Court Opinion

ID: 9406516
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-30 20:13:55.094035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:30.560216
License: Public Domain

2023 WI 60

                  SUPREME COURT           OF   WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:              2021AP373

COMPLETE TITLE:        Derrick A. Sanders,
                                 Petitioner-Appellant,
                            v.
                       State of Wisconsin Claims Board,
                                 Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner.

                         REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
                         Reported at 404 Wis. 2d 327, 978 N.W.2d 398
                                    (2022 – unpublished)

OPINION FILED:         June 30, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:         April 19, 2023

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:              Circuit
   COUNTY:             Dane
   JUDGE:              Stephen E. Ehlke

JUSTICES:
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., announced the mandate of the Court,
and delivered an opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and
ROGGENSACK, J., joined.      HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring
opinion. KAROFSKY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN
WALSH BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., joined.

NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

       For the respondent-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs
filed by Hannah S. Jurss, assistant attorney general, with whom
on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an
oral argument by Colin T. Roth, assistant attorney general.

       For the petitioner-appellant, there was a brief filed by
Matthew Splitek and Quarles & Brady LLP, Madison. There was an
oral argument by Matthew Splitek.
                                                                           2023 WI 60
                                                                   NOTICE
                                                     This opinion is subject to further
                                                     editing and modification.   The final
                                                     version will appear in the bound
                                                     volume of the official reports.
No.       2021AP373
(L.C. No.    2020CV1016)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                               :             IN SUPREME COURT

Derrick A. Sanders,

             Petitioner-Appellant,
                                                                        FILED
      v.                                                           JUN 30, 2023

State of Wisconsin Claims Board,                                    Samuel A. Christensen
                                                                   Clerk of Supreme Court

             Respondent-Respondent-Petitioner.

REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., announced the mandate of the Court,
and delivered an opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and
ROGGENSACK, J., joined.      HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring
opinion. KAROFSKY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ANN
WALSH BRADLEY and DALLET, JJ., joined.

      REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.                    Reversed.

      ¶1     REBECCA       GRASSL    BRADLEY,   J.      In     1992,     Derrick       A.

Sanders     and   two   others      "severely   beat[]"      James.1       After     the

assault,     Sanders's      co-actors    took   James     to   another      location.

Sanders did not accompany them.            One of the co-actors shot James

in the head, killing him.

      1James is a pseudonym.    We use it to preserve                            victim
privacy. See Wis. Stat. § 950.04(1v)(ag) (2021–22).
                                                                       No.    2021AP373

        ¶2    Sanders    twice     pled       no    contest     to     first-degree

intentional homicide as party to a crime; consequently, he spent

about 26 years in prison.             He incorrectly believed the State

could prove that charge even though he participated only in the

assault.      The first plea was vacated in 1995.              The State brought

the charge again, and Sanders entered the second plea.                        In 2018,

the second plea was vacated.

        ¶3    Months    later,    Sanders     petitioned      the    State       Claims

Board for compensation, seeking over $5.7 million.                           The Board

awarded $25,000, the maximum under Wis. Stat. § 775.05(4) (2019–

20).2        Section 775.05(4)     provides,        in   relevant      part,      "[i]f

the . . . [B]oard        finds     that"       $25,000       "is     not      adequate

compensation it shall submit a report specifying an amount which

it considers adequate to the chief clerk of each house of the

legislature[.]"         The   Board   did     not    find    $25,000    inadequate;

therefore, it did not submit a report.

        ¶4    Sanders    sought    judicial        review,    arguing      the    Board

should have made a finding regarding the adequacy of $25,000.
The circuit court rejected his argument, affirming the Board.3

In a split decision, the court of appeals reversed.                        Sanders v.

State of Wis. Claims Bd., No. 2021AP373, unpublished slip op.

(Wis. Ct. App. June 9, 2022).          We granted review.

       Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent references to
        2

the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019–20 version.

       The Honorable Stephen E. Ehlke, Dane County Circuit Court,
        3

presided.

                                          2
                                                                        No.        2021AP373

       ¶5     We reject Sanders's argument.              It is incompatible with

the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 775.05(4).                      Section 775.05(4)

requires the Board to submit a report in the event that the

Board finds $25,000 inadequate.                  The Board did not so find.

Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals.4

                                  I.     BACKGROUND

       ¶6     The    governing    statute       requires    the    Board      to     use   a

multiple-step process when it receives a claim.                            First, the

Board must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine "either that

the evidence is clear and convincing that the petitioner was

innocent of the crime for which he . . . suffered imprisonment,

or     that    the    evidence     is     not    clear      and    convincing           that

he . . . was         innocent."          Wis.     Stat.      § 775.05(3).                "If

the . . . [B]oard         finds   that    the    petitioner       was   innocent         and

that       he . . . did    not    by     his . . . act       or    failure         to   act

contribute to bring about the conviction and imprisonment for

which       he . . . seeks       compensation,"       the     Board     proceeds           to

address compensation.         § 775.05(4).

       The court of appeals also suggested the Board engaged in
       4

improper ex parte communications with the Milwaukee County
District Attorney's Office.    Sanders v. State of Wis. Claims
Bd., No. 2021AP373, unpublished slip op., ¶48 (Wis. Ct. App.
June 9, 2022). It concluded the issue needed to be explored on
remand. Id. The State asks us to resolve this issue. Sanders
does not develop an argument in response. "An argument to which
no response is made may be deemed conceded for purposes of
appeal."    Waukesha County v. S.L.L., 2019 WI 66, ¶42, 387
Wis. 2d 333, 929 N.W.2d 140 (Hoffman v. Econ. Preferred Ins.,
2000 WI App 22, ¶9, 232 Wis. 2d 53, 606 N.W.2d 590). We do not
address the ex parte communications issue because it has been
abandoned.

                                           3
                                                                 No.    2021AP373

      ¶7     As to compensation, the Board must first "find the

amount which will equitably compensate the petitioner, not to

exceed $25,000 and at a rate of compensation not greater than

$5,000 per year for the imprisonment."              Wis. Stat. § 775.05(4).

Second, "[i]f the . . . [B]oard finds that the amount it is able

to   award   is    not    an   adequate   compensation    it   shall   submit   a

report specifying an amount which it considers adequate to the

chief clerk of each house of the legislature[.]"               Id.

      ¶8     In this case, the Board found Sanders was innocent of

the crime for which he was imprisoned.              He did not participate

in the murder——only the assault.                 It also found he did not

contribute    to    his    conviction     even   though   he   twice   pled     no

contest.      No party challenges these findings.               Sanders takes

issue with the Board only for not making a finding regarding

adequacy.

      ¶9     After the Board awarded Sanders $25,000, Sanders filed

a petition for rehearing.            The Board, via its Chairman, denied

the petition.      The denial letter explains:

      The . . . Board's decision clearly states that the
      [B]oard . . . voted to award compensation in the
      amount of $25,000. Because the Board did not conclude
      that the amount which it was able to award was "not
      adequate compensation," it is not required to submit a
      report to the legislature "specifying an amount which
      it considers adequate." Therefore, the absence of an
      explicit   statement   regarding   the   request   for
      additional damages does not render the Board's
      decision incomplete.
      ¶10    The circuit court affirmed the Board, noting Sanders
did not cite any "administrative rule, policy, or prior practice

                                          4
                                                                          No.    2021AP373

that   requires      the     Board    to       expressly    address     his    additional

damages claims in its final decision."                     As the court continued:

       He relies solely on the final sentence of Wis. Stat.
       § 775.05(4) . . . .   I find Sanders'[s] reliance on
       this portion of the statute unpersuasive. . . . [T]he
       Board did not make a finding that $25,000 was
       inadequate compensation and it was therefore not
       required to take further action.
Over one judge's           dissent, the court of appeals reversed and

remanded to the circuit court with directions to remand to the
Board.    Sanders, No. 2021AP373, ¶1.

                             II.     STANDARD OF REVIEW

       ¶11   Sanders       argues     Wis.       Stat.     § 775.05(4)    compels      the

Board to make a finding regarding adequacy.                        The interpretation

of a statute is a question of law subject to our independent

review.      State v. Neill, 2020 WI 15, ¶14, 390 Wis. 2d 248, 938

N.W.2d 521        (quoting    State       v.    Hinkle,     2019   WI    96,    ¶14,   389

Wis. 2d 1, 935 N.W.2d 271).

       ¶12   Our     rejection       of    Sanders's        interpretation       triggers

another issue:        Was the Board required to explain why it did not

make a finding?            Our consideration of this issue turns on a

question     of    statutory       interpretation          and   accordingly     is    also

subject to our independent review.                   See id.       Specifically, Wis.

Stat. § 775.05(5) authorizes judicial review only of the Board's

"findings and the award," so we must determine the meaning of

that phrase.        We assume, without deciding, that the first issue—

—whether the Board was required to make a finding——falls within

the purview of § 775.05(5).                    We conclude the Board is not so
required; it has discretion.                   Our assumption, however, does not

                                                5
                                                                                     No.    2021AP373

extend       to    the     Board's      exercise,           or    non-exercise,            of     this

discretion.

