Court Opinion

ID: 9727061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:18:49.3444+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:33.221677
License: Public Domain

SAYLOR, Justice,
concurring opinion
The order under review providing for temporary protection from abuse barred Baker from “abusing, harassing, threatening and stalking [N.B.] or placing her in fear of abuse in any place where she may be found.” The majority finds such directive insufficiently specific to proscribe his public expression of an intent to kill N.B. In reaching this conclusion, the majority adopts the reasoning of the Superior Court majority to the effect that, although Baker’s expression was “threatening in nature,” the protection order failed to apprise whether such statements were prohibited only in N.B.’s presence or if communicated to her. The majority does not advise, however, from what portion of the order it deems the uncertainty to arise.
Certainly, as the majority effectively concedes, there should be no uncertainty that the proscription against “threatening” would generally bar public expressions of an intent to kill another — the common understanding of the term does not entail an element of presence or communication vis-á-vis the intended victim. See, e.g., Webster’s New World College Dictionary (4th ed.1999) (defining the term “threat” as “an expression of intention to hurt, destroy, punish, etc.”). It may be, then, that the majority relies upon the order’s employment *201of the phrase “in any place in which she may be found” as implying a limitation concerning presence or communication. I do not believe, however, that this is either the intent of the order or the likely interpretation of a subject.
Significantly, the order under consideration is, for all intents and purposes, identical to the standard form of order for temporary protection from abuse set forth in Rule of Civil Procedure 1905. See Pa.R.C.P. No.1905 (prescribing in the standard form of order that “[djefendant shall not abuse, stalk, harass, threaten the Plaintiff or any other protected person in any place where they might be found”). Presently, therefore, the Court is not merely deciding a case; rather, it is effectively determining the scope of all temporary orders for protection from abuse as implemented through the directive of Rule 1905. The majority’s decision means that, unless and until Rule 1905 is amended, all subjects of temporary protection from abuse orders are free to publicly express their intentions to inflict harm upon the petitioner, so long as there is no evidence of presence or communication. In this regard, I share the concern expressed in the Superior Court dissent that permitting such conduct, which is clearly disrespectful of the court’s intervention, would thwart important purposes of the Act. See Commonwealth v. Baker, 722 A.2d 718, 724 (Pa.Super.1998)(Orie Melvin, J., dissenting)(emphasizing the Act’s aim of reacting to early signs of abuse and preventing more serious abuse from occurring, as well as its numerous provisions which enable courts to respond quickly and flexibly to advance warnings of abuse).
While I have little difficulty concluding that Baker’s statement fell within the contemplation of the court’s order, I concur in the decision to vacate the contempt citation, as I find the record insufficient to support the penalty imposed. The record of the underlying PFA case suggests that the trial court entered the temporary protection order without conducting an ex parte proceeding and without the threshold finding that N.B. faced immediate danger. See generally 23 Pa.C.S. § 6107(b). Indeed, since N.B. apparently did not pursue the matter beyond the mere filing of her petition, there is no *202record evidence or finding that she ever suffered abuse or was at risk of harm.1 While the court’s temporary protection order so entered was properly served upon Baker, the record of the contempt proceedings (reflected in the form of a stipulation to the fact of the statement and the general circumstances under which it was made) does not reveal specifics concerning the nature of the explanation provided by the deputies who served the order; further, Baker’s offending utterance, having occurred shortly after service of the order, was apparently made without significant opportunity for reflection upon the implications of that order. Nor does the record reflect that the deputies subsequently cautioned Baker concerning the inappropriateness of his comment in light of the order, or were faced with repeated or flagrant conduct. Additionally, while Baker’s comment was certainly an expression of anger directed at N.B., it was not necessarily a description of an actual, intended course of future conduct. While many of these factors would go more to Baker’s degree of culpability than to the fact of a violation, such legal conclusions are more closely intertwined in the area of indirect criminal contempt than in usual judicial proceedings. See generally Cooke v. United, States, 267 U.S. 517, 538, 45 S.Ct. 390, 395, 69 L.Ed. 767 (1925)(stating that “the intention with which acts of contempt have been committed must necessarily and properly have an important bearing on the degree of guilt and the penalty which should be imposed”).2 Therefore, while *203the seriousness of Baker’s utterance cannot reasonably be disputed, some further finding by the trial court related to the intention or effect of Baker’s statement would have been warranted, beyond the mere conclusion that his speech was a voluntary act, prior to the imposition of a sanction reaching to the maximum available penalty. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 6113-14(b)(establishing the maximum period of incarceration for indirect criminal contempt for violation of a protection order as six months). Absent such finding, an appellate court is simply unable to judge whether the punishment of incarceration imposed was reasonably commensurate with the gravity of the offense and an exercise of the least oppressive sanction necessary to redress the violation.
Chief Justice FLAHERTY joins this concurring opinion.

. Notably, N.B. herself ultimately became the subject of contempt proceedings initiated by the court for her failure to pay prescribed costs after failing to pursue her petition.

. Significantly, courts have been circumspect in their resort to contempt powers, restraint in this area being particularly appropriate since indirect criminal contempt generally involves violation of parameters of acceptable behavior established by the courts, contrasting with the conventional situation in which the judiciary interprets and applies the laws as established by a legislative body. In this sense, the judiciary is itself a subject of the affront by the contemnor and is necessarily in the position of vindicating its own authority. United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 840, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 2563, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994). In light of such concerns, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that courts are obliged to employ " 'the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.' ” Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 276, 110 S.Ct. 625, 632, 107 L.Ed.2d 644 *203(1990) (citation omitted). The courts have also emphasized the necessity for parameters upon the exercise of contempt powers and of adequate procedural safeguards. See, e.g., Crozer-Chester Med. Center v. Moran, 522 Pa. 124, 135-36, 560 A.2d 133, 139 (1989). See generally Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 838, 114 S.Ct. at 2563.