Court Opinion

ID: 5448839
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-01-08 18:15:48.203052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:32:18.278742
License: Public Domain

VAN FLEET, J.
The plaintiff is a corporation engaged in the business of .supplying water to the city of San Diego and its inhabitants. In February, 1890, the common council of the city passed an ordinance fixing the water rates for the year beginning July 1, 1890. In May, 1890, the plaintiff brought this action against the city, the common council, the mayor, and the individual members of the council, to annul this ordinance and enjoin its enforcement. The complaint alleged in substance that the entire revenue which plaintiff could receive during the year in question, under the rates so fixed, would be insufficient to pay its operating expenses and fixed charges for that year,j( and would, therefore, ’afford no reward whatever to plaintiff for furnishing the water, and that the ordinance would deprive plaintiff of its property without process of law and without compensation. It was also alleged that, hy reason of certain fraudulent practices on the part of the council, the plaintiff was deprived of a fair opportunity to be heard before the council, and prevented from properly presenting its side of the ease. The action was tried after the expiration of the year in question, and a judgment was entered declaring the ordinance to be void, and setting the same aside. From this judgment, and from an order denying their motion for a new trial, the defendants appeal.
The findings of the court were in substance: That the prop*563erty and plant of the plaintiff necessary to supply water to the city and its inhabitants actually cost $750,000; that the reasonable and necessary operating expenses of plaintiff for the year in question, and actually expended by it for that 'purpose, amounted to $40,000; that plaintiff was indebted upon its bonds for money borrowed, amounting to the sum of $1,000,000, bearing interest a,t the rate of five per cent per annum, of which amount $750,000 had been necessarily and properly expended for the construction of the plant; that the total receipts of plaintiff for the year in question derived from the rates fixed by said ordinance could not be and were not greater than $65,788.65; that the annual depreciation of the plant on account of natural decay and use amounted to three and one-third per cent of its value; that no dividends for the stockholders of plaintiff had been or could be earned from the rates fixed by said ordinance for said year; and that the rates so fixed were not just or reasonable.
The court also found certain facts concerning the proceedings of the common council and its committee in investigating the subject matter, which will be noticed hereafter.
These findings are assailed as being in some particulars unsupported by the evidence; and many questions of law have been ably argued by numerous counsel. Some of these questions, though highly interesting and important, are not necessarily involved in this appeal, and we shall therefore not notice them; but we will, so far as space will permit, consider each of the other points made.
1. It is contended by defendants that, under article XIY of the constitution of this state, a court has no power, in the absence of fraud, to hold such an ordinance invalid merely because the court finds the rates fixed thereby to be unjust and unreasonable.
We shall not attempt in this opinion to review the many cases on this subject. It is sufficient to say that the supreme court of the United States (whose decisions on this matter are controlling) has repeatedly decided that the power of the state to fix and regulate the rates of compensation to be charged by persons and corporations in charge of certain public utilities is so limited by the constitution of the United States that it cannot be exercised to such an extent as to require any such person or *564corporation to furnish its property or services without reward; and that, if the rates are fixed by legislative power, or otherwise than by appropriate judicial proceedings in which full notice and opportunity to appear and defend are given, it is within the province of the courts to review such action, to the extent, at least, of ascertaining whether the rates so fixed will furnish some reward for the property used and services furnished. To fix rates that will allow no such reward is to take property for public use without just compensation. To this extent at least, then, the court was entitled to go in this case.
But appellants contend that in any event the court could do no more in reviewing the action of the common council than to say whether there was or was not evidence produced before that body sufficient to sustain its conclusions; and that the court was not at liberty to determine the question upon other and perhaps new evidence not produced before the council, nor to substitute its judgment as to the reasonableness of the rates for the judgment of that body. In this contention we think that counsel entirely misconceives the nature of the functions respectively exercised under our constitution by the rate-fixing body and by the courts. Whether the fixing of rates by the council be called a legislative, a judicial, or an administrative act, it is certainly not an adversary judicial proceeding such as, under the constitution, will conclude private rights. It is a proceeding on the part of the government to which neither the water company nor the rate payers are parties, conducted without notice to them, and without any right on their part to effectually intervene. Such a proceeding cannot operate to divest private rights; and, though the supreme court of the United States holds it to be a legitimate exorcise of governmental powers, that court also holds that when it is carried so far as to deprive anyone of his property without just compensation it is an unlawful exercise of such power, and simply void. The function of the courts is merely to ascertain whether the power has been carried beyond the constitutional limits so fixed; and, if such be found to be the case, to declare the acts of the council void. They do not sit as appellate tribunals to review tbe correctness of the council’s determination, nor need they know anything about the evidence on which that body has acted. All that they have to consider is, whether, in a given case, the result of the councils ac*565tion will be to take tbe property oí tbe complaining party without just compensation.. Tbat is a mixed question, of fact and law, to be decided by tbe court upon, tbe evidence produced before it.
