Court Opinion

ID: 9736114
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:44:20.92285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:04.471279
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: I dissent. The majority first holds that the search of defendant’s car was legal notwithstanding the fact that the search warrant wás quashed and all physical items seized pursuant thereto were suppressed. Since these rulings were never appealed by the State, I do not believe the search is now subject to review under the constraints of People v. Hopkins (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 1, 284 N.E.2d 283, and People v. Taylor (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 136, 277 N.E.2d 878. The majority improperly limits the collateral estoppel effects of the Perry County Circuit Court’s rulings to the “validity of the search warrant itself.” The majority thereafter sets forth all of the information the police had in order to conclude that there was a sufficient basis “for a reasonable belief that certain crimes had been committed by the defendant.” I submit that at most this gave the police probable cause to arrest defendant. This information does not support the finding that the search was valid, especially since the Perry County court found otherwise. That court found informant Miller unreliable and his information, in conjunction with that of the police, insufficient to support a finding of probable cause to search. Moreover, there is no indication anywhere in the record that Miller’s confession was submitted as part of the police’s application for the warrant. Thus it cannot be stated, as does the majority, that Miller’s “statement against penal interest” was sufficient to support a finding of probable cause to search, especially where the Perry County court did so find. Therefore, the majority’s contention that the police were “undeniably” armed with probable cause for the search is not valid. Nowhere does the majority attempt to justify the search under one of the well-known doctrines such as search incident to arrest, plain view search, or search pursuant to the so-called “automobile exception” to the constitutional requirement of a warrant. And I have difficulty in reconciling the majority’s holding with that of the famous parked car case of Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 91 S. Ct. 2022. Nonetheless, since the warrant was invalid and the search improper, I submit the only remaining points to be resolved are whether the confessions were the fruit of the illegal search and whether they should have been suppressed under the exclusionary rule. Again, the majority errs on both counts. The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy used to secure one’s fourth amendment right to be free from illegal search and seizure. The source of this rule was Weeks v. United States (1914), 232 U.S. 383, 391-93, 58 L. Ed. 652, 655-56, 34 S. Ct. 341, 344: “The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put the courts of the United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such power and authority, and to forever secure the people, their persons, houses, papers and effects against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law. This protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not, and the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon all entrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of the laws. The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights. * * * * * * If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.” The court found that the evidence at issue had been illegally seized in direct violation of the constitutional rights of the accused and thus should have been returned to the defendant and not used at his trial. The exclusion of the evidence was found to be an implied requirement of the fourth amendment. This limitation on the use of illegally seized evidence, however, was held only to apply to the Federal Government and its agencies. The exclusionary rule took on a deterrent théme in the case of Wolf v. Colorado (1949), 338 U.S. 25, 93 L. Ed. 1782, 69 S. Ct. 1359, which acknowledged that the exclusion of illegally seized evidence might provide a vehicle for discouraging unreasonable police conduct. However, relying on the State’s contention that such conduct by the police was too slight to necessitate such a deterrent remedy and on the general proposition that the public opinion of the local community would more effectively deter illegal police action, the court held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to the States. In 1961, however, the use of evidence at State trials that would be excluded at Federal trials was found to be illogical and the exclusionary rule was applied to the States via the fourteenth amendment. (Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 367 U.S. 643, 660, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 1093, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1694.) At this time the court restated that the purpose of the exclusionary rule “ ‘is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it.’ ” (Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 1090, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1692, citing Elkins v. United States (1960), 364 U.S. 206, 217, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669, 1677, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 1444.) Evidence resulting from an illegal search and seizure was, therefore, held inadmissible against the accused at either a State or Federal trial. It is clear, then, that the rationale of the exclusionary rule is primarily the deterrence of unlawful police conduct. (Wolf v. Colorado; Elkins v. United States (1960), 364 U.S. 206, 217, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669, 1677, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 1444.) To a lesser extent, the rule is also designed to protect the integrity of the courts by removing what would appear to be a judicial imprimatur of unlawful government conduct. (Harrison v. United States (1968), 392 U.S. 219, 224 n.10, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1047, 1052 n.10, 88 S. Ct. 2008, 2011 n.10; Elkins v. United States (1960), 364 U.S. 206, 222-23, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1669, 1680-81, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 1446-47.) However, the Supreme Court has as of late resorted to emphasis of the deterrent rationale alone. Stone v. Powell (1976), 428 U.S. 465, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067, 96 S. Ct. 3037; United States v. Calandra (1974), 414 U.S. 338, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561, 94 S. Ct. 613. Since the exclusionary rule was first propounded, the Supreme Court has both broadened and narrowed the rule to meet the challenges of a changing society and legal environment. One such expansion encompassed evidence tainted by an illegal search and seizure. “The exclusionary rule applies not only to items obtained in an illegal search or seizure, but also to any derivative evidence which is discovered based upon the knowledge gained by the police through the illegal police conduct. This derivative evidence has been dubbed the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’ The primary evidence which was obtained in the search is the poisonous tree, and the derivative evidence its fruit.” (W. Ringel, Searches & Seizures, Arrests and Confessions §3.2, at 3-3 (2d ed. 1979) (hereinafter cited as Ringel).) Hence primary evidence which results from unlawful police action is automatically subject to suppression, while derivative or secondary evidence is suppressed if it is tainted because it was obtained by “exploitation” of the primary illegality. Alderman v. United States (1969), 394 U.S. 165, 22 L. Ed. 2d 176, 89 S. Ct. 961; Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407. The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, so named in Nardone v. United States (1939), 308 U.S. 338, 341, 84 L. Ed. 307, 312, 60 S. Ct. 266, was first espoused in the case of Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States (1920), 251 U.S. 385, 64 L. Ed. 319, 40 S. Ct. 182. In that case, the government, after an illegal search which resulted in the seizure of books, papers and documents from the defendant, returned the material to the corporation, but only after the government had obtained sufficient information from that material to frame a new indictment and obtain subpoenas to reseize some of the same records. The court held that evidence either directly or indirectly obtained as the result of an illegal search could not be used by the government, lest the fourth amendment be rendered to the status of “mere words.” “The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the court but that it shall not be used at all. Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred or inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Government’s own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed.” 251 U.S. 385, 392, 64 L. Ed. 319, 321, 40 S. Ct. 182. Although the exclusionary rule in Silverthorne was applied only to physical, tangible evidence which was the “fruit” of an illegal search, the Supreme Court in Wong Sun v. United States applied the rule to verbal evidence similarly obtained. The court found there was no difference between verbal and physical evidence when the purpose of the exclusionary rule was considered. “[V]erbal evidence which derives so immediately from an unlawful entry and an unauthorized arrest as the officers’ action in the present case is no less the ‘fruit’ of official illegality than the more common tangible fruits of the unwarranted intrusion. [Citation.] Nor do the policies underlying the exclusionary rule invite any logical distinction between physical and verbal evidence. Either in terms of deterring lawless conduct by federal officers, [citation]; or of closing the doors of the federal courts to any use of evidence unconstitutionally obtained, [citation], the danger in relaxing the exclusionary rules in the case of verbal evidence would seem too great to warrant introducing such a distinction.” 