Court Opinion

ID: 9748857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:15:34.774314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:40.014002
License: Public Domain

DEL SOLE, Judge,
dissenting.
Daniel Kris Atkinson and Maria Dolores Sprester are the parents of Kristopher Robin Atkinson. Mr. Atkinson received custody of Kristopher in 1990, after the parties agreed to a consent custody order. At the time of the order, Mr. Atkinson had remarried and has two step-children who reside with him and his second wife. Mrs. Sprester married Gary Lee Sprester in 1989 and the couple has a son. Mrs. Sprester is not employed and cares for her son at home. She has no physical condition to prevent her from working. Mr. Atkinson seeks support from Mrs. Sprester. Based on the facts, the hearing Officer determined that Mrs. Sprester was unable to work because she desired to remain with her young child and had established no earning capacity. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer entered a “zero” support order. Mr. Atkinson sought trial court review and a de novo hearing was held. The trial court denied relief and entered an order stating that the “zero” support order was to remain in full force and effect. This appeal followed.
When reviewing an order of support, this court will not reverse the decision of the trial court absent an abuse of discretion. Machen v. Machen, 278 Pa.Super. 135, 420 A.2d 466 (1980). It is also well established that both parents are equally responsible to support their children. DeMasi v. DeMasi, 366 Pa.Super. 19, 530 A.2d 871 (1987). In determining a parent’s ability to provide support, the focus is on earning capacity rather than on the parent’s actual earnings. Akers v. Akers, 373 Pa.Super. 1, 540 A.2d 269 (1988). Among the factors to be considered in evaluating a parent’s support *151obligation are the parent’s income, potential earning power, and the nature and extent of property and financial resources. Commonwealth ex rel. ReDavid v. ReDavid, 251 Pa.Super. 103, 380 A.2d 398 (1977). The trial court must also consider, however, that a parent may not be penalized for having remained in the home for the purpose of nurturing young children instead of securing work outside of the home. Rock v. Rock, 385 Pa.Super. 126, 560 A.2d 199 (1989). This exception, which held that earning capacity cannot always be imputed to the “nurturing parent” who chooses to stay home with a minor child, was first pronounced in Commonwealth ex rel. Wasiolek v. Wasiolek, 251 Pa.Super. 108, 380 A.2d 400 (1977). In Wasiolek we held that earning capacity cannot always be attributed to a parent who chooses to stay home with a minor child, and that in deciding whether to excuse the nurturing parent from any support obligation for that child, the trial court is to consider the child’s age and maturity, the availability of others to assist the parent, the adequacy of available financial resources if the parent remains at home, and the parent’s desire to stay at home and nurture the child. Hesidenz v. Carbin, 354 Pa.Super. 610, 616, 512 A.2d 707, 710 (1986).
We did not establish an absolute rule in Wasiolek, however, that an earning capacity cannot be imputed to a nurturing parent who chooses to stay at home rather than work outside of the home. Rather, we held that the nurturing parent’s perception that the welfare of the child is served by having a parent at home is not dispositive, but is merely one factor to be considered by the trial court in making its determination whether to excuse the parent from contributing support. See Bender v. Bender, 297 Pa.Super. 461, 444 A.2d 124 (1982). In Bender, we held that the fact that the “nurtured” child was not the subject of the support order nor the child of the father could be considered by the trial court, but did not necessarily remove the case from Wasiolek’s “nurturing parent” exception. Bender at 467, 444 A.2d at 126. However, we did not exempt the “nurturing parent” from possible support obli*152gations particularly where the “nurtured” child is not the subject of the support order.
In the instant case, the trial court concluded that Mrs. Sprester had not established an earning capacity because she chose to remain at home to care for her young child. Unfortunately, this conclusion ignores the economic reality that exists in her present family situation. While her remaining at home may prevent her from engaging in paid employment, it is of economic value to her present family unit. A determination of that value should have been made by the trial court. The fact that the Sprester family is being spared the expense of having to pay for child care is relevant in determining Mrs. Sprester’s earning capacity. A portion of that value should inure to the benefit of the child who is not in her custody. Therefore, the value of Mrs. Sprester’s nurturing parent services to her family unit should have been considered by the trial court in determining he¡r support obligation. A non-custodial parent should not escápe child support solely because a new family unit is established and additional children require care. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the general support law of this Commonwealth which requires parents to support their children from prior relationships. I seriously doubt that the Majority would .allow a father, who remarries and starts a new family, to remain at home with his children and claim the nurturing parent exception to avoid supporting children from a prior marriage.
Contrary to the position expressed by the Majority, requiring all parents to be responsible financially for their children is not “another destructive step in a culture which appears bent on destroying family stability.” Rather, it is a realistic attempt to insure that both parents have a responsibility to their children. Being a parent is a demanding vocation that requires personal and financial sacrifice. By choosing not to allow a parent to escape child support obligations because of the existence of a new family we are recognizing the needs of children to the love, support, and sacrifice of both parents.
I believe that courts must look beyond a nurturing parent claim, particularly where the nurtured child is not the one for *153whom support is sought, to determine a parties support obligation. In arriving at this determination, courts should consider the financial condition of the family, the nurturing needs being met, the ability of the obligor parent to engage in employment, the economic value of the nurturing parent’s service to the family unit, and any other factors that may enhance this determination.
Therefore, I dissent.