Court Opinion

ID: 9763489
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:47:00.219705+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:44.351965
License: Public Domain

Mountain, J.,
dissenting. This Court has reached an extraordinary result in a very remarkable way. As I shall hope to make clear, the structure of argument as presented *306in the Court’s opinion is rested upon an assumed factual premise which does not exist. In part because of this, the concluding and most significant part of the argument suffers from the defect of visiting liability, in a wholly irrational way, upon parties who are more probably than not totally free of blame. I respectfully dissent.
During the course of the Court’s opinion there appear statements to the effect that all those who might have been in any way responsible for plaintiff’s injury are before the court.1 Hence, the argument continues, a process of selection properly undertaken by the finder of fact cannot fail to implicate the true culprit or culprits. Indeed, as I read the opinion, the entire argument is made to rest upon this premise: each and every person who may have brought about the imperfection in the surgical instrument or who may have caused the injury by its misuse is before the court; it remains only to identify him.
And yet we know — and everyone who has been associated with this case has always known — that this assumption is not in fact true. The only four defendants in the case are: the surgeon, Dr. Harold Somberg, who performed the operation; St. James Hospital, the medical facility in which the operation took place; Lawton Instrument Co., which manufactured the rongeur; and Rheinhold-Schumann, Inc., the distributor which sold it to the hospital. There is no other defendant in the case. And yet the record is replete with testimony that other surgeons — perhaps as many as twenty — have used the rongeur during the four years that it has formed part of the surgical equipment of the hospital, and that any one or more of them may perfectly well have been responsible for so injuring the instrument that it came apart while being manipulated in plain*307tiffs incision; or that it may have been weakened to near breaking point by cumulative misuse, entirely by persons not now before the court.2 In the face of this uncontro*308verted proof that the surgical instrument had been used upon approximately twenty earlier occasions and possibly by the same number of different surgeons, in the hands of any of whom it may have been fatally misused, how then can it be said that the wrongdoer is surely in court! There is a far greater likelihood that he is no party to this litigation at all and that his identity will never be established.
I of course agree with the Court that it is most unfortunate that this plaintiff should go uncompensated. Every humanitarian instinct impels the hope that when an unconscious patient is injured in some unforeseen and unforeseeable way, due reparation will be forthcoming. It is to the manner in which the Court would seek to fulfill this hope that I object.
As the opinion of the Court has been careful to point out, (P. 305), plaintiff’s claims against the surgeon, Dr. Somberg, and against the hospital sound in negligence;3 *309his claims against the manufacturer and distributor, on the other hand, are stated as arising from alleged breach of warranty or as resting upon a theory of strict liability in tort. At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s ease it had become apparent that with respect to his negligence claims he was entitled to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.4 The fracture of the rongeur in the wound bespoke negligence on the part of someone, the instrument was at the time within the control of a defendant and the injury was clearly not attributable to any fault ox neglect on the part of the plaintiff. Rose v. Port of New York Authority, 61 N. J. 129, 136 (1972); Kahalili v. Roseclif Bealty, Inc., 26 N. J. 595, 605-607 (1958).
The opinion takes the view that at this point the burden *310of proof shifted to defendants.5 This, as is apparently conceded, has not hitherto been the law of this State. “The operation of this rule of evidence \_res ipsa loquitur] does not shift the burden of persuasion, [citing authorities].” Bornstein v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., 26 N. J. 263, 269 (1958). Nevertheless this alteration in the law may be entirely reasonable and justified — at least if limited to this kind of medical malpractice case. 1 Louisell & Williams, Medical Malpractice sec. 15.02 et seq. In any event the argument as to the procedural effect to be given the rule of res ipsa has well been called “a tempest in a teapot.” 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts (1956) see. 19.11, p. 1104. Parenthetically, it may be pointed out that the duty of explanation on the part of a surgeon, when unforeseen injury occurs, is always inherent in the relationship between physician and patient. 1 Louisell & Williams, Medical Malpractice, supra, sec. 15.01. Thus far, as to the negligence claims, I might be persuaded to agree with the Court.
