Court Opinion

ID: 9577712
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:37:17.07618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:06.688093
License: Public Domain

Carley, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the judgment of the majority and agree with what is said in Divisions 1, 3, 4, and 5 of the majority opinion. With regard to Division 2, I must agree with the final conclusion that because the appellant did not request a continuance, the questionable tactics of the State in this case do not require a reversal of the conviction. However, I do not believe that the testimony of the three thoroughly prepared, highly educated, and extensively specialized expert witnesses *311can be classified correctly as “rebuttal” testimony in view of the factual and procedural scenario in this case. As the majority observes, “out of a sense of fairness, the State could have anticipated his defense ... as it was essentially the same defense presented at a previous trial. . . .” (Majority opinion, page 308.) Furthermore, even without the history of the first trial, I am fearful of placing the judicial stamp of approval upon prosecutorial sandbagging by calling this testimony “rebuttal.” The majority’s rationale would allow the State to bring in such high-powered “rebuttal” defense in almost any case unless the defendant offered no defense. I say this because, in any case in which a defendant denies the essential elements of the crime, the State can contend that the defendant had in effect “attacked” the credibility of the State’s witnesses.
Decided May 22, 1986
Rehearing denied June 6, 1986
William T. Hankins III, for appellant.
Robert E. Wilson, District Attorney, J. Tom Morgan, Susan Brooks, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
Even if, technically, the State could properly claim its expert evidence to be “rebuttal,” allowing the admission of that evidence in this case solely on that ground would place form over substance to the prejudice of the defendant. “A specious and empty compliance with the formalities of law which results in the withholding of that which the spirit of the law seeks to grant cannot be countenanced.” Fish-man v. State, 128 Ga. App. 505, 511 (197 SE2d 467) (1973). However, after the recess granted by the trial court to appellant for the purpose of interviewing the State’s witnesses, no motion for a continuance was made. Davis v. State, 135 Ga. App. 203 (217 SE2d 343) (1975); Hunnicutt v. State, 135 Ga. App. 774, 775 (219 SE2d 22) (1975). The denial of such a motion — even if made — would be reversible on appeal only if the denial constituted abuse of discretion. However, I must opine that under the circumstances present in this case, the denial of a motion for continuance would constitute an abuse of discretion. Nevertheless, since no continuance was requested, I concur in the judgment affirming the conviction.