Court Opinion

ID: 9395776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-18 16:11:30.314412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:11.022706
License: Public Domain

J-A03036-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    THOMAS DEVIETRO                            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
    PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE AND              :
    CROZER CHESTER MEDICAL CENTER              :
    A/K/A CROZER-KEYSTONE HEALTH               :
    SYSTEM                                     :
                                               :
                       Appellees               :      No. 1653 EDA 2022

                  Appeal from the Order Entered May 25, 2022
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
                    Civil Division at No(s): CV-2021-007927

BEFORE:      KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                                    FILED MAY 18, 2023

        Appellant, Thomas DeVietro, appeals from the order entered in the

Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his petition to

expunge his involuntary commitment record and to restore his firearm rights.

We affirm in part and vacate and remand in part for further proceedings.

        The trial court set forth the relevant facts of this case as follows:

           [O]n June 8, 2018, [Appellant] presented to Springfield
           Hospital, where he reported stress and recurrent suicidal
           ideation with a plan of how he would commit suicide. As a
           result, he was subject to involuntary emergency treatment
           and was involuntarily committed under Section 302 of the
           Mental Health Procedures Act (“MPHA”). After a three-day
           involuntary commitment…, Crozer-Chester staff completed
           an Application for Extended Involuntary Treatment under
____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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         Section 303 of the MHPA; the 303 Application was
         subsequently withdrawn and [Appellant] was discharged on
         June 15, 2021. Following his involuntary commitment,
         [Appellant’s] firearm rights were revoked under the Uniform
         Firearms Act, as individuals who have been involuntarily
         committed for psychiatric treatment under Section 302 of
         the MHPA are barred from any form of firearm possession.

(Trial Court Opinion, dated 5/9/22, at 1-2).

      On September 20, 2021, Appellant filed a petition to expunge his

involuntary commitment record alleging a lack of sufficient evidence to

support the commitment.      Appellant further sought to restore his right to

possess firearms under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6015(f)(1). The court held a hearing

on January 25, 2022, at which Appellant testified. By order dated May 9, 2022

and filed May 25, 2022, the court denied Appellant’s petition. Appellant timely

filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2022. The court did not order, and Appellant

did not file, a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal per

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

      Appellant raises three issues for our review:

         Whether the Trial Court erred in assessing [Appellant’s]
         petition based on the “threats and acts” formulation for
         determining whether sufficient evidence supported
         [Appellant’s] involuntary commitment, when the evaluating
         physician    who     ordered   [Appellant’s]  involuntary
         commitment applied the “inability to satisfy basic needs”
         formulation?

         If the “threats and acts” formulation for determining
         whether sufficient evidence supported [Appellant’s]
         involuntary commitment was the correct formulation to
         apply, whether the Trial Court erred in finding that sufficient
         evidence supported the conclusion that [Appellant] had
         committed acts in furtherance of a threat to commit suicide;

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          specifically, whether the Trial Court erred by concluding that
          [Appellant] had committed an act in furtherance of a suicidal
          threat merely because he “owned multiple firearms” and
          “stated he had considered shooting himself”?

          Whether the Trial Court erred by failing to consider
          [Appellant’s] petition for restoration of firearm rights under
          18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(f)(1) based on [Appellant’s] present
          ability to possess a firearm without risk to himself or any
          other person, as opposed to his ability to possess a firearm
          without risk at the time of his involuntary commitment?

(Appellant’s Brief at 7-8).

       For purposes of disposition, we consider Appellant’s first and second

issues together. Therein, Appellant argues that the MHPA sets forth three

alternative formulations for determining whether a person poses a clear and

present danger of harm to himself.             Appellant claims that his commitment

paperwork indicates that Appellant met the “inability to satisfy basic needs”

formulation such that Appellant posed a clear and present danger of harm

upon his arrival at the facility.1 Nevertheless, Appellant insists that when the

trial court analyzed Appellant’s expungement petition, the court failed to

evaluate whether sufficient evidence existed for the conclusion that Appellant

met the “inability to satisfy basic needs” criteria. Instead, Appellant contends

the trial court improperly analyzed one of the other formulations under the

MHPA, namely, whether Appellant made threats to commit suicide and had

committed acts in furtherance of those threats (the “threats and acts”

____________________________________________

1Appellant makes this claim based on one portion of his paperwork where a
box next to the “inability to satisfy basic needs” section is checked off.

