Court Opinion

ID: 9406549
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-01 06:00:16.75295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:31.421443
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     SYLVESTER SINCLAIR, JR.,                        DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         AT-0752-22-0108-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF                                   DATE: June 30, 2023
       TRANSPORTATION,
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Georgia A. Lawrence, Esquire, and Shaun Southworth, Esquire, Atlanta,
             Georgia, for the appellant.

           Christopher R. Lopez, Esquire, Des Plaines, Illinois, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     sustained his removal from his position as an Air Traffic Control Specialist based
     on charges of (1) unavailability for regular, full-time duty and (2) failure to

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                               2

     maintain medical clearance. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the
     appellant’s petition for review. We REVERSE the initial decision in part to find
     that the agency violated the appellant’s due process rights, AFFIRM as
     MODIFIED the initial decision in part to clarify the legal standards applicable to
     the appellant’s disability discrimination affirmative defenses, and DO NOT
     SUSTAIN the appellant’s removal.

                                              BACKGROUND
¶2         Effective December 29, 2017, the agency removed the appellant from his
     position     as     an   Air   Traffic    Control   Specialist   based   on     charges   of
     (1) unavailability for regular, full-time duty and (2) failure to maintain medical
     clearance.        Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6 at 68-74, 84-86.           Regarding the
     former charge, the agency alleged that the appellant had not reported for regular,
     full-time duty since May 8, 2015. Id. at 84. Regarding the latter change, the
     agency alleged that the appellant had been rendered medically disqualified for air
     traffic control duties effective April 19, 2016, and that he had not challenged this
     determination. Id. at 84, 87-88. Both the agency’s notice of proposed removal
     and decision letter referenced the agency’s unsuccessful efforts to locate another
     position to which the appellant could be reassigned. Id. at 70, 85. Following his
     removal, the appellant filed a formal equal employment opportunity complaint
     alleging that the agency had discriminated against him by (1) failing to provide
     him with a reasonable accommodation and (2) removing him from his position .
     Id. at 11-12, 31-34. In a final agency decision issued on November 12, 2021, the
     agency made a finding of no discrimination as related to the appellant’s removal.
     Id. at 11-30.
¶3         On December 12, 2021, the appellant filed the instant appeal with the Board
     challenging the agency’s removal action. IAF, Tab 1. He requested a hearing on
     the matter. IAF, Tab 5 at 4, Tab 11 at 3, 7. The appellant alleged before the
     administrative judge that the agency had engaged in disability discrimination
                                                                                           3

     (failure to accommodate and disparate treatment). IAF, Tab 1 at 5, Tab 20 at 6.
     He also alleged that the agency had violated his due process rights because (1) the
     deciding official also served as the proposing official and (2) the agency had
     improperly relied on ex parte information regarding searches conducted for a
     vacant position for the appellant.      IAF, Tab 18 at 4, Tab 25 at 15-18.          The
     administrative judge informed the appellant of the applicable evidentiary burdens
     for these affirmative defenses. IAF, Tab 20 at 4-10.
¶4         Following    a   hearing    conducted    via   Zoom     for   Government,     the
     administrative judge issued an initial decision affirming the agency’s removal
     action. IAF, Tab 26, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 25. In so doing, she found that
     the agency proved the charges of (1) unavailability for regular, full-time duty and
     (2) failure to maintain medical clearance 2 by preponderant evidence and had

