Court Opinion

ID: 9556787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-18 17:08:48.024913+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:00:57.099522
License: Public Domain

J-A03014-23

                                   2023 PA Super 157

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ROBERT BRUCE GILLINS                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2412 EDA 2021

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 27, 2021
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0513171-1994

BEFORE:      KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                            FILED AUGUST 18, 2023

       Appellant, Robert Bruce Gillins, appeals from the Order entered in the

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County dismissing his petition filed

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541-

9545, in which he challenged the validity of his guilty plea through an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim and a claim of breach of contract falling

outside the ambit of the PCRA. For reasons that follow, we vacate the order

and remand to the trial court, which shall vacate Appellant’s sentence, but not

his underlying convictions, with the aim of conferring on him the benefit of the

bargain he entered when agreeing to plead guilty in exchange for the promise

of concurrently run federal and state sentences.

       On March 26, 1994, Appellant was arrested and charged with Murder

and related state offenses.         While his state case was pending, he was
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A03014-23

sentenced in federal court to a life sentence on one count of Continuing

Criminal Enterprise and to a concurrent sentence of 240 months' incarceration

for money laundering.1

       On October 3, 1996, Appellant appeared before the trial court and

entered a counseled negotiated guilty plea to third-degree murder in exchange

for a 10 to 20-year state sentence of incarceration, with no further penalty on

the possession of an instrument of crime (“PIC”) charge. The trial court's

sentencing order indicated that Appellant's sentence would run consecutively

with any state sentence Appellant was then serving and, pursuant to the plea

negotiation and central to the present issue, concurrently with his federal

sentences. There is consensus in the record that Appellant indicated he would

not have accepted the plea deal without the promise that his existing federal

sentences would run concurrently with his state sentence while he was housed

in state prison. Appellant filed no direct appeal.

____________________________________________

1 In 1994, a federal grand jury indicted Appellant as the head of a twenty-

member organization that conspired to distribute cocaine and commit related
offenses in a drug distribution ring that obtained and distributed
approximately 20 kilograms of cocaine per week across the Mid-Atlantic from
Philadelphia to South Carolina. See United States v. Kelly, No. 95-5632,
1997 WL 79942, at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 26, 1997) (per curiam) (summarizing
facts relating to co-conspirators).      On his Federal Continuing Criminal
Enterprise charge, Appellant ultimately pleaded guilty and agreed to cooperate
with the government, while on his federal Money Laundering charge, he was
sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment to run concurrent with his life
sentence.

                                           -2-
J-A03014-23

      However, neither defense counsel, the Commonwealth, nor the trial

court recognized that relevant federal jurisprudence holds that neither the

federal courts nor the federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") are bound by a state

court sentencing order directing that an existing federal sentence shall run

concurrently to the newly imposed state sentence. See, e.g., Barden v

Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 478 n.4 (3d Cir. 1990). Therefore, the trial court

lacked the authority to order that Appellant's state sentence run concurrently

with his federal sentences.

      It was not until Appellant applied for a Presidential commutation of his

federal sentence in 2012 that he was informed for the first time, by the federal

Office of the Pardon Attorney, that his federal sentences were considered held

in abeyance until he completed his 10 to 20-year state sentence and reported

to a federal correctional facility, only at which time his federal sentences would

commence. After consulting with counsel, Appellant filed a petition with the

federal BOP asking it to recognize he had been incarcerated nearly 17 years

on his state sentence pursuant to his plea agreement in which he was

promised that his state sentence would run concurrently with his federal

sentences.

      The BOP denied his request, citing, inter alia, that his federal judgment

of sentence was silent on the issue of concurrent sentences.            The BOP

explained further that it contacted the federal sentencing court on the question

of retroactive designation of concurrent sentences in Appellant's case, and the

                                      -3-
J-A03014-23

federal sentencing court replied that it intended Appellant's federal sentence

to run consecutively to any other sentence. (See 2/12/19 Rule 907 response,

Exhibit E).

       As noted in this Court’s prior memorandum decision, Commonwealth

v. Gillins, 245 A.3d 1100 (Pa. Super. 2020) Appellant filed his first PCRA

petition on June 6, 2017, alleging ineffective assistance of plea counsel,

breach of his plea agreement, and an invalid guilty plea. Specifically, the pro

se petition claimed that although the Commonwealth and the trial court had

agreed that his third-degree murder sentence would run concurrently with his

federal sentence, he learned 17 years later that the state court lacked

authority to impose concurrent sentences in this case.

       The PCRA court appointed counsel, but less than one week later, and

without contacting Appellant, appointed counsel filed a petition to withdraw

and a Turner/Finley 2 letter indicating that Appellant's PCRA claims were

time-barred. PCRA counsel conceded that the trial court and both parties had

agreed during the guilty plea hearing that Appellant's state sentence would

run concurrently with his federal sentence, but counsel concluded Appellant

had failed to exercise due diligence by waiting 20 years to turn to the court to

seek clarification of his sentence. The PCRA court agreed, granted counsel's

____________________________________________

2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).

                                           -4-
J-A03014-23

petition to withdraw, and dismissed Appellant's petition pursuant to

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.    Gillins, 245 A.3d 1100 at **1.

      Appellant filed a pro se appeal. In this Court's memorandum decision

of December 24, 2020, we determined that PCRA counsel improperly had

failed to consult with Appellant in what was Appellant's first PCRA petition,

and we recognized that "a collateral petition to enforce a plea agreement is

regularly treated as outside the ambit of the PCRA and under the contractual

enforcement theory of specific performance [such that] the designation of the

petition does not preclude a court from deducing the proper nature of a

pleading.” Gillins, 245 A.3d 1100 at **2 (citing Commonwealth v. Kerns,

220 A.3d 607, 611-12 (Pa. Super. 2019) (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted)). We concluded, therefore, that the PCRA court had "fail[ed]

to confront Appellant's allegations of PCRA counsel's ineffectiveness and the

possibility that Appellant's claims fall outside of the PCRA[.]"   Gillins, 245

A.3d 1100, at **5.

      Accordingly, we vacated the PCRA court's order and remanded for the

appointment of new PCRA counsel, who was to review Appellant's claims of

PCRA counsel's ineffectiveness, discern in the alternative whether Appellant's

contract-based claim falls outside of the PCRA and its timeliness provisions,

                                     -5-
J-A03014-23

file supplemental briefing on these issues, and continue to represent Appellant

for the duration of the PCRA proceedings.3

       On remand, the PCRA court again issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its

intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing, and it subsequently denied

Appellant's counseled PCRA petition for jurisdictional reasons expressed in

newly appointed PCRA counsel's Turner/Finley letter. This timely appeal

followed.

       According to the PCRA court's Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, PCRA counsel

reviewed and analyzed each of Appellant's issues as directed, and it

concluded, in relevant part, that the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction under the

PCRA to provide relief because Appellant was no longer serving a state

sentence. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(i) (to be eligible for relief under the

PCRA, the petitioner must plead and prove, "the petitioner has been convicted

of a crime under the laws of this Commonwealth and is at the time relief is

granted currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole for

the crime."). The PCRA court agreed, as it is undisputed that Appellant's state

____________________________________________

3 We also relinquished jurisdiction.  Furthermore, our decision acknowledged
that "[t]o the extent Appellant's claims are cognizable under the PCRA, we
recognize that Appellant might not even be eligible for PCRA relief if he has
finished serving his state sentence, timeliness considerations aside." Gillins,
245 A.3d 1100, at *5, n.3. As we note infra, the record establishes that
Appellant completed his state sentence on March 26, 2019, prior to this
Court’s decision on December 24, 2020.

                                           -6-
J-A03014-23

sentence for third-degree murder expired on March 26, 2019, at which time

he was transferred to federal custody.

       Appointed counsel also determined that Appellant had no recourse to

challenge his guilty plea under principles of contract law, a position that was

also adopted by the PCRA court.                According to the PCRA court, because

Appellant's    only    agreement       regarding     his   sentence   was   with   the

Commonwealth, which "did not have the authority to force the BOP or federal

court to run [Appellant's] federal and state sentences concurrently," the

Commonwealth cannot be held in breach of any agreement.4 Instead, the

PCRA court opined, "it was [Appellant's] own lengthy criminal history that

prevented the BOP from running the sentences concurrently. Had Appellant

been eligible for concurrent sentences under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3621(b), the BOP

could have imposed concurrent sentences."                  PCRA Court Opinion at

11.   Accordingly, the PCRA court granted counsel's petition to withdraw

pursuant to Turner/Finley and dismissed Appellant's PCRA petition as

meritless.

       This pro se appeal followed. In Appellant’s pro se brief, he raises the

following issues for this Court’s review:

____________________________________________

4 As discussed infra, we disagree with the trial court’s legal conclusion in this

regard, as the inability of both the Commonwealth and a trial court to perform
on a promise forming the basis of a plea agreement with Appellant constituted
a breach of the agreement.

                                           -7-
J-A03014-23

      I.   Was the PCRA Court's dismissal of Appellant's PCRA Petition
      err [sic] when the court failed to address Appellant's request for
      relief under breach of contract law?

      II. Was the PCRA Court's dismissal of Appellant's PCRA Petition
      err [sic] when the court failed to address Appellant's request for
      relief under a writ of error coram nobis.

      III.    Was the PCRA Court's dismissal of the Appellant's PCRA
      Petition unsupported by the record and based on legal err [sic]
      because Appellant's second PCRA appointed counsel was
      ineffective for failing to raise the Pennsylvania Supreme Court['s]
      and this Court's controlling caselaw, Appellant's due process
      violations, trial ineffectiveness, breach of contract and writ of error
      coram nobis relevant precedent and controlling case law.

      IV.   Was the PCRA Court's dismissal of the Appellant's Petition
      err [sic] when the PCRA Court failed to address the petition in
      almost two years -- causing a potential statute of limitations bar.

Appellant’s Pro Se Brief, at 6.

      Initially, we conclude that Appellant is ineligible for relief on the several

PCRA claims he raises, as he has completed his state sentence. “Eligibility for

relief under the PCRA is dependent upon the petitioner [pleading and proving

by a preponderance of the evidence that he is] currently serving a sentence

of imprisonment, probation, or parole for a crime.”          Commonwealth v.

Turner, 80 A.3d 754, 761–62 (Pa. 2013). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(i).

As our Supreme Court has explained, as soon as his sentence is completed, a

PCRA petitioner becomes ineligible for relief. Commonwealth v. Ahlborn,

699 A.2d 718, 720 (Pa. 1997).

                                       -8-
J-A03014-23

      Furthermore, to the extent Appellant seeks coram nobis relief for

ineffective assistance of counsel claims cognizable under the PCRA, this claim

likewise fails. Of significance here, section 9542 of the PCRA provides:

      This subchapter provides for an action by which persons convicted
      of crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal
      sentences may obtain collateral relief. The action established in
      this subchapter shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral
      relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory
      remedies for the same purpose that exist when this subchapter
      takes effect, including habeas corpus and coram nobis. This
      subchapter is not intended to limit the availability of remedies in
      the trial court or on direct appeal from the judgment of sentence,
      to provide a means for raising issues waived in prior proceedings
      or to provide relief from collateral consequences of a criminal
      conviction. Except as specifically provided otherwise, all provisions
      of this subchapter shall apply to capital and noncapital cases.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (emphasis added).

      Our Supreme Court has construed the language of section 9542

to:

      demonstrate[ ] quite clearly that the General Assembly intended
      that claims that could be brought under the PCRA must be brought
      under that Act. No other statutory or common law remedy “for the
      same purpose” is intended to be available; instead, such remedies
      are explicitly “encompassed” within the PCRA.

Commonwealth v. Hall, 771 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Pa. 2001) (emphasis in

original).

      Remaining for our consideration, therefore, is Appellant’s first issue, in

which he contends that the PCRA court erred when it failed to construe his

claim applying contract-based principles as a collateral petition existing

independently of the PCRA eligibility and timeliness provisions. Through this

                                      -9-
J-A03014-23

separate claim, Appellant asserted that the Commonwealth breached its plea

agreement with him when it promised concurrent sentences that the trial court

lacked authority to impose unilaterally.

      Our review of a collateral petition to enforce a plea agreement is

governed by the following principles:

            We recognize that “a collateral petition to enforce a
            plea agreement is regularly treated as outside the
            ambit of the PCRA and under the contractual
            enforcement theory of specific performance. The
            designation of the petition does not preclude a court
            from deducing the proper nature of a pleading.” []
            Kerns, 220 A.3d [at] 611-12 [] (internal citations and
            quotation marks omitted).      Plea bargains play a
            critical role in the criminal justice system of this
            Commonwealth:

                  Accordingly, it is critical that plea
                  agreements are enforced, to avoid any
                  possible perversion of the plea bargaining
                  system.     The disposition of criminal
                  charges by agreement between the
                  prosecutor and the accused, ...is an
                  essential component of the administration
                  of justice. Properly administered, it is to
                  be encouraged.

