Court Opinion

ID: 9788392
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:48:57.163883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:10.121297
License: Public Domain

Justice MARTINEZ,
specially concurring.
I concur in the judgment of the court that the evidence seized during a search of McCullough's home is admissible. I do not, however, accept the reasoning upon which the court relies for this conclusion. The majority supports its holding by unnecessary and inaccurate statutory and constitutional analyses and views United States Supreme Court precedent as support for its proposition that the Fourth Amendment's requirement of reasonableness is not violated by searches without reasonable grounds for the parole officer to believe that a parole violation has occurred. The majority arrives at this holding even though the search in this case is supported by reasonable grounds. Moreover, the majority addresses the constitutional issue only after engaging in statutory interpretation which I believe to be incorrect. Therefore, I respectfully concur in the result only.
I.
By finding that section 17-2-201, 6 C.R.S. (1999), eliminates the requirement that "reasonable grounds" support parole searches, and that this statute as interpreted is constitutional, the majority reaches further than is necessary to settle the dispute before us. The trial court's order suppressing the evidence seized pursuant to a parole search of the defendant's home should be reversed because the court applied an incorrect legal standard and suppressed evidence even though it found that the parole officers had reasonable grounds to search.
I therefore begin with a discussion of the narrow grounds upon which resolution of this case rests. The trial court applied a subjec*784tive intent standard to determine the propriety of the parole officer's search. Our case law clearly establishes that an objective standard of review governs a motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search or seizure. Because the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in determining the propriety of the search, its suppression order must be reversed. See People v. Weston, 869 P.2d 1293, 1298 (Colo.1994).
In making its suppression order, the trial court found that MeCullough's arrest in January 1999 for possession of a controlled substance was an objectively reasonable basis for the parole officer to conduct the search at issue in this case. However, the trial court ruled that the search was impermissible because it also found that the parole officers subjectively relied on a signed parole agreement to conduct the search.1 As the prosecution correctly argues, application of a subjective intent standard of review to the question whether a search is permissible is inconsistent with our prior decisions. A reviewing court, to determine whether a search was lawful, must ask if objectively reasonable grounds existed to justify the search. See People v. Mendoza-Balderama, 981 P.2d 150, 157 (Colo.1999); People v. Rodriguez, 945 P.2d 1851, 1359-60 (Colo.1997). While the officer's subjective assessment of the facts may assist a court to understand the situation confronting the officer at the time of the search, or may affect the officer's credibility, an officer's flicit subjective motive is not sufficient to invalidate an otherwise proper search,. See Rodrigues 945 P.2d at 1860; see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-18, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996).
We have applied this analysis in numerous cases involving challenged searches or seizures. See, e.g., People v. Daverin, 967 P.2d 629, 682 (Colo.1998); People v. Dumas, 955 P.2d 60, 68 (Colo.1998); People v. Altman, 938 P.2d 142, 146 (Colo.1997); People v. Hauseman, 900 P2d 74, 78 (Colo.1995); Weston, 869 P.2d at 1298; People v. Ratcliff, 778 P.2d 1871, 1876 (Colo.1989). In my view, the same rationale underlying the objective standard in other cases applies with equal foree to parole searches. See Rodrigues, 945 P.2d at 1860; People v. Woods, 21 Cal.4th 668, 88 CalRptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d 1019, 1027 (1999).
It follows that in this case the trial court erred in basing the validity of the search on the searching officers' subjective intent. Application of an erroneous legal standard requires reversal of the trial court's suppression order. See Weston, 869 P.2d at 1298. Moreover, because the trial court correctly found that objectively reasonable grounds existed to search McCullough's home, I agree with the majority that the evidence seized pursuant to the search is admissible.
Therefore, this case does not present the issues decided by the majority. However, given the importance of these issues, I now turn to those aspects of the majority opinion.
IL
A.
I first look to the majority's argument that the language of section 17-2-201 shows an unambiguous legislative intent to abandon the "reasonable grounds" requirement for parole searches we set forth in People v. Anderson, 189 Colo. 34, 586 P.2d 302 (1975). The statute is facially silent on whether "reasonable grounds" is required for parole searches. Therefore, I cannot agree with the majority that the plain language of section 17-2-201 evinces the General Assembly's intent to no longer require "reasonable grounds" for parole searches.
