Court Opinion

ID: 9827481
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:35:34.248229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:29.544597
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
Appellee has asked for additional conclusions of fact, which we give in the language requested by her, modified and explained as indicated :
“Requested Conclusions of Fact
“(1) Defendant owned and operated a line of railway through Jefferson county and Beaumont. A switch or passing track parallelled its main line, about 20 feet therefrom, extending from its yards, westward about 110 car lengths distant, where it entered its main line. Both tracks crossed Fourth street in Beaumont, at grade. The tracks were elevated about three feet above the street level which gradually approached the crossing from a distance of about 50 feet. The bottom of a freight car standing on this crossing would be about 3 feet above the elevated portion of the street and about 6 feet above its level.
“(2) Fourth street was a through thoroughfare between the north and south sections of the city of Beaumont; was a paved street, and the only paved street west of the viaduct some six blocks east. It extended straight several hundred feet on both sides of the railroad tracks, which crossed it at right angles and the crossing was in no way obscured.”
There was no testimony of the amount of “improvements” in the territory adjacent to this crossing, nor of its proximity to the “populated” section of the city, nor of the amount of travel on this street; as stated in our original opinion, there were no facts in evidence indicating that this crossing was “more than ordinarily hazardous,” unless a conclusion to that effect may be drawn from these additional conclusions of fact.
“(3) On the night of the occurrence defendant left its yards over this passing track with a freight train consisting of 94 freight cars, engine and caboose, to enter its main line when it had been cleared by its regular east bound passenger train which was running behind schedule.
“(4) The freight train was moved at such speed that it blocked the Fourth street crossing for more than thirty minutes while killing time until its main line was cleared.”
The freight train was in constant motion during the 30- minutes or more that it blocked .the Fourth street crossing.
. “(5) The time was around 12 o’clock at night; the freight cars were dark colored and unlighted and their presence blocking the crossing was not discoverable by persons traveling said street in automobiles until such time as the lights on their cars were elevated, by their approach, enough to shine upon the elevated box car, which distance would be about 50 feet therefrom. The noise of the train, at the speed it was moving, was not audible beyond .that distance.”
Appellant has filed exceptions to the fifth requested conclusion, but if has support, on the point to which appellant reserved its exception, by the following testimony: “Q. At the time of the collision and under the surroundings as they existed at the time as seen by you, at what distance could the train on said crossing have been seen by persons in an approaching automobile exercising proper care? A. Well, they couldn’t have seen it so far because there wasn’t any moon shining. The lights froth the car *1084wouldn’t have shown on the train until it got within 40 or SO feet of it.”
.“(6) The lights of an approaching automobile, if not intercepted by any object in front of it, would shine under the freight cars and on the street beyond and give the illusion of an open, unobstructed highway ahead.”
This conclusion is based upon the following testimony cited by appellee in its support:
Defendant’s witness Wells said: “After you get right near the track, your lights reflect under the train — that is, right up close to it.”
And the witness Mitchell says:
“Q. The light of your automobile would shine under the cars due to the crossing elevated ? A. It might hit right at the bottom of the car.
. “Q. That is a case — you mean 20 or 30 feet back? A. When you are right near the train.
“Q. After you get up on the incline? A. If you go on the incline, it naturally deflects your light upward.”
Our fact conclusion under this sixth request is intended merely to give effect to the quoted testimony. On the issue of “illusion” we take the following summary of the testimony of appellee from appellant’s exception to this sixth requested conclusion, and this testimony constitutes a part of our fact conclusion on that issue: “Miss Tulu Beard testified that as they approached the crossing there was no automobile coming from down the street from the opposite direction and on the other side of the railroad which would give them the illusion of an open track.”
“(7) In this situation the automobile in which plaintiff was riding approached the crossing. Both she and the driver of the auto were strangers to -that locality and did not know of the existence of the crossing. Ahead of them,-and between them and the crossing another auto had stopped about 10 or 12 feet from the crossing blocked by the train. This standing auto was seen by the plaintiff and the driver of her car as they approached and as the lights from their car shone upon it and they took it to be a car which had parked at that place. At a proper distance from the parked car, the driver of plaintiff’s car turned his car sufficiently to the left to pass the parked car.
“(8) In passing the parked car, when the lights from plaintiff’s car were in position to strike the road ahead, the presence of the obstruction on the highway was first revealed to plaintiff and the driver of her car and they were then within a very few feet of the train. Instantaneously the driver of plaintiff’s car applied his brakes and swerved to the right to pass in front of the parked car and regain his proper side of the highway and escape a collision.”
The eighth requested conclusion is approved, with the qualification that appellee and the other occupants of the wrecked automobile testified that they did not see the train until they were “within approximately 5 feet of same.”
“(9) Plaintiff’s automobile immediately collided with the freight car across the crossing, the hood and front end passing underneath the freight car striking the center rods thereof, and the body of the auto, back of the hood, coming into contact with the bottom of the freight car. Plaintiff and the driver of her car were both rendered unconscious by the contact.
“(10) The automobile remained in this position, partly under the freight car, until the slowly moving train pushed or pulled it from under the freight car and clear of the track where it was left standing upright with its occupants, just clear of the passing cars and on and crossway the street.
“(11) The time was midnight, a very dark night, no surrounding lights of any kind and defendant gave no warning of the obstructed crossing in any way, such as, flagman, bell, whistle, zig zag, alarm, light, sound or otherwise.