     2
       The administrative judge considered the agency’s charge of “failure to maintain
     medical clearance” as “tantamount to a charge of medical inability to perform,” and
     analyzed the charge accordingly in the initial decision. IAF, Tab 20 at 2; ID at 7,
     10-12. We discern no error with her characterization of this charge. When an agency
     controls the withdrawal or denial of its certification of an employee’s fitness or other
     qualification for a position, the Board’s authority generally extends to a review of the
     merits of that withdrawal or revocation.         Adams v. Department of the Army,
     105 M.S.P.R. 50, ¶ 10 (2007), aff’d, 273 F. App’x 947 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Indeed, the
     Board has previously found that it can review the validity of a Federal Aviation
     Administration medical decertification in an adverse action appeal. E.g., Cosby v.
     Federal Aviation Administration, 30 M.S.P.R. 16, 17-19 (1986).
     In analyzing this charge, however, the administrative judge relied o n the standard set
     forth in Sanders v. Department of Homeland Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 144, ¶ 11, aff’d,
     625 F. App’x 549 (Fed. Cir. 2015). ID at 10-12. Following the issuance of the initial
     decision, the Board determined that this standard applies only when an employee who
     occupies a position with medical standards is removed based solely on medical history,
     i.e., when the only basis for concluding that the employee was medically unable to
     perform the core duties of his position was the fact that his medical records reflected
     that, at some time in the past, he was classified as having, was examined for, or was
     treated for the medical condition or impairment in question. Haas v. Department of
     Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 36, ¶¶ 10-15. The Board clarified that, in cases, as
     here, involving a current medical condition, the agency must establish that the
     appellant’s medical condition prevents him from being able to safely and efficiently
                                                                                             4

     satisfied the nexus requirement. ID at 9-13. She also found that the appellant
     failed to prove the aforementioned affirmative defenses and that, given the nature
     of the agency’s charges, removal was warranted. ID at 13-24.
¶5         The appellant has filed a petition for review, and the agency has filed a
     response. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3. In his petition, the appellant
     argues that (1) the agency violated his due process rights and (2) the agency
     engaged in failure to accommodate disability discrimination. PFR File, Tab 1
     at 4-20.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     We reverse the initial decision in part to find that the agency violated the
     appellant’s due process rights.
¶6         The appellant argues that the agency violated his due process rights. PFR
     File, Tab 1 at 6-10. To this end, he contends that the deciding official improperly
     relied on material ex parte information in deciding to remove him, i.e.,
     information regarding searches conducted by the agency for a vacant position to
     which he could be reassigned. Id. He avers that, although he was notified about
     one job search, the agency failed to inform him about the “particularities of other
     job searches” despite his requesting this information. Id. at 6-8. For the reasons
     discussed herein, we agree that the agency violated the appellant’s due process
     rights and we reverse the agency’s removal action. 3

     perform the core duties of his position.     Id., ¶ 15 & n.3.   This clarification is not
     material to the outcome of this appeal.
     3
       As indicated, the appellant also alleged before the administrative judge that the agency
     violated his due process rights because the same person served as both the proposing
     official and the deciding official; however, the administrative judge found this claim
     unavailing. IAF, Tab 18 at 4, Tab 20 at 4; ID at 14 n.2. To the extent the appellant
     reasserts this claim on review, PFR File, Tab 1 at 7, we also find it unavailing, see
     Hidalgo v. Department of Justice, 93 M.S.P.R. 645, ¶ 16 (2003) (explaining that the
     Board has held that the proposing official and the deciding official may be the same
     person in a chapter 75 proceeding).
                                                                                      5

¶7        Before taking an appealable action that deprives a tenured Federal employee
     of his property right in his employment, an agency must provide him w ith
     minimum due process of law.       Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,
     470 U.S. 532, 543-46 (1985).      Due process entitles the employee to oral or
     written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer’s
     evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story.    Id. at 546; see
     5 U.S.C. § 7513(b). In determining whether these requirements have been met,
     the Board analyzes whether a notice of proposed removal, along with the
     supporting documentation attached thereto and contemporaneously provided to
     the appellant, afforded him sufficient notice of the charges against him to enable
     him to make a meaningful reply to the proposal. See Alvarado v. Department of
     the Air Force, 97 M.S.P.R. 389, ¶ 8 (2004).
¶8        The Board also looks to whether new and material information was
     introduced by means of an ex parte communication to the deciding official . Stone
     v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 179 F.3d 1368, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir.
     1999). Pursuant to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s decisions
     in Stone and Ward v. U.S. Postal Service, 634 F.3d 1274, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2011), a
     deciding official violates an employee’s due process rights when he relies on new
     and material ex parte information as a basis for his decisions on the merits of a
     proposed charge or the penalty to be imposed.       The Board will consider the
     following factors, among others, to determine whether an ex parte contact is
     constitutionally impermissible: (1) whether the ex parte communication merely
     introduces “cumulative” information or new information; (2) whether the
     employee knew of the error and had a chance to respond to it; and (3) whether the
     ex parte communications were of the type likely to result in undue pressure upon
     the deciding official to rule in a particular manner.    Stone, 179 F.3d at 1377.
     When a procedural due process violation has occurred, such a violation is not
     subject to the harmless error test; rather, the appellant is entitled to a new
     constitutionally correct administrative procedure. Id.
                                                                                         6

