Court Opinion

ID: 9577337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:33:58.168997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:23.176392
License: Public Domain

WOLLMAN, Justice
(concurring specially).
I agree that the petition to vacate and set aside the judgment under the provisions of SDCL 15-6-60(b)(3) is barred by the one-year limitation period set forth in the statute, that the judgment was not void within the meaning of SDCL 15-6-60(b) (4), and that appellant is not entitled to have the judgment vacated under the provisions of SDCL 15-6-60(b)(6). I also agree that the conduct of respondent’s counsel did not constitute fraud upon the county court within the meaning of the last paragraph of SDCL 15-6-60(b). See Gifford v. Bowling, 86 S.D. 615, 200 N.W.2d 379.
My concurrence should not in any way be construed as an approval of the manner in which the wrongful death claim was settled by counsel for the hospital with unrepresented claimants, including minor children. At the very least, the claimants should have been required to appear at the time the petition to make a compromise settlement was considered by the court so that the court could have questioned them personally on all aspects of the proposed settlement, including the question of possible representation by counsel. I find counsel’s failure to have claimants present *347at the time the petition was presented to the county judge to be inexplicable on the face of the record.
I am authorized to state that Justice HANSON joins in this special concurrence.