Court Opinion

ID: 9711686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:36:42.113937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:06.644887
License: Public Domain

Christianson, J.
(Dissenting) I dissent.
Plaintiff brought this action for divorce against the defendant on the ground of extreme cruelty. The statute (NDRC 1943, 14-0505) declares “extreme cruelty is infliction by one party to the marriage of grievous bodily injury or grievous mental suffering upon the other.” The defendant answered in denial and also by way of counterclaim alleged extreme cruelty on the part of plaintiff. After a prolonged trial and the examination of a large number of witnesses including both plaintiff and defendant all of whom appeared in person and testified before the court, the trial court found that the allegations of extreme cruelty were hot proven by either side, also, that acts testified to by the plaintiff had been condoned and the court ordered.a dismissal both of the complaint and of the counterclaim. The plaintiff appeals and asks for a trial anew in this Court. The original legislation providing for such appeal was enacted by the Legislative Assembly in the early history of the State. Laws 1893, Chapter 82. In Christianson et al v. Warehouse Association, 5 ND 438, 67 NW 300, 32 LRA 730, it was contended the statute was unconstitutional in this that it attempted “to confer upon this Court a jurisdiction not conemplated or permitted by the Constitution.” This Court sustained the constitutionality of the act and in so doing considered what this Court was required to do under, the statute. In its opinion in the case this Court said:
“Broadly stated, the objections urged against this law is *579that it attempts to confer original jurisdiction upon this court, while, under the constitution, our jurisdiction is appellate only, except in certain specified cases.” 5 ND at p 442.
“That statute says that this court ‘shall try the case anew.’ This language, it is apparent, was not used with exact accuracy. The case is not tried anew. There is no new evidence or any evidence adduced in this court. The case must he decided upon a record already prepared by a judicial tribunal. This court simply reviews the record, and the practical and necessary result of such review is to correct the errors, if any, either of the law or fact into which the < court below may have fallen. . . . The judgment of the trial court upon the facts must still have weight and influence with this court, especially when based upon the testimony of ivitnesses idho appeared in person before that court" 5 ND at pp 443, 444. (Italics supplied)
The rule announced in Christianson et al v. Warehouse Association, supra, that on a trial de novo on appeal “the judgment of the trial court upon the facts must still have weight and influence with this court, especially when based upon the testimony of witnesses who appeared in person before that court,” has been adhered to and applied by this Court in many subsequent cases. See Bingenheimer Mercantile Co. v. Sack, 50 ND 381, 385, 195 NW 969, 970; Doyle v. Doyle, 52 ND 380, 389, 202 NW 860, 863; Coykendall v. Briggs et al, 60 ND 267, 270, 234 NW 74, 75; Horner v. Horner, 66 ND 619, 620, 268 NW 428; Donovan v. Johnson, 67 ND 450, 455, 274 NW 124, 125; Buchanan v. Buchanan, 69 ND 208, 285 NW 75; Funk v. Baird, 72 ND 298, 309, 6 NW2d 569, 575; Klundt v. Pfeifle, 77 ND 132, 41 NW2d 416.
In Doyle v. Doyle, supra, this Court said:
“On a trial de novo the findings of the trial court are not clothed with the same presumptions in their favor as in 'other cases. But, on the other hand, in such a case as this, we must take into consideration the fact that we have here but a cold and lifeless record. We are called upon to determine the mental capacity, the state of mind, the knowledge and intent of Ellen Doyle at the time she executed and delivered the deed. We have not the advantage of seeing her, of noting her demeanor, of hearing her voice; of the innumerable intangible indicia that are so *580valuable to a trial judge in determining questions of this character. The trial court had the advantage of all of these things and, breathing the air of the trial, he was in an immeasurably better position to find the real facts in the case. Therefore, notwithstanding that the case is here for trial de novo, we must give some appreciable weight to the determination of the trial court.” 52 ND at p 389.