¶9          Here, the agency’s August 21, 2017 notice of proposed removal stated, in
      pertinent part, that the appellant had been medically disqualified from his Air
      Traffic Control Specialist position since April 2016.     IAF, Tab 6 at 84.     The
      notice explained that “[t]he [agency’s] policy is to assist, to the extent possible,
      the continued employment for employees who are found medically disqualified
      from their present position, but may still be qualified for other positions in the
      [a]gency.” Id. at 85. The notice indicated that, on June14, 2016, the agency had
      received the appellant’s requested job parameters and conducted an unsuccessful
      search for a vacant position based on the information he provided; however, “as
      of August 4, 2016,” no vacant positions were available for him. Id. The notice
      also stated that the agency had conducted “a [second] job search, [Federal
      Aviation Administration (FAA)] and [Department of Transportation (DOT)]
      wide.” Id.
¶10         In response to the notice of proposed removal, the appellant averred that he
      had not been provided information regarding the agency’s job searches, to include
      the results thereof, and that the agency had not included this information in the
      list of the materials relied upon in the notice of proposed removal. Id. at 52-53,
      86.   Accordingly, the appellant requested information regarding both of the
      agency’s job searches along with a list of “all FAA and DOT Jobs Government
      wide, which have been hired within the FAA and DOT Whether Temporaily
      Detailed and/or made permanent for hire, from the period of May 8th 2015 until
      present date.” Id. at 52-53 (grammar, punctuation, and spelling in original).
¶11         On December 20, 2017, the agency issued its decision on the proposed
      removal, again stating that the agency had conducted two unsuccessful job
      searches for a position for the appellant.     Id. at 54-59.   The decision letter
      acknowledged the appellant’s request for information regarding the searches;
      however, the letter stated that, if the appellant “would like to request information
      regarding FAA and DOT jobs [] from the period of May 8, 2015 to the present ,”
      he could “submit a formal request to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
                                                                                        7

      Coordinator.” Id. at 54-55. In other words, the decision letter indicated that the
      agency had not provided the appellant with any additional information regarding
      the job searches prior to effecting his removal; rather, upon effecting his removal,
      it informed him that he could seek publicly available information via a FOIA
      request. Id.
¶12        The appellant has not disputed that he is medically unable to perform the
      duties of his Air Traffic Control Specialist positon; thus, the contested issue
      underlying the agency’s nondisciplinary removal action is whether the appellant
      could be reassigned to another position. In cases involving a medical inability to
      perform, the agency’s ability to reassign an employee to a vacant position for
      which he is qualified goes to the reasonableness of the penalty.        Clemens v.
      Department of the Army, 120 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 5 (2014). Although the notice of
      proposed removal referenced two unsuccessful job searches, the agency declined
      the appellant’s request for information regarding these searches, e.g., whether the
      searches had yielded any vacant positions and, if so, why the agency had
      determined that the appellant was unqualified or otherwise ineligible for such
      positions. IAF, Tab 6 at 54-55, 85. Given the circumstances, we find that the
      agency’s failure to provide this information precluded the appellant from
      meaningfully responding to the agency’s proposed action and amounted to a
      violation of his due process rights.      See Cheney v. Department of Justice,
      479 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (concluding that an employee had not been
      provided with the opportunity to make a meaningful response to the agency’s
      notice of proposed suspension when the appellant was left to guess at the reasons
      for his security clearance suspension); see also O’Keefe v. U.S. Postal Service,
      318 F.3d 1310, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (concluding that, because due process
      requires that an employee be given notice of the charge and specifications against
      him in sufficient detail to allow the employee to make an informed reply, it was a
      due process violation to justify a penalty based on allegations not set forth in the
      notice of proposed removal). To this end, the agency’s second job search, which
                                                                                            8

