Court Opinion

ID: 9957095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 17:10:55.806519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:06.337986
License: Public Domain

No. 186              March 27, 2024                   585

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                 STATE OF OREGON,
                  Plaintiff-Respondent,
                            v.
               LARRY ALEX WHITELEY,
                  Defendant-Appellant.
               Lane County Circuit Court
           21CR03245, 20CR30970, 22CR13632;
           A179451 (Control), A179452, A179936

  Charles D. Carlson, Senior Judge.
  Submitted February 26, 2024.
  Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and John Evans, Deputy Public Defender, Office of
Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Colm Moore, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
  POWERS, J.
   In Case No. 21CR03245, Counts 1 and 2 reversed and
remanded; otherwise affirmed. In Case No. 20CR30970,
reversed. In Case No. 22CR13632, affirmed.
586                                                  State v. Whiteley

          POWERS, J.

         In this consolidated criminal appeal, defendant
assigns error to the trial court’s refusal to give a choice of
evils jury instruction. In Case No. 21CR03245, defendant
appeals from a judgment of conviction for felony driving
while suspended or revoked (DWS) and felony driving under
the influence of intoxicants (DUII).1 In Case No. 20CR30970,
the trial court entered a judgment revoking probation after
concluding that defendant failed to obey all laws and vio-
lated the condition prohibiting the use or possession of con-
trolled substances based on the jury’s guilty verdicts in Case
No. 21CR03245, and defendant argues that, if we reverse
the judgment in the DWS and DUII case, he is also entitled
to reversal of the probation violation judgment. In addition,
defendant filed a notice of appeal in Case No. 22CR13632,
but he does not assign error to any rulings in that case; we
therefore affirm the judgment in that case. As explained
below, we reverse and remand in Case No. 21CR03245 and
reverse in Case No. 20CR30970 because the trial court erred
in failing to give the choice-of-evils instruction.

         We review a trial court’s refusal to give a requested
jury instruction for legal error, viewing the record in the
light most favorable to the requesting party. State v. Paul,
289 Or App 408, 409, 410 P3d 378 (2017). A defendant is enti-
tled to have the jury instructed on a defense if the instruc-
tion correctly states the law and if there is any evidence to
support the presence of each element of the defense. State
v. Moreno, 287 Or App 205, 209, 402 P3d 767 (2017); see
also State v. Phillips, 317 Or App 169, 174 n 1, 503 P3d 1282
(2022) (explaining that choice of evils is not an affirmative
defense and that the state has the burden of disproving the
defense beyond a reasonable doubt whenever a defendant
raises the defense by either pretrial notice or by presenting
evidence in the defendant’s case-in-chief, which is the situa-
tion in this case). That is, “[a] defense to a criminal charge,
such as choice of evils, should be withdrawn from the jury’s
consideration only if there is no evidence in the record to
    1
      Defendant was also charged with reckless driving. He was acquitted on
that charge.
Cite as 331 Or App 585 (2024)                                  587

support an element of the defense.” Moreno, 287 Or App at
209 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
        ORS 161.200 provides the statutory elements for
the defense of choice of evils:
       “(1) Unless inconsistent with other provisions of chap-
   ter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, defining justifiable use of physi-
   cal force, or with some other provision of law, conduct which
   would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not
   criminal when:
      “(a) That conduct is necessary as an emergency mea-
   sure to avoid an imminent public or private injury; and
       “(b) The threatened injury is of such gravity that,
   according to ordinary standards of intelligence and moral-
   ity, the desirability and urgency of avoiding the injury
   clearly outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury
   sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense
   in issue.
       “(2) The necessity and justifiability of conduct under
   subsection (1) of this section shall not rest upon consider-
   ations pertaining only to the morality and advisability of
   the statute, either in its general application or with respect
   to its application to a particular class of cases arising
   thereunder.”
That defense is available even when the injury sought to be
avoided is to property. State v. Olson, 79 Or App 302, 305,
719 P2d 55 (1986). We have explained that for the choice-of-
evils defense, there must be evidence that the defendant’s
conduct was necessary to avoid a threatened injury, that the
threatened injury was imminent, and that it was reason-
able for the defendant to believe that the need to avoid the
threatened injury was greater than the need to avoid the
injury that the violated statute seeks to prevent. State v.
McPhail, 273 Or App 42, 49, 359 P3d 325 (2015), rev den, 358
Or 529 (2016).
         Consistent with our standard of review described
above, we set out the relevant facts to defendant’s challenge
on appeal. At trial, defendant testified that his driving
privileges were suspended. He had purchased a van from a
friend with the intention of living in it. Defendant was mov-
ing his property from a friend’s house to the van in stages.
588                                           State v. Whiteley

