Court Opinion

ID: 9737875
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:36:21.165257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:02.272469
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). McReavy was convicted of armed robbery,1 kidnapping,2 and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony,3 and was sentenced as *223a third offender.4 The issue presented concerns the substantive5 use of McReavy’s failure during post-arrest, post -Miranda6 interrogation to respond to particular questions concerning his involvement in the robbery and kidnapping.
The Court of Appeals reversed McReavy’s conviction on the ground that testimony and argument concerning McReavy’s failure to answer violated the rule stated in People v Bobo, 390 Mich 355; 212 NW2d 190 (1973). Because we conclude that any error does not require reversal of Mc-Reavy’s convictions, we join in reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals and in remanding the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of issues raised by McReavy that were not addressed by the Court of Appeals.
i
McReavy’s convictions stem from an armed robbery of a gas station and the abduction of the station attendant in the attendant’s car.
During the people’s case in chief, the prosecutor elicited testimony from the two arresting officers regarding McReavy’s postarrest, post-Miranda interrogation. The testimony included a reference to McReavy’s failure to respond to "direct” questions about the robbery and a description of his de*224meanor when failing to respond.7 McReavy’s objection was overruled. The officers also testified about McReavy’s answers to other questions, including "indirect” questions about his involvement in the robbery.
McReavy did not testify. Under the circumstances of this case, the evidence was admissible, if at all, as substantive and not impeachment evidence.
In closing argument, the prosecutor asserted that McReavy’s failure to respond to the direct questions and his demeanor when he failed to respond were "passive admissions.” The prosecutor thus adverted to McReavy’s failure to respond as substantive evidence of his guilt.8
On appeal, McReavy claimed Bobo error and raised two other issues. The Court of Appeals found Bobo error requiring reversal in the admission over objection of the testimony concerning McReavy’s failure to answer the direct questions and in the prosecutor’s reference in closing argument to McReavy’s "passive admissions.”9 The *225Court of Appeals did not address the other two issues raised by McReavy.
n
We agree with the majority that the decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed. We so conclude because any error in the testimony and argument concerning McReavy’s failure to answer the direct questions does not require reversal.
During his postarrest interrogation, McReavy responded to "indirect” questions. As related in the officers’ testimony, McReavy stated that he had not received the gun used in the robbery from his roommate, that his roommate was not involved in the robbery, and that he was not denying that he was involved in the robbery. The first-hand knowledge manifested by these responses tended to incriminate McReavy.
Additionally, the victim identified McReavy at trial. A gun and the victim’s car were found near McReavy’s residence. Articles of clothing similar to those worn by the robber were found in Mc-Reavy’s residence and did not belong to McReavy’s roommate. McReavy owed his roommate rent, and paid him before he was able to cash his paycheck.
Whatever weight the jury may have placed on the testimony and argument concerning McReavy’s failure to answer the "direct” questions was overshadowed by the probative significance of McReavy’s "indirect” admissions and the other evidence tending to establish his guilt.10
No more needs to be said to decide this case.
hi
The majority nevertheless employs the prose*226cutor’s appeal in the instant case as a "vehicle” to opine on whether the substantive use of McReavy’s "silence” was violative of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. It predicates reversal of the Court of Appeals in part on the conclusion that the officers’ testimony and the prosecutor’s argument concerning McReavy’s failure to answer the direct questions did not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege.
