, “the court
shall consider all relevant and material evidence, including the
recommendations of counsel, the probation department,” and
each of the following criteria: “(A) The severity of the offense or
offenses for which the ward has been most recently adjudicated,
including the ward’s role in the offense, the ward’s behavior, and
harm done to victims. [¶] (B) The ward’s previous delinquent
history, including the adequacy and success of previous attempts
by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the ward. [¶] (C) Whether the
programming, treatment, and education offered and provided in a
secure youth treatment facility is appropriate to meet the
treatment and security needs of the ward. [¶] (D) Whether the
goals of rehabilitation and community safety can be met by

                                 6
assigning the ward to an alternative, less restrictive disposition
that is available to the court. [¶] (E) The ward’s age,
developmental maturity, mental and emotional health, sexual
orientation, gender identity and expression, and any disabilities
or special needs affecting the safety or suitability of committing
the ward to a term of confinement in a secure youth treatment
facility.” (§ 875, subd. (a)(3).)
                     2. Relevant procedural history
       The probation department prepared a report
recommending M.M. be committed to SYTF. The report detailed
M.M.’s prior delinquency history, which included five burglaries
and attempted burglaries. (Pen. Code, § 459.) On the first
petition, the juvenile court ordered M.M. home on probation. On
the second and third petitions, M.M. was ordered to camp and
was released after completion. On the last two petitions, the
court granted home on probation. M.M. received two citations for
petty theft and loitering while on probation and had multiple
unverified school absences and “tardies.” He later violated
probation by failing to complete the work required to earn his
high school diploma.
       M.M. was on probation and had met with his probation
officer earlier in the day when he led deputies on the high-speed
chase that resulted in V.R.’s death. The probation reported noted
that M.M. was not “amenable to rehabilitation services” at a
suitable placement or camp. Because of his previous
participation in rehabilitative services, the gravity of his offense,
and his criminal sophistication, M.M. required a higher level of
supervision. A “less restrictive alternative would lack the
programming length to provide public safety and services needed
to achieve the rehabilitative goals” for M.M.

                                  7
       At the disposition hearing, the probation officer who
authored the probation report testified she had supervised M.M.
for three years. In recommending SYTF, probation considered a
variety of factors including M.M.’s previous delinquency record,
participation in various services, the severity of the offense, and
his eligibility for other programs. The probation officer testified
camp placement would be unsuitable because the age limit is 18
years old and M.M. was two months shy of 18. She also testified
that SYTF would be appropriate because it provides services such
as psychiatric, counseling, and educational services that M.M.
would need.
       A probation director testified SYTF provided therapy and
psychiatric services, vocational training, and educational services
such as college courses towards an Associate in Arts (A.A.)
degree. She testified that the services offered were individually
tailored to meet the ward’s needs. The goal was to develop
services to “move along” with the individual for the time they are
at SYTF.
       Another probation director testified SYTF was in
negotiations to offer a bachelor’s level education. He testified
that everyone receives a tailored educational plan designed to
reach each person’s goal.
       Several witnesses testified on M.M.’s behalf regarding his
good behavior in juvenile hall, progress in counseling, maturity,
completion of high school and enrollment in college courses, and
participation in various programs. A director of the
Anti-Recidivism Coalition (ARC), who worked with M.M.,
testified that M.M. would benefit more at Magnolia House than
at SYTF. He believed SYTF did not have all the “programming
up and running right now.” He testified that SYTF was still

                                8
working on “building out programs.” The housing director for
ARC said he had a bed available for M.M. at Magnolia House. He
testified that Magnolia House is a 22-bed home geared to help 18-
to 25- year-old men return to their communities. There are a
variety of services available, including counseling and education
services. A resident is permitted to leave Magnolia House so long
as they notify staff members where they are going.
        At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court
committed M.M. to SYTF and found that a less restrictive
alternative disposition would be unsuitable. The court discussed
all the criteria it considered pursuant to section 875, subdivision
(a)(3).
        First, regarding the severity of the offense, the court noted
that M.M. was the “sole actor and the only principal.” His
conduct was so severe that immediately after the accident “he
was plainly aware of the malicious and reckless and dangerous
and callous nature of his actions.”
        Second, regarding previous delinquent history, the court
noted that M.M.’s criminal history began when he was 15 years
old, and there were five sustained petitions for felony theft
offenses. M.M. had multiple probation violations. He was placed
home on probation on multiple occasions and sent to camp once.
However, M.M. “never successfully completed a grant of
probation.” The court noted that M.M.’s conduct “continues to get
worse, not better” despite attempts at rehabilitation. On the date
of the traffic collision, M.M. was on probation. And hours before
the traffic collision, M.M. had met with his probation officer
about his efforts to rehabilitate “to no avail.”
        Third, as to whether programming, treatment, and
education offered at SYTF was appropriate for M.M. to meet his

