Court Opinion

ID: 9905483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 17:04:31.440584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:36.691078
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

                                         Docket No. 49859

 MARIANITA R. MARTINEZ,                  )
                                         )
    Petitioner-Appellant,                )
                                         )
 v.                                      )
                                         )
 VICTORIO CARRETERO,                     )
                                         )                     Boise, June 2023 Term
    Respondent,                          )
                                         )                     Opinion Filed: November 29, 2023
 and                                     )
                                         )                     Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
 CARRETONERO TRANSPORTATION,             )
 LLC; CARRETONERO LOGISTICS, LLC; )
 and CARRETONERO TRANSPORTATION )
 SERVICES, INC.,                         )
                                         )
    Respondents.                         )
 _______________________________________ )

       Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
       Power County. Rick Carnaroli, District Judge. Paul S. Laggis, Magistrate Judge.
       The decision of the district court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
       with instructions that the district court remand this case to the magistrate court for
       further proceedings.
       Barton, Atkinson & Murdoch, P.C., Rexburg, for Appellant Marianita R. Martinez.
       Steven A. Atkinson submitted argument on the briefs.
       Blaser Oleson & Lloyd, Chartered, Blackfoot, for Respondent Victorio Carretero.
       Jeromy W. Pharis submitted argument on the briefs.
                                     _____________________

BRODY, Justice.
       By statute, Idaho recognizes common law marriages only if they were entered into by the
parties before January 1, 1996. In the proceedings below, Marianita Martinez alleged that after she
and Victorio Carretero divorced in April 1995, they subsequently entered into a common law
marriage between their divorce in April 1995 and their move to California in November 1995.

                                                 1
After the filing of cross-motions for summary judgment on the common law marriage issue, the
magistrate court proceeded to hold an evidentiary hearing without ruling on the motions and
without objection from either party. At the evidentiary hearing, the magistrate court excluded all
evidence of the parties’ conduct on or after January 1, 1996, as being irrelevant to whether the
parties had entered into a common law marriage prior to that date. This ruling resulted in the
exclusion of, among other things, evidence of a life insurance application in which Carretero
identified Martinez as his “wife” on January 10, 1996—two months after the parties left Idaho in
November 1995. At the close of the hearing, the magistrate court concluded there was not
sufficient evidence to show that the parties had consented to marry within the seven-month period
prior to January 1, 1996. The magistrate court then dismissed Martinez’s claim of a common law
marriage, and on appellate review, the district court affirmed. We affirm in part, reverse in part,
and remand.
                  I.    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    A. Factual Background
        Martinez and Carretero were originally married in California in November 1989, and had
their first child in 1992. Two years after that, in 1994, a family dispute arose, during which
Martinez and Carretero separated, and Martinez filed a petition for divorce on September 14, 1994,
in Power County, Idaho. After that filing, Martinez worked the potato harvest in Idaho, after which
the parties reconciled, and began living together again in a home in American Falls, Idaho. At the
evidentiary hearing following the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, Martinez testified
that Carretero had asked her to “get back together” as “husband and wife” and to live together as
a family. In contrast, Carretero never testified to why the parties reconciled, but did testify that
after the reconciliation, he intended to get divorced.
        There is no dispute that, after the reconciliation, the parties continued with divorce
proceedings and on March 10, 1995, signed a Stipulation for Divorce in Idaho. The decree of
divorce was entered a month later, on April 18, 1995. During this time, it is undisputed that the
parties were living together at the home in American Falls. It is also undisputed that roughly seven
months after the decree was entered, in November 1995, the parties moved together, with their
child, to California.
        During the seven-month period in Idaho before the move, Martinez did not enforce
Carretero’s child support payment obligation required under the Stipulation for Divorce. Also,
during this seven-month period, Martinez alleged—through declarations and testimony from
herself and witnesses at the later evidentiary hearing—that she and Carretero continuously lived
together as husband and wife with their minor child, shared control over financial and legal
matters, publicly held themselves out as husband and wife to family members, and that Carretero
provided for their family while Martinez stayed home to raise their minor child. For example,
Martinez’s adult niece testified at the evidentiary hearing that Carretero called Martinez his “wife”
during the time before the parties moved from American Falls to California. Her sister-in-law
testified to the same. After the parties moved from Idaho to California in November 1995, two
years later, in 1997, they moved to Arizona for Carretero’s employment. The parties eventually
returned to Idaho sometime in 2005 or 2006.
