Court Opinion

ID: 9470628
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:11:27.415559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:01.159202
License: Public Domain

KEARSE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
With all due respect to the majority, I dissent from the decision to remand this case to the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). The only question as to which remand is ordered is whether plaintiff Rakhil Felshina was disabled by reason of her combined weight and blood pressure. It appears to me that the ALJ concluded that she was not so disabled and that there was substantial evidence to support his conclusion.
As the majority recognizes, the standards, promulgated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, by which a combination of weight and blood pressure are judged to be disabling or not disabling are reflected in a table at 20 C.F.R. § 404, App. 1, at § 10.10(B) (1982). According to the table, a person standing 62 inches tall is not deemed disabled on this ground unless the weight component of her weight-and-blood-pressure combination is 242 pounds or more. At Felshina’s August 13, 1980 hearing before the ALJ, at which she was accompanied by her daughter and an interpreter, Felshina testified that she weighed 230 pounds. The ALJ asked, “Is that what you usually weigh?” Felshina replied “This has it has been staying now.” [sic] The testimony that her weight in August was 230 pounds and that it had been at that level for some time does not seem to me inconsistent with either the recording of her weight as 250-254 pounds at Beth Israel Hospital 6-7 months before, or Dr. Dann’s recording of her weight as 217 pounds 5 months before.
Even the presence of evidence that actually conflicted with Felshina’s testimony as to her weight, however, would not be a basis on which to set aside a finding of nondisability. The factfinding process in disability benefits proceedings is committed to the Secretary, here acting through the ALJ. He need not resolve factual issues in accordance with the preponderance of the evidence. See Schauer v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir.1982). Rather, his findings must be given conclusive effect by the courts if they are supported by “substantial evidence,” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Supp. IV 1980); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339 n. 21, 96 S.Ct. 893, 905 n. 21, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971); Rivera v. Harris, 623 F.2d 212, 216 (2d Cir.1980), that is, by “ ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’ ” Richardson v. Perales, supra, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 *75S.Ct. at 1427 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 216, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)).
The ALJ here found “that the claimant’s impairments singly, or in combinations are not severe enough to significantly restrict her capacity to perform basis [sic] work-related functions.” (ALJ decision dated August 21, 1980, at 3.) Felshina had testified that her weight then was, and had been remaining at, 230 pounds. This was below the minimum disabling weight recognized by the regulations. I would regard the claimant’s statements as relevant evidence that the ALJ was entitled to accept as adequate to support his finding of nondisability on account of her weight-and-blood-pressure. I would therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of the complaint.