In Buchanan v. Buchanan, supra, this Court said:
“The means by which an appellate court may measure the credibility of witnesses are exceedingly limited. There are, however, -many indicia of truth and falsity, of exaggeration and of recklessness in testimony, which enter into the atmosphere of a trial of this character and which can not be preserved for the benefit of a reviewing court. Of these, the trial judge had the benefit. His decision is entitled to appreciable weight.” 69 ND at pp 209, 210.
In this case the judgment rendered by the trial .court was based upon the testimony of the parties -and witnesses who appeared in person before the court. The transcript of the testimony so taken occupies some 438 pages. There is conflict in the testimony as to the conduct of the defendant which forms the basis for the charge of extreme cruelty.
The plaintiff and defendant were married on- January 25, 1947, both parties had been previously married to other persons and divorced. At the time of their marriage the plaintiff was 31 years of age. The record does not show the age of the defendant. The defendant had a son by the prior marriage who at the time of the trial was attending St. Thomas College and the defendant has been making substantial contribution to enable the son to pursue his studies at St. Thomas. It does not appear whether the plaintiff had any children by her previous marriage but apparently she did not. In the majority opinion reference is made to the building and operation of a motel by the parties at Mandan. The evidence shows that the construction of the present motel was commenced in 1948 and completed in 1949. One Johnson who built the motel testified that the defendant personally assisted in such construction. Such builder testified that-in 1949 he commenced construction in the early *581part of April 1949 and continued the work until the early part of October 1949. During this time the defendant was there and in addition to operating the motel assisted in the construction. The builder testified that at no time during such construction was the defendant under the influence of intoxicants. He testified that the defendant paid him his wages promptly each week.
A Mrs. Mann testified that she worked at the motel in cleaning and caring for the cabins from May 3, 1949, to September 9, 1949; that she worked in the afternoons; that the defendant was working at the motel and was nearly always there; and that during all this time she never saw him under the influence of intoxicants; that the plaintiff was seldom there and that on one occasion when she was there she had been drinking.
The manager of one of the principal lumberyards in Mandan testified that he sold building material for the motel to the defendant amounting in the aggregate to over $18,900; that all the arrangements were made with the defendant and that the bill for material was promptly paid; that the defendant in various dealings with him had always paid his bills and that he furnished the material to the defendant in confidence that payment would be made. The manager of the Mandan Sheet Metal Works testified that he sold and furnished certain material for the construction of the motel. He testified that the defendant’s credit rating was excellent and that payment was promptly made for the supplies furnished. Similar testimony was given by the plumbing contractor. The plaintiff testified that she drew a sketch or plan of the motel and that she conferred with Johnson, the builder, about the construction; that he came to the house and discussed the matter with her and the defendant. Johnson, the builder, testified that he at no time discussed the matter with the plaintiff or talked to her at all. That he only saw her a couple times while the motel was being constructed, as shé was going to or coming from the motel.