      concluded in November 2016, yielded vacant FAA Support Specialist positions;
      however, agency personnel determined that the appellant could not be reassigned
      to these positions because they were not equivalent to his Air Traffic Control
      Specialist position. IAF, Tab 13 at 97. The appellant, having not received any
      contemporaneous information regarding his consideration for these positions, was
      unable to address the agency’s determination in this regard prior to his removal.
      Moreover, despite indicating in both its notice of proposed removal and its
      decision letter that it had conducted two unsuccessful job searches for the
      appellant, the agency has since acknowledged that it actually conducted four job
      searches. 4 E.g., PFR File, Tab 3 at 6; IAF, Tab 6 at 6, 55, 85, Tab 13 at 4, Tab 14
      at 81.
¶13            We also find that the deciding official considered material, ex parte
      information in violation of the appellant’s due process rights. To this end, on
      September 22, 2017, i.e., approximately 1 month after the issuance of the notice
      of proposed removal, an agency Human Resources Specialist and an agency
      Labor Employee Relations Specialist retroactively considered whether the
      appellant was qualified for a Staff Support Specialist position for which the
      vacancy announcement closed on September 21, 2017.              ID at 7; IAF, Tab 16
      at 78-84, Tab 19 at 47-48.     Notably, the deciding official testified that he too
      considered whether the appellant was qualified for this position.              Hearing

      4
        As set forth in the initial decision, the first job search, which began in June 2016,
      apparently yielded no results. ID at 3-4; IAF, Tab 13 at 81, Tab 14 at 81. The second
      search, which concluded in November 2016, yielded the above-discussed vacant
      Support Specialist positions. ID at 5; IAF, Tab 13 at 97. The third search was
      precipitated by March 22, 2017 advice from agency counsel regarding the inadequacy
      of the first two searches. IAF, Tab 19 at 45-46. To this end, counsel advised the
      agency that the first two searches should not have been restricted to the FAA; rather,
      they should have been conducted DOT-wide. ID at 5-6; IAF, Tab 19 at 45. In response
      to this advice, the agency undertook a more expansive retroactive search. IAF, Tab 15
      at 19, Tab 19 at 45, 50. As discussed in greater detail herein, the fourth search, which
      was also retroactive, occurred in September 2017, i.e., after the issuance of the notice
      of proposed removal but prior to the issuance of the decision letter.
                                                                                         9

      Transcript (HT) at 134-35, 153-54 (testimony of the deciding official). Indeed,
      the deciding official testified that he and the agency’s Labor and Employee
      Relations Specialist “had conversations about the availability of the position and
      the requirements of the position” and that the two “both came to the same
      conclusion that due to the [appellant’s] medical diagnosis and the responsibilities
      of the job, that it would not be a proper fit.”      HT at 153 (testimony of the
      deciding official).   The deciding official acknowledged that, had the appellant
      been found qualified, he would have been given the position, i.e., he would not
      have been removed from Federal service.          HT at 162-63 (testimony of the
      deciding official).   The appellant, however, did not learn that the agency had
      considered him for this position until after his removal. HT at 254-56 (testimony
      of the appellant).    We find that this information constituted constitutionally
      impermissible new and material ex parte information.          See Stone, 179 F.3d
      at 1377.   Indeed, when a deciding official admits that ex parte information
      influenced his penalty determination, the information in question is clearly
      material. Silberman v. Department of Labor, 116 M.S.P.R. 501, ¶ 12 (2011).
¶14         Because we find that the agency violated the appellant’s due process rights,
      we reverse the initial decision in part and do not sustain the agency’s removal
      action. Even when the underlying action is overturned on procedural grounds,
      however, the Board must decide the discrimination issues raised in an appeal;
      accordingly, we herein consider the appellant’s disability discrimination claims . 5
      Schibik v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 98 M.S.P.R. 591, ¶ 11 (2005).

