Court Opinion

ID: 9390618
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 00:02:25.076898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:35.760385
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60371         Document: 00516729857             Page: 1     Date Filed: 04/27/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                  Fifth Circuit

                                                                                FILED
                                                                            April 27, 2023
                                        No. 22-60371                       Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                Clerk

   Nena Mauritz; Matthew Mauritz,

                                                                   Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                             versus

   Scott Lynn; Hattiesburg Clinic, P.A.,

                                                                 Defendants—Appellees.

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Southern District of Mississippi
                                  USDC 2:20-CV-184

   Before Stewart, Dennis, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Nena Mauritz, an employee at the Hattiesburg Clinic (the “Clinic”),
   and her husband, Matthew Mauritz, sued Dr. Scott Lynn and the Clinic,
   alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress against Dr. Lynn; assault
   and battery against Dr. Lynn; negligence against the Clinic; loss of
   consortium against Dr. Lynn and the Clinic; and claims against the Clinic
   under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111, et seq.
   (“ADA”) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e,

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                         No. 22-60371

   et seq. (“Title VII”) for discrimination and harassment based on Nena’s 1
   disability and her sex. The district court granted in part the Clinic’s motion
   for summary judgment, dismissed Nena’s claims under Title VII and the
   ADA, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Nena and
   Matthew’s state law claims. The case was remanded to state court, and Nena
   appealed.2
                                               I.
           Nena Mauritz has worked at the Clinic since 2009. From 2010 until
   2019, she worked in the Clinic’s neurology department; she transferred to
   the endocrinology department in 2019. Nena also suffers from multiple
   sclerosis, and has been a patient at the Clinic since 2007. During her time
   working in the neurology department, Nena was harassed and discriminated
   against by a doctor in the department, Dr. Scott Lynn.
           Beginning around 2012 or 2013, Dr. Lynn started calling Nena
   “Swiss-cheese brain,” referencing her disability. This comment continued
   throughout her employment in the neurology department, and eventually Dr.
   Lynn called Nena “Swiss-cheese brain” whenever she made a mistake. In
   spring 2015, Dr. Lynn said that Nena was “prostituting herself out” in front
   of two pharmaceutical representatives. Dr. Lynn told another employee to
   tell Nena “[f]*** you” when that employee next saw Nena.
           On May 8, 2015, Nena met with Joy Yates, a Clinic administrator,
   about Dr. Lynn’s conduct. On May 26, 2015, Dr. Lynn remarked to Nena
   that Nena’s daughter would “get pregnant when she is 17 or 18 and then

           1
            Because Nena and her husband share the same last name, we refer to Nena
   Mauritz as “Nena” and Matthew Mauritz as “Matthew.”
           2
             Scott Lynn and the Clinic subsequently appealed the district court’s decision to
   decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. That appeal is not
   before us.

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   [Nena would] have a baby to love,” which Nena stated was a reference to her
   inability to have more biological children. Following the May 26, 2015,
   comment, Nena met with Yates and the Clinic’s executive director, Tommy
   Thornton, on May 27, 2015. Nena told Thornton “about names [she] was
   called and things [ ] Dr. Lynn had said about [Nena’s] daughter.” Nena
   expressed some trepidation with Dr. Lynn “knowing anything about [her]
   talking with the administration,” but she asked for assistance to be
   transferred out of the neurology department, because she did not think that
   Dr. Lynn would “let her leave.” Thornton stated that Dr. Lynn would not
   be allowed to retaliate, and asked if Nena would be willing to stay for six to
   eight weeks in the neurology lab.
          After being informed that Nena planned to transfer departments, Dr.
   Lynn created an assistant manager position within the neurology department.
   Clinic administration informed Nena that the new position would involve less
   contact with Dr. Lynn. Although Nena interviewed for four different jobs
   within the Clinic, she either was not offered a position or removed herself
   from consideration for the job. During this time, Nena felt that she was being
   “manipulated” by Clinic administrators, because there had been “no effort”
   to “assist in transferring [her] out of the [neurology] department.” In
   October 2015, Nena took the assistant manager position within the neurology
   department.
          On November 3, 2015, Dr. Lynn texted Nena a picture of Nena from
   college, where Nena’s midriff was showing; Dr. Lynn also showed the
   picture to other employees within the department, “taunt[ed]” Nena with
   it, and refused to delete it after Nena asked him to. On other occasions, Dr.
   Lynn would call Nena “out in front of people when [she] was not wearing
   heels to work,” because “Dr. Lynn knew [Nena] had balance and gait issues
   from MS.” In May 2016, Dr. Lynn touched a button on Nena’s shirt and
   pressed on her left breast. At one point in July 2017, Dr. Lynn commented

