Court Opinion

ID: 9544478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:55:56.84538+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:03.641259
License: Public Domain

Finley, J.
(concurring specially) — While I concur in the result reached by the majority, I am compelled to briefly respond to certain significant issues raised by the appellants and the dissent which are not discussed sufficiently in the majority opinion to satisfy my individual concern about this case.
Traditionally, the equal protection clause has required simply that “[n]o state . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const, amend. 14. The progression of the law in the area of equal protection has resulted in the development fairly recently of certain standards for determining the validity of a challenged statute or ordinance, i.e., the “compelling”, and the “legitimate” state interest tests. Whether a given equal protection challenge is to invoke the close scrutiny of the judiciary associated with the compelling state interest test, or a less strict form of review under the legitimate state *520interest or “rational basis” test has in the past been susceptible of overly simplistic determinations by reference to a judicially recognized system of categories comprising “suspect classifications” and “fundamental interests”.1 Quite recently, however, these tests themselves have been subjected to close scrutiny, and a tendency away from overly precipitate categorization toward more careful analysis seems to be evident in equal protection cases.
As a result of confusion generated by inadequate analysis, Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S 134, 31 L. Ed. 2d 92, 92 S. Ct. 849 (1972), is the primary basis not only for the majority but also for the dissenting opinion in the instant case. The difficulty inherent in Bullock is implicit in the following:
Because the Texas filing-fee scheme has a real and appreciable impact on the exercise of the franchise, and because this impact is related to the resources of the voters supporting a particular candidate, we conclude, as in Harper, that the laws must be “closely scrutinized” and, found reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of legitimate state objectives in order to pass constitutional muster.
(Italics mine.) 405 U.S. at 144. Upon close reading the contradiction in the above statement from Bullock, in linking “close scrutiny” with the “legitimate state objectives” test, becomes apparent. It is further demonstrated by examination of numerous opinions of the court which inextricably connect “close scrutiny” by the judiciary only with the requirement that necessary and compelling state interests be shown, rather than merely “legitimate state objectives”.2 Additionally, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 16 L. Ed. 2d 169, 86 S. Ct. 1079 (1966) has constituted one of the primary bases for application of the compelling state interest test. See, e.g., Williams v. *521Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 21 L. Ed. 2d 24, 89 S. Ct. 5 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 20 L. Ed. 2d 436, 88 S. Ct. 1509 (1968). The fluctuating nature of these equal protection tests3 faced the court in Bullock and leaves this court in the quandary in which it now finds itself.
Perhaps the clearest pronouncement of the fundamental criterion of the compelling state interest test was that recently stated in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686, 36 L. Ed. 2d 583, 93 S. Ct. 1764 (1973) as follows:4
Moreover, since sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate “the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility . . . .” Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 175 (1972).
(Italics mine.) It is evident from this reasoning in Frontiero that the critical factor in determining the applicability of the compelling state interest test — with its stricter standard of judicial review — is the “immutability” of the characteristic or condition which serves as the statutory basis for discriminatory treatment.5 This conclusion is exemplified in the otherwise confusing and contradictory statement in Bullock which, as noted earlier, appears causally related to the fact of inconsistent constructions of Bullock by the majority and dissent herein. That is, the previous mechanical and automatic approach to the equal protection clause — suggested by invocation of the compelling *522state interest test simply where a particular characteristic or condition fits easily within certain well-established “suspect classifications” — is no longer appropriate to or consistent with a fair and meaningful mode-of judicial review. Rather, the compelling state interest test should be applied to the case where it can be demonstrated that the subject characteristic or condition is “immutable” and realistically incapable of modification by the individual or group facing alleged discriminatory treatment as a consequence of the challenged statute or ordinance. It is within the context of this approach to the compelling state interest test that the instant statutory scheme concerning candidate filing fees should be examined.
In this regard, the appellants assert that “wealth”, and its counterpart “indigency”, constitute a suspect classification, citing supportive cases, and that discrimination on the basis of wealth is forbidden by the equal protection clause unless it is necessary to promote a compelling state interest. However, as indicated above, the recent reevaluation by the United States Supreme Court of the tests for judicial review under the equal protection clause apparently no longer affords room for a determination of constitutional validity by “pigeon-holing” — resting the applicability of the compelling state interest test upon the accessibility of a given characteristic to an established “suspect” classification. Rather, the merits of each case and its subject condition or class must be examined individually. In the immediate case, it is unrealistic to conclude broadly or categorically that the condition of indigency invokes application of the compelling state interest test (see Ortwein v. Schwab, 41 U.S.L.W. 3474 (March 1973)), or that a potential candidate of average intelligence and motivation would forever, under all circumstances, face insurmountable difficulties in raising the necessary fees for filing for office in our state. Indeed, a lack of wealth cannot in this case be reasonably found to constitute an “immutable characteristic” as is otherwise almost universally true where a legislative classifi*523cation is based upon such criteria as a person’s sex,6 race,7 or legitimacy of birth.8