      5
        Because we reverse the agency’s removal action, we need not address the appellant’s
      other remaining claims, including his contention that the agency committed harmful
      procedural error. PFR File, Tab 1.
                                                                                        10

      We affirm the administrative judge’s conclusion that the appellant failed to prove
      his claim of disparate treatment disability discrimination; however, we clarify the
      legal standard for this claim.
¶15        The appellant argued before the administrative judge that the agency
      engaged in disparate treatment disability discrimination; however, he does not
      discernably raise any arguments regarding this claim on review. PFR File, Tab 1;
      IAF, Tab 20 at 6.    We discern no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s
      conclusion that the appellant failed to prove this claim; however, we take this
      opportunity to clarify the applicable legal standard therefor. ID at 23-24.
¶16        Following the issuance of the initial decision, the Board clarified that an
      appellant who proves that disability discrimination was a motivating factor in the
      contested   personnel   action   may    be   entitled   to   injunctive   or   other
      “forward-looking” relief, but to obtain the full measure of relief, including status
      quo ante relief, compensatory damages, or other forms of relief related to the end
      result of an employment decision, the appellant must show that discri mination
      was a “but-for” cause of the action.      Pridgen v. Office of Management and
      Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 22, 40, 42. Here, the administrative judge concluded
      that the appellant had failed to identify evidence of discriminatory animus on part
      of the agency, and we discern no basis to disturb this conclusion. ID at 23 -24.
      Accordingly, we need not reach the question as to wheth er the appellant proved
      that discrimination was a but-for cause of the agency’s decision to remove him.

      We affirm the administrative judge’s conclusion that the appellant failed to prove
      his claim of failure to accommodate disability discrimination.
¶17        The appellant raises a series of challenges regarding the administrative
      judge’s conclusion that he failed to prove his affirmative defense of failure to
      accommodate disability discrimination. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-20. To this end, he
      challenges the administrative judge’s conclusion that he was medically unable to
      perform the essential functions of a particular vacant position and he avers that
      the agency failed to engage in the interactive process. Id. at 5-6, 14-15. We find
      that these arguments do not warrant a different outcome.
                                                                                            11

¶18         An agency is required to make reasonable accommodation to the known
      physical and mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
      disability unless the agency can show that accommodation would cause an undue
      hardship on its business operations.          Miller v. Department of the Army,
      121 M.S.P.R. 189, ¶ 13 (2014);            29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a).            Reasonable
      accommodation includes modifications to the manner in which a position is
      customarily performed in order to enable a qualified individual with a disabilit y
      to perform the essential job functions. Miller, 121 M.S.P.R. 189, ¶ 13. In order
      to establish disability discrimination based on a failure to accommodate, an
      employee must show the following: (1) he is an individual with a disability, as
      defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g); (2) he is a qualified individual with a
      disability, as defined by 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); and (3) the agency failed to
      provide a reasonable accommodation. Id.
¶19         Here, we find no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s co nclusion that
      the appellant failed to satisfy the definition of a “qualified” individual under
      29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); 6 thus, he necessarily failed to show that the agency
      engaged in failure to accommodate disability discrimination. ID at 18-23; see
      Haas v. Department of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 36, ¶ 28 (explaining that