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formulation).    By evaluating Appellant’s expungement petition based on a

formulation for determining clear and present danger that was different from

the formulation applied by the evaluating physician who ordered Appellant’s

commitment, Appellant maintains the trial court failed to defer to the

physician’s conclusions when it considered Appellant’s expungement petition.

      Even if the court correctly assessed Appellant’s expungement petition

under the “threats and acts” formulation, Appellant argues the evidence was

insufficient for a commitment under that formulation. Appellant avers that

the trial court’s findings that Appellant’s actions prior to his commitment

constituted the development of a plan to commit suicide was manifestly

unreasonable and erroneous based on the evidence available to the evaluating

physician at the time of Appellant’s commitment.       Appellant contends that

owning firearms and knowing how to operate them does not equate to a

suicidal plan.    Appellant insists that his alleged statement that he had

“considered shooting himself” is mere suicidal ideation and does not constitute

an act in furtherance of such ideation. Appellant posits that “[w]hat the [t]rial

[c]ourt characterizes as ‘a plan’ to commit suicide is nothing more than an

abstract ideation.”   (Id. at 28).    Appellant emphasizes that there is no

evidence of any act that Appellant took in furtherance of a suicide threat,

which is expressly required to support an involuntary commitment based on

the “threats and acts” formulation. For these reasons, Appellant concludes

this Court must vacate the order denying his expungement petition, and

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remand with instructions for the trial court to evaluate Appellant’s petition

under the same formulation used by the evaluating physician; or reverse the

order denying Appellant’s expungement petition based on insufficient

evidence for the commitment. We disagree.

      The MHPA governs applications for involuntary commitment and

provides, in relevant part, as follows:

         § 7302. Involuntary emergency examination and
         treatment authorized by a physician—Not to exceed
         one hundred twenty hours

         (a)    Application       for    Examination.—Emergency
         examination may be undertaken at a treatment facility upon
         the certification of a physician stating the need for such
         examination; or upon a warrant issued by the county
         administrator authorizing such examination; or without a
         warrant upon application by a physician or other authorized
         person who has personally observed conduct showing the
         need for such examination.

             (1) Warrant for Emergency Examination.—Upon written
         application by a physician or other responsible party setting
         forth facts constituting reasonable grounds to believe a
         person is severely mentally disabled and in need of
         immediate treatment, the county administrator may issue a
         warrant requiring a person authorized by him, or any peace
         officer, to take such person to the facility specified in the
         warrant.

            (2) Emergency Examination Without a Warrant.—Upon
         personal observation of the conduct of a person constituting
         reasonable grounds to believe that he is severely mentally
         disabled and in need of immediate treatment, and physician
         or peace officer, or anyone authorized by the county
         administrator may take such person to an approved facility
         for an emergency examination. Upon arrival, he shall make
         a written statement setting forth the grounds for believing
         the person to be in need of such examination.

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          (b) Examination and Determination of Need for
          Emergency Treatment.—A person taken to a facility shall
          be examined by a physician within two hours of arrival in
          order to determine if the person is severely mentally
          disabled within the meaning of section 301(b)1 and in need
          of immediate treatment. If it is determined that the person
          is severely mentally disabled and in need of emergency
          treatment, treatment shall be begun immediately. If the
          physician does not so find, or if at any time it appears there
          is no longer a need for immediate treatment, the person
          shall be discharged and returned to such place as he may
          reasonably direct. The physician shall make a record of the
          examination and his findings. In no event shall a person be
          accepted for involuntary emergency treatment if a previous
          application was granted for such treatment and the new
          application is not based on behavior occurring after the
          earlier application.

              1   50 P.S. § 7301.

                                       *       *   *

50 P.S. § 7302(a), (b).2

          § 7301. Persons who may be subject to involuntary
          emergency examination and treatment

          (a) Persons Subject.—Whenever a person is severely
          mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment, he
          may be made subject to involuntary emergency
          examination and treatment. A person is severely mentally
          disabled when, as a result of mental illness, his capacity to
          exercise self-control, judgment and discretion in the conduct
          of his affairs and social relations or to care for his own
          personal needs is so lessened that he poses a clear and
          present danger of harm to others or to himself, as defined
          in subsection (b), or the person is determined to be in need
          of assisted outpatient treatment as defined in subsection
          (c).
____________________________________________

2 An involuntary commitment under Section 7302 is commonly known as a
“302 commitment.” See In re B.W., ___ Pa. ___, 250 A.3d 1163, 1166
(2021).