   B. Procedural Background
         Twenty-five years after the parties’ decree of divorce was entered, on May 4, 2020,
Martinez filed a verified pleading titled Petition for Decree of Divorce with Minor
Children/Complaint in the district court of Bannock County, Idaho. In it, Martinez pleaded two
alternative claims: (1) that the parties entered into a common law marriage during the seven-month
period they lived together in Idaho following their April 1995 divorce; or (2) if there was no
common law marriage, Martinez alleged there was “general partnership” between herself and
Carretero regarding a trucking business that the parties allegedly formed together—and Martinez
sought its dissolution, compensatory damages, restitution, and other damages under a related wage
claim.
         Roughly two months after Martinez filed her pleading, the district court entered a
procedural order that explained the “alternative” nature of Martinez’s pleading and sua sponte
bifurcated the case after consulting with the administrative district judge. The district court
“remanded” the common law marriage and divorce portion of the pleading to the magistrate court
and outlined a contingent procedural disposition. If a common law marriage existed, the magistrate
court would “proceed with addressing and resolving the divorce issues and the alternatively pled
count will become moot.” On the other hand, if a common law marriage did not exist, the matter
would be “referred back to district court and the alternatively pled claims related to dissolution of
business relationships and the wage claim [would] proceed in district court.”
         Days prior to entry of the procedural order, Carretero filed a motion to dismiss the portion
of the pleading alleging the existence of a common law marriage and requesting a divorce.
However, Carretero’s motion did not rely solely on the pleadings—instead, it relied on matters
outside the pleadings where Carretero attached his affidavit and testified that, among other things,
he never entered into a second marriage with Martinez. Martinez initially objected to Carretero’s
motion to dismiss as procedurally improper, and after the procedural order was entered, filed a
memorandum in support of her argument that dismissal was improper. Martinez concluded her
memorandum by acknowledging that “the question of the marriage should be determined at trial
as soon as possible following the completion of discovery.”
       However, four days later, Martinez filed a motion for a declaratory judgment under Idaho
Rule of Family Law Procedure (“I.R.F.L.P.”) 506, as it existed prior to July 1, 2021, contending
that the undisputed evidence in the record established as a matter of law that the parties entered
into a common law marriage. In support of her motion, Martinez relied on her verified pleading,
and alleged various “undisputed” facts she claimed established that the parties had entered into a
common law marriage in Idaho in 1995 after their divorce. Despite now arguing that she was
entitled to judgment as matter of law based on undisputed material facts in the record, Martinez
specifically requested a “speedy hearing where she may call witnesses and present evidence in
support of this motion as provided for by I.R.F.L.P. 506 [now I.R.F.L.P. 508 (“The court may
order a speedy hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment.”)].”
       Four days later, on August 11, 2020, Carretero filed a notice that he “intends to require
strict compliance” with the Idaho Rules of Evidence in the pending family law proceeding before
the magistrate court pursuant to Rule 102(B)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure, in
effect prior to July 1, 2021. The same day Carretero filed his notice for strict compliance, he filed
a motion for change of venue from Bannock County, Idaho, to Power County, Idaho, on the
common law marriage and divorce issue. The magistrate court in Bannock County granted the
motion, and venue changed to the magistrate court in Power County.
       After the change of venue, on October 29, 2020, Martinez filed a motion for summary
judgment under Idaho Rule of Family Law Procedure 505 (now I.R.F.L.P. 507), and a motion for
declaratory judgment under Rule 506 (now I.R.F.L.P. 508), as in effect prior to July 1, 2021. As
with her prior motion for a declaratory judgment, this combined motion alleged that based on
purportedly undisputed facts, a common law marriage between Martinez and Carretero formed as
a matter of law in Idaho in 1995 after their divorce. However, unlike her prior motion for a
declaratory judgment, Martinez attached declarations from herself and other family members, and
various documents spanning 1996 to 2008, all supporting her claim that after the parties’ April
1995 divorce, the parties entered into a common law marriage during the seven-month period they
continued to live together in Idaho.
