Court Opinion

ID: 9849229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:36:26.700045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:08.367790
License: Public Domain

Justice Lake,
concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion solely because the two offenses charged involved separate assaults. The assault with a deadly weapon which was an essential element of the robbery, with which the defendant was charged in Case No. 2296, was over and done with when the assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill, inflicting serious injuries not resulting in death, with which he is charged in Case No. 2295, occurred.
Had there been no display or other use of the .38 pistol prior to the completion of the robbery by the taking of the money and the .22 pistol, the defendant, in my opinion, would have been guilty of common law robbery only. The subsequent shooting of Smith with his own .22 pistol, taken from him in the robbery, was a separate offense, no element of which was an element of *634the crime of armed robbery. The fact that two separate pistols were used is not, of course, the determining circumstance upon which I reach this conclusion, but it does point up the separateness of the two offenses.
I, therefore, concur in the majority view that the defendant has been convicted of two separate, distinct crimes and can be punished for both.
I am also inclined to the view suggested in the majority opinion that the second assault, though committed after the offense of robbery was completed, may be deemed to have been committed in the perpetration of the felony of armed robbery, within the meaning of G.S. 14-17, so that, had Smith died from the wounds inflicted upon him, the defendant might have been convicted of first degree murder. However, that question is not before us for decision in this case.
It is my view that the majority opinion necessarily leads to conclusions not consistent with the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. The constitutional prohibition against being put twice in jeopardy for the same offense cannot be avoided by the State by the simple process of consolidating two separate indictments for trial, as was done in this case.
The double jeopardy question is not resolved by merely observing, correctly, as the majority opinion does here, that each of the two principal offenses charged in the respective indictments involves an element not involved in the other. It is my understanding that the test of double jeopardy is whether the defendant, upon trial under the second indictment, could be convicted of any offense for which he could have been convicted upon trial under the first indictment. If so, by being brought to trial under both indictments, whether in succession or simultaneously, he is placed in double jeopardy of a conviction for that offense, which the Constitution forbids. State v. Overman, 269 N.C. 453, 464, 153 S.E. 2d 44; Re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 9 S. Ct. 672, 33 L. Ed. 118; Commonwealth v. Comber, 374 Pa. 570, 97 A 2d 343, 37 ALR 2d 1058; Anno. 37 ALR 2d 1068; 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, § 187.
That which makes the constitutional protection against double jeopardy inapplicable to the present case is not the circumstance that each of the two offenses, armed robbery and felonious assault, in addition to the common element of assault *635•with a deadly weapon, has an element not present in the other. The controlling circumstance, on that question, in this case is the fact that here we are concerned with two separate, distinct assaults with a deadly weapon. The second assault, in my opinion, was not an element of the offense of armed robbery and, had it been the only assault with a deadly weapon, the conviction of armed robbery could not be sustained. Conversely, under an indictment for armed robbery, the defendant could not be convicted of an assault with a deadly weapon committed after the robbery was completed.