Court Opinion

ID: 9390552
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 19:03:07.145454+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:35.335654
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/27/23 Postmark Partners v. Paik CA1/1
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                    DIVISION ONE

 POSTMARK PARTNERS, LP,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     A165097

 v.                                                                      (San Francisco City & County
 KYUNG AH KARA PAIK,                                                     Super. Ct. No. CUD-21-668260)
           Defendant and Appellant.

          Postmark Partners, LP (Postmark) and Kyung ah Kara Paik entered
into a settlement agreement to resolve a pending unlawful detainer action.
Postmark subsequently filed an ex parte application to enforce the settlement
agreement. The trial court granted the application and entered a judgment
awarding, in relevant part, unpaid back rent to Postmark. On appeal, Paik
contends the back rent award violated the terms of their settlement
agreement. She also contends she was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on
the amount of back rent. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
                                                I. BACKGROUND
          Paik entered into a rental agreement with Postmark in 2016 and,
shortly thereafter, stopped paying rent. Postmark filed an unlawful detainer
action against Paik due to her failure to pay rent. In the complaint,
Postmark listed the fair rental value of the premises as $133.17 per day and
stated, “damages to [Postmark] caused by [Paik’s] unlawful detainer of the
Subject Premises will accrue at that rate.” The complaint also stated, “[Paik
is] currently obligated to pay the monthly rental sum of $4,250.68 per
month.”
      Paik filed a general denial in response to the complaint, stating “[she]
has no information or belief that the following statements of the Complaint
are true, so [she] denies them.” Her answer also alleged various affirmative
defenses, including that Postmark (1) “breached the warranty to provide
habitable premises,” (2) “is in violation of [Paik’s] rights under COVID-19
Tenant Relief Act,” and (3) owes Paik “a deposit plus unpaid interest
pursuant to San Francisco Administrative Code § 49.2.”
      The parties subsequently entered into a settlement agreement to
resolve the unlawful detainer action. Paik retained counsel prior to executing
the settlement. As relevant to this appeal, paragraph 8 of the settlement
agreement required Paik to “vacate the Premises leaving it empty of all
persons and property on or before . . . January 31, 2022. All keys . . . must be
delivered immediately to [the] onsite manager.” In exchange, Postmark
agreed “to abate prosecution on [the unlawful detainer action] and dismiss
the case without prejudice within 5 court days of [Paik’s] timely moveout.”
Paragraph 9 of the settlement agreement further stated, “[Postmark] is not
waiving its rights to pursue the unpaid rent from [Paik] through collections
or other available court action; and [Paik] is not waiving any defenses to
challenge [Postmark’s] claims to said rent.”
      The settlement agreement also outlined Postmark’s remedies if Paik
breached the agreement. Specifically, paragraph 15 of the agreement
provided, “[Postmark] is awarded possession of the Premises if a breach of

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this Agreement occurs. ‘Breach’ is defined as [Paik’s] failure to abide by any
of the terms and requirements of the Paragraph 8.”
      Paragraph 16 of the settlement agreement also specified: “In the event
that [Paik] fails to perform . . . [Postmark’s] attorney may appear in the Law
and Motion Department, Department/Room 501, of the San Francsico
Superior Court . . . with an ex parte application and supporting declaration
stating that [Paik has] breached the Agreement.” The agreement further
explained: “Department 501 is conferred with jurisdiction to enter judgment
for restitution of the Premises, forfeiture of the lease, as well as all back rent
. . . owing pursuant to this ex parte procedure . . . , as well as $1,700 in legal
fees for any enforcement action.” (Boldface omitted.) Finally, the settlement
agreement contained a waiver of Paik’s right to appeal: “Should a judgment
for restitution be signed by the Court, [Paik] expressly waive[s] any right to
an appeal . . . for any reason whatsoever.”
      Paik failed to vacate the premises, remove all of her property, or turn
over the keys as required by the settlement agreement.
      In response, Postmark applied “on an ex parte basis for an order to
enter judgment pursuant to the ‘Settlement Agreement with Stipulation for
Entry of Future Judgment.’ ” It asserted it “had made efforts earlier in the
week prior trying to coordinate [Paik’s] moveout, but [Paik] ignored all
communications.” In support of its application, Postmark submitted a
declaration from its onsite manager, Tatiana Kyriakides. Kyriakides stated
she asked Paik when she would return the apartment keys, and Paik
responded, “ ‘I do not know.’ ” In the ex parte application, Postmark
“request[ed] the court to enforce the terms of the Settlement by entering
judgment against [Paik] for forfeiture of the lease, as well as restitution and
possession of the real property . . . [and] for all unpaid rent owed through