The majority thus ignores the well-established rule that this Court does not grapple with constitutional issues if there is a nonconstitutional basis on which the case can properly be decided. The course chosen is especially inappropriate under the circumstance that the United States Supreme Court, although it no doubt has had the opportunity to do so, has avoided deciding whether reference to "partial silence” as substantive evidence of guilt is violative of the Fifth Amendment.
Parenthetically, this case does not involve Doyle v Ohio, 426 US 610; 96 S Ct 2240; 49 L Ed 2d 91 (1976), where the United States Supreme Court held that the impeachment use of a defendant’s silence violates the Due Process Clause where the defendant remained silent after the receipt of Miranda warnings.11
*227IV
Because, and only because, the majority unnecessarily addresses the Fifth Amendment issue, we add the following commentary to its analysis of McReavy’s claim under the Fifth Amendment.
A
The majority asserts that "[t]he instant case presents the constitutional issue addressed in Miranda, that is, the substantive use of a defendant’s statements and comments on a defendant’s behavior, demeanor, and nonresponsive conduct after a valid waiver of his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination,”12 and further describes the constitutional question as "whether the trial court erred in finding that defendant waived his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination until he invoked his rights on the morning following the inquiry in question.”13 The majority would answer the question so posed in the negative.14
1
We disagree with the suggestion that the constitutional issue presented in this case was decided in Miranda. The issue in Miranda was the admissibility of statements made during custodial interroga*228tion.15 We all agree that McReavy’s statements were admissible. We are not aware of any basis in the Miranda opinion for the majority’s assertion that Miranda also involved the admissibility of a defendant’s "behavior, demeanor, and nonresponsive conduct.” Nor did Miranda involve the admissibility of "statements,” or "behavior, demeanor, and nonresponsive conduct,” after a valid waiver of Fifth Amendment rights. Rather, the Miranda opinion dealt with the procedural safeguards necessary to validate a waiver of the rights discussed in Miranda.
2
The majority’s emphasis on McReavy’s "waiver” of his "Fifth Amendment privilege” is misplaced. The assertion that McReavy waived his privilege against self-incrimination is a legal conclusion that the custodial interrogation was conducted in compliance with the procedural requirements of Miranda, and that as a result McReavy’s statements were the product of a knowing and intelligent decision not to exercise one of his Fifth Amendment rights.
The "waiver” is coextensive with the statement. McReavy had a right not to answer the direct questions about his involvement in the robbery, and this right was not waived because he answered indirect questions on the same subject.
The procedural requirements of Miranda are designed to ensure that an accused’s statements *229are voluntary and not the product of coercion inherent in custodial interrogation. The procedures seek to promote the intelligent exercise or nonexercise of Fifth Amendment rights by ensuring that the accused is informed of those rights at the outset of the interrogation.16 Miranda thus requires, in addition to informing an accused that he has the right to remain silent, that he be informed of the possible consequences of not exercising that right,17 namely, "that anything he says can be used against him.”18
Miranda does not, however, provide that the accused must be advised that if he makes a statement, both what he says and what he fails to say can then be used against him.19 Miranda does not require that an accused be told that his failure to say something can be used against him. Without knowledge of the costs the majority would associate with making a statement, an accused is unable to make an intelligent decision whether to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination. The introduction of a defendant’s failure to answer a particular question on the basis that the defendant waived his privilege against self-incrimination by *230answering other questions is thus inconsistent with the rationale of Miranda.

