Court Opinion

ID: 9383022
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-29 15:15:17.443734+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:43.137945
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 22-0065
                             Filed March 29, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

RONNIE NORMAN MURRAY,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jeffrey D. Farrell,

Judge.

      Ronnie Murray challenges the district court’s order granting the State’s

motion to correct an illegal sentence. WRIT ANNULLED.

      John Audlehelm of Audlehelm Law Office, Des Moines, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Nicholas E. Siefert, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

      Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
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AHLERS, Judge.

       In   1999,    the      Iowa   legislature   modified   sex-offender-registration

requirements of a person convicted of an “aggravated offense,” lengthening the

required registration period from ten years to life. See 1999 Iowa Acts ch. 112,

§§ 2 (adding a section defining “aggravated offense”), 5 (requiring a person

convicted of an aggravated offense to “register for the rest of the person’s life”).

The amended statute took effect July 1, 1999. See Iowa Code § 3.7(1) (1999)

(setting the first day of July after passage of an act of the general assembly as the

effective date of the act).

       Ronnie Murray committed acts on October 13, 1999, that led to a jury finding

him guilty of sexual abuse in the third degree in violation of Iowa Code

section 709.4(1). Sexual abuse in the third degree in violation of section 709.4(1)

is one of the crimes the 1999 legislative amendments defined as an aggravated

offense requiring lifetime sex-offender registration. See 1999 Iowa Acts ch. 112,

§§ 2, 5; see also Iowa Code §§ 692A.1(1)(c) (Supp. 1999) (defining sexual abuse

in the third degree in violation of section 709.4(1) as an aggravated offense), .2(3)

(requiring a person convicted of an aggravated offense to “register for the rest of

the person’s life”). However, when Murray was sentenced to a prison term not

exceeding ten years, the sentencing order incorporated by reference an attached

notification signed by Murray and the judge that informed Murray he was required

to register as a sex offender for ten years. There is no dispute now that the form

incorporated into the sentencing order notifying Murray that his registration period
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was ten years was incorrect, as Murray was obligated to register for life.1 Murray

eventually completed his prison sentence and was released.

      The events leading to this appellate action occurred in 2020, when Murray

was arrested for and charged with failure to register as a sex offender. Murray

contested the charge, arguing he should not be required to register—or at least

should not be charged with failing to register—because he had been misinformed

that he was only required to register for ten years and that ten-year period had

passed. This appeal does not concern Murray’s criminal charge. Instead, it

addresses the State’s effort to head off similar challenges by Murray to any

possible future criminal charges. The State sought to accomplish this by filing a

motion in Murray’s 1999 case (this case), asking the court to correct an illegal

sentence by removing any reference to a ten-year requirement.2 The district court

granted the motion and amended the sentencing order “to remove any reference

to the duration of defendant’s requirement to register.” Murray filed notice of

appeal.

      Our first order of business is to address jurisdiction.    While the State

concedes that a challenge asserting a sentence is illegal can be brought at any

time, see Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(5)(a) (“The court may correct an illegal sentence

at any time.”), the State contends Murray cannot appeal as a matter of right

because he is not seeking review of a final judgment. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)

(2022) (giving a defendant a right of appeal from a final judgment of sentence,

1 It appears the mistake was caused by use of an outdated form from before the
1999 amendments.
2 The State is permitted to challenge an illegal sentence. See State v. Ohnmacht,

342 N.W.2d 838, 841–42 (Iowa 1983).
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except in circumstances not at issue here). The State asserts that the proper

method of bringing this matter to the appellate court is through petition for writ of

certiorari.   See State v. Propps, 897 N.W.2d 91, 96–97 (Iowa 2017) (finding

appeals from a motion to correct an illegal sentence as “most appropriately

fashioned” as a petition for writ of certiorari). We agree. See id. But that does not

end the discussion. Although Murray brings this matter to us improperly via notice

of appeal, our rules permit us to proceed via the proper form of review. Id. at 97;

see also Iowa R. App. P. 6.108. As we believe petition for writ of certiorari is the

proper form of review, we will treat Murray’s notice of appeal and accompanying

brief as such a petition. Propps, 897 N.W.2d at 97. We grant the petition for writ

of certiorari and proceed to the merits.

