Court Opinion

ID: 9568923
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:08:43.17992+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:16:07.267195
License: Public Domain

Benton, J.,
dissenting.
The Circuit Court of Tazewell County had no authority to reinstate on its docket the case that had been transferred to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court. The order reinstating the case on the circuit court’s docket occurred five months after the circuit judge transferred by final decree enforcement of all matters pertaining to custody and visitation to the juvenile court. That reinstatement order violated Rule 1:1 and lacks any statutory foundation.
The circuit court entered the divorce decree in 1991. By the terms of the decree, the mother was granted custody of the two children and was awarded $400 per month as child support. The father was granted visitation as specified in the decree. The decree also transferred jurisdiction over “all matters . . . pertaining to child support, visitation rights [, and] custody ... to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of appropriate jurisdiction, for enforcement or modification or revision thereof as the circumstances may require, as provided by [Code §] 20-79.”
Five months after entry of the decree, the Tazewell County juvenile court transferred the case to the Chesterfield County juvenile court, the jurisdiction where the mother and the children then resided. The mother filed a motion in the Chesterfield County juvenile court for an increase in child support. Several days later, the father filed a motion to reinstate the case on the docket of the circuit court. After a hearing, the judge of the circuit court reinstated the case on the docket and changed the visitation schedule that was specified in the decree.
The majority’s opinion holds that a transfer of a case to the juvenile court after entry of a final decree pursuant to Code § 20-79(c) “conveys concurrent jurisdiction” to allow either the circuit court or the juvenile court to act upon the transferred matter. That holding reads into the statute an added jurisdictional element where none exists. In pertinent part, Code § 20-79(c) states:
After the entry of a decree of divorce a vinculo matrimonii the court may transfer to the juvenile and domestic relations district *90court any other matters pertaining to support and maintenance for the spouse, maintenance support, care and custody of the child or children on motion by either party, and may so transfer such matters before the entry of such decree on motion joined in by both parties. In the transfer of any matters referred to herein, the court may, upon the motion of any party, or on its own motion, and for good cause shown, transfer any matters covered by said decree or decrees to any juvenile and domestic relations district court within the Commonwealth that constitutes a more appropriate forum. An appeal of an order by such juvenile and domestic relations district court which is to enforce or modify the decree in the divorce suit shall be as provided in § 16.1-296.
Nothing in Code § 20-79 creates concurrent jurisdiction in the circuit court after the transfer.
The statutes that delineate the jurisdiction of the circuit court and the juvenile court are quite clear and unambiguous. When the legislature has intended to convey concurrent jurisdiction, it has clearly stated its intention. See Code § 16.1-244. Indeed, in interpreting Code § 16.1-244, this Court has held that circuit courts and juvenile courts have concurrent jurisdiction over “custody, guardianship, visitation or support of children” when such an issue is incidental to the determination of causes pending in such courts. See Peple v. Peple, 5 Va. App. 414, 418, 364 S.E.2d 232, 235 (1988). After the circuit court entered the final decree and transferred this case to juvenile court, no cause remained pending in the circuit court.
Although a circuit court generally has continuing jurisdiction under Code § 20-108 to change or modify its decree as to matters affecting minor children, the Tazewell County circuit court divested itself of the right to do so by transferring those matters to the juvenile court pursuant to Code § 20-79(c). By its explicit terms, Code § 20-79 provides the bases upon which the circuit court transferred to the juvenile court for enforcement, modification, or revision “all matters ... pertaining to child support, visitation rights, [and] custody of the minor children.” The statute also references the appeal procedure by which the case could be returned to the circuit court. Only through exercise of the appeal procedure could the case be “reinstated” in the circuit court. Thus, when the father sought relief in the circuit court, he was attempting to circumvent the final decree and the statutory framework for relief.
*91The husband pled no statutory or case law authority for the reinstatement of the case in the circuit court. In granting the motion, the circuit judge likewise cited no authority. I find no authority to support the circuit judge’s order reinstating the case on the circuit court’s docket.
