Court Opinion

ID: 9646848
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:13:15.931776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:42.702408
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Senior Judge Kalish:
I respectfully dissent.
While findings of fact supported by competent evidence are conclusive on appeal, Taylor v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 474 Pa. 351, 378 A.2d 829 (1977), such rule does not apply in favor of deductions or inferences made from such facts. These are always reviewable on appeal. Brooks v. Conston, 356 Pa. 69, 51 A.2d 684 (1947). Conclusions are no more than the Boards reasoning from the facts. The appellate court can competently draw appropriate inferences and conclusions from the evidence, regardless of the action of the trial judge or Board. Kemp v. Majestic Amusement Co., 427 Pa. 429, 234 A.2d 846 (1967). The appellate courts duty is to examine the testimony in the light most favorable to. the party in whose favor the Board has found, giving that party the benefit of all inferences that can logically and reasonably be drawn from the testimony to see if substantial evidence exists for the Boards conclusions. Taylor.
*382In a voluntary quit case, the claimant has the burden of proving that the termination was based on a necessitous and compelling reason, in order to receive unemployment compensation benefits. Steffy v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 499 Pa. 367, 453 A.2d 591 (1982). A finding of a necessitous and compelling reason is based on real objective circumstances. Substantial reasons and adequate excuses that will bear the test of reason and are done in good faith, and for such a cause as would motivate a qualified worker to give up his job, will support such a finding. Bliley Electric Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 158 Pa. Superior Ct. 548, 45 A.2d 898 (1946).
Retaliation because an employee has filed a discrimination charge is unlawful under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a) (1964). Furthermore, discrimination constitutes a necessitous and compelling reason for leaving work, when the circumstances are such as would be intolerable and would motivate a qualified employee to quit his or her job, considering also the outward pressures. Taylor.
Based on the record, the conclusions made by the Board are neither reasonable nor logical inferences. What the “other alternatives” were that petitioner could have considered were not mentioned by the Board nor explained. For two years prior to the filing of her discrimination complaint against the employer, petitioner was not placed on probation. Thereafter, with rapidity, she was placed on probation three consecutive times for unacceptable lateness and unacceptable production under conditions which subjected her to controls different from employees of the same level. These changes were supported by records of the employer which were fuzzy at best and certainly not of a substantial nature. The record of absences or latenesses was proven *383primarily by the supervisors testimony, which was based to a great extent on hearsay. There were no punch clocks or sign-in sheets admitted into evidence. Petitioner testified that she was told that she had “stepped on a couple of guys big toes. . . .” Certified Record at 13. She felt that she was compelled to resign because of the complaints that she had filed.
The determining factor is not whether the conduct of the employer was of a personal nature directed toward petitioner. Rather, the issue is whether that conduct, in light of all the surrounding circumstances, would motivate the average employee to quit his or her position. Timing of the disciplinary action certainly is a circumstance to be considered.
[I]f a worker leaves his employment when he is compelled to do so by necessitous circumstances or because of legal or family obligations, his leaving is voluntary with good cause, and under the act he is entitled to benefits. . . . [Such] circumstances . . . transform whatds ostensibly voluntary unemployment into involuntary unemployment.
Taylor, 474 Pa. at 359, 378 A.2d at 833.
Applying the above principles to the testimony in this case, I am convinced that petitioner has met her burden of proof.