¾. On tbe otber band, tbe plaintiff contends that section 1 of article XIV of tbe constitution of this state is opposed to tbe constitution of tbe United States, in that it operates to deprive the water company of its property without due process of law. It is argued that no provision for the fixing of water rates by the tribunal thereby created can be valid without notice to those whose rights are to he affected, and an opportunity to them to appear and defend, tbe right to which must be given by tbe constitution itself. Tbat no such notice or bearing is provided for must be admitted; but tbe consequence contended for does not follow.
In the first place there is nothing in the pleadings or evidence in this case to show that any water rights or property of plaintiff used in furnishing the water in question were acquired before the adoption of tbe present constitution. On tbe contrary, we think it substantially appears tbat they were all acquired since that time. We are unable to perceive why the people of this state in adopting tbat constitution had not tbe right to declare tbat all water not then reduced to private ownership should thereafter remain public, and tbat thereafter every person undertaking the business of supplying cities or towns or their inhabitants with water should do so upon the condition that the rates to be charged therefor should be conclusively fixed by the state. Such a business is so far public in its very nature that the state might lawfully forbid its exercise by any private individual, and, a forti-ori, might impose such conditions and restrictions upon its exercise as might be thought proper. If, then, that section of tbe constitution could be construed as rendering the decision of the council absolutely final and conclusive, plaintiff, at least, • could not be heard to complain. If it chose, with tbat section in force, to enter upon that business, it was bound to submit to the conditions thereby imposed.
But we think that tbe true construction of that section is such that it is not open to the constitutional objection urged, even if raised by one who at the time of its adoption was engaged in that business. It obviously was not the intention of *566the framers of that provision, to make any distinction between lights then existing and those to be thereafter acquired, nor can we attribute to them any intention of confiscating private property. The meaning of the section is, that the governing body of the municipality, upon a fair investigation, and with the exercise of judgment and discretion, shall fix reasonable rates and allow just compensation. If they attempt to act arbitrarily, without investigation, or without the exercise of judgment and discretion, or if they fix rates so palpably unreasonable and unjust as to amount to arbitrary action, they violate their duty and go beyond the powers conferred upon them. Such was the conclusion reached by this court in Spring Valley Water Works v. San Francisco, 82 Cal. 286, 16 Am. St. Rep. 116, to which conclusion we adhere. Although that case was decided without the light cast on the subject by later decisions of the supreme court of the United States, and contains some observations which perhaps may require modification, we are satisfied with the correctness of the conclusion there given to this section of the constitution.
According to this construction, the rules announced under the first head in this opinion are applicable. If the council has fixed rates so palpably unreasonable and unjust as to amount to a taking of plaintiff’s property without just compensation, it has so far exceeded the powers conferred upon it, and the court is competent to afford redress.
3. This brings us, then, to the question whether the findings support the judgment. They show that the total receipts of the plaintiff from the rates fixed by the council would be and were insufficient to pay plaintiff’s actual and necessary operating expenses, together with the interest on so much of its bonded indebtedness as was necessarily and properly expended by it in the construction of its plant, necessarily and actually used for the supplying of the. water here in question—indeed, [would fall short more than $11,000 of paying those charges. No circumstances requiring such a loss were found, and the finding that these actual charges were necessarily and properly incurred in the legitimate exercise of the business of furnishing water to the city negative the existence of any such circumstances. It is clear that under the rule laid down by the supreme court of the United States in Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan *567etc. Co., 154 U. S. 362, 412, thaA court would hold those rates to be so unreasonable and unjust as to require the court to set them aside. The decision in that case, however, is not in all respects satisfactory: and, after a careful examination of all the many cases on this subject, we are unable to discover that any consistent or adequate rules controlling the exercise of the governmental power of fixing rates have yet been judicially laid down. The subject is one of extreme complexity, and its inherent difficulties have been increased rather than diminished by the numerous decisions in which it has been discussed. We think, however, that a consideration of the real nature of the power conferred by our constitution will afford a sufficient solution of the question.
It is apparent that the water company does not own the water which it collects and supplies, or the plant which it uses to collect and distribute that water, in the same sense in which a man is said to own his house or his farm. By the very nature of the use to which it is applied, the company has devoted that property to a public use. Having once undertaken ti> perform that public duty, it must continue to perform it, and must carry on its business under tire lawful regulations of the government. In effect the state may be said to have appropriated the water and the plant to public use. For that appropriation it is bound to make just compensation, and it has provided for such compensation by requiring the municipal authorities to fix just and reasonable rates at which the water is to be furnished to and .received by the consumers. Since the state has “taken” the use$ of this property, it is bound to provide a just compensation for that use, and article XIY of the constitution must be construed as providing for that just compensation.
The question of what is just compensation in such a case is, we think, in all respects analogous to the question which arises in every ease of appropriation under the power of eminent domain; and it may be reduced to the formula that the public must pay the actual value of that which it appropriates to the public use. In determining such value three, and we believe only three, methods are possible: 1. Either by ascertaining what the property could be sold for (its market value); or 2. By ascertaining what it would cost to replace it; or 3. By ascertaining the revenue it is capable of producing. In cases like the present, *568however, neither the first nor the second method can be resorted to. The judicial test of market value depends upon the fact that the property in question is marketable at a given price, which in turn depends upon the fact that sales of similar property have been and are being made at ascertainable prices. But such property as this is not so sold, at least, not often enough to furnish a fair criterion; and the very fact of 'governmental regulation would necessarily control the price. Until the rates are fixed no one oan say how much the property would sell for, and therefore that price cannot be ascertained as a basis for fixing those rates.
The second method is entirely inapplicable to property of this kind. The construction of municipal waterworks is a matter of growth. It is necessary in. common prudence, on the one hand, to construct the works of such capacity as to satisfy the needs of the growing city, not only at the moment, but within the near future; and, on the other hand, not to extend them so much as to cast an unnecessary burden on the stockholders, or the present consumers. As such works are a necessity to the city, they must keep pace with, and to some extent anticipate, its growth. When constructed they stimulate to that extent the progress of the city, and tend, like all conveniences, to lower the general cost of production of all things. It results that at least the first water system in any city occupies the position of a pioneer. At any expense the works must be constructed, and usually no reward can be realized by the constructors until some time has elapsed. In the mean time, as the city grows, in part by reason of this very supply of water, the facility of constructing works of all kinds is increased, and the cost of such construction diminished. It would, therefore, be highly unjust to permit the consumers to avail themselves of the plea that at the present time similar works could be constructed at a less cost, as a pretext for reducing the rates to be paid for the water. The reduced expense, if it be reduced, is due in part at least to the very fact that the city has been provided at the cost of the water company with increased facilities for doing business.
But it is said that those who enter upon any business enterprise undertake the risk of being undersold by those who, coming later into the field, have the advantage of a cheapening of construction. But this is not an ordinary business enterprise. *569Those who engage in it put their property entirely into the hands oí the public. Having once embarked it is beyond their power to draw back. They must always be ready to supply the public demand, and must take the risk of any falling off in that demand. They cannot convert their property to any other use, however unprofitable the public use may become. They have expended their money for the benefit of others, and subjected it to the control of others., That money has, in effect, been taken by the public; and the public, while refusing to return that money, cannot be heard to say that it no longer has need for all of it.
Nor would it, on the other hand, be just to the consumers to require them to pay an enhanced price for the water, on the ground that it would now cost more to construct similar works. Such a contingency may well happen; but to allow an increase of rates for such reason would be to allow the water company to make a profit, not as a reward for its expenditures and services, but for the fortuitous occurrence of a rise in the price of materials or labor. The law does not intend that this business shall be a speculation in which the water company or the consumers shall respectively win or lose upon the casting of a die, or upon the equally unpredictable fluctuations of the markets. For the money which the company has expended for the public benefit it is to receive a reasonable, and no more than a reasonable, reward. It is to be paid according to what it has done, and not according to what others might conceivably do. In effect, the bargain between the company and the public was made when the works were constructed: and this matter is to be determined according to the state of things at that time.