                  In this Commonwealth, the practice of
                  plea bargaining is generally regarded
                  favorably, and is legitimized and governed
                  by court rule....         A “mutuality of
                  advantage”       to     defendants     and
                  prosecutors flows from the ratification of
                  the bargain.

                  Assuming the plea agreement is legally
                  possible to fulfill, when the parties enter
                  the plea agreement and the court accepts
                  and approves the plea, then the parties
                  and the court must abide by the terms of

                                    - 10 -
J-A03014-23

                  the agreement. Specific enforcement of
                  valid plea bargains is a matter of
                  fundamental fairness. The terms of plea
                  agreements are not limited to the
                  withdrawal of charges, or the length of a
                  sentence.   Parties may agree to—and
                  seek enforcement of—terms that fall
                  outside these areas.

                  Although a plea agreement occurs in a
                  criminal context, it remains contractual in
                  nature and is to be analyzed under
                  contract-law standards.       Furthermore,
                  disputes over any particular term of a plea
                  agreement must be resolved by objective
                  standards. A determination of exactly
                  what promises constitute the plea bargain
                  must be based upon the totality of the
                  surrounding circumstances and involves a
                  case-by-case adjudication.

                  Any ambiguities in the terms of the plea
                  agreement will be construed against the
                  Government.           Nevertheless,    the
                  agreement itself controls where its
                  language sets out the terms of the bargain
                  with specificity. ...

      Commonwealth v. Snook, 230 A.3d 438, 444 (Pa.Super. 2020)
      (internal citations omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Koch,
      654    A.2d      1168    (Pa.Super.   1995)   (explaining that
      Commonwealth's legal inability to fulfill promise made in plea
      bargain resulted in breach of plea agreement such that
      defendant's guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary).

[Gillins]
      Moreover, the reality of the criminal justice system is that nearly
      all criminal cases are disposed of by plea bargains: “[n]inety-
      seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of
      state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.” Missouri v. Frye,
      ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1407, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012)
      (internal citations omitted). Plea bargaining “is not some adjunct
      to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.”
      Id. Accordingly, it is critical that plea agreements are enforced,

                                     - 11 -
J-A03014-23

       “to avoid any possible perversion of the plea bargaining system.”
       Commonwealth v. Fruehan, 384 Pa.Super. 156, 557 A.2d
       1093, 1094 (1989) (internal citations omitted).
Commonwealth v. Hainesworth, 82 A.3d 444, 449 (Pa. Super. 2013)

       As discussed supra, it was unbeknownst to both parties and the trial

court that concurrently run state and federal sentences are not available to a

state defendant unless the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) agrees to

it. Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1014 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 640 A.2d 1330, 1335 (Pa. Super.

1994)).    Appellant asserts, nevertheless, that he may still obtain the

bargained-for benefit of receiving credit toward his federal sentence, not

through the specific performance of terms to what was a void plea agreement

at its inception, but by vacating his 20-year state sentence while keeping

intact his underlying state convictions.

       Such a vacatur, he argues, would bring him within a federal statute5

that enables inmates to receive retroactive federal credit for time served in

state prison and, thus, would remedy the adverse collateral consequences he

continues to experience from the denial of his bargain. Specifically, because

the BOP held Appellant’s federal sentences in abeyance until he completed his

state sentence, his standing as a candidate in the federal sentence

commutation and reduction programs has suffered.

____________________________________________

5 18 U.S.C. 3585(b)(2), discussed infra.

                                          - 12 -
J-A03014-23

       Appellant raises and develops this issue for the first time in his Reply

Brief,6 in which he addresses the Commonwealth’s argument that any iteration

____________________________________________

6 Initially, we consider whether Appellant’s reply brief, which significantly
supplements the insufficient argument for specific performance of his plea
agreement appearing in his original brief, should be prohibited.