If, under our statutory scheme, Washington’s required fees for candidacy filing were deemed 'exorbitant and unreasonable — as were the Texas fees in Bullock9 — then it would indeed be questionable whether the appellants herein who claim a status of indigency would realistically be able to gather sufficient sources of funding to meet the required amount. In such a case, application of the compelling state interest test, as advocated by the appellants, would constitute appropriate judicial review. However, it is not contended by the appellants that the Washington filing fees are exorbitant; rather, it is the indigent status of these parties that is advanced as the basis for declaring our statutory scheme repugnant to the equal protection clause. Nor does the dissent herein suggest that these filing fee amounts are unreasonable. Under the circumstances, absent any contrary indication, the immediate filing fee amounts must be presumed to be reasonable. In this regard, the variance between Washington filing fees and the much larger Texas fees in Bullock is substantial.10 Thus there is no apparent reason to support a conclusion that the subject filing fees are not reasonable. Consequently, the application of the compelling state interest test upon the basis of the characteristic of “wealth” is logically inappropriate to a *524determination of the equal protection challenge in the instant case.
The above rationale pertaining to application of the compelling state interest test upon the basis of wealth is equally pertinent to the franchise of voting which the dissent characterizes as “fundamental” and contends requires the automatic application of this stricter test. Since the primary impact of the Washington statutory scheme for candidate filing fees is upon the candidate, any impact upon the public exercise of the voting franchise is secondary at best. Past decisions of the United States Supreme Court, cited by the dissent, which characterized voting as a fundamental interest requiring invocation of the compelling state interest test, involved direct and substantial rather than theoretical obstacles to the personal and immediate exercise of the right to vote. Thus, the incidental effect of the immediate filing fee requirement upon the voting public should not be sufficient, in and of itself, to sustain an invocation of the compelling state interest in this case. Any standard of review incorporating more than the legitimate state interest or rational basis test is unnecessary and inappropriate to our determination herein.
The issue before this court, then, is whether the instant filing fee system is reasonably related to a legitimate interest or objective of the state. Pertinent to this issue is the following language from Bullock:
In addition to the State’s purported interest in regulating the ballot, the filing fees serve to relieve the State treasury of the cost of conducting the primary elections, and this is a legitimate state objective; in this limited sense it cannot be said that the fee system lacks a rational basis.
(Italics mine.) Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 147, 31 L. Ed. 2d 92, 92 S. Ct. 849 (1972). This reasoning of the Supreme Court resolves both the issue of whether a legitimate state interest exists to which the fee system bears some relation, and that of whether this relation is, in fact, rational, affording sufficient justification for the required *525fees. In concluding (1) that the fees assist the state in the financing of primary elections, (2) that assistance in financing elections is a legitimate state interest, and (3) that the fee system provides a rational means for the achievement of these legitimate ends, the Supreme Court has settled the dispute which we face in this case. Pursuant to the applicable test for determining the existence and legitimacy of a justificatory state interest, it is evident that the equal protection clause is neither violated nor offended by our statutory requirement that a candidate for public office pay a reasonable filing fee.
The preceding discussion, in my best judgment, amply resolves the issue before this court. However, considering recent, if not current, experience with disruptive tactics on the part of certain individuals and groups in a variety of contexts, I am disturbed by what seems to me a real probability of a substantial threat to our political processes which inheres in the judicial obliteration of candidacy controls. I have in mind the likelihood of disruptive mass-filings, overcrowded ballots for disruptive purposes, and the arrest of effective voter participation in the electoral process through sheer confusion. The serious potentiality of such a result was evinced by the multiple filings which occurred, even with statutory controls, during our 1972 primary elections.11 In this regard, the court in Bullock recognized as “legitimate” the interest of the state in seeking to
prevent the clogging of its election machinery, avoid voter confusion, and . . . overcrowded ballots. Moreover, a State has an interest, if not a duty, to protect the integrity of its political processes from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies.
(Italics mine.) Bullock v. Carter, supra at 145. As suggested earlier, it was the exorbitant character of the Texas fee schedule which dictated a determination by the *526Supreme Court that the legitimate interest of the State of Texas in deterring fraudulent or mass filings and consequent voter confusion could not prevail against the unreasonable fees charged, and imposed upon candidates for public office. Equally evident was the court’s specific caveat concerning overextension of the Bullock decision beyond the exorbitant Texas schedule, emphasizing that “nothing herein is intended to cast doubt on the validity of reasonable candidate filing fees.” 405 U.S at 149. Though perhaps not the only means of realizing the above legitimate interests of the state which were recognized in Bullock, it is apparent that the reasonable Washington filing fee requirement imposes and provides a proper and essential measure of candidacy controls, yet is inoffensive to the equal protection clause.12 To summarize then, in the absence of a showing that an individual or group has borne discriminatory treatment upon the basis of an “immutable characteristic”, or that some fundamental interest is directly inhibited by our statutory scheme, it is inappropriate to apply the compelling state interest test to this equal protection challenge. The facts and circumstances in this case demonstrate the basis for application of only the legitimate state interest test. Measuring the constitutionality of the Washington fee schedule by means of this latter test, keeping in mind the language of the Supreme Court in Bullock, it is evident that our reasonable filing fees for candidacy are consistent with the mandates of the equal protection clause.
On the basis of the reasons indicated, I' concur in the majority opinion.
Stafford and Wright, JJ., concur with Finley, J.

