Court Opinion

ID: 9719003
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:40:05.938242+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:04.004263
License: Public Domain

GOLDBERG, Justice,
concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment.
Although I wholeheartedly endorse the judgment in this case, I would have arrived at this result with greater restraint. I am of the opinion that municipalities have never been authorized by the General Assembly to prohibit and regulate smoking in restaurants and “victualing houses.” Moreover, in my judgment, the Legisla*909ture, by its enactment of G.L.1956 § 23-20.6-2(e)(l) prohibiting smoking in certain enumerated public places, including “[elating facilities with a seating capacity of fifty (50) or more persons” has preempted the field of regulation as it relates to restaurants and “victualing houses” and further, the cities and towns may not enact ordinances that regulate these establishments. I am also convinced, however, that by specifically excluding from the provisions of the statute the regulation of “bars, nightclubs [and] lounges,” the Legislature has left the regulation of these establishments where it has traditionally reposed since the end of prohibition, with the cities and towns, a situation that has been long recognized by this Court. Further, I conclude that by its enactment of G.L.1956 § 3-5-21,4 the municipalities have been specifically delegated regulatory authority, including the power to impose conditions upon a licensee.
Regulation of Bars, Nightclubs, Lounges, and Dance Clubs
In my opinion, the Town of East Greenwich (town) is free to regulate and prohibit smoking in all licensed establishments where alcohol is served. Thus, I believe that this case should be decided by reference to the authority of the cities and towns to issue liquor licenses and to regulate activities within these licensed premises. I disagree with the expansive holding of the majority relative to the town’s authority over victualer licenses. First, and most noteworthy, each plaintiff is the holder of a class B alcohol beverage license as well as a victualer license. Were we to decide the case by reference to the clear delegation of regulatory authority over liquor licenses to the cities and towns, we need not reach the issues relative to the Home Rule Charter Amendment to the Rhode Island Constitution and would accord allegiance to our well settled rule that this Court “will not decide a constitutional question raised on the record when it is clear that the case before it can be decided” on other grounds such that the determination of the constitutional question is not “indispensably necessary for the disposition of the case.” State v. Pascale, 86 R.I. 182, 185, 134 A.2d 149, 151 (1957). This rule has been of particular relevance and importance in cases involving issues of state law preemption. See State v. Berberian, 80 R.I. 444, 445, 98 A.2d 270, 271 (1953) (Supreme Court will not decide a constitutional question unless it is indisputably necessary for disposition of the case). Accordingly, in my opinion this case ought to be decided by reference to title 3 of the General Laws and not title 5.
The fact that “an alcohol beverage licensee holds his license subject to regulatory restrictions, however burdensome, when adopted pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power is so well settled as to require neither discussion nor citation of authority.” Lyons v. Liquor Control Administrator, 100 R.I. 573, 576, 218 A.2d 1, 3 (1966). Since the repeal of prohibition in 1933 by the ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment to the United States Constitution, the decision to issue alcohol beverage licenses has rested with the qualified electors of the cities and towns. With the *910exception of the Town of Barrington,5 the electors of thirty-eight cities and towns voted in favor of issuing licenses for the sale of intoxicating liquor within their borders. Board of License Commissioners of Portsmouth v. Daneker, 78 R.I. 101, 105, 79 A.2d 614, 616 (1951). This Court has declared that the sale in this state of intoxicating liquor is “ ‘so clearly and completely subject to exercise of the police power of the State that it may even be entirely prohibited by the State * * * or it may be permitted subject to such restrictions and burdens, however great, as the State Legislature may deem it advisable to impose * * *,’ ” so long as the regulations do not violate either the Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. Sepe v. Daneker, 76 R.I. 160, 165, 68 A.2d 101, 104 (1949). Consistent with this exercise of sovereignty, the Legislature has delegated to the cities and towns enabling authority to make ‘“such rules and regulations by the licensing authority of the several towns and cities as in their respective discretions in the public interest shall seem proper to be made.’” Id. The prohibition of smoking in these licensed establishments, in my opinion, falls within this delegated authority, and constitutes a reasonable regulation enacted pursuant to the town’s police power.
