Court Opinion

ID: 9741367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:54:11.51495+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:23.702499
License: Public Domain

Caporale, J.,
concurring in part, and in part dissenting.
I agree fully with the majority’s resolution of, and all it has to say with respect to the issue presented by, the mother’s second and third assignments of error.
However, I disagree with the majority’s resolution of the mother’s first assignment of error. Its holding that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to modify the earlier decree so as to compel the father to pay in the future for needs which could have been but were not met during the son’s minority is, in my view, contrary to the principles of law previously announced by this court and restated in the majority opinion.
While the mother’s dedication to her son’s well-being as well as her disinclination to incur expenses which she could not pay is to be appreciated and applauded, her delay in seeking relief ought not be ignored, thus permitting her to extend the time during which the father remains responsible under the decree of dissolution.
Two years and 10 months elapsed from the time of the original decree to the son’s majority, all but 4 months of which *379elapsed before the mother filed the application now before us. She should have sought relief as soon as she became aware of the fact that the son had needs she could not meet with the child support awarded her by the decree. I fear the majority opinion will lead to filings by custodial parents shortly before a child reaches majority to require noncustodial parents to pay for services after a child reaches majority which could and should have been provided during the child’s minority. It seems to me that such a practice would in part defeat the court’s holding with respect to the second issue in this case. Of even greater importance, however, is the fact that delay does not serve a child’s best interests. Needs which can be met ought to be met as they arise.
There are further substantive problems with the majority’s resolution of the mother’s first assignment of error. Her testimony that the needs arose “during the last year or two” can be interpreted to mean either that the needs arose during the last year or two prior to the son’s reaching majority or that the needs arose during the last year or two prior to the May 7, 1985, hearing on her application. If the first interpretation is the fact, it seems to me legally incorrect, given the proximity of the period to the entry of the decree and the absence of evidence to the contrary, to hold that the needs were not within the contemplation of the parties when their marriage was dissolved. If the second interpretation is the fact, then it was the mother’s burden to show that no part of those needs arose after the son’s majority. In the absence of such evidence the trial court correctly concluded that the mother’s testimony was not relevant.
Moreover, there is a procedural problem with the majority’s opinion. Paragraph 5 of the application alleges: “That the changes as aforesaid amount to such a change in circumstance as to merit an increase in child support for the benefit of David Joseph Meyers to the sum of $500.00 per month.” The allegations of the application relate to an increase in future child support payments, not to the reimbursement of specific expenses not yet incurred. Thus, requiring the father to pay future expenses grants the mother relief which is extraneous to the issues presented by this case. The mother’s prayer for “such *380other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable” is just that, a prayer for relief within the issues framed by the allegations of the application. See Waite v. Samson Dev. Co., 217 Neb. 403, 348 N.W.2d 883 (1984), which states that while a prayer for relief is part of a petition, it is not a portion of the statement of fact required to constitute a cause of action. The issues to be tried must be formed by the pleadings, and a judgment rendered thereon must respond to the issues raised by the pleadings. Muller Enterprises, Inc. v. Gerber, 178 Neb. 463, 133 N.W.2d 913 (1965). Only in that way may a party know what he or she is expected to answer and what his or her potential liability might be. The result reached by the majority deprives the father of that fundamental protection.
I would affirm the trial court’s decree in its entirety.
Krivosha, C.J., and Colwell, D.J., Retired, join in this concurrence and dissent.