Court Opinion

ID: 9405145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-27 16:09:20.327956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:19.578995
License: Public Domain

J-S18044-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    ANDREW HOLDER,                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2848 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 13, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-51-CR-0004884-2017

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                            FILED JUNE 27, 2023

        Appellant, Andrew Holder, appeals from the October 13, 2022, order

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, which dismissed

Appellant’s first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46, without an evidentiary hearing.

Appellant’s counsel has filed a petition to withdraw as counsel, and an

accompanying Turner/Finley1 brief.             After a careful review, we grant

counsel’s petition to withdraw and affirm the PCRA court’s order.

____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1See Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1988);
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).
J-S18044-23

      On direct appeal, this Court previously set forth the relevant facts and

procedural history, in part, as follows:

            [Appellant was arrested in connection with the murder of
      Darryl “Kwan” Curtis (“the decedent”), and he, along with his co-
      defendant Jamal Washington (“Washington”), proceeded to a
      bench trial. At trial, Appellant was represented by Ben Cooper,
      Esquire.] The trial court offered the following detailed summary of
      the underlying facts established at Appellant’s trial:
            On the evening of January 3, 2017, Marcella Vance
      (“Vance”) watched movies with her cousin, Jessica Kidd (“Kidd”),
      and her paramour, the decedent…, in the back room of her
      apartment located at [8**9] Erdrick Street in Northeast
      Philadelphia. Vance shared the apartment with her roommate,
      Nashieta Noland (“Noland”), who was present in the front room
      with her paramour, Washington. At approximately 8:30 p.m.,
      Vance left the apartment to drive Kidd home. Shortly thereafter,
      both Noland and Washington left the apartment, leaving the
      decedent alone inside.
             Between 7:52 p.m. and 8:24 p.m., Washington received
      multiple phone calls from and [sic] individual named Robert
      Thorogood (“Thorogood”) and [Appellant].          At 8:24 p.m.,
      Washington called [Appellant]. [Appellant], who was wearing a
      global position-tracking electronic monitor while under the
      supervision of the Pennsylvania State Parole Board, traveled to
      the area of [8**9] Erdrick Street. There, he and an unidentified
      individual met Washington, and all three walked in the direction
      of the apartment, which [Appellant] entered at 9:35 p.m., armed
      with a pistol. Inside, [Appellant] searched a safe inside Noland’s
      room and encountered the decedent inside Vance’s bedroom.
      There, he shot and killed the decedent.
            Detective Thorsten Lucke, an expert in both video
      surveillance recovery and cell phone data extraction, recovered
      video surveillance recordings from private residences at [8**2]
      and [8**5] Erdrick Street, along with video recorded from a
      church located at the corner of W[e]lsh and Erdrick Streets.
      Surveillance footage recovered from the corner of Erdrick and
      W[e]lsh Streets depicted two vehicles making a left-hand turn
      from W[e]lsh Street onto Erdrick, in the direction of the
      apartment. The camera located at [8**2] Erdrick Street captured
      video of [Appellant], Washington, and another individual walking
      down Erdrick Street at 9:32 p.m. towards the decedent’s location,

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     before disappearing from view. At 9:34 p.m., the cameras at
     [8**2] Erdrick Street recorded…Washington speaking on a cellular
     device while walking back towards Welsh Street, away from the
     crime scene. At 9:38 p.m., both cameras captured [Appellant],
     armed with a pistol, running away from the murder scene with the
     unidentified individual, with an object consistent with a backpack
     seen carried in the frame. [Appellant’s] positive identity was
     captured as he ran past the camera located at [8**2] Erdrick
     Street at 9:39 p.m.
           Vance, who had dropped Kidd off at her home before
     purchasing dinner and cigarettes at other locations, called the
     decedent at 9:48 p.m. but received no response. Upon entering
     the apartment less than fifteen minutes later, Vance discovered
     the decedent’s body lying in a pool of blood in the back bedroom.
     After attempting to give CPR, both Vance and her upstairs
     neighbor called 911. Philadelphia Police Sergeant Conway and
     Officer Theodore Brown answered a radio call for an unresponsive
     male and discovered the decedent’s body on location. The
     decedent was pronounced dead at the scene at 10:19 p.m.
            Forensic pathologist Dr. Lindsay Simon performed the
     decedent’s autopsy and determined that the cause of death was a
     single gunshot wound to the head, and the manner of death was
     homicide. The projectile entered the decedent’s head above the
     right eyebrow, traveled through his skull and brain, before exiting
     behind the left ear, causing immediate incapacitation and death.
     There was no soot or stippling discovered on the body to
     determine the distance of the shooter.
           After calling the police, Vance called Noland, described the
     bloody crime scene, and asked her to return to the apartment.
     Washington also returned to the apartment upon Noland’s
     request. All three spoke to detectives at the scene and traveled
     to the Police Administration Building where they each provided
     statements, and Washington surrendered his cell phone for further
     investigation.
           Officer Brown inspected the apartment and observed
     misplaced items in Noland’s bedroom, including a gun-cleaning kit
     and boxes of unfired projectiles, but did not find any signs of
     forced entry. At 1:10 a.m. on December 4, 201[7], Officer Brian
     Stark of the Crime Scene Unit arrived at the location and
     recovered forty-nine bullets of different brands that had been
     previously stored in Vance’s safe.       A fired projectile was
     discovered inside a dresser drawer in Vance’s bedroom,

