Court Opinion

ID: 9858845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:57:49.189299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:57:03.620421
License: Public Domain

GLADNEY, Justice Ad Hoc
(dissenting). .
Louisiana’s Workmen’s' Compensation Act is restricted to injuries occurring in hazardous businesses, trades, or occupations, as designated in R.S. 23:1035. Included are those specifically enumerated and others indirectly by reason of certain hazardous characteristics.
We find in the last classification, hazardous businesses, involve “ * * * the construction, installation, operation, alteration, removal or repairs of wires, cables, switchboards or apparatus charged with electric current.”
The salient facts in the instant case disclose that Fontenot was employed in a business not listed as hazardous per se; that his accidental injury occurred while performing non-hazardous duties; and that he also was employed to operate a cash register and a conveyor belt empowered by a small electric motor. The facts relating to the employee’s operation of the cash register and conveyor belt were determined by, the Court of Appeal (232 So.2d 143) :
“The cash register which he used was ' powered by a small enclosed electric motor. He operated it simply by punching some keys or buttons located on the front of the device to ring up the amount of each sale. . Several girls were regularly employed to serve as checkers or cashiers, . and plaintiff was required to work in that *241capacity only when there was a 'rush’ in .the store. The evidence does not show that he was ever required to repair the . register, to change a tape on it or to expose the motor or wiring in any manner.
“The counter near the cash register ■was equipped with two moving rubber conveyer belts. These belts were looped t: .over rollers or pulleys, and two electric '•‘nlotors connected with these pulleys caused':each belt to move when the current was applied" to the proper motor. The ■counter-top surface of each belt was ' .about 18 inches wide and four to five feet long. One belt was used to convey' the merchandise which had been check■ed away from the cashier to the front ■end of the counter where it was bagged and taken by the customer. The first ■ belt was activated or caused to move by a foot switch which was depressed by the ■cashier with his foot when he wanted to ■draw the merchandise toward him. The ■other belt was activated by a hand switch, similar to an electric light wall switch. The cashier turned on that switch with . his hand when he wanted to move merchandise on the counter away from him.
...“The two electric motors which op-crated these belts were located at opposite ends of the checking counter. The cashier stood near the center of that counter, so' he' was several feet from .-either motor-while he was checking mer'chandise.' Both motors and all pulleys were completely enclosed, and a person could not come in contact with either of the motors or with any of the pulleys or wiring without first using a screwdriver to remove one of the covering panels. The evidence shows that these panels were removed only by maintenance men, and not by cashiers or stockers..
“A metal plate covered the crack or space near the center of the checker’s counter where these two belts came together. Occasionally coins or other small items would slide under the metal plate and drop between the two moving belts. When that occurred, the cashier usually lifted up the metal plate and reached down between the belts and retrieved the coin or other small item. This space between the two belts was about one foot wide. The motor, of course, would not be operating when these items were remov- . ed, and no motors, wires or pulleys were exposed at the place where the items dropped.
His operation of the cash register and conveyer-belt did not, therefore, regularly expose him to or bring him into frequent contact with a hazardous feature of this non-hazardous business, and they were not of such a nature as to be inherently more hazardous than those ordinarily encountered so that the danger of harm to him increased with their use.
As a consequence, actual operation of these devices is without conceivable risk *243of injury and does not in fact constitute a hazardous feature of plaintiff’s employment. The- Court of Appeal so found, holding:
“The test to be applied in determining whether electrically-operated appliances or machinery are hazardous, and thus whether the Workmen’s Compensation Act should apply to a person who regularly uses those devices in otherwise nonhazardous business, is simply whether the employee’s use of or exposure to these devices is such that the risk of a work-connected injury is materially or substantially increased over what it would have been had the employee not been subjected to these hazards.”
The majority opinion of this court in referring to the rule so applied by the Court of Appeal, declared:
“Although we realize that the test set down by the Court of Appeal finds support in earlier opinions of the Courts of Appeal,1 we do not agree with the court’s
conclusion or the rationale of those pronouncements. R.S. 23:1035 declares that its provisions shall apply to every person performing services arising out of and incidental to his employment in the course of his employer’s business in certain named hazardous trades, one of which is the 'operation * * * of apparatus charged with electrical current.’ The language is clear and unambiguous. We cannot, under the guise of statutory interpretation, insert into the statute a provision which would permit distinguishing between various kinds of electrical apparatus or appliances, and limit its scope to those which are thought to be more dangerous than others. To the contrary, giving the act a liberal interpretation to effect compensation coverage, which we are bound to do, we must construe the statute so as to cover the operation of any apparatus charged with electrical current, without regard to its size or the extent of its inherent danger.”
In rejecting an adjudication of the case upon its facts the decree has held hazardous that which is in fact not hazardous. This construction of R.S. 23 :1035 is repugnant to and inconsistent with the avowed purpose of the statute and intention of the legislature to restrict its scope to hazardous employments.
Progress has imposed upon almost every business now regarded as non-hazardous the necessity of using electricity in its daily operations. Must those classifications be *245changed because an employer is required to regularly use an electric typewriter, a telephone or some other harmless electric device?
If the Workmen’s Compensation Act does restrict its application to businesses classified as hazardous under R.S. 23:1035 such as are not hazardous in fact should not be .affected by the statute. The construction so accorded R.S. 23:1035, in my opinion, is inconsistent with established guidelines for statutory interpretation. Thus the primary object in construing a statute is to give effect to the intention of the legislature and the intent as deduced from the whole will prevail over the part considered separately. Fruge v. Muffoletto, 242 La. 659, 137 So.2d 336; and meaning that will extend the statute to a situation never intended to be covered thereby will not be imputed. Emmons v. Agricultural Insurance Company, 245 La. 411, 158 So.2d 594; on remand 163 So.2d 812. Justice Strong of the United States Supreme Court in The Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 227, 22 L.Ed. 80, 81, upon consideration of an interpretation of a provision in the statute, said:
“The broad construction of the Act contended for makes it plainly repugnant to the body of the Act, and therefore is inadmissible.”
Being of the opinion the majority decision of this court is in error, I respectfully dissent from the views expressed therein.

. The eases listed in note 1 are:
“Claiborne v. Smith, 2 So.2d 714; Harrington v. Franklin’s Stores Corp. of New Iberia, 55 So.2d 647; Coleman v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, 83 So.2d 469; Leleau v. Jacomine, 144 So.2d 921; and Honeycutt v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, 146 So.2d 860. But compare Pinchera v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, Inc., 206 So.2d 793.”