                                     III.     DISCUSSION

       ¶13    In this court's seminal 2004 decision, State ex rel.

Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, we confirmed textualism

is the correct methodology for statutory interpretation.                                          2004

WI 58, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.                                Kalal is binding on

"all     Wisconsin          courts"——indeed,               it     is        "the     most         cited

[Wisconsin]         case    of     modern       time[.]"              See     Daniel       R.    Suhr,

Interpreting Wisconsin Statutes, 100 Marq. L. Rev. 969, 969–70

(2017);      see    also    State       v.   Hayes,        2004       WI 80,       ¶104    n.1,    273

Wis. 2d 1,         681     N.W.2d 203        (Sykes,            J.,    concurring)           ("[T]he

principles of statutory interpretation articulated by this court

in . . . Kalal . . . [cannot]                   be    dismissed          as    mere        'spirited

discussions'         or     'vigorous         discussions'              by     'part        of     the

court.' . . .            Needless to say, Kalal is binding precedent.").

(emphasis         added).          Under      this         well-established               textualist

methodology, we begin and end with a plain-meaning analysis of
Wis.    Stat.      § 775.05      because        its        text   is        unambiguous.           See

Enbridge      Energy       Co.     v.    Dane    County,          2019        WI 78,       ¶19,    387

Wis. 2d 687,        929     N.W.2d 572        (quoting           Kalal,       271    Wis. 2d 633,

¶45).

       ¶14    We    interpret        the     relevant        words      of     the     statute      in

accordance         with    their     "common         and    approved          usage";       however,

"technical words and phrases and others that have a peculiar

meaning in the law" are "construed according to such meaning."
See Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1).                     To determine common and approved
                                                 6
                                                                      No.    2021AP373

usage, we consult dictionaries.                 See State v. McKellips, 2016

WI 51, ¶32, 369 Wis. 2d 437, 881 N.W.2d 258 (citing State v.

Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 499–500, 573 N.W.2d 187 (1998)).                          To

determine the meaning of legal terms of art, we consult legal

dictionaries.           State   v.    Schaefer,     2008   WI   25,   ¶¶29–31,    308

Wis. 2d 279, 746 N.W.2d 547 (consulting Black's Law Dictionary

to determine the meaning of "discovery").

      ¶15    We read the relevant words of the statute "in the

context in which . . . [they] are used; not in isolation but as

part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or

closely-related statutes."             James v. Heinrich, 2021 WI 58, ¶20,

397 Wis. 2d 517, 960 N.W.2d 350 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633,

¶46).       We   also    consider     traditional     canons    of    construction,

which serve as "helpful, neutral guides" for our analysis.                       Id.,

¶23 n.12 (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:

The Interpretation of Legal Texts 61 (2012)).

      ¶16    Lastly, we consider statutory history, which can be

relevant to plain meaning.             Brey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.,
2022 WI 7, ¶20, 400 Wis. 2d 417, 970 N.W.2d 1 (quoting James,

397   Wis. 2d 517,        ¶26);      Wis.   Stat.    § 990.001(7)      ("A   revised

statute is to be understood in the same sense as the original

unless the change in language indicates a different meaning so

clearly as to preclude judicial construction.                    If the revision

bill contains a note which says that the meaning of the statute

to which the note relates is not changed by the revision, the

note is indicative of the legislative intent.").
      ¶17    Wisconsin Stat. § 775.05(4) states, in relevant part:
                                            7
                                                                               No.    2021AP373

      [T]he claims board shall find the amount which will
      equitably compensate the petitioner, not to exceed
      $25,000 . . . .   If the claims board finds that the
      amount it is able to award is not an adequate
      compensation it shall submit a report specifying an
      amount which it considers adequate to the chief clerk
      of each house of the legislature[.]
The key word in Wis. Stat. § 775.05(4) is "if."                                As the State

argues,     "[t]his     case     presents          a    straight-forward             statutory

interpretation        question     that,           at       base,     asks     whether      the

[l]egislature actually means 'if' when it uses the word 'if.'"

"If" means "[i]n the event that" or "[o]n the condition that[.]"

if, The American Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 2011); see also

if, Random House Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed. 1993) (defining

"if" as "in case that" or "on condition that"); if, Funk &

Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Language (1923)

(defining    "if"     as     "provided        or       on    condition        that").       For

example, consider the hit song, "If You Leave," which includes

the     following     lyrics:          "if    you       leave,        don't    look     back."

Orchestral Manoeuvres in the Dark,                          If You Leave        (A&M 1986).

These lyrics are not            an unconditional command to never look

back;     rather,     they     state     a    directive             applicable       upon   the

fulfillment of the "if" condition, which may never be satisfied.

See Wisconsin Bill Drafting Manual § 2.08(2) (2023–24) ("If you

are expressing a condition that may never occur, use 'if' to

introduce     the     condition,        not        'when'      or     'where.'").           The

directive, "don't look back," is simply irrelevant unless "you"

left.     The lyrics are also not a command to decide whether to

leave.

                                              8
                                                                                No.     2021AP373

       ¶18     Applying       these       definitions,       Wis.       Stat.    § 775.05(4)

requires the Board to submit a report "in the event that" or "on

the condition that" the Board finds $25,000 inadequate.                                      The

Board did not so find.                    As noted in the letter denying the

petition for rehearing, "the Board did not conclude that the

amount       which     it      was     able        to    award     was     'not       adequate

compensation[.]'"

       ¶19     In    contrast        to     the     structure       of     the        preceding

subsection, Wis. Stat. § 775.05(4) does not command the Board to

make a finding regarding the adequacy of $25,000.                                The "whole-

text   canon"       instructs        "interpreter[s]         to    consider       the    entire

text, in view of its structure and of the physical and logical

relation      of     its    many     parts."            Brey,     400    Wis. 2d 417,        ¶13

(quoting Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 167).                           The language of

§ 775.05(4) is notably distinct from § 775.05(3), which states:

"the . . . [B]oard shall find either that the evidence is clear

and convincing that the petitioner was innocent of the crime for

which he . . . suffered imprisonment, or that the evidence is
not    clear    and        convincing       that    he . . . was         innocent."          The

legislature could have used similar language in § 775.05(4) but

did not.       The differences between the two subsections inform our

analysis.

       ¶20     Wisconsin       Stat.       § 775.11(3)       similarly          informs      our

analysis.       The statute is closely related because it appears in

the same chapter of the Wisconsin Statutes.                               State v. Reyes

Fuerte,      2017     WI 104,        ¶27,     378       Wis. 2d 504,      904     N.W.2d 773
(citing City of Janesville v. CC Midwest, Inc., 2007 WI 93, ¶24,
                                               9
                                                                             No.   2021AP373

302   Wis. 2d 599,        734    N.W.2d 428).            For      context,    § 775.11(1)

provides:      "Any state employee against whom charges are filed

under . . . [Wis. Stat. §] 940.29, and who is subsequently found

not guilty, shall be reimbursed by the state for reasonable

attorney fees and costs in defending such action."                             Subsection

(3) declares:         "On receipt of such a claim the . . . [B]oard

shall determine whether the claim is authorized by this section

and if so shall determine the amount of attorney fees and costs

incurred and shall allow such attorney fees and costs as in its

judgment are reasonable."                Effectively, Sanders would have us

rewrite     Wis.     Stat.       § 775.05(4)         with      language      parallel     to

§ 775.11(3).       Specifically, Sanders presses an interpretation of

§ 775.05(4) that would require the Board to determine whether

the amount it is able to award is not an adequate compensation,

and if so, to submit a report to the legislature.                            The statute,

however, does not say this, and "[i]t is not up to the courts to

rewrite the plain words of statutes[.]"                      Neill, 390 Wis. 2d 248,

¶23    (quoting       State       v.     Wiedmeyer,          2016      WI App 46,         370
Wis. 2d 187,        881    N.W.2d 805)          (second        modification        in    the

original).         "Rather,      we    interpret       the     words   the    legislature

actually enacted into law."                   Id. (quoting State v. Fitzgerald,

2019 WI 69, ¶30, 387 Wis. 2d 384, 929 N.W.2d 165).

      ¶21   Sanders       does    not        reconcile      his    interpretation       with

Wis. Stats. §§ 775.05(3) or 775.11(3) and even acknowledges, "it

is     true"          that            Wis.          Stat.         § 775.05(4)           "does

not . . . specifically direct the Board to determine whether its
award is 'adequate.'"              He claims, however, a fair reading of
                                               10
                                                                                 No.    2021AP373

§ 775.05(4) necessarily implies this direction.                            He first claims

two words are materially the same:                        "equitably" and "adequate."