In the majority opinion reference is made to a statement alleged to have been made by the defendant concerning plaintiff’s mother. The. defendant denied that he made any such statement. *582In tlie majority opinion reference is also made to an incident which is said to have occurred in July 1950 when it is said that the defendant slapped or struck the plaintiff, The evidence is to the effect that this incident happened after the plaintiff and defendant had returned from Bismarck where they had viewed a parade at the Elks’. Convention, that the plaintiff and the defendant and a man named Delzer, who had been doing, some concrete work at the motel, and his wife came to the home of the plaintiff and defendant in Mandan; that the men went to a bar and procurred some beer and that the four-of them drank the beer; that thereupon the plaintiff and Mrs. Delzer went to obtain, and did obtain, some more beer. The defendant testified that they did not return promptly; that both lie and Delzer telephoned them at the bar where they were but that they did not return and were gone about three hours. A maid who was present testified that when the plaintiff and Mrs. Delzer returned defendant complained because they had been absent so long. The plaintiff testified that the defendant struck her and called her a vile name. She further testified that this was the only time during their married life that he in any manner inflicted any personal injury on her. A maid who was present and was called as a witness by the plaintiff stated that the defendant slapped the plaintiff with the open hand. When plaintiff’s counsel asked if he (defendant) gave her a black eye she answered “ a little mark here.” The testimony shows without dispute that later that evening all four went to the Dome, one of the night clubs between Bismarck and Mandan, and had dinner there; that thereafter plaintiff and defendant returned to their home; that the plaintiff and defendant continued to live together as husband and wife until shortly before Christmas; and that there was no serious quarrel between them from that time until shortly before Christmas when they had an argument concerning her expressed desire to go home for Christmas; that the plaintiff did go home for Christmas; and that the defendant went to see her and sought to have her come back home; that eventually she did come back about the latter part of December or the first of January; and that the plaintiff and defendant lived together as *583husband and wife from the time the plaintiff returned about January 1, 1951, until August 24, 1951.
Reference is made in the majority opinion to a proposed agreement for condonation. This proposed agreement was prepared by defendant’s counsel in an effort to obtain a reconciliation of the parties. Changes were made in an attempt to make-file recitals agreeable to the plaintiff. A conference was. had between plaintiff and defendant and defendant’s counsel on September 12, 1951, and again on September 13, 1951. At the latter, conference defendant signed the proposed agreement, plaintiff .did not, but after defendant had signed the agreement she picked it up and put it in her purse. She stated that she' would think it over and let him know at 10 or 11 o’clock the nest morning. The plaintiff never came back and did not notify defendant as she had promised but kept the proposed agreement which he-had signed and on September 19, 1951, brought this action for divorce and introduced the proposed agreement in evidence on the trial.
The status in life and sensibility of the parties are regarded as inevitable factors where the' conduct complained of is the infliction of grievous mental suffering. 1 Nelson on Divorce, 2d ed, p 209. The decree of intelligence, refinement and delicacy of health and sentiment, are matters for the court to -weigh with others in determining whether conduct complained of was cruel. 1 Nelson on Divorce, 2d ed, pp 242-263.
“ ‘Cruelty,’ as ground for divorce, is a composite of cause and effect.- It implies not only misconduct on the part of the spouse against whom a divorce is sought, but also injury to the mental or physical well-being of the one who seeks the relief.” 1 Nelson on Divorce, 2d ed, p 234.
“The decisions defining mental cruelty employ such a. variety of phraseology that it would be nest to impossible to reproduce any.generally accepted form. Very often, they do not purport to define it as distinct from physical cruelty, but combine both elements in a general definition of ‘cruelty,’ physical and mental. The generally recognized elements are:
(1) A course of abusive and humiliating treatment; -
*584(2) Calculated or obviously of a nature to torture, discommode, or render miserable tbe life of tbe opposite spouse; and
(3) Actually affecting the physical or mental health of such spouse.” 1 Nelson on Divorce, 2d ed, p 220.
The statute (NDRC 1943, 14-0505) declares “extreme cruelty is the infliction by one party to the marriage of grievous bodily injury or grievous mental suffering upon the other.” Under this statute it is essential that the complaining party prove not only the acts, words and conduct of the other party to the marriage which he or she claims inflicted grievous bodily injury or grievous mental suffering, but must also prove that the acts, words or conduct complained of in fact did inflict grievous bodily injury and grievous mental suffering or both upon the complaining party. Mahnken v. Mahnken, 9 ND 188, 82 NW 872; Johnson v. Johnson, 46 ND 606, 180 NW 794; Johnson v. Johnson, 50 ND 696, 197 NW 773. In determining whether circumstances show extreme cruelty the court sitting as a trier of fact should keep in view the intelligence, apparent refinement and delicacy of sentiment of the complaining party. 1 Nelson on Divorce, 2d ed, p 209, pp 242-263; 17 Am Jur, Divorce and Separation ( Sec 55, p 178; Thompson v. Thompson, 16 Wash2d 78, 132 Pac2d 734; Jackson v. Jackson, 70 RI 333, 38 Atl2d 637.