371 U.S. 471, 485-86, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 454, 83 S. Ct. 407, 416. While the exclusionary rule has thus been extended to apply to physical and verbal evidence derived from the primary illegal search and seizure, certain limitations have been placed on its application. The Supreme Court in Wong Sun has recognized that “[w]e need not hold that all evidence is ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is ‘whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’ Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1959).” (371 U.S. 471, 487-88, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 455, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417.) The Supreme Court has consistently applied the Wong Sun exploitation test as of late in determining whether exclusion of evidence in that particular case would promote the main deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule. United States v. Ceccolini (1978), 435 U.S. 268, 275, 55 L. Ed. 2d 268, 276, 98 S. Ct. 1054, 1059-60; Brown v. Illinois (1975), 422 U.S. 590, 599, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 424-25, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2259; United States v. Calandra (1974), 414 U.S. 338, 347, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561, 571, 94 S. Ct. 613, 619. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has recognized certain situations where the prosecuting authorities can convince the court that the taint of an illegal search or arrest has been removed or purged from the secondary evidence or fruit because it was not obtained by exploitation of the primary illegality. One of these situations is the so-called “independent source” rule which was first set forth in Silverthorne as quoted above. This rule holds that where evidence which was legally obtained in fact provided an independent basis for the disclosure of the challenged evidence, it can be said the taint of police misconduct has been removed from the alleged fruit. (United States v. Bacall (9th Cir. 1971), 443 F.2d 1050, 1956, cert. denied (1971), 404 U.S. 1004, 30 L. Ed. 2d 557, 92 S. Ct. 565; United States v. Holsey (10th Cir. 1970), 437 F.2d 250, 253; United States v. Schipani (2d Cir. 1969), 414 F.2d 1262, 1266, cert. denied (1970), 397 U.S. 922, 25 L. Ed. 2d 102, 90 S. Ct. 902.) Some courts have interpreted the rule to mean that the government must show the discovery of the challenged evidence was in no way connected with the primary illegality. United States v. Castellana (5th Cir. 1974), 488 F.2d 65, 67-68, aff'd in part, 500 F.2d 325; United States v. Resnick (5th Cir. 1973), 483 F.2d 354, 357, cert. denied (1973), 414 U.S. 1008, 38 L. Ed. 246, 94 S. Ct. 370; United States v. Barrow (3d Cir. 1966), 363 F.2d 62, 66, cert. denied (1967), 385 U.S. 1001, 17 L. Ed. 2d 541, 87 S. Ct. 703; United States v. Schipani. “Other courts have more broadly construed the independent source exception to admit evidence when some prior lead existed which may have led to discovery of the challenged evidence, even though an illegal search provided the same information and the evidence was not secured until after the information was received through the illegal search.” (Ringel, §3.3(a), at 3—13.) E.g., United States v. Brock (9th Cir. 1978), 571 F.2d 480, 484; United States v. Sor-Lokken (10th Cir. 1977), 557 F.2d 755, 758, cert. denied (1977), 434 U.S. 894, 54 L. Ed. 2d 181, 98 S. Ct. 274; United States v. DeMarce (8th Cir. 1975), 513 F.2d 755, 758; United States v. Bacall.) Notwithstanding these various interpretations of the independent source rule, it still stands as one method for proving that the subject evidence is free from the taint of an illegal search. Another such method for disproving the causal connection between the illegal search and alleged fruit is the attenuation doctrine, whereby the government shows that the connection has “become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint’.” (Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 487, L. Ed. 2d 441, 455, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417; Nardone v. United States (1939), 308 U.S. 338, 341, 84 L. Ed. 307, 312, 60 S. Ct. 266. This approach resulted from an application of good sense, because the proper “[sophisticated argument” could always prove a causal connection. Hence, the Supreme Court has established certain considerations to be made in determining whether there has been sufficient attenuation to purge the taint of unlawful conduct. In Brown v. Illinois, the Supreme Court synthesized these factors, even though that case involved illegal arrest rather than search and later confession, “The question whether a confession is the product of a free will under Wong Sun must be answered on the facts of each case. No single fact is dispositive. The workings of the human mind are too complex^and the possibilities of misconduct too diverse, to permit protection of the Fourth Amendment to turn on such a talismanic test. The Miranda warnings are an important factor, to be sure, in determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest. But they are not the only factor to be considered. The temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, [citation], and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct are all relevent. [Citation.]” (422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 427, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2261-62.) All of these factors have been applied in light of the deterrent policy underlying the exclusionary rule. (Rakas v. Illinois (1978), 439 U.S. 128, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 99 S. Ct. 421; United States v. Ceccolini; Stone v. Powell.) This factor-policy analysis is now commonplace by virtue of the plethora of cases which inundate the case books. Still a third exception to the exclusionary rule as it relates to secondary or derivative evidence is the