Court Opinion

ID: 9963855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 14:05:35.429756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:02.276801
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 19, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2023-CA-0338-MR

CITY OF PIKEVILLE                                                  APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 20-CI-00190

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
KENTUCKY; AND MOUNTAIN WATER
DISTRICT                                                            APPELLEES

                               OPINION
                AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART,
                          AND REMANDING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, GOODWINE, AND JONES, JUDGES.

JONES, JUDGE: The City of Pikeville (“Pikeville”) appeals a judgment of the

Franklin Circuit Court affirming an order of the Public Service Commission

(“Commission”) that adjusted Pikeville’s water rate to $1.97 per 1,000 gallons for

Pikeville’s two wholesale customers, Mountain Water District (“MWD”) and
Southern Water and Sewer District (“Southern”). Pikeville asserts the Commission

denied it due process because: (1) the Commission applied this adjustment to its

wholesale rate for Southern, which Pikeville believes should not have been at issue

in the underlying administrative proceedings; (2) the Commission directed MWD

and Southern – rather than only MWD – to pay for Pikeville’s allowable rate case

costs; and because (3) the wholesale water rate the Commission set was, in

Pikeville’s view, confiscatory. As set forth below, we affirm in part, reverse in

part, and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Opinion.1

                                       I. Background

              We will briefly review some of the applicable law and general facts of

this appeal before delving into the issues presented. MWD and Southern are

statutorily created public water districts operated and regulated pursuant to

Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) Chapter 74 and are expressly subject to the

jurisdiction of the Commission, which is operative under KRS Chapter 278.

MWD and Southern both purchase wholesale water from Pikeville, which operates

and maintains a municipal waterworks by virtue of the provisions of KRS 96.320

through .510. Ordinarily, municipalities such as Pikeville that operate and

1
  In its appellee brief, MWD asks this Court to take judicial notice of various filings with the
Commission indicating that since December 1, 2022, Pikeville effectively adjusted its wholesale
rates for MWD and Southern to $2.26 per 1,000 gallons. We will not address this recent
development, assuming it occurred, because it is beyond the scope of our review.

                                              -2-
maintain waterworks are exempt from regulation by the Commission. See KRS

278.010(3)(d). However, where, as here, “contracts have been executed between a

utility and a city . . . KRS 278.200 is applicable and requires that by so contracting

the City relinquishes the exemption and is rendered subject to the [Commission]

rates and service regulation.” Simpson Cnty. Water Dist. v. City of Franklin, 872

S.W.2d 460, 463 (Ky. 1994). In short, the Commission has jurisdiction over

Pikeville’s rates for wholesale water service to MWD and Southern. The purpose

of the Commission’s jurisdiction over a municipal utility’s wholesale transactions

with a public utility is to ensure that any public utility “consumer/customer that has

contracted and become dependent for its supply of water from a city utility is not

subject to either excessive rates or inadequate service.” Id. at 465.

               To secure approval of proposed rate adjustments to public utilities,

city-owned utilities must file a “tariff” (i.e., proposed rate2) with the Commission.

And, because the requirements and procedures set forth in KRS Chapter 278 and

the Commission’s regulations apply equally to filings by a city-owned utility or a

jurisdictional utility in this circumstance, municipal wholesale water rates charged

to jurisdictional utilities are subject to KRS 278.030, KRS 278.040, KRS 278.170,

KRS 278.260, and KRS 278.270. Under these provisions, the Commission has the

2
  See KRS 278.010(12) (“‘Rate’ means . . . any schedule or tariff or part of a schedule or tariff
thereof[.]”).

                                                -3-
authority and obligation in any ensuing rate case to investigate whether any rate is

fair, just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory. If any rate fails those metrics,

the Commission is authorized to prescribe a fair, just, and reasonable rate to be

followed in the future. To be clear, rate cases are extensive by design. “A general

rate case pursuant to KRS 278.190 is a lengthy procedure in which a new base rate

is approved only after thorough examination of all operations and costs by the

[Commission].” Kentucky Indus. Util. Cust., Inc. v. Kentucky Util. Co., 983

S.W.2d 493, 497 (Ky. 1998) (emphasis added).

             Our standard of review regarding decisions of the Commission is as

follows:

             Judicial review of orders issued by the Commission is
             governed by KRS 278.410(1). A court may vacate or set
             aside an order or determination by the Commission only
             where the Commission’s decision is determined to be
             “unlawful or unreasonable.” See KRS 278.410(1);
             Citizens for Alt. Water Sol. v. Kentucky Pub. Serv.
             Comm’n, 358 S.W.3d 488, 489-90 (Ky. App. 2011). The
             party seeking to set aside the Commission’s
             determination has “the burden of proof to show by clear
             and satisfactory evidence that the [Commission’s]
             determination, requirement, direction or order is
             unreasonable or unlawful.” KRS 278.430.

             A decision is considered “unlawful” if it violates a statute
             or constitutional provision. National-Southwire
             Aluminum Co. v. Big Rivers Elec. Corp., 785 S.W.2d 503
             (Ky. App. 1990); see also Public Serv. Comm’n v.
             Jackson Cny. Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 50 S.W.3d 764
             (Ky. App. 2000). An order of the Commission “can be
             found unreasonable only if it is determined that the

                                          -4-
            evidence presented leaves no room for difference of
            opinion among reasonable minds. In making such a
            review, the court is confined to a consideration of the
            evidence as presented in the record.” Kentucky Indus.
            Util. Cust., Inc. v. Kentucky Util. Co., 983 S.W.2d 493,
            499 (Ky.1998) (citing Energy Reg. Comm’n v. Kentucky
            Pwr., 605 S.W.2d 46 (Ky. App. 1980)).

            The Commission serves as fact-finder and possesses sole
            discretion to judge the credibility of evidence. Energy
            Reg. Comm’n, 605 S.W.2d at 50. “The [Commission]
            acts as a quasi-judicial agency utilizing its authority to
            conduct hearings, render findings of fact and conclusions
            of law, and utilizing its expertise in the area and to the
            merits of rates and service issues.” Simpson Cty. Water
            Dist. v. City of Franklin, 872 S.W.2d 460, 465 (Ky.
            1994).

            Although KRS Chapter 278 grants the Commission
            sweeping authority to regulate public utilities, the
            Commission is a creature of statute and its powers are
            purely statutory, having only such powers as conferred
            expressly, by necessity, or by fair implication. Croke v.
            Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Kentucky, 573 S.W.2d 927 (Ky.
            App. 1978). “Whether the [Commission] exceeded the
            scope of its authority is a question of law that we
            scrutinize closely and review de novo.” Cincinnati Bell
            Tel. Co. v. Kentucky Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 223 S.W.3d
            829, 836 (Ky. App. 2007) (citing Commonwealth,
            Transp. Cab. v. Weinberg, 150 S.W.3d 75 (Ky. App.
            2004)). Finally, as always, we review questions of law
            de novo. City of Greenup v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 182
            S.W.3d 535, 539 (Ky. App. 2005) (citing Revenue Cab.
            v. Comcast Cablevision of the South, 147 S.W.3d 743,
            747 (Ky. App. 2003)).

Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers, Inc. v. Kentucky Public Serv. Comm’n, 504

S.W.3d 695, 704-05 (Ky. App. 2016).

                                        -5-
             With that in mind, we now turn to the issues at hand.

 II. The Commission did not deprive Pikeville of procedural due process by
          adjusting Pikeville’s wholesale water rate for Southern

             As indicated, the first issue presented in this appeal is whether the

Commission adjusted Pikeville’s wholesale water rate for Southern consistently

with Pikeville’s right of procedural due process. Pikeville raises several related

arguments in this vein which will be addressed in depth below, but their common

thread is Pikeville’s contention that when it applied for a rate increase, it only

applied to increase its rate for MWD; it was led to believe over the course of the

ensuing rate proceeding that only its rate for MWD was going to be at issue; and

that when the Commission ultimately adjusted its wholesale rate for Southern as

well, it was caught unawares and accordingly denied procedural due process.

             We disagree. As outlined below, while Pikeville only sought to

increase its wholesale rate for MWD, it had ample notice shortly after the initiation

of the underlying rate proceeding and the Commission’s associated investigation

that all of its wholesale rates would be at issue, including its rate to Southern. The

facts relevant to Pikeville’s contention and associated arguments are as follows.

On February 21, 2019, Pikeville filed with the Commission a revised tariff sheet

setting forth proposed adjustments to its existing rate for wholesale water service

to MWD, to be effective April 5, 2019. In support of its proposed rate adjustment,

Pikeville included with its filing a February 5, 2019 cost-of-service study

                                          -6-
(“COSS”) from an entity named RateStudies. The COSS only addressed

Pikeville’s wholesale relationship with MWD. In sum, since 2009, Pikeville had

been charging MWD $1.68 per 1,000 gallons for the first 28,000,000 gallons

purchased, and $1.30 per 1,000 gallons beyond that amount. Pikeville sought to

raise its existing rate to $2.30 per 1,000 gallons. In the event MWD protested the

proposed increase and necessitated a rate case before the Commission, Pikeville

proposed an additional monthly surcharge to MWD over 36 months to enable

Pikeville to recover its rate case expenses. Notably, Pikeville had no unified rate

for all of its wholesale purchasers and instead contracted with each purchaser

separately. Included with its tariff filing, Pikeville listed its current rate for

wholesale water service to Southern – a rate it did not wish to adjust. Effective

October 16, 2018, and pursuant to an uncontested tariff filing of September 13,

2018, Pikeville had been charging Southern a different rate of $2.25 per 1,000

gallons.3

               On March 4, 2019, MWD submitted a letter to the Commission asking

it to open a formal proceeding to investigate Pikeville’s proposed rate, establish a

procedural schedule, and to ensure that the proposed rate was not placed into effect

3
  Before September 13, 2018, Pikeville charged Southern $1.72 per 1,000 gallons. It is unclear
from the record when that prior rate was set. But Pikeville acknowledges in its brief that the last
time it increased rates for any of its customers – retail or wholesale – prior to 2018 was on
January 1, 2012; and the Commission indicated in its January 31, 2020, order on rehearing that
since 2002, the only other instance where Pikeville increased its wholesale rates occurred in
2009.

                                                -7-
before the Commission conducted a hearing. The Commission issued an order on

March 28, 2019, establishing a formal proceeding, suspending the proposed rate

until September 4, 2019,4 making MWD a party to the proceeding and providing

any other interested party until April 15, 2019, to intervene. Ultimately, no other

party intervened.

                In objecting to Pikeville’s proposed rate increase, MWD indicated that

Pikeville had failed to provide it any evidence from which it could determine that

the proposed rate was reasonable. To facilitate the production of that evidence, the

Commission entered an order on June 10, 2019, directing Pikeville to answer 29

interrogatories (with multiple subsections) encompassing roughly every aspect of

Pikeville’s water operations. Of those, interrogatories 12 through 19 and 26

through 29 sought, in sum, detailed information regarding all of Pikeville’s

wholesale customers – including but not limited to their identities; minimum and

maximum water usages per month; the amount of water they purchased and for

how much in the last 36 months; the rates they were each charged for service; what

they paid for the upkeep of the water mains; the amount of water treatment plant

capacity reserved for each customer and whether that was expected to change in

the next three years; the minutes of each city council meeting in 2018 and 2019 in

which a proposed rate adjustment to Pikeville’s wholesale customers was

4
    See KRS 278.190(2).

                                           -8-
discussed; all correspondence between Pikeville and its wholesale customers since

January 1, 2018, regarding revisions to Pikeville’s wholesale rates; how Pikeville

had calculated its proposed wholesale rate adjustment; and the annual effect of the

proposed rate adjustment on Pikeville’s revenues from wholesale water service to

each of its wholesale water service customers. Interrogatory 28 also directed

Pikeville to “Provide all contracts, if any, for water service between Pikeville,

Mountain District, or Southern Water and Sewer District that have not been filed

with the Commission.” (Emphasis added.) Pikeville provided detailed

information responsive to each of these interrogatories, much of which involved

Southern.

             On July 1, 2019, the Commission further directed Pikeville to explain

why it had completed a COSS on February 5, 2019 to set a rate for MWD, but not

for Southern. On the same date, MWD also submitted interrogatories to Pikeville

along the same line of inquiry, including the following:

             If the purpose of the COSS was to “. . . determine a fair
             water rate for the Mountain Water District . . .,” why is
             the rate proposed for MWD different from the rate
             proposed for Southern Water District? Explain all
             differences in allocations of costs and facilities to
             determine the different rates. Provide the COSS used to
             set the rate for Southern Water District.

             Responding to these interrogatories, Pikeville directed the

Commission and MWD to a report it had produced in discovery and referred to as

                                         -9-
an “initial COSS,” namely, an August 16, 2018 document authored by RateStudies,

entitled “Pikeville, Kentucky Water and Wastewater Rate Study And Cost of

Service Analysis for Wholesale Customers.” Pikeville had presented this report to

both MWD and Southern in 2018 during their respective rate increase negotiations.

The recommendation of the report was to charge MWD and Southern the same rate

(i.e., $2.25 per 1,000 gallons) because, as the report elaborated in its analysis on

page 24,

             A Cost of Service analysis is a method used to fairly
             distribute cost to classes of customers based on the
             services provided to each class. The City of Pikeville
             does not distinguish between classes of customers such
             as residential, commercial, or industrial. However, the
             City provides water service to two other water systems,
             Mountain Wt. and Southern Wt. Each of these water
             systems are charged different rates although they are
             provided the same level of service. The purpose of the
             Cost of Service analysis is to determine a fair water rate
             for both water systems.

(Emphasis added.)

             Pikeville also produced an October 16, 2018 letter it had submitted to

MWD during their negotiations. The letter referenced Southern’s new effective

one-tier wholesale rate of $2.25 per 1,000 gallons, and it offered MWD the same

rate. As to why Pikeville nevertheless decided to propose a higher rate for MWD

(i.e., $2.30 per 1,000 gallons, plus a rate case expense surcharge), Pikeville

provided the following response to MWD’s interrogatory:

                                         -10-
             Pikeville initially retained RateStudies to prepare cost-of-
             service studies for all of Pikeville’s water and sewer
             operations. The initial COSS prepared by RateStudies
             followed the methodology identified in the American
             Water Works M54 manual, and it included proposed
             rates for both Southern Water and Sewer District and
             Mountain Water District. When Pikeville presented
             Mountain Water District with the initial COSS, Mountain
             Water District suggested that the AWWA’s M54
             methodology was somehow flawed. Rather than fighting
             over the reasonableness of rates determined by the M54
             methodology with MWD, Pikeville requested that
             RateStudies complete another cost-of-service study
             specifically for Mountain Water District based on the
             Debt Service Coverage methodology commonly used by
             Commission Staff for its staff reports. Southern Water
             and Sewer District did not object to the initial COSS
             results. New wholesale water rates to Southern Water
             and Sewer District were already effective at the time
             RateStudies completed its second COSS, and therefore, it
             was unnecessary to include Southern Water and Sewer
             District in the second COSS.

             At the September 10, 2019 final administrative hearing, the questions

and testimony focused upon the evidence Pikeville had adduced in response to the

Commission’s and MWD’s extensive interrogatories – evidence that concerned

Pikeville’s wholesale rates, not simply its wholesale rate for MWD. Notably, the

Commission again questioned Pikeville about how Pikeville’s cost of service to

Southern compared to its cost of service to MWD; and Pikeville’s representative,

Grondall Potter, reaffirmed the substance of Pikeville’s earlier response set forth

above. Thus, Pikeville was pressed repeatedly about its wholesale rates for MWD

and Southern; it did not disagree with the conclusion of its “initial COSS” that it

                                        -11-
was providing MWD and Southern “the same level of service”; nor did it disagree

with the conclusion that the two utilities should be charged the same wholesale

rate. Boiled down, Pikeville simply believed MWD should pay a higher rate than

Southern because, when it proposed a rate increase of $2.25 per 1,000 gallons to

both utilities in 2018, Southern settled for that rate and MWD did not. In turn,

Pikeville’s mixed results in its separate wholesale rate negotiations with Southern

and MWD explain why Pikeville’s September 13, 2018 tariff filing only sought to

increase Southern’s rate, and why its February 21, 2019 tariff filing only sought to

increase MWD’s rate.

