Court Opinion

ID: 9523428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:41:52.783147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:05:35.573137
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
DeBruler, J.
Both our State (Art. 1, § 24) and Federal (Art. 1, § 10) Constitutions contain ex post facto clauses, and they have long been viewed by this Supreme Court as well as by the United States Supreme Court as a bar to certain forms of legislation.
“The plain and obvious meaning of this prohibition is, that the legislature shall not pass any law, after a fact done by any citizen, which shall have relation to that fact, so as to punish that which was innocent when done; or to add to the punishment of that which was criminal; or to increase the malignity of a crime; or to retrench the rules of evidence, so as to make conviction more easy.” Strong v. State (1822), 1 Blackf. 202, 205; Calder v. Bull (1798), 3 Dall. 386,1 L. Ed. 648.
I believe that the trial court here was correct, and that the section of the Habitual Traffic Offenders Act which mandates the use of convictions that pre-existed the enactment of this statute in computing the number of offenses necessary for a license revocation operates against the appellee as an ex post facto law since it was enacted, “after a fact done by a citizen which shall have relation to that fact so as to . . . add to the punishment of that which was criminal. . . .” Strong v. State, supra.
The Habitual Traffic Offenders Act became effective on September 1, 1972, and, provides in part, for the revocation of an operators license for a term of ten years upon a driver’s having accumulated three or more convictions for the offense of Driving While Intoxicated (IC 1971, 9-4-1-54, being Burns § 47-2001 [b] [2]) within the previous ten year period. It is also stipulated in the Act (IC 1971, 9-14-13-3a, being Burns § 47-2336a) that only one of the three necessary convictions had to have occurred after the effective day of the Act. The certified driving record of this appellee intro*38duced at the revocation hearing below showed that in the years 1965,1969 and 1972 he had been convicted of the offense of Driving While Intoxicated, and on each occasion had his license suspended for one year, ninety days and sixty days respectively.
Driving while intoxicated is a criminal misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment, fine or a license suspension. After each of his convictions on this offense appellee had the penalties then provided by the statute assessed and imposed upon him. Now, however, because of this new legislation and as a result of his previous convictions he will have the identical penalty reimposed. Thus the Habitual Traffic Offenders Act is a law which was not in existence at the time of two of these convictions but now provides further penalties based on these prior convictions. A law such as this which by its necessary operation has retrospective application to crimes committed before its enactment and by its relation to these offenses increases the penalty upon a citizen is within the definition of an ex post facto law.
The majority holds, however, that while they may concede the ex post facto nature of this legislation the prohibitions of the clause are limited only to the imposition of criminal penalties and since the revocation here is not in the nature of a criminal punishment that clause does not conflict with this statute. While I can agree that the revocation of an operators’ license under the Habitual Traffic Offenders Act is not a criminal proceeding I cannot agree that this deprivation, which of course is identical to the penalties already imposed on the appellee by his previous criminal convictions, is so unsubstantial as not to constitute a punishment for the individual involved. Nor do I believe that the history or nature' of the ex post facto clause requires us to interpret it in so narrow a fashion. For example, in its opinion in U.S. v. Lovett (1946), 328 U.S. 303, 66 S. Ct. 1073, 90 L. Ed. 1252, the United States Supreme Court found that the loss of a government salary, although not a criminal penalty, was a punishment *39within the terms, of the e* post facto and-, bill' of attainder clauses. Likewise, in Cummings v. Missouri (1866), 71 U.S. 277, 18 L. Ed. 356, the Court found that the loss of the ability to participate in a chosen profession, again "a penalty in no way deemed criminal, was sufficiently substantial as to be a punishment within the ex post facto clause. Where substantial punitive consequences result to the individual, even though they are not strictly criminal in nature, these consequences or penalties are within the meaning of the ex .post facto clause.
' It must be recognized that the ten year revocation of a motor vehicle operators license in an automobile oriented society involves a serious deprivation to the individual. Not only does it naturally hinder a person’s ability to travel and move about but it also may have serious effects on the type of employment he may accept and even the area in which he may live. These consequences may involve significant personal hardships on the individual and are serious enough to constitute penalties which a/ citizen has a right not to .have applied to him in an ex post facto manner.
I must emphasize that my view of this case recognizes the .interest of the State in regulating the revocation of motor vehicle operators licenses, and I believe the use of a citizen’s driving record is clearly a legitimate method of making that decision. However the individual has an even greater interest, and one which is constitutionally protected by the ex post facto clause, in knowing that convictions and penalties which have been assessed and finalized before the enactment of new legislation will remain dormant. The ex post facto clause operates to stay the hand of the Legislature when it seeks to unearth a citizen’s previously disposed of convictions and use them anew to work a significant deprivation on that citizen.
Note.—Reported at 310 N.E.2d 873.