Court Opinion

ID: 9797164
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:14:35.777207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:52:57.148284
License: Public Domain

EASTAUGH, Justice,
dissenting.
A. Introduction
I respectfully dissent from the conclusion that Trooper Tuckwood's investigatory stop was lawful. When he contacted Morgan Hartman, Trooper Tuckwood could not have had a reasonable suspicion that Hartman posed an imminent public danger because: (1) he knew the family car Hartman had been driving was no longer in Hartman's possession and was no longer available to Hartman because it was disabled and being towed; (2) he knew Hartman was only a passenger in someone else's car; and (8) he expressed no belief, reasonable or otherwise, that Hartman might begin to drive that car. The result the court reaches is therefore contrary to Coleman v. State.1 It is also contrary to the three pertinent court of appeals decisions on which today's opinion relies.
I first discuss the lawfulness of the investigatory stop because the court's opinion focuses on that issue. Because I conclude that the investigatory stop was unlawful, it is also necessary to decide whether the unlawfulness of the stop affects the license revocation. The - applicable - statutes, - AS 28.35.031(a) and AS 28.15.166(g), do not authorize the state to suspend a motorist's license on the basis of a search that is itself the product of an unlawful arrest. The arrest here was unlawful because it directly resulted from an unlawful stop. The license revocation should therefore be reversed.
B. The Investigatory Stop Was Unlawful.
In Coleman, we articulated the standard for investigatory stops in Alaska: a police officer may make an investigatory stop only if he has "a reasonable suspicion that imminent public danger exists or serious harm to persons or property has recently occurred." 2 We recently reaffirmed our adherefice to the Coleman standard in Saltz v. State, Department of Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles.3 We also explained that a reasonable suspicion must be based on "specific and articulable facts" and a "totality of the circumstances." 4
We have held that a sufficient imminent public danger exists for which an officer may make an investigatory stop if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that a person is driving while intoxicated.5 But we have never considered whether a person who has ceased driving while intoxicated continues to pose an "imminent public danger" under Coleman. That case requires an officer to have a reasonable suspicion that imminent public danger exists, not that imminent public danger existed at some point in the past.6
In a series of cases-Larson v. State,7 Romo v. Mumicipality of Anchorage,8 and Shearer v. Municipality of Anchorage9-the court of appeals addressed whether, and under what cireumstances, a person who was formerly driving while intoxicated but is no longer doing so continues to pose an imminent public danger under Coleman.
In Larson, a police officer observed a car stopped in the middle of the road, and then watched as the driver of the car (Larson) drove on the wrong side of the road, tried to pick up pedestrians, and almost hit a second *1127group of pedestrians.10 The officer then witnessed Larson pick up two pedestrians, one of whom took over driving the vehicle Larson had been operating.11 The officer stopped the car, immediately contacted Larson (who was then a passenger), observed that he appeared intoxicated, and arrested him for DWI.12 Larson argued that the stop was unlawful and that therefore evidence of his intoxication should be suppressed.13 The court of appeals rejected his argument. The court first reasoned that the officer's suspicion that Larson had been driving while intoxicated was reasonable given Larson's erratic driving.14 The court then addressed "whether the requisite element of imminent danger terminated when Larson allowed an apparent stranger to drive the car in his place." 15 The court concluded that the district court had not clearly erred when it found that "it was likely that Larson would have resumed driving at some later point, and that [the officer] was not unreasonable in believing that the change of drivers did not eliminate the need to make an investigatory stop." 16
In Romo, a police officer followed a truck after he recognized a known prostitute in the truck's front passenger seat.17 The truck pulled into a parking lot and the driver (Romo) voluntarily exited the truck and approached the officer.18 The officer noticed that Romo smelled of alcohol and Romo admitted to the officer that he had been drinking.19 The officer then asked Romo to perform field sobriety tests; Romo failed the tests.20 The court of appeals concluded that the investigatory stop commenced when the officer asked Romo to perform the field sobriety tests and that the officer had sufficient reasonable suspicion at that point to warrant that request.21 As the court explained:
The fact that Romo was driving just prior to his encounter with [the officer] demonstrated Romo's willingness to drive in his current [intoxicated] condition. At the time of the encounter, Romo retained possession of his car and it remained immediately accessible for him to drive. Under these cireumstances there was a sufficient risk of imminent public danger to warrant an investigatory stop.[22]
In Shearer, an off-duty police officer observed a Jeep speeding on the Glenn Highway and swerving between lanes without signaling.23 The officer telephoned Anchorage Police Department dispatch for a check on the Jeep's license plates, determined where the owner lived, and followed the Jeep to the owner's residence.24 The driver (Shearer) opened his garage door, parked the Jeep in his driveway, and exited the Jeep.25 As Shearer headed into his house through the garage, the officer contacted him.26 The officer noticed that Shearer smelled of alcohol and arrested him for DWI after he had difficulty performing field sobriety tests.27 On appeal, Shearer conceded that he arguably posed an imminent public danger while he was driving home, but claimed that "because he parked his Jeep in his driveway, exited the vehicle and was headed towards his home when [the officer] contacted him, [the officer] had no basis to reasonably suspect that Shearer continued to pose an imminent dan*1128ger to the motoring public." 28 The court of appeals rejected Shearer's argument because, as the court explained, at the time of his encounter with the officer, "Shearer retained possession of the vehicle and it remained immediately accessible for him to drive." 29
Thus, under Larson, Romo, and Shearer, an officer may conduct an investigatory stop of a person who is no longer driving but is suspected of driving while intoxicated when (a) the driver just demonstrated his willingness to drive while intoxicated, and (b) the driver retains possession of his vehicle and it remains immediately accessible for him to drive.30 The second prong of that analysis provides assurance that the officer has a reasonable suspicion that imminent public danger continues to exist even though the intoxicated driver was no longer driving.31
The court's opinion correctly reasons that Trooper Tuckwood had a reasonable suspicion for thinking that Hartman had been driving while intoxicated. But there is no justification for concluding that Hartman posed an imminent public danger at the moment he was contacted by Trooper Tuck-wood. Trooper Tuckwood could not then have reasonably suspected that Hartman would again operate a vehicle that day. The Honda owned by Hartman's father was disabled and Trooper Tuekwood was having it towed. And there was no evidence Hartman might operate the tan Taurus in which he was now a passenger. Trooper Tuckwood never testified that he thought Hartman might drive the Taurus. As Hartman argues, the Taurus did not belong to him and he had manifested a "non-driving intention" as a passenger in the Taurus. Moreover, there was no indication the Taurus driver was impaired or might ask or permit Hartman to drive. Because Hartman was not in possession of a vehicle and no vehicle was immediately accessible for him to drive, Trooper Tuckwood could not have reasonably suspected that imminent public danger existed when he stopped the Taurus, contacted Hartman, and saw that Hartman was merely a passenger in someone else's car.32
The court's opinion discusses Larson, Romo, and Shearer.33 But in my view, the opinion recognizes but ultimately misapplies the factual justification that permitted the court of appeals to uphold the stops in those cases: the availability of a vehicle the defendant might drive and some likelihood he might actually drive it.34 To uphold the stop here given the complete absence of any evidence and any administrative finding that there was any likelihood Hartman might drive the Taurus misapplies the court of appeals's decisions. And, given the circumstances here, it would mean police could find imminent public danger justifying an investigatory stop whenever a vehicle driver gives a ride to an intoxicated passenger, on a theory, unsupported by any evidence supporting a reasonable belief, the driver might relinquish the wheel to the visibly intoxicated passenger. No doubt such a relinquishment of control can occur. But absent evidence justifying some reason to think it is likely to occur, a DUI investigatory stop would not be sustainable in that case, nor is it in this case.
It is not just that those three court of appeals decisions uphold stops for reasons absent here. Our own case, Coleman, requires us to hold that the absence of any evidence that the trooper actually thought Hartman might drive the Taurus, and the absence of any evidence that would have made such a notion reasonable, is fatal to this stop. Coleman requires the officer to suspect that imminent public danger exists, not simply that it existed in the past.35
The state also argues that Trooper Tuck-wood's investigatory stop was lawful because *1129Trooper Tuckwood had a reasonable suspicion that "serious harm to persons or property bald] recently occurred.36 The state suggests that Trooper Tuckwood may have stopped the Taurus to investigate whether a theft had been committed. But the Honda was never reported stolen, and Trooper Tueckwood never expressed any concern in his police report or his testimony that he thought the Taurus was stolen. And the only damage to the car that Trooper Tuck-wood reported was that the Honda was "dented" and "leaking water or antifreeze."
The state cites Gutierres v. State37 and argues that an officer may investigate a crime before he or she has specific knowledge that a crime has been committed. But an officer must still have specific and articu-lable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that serious harm to property has recently occurred.38 In Gutierres, an officer was patrolling a residential area in the middle of the night when he saw a man jump into the passenger side of a car in a back alley as the officer approached; the driver then swiftly backed the vehicle down the alley.39 The court of appeals held that these were "sufficiently suspicious cireumstances" to warrant an investigatory stop on the theory that there had been a potential burglary.40 But here, Trooper Tuckwood did not testify that he had witnessed any suspicious cireum-stances suggesting a car theft. Instead, he reported and testified that he knew the Honda belonged to John Hartman; his report and testimony implied that he thought Morgan Hartman (John's son) had been driving the car because Morgan's friend lived nearby.
Because Trooper Tuckwood did not have a reasonable suspicion that imminent public danger existed or that serious harm to property had recently occurred, the investigatory stop was unlawful under Coleman.41
C. Hartman's Driver's License Revocation Should Be Reversed.
Hartman's driver's license revocation should be reversed because the statutory provisions underlying administration of a breath test, the revocation of a driver's license, and the driver's license revocation appeal process are contingent upon a lawful arrest.42 - Alaska Statute 28.15.165(a) requires an officer to notify a person who has failed or refused to take a chemical or breath test administered under AS 28.35.081(a) that the department intends to revoke his driver's license and that he has a right to administrative review. Alaska Statute 28.35.081(a)-part of the implied consent statute-provides:
A person who operates or drives a motor vehicle in this state ... shall be considered to have given consent to a chemical test or tests of the person's breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of the person's blood or breath if lawfully arrested for an offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was operating or driving a motor vehicle ... while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, inhalant, or controlled substance.... The test or tests shall be administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer who has probable cause to believe that the person was operating or driving a motor vehicle ... in this state *1130while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage....
(Emphasis added.) And AS 28.15.166(g) provides that a DMV hearing officer may consider two issues when reviewing the DMV driver's license revocation decision: first, whether the law enforcement officer had "probable cause to believe ... that the person was operating a motor vehicle ... while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, inhalant, or controlled substance," and see-ond, whether the person refused to submit to the chemical test or the chemical test produced a result indicating the person had a blood aleohol content at or above .08 percent. (Emphasis added.) Under AS 28.15.166(), if one of the subsection .166(g) issues is determined in the negative by the hearing officer, "the department's action shall be rescinded."
Alaska Statute 28.35.031(a) and AS 28.15.166(g) require a driver's license revocation to be based upon a lawful arrest. Under AS 28.35.031(a), the state may not use breath test results that are obtained following an unlawful arrest. And under AS 28.15.166(), the driver's license revocation must be rescinded if the officer did not have probable cause to believe that the person was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated.
For reasons I explained in Part B, the investigatory stop was unlawful. The ensuing arrest was also unlawful because Trooper Tuckwood established probable cause to arrest Hartman with information gathered during the unlawful stop. "[Aln arrest is invalid if it follows as a consequence of and depends upon [an] unlawful stop.... [Aln unlawful stop may 'invalidate' an ensuing arrest ... through the exclusion of evidence garnered from the stop." 43 Without the investigatory stop, Trooper Tuckwood would not have had probable cause to arrest Hartman for driving while intoxicated. It was only after the stop that Trooper Tuckwood confirmed the identity of the driver of the Honda or had any evidence (aside from the smell of alcohol in the Honda) of Hartman's intoxication. Because a driver's license revocation is premised on a lawful arrest, and because Trooper Tuckwood's arrest of Hartman was unlawful, we should reverse his driver's license revocation. 44
D. Conclusion
Because the statutory provisions governing driver's license revocation proceedings do not authorize the state to revoke a motorist's driver's license on the basis of a search that itself is the product of an unlawful arrest, and because the arrest here was unlawful, we should reverse Hartman's driver's license revocation.

. Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40 (Alaska 1976).

. Id. at 46.

. Saltz v. State, Dep't of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles, 126 P.3d 133, 136 (Alaska 2005).

. Id.

. Id.; Ebona v. State, 577 P.2d 698, 701 (Alaska 1978).

. See Coleman, 553 P.2d at 46.

. Larson v. State, 669 P.2d 1334 (Alaska App. 1983).

. Romo v. Municipality of Anchorage, 697 P.2d 1065 (Alaska App.1985).

. Shearer v. Municipality of Anchorage, 4 P.3d 336 (Alaska App.2000).

. Larson, 669 P.2d at 1335.

. Id.

. Id. at 1335-36.

. Id. at 1336.

. Id. at 1337.

. Id.

. Id.

. Romo, 697 P.2d at 1067.

. Id.

. Id.

. Id.

. Id. at 1068-69.

. Id. at 1069-70.

. Shearer, 4 P.3d at 337.

. Id. at 337-38.

. Id. at 338.

. Id.

. Id.

. Id.

. Id. at 340 (internal quotation marks omitted).

. Id.; Romo, 697 P.2d at 1069-70; Larson, 669 P.2d at 1337.

. See Coleman, 553 P.2d at 46.

. See Shearer, 4 P.3d at 340; Romo, 697 P.2d at 1069-70; Larson, 669 P.2d at 1337.

. Op. at 1122-1124.

. Shearer, 4 P.3d at 340; Romo, 697 P.2d at 1069-70; Larson, 669 P.2d at 1337.

. Coleman, 553 P.2d at 46.

. See Coleman, 553 P.2d at 46.

. Gutierres v. State, 793 P.2d 1078 (Alaska App. 1990).

. See Saltz v. State, Dep't of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles, 126 P.3d 133, 136 (Alaska 2005).

. Gutierres, 793 P.2d at 1079.

. Id. at 1080.

. See Coleman, 553 P.2d at 46.

. Thorne v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, 774 P.2d 1326, 1331 (Alaska 1989) (stating that whether arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe defendant was driving while intoxicated is issue of "central importance" in driver's license revocation proceeding); Miller v. State, Dep't of Pub. Safety, Div. of Motor Vehicles, 761 P.2d 117, 118-19 (Alaska 1988) (considering lawfulness of investigatory stop under Coleman ); State v. Grier, 791 P.2d 627, 630-31 (Alaska App.1990) (noting that because former AS 28.35.031(a) required probable cause to arrest, if arresting officer did not have probable cause to arrest defendant for driving while intoxicated, trial court properly suppressed defendant's blood and breath test results).

. Pooler v. Motor Vehicles Div., 306 Or. 47, 755 P.2d 701, 703 (1988).

. Because the statutes prohibit the state from revoking a motorist's driver's license on the basis of a search that is itself the product of an unlawful arrest, it is not necessary to consider whether the exclusionary rule should also operate in this context to suppress the breath test result obtained after the unlawful investigatory stop. See Nevers v. State, Dep't of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles, 123 P.3d 958, 963 n. 21 (Alaska 2005) (holding that although exclusionary rule does not apply to search and seizure violations in administrative driver's license revocation proceedings, there may be potential exceptions, as when "a Fourth Amendment violation stems from a lack of probable cause for a DWI arrest").
This court's opinion remands for a new hearing because it concludes that the procedure followed by the hearing officer at the hearing violated Hartman's due process. Op. at 1126. The result I believe to be required here also makes it unnecessary to decide that procedural issue.