Court Opinion

ID: 9731019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:30:44.955826+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:12.372739
License: Public Domain

DAUPHINOT, Justice,
concurring.
INTRODUCTION
The unique facts of this case are a cause for concern. Appellant plea-bargained for deferred adjudication community supervision. Unknown to Appellant and his counsel, however, the community supervision department had been instructed to contact the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to report that Appellant was not a citizen of the United States.
Scott Ray, the testifying community supervision officer, identified Defendant’s Exhibit 3 as “the rules that our department must undergo according to Texas Department of Criminal Justice CJAD division.” He described it as “a section of our departmental policy and procedures specifically regarding our relationship to *577Immigration and Naturalization Service.” The community supervision office is required to fax a copy of the pre/post sentence investigation cover sheet to INS within one week for any defendant not born within the United States. The community supervision office is admonished to cooperate with INS in performing INS’s job.
Exhibit 3 also provides, “If the probationer was deported, the supervision officer will submit an ROV [report of violation] and will change the case status to Indirect (I) and the supervision level to DPRT.” It is then up the individual trial judge to decide whether the community supervision department files a motion to revoke probation. The record does not reflect whether the violation, which is the basis of the petitions to revoke or to adjudicate, is leaving the county without permission, failing to report, or being deported. Most courts, although the trial court in which Appellant entered his plea is an exception, “file [sic] those motions to revoke after three months.... ”
In the case before us, the Tarrant County Community Supervision Department immediately contacted INS because Appellant was not born in the United States. One day after Appellant entered his plea, INS seized and deported him, depriving him of his ability to participate in the hearing on his motion for a new trial. Equally important, these actions made it impossible for Appellant to comply with the conditions of community supervision. The community supervision officer testified that the judges of the Tarrant County criminal district courts had authorized the community supervision department to make such reports to INS.
This record raises questions of due process and equal protection, a question of whether the plea bargain was breached, a question of the voluntariness of the plea, and a question of whether a trial judge has become an adversary to a noncitizen defendant when the trial judge may believe federal law requires judges to act as agents of INS. Yet, Appellant appears to have no vehicle for invoking a direct appellate review of these quite serious questions, and is entitled to neither record nor counsel for the purpose of preparing an application for writ of habeas corpus. In-. deed, under these circumstances, I do not understand how Appellant could avail himself of habeas corpus relief.
In holding that an appellant may not raise voluntariness on direct appeal unless he raised the issue by pretrial motion or the trial judge has granted permission to appeal, the court of criminal appeals stated in Cooper v. State,
When we actually consider the issue of whether voluntariness of a guilty plea may be raised on appeal from a plea-bargained, felony conviction, we find that the answer must be that it may not. The first two reasons have been set out above: The legislature forbade it in 1977, and to do so would completely frustrate the statute. Our rule-making authority does not extend to enlarging the right of appeal in this fashion....
Two other reasons support the legislative decision to forbid appeals of volun-tariness in such cases. One is a cost-benefit analysis. The number of plea-bargain, felony cases in which a plea was entered involuntarily is very small, compared to the large number of meritless appeals that would be authorized.1
The court further explained,
The number of cases in which the plea is involuntary when the trial court followed the plea agreement is therefore *578very small, and the number of cases in which the involuntariness would appear in an appellate record is even smaller. Experience has shown us that most cases of involuntary pleas result from circumstances that existed outside the record, such as misunderstandings, erroneous information, impaired judgment, ineffective assistance of counsel, and plea-bargains that were not followed or turn out to be impossible of performance. The legislature reasonably determined to eliminate a small number of meritorious appeals to prevent a much larger number of meritless appeals.
This decision may be seen as even more reasonable when it is remembered that meritorious claims of involuntary pleas may be raised by other procedures: motion for new trial and habeas corpus. These procedures are not only adequate to resolve claims of involuntary pleas, but they are superior to an appeal in that the claim may be supported by information from sources broader than the appellate record, (emphasis added) (citations omitted)2
A defendant who challenges the volun-tariness of his plea must do so within the appellate timetable for direct appeal and may not raise voluntariness after revocation or adjudication.3 But a defendant who is placed on probation may not challenge the voluntariness of his plea by way of an 11.07 writ unless his probation has been revoked or, if adjudication of guilt was deferred, until his guilt has been adjudicated.4 While article Y, section 5 of the Texas Constitution may provide for habeas relief, how can Appellant show that he is unlawfully restrained of his liberty and that the Texas court has jurisdiction if he has been deported from the United States? Must he wait until he attempts an illegal entry since he cannot enter legally because of the felony probation, which is not a conviction under state law but is a conviction under federal immigration law?
Appellant in this case did file a motion for new trial. Does the court of criminal appeals intend to instruct us that, because he filed the motion for new trial, Appellant can appeal its denial outside the strictures of Rule 25.2(b)(3)?5 The court states, “This decision may be seen as even more reasonable when it is remembered that meritorious claims of involuntary pleas may be raised by other procedures: motion for new trial and habeas corpus.”6
Inherent in the concept of a “plea” is the notion that it be freely and voluntarily entered.7 Indeed, a trial court may not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere unless it is knowing and voluntary.8 Here, *579Appellant contends the trial court failed to inform him at the time he entered his plea that, as a matter of procedure, the community supervision department would contact INS regarding his citizenship status. Appellant argues that had he known that immediate deportation would result, he would never have pled guilty. Therefore, according to Appellant, his plea was not knowing or voluntary, and consequently should be set aside.
But Appellant apparently has no vehicle for seeking redress. If he waits until his guilt is adjudicated, he has waited until too late. The conscientious trial judge recognized Appellant’s absence from the hearing on the motion for new trial was involuntary. He allowed the hearing to proceed without Appellant’s presence because to do otherwise “would deny him procedural appeal guaranteed by both the statutes of [sic] the Constitution and the State of Texas_” The trial‘judge also granted Appellant’s motion to arrest terms of probation pending issuance of mandate. He intended that Appellant be allowed an avenue of redress by granting permission to appeal. A different trial judge might have denied permission. To require permission of the trial judge to seek relief from an involuntary plea subjugates any defendant’s due process and equal protection rights to the good will of the trial judge.
Judges may not rewrite laws the legislature has enacted. But we are also bound by the same oath to preserve the mantle of constitutional safeguards for both citizen and noncitizen alike. Because of the court’s holding in Cooper, however, I have no choice but to concur in the outcome the majority reaches.

. Cooper v. State, 45 S.W.3d 77, 81 (Tex.Crim. App.2001).

. Id., 45 S.W.3d at 82.

. Daniels v. State, 30 S.W.3d 407, 408 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (citing Manuel v. State, 994 S.W.2d 658, 661-62 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (holding a defendant placed on deferred adjudication has to appeal issues relating to the original deferred adjudication proceeding when deferred adjudication is first imposed)).

. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07 (Vernon Supp.2001); Ex parte Chappell, 959 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex.Crim.App.1998); Ex parte Payne, 618 S.W.2d 380, 381 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (holding that because applicant was placed on probation in theft case and such probation was never revoked, that conviction is not ''final” and may not be challenged under article 11.07).

. Tex.R.App. P. 25.2(b)(3).

. Cooper, 45 S.W.3d at 82.

. George v. State, 20 S.W.3d 130, 133 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd); Session v. State, 978 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1998, no pet.); Johnson v. State, 978 S.W.2d 744, 745-46 (Tex.App.—Eastland 1998, no pet.).

. Tex.Code Crim. Proc Ann. art. 26.13(b) (Vernon 1989); Flowers v. State, 935 S.W.2d 131, 133-34 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996).