Court Opinion

ID: 9365703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-24 19:02:40.352092+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:47.101535
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/24/23

                        CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION ONE

                             STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 RODRIGO RODRIGUEZ PRECIADO et                D079536
 al.,

          Plaintiffs and Appellants,
                                              (Super. Ct. No. 37-2021-
          v.                                  00007896-CU-PA-NC)

 FREIGHTLINER CUSTOM CHASSIS
 CORPORATION,

          Defendant and Respondent.

        APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Earl H. Maas, III, Judge. Affirmed.
        Law Offices of Otto L. Haselhoff and Otto L. Haselhoff for Plaintiffs
and Appellants.
        Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, Philip R. Cosgrove and Ryan E.
Cosgrove for Defendant and Respondent.

        Plaintiffs Rodrigo Rodriguez Preciado, Norma Janeth Banda Arreola,
Alejandro Rodriguez Banda, and Haydee Antonieta Zumaeta (Plaintiffs)
appeal from an order granting the motion to quash service of summons filed
by defendant Freightliner Custom Chassis Corporation (FCCC). Plaintiffs
contend that the trial court erred in concluding that they failed to establish
that California has general or specific jurisdiction over FCCC in this action.
      We conclude that Plaintiffs’ arguments lack merit, and accordingly we
affirm the order granting FCCC’s motion to quash and dismissing it from this
action.
                                        I.
              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      This litigation arises from a February 22, 2020 bus accident that
occurred on Interstate 15 in San Diego County, resulting in the death of

Cynthia Karely Rodriguez Banda (Cynthia)1 and injury to Zumaeta.
      On February 22, 2021, Zumaeta, along with Cynthia’s parents and
brother (as survivors), filed a lawsuit against several defendants. The
defendants included (1) the bus owners/operators; (2) the bus driver; (3) the
California Department of Transportation; (4) the manufacturer of the bus
(alleged to be General Coach America, Inc.); (5) the alleged manufacturer of
the bus’s tires; and (6) the alleged manufacturer of the bus’s seats and seat
belts. As specifically relevant here, the defendants also included FCCC,

which manufactured the bus’s chassis.2 All of the causes of action asserted

against FCCC were based on various theories of products liability.3

1     We refer to Cynthia by her first name to distinguish her from plaintiffs
with the same surnames, and we intend no disrespect by doing so.

2     FCCC was erroneously identified in the complaint as “Freightliner.”

3    Specifically, the complaint alleged the following causes of action
against FCCC: “products liability - negligence,” “products liability - failure to
warn,” “products liability - strict liability,” “products liability - breach of

                                        2
      On April 1, 2021, FCCC specially appeared in the action and filed a
motion to quash service of summons based on lack of personal jurisdiction in

California. (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10.)4 FCCC argued that Plaintiffs could
not “meet their burden of establishing the requisite connection between
FCCC, California, and this litigation to justify general or specific jurisdiction
over FCCC.”
      FCCC supported its motion with the declaration of Dennis Rostenbach,
who holds a position in “FCCC Dealer Operations/Product Litigation” at
FCCC. Rostenbach stated that FCCC is a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in Gaffney, South Carolina. According to
Rostenbach, “FCCC does not own property in California,” “FCCC does not
manufacture and/or assemble vehicles in California,” “FCCC has one
employee in California who works remotely from his home,” and “FCCC has
approximately 800 employees in South Carolina.” Rostenbach explained that

warranties,” and “products liability - misrepresentation/concealment.”
(Capitalization omitted.)

4      The hearing on the motion to quash was noticed for July 9, 2021, which
was the first hearing date available on the trial court’s calendar, and was 99
days after FCCC filed its motion on April 1, 2021. The Code of Civil
Procedure states that, in filing a motion to quash, “[t]he notice shall
designate, as the time for making the motion, a date not more than 30 days
after filing of the notice.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (b).) In the trial
court, Plaintiffs argued that the motion to quash “must be denied” for failure
to have the motion heard within 30 days. They raise the argument again in
their appellate briefing. The contention lacks merit. A “tardy hearing date
on a motion . . . under section 418.10” does not “deprive[ ] the trial court of
jurisdiction to consider the merits of the motion.” (Olinick v. BMG
Entertainment (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1286, 1296; see also Edmon &
Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group
2022) ¶ 3:381 [“scheduling a hearing date beyond 30 days does not invalidate
the motion”].)
                                        3
“FCCC designs, manufactures, assembles and sells chassis, which are
incomplete vehicles,” but it “does not design, manufacture, assemble,
advertise or sell buses.”
      Based on the vehicle identification number of the bus involved in the
accident, Rostenbach determined that FCCC was the manufacturer of the
bus’s chassis. As shown by the invoice attached to Rostenbach’s declaration,
the chassis was sold by FCCC in 2013 to Champion Bus, Inc., which was
located in Imlay City, Michigan. FCCC assembled the chassis in South
Carolina according to the buyer’s specifications. According to Rostenbach,
“The subject . . . chassis was not designed, assembled, advertised or sold by
FCCC in California.” Rostenbach stated that “FCCC has no control over
where the purchasers of its chassis market and sell their completed vehicles.”
As Rostenbach explained, “FCCC did not market, advertise, distribute or sell
the subject bus, which Plaintiffs claim is defective, in California.”
      Plaintiffs filed an opposition on June 25, 2021. The sole evidence relied
upon by Plaintiffs in support of their opposition were two groups of printouts
from internet websites.
      The first group of printouts was from FCCC’s website. In their
opposition briefing, Plaintiffs focused on language in those printouts
describing FCCC’s market share for chassis: “As the world’s largest
manufacturer of diesel walk-in van chassis, nearly two-thirds of all diesel
walk-in van chassis sold today are made by FCCC. We also hold more than
half the market in Class A diesel motorhome chassis and more than a quarter
of the market in conventional school bus chassis.” Plaintiffs also focused on
the portion of FCCC’s website that identified independent service centers
where FCCC’s products could be serviced. The FCCC website states,
“Freightliner Custom Chassis owners have access to the industry’s largest

