Court Opinion

ID: 9942942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 15:06:09.385074+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:24.225286
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-1141

                                       N.S.

                                       vs.

                                       A.S.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       The defendant, A.S., appeals from a District Court judge's

 entry in January 2022 of a permanent abuse prevention order

 under G. L. c. 209A at the request of A.S.'s former wife, N.S.

 A.S. argues that the court lacked jurisdiction, that the order

 deprived him without due process of his liberty interest in his

 relationship with the parties' child, and that N.S. failed to

 show a need for a permanent order.           Reviewing "for an abuse of

 discretion or other error of law," E.C.O. v. Compton, 464 Mass.

 558, 562 (2013), we affirm the permanent order.

       Background.     In A.S.'s prior appeal, a panel of this court

 (1) dismissed as moot A.S.'s challenge to the ex parte c. 209A

 order that issued on July 3, 2020; (2) affirmed the subsequent

 order of July 7, 2020 (July 7 order) extending the ex parte

 order for six months after an evidentiary hearing; (3) affirmed
orders entered in August 2020 denying A.S.'s motion to terminate

the c. 209A order and motion to reconsider that denial; and (4)

affirmed an order entered in October 2020 denying A.S.'s motion

to vacate.   N.S. v. A.S., 100 Mass. App. Ct. 1128 (2022).

     The July 7 order affirmed in the prior appeal was based on

N.S.'s testimony about events occurring a few days earlier, on

July 3, 2020.   She testified that during an argument in the

presence of the parties' then three year old child, A.S. bumped

N.S.'s head with his head, grabbed the cell phone on which she

had just recorded part of their interaction, and smashed it with

a meat tenderizer.   N.S. further testified that A.S. had grabbed

her arm during an argument a year earlier and given her bruises,

had her grabbed her forearm again during an argument a few

months earlier, and recently spat in her face when she told him

she had hired an attorney in connection with the divorce action

he commenced against her.   N.S. testified that she was in fear

both of harm to herself and of "harm and trauma" to the child

from having been exposed to A.S.'s conduct.   On this basis, a

judge1 issued a c. 209A order that included "no contact" and

"stay away" provisions and awarded custody of the child to N.S.2

1 The judge who issued the July 7 order was not the same judge
who issued the permanent order in January 2022.
2 A temporary custody order was also entered in the divorce

action. A.S.'s appeal from the subsequent judgment of divorce
nisi is the subject of a separate decision issued today, A.S. v.

                                 2
A.S. was also charged with domestic assault and battery and

other offenses as a result of the incident.3

     In January 2021, while the appeal from the July 7 order was

pending in this court, a different District Court judge extended

the c. 209A order for an additional year after a hearing

attended by both parties and their counsel.4   In November 2021,

in the divorce action, a Probate and Family Court judge entered

a judgment of divorce nisi that awarded N.S. physical and legal

custody of the child but allowed A.S. to have supervised

parenting time, as well as limited electronic contact with N.S.

about matters concerning the child.   That judge then modified

the c. 209A order to include the same provisions, as authorized

by G. L. c. 209A, § 3.   In January 2022, after an in-person

hearing attended by N.S., her counsel, and A.S. (representing

N.S., Mass. App. Ct., No. 22-P-434, and we take judicial notice
of the record in that appeal. See Jarosz v. Palmer, 436 Mass.
526, 530 (2002) (court may take judicial notice of records in
related case).
3 We take judicial notice that A.S. was convicted of malicious

destruction of property and that his appeal from that conviction
is pending in this court.
4 The judge who issued the January 2021 order was also not the

judge who issued the permanent order in January 2022. The
January 2021 order is not before us. Although A.S. has included
in his record appendix what appears to be a notice of appeal
from that order, dated January 15, 2021, no such notice was ever
docketed. We nevertheless address A.S.'s arguments regarding
the January 2021 order to the extent that the issuance of that
order is relevant to the current appeal.

                                3
himself), another District Court judge made the c. 209A order

permanent.   A.S. now appeals.

     Discussion.5   1.   Jurisdiction.    A.S. asserts that, for

three separate reasons, the District Court lacked jurisdiction

to issue any c. 209A order against him.       We are unpersuaded.