“(12) Plaintiff was fully acquitted by the jury verdict, supported by sufficient evidence, of all negligence and no complaint thereof is made. Plaintiff suffered injuries in the collision.”
By her motion for rehearing, appel-lee invokes the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-tur. That doctrine has no application to this case. She plead specific acts of negligence, and only specific acts of negligence were submitted to the jury. It is the general rule, reaffirmed by this court in Hawthorne v. T. & N. O. R. R. Co., 84 S.W.(2d) 1015, that allegations of specific acts of negligence bar the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The following note on this proposition from Texas Law Review, vol. 14, No. 2, p. 277 (February, 1936) is in'point against every contention appellee could make on the theory of res ipsa loquitur:
*1085“Pleading — Res Ipsa Loquitur — Effect of Alleging Specific Acts of Negligence— Plaintiff was struck by a projection from one of defendant’s trains, knocked under the moving cars, and injured. He sued for damages, his petition alleging specific acts of negligence. Held, that the allegation of specific acts of negligence prevents the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Hawthorne v. Texas & N. O. R. R. (Beaumont Tex.Civ.App., 1935) 84 S.W.(2d) 1015.
“The rule of the principal case seems to be well established in Texas. Johnson v. Galveston, H. & H. R. R., 27 Tex.Civ.App. 616, 66 S.W. 906 (1902, writ of error refused) ; Lone Star Brewing Co. v. Willie, 52 Tex.Civ.App. 550, 114 S.W. 186 (1908, writ of error refused); Cecil & Co. v. Stamford Gas & Electric Co. (Tex.Civ.App.1922) 242 S.W. 536; Davis v. Castile (Tex.Com.App.1924) 257 S.W. 870; Wichita Valley Ry. v. Helms (Tex.Civ.App.1924) 261 S.W. 225. The Texas cases also hold that where there are both specific and general allegations of negligence, the specific allegations will control and res ipsa loquitur will not apply. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Herring (Tex.Civ.App.1896) 36 S.W. 129; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Vance (Tex.Civ.App.1897) 41 S.W. 167; Houston, E. & W. T. Ry. v. Summers (Tex.Civ.App.1899) 49 S.W. 1106, affirmed 92 Tex. 621, 51 S.W. 324 (1899); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Thomas, 63 Tex.Civ.App. 312, 132 S.W. 974 (1910). However, under the Texas system of alternative pleading, where there are allegations of specific acts of negligence and in the alternative a separate allegation of negligence generally, res ipsa loquitur will be applicable. Trinity & B. V. Ry. v. Geary (Tex.Civ.App.1914) 169 S.W. 201, reversed on other grounds, 107 Tex. 11, 172 S.W. 545 (1915); Schaff v. Sanders (Tex.Civ.App.1923) 257 S.W. 670, affirmed (Tex.Com.App.1925) 269 S.W. 1034; Wichita Falls Traction Co. v. Elliott (Tex.Com.App.1935) 81 S.W.(2d) 659.
“Some Texas cases have expressed the view that res ipsa loquitur should be applicable regardless of whether the allegations are of specific acts of negligence or of negligence generally. See Trinity & B. V. Ry. v. Geary (Tex.Civ.App.1912, writ of error dismissed) 144 S.W. 1045; Texas-Louisiana Power Co. v. Daniels (Tex.Civ.App.1933, writ of error granted) 61 S.W.(2d) 179, 184; Wichita Falls Traction Co. v. Elliott, supra (Tex.Com.App.) 81 S.W.(2d) 659, at page 666. These cases apparently represent a weak minority view in this state but are in accord with many well reasoned judicial opinions outside this jurisdiction. Biddle v. Riley, 118 Ark. 206, 176 S.W. 134, L.R.A.1915F, 992 (1915); Firszt v. Capitol Park Realty Co., 98 Conn. 627, 120 A. 300, 29 A.L.R. 17 (1923); Cleary v. Cavanaugh, 219 Mass. 281, 106 N.E. 998 (1914); Dearden v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. R., 33 Utah, 147, 93 P. 271 (1907); Washington-Virginia Ry. v. Bouknight, 113 Va. 696, 75 S.E. 1032, Ann.Cas.1913E, 546 (1912); Walters v. Seattle, R. & S. Ry., 48 Wash. 233, 93 P. 419, 24 L.R.A.(N.S.) 788 (1908). Contra: The Great Northern, 251 F. 826 (C.C.A.9th, 1918); Kennedy v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 128 Mo.App. 297, 107 S.W. 16 (1907); Pierce v. Great Falls & C. Ry., 22 Mont. 445, 56 P. 867 (1899).”
Apart from the theory of res ipsa loqui-tur, appellee predicates her motion for rehearing on the issues of negligence submitted to the jury and that these issues were raised by the evidence. She makes no contention that she could strengthen her case upon another trial, nor that she could offer evidence upon any issue not submitted to the jury. The only proposition in this case, as originally briefed by appellant and as presented by appellee’s motion for rehearing, is simply whether or not the issues submitted to the jury have support in the evidence. If they have support,' then the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed; if they do not have support, then the judgment of the lower court should be reversed and judgment here rendered for appellant. It is our conclusion that, as a matter of law, the verdict of the jury is without support; for that reason, appellee’s motion for rehearing is in all things overruled