Court Opinion

ID: 9926006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-23 17:13:59.951103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:58.396825
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

            Present: Judges O’Brien, Fulton and Callins
PUBLISHED

            Argued at Richmond, Virginia

            SHANNON B. BOYETTE
                                                                                    OPINION BY
            v.      Record No. 1278-22-2                                     JUDGE JUNIUS P. FULTON, III
                                                                                 JANUARY 23, 2024
            CARRIE E. SPROUSE

                               FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GOOCHLAND COUNTY
                                            Timothy K. Sanner, Judge

                            R. Braxton Hill, IV (T. O’Connor Johnson; Merritt Law, PLLC; The
                            Johnson Injury Firm, on briefs), for appellant.

                            E. Brandon Ferrell (Kerrigan O’Malley; Carter & Shands, P.C., on
                            brief), for appellee.

                    Shannon B. Boyette appeals a decision by the Circuit Court of Goochland County in a

            personal injury negligence action against Carrie E. Sprouse arising from a motor vehicle accident.

            Over Boyette’s objection, the trial court submitted the case to a jury and granted an instruction

            Sprouse proposed on the “sudden emergency” doctrine. The jury rendered a verdict for Sprouse.

            Boyette now assigns error to the trial court’s decisions to grant the jury instruction, and to reject

            Boyette’s motion to strike Sprouse’s evidence. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial

            court’s judgment.

                                                       BACKGROUND

                    “In reviewing the evidence presented at trial, we view it ‘in the light most favorable to

            the prevailing party, granting it the benefit of any reasonable inferences.’” Pergolizzi v.

            Bowman, 76 Va. App. 310, 317 n.1 (2022) (quoting Starr v. Starr, 70 Va. App. 486, 488 (2019)).

            The accident occurred at nighttime on September 29, 2017, as Boyette and his daughter were
passengers in a vehicle driven by Evaki Boyette, his wife at the time. They were in the Boyettes’

2010 Toyota Corolla, driving on Ashland Road towards Ashland, Virginia. The car was equipped

with a dashboard video camera that was facing forward and recording throughout the relevant

events. Evaki drove, Boyette sat in the front passenger seat, and their daughter sat behind the

driver’s seat. The roadway was not illuminated by streetlights, but the roadway was dry. As the

Boyettes approached the location of the accident, the road was somewhat winding and consisted of

two lanes traveling in opposing directions, with a posted speed limit of 45 miles per hour.

        Moving at approximately 45 miles per hour, the Boyettes came upon a slight rightward

curve in the road, and Evaki noticed two vehicles stopped on the opposite side of the road, both

facing toward her. The two vehicles were stopped in the opposing lane, one behind the other.

Despite the position of the vehicles, the headlights of both vehicles were visible simultaneously and

in Evaki’s line of sight due to the curvature of the road. The rear vehicle’s high beams were

illuminated. As her vehicle entered the turn, faced with the blinding headlights, Evaki decreased her

speed to around 40 miles per hour by taking her foot off the accelerator. As she passed the spot

where the stopped vehicles were located, a large white dog appeared “suddenly” on the road in front

of her, and the Boyettes’ car struck the dog. Evaki did not apply the brakes before the impact

occurred.

        After the impact, the Boyettes’ car continued forward in its lane, but slowed from

approximately 40 miles per hour to between 5 and 10 miles per hour. Moments later, Carrie

Sprouse’s car struck the rear end of the Boyettes’ vehicle. Evaki later testified at a deposition that

she did not remember pressing the brakes between hitting the dog and being hit by Sprouse. When

asked whether Evaki had hit the brakes at any point, Shannon Boyette testified, “We somehow went

from 45 to approximately [5] miles an hour so I don’t know if she broke or not.”

                                                  -2-
        Sprouse testified that she had been driving on Ashland Road behind the Boyettes’ vehicle

for a minute or two before the accident. She was traveling approximately 40 to 45 miles per hour,

maintaining a consistent distance behind the Boyettes’ car. Sprouse testified that she was unsure of

the distance between the two cars but estimated that it was “two car-lengths.” On review of the

dash cam footage, however, she stated that the time between the Boyettes’ car hitting the dog and

her own vehicle hitting the Boyettes’ car was four seconds. Sprouse testified that she did not

believe that she was following too closely or “tailgating” the Boyettes.

        As Sprouse approached the spot in the road where the two vehicles were parked on the

opposite side of the road, her vision was obscured by the headlights of the two vehicles, and she

slowed down by taking her foot off the accelerator. Sprouse testified, “I squinted a little because I

couldn’t see and I tried to look away from the lights so they weren’t blinding me.” Then, Sprouse

testified, “I got past the bright lights and then I could see the car in front of me and slammed on

[the] brakes.” Despite applying the brakes, she was unable to stop in time to avoid the collision.

