Court Opinion

ID: 9482764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:59:42.574758+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:11.376557
License: Public Domain

WIENER, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Judge Goldberg’s dissent eloquently and forcefully raises a number of serious problems with the doctrine of standing as currently articulated, and, perhaps more significantly, offers the Supreme Court a principled way to limit the Lyons doctrine so that justice can be done in cases like O’Hair’s. Nonetheless, given that the majority, with one minor exception, accurately states and applies the standing doctrine now sanctioned by that Court, I find myself unable to join Judge Goldberg’s well-crafted dissent. I therefore concur in the majority’s holding that O’Hair does not have standing to procure declaratory relief against Judge Herman under Lyons and its extensive progeny because she cannot show a real and immediate threat that Judge Herman will again exclude her from jury service and jail her for refusing to “affirm.” I also concur in the- majority’s holding that the Society lacks standing to seek prospective relief for its members as it cannot meet the first prong of the test for associational standing set forth in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2441, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977).
My disagreement with the majority, and thus my reason for writing separately, stems from the sweeping language, unsupported speculation, and possibly incorrect analysis, that the majority employs in concluding that the Society fails the third prong of the Hunt test. The majority seems to offer two reasons why the Society fails this prong. One is that the Society’s members may differ as to the religious nature of an affirmance. If by this statement the majority means to say that the Society lacks standing because its members may have conflicting interests on the outcome of the litigation, then it needlessly decides an issue not previously addressed by this court, and, in so doing, adopts a rule that has been rejected by most circuits that have decided that issue. See National Maritime Union v. Commander, Military Sealift Command, 824 F.2d 1228, 1231-34 (D.C.Cir.1987) (conflicting interests among members will not defeat union’s standing to urge the interests of some members in litigation); Contractors Ass’n of Eastern Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 1260, 1264-66 (3rd Cir.1991); and Gillis v. U.S. Dept of Health and Human Services, 759 F.2d 565, 572-73 (6th Cir.1985). But see Associated General Contractors v. Otter Tail Power Co., 611 F.2d 684, 691 (8th Cir.1979). Indeed, in National Maritime Union, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia went so far as to assert that the Supreme Court itself, in UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 106 S.Ct. 2523, 91 L.Ed.2d 228 (1986), determined that conflicting member interests will not preclude associational standing. 824 F.2d at 1232-33.
The majority’s second reason for finding that participation of the individual members of the Society is necessary appears to be that a free exercise claim, by its very nature, requires particularized information from all members. For this proposition the majority cites Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 320-21, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 2689-90, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980), in which Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, determined that the Women’s Division of the Board of Global Ministries of the United Methodist Church had no standing under the third Hunt prong to challenge the Hyde Amendment on behalf of its members because a free exercise claim “ordinarily requires individual participation.” But this court has never interpreted McRae as precluding all free exercise claims brought by associations on behalf of their members. See, e.g., Church of Scientology v. Cazares, 638 F.2d 1272, 1276-80 (5th Cir.1981) (distinguishing McRae and finding church to have standing under the third Hunt prong to bring a free exercise claim on behalf of its members). The critical aspect of McRae, moreover, was that the Women’s Division conceded a diversity of views within its membership as to the permissibility, necessity, and advisability of abortion. In this case, by contrast, the majority pre*1290sumes a diversity of views, stating that nothing in the record supports the notion that Society members share O’Hair's views regarding the religious nature of an affirmance. Does not the fact that the Society is a co-petitioner in this suit indicate that at least a substantial number of its members hold the same view of an affirmation as does O’Hair?
Furthermore, numerous cases raising issues other than free exercise make clear that the third Hunt prong does not mean that an association lacks standing if the participation of any member is necessary. See, e.g., Hospital Council of Western Pennsylvania v. Pittsburgh, 949 F.2d 83, 89 (3rd Cir.1991) (“[Association may assert a claim that requires participation of some members.”). The third Hunt prong merely paraphrases the more elaborate discussion of individual participation in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). In Warth, the Court explained that “so long as the nature of the claim and of the relief sought does not make the individual participation of each injured party indispensable to proper resolution of the cause, the association may be an appropriate representative of its members, entitled to invoke this court’s jurisdiction.” 422 U.S. at 511, 95 S.Ct. at 2212 (emphasis added). In this case, however, it is not immediately apparent why the individual participation of all Society members would be required for this free exercise claim.
What really disturbs me, no less than it disturbs Judge Goldberg, is that neither O’Hair nor the Society has any way to pursue redress of the First Amendment violations perpetrated by the state trial judge in this case. My disturbance is not, I fear, shared by many of my colleagues, in most of whom I sense a degree of relief that the issue of standing pretermits the need to address Appellees’ free exercise claims.
O’Hair, and likely her famous grandmother as well, must have thought that Santa Claus, the Easter bunny, and the tooth fairy had combined their efforts to deliver the jury summons that launched this case on its odyssey. I have the impression that many of my colleagues are thankful to the Supreme Court (if not to that same mythical trio) for providing the insurmountable obstacle of standing that interdicts this court’s obligation to deal with the discomfiting First Amendment claims of these perennial Atheist gadflies. In that regard, however, we would all do well to heed the sagacious words of Justice Holmes:
If there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought — not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate.
United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 653, 49 S.Ct. 448, 451, 73 L.Ed. 889 (1929). The practical effect of lack of standing, pursuant to Lyons, is the denial of a remedy for the type of unconstitutional abuse visited by Judge Herman directly on O’Hair, and indirectly on the Society, as long as occurrences of that nature are anecdotal and do not rise to the frequency or consistency required to confer standing.
True, Judge Herman started down the path of propriety in his handling of O’Hair’s free exercise objection to participating in an act of affirmation. In fact, the judge reached the penultimate stepping stone on that path before he deviated from the proper to the impermissible. If, instead of engaging in constitutionally repugnant debate with O’Hair about the validity of her religious beliefs vis-a-vis an affirmation, Judge Herman had calmly but firmly insisted that O’Hair propose a truth-ensuring statement that she felt she could make without violating the tenets of Atheism as she in good faith professes them, the judge would have maintained an unassailable position, doing all that the courts and the Constitution require. That is clear from the panel majority opinion and the dissenting opinion, both penned by Judge Goldberg.
Fortunately, the substance of Judge Goldberg’s opinions subsists, shining as a lamp to brighten the constitutional path for the eyes of all trial judges, both state and federal, within the boundaries of this cir*1291cuit whenever one of those jurists happens to encounter a prospective juror or witness who has either religious or anti-religious concerns about oaths or affirmations. Albeit today’s majority opinion keeps Judge Goldberg’s opinions from constituting precedent, their lesson is “out there” for all judges of good will to heed.
For the foregoing reasons I specially concur in part and dissent in part.