              The Commission took what is set forth above into consideration when

it adjudicated the underlying rate case and held, in its December 19, 2019 order,

that “In calculating a fair, just and reasonable wholesale rate . . . Pikeville should

charge the same wholesale rate to both of its wholesale customers, Mountain

District and Southern District.” It ultimately determined Pikeville’s evidence

supported a wholesale rate of $1.97 per 1,000 gallons, and prospectively5 adjusted

Pikeville’s wholesale rates for both MWD and Southern accordingly.

5
 The Commission initially ordered Southern’s rate to be retroactively adjusted to $1.97 per
1,000 gallons, but subsequently amended its order to make the adjustment prospective.

                                              -12-
             Pikeville petitioned the Commission to reconsider its holding. In its

January 31, 2020 order on reconsideration, the Commission addressed Pikeville’s

arguments and denied its request, explaining in relevant part:

             Pikeville first argues that the issue before the
             Commission was solely Pikeville’s wholesale water rate
             to Mountain Water and not the wholesale rate charges to
             Southern District. Pikeville asserts that at no time during
             this proceeding, until the December 19, 2019 Final
             Order, did the Commission notify Pikeville that there
             could be changes to Southern District’s wholesale rate.
             Pikeville argues that the Commission’s change to
             Southern District’s wholesale rate violates KRS 278.200
             (requiring a hearing before a change to water rates
             charged by a city), KRS 278.180 (requiring notice to a
             utility that it will change a rate), and KRS 278.270
             (requiring a hearing and a finding that a rate is
             unreasonable, etc. and proscribing a rate to be followed
             in the future).

             Pikeville argues that the Commission failed to adhere to
             any of these requirements because: (1) it did not hold a
             hearing on the wholesale rate to be charged to Southern
             District; (2) it did not provide notice that it would be
             changing the wholesale rate to be charged to Southern
             District; (3) it did not find that the wholesale rate charged
             to Southern District was unjust, unreasonable,
             insufficient, unjustly discriminatory or otherwise in
             violation of KRS Chapter 278; . . . .

             The Commission, however, disagrees that it cannot make
             changes to the wholesale rate that Pikeville charges to
             Southern District. The Commission did hold a hearing
             regarding Pikeville’s wholesale water rate. During the
             hearing, Pikeville presented evidence regarding the costs
             incurred to provide wholesale water service, thus
             satisfying the hearing requirement in KRS 278.200.
             Pikeville may not have been on specific notice that the

                                         -13-
             wholesale rate to Southern District was at issue, but the
             evidence presented at the hearing and during the
             proceeding refers almost exclusively of [sic] the cost of
             providing wholesale water service, and not specifically to
             Mountain Water. Thus, it is difficult for the Commission
             to believe that even if Pikeville had been on notice that
             Southern District’s wholesale rate had been at issue, the
             resulting wholesale rate would have been any different
             than that for providing the same service to Mountain
             Water. Furthermore, Pikeville has not provided any
             indication in its request for a rehearing that it could have
             presented evidence that Southern District’s wholesale
             rate should be different than Mountain Water’s.
             Pikeville’s original proposed wholesale rate to charge
             Mountain Water was actually $.05 more per 1,000
             gallons that [sic] what it had been charging Southern
             District, indicating that Pikeville believed the cost of
             providing wholesale service to Southern District might be
             less than to Mountain Water. Therefore, any additional
             evidence taken regarding Southern District’s wholesale
             rate, or a subsequent investigation into Southern
             District’s wholesale water rate, could possibly yield a
             lower rate than that set in the Final Order.

             On appeal before this Court, as before the circuit court, Pikeville

maintains it was denied procedural due process in this respect. In support, it

reasserts the arguments it posed to the Commission in its petition for rehearing.

But we agree with the circuit court’s conclusion that the Commission’s analysis

was correct. As stated at the onset, and as discussed above, Pikeville had ample

notice shortly after the initiation of the underlying rate proceeding and the

Commission’s associated investigation that all of its wholesale rates would be at

issue; it was provided a hearing where all of the evidence relevant to its wholesale

                                         -14-
rates was adduced and considered; and, despite complaining in its subsequent

appeals that it had no opportunity to address the Commission’s concerns or the

evidence that the Commission considered related to Southern, Pikeville made no

contention in its petition for rehearing before the Commission, and makes no

contention here, that it could have presented evidence supporting that Southern’s

wholesale rate should have been different than Mountain Water’s. In short,

Pikeville was given notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, which are the

general hallmarks of due process. See Utility Regulatory Comm’n v. Kentucky

Water Service Co., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 591, 593 (Ky. App. 1982).

             That said, we believe the Commission’s analysis requires additional

elaboration as it does not address some of the finer points Pikeville raises. First,

Pikeville argues that a few details in the administrative record objectively indicated

Southern’s rates would not be at issue before the Commission, namely, that the

Commission did not require Southern to be notified of the proceedings, to

intervene in the proceedings, or to be named in the caption of the underlying rate

case; nor did the Commission suspend Southern’s wholesale rate during the

pendency of the underlying rate case. Additionally, Pikeville asserts it had no

reason to believe its wholesale rate for Southern would be adjusted because the

Commission had already “approved” its wholesale rate for Southern on October

16, 2018, shortly before the underlying rate case was initiated.

                                         -15-
               However, while notifying Southern or adding it as a party might have

been the better practice, it was unnecessary to make Southern a party to the

underlying proceedings to affect its wholesale rate with Pikeville.6 Also, the

Commission could not have suspended Southern’s wholesale rate during the

pendency of the underlying rate case because, at that time, Southern’s wholesale

rate had already become effective;7 it stemmed from a tariff that had already been

filed and had gone unchallenged. As such, the Commission could only have

adjusted Southern’s wholesale rate prospectively, e.g., after it entered its final

order.8 Likewise, Pikeville was presumptively aware that the Commission’s prior

approval of any wholesale rate does not estop the Commission from subsequently

adjusting that rate. See Fern Lake Co. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 357 S.W.2d 701,

704 (Ky. 1962). In any event, the extensive information requests Pikeville

6
  To the extent Southern had an interest in the underlying proceedings that was not adequately
represented, it could have intervened but was not required to do so. See 807 Kentucky
Administrative Regulation (“KAR”) 5:001E § 4(11). Additionally, regardless of its nonparty
status, Southern could also have sought review of the Commission’s order in this matter. See
KRS 278.410(1) (Providing in part, “Any party to a commission proceeding or any utility
affected by an order of the commission may . . . bring an action against the commission in the
Franklin Circuit Court to vacate or set aside the order or determination on the ground that it is
unlawful or unreasonable.” (emphasis added)).
7
  See KRS 278.190(1) (providing in relevant part that “the commission may, at any time before
the schedule becomes effective, suspend the operation of the schedule and defer the use of the
rate . . . .”).
8
  The Commission has the statutory authority to modify utility rates, service, or practices once
the Commission determines that the rates, service, or practices are not fair, just, and reasonable.
However, the changes to rates and service apply on a prospective basis. See KRS 278.270.

                                               -16-
received from the Commission clearly placed Pikeville on notice that its wholesale

rate for Southern would be examined. As stated at the onset, “[a] general rate case

pursuant to KRS 278.190 is a lengthy procedure in which a new base rate is

approved only after thorough examination of all operations and costs by the

[Commission].” Kentucky Utilities Co., 983 S.W.2d at 497 (emphasis added).

             Second, Pikeville argues the Commission’s adjustment of its

wholesale rate for Southern is voidable because the Commission did not comply

with KRS 278.180 prior to doing so. In relevant part, that statute provides:

             (1) Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section,
             no change shall be made by any utility in any rate except
             upon thirty (30) days’ notice to the commission, stating
             plainly the changes proposed to be made and the time
             when the changed rates will go into effect. However, the
             commission may, in its discretion, based upon a showing
             of good cause in any case, shorten the notice period from
             thirty (30) days to a period of not less than twenty (20)
             days. The commission may order a rate change only
             after giving an identical notice to the utility. The
             commission may order the utility to give notice of its
             proposed rate increase to that utility’s customers in the
             manner set forth in its regulations.

Id.

             Pikeville’s argument appears to be that the Commission was required,

perhaps at the onset of the underlying rate case, to notify Pikeville pursuant to this

statute that it intended to change Pikeville’s wholesale rate for Southern, and by

how much.

