Court Opinion

ID: 9788870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:21:22.766485+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:43:23.072107
License: Public Domain

Justice COATS,
dissenting.
Today the court upholds the suppression of a criminal defendant's confessions (at the scene and later at the police station) to possessing illegal drugs, as well as the drugs themselves and the drug paraphernalia he handed over to the police, in effect dismissing a prosecution for child abuse and illegal possession. It does so not because the defendant's statements or consent were in any way involuntary or taken in violation of his Mi-ramnda rights, but on the grounds that the police conducted an illegal search by follow*1292ing the defendant to his living room chair to ask if he was okay, immediately after he lost consciousness and collapsed in their presence in his doorway. The Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches, and the exclusionary remedy exists to deter improper or undesirable police conduct. Because I consider incomprehensible the suggestion that the officers in this case should have remained in the defendant's doorway rather than seeing to his immediate well-being, I feel compelled to register my dissent.
As the majority acknowledges, a well-ree-ognized exception to the requirements of probable cause and a warrant before entering a dwelling exists for emergency assistance. Maj. op. at 1290; see People v. Amato, 193 Colo. 57, 562 P.2d 422 (1977)(fire fighters and police officers responding to an emergency call for resuscitation to treat a possible drug overdose could lawfully make warrantless entry into apartment under emergency exception); see also Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361 (8th Cir.1971) (police "may enter a dwelling without a warrant to render emergency aid and assistance to a person they reasonably believe to be in distress and in need of that assistance"); see generally 8 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seigure § 6.6(a) (8d ed.1996). While the doctrine has at times been categorized as a variant of the "exigent cireumstances" exception, see maj. op. at 1289, it is distinct from other kinds of exigent cireumstances and has its own separate justification and requirements. See People v. Harper, 902 P.2d 842, 845 n. 2 (Colo.1995) (noting recognition of the distinction since first application of the exception in this jurisdiction in Amato ). Unlike exigencies in the investigation of crime that make it impossible as a practical matter to secure a warrant from a neutral magistrate, an emer-geney is an exception not only to the warrant requirement but even to the requirement for probable cause of a crime, being justified as the execution of a duty completely separate and apart from the investigation of crime. See ABA Standards for Criminal Justice § 1-2.2 (2d ed.1980) (police have "complex and multiple tasks to perform in addition to identifying and apprehending persons committing serious criminal offenses," including to "aid individuals who are in danger of physical harm," "assist those who cannot care for themselves," and "provide other services on an emergency basis"); see also 3 LaFave, supra at 390.
It is unquestionably the case that entry pursuant to the emergency exception can be justified only if the cireumstances as they would have appeared to a prudent and trained officer at the time of the entry indicated an emergency threatening the life, safety, or in some cases property, of another. See People v. Malczewski, 744 P.2d 62, 66 (Colo.1987)(reason to believe there was immediate crisis when mother flagged officer down and told him that father had broken into her niece's house and taken their baby to his apartment). But there was no question in this case that the officers watched the defendant pass out before their eyes. The district court specifically found that "they were justifiably concerned about [the defendant's] medical condition." Similarly, the scope of the emergency exception must be strictly cireumseribed by the nature of the emergency justifying the initiation of the warrantless intrusion. See People v. Wright, 804 P.2d 866, 870 (Colo.1991)(search of purse for information was not justified by emergency exception where owner was already receiving medical care and was conscious and able to give whatever information was required). But there is no suggestion of a general exploratory search in this case, or any search for that matter, other than merely accompanying the defendant to his living room chair and asking if he was okay.
In fact, the majority's conclusion in this case does not appear to be dictated in any meaningful way by the district court's findings of historical fact. It rests on the majority's own conclusion, as a matter of law, maj. op. at 1290, that the defendant's collapse in the officers' presence did not pose a serious enough threat to his life or safety to amount to an "immediate crisis" that could justify the minimal intrusion of breaking the imaginary plane of the defendant's doorway to see if he needed help. Although the majority ostensibly acknowledges that the lawfulness of the officers' entry depends upon reasonable appearances, from their point of view at the *1293time of their entry, it actually relies on the fact that it was not necessary, in the end, to call an ambulance and that the defendant's wife turned out to be home and available to help. The fact that a person regains consciousness after collapsing and is able to stand up and make it to a chair a short distance away in no way rules out the danger of a serious malady that could render him unable to act rationally or fend for himself,1 To have simply turned and walked away, or waited outside to see if the defendant would return, may well have amounted (at least until today) to a dereliction of the officers' duty.
At the very least, the majority holding charges police with correctly assessing the medical cause and seriousness of a blackout and accurately determining whether the danger has passed before entering a home to offer emergency assistance. While dismissal of the relatively minor crimes at issue here may seem insignificant, the majority's rule of decision is one that should send a shudder through anyone who might want and expect similar assistance. To my mind, characterizing the mere entry of the defendant's house under these circumstances as a violation of his constitutional rights and seeking to deter similar behavior in the future stems from a misreading of our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and will almost certainly have a socially undesirable impact. In light of the trial court's factual finding of justified concern for the defendant's medical condition, I would applaud rather than condemn the officers' conduct in this case. I therefore respectfully dissent.

. The officers testified that the defendant was wobbly and staggered into his residence, and as the district court noted, even according to the defendant's account, he did not recall what happened after he passed out at the front door until he came to in the chair.