B

We acknowledge that some courts appear to have adopted the majority’s approach.20
Other courts, however, have held that the Fifth Amendment bars the substantive use of a defendant’s failure to answer questions during custodial interrogation in the course of which he answered other questions. We advert to these decisions only because the majority has chosen to opine on the Fifth Amendment question.
1
In United States v Williams, 665 F2d 107, 109 (CA 6, 1981), the defendant made incriminating statements during a postarrest, post-Miranda interview but refused to answer questions regarding his acquisition of a stolen truck. In its case in chief, the government elicited testimony from the interviewing agent that Williams had refused to discuss his purchase of the truck. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found plain error, and held that "it clearly violated Williams’ Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when the fbi agent was examined as to Williams’ refusal to answer these questions.”
In United States v Lewis, 651 F2d 1163 (CA 6, 1981), an irs special agent testified during the case in chief concerning an interview with Lewis. After describing the statements made by Lewis, the *231agent testified that Lewis had refused to answer questions on three occasions and that he had twice requested counsel. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the testimony regarding Lewis’ refusal to answer particular questions violated the Fifth Amendment.21
In Odell v State, 90 Wis 2d 149, 152-153; 279 NW2d 706 (1979), a detective testified in the case in chief that Odell had made extensive statements during custodial interrogation, but that he had refused to answer questions concerning the source of money in his possession. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the detective’s testimony regarding Odell’s refusal to answer those questions was violative of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because the testimony was used as a tacit admission of Odell’s guilt.
In United States v Ghiz, 491 F2d 599 (CA 4, 1974), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the defendant’s conviction on the basis of testimony during the case in chief that post-Miranda interrogation was terminated when Ghiz stated he did not wish to answer any questions about a stolen tractor. The court first noted that evidence of a defendant’s refusal to answer particular questions is inadmissible if in so refusing, the defendant either expressly invoked the Fifth Amendment or otherwise indicated that he was relying on his Miranda rights. The court then held that Ghiz’ statement, that he did not wish to talk *232about the tractor, was a clear indication of his reliance on the right to remain silent.22
2
In most of the cases discussed in subsection 1 above, custodial interrogation appears to have been terminated after the accused "refused” to answer certain questions. The instant case might thus be "distinguished” on the ground that Mc-Reavy’s interrogation continued after he "refused” to answer the direct questions about his involvement in the robbery.
With the possible exception of Lewis, the defendants in the cited cases did not state they would answer no further questions. Rather, after answering some questions the defendants "refused” to answer others, and the questioning was then terminated by the interrogating officer. These cases thus do not involve defendants who were asserting the right to terminate custodial interrogation,23 but rather defendants who were exercising the right not to answer a particular question.
If an interrogator has fifteen questions and an accused is only willing to answer fourteen, it would be strange if the admissibility as substan*233tive evidence of a failure to respond to one question depended on whether the interrogator asked that question first, fifth, tenth, or last.
When a defendant is challenging the admissibility of statements made after he failed to answer a particular question, it may indeed be appropriate to require the defendant to have more clearly expressed his desire to invoke the "right to remain silent.” Absent such a clear expression, the interrogator may not have known that questioning should have stopped. Such concerns are not present in the instant case since the question here opined on does not concern the admissibility of statements.24
The majority distinguishes the cited cases on the basis that those cases involved "factual situations where the defendant refused to speak,”25 and that this case involves "a defendant’s absence of response in the course of making a statement as opposed, for example, to a statement that he refused to answer questions, or wanted counsel . . . .”26 We do not find persuasive the suggested distinction between a "refus[al] to answer questions” and an "absence of response,” and neither did the courts in Williams and Odell.27
The majority also distinguishes the cited cases on the basis that in the instant case, "we have a *234trial court determination that the defendant did waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and that he did not invoke that privilege until the morning following the challenged interview.”28 In all the cited cases, however, the defendant made statements during custodial interrogation, and testimony concerning those statements was elicited in the prosecution’s case in chief. There was thus a trial court determination, or it was uncontested, that the defendant had "waived” his Fifth Amendment rights. Again, we disagree with the majority concerning the significance of that "waiver.”
The majority goes on to say that "[t]he defendant had the opportunity to take the stand [at the Walker hearing (People v Walker [On Rehearing], 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 [1965])] and assert that his 'nonutterances’ were refusals and that he understood that he was relying on his Miranda warnings, but he did not do so.”29 The defendant does not have the burden of proof respecting the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation. It is the prosecutor who has that burden, a burden which applies to a defendant’s "nonutterances,” at least where those "nonutterances” are said to be the defendant’s admissions.
c
In sum, there appears to be a split of authority whether the Fifth Amendment permits the substantive use of a defendant’s failure to answer particular questions during postarrest, post-Miranda interrogation.30 Decision in the instant *235case does not require the Court to adopt one line of authority or the other, and we decline to do so.