Sprouse did not see any hazard lights or brake lights coming from the Boyettes’ vehicle before the

collision.

        At trial, after Sprouse presented her case in defense, Boyette moved to strike Sprouse’s

evidence, arguing that she had presented insufficient evidence to rebut Boyette’s prima facie case of

negligence.1 The trial court denied the motion, finding that the case was appropriate for submission

to the jury.

        1
           Boyette first moved to strike the defense, then, upon a request by the circuit court for
clarification, asked for a directed verdict against Sprouse. The trial court refused the latter request
because Code § 8.01-378 prohibits trial judges from directing jury verdicts. The trial court noted,
however, that Boyette could properly make a motion to strike, which would result in the court’s
entering a partial summary judgment for Boyette on the issue of liability. The trial court considered
and refused that motion as well.
                                                   -3-
       Over Boyette’s objection, the trial court also granted the following jury instruction on the

“sudden emergency” doctrine:

               Carrie Sprouse contends that she was confronted with a sudden
               emergency. A sudden emergency is an event or a combination of
               circumstances that calls for immediate action without giving time for
               the deliberate exercise of judgment.

               If you believe from the evidence that the [sic] Carrie Sprouse,
               without negligence on her part, was confronted with a sudden
               emergency and acted as a reasonable person would have acted under
               the circumstances of this case, she was not negligent.

So instructed, the jury rendered a verdict for Sprouse, and the trial court entered a judgment in

accord with the same.

       Boyette now appeals, assigning error to the trial court’s decisions to grant Sprouse’s

proposed “sudden emergency” jury instruction and to deny Boyette’s motion to strike.2

                                             ANALYSIS

                              I. “Sudden Emergency” Jury Instruction

                                       A. Standard of Review

       On review of a trial court’s decision to grant proposed jury instructions, this Court’s “sole

responsibility is to ensure that the law has been clearly stated in the instructions and that they

cover all the issues that the evidence fairly raises.” Howsare v. Commonwealth, 293 Va. 439,

443 (2017) (citing Swisher v. Swisher, 223 Va. 499, 503 (1982)). “[A] litigant is entitled to jury

instructions supporting his or her theory of the case if sufficient evidence is introduced to support

that theory.” Hancock-Underwood v. Knight, 277 Va. 127, 130 (2009) (quoting Schlimmer v.

       2
          Boyette also assigns error to several other jury instructions. Boyette, however, failed to
include any argument in his briefs relating to those instructions, so they are waived. See
Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 478 (2005) (“Failure to adequately brief an assignment
of error is considered a waiver.”); see also Wroblewski v. Russell, 63 Va. App. 468, 489 (2014)
(“Wife did not present any argument on this issue; therefore, it is waived and will not be considered
on appeal.” (citing Rule 5A:20(e)))
                                                  -4-
Poverty Hunt Club, 268 Va. 74, 78 (2004)). “The evidence introduced in support of a requested

instruction ‘must amount to more than a scintilla.’” Id. at 131 (quoting Schlimmer, 268 Va. at

78). “And in deciding whether a particular instruction is appropriate, we view the facts in the

light most favorable to the proponent of the instruction.” Cooper v. Commonwealth, 277 Va.

377, 381 (2009) (citing Commonwealth v. Cary, 271 Va. 87, 91 (2006)). “A trial court’s

decision whether to grant or refuse a proposed jury instruction is generally subject to appellate

review for abuse of discretion.” Howsare, 293 Va. at 443 (citing Cooper, 277 Va. at 381).

       B. The trial court correctly granted Sprouse’s “sudden emergency” jury instruction.

       Boyette argues that the trial court’s decision to grant the jury instruction on the “sudden

emergency” doctrine was erroneous because the Supreme Court of Virginia has found the doctrine

inapplicable in negligence cases arising from similar car accidents. Boyette argues that none of the

unusual circumstances in this case—e.g., the sudden stop of the Boyettes’ car after the collision with

the dog or the visual obstruction caused by the stopped cars’ headlights—would constitute a

“sudden emergency” on its own, so those circumstances cannot constitute a “sudden emergency”

when considered together. We disagree.

       Under the “sudden emergency” doctrine, when a defendant, “without prior negligence on

his part, is confronted with a sudden emergency and acts as an ordinarily prudent person would

have done under the same or similar circumstances, he is not guilty of negligence.”

