Court Opinion

ID: 9622301
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:15:19.519332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:51.858979
License: Public Domain

Sweeney, J.
(dissenting) — The chronology of events here is helpful:
March 8, 1993 Accident giving rise to the claim.
August 30, 1995 Kay and Norma Lybbert sue Grant County for negligence.
September 6, 1995 Lybberts attempt, unsuccessfully, to serve Grant County. RCW 4.28.080.
September 21, 1995 Attorney for Grant County appears.
October 23, 1995 Grant County serves requests for discovery, including interrogatories.
February 29, 1996 Lybberts serve their requests for discovery.
*635May 6, 1996 Lybberts mail responses to Grant County’s discovery requests (over six months after Grant County propounded the discovery requests).
May 7, 1996 The statute of limitations runs on Lybberts’ claim against the County. RCW 4.16.080(2).
June 21, 1996 Grant County serves its answer and affirmative defenses, including insufficiency of process.
June 26, 1996 Grant County responds to Lybberts’ discovery requests (1 month and 20 days after the requests were received).
The Lybberts rely on two cases, Raymond v. Fleming, 24 Wn. App. 112, 600 P.2d 614 (1979), review denied, 93 Wn.2d 1004 (1980), and Romjue v. Fairchild, 60 Wn. App. 278, 803 P.2d 57, review denied, 116 Wn.2d 1026 (1991), for their argument that Grant County waived its right to assert the defense of insufficiency of service of process. A defense is usually waived if it is not asserted in the defendant’s answer (CR 8) or included in a dispositive motion (CR 12(b)(5)). Raymond, 24 Wn. App. at 114-15; French v. Gabriel, 116 Wn.2d 584, 594, 806 P.2d 1234 (1991). Here, Grant County’s affirmative defense was timely asserted in its answer.
I also believe that both Raymond and Romjue are distinguishable. And I therefore respectfully dissent.
In Raymond, the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident on December 15, 1974. He sued for injuries but served the wrong party. On May 31, 1977, a lawyer appeared for the defendant, Fleming. After the appearance and before the statute had run, Raymond’s lawyer asked Fleming’s lawyer to answer the complaint. Fleming’s lawyer responded by repeatedly asking for more time to file an answer. Raymond’s lawyer gave him more time. The statute of limitations finally ran. On April 21, 1978, the *636trial court dismissed Raymond’s complaint because the defendants had not been properly served. Raymond, 24 Wn. App. at 113-14.
Division One reversed holding that the defendants had waived the right to assert the affirmative defense and should be estopped from asserting the defense. Id. at 114. In Raymond, however, unlike the case here, defense counsel deliberately lured the plaintiff along with repeated requests for more time:
Raymond’s counsel repeatedly asked for an answer to the complaint, which requests were not acceded to, and defense counsel just as repeatedly asked Raymond’s counsel for additional time to file an answer, which requests were acceded to. On January 23, 1978, Raymond moved for an order of default or in the alternative for a trial assignment and for an order compelling answers to interrogatories which he had served on defense counsel on October 5, 1977. Defense counsel again asked for more time and Raymond agreed to a continuance until February 24, 1978. Upon motion of defense counsel, the hearing was continued for a second time until March 10, 1978.

Id.

In Romjue, the plaintiff tried to serve a defendant at home. Unfortunately, the defendant, a child, had moved away from the home about eight months before the attempted service. Plaintiffs counsel filed an affidavit of service reciting that service had been effected on the defendant at his parent’s home—his “residence and usual place of abode.” Interrogatories were propounded to the plaintiff. Romjue, 60 Wn. App. at 280. And, significantly, before the three-year statute of limitations ran, plaintiff’s counsel confirmed his understanding that service had been properly effected:
Please be advised that it is my understanding that the defendants have been served in the above matter [Romjue v. Fair-child], Accordingly, enclosed are the original and a copy of our interrogatories and a Request for Production of Documents for answering. Please get us your responses in a timely fashion.
Id. at 281.
*637Again this case is different. Here, there was no confirming letter, no understanding, and no representation by the defendant that service had been properly effected.
In Nitardy v. Snohomish County, 105 Wn.2d 133, 712 P.2d 296 (1986), plaintiff served a complaint on the secretary for the Snohomish County Executive rather than the Snohomish County Auditor, as required by RCW 4.28.080(1). Following suit, and before expiration of the statute of limitations, “discovery began with at least six depositions being taken.” Nitardy, at 134.
The County appeared and was represented during all of the depositions. The statute of limitations expired. The County then moved for summary judgment on the ground of improper service. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the action. Id. The Supreme Court held that substantial compliance with the statute was not sufficient. Id. Although the court’s analysis did not include the question of waiver or estoppel, it seems to me that if substantial compliance with a service statute is not enough, then, clearly, no compliance with the statute is not enough.
Therefore, neither Raymond nor Romjue are controlling here. I also question the wisdom of a legal policy which requires waiver or estoppel of an affirmative defense if a defense lawyer fails to tell the plaintiff he or she has served the wrong person.
Waiver is, after all, the voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a known right. Saunders v. Lloyd’s of London, 113 Wn.2d 330, 339, 779 P.2d 249 (1989). And therefore conduct implying a waiver must be unequivocal. Bill McCurley Chevrolet, Inc. v. Rutz, 61 Wn. App. 53, 57-58, 808 P.2d 1167, review denied, 117 Wn.2d 1015 (1991). The conduct here (failing to timely answer interrogatories) is hardly “consistent with any other interpretation than intent to waive,” especially since here the Lyhberts took over six months to answer the defendant’s discovery requests. Saunders, 113 Wn.2d at 340.
Imposition of the doctrine of equitable estoppel is also a stretch.
*638Equitable estoppel requires: (1) an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with a claim afterward asserted; (2) action by another in reasonable reliance on that act, statement, or admission; and (3) injury to the party who relied if the court allows the first party to contradict or repudiate the prior act, statement, or admission.
Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 124 Wn.2d 816, 831, 881 P.2d 986 (1994). Estoppel must be proved by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. Id. There is nothing in this record which I construe as representations by Grant County to the Lybberts, or their attorneys, that service had been properly effected, and they could sit by and do nothing. “The party asserting estoppel must show not only lack of knowledge of the facts, but also the absence of any convenient and available means of acquiring such knowledge.” Davidheiser v. Pierce County, 92 Wn. App. 146, 153, 960 P.2d 998 (1998).
The Lybberts hired lawyers to protect their interests. Those interests included properly serving a complaint. The lawyers for Grant County had no obligation to protect the Lybberts’ interests. RPC 3.4 (setting forth opposing counsel’s duties to one another).
Whether the argument is waiver or estoppel, the heart of the Lybberts’ argument is that Grant County and its lawyer had a duty to spontaneously advise the Lybberts that service had not been properly effected. In an adversarial setting, that is a new duty.
The Lybberts, and their attorneys, have court enforceable authority to require just such information. CR 37(a) (motion for order compelling discovery). A CR 55(a) motion for default, a motion to compel responses, or even a letter confirming that service had been properly effected (like in Romjue) before the statute runs would have discharged the plaintiffs’ responsibility. Failing that, it is difficult to understand why a defense lawyer should have to advise the plaintiffs that they have not taken the necessary steps to ultimately deprive the defendant of the property.
*639Reconsideration denied February 12, 1999.
Review granted at 138 Wn.2d 1002 (1999).