so-called “inevitable discovery” rule, which allows the government to show that the challenged evidence would have been inevitably obtained by legal means. (Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau (3d Cir. 1974), 502 F. 2d 914, 927-28, cert. denied (1975), 420 U.S. 909, 42 L. Ed. 2d 839, 95 S. Ct. 829; Wayne v. United States (D.C.Cir. 1963), 318 F. 2d 205, 209, cert. denied (1963), 375 U.S. 860, 11 L. Ed. 2d 86, 84 S. Ct. 125.) This rule, which works under the assumption that the subject evidence would have been discovered via diligent police work, has never been directly ruled on by the Supreme Court, although it was referred to favorably in dictim in Brewer v. Williams (1977), 430 U.S. 387, 406 n.12, 51 L. Ed. 2d 424, 441 n.12, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 1243 n.12. The focus of the rule is whether normal police procedures would have uncovered the evidence without the llegality. (Government of Virgin Islands v. Gereau; United States v. Falley (2d Cir. 1973), 489 F.2d 33, 40; United States v. Evans (8th Cir. 1972), 454 F.2d 813,819, cert. denied (1972), 406 U.S. 969, 32 L. Ed. 2d 668, 92 S. Ct. 2423.) Again, the standard of proof under this rule varies with the courts applying it, some requiring certainty of discovery (Crews v. United States (D.C. 1978), 389 A.2d 277, rev'd on other grounds (1980), 445 U.S. 463, 63 L. Ed. 2d 537, 100 S. Ct. 1244), some requiring only a reasonably strong probability (People v. Superior Court (1978), 80 Cal. App. 3d 665, 293 P.2d 33, 145 Cal. Rptr. 795, 799), and some demanding almost no showing at all (Commonwealth v. Garvin (1972), 448 Pa. 258, 293 A.2d 33). Yet numerous courts have rejected the rule because of its speculative nature and the negative impact it has on the deterrent rationale of the exclusionary rule. United States v. Houltin (5th Cir. 1976), 525 F.2d 943, 949, cert. denied (1978), 439 U.S. 826, 58 L. Ed. 2d 118, 99 S. Ct. 97; Parker v. Estelle (5th Cir. 1974), 498 F.2d 625, 629-30 n.12, cert. denied (1975), 421 U.S. 963, 44 L. Ed. 2d 450, 98 S. Ct. 1951; United States v. Griffin (6th Cir. 1974), 502 F.2d 959, 961, cert. denied (1974), 419 U.S. 1050, 42 L. Ed. 2d 644, 95 S. Ct. 625, United States v. Paroutian (2d Cir. 1962), 299 F.2d 486, 489. The evolvement of these limitations on the application of the exclusionary rule appears to be an attempt to balance the assurance of fourth amendment protection with the cost to society when pertinent but illegally obtained evidence is excluded from trial and a defendant is set free. However, not all illegally obtained evidence is excluded. Only if the police will be forced to refrain from obtaining such evidence in an illegal manner in the future will the evidence be excluded at trial. “[Djespite the broad deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule, it has never been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons. As in the case of any remedial device, ‘the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most "efficaciously served.’ ” Stone v. Powell (1976), 428 U.S. 465, 486-87, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067, 1083, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3049, citing United States v. Calandra (1974), 414 U.S: 338, 348, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561, 571, 94 S. Ct. 613, 620. Yet questions have been raised as to whether the application of the exclusionary rule furthers its underlying rationale of deterring future police misconduct. The Supreme Court in Stone v. Powell candidly discussed some of the costs in applying the exclusionary rule at trial. “[T]he focus of the trial, and the attention of the participants therein, are diverted from the ultimate question of guilt or innocence that should be the central concern in a criminal proceeding. Moreover, the physical evidence sought to be excluded is typically reliable and often the most probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant. As Mr. Justice Black emphasized in his dissent in Kaufman [v. United States (1969), 394 U.S. 217, 22 L. Ed. 2d 227, 89 S. Ct. 1068]: ‘A claim of illegal search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment is crucially different from many other constitutional rights; ordinarily the evidence seized can in no way have been rendered untrustworthy by the means of its seizure and indeed often this evidence alone establishes beyond virtually any shadow of a doubt that the defendant is guilty.’ 394 U.S. at 237, 22 L. Ed. 2d 227, 89 S. Ct. 1068. Application of the rule thus deflects the truthfinding process and often frees the guilty. The disparity in particular cases between the error committed by the police officer and the windfall afforded a guilty defendant by application of the rule is contrary to the idea of proportionality that is essential to the concept of justice. Thus, although the rule is thought to deter unlawful police activity in part through the nurturing of respect for Fourth Amendment values, if applied indiscriminately it may well have the opposite effect of generating disrespect for the law and administration of justice.” 