Recall that the Board, before the report issue is even reached,

must    "find       the     amount    which      will         equitably       compensate       the

petitioner,        not    to    exceed    $25,000[.]"             § 775.05(4)          (emphasis

added).       Then, "[i]f the . . . [B]oard finds that the amount it

is able to award is not an adequate compensation it shall submit

a report[.]"            Id. (emphasis added).                 Conflating the two words,

Sanders argues:             "the Board cannot 'find the amount which will

equitably compensate' an exoneree                        without determining whether

such an amount is adequate equitable compensation.                                      The two

questions         [1]    whether     an   amount         is    'the    amount       which   will

equitably compensate the petitioner' and [2] whether the same is

'an adequate compensation' are indistinct."

       ¶22    The problem with this reasoning is twofold.                              First, we

normally          "presume . . . different                    words       have         different

meanings."         Parsons v. Assoc. Banc-Corp., 2017 WI 37, ¶26, 374

Wis. 2d 513, 893 N.W.2d 212 (quoting Pawlowski v. Am. Fam. Mut.
Ins., 2009 WI 105, ¶22, 322 Wis. 2d 21, 777 N.W.2d 67).                                        The

"presumption        of    consistent      usage"         canon       holds,    "[a]     word   or

phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning throughout a text; a

material variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning."

Scalia    &       Garner,      Reading    Law,      at    170.         Sanders's        argument

relies,      by    his    own    admission,         on    "equitably"         and   "adequate"

being     "indistinct."              Second,        under      the     "surplusage"         canon

"[s]tatutory language is read where possible to give reasonable
effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage."                                James, 397
                                               11
                                                                  No.   2021AP373

Wis. 2d 517, ¶21 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46; citing

Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 174).          As the State argues:

    [I]f "equitably compensate" were the same as "adequate
    compensation," then how could the . . . Board ever
    simultaneously determine that an amount within the
    statutory     maximum    is     indeed    "equitabl[e]
    compensat[ion] (as it is required to do . . . ) while
    also choosing to affirmatively find that the amount it
    awarded as "equitabl[e] compensate[ion]" was "not an
    adequate compensation" and submit a report?        Put
    differently, if the inquiries were one-and-the-same,
    then the . . . Board's submitting a report to the
    [l]egislature would necessarily mean that its award
    was not "equitabl[e] compensat[ion]."
Under     Sanders's     interpretation,         the    Board's           initial

determination    that    the    statutory       maximum      is     "equitable

compensation"——and,     inherently,      adequate——effectively          prevents

it from ever concluding that amount is inadequate.                      For this

reason, Sanders cannot overcome the presumption that different

words have different meanings.

    ¶23    Sanders also misunderstands the "predicate act" canon,

which   holds,   "[a]uthorization     of   an   act   also    authorizes       a

necessary predicate act."      Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 192.
For example, "permission to harvest the wheat on one's land

implies permission to enter the land for that purpose."                      Id.

According to Sanders:

    The final sentence of . . . [Wis. Stat. §] 775.05(4)
    tells the Board what it must do "if" it finds that
    "the amount it is able to award is not an adequate
    compensation." . . . [A] necessary predicate of the
    Board's   making——or even  declining  to  make——that
    finding is a prior determination whether the Board's
    award is adequate.

                                    12
                                                                    No.     2021AP373

Problematically for Sanders, no one suggests the Board is not

authorized to make a finding regarding adequacy.                   Sanders would

turn authorization into a command.              For this reason, the canon

does not aid his proffered interpretation.                 As Sanders candidly

concedes, the canon is "not on all fours."

    ¶24     Lastly,    Sanders    advances      an    unpersuasive        statutory-

history    argument.       In    1913,    the        legislature    enacted      the

following:

    If the board shall find that the petitioner was
    innocent of the crime or offense for which he has
    suffered imprisonment, and that he did not by his act
    or failure to act contribute to bring about the
    conviction and imprisonment for which he seeks
    compensation, the board shall proceed to find the
    amount which will compensate the petitioner for his
    wrongful imprisonment.      Such board may award a
    compensation to the petitioner so found innocent of
    not to exceed five thousand dollars in any case, and
    at a rate of compensation not greater than fifteen
    hundred dollars per year for the imprisonment so
    unjustly suffered.   If the board shall find that the
    amount they may be able to award will not be an
    adequate compensation to the petitioner they shall
    report an amount to the legislature which they shall
    deem   to  be   adequate   and  shall  recommend  the
    appropriation by the legislature to the petitioner of
    the amount in excess of the amount they may have
    awarded.
§ 4, ch. 189, Laws of 1913 (emphasis added).

    ¶25     Sanders     construes    relevant          amendments     as     merely

stylistic, suggesting we should infer the plain meaning of Wis.

Stat.     § 775.05(4)     by     considering         the   language         of   its

predecessor.     In his view, the predecessor board (a different

entity than the Board) was first required to find the total
amount of money the petitioner would need to be compensated——

                                     13
                                                                                No.        2021AP373

without regard to a statutory maximum.                            If the amount needed

were more than the statutory maximum, that amount, he claims,

would be necessarily inadequate, thereby requiring a finding and

report.

    ¶26     The 1913 statute did not require the board to make a

finding     regarding          the     adequacy         of   the        statutory          maximum

compensation.           It used conditional language, like the current

statute.        In this case, statutory history does not affect our

plain-meaning analysis.

    ¶27     Next, we consider whether the Board was required to

explain    why    it     did    not       make    a     finding     regarding         adequacy.

Sanders is entitled to judicial review under Wis. Stat. ch. 227,

which    governs    administrative               procedures       and    review;       however,

Wis. Stat. § 227.03(5) provides, "[t]his chapter does not apply

to proceedings of the . . . [B]oard, except as provided in [Wis.

Stats. §§] 775.05(5), 775.06(7) and 775.11(2)."                                We therefore

examine    § 775.05(5),          the       only       applicable       statute    among         the

enumerated exceptions.
    ¶28     Wisconsin          Stat.       § 775.05(5)          does     not    subject         all

aspects    of     the    Board's          decision-making          process       to    judicial

review;    rather,       it    states:           "The . . . [B]oard            shall       keep   a

complete record of its proceedings in each case and of all the

evidence.       The findings and the award of the . . . [B]oard shall

be subject to review as provided in ch. 227."                            Section 775.05(5)

states     an     exception          to    the        general     exclusion           of     Board

proceedings articulated in Wis. Stat. § 227.03(5).                                Under that

                                                 14
                                                                        No.     2021AP373

exception, we may review only the Board's "findings" and "the

award."

       ¶29   As used in Wis. Stat. § 775.05(5), "findings" is a

legal term of art——it is a "word[]" with "a peculiar meaning in

the law[.]"     Wis. Stat. § 990.01(1).              "Findings" is synonymous

with   "finding[s]        of   fact."     finding,      Black's    Law    Dictionary

(11th ed. 2019).      A "finding of fact" is "[a] determination by a

judge, jury, or administrative agency of a fact supported by the

evidence in the record[.]"               Id. at finding of fact; see also

finding of fact, Mellinkoff's Dictionary of American Legal Usage

(1992) ("[A] determination by the jury, or by a judge in a case

tried without a jury, that the evidence proves that something is

a fact.").     For example, the phrase "finding of fact" is used

appropriately in the following sentence:                 "[H]e agreed with the

jury's    finding    of    fact   that    the   driver    did     not    stop      before

proceeding into the intersection[.]"                 finding of fact, Black's

Law    Dictionary.         A   "finding    of   fact"    is     capable       of    being

reviewed on appeal to determine whether "substantial evidence in
the record" supports its validity.              See Wis. Stat. § 227.57(6).

       ¶30   Although the word "finding" is sometimes used in an

informal manner to refer to non-factual determinations, the word

was not so used in Wis. Stat. § 775.05(5).                        Wisconsin Stat.

§ 775.06 is a closely-related statute; it appears in the "same

chapter" (indeed, it immediately follows § 775.05), and it uses

"similar terms."      See Reyes Fuerte, 378 Wis. 2d 504, ¶27 (citing

CC Midwest, Inc., 302 Wis. 2d 599, ¶24).                      Additionally, Wis.
Stat. § 227.03(5) cross-references both statutes as exceptions
                                          15
                                                                                No.    2021AP373

to    the    general     exclusion      of    Board       proceedings         from     judicial

review.         Cf. id. (explaining statutes are closely related if one

references the other (citing CC Midwest, Inc., 302 Wis. 2d 599,

¶24)).       For context, § 775.06(1) provides:

       The . . . [B]oard   shall hear   petitions                          from  law
       enforcement officers employed by the state                           who have
       judgments against them for damages caused                            while in
       their line of duty where they acted in good                         faith and
       who have incurred charges for counsel fees                          and costs
       in defending said action.
Subsection (7) says:                "The . . . [B]oard shall keep a complete

record of its proceedings in each case and of all the evidence.

The    findings,       conclusions,       determination           and     award       shall   be

subject to review as provided in ch. 227."                         Under the surplusage

canon,       discussed       above,    "findings"          is     not    synonymous         with

"conclusions"          or     the     "determination."                  See      James,       397

Wis. 2d 517, ¶21 (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46; citing

Scalia      &    Garner,     Reading    Law,        at    174).         While    § 775.06(7)

authorizes          judicial         review        of      "conclusions"              and     the

"determination,"            § 775.05(5)      does       not.      Section       775.05(5)      is

narrower in scope, indicating "findings" is used in its formal,

legal sense.

