Court Opinion

ID: 9661332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:35:49.487817+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:27.279275
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING
COLEMAN, Justice.
The brief of appellee on rehearing discloses a bitterness .toward Earl Bryan which does not assist this court in deciding a difficult case. Light, not heat, is what the court needs.
Appellee argues that by reversing the decree we give Earl Bryan a third day in court on the same controversy. To set that idea at rest, we say here that we are of opinion that Earl Bryan is bound by the decree in the prior suit. So far as Earl Bryan and Smith are concerned, the line was established by the decree in Case No. 2594 in the circuit court. In the case at bar, the line will be established as between appellants and Smith. If it should result that the line finally fixed in the instant case does not coincide with the line fixed in Case No. 2594, it seems that the parties would be entitled to the land between the two lines as tenants in common according to their respective interests, but that question is not before us and may not arise.
In response to appellee’s earnestness we have again examined the transcript in the light of appellee’s criticism of the opinion. Appellee’s brief concludes as follows:
“CONCLUSION
“Since the Opinion of the Court in this case is factually in error in assuming:
“1. That Appellants were precluded from showing anything in this case because of the circuit court case;
“2. That Smith’s pleadings established the jurisdictional requirements of a disputed boundary line;
“3. That only the circuit court file showed the line fixed by Judge Thagard;
“4. That the line is not clearly shown in the Transcript; and
“5. That the line approved by Judge Thagard was fixed only by agreement; “And since it is in error in assuming as a matter of law that boundary line cases depend solely on title rather than rightful possession; this Rehearing *545should be granted and the Decree of Judge Kettler should be affirmed.”
As to No. 1, that we erred in assuming that appellants were precluded from showing anything in this case, appellee says that the trial judge “did not blindly accept Judge Thagard’s line and he did not close any doors to C. E. and R. C. Bryan. They had their day in Court. They just had a bad day, and they failed to show Judge Kettler where Judge Thagard was in error.”
We did not say that the trial court refused to allow appellants to present evidence. What we said was: “Appellants argue that the circuit court decree is not conclusive against them, because they were not parties or privies to the suit in the circuit court, and that the court in the instant case erred in rendering a decree which declares that complainants are concluded by the circuit court’s decree.”
We may not fully comprehend appellee’s argument. We do not wish to indulge in idle play on words or an exercise in semantics. The trial court’s decree, complained of on this appeal, recites that “a decree is hereby rendered sustaining the line as established by the Circuit Court as the line between the coterminous owners in this suit.”
If we understand the meaning of the quoted language, the decree just quoted from sustains the circuit court boundary line and makes that line, or the decree establishing it, conclusive against appellants. As we undertook to show on original deliverance, we are of opinion that appellants are not bound by the circuit court decree because they were not parties or privies to that suit. We do not think appellants have the burden of showing to the instant trial court, or to this court on appeal, that the circuit court decree is in error, and this view we hold because we do not think appellants are bound by the circuit court decree.
We will say this, that we are not persuaded that the line running “south to the river from the existing corner, said corner being witnessed by twenty-four inch water oak and designated on the map of Carlos Botts now in evidence in this proceeding as Exhibit Four,” is necessarily the true line dividing the east half from the west half of northwest quarter of Section 22. The last quotation is from the circuit court decree
Appellee says said Exhibit Four, referred to in the circuit court decree, is not in the transcript before us but was before the trial court, and, therefore, we ought to assume that the omitted evidence sustains the decree appealed from. We note that Exhibit Four was an exhibit in Case No. 2594 in the circuit court and not in the trial court in the instant case. The register’s certificate in the record before us recites that “the foregoing pages numbered One through 100, both inclusive, contain a full and complete transcript of a certain cause . . .” wherein appellants are complainants, etc. We think, on this certificate, we should regard the transcript as complete.
As to the reason we are not persuaded that the line established in the circuit court is necessarily the correct line we note the following statement from appellee’s brief:
“After trying this case a day and a half, as recited in the Decree of the Court, (Tr. 67) the trial judge ‘settled’ the case by having the parties agree that the Patsaliga divided the east from the west half of the NWJ4 of Section 22. Admittedly this ‘agreement’ was untrue, for the river was not such a dividing line. However, the Court then had the parties make the river their dividing line, by cross conveyances.
“The ‘agreement’ fixed the line between the east and west half of the NW !4 of Section 22 and it was to run from an ‘existing corner’ witnessed by a twenty-four inch water oak. (Tr. 68) This water oak is shown on Complainant’s Exhibit 2, in this case, which was Botts’ survey of March 5, 1959 (Tr. 16) made after the ‘agreed’ Decree of February 25, 1959 was entered.
