Court Opinion

ID: 9860117
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:11:23.667301+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:18:04.917045
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE JOHNSON, dissenting: I respectfully disagree with the majority. I will limit my discussion to whether (1) the failure to allow defendant’s character witnesses to testify constituted prejudicial error, and (2) the People proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of reckless homicide. I find no merit in the other contentions raised on appeal. The following facts are taken from the testimony adduced at trial. On December 10, 1985, in the afternoon, defendant drank two beers and took a nap before preparing to attend a party. In the early evening while driving to the party, defendant stopped at the red light just before the intersection of 79th Street, Stony Island Avenue, and South Chicago Avenue. Gilberto Alvarez and his passenger were also stopped at the light. The weather on that particular evening was foggy and rainy. Alvarez stated that defendant’s automobile was stopped at the light, in the left-hand turning lane. After the light turned green, both cars proceeded into the intersection. About halfway into the intersection defendant did not make a left turn, but, instead, accelerated and changed lanes, cutting in front of Alvarez’ car. Alvarez further testified that he saw “a body in the air” at about the same time defendant swerved into his lane. Alvarez followed defendant’s car and obtained the vehicle’s license plate number and then returned to the scene of the accident. Defendant testified that he proceeded into the intersection at a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour. He stated that he heard a loud thump and did not know what had hit his vehicle. He believed someone had thrown something at the vehicle, since the immediate area was a gang hangout. Thus, in fear, he did not stop to see what had occurred. After defendant was notified that Chicago police officers were at his home looking for him, he immediately returned home. Officer James Jackson was parked at 1932 East 80th Street and observed defendant as he arrived home. Jackson testified that after approaching defendant, he detected the odor of alcohol on his breath. Defendant was placed under arrest and advised of his rights. At the police station, defendant took a breathalyzer test, which revealed his blood alcohol to be .08. Hair samples were removed from the fractured windshield of his vehicle. An expert testified that the hair could have come from the victim. The expert also found glass in the victim’s clothing which matched the glass from the windshield of defendant’s vehicle. The medical examiner testified that the victim died of multiple injuries by vehicular homicide. At the close of the People’s case, defendant’s motion for a directed verdict was denied. Defendant’s motion to allow the character testimony of his parish priest and employer was also denied after the trial court found that defendant’s reputation for truth and veracity was not at issue. A jury found defendant not guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol and guilty of reckless homicide. A defendant in a criminal proceeding may provide “proof of such previous good character as is inconsistent with the commission of the crime with which he is charged.” (People v. Lewis (1962), 25 Ill. 2d 442, 445; see People v. La Fiura (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 1099, 1104.) This proof is established by showing defendant’s reputation for the specific character trait involved. (Lewis, 25 Ill. 2d at 445; La Fiura, 93 Ill. App. 3d at 1104.) Moreover, evidence of community reputation must be based on the witness’ affiliation with defendant’s neighbors and friends. (People v. Kurena (1980), 87 Ill. App. 3d 771, 778.) However, the trial court’s determination concerning the competency to testify as a character witness will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. La Fiura, 93 Ill. App. 3d at 1104. The State concedes that a criminal defendant may present evidence of his general reputation in the community. However, the State argues that the parish priest could only offer his personal opinion and not information concerning defendant’s general reputation in the community. The State also argues that defendant’s employer did not have any knowledge of his reputation in the community based on association with his friends and neighbors. I am not persuaded by the State’s arguments. Concerning the parish priest, it is more probable than not that he was familiar with defendant’s general reputation in the community. The church, generally, is an integral part of the community where parishioners gather to converse on various matters. Therefore, the parish priest would more than likely have knowledge of defendant’s reputation in the community. Furthermore, I am not convinced that defendant’s employer could not have competently testified as to defendant’s reputation in his community. The State’s suggestion that the employer could only testify as to defendant’s work reputation is speculative at best. Hence, I find that the trial court erred by not allowing the reputation testimony of defendant’s witnesses. Defendant also contends that he was not proved guilty of reckless homicide beyond a reasonable doubt. The State maintains that it has met its burden of proof by the evidence which revealed that defendant was driving recklessly, struck and killed the victim, eluded the police, and failed to report the incident to the police. Under the facts and surrounding circumstances of the case at bar, I find that the State failed to prove defendant guilty of reckless homicide beyond a reasonable doubt. The facts, as presented by testimony at trial, established that on the night in question the weather was wet and foggy. Defendant stopped at a red light and proceeded into the intersection when the light turned green. Defendant did not see the victim at any time nor did any of the testifying witnesses. Although Alvarez’ vehicle was adjacent to defendant’s automobile, Alvarez testified that he did not see the victim until after she had been struck. Defendant stated that he heard a thump but did not stop because he believed that something had been thrown at his car. Furthermore, although defendant admitted drinking beer prior to the incident, the results of his breathalyzer and balance tests revealed that he was not legally intoxicated at the time of the incident. The court also found him not guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol. Contrary to the State’s argument, as soon as defendant learned of the incident, he returned home and he answered the inquiries of the officers. I conclude that defendant was not proved guilty of reckless homicide beyond a reasonable doubt. I would reverse the judgment of the circuit court.