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January 31, 2022 in the amount of $93,584.12 plus $1,700 attorney’s fees for
enforcement as outlined in the Settlement for a total monetary judgment of
$95,284.12.” Postmark’s application further noted “the unit and its keys have
not been surrendered.”
      Paik opposed the application “on the basis that she substantially
performed the Settlement Agreement . . . , any alleged breach was not
material, and because the application unlawfully seeks liquidated damages
not agreed for [sic] in the Settlement Agreement.” While Paik stated in her
opposition that she moved out of the apartment as of January 31, 2022,
nothing in the record indicates she communicated that to Postmark. Paik
acknowledged she kept the keys, but asserted she did so in order to complete
her move out without inconveniencing Postmark. Paik does not indicate she
ever attempted to make arrangements with Postmark to return the keys or
establish a later date to return them. Paik’s opposition did not request an
evidentiary hearing on any of the issues raised in the application. Nor did
she dispute the amount of unpaid rent that was due, but rather argued the
“judgment of $93,584.12 should be denied because it was never agreed to in
the Settlement Agreement.”
      The trial court granted Postmark’s ex parte application and “awarded a
monetary judgment against [Paik] . . . for all unpaid rent owed through
January 31, 2022 in the amount of $93,584.12 plus $1,700 [in] attorney’s
fees” along with “restitution and possession of the real property” in question
and forfeiture of the lease. The court further noted that “as of 2/3/2022,
9 AM, [Paik] still has not surrendered keys to the premises.” Paik timely
appealed.

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                              II. DISCUSSION
      On appeal, Paik argues she did not breach the settlement agreement
due to her substantial performance or, alternatively, the judgment for
monetary damages is unenforceable. In response, Postmark contends the
waiver provision in the settlement agreement bars Paik from appealing the
trial court’s judgment, Paik substantially breached the agreement, and the
back rent award is enforceable.
A. Right to Appeal
      Postmark contends the waiver provision in the settlement agreement
bars Paik’s appeal. Postmark notes “there is nothing unclear or ambiguous
about the appeal waiver clause in question,” and it encompasses the court’s
entire judgment, including rental damages. Conversely, Paik argues Civil
Code section 1953 voids the waiver as a matter of public policy, and claims
the waiver provision “does not apply to appeals of monetary judgments for
back rent.”
      Courts have regularly held that parties may contractually waive
appellate rights. “ ‘It is well-settled that a party may expressly waive its
right to appeal subject to only a few conditions: [¶] 1. The attorney must have
the authority to waive a party’s right to appeal. [¶] 2. The waiver must be
express and not implied. [¶] 3. The waiver must not have been improperly
coerced by the trial judge.’ ” (PG&E “San Bruno Fire” Cases (2019)
43 Cal.App.5th 596, 607.) A waiver of the right to appeal must be “explicit[]
and unambiguous[].” (Ruiz v. California State Automobile Assn. Inter-
Insurance Bureau (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 596, 605 (Ruiz).)
      Likewise, parties may waive appellate rights in the context of
settlement agreements. (See, e.g., Concepcion v. Amscan Holdings, Inc.
(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1322 (Concepcion); Ruiz, supra,

