Court Opinion

ID: 9716328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:34:27.710682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:43.971789
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Hoffman, J.—
I dissent from the majority opinion.
Appellant, in his brief, after setting out verbatim the motion to correct errors, states the following:
“The issues therefore presented, are as follows:
1. Whether a proper foundation was laid prior to the use of a tape recording;
2. Whether the tape recording was proper rebuttal evidence ;
3. Whether the statement contained in the tape recording was coerced.”
The above points are all that were argued or briefed by appellant and are the sole issues which may be considered on appeal.
During the State’s case-in-chief the tape recording was offered into evidence. Defendant’s counsel voiced a comprehensive objection to the introduction thereof which was sustained by the trial court. Under cross-examination the defendant denied making certain statements which were on the tape recording. Upon rebuttal, the State offered a portion of the tape recording into evidence for the purpose of impeachment. Over objections of defendant’s counsel the trial court permitted the jury to hear a portion of the tape recording.
Appellant contends that a proper foundation was not laid prior to the introduction of the tape into evidence, that the statements made on the tape were coerced, and that it was not proper rebuttal evidence.
*680In Lamar v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 504, at 512-513, 282 N.E.2d 795, at 800, our Supreme Court in defining the foundation requirements for sound recordings, stated:
“The admission of a sound recording should be preceded by a foundation disclosing the following:
(1) That it is authentic and correct.
(2) That the testimony elicited was freely and voluntarily made, without any kind of duress;
(3) That all required warnings were given and all necessary acknowledgments and waivers were knowingly and intelligently given;
(4) That it does not contain matter otherwise not admissible into evidence; and
(5) That it is of such clarity as to be intelligible and enlightening to the jury.”
Sound recordings were previously held admissible in Sutton, et al. v. State (1957), 237 Ind. 305, 145 N.E.2d 425, upon a showing of authenticity and identification of the speakers.
1) Was the tape authentic and correct?
The manner of the recording’s preservation must be shown to assure that no changes, additions or deletions have been made. Speakers must be identified. Lamar v. State, supra.
In the present case, the County Prosecutor testified, under direct examination, as follows:
“My name is Dave Dellinger. I am the County Prosecutor for the 38th Judicial Circuit. On the night in question, June 30th of 1971, this tape recording was taken in my office in the presence of Sgt. Edgar Likens of the Indiana State Police, Robert Christopher, Deputy Prosecutor in my office, the defendant in this case Mr. Doyne Larimer, and myself. Since that date it has been in the possession of my office in my physical possession locked up. It has not been altered or changed in any way. * *
Detective Edgar Likens testified that he had listened to the tape in its entirety, reviewed his notes made therefrom, listened to the pertinent portion more than once, and ascertained that the tape was unaltered. The tape was, therefore, sufficiently authenticated.
2) Was the statement freely and voluntarily given?
*681Detective Sergeant Robert E. Fox testified that when he served the warrant on defendant he read him the following:
“Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights.
“You have the right to remain silent.
“Anything you say can be used against you in Court. “You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions and to have him with you during questioning.
“If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning if you wish.
“If you decide to answer now without a lawyer present, you will still have the right to stop answering at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time until you talk to a lawyer.”
Detective Likens testified that prior to talking to the defendant he advised the defendant of his rights and asked him if he had any objections to tape recording the conversation.
The portion of the tape recording admitted into evidence discloses the following:
“MR. DELLINGER: If you have any questions, we’ll be glad to answer what you have. You haven’t had any problems with any of [us] here tonight?
“THE DEFENDANT: No.
“MR. DELLINGER: Nobody mistreated you in any way?
“THE DEFENDANT: No, I think the people treated me pretty nice.”
Johnson v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 283, at 293, 235 N.E.2d 688, at 694, announced the proper standards for determining if a confession is voluntary:
“In determining whether the due process clause of the 14th Amendment is violated, the admissibility of the confession is tested by the same standard in both Federal and State prosecutions, that is whether under all the attendant circumstances, the confession was free and voluntary, freely self-determined, the product of a rational intellect and a free will, and without compulsion or inducement of any sort, or whether the accused’s will was overborne at the time he confessed.”
