Court Opinion

ID: 9444205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:45:51.72658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:45.797936
License: Public Domain

GOURLEY, District Judge
(dissenting).
In these criminal appeals from a jury verdict of guilty, I joined in a per curiam order affirming the judgments of the District Court since I believed substantial evidence existed to support the verdicts. I was also of the opinion, and continue to so believe, that no error existed in the record to which objection was made or exception taken. There was no basis to sustain any of the assignments of error presented by the defendants in their appeal.
Nevertheless, during the argument of the appeal, I noticed what I considered “plain error” in the charge of the trial judge which I believed affected substantial rights of the defendants.
The following portion of the District Judge’s charge to the jury, in my judgment, poignantly poses the question of “plain error.”
“These indictments, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, were returned under Section 145(b) of Title 26 of the United States Code, which provides, so far as it pertains to these charges, that any person who wilfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this chapter, or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
*809“Now, as the Court has charged you, your duties as jurors consist of a fact-finding body, and when you have reached a verdict in the case, either guilty or not guilty, then your duties are at an end. If your verdict is not guilty then that is the end of the case. The Government ean’t appeal from that verdict by the jury. If your verdict is guilty, then of course it becomes the duty of the Court to pass sentence. You have nothing whatever to do with the fixing of any sentence in any case, but merely to hear the evidence in the case and determine from that evidence whether or not the charges are sustained, whether or not the defendant is guilty or not guilty.
“Now, as to the matter of the punishment provided by the statute, that means that the Court in passing sentence may fine the defendant any amount, according to the discretion of the Court, from one cent up to ten thousand dollars. There is not any definite amount fixed in the statute that the Court must fine the defendant. The statute says that ‘Upon conviction thereof, the defendant may be fined not more than ten thousand dollars.’ That means that the Court could fine him any amount from one cent to ten thousand dollars. ‘Or imprisoned for not more than five years.’ That means the Court could order him imprisoned for any length of time from one minute up to five years, according to the punishment that the Court might think is justified in this case. That does not mean that the Court has to impose a fine of ten thousand dollars or a sentence of five years, but leaves it to the discretion of the Court.” (Italics supplied.)
The question of plain or substantial error was not argued and counsel for the litigants were not prepared to enlighten the court on applicable principles of law.
Opportunity has now existed for an independent research and more reflected judgment to be made of the law, and I am now convinced that substantial or plain error does exist which materially affected the rights of the defendants.
I must, therefore, vacate my joinder in the per curiam order of affirmation and respectfully dissent to the judgment of my learned colleagues.
It is incumbent upon this court to take notice of substantial or plain error, whether or not such error was raised by counsel at time of trial or laid as an assignment of error in appeal.
The law provides an impenetrable cloak of protection about a defendant in a criminal proceeding which requires the court of appeals, in cases of serious criminal offenses to carefully check the record for error prejudicial to defendant, whether such error had been urged upon the court or not. Tatum v. United States, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 386, 190 F.2d 612.
Undoubtedly, as a matter of administrative policy, to avoid any unnecessary appeals and new trials, it is important that errors, which inevitably will occur from time to time in extemporaneous charges of the most competent judges, be pointed out immediately by trial counsel with a view to their correction then and there. That policy is enforced in many cases by refusal to review for defects in a charge not challenged at the trial. Indeed, the silence of counsel often suggests that errors seem trivial at that time. But where, particularly in a criminal case, several errors appear, which in the aggregate contain the potential of substantial damage to the accused, the policy of sound and time saving trial administration which would penalize failure to point out error below may have to yield to more important considerations of making sure that the accused has been treated fairly. United States v. Cumberland, 3 Cir., 200 F.2d 609; Miller v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 6 Cir., 40 F.2d 820; Morris v. United States, 9 Cir., 156 F.2d 525, 169 A.L.R. 305; United States v. Raub, 7 Cir., 177 F.2d 312; Logan v. United States, 5 Cir., 192 F.2d 388; Wyche v. United States, 90 U.S.App.D.C. 67, 193 F.2d 703; Apodaca v. United States, 10 Cir., 188 F.2d 932; *810Rose v. United States, 10 Cir., 128 F.2d 622; Remmer v. United States, 9 Cir., 205 F.2d 277.
Thus, the question is resolved as to whether the error committed was of so fundamental a nature that the court of appeals should exercise the power provided by Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A.
I believe the error below is “plain” within the meaning of the rule, and that it affects “substantial rights.” I can perceive nothing more substantial than to have the members of the jury, in their deliberation, consider the fact that if a verdict of not guilty is returned, no right to appeal exists on the part of the Government, and to further consider the nature or extent of the punishment that the trial court could impose in the event of a verdict of guilty.
Criminal jurisprudence has long recognized error and inherent danger to a fair trial when a jury is charged on the subject of punishment, and certainly, even more grievous error and peril to the impartial administration of justice would exist when reference is made to the Government’s inability to appeal from a verdict of not guilty. Ryan v. United States, 8 Cir., 99 F.2d 864; Demetree v. United States, 5 Cir., 207 F.2d 892; 23 C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 1290(b) page 869; Housel and Walser, 2nd Ed., Defending and Prosecuting Federal Criminal Cases.
When instructions have been made to a jury which should not be made, it is a question of judgment whether what was said was so prejudicial as to justify a reversal where the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction.
I cannot conceive that the instructions made by the trial judge were not considered with some weight in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
The administration of criminal justice •in this democracy should not be subjected to the remotest hazard that a person be deprived of his liberty on any thoughts or ideas that do not relate directly to the facts as presented to establish a defendant’s guilt.
I, therefore, respectfully dissent from the judgment of my distinguished colleagues and believe that a new trial should be awarded and the proceeding remanded to the District Court.
Since the formulation of the within dissent, defendants have made application to the court for rehearing and for the reasons herein stated, I believe rehearing should be granted.