Court Opinion

ID: 9406059
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-29 18:00:50.01705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:26.711171
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50767        Document: 00516804456             Page: 1      Date Filed: 06/29/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                     ____________                                      FILED
                                                                                     June 29, 2023
                                       No. 22-50767                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                                         Clerk

   Sara Luebano,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Office Depot, L.L.C.,

                                               Defendant—Appellee.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Western District of Texas
                               USDC No. 7:21-CV-233
                     ______________________________

   Before Clement, Graves, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Sara Luebano was an assistant manager at Office Depot’s location in
   Odessa, Texas. She worked for the company during a mass shooting event in
   August 2019. In June 2020, Luebano needed knee surgery and applied for
   time off under the Family and Medical Leave Act. Office Depot granted her
   leave beyond the twelve weeks required by statute. When Luebano failed to
   return to work by January 2021, the store terminated her employment.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                    No. 22-50767

   Luebano sued Office Depot for negligence related to the 2019 mass shooting
   and for violations of the FMLA and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The
   district court dismissed Luebano’s federal claims pursuant to Federal Rule
   of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and declined to take supplemental jurisdiction
   over her state law claims. We AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part the
   district court’s order on the motion to dismiss. Consequently, we VACATE
   the district court’s order on the motion to reopen. Finally, we REMAND to
   the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
                                         I
                                         A
          What follows are the facts as alleged in Luebano’s amended
   complaint. Luebano worked at Office Depot in Odessa, Texas, from June
   2016 until January 2021. She started as a copy center associate and worked
   her way up to an assistant manager. While serving as an assistant manager,
   on August 31, 2019, an associate informed her that an active shooter was in
   Odessa. Police activity outside the store was heavy, and her active general
   manager, Dieter Mullin, ordered Luebano to ask the officers what was
   happening. Luebano was terrified. But she complied with her supervisor’s
   instructions and went outside to speak with the police. An officer told her to
   return to the building and that the situation was serious. Luebano informed
   the customers and associates that the store was on lockdown due to the
   ongoing active shooter event. She then locked the door and dropped the gate.
          Rumors started to fly around the building that the mass shooter had
   shot people down the street. However, Mullen was anxious to reopen the
   store, asking Luebano to pay attention to what a nearby Target was doing. A
   little later, believing Target had reopened and that the situation was over,
   Mullen ordered Luebano to open the location for business. However, the
   store’s area loss prevention manager, Blake Langley, countermanded these

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   instructions. After intense confusion, Luebano followed Langley’s guidance
   to conduct an emergency store closing and safely led the remaining people
   outside the building. The next day, Luebano submitted a letter to Office
   Depot complaining about how its managers handled the active shooter event.
   But nothing materialized from her letter.
          About a month later, on October 1, 2019, Mullen and Hector Arellano,
   the new general manager, called Luebano into their office. They presented
   her with a performance improvement plan, in which Luebano’s managers
   informed her that she was not performing her assistant manager
   responsibilities appropriately. Luebano disputed the factual basis for the
   plan, specifically its claim that she had been disciplined in the past for her
   performance. Mullen and Arellano refused to show her the documents
   underpinning the performance improvement plan. In response, Luebano
   declined to sign any disciplinary paperwork. Later, Luebano’s management
   held additional disciplinary discussions regarding her handling of store
   security, bag checks, laptop inventory, and the store’s safe.
          Unrelated to these events, on June 10, 2020, Luebano informed Office
   Depot that she needed to take prolonged medical leave for knee surgery
   starting June 19. Office Depot’s human resources team instructed her to
   submit a request for FMLA leave, and she complied. Initially, Office Depot
   approved Luebano for FMLA leave starting June 19 and ending July 30.
   However, it later extended her leave several times.
          But Luebano started to suspect her job might be in jeopardy. Early in
   October 2020, she saw the Odessa Office Depot advertising for a new
   assistant manager. Arellano denied any knowledge of a job posting. On
   October 12, Luebano was cleared to return to work with restrictions. She
   attempted to get on the work schedule, but Office Depot’s HR team extended
   her leave to December 10, 2020, instead. Oddly, about a month later in