                                        4
service network, comprised of more than 450 Freightliner branded service
locations throughout North America.” Those service centers include at least
15 locations in California.
      The second group of printouts was from the website of Velocity Truck
Centers, which has several locations in California, and in other states. The
printouts appear to indicate that Velocity Truck Centers is a dealer that sells
chassis manufactured by FCCC. The printouts depict two models of FCCC

chassis, but not the model of chassis that is at issue in this litigation.5
      Plaintiffs filed objections to Rostenbach’s declaration. They also
requested, in the alternative, that the hearing on the motion to quash be
continued by 180 days to permit them to conduct discovery. However,
Plaintiffs did not set forth any specific jurisdictional discovery that they
intended to pursue or point to any jurisdictional discovery that they had
already propounded in the 85 days since FCCC filed its motion to quash.
      In its reply, FCCC confirmed that Plaintiffs had not propounded any
discovery specifically designed to develop facts relating to the issue of
personal jurisdiction. Instead, on June 10, 2021, Plaintiffs propounded
lengthy discovery requests to FCCC that were not targeted to issues of

personal jurisdiction.6

5     Specifically, the printouts from the Velocity Truck Centers website
depict the “Freightliner Custom Chassis MT” and the “Freightliner Custom
Chassis MT50e.” The model sold by FCCC to Champion Bus, Inc. was the
“2014 Freightliner S2 chassis.”

6     In its reply, FCCC also submitted discovery responses from Plaintiffs
establishing that, contrary to the allegations in the complaint, the family
members of Cynthia who are plaintiffs in this action are residents of Mexico,
not California. The complaint alleged that plaintiff Zumaeta is a resident of
California, and FCCC did not submit evidence to challenge that allegation.
                                        5
      At a July 9, 2021 hearing, the trial court denied Plaintiffs’ request for a
continuance to conduct discovery, overruled Plaintiffs’ objections to
Rostenbach’s declaration, and granted FCCC’s motion to quash.
      Plaintiffs appeal from the order granting FCCC’s motion to quash and

dismissing FCCC from the action.7
                                       II.
                                 DISCUSSION
A.    The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying the Request to
      Continue the Motion to Permit Discovery or by Overruling Plaintiffs’
      Objections to Rostenbach’s Declaration
      Before turning to the merits of FCCC’s personal jurisdiction challenge,
we consider two preliminary issues. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend the trial
court erred in (1) denying their request for a continuance of the motion to
quash so they could conduct discovery; and (2) overruling their objections to
Rostenbach’s declaration.

7      In connection with this appeal, Plaintiffs have filed two requests for
judicial notice. The first request, filed April 11, 2022, provides color printouts
of the website pages of FCCC and Velocity Truck Centers that Plaintiffs
submitted in the trial court to support their opposition to FCCC’s motion to
quash. Because Plaintiffs perceive those printouts to be difficult to read as
they appear in the black and white reproductions in the appellate record,
they have provided us with more legible color printouts, and they ask that we
take judicial notice of them. We grant the April 11, 2022 request. In their
second request, filed September 14, 2022, Plaintiffs ask that we take judicial
notice of an Illinois appellate court case and a federal district court opinion,
and they provide copies of those opinions, both of which are also available
through legal research databases, including Westlaw and LEXIS. As
Evidence Code section 452 provides that “[j]udicial notice may be taken of . . .
(a) The decisional, constitutional, and statutory law of any state of the United
States and the resolutions and private acts of the Congress of the United
States and of the Legislature of this state,” we grant Plaintiffs’ September 14,
2022 request for judicial notice.
                                        6
      1.    Plaintiffs’ Request for a Continuance to Conduct Discovery
      Plaintiffs requested in their opposition memorandum that the trial
court continue the motion to quash for 180 days to allow them to conduct
discovery relevant to personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs contend that the trial
court erred in denying their request.
      “A trial court has the discretion to continue the hearing on a motion to
quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction to allow the
plaintiff to conduct discovery on jurisdictional issues.” (HealthMarkets, Inc.
v. Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1173.) “In order to prevail on
a motion for a continuance for jurisdictional discovery, the plaintiff should
demonstrate that discovery is likely to lead to the production of evidence of
facts establishing jurisdiction.” (In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II
(2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 127 (Automobile Antitrust Cases).) Because the
decision to grant a continuance is a discretionary decision, “[o]n appeal, we
will not reverse the trial court’s ruling unless we find a manifest abuse of
that discretion.” (Ibid.)
      Here, although Plaintiffs requested a continuance for the purpose of
conducting discovery on jurisdictional issues, they failed to identify any
specific area of inquiry that they would pursue if they were allowed to
conduct discovery. In his declaration, Plaintiffs’ counsel described the
discovery he sought to conduct in extremely vague terms: “Plaintiffs seek to
take depositions, engage in limited written discovery, and probe the
connections of the moving defendant to the forum state, and inquire as to the
claims regarding non-connection by moving defendant, among other things.”
In addition, there were 85 days between the April 1, 2021 filing of FCCC’s
motion to quash and the June 25, 2021 filing of Plaintiffs’ opposition to that
motion, and 99 days between the filing of the motion and the hearing date.