Hancock-Underwood, 277 Va. at 137 (quoting Vahdat v. Holland, 274 Va. 417, 421 (2007)). An

“emergency within the meaning of the sudden emergency doctrine is a sudden, unexpected and

unforeseen happening or condition that calls for immediate action.” Herr v. Wheeler, 272 Va.

310, 315 (2006). A sudden emergency may involve “a combination of circumstances that calls

for immediate action without giving time for the deliberate exercise of judgment.” Harrah v.

Washington, 252 Va. 285, 294 (1996) (emphasis added). “[W]here a set of circumstances has

                                                -5-
existed and the party has been exposed to them before, the situation is not ‘unexpected.’” Herr,

272 Va. at 315 (quoting Harrah, 252 Va. at 294).

       “[O]rdinarily the question of application of the sudden emergency doctrine is for the

triers of fact.” Herr, 272 Va. at 315 (quoting Cowles v. Zahn, 206 Va. 743, 746 (1966)).

“[W]hen the evidence is in conflict or when diverse inferences may be properly drawn from the

evidence,” it is for the jury to decide “(1) whether an emergency existed, (2) whether the

emergency was created by the negligence of the person facing the emergency, and (3) whether,

after the emergency arose, that person acted as an ordinarily prudent person would have acted

under the circumstances.” Bentley v. Felts, 248 Va. 117, 120 (1994) (quoting Carolina Coach

Co. v. Starchia, 219 Va. 135, 141 (1978)). Therefore, granting a jury instruction on the “sudden

emergency” doctrine is appropriate if “[t]here is more than a scintilla of evidence that would

have permitted a jury to find that the [defendant] was confronted with an emergency [not]

created by the defendant’s negligence and that the [defendant] acted as an ordinarily prudent

person would have acted under the same or similar circumstances.” Jones v. Ford Motor Co.,

263 Va. 237, 263 (2002).

       Application of the “sudden emergency” doctrine has a caveat, however. Trial courts

“must use particular care when determining whether to grant a sudden emergency instruction

because . . . it has the tendency to afford a jury ‘an easy way of avoiding instead of deciding the

issue made by the evidence in the case.’” Herr, 272 Va. at 315 (quoting Harrah, 252 Va. at

294). For this reason, the Supreme Court has advised that “the grant of a sudden emergency

instruction is rarely appropriate.” Hancock-Underwood, 277 Va. at 137 (quoting Jones, 263 Va.

at 263); see also Vahdat, 274 Va. at 421 n.2. Thus, though it is true that the question of whether

the “sudden emergency” doctrine applies is “ordinarily” for the factfinder, and consequently a

jury instruction on the doctrine should be granted when there is “more than a scintilla of

                                                -6-
evidence” to support it, it is simultaneously true that it is “rarely appropriate” for trial courts to

grant such a jury instruction, due to the risk that giving the instruction will unduly influence the

jury to conclude that the doctrine applies.3

        Applying these principles to the evidence presented in this case and viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to Sprouse, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

concluding there was more than a scintilla of evidence to support a jury’s finding that Sprouse faced

a “sudden emergency.” In Cowles v. Zahn, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the trial court

should have issued a “sudden emergency” jury instruction where the defendant hit the back of

the plaintiff’s car, which the plaintiff had stopped on the right shoulder of a two-lane road after

the car suffered a mechanical malfunction. 206 Va. at 744-47. The accident occurred after dark,

and the shoulder of the road was so narrow that the plaintiff could not pull his vehicle entirely off

the road. Id. Another car had stopped and parked in front of the plaintiff’s car. Id. A third car

traveling the same direction in front of the defendant had veered into the opposing lane to pass

plaintiff’s car and was doing so at the time the defendant came upon the scene. Id. The

defendant claimed he was traveling between 50 and 52 miles per hour and could not see the

taillights of the plaintiff’s car until about 50 feet away, leaving him insufficient time to stop. Id.

Other witnesses stated they could see the taillights of the car about 500 feet away. Id. Because

“the evidence was in sharp conflict as to the distance defendant could or should have seen the tail

