Court Opinion

ID: 9455694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:30:19.630214+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:41.942853
License: Public Domain

SIMPSON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
I respectfully dissent.
I believe that the only test that will inject sufficient certainty into the interpretation of Title 26, U.S.C. Section 166 is the dominant and primary motivation test articulated by Chief Judge Lumbard in his concurring opinion in Weedle v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 2 Cir., 1963, 325 F.2d 849, 851. The Seventh Circuit recently adopted this standard in Niblock v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 7 Cir., 1969, 417 F.2d 1185.
The bare self-serving statements of Taxpayer were the sole evidence offered by him as to his motivation. If the dominant motivation criterion had been applied, I do not think these statements *285would have been sufficient under Boeing Company v. Shipman standards of proof,1 to take the case to the jury in the face of the clear proof that Generes and Kelly were required to sign the endorsement in order for the corporation to engage in the construction business. This problem of proof was prophetically forecast by Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193, 204, 83 S.Ct. 1168, 1175, 10 L.Ed.2d 288, 295:
“Moreover, there is no proof (which might he difficult to furnish where the taxpayer is the sole or dominant stockholder) that the loan was necessary to keep his job or was otherwise proximately related to maintaining his trade or business as an employee.” (Emphasis supplied)
On this basis, I would reverse the judgment below and remand with directions to the trial court to enter judgment n.o.v. in favor of the United States.

. The Boeing Company v. Shipman, 5 Cir. 1969, 411 F.2d 365, 374, 375.