Section 17-2-201(5)(F(I)(D) states, in pertinent part, that "the parolee shall ... allow the parole officer to make searches of his person, residence, or vehicle." Because the *785General Assembly did not explicitly include the Anderson “reasonable grounds” requirement in this provision, the majority concludes that the legislature intended to eliminate the requirement of reasonable grounds for parole searches. See maj. op. at 778. The language of the statute, the majority asserts, is “clear and unambiguous” id. at 778, therefore we need not look to additional rules of statutory construction to determine the legislative intent underlying the 1987 amendment of section 17-2-201. See id. at 777. I cannot agree.
Section 17-2-201 is silent on the question of whether reasonable grounds to believe that a parole violation has occurred must underlie a search. This silence is not independently sufficient grounds upon which to conclude that reasonable grounds are not required. The statute’s plain language is logically consistent either with requiring or not requiring reasonable grounds; it simply does not address the issue at all.
Consequently, the statute’s language neither clearly nor unambiguously evinces the legislative intent behind its enactment. Section 17—2—201(5)(f)(I)(D) also fails to “state directly,” maj. op. at 778, that parole searches “must be conducted in furtherance of the purposes of parole” and must “not be arbitrary, capricious, or harassing.” Maj’. op. at 781, 782. By parity of reasoning, therefore, we ought to conclude that the General Assembly did not intend for any of those requirements to govern parole searches. Thus, the majority’s analysis of what it finds to be a “clear and unambiguous legislative intent is not persuasive.2 See Regional Transp. Dist. v. Lopez, 916 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Colo.1996) (function of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the intent of the legislature).
In Anderson, 189 Colo, at 37, 636 P.2d at 305, we held that “reasonable grounds” for a parole search was required for the search to be constitutionally permissible. Therefore, we should presume that the General Assembly intended to implicitly retain the “reasonable grounds” requirement. See Vaughan v. McMinn, 946 P.2d 404, 409 (Colo.1997) (stating that the legislature is presumed to be aware and adopt the construction of prior judicial decisions in an area of law when it legislates in that area).
This case does not present the question of whether section 17-2-2013 eliminates the Anderson “reasonable grounds” requirement. Here, the trial court simply applied an incorrect subjective legal standard in ruling on the defendant’s motion to suppress. Further, the parole officers’ search was based on adequate grounds for a search. The majority proceeds to discern the meaning of section 17-2-201 when doing so can have no possible meaningful effect on the disposition of the case before us.
Our prior decisions clearly and unambiguously bar such an approach to this case. As we stated in People v. Lybarger, 700 P.2d 910, 916 (Colo.1985), it is “[ajxiomatic to the exercise of judicial authority .'.. that a court should not decide a constitutional issue un*786less and until such issue is actually raised by a party to the controversy and the mecessity for such decision is clear and imescapable." (Emphasis added.) We have long recognized and adhered to this principle. See, eg., Ricci v. Davis, 627 P.2d 1111, 1121 (Colo.1981) ("It is well settled that a court will not rule on a constitutional question which is not essential to the controversy before it."); Friedman v. Motor Veh. Div. of Dep't of Revenue, 194 Colo. 228, 229, 571 P.2d 1086, 1087 (1977); Weissman v. Board of Ed. of Jefferson County Sch. Dist. No. R-1, 190 Colo. 414, 419, 547 P.2d 1267, 1271 (1976) Times-Call Publ'y Co. v. Wingfield, 159 Colo. 172, 177, 410 P.2d 511, 518 (1966).
B.
After concluding that the General Assembly intended to remove the Anderson "reasonable grounds" requirement for parole searches, the majority addresses whether a search conducted without reasonable grounds is constitutionally permissible. As I have explained, it is not necessary to consider whether the General Assembly removed the "reasonable grounds" requirement. Therefore, I do not believe that it is appropriate for this court to consider the constitutional status of section 17-2-201 as interpreted by the majority.
In determining that a parole search conducted without reasonable grounds is permissible under the constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures, see maj. op. at 780-781, I believe that the majority misapplies United States Supreme Court and lower court precedent. Therefore, I cannot accept the conclusion that section 17-2-201 as interpreted by the majority satisfies the minimum constitutional standards of reasonableness. In my judgment, the majority's constitutional analysis rests on three crucial errors: (1) the mistaken conclusion that Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 LEd.2d 709 (1987) sanctions parole searches not based on reasonable grounds; (2) a misinterpretation of the Supreme Court's standard for determining whether individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required for a search or seizure; and (8) a misapplication of lower court cases in which parole or probation searches were allowed without a finding of reasonable grounds.
1.
I look first to the majority's interpretation and application of Griffin. See maj. op. at Ti9-781. In Griffin, 488 U.S. at 872, 107 S.Ct. 3164, the Supreme Court considered whether probation searches must be based on a warrant or probable cause. At issue was a Wisconsin statute that mandated searches of a probationer's home if: (1) the probation officer had "reasonable grounds" to believe that a probation violation had occurred; and (2) the reasonable grounds were based on a number of statutorily identified factors. See id. at 870-71, 107 S.Ct. 3164. The petitioner in Griffin was a probationer about whom the probation department had received a tip from the police. See id. at 871, 107 S.Ct. 3164. The police claimed that Griffin had or might still have guns in his residence, in violation of his probation agreement. See id. A probation officer and several police officers went to Griffin's home and conducted a search, which disclosed a handgun. See id. Petitioner was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and sentenced to two-years' imprisonment. See id. at 872, 107 S.Ct. 8164.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the evidence seized pursuant to the search was admissible and affirmed the conviction. See id. The court held that a requirement of "reasonable grounds" for probation searches is consistent with a probationer's reasonable expectation of privacy. See id. Moreover, the police tip constituted reasonable grounds for the search under Wisconsin's statute. See id.
The Supreme Court held that the statute satisfied the Fourth Amendment requirement of reasonableness. See id. at 878, 107 S.Ct. 3164. The Griffin majority grounded its holding in the proposition that effective supervision of probationers is "a special need, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, [that] make[s] the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Id. at 878, 107 S.Ct. 8164; see also id. at 8T73-74, 107 S.Ct. 3164.
*787The Court then asked whether the "special needs" associated with probation supervision justified the impingement of the probationer's privacy by a home search based on "reasonable grounds" to believe that a probation violation had occurred. See id. at 875, 107 S.Ct. 3164. As I explain in more detail infra, it is critical for the purpose of understanding the relevance of Griffin to the case before us that the Court analyzed the statute as it had been interpreted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. See id. at 875-76, 107 S.Ct. 8164. That is, the Court tied its Fourth Amendment analysis to the Wisconsin Supreme Court's determination that a statute requiring "reasonable grounds" for a probation search was consistent with a probationer's reasonable expectation of privacy and that such grounds existed in the case before it. See id. at 875, 107 S.Ct. 3164. Under that analytical framework, the Court concluded that "[wle think it clear that the special needs of Wisconsin's probation system make the warrant requirement impracticable and justify replacement of the standard of probable cause by 'reasonable grounds," as defined by the Wisconsin Supreme Court." Id. at 876, 107 S.Ct. 8164.
I need not examine the Court's arguments for its holding that "the special needs of Wisconsin's probation system make the warrant requirement impracticable," see id. at 876-79, 107 S.Ct. 3164, because those issues are irrelevant to the matter before us. We are not deciding whether parole searches in Colorado must be backed by a warrant or probable cause. The answer to that question clearly is no, as Anderson itself indicates. See Anderson, 189 Colo. at 87-8, 586 P.2d at 304-05. Instead, the issue the majority has placed before this court is whether. parole searches not backed by reasonable grounds are consistent with the minimum constitutional requirement of reasonableness.
Griffin provides no assistance in resolving that issue. The Court in Griffin only stated that a probation search founded on what the Wisconsin Supreme Court determined to be reasonable grounds, without a warrant or probable cause, is permissible under the Fourth Amendment. See, eg., id. at 872, 107 S.Ct. 3164 ("We think the Wisconsin Supreme Court correctly concluded that this warrantless search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.") (emphasis added); id. at 873-74, 107 S.Ct. 8164 ("A State's operation of a probation system ... likewise presents 'special needs' beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable cause requirements.") (emphasis added); id. at 875-76, 107 S.Ct. 3164 ("We think it clear that the special needs of Wisconsin's probation system make the warrant requirement impracticable and justify replacement of the standard of probable cause by "reasonable grounds," as defined by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.") (emphasis added); id. at 878, 107 S.Ct. 3164 ("We think that the probation regime would also be unduly disrupted by a requirement of probable cause.") (emphasis added).