But certainly no farther. At this point the effect to be given a shift in the burden of proof becomes the crucial issue. The authorities which have adopted or espoused the view that res ipsa, shifts the burden of proof have, as far as I can discover, understood this to mean that upon such a shift taking place, a defendant becomes obliged to offer evidence explaining his own conduct or throwing light upon the circumstances attending plaintiff’s injury, which will be of sufficient probative force to establish his lack of fault by a preponderance of the evidence. The fact finder will then be called upon to decide whether the defendant’s proofs have met this test or whether they have fallen short.
*311The view expressed by the Court in this case as to the effect of shifting the burden of proof appears to be something quite different. Under this new rule it is no longer enough that a defendant meet the standard described above. His role is no longer simply that of one who may hope to succeed if his proofs justify a verdict. Rather he now finds himself one of a band of persons from among whom one or more must be singled out to respond in damages to the plaintiff’s claim. He is now a member of a group who must collectively, among themselves, play a game of sauve qui peut — and play it for rather high stakes. With all due respect I submit that at this point there has been complete departure from the rule of reason; the argument is now stripped of all rational basis.
Note, first, the role the jury is being called upon to play. The judge will give to the jury two potentially contradictory instructions. Eirst the jurors will be told to arrive at a verdict by a preponderance of the evidence, each defendant having the burden of exculpating himself. Then a further direction will be given that they must bring in a verdict against some one or more of the defendants. But suppose the members of the jury cannot agree that the evidence will sustain a verdict against any defendant. What then! Each juror has taken an oath — no small matter — to reach a verdict only “according to the evidence.”6 What does he now do? Presumably he poses his problem to the judge. And upon seeking the aid of the court, what further instructions is he to be given?
What is to be the posture of the judge if he is thereafter called upon to rule upon a motion for judgment notwith*312standing the verdict or for a new trial, and it is perfectly clear to him that the verdict conld not be supported by the evidence and was rendered only in response to the compulsion of this proposed charge? I leave the answers to these questions to those jurors and judges who must in the future act under the shadow of this decision.
Consider further the hypothesis last suggested, that a jury does undertake, despite a failure of adequate proof, to carry out the mandate of this instruction. How is a verdict to be reached? The absence of sufficient evidence upon which a verdict might justly rest, coupled with the compulsion to reach a verdict against someone, removes from the case any semblance of rationality. It then becomes a mere game of chance. There being no rational guide, each jury may proceed as the whimsy of the moment dictates. Thus we have trial by lot, or by chance — no more a rational process than were trial by ordeal or trial by combat. And yet it is the very essence of the judicial process that a determination reached by a court shall be the result of a rational study and analysis of applicable fact and law.7
*313Nor can it be seriously contended that in following the course outlined by the Court there would not be instances — perhaps many — where liability would be visited upon wholly innocent persons. I cannot concur in a decision announcing a rule of law which invites such a result.
It is, of course, generally accepted as axiomatic in a society dedicated to tbe values of individualism, that no person shall be made to answer for an event, unless his responsibility for it has been convincingly proved by due process of law. [Fleming, Developments in the English Law of Medical Liability, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 633, 646 (1959)]
Finally it may be asked whether a trial such as is here projected may in any true sense be termed either a trial by jury or an exercise of the judicial process, as those concepts are generally understood.
I would vote to reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and to reinstate the judgment of the trial court.
Clifford, J., and Judge Collester join in this dissenting opinion.
For affirmance — Chief Justice Hughes, and Justices Jacobs, Sullivan and Pashman — 4.
For reversal — Justices Mountain and Clifford, and Judge Collester — 3.

