Court Opinion

ID: 9390875
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Date Created: 2023-04-28 20:00:49.263561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:37.886136
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                                File Name: 23a0202n.06

                                         Case No. 22-1084

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT                                  FILED
                                                                                  Apr 28, 2023
                                                 )                           DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
 RASON ANGELO HORTON,
                                                 )
        Petitioner - Appellant,                  )
                                                 )     ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
 v.                                              )     STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
                                                 )     EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
 WILLIS CHAPMAN, Acting Warden,                  )
        Respondent - Appellee.                   )                                       OPINION
                                                 )
                                                 )

Before: GIBBONS, THAPAR, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.

       JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge.               In the aftermath of two robberies, law

enforcement officers quickly focused on Rason Horton as a suspect. After Horton was arrested,

two detectives went to question Horton in jail. During that questioning, Horton made several

references to an attorney, but the detectives did not interpret the comments as a request to consult

an attorney and continued the interrogation. Horton’s statements were admitted at trial, and he

was convicted. Now, Horton seeks relief from his state court conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254,

arguing that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated during the police questioning. The district

court denied Horton’s petition, agreeing with the state court that Horton’s references to an attorney

were vague or only limited invocations of his right to counsel. Horton appeals. Because we agree

that the state court decision was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law, we affirm.
No. 22-1084, Horton v. Chapman

                                                  I.

       On the morning of September 3, 2004, a robbery occurred at a gas station in Ann Arbor,

Michigan. The robber took cash from the register and then demanded the keys to the store clerk’s

car. The clerk refused to hand over his keys and fled on foot. The robber pursued and ultimately

shot and killed the clerk. After shooting the clerk, the robber noticed the presence of several

witnesses at the scene, became agitated, and pointed the gun at various cars before firing into one

of their windshields. He then took the clerk’s keys from his pocket and drove away in the clerk’s

car.

       Within an hour, a second robbery occurred at a gas station in Detroit. There, a man forced

two cashiers to carry the store’s safe out to his car and then left without further incident.

       On September 20, 2004, authorities in New Mexico arrested Rason Horton.                  Law

enforcement believed that Horton was responsible for both Michigan robberies and had taken a

Greyhound bus from Detroit to New Mexico the night of the robberies. They also believed that

Horton had asked another person to burn the store clerk’s car, which had been found, damaged but

identifiable, in Detroit shortly after the second robbery.

       Detectives David Monroe and Greg Jones of the Ann Arbor Police Department flew to

New Mexico to interview Horton the next day. At the outset of the interview, Monroe told Horton

that he had spoken with Horton’s sister and that she told the detectives that Horton “had taken

responsibility for a robbery that happened at the Marathon gas station in Detroit.” DE 27-5, Evid.

Hr’g Tr., Page ID 449. Monroe also explained that his understanding was that Horton had also

“indicated [that] he had not harmed anyone in Ann Arbor.” Id. The detectives told Horton that

they wanted to get his side of the story.

                                                 -2-
No. 22-1084, Horton v. Chapman

       The parties dispute what happened next. Both parties appear to acknowledge that Horton

admitted to committing the Detroit robbery. At the state court evidentiary hearing, Monroe

testified that he then stopped Horton from continuing and advised him of his Miranda rights.

Monroe also testified that Horton said that he understood his rights and that he wanted to talk with

the detectives. Horton, in contrast, testified that he was not advised of his Miranda rights until

twenty to twenty-five minutes into the interview and that he asked for an attorney before he was

advised of his rights but that the detectives did not acknowledge his request.

       Both sides agree, however, that the interview continued. The detectives asked Horton if

money had been his motivation, not specifying either robbery, and Horton stated that he had not

murdered anyone. Horton commented that he was concerned about spending the rest of his life in

prison, apparently referencing the Detroit robbery. Horton then told the detectives that he had

spoken to his sister the previous day and that “she was trying to find a good attorney for him.” DE

27-5, Evid. Hr’g Tr., Page ID 451. The detectives did not follow up on this comment, and the

questioning continued.