      6
        The appellant draws the Board’s attention to the fact that the administrative judge
      stated that, because the appellant was medically unable to perform the duties of an Air
      Traffic Control Specialist with or without a reasonable accommodation, he failed to
      show that he is a qualified individual with a disability “for the [Air Traffic Control
      Specialist] position.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 12; ID at 19. Because this statement may have
      elicited confusion, we modify the initial decision to clarify that , in analyzing whether
      an employee has shown that he is a qualified individual with a disability, the Board
      must consider not only whether there was a reasonable accommodation that would have
      enabled the employee to perform the essential functions of his position, but also
      whether the agency could have accommodated the employee via reassignment. See
      Desjardin v. U.S. Postal Service 2023 MSPB 6, ¶ 28.                Here, insofar as the
      administrative judge also properly considered whether the agency could have reassigned
      the appellant, a different outcome is not warranted. ID at 19-23; see Panter v.
      Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984).
                                                                                           12

      a claim of disability discrimination based on an agency’s failure to reasonably
      accommodate that disability requires that the individual be a qualified individual
      with a disability).
¶20         An appellant can establish that he is a qualified individual with a disability
      by showing that he can, with or without accommodation, perform either the
      essential functions of his position of record or those of a vacant funded position
      to which he could be assigned. Desjardin v. U.S. Postal Service, 2023 MSPB 6,
      ¶ 28; see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). On review, the appellant does not challenge the
      administrative judge’s conclusion that he is medically unable to perform the
      essential duties of his Air Traffic Control Specialist, i.e., his position of record .
      PFR File, Tab 1; ID at 18-19. Moreover, we find that he has not presented a basis
      to disturb her conclusion that he failed to identify a vacant position to which the
      agency could have reassigned him. ID at 19-23; see Massey v. Department of the
      Army, 120 M.S.P.R. 226, ¶ 12 (2013) (explaining that, as part of a failure to
      accommodate affirmative defense, the appellant has the burden of establishing the
      existence of a position to which he could have been reassigned).                Indeed,
      discussed in the initial decision, the appellant identified eight potential positions
      that were vacant during the relevant timeframe. ID at 21; IAF, Tab 19 at 8. The
      appellant provides no basis to disturb the administrative judge’s conclusion that
      his reassignment to seven of these eight positions would have constituted a
      promotion. 7 ID at 21; see Gonzalez-Acosta v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      113 M.S.P.R. 277, ¶ 14 (2010) (explaining that an agency is not required to

      7
        On review, the appellant argues that agency policy and the applicable collective
      bargaining agreement required the agency to reassign him to any vacant position for
      which he was qualified, regardless of whether the reassignment would result in a
      promotion. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5, 11. This claim of harmful procedural error, however,
      is unavailing for purposes of his disability discrimination affirmative defense. See
      Taylor v. Department of Homeland Security, 107 M.S.P.R. 306, ¶ 8 (2007) (explaining
      that the Rehabilitation Act does not require an agency to promote an individual in order
      to provide reasonable accommodation).
                                                                                           13

      promote an individual in order to provide reasonable accommodation ). Moreover
      he does not provide a basis to disturb the administrative judge’s conclusion,
      which was based in part on credibility determinations, that his medical
      restrictions precluded him from performing the essential functions of the eighth
      position. ID at 22; see Purifoy v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 838 F.3d 1367,
      1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding that the Board must defer to an administrative
      judge’s demeanor-based credibility determinations, “[e]ven if demeanor is not
      explicitly discussed”).    To the extent the appellant reasserts that the agency
      should have expanded its search parameters, his contention is unavailing; indeed,
      as set forth in the initial decision, it was ultimately the appellant’s burden to show
      the existence of a vacant position to which he could have been reassigned. ID
      at 22; see Jackson v. U.S. Postal Service, 79 M.S.P.R. 46, 54 (1998) (clarifying
      that the agency’s failure to look for a position as a reasonable accommodation
      does not relieve the appellant of the burden of ultimately showing that such
      positions existed and were available).
¶21         The appellant argues that the agency failed to engage in the interactive
      process. E.g., PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-6. However, the Board has found that an
      agency’s failure to engage in the interactive process alone does not violate the
      Rehabilitation Act; rather, the appellant must show that this omission resulted in
      failure to provide reasonable accommodation.         Gonzalez-Acosta, 113 M.S.P.R.
      277, ¶ 16; see Paris v. Department of the Treasury, 104 M.S.P.R. 331, ¶ 24
      (2006) (explaining that, to rule in favor of an employee on a disability
      discrimination claim merely because           he has “articulated” a reasonable
      accommodation not only relieves the employee of his burden of proof, but can
      lead to an unenforceable decision). The appellant has not made such a showing. 8