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222 Cal.App.4th at pp. 603–605.) Because a settlement agreement is a
contract, a court may not “impose on the parties more restrictive or less
restrictive or different terms than those contained in their settlement
agreement.” (Hernandez v. Board of Education (2004) 126 Cal.App.4th 1161,
1176.) Nor does an express waiver of the right to appeal “preclude an appeal
to determine whether or not the judgment was authorized by the [settlement
agreement].” (Rooney v. Vermont Investment Corp. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 351,
359.) “Any doubt will be resolved against a waiver of the right to appeal.”
(Concepcion, at p. 1322.)
      1. The Trial Court’s Award of Back Rent Was Within the
         Terms of the Settlement Agreement
      As an initial matter, Paik claims the settlement agreement did not
authorize the trial court to award back rent. She contends paragraphs 9 and
15 of the settlement agreement (paragraph 9 and paragraph 15) indicate the
agreement only provided for possession of the premises as a remedy for any
breach. We disagree.
      Paragraph 9 provides: “[Postmark] is not waiving its rights to pursue
the unpaid rent . . . through collections or other available court action; and
[Paik] is not waiving any defenses to challenge [Postmark’s] claims to said
rent.” Paik interprets paragraph 9 to mean “that the parties did not intend
for the Settlement Agreement to involve a court ordered resolution as to the
alleged back rent.” Paik argues paragraph 15, which states, “[Postmark] is
awarded possession of the Premises if a breach of this Agreement occurs,”
supports her position because it “provides that possession, not back rent, is
the remedy for breach of the Settlement Agreement.” She argues
paragraph 16 of the settlement agreement (paragraph 16), which provides,
“Department 501 [of the San Francisco Superior Court] is conferred with
jurisdiction to enter judgment for restitution of the Premises, . . . as well as

                                        6
all back rent . . . owing pursuant to this ex parte procedure,” addresses
jurisdiction and not available remedies.
      The principles of contract interpretation are well established. Under
Civil Code section 1641, “[t]he whole of a contract is to be taken together, so
as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to
interpret the other.” This directive is premised on the idea that “ ‘[g]enerally
the parties to an instrument intend every clause to have some effect and in
some measure to evidence their agreement, and this purpose should not be
thwarted except in the plainest case of necessary repugnance. Even where
different parts of the instrument appear to be contradictory and inconsistent
with each other, the court will, if possible, harmonize the parts and construe
the instrument in such way that all parts may stand and will not strike down
any portion unless there is an irreconcilable conflict wherein one part of the
instrument destroys in effect another part.’ ” (Southern Pacific Land Co. v.
Westlake Farms, Inc. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 807, 822.)
      Here, paragraphs 9, 15, and 16 can be interpreted without conflict.
Paragraph 16 unambiguously authorizes the trial court “to enter judgment
for . . . all back rent” pursuant to the ex parte procedures set forth in the
settlement agreement. While paragraph 9 reserves Postmark’s right to
pursue unpaid rent and Paik’s right to oppose such claims, the paragraph can
be interpreted as preserving actions that may be brought outside of the
settlement agreement—i.e., allowing Postmark to bring a separate action for
back rent even if Paik complied with the settlement agreement. Likewise,
paragraph 15, which awards possession of the premises to Postmark in the
event of a breach, does not limit available remedies but instead
predetermines the question of possession upon a breach of the settlement
agreement.