     First, A.S. argues that, after the initial ex parte order

was issued by an on-call judge from another District Court,

acting under G. L. c. 209A, § 5, the clerk-magistrate of the

court to which the on-call judge was assigned failed to certify

the order to the court having venue and jurisdiction over the

matter -- here, the District Court in the parties' town.         A.S.

claims that such certification was necessary under G. L.

c. 209A, § 5, in order to confer jurisdiction and commence

proceedings under c. 209A, and thus that this action was never

properly commenced.

     A.S. cites no authority, however, for his claim that such a

certification is "jurisdictional."       Nor is it the only way of

commencing a c. 209A action.     Such an action may also be

commenced by filing a complaint.       See G. L. c. 209A, § 3.

Although A.S. claims that N.S. never filed a complaint, the

5 We decline to address numerous issues raised in the "Statement
of Facts" section of A.S.'s brief that either were resolved by
or could have been raised in the prior appeal. Apart from the
assertedly jurisdictional issues related to the commencement of
this action, we address only those issues that arose after the
orders affirmed in the prior appeal.

                                   4
docket here reflects that a complaint was filed on July 6, 2020.6

A.S. has included a partial, unsigned copy of the complaint in

his record appendix,7 as well as a c. 209A affidavit signed by

N.S. on July 3, 2020, which was witnessed by a police officer

and recounted the same events N.S. testified to at the July 7

hearing.   Even if the complaint that was filed was unsigned, it

was not a nullity.   Rather, our rules provide merely that an

unsigned pleading "may be stricken" (emphasis added).   Mass. R.

Civ. P. 11 (a) (1), as appearing in 488 Mass. 1403 (2021).      This

stands in sharp contrast to the Federal rule, which states that

"[t]he court must strike an unsigned paper unless the omission

is promptly corrected after being called to the attorney's or

party's attention" (emphasis added).   Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a).    We

6 If A.S. wished to controvert the docket entry showing that a
complaint was filed, the burden was on A.S. to seek correction
of the record under Mass. R. A. P. 8 (e) (2), as appearing in
481 Mass. 1611 (2019). He did not do so, and we treat the
docket entries transmitted to us as accurate. See Mass. R. A.
P. 9 (a) (1), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1615 (2019) ("Upon the
filing of a notice of appeal, the clerk of the lower court shall
promptly review the file and ensure the accuracy of the docket
entries"). See also Adoption of Ursa, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 558,
565 (2023) (uncontroverted docket entries conclusive).
7 Whether this is an accurate copy of the original in the

District Court clerk's possession cannot be determined based on
the contents of the record appendix filed by A.S. And it is "a
fundamental and long-standing rule of appellate civil practice"
that the appellant has an obligation "to include in the appendix
those parts of the [record that] are essential for review of the
issues raised on appeal." Shawmut Community Bank, N.A. v.
Zagami, 30 Mass. App. Ct. 371, 372-373 (1991), S.C., 411 Mass.
807 (1992).

                                 5
conclude that this action was properly commenced by the filing

of the complaint.8   We therefore need not reach A.S.'s various

other arguments premised on his claim that no valid complaint

was filed.

     A.S.'s second basis for claiming that the court lacked

jurisdiction is that N.S. did not file the affidavit that A.S.

asserts is required in child custody proceedings by G. L.

c. 209B, § 3 (a).    "Chapter 209B provides guidelines to

determine when a Massachusetts court may exercise jurisdiction

over an initial child custody proceeding."    Custody of Brandon,

407 Mass. 1, 5 (1990).   It has no application to "[a] G. L.

c. 209A order entered in a court other than the Probate and

Family Court," because such orders "may not decide custody."

Smith v. Joyce, 421 Mass. 520, 523 (1995).    Even if we assume

for purposes of argument (1) that the affidavit requirement

applies to c. 209A proceedings in which child custody may be at

issue and (2) that the affidavit and complaint here, taken

together, did not substantially provide the information required

by G. L. c. 209B, § 3 (a), A.S. nevertheless cites no authority

for his claim that the filing of such an affidavit is

8 We further note that A.S. has not identified any prejudice to
him from any defect in the filing of the complaint. The
transcript leaves no doubt that, at least as of July 7, 2020, he
was fully aware of the terms of the order and of N.S.'s
statements that led to its issuance.

