Court Opinion

ID: 2964817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:31:33.530484+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:01.999369
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                              _________________________
          No. 96-2241
                                 EXXON CORPORATION,
                                Plaintiff, Appellant,
                                         v.
                             ESSO WORKERS' UNION, INC.,
                                Defendant, Appellee.
                              _________________________
                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
                      [Hon. Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge]
                              _________________________
                                       Before
                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                       Coffin and Cyr, Senior Circuit Judges.
                              _________________________
               Douglas 
                      B. 
                         Neagli, with whom Michael J. Liston, Glass, Seigle
          & Liston,  Patrick J. Conlon,  and Joseph T.  Walsh, III were  on
          brief, for appellant.
               Warren M. Davison, Mark A. de Bernardo, Nancy N. Delogu, and
          Littler, Mendelson, Fastiff, Tichy & Mathiason, P.C. on brief for
          Institute for a Drug-Free Workplace, amicus curiae.
               Nathan S. Paven, with whom Paven & Norton were on brief, for
          appellee.
                              _________________________
                                    July 8, 1997
                              _________________________

                    SELYA, Circuit Judge.  This appeal tests the margins of
          an 
            arbitrator's ability to order the reinstatement, into a safety-
          sensitive 
                   job, of an employee who has failed a reliable drug test.
          After painstaking reflection, we conclude that a well defined and
          dominant 
                  public policy encourages employers to develop, establish,
          and 
             enforce 
                     programs to prevent their employees from attempting to
          perform  safety-sensitive  work  while  under  the  influence  of
          narcotics 
                   or 
                     other 
                           intoxicants.  Moreover, once an employer has set
          such a program in place, it countermands public policy if  courts
          too readily  rescue employees  who fail  to satisfy  programmatic
          standards from the  predictable consequences of such  violations.
          Hewing to this line, we  refuse to enforce the arbitral award  of
          which plaintiff-appellant Exxon Corporation (Exxon) complains.
          I.  BACKGROUND
                    The facts are essentially undisputed.  Exxon operates a
          fuel terminal in Everett, Massachusetts and employs several truck
          drivers to  supply  petroleum to  service stations  and  airports
          throughout New England.  Exxon's nemesis, the Esso Workers' Union
          (the Union),  appellee here,  represents most  of these  drivers.
          Exxon 
               and 
                   the Union entered into a collective bargaining agreement
          (the 
              CBA) 
                   in 
                     February 
                              1990.  The CBA establishes inter alia a five-
          step 
              employee grievance procedure culminating in final and binding
          arbitration.
                    Part 
                        11 
                           of 
                             the 
                                 CBA 
                                     covers employee discipline.  Its first
          section 
                 provides 
                         that 
                              Exxon "shall post a list of offenses which it
          deems serious," and  its second section provides that Exxon  "may
                                          2

          discharge or  otherwise discipline"  any employee  who commits  a
          posted  offense.   The second  section also  stipulates that  any
          employee 
                  who 
                      believes his suspension or discharge is without "just
          cause" may pursue a grievance.
                    An 
                      appendix 
                               to 
                                 the 
                                     CBA 
                                         catalogs the posted offenses.  The
          list includes the following:
                    6.  Alcohol Beverage/Habit-Forming or Illegal
                    Drug or Any Dangerous Substance
                         a.  Being under the influence of an
                         alcoholic  beverage   or  drug   on
                         Company time or property.   Testing
                         positive on a drug test or  refusal
                         to submit to a drug test.
                         b.  Bringing onto Company property,
                         or possessing, or using on  Company
                         time  or   Company   property,   an
                         alcoholic  beverage,   illicit   or
                         unprescribed controlled  substance,
                         or 
                           any 
                               dangerous substance which the
                         Company  believes  may  impair  the
                         employee's  ability   to   properly
                         perform  duties   in  a  safe   and
                         responsible manner.
                    Exxon 
                         has 
                             implemented 
                                        a 
                                          comprehensive drug-free workplace
          program (the DFW program), embodied in a formal policy  statement
          and the  aforementioned  list of  posted  offenses.   The  policy
          statement declares in part:
                    Exxon Corporation  is  committed to  a  safe,
                    healthy,  and productive  workplace  for  all
                    employees.   The Corporation recognizes  that
                    alcohol, drug,  or other  substance abuse  by
                    employees 
                             will impair their ability to perform
                    properly 
                            and 
                                will have serious adverse effects
                    on 
                      the 
                          safety, efficiency, and productivity of
                    other 
                         employees and the Corporation as a whole
                    . . . .  Being unfit for work because of  use
                    of 
                      drugs 
                            or 
                               alcohol is strictly prohibited and
                    is grounds for termination of employment.
                                          3

          Exxon's program  is carefully tailored to  meet the goals of  the
          Drug-Free 
                   Workplace 
                            Act 
                                of 1988 (the DFW Act), 41 U.S.C. SS 701-707
          (1994).   Exxon has  made the  program's terms  available to  all
          employees; the program encourages employees voluntarily to report
          drug  and alcohol  problems; and  the company  not only  provides
          rehabilitative services to employees  who come forward, but  also
          promises that "[n]o employee . . . will be terminated due to  the
          request  for help  in overcoming  that dependency  or because  of
          involvement in a rehabilitation effort."
                    Exxon's program reflects the company's recognition that
          drug use during the performance of safety-sensitive tasks poses a
          significant 
                     threat to co-workers and to the public.  Therefore, it
          subjects employees in these positions to random drug testing.  In
          that regard, the program puts Exxon's work force on notice of the
          company's intention to conduct "[u]nannounced periodic or  random
          [drug] 
                testing" of employees who are working in certain designated
          safety-sensitive jobs.
                    Albert 
                          A. 
                             Smith, a veteran Exxon employee, works in such
          a 
           designated 
                      position. 
                                