*546“With this map, observé the map by Botts dated March '20, 1959 .(Tr. 76) These two maps demonstrate the difficulty in this case. The ‘Henry Merrill Corner’ is not in accord with the government survey. Nor is the ‘Pickett Line’ west from it. The point between the West and East 14 of NW !4> Section 22 was located by Pickett by the ‘off-set’ shown on Tr. 76 and testified about by Surveyor Reeves and Earl Bryan. But if Pickett’s line is the North line of Section 22, this midpoint between the West and East i/z of the NW must be on it. But, as is apparent, it can’t be. Botts did the best he could with what he had. He was compelled to start at the ‘Henry Merrill Corner’. He had to run to the ‘existing corner’ marked by the water oak. This made a straight line shown on pages 16 and 76 in the Transcript, but it could not follow the ‘Pickett Line’. This was one of the things, which upset Earl Bryan.”
Perhaps unnecessarily, we set out here Complainant’s Exhibit 2, which is Botts’ survey of March 5, 1959:

*547

*548Now we understand that by order of September 29, 1959, Tr. 77, the circuit court disapproved said Exhibit 2, but our understanding is that appellee concedes that Exhibit 2 correctly shows the “existing corner” marked by the 24-inch water oak. As we read the map, the Merrill Corner, which may not be correct but was apparently accepted as the northeast corner of Section 22, is located 39.086 chains plus 11.961 chains, a total of not more than 51.047 chains, from the 24-inch water oak. If the north boundary of Section 22 is the length of 80 chains or 79.87 chains, as we understand the field notes, then the dividing line between east and west halves of Northwest quarter ought to lie 60 chains, or at least 59.90 chains, west of the northeast comer of the section. But, the distance shown on Exhibit 2 is only 51.047 chains, which is almost nine chains or 594 feet short. Thus, we are not persuaded that the line established by the circuit court is necessarily correct. It may be that we do not understand the map correctly, but, if we misunderstand, that fact further persuades us that the circuit court line is not necessarily the trae line. Appellee admits in brief that the line agreed on as the river is not the true line. We are not persuaded that the same condition does not exist as to the line running south from the 24-inch water oak. That line also was fixed by an agreement to which appellants were not parties.
As to appellee’s second criticism, that we erred in assuming “That Smith’s pleadings established the jurisdictional requirements of a disputed boundary line,” we should observe that we are not here concerned with a ruling as to the sufficiency of pleadings. We do not think appellee questions the sufficiency of the bill of complaint. As we understand appellee’s argument, appellee contends that there is a failure to prove that the line between the east and west halves of northwest quarter of Section 22 is in dispute. Our statement, that a dispute as to the north fifty feet is shown by Smith’s answer or plea, is misleading and we will undertake to correct it.
Smith’s answer recites:
“6. That on the line in suit, W. T. Smith Lumber Company owns only land adjoining that part thereof that lies north of Patsaliga River; that is, that of the half mile length of the line in suit, W. T. Smith Lumber Company owns land adjoining only about the north 50 feet thereof.”
What we should have said is that Smith’s answer shows that Smith and appellants are coterminous owners to at least the north fifty feet.
Smith argues, however, that the evidence fails to show a dispute as to the location of the north fifty feet of the line. Smith says, “But Complainants never testified in this case.” Such is the case, but we know of no rule that requires the landowner, in a boundary dispute, to take the witness stand and testify that the location of the line is disputed.
Appellee says “ . there is much testimony in this case about Earl Bryan disputing the line established by Judge Thagard,” and
“But nowhere does Earl Bryan testify that
“(1) the line in question is uncertain, or
“(2) that it is disputed by C. E. and and R. C. Bryan
"A fortiori he failed to testify that there was a dispute on this line between complainants and respondents, as alleged in the Bill of Complaint.”
Earl Bryan was called as a witness by appellants. He testified:
“Q. Now, getting back to the northwest quarter of Section 22, according to your personal knowledge, not what someone else says, but your personal knowledge, is *549this line dividing the east half and the west half, in any dispute whatsoever?
“A. The one that comes down here?
“Q. Yes, sir.
“A. That’s the one that the dispute is on.
“Q. That’s the one this lawsuit is about, isn’t it?
“A. That’s right.”;
and further, respecting the same line as we understand it:
“Q. Now, with reference to what caused, one of the things that put this line in dispute here, the one that we are litigating about, talking about now, right there, according to the W. T. Smith Lumber Company and the survey, the line that they are claiming, does it go over into the estate’s property?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Do you know how much it goes over?
“A. 10 and a half chains.
“Q. 10 and a half chains ? You know that of your own personal knowledge?
“A. Yes, sir.”
The estate referred to is the estate of appellants’ father. Appellants claim as heirs of their father. We think this testimony shows a dispute between Smith and appellants as to location of the line.
In paragraph 5 of its answer, appellee avers that “ . the line in suit was litigated and finally established by a survey made under the direction and supervision of and specifically approved by the said Court,” referring to Case No. 2594 in the circuit court. Thus appellee itself says the line was litigated in and established by the suit in the circuit court. If the line was ever established, it was established in that suit, but we are of opinion that the establishment in the circuit court in Case No. 2594 is not binding on appellants. We disagree with appellee and are of opinion that the existence of a dispute as to location of the line is sufficiently shown.
Appellee’s third criticism is that we erred in assuming that only the circuit court file showed the line fixed by Judge Thagard. Appellee takes us to task for questioning the admissibility of the file in Case No. 2594. It should be sufficient answer to this criticism to repeat “ . . . . we do not rule on the question . . . . ”
Appellee argues that there is evidence other than in the circuit court file to show the line fixed by Judge Thagard. Conceding arguendo that there is other evidence to show the line, we are still of opinion that the line so fixed by the circuit court is not binding on appellants.
As to the fourth contention that we erred in assuming that the line was not clearly shown in the transcript, whether the line fixed by the circuit court be clearly shown or not, it remains a line fixed by an agreement to which appellants were not parties.
The fifth criticism is that we erred in assuming that the line approved by Judge Thagard was fixed only by agreement Appellee says:
“But this Court, and Appellants, say that C. E. and R. C. Bryan are not bound by that Decree, since they were not parties to the suit. This is, of course, true. But, the use by Judge Kettler of Judge Thagard’s Decree is not necessarily wrong. It could have been right. Certainly, it was consistent with the remainder of the Decree, for Judge Thagard fixed the lines by fixed landmarks, as Earl Bryan asked in his pleadings in the circuit court case. Is the fixing of a line at an ‘existing corner’ presumed to be *550erroneous? We would have thought the exact opposite.”
We have already undertaken to show that we are not persuaded that the “existing corner” marked by the 24-inch water oak is correctly located at the northwest corner of northeast quarter of northwest quarter of Section 22. Merely to say that it is an existing corner does not persuade us that the corner is correctly located. We do not understand that any presumption of correctness attends a decree fixed by agreement in a lawsuit to which appellants were not parties.
The sixth unnumbered criticism is that we erred in assuming that boundary line cases depend solely on title j-ather than rightful possession. We do not think we made that assumption. We do not understand that the evidence shows or that the trial court considered the possession, or lack of it, by either party. We do not find proof of actual occupancy by anyone. In that situation, it would seem that the location of the boundary would depend on title. In the absence of possession and monuments, what basis, other than title, exists on which to determine the location of the boundary? This court has said:
“ * * * In Baldwin v. Harrelson et al., 225 Ala. 386, 143 So. 558, 559, it is declared as the established rule of our cases dealing with the establishment of disputed boundary lines between coterminous landowners that because the dispute thereof is affected by adverse possession and in fact involves the title to a strip of land in dispute between the undisputed holdings of coterminous landowners ‘is none the less a boundary controversy and within the statutory powers of the chancery court.’ * * Wood v. Foster, 229 Ala. 430, 431, 157 So. 863, 864.
We do not think anything we have said conflicts with recognized rules as to what evidence is admissible in cases of disputed boundaries. In this connection, see Pounders v. Nix, 222 Ala. 27, 29, 130 So. 537.
Appellee asks what will be tried on remandment of this case. We think the court should determine the boundary according to accepted practices and procedure. This court has said:
“The purpose of sections 2, 3 and 4, Title 47, and section 129, subdivision 5, of Title 13, Code, is to establish uncertain or disputed boundaries. Complainant, therefore, ordinarily is entitled to a decree if the court finds a disputed boundary, rather than to deny all relief as was done here. Jenkins v. Raulston, 214 Ala. 443, 108 So. 47; Baldwin v. Harrelson, 225 Ala. 386, 143 So. 558; Copeland v. Warren, 214 Ala. 150, 153, 107 So. 94; Camp v. Dunnavent, 215 Ala. 78, 109 So. 362; Yauger v. Taylor, 218 Ala. 235, 118 So. 271; Smith v. Cook, 220 Ala. 338, 124 So. 898; Clarke v. Earnest, 224 Ala. 165, 139 So. 223.” Drewry v. Cowart, 250 Ala. 406, 407, 34 So.2d 687, 688.
§§ 4 and 5 et seq., of Title 47, Code 1940, seem to provide authority for the court to order a survey to fix a disputed boundary between coterminous owners.
We are not persuaded that we should affirm the decree appealed from.
Opinion extended.
Application overruled.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and LAWSON and GOODWYN, JJ., concur.