Court Opinion

ID: 9618904
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:18:57.322803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:33.333299
License: Public Domain

Littlejohn, Justice
(dissenting) :
Being of the opinion that the lower co.ui't should be reversed, I respectfully dissent to the opinion of Mr. Justice Bussey. We are in agreement, however, on the point that a proper claim was hied with the Industrial Commission within one year as required by the statute.
Except fo,r the statute claimant would have no rights against the employer in this case. Accordingly, claimant can only pursue her rights by complying with the statute which grants them. The statute requires an employee to give written notice of an injury, but provides that oral notice will be permitted if just excuse is shown for failure to, give written notice. This co,urt has given liberal interpretation to these statutory provisions and we have permitted the Commission to accept excuses which certainly only barely met the scintilla rule. As I interpret the cases, this is the first instance in which this court has approved a finding of excusable failure to give notice where there was no semblance of an excuse offered, and indeed in this proceeding, after the case was remanded to the Commission for additional evidence, the claimant elected to remain silent on the issue involved.
This claimant knew that she was required to report an injury. She should not be allowed to disregard the statute and say, “I did not give written notice because I elected to give oral notice instead.” The effect of the majority opinion is to amend the statute, which is the province of the legislature and not of this court.
The Commission has found that giving oral notice is alone excuse for failing to give written notice. This is not the type of excuse contemplated by the statute. If giving oral notice in this case is sufficient, then oral notice in all cases is sufficient. This defeats the purpose of the statute.
I am also of the opinion that the notice allegedly given was not a full disclosure of the facts as required by the *263statute. Such disclosure as was made is shown by claimant’s own testimony as follows:
“Q. Now, tell us what happened?
“A. Well, I started to work at 4:30 and we had the buckets there to fill our magnets up to put in the container—
“Q. A bucket?
“A. Yes — and I filled the bucket up and was bent over when I picked them up a sharp pain hit me in the back and run down my right leg, and so it was hurting me and he had come, the supervisor, Rayford Burdett, came along and asked me if I would work the next day, which was Saturday, and I told him that I would and then he came back along before we took our break along, something after ten or something ’til eleven, the last break we took before we knocked off — and I told him I had picked those magnets up and that a sharp pain come in my back and run down my right leg and I showed him my leg that had swollen up.
“Q. Your leg had swollen?
“A. Yes — I had to undo my shoe and he said well that’s all right just come on in, he said you’ll be running this job and you’ll be sitting down.
“Q. How much does this bucket weigh that you picked up, do you know ?
“A. I don’t have no idea — -I’ll tell you what it was — it was a three pound crisco can because this girl had brought it from home, but I don’t have no idea how much it weighed.”
The opinion overlooks the fact that filing of a written notice would beyond dispute place the employer on notice that a claim may be in the making. That which took place as recited above, served no such purpose.
A notice is not sufficient unless it fairly conveys to the person entitled thereto such information as the law intends, or reasonably puts the employer on inquiry as to such information. If this claimant told her supervisor only what she stated that she told him, I do not think that the em*264ployer was told enough to alert it to investigate the alleged happening so that the case could be defended, and medication provided if such was warranted. It should be noted from the testimony of the claimant herself that she did not seek out her supervisor to give the information, but merely mentioned it to him when he came by where she was working.
The wisdom of the statute requiring written notice is emphasized by this very case. The claim was pursued only after it had become so stale that the supervisor was unable to recall anything about the case of real value to his employer as a defense, or helpful to the Commission in determing the facts.
The shock absorbing provision in the statute which permits, upon a proper showing, an employee to rely on oral notice instead of written notice, is a wise provision but it is subject to much mischief and should not be applied except to prevent an injustice. Examples of excusable failure to give statutory notice are enumerated in 100 C.J.S. Workmen’s Compensation § 450 a, p. 331, and include the following: case of mistake, incapacity, inability and unforeseen cause.
The claimant, at the time of the accident and at all times since, has been in complete control of her faculties. A search of the entire record, including her testimony and that of all witnesses, fails to reveal any evidence which points to a logical reason or excuse why she should not have complied with the statute. The Commission cites none and merely holds that she should be excused from giving written notice because she chose to give oral notice. An election of the type of notice to be given is the province of the legislature, not of the claimant.
I would hold as a matter of law that this claim should be barred because no excuse for failing to give written notice has been shown.