                                He is responsible for loading, driving, and
          unloading 
                   a 
                    five-axle 
                              tractor-trailer combination which, when fully
          loaded, 
                 carries 12,000 gallons of highly flammable motor fuel.  He
          typically  drives this  rig through  many of  New England's  more
          densely populated  areas.   Exxon requires  employees who  occupy
          designated 
                    safety-sensiti
                                 ve positions   and Smith's is plainly such
                                          4

          a  position                                                     h
           igned 
                such 
                     a 
                      statement 
                                in 1989, thereby attesting that he had read
          and understood the parameters of Exxon's DFW program, that he was
                     1    to sign so-called  compliance statements.   Smit
          s
          not abusing alcohol or drugs, and that he was amenable to  random
          drug testing.
                    On 
                      August 
                             21, 
                                1990, 
                                      Smith reported for duty.  Without any
          forewarning, Exxon  directed him  to  take a  drug test.    Smith
          submitted to the test and apparently drove his regular route that
          day.   The test  results were obtained  the following week;  they
          revealed that Smith  had cocaine in his bloodstream when  tested.
          Although the test results could not indicate when Smith had  used
          the cocaine or whether he had performed his job while still under
          its pernicious influence, Exxon decided that Smith posed a threat
          to public safety and fired him.
                    The  Union  grieved  Smith's  ouster.    The  grievance
          culminated in arbitration.  The parties put two questions to  the
          arbitrator: 
                      
                      (1) 
                         Did 
                             Exxon have just cause to discharge Smith?  (2)
          If 
            not, 
                 what 
                      is the appropriate remedy?  In September of 1992, the
          arbitrator found the results of the drug test to be reliable  but
          nonetheless decided  that  Exxon  wrongfully  terminated  Smith's
          employment.  The arbitrator acknowledged that Part 11 of the  CBA
          gave Exxon the right  to discharge Smith for committing a  posted
               1In an earlier, unrelated case which involved  a hauler who,
          like Smith,  failed a random drug  test, we described a  somewhat
          similar 
                 job 
                     as 
                       entailing 
                                 "work of a kind where, one suspects, there
          might be old practitioners, and there might be bold practitioners
            
           but 
               there 
                     would likely be few (if any) old, bold practitioners."
          Jackson  v. Liquid Carbonic  Corp., 863 F.2d  111, 112 (1st  Cir.
          1988).
                                          5

          offense, but he reasoned that this right was subject to Part 11's
          "just 
               cause" 
                      provision.  Concluding that dismissal was too extreme
          a 
           punishment, 
                      the 
                          arbitrator settled upon a two-month suspension as
          an appropriate  disciplinary measure, to  be followed by  Smith's
          reinstatement if he passed a contemporaneous drug test.
                    Exxon balked  at  the arbitrator's  award and  sued  in
          federal district court to set it aside.  The parties  cross-moved
          for summary judgment.  The lower court granted the Union's motion
          and affirmed the arbitral award.  Unyielding in its commitment to
          prevent Smith from getting behind the wheel of a petroleum truck,
          Exxon  appeals.    Our  review  of  the  district  court's  legal
          conclusions is plenary.  See Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. v.
          Tanner, 72 F.3d 234, 237 (1st Cir. 1995).
          II.  PRINCIPLES AFFECTING JUDICIAL REVIEW
                    Collective  bargaining   agreements  are  designed   to
          memorialize the terms and conditions of employers'  relationships
          with 
              their 
                   unionized 
                             employees.  These agreements typically contain
          grievance  procedures that  designate  arbitration as  the  final
          dispute-resolution mechanism.  "In  such cases . . . courts  play
          only  a limited  role when  asked to  review the  decision of  an
          arbitrator."  United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484
          U.S. 29, 36 (1987).  In large part, that role is ordained  by the
          fact   that  "[i]n   labor  arbitration,   matters  of   contract
          interpretation  are  typically for  the  arbitrator,  not  for  a
          reviewing  court."   El Dorado  Technical Servs.,  Inc. v.  Union
          General De Trabajadores, 961 F.2d  317, 319 (1st Cir. 1992).   As
                                          6

          long as the arbitrator is arguably interpreting the CBA, a  court
          cannot 
                second-guess his decision.  See id. (citing Misco, 484 U.S.
          at 38); Dorado Beach Hotel  Corp. v. Union De Trabajadores De  La
          Industria 
                   Gastronomica, 
                                Local 610, 959 F.2d 2, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1992).
          In  such  purlieus,  a court's  task  ordinarily  is  limited  to
          determining 
                     whether 
                            the 
                                arbitrator's construction of the collective
          bargaining agreement is to any extent plausible.  See Misco,  484
          U.S. at 36-38.
                    Policy 
                          spins 
                                this 
                                    web 
                                        of 
                                           rules.  Judicial deference to an
          arbitrator's 
                      contract 
                              interpretation furthers "[t]he federal policy
          of  settling  labor disputes  by  arbitration  [which]  would  be
          undermined 
                    if courts had the final say on the merits of [arbitral]
          awards." 
                   
