Court Opinion

ID: 9900024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 07:12:14.637161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:58.541414
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed November 16, 2023

                                     In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                  __________

                              No. 11-22-00065-CR
                                  __________

               CRESHAWN DUPRI HOWARD, Appellant
                                        V.
                    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 104th District Court
                            Taylor County, Texas
                        Trial Court Cause No. 22485-B

                     MEMORANDUM OPINION
      Creshawn Dupri Howard entered an open plea of guilty to the offense of
murder. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(c) (West Supp. 2023). The jury
assessed his punishment at confinement for a term of forty-five years in the
Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), and the
trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly. Appellant challenges his conviction in
two issues. First, he argues that his right to due process was violated because the
trial court “allowed [Appellant]’s guilty plea to be entered” without an affirmative
showing that it was intelligently and voluntarily made and without a showing that
Appellant fully understood the consequences of his plea. Second, he argues that the
trial court erred when it failed to comply with Article 26.13 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure prior to accepting his guilty plea. Appellant maintains that the
trial court’s actions were harmful and require us to vacate his conviction and remand
this cause for a new trial. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
                          Factual and Procedural History
      Appellant murdered the victim, David Devora, on New Year’s Eve in 2019,
when he shot Devora through a door during an attempted robbery. Appellant and
four others planned to rob Devora at his cousin’s house to obtain money and bond a
friend out of jail. One of Appellant’s codefendants, Michael Wright-Collazo,
testified during the punishment phase. Collazo testified that, although the robbers
allegedly did not plan to kill anyone, they had picked up a shotgun prior to the
robbery so that they could “scare everybody in there, and take everything and run
out.” Executing their plan, Collazo knocked on the front door, Appellant stood by
the garage door, and another codefendant “crouched” near the front door. Collazo
testified that “whenever [Devora] opened the door, they were supposed to . . . show
the guns and run in there.” Devora opened the front door but then attempted to shut
it. Collazo testified that they struggled with Devora to push open the front door and
enter the house, and in the ensuing struggle, Appellant discharged the shotgun
through the front door. Devora died from the shotgun wound to his head. Collazo
testified that he, Appellant, and the other codefendant fled to their vehicle and drove
off. Detective Jeff Cowan of the Abilene Police Department investigated the
shooting and apprehended the five individuals involved, including Appellant.
      Dr. Jason D. Dunham conducted three competency evaluations of Appellant
at the direction of the trial court.    In 2020, Dr. Dunham conducted the first
examination via teleconference. In his report, Dr. Dunham stated that he was unable
                                              2
to conduct a standard and structured clinical interview given the difficulties in doing
so via teleconference and based on Appellant’s wishes to stop the meeting.
Dr. Dunham concluded that the “data point[ed] in both directions”—that Appellant
could be incompetent to stand trial or he could be malingering—and recommended
the “very conservative and qualified opinion” that Appellant was not competent to
stand trial at that time. On May 13, 2020, Appellant and the State waived the right
to a jury trial on Appellant’s “motion claiming incompetency,” and the trial court
received evidence as to Appellant’s competency,1 issued a judgment of
incompetency, and ordered that Appellant be committed for purposes of attaining
competency to stand trial. On April 23, 2021, Appellant filed a motion to reconsider
the prior finding of incompetency because Appellant “appears to have regained trial
competency.”        The trial court ordered another competency evaluation, and
Dr. Dunham found Appellant competent to stand trial following this evaluation.
       Four days after the case was preferentially set for trial for the following month,
Appellant’s trial counsel filed another motion suggesting incompetency. The trial
court again ordered that Appellant be evaluated.                  Following this evaluation,
Dr. Dunham concluded that Appellant was malingering and was competent to stand
trial. At the hearing on that motion that followed on January 19, 2022, the trial court
found Appellant competent to stand trial; neither party opposed the finding.
Appellant’s trial counsel then presented an oral motion for continuance requested by
Appellant for “another 60 days”; trial counsel stated that he did not have “a legal
justification, except that I understand where [Appellant] is coming from,” and
confirmed that he would be ready for trial by the trial date.