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       (b) Determination of Clear and Present Danger.—

           (1) Clear and present danger to others shall be shown by
       establishing that within the past 30 days the person has
       inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily harm on
       another and that there is a reasonable probability that such
       conduct will be repeated. If, however, the person has been
       found incompetent to be tried or has been acquitted by
       reason of lack of criminal responsibility on charges arising
       from conduct involving infliction of or attempt to inflict
       substantial bodily harm on another, such 30-day limitation
       shall not apply so long as an application for examination and
       treatment is filed within 30 days after the date of such
       determination or verdict. In such case, a clear and present
       danger to others may be shown by establishing that the
       conduct charged in the criminal proceeding did occur, and
       that there is a reasonable probability that such conduct will
       be repeated. For the purpose of this section, a clear and
       present danger of harm to others may be demonstrated by
       proof that the person has made threats of harm and has
       committed acts in furtherance of the threat to commit harm.

          (2) Clear and present danger to himself shall be shown
       by establishing that within the past 30 days:

          (i) the person has acted in such manner as to
       evidence that he would be unable, without care,
       supervision and the continued assistance of others, to
       satisfy his need for nourishment, personal or medical
       care, shelter, or self-protection and safety, and that
       there is a reasonable probability that death, serious
       bodily injury or serious physical debilitation would
       ensue within 30 days unless adequate treatment were
       afforded under this act; or

          (ii) the person has attempted suicide and that there is
       the reasonable probability of suicide unless adequate
       treatment is afforded under this act. For the purposes of
       this subsection, a clear and present danger may be
       demonstrated by the proof that the person has made
       threats to commit suicide and has committed acts
       which are in furtherance of the threat to commit
       suicide; or

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             (iii) the person has substantially mutilated himself or
         attempted to mutilate himself substantially and that there
         is the reasonable probability of mutilation unless adequate
         treatment is afforded under this act. For the purposes of
         this subsection, a clear and present danger shall be
         established by proof that the person has made threats to
         commit mutilation and has committed acts which are in
         furtherance of the threat to commit mutilation.

                                    *     *   *

50 P.S. § 7301(a), (b) (emphasis added).

      “[A] person who has developed a complete plan, or taken steps to

develop a plan, to commit suicide has committed acts which are in furtherance

of the threat to commit suicide.” In re B.W., supra at ___, 250 A.3d at 1175

(internal quotation marks omitted).      Further, the act of “engaging in the

planning process constitutes an act in furtherance of the threat to commit

suicide.” Id. An “act in furtherance” need not be overt or tangible. Id. at

___, 250 A.3d at 1176-77 (holding articulation of specific plan to harm

identified target that is deemed credible by medical professionals is sufficient

to prove act in furtherance of threat to commit harm; reversing Superior

Court’s holding that B.W.’s actions constituted mere threat without act in

furtherance).   See also Appeal of H.D., 698 A.2d 90, 94 n.4 (Pa.Super.

1997), appeal denied, 553 Pa. 691, 717 A.2d 1029 (1998) (holding H.D.’s plan

to jump off of bridge was sufficient to support 302 commitment; rejecting

characterization of such statement as mere suicidal “idea” that did not

establish suicidal intent; stating “we refuse to second-guess the conclusion of

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the emergency medical and mental health professionals that H.D. presented

a clear and present danger of harm to herself”).

     The Uniform Firearms Act prohibits a person who has been subject to a

302 commitment from possessing, using, controlling, selling, transferring,

manufacturing, or obtaining a license to possess firearms. See 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 6105(c)(4). The firearm restriction may be lifted if the 302 commitment

was based on insufficient evidence. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.1(g)(2) (stating

person who is involuntarily committed under Section 302 of MHPA may

petition court to review sufficiency of evidence upon which commitment was

based; if court determines evidence upon which involuntary commitment was

based was insufficient, court shall order that record of commitment be

expunged).

     “The evidence upon which the commitment was based is the information

contained in the physician’s record of the examination of the individual and

the resultant findings.” In re Vencil, 638 Pa. 1, 13, 152 A.3d 235, 242 (2017)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the trial court must “review

the physician’s findings, made at the time of the commitment, to determine

whether the evidence known by the physician at the time, as contained in the

contemporaneously-created     record,   supports   the   conclusion   that   the

individual required commitment under one (or more) of the specific,

statutorily-defined circumstances.”     Id.   Such review by the trial court

“requires deference to the physician, as the original factfinder, as the

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physician examined and evaluated the individual in the first instance, was able

to observe his or her demeanor, and has particularized training, knowledge

and experience regarding whether a 302 commitment is medically necessary.”