■ v
Because, and only because, the majority unnecessarily addresses the constitutional question, we note that in addition to implicating the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the substantive use of a defendant’s failure to respond to an incriminatory accusation also implicates decisions of this Court that are not based on the United States Constitution.
A
In People v Bigge, 288 Mich 417; 285 NW 5 (1939), the Court found error requiring reversal in the prosecutor’s reference in his opening statement to Bigge’s failure to deny an incriminatory accusation made in his presence.31 The Court was required to decide whether evidence of Bigge’s “silence” was admissible because if such evidence *236were admissible,32 the prosecutor’s remarks would have been proper as a statement of intended proof. The Court ruled that evidence of an incriminatory accusation made in the defendant’s presence and his failure to deny the accusation could not be used as substantive evidence of guilt:
The time has not yet come when an accused must cock his ear to hear every damaging allegation against him and, if not denied by him, have the statement and his silence accepted as evidence of guilt. There can be no such thing as confession of guilt by silence in or out of court. The unanswered allegation by another of the guilt of a defendant is no confession of guilt on the part of a defendant. Defendant, if he heard the statement, was not morally or legally called upon to make denial or suffer his failure to do so to stand as evidence of his guilt. He said nothing, and what was said in his presence by another was inadmissible, just as the court later held. [Id., p 420.]
The Court of Appeals has in a number of cases interpreted Bigge as generally prohibiting the use of tacit admissions in criminal trials.33
*237Factors that may be germane to the question whether the substantive use of a defendant’s silence violated the Fifth Amendment are not germane where the question is whether this Court’s holding in Bigge was violated.
The admissibility of tacit admissions in criminal cases does not depend on whether the defendant received the Miranda warnings before he failed to respond to an accusation made in his presence.34 It is thus not controlling that the defendant was, or was not, relying on Miranda warnings when he failed to respond to the incriminatory accusation.
The admissibility of tacit admissions also does not depend on whether the defendant was in custody when he failed to respond to the accusation.35 Nor does it depend on whether the defendant had already been arrested or otherwise formally accused.36 It is thus not controlling whether the *238defendant was relying on any particular constitutional right that may have attached at that time.
Further, the admissibility of tacit admissions does not depend on whether the defendant did, or did not, make statements during the conversation in which he failed to respond to an incriminatory accusation. In Bigge, the defendant’s purported tacit admission occurred during a lengthy conversation in which he made statements, including inculpatory statements.37 It is thus not controlling that the failure to respond may be characterized as "partial,” rather than "total,” silence.38
This Court’s decision in Bigge stands for the proposition that in a criminal case a defendant’s failure to respond to an incriminatory accusation made in his presence is not admissible as substantive evidence of the defendant’s guilt. The decision in Bigge was not based on the United States Constitution.39 Subsequent developments in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence do not affect, or put in question, the Court’s holding in that case._
*239B
Because, and only because, the majority unnecessarily addresses the substantive issues raised in this appeal, we consider whether this Court’s decision in Bigge applies to the facts of the instant case.
An officer testified on direct examination that "I started asking [McReavy] questions directly about the robbery, his involvement. He would just sit and look down. He wouldn’t respond yes or no.” In closing argument, the prosecutor said:
Remember what Detective Vincent said? There’s no doubt in my mind about the robbery, that [McReavy] was involved in it. The questioning ceased. Not one denial, not one suggestion that it wasn’t me. To the contrary, passive admissions. The man feels bad, he’s got his head down, he’s upset, doesn’t want to talk about it.
The prosecutor asserted that McReavy’s failure during custodial interrogation to respond to the direct questions and his accompanying demeanor was evidence of his guilt. The prosecutor’s argument, and the testimony on which that argument was based, was thus violative of Bigge.
We would not, however, reverse McReavy’s convictions on the basis of that error. McReavy responded to indirect questions about his involvement in the robbery. McReavy was asked whether he was denying that he committed the robbery, and his response was " 'no.’ ” It would have been consistent with Bigge for the prosecutor to argue that McReavy had not denied his guilt because it *240would have been a fair comment on what Mc-Reavy actually said.40
Under the circumstance that it would have been permissible for the prosecutor to have made the challenged remarks whether or not McReavy had failed to answer the direct questions about his involvement in the robbery, we would not reverse McReavy’s convictions even though the prosecutor’s argument and the officers’ testimony regarding McReavy’s failure to answer those questions were violative of Bigge.41
c
The majority would hold that the prosecutor’s remarks and the officers’ testimony concerning McReavy’s failure to respond to the direct questions did not violate the rule stated in Bigge.42 We now consider the majority’s rationale for reaching that result.
1
At the outset, we note that the majority’s characterization of Bigge as a decision based on conventional evidence law—specifically, the theory of the adoptive admission43—finds little support in *241the language of the Court’s decision.44 Regardless, to the extent Bigge is regarded as a decision grounded in evidentiary concerns, it stands for the proposition that silence in the face of an accusation is not a sufficient manifestation of the accused’s adoption or belief in the truth of the accusation such that the accusation is deemed to be the accused’s own statement.
