Court Opinion

ID: 9386223
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-11 18:00:30.254395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:01.467018
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60481        Document: 00516707275             Page: 1      Date Filed: 04/11/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                 Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________                              FILED
                                                                           April 11, 2023
                                    Summary Calendar
                                                                          Lyle W. Cayce
                                      No. 22-60481
                                                                               Clerk
                                    ____________

   Arthur Doe; Brenda Doe; Carol Doe; Diana Doe;
   Elizabeth Doe,

                                                                    Plaintiffs—Appellees,

                                            versus

   Lynn Fitch; Sean Tindell, Commissioner of the Mississippi
   Department of Public Safety; Megan Costilow, Director of the
   Mississippi Sex Offender Registry; Colonel Randy Ginn, Director of the
   Mississippi Highway Patrol; Lieutenant Colonel Charles
   Haynes, Director of the Mississippi Bureau of Investigation,

                                             Defendants—Appellants.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Mississippi
                               USDC No. 3:16-CV-789
                     ______________________________

   Before Stewart, Dennis, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-60481         Document: 00516707275                Page: 2       Date Filed: 04/11/2023

                                            No. 22-60481

           Defendants Lynn Fitch, Attorney General for the State of Mississippi;
   Sean Tindell, the Commissioner of the Mississippi Department of Public
   Safety; Megan Costilow, Director of the Mississippi Sex Offender Registry;
   Colonel Randy Ginn, Director of the Mississippi Highway Patrol; Lieutenant
   Colonel Charles Haynes, Director of the Mississippi Bureau of Investigation,
   (collectively, “Defendants”) appeal the district court’s award of attorney’s
   fees and costs to Plaintiffs’ counsel, the Center for Constitutional Rights
   (“CCR”), who prevailed in a lawsuit challenging a Mississippi law requiring
   those convicted under the state’s Unnatural Intercourse statute1 to register
   as sex offenders. For the following reasons, we affirm the district court.
           After      attempting       to    negotiate       with     Mississippi       officials,
   Pseudonymous Plaintiffs Arthur, Brenda, Carol, Diana, and Elizabeth Doe
   filed this lawsuit challenging Mississippi’s sex offender registry law requiring
   sex offender registration for those convicted under the state’s now-
   unconstitutional2 Unnatural Intercourse Statute as facially unconstitutional
   under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause and as violative of
   the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection clause based on
   Mississippi’s allegedly discriminatory application of the statute in not
   requiring those with materially indistinguishable convictions to register as
   sex offenders. The parties settled after a companion case brought in
   Louisiana concluded that a similar state statute violated the Equal Protection
   Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and required Louisiana to remove
           _____________________
           1
              The Mississippi Supreme Court has interpreted the Unnatural Intercourse
   statute to criminalize oral and anal sex. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 79 So. 2d 452 (Miss. 1955);
   State v. Mays, 329 So. 2d 65 (Miss. 1976).
           2
             Mississippi’s Unnatural Intercourse Statute was rendered unconstitutional in the
   wake of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), though Mississippi continues to enforce
   the statute through its sex offender registry laws.

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Case: 22-60481         Document: 00516707275               Page: 3       Date Filed: 04/11/2023

                                           No. 22-60481

   those convicted under the statute from its sex offender registry. See Doe v.
   Jindal, 851 F. Supp. 2d 995 (E.D. La. 2012) (Feldman, J.).
           After the district court approved the parties’ settlement, which
   required Mississippi to remove twenty-eight individuals from its sex offender
   registry, and post-conviction relief in state court mooted the remaining
   plaintiff’s claims, CCR moved for attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
   1988. After considering objections from Defendants, the district court
   reduced CCR’s attorney’s fees by fifteen percent to account for work on an
   unsuccessful motion for summary judgment3 and any clerical work
   performed by attorneys. In awarding attorney’s fees to Plaintiffs’ counsel,
   the district court followed Circuit precedent requiring it to first calculate the
   lodestar amount by determining “the reasonable number of hours expended
   on the litigation and the reasonable hourly rates for the participating
   lawyers,” “multiply[ing] the reasonable hours by the reasonable hourly
   rates,” and then adjusting that “lodestar” amount using the factors outlined
   in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Exp., Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974)
   abrogated on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989). See
   Doe v. Fitch, 2022 WL 4002326 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 1, 2022); see also Louisiana
   Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 324-29 (5th Cir. 1995).