       1
        The first competency evaluation was offered by Appellant’s trial counsel at the hearing and
admitted into evidence without objection.
                                                    3
        However, trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw in February 2022. At the
hearing, Appellant’s trial counsel advised the trial court that, currently, the hearing
was “[not] so much in support of getting a different lawyer” as much as it was a
request to reconsider the continuance requested at the January 19 hearing. Appellant
testified at the hearing on the motion to withdraw. Appellant now did not believe
that he needed a new attorney. Instead, Appellant answered affirmatively when trial
counsel asked whether the issues “that caused [Appellant] to be found incompetent
the first time” had not been completely resolved, and whether Appellant hoped for
more time to, “by some means, get right on” his medication to “improve
[Appellant’s] ability to assist [trial counsel] in preparing [Appellant] for trial[.]” On
cross-examination, Appellant confirmed that he had lied to law enforcement during
the investigation of the murder case and had previously committed multiple acts of
giving false and fictitious information and evasion to avoid apprehension. After
considering the evidence presented, including Appellant’s testimony, the contents of
the trial court’s file, and the three prior expert reports by Dr. Dunham,2 the trial court
denied Appellant’s motion for continuance.
        The jury trial commenced on March 8, 2022. Prior to the State’s reading of
its two-count indictment, Appellant’s trial counsel asked if Appellant would have
the “opportunity to plead after each paragraph[.]”3 Appellant did so, and, on the
murder charge alleged in Count One, he pleaded “not guilty” to the first two
paragraphs and pleaded “guilty” to the third, which alleged felony murder. See

        2
         In the two reports that found Appellant competent, Dr. Dunham also found that Appellant did not
require medication in order for him to maintain his current level of trial competence.
        3
         For Count One, the State alleged in three paragraphs that Appellant committed murder as described
in Section 19.02(b) of the Texas Penal Code. See PENAL § 19.02(b)(1)-(3). For Count Two, the State
alleged that Appellant had committed aggravated robbery. See PENAL § 29.03(a).

                                                        4
PENAL § 19.02(b)(3). Following Appellant’s guilty plea, Appellant’s trial counsel
confirmed Appellant’s plea by saying “yes.” Appellant’s trial counsel did not
suggest that Appellant was incompetent nor did he make an issue of Appellant’s
competency at the time of Appellant’s plea. The trial court acknowledged and
accepted Appellant’s plea. 4
        Given the plea, the State waived the first two paragraphs of Count One and
waived Count Two in the indictment, and trial proceeded to opening statements.
During his opening statement, Appellant’s trial counsel apologized to the State for
the “surprise” and told the jury, “[the plea] makes this essentially a punishment
proceeding. You’ll still have to hear it and decide on the guilt-innocence issues, but
it’s not going to be contested by us.” Appellant’s trial counsel made no mention of
any competency issues during the remainder of trial, and, when Appellant testified,
he appeared to comprehend the State’s and his trial counsel’s questions and
answered such questions clearly and logically.
                                                 Analysis
        I. Due Process
        In his first issue, Appellant argues that he was denied his constitutional due
process rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments when the trial
court accepted his guilty plea “without an affirmative showing on the record” that
Appellant’s plea was intelligently and voluntarily made and without a showing that
Appellant fully understood the consequences of his plea.
        “Federal due process requires that ‘[w]aivers of constitutional rights not only
must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient

        4
          At the time of the plea, the trial court “acknowledge[d] that the defendant entered a plea of guilty
to the third paragraph.” The trial court confirmed that it received and accepted the plea in its instructions
to the jury.
                                                           5
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.’” Davison v.
State, 405 S.W.3d 682, 686 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (quoting Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). In pleading guilty, a defendant relinquishes his Sixth
Amendment rights to a jury trial and to confront witnesses against him, as well as
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. “For this waiver to
be valid under the Due Process Clause, it must be ‘an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege.’” Id. (quoting McCarthy v. United
States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969)). A criminal defendant must have actual awareness
of the charges against him and the privileges he necessarily relinquishes. Id.
      The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state may “deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1. Consistent with that guarantee, a guilty plea is valid only if it represents a
voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the
defendant. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970) (citing Boykin v. Ala.,
395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969)); Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 747 (1970); see McCarthy v.
U.S., 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
      Boykin requires that the record must affirmatively disclose that a defendant
who pleaded guilty did so knowingly and voluntarily. 395 U.S. at 242; Brady, 397
U.S. at 747 n.4. However, “Boykin [does] not specifically set out what must be
‘spread on the record’ to comply with [its] mandate.” Gardner v. State, 164 S.W.3d
393, 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (quoting Aguirre-Mata v. State, 125 S.W.3d 473,
475 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). In this regard, a failure to admonish a defendant does
not necessarily amount to a due process violation. Davison, 405 S.W.3d at 687. To
amount to a due process violation, “the record must also be silent with respect to
whether he was otherwise provided, or nevertheless aware of, the requisite
information to render his guilty plea voluntary and intelligent.” Id.
                                             6
      In this case, the record is not silent regarding the requisite information needed
to show Appellant’s plea was voluntarily and intelligently made. Instead, as detailed
below, the record is replete with evidence that Appellant was aware of, or otherwise
provided with, information regarding his right to a jury trial, the right to confront
witnesses against him, the right against self-incrimination, and the nature of the
charges against him, including the range of punishment. We review each right in
turn and the corresponding information found in the record that showed that
Appellant was aware of and informed of his rights.
      Appellant offered his plea of guilty in the presence of the jury. By pleading
guilty in the jury’s presence and electing for the jury to determine his punishment,
Appellant exercised his right to a jury trial; in actually exercising this right, he was
necessarily aware of it. See Gaal v. State, No. 02-08-00382-CR, 2011 WL 2754754,
at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 14, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (“[A]ppellant must have been aware of his right to a jury trial since he
exercised it when he announced his guilty plea in front of the jury and continued to
exercise it, as to a determination of his punishment, after announcing the plea.”);
Williams v. State, 674 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (“Clearly any plea
before a jury has always been considered to be a jury trial.”). Indeed, Appellant
participated in the trial, personally and through his trial attorney.        Similarly,
Appellant exercised his right to confront the witnesses against him by cross-
examining, through trial counsel, the State’s witnesses. In this regard, Appellant
concedes in his reply brief that “[t]he record shows that Appellant was represented
by counsel and confronted his accusers.”
      Regarding Appellant’s right against self-incrimination, although Appellant
was not formally admonished at his plea, or before he testified, the trial court

