Court Opinion

ID: 9746537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:21:11.787429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:14.548747
License: Public Domain

YEGAN, J.
I concur in the result under compulsion of California Supreme Court precedent. Here there are three things of which I am fairly certain: First, subject matter jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal without having first made objection thereto in the trial court. General principles of consent, estoppel, waiver, and theory of trial have no application. (See, e.g., Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Theatrical Stage Employees Union (1968) 69 Cal.2d 713, 721 [73 Cal.Rptr. 213, 447 P.2d 325]; Summers v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal.2d 295, 298 [1 Cal.Rptr. 324, 347 P.2d 668]; see also 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1977) Appeal, §§ 383, p. 383 [estoppel], 388, p. 439 [waiver], 399, pp. 451-452 [theory of trial].)
Second, the Court of Appeal and its justices must accept and follow California Supreme Court precedent. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937].) But as the late Bernard Witkin would say, just because we are bound, does not *385mean we are gagged. (Witkin, Manual on Appellate Court Opinions (1977) pp. 168-169; see also People v. Musante (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 156, 159-162 [162 Cal.Rptr. 158] (cone. opn. of Gardner, P. J.).)1 Respectful suggestion to the California Supreme Court or the Legislature that the law should be changed is a legitimate function of the Court of Appeal or one of its justices.
Third, Sam Dabney is rolling over in his grave.
The majority opinion fairly states the facts and procedural history but certain additional observations should be made: Appellant and her mother have differing views concerning administration of the trusts. The disagreement was so vehement that they mediated many of their disputes in 1998. At that time, appellant “agreed to be available to discuss the property with the professionals who will be hired by the Trust to accomplish the lot line adjustment.”
Appellant has been aware that a lot line adjustment was appropriate years before the subject order directing her to execute such document was made. The lot line adjustment neither adds nor subtracts land from either of the two parcels and in fact makes them both legal parcels.
When appellant agreed to cooperate in the lot line adjustment, she was represented by counsel. Prior to the entry of the order to sign the lot line adjustment, appellant was given oral and written notice of her mother’s intent to ask the probate court to make the lot line order. The only written objection she made was that the $5,836.18 in costs to do so should be allocated as an income expense rather than a principal expense.
At the hearing on the motion, neither she nor her attorney objected to the signing of the lot line order. In this situation, it is not surprising that the probate court signed the order for a lot line adjustment. Thereafter, she did not ask for reconsideration, bring a motion for new trial, or ask for any other type of post order relief. At no time did she utter the phrase, “subject matter jurisdiction.”
Appellant filed a notice of appeal and retained new counsel, who, for the first time on appeal argues lack of subject matter jurisdiction. I do not fault counsel for doing so. But raising the issue does not necessarily mean that he *386should prevail. The premise to this contention is that appellant, as an individual person who owns approximately 15 percent of the studio property, is not subject to trust administration. (Buckley v. Superior Court (1894) 102 Cal. 6 [36 P. 360]; see also Texas Co. v. Bank of America etc., Assn. (1935) 5 Cal.2d 35, 39 [53 P.2d 127]; cf. Prob. Code, §§ 17000, 17001.) In her reply brief and in a brief moment of candor, appellant says that she “had the unfettered right to ‘change her mind’ or decide ‘not to cooperate’ with her 85 percent co-tenant or to just not want to sign because she was ornery, petty, having a ‘bad hair day’ or just plain ‘unhappy’ with other unrelated things.” In this situation, appellant should not be permitted to “change her mind.”
Allowing her to be heard on the merits for the first time on appeal is not only unfair to respondent, it is also unfair to the trial court. As far as it knew, it was called upon to sign an uncontested order on a matter of trust administration and it was at least 85 percent correct. Appellant’s “change of mind” allows her to defeat the orderly administration of justice at the trial and appellate levels. This is not the paradigm of how litigation should proceed.
Sam Dabney would not be pleased with today’s ruling. He retained counsel who drafted a comprehensive estate plan to provide for both his wife and children. That his wife and daughter cannot agree on the proper fimding of the trusts and allocations of assets should not be a springboard for litigation of a lot line adjustment which benefits everyone. This dispute is now infused with new life. Our reversal of the lot line adjustment order proves the old adage that the law does not exist to prevent a person from his or her own folly.
I am required by oath of office and the rule of Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 57 Cal.2d 450, to follow the law as declared by the California Supreme Court. By concurring in the judgment reversing that portion of the order which requires appellant to execute the lot line adjustment, I have done so. The Supreme Court has declared that lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised for the first time on appeal. As the majority opinion indicates, the probate court had no subject matter jurisdiction to require a 15 percent cotenant to execute a lot line adjustment in her individual capacity. While bound, I am not gagged. (Witkin, Manual on Appellate Court Opinions, supra, at pp. 168-169.) Like Presiding Justice Gardner, I reserve my First Amendment right to express my view on the law as it should be. (People v. Musante, supra, 102 Cal.App.3d at p. 159 (conc. opn. of Gardner, P. J.).)
In my opinion, the present order partially reversing the judgment results in a miscarriage of justice. Appellant should not be permitted to raise lack of *387subject matter jurisdiction for the first time on appeal. Appellant perhaps believes that her “change of mind” will have some beneficial effect on the allocation of trust assets and the valuations placed thereon. She is wrong. The rulings thereon are long final.

 Known for his ability to make a point with humor, this highly respected jurist said: “I fully recognize that under the doctrine of stare decisis, I must follow the rulings of the Supreme Court, and if that court wishes to jump off a figurative Pali, I, lemming-like, must leap right after it. However, I reserve my First Amendment right to kick and scream on my way down to the rocks below.” (People v. Musante, supra, 102 Cal.App.3d at p. 159.)