Court Opinion

ID: 9581779
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:18:44.770397+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:15.009151
License: Public Domain

Steinle, J.
(dissenting). The maxim of res ipsa loquitur does not apply where the facts are such that an inference that the accident was due to a cause other than defendant’s negligence could be drawn as reasonably as that it was due to his negligence. Loomis v. Toledo R. & L. Co. (1923), 107 Ohio St. 161, 140 N. E. 639.
In Hyer v. Janesville (1898), 101 Wis. 371, 377, 77 N. W. 729, when considering the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur, this court said that:
*103“. . . where there is no direct evidence of how an accident occurred, and the circumstances are clearly as consistent with the theory that it may be ascribed to a cause not actionable as to a cause that is actionable, it is not within the proper province of a jury to guess where the truth lies and make that the foundation for a verdict.”
The same principle was sustained in Klein v. Beeten (1919), 169 Wis. 385, 172 N. W. 736, and Baars v. Benda (1946), 249 Wis. 65, 23 N. W. (2d) 477. In Klein v. Beeten it was said, that while inference allowed by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur constituted proof of negligence, it is only where the circumstances leave no room for a different presumption that the maxim applies.
The principle was also recognized in Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Matson (1950), 256 Wis. 304, 311, 41 N. W. (2d) 268, where it was observed that:
“The jury may not guess that an actionable cause rather than one not actionable produced the accident when the possible nonactionable cause is present- in - the evidence of the circumstances, . . .”
It appears to me that in the instant matter a most reasonable inference may be drawn from the evidence that a non-actionable cause — real and not imaginative — may have precipitated the untoward result. In his decision the trial court expressed a view, in which I concur. He said:
“I think the explanation is very clear here that any person who was conscious would not have operated an automobile 250 [actually more than 270] feet [off the road and up the embankment] without making some effort to try to control its course.”
There is no dispute in the evidence that the jeep and the trailer after leaving the black-top, traveled in a straight line without deviation, only one set of tracks being made, the trailer wheels tracking the jeep wheels exactly, and without *104any effort on the part of the operator to slow, stop, or turn the vehicles in order to attempt to avoid striking the trees. The evidence further indicates that while the vehicles were traveling off the road and up the embankment, the operator, although moving his feet in an undescribed manner, actually “stiffened out.” The only reasonable inference to be deduced from that evidence is that the operator had in some manner become physically incapacitated or disabled, and that he was thereby prevented from exercising reasonable care and caution for the protection of himself, his wife, and property,— a nonactionable cause of the collision. It seems to me that any alive, conscious driver would have taken some means to avoid the collision. The evidence indicates that the driver was an experienced operator of automobiles and airplanes. This evidence is not inconclusive but is sufficient to have entitled the court to infer that the operator was disabled or incapacitated.
As to the fire in the seat cushion it may be asked: When did it start, before or after the crash? Was it not possibly a cause of the crash ? In Wisconsin Telephone Co. v. Matson, supra, the court said (p. 311) :
“Counsel has suggested that the driver of the Matson truck may have been forced into the telephone pole by another car or perhaps a man stepped in front of the truck causing him to swerve. This will not do unless it is shown that there was such other truck or man. Until then the circumstances are not consistent with any theory save negligent operation.”
That the seat cushion was on fire is a fact. It is not an imaginative item. Although the presence of the fire may have been a result of the crash, nevertheless, for the reason that it can reasonably be inferred that the fire was an efficient factor in causing the crash, the res ipsa loquitur rule is not applicable.
A finding of negligence by a jury under facts as here, could only be based on conjecture. Since there is no direct evidence *105of negligence, and since the rule of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable for the reason that there is evidence of record from which it may be reasonably inferred that the accident was due to a cause other than an act or acts of negligence on the part of the operator of the jeep, I am of the opinion that the court’s order in directing the verdict was proper, and I must, therefore, respectfully dissent from the determination by the majority of the court.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Chief Justice Fairchild joins in this dissent.