                                    -3-
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     demonstrating that the projectile was fired inside the room.
     Officer Stark also recovered five latent fingerprints from the crime
     scene, which he submitted for review. Patrick Raytek, a forensic
     scientist with the police department’s latent print unit, examined
     all five latent prints and determined that a print lifted from the
     ammunition box matched [Appellant].
            On the morning [after the shooting], Vance returned to the
     apartment and discovered a fired cartridge casing (“FCC”) on the
     floor between her bed and nightstand. Vance further noticed that
     the decedent’s backpack, which usually contained valuable coins,
     comic books, and possibly narcotics, was missing from her
     bedroom. After contacting the police, she returned to the Police
     Administration Building and provided a second statement, wherein
     she explained that her ex-husband…previously kept a firearm in
     the searched safe, but the firearm had been removed from the
     home prior to the shooting. She further noted that the safe did
     not contain valuables.
            Later   that   morning,     [Appellant’s]    State    Parole
     Officer…Jacqueline Vaughn discovered an email alerting her that
     the battery charge of [Appellant’s] GPS ankle monitor had fallen
     below the alert threshold at 8:51 p.m. on the night of the shooting
     and went into violation at 9:21 p.m. for failure to charge the
     device.    Because the monitor was in violation, it recorded
     [Appellant’s] location every fifteen seconds.        Vaugh cross-
     referenced the GPS information with a map of the city. Her
     analysis determined that, starting at 9:00 p.m., [Appellant]
     traveled from Wissahickon Avenue and onto Roosevelt Boulevard,
     towards the crime scene. GPS records further revealed that
     [Appellant] arrived on Erdrick Street at 9:32 p.m. and remained
     until 9:44 p.m. The GPS monitor tracked [Appellant’s] location as
     he returned home between 9:44 p.m. and 10:11 p.m., whereupon
     he began charging the device above the alert threshold.
           The next day, Vaughn watched a news program reporting
     the decedent[’]s murder in his apartment on Erdrick Street. After
     reviewing her report showing [Appellant] at the location at the
     time of the shooting, Vaughn contacted homicide detectives.
           David Webb, an account manager with Attendi Electronic
     Monitoring, the company that manufactures and stores records for
     [Appellant’s] GPS monitor, reviewed the data associated with
     [Appellant’s] device from the night of the murder. In his analysis,
     Webb noted that, while the device can pinpoint a user’s location
     to within a ten-foot range of accuracy, movement of that device,