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   November 2020, Office Depot informed Luebano that her leave had caused
   undue hardship, and it could no longer guarantee her role as an assistant
   manager at the Odessa store. But Office Depot informed Luebano she would
   be considered for any positions available at the Odessa location once she fully
   recovered.
          On December 10, 2020, Luebano’s leave expired, and Office Depot
   emailed her the next day. Luebano informed Office Depot that she had
   another appointment set for December 14, and Office Depot granted a
   further extension of her leave until December 15. On December 16, Luebano
   received another email indicating that her leave had been exhausted.
   However, Luebano did not return to work, and on January 7, 2021, she
   received an email from Fidelity Investments regarding her 401k and the
   termination of her employment. Concerned, Luebano contacted Arellano,
   who claimed to be uncertain whether Office Depot had terminated her. A few
   days later, on January 12, Arellano texted Luebano that Office Depot had
   fired her.
                                         B
          Luebano filed suit on September 27, 2021, in Ector County against
   Office Depot for violations of the FMLA and Texas law. Office Depot
   accepted service of her complaint on November 10, 2021, and timely
   removed to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction. It
   simultaneously moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Luebano
   responded to this motion by requesting leave to amend, and the district court
   allowed her to file an amended complaint. On April 7, 2022, Luebano
   submitted her amended complaint, which added an ADA cause of action.
   Later that month, Office Depot again moved to dismiss. Luebano did not file
   a response to that motion. The district court granted Office Depot’s motion
   to dismiss.

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           In its order, the district court first found that Luebano had failed to
   exhaust her ADA claim with the EEOC before filing her lawsuit. It then
   concluded that Luebano could not plausibly state a violation of the FMLA
   because she had exhausted her protected leave. Having dispatched her
   federal claims, the district court refused to take supplemental jurisdiction
   over Luebano’s state law causes of action and dismissed the remainder of the
   amended complaint.
           Luebano responded to the district court’s order by moving to reopen
   the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1). In support of her
   motion, Luebano argued that her attorney could not access the electronic
   filing system and submit her response to the motion to dismiss. She went on,
   asking the district court for relief because her attorney got sick while traveling
   and could not effectively remedy the filing issue before the court ruled on the
   motion. The district court did not agree that these barriers met the Rule
   60(b)(1) threshold and denied Luebano’s motion. Luebano timely appealed
   the order denying her motion to reopen her case. 1
                                                II
           “We review the grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) de
   novo, accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and viewing those facts in the
           _____________________
           1
             In 2021, the Supreme Court approved an amended Federal Rule of Appellate
   Procedure 3(c)(5). The amended rule states: “In a civil case, a notice of appeal
   encompasses the final judgment . . . if the notice designates . . . (B) an order described in
   Rule 4(a)(4)(A).” Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(5). Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
   4(a)(4)(A)(vi) includes motions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60. The
   upshot of these intertwining rules is that Luebano has properly appealed the district court’s
   order dismissing her complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) by filing an appeal of the order
   denying her Rule 60(b)(1) motion.
            Additionally, because we ultimately reverse the district court’s order granting the
   motion to dismiss, we do not address the order on the motion to reopen the case on the
   merits. Instead, we vacate that order.

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   light most favorable to the plaintiffs.” Meador v. Apple, Inc., 911 F.3d 260, 264
   (5th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “To survive a motion
   to dismiss, a complaint must ‘plead factual content that allows the court to
   draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
   alleged.’” Nix v. Major League Baseball, 62 F.4th 920, 928 (5th Cir. 2023)
   (alteration adopted) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
   “Conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual
   conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.” Id. (alteration
   adopted) (citation omitted).
                                         III
           Luebano’s appeal exclusively challenges the district court’s order
   dismissing her complaint. She first argues that the district court erred in
   rejecting her ADA claim because she generally alleged administrative
   exhaustion, which Luebano contends is all that is required of her at the
   pleading stage. Second, Luebano contends that the district court erred in
   dismissing her FMLA causes of action by collapsing her FMLA leave with
   other disability leave that she never requested. We address each argument in
   turn.
                                          A
           The district court concluded that Luebano failed to allege that the
   EEOC sent her a right-to-sue letter or that the agency had not adjudicated
   her charge within 180 days. Consequently, it dismissed her ADA claim
   because Luebano had not demonstrated on the face of her amended
   complaint that she had exhausted her administrative remedies.
           Before an employee can file an ADA case in federal court, she must
   exhaust her administrative remedies. See Dao v. Auchan Hypermarket, 96 F.3d
   787, 788–789 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). In the ADA context, proper
   exhaustion of administrative remedies requires an employee to submit a

