Court Opinion

ID: 9662940
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:23:51.72945+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:44.108867
License: Public Domain

Hendry, C.J.,
concurring in part, and in part dissenting.
I concur with Justice Gerrard insofar as he suggests that the cap on damages imposed by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 44-2825(1) (Reissue 1998) may violate substantive due process rights of injured persons. I write separately, however, to state that for reasons similar to those expressed in my dissent in Bergan Mercy Health Sys. v. Haven, 260 Neb. 846, 620 N.W.2d 339 (2000) (Hendry, C.J., dissenting), I believe the Gourleys lack standing to challenge the Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability Act as unconstitutional special legislation in violation of Neb. Const, art. Ill, § 18.
In assessing a special legislation claim, we must first determine the privilege created by the statute and the particular class which is singled out to receive the privilege. Haven, supra. See, also, Swanson v. State, 249 Neb. 466, 544 N.W.2d 333 (1996); Stanton v. Mattson, 175 Neb. 767, 123 N.W.2d 844 (1963). In my view, the privilege created by § 44-2825(1) is the cap on the total amount recoverable “from any and all health care providers . . . for any occurrence resulting in injury or death of a patient.” The particular class singled out by the Legislature to receive the privilege is composed of “health care providers,” which class is *971limited to physicians, nurse anesthetists, qualifying professional entities, and hospitals. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 44-2803 (Reissue 1998).
Next, we must determine the persons within the general class which is made the subject of the legislation who stand in the same relation to the privilege as the particular class that receives the privilege. Haven, supra. See, also, Swanson, supra; Stanton, supra. Further, we must then determine whether the statute violates Neb. Const, art. Ill, § 18, either because the particular class which receives the privilege is a permanently closed class, or because the particular class has no reasonable distinction or substantial difference from the general class. Haven, supra. See, also, Swanson, supra; Stanton, supra.
I believe that the general class of persons standing in the same relation to the privilege would be all other health care professionals who are not “health care providers” as defined by the act, but who nonetheless may be liable “for bodily injury or death on account of alleged malpractice, professional negligence, failure to provide care, breach of contract, or other claim based upon failure to obtain informed consent for an operation or treatment.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 44-2822 (Reissue 1998). Such individuals could include, for example, optometrists (see Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-1,135.06 (Cum. Supp. 2002)); dentists (see, generally, Gordon v. Connell, 249 Neb. 769, 545 N.W.2d 722 (1996), Capps v. Manhart, 236 Neb. 16, 458 N.W.2d 742 (1990), DeCamp v. Lewis, 231 Neb. 191, 435 N.W.2d 883 (1989), and Pfeifer v. Konat, 181 Neb. 30, 146 N.W.2d 743 (1966)); and chiropractors (see, generally, Jones v. Malloy, 226 Neb. 559, 412 N.W.2d 837 (1987)).
I therefore conclude that the only persons who would have standing to assert that § 44-2825(1) is unconstitutional special legislation are such members of the general class who do not benefit from the privilege of the cap on damages pursuant to § 44-2825(1). Haven, supra. See, also, Swanson, supra; Stanton, supra. Because in my view the Gourleys lack standing, I reserve judgment as to whether § 44-2825(1) violates Neb. Const, art. Ill, § 18, until the proper party, together with an adequate and proper record, is before the court.
Recognizing that courts are concerned only with the power of the legislative branch to enact statutes, and not a legislature’s *972wisdom, with the exception of its analysis regarding special legislation, I concur with the per curiam opinion. See, U.S.D. No. 229 v. State, 256 Kan. 232, 238, 885 P.2d 1170, 1175 (1994) (stating that “ ‘the function of the court is merely to ascertain and declare whether legislation was enacted in accordance with or in contravention of the constitution — and not to approve or condemn the underlying policy,’ ” quoting Samsel v. Wheeler Transport Services, Inc., 246 Kan. 336, 789 P.2d 541 (1990)); Fagas v. Scott, 251 N.J. Super. 169, 211, 597 A.2d 571, 593 (1991) (stating that “ ‘judicial branch of the government does not and cannot concern itself with the wisdom or policy of a statute [and that s]uch matters are the exclusive concern of the legislative branch, and the doctrine is firmly settled that its enactment may not be stricken because a court thinks it unwise,’ ” quoting N. J. Sports & Exposition Authority v. Mc Crane, 61 N.J. 1, 292 A.2d 545 (1972)).