                   Uni
                      ted Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
          U.S. 
              593, 
                   596 (1960).  Through the medium of the CBA, the employer
          and the union bargain for the arbitrator's interpretation, and  a
          federal court must respect that bargain.  See W.R. Grace & Co. v.
          Local Union 759, Int'l  Union of United Rubber Workers, 461  U.S.
          757, 765 (1983).  It follows, therefore, that a court should  not
          tamper with an  arbitral award "unless it  can be shown that  the
          arbitrator acted  in a  way for  which neither  party could  have
          bargained."  Local  1445, United Food & Commercial Workers  Int'l
          Union v. Stop & Shop Cos., 776 F.2d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 1985).
                    Public policy, however,  has its own imperatives    and
          they  occasionally conflict  with  the  imperatives  of  contract
          interpretatio
                      n.  It is a fundamental rule that courts must refrain
          from enforcing contracts that violate public policy.   Collective
                                          7

          bargaining agreements are  simply a species of contracts and,  as
          such, 
               are 
                   not 
                      immune 
                             from the operation of this rule.  "As with any
          contract . . .,  a court may not enforce a  collective-bargaining
          agreement 
                   that 
                       is 
                          contrary to public policy."  W.R. Grace, 461 U.S.
          at 766; accord Misco, 484 U.S. at 42-43.  Because this refusal to
          enforce 
                 contracts 
                          which 
                                offend public policy is inured in  judicial
          tradition, 
                    the 
                       question 
                                of what public policy demands is within the
          judicial, not the arbitral, domain.   See Misco, 484 U.S. at  43;
          W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766.
          III.  ANALYSIS
                    In the district court, Exxon argued for reversal of the
          arbitral 
                  award 
                        on 
                          two 
                              grounds:  first, that the arbitrator exceeded
          his authority; and second, that the award violates public policy.
          The district court rejected  both arguments.  See Exxon Corp.  v.
          Esso Worker's  Union, Inc.,  942 F.  Supp. 703  (D. Mass.  1996).
          Because  courts  ought   not  trespass  unnecessarily  into   the
          uncertainties
                       of the public policy terrain, we begin by discussing
          Exxon's more case-specific argument.
                           A.  The Arbitrator's Authority.
                    The key to this issue lies in Part 11 of the CBA.   One
          section 
                 of 
                    Part 11 provides that Exxon "may discharge or otherwise
          discipline" employees who commit posted offenses   "may," in this
          context,  "means has  a right  to," according  to the  definition
          contained 
                   in 
                      the CBA   and another section provides that employees
          may challenge  discharges which Exxon  has imposed without  "just
          cause." 
                  
                  Exxon asseverates that the arbitrator should have equated
                                          8

          the "right to discharge" language with the "just cause" language;
          because 
                 Exxon reserves the right to discharge employees who commit
          posted offenses, this thesis runs, it perforce has just cause  to
          discharge such employees.
                    But 
                       the 
                          arbitrator 
                                     teased another meaning out of Part 11.
          He 
            concluded 
                      that 
                          the 
                              language which permits Exxon "to discharge or
          otherwise discipline"  an employee who  commits a posted  offense
          furnishes 
                   Exxon 
                         with 
                             a 
                               range of disciplinary options, and that this
          range 
               is 
                  in 
                     turn subject to an independent application of the just
          cause 
               barometer.  On this reading of Part 11, the arbitrator ruled
          that 
              Exxon 
                    did not have just cause to cashier Smith merely because
          he tested positive for drugs.2
                    Although  Exxon's interpretation  of  the  CBA  may  be
          somewhat 
                  less strained, judges have no roving writ to construe the
          contract language  in the way  that they think  best.  Rather,  a
               2According to the arbitrator:
                        just  cause  standard requires  that  the
                            prove  by  the preponderance  of  th
                    The
                    Company                                     e
                    evidence  that  the  employee  committed  the
                    offense and that the level of discipline  was
                    warranted
                            . 
                               
                               In this case the Company's actions
                    were  automatic:     if  an  employee  in   a
                    designated position  tests positive, s/he  is
                    terminated. 
                                
                                The Company's presumption is that
                    the employee is a danger to public safety and
                    the 
                       only 
                            remedy is to excise that danger.  The
                    Company's  self-imposed  narrowness  in   its
                    choice of remedy fails to meet the just cause
                    standard.  There was no evidence that Company
                    drivers had any  record of dangerous  driving
                    due to ingesting illicit drugs.  In the  case
                    of  Smith,  there   was  no  record  of   any
                    discipline or any  signs or indications of  a
                    drug-related problem during his nearly twenty
                    years with the Company.  [Emphasis supplied.]
                                          9

          court's proper province is to determine whether the  arbitrator's
          reading  is plausible,  albeit not  the reading  the court  might
          choose. 
                  
                  See
                      
                      El Dorado, 961 F.2d at 320 ("When the language of the
          underlying contract, taken in context and with due regard for the
          surrounding circumstances,  is  fairly susceptible  to  differing
          meanings, a reviewing court must not meddle with the arbitrator's
          rendition.").  In this instance, the arbitrator's  interpretation
          survives that indulgent scrutiny.
                    The proof of  the pudding is found in Crafts  Precision
          Indus., Inc.  v. Lodge No.  1836, Etc., 889  F.2d 1184 (1st  Cir.
          1989).    There,  the employer  had  dismissed  an  employee  for
          insubordination.    The   CBA  listed  insubordination  as   "one
          `example[]'  of  conduct [that]  may  result  in  suspension,  or
          immediate 
                   discharge," and also included a clause reserving for the
          employer 
                  the 
                     exclusive 
                               right to discipline employees.  Id. at 1184-
          85. 
              
              In 
                 a 
                   refrain that echoes the argument which Exxon makes here,
          the 
             employer 
                      argued 
                            that 
                                 these two clauses, in conjunction, gave it
          an 
            absolute 
                     right to discharge an employee for insubordination and
          urged the arbitrator to  equate this right to discharge with  the
          CBA's 
               "just 
                    cause" 
                           provision.  The arbitrator interpreted the right
          to discharge as distinct from just cause to discharge and instead
          reinstated the employee.  On appeal, we upheld the award  because
          the challenged language was open to several interpretations,  and
          the 
             arbitrator's 
                         position reflected one such (plausible) iteration.
          See id. at  1185.  Because Crafts  is a fair congener,  precedent
          compels 
                 us 
                    to conclude that the arbitrator's interpretation of the
                                         10

          disputed language here is within the pale and that the arbitrator
          did not exceed his authority in this respect.
                                 B.  Public Policy.
                    Exxon's second  claim  of error  can most  usefully  be
          discussed in three segments.
                    1. 
                       