                                        7
However, Plaintiffs did not use that time period to propound any discovery
targeted to the issue of personal jurisdiction. On the contrary, on June 10,
2021, Plaintiffs propounded lengthy discovery requests on FCCC, but
Plaintiffs did not design that discovery to lead to evidence relevant to issues

of personal jurisdiction.8
      In denying the continuance, the trial court specifically focused on
Plaintiffs’ failure to propound jurisdictional discovery when they had the
opportunity to do so, and on their failure to identify the specific discovery
they would pursue if given a continuance. As explained in the order granting
the motion to quash: “The Court finds, as stated in the reply papers, that
plaintiffs have had since the motion was filed on April 1, 2021 to propound
discovery regarding the jurisdictional issues, but have failed to do so.
Instead, plaintiffs propounded discovery regarding issues that were unrelated
to the motion to quash for lack of' jurisdiction. Plaintiffs also failed to submit

8      In their appellate briefing, Plaintiffs point to two of the 174 categories
of documents described in their June 10, 2021 request for production
propounded on FCCC. Request No. 95 asked for “All DOCUMENTS
PERTAINING to the manufacture of YOUR PRODUCT, limited to those
DOCUMENTS that PERTAIN to the CLAIMED DEFECT.” Request No. 100
asked for “All DOCUMENTS PERTAINING to the chain of distribution of
YOUR PRODUCT, limited to those DOCUMENTS that PERTAIN to the
CLAIMED DEFECT.” Based on these requests, Plaintiffs contend that they
did, in fact, start the process of attempting to obtain discovery related to
personal jurisdiction. We are not persuaded. Based on our review of the 174
requests for production and the 38 special interrogatories propounded by
Plaintiffs on FCCC, the discovery propounded by Plaintiffs was not targeted
to the issue of personal jurisdiction, and instead was directed at developing
the elements of their causes of action. Moreover, Plaintiffs did not identify
these two requests when arguing for a continuance in the trial court in order
to conduct jurisdictional discovery.
                                        8
the specific discovery or description of the discovery they seek to propound for

the Court’s consideration.”9
      Because Plaintiffs failed to articulate what specific facts they would
seek to develop if granted a continuance, the trial court could reasonably
conclude that Plaintiffs did not “demonstrate that discovery is likely to lead
to the production of evidence of facts establishing jurisdiction.” (Automobile
Antitrust Cases, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 127.) Accordingly, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiffs’ request for a
continuance of the motion to quash to conduct discovery. (See Thomson v.
Anderson (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 258, 271 [the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in implicitly denying a request for a continuance of a motion to
quash to allow discovery when, among other things, “counsel did not identify
what kind of discovery she wanted to take or what kind of jurisdictional facts
she believed discovery would disclose”].)
      2.    Plaintiffs’ Objections to Rostenbach’s Declaration
      Plaintiffs filed objections to almost every paragraph in the Rostenbach
declaration. They objected on grounds that included lack of foundation,

9      During the motion hearing, the trial court provided a similar
explanation for why it was denying the request for a continuance: “And with
respect to the request for further discovery, I don’t have before me the
request for specific further discovery which would aid in the determination
with respect to jurisdiction. . . . And then I’ve got . . . the specially appearing
part[y’s] response saying we’ve got other discovery, none of it dealt with this
jurisdictional issue. And so I’m going to deny the request. I agree that I
prefer to allow discovery to go forward whether it’s a jurisdictional issue, but
almost invariably I get that request two months before the hearing. And I
get it with specific here’s the interrogatories we would like to set. Here is the
individual we would like to depose that will help us on the jurisdictional
issue. . . . I understand why the special appearing party is named here, but
in this particular unique case, I’m going to have to rule against you.”
                                         9
conclusory, irrelevant, calls for speculation, and lack of personal knowledge.
The trial court overruled the objections.
      On appeal, Plaintiffs contend that their objections should have been
sustained because Rostenbach had no personal knowledge of the matters
discussed in his declaration, and thus his statements lacked foundation.
According to Plaintiffs, “the declaration did not state the basis of
[Rostenbach’s] personal knowledge nor provide admissible evidence
establishing his personal knowledge.”
      The Evidence Code provides that “the testimony of a witness
concerning a particular matter is inadmissible unless he has personal
knowledge of the matter.” (Evid. Code, § 702, subd. (a).) “A witness’ personal
knowledge of a matter may be shown by any otherwise admissible evidence,
including his own testimony.” (Id., subd. (b).) In determining whether the
trial court properly concluded a declarant had personal knowledge, “we will
uphold the trial court’s determination if it is supported by substantial
evidence. . . . We review for abuse of discretion the ultimate decision whether
to admit the evidence.” (People v. Phillips (2000) 22 Cal.4th 226, 236.)
      Here, Rostenbach’s declaration explained the nature of his employment
at FCCC and his familiarity with its records and corporate operations.
Rostenbach declared, “I make this declaration based on personal experience
and knowledge of the facts set forth herein, which includes my review of the
books and records of FCCC that are kept in the ordinary course of business,
as well as personal knowledge obtained during my employment by FCCC in
the ordinary course of my duties. [¶] . . . I have been employed by FCCC
since August of 1996. I have held the position of FCCC Dealer
Operations/Product Litigation since 1998. In my role with the company, I
have become familiar with the record-keeping of FCCC and its organizational