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      Conversely, Paik’s proposed interpretation cannot be harmonized with
the language of paragraph 16 and would result in the de facto striking of the
phrase “as well as all back rent . . . due and owing.” Our goal is to avoid such
a result. (Southern Pacific Land Co. v. Westlake Farms, Inc., supra,
188 Cal.App.3d at p. 822 [courts attempt to “harmonize the parts and
construe the instrument in such way that all parts may stand and will not
strike down any portion”].) Accordingly, we decline to adopt Paik’s
interpretation of the settlement agreement.
      2. The Waiver Provision Encompassed the Entire Judgment
      We also reject Paik’s argument that the waiver provision was limited
only to the remedy of possession of the property. In Pratt v. Gursey,
Schneider & Co. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1105 (Pratt), the Court of Appeal
analyzed an arbitration agreement waiver, which stated “the right to appeal
from the arbitrator’s award or any judgment thereby entered or any order
made is expressly waived.” (Id. at p. 1107.) When the losing party appealed
the arbitrator’s award, the appellate court dismissed the appeal based on the
express waiver of the right to appeal in the agreement. (Id. at p. 1110.) The
court explained, “The broad language utilized by the parties constitutes a
waiver of the right to appeal from ‘any judgment’ or ‘any order.’ . . . [T]he
right to appeal ‘any judgment’ or ‘any order’ has been expressly waived.”
(Ibid.)
      A similar analysis is relevant here. The waiver provision in the parties’
settlement agreement states, “Should a judgment for restitution be signed by
the Court, [Paik] expressly waive[s] any right to an appeal . . . for any reason
whatsoever.” This waiver uses broad language similar to that in Pratt, and
expressly waives “any right” and “for any reason.”

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      Paik argues the reference to “a judgment for restitution” limits the
waiver to “possession alone and excludes monetary damages.” Paik asserts a
“reasonable person . . . would believe that [Postmark] would seek any claim
for unpaid rent in a separate action.”
      The California Supreme Court has defined “ ‘restitution’ ” to mean “the
return of money or other property obtained through an improper means to
the person from whom the property was taken. [Citations.] ‘The object of
restitution is to restore the status quo by returning to the plaintiff funds in
which he or she has an ownership interest.’ ” (Clark v. Superior Court (2010)
50 Cal.4th 605, 614.) While restitution may refer to “ ‘ “ ‘the disgorging of
something which has been taken,’ ” ’ ” it may also “ ‘ “ ‘refer[] to compensation
for injury done.’ ” ’ ” (Simms v. Bear Valley Community Healthcare Dist.
(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 391, 403.)
      Nothing in the record supports Paik’s argument that the parties
intended the definition of “restitution” to vary from that established by case
law—i.e., the return of money and/or property. As discussed above, neither
paragraph 9 nor 15 support Paik’s position that Postmark was required to
pursue back rent through a separate proceeding. Accordingly, the waiver
provision applied to the entirety of the judgment and not merely the issue of
possession of the premises.
      3. Civil Code Section 1953 Does Not Apply
      Finally, Paik contends the “waiver is unenforceable in its entirety as
barred by Civ[il] Code section 1953.” Civil Code section 1953 provides “[a]ny
provision of a lease or rental agreement of a dwelling” that modifies “[a
lessee’s] procedural rights in litigation in any action involving his [or her]
rights and obligations as a tenant,” “shall be void as contrary to public
policy.” (Civ. Code, § 1953, subd. (a)(4).) The express terms of this section

                                         9
limit its application to “lease or rental agreement[s],” not settlement
agreements. Here, the waiver does not modify Paik’s rental agreement, but
rather is part of the parties’ settlement agreement. (See, e.g., Kaufman v.
Goldman (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 734, 745, fn. 5 [waiver in the settlement of a
landlord-tenant dispute, which included a remedy of possession, did not
“ ‘constitute[] an unenforceable waiver’ of Civil Code section 1953”].)
      In sum, the trial court acted within the scope of the settlement
agreement when it entered judgment awarding Postmark back rent, Paik
waived her right to appeal from that judgment in its entirety, and the waiver
does not run afoul of Civil Code section 1953.
B. Material Breach of Settlement Agreement
      Paik’s primary argument on appeal is that she “substantially
performed” the settlement agreement because she “removed most of her
belongings and vacated the unit on January 31, 2022.” Because of her
alleged compliance, Paik contends she “should not be held to pay a $93,584.12
forfeiture.”
      Whether Paik materially breached the settlement agreement is only
relevant in assessing whether Postmark was authorized to file an ex parte
application to enforce the agreement. But Paik does not challenge
Postmark’s right to file the ex parte application. Nor does she challenge the
trial court’s authority to consider and grant Postmark’s application. Rather,
Paik only challenges the scope of the award—i.e., she “should not be held to
pay a $93,584.12 forfeiture.” Accordingly, Paik’s argument that she
“substantially performed” the settlement agreement is irrelevant to her
challenge of whether the settlement authorized a back rent award and the
amount of that award.

