Court Opinion

ID: 9945727
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 15:04:16.649471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:39.560636
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                       Opinion filed February 28, 2024.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D22-0685
                       Lower Tribunal No. F21-1504
                          ________________

                        Dwight Verner Region,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                          The State of Florida,
                                  Appellee.

     An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Richard
Hersch, Judge.

      Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Shannon Hemmendinger,
Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

      Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Christina L. Dominguez,
Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before EMAS, SCALES and BOKOR, JJ.

     PER CURIAM.
      Affirmed. See Jackson v. State, 2 So. 3d 1036, 1037 (Fla. 3d DCA

2009) (“What the appellant characterizes as self-initiated ‘interjections’ by

the trial judge were motivated by the judge's appropriate interest in

preserving the regularity and orderliness of the proceeding.”); R.J. Reynolds

Tobacco Co. v. Robinson, 216 So. 3d 674, 684 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (“The

trial court should clearly convey to counsel that misconduct will not be

tolerated, even in the presence of the jury if necessary”) (citing Gomez v.

State, 751 So. 2d 630, 632-33 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (“There comes a point

and time in the conduct of a trial that the trial judge should and must intervene

in the egregious conduct, whether it has been challenged or not.”)); Koelemij

v. State, 285 So. 3d 376, 379 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) (“Although the better

practice is to excuse the jury before admonishing an attorney in open court,

reproving defense counsel in the jury's presence ‘does not, in itself,

constitute reversible error.’ Paramore v. State, 229 So. 2d 855, 860 (Fla.

1969), vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 935, 92 S.Ct. 2857, 33

L.Ed.2d 751 (1972). ‘[I]n order to constitute reversible error, [a reprimand]

must prejudice the party whose counsel was rebuked.’ Id. ‘Whether a new

trial should be granted under such circumstances is subject to the trial

judge's discretion, as [the trial court] is in a better position to determine the

effect of such rebuke or reprimand.’ Id. ‘However, reversible error occurs

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when the judge's comments and conduct “so severely call into question an

attorney's level of advocacy and sense of fairness” that they create a

prejudicial effect on the defendant.’ London v. State, 127 So. 3d 688, 689

(Fla. 4th DCA 2013)”) (additional quotations omitted).

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