                       Framing 
                               the Inquiry.  Misco is the watershed case in
          respect to  judicial  review of  an  arbitration award  which  is
          challenged on public policy grounds.  There, the company employed
          Cooper as  a  night-shift  machinist whose  duties  involved  the
          operation of a dangerous  piece of equipment.  One night,  police
          arrested 
                  him 
                      in the company parking lot, having discovered him "in
          the backseat of  [a] car with  marijuana smoke in  the air and  a
          lighted 
                 marijuana 
                          cigarette in the frontseat ashtray."  484 U.S. at
          33.   The company then  fired him for  breaking its rule  against
          possession  of illicit  drugs on  business premises.   The  union
          grieved  Cooper's  discharge,  and  an  arbitrator  ordered   his
          reinstatement.  The  company sued and the federal district  court
          annulled  the award based  on public policy.   The Fifth  Circuit
          affirmed, holding that Cooper's reinstatement "would violate  the
          public policy  `against the operation  of dangerous machinery  by
          persons under  the influence of  drugs or alcohol.'"   Id. at  35
          (quoting 768 F.2d 739, 743 (5th Cir. 1985)).
                    The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that a court may set
          aside 
               an 
                 arbitrator's 
                              award on public policy grounds only when "the
          contract 
                  as 
                    interpreted 
                                would violate `some explicit public policy'
          that is `well  defined and dominant.'"   Id. at 43 (quoting  W.R.
                                         11

          Grace, 461  U.S. at  766).   Neither  common sense  nor  "general
          consideration
                      s of supposed public interests" are suitable vehicles
          for identifying public policy;  rather, courts must glean  public
          policy from laws and legal precedents.  Id. (quoting W.R.  Grace,
          461 U.S. at 766).  Because the lower courts had predicated  their
          perceptions 
                     of 
                       public 
                              policy on intuition rather than positive law,
          the judgment could not stand.
                    Misco
                         
                         teaches that, though courts may set aside arbitral
          awards which contravene public policy,  they may do so only in  a
          narrow class of cases, marked by a special set of  circumstances.
          See
             
             id.
                 
                 at 
                    43.  To determine whether a particular case fits within
          the confines  of  this class,  courts  must employ  a  two-tiered
          analytic approach.   First, since a  generalized sense of  public
          policy  provides an  insufficient basis  upon which  to annul  an
          arbitral award, an inquiring court must review existing statutes,
          regulations,  and judicial  decisions to  ascertain whether  they
          establish a well defined and dominant public policy.  If positive
          law 
             does 
                  not 
                      give rise to such a policy, the inquiry is at an end.
          See
             
             id.
                 
                 at 
                    43-44.  If, however, the court finds that such a policy
          exists, it must then proceed to the second step of the pavane and
          determine 
                   whether 
                          the 
                              arbitral award clearly violates the discerned
          public policy.3  See id. at 44.
                3The  Misco Court provided an  apt illustration of how  the
          second-stage inquiry operates.  It noted that, even assuming  the
          existence of the public policy perceived by the court of appeals,
          reinstating  Cooper did  not  necessarily frustrate  that  policy
          because there was no showing that Cooper had used marijuana while
          on 
            the 
                job. 
                      
                     The 
                         Court 
                               thought that "the assumed connection between
          the marijuana gleanings found in Cooper's car and Cooper's actual
                                         12

                    2. 
                       
                       Identifyi
                                ng the Public Policy.  There is a plenitude
          of positive law  to support the existence  of a well defined  and
          dominant 
                  public policy against the performance of safety-sensitive
          jobs 
              while 
                    under the influence of drugs or other intoxicants.  See
          Gulf 
              Coast 
                    Indus. Workers Union v. Exxon Co., 991 F.2d 244, 252-53
          (5th Cir.  1993) (collecting  cases).   Gulf  Coast itself  is  a
          representativ
                      e case.  There, the court set aside an arbitral award
          which proposed  to reinstate  in a  safety-sensitive position  an
          employee who had tested positive for drug use after admitting  to
          his 
             employer 
                      that he had a drug problem but representing (falsely,
          as  matters turned  out)  that  he was  obtaining  treatment  and
          abstaining from substance abuse.  The court amply illustrated the
          proposition that  numerous  statutes, regulations,  and  judicial
          opinions  "pronounce the  emphatic national  desire to  eradicate
          illicit 
                 drugs 
                       from 
                           the 
                               workplace," particularly in safety-sensitive
          occupations. 
                       Id. at 250; see also Exxon Corp. v. Baton Rouge Oil,
          77 F.3d 850, 855-56 (5th Cir. 1996) (again finding a well defined
          and dominant  public policy  against the  performance of  safety-
          sensitive jobs while under the influence of drugs).
                    The Third  Circuit has addressed  the same  issue in  a
          trilogy  of cases  (all  featuring  an employer  related  to  the
          appellant here).  In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's  Union,
          993 F.2d 357 (3d Cir.  1993) (Exxon I), the court invoked  public
          policy 
                in 
                   refusing to enforce an arbitral award which directed the
          use of drugs in the workplace is tenuous at best and provides  an
          insufficient  basis for  holding  that  his  reinstatement  would
          actually violate the [perceived] public policy."  484 U.S. at 44.
                                         13

