Court Opinion

ID: 9956973
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 15:02:38.776612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:01.708041
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-1545   Document: 59     Page: 1   Filed: 04/03/2024

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

                 URVASHI BHAGAT,
                  Plaintiff-Appellant

                            v.

  UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK
     OFFICE, KATHERINE K. VIDAL, IN HER
 OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS UNDER SECRETARY OF
  COMMERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
    AND DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES
  PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, UNITED
                   STATES,
              Defendants-Appellees
             ______________________

                       2023-1545
                 ______________________

    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
 Eastern District of Virginia in No. 1:20-cv-01515-CMH-
 IDD, Senior Judge Claude M. Hilton.
                  ______________________

                 Decided: April 3, 2024
                 ______________________

    URVASHI BHAGAT, Palo Alto, CA, pro se.

    MAUREEN DONOVAN QUELER, Office of the Solicitor,
 United States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria,
Case: 23-1545    Document: 59     Page: 2    Filed: 04/03/2024

 2                                             BHAGAT v. PTO

 VA, for defendants-appellees. Also represented by OMAR
 FAROOQ AMIN, MARY L. KELLY, THOMAS W. KRAUSE,
 FARHEENA YASMEEN RASHEED; JESSICA D. ABER, MATTHEW
 JAMES MEZGER, Office of the United States Attorney for the
 Eastern District of Virginia, United States Department of
 Justice, Alexandria, VA.
                  ______________________

     Before PROST, CLEVENGER, and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit
                         Judges.
 PER CURIAM.
     Urvashi Bhagat (“Bhagat”) appeals several orders from
 the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
 Virginia: requiring Bhagat to file paper motions to the
 court, rejecting her requests for discovery enlargement and
 rescheduling of the pretrial conference, denying her re-
 quest to file a second amended complaint, denying her re-
 quest to exclude an expert, granting defendant United
 States Patent and Trademark Office’s (“PTO”) partial mo-
 tion to dismiss Bhagat’s causes of action unrelated to pa-
 tentability, denying her request to strike the PTO’s motion
 for summary judgment and granting that motion finding
 that Bhagat’s patent claims are ineligible under 35 U.S.C.
 §§ 101 and 103. Bhagat also asserts various due process
 violations against the district court. We affirm.
                        BACKGROUND
                   A. The Patent Application
     Bhagat is the inventor of the United States Patent Ap-
 plication No. 13/877,847 (the “Application”). The Applica-
 tion claims are directed to nutritional formulations
 containing omega-6 fatty acids and antioxidants, which the
 Application describes as contained “in any orally accepta-
 ble form, including, capsules, tablets, liquid formulations,
 or whole foods” and administered orally. The Application
 claims a “packaged product” where “the intermixture of
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 BHAGAT v. PTO                                                 3

 omega-6 fatty acid(s) and antioxidant(s) is not any single
 specific variety of a vegetable, a fruit, a nut, or a seed,” and
 the dosage ranges “from 1 to 40g of omega-6 fatty acids and
 from 25mg to 10g of antioxidants . . . wherein the antioxi-
 dants comprise one or more polyphenols in the dosage of
 greater than 5mg.” App. Br. to PTO at 46, claim 82. The
 Application also claims the product in a “kit” that includes
 a range of two to twenty different nutritional formulations,
 “which collectively provide an amount of nutrients from
 0.0001 to 100 g/kg body weight . . . 40-80% of individual’s
 daily calories . . . 10-50% calories from protein, 15-50% cal-
 ories from lipids, and 35-85% calories from carbohydrates;
 and/or . . . deliver at least 50% of daily micronutrients for
 the individual” and/or is made up of “at least one of: vege-
 table or vegetable juice packs, fruit or fruit juice packs, dry
 grain packs, cereal packs, legume, grain, nuts, or seed
 packs, meat or seafood packs, or herbs, lipids, meals, snack,
 side dish, salad, desserts, milks, powder, puree, or yogurt
 packs.” App. Br. to PTO at 23–4, claim 95.
     The Application also contains method claims, wherein
 claim 88 sets out steps for “administering the dosage to an
 individual, wherein the individual belongs to a diet cohort”
 based on factors like “gender, age, genetic profile, family
 history, climactic temperature, or medical condition,” claim
 97 describes a method for treating “a medical condition or
 disease in the individual” and claim 116 recites a method
 for treating a variety of conditions such as aging, mental
 disorders, diabetes, autoimmune and infectious diseases.
 App. Br. to PTO at 21, 24, 31–32, claims 88, 97, and 116.
 None of the method claims, however, “include tailoring the
 nutrient dosages in the product to the diet cohort or re-
 stricting the total daily intake of any of the claimed nutri-
 ents.” J.A. 21.
     The Application additionally includes a withdrawn
 claim directed to a computer system to implement the
 method claims and to output nutritional plans for individ-
 uals based on dietary preferences and guidelines “wherein
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 4                                             BHAGAT v. PTO

 the nutrition program comprises a listing of formulations,
 optionally comprising food items, wherein from 1 to 40g of
 omega-6 fatty acids and from 5mg to 10g of antioxidants
 comprising at least 5mg of one or more polyphenols are in-
 cluded in the program for daily consumption by the indi-
 vidual.” App. Br. to PTO at 29–30, claim 112.
                     B. Procedural History
                      1. PTO Proceedings
     Bhagat filed the Application with the PTO in 2013. The
 PTO examiner rejected all pending claims of the Applica-
 tion for obviousness and rejected claims 82 and 99 for fail-
 ing to comply with the written description requirement,
 claims 82, 87, 91–93, 96, 97, 99, 102, 109, 110, and 113–120
 for indefiniteness, and claims 88, 89, 95, 103, and 107–110
 for improper dependency.
      Bhagat appealed to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
 (“Board”), which reversed the rejection for written descrip-
 tion and affirmed the rejection for obviousness on the mer-
 its. 1 The Board affirmed the obviousness rejection because
 the Application claims were “obvious in light of numerous
 past expert studies and disclosures,” particularly Claudia
 R. Morris’s U.S. Published Patent Application Number
 2008/0213239 (“Morris”). Bhagat v. U.S. Pat. & Trade-
 mark Off., No. 1:20-cv-1515, 2023 WL 2721003, at *2 (E.D.
 Va. Mar. 30, 2023) (“Summary Judgment Opinion”).
    The Board explained that Morris addresses the treat-
 ment of various conditions, like cardiovascular disease, by
 disclosing nutritional formulations comprising omega-6