                                 9
treatment and security needs, the juvenile court acknowledged
SYTF was a new program, and that M.M. could enroll in college
level courses. Although upper level college classes were not
available now, they “presumably will be available” at a later
time. As to other programming, the court found there was a
“limited amount of vocational training available,” but intensive
mental health counseling, psychiatric, substance abuse, and
religious services that will be provided. The court found SYTF
was “the only alternative that meets the security needs of [M.M.]
and the community.”
       Fourth, as to whether the goals of community safety and
rehabilitation could be met, the juvenile court found that neither
camp nor suitable placement were appropriate for M.M., who was
now 19 years old. Camp was suitable for minors 18 years or
younger, and M.M. would “not fit into the camp structure.”
Because of the age discrepancy, the court found that M.M. “could
control or be a negative influence to others.” SYTF had a “range
of ages,” however, and the minors are housed separately by age
and maturity. Thus, the court found “most of [the] concerns [with
camp] can be alleviated” by SYTF’s structure. Moreover, a camp
commitment is capped at nine months which the court found was
“not nearly enough time for [M.M.] to fully understand the
impact of his actions” or receive sufficient counseling, training, or
therapy.
       Finally, the court noted that M.M. had previously been in
camp and “it had no impact on his rehabilitation.” For similar
reasons, the court found suitable placement was not an
appropriate alternative.
       The juvenile court also found that home probation and
Magnolia House were not appropriate for M.M. The court found

                                 10
that M.M. needed “a more structured environment to help him
focus on his rehabilitation, and to make sure that he consistently
attends the programs that will help him.” An SYTF “would
provide these services and resources for a far greater period of
time so that rehabilitation can be assured, and with far more
intensity and accountability.” Placement in a less structured
environment than SYTF and releasing M.M. back into the
community would risk public safety.
      With respect to M.M.’s age, maturity, and other factors that
could affect the safety and suitability of committing him to SYTF,
the juvenile court found no “limitations or problems.”
                                3. Analysis
      We review the juvenile court’s placement decision for an
abuse of discretion. (In re Nicole H. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1150,
1154.) The juvenile court abuses its discretion “ ‘ “when the
factual findings critical to its decision find no support in the
evidence.” ’ ” (Ibid.) We will not disturb the juvenile court’s
findings when there is substantial evidence to support them. (In
re Khalid B. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1288.) “ ‘ “ ‘ “In
determining whether there was substantial evidence to support
the commitment, we must examine the record presented at the
disposition hearing in light of the purposes of the Juvenile Court
Law,” ’ ” ’ ” which includes public safety as well as the
rehabilitation of the juvenile offender. (Nicole H., at p. 1154;
§ 202.)
      Here, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that a less restrictive alternative disposition was
unsuitable. Substantial evidence supported that each criterion
weighed in favor of committing M.M. to SYTF as opposed to an
unsuitable, less restrictive alternative. The evidence supports

                               11
that M.M.’s crime was severe—he committed murder and was the
sole actor. M.M.’s prior delinquent history, his previous camp
placement, and unsuccessful home probation grants supported
the finding that a less restrictive alternative would not be
appropriate. As the juvenile court noted, M.M. had never
successfully completed probation and his offenses “continue[d] to
get worse, not better” despite attempts at rehabilitation.
       The evidence also supports the juvenile court’s finding that
SYTF met M.M.’s programming, treatment, and educational
needs. Although SYTF was new, SYTF provided specifically
tailored therapy, counseling, and mentoring services and M.M.
could continue taking courses towards his A.A. degree. With
respect to higher level courses, negotiations for these courses
were underway, and the court found such courses would be
available in the future. Regarding community safety and
rehabilitation, the court properly concluded SYTF was “the only
alternative that meets the security needs of [M.M.] and the
community.” Given the increasing seriousness of M.M.’s crimes
and his prior failed attempts to rehabilitate in less restrictive
settings, a less structured environment such as Magnolia House
would not adequately protect public safety or promote the goal of
rehabilitation. Moreover, camp was not a viable option because it
had age limits. Because substantial evidence supports the court’s
findings, there was no abuse of discretion in ordering M.M. to
SYTF.

                                12
                        DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                   BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.

             YEGAN, J.

                              13
                      Brian C. Yep, Judge

             Superior Court County of Los Angeles

                ______________________________

      Christine M. Aros, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Gabriel Bradley, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.