In its memorandum opinion the trial court said:
“On cross examination by defendant’s counsel, she admitted that there was no serious trouble between them from January, 1951 up to the time she left in August, 1951 and that they lived and cohabited together during that peiiod from January 1st, 1951 to August 25, 1951.”
In its findings of fact the court said :
“That the plaintiff had left the defendant just before Christmas in 1950, that she returned to him during the holidays, and lived and co-habited with him from January 1st, 1951 to August 24th, 1951, when she left him and lived separate and apart from him; that from January 1st, 1951 up to the time she left him on August 24th of the said year, the parties did not have any serious trouble, and the Court finds that during said time the plaintiff with knowledge of the defendant’s conduct towards her and all of the acts and things which she has complained of *585condoned such acts and conduct of the defendant committed prior thereto, ’ upon which she has relied for divorce upon the ground of extreme cruelty, and that the plaintiff and the defend-ant became reconciled and thereafter lived and co-habited together from January 1st, 1951 to August 24th, of said year when she left him to live separate and apart from him.”
The fact that the plaintiff lived and cohabited with the defendant as his wife from January 1, 1951, to August 24, 1951, even though it does not amount, to a legal condonation, does have a bearing upon whether the defendant had inflicted upon her grievous bodily injury or grievous mental suffering. It is hardly likely that she would have so lived and cohabited if the defendant had previously inflicted, or was then inflicting, upon her grievous bodily injury or grievous mental suffering. McKee v. McKee, 107 NJ Eq 1, 151 Atl 620; see, also, Maranto v. Maranto, 192 Md 214, 64 Atl2d 144.
In Mahnken v. Mahnken, supra, this Court said:
“It is claimed, and there is evidence in the record tending to show, that the language used by defendant towards his wife caused a nervous sickness on three several occasions, so serious that the visits of the family physician were necessary. We cannot, however, regard this as proven. The family physician who is also the family physician in plaintiff’s father’s family, testifies that he has no recollection of ever treating plaintiff for any nervous disorders, or ever treating her except at confinement, and that her general health is good. It is quite clear, we think, that the use of the offensive language did not inflict grievous bodily injury upon plaintiff. But under the later and better construction of statutes similar to ours it is held that the grievous mental suffering may be sufficient to warrant a divorce under the statute, and yet may be productive of no perceptible bodily injury. Barnes v. Barnes, 95 Cal 171, 30 Pac Rep 298, 16 LRA 660; Smith v. Smith, 119 Cal 183, 48 Pac Rep 730, 51 Pac Rep 183; Carpenter v. Carpenter, 30 Kan 744, 2 Pac 122. But whether or not this grievous mental suffering has teen inflicted in any particular case is purely a question of fact to he determined from a consideration of all the circumstances of the case, including the mental characteristics of the *586party complaining so far as they may be developed. Fleming v. Fleming, 95 Cal 430, 30 Pac Rep 566. But it is very evident that courts here tread upon delicate, and perhaps uncertain grounds. The diff erenees in mental characteristics are as varied as the difference in facial expression. The effect upon two minds of the same act or language may be entirely different, and the effect upon one may be incomprehensible to the other. It is clear, then, that no standard can be erected, no measurements given, and no criterion established by which to gauge mental suffering. This is a point upon which this court would be inclined to give much weight to the vieivs of the trial court. The complainant was before that court, and was examined at great length. All her mental characteristics would be much more apparent there than they can be from a study of the record. . . . We find no evidence .in this case of the infliction of that grievous mental suffering that the law requires to justify the granting of a divorce. No doubt the language used by defendant would produce anger in a proud-spirited woman. But it is not for that cause that the marriage contract can be annulled. That contract, while it imposes upon the parties thereto the imperative obligation never to unnecessarily anger or wound each other, yet it also imposes the duty of forgiveness of all those weaknesses, imperfections, and peculiarities to which humanity is ever prone. . . . The statutory grounds for divorce in this state are broad, and courts may not multiply divorces by granting them in cases not clearly within the statute.” 9 ND at pp 191, 192. (Italics supplied)
