Court Opinion

ID: 9794610
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:08:30.845383+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:10.095450
License: Public Domain

Dore, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part) — I concur that State v. Darden, 30 Wn. App. 460, 635 P.2d 760 (1981) should be reversed and that Darden be granted his freedom. I dissent, however, to the majority's retroactive application of Darden back to November 17, 1978, the date *681of the adoption of former CrR 3.3(b).
The majority, with its inappropriate reasoning, would release convicted felons, without any showing of prejudice, back to November 17, 1978. I would have applied the reasoning and rationale of the United States Supreme Court case of United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 73 L. Ed. 2d 202, 102 S. Ct. 2579 (1982) to the subject case, limiting Darden's retroactivity to August 21, 1980, the date of the release of the opinion of State v. Edwards, 94 Wn.2d 208, 616 P.2d 620 (1980). We don't know at this time how many felons convicted between November 17, 1978 and August 21,1980 will be released as a result of this decision, because more than 100 days expired between their arrests and preliminary hearings. We will soon know.
The crucial issue in this case is the applicability of State v. Edwards, supra. Rules of court should generally be construed in the same manner as statutes. State v. McIntyre, 92 Wn.2d 620, 622, 600 P.2d 1009 (1979). Once a statute has been construed by this court, that construction operates as if it were originally written into it. Johnson v. Morris, 87 Wn.2d 922, 927-28, 557 P.2d 1299 (1976). Accordingly, an interpretation of former CrR 3.3 in Edwards would appear to relate back to the enactment of that rule.5
The majority here has applied Edwards back to the inception of the rule. I feel, however, this would bring about drastic and unjust results in a number of cases where no prejudice was claimed or can be shown. A more equitable disposition is the adoption of the reasoning employed *682by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Johnson, supra. There, the Court applied a Fourth Amendment decision retroactively to all convictions that were not yet final at the time the decision was rendered. The Court held this rule would apply to all Fourth Amendment decisions, except those cases clearly controlled by existing retroactivity precedents.6
The Johnson Court reasoned that the retroactive application of Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980) to all previously nonfinal convictions would provide a principle of decisionmaking consistent with the Court's original understanding of retro-activity expressed in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601, 85 S. Ct. 1731 (1965) and Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 15 L. Ed. 2d 453, 86 S. Ct. 459 (1966). The Johnson Court also rationalized that such a principle is capable of general applicability, thus preventing an artificial restructuring of "'expectations legitimately created by extant law"'. Johnson, at 555. Additionally, the Court found its application of Payton to cases pending on direct review to comport with judicial responsibilities "to do justice to each litigant on the merits of his own case". Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 259, *68322 L. Ed. 2d 248, 89 S. Ct. 1030 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The application of this approach in the Johnson case also furthered the Court's goal of treating similarly situated defendants similarly.
Adopting the rationale of Johnson, I would hold that in the future we apply the Edwards decision only to those cases that were pending on direct appeal at the time Edwards was decided.
Conclusion
I concur in reversing Darden; however, I would apply the doctrine of Edwards retroactive only to August 21, 1980 rather than November 17, 1978 as the majority does. There is no need for such a liberal interpretation that will open jail doors to convicted felons without justification. Johnson only requires retroactivity to August 21, 1980.
Rosellini, J., concurs with Dore, J.

 As State v. Edwards, 94 Wn.2d 208, 616 P.2d 620 (1980) involved an interpretation of an existing rule, the cases cited by the State involving newly adopted procedural rules are inapplicable. Particularly distinguishable is State v. Barton, 93 Wn.2d 615, 611 P.2d 789 (1980), in which this court declined to apply retroactively the rule of State v. Aleshire, 89 Wn.2d 67, 568 P.2d 799 (1977) relating to the time within which a retrial must be had following a mistrial. We concluded the Aleshire rule was a "'newly adopted procedural rule'", not an interpretation of an existing rule, and would, therefore, be prospective in nature. Barton, at 616. In the present case, we find the reverse. Consequently, the factors applied in Barton in determining whether a new rule should be limited to prospective application are inapplicable in the context of this case.

 Where a decision of the court merely applies settled principles of law to a new set of facts, the rule of the later case applies in earlier cases. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 99 S. Ct. 2248 (1979); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637, 89 S. Ct. 584 (1969); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 22 L. Ed. 2d 248, 89 S. Ct. 1030 (1969). In such cases, it has been a foregone conclusion that the rule of the later case applies in earlier cases, because the later decision has not, in fact, altered that rule in any material way. Conversely, where the court has declared a rule of criminal procedure to be a clear break with the past, the new principle is not applied retroactively. See United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 547 n.5, 45 L. Ed. 2d 374, 95 S. Ct. 2313 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (collecting cases). Third, the court has recognized full retroactivity as a necessary adjunct to a ruling that a trial court lacked authority to convict or punish a criminal in the first place. In such cases, the court has relied less on the technique of retroactive application than on the notion that the prior inconsistent judgments or sentences were void ab initio. See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 33 L. Ed. 2d 706, 92 S. Ct. 2562 (1972); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 25 L. Ed. 2d 469, 90 S. Ct. 1189 (1970). Our decision in State v. Edwards, 94 Wn.2d 208, 616 P.2d 620 (1980) fits none of these three categories.