We must then have recourse to the third standard of value—■ the revenue which the property is capable of producing. At the first blush there might seem to be a difficulty in applying this standard, for the revenue received by the company will be absolutely controlled by the rates fixed, and no revenue can be collected except upon rates so fixed. This difficulty has led one of the counsel in this case, in a singularly able and ingenious argument, to contend that the rates must be so fixed as to enable the company to obtain precisely the revenue which it would realize if the rates were not regulated by the public at all. To this proposition we cannot assent. The whole history of mu-*570nieipal regulation conclusively shows that its principal purpose was always to diminish what were rightly or wrongly believed to be exorbitant charges. The theory of its application has always been that it is necessary to restrain the proprietors of what have been called “virtual monopolies” from imposing extravagant and unreasonable tariffs for the use of their facilities. Whether the system be well conceived or not, whether it accords with the theory of free government, are not questions with which we have to do. It is sufficient that the law recognizes that there is a standard by which just compensation may be measured, 'and that it is intended to prevent that measure from being exceeded.
Wbat that standard is, as applied to tire present case, we think not difficult of ascertainment. As we have said, it is not the water or the distributing works which the company may be said to own, and the value of which is to be ascertained. They were acquired and contributed for the use of the public; the public may be said to be the real owner, and the company only the agent of the public to administer their use. What the company has parted with, what the public has acquired, is the money reasonably and properly expended by the company in acquiring its property and constructing its works. The state has taken the use of that money, and it is for that use that it must provide just compensation. What revenue money is capable of producing is a question of fact, and, theoretically at least, susceptible of more or less exact ascertainment. Regard must be had to the nature of the investment, the risk attendant upon it, and the public demand for the product of the enterprise. It would not, of course, be reasonable to allow the company a profit equal to tbe greatest rate of interest realized upon any kind of investment, nor, on the other hand, to compel it to accept the lowest rate of remuneration which capital ever obtains. Comparison must be made between tbis business and other kinds of business involving a similar degree of risk, and all the surrounding circumstances must be considered. An important circumstance will always be the rate of interest at which money can be borrowed for investment in such a business; and, where the business appears to be honestly and prudently conducted, the rate which the company would be compelled to pay for borrowed money will furnish a safe, though not always con-*571elusive criterion oí tbe rate of profit wbicb will be deemed reasonable. In ordinary eases, where the management is fair and economical, it would be unreasonable to fix the rates so low as to prevent the company from paying interest on borrowed money at the lowest market rate obtainable; and, even tiren, some allowance or margin should be made for any risk to which the company may be exposed, over 'and above the risk taken by a lender.
This being so, the existence of the bonded indebtedness on which so much stress has been laid, and which has seemed to present so difficult a problem in some of the cases, must be disregarded. That fact, indeed, it seems to us, can never be important, except as entitling the holders of the bonds, as parties in interest, to be heard in actions like the present. Evidently, no distinction can be made between those who construct the works with their own money and those who do so with money borrowed from others. In either case the money actually invested is the basic criterion of the revenue to be allowed.
It follows that we cannot say that the finding of the court below, that the rates fixed by the city council were less than what was reasonable, is unsupported by tbe evidence. After deducting current expense for the year—$40,000—from the revenue received—$65,788.65—there would be left bnt $25,788.65 —or bnt little more than three and óne-third per cent upon $750,000, the actual cost of the works; while the evidence shows that the company was compelled to pay a much higher rate upon money which it appears to have fairly borrowed. It is true that the evidence is not as full and satisfactory on this question as it should be, doubtless owing to tbe fact that the rules governing this inquiry were not clearly apprehended by tbe counsel who tried the case. Bnt as no attempt was made to show that the rate of interest paid by the company was above the lowest market rate, and as the prudence and economy of the management were not successfully impeached, we cannot say that the court below was not justified in tbe conclusion to which it arrived on this question.
Bnt it is contended that the power of the court is at most to inquire whether some reward will be provided by the rates fixed and that if some reward, however small, is so provided, the court cannot interfere. We have been referred to dicta in some of the *572cases which do support that contention; but we are unable to agree with that conclusion. It is an elementary doctrine of constitutional law that the question of just compensation is a judicial question to be determined in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings; and, construing article XIY of our oonstitu-' tion with section 14 of article I (as we think we are bound to do)^ we find no difficulty in holding that whenever the rates fixed by the council are grossly and palpably insufficient to furnish such a revenue as will afford just compensation within the rules above declared, redress may be had in the courts. Of course, every slight or conjectural deficiency will not justify an appeal to the courts; nor, if the question be doubtful, will the court, in the absence of fraud or other special ground of equitable interference, substitute its judgment for that of the municipal body. But whenever it is clear and beyond question that the revenue which the company can possibly receive under the rates fixed will be wholly insufficient to allow it the compensation to which it is legally entitled, it is the duty of the court to declare the ordinance void. Such is the case under the findings here, and those findings must, therefore, be held to support the judgment.