In Johnson v. Johnson, supra, the charge that the defendant inflicted grievous mental suffering upon the plaintiff was predicated largely upon evidence that the defendant had “exhibited to his wife lewd pictures, lascivious compositions, and paraphernalia evidencing a depraved moral nature, and that these acts or some of them took place at a time when, owing to the delicate condition of her health, she was subjected to extreme mental suffering on account thereof.” In its opinion, the Court said:
“It is not necessary in this opinion to describe the character of the matter so exhibited by the defendant. These acts deserve *587the condemnation which counsel for the appellant has given them, but they do not necessarily amount to extreme cruelty. However much they are inclined to shock the moral sensibilities of' persons of refinement, it is obvious that their effect in the particular case depends upon the manner in which they are received. The testimony of the plaintiff herself, aside from her direct statements, does not disclose that she was extremely shocked by these vile exhibitions. . . . There is nothing in the testimony of the plaintiff which evidences extreme shock at these matters. On the other hand, we would not be justified,. from her testimony, in saying that she chose to live on the same moral plane as her husband. There is no reason to believe that this girl of tender years had so far abandoned her natural modesty and inherent feminine virtue as to initiate such indecent subjects of domestic intercourse; hut it does not follow that they were necessarily so abhorrent to her as to cause grievous mental suffering. This depends so largely upon the sensibility of her moral nature, which could only be known to others as reflected by her presence and demeanor, that we who have only the cold record of the testimony are at a disadvantage. The trial judge, who had a superior opportunity to observe the parties and who held that obscenity of the character complained of might constitute extreme cruelty, did not feel warranted in finding that the plaintiff was shocked to the point of grievous mental suffering by the attitude and conduct of the defendant in relation to the matters that he exhibited to his .wife. In the light of this record, we do not feel justified in overturning the findings of the trial court.” 46 ND at pp 609, 610.
In Swanson v. Swanson, supra, this Court said:
“Whether the acts of the plaintiff have inflicted grievous mental suffering upon the defendant is a question of fact to be determined from all of the circumstances of the case. Mahnken v. Mahnken, 9 ND 188, 82 NW 870; Rindlaub v. Rindlaub, 19 ND 352, 125 NW 479. In this case there is merely evidence of acts which it is noiv said caused grievous mental suffering. There is no direct evidence that the acts did cause such suffering. Facts, of course, may justify inferences and certainly it is a legitimate inference in this case that plaintiff’s acts did cause *588the defendant annoyance and humiliation, hiit whether they caused grievous mental suffering is another question. Grievous means ‘severe or intense.’ Webster’s International Dictionary.”
Thorndike-Barnhart’s Dictionary defines grievous as meaning “hard to bear; causing great pain or suffering; flagrant; atrocious.”
In its- .findings of fact the trial court found:
“That the plaintiff failed to prove that the acts and conduct of the defendant has caused her grievous bodily injury, grievous mental suffering or that the defendant’s conduct seriously impaired her health or endangered her life. It is true that plaintiff testified that the defendant’s conduct caused her to have ‘headaches’ but there is no substantial corroboration that the defendant's acts and conduct caused her grievous mental suffering because her physical appearance, demeanor as she testified, and her actions at the time of the trial disclosed that she was apparently in the best of health.”
