Court Opinion

ID: 9834058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:16:01.752217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:11.284401
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Defendant in error has filed a motion for rehearing in which he contends that our decision is in conflict with Sheffield v. Hogg (Tex. Sup.) 77 S.W.(2d) 1021, 1022, *357wherein we held that appellee did not own an interest in real estate after executing the assignment of the lease to Caldwell. We cannot agree with this contention. In the Hogg Case the lease contained the following provision, to wit: “Fifth: (a) In consideration of this lease second party agrees that first parties shall have the following royalty of the gross production of all oil or gas wells on said lands, to-wit: one-eighth of all oil and one-eighth of all gas; and first parties’ one-eighth royalty interest in all oil and gas marketed from said land to be paid over to them by second party at the end of each month, or whenever second party shall receive pay therefor, such royalty to be delivered by second party to the credit of first parties in any pipe-line or pipe-lines which said first parties may designate, and which connect with the wells or connect with the settling tanks of second party, free of any charge to first parties, or into said first parties’ own private storage upon said land, or upon their other land adjoining, at the expense of said first parties; and first parties shall have one-eighth interest in all money realized from gas marketed from said land-, as a royalty to be paid over to them, or their order, at the end of each month, or whenever second party shall receive pay therefor.”
No similar provision is found in defendant in error’s assignment of his lease. Defendant in error was not to receive anything as rents or royalty; he was to receive purchase money.
It occurs to us that what defendant in error had under, his assignment was a covenant provision to be paid $16,250 out of one-fourth of seven-eighths of the oil produced from the land, and that this covenant would run with the land and be binding on subsequent purchasers who bought with knowledge of the covenant.
However, whether defendant in error held an interest in the land or not, this suit was an action in equity to cancel a release and could only be maintained upon the theory that the record of this alleged release might affect the rights of defendant in error if the lease should be transferred to a purchaser who had no knowledge of this release being void, as contended by defendant in error. The trial court would not have jurisdiction of such a suit against nonresident defendants served only with out of state process.
What was said by Justice McClendon in American Soda Fountain Co. v. Hairston Drug Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 52 S.W.(2d) 764, is very much in point in this case. The following quotation is found in 52 S.W.(2d) 764, on page 767 of that decision:
“The action was in form clearly one for damages for breach of warranty and fraud, and the prayer for general relief would have supported a personal judgment. The specific relief prayed for was a credit on the notes and pro tanto cancellation of the lien. In so far as the suit may be construed as an affirmative action based upon fraud or breach of warranty, it was clearly a personal action.
“In so far as it merely sought a credit upon the indebtedness represented by the notes, it was purely a matter of defense which could be urged whenever action was brought on the notes (Mason v. Peterson [Tex. Com. App.] 250 S. W. 142), and could not form the basis of an independent suit. An independent action -to enforce the credit must rest upon some equitable ground; and, since the credit claimed constituted a defense, pro tanto, to the notes, except in the hands of a bona fide holder, it follows that to obtain any relief it ipust be shown that the notes were not due, and there was danger of their passing into the hands of a bona fide purchaser before maturity. The only relief which equity could afford would be to enjoin the negotiation of the notes or to compel by mandatory injunction the entering of a credit thereon. This relief would be personal, and could not be granted or enforced against a party over whose person the court had not obtained jurisdiction.
“In so far as the action sought cancellation pro tanto of the lien, and to that extent may be regarded as one only in rem against a nonresident, it would be governed by the provisions of R. S. arts. 1975 — 1979. These articles were not complied with (1) in respect to service (Wilson v. Bank, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 54, 63 S. W. 1067, error refused; Norvell v. Pye [Tex. Civ. App.] 95 S. W. 666); and (2) in the inhibition against a judgment by default and the requirement of a statement of facts (article 1978). These articles provide a method whereby titles and interests in property situated in this state may be adjudicated so as to bind the *358rights of nonresidents, who cannot he reached' by the ordinary processes of the .courts of this state, on account of want of jurisdiction over their persons. The state has the power to provide for such adjudication, and, when it has prescribed the procedure therein, we think such procedure is exclusive.
“From whatever viewpoint the judgment be regarded, it cannot in our opinion be sustained.
“In remanding the cause for further proceedings, it should be noted that the prosecution of the writ of error by the soda fountain company, in which it invoked the jurisdiction of this court, and thereby sought and obtained a reversal of the judgment against it, constituted a personal appearance on its part as a litigant, and it will not be necessary to issue further process.
“The trial court’s judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court for a new trial.”
We adhere to our original disposition of this cause and, accordingly, defendant in error’s motion for rehearing will be overruled.