Court Opinion

ID: 9665204
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:42:37.630529+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:13.958701
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in the analysis and conclusions drawn in parts n and iii of the majority opinion. I question, however, the fourth section.
In section iv, the majority analyzes the proper burden of proof of falsity in a defamation case *207involving a media defendant and a private-figure plaintiff. To do so, the opinion discusses Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc v Hepps, 475 US —; 106 S Ct 1558; 89 L Ed 2d 783 (1986). In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that in defamation cases involving private-figure plaintiffs and speech of public concern the plaintiff has the burden of proving falsity. In introducing this analysis, the majority notes that in the present case the issue raised in Philadelphia "has been briefed, albeit in a slightly different context . . . .” (Ante, p 203.) The majority concludes that the report of an arrest and of the facts used to establish probable cause for the arrest amount to speech of public concern, and thus at trial, plaintiff has the burden of proving falsity. I dissent from the inclusion of section iv for several reasons.
First, the parties did not raise the present issue. Philadelphia was decided on April 21, 1986. The parties’ briefs were submitted to this Court in late 1985, and thus do not cite or discuss Philadelphia. Neither do the parties raise the issue resolved in Philadelphia regarding the burden of proof of falsity.
Second, even if the parties had raised the question of burden of falsity, it is not clear that the. issue would properly be before the Court. Unlike the majority, I think it is fairly clear that the article contained false information. The Court of Appeals also reached this conclusion.
The parties agree that the underlying facts behind the story are substantially false: plaintiff did not commit the rape. Although plaintiff was arrested for the crime, he was never charged. [137 Mich App 42-43; 357 NW2d 794 (1984).]
The fact that defendant printed what arguably *208amounts to a retraction on December 3, 1980, supports a finding that falsity is not at issue. If there is no dispute as to the article’s falsity, then the question who has the burden of proving falsity becomes irrelevant. It is precisely this question which Philadelphia addresses. The case creates a rule of law only for those cases in which there is a factual dispute regarding the truth of the publication.1
Third, even if Philadelphia were applicable, I think this Court accepts an extra and inappropriate burden by discussing it. The trial lawyers and judge should bear the responsibility of raising the issue and determining whether the case applies. This Court’s discussion of it is pure dicta; it was not necessary to the resolution of the case. The majority concludes that reversal of the summary judgment is mandated before it even addresses the Philadelphia issue. I would stop at that point.
Finally, I think the majority’s application of the Philadelphia rule to the present case is erroneous. While the report of an arrest might amount to speech of public concern, I do not agree that the surrounding details do. Such details are exactly what plaintiff finds false and defamatory. I would conclude that most of the article did not contain speech of public concern for the reasons expressed by the Court of Appeals in its rejection of defendant’s public-interest privilege argument. 137 Mich App 58.

 I find the majority’s opinion at least unclear on this point. The first sentence of the introduction states that the facts in the case are undisputed. Later, the majority says, "It has not been found that the newspaper report of the plaintiffs arrest and the reasons for the arrest were false.” (Ante, p 174.) The latter statement contradicts, without explanation, the Court of Appeals finding, and seems inconsistent with the introductory statement.