          employer to reinstate a helmsman who had tested positive for drug
          use after his ship ran aground.  Id. at 364.  The court relied in
          part on a series of Coast Guard regulations, declaring them to be
          "part  of a  broader public  policy against  operation of  common
          carriers under  the influence of  drugs," and  found that  policy
          adequately 
                    evinced 
                            by 
                              an 
                                 array of drug-testing regulations.  Id. at
          361-62 (citing  14 C.F.R.  part  121, Appendix I (1992)  (Federal
          Aviation Administration drug-testing program); 49 C.F.R. part 219
          (1991) (Federal Railroad Administration drug-testing program); 49
          C.F.R. part 391 subpart H (1991) (Federal Highway  Administration
          drug-testing program)).
                    In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 11  F.3d
          1189 (3d Cir. 1993) (Exxon  II), the court continued on the  same
          course.  It  set aside as contrary  to public policy an  arbitral
          award 
               reinstating 
                          an 
                             employee who reported to work inebriated.  The
          court declared "that an owner or operator of an oil tanker should
          not be compelled to reinstate to a `safety-sensitive' position an
          individual who has been found to be intoxicated while on duty  on
          that vessel."  Id.  at 1194.  Finally,  in Exxon Shipping Co.  v.
          Exxon 
               Seamen's Union, 73 F.3d 1287 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.
          Ct. 2515 (1996) (Exxon III), the court reinstated an employee who
          had 
             refused 
                     to submit to a drug test, finding that the CBA did not
          require the  employee to  take the test.   Even  then, the  court
          reaffirmed its earlier finding that there exists a "broad  public
          policy against permitting an individual to operate a vessel while
          under the influence of drugs or alcohol."  Id. at 1292.
                                         14

                    This chorus  has  many voices.   Several  other  courts
          likewise 
                  have identified a well defined and dominant public policy
          against the performance of safety-sensitive jobs by persons under
          the influence of intoxicants.  Thus, in Union Pacific R.R. Co. v.
          United Transp. Union, 3 F.3d 255, 262 (8th Cir. 1993), the  court
          used public  policy as  a lever to  set aside  an arbitral  award
          reinstating a railroad brakeman who had tested positive for  drug
          use after a switching accident.  The court had "no difficulty  in
          concluding that there exists  a well-defined and dominant  public
          policy  against a  railroad's  employment  of  individuals  whose
          impaired  judgment due  to  the use  of  drugs or  alcohol  could
          seriously threaten  public safety."  Id.  at 261.  Similarly,  in
          Delta 
               Air 
                  Lines, 
                         Inc. 
                              v. 
                                 Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l, 861 F.2d 665,
          674 (11th Cir.  1988), the court defenestrated an arbitral  award
          presuming to  reinstate a pilot who  had flown an aircraft  while
          obviously 
                   drunk. 
                           
                          The 
                              court described this as a "rare example of an
          award the enforcement of which would violate clearly  established
          public policy which condemns the operation of passenger airliners
          by 
            pilots 
                   who 
                      are 
                          under 
                                the influence of alcohol."  Id. at 671.  By
          like  token,  the   district  court  in  Georgia  Power  Co.   v.
          International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 84, 707 F. Supp.  531,
          538-39  (N.D. Ga. 1989),  aff'd, 896 F.2d  507 (11th Cir.  1990),
          recognized  the public  policy  against  performance  of  safety-
          sensitive jobs  by persons under the  influence of drugs and  set
          aside an arbitral award aimed at reinstating an employee who  had
          tested positive for drug use.
                                         15

                    We 
                      agree 
                            with 
                                these 
                                      courts.  In our judgment, society has
          achieved a broad  national consensus that  persons should not  be
          allowed to endanger others while laboring under the influence  of
          drugs.   This consensus  is  made manifest  by positive  law  and
          translates 
                    into 
                         a 
                          well 
                               defined and dominant public policy   indeed,
          a 
           national 
                    crusade 
                            
                             
                             counselling against the performance of safety-
          sensitive tasks by individuals who are so impaired.
                    One subset of this policy is that persons who are under
          the influence  of narcotics or  other intoxicants  should not  be
          permitted 
                   to 
                      operate commercial vehicles on public highways.  This
          conclusion is fortified by our knowledge that the legislatures of
          those states through  which Smith must drive a petroleum  tanker-
          truck have uniformly criminalized the operation of motor vehicles
          by persons who are  under the influence of alcohol or  controlled
          substances.  See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 90 S 24(1)(a)(1)  (West
          1997) 
               (criminalizing the operation of "a motor vehicle while under
          the influence of intoxicating  liquor, or of marijuana,  narcotic
          drugs, 
                depressants or stimulant substances"); R.I. Gen. Laws S 31-
          10.3-31(a) (1996) (making it "illegal for any person driving  any
          commercial motor  vehicle . .  . to operate  or control any  such
          vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, toluene,  or
          any 
             other 
                  [controlled] 
                               substance"); id. S 31-27-2(a) (criminalizing
          the 
             driving 
                     of "any vehicle . . . while under the influence of any
          intoxicating 
                      liquor, 
                             drugs, toluene, or any controlled substance");
          Conn. 
               Gen. 
                    Stat. 
                         Ann. 
                              S 
                                14-227a(a) (West 1997) (similar); N.H. Rev.
          Stat. Ann. S 265:82 (I)(a) (1995) (similar); Vt. Stat. Ann.  tit.
                                         16

