Court Opinion

ID: 9681462
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:50:56.738934+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:34.107535
License: Public Domain

HILL, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority construes section 14(8) of the Texas Tort Claims Act to mean that unless there is a specific law or ordinance in existence and applicable to an emergency situation, a governmental unit is not exempt from the Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity. The majority ignores the fundamental rule controlling the construction of a statute; that is, to ascertain, if possible, the intent of the Legislature as expressed in the language of the statute. State v. Terrell, 588 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex.1979).
I believe the Legislature’s concern in enacting section 14(8) was to further the public interest by assuring effective action in *564emergency situations by those entrusted with the responsibility of saving lives and property. The Legislature did not, however, intend to encourage governmental units to violate statutes or ordinances during emergencies, as this would be contrary to the public interest. Section 14(8) was designed to implement this legislative intent by protecting governmental units and their employees from liability for their failure to use ordinary care in an emergency unless they act in violation of a standard of care that has been statutorily provided.
The majority’s interpretation of the provision places an impossible burden on governmental units to provide by comprehensive laws and ordinances for every response that must be taken in an emergency in order to gain the exemption. That construction, in my opinion, frustrates rather than effectuates the legislative intent.
There is no evidence in the record of this cause that the District violated any statutes or ordinances during the emergency action. I would, therefore, hold that the District is immune from liability pursuant to section 14(8).
McGEE and GONZALES, JJ., join in this dissent.