Court Opinion

ID: 9383831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-31 14:04:55.37937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:48.361689
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 24, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals

                               NO. 2022-CA-0751-MR

BERTHA WAGONER                                                          APPELLANT

                  APPEAL FROM LINCOLN CIRCUIT COURT
v.               HONORABLE MARCUS L. VANOVER, JUDGE
                         ACTION NO. 20-CI-00100

JASON ERIC STULL; ASHLEE
COTTRELL; AND LORI HENSLEY                                               APPELLEES

                                     OPINION
                                    AFFIRMING

                                    ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; COMBS AND JONES, JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Bertha Wagoner (“Appellant”) appeals from an

order of the Lincoln Circuit Court denying her petitions for grandparent visitation.

She argues that the circuit court erred in finding that her request for visitation with

a grandchild was moot; that the court applied the wrong standard to establish

grandparent visitation; and, that the court should have found that visitation with

another grandchild was in that child’s best interest. She seeks an opinion reversing
the order on appeal and remanding the matter for further proceedings. After

careful review, we find no error and affirm the order on appeal.

                         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                 Jason Eric Stull (hereinafter referred to as Father) is the biological

father of minor children C.E.S. (hereinafter referred to as Child 1) and D.A.S.

(hereinafter referred to as Child 2).1 Ashlee Cottrell is the mother of Child 1, and

has had little or no contact with the child after Father was awarded custody of her

in a dependency, abuse, and neglect proceeding in August of 2013. Child 1 lives

with Father and his wife in Jefferson County, Kentucky. Father shares joint

custody of Child 2 with that child’s mother, Lori Hensley. Child 2 is estranged

from Father and lives with Ms. Hensley and Appellant.

                 In concert with other proceedings,2 Appellant filed separate petitions

in Lincoln Circuit Court seeking grandparent visitation with both Child 1 and

Child 2.3 The matter proceeded in the circuit court, and a hearing on the petitions

1
    Due to the nature of this proceeding, we will not use the names of the children.
2
 Appellant was a caregiver of Child 1 for substantial periods of time during the child’s life, and
sought to be recognized as de facto custodian of both children. As of the time the order on
appeal was entered, Appellant did not have the status of de facto custodian of either child.
3
 Civil action No. 20-CI-00100 sought visitation with Child 2. Action No. 20-CI-00101 sought
visitation with Child 1. The actions were consolidated via an agreed order entered on or about
August 6, 2020, and thereafter practiced together as action No. 20-CI-00100.

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was conducted. On May 24, 2022, the court entered an order denying both

petitions.

              In adjudicating the petitions, the circuit court found that Appellant had

a significant relationship with Child 1 and provided care for Child 1 for substantial

periods of time. Soon after Father was granted sole custody of Child 1, Child 1

began staying with Appellant and her husband for extended periods of time.

Appellant argued in a separate de facto custody proceeding4 that Father essentially

abandoned Child 1. Father argued that he is a long-haul truck driver and stated

that Appellant took care of Child 1 while he was travelling, and Appellant was

merely providing temporary care during his travels. The circuit court determined

that at the time of the hearing, Child 1 resided with Father and his wife in Jefferson

County, Kentucky. It found that Child 2 was living in Lincoln County, Kentucky,

with her mother and Appellant.

              The circuit court determined that Appellant and Father each believed

they were acting in the children’s best interests. It noted that Father believed

Appellant was overreaching and trying to undermine his parental authority. The

court found that Appellant believed Father was acting out of spite. It found that

4
  On June 28, 2021, the Lincoln Circuit Court rendered an opinion and order denying Appellant’s
petition to be recognized as a de facto custodian of Child 1. Appellant withdrew her petition for
de facto custodian status as to Child 2 upon concluding that she could not establish the required
elements for that status. The May 24, 2022 order now on appeal expressly incorporated by
reference the findings set out in the June 28, 2021 order.

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Father and Appellant differed fundamentally on parenting decisions, including

what Child 1 should eat.

             The court went on to cite Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”)

405.021 as controlling on the issue of grandparent visitation. Pointing to Walker v.

Blair, 382 S.W.3d 862 (Ky. 2012), and Pinto v. Robison, 607 S.W.3d 669 (Ky.