      8
        We have considered the appellant’s remaining arguments, including his claim that the
      administrative judge either misinterpreted or failed to consider certain evidence in the
      record; however, we find these claims unavailing. PFR File, Tab 1 at 18-20; see
      Marques v. Department of Health and Human Services, 22 M.S.P.R. 129, 132 (1984)
                                                                                              14

      Accordingly, we find that he failed to prove his claim of failure to accommodate
      disability discrimination. 9

                                              ORDER
¶22         We ORDER the agency to cancel the removal action and restore the
      appellant effective December 29, 2017. See Kerr v. National Endowment for the
      Arts, 726 F.2d 730 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The agency must complete this action no
      later than 20 days after the date of this decision.
¶23         We also ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the correct amount of back
      pay, interest on back pay, and other benefits under the Office of Personnel
      Management’s regulations, no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this
      decision. We ORDER the appellant to cooperate in good faith in the agency’s
      efforts to calculate the amount of back pay, interest, and benefits due, and to
      provide all necessary information the agency requests to help it carry out the
      Board’s Order. If there is a dispute about the amount of back pay, interest due,
      and/or other benefits, we ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the undisputed
      amount no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision.
¶24         We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing
      when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has
      taken to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask
      the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).

      (explaining that an administrative judge’s failure to discuss all of the evidence of record
      does not mean that the evidence was not considered), aff’d, 776 F.2d 1062 (Fed. Cir.
      1985) (Table).
      9
        We acknowledge the apparent conflict of finding both that the agency violated the
      appellant’s due process rights by failing to provide him with material information
      regarding its job searches and that the appellant failed to identify a vacant position to
      which he could have been reassigned, i.e., that the job searches failed to yield a vacant
      position. However, as indicated, a due process violation is not subject to the harmful
      error test; indeed, an appellant subject to such a violation is automatically entitled to a
      new, constitutionally correct removal proceeding. Ward, 634 F.3d at 1279.
                                                                                     15

¶25        No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully
      carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement
      with the office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appellant
      believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition
      should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency has not
      fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of
      any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).
¶26        For agencies whose payroll is administered by either the National Finance
      Center of the Department of Agriculture (NFC) or the Defense Finance and
      Accounting Service (DFAS), two lists of the information and documentation
      necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from a Board decision
      are attached. The agency is ORDERED to timely provide DFAS or NFC with all
      documentation necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from the
      Board’s decision in accordance with the attached lists so that payment can be
      made within the 60-day period set forth above.

                      NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
                            YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
                           ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
           You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney
      fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set forth at title 5 of
      the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The
      regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If
      you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees
      and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.
      You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued
      the initial decision on your appeal.
                                                                                     16

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 10
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropria te one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.              5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).

10
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                       17

      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court   at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim     of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
                                                                                18

race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other securi ty.       See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
                                                                                     19

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice describ ed in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 11   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation

11
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                           20

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.
                                 DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE
                                           Civilian Pay Operations

                          DFAS BACK PAY CHECKLIST
The following documentation is required by DFAS Civilian Pay to compute and pay back pay
pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805. Human resources/local payroll offices should use the following
checklist to ensure a request for payment of back pay is complete. Missing documentation may
substantially delay the processing of a back pay award. More information may be found at:
https://wss.apan.org/public/DFASPayroll/Back%20Pay%20Process/Forms/AllItems.aspx.

