Court Opinion

ID: 9483358
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:18:25.530278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:35.095151
License: Public Domain

HARLINGTON WOOD, Jr., Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Because of the focus of this review it gives no satisfaction to one having to review the work of a hardworking, experienced district judge, and then to state a critical assessment of it. Regrettably this panel had little choice.
I view the matter of our jurisdiction as possibly a closer issue than do my brethren. It is recognized that not every sentence which falls within the applicable sentencing guidelines is irrefutably insulated from review. Rather, such sentences are subject to review if imposed in violation of the law. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1). Although rare, a sentence that violates a defendant’s due process rights to a fair trial is one imposed in violation of the law.
We have in the past, as mentioned above in this opinion, commented on certain language used at sentencing. In United States v. Schneider, 910 F.2d 1569, 1571 (7th Cir.1990), in which the judge referred to the defendant as “a flake,” Judge Pos-ner for the panel wrote, “[T]he use of slang in discharging the awesome duty of sentencing is regrettable.” Unfortunately, considerable slang was again used in the present sentencing. For example, references were made to the penitentiary as “the slammer” or the “pigeon hole.” The phrases were used “to screw around with it anymore,” and “piping the defendant away for so long they’re going to have to package air and bring it to you.” The defendant was admonished in the future to stay the “hell” out of the judge’s district. There is other abundant and effective language available for the judge to choose to forcefully impress the defendant with the seriousness and possible consequences of the defendant’s acts. Nonetheless, the sentencing language used in this case does not rise to the level of a due process problem sufficient to give this court jurisdiction to review a sentence within the applicable guideline range. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1).
In Schneider the judge referred to the defendant as a “flake,” but this case I believe goes beyond that. Here the defendant is a Mexican National whom the judge during sentencing referred to as a “turkey.” The use of that term could have *54adverse connotations beyond the use of the term “flake” as applied to describe a citizen of our own. I have no reason to believe that Judge Mills has any ethnic bias whatsoever. I know that outside the record, but others do not, including this defendant. The use of that term applied to a Mexican National lends itself to an interpretation which might give the unfortunate appearance of possible prejudice and bias against citizens of Mexico.1 Because of that possibility, in my view, it comes very close to a constitutional violation contrary to our accepted views, not just of language choice, but of fairness and due process in the important sentencing procedures in federal courts. In Schneider no fault was found with the content of the slang, but this is a more sensitive situation involving content and connotation. As such, this comes close to providing this court jurisdiction to review this sentence on that basis, an argument that in my judgment the defendant adequately raised in his brief. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1).
Added to this is the district judge’s dwelling on the economic benefits of incarcerating the defendant, a factor understandably not found in the sentencing guidelines. At the particular time in the sentencing process when the district judge first mentioned the economic question of whether it would cost the United States more or less to incarcerate the defendant because of his pattern of illegal entry into this country, the defendant’s bad record was already before the court. That record was itself sufficient to justify a substantial sentence. Nevertheless, when referring to the defendant as a “turkey,” the judge said he did not know what to do with the defendant. Then just before imposing sentence, the judge returned to the economics of it, speculating on the cost per month and came to the conclusion that it is “cheaper to the American taxpayer to at least know where you [the defendant] are.” The defendant was then sentenced to the maximum. This emphasis on the supposed economy in these particular times may have appeal to some, but it is nevertheless inappropriate. I am concerned that the economic emphasis could be seen as decisive in the sentence determination. To that extent it may have been an improper use of speculative and improper information. Using improper information at sentencing can be sufficient to give us jurisdiction. See United States ex rel. Welch v. Lane, 738 F.2d 863, 865 (7th Cir.1984) (violates due process to base sentence on materially untrue assumptions); 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1) (jurisdiction to review a sentence imposed in violation of the law). Here the seed of the judge’s economic discourse seems to have come from the defendant’s counsel. It would have been advisable for the district court, if any comment was deemed necessary, to simply have advised defense counsel that economics was not a valid consideration in the sentencing context, rather than using it to justify the sentence imposed. The fate of people in the federal criminal justice system fortunately is not determined by a cost analysis which may be useful in other circumstances. Punishment is for other reasons.
Title 28, Section 2106 of the United States Code, grants a reviewing court some degree of supervision over the district courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2106. That authority, like the due process clause, might have some application here, but for present purposes that possibility will not be explored. See United States v. Curran, 926 F.2d 59, 62-64 (1st Cir.1991) (relying on the appearance of injustice, the court invoked its supervisory powers to vacate and remand a sentence based in part on letters that the defendant was not given an opportunity to review); United States v. Connor, 950 F.2d 1267, 1278 (7th Cir.1991) (this court suggested, but did not hold, that it might be appropriate to invoke our supervi*55sory powers to remand a preguideline sentence that appeared to be partially based on information contained in newspaper clippings not presented to the parties). See also United States v. Radix Laboratories, Inc., 963 F.2d 1034, 1040-43 (7th Cir.1992) (this court chose not to invoke its supervisory powers to vacate a pre-guideline sentence). A competent judge who conducts a sentencing as in this case makes it unnecessarily difficult for himself and for us and taints an otherwise good sentencing. It is well that judges as individuals have their own presiding styles as does Judge Mills, but care is required to keep within acceptable bounds.
If we had jurisdiction, and I think it is a very close question, I would have suggested that this sentence be vacated and the resentencing be by another judge, not only because Judge Mills may have committed a fundamental error, but because I believe it would have better served the appearance of justice, a very important consideration even for a very guilty defendant.

. Our government and the Mexican government are presently endeavoring to improve understanding and cooperation between the judges of our respective countries. In the fall of 1991 a delegation of United States judges was sent by our State Department to Mexico City to meet with Mexican judges. In August 1992 Mexican judges will return the visit and meet again with the United States judges in Washington, D.C. This judicial exchange has been viewed as useful and successful, diplomatically and judicially.