                                 6
jurisdictional.   The jurisdictional requirements of c. 209B

appear in a different section, G. L. c. 209B, § 2, which

primarily concerns resolution of questions regarding which

State's courts may make child custody determinations.    The

section requiring the affidavit provides only that "[t]he court

may impose sanctions against any party who fails to act in

conformity with this section without leave of court granted for

good cause shown" (emphasis added).    G. L. c. 209B, § 3 (f).    We

conclude that any claimed defect in the affidavit filed by N.S.

did not deprive the District Court of jurisdiction.

     A.S.'s third argument is that the District Court lacked

jurisdiction to extend the c. 209A order during the time the

prior appeal was pending in this court.    That is not the law.

Although a judge generally "lack[s] the authority to amend the

judgment after the appeal had been entered in this court and we

obtained jurisdiction," Kelso v. Kelso, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 226,

229 n.7 (2014), "this rule does not apply in the sui generis

context of c. 209A abuse prevention orders," Quinn v. Gjoni, 89

Mass. App. Ct. 408, 411 (2016).9

9 Although a judge suggested in an October 2020 ruling that he
could not address a particular motion because the case was on
appeal, he appears to have been mistaken. In any event, the
judge also denied the motion in question, and it is that ruling
that was affirmed by the prior panel.

                                   7
     2.   Due process.    A.S. next asserts that he was deprived

without due process of his liberty interest in his relationship

with his child.   Again, we are unpersuaded.10   We address A.S.'s

procedural claims in order, deferring until later our discussion

of the evidence supporting the order.11

     First, A.S. complains that in January 2021, during the

COVID-19 pandemic, he was not afforded an in-person hearing, but

only a Zoom hearing, on whether the c. 209A order should be

extended by one year.12    This was not a per se due process

10 Because it could have been raised in the prior appeal, we
decline to address A.S.'s claim that he was barred from speaking
in his own defense at a July 6, 2020 hearing on the c. 209A
order. Notably, however, that hearing was merely continued
until the next day so that A.S.'s newly-retained counsel could
participate. The next day, with counsel present by telephone,
A.S. testified. A.S. also complains that on July 6, 2020,
without proper notice, he was arraigned on criminal charges
arising out of the incident with N.S. and then was improperly
subjected to conditions of release that mirrored the c. 209A
order. Those issues could have been raised in the criminal
case, the appeal from which is pending. They are not before us
here.
11 Pursuant to G. L. c. 209A, § 3, the custody-related provisions

of the c. 209A order are controlled by the divorce judgment
issued by the Probate and Family Court, which is the subject of
A.S.'s other appeal decided today. See note 2, supra. Thus,
since November 2021, the c. 209A order has provided among other
things that, although N.S. has custody, A.S. has the right to
biweekly supervised visitation with the child. Insofar as the
c. 209A order merely conforms to the divorce judgment, A.S.'s
challenge to those portions of the order is effectively governed
by the affirmance of that judgment.
12 A.S. also complains that hearings in July, August, and October

2020 were held remotely rather than in person. The orders
issued as a result of those hearings were affirmed in the prior
appeal; further nonjurisdictional challenges to those orders are

                                  8
violation, see Adoption of Patty, 489 Mass. 630, 642 (2022), nor

has A.S. shown that the hearing as conducted violated due

process.   The hearing transcript contains no objection on his

part to a Zoom hearing.   The transcript further reflects that

A.S. was represented by counsel, who was offered and declined an

opportunity to cross-examine N.S. on her reasons for seeking an

extension of the c. 209A order, as set forth both in her

affidavit dated December 28, 2020,13 and as proffered by her

counsel at the hearing.   A.S.'s counsel was also offered an

opportunity to call A.S. as a witness, but counsel declined and

instead chose to give a detailed proffer of A.S.'s testimony.

     Second, A.S. claims that counsel for N.S. misrepresented

material facts at various hearings.   We have carefully examined

those portions of the record cited by A.S. and conclude that, to

the extent any objections to such representations were preserved

not now before us. A.S. further asserts that various docket
entries erroneously indicate that hearings occurred in person
when they were actually held remotely, and that the judge who
entered the permanent c. 209A order erroneously relied on such a
docket entry to conclude that A.S. had "had [his] day in court
multiple times." We have reviewed the docket entries and see
nothing in them that could have misled the judge as to the
nature of the prior hearings, nor do we read the transcript of
his comments to reflect any misunderstanding on his part.
13 The affidavit is repeatedly mentioned in the hearing

transcript, which makes clear that the judge presiding at the
January 2021 hearing and both parties had copies of the
affidavit, but A.S. has not included it in his record appendix
here. We have taken judicial notice of the affidavit as
appearing in the record appendix filed by A.S. in the prior
appeal.