                                              7
provided to the venire panel, in the defendant’s presence, an instructive explanation
of Appellant’s rights.
            In a criminal case, the defendant has the right to take the stand
      and testify on his own behalf, but the law further provides that if he
      does not do so, his failure shall not be taken as a circumstance against
      him. This decision is for the defendant with counsel from his attorney.
Appellant argues that we should not consider this because it was directed at the
venire panel, and not Appellant; therefore, Appellant may not have understood or
even paid attention. Though not an admonishment directed solely to Appellant, it
was offered by the judge, in open court and in Appellant’s presence prior to his plea.
Additionally, Appellant’s right against self-incrimination was addressed in open
court not only by the trial court but also by the State’s attorney, Appellant’s attorney
and indirectly by Appellant himself. For example, the following statements and
exchanges occurred during voir dire in the presence of Appellant:
      [THE STATE]: We have to give the defendant the presumption of
      innocence. We have to hold the State to a burden of proof, which is
      proof beyond a reasonable doubt. And if the State doesn’t overcome
      that burden of proof, then we have to say, “Hey, this person on the
      presumption of innocence alone, even if they didn’t present any
      evidence whatsoever on their behalf, we find them not guilty,” and
      that’s our system.
      ....
      [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If [Appellant] chooses not to testify, could
      you follow the law and not hold that against him?
      [VENIREPERSON]: I believe so, yes, sir.
      ....
      [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: All right. What do you think? Do you -- is
      it -- would you honor a defendant’s right to remain silent and his choice
      to do so if that in fact is what he does?
      [VENIREPERSON]: Definitely.
                                              8
Moreover, Appellant’s own testimony indicated that he was aware of and waived
this right. Appellant attempted to invoke his right against self-incrimination at the
hearing on the motion for continuance by responding to one of the State’s questions,
“I plead the Fifth.” At trial, the following exchange occurred:
      [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I mean, where does it end? You can’t -- you
      know you’re doing prison time behind this, right?
      [APPELLANT]: Yes, sir.
      [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You -- you knew when you pleaded guilty
      that you were signing up for prison, 5 to 99 years or life, whatever the
      jury said. You knew that when you pleaded guilty, didn’t you?
      [APPELLANT]: Yes, sir.
Appellant points to nothing in the record that supports an argument that despite these
statements, he was in fact unaware of his right against self-incrimination. As
articulated in Davison, the record shows he was otherwise provided with the
necessary information. 405 S.W.3d at 687.
      The record also shows that Appellant was aware of the nature of the charges
against him and their consequences. By pleading guilty to the third paragraph of the
indictment, it appears that Appellant was aware of the difference between each
paragraph and elected to plead to the one that alleged felony murder. Moreover,
Appellant was present while the trial court, the State’s attorney, and appellant’s trial
counsel all discussed the proper range of punishment prior to Appellant entering his
plea. In Appellant’s presence, the trial court defined the range of punishment for the
venire panel by stating:
            In the case before you today, the defendant is charged in an
      indictment with two offenses. The first offense is the offense of
      murder. The second offense is the offense of aggravated [robbery].
      The offense of murder is a first-degree felony that carries a range of
      punishment of not less than 5 years and not more than 99 years or life
                                              9
        in prison and up to a $10,000 fine. . . . [Aggravated robbery] is also a
        first-degree felony, which is punishable by not less than 5 years, not
        more than 99 years or life in prison, and up to a $10,000 fine.
During voir dire, the State informed the venire panel, in Appellant’s presence of the
proper range of punishment for murder and aggravated robbery, including the fine
amount. Similarly, trial counsel told the venire panel that Appellant could be facing
“99 years or life.” As stated above, Appellant himself acknowledged that he
understood the range of punishment at the time of the plea.
        [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You -- you knew when you pleaded guilty
        that you were signing up for prison, 5 to 99 years or life, whatever the
        jury said. You knew that when you pleaded guilty, didn’t you?
        [APPELLANT]: Yes, sir.

The proper range of punishment was disclosed in Appellant’s presence no fewer than
six times.5 Further, Appellant, by his own admission, was actually aware of the
range of punishment he faced.
        We may also infer Appellant’s plea was voluntary from evidence that his
guilty plea was part of a trial strategy. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 240; Gardner, 164
S.W.3d at 399; Abrego v. State, 611 S.W.3d 139, 141 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2020, no pet.); Gaal, 2011 WL 2754754, at *4 (citing Gardner, 164 S.W.3d
at 399).        Appellant unequivocally acknowledged his purpose and intent to
voluntarily plead guilty to the charged offense.
             Q: Creshawn, first of all, yeah, why did you plead guilty to
        murder?

        5
           Including the statements above, Appellant was informed of the range of punishment twice when
the trial court read its charge to the jury. Appellant’s trial counsel further stated that a “sufficient term” for
Appellant would be twenty years of imprisonment, and he reminded him that he would be facing “10, 20,
25, years” during Appellant’s testimony.
                                                            10
              A: Because I felt like it was right and I felt like I owed that to
        his family.

Throughout Appellant’s testimony, he acknowledged his actions and expressed his
remorse for taking Devora’s life. Defense counsel asked the jury to consider
defendant’s remorse when determining Appellant’s sentence, calling him
“salvageable.” The record supports the inference that Appellant’s guilty plea
(which, by his audible comment of “yes” following Appellant’s announcement, we
may also infer was done in consultation with competent counsel) was a knowing and
voluntary acknowledgement of his culpability to persuade the jury to assess a lighter
sentence. See Gardner, 164 S.W.3d at 399.
        This is not a silent record that might raise concerns of due process. Although
bereft of a formal admonishment of his constitutional rights, the record supports the
conclusion that Appellant’s plea was knowing and voluntary, which is confirmed by
the discussion of his rights and potential punishment during voir dire, as well as
Appellant’s own testimony and the apparent trial strategy employed by Appellant’s
trial counsel. Appellant did not plead “guilty” in ignorance of the factual assertions
against him, the range of punishment he faced, his presumption of innocence,6 his
right against self-incrimination, his right to a jury trial, or the State’s burden of
proof.7 As to constitutional due process afforded to Appellant, the record adequately
shows that Appellant freely, knowingly, and voluntarily pleaded guilty and gives us