2
The majority distinguishes Bigge on the basis that "[t]he Bigge rule denies admissibility because the inference of relevancy rests solely on the defendant’s failure to deny,”45 whereas "the relevancy of defendant’s behavior in the instant case in neither denying nor admitting the direct inquiry rests not on a third party’s assertion but on the admissions defendant himself made . . . .”46
The suggestion that Bigge only applies where the prosecutor’s "inference of relevancy” rests solely on the defendant’s failure to deny the incriminatory accusation is not supported by the facts of Bigge. The defendant in Bigge also made inculpatory statements during the conversation in which he failed to respond to the incriminatory *242accusation.47 Thus, it could be said of Bigge, to the same extent as McReavy, that the "inference of relevancy” was not based solely on the defendant’s failure to respond, but was also based on the defendant’s actual statements, and the "inference of relevancy” thus does not serve to distinguish Bigge.
Assuming for the moment that the testimony of the arresting officers was admissible to "allow the factfinder to more fully determine the probative significance of the defendant’s complete statement to the police,”48 the admissibility of that testimony in no way renders permissible the prosecutor’s argument to the jury that McReavy’s failure to respond to the direct questions were "passive admissions” of guilt. The prosecutor may not make an impermissible argument to the jury simply because the evidence on which that argument is based was admissible for another purpose.49
3
The majority also announces and then invokes a "rule of completeness,” under which "all is admissible.”50 The premise of the asserted "rule of completeness,” under which all becomes admissible, is that a thought cannot be accurately understood without eliciting the entire utterance by which the thought was expressed.51 The "rule of completeness” does not support the unbounded admissibil*243ity of a defendant’s failure to answer questions. Silence in the face of accusation is not an utterance, and to suggest otherwise is to ignore this Court’s decision in Bigge.
Evidence of a defendant’s failure to respond to particular questions and his accompanying demeanor is not admissible, or even relevant, simply because the defendant answered other questions.. A defendant’s failure to respond to an incriminatory accusation or question—which generally has no more probative significance than a failure to answer a question that was never asked—is not per se transformed into a relevant "omission” once the defendant answers another question.
That is not to say that a defendant’s failure to respond to a question is per se irrelevant. The relevance of a defendant’s failure to answer particular questions depends on the content of those questions and of the statements the defendant actually made. In this case, for example, there was a close similarity between the questions McReavy failed to answer and the questions he did answer, in particular, his response " 'no’ ” to the question whether he was denying that he had committed the robbery.52
VI
We now consider other federal cases cited by the majority.
The majority relies on United States v Shaw, 701 F2d 367 (CA 5, 1983), to support the proposition that "a description of a defendant’s behavior *244which serves to explain the circumstances and conduct of a defendant who has not invoked his right to remain silent will not be considered improper comment on the 'defendant’s postarrest silence.’ ”53 Shaw is at most ambivalent support for the majority’s position.
In Shaw, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that testimony elicited on direct examination of a government witness concerning Shaw’s reaction when he was informed why he was being questioned was proper.54 The court said:
The lack of response to which the sheriff alluded merely expressed Shaw’s demeanor during one point of the questioning. Even if death were accidental, a few moments of speechless silence upon hearing of the death would be a normal reaction. These remarks could not have been an impermissible comment on Shaw’s exercise of his Fifth Amendment right to silence following arrest because Shaw was not, at this time, exercising such a right. There was neither silence nor a comment, but simply a description of an interview where Shaw did give a statement and did not remain silent. [Id., p 385. Emphasis added.]
The court does not appear to have been addressing the propriety of testimony regarding Shaw’s *245failure to answer particular questions55 and the court’s approval of the demeanor evidence was based at least in part on an "innocent” explanation for Shaw’s demeanor. Shaw does not support the proposition that evidence of a defendant’s failure to answer particular questions, or his accompanying demeanor, is admissible so that the prosecutor may invite the jury to construe such evidence as a "passive admission” of guilt.56
In addition, the court also held that another police officer’s testimony concerning Shaw’s post-arrest demeanor was constitutional error.57 In discussing this "description of a defendant’s behavior,”58 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit observed:
The standard is strict; virtually any description of a defendant’s silence following arrest and a Miranda warning will constitute a Doyle violation. Accordingly, it appears inescapable that Pennington’s remarks, even though unsolicited and couched in narrative terms, and to which no objection was made, did constitute an improper com*246ment upon silence as envisioned in Doyle. [Id., p 382.]
The majority also cites Rowan v Owens, 752 F2d 1186 (CA 7, 1984), in which the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held it was not error for the prosecutor to elicit testimony concerning Rowan’s assertion of his right to remain silent at the close of a postarrest, post-Miranda interrogation in which he had made incriminating statements.59 At the most,60 Rowan provides support for the officers’ testimony that the interrogation ended when Mc-Reavy stated he did not wish to answer any more questions and that he would "clear things up” later.61 The admissibility of that testimony is not challenged.
Cavanagh and Archer, JJ., concurred with Levin, J._

 MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797.

 MCL 750.349; MSA 28.581.

 MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2).

 MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083.

 The issue in the companion case of People v Cetlinski, 435 Mich 742; 460 NW2d 534 (1990), concerned the impeachment use of Cetlinski’s failure during investigative interviews with police and fire personnel to volunteer that he had discussed the possibility of hiring someone to set fire to his property.
The issue in the companion case of People v Sutton (After Remand), 436 Mich 575; 464 NW2d 276 (1990), concerns the impeachment use of Sutton’s failure to come forward and inform the police that he had shot someone but that it was an accident, and of his postarrest, post-Miranda silence.

 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).

 One of the officers testified:
Q. Okay. What next was said?
A. Well, I started asking him questions directly about the robbery, his involvement. He would just sit and look down. He wouldn’t respond yes or no.
The other officer gave substantially similar testimony.

 In the words of the prosecutor,
Remember what Detective Vincent said? There’s no doubt in my mind about the robbery, that he was involved in it. The questioning ceased. Not one denial, not one suggestion that it wasn’t me. To the contrary, passive admissions. The man feels bad, he’s got his head down, he’s upset, doesn’t want to talk about it.

 People v McReavy, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided January 14, 1987 (Docket No. 88620).

 The majority agrees with this assessment of the record. See ante, p 220, n 26.

 See, generally, United States ex rel Savory v Lane, 832 F2d 1011, 1017 (CA 7, 1987) ("Because appellant did not take the stand, and the state’s purpose in referring to appellant’s silence was to suggest that he was guilty [rather than to impeach his testimony], the problem does not involve the application of Doyle v Ohio, . . . but rather involves the application of Griffin v California [380 US 609; 85 S Ct 1229; 14 L Ed 2d 106 (1965)]”).
Thus, the majority’s commentary on the "insoluble ambiguity” rationale of Doyle (see ante, pp 211-212 and 217-219), as well as its “fundamental unfairness” rationale (see ante, p 218, n 21, and p 220, n 25), is of little utility.
We express no opinion on the applicability of Doyle to the "partially silent” defendant.

 Ante, p 211.

 Ante, p 201.

 See ante, pp 202-203. See also ante, pp 200, 203, 211, 215, 218-220, and 221-222.

 More specifically, we deal with the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself. [Miranda, supra, p 439. See also id., p 445.]

 I'd, p 467.

 The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court. This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing it. It is only through an awareness of these consequences that there can be any assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise of the privilege. [Id, p 469.]

 Id, p 479.

 Nor is an accused told that his "conduct”—whether or not he makes a statement—can be used against him. Cf. ante, p 212 ("Not until [the morning following the interrogation in issue] could the defendant again reasonably believe that the state was assuring him his conduct during the course of making a statement would not be used against him”).

 See, for example, United States v Goldman, 563 F2d 501 (CA 1, 1977) (discussed in ante, pp 216-217).

 In rejecting the government’s claim that the challenged testimony did not invite an inference of guilt, the court remarked that "[unfortunately, the agent’s unnecessary and irrelevant testimony that he first advised appellant of his Miranda rights, and asked appellant if he understood those rights, made the inference inevitable.” Id., p 1167.
The arresting officers in the instant case testified they had given McReavy the Miranda warnings before McReavy failed to respond to the direct questions about his involvement in the robbery.

 One distinction between Ghiz and the instant case is that Mc-Reavy was silent when asked the direct questions about his involvement in the robbery.

 The majority avers that "there is no case supporting the claim that a defendant’s absence of response in the course of making a statement as opposed, for example, to a statement that he refused to answer questions, or wanted counsel, constituted an invocation of a defendant’s previously waived Fifth Amendment privilege.” Ante, p 212, n 14.
To the extent "an invocation of a defendant’s previously waived Fifth Amendment privilege” refers to an accused’s right to terminate custodial interrogation (see Miranda, supra, pp 473-474), we agree with the majority’s characterization of the cases cited. It is not claimed, however, that McReavy’s failure to respond to the direct questions was an assertion of his right to terminate the interrogation.

 Because this case involves only the admissibility of a defendant’s failure to respond and not the admissibility of statements made after the failure to respond, we express no opinion on what constitutes a sufficient invocation of the right to terminate a custodial interrogation. Cf. ante, p 218, n 22 ("If the selective silence view of [this opinion] were adopted, questioning presumably would have to cease whenever the defendant failed to respond directly to a question”).

 Ante, p 202, n 2.

 Ante, p 212, n 14.

 In Williams, the defendant’s "partial silence” was described variously as "refusal to answer,” "failure to answer,” and "did not answer.” In Odell, the defendant’s "partial silence” was described by the police officer in his testimony as " 'would not answer,’ ” and by the court as "refusal” and "failure to respond.”