The majority’s decision allowing the circuit court to reinstate on its docket any matter that it had by final order transferred to the juvenile court clearly violates Rule 1:1. Twenty-one days after entry of its order transferring the case to the juvenile court, the circuit court had no authority to entertain a motion to reinstate the case on its docket for enforcement and modification. See Rule 1:1. Neither the Rules of Court nor the statutory scheme confers discretionary authority to the circuit court to exercise continuing jurisdiction over matters that the circuit court had transferred to the juvenile court after entry of the final decree. Moreover, the majority opinion offers no authority for allowing the circuit judge to circumvent Rule 1:1.
Pursuant to the order transferring the case, the juvenile court was authorized to handle “all matters . . . pertaining to child support, visitation rights [, and] custody ... for enforcement or modification or revision thereof as the circumstances may require.” Those matters fall within the power, competence, and expertise of the juvenile court. Thus, complete relief could have been obtained in the juvenile court. In addition to being violative of the rules and statutes, the action of the circuit court reinstating the case on its docket was unnecessary and redundant. See Smith v. Smith, 4 Va. App. 148, 150, 354 S.E.2d 816, 817 (1987).
Moreover, Code § 20-79(c) contains a specific reference to Code § 16.1-296 as the mechanism for an appeal back to the circuit court from the juvenile court to which a decree has been transferred for enforcement or modification of the decree. Code § 16.1-296 provides both a right to appeal and a specific identification of the circuit court to which the appeal shall be taken. “In any case which has been referred or transferred from a circuit court to a juvenile court and an appeal is taken from an order or judgment of the juvenile court, the appeal shall be taken to the circuit court which had original jurisdiction of the case.” Code § 16.1-296. These statutes clearly provide that the husband’s procedural route back to the circuit court was by appeal from a final order of the juvenile court.
*92The majority’s holding permits the parties to circumvent final orders and shop for the forum that one party believes might be more favorable to his or her claim. When the circuit judge transferred jurisdiction to the juvenile court for the enforcement, modification, or revision of matters related to the children, the circuit judge implicitly made the determination at that time that the administration of the terms of the decree would be best served and efficiently monitored in the juvenile court. The majority’s decision, allowing a circuit judge to disregard his or her prior order, sanctions a result that is clearly not provided for by the statutory scheme or legislative intent. See Owens v. Commonwealth, 129 Va. 757, 760, 105 S.E. 531, 532 (1921). The majority’s decision does not advance the administration of justice.
Code § 20-79(c) allows the circuit court to take advantage of a variety of well recognized strengths of the juvenile court. As the majority recognizes, juvenile courts have the ability to expedite family matters. Juvenile courts also have the ability to provide a more informal setting for the resolution of family matters. In addition, the juvenile courts often have an expertise in the resolution of family disputes that may not be available in the more structured environment of a court of record. The circuit court’s ability to utilize the services of the juvenile court is not a limitation on the options available to the circuit court. Moreover, contrary to the views expressed in the majority opinion, it is not a foregone conclusion that “the issues [that these parties could not resolve between themselves] . . . ultimately [had to] be litigated in a court of record.” It is just as likely that the juvenile court could have resolved the dispute in a manner that was satisfactory to the parties.
The juvenile court does not serve a “needless” role in the resolution of family matters. Nothing about the circuit court makes it “the most appropriate forum to grant complete relief” in a family matter that has already been decided by final decree and can only be modified upon a showing of a change in circumstances. When the final decree of divorce was entered, the circuit judge transferred the case to the juvenile court and obviously concluded at that time that the transfer was appropriate. Once the transfer was made, the juvenile court was equally equipped to grant complete relief to the parties in the custody and visitation dispute and was the appropriate forum for enforcement, modification, and revision.
For these reasons, I dissent. I would hold that the circuit judge exceeded his power when he reinstated on his docket the case that had been transferred to the juvenile court more than twenty one days prior to the reinstatement order.