       After covering other topics, Horton again insisted that he had not harmed anyone in Ann

Arbor and that “there was no way he should be convicted of that murder because it was something

that he had not done.” Id. Monroe asked Horton who had committed the murder, and Horton

indicated that “he did not want to give . . . that information without—until he had spoke [sic] to

his attorney.” Id. Monroe changed the subject, asking Horton about driving to Detroit after the

Ann Arbor robbery and about the car that Horton was using at the time. In response to Monroe

asking about the car being burned, Horton claimed that he only knew that the car had been burned

because his sister told him. When Monroe pressed Horton about how he had gotten the car, Horton

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No. 22-1084, Horton v. Chapman

responded that “he didn’t want to tell [the officers] that until he had a lawyer present or an attorney

present.” Id. at 452. Monroe again changed the topic but continued questioning Horton.

       In an apparent effort to clarify Horton’s story as to the Ann Arbor robbery, Monroe asked

Horton if he was claiming that “he had been at the gas station in Ann Arbor but had not harmed or

killed anyone.” Id. at 453–54. Horton responded by stating that he had been present at the Ann

Arbor gas station but “for a completely different reason” and that a lot of things had happened in

a short time frame. Id. at 452–53. Horton repeated his claim that he had not killed anyone. Horton

told the detectives that he was not the only person in the gas station during the robbery and that

“two other people in addition to the clerk” were there. Id. at 454.

       At one point, Horton told Monroe and Jones that he had not planned on talking to them and

instead had planned on simply staring at them during the interview. He also commented that “if

he had an attorney there the attorney would tell him not to talk.” Id. Monroe testified that Horton

then commented, “but I like you guys.” Id. Horton told the detectives that he would tell them

everything if they got him a cigarette. The facility would not allow smoking, however, so the

detectives promised to get him a cigarette later that day if he continued to answer their questions.

Horton agreed, and the interview continued.

       In continued discussion about the Ann Arbor robbery, Horton persisted in his claim that

another person, his “homie,” was responsible. Id. at 455. Although he acknowledged that he was

at the gas station and had planned to participate, Horton claimed that he had taken the clerk’s car

keys off the counter at the beginning of the robbery and then went to sit in the clerk’s car. Horton

claimed that he was sitting in the car when he saw his homie chasing the clerk and that he did not

see the shooting itself but later saw the clerk’s body on the street.

                                                 -4-
No. 22-1084, Horton v. Chapman

       Soon thereafter, Horton again asked about having a cigarette, and the detectives reiterated

their promise that he could smoke later that day if he would continue speaking with them. After

approximately five more minutes of questioning, Horton told the detectives, “that’s enough

questions for now.” Id. at 457. The detectives told Horton that they would take a break for lunch

and that the detectives would find a place for him to smoke.

       Around three and a half hours later, Monroe and Jones drove Horton to another facility

where he could smoke and resumed the interview. The detectives did not read Horton’s Miranda

rights to him again at the start of the second session. Horton spoke first, asking “where did we

leave off?” Id. at 458. After some discussion of the Ann Arbor robbery, Horton proposed a trade

wherein he would reveal his homie’s identity if the detectives made a sentence agreement with

him. The detectives told Horton that they could not make any promises or guarantees.

       According to Monroe’s state court testimony, Horton brought up a lawyer three other times

that day. At one point, Horton commented to the detectives that “a very good lawyer can beat

this” and that the lawyer “would know loopholes and that he would know the ins and outs.” Id. at

460. When discussing his family, Horton told the detectives that he wanted to get his sister out of

her neighborhood and that “he wanted to talk, talk to his attorney about specifics.” Id. Finally,

when the detectives pointed out several inconsistencies in Horton’s story, Horton remarked that

“he’d have to see what an attorney could simmer up” regarding his explanation. Id. at 461.

       The second portion of Horton’s interview ended after approximately three hours. After it

concluded, the detectives returned Horton to his facility, where he told them that “this was

bothering him” but that “he felt better.” Id. at 463.

       Horton was charged in Michigan state court with felony murder, armed robbery,

carjacking, being a felon in possession of a firearm, possession of a firearm during commission of

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No. 22-1084, Horton v. Chapman

a felony, and two counts of assault with intent to commit murder. Horton elected to go to trial.

Before trial, defense counsel moved to suppress the statements that Horton made to Monroe and

Jones during the New Mexico interview. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied

Horton’s motion, and the statements were admitted into evidence. The jury convicted Horton of

all charges except the assault charges. The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of life in

prison.1

         Horton appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals, claiming, among other things, that his

constitutional rights were violated when his statements were admitted into evidence.            The

Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. Horton sought leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme

Court on the same grounds, but his application was denied.2

         Horton then filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition in federal court, raising four grounds for

relief.3 At the same time, Horton moved to stay the federal proceedings so that he could exhaust

his state court remedies for three additional claims, and the district court granted his motion.

