Court Opinion

ID: 9568788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:07:36.759659+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:08:29.786679
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON REPIEARING PER CURIAM. Appellee, State Board of Education, has. filed a motion for rehearing in which it raises three points. We have given full consideration to the arguments advanced and conclude that none has merit, but since-all are raised now for the first time, we are moved to discuss them briefly.  In Point I, it is asserted that a. validating statute passed by the legislature in 1967 (ch. 16, § 296, N.M.S.L.1967) had the effect of making this cause moot. This, cannot possibly be true in the light of art.. IV, § 34, N.M.Const. which states that “[n]o act of the legislature shall affect the right or remedy of either party * * * in any pending case.” This action had been commenced before ch. 16, N.M.S.L. 1967, became effective, and there can be no question that the legislation could in noway alter rights as they existed when the action was commenced. Thrall v. Grant County Board of Education, 38 N.M. 358, 33 P.2d 908 (1934). See also dissent in Bradbury & Stamm Const. Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 70 N.M. 226, 240, 372 P.2d 808 (1962). The cases relied on by appelleein support of their position arose in states not having a constitutional provision such-as ours.  In a second point, it is argued that the plaintiffs-appellants had no standing to sue, under the doctrine of Asplund v. Hannett, 31 N.M. 641, 249 P. 1074, 58 A.L.R. 573 (1926), and although not raised earlier, absent such standing, no cause of action was stated. We have held that failure to state a cause of action by virtue-of an absence of standing to sue can be-raised at any time. Valdez v. City of LasVegas, 68 N.M. 304, 361 P.2d 613 (1961). While we give full recognition to the rule, we are impressed that the doctrine of Asplund v. Hannett, supra, does not require-a holding that plaintiffs were without standing. Rather, it is our view that our holding in Thrall v. Grant County Board of Education, supra, and in Harriett v. Lusk, 63 N.M. 383, 387, 320 P.2d 738 (1958), dietate a holding recognizing the right in appellants to bring the action. Compare what is said in State ex rel. Castillo Corp. v. New Mexico State Tax Commission, 79 N.M. 357, 443 P.2d 850 (1968). It follows that a cause of action was stated.  We see no possible merit in Point III. It is argued that because our holding will necessarily cause major problems of financing in the school districts affected, the Chief of the Public School Finance Division of the Department of Finance and Administration, whose duty it is to handle such matters, was an indispensable party. That this is not true would seem to be evident from the fact that the statutes do not require that he be made a party to the acts which result in consolidation. We do not doubt that as a result of the decision, many difficult problems will arise for a considerable number of public officials including the Chief of the Public School Finance Division. This does not mean he was a ■necessary or indispensable party. No in personam judgment was entered affecting him either personally or in his office. Rehearing should be denied. It is so ordered.