2020), the court recognized the presumption that a fit parent makes decisions in a

child’s best interest. It found that a grandparent seeking visitation must prove by

clear and convincing evidence that he or she is entitled to visitation over the

parent’s objection.

             The court then found that Appellant’s petition for visitation with Child

2 was moot because Child 2 and her mother were already living with Appellant. It

denied Appellant’s request for visitation with Child 1, upon concluding that

Appellant did not meet her burden of proving that Father was not acting in Child

1’s best interest. This appeal followed.

                           STANDARDS OF REVIEW

             We will not disturb the circuit court’s findings of fact unless they are

clearly erroneous. Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 52.01; Reichle v.

Reichle, 719 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Ky. 1986). We review questions of law de

novo. Nash v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, 345 S.W.3d 811, 816 (Ky. 2011).

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                           ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS

              Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in its conclusion that her

petition for visitation with Child 2 is moot. She also asserts that the court

committed reversible error in failing to grant her petitions for visitation with both

children, as the facts clearly demonstrate that visitation is in the children’s best

interests. Appellant directs our attention to the factors for considering a child’s

best interests set out in Walker, supra, and argues that each of these factors

supports a proper finding that the children’s best interests are served with

grandparent visitation. In addition, Appellant argues that the circuit court should

have considered the matter under a “preponderance of the evidence” rather than

“clear and convincing” evidence standard. She seeks an opinion reversing the

order on appeal, and remanding the matter with instructions to enter an order of

visitation as to both children.

              Grandparent visitation is addressed by KRS 405.021(1)(a), which

states that, “[t]he Circuit Court may grant reasonable visitation rights to either the

paternal or maternal grandparents of a child and issue any necessary orders to

enforce the decree if it determines that it is in the best interest of the child to do

so.”5 The circuit court may apply KRS 405.021(1)(a) to establish grandparent

5
 In Pinto, supra, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that portions of KRS 405.021 were
unconstitutional. It expressly held, however, that KRS 405.021(1)(a) remained in effect. “[W]e
are leaving intact KRS 405.021(1)(a) . . . .” Pinto, 607 S.W.3d at 677.

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visitation “so long as the trial court complies with Walker in applying those

subsections of the statute.” Pinto, 607 S.W.3d at 677. Walker, supra, states that

                     When considering a petition for grandparent
             visitation, the court must presume that a fit parent is
             making decisions that are in the child’s best interest.
             “[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit a [s]tate to
             infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make
             child rearing decisions simply because a state judge
             believes a ‘better’ decision could be made.” So long as a
             parent is fit, “there will normally be no reason for the
             [s]tate to inject itself into the private realm of the family
             to further question the ability of that parent to make the
             best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s
             children.” So a fit parent’s wishes are not just a factor to
             consider in determining what is in the child’s best
             interest. The constitutional presumption that a fit parent
             acts in the child’s best interest is the starting point for a
             trial court’s analysis under KRS 405.021(1).

                    The grandparent petitioning for visitation must
             rebut this presumption with clear and convincing
             evidence that visitation with the grandparent is in the
             child’s best interest. In other words, the grandparent
             must show that the fit parent is clearly mistaken in the
             belief that grandparent visitation is not in the child’s best
             interest. If the grandparent fails to present such evidence
             to the court, then parental opposition alone is sufficient to
             deny the grandparent visitation.

                    A trial court can look at several factors to
             determine whether visitation is clearly in the child’s best
             interest. The Vibbert [v. Vibbert, 144 S.W.3d 292 (Ky.
             App. 2004),] court laid out many of these factors,
             including:

                1) the nature and stability of the relationship between
                the child and the grandparent seeking visitation;

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                   2) the amount of time the grandparent and child spent
                   together;

                   3) the potential detriments and benefits to the child
                   from granting visitation;

                   4) the effect granting visitation would have on the
                   child’s relationship with the parents;

                   5) the physical and emotional health of all the adults
                   involved, parents and grandparents alike;

                   6) the stability of the child’s living and schooling
                   arrangements; and

                   7) the wishes and preferences of the child.

                To this list, we add:

                   8) the motivation of the adults participating in the
                   grandparent visitation proceedings.

Walker, 382 S.W.3d at 870-71 (footnotes and citations omitted). Distilled to its

most essential elements, Walker 1) requires the circuit court to presume that a fit

parent acts in the best interest of his or her child, and 2) places upon the

grandparent seeking judicial intervention the heavy burden of providing clear and

convincing evidence that visitation with the grandparent is in the child’s best

interest. Id.