“. . . plaintiff sued all who might have been liable for his injury . . .” (P. 295). “Since all parties had been joined who could reasonably have been connected with that negligence or defect, it was clear that one of those parties was liable . . .” (P. 303).

There was uncontradicted testimony that the rongeur had been purchased by the hospital about four years before the date of plaintiff’s operation, [T 2.70], and that during that span of time it had been used about twenty times in the performance of operations. [T 2.65-66; p. 296]
On the cross-examination of Dr. David J. Graubard, plaintiff’s medical expert, the following occurred:
Q Well, Doctor, suppose — assume, if you would, that on a prior occasion the rongeur had been used improperly, exerting too much force and the cup had been bent by a surgeon who just happened to have — who just happened to be on the hospital staff, had privileges at the hospital and the doctor straightened it, would that weaken the instrument?
A Yes.
Q And that could at a later date cause it to break, isn’t that correct?
A Yes, sir. [T 2.139]
During the interrogation of John Carroll, an expert in metallurgy called by defendant, Lawton Instrument Co., the following colloquies took place:
Q Do you think it [the rongeur] was overstrained, though, in its use?
A. At some point during its use. I couldn’t say specifically when. [T 4.34]
Q Now, you said, I believe, that at some point in the use it [the rongeur] was over-strained?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, what did you mean by that?
A I meant that, to use a technical term, it was loaded beyond the yield point. And the yield point of a material is a load at which it loses elasticity, does not return to the original shape.
Q But you can handle over-straining without simultaneous fracture, can’t you?
A Any time you bend anything you strain it.
Q And if you bend it sufficiently enough during the course of its use at some point in time it’s going to break because it’s far over-strained above the point of its ability to take a pressure or load?
A In the sense that over-straining means weakening.
Q Bight. So that it is possible for an instrument such as a pituitary rongeur to be weakened through use over a period of time and at a final point in time break?
A Yes, sir. [T 4.43]
*308Q So then you found, Mr. Carroll, that it had been stressed?
A Yes, sir.
Q Beyond it’s ability to tolerate, is that correct?
A That’s correct, sir.
Q Stressed over a period of time perhaps, probably?
A I couldn’t answer that as to time, sir. It could have happened during the course of one operation or many operations.
Q You know it was stressed beyond its ability to tolerate that stress?
A Yes, sir.
Q In its use? A. Yes.
Q The point of time you can’t pinpoint?
A I cannot. [T 4.50]

Not presented for consideration under the pleadings and not touched upon by the parties or any of the courts before which this case has come is the issue of whether a hospital at its peril puts into the hands of a surgeon a defective instrument, such as everyone seems to agree was the condition of the rongeur here, no matter how that defect came about. The state of the law in New Jersey thus remains open as to whether strict liability in tort might be available against the hospital here, see generally Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 355 F. Supp. 1065 (E. D. Wis. 1973) ; Note, Torts — Strict Liability — Hospitals May. be Strictly Liable for Administrative Services, 41 Tenn. L. Rev. 392 (1974) ; cf. Magrine v. Spector, 100 *309N. J. Super. 223, 255-41 (App. Div. 1968) (Botter, J. S. C., dissenting) ; Farnsworth, “Implied Warranties of Quality in Non-Sales Oases,” 57 Colum. L. Rev. 653 (1957) ; or whether, in appropriate circumstances, a court might recognize an absolute duty of some other origin under which a hospital would be required to furnish a surgeon with a non-defective instrument.

It has hitherto been the generally accepted rule that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no application to cases involving alleged breach of warranty. “The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur relates to cases involving negligence and has no application to an alleged breach of warranty.” Trust v. Arden Farms Co., 50 Cal. 2d 217, 324 P. 2d 583, 586 (1958). Nevertheless the manner in which inferences of defective manufacture may be drawn from factual circumstances in breach of warranty or strict tort liability cases is not very different from the way in which inferences of negligence may be drawn where res ipsa loquitur properly applies. “The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, frequently resorted to in negligence cases, is not applicable as such in the field of warranty, although the usual resort to circumstantial evidence in attempting to establish a breach of warranty indicates some of the same thinking found in res ipsa loquitur cases.” State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N. W. 2d 449, 452 (1961). This similarity was noted by this Court in Corbin v. Camden Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 N. J. 425, 436 (1972), holding that a res ipsa charge in a products liability case resting upon strict tort liability would not, at least in that case, be deemed reversible error.

Apparently, as to a shift in burden of proof, no distinction is to be drawn between those defendants charged with negligence and those against whom breach of warranty is asserted. While, as I concede immediately below, a rule shifting the burden of proof may perhaps he justified here as to the negligence charges, it certainly should never, either here or elsewhere, pertain to products liability claims.

To petit jurors in New Jersey there is administered the following oath:
You do swear in the presence of Almighty God that you will well and truly try the matter in dispute between ............, plaintiff and ............. defendant, and a true verdict give according to the evidence. [N. J. S. A. 2A:74-6; emphasis supplied]

Justice (now Chief Judge) Breitel has expressed the point well:
The primary internal characteristic of the judicial process is that it is a rational one. The judicial process is based on reasoning and presupposes — all antirationalists to the contrary notwithstanding — that its determinations are justified only when explained or explainable in reason. No poll, no majority vote of the affected, no rule of expediency, and certainly no confessedly subjective or idiosyncratic view justifies a judicial determination.
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The rational judicial process is not permitted to rove generally over the scene of human affairs. Instead, it must be used, on pain of violating the proprieties, within the framework of a highly disciplined special system of legal rules characteristic of the legal order. No principle of the moral order or any other by itself may demand recognition in the judicial process of dispute determination except as it is incorporated or can be incorporated into the system of legal rules. [Breitel, The Lawmakers, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 749, 772-3 (1965)]