Court Opinion

ID: 9618260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:09:47.686144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:26.942524
License: Public Domain

VOLLACK, Justice,
dissenting:
The majority holds that the defendant’s silence, when his trial date was set beyond the speedy trial period, did not constitute a waiver of his statutory right under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), section 24-60-501, 10 C.R.S. (1982). I disagree with this analysis in light of recent case law concerning statutory waiver. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
A.
The consideration of whether a defendant has waived his statutory IAD rights begins with this principle: a prisoner *79waives his Article IV rights by acting in a manner inconsistent with the provisions of the IAD. See e.g., United States v. Odom, 674 F.2d 228 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1125, 102 S.Ct. 2946, 73 L.Ed.2d 1341 (1982). My disagreement with the majority arises over what inconsistent action constitutes an implied waiver of the IAD rights.
The majority states that “a defendant must either expressly waive his statutory right to a speedy trial or else affirmative conduct evidencing such a waiver must be shown.” At 76, quoting People v. Abeyta, 195 Colo. 338, 340, 578 P.2d 645, 646 (1978).1 The majority then states that a defendant may waive his speedy trial rights “by freely acquiescing in a trial date beyond the ... speedy trial period.” At 76, quoting Martin v. People, 738 P.2d 789, 792 (Colo.1987). Presumably, the majority equates “freely acquiescing in a trial date” with the “affirmative conduct” that the majority asserts is necessary to show waiver. However, although the majority acknowledges that the defendant in this case acquiesced in two trial dates, it deems this acquiescence insufficient to find waiver. At 76. I disagree.
In my opinion, the “freely acquiescing” language of Martin contemplates the defendant’s silence during the setting of a trial date as a waiver. It is sufficient that a defendant agree with the trial date without objection. The definition of acquiesce, “to accept or comply tacitly or passively,” Webster’s Third International Dictionary 18 (1969), supports this view. I believe that the actions of the defendant in this case clearly show acceptance of the trial dates offered by the trial court, and I would find a waiver of the defendant’s IAD rights.
B.
In Martin v. People, we interpreted the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detain-ers Act (Uniform Act), section 16-14-101 to -108, 8A C.R.S. (1986), and held that a defendant should not automatically be deprived of the protection afforded by the notification requirement of section 16-14-103 “merely because he silently relies on the statute’s provisions.” 738 P.2d at 792. We recognized that a defendant is not a participant in the notification procedures under section 16-14-103, which requires that the superintendent of an institution where the prisoner is confined notify the prisoner of the untried formal charges against him.2 If a violation of section 16-14-103 occurs, it does so independently of any action or inaction on the part of the defendant. In addition, at the notification stage it is more than likely that the defendant is not represented by counsel.
The situation is quite different for setting a trial date, as required under section 16-14-104 and Article IV(c) of the IAD. During the setting of a trial date, the defendant and his attorney are before the court as participants in the process. It makes sense to find that silent acquiescence in the trial date constitutes an implied waiver. The majority notes, “[sjince the rights created by the IAD are statu*80tory, rather than constitutional, waiver of those rights ‘must be voluntary, but need not be knowing and intelligent.’ ” At 75, quoting People v. Moody, 676 P.2d 691, 695 (Colo.1984). Thus, a defendant can waive his IAD rights without being aware they exist, and can agree to a trial date without knowing what speedy trial period is applicable.
In the instant case, both parties stated that the first trial date was “fine.” The defense counsel admits that he knew that this date was beyond the speedy trial period. At a hearing on the People’s motion for reconsideration, the public defender in this case testified as follows regarding his knowledge of the time limit for setting a trial date in this case:
Q. [prosecutor] Now, you have stated in your affidavit that this was your first attempt — that you were under the impression this was a 180-day case, Article 3 [Article III of the IAD], yet you knew trial had been set 224 days beyond June 18, the relevant date for an Article 3 proceeding. You never suggested moving that date up?
A. [defense counsel] I discovered the detainer problem after Mr. Avery [the assistant district attorney] did. The Court informed Mr. Avery. Mr. Avery then informed me.
Q. [prosecutor] Yet at that time you stated here you thought this was a 180-day case?
A. [defense counsel] That’s correct.
Q. [prosecutor] And yet you knew that the trial had been set well beyond 180 days, did you not?
A. [defense counsel] Yes.
A defendant should not have the right to participate in the setting of a trial date beyond the speedy trial period and then claim a violation of the speedy trial provision. Accord Scrivner v. State, 441 N.E.2d 954 (Ind.1982); State v. Suarez, 681 S.W.2d 584 (Tenn.Crim.App.1984). Under our holding in Martin v. People, the acquiescence in a trial date beyond the time period required for speedy trial would constitute a waiver. It matters not that at the time of this acquiescence defense counsel did not know if Article Ill’s 180-day limit or Article IV’s 120-day limit applied. The defendant, through counsel, agreed to the second trial date. According to the trial court, the defendant acquiesced to this date without the knowledge that Article IV applied to the case. However, knowledge is not an element of the statutory waiver. In my view, it is sufficient that the defendant freely acquiesced in a trial date beyond the 120-day period.
Accordingly, I would reverse the order dismissing the charges against the defendant and remand the case with directions to set the case for trial.
I am authorized to state that Justice ROVIRA joins in this dissent.

. It should be noted that the cases relied on by the majority would likely not apply to cases arising from criminal acts committed after July 1, 1985. See at 76, n. 5. As we stated in People v. Martin, 732 P.2d 1210, 1213 n. 4 (Colo.1987), section 18-1-405(5.1) "reverses prior case law which held that a defendant’s silence and failure to object to the setting of a trial date beyond the speedy trial term did not constitute a waiver.” In my opinion, subsection 5.1 elucidates a principle which rejects the notion that a defendant can agree to a trial date without objection only to later claim that his rights'were violated.

. Section 16-14-103 states:
Duties of superintendent upon delivery of request. (1) Any request made pursuant to section 16-14-102 shall be delivered to the superintendent where the prisoner is confined who shall forthwith:
(a) Certify the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served on the sentence, the time remaining to be served, the good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state board of parole relating to the prisoner; and
(b) Send, by registered mail, a copy of the request made by the prisoner and a copy of the information certified under paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) to both the court having jurisdiction of the untried offense and to the prosecuting official charged with the duty of prosecuting the offense.