 Ante, p 202, n 2 (emphasis in original).

 Id.

 This is not surprising since by analyzing this case under the Fifth Amendment, the Court is to some extent entering uncharted terrain. *235See, generally, Poulin, Evidentiary use of silence and the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, 52 Geo Wash L R 191, 197 (1984) (“The cases . . . lack any clear analysis of the constitutional basis for admitting or excluding such evidence [of a defendant’s pretrial silence] from the case in chief . . .”).

 In his opening statement, the prosecutor said:
"[T]his person, his brother-in-law in fact, said to this witness who will testify, 'What’s the use of going over this matter again. Charles [the defendant] is guilty as hell.’ ” [Id., p 419.]
After an objection, the prosecutor continued:
"I haven’t finished. Charles Bigge could have said right there if it wasn’t true. It was his duty to have said so.” [Id.]

 The trial court had ruled inadmissible testimony that the accusation was made in Bigge’s presence and that he failed to deny it. Id., p 420.

 See, for example, People v Washington, 100 Mich App 628, 630; 300 NW2d 347 (1980), where the Court of Appeals, citing Bigge, said: "The tacit admission rule, which permits a defendant’s silence in the face of an accusation to be used against him, is not utilized in criminal cases in Michigan.”
There once was a res gestae exception to the holding in Bigge. See People v Gisondi, 9 Mich App 289, 293-294; 156 NW2d 601 (1967) ("[U]nder longstanding Michigan precedents, which antedate Escobedo [v Illinois, 378 US 478; 84 S Ct 1758; 12 L Ed 2d 977 (1964)] and Miranda, the accused’s silence in face of an accusation is not deemed an admission or confession in a criminal case, except when such silence occurs on the part of a suspected participant in a crime as a part of the res gestae”) (citations omitted). Cf. People v Barnes (On Remand), 44 Mich App 488, 492-493; 205 NW2d 591 (1973).
This exception was based on People v Todaro, 253 Mich 367, 373-375; 235 NW 185 (1931), and People v Todaro (On Rehearing), 256 *237Mich 427; 240 NW 90 (1932). See Bigge, supra, p 420 ("The Todaro Case was confined to res gestae occurrences and is no authority for admitting the testimony in the instant case”).
Todaro was overruled in People v Bobo, supra, pp 361-362, and the Court of Appeals has determined that as a result the res gestae exception no longer rests on solid precedential footing. See People v Parks, 57 Mich App 738, 753; 226 NW2d 710 (1975).

 Bigge was decided twenty-seven years before the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda. See also Gisondi, n 33 supra (in a decision issued after the decision in Miranda, the Court of Appeals applied Bigge where the trial occurred before the decision in Miranda).

 In Bigge, the defendant’s failure to respond to an incriminatory accusation occurred during a conversation among the defendant, the defendant’s brother-in-law, a lawyer representing the company from which Bigge had embezzled money, and another lawyer who appears to have been representing Bigge, or his brother-in-law, or both. The conversation took place in the latter lawyer’s office. See People v Bigge, Brief for Plaintiff and Appellee, pp 15-25.
For other cases where Bigge was applied to a defendant’s failure in a noncustodial setting to respond to an incriminatory accusation, see People v Wardell, 26 Mich App 69, 71-72; 181 NW2d 788 (1970), and Parks, n 33 supra, pp 749-753.

 In Bigge, the defendant failed to respond to an incriminatory accusation made in his presence on May 1, 1937. See Bigge, supra, p 419. Bigge was arrested on the basis of a complaint filed on *238August 20, 1937. See People v Bigge, Brief for Defendant and Appellant, pp 3-4.
See also Wardell, n 35 supra, pp 71-72 (the defendant’s failure to protest his innocence in response to incriminating statements was made one day after the alleged commission of the crime).

 See People v Bigge, Brief for Plaintiff and Appellee, n 35 supra, pp 16-17 and 22-24.

 See also Parks, n 33 supra, pp 749-753 (evidence of the defendant’s failure to respond to an incriminatory accusation was inadmissible where the "admission” occurred during a telephone conversation initiated by the defendant in which he " 'ask[ed] for his job back and explain[ed] the difficulties he was in’ ”).

 In its discussion of the admissibility of the defendant’s "silence,” the Court in Bigge did not purport to rely on the United States Constitution nor did it cite any authority that purported to do so.
Bigge was decided in 1939. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was not applied to the states until 1964. See Malloy v Hogan, 378 US 1; 84 S Ct 1489; 12 L Ed 2d 653 (1964).
In Gisondi, n 33 supra, the Court of Appeals relied on Bigge to reverse a conviction where the trial occurred before the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda.