        Among other things, the documents attached in support included: the 1995 Stipulation for
Divorce; a January 10, 1996, life insurance application signed by Carretero, which identified
Martinez as Carretero’s “wife”; a July 1996 claim for medical benefits signed by Carretero, which
requested coverage for Martinez’s medical treatment starting January 8, 1996, and identified
Martinez as his “wife”; a 1998 joint vehicle purchase agreement with both parties’ signatures; two
separate 1998 vehicle insurance applications, both listing the parties as “married”; a 2000 letter
concerning delinquent property taxes, addressing the parties as husband and wife who jointly
owned the property (“H/W JT”); a 2000 rental agreement signed by both parties, representing both
as legal owners of a single mobile home; and 2002 pay stubs from Carretero’s former employer
showing he claimed “married” filing status for purposes of his federal income tax withholdings
that year.
        In response, Carretero argued he was entitled to summary judgment because Martinez
could not establish a prima facie case that a common law marriage had been entered into before
January 1, 1996, which is the date of the statutory cut-off under Idaho Code section 32-201(2).
Carretero also argued that any evidence of the parties’ conduct after the cut-off date was irrelevant
to whether a common law marriage was entered into before the cut-off date. Carretero did not
attach new evidence in support of his cross-motion for summary judgment, and instead relied on
his affidavit submitted in support of his motion to dismiss referenced above. In that affidavit,
Carretero alleged, among other things, that he never remarried Martinez after the 1995 divorce
decree was entered, and that since 1995 he has always filed his income taxes as a single person.
However, Martinez only attached his Federal Tax Returns for tax years 2010 to 2018—which all
reflect that he filed as “Head of Household.”
        A few weeks later, on December 7, 2020, the magistrate court held a hearing on the pending
cross-motions for summary judgment on the common law marriage issue. The transcript from that
hearing is not in the record on appeal. However, the magistrate court’s minute entry and order
from the hearing reflect that the court did not rule from the bench, instead it took the matter under
advisement. Roughly two weeks later, at a hearing on December 22, 2020, the magistrate court
advised the parties that it “would require further information and testimony after having reviewed
the file and Affidavits therein and would be setting the matter for an Evidentiary Hearing.” Without
clearly ruling on the cross-motions for summary judgment—or Carretero’s argument to exclude
any evidence of the parties’ conduct after the statutory cut-off date as irrelevant—the magistrate
court indicated that at the evidentiary hearing, the “point of inquiry will be for a time frame” prior
to January 1, 1996. Nothing in the record reflects that Martinez objected to the evidentiary hearing
as procedurally improper.
       The evidentiary hearing was held a few months later, on March 15, 2021. At the hearing,
Martinez called six witnesses to testify, including herself, family members, and Carretero. The
magistrate court admitted exhibits offered by Martinez, which included, among other things, the
1994 petition for divorce, the 1995 Stipulation for Divorce, photographs of the parties’ shared
residence in 1994–95, and a March 1996 letter from Idaho’s First Security Bank addressed to both
parties reflecting a debt from 1995. However, after a relevancy objection from Carretero based on
the statutory cut-off date, the magistrate court excluded all documents submitted concerning events
that occurred after the statutory cut-off date, including evidence of a life insurance application,
signed by Carretero on January 10, 1996, which identified Martinez as his “wife.” The magistrate
court also broadly excluded testimony concerning the parties’ conduct as irrelevant if that conduct
occurred after the statutory cut-off date.
       At the close of Martinez’s evidentiary presentation, Carretero moved for an involuntary
dismissal with prejudice, arguing Martinez failed to establish a prima facie case for a common law
marriage. Ruling from the bench, the magistrate court agreed. The magistrate court found that
Martinez presented no direct evidence, through documents or testimony, to prove the parties
consented to be married or lived as husband and wife and held themselves out as husband and wife
in Idaho within the seven-month period between their April 1995 divorce and their November
1995 move to California. From this, the magistrate court concluded, as a matter of law, that no
common law marriage was entered into in Idaho between the parties prior to January 1, 1996. Two
days later, on March 17, 2021, the magistrate court entered a partial judgment, and a written
decision memorializing its ruling. That same day, the magistrate court issued an order
“upmanding” the case to district court to address the alternatively pleaded dissolution of the
alleged general partnership and Martinez’s wage claim.
