Court Opinion

ID: 9795473
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:29:41.681026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:30:08.278345
License: Public Domain

WILKINS, Associate Chief Justice,
dissenting:
¶ 22 I conclude that the preinjury releases at issue in this appeal are not, in and of themselves, contrary to the public policy of this state. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
¶23 I agree with the majority that the central purpose of Utah’s Inherent Risks of Skiing Act is to facilitate affordable insurance rates for ski area operators because of their direct impact on and contribution to the Utah economy. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-51 (2002 & Supp. 2007). I also agree that, in drafting the public policy statement that precedes the substantive text of the Act, the Legislature clearly intended to clarify the law and proscribe lawsuits against ski area operators for those risks that are inherent in skiing. My conformity with the majority opinion, however, ends there.
¶ 24 Grounding their reasoning in the “legislative findings and expressions of public policy [in the Act],” supra ¶ 13, the majority ultimately concludes that the Legislature has “authoritatively put to rest the question of whether ski area operators [may] use prein-jury releases to significantly pare back or ... eliminate their need to purchase ... liability insurance_They [may] not.” Supra ¶ 16. In other words, the majority reasons that because encouraging affordable insurance rates is the primary objective of the Act, once ski area operators obtain that insurance they may do no more to protect themselves; Consequently, my colleagues conclude, it violates this express public policy for ski area operators to attempt to limit their liability by seeking' preinjury releases from patrons. Extracting such releases, according to the-majority, “breache[s the] public policy bargain” made by the Act. Supra ¶ 16. I disagree.
*566¶ 25 When deciding questions of statutory interpretation, we customarily look first to the plain language of a statute. It is also usual that we take note of words and phrases the Legislature did not include. See Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT 110, ¶ 14, 993 P.2d 875 (“[0]missions in statutory language should be taken note of and given effect.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Similarly, we have previously expressed the view that “[this] court has no power to rewrite a statute to make it conform to an intention not expressed.” Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 107 Utah 502, 155 P.2d 184, 185 (1945) (emphasis added).
¶ 26 In my view, the majority’s interpretation improperly expands the plain language of the Act and infuses it with “intention not expressed” by the Legislature. Id. Section 78-27-51 simply proscribes lawsuits against ski area operators for those risks that are inherent to skiing. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-51. Nowhere does the text suggest that ski area operators may not contractually further limit their liability for risks that are not inherent to skiing. In fact, the text is silent about whether an individual may or may not sue a ski area operator on some other basis. Accordingly, this court should resist the temptation to add language or meaning to the Act where no hint of it exists in the text.
¶ 27 When the Legislature clearly identifies a public policy objective, we have a duty to honor it. We also have a duty, however, not to stray beyond the plain language of a statute, as I believe the majority has done here. I conclude that preinjury releases do not automatically violate the public policy of this state and that releases must be examined on an- individual basis to determine whether they are enforceable under the applicable law. Wdiere, as here, neither prein-jury release executed by the plaintiff was a requirement to using the ski area but instead granted additional benefits and privileges to the skier, both parties should be free to enter into the agreement, or not, and expect it to be enforced by our courts as agreed. Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Snowbird.
¶ 28 Justice DURRANT concurs in Associate Chief Justice WILKINS’S dissenting opinion.