Court Opinion

ID: 9916330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-09 19:01:37.69515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:24:59.665216
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40813           Document: 00517026797              Page: 1       Date Filed: 01/09/2024

                United States Court of Appeals
                     for the Fifth Circuit                                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                             Fifth Circuit
                                        ____________                                       FILED
                                                                                     January 9, 2024
                                         No. 22-40813
                                                                                      Lyle W. Cayce
                                        ____________
                                                                                           Clerk

   Rosandra Daywalker,

                                                                        Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                                versus

   UTMB at Galveston; MD Ben Raimer, In His Official Capacity,

                                                 Defendants—Appellees.
                        ______________________________

                        Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the Southern District of Texas
                                  USDC No. 3:20-CV-99
                        ______________________________

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, Stewart, Circuit Judge, and Scholer,
   District Judge.†
   Per Curiam:*
              Rosandra Daywalker appeals the district court’s discovery decisions,
   denial of her motion for sanctions, grant of summary judgment, and dismissal
   of her Title VII, Rehabilitation Act, and Family and Medical Leave Act

              _____________________
   †
       United States District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
   *
       This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                    No. 22-40813

   (“FMLA”) discrimination claims against her former employer. Because we
   find no error, we AFFIRM.
                          I. Factual Background
          In June 2015, Daywalker, a Black woman, graduated with honors from
   her medical school and matched to the five-year Otolaryngology residency
   program at the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston
   (“UTMB”). In a residency program, medical school graduates pursue
   advanced certifications in specialized fields of medicine while training under
   the supervision of a faculty of experienced doctors. Otolaryngology is the
   medical specialty involving the surgical and medical management of head and
   neck conditions. Daywalker was the only Black resident in UTMB’s 2015–
   2020 Otolaryngology program class.
          Otolaryngology residents at UTMB cycle through medical rotations
   in different specialty departments, attend lectures, and participate in didactic
   exercises. UTMB’s program is structured so that a resident is provided with
   greater responsibilities and expected to exhibit core clinical competencies as
   they progress through their post-graduate years. A typical post-graduate year
   in the program begins in July and runs through the following June. To aid
   residents progressing through the program, UTMB’s Clinical Competency
   Committee discusses residents’ progress and development of core
   competencies. The Committee also imposes discipline and improvement
   plans, if necessary.
          During her first two years at UTMB, Daywalker was supervised by
   Dr. Susan McCammon, a white woman. Within her first year in the program,
   she received good evaluations for her positive energy and “ability [to]
   communicate well with patients and families as well as nursing staff.”
   However, some of her supervisors also reported that she had failed to timely
   complete medical documentation and had problems with unexcused

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   tardiness and absences in some clinical rotations. While Daywalker’s clinical
   skills improved in her second year, some of her supervisors noted that she
   still needed to be more efficient in producing clinical documentation.
          In April 2017, towards the end of Daywalker’s second year, Dr.
   McCammon was replaced by Dr. Wasyl Szeremeta, a white man, as director
   of the program. In her end of second-year evaluations, Dr. Szeremeta noted
   that Daywalker needed to improve her clinical documentation and
   interpersonal communication skills. In August 2017, Dr. Szeremeta and the
   assistant program director, Dr. Farrah Siddiqui, met with Daywalker to
   discuss the importance of efficiency and accuracy in completing clinical
   documentation. Some of her supervisors reported that she displayed
   improvements after the meeting, as her first third-year evaluations provided
   that her “[r]enewed energy and positive, confident attitude have improved
   [her] clinical efficiency/documentation.” However, other supervisors
   reported that her core competencies lagged behind her peers based on her
   clinical inefficiency and slow documentation.
          In May 2018, UTMB conducted a routine audit of the department’s
   medical documentation. The audit revealed that Daywalker had not
   completed records for five patients dating back to June 2017. Dr. Szeremeta
   questioned her about these records, and Daywalker responded that the
   patients “[l]eft without being seen” and should have been removed from the
   schedule. Upon further review, Dr. Szeremeta learned that Daywalker did
   see the five patients, and he became concerned that Daywalker
   “subsequently created notes and ‘documentation’” to cover up her
   omissions. He believed that Daywalker had copied and pasted prior notes
   from other doctors without making any significant edits. His concerns about

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   Daywalker’s clinical inefficiency led UTMB to place her on a remediation
   program.1
           On May 30, 2018, Dr. Szeremeta notified Daywalker of her
   remediation plan and explained that her “lapses in professional behavior”
   have created difficulties for the faculty to trust in her competency. According
   to her evaluations for the first half of 2018, Daywalker scored a near eight out
   of ten for professionalism. On June 1, 2018, she submitted an internal
   complaint against Dr. Szeremeta, asserting that he created a hostile work
   environment and discriminated against her based on her race and sex. In her
   complaint, she alleged that Dr. Szeremeta made numerous disparaging
   comments during working hours in the UTMB emergency room, at public
   meetings among program residents, and at conferences that she attended.
   She further asserted that Dr. Szeremeta became fixated on her, consistently
   staring at her during working hours and consistently interrupting her work to
   give her negative feedback in full view of other employees and residents.
   Ultimately, Dr. Szeremeta was removed as her supervisor and replaced by
   Dr. Siddiqui.
           Later that summer, she reached out to Dr. Vicente Resto, the
   department chair, to discuss being removed from the remediation plan. Due
   to personal conflicts with Dr. Siddiqui, Dr. Resto assigned her another
   supervisor to “help her pass the remediation and graduate from the residency
   program.” In early August, Daywalker requested a four month “leave of
   absence.” On August 8, 2018, UTMB sent her a letter approving her request
   and informing her that she would return to the program as a third-year

           _____________________
           1
             UTMB describes remediation programs as a performance improvement plan
   “provid[ing] tailored assistance, training, and/or supervision to residents who need
   additional support to meet expectations” and not “formal discipline” or “report[ed] . . .
   to future employers.”

