Court Opinion

ID: 9957891
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-05 16:01:40.642545+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:16:01.517835
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-6063     Document: 010111027380          Date Filed: 04/05/2024      Page: 1
                                                                                       FILED
                                                                           United States Court of Appeals
                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                             Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                                April 5, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                              Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                  Clerk of Court
  KERRY RYAN NOBLES,

        Petitioner - Appellant,

  v.                                                            No. 23-6063
                                                         (D.C. No. 5:22-CV-00376-G)
  WILLIAM “CHRIS” RANKINS, Warden,                              (W.D. Okla.)

        Respondent - Appellee.
                       _________________________________

             ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
                    _________________________________

 Before MATHESON, BALDOCK, and EID, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

        Kerry Ryan Nobles, an Oklahoma state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a

 certificate of appealability (“COA”) to challenge the district court’s denial of his

 28 U.S.C. § 2254 application for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A)

 (requiring a COA to appeal “the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the

 detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court”). Exercising

        *
          This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
 res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
 consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-6063      Document: 010111027380          Date Filed: 04/05/2024        Page: 2

 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a), we deny his request for a COA and

 dismiss this matter.1

                                     I. BACKGROUND

                                        A. State Cases

        This matter stems from convictions and sentences in five separate state court

 cases. In two of them, Mr. Nobles was charged with multiple counts of domestic

 violence, sexual assault, kidnapping, and other offenses. In the other three, he was

 charged with violating a victim protective order and attempting to prevent a state witness

 from testifying.

        In the first two cases, he pled guilty in 2016 to all but the sexual assault and

 kidnapping charges. In 2017, the court imposed a sentence of over 60 years, making the

 convictions final. The court advised Mr. Nobles that, to appeal, he must apply to

 withdraw his plea within 10 days, and if the application was denied, he could seek

 certiorari to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”). He did not apply to

 withdraw his plea. Mr. Nobles chose to serve his sentence in an Oklahoma Department

 of Corrections (“ODOC”) prison instead of county jail while awaiting trial on the

 remaining sexual assault and kidnapping charges in the first two cases and the charges in

 the other three cases.

        1
          Because Mr. Nobles appears pro se, “we liberally construe his filings, but we
 will not act as his advocate.” James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013).

                                               2
Appellate Case: 23-6063     Document: 010111027380         Date Filed: 04/05/2024     Page: 3

        In 2018, a jury found Mr. Nobles guilty of witness tampering in one of the other

 three cases. The court imposed a sentence to be served consecutively to the 2017

 sentence. He did not file an appeal.

        In 2020, Mr. Nobles pled guilty to the remaining charges. The court modified the

 2017 sentence and ordered that the sentences for the 2017, 2018, and 2020 convictions be

 served concurrently, resulting in a 20-year sentence. Mr. Nobles received credit for time

 served in county jail, but not for time served in the ODOC prison on the 2017 sentence.

 As with the 2016 plea, he did not apply to withdraw his 2020 plea.

                           B. State Postconviction Proceedings

        In 2021, Mr. Nobles sought postconviction relief in state court, arguing his 2016

 and 2020 guilty pleas were invalid. He alleged that (1) the prosecution failed to disclose

 exculpatory evidence and engaged in prosecutorial misconduct; (2) the trial court erred in

 accepting his 2016 plea; (3) the attorneys who represented him leading to the 2017 and

 2020 convictions were ineffective for various reasons, including failure to seek

 withdrawal of his 2016 plea despite his having asked them to do so; (4) his 2020 plea was

 not knowing and voluntary because he thought he would receive credit for time served in

 the ODOC prison on the 2017 sentence; and (5) the State breached the 2020 plea

 agreement by not crediting his prison time. Of these five arguments, (1) and (3) appear to

 apply to his 2017 and 2020 convictions, (2) to his 2017 convictions, and (4) and (5) to his

 2020 convictions. The court construed Mr. Nobles’s application as seeking appellate and

 postconviction relief.

                                              3
Appellate Case: 23-6063      Document: 010111027380          Date Filed: 04/05/2024      Page: 4

        The court first said Mr. Nobles could not appeal his 2017 or 2020 convictions out

 of time, finding he had failed to show he was denied an appeal through no fault of his

 own. It noted that despite his having been advised on how to perfect an appeal,

 Mr. Nobles did not move to withdraw his pleas, so he “fail[ed] to take steps to invoke his

 right to appeal.” ROA at 561. It found his allegations that he told counsel to move to

 withdraw his pleas not “plausible” in light of his failure to appeal any of his convictions,

 id., and concluded the allegations were “insufficient to meet his burden of demonstrating

 that he was denied an appeal through no fault of his own,” ROA at 562.