                                        10
structure, as well as that of other corporate entities that are affiliated with
FCCC, such as Daimler Trucks North America LLC. [¶] . . . Based on my
employment with FCCC, I have knowledge of the operations of FCCC. I am
also familiar with records created and maintained in the ordinary course of
business of FCCC.”
      These statements provide substantial evidence to support a finding
that Rostenbach had personal knowledge of the matters set forth in his
declaration. (See Tutti Mangia Italian Grill, Inc. v. American Textile
Maintenance Co. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 733, 742 [a foundation was properly
laid for a declaration where the witness explained the basis for his personal
knowledge].) The trial court accordingly did not abuse its discretion in
overruling Plaintiffs’ objections to Rostenbach’s declaration based on lack of
personal knowledge.
B.    The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting the Motion to Quash
      We now turn to the central issue presented in this appeal: whether the
trial court erred in concluding that Plaintiffs failed to establish that
California had personal jurisdiction over FCCC in this action.
      The standard of review in an appeal from an order granting a motion to
quash for lack of personal jurisdiction is well-settled. “In reviewing a trial
court’s determination of jurisdiction, we will not disturb the court’s factual
determinations ‘if supported by substantial evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘When no
conflict in the evidence exists, however, the question of jurisdiction is purely
one of law and the reviewing court engages in an independent review of the
record.’ ” (Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 262, 273
(Pavlovich).) Here, the parties do not identify any factual disputes that the
trial court was required to resolve. We accordingly conduct an independent
review.

                                        11
      A California court “may exercise personal jurisdiction on any basis
consistent with the Constitutions of California and the United States.”
(Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 268; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.)
“The exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant comports with
these Constitutions ‘if the defendant has such minimum contacts with the
state that the assertion of jurisdiction does not violate “ ‘traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.’ ” ’ ” (Pavlovich, at p. 268.) “Under the
minimum contacts test, ‘an essential criterion in all cases is whether the
“quality and nature” of the defendant’s activity is such that it is “reasonable”
and “fair” to require him to conduct his defense in that State.’ ” (Ibid.)
      “When a defendant moves to quash service of process on jurisdictional
grounds, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying
the exercise of jurisdiction.” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc.
(1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 449 (Vons).) “The plaintiff must come forward with
affidavits and other competent evidence to carry this burden and cannot
simply rely on allegations in an unverified complaint.” (Buchanan v. Soto
(2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1362.) “Once facts showing minimum contacts
with the forum state are established, however, it becomes the defendant’s
burden to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be
unreasonable.” (Vons, at p. 449.)
      There are “two kinds of personal jurisdiction: general (sometimes
called all-purpose) jurisdiction and specific (sometimes called case-linked)
jurisdiction.” (Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (2021)
___ U.S. ___, ___ [141 S.Ct. 1017, 1024] (Ford Motor).) Plaintiffs contend that
they “established both general and specific jurisdiction.” We accordingly
consider each in turn.

                                        12
      1.       General Jurisdiction
      “A state court may exercise general jurisdiction only when a defendant
is ‘essentially at home’ in the State. [Citation.] General jurisdiction, as its
name implies, extends to ‘any and all claims’ brought against a defendant.
[Citation.] Those claims need not relate to the forum State or the defendant’s
activity there; they may concern events and conduct anywhere in the world.
But that breadth imposes a correlative limit: Only a select ‘set of affiliations
with a forum’ will expose a defendant to such sweeping jurisdiction.
[Citation.] In what [the Supreme Court] ha[s] called the ‘paradigm’ case, an
individual is subject to general jurisdiction in her place of domicile.
[Citation.] And the ‘equivalent’ forums for a corporation are its place of
incorporation and principal place of business.” (Ford Motor, supra, 141 S.Ct.
at p. 1024.)
      Although a defendant’s state of incorporation and principal place of
business are the paradigmatic indications that a corporation is “at home” in a
state, “in an exceptional case . . . a corporation’s operations in a forum other
than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so
substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that
State.” (Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 571 U.S. 117, 139, fn. 19 (Daimler
AG), citing Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. (1952) 342 U.S. 437.)
For example, in Perkins, the Supreme Court held that a corporation was
subject to general personal jurisdiction in Ohio, even though it was organized
in the Philippines and normally conducted its operations there, because its
business operations were temporarily relocated to Ohio during wartime.
(Perkins, at pp. 448-449.) The inquiry is “whether th[e] corporation’s
‘affiliations with the State are so “continuous and systematic” as to render [it]
essentially at home in the forum State.’ ” (Daimler AG, at p. 139.)

