Court Opinion

ID: 9963465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 16:04:04.347548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:49.632617
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Keith, 2024-Ohio-1591.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                    :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,              :
                                                            No. 113131
                 v.                               :

GARY KEITH,                                       :

                 Defendant-Appellant.             :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 25, 2024

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Case No. CR-22-670882-A

                                            Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Halie Turigliatti, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Mary Catherine Corrigan, for appellant.

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J.:

                Defendant-appellant, Gary Keith, appeals his sentence for gross sexual

imposition and disseminating matter harmful to juveniles. Finding no merit to the

appeal, we affirm.
             In 2022, appellant was charged with one count of attempted rape, in

violation of R.C. 2923.02 and 2907.02(A)(2), with a repeat violent offender

specification, a sexual motivation specification, and a sexually violent predator

specification;   two   counts   of   gross   sexual   imposition   in   violation   of

R.C. 2907.05(A)(1); one count of importuning in violation of R.C. 2907.07(B)(2);

and one count of disseminating matter harmful to juveniles in violation of

R.C. 2907.31(A)(1). The victim was appellant’s neighbor, whom he had hired to do

odd jobs around his house.

             According to a plea agreement with the state of Ohio, on January 30,

2023, the appellant pleaded guilty to one count of gross sexual imposition and the

sole count of disseminating matter harmful to juveniles, felonies of the fourth and

fifth degrees, respectively. The remaining counts and specifications were nolled.

The trial court requested a presentence-investigation report and continued the

matter for sentencing.

             On February 28, 2023, the trial court sentenced the appellant to a

maximum sentence of 18 months for gross sexual imposition consecutive to

12 months on disseminating matter harmful to juveniles for a total sentence of

30 months in prison.

             The appellant raises two assignments of error for our review:

      I. The trial court’s sentence was contrary to law.

      II. The appellant’s constitutional right to due process was violated
      when the trial court was neither impartial [n]or neutral.
            In his first assignment of error, the appellant claims that his sentence

was contrary to law.

            We review felony sentences under the standard set forth in

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).    State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002,

59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 1, 16. In Ohio, there is a presumption that a defendant’s multiple

prison sentences will be served concurrently, see R.C. 2929.41(A), unless certain

circumstances apply under R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)-(3) (factors not applicable to this

case) or the trial court makes findings supporting the imposition of consecutive

sentences under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).

            Under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), a trial court may order prison terms to be

served consecutively if it finds “the consecutive service is necessary to protect the

public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences

are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the

danger the offender poses to the public.” Further, the court must also find any of

the following:

      (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while
      the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction
      imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the
      Revised Code, or was under postrelease control for a prior offense.

      (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one
      or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the
      multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single
      prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the
      courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s
      conduct.
      (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
      consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future
      crimes by the offender.

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).

             R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides that when reviewing felony sentences, a

reviewing court may overturn the imposition of consecutive sentences only where

the court “clearly and convincingly” finds that (1) “the record does not support the

sentencing court’s findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4),” or (2) “the sentence is

otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Jones, Slip Opinion No. 2022 1083, 2024-Ohio-

1083, ¶ 12. R.C. 2953.08(F) requires an appellate court to review the entire trial

court record, including any oral or written statements made to or by the trial court

at the sentencing hearing, and any presentence, psychiatric, or other investigative

report that was submitted to the court in writing before the sentence was imposed.

R.C. 2953.08(F)(1) through (4); Jones at id.

              Accordingly, to address the appellant’s assigned error, we review the

entire record and consider whether it does not clearly and convincingly support the

trial court’s consecutive-sentence findings. State v. Trujillo, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 112442, 2023-Ohio-4068, ¶ 41, citing State v. Gwynne, Slip Opinion No. 2023-

Ohio-3851, ¶ 5 (“Gwynne III”).1 See also State v. Stiver, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 112540, 2024-Ohio-65; State v. Elkins, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112582, 2024-

      1 In Trujillo, as well as subsequent cases out of this court, we refer to Gwynne, Slip

Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3851, as “Gwynne V.” However, in Jones, the same case is
referred to as “Gwynne III.” See Jones at ¶ 30 (Connelly, J., concurring). We will adopt
the language of the Ohio Supreme Court in this opinion.
Ohio-68; State v. Neal, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112347, 2023-Ohio-4414.2 Our

review is deferential. Neal at ¶ 7, fn. 1.

