Court Opinion

ID: 9725243
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:36:37.150575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:04.554577
License: Public Domain

*641Dissenting Opinion
Jackson, J.
I disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority opinion and dissent thereto. The statement of facts contained in the majority opinion ignores evidence of probative value that requires consideration not for the purpose of weighing evidence, but to ascertain whether or not the finding of the court is sustained by sufficient evidence and whether or not it is contrary to law.
The majority opinion indicates that appellant put decedent out of the house after an argument the day of the homicide; that later that evening decedent returned to appellant’s home and tried to get back in the house whereupon appellant shot, and killed decedent. The un*642disputed evidence on that question is that the argument referred to and the ejectment of decedent from appellant’s house occurred ri day or so prior to the homicide, that' on' the day Of the homicide' appellant, decedent' and one Don Olinger were' in appellant’s home, Olinger and decedent drinking, appellant not. Decedent left the home of appellant between 3:30 and 4:00 to go to the home of his sister intending to and stating he would return to appellant’s home the first of the month to pick up his mail. Later in the night after appellant and Olinger had gone to bed and apparently about 11:00 p.m. a person who later turned out to be the decedent broke into appellant’s home. Appellant, according to the uncontradicted evidence in the record, never saw or identified such person until after having twice warned the intruder to leave, and. being confronted with continued intrusion into his home, he fired the shotgun. The intruder fell outside the house and appellant later learned that he had shot decedent.
Under the circumstances disclosed by the record before us, there was a total failure on the . part of the State to prove in its case in chief the defendant’s [appellant’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, arid the refusal of the court to sustain the. motion to discharge at the conclusion of the State’s evidence before introduction of evidence on behalf of defendant constitutes reversible error. Lindley v. State (1929), 201 Ind. 165, 166 N. E. 661; Dorak v. State (1915), 183 Ind. 622, 624, 109 N. E. 771; Fritz v. State (1912), 178 Ind. 463, 466 99 N. E. 727; Osborn v. State (1904), 164 Ind. 262, 271, 73 N. E. 601; Howard v. State (1897), 50 Ind. 190.
Other glaring errors are apparent from the record. These will be touched on only briefly without discussion. A fatal variance exists in the introduction of *643State’s exhibit No. 10 as the weapon causing death, it is described, in the testimony of the police officers, as a “twelve gauge Browning automatic rifle” and is so admitted in evidence. The evidence is that decedent died of á shotgun wound. The defense of self-defense was established by the State itself, was corroborated by. the defendant’s testimony, and is .nowhere in the record contradicted or impeached, in fact proof thereof was adduced by the State in its case in chief. It is not contradicted that appellant was in a place where he had a right to be, he was entitled to defend himself and his property, and the decedent, under the existing circumstances, was a trespassing, violent intruder in the night time.
Finally, the majority opinion errs in concluding that •“[t]he unlawful act in this case was the pointing of a loaded gun and the discharging of same at the. decedent. The court had a right to believe that the appellant knew the person whom he was shooting.” There is no evidence whatever in the record to sustain either conclusion, on the contrary the uncóntradicted evidence is that the pointing and firing of the gun was not unlawful and that appellant did not know the person who was shot and the trial court had no right to indulge in any such inference, presumption or belief. All presumptions must be indulged in favor of the innocence of the defendant and not otherwise. The evidence is uncontradicted and unimpeached that appellant saw only the hand or arm of. decedent and never saw his face or body to determine who the intruder, was, the only evidence in the record is that the identity of decedent was unknown until after the shooting.
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and cause remanded for a new trial.
Note. — Reported in 195' N.- E. 2d 355. '