Court Opinion

ID: 9941117
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 21:05:00.2909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:14.442913
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (5th) 220326-U
            NOTICE
                                                                                            NOTICE
 Decision filed 02/15/24. The
                                                                                 This order was filed under
 text of this decision may be       NOS. 5-22-0326, 5-22-0327 cons.
                                                                                 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
 changed or corrected prior to
 the filing of a Petition for                                                    not precedent except in the

 Rehearing or the disposition of
                                                IN THE                           limited circumstances allowed
 the same.                                                                       under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                   APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                               FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,      )     Appeal from the
                                          )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                 )     Madison County.
                                          )
v.                                        )     Nos. 16-CF-2899, 17-CF-3032
                                          )
DIONTAE A. VAUGHN,                        )     Honorable
                                          )     Neil T. Schroeder,
      Defendant-Appellant.                )     Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

         JUSTICE McHANEY delivered the judgment of the court.
         Justices Moore and Boie concurred in the judgment.

                                             ORDER

¶1       Held: The trial court’s second stage-dismissal of defendant’s amended postconviction
               petition is affirmed where defendant failed to allege facts to support allegations
               that his guilty plea was the result of a bribe or coercion.

¶2       This appeal arises from the trial court’s second-stage dismissal of an amended petition that

the defendant, Diontae A. Vaughn, raised under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS

5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)). In his amended postconviction petition, the defendant alleged,

inter alia, that he was suffering from a mental illness at the time of his guilty plea; that plea counsel

coerced him into pleading guilty knowing that he had been previously diagnosed with mental

health issues; that his plea of guilty was not voluntary; and that plea counsel was ineffective for

advising him to take the plea. After a hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss, the trial court

granted the motion and dismissed the defendant’s petition for postconviction relief. The defendant

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appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in dismissing his postconviction petition at the second

stage where he made a substantial showing that his guilty plea was coerced by plea counsel’s

payments to him in exchange for his plea. Based on the following, we affirm.

¶3                                       I. Background

¶4                                      A. Plea Hearing

¶5     The defendant’s guilty plea encompassed charges from two cases arising from different

incidents. In case number 16-CF-2899, the defendant was charged with residential burglary (720

ILCS 5/19-3(a) (West 2016)), armed habitual criminal (id. § 24-1.7(a)), and armed violence (id.

§ 33A-2(a)). In case number 17-CF-3032, the defendant was charged in an amended indictment

with one count of home invasion (id. § 19-6(a)(3)), one count of armed habitual criminal (id.

§ 5/24-1.7(a)), and one count of attempted armed robbery (id. §§ 18-2(a)(2), 8-4(a)).

¶6     Before he entered his guilty plea, the defendant was twice evaluated for fitness. The

examining doctor diagnosed the defendant with malingering, antisocial personality order, other

specified depressive disorder, and “Rule Out Posttraumatic Stress Disorder.” The defendant was

found fit to stand trial on July 11, 2018.

¶7     On November 21, 2018, the trial court held a hearing where the parties announced they had

negotiated a plea agreement: the defendant would plead guilty to residential burglary in the 2016

case and to a new charge, attempted armed robbery, in the 2017 case, in exchange for concurrent

28-year sentences (to be served at 50%) and dismissal of the remaining charges. The plea

agreement included a recommendation that the defendant be placed in a facility where he could

receive mental health treatment.

¶8     The trial court admonished the defendant of the charges and the agreed-upon sentence as

set out in the plea agreement. The defendant confirmed that he understood. The trial court then

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asked the defendant if that was the sentence he expected to receive, and the defendant replied

“yes.” The following colloquy ensued:

               “THE COURT: Are you under the influence of any drugs or alcohol today?

               THE DEFENDANT: No.

               THE COURT: Are you suffering from any mental or physical disability that would

       prevent you from understanding what we are doing here today?

               THE DEFENDANT: No, I don’t believe so.”

¶9     The trial court admonished the defendant about his trial rights and the sentencing range,

and the State provided a factual basis, after which the following colloquy ensued:

               “THE COURT: Mr. Vaughn, has anyone forced you or threatened you to get you

       to plead guilty today?

               THE DEFENDANT: No.

               THE COURT: Has anyone promised you anything other than the plea negotiations

       stated here in court today to get you to plead guilty?

               THE DEFENDANT: No.

               THE COURT: Are you entering into this plea freely and voluntarily?

               THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

               THE COURT: Did you discuss this plea with your attorney, Miss Copeland?

               THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

               THE COURT: Mr. Vaughn, I find that you understand the nature of the charges

       against you, your rights and the possible penalties that exist for these offenses. I find that

       you freely, knowingly, and voluntarily desire to waive your right to a trial and enter pleas

       of guilty. I’m satisfied that there is a factual basis to support your pleas. I will accept your

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        pleas of guilty, enter findings of guilt and judgment on those findings. Miss Copeland, do

        you waive a Presentence Investigation and stipulate to the defendant’s prior criminal

        history in the court files?

                THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your honor.

                THE COURT: Miss Uhe, does the State also so waive and stipulate?

                THE STATE: Yes, Your Honor.”

The trial court then accepted the defendant’s guilty plea and imposed the agreed-upon sentence.

¶ 10    On December 27, 2019, the defendant filed a pro se motion to reconsider sentence, which

the trial court denied, finding the defendant had entered into a fully-negotiated plea and numerous

charges had been dismissed pursuant to his plea with his sentences to run concurrently. The trial

court found the motion was not viable since the guilty plea had been negotiated. The defendant

also wrote the judge a letter, admitting his guilt for residential burglary but denying his guilt for

attempted armed robbery. The court took no action on this letter.

¶ 11                                  B. Postconviction Petition

¶ 12    On February 3, 2021, the defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging that plea

counsel had been ineffective, performed unethical practices, and provided him with erroneous

advice. The defendant alleged, in relevant part, that “because [plea counsel] knew that my mental

health was in question and declining she bribed and coerced me to take a substantial amount of

time and she would send me money to help me out while in prison. She promised me money for a

T.V. ($230.00) which she sent to me. (Exhibit #6.)[1] And other monetary gifts. (which was

unethical practices).”

        1
          Although the defendant made references to attached exhibits in his pro se petition, they were not
included with the copies of the petition in the record. Appointed postconviction counsel later attached
exhibits to the defendant’s amended petition.
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¶ 13   On September 24, 2021, the trial court advanced the defendant’s petition to the second

stage and appointed postconviction counsel. On October 25, 2021, the State filed a motion to

dismiss the defendant’s petition for postconviction relief.

¶ 14   On February 9, 2022, postconviction counsel filed an amended petition, which

incorporated the defendant’s pro se claims and made additional claims. In his amended petition,

the defendant alleged, inter alia, that he was suffering from a mental illness at the time of his guilty

plea; that plea counsel coerced him into pleading guilty knowing he had been previously diagnosed

with paranoid schizophrenia and bipolar disorder; that his plea of guilty was not voluntary; and

that plea counsel was ineffective for advising him to take the plea. Postconviction counsel attached

Exhibit 6, a JPay2 receipt from January 2019 in the name of the defendant’s plea attorney, Mary

Copeland, in the amount of $230. He also attached mental health diagnoses from 2015 and 2016,

which included paranoid schizophrenia, major depressive order without psychotic features, and

bipolar disorder with psychotic features.

¶ 15   On March 8, 2022, the State filed an amended motion to dismiss the defendant’s petition

for postconviction relief. The State’s amended motion asserted that the defendant’s fitness had

been evaluated twice and he was found fit for trial both times; that plea counsel’s performance did

not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness; that the defendant was not prejudiced; that

defendant did not allege a substantial denial of his constitutional rights; that the defendant had not

raised a constitutional claim nor supported that claim through his filing or affidavit; that defendant

did not provide any documentation to support his claims that his attorney bribed or coerced him

due to his mental health condition; and that the defendant had entered into the fully negotiated plea

       2
         JPay is one of the services allowed by the Illinois Department of Corrections for prisoners to
receive money.

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knowingly and voluntarily, and numerous, more serious, charges were dismissed pursuant to his

plea.

¶ 16    On May 24, 2022, the trial court heard arguments from the parties on the State’s motion to

dismiss. Following arguments, the trial court found, in relevant part, that, contrary to the

defendant’s claim that he was suffering from mental health issues at the time he entered his guilty

plea, he had been found fit to stand trial on two occasions prior to entering into the negotiated plea

agreement and that there was no indication that he did not understand the nature of the proceedings

against him. In addressing the bribery claim, the trial court stated:

               “THE COURT: [The defendant] alleges that Ms. Copeland bribed and coerced him.

        Those are conclusory statements. He doesn’t indicate how she bribed him. What was the

        quid pro quo? I’ll give you money, you do this. I don’t know. Coerced me, it’s again a

        conclusory statement—

               THE DEFENDANT: She bribed me with money. Gave me money once I got—

               THE COURT: Mr. Vaughn, now is not the time. So he tries to support that by the

        fact that he attaches the receipt where Ms. Copeland put two hundred thirty dollars on his

        books. I’m not aware of anything that’s illegal about an attorney sending a client money or

        putting money on their books. And that doesn’t support the bribed and coerced.

