Court Opinion

ID: 9944612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 18:02:51.35623+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:20:01.601526
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/23/24 P. v. Pedraza CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        G062015

           v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 17NF2318)

 OSIRIS LENIN GARFIAS PEDRAZA,                                         OPINION

      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Terri K.
Flynn-Peister, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded with directions.
                   George L. Schraer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
              Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin Urbansky and Warren J.
Williams, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                   *          *          *
              Osiris Lenin Garfias Pedraza appeals for the second time from the
judgment convicting him of murder, following the trial court’s refusal to strike a firearm
enhancement after our remand from his first appeal. Pedraza does not challenge the
court’s refusal to strike the firearm enhancement in this appeal. Instead, he addresses
amendments to Penal Code1 section 186.22, enacted as part of Assembly Bill No. 333
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.; Stats. 2021, ch. 699, §§ 1-5.) (Assem. Bill 333), which modify
the requirements for proving gang enhancements. He argues that pursuant to In re
Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada), those amendments apply retroactively to this
nonfinal judgment and require reversal and retrial of the jury’s true findings that he
committed the murder for the benefit of a street gang. The Attorney General counters the
Estrada rule cannot apply in this case because the portion of Pedraza’s judgment
involving the gang enhancement became final after his first appeal.
              We are not persuaded since, as discussed below, our Supreme Court has
held that if any portion of a judgment remains open, that entire judgment qualifies as
nonfinal for purposes of applying Estrada.
              The Attorney General also argues that Assem. Bill 333’s amendments to
section 186.22 are unenforceable to the extent of the gang-murder enhancement under
section 190.2, subdivision (a)(22), as they would unconstitutionally amend provisions of
Proposition 21, passed by the voters in 2000. Based on the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in People v. Rojas (2023) 15 Cal.5th 561 (Rojas), once again, as discussed in
more detail below, we must disagree.

       1
              All further statutory references are to this code.

                                              2
              Finally, Pedraza argues that Assem. Bill 333’s addition of section 1109,
which now requires that gang enhancements be bifurcated from substantive charges and
litigated only if the defendant was convicted of the substantive crime, applies
retroactively to this case under Estrada. As a result, he argues Estrada requires not only
that his gang enhancements be vacated, but his conviction as well. This time we
disagree. Estrada retroactivity applies to laws intended to ameliorate sentences; it does
not apply to laws intended to affect the determination of guilt—which is the purpose of
section 1109. While it is true that being acquitted of the charged crime is the ultimate
sentencing amelioration, to apply Estrada in that way would result in a rule requiring that
all criminal laws affording any new protection to the accused would necessarily be given
retroactive effect. That is not what Estrada requires, and we reject the assertion.

                                           FACTS
              In July 2017, a member of a rival gang referred to Pedraza’s gang in
disparaging manner. The evidence at trial reflected that about 30 minutes later Pedraza
returned with other members of his gang; he then shot the rival gang member, who died.
              Pedraza was convicted of first degree murder, and the jury found true that
(1) he intentionally killed the victim while he was an active participant in a criminal
street gang and committed the murder to further the criminal activities of that gang
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22); i.e., the gang-murder enhancement); (2) he committed his offense
for the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with, a criminal street gang and
with the specific intent to promote, further, and assist in criminal conduct by members of
that gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(4); i.e., the gang-murder special circumstance
enhancement); (3) he personally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53,
subd. (d)); and (4) he vicariously discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53,
subds. (d) & (e)(1)).

                                              3
              In January 2020, the trial court sentenced Pedraza to life without the
possibility of parole for the murder with the gang-murder special circumstance and
imposed a consecutive 25-years-to-life term for the personal discharge of a firearm
enhancement. The court stayed the term for the gang-murder special circumstance
enhancement and the vicarious arming enhancement.
              Pedraza’s first appeal resulted in a partial reversal and remand with
instructions to reconsider striking the firearm enhancement. On remand, the trial court
declined to strike the enhancement. While that case was on remand, Assem. Bill 333
became effective.2