Horton then went back to state court, where he unsuccessfully pursued collateral relief for ten

years.

1
  Horton was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction, to be
followed by concurrent terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the murder
conviction, twenty-five to fifty years’ imprisonment for the armed robbery conviction, thirty-five
to 60 years’ imprisonment for the carjacking conviction, and three to seven-and-a-half years’
imprisonment for being a felon in possession of a firearm.
2
 In its denial, the Michigan Supreme Court stated only that it was “not persuaded that the questions
presented should be reviewed by [it.]” See People v. Horton, 731 N.W.2d 739, 739 (Mich. 2007).
3
  Horton’s four claimed grounds for relief were: (1) the trial court erred when it admitted evidence
of his custodial admission to the police because his admissions were taken in violation of his right
to remain silent and his right to counsel; (2) his statements to the police were involuntary; (3) the
trial court erroneously allowed the prosecution to admit evidence of another “bad act,” and (4) the
trial court should have ordered a mistrial sua sponte after items that had not be admitted into
evidence were given to the jury.
                                                -6-
No. 22-1084, Horton v. Chapman

          Horton returned to federal court in August 2018, filing a motion to lift the stay and an

amended habeas petition that added an additional claimed ground for relief.4 The district court

granted the motion to lift the stay and re-opened the case. After briefing from both parties, the

district court denied Horton’s habeas petition but granted a certificate of appealability on his claim

that his statements were admitted into evidence in violation of his constitutional rights. Horton

timely appealed.5

                                                    II.

          This court reviews a district court’s dismissal of a § 2254(d) petition de novo and its factual

findings for clear error. Lovins v. Parker, 712 F.3d 283, 293 (6th Cir. 2013). Under § 2254(d),

the district court “shall not [ ] grant[ ] [a habeas petition] with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court . . .; or (2) resulted in a decision that

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

          When the state court denies a petitioner’s federal claim, “it may be presumed that the state

court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural

principles to the contrary.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). This presumption may

be overcome “[w]hen the evidence leads very clearly to the conclusion that a federal claim was

inadvertently overlooked in state court.” Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 303 (2013). If the

4
    Horton added an actual innocence claim.
5
    Horton also moved to expand the certificate of appealability, but that motion was denied.
                                                   -7-
No. 22-1084, Horton v. Chapman

state court did not adjudicate a petitioner’s claim on the merits, this court reviews the claim de

novo. Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009).

       Section 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”), is a “purposefully demanding standard,” Montgomery v. Bobby, 654 F.3d 668, 676

(6th Cir. 2011) (en banc), and it requires that state court determinations “be given the benefit of

the doubt,” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (quoting Woodford v. Visciotti, 537

U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)).

       Here, Horton invokes both §§ 2254(d)(1) and 2254(d)(2), arguing that the Michigan Court

of Appeals’ decision was contrary to Supreme Court precedent, unreasonably applied Supreme

Court precedent, and constituted an unreasonable determination of the facts.

       In Horton’s view, the statements that he made to Monroe and Jones occurred after he

invoked his right to counsel, so their admission into evidence violated his Fifth Amendment6

rights. Horton argues that the state court misapplied clearly established federal law by “appl[ying]

an unduly strict standard of whether statements requesting counsel applied to the specific questions

that later incriminated Horton.” CA6 R. 13, Appellant Br., at 23–24. In contrast, the state argues

that Horton never unequivocally requested to cease all questioning until he consulted an attorney.

Instead, Horton told the detectives only that he would not answer specific questions without an

attorney, which constituted only a limited invocation of the right to counsel. The state argues that

the state court therefore properly applied clearly established federal law, and that Horton should

be denied relief.

6
  Horton also appears to claim that the admission of his statements violated his Sixth Amendment
rights, but he did not brief the issue and therefore forfeited it. See Peters Broad. Eng’g, Inc. v. 24
Cap., LLC, 40 F.4th 432, 443 n.6 (6th Cir. 2022).
                                                -8-
No. 22-1084, Horton v. Chapman

                                                III.

