Court Opinion

ID: 9567277
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:51:41.194581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:30.224663
License: Public Domain

Eberhardt, Presiding Judge,
dissenting. As I read this record, including the pleadings, affidavits, interrogatories, depositions and the documentary evidence, this is a classic employer-independent contractor situation.
There was a written contract under which the parties operated. It provided that the relationship should be that of employer-independent contractor, and that the employer, Union Camp, should not have the right of *588control or supervision of the contractor and his employees save to require the end result to be accomplished in accordance with the specifications supplied. It was to have no right to hire or discharge Townsend’s (contractor) employees. It could not direct the employing or discharging of them, nor could it direct what equipment the contractor would use in cutting and delivering the pulpwood. The wood was to be cut (generally from lands of the employer, Union Camp) on tracts to be designated, and deliver to its plant in Savannah at a stated rate per cord, or unit of weight. Neither Townsend nor his employees ever appeared on Union Camp’s payroll. There were no deductions from payments for the delivered wood for social security, taxes, etc. On the other hand, Townsend hired all of his men, paid them according to the agreement he made with them, made the necessary deductions from wages and filed the required reports and remittances to the government, and paid them from his own funds. He was free to hire and discharge whom he would and for such reasons as he might determine, to pay such wages as he might determine in contracting with his employees, to give them instructions and directions as to when and where and how to perform their tasks. All of this he did, and at no time did Union Camp exercise or attempt to exercise any such powers. See Weiss v. Kling, 96 Ga. App. 618 (101 SE2d 178).
Townsend supplied his own equipment for use by his employees in the cutting and delivering of the pulpwood, though it appears that as to some of it Union Camp had assisted him in the purchase of it by financing it for him under written contracts providing for repayment in monthly payments. (While this is evidence indicating the independent contractor relationship, Malcom v. Sudderth, 98 Ga. App. 674, 688 (106 SE2d 367); Baird v. Travelers Ins. Co., 98 Ga. App. 882, 885 (107 SE2d 579), if it should appear that the ownership of the equipment was *589in the employer it would not proscribe the independent contractor relationship. Central R. & Bkg. Co. v. Grant, 46 Ga. 417; Zurich Gen. Acc. &c. Ins. Co. v. Lee, 36 Ga. App. 248 (2c) (136 SE 173); Bentley v. Jones, 48 Ga. App. 587 (173 SE 737); Banks v. Ellijay Lbr. Co., 59 Ga. App. 270 (200 SE 480)). The test is not the ownership of the equipment, but whether the employer (Union Camp) had the right to direct the time, method, manner, means, etc. of the execution of the work to be done, or whether it in fact did so.
Townsend was required to, and did, submit evidence of his having procured liability insurance upon his motor vehicles used in the operation, and workmen’s compensation insurance for his employees. But this in no way affects the relationship between himself and Union Camp. It was for the benefit of the general public that the liability insurance was required and for his employees that the compensation insurance was provided. Owners have generally required contractors engaged in building to submit evidence of liability, compensation and fire insurance, and often to post payment and performance bonds. This has never been regarded as an act in violation of the employer-independent contractor relationship. It has nothing to do with the method or means or manner of accomplishing the job to be done.
The majority has seized upon the lone provision in the contract that it shall be "subject to the reasonable rules adopted by the owner as applicable to timber harvesting on said timberlands.” The harvesting of timber has undergone vast changes in the last two or three decades. Much knowledge has been obtained through experience in the management of timberlands, and all has not yet been learned. This provision simply enables the parties to innovate procedures in the harvesting that have been found to be more economic, or better suited to the use of the land for timber growing, such as, for example, the "clean-cutting” of lands by owners who are engaged in a *590business which requires the replanting of its lands and growing of another crop of timber suitable for its use as rapidly as can be done. If the owner wishes to adopt a rule that its lands are to be "clean-cut” the pulpwood producer will take that into account in calculating his cost and hence the price for which he will do the job. If selective cutting is to be employed, the cost and price may be different. But the method, manner and time of performance of the contract are not otherwise affected. The "reasonable rules” referred to are specifically related to those "applicable to timber harvesting on timberlands.” I do not conceive of this as being violative of the employer-independent contractor relationship.
There are slight differences in the contract here and that in Lyons v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 127 Ga. App. 268 (193 SE2d 244), but I do not regard them as being substantial, or as requiring a different result.
I think the trial court has properly construed the contract. There is a total absence of evidence showing that Union Camp has at any time attempted to assume control over Townsend or his employees. I would affirm.