In this case there is no evidence of any grievous bodily injury. 1 Nelson on Divorce, 2d ed, p 240; Thacker v. Thacker, 125 W Va 103, 23 SE2d 64; Johnson v. Johnson, 80 NH 15, 112 Atl 399. See, also, Johnson v. Johnson, 50 ND 696, 197 NW 773. Nor is it shown that any grievous mental suffering has been inflicted upon the plaintiff. The only evidence relating to plaintiff having headaches and taking medicine therefor is her own testimony which is wholly uncorroborated. Whether she had headaches, whether she took medicine and, if so, what medicine she took is not referred to in the testimony of any other witness. It appears from the testimony without dispute that in June 1949 the plaintiff went to the Quain and Ramstad Clinic at Bismarck for a medical examination or checkup; and that in September 1949 she went to Minneapolis for a medical examination. What the purpose of these examinations were is not shown. If her health had been adversely affected by the conduct of the defendant the medical testimony, if any, would have been available to her. She had available services of medical experts whose testimony could readily have been obtained either as a result of the examinations that had been made or upon further examination. The plaintiff testified that she was in good health and no longer had any *589headaches, and as the trial court states in his findings her physical appearance and demeanor upon the trial disclosed that she was apparently in the best of health. The plaintiff was a woman of experience in life. She had operated a restaurant for some time and had assisted in operating a bar. There is nothing to indicate either frailty or unusual sensitiveness of character. There is nothing in her testimony to indicate that she was in any manner embarrassed or shocked or had been caused any mental suffering by the alleged misconduct of the defendant. She did not seem at all embarrassed in reciting the language which she attributed to the defendant and her testimony indicates rather a state of anger than one of grievous mental suffering because of what was said or done. What was said by this Court in Mahnken v. Mahnken, supra; Johnson v. Johnson, supra; and Swanson v. Swanson, supra, is applicable here. The trial judge who heard and saw these parties and their witnesses determined that the plaintiff had failed to establish that the defendant had inflicted upon her grievous bodily injury or grievous mental suffering. As pointed out in our former decisions the trial court was in a far better position than this Coui’t to form an accurate judgment as to these matters, and this Court should “give much weight to the views of the trial court.” (Mahnken v. Mahnken, supra.) The decision of the majority in this case ignores the views of the trial court.
The trial court found that a cause of action for divorce had not been established. Consequently the trial cburt made no determination concerning the division of the joint property. In view of the determination of the court that the evidence was insufficient to establish any “cause for which a divorce might be decreed” the trial court was without authority to make any determination concerning the division of the joint property. NDRC 1943, 14-0601, 14-0603; Mattson v. Mattson, ante, 381, 56 NW2d 764. Although evidence had been taken relating to the joint property all questions concerning the division of the joint property remained undetermined. Our laws provide:
“Upon an appeal from a judgment or order, the supreme court may reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment or order as to any and all of the parties, and if necessary or proper, may order a *590new trial of the entire cause or of some specific issue or issues, . . . . If, in the consideration of any appeal, it becomes apparent to the supreme court that some issue involved in the case has not been tried, or if tried has not been determined by the trial court, and that it is necessary or desirable to proper disposition of the case on appeal that such issue be determined, the supreme court may remand, the case to the district court for the determination of such issue, without relinquishing jurisdiction of the appeal, and the supreme court may hold the determination of the appeal in abeyance until such issue has been determined by the trial court and the determination certified to the supreme court. In such case the proceedings had and the determination made in the trial court, upon remand, shall be deemed part of the record on appeal in such cause.” (Italics supplied) NDRC 1943, 28-2729.
In this case the question as to the division of the joint property was not determined by the trial court. The determination of that question was not merely a matter of computation, it involved the consideration and weighing of much evidence. The majority assume the power to decide all questions concerning the division of the joint property in the first instance and ignore the trial court which is vested “with power to determine in the first instance all questions of law and fact” in any such action. Upon the record here the question concerning the division of the joint property should not be determined by this court in the first instance, but the action should be remanded to the district court for adjudication and determination thereof by the trial court as prescribed by NDRC 1943, 28-2729.