          23, S 1201(a) (1995) (similar); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 29-A,  S
          2411(1) (West 1996) (similar).
                    We find  further evidence of  this policy in  Congress'
          enactment in 1991 of the Omnibus Transportation Employee  Testing
          Act (the Testing Act), now codified in 49 U.S.C. S 31306  (1994).
          The Testing  Act  instructs the  Secretary of  Transportation  to
          promulgate regulations "that establish a program requiring  motor
          carriers to conduct preemployment, reasonable suspicion,  random,
          and 
             post-accident 
                          testing of operators of commercial motor vehicles
          for  the  use  of  alcohol or  controlled  substances."    Id.  S
          31306(b)(1)(A
                      ).  In response, several Department of Transportation
          agencies  have promulgated  regulations designed  to promote  the
          public policy against  performance of  safety-sensitive tasks  by
          persons  who  use  drugs.   For  example,  the  Federal  Aviation
          Administration has devised a program which requires preemployment
          drug  testing as well  as periodic drug  testing of employees  in
          safety-sensitive positions.   See 14 C.F.R. Part 121, Appendix  I
          (1996).  The Coast Guard has promulgated regulations in order "to
          minimize 
                  the 
                      use 
                         of 
                            intoxicants by merchant marine personnel and to
          promote a  drug free  and safe work  environment."   46 C.F.R.  S
          16.101(a) 
                   (1996).  The Federal Railroad Administration has adopted
          regulations  crafted to  "prevent  accidents  and  casualties  in
          railroad operations that result  from impairment of employees  by
          alcohol or  drugs."  49  C.F.R. S 219.1(a)  (1996).  The  Federal
          Transit 
                 Administration's regulations now require each recipient of
          a subsidy "to implement an anti-drug program to deter and  detect
                                         17

          the use of prohibited drugs  by covered employees."  49 C.F.R.  S
          653.3 (1996).   Last, but surely  not least, the Federal  Highway
          Administration's regulations have been tailored "to help  prevent
          accidents 
                   and injuries resulting from the misuse of alcohol or use
          of 
            controlled substances by drivers of commercial motor vehicles."
          49 C.F.R. S 382.101 (1996).
                    Congress' 
                             strongest statement against the performance of
          safety-sensitive tasks  while  under the  influence of  drugs  is
          embodied 
                  in 
                     the DFW Act, which instructs federal agencies to award
          contracts 
                   or 
                      grants only to those employers who promise to provide
          a drug-free working  environment by:  (1) publishing a  statement
          informing  employees that  use  of  drugs is  prohibited  in  the
          workplace; (2) establishing a "drug-free awareness program;"  (3)
          providing  employees  with  drug  counseling  and  rehabilitation
          services; (4)  adopting and imposing  penalties on employees  who
          violate the terms  of the "drug-free awareness program;" and  (5)
          furnishing  employees with  copies  of the  employer's  statement
          against on-the-job drug use.  41 U.S.C. SS 701(a)(1), 702(a)(1).
                    At 
                      this 
                           point 
                                in 
                                   American history, few elements of public
          policy command the consensus that attaches to the policy  against
          the use of controlled substances by those whose work  potentially
          imperils  others.   Judicial decisions,  agency regulations,  and
          legislative 
                     enactments combine to form a solid phalanx of positive
          law evidencing a well defined and dominant public policy  against
          the 
             performance 
                        of 
                           safety-sensitive tasks while under the influence
          of 
            drugs. 
                    
                   Thus, 
                         Exxon 
                               has satisfactorily negotiated the first step
                                         18

          of the public policy pavane.
                    3.  The Interface.  Confirming the existence of a  well
          defined and dominant public policy  is only half the battle.   To
          abandon an arbitral award  as contrary to public policy, a  court
          must find that the award clearly violates the identified  policy.
          See Misco, 484 U.S. at 43; Prudential-Bache, 72 F.3d at 241.   In
          this  instance, the  Union  contends that,  even  if there  is  a
          cognizable  public policy  against  the  performance  of  safety-
          sensitive 
                   work 
                       by 
                          individuals who are under the influence of drugs,
          reinstating Smith would not insult such a policy because there is
          no 
            evidence 
                     that 
                         Smith 
                               was in the grip of cocaine while driving his
          petroleum truck.  According to the Union, the positive result  of
          Smith's 
                 random 
                        drug 
                            test 
                                 "merely" indicates the presence of cocaine
          in 
            his 
                bloodstream; it does not necessarily signify that Smith was
          under 
               the 
                   influence of the narcotic either at the time of the test
          or at the time he drove his rig.4
                    The 
                       Union 
                             casts this argument so narrowly that it misses
          the mark.  Relying upon job-relatedness as the sole determinative
          factor in  permitting employers to  discharge employees who  test
          positive 
                  for 
                      drug use would force employers to wait for some other
          consequential 
                       indication 
                                 that drugs are affecting work performance.
               4Altho ugh the arbitrator found that the drug test  reliably
          indicated 
                   the 
                      presence 
                               of cocaine in Smith's system (a finding that
          the Union does not contest on appeal), the test results could not
          pinpoint  when  Smith  was under  the  drug's  influence.    This
          uncertainty arises from the fact that the manner in which cocaine
          metabolizes within  a  person's body  depends  upon a  myriad  of
          factors, many of which (e.g., the potency and purity of the  drug
          ingested,  the  drug-user's  tolerance,  food  consumption,   and
          psychological condition) were not known to Exxon.
                                         19