                                         -17-
               We disagree. The above-quoted statute deals with proposed rate

changes, not changes resulting from a rate case investigation. Following the date

that it is filed, and absent a request for a hearing by a person with an interest in a

proposed rate or by the Commission on its own motion, a proposed rate becomes

effective by operation of law upon expiration of the statutory notice required by

KRS 278.180. The purpose of the thirty-day notice set forth in the statute is to

provide interested parties an opportunity to suspend the proposed rate before it

takes effect to investigate its reasonableness. See KRS 278.190.

               Conversely, when, as here, the Commission chooses to investigate any

rate, it maintains the authority to “investigate the methods and practices of utilities

to require them to conform to the laws of this state, and to all reasonable rules,

regulations and orders of the commission not contrary to law.” KRS 278.040(3)

(emphasis added). Here, Pikeville only sought approval of a proposed rate

increase to MWD. However, the Commission could not have assessed the

reasonableness or lawfulness of Pikeville’s proposed rate without examining all of

Pikeville’s operations and costs, including Pikeville’s cost of servicing Southern.

More to the point, the Commission could not have approved or otherwise adjusted

Pikeville’s proposed rate increase if the result violated KRS 278.030(3)9 and KRS

9
 KRS 278.030(3) provides: “Every utility may employ in the conduct of its business suitable
and reasonable classifications of its service, patrons and rates. The classifications may, in any

                                               -18-
278.170(1),10 which forbid charging unreasonably disparate rates to similarly

situated jurisdictional utilities.

               In short, while Pikeville may not have been prohibited from

attempting to increase one wholesale rate at a time, it was not entitled to presume it

could set a single rate for a single wholesale customer in a vacuum. The

Commission is obligated by statute to prohibit unreasonably discriminatory rates or

disparate treatment among similarly situated classes of customers; and

               Whenever the commission, upon its own motion or upon
               complaint as provided in KRS 278.260, and after a
               hearing had upon reasonable notice, finds that any rate is
               unjust, unreasonable, insufficient, unjustly discriminatory
               or otherwise in violation of any of the provisions of this
               chapter, the commission shall by order prescribe a just
               and reasonable rate to be followed in the future.

KRS 278.270 (emphasis added).

               Pikeville was provided reasonable notice that all of its wholesale rates

were the subject of the Commission’s investigation. It was provided ample

opportunity to adduce evidence during discovery and during a hearing to justify its

wholesale rates. Based upon that evidence, the Commission determined the “fair,

proper case, take into account the nature of the use, the quality used, the quantity used, the time
when used, the purpose for which used, and any other reasonable consideration.”
10
  KRS 278.170(1) provides: “No utility shall, as to rates or service, give any unreasonable
preference or advantage to any person or subject any person to any unreasonable prejudice or
disadvantage, or establish or maintain any unreasonable difference between localities or between
classes of service for doing a like and contemporaneous service under the same or substantially
the same conditions.”

                                                -19-
just and reasonable” rate for the level of service Pikeville provided MWD was

$1.97 per 1,000 gallons. The evidence Pikeville adduced also indicated Pikeville

provided MWD and Southern the same level of service. Accordingly, if the

Commission adjusted MWD’s rate to $1.97 per 1,000 gallons but permitted

Southern’s rate to remain at $2.25 per 1,000 gallons, the Commission would have

violated KRS 278.030(3) and KRS 278.170(1).11 Under the circumstances of this

case it was obligated to commensurately adjust Southern’s rate to that level as

well, despite Southern’s status as a nonparty. This result is consistent with the

Commission’s precedent12 and a permissible construction of the operative

11
   Pikeville also faults the Commission for not making a specific finding, per KRS 278.270, that
its rate of $2.25 per 1,000 gallons for Southern was “unjust, unreasonable, insufficient, unjustly
discriminatory, or otherwise in violation of” KRS Chapter 278. However, Pikeville cites no
authority indicating the Commission was required to use “magic words” to that effect. The clear
implication of the Commission’s December 19, 2019 order is that if the Commission had
adjusted MWD’s wholesale rate, but permitted Southern’s rate to remain as it was, the result
would have violated KRS 278.030(3) and KRS 278.170(1).
12
   See, e.g., In the Matter of: Proposed Adjustment of the Wholesale Water Service Rates of the
City of Williamstown, Case No. 2005-00297, 2005 WL 3783587 n.2 (Ky. P.S.C. Nov. 30, 2005)
(adjusting the rate of nonparty, non-objecting jurisdictional utility that also purchased wholesale
water from municipality “[s]ince no evidence has been submitted to support differing wholesale
water service rates”); In the Matter of: Proposed Adjustment of the Wholesale Water Service
Rates of the Frankfort Electric and Water Plant Board, Case No. 96-595, 1997 WL 34862825
n.1 (Ky. P.S.C. Aug. 11, 1997) (conditioning approval of an agreed wholesale rate upon the
rate’s application to two similarly situated nonparty, non-objecting jurisdictional utilities, and
adding: “The Commission’s action today should not be construed as an endorsement of Peaks
Mill Water District and Farmdale Water District’s conduct. While the Intervenors expended
their time and resources to participate in this proceeding, Peaks Mill Water District and Farmdale
Water District stood idly by. None of the benefits which will directly accrue to these two public
utilities as a result of the Settlement Agreement can be traced to their actions or those of their
management.”).

                                               -20-
statutes.13 In short, the Commission did not deny Pikeville due process by

affecting Pikeville’s wholesale rate for Southern, and we affirm to that extent.

Whether the wholesale rate that the Commission set was confiscatory, however,

will be discussed later in this opinion.

  III. The Commission did not deprive Pikeville of due process by requiring
 both Southern and MWD, rather than only MWD, to pay its reasonable rate
                                case costs

               The Commission permits recovery of rate case expenses through

prospective rate setting. See, e.g., 807 KAR 5:001E § 16(8)(f). Indeed, rate case

expenses have long been considered appropriate for inclusion in utility rates as a

cost of doing business. See, e.g., West Ohio Gas Co. v Pub. Utilities Comm’n of

Ohio, 294 U.S. 63, 73, 55 S. Ct. 316, 79 L. Ed. 761 (1935) (explaining such

expenses “must be included among the costs of operation in the computation of a

fair return”); Driscol v. Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U.S. 104, 120-21, 59 S. Ct.

715, 83 L. Ed. 1134 (1939). The issue Pikeville raises in this context is not the

amount of its rate case expenses the Commission deemed it could recover through

prospective rate setting surcharges, but who the Commission determined it should

recover those expenses from. In the rates it set for both MWD and Southern, the

13
  See Kentucky Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n v. Estill Cnty. Fiscal Ct., 503
S.W.3d 924, 927-28 (Ky. 2016) (“Where the General Assembly does not use language that
addresses the specific question at issue, the standard of review for an agency’s interpretation of
unclear, ambiguous language in a statute is whether the agency used ‘a permissible construction
of the statute’ to reach its adjudicative decision.” (citations omitted)).

                                               -21-
Commission split Pikeville’s rate case expenses evenly between both utilities. But,

in line with its prior argument, Pikeville asserts that because Southern was a

nonparty below whose rate should not have been affected at all, MWD should be

exclusively responsible for its rate case expenses.

              For the reasons stated in our analysis of Pikeville’s prior argument, we

reject this contention. If Pikeville is also attempting to argue Southern’s rights

were somehow violated, Pikeville has no standing to do so. Lastly, if Pikeville is

attempting to argue that its rate case expenses should not have been prospectively

incorporated into the rate of nonparty that did not seek to intervene, we likewise

disagree. Rate cases may be initiated by the Commission on its own motion and

prosecuted by the Commission regardless of whether any affected utility chooses

to intervene. See KRS 278.190(1). Even in that circumstance, rate case expenses

are still considered a general cost of doing business; and, consistently with that

premise and the Commission’s precedent,14 rate case expenses are recoverable

even from nonparty affected utilities that choose not to intervene. No error

occurred in this regard.

14
  See, e.g., In the Matter of: Electronic Tariff Filing of the City of Harrodsburg Water Dep’t
Revising its Wholesale Water Service Rates, Case No. 2022-00349, 2023 WL 3585767, at *7
(Ky. P.S.C. May 16, 2023) (dividing rate case expenses of municipal wholesale water suppliers
evenly between its two jurisdictional utility wholesale purchasers who neither objected to the
increased rate nor sought to intervene).