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   timely charge with the EEOC and file her complaint within ninety days after
   receiving a right-to-sue letter. Id. Under the appropriate circumstance, a
   district court may dismiss a cause of action under Rule 12(b)(6) when the
   plaintiff fails to show she exhausted her administrative remedies on the face
   of the complaint. See Taylor v. U.S. Treasury Dep’t, 127 F.3d 470, 478 n.8 (5th
   Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
           However, failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense that a defendant
   must raise. See Davis v. Fort Bend Cnty., 893 F.3d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 2018),
   aff’d, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1850-52 (2019). And while affirmative defenses,
   including non-exhaustion, can be appropriately asserted on a 12(b)(6)
   motion, dismissal on such a basis is appropriate only if the defense is evident
   on the face of the complaint. See EPCO Carbon Dioxide Prods., Inc. v. JP
   Morgan Chase Bank, 467 F.3d 466, 470 (5th Cir. 2006). Here, Luebano’s
   purported failure to exhaust does not appear on the face of her complaint.
   Indeed, she affirmatively claims she has exhausted her administrative
   remedies. For its part, Office Depot did not attach any documentation
   supporting the application of exhaustion defenses when it moved for 12(b)(6)
   dismissal. Nor did it move in the alternative for summary judgment based on
   such evidence. So, the district court erred when it dismissed Luebano’s
   ADA claim for lacking exhaustion pleading in her complaint.                    2

           _____________________
           2
              Office Depot also asserts on appeal that Luebano’s complaint was untimely
   because she failed to plead that she filed suit within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter.
   But this argument was not raised to the district court. See Rollins v. Home Depot USA, Inc.,
   8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021) (“A party forfeits an argument by failing to raise it in the
   first instance in the district court—thus raising it for the first time on appeal . . . .”). In any
   case, this theory suffers from the same problem as before: the ninety-day deadline is “not
   a jurisdictional prerequisite” and is instead “akin to a statute of limitations.” Espinoza v.
   Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 754 F.2d 1247, 1249 n.1 (5th Cir. 1985).

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                                          B
          Next, we address Luebano’s challenge to the district court’s decision
   to dismiss her FMLA claims. The district court found that Luebano had
   taken all twelve weeks of her statutorily protected FMLA leave. As a
   consequence, according to the district court, she could neither plead a prima
   facie case for FMLA interference nor FMLA retaliation. Luebano argues that
   she adequately pleaded both causes of action and that the district court erred
   by improperly conflating her FMLA leave with other, non-statutorily
   protected leave that Office Depot gave her.
                                          1
          “The FMLA requires covered employers to grant covered employees
   up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave for certain qualifying reasons, such as
   the . . . occurrence of a serious health condition.” DeVoss v. Sw. Airlines Co.,
   903 F.3d 487, 490 (5th Cir. 2018). To protect this statutory right, the FMLA
   bars covered employers from interfering with the right of an employee to take
   such leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). In this circuit, to establish her
   interference claim under the FMLA, Luebano must show: (1) she “was an
   eligible employee;” (2) her “employer was subject to FMLA requirements;”
   (3) she “was entitled to leave;” (4) she “gave proper notice of [her] intention
   to take FMLA leave;” and (5) her “employer denied [her] the benefits to
   which [s]he was entitled under the FMLA.” Caldwell v. KHOU-TV, 850
   F.3d 237, 245 (5th Cir. 2017). Luebano alleges the first four elements but fails
   to allege the fifth.
          We have held that a plaintiff who exhausts her FMLA leave cannot
   allege that her employer interfered with her right to take such leave. See Hunt
   v. Rapides Healthcare Sys., LLC, 277 F.3d 757, 763–768 (5th Cir. 2001),
   abrogated on other grounds by Wheat v. Fla. Par. Juvenile Justice Comm’n, 811
   F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 2016) (finding in an FMLA leave interference claim where

