Court Opinion

ID: 9726416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:48:10.688264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:26.926078
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE BARRY, dissenting: Although I agree with much of the majority’s opinion, I am compelled to dissent in this case because I believe the defendant’s conviction for attempt rape should not be vacated. Under People v. King (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 551, 363 N.E.2d 838, multiple convictions were proper here. In King, the supreme court stated: “Prejudice results to the defendant only in those instances where more than one offense is carved from the same physical act. Prejudice, with regard to multiple acts, exists only when the defendant is convicted of more than one offense, some of which are, by definition, lesser included offenses. Multiple convictions and concurrent sentences should be permitted in all other cases where a defendant has committed several acts, despite the interrelationship of those acts. ‘Act,’ when used in this sense, is intended to mean any overt or outward manifestation which will support a different offense. We hold, therefore, that when more than one offense arises from a series of incidental or closely related acts and the offenses are not, by definition, lesser included offenses, convictions with concurrent sentences can be entered.” (66 Ill. 2d 551, 566, 363 N.E.2d 838, 844-45.) In the offense report supplied to the defendant in response to his bill of particulars, Officer Daly reported that the complainant told him that while still downstairs the “subject pulled her to him and french kissed her.” Although the majority admits that “kissing may constitute such lewd conduct as would support a charge of indecent liberties with a child,” it subsequently comes to the conclusion that only one offense may stand because the indecent liberties and attempt rape charges arose out of the same physical act. I disagree, and believe that there are two physical acts which support the entry of two convictions. There can be little doubt that the defendant’s embrace of the complainant and simultaneous French kissing of her downstairs constituted the offense of indecent liberties with a child under section 11 — 4(a) (3) of the Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 11 — 4(a) (3)). On this point, the statements of the supreme court in People v. Kirilenko (1953), 1 Ill. 2d 90, 96, 115 N.E.2d 297, 300, are particularly apt: “While a kiss may bear connotations of love, respect, saluation or forgiveness under proper circumstances, it should also be recognized that the bodily contact established by kissing often serves as a preliminary stimulant for arousing or appealing to sexual passions and desires.” The embracing and kissing of the 12-year-old complainant by the 52-year-old defendant was obviously done with the intent to arouse the sexual desires of either or both of them, and this conduct alone supports the indecent liberties conviction. More importantly, however, that conduct is totally distinct and separate from the kissing and associated acts performed in another part of the house, upstairs, which led to the attempt rape conviction. Reference to a statement this court made in People v. Schultz (1979), 73 Ill. App. 3d 379, 392 N.E.2d 322, is useful in determining whether there was one act or several acts for King purposes. In Schultz, relying upon the factors utilized by the supreme court in People v. Cox (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 101, 291 N.E.2d 1, this court stated: “If, after an examination of several factors — time interval between acts; identity of the victim; location of the acts; and whether or not those acts fall within the same section of the Criminal Code — it is obvious that the defendant has committed several acts which give rise to more than one offense, none of which are lesser included offenses, then multiple convictions are proper under King.” 73 Ill. App. 3d 379, 385, 392 N.E.2d 322, 327. Applying this test to the facts of the instant case, there apparently was not a lengthy time interval between the embrace and kissing downstairs and the acts constituting the attempt rape. However, the acts were not simultaneous, nor almost simultaneous, so as to suggest one continuous act. (See Schultz, compare People v. Manning (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 132, 374 N.E.2d 200; People v. Cox (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 101, 291 N.E.2d 1; People v. Jackson (1978), 64 Ill. App. 3d 159, 380 N.E.2d 1210; People v. Tate (1976), 37 Ill. App. 3d 358,346 N.E.2d 79.) Although the complainant was the victim in both instances, the acts occurred in different rooms of the house and are proscribed by different sections of the Criminal Code. Taking all this into consideration, it seems clear that the defendant has “committed several acts which give rise to more than one offense, none of which are lesser included offenses ° * *” (Schultz, 73 Ill. App. 3d 379, 385, 392 N.E.2d 322, 327), and consequently multiple convictions are proper under King. I would affirm both the indecent liberties and attempt rape convictions.