Court Opinion

ID: 9776023
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:16:44.551824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:32.987695
License: Public Domain

GUILLOT, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I agree with BLS and Altman, defendants below, that the trial court erred in assuming in personam jurisdiction over them because the necessary purposeful acts of them in this state were not established, and thus they were not afforded due process.
The majority has discussed the test that the Texas Supreme Court has established to support a default judgment when substituted service under the long-arm statute is utilized. First, the pleading must allege facts, which, if true, would make the defendant “amenable to process.” Whitney v. L & L Realty Corp., 500 S.W.2d 94, 95 (Tex.1973). Second, there must be proof in the record that the defendant was served in the manner required by the statute. Verges v. Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corp., 642 S.W.2d 820, 821 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1982, no writ). Appellants contend in their *548writ that neither prong of this test has been met. Because I find that appellants were not amenable to process, I do not address the second prong of the test as to whether appellants were properly served.
The first prong of the test for upholding a default judgment entered pursuant to substituted service under the long-arm statute concerns section 4 of article 2031b. This section reaches only “as far as the limits of the federal constitutional requirements of due process will permit.” U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978). I think that the proper test under this first prong should be whether plaintiff’s petition alleges such purposeful acts of the defendant such that the defendant comes within the constitutional reach of this state’s jurisdiction. See Gathers v. Walpace Co., 544 S.W.2d 169 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The requirements that a plaintiff must meet in order to show jurisdiction over an out of state defendant when the defendant enters a special appearance pursuant to TEX.R. CIV.P. 120a were established by the Texas Supreme Court in O’Brien v. Lanpar Company, 399 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex.1966). The three elements that must exist are: (1) the nonresident defendant or corporation must purposefully do some act or consummate some transaction in this state; (2) the cause of action must arise from, or be connected with, such transaction; and (3) the assumption of jurisdiction by this state must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, consideration being given to the quality, nature, and extent of the activity in this state, the relative convenience of the parties, the benefits and protection of the laws of this state afforded to the respective parties, and the basic equities of the situation. U-Anchor, 553 S.W.2d at 762. I would hold that these same requirements should apply when deciding whether a petition is sufficient to show jurisdiction to support a default judgment. There should not be any difference between “amenability to process” for purposes of supporting a default judgment and “amenability to process” when a special appearance under TEX.R.CIV.P. 120a is made. In both instances, jurisdiction must first attach. A plaintiff must first show the minimum contacts before the defendant has any responsibility to answer. See Gathers.
In order to establish if the requirements have been met, I would look to the pleadings of Buslease to determine if the jurisdictional allegations that they contain are sufficient. Cf. McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex.1965). Buslease alleges in its petition that appellants have done business in the state of Texas by virtue of the lease agreements that they entered into with Buslease. The lease agreements are attached to its petition. The agreements are performable in part in Texas. On appeal, Buslease relies on this allegation, contending that the facts contained in its pleadings are sufficient under section 4 of article 2031b to confer jurisdiction of a Texas court upon appellants. In applying the three prong test of O’Brien, I find that Buslease has not made the slightest attempt to allege any purposeful acts in Texas on the part of appellants other than the sending of lease payments to Texas. This is not sufficient. See U-Anchor, 553 S.W.2d at 763. Buslease has not alleged any other purposeful acts that would establish jurisdiction over BLS and Altman. I would hold that the allegations in Bus-lease’s petition are not sufficient to establish jurisdiction since not enough purposeful acts have been alleged.
To the extent Blumenthal v. Ameritex Computer Corp., 646 S.W.2d 283 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1983, no writ), differs from my view in this case, I would overrule Blu-menthal. It offends my traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice to allow a party to only plead a general allegation that a contract was to be performed in this state, without stating sufficient purposeful acts conducted pursuant to the contract, and thus acquire jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. Clearly some purposeful acts of the out-of-state defendant must be alleged. See TM Productions, Inc. v. Blue Mountain Broadcasting Co., 623 S.W.2d *549427, 431 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1981), writ refd n.r.e. per curiam, 639 S.W.2d 450 (Tex.1982); Gathers v. Walpace Co., 544 S.W.2d 169 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1976, writ refd n.r.e.).
Considering the basic equities and circumstances of the case, I would hold that BLS and Altman would not be accorded due process of law if required to defend the suit of Buslease in Texas under these pleadings. Inasmuch as BLS and Altman have entered general appearances by pursuing this appeal, I would remand for a trial on the merits. Cf. McKanna, 388 S.W.2d at 930.
I would reverse the judgment and remand to the trial court for a new trial.