Court Opinion

ID: 9845729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:27:01.797395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:20.226443
License: Public Domain

Rose, J.,
dissenting:
In Merluzzi v. Larson, 96 Nev. 409, 610 P.2d 739 (1980), we restricted when a plaintiff can recover for emotional distress arising from the negligent damage to his or her property. Today the majority eliminates all actions for emotional distress based on damage caused to a plaintiff’s property by the defendant’s negligent conduct. Because I believe there are a few cases where such a right should be recognized, I dissent from the majority opinion.
I would permit the assertion of a claim for emotional distress when the defendant’s negligent conduct is the proximate cause of the property damage, the plaintiff hears or sees the accident and is in reasonably close proximity to it, the damage to the personal property was foreseeable, and the property that is damaged has a unique or special significance to the plaintiff, such as substantial damage done to one’s home. Following this rule, I would permit the appellants to proceed with their lawsuit and reverse the summary judgment entered against them.
Recognizing this case and others like it as exceptions to the general rule prohibiting such actions will not result in a flood of litigation. Cases such as this one are relatively few and far between. In the vast majority of cases where personal property damage is caused by the negligence of another, a claim for emotional distress will be precluded, and I believe rightly so.