     1   The Board summarily affirmed the rejections based
 on indefiniteness and improper dependency because Bha-
 gat failed to include in her Appeal Brief any substantive
 arguments on the merits that the rejections on those
 grounds should be reversed. J.A. 5980, 6480.
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 BHAGAT v. PTO                                               5

 fatty acids and Vitamin E in dosages and amounts that
 overlap with those in the Application claims. Id. at *2
 (“Morris shows that the formulations comprise from about
 50 mg to about 500 mg omega-6 fatty acids that may be
 administered once, twice, or three times daily, which would
 equal a dosage ranging from 50 mg to 1,500 mg of omega-6
 fatty acids a day.”). The Board also found that Morris dis-
 closed packaged formulations of omega-6 fatty acids, Vita-
 min E, and polyphenols, as well as dosages of omega-6 and
 Vitamin E in the ranges claimed in the Application claims
 and disclosed that “dosages are a result-effective variable
 and may be optimized for an individual,” rendering the Ap-
 plication’s claimed dosages obvious. Id. Factors discussed
 in Morris as impacting the preparation of formulations in-
 clude age, weight, and genetic makeup, which overlap with
 the diet cohort factors in the Application. Id. at *2. The
 Board found that Morris disclosed most of what the
 claimed invention covered, and that the only difference—
 that the Application disclosed using nutrients from differ-
 ent sources—was rendered obvious from other expert dis-
 closures teaching the mixtures of different nutrient
 sources. Id. at *2 (“The only difference the Board found
 between Morris and [the Application’s] claimed formula-
 tion was an explicit disclosure of using nutrients from dif-
 ferent sources . . . . [which] would have been obvious in
 light of another expert’s teachings of oil blends from differ-
 ent sources.”).
                 2. District Court Proceedings
    On December 10, 2020, Bhagat filed suit in the United
 States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to
 challenge the Board’s decision, alleging that the district
 court had jurisdiction pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 145 and
 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338(a), and 1361. Id. at *2. Bhagat
 amended her complaint on April 19, 2021. Am. Compl.,
 Bhagat v. USPTO, (No. 1:20-cv-01515), ECF 13. In addi-
 tion to alleging that the PTO erroneously rejected her pa-
 tent claims, Bhagat asserted entitlement to general
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 6                                              BHAGAT v. PTO

 damages due to the PTO’s “bad faith,” and asserted causes
 of action for “taking of her property, including but not lim-
 ited to her patent,” tortious harassment, and a mandamus
 compelling the PTO to issue the Application’s rejected pa-
 tent claims. Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 64–84, Bhagat v. USPTO,
 (No. 1:20-cv-01515), ECF 13; Bhagat v. U.S. Pat. & Trade-
 mark Off., No. 1:20-cv-1515, 2021 WL 3130866, at *2 (E.D.
 Va. July 22, 2021) (“Motion to Dismiss Opinion”).
    On July 22, 2021, the district court granted the PTO’s
 motion to dismiss all of Bhagat’s causes of action that were
 not related to the patentability of the Application claims
 and to strike Bhagat’s request for a jury trial. Motion to
 Dismiss Opinion, 2021 WL 3130866, at *3.
    The district court first determined that it did not have
 subject matter jurisdiction over the claims for takings,
 money damages, or tortious harassment due to sovereign
 immunity. Id. at *1. As the district court noted, agencies
 of the United States, such as the PTO, are generally
 shielded from liability by sovereign immunity unless Con-
 gress has expressly waived it. Id.
     The district court explained that “Congress has not
 waived its sovereign immunity for money damages in ac-
 tions brought pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 145” and therefore
 found it did not have jurisdiction over any of Bhagat’s
 claims for money damages under Section 145. Id.
    The district court then stated that the Tucker Act
 waives sovereign immunity for claims for non-tort money
 damages, such as takings claims, but gives exclusive juris-
 diction to the Court of Federal Claims when those damages
 are over $10,000, and that the Federal Tort Claims Act
 waives sovereign immunity for tortious harassment only if
 a plaintiff first presents an administrative claim to the
 agency that the plaintiff purports is responsible for their
 injury. Id. at *1–2. Since Bhagat brought claims for
 $500,000,000 against the United States, the district court
 concluded that the Court of Federal Claims had exclusive
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 BHAGAT v. PTO                                               7

 jurisdiction over the damages claim under the Tucker Act.
 Id. at *1. The district court also found that since Bhagat
 did not present an administrative claim to the PTO, the
 agency allegedly responsible for harassing her, the district
 court did not have jurisdiction over her tortious harass-
 ment claim. Id. at *2.
     Next, the district court addressed the PTO’s motion to
 dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief could be
 granted, finding that there were no facts in the Amended
 Complaint to support Bhagat’s allegations that the PTO vi-
 olated her constitutional rights, made false statements, or
 that she was entitled to mandamus relief. Id. The district
 court found that Bhagat failed to establish, as required for
 mandamus relief, that “(1) she has a clear right to the relief
 requested and (2) no other relief is available” because she
 failed to plausibly allege that the PTO owes her a duty to
 issue her patent and because she had another avenue of
 relief under Section 145, which she also asserted in her
 Amended Complaint. Id. (citing Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S.
 603, 616 (1984)). The district court also concluded that
 Bhagat alleged only that the PTO erred in adjudicating her
 patent without alleging any facts to support her claim that
 the PTO made false statements and acted with misconduct,
 and therefore concluded that she made only “naked asser-
 tions” that could not survive the PTO’s motion to dismiss.
 Id. (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Sim-
 ilarly, the district court found that Bhagat’s allegation that
 the PTO violated her constitutional rights was not a plau-
 sible claim because she identified neither the violative ac-
 tion the PTO allegedly took nor the constitutional right it
 purportedly violated. Id. at *3.
     Finally, the district court granted the PTO’s motion to
 strike Bhagat’s request for a jury trial because the Seventh
 Amendment right to a jury trial is not applicable in actions
 against the United States, unless Congress in waiving sov-
 ereign immunity unequivocally expresses that the right ex-
 ists in the authorizing statute. Id. The district court held
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 8                                              BHAGAT v. PTO