              A trial court is required to make the findings mandated by

R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporate its findings into its

sentencing entry; however, the trial court is not obligated to state reasons to support

its findings, “nor is it required to give a talismanic incantation of the words of the

statute, provided that the necessary findings can be found in the record and are

incorporated into the sentencing entry.” State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-

Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 37.

              Here, the appellant does not argue that the trial court failed to make

the requisite statutory findings and our review of the record shows that the trial

court did indeed make those findings. Appellant contends that the trial court failed

to consider factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 and the record is devoid of any

evidence that he committed the crime of gross sexual imposition; therefore, the

record did not support the imposition of consecutive sentences.

              Before the trial court imposed consecutive sentences, the appellant

spoke and admitted that he touched the victim’s thigh and showed her inappropriate

images on his phone. Specifically, the appellant stated:

      Well, I’m here to give you the truth. On Count 3 [gross sexual
      imposition] I was charged with touching of [the victim’s] thigh and I

      2 In State v. Hayes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111927, 2023-Ohio-4119, a panel of this

court applied a de novo standard of review, finding that the Gwynne III did not explicitly
overrule Gwynne II because Gwynne III was a plurality decision. Upon reconsideration,
however, this court vacated its decision in Hayes and followed Gwynne III. See State v.
Hayes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111927, 2024-Ohio-845.
       did do that. * * * Count 5 [disseminating matter harmful to juveniles]
       was showing her something on my phone, some kind of pornography.
       I do remember doing that.

(Tr. 12.)

              Gross sexual imposition is defined, in pertinent part, as follows:

“No person shall have sexual contact with another * * * when * * * [t]he offender

purposely compels the other person * * * to submit by force or threat of force.”

R.C. 2907.05(A)(1). Sexual contact is defined as “any touching of an erogenous zone

of another, including without limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic region,

or, if the person is a female, a breast, for the purpose of sexually arousing or

gratifying either person.” R.C. 2907.01(B). The appellant claims there was no

evidence he touched the victim’s thigh for sexual gratification, but the appellant

pleaded guilty to the crime of gross sexual imposition, admitting he did so in fact

commit the offense.

              In sentencing the appellant to consecutive sentences, the trial court

reviewed the presentence-investigation report, heard from the victim through her

statement as read by the prosecutor, heard from the appellant, and reviewed the

appellant’s lengthy criminal history, which included prior convictions for sex

offenses.

              The trial court made the following findings in imposing consecutive

sentences:

       The court makes the following findings with reference to its sentence.
       This court does find that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect
       the public from future crime. The court does find that consecutive
      sentences are necessary to punish the offender. The court finds that
      consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of
      the offender’s conduct.

      And I want to remark with reference to that because this kid was 17
      years old. She was a perfect victim. She was working to try to help her
      family. She needed to help to provide some kind of financial support
      for her family and she had to — she thought she needed to do these jobs
      in order to help her family to overcome their circumstances and [the
      appellant] took advantage of that. He knew what her plight was, he
      knew what her struggles were, and he took advantage of that.

      The court further finds that * * * the sentences are not disproportionate
      to the danger the offender poses to the public. As a comment, the court
      has noted his record already and he continues to engage in terrible,
      terrible offensive conduct both with females and with juvenile females.
      And this court finds that the offender’s history of criminal conduct
      demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the
      public from future crimes by the offender.

             The trial court made the necessary findings to support the appellant’s

sentence, and the appellant has not shown that the court’s findings are not

supported by the record. Specifically, the trial court focused on the victim’s age and

vulnerability, the relationship that the appellant had with the victim, which

facilitated the offense, and the appellant’s lengthy criminal history including sex

offenses.