Griffin, therefore, only establishes that the "reasonable grounds" requirement is a suffi-ctent protection for a probationer's Fourth Amendment interests. See id. at 880 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. 3164 ("[The only regulation upon which we rely for our constitutional decision is that which permits a warrantless search on 'reasonable grounds.'"). The decision does not establish, as the majority argues, that the "reasonable grounds" requirement is not a mecessary condition for valid searches of a parolee's home. Indeed, the Court never asks whether "reasonable grounds" is required for the type of search at issue in this case. The Court only states that when reasonable grounds are present for a probation officer to believe a probation violation has occurred, search of a probationer's home is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. At times the majority in this case appears to recognize that the issue in Griffin was whether probation searches require a warrant or probable cause. See, eg., maj. op. at 780. Inexplicably, however, the majority also relies on Griffin for its holding that a parole search not backed by "reasonable grounds" is permissible under the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
2.
Another element of the majority's constitutional analysis is the proposition that individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is not neces*788sary for parole searches. See maj. op. at 780-781. The majority's discussion of this proposition provides no more support for its holding than does its application of Griffin.
The majority cites Skinner v. Railway Lo-bor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 108 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989), for the principle that "a showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional floor, below which a search is presumed unreasonable." Maj. op. at 780-781. As the majority correctly notes, individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is not required for a search to be reasonable if "the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and [if] an important government interest furthered by the intrusion would be jeopardized by a requirement of individualized suspicion." Skimmer, 489 U.S. at 624, 109 S.Ct. 1402. The majority asserts that these conditions are satisfied here. I do not agree.
The majority first states that under seetion 17-2-201 "the privacy interests of a parolee, while not nonexistent, are certainly minimal." Maj. op. at 781. This conclusion is premised on the majority's interpretation of the statute, one that is, as I have explained, unconvincing. It is not at all clear that the General Assembly intended to eliminate the "reasonable grounds" requirement for parole searches when it amended section 17-2-201. See supra Part ILA. This court should require clearer evidence of legislative intent than that which is available to us in this case before dramatically curtailing the privacy interests of a class of our citizens.
The majority also claims that "[rlequiring individualized suspicion ... would place in jeopardy the State's overwhelming interest in ensuring that a parolee complies with the condition of his parole." Maj. op. at 781. While the majority recites the relevant language from Skinner, it does not provide any manner of explanation as to why individualized suspicion bars effective parole supervision. CL Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619-83, 109 S.Ct. 1402 (providing a detailed explanation of the grounds justifying departure from the individualized suspicion requirement for drug testing railway employees). There is no showing before us that the effectiveness of Colorado's parole system has been threatened over the last quarter-century, since Anderson was decided, by a requirement of individualized suspicion for searches. Further, the majority cites to no holding that individualized suspicion of wrongdoing poses a grave threat to effective supervision of parolees. See infro Part IL.B.8 for discussion of cases relied on by the majority.
It is also instructive to observe that, had the General Assembly believed that individualized suspicion was no longer necessary for parole searches, we reasonably could expect it to have been explicit in that determination. Instead, based on the majority's own understanding, the legislature only implicitly abandoned Anderson. In sum, the majority has not demonstrated that its holding satisfies the core Fourth Amendment requirement that a person's privacy interests "be invaded no more than necessary to achieve" the governmental interest involved. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 825, 3483, 105 S.Ct. 7883, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985).