In Thompson v. Town of East Greenwich, 512 A.2d 837, 840 (R.I.1986), this Court reversed a decision of the Superior Court that declared that regulations requiring that all persons vacate the premises within one hour after closing were invalid because ‘“[njowhere in the law [was] there an express delegation of power [by the General Assembly] to local authorities to enact and promulgate conditions of this kind [upon] the issuance of a liquor license.’” We held that the authority to issues licenses granted by the General Assembly to the cities and towns was “logically and appropriately complemented by § 3-5-21, which legislatively empowers these same governing bodies to revoke or suspend a liquor license for breach of any conditions upon which it was issued.” Thompson, 512 A.2d at 841. We concluded that by conferring the power to revoke or suspend, the Legislature intended to “implicitly authorize municipalities to attach conditions to the issuance of liquor licenses.” Id. We rejected the holding of the trial judge that the absence of any specific standards governing what types of conditions may be imposed rendered § 3-5-21 invalid as an unconditional delegation of legislative power. Thompson, 512 A.2d at 842. We noted that the General Assembly mandated that its enactments concerning liquor control be liberally construed “in aid of its declared purpose which declared purpose is the promotion of temperance and for the reasonable control of the traffic in alcoholic beverages.” Id. (quoting G.L.1956 § 3-1-5). We simply held that “any conditions that a municipality may choose to enforce upon the issuance of a liquor license must be reasonable.” Id. (Emphases added.) I am satisfied that the restrictions contained in Ordinance No. 686 are more than reasonable and withstand judicial scrutiny.
Moreover, in the recent decision of El Marocco Club, Inc. v. Richardson, 746 A.2d 1228 (R.I.2000), this Court again rejected the argument that the General Assembly had intended to occupy the field of alcohol beverage regulation; we reaffirmed our holding that the cities and towns are vested with significant regulatory authority with respect to taverns, bars and *911nightclubs within their jurisdiction and concluded that this authority extended to the prohibition and regulation of nude dancing in licensed premises. I am equally satisfied that this regulatory authority encompasses the ordinance currently before this Court.
Regulation of Restaurants Pursuant to Chapter 24 of Title 5 of the General Laws
This Court has held that the power to license is an aspect of sovereignty and is vested exclusively in the state. Absent a specific delegation of authority, a municipality is without jurisdiction to issue licenses or to otherwise regulate businesses. Nugent v. City of East Providence, 103 R.I. 518, 238 A.2d 758 (1968). Thus, notwithstanding the enactment by the people of East Greenwich of a Home Rule Charter, in the absence of a specific delegation of regulatory authority over eating establishments, the town is without the power and authority to impose these mandatory and affirmative conditions upon the holder of a victualer license. In my opinion, although the Legislature has delegated to the cities and towns “the power to regulate, including the setting of hours of operation, the keeping of taverns, victualing houses, cookshops, oyster houses and oyster cellars,” G.L.1956 § 5-24-l(a), by licensing these establishments, this power does not extend beyond the right to revoke a license “where it is determined that there has been a failure to maintain the premises and equipment used therein in a condition of cleanliness and wholesomeness[.]” Santos v. City Council of East Providence, 99 R.I. 439, 443, 208 A.2d 387, 389 (1965). We have held that in establishments in which a licensee fails to observe “even ordinary and minimal standards of cleanliness and sanitation,” the licensing authority “has not only the right but the duty to withdraw the license[.]” Id. Further, cause to revoke a victualer license “may be established on a showing of any failure to comply with such ordinary standards of cleanliness and sanitation as are reasonably necessary to protect the public interest in its health and welfare.” Id. at 443-44, 208 A.2d at 389. We have never extended the reach of this authority beyond minimal standards of sanitation and cleanliness. Indeed, in El Nido, Inc. v. Goldstein, 626 A.2d 239 (R.I.1993), we held that the City of Pawtucket had limited authority to review a validly issued victualer license and only “to establish whether there is cause to revoke [the] license, namely, whether there has been ‘any failure to comply with such ordinary standards of cleanliness and sanitation as are reasonably necessary to protect the public interest in its health and welfare.’ ” Id. at 242-43 (quoting Santos, 99 R.I. at 443-44, 208 A.2d at 389)). (Emphasis added.) I am not in agreement that we should extend the reach of § 5-24-1 beyond these holdings.
In my opinion, by its enactment of Ordinance No. 686, the town has far exceeded its limited authority to regulate its licensed restaurants consistent with “ordinary standards of cleanliness and sanitation,” and was not authorized to impose conditions on restaurants that, according to the ordinance, “help to ameliorate the dining experience for non-smokers in those licensed premises where smoking is allowed.” Ordinance No. 686, Town of East Greenwich, Code of Ordinances, Sec. 10-300. Significantly, Ordinance No. 686 defines restaurant to mean any eating establishment, including,
“coffee shops, cafeterias, luncheonettes, sandwich stands, diners, short order cafes, fast food establishments, soda fountains, and any other commercial eating or beverage establishment (other than a bar) including restaurants located *912in a hotel or motel, or part of any organization or club where facilities are rented out to the public, boardinghouse or guest house, which is licensed by the Town of East Greenwich to sell food or beverage to the public, guests or patrons, where the food (is) or beverages are customarily consumed on the premises, but not an establishment whose (primary) and sole purpose is to serve food or beverages to employees of a common employer or to students of a common educational institution.” Ordinance No. 686, Sec. 10-301.