       Martinez timely appealed the magistrate court’s decision to the district court. On
intermediate appeal, Martinez argued that the magistrate court erred in (1) holding an evidentiary
hearing instead of granting Martinez summary judgment as a matter of law when Carretero raised
no issue of material fact; (2) excluding evidence of the parties’ conduct after the statutory cut-off
date as irrelevant because such evidence was relevant to proving a common law marriage existed
before that date; and (3) granting Carretero’s motion for an involuntary dismissal when Martinez
provided prima facie evidence of a common law marriage sufficient to shift the burden to Carretero
to disprove the marriage by clear and convincing evidence. The district court determined each of
these arguments was without merit and affirmed the magistrate court’s decision. Martinez timely
appealed to this Court.
                              II.   STANDARDS OF REVIEW
       “When an appeal is initially taken to the district court from a decision by a magistrate, any
subsequent review will be conducted independent of, but with due regard for, the decision of the
district court.” O’Holleran v. O’Holleran, 171 Idaho 671, __, 525 P.3d 709, 711 (2023) (quoting
Kelly v. Kelly, 171 Idaho 27, __, 518 P.3d 326, 333 (2022)). When this Court reviews the decision
of a district court acting in its appellate capacity, this Court reviews the record of the magistrate
court “to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s
findings of fact and whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from those findings.”
O’Holleran, 171 Idaho at __, 525 P.3d at 711 (quoting Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 858, 303
P.3d 214, 217 (2013)). “This Court affirms the district court’s decision as a matter of procedure if
‘those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court
affirmed the magistrate’s decision[.]’” O’Holleran, 171 Idaho at __, 525 P.3d at 711 (quoting
Pelayo, 154 Idaho at 858, 303 P.3d at 217).
       “This Court exercises ‘free review over questions regarding the application of procedural
rules.’” O’Holleran, 171 Idaho at __, 525 P.3d at 711 (quoting Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526,
529, 284 P.3d 970, 973 (2012)). “This Court also freely reviews questions of law.” Regdab, Inc.
v. Graybill, 165 Idaho 293, 295, 444 P.3d 323, 325 (2019). Typically, “[w]hen reviewing the trial
court’s evidentiary rulings, this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard.” State v. Ogden, 171
Idaho 258, 519 P.3d 1198, 1206 (2022) (quoting State v. Chambers, 166 Idaho 837, 840, 465 P.3d
1076, 1079 (2020)). However, “[t]he question of whether evidence is relevant is reviewed de novo,
while the decision to admit relevant evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Ogden, 171
Idaho at ___, 519 P.3d at 1210 (2022) (quoting State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744, 781, 419 P.3d 1042,
1079 (2018)).
                                       III.    ANALYSIS
   A. Any error in the magistrate court’s decision to conduct an evidentiary hearing before
      ruling on the pending cross-motions for summary judgment was invited and not
      preserved for appeal.
       Martinez first argues the magistrate court procedurally erred by holding an evidentiary
hearing without first ruling on the pending cross-motions for summary judgment concerning
whether Martinez and Carretero had entered into a common law marriage prior to January 1, 1996.
Martinez also argues the district court erred in concluding that she failed to preserve this issue for
appeal. According to Martinez, had the magistrate court decided the cross-motions instead of
proceeding to an evidentiary hearing, she would have prevailed in showing a common law
marriage between herself and Carretero existed because he failed to allege any “facts in
contradiction to those facts” asserted by her in support of her motion. Thus, she would have been
entitled to judgment as a matter of law absent the error.
       Two weeks after the magistrate court took the cross-motions under advisement, at the next
hearing on December 22, 2020, the court informed the parties it stood undecided on the motions,
and did not rule in favor of, or against, either party. Instead, the magistrate court stated it intended
to hold an “evidentiary hearing” on the pending motions before it could rule on whether a common
law marriage existed:
                THE COURT: I have reviewed the file and the affidavits, and it is my
        opinion that I would require further testimony in order to make a decision. And I
        would like to set this matter for an evidentiary hearing so that you may call
        witnesses to provide additional information. I would like to set that the first two
        weeks after Christmas. Will your calendars permit me to set that type of hearing in
        that time frame?
                [MARTINEZ’S COUNSEL]: That should be possible, Judge.
                THE COURT: [Carretero’s counsel]?
                  [CARRETERO’S COUNSEL]: I would agree that should be possible based
        on, I guess, everybody else. I mean, I’ve got some things there to contend with,
        but . . .
                ....
                THE COURT: I will have my clerk block out a half a day. And if we require
        additional time, I will accommodate that on a different day. I believe I’ve done
        enough research and review of the file that I will be able to point counsel in the
        direction of my questions, which may reduce the number of witnesses that are
        necessary. However, I will allow the attorneys to present their case in a—I want
        the attorneys to have the opportunity to present their—all of their information. Any
        questions?