        6
          The trial court instructed the venire panel during voir dire, in Appellant’s presence, regarding the
presumption of innocence and the State’s burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt: “[Appellant]
in this case is presumed to be innocent unless his guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence
and testimony admitted under the rulings of the Court.” The State’s attorney and Appellant’s trial counsel
also discussed the presumption of innocence in favor of Appellant and the State’s burden of proof with
members of the venire panel in Appellant’s presence.
        7
         The State’s burden of proof was reiterated, in Appellant’s presence, no less than eight times to the
venire panel.
                                                         11
fair assurance that he understood the consequences of his guilty plea. We overrule
Appellant’s first issue.
      II. Article 26.13
      In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court failed to admonish
Appellant pursuant to Article 26.13(a)(1)–(6) and did not comply with
Article 26.13(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
      Article 26.13(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that, prior
to accepting a guilty plea or a plea of nolo contendere, the trial court must provide
the defendant with the following admonishments:
      (1) the range of punishment;
      (2) the fact that any sentencing recommendation made by the State is
      not binding on the trial court;

      (3) the fact that, if the punishment assessed does not exceed the
      recommendation made by the State as agreed to by the defendant and
      his or her attorney, the defendant may only appeal with the trial court’s
      permission “except for those matters raised by written motion filed
      prior to trial”;
      (4) the fact that immigration consequences may result if the defendant
      is not a citizen of the United States;

      (5) the fact that the defendant will need to meet the registration
      requirements of Chapter 62 if he or she is convicted of or placed on
      deferred adjudication for an offense that requires registration as a
      sexual offender; and

      (6) the fact that, if the defendant is placed on community supervision
      and satisfactorily fulfills its conditions, the court is authorized, on the
      expiration of the community supervision period, to exercise judicial
      clemency pursuant to Article 42A.701(f) of the Texas Code of Criminal
      Procedure.