                                      DISCUSSION
       1.     Assem. Bill 333 and Retroactivity
              Effective January 1, 2022, Assem. Bill 333 significantly modified
section 186.22. (See Stats. 2021, ch. 699, §§ 1–4; People v. E.H. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
467, 477.)
              As the California Supreme Court explained in People v. Tran (2022)
13 Cal.5th 1169 (Tran): “Assembly Bill 333 made the following changes to the law on
gang enhancements: First, it narrowed the definition of a ‘criminal street gang’ to require

       2
               Pedraza acknowledges that the retroactive effect of Assem. Bill 333’s
statutory changes is an issue that could have been raised in the trial court on remand, but
it was not. However, he argues that because there could be no satisfactory tactical reason
for counsel to have failed to raise it, the omission qualified as ineffective assistance of
counsel as a matter of law, and thus the issue can be raised for the first time on appeal.
(See People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) The Attorney General does not dispute
the point. In any event, we exercise our discretion to review a pure issue of law raised for
the first time on appeal. (American Indian Health & Services Corp. v. Kent (2018)
24 Cal.App.5th 772, 789; Duran v. Obesity Research Institute, LLC (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th
635, 646 [“As an exception to the general rule, the appellate court has discretion to
consider issues raised for the first time on appeal where the relevant facts are undisputed
and could not have been altered by the presentation of additional evidence”].)

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that any gang be an ‘ongoing, organized association or group of three or more persons.’
(§186.22, subd. (f), italics added.) Second, whereas section 186.22, former
subdivision (f) required only that a gang’s members ‘individually or collectively engage
in’ a pattern of criminal activity in order to constitute a ‘criminal street gang,’ Assembly
Bill 333 requires that any such pattern have been ‘collectively engage[d] in’ by members
of the gang. (§186.22, subd. (f), italics added.) Third, Assembly Bill 333 also narrowed
the definition of a ‘pattern of criminal activity’ by requiring that (1) the last offense used
to show a pattern of criminal gang activity occurred within three years of the date that the
currently charged offense is alleged to have been committed; (2) the offenses were
committed by two or more gang ‘members,’ as opposed to just ‘persons’; (3) the offenses
commonly benefitted a criminal street gang; and (4) the offenses establishing a pattern of
gang activity must be ones other than the currently charged offense. (§186.22, subd.
(e)(1), (2).) Fourth, Assembly Bill 333 narrowed what it means for an offense to have
commonly benefitted a street gang, requiring that any ‘common benefit’ be ‘more than
reputational.’ (§186.22, subd. (g).)” (Tran, at p. 1206, original italics.)
              “Assembly Bill 333 [also] added section 1109, which requires, if requested
by the defendant, a gang enhancement charge to be tried separately from all other counts
that do not otherwise require gang evidence as an element of the crime. If the
proceedings are bifurcated, the truth of the gang enhancement may be determined only
after a trier of fact finds the defendant guilty of the underlying offense. (Tran, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 1206.)
              Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, established that a change in law that reduces
punishment for a crime must be applied to all defendants whose judgments are not final:
“When the Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen the punishment it has obviously
expressly determined that its former penalty was too severe and that a lighter punishment
is proper as punishment for the commission of the prohibited act. It is an inevitable
inference that the Legislature must have intended that the new statute imposing the new

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lighter penalty now deemed to be sufficient should apply to every case to which it
constitutionally could apply. The amendatory act imposing the lighter punishment can be
applied constitutionally to acts committed before its passage provided the judgment
convicting the defendant of the act is not final. This intent seems obvious, because to
hold otherwise would be to conclude that the Legislature was motivated by a desire for
vengeance, a conclusion not permitted in view of modern theories of penology.” (Id. at
p. 745.)
       2.     Application of Assem. Bill 333 to This Case
              The Attorney General agrees that Estrada requires that a change in law that
ameliorates punishment for a crime must be applied retroactively to all defendants with
“nonfinal judgments.” He also agrees that Assem. Bill 333’s amendments to section
186.22, which tighten the requirements for imposing sentence enhancements based on
gang affiliation, are generally governed by that rule. (See People v. Lopez (2021)
73 Cal.App.5th 327, 344.) The Attorney General nonetheless contends the amendments
cannot be retroactively applied in this case because “the jury’s true findings on the gang-
enhancement allegations had become final in 2021” when this court issued the remittitur
following his first appeal. Therefore, the only portion of Pedraza’a judgment that
remained nonfinal following that remittitur was whether the trial court should impose or
strike the firearm enhancement. We disagree.
              A judgment of conviction cannot be sliced and diced to assess its finality
for purposes of the retroactive application of an ameliorative change under Estrada. Our
Supreme Court has held there is only one ‘“judgment of conviction”’ for purposes of
Estrada retroactivity, and it includes both the adjudication of guilt and the sentence. If
any aspect of that judgment is not final, then the judgment is not final for purposes of
Estrada retroactivity. (People v. McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40, 46 (McKenzie).)
              In McKenzie, the Supreme Court rejected the argument made here by the
Attorney General: “the People assert, the original 2014 order granting defendant