        The court also denied postconviction relief, determining his application was not

 verified and therefore did not comply with the statutory requirements to invoke the

 court’s authority under Oklahoma’s postconviction procedure. Thus, the court did not

 address Mr. Nobles’s claims on the merits.

        The OCCA affirmed in a three-page order. First, it upheld the trial court’s finding

 that Mr. Nobles failed to “provide sufficient evidence or any authority to establish that he

 was denied an appeal through no fault of his own.” ROA at 565. Second, the OCCA

 affirmed the denial of postconviction relief on an alternative ground, holding that

 Mr. Nobles’s arguments were procedurally defaulted because he “had not established

 sufficient reason for not” raising them in a timely appeal. Id.; see Okla. Stat. tit. 22,

 § 1086.

                            C. District Court § 2254 Proceedings

        In 2022, Mr. Nobles, through counsel, filed his § 2254 application in federal

 district court. He again challenged his 2017 and 2020 convictions based largely on the

                                                4
Appellate Case: 23-6063     Document: 010111027380         Date Filed: 04/05/2024       Page: 5

 same arguments he raised in the state-court postconviction proceeding.2 The Respondent

 Warden moved to dismiss the claims challenging the 2017 convictions, arguing

 Mr. Nobles was no longer in custody on the 2017 sentence. He also moved to dismiss the

 § 2254 application as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

        The application was referred to a magistrate judge, who recommended dismissal

 of all claims because Mr. Nobles’s arguments were procedurally barred. The district

 court overruled Mr. Nobles’s objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation, but

 denied relief on the 2017 convictions on a different ground, granting the Respondent

 Warden’s motion and holding that Mr. Nobles was no longer in custody for those

 offenses. The court dismissed the claims challenging the 2020 convictions because Mr.

 Nobles’s arguments were procedurally barred. It also denied a COA.

                                     II. DISCUSSION

                           A. COA Requirements and AEDPA

        We must grant a COA to review a § 2254 application. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A);

 see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335–36 (2003). To receive a COA, an applicant

 must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C.

 § 2253(c)(2), and must show “that reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the

 petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were

        2
         In his § 2254 application, Mr. Nobles did not challenge the OCCA’s ruling that
 he could not seek appellate relief out of time.

                                              5
Appellate Case: 23-6063      Document: 010111027380          Date Filed: 04/05/2024       Page: 6

 adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,

 484 (2000) (quotations omitted).

        When a district court dismisses a § 2254 motion on procedural grounds, we will

 issue a COA only if the applicant shows it is “debatable whether the petition states a valid

 claim of the denial of a constitutional right and . . . whether the district court was correct

 in its procedural ruling.” Id. at 478.

        Our consideration of Mr. Nobles’s request for a COA must account for the

 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), which requires “deferential

 treatment of state court decisions.” Dockins v. Hines, 374 F.3d 935, 938 (10th Cir.

 2004); accord Davis v. McCollum, 798 F.3d 1317, 1319 (10th Cir. 2015). Under

 AEDPA, when a state court has adjudicated the merits of a claim, a federal court cannot

 grant habeas relief unless the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an

 unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

 Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

        When a state court has denied a claim based on a factual determination, a federal

 court cannot grant habeas relief on that claim unless the state court’s decision “was based

 on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

 State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). “[A] factual determination only

 qualifies as unreasonable . . . if all ‘reasonable minds reviewing the record’ would agree

 it was incorrect.” Smith v. Aldridge, 904 F.3d 874, 880 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting

 Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 314 (2015) (brackets omitted)). Thus, a state court’s

 factual determinations “shall be presumed to be correct” unless the applicant rebuts them

                                                6
Appellate Case: 23-6063        Document: 010111027380       Date Filed: 04/05/2024         Page: 7

 by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340;

 see Littlejohn v. Trammell, 704 F.3d 817, 825 (10th Cir. 2013). “We may not

 characterize . . . state-court factual determinations as unreasonable ‘merely because we

 would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance,’” Brumfield, 576 U.S. at

 313–14 (quoting Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010) (brackets omitted)).