 that the remaining patent claim, for which Congress
 waived sovereign immunity under Section 145, did not pro-
 vide Bhagat with a right to a jury trial because Section 145
 contains no unequivocal right to a jury trial. Id.
    Thus, the district court dismissed all causes of action
 besides the patent claim under Section 145 and struck Bha-
 gat’s request for a jury trial. Id.
     On December 14, 2022, Bhagat filed a motion for the
 extension of time for expert rebuttal reports and the en-
 largement of discovery, arguing that the PTO’s “long-
 winded and disjointed” expert reports required more time
 to prepare the rebuttals, that illness and unavailability of
 her experts caused a delay, and that she contacted the
 judge’s law clerk by phone and email to request a confer-
 ence to extend time for expert rebuttals and enlarge discov-
 ery before the close of discovery. 2 Mot. for Extension of
 Time for Expert Rebuttal Report & Further Enlargement
 of Discovery, Bhagat v. USPTO, (No. 1:20-cv-01515), ECF
 62, 64. Bhagat requested an extension of time for disclos-
 ing rebuttals to the PTO’s experts to December 9, 2022, the
 date that she did submit the rebuttals, which was thirteen
 days after the initial deadline of November 25, 2022. ECF
 64, at 11. She also requested that discovery be enlarged to
 February 6, 2023, to allow her further discovery requests
 and to permit her to depose the PTO’s expert witness, and
 for the final pretrial conference to be delayed from January
 12, 2023, to February 12, 2023. ECF 64, at 11.
    Also on December 14, 2022, Bhagat filed a motion to
 disqualify the PTO’s expert, Dr. William S. Harris, as an

     2   Per her own admission, Bhagat contacted the clerk
 multiple times from November 20, 2022, through Decem-
 ber 5, 2022. ECF 64, at 6. The district court subsequently
 issued orders explaining that this was not the proper mode
 for requesting relief from the court, discussed infra at 8–9.
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 BHAGAT v. PTO                                               9

 expert witness due to “numerous conflicts of interest, and
 his opinions and testimony [being] neither relevant nor re-
 liable pursuant to the standards set forth in Daubert v.
 Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 506 U.S. 579 (1993).” Mot. to
 Disqualify Dr. Harris at 1, Bhagat v. USPTO, (No. 1:20-cv-
 01515), ECF 66.
     On December 16, 2022, the district court issued an or-
 der addressing Bhagat “constantly emailing and calling the
 [c]ourt requesting various forms of relief despite being in-
 formed by the [c]ourt, on more than one occasion, that writ-
 ten motions are the only appropriate form by which to
 request relief from the [c]ourt.” Bhagat v. U.S. Pat. &
 Trademark Off., No. 1:20-cv-01515, 2022 WL 18401639, at
 *1 (E.D. Va. Dec. 16, 2022), ECF 68 (“First Ex Parte Com-
 munications Order”). The district court noted that, while
 it had granted Bhagat’s motion for Pro Se E-Noticing, that
 grant did not permit her to “file documents or requests for
 relief electronically” and that she must follow the proper
 procedure for requesting relief, which is “filing a paper copy
 of any motion through the Clerk’s Office that includes the
 relief requested and a legal basis for granting such relief.”
 Id. The district court directed Bhagat to review the United
 States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
 Pro Se Reference Handbook and asserted that it would not
 respond to any further email or phone communications
 from Bhagat. Id.
    In response, Bhagat filed a motion, which the district
 court “interpret[ed] . . . as a Motion to Vacate the Decem-
 ber 16, 2022 Order.” Bhagat v. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off.,
 No. 1:20-cv-01515, 2022 WL 18401638, at *1 (E.D. Va. Dec.
 30, 2022), ECF 75 (“Second Ex Parte Communications Or-
 der”). The district court denied this motion on December
 30, 2022, reiterating that Bhagat “should never contact
 chambers regarding any substantive issues concerning the
 case unless authorized by the [c]ourt in advance” and con-
 cluding that Bhagat’s substantive request for extension of
 time for expert rebuttal reports, which was the topic of her
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 10                                             BHAGAT v. PTO

 ex parte communication, was not an exception to this rule
 just because the district court had the “ability to sua sponte
 grant an extension of time ‘with or without motion or no-
 tice’ as noted” in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1)(A).
 Id.
     On January 10, 2023, the district court denied Bhagat’s
 motion to enlarge discovery to February 6, 2023, and to re-
 schedule the pretrial conference, but granted the motion in
 part to permit the extension of the rebuttal disclosures to
 December 9, 2022. Order on Mot. for Extension of Discov-
 ery, Bhagat v. USPTO, (No. 1:20-cv-01515), ECF 77. The
 district court reasoned that Bhagat’s motion, which she
 filed after the close of discovery, was not timely, and that
 regardless she failed to show good cause for an extension
 because her delays were caused by her own legal strategy 3
 and inability to manage her personal workload. Id. The
 district court found that, since Bhagat did not begin discov-
 ery until November 1, 2022, despite discovery opening on
 August 11, 2022, she did not show good cause for her ex-
 tension request. Id. The district court was also unper-
 suaded by Bhagat’s arguments that the PTO has more
 resources than she does, as it noted there is often a dispar-
 ity in resources among parties. Id. Thus, it rejected her