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probation was ‘a final judgment for purposes of filing an appeal,’ and that judgment—
which included defendant’s ‘underlying conviction’ and ‘the admissions to prior
convictions that qualified [him] for enhanced sentencing’—became ‘final for Estrada
purposes . . . when the time to appeal from the . . . order passed, well before the
Legislature amended the enhancement statute.’ Defendant therefore is not entitled to
‘retroactive application’ of the statutory revisions.” (McKenzie, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 46.)
The Supreme Court explained that “[t]he People’s arguments fail under our precedents
[because] the People err by assuming that when we used the phrase ‘judgment of
conviction’ in Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at page 744, we were referring only to
‘underlying’ convictions and enhancement findings, exclusive of sentence. In criminal
actions, the terms ‘judgment’ and ‘“sentence”’ are generally considered ‘synonymous’
[citation], and there is no ‘judgment of conviction’ without a sentence [citation].”
(McKenzie, at p. 46.)
              Without acknowledging McKenzie, the Attorney General relies on language
in People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 169-170 (Padilla)—a case which addresses
the retroactive effect of a law which requires that criminal cases against minors be
initiated in juvenile court subject to a later transfer hearing—for the proposition that
Estrada retroactivity can affect only the “nonfinal” part of a judgment: “Whatever
potential that hearing may have for reducing his punishment (the nonfinal part of his
judgment), it does not authorize or constitute relitigation of guilt.” (Id. at p. 170.) But in
our view, and consistent with McKenzie, the more precise distinction the Supreme Court
draws in Padilla appears just before the language the Attorney General emphasizes, i.e.,
“the right and remedy we recognize today does not allow Padilla to raise claims unrelated
to his sentence.” (Id. at p. 169, italics added.) That distinction is also consistent with
Estrada itself, which established a rule of retroactivity for laws which ameliorate
punishment rather than guilt. (See People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299,
307.)

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              When we apply that guilt versus sentencing analysis here, we conclude
Estrada does retroactivity apply to this case because gang enhancements, like all other
enhancements, relate to sentencing.
       3.     Application of Assem. Bill 333 to the Gang-Murder Enhancement
              The Attorney General also asserts that even if Assem. Bill 333’s
amendment of section 186.22 would be otherwise applicable, it is unenforceable to the
extent of the gang-murder special circumstance under section 190.2. The Attorney
General argues that if applied to that enhancement, it amounts to an unconstitutional
amendment of Proposition 21.
              The Supreme Court has now resolved that issue in Rojas, supra, 15 Cal.5th
561: “We hold that the application of Assembly Bill 333 to the gang-murder special
circumstance does not violate the limitation on legislative amendment in Proposition 21.”
(Rojas, at p. 566.) We are bound by that ruling.
       4.     Retroactivity of Section 1109’s Requirement of Bifurcation
              Pedraza’s final contention is that section 1109, which was also added by
Assem. Bill 333 and requires the court to bifurcate the adjudication of the defendant’s
guilt from the determination of any gang enhancements, must also be applied
retroactively to this case. 3 (See People v. Burgos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 550, 568,

       3
               Section 1109 provides: “(a) If requested by the defense, a case in which a
gang enhancement is charged under subdivision (b) or (d) of Section 186.22 shall be tried
in separate phases as follows: [¶] (1) The question of the defendant’s guilt of the
underlying offense shall be first determined. [¶] (2) If the defendant is found guilty of
the underlying offense and there is an allegation of an enhancement under subdivision (b)
or (d) of Section 186.22, there shall be further proceedings to the trier of fact on the
question of the truth of the enhancement. Allegations that the underlying offense was
committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, a criminal street
gang and that the underlying offense was committed with the specific intent to promote,
further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members shall be proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence. [¶] (b) If a defendant is charged with a violation of
subdivision (a) of Section 186.22, this count shall be tried separately from all other