This exceedingly broad ordinance also includes enforcement provisions that likewise lack statutory authorization. Section 10-303(1) of Ordinance No. 686 entitled “Enforcement” provides for mandatory attendance at “a tobacco education session conducted by the town’s drug program coordinator, and a written reprimand” for a first offense. Second offenses require mandatory tobacco education and a written warning and third offenses carry the penalty of a license suspension or revocation. Although the ordinance is laudable, long overdue and certainly in the public interest, I do not believe that the town is vested with the authority to issue a written reprimand, suspend a victualer license, (as opposed to a revocation for serious departures from “ordinary standards of cleanliness and sanitation”), or to require attendance “at a tobacco education session conducted by the town’s drug program coordinator.” I therefore conclude that Ordinance No. 686 was enacted without delegated legislative authority to the town to impose conditions on holders of victual-er licenses.
Preemption
Although, as this Court has recently held that “preemption only exists in circumstances in which the municipality would have the authority to regulate a particular subject in the absence of state action[,]” Town of Warren v. Thornton-Whitehouse, 740 A.2d 1255, 1261 (R.I. 1999), and although I am of the opinion that the enforcement authority encompassed in Ordinance No. 686 is without legislative support, I also believe that the regulation of smoking in restaurants has been preempted by the Legislature. In my opinion, Ordinance No. 686 fails both preemption tests adopted by this Court. First, it conflicts with a statewide enactment on the same subject and, second, the Legislature has “intended that its statutory scheme completely occupy the field * * * [.]” Id. In considering the issue of preemption, this Court has traditionally looked to the legislative findings and policy considerations that underlie a statutory scheme. Indeed, in examining the enabling act creating the Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC), the Legislature’s findings that protection and preservation of the state’s coastal resources were “essential to the social and economic well-being of the people of Rhode Island,” led us to conclude that the CRMC had exclusive jurisdiction over noncommercial residential boat wharves, and that piecemeal regulation of boat wharves by the cities and towns was not in the public interest. Id. at 1262 (quoting G.L.1956 § 46 — 23—1(b)).
A similar examination of the declared purpose of chapter 20.6 of title 23 leads me to conclude that the General Assembly intended to occupy the field of regulation relative to smoking in restaurants:
“Legislative intent. — The use of tobacco for smoking purposes is being found to be increasingly dangerous, not only to the person smoking, but also to the non-smoking person who is required to breathe the contaminated air. The most pervasive intrusion of the nonsmoker’s right to unpolluted air space is *913the uncontrolled smoking in public places. The legislature intends, by the enactment of this chapter, to protect the health and atmospheric environment of the non-smoker by regulating smoking in certain public areas.” Section 23-20.6-1. (Emphasis added.)
Among those “certain public areas” are “[elating facilities with a seating capacity of fifty (50) or more persons [that] shall have separate seating for nonsmokers and smokers.” Section 23-20.6-2(e)(l). Thus, I am convinced that the General Assembly has signaled its intent to occupy the field of regulation relative to the state’s restaurants and other eating facilities. With respect to smaller eating facilities that seat fewer than fifty patrons, in my opinion the General Assembly has elected to exempt these establishments from regulation based upon their size. Clearly, Ordinance No. 686 is in conflict with this provision because it imposes conditions upon every conceivable place one can obtain nourishment upon furnishing consideration. Further, by its enactment, I am of the opinion that the General Assembly intended to prevent the unhappy consequence of the thirty-nine municipalities imposing varying and conflicting standards on every restaurant and coffee shop in the state.
The second way that a local regulation can be preempted is if the ordinance is in conflict with a state statute on the same subject. Ordinance No. 686 conflicts with chapter 20.6 of title 23 in several important respects. First, § 23-20.6-2(c) provides for specific penalties for any person who violates the provisions of chapter 20.6, including a fine of not less than $50, nor more than $500, for “contributing to the maintenance of a public nuisance in a public place.” In contrast, Ordinance No. 686 is enforced by written reprimands, mandatory attendance at educational seminars and license suspension and revocation. Clearly, these provisions are in direct conflict with state law. Second, Ordinance No. 686 encompasses eating facilities that seat fewer than fifty patrons, in direct conflict with § 23-20.6-2(e)(l) in which these facilities are exempted. Further, contrary to state law, the ordinance prohibits restaurant service to any patron under the age of eighteen in any area where smoking is permitted. Thus, in several significant respects the ordinance directly and substantially conflicts with a state statute on the same subject.
