Court Opinion

ID: 9541231
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:23:45.301729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:56.314806
License: Public Domain

DIETZEN, Justice
(concurring).
Although I concur in the court’s decision that the 2002 and 2004 orders regarding Basic Resolution 876 are void because the district court lacked in rem jurisdiction over the revenue bonds, I write separately to voice my concern about the unevenness of our cases on subject matter jurisdiction. Appellants argue that the district court’s lack of authority over the revenue bonds implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Our cases have not always been clear as to the classification of matters that involve subject matter jurisdiction and, more specifically, whether in rem jurisdiction should be treated more like subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction. Compare In re Florance, 360 N.W.2d 626, 629 n. 1 (Minn.1985) (discussing in rem jurisdiction in the context of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction), with Hoff v. Kempton, 317 N.W.2d 361, 365 n. 5 (Minn.1982) (expressing our understanding that in rem jurisdiction is commonly grouped “under the rubric of ‘personal jurisdiction’ ”).
We need not resolve the nature of the jurisdictional issue in this case, because “[a] void judgment is one rendered in the absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties.” Matson v. Matson, 310 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Minn.1981) (emphasis added). Notwithstanding our efforts in recent years to distinguish procedural tools from jurisdictional limits, see, e.g., In re Civil Commitment of Giem, 742 N.W.2d 422, 427-29 (Minn.2007), there is a need for further clarification of our jurisprudence on subject matter jurisdiction.