Court Opinion

ID: 9849133
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:35:09.412548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:01.941791
License: Public Domain

LOUIS J. CECI, J.
(dissenting). I dissent. I find it most unfortunate that the majority fails to consider the constitutional responsibility attendant with the right of free speech as set forth in the Wisconsin Constitution.
The first amendment of the United States Constitution should not be used to protect outright false statements of the media nor should it eclipse state-granted protections against defamatory activity. The majority has obviously chosen to follow the U. S. Supreme Court's interpretations of the first amendment on defamation matters, rather than to look to the Wisconsin Constitution for guidance. Article 1, sec. 3 of our state constitution extends to every person the right to freely speak, write, and publish. It states:
"Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right, and no laws shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions or indictments for libel, the truth may be given in evidence, and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous be true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact." (Emphasis added.)
*123Thus, in Wisconsin "being responsible for the abuse of" the right of free speech fully coexists with the right itself.
I would not quarrel with the majority's unconsidered adoption of federal case law on defamation matters if the wording and impact of the applicable provisions of the U. S. Constitution and the Wisconsin Constitution were the same. But the Wisconsin Constitution includes a clause which establishes a responsibility for the abuse of free speech; the U. S. Constitution does not. The majority does not consider or address this responsibility in its opinion. Asserting over a newscast without verifying the truth of the statement that James R. Lewis is accused in a Tylenol extortion plan I perceive to be an abuse of Coursolle's right of free speech. Coursolle now should be held responsible for the abuse of its right.
The Wisconsin Constitution not only grants the right of free speech to the citizens of this state, it also protects these same citizens from an abuse of that right, including abusive and irresponsible reporting by the media. The majority's decision unfortunately fails to acknowledge the constitutional protections against defamation extended by the state's constitution to citizens of this state.
I also disagree with the majority's conclusion that James R. Lewis is a public figure for all purposes.
The majority outlines the tension of competing interests which attend media-defamation actions. The individual has an interest in protecting his good reputation; the public has a need for the press to operate in a free and uninhibited manner (majority opinion at 111-112). The majority, however, destroys this necessary balance by seemingly ignoring the individual's interest in protecting his reputation from defamatory statements.
Certainly the public has a right to receive information about public issues and about public figures "who are in a position significantly to influence the resolution of those issues." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). But Lewis was no longer in a position of significant influ*124ence at the time of the Tylenol broadcast; he had left the state legislature in 1979. The public's right to know— through the vehicle of an uninhibited press — is overshadowed by Lewis' right to protect his reputation. Even though the public might still be interested in and curious about Lewis' post-legislative activities, its right to know about such activities does not rise to the same level of legitimate interest which existed when Lewis was a member of the legislature. Therefore, the public's right to know should not be protected to the same extent it was protected when Lewis was a member of the legislature. That is, Lewis should not be required to show actual malice in the broadcasting of the Tylenol story merely because "there was a special public interest in information about Lewis. . . ." (Majority at 116.)
The majority notes that Lewis "does pot deny that he participated in highly controversial and newsworthy activities while in public office which had little or no relationship to his official duties —" (At 117.) I submit that many ex-legislators have engaged in controversial and newsworthy activities while in public office. What is newsworthy, however, often is determined by an editor who, through his editorial decisions, chooses what is important for public consumption. Merely being so chosen for mention in the media ought not to determine one's status for the purpose of the purpose of defamatory actions.
Because the majority does not consider the responsibilities attendant with the right of free speech as embodied in the Wisconsin Constitution and because I disagree with the majority's conclusion that Lewis is a public figure for all purposes, I respectfully dissent. I would reverse the trial court's decision in granting summary judgment for Coursolle.