                                       13
      Here, the undisputed facts are that FCCC is a Delaware corporation,
and its principal place of business is in South Carolina. It does not have any
offices or facilities in California. Plaintiffs have submitted website printouts
suggesting that some of FCCC’s products are sold and serviced in California
(through independent dealers), but those types of contacts do not establish
that FCCC is “at home” in California. As the Supreme Court has made clear,
general jurisdiction requires more than a showing that “a corporation
‘engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business’ ” in
a state. (Daimler AG, supra, 571 U.S. at pp. 137-138.) Instead, the state
must hold the particular position of being the location where the corporation
is “at home.” (Id. at p. 139, fn. 20 [“A corporation that operates in many
places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.”].) Accordingly,
Plaintiffs have not met their burden to show that FCCC is subject to general
jurisdiction in California.
      2.    Specific Jurisdiction
      In contrast to general jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction “covers
defendants less intimately connected with a State, but only as to a narrower
class of claims. The contacts needed for this kind of jurisdiction often go by
the name ‘purposeful availment.’ ” (Ford Motor, supra, 141 S.Ct. at p. 1024.)
For a state to have specific jurisdiction, the defendant “must take ‘some act
by which [it] purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State.’ [Citation.] The contacts must be the defendant’s
own choice and not ‘random, isolated, or fortuitous.’ [Citation.] They must
show that the defendant deliberately ‘reached out beyond’ its home—by, for
example, ‘exploi[ting] a market’ in the forum State or entering a contractual
relationship centered there. [Citation.] Yet even then—because the
defendant is not ‘at home’—the forum State may exercise jurisdiction in only

                                        14
certain cases. The plaintiff’s claims . . . ‘must arise out of or relate to the
defendant’s contacts’ with the forum.” (Id. at pp. 1024-1025.)
      Thus, a two-part showing by the plaintiff is required to establish
specific jurisdiction: “[(1)] the defendant has ‘purposefully directed’ his
activities at residents of the forum, . . . and [(2)] the litigation results from
alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities.” (Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 472-473, citation omitted.)
              a.    Purposeful Availment
      We first consider whether Plaintiffs have established that FCCC
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
California.
      “[P]urposeful availment occurs where a nonresident defendant
‘ “purposefully direct[s]” [its] activities at residents of the forum’ [citation],
‘ ‘‘purposefully derive[s] benefit” from’ its activities in the forum [citation],
‘create[s] a “substantial connection” with the forum’ [citation], ‘ “deliberately”
has engaged in significant activities within’ the forum [citation], or ‘has
created “continuing obligations” between [itself] and residents of the forum.’ ”
(Snowney v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1063.)
“ ‘ “The purposeful availment inquiry . . . focuses on the defendant’s
intentionality. [Citation.] This prong is only satisfied when the defendant
purposefully and voluntarily directs his activities toward the forum so that he
should expect, by virtue of the benefit he receives, to be subject to the court’s
jurisdiction based on” his contacts with the forum.’ (Pavlovich, supra,
29 Cal.4th at p. 269.) In a products liability case, like this one, the California
Supreme Court has held that a nonresident manufacturer purposefully avails
itself of the benefits of California when it takes actions ‘designed to
consummate a business arrangement in which [it] would profit financially by

                                         15
selling its product for use in California,’ and both knows and intends that its
product will ‘enter California and . . . be used’ in this state. (Secrest Mach.
Corp. v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 664, 671 (Secrest).)” (LG Chem, Ltd.
v. Superior Court of San Diego County (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 348, 362-363
(LG Chem).)
      “Following Secrest, California courts have consistently concluded that a
foreign corporation purposefully avails itself of the benefits of the California
forum when it knowingly sells and ships its products to California businesses
for use in California.” (LG Chem, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 363 [citing
cases].) Thus, for example, this court recently held that a company who “sold
and shipped millions of its [particular] batteries over the course of two years
to three California companies for their use,” constituting sales that were
“substantially remunerative,” had “purposefully availed itself of the benefits
of doing business in California.” (Id. at p. 363.) Put another way, “if the sale
of a product of a manufacturer or distributor . . . is not simply an isolated
occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to
serve, directly or indirectly, the market for its product” in the forum state,
the purposeful availment requirement is met. (World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.

v. Woodson (1980) 444 U.S. 286, 297 (World-Wide Volkswagen).)10
      As we have explained, the only evidence Plaintiffs submitted in
opposition to the motion to quash were printouts from the websites of FCCC