       ¶31      Under the text of Wis. Stat. § 775.05(4), "the award"

is the "[c]ompensation awarded" by the Board.                           The report is not

a part of "the award," because the statute provides for the

filing of a report if "the amount" the Board is "able to award

is not an adequate compensation."                        § 775.05(4); see also Wis.

Stat. § 20.505(4)(d) ("A sum sufficient for payments of award
made by the . . . [B]oard . . . under . . . [§] 775.05(4)[.]").

                                              16
                                                                               No.     2021AP373

       ¶32    We conclude the Board's decision not to make a non-

required finding regarding adequacy is not a "finding" in the

legal sense of the word as used in the statute.                               See Wis. Stat.

§ 775.05(5).            It is not possible to apply a substantial evidence

standard       to       the    Board's     exercise        or     non-exercise         of    its

discretion because the Board did not determine the truth or

falsity      of     a   fact     in   declining      to    make    a    finding      regarding

adequacy.           Additionally,         this      exercise       or       non-exercise      of

discretion does not impact "the award"——only whether to submit a

report,      which       is    not    a   part      of    "the    award[.]"            See   id.

Accordingly,            the    Board's     exercise        or     non-exercise         of    its

discretion in this regard is not subject to judicial review.

                                  IV.     THE CONCURRENCE

       ¶33    The concurrence author does not join any part of our

opinion——not even those portions with which he agrees.                                 "[I]t is

this court's function to develop and clarify the law."                                 State ex

rel.    Wis.        Senate       v.   Thompson,          144    Wis. 2d 429,         436,    424

N.W.2d 385 (Wis. 1988) (citations omitted).                            Without cause, the
concurrence author deprives the people of precedent on a novel

issue, preferring instead to act as a court of one.

       ¶34    The       concurrence       discusses       only    two       portions    of   our

opinion in explaining the author's decision to deny this opinion

precedential            value.        First,     the      concurrence         discusses      the

meaning of the word "findings."                      According to the concurrence,

our opinion "reaches beyond the issues raised by the parties and

addresses         the     reviewability        of    findings          in    this    statutory
scheme."      Concurrence, ¶50.            The concurrence is wrong.
                                               17
                                                                              No.     2021AP373

       ¶35     Sanders argued, "[r]eversal and remand are necessary

so the Board can exercise its discretion."                         He claims, like the

dissent, that the Board erroneously exercised its discretion by

not documenting its decision-making process.                         In response, the

Board argues certain aspects of its decision making are not

subject to judicial review.                Specifically, it argues a court may

review only:          "(1) its decision about whether a claimant has

demonstrated         by    clear    and     convincing      evidence          that    he   was

innocent . . . ;           and   (2)      its    decision    about       the     amount     of

equitable compensation, not to exceed $25,000."

       ¶36     Although we adopt a slightly different rationale than

the    Board's       argument,      any    suggestion       that    we    have       deviated

significantly from the parties' presentation of this case is

false.         The    concurrence         misunderstands      either          the    parties'

arguments      or    the    party      presentation       principle.            Regardless,

"[w]e sit here to decide the law as we find it, and not as the

parties or others may have supposed it to be."                        Wis. Jud. Comm'n

v.    Woldt,    2021      WI 73,    ¶66,        398   Wis. 2d 482,       961        N.W.2d 854
(Rebecca       Grassl      Bradley,       J.,    concurring/dissenting)              (quoting

Ross   v.    Bd.     of    Outagamie      Cnty.       Supervisors,       12    Wis. 26,      44

(1860) (Dixon, C.J., dissenting)).                     "In a legal system in which

appellate opinions not only establish the meaning of law, but do

so through precedent that binds future litigants, courts cannot

cede to the parties control over legal analysis."                             St. Augustine

Sch. v. Taylor, 2021 WI 70, ¶103, 398 Wis. 2d 92, 961 N.W.2d 635

(Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) (quoting Amanda Frost,
The Limits of Advocacy, 59 Duke L.J. 447, 453 (2009)).                                     This
                                                18
                                                                                 No.     2021AP373

court     has     a    duty     to    independently                research,    analyze,       and

interpret the law on behalf of the nearly 6 million people of

Wisconsin.            See     State    v.       Alexander,          2015     WI 6,     ¶83,     360

Wis. 2d 292, 858 N.W.2d 662 (Gableman, J., concurring) ("[I]t is

axiomatic that this court is not bound by the issues presented

or the arguments made by the parties.").

       ¶37     Strict application of the party presentation principle

is especially unsuited for the Wisconsin Supreme Court.                                        This

court is not a lower court; it serves a law-developing function.

State v. Grawien, 123 Wis. 2d 428, 432, 367 N.W.2d 816 (Ct. App.

1985)     ("The       Wisconsin       Supreme          Court,       unlike     the     court    of

appeals,        has    been     designated         by        the    constitution       and     the

legislature       as     a    law-declaring            court.         While     the    court    of

appeals         also         serves        a      law-declaring              function,         such

pronouncements          should       not       occur    in    cases     of     great    moment."

(internal citation omitted)); see also State v. Herrmann, 2015

WI 84,    ¶154,        364    Wis. 2d       336,       867    N.W.2d 772        (Ziegler,      J.,

concurring) ("Unlike a circuit court or the court of appeals,
the supreme court serves a law development purpose[.]").                                       The

concurrence's application of this non-binding principle                                       would

turn this court into a circuit court, "consign[ing] the state's

highest       court     to    selecting         winners       and    losers     in    litigation

rather than declaring law."                    St. Augustine Sch., 398 Wis. 2d 92,

¶105.

       ¶38     Ironically, the concurrence deviates from the party

presentation principle in this very case.                            As the dissent points
out,    the     Board    "concede[d]"——in              very     explicit       terms——that       it
                                                 19
                                                                                      No.     2021AP373

should lose under the 1913 statute.                          See dissent, ¶71.                Under a

strict application of the party presentation principle, Sanders

should prevail unless we are willing to declare that subsequent

amendments were substantive.               Recognizing the Board's error, the

concurrence          properly      deviates             from        the    principle.              The

concurrence       author     has     deviated           from    the       principle          in   other

cases     as    well.        See,       e.g.,       5     Walworth,         LLC        v.    Engerman

Contracting,         Inc.,    2023      WI 51,          __     Wis. 2d __,            __    N.W.2d __

(overruling a decision of this court even though no party asked

this court to do so); Friends of Frame Park, U.A. v. City of

Waukesha,        2022        WI 57,       402           Wis. 2d 1,              976         N.W.2d 263

(majority/lead op.) (adopting an argument neither party advanced

in order to overrule a long line of court of appeals decisions).

      ¶39      The     concurrence's           claim         that         the    definition          of

"findings" is unnecessary to resolve this case is also difficult

to follow.        Concurrence, ¶50.             The concurrence appears to agree

the   Board      has    discretion        to    make           or    not    make        a    finding.

Discretionary          decisions        typically            are      subject          to    judicial
review.        Accordingly, some discussion as to why this particular

exercise of discretion is not subject to review is warranted,

particularly         because       Sanders      argues              the    Board        erroneously

exercised its discretion.

      ¶40      The concurrence also declines to join this opinion's

critique of the dissent.                The concurrence declares the dissent's

analysis is a "well-reasoned, good-faith reading of the statute"

ostensibly       not    rooted     in    "public          policy."              Id.,       ¶52.     The
concurrence does not, however, explain why the dissent is wrong
                                               20
                                                                             No.    2021AP373

or address the irrelevancy of the dissent drawing comparisons

between the amount of compensation available under Wisconsin's

law   versus       other      states'      statutes.            The   dissenters    believe

policy is a legitimate consideration in conducting a statutory

analysis.          In other cases, the dissenters have quite clearly

advocated      for      a    so-called          "holistic       approach"    to    statutory

interpretation.             See, e.g., Clean Wis., Inc. v. DNR, 2021 WI 71,

¶41, 398 Wis. 2d 386, 961 N.W.2d 346 (Dallet, J., concurring).

The dissent's focus on, for example, the amount of compensation

available in New Hampshire to the wrongfully convicted makes

much more sense in the context of the dissenters' other separate

writings.            See      dissent,           ¶56     n.1.         The    concurrence's

unwillingness to critique an anti-textual analysis does not.

      ¶41     On    a   final    note,          the    concurrence     characterizes      our

response as "overly emphatic[.]"                         Concurrence, ¶51.           If the

concurrence means to suggest our analysis of important legal

issues   is    thorough,         we     take      it    as    a   compliment.        If   the

concurrence        disagrees      on       the    legal      principles     presented,    we
would welcome a discourse but the concurrence does not cite any

law or even secondary sources to support its position.