*682It appears that the statement on the tape in the present case was freely and voluntarily given.
3) Were all required warnings given and all necessary acknowledgments and waivers knowingly and intelligently given?
In discussing this requirement, our Supreme Court, in Layton v. State (1973), 261 Ind. 251, at 252, 301 N.E.2d 633, at 634-635, stated:
“Appellant’s second specification of error revolves around the admission into evidence of a pre-trial confession. Appellant suggests that since a written transcript of the confession and the tape-recording itself were not totally consistent, both having been presented to the jury, it is necessary that the customary waiver of Miranda rights be on the tape-recording as well as in written form as it is in the instant situation. The authority for this proposition is purportedly Lamar v. State (1972), [258] Ind. [504], 282 N.E.2d 795. However, that case simply set forth as one of five criteria for establishing a foundation for the admission of a sound-recording ‘that all required warnings were given and all necessary acknowledgments and waivers were knowingly and intelligently given.’ The precise medium through which a waiver is obtained is not delimited by this rule. Appellant does not, at this portion of his argument, maintain that the waiver was in fact involuntary. We do not see in what ways defendant’s rights will be better protected by requiring that a waiver be preserved in the same medium as the confession.” Compare: Schmidt v. State (1970), 255 Ind. 443, 265 N.E.2d 219.
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that since the tape recording was being offered into evidence for impeachment purposes only, a knowing and intelligent waiver may not be necessary. Oregon v. Hass 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570; Harris v. New York (1971), 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.E.2d 1; Johnson v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 683, 284 N.E.2d 517; Sankey v. State (1973), 157 Ind. App. 627, 301 N.E.2d 235.
4) Was all inadmissible matter deleted from the tape?
If a tape recording is to be offered as evidence, the trial judge should be furnished with a typewritten transcript of *683such recording and should also listen to the recording to determine how to best insulate the jury from any inadmissible portions. Lamar v. State, supra.
While no evidence of a written transcript is contained in the record, it appears that the trial judge in the present case did listen to the pertinent portion of the tape. However, when the tape recording was played to the jury, the following portion was included:
“MR. LIKENS: You say you did tell Maxine about wearing the clothes?
“THE DEFENDANT: What?
“MR. LIKENS: You say you did tell Maxine about wearing the [women’s] clothes ?
“THE DEFENDANT: Why I wore them?
“MR. LIKENS: Yes.
“THE DEFENDANT: Yea, I told her that. She seen me.
“MR. LIKENS: Well, she saw him wearing them and he thought they ought to have a right to know why he was wearing them.
“THE DEFENDANT: Yea, I told them that.
“MR. LIKENS: When was that? A month ago or sometime ago or what?
“THE DEFENDANT: Probably about a month ago.
“MR. LIKENS: Sometime recently?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yea.
“MR. LIKENS: You told them it was, because of what happened to you down at Muscatatuch? [sic]
“THE DEFENDANT: Yea, that’s what I told ’em. I told them I never felt like I was a man. I shouldn’t never been a dam [sic] man. Yep, that’s what I told them.
“MR. DELLINGER: That’s just what you’ve told us tonight.
“THE DEFENDANT: Yea.
“MR. DELLINGER: And I really think that is honest to God the truth.
“THE DEFENDANT: It certainly is the truth. If you want the dam [sic] nigger’s name *684that done it, I can even give you that and can even tell you where he’s at today.”
The trial judge quickly admonished the jury to disregard the foregoing testimony. An admonition to disregard improper testimony is presumed to correct any alleged error. Martin v. State (1974), 261 Ind. 492, 306 N.E.2d 93.
A proper foundation was laid by the State for admission of the tape recording especially when offered only for impeachment. The record clearly demonstrates that such statements were not coerced. The statements were admissible for impeachment purposes after the defendant testified.
The record before us clearly demonstrates that as a matter of law the trial court could not find that statements made by the defendant were involuntarily made. All of the facts were presented to the jury who made their determination. The record clearly demonstrates guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The judgment of conviction of the trial court should be affirmed.