Court Opinion

ID: 9670887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:27:48.368635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:07.054960
License: Public Domain

SIMONETT, Justice
(dissenting).
I do not think that the plaintiff Peter-sons' inquiry about whether to make a claim is a claim, and to say that it is can only introduce mischief into probate practice.
When, in response to the Petersons’ inquiry, the personal representative’s attorney assured the Petersons that it was not necessary to file any claim, the personal representative was thereby estopped from subsequently asserting that the filing of a claim was necessary. Particularly should estoppel apply here when, contrary to the representations made, the personal representative, without advising the Petersons, abandoned the contract for deed and omitted it from the estate’s inventoried assets. The problem is that during the entire 5 years the estate was open, the Petersons made no effort to file a claim, even after all three annual payments under the contract for deed went unpaid and even though the estate’s attorney advised them, after the first annual defaulted payment, to get an attorney. Eventually, plaintiffs did retain counsel and started this lawsuit some 5 months before the probate was closed. Even though plaintiffs did not plead fraud or estoppel, these issues were litigated. The trial court concluded there was no fraud and also concluded that even though plaintiffs might have been initially misled by the initial representations, subsequent events put them on timely enough notice to file a claim, which, however, they did not do. I cannot say that these findings of the trial court are clearly erroneous.
The Petersons did not sue the personal representative nor otherwise elect to proceed in probate court, but instead sued Jeannine (Lehman) Rinde in her individual capacity, apparently pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 524.3-1004 (1982), which provides that “[a]fter assets of an estate have been distributed * * * an undischarged claim not barred may be prosecuted in a proceeding against one or more distributees.” Ordinarily, whether a claim in probate was duly made and whether it should be deemed allowed or disallowed would seem to be questions that come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court, but as this case was tried there were also other issues of fraud, breach of contract and estoppel, all of which were pertinent to the issue of whether plaintiffs had an “undischarged claim.” Moreover, the legislature has provided by law for a cause of action for an undischarged claim against a distributee in a separate court action, and, in my opinion, the district court has jurisdiction in this kind of proceeding to decide all issues.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. I would reverse and affirm the trial court.