Court Opinion

ID: 9626096
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:01:58.089636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:22.159751
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in Divisions 1 and 2 on the merits of the issues ruled on. I am compelled to concur in Division 3, which focuses on an aspect of appellate procedure in workers’ compensation cases, because the statute does not make the exercise of superior court appellate jurisdiction dependent on even a good faith effort by appellant to pursue, or by the court to afford, that remedy.
Appellants enumerate as error the deprivation of their right to an appeal and decision in the superior court and assert that the superior court refused their request for a hearing and permitted the decision of the board to become affirmed by operation of law.
On May 21, 1996, appellants filed with the board a timely appeal from its award. In full compliance with OCGA § 34-9-105 (b), which *441governs such appeals, the board transmitted the record to the superior court on June 12, and it was filed in the clerk’s office on June 17. On July 29, more than 60 days from the date the notice of appeal was filed with the board, the superior court filed a “certificate.” It read: “This is to certify that this Court rejected the Employer/Insurer’s request that oral argument be scheduled in the above-referenced appeal from the Appellate Division of the Georgia State Board of Workers’ Compensation. This Court neither heard nor scheduled oral argument in the above-referenced case within sixty days from the date the notice of appeal was filed with the Georgia State Board of Workers’ Compensation, preferring instead that this case be affirmed by operation of law.” A letter to the judge to whom the appeal was assigned indicates that the certificate was filed in response to a request to the judge, in order to memorialize what transpired when appellants sought a hearing.
Thereafter, appellants filed an application for appeal to the Court of Appeals, pursuant to OCGA §§ 5-6-35 (a) (1) and 34-9-105 (d). This Court permitted the appeal to proceed, and appellants duly filed a notice of appeal on September 17.
OCGA § 34-9-105 (b) provides what ostensibly is a right of appeal to the superior court “in the manner and upon the grounds provided in this Code section.” After the record is filed with the clerk, “[t]he case so appealed may then be brought by either party upon ten days’ written notice to the other before the superior court for a hearing upon such record, subject to an assignment of the case for hearing by the court.” The latter clause retains in the court the power to set its calendar. If the case is not heard within 60 days or within 20 days after a continued hearing or if the superior court’s dispositive order is not entered within 20 days of the hearing, the decision of the board is affirmed by operation of law.1
Before 1988, an appeal to the courts was a matter of right in workers’ compensation cases. Thereafter, and now, it is a matter of discretion. Right of access to the courts for review of the administrative decision was eliminated by the legislature.
*442In Southeastern Aluminum Recycling v. Rayburn, 251 Ga. 365, 366 (306 SE2d 240) (1983), the Supreme Court construed OCGA §§ 34-9-105 and 5-6-35 to constitute the superior courts as “the courts of last resort as a matter of right in workers’ compensation and other cases.” It explained that in consequence, “[slitting as an appellate court of last resort of right, the superior courts are no longer merely a base which must be touched en route in the course of a workers’ compensation appeal. Under OCGA § 5-6-35 . . ., the superior courts have all of the authority and all of the responsibilities which the appellate courts formerly had in workers’ compensation cases. It therefore is imperative that the hearings in superior courts in workers’ compensation appeals, provided for by law, be conducted in a plenary manner.” Id. Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded that case to the superior court because the party appealing the board’s award had not been afforded its right to the hearing.
The law in existence at that time did not contain a proviso for the board’s award to become affirmed by operation of law in the event prescribed procedural steps were not taken by the parties or by the court. See OCGA § 34-9-105 (b) (1982).
After the hearing by the Supreme Court in Southeastern Aluminum Recycling, we granted a discretionary appeal. In the course of our opinion we reiterated the long-standing recognition that “[t]he Workers’ Compensation Act was designed to provide immediate financial assistance to injured employees and to furnish a speedy, inexpensive and final settlement of their claims. [Cits.]” Southeastern Aluminum Recycling v. Rayburn, 172 Ga. App. 648, 649 (1) (324 SE2d 194) (1984).