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   that Nena’s “high-cost drugs” were increasing the Clinic’s healthcare costs;
   on a different occasion, Dr. Lynn handed Nena a plastic bag and told her to
   put the bag over her head and to take a deep breath. The next month, after
   Nena got her words mixed up while talking to Dr. Lynn, he asked Nena
   “[W]hat’s wrong with you?” and then stated, “[N]ever mind, we all know
   you have something wrong with your brain.” During this time, Nena met
   with Yates monthly, and brought up her issues with Dr. Lynn’s behavior,
   although she told Yates not to directly confront Dr. Lynn. However, Nena
   believed that Dr. Farrell, another Clinic doctor, would speak to Dr. Lynn
   about his behavior, and keep Nena out of the spotlight by focusing on Dr.
   Lynn’s treatment of a former employee, Kristen Fischer.
          On July 16, 2019, when Nena was standing in the doorway of another
   employee’s office, with her back to the door, Dr. Lynn pushed her. Nena was
   able to catch herself on a chair. When she turned to her right, she saw Dr.
   Lynn walking past her, putting his arms out, and saying, “I’d love to see
   lopsided Nena fall.” Nena told her co-worker Julia Starrett about the
   incident. On July 25, Kristy Gould spoke with Nena. Nena said that she was
   “not interested in pursuing anything because [she] had no faith in [the]
   administration[.]” However, in August 2019, after Starrett reported Dr.
   Lynn’s conduct to Clinic administration through a third-party survey, the
   Clinic investigated the July 16, 2019, pushing incident. The Clinic Board of
   Directors suspended Dr. Lynn for a week, withheld one month of his salary,
   required him to complete an independent, professional behavioral counseling
   program, and required him to participate in ongoing outpatient therapy.
   After further investigation, the Clinic imposed additional penalties, including
   moving Dr. Lynn’s practice away from the main Clinic building and requiring
   him to pay the costs of the investigation and any monetary settlement paid.
   Nena was placed on administrative leave with pay, and she interviewed for
   and accepted a manager position in the endocrinology department. After the

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   July 16, 2019, pushing incident, Nena did not suffer any further harassment.
          Nena filed an EEOC charge on January 13, 2020, alleging that Dr.
   Lynn verbally, physically, and sexually harassed her. She received a Notice
   of Right to Sue on January 28, 2021. On July 2, 2020, Nena and Matthew
   filed suit against Dr. Lynn and the Clinic in Mississippi state court, for claims
   arising out of the multiple incidents of alleged harassment by Dr. Lynn. The
   Clinic removed the case to federal court on October 2, 2020. On May 18,
   2021, Nena and Matthew filed an amended complaint, alleging the following:
   intentional infliction of emotional distress against Dr. Lynn; assault and
   battery against Dr. Lynn; negligence against the Clinic; loss of consortium
   against Dr. Lynn and the Clinic; and claims against the Clinic under the ADA
   and Title VII for discrimination and harassment based on Nena’s disability
   and her sex. The district court granted the Clinic’s motion for summary
   judgment as to Nena’s ADA and Title VII claims, reasoning that Nena failed
   to carry her burden of proving that the Clinic failed to take prompt remedial
   action as to her ADA claim, and that her Title VII claim was untimely because
   she failed to point to a specific act of sexual harassment that occurred during
   the 180-day limitations period.
                                          II.
          This court reviews a district court’s decision to grant summary
   judgment de novo, using the same standards the district court used to decide
   the motion. See Smith v. Reg’l Transit Auth., 827 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir.
   2016). Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that there is no
   genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
   as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute as to a material fact
   is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
   verdict for the nonmoving party.” Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d

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   536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
   250, 251–52 (2015)).
                                          III.
                               A. Nena’s ADA Claim
          Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), a charge of discrimination must be
   filed within 180 days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice
   occurred.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Waltman v. Int’l Paper Co., 875
   F.2d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 1989). The 180-day period for filing an EEOC charge
   “begins to run from the time the complainant knows or reasonably should
   have known that the challenged act has occurred.” Vadie v. Miss. State Univ.,
   218 F.3d 365, 371 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Nena filed her EEOC
   charge on January 13, 2020, so only acts that occurred on or after July 15,
   2019, fall within the statutory time period.
          Unlike an intentional discrimination claim, however, which focuses
   on a specific discriminatory act, “a hostile environment claim arises from the
   ‘cumulative effect of individual acts,’ some of which ‘may not be actionable
   on [their] own.’” Sewell v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 974 F.3d 577, 583–84 (5th
   Cir. 2020) (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115
   (2002)). “That means that ‘the filing clock cannot begin running with the
   first act, because at that point the plaintiff has no claim; nor can a claim expire
   as to that first act, because the full course of conduct is the actionable
   infringement.’” Id. at 584 (quoting Heath v. Bd. of Supervisors for Agric. &
   Mech. Coll., 850 F.3d 731, 737 (5th Cir. 2017), as revised (Mar. 13, 2017)).
   Therefore, if “an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period,
   the entire time period of the hostile environment may be considered by a
   court for the purposes of determining liability.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117.
          The continuing violation doctrine applies here because Nena points to
   a pattern of conduct related to her disability beginning in 2012 and continuing