                   [MARTINEZ’S COUNSEL]: No, Your Honor.
                   [CARRETERO’S COUNSEL]: No, Your Honor.
(Emphasis added.)
        We affirm the district court’s conclusion that Martinez failed to preserve her argument that
the magistrate court erred by conducting an evidentiary hearing. The record establishes that
Martinez not only invited an evidentiary hearing, but also that she never objected to the hearing
that eventually occurred. “The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an
error when [the party’s] own conduct induces the commission of the error.” Beebe v. N. Idaho Day
Surgery, LLC, 171 Idaho 779, __, 526 P.3d 650, 660 (2023) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted). Stated another way, a party cannot “successfully complain of errors [the party] has
acquiesced in or invited.” City of Middleton v. Coleman Homes, LLC, 163 Idaho 716, 727, 418
P.3d 1225, 1236 (2018) (citation omitted). When a party invites an error, “such errors are not
reversible.” Id.
        Here, two of Martinez’s filings, both comprising the filings constituting her side of the
pending cross-motions for summary judgment, acknowledged and requested a trial-like hearing to
resolve the common law marriage issue—while at the same time asking for judgment as a matter
of law without a trial-like hearing. First, in response to Carretero’s motion to dismiss (which was
in substance a motion for summary judgment which relied on Carretero’s affidavit—a matter
outside the pleadings), Martinez filed a memorandum which explicitly acknowledged “that the
question of the marriage should be determined at trial as soon as possible following the completion
of discovery.” (Emphasis added.) Second, four days later, Martinez filed a motion for a declaratory
judgment that the common law marriage existed as a matter of law, a motion that Martinez
essentially reiterated and filed again with additional evidence after the change of venue. Relevant
here, at the end of her first filed motion, Martinez explicitly “request[ed] [a] speedy hearing where
she may call witnesses and present evidence in support of this motion as provided for by I.R.F.L.P.
506.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, Martinez herself invited the magistrate court to hold the evidentiary
hearing she now complains of on appeal.
        Moreover, as evidenced by the colloquy above and the transcript of the evidentiary hearing,
Martinez never objected to the hearing or argued that the magistrate court must first rule on the
pending cross-motions for summary judgment before it could hold an evidentiary hearing. Instead,
Martinez fully participated in the evidentiary hearing, called witnesses, and offered evidence.
Thus, apart from inviting the error, whether the magistrate court’s procedural misstep was
reversible error is an issue Martinez raised for the first time on appeal to the district court.
Generally, we will not consider unobjected to issues raised for the first time on appeal. See Gordon
v. Hedrick, 159 Idaho 604, 612, 364 P.3d 951, 959 (2015). For these reasons, we will not address
Martinez’s challenge to the magistrate court’s decision to hold an evidentiary hearing without first
ruling on the pending cross-motions for summary judgment and affirm that part of the district
court’s decision.
   B. The magistrate court erred by excluding evidence of the parties’ conduct after
      December 31, 1995, and by granting Carretero’s motion for an involuntary dismissal.
       Martinez also claims that the district court erred when it affirmed the magistrate court’s
decision to exclude evidence of the parties’ conduct that occurred after December 31, 1995, on the
basis that it was irrelevant to whether the parties had entered into a common law marriage. In 1995,
“to promote the stability and best interests of marriage and the family,” the Idaho Legislature
amended Idaho Code sections 32-201 and 32-301 to eliminate the recognition of common law
marriages in Idaho entered into after December 31, 1995. 1995 Idaho Sess. Laws 334, 335. The
relevant provision that precluded common law marriages in Idaho provided that such marriages
“created by consenting parties through a mutual assumption of marital rights, duties or obligations”
would only be valid if “in effect prior to January 1, 1996[.]” I.C. § 32-201(2). In other words, this
date is a statutory cut-off for the initiation of a lawful and valid common law marriage.
