Court Opinion

ID: 9590417
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:54:43.087706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:46.416232
License: Public Domain

Bell, Judge
(concurring):
In my opinion, the judgment should be reversed.
Charleston Television commenced this proceeding pursuant to Section 1-23-150, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976, challenging the validity of Regulation 19-445-2120, which governs the leasing on non-State-owned real property by State agencies. In essence, Charleston Television claims the Regulation is invalid because it does not provide, as required by statute, any procedures for competitive bidding on State leases in those cases where competitive bidding is feasible.
In its declaratory order, the Budget and Control Board found that prior to the submission of lease proposals in this case, the Division of General Services determined that competitive bidding was not feasible. This finding was not disturbed by the circuit court and no exception was taken to it by cross appeal to this Court. Thus, the case comes to us as one in which competitive bidding is not feasible.
Section l-23-150(a) permits “any person” to petition a State agency for a declaratory ruling challenging the authority of the agency to promulgate a particular regulation. After seeking administrative review before the agency, “any person affected by” the provisions of the regulation may seek judicial review in the circuit court. Section l-23-150(b). The text of subsection (b) makes it clear that the right to seek judicial review is more restricted than the right to seek administrative review. Any person may seek to have the agency reconsider its regulation; but only a person who is adversely affected by the regulation may challenge it in court.
*460Since competitive bidding on the contested lease was not feasible, it made no difference in this case whether the Board had a regulation for competitive bidding or not. Had such a regulation existed, it would have given Charleston Television no legal right or privilege to competitive bidding on the lease, since it would not have applied in this case. Conversely, no interest of Charleston Television in procuring the contested lease has been affected by the failure of the Board to promulgate procedures for competitive bidding for those cases where such bidding is feasible. In other words, on the facts presented, Charleston Television is not a “person affected by” the challenged regulation, as required by subsection (b). For this reason, I would hold it has no standing under Section 1-23-150 to challenge the regulation in court. Cfi, Anders v. South Carolina Parole and Community Corrections Board, 279 S. C. 206, 305 S. E. (2d) 229 (1983) (where plaintiff lacks standing, court does not have subject matter jurisdiction).
The wisdom of restricting the right of judicial review of regulations to those persons actually affected by them is demonstrated in this case. If the statute imposed no restriction on judicial review, any person could come in from the street and, by persuading the court that the Board should have promulgated regulations for competitive bidding, invalidate all existing State leases of real estate. Even in today’s atmosphere of relaxed rules of standing, such drastic power should not be afforded to one who has no direct interest affected by the regulation.
I conclude with a final observation. The opinions of my brethren contain lengthy discussions about the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies under Section 1-23-126, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976. Since Charleston Television did not proceed under that statute, it seems to me unnecessary to reach the issue at all.