Court Opinion

ID: 9574122
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:02:33.499712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:07.585344
License: Public Domain

PETERSON, C. J.,
dissenting.
The core of the majority’s holding is this:
“The District cites no statutory or other relevant authority in support of its contention that it could prospectively adopt a policy granting a blanket exemption from disclosure to a class of persons, e.g., replacement teachers during a strike, before the District even received and evaluated individual requests for exemption.
“We hold that the information which Guard sought here is not exempt absent an individualized showing of justification for an exemption. The school district’s blanket policy, exempting public records from disclosure without an individualized showing, violates the Inspection of Public Records law, ORS 194.410 et seq, and is therefore unenforceable. Accordingly, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the District’s policy in part.” 310 Or at 40. (Footnote omitted.)
Not much analysis here. But more to the point, the conclusion is error.
There are three exemption statutes, ORS 192.496, 192.501 and 192.502. They are replete with instances in which the legislature has made certain records exempt. In most cases, the exempt records are described by the class of records involved. Other categories of exempt records are made so *43because of the class of persons involved. See, for example, these exemptions:
— Names and addresses of employees who sign authorization cards or petitions for the purpose of requesting representation or decertification elections. ORS 192.501(7);
— Circulation records of a public library showing use of specific library materials by named persons. ORS 192.501(10);
— Employee and retiree address, telephone number and other nonfinancial membership records and employee financial records maintained by the Public Employes’ Retirement System. ORS 192.502(11).
There are other exemptions that have the same effect, even though the statutes are worded differently. See, for example:
— Information about the physical or mental health or treatment of a person. ORS 192.496(1);
— Trade secrets. ORS 192.501(2);
— Information relating to the appraisal of real estate prior to its acquisition. ORS 192.501(6).
Clearly, there is no legislative policy against exempting some public records that describe a class of persons. The legislature cannot have anticipated every category of record that might be exempt from disclosure. It therefore granted public bodies flexible authority to make such decisions within the limitations of the applicable statute, in this case, ORS 192.502(2).
It is permissible for an agency, under ORS 192.502(2), to create a class of exempt records, based upon personal characteristics of a group of persons. The agency need not wait for an individual to request exemption of those records pertaining to him, her, or it.
On April 8, 1987, a teachers’ strike began in Lane County School District No. 4J. The schools were closed during the ensuing three weeks. During this time, the district considered whether to hire replacement teachers, and ultimately hired 19 replacement coaches (and about 400 replacement teachers). Potential applicants were advised that the personal *44data that they submitted would be kept confidential. All 14 replacement coaches who testified stated that they believed that their names and addresses would be kept confidential.
The district’s concern for confidentiality was based upon events that occurred during a 1979 teachers’ strike. During that strike, replacements were telephoned at all hours of the day and night. The district had difficulty contacting replacement teachers because they were afraid to pick up their phones for fear of being abused by regular staff. There were 11 incidents involving slashed tires, dents and scratches in the replacement teachers’ vehicles.
The record shows that during the 1987 strike, Eugene Education Association newsletters listed by name the substitute teachers working as replacements. Union members were given a script and asked to call replacement teachers at home, telling them not to work and that there would be negative results from working as a replacement. Some replacements were called in the middle of the night. Others were threatened with bodily harm.
The District’s policy is authorized by ORS 192.502(2). I do not read ORS 192.502(2) to require exemption only “on an individual, case-by-case, basis.” 310 Or at 39. If an agency policy meets the requirements of the statute, it is permissible, even if the exemption is articulated in terms of the persons whose records will be exempt.
The statute itself does not require such an individualized approach. The statute simply authorizes an agency to exempt records from disclosure if the requirements of the statute are met. Those requirements are twofold:
1. The information must be “of a personal nature.”
2. “Public disclosure thereof would constitute an unreasonable invasion of privacy.”
The agency’s action in this case clearly complied with the requirements of the statute.
The first sentence of ORS 192.502(2) states that even if the information is personal and disclosure would constitute an unreasonable invasion of privacy, the records can be released upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that disclosure is required in the public interest “in the particular *45instance.” The words “in the particular instance” must refer to the instance of the application of the person seeking disclosure, not to the request of an individual whose records are involved that those records be exempt from disclosure.
True, Jordan v. MVD, 308 Or 433, 781 P2d 1203 (1989), contains some language that supports the majority:
“The first mention, in the first sentence of ORS 192.502(2), requires that the individual whose information of a personal nature is a part of the public record must show to the agency that disclosure would constitute an unreasonable invasion of privacy in order to claim entitlement to this statutory exemption.” 308 Or at 443 n 9.
That statement was made in the context of the facts of that case. There, the individual whose address was sought to be obtained from the agency, previously had written the agency asking that such information be kept confidential. The agency granted the exemption. That happens to be a fact involved in the Jordan case. The Jordan language cannot be converted to a holding that the public records law forbids an agency from exempting records based upon identifiable characteristics of a class of persons in the agency records.
Suppose that, for licensing purposes, the Motor Vehicles Division needed to know whether a licensee had AIDS or syphilis or gonorrhea. I have no doubt that the agency, without requiring an individual request from each licensee that that information be kept confidential, could exempt such records because (1) they contain “information of a personal nature” and (2) because public disclosure thereof would constitute an unreasonable invasion of privacy.
Societal needs are not unchanging. In enacting statutes like ORS 192.502(2), the legislature must have had in mind situations such as the case at bar. Granting such authority to a public body is consistent with the purpose of the public records law.
I therefore dissent.