                                             -22-
 IV. The Commission partially erred in calculating Pikeville’s wholesale rate

            A final order of the Commission regarding a rate will only be

overturned if it is deemed unreasonable. Our Supreme Court has explained:

            Unreasonable has been construed in a rate-making sense
            to be the equivalent of confiscatory. This Court has
            equated an unjust and unreasonable rate to confiscation
            of utility property. We have declared that rates
            established by a regulatory agency must enable the utility
            to operate successfully and maintain its financial integrity
            in order to meet the just and reasonable non-confiscatory
            tests.

Public Service Comm’n of Kentucky v. Dewitt Water Dist., 720 S.W.2d 725, 730

(Ky. 1986) (citation omitted). Further,

            The federal and state constitutions protect against the
            confiscation of property, not against a mere reduction of
            revenue. A confiscatory rate is one that is unjust and
            unreasonable. Rates are non-confiscatory, just and
            reasonable so long as they enable the utility to operate
            successfully, to maintain its financial integrity, to attract
            capital and to compensate its investors for the risks
            assumed even though they might produce only a meager
            return on the so-called ‘fair value’ rate base. By long
            standing usage in the field of rate regulation the ‘lowest
            reasonable rate’ is one which is not confiscatory in the
            constitutional sense. Assuming that there is a zone of
            reasonableness within which the legislature or its
            designee is free to fix a rate varying in amount and higher
            than a confiscatory rate it is also free to decrease any rate
            which is not the ‘lowest reasonable rate.’

Commonwealth ex rel. Stephens v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 545 S.W.2d 927,

930-31 (Ky. 1976) (citations omitted).

                                          -23-
             As noted, the Commission set Pikeville’s rate for the sale of wholesale

water at $1.97 per 1,000 gallons. The Commission calculated this rate through the

“debt service coverage” method, an accounting method it utilizes to calculate the

overall revenue requirement of water districts, water associations, and municipal-

owned water utilities. This method is designed to enable utilities to recover an

appropriate portion of the following expenses through rate-setting: cash-related

pro forma operating expenses; depreciation expense; the average annual principal

and interest payments on all long-term debts; and working capital that is in

addition to depreciation expense.

             Pikeville argues the Commission misapplied the debt service coverage

method in setting its wholesale water rate. Specifically, Pikeville contends the

Commission miscalculated its revenue requirement by: (1) failing to amortize

several of its pre-2017 nonrecurring repair and maintenance expenses; (2)

incorrectly reducing its depreciation expense; (3) refusing to recognize, as an

allowable operating expense, its cost of electricity attributable to water loss; and

(4) refusing to correct, on rehearing, what the Commission acknowledged was its

own error in excluding $1,375 of Pikeville’s maintenance costs from its calculation

of Pikeville’s operating expense. We will address these contentions in turn.

                                         -24-
1. Non-amortization of pre-2017 nonrecurring repair and maintenance
expenses

                Pursuant to 807 KAR 5:001E § 16(1)(a),15 all applications for a

general rate adjustment shall be supported by either a “fully forecasted test period,”

or a “twelve (12) month historical test period which may include adjustments for

known and measurable changes.” Here, Pikeville chose the latter course and was

permitted to utilize its fiscal year 2017 as its “historical test period,” which is

essentially a sample period representative of average annual costs and expenses

taken from a multi-year period, used as a baseline for ascertaining its applicable

rate. During that “test year” period of fiscal year 2017, Pikeville had

“nonrecurring expenses,” e.g., expenses that were not representative of its average

annual expenses; namely, $99,506 in telemetry repairs and rehabilitation expenses

associated with two water tanks, and a $24,264 cost of repairing a high service

pump. Pikeville sought to have the entirety of these repair and maintenance costs

counted toward its test year operating expenses for ratemaking purposes.

                However, when using a historical test period, operations are adjusted

to reflect a typical or normal 12-month operating period. Under that approach,

amortization is a common way to normalize test year operations for abnormal or

nonrecurring items; doing so ensures that the revenue requirement calculated is not

15
     807 KAR 5:001E expired effective June 11, 2023.

                                              -25-
artificially elevated based upon costs that will likely not reoccur on an annual

basis. The Commission took this approach and amortized the expenses set forth

above over a period of 15 years, the estimated useful life of the repairs. The

Commission also allocated 33.423% of those expenses to the outside-the-city water

system. As a result, and contrary to Pikeville’s wishes, the Commission only

counted a small fraction of those expenses toward Pikeville’s total allowable repair

and maintenance costs for the 2017 test year: $4,417 (representing the repairs to

the two water tanks) and $1,077 (representing the repairs to the high service

pump).

             In its petition for rehearing and in each of its subsequent appeals

regarding this issue, Pikeville has claimed the Commission should only have

amortized these expenses on one condition: The Commission also needed to add

into its total allowable repair and maintenance costs amortized portions of several

of Pikeville’s other nonrecurring expenses from years prior to 2017. This is so,

Pikeville explains, because its usual accounting practice is to lump the entire cost

of projects like its water tank and service pump repairs into one fiscal year and to

declare them as operating expenses, rather than amortize them over several years.

Pikeville contends that if it had instead chosen to amortize those types of projects

over the years prior to 2017, amortized fractions of those prior project expenses

would have carried forward to 2017 and, thus, should have been properly added to

                                         -26-
its allowable repair and maintenance costs for purposes of its 2017 test year and

calculating its revenue requirement.

             We disagree, and for three separate reasons. First, the Commission is

not bound by Pikeville’s method of accounting. See Kentucky Utilities Co., 983

S.W.2d at 501. Second, Pikeville did not adduce any evidence of its alleged

unamortized project expenses from years prior to 2017 until it filed its post-order

petition for rehearing. A petition for rehearing is not an opportunity to adduce

evidence that could “with reasonable diligence have been offered on the former

hearing.” See KRS 278.400.

             Third, we agree with the Commission’s assessment that what Pikeville

is advocating – prospectively factoring Pikeville’s past nonrecurring expenditures

into Pikeville’s revenue requirement, and thus allowing those expenses to be borne

by current and future ratepayers – violates the “filed rate doctrine” and its

prohibition against retroactive ratemaking. Where, as here, “the legislature has

established a comprehensive ratemaking scheme, the filed rate defines the legal

relationship between the regulated utility and its customer with respect to the rate

that the customer is obligated to pay and that the utility is authorized to collect.”

Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., 223 S.W.3d at 837. Consequently, that “filed rate” cannot

be altered retroactively and holds constant until a rate change is formally requested

or a challenge to the rate is raised by an interested party. Id. at 839.

                                          -27-
Correspondingly, the filed rate cannot, pursuant to established Commission

precedent, be altered prospectively to adjust for past losses. See, e.g., In the Matter

of: Electronic Tariff Filing of Henderson Water Utility Revising its Wholesale

Water Service Rates, Case No. 2021-00067, 2022 WL 79827, at *3 (Ky. P.S.C.

Jan. 4, 2022). Thus,

             While there can be circumstances under which
             adjustments are permitted for known and measurable
             post-test-year events or costs, there is neither justification
             nor precedent for including a pre-test-year expense in the
             test year for the purpose of determining a utility’s
             revenue requirement.

In the Matter of: Application of Delta Natural Gas Company, Inc., for an

Adjustment of Rates, Case No. 2010-00116, 2010 WL 4162569 (Ky. P.S.C. Oct.

21, 2010).

             Pikeville cites no exception to this general rule. Thus, expenses

predating the historical test period were properly excluded from consideration in

the underlying rate proceeding. As the circuit court observed in its own review of

this matter, if Pikeville wished to recover those prior expenses through rate-setting,

it should have timely filed for a base rate increase when it became apparent that its

rates were deficient; it should not have waited roughly a decade since its most

recent rate increase in 2009 to do so.

                                         -28-
2. Reduction of Pikeville’s Depreciation Expense

             As indicated, a factor considered in calculating a revenue requirement

for ratemaking purposes under the debt service coverage method is a proper

allocation of the utility’s depreciation expense. Pikeville argues the Commission

inappropriately reduced its depreciation expense allocable to its wholesale

customers by a margin of $47,926.60 (rounded up to $47,927). As to how this

occurred, some background is necessary. As discussed, on June 10, 2019, the

Commission entered an order directing Pikeville to answer 29 interrogatories

(some with multiple subsections) encompassing roughly every aspect of Pikeville’s

water operations. Of those, one interrogatory directly required Pikeville to identify

all shared revenues and expenses allocated between Pikeville’s inside-the-city and

outside-the-city water system divisions; and another required Pikeville to provide

depreciation schedules for its water divisions.

