Court Opinion

ID: 9738750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:02:01.047674+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:08.263145
License: Public Domain

T. M. Burns, J.
(dissenting). Defendant Schieda appeals of right his July 31, 1978, jury conviction of obtaining money over $100 by false pretenses. MCL 750.218; MSA 28.415. On August 18, 1978, he was sentenced to a term of one year probation and ordered to pay $500 in court costs. I would reverse defendant’s conviction.
The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether the lower court judge erred when she denied defendant’s motion for a directed verdict at the close of the people’s proofs. Defendant argues in this Court, as he did below, that the prosecutor failed to produce at trial sufficient evidence to show that the City of Westland relied upon his false pretenses.
It appears from the record that defendant was hired by the City of Westland to install sewer pipes at 13 locations in the city. Defendant billed and was paid for completing the 13 sewer leads but, in fact, he had done only 9 of them. Although the city agent who actually paid defendant seems not to have known that he had completed only 9 of the 13 sewer leads, an engineering firm employed by the city to inspect the sewer construction and insure that all work was done, had evidence in its files on the date that defendant was paid which showed that all of the work had not been done. Thus, defendant argues that the city could not have justifiably relied upon his statement that all work was completed when it paid him. I agree.
When ruling on a motion for a directed verdict *425of acquittal, a trial judge must consider whether all of the evidence presented by the prosecutor, if viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecutor, would be sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find that all essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Hampton, 407 Mich 354; 285 NW2d 284 (1979). To sustain a conviction for obtaining money by false pretenses the prosecutor must show that the person sought to be deceived relied upon the false pretenses to his detriment. People v Larco, 331 Mich 420, 429; 49 NW2d 358 (1951), People v Wilde, 42 Mich App 514; 202 NW2d 542 (1972).
The pertinent question before us is whether the City of Westland should be deemed to have possessed all knowledge within the ken of its officers, employees and agents. If so, then the evidence is insufficient to support the crime of obtaining money by false pretenses because an agent of the city, the engineering firm that it employed to oversee the construction work, was aware that defendant had not completed all work as he claimed.
As a general rule, the knowledge possessed by a corporation about a particular matter is the sum total of all of the knowledge that its officers and agents acquire while acting under and within the scope of their authority. People v Wilde, supra. In Dundas v City of Lansing, 75 Mich 499, 504; 42 NW 1011; 13 Am St Rep 457 (1889), the Supreme Court held:
"The individual knowledge of officers or agents of a municipal corporation, who in such capacity have powers or duties conferred upon them with reference to a given matter, is the knowledge of the corporation, and notice to such officers or agents is notice to the corpora*426tion, and the corporation is bound or affected by such knowledge or notice.”
See also, Thornton v City of Flint, 39 Mich App 260, 270; 197 NW2d 485 (1972).
The crucial question, of course, is not whether certain individuals employed by the City of West-land relied on the representations of defendant, but whether the City of Westland, through its agents, could have so justifiably relied thereon. Thus, as the complainant in this case is the City of Westland, it is irrelevant that any particular agent of the city was deceived by defendant if the city, through other duly authorized agents, was not so deceived. To the extent that the majority opinion focuses on the knowledge of only certain city employees, and not the composite knowledge acquired by all city employees while acting within the scope of their employment, I believe that the majority opinion is wrongly decided.
In this case, the City of Westland must be charged with the knowledge possessed by the engineering firm that it hired to oversee the construction work. That knowledge concerned facts pertaining to the instant matter over which the engineering firm had been delegated responsibility. I would hold that the city could not have justifiably relied on defendant’s false pretense when it tendered to him payment for work that he had not completed. Lacking proof of such reliance, the crime of false pretenses has not been established by the prosecutor. Therefore, the trial judge erred when she denied defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.
I would reverse defendant’s conviction.