                                    B. Procedural Default

        Although the district court dismissed Mr. Nobles’s challenges to his 2017

 convictions on the ground he was not in custody on those offenses when he filed his

 § 2254 application, we deny his request for a COA because he procedurally defaulted

 these challenges in state court.3 We may deny a COA on a ground that is supported

 by the record even if it was not relied on by the district court. See Davis v. Roberts,

 425 F.3d 830, 834 (10th Cir. 2005). We similarly deny a COA on his challenges to his

 2020 convictions because he also procedurally defaulted these challenges in state court,

 as the district court held.

    Legal Background

        a. Procedural default

        Under the “procedural default” doctrine, a claim that an applicant presented in

 state court cannot be reviewed on the merits in a federal habeas action if it was precluded

        3
         Although “[§] 2254’s in-custody requirement is jurisdictional,” McCormick v.
 Kline, 572 F.3d 841, 848 (10th Cir. 2009), we have “leeway to choose among threshold
 grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits.” Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l
 Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431 (2007) (brackets and quotations omitted).

                                               7
Appellate Case: 23-6063      Document: 010111027380          Date Filed: 04/05/2024      Page: 8

 from review in the state court under an “independent and adequate state ground.”

 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731–32, 735 n.1 (1991). “A state procedural

 ground is independent if it relies on state law, rather than federal law, as the basis for the

 decision.” English v. Cody, 146 F.3d 1257, 1259 (10th Cir. 1998). It is adequate if it

 “was firmly established and regularly followed.” Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 60

 (2009) (quotations omitted).

        b. Cause and prejudice

        To overcome a procedural default, a § 2254 applicant must either “demonstrate

 cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal

 law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental

 miscarriage of justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. “Cause under the cause and prejudice

 test must be something external to the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be

 attributed to him.” Id. at 753. To demonstrate prejudice, “a petitioner must show actual

 prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation.” Johnson v. Champion, 288

 F.3d 1215, 1227 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotations omitted).

        Ineffective assistance of counsel can serve as cause to excuse a procedural default.

 See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 450–51 (2000). To establish ineffective

 assistance of counsel, an applicant must show (1) constitutionally deficient performance

 that (2) resulted in prejudice by demonstrating “a reasonable probability that, but for

 counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984).

                                                8
Appellate Case: 23-6063      Document: 010111027380         Date Filed: 04/05/2024     Page: 9

        c. Miscarriage of justice

        The fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to the procedural default rule “is

 a markedly narrow one, implicated only in extraordinary cases where a constitutional

 violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.”

 Magar v. Parker, 490 F.3d 816, 820 (10th Cir. 2007) (brackets and quotations omitted).

 A claim of actual innocence must be based on new evidence suggesting “factual

 innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623

 (1998); see also Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998) (“The miscarriage of

 justice exception is concerned with actual as compared to legal innocence. . . . To be

 credible, a claim of actual innocence must be based on reliable evidence not presented at

 trial.” (quotations omitted)).

    Application

        When the OCCA affirmed the trial court’s denial of postconviction relief on both

 his 2017 and 2020 convictions, it relied on the state procedural default rule that

 Mr. Nobles waived his claims by not raising them in a direct appeal. See Okla. Stat. tit.

 22, § 1086; Hawes v. Pacheco, 7 F.4th 1252, 1261 n.6 (10th Cir. 2021) (federal habeas

 court “must focus on the last state court decision explaining its resolution of the

 petitioner’s federal claims” (brackets and quotations omitted)). The following discussion

 shows that reasonable jurists would not debate that he cannot overcome procedural

 default.

                                               9
Appellate Case: 23-6063      Document: 010111027380         Date Filed: 04/05/2024      Page: 10

         a. Independent and adequate state ground

         Mr. Nobles contends that Oklahoma’s waiver rule is neither independent nor

  adequate, but we have repeatedly held that it is. See, e.g., Ellis v. Hargett, 302 F.3d

  1182, 1186 (10th Cir. 2002); Hale v. Gibson, 227 F.3d 1298, 1330 (10th Cir. 2000). He

  presents no authority to the contrary. Thus, reasonable jurists would not debate that his

  claims were procedurally defaulted on an independent and adequate state ground.

         b. Cause and prejudice

         On cause and prejudice, Mr. Nobles argued in district court that his counsel’s

  failure to move to withdraw his 2016 guilty plea excused the procedural default of his

  postconviction claims challenging both his 2017 and 2020 convictions.4 Although

  counsel’s failure to preserve a claim for review in state court may be a basis for

  overcoming a procedural default, Edwards, 529 U.S. at 451, Mr. Nobles has not shown

  that counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness in that regard excused the procedural default of his

  postconviction claims. See Hickman v. Spears, 160 F.3d 1269, 1273 (10th Cir. 1998)

  (explaining that to show that counsel’s ineffectiveness excused a procedural default, the

  petitioner must show that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense).