       The opportunity for, and the extent of, a reply brief is limited. . .
       . [A] reply brief cannot be a vehicle to argue issues raised but
       inadequately developed in appellant's original brief. 16 Standard
       Pennsylvania Practice 2d § 89.5; see Leonard S. Fiore, Inc. v.
       Department of Labor and Industry, Prevailing Wage
       Appeals Board, 526 Pa. 282, 585 A.2d 994 (1991)(motion to
       suppress portions of appellant's reply brief which reargued issues
       previously raised and argued in appellant's brief granted); Park
       v. Chronister, 151 Pa.Cmwlth. 562, 617 A.2d 863, 871 (1992),
       alloc. denied, 534 Pa. 654, 627 A.2d 731 (1992). When an
       appellant uses a reply brief to raise new issues or remedy deficient
       discussions in an initial brief, the appellate court may suppress the
       non-complying portions. Pa.R.A.P. 2101. If the defects in a brief
       are substantial, appellate courts have the discretion to quash or
       dismiss the appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 2101; see Grosskopf v. WCAB
       (Kuhns Market), 657 A.2d 124 (Pa.Cmwlth.), alloc. denied,
       542 Pa. 677, 668 A.2d 1139 (1995); Commonwealth v. Taylor,
       306 Pa.Super. 1, 451 A.2d 1360 (1982). The onus of complying
       with the rules of appellate procedure falls entirely on appellate
       counsel, who may suffer consequences from committing
       prejudicial errors. See Commonwealth v. Stoppie, 337
       Pa.Super. 235, 486 A.2d 994 (1984)(admonishing appellate
       counsels who do not comply with published rules).

Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 219 (Pa. 1999).

Because Appellant’s reply brief is responsive to the Commonwealth’s theory
that the completion of his sentence renders moot the issue that he could
achieve the benefit of his bargain by modifying or vacating his sentence, we
deem it appropriate to review the position taken in the reply brief. Cf. Fahy
(electing to review issues raised in the appellant’s reply brief, despite their
absence from the original brief, where the Commonwealth wished to respond
with a sur reply brief).

                                          - 13 -
J-A03014-23

of a contract-based issue is necessarily moot because Appellant has completed

his state sentence and may no longer obtain the benefit of the bargain through

specific performance of its terms. See Mistich v. Pa. Bd. Of Probation and

Parole, 863 A.2d 116, 120 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (holding where petitioner

chooses to attack only his sentence, and not the underlying conviction, the

expiration of the sentence renders the case moot unless the petitioner can

demonstrate collateral consequences adequate to satisfy the case-or-

controversy requirement). Accord Commonwealth v. King, 786 A.2d 993,

996 (Pa. Super. 2001). See also Pub. Defender’s Office of Venango Cty.

V. Venango Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 893 A.2d 1275, 1279 (Pa. 2006)

(noting that under the mootness doctrine, “an actual case or controversy must

be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is

filed.”).

       The Commonwealth concedes that Appellant’s guilty plea was invalid

and that he was unfairly deprived of the benefit of his bargain, but it insists,

nevertheless, that once Appellant’s state sentence expired, so, too, did any

further consequences flowing from the breach of contract.             Yet, the

Commonwealth does admit that “[h]ad [Appellant’s] Pennsylvania sentence

been concurrent with his federal sentence, he would have finished the 240-

month federal money laundering sentence that runs concurrent with his life

sentence. The fact that he is only now beginning that sentence may affect his

efforts at obtaining federal clemency. But . . . no remedy in state law can

                                     - 14 -
J-A03014-23

force the BOP to credit his state time toward his federal sentence, even if he

was denied the benefit of his bargain with the Commonwealth.”         Brief for

Appellee, at 16.

      Our jurisprudence has long recognized a defendant’s right to either

vacate or modify a sentence stemming from the Commonwealth’s or trial

court’s unlawful inducement of a guilty plea or breach of a plea agreement.

In the seminal case of Commonwealth v. Zuber, 353 A.2d 441 (Pa. 1976),

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth’s legal inability

to fulfill a promise that induced the defendant to plead guilty constituted a

breach of contract that warranted reversal and remand for the imposition of a

new sentence that would confer to the defendant the benefit of his bargain.

In so doing, it explained:

      there is an affirmative duty on the part of the prosecutor to honor
      any and all promises made in exchange for a defendant's plea. [].
      Our courts have demanded strict compliance with that duty in
      order to avoid any possible perversion of the plea bargaining
      system, evidencing the concern that a defendant might be coerced
      into a bargain or fraudulently induced to give up the very valued
      constitutional guarantees attendant the right to trial by jury.

      Therefore, in Pennsylvania, it is well settled that ‘where a plea
      bargain has been entered into and is violated by the
      Commonwealth, the defendant is entitled, at the least, to the
      Benefit of the bargain.’ Commonwealth v. Zakrzewski, 460 Pa.
      528, --, 333 A.2d 898, 900 (1975) (emphasis added).