                                    -4-
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     or interference by entering a building, can decrease that range of
     accuracy to an inconclusive level of 100 feet.
            GPS location records kept in the course of ordinary business
     demonstrated that at 9:31:35 p.m., [Appellant’s] device recorded
     his location at [8**7] Erdrick Street. At 9:32:35 p.m., [Appellant]
     was walking outside [8**8] Erdrick Street, towards the decedent’s
     location at [8**9] Erdrick Street at a speed of three miles per
     hour. [Appellant] continued past [8**4] Erdrick Street before
     reaching [8**5] Erdrick Street at 9:34:35 p.m. At [8**5] Erdrick
     Street, the device’s range of accuracy decreased to fifty-six feet,
     indicating that [Appellant] was inside a building.         Between
     9:35:38 p.m. and 9:37:35 p.m., the device identified
     [Appellant’s] location at [8**9] Erdrick Street, with decreasing
     ranges of accuracy from seventy-nine feet to ninety-three feet,
     and ultimately reaching inconclusive levels beyond 100 feet,
     demonstrating his presence inside a building. By 9:40 p.m., the
     device began recording [Appellant’s] location moving away from
     [8**9] Erdrick Street with increasing levels of accuracy, before
     being plugged in at 10:11 p.m. and coming to rest at 11:57 p.m.
            Detective Lucke completed a call detail record report on the
     cellular device attributed to Washington on June 7, 2017, which
     revealed a series of phone calls between his device and those
     attributed to [Appellant] and Thorogood. At 7:53 p.m., Thorogood
     placed a call to Washington, lasting fifteen seconds. At 7:54 and
     7:57 p.m., [Appellant] left voicemails with Washington, who
     responded with an outgoing call to [Appellant] at 8:24 p.m.
     Washington and [Appellant] next communicated at 9:21 p.m.,
     before the instant shooting. Washington next placed several calls
     to [Appellant] between 9:40 p.m. and 9:41 p.m., and again
     between 10:01 p.m. and 10:09 p.m. that evening. In total,
     Washington’s device recorded twenty-six communications
     between devices associated with Washington and [Appellant], all
     of which occurred within the time frame immediately before and
     after the murder.
            Detective Lucke’s analysis further revealed that, in the
     aftermath of the instant shooting, Washington deleted from his
     cell phone all records of his communications with [Appellant] and
     Thorogood that evening. Cell phone data extraction permitted
     Detective Lucke to recover some, but not all, of their
     communications.
           Detective James Dunlap, an expert in cellular tower
     analysis, reviewed data from towers located at [8**6] Erdrick

                                    -5-
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        Street and .6 miles away from the crime scene on Interstate-95,
        and he identified numerous connection[s] between Washington’s
        device and those towers between 8:04 p.m. and 9:54 p.m. on the
        night of the murder.          Additional connections depicted
        Washington’s device making two connections at a tower located
        at Rhawn Street and Roosevelt Boulevard, 1.5 miles away from
        the crime scene. Nine Connections between 10:06 p.m. and
        10:10 p.m. show the device traveling along Roosevelt Boulevard
        before making a connection with the tower at [18*1] West
        Allegheny Avenue, which is associated with Washington’s home
        address at [19*1] West Willard Street. Analysis of the device
        associated with [Appellant] (215-8**-7***) showed that it
        connected to the tower associated with the crime scene numerous
        times between 9:25 p.m. and 10:08 p.m. Analysis of the device
        associated with Thorogood revealed that the device was not in the
        area of the crime scene…at the time of the shooting.

Commonwealth v. Holder, No. 891 EDA 2020, 2021 WL 2105031, at *1-5

(Pa.Super. filed 5/25/21) (unpublished memorandum) (quoting Trial Court

Opinion, filed 6/22/20, at 2-7).

        At the conclusion of the bench trial, on December 4, 2019, the trial court

convicted Appellant of third-degree murder, burglary, and conspiracy to

commit burglary. The trial court sentenced Appellant on February 12, 2020,

to an aggregate of seventeen and one-half years to thirty-five years in prison.

After the trial court denied Appellant’s timely post-sentence motion, Appellant

filed a counseled notice of appeal.

        Relevantly, on direct appeal, Appellant alleged the Commonwealth

committed a Brady2 violation by failing to disclose the address of potential

____________________________________________

2   Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1969).

                                           -6-
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witness Gerald Morrison prior to trial.3 In finding no relief was due, this Court

relevantly indicated the following:

             Appellant contends that the Commonwealth committed a
       Brady violation by willfully failing to disclose the address of
       potential witness Gerald Morrison. The trial court denied relief on
       the claim, holding that Appellant demonstrated neither that the
       Commonwealth suppressed evidence nor that he was prejudiced.
       It explained as follows:
                     At trial, Appellant called witness Kyle Page
              (“Page”), who testified that on February 4, 2017, he
              received a text message from Morrison. Detective
              Jeffrey Burke interviewed Page and read the text
              message, which said that Morrison shot “that dude D”
              in the Holmesburg section of Philadelphia four weeks
              prior, matching the date and general location of the
              instant murder. On October 31, 2020, in preparation
              for trial, Detective Burke spoke to Morrison at his
              known address and documented the interview on his
              activity sheet, which was provided to the defense.
                    On the last day of trial, defense counsel
              informed th[e] [trial] court that he intended to
              subpoena Morrison, but Morrison’s address was
              missing from the activity sheet, preventing him from
              doing so. In response, the Commonwealth explained
              that Morrison’s name was included in discovery, which
              was provided to counsel at the time the matter was
              scheduled for trial. The Commonwealth had not
              subpoenaed Morrison for trial, and until Detective
              Burke’s testimony the day before, the defense had not
              requested Morrison’s address.
                    Based on the totality of the            above
              circumstances, it is clear that the Commonwealth did
              not suppress Morrison’s address to prevent his
              testimony, and [Appellant] cannot demonstrate
              prejudice. Morrison was identified as a potential
              witness within discovery, granting the defense an
____________________________________________