 For similar reasons, the testimony of the officers regarding Mc-Keavy’s failure to respond to the direct questions, which was by and large cumulative of their testimony regarding McReavy’s responses to the indirect questions, does not require reversal of McReavy’s convictions.

 See also part n.
We express no opinion as to the sufficiency of the trial court’s curative instructions. Cf. ante, p 214, n 16.

 See ante, p 215.

 Bigge, on the other hand, precludes admissibility of a defendant’s failure to say anything in the face of an accusation as an adoptive or tacit admission under MRE 801(d)(2)(B) unless the defendant "manifested his adoption or belief in its truth . . . .” [Ante, p 213.]

 The majority opinion quotes from 2 Wigmoré, Evidence (Chadbourn rev), § 292, pp 229-230, for an explication of the theory of the adoptive admission. There is, however, no language in the opinion in Bigge suggesting that the Court was applying principles alluded to by Professor Wigmore.
In contrast, the evidentiary approach manifestly was applied in the Court’s earlier decisions in Todaro (On Rehearing), n 33 supra, pp 432-433, and Todaro, n 33 supra, pp 374-375. For the subsequent history of Todaro, see n 33.

 Ante, p 213 (emphasis added).

 Ante, pp 213-214. See also ante, p 213 ("The prosecutor’s theory of relevancy in McReavy was that although the defendant did not directly admit his involvement in the case, his responsive answers to some questions . . . were tacit indications of guilty knowledge”).

 See n 37 and the accompanying text.

 Ante, p 203.

 See, generally, United States ex rel Savory, n 11 supra, p 1017 ("where impeachment by silence is permissible, the government may not argue that a defendant’s silence is inconsistent with a claim of innocence”), and United States v Shue, 766 F2d 1122, 1130 (CA 7, 1985).

 See ante, p 214.

 See 7 Wigmore (Chadbourn rev), § 2094, p 595 (quoted in ante, pp 214-215, n 18).

 That will not always be the case. By way of illustration, we note that had McReavy refused to answer the indirect and direct questions, and his statement had therefore consisted solely of the information he volunteered about the troubles in his personal life, the testimony concerning McReavy’s failure to respond to the direct questions clearly would have been inadmissible.

 Ante, p 217.

 A county sheriff testified:
" When I told him the reason for questioning him, he dropped his head and covered up his face and just sat there for a minute. And I described to him the condition of the child, and he didn’t answer, he didn’t say anything, he just sat there and looked at me.” [Id., p 385. Emphasis added.]
The court’s opinion (quoted above) thus indicates that the challenged testimony described Shaw’s demeanor in response to statements, not questions that he failed to answer.

 See n 54.

 in distinguishing Shaw, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit made the following pertinent observations in United States v Elkins, 774 F2d 530, 538 (CA 1, 1985):
In the context of the present trial there can be no doubt that Lt. McCarthy’s statement, although arguably evidence of the defendants’ demeanor, invited the jury to infer guilty knowledge from the defendants’ failure to respond. In contrast to the last statement made in United States v Shaw, we can hypothesize no plausible alternative interpretation for Lt. McCarthy’s testimony which might cure its effect upon the jury.

 An officer testified on direct examination in the case in chief:
"After I read him the Miranda rights I asked him did he want to talk to us now and he put his head in a down position and shook it 'no,’ and never did say a word.” [Id., p 381.]

 Ante, p 217.

 See ante, pp 215-216.

 The Rowan court’s partial rationale for not finding error was that the challenged testimony did not invite the jury to infer the defendant’s guilt. See Rowan, p 1190. The prosecutor in the instant case expressly invited the jury to infer McReavy’s guilt from his failure to respond to the direct questions.

 But see State v Guerra, 161 Ariz 289, 296; 778 P2d 1185 (1989), in which the Supreme Court of Arizona observed:
This case presents a hybrid situation. Guerra received Miranda warnings, talked to the police for about forty-five minutes, and then ended the interview by requesting an attorney. In this situation, the prosecutor could properly comment on the inconsistency of the statements under Anderson v Charles [447 US 404; 100 S Ct 2180; 65 L Ed 2d 222 (1980)], but could not comment on Guerra’s invocation of his Miranda rights under Doyle v Ohio.