Court Opinion

ID: 9806896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 19:34:22.407384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:14:59.895341
License: Public Domain

Barros, J.,
concurs and votes to affirm the judgment, with the following memorandum: While I agree that the judgment of conviction must be affirmed, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the defendant did not meet his initial burden in establishing his entitlement to a missing witness charge. The Supreme Court should have given the missing witness charge, but the error in failing to do so was harmless.
“The party seeking the missing witness charge must sustain an initial burden of showing that the opposing party has failed to call a witness who could be expected to have knowledge regarding a material issue in the case and to provide testimony favorable to the opposing party” (People v Edwards, 14 NY3d 733, 735 [2010] [brackets omitted]; see People v Macana, 84 NY2d 173, 177 [1994]). The Court of Appeals has cautioned that courts should not place too onerous a burden on a party requesting the missing witness charge, since such party “can hardly know what that witness knows or what the witness would say if called” (People v Hitching, 78 NY2d 532, 537 [1991]).
As an eyewitness to the shooting, the defendant’s roommate could certainly be expected to have knowledge regarding material issues in the case. In addition to being the defendant’s roommate, he was a friend of the victim. Indeed, on multiple occasions, the roommate invited the victim to the apartment that he shared with the defendant, resulting in a lock being installed between the defendant’s bedroom and the roommate’s bedroom. Based upon his relationship with the victim and the defendant, and his knowledge of the events leading up to the shooting, it could be expected that the roommate would offer testimony as to, among other things, the defendant’s motive and the defendant’s justification defense. Clearly, the roommate was a key witness whose expected testimony would be material and noncumulative (see People v Savinon, 100 NY2d 192, 197 [2003]).
*1001Moreover, the roommate could be expected to give favorable testimony to the People. He immediately reported the shooting to the police. The roommate’s girlfriend, who was called by the People as a witness, testified that she and the roommate were together at the precinct when she gave a recorded statement to the police, and a detective testified that he interviewed the roommate.
Contrary to the majority’s determination, the placement of the roommate on the People’s witness list is a very strong indicator that the People intended to call him as a witness, and, consequently, that the People expected that the roommate would provide favorable testimony. The witness list was exchanged just prior to the trial and was, presumably, relied upon by the defendant and the court for, among other things, scheduling and preparing for trial. It was not merely the prosecutor’s “wish” list.
“Once the party seeking the charge has established prima facie that an uncalled witness is knowledgeable about a pending material issue and that such witness would be expected to testify favorably to the opposing party, it becomes incumbent upon the opposing party, in order to defeat the request to charge, to account for the witness’ absence or otherwise demonstrate that the charge would not be appropriate” (People v Gonzalez, 68 NY2d 424, 428 [1986]). Here, the People failed to make any showing. Accordingly, the Supreme Court improvidently denied the request to give the missing witness charge.
Even so, the error was harmless since the defendant was given ample latitude to comment on the People’s failure to produce the witness, the defendant was acquitted of the murder charge, the evidence of the defendant’s guilt on the charges of manslaughter in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree was overwhelming, and there is no significant probability that a properly instructed jury would have acquitted the defendant of the charges of manslaughter in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (see People v Hall, 18 NY3d 122, 132 [2011]; People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 242 [1975]; cf. People v Vasquez, 76 NY2d 722, 725 [1990]).