                                      V.    THE DISSENT

      ¶42     The           dissent         would         hold        the     Board       is

"require[d] . . . to            make       an    adequacy       determination      when   the

Board awards the $25,000 maximum despite a wrongly imprisoned

petitioner's request for more."                        Dissent, ¶55.        Alternatively,

for the sake of argument, the dissent would hold, "[t]he choice
to refrain from determining adequacy is . . . a discretionary
                                                 21
                                                                           No.       2021AP373

choice."       Id., ¶75.        Either way, the dissent faults the Board

for not "document[ing] and explain[ing]" its decision.                                    Id.,

¶76.

       ¶43    The    dissent's         conclusions     are      grounded       in     public

policy,       not     law.         The     dissent        begins        with      what      it

mischaracterizes              as         "context"             for        "determin[ing]

whether . . . [the            Board]     fulfilled       its     statutory        duty      in

Sanders' case."          Id., ¶58.         The dissent derives "context" not

from the statutory text but from its own policy preferences.

The    dissent's      "context"     consists      of     the    following       complaint:

"Wisconsin is lagging far behind" the other 38 states that have

created compensation schemes for the wrongfully convicted.                                Id.,

¶56 (citation omitted).            Wisconsin "currently has the lowest per

year compensation cap at $5,000 and the second lowest total

compensation cap at $25,000."                Id. (citation omitted).                      "Only

New Hampshire's total compensation cap is lower, at $20,000."

Id.,    ¶56    n.1    (citation        omitted).         "The        difference      between

Wisconsin's cap and those in other states is significant."                                Id.,
¶57.         The    dissent     then     imbues    its     interpretation            of    the

statutory text with its subjective view of "common sense," but

unambiguous statutes are not empty vessels to be filled with

judicial sensibilities.                See id., ¶¶69, 81.               In claiming the

court's       analysis    will     "shield[]       the     Board       from    [judicial]

review," "incentivize[]" the Board to act unscrupulously, and

"allow[] the Board to add insult to injury," the dissent makes a

policy    argument       about     what    the    statute        should       say,    not    a

                                            22
                                                                           No.    2021AP373

textualist argument about what the statute actually says.                               See

id., ¶¶81 n.8, 85.

       ¶44      Although     the    dissent's       public   policy       discussion      is

interesting,         it    has     no     relevance    to    the     legal       questions

presented       in   this    case,       regardless    of    the    number       of   years

Sanders spent in prison.                  Courts decide what the law is, not

what it should be.                In the course of executing this judicial

function,       we   neither       endorse      nor   condemn      the    legislature's

policy choices.

       ¶45      Following the dissent's policy discussion, it commits

multiple analytical errors in interpreting the statutory text.

First,     it    conflates        the    Board's    mandatory      duty    to    submit   a

report upon a finding of inadequacy with a non-existent duty to

make   a     finding      regarding       adequacy.      Repeatedly,        the    dissent

emphasizes       the      statute       uses   "mandatory    language"——"it           shall

submit     a    report"——but        the    dissent    overlooks      the     conditional

nature of the words preceding the mandatory language.                                  See,

e.g., id., ¶¶54, 67.               The mandatory language becomes operative
only if the condition——a finding of inadequacy——is fulfilled.

       ¶46      Second,     the    dissent     interprets     the    word       "findings"

beyond its generally accepted legal meaning:

       "[F]inding" is often used . . . to mean a decision or
       a   determination.     See  Find,  American  Heritage
       Dictionary (5th ed. 2022) ("To come to a legal
       decision or verdict."). Wisconsin Stat. § 775.05 uses
       "find" in this general sense . . . .   As such, there
       is no indication in the statute that the word
       "finding" in . . . § 775.05(5) was meant in a limited
       sense to exclude some types of decisions, rather than

                                               23
                                                                           No.    2021AP373

       as    a    general            synonym         for      "decision"           or
       "determination."
Id., ¶27.         As a preliminary matter, the dissent incorrectly

cites a non-legal dictionary for a legal definition.                                    Legal

precision       favors     using    legal    dictionaries      for    defining          legal

concepts        embedded    in     laws.          Additionally,      the    legislature

generally does not use "synonyms."                   See Wisconsin Bill Drafting

Manual, § 2.04(5) ("Avoid using synonyms.                      Use different words

for different meanings and the same word when the same meaning

is intended.").          By interpreting "finding" to be synonymous with

various other phrases, the dissent would subject all aspects of

the Board's decision making to judicial review.                            In so doing,

the     dissent's       interpretation        effectively      amends       Wis.        Stat.

§ 227.03(5)       as     follows:         "This     chapter    does      not     apply    to

proceedings       of     the . . . [B]oard,         except    as   for     claims       filed

under provided in" § 775.05.                  We do not have the power the

dissent would usurp from the legislature.

       ¶47   Lastly, the dissent suggests Wis. Stat. § 775.06 is

not a closely-related statute because it references "findings,
conclusions,        determination,          and    award,"    whereas       Wis.        Stat.

§ § 775.05(5) uses only the phrase "findings and the award[.]"

See dissent, ¶80 n.7.              If the dissent's view were correct, few

if any statutes would be closely related, and we would interpret

a     statute     "in    isolation[.]"            James,     397   Wis. 2d 517,           ¶20

(quoting        Kalal,     271     Wis. 2d 633,       ¶46).        This         court    has

repeatedly       rejected     such    a    cramped    construction         of    statutes.
Id. (quoting Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46).

                                             24
                                                                              No.    2021AP373

                                  VI.     CONCLUSION

     ¶48    The people have not given this court the power to

"second-guess"         the    legislature's         policy       choices.       Johnson      v.

WEC, 2021 WI 87, ¶3, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469.                               "Judicial

deference     to       the    policy    choices       enacted          into   law    by    the

legislature        requires       that        statutory          interpretation           focus

primarily     on       the    language    of        the    statute."           Kalal,       271

Wis. 2d 633,           ¶44.       "While textualism cannot                    prevent       the

incursion          of          policy              preferences            into            legal

analysis . . . without textualism,                        such         encroachment          is

certain."      Friends of Frame Park, U.A. v. City of Waukesha,

2022 WI 57, ¶96, 403 Wis. 2d 1, 976 N.W.2d 263 (Rebecca Grassl

Bradley, J., concurring) (quoting Woldt, 398 Wis. 2d 482, ¶92).

The court of appeals majority "grafted onto . . . [Wis. Stat.

§ 775.05(4)]       a    process    the    legislature            has    not   sanctioned";

accordingly, its conclusions——and the dissent's——"are contrary

to   policy    choices          made     by     the       legislature."              Sanders,

No. 2021AP373, ¶56 (Fitzpatrick, J., dissenting) (citing Mayo v.
Wis. Injured Patients & Fams. Comp. Fund., 2018 WI 78, ¶¶26, 40,

383 Wis. 2d 1, 914 N.W.2d 678).

     By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is

reversed.

                                              25
                                                                      No.    2021AP373.bh

       ¶49    BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.            (concurring).          After the Claims

Board awarded Derrick Sanders the statutory maximum of $25,000,

Wis. Stat. § 775.05(4) required the Board to submit a report to

the legislature if the Board found the award inadequate.                                  No

report was submitted.            Sanders maintains the Board erred because

it did not explain why the award to Sanders was adequate.                                The

statute      is   only   triggered,        however,   if   the     Board     finds       the

amount of the award inadequate.                 If the Board does not find the

amount inadequate, there is no statutory mandate to explain why

it    decided     against   making     a    finding    that     § 775.05         does    not

require the Board to make.                  I agree with the lead opinion's

statutory analysis explaining why this is so, reasoning that

largely      mirrors     Judge   Fitzpatrick's        dissent    at    the       court    of

appeals.

       ¶50    The lead opinion goes further, however.                       It reaches

beyond      the   issues    raised    by     the   parties      and    addresses         the

reviewability of findings in this statutory scheme.                               Because

this discussion is not necessary to resolve the dispute, was not
briefed, and could have wider implications, I believe it would

be unwise to address that issue authoritatively in this case.

       ¶51    The lead opinion answers with an extended discussion

of    the    party     presentation     principle      for    reasons        I    do     not

understand.       Every member of the court agrees that sometimes our

case-deciding, law-clarifying function requires us to go beyond

the    precise     contours      of   the    parties'      legal      arguments.           A

majority of this court——and as far as I am aware, almost every
court in the country——also agrees we usually should not do so,

                                            1
                                                                     No.   2021AP373.bh

particularly when resolving a case does not require it.                       That is

the case here.        Therefore, the lead opinion's overly emphatic

response to a rather standard judicial decision-making principle

makes little sense.

       ¶52   Additionally, the lead opinion engages in a lengthy

critique of the dissent for allegedly rooting its conclusions in

public policy rather than law.                While I reject an approach to

statutory     interpretation       that       incorporates         one's    preferred

policy   outcome,     I   simply   do     not    see   that    in    the    dissent's

analysis.       The     briefing   on     both    sides       of    this    case   was

excellent, and in my view, the dissent presents a well-reasoned,

good-faith reading of the statute.               Sometimes judges endeavoring

to faithfully interpret statutes disagree; no nefarious motive

need   be    invoked.      Although       I   disagree    with       the    dissent's

analysis, the critique by the lead opinion misses the mark.