      3  Bhagat filed a petition to the United States Su-
 preme Court requesting that the Supreme Court issue a
 writ of mandamus to the United States District Court for
 the Eastern District of Virginia on August 17, 2022. In re
 Urvashi Bhagat, 2022 WL 4226537 (August 17, 2022). Her
 Petition was denied on October 31, 2022. In re Bhagat, 143
 S. Ct. 396 (2022). The district court determined that Bha-
 gat’s decision to wait to begin discovery until after the out-
 come of her petition to the Supreme Court was a legal
 strategy that did not entitle her to an extension for discov-
 ery. Order on Mot. for Extension of Discovery, Bhagat v.
 USPTO, (No. 1:20-cv-01515), ECF 77.
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 BHAGAT v. PTO                                            11

 request to extend discovery or to reschedule the pretrial
 conference. Id.
     On January 17, 2023, the district court denied Bhagat’s
 motion to disqualify Dr. Harris, reasoning that her “objec-
 tions go to the weight of the expert’s testimony, not admis-
 sibility.” Order Declining to Disqualify Dr. Harris, Bhagat
 v. USPTO, (No. 1:20-cv-01515), ECF 83.
    The PTO filed a motion for summary judgment on Jan-
 uary 20, 2023, arguing that the undisputed facts show that
 the Application claims are patent ineligible under
 35 U.S.C. § 101 and that claims 82–89, 91–104, 107–110,
 and 113–120 are unpatentable as obvious under 35 U.S.C.
 § 103. On January 31, 2023, Bhagat responded with a mo-
 tion to strike the PTO’s summary judgment motion as
 premature since she had appealed the close of discovery,
 denial of the rescheduling of the pretrial conference, and
 admissibility of the PTO’s expert report.
     The district court denied Bhagat’s motion to strike the
 PTO’s motion for summary judgment and granted the
 PTO’s motion, finding that the claims at issue are patent-
 ineligible under Section 101 and unpatentable under 103.
 Summary Judgment Opinion, 2023 WL 2721003, at *1–5.
     The district court first addressed the motion to strike,
 finding that since Bhagat had over four months to conduct
 discovery, her argument that the motion for summary
 judgment was premature due to her appeal of the district
 court’s refusal to extend discovery was not persuasive. Id.
 at *1. The district court also found that Bhagat failed to
 demonstrate that a stay was supported pending interlocu-
 tory appeal of discovery matters. Id.
     After concluding that Bhagat’s motion to strike the
 PTO’s motion should be denied, the district court turned to
 the merits of the PTO’s summary judgment motion.
     The district court first addressed the PTO’s argument
 that all the Application claims are patent ineligible under
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 12                                             BHAGAT v. PTO

 Section 101, finding that both the product and method
 claims were directed to patent-ineligible subject matter
 and were not transformed to patent-eligible subject matter
 because the only limitations beyond those directed at nat-
 ural phenomena or abstract ideas were well-known and
 conventional. Id. at *3–4 (citing Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v.
 CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014)); see also PTO Mem.
 in Supp. of Summ. Judgment at 16–24, Bhagat v. USPTO
 (No. 1:20-cv-01515), ECF 86.
     In its Alice step one analysis, i.e., determining whether
 the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible concept such
 as a natural phenomenon or abstract idea, the district
 court found that the Application claims recited a combina-
 tion of nutrients naturally present in almonds, with some
 of the claims describing the same dosages of omega-6 fatty
 acids, polyphenols, and phytosterols contained in almonds.
 Summary Judgment Opinion, 2023 WL 2721003, at *3
 (“[A]lmonds contain the dosages of omega-6 fatty acids re-
 cited in claims 92, 107, 113, and 119, and the polyphenol
 dosage recited in claim 120. Almonds further comprise
 phytosterols as required by claim 85, in the dosages recited
 in claims 86, 93, 108, and 114.”); see also id. (“Claim 94’s
 requirement that one formulation provide omega-6 fatty
 acids in a dosage less than 1 g, but that a plurality collec-
 tively provide 1 to 40 g of omega-6 merely encompasses a
 product of 100 g of almonds broken into 5 g increments. Al-
 monds also contain the phytochemicals, lipids, antioxi-
 dants, vitamins, minerals, and fiber recited in claims 87
 and 101 [and] claim 89 encompasses a mixture of one or
 more food items, which includes a mixture of 100 g of al-
 monds with other nuts.”). The district court also found that
 claim 112, which “deals with a computer system that im-
 plements the method of preparing the product” was di-
 rected to the abstract idea of meal planning. Id. at *4.
    In its Alice step two analysis, i.e., determining if any
 additional claim limitations transform a natural phenome-
 non or abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention, the
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 BHAGAT v. PTO                                             13

 district court concluded that all the remaining limitations
 recited well-known activities such as conventional packag-
 ing practices, crushing almonds into a powder, and “admin-
 istering,” “determining,” “selecting,” and “preparing” steps.
 Id. The district court found that the “administering” step
 included eating or feeding almonds to an individual and
 that the “diet cohorts” were identified in “a generic manner
 that all humans would qualify.” Id. Similarly, the district
 court found that the “determining” step groups individuals
 into the broad diet cohorts “based on food preference, die-
 tary habits, age, or gender” and that the “selecting” and
 “preparing” steps link the nutritional formulations to the
 diet cohorts. Id. The district court also concluded that
 claim 112 does nothing more than add conventional com-
 puter components to the abstract idea of meal planning.
 Id. Thus, the district court concluded the Application’s
 claims were patent ineligible under Section 101.
     The district court then found that the pending Applica-
 tion claims were further unpatentable as obvious under
 Section 103 considering the teachings of Morris, which the
 Board relied on in rejecting the claims, and Joshua C. An-
 thony et al., U.S. Published Patent Application Number
 2007/0166411 A1 (“Anthony”). Id. at *5. The district court
 noted that the Board determined that Morris taught “pre-
 paring and administering a packaged dietary formulation
 comprising omega-6 fatty acids, Vitamin E, and polyphe-
 nols” as well as “dosages of omega-6 fatty acids and Vita-
 min E overlapping the claimed range.” Id. The district
 court also noted that the PTO’s expert witness Dr. Harris
 explained that “the benefits of consuming the claimed nu-
 trients were well-known in the art as of 2010” and that
 Bhagat had not argued how the references Dr. Harris used
 to support this statement did not disclose the limitations in
 the dependent claims. Id. The district court found that
 Bhagat failed to establish unexpected results to rebut the
 presumption of obviousness from the overlapping dosage
 ranges in Morris and the Application and could not support
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 14                                             BHAGAT v. PTO

