Court Opinion

ID: 9584715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:52:01.438264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:48.507915
License: Public Domain

Blackburn, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but I cannot agree with the analysis therein or the overruling of Lawrence v. State, 228 Ga. App. 745 (492 SE2d 727) (1997) or Dunlap v. State, 231 Ga. App. 82 (497 SE2d 640) (1998).
The trial court properly sentenced Glover to ten years at a detention center, an authorized alternative option, pursuant to OCGA § 42-8-34.1, for three violations of special conditions of probation pursuant to OCGA § 42-8-34.1.
OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (b) provides:
At any revocation hearing, upon proof that the defendant has violated any provision of probation or suspension other than by commission of a new felony offense, the court shall consider the use of alternatives to include community service, intensive probation, diversion centers, probation detention centers, special alternative incarceration, or any other alternative to confinement deemed appropriate by the court or as provided by the state or county. In the event the court determines that the defendant does not meet the criteria for said alternatives, the court may revoke the balance of probation or not more than two years in confinement, whichever is less.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In revoking probation, the revocation court used an “alternative to confinement” and revoked ten years of Glover’s sentence, to be *164served in a detention center: “I’m going to follow the State’s recommendation and sentence him to ten years at the detention center.” See OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (b). In doing so, the two-year maximum requirement of OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (b) did not apply, because, under the statute, such two-year requirement becomes applicable only “[i]n the event the court determines that the defendant does not meet the criteria for said alternatives [to confinement].” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. Accordingly, the court’s revocation of ten years to be served in a detention center was authorized under OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (b). The majority’s discussion regarding the meaning of “imposed pursuant to this Code section” as contained in OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (c) therefore is unnecessary; and no cases need be overruled.
I note that the probation revocation order, which was apparently a form drafted by the district attorney’s office, states that the trial court found that Glover did not satisfy incarceration alternatives. This statement on the form order is, however, directly inapposite to the trial court’s sentence of Glover to an alternative to confinement, namely a detention center, and Glover’s actual delivery to such a center. As such, it is clear that, despite the erroneous language of the order, the trial court did indeed find that Glover satisfied the requirements to be sentenced to an alternative to incarceration, and it sentenced Glover to just such an alternative.
Pursuant to the revocation court’s order, Glover was properly sent to the Cobb County Adult Detention Facility. However, Glover alleges that he was subsequently transferred to Phillips Correctional Institution, a state department of corrections (DOC) prison facility. Thus, Glover contends that the court’s otherwise proper ten-year revocation sentence is now “illegal,” because he is no longer serving it in an “alternative to confinement,” and, as such, his revocation should have been for a maximum of two years pursuant to OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (b). He filed the instant “motion to vacate illegal sentence,” and the revocation court denied such.
There is nowhere in the record before this Court, any evidence that Glover is, in fact, serving his revocation sentence in a manner other than that ordered by the revocation court, i.e., in an “alternative to confinement.”6 Further, before this Court, there is no transcript of the hearing on Glover’s motion to vacate illegal sentence, and the revocation court’s order does not indicate a basis for its denial of the motion.
However, as noted above, the court’s revocation of ten years to *165serve in a detention center was not “illegal” under OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (b). The alleged transfer of Glover to a state DOC prison facility would not render an otherwise legal revocation sentence illegal. Assuming Glover was in fact transferred to a DOC prison in contravention of the revocation court’s order, such does not render the court’s order requiring ten years to be served in a detention center, “an illegal sentence” under OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (b).
Glover also argues that, even if he is serving his revocation sentence in a probation detention center, such center is not an “alternative to confinement,” because “there is no difference to a detainee whether he is housed in a prison or a detention center.” However, Glover’s argument is premised upon the faulty notion that an “alternative to confinement” is based upon a defendant’s subjective perceptions thereof.
The confinement referred to means imprisonment in a jail or penitentiary, which is primarily punitive, rather than the type of confinement described in Pitts [c. State, 206 Ga. App. 635, 637 (3) (426 SE2d 257) (1992)], where the primary goal is rehabilitation. . . . Georgia law thus authorizes a trial court to condition a defendant’s probation on limited confinement in a detention or diversion center or own home. Such does not constitute incarceration, which refers to continuous and uninterrupted custody in a jail or penitentiary.
Penaherrera v. State, 211 Ga. App. 162, 163 (438 SE2d 661) (1993). Accordingly, confinement in a probation detention center is an alternative to incarceration in prison, even if Glover does not perceive it as such.
The headnote of the 1989 amendment to OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (b) states that such amendment was specifically “to provide for the revocation of the balance of probation or not more than two years thereof, whichever is less, for violations.” There was no qualification regarding the type of violation as going to either a “special” or “general” condition of probation. Ga. L. 1989, p. 856. Thereafter, in furtherance of its goal, the legislature specifically provided in subsection (b) that “upon proof that the defendant has violated any provision of probation . . . other than [the] commission of a new felony offense,” the revocation court should consider alternatives to confinement, and if not applicable, “revoke the balance of probation or not more than two years in confinement, whichever is less.” Id.
Thus, the majority would have to find as “meaningless” not only the language, “pursuant to this Code section,” as contained in OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (c), but also the plain language of subsection (b) requiring a two-year maximum confinement for a violation of any condition of *166probation, other than a new felony offense. It would be necessary to rewrite both subsections (b) and (c) of OCGA § 42-8-34.1 in order to support the majority’s interpretation. Subsections (b) and (c) presently work together in harmony, with no part being “meaningless.”
Subsection (b) provides probation revocation guidelines when a court considers (1) alternatives to confinement, or, in lieu thereof, (2) confinement for a violation of any condition of probation that is non-felony.