In 1987, the procedure was changed to shorten the time for appeal from 30 days to 20 days. Ga. L. 1987, pp. 806, 808, § 3. In 1988, the law was amended twice. The first time a proviso for automatic affirmance (“considered affirmed”) upon inaction by the superior court was added. Ga. L. 1988, pp. 535, 536, § 1. The second time, the proviso was eliminated. Ga. L. 1988, pp. 1679, 1690, § 20. The next session of the General Assembly saw a return of the automatic affirmance proviso in subsection (b) (“considered affirmed by operation of law”) and the addition in subsection (d) of a time measurement for such affirmances for the purpose of applications to be made pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35. Ga. L. 1989, pp. 579, 581, § 2. In conjunction with the 1997 amendment (Ga. L. 1997, p. 1367, § 4), that is currently the law.
Before the proviso was added back and expanded, and while the law was as stated in the latter 1989 amendment, this Court ruled that the burden was on the appellant in superior court to ensure a timely hearing, so that a hearing by the superior court outside the time limits was null and void. AT&T Technologies v. Barrett, 195 Ga. *443App. 675, 676 (395 SE2d 22) (1990).
Nevertheless, later in 1990, the Supreme Court held that the time requirements for the superior court appeal, while technically exceeded, were sufficiently met so as to allow the principle of “fair treatment of the parties and the policy of reaching the merits of a controversy” to prevail over the short and rigid time periods set. Felton Pearson Co. v. Nelson, 260 Ga. at 515. Thus the Court favored superior court review over affirmance of board decision by operation of law.2
Thereafter, this Court dealt with applications for review when there was no superior court judgment or order to consider. In Atlanta Family Restaurants v. Perry, 209 Ga. App. 581, 582 (434 SE2d 140) (1993), we granted an application for discretionary appeal, held that the board erred, and ruled that “the dismissal [by the board] should not have been affirmed by the superior court.” The special concurrence pointed out that the superior court had not in fact rendered a judgment, and it highlighted some of the problems with this awkward, drawn-out, and jurisprudentially unsound procedure. Id. at 582-585 (Beasley, P. J., concurring specially). See, for other aspects of this problematic scheme, Reynolds Constr. Co. v. Reynolds, 218 Ga. App. 23, 26-27 (459 SE2d 612) (1995) (Beasley, C. J., concurring specially).
The opinions in Borden, Inc. v. Holland, 212 Ga. App. 820 (442 SE2d 916) (1994), also illustrate the problematic nature of this scheme. A discretionary appeal in this Court was permitted, the judgment of the superior court attempting to rule on the merits of the appeal from the board was reversed as lacking jurisdiction, and neither the employee (who appealed from the board award to the superior court) nor the employer (who appealed with permission to this Court) received a judicial review on the merits of their respective positions.
Likewise in Buschel v. Kysor/Warren, 213 Ga. App. 91 (444 SE2d 105) (1994), it was held that the superior court judgment was a nullity because the statutory time limits were exceeded. But because there was a cross-appeal by the employer, which challenged the award of the board, this Court reviewed the board’s award on the merits. The Court ruled that the board’s award was supported by the *444evidence and directed the superior court “to issue an order stating the decision of the full board was affirmed by operation of law.” Id. at 95 (5).
Clinical Arts &c. Svcs. v. Smith, 218 Ga. App. 681 (462 SE2d 757) (1995), is an example of a by-pass case. No action on the appeal by the superior court worked an affirmance of the board decision by operation of law, and this Court granted a discretionary appeal. It reviewed the board’s decision directly and concluded that the board had used the wrong standard in considering the evidence. So the Court reversed that decision and “remand[ed] the case to the superior court with directions that the case be recommitted to the appellate division of the Board for review under the proper standard as set forth in [the] opinion.” (Footnote omitted.) Id. at 683.
Harrell v. City of Albany Police Dept., 219 Ga. App. 810 (466 SE2d 682) (1996), is another example of a by-pass case. In the absence of a hearing and decision in the superior court, this Court was compelled to review the decision of the appellate division of the board because the application revealed a possibility of reversible error. As in Clinical Arts, the board decision was reversed and the case remanded, not to the board but to the superior court which had not acted, with direction that the case be recommitted to the board for reconsideration in light of a recent Supreme Court decision.3
Does all of this mean that the parties and the superior court each have the option of avoiding superior court review by simply allowing the time to expire? We have countenanced such a practice and construed subsections (b) and (d) of OCGA § 34-9-105 to permit this by-passing of appellate review by the superior court. If an appellant chooses to seek review in the Court of Appeals directly, then appellant need only omit giving notice for a hearing in the superior court. The time will expire, the decision of the board will become the decision of the superior court by operation of law, and appellant may apply for discretionary appeal under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1). By the same token, if the superior court does not wish to hold a hearing or decide the case, it need only refuse to act, as in this case, or refrain from acting. The result in either event is a direct review by this Court, by default, of the award of the workers’ compensation board, if we grant the application. It is a big “if,” and when it is prompted by the inaction or refusal of the superior court, the appellant loses what was once a right to a direct appeal.
*445This occurs after a long period of non-action while the case simply awaits the ticking of the clock; it measurably delays finality for the claim. If there is no review in the superior court, the statutory dead time from the date of the award of the board’s appellate division is one hundred thirty days, or four months and ten days. OCGA § 34-9-105 (b) and (d). Then, even if an appeal is granted by the Court of Appeals, the statutory time for getting to that point is another seventy days, or two months and ten days. OCGA § 5-6-35 (d), (e), (f) and (g). By the time the superior court clerk has prepared and transmitted the record, appellate briefing, and perhaps oral argument, is accomplished, and the Court of Appeals reaches a decision, up to another year will have passed.
During all of this time, a supersedeas is in effect, and “no [properly insured] employer shall be required to make payment of the award involved in the questions made in the case so appealed until such questions” have been decided. OCGA § 34-9-105 (e). Thus the delay occasioned by the cumbersome process disserves the objective of speedy relief to an injured worker who is entitled to it; plus it increases both the private and public costs of resolution.
. It also destroys a right of access to the courts for the party aggrieved by the administrative body’s final decision, when it is the superior court which chooses not to act. That infringes on the constitutional guarantee that “[n]o person shall be deprived of the right to prosecute or defend, either in person or by an attorney, that person’s own cause in any of the courts of this state.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XII.
Thus, the superior court can refuse to hear the appeal, and because workers’ compensation cases require an application for appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (1), this Court can refuse to hear the appeal (although it did not do so in this case). If both courts refuse, the party aggrieved by the board’s decision has no judicial remedy at all nor even a right to an explanation of why the courts refuse to consider the case. Thus there is no longer an appeal of right, and the superior courts are once again “merely a base which must be touched en route in the course of a workers’ compensation appeal,” a situation considered an anathema by the Supreme Court in Southeastern Aluminum Recycling, supra, 251 Ga. at 366.
This completely frustrates the goal of prompt resolution of employees’ claims so as to provide financial relief for job-related injuries. It ignores the constitutional mandate for “speedy, efficient, and inexpensive resolution of disputes and prosecutions.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IX, Par. I. It increases the transactional costs of the case, as filing fees, record copying costs, and attorney fees gather along the way. And it adds to the administrative load of the courts, as two courts are automatically involved in such appeals, one which will *446not act and the other which may or may not decide the case. If all superior courts were so disposed, then all workers’ compensation cases would be final at the administrative board level, subject to judicial review only at the discretion of this Court in accordance with its policy on discretionary appeals.
Appellate procedure for workers’ compensation cases cries for reform, to simplify and streamline the process which now has five levels, some of which are optional but still are involved, and the possibility of fourteen adjudicators, assuming there is agreement on the three-member panel of this Court with respect to disposition, and counting a petition for certiorari. If the case achieves whole court status in the Court of Appeals, and there is a petition for certiorari, then eighteen adjudicators are involved in the five levels. All for one worker’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits.4 This procedure, although the law, is at odds with the overruling substantive, traditional, and humane public policy for which the Workers’ Compensation Act ostensibly stands and which was recently reacknowledged by the Supreme Court: “The legislature has determined that [the exclusivity provision] is the quid pro quo for workers receiving a guarantee of prompt benefits for work-related injuries without regard to fault or common-law defenses and without the delay inherent in tort litigation.” Doss v. Food Lion, 267 Ga. 312, 313 (2) (477 SE2d 577) (1996).
It is believed that in this Court’s 90-year history, no case has been affirmed by operation of law but has received consideration and action by the Court, as required by the Georgia Constitution. Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IX, Par. II. So long as the superior courts have initial jurisdiction of appeals in workers’ compensation cases, that jurisdiction should be exercised as well.
Remand for hearing in the superior court in this instance would achieve no purpose because appellants have now had their day in court on the merits of their appeal. Had we denied their application, their only recourse would have been a petition to the Supreme Court of Georgia for certiorari. Although appellants have not been harmed as a matter of law, all parties have borne significant costs attribut*447able to the complex process.
Decided July 16, 1997.
Drew, Eckl & Farnham, John C. Bruffey, Jr., Thomas L. Walker, for appellants.
James A. Shea, Jr., for appellee.

 Prior to July 1, 1997, the 60 days was to be measured from the date the notice of appeal was filed with the board. The law was amended to provide that the 60-day period be measured from the date of docketing in the superior court, thus recognizing that a more realistic date for measurement of the time during which the superior court could hold a hearing was the date the case arrived in the superior court. The amendment thus gives a full two-month period for the superior court to hear the case. Ga. L. 1997, p. 1367, § 4. This resolves the problem noted by the two appellate courts in a 1990 case, Nelson v. Felton Pearson Co., 195 Ga. App. 92, 93 (392 SE2d 274) (1990), rev’d, Felton Pearson Co. v. Nelson, 260 Ga. 513, 514, n. 1 (397 SE2d 431) (1990). The inequity was also pinpointed in Synthetic Indus. v. Camp, 196 Ga. App. 637 (396 SE2d 518) (1990), and illustrated by Lanier v. Jim Brown Dev. Corp., 199 Ga. App. 255 (404 SE2d 626) (1991). Another aspect of inequity in the procedure is noted in Coronet Carpets v. Reynolds, 199 Ga. App. 383 (405 SE2d 103) (1991).

 The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision, Nelson v. Felton Pearson Co., 195 Ga. App. 92, which had held that the board’s award was affirmed by operation of law so that the superior court’s reversal of the board’s award was deemed beyond that court’s authority. The ultimate result was reinstatement of the reversal, but it is not reported whether employee Nelson again sought a discretionary appeal, this time on the merits. Nelson’s first appeal to the Court of Appeals raised by enumeration of error only the issue of the superior court’s jurisdiction to act. See Nelson v. Felton Pearson Co., 198 Ga. App. 532 (402 SE2d 807) (1991).

 Although the Court in the instant case does not give procedural direction but simply remands the case, I assume that because of the ruling in Division 2 (b), it is to be remanded to the superior court to be remanded to the appellate division of the board to be remanded to the administrative law judge for further consideration. Thereafter the whole process can begin anew.

 The procedurally tortured case of Bankhead Enterprises v. Beavers, 267 Ga. 506 (480 SE2d 840) (1997), bears witness to this morass. The ALJ decided the case. The appellate division reversed, but the superior court reversed and remanded to the board. The appellate division again reversed the ALJ. The superior court again reversed and remanded to the appellate division, and this time with direction to remand to the ALJ. An application for discretionary appeal to this Court from the superior court was denied, but a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court was granted, and that Court granted the application for discretionary review. It concluded that the superior court had erred and should have affirmed the second award of the appellate division of the board. Thus, all told, five levels of process and fourteen statutory decision-makers entered into the resolution of Beavers’ claim for workers’ compensation.