        3
         With respect to the evidentiary burden the defendant must meet, the “sudden
emergency” doctrine is not an affirmative defense; rather, “when a plaintiff presents a prima
facie case of negligence, a defendant, relying on the defense of sudden emergency, must then
make ‘a reasonable explanation, such an explanation as the jury could accept, showing that what
happened was due to something other than the negligence of [the defendant].’” Vahdat, 274 Va.
at 422 (alteration in original) (quoting Daniels v. C.I. Whitten Transfer Co., 196 Va. 537, 546
(1954)). “[N]otwithstanding this burden of producing evidence in explanation, the ultimate
burden remain[s] on the plaintiff to prove [his] case, that is, to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that [his] injuries were caused by the negligence of the defendant[].” Id. (quoting
Daniels, 196 Va. at 546).
                                                -7-
lights on the stalled [plaintiff’s] automobile,” the Supreme Court concluded that the questions of

whether there was a “sudden emergency” and, if so, whether the defendant’s own negligence had

created it, should have been submitted to the jury. Id. at 747. “Whether defendant’s failure to

see the [plaintiff’s] car sooner was due to lack of visibility on account of the curve, his excessive

speed under the circumstances, inattention on his part, or the movements and position of the

[third] car,” were all issues for the jury, as was the question of “whether he failed to react to the

situation ahead as soon as an ordinarily prudent person would have under the same or similar

circumstances.” Id.

        In this case, the trial court noted that the evidence relating to the distance by which Sprouse

was following the Boyettes was “somewhat in conflict between two car-lengths versus more like

four seconds at the time of the collision as shown by the video.” The trial court also took note of

“the sudden dog movement . . . completely out of the blue apparently which the Defendant was not

in a position to view really at all,” and “which resulted in not only a collision but the sudden

slowing of the front vehicle without any brake lights being displayed.” Moreover, all this occurred

while Sprouse had to contend with “the presence of unusually blinding headlights.” Finally, the

trial court noted the cars’ “relative lack of speed prior to the accident.” In this case, as in Cowles,

“the evidence was in sharp conflict as to the distance [Sprouse] could or should have seen the tail

lights on the . . . [Boyettes’] automobile.” Id. As in Cowles, “[w]hether [Sprouse’s] failure to see

the [Boyettes’] car sooner was due to lack of visibility . . . , inattention on [her] part, or the

movements and position of the [other] car[s],” were jury issues, as was the question of “whether

[Sprouse] failed to react to the situation ahead as soon as an ordinarily prudent person would

have under the same or similar circumstances.” Id.

        In reaching this conclusion, the Court is mindful that the Supreme Court of Virginia has

held that “‘a driver knows, or should know, that a car immediately in front of him may stop

                                                  -8-
suddenly;’ thus, such an occurrence is foreseeable and not unexpected.” Chodorov v. Eley, 239

Va. 528, 530-31 (1990) (quoting Garnot v. Johnson, 239 Va. 81, 86 (1990)). Therefore, a car’s

sudden stop in traffic, considered alone, does not constitute a “sudden emergency.” Garnot, 239

Va. at 86 (holding there was no “sudden emergency” when the plaintiff, who had been stopped at

a red light in front of the defendant, began to drive forward and then stopped again suddenly due

to traffic). It does not follow from this holding, however, that a “sudden emergency” cannot

exist in any case that a car has suddenly stopped. Rather, there must be more to support a

“sudden emergency” finding than merely a car’s sudden stopping. As the Supreme Court stated

in Garnot, “such a stopping, absent evidence of an unforeseen happening, does not constitute an

emergency that would invoke the sudden emergency doctrine.” Id. (emphasis added).

        The trial court correctly concluded in this case that the sudden stop of the Boyettes’

vehicle was compounded by the other circumstances of the case to create a “very unusual event.”

As the trial court explained, “it’s the combination . . . of the blinding lights coupled with the

sudden occurrence of the dog and its apparent size which resulted in fairly significant slowing

apparently of the vehicle in front without any kind of warning from the brake lights being

employed” which created a sudden emergency that called for immediate action from Sprouse

without giving her time for the deliberate exercise of judgment. Although a car’s sudden stopping

on the road “in a line of traffic” is not “unexpected,” Garnot, 239 Va. at 86, the trial court’s

conclusion below, that a car’s “sudden slowing . . . without any brake lights,” due to a collision

resulting from a “sudden dog movement which is completely out of the blue” and “in the

presence of unusually blinding headlights,” could be. The trial court therefore correctly let the

jury decide the question.

        The trial court acknowledged that granting an instruction on the “sudden emergency”

doctrine is “not a favored doctrine under Virginia law,” but determined that this case constituted a

                                                  -9-
rare circumstance in which granting the instruction would be appropriate. Because there was more

than a scintilla of evidence that would permit a jury to find that Sprouse was confronted with a

sudden emergency not created by her own negligence and that Sprouse acted as an ordinarily

prudent person would have acted under the same or similar circumstances, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion by granting the “sudden emergency” jury instruction. See Jones, 263 Va. at

263.