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   an employer failed to reinstate a plaintiff: “[i]f an employee fails to return to
   work on or before the date that FMLA leave expires, the right to
   reinstatement also expires.”). 3 The district court correctly concluded that
   Luebano has not pleaded a claim for FMLA interference. Luebano applied
   for FMLA-protected leave on June 10, 2020, and Office Depot approved her
   leave. As alleged, the store allowed her to remain on medical leave until
   January 2021. Per her complaint, this roughly six-month period of applied-
   for and received medical leave exceeds the twelve weeks protected under the
   FMLA. So, given her pleading, Luebano cannot plausibly allege that Office
   Depot interfered with her FMLA rights.
                                                2
           But the district court went too far in dismissing Luebano’s FMLA
   retaliation cause of action by applying the same reasoning it used to dismiss
   her FMLA interference claim. In employment discrimination cases, the
   complaint need not “contain specific facts establishing a prima facie case of
   discrimination under the framework set forth . . . in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
   v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506,
   508 (2002). “The prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas . . . is an
   evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement.” Id. at 510, 122 S.Ct. 992.
   But Luebano must “plead sufficient facts on all of the ultimate elements” of
   her claim. Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 2016).
   In framing a motion to dismiss inquiry, “a district court may find it helpful to
   reference McDonnell Douglas.” Norsworthy v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 22-
   20586, 2023 WL 3965065 at *2 (5th Cir. June 13, 2023).

           _____________________
           3
             Hunt analytically divides the FMLA rights of employees into two. See 277 F.3d at
   763. First, “[t]he statute prescriptively provides a series of substantive rights[,]” such as
   the right to take FMLA leave without interference from an employer. Id. Second, the
   statute protects employees from penalties for exercising their statutory rights. Id.

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          The district court determined in its order granting the motion to
   dismiss that Luebano failed to establish her prima facie case. It found that she
   did not plead the third element, specifically that her FMLA leave caused
   Office Depot’s decision to terminate her when Luebano received all her
   statutorily protected leave. Because a plaintiff is not required to plead a prima
   facie case at the motion to dismiss phase, Scott v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 16
   F.4th 1204, 1210 (5th Cir. 2021), the district court applied the wrong
   standard here.
          Still, an FMLA retaliation claim does require Luebano to show a
   causal link between her FMLA leave and the adverse action. Acker v. Gen.
   Motors, L.L.C., 853 F.3d 784, 790 (5th Cir. 2017). But it is enough to survive
   a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for Luebano to plead adequate facts that allow us to
   draw a reasonable causation inference. Nix, 62 F.4th at 928. Luebano alleges
   that she took advantage of FMLA-protected leave and was terminated
   shortly after doing so. As we have explained in the past, “[t]he FMLA’s
   protection against retaliation is not limited to periods in which an employee
   is on FMLA leave, but encompasses the employer’s conduct both during and
   after the employee’s FMLA leave.” Hunt, 277 F.3d at 768-69 (emphasis
   added). Accordingly, Luebano effectively pleads causation when her
   termination took place in close “temporal proximity” to her use of FMLA
   leave. Mauder v. Metro. Transit Auth. of Harris Cnty., 446 F.3d 574, 583 (5th
   Cir. 2006). But the timing between Luebano’s termination and the end of her
   statutory leave must be “very close[.]” Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532
   U.S. 268, 273–74 (2001) (per curiam)..
          Here, Luebano pleads temporal proximity that is quite tight. Luebano
   took her FMLA leave in June 2020, which means the statutorily protected
   period of that leave expired in September 2020. And while Luebano was not
   formally terminated until January 2021, Office Depot began advertising a
   vacancy for her position as early as October 4, 2020. In November 2020, she

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   was essentially warned that she was being terminated. In early January 2021,
   it became official. Based on this alleged timeline, and in light of the fact-
   intensive nature of the causation question, Luebano has sufficiently alleged a
   causal link between her statutorily protected leave and Office Depot’s
   decision to fire her, such that her complaint should survive a 12(b)(6)
   dismissal. Consequently, the district court erred because Luebano’s
   complaint plausibly establishes the elements of her FMLA retaliation cause
   of action.
                                        IV
          For the reasons above, the district court correctly dismissed
   Luebano’s FMLA interference claim. But it erred in dismissing Luebano’s
   ADA and FMLA retaliation claims. And because federal claims remain, the
   district court erred in dismissing Luebano’s state law causes of action. Thus,
   we AFFIRM in part and REVERSE in part the district court’s order
   granting the motion to dismiss. Consequently, we VACATE the district
   court’s order on the motion to reopen. Finally, we REMAND to the district
   court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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