Additionally, the majority diverges from applicable Supreme Court decisions in the type of searches it countenances absent individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. The Court has allowed searches not based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing in very limited cireumstances. In almost all cases allowing such searches, the state action was "routinized, fleeting, and nonintrusive encounters conducted pursuant to regulatory programs which entailed no contact with the person." Skinner, 489 U.S. at 638, 109 S.Ct. 1402 (Marshall, J., dissenting), citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562, 96 S.Ct. 8074, 49 LEd.2d 1116 (1976) (discussing brief interrogative stop at permanent border crossing); Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 980 (1967) (upholding routine annual housing inspection by city housing departments). In other instances, searches have been allowed only upon the occurrence of a statutorily defined triggering incident and compelling evidence was presented that serving the governmental interest involved requires jettisoning individualized suspicion. See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 629-80, 109 S.Ct. 1402 (stating that blanket policy of drug testing rail employees *789following accidents is necessary to protect public safety).
In contrast, the majority sanctions searches of an entirely different order, searches that will intrude into every sphere of a parolee's privacy. The only limitations the majority sees fit to place on these far-reaching searches are that: "(1) [they are] conducted pursuant to any applicable statute; (2) [they are] conducted in furtherance of the purposes of parole, i.e. related to the rehabilitation and supervision of the parolee; (8) [they are] not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing." Maj. op. at 781. These "restrictions" provide no effective guidance for' searches that intrude upon, in addition to a parolee's vehicle, her person or home, which are a person's most important spheres of privacy and dignity. See Schmerber v. Cali-forma, 884 U.S. T57, 465, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (stating that "[the overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State."); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S.Ct. 679, 5 LEd.2d 784 (1961) ("At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his home and there to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.").
Looking first to the condition that a parole search must be conducted pursuant to applicable statutes, I observe that this require-, ment contributes little to the reasonableness of the search. A parole search is reasonable under section 17-2-201 only if the statute itself is consistent with the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement. The majority's analysis of parole searches conducted absent reasonable grounds fails to carry this essential point. Therefore, that a parole search is conducted pursuant to section 17-2-201 does not establish that the search is reasonable.
The majority next states that the search must be conducted in furtherance of a parolee's rehabilitation and supervision. This condition is explained as having essentially two features: the search must be conducted under the authority of a parole officer and it may not be a subterfuge for a criminal investigation. See maj. op. at 782. I agree with the majority that a parole search conducted under the authority of a police officer or as a criminal investigation is not reasonable.
However, these limitations are not sufficient to protect a parolee's privacy interests. The parole officer is 'free to extensively search a parolee's body, clothing, possessions, residence, and vehicle. No prior showing of the need for a search is required beyond the parole officer's unconstrained judgment that the search somehow is related to rehabilitating or supervising the parolee. The issue is not whether parole officers will act from improper motives under the majority's new rule. My concern instead is that this rule unnecessarily erodes a parolee's privacy interests and fails to provide parole officers and courts with a practicable standard for determining when a search is reasonable.
Finally, the majority states that a parole search may not be "arbitrary, capricious, or harassing." Maj. op. at 782. I find that this condition contributes little toward establishing that searches absent reasonable grounds are constitutionally permissible. This final criterion strikes me as little more than an obvious complement to the majority's second criterion that a search be in furtherance of the purposes of parole. If a search in fact furthers the purposes of parole, then, by definition, it is not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing. A search that is arbitrary, capricious, or harassing cannot, again by definition, further a legitimate purpose of parole.
I conclude that the majority's sanctioning of parole searches without individualized suspicion of wrongdoing goes far beyond Supreme Court precedent and fails to adequately guide parole officers and courts in determining whether a search is reasonable.
8.
Finally, the majority argues that its holding is consistent with a handful of decisions from other jurisdictions that, according to the majority, have held that parole or probation searches are permissible absent a "reasonable grounds" requirement. However, a careful examination of the cases the majority *790cites indicates that they are readily distinguishable from the position taken by the majority.
Some of the cases relied on by the majority are similar to Griffin in that they address only whether a warrantless probation or parole search is permissible. See, eg., Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1862, 1865 (11th Cir.1982) (stating that issue before the court is whether warrantless searches by probation officers violates the Fourth Amendment); id. at 1868 ("We thus conclude that a probationer's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is not violated by a condition of probation that permits warrantless searches of his person and property ... "); State v. Davis, 6 Neb.App. 790, 577 N.W.2d 768, 769 (1998) (stating that a warrantless search of parolee's apartment was permissible); State v. Morgan, 206 Neb. 818, 295 N.W.2d 285, 289 (1980) (stating that a warrantless search of probationer's residence was permissible). Like Griffin, these cases do not present the question whether "reasonable grounds" is required for a probation or parole search to be reasonable. Therefore, they provide little support for the majority's claim that a search conducted without reasonable grounds to believe that a parole violation has occurred satisfies minimum constitutional standards. See maj. op. at 781.