         4
           We do not address the additional cause-and-prejudice arguments Mr. Nobles
  raises for the first time in his application for COA. See United States v. Viera, 674 F.3d
  1214, 1220 (10th Cir. 2012) (declining to consider arguments for COA that pro se
  applicant failed to present in district court).

                                               10
Appellate Case: 23-6063        Document: 010111027380        Date Filed: 04/05/2024      Page: 11

                    i. 2017 convictions

         Because the district court dismissed Mr. Nobles’s claims challenging the 2017

  convictions based on lack of jurisdiction, it did not address whether his cause-and-

  prejudice argument excused his procedural default of those claims. In support of that

  argument, Mr. Nobles asserted that shortly after his sentencing in 2017, he told his

  attorney that he wanted to withdraw his 2016 plea. See ROA at 640. The state trial court

  found this assertion not “plausible.” ROA at 561. The OCCA agreed, concluding that

  “the record fail[s] to establish [he] was denied an appeal through no fault of his own.”

  ROA at 566. The OCCA thus rejected Mr. Nobles’s assertion that counsel was to blame

  for his failure to perfect his right to appeal. He did not directly challenge this finding in

  district court.

         Before this court, Mr. Nobles asserts that the state courts’ finding was

  “conclusory,” Aplt. Opening Br. at 26. The OCCA’s ruling that Mr. Nobles “has not

  established sufficient reason for not asserting his current grounds for relief in direct

  appeal proceedings,” ROA at 565, was brief, but the OCCA relied on the state trial

  court’s finding that it was implausible Mr. Nobles told counsel to appeal. Under that

  finding, Mr. Nobles could not show either the deficient performance or prejudice

  elements for ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland.

         If we review for AEDPA deference, see Roberson v. Rudek, 446 F. App’x 107,

  109–10 (10th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (implicitly agreeing with deferential standard by

                                                11
Appellate Case: 23-6063      Document: 010111027380         Date Filed: 04/05/2024         Page: 12

  affirming district court’s invocation of AEDPA deference),5 reasonable jurists would not

  conclude that the state courts unreasonably applied Supreme Court law, 28 U.S.C.

  § 2254(d)(1), and/or unreasonably determined facts, id. § 2254(d)(2). As to the latter,

  Mr. Nobles further does not present clear and convincing evidence to rebut the

  presumption that the state courts’ findings of fact are correct. See id. § 2254(e)(1);

  Littlejohn, 704 F.3d at 825.

         Even if AEDPA deference does not apply, reasonable jurists would not debate that

  Mr. Nobles’s cause-and-prejudice argument does not excuse his procedural default of his

  claims challenging the 2017 convictions.

                ii. 2020 convictions

         In district court, Mr. Nobles did not allege in his cause-and-prejudice argument

  that he told counsel to file an application to withdraw his 2020 plea. See ROA at 640.

  And he did not raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on that basis in the

  state-court postconviction proceedings. The district court concluded that such a claim

  was unexhausted, therefore procedurally barred, and could not be used to establish cause

  for his procedural default of his claims challenging the 2020 convictions. See Edwards,

  529 U.S. at 452 (explaining that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim “generally

  must be presented to the state courts as an independent claim before it may be used to

         5
           See 10th Cir. R. 32.1 (“Unpublished decisions are not precedential, but may be
  cited for their persuasive value.”); see also Fed. R. App. P. 32.1.

                                               12
Appellate Case: 23-6063     Document: 010111027380         Date Filed: 04/05/2024      Page: 13

  establish cause for a procedural default.” (quotations omitted)). Reasonable jurists would

  not debate the correctness of that conclusion.

         c. Miscarriage of justice

         Mr. Nobles also has not shown a fundamental miscarriage of justice to excuse his

  procedural default. He has not made any showing, let alone a “credible showing of actual

  innocence.” McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 392 (2013). No reasonable jurist

  would find otherwise.

                                     III. CONCLUSION

         For the foregoing reasons, reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s

  decision that Mr. Nobles was not entitled to habeas relief. We deny a COA and dismiss

  this matter.

                                                Entered for the Court

                                                Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
                                                Circuit Judge

                                              13