                                             12
TEX. CODE CRIM PROC. ANN art. 26.13(a) (West Supp. 2022); Shoemaker v. State,
No. 11-15-00107-CR, 2017 WL 1957636, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland May 11,
2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Article 26.13(b) states
that a trial court cannot accept a plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere “unless it
appears that the defendant is mentally competent and the plea is free and voluntary.”
CRIM. PROC. art. 26.13(b). “A person is incompetent to stand trial if the person does
not have: (1) sufficient present ability to consult with the person’s lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding, or (2) a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against the person.” CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.003(a)
(West 2018).
      A trial court’s failure to admonish a defendant under Article 26.13 is non-
constitutional error that may be raised for the first time on appeal unless it is
expressly waived. Loch v. State, 621 S.W.3d 279, 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021);
Bessey v. State, 239 S.W.3d 809, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Accordingly, we
disregard such error if it does not affect Appellant’s substantial rights. TEX. R.
APP. P. 44.2(b). In determining whether the error affected Appellant’s substantial
rights, we examine the entire record for indications as to whether Appellant was
aware of the consequences of his plea of guilty prior to the trial court’s acceptance
of his plea and whether he was misled or harmed by the trial court’s failure to
properly admonish him. See Davison, 405 S.W.3d at 688–89; VanNortrick v. State,
227 S.W.3d 706, 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Anderson v. State, 182 S.W.3d 914,
919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Burnett v. State, 88 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim App.
2002). In this regard, facts in the record, even facts that occur after the defendant
pleads guilty, may raise the inference that, at the time of his guilty plea, the defendant
was actually aware of the consequences of his plea. Davison, 405 S.W.3d at 689;
Burnett, 88 S.W.3d at 640–41.
                                               13
        A trial court’s error is not harmful if we have a fair assurance that the
defendant’s decision to plead guilty would not have changed had the trial court
admonished him. VanNortrick, 227 S.W.3d at 709. For example, if the record shows
that the defendant was made aware of the range of punishment by means other than
a formal admonishment of same, the trial court’s failure to admonish the defendant
under Article 26.13(a)(1) does not affect the defendant’s substantial rights. See, e.g.,
Burnett, 88 S.W.3d at 639, 641 (no harm under Article 26.13(a)(1) where the record
contained the phrases “life sentence,” “life in prison,” and “five–to–99 or life”
approximately forty-five times, and there was no evidence appellant was unaware of
the consequences of his plea); Duncan v. State, 6 S.W.3d 794, 795–96 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d) (no harm under Article 26.13(a)(1) where
defendant filed a motion mentioning the appropriate range, and the trial court stated
the proper range in the defendant’s presence). Similarly, the trial court’s failure to
admonish a defendant of a particular consequence of a plea is harmless if that
consequence does not apply to the defendant. See Bessey, 239 S.W.3d at 813–14;
Anderson v. State, 182 S.W.3d 914, 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Slaughter v. State,
No. 02-07-00050-CR, 2007 WL 3120688, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 25,
2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
        In this case, the trial court erred when it failed to admonish Appellant as
required by Article 26.13(a).8 See Davison, 405 S.W.3d at 687–88; Burnett, 88
S.W.3d at 636–37. However, any harm caused by the trial court’s error did not affect
Appellant’s substantial rights. As stated above, Appellant was made aware of the
range of punishment before he pleaded guilty, and Appellant confirmed—through

        8
         The State concedes that the trial court failed to admonish Appellant under Section 26.13 and only
briefs harm on this issue.