Additionally, many of the cases identified by the majority do not support a universal policy of allowing parole searches without a "reasonable grounds" requirement. At most, they suggest that whether a probation or parole search without reasonable grounds is permissible is related to the specific supervision needs present in a given instance. In Morgan, 295 NW.2d at 288, the Nebraska Supreme Court, after discussing whether warrantless probation searches are in principle permissible, stated that "such conditions should be sparingly imposed and should be reasonably related to the offense for which the defendant was convicted." In State v. Zeta Chi Fraternity, 142 NH. 16, 696 A.2d 530, 539 (1997), the New Hampshire Supreme Court relied on the trial court's findings that the defendant's prior offenses necessitated unannounced searches to achieve
the purposes of probation to uphold the challenged search. Moreover, the search at issue in Zeto Chi was warrantless, not one without reasonable grounds to believe that a probation violation had occurred. See id. In State v. Smith, 589 NW.2d 546, 550 (N.D. 1999), the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld a warrantless probation search in light of the nature of the activities the defendant was suspected of engaging in. Moreover, North Dakota's probation statute allows the sentencing court to require at its discretion warrantless probation searches. See id. at 548-49. In contrast, section 17-2-201 applies to all parolees. See § 17-2-201(5)(f)(D).
In short, almost all of the cases cited by the majority only permit warrantless parole or probation searches when cireumstances indicate that such searches are necessary on a selected basis to secure the governmental interests at stake. This practice is starkly different from the majority's conclusion that a universal policy of parole searches without individualized suspicion of wrongdoing meets minimum constitutional standards.
IIL
This case should be resolved on well-settled principles of law. The trial court's suppression order should be reversed because it was based on an assessment of the subjective intent of the searching officers. Under the proper standard of objective reasonableness, the evidence seized pursuant to the search is admissible against the defendant.
However, the majority disregards this resolution to reach its conclusion that searches without reasonable grounds to believe that a parole violation has occurred are constitutionally permissible. Accordingly, I respectfully concur in the result only.
I am authorized to state that Justice HOBBS and Justice BENDER join in the special concurrence.

. I disagree with the majority's claim that the trial court "applied [the] 'reasonable grounds' legal standard in its resolution of the motion to suppress." Maj. op. at 777-778. While the trial court found that reasonable grounds existed for the search, and stated that the search would have been permissible if the searching officers had in fact relied on those grounds, the trial court applied a subjective intent standard to find that the search was impermissible. The trial court would not have held that the search was impermissible if it had applied the reasonable grounds standard, given its ruling that reasonable grounds existed for the search.

. In addition, that a parolee under section 17-2-201 is obligated to allow his parole officer to search his person, residence or vehicle does not establish clearly or unambiguously that the General Assembly intended to abandon the “reasonable grounds” standard. See maj. op. at 778. This requirement is logically consistent with the additional requirement that a search is permissible only if the searching officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a parole violation has occurred. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 870-71, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709. (1987) (analyzing Wisconsin probation statute that required reasonable grounds for searches and made it a probation violation to refuse consent to a home search).

. Whether the Anderson "reasonable grounds” requirement or another, lesser standard governs parole searches, if there are in fact reasonable grounds for the search, then the search is constitutionally sound. Under Anderson, the existence of reasonable grounds is the minimum showing that the prosecution must make for evidence seized pursuant to a parole search to be admissible. See Anderson, 189 Colo, at 38, 536 P.2d at 305. Under a lesser standard, proof of reasonable grounds would constitute more than necessary evidence that the search was reasonable. In either case, the evidence seized in this case is admissible against the defendant. Therefore, this court need not attempt to determine whether section 17-2-201 incorporated the "reasonable grounds” requirement. The majority’s reliance on what I can only see as an unwarranted interpretation of the "plain language" of the statute further complicates proper resolution of this case.