Court Opinion

ID: 9955755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 14:14:57.438549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:20.216570
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 22, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                             NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                    Commonwealth of Kentucky
                                Court of Appeals
                                   NO. 2022-CA-1072-MR

JIM MUNCIE AND CINDY MUNCIE                                         APPELLANTS

                     APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT
v.                   HONORABLE JERRY D. CROSBY, II, JUDGE
                            ACTION NO. 13-CI-00688

SHIELD ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSOCIATES, INC. AND PATRICIA
WIESEMANN                                                             APPELLEES

                                          OPINION
                                         AFFIRMING

                                         ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, CALDWELL, AND CETRULO, JUDGES.

ACREE, JUDGE: Appellants, Jim and Cindy Muncie, appeal the Oldham Circuit

Court’s August 11, 2022 order dismissing their lawsuit for failure to prosecute

pursuant to CR1 41.02. The circuit court did so after four years of inaction

following remand of this case from the Kentucky Supreme Court. We conclude

1
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the lawsuit and,

therefore, we affirm.

                                  BACKGROUND

             This case, which now makes its second appearance before this Court,

has a factual and procedural history which is greater than is necessary to resolve

the narrow issue presented in this appeal; namely, whether the circuit court erred

by dismissing Appellants’ lawsuit for failure to prosecute upon remand of their

case from the Kentucky Supreme Court. For the curious, a fuller account of the

underlying history of this dispute may be found in Muncie v. Wiesemann, 548

S.W.3d 877 (Ky. 2018). The background relevant to this appeal is as follows.

             In 2010, 1,000 gallons of home heating oil leaked from an

underground tank on property owned by the Martha Magel estate. Muncie, 548

S.W.3d at 877-78. The oil flowed downhill and flooded Appellants’ residence,

causing massive damage. Id. at 878. Appellee Patricia Wiesemann managed the

Magel estate as testatrix. Id. Appellee Shield Environmental Associates, Inc.

(Shield Environmental) performed work on a sump pump at Appellants’ residence;

the sump pump subsequently malfunctioned. Brief for Appellee Shield

Environmental at 1.

             Eventually, Appellants partially settled a resultant federal lawsuit and

$60,000 was allocated to Appellants to remedy actual damages to their property.

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Muncie, 548 S.W.3d at 878. However, the agreement reserved some of

Appellants’ claims, including “claims by [Appellants] asserting the diminution of

value of their real estate due to the stigma resulting from the contamination[.]” Id.

             Appellants filed a state claim in the Oldham Circuit Court, and the

circuit court subsequently granted summary judgment in Appellees’ favor. Id.

The circuit court reasoned that “while stigma damages may be considered in the

measure of actual damages for remediation, [Appellants] could not seek both the

costs of remediation (i.e., the repair costs) and the diminution in value due to

stigma damages” and, therefore, Appellants had no further claim. Id. This Court

agreed, reasoning that “when there is actual damage to real property, stigma or

reputation damages may be included as a measure of damages . . . [however,] there

is not an independent right of recovery available for such damages.” Id. at 878-79

(modification original, internal quotation marks omitted).

             The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that “if remediation damages

are settled but a claim on the stigma damages resulting from the actual injury is

reserved, then the injured party may be awarded stigma damages regardless of the

partial settlement on remediation.” Id. at 880. Accordingly, the Supreme Court

reversed and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Appellants

had been compensated for diminution of value resulting from any stigma

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associated with the oil spill. Id. at 881. The Supreme Court entered its Order of

Remand on July 12, 2018.

             Appellants took no action on their case upon its return to the circuit

court. Appellees each filed a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution under CR

41.02(1) in June of 2022 – nearly four years after the Supreme Court remanded the

case. Appellants filed a response on July 15, stating personal difficulties

accounted for their inactivity in the lawsuit. More specifically, they stated that

Appellant Cindy Muncie’s mother was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s Disease, and

that Cindy alone supported her mother personally and financially. Cindy’s mother

died in 2019. Appellants’ attorney’s younger brother died suddenly later that year.

Cindy received a uterine cancer diagnosis in 2019. And Appellants noted the

economic and administrative challenges arising from the COVID-19 pandemic

made it difficult to pursue their lawsuit.

             The circuit court granted the motions in an order entered August 11,

2022; though it sympathized with the losses of Appellants and their attorney, “the

effects of these events do not mean they were unable to do anything.” The court

concluded Appellants “failed to offer any substantial reason to justify such a long

delay in proceeding with this case.” Appellants appealed, bringing this Sisyphean

matter before this Court a second time.

