Court Opinion

ID: 9811849
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:30:48.637395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:56.821759
License: Public Domain

OPINION
Opinion by Justice YÁÑEZ.
Following a bench trial, Enrique Rios was convicted of the third-degree felony offense of failure to comply with sex-offender registration requirements. See Tex.Code CRIm. Peoc. Ann. arts. 62.01, 62.03, 62.10 (Vernon Supp.2004). He was sentenced to two years imprisonment. In two issues, Rios challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. We hold the evidence is legally insufficient to support Rios’s conviction and reverse the trial court’s judgment.
Background
On April 25, 2001, Rios registered as a sex offender living at his mother’s residence, located at 2212 Mary Street in Corpus Christi, Texas. See Tex.Code CRiM. PROC. Ann. arts. 62.03, 62.04 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
*751At trial, there was conflicting testimony as to whether Rios had lived continuously at the Mary Street address from the date of his registration in April 2001 through February 15, 2002, the date of the alleged violation.
Victor Ray Casares, Sr., a Corpus Christi police officer, testified that on February 15, 2002, he and officer Andrew Yba-nez were conducting compliance checks on registered sex offenders. Upon arriving at 2212 Mary Street, the officers encountered Rios’s mother, Natalia Petri, outside. Casares testified Petri told them she had lived at the address for twenty-two years. According to Casares, Petri said that Rios no longer lived there, that he was in Dallas, and that she had not seen him for a couple of months, since Christmas. The officers obtained Petri’s signature on a form stating that Rios no longer lived at the address.
Officer Ybanez corroborated Casares’s testimony. On cross-examination, Ybanez testified the officers did not search the house and admitted that it was possible Rios was there.
At trial, Petri testified that Rios had always lived with her. She said that when the officers came to her home, they told her they were patrolling the neighborhood to prevent burglaries and asked if she had seen any suspicious activities. She testified that the officers asked who lived with her, and she told them that Rios and her grandson lived there. According to Petri, she told the officers that Rios was inside the house, but was asleep. She stated that she offered to wake him, but the officers said it was not necessary. She denied that she said Rios was living in Dallas. She testified that the officer asked her to sign a document to prove they had been patrolling in the area. She specifically testified that Rios was living with her between December 2001 and February 15, 2002 and that he had lived with her at the Mary Street address “all the time.”
Tami Weidenfeller, custodian of records at Christus Spohn Hospital, verified the introduction of Rios’s hospital records. The records reflect that on February 19, 2002, four days after the officers’ visit, Rios attempted to obtain a refill on prescription medication by visiting the hospital. The hospital records of Rios’s February 19 treatment show his address as “2212 Mary Street.” Weidenfeller testified that patients are asked to provide an address upon admission, but that no other information is requested to verify a patient’s address.
Standard of Review
Claims of legal insufficiency of evidence are reviewed by examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Sanders v. State, 119 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Tex.Crim.App.2003).
In a criminal conviction, sufficiency of the evidence is determined by the elements of the crime as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). The correct charge “would be one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id. In Malik, the court of criminal appeals provided that this standard can be applied to all trials, whether to the bench or to the jury. Id. at 240; see also Fuller v. State, 73 S.W.3d 250, 252 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (evidentiary sufficien*752cy should be measured against “elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case” in all sufficiency cases).1 The court of criminal appeals has made clear that under Malik, “the indictment [is] the basis for the allegations which must be proved” and that the hypothetically correct jury charge for the ease must be “authorized by the indictment.” Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 254 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (citing Planter v. State, 9 S.W.3d 156, 159, n. 5 & 6 (Tex.Crim.App.1999)).
When a statute lists more than one method of committing an offense, and the indictment alleges some, but not all, of the statutorily listed methods, the State is limited to the methods alleged. Fuller v. State, 73 S.W.3d 250, 255 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) (Keller, P.J., concurring) (citing Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 404 (Tex.Crim. App.2000)); Gollihar, 46 S.W.3d at 255.
Questions concerning the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are to be resolved by the trier of fact. Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 254 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). Evidence is not rendered insufficient when conflicting evidence is introduced. Matchett v. State, 941 S.W.2d 922, 936 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). The reviewing court must assume that the fact finder resolved conflicts, including conflicting inferences, in favor of the verdict, and must defer to that resolution. Id.
We also measure the factual sufficiency of the evidence in a non-jury trial by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge for the case. See Adi v. State, 94 S.W.3d 124,131 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. ref d) (discussing application of “hypothetically correct jury charge” analytical construct in context of factual-sufficiency review in case tried to jury). In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the elements of the offense on which the State carries the burden of proof, we impartially examine all of the evidence and set aside the verdict only if “proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the [fact-finder’s] determination, or the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is greatly outweighed by the contrary proof.” Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) (citing Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000)). We are also required to accord due deference to the fact-finder’s determinations on the weight and credibility of the evidence and may not merely substitute our own judgment for that of the fact-finder. Id.; Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 7; see Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 254 (questions concerning credibility of witnesses and weight given their testimony are resolved by the trier of fact).
Analysis
The indictment charges Rios with “failure to comply with registration requirements” and cites articles 62.01,2 62.03,3 and *75362.104 of the code of criminal procedure. See Tex.Code CRIM. PROC. Ann. arts. 62.01, 62.08, 62.10 (Vernon Supp.2004). Specifically, the indictment alleges that Rios:
on or about February 15, 2002, in Nueces County, Texas, was required to register because of a reportable conviction for Indecency with a Child, and did then and there intentionally, knowingly and recklessly fail to verify the information in the completed registration form by fading to report no later than the seventh day after his arrival in the municipality where he resided and intended to reside for more than seven days, to wit: Corpus Christi, to the local law enforcement authority, namely the Corpus Christi Police Department, who had received said registration form.
In brief, the indictment thus alleged: (1) Rios’s status as a person with a reportable conviction; (2) that he intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly failed to verify the information in his registration form; and (3) by failing to report to the Corpus Christi Police Department no later than seven days after his arrival in Corpus Christi.
The State alleged Rios failed to comply with the registration requirements because:
(1) on April 25, 2001, he registered with the Corpus Christi police department as a sex offender living at 2212 Mary Street in Corpus Christi;
(2) pursuant to a visit by Corpus Christi police officers on February 15, 2002, Rios’s mother signed a statement that he had not lived at 2212 Mary Street since “December 2001,” a period of approximately six to eight weeks;
(8) Rios returned to Corpus Christi sometime between February 15, 2002 and February 19, 2002 because his medical records show he was admitted to the hospital in Corpus Christi on February 19, 2002; and (4) when he returned to Corpus Christi, he failed to report “no later than the seventh day after his arrival” to the Corpus Christi police department.
In proving Rios failed to comply with registration requirements, the State was therefore limited to the allegation in the indictment: that he failed to report within seven days of his “arrival in” — or return to — Corpus Christi.
At trial, however, the State relied on Petri’s statement as evidence that Rios “was no longer living at 2212 Mary Street.” (emphasis added). The State argued:
[Prosecutor]: ... We do not have the burden of proving where the Defendant is. We have the burden of proving that he is not somewhere. And I believe in this case, again, that the evidence is clear that he was not there. ... And again, we do not have to prove where he was, where he might have been, but *754simply that he was not at 2212 Mary. (emphasis added)
The State presented no evidence regarding the date Rios allegedly returned to Corpus Christi and failed to register. In its brief, the State argues that “the trial court was also entitled to believe Rios’ own admissions in his medical records that he had moved back to Corpus Christi and was residing at 2212 Mary Street on February 19, 2002.” The only evidence supporting the State’s theory that Rios “returned” to Corpus Christi after living elsewhere is Rios’s medical records, which reflect he was admitted to the hospital on February 19, 2002 and gave his address as 2212 Mary Street. As noted, the custodian of the records testified that information regarding a patient’s address is provided by the patient at the time of admission and that she was unaware whether there were any procedures for verifying such information.
The State argues that “[hjaving arrived back in Corpus Christi sometime between February 15, 2002, and February 19, 2002, Rios was required to verify registration with the Corpus Christi Police Department.” We conclude that Rios’s February 19, 2002 hospital records showing his address as 2212 Mary Street are legally insufficient to establish that he “arrived” in Corpus Christi on that date.5
We hold that the State offered no evidence supporting its allegation that Rios “arrived in” or returned to Corpus Christi and failed to report within seven days to the Corpus Christi Police Department. Thus, the evidence is legally insufficient to support Rios’s conviction.
Because of our disposition of Rios’s first issue, it is unnecessary for us to address his second issue. See Tex.R.App. P. 47.1. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and render a judgment of acquittal.
Dissenting opinion by Justice ERRLINDA CASTILLO.

