Court Opinion

ID: 9862930
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 02:30:20.757683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:38:37.945235
License: Public Domain

WILSON, Justice
(concurring).
I concur in the result only on the ground, somewhat questionable, that the court was *79justified in preserving the status quo pending final hearing. In my opinion use of the trade-name, “Penney’s Auto Center” in the Corpus Christi area under this record does not constitute unfair competition. It is with extreme reservation that I concur in a holding that its use should be temporarily restrained.
The words, “Auto Center” are generic and descriptive only. As said in Iowa Auto Market v. Auto Market & Exchange, 197 Iowa 420, 197 N.W. 321, the words “Auto Market” are no more distinctive than the words “shoe store” or “meat market.” It is held that the term, “Food Center” is generic and generally descriptive. It is not susceptible of monopolization as a trade-name, and “a court of equity is not justified in assuming as a matter of law that it has or is calculated to deceive the public, or that any confusion with reference to the identity of the two businesses exists to the prejudice of the plaintiff.” The claim that the words have acquired a secondary meaning, that an extensive advertising campaign by expenditure of large sums of money has made plaintiff’s business widely identified with the words, is not sufficient basis for equitable intervention. Food Center Supermarkets, Inc. v. Altiere, Sup., 123 N.Y.S.2d 260.
Such terms as “Bowling Center”, Furniture Center” and “Food Center” are only generic and descriptive, and “it is only the manner of their use by another that is considered and restrained. There must be confusion or deception with implicit representation that the goods of the later are those of the first user.” Houston v. Berde, 211 Minn. 528, 2 N.W.2d 9. In the latter case it was pointed out that even assuming the words “Food Center” have acquired a secondary meaning, associating them in the public mind with plaintiff’s business, if there is not shown confusion of the public or tendency to deception, injunction will not be granted. The case emphasizes the fact that defendant used his own name and the possessive “Berde’s” in connection with the words, “Food Center.”
The prerequisite showing of deceptive simulation in the use of generic words which are the common property of all persons, even where there is a claimed acquisition of secondary meaning, is stated in Alff v. Radam, 77 Tex. 530, 14 S.W. 164, 9 L.R.A. 145: “[if] such simulation was calculated to deceive ordinarily prudent persons, and did deceive such persons, the plaintiff would be entitled to protection against the consequences of such deception.”
In Pipe Linings, Inc. v. Inplace Linings, Inc., Tex.Civ.App., 349 S.W.2d 279, writ ref. n.r.e., it was shown that plaintiff had expended considerable time and money in promotion efforts, advertising the words “in place”. It was shown that the public had become familiar with “in place” in connection with its business and advertising. The court held: “In the absence of fraud, a name merely descriptive of the business carried on cannot be exclusively appropriated as against others who can and do use the name with equal truth, even if the words have acquired a secondary meaning.” See Goidl v. Advance Neckwear Co., 132 Tex. 308, 123 S.W.2d 865; Winter Garden District v. Winter Garden Fair, Tex.Civ.App., 299 S.W. 512, 514, writ dism.; Burge v. Dallas Retail Merchants Association, Tex.Civ.App., 257 S.W.2d 733; Duke v. Cleaver, 19 Tex.Civ.App. 218, 46 S.W. 1128, writ dism.; Dixiepig Corporation v. Pig Stand Co., Tex.Civ.App., 31 S.W.2d 325.
The evidence is undisputed in this case that appellant wants its customers to know they are trading with J-. C. Penney Company. Confusion with plaintiff’s business is a result contrary to appellant’s interests. In much of its advertising and most of its signs the name “Penney’s” is in the same size type as “Auto Center.” There is no evidence of fraudulent intent; there is no evidence of confusion of identity; there is no showing of probable deception. The only evidence offered establishes the contrary; the public is not confused, but recognizes the distinction in identity. The extent of the evidence is that applicant had used the words “auto center” for an extended peri*80od of time, and had expended money in advertising the trade-name.
Such unimaginative and generic terms as “Garden Center,” “Tire Center,” “T-V Center,” “Furniture Center,” “Sports Center,” “Appliance Center” and a host of others are so commonplace that a holding of exclusive appropriation is not to be lightly considered.