Court Opinion

ID: 9711017
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:23:00.564382+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:01.684240
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
DeBruler, J.
Ross’ trial lawyer was appointed for her by the trial court. At trial he was called upon to conduct cross-examination of the co-defendant Spencer. Spencer had just provided critical evidence of Ross’ guilt and Ross’ lawyer knew that Spencer had a verbal agreement with the prosecution to enter a plea of guilty to robbery in return for a dismissal of the count for inflicting an injury during the felony which plea and dismissal had not yet taken place. At that time Spencer’s trial had been set for the week after Ross’ trial. At the time of Ross’ trial, Ross’ lawyer and Spencer’s lawyer were partners in the same law firm.
While no cases have been presented which specifically so hold, it is apparent to me that for Sixth Amendment purposes, Ross and Spencer must be considered to have been jointly represented by the same person. Law partners share the burdens and benefits of their legal enterprise. They commonly share offices, libraries, files, secretarial staff,, and the making of legal decisions on behalf of clients. In fact, Ross’ lawyer testified at the hearing below that he had learned of Spencer’s agreement with the prosecution through consultation with his partner who represented Spencer.
*614It is, of course, well settled that joint representation of co-defendants by a single attorney does not necessarily demonstrate a conflict of interest and a denial of the assistance of counsel. Martin v. State, (1974) 262 Ind. 232, 314 N.E.2d 60. However, where one of several jointly represented co-defendants actually testifies against the others, and is cross-examined by their common counsel, a conflict of interest has been firmly established. Here Ross’ need was to have Spencer shown through cross-examination to have been unworthy of belief, while at the same time Spencer’s need was to have his credibility maintained. This conflict of interest would have been so obvious to the trial judge that he should have intervened in the trial prior to the commencement of the cross-examination of Spencer and should have sought a waiver of counsel from Ross and failing that, he should have prevented the continued representation of Ross by her then counsel.
The trial judge hearing the post-conviction petition was clearly in error in concluding that no conflict of interest existed warranting reversal of Ross’ conviction. The conflict was shown and it denied Ross the assistance of counsel and could not have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Holloway v. Arkansas, (1978) 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173. I would, therefore, vote to reverse the judgment of the trial court and order judgment for Ross directing that she be granted a new trial.
NOTE. — Reported at 377 N.E.2d 634.