       The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no person “shall be

compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”7 U.S. Const. amend. V. In

Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that the right against self-incrimination extends

beyond formal legal proceedings to reach even “informal compulsion . . . during in-custody

questioning.” 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966). Thus, Miranda requires that suspects undergoing

custodial interrogation be informed of their right to remain silent and to have an attorney present

during questioning. Id. at 478–79.

       Once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, interrogation can resume only after “counsel

has been made available . . . unless the accused himself initiates further communication,

exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981).

This rule is “designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously

asserted Miranda rights.” Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990).

       To determine whether the Edwards rule applies, an accused person must have “actually

invoked his right to counsel.” Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 (1994) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted) (emphasis in original). This invocation must be “unambiguous[]”to

invoke the right and trigger the requirement that the police cease questioning. Id. at 459. Thus, a

suspect “must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable

police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.”

Id. An ambiguous or equivocal reference to counsel, however, “do[es] not require the cessation

of questioning.” Id.

7
 The Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
                                               -9-
No. 22-1084, Horton v. Chapman

       It is possible for a suspect to invoke his or her right to counsel selectively, that is, with

respect only to certain aspects of the questioning. In Michigan v. Mosley, a defendant refused to

answer questions about several robberies, after which a detective ceased interrogating him about

them, but the defendant later confessed to an unrelated homicide in a subsequent interrogation.

423 U.S. 96, 104–05 (1975). The Supreme Court held that the defendant’s assertion of his right

to counsel during the robbery interrogation selectively invoked the right and did not extend to the

homicide questioning. Id. at 105. Relatedly, in Connecticut v. Barrett, a suspect provided an oral

confession after saying that “he would not give the police any written statements [without counsel]

but had no problem in talking about the incident.” 479 U.S. 523, 525 (1987). The Court held that

the refusal to provide a written statement was a “limited invocation of the right to counsel” that

did not extend to an oral confession. Id. at 529–30.

                                               IV.

       Horton raised his Fifth Amendment arguments in state court, but the Michigan Court of

Appeals rejected Horton’s claim with the following reasoning:

       Defendant first argues he was denied his Fifth Amendment right against self-
       incrimination when the trial court admitted, over his objection, custodial
       admissions he made to the police. Defendant also argues that the trial court should
       have suppressed the statements as involuntarily made. We disagree with both
       contentions.
       A trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. People v. Medlyn, 215 Mich.
       App. 338, 340; 544 N.W.2d 759 (1996). A court’s ultimate decision regarding a
       motion to suppress is also reviewed de novo. People v. Davis, 250 Mich. App. 357,
       362; 649 N.W.2d 94 (2002). However, the trial court’s findings of fact following
       a suppression hearing will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous.
       People v. LoCicero, 453 Mich. 496, 500; 556 N.W.2d 498 (1996). Factual findings
       are clearly erroneous where, based on review of the whole record, there is a firm
       and definite conviction that the trial court made a mistake. People v. Burrell, 417
       Mich. 439, 449; 339 N.W.2d 403 (1983).
       The right against self-incrimination is a right guaranteed by both the United States
       and Michigan Constitutions. U.S. Const., Am. V; Const. 1963, art 1, § 17. “[A]
       suspect in police custody must be informed specifically of the suspect’s right to