10    Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd.
v. Superior Court of California, Solano County (1987) 480 U.S. 102, 112
provided the following examples of conduct that might constitute purposeful
availment: “designing the product for the market in the forum State,
advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for providing regular
advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through a
distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State.”
                                        16
and Velocity Truck Centers. As FCCC did not assert any evidentiary
objections to those documents, we consider their contents.
      As relevant to the issue of purposeful availment, the website printouts
suggest that FCCC may, to some extent, “serve, directly or indirectly, the
market for its product” in California. (World-Wide Volkswagen, supra,
444 U.S. at p. 297.) Specifically, the printouts from the Velocity Truck
Centers website show that Velocity Truck Centers offers for sale two chassis
models made by FCCC. Those same website printouts also show that
Velocity Truck Centers has several locations in California. From those
predicates, along with FCCC’s description of itself as “the world’s largest
manufacturer of diesel walk-in van chassis,” Plaintiffs contend they have
established that FCCC sells chassis in California. Moreover, the printouts
from FCCC’s website show that FCCC has relationships with numerous
authorized service centers in California to provide service for its chassis in

the state.11
      The sparse evidence provided by Plaintiffs on the issue of purposeful
availment makes it difficult for us to analyze whether FCCC has, indeed,
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in California. It
would have been preferable for Plaintiffs to have attempted to develop facts
about the nature and extent of FCCC’s sales of chassis in California, FCCC’s
advertising in California, and the extent to which FCCC has entered into
contracts with service centers in California. The cursory website printouts
provided by Plaintiffs are a poor substitute for discovery targeted at issues

11    FCCC did not submit evidence about its overall activities in California,
other than to explain that the chassis involved in the accident here had no
connection to California. However, it was Plaintiffs’ burden to submit
evidence supporting jurisdiction in the first place, not FCCC’s burden to
submit evidence to defeat it. (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 449.)
                                       17
related to purposeful availment.12 As will become evident from our
subsequent discussion, however, the purposeful availment prong of the
specific jurisdiction analysis is not where the most serious deficiencies with
Plaintiffs’ jurisdictional claim arise. The more serious problems arise in
Plaintiffs’ attempt to establish that its claims arise out of or relate to FCCC’s
contacts with California. Accordingly, we will assume, for the sake of our
analysis, that Plaintiffs have established that FCCC, at least to some extent,
sells and provides service for its chassis in California, and that the purposeful
availment prong of the specific jurisdiction analysis has therefore been met.
With that assumption, we will proceed to the second prong of the specific
jurisdiction analysis.
            b.    Arising Out of or Related to FCCC’s Contacts With
                  California
      The inquiry in the second prong of the specific jurisdiction analysis is
whether Plaintiffs have established that their claims against FCCC in this
lawsuit “ ‘arise out of or relate to [FCCC’s] contacts with the forum.’ ” (Ford
Motor, supra, 141 S.Ct. at p. 1026, italics omitted.) As the Supreme Court
explained in Ford Motor, “[t]he first half of that standard asks about
causation; but the back half, after the ‘or,’ contemplates that some
relationships will support jurisdiction without a causal showing. That does
not mean anything goes. In the sphere of specific jurisdiction, the phrase

12    Although it would have been greatly preferable for Plaintiffs to have
conducted discovery on issues related to specific jurisdiction, Plaintiffs made
no attempt to do so while the motion to quash was pending, and instead
propounded lengthy discovery on the merits of their claims. Accordingly, as
we have explained, the trial court was well within its discretion to deny
Plaintiffs’ request to continue the motion to allow additional time for
discovery.
                                       18
‘relate to’ incorporates real limits, as it must to adequately protect defendants
foreign to a forum.” (Ibid., italics added.)
      Ford Motor is the Supreme Court’s most recent discussion of the second

prong of the specific jurisdiction inquiry.13 (Ford Motor, supra, 141 S.Ct.
1017.) The facts in Ford Motor have some meaningful similarities to this
action that make Ford Motor an especially useful precedent in determining
whether Plaintiffs have established that their claims against FCCC arise out
of or relate to FCCC’s contacts with California. Specifically, both this case
and Ford Motor concern product liability claims against a motor vehicle

manufacturer (or in this case a motor vehicle component manufacturer),14

13     Prior to Ford Motor, the Supreme Court in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Superior Court (2017) ___ U.S. ___ [137 S.Ct. 1773], considered a different
facet of the requirement that a plaintiff’s claims arise out of or relate to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum state. In Bristol-Myers, out-of-state
plaintiffs sued a pharmaceutical company in California even though the
plaintiffs did not obtain a prescription for or buy the allegedly harmful drug
in California, did not ingest it in California, and did not incur injury or
receive medical care for injuries in California. (Id. at p. 1778.) Moreover, the
drug was not manufactured or developed in California. (Ibid.) Under those
circumstances, even though the pharmaceutical company conceded it had
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in
California and did sell the drug in California to other consumers, there was
an insufficient connection with California to support specific jurisdiction for
the out-of-state plaintiffs whose claims had no connection to California. (Id.
at p. 1782.) Bristol-Myers established that “[i]n order for a court to exercise
specific jurisdiction over a claim, there must be an ‘affiliation between the
forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an
occurrence that takes place in the forum State.’ ” (Id. at p. 1781.) Here, as
required by Bristol-Myers, there is undoubtedly a connection between
California and Plaintiffs’ claims because the bus accident occurred in
California.
14    Although, as FCCC urges, there are undoubtedly meaningful
distinctions to be drawn in a personal jurisdictional analysis between a motor