       To prove a prima facie case of a common law marriage, a party must initially prove by a
preponderance of the evidence the following four elements: (1) the parties were eighteen years of
age or older and unmarried; (2) the parties consented to be husband and wife; (3) the parties
assumed marital rights, duties, or obligations including—living together as husband and wife,
treating each other in a manner typical of married people, and holding themselves out as husband
and wife; and (4) the parties’ consent and assumption of marital rights, duties, or obligations
occurred in Idaho prior to January 1, 1996. See Wilkins v. Wilkins, 137 Idaho 315, 320, 48 P.3d
644, 649 (2002); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Idaho 122, 126–27, 645 P.2d 356, 360–61
(1982); I.C. § 32-201(2); see also I.C.J.I. 911. Critically, once a party presents sufficient evidence
to establish a prima facie case of a common law marriage, “a presumption of marriage exists,
which must be overcome by the opposing party with clear and convincing evidence.” Wilkins, 137
Idaho at 320, 48 P.3d at 649; Metro. Life Ins. Co., 103 Idaho at 126, 645 P.2d at 360.
       On appeal, Martinez argues that the district court erred in affirming the magistrate court’s
decision to exclude all evidence of the parties’ conduct on or after January 1, 1996, as irrelevant
to whether the parties had entered into a common law marriage before the statutory cut-off date.
Martinez also argues that the district court erred in applying the abuse of discretion standard to
review the magistrate court’s decision that evidence of the parties’ conduct following December
31, 1995, was relevant because this Court’s decisions hold that the issue of relevancy is reviewed
de novo. Martinez maintains that evidence of the parties’ conduct on or after January 1, 1996, is
relevant because whether Carretero admitted Martinez was his wife in the time following the
seven-month period in 1995—when the marriage was alleged to have occurred—has some
tendency to make the fact of the marriage more probable. Martinez maintains the magistrate court’s
error in excluding relevant evidence of the parties’ conduct on or after January 1, 1996, prevented
her from “presenting a wealth of information” at the evidentiary hearing that supported her claim
of a common law marriage.
       Connected to this evidentiary challenge, Martinez argues that had the magistrate court
properly admitted relevant evidence of the parties’ conduct and applied the “presumption of
morality” (a long-used term of art meaning the law favors the presumption of marriage rather than
co-habitation) in favor of a marriage as provided in Mauldin v. Sunshine Mining Company, 61
Idaho 9, 17, 97 P.2d 608, 611 (1939), she would have established a prima facie case of a common
law marriage sufficient to shift the burden to Carretero to prove, by clear and convincing evidence,
that a common law marriage did not occur. Thus, the magistrate court’s error affected her
substantial rights because, had the magistrate court admitted the relevant evidence, it may not have
involuntarily dismissed her case. For the reasons explained below, we agree with Martinez that the
magistrate court erred in excluding the January 10, 1996, life insurance application and the July
1996 claim for medical benefits.
   1. The January 10, 1996, life insurance application and the July 1996 claim for medical
      benefits are relevant to proving the parties entered a common law marriage in 1995.
       During the evidentiary hearing, Martinez attempted to introduce and admit a copy of a life
insurance application into evidence. The application was executed by Carretero and Martinez on
January 10, 1996, and in it, Carretero identified Martinez as his “wife.” Carretero objected that the
application was not relevant to whether the parties had entered into a common law marriage and
objected that Martinez should not be allowed to go down the other “list of documents” dated after
December 31, 1995, that Martinez had submitted in support her motion for summary judgment.
After argument from the parties, the magistrate court sustained the objection and broadly ruled
that evidence of the parties’ conduct on or after January 1, 1996, would be excluded as irrelevant.
In addition to the exclusion of the life insurance application, this ruling also resulted in the
exclusion of a July 17, 1996, claim of medical benefits. In that claim, Carretero referenced
Martinez’s illness, which began January 5, 1996, and requested coverage for her treatment of that
illness on January 8, 1996. He also identified Martinez as his wife. The magistrate court’s ruling
excluding both of these documents was in error, and the district court erred in affirming it.
       Evidence must be relevant to be admissible. I.R.E. 402. This evidentiary baseline applies
in family law proceedings regardless of whether the proceedings are conducted in strict compliance
with the Idaho Rules of Evidence or the Idaho Rules of Family Law Procedure. See I.R.F.L.P.
102(B)(1) (2020). “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining
the action.” I.R.E. 401 (emphasis added). “Relevant evidence is admissible unless [the Idaho Rules
of Evidence], or other rules applicable in the courts of this state, provide otherwise.” I.R.E. 402.
“Whether a fact is ‘of consequence’ or material is determined by its relationship to the legal
theories presented by the parties.” State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, 670, 462 P.3d 1125, 1134 (2020)
(citation omitted).