 her contention that Morris teaches away from the Applica-
 tion claims. Id. Finally, the district court found that Bha-
 gat’s argument that the prior art was not relevant because
 it did not address the same problem solved by her Applica-
 tion claims was unconvincing because “the prior art [was]
 from the same field of endeavor in nutritional formula-
 tions.” Id.
     Therefore, the district court granted the PTO’s motion
 for summary judgment that the Application claims were
 not eligible for patent protection. Id.
     On March 15, 2023, Bhagat filed a motion for leave to
 file a second amended complaint, which the district court
 denied as unduly delayed on March 31, 2023. Mot. for
 Leave to File Second Am. Compl., Bhagat v. USPTO, (No.
 1:20-cv-01515), ECF 113; Order Denying Mot. to File Sec-
 ond Am. Compl., Bhagat v. USPTO, (No. 1:20-cv-01515),
 ECF 126.
    Bhagat appeals (1) the district court’s orders requiring
 her to file paper motions to request relief from the court,
 denying her request for the enlargement of discovery, deny-
 ing her challenge to the admissibility of Dr. Harris’s testi-
 mony, and denying her leave to file a second amended
 complaint, and alleges that the failure of the judges to
 recuse themselves was a violation of due process; (2) the
 district court’s dismissal of her damages, takings, and mis-
 conduct claims and striking of her demand for jury trial;
 and (3) the district court’s denial of her motion to strike,
 and its subsequent grant of, the PTO’s motion for summary
 judgment. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
 § 1295(a)(1).
                         DISCUSSION
     This Court reviews district court orders on procedure,
 discovery, complaint amendments, judge recusal and the
 admissibility of evidence under the law of the regional cir-
 cuit; here, the Fourth Circuit, which reviews these
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 BHAGAT v. PTO                                                15

 decisions for an abuse of discretion. Panduit Corp. v. All
 States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574–75 (Fed. Cir.
 1984); United States ex rel. Nicholson v. MedCom Caroli-
 nas, Inc., 42 F.4th 185, 196 (4th Cir. 2022) (“District courts
 have inherent power to manage their dockets with an eye
 toward speedy and efficient resolutions . . . . So we review
 decisions about the nature of a dismissal . . . for an abuse
 of discretion.”); United States ex rel. Becker v. Westinghouse
 Savannah River Co., 305 F.3d 284, 290 (4th Cir. 2002) (“We
 afford substantial discretion to a district court in managing
 discovery and review discovery rulings only for abuse of
 that discretion.”); Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v.
 Alpha of Virginia, Inc., 43 F.3d 922, 940 (4th Cir. 1995)
 (“We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s ruling
 on a motion for leave to amend and to add counterclaims.”);
 United States v. Cherry, 330 F.3d 658, 665 (4th Cir. 2003)
 (“We review a trial judge’s decision on matters of recusal
 for abuse of discretion.”); United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d
 261, 265 (4th Cir. 2003) (“We review for abuse of discretion
 a district court’s decision to admit or reject expert testi-
 mony.”).
      This Court also reviews procedural decisions that are
 not unique to patent law, such as dismissal of a complaint
 for lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim and a grant
 of summary judgment, under the law of the regional cir-
 cuit. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1358 (Fed. Cir.
 2002); Weisner v. Google LLC, 51 F.4th 1073, 1081 (Fed.
 Cir. 2022); Syngenta Crop Prot., LLC v. Willowood, LLC,
 944 F.3d 1344, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2019). The Fourth Circuit
 reviews dismissals under both FRCP 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)
 de novo. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1358 (citing Evans v. B.F. Per-
 kins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999)); Burbach
 Broad. Co. of Del. V. Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.3d 401,
 405–06 (4th Cir. 2002). Similarly, the Fourth Circuit re-
 views the grant of summary judgment de novo, construing
 the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
 party. Syngenta, 944 F.3d at 1355. The Fourth Circuit
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 16                                              BHAGAT v. PTO

 reviews district court determinations of whether summary
 judgment was premature for an abuse of discretion. Har-
 rods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214,
 244 (4th Cir. 2002).
                      A. Non-Patent Claims
      The district court did not abuse its discretion or violate
 due process in issuing its orders declining to extend discov-
 ery, requiring Bhagat to file motions to request relief and
 to do so via paper motions rather than through electronic
 filing, admitting Dr. Harris’s testimony, or declining to al-
 low Bhagat another amendment to her complaint. It was
 also not reversable error for Judge Claude M. Hilton and
 Magistrate Judge Ivan Davis to decline to recuse them-
 selves. The district court did not err as a matter of law in
 dismissing Bhagat’s claims for damages, takings, constitu-
 tional violations, and mandamus under FRCP 12(b)(1) and
 12(b)(6).
                      1. Procedural Issues
    Bhagat fails to demonstrate that the district court
 abused its discretion or violated due process in its manage-
 ment of discovery and the trial procedure.
      First, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny Bhagat’s
 request to extend discovery, which she filed after the close
 of discovery. Bhagat’s argument that her ex parte emails
 and calls were an attempt to timely request the extension
 of discovery fails because the district court repeatedly no-
 tified Bhagat that the proper procedure for requesting re-
 lief from the court was through filing paper motions. See,
 e.g., First Ex Parte Communications Order, Bhagat v.
 USPTO, (No. 1:20-cv-01515), ECF 68. Thus, Bhagat’s ac-
 tions did not amount to “excusable neglect” that could jus-
 tify her untimely extension motion. Symbionics Inc. v.
 Ortlieb, 432 F. App’x 216, 219–20 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[A] dis-
 trict court should find excusable neglect only in the extraor-
 dinary cases where injustice would otherwise result.”
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 BHAGAT v. PTO                                               17

