Court Opinion

ID: 9884929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:25:04.445565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:42.600165
License: Public Domain

LESLIE, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
I cannot concur in a finding that a termination fee of $53,456.19 for the two trusts at issue here is reasonable.
The trust for Helen D. Vasilius contained 16 shares of AT & T stock and 35,798 shares of 3M stock. The Helen Dwan Vasi-lius share of the trust for Mary C. Dwan consisted exclusively of 17,907 shares of 3M stock. The family considered the 3M stock to be “heirloom” property and the testator in his will clearly desired that the 3M stock be retained. In fact, nothing was ever sold or bought. FTC received an annual fee for its services and when the deferred charge of 2% of the market value is added into the total compensation equation, FTC would receive a substantial overall fee.
In the absence of an agreement, a trust company is entitled only to reasonable compensation. The trial court found that John C. Dwan agreed to the charges made by FTC for its services as a trustee, including its two percent deferred charge to the remainder, at the time he made his will naming FTC co-trustee of the trusts under his *644will. FTC argues that a letter sent seven years before the execution of Dwan’s will was the basis of an agreement between FTC and Dwan. However, a 1961 letter from FTC to the beneficiaries of the trust suggests that no such agreement ever existed:
Since the completion of distributions out of the John C. Dwan Estate we have been considering the charges that the Trust Company should make as trustee of the three residuary trusts. * * * I promised to write to all of you as soon as we had come to our conclusions here.
Had there been an agreement, there would have been no need to consider the fees to be charged. Additionally, the 1950 letter apparently was admitted only for the limited purpose of showing that FTC’s fees were reasonable. In my opinion the finding that there was an agreement is clearly erroneous.
I agree with appellant that the trial court abdicated its fact finding function to a panel of industry experts and ought to have considered factors such as time and labor, the complexity and novelty of problems involved, the extent of the responsibilities assumed, and the results obtained. Clearly, in my opinion, the value of the trust should not be the controlling factor that it appears to be here. These trusts were as easy to administer as can be imagined. I believe the trial court’s determination that the FTC was entitled to a 2% termination fee is clearly erroneous and would remand to the trial court for a determination of reasonable compensation without regard to a percentage figure. As appellant submits, “ * * * a court which in a contested case is being asked to approve fees * * * is entitled to know what it costs a trust company, in modern times with modern procedures and equipment, to administer trusts with assets of the magnitude and nature of those at issue herein.” So, may I add, is the objector. As the majority itself recognizes, the trial court should look to the circumstances surrounding the administration of the particular trust in question. I do not believe it did so and therefore respectfully dissent.