Zuber, 353 A.2d at 458-59.

      We also have determined that when a prosecutor is unable as a matter

of law to fulfill a promise made in a plea bargain, a breach of the plea

                                    - 15 -
J-A03014-23

agreement occurs that renders the defendant's guilty plea unknowing and

involuntary. In this circumstance, the defendant is allowed to choose the relief

awarded, that is, whether to withdraw the guilty plea or to effectuate specific

performance of the plea agreement. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kroh,

654 A.2d 1168, 1174 (Pa. Super. 1995) (acknowledging defendant had option

either to withdraw guilty plea or to obtain performance of the plea agreement,

and   granting   defendant's     choice      of   specific   performance);   Zuber

(acknowledging option between withdrawal of plea and specific performance

where legally unavailable promise of concurrent sentencing induced defendant

to plead guilty; court modified sentence pursuant to defendant's request).

      The Commonwealth posits, however, that neither remedy is available to

Appellant. Specific performance of the plea bargain is not possible for two

reasons. The first is that Appellant has completed his state sentence, which

the Commonwealth contends would preclude the concurrent running of his

state and federal sentences, thus rendering the issue moot. The second is

that neither our courts nor the Commonwealth has the authority to impose

upon federal prosecutors and the BOP a duty to award Appellant credit toward

his federal sentences for time served while he was housed in a state

correctional   institution   serving   his    state   sentence.     See   Konyk v.

Pennsylvania State Police of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 183 A.3d

981, 990 (Pa. 2018) (holding it is the prosecutor, not the government of

another jurisdiction, who has an affirmative duty to honor promises made in

                                       - 16 -
J-A03014-23

exchange for a defendant's guilty plea) (citing State v. Barone, 147 N.J. 599,

689 A.2d 132, 139 (1997) (“Absent consent or participation by state

authorities in [a federal] plea agreement, federal prosecutors cannot bind

state prosecutors and vice versa.”).    Furthermore, as noted supra, the BOP

explained in 2019 that retroactive designation of concurrent sentences in

Appellant's case would run counter to the federal sentencing court’s stated

intention that Appellant's federal sentence would run consecutively to any

other sentence.

      Appellant, however, asserts in his brief that “[w]hat the Commonwealth

fails to appreciate is that vacatur of Mr. Gillins’s sentence would result in the

terms of the plea agreement being necessarily enforced under federal law.”

Reply Brief for Appellant, at 6. This is so, he maintains, because “Federal law

provides that ‘[a] defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term

of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention [] that has not

been credited against another sentence.” 18 U.S.C. 3585(b)(2).

      A review of Section 3585(b)(2) and relevant decisional law substantiates

the use of this statute for awarding credit in our circumstances, but it does

not support Appellant’s unqualified assertion that our vacating his sentence

would “necessarily” result in the enforcement of his plea agreement, as the

“Attorney General, through the BOP, possesses the sole authority to make

credit determinations pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).” United States v.

Whaley, 148 F.3d 205, 206 (2d Cir.1998).

                                     - 17 -
J-A03014-23

      In Dandridge v. Schultz, No. CIV.A. 07-1531, 2007 WL 4300846 2007

(E.D. PA. Dec. 6, 2007), the defendant sought federal credit for time spent in

state prison where the state court vacated both of his state sentences but not

his underlying state convictions.   Initially, the BOP awarded the defendant

federal credit for time served on the state sentences pursuant to Section 3585,

because the time ultimately had not been applied to his state sentences.

However, when the state eventually reinstated the defendant’s state

sentences, the BOP revoked the credit.

      The defendant filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging

that the time served pursuant to his state sentences should be credited toward

his federal sentence, entitling him to immediate release.       On review, the

United States District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, reasoned that

the defendant would have had a colorable claim that his time in state prison

should be applied to his federal sentence if his vacated state sentences had

not later been reimposed:

      The Bureau of Prisons has the authority to compute federal
      sentences in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3585. See United
      States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 335, 112 S.Ct. 1351, 117
      L.Ed.2d 593 (1992) (“[T]he Attorney General must continue to
      compute the credit under § 3585(b) as he did under the former §
      3568.”); Allen, 236 F. App'x at 782 (“The authority to calculate a
      federal prisoner's period of incarceration for the sentence imposed
      and to provide credit for time served is delegated to the Attorney
      General, who acts through the BOP.”). Section 3585(b) provides:

         Credit for prior custody.-A defendant shall be given credit
         toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time
         he has spent in official detention prior to the date the
         sentence commences-

                                     - 18 -
J-A03014-23

        (1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was
        imposed; or

        (2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant
        was arrested after the commission of the offense for which
        the sentence was imposed;

        that has not been credited against another sentence.