 (emphasis in original)). Further, the district court did not
 abuse its discretion in finding that Bhagat failed to demon-
 strate good cause to extend discovery because she waited
 three months from the opening of discovery to send her dis-
 covery requests. Cook v. Howard, 484 F. App’x 805, 815–
 16 (4th Cir. 2012) (concluding that the district court did not
 abuse its discretion by failing to find good cause where the
 party demonstrated a lack of diligence by waiting months
 between filing suit and seeking discovery).
      Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion
 by requiring Bhagat to file written motions to request relief
 orders, nor did it violate due process with its rule that pro
 se parties must submit written motions rather than elec-
 tronic filings. The district court’s local rule, E.D. Va. Local
 Civil Rule 7(F), requires that parties file written briefs
 with all motions to request relief from the court, and E.D.
 Va. Local Civil Rule 1(A) in conjunction with the E.D. Va.
 Electronic Case Filing Policies and Procedures Manual re-
 quires pro se parties to file using paper rather than
 through electronic filing. E.D. Va. Local Civ. R. 7(F), 1(A);
 U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. Va., Electronic Case Filing Policies and
 Procedures Manual, at 12, 23 (Revised Sept. 23, 2020),
 https://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/sites/vaed/files/ECF-Manu
 al%2012-17-2021.pdf. Bhagat argues that Rule 7(F) con-
 flicts with FRCP 6(b)(1)(A); however, that rule merely per-
 mits the court to grant extensions without motion and
 therefore does not conflict with the local rule’s requirement
 that applies in the absence of such a discretionary excep-
 tion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(A); Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife
 Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 896 n.5 (1990) (explaining that a court
 may, using its discretion, grant a request for an extension
 of discovery even without motion or notice). In fact, under
 another local rule, the district court has discretion to waive
 the requirement for a written motion in some circum-
 stances, which further demonstrates that the local rules
 align with the discretionary nature of FRCP 6(b)(1)(A).
 E.D. Va. Local Civ. R. 26(B).
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 18                                              BHAGAT v. PTO

      Similarly, it was not a due process violation for the dis-
 trict court to require Bhagat to comply with its rule that
 pro se parties may not use electronic filing, because she has
 not identified that she has a “right” to electronic filing, nor
 has she established that she suffered lack of notice or op-
 portunity to be heard. See In re Hunter, 600 F. App’x 126,
 127 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[Plaintiff] cite[d] neither statutory law
 nor judicial precedent demonstrating a clear right to file
 electronically.”); J.G. Peta, Inc. v. Club Protector, Inc., 65
 Fed. App’x 724, 728 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding no constitu-
 tional right to submit motions in a particular format);
 Cleveland Bd. Of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546
 (1985) (“The essential requirements of due process . . . are
 notice and an opportunity to respond.”). Bhagat alleges
 that the district court usurped approximately twelve days
 of her time by requiring paper filings, which led to her de-
 lay in completing discovery, impeded her ability to oppose
 summary judgment, and delayed her filing her motion to
 amend her complaint a second time. Appellant’s Br. at 27.
 However, Bhagat’s delays were primarily caused by her de-
 cision to wait three months to begin discovery and, simi-
 larly, she did not move for leave to file a second amended
 complaint until over a year and a half after her first
 amended complaint was partially dismissed and after fil-
 ing notice of appeal to this Court. See Order Granting De-
 fendant’s Partial Mot. to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Am.
 Compl., Bhagat v. USPTO, (No. 1:20-cv-01515), ECF 26
 (07/22/2021); Mot. for Leave to File Second Am. Compl.,
 Bhagat v. USPTO, (No. 1:20-cv-01515), ECF 113
 (03/15/2023); Notice of Appeal, Bhagat v. USPTO, (No.
 1:20-cv-01515), ECF 81 (01/13/2023). Thus, the district
 court did not violate due process by requiring Bhagat to file
 electronically where she has not shown any constitutional
 right to do so or by rejecting her argument that she had no
 notice or opportunity to be heard because of the district
 court’s requirement.
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 BHAGAT v. PTO                                              19

      Third, the district court did not abuse its discretion
 when it denied Bhagat’s motion to exclude Dr. Harris’s tes-
 timony because the district court correctly noted that Bha-
 gat’s complaints about Dr. Harris’s testimony went to the
 weight, rather than admissibility, of that testimony. See
 Bresler v. Wilmington Trust Co., 855 F.3d 178, 195–96 (4th
 Cir. 2017) (finding it was not an abuse of discretion for the
 district court to decline to exclude an expert’s testimony
 under Daubert where the challenges to the testimony went
 to weight and credibility rather than admissibility). Daub-
 ert challenges should be to the reliability and relevance of
 the expert’s principles and methodology rather than to the
 expert’s conclusions. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma.,
 Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993). Bhagat did not challenge
 Dr. Harris’s principles or methodology; rather, she sought
 disqualification based on his “significant financial interest”
 in preventing the Application from being granted and his
 purported misinterpretation of the prior art and the law.
 Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Disqualify Dr. Harris at 3, 7, Bha-
 gat v. USPTO, (No. 1:20-cv-01515), ECF 66. Bhagat’s ar-
 gument of bias goes to Dr. Harris’s credibility, and her
 argument that Dr. Harris mischaracterized the prior art
 and the law goes to the weight of his evidence; none of her
 challenges are to the evidence’s admissibility and thus the
 district court did not abuse its discretion in denying her
 motion to exclude Dr. Harris’s testimony.
     Fourth, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district
 court to deny Bhagat’s motion for leave to file a second
 amended complaint because she does not dispute that the
 motion was delayed and puts forth no evidence that her de-
 lay would not prejudice the PTO to permit her to amend
 her complaint after discovery had closed and judgment for
 the PTO entered. See Mayfield v. National Ass’n for Stock
 Car Auto Racing, Inc., 674 F.3d 369, 379 (4th Cir. 2012)
 (finding the district court did not abuse its discretion in
 denying a motion to amend a complaint filed over two and
 a half years prior when significant discovery had occurred);
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 20                                             BHAGAT v. PTO

 see also Matrix Capital Mgmt. Fund, LP v. BearingPoint,
 Inc., 576 F.3d 172, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he further the
 case progressed before judgment was entered, the more
 likely it is that the amendment will prejudice the defend-
 ant . . . .”).
      Fifth and finally, it was not reversable error for Judge
 Hilton and Magistrate Judge Davis to decline to recuse
 themselves from the case. Bhagat did not request that ei-
 ther judge do so at any point before the district court; thus,
 she raises this issue for the first time on appeal. The only
 arguments that Bhagat puts forth to establish that the
 judges were biased are that their rulings were all “substan-
 tially against” Bhagat and that “the court silenced [Bha-
 gat] in hearing . . . and pressed her to withdraw the
 action.” Appellant’s Br. at 66–67 (citing J.A. 9922–48; J.A.
 9932). These arguments are insufficient to establish a sub-
 stantial interest for either judge that would create a temp-
 tation that would lead the average judge to be biased.
 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 106 S. Ct. 1580, 1587 (1986);
 see also Litkey v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)
 (“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid
 basis for a bias or partiality motion” and “judicial remarks
 during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving
 of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases,
 ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge.”).
     Thus, none of the district court actions in managing
 discovery or trial procedure constituted an abuse of discre-
 tion or a violation of the due process clause.
                          2. Dismissal
     The district court did not err in dismissing Bhagat’s
 damages, takings, and tortuous harassment claims for lack
 of jurisdiction or in dismissing her causes of action for mis-
 conduct, violation of a constitutional right, and entitlement
 to mandamus relief for failure to state a claim on which
 relief can be granted.
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 BHAGAT v. PTO                                              21

