Court Opinion

ID: 9569760
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:17:08.690425+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:03:56.453961
License: Public Domain

CURETON, J.,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
I.
The majority contends that Hurd produced sufficient evidence to establish that he was let off the bus in an unreasonably dangerous location. I disagree.
At trial, Hurd offered the deposition of Booker Pressley, the former director of Williamsburg County’s transit authority. *617Pressley stated that the area in which the “Park and Ride” was created was congested. Pressley attested that the “Park and Ride” was created so that the passengers would not have to cross the road to go to Mingo’s store, and it was also established to provide the County with a safer place to discharge its passengers than on the side of the highway.
Hurd also presented testimony from Dr. Roberts, an expert in the field of traffic and pedestrian safety design, that it was unwise for the bus driver to have allowed passengers to disembark from the bus on the shoulder of the highway when there was a “Park and Ride” available. However, Roberts further opined that it would be reasonable to drop passengers off on the side of the road under the following circumstances:
[K]eep in mind that this is a rural area where your passengers are going to be getting on and off in rural circumstances. So ... what you want is a location where you can let the passengers off where hopefully you can get the bus completely off the traveled way and still have room for the passengers to get off without ending up in the ditch or something of this type. Then the bus can move off, allow the passengers, if they need to cross the roadway, a clear unobstructed view in either direction so they can cross the road in a location which is reasonably convenient for the passengers.
At trial Appellant presented evidence which clearly showed that the shoulder of the road was adequate in size to allow the bus space to pull completely off the roadway while still having adequate room for passengers to disembark -without stepping into a ditch, etc. The shoulder was also sufficient to enable the bus to reenter the roadway, while at the same time allowing the passenger to safely stand in the shoulder and view both lanes of traffic so that the passenger could then cross the roadway in a reasonably convenient location. The majority points to the fact that when the bus moved to reenter the highway, the bus was at an angle and Hurd testified he was unable to see to his right. However, there is no evidence to show that the bus pulled onto the highway into the oncoming lane of traffic traveling from the right and blocked Hurd’s view in that manner.
*618A common carrier has a duty to exercise the highest degree of care towards its passengers. Singletary v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 217 S.C. 212, 218, 60 S.E.2d 305, 307 (1950). However, “the relation of passenger and carrier ordinarily ends when the passenger steps from a bus into a reasonable safe place on a public highway.” Flynn v. Carolina Scenic Stages, 237 S.C. 340, 345, 117 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1960). Accord Harris v. Atl. Greyhound Corp., 243 N.C. 346, 90 S.E.2d 710, 713 (1956) (finding bus company owes a passenger duty to provide a safe landing, but once passenger has alighted safely to a place of safety, relationship of carrier and passenger ends).
The extent of Pressley and Roberts’s testimony was not that this particular shoulder was unsafe in and of itself, but that this shoulder was unreasonably dangerous in light of the fact that there was a safer location, a “Park and Ride,” a few hundred feet away. However, the threshold that must be met was that the carrier breached a duty to Hurd because the carrier let him off the bus in an unreasonably dangerous location. The evidence presented by Hurd does not meet this standard.
II.
The majority found that Hurd presented evidence that allowed an inference that the County’s actions were the proximate cause of the accident and that the county’s negligence was greater than Hurd’s negligence. I disagree.
Although comparison of a plaintiffs negligence with that of a defendant is ordinarily a question for the jury, the trial court should determine this question as a matter of law if the “sole reasonable inference which may be drawn from the evidence is that the plaintiffs negligence exceeded fifty percent.” Bloom v. Ravoira, 339 S.C. 417, 422, 529 S.E.2d 710, 713 (2000). “Where evidence of the plaintiffs greater negligence is overwhelming, evidence of slight negligence on the part of the defendant is simply not enough for a case to go to the jury.” Id. at 424, 529 S.E.2d at 714.
Hurd testified that he did not have a clear view of the highway when he began to cross the street to reach Mingo’s store. He stated that he continued to cross the highway even though the bus was blocking his ability to see oncoming traffic. *619Rather than wait a brief moment on the shoulder for the bus to pull away, Hurd chose to cross the highway despite his obstructed view. Furthermore, Hurd requested to be let out on the shoulder even though the driver informed him that he was driving to the “Park and Ride” where Hurd could have safely exited the bus and walked to Mingo’s store. Hurd’s own testimony established that he attempted to cross the highway in an unreasonable and unsafe manner.
A common carrier of passengers is due such passengers the highest degree of care, but is not an insurer of the safety of passengers under all circumstances.... In an action in tort based on negligence, the negligence of the defendant must be the proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff. Even though there may be some testimony from which it could be inferred that a defendant was negligent, a plaintiff cannot unnecessarily and consciously take a risk which may or may not result in injury, and when it does result in injury, then recover damages therefor against a defendant. In other words, the law requires that a passenger ... should use every reasonable care to avoid injury to himself, and if he fails to use such care as a man of ordinary prudence and caution would have used under the surrounding circumstances, and is injured as a result thereof, he cannot recover.
Singletary, 217 S.C. at 218-19, 60 S.E.2d at 307-308 (1950). Under the facts of this case, I find that Hurd failed to present evidence that the carrier’s negligence was the proximate cause of his injuries or that the County’s negligence was greater than his own. Accordingly, the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict in favor of the County.
I would REVERSE and enter judgment for Appellant.