       As a preliminary matter, the district court erred in reviewing the magistrate court’s
relevancy ruling for an abuse of discretion. Whether evidence is relevant is reviewed de novo—
while the decision to exclude or admit relevant evidence under another rule is generally reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. Id.; compare State v. Diaz, 170 Idaho 79, 91, 507 P.3d 1109, 1121
(2022) (explaining that whether to exclude relevant evidence as unfairly prejudicial under I.R.E.
403 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion), with State v. Roman-Lopez, 171 Idaho 585, __, 524
P.3d 864, 871 (2023) (clarifying that the nature of a hearsay ruling and the challenge to the
admission or exclusion of potential hearsay evidence will decide the appropriate standard of review
on appeal).
       Here, the January 10, 1996, life insurance application has at least some tendency to prove
that the parties consented to marry during the preceding seven-month window between their April
1995 divorce and their November 1995 move to California. In the application, Carretero identified
Martinez as his “wife” and represented this as fact through his signature. This conduct by Carretero
occurred after the parties’ April 1995 divorce. Likewise, the July 17, 1996, claim for medical
benefits identifying Martinez as Carretero’s wife as of January 5, 1996, also has some tendency to
prove the same. Thus, the application and the claim for medical benefits are plainly relevant to
proving a fact of consequence: that the parties may have consented to marry during the seven-
month window in Idaho following the April 1995 divorce. Although the application was not
executed within the seven-month window, any alleged “remoteness” to the seven-month window
only bears “on the weight rather than the admissibility” of the evidence to proving the fact asserted
(i.e., a contract to marry). See Nelsen v. Nelsen, 170 Idaho 102, 120, 508 P.3d 301, 319 (2022)
(quoting In re Estate of Brown, 52 Idaho 286, 297, 15 P.2d 604, 607–08 (1932)).
       Certainly, at some point, evidence “becomes so remote that it no longer tends to make a
fact ‘of consequence . . . more probable or less probable’ and, therefore, is inadmissible” because
it no longer meets the basic test for relevancy. Nelsen, 170 Idaho at 120, 508 P.3d at 319 (alteration
in original) (citation omitted). However, that is not the case here. The application was executed
roughly nine months from the start of the critical seven-month period and two months after its end.
The timing of these documents is not so remote that they no longer have any tendency to make the
fact of the parties’ consent to marry within the seven-month period more or less probable. See
I.R.E. 401; see, e.g., Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., 127 Idaho 565, 574–75, 903 P.2d 730,
739–40 (1995) (recognizing that data gathered four years after a flood could be excluded as
irrelevant where it was too remote). Thus, it was error to exclude the January 10, 1996, life
insurance application and the July 17, 1996, claim for medical benefits as irrelevant. We recognize
that Martinez’s appeal challenges the exclusion of additional evidence, created after 1996, which
she contends tends to prove the parties held each other out as husband and wife. The magistrate
court can address the admissibility of those documents on remand consistent with this opinion.
   2. The error in excluding relevant evidence affected Martinez’s substantial rights.
       “On appeal, it is not sufficient simply to show error” in a ruling to admit or exclude
evidence. Reed v. Reed, 160 Idaho 772, 775, 379 P.3d 1042, 1045 (2016). “A party alleging error
must also show that the error affected the party’s substantial rights.” Id.; see also I.R.E 103(a);
I.R.F.L.P 810 (2020) (revised Mar. 29, 2021, and renumbered I.R.F.L.P. 806). “A right is
substantial if it could affect the outcome of litigation.” Bromund v. Bromund, 167 Idaho 925, 932,
477 P.3d 979, 986 (2020) (citing Fonseca v. Corral Agric., Inc., 156 Idaho 142, 149, 321 P.3d
692, 699 (2014), abrogated on other grounds by Sims v. Jacobson, 157 Idaho 980, 342 P.3d 907
(2015)). For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the magistrate court’s error in excluding
relevant evidence affected Martinez’s substantial rights.