Id. at 20, 152 A.3d at 246.

       Initially, regarding Appellant’s first claim that the court applied the

incorrect formulation when evaluating Appellant’s petition for expungement,

we note that in Appellant’s petition for expungement, he alleged that the

evidence was insufficient to demonstrate Appellant was a clear and present

danger to himself under the “threats and acts” formulation. (See Petition for

Expungement, filed 9/20/21, at 8). Further, in his bench memo following the

hearing on Appellant’s petition for expungement, he stated “[b]ased on

Section 301(b)(2) of the MHPA, the Threats and Act formulation in Section

301(b)(2)(ii) … applies to the case at hand.” (Appellant’s Bench Memo, filed

2/17/22, at 5).      The bench memo goes on to analyze whether there was

sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Appellant was a clear and present

danger under the “threats and acts” formulation. (Id. at 5-8).

       Appellant acknowledged in his post-hearing bench memo that one of the

individuals who completed Appellant’s paperwork checked the box next to the

“inability to satisfy basic needs” formulation under Section 7301(b)(2)(i),3 but

____________________________________________

3 As Appellee, the Pennsylvania State Police (“PSP”) observes, there appears
to be different handwriting throughout the application for Appellant’s
involuntary commitment. Thus, it is not entirely clear if the evaluating
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Appellant went on to state, “[h]owever, the physician’s description of

[Appellant’s] specific behavior on page 4 of the Notification Form alleges

threats to commit suicide and does not mention an inability of [Appellant] to

meet his basic needs, implicating a Threats and Acts analysis.” 4 (Id. at 11-

12). In light of Appellant’s arguments before the trial court, we cannot agree

with his complaint on appeal that the court used the incorrect formulation to

evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence, where Appellant expressly conceded

the “threats and acts” formulation was the relevant test under which the court

should evaluate whether Appellant demonstrated a clear and present danger

to himself. Essentially, Appellant is now raising a new argument on appeal,

which he cannot do. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating issues not raised in trial

court are waived and cannot be raised for first time on appeal).

       Regarding whether the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate Appellant

posed a clear and present danger to himself under the “threats and acts”

formulation, the trial court reasoned:

          In this case, [Appellant] presented to Springfield Hospital on
          June 8, 2018. The certified records from the hospital state:

              “33 [male] US Army veteran presents to Springfield
____________________________________________

physician or the intake social worker checked this box on Appellant’s
paperwork. By contrast, the application makes clear the physician drafted the
sections describing Appellant’s behavior that led the physician to believe
Appellant posed a clear and present danger to himself.

4 Appellant then argued in his bench memo that the evidence was also
insufficient to demonstrate that he posed a clear and present danger to himself
under the “inability to satisfy basic needs” formulation.

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            [Emergency Department]; recurrent suicidal ideations
            & plan. Plan = [gunshot wounds] or ingesting poison.
            Recurrent suicidal ideations for years following
            discharge from Army & death of mother. Thoughts of
            harming himself on hourly basis.     Acutely worse
            today.”

            Pg. 5

            “Patient verbalizing depression, hopeless, helpless,
            suicidal, considered shooting self, owns several guns.

            Pg. 9

         These records show that [Appellant] presented with suicidal
         ideation and a plan to commit suicide. He admitted to
         owning several guns and to considering shooting himself.

         [Appellant] contends presently that his statements did not
         constitute a “plan” to commit suicide because he did not
         take any affirmative acts towards the development of a
         plan, such as researching how to commit suicide or making
         purchases with the intent to commit suicide. However, the
         information presented at the time of the involuntary
         commitment was enough for the treating physician to have
         believed that [Appellant] had developed a plan to commit
         suicide—he already owned multiple firearms, [from] which
         it could be reasonably inferred that he knew how to operate
         due to his military service, and he stated he had considered
         shooting himself. This plan would be considered an act
         committed in furtherance of a threat to commit suicide
         under the standard presented in In re B.W.

         Since the record supports the conclusion of the physician
         that [Appellant] was a clear and present danger to himself,
         it was reasonable for the physician to conclude that
         [Appellant] needed to be involuntarily committed at the
         time. As the decision made at the time of the commitment
         was supported by the evidence as contained in the
         contemporaneously-created record at the time of the
         involuntary commitment, … [Appellant] is not eligible for an
         expungement under 18 [Pa.C.S.A.] § 6111.1(g)(2) ….