                                        19
where the injury-causing accident occurred in the forum state, but the
allegedly defective vehicle was sold and manufactured somewhere else.
      In Ford Motor, two product liability suits were brought against the
automobile manufacturer Ford as a result of two car accidents. (Ford Motor,
supra, 141 S.Ct. at pp. 1022-1023.) In both of the cases at issue in the Ford
Motor opinion, “[t]he accident happened in the State where suit was brought.
The victim was one of the State’s residents. And Ford did substantial
business in the State—among other things, advertising, selling, and servicing
the model of vehicle the suit claims is defective.” (Ford Motor, at p. 1022.)
However, “the particular car involved in the crash was not first sold in the
forum State, nor was it designed or manufactured there.” (Ibid.) “Only later
resales and relocations by consumers had brought the vehicles to” the forum
states, where the accidents occurred. (Id. at p. 1023.) Ford argued that the
claims against it did not arise out of or relate to its contacts with the forum
states because it did not sell, manufacture or design the plaintiffs’ cars in the
forum states. (Id. at p. 1026.) The Supreme Court rejected that argument
because the record established other connections between the plaintiffs’
claims and Ford’s activities in the forum states.
      The Supreme Court first recited the extensive contacts between Ford
and the forum states, including sales in the forum states of the identical car
models involved in the accidents and alleged to be defective: an Explorer and
a Crown Victoria. (Ford Motor, supra, 141 S.Ct. at p. 1028.) “By every
means imaginable—among them, billboards, TV and radio spots, print ads,

vehicle manufacturer and a motor vehicle component manufacturer, because
we conclude that personal jurisdiction is lacking even if we treat FCCC as
analogous to a motor vehicle manufacturer such as Ford, we need not (and do
not) consider the impact of FCCC’s status as a manufacturer of components
rather than completed motor vehicles.
                                       20
and direct mail—Ford urges [forum-state residents] to buy its vehicles,
including (at all relevant times) Explorers and Crown Victorias. Ford cars—
again including those two models—are available for sale, whether new or
used, throughout the [forum] States, at . . . dealerships . . . . And apart from
sales, Ford works hard to foster ongoing connections to its cars’ owners. The
company’s dealers in [the forum states] (as elsewhere) regularly maintain
and repair Ford cars, including those whose warranties have long since
expired. And the company distributes replacement parts both to its own
dealers and to independent auto shops in the two [forum] States. Those
activities, too, make Ford money. And by making it easier to own a Ford,
they encourage [forum-state residents] to become lifelong Ford drivers.”
(Ibid.)
      The Supreme Court then explained how Ford’s forum-state connections
related to the plaintiffs’ claims. “Each plaintiff’s suit, of course, arises from a
car accident in one of those [forum] States. In each complaint, the resident-
plaintiff alleges that a defective Ford vehicle—an Explorer in one, a Crown
Victoria in the other—caused the crash and resulting harm. And as just
described, Ford had advertised, sold, and serviced those two car models in
both [forum] States for many years. (Contrast a case, which we do not
address, in which Ford marketed the models in only a different State or
region.) In other words, Ford had systematically served a market in [the
forum states] for the very vehicles that the plaintiffs allege malfunctioned and
injured them in those States. So there is a strong ‘relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation’ —the ‘essential foundation’ of
specific jurisdiction.” (Ford Motor, supra, 141 S.Ct. at p. 1028, italics added.)
The Supreme Court explained that “this exact fact pattern (a resident-
plaintiff sues a global car company, extensively serving the state market in a

                                        21
vehicle, for an in-state accident)” is “a paradigm example—of how specific
jurisdiction works.” (Ibid.) As the Supreme Court summarized its holding,
“When a company like Ford serves a market for a product in a State and that
product causes injury in the State to one of its residents, the State’s courts
may entertain the resulting suit.” (Id. at p. 1022, italics added.)
      Here, Plaintiffs’ sparse evidentiary submission in opposition to FCCC’s
motion to quash did not establish the type of facts that Ford Motor relied
upon to conclude that the plaintiffs’ claims arose out of or were related to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum states. In Ford Motor, an important
factor was that “Ford had systematically served a market in [the forum
states] for the very vehicles that the plaintiffs allege malfunctioned and
injured them in those States.” (Ford Motor, supra, 141 S.Ct. at p. 1028, italics
added.) Specifically, the cars that caused the injuries alleged by plaintiffs
were an Explorer and a Crown Victoria. The evidence showed that Ford
“advertised, sold, and serviced those two car models in both [forum] States for
many years.” (Ibid., italics added.) In contrast, the website printouts
provided by Plaintiffs do not establish that FCCC has ever advertised, sold,
or serviced the model of chassis at issue in this lawsuit in California. At
most, the printouts from the website of Velocity Truck Centers suggests that
two models of FCCC’s chassis are sold in California (the “Freightliner
Custom Chassis MT” and the “Freightliner Custom Chassis MT50e”), but not
the “2014 Freightliner S2 chassis” at issue in this case. Moreover, there is no
evidence that authorized service centers in California have serviced the
model of chassis involved in this lawsuit.
      We note that although “[m]ost lower federal and state courts
considering case linkage in the context of a product liability claim have
interpreted Ford Motor Co. to require forum contacts pertaining to the

