Court Opinion

ID: 9477986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:36:15.865984+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:09.274260
License: Public Domain

PIERCE, Circuit Judge,
with whom Judge CARDAMONE joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
For substantially the reasons set forth in the original panel opinion in United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74 (2d Cir.1987), and in all but Section D of Judge Mahoney’s separate opinion herein, I would hold (1) that 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1986) authorizes the post-indictment, pretrial restraint of assets that otherwise would be utilized to retain an attorney; (2) that such a restraint violates the defendant’s qualified sixth amendment right to counsel of choice, unless at a pretrial adversarial hearing the government establishes, “by evidence independent of the indictment, a probability of convincing a jury beyond a reasonable doubt both that the defendant has violated the statute and that the assets are subject to forfeiture,” Monsanto, 836 F.2d at 83; and (3) that the district court has the authority to hold the requisite pretrial hearing. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the per curiam opinion to the extent that it remands this matter with instructions that the district court release whatever funds are necessary for Monsanto to retain counsel of choice. I believe that the original panel majority was correct to remand with instructions that the district court conduct an appropriate *1419pretrial hearing “at which the government will have the burden of establishing the probability that Monsanto will be convicted at trial and the ... properties in question will be subject to forfeiture.” Id. at 85.
I concur in the per curiam opinion, however, to the extent that it exempts from post-conviction forfeiture .any bona fide fees actually paid to Monsanto’s counsel. I agree with the original panel majority’s observation that “the threat of post-conviction third party forfeiture ... may effectively prevent a defendant from being able to retain counsel of choice.” Id. at 84 (emphasis in original). I would therefore exempt from post-conviction forfeiture any assets that have not been the subject of a valid pretrial restraining order and that have been used to pay bona fide legal fees; to hold otherwise would provide the government with the ability to limit a defendant’s choice of counsel, at the pretrial and trial stages, without the necessity of demonstrating in advance the likely forfeit-ability of the subject assets. To the extent the majority today invalidates the particular restraining order at issue in this case and rejects the possibility of any legitimate pretrial restraint that infringes upon the right to counsel of choice, I would hold that any legitimate fee paid to Monsanto’s attorney not be subject to post-conviction forfeiture.