(Trial Court Opinion at 4-5).

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          We agree with the trial court that the records from Appellant’s

involuntary commitment contain sufficient evidence to demonstrate that

Appellant was a clear and present danger to himself under the “threats and

acts” formulation.      See 50 P.S. § 7301(b)(2)(ii).     See also In re Vencil,

supra. Contrary to Appellant’s assertions, an overt or tangible act was not

required to support Appellant’s involuntary commitment. See In re B.W.,

supra; Appeal of H.D., supra. As the PSP observed in its brief: “The only

other step that remained was for Appellant to pick up a gun and kill himself

with it by pulling the trigger. There need not be any other showing of an act

in furtherance, because the only act left is the act of suicide.” (PSP’s Brief at

13-14).      Therefore, Appellant’s first and second issues on appeal merit no

relief.

          In his third issue, Appellant argues the court applied the incorrect legal

analysis when it evaluated Appellant’s request for restoration of his firearm

rights.     Appellant claims that restoration of firearm rights is based on the

petitioner’s current ability to safely possess firearms. Appellant insists the

trial court misapplied the applicable law because it focused solely on

Appellant’s ability to safely possess firearms at the time of his commitment.

Appellant concludes the trial court’s application of the wrong legal standard

for evaluating his petition to restore his firearm rights warrants reversal, and

this Court must grant relief. We agree relief is due.

          “Upon application to the court of common pleas under this subsection

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by an applicant subject to the prohibitions under subsection (c)(4) [related to

involuntary commitments under the MHPA], the court may grant such relief

as it deems appropriate if the court determines that the applicant may possess

a firearm without risk to the applicant or any other person.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §

6105(f)(1). Thus, “Section 6105(f)(1) plainly leaves the decision of whether

to restore the right to possess a firearm within the discretion of the trial court.”

In re E.H., 233 A.3d 820, 823 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___,

249 A.3d 497 (2021) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “An

abuse of discretion is not merely an error in judgment[;] it occurs when the

law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, as shown

by the evidence on record.” Id.

      Instantly, Appellant testified at the hearing about his personal growth,

support system, and mental stability. Appellant informed the trial court that

he was willing to undergo a risk assessment with a licensed psychologist if the

court requested him to do so.           (See N.T. Hearing, 1/25/22, at 46);

(Appellant’s Bench Memo at 14). Counsel for the PSP also noted at the hearing

that it would like to see a risk assessment of Appellant as it pertained to

restoration of Appellant’s firearm rights. (See N.T. Hearing at 49). Although

there was some conversation at the conclusion of the hearing about keeping

the record open for Appellant to undergo a risk assessment, the trial court did

not formally keep the record open for this purpose. Instead, the trial court

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acknowledged that it seemed like the PSP was “more or less agreeable to

providing [Appellant] relief [on the restoration of firearm rights,] contingent

on [Appellant] undergoing a risk assessment[.]” (N.T. Hearing at 52). Thus,

the court suggested the parties should file post-hearing briefs on the

expungement issue because “that component of relief is really in dispute[.]”

(Id.)

        Nevertheless, in its decision denying relief, the court stated Appellant

was not eligible for restoration of firearm rights under Section 6105(f)(1), but

the court did not explain why. (See Trial Court Opinion at 5). Of note, the

court did not cite to any of Appellant’s testimony at the hearing or mention

the fact that Appellant had not undergone a risk assessment as reasons for

the court’s denial of relief. On appeal, the PSP concedes the importance of a

risk assessment and expert testimony as it relates to the restoration of firearm

rights.   (See PSP’s Brief at 19-20).    Under these circumstances, the best

resolution of this issue is to remand for a new hearing at which time the trial

court can hear evidence regarding whether Appellant “may possess a firearm

without risk to [himself] or any other person.” See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(f)(1).

Upon remand, the trial court shall direct Appellant to undergo a risk

assessment or other appropriate evaluation the court deems necessary to aid

its decision. Accordingly, we affirm the portion of the court’s order denying

Appellant’s expungement petition; vacate the portion of the court’s order

denying his request for restoration of firearm rights; and remand for further

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proceedings consistent with this memorandum.

      Order affirmed in part, vacated in part.   Case remanded for further

proceedings. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/18/2023

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