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review granted and briefing deferred July 13, 2022, S274743 (Burgos).) Pedraza argues
the new statute requires the court to not only reverse his gang enhancements, but his
murder conviction as well, and to remand the case to the trial court for retrial on both
issues. This time we are not persuaded.
              The Attorney General argues that the portion of Assem. Bill 333 adding
section 1109 is not retroactive because it is a procedural change, not intended to
ameliorate the punishment. This issue is also pending before our Supreme Court. (See
People v. Ramirez (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 48, review granted and briefing deferred
Aug. 17, 2022, S275341 [section 1109 is not retroactive]; Burgos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th
550, rev.gr. [section 1109 is retroactive].)
              Although other aspects of Assem. Bill 333 are intended to restrict the
circumstances in which gang enhancements can be applied, there is no indication that the
bifurcation requirement it created in section 1109 had the same purpose. To the contrary,
the Legislature’s findings in support of Assem. Bill 333 suggest its concern was that
presenting the jury with evidence of the defendant’s gang affiliation could have a
prejudicial effect on the jury’s determination of guilt on the substantive charge.
              Burgos acknowledges the same point: “The findings further establish that
the bifurcation of gang enhancements at trial is intended to ameliorate the prejudicial
impact of trying enhancements together with the offense. ‘Bifurcation of trials where
gang evidence is alleged can help reduce its harmful and prejudicial impact.’ [Citation.]
‘Gang enhancement evidence can be unreliable and prejudicial to a jury because it is
lumped into evidence of the underlying charges which further perpetuates unfair
prejudice in juries and convictions of innocent people.’ [Citation.] ‘California courts
have long recognized how prejudicial gang evidence is. [Citation.] Studies suggest that

counts that do not otherwise require gang evidence as an element of the crime. This
charge may be tried in the same proceeding with an allegation of an enhancement under
subdivision (b) or (d) of Section 186.22.”

                                               9
allowing a jury to hear the kind of evidence that supports a gang enhancement before it
has decided whether the defendant is guilty or not may lead to wrongful convictions.
[Citations.]’” (Burgos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at pp. 566-567, rev.gr.) We agree with the
view that bifurcation is intended to eliminate the possibility that gang evidence could
prejudice the jury’s evaluation of guilt.
               Burgos then goes on to explain why the goal of protecting the neutrality of
the jury’s assessment of guilt is nonetheless entitled to retroactive effect under Estrada:
“one of the ameliorative effects of bifurcation is that some defendants will actually be
acquitted of the underlying offense absent the prejudicial impact of gang evidence. This
increased possibility of acquittal—which necessarily reduces possible punishment—is
sufficient to trigger retroactivity under the Estrada rule.” (Burgos, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th
at p. 567, rev.gr.)
               But this is where we part company with Burgos. While it is true that being
found not guilty of a crime could be viewed as the ultimate amelioration of the
defendant’s potential punishment, applying Estrada in that way would mean any
amendment to the criminal law which benefits the accused in any way would be deemed
automatically retroactive. The Supreme Court has never created such a sweeping rule.
As we have already noted, its recent decision in Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th 152, stated
that the retroactive “right and remedy we recognize today does not allow Padilla to raise
claims unrelated to his sentence.” (Id. at p. 169, italics added.) Applying that rule here,
we conclude that because Pedraza’s right to bifurcate the trial of guilt from the
determination of gang enhancements is intended to affect the determination of guilt, it is
not retroactive under Estrada.

                                        DISPOSITION
               The judgment is reversed in part. We vacate the true findings under
   sections 186.22, subdivision (b), and 190.2, subdivision (a)(22), and remand the

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matter to the trial court to afford the prosecution the opportunity to retry these
allegations in conformance with the current law. The remainder of the judgment is
affirmed.

                                               GOETHALS, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

SANCHEZ, J.

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