                                       22
specific product model at issue in the litigation” (Adams v. Aircraft Spruce &
Specialty Co. (Conn. 2022) 284 A.3d 600, 617 (Adams), italics added), some
other courts have concluded that Ford Motor does not necessarily require the
defendant to have marketed or sold the precise model of product at issue in
the litigation in the forum state. (See, e.g., Godfried v. Ford Motor Co.
(D.Me., May 6, 2021, No. 1:19-cv-00372-NT) 2021 WL 1819696, at p. *5 [“it is
not necessarily a prerequisite for specific jurisdiction that a company market
or sell the specific product model at issue in the forum state”]; Sibley v. Air
and Liquid Systems Corp. (N.D.Cal., June 30, 2021, No. 20-cv-07697-MMC)
2021 WL 2688819, at p. *3 [same]; Harding v. Cordis Corp. (Ill.Ct.App. 2021)
196 N.E.3d 514, 523 [“nothing in Ford suggests that the only way to
demonstrate that a defendant has minimum contacts with a forum state is
through sales of the injurious product”].)
      “These courts have indicated that forum activity relating to other
models of the same product type could provide support for specific
jurisdiction, if there is no basis to conclude that there is a material difference
between the models.” (Adams, supra, 284 A.3d at p. 618.) “Although not
stated expressly, these courts appear to have presumed that, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, other models of the same product type that were
produced by the defendant manufacturer could or would share the same
design defect, manufacturing defect, or defective warnings as the particular
model at issue in the litigation.” (Ibid.)
      We agree that if it were reasonable for us to presume that other similar
models of chassis sold by FCCC in California had the same alleged defect as
the 2014 Freightliner S2 chassis involved in this litigation, that would likely
be sufficient to demonstrate that the Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of or relate to
FCCC’s forum-related activities. But we see no basis for such a presumption

                                        23
on this record. According to Plaintiffs, the alleged defect in the 2014
Freightliner S2 chassis is that it did not have electronic stability and traction
control features. Without any evidence on the issue, we cannot simply
presume that FCCC’s other models of chassis sold in California had or have
the same alleged defect. We express no view on whether such a presumption
or inference would be appropriate in another factual context.
      Plaintiffs’ insufficient evidentiary showing becomes clear when
contrasted with the detailed evidentiary showing by the plaintiff in a recent
products liability case against FCCC’s corporate relative, Daimler Trucks
North America LLC (Daimler), which sells the Freightliner brand of trucks.
(Daimler Trucks North America LLC v. Superior Court (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th
946.) Daimler argued that the plaintiff’s claims did not arise out of or relate
to Daimler’s contacts with California because it “did not design, manufacture,
assemble, or sell the very Freightliner involved in California.” (Id. at p. 957.)
The court rejected that argument, based on plaintiff’s evidence, which showed
Daimler’s connections to California, including activity specifically related to
the model of truck at issue in the lawsuit (the Cascadia). As the court
explained, “Daimler advertises Freightliner trucks, including the Cascadia
specifically, across multiple national and regional media that is also directed
to California. Daimler has 32 authorized dealerships in California that sell
Freightliners. Customers can order the vehicles at these dealerships;
Daimler then assembles the specified vehicles and delivers them to the
dealership. Between 4,000 to 5,000 trucks were sold in California each year
from 2014 to 2020. Authorized dealerships advertise Freightliner trucks, and
Daimler provides the dealerships with information for display advertising
purposes. Daimler also sells and ships truck parts to 27 of these authorized
California dealerships. The dealerships offer a variety of specialized

                                       24
maintenance and repair services. Twenty-three of the authorized California
dealerships service Freightliner trucks. There are 11 truck ‘Elite Support’
locations in California. These service centers offer customers the services of
mechanics who receive ‘continual training from the experts at Freightliner’
and must meet specific criteria. Nine ‘ServicePoint’ locations in California
offer 24/7 service, repairs, parts, inspections, and trailer maintenance. Seven
‘Body Shop’ locations in California provide Freightliner crash repair and
other repair services not often available in a typical dealership. Hundreds of
these service shops are located in the United States.” (Id. at pp. 950-951,
italics added.) The court concluded that “Daimler’s activities supporting the
sale and service of the Freightliner Cascadia in this state,” among other facts,
“demonstrate that [plaintiff’s] claims ‘relate to’ those very California
activities.” (Id. at p. 959.) Here, in contrast, Plaintiffs have provided no
evidence that FCCC has engaged in any activity supporting the sale and
service of the 2014 Freightliner S2 chassis in California or of any other
chassis containing the same alleged defects.
      Apart from failing to present evidence that FCCC sold the same or
similar chassis in California, Plaintiffs also have not identified any other
connection between FCCC’s California contacts and this lawsuit that would
support an exercise of specific jurisdiction. As FCCC established through the
Rostenbach declaration, the chassis at issue was assembled in South
Carolina and then sold to Champion Bus, Inc. in Michigan. FCCC had no
involvement in bringing that chassis, or the bus into which it was ultimately
incorporated, into California. There is also no evidence that FCCC was
involved in servicing that chassis in California.
      Accordingly, we conclude that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their
burden to establish the second prong of the specific jurisdiction inquiry,

                                       25
namely, that their claims against FCCC arise out of or relate to FCCC’s
contacts with California. The trial court thus properly granted FCCC’s
motion to quash.
                                DISPOSITION
      The order granting FCCC’s motion to quash and dismissing FCCC
from this action is affirmed.

                                                                   IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

BUCHANAN, J.

                                     26