Court Opinion

ID: 9772649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:24:40.771023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:46.480177
License: Public Domain

DORSEY, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority concludes that appellant’s Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel at his felony trial was violated because his retained lawyer had been suspended from practicing law at the time of his trial. It reaches this conclusion without examining whether counsel’s performance was deficient or whether such deficiency contributed to the conviction. The sole basis is that a suspended lawyer is the equivalent of no lawyer. I disagree and respectfully dissent.
The Sixth Amendment of the Federal Constitution provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” This federally protected right applies to prosecutions in federal courts and to state criminal trials as a part of due process that the states are obliged to give citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). In state felony trials, if an accused is unable to afford to hire a lawyer, the state is required to secure counsel for him. Id.; Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 *394U.S. 25, 36-37, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 2012-13, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972).
The purpose of the Sixth Amendment is to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial. Id. at 33, 92 S.Ct. at 2010-11. That a person who happens to be a lawyer is present beside the accused is not enough to satisfy the constitutional requirement. “[T]he right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14, 90 S.Ct. 1441,1449 n. 14, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970). Well before the application of the Sixth Amendment to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court held that the assistance of counsel is so fundamental a requirement that it is “an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court’s authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1024, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938).
The right to the assistance of counsel is the right to have a lawyer to counsel, advise, and to conduct the defense of the accused. This right is critical because lawyers are the means through which the other rights that constitute due process for the person on trial are secured. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2043, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). When one is deprived of representation of counsel, harm is presumed. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2067-68, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
No particular requirements other than “counsel” are specified in the Sixth Amendment. In the Amendment’s context, “counsel” means a lawyer. The presumption is that the legal profession will maintain adequate standards through its licensing and disciplinary process to insure the advocate has a basic level of competency to represent the criminal defendant in an adversary proceeding. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65.
Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to result in prejudice. So are the various kinds of state interference with counsel’s assistance. Prejudice in these circumstances is so likely that case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not worth the cost.
Id. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067. If counsel is not a licensed lawyer, harm is presumed without an inquiry into the adequacy of the representation.
When is harm presumed because of the licensing deficiency of counsel for the accused? There are three broad categories. Harm is presumed when the accused is represented by someone who has never been licensed to practice law for failure to meet substantive bar admission requirements. Representation by such a non-lawyer does not fulfill the mandate of the Sixth Amendment. Solina v. United States, 709 F.2d 160, 167 (2d Cir.1983); People v. Felder, 47 N.Y.2d 287, 418 N.Y.S.2d 295, 298-99, 391 N.E.2d 1274, 1277 (1979).
The second category consists of instances of technical impediments in counsel’s credentials when he represented the accused. In these situations the right to counsel is not violated. Harm is not presumed, and the inadequacy of the representation must be shown. See United States v. Bradford, 238 F.2d 395 (2d Cir.1956) (attorney licensed in state court but not licensed in Federal court); Wilson v. People, 652 P.2d 595, 597 (Col.Ct. App.1982) (fulfillment of all requirements except taking the oath); People v. Cornwall, 3 Ill.App.3d 943, 277 N.E.2d 766, 768 (1976) (licensed out of state attorney failed to seek admission pro hoc vice in Illinois); State v. White, 101 N.M. 310, 681 P.2d 736, 740 (1984) (licensed out of state lawyer failed to be accompanied by local counsel during trial in violation of local rules); Hill v. State, 393 S.W.2d 901, 904 (Tex.Crim.App.1965) (failure to pay bar dues resulting in a suspension from practice). In all of these situations the lawyer was not authorized to practice law in the forum in which the accused was represented. In spite of that prohibition from practicing law when and where the accused was defended, the courts have held that the accused had the assistance of counsel as required by the Sixth Amendment.
In the third category are those situations where counsel has been licensed but is disbarred. When the previously licensed lawyer is disbarred, the courts divide on the result under the Sixth Amendment. In the *395Second Circuit disbarment is not necessarily the equivalent of non-admission. United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883, 889 (2d Cir. 1990); Waterhouse v. Rodriquez, 848 F.2d 375, 383 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1003, 110 S.Ct. 564, 107 L.Ed.2d 558 (1988). In Waterhouse, a lawyer who was disbarred for failing to represent clients after taking their fees and for misappropriating clients funds was counsel for Sixth Amendment purposes. But, a lawyer who was disbarred for fraudulently obtaining his law license did not meet the requirement of the Sixth Amendment. Novak, 903 F.2d at 889. A fraudulently obtained license is the equivalent of no license because, had the true facts been known, no law license would have issued. Id.
Similarly, a Texas court of appeals held that a lawyer who was disbarred prior to his representation of the accused was the equivalent of “no counsel”, and the accused Sixth Amendment’s rights were violated. Ex Parte Williams, 870 S.W.2d 343, 348 (Tex. App. — Fort Worth 1994, pet. refd.) The particular holding in the case was that the trial court’s action in granting a mistrial upon learning of the lawyer’s disbarment did not bar subsequent prosecution because the trial judge had no choice but to grant the mistrial.
I do not think it meaningful, in the Sixth Amendment context, to differentiate between disbarment or suspension from practice. The inquiry should be competency to represent the accused in a criminal proceeding. The license to practice law creates a presumption of competency. If a person has never been licensed, there is no such presumption of competency, harm is presumed and the Sixth Amendment is violated. Likewise, if the license to practice was obtained fraudulently, so that it should have never been issued, harm should be presumed.
If the license is lost or suspended because of incompetency or failure to meet required educational standards, I would hold that harm is presumed, because both go to the knowledge and ability to adequately represent the client.
Here counsel’s license was suspended for failure to respond to an inquiry of a bar disciplinary committee. The record is silent as to what the committee was investigating when counsel refused to respond. There being no evidence that his license was suspended because his knowledge, training or skills were inadequate, I am not prepared to presume he inadequately represented his client, the defendant below.
I respectfully dissent.