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C. Liquidated Damages
      Paik contends “the back rent claim is an unlawful attempt to recover
liquidated damages with no relation to the alleged breach of the Settlement
Agreement.” We disagree.
       “ ‘The term “liquidated damages” is used to indicate an amount of
compensation to be paid in the event of a breach of contract, the sum of which
is fixed and certain by agreement, and which may not ordinarily be modified
or altered when damages actually result from nonperformance of the
contract.’ [Citation.] ‘Liquidated damages constitute a sum which a
contracting party agrees to pay . . . for breach of some contractual
obligation.’ ” (McGuire v. More-Gas Investments, LLC (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th
512, 521.)
      Here, the settlement agreement clearly provides the trial court with
discretion to determine the amount of back rent, if any, to award to Postmark
upon a breach of the settlement agreement. In relevant part, the settlement
agreement states: “Department 501 [of the San Francisco Superior Court] is
conferred with jurisdiction to enter judgment for . . . all back rent . . . owing
pursuant to this ex parte procedure, . . . as well as $1,700[1] in legal fees for
any enforcement action.” The settlement agreement neither provides a
specified and fixed sum for back rent, nor guarantees that Postmark would be
awarded back rent. Instead, the agreement states that Department 501 of
the San Francisco Superior Court is authorized to decide the issue of back
rent as part of an ex parte application to enforce the settlement agreement.

      1The court is not considering whether the legal fees award constitutes
liquidated damages because that issue was not raised on appeal. (Tiernan v.
Trustees of Cal. State University & Colleges (1982) 33 Cal.3d 211, 216, fn. 4.)

                                         11
      Paik compares her situation to that of Graylee v. Castro (2020)
52 Cal.App.5th 1107 (Graylee), but the two are not analogous. In Graylee, on
“[t]he day of trial, the parties entered into a stipulated judgment in which the
tenants agreed to vacate the property by a certain date and time. If they
failed to do so, the landlord would be entitled to enter a $28,970 judgment
against them.” (Id. at p. 1110.) The Graylee court concluded this provision
constituted a liquidated damages award because “the stipulation
predetermined the amount of damages the landlord would be entitled to
receive if the tenants breached their settlement obligations.” (Id. at p. 1114.)
      The settlement agreement in Graylee clearly stated the amount of
monetary judgment for failure to vacate the property. (Graylee, supra,
52 Cal.App.5th at p. 1110.) Here, however, the settlement agreement does
not provide a set amount but rather authorizes Postmark “to pursue the
unpaid rent from [Paik] through collections or other available court action.”
While Postmark requested a specific amount of back rent in its application to
the court, the amount was not predetermined.
      Moreover, we note Paik had multiple opportunities to contest the
amount of unpaid rent requested by Postmark, but failed to do so. Paik did
not meaningfully respond to Postmark’s ex parte application when it
requested rent in the amount of $93,584.12. Notably, Paik did not submit
any argument or evidence to contest the amount of unpaid rent. Nor did she
request a hearing on the rent issue or otherwise seek leave to submit
evidence on the issue. The settlement agreement granted the trial court the
authority to determine and award back rent as part of Postmark’s ex parte
application to enforce the settlement agreement, and Paik has failed to
demonstrate any error in the court’s award.

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                              III. DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Defendant may recover its costs on appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)

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                                     MARGULIES, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUMES, P. J.

BANKE, J.

A165097
Postmark Partners, LP v. Paik

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