Court Opinion

ID: 9524765
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:56:56.292909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:11:51.194922
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CHAPMAN, dissenting: I disagree with the majority that the plaintiff was absolved from serving the parties with notice. Granting injunctive relief without notice is an extraordinary remedy and is appropriate only under the most extreme and urgent circumstances. Board of Education of Community Unit School District No. 101 v. Parlor, 85 Ill. 2d 397, 401, 424 N.E.2d 1152, 1153 (1981). To grant such relief without notice to the adverse party, it must clearly appear from specific facts shown by affidavit or by verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon. 735 ILCS 5/11 — 101 (West 1994). The critical inquiry in determining the propriety of an injunction without notice is whether in the minutes or hours necessary to procure defendant’s appearance defendant could and would take such action as to seriously obstruct the court from dealing justly and effectively with the issues in dispute. Board of Education of Community Unit School District No. 101 v. Parlor, 81 Ill. App. 3d 667, 670, 402 N.E.2d 388, 390 (1980), affd, 85 Ill. 2d 397, 424 N.E.2d 1152 (1981). Plaintiff’s verified complaint states, "[If injunctive relief is not granted,] [plaintiff] will lose the substantial cost of preparing the bid, loss of profits from the project, loss of sales to pay overhead and incalculable damage to its professional reputation for submitting a bid wrongfully found to be 'unresponsive’ by the Tri-City Regional Port District.” The pleadings do not indicate how the plaintiff would be irreparably injured by notifying the defendants of the hearing. There is no allegation that "during the period it takes to give notice, the opponent will take measures as to destroy the substance of the litigation or otherwise obstruct the court from dealing effectively with the issues.” G&J Parking Co. v. City of Chicago, 168 Ill. App. 3d 382, 387, 522 N.E.2d 774, 777 (1988). Finally, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that notice was not required because the Port District hád previously been informed of the plaintiffs grievance. Notice of the grievance does not equate with notice of an injunction. Moreover, according to plaintiff’s complaint, Keller Construction is an Illinois firm with principal offices in Madison County. Thus, there is nothing in the record to suggest that plaintiff could not have easily notified Keller. Because nothing in the record supports a finding that notice did not have to be given, I would find that the temporary restraining order was wrongfully issued. I would further find that Keller is entitled to damages under section 11 — 110 and remand this case to the trial court for a determination of the amount of damages incurred by Keller.