          Typically, this other indication will be an accident.  See, e.g.,
          Union Pacific,  3 F.3d at  256-57; Exxon I,  993 F.2d at  358-59;
          Amalgamated 
                     Meat 
                         Cutters, Local Union 540 v. Great W. Food Co., 712
          F.2d 122, 123-24 (5th Cir. 1983).  The notorious mishap involving
          the Exxon Valdez, which produced vast environmental  devastation,
          highlights the core  problem associated with this  "wait-and-see"
          approach.  If we have learned anything from such catastrophes, it
          is that  employers must act  affirmatively to avoid  drug-related
          accidents 
                   rather than wait passively for such accidents to happen.
                    We  conclude, therefore,  that  the  well  defined  and
          dominant 
                  public 
                        policy 
                               which we have identified does not require an
          employer 
                  to 
                     await the occurrence of an accident before discharging
          an employee who tests positive for drug use.  In this sense,  the
          public policy is not as closely cabined as the Union implies.  It
          is the Union's failure to recognize  this aspect   and, thus,  to
          appreciate the full breadth of the discerned public policy   that
          is fatal to its argument and crucial to our decision.
                    The  pertinent public  policy  dictates not  only  that
          employees 
                   refrain 
                          from 
                               performing safety-sensitive jobs while under
          the  influence of  drugs, but  also that  employers develop  (and
          enforce) programs designed  to discourage such  activity.    This
          added 
               dimension is most apparent in the DFW Act and in the Testing
          Act.  The impact  of the latter statute  is made manifest by  the
          proliferation of governmental  regulations which mandate  regular
          drug testing for employees  in safety-sensitive positions.   See,
          e.g., 14 C.F.R.  Part 121, Appendix  I (1996) (codifying  Federal
                                         20

          Aviation Administration's  drug-testing  program); 46  C.F.R.  SS
          16.101-16.500 (1996)  (codifying Coast  Guard's chemical  testing
          program);  49 C.F.R.  SS  219.1-219.715 (1996)  (limning  Federal
          Railroad Administration's drug-testing procedures); 49 C.F.R.  SS
          653.1-653.83 (1996) (delineating Federal Transit Administration's
          drug-testing procedures);  49  C.F.R. SS  382.101-382.605  (1996)
          (describing, inter alia,  Federal Highway Administration's  drug-
          testing procedures).  This statutory and regulatory mosaic  bears
          witness  that  the same  public  policy  which  countervails  the
          performance 
                     of safety-sensitive tasks while under the influence of
          drugs also encourages (and, in some cases, requires) employers to
          implement and enforce drug-free workplace programs which  include
          mandatory drug testing of those in safety-sensitive posts.
                    Consistent with  this  enhanced  understanding  of  the
          discerned  public policy,  we hold  that forcing  an employer  to
          reinstate an employee who tests positive for drug use pursuant to
          a test  that the  employer  administers as  part of  a  drug-free
          workplace program would undermine that policy.  It makes no sense
          to construe  public policy  as encouraging    and  in some  cases
          mandating     employers  to establish  and  enforce  drug-testing
          programs, 
                   yet to preclude them from taking decisive action against
          those employees who test positive.
                    The   Union  warns   that   this  holding   is   wholly
          unprecedented. 
                         
                         But 
                            the 
                                demands of public policy are dynamic rather
          than static.   Modern  society's widespread  recognition of,  and
          increasingly 
                      aggressive response to, the growing drug problem is a
                                         21

          harbinger 
                   that 
                       public 
                              policy may make progressively greater demands
          on 
            industry. 
                       
                      Moreover, 
                                the Union's claim that we are blazing a new
          trail is not entirely accurate.
                    At least  two recent cases  track the expanding  public
          policy on which we rely.  These cases note, albeit in dicta, that
          employers 
                   must not be compelled to reinstate personnel who violate
          the 
             terms 
                   of 
                     a 
                       comprehensive drug-free workplace program.  In Baton
          Rouge 
               Oil, 
                    the Fifth Circuit reversed as contrary to public policy
          an 
            arbitral 
                     decision awarding back pay to an employee in a safety-
          sensitive position who  had tested positive for cocaine during  a
          random drug test.  The  court held that allowing the employee  to
          collect 
                 back 
                      pay 
                         would 
                               contravene public policy despite the absence
          of 
            any 
                evidence that he actually had performed his job while drug-
          impaired. 
                    
                    See
                       
                       Baton 
                             Rouge Oil, 77 F.3d at 856.  In so holding, the
          court noted the absurdity of reinstating such an employee:
                    It is  undisputed that  Chube [the  employee]
                    occupied a safety-sensitive position.  It  is
                    also 
                        undisputed that Chube tested positive for
                    cocaine 
                           use 
                               while occupying that position, and
                    thereby  endangered   the  safety  of   other
                    employees.  We  think that the public  policy
                    exception  . .  . must  be read  not only  to
                    prohibit  the  prospective  placement  of  an
                    employee into a position where he is a danger
                    to his company and to fellow employees (i.e.,
                    order 
                         of 
                            reinstatement into a safety-sensitive
                    position),   but    also   to   prohibit    a
                    retrospective approval of the conduct . . . .
          Id.
                    The Third Circuit echoed these sentiments in Exxon  III
          while 
               upholding an arbitral award which reinstated an employee who
          refused 
                 to 
                    take 
                        a 
                          drug 
                               test.  The court premised this ruling on the
                                         22

          arbitrator's conclusion that, under  the terms of the  collective
          bargaining agreement, the  company lacked cause to insist upon  a
          drug test.  See Exxon III, 73 F.3d at 1295-96.  En  route to this
          determination,  however, the  court  observed that  "[a]  clearly
          defined and cautiously administered program of drug testing . . .
          is the natural  corollary to .  . . a  strong public policy  that
          precludes 
                   allowing 
                           intoxicated or drug-impaired seamen to remain in
          safety-sensit
                      ive positions aboard oil tankers."  Id. at 1294.  The
          court went on to proclaim  that the "right to test employees  for
          alcohol or drug use . . . is critical to achieving the objective"
          of preventing drug-impaired  individuals from performing  safety-
          sensitive 
                   jobs.  Id.  The court's ensuing discussion left no doubt
          that, 
               if 
                  a 
                    drug 
                        test 
                             was 
                                 validly requested, reinstating an employee
          who boycotted it would undermine public policy.  See id. at 1294-
          95.
                    Baton Rouge Oil and Exxon III reinforce the proposition
          that 
              a 
                comprehensive and finely-tuned DFW program which includes a
          drug-testing 
                      component 
                               is a natural corollary to the ringing public
          policy 
                against performance of safety-sensitive jobs by individuals
          who 
             are 
                 under the influence of narcotics or other intoxicants.  It
          follows 
                 that, 
                       if 
                         an 
                            employer elects to establish such a program and
          properly preserves its right of implementation in the  collective
          bargaining agreement, thwarting the employer's efforts to enforce
          the 
             program's standards would countervail the basic public policy.
                    The Union  intimates  that the  public policy  we  have
          identified, 
                     if it persists at all, can be vindicated by some other
                                         23

