Court Opinion

ID: 992595
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-03 23:54:22.757801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:44:12.302997
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, as Receiver for the
National Bank of Washington,
Washington, D.C.,
                                                                    No. 96-2095
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

EDWARD R. WOODY,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Peter J. Messitte, District Judge.
(CA-94-2775-PJM)

Submitted: June 19, 1997

Decided: July 7, 1997

Before WILKINS and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and
BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

David L. Woody, Silver Spring, Maryland, for Appellant. Thomas L.
Hindes, Ann S. DuRoss, Gregory E. Gore, FEDERAL DEPOSIT
INSURANCE CORPORATION, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Edward R. Woody appeals from a district court order entering
default judgment against him after he did not file a responsive plead-
ing. The appeal addresses the district court decisions concerning the
FDIC's service of process on Woody. Woody does not appeal the
entry of default or default judgment entered against him. Finding no
error, we affirm.

The FDIC filed suit against Woody as the guarantor on a defaulted
note. The maker of the note endorsed the note to the FDIC. On
appeal, Woody argues that the service of process was improper. He
makes three arguments regarding the service of process. First, he
argues that the district court should not have granted the FDIC an
extension of time to serve him. Woody, however, actively evaded ser-
vice of process. Such a finding by the district court warranted its
granting of an extension of time for service of process. See Hilman
Co. (V.I.) v. Hyatt Int'l, 899 F.2d 250, 252 (3d Cir. 1990).

Second, Woody argues that the court should not have allowed the
FDIC to serve him pursuant to Maryland civil procedure rules without
fulfilling all requirements of the Maryland rules. Specifically, he
alleges that the FDIC did not show that it made a good faith effort to
serve him and that service under another rule was inapplicable or
impracticable. See Md. R. Civ. P. 2-121(b). The record reflects that
it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to find that the
FDIC made these showings. The FDIC submitted uncontroverted affi-
davits showing that its process servers had made multiple attempts to
serve or contact Woody at the addresses which it had for him. A thor-
ough and good faith effort was made to serve Woody under the Mary-
land civil procedure rules. See Lohman v. Lohman , 626 A.2d 384, 394
(Md. 1993).

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Finally, Woody argues that his due process rights were violated
because the FDIC did not serve him with a copy of its motion to
enlarge time to serve the complaint and for substitute service. Woody
did not raise this issue in the district court in his motion to set aside
the judgment. Woody was not denied due process because he was not
entitled to notice because he was not yet a party to the action. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). The district court did not err in entertaining the
motion.

We therefore affirm the district court order. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately pres-
ented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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