                In the matter sub judice, the circuit court determined from the record

and the parties’ testimony that Father is a fit parent who seeks to further his

daughters’ best interests. Appellant offered countervailing evidence as to Father’s

                                            -7-
fitness and motivation, arguing that in the past he had problems with alcohol and

mental health issues. Appellant suggests that Father is motivated against Appellant

by spite. These are factors which support Appellant’s contention that grandparent

visitation is in Child 1’s best interest. The question for our consideration,

however, is not whether the record would have supported a different result, but

whether the record supports the conclusion reached. C.M.C. v. A.L.W., 180 S.W.3d

485, 494 (Ky. App. 2005). The record supports the circuit court’s finding that

Father is a fit parent who is motivated by his daughters’ best interests.

             Under Walker, the question then becomes whether Appellant met the

burden by clear and convincing evidence that grandparent visitation is in Child 1’s

best interest. In examining this issue, the circuit court considered the Vibbert

factors set out in Walker, including the nature of the relationship between

Appellant and the children; the amount of time they spent together; the potential

detriments and benefits to the children from granting visitation; and, additional

other factors for determining the children’s best interests. The court found that

Appellant had conflict with Father over decisions regarding Child 1 that Appellant

believed she could make better. It found that this conflict would likely create with

Child 1 negative impressions of Father’s parental role. Based on its finding that

Father was a fit parent, and that Father and Appellant “differ[ed] fundamentally on

parenting decisions,” the circuit court determined that Appellant did not

                                          -8-
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that visitation was warranted.

Because the record supports this conclusion, we find no error.

             Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in characterizing as moot

her claim of entitlement to an order of visitation with Child 2. It is uncontroverted

that Child 2 and her mother, Ms. Hensley, reside with Appellant. When questioned

as to why she was seeking an order of visitation for a child with whom she was

already living, Appellant, through counsel, stated that such an order would still be

beneficial if things changed in the future.

                    A moot case is one which seeks to get a judgment
             on a pretended controversy, when in reality there is none,
             or a decision in advance about a right before it has been
             actually asserted and contested, or a judgment upon some
             matter which, when rendered, for any reason, cannot
             have any practical legal effect upon a then existing
             controversy.

Benton v. Clay, 192 Ky. 497, 499-500, 233 S.W. 1041, 1042 (1921) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Appellant’s petition for an order of visitation with Child

2, with whom she is already living with Ms. Hensley’s consent, sought a decision

in advance about a right before it has been actually asserted or contested. Such an

order cannot have any practical legal effect upon an existing controversy. We find

no error.

             Lastly, we will address Appellant’s contention that the circuit court

improperly applied the “clear and convincing” standard of proof rather than a

                                          -9-
“preponderance of the evidence” standard. Walker, 382 S.W.3d at 871, states that

a “grandparent petitioning for visitation must rebut this presumption [of parental

fitness] with clear and convincing evidence that visitation with the grandparent is

in the child’s best interest.” “Clear and convincing proof is that of a probative and

substantial nature carrying the weight of evidence sufficient to convince ordinarily

prudent minded people.” F.V. v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health and Family

Services, 567 S.W.3d 597, 606 (Ky. App. 2018) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Appellant did not offer clear and convincing proof to overcome

the presumption that Father is a fit parent acting in Child 1’s best interest. The

Lincoln Circuit Court applied the correct standard, and we find no error.

                                  CONCLUSION

             Per Walker, the Due Process Clause does not permit the state to

infringe on fundamental parental rights simply because a trial judge believes a

better decision could be made, nor to question parental decisions so long as the

parent is otherwise fit. A grandparent seeking an order of visitation must

overcome the high hurdle of a presumption that a fit parent acts in the best interest

of his or her child. The record and the law support the Lincoln Circuit Court’s

determination that Appellant’s petition for visitation with Child 2 is moot, and that

Appellant did not demonstrate by clear and convincing proof that visitation is in

                                         -10-
Child 1’s best interest. For these reasons, we affirm the order of the Lincoln

Circuit Court denying Appellant’s petitions for visitation.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEE JASON
                                           STULL:
Nolan Weddle
Junction City, Kentucky                    Penny L. Hines
                                           Somerset, Kentucky

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