.We note that in her dissenting opinion, Justice Castillo argues that Malik’s unequivocal language that the Malik standard "can uniformly be applied to all trials, whether to the bench or to the jury,” see Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997), "should not be read in a vacuum.” Justice Castillo thus repeats verbatim the argument she articulated in her concurring opinion in Wheaton v. State, 129 S.W.3d 267, 274 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.) (J. Castillo, concurring).

. Article 62.01 contains definitions of terms applicable to the sex offender registration program outlined in chapter 62. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.01 (Vernon Supp. 2004).

. Article 62.03 provides, in pertinent part, that prior to being released from a penal institution, a person subject to the registration requirements must be informed that:
(A) not later than the seventh day after the date on which the person is released or the *753date on which the person moves from a previous residence to a new residence in this state, the person must:
(i) register or verify registration with the local law enforcement authority in the municipality or county in which the person intends to reside .... [and]
(B) not later than the seventh day before the date on which the person moves to a new residence in this state or another state, the person must report in person to the local law enforcement authority with whom the person last registered and to the juvenile probation officer, community supervision and corrections department officer, or parole officer supervising the person.
See TexCode Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.03(a)(1)(A), (B) (Vernon Supp.2004).

. Article 62.10(a) provides that "[a] person commits an offense if the person is required to register and fails to comply with any requirement of this chapter.” See TexCode Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.10(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004).

. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Castillo concludes that the evidence supports an inference that Rios "returned to and lived in Nueces County beginning no later than February 19, 2002.” The evidence cited in support of this inference is: (1) that "Rios claimed his mother's phone number as his and her home as his address on the hospital's patient registration form on February 19, 2002;” and (2) Rios’s hospital records contained information regarding his health care coverage showing a connection to Nueces County during the relevant time period. As noted above, we conclude Rios’s February 19 hospital records are legally insufficient to establish his arrival in Corpus Christi on that date. We also fail to see how Rios’s health care card showing coverage for the relevant time period supports an inference that he arrived in Corpus Christi between February 15, 2002 and February 19, 2002.