Court Opinion

ID: 9640937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:18:57.217915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:33.851298
License: Public Domain

COVINGTON, J.,
concurring in result.
In Missouri the law has been that in an action to recover damages for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident, evidence of intoxication of a party is admissible as a circumstance to be considered with other facts in evidence to determine the question of negligence. Broderson v. Farthing, 762 S.W.2d 548, 549 (Mo.App.1989). Evidence of the drinking of alcohol, however, as opposed to actual intoxication, is admissible only when coupled with evidence of erratic driving or some other circumstance from which it might be inferred that defendant’s physical condition was impaired at the time of the collision. Before evidence of alcohol consumption becomes relevant, the other evidence must support an inference that the drinking caused the party to drive in an erratic manner and that the erratic driving caused the collision. The evidence must not include guess work, conjecture and speculation as to the existence of the necessary facts to make the conclusion. Id. Erratic driving involves something more than mere negligence. Id. at 551. It includes “abnormal, peculiar, unaccountable and aberrant operation of the vehicle.” Id. “Erratic driving is not the product of carelessness or of inattention but is conduct so heedless of circumstances as to be attributable to some impairment of faculties or of function.” Id. I concur with the principal opinion that the trial court abused its discretion in not admitting evidence of the drinking of alcohol. This conclusion is supported by the cases compiled in Broderson v. Farthing, 762 S.W.2d at 550-51.
The question of submissibility of punitive damages is a separate issue. Although not opposed to submission of punitive damages in cases involving intoxication, I am op*157posed to the submission of punitive damages without enunciation of the standards or principles upon which the evidence may be submitted to the jury. The principal opinion slides from its discussion of evidence of intoxication in connection with Doisy v. Edwards, 398 S.W.2d 846 (Mo.1966), into a conclusion that the jury “should have been permitted to consider such evidence in connection with the issue of Weller’s recklessness,” (emphasis added) which the principal opinion appears to equate with Weller’s “condition of sobriety at the time of the accident.” The principal opinion fails to analyze the issue of punitive damages in the traditional analysis, nor does it pronounce that submission of punitive damages in alcohol-related cases requires a different analysis. If the principal opinion suggests that this Court should adopt a different standard for analysis of punitive damages in cases involving intoxication, the policy decision, though not inappropriate, should not be permitted to disregard completely the principles of law this Court has articulated in the area of punitive damages.
The most important consideration relative to the issue of punitive damages in a case involving a drunken driver is the defendant’s state of mind at the time the tort is committed. The plaintiff must establish that a defendant motorist manifested a state of mind to justify imposition of punitive damages,„ while under the influence of alcohol. See Punitive Damages and the Drunken Driver, 8 Pepperdine L.Rev. 117 (1980). This is not a simple task. Although a majority of jurisdictions have indicated that recovery of punitive damages-from an intoxicated driver may be allowed under certain circumstances, the cases differ as to whether intent or motive must be shown before punitive damages may be awarded. Some jurisdictions that approve assessment of punitive damages against drunken drivers emphasize the defendant’s conduct and impute a state of mind consistent with that conduct. See Miller v. Blanton, 213 Ark 246, 210 S.W.2d 293 (1948). There the Supreme Court of Arkansas inferred a disregard for the safety of others from the fact that the defendant pleaded guilty to the offense of reckless driving. In Sebastian v. Wood, 246 Iowa 94, 66 N.W.2d 841 (1954), the Iowa Supreme Court likewise rejected defendant’s argument that malice was a necessary element and found “legal malice” from the wanton or willful misconduct of the defendant.
Nor may the plaintiff disregard causation. As Broderson v. Farthing indicates, it is necessary to strike a balance between evidence of consumption of alcohol and proof that such consumption had a marked effect in causing the accident. Both the defendant’s motives and conduct in committing the tort are important as the basis of the award for punitive damages. The question, then, is whether this Court should hold that driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquors may, in certain circumstances, constitute “reckless indifference to the rights of others.” See Burnett v. Griffith, 769 S.W.2d 780, 789 (Mo.banc.1989).
Authority from Pennsylvania provides guidance. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, although permitting submission of punitive damages in some cases in which there is evidence of intoxication, properly recognized that, despite a defendant’s intoxication, other circumstances would have to be present to warrant submission of the punitive damage issue to a jury. Focht v. Rabada, 217 Pa.Super. 35, 268 A.2d 157 (1970). Pennsylvania previously adopted the rule of punitive damages as set forth in § 908 of the Restatement of Torts and the comments thereunder. The Pennsylvania rule allows the awarding of punitive damages when the act is done with reckless indifference as well as with bad motive. Pennsylvania looked for definition of “reckless” under these circumstances to § 500 of the Restatement of Torts titled “Reckless Disregard of Safety”. Comment (d) to that section states: “If the conduct involves a high degree of chance that serious harm will result, that fact, that he knows or has reason to know that others are within the range of its effect, is conclusive of his recklessness.” Extending the definition of “reckless” previously established in other cases involving driving while intoxicated to *158the question of punitive damages, the Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected defendant’s contention that wrong motive must exist in all cases before punitive damages will be imposed:
Automobiles represent the most lethal and deadly weapons today entrusted to our citizenry. When automobiles are driven by intoxicated drivers, the possibility of death and serious injury increases substantially. Every licensed driver is aware that driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor presents a significant and very real danger to others in the area. Thus, we have no hesitancy in concluding that an intentional assault with fists may, in certain instances, constitute action less outrageous than attempting to drive while under the influence of intoxicating liquor which constitutes a threat to the life and safety of others....
Focht, 268 A.2d at 161.
Missouri has adopted the standard for punitive damages as set forth in § 908 of the Restatement of Torts and the comments thereunder in the case of a claim for actual damages based on intentional tort. “Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of others.” Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 908(2) (1979); Burnett v. Griffith, 769 S.W.2d 780, 789 (Mo. banc 1989). Although the claim for actual damages in the present case is based on negligence, the standard set forth in § 908 of the Restatement is appropriate in cases involving the drunken driver, given the considerations relative to the defendant’s state of mind at the time the tort is committed.
As a matter of policy, there is valid reason for this Court to adopt a rule that permits submission of punitive damages in cases in which there is evidence of intoxication together with other evidence indicating a reckless indifference to the interests of others. The evidence in this case shows that defendant was travelling in excess of the speed limit and ran a red light prior to striking plaintiffs’ automobile. This evidence alone does not by necessity constitute reckless indifference. The defendant, however, after slowing and pulling over as though to stop, quickly accelerated and continued on his way. The excluded testimony would have shown that defendant was moving from lane to lane and traveling well in excess of the speed limit, that he ran four other red lights, weaving through the parked vehicles, and that he slumped over the steering wheel when his automobile came to rest. The excluded testimony would have also shown that defendant apparently struck a second automobile and left the scene of that accident. In totality, the evidence indicates reckless indifference to the rights of others and would require submission of the question of punitive damages to the jury. On these bases, I concur in result with the principal opinion.