3 Appellant also presented on direct appeal sufficiency and weight of the
evidence challenges, as well as contended the trial court abused its discretion
in imposing an excessive sentence. This Court found no merit to these claims.

                                           -7-
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           opportunity to interview him in preparation for trial.
           Though the copy of the activity sheet did not include
           Morrison’s address, the address could have been
           obtained by defense counsel upon request, and
           defense counsel did not make such a request until
           after trial commenced.
                  Moreover, [Appellant] fails to show how
           Morrison’s testimony would have altered the result of
           the proceedings. While examining witness Page on
           direct, the defense elicited that Morrison sent Page an
           incriminating message one month after the shooting.
           Through its examination of Detective Burke, the
           defense further elicited the contents of that message,
           which implied that Morrison took credit for killing an
           individual named “D” at the time and location of the
           instant homicide.
                   Th[e] [trial] court balanced the possibility of
           Morrison’s involvement with the other direct and
           circumstantial evidence presented at trial. While
           video evidence establishes that [Appellant] arrived at
           [8**9] Erdrick Street with an unidentified individual,
           having Morrison possibly identified as that individual
           would not alter the instant verdict, as video
           surveillance evidence identifying [Appellant], GPS
           data tracking him, and fingerprint recovery identifying
           him as having been present in the home, all
           unequivocally establish [Appellant’s] involvement in
           and guilt of the instant offense. Not only did the
           absence of Morrison’s address-information that was
           readily available to the defense upon request-from
           discovery fail to change the outcome of this case, but
           it fails to tarnish the fairness of the trial itself. For
           those reasons, the instant claim fails.
     Trial Court Opinion, filed 6/22/20, at 9-10.
           We conclude the trial court’s analysis is sound. The case
     law relied upon by Appellant in supporting his claim relates to
     instances in which the Commonwealth failed to disclose the very
     existence of a potentially exculpatory witness.
            Here, it is undisputed that the Commonwealth timely
     identified Morrison as a potential witness. It was Appellant’s
     failure to follow up on the information duly supplied by the
     Commonwealth that resulted in his inability to procure a

                                     -8-
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       statement or testimony from Morrison. Appellant tacitly concedes
       in his brief that his real claim sounds in ineffectiveness of counsel
       for his failure to investigate Morrison. However,…that claim is
       properly raised not on direct appeal, but in post-conviction
       collateral proceedings. As Appellant has not established that he
       suffered prejudice as a result of the Commonwealth’s suppression
       of favorable evidence, his Brady claim does not warrant relief.

Holder, No. 891 EDA 2020, 2021 WL 2105031, at *17-19 (citations omitted).

       Accordingly, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on

May 25, 2021. Appellant did not file a petition for allowance of appeal with

our Supreme Court.

       On April 26, 2022, Appellant filed a timely, counseled PCRA petition, and

on September 9, 2022, the PCRA court4 provided Appellant with notice of its

intent to dismiss under Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Appellant did not file a response,

and by order and opinion entered on October 13, 2022, the PCRA court denied

Appellant’s PCRA petition.

       This timely, counseled notice of appeal followed on November 6, 2022.5

The PCRA court did not direct Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement,

and, thus, Appellant did not file such a statement.         On March 7, 2023,

____________________________________________

4 We note the Honorable Barbara A. McDermott was the trial court judge who
sat for Appellant’s bench trial, and she was also the PCRA court judge in the
instant matter.

5Justin Charles Capek, Esquire, filed the PCRA petition on behalf of Appellant;
however, after the PCRA court denied the petition, Attorney Capek was given
permission to withdraw. The PCRA court then appointed Gary S. Server,
Esquire, who filed the notice of appeal to this Court on behalf of Appellant.