       ¶53   For these reasons, I respectfully concur.

                                          2
                                                              No.    2021AP373.jjk

    ¶54     JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.            (dissenting).     Derrick Sanders

wrongfully spent 26 years imprisoned for a homicide that he did

not commit.     Because he was wrongly imprisoned by the State, the

Wisconsin     Claims    Board    awarded     him   $25,000,    the     statutory

maximum that the Board itself is authorized to award from its

appropriation fund.       Wisconsin Stat. § 775.05(4) says that "[i]f

the claims board finds that the amount it is able to award is

not an adequate compensation it shall submit a report specifying

an amount which it considers adequate to the chief clerk of each

house of the legislature . . . ."             Despite this directive, the

Board said nothing about whether or not the $25,000 award was

adequate to compensate Sanders for his 26 years of imprisonment,

nor did the Board submit a report to the legislature.                      Yet a

majority of this court holds that the Board did everything it

was required to do under the statute.              This holding transforms

the mandatory language of the statute into a mere suggestion and

erroneously shields the Board from judicial review.                  As such, I

respectfully dissent.
    ¶55     I begin with a brief history of Wisconsin's practice

of compensating innocent people who were wrongly imprisoned by

the State.      I then provide some necessary factual background.

Next,   I   look   to   Wis.    Stat.   § 775.05(4)   and   explain     how   the

statute requires the Board to make an adequacy determination

when the Board awards the $25,000 maximum despite a wrongly

imprisoned petitioner's request for more.               Finally, I explain

how the Board's failure to explain and document its decision

                                        1
                                                                               No.    2021AP373.jjk

allows it to evade review, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 775.05(5)

and Wis. Stat. ch. 227.

                                          I.       HISTORY

       ¶56    In 1913, Wisconsin was first off the starting blocks

in    compensating         innocent       people         wrongfully      imprisoned          by   the

state.       Shelley Fite, Compensation for the Unjustly Imprisoned:

A Model for Reform in Wisconsin, 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 1181, 1182

(2005).         Since          then,     thirty-eight         states       and       the   federal

government         have    followed           in   our    tracks.          See      The    National

Registry      of    Exonerations,             Compensation         by    the     Numbers:     State

Statutory      Compensation             (Apr.      6,    2023),     https://perma.cc/N9RC-

9EZM.        Now,    despite           once    leading       the    pack       in    compensating

individuals         for    the       "sacrifices         which     the     state      imposes     on

[them] for the public purpose of punishing crime," Wisconsin is

lagging far behind.                    See John H. Wigmore, The Bill to Make

Compensation to Persons Erroneously Convicted of Crime, 3 J. Am.

Inst.      Crim.    L.     &    Criminology         665,     665    (1913).           This    state

currently has the lowest per year compensation cap at $5,000 and
the    second      lowest        total    compensation           cap     at    $25,000.1          The

National      Registry          of     Exonerations,         Compensation            Statutes:     A

National Overview (June 2, 2022), https://perma.cc/6XRD-PT6D.

       ¶57    The difference between Wisconsin's caps and those in

other      states         is     significant.                The    majority          of     states

compensating for wrongful conviction provide at least $50,000

per year of wrongful imprisonment, ten times Wisconsin's per-

       Only New Hampshire's total compensation cap is lower, at
       1

$20,000. N.H. Rev. Stat. § 541-B:14.

                                                   2
                                                                                  No.    2021AP373.jjk

year     cap.         Innocence       Project,          Key     Provisions              in   Wrongful

Conviction             Compensation               Laws              (May          27,           2022),

https://perma.cc/39LX-7EJJ.                     Even setting aside comparisons to

other       states,    the     total       compensation             cap     set     by       Wisconsin

legislators in 1913 ($5,000), adjusted for inflation, translates

to more than $150,000 in today's dollars, six times the current

cap    of    $25,000.         See     Bureau      of        Labor    Statistics,             Inflation

Calculator,            https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm

(accessed Apr. 21, 2023).

       ¶58     However, these low caps do not serve as an absolute

ceiling.            Section 775.05(4)            includes       an        escape        hatch    which

instructs the Board to submit a report to the legislature if the

maximum       allowable        award       is     inadequate          compensation              for   a

wrongfully convicted petitioner.                        See Wis. Stat. § 775.05(4).

Within       this     context,        we    examine          the     Board's            decision      to

determine whether it fulfilled its statutory duty in Sanders'

case.

                                      II.       BACKGROUND
       ¶59     The    lead     opinion          minimizes       the        fact     that       Sanders

wrongfully      spent     26    years       in    prison,           while    emphasizing           that

Sanders      participated        in    an       earlier       battery       of     the       victim——a

crime that Sanders was not convicted of and a fact that is

irrelevant to our review of the Board's decision.                                       In order to

clarify which facts are relevant to our review, I provide a

brief summary of the Board's decision here.

       ¶60     In     2018,    the     Circuit          Court        for    Milwaukee           County
vacated       Sanders'         conviction             for     first-degree               intentional

                                                  3
                                                                     No.   2021AP373.jjk

homicide.       After    26   years        in   prison,      Sanders     walked        free.

Subsequently,      Sanders     petitioned         the    Board    for    compensation,

seeking around $530,000 for lost wages and assets, and around

$5.2 million in lost earning potential.2                      The Milwaukee County

District Attorney's Office did not oppose the petition.

    ¶61     The    Board      made     two       determinations.             First,       it

determined      that    Sanders      had    shown       by   clear   and     convincing

evidence that he was innocent and did not contribute to his

conviction.       Second, it decided to award Sanders $25,000, less

than $1,000 per year of wrongful imprisonment.

    ¶62     The    Board      offered       a    detailed        rationale       for    its

determination that Sanders was innocent.                      It explained that a

court had found that there was no factual basis for Sanders' no

contest plea to first-degree intentional homicide.                               It noted

that Sanders consistently maintained he had not been involved in

the homicide, and that one of the men actually involved in the

homicide had signed a statement that Sanders was neither present

nor involved.      The Board additionally explained that the "unique
facts" of the case showed that Sanders had not contributed to

his own conviction, despite his no contest plea.                         Specifically,

Sanders   had     always   maintained           his   innocence,        sought    a    plea

withdrawal, and met the high legal standard to merit withdrawal.

    2  In his hearing before the Board, Sanders explained that
"I'm not trying to say I would have earned $5 million, what I'm
saying is compensation due to . . . the precedent that I've been
seeing . . . ." Sanders then referenced two prior cases before
the Board, one in which a petitioner received $7.5 million after
being wrongfully imprisoned for 24 years, and another in which a
petitioner   received   $13  million   after   being  wrongfully
imprisoned for 13 years.

                                            4
                                                                              No.   2021AP373.jjk

       ¶63     By contrast, the Board provided zero rationale for its

decision       to    award       Sanders    the           statutory      maximum        without

requesting more from the legislature.                       The Board merely restated

that    Sanders      was     innocent      of       the    crime     for       which    he      was

convicted, and that "[a]ccordingly, the Board further concludes

that compensation in the amount of $25,000 shall be awarded"

from its appropriation fund.                We do not know whether the Board

considered Sanders' role in the beating of the victim prior to

the crime.       We do not know whether the Board considered Sanders'

factually unsupported no contest plea.                        We do not know whether

the    Board    considered        how    Sanders'          case    compared         with    those

wrongfully convicted petitioners who were awarded millions of

dollars.        We   do    not    even   know       whether       the    Board      considered

adequacy at all or whether it ceased consideration of the case

upon awarding the statutory maximum from the appropriation fund.

The reality is that we do not know anything about the Board's

rationale for not sending a report to the legislature.

       ¶64     Having established the relevant background, I turn to
Wis. Stat. § 775.05 and explain why the Board was required to

document and explain its decision regarding the adequacy of the

award.

                                    III.    ANALYSIS

       ¶65     Wisconsin     Stat.      § 775.05          requires      the    Board       to   (1)

determine whether or not its award to Sanders was adequate; and

(2) provide at least some rationale for its determination so

that a court may review its determination under Wis. Stat. ch.
227.     See Wis. Stat. § 775.05(4)-(5). The Board failed to meet

                                                5
                                                                     No.    2021AP373.jjk

both   of    these      requirements.         Therefore,     the     Board's       action

should be reversed and remanded with instructions to correct

that failure.        I discuss each of these points in turn below.

                   A.   The Board Must Determine Adequacy.

       ¶66   The text and history of Wis. Stat. § 775.05(4) make it

clear that the Board was required to determine whether or not

its award to Sanders was adequate.               The relevant portion of Wis.