                                              - 10 -
No. 22-1084, Horton v. Chapman

      remain silent and to have an attorney present before being questioned.” People v.
      Kowalski, 230 Mich. App. 464, 472; 584 N.W.2d 613 (1998). If a suspect requests
      an attorney, interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. Id. But where a
      defendant makes only an ambiguous or equivocal reference to an attorney,
      questioning may continue. People v. Granderson, 212 Mich. App. 673, 677-678;
      538 N.W.2d 471 (1995). And a limited request for counsel, such as a request for
      counsel for answering a specific question, does not limit police from continuing to
      interrogate a suspect on other topics. People v. Adams, 245 Mich. App. 226, 233-
      234; 627 N.W.2d 623 (2001).
      There were only two witnesses on this issue, and their testimony conflicted with
      each other. Defendant testified that he unequivocally invoked his right to counsel,
      and Detective Jones testified that defendant never made such a request. Clearly,
      the trial court found Jones’s testimony on this point credible and did not believe
      defendant’s claim to the contrary. Given the lack of other evidence to corroborate
      defendant’s claim, and the fact that the trial court is entitled to gauge credibility,
      there is nothing in the record to give this Court a firm and definite conviction that
      a mistake was made in the trial court's relevant factual findings. Therefore, the trial
      court's factual findings were not clearly erroneous and will not be disturbed.
      Burrell, supra at 449.
      Looking at the rest of the record, it is clear that defendant’s references to an attorney
      were either in passing, such as references about how a good attorney would get him
      off or would tell him not to answer questions and how his sister was going to get
      him an attorney, or they were limited to invocations of an attorney before defendant
      would answer specific questions. And when defendant indicated his refusal to
      answer a specific question without an attorney, the detectives ceased questioning
      defendant on that particular question, never bringing up that topic again unless
      defendant brought it up first. As indicated above, the police are allowed to continue
      questioning in such cases, so long as they avoid the topics for which defendant had
      invoked a limited right of counsel, Adams, supra at 233-234, and police may
      question defendant about a previously foreclosed subject where the defendant
      himself initiates it. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-485; 101 S Ct 1880; 68
      L.Ed.2d 378 (1981).
      Further, when detectives asked defendant if he was the shooter in the Ann Arbor
      robbery, this was not an improper broach of a subject defendant had requested an
      attorney for, because he claimed a third party had done the shooting and the
      question he specifically refused to answer sought the third party’s name, not
      whether he was the shooter. Thus, there was nothing improper about the continuing
      interrogation of defendant by police on issues other than those specific questions
      defendant said he would not answer without an attorney. Therefore, defendant's
      Fifth Amendment right was not violated and the trial court properly declined to
      suppress defendant's admissions to police on that basis.

                                               - 11 -
No. 22-1084, Horton v. Chapman

People v. Horton, No. 264604, 2007 WL 127825, at *1–2 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2007) (per

curiam).

                                                V.

       First, Horton argues that the Michigan Court of Appeals did not apply the correct legal

standard for evaluating his invocation of his right to counsel so its decision is therefore contrary

to clearly established federal law.

       A federal court may grant habeas relief under the “contrary to” clause of § 2254(d)(1) only

“if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a

set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000).

       According to Horton, the state court failed to apply the objective rule from Davis, 512 U.S.

at 459, that requires a suspect to unambiguously invoke his right to counsel. Horton claims that

the state court instead “applied an unduly strict standard of whether statements requesting counsel

applied to the specific questions that later incriminated Horton.” CA6 R. 13, Appellant Br., at 23–

24.

       The state court, however, identified and applied the correct legal standard. It first outlined

the relevant legal framework, explaining that unambiguous requests for counsel cut off questioning

but that equivocal statements do not trigger that requirement. Horton, 2007 WL 127825, at *1. It

also noted that suspects can make a limited request for counsel, which “does not limit police from

continuing to interrogate a suspect on other topics.” Id. The court then concluded that Horton’s

references to an attorney were in passing or were limited invocations. Id. at *2. Thus, the court

held that, because the detectives did not return unprompted to the topics for which Horton invoked

his right to counsel, Horton’s constitutional rights were not violated. Id. This analysis identified

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No. 22-1084, Horton v. Chapman

and applied the correct legal standard, and accordingly, the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision

was not contrary to clearly established federal law.

                                                VI.

       Second, Horton argues that the Michigan Court of Appeals unreasonably applied clearly

established federal law.

       A federal court may grant habeas relief under the “unreasonable application” clause of

§ 2254(d) “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme

Court’s] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the [petitioner’s] case.”

Williams, 529 U.S. at 365. “As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, [the

petitioner] must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was

so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing

law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103.

       Horton claims that the state court unreasonably applied Edwards and Smith v. Illinois,

469 U.S. 91 (1984) (per curiam), in which the Supreme Court held that the defendants’ Fifth

Amendment rights had been violated by continued questioning after they requested counsel.

       In Edwards, the accused was arrested and taken to the police station for interrogation.

451 U.S. at 478. After some initial questioning, Edwards sought to “make a deal.” Id. at 479.

After being given the phone number of the county attorney, ostensibly to negotiate a deal, Edwards

said, “I want an attorney before making a deal.” Id. The officers ceased their questioning and

returned Edwards to jail. Id. The officers, however, resumed questioning Edwards the next

morning, and during that interrogation, Edwards implicated himself in the crime. Id. The Supreme

Court held that the second interrogation of Edwards violated his Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at

484–85. The Court held “that an accused . . . having expressed his desire to deal with the police

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No. 22-1084, Horton v. Chapman

only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has

been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication,

exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Id. The Court further stated that “it is inconsistent

with Miranda and its progeny for the authorities, at their instance, to reinterrogate an accused in

custody if he has clearly asserted his right to counsel.” Id. at 485.

