Court Opinion

ID: 9752788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:34:59.653516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:22.369663
License: Public Domain

WAGNER, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
I disagree with the majority’s disposition of the case because, in my view, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on aiding and abetting, and even assuming error, it was harmless. Appellant raises an additional significant issue, but one which cannot be resolved in his favor on the record before us.1 Therefore, I would affirm appellant’s convictions.
I.
Appellant was indicted along with a co-defendant, Cynthia Murphy, for each of the offenses for which he was convicted; however, the proceeding below involved only appellant. The government introduced sufficient evidence to establish that the crimes were committed and that appellant was the person who committed them. That evidence is recounted in detail in the majority’s opinion. It need not be repeated except as necessary to explain the reasons for my dissent. Cynthia Murphy was shown to be linked to the crimes through evidence showing that she was seen standing in the alley near the back entrance of the closed restaurant which was burglarized while the crimes were in progress and before appellant was chased out of the restaurant by the police dog. There was a lady’s pocketbook a few feet from Ms. Murphy which contained a hat, make-up mirror and tools which would be useful in a burglary (two flashlights, a hammer, two types of screw drivers and vice grips). Aside from this evidence of the possible involvement of Ms. Murphy in the crimes charged, there was testimony that the bottles of liquor, the subject of the petit larceny count, contained latent fingerprints of someone other than appellant. While there was evidence that the locks were hanging from the rear door, which had been removed from its hinges, and that an office door and a safe inside showed signs of breaking, there was no direct evidence of who or how many persons participated in these phases of the crimes.
The government requested, but appellant, who represented himself, expressed a “problem” with the standard aiding and abetting instruction.2 The trial court denied the request. In closing argument appellant argued, without evidentiary support, that he was never inside the restaurant and that there could have been a “missing link suspect” who escaped undetected through the alley. No doubt confused by appellant’s argument and the possible involvement of others in the crimes, including Ms. Murphy, the jury sent a note seeking guidance, “particularly in reference to petit larceny.”3 The reason for the note is not difficult to discern. The presence of fingerprints of someone other than appellant on the property which was taken in the larceny, the evidence of Ms. Murphy’s presence near the burglarized premises in constructive possession of a pocketbook of tools, and appellant’s argument regarding the “missing link” suspect provide a reasonable explanation for the note. It was in response to this note and the fact *1104the accused had argued to the jury that someone else was involved in the burglary that the trial court reversed its earlier ruling and decided to provide the aiding and abetting instruction.
In my opinion the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving the aiding and abetting instruction under the circumstances. Tyler v. United States, 495 A.2d 1180, 1183 (D.C.1985) (the instruction to be given in response to a jury note lies within the trial court’s discretion). The inculpato-ry presence of Ms. Murphy near the burglary tools and the fingerprint testimony provided evidentiary support for the jury to infer that appellant was not the sole participant in the crimes charged.
My disagreement with the majority opinion is accounted for, in part, by its conclusion that where two people are shown to have participated in a crime, the guilt of the one shown to have had greater involvement cannot be considered under an aiding and abetting theory. I believe that the majority’s position on this score is contrary to current law. In establishing criminal culpability based upon an aiding and abetting theory, it is not required that the role of the aider and abettor be determined to be subordinate to the role of others involved. United States v. Austin, 462 F.2d 724, 731-32 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048, 93 S.Ct. 518, 545, 547, 34 L.Ed.2d 501 (1972). What is essential is that there be proof that the crime was committed by someone and that a defendant have participated in the commission of the offense. Gayden v. United States, 584 A.2d 578, 583 (D.C.1990), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 137, 116 L.Ed.2d 104 (1991); Head v. United States, 451 A.2d 615, 626 (D.C.1982); Hackney v. United States, 389 A.2d 1336, 1343 (D.C.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132, 99 S.Ct. 1054, 59 L.Ed.2d 95 (1979).
The majority suggests that none of these cases “stands for the proposition that the main wrongdoer can be an aider and abettor of a minor participant.” However, this is not the critical issue in determining the propriety of the instruction. The cases do establish that such a distinction is not significant in deciding, as we do here, whether an aiding and abetting instruction was properly given. Head, supra, 451 A.2d at 626 (where evidence tended to prove appellant was the principal, aiding and abetting instruction not error); Hackney, supra, 389 A.2d at 1343-44 (although evidence showed appellant was actual killer, instruction on aiding and abetting not inconsistent or misleading); Austin, supra, 462 F.2d at 731 (not necessary to aiding and abetting theory to determine who was the central figure where each of four defendants played integral part). In many circumstances, it cannot be determined which of several participants masterminded the criminal venture nor who played the greater role. Nevertheless, an aiding and abetting theory is viable, and the instruction may be given.
Even when the evidence shows that a defendant is the principal in a crime in which others participated, an instruction on aiding and abetting is not inconsistent or misleading as “the greater participation in the offense includes the lesser and the legal effect is the same.” Hackeny, supra, 389 A.2d at 1344. The effect of the instruction under such circumstances is to allow the jury to consider whether, as one of several persons clearly implicated, the defendant is responsible as the principal or as the one who assisted others in committing the offense. Head, supra, 451 A.2d at 626.
The distinction between the criminal responsibility for commission of an offense by a principal and by an accessory has been eliminated by statute which provides for treatment of the latter as an accessory or as principal. D.C.Code § 22-105 (1989).4 This statute does not involve a separate offense, but an alternative charge which permits a defendant to be found guilty as a principal for aiding another in the commis*1105sion of an offense. Insofar as the majority premises its decision on the grounds of the relative level of participation by appellant and Murphy, it imposes a distinction which is not within the statute nor recognized in applicable case law.
To establish aiding and abetting under the statute the government must prove that “(a) a crime was committed by someone; (b) the accused assisted or participated in its commission; and (c) his participation was with guilty knowledge.” Jefferson v. United States, 463 A.2d 681, 683 (D.C.1983). While I agree with the majority’s observation that one cannot aid and abet himself, one need be shown only to have aided someone in committing the offense. Id. at 683; United States v. Martin, 747 F.2d 1404, 1407 (11th Cir.1985); Morgan v. United States, 159 F.2d 85, 87 (10th Cir.1947). The relative level of participation by each person involved is immaterial. See Hackney, supra, 389 A.2d at 1343-44; see also United States v. Staten, 189 U.S.App.D.C. 100, 109, 581 F.2d 878, 887 (1978). Also immaterial is the characterization of one participant as the dominant participant in the crime. It is not even required that all guilty parties be apprehended, charged or identified.5 Gayden, supra, 584 A.2d at 582; Mason v. United States, 256 A.2d 565, 567 (D.C.1969); Feldstein v. United States, 429 F.2d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 920, 91 S.Ct. 174, 27 L.Ed.2d 159 (1970).
Unless it is unreasonable to infer that Murphy was involved in the crime in any way, a conclusion which the majority does not reach, there is sufficient evidence that the crimes at the Lincoln Restaurant were committed and that both Murphy and appellant participated in them. The implication of Murphy is supported by reasonable inferences which can be made from the evidence. Although the proof as to appellant’s role in the enterprise appears to be greater than that shown for Ms. Murphy, the law does not preclude his conviction on an aiding and abetting theory where someone else is shown to have been involved, where all elements of the crime have been established and where all elements of aiding and abetting have been proved.6
The fact that the instruction was given after closing arguments and during deliberations was not prejudicial to appellant and does not serve as a basis for reversal of the conviction on the facts presented. Instructing a jury on aiding and abetting will constitute reversible error if the trial court abuses it discretion, Tyler, supra, 495 A.2d at 1183, and the error is prejudicial to appellant. See Ballard v. United States, 430 A.2d 483, 487-88 (D.C.1981). I find neither an abuse of discretion nor prejudice here. In Tyler, as in this case, the court instructed the jury for the first time on aiding and abetting a burglary in response to a jury note. Tyler, supra, 495 A.2d at 1182-83. The court found no prejudice because the defense was that appellant was not among *1106the men involved in the burglary, a defense which would have exonerated him as principal or as an aider and abettor. Id. Thus, the court concluded that appellant’s argument would not have been different if the instruction had been given before argument and deliberations. Id. Analogous circumstances are presented here.
The majority seeks to distinguish Tyler on the grounds that appellant might have been able to invite the jury’s attention to the lack of evidence connecting him to Ms. Murphy and to the absence of evidence that appellant assisted an unknown person inside the restaurant. First, the opportunity to argue the absence of evidence linking the perpetrators of the crime was a circumstance for consideration in Tyler as in this case. Yet, the possibility did not control the outcome. Second, evidence concerning Ms. Murphy’s presence and discovery of the tools near her could have been admitted only because of its relevance to the burglary and related offenses. The evidence would have supported an argument that the government failed to establish any connection between appellant and the tools or appellant and Ms. Murphy. Appellant chose not to make this argument which was consistent with his defense and which could have been made without an aiding and abetting instruction. Since the delay in giving the aiding and abetting instruction did not foreclose the argument, I find no prejudice to appellant as a result of its timing. Third, only if the jury believed that appellant was the man inside the restaurant and/or the man who was captured running out of the restaurant could the jury find appellant guilty as an aider and abettor or as a principal. Appellant did argue that he was never inside the restaurant and that he did not participate in the crime. In effect, he made an argument distancing himself from the perpetrator of the crimes. For these reasons, I see no significant difference between what appellant argued and what he might have argued if the instruction had been given earlier.
In this case appellant successfully challenged the government’s initial request for an aiding and abetting instruction,7 which was supportable given the evidence.8 Appellant was allowed to argue, without evi-dentiary support, that he was not present and that some other person must have committed the offense and escaped up the alley. Ironically, the majority finds prejudicial the instruction on aiding and abetting, in part, because of an absence of a showing that someone other than appellant was the primary participant in the criminal events. The government argues, and I agree, that appellant’s closing argument was that the burglary was committed not by him, but by someone else. Had the jury accepted his argument, appellant would have been found not guilty as a principal or as an aider and abettor. See Tyler, supra, 495 A.2d at 1183. Therefore, I find no prejudice.
Moreover, the evidence of appellant’s guilt was substantial. Assuming error in the instruction, the judgment could not have been swayed substantially by it under the circumstances. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1248, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). For the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that no error has been shown warranting reversal and a new trial in this case.

.That issue involves the adequacy of the trial court’s inquiry when confronted with appellant’s request to represent himself because of his dissatisfaction with counsel. In view of the disposition of the case, further discussion of the issue would be advisory only. Therefore, I do not address it.

. Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 4.02 (3d ed. 1978).

. The note read:
If a person knows of a crime and is present during the crime and agrees with the commission of the crime, is that person guilty of a crime? Please clarify the law on these questions, particularly in reference to petit larceny.

. D.C.Code § 22-105 reads:
In prosecutions for any criminal offense all persons advising, inciting, or conniving at the offense, or aiding or abetting the principal offender, shall be charged as principals and not as accessories, the intent of this section being that as to all accessories before the fact the law heretofore applicable in cases of misdemeanor only shall apply to all crimes, whatever the punishment may be.

. The majority opinion cites Payton v. United States, 305 A.2d 512 (D.C.1973), for the proposition that "there must be evidence that someone other than defendant was the principal whom defendant aided and abetted" before a defendant who is charged as principal may be convicted as an aider and abettor. Id. at 513. A review of the cases cited by the Payton court in support of this statement leaves no doubt that it was not concerned with the necessity of proof of a position of dominance by the principal. In Morgan, supra, which Payton cites, the appellant was found not guilty as a principal, but guilty of the charged offense of aiding and assisting in the illegal transportation of intoxicating liquor. Morgan, 159 F.2d at 85. The conviction was reversed because the government failed to prove that anyone else was involved. Id. at 87. In United States v. Horton, 180 F.2d 427 (7th Cir.1950), also cited in Payton, the failure of proof of aiding and abetting turned on the lack of proof that the alleged co-participants had violated any laws. The court in Payton relied on these cases in reaching its result, but seemed to suggest, contrary to established precedents, that an aiding and abetting instruction could not be given unless the other perpetrators were identified. Payton, 305 A.2d at 513. On the other hand, the decision can be reconciled with applicable law, if the decision is viewed as based upon the court's conclusion that it had not been proven that the crime charged had been committed by someone in addition to appellant.

. The aiding and abetting instruction allows a defendant to be found guilty of the charged offense without "finding that he personally committed each of the acts constituting the offense"; however, the jury must find "beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was committed by someone.” Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 4.02 (3d ed. 1978).

. Although appellant did not state that he objected to the instruction, he expressed that he had a problem with it. The trial court considered the matter and denied the government’s request.

. If the evidence of Ms. Murphy’s constructive possession of burglary tools in the alley on a winter evening, near the door of a restaurant in which a burglary was in progress was not relevant to show her participation in the crimes, then this evidence should have been excluded as irrelevant. However, the evidence was offered and admitted, no doubt, because of its obvious relevance to the offenses.