Court Opinion

ID: 9706967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:56:57.719778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:26.486176
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
KLEIN, J.:
¶ 1 Although I agree that the majority’s outcome is both logical and preferable in light of the duties required of a trustee/executor, I cannot agree that In re Ehret’s Estate, 427 Pa. 584, 235 A.2d 414 (1967), has effectively rendered In re Williamson’s Estate, 368 Pa. 343, 82 A.2d 49 (1951), and In re Scott’s Estate, 418 Pa. 332, 211 A.2d 429 (1965), obsolete. Therefore, I believe that our Supreme Court’s rule is still in effect. If a person or entity took a principal commission as executor at *77the time there was a prohibition against dual commissions, that person or entity is barred from taking a principal fee from the trust although the rule changed before the fee against the trust principal was claimed. Therefore, as much as I agree in principle with the majority, I believe we are required to follow the rule until the Supreme Court specifically allows us to do otherwise. Therefore, I must dissent.
¶ 2 Briefly, I note that Ehret’s Estate does not overrule Williamson’s Estate or Scott’s Estate. In Ehret’s Estate, the appellant bank, never an executor of the estate, sought compensation for its work as trustee for the estate. Until the lawsuit, the bank had never been paid any compensation or commission for its work. In this situation, our Supreme Court allowed the bank to be fairly compensated for the work it had performed. Ehret’s Estate did not involve the dual commissions at issue in Williamson’s Estate and Scott’s Estate, which are at issue here. The Supreme Court, at least as it was constituted in 1967 when Ehret’s Estate was decided, may have been signaling its willingness to revisit the dual commission rule, but for whatever reason, it never has.
¶ 3 The issue of retroactive application of the Acts of 1945 and 1953 has been answered in the negative by Scott’s Estate, and I do not believe that we are at liberty to ignore that decision. While I have no argument otherwise with the majority’s analysis and conclusion, we have no authority to reach that conclusion. It is for the Supreme Court to change its rule.
¶ 4 Therefore, I respectfully dissent.