       In Smith, the accused was arrested and taken to an interrogation room for questioning.

469 U.S. at 92. When informed during the reading of his Miranda rights that he had a right to

consult a lawyer and to have a lawyer present during questioning, Smith responded, “[u]h yeah.

I’d like to do that.” Id. at 93. The officers, however, did not acknowledge this statement, read

him the rest of his Miranda rights, and proceeded to question Smith. Id. Smith ultimately made

incriminating statements in response to this questioning. Id. at 93–94. In rejecting Smith’s

challenge to the admission of these statements at trial, the state court determined that Smith’s

invocation of his right to counsel was ambiguous because he subsequently responded to continued

questioning. Id. at 97. The Supreme Court, however, held that “an accused’s postrequest

responses to further interrogation may not be used to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of the

initial request [for counsel] itself.” Id. at 100 (emphasis in original).

       Edwards considered whether an undisputedly unequivocal request for counsel prevents

further questioning. And Smith considered whether subsequent statements can be used to cast

doubt on an initial unambiguous invocation. Both holdings are irrelevant here. In Horton’s case

the question was whether Horton invoked his right to counsel at all—not whether further

questioning transpired after a clear invocation. The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that

Horton did not unequivocally invoke his right to counsel generally but instead made a limited

                                                 - 14 -
No. 22-1084, Horton v. Chapman

request for counsel, which prevented further questioning only on specific topics. Horton, 2007

WL 127825, at *2. This holding does not implicate Edwards and Smith.

       Further, the state court’s interpretation of Horton’s references to counsel did not lack

justification. The evidence before the state court showed that Horton referenced an attorney at

various points in his interview. Many of these references, however, simply noted that he might

need an attorney at some point. For example, Horton noted that his sister “was trying to find a

good attorney for him.” DE 27-5, Evid. Hr’g Tr., Page ID 451. Horton also commented that “if

he had an attorney there the attorney would tell him not to talk.” Id. at 454. Additionally, Horton

told the detectives that “a very good lawyer can beat this,” the lawyer “would know loopholes and

that he would know the ins and outs,” and that “he’d have to see what an attorney could simmer

up” regarding his inconsistent explanation for his involvement in the robberies. Id. at 460–61.

Even more obliquely, Horton mentioned that “he wanted to talk, talk to his attorney about

specifics” regarding moving his sister out of a problematic neighborhood. Id. at 460. These

comments did not unambiguously invoke Horton’s right to counsel during the interrogation.

       Two of Horton’s references to an attorney, however, were more specific. When asked the

identity of the Ann Arbor shooter, Horton said that “he did not want to give that information [ ]

without—until he had spoke [sic] to his attorney.” Id. at 473. And when Monroe pressed Horton

about how he had obtained the clerk’s car, Horton responded that “he didn’t want to tell that until

he had a lawyer present or an attorney present.” Id. at 452. The Michigan Court of Appeals

concluded that these were limited invocations of Horton’s right to counsel. Horton, 2007 WL

127825, at *2. Given the specificity of Horton’s comments—that he did not want to provide

specific pieces of information without first consulting an attorney—the state court’s view that these

were limited invocations was reasonable. Under AEDPA, the state court’s conclusion was not “so

                                               - 15 -
No. 22-1084, Horton v. Chapman

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103.

       Accordingly, the Michigan Court of Appeals decision did not reflect an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law.

                                                  VII.

       Horton alternatively requests that, if habeas relief is not warranted on the current record,

the case be remanded to the district court for an evidentiary hearing. Habeas review, however, is

“limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.”

Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). Because our

review “focuses on what a state court knew and did, . . . [i]t would be strange to ask federal courts

to analyze whether a state court’s adjudication resulted in a decision that unreasonably applied

federal law to facts not before the state court.” Id. at 182–83.

       Here, the state court record “precludes habeas relief under the limitations of § 2254(d),”

Id. at 183 (citing Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007)), so we will not remand for an

evidentiary hearing.

                                                  VIII.

       Accordingly, we deny Horton’s motion for an evidentiary hearing and affirm the district

court’s judgment.

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