Court Opinion

ID: 9647555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:39:58.032048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:54.495769
License: Public Domain

STEPHENSON, Justice,
dissenting.
First, I have a philosophical difference with the thrust of the majority opinion which treats municipal corporations the same as private corporations. There is a fundamental difference between the two. The taxpayer resident of a city is not in the same position as the stockholder of a private corporation. There are many differences which are too obvious to be enumerated. The two entities exist for different purposes. Thus, I am of the opinion the two are so different that there is a justification for treating the two differently as regards tort liability. It is true that the rule of immunity has a harsh result in denying damages to an injured person. However, there is a balancing act to be considered in whether the taxpayers of the city should bear the burden instead of the injured person.
Despite Haney, the rule of immunity has been so consistently adhered to we should consider the rule as expressing public policy and leave any change to legislative action.
Next, I find Haney a little opaque. It abolishes the governmental-proprietary test and adopts the theory of a Wisconsin case which ends with the remark that immunity should be the exception rather than the rule, whatever that means. Then, Haney, after piously rejecting the theory of municipal immunity for torts, proceeds to exempt judicial, legislative, quasi-judicial, and quasi-legislative acts from the rule.
The majority picks up on this exemption and cites Brown and Grogan as illustrative of regulatory functions which impose no liability by virtue of failure to perform. Somehow, to my amazement, these cases are wedged into a definition of quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative functions. It is obvious to me that these functions are executive in nature.
Haney and the majority are very critical of the exception to the immunity doctrine carved out over the years; according to Haney, “contrived devices,” according to the majority, “pigeonholes for conclusions arrived at intuitively.”
The majority, with a great deal of mum-bo-jumbo, states that the governmental regulatory function is different from any performed by private persons or in private industries and would be a new kind of tort liability. This should be a surprise to all. Private industry routinely carries on inspections to conform to laws and regulations.
My prediction is that these exceptions in the majority opinion will cause the same difficulty as illustrated in post-Haney cases. Perhaps these cases are not models of rational thought; yet they sought to ameliorate the harshness of the rule on immunity. On the bright side, it will call for a great many more opinions from this court explaining just what is meant by the majority opinion. I look forward to this development with anticipation.
In answer to the proposition that “liability follows negligence,” I have no hesitation in stating that the individuals who commit torts, even inspectors who fail to follow duties, should be liable. This should satisfy “the concept of liability for negligence expresses a universal duty owed by all to all.” Let the case be tried against the individual or individuals committing the *153tort. Thus, the injured party is not precluded from obtaining judgment against the guilty party. Whether the cause of action could be maintained against the city should be left as is or to the legislature.
It appears that the majority opinion stands on principle with exceptions.
The majority opinion will undoubtedly lead to bankruptcy of many municipalities, large and small. My only suggestion to city fathers is to run for the hills and seek help from the legislature.
STEPHENS, C.J., joins in this dissent.