 See Comment, Developments in the Law—Equal Protection, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1065 (1969); Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341 (1949).

 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1010, 87 S. Ct. 1817 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 86 L. Ed. 1655, 62 S. Ct. 1110 (1942).

 See Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1972).

 “This reasoning is taken from the plurality opinion of the court in Frontiero.

 “Perhaps the answer is that race and lineage are congenital and unalterable traits over which an individual has no control and for which he should receive neither blame nor reward. In a society which proclaims that all men are created equal, such traits presumptively present no basis for an inference of differing worth.” Comment, Equal Protection, supra at 1126-27.

 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 36 L. Ed. 2d 583, 93 S. Ct. 1764 (1973).

 See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 98 L. Ed. 884, 74 S. Ct. 693 (1954).

 See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 20 L. Ed. 2d 436, 88 S. Ct. 1509 (1968).

 It is true, as indicated by the dissent, that one filing fee within the Texas system reviewed in Bullock amounted to only $50. However, it is evident from a close examination of Bullock and the court’s frequent reference to the Texas fee system as exorbitant, large, and unreasonable that the $50 fee was not the subject of the court’s review, but was merely incidental to the otherwise exorbitant fee schedule.

 The fees which form the subject of the instant litigation range from $150 to $425; the Texas fees dealt with by the United States court in Bullock ranged from $1,000 to $6,300.

 According to the Election Division of the Office of the Secretary of State, the average 1972 primary election ballot contained the names of some 75 candidates for public office.

 Retaining the restriction of a reasonable filing fee will not, of itself, totally obviate the possibility of fraudulent and frivolous candidacies; however, until such time as it behooves the legislature to enact remedial measures permitting access to candidacy filing by means alternative to the payment of a reasonable fee (e.g., permitting the filing of petitions containing a required number of signatures from qualified voters), our current fee requirement, as promotive of serious candidacy, appears to provide an essential control, albeit less than an exclusive panacea.