Court Opinion

ID: 9482108
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:40:28.753091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:46.150855
License: Public Domain

concurring:
Because Muca appreciated the gravity of the situation, I concur, concluding that, in this case, Fifth Amendment Miranda post-indictment warnings were sufficient to constitute the basis for a Sixth Amendment waiver of counsel. See, e.g., Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 294, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 2396, 101 L.Ed.2d 261 (1988) (concluding that, where the defendant was aware of the “gravity of [his] situation,” Miranda warnings provided sufficient information to render him competent to waive the Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Riddick v. Edmiston, 894 F.2d 586, 591 (3d Cir.1990) (finding that the defendant “was plainly aware of the gravity of his situation” and thus a knowing Sixth Amendment waiver had been made); Norman v. Ducharme, 871 F.2d 1483, 1487 (9th Cir.1989) (“[T]he display of the warrant was sufficient to apprise a lay person ... of the nature of the crime for which he was arrested and the gravity of the situation.”), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1483, 108 L.Ed.2d 619 (1990). Cf. McNeil v. Wisconsin, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 2209, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991) (stating that the Fifth Amendment right to counsel “is in one respect narrower than the interest protected by the Sixth Amendment guarantee (because it relates only to custodial interrogation) and in another respect broader (because it relates to interrogation regarding any suspected crime and attaches whether or not the ‘adversarial relationship’ produced by a pending prosecution has yet arisen).”).
I would leave to another day whether a Miranda warning in all cases operates, under the Sixth Amendment, as a waiver of counsel.