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   resident upon the expiration of her leave. Dr. Harold Pine, a program faculty
   member, delivered the letter to Daywalker and informed her of additional
   concerns expressed by faculty members. The following day, Daywalker
   engaged counsel to submit a letter to request conversion of her “leave of
   absence” into protected leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act
   (“FMLA”). UTMB granted her FMLA leave the following week.
          While on FMLA leave, Daywalker obtained records from the
   American Board of Otolaryngology which stated that UTMB reported she
   was a fourth-year resident on course to complete her residency in June 2020.
   She also consulted an attorney and requested disability accommodations
   upon her return to UTMB in November 2018. On November 6, 2018, her
   first day back, she met with Dr. Szeremeta and other program staff to discuss
   her status. Dr. Szeremeta informed her that she would have to repeat her
   third year during the 2018–2019 program year. Daywalker resigned that same
   day.
          A few months later, Daywalker filed suit against UTMB and its then-
   president, Dr. Ben Raimer, in federal court. She alleged race- and gender-
   based discrimination claims under Title VII, FMLA, and the Rehabilitation
   Act. During discovery, Daywalker served UTMB with several discovery
   requests seeking comparator evidence, or information about the performance
   and discipline of the program’s other residents. UTMB objected to those
   requests pursuant to the Federal Education Rights Privacy Act (“FERPA”).
   The district court then referred the request to compel to the magistrate
   judge. The magistrate judge determined that FERPA applied to UTMB’s
   other residents because medical residency was “undoubtedly an academic
   undertaking that allows doctors to further their education and training in the
   medical field.” However, the magistrate judge allowed the disclosure of
   residents’ records, subject to the individual residents’ objections. The

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   district court then issued an order directing the redaction of all identifying
   information and limiting the documents to counsel’s eyes only.
           Under the district court’s directive, the parties submitted dispute
   letters addressing one of Daywalker’s requests for production. Daywalker
   asserted that her request for production governed relevant comparator
   evidence from two program residents outside of her protected class, residents
   anonymously numbered three (“Resident Three”) and sixteen (“Resident
   Sixteen”). UTMB argued that the requests did not encompass Resident
   Three’s and Resident Sixteen’s performance records. The magistrate judge
   received the letters after the final discovery deadline passed. Her request was
   denied because its language did not encapsulate the records of Resident
   Three and Resident Sixteen as the dates listed did not precisely match their
   program years. Thus, Daywalker proceeded with limited comparator
   information about only one other resident.
           Upon UTMB’s and Raimer’s motion for summary judgment, the
   district court dismissed Daywalker’s Title VII claims because (1) she failed
   to provide comparator evidence showing that another resident outside her
   protected class was treated more favorably;2 (2) she provided insufficient
   evidence to show that her internal complaint of discrimination caused the
   program staff to hold her back; and (3) binding precedent required a greater
   degree of harassment beyond the insensitive remarks and microaggressions
   she alleged to prove a hostile work environment claim. The district court then
   dismissed her FMLA and Rehabilitation Act claims because she had not
   offered evidence of the causal links between (1) her request for FMLA leave

           _____________________
           2
             The district court held that the other resident she pointed to was not similarly
   situated because he had different disciplinary issues and was in a different stage of the
   program’s disciplinary process.

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   and informing UTMB of her disability status and (2) the decision to retain
   her as a third-year resident.
          Additionally, the district court denied Daywalker’s motion for
   sanctions based on spoliation of evidence and opposing counsel’s conduct at
   depositions. She alleged that an internal investigator for UTMB deleted
   relevant notes and electronic recordings of meetings. The district court
   reasoned that there was no prejudice from the loss of the documents because
   UTMB produced the same material via another method and provided her
   with the minutes for the relevant meetings. The district court further
   concluded that “none of [her other claims] amount[ed] to sanctionable
   conduct.” Daywalker timely appealed the magistrate judge’s evidentiary
   decisions and the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor
   of UTMB and Dr. Raimer and denying her motion for sanctions.
                                   II. Discussion
          On appeal, Daywalker contests the magistrate judge’s determination
   that the program’s residents were covered under FERPA and his denials of
   Daywalker’s motion to compel, and the district court’s denial of her motion
   for sanctions and grant of summary judgment in favor of UTMB. We address
   each challenge in turn.
          A. FERPA Order
          We begin by discussing the magistrate judge’s FERPA order
   determining that medical residents are students protected by the Act.
   “Issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo.” Matter of Lopez,
   897 F.3d 663, 668 (5th Cir. 2018).
          Daywalker avers that the magistrate judge “erroneously expanded
   FERPA to medical residents.” She contends that “nothing in the limited
   legislative history of FERPA[] created rights for medical resident[s].” She

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   points out that the U.S. Department of Education (“DOE”) has held that
   medical residents are not students covered by FERPA in a 1995 guidance
   letter.3 Alternatively, she argues that the comparator documents she sought
   are not “‘educational records’ as defined by FERPA” because UTMB
   operates its residency programs independent of its medical and graduate
   schools as its records are not maintained like an educational institution. She
   further asserts that the FERPA order improperly creates new precedent
   citing unpublished and unpersuasive district court opinions in cases either
   not involving medical residents or cases where the resident did not argue that
   FERPA was inapplicable.
           We disagree and hold that the magistrate judge did not err in applying
   FERPA to UTMB’s medical residents. He began his analysis by stating that
   “[t]he scope of the term ‘student’ must be considered within the context of
   the specific [] statute before the court.” Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. United States,
   759 F.3d 437, 444 (5th Cir. 2014). He then noted that FERPA defines
   “education records” as “records, files, documents, and other materials
   which (i) contain information directly related to a student; and (ii) are
   maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a person acting for
   such agency or institution.” 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A). The Act defines a
   student as “any person with respect to whom an educational agency or
   institution maintains education records or personally identifiable
   information.” Id. § 1232g(a)(6). FERPA defines an educational agency or
   institution as any entity that receives funds from any DOE program. Id. §
   1232g(a)(3). The magistrate judge squarely addressed this issue and reasoned
   that UTMB’s medical residents are students subject to FERPA’s protections

           _____________________
           3
              The DOE guidance letter provides that “[a] medical resident who works at a
   hospital is not a ‘student’ as that term is defined in FERPA” because they have achieved a
   terminal degree in their field and merely seek advanced certification.

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   because UTMB receives DOE funding and keeps personal records of their
   performance as they engage in practical educational curricula in pursuit of
   receiving a specialized certification.4
          The magistrate judge noted that although this court has previously
   recognized that medical residents are classified as employees with respect to
   Social Security, Medicare, and federal payroll taxes, we have consistently
   maintained that those determinations were based on the government
   regulations or statutes at issue in those cases. See, e.g., Univ. of Tex. Sys., 759
   F.3d at 444. The magistrate judge concluded that “medical residents are
   students for purposes of FERPA” because “a medical residency is
   undoubtedly an academic undertaking that allows doctors to further their
   education and training in the medical field.” He also pointed out that several
   district courts have held the same, and thus there was “no reason to chart a
   new course” by holding opposite. Regardless of his construction of the
   statute, the magistrate judge’s FERPA order did not impact Daywalker’s
   access to the comparator information she needed to establish her
   discrimination claims. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2)(B); 34 C.F.R. §
   99.31(a)(9)(i). The magistrate judge stated that her “requests for production
   and interrogatories seeking comparator information [were] directly relevant
   to her claims of discrimination” and that “it [was] appropriate to allow the
   disclosure of such material.” FERPA merely imposes additional protection
   of students’ records, allowing disclosure if made to comply with a court
   order. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2)(B). Thus, we find no reversible error in the
   magistrate judge’s FERPA order.

          _____________________
          4
             UTMB stores and reports such information pertaining to its residents to the
   American Board of Otolaryngology. Shortly after completing the program, residents
   desiring to continue in the field must take and pass both written and oral exams. See
   https://www.abohns.org/about-our-certifications/our-assessment-programs.

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           B. Discovery Determinations
           Having addressed the FERPA issue, we now turn to the magistrate
   judge’s denials of Daywalker’s request to compel and the protective order
   restricting the produced records to “counsel’s eyes only.” We review a
   district court’s discovery decisions for abuse of discretion. Williams v. Boeing
   Co., 23 F.4th 507, 514 (5th Cir. 2022). We “will reverse a discovery ruling
   only if it is ‘arbitrary or clearly unreasonable,’ and the complaining party
   demonstrates that it was prejudiced by the ruling.” HC Gun & Knife Shows,
   Inc. v. City of Houston, 201 F.3d 544, 549 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Mayo v.
   Tri-Bell Indus., Inc., 787 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 1986)). We hold that the
   record does not support a determination that the magistrate judge and district
   court abused their discretion either by (1) construing Daywalker’s contested
   request to not describe the records of two of UTMB’s residents with
   reasonable particularity or (2) by ordering that only her counsel could review
   the produced records in a modifiable protective order.
           We begin with the magistrate judge’s denial of her request for UTMB
   to produce comparator evidence. Daywalker asserts that the magistrate judge
   abused his discretion in denying her request for UTMB to produce
   comparator documents for two other residents in her class, Resident Three
   and Resident Sixteen.5 Daywalker contends that we should not uphold the
   district court’s decision because it failed to adhere to the liberal spirit of the
   Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and caused fundamental unfairness. UTMB
   counters that the magistrate judge reasonably construed the contested
   request for production and held that it could not be read to encompass the

           _____________________
           5
            She avers that the abuse of discretion is facially apparent because the magistrate
   judge’s FERPA order states that the records of other residents were “directly relevant to
   her claims of discrimination” such that it was appropriate to allow her to access other
   residents’ records.

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   records for Residents Three and Sixteen because their class years did not
   match the requested years.
           We hold that the magistrate judge reasonably construed the contested
   discovery request. The record shows that the district court reviewed the
   parties’ position letters6 and determined that although the information
   Daywalker sought may have been relevant to her claim, no request for
   production at issue encompassed the contested records for Residents Three
   and Sixteen. She requested all records of third-year residents from 2016 to
   2017 and fourth-year residents from 2017 to 2018. UTMB posited that the
   contested information did not fall within the relevant period because
   Residents Three and Sixteen were third-year residents from 2017 to 2018.
   The magistrate judge and district court agreed. So do we.
           We hold that the magistrate judge’s interpretation of Daywalker’s
   request for production was not arbitrary or clearly unreasonable. The
   magistrate judge noted that it was counsel’s “obligation to make document
   requests that define[d] specifically what [Daywalker was] looking for” and
   rejected any “insinuation that this [determination was] somehow an effort to
   cut off [Daywalker]’s ability to proceed with her case” as “flat out
   incorrect.” While courts have encouraged the liberal application of the
   Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the interest of maintaining fairness to
   litigants,7 the Rules also require parties to identify the documents they
   request with “reasonable particularity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(1)(A). In
   cases where we have admonished a district court for failing to order a party
   to produce comparator evidence, the error occurred from a failure to compel

           _____________________
           6
             The parties submitted position letters describing the production dispute pursuant
   to the district court’s directive.
           7
               See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 506 (1947).

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   documents governed by or subject to a valid request for production. See
   Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152, 1159 (5th Cir. 1991). For instance, in Coughlin
   v. Lee, the district court declined to compel an employer to produce relevant
   personnel records in a wrongful termination case based on the plaintiffs’
   exercise of protected speech. Id. at 1158–59. The plaintiffs requested
   production of all personnel files for the relevant period of their discharges.
   Id. at 1158. Thus, we held that the district court’s decision limiting discovery
   based on its determination of relevance constituted an abuse of discretion. Id.
   at 1159–60.
          Coughlin is distinguishable, however, because the trial court’s error
   there flowed from its refusal to compel the production of documents
   encompassed by the plaintiffs’ requests without substantial consideration. Id.
   at 1160 (“The district court appears to have limited discovery because it
   considered these files irrelevant to the plaintiffs’ freedom of speech case.”).
   Here, there was no request encompassing the information and the district
   court provided a reasonable justification for its interpretation of the
   contested request. At the hearing, Daywalker argued that a denial of her
   request would allow UTMB to evade liability “because of some technical
   reading of” her request for production. To the contrary, the record shows
   that the shortcoming in Daywalker’s case results from the imprecision with
   which the contested request was drafted, not the result of a mere technicality.
          As written, Daywalker’s requests could not be construed to
   incorporate the records of Residents Three and Sixteen because they were
   not third-year residents during the program year spanning from 2016 to 2017.
   And because they were not third-year residents from 2016 to 2017, it follows
   that they were not fourth-year residents from 2017 to 2018. For Daywalker
   to receive those documents, the magistrate judge would have had to re-write
   her document requests. On appeal, Daywalker cites no binding Fifth Circuit
   precedent for the proposition that a district court is obligated to reform a

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   party’s discovery requests to encapsulate desired, relevant information.
   Thus, we hold that the magistrate judge and district court did not commit
   reversible error by denying her request for production, and subsequently
   denying her motion for reconsideration.
          With respect to the district court’s standing order, Daywalker’s
   arguments also fail to demonstrate an abuse of discretion. She argues that the
   district court unfairly prevented her from reviewing the produced records of
   the other residents by limiting access to her counsel’s eyes only. UTMB
   counters that Daywalker’s substantial rights were not affected by the
   imposition of a standard protective order limiting access to confidential and
   sensitive information. It further argues that nothing in the disclosed
   performance records necessitated a medical degree or insider institutional
   knowledge to interpret them and that Daywalker “does not explain why it
   would take a medical doctor to ascertain whether the documents contained
   useful comparator information, and none is apparent from the record.”
          We again agree and find no reversible error. As aggrieved as
   Daywalker may feel from the dismissal of her claims against her employer,
   the record does not demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion
   by requiring her to abide by a protective order. She did not move to modify
   the order to assist her counsel, nor does she demonstrate that she could not
   sufficiently explain UTMB’s performance standards and scoring data to her
   counsel to supplement her search for comparator evidence. Thus, we hold
   that the magistrate judge’s and district court’s discovery determinations did
   not constitute abuses of discretion. See Williams, 23 F.4th at 514.
          C. Motion for Sanctions
          “We review a court’s granting or denial of a motion for sanctions
   under an abuse of discretion standard.” Haase v. Countrywide Home Loans,
   Inc., 748 F.3d 624, 630 (5th Cir. 2014). We have consistently held that this

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   standard of review is “necessarily very deferential.” Jenkins v. Methodist
   Hosps. of Dall., 478 F.3d 255, 264 (5th Cir. 2007). Daywalker contends that
   the district court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for
   sanctions against UTMB and its counsel for the alleged spoliation of evidence
   and its counsel’s alleged misconduct during depositions. Beyond referencing
   the allegations she made to the district court, Daywalker improperly attempts
   to incorporate the law and facts raised in her motion for sanctions by
   reference “[d]ue to word limitation[s] and the number of issues briefed in
   this case.”
           As a preliminary matter, we hold that the district court did not abuse
   its discretion in denying Daywalker’s motion for sanctions. The district court
   concluded that any deleted records relevant to her claims were cured through
   the production of other evidence, such as the Committee’s meeting minutes
   where the committee members discussed Daywalker. Furthermore,
   Daywalker did not brief the issue before the court in spite of our consistent
   holdings that a party must brief issues before us and cannot simply
   incorporate by reference their positions taken in district court.8 See, e.g., Peel
   & Co., Inc. v. The Rug Market, 238 F.3d 391, 398–99 (5th Cir. 2001).
   Nevertheless, even if we ignored her abandonment of the issue, there is no
   basis for reversal of the district court’s determination. In line with our

           _____________________
           8
             In her reply, Daywalker argues that incorporation by reference is permissible
   because “[t]here is no case law forbidding a party from citeimg [sic] or incorporating
   arguments already briefed and referenced in ROA [sic].” This ignores the Federal Rules of
   Appellate Procedure, Fifth Circuit rules, and our consistent and longstanding precedent
   that parties must brief their issues on appeal to obtain relief from this court. See Yohey v.
   Collins, 985 F.3d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 1993). Notably, Daywalker’s counsel had other
   options. In accordance with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Fifth Circuit
   rules, counsel could have moved to file a brief in excess of the page or word-volume
   limitations to ensure adequate space to explain her arguments that sanctions are
   appropriate. See Fed. R. App. P. 32; 5th Cir. R. 32.4.

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   established principle to defer to a district court’s denial to impose sanctions,
   we decline to reverse the district court’s decision in this case. See Jenkins,
   478 F.3d at 264.
           D. UTMB’s Motion for Summary Judgment
           We now turn to Daywalker’s challenge to the district court’s
   summary judgment to her Title VII, FMLA, and Rehabilitation Act claims.
   A district court’s summary judgment is subject to de novo review. Williams,
   23 F.4th at 512. We begin with Daywalker’s claims that UTMB unlawfully
   retaliated against her for taking protected actions under Title VII, the FMLA,
   and the Rehabilitation Act, as they are reviewed under the same burden-
   shifting framework.
                    i. Title VII Race Discrimination in Advancement Claim
           Title VII prohibits an employer from “fail[ing] to or refus[ing] to hire
   or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
   individual with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions, or
   privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
   sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). Our en banc court has
   recently made clear that a plaintiff is not required to suffer a permanent
   adverse employment decision to maintain a Title VII claim. Hamilton v.
   Dallas County, 79 F.4th 494, 502 (5th Cir. 2023) (en banc).9 However, to
   establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff
   must demonstrate that she was “treated less favorably because of [her]
   membership in [a] protected class than were other similarly situated
           _____________________
           9
              While the district court also held that Daywalker could not sustain her claim
   because no adverse employment action occurred, we note that she has preserved her claim
   of error in the district court and on appeal. Thus, Daywalker is entitled to the benefit of the
   substantive change of our Title VII jurisprudence that is congruent with her claim of error.
   See Harrison v. Brookhaven Sch. Dist., 82 F.4th 427, 428 (5th Cir. 2023).

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   employees who were not members of the protected class, under nearly
   identical circumstances.” Lee v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 259 (5th
   Cir. 2009).
          Where a plaintiff establishes less favorable treatment, an inference of
   racial discrimination is raised, and the burden then shifts to the employer to
   offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation. Id. (citing McDonnell
   Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). If the employer provides
   such an explanation, “the burden shifts back to the [plaintiff] to demonstrate
   that the employer’s explanation is merely a pretext for racial bias.” Id.
          Daywalker’s Title VII claims fail to surpass the first hurdle,
   establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. To survive summary
   judgment, she must show that she was treated less favorably than similarly
   situated employees who were not members of her protected class, under
   nearly identical circumstances. Paske v. Fitzgerald, 785 F.3d 977, 985 (5th Cir.
   2015). We have clarified that an appropriate comparator is an employee
   treated more favorably under the same circumstances or with “essentially
   comparable violation histories.” Lee, 574 F.3d at 260. This court has
   consistently rejected arguments that proffered comparators need not be
   nearly identical, that is, need not share similar attributes or responsibilities to
   sustain a claim. See Herster v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 887 F.3d
   177, 185 (5th Cir. 2018).
          For instance, in Saketkoo v. Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund,
   we held that the plaintiff, a female physician, failed to establish a prima facie
   case for gender discrimination where she did not “present evidence that any
   male physicians shared her research responsibilities, section assignments,
   historical performances, or other attributes that would render them similarly
   situated.” 31 F.4th 990, 998 (5th Cir. 2022). The Saketkoo panel determined
   that the standard to show discrimination is not met where a plaintiff offers no

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   explanation as to why the individuals are appropriate comparators. Id.at 999.
   The panel concluded that while she did identify that other male physicians,
   like herself, were not generating revenue from their practice, that alone was
   insufficient to render their experiences “nearly identical” in the field of
   academic medicine. Id. at 998–99.
          Just like in Saketkoo, Daywalker cannot establish a prima facie case of
   discrimination by merely pointing to other residents that UTMB’s faculty
   expressed concerns about. She has failed to show how their experiences in
   the field of practical medicine in Otolaryngology were “nearly identical.” See
   id. Furthermore, her arguments on appeal offer little to no explanation as to
   how Resident Three is an appropriate comparator. See id. at 999. Daywalker
   asserts that Resident Three is similarly situated because UTMB “would have
   provided Resident [Three]’s records if this were not the case.” She further
   asserts that “[i]t cannot be disputed in good faith that Daywalker has not met
   all elements of her race discrimination on her demotion and discharge
   claims.” UTMB counters that the record shows that Resident Three’s
   disciplinary history governed a vastly different faculty concern that she
   “[m]ay be having depth or eye/hand issues with endoscopic cases.” In other
   words, Resident Three has a disciplinary history with no similarity to
   Daywalker’s.
          We hold that summary judgment was appropriate as to Daywalker’s
   Title VII claims because she has not proven her prima facie case to raise the
   inference of racial discrimination. The district court noted that Resident
   Three did not have issues with the accuracy and punctuality of recording
   medical notes and “was in a different stage of the disciplinary process.”
   Beyond making the bare assertion that Resident Three is an appropriate
   comparator, Daywalker offers no explanation of how Resident Three is
   similarly situated to her. See Saketkoo, 31 F.4th at 999; see also Turner v. Baylor
   Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[A] party cannot

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   defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated
   assertions, or ‘only a scintilla of evidence.’”). Setting aside any possible
   issues of abandonment due to the limited discussion of this issue in her
   briefs,10 we hold that Daywalker failed to adduce evidence of a comparator
   with comparable violation histories to raise an inference of racial
   discrimination. See Saketkoo, 31 F.4th at 999–1000. Ordinarily, the Title VII
   inquiry ends here because a plaintiff’s “Title VII claims fail[] as a matter of
   law” where they are unable to prove a prima facie case of discrimination. See
   Alkhawaldeh v. Dow Chem. Co., 851 F.3d 422, 426 (5th Cir. 2017).
           In the interest of completeness, however, we evaluate Daywalker’s
   assertion that she has proven that UTMB’s non-discriminatory justification
   was a pretext for racial discrimination. Assuming arguendo that her Title VII
   claims present a prima facie case of racial discrimination, her claims fail
   because she cannot demonstrate that UTMB’s alleged non-discriminatory
   ground for termination—her untimely clinical notetaking—is merely
   pretextual. After presenting a prima facie case of discrimination, a defendant
   must offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory justification for the alleged
   discriminatory conditions. See Septimus v. Univ. of Hous., 399 F.3d 601, 609
   (5th Cir. 2005). In that case, summary judgment is appropriate unless the
   plaintiff demonstrates that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to
   whether the proffered legitimate reasons are a pretext for discrimination. Id.
   Even if an employer’s stated non-discriminatory justification lacks support,
   it does not violate Title VII if it acted on a reasonably held belief. Dickerson v.

           _____________________
           10
               Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(4) requires that an “appellant’s
   argument contain the reasons [she] deserves the requested relief with citation to the
   authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on.” Weaver v. Puckett, 896 F.2d 126, 128
   (5th Cir. 1990) (internal quotations omitted). We have deemed arguments containing mere
   conclusory assertions without sufficient support from caselaw or the record abandoned. See
   Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.3d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 1993).

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   Metropolitan Dade County, 659 F.2d 574, 581 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (“Even if
   [the employer] w[as] wrong in its evaluation of the [employee’s
   performance], it did not violate Title VII if it acted on a reasonable belief
   about [the conduct].”).
          On appeal, Daywalker asserts that she demonstrated pretext because
   (1) Dr. Resto admitted to her in a meeting in the summer of 2018 that “there
   was no validity to the remediation”; (2) she invalidated the reasons offered
   in Dr. Szeremeta’s remediation memo with her own recounting of the events;
   and (3) Dr. Resto and Dr. Siddiqui said she was “passing” her remediation
   plan in July 2018. UTMB argues that any comment about the “validity” of
   the remediation plan does not establish a fact issue as to pretext because “the
   remediation and UTMB’s decision to retain her as a [third-year resident]
   were separate acts, even if based on some of the same underlying conduct.”
   UTMB further contends that no “fundamentally different” rationales exist
   to establish pretext through inconsistency and that Dr. Resto’s comments
   “do not disprove that the faculty was concerned that ‘her notes were
   untimely and inaccurate.’”
          We conclude on these facts that the district court appropriately
   determined that Daywalker did not create a fact issue as to pretext. UTMB
   supervisors’ comments on Daywalker’s progress on her clinical charting
   skills during her first three years of residency are a mixed bag. Numerous
   comments for years two and three show that she did extremely well in certain
   rotations. However, the record also shows that numerous supervisors
   throughout the entirety of her time at UTMB commented on her need to
   improve her clinical notetaking skills and timeliness in recording patient
   notes. Daywalker admitted in her opposition to summary judgment that she
   did not complete some of the patient notes in a timely manner. In a July 2018
   meeting with Dr. Siddiqui and Dr. Resto, Dr. Siddiqui informed Daywalker
   that she “continued to have lapses in documentation, [] was late on a call

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   note,” and that her clinical efficiency skills lagged behind what was expected
   for a resident of her experience. Notably, UTMB’s program requires senior
   residents to exhibit higher levels of clinical competency such that select
   positive reviews from years one and two cannot be said to be an accurate
   determinator that Daywalker would consistently meet expectations as she
   gained more responsibility. Numerous documents in the record support
   UTMB’s stated justification that Daywalker had difficulties with the timely
   charting of patient notes.
          Daywalker does not attack UTMB’s reliance on its justification as
   unreasonable, which only further supports this conclusion. See Baker v. Exxon
   Chem. Americas, 68 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (noting plaintiff’s
   failure to show pretext or disprove reasonable reliance on stated justification
   for failure-to-promote claim did not merit reversal). Thus, summary
   judgment was appropriate as to her Title VII claims because she did not
   provide evidence creating a fact dispute as to pretext.
                 ii. Title VII Hostile Work Environment Claim
          Title VII also makes it unlawful to subject employees “to work in a
   discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment.” Gardner v. CLC of
   Pascagoula, L.L.C., 915 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2019). To bring a hostile work
   environment claim, a plaintiff must show that they were harassed based on
   their status within a protected class in such a pervasive and severe manner to
   affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment. See, e.g., West v. City of
   Houston, 960 F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 2020). A court must look at the totality
   of the circumstances to determine whether the alleged discriminatory
   conduct unreasonably interferes with an employee’s performance, including
   the severity and frequency of the conduct and whether it is comprised of
   physical threats or humiliation, or are merely offensive utterances. See Harris

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   v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). The alleged hostile environment
   must be both objectively and subjectively offensive. Id. at 21–22.
          Here, the objectively offensive requirement is determinative of
   Daywalker’s claim. We have held that “[d]iscriminatory verbal intimidation,
   ridicule, and insults may be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
   conditions” of employment and “create an abusive working environment
   that violates Title VII.” Wallace v. Tex. Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1049 n.9
   (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). One instance where the racially
   discriminatory remarks and intimidation crossed the line occurred in Walker
   v. Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 626 (5th Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by
   Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006). The district
   court in Walker granted summary judgment as to a Black employee’s hostile
   work environment claims because it concluded that none of the comments
   were physically threatening or humiliating. Id. at 625–26. This court reversed
   because the district court ignored substantial evidence creating a fact dispute
   as to the severity and pervasiveness of the consistent use of racial epithets
   and derisive remarks against Black employees in the workplace over a period
   of three years.11 Id. at 626.

          _____________________
          11
             The panel summarized some of the evidence of the pervasive discriminatory
   animus as follows:
          The offensive remarks began in 1994, shortly after [plaintiff] was hired and
          had not ceased the week prior to the appellants’ resignations in May of
          1997. While working for [her employer], the [Black employees] at various
          times were subjected to: comparisons to slaves and monkeys, derisive
          remarks regarding their African heritage, patently offensive remarks
          regarding the hair of African–Americans, and conversations in which a co-
          worker and supervisor used the word “n*gger.” The office manager also
          informed them that the vice-president did not want the African–American
          women to talk to each other.
   Id.

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          Based on the evidence adduced at the district court, this is not such a
   case where the district court ignored years of derisive comments and
   intimidating behavior to grant summary judgment in UTMB’s favor. The
   evidence presented in cases like Walker goes far beyond the conduct alleged
   here. At most, Daywalker has shown that Dr. Szeremeta made a handful of
   statements offensive to employees of color over the span of a few years. The
   insensitive statements are separated by months, and most involve instances
   where Dr. Szeremeta gave feedback or criticism about Daywalker’s
   performance. However, the course of alleged racially insensitive treatment is
   less prolonged and pervasive than other cases where we determined that the
   plaintiff failed to show that they suffered from extraordinarily pervasive
   discriminatory conduct. See Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d
   337, 347–48 (5th Cir. 2007) (determining that no reasonable jury could find
   that the employer’s consistent comments on “ghetto children” and Black
   employees’ spending habits and family structure were sufficiently pervasive
   to create a hostile work environment). Therefore, we hold that summary
   judgment was appropriate as to Daywalker’s Title VII hostile work
   environment claim.
                 iii. Title VII Constructive Discharge Claim
          A resignation is actionable under Title VII where it constitutes a
   constructive discharge. Brown v. Kinney Show Corp., 237 F.3d 556, 566 (5th
   Cir. 2001). To prove constructive discharge, the plaintiff must demonstrate
   that their “working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable employee
   would feel compelled to resign.” Faruki v. Parson, S.I.P., Inc., 123 F.3d 315,
   319 (5th Cir. 1997). We have accepted certain events—demotions,
   reductions in salary or responsibilities, assignment to degrading work,
   badgering or harassment by an employer to encourage resignation, and offers
   to place them on early retirement—are evidence of circumstances where a
   reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign. Brown v. Bunge Corp.,

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   207 F.3d 776, 782 (5th Cir. 2000). “Constructive discharge requires a greater
   degree of harassment than that required by a hostile environment claim.”
   Kinney Shoe, 237 F.3d at 566. Based on our constructive discharge
   jurisprudence and the reasons given above, we hold that Daywalker’s
   constructive discharge claim also fails. See id.
          Even absent our jurisprudence’s ascription of a higher degree of
   harassment to maintain a constructive discharge claim, Daywalker’s claim
   would nonetheless fail to survive summary judgment. For instance, in
   Lauderdale v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, a female correctional
   officer alleged that her supervisor sexually harassed her over a period of four
   months while she worked in a state facility. 512 F.3d 157, 161 (5th Cir. 2007).
   The district court denied her constructive discharge claim because she did
   not present evidence that the sexual harassment was calculated to encourage
   her resignation or evidence of intentional animus to “create or perpetuate
   the intolerable conditions compelling resignation.” Id. at 167 (quoting Haley
   v. Alliance Compressor, 391 F.3d 644, 650 (5th Cir. 2004)). The panel
   determined that the plaintiff “merely reiterated the facts that constituted
   harassment” and that her “failure to [adequately] brief and to correctly
   distinguish constructive discharge from her harassment claim [meant that]
   she ha[d] failed to create a genuine issue of material fact that a reasonable
   employee would have felt compelled to resign under the same
   circumstances.” Id.
          Daywalker’s case is strikingly similar in terms of its deficiencies to the
   plaintiff’s in Lauderdale. However, she asserts in her brief that hostile work
   environment claims and constructive discharge claims are functionally
   coextensive without noting the distinctions established by our jurisprudence.
   Her analysis, however, misses the mark. For these reasons, we hold that
   summary judgment in favor of UTMB as to Daywalker’s constructive
   discharge claim was appropriate. Id. at 167.

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                 iv. Title VII Retaliation Claim
          Daywalker’s Title VII, FMLA, and Rehabilitation Act retaliation
   claims also fail here. We evaluate each of these claims under functionally
   similar structures based on the same McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
   framework. See, e.g., Lindsley v. TRT Holdings, Inc., 984 F.3d 460, 469 (5th
   Cir. 2021); Jenkins v. Cleco Power, LLC, 487 F.3d 309, 316 n.3 (5th Cir. 2007).
   To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that “a causal
   link exists between the protected activity” and the complained of
   discriminatory “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” or adverse
   employment action. See Gorman v. Verizon Wireless Tex., L.L.C., 753 F.3d
   165, 170 (5th Cir. 2014); Hamilton, 79 F.4th at 499–506 (eliminating the
   adverse employment action requirement from a prima facie case). Plaintiffs
   must prove their claims “according to traditional principles of but-for
   causation.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013).
          On appeal, Daywalker argues that the close proximity of time between
   her internal discrimination complaint and the August 8, 2018 letter is
   evidence of a causal link between her protected activity and UTMB’s
   discriminatory terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. She further
   asserts that Dr. Pine spoke to her as a representative of the Committee and
   faculty when he told Daywalker that she would never be an Otolaryngologist
   if she did not sign the remediation plan and that “a sizeable group in the
   faculty” thought she would not finish the program. She contends that
   because Dr. Pine made these comments during the pending investigations
   against Dr. Szeremeta and Dr. Siddiqui, “they are evidence a [sic] retaliatory
   animus of the faculty.”
          Daywalker brings a “cat’s paw” argument, a theory of proving
   causation in discrimination cases by asserting that an individual with racially
   discriminatory animus infected the decision-making process. EEOC v.

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   Emcare, Inc., 857 F.3d 678, 684 & n.3 (5th Cir. 2017). Here, she argues that
   Dr. Pine and Dr. Szeremeta asserted influence over the rest of the faculty to
   hold her back as a third-year resident. However, merely asserting a theory is
   not enough. We have held that a plaintiff pursuing this theory of causation
   must demonstrate that individuals with discriminatory animus “had
   influence or leverage over the official decisionmaker.” Russell v. McKinney
   Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 226 (5th Cir. 2000). Beyond making these
   unsubstantiated allegations, Daywalker points to no specific evidence
   showing how Dr. Szeremeta and Dr. Pine tainted the deliberative process or
   had “influence or leverage” over the entire faculty. See id.
          In fact, she does not include more than conclusory allegations that the
   evidence and allegations presented at the district court even satisfy the
   relevant standards. Therefore, we hold that summary judgment was
   appropriate to Daywalker’s Title VII retaliation claim. Nassar, 570 U.S. at
   360.
                 v. FMLA Retaliation Claim
          Daywalker also brings a retaliation claim under the FMLA. The
   FMLA prohibits retaliation against employees that exercise their FMLA
   rights. Campos v. Steves & Sons, Inc., 10 F.4th 515, 527 (5th Cir. 2021). In her
   prima facie case, a plaintiff is required to demonstrate that she was treated
   less favorably than an employee who had not requested leave under the
   FMLA or that she suffered from discriminatory conditions of employment
   because she sought protection under the FMLA. See id. A plaintiff must
   provide evidence of a causal link, and her claim is subject to the McDonnell
   Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Caldwell v. KHOU-TV, 850 F.3d
   237, 245–46 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[E]ven if the plaintiff makes out a prima facie
   case, he may not overcome a motion for summary judgment if the employer
   articulates a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the employment action

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                                          No. 22-40813

   at issue.”). A plaintiff may use retaliatory comments to establish causation.
   See Saketkoo, 31 F.4th at 1001.
           The reasons articulated in our analysis of her other claims
   demonstrate that Daywalker’s FMLA claim also fails under the burden-
   shifting framework. Caldwell, 850 F.3d at 245. But in the interest of
   completeness and because the district court addressed these claims, we
   endeavor to address her arguments as to her FMLA retaliation claim.12
   Because she has not pointed to comparator evidence on her FMLA claim, we
   look to her other offered circumstantial evidence of causation. See Saketkoo,
   31 F.4th at 1001. One of her primary arguments is that a short temporal link
   of a few months existed between her putting Dr. Resto on notice of her
   disabilities and the cause for her FMLA leave in a meeting in June 2018 and
   again in October 2018. She maintains that UTMB “did not notify [her that]
   she had been demoted until she returned from FMLA leave on November 6,
   2018.” She alternatively contends that Dr. Pine’s statements made on
   August 8, 2018 that she would likely not finish the program if she did not
   agree to repeat select third-year rotations demonstrates retaliatory animus.
   Thus, she concludes that her proffered evidence in addition to the underlying
   “falsity of the remediation” plan is sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
           We disagree. The record contains numerous sources that provide that
   UTMB’s faculty decided to have Daywalker repeat certain third-year
   rotations before her request to convert her personal leave to FMLA leave was
   received. For instance, the Committee’s August 6, 2018 meeting minutes
   show that the committee discussed holding Daywalker back as a third-year
   resident after she returned from leave. The August 8, 2018 letter was
           _____________________
           12
             In her brief, Daywalker admits that the analyses for all of her retaliation claims
   are closely related and essentially advances the same arguments as to the causal link
   required to prove her prima facie case.

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                                      No. 22-40813

   delivered on that date and stated that her leave was not considered FMLA. It
   follows that the letter explicitly stated so because the program staff did not
   know she sought FMLA leave.
          UTMB points out that an employee is required to “provide at least
   verbal notice sufficient to make the employer aware that the employee needs
   FMLA-qualifying leave, and the anticipated timing and duration of the
   leave.” Daywalker’s statement that she “thought [she] might qualify for
   FMLA” leave made to UTMB’s administration in early August thus cannot
   be interpreted as sufficient verbal notice to trigger FMLA protection pre-
   dating the August 8, 2018 letter. Furthermore, Daywalker’s exact words in
   her August 1, 2018 email requesting leave stated that “I would like to inform
   the [Graduate Medical Education] Office of my official request to take a leave
   of absence.” Looking to her complaint, Daywalker averred that she engaged
   counsel to “draft[] a letter requesting FMLA [leave], among other things”
   after she received the August 8, 2018 letter. Thus, we hold that the record
   demonstrates that summary judgment in favor of UTMB was appropriate as
   to Daywalker’s FMLA retaliation claim because she did not create a fact issue
   as to the causal link between her protected activity and the alleged
   discriminatory terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. See Saketkoo,
   31 F.4th at 1001.
                  vi. Rehabilitation Act Retaliation Claim
          The Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination based solely on
   account of a person’s disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Under the Rehabilitation
   Act, unlike Title VII, liability arises “only if the discrimination occurred
   ‘solely by reason of [plaintiff’s] disability,’ not when it is simply a ‘motivating
   factor.’” See Houston v. Tex. Dep’t of Agric., 17 F.4th 576, 585 (5th Cir. 2021)
   (quoting Soledad v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 304 F.3d 500, 505 (5th Cir.
   2002)). Rehabilitation Act claims are also evaluated under the McDonnell

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   Douglas burden-shifting framework. See id. Because we have held that
   Daywalker has failed to show that UTMB’s proffered non-discriminatory
   reasons for its decision were pretextual, her Rehabilitation Act claim also
   fails. See id. at 586 (denying Rehabilitation Act claim for the same reasons the
   plaintiff’s FMLA claims were rejected because she incorporated her
   arguments together and admitted they were “intimately connected”).
   Notably, Daywalker’s arguments that UTMB had notice of her disability as
   early as June 2018 do not square with the record or our caselaw. See, e.g.,
   Hileman v. City of Dallas, 115 F.3d 352, 353 (5th Cir. 1997); Soledad, 304 F.3d
   at 505. Throughout her brief, Daywalker offers only conclusory assertions
   that UTMB’s conduct, whether it be through Dr. Pine, Dr. Szeremeta, the
   Committee, or the faculty at large demonstrates that her disability was the
   sole reason for her alleged discrimination. Thus, we hold that summary
   judgment was appropriate as to her Rehabilitation Act claim because she has
   not provided sufficient evidence of a causal link between the alleged
   discrimination and her disability status.
                               III. Conclusion
          In sum, we hold that (1) UTMB’s medical residents are students
   covered by FERPA; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in
   making any discovery decisions in this case and in denying Daywalker’s
   motion for sanctions; and (3) summary judgment was appropriate because
   Daywalker could not provide sufficient evidence to create a material fact
   dispute as to her Title VII, FMLA, and Rehabilitation Act claims. Thus, we
   AFFIRM.

                                         28