Stat. § 775.05(4) reads as follows:

       If the claims board finds that the petitioner was
       innocent . . . the claims board shall find the amount
       which will equitably compensate the petitioner, not to
       exceed $25,000 and at a rate of compensation not
       greater    than    $5,000     per    year   for    the
       imprisonment . . . .   If the claims board finds that
       the amount it is able to award is not an adequate
       compensation it shall submit a report specifying an
       amount which it considers adequate to the chief clerk
       of each house of the legislature . . . .

Wis. Stat. § 775.05(4) (emphasis added).
       ¶67   The     statute    uses    the     mandatory       language       "shall,"

requiring the Board to report to the legislature if it "finds

the amount it is able to award is not an adequate compensation."

Wis.    Stat.      § 775.05(4).         In     order    to      comply      with     this

requirement, the Board must first determine whether or not the

amount it is able to award is adequate.                      Because an award is

either adequate or it is not, the word "if," coupled with the

report requirement, sets up a binary decision tree with two

options.        Option     1:   the    Board    decides      that     the     award    is

adequate,     so   it    is   not   required    to     submit    a   report     to    the

legislature.         Option 2: the Board decides that the award is

                                          6
                                                                No.   2021AP373.jjk

inadequate,    so    it    is   required    to   submit    a    report      to    the

legislature.

    ¶68    The      lead   opinion    relies     almost     entirely        on    the

proposition that the word "if" creates a third option for the

Board, and allows the Board to entirely refrain from determining

whether or not the award is adequate.                 This reading of the

statute strains credulity.           By the lead opinion's logic, Wis.

Stat. § 775.05 includes a mandatory requirement that the Board

submit a report to the legislature if it finds that the maximum

award is inadequate.        But it simultaneously allows the Board to

avoid that requirement at whim regardless of the adequacy or

inadequacy of the award.

    ¶69    The      lead    opinion's       foray   into       80s    pop        music

illustrates the absurdity of its position.                 The "if" condition

presented by the lyrics "if you leave" creates two options:

leave or stay.       It is unlikely that any listener of sound mind

would determine that the singer was also presenting a third

choice: refuse to decide whether to stay or leave and instead
exist in some bizarre metaphysical state outside of staying or

leaving.      The same is true of the statute.                   There are two

options——the award is adequate or it is inadequate——and the lead

opinion treads outside the bounds of common sense in determining

there is a third option.

    ¶70    Returning from the lead opinion's musical interlude, I

now turn to the statutory history of Wis. Stat. § 775.05(4),

which confirms that the Board is required to determine whether

                                        7
                                                                    No.   2021AP373.jjk

its award is adequate.         The 1913 version of the statute read, in

pertinent part, as follows:

       If the board shall find that the petitioner was
       innocent . . . the board shall proceed to find the
       amount which will compensate the petitioner for his
       wrongful imprisonment.      Such board may award a
       compensation to the petitioner so found innocent of
       not to exceed five thousand dollars in any case, and
       at a rate of compensation not greater than fifteen
       hundred dollars per year for the imprisonment so
       unjustly suffered.   If the board shall find that the
       amount they may be able to award will not be an
       adequate compensation to the petitioner they shall
       report an amount to the legislature which they shall
       deem to be adequate . . . .

Section 3203a(4), ch. 189, Laws of 1913.
       ¶71   It is clear that the 1913 statute first required the

Board to find the amount that would compensate the petitioner

for the time spent wrongfully imprisoned, and then separately

enabled the Board to award up to the statutory maximum.                              The

Board    concedes    as   much.       The    fact    that     a    subsequent     1935

revisor's bill condensed this language and combined the first

two    sentences    together    did    not    change    the       Board's     duty    to

determine the correct amount of compensation.

       ¶72   "A   revisor's    bill   ordinarily       does       not   result   in    a
change in the meaning of the statutes revised," and it did not

result in a change in meaning here.                 S. Milwaukee Sav. Bank v.

Barrett, 2000 WI 48, ¶37, 234 Wis. 2d 733, 611 N.W.2d 448; see

also Wis. Stat. § 990.001(7) ("If the revision bill contains a

note which says that the meaning of the statute to which the

note    relates    is   not   changed   by    the     revision,         the   note    is
indicative of the legislative intent.").                The revisor's bill in

                                        8
                                                                    No.   2021AP373.jjk

question noted that its purpose was to "make the statutes more

clear,      concise,    and   compact,"       rather    than    make      substantive

changes, and that "[t]he absence of a note to any section of the

bill means that only verbal changes [were] intended."                       1935 S.B.

75 (directing the reader to see the first note in 1935 S.B. 50);

1935 S.B. 50.          There was no note appended to the section at

issue here, and therefore no substantive change was intended.

The 1913 and 1935 statutes required the Board to determine the

amount that will compensate the petitioner, regardless of the

statutory maximum, and the statute continues to do so in its

current form.

      ¶73     In analyzing the statutory history, the lead opinion

misses the point.        It focuses on the 1913 statute's conditional

statement, while ignoring the requirement that "the board shall

proceed to find the amount which will compensate the petitioner

for   his    wrongful    imprisonment."         The    act     of   "find[ing]     the

amount which will compensate" a person necessarily implies some

determination      of     how     much    is    required       to     appropriately
recompense the person for the loss suffered.                    See "Compensate,"

Merriam-Webster          Online      Dictionary,             https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/compensate (last visited June 23, 2023)

("to make an appropriate and usually counterbalancing payment

to"   (emphasis    added)).        Necessarily,        in   deciding      the   proper

amount of compensation, the Board has already determined the

adequacy of the amount it is statutorily able to award.3

      3This determination is a matter of simple math: is the
amount which will compensate the petitioner greater than the
amount the statute allows the Board to award?

                                          9
                                                                          No.    2021AP373.jjk

      ¶74    It        is   not    surprising,        therefore,        that      the     Board

conceded that the 1913 version of the statute required it to

determine how much would compensate the petitioner, regardless

of   the    statutory         maximum.        Where     the     Board   goes      wrong,       of

course, is in arguing that a revisor's bill made substantive

changes     to     that     requirement,         when     the    revisor's        bill    made

explicit that there were no substantive changes.

      ¶75        As explained, the text and history of the statute

make clear the Board was required to determine whether or not

its award would adequately compensate Sanders.                            But even if we

were to assume the lead opinion's reading of the statute is

correct——and the Board is allowed to refrain from determining

whether the award is adequate——the Board is still required to

make a determination that it must document and explain.                                       The

choice      to    refrain         from    determining         adequacy      is        still    a

discretionary           choice.4         Under     either       reading,        the     statute

requires     the       Board      to   exercise     its    discretion       in        making   a

decision,        and    (as    the     next   section         explains)     document          the
rationale behind the decision.

      4 An example of when the Board arguably made such a
determination is when it decided not to submit a report to the
legislature on behalf of a petitioner because "a legislative
committee [was] presently considering a range of issues
concerning   innocent   convicts.     The   committee   may   make
recommendations on the issue of compensation for innocent
convicts."    State of Wisconsin Claims Board, Decisions re:
December     2,     2004     hearings     (Dec.     14,     2004),
https://claimsboard.wi.gov/Documents/Decision_Conv_2004-12-
02%20Avery,%20Steven.pdf.

                                              10
                                                                                 No.    2021AP373.jjk

      B.    The Board Must Document Its Decision-Making Process.

      ¶76       Having established that Wis. Stat. § 775.05 requires

the Board to determine whether or not its award is adequate,

regardless        of        the    statutory          maximum,      I     now     turn       to    the

requirement       that        the     Board       must      document       and     explain         that

decision.

      ¶77       The     Board's       decisions           regarding        compensation             for

wrongfully convicted petitioners are subject to judicial review

"as provided in ch. 227."5                  Wisconsin Stat. § 775.05(5) provides

that the Board "shall keep a complete record of its proceedings

in each case and of all the evidence.                               The findings and the

award of the claims board shall be subject to review as provided

in ch. 227."           Section 227.57(8) instructs a court to reverse or

remand the cause when an "exercise of discretion is outside the

range      of    discretion          delegated         to     the       agency         by   law;    is

inconsistent          with        a . . . prior          agency      practice . . . or               is

otherwise        in     violation        of       a      constitutional           or        statutory

provision."            In    order    for     a    court     to     determine          whether     the
Board's exercise of discretion is within these bounds, the Board

must document its decision and the rationale behind it.                                             See

Reidinger v. Optometry Examining Bd., 81 Wis. 2d 292, 297-298,

260   N.W.2d      270        (1977)    ("Discretion           is     not    synonymous             with

      5Wisconsin Stat. § 227.03(5) states that chapter 227 "does
not apply to proceedings of the claims board, except as provided
in ss. 775.05(5), 775.06(7), and 775.11(2)." Section 775.05(5)
relates to proceedings regarding compensation for innocent
convicts——the relevant proceeding in this case.        As such,
chapter 227 review standards apply to the "findings" and "award"
of the subject proceedings in this case.         See Wis. Stat.
§ 775.05(5).

                                                  11
                                                                 No.       2021AP373.jjk

decision-making.     Rather,    the    term     contemplates          a    process    of

reasoning . . . there      should     be    evidence      in    the       record    that

discretion was in fact exercised and the basis of that exercise

of discretion should be set forth.").

