Court Opinion

ID: 9649155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:43:29.058152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:08.288095
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. After the foreman of the jury had announced the jury’s verdicts to the court, the clerk of the court recorded . the verdicts and announced them as follows:
“Members of the jury, hearken to the verdict as the Court hath it recorded. You do say, in the issue joined between the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Richard P. Brightwell, that you find him on Indictment No. 388, murder, not guilty first degree; guilty third degree; guilty on Indictment No. 389, voluntary manslaughter; guilty on Indictment No. 391, resisting arrest, and guilty on Indictment No. 394, possession of firearms without license, and so say you all?”
The jury, both as a whole and individually when polled, then affirmed its verdicts.
*429As the majority notes, the verdicts of guilty of third degree murder and guilty of voluntary manslaughter are inconsistent. These verdicts, however, clearly are in no way inconsistent with the verdict of not guilty of murder of the first degree. Thus, had the court sent the jury back with additional instructions for further deliberation, it could not have permissibly directed the jury to reconsider its verdict of not guilty of first degree murder. See State v. Rhinehart, 267 N.C. 470, 148 S.E.2d 651 (1966) (where jury returned verdict of acquittal on one count and no verdict on another, reversible error to instruct jury to reconsider acquittal verdict while reaching verdict on other count).
The cases cited by the majority, Commonwealth v. Johnson, 359 Pa. 287, 59 A.2d 128 (1948) and Commonwealth v. Dzvonick, 450 Pa. 98, 297 A.2d 912 (1972), require this result and do not support the majority’s contrary conclusion. These cases stand for the proposition that the jury, before discharge, may correct its verdict only if the verdict, on its face, shows an error in form or in substance. Here, the only verdicts which on their face show an error are the inconsistent verdicts of third degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. Because only these verdicts could have been reconsidered, counsel was ineffective for not requesting the court to instruct the jury to redeliberate only with respect to these inconsistent verdicts.
Further, even accepting the majority’s erroneous premise that the jury could have validly reconsidered its verdict of acquittal of murder of the first degree, the majority’s conclusion that counsel was effective despite his failure to request a limiting jury instruction is manifestly erroneous. Counsel advanced no interest of appellant by failing to request that the jury be directed to reconsider only its inconsistent verdicts of third degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. See Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967). Even if the court had refused the request, counsel would have preserved his meritorious objection for direct appellate review. And, of course, if the court had complied with counsel’s request, on *430redeliberation appellant could have been found guilty of no more than murder of the third degree, and possibly would have been found guilty of voluntary manslaughter or acquitted. In short, there was something to gain and nothing to lose by requesting the court to limit the scope of the jury’s redeliberations.
Because counsel was clearly ineffective for not requesting that the jury be permitted to reconsider only its inconsistent verdicts, the order of the PCHA court should be reversed, the judgment of sentence vacated, and a new trial granted on the charges of murder of the third degree and voluntary manslaughter.