NOTE: Attorneys’ fees or other non-wage payments (such as damages) are paid by
vendor pay, not DFAS Civilian Pay.

☐ 1) Submit a “SETTLEMENT INQUIRY - Submission” Remedy Ticket. Please identify the
       specific dates of the back pay period within the ticket comments.

Attach the following documentation to the Remedy Ticket, or provide a statement in the ticket
comments as to why the documentation is not applicable:

☐ 2) Settlement agreement, administrative determination, arbitrator award, or order.

☐ 3) Signed and completed “Employee Statement Relative to Back Pay”.

☐ 4) All required SF50s (new, corrected, or canceled). ***Do not process online SF50s
       until notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 5) Certified timecards/corrected timecards. ***Do not process online timecards until
       notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 6) All relevant benefit election forms (e.g. TSP, FEHB, etc.).

☐ 7) Outside earnings documentation. Include record of all amounts earned by the employee
       in a job undertaken during the back pay period to replace federal employment.
       Documentation includes W-2 or 1099 statements, payroll documents/records, etc. Also,
       include record of any unemployment earning statements, workers’ compensation,
       CSRS/FERS retirement annuity payments, refunds of CSRS/FERS employee premiums,
       or severance pay received by the employee upon separation.

Lump Sum Leave Payment Debts: When a separation is later reversed, there is no authority
under 5 U.S.C. § 5551 for the reinstated employee to keep the lump sum annual leave payment
they may have received. The payroll office must collect the debt from the back pay award. The
annual leave will be restored to the employee. Annual leave that exceeds the annual leave
ceiling will be restored to a separate leave account pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805(g).
                                                                                               2

NATIONAL FINANCE CENTER CHECKLIST FOR BACK PAY CASES
Below is the information/documentation required by National Finance Center to process
payments/adjustments agreed on in Back Pay Cases (settlements, restorations) or as ordered by
the Merit Systems Protection Board, EEOC, and courts.
1. Initiate and submit AD-343 (Payroll/Action Request) with clear and concise information
   describing what to do in accordance with decision.
2. The following information must be included on AD-343 for Restoration:
       a.   Employee name and social security number.
       b.   Detailed explanation of request.
       c.   Valid agency accounting.
       d.   Authorized signature (Table 63).
       e.   If interest is to be included.
       f.   Check mailing address.
       g.   Indicate if case is prior to conversion. Computations must be attached.
       h.   Indicate the amount of Severance and Lump Sum Annual Leave Payment to be
            collected (if applicable).
Attachments to AD-343
1. Provide pay entitlement to include Overtime, Night Differential, Shift Premium, Sunday
   Premium, etc. with number of hours and dates for each entitlement (if applicable).
2. Copies of SF-50s (Personnel Actions) or list of salary adjustments/changes and amounts.
3. Outside earnings documentation statement from agency.
4. If employee received retirement annuity or unemployment, provide amount and address to
   return monies.
5. Provide forms for FEGLI, FEHBA, or TSP deductions. (if applicable)
6. If employee was unable to work during any or part of the period involved, certification of the
   type of leave to be charged and number of hours.
7. If employee retires at end of Restoration Period, provide hours of Lump Sum Annual Leave
   to be paid.
NOTE: If prior to conversion, agency must attach Computation Worksheet by Pay Period and
required data in 1-7 above.
The following information must be included on AD-343 for Settlement Cases: (Lump Sum
Payment, Correction to Promotion, Wage Grade Increase, FLSA, etc.)
       a. Must provide same data as in 2, a-g above.
       b. Prior to conversion computation must be provided.
       c. Lump Sum amount of Settlement, and if taxable or non-taxable.
If you have any questions or require clarification on the above, please contact NFC’s
Payroll/Personnel Operations at 504-255-4630.