Court Opinion

ID: 9367354
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-31 16:10:02.885099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:59.373012
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Abey Abdul-Salaam,                              :
                Petitioner                      :
                                                :
                v.                              :
                                                :
Pennsylvania Parole Board,                      :    No. 253 C.D. 2022
                  Respondent                    :    Submitted: November 23, 2022

BEFORE:         HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
                HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
                HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON                              FILED: January 31, 2023

                Abey Abdul-Salaam (Abdul-Salaam), through counsel, petitions for
review of a decision of the Pennsylvania Parole Board (Board) mailed February 18,
2022.       Abdul-Salaam contends that the Board abused its discretion when, in
recalculating his maximum sentence date upon his conviction of new criminal
charges, it denied him credit for time previously spent at liberty on parole.1 Upon
review, we affirm the Board’s decision.

        1
          Abdul-Salaam’s petition for review also challenged the length of backtime imposed by
the Board, asserting that it exceeded the presumptive range. However, his counsel expressly
abandoned that argument after confirming that the 36 months of backtime imposed were within
the presumptive range of 24 to 40 months applicable to Abdul-Salaam’s conviction of the second
degree felony of aggravated assault against a child under six years of age. See Br. of Pet’r at 10-
11 (citing 37 Pa. Code § 75.2).
                                    I. Background
               In June 2000, Abdul-Salaam received a sentence of 7 years, 9 months
to 29 years of imprisonment for drug and firearm convictions. Certified Record (CR)
at 24 & 39. At that time, his maximum sentence date was April 15, 2035. Id. He
was paroled in May 2002, but was rearrested on new charges in August 2003. Id. at
3 & 10.
               After serving various sentences, Abdul-Salaam was eventually released
on reparole in January 2014. CR at 25. He remained at liberty on parole for nearly
six years, during which time he held stable employment, maintained a stable
residence, married, and had a son. Id. at 37 & 92. However, in November 2019, he
was rearrested and later pleaded guilty to having beaten his then-three-year-old son
with a belt, causing serious and widespread bruises that resulted in the immediate
emergency removal of the child from the home. Id. at 39, 46 & 147. Abdul-Salaam
was convicted of new offenses including aggravated assault against a child under six
years of age, a second-degree felony. CR at 88-89 & 147; see Section 2702(a)(8) of
the Crimes Code,2 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(8). He was sentenced to one to two years
of incarceration, less time spent in custody following his rearrest. CR at 89. The
Board also recommitted him to serve 36 months of backtime as a convicted parole
violator. Id. at 124.
               At Abdul-Salaam’s detention hearing, his parole supervisor
acknowledged Abdul-Salaam’s successful parole supervision for nearly six years.
CR at 92 & 95-96. However, in recalculating Abdul-Salaam’s maximum sentence
date following his new convictions, the Board declined to award Abdul-Salaam
sentence credit for the period he spent at liberty on parole between January 2014 and

      2
          18 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-9546.
                                          2
November 2019. Id. at 124-25. The Board’s stated reason for denying sentence
credit was that Abdul-Salaam “committed a new offense that was assaultive in nature
thereby warranting denial of credit for time at liberty on parole.” Id. at 125. Abdul-
Salaam sought administrative relief from the Board, which was denied, again based
on the assaultive nature of the new conviction. CR at 147-48. Abdul-Salaam then
petitioned for review in this Court.

                                           II. Issue
              On appeal,3 Abdul-Salaam’s sole argument is that the Board abused its
discretion by denying him sentence credit for the nearly six years he spent at liberty
on parole without incident.

                                       III. Discussion
              In Marshall v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 200 A.3d
643 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018), we reviewed a denial of sentence credit for nearly nine
years spent at liberty on parole; we characterized our task as “evaluat[ing] whether
the Board abused its discretion” in denying credit for that time. Id. at 651. We
explained that in order to satisfy constitutional due process requirements and its
statutory mandate, the Board must state its reasons for denying sentence credit;
although a single sentence will suffice in most instances, the statement of reasons
must be sufficient to provide an appellate court with a “method to assess the Board’s
exercise of discretion.” Id. at 650 (quoting Pittman v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole,

       3
         “Our review of the Board’s decision is limited to determining whether constitutional
rights were violated, whether the decision is in accordance with the law, or whether necessary
findings are supported by substantial evidence.” Marshall v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 200 A.3d
643, 647 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (quoting Kerak v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 153 A.3d 1134,
1138 n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016)) (additional quotation marks omitted).