The majority seeks to avoid this analysis by adopting a new doctrine — preemption will be overlooked when the local regulation is broader than the state statute. This is a novel approach to a preemption analysis and is in conflict with previous pronouncements of this Court in which we have specifically struck down, as preempted by state law, municipal regulations that are broader and encompass more conduct than a state statute on the same subject matter. In Pascale, we voided a municipal ordinance making unlawful any failure to comply with any lawful order, signal or direction of a police officer on the ground that it was preempted by a state statute making it unlawful “ ‘to willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any Police Officer * * *.’ ” Pascale, 86 R.I. at 185, 134 A.2d at 151. We held that the ordinance encompassed any disobedience to a police officer whether it was willful or not, and consequently it impermissibly extended and broadened the scope of the state statute. Moreover, in the leading preemption case of Wood v. Peckham, 80 R.I. 479, 481, 482, 98 A.2d 669, 670 (1953), this Court struck down an ordinance that regulated “cleanliness, sanitary matters, [and] the right of inspection” of camp grounds and trailer and tourist camps in the Town of Middletown that “insofar as matters of sanitation [were] concerned, [contained] the same general *914treatment, requirements and coverage” as the statute. We adopted the view that,
“where a state legislature has made provision for the regulation of conduct in a given situation and has provided punishment for the failure to comply therewith, it has shown its intention that the subject matter is fully covered by the statute and that a municipality under its general powers cannot regulate the same conduct or make the same act an offense also against a municipal ordinance.” Id. at 488, 98 A.2d at 670.
We therefore held that when the General Assembly enacts a statute having statewide application “in the exercise of the police power primarily for the welfare of the general public and in the interest of preventing the existence * * * of unsanitary and unhealthful conditions which might affect the state as a whole[,]” a local ordinance is invalid when it invades a field that “the state has intentionally and specifically covered and pre-empted * * *[.]” Id. at 483, 483-84, 98 A.2d at 671. Neither in Wood nor any other preemption case has this Court engaged in a parsing of the ordinance to determine, as the majority holds, whether “the more stringent smoking regulations imposed by the town advance the stated purposes” of the statute. We have consistently and unfailingly held that a “municipal ordinance is preempted if it conflicts with a state statute on the same subject.” Town of Warren, 740 A.2d at 1261. We have never upheld an ordinance on the ground that, although broader and more encompassing than a state enactment, it advances the legislative intent. Rather, we look to the language of the ordinance to determine whether it conflicts with state law. Our function is not to overlook local regulations that conflict with state law simply because, as the majority holds, the requirements of the ordinance “augment rather than conflict with the statutory scheme.” In my opinion, if the General Assembly intended to share its regulatory authority over eating facilities, it unequivocally would have done so. Significantly, when the General Assembly enacted the “Smoking Restrictions in Schools Act,” G.L.1956 § 23-20.9-1, it specifically included a preemption provision that provided as follows:
“Preemption. — Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to restrict the power or authority of any Rhode Island city, town or other legal subdivision to adopt and enforce additional local laws, ordinances, or regulations that comply with at least the minimal applicable standards to establish smoke free schools, as set forth in this chapter.” Section 23-20.9-11.
Accordingly, I am satisfied that the General Assembly is perfectly capable of adopting regulations that comprise the floor in a given area and of leaving the erection of the ceiling to the cities and towns. It simply did not do so here.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, I would affirm in part and reverse in part. In my opinion, the town is authorized to regulate all alcohol beverage licensees pursuant to title 3 of the General Laws, but is without the authority to regulate holders of victual-er licenses. I further conclude that the regulation of eating establishments has been preempted by the General Assembly. Therefore, I concur in part, dissent in part, and concur in the judgment.

. General Laws 1956 § 3-5-21, provides:
“Revocation or suspension of licenses — Fines for violating conditions of license. — (a) Every license is subject to revocation or suspension and a licensee is subject to fine by the board, body or official issuing the license, or by the department or by the division of taxation, on its own motion, for breach by the holder of the license of the conditions on which it was issued or for violation by the holder of the license of any rule or regulation applicable, or for breach of any provisions of this section.”

. The electors of the Town of Barrington have subsequently revisited this question and liquor is available for purchase in Barrington.