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   until the July 16, 2019, pushing incident. Because the July 16, 2019, pushing
   incident occurred within the prescription period, Nena’s hostile work
   environment claim is timely. On appeal, the Clinic argues that the district
   court erroneously determined that the violation was continuing and without
   an intervening act. We disagree. The Clinic does not point to any evidence
   of an intervening cause, and it does not meaningfully contest Nena’s version
   of events—wherein Dr. Lynn frequently and often made remarks about her
   disability throughout her time working in the neurology department,
   ultimately culminating in the July 19, 2019, pushing incident. Nena has
   adequately demonstrated that the continuing violation doctrine applies to her
   ADA hostile work environment claim.
          In addition to the claim being timely, Nena must show that: “(1) [she]
   belongs to a protected group, (2) was subject to unwelcome harassment (3)
   based on [her] disability, (4) which affected a term, condition, or privilege of
   employment, and (5) [the Clinic] knew or should have known of the
   harassment and failed to take prompt, remedial action.”           Thompson v.
   Microsoft Corp., 2 F.4th 460, 470–71 (5th Cir. 2021) (internal citation
   omitted). To determine “whether harassment is sufficiently pervasive or
   severe,” a court considers “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its
   severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
   offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
   employee’s work performance.” Id. (quotation omitted).
          The district court relied on the fifth element—failure to take prompt
   remedial action—to determine that Nena failed to meet her burden. The
   district court concluded that the Clinic took prompt remedial action to
   prevent Dr. Lynn from further harassing Nena after the July 16, 2019,
   pushing incident, demonstrated by their investigation, and culminating in Dr.
   Lynn’s reprimand. Further, after meeting with Nena following the initial
   investigation, the Clinic continued investigating and imposed additional

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   penalties on Dr. Lynn. The district court was unpersuaded by Nena’s
   argument that the Clinic failed to take any action prior to the pushing
   incident, because although Nena did report the harassment, it was her
   “uncontroverted testimony” that she asked the Clinic not to confront Dr.
   Lynn about his behavior.
          “A defendant may avoid [ADA] liability when harassment occurred
   but the defendant took ‘prompt remedial action’ to protect the claimant.”
   Williams-Boldware v. Denton Cnty., 741 F.3d 635, 640 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal
   quotation omitted). “Whether an employer’s response to discriminatory
   conduct is sufficient will necessarily depend on the particular facts of the
   case—the severity and persistence of the harassment, and the effectiveness
   of any initial remedial steps.” Hirras v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 95 F.3d
   396, 399–400 (5th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation and citation omitted). An
   “employer may be liable despite having taken remedial steps if the plaintiff
   can establish that the employer’s response was not ‘reasonably calculated’ to
   halt the harassment.” Skidmore v. Precision Printing & Pkg., Inc., 188 F.3d
   606, 615–16 (5th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
          We have long recognized that to demonstrate that an employer has
   failed to take prompt remedial action, the employee must first show that she
   took   “advantage     of   corrective       opportunities   provided   by   the
   employer.” Harvill v. Westward Commc’ns, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 428, 437 (5th
   Cir. 2005) (quoting Woods v. Delta Beverage Group, 274 F.3d 295, 300 n.3 (5th
   Cir. 2001)).    “Nonetheless, if an employee believes that bringing a
   subsequent [] harassment complaint would be futile, or ‘it becomes
   objectively obvious that the employer has no real intention of stopping the
   harassment, the harassed employee is not obligated to go through the wasted
   motion of reporting the harassment.’” Id.
          Construing all inferences in favor of Nena, we cannot say that the