               So Ms. Copeland sent him two hundred thirty dollars for whatever reason. Maybe

        she felt sorry for him. Maybe he asked her. I don’t know. But there is—that doesn’t tie in.

        I don’t think that that’s a significant enough tie in to for me to say that those conclusory

        statements, bribed and coerced, present a sufficient basis to form a claim of a substantial

        violation of his Constitutional rights.”

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The trial court granted the State’s motion and dismissed the defendant’s amended petition, from

which the defendant timely appealed.

¶ 17                                      II. Analysis

¶ 18    The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in dismissing the defendant’s

amended postconviction petition at the second stage where he claims he made a substantial

showing that his guilty plea was coerced by plea counsel’s payments to him in exchange for the

plea.

¶ 19    The Post-Conviction Hearing Act provides a statutory remedy to criminal defendants who

assert claims for substantial violations of their constitutional rights at trial. People v. Edwards,

2012 IL 111711, ¶ 21. A postconviction proceeding “is not a substitute for, or an addendum to,

direct appeal.” People v. Kokoraleis, 159 Ill. 2d 325, 328 (1994). “The purpose of a post-conviction

proceeding is to permit inquiry into constitutional issues involved in the original conviction and

sentence that were not, nor could have been, adjudicated previously upon direct appeal.” People

v. Peeples, 205 Ill. 2d 480, 510 (2002). The postconviction petition must “clearly set forth the

respects in which petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated” and shall have attached thereto

affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations or shall state why the same are not

attached. 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2016).

¶ 20    “The Act provides a three-stage mechanism for a defendant to advance such a claim.”

People v. Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 18. “At the first stage, the trial court must independently

review the petition within 90 days of its filing and determine whether it is frivolous or patently

without merit.” Id.; 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2016). Thereafter, if the petition is not

summarily dismissed, it must be set for further consideration in the second stage. Addison, 2023

IL 127119, ¶ 18; 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(b) (West 2016).

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¶ 21   “The second stage of postconviction review tests the legal sufficiency of the petition.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Dixon, 2018 IL App (3d) 150630, ¶ 12. The

petitioner bears the burden at the second stage of making a substantial showing of a constitutional

violation. Id. The circuit court may only dismiss a postconviction petition at this stage if the

allegations, liberally construed in favor of the defendant and taken as true, do not make a

substantial showing of a constitutional violation. People v. James, 2023 IL App (1st) 192232, ¶ 33.

“The purpose of the first two stages is to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is even

necessary.” People v. Fields, 2020 IL App (1st) 151735, ¶ 42. A reviewing court applies a de novo

standard to a trial court’s dismissal of a postconviction petition at the second stage. Addison, 2023

IL 127119, ¶ 17.

¶ 22   The defendant correctly points out that a guilty plea induced by threats, false

representations, or improper promises, such as a bribe, cannot stand. Brady v. United States, 397

U.S. 742, 755 (1970); accord People v. Aceituno, 2022 IL App (1st) 172116, ¶ 32. While the

defendant provided evidence that plea counsel sent him money, that fact alone does not make a

substantial showing of a constitutional violation. Liberally construing in favor of the defendant

and taken as true, the defendant’s allegations are (1) that he pled guilty and (2) that plea counsel

sent him $230. We decline the defendant’s invitation to speculate about plea counsel’s motivation

to send the defendant money. The defendant’s obvious response is that there would be no need for

speculation because plea counsel could answer that question during an evidentiary hearing.

However, the fatal flaw in this contention lies in the defendant’s failure to allege a single fact

regarding how 28 years in prison was worth $230. We do not interpret the Act to require the trial

court to advance the defendant’s conclusory allegation to a third-stage evidentiary hearing merely

to afford the defendant with another opportunity to attempt to pound a square peg into a round

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hole. Although all well-pleaded facts in a postconviction petition and affidavits are to be taken as

true, nonfactual and nonspecific assertions which merely amount to conclusions are insufficient to

make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. People v. Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d 403, 412

(2003). Thus, we conclude that the defendant failed to carry his burden at the second stage to make

a substantial showing of a constitutional violation where he failed to allege facts that supported his

allegations that his guilty plea was the result of a bribe or coercion.

¶ 23                                     III. Conclusion

¶ 24   For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 25   Affirmed.

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