Court Opinion

ID: 9825234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 12:22:02.418832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:40:35.582296
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
[5] On application for rehearing by the state the Attorney General properly • states the rule of law as to the corroboration of the injured party in seduction cases. The opinion in this case announces the same rule; that is to say, the corroboratory evidence exacted by the statute is sufficient if it extends to a material fact in the case, and satisfies the jury that the woman is worthy of credit. If the corroboration is to an immaterial fact only, the terms of the statute have not been met; and hence there can be no conviction, for, if the corroboration does relate only to an immaterial matter, the jury would not be authorized to convict, even though satisfied that the testimony of the woman is worthy of belief. What, then, is a material fact in a seduction case? There are, of course, several. Sexual intercourse by the accused with a chaste unmarried woman is a most material fact, but not of itself sufficient, for, unless the sexual intercourse was accomplished by one or all of the several means enumerated in the statute, to wit, by means of temptation, deception, arts, flattery, or by a promise of marriage, there is no seduction. As stated in- the opinion, there was no evidence offered upon this trial to corroborate the prosecutrix upon any material fact involved upon this trial.
[6] We deem the insistence of the Attorney General untenable wherein it is urged that the fact of defendant’s having visited the woman in question is a material fact such as is contemplated by the established rule as to corroboration. Nor is the proferí of the child sufficient in the absence of all testimony, except that of the prosecutrix, that the accused is the father thereof. To so hold would be to emasculate the statute and render meaningless the precautionary terms thereof as to corroboration. To so' decide would be to place it in the power of any woman who comes within the terms of the statute to present her baby in court, accompanied with her testimony that the accused is the father, and by her testimony and that of some other witness to the sole effect that the accused had visited her secure the conviction of the defendant; and this is not authorized by the express terms of the statute. We think the rule means more than this: That it means a corroboration of the woman’s testimony must be of a material fact comprehended in the issues of a case of this character. It might appear to be more clear to announce and hold that the material fact required for corroboration must *416relate to one or more of the constituent elements of the offense, a necessary averment, or to an essential ingredient thereof. Of course, we do not hold that every fact testified to by the prosecutrix need be testified to also by other witnesses, for to so hold would be to decide, in effect, that the woman’s uncorroborated testimony proves noth-' ing, and is therefore worthless. We are of the opinion:
“That the corroboration shall be such as to convince the jury, beyond reasonable doubt, that the witness swore truly, but, to produce this conviction,! it must be in a matter material to the issue, and must tend to connect the defendant with that material matter; and the matter itself must not be in its nature formal, indifferent, or harmless.” Cunningham v. State, 73 Ala. 51, 55.
In each of the cases cited by the Attorney General a very different state of facts as to the corroboration is shown from the facts shown in the case at bar; but to differentiate these facts here would be to extend.this opinion to too great a length, and we will not do so.
It clearly appearing from the entire record that the testimony of the prosecuting witness is wholly without corroboration as to any material fact involved in the result of this case, as stated in the original opinion, the judgment of conviction cannot be permitted to stand.
Application overruled.