                                               3
159 A.3d 466, 474 (Pa. 2017)) (additional quotation marks omitted). In other words,
“[t]o meet the constitutional guarantees of due process, an agency’s decision must
be explained ‘in sufficient detail to permit meaningful appellate review.’” Marshall,
200 A.3d at 650 (quoting Fisler v. State Sys. of Higher Educ., Cal. Univ. of Pa., 78
A.3d 30, 41 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)) (additional citation omitted). “There must be
safeguards to ensure against arbitrary decision-making.” Marshall, 200 A.3d at 650
(citing Peak v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 501 A.2d 1383, 1389 (Pa. 1985)).
             In Marshall, this Court remanded for a further explanation of the
Board’s reasoning where it denied sentence credit based solely on a four-word
explanation, “felony drug related crimes,” without any explanation of how those
words related to the parolee. 200 A.3d at 649. Further, regarding the commission
of a new felony while on parole, we observed that “the commission of a felony could
be one of the factors that the Board considers when exercising its discretion to award
or withhold credit; however, standing alone, the commission of a felony is an
insufficient articulation of the Board’s reasoning.” Id. at 650.
             Here, by contrast, the Board’s appeal panel decision provided, in
pertinent part, the following explanation to Abdul-Salaam:
             [Y]ou raise the following points of contention: 1) the new
             conviction was not serious or assaultive, [and] 2) you
             claim the Board erred in denying you credit for the time
             spent at liberty on parole . . . .
             First, the record reveals that on July 27, 2020[,] you
             suffered a new criminal conviction in Dauphin County for
             Aggravated Assault with the Victim Less than 6 and
             Defendant 18 or Older (F2) and Endangering the Welfare
             of a Child (M2). The offense involved you whipping your
             3-year-old child with a belt to the point that he had bruises
             and red marks all over his body. Dauphin County Children
             and Youth considered the injuries so severe that an
             emergency removal order of the child was issued. The

                                          4
               Board considers the particulars of the crime sufficiently
               serious and assaultive enough.
               Next, the decision on whether to grant or deny a convicted
               parole violator (“CPV”) credit for time at liberty on parole
               is purely a matter of discretion. The Prisons and Parole
               Code[4] authorizes the Board to grant or deny credit for
               time at liberty on parole for certain criminal offenses. 61
               Pa.C.S. § 6138(a)(2.1). Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s
               ruling in Pittman . . . , the Board must articulate the basis
               for its decision to grant or deny a CPV credit for time spent
               at liberty on parole. In this case, the Board articulated that
               you were denied such credit because you were convicted
               of a new offense that was assaultive in nature thereby
               warranting the denial of such credit. As established above,
               the panel finds the reason provided sufficient for denying
               credit for the time spent at liberty on parole in this case.

CR at 147-48. This statement of reasons clearly related to Abdul-Salaam’s conduct
and went well beyond merely stating that his new conviction was for a felony
offense. As such, we find it sufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements by
allowing meaningful appellate review.
               We recognize that Abdul-Salaam was stable and successful on parole
for nearly six years. Moreover, as in Marshall, this successful period at liberty on
parole exceeded the one-to-two-year new sentence Abdul-Salaam received. See
Marshall, 200 A.3d at 650 (observing that the parolee’s new conviction was for a
shorter time than that which he had spent at liberty on parole). We also acknowledge
that the new felony offense here, aggravated assault on a child under six years of
age, was not clearly related to Abdul-Salaam’s previous convictions for drug and
firearms offenses so as to suggest recidivism. See id. at 651. Nevertheless, it is not
within this Court’s function or authority to substitute our judgment for that of the
Board in the exercise of its discretion. See 2 Pa.C.S. § 704; Harden v. Pa. Bd. of

      4
          61 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-7301.

                                             5
Prob. & Parole, 980 A.2d 691, 701-02 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (citing Cox v. Pa. Bd. of
Prob. & Parole, 493 A.2d 680, 683 (Pa. 1985)). We cannot conclude that the Board
abused its discretion in denying credit for time spent at liberty on parole, where the
crimes resulted in two new convictions, including a felony count of aggravated
assault perpetrated against a helpless toddler and severe enough to cause serious
bruising and the immediate emergency removal of the child from the home.
             We also do not agree with Abdul-Salaam’s suggestion that the Board
abused its discretion in denying sentence credit because his aggravated assault was
not listed among the violent offenses excepted from the Board’s discretionary
sentence credit by Section 6138(a)(2.1) of the Prisons and Parole Code, 61 Pa.C.S.
§ 6138(a)(2.1). Essentially, Abdul-Salaam implies that the Board should have
granted sentence credit merely because it was not precluded by statute from doing
so. Under Abdul-Salaam’s reasoning, the Board would effectively be forced to grant
sentence credit for any crime not expressly excluded by statute from such credit.
The discretion expressly provided to the Board in Section 6138(a)(2.1) would be
rendered illusory. We cannot accept such a reading of Section 6138(a)(2.1).

                                  IV. Conclusion
             For the foregoing reasons, we are constrained to affirm the Board’s
decision.

                                       __________________________________
                                       CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

                                          6
        IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Abey Abdul-Salaam,                   :
                Petitioner           :
                                     :
           v.                        :
                                     :
Pennsylvania Parole Board,           :   No. 253 C.D. 2022
                  Respondent         :

                                ORDER

           AND NOW, this 31st day of January, 2023, the decision of the
Pennsylvania Parole Board mailed February 18, 2022 is AFFIRMED.

                                  __________________________________
                                  CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge