Court Opinion

ID: 9380820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-21 15:00:33.049719+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:27.829009
License: Public Domain

20-2019
United States v. Matthews

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                 SUMMARY ORDER

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order
filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a
document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an
electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order
must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.

       At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 21st day of March, two thousand twenty-three.

       PRESENT:         Reena Raggi,
                        Richard C. Wesley,
                        Steven J. Menashi,
                               Circuit Judges.
____________________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                 Appellee,

          v.                                                   Nos. 20-2019, 20-3218

MICHAEL MATTHEWS,

                Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________________________
For Appellee:                          Cyrus    P.W.    Rieck    and    Carina    H.
                                       Schoenberger,    Assistant    United   States
                                       Attorneys, for Carla B. Freedman, United
                                       States Attorney for the Northern District of
                                       New York, Syracuse, NY.

For Defendant-Appellant:               Jeffrey R. Parry, Fayetteville, NY.

      Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of New York (Hurd, J.).

      Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that the orders of the district court of June 17, 2020, and September 2,
2020, are AFFIRMED.

      Defendant-Appellant Michael Matthews appeals from the orders denying
his motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A),
commonly known as a motion for compassionate release, and his motion for
reconsideration. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the
procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

                                            I

      In 2006, a jury found Matthews guilty of conspiracy to commit bank
robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(a). At sentencing, the district court concluded that Matthews qualified as a
career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, and was
subject to a mandatory life sentence under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113 and 3559(c). The
district court sentenced Matthews to life terms of imprisonment on both counts, to
be served concurrently. We affirmed the conviction on direct appeal. United States
v. Matthews, 545 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2008).

      In 2009, Matthews filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in which he asserted a claim of ineffective assistance
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of counsel because his attorney had hired, as an investigator for the defense, a
former police officer with whom Matthews had a prior negative relationship. The
district court denied the motion. On appeal, we vacated the judgment and
remanded the case because the district court failed to conduct a hearing with
respect to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Matthews v. United States, 682
F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2012).

      On remand, following an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted
Matthews’s § 2255 motion with respect to the sentence on his bank robbery
conviction. The district court then dismissed the bank robbery count but did not
modify the life sentence imposed pursuant to the remaining conviction for
conspiracy to commit bank robbery.

      On April 29, 2020, Matthews, proceeding pro se, moved for a sentence
reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) “due to the COVID 19 pandemic.”
App’x 9. Matthews argued that he was at risk of contracting the virus because he
is “black,” “68 years of age,” and has “underlying health issues that include
hypertension that could result in[] blood clots [and] embolism.” Id.

      In opposition, the government argued that Matthews’s age, race, and
medical condition did not qualify as extraordinary and compelling reasons
warranting release. The government noted that while the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention had recognized pulmonary hypertension as an increased
risk factor, it had not so recognized hypertension, the condition Matthews
identified in his motion. Id. at 58-60.

      The government further argued that the district court should deny
Matthews’s motion even if he had demonstrated extraordinary and compelling
reasons for release because he remained “a danger to the safety of … the
community” and “the § 3553(a) factors do not warrant a reduction in sentence.”
Id. at 60 (internal quotations marks and citations omitted). The government
described Matthews’s violent criminal history, identified supervised release
violations and prison infractions, and advised that Matthews presented a

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“medium risk” for recidivism. Id. at 60-61. The government argued that granting
the motion would be inconsistent with the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, including
the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the
defendant, the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the
offense and to afford adequate deterrence, and to protect the public from further
crimes of the defendant. Id. at 61.

      The district court denied Matthews’s motion in a short order: “According to
defendant’s submission, his ethnicity warrants his immediate release from the
custody of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) in light of the danger posed by the
COVID-19 pandemic. ... Upon review of the briefing, Matthews’s motion is
DENIED for substantially the reasons set forth in the Government’s opposition
memorandum.” Id. at 1-2.

      Matthews moved for reconsideration. The government acknowledged in
response that it had overlooked a reference in Matthews’s medical records to
pulmonary hypertension, which could establish an extraordinary and compelling
reason warranting early release. The government nevertheless maintained that the
district court should deny Matthews’s motion for compassionate release based on
the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. The district court issued an order denying
Matthews’s motion for reconsideration without explanation. Matthews filed
timely notices of appeal and a counseled appellate brief.

                                        II

      We “review the denial of a motion for a discretionary sentence reduction for
abuse of discretion.” United States v. Holloway, 956 F.3d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 2020).
After “considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a),” a district court “may
reduce” a defendant’s term of imprisonment if it concludes that “extraordinary
and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” and “that such a reduction is
consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). Application of the § 3553(a) factors can
provide an independent ground for denying a motion for compassionate release,

                                        4
even if the court assumes the existence of extraordinary and compelling
circumstances. See United States v. Jones, 17 F.4th 371, 374 (2d Cir. 2021).

      The district court denied Matthews’s motion “for substantially the reasons
set forth in the Government’s opposition memorandum.” App’x 2. Initially, the
government had argued that Matthews’s conditions did not qualify as
“extraordinary and compelling reasons” and that the application of the § 3553(a)
sentencing factors did not warrant a sentence reduction. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
In supporting Matthews’s motion for reconsideration but opposing his motion for
compassionate release, the government conceded that Matthews’s condition of
pulmonary hypertension amounts to an extraordinary and compelling reason but
maintained that the § 3553(a) factors still counseled against a sentence reduction.
The district court denied the motion for reconsideration without explanation. The
district court’s failure to explain the basis for its decisions, particularly its denial
of reconsideration, is troubling. See United States v. Granger, No. 21-423, 2022 WL
1132495, at *2 (2d Cir. Apr. 18, 2022). While the district court’s “explanation need
not be lengthy,” its failure to provide any rationale for its ruling makes it difficult
to “conduct[] meaningful appellate review.” United States v. Young, 998 F.3d 43, 56
(2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).

      Nevertheless, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Matthews’s motions because we understand the district court to have
relied on the government’s argument that the § 3553(a) factors counseled against
any reduction in sentence. These factors include, among other things, the nature
and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant, the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense and
provide just punishment, and the need to protect the public from further crimes of
the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We presume that a sentencing judge has
considered “all relevant § 3553(a) factors and arguments unless the record
suggests otherwise.” United States v. Smith, 982 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting
United States v. Rosa, 957 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir. 2020)).

                                           5
      In its opposition to Matthews’s motion for a sentence reduction, the
government reviewed Matthews’s violent criminal history, which included
burglary, criminal possession of stolen property, robbing a bar with a handgun
and firing multiple shots at officers, and robbing several banks. App’x 61. In
addition, the government reviewed Matthews’s infractions while incarcerated, his
failure to abide by the conditions of his parole and supervised release, the medium
risk of recidivism, and his demonstrated lack of remorse or acceptance of
responsibility for his crimes. Id. at 60-62. Given this record, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in concluding that the sentencing factors counseled against
release.

      Matthews argues that the district court “erred by interpreting Matthews’s
reference to his race ... as the basis for his request for release.” Appellant’s Br. 7-8.
While Matthews did not move for compassionate release solely on the basis of his
race, we conclude that any error in characterizing his motion was harmless
because the district court acted within its discretion in denying the motion based
on the applicable § 3553(a) factors.

      Matthews also argues that the district court “failed to utilize and delineate
the tenets of ... § 3553 in that it made no reference to the sentencing factors
whatsoever.” Id. at 5. However, the district court explained that it denied the
motion “for substantially the reasons set forth in the Government’s opposition
memorandum.” App’x 1-2. Upon review of those reasons, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Matthews’s motion.

                                           6
                                    *      *      *

       We have considered Matthews’s remaining arguments, which we conclude
are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. 1

                                         FOR THE COURT:
                                         Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

1  We also grant, nunc pro tunc, the government’s motion to supplement the record and to
file its supplemental appendix partially under seal. Motion to Supplement the Record on
Appeal and File a Government Appendix Under Seal, United States v. Matthews, No.
20-2019 (2d Cir. Oct. 28, 2021), ECF No. 121.

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