428 U.S. 465, 489-91, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067, 1085-86, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3050. More recently, the cost of excluding verbal evidence at trial was specifically addressed in United States v. Ceccolini. “Another factor which not only is relevant in determining the usefulness of the exclusionary rule in a particular context, but also seems to us to differentiate the testimony of all live witnesses — even putative defendants — from the exclusion of the typical documentary evidence, is that such exclusion would perpetually disable a witness from testifying about relevant and material facts, regardless of how unrelated such testimony might be to the purpose of the originally illegal search or the evidence discovered thereby. Rules which disqualify knowledgeable witnesses from testifying at trial are, in the words of Professor McCormick, ‘serious obstructions to the ascertainment of truth’; accordingly, ‘[f]or a century the course of legal evolution has been in the direction of sweeping away these obstructions.’ C. McCormick, Law of Evidence §71 (1954).” 435 U.S. 268, 277, 55 L. Ed. 2d 268, 277-78, 98 S. Ct. 1054, 1061. It has also been suggested that the rule has a greater deterrent effect on the prosecutor than on the police when evidence at trial is excluded. This is so because the police generally are not informed that the evidence was excluded and yet the prosecutor rarely has any degree of control over the actions of the police. Oakes, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 726 (1970). Rather than applying the exclusionary rule to all illegally seized evidence, arguments have been made that it would be applied only to illegally seized evidence which is inherently unreliable, i.e., a coerced or induced confession, or a faulty lineup for identification of the suspect. This way the all-encompassing indiscriminate nature of the rule is avoided. (Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence? 62 Judicature 214, 222-23 (1978).) Judge Wilkey feels the exclusionary rule, besides not fulfilling its deterrent purpose, suffers from five defects. First, he condemns the rule’s “undiscriminating meat-axe approach.” “It totally fails to discriminate between the degrees of culpability of the officer or the degrees of harm to the victim of the illegal search and seizure.” (62 Judicature 214, 225-26.) Even if the officer was using his best judgment in difficult circumstances and even if no harm resulted from the illegal search, the evidence is excluded. Second, the rule fails to distinguish between minor and more serious offenses, resulting in the wholesale release of criminals no matter what offense they are charged with. Third, the rule, rather than discouraging police misconduct, encourages them to commit perjury in order to convict the accused. (62 Judicature 214, 226; see also Kaplan, The Limits of The Exclusionary Rule, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1027, 1032-33 (1974).) “Fourth, the rule discourages internal disciplinary action by the police themselves.” (62 Judicature 214, 226.) An officer being disciplined for a fourth amendment violation by his superiors would short circuit the prosecutor’s case before it began or provide grounds for post-conviction relief if subsequent action against the officer were taken. Finally, Judge Wilkey feels that the existence of the rule “makes it virtually impossible for any State, not only the Federal government, to experiment with any other methods of controlling police,” for the federally-imposed Mapp rule removed the incentive and opportunity to deal with search and seizure by methods other than suppression. 62 Judicature 214, 227. In conjunction with these criticisms, the State argues, and the majority agrees, that examination of the circumstances surrounding defendant’s confessions and the police action in regard thereto provide no grounds for suppressing the confessions because there was no unlawful activity which needs to be deterred in the future. However, it can hardly be denied that the confessions in question were the fruit of an illegal search. They were a derivative of the search; they followed approximately 45 minutes after defendant stood by and watched the police find contraband in his trunk. Applying the analysis of Brown v. Illinois, I believe the Miranda warnings were properly given to defendant before he confessed. However, the temporal proximity between the primary illegality (the search) and the derivative thereof (the first confession) was only 45 minutes, which leads me to believe that the threshhold requirement of the voluntariness of the statement was not met. (Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 427-28, 95 S. Ct. 2259, 2262; In re Bizzle (1976), 36 Ill. App. 3d 321, 325, 343 N.E.2d 633; People v. Fields (1975), 31 Ill. App. 3d 458, 468, 334 N.E.2d 752.) Indeed, this court has recognized that “[confronting a suspect with illegally seized evidence tends to induce a confession by demonstrating the futility of remaining silent.” (People v. Robbins (1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 298, 305, 369 N.E.2d 577.) Moreover, there were no intervening factors of great significance between the search and confessions, which further leads me to believe that the statements were made for the sole reason that the tools and grease guns were discovered in the trunk of defendant’s car. Thus, it seems clear that “granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality * * (Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471, 488, 9 L. Ed) 2d 441, 455, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417.) “Once