*265No pursuit of the claim was made until August 1963, some eight months after the alleged accident. Her ailment was diagnosed when she went to the hospital the last part of January 1963, as a ruptured disc. She had knowledge of this while the employer did not have knowledge of it and was afforded no opportunity to furnish medical care so as to minimize disability and minimize liability.
“But delays in giving notice after the seriousness of an unjury has become apparent or which prevent the employer from making proper inquiry as to the circumstances of the injury or from sending medical aid so as to reduce or perhaps take away the claim for compensation have generally held to sustain a finding of prejudice.” Am. Jur., Workmen’s Compensation, Section 383.
The reason that an employer is entitled to prompt full notice of an accident is well stated in the case of Mintz v. Fiske-Carter Construction Co., 218 S. C. 409, 63 S. E. (2d) 50, by the late Chief Justice Strikes, as follows:
“The subject of the requirement of notice of accident is treated at length in 71 C.J. 976 et seq., where it is said at the outset of the discussion that the required notice is not to be treated as a mere formality o,r technicality and dispensed with as a matter of course, which seems to have been done here by the commission. It is also the subject of a series of valuable annotations in American Law Reports, the last in 145 A.L.R. 1263. It is concluded there, upon many authorities, that the provision for notice should be liberally construed in favor of the claimants, but there are limitations upon that rule and the statutory requirement cannot be disregarded altogther. Its purpose is at least twofold ; first, it affords protection of the employer in order that he may investigate the facts and question witnesses while their memories are unfaded, and second, it affords the employer opportunity to furnish medical care of the employee in order to minimize the disability and consequent liability upon the employer. 145 A.L.R. 1267. See also, *26658 Am.Jur. 826 et seq., Workmen’s Compensation, Sec. 375 et seq.”
Both the spirit, if not the absolute letter of the statute and common fairness required that she report the diagnosis of a ruptured disc to her employer. She not only did not report the matter to her employer, but she denied that she had suffered any definite injury. Dr. Halford testified that his record .reflected “Patient denies history of definite injury; claims insidious onset.” He further testified * * “She told me at that time that her pain had been there for three weeks; so that would date the onset to early January of ’63.” The alleged accident was about six weeks before the statement made to the doctor. The claimant did not deny giving such history to her own doctor. The employer has been prejudiced as a matter of law by failure of claimant to give proper notice.
The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the whole of the testimony is that there is no competent evidence of any disability suffered by the claimant causally connected with her employment. She relies entirely on her own lay testimony to prove her contention that she picked up a bucket of magnets on December 14, 1962, and that this ruptured a vertebra in her back, as diagnosed six weeks later, at which time she denied that she had had an accident and stated that the onset was insidious. There is no competent evidence from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that the bucket with its weight, in this case, would most likely rupture the disc of a person who picked them up. It is common kitchen knowledge that a three pound Crisco bucket will hold slightly more than three pints liquid measure. Nor can one conclude from the evidence that the weight of the magnets is great. There are two persons who were present and knew about the weight of the bucket. Claimant said: “, but I don’t have no idea how much it weighed.” The supervisor, Mr. Burdette, was asked: “It *267would weigh about how many pounds?” To this question he replied: “Five — six—seven.”
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the claimant as we are required to do, the record anchors down the weight of the magnets involved to a maximum of seven pounds, which is less than the weight of a gallon of water.
It is well settled that a layman may prove causal connection between a happening and an injury without medical testimony, but there are limitations, and it is not every set of facts which gives rise to the application of this rule. If claimant’s contention is consistent with medical experience there is no reason why she should not have asked her own doctor, who was on the stand, a hypothetical question to establish her contention. The burden of proof as relates to causal connection was upon her.
It is obviously the claimant’s contention that lifting the bucket ruptured the disc, but a study of the record shows that actually not even she testified that it did rupture the disc or that in her opinion it ruptured the disc. For related cases concerning lay testimony on medical questions see Hines v. Pacific Mills et al., 214 S. C. 125, 51 S. E. (2d) 383, and Ashley v. South Carolina Highway Department, 213 S. C. 354, 49 S. E. (2d) 505.
The backbone and its disc are involved and complicated. Under the facts of this case her own testimony is not competent to establish causal connection.
The lower court should be reversed, and I would so hold.
Moss, C. J., concurs.