He explained that he was moving the property in stages so
that he could keep his eyes on it.
         The van was parked on the street near a residence in
Cottage Grove. A resident of that home, Cooley, approached
defendant. Cooley acted friendly, but he whispered in defen-
dant’s ear that he would call the police if defendant did not
move the van. Defendant became worried for his safety,
believing that Cooley was threatening him. He perceived
Cooley as “aggressive” and thought that it looked like Cooley
had a gun in his waistband. Defendant decided to drive the
van a short distance for his safety and to protect his prop-
erty. He felt that he had to drive the van to get “out of a vio-
lent situation” and to “get out of trouble in * * * that area.” He
had a “fight or flight response,” and he was in fear for his life.
         Calling the police to report defendant, Cooley made
statements to the 9-1-1 dispatcher that corroborated defen-
dant’s perception of Cooley as threatening. Cooley told the
dispatcher that he had a handgun and that he “should take
care of this” himself.
         An officer arrived and saw defendant begin driv-
ing the van. Defendant drove under five miles per hour. The
officer pulled defendant over for a traffic violation and even-
tually arrested him for DUII and DWS. Defendant did not
know that a police officer was there when he decided to drive.
In hindsight, had he known that the officer was there at the
time, defendant testified that he would not have driven and
acknowledged that he could have gone to the officer for help
instead.
         From that evidence, defendant argued that a jury
could find that he believed that moving the van was rea-
sonably necessary for him to avoid a threatened injury to
himself or his property by Cooley, that the threatened injury
was imminent, and that it was reasonable for defendant to
believe that the need to avoid the threatened injury was
greater than the harm of his driving while intoxicated and
suspended or revoked. Defendant renews those arguments
on appeal.
        The state remonstrates that the record does not
contain sufficient evidence for a rational factfinder to find
Cite as 331 Or App 585 (2024)                           589

that defendant’s criminal conduct was necessary or that
his belief that a threat of injury existed was reasonable.
In support of that argument, the state quotes testimony by
defendant that undermined his defense. For example, the
state points to defendant’s testimony that, had he known
that the officer was there, he would not have driven because
the “whole idea was not to get caught.” The state also high-
lights that defendant agreed on cross-examination that he
could have “walked away” or could have done “any number
of things” other than drive the van. The difficulty with the
state’s argument is that that is not the only way to view the
evidence.
         The state’s view of the evidence is not consistent
with our standard of review. Viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to defendant, a reasonable factfinder
could find the necessary elements of the defense. Although
it is true that defendant’s testimony, primarily on cross-
examination, could undermine his defense at times by con-
tradicting some of his direct examination testimony, no
legal principle compels the factfinder to believe defendant’s
most damaging admissions on cross-examination and to
disbelieve his testimony that supports his defense. Again,
our task is to view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the proponent of the instruction. In that light, defendant
encountered a man, Cooley, who appeared to have a firearm
in his waistband and who seemed friendly but then whis-
pered in defendant’s ear that he was going to call the police
in a way that defendant found threatening. Defendant was
worried about his safety and his property. He did not real-
ize that a police officer was parked nearby. He felt it was
necessary to drive a short distance, which he did at a very
low speed, to get “out of a violent situation.” That was an
approach that would minimize the threat of harm from
defendant driving while suspended and driving while under
the influence. There was also independent evidence that
Cooley had a handgun and might have been considering
taking care of the situation himself in some way. In sum,
viewing the record consistently with our standard of review,
there was sufficient evidence in the record to support each
element of the choice-of-evils defense. Thus, the trial court
erred by not giving the instruction.
590                                         State v. Whiteley

         Moreover, given that there was evidence to support
the defense, which would have applied to both counts, we can-
not conclude that the failure to give the choice-of-evils jury
instruction had little likelihood of affecting the verdict. See
State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 32, 77 P3d 1111 (2003) (explaining
that, under Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon
Constitution, an appellate court will affirm a judgment if
there is “little likelihood that the particular error affected
the verdict” and that the focus is on “the possible influence
of the error on the verdict rendered, not whether this court,
sitting as a factfinder, would regard the evidence of guilt as
substantial and compelling”). Accordingly, we reverse and
remand both Counts 1 and 2.
        Finally, because the trial court concluded in Case
No. 20CR30970 that defendant violated his probation based
on his convictions in Case No. 21CR03245, we also reverse
that judgment.
        In Case No. 21CR03245, Counts 1 and 2 reversed
and remanded; otherwise affirmed. In Case No. 20CR30970,
reversed. In Case No. 22CR13632, affirmed.