              The appellant also challenges the maximum nature of his sentence,

stating that the trial court failed to consider the sentencing factors found in

R.C. 2929.11, purposes of felony sentencing, and R.C. 2929.12, seriousness, and

recidivism factors.

              This court has held that “[a] trial court’s imposition of a maximum

prison term for a felony conviction is not contrary to law as long as the sentence is
within the statutory range for the offense, and the court considers the purposes and

principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and

recidivism factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12.” State v. Artis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 111298, 2022-Ohio-3819, ¶ 12, citing State v. Seith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 104510, 2016-Ohio-8302.         See also State v. Pate, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 109758, 2021-Ohio-1089, ¶ 3 (a court’s imposition of any prison term, even a

maximum term, for a felony conviction is not contrary to law if the sentence is within

the statutory range for the offense and the trial court considers R.C. 2929.11 and

2929.12). While the trial court must consider the factors, it is not required to make

specific findings on the record regarding its consideration of those factors, even

when imposing a more-than-minimum sentence. Pate at ¶ 6. Consideration of the

factors is presumed unless the defendant affirmatively shows otherwise. Id., citing

State v. Wright, 2018-Ohio-965, 108 N.E.3d 1109, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.).

               “Furthermore, a trial court’s statement in its sentencing journal entry

that it considered the required statutory factors is sufficient to fulfill its obligations

under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Artis at ¶ 13, citing State v. Sutton, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga Nos. 102300 and 102302, 2015-Ohio-4074. Here, the court stated in its

sentencing journal entry that it considered all factors required by law.

              Based on the foregoing, we affirm the imposition of maximum,

consecutive sentences. The trial court’s findings were not clearly and convincingly

unsupported by the record. Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.
              In the second assignment of error, the appellant argues that his due

process rights were violated because the trial court was biased against him and

favored the victim.

              In determining whether purported judicial bias resulted in a due

process violation, we presume that a judge is unbiased and unprejudiced in the

matters over which he or she presides, and ‘“the appearance of bias or prejudice

must be compelling in order to overcome the presumption.”’ Cleveland v.

Goodman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 108120 and 108678, 2020-Ohio-2713, ¶ 18,

citing State v. Eaddie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106019, 2018-Ohio-961, ¶ 18,

quoting State v. Filous, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104287, 2016-Ohio-8312, ¶ 14.

              ‘“R.C. 2929.19 grants broad discretion to the trial court to consider

any information relevant to the imposition of a sentence.”’ State v. Franklin, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107482, 2019-Ohio-3760, ¶ 31, quoting State v. Asefi, 9th Dist.

Summit No. 26931, 2014-Ohio-2510, ¶ 8. “[E]ither the victim or the victim’s

representative, and any other person with approval of the trial court, may speak at

the sentencing hearing.” State v. Stilson, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 08 MA 143, 2010-

Ohio-607, ¶ 23. The trial court considered the presentence-investigation report and

heard from the state, appellant, appellant’s counsel, and the victim through a

statement read to the court by the prosecutor. The appellant complains that the

court constantly interrupted him during his allocution; however, the transcript

reflects that the court interrupted the appellant to challenge his recitation of his
criminal history and his negative statements regarding the victim’s gender identity

— none of the court’s statements evidence bias against the appellant.

              The appellant also claims that the trial court favored the victim over

the appellant. Again, the transcript reveals no bias. On learning that the victim did

not agree with the plea the state reached with the appellant, the court questioned

the state regarding how the plea agreement was reached. The court also responded

to the victim’s statements in her impact letter, assuring her that the court had

consideration for her “as a citizen in this county” just as the court had regard for

“anyone who has appeared in this courtroom” in the court’s 36 years on the bench.

              Having found no evidence of judicial bias, the appellant’s due process

rights were not violated. Accordingly, the second assignment of error is overruled.

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.          The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

________________________
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, JUDGE

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR