Court Opinion

ID: 9406837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-04 00:01:03.417423+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:33.530139
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                        FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

    KAREN C. HAN,

                    Plaintiff,
    v.
                                         Civ. Action No. 18-141
    FINANCIAL SUPERVISORY SERVICE,                (EGS)

                    Defendant.

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I.       Introduction

         Ms. Karen C. Han (“Ms. Han” or “Plaintiff”), who proceeds

pro se, brought this action against Financial Supervisory

Service (“FSS” or “Defendant”), alleging that FSS interfered in

the contractual relationship between her now-defunct financial

services company, Peninsula Asset Management Ltd. (“Peninsula”),

and Hankook Tire Company, Ltd. (“Hankook”). See generally

Compl., ECF No. 1. 1 On July 5, 2022, the Court granted FSS’

Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for lack of personal

jurisdiction in a final appealable order. See Han v. Fin.

Supervisory Serv., No. CV 18-141(EGS/GMH), 2022 WL 2438513, at

*9 (D.D.C. July 5, 2022).

1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the
Court refers to the ECF page numbers, not the page numbers of
the filed documents.
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      Pending before the Court is Ms. Han’s Motion to Alter or

Amend the Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). See Pl.’s Mot. Alter

or Amend Order Granting Def.’s Mot. Dismiss Pursuant Fed. R.

Civ. P. 59(e)., ECF No. 31. Upon careful consideration of the

motion, opposition, and reply thereto; the applicable law; and

the entire record herein, the Court hereby DENIES Ms. Han’s

Motion.

II.   Background

      A.   Factual

      The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the factual

background of this case, as set forth in its July 5, 2022

Memorandum Opinion and Order. See Han, 2022 WL 2438513, at *1-5.

In short, Ms. Han previously owned Peninsula, a financial

services company that entered into an agreement to complete a

financial transaction for an alleged alter-ego of the South

Korean company Hankook (the “Peninsula/Ocean Agreement”). See

Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 2, 8, 19. She alleges that: (1) the

transaction violated South Korean financial laws and

regulations; (2) reports of Peninsula’s involvement damaged the

company’s business and reputation; and (3) Peninsula was forced

to close due to fears that it could be criminally liable for its

participation. See id. ¶¶ 2, 23, 25, 32. Peninsula demanded that

Hankook indemnify it for its losses pursuant to the

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Peninsula/Ocean Agreement, but Hankook refused. See id. ¶¶ 48-

49.

      Ms. Han and Peninsula thereafter sued Hankook and others in

the 153rd Judicial District Court of Tarran County, Texas for

breach of contract. See id. ¶ 49. That court dismissed the suit

for lack of personal jurisdiction. See id. Ms. Han, her husband,

and Peninsula then sued the same defendants in the District

Court for the Northern District of Ohio for the same claims. See

id. ¶ 50. That court dismissed their claims for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. See id. ¶ 69.

      Ms. Han subsequently sued FSS in this Court. See generally

id. ¶¶ 83-93. She alleges that FSS assured Hankook that FSS

would not produce discovery in the Ohio litigation, thereby

encouraging Hankook to breach the indemnity provision of the

Peninsula/Ocean Agreement. See id. ¶¶ 3-4, 52, 88.

      B.   Procedural

      Ms. Han filed this Motion to Alter or Amend the Court’s

Previous Order on July 18, 2022. See Pl.’s Mot. Alter or Amend

Order Granting Def.’s Mot. Dismiss Pursuant Fed. R. Civ. P.

59(e)., ECF No. 31; Pl.’s Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot. Alter or Amend

Order Granting Def.’s Mot. Dismiss Pursuant Fed. R. Civ. P.

59(e). (“Pl.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 31-1. FSS submitted its brief in

opposition on July 29, 2022, see Mem. Law Opp’n Pl.’s Mot.

Change Venue (“Def.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 32; and Ms. Han replied

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on August 1, 2022, see Pl.’s Reply Def.’s Resp. Opp’n Pl.’s Mot.

Alter or Amend Pursuant Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (“Pl.’s Reply”),

ECF No. 33. The motion is now ripe and ready for adjudication.

III. Legal Standard

     A. Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment

     Rule 59(e) permits a party to file a motion to alter or

amend a judgment within twenty-eight days of the entry of that

judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Rule 59(e) motions are

“discretionary and need not be granted unless the district court

finds that there is an intervening change of controlling law,

the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear

error or prevent manifest injustice.” Firestone v. Firestone, 76

F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted). These motions are

“disfavored,” and the moving party bears the burden of

establishing “extraordinary circumstances” warranting relief

from a final judgment. Niedermeier v. Off. of Baucus, 153 F.

Supp. 2d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2001) (citing Anyanwutaku v. Moore, 151

F.3d 1053, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). Rule 59(e) does not provide a

vehicle “to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or

present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry

of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5

(2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting C. Wright &

                                4
A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1 (2d ed.

1995)).

     B. Pro Se Litigants

     “[P]ro se litigants are not held to the same standards in

all respects as are lawyers.” Roosevelt Land, LP v. Childress,

No. CIV.A. 05-1292(RWR), 2006 WL 1877014, at *2 (D.D.C. July 5,

2006) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). The

pleadings of pro se parties therefore “[are] to be liberally

construed.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per

curiam) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Even

so, “[t]his benefit is not . . . a license to ignore the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.” Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 658

F. Supp. 2d 135, 137 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Jarrell v. Tisch, 656

F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987)). Pro se litigants must comply

with federal and local rules. See Jarrell, 656 F. Supp. at 239;

Roosevelt Land, 2006 WL 1877014, at *2.

III. Analysis

     Ms. Han submits this Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter the Court’s

Order dismissing the Complaint to seek a change in venue to the

District Court for the Southern District of New York pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 31-1 at 1-2. For the

reasons that follow, the Court DENIES Ms. Han’s Motion.

     Ms. Han asserts that Section 1406(a) and Supreme Court

precedent require that the Court consider whether the “interest

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of justice” requires a transfer rather than dismissal. See id.

at 3-5 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a); Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman,

369 U.S. 463, 466 (1962)). She contends that the “interest of

justice” requires transfer because her claims are subject to a

statute-of-limitations defense. See id. at 4-5. Ms. Han further

argues that the Court should transfer her suit because transfer

would “promote the expeditious adjudication of [her] claims” and

“allow[] . . . [her] and the transferee court to dispense with

waste of time and valuable resources.” Id. at 4-5.

     FSS argues that Ms. Han’s Motion is procedurally deficient

because Ms. Han is raising an argument that she could have

presented in her earlier briefing but did not. Def.’s Opp’n, ECF

No. 32 at 5. The Court agrees that Ms. Han may not move for a

change of venue through this Rule 59(e) Motion. “[A]mendment of

a judgment is . . . an extraordinary measure” that the Court may

grant “under three circumstances only: (1) if there is an

‘intervening change of controlling law’; (2) if new evidence

becomes available; or (3) if the judgment should be amended in

order to ‘correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.’”

Leidos, Inc. v. Hellenic Republic, 881 F.3d 213, 217 (D.C. Cir.

2018) (quoting Firestone, 76 F.3d at 1208). Ms. Han does not

argue that any of these circumstances are present here. See

generally Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 31-1. Instead, she argues that the

Court should consider her motion to transfer venue, see id.;

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“rais[ing] arguments that could have been raised prior to the

entry of” the Court’s July 5, 2022 Memorandum Opinion and Order,

Exxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S. at 485 n.5 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). 2 She has acted too late. See Ciralsky

v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted)

(affirming district court’s denial of Rule 59(e) motion where

the movant “elected not to act until after a final order had

been entered”). Rule 59(e) does not provide a vehicle for her to

raise the venue issue now. See Patton Boggs LLP v. Chevron

Corp., 683 F.3d 397, 403 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing Fox v. Am.

Airlines, Inc., 389 F.3d 1291, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).

     Goldlawr does not change the Court’s conclusion. In that

case, the Supreme Court affirmed a decision transferring the

venue of an antitrust suit despite the petitioners’ argument

that the transferring court did not have personal jurisdiction

over them. See Goldlawr, 369 U.S. at 464, 467. The Supreme Court

explained that “[t]he language of § 1406(a) is amply broad

2 In her reply brief, Ms. Han concedes that she “did not make
such transfer argument as a fallback argument in her opposition
to FSS’s motion to dismiss.” Pl.’s Reply, ECF No. 33 at 3 n.2.
The Court also notes she did not argue the Court should transfer
the venue of the action in her Objections to Magistrate Judge
Harvey’s R. & R. See generally Pl.’s Objs. Magistrate Judge’s
Proposed Findings & Recommendations, ECF No. 26. She therefore
waived the argument. See N. Am. Cath. Educ. Programming Found.,
Inc. v. Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, 800 F. Supp. 2d
239, 249 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Aikens v. Shalala, 956 F. Supp.
14, 19 (D.D.C. 1997); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)).
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enough to authorize the transfer of cases, however wrong the

plaintiff may have been in filing his case as to venue, whether

the court in which it was filed had personal jurisdiction over

the defendants or not.” Id. at 466. However, Goldlawr does not

concern the standard the Court must apply to resolve Rule 59(e)

motions and therefore is not instructive to resolution of the

instant motion. See generally id. at 464-67.

      Because Ms. Han has not met the exacting standard for Rule

59(e) motions, the Court DENIES her Motion to Alter or Amend the

July 5, 2022 Memorandum Opinion and Order. 3

IV.   Conclusion and Order

      For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby

      ORDERED that Ms. Han’s Motion to Alter or Amend its

Dismissal of the Complaint, ECF No. 31, is DENIED.

      SO ORDERED.

Signed:    Emmet G. Sullivan
           United States District Judge
           July 3, 2023

3 FSS also argues that Ms. Han’s Motion is substantively
deficient because Magistrate Judge Harvey’s R. & R. “would
travel with the case” if the Court transferred venue. Def.’s
Opp’n, ECF No. 32 at 6. FSS cites no authority—and the Court is
not aware of any authority—supporting this proposal. In
addition, FSS recommends that the Court “pass upon” the
sovereign immunity and statute of limitations issues. See id. at
6-7. As Ms. Han responds in her reply briefing, see Pl.’s Reply,
ECF No. 33 at 4; FSS should have filed its own Rule 59(e) motion
to have the Court reconsider or amend its judgment, see Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59(e).
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