Court Opinion

ID: 9667344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 01:43:12.766769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:37.247506
License: Public Domain

*360BOB McCOY, Justice,
dissenting.
I concur with the majority’s holding that Appellant had standing to challenge the initial stop of the vehicle in which he was a passenger. I disagree, however, with the holding that the State did not meet its burden of establishing that the stop was reasonable.
The majority relies on Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488 (Tex.Crim.App.2005), in concluding that the State did not meet its burden of proving that the stop was reasonable. In Ford, the police officer testified that he stopped Ford because Ford was “following too close” to another car. Id. at 493. The court found a complete absence of objective factual support in the record. Id. It determined that without “specific, articulable facts,” the statement was merely the opinion of the officer, and the court had no means of assessing whether the stop was reasonable. Id. at 493-94.
The purpose of providing “specific and articulable” facts is to create a standard that disregards any subjective intent of the officer making the stop and looks solely to whether an objective basis for the stop exists. Id. at 492. Therefore, if the stop was based on the subjective judgment of the police officer, objective facts must be provided to support the decision. This standard exists to prevent the risk of arbitrary or abusive police practices that could result if a police officer’s subjective opinion were allowed to suffice instead of specific facts. Id.
In Ford, the testimony that the cars were “following too close” was subject to varying interpretations depending on the person who observed the conduct. One officer’s opinion of what constitutes “following too close” could differ from another’s. Immediate questions arise from the testimony: How close were the cars? What was the speed of the vehicle and other traffic? What were the road conditions? Without additional objective facts to support this testimony, the stop is justified only by the officer’s individual perception. It is apparent that additional facts were necessary in the Ford case because the officer’s statement was in fact an opinion.
An examination of the Ford rule shows that “specific and articulable facts” are necessary to justify a stop only when the stop would otherwise be based only on the subjective opinion of the officer. Ford is not applicable to this case because the stop was based on the failure to signal a lane change, an offense that could be objectively determined. Where testimony is based on an objective observation, such as the running of a red light, the risk of allowing a police officer’s individual perception to justify a stop is not present. See McVickers v. State, 874 S.W.2d 662, 663-64 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (running a red light is a sufficient basis for stop); Tores v. State, 518 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Tex.Crim.App.1975) (running a stop sign is a sufficient basis for stop); Walter v. State, 997 S.W.2d 853, 858 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 28 S.W.3d 538 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (failing to signal before making a turn is an objective basis for stop).
Here, the driver’s “failure to signal a lane change” was, in and of itself, an objective reason for the stop. Such an offense was not subject to various interpretations: either the driver used her signal to change lanes or she did not. Unlike Ford, where additional facts were absolutely necessary to determine whether there was an objective basis to stop the car, such facts were not necessary in this case. Furthermore, while objective questions arose to challenge a subjective observation in the Ford testimony, the only question that arose from the testimony in the case before us was whether or not the offense occurred. *361Because the stop was based on the observation of an objective offense rather than the officer’s subjective judgment that an offense may have occurred, no additional facts must be provided to show that there was an objective basis to stop the vehicle.
Despite the fact that an officer may rely upon information relayed to him by other officers, the majority focuses heavily on the fact that the testifying officer was told the reason for the stop, rather than was present when the stop was made. See State v. Jennings, 958 S.W.2d 980, 933 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1997, no pet.) (citing Fearance v. State, 771 S.W.2d 486, 509 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 927, 109 S.Ct. 3266, 106 L.Ed.2d 611 (1989)). While Officer Bailey testified that he was not present when the stop was made, he did testify that when he arrived at the scene of the traffic violation he was “told the reason for the traffic stop was failure to signal a lane change."1 It is important to note that hearsay is admissible in a suppression hearing. See Granados v. State, 85 S.W.3d 217, 227 (Tex.Crim.App.2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 927, 123 S.Ct. 1578, 155 L.Ed.2d 321 (2003). An officer may rely upon information given to him by other officers, such as the information told to Officer Bailey concerning the reason for the stop. See Jennings, 958 S.W.2d at 933.
Although the majority asserts that the officer’s testimony did not provide an objective description of the facts to show the reasonableness of the stop, case law supports the position that the stop was reasonable. In Walter, the court held that the state trooper’s statement that he observed the driver commit the traffic offense of changing lanes without signaling was substantial evidence that he had reasonable suspicion to stop the car. See Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Walter, 979 S.W.2d 22, 29 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.). In Shellberg, the court held that the officer properly stopped the car for the failure to signal. Tex. Dep’t Of Pub. Safety v. Shellberg, 2005 WL 1981488, at *2 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi Aug.18, 2005, no pet.) (mem.op.). In Hargrove, a detective testified that the officers made the traffic stop based on the driver’s failure to signal a lane change. The court held that there was reasonable suspicion for the stop. Hargrove v. State, 40 S.W.3d 556, 559 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd).
Because I believe that there was reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle, I would hold that the trial court properly denied Appellant’s motion to suppress and affirm the trial court’s judgment. I respectfully dissent.

. Officer Bailey further testified that he was advised by Sergeant Loeffert that at the time the stop was made, Appellant was in the back seat, crouched down with a jacket over his head. The majority does not question the fact that Bailey was also told this fact rather than observing it himself.