                                 9
for appeal, A.S. has not shown that any of them have merit.

A.S. also claims that at the January 2022 hearing resulting in

the permanent order, counsel for N.S. was improperly permitted

to "testify" without having been sworn as a witness.       It was,

however, within the judge's discretion to entertain

representations of counsel, as an officer of the court, just as

a judge at the January 2021 hearing did for A.S.'s own counsel.

Cf. Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. 592, 597-598 (1995) (rules of

evidence need not be followed during c. 209A proceedings); Mass.

G. Evid. § 1106 (2023) (similar).    After reviewing the

transcript of the January 2022 hearing, we are confident that

the judge was able to give those representations appropriate

weight.   The transcript also makes clear that the judge afforded

A.S. a fair opportunity to respond, which A.S. squandered by

repeatedly digressing into procedural matters irrelevant to

whether there was a need to extend the order.

    Third, A.S. claims that the judge denied him the right to

cross-examine witnesses at the January 2022 hearing.       We reject

this claim.   A.S. alluded to cross-examination only once, and he

never directly asked to cross-examine N.S.

    Fourth, A.S. claims that the judge who entered the

permanent order failed to remain neutral and presumed A.S. to be

guilty of assault.   To the extent that claim is properly before

                                10
us, we reject it based on our review of the transcript.14

Notably, A.S. never requested that the judge recuse himself, let

alone made such a request in a timely fashion.   See Demoulas v.

Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 428 Mass. 543, 547-549 (1998), S.C.,

432 Mass. 43 (2000); Adoption of Norbert, 83 Mass. App. Ct. 542,

545 (2013).   Cf. Matter of Moore, 449 Mass. 1009, 1010 n.1

(2007) (summarily rejecting recusal claim raised for first time

on appeal); Commonwealth v. Armand, 411 Mass. 167, 175–176

(1991) (same).

     Fifth and finally, although A.S. does not clearly frame the

argument in due process terms, he suggests without citation to

supporting authority that no c. 209A order should have entered

so long as the conditions of his pretrial release in the

criminal case required him to have no contact with N.S. or the

child.   The court has held, however, that "conditions of

pretrial release, even if they encompass the same conditions as

an abuse prevention order, are no substitute for an abuse

prevention order."   Vera V. v. Seymour S., 98 Mass. App. Ct.

315, 319 (2020).

14For example, A.S. claims that the judge showed he had
prejudged the matter when he told A.S. that, the issue of
custody by that time having been resolved in the divorce case,
the subject of the extension hearing was "abuse prevention . . .
whether or not in fact your former wife is in danger or is in
fear of imminent serious physical harm from you." This
statement was clearly intended simply to refocus A.S. onto the
subject of the hearing.

                                11
     3.   Basis for permanent order.   A.S. asserts that the

evidence failed to support the issuance of the permanent order.

We disagree.   To begin with, the evidence included N.S.'s

original affidavit and testimony from July 2020, recounted

above, in which she stated that A.S. had physically assaulted

her in front of the child and that she was concerned about harm

and trauma to the child.

     It also included N.S.'s subsequent affidavit in support of

the January 2021 extension, in which N.S. stated that A.S.

"continue[d] to be very afraid that [A.S.] could cause [her]

physical harm."   She described his controlling and harassing

behavior, which included attempts to have a criminal complaint

issued against her and to have her and the child evicted from

their home.    She stated that A.S. "seeme[ed] to be growing more

aggressive" and that she was "extremely fearful that if the

[o]rder is not extended, he may immediately come to [her] home,

frighten [her] and [her] child, and cause harm to [her]."      She

therefore asked that the order be extended for two years.