       Challenges to the illegality of a sentence are reviewed for correction of

errors at law. Jefferson v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 926 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Iowa 2019).

       Murray claims the district court acted illegally by amending the original

sentencing order because the court is barred from doing so by issue preclusion.

He relies on Barker v. Iowa Department of Public Safety to support his claim. 922

N.W.2d 581 (Iowa 2019). We find Murray’s reliance on Barker misplaced. Like

Murray, Barker was incorrectly informed at sentencing that he was required to

register as a sex offender for ten years but was later informed that he had a lifetime

registration requirement. See id. at 585. Unlike Murray, however, Barker filed for

postconviction relief (PCR) challenging the voluntariness of his guilty plea due to

the district court misleading him as the duration of his registration requirements,

and he secured a ruling from our court that included a finding that the duration of

his registration requirement was ten years. See id. (citing Barker v. State, No. 14-
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1178, 2015 WL 5287142, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Sep. 10, 2015)).                When the

Department of Public Safety (DPS) refused to accept our court’s ruling and

required Barker to register for life, Barker sought judicial review of the DPS

decision. Id. On appeal from a district court ruling affirming the DPS’s position

that Barker was required to register for life, the supreme court reversed, relying on

issue preclusion to conclude our court’s 2015 decision that Barker was only subject

to a ten-year registration requirement “has preclusive effect over the DPS’s

determination.” Id. at 591. In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court twice

highlighted the unique and rare circumstances leading to the result. Id. at 584

(“This appeal presents a unique set of circumstances . . . .”), 588 (“Barker has

established all four elements of issue preclusion based on the rare circumstances

of his case.”).

       Here, we have none of the unique or rare circumstances that drove the

outcome in Barker.     Like in Barker, Murray was incorrectly informed that his

registration requirement was ten years. But the similarity ends there. Unlike

Barker, Murray did not seek PCR, let alone receive a proclamation from a PCR

court that his registration was limited to ten years. Also unlike Barker, Murray did

not seek relief through the DPS administrative process and subsequent judicial

review. Without those pieces of the puzzle, Murray does not have the type of

judicial ruling Barker had that allowed Barker to rely on issue preclusion. See id.

at 587–88 (listing the requirements for issue preclusion, which include, among

others, a favorable determination in a prior action at which the issue presented is

identical). Therefore, we find Barker inapplicable to Murray’s situation.
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       The district court correctly amended Murray’s sentence in accordance with

State v. Bullock.    638 N.W.2d 728 (Iowa 2002).         In Bullock, the defendant

challenged the sentencing order imposing a lifetime sex-offender-registration

requirement, contending the registration period should be limited to ten years. Id.

at 734. After reviewing the statutory scheme for sex-offender registration, the court

noted “it is at once apparent that the determination of the length of any required

registration is an administrative decision initially committed to the [DPS].” Id. at

735. As a result, the court concluded “that the sentencing court was without

authority to determine the length of any future registration by the defendant.” Id.

The court also concluded that “[a]ny adjudication by the district court prior to an

administrative decision and a request for judicial review of that decision is

premature” and not ripe for judicial determination. Id. As a result, the court vacated

the sentence and remanded for resentencing. Id. As part of the remand order, the

supreme court directed that the “sentencing order shall not include any

determination of the defendant’s responsibility to register as a sex offender.” Id.3

       We find Bullock squarely on point and agree with the district court’s decision

to grant the State’s motion to correct an illegal sentence and strike any reference

to a duration of sex-offender registration.          Consistent with Bullock, the

determination of duration of registration is left to the DPS, as “the sentencing court

was without authority to determine the length of any future registration of the

defendant.” 638 N.W.2d at 735. Murray cannot establish that the district court

3 Although Bullock was decided in 2002, the supreme court continues to follow the
principle of finding a sentence illegal when it specifies a duration for sex-offender
registration. See State v. Goodson, 958 N.W.2d 791, 806 (Iowa 2021).
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acted illegally by amending the sentencing order to strike the sex-offender-duration

language, so we annul the writ.

      WRIT ANNULLED.