          disciplinary 
                      measure, 
                              short of termination.  This intimation misses
          the
                   construed,  
          would insult public policy for a court to enforce a contract that
          a worker  who  has  scorned the  employer's  drug-free  workplace
          program.5
                    This 
                        case 
                             is 
                                emblematic of the proposition.  In terms of
          public policy,  it would be  grossly counterproductive to  impede
          Exxon's 
                 efforts 
                         at 
                           fully 
                                 implementing its DFW program by forcing it
          to reinstate  an employee  who blatantly  violated the  program's
          terms. 
                 
                 Indeed, Smith's utter disregard for Exxon's DFW program is
               point.   The arbitrator  has said  in effect  that the  CBA
          properly             requires Exxon to reinstate  Smith   and  it
          requires the ongoing employment in a safety-sensitive capacity of
          one 
             feature 
                     which distinguishes this case from Misco.6  Unlike the
          employer in  Misco, Exxon maintains  a comprehensive DFW  program
          which 
               is 
                 delicately 
                            calibrated to further the public policy against
          job  performance while  under the  influence of  drugs and  other
               5
                                                                          ,
                Moreover, the alternative remedy selected by the arbitrator
            a two-month suspension, followed by a one-time drug test   does
          not hold out much promise for the safety of either the public  or
          Smith's fellow employees.  Smith's failed drug trust evinces  his
          inability 
                   or 
                      unwillingness to conform to the strictures of the DFW
          program.  If he were returned to a safety-sensitive position,  as
          the arbitrator  suggests,  there would  be  no sound  reason  for
          believing that the leopard had changed his spots.
            
            
             
              
              6
               Another
                       distinguishing feature is temporal in nature.  Misco
          arose out of an incident that occurred in January 1983.  Judicial
          review did not end until the Supreme Court spoke in 1987.   Here,
          however, Smith failed  the drug test in  the summer of 1990,  and
          judicial review  is still  ongoing.   As  our discussion  of  the
          emerging 
                  public 
                        policy 
                               reveals, see text supra, Misco predates both
          the Testing  Act and  the DFW  Act.   This chronological  reality
          highlights 
                    the broader fact:  public policy in respect to drugs in
          the workplace has matured  greatly in the decade since Misco  was
          decided.
                                         24

          intoxicants.  Smith transgressed the terms of this program  three
          times over:   failing to  report his drug  use to Exxon,  falsely
          representing that he abjured illicit drugs, and  testing positive
          for  drug use.    Given  this threefold  violation,  Exxon  acted
          reasonably 
                    in selecting discharge as the most appropriate means of
          eliminating the threat  that Smith poses to  the public.  In  the
          bargain, 
                  Exxon's action was also a necessary means of ensuring the
          integrity of its DFW program.  Forcing Exxon to reinstate, into a
          safety-sensitive position, an  employee who lacks any  meaningful
          commitment to its DFW  program would hamstring its  well-directed
          attempts to implement public policy.
                    The Union tries to retrieve yet one more arrow from its
          quiver. 
                  
                  Under 
                       the 
                           terms 
                                 of its DFW program, Exxon treats employees
          who test  positive for drug use  more harshly than employees  who
          voluntarily come  forward and reveal  that they are  experiencing
          problems.  During  oral argument, the Union attempted to  distort
          Exxon's distinction  between  these  two types  of  employees  by
          suggesting that, since Exxon does not discharge the latter (i.e.,
          employees who voluntarily report drug abuse), it lacks sufficient
          reason 
                to 
                   discharge 
                            the 
                                former (i.e., employees who are "caught" by
          random drug testing).
                    This  argument is  deeply  flawed.    Exxon  encourages
          employees 
                   to 
                     report 
                            their drug use so that the company can transfer
          such 
              workers 
                      to 
                        jobs 
                             that do not implicate public safety while they
          undergo rehabilitation.  These employees do not pose a threat  to
          the public because,  by reporting their drug abuse, they  provide
                                         25

          Exxon with the opportunity to implement safety precautions.   The
          actions 
                 of 
                   these 
                         employees are radically different from the actions
          of employees who, like Smith, attempt to conceal their drug  use.
          These duplicitous employees pose  a real and serious threat:   by
          failing 
                 to 
                    report 
                          their 
                                problem, they deny Exxon the opportunity to
          take precautions  to safeguard  the public.   On  this basis,  we
          believe 
                 it 
                    is 
                      reasonable 
                                   and fully consistent with the identified
          public 
                policy   for Exxon to offer a measure of job security as an
          incentive for  voluntary reporting, while  cutting all ties  with
          employees 
                   who do not accept the incentive and who subsequently are
          caught.
                    We 
                      need 
                           go 
                              no 
                                further. 
                                          
                                          Because Smith thumbed his nose at
          Exxon's DFW program, his reinstatement clearly would violate  the
          well defined  and dominant public  policy against performance  of
          safety-sensitive jobs while under the influence of drugs.  Hence,
          the federal courts must refuse to enforce the arbitral award.
          Reversed.
                                         26