A.S.'s counsel did not oppose extending the order as it

pertained to N.S.    The judge who presided over that hearing

extended it for one year.15

15In light of N.S.'s affidavit, and of A.S.'s counsel's decision
not to cross-examine N.S., we reject A.S.'s attack on the
January 2021 extension order as having been issued based not on

                                 12
     The evidence also included N.S.'s testimony from the

January 2022 hearing at which the order was made permanent.    In

response to questions from the judge,16 N.S. stated that, based

on A.S.'s past conduct, she remained afraid that he would cause

her "imminent serious physical harm," and that she was the

complaining witness in an ongoing criminal case against A.S.17

Through counsel she asked that the order be made permanent.

     The judge not only expressly credited N.S.'s testimony

about her fear, but also stated, "I believe that she is in fact

in danger of imminent serious physical harm."   Further, the

judge was entitled to find that N.S.'s fear was reasonable,

based on A.S.'s erratic and disrespectful demeanor at the

hearing.   "[T]he parties' demeanor in court" has repeatedly been

evidence but merely on a presumption that it was still needed.
We also reject A.S.'s argument that the order insofar as it
pertained to the child lacked the requisite "independent
support." Smith, 421 Mass. at 523. N.S.'s testimony regarding
her fear of trauma to the child provided such support. The
order to stay away from the child was not, as A.S. claims,
issued "simply because it seem[ed] to be a good idea." Id. at
523 n.1.
16 Particularly in the charged atmosphere of the hearing, and

contrary to A.S.'s suggestion, the judge did not abuse his
discretion in asking N.S. this series of short, focused
questions to obtain critical information from her.
17 In light of this testimony, we reject A.S.'s claim that the

only judge to have heard testimony from N.S. was the judge who
presided at the July 7, 2020 hearing. To the extent that A.S.
complains that that same judge did not preside over subsequent
hearings, which instead were conducted by different judges of
the District Court, A.S. cites no authority suggesting that the
common practice of judicial rotation violated any provision of
law.

                                13
held to be a relevant factor that a judge should consider in

deciding whether to extend a c. 209A order.    Iamele v. Asselin,

444 Mass. 734, 740 (2005).   See S.V. v. R.V., 94 Mass. App. Ct.

811, 813 (2019); Vittone v. Clairmont, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 479,

487 (2005); Pike v. Maguire, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 929, 929 (1999).

In Pike, supra at 930, in affirming a permanent extension of a

c. 209A order, the court stated that "[c]onfirmation of the

reasonableness of the plaintiff's apprehension of the defendant

could be drawn from . . . the defendant's emotionally charged

statements at the [extension] hearing, . . . statements which

could well have indicated to the judge a basis for concluding

that the defendant's anger against the plaintiff might reignite"

(quotation and citations omitted).   The same is true here; the

judge repeatedly commented that A.S.'s unstable and erratic

behavior over the course of the case and at the hearing caused

the judge to find that N.S. was both reasonably in fear and in

actual danger.   The judge stated, "I am very concerned for your

former wife and for her safety, I truly am."

    We reject A.S.'s claim that the judge shifted the burden to

him to prove that a permanent order was not necessary.    The

judge's statement to A.S. that he wanted "to discuss why [the

c. 209A order] should not be extended either for a year or . . .

forever" was plainly intended merely to direct A.S.'s attention

                                14
away from the irrelevant matters A.S. was addressing and back

onto the subject of the hearing.

    We acknowledge that A.S. vigorously contested N.S.'s

version of events, challenged the existence and reasonableness

of her fear, and offered his own evidence in support of his

position.   But the judge was free to disbelieve A.S.   "We accord

the credibility determinations of the judge who 'heard the

testimony of the parties . . . [and] observed their demeanor'

. . . the utmost deference."   Ginsberg v. Blacker, 67 Mass. App.

Ct. 139, 140 n.3 (2006), quoting Pike, 47 Mass. App. Ct. at 929.

See Prenaveau v. Prenaveau, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 479, 496 (2012),

quoting Johnston v. Johnston, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 531, 536 (1995)

("In a bench trial credibility is 'quintessentially the domain

of the trial judge [so that his] assessment is close to immune

from reversal on appeal except on the most compelling of

showings'").

                                15
       Conclusion.   The permanent c. 209A order entered on January

18, 2022, is affirmed.

                                       So ordered.

                                       By the Court (Meade,
                                         Massing & Sacks, JJ.18),

                                       Assistant Clerk

Entered: February 22, 2024.

18   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                  16