       As discussed above, since Martinez alleges a common law marriage existed prior to the
legislative repeal, we begin with the long-standing principle that “when a couple cohabit, assume
the rights, duties and responsibilities of marriage, and hold themselves out as being married, a
presumption of marriage arises which, if disputed, must be overcome by clear and positive
evidence.” Matter of Eliasen's Est., 105 Idaho 234, 238, 668 P.2d 110, 114 (1983) (citing Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 103 Idaho at 127, 645 P.2d at 361). The magistrate court found that, following the
entry of the Decree of Divorce on April 18, 1995, the parties continued to live together, contributed
to the household, and provided care and shelter to their minor child before moving to California
around the end of October, or early November 1995. Martinez’s family testified that the parties
referred to each other as “husband” and “wife,” they were not made aware of the divorce, and
considered the parties to be “married.” However, the family did not testify with any specificity
that the parties referred to each other as husband and wife during the relevant period in 1995.
       The magistrate court concluded Martinez failed to establish a prima facie case of a common
law marriage because there was no direct evidence to prove consent—such as the parties buying
“insurance and put[ting] their names on there as husband and wife”—within the seven-month
period the parties resided in Idaho in 1995 after the April 1995 divorce. In the absence of direct
evidence, the magistrate court concluded that the parties living together and providing care and
shelter to their minor child was not enough to establish that the parties consented to marry in light
of the April 1995 divorce. Instead, to reestablish the martial relationship, the magistrate court
concluded that Martinez needed to provide evidence of a “distinct and public manifestation” that
the parties consented to be married.
       However, the parties’ consent “need not be manifested in any particular manner and no
magic words are necessary but rather consent may be express or it may be implied from the parties’
acts and conduct.” Metro. Life Ins. Co., 103 Idaho at 127, 645 P.2d at 361 (emphasis added). While
the July 17, 1996, claim of medical benefits and the life insurance application from January 10,
1996, could be subject to multiple interpretations or explanations, they at least have a tendency to
prove Carretero consented to marry Martinez after the April 1995 divorce and within the seven-
month critical period. Thus, had this documentation and the testimony relating to this
documentation been admitted, prima facie evidence of the parties’ consent to enter into a common
law marriage would have been present. The error in excluding the claim for medical benefits and
life insurance application—which did reflect the parties as married two months after leaving
Idaho—affected the magistrate court’s conclusion that Martinez did not prove her prima facie case
and resulted in the dismissal of her claim.
       Furthermore, if the evidence had been admitted, Martinez may have met her burden to
demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that the parties consented to enter into a common law
marriage and the presumption of marriage would have been applied. See Metro. Life Ins. Co., 103
Idaho at 127, 645 P.2d at 361 (quoting Mauldin, 61 Idaho at 17, 97 P.2d at 611) (“When a marriage
has been shown in evidence, whether regular or irregular, and whatever the form of proof, the law
raises a strong presumption of its legality[.]”). Then the magistrate court would have “assume[d]
a martial relationship” within the seven-month period and shifted the burden to Carretero to prove
no marriage occurred by clear and convincing evidence before it made ultimate findings on the
elements of a common law marriage. See id.; Wilkins, 137 Idaho at 320, 48 P.3d at 649. In other
words, had the error not occurred, Carretero may have been required to put on his own case and
prove no marriage had occurred. The burden would require Carretero to provide evidence or
testimony that—contrary to the testimony from family members put on by Martinez—he never
publicly held Martinez out to be his “wife” between the parties’ separation and move to California
in November 1995. Therefore, the erroneous exclusion of this evidence could have affected the
outcome of the litigation.
       For these reasons, we reverse the district court’s decision affirming the involuntary
dismissal of Martinez’s common law marriage claim and remand with instructions that the district
court remand this matter to the magistrate court for further proceedings.
   C. Carretero is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal and Martinez is awarded costs.
       Carretero requested attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code section 12-121. Martinez
did not request fees on appeal. “In order to be eligible for an award of attorney fees under Idaho
Code section 12-121, the party must be the prevailing party on appeal.” Baughman v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 162 Idaho 174, 183, 395 P.3d 393, 402 (2017) (citation omitted). Martinez is the
prevailing party on appeal, not Carretero. Thus, Carretero is not entitled to fees. Additionally, as
the prevailing party, Martinez is awarded costs as a matter of course. I.A.R. 40(a).
                                    IV.    CONCLUSION
       For the reasons set forth above, the district court’s decision is affirmed in part and reversed
in part, and the case is remanded with instructions that the district court remand this matter to the
magistrate court for further proceedings. Costs are awarded to Martinez on appeal.
       Chief Justice BEVAN, and Justices STEGNER, MOELLER and ZAHN CONCUR.