                                           -9-
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Appellant’s counsel, Attorney Server, filed with this Court an application to

withdraw and an accompanying Turner/Finley brief.6

        Prior to reviewing the merits of this appeal, we first determine whether

PCRA counsel has fulfilled the procedural requirements for withdrawing as

counsel. Commonwealth v. Daniels, 947 A.2d 795, 797 (Pa.Super. 2008).

Our Supreme Court has stated that competent counsel must independently

review the record before withdrawal shall be permitted. See Turner, supra.

Independent       review   requires    counsel     to   review   the   case   zealously.

Commonwealth v. Mosteller, 633 A.2d 615, 617 (Pa.Super. 1993). Counsel

must then submit a “no-merit” letter or brief on appeal to this Court, listing

the issues which the petitioner wants reviewed, explaining how and why those

issues lack merit, detailing the nature and extent of counsel’s diligent review

of the case, and requesting permission to withdraw.               Commonwealth v.

Karanicolas, 836 A.2d 940, 947 (Pa.Super. 2003).

              Counsel must also send to the petitioner: (1) a copy of the
        “no-merit” letter/brief; (2) a copy of counsel’s petition to
        withdraw; and (3) a statement advising petitioner of the right to
        proceed pro se or by new counsel.
                                        ***
               Where counsel submits a petition and no-merit letter
        that...satisfy the technical demands of Turner/Finley, the
        court—trial court or this Court—must then conduct its own review
        of the merits of the case. If the court agrees with counsel that
        the claims are without merit, the court will permit counsel to
        withdraw and deny relief.

____________________________________________

6   Appellant has not filed a pro se brief or a brief with privately retained counsel.

                                          - 10 -
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Commonwealth v. Muzzy, 141 A.3d 509, 511 (Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Doty, 48 A.3d 451, 454 (Pa.Super. 2012)).

      Instantly, PCRA counsel, Attorney Server, has complied with the

procedural requirements. Specifically, Attorney Server forwarded to Appellant

his petition to withdraw and a copy of his Turner/Finley brief, which details

his zealous review of the record and review of the issues Appellant raised in

his PCRA petition, why he believes the issues Appellant raised are meritless,

and a letter explaining to Appellant his right to proceed pro se or with new

counsel. Therefore, we may proceed to an independent review of the appeal.

      On appeal, counsel raises in the Turner/Finley brief the issue of

whether “trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and call Gerald

Morrison as a [defense] witness at trial?” Id. at 6.      Initially, we note the

following well-established applicable legal precepts:

      Our standard of review for an order denying PCRA relief is limited to

whether the record supports the PCRA court’s determination, and whether that

decision is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 597 Pa. 648,

952 A.2d 640, 652 (2008). “We must accord great deference to the findings

of the PCRA court, and such findings will not be disturbed unless they have no

support in the record.” Commonwealth v. Scassera, 965 A.2d 247, 249

(Pa.Super. 2009) (citation omitted).

      As relevant here, a PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when he

proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence

                                     - 11 -
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resulted from the “[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in the

circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining

process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken

place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). In reviewing Appellant’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claim, we are mindful that, since there is a presumption

counsel provided effective representation, the defendant bears the burden of

proving ineffectiveness. Commonwealth v. Ali, 608 Pa. 71, 10 A.3d 282

(2010).     To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must

establish “(1) [the] underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular

course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis

designed to effectuate his [client’s] interests; and (3) but for counsel’s

ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the

proceedings would have been different.” Id., supra, 10 A.3d at 291 (citations

omitted).

            We need not analyze the prongs of an ineffectiveness claim
      in any particular order. Rather, we may discuss first any prong
      that an appellant cannot satisfy under the prevailing law and the
      applicable facts and circumstances of the case. [C]ounsel cannot
      be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 635 Pa. 665, 139 A.3d 1257, 1272 (2016)

(citations omitted). See Commonwealth v. Daniels, 600 Pa. 1, 963 A.2d

409, 419 (2009) (“A failure to satisfy any prong of the ineffectiveness test

requires rejection of the claim of ineffectiveness.”) (citation omitted)).   “A

claim has arguable merit where the factual averments, if accurate, could

                                    - 12 -
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establish cause for relief.” Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 707

(Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc) (citation omitted).

      Further,

             To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that
      there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
      unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have
      been different. [A] reasonable probability is a probability that is
      sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the
      proceeding.

