Court Opinion

ID: 9546070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:24:25.594607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:56.997351
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Hall
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion for the reasons I have expressed in Liber v. Flor, et al., decided this day, and for further reasons as herein set forth.
The majority opinion states:
“ * * * The equal protection of the laws provision of the federal constitution, and sections 3 and 6, Article II of the Colorado Constitution which declare certain rights to be inalienable and guarantee judicial process for their protection, are not violated by application of the rule that the state and its instrumentalities are not liable in tort actions. * *
Such statement may serve to convince Fabers that they cannot win, but affords no explanation as to why they must suffer from injuries inflicted upon them through negligent acts of others and without redress. Their constitutional rights are rendered meaningless by this language.
*244The majority opinion acknowledges the fact that the announced rule has been criticized by writers, judges and students of the law. A very forthright, scholarly and lucid criticism is to be found in Ace Flying Service, Inc. v. Colorado, 136 Colo. 19, 314 P. (2d) 278, wherein Justice Moore stated:
“ ‘A legal right to damage for an injury is property and one cannot be deprived of his property without due process. * * *.’ Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P. (2d) 372.
“In my judgment this question [is the state immune from suit in a certain situation] should be answered in the negative. To give an affirmative answer would mean that the due process clause of the constitution had been watered down or amended to read, No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law by any person other than the sovereign State of Colorado.’ This I cannot sanction. Unjust and unreasonable exercise of sovereign power is the very thing which the constitutional provision was designed to prevent.
“Whatever may have been the rule heretofore, I am of the firm opinion that any citizen may resort to litigation to protect his life, liberty or property even though his adversary be the sovereign state of Colorado. The constitution cannot be so nullified as to permit the state to deprive a citizen of ‘property’ without due process of law. * * * The common law doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot prevail against the constitutional guarantee of a day in court for every claim based on an asserted property right. * * * .
“If the right to acquire, possess, and protect, property is ‘inalienable,’ the individual cannot be deprived of it without his consent, either by the legislature or by the outmoded common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. There is no adequate way to protect property if resort *245to the judicial process is withdrawn. The constitutional right to protect property is guaranteed to all persons and we should not by judicial pronouncement alter or qualify those words to mean ‘all persons except those doing business with the state.’
* * ❖
“ * * * I am satisfied that the provisions of the constitution under discussion were intended to serve a definite purpose, and that where the plain meaning of the words employed are pertinent to a dispute this court should not hesitate to apply them to protect the individual citizen in the practical enjoyment of the inalienable rights guaranteed to him by that constitution.
“I reach this conclusion notwithstanding former opinions of this court in which no reference is made to the said constitutional provisions. If constitutional government is to survive we must give practical effect to the fundamental law in resolving the problems of the individual citizen. A Bill of Rights which sets forth freedoms which are stated to be ‘inalienable’ amounts to nothing if by fanciful judicial interpretation these rights are frittered away until nothing is left but an empty shell for display purposes on patriotic occasions. * * * .
“The guaranty of our constitution that a speedy remedy shall be afforded for every injury to property, is not met by the argument that the ‘remedy’ available is to seek relief at the hands of the legislature. I make this assertion notwithstanding language indicating a contrary view to be found in State of Colorado v. Colorado Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 104 Colo. 436, 91 P. (2d) 481. * * (Emphasis supplied.)
I heartily concur in the above statement of Justice Moore, and in so doing feel that I must register dissent to the majority opinion.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Franz concurs in this dissent.