           _____________________
           3
              Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment a month after filing their complaint,
   which was denied based on Defendants’ representation that they needed discovery. In
   reducing the award for CCR’s work on the motion for summary judgment, the district court
   noted that “it was the State that pressed for costly and timely discovery while the plaintiffs’
   pushed for a speedy resolution.” Doe v. Fitch, 2022 WL 4002326, at *8 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 1,
   2022). Plaintiffs also moved for class certification, which the district court denied to allow
   for discovery, and “though the plaintiffs ultimately abandoned their claim for class
   certification, the [district court] credit[ed] their explanation that the settlement for the []
   offenders [convicted under Louisiana’s statute], reduced the putative class below the
   numerosity threshold.” Id.

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Case: 22-60481        Document: 00516707275             Page: 4      Date Filed: 04/11/2023

                                         No. 22-60481

           We review awards of attorney’s fees “for abuse of discretion,
   reviewing factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.”
   DeLeon v. Abbott, 687 F. App’x 340, 342 (5th Cir. 2017) (internal citation
   removed). Where, as here, the district court provided a clear explanation for
   its reasons for the fee award, “[w]e cannot overemphasize the concept that a
   district court has broad discretion in determining the amount of a fee
   award.” Associated Builders & Contractors of La., Inc. v. Orleans Par. Sch. Bd.,
   919 F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1990); Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir.
   1993) (“Due to the district court’s superior knowledge of the facts and the
   desire to avoid appellate review of factual matters, the district court has broad
   discretion in setting the appropriate award of attorney[’s] fees.”).
           On appeal, Defendants argue that: (1) Plaintiffs failed to present
   evidence of a need for out-of-state counsel; (2) Plaintiffs only achieved
   moderate success; (3) CCR should not be compensated for Plaintiffs’
   motions for summary judgment and class certification; and (4) the
   unsuccessful due process claim should have been separated from the equal
   protection claim, and fees reduced accordingly. The district court carefully
   addressed each of these arguments, found sufficient evidence4 to support the
   use of out-of-state counsel and that the two claims were so interrelated that
   separating them would be impracticable. See Fitch, 2022 WL 4002326, at *4-
   *9. Still, the district court imposed an across-the-board reduction to

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           4
             For example, Cliff Johnson, an Assistant Professor of Law and Director of the
   Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center at the University of Mississippi School of
   Law, submitted an affidavit in support of CCR’s motion for attorney’s fees averring that
   “I am not aware of any [Mississippi] firm that would have been willing to handle a complex
   pro bono matter for sex offenders. . . [m]any Mississippi lawyers would not represent sex
   offenders for personal reasons or because they are concerned about losing paying matters
   from clients or potential clients.” Fitch, 2022 WL 4002326, at *4.

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                                       No. 22-60481

   Plaintiffs’ counsel’s fees5 to account for billing judgment, including
   Plaintiffs’ failure to prevail on invalidating the statute. Id. at *8, 9 (imposing
   reduction to account for “lack of clarity as to whether fees were for clerical
   or legal work, the results achieved, and work spent on non-prevailing issues”)
   (citing Saizan v. Delta Concrete Products Co., Inc., 448 F.3d 795, 800 (5th Cir.
   2006) (reducing award sought by fifteen percent)). In awarding attorney’s
   fees and costs to CCR, the district court explained its reasoning and applied
   the correct legal standard. Defendants have failed to overcome the deference
   we accord the district court and have cited no authority suggesting the
   district court abused its discretion. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d at 336 (“We shall not
   [] disturb a district court’s decision regarding fees for cost recovery litigation
   absent an abuse of discretion.”).
          Finding no abuse of discretion, we AFFIRM the district court’s
   award of attorney’s fees to CCR.

          _____________________
          5
          CCR had already reduced their requested attorney’s fees by ten percent. Fitch,
   2022 WL 4002326, at *6.

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