    Bhagat’s claim for general damages and her claim for
 damages under the Takings Clause are claims against the
 United States for money, which fall under the Tucker Act.
 28 U.S.C. § 1491. The Tucker Act waives sovereign im-
 munity by granting jurisdiction to the Court of Federal
 Claims over claims against the United States “for liqui-
 dated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in
 tort.” Id. District courts have concurrent jurisdiction over
 these claims only when the claims do not exceed $10,000;
 otherwise, the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive juris-
 diction. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 520 (1998); Sub-
 urban Mortg. Assoc., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban
 Dev., 480 F.3d 1116, 1121 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (explaining
 that the Court of Federal Claim’s exclusive jurisdiction for
 money damages over $10,000 comes from Congress not
 granting any other court jurisdiction over these claims and
 the “Little Tucker Act” that gives district courts concurrent
 jurisdiction over Tucker Act claims that do not exceed
 $10,000) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2)). 4 It is undisputed

     4   Contrary to Bhagat’s contentions, this jurisdic-
 tional scheme has not been overruled by the Supreme
 Court, and the cases that Bhagat cites for this proposition
 do not support her argument. Appellant’s Br. at 20–21 (cit-
 ing Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2179 (2019)
 (removing the “state-litigation requirement” for takings
 claims against local governments that required the takings
 claim to be brought in state court before federal court); Gra-
 ble & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545
 U.S. 308, 312–14 (2005) (finding federal question jurisdic-
 tion over a state law claim that involved contested issues
 of federal law); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env’t Study
 Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 71 n.15 (1978) (finding jurisdiction
 in a district court under Section 1331(a) where the party
 did not seek compensation for a takings claim, which the
 Court clarified would be properly brought in the Court of
 Claims, but instead requested a declaratory judgment).
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 22                                             BHAGAT v. PTO

 that Bhagat seeks over $10,000 in damages; thus, the dis-
 trict court did not err in finding it lacked jurisdiction over
 her general damages claim and damages under the Tak-
 ings Clause claim.
     Similarly, there is no waiver of sovereign immunity for
 claims for money damages under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338,
 or 35 U.S.C. § 145 because none of these statutes contain
 express and unequivocal waivers of sovereign immunity.
 United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (stating
 that waivers of sovereign immunity must be expressed un-
 equivocally). Bhagat fails to point to an express waiver of
 sovereign immunity in any of the relevant statutes. Addi-
 tionally, the PTO is not, as Bhagat contends, a “sue or be
 sued” agency that operates similarly to a private corpora-
 tion, and there is no “sue or be sued” clause in the Patent
 Act. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 1.
     The district court was also correct to dismiss Bhagat’s
 allegations of misconduct, violations of constitutional
 rights, and entitlement to mandamus relief for failure to
 state a claim on which relief could be granted because none
 rise above conclusory allegations.
     To support her argument that the district court erred
 in dismissing her claims for misconduct, constitutional vi-
 olations, and entitlement to mandamus relief, Bhagat
 points to numerous portions of her Amended Complaint
 and essentially argues that she had a constitutional right
 to have her Application issue as a valid patent and that the
 PTO’s refusal to do so was a result of its bad faith and mis-
 conduct. Appellant’s Br. at 22 (citing Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 2–
 3, 11, 13, 36–37, 40–41, 45–46, 48–49, 55, and 56–63,
 Prayer for Relief (b), (c), (d), and (f)). The portions of the
 Amended Complaint that Bhagat points to merely critique
 the PTO for rejecting her claims and the PTAB for main-
 taining most of those rejections, and at no point does Bha-
 gat identify specific false statements or actions of
 misconduct from the PTO or cite to any portion of the
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 BHAGAT v. PTO                                              23

 Constitution to support the PTO’s alleged violation of her
 constitutional rights. Further, for mandamus relief, Bha-
 gat failed to plead that she had a clear right to have her
 Application issued as a valid patent and that there was no
 alternative relief available—particularly because Bhagat
 included claims for relief under § 145 in her complaint, ac-
 knowledging that alternative relief existed. Am. Compl.
 Prayer for Relief (c). Thus, the district court did not err in
 finding that Bhagat failed to state a claim on these issues.
     Finally, Congress did not clearly provide a right to a
 jury trial in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338, or 35 U.S.C. § 145,
 and thus the district court correctly struck Bhagat’s re-
 quest for a jury trial. See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S.
 156, 160–63 (1981) (“[I]f Congress waives the Govern-
 ment’s immunity from suit . . . the plaintiff has a right to a
 trial by jury only where that right is one of ‘the terms of
 [the Government’s] consent to be sued’. . . . The appropri-
 ate inquiry, therefore, is whether Congress clearly and un-
 equivocally departed from its usual practice in this area,
 and granted a right to trial by jury.”) (quoting United
 States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976); United States v.
 Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980)).
         B. Summary Judgment on Patent Ineligibility
     The district court did not err as a matter of law in deny-
 ing Bhagat’s motion to strike the PTO’s motion for sum-
 mary judgment or in granting the PTO’s motion for
 summary judgment.
             1. Denial of Bhagat’s Motion to Strike
     It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court
 to determine that the PTO’s summary judgment motion
 was not premature. See Harrods, 302 F.3d at 244 (“We re-
 view for abuse of discretion the district court’s refusal to
 allow [a party] the opportunity to engage in discovery prior
 to the entry of summary judgment.”).
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 24                                                BHAGAT v. PTO

