Court Opinion

ID: 9483312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:16:42.731721+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:32.852851
License: Public Domain

D.W. NELSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Jose Flores Martinez was arrested by state authorities on March 11, 1990, and was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm. Although Martinez does not speak English, he managed to request counsel at his arraignment in state court. Martinez was never provided with counsel, however. Instead, he remained in jail on the state charge. Even though that charge was dropped in April 1990, Martinez remained in state custody until September 6 because his possession of a firearm violated a condition of his parole. On September 6, the day Martinez was scheduled to be released from jail on the parole violation, he was instead handed over directly to federal officers, who charged him with the same crime — being a felon in possession of a firearm — on the basis of the same arrest. Martinez was interrogated by those officers while in federal custody, and he confessed.
The district court suppressed the confession, holding that “once he’s requested a lawyer, the fact that he did not get one after he requested it and spent that long a time in jail before he was then turned over to the federal authorities precludes the use of a confession.” The majority reverses the district court.
In Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 1411, 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986), the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s invocation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel precludes further attempts to question the defendant about the same offense. In McNeil v. Wisconsin, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 2207, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991), however, the Court cautioned that invocation of Sixth Amendment rights regarding one offense did not preclude the government from questioning the defendant about an unrelated offense.
In a recent decision interpreting these two cases, we held that Jackson controls— and the confession must be suppressed— “when the pending charge is so inextricably intertwined with the charge under investigation that the right to counsel for the pending charge cannot constitutionally be isolated from the right to counsel for the uncharged offense.” United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 257 (9th Cir.1992). The majority and I are in agreement that the charges in this case were “inextricably intertwined.” The majority concludes, however, that Hines cannot apply in this case because the state charges were dismissed before Martinez was questioned by federal officials. Although I share the majority’s reluctance to extend the protections of Jackson “indefinitely into the future after the initial charge is dismissed,” I have no problem applying Jackson and Hines in the circumstances of this case.
Although Martinez requested an attorney to help him defend against the charge, one was never provided. When the state charges against him were dropped, Martinez was not released from jail. Instead, Martinez was transferred directly from state custody into federal custody. Indeed, he was held in custody for the weapons charge continuously from the time of his arrest through the time he was questioned by federal officials. The alleged federal crime for which he was questioned was the same crime for which he had been arrested and for which he had been held in jail for six months.
From Martinez’ perspective, then, he was arrested, requested but never received counsel, was held in jail for several months, and then was questioned about the crime. *1107It is unreasonable to expect Martinez, who does not speak English and who — in spite of his request — has been denied the assistance of counsel, to understand that he is now facing a different (albeit “inextricably intertwined”) prosecution by a different sovereign, and that he must reiterate his request for counsel or he will forfeit it. Because of this, and because Martinez was in continuous custody for the weapons violation from the time of his arrest through his questioning by federal officials, I agree with the district court that his confession must be suppressed under Jackson. I therefore dissent.