It should, of course, be said that it does not follow that in every case the company will be entitled to credit for all of its current expenditures, or to receive a compensation based on the entire cost of its works. Reckless and unnecessary expenditures, not legitimately incurred in the actual collection and distribution of the water furnished, or in the acquisition, construction, or preservation of so much of the plant as is necessary for that purpose, cannot be allowed. Nor can the investment on which the company is entitled to base its compensation be held to include property not now actually employed in collecting or distributing the water now being supplied, however useful it may have been in 'the past, or may yet be in the future. It is the money reasonably and properly expended in each year in collecting and distributing the water which constitutes the current expenses which may be allowed; and it is the money reasonably and properly expended in the acquisition and construction of the works actually and properly in use for that purpose, which constitutes the investment on which the compensa^ lion is to be computed. The amounts stated in the findings in this case are found to be of that character.
*5734. But it is contended that the findings in several particulars are unsupported by the evidence.
It is claimed that the evidence does not justify the finding that $750,000 had been actually expended in the purchase and construction of the plant. On this subject the evidence is extremely unsatisfactory. Apart from estimates testified to by engineers, the only evidence of the cost was the books of the company, which placed the amount at $735,000. Of this sum defendants object to items amounting to about $127,000, viz., an alleged duplicate of the entry of $13,932, an alleged overcharge of $25,000 in the real estate account, and the sum of $88,000 alleged to be the cost of certain works abandoned and not in use. On these questions we have had little or no assistance from counsel fox respondent, and our examination of the evidence has failed to satisfy us on any one of them. The books, or those portions of them brought up in the transcript, require much explanation, which has not been furnished us. In fact, the case appears to have been tried largely on a wrong theory, the greater portion of the evidence consisting of the testimony of expert witnesses as to the value of the property. This is at the best an unsatisfactory way of determining the question of actual cost (for which purpose only could it be admissible), and should not be resorted to when better evidence can be obtained. As against the company, at least, its books furnish better evidence on this subject, and cannot be disregarded. These books certainly show the cost to have been less than $750,000, though we are unable to determine the precise amount properly shown by them; and the evidence clearly discloses that portions of the plant included in that cost are not now in use, if, indeed, they have not been totally abandoned. We think, therefore, that this finding is not justified by the evidence. On this and kindred matters not only is the burden of proof on the plaintiff, but it is bound to establish them by the most clear and satisfactory evidence, in order to overcome the presumption of the correctness of the action of the city council.
The finding that the expenses of the company for the year in question were $40,000 is also attacked. The books of the company put the amount at $44,255.30. Of this amount appellants object to items of about $5,000 as unnecessary and improper, and object particularly to an item of $12,800, being an un*574paid bill which, is disputed by plaintiff, and on which its liability is left doubtful. Counsel for respondents ha-re not attempted to answer these points. As the evidence is presented to us in an unsatisfactory shape, we will say no more than that it does not support the finding. Whether all of the items complained of are proper or improper cannot be determined upon this record, but some of them are not shown to be proper. It will be the duty of the court on a retrial to allow no item of expenditure which is not satisfactorily shown to be an actual and proper charge in the actual conduct of the business of supplying water; and, when legal or other' general expenses are claimed, they must be shown to hare had a proper relation to that business. Of course, the items of expenses in the present action should be disregarded. The trial being had after the expiration of the year for which the rates in question were fixed, the amounts of revenue and expenses are capable of exact proof.
With regard to the question of the depreciation of the plant by use, it is sufficient to say that ordinary repairs should be charged to current expense, that substantial reconstruction or replacement should be charged to the construction account, and that depreciation should not otherwise be considered. It is doubtless difficult in many eases to properly discriminate between current and ordinary repairs and such repairs as amount in effect to new construction Such difficulties, when they arise, must be solved by the application of the principles on which ordinary business enterprises are conducted.
It may be added that when, as appears to have been the case in this instance, portions of the company’s expenses are specifically repaid by the consumers, such expenses should be eliminated from the computation. This will apply at least to the ‘Taps” put in for private consumers.
