Court Opinion

ID: 9752970
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:48:09.470337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:26.728766
License: Public Domain

Duncan and Lampron, JJ.,
dissenting: At the hearing before the Master there was evidence that when the plaintiff received his first deed in 1925 there were two rights of way in the vicinity of the land conveyed to him, either of which answered the description of a “right of way to cross land of Watkins.” One of these passed along the *207west boundary of the plaintiff’s land, and w.as used to reach the Richardson land to the south. The other branched off from the first one before reaching the plaintiff’s land and entered it across its northerly boundary. This way was used by the plaintiff for many years before the defendants’ southwest corner was established and Watkins Avenue was laid out.
In these circumstances parol evidence was admissible to identify the way intended by the parties to the deed in 1925. French v. Hayes, 43 N. H. 30. “The meaning of the deed being doubtful, parol evidence of a competent character is admissible to show the meaning ... For such purpose evidence of acts and statements preliminary to the writing or in the course of negotiations . . . and of the conduct of the parties afterwards as a practical construction of the instrument ... is to be admitted.” Smart v. Huckins, 82 N. H. 342, 347. See also, Pettee v. Chapter, 86 N. H. 419, 431; Sanborn v. Keroack, 103 N. H. 297, 301.
The plaintiff offered to prove that Watkins told him when he was buying the land “that he would have a right to use this driveway [across the north boundary] to get into his property.” Upon objection the evidence was excluded subject to plaintiffs’ exception. In our opinion the evidence should have been received, and we would sustain the plaintiffs’ exception.