    ¶78    This is not a new concept.                We have long said that

discretionary decision-making requires some documented evidence

of the decision-maker's rationale.              See, e.g., Arrowhead United

Tchrs. Org. v. Wis. Emp. Rels. Comm'n, 116 Wis. 2d 580, 603, 342

N.W.2d 709 (1984); Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n

of Wisconsin, 109 Wis. 2d 127, 136-137, 325 N.W.2d 339 (1982);

Hacker v. State Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 197 Wis. 2d 441,

476-480   541    N.W.2d   766   (1995)      (all    evaluating        discretionary

determinations in the context of ch. 227 review).                     Documentation

is the necessary implication of ch. 227 review.                           In order to

determine whether a reasoning process is outside a decision-

maker's range of discretion, inconsistent with prior practice,

or in violation of the law, there must be some indication of the

decision-maker's reasoning process.             To decide otherwise allows
discretionary decision-makers subject to review to avoid review

of their decisions, thereby contravening § 227.57.                          Worse, it

allows decision-makers to make determinations based on reasons

that are well outside the bounds of rational decision-making,

without any means for those negatively affected by arbitrary

decisions to challenge them.

    ¶79    The    lead    opinion     asserts      that   the    Board        was    not

required to document anything about the adequacy of the award
because "the Board's decision not to make a non-required finding

                                       12
                                                                  No.   2021AP373.jjk

regarding adequacy is not a 'finding' in the legal sense of the

word as used in the statute."                 See lead op., ¶32.           This is

incorrect.       As I have explained above, the Board is required to

decide whether or not the award is adequate.                      And the Board's

adequacy decision is clearly a "finding" that is subject to

review under the plain language of the statute.                    See Wis. Stat.

§ 775.05(4) ("If the claims board finds that the amount . . . is

not an adequate compensation . . . ."); Wis. Stat. § 775.05(5)

(The findings and the award of the claims board shall be subject

to   review . . . .).           Consequently,       the   Board    must    document

whether or not it found the statutory maximum adequate and its

rationale for that decision.

      ¶80   However, even if we assume for the sake of argument

that the statute does not require the Board to make an adequacy

determination, the lead opinion's limited reading of the word

"finding"——a reading that excludes the Board's decision to avoid

deciding adequacy——simply does not comport with the way the word

"find" is used in the statute.                The lead opinion insists that
"find" is a legal term of art and is synonymous to "findings of

fact," but "finding" is often used in a broader sense to mean a

decision    or    a    determination.         See    Find,   American      Heritage

Dictionary of the English Language (5th ed. 2022) ("To come to a

legal decision or verdict.").                 Wisconsin Stat. § 775.05 uses

"find" in this general sense each time it describes a decision

the Board makes, without regard to whether the Board is finding

a fact or making a more discretionary determination, such as
"find[ing]       the   amount    which    will      equitably     compensate     the

                                         13
                                                         No.    2021AP373.jjk

petitioner,   not   to   exceed   $25,000."6   As    such,     there   is   no

indication in the statute that the word "finding" in Wis. Stat.

§ 775.05(5) was meant in a limited sense to exclude some types

of decisions, rather than as a general synonym for "decision" or

"determination."7

     ¶81   Under    a    commonsensical    reading     of      Wis.    Stat.

§ 775.05(4), the Board is required to find whether or not the

statutory maximum is adequate——a finding that clearly is subject

to review under ch. 227.          Wis. Stat. § 775.05(5).         But even

under a reading that allows the Board to refrain from deciding

     6 See Wis. Stat. § 775.05(3) ("the claims board shall find
either that the evidence is clear and convincing that the
petitioner was innocent of the crime . . ."); Wis. Stat.
§ 775.05(4) ("If the claims board finds that the petitioner was
innocent and that he or she did not . . . contribute to bring
about the conviction . . . , the claims board shall find the
amount which will equitably compensate the petitioner, not to
exceed $25,000 . . . . Compensation awarded by the claims board
shall include any amount to which the board finds the petitioner
is entitled for attorney fees, costs and disbursements. If the
claims board finds that the amount it is able to award is not an
adequate   compensation  it   shall  submit   a  report . . . ."
(emphasis added)).
     7 The language the lead opinion points to in Wis. Stat.
§ 775.06(7), "findings, conclusions, determination, and award"
mirrors language used earlier in that particular section.    See
Wis.    Stat.   § 775.06(4)    ("the    findings,   conclusions,
determination, and award of, or denial thereof, shall be based
on all the evidence . . . ").     Wisconsin Stat. § 775.05, by
contrast, includes no such language, but instead uses the word
"finding" throughout to describe each of the decisions the Board
makes.

                                    14
                                                                      No.   2021AP373.jjk

adequacy, the decision to refrain is still subject to review.8

Because the Board is subject to ch. 227 review, it is required

to document the rationale behind its discretionary decisions——

including its decision regarding the adequacy of an award.

  C.       The Board Failed to Document Its Decision-Making Process.

       ¶82       Turning to the Board's decision here, the record is

devoid of any evidence indicating the Board exercised discretion

regarding the adequacy of the award.                    In its decision, the Board

did not address whether $25,000 was adequate, but wrote only

that it found Sanders innocent, and "[a]ccordingly, the Board

further concludes that compensation in the amount of $25,000

shall       be     awarded       from    the        Claims   Board    appropriation."

Additionally,        in    its     decision     to    deny   Sanders'    petition    for

rehearing, the Board wrote only that "the Board did not conclude

that the amount which it was able to award was 'not adequate

compensation.'"

       ¶83       Neither   of    those    brief       statements     provide   evidence

that       "discretion       was    in    fact        exercised"     when   the   Board
determined the adequacy of the award, nor do they set forth "the

       In addition to shielding the Board from review of its
       8

decision to refrain from considering adequacy, the lead opinion
effectively shields the Board from review of any decision not to
send a report to the legislature. The Board is incentivized to
say nothing, even if it actively finds that the award is
adequate.   As already established (and not refuted by the lead
opinion), the Board's finding of adequacy is reviewable under
Wis. Stat. §§ 227.03(5) & 775.05(5).     However, the Board may
refrain from documenting its finding of adequacy and thus evade
review because the reviewing court must assume from the empty
record——as the lead opinion appears to do in this case——that
adequacy was not considered.

                                               15
                                                                          No.    2021AP373.jjk

basis of that exercise of discretion."                      See Hacker, 197 Wis.2d

at   478    (quoting    Reidinger,       81    Wis.2d       at    298).         The    Board's

decision does not mention whether it determined the award was

adequate, much less the basis for that determination.                                Likewise,

the order denying rehearing, which stated that "the Board did

not conclude that the amount which it was able to award was 'not

adequate     compensation'"       failed       to    establish      that        an    adequacy

determination     was     made.      Although          a    double        negative       often

colloquially     translates       into     the      corresponding          positive,       the

Board's use of the double negative here establishes only the

negative——the Board refrained from making a decision regarding

adequacy.      Even accepting that the Board did determine $25,000

was adequate, the Board failed to set forth any basis for that

determination in its order.              Accordingly, the court of appeals

was correct in remanding the matter to the Board to properly

exercise its discretion as to whether $25,000 was adequate.

      ¶84    It bears repeating that requiring some documentation

of the Board's decision-making is not simply an exercise in
ensuring that the Board dot its I's and cross its T's, but

instead is a matter of real substantive importance.                             Perhaps the

Board did have a legitimate reason for not recommending a higher

amount to the legislature.           The problem is that we do not know

the reason, or whether there was any reasoning at all.                                The lead

opinion's     decision     allows        the        Board    to     evade        review    of

determinations     made    on     potentially         illegitimate          or       arbitrary

grounds by simply not documenting the grounds for its decision.

                                           16
                                                         No.    2021AP373.jjk

This directly contravenes the legislature's directive that the

Board be subject to review.      See Wis. Stat. § 775.05(5).

                        IV.     CONCLUSION
    ¶85   Sanders spent twenty-six years in prison for a crime

he did not commit.      To be awarded even a cent for those lost

decades, he was required to clear a high bar that only 179

petitioners have cleared since 2000——prove to the Board by clear

and convincing evidence that he was innocent.             Here the lead

opinion allows the Board to add insult to injury by absolving

the Board of its duty to follow the legislature's directive to:

(1) determine whether or not the statutory maximum is adequate;

and (2) explain its reasoning such that a court can review——and

Sanders can understand——the rationale behind its determination.

Because the Board did not do so here, I respectfully dissent.

    ¶86   I   am   authorized    to   state   that   Justices    ANN   WALSH

BRADLEY and REBECCA FRANK DALLET join this dissent.

    9    State of Wisconsin Claims Board, Innocent Convict
Compensation     Decisions    (accessed     Jun.    2,     2023),
https://claimsboard.wi.gov/Pages/InnocentConvictDecisions.aspx.

                                      17
    No.   2021AP373.jjk

1