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 624 Pa. 4, 84 A.3d 294, 311-12 (2014) (citations,

quotation marks, and quotations omitted). See Commonwealth v. Gribble,

580 Pa. 647, 863 A.2d 455, 472 (2004) (“[A] defendant [raising a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel] is required to show actual prejudice; that is,

that counsel’s ineffectiveness was of such magnitude that it could have

reasonably had an adverse effect on the outcome of the proceedings.”)

(quotation omitted)).

      With regard to the failure to investigate potential witnesses, our

Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held as follows:

            Counsel has a general duty to undertake reasonable
      investigations or make reasonable decisions that render particular
      investigations unnecessary....The duty to investigate...may
      include a duty to interview certain potential witnesses; and a
      prejudicial failure to fulfill this duty, unless pursuant to a
      reasonable strategic decision, may lead to a finding of ineffective
      assistance....
            [W]here there is a limited amount of evidence of guilt, it is
      per se unreasonable not to attempt to investigate and interview
      known eyewitnesses in connection with defenses that hinge on the
      credibility of other witnesses....

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           [S]uch a per se failing as to performance, of course, does
      not make out a case of prejudice....

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 600 Pa. 329, 966 A.2d 523, 535-36 (2009)

(citations omitted).

      Further, this Court has held:

       [A] failure to investigate and interview a witness claim overlaps
      with declining to call a witness since the petitioner must prove: (i)
      the witness existed; (ii) the witness was available to testify; (iii)
      counsel knew of, or should have known of, the existence of the
      witness; (iv) the witness was willing to testify; and (v) the
      absence of the testimony was so prejudicial as to have denied the
      defendant a fair trial.

Commonwealth v. Pander, 100 A.3d 626, 638-39 (Pa.Super. 2014) (en

banc) (quotation marks and quotation omitted). To demonstrate prejudice, a

petitioner “must show how the uncalled witness’s testimony would have been

beneficial under the circumstances of the case.” Commonwealth v. Gibson,

597 Pa. 402, 951 A.2d 1110, 1134 (2008).

      Here, in finding no relief is due, the PCRA court relevantly indicated the

following:

             At trial, [Appellant’s] trial counsel called Page, who testified
      that he received a text message from Morrison on January 3,
      2017, the night of the decedent’s murder. N.T., 12/3/19, at 228-
      29, 251. Detective Jeffrey Burke, who interviewed Page on
      February 4, 2017, read the text message into the record[.] [The
      text message] stated that Morrison shot “the dude D” in the
      Holmesburg section of Philadelphia. Id. at 265-68. The text
      message’s contents matched the date, details, and general
      location of the decedent’s murder.
            Detective Burke testified [at trial] that he was unable to
      trace the text message or the phone number which sent the
      message back to Morrison. Id. at 275. The only evidence which

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     connected Morrison to the phone number that sent the text
     message was the testimony of Page. Detective Burke noted that
     he had concerns about Page’s credibility due to his prior record.
     Id. at 262, 265-67. There were no other messages from the
     phone number sent to Page before or after the text message
     allegedly sent by Morrison. The phone number also did not have
     any communications or appear in the cell phone records of
     [Appellant], the decedent, or [Appellant’s] co-defendant,
     Washington. Id. at 275-77.
           On October 31, 2019, in preparation for trial, Detective
     Burke located Morrison at his address and interviewed him.
     During this interview, Morrison stated that he did not know
     [Appellant], the decedent, or Washington. Morrison also told
     police that he did not recognize the phone number which sent the
     text message to Page. Detective Burke documented the interview
     on an activity sheet dated November 19, 2019, which was
     provided to the defense within a week with Morrison’s address
     redacted. Id. at 267-73.
            On the final day of trial, trial counsel informed [the trial]
     court that he attempted to subpoena Morrison the day before trial,
     but [he] was unable to serve him. N.T., 12/4/19, at 2. Trial
     counsel stated that his investigator was unable to locate Morrison
     at the address, which had just been provided to him by Detective
     Burke. Trial counsel then acknowledged that, even if Morrison did
     appear, it was not likely that he would be willing to testify as “[i]t
     would be safe to say…that Mr. Morrison would take the Fifth
     Amendment if called to testify about these text messages.” Id.
     at 2-3. Consequently, trial counsel did not request a continuance
     to further attempt to locate Morrison.
                                  ***
            Although [Appellant] is able to show that the witness
     (Morrison) existed and counsel knew of the witness prior to trial,
     [Appellant] has failed to establish that Morrison was available and
     willing to testify for the defense and that the absence of Morrison’s
     testimony was so prejudicial that it denied him a fair trial.
     [Appellant] alleges that the fact that Morrison voluntarily spoke
     with police on October 31, 2019, shows that he was available and
     willing to testify. However, during his interview with police,
     Morrison denied any knowledge of [Appellant], Washington, the
     decedent, or the [incriminating] text message.
          At the time [Appellant] filed the instant [PCRA] petition, he
     was unable to locate Morrison so, in June of 2022, the [PCRA]