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   evidence “is so weak or tenuous” as to whether the Clinic took prompt
   remedial action to protect her before the July pushing incident that summary
   judgment is warranted in the Clinic’s favor.3 Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37
   F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citation
   omitted).     There is a factual dispute over whether Nena directed the
   administration to not act, or if she merely wanted her name to be left out of
   the conversation.        The district court concluded that it was Nena’s
   “uncontroverted testimony that each time she reported Dr. Lynn’s behavior
   she asked the Clinic not to confront Dr. Lynn about his behavior.” The
   district court also pointed to Nena’s statements that she did not want Dr.
   Lynn “approached about his behavior specifically directed towards [her]”
   and that she did not want to “formally report” Dr. Lynn. But the district
   court did not view the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to
   Nena, because Nena stated on several other occasions—including in
   evidence submitted by the Clinic itself—that she was primarily concerned
   about “Dr. Lynn knowing anything about [her] talking with administration.”
   Nena had endorsed a plan proposed by Yates to have Dr. Lynn confronted
   about his behavior, without relating the complaints back to Nena—rather,
   the comments would be focused on a different employee’s complaints to
   protect current employees. Nena was “under the impression that Dr. Farrell
   [the doctor who was going to speak with Dr. Lynn] knew of all of the
   complaints, including [Nena’s].”
           It also appears that Nena’s reluctance to explicitly seek corrective
   opportunities may have been due to a fear of retaliation by Dr. Lynn—fear
   that was not unfounded, as Thornton stated that “Dr. Lynn would not be

           3
             We agree with the district court that the summary judgment record supports the
   conclusion that the Clinic took prompt remedial action to prevent further harassment after
   learning of the July 16, 2019, pushing incident. Nena does not meaningfully contest this
   issue on appeal.

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   allowed to retaliate,” with regard to Nena’s concerns about talking with
   administration, and Yates stated that she wanted to inform Dr. Lynn
   “separately” about Nena’s initial request to transfer, ostensibly to manage
   his reaction. Nena’s fears were confirmed when Dr. Lynn purportedly
   created an assistant manager position specifically for Nena in neurology once
   he found out she was seeking a transfer. Later, while still trying to find a job
   to transfer to, Nena felt as though she was “being manipulated” and that
   “there seemed to be no effort in [her] opinion to assist in transferring me out
   of the department.” Ultimately, Nena accepted the assistant manager
   position, but only after feeling as though the administration4 was not putting
   in effort to help her and was sending her to interview for positions for which
   Nena was unqualified. It is therefore reasonable to infer that Nena believed
   that bringing a direct complaint against Dr. Lynn would be futile, because the
   Clinic had no “real intention of stopping the harassment.” See Harvill, 433
   F.3d at 437.
           We therefore REVERSE and REMAND as to Nena’s ADA claim.5
                                B. Nena’s Title VII Claim
           Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1), a charge of discrimination must be

           4
              Indeed, the minutes of the November 25, 2019, board meeting create another
   layer of ambiguity. Dr. Lauderdale, after learning of Dr. Lynn’s conduct prior to the July
   16, 2019, pushing incident from Nena, indicated that “in her opinion the matter had been
   mishandled by Administration . . . Mr. Thornton noted the additional information provided
   to Dr. Lauderdale had also been provided to him, Lisa Freeman, and Dr. Farrell. When
   questioned, these employees indicated the information had not been brought up over the
   last five years and not reported to Administration.” Taking all reasonable inferences in
   favor of Nena, her request that she not be named specifically may not be the primary reason
   that the administration failed to act. It is possible that Nena’s complaints never made their
   way up the administrative ladder.
           5
             Although the Clinic also argues that we can alternatively affirm because the
   conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive, we remand so that the district court can
   consider this argument in the first instance.

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   filed within 180 days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice
   occurred.” Waltman v. Int’l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 1989).
   The district court dismissed Nena’s Title VII claim as time barred because
   she failed to identify a specific act of sexual harassment that occurred during
   the 180-day limitations period prior to the filing of her EEOC charge. We
   agree with the Clinic that Nena waived the issue by inadequately briefing it.
   A party can waive an argument by inadequately briefing it by, inter alia, failing
   to “offer any supporting argument or citation to authority” or to “identify
   relevant legal standards and any relevant Fifth circuit cases,” or by failing to
   offer record citations. See, e.g., JTB Tools & Oilfield Servs., L.L.C. v. United
   States, 831 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir. 2016); United States v. Rojas, 812 F.3d 382,
   407 n.15 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 446–
   47 (5th Cir. 2010)). Here, Nena does not provide any meaningful argument
   apart from the assertion that her testimony “was not speculative.” Beyond
   that, she does not provide any record citations or relevant caselaw. She has
   therefore failed to adequately brief the issue and has waived it. We therefore
   AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Nena’s Title
   VII claim.
                                         IV.
          For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part,
   and REMAND for further proceedings.

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