Court Opinion

ID: 9621610
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:01:30.090601+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:19.654539
License: Public Domain

Justice KITTREDGE,
dissenting in a separate opinion.
I respectfully dissent. The habitual traffic offender statute defines a “habitual offender” as a person who has:
(а) Three or more convictions, singularly or in combination of any of the following separate and distinct offenses arising out of separate acts:
(1) Voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter or reckless homicide resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle;
(2) Operating or attempting to operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, narcotics or drugs;
(3) Driving or operating a motor vehicle in a reckless manner;
(4) Driving a motor vehicle while his license, permit, or privilege to drive a motor vehicle has been suspended or revoked, except a conviction for driving under suspension for failure to file proof of financial responsibility;
(5) Any offense punishable as a felony under the motor vehicle laws of this State or any felony in the commission of which a motor vehicle is used;
(б) Failure of the driver of a motor vehicle involved in any accident resulting in the death or injury of any person to stop close to the scene of such accident and report his identity;
S.C.Code Ann. § 56-l-1020(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
The habitual offender statute lists six specific offenses that “count” towards habitual offender status. Indeed, the legisla*298ture elected to limit qualifying offenses to the enumerated “separate and distinct offenses.” The enumerated offenses set forth in sections (1), (2), (3), (4) and (6), refer to specific statutory offenses,2 and section (5) incorporates the provisions of the motor vehicle laws punishable as a felony.
Given the clear statutory language, I take the view that if an offense is not one of the six listed in the habitual offender statute, the conviction may not “count” towards habitual offender status. The offense of driving with an unlawful alcohol concentration (DUAC) is not included as one of the section 56-l-1020(a) offenses. I thus conclude the offense of DUAC is not a qualifying offense under section 56-l-1020(a) for habitual offender status.
Moreover, I disagree with the Court’s attempt to satisfy the statute by equating the offense of DUI with the offense of DUAC. Under South Carolina law, DUI and DUAC are different offenses. See § 56-5-2930 and § 56-5-2933. The element of “driving under the influence” is not present in an offense for DUAC. I respectfully disagree with the majority’s analysis which bootstraps § 56 — 5—2950(b)(3), a permissible inference provision located in an entirely different statute, to the DUAC statute in order to reach the conclusion that a conviction for DUAC qualifies as a conviction of “operating or attempting to operate a motor vehicle while under the influence.”
I certainly understand the policy rationale for including the offense of DUAC as a qualifying offense for habitual traffic offender status, but that determination lies with the legislature and not this Court.
I vote to reverse the decision of the ALC.
PLEICONES, J., concurs.

. See S.C.Code Ann. §§ 56-1-440, 56-5-1210, 56-5-2910, 56-5-2920, and 56-5-2930 (2008).