5. Among other things, the court below made the following finding:
“10. That the taking of evidence as to the value of the plaintiff’s plant and the rates that should be fixed by the common council of said city, during the month of February, 1890, for the year commencing July 1, 1890, was by said common council delegated to a joint committee consisting of three members from the board of delegates and three members from the board of aldermen of said common council. That said joint committee *575proceeded' to and did take evidence from tbe plaintiff and its officers and other witnesses for a number of days, and that on tbe twenty-first day of February, 1890, tbe plaintiff then being before said committee by its attorney, said attorney inquired of said committee whether other evidence would be taken, and announced that if other evidence would be taken he, the said attorney, desired to be present, and especially that if evidence was given by members of the board of public works of said city, or estimates were taken from said members of the value or cost of the plaintiff’s plant, that he, said attorney, desired to be present and examine said members of the board of public works as to the evidence given by them or the estimates furnished. That it was announced by one of said committee at that time, in the presence of the other members, that he did not know of any other evidence that was to be taken, which was not disputed by any other member of the committee. That there, at that time, and immediately following the demand of said attorney as aforesaid, the city engineer of said city, who was present, was privately and secretly informed that the committee desired to have him present at a meeting to he held the following day to give an estimate of. the value of said plant. That on the following day said committee met secretly, and without notifying the water company or its said attorney, and took the testimony of said city engineer and one Schuyler, a member of the board of public works of said city, and took from them their estimates of the value and cost of every part of the distributing system, pumps, wells, and other property of the plaintiff, not including its water rights, rights of way or real estate. That said meeting was held secretly in a hack room of the office of the city attorney, while all of the other meetings of the committee had been held publicly in the room of the board of aldermen, was beld on a legal holiday when the offices of the city in the City Hall were closed, and said meeting was held with the doors closed and locked. That the plaintiff had no notice or knowledge of said meeting or the taking of said evidence, and was not present either by its officers or its attorney or otherwise, and was given no opportunity to he present or investigate or cross-examine with reference to the evidence given and estimates furnished. That said estimates so furnished were largely less than the cost as proved or estimated by the evidence of the officers *576of the plaintiff taken by said committee, and sworn statements furnished by its officers, and the estimates so furnished in the absence of the plaintiff were taken with but few exceptions, and as to small amounts, as the value and cost of said plant by said committee, and made the basis of their report, and of the rates fixed by them and subsequently adopted by the ordinance of the common council. That the report of said committee was made up and concluded on the twenty-fourth day of February, 1890, was presented to both houses of said common council on the evening of that day, and was then adopted by each of said bodies without change. That the attorney of the plaintiff appeared before each of said bodies and demanded that the plaintiff be allowed to offer evidence to said common council, with reference to the fixing of said rates, but his right to offer said evidence was denied, 'and no evidence was received or heard. That the evidence taken by the committee was taken down by a stenographer and transcribed, but was never read to or submitted to either board of said common council, but that the members of said committee, or some of them, stated their recollection of the evidence upon which their said report was based. That the ordinance mentioned in the complaint, fixing said rates, was passed and adopted by both of the bodies of said common council on the evening of the twenty-fifth day of February, 1890, without any further hearing, or opportunity to be heard, on the part of plaintiff.”
It is claimed that this finding is not altogether in accord with the evidence; but, though we find some verbal inaccuracies, we think that in all material particulars it is sufficiently supported.
It is plain that these facts show so much of unfairness in the investigation had by the common council as to’ overcome the presumption of the correctness of its decision. It was clearly the duty of the council to give to the water company, at least when requested to do so, a reasonable opportunity to be heard, not merely for the purpose of presenting its own evidence, but also of explaining or overcoming, if it could, evidence presented by others. The company, of course, could not claim as a right to be heard at any time it chose; but it certainly was entitled, upon reasonable request for that purpose, to be present when evidence was being produced before the council or its committee, or to be otherwise informed of that evidence and allowed to *577overcome it if possible. Tbe action of tbe committee, for which no sufficient excuse was given, appears to have been taken for tbe very purpose of excluding tbe plaintiff when that evidence was received, and it therefore seriously impugns tbe fairness of tbe investigation. Indeed, such an investigation ought to be held publicly, and upon such reasonable public notice of the times and places of tbe meetings as will enable those interested to be present; and a neglect of this precaution, when unexplained, must always give rise to injurious suspicions.
A number of other points have been discussed by counsel, but they are all either covered by what has been said, or have been thereby rendered unimportant.
For the reasons above set forth, tbe judgment and order appealed from are reversed, and tbe cause remanded for a new trial.
Henshaw, J., and McFarland, J., concurred.