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                                     ANALYSIS

             “For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or comply with these rules or

any order of the court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any

claim against him.” CR 41.02(1). Unless the court specifies in its order, a

dismissal “other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, for

want of prosecution under Rule 77.02(2), or for failure to join a party under Rule

19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.” CR 41.02(3). A dismissal under

Rule 41.02 is distinct from a dismissal under Rule 77.02, a “housekeeping rule”

that requires courts to review their dockets annually and dismiss without prejudice

those cases wherein “no pretrial step has been taken within the last year[.]” CR

77.02(2); Wildcat Prop. Mgmt., LLC v. Reuss, 302 S.W.3d 89, 92 (Ky. App. 2009).

Conversely, a dismissal under Rule 41.02 is with prejudice. Wildcat Prop. Mgmt.,

302 S.W.3d at 92.

             “Dismissals for lack of prosecution pursuant to CR 41.02 and CR

77.02 are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” Toler v. Rapid

American, 190 S.W.3d 348, 351 (Ky. App. 2006) (citations omitted). A trial court

abuses its discretion when its decision is “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or

unsupported by sound legal principles.” Sexton v. Sexton, 125 S.W.3d 258, 272

(Ky. 2004) (citations omitted). Additionally, “the involuntary dismissal of a case

with prejudice ‘should be resorted to only in the most extreme cases,’ and a

                                          -5-
reviewing court must ‘carefully scrutinize the trial court’s exercise in doing so.’”

Wildcat Prop. Mgmt., 302 S.W.3d at 93 (quoting Polk v. Wimsatt, 689 S.W.2d 363,

364-65 (Ky. App. 1985)).

             As the circuit court did in its order, trial courts may consider the six

factors supplied by Ward v. Housman to determine whether dismissal with

prejudice pursuant to CR 41.02 is appropriate. 809 S.W.2d 717, 719 (Ky. App.

1991) (citations omitted). These factors are “1) the extent of the party’s personal

responsibility; 2) the history of dilatoriness; 3) whether the attorney’s conduct was

willful and in bad faith; 4) meritoriousness of the claim; 5) prejudice to the other

party[;] and 6) alternative sanctions.” Id. However, because motions to dismiss

for lack of prosecution are fact-specific inquiries, the “propriety of the trial court’s

ruling does not necessarily hinge on its discussing the six particular factors listed

in Ward.” Jaroszewski v. Flege, 297 S.W.3d 24, 33 (Ky. 2009). Instead, “the trial

court must assess all factors relevant to that particular case, which might include

some or all factors listed in Ward and may include other factors.” Id.

             Though it was not required to, the circuit court considered each of the

six Ward factors in reaching its conclusion. As to the first – the extent of

Appellants’ personal responsibility – the court determined the deaths of Cindy

Muncie’s mother and Appellants’ attorney’s brother did not explain the complete

lack of action on the case since the Supreme Court remanded it. As to the COVID-

                                          -6-
19 emergency, the circuit court noted it had been proceeding remotely in its civil

matters since the time in-person proceedings were suspended. The circuit court

determined the history of dilatoriness in this matter was substantial, noting

involuntary dismissals for lack of prosecution had been upheld for far shorter

delays than the four-year delay in the instant case. The court determined

Appellants’ attorney’s conduct was willful, as neither circumstances in the

attorney’s personal life nor the COVID-19 pandemic explained four years of

inactivity.

              The circuit court determined the merits of Appellants’ claim were

unclear, but observed the Appellants would have difficulty proving diminution in

value as a result of the stigma resulting from the oil cleanup considering so much

time had passed since the spill in 2010. Regarding the fifth Ward factor, the court

believed Appellees would be prejudiced by being forced to participate in a lawsuit

that has lasted for over ten years with no indication the case was moving toward

final resolution. The court determined dismissal to be the only appropriate

sanction, as “anything less than dismissal at this point would frustrate the purpose

of CR 41.02 by allowing lawsuits to go on for years despite the lack of progress

being made.” And it noted that, not only did Appellants take no steps to advance

their case by filing motions or otherwise apprising the court of the status of their

                                          -7-
case and requesting forbearance, Appellants never informed opposing counsel why

they were not pursuing their lawsuit.

             We detect no abuse of the circuit court’s discretion in its decision to

dismiss this action with prejudice. No aspect of its application of the Ward factors

was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. The

circuit court acted within the bounds of its broad discretion in granting Appellees’

motions to dismiss for lack of prosecution, and, accordingly, we must affirm its

ruling.

                                  CONCLUSION

             Having carefully scrutinized the circuit court’s ruling as required, we

affirm the Oldham Circuit Court’s August 11, 2022 order granting Appellees’

motions to dismiss pursuant to CR 41.02.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                         -8-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:    BRIEF FOR APPELLEE SHIELD
                         ENVIRONMENTAL ASSOCIATES,
Joseph E. Conley, Jr.    INC.:
Edgewood, Kentucky
                         Mark E. Hammond
                         John F. Shockley
                         Louisville, Kentucky

                         BRIEF FOR APPELLEE PATRICIA
                         WIESEMANN:

                         Kenneth A. Bohnert
                         Bradley R. Palmer
                         Louisville, Kentucky

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