                                                       14
his own testimony—his understanding of the range of punishment when he pleaded
guilty. Because we have fair assurance that Appellant’s plea would not have
changed had he been properly admonished of the range of punishment by the trial
court, we conclude that the trial court’s error in failing to admonish him under
Article 26.13(a)(1) did not harm Appellant.
      Nor was Appellant harmed by the trial court’s failure to admonish him under
Article 26.13(a)(4). Where the record shows that a defendant is a United States
citizen, the trial court’s failure to admonish him on the possible immigration
consequences that could result from his plea constitutes harmless error.
VanNortrick, 227 S.W.3d at 709. We may also draw reasonable inferences from
facts in the record to determine whether Appellant is a United States citizen.
Taylor v. State, No. 11-21-00256-CR, 2022 WL 17346072, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Eastland Dec. 1, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing
Fakeye v. State, 227 S.W.3d 714, 716 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
      As an initial matter, Appellant does not contend that he would have changed
his plea had the trial court given him the admonishment in Article 26.13(a)(4), nor
does Appellant assert that he is not a United States citizen or claim that he has
suffered any adverse immigration consequences because of his plea. Appellant
merely asserts that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to admonish
Appellant under “Article 26.13 a 1 through 6 [sic], inclusive” and requests this court
to vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for a new trial.
      Direct evidence of citizenship is not present in this record, but we can
reasonably infer Appellant’s citizenship from the evidence. Appellant’s older sister
testified, and the sealed record confirms, that Appellant was born in Abilene, Texas.
Appellant’s mother testified that she was “legal” and “a good citizen.” Appellant’s
grandfather served on the school board in Abilene where Appellant attended public
                                              15
school. From these facts we may reasonably infer that Appellant is a United States
citizen. Because Appellant is a United States Citizen, we have a fair assurance that
Appellant’s plea would not have changed had the trial court admonished him under
Article 26.13(a)(4), and any error by the trial court in failing to admonish Appellant
under this subsection was harmless.
      The remaining subsections of Article 26.13(a) are similarly inapplicable.
Appellant did not plea pursuant to a plea bargain, and the State did not provide a
punishment recommendation—nor did Appellant or his attorney agree to any
punishment recommendation—as contemplated by subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3).
See CRIM. PROC. art. 26.13(a)(2)-(3). Appellant was not convicted of an offense that
requires sex offender registration. See id. art. 26.13(a)(5). Further, Appellant
was ineligible for community supervision. See id. art. 26.13(a)(6); see also id.
arts. 42A.054, 42A.056.      Because subsections (a)(2)–(a)(6) are inapplicable to
Appellant, the trial court’s failure to admonish him under these subsections did not
affect his substantial rights. Anderson, 182 S.W.3d at 919. Moreover, a trial court’s
failure to comply with subsection (a)(5) or (a)(6) “is not a ground for the defendant
to set aside the conviction, sentence, or plea.” CRIM. PROC. art. 26.13(h), (h-1). The
trial court’s error in failing to admonish Appellant pursuant to Article 26.13(a) did
not affect Appellant’s substantial rights; therefore, such error was harmless and must
be disregarded. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b).
      The trial court did not commit error under Article 26.13(b). Article 26.13(b)
states that no plea of guilty “shall be accepted by the trial court unless it appears that
the defendant is mentally competent and the plea is free and voluntary.” CRIM. PROC.
art. 26.13(b). We concluded in addressing Appellant’s first issue that his plea was
free and voluntary. And unless an issue is made of a defendant’s present mental
competency at the time of the plea, the trial court need not make an inquiry or hear
                                               16
evidence on such issue, and it is not error to accept the guilty plea. See Kuyava v.
State, 538 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Fluellen v. State, 443 S.W3d
365, 369 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.); Shoemaker, 2017 WL 1957636, at
*2.
        At the time of Appellant’s guilty plea, Appellant’s trial counsel did not
suggest incompetency nor make an issue of Appellant’s competency. Moreover,
trial counsel made no mention of or suggested that any competency issues existed
during the remainder of trial. The trial court observed Appellant when he pleaded
guilty, throughout the pretrial proceedings, and throughout trial, including during
Appellant’s testimony. When Appellant testified, his answers were articulate and
responsive. See Stone v. State, 638 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1982, pet. ref’d) (clear and lucid testimony of appellant is evidence of
competency). In its judgment, the trial court confirmed that it appeared that
Appellant was mentally competent to stand trial, made the plea freely and
voluntarily, and was aware of the consequences of his plea. Based on our review of
the record as a whole, we conclude that the trial court did not err under 26.13(b)
when it accepted Appellant’s guilty plea.9 See Hall v. State, 935 S.W.2d 852, 855–

        9
          We note that, to support his argument, Appellant cites to evidence from the motion-to-withdraw
hearing wherein Appellant requested a continuance. The testimony, evidence, and arguments at the hearing
do not suggest that at the time of the proceedings, Appellant lacked either a rational, factual understanding
of the proceedings or a sufficient ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding. See CRIM. PROC. art. 46B.003(a). Moreover, we look to any suggestion of incompetency
at the time of Appellant’s plea and, as we have said, no mention was made of any competency issues at the
time of his plea, and a review of his own testimony reveals lucid and cogent answers and supports the trial
court’s determination that Appellant was competent to stand trial.
         We further note that the trial court appropriately addressed the issues raised by Appellant’s trial
counsel on the issue of competency throughout the proceedings, allowing ample opportunity for the parties
to submit any motions, requests, and evidence, and ordered that Appellant be evaluated by an expert each
time the issue was raised even after a finding that Appellant was competent to stand trial on a preferential
setting, carefully considering the evidence before it during the proceedings.
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56 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no pet.) (trial court did not err where no issue of
competency was raised at the time of the plea, the trial court had an opportunity to
observe the defendant, and the punishment charge and judgment stated that the
defendant appeared mentally competent).
      In conclusion, the trial court committed non-reversible error by failing to
admonish Appellant pursuant to Article 26.13(a) but such error was harmless. The
trial court did not err under Article 26.13(b) when it accepted Appellant’s guilty plea.
We overrule Appellant’s second issue.
                                   This Court’s Ruling
      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                               W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
                                               JUSTICE

November 16, 2023
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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