Subsection (c) fills in the gaps by providing alternative, and more severe, revocation guidelines when a trial court considers (1) a violation of a condition of probation by the commission of a felony, or (2) a violation of a condition imposed by a revocation court during a prior revocation hearing, i.e., “pursuant to this Code section.”
Clearly, when an original probation sentence is revoked for less than the balance of probation, as will almost always happen when, pursuant to OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (b), only two years are revoked at a time, a second term of probation, with conditions, may be reinstated by the revocation court for the remainder of the original sentence. Or, when an alternative to confinement is imposed pursuant to OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (b), certain conditions may be imposed thereto by the revocation court and a period of probation, with conditions, reinstated for the remainder of the original sentence. That is what happened in this case — Glover’s sentence was revoked for ten years and the balance of the original probation, with conditions, was reinstated by the revocation court.
It is these instances to which the language “imposed pursuant to this Code section” speaks. The only way a condition of probation could be imposed “pursuant to this Code section,” a Code section that deals solely with revocation proceedings, is if the condition is imposed during a revocation proceeding. Thereafter, the probationer has already had one bite at the “two-year or alternative to incarceration” apple contained in subsection (b), and is again before the court for a violation of an imposed condition. Then, obviously, the more severe revocation of the balance of probation is warranted under subsection (c).
Further, the majority’s distinctions between “special conditions” and “general conditions” of an original probation sentence add nothing to the analysis in this case. The legislature has provided that a violation of any condition of an original probation, other than the commission of a felony offense, warrants revocation under the guidelines of subsection (b). After a revocation court, pursuant to OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (b), revokes an original term of probation for two years or revokes to an alternative to confinement for a term less than the balance of probation, any condition imposed by the revocation court as a result of the alternative to confinement and/or reinstatement of pro*167bation may be considered as a “special condition imposed pursuant to this Code section.”
In Gearinger v. Lee, 266 Ga. 167 (465 SE2d 440) (1996), Lee pled nolo contendere to theft by conversion and pled guilty to possession of cocaine and was sentenced to five years probation on the theft charge and ten years probation on the possession charge. Lee’s probation was thereafter modified and he was remanded to a detention center by an order that set forth as a “Special Condition of his probation,” inter alia, that Lee obey “any and all rules, regulations, and policies” of the center. Lee’s probation was subsequently revoked on petition for violation of the special conditions, and he was ordered to serve in jail the remainder of his sentence on the theft charge and the next five years of his sentence on the possession charge, with the balance of the time remaining on the latter sentence to be served on probation. Our Supreme Court affirmed the revocation court’s order, reversing the ruling of the habeas court. The Supreme Court held that the subject revocation comported with OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (c), and that where a revocation results from a violation of a special condition, and not for a felony offense, the revocation court need not determine the lesser of the remaining probated sentence or the maximum penalty for the felony committed. It stated that the revocation court is authorized under such circumstances to revoke no more than the balance of a defendant’s probation.
OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (c) provides:
If the violation of probation or suspension alleged and proven by a preponderance of the evidence or the defendant’s admission is the commission of a felony offense or the violation of a special condition imposed pursuant to this Code section, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court may revoke no more than the lesser of the balance of probation or the maximum time of the sentence authorized to be imposed for the crime constituting the violation of the probation.
Mancille c. Hampton, 266 Ga. 857 (471 SE2d 872) (1996), unlike Gearinger, involved both the violation of a special condition and the commission of a felony. The Supreme Court held that the revocation court could deal with the probationer as having either violated a special condition or committed a felony, under OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (c).
This case does not involve the application of OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (c), but rather OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (b).
Lawrence, supra, involved a violation of a special condition of probation imposed pursuant to OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (d), and thus no two-year limit applied. This subsection states:
*168Decided July 16, 1999
Dennis C. O’Brien, for appellant.
Patrick H. Head, District Attorney, Debra H Bernes, Nancy I. Jordan, Bruce D. Hornbuckle, Assistant District Attorneys, for appel-lee.
The payment of restitution or reparation, costs, or fines ordered by the court may be payable in one lump sum or in periodic payments, as determined by the court after consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case and of the defendant’s ability to pay. Such payments shall, in the discretion of the sentencing judge, be made either to the clerk of the sentencing court or, if the sentencing court is a probate court, state court, or superior court, to the probation office serving said court.
The majority argues that, although fines may be ordered by a court pursuant to OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (d), fines cannot be imposed by that same section. I cannot agree with this position, as it fails to appreciate the mandate of OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (b) which, as discussed above, allows a court, at any revocation hearing, to impose alternatives to confinement it deems appropriate. The use of fines would fall under this rubric, as would other special conditions of probation. OCGA § 42-8-34.1 does allow the imposition of fines or other special conditions of probation.
In Dunlap, supra, the defendant violated a special condition of probation requiring his banishment from certain areas which had not been imposed at a revocation hearing, and no new felony offense was involved. Thus, that condition had not been imposed pursuant to OCGA § 42-8-34.1, and only two years of his probation could be revoked.
For the above reasons, I disagree with the analysis of the majority, and see no basis to overrule the cited cases.
I am authorized to state that Judge Eldridge joins in this opinion.

 Only Glover, in his brief, has made such statement. However, the Georgia DOC sent a letter to the Clerk of the Cobb County Superior Court stating the DOC was “unable to assume custody of [Glover],” because OCGA § 17-10-1 (a) (3) (A) requires service of this case in a community corrections (probation) facility or in a county jail.