Court Opinion

ID: 9889465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-10 16:01:21.091307+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:40:41.057189
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11210   Document: 28-1    Date Filed: 10/10/2023   Page: 1 of 5

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 23-11210
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       IN RE: TESFALEM ISSAC,
                                                           Appellant,
       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
       ex rel.
                                                             Plaintiﬀ,
       versus
       LOCKHEED MARTIN,

                                                 Defendant-Appellee.

                         ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-11210      Document: 28-1       Date Filed: 10/10/2023     Page: 2 of 5

       2                       Opinion of the Court                  23-11210

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-00893-MHC
                           ____________________

       Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and WILSON and LUCK, Cir-
       cuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Tesfalem Issac appeals the dismissal of his fifth amended
       complaint against Lockheed Martin for violations of the False
       Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq. The district court ruled that Is-
       sac’s complaint failed to state a claim for relief. Fed. R. Civ. P.
       12(b)(6). Issac challenges only the dismissal of his retaliation claim,
       31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). We affirm.
               In March 2018, Issac filed a qui tam suit under seal against his
       then-employer, Lockheed Martin. The United States declined to in-
       tervene. In February 2022, Issac filed his fifth amended complaint.
       He alleged that he was a structural mechanic for Lockheed. In 2010,
       he was assigned to a team responsible for sealing fuel tanks on cer-
       tain aircraft. His supervisor directed Issac and the crew to use spray
       guns ordinarily used for painting airplanes to apply an adhesion
       promotor to the fuel tanks, instead of using a slower method like
       an aerosol can, paint brush, or cotton cloth to ensure proper appli-
       cation and sealing. Although the high-pressured spray guns re-
       leased noxious chemical fumes, Lockheed failed to provide its em-
       ployees with proper respirators, which caused them to become
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       23-11210                Opinion of the Court                           3

       sick. The spray guns and lack of protective gear allegedly violated
       the Manufacturing Process Standard, the Occupational Safety and
       Health Act, the terms of Lockheed’s government contracts, and
       Department of Defense protocols.
              Issac alleged that, beginning in 2010, he complained to his
       supervisor and other personnel about the health effects of using the
       spray guns. In 2016, he and other employees contacted the Occu-
       pational Safety and Health Administration about their illnesses, but
       two days before a scheduled air quality test, Lockheed took
       preemptive measures to conceal the effects of the spray guns. He
       also contacted his union about the fumes.
               Issac alleged that, in July 2018, after he filed his qui tam law-
       suit, the Department of Defense inspected the facility and tagged
       the spray guns as “out of compliance” with the aircraft’s sealing
       standards. After the inspection, he was treated “differently” and
       transferred to a different building, where he was assigned menial
       tasks. In October 2018, the government interviewed him regarding
       his allegations.
               In November 2018, Lockheed’s work placement committee
       informed Issac that he was “out pending placement” because his
       health had worsened to the extent that it could not “accommodate
       [his] current medical limitation(s).” In May 2021, Lockheed notified
       him that his “request for time away from work ha[d] been ap-
       proved” for November 2018 through September 2021. Because he
       never requested medical leave, he believed Lockheed was trying to
       cover up his retaliatory termination.
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                   23-11210

              The district court dismissed Issac’s complaint. It ruled that
       the complaint failed to state a claim for retaliation under the False
       Claims Act because the complaint lacked any allegations to support
       a plausible inference that Lockheed knew Issac had engaged in pro-
       tected activity or a causal connection between Issac’s engagement
       in a protected activity and his adverse employment actions.
              We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint. Einhorn v.
       Axogen, Inc., 42 F.4th 1218, 1222 (11th Cir. 2022). A complaint must
       include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
       pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8 “does not
       require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an
       unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
       Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A pleading that offers
       labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of
       a cause of action will not do.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). To
       survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain “sufficient
       factual matter, accepted as true, [that] state[s] a claim to relief that
       is plausible on its face.” Id.
              The Act provides relief to an employee discriminated against
       “because of lawful actions done . . . in furtherance of an action un-
       der [the Act] or other efforts to stop . . . violations of [the Act].” 31
       U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1). To prove that the retaliation was “because of”
       the protected activity, the plaintiff must prove that his employer
       was aware of the protected activity. Id.; see U.S. ex rel. Sanchez v.
       Lymphatx, Inc., 596 F.3d 1300, 1304 (11th Cir. 2010).
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       23-11210               Opinion of the Court                        5

               The district court did not err in dismissing Issac’s claim of
       retaliation. Issac alleged no facts from which the district court
       could plausibly infer that Lockheed was aware or on notice that he
       was pursuing a claim against it under the Act. His complaint failed
       to draw a causal link from his engagement in protected activities—
       undisputedly, his filing a qui tam lawsuit under seal and meeting
       with the government about his allegations six months later—to his
       transfer away from aircraft work and being notified that he was
       “out pending placement” due to medical limitations. Issac never
       alleged that Lockheed knew about the qui tam filing or his inter-
       view with the government before the adverse actions.
               Issac instead alleged that he was treated “differently” after
       the Department inspected the spray guns in July 2018, but he never
       alleged that the Department’s inspection was prompted by his
       qui tam action or that the inspection tipped off Lockheed that it was
       being sued by Issac for committing fraud on the government. Nu-
       merous employees allegedly had become sick from using the spray
       guns, and Issac was not the only employee who had complained.
       Because Issac’s complaint was devoid of any factual allegations
       that, if true, would establish that Lockheed was on notice that he
       had engaged in protected activities, see Sanchez, 596 F.3d at 1304,
       he failed to state a claim for retaliation under the Act.
             We AFFIRM the dismissal of Issac’s complaint.