the defendant establishes the ‘primary illegality’ and shows its connection to what are alleged to be the fruits of the illegality, the prosecution then has the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the challenged evidence was obtained by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. Brown v. Illinois; People v. Wilson, 60 Ill. 2d 235, 326 N.E.2d 378 (1975); People v. Black, 52 Ill. 2d 544, 288 N.E.2d 376 (1972).” People v. Robbins (1977), 54 Ill. App. 3d 298, 305. The majority states that these confessions were acts of free will and that any taint was removed because defendant admitted the voluntariness and truth of those statements. In a footnote the majority cites defendant’s suppression hearing testimony that he voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, was not coerced and spoke truthfully to the police. However, to base their conclusions regarding voluntariness on this testimony is credulous, giving the following remarks by defendant: “Q. Mr. Pierce, you stated to your attorney that the reason you gave the first statement was that since they already had this stuff you saw them seize the stuff, you felt it was fruitless to fight? A. Yes, sir. Q. So it is your testimony it wasn’t because you were arrested that you gave the statement, it was because you actually saw the officers seize the property? A. Yes, sir. Q. Your arrest had nothing to do with it then? A. Yes, sir, that is right. Q. The fact that you were in custody and under arrest did not lead to the statement you made? By your own testimony it was the fact that you saw the officers find the stolen goods so-to-speak in your car? A. Yes, sir, that’s right. Q. Now, regarding the second statement, would that be a fair assessment also, that that entered into it? A. Well — yeah. Q. It wasn’t the fact that you were under arrest? It was the fact that they had found this stuff in your trunk? A. Yes, sir.” Due to the defendant’s insistence that his confessions were catalyzed by the police search of his automobile pursuant to a warrant and in his presence, in conjunction with the short period of time between the search and the statements and the absence of any meaningful intervening circumstances, I do not believe the State has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the confessions were anything but a direct result of the search. The majority’s holding to the contrary is without support in the record. Thus, it has been established that the nexus between the search and confessions was not so attenuated as to dissipate the taint, the latter following hot on the heels of the former. Nor can it be shown, and the State has not suggested, that the confessions would have been inevitably obtained through diligent legal police work. What the majority does say, however, is that the police had evidence in their possession which in fact provided an independent basis for the acquisition of the confessions. This legally obtained evidence includes Chief Sievers’ suspicion of defendant’s involvement in the burglary because defendant’s automobile was observed by him in the early morning hours of January 1, 1979, on the road by the landfill where the burglary had occurred, Chief Sievers’ suspicion of Ronald Miller in the same crime because of his presence as a passenger in defendant’s automobile when observed by the landfill, Miller’s legally obtained confession implicating defendant, and the discovery of two of the stolen items where Miller said they were. H v there could ever be an independent source for the discovery of a confession that had not as yet been made is beyond my comprehension. Be that as it may, the fatal flaw in the logic of the majority is that it was not this legally obtained information which was presented to defendant and caused him to confess, thus providing the basis for the statements. It was the search of his vehicle and discovery of the contraband which led straight to the confessions. Thus, there was no independent source for these confessions, and it cannot be said that the taint of the illegal search had been removed from the fruit of that search. Finally, I must speak to the majority’s misapplication of the standards announced in Brown v. Illinois. The majority has misinterpreted this case in suggesting that “the purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct is premier in any analysis, and that this factor may alter or even supersede any causal or temporal proximity conclusions which might otherwise be made.” (Emphasis added.) The majority cites numerous cases for the supposed definitiveness of the police activity and stands by the recent case of Rawlings v. Kentucky (1980), 448 U.S__, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633, 100 S. Ct. 2556, as one which allegedly promotes that factor as the controlling consideration in any case such as ours. However, a review of that case demonstrates otherwise. The Supreme Court in Rawlings began its consideration of whether the petitioner’s admission to ownership of the drugs was a fruit of an illegal detention by quoting the following passage from Brown v. Illinois: “ ‘The question whether a confession is the product of a free will “ * * must be answered on the facts of each case. No single fact is dispositive.’” (Rawlings v. Kentucky (1980), 448 U.S__,__, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633, 643, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 2562, quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416, 427, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2261.) The court went on to describe the four Brown factors of Miranda warnings, temporal proximity, intervening circumstances, and official misconduct, and subsequently applied each element of the analysis to the facts of the case. The court stated that Rawlings had received Miranda warnings only moments before his statements, an important but not dispositive consideration. As for temporal proximity, the court took note of detention for 45 minutes and said: “Although under the strictest of custodial conditions such a short lapse of time might not suffice to purge the initial taint, 0 ” e ‘[A]1I witnesses for both sides of this litigation agreed to the congenial atmosphere existing during the forty-five minute interval’ * * * [such] that these circumstances outweigh the relatively short period of time that elapsed between the initiation of the detention and petitioner’s admissions.” (448 U.S__,__, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633, 643-44, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 2563.) With respect to intervening circumstances, the court recognized Rawling’s “apparently spontaneous reactions to the discovery of his drugs in Cox’s purse” (448 U.S__,__, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633, 644, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 2563), and the testimony of other witnesses that Rawlings was not going to let Cox suffer for him. Finally, as for the conduct of the police, the court held that while the detention of an individual while seeking a search warrant may be an open question, “the conduct of the police here does not rise to the level of conscious or flagrant misconduct requiring prophylactic exclusion of petitioner’s statements.” (448 U.S__,__, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633, 645, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 2564.) Thus, the Rawlings court applied the total Brown analysis and did not promote any one factor at the expense or exclusion of the others. The majority continually emphasizes the adjectives “conscious” or “flagrant” when speaking of official misconduct. Yet, it concedes, as it must, that police conduct subject to such scrutiny under Brown includes negligent as well as willful activity. (Michigan v. Tucker (1974), 417 U.S. 433, 447, 41 L. Ed. 2d 182, 194, 94 S. Ct. 2357, 2365.) The Perry County Circuit Court found that the police had inadequately demonstrated the underlying reliability of informant Miller when they applied for then-search warrant such that probable cause to search was lacking. I cannot fault anyone but the police and the State’s Attorney who applied for the warrant for failure to comply with one of the two requisite warrant requirements of Aguilar v. Texas (1964), 378 U.S. 108, 113-14, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723, 728-29, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 1513-14. Nor can I conclude that execution of a search warrant in the presence of numerous police officers, the discovery of incriminating articles of the car, arrest, custody and interrogation, all in an uninterrupted chain, constitutes the sort of congenial atmosphere that breaks up the otherwise short duration of 45 minutes between the illegal search and the confessions. While I admit that the actions of the police and the State’s Attorney came nowhere near the abominations present in Brown, they still acted pursuant to an invalid warrant of their own making. That, in conjunction with the time proximity and the uninterrupted chain of events from search to confession lead unmistakably to the conclusion that these confessions should be suppressed under the exclusionary rule as it exists today. The majority has reached its foregone result at the expense of the long development of the law of search and seizure. I cannot help but feel as did Mr. Justice Marshall, with whom Mr. Justice Brennan concurred, in his dissent in the Rawlings case: “Today a majority of the court has substantially cut back the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment and the ability of the people to claim that protection, apparently out of concern lest the government’s ability to obtain criminal convictions be impeded. A slow and steady erosion of the ability of victims of unconstitutional searches and seizures to obtain a remedy for the invasion of their rights saps the constitutional guarantee of its life just as surely as would a substantive limitation. Because we are called on to decide whether evidence should be excluded only when a search has been ‘successful,’ it is easy to forget that the standards we announce determine what government conduct is reasonable in searches and seizures directed at persons who turn out to be innocent as well as those who are guilty. I continue to believe that ungrudging application of the Fourth Amendment is indispensable to preserving the liberties of a democratic society.” (448 U.S__,__, 65 L. Ed. 2d 633, 652, 100 S. Ct. 2556, 2569.) Since I likewise feel that the exclusionary rule vindicates every person’s right to privacy and right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, that it was properly applied here, and would affirm the order of the circuit court, I must dissent.