Court Opinion

ID: 9950793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 20:01:15.676258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:49.172714
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-12204    Document: 30-1     Date Filed: 03/14/2024   Page: 1 of 6

                                            [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-12204
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       QUENTIN ANDERSON,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Georgia
                 D.C. Docket No. 4:22-cr-00005-CDL-MSH-1
                           ____________________
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       2                          Opinion of the Court                   23-12204

       Before NEWSOM, BRASHER, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Quentin Anderson, a federal prisoner, appeals his convic-
       tions for robbery under the Hobbs Act and a related conspiracy to
       possess a firearm. 1 Anderson argues that the district court wrongly
       accepted his guilty plea under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
       11(b). 2 He also argues that his counsel ineffectively assisted him un-
       der Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Neither persuades
       us.
              The district court did not plainly err in accepting Anderson’s
       plea because it was knowing and voluntary. And a direct appeal is
       not the proper vehicle to bring an ineffective assistance claim. So
       we affirm Anderson’s convictions and sentence.
                                              I.

              Anderson was charged with one count of robbery under the
       Hobbs Act and one count of conspiring to possess a firearm during
       and in relation to that robbery. He pleaded guilty to both counts.
             His plea agreement listed the statutory maximums for each
       count—20 years—and stated that the district court would not be
       bound by his attorney’s or the probation office’s estimated sentenc-
       ing range. Anderson stipulated in the plea agreement that the

       1 Anderson also appeals his sentence but offers no argument on that front be-

       sides the fact that it follows an unlawful conviction.
       2 Anderson does not cite Rule 11, but that rule governs pleas.
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       23-12204              Opinion of the Court                        3

       government could prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he com-
       mitted seven armed robberies.
              At the change-of-plea hearing, the district court conducted a
       plea colloquy and, in relevant part, asked if Anderson understood
       that the sentence he received could differ from any estimate given
       to him by his attorney, the probation officer, the government’s at-
       torney, or anyone else. Anderson said yes. He also agreed to the
       government’s factual description of the seven robberies. The court
       accepted his guilty plea.
               The probation office calculated his sentencing range—87 to
       108 months—under the sentencing guidelines, basing its calcula-
       tion on the one robbery to which Anderson pleaded guilty. But the
       government objected, arguing that his sentencing range should be
       based on the seven robberies to which he stipulated, which would
       result in a range of 188 to 235 months.
              At sentencing, the district court upheld the government’s
       objection. There, Anderson’s counsel stated that she believed she
       had advised Anderson incorrectly regarding the factual stipulation
       in the plea agreement and had in fact been ineffective. The district
       court sentenced Anderson to 200 months of imprisonment. Ander-
       son never moved to withdraw his guilty plea, though he said that
       the plea was based on an ineffective assistance of counsel.
                                       II.

            “A defendant who failed to object to the Rule 11 colloquy or
       move to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing, must show plain
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                  23-12204

       error on appeal.” United States v. Chubbuck, 252 F.3d 1300, 1302
       (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
                                         III.

               Anderson directly appeals his convictions on two grounds.
       First, he says that the district court should not have accepted his
       guilty plea because he did not knowingly plead guilty. Second, he
       says that his conviction is invalid because his counsel ineffectively
       assisted him. We address each in turn.
                                         A.

              “A plea of guilty is constitutionally valid only to the extent it
       is voluntary and intelligent.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614,
       618 (1998). “Rule 11 expressly directs the district judge to inquire
       whether a defendant who pleads guilty understands the nature of
       the charge against him and whether he is aware of the conse-
       quences of his plea.” McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 464
       (1969). A defendant pleads knowingly and voluntarily, even if rely-
       ing on his counsel’s erroneous sentencing prediction, when the dis-
       trict court explains that the sentence it imposes may differ from
       such a prediction. See United States v. Pease, 240 F.3d 938, 941 (11th
       Cir. 2001).
              Anderson complains that he did not knowingly plead guilty
       because he relied on his attorney’s erroneous sentencing predic-
       tion. But during Anderson’s plea colloquy, the district court ex-
       plained that the sentence it imposes may differ from any prediction
       Anderson received. Anderson agreed that he understood this point
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       23-12204               Opinion of the Court                          5

       and pleaded guilty anyway. We therefore conclude that the district
       court did not plainly err.
                                         B.

               For claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, a convicted
       defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was defi-
       cient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
       Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. But “[w]e generally do not address inef-
       fective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal.” United States
       v. Puentes-Hurtado, 794 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 2015). “Instead,
       an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is properly raised in a col-
       lateral attack on the conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” United
       States v. Merrill, 513 F.3d 1293, 1308 (11th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up).
       We can address such a claim on direct appeal “in the rare instance
       where the record is sufficiently developed.” Id. (cleaned up). But
       the record is not sufficiently developed for review on direct appeal,
       even when counsel makes statements on the record about commu-
       nications with the defendants, when those statements “were not
       made under oath” and “were not subject to cross-examination.”
       United States v. Ahmed, 73 F.4th 1363, 1375–76 (11th Cir. 2023).
               Here, although Anderson’s counsel informed the court that
       she had incorrectly advised him that the stipulated robberies would
       not count toward his guideline range calculation, the record is not
       sufficiently developed for us to adjudicate that issue. She did not
       make those statements under oath, nor was she subject to cross-
       examination. Any claim Anderson wishes to raise would best be
       raised in a § 2255 motion, where he would have the opportunity to
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                23-12204

       request an evidentiary hearing on his claim. Accordingly, we de-
       cline to consider Anderson’s claim of ineffective assistance of coun-
       sel.
                                       IV.
             For the reasons above, Anderson’s convictions and sentence
       are AFFIRMED.