Court Opinion

ID: 9654804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:51:39.67846+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:13.658358
License: Public Domain

*551DisseNtiNg Opinion
Mr. Justice McCanless.
I disagree.with, the majority of the Court and must dissent from their opinion. I do agree that Sections 20-235 to 20-340, inclusive, Tennessee Code Annotated, enacted as Chapter 67 of the Public Acts of 1965, are valid. As the majority opinion demonstrates, they themselves violate no rights guaranteed by the Constitutions of the United States and by the State of Tennessee. The question for our determination is whether the application of the statute constitutes a violation of any such rights under the facts of this suit. In my opinion it does not.
The defendant placed his order for the lumber with the complainant by long distance telephone. The complainant fabricated it at its plant in Chattanooga and delivered it to the defendant, through his representative, onto a truck that the defendant had sent to Chattanooga.
I am of opinion that the defendant thus had “the necessary minimum contacts” with the complainant in Tennessee to justify service of process on him through the Secretary of State under the provisions of Section 20-236, Tennessee Code Annotated, and my “sense of fair play” is not offended by my view that he be required to have his rights and obligations adjudicated in this cause pursuant to the service that was had on him under that section. My examination of the authorities cited in the majority opinion and of others that I have read persuade me that the r esult reached by the Chancellor and by the Court of Appeals was correct and that the majority opinion of this Court unduly restricts the application of the statute. I would affirm.