                                   II. Boyette’s Motion to Strike

                                       A. Standard of Review

       “[A] motion to strike at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case-in-chief . . . tests whether

his evidence is sufficient to prove it.” Tahboub v. Thiagarajah, 298 Va. 366, 371 (2020) (citing

Martin P. Burks, Pleading and Practice § 275, at 487 (4th ed. 1952)). Although a motion to

strike the evidence is “[u]sually . . . made by the defendant,” plaintiffs do have the same option.

Rountree v. Rountree, 198 Va. 658, 663 (1957); see also Gabbard v. Knight, 202 Va. 40, 43

(1960). In either case, if there is sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict in favor of the

non-moving party, striking the evidence is inappropriate. Walton v. Walton, 168 Va. 418, 422

(1937). The question for this Court on review is whether “upon careful consideration of all the

evidence, . . . reasonable men may differ on the conclusion to be reached.” Id. A trial court

should not sustain a motion to strike “in any doubtful case.” Id.; see also Costner v. Lackey, 223

Va. 377, 381 (1982) (“A motion to strike is in effect a motion for summary judgment which is

not to be granted if any material fact is genuinely in dispute.”); Code § 8.01-378 (“If the trial

judge has granted a motion to strike the evidence of the plaintiff or the defendant, the judge shall

enter summary judgment or partial summary judgment in conformity with his ruling on the

motion to strike.”). Granting a motion to strike “and thereby taking the case from the jury, is

drastic and should not be done unless it is very plain that the court would be compelled to set

                                                - 10 -
aside a verdict for [the non-moving party].” Tahboub, 298 Va. at 371 (quoting Walton, 168 Va.

at 421-22).

       When reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to strike, we view the evidence “in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and the non-moving party ‘must be given the

benefit of all substantial conflict in the evidence, and all fair inferences that may be drawn

therefrom.’” Dill v. Kroger Ltd. P’ship I, 300 Va. 99, 109 (2021) (quoting Egan v. Butler, 290

Va. 62, 73 (2015)). “Any reasonable doubt as to the sufficiency of the evidence must be

resolved in the [non-moving party]’s favor.” Tahboub, 298 Va. at 371 (quoting Artrip v. E.E.

Berry Equip. Co., 240 Va. 354, 357 (1990)). “When evaluating a motion to strike, the [trial]

court must not judge the weight or credibility of evidence, because to do so ‘would invade the

province of the jury.’” Dill, 300 Va. at 109 (quoting Tahboub, 298 Va. at 371).

       “To establish actionable negligence, [Boyette] had the burden to show the existence of a

legal duty, a breach of the duty, and proximate causation resulting in damage.” Atrium Unit

Owners Ass’n v. King, 266 Va. 288, 293 (2003) (citing Fox v. Custis, 236 Va. 69, 73 (1988)). A

defendant relying on the doctrine of “sudden emergency” may rebut the plaintiff’s prima facie

case by offering “a reasonable explanation, such an explanation as the jury could accept,

showing that what happened was due to something other than the negligence of [the defendant].”

Vahdat, 274 Va. at 422 (alteration in original) (quoting Daniels v. C.I. Whitten Transfer Co., 196

Va. 537, 546 (1954)). Despite the defendant’s obligation to provide such an explanation,

however, “the ultimate burden remain[s] on the plaintiff to prove [his] case, that is, to show by a

preponderance of the evidence that [his] injuries were caused by the negligence of the

defendant[].” Id. (quoting Daniels, 196 Va. at 546).

                                               - 11 -
        B. The trial court correctly denied Boyette’s motion to strike Sprouse’s evidence.

       On review of the trial court’s denial of Boyette’s motion to strike, therefore, we ask

whether, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Sprouse and taking all

reasonable inferences therefrom in Sprouse’s favor, a jury reasonably could find that Sprouse

was not negligent, or, if she was negligent, that her negligence did not proximately cause an

injury to Boyette. More specifically, because the jury in this case was appropriately instructed

on the “sudden emergency” doctrine, we ask whether a jury reasonably could find that Sprouse,

without negligence on her part, was confronted with a sudden emergency and acted as a

reasonable person would have acted under the circumstances of this case.

       For substantially the same reasons that it was appropriate for the trial court to grant the

“sudden emergency” jury instruction, we conclude that a jury reasonably could find that Sprouse

was confronted with a “sudden emergency” not created by her own negligence, and acted as an

ordinarily prudent person would have acted under the same or similar circumstances. Because

reasonable jurors could disagree on these factual issues, and a trial court should deny a motion to

strike “in any doubtful case,” the trial court here correctly denied Boyette’s motion and submitted

the matter to the jury. Walton, 168 Va. at 422.

                                          CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                                                              Affirmed.

                                                  - 12 -