Court Opinion

ID: 9744693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:12:49.908874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:20:57.627592
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE MILLER, specially concurring: I concur in the court’s judgments in the present appeals. I do not agree, however, with the majority’s suggestion that today’s holdings are dictated by constitutional concerns, and for that reason I write separately. The common question in these consolidated appeals is properly resolved as one of statutory construction, not constitutional interpretation. Accordingly, our task in this regard is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent. (Croissant v. Joliet Park District (1990), 141 Ill. 2d 449, 455.) That inquiry appropriately begins with the language of the statute. (People v. Dare (1988), 119 Ill. 2d 441, 447.) Section 2 — 118.1(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code provides that the rescission hearing is to be conducted “[w]ithin 30 days after receipt of the written request” for a hearing (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95½, par. 2 — 118.1(b)). The statute does not impose any additional duty on a driver, and I agree with the majority that the time period provided by the statute begins to run when the driver submits and properly serves a written request for a hearing, in accordance with our rules regarding service. I do not agree, however, with the majority’s further statement that every failure to conduct a hearing within the time allowed by section 2 — 118.1 must be deemed unconstitutional, resulting in a denial of due process. (154 Ill. 2d at 253, 261.) It is certainly true that a driver’s license is a protectible property interest and that the due process clause governs its suspension or revocation. (Bell v. Burson (1971), 402 U.S. 535, 29 L. Ed. 2d 90, 91 S. Ct. 1586.) Due process, however, does not invariably require a predeprivation hearing whenever the State seeks to restrict a person’s driving privileges (Mackey v. Montrym (1979), 443 U.S. 1, 61 L. Ed. 2d 321, 99 S. Ct. 2612; Dixon v. Love (1977), 431 U.S. 105, 52 L. Ed. 2d 172, 97 S. Ct. 1723), and we have previously found that a presuspension hearing is not required under the summary suspension provision involved here (People v. Gerke (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 85, 91). Because the summary suspension of a driver’s license is not effective until the 46th day after the driver receives the necessary notice of that action (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 95½, par. 11 — 501.1(g)), the hearing provided by section 2 — 118.1 may occur either before or after the suspension will take effect, depending on how prompt the driver is in making the request. (People v. Esposito (1988), 121 Ill. 2d 491, 507.) Thus, section 2 — 118.1(b) may afford drivers greater protection than is constitutionally required, and failure to conduct a hearing within the time limit set forth in that provision would not necessarily result in a denial of due process. For the reasons stated, I concur in the court’s judgments in the present appeals.