     Dandridge's federal sentence commenced on March 29, 2007,
     when he was released by the New Jersey officials and taken into
     federal custody. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a) (“A sentence to a term
     of imprisonment commences on the date the defendant is received
     in custody awaiting transportation to ... the official detention
     facility at which the sentence is to be served.”). Prior to this time,
     he was in “official detention” in New Jersey state prison serving
     his state sentences.

     Dandridge's time in state custody prior to the vacation of his state
     sentences has “been credited against another sentence,”
     however. The last clause of § 3585 limits “an award of credit for
     time served prior to the imposition of a federal sentence under
     section 3585(b) to instances where the time period was not spent
     in service of a previously imposed sentence and thus had not been
     credited against that earlier sentence.” Rios v. Wiley, 201 F.3d
     257, 272 (3d Cir.2000). The provision prohibits “double credit.”
     Id. If Dandridge's vacated state sentences had not been
     reimposed, he would have a colorable claim that the time should
     be applied to his federal sentence. See Kayfez v. Gasele, 993
     F.2d 1288, 1290 (7th Cir.1993) (“[I]t would be unreasonable to
     consider as a ‘[credit] against another sentence,’ an allowance of
     credit against a vacated sentence.”). But when his state sentence
     was reimposed, the state court judge gave him credit against his
     state sentence for the 313 days he had previously spent in state
     custody. (Camden County Judgment of Conviction, Indictment No.
     310-01-06, Apr. 23, 2007.) Applying the same credit to the
     federal sentence would result in double credit. The BOP did not
     abuse its discretion in not crediting Dandridge's federal sentence
     with the time he had served in state prison.

Dandridge at *5 (emphasis added).

     As discussed, the Commonwealth persists that Appellant may not

succeed in his attempt to gain the benefit of the bargain made with the

                                    - 19 -
J-A03014-23

Commonwealth because the sentence has expired and may not now be

modified, making his claim moot. It adds, “This conclusion is bolstered by the

absence of a remedy. [Appellant] cannot obtain specific performance because

no Pennsylvania entity has the authority to order that [Appellant’s] state time

be credited toward his federal sentence. Only the BOP has that authority and

the BOP already denied request for concurrent credit.” Brief of Appellee at

16.

      Nevertheless, consistent with our precedent stressing principles of

fundamental fairness inherent in honoring plea agreements and cautioning

that they are to be enforced to avoid any possible corruption of the plea-

bargaining system, we find that, on balance, the facts warrant reversal in the

present matter. It is agreed that the false promise of concurrent state and

federal sentences induced Appellant to plead guilty to the state charges, and

that he subsequently served a 20-year state sentence without receiving any

time credit toward his federal sentences. There is, furthermore, no dispute

that Appellant deals with continuing adverse consequences associated with

the denial of his bargain made in the guilty plea. The federal government held

his federal sentences in abeyance for twenty years until he completed his state

sentence, and Appellant cites authority confirming that federal time served is

an important consideration in approving candidates for the federal sentence

clemency and reduction programs. See Reply Brief for Appellant, at 8, 9.

                                    - 20 -
J-A03014-23

      Finally, although it is settled that the trial court had no authority to

order Appellant’s federal sentences to run concurrently with Appellant’s state

sentences, Appellant has presented federal statutory and decisional law,

discussed supra, showing that federal inmates may receive federal credit

towards the service of a term of imprisonment for detention that has not been

credited against another sentence. Vacatur of Appellant’s 20-year sentence

while keeping intact his underlying state convictions, would serve the dual

purpose of providing Appellant an opportunity to receive federal credit for his

state time and otherwise retaining Appellant’s record of conviction. In this

way, the Commonwealth’s plea agreement with Appellant, as accepted by the

trial court, may be effectuated to provide the benefit of the bargain struck

between the parties.

      For these reasons, we vacate the order below and remand to the trial

court, which shall vacate Appellant’s sentence but retain his underlying

conviction. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/18/2023

                                    - 21 -