             The Commission entered its final order adjudicating this matter

roughly six months later. There, the Commission noted Pikeville had claimed a

total of $414,518 in depreciation expense, but that it had failed to identify

depreciation as a shared expense allocated between its two systems, and that

Pikeville’s depreciation schedules also did not specify that depreciation had been

allocated. From this, the Commission gathered that Pikeville had not allocated

depreciation between its systems. It is uncontested, however, that depreciation

                                         -29-
should have been allocated for purposes of this ratemaking case: Pikeville’s

wholesale customers only utilized the city’s inside-the-city system, but they were

not the only ones who did so – Pikeville’s separate class of outside-the-city

customers utilized Pikeville’s outside-the-city system and its inside-the-city water

system plant. Thus, based on the quantity of outside-the-city customers also

utilizing the inside-the-city water system plant, the Commission allocated 33.423%

of the inside-the-city water system plant depreciation expense to the outside-the-

city water system. For purposes of this ratemaking case, this had the effect of

decreasing Pikeville’s total claimed depreciation expense by $136,842. That, taken

with another reduction of $5,093 that the Commission made and is not at issue,

reduced Pikeville’s total depreciation expense to $272,583.

             Pikeville petitioned the Commission for rehearing regarding this

decrease, faulting the Commission for not knowing – or at least not providing it an

additional opportunity to explain – that it had treated depreciation as a shared

expense between its inside-the-city and outside-the-city systems. Specifically, it

contended that it had attributed $47,927 in depreciation expense to its “outside-the-

city” customer class and, in so doing, had already excluded that amount from its

claimed $414,518 depreciation expense. Pikeville also contended that it had

adduced sufficient evidence in support of that proposition. It noted that in one of

the Commission’s other 29 interrogatories, the Commission had instructed it to

                                        -30-
produce general ledgers for its proposed test period; and that in response it had

produced, among other documents, a 637-page general ledger report of its fiscal

year 2017. Page 586 of that report – which appears on page 924 of the 8368-page

administrative record – depicts the following relevant entries under a “Description

Vendor Name/Remarks” category labeled “special revenue”:16

 SPECIAL          PERIOD         JNL NO.         DATE            CREDIT          BALANCE
 REVENUE          CODE

 Reclass plant    1 JE           21974           07/31/2016      3,991.42        (3,991.42)
 cost to
 special
 revenue from
 wholesale
 Reclass plant    2 JE           21975           08/31/2016      3,991.42        (7,982.84)
 cost to
 special
 revenue from
 wholesale
 Reclass plant    3 JE           21975           09/30/2016      3,991.42        (11,974,26)
 cost to
 special
 revenue from
 wholesale
 3-plant cost –   4 JE           21978           10/31/2016      3,991.42        (15,965.68)
 adjusting
 entries
 October 2016
 2-5
 4-plant cost –   5 JE           22053           11/30/2016      3,991.42        (19,965.68)
 adjusting
 entries
 November
 2016 3-9
 5-plant cost –   6 JE           22122           12/31/2016      3,991.42        (23,948.52)
 adjusting
 entries

16
  The chart set forth below is an inexact reproduction of what appears on page 924 of the
administrative record. It merely sets forth the relevant substance.

                                              -31-
December
2016 4-7
5-plant cost –     7 JE          22221         01/31/2017    3,991.42      (27,939.94)
adjusting
entries
January 2017
4-5
4-plant cost –     8 JE          22315         02/28/2017    3,991.42      (31,931.36)
adjusting
entries
February
2017
10-plant cost      9 JE          22425         03/31/2017    3,991.42      (35,922.78)
– adjusting
entries March
2017 10
2-plant cost –     10 JE         22470         04/30/2017    3,991.42      (39,914.20)
adjusting
entries April
2017 2, 5-7
9-plant cost -     11 JE         22630         05/31/2017    4,006.20      (43,920.40)
adjusting
entries May
2017 9
6-plant cost –     12 JE         22675         06/30/2017    4,006.20      (47,926.60)
adjusting
entries June
2017 4-6

                 Pikeville asserted that, taken as a whole, the above “special revenue”

entries indicated it had allocated $47,926.60 in depreciation expense to the

“outside-the-city” system, rather than to the “inside-the-city” system.

Additionally, Pikeville noted that another of the Commission’s interrogatories

from June 10, 2019 – specifically, subsection (e) of interrogatory 16 – had required

it to “provide a schedule that lists the individual revenue subaccounts in the FYE

June 30, 2017 Trial Balance that was combined to arrive at the other income of

$252,335 as reported in the COSS.” Stated differently, the interrogatory had asked

                                            -32-
Pikeville to list what Pikeville had excluded from its “inside-the-city” class

allocation. In response, Pikeville had provided the Commission the following

table:

 210.10.440.00               WATER TAP FEE                $24,510.00
 210.10.450.00               WATER PENALTY                $10,911.47
 210.10.451.00               WATER SPECIAL                $150,302.92
                             REVENUE
 210.10.451.03               SPECIAL REVENUE              $47,926.60
 210.10.460.00               WATER S C                    $12,457.00
 210.10.475.00               INTEREST                     $1,774.41
 210.10.475.01               INTEREST                     $4,258.09
 210.10.475.01               INTEREST, ADJ NOT            ($62.47)
                             INCLUDED IN COSS
 210.10.490.00               MISCELLANEOUS                $256.13
                                                          $252,334.15

             According to Pikeville, the “special revenue” listed in the above table

was a reference to the “special revenue” listed on page 586 of its fiscal year 2017

general ledger report; and – keeping in mind that Pikeville had now revealed that

“special revenue” actually meant “depreciation allocated to the outside-the-city

system” – the above table therefore demonstrated Pikeville had removed what it

considered was the “outside-the-city” depreciation from its claimed depreciation

expenses of $414,518 for purposes of the underlying rate case. It argued the

Commission had erred by deducting what was essentially another “outside-the-

city” share of depreciation from its claimed $414,518 in depreciation expense; and

it asked the Commission to recalculate its depreciation adjustment by factoring in

$47,927, the amount of depreciation expense Pikeville had previously deducted on

its own.

                                         -33-
             The Commission declined to do so. In its order denying this aspect of

Pikeville’s petition, the Commission explained that Pikeville had been asked on at

least two occasions prior to final adjudication to identify expenses that were

allocated to the “inside-the-city” and “outside-the-city” systems, but that it had

failed to provide a coherent or clear explanation regarding the allocation of

depreciation to enable the Commission to make the determination Pikeville was

now advocating. Essentially, the Commission held that Pikeville’s post hoc

revelation and translation of its accounting jargon was too little, too late, for

purposes of the Commission’s KRS 278.400 rehearing authority.

             On appeal before this Court, as below, Pikeville asserts the

Commission erred by refusing to grant it rehearing on this issue. While it would

have been desirable for Pikeville to provide a more cogent explanation of its

accounting jargon and perhaps broken down the data in a form more readily

understand, the information and data were provided to the Commission, and as

Pikeville’s motion for rehearing pointed out, the Commission incorrectly

interpreted the data provided. This mistake by the Commission is the type that

should have been corrected as part of rehearing.

3. Electrical expense for water loss

             The electrical expense of producing water is part of a utility’s

operating expense – another of the factors relevant to calculating a utility’s revenue

                                          -34-
requirement for ratemaking purposes. Pikeville argues the Commission

miscalculated its electrical expense associated with water production during the

2017 test year and consequently assigned it an improperly low overall revenue

requirement. We agree. Before discussing the specifics of Pikeville’s argument,

additional background is necessary.

             Electrical expense is a variable expense, meaning that it increases

proportionally as the gallons of water produced for sale increases. Thus, the

Commission’s task below was to (1) determine a representative level of electrical

expense to include in Pikeville’s operating expenses and (2) allocate a fair portion

of the electrical expense to the wholesale customers. Internally, Pikeville tracks

costs for “inside the city” customers and “outside the city customers,” and

considers its wholesale customers as part of its “inside the city” customer class.

During its test year, Fiscal Year 2017, Pikeville reported a total electrical expense

of $343,036; of that, Pikeville attributed $299,596 to producing water for its

“inside the city” (and thus wholesale) customers, and $43,440 to producing water

for its “outside the city” customers. Notwithstanding, the Commission determined

that for ratemaking purposes the proper way of allocating the total electrical

expense between Pikeville’s “inside the city” and “outside the city” customer

groups was to utilize a five-year average of water produced and sold by Pikeville.

                                         -35-
Pikeville does not contest the propriety of the Commission’s use of a five-year

average.

               In ascertaining the applicable five-year average, the Commission

relied on the following information provided by Pikeville relating to the total

gallons of water Pikeville produced and the total gallons of water Pikeville sold to

its customers from 2014 to 2018:17

 Fiscal yr. Total             Inside city    Outside       Mountain       Southern
            Production        (retail)       city          District       District
            (gal.)
 2018       1,087,579,500     284,483,307    76,950,631    412,128,108    124,455,000
 2017       1,155,123,700     281,672,417    72,572,900    463,158,000    155,982,000
 2016       1,223,575,100     267,187,400    76,437,700    482,373,000    143,611,000
 2015       1,320,837,800     279,392,200    83,794,500    509,484,000    159,061,000
 2014       1,320,131,700     269,345,600    89,936,400    490,097,000    183,374,000

               Ostensibly utilizing this data, the Commission then recalculated

Pikeville’s allowable electrical expense as follows:

       Reported Electric Inside City                                  $ 299,596
       Add: Electric Expense Allocated Outside City:
       Treatment Plant                                                43,440
       Total Electric Expense                                         343,036
       Divided by: Average Water Production                           1,221,449,560
       Electric Cost per Gallon                                       0.000281
       Multiplied by: Average Inside Water Sales                      901,310,007
       Reallocated Inside City Electric Expense                       253,268
       Less: Reported Electric Expense                                (299,596)
       Pro Forma Adjustment                                           $ (46,328)
               In sum, the Commission disallowed $46,328 of Pikeville’s claimed

$299,596 in electrical expenses for its “inside the city” customer group, and thus

17
  Pikeville supplied this information in response to a post-hearing data request from the
Commission.

                                              -36-
reduced Pikeville’s claimed operating expenses by that margin, which ultimately

reduced Pikeville’s overall revenue requirement. On appeal, Pikeville argues the

Commission’s calculations were incorrect in two ways – the first of which is

readily apparent: The five-year “average inside water sales” from 2014 through

2018 is 901,160,806 gallons, not 901,310,007 gallons.

             The second way is less obvious, however, and requires closer scrutiny

of the production and sales chart set forth previously. Of note, in each fiscal year

the sum of gallons of water purchased is less than the total gallons of water

produced. For example, in 2014, there was a difference of 287,378,700 gallons. In

2015, 289,106,100 gallons. In 2016, 253,966,000 gallons. In 2017, 181,738,383

gallons. And in 2018, the difference was 189,562,454. These discrepancies

represent unaccounted-for water loss – a five-year average of 240,350,327 gallons

per year.

             Using the Commission’s math, producing 240,350,327 gallons of

water at an electrical expense of $.000281 per gallon cost Pikeville a five-year

average of $67,538 per year. The Commission effectively subtracted this amount –

along with the amount attributable to Pikeville’s five-year-average electrical

expense in producing water for its “outside the city” customer group (roughly

$22,463, or 79,938,426 gallons multiplied by $.000281), from Pikeville’s claimed

electrical expense of $343,036; and in doing so, it arrived at its solution:

                                         -37-
Pikeville’s expense for only producing water for the “inside the city” customer

group – and the only electrical expense the Commission was willing to recognize

for purposes of the underlying rate case – was $253,268 (i.e., what it incorrectly

calculated as the “inside the city” customer group’s five-year-average purchase of

901,310,007 gallons per year, multiplied by $.000281).

              Pikeville, for its part, argues that a full pro rata share of its electrical

expenses in producing this lost and unaccounted-for water should have been

attributed to its “inside the city” customer group for ratemaking purposes, and that

proper consideration of those electrical expenses should have entitled it to roughly

$315,000 in total electrical expenses allocable to its “inside the city” (and thus

wholesale) customer class, not merely $253,268.

              The Commission, on the other hand, stands by its calculations,

explaining in its brief:

              Commission regulation 807 KAR 5:066, Section 6(3)
              limits water loss to 15 percent for ratemaking purposes.
              As the facts of this case bear out, there was a significant
              nexus between the amount of water produced and the
              amount of water sold to customers, well in excess of the
              15 percent recoverable by regulation.[18] Moreover,

18
  Tangentially, we note the Commission attempts to bolster its claim of Pikeville’s “excessive”
unaccounted-for water loss by asserting that Pikeville had a five-year average of “26%” yearly
water loss from 2014 through 2018 – an assertion the Franklin Circuit Court found convincing
enough to cite as fact in its underlying review. Once again, however, the Commission’s math is
wrong. As set forth herein, Pikeville’s average yearly water loss from 2014 through 2018 was
19.68%, not 26%. To hazard a guess, it appears the Commission arrived at “26%” by improperly
adding 240,350,327 (the five-year-average amount of Pikeville’s gallons of unaccounted-for
water loss) with 79,938,426 gallons (the five-year-average accounted-for amount of gallons

                                             -38-
               Pikeville failed to identify any justification for the
               discrepancy, and it did not provide any evidence as to
               why it was entitled to recover those costs from its
               wholesale customers.

               With that said, Pikeville’s and the Commission’s positions on this

subject are both flawed. For rate making purposes, the regulation cited by the

Commission, 807 KAR 5:066 § 6(3), does not – contrary to Pikeville’s math –

permit consideration of all or a full pro rata share of electrical expense

representing unaccounted-for water loss. Conversely, it does not permit the

Commission to exclude all unaccounted-for water loss from consideration, either –

which is effectively what the Commission did in its calculations set forth above.

Indeed, the Commission cites no precedent favoring that aspect of its math, and we

have found none.

               Rather, 807 KAR 5:066 § 6(3) provides in relevant part that “for rate

making purposes a utility’s unaccounted-for water loss shall not exceed fifteen (15)

percent of total water produced and purchased, excluding water used by a utility in

its own operations.” (Emphasis added.) In other words, for rate making purposes

a utility may claim its expenses associated with producing water it unaccountably

loses in a given year to the extent that the lost water does not exceed 15% of the

total water produced by the utility. Thus, for ratemaking purposes, the formula is

Pikeville sold to its “outside the city” customers) and dividing that sum by 1,221,449,560 (the
five-year-average amount of gallons Pikeville produced).

                                              -39-
as follows: (cost of producing water) multiplied by (percentage of a utility’s

unaccounted-for water loss exceeding 15% of its total water production) equals

(the amount to be deducted from the utility’s cost of producing water).19

              Here, the Commission correctly noted that the five-year average of

Pikeville’s total water production was 1,221,449,560 gallons per year. 15% of that

amount is 183,217,434 gallons. As noted, however, Pikeville’s five-year average

of unaccounted-for water was 240,350,327 gallons per year – about 19.68%, which

exceeded the permitted margin by 4.68%. Accordingly, $343,036 (Pikeville’s

claimed yearly electrical expense for producing water) multiplied by 4.68% (its

water loss % above 15%) equals $16,054 (the amount to be deducted from

Pikeville’s claimed yearly electrical expense for producing water). For ratemaking

purposes, Pikeville’s allowable yearly electrical expense for producing water,

consistent with 807 KAR 5:066 § 6(3) and the Commission’s five-year-average

methodology, was therefore $326,982.

19
  For a straightforward illustration of how 807 KAR 5:066 § 6(3) is properly applied, see, e.g.,
In the Matter of: Electronic Application of Crittenden-Livingston Water District for Authority to
Enter into a Loan Agreement with the Kentucky Infrastructure Authority, Case No. 2020-00232,
2020 WL 5530102, at *1 n.5 (Ky. P.S.C. Sep. 10, 2020):

              Purchased Water                                                        728
              Purchased Power                                                    152,336
              Cost of Water                                                      153,064
              Multiply by Water Loss Percentage Above                             6.25%
              15%
              Expense Reduction to Cost of Water                                    9,567

                                              -40-
             Having separated Pikeville’s costs for excessive water loss from

Pikeville’s electrical expenses, and having accounted for its permitted water loss,

we now turn to what remains: The “inside the city” customer class’s pro rata share

of the $326,982 electric expense. Over the course of five years, Pikeville sold an

average of 981,099,232 gallons of water per year. Of that, it sold an average of

79,938,426 gallons to its “outside the city” customer class per year – roughly

8.15%; and 901,160,806 gallons to its “inside the city” customer class – roughly

91.85%. 91.85% of $326,982 is roughly $300,333.

             In sum, the Commission erred in adjusting Pikeville’s electrical

expense by deducting $299,596 from $253,268. Rather, it should have deducted

$299,596 from $300,333. Had it properly done so, it would have arrived at a

positive pro forma adjustment of $737 to Pikeville’s operating expenses, not a

negative pro forma adjustment of $46,328. Accordingly, the Commission

impermissibly reduced Pikeville’s pro forma operating expenses by $47,065.

4. De Minimus expenses

             Due to its own admitted error, the Commission incorrectly excluded

an additional allocation of $1,375 of Pikeville’s maintenance costs from its

calculation of Pikeville’s relevant operating expenses. Pikeville brought this error

to the Commission’s attention in its petition for rehearing, noting that if $1,375

were properly added to its operating expenses for purposes of ascertaining its

                                         -41-
revenue requirement, its applicable rate – according to the Commission’s math set

forth above – would have increased enough to be rounded up by one cent.

Specifically, while a revenue requirement of 1,779,005 yielded a rate of $1.97 per

1,000 gallons (rounded down from 1.9739), a revenue requirement of 1,780,380

yielded a rate of $1.98 per 1,000 gallons (rounded up from 1.9755). However, the

Commission refused to correct its mistake, explaining that in its view, adding

$1,375 to Pikeville’s operating expenses was “de minimus because it does not

materially impact the calculation of the Plaintiff’s wholesale rate.” The circuit

court later affirmed this aspect of the Commission’s order.

             On appeal before this Court, Pikeville argues as it did below that the

Commission’s error in excluding $1,375 from its operating expenses was not

harmless because that amount, under the circumstances, should not have been

considered “de minimus.” This is so because, had that amount been added, its rate

would have changed according to the Commission’s own calculations.

             We believe Pikeville’s argument has merit. The rule of law associated

with the phrase “de minimus” is “de minimis non curat lex,” which translates from

the Latin as “The law does not concern itself with trifles.” BLACK’S LAW

DICTIONARY 443 (7th ed. 1999). The Commission, in opposing Pikeville on this

point, is essentially claiming that a one-cent adjustment to the rate it assessed for

Pikeville – as required by its own calculations – would be so trivial that the law

                                         -42-
should ignore it. And yet, the Commission cites no authority favoring its position,

and its own precedent is replete with examples of the Commission specifically

approving or disapproving – not ignoring – utility rate adjustments of one cent or

less.20 Stated otherwise, when the Commission interprets and enforces its statutory

mandate, it frequently concerns itself with one-cent adjustments. We will not

presume a one-cent adjustment is a de minimus “trifle.”

              The Commission also contends in its brief – without citing any

precedent – that “if the Court were to rule that a $.01 change to a single class of

customer’s rates was material, it would collapse the zone of reasonableness,

overturning decades of precedent.”

              However, determining the “zone of reasonableness” in the ratemaking

context is a discretionary function of the Commission that involves ascertaining

20
   See, e.g., In the Matter of: Purchased Water Adjustment Filing of Dexter-Almo Heights Water
district, Case No. 2017-00228, 2017 WL 2730250 (Ky. P.S.C. Jun. 21, 2017) (approving utility’s
request, during rate adjustment proceeding, for a rounded-up revised purchased water adjustment
factor of $0.28 per 1,000 gallons, rather than $0.27 per 1,000 gallons); In the Matter of:
Purchased Water Adjustment Filing of Reid Village Water District, Case No. 2017-00277, 2017
WL 3452807 (Ky. P.S.C. Aug. 9, 2017) (approving utility’s request, during rate adjustment
proceeding, for a rounded-up revised purchased water adjustment factor of $0.09 per 1,000
gallons, rather than $0.08 per 1,000 gallons); In the Matter of: Purchased Water Adjustment
Filing of Henderson County Water District, Case No. 2018-00102, 2018 WL 1694922 (Ky.
P.S.C. April 2, 2018) (approving utility’s request, during rate adjustment proceeding, for a
rounded-up revised purchased water adjustment factor of $0.51 per 1,000 gallons, rather than
$0.50051 per 1,000 gallons); In the Matter of: Purchased Water Adjustment Filing of Union
County Water District, Case No. 2018-00423, 2019 WL 264979 (Ky. P.S.C. Jan. 15, 2019)
(rejecting utility’s request, during rate adjustment proceeding, for a purchased water adjustment
factor of -$0.36 per 1,000 gallons, and finding instead that a rounded-down factor of -$0.35 per
1,000 gallons was “fair, just, and reasonable”).

                                              -43-
whether a calculated rate is sufficient to enable the utility to operate successfully

and maintain its financial integrity and is therefore just, reasonable, and

nonconfiscatory. Dewitt Water Dist., 720 S.W.2d at 730; see also South Central

Bell Tel. Co., 545 S.W.2d at 930-31. On the other hand, correcting patent errors in

the calculation of a rate is a ministerial function of the Commission, not a

discretionary one; and it is a function particularly suited for a petition for

rehearing. Indeed, this is a point the Commission has recognized in its own

precedent. See, e.g., In the Matter of: An Adjustment of Rider AMRP of the Union

Light, Heat and Power Company, Case No. 2003-00103, 2003 WL 22701501 (Ky.

P.S.C. Aug. 29, 2003):

             On August 28, 2003, ULH&P filed a motion for
             rehearing in which it stated that the Commission’s
             decision was arbitrary, unjust and unreasonable. ULH&P
             requests that the rates approved for Rate RS Residential
             Service (“Rate RS”) and Rate GS General Service (“Rate
             GS”) be rounded off to the nearest cent and states in
             support of this request that its billing system is only
             designed to apply its charges to the nearest cent.

             ...

             While the Commission does not find that its Order of
             August 25, 2003 is “arbitrary, unjust and unreasonable,”
             we do find that a ministerial error in the Order provides a
             basis to grant ULH&P’s motion.

           V. Remand is Necessary for the Commission to Recalculate the Rate

                                          -44-
             We have identified three errors that the Commission made in

calculating the appropriate rate: 1) excluding the $47,927, the amount of

depreciation expense Pikeville had previously deducted on its own, from the

allowable depreciation adjustment; 2) impermissibly reducing Pikeville’s pro

forma operating expenses by $47,065; and 3) excluding $1,375 from its operating

expenses.

             A court passing upon a challenge to the validity of statutory rates does

not determine the rates to be adopted as a substitute. Kentucky Power Co. v.

Energy Regulatory Comm’n of Kentucky, 623 S.W.2d 904, 907 (Ky. 1981);

Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm’n of Kentucky, 290 U.S. 264,

271-72, 54 S. Ct. 154, 78 L. Ed. 307 (1933). And courts of review may only

vacate or set aside the Commission’s rate order after determining that they are

“unlawful or unreasonable.” Commonwealth ex rel. Stephens v. South Central Bell

Tel. Co., 545 S.W.2d 927, 931 (Ky. 1976). While we are cognizant of the zone of

reasonableness, the errors in this are too substantial and too numerous to simply

ignore. According to our math, the errors had a material impact on the rate set by

the Commission and were confiscatory.

             Accordingly, we reverse and remand merely for the Commission to

provide Pikeville a nonconfiscatory wholesale rate consistent with the evidence

and 807 KAR 5:066 § 6(3).

                                        -45-
                                VI. Conclusion

             Consistently with what is set forth above, we AFFIRM IN PART,

REVERSE IN PART, AND REMAND for further proceedings not inconsistent

with this opinion.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT                BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
FOR APPELLANT:                          FOR APPELLEE PUBLIC SERVICE
                                        COMMISSION OF KENTUCKY:
M. Todd Osterloh
Lexington, Kentucky                     Nancy J. Vinsel
                                        John E.B. Pinney
                                        Jurgens van Zyl
                                        Frankfort, Kentucky

                                        BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT
                                        FOR APPELLEE MOUNTAIN
                                        WATER DISTRICT:

                                        Monica H. Braun
                                        Gerald Wuetcher
                                        Mary Ellen Wimberly
                                        Lexington, Kentucky

                                        Jim G. Vanover
                                        Pikeville, Kentucky

                                     -46-