      The Fourth Circuit makes clear that “[i]f a party be-
 lieves that more discovery is necessary for it to demon-
 strate a genuine issue of material fact, the proper course is
 to file a Rule 56(f) affidavit” explaining that more time for
 discovery is needed for that party to oppose the motion for
 summary judgment. Id. While courts have, in some cases,
 found that summary judgment was premature without the
 opposing party filing a Rule 56(f) affidavit, in general, “the
 failure to file an affidavit under Rule 56(f) is itself sufficient
 grounds to reject a claim that the opportunity for discovery
 was inadequate.” Id. (quoting Evans v. Techs. Applications
 & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 961 (4th Cir. 1996) (internal quo-
 tations removed)). Here, Bhagat does not dispute that she
 failed to file a Rule 56(f) affidavit. Further, this is not a
 case where “the nonmoving party, through no fault of its
 own, has had little or no opportunity to conduct discovery,”
 which can sometimes justify a finding that summary judg-
 ment was premature without a Rule 56(f) affidavit, because
 Bhagat has had ample time to complete discovery and, as
 previously discussed, chose to wait three months to begin
 pursuing discovery. Id. Thus, the district court did not
 abuse its discretion in denying to Bhagat’s motion to strike
 the PTO’s motion for summary judgment as premature.
                 2. Grant of Summary Judgment
      Further, the district court correctly granted the PTO’s
 unopposed motion for summary judgment, since there were
 no disputed issues of material fact to contradict the finding
 that the Application claims were patent ineligible under
 Section 101 and that the pending claims were unpatenta-
 ble under Section 103. Bhagat did not file an opposition to
 the PTO’s summary judgment motion and instead relies on
 her briefing in support of her motion to strike to argue that
 she raised issues of disputed fact. Appellant’s Br. 49–50.
 However, Bhagat does not identify a single issue of dis-
 puted fact in her motion to strike briefing; instead, she
 merely included the conclusory statement that “the record
 is rife with other facts [besides Dr. Harris’s testimony that
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 BHAGAT v. PTO                                               25

 Bhagat moved to exclude] that are in serious dispute.”
 Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Strike at 2, Bhagat v. USPTO
 (No. 1:20-cv-01515), ECF 91. Thus, Bhagat has put forth
 nothing to contradict the PTO’s account of the undisputed
 facts in its summary judgment motion. See S.E.C. v. Far-
 kas, 557 F. App’x 204, 207 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that the
 court is allowed to treat the movant’s facts as undisputed
 when the nonmovant fails to dispute the movant’s asser-
 tions of fact).
     The district court therefore did not err in granting the
 PTO’s motion for summary judgment that the Application
 claims are patent ineligible under Section 101, or in the al-
 ternative, that the pending claims are obvious under Sec-
 tion 103.
      The district court correctly found that the Application
 claims were directed to a product of nature or abstract idea
 under Alice step one and that no additional claim elements
 transformed the ineligible subject matter into a patent-eli-
 gible invention. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217; Mayo Collaborative
 Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’y, Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012).
 Bhagat put forth no evidence to contradict the PTO’s asser-
 tion that the claimed nutritional formulations were the
 same combination of nutrients found naturally in almonds;
 on appeal, her only contention is that the Application ex-
 pressly disclaims almonds when it says, “wherein omega-6
 fatty acid(s) and antioxidant(s) are not any single specific
 variety of a vegetable, a fruit, a nut, or a seed.” Appellant’s
 Br. at 54 (quoting Application claim 82). However, limiting
 the form of the servings of the nutritional formulations to
 require a mixture of fatty acids and antioxidants—rather
 than “any specific variety of a vegetable, a fruit, a nut, or a
 seed”—does not change the undisputed fact that the nutri-
 tional compositions Bhagat seeks to claim exist in nature.
 Bhagat also does not dispute that claim 112 is directed to
 the abstract idea of meal planning. Appellant’s Br. 52–57.
 Thus, the district court did not err in finding that the
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 26                                             BHAGAT v. PTO

 Application claims were directed to a product of nature and
 an abstract idea.
      Bhagat also fails to argue that the additional claim el-
 ements such as packaging, labeling, administering, prepar-
 ing, and computer-automating are not conventional
 activities that are able to transform the Application into a
 patent-eligible invention. Instead, she simply asserts that
 the “claims as a whole are not well-understood” and relies
 on the absence of a Section 102 rejection for lack of novelty
 for this proposition. Appellant’s Br. 56–57. This is insuffi-
 cient to preclude the district court from finding on sum-
 mary judgment that the additional limitations were well-
 understood and thus insufficient under Alice step two to
 turn the patent ineligible subject matter into a protectable
 invention. See Genetic Techs. Ltd v. Merial L.L.C., 818
 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[T]he inventive concept
 necessary at step two of the Mayo/Alice analysis cannot be
 furnished by the unpatentable law of nature (or natural
 phenomenon or abstract idea) itself.”); PersonalWeb Techs.
 LLC v. Google LLC, 8 F. 4th 1310, 1318 (Fed Cir. 2021)
 (“[A] new abstract idea is still an abstract idea.”). Thus,
 the district court correctly found that the Application
 claims were ineligible for patent protection under Section
 101.
     Finally, the district court’s conclusion that the Applica-
 tion’s pending claims should alternatively be rejected on
 Section 103 grounds was proper. Since Bhagat did not op-
 pose the PTO’s motion for summary judgment or contradict
 any of the PTO’s undisputed facts, it was not erroneous for
 the district court to find that the prior art’s disclosure of
 the nutritional formulations in the Application claims in
 overlapping ranges established a presumption of obvious-
 ness that Bhagat failed to overcome. The prior art discloses
 the same nutrients claimed in Bhagat’s Application claims
 in overlapping dosages, and she fails to put forth facts that
 would establish teaching away or unexpected results. Bha-
 gat provided no evidence in her motion to strike that the
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 BHAGAT v. PTO                                              27

 prior art taught away or led to unexpected results, and on
 appeal argues that the presence of some formulations in
 Morris in different dosages of the nutrients taught away
 and relies on conclusory statements that the results were
 unexpected. Bhagat’s belated arguments are insufficient
 to preclude summary judgment.
                         CONCLUSION
     For the reasons stated above, we hold that the district
 court did not abuse its discretion in issuing any of the chal-
 lenged orders, did not err in dismissing Bhagat’s non-pa-
 tent claims, and did not err in denying Bhagat’s motion to
 strike the PTO’s motion for summary judgment or in grant-
 ing summary judgment in favor of the PTO.
                         AFFIRMED