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     court provided [Appellant’s] PCRA counsel with three months to
     locate him and amend the instant petition. On September 8,
     2022, [Appellant’s] PCRA counsel informed [the PCRA] court that
     he had located and spoken with Morrison, but [Morrison] refused
     to cooperate or provide an affidavit.
            The evidence provided to [the PCRA] court establishes that
     Morrison is not willing to testify at this point and would not have
     been willing to testify at trial. Even after being located by PCRA
     counsel, Morrison refused to give a statement or [proffer]
     testimony about what he would have testified to at trial if he had
     been located at that time. Therefore, [Appellant’s] claim fails as
     he did not produce any evidence that Morrison would have been
     willing to testify on his behalf at trial. See Commonwealth v.
     Selenski, 228 A.3d 8, 17 (Pa.Super. 2020) (the appellant’s failure
     to demonstrate that his co-conspirator was willing to testify for
     the defense was fatal to his PCRA claim of ineffective assistance
     of trial counsel for failing to call the co-conspirator as a witness).
           Furthermore, on direct appeal, both the [trial] court and the
     Superior Court denied [Appellant’s] Brady claim alleging that the
     Commonwealth withheld Morrison’s address[.] [Notably, both
     courts] found that [Appellant] was not prejudiced by the absence
     of Morrison’s testimony at trial. [The trial] court concluded and
     the Superior Court agreed that:
                  [Appellant] fails to show how Morrison’s
           testimony would have altered the result of the
           proceeding. While examining witness Page on direct,
           the defense elicited [evidence] that Morrison sent
           Page an incriminating message one month after the
           shooting.     Through its examination of Detective
           Burke, the defense further elicited the contents of that
           message, which implied that Morrison took credit for
           killing an individual named “D” at the time and
           location of the instant homicide.
                  The court balanced the possibility of Morrison’s
           involvement with the other direct and circumstantial
           evidence presented at trial. While video evidence
           establishes that [Appellant] arrived at [8**9] Erdrick
           Street with an unidentified individual, having Morrison
           possibly identified as that individual would not alter
           the instant verdict, as video surveillance evidence
           identifying [Appellant], GPS data tracking him, and
           fingerprint recovery identifying him as having been

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             present in the home, all unequivocally establish
             [Appellant’s] involvement in and guilt of the instant
             offenses. Not only did the absence of Morrison’s
             address—information that was readily available to the
             defense upon request—from discovery fail to change
             the outcome of this case, but it fails to tarnish the
             fairness of the trial itself. For those reasons, the
             instant claim fails.
      Holder, No. 891 EDA 2020, [2021 WL 2105031,] at *9-10.
            There is no genuine issue of material fact which necessitates
      a hearing in this case. Even if Morrison was available and willing
      to testify at trial, [Appellant’s] conviction would still be upheld.
      [The trial] court heard the testimony regarding the contents of the
      text message and still convicted [Appellant].           [Given the]
      overwhelming evidence put forth at trial[,] [Appellant cannot
      demonstrate that the absence of Morrison’s testimony was so
      prejudicial as to have denied Appellant a fair trial.]

PCRA court Opinion, filed 10/13/22, at 7-11 (footnote omitted).

      We agree with the PCRA court’s sound reasoning. Specifically, Appellant

has failed to demonstrate that Morrison was willing to testify favorably for

Appellant.    See Pander, supra. Moreover, as the PCRA court noted,

assuming, arguendo, Morrison testified at trial that he sent the incriminating

text to Page, and he was the unidentified individual who accompanied

Appellant during the home invasion, the absence of this testimony was not so

prejudicial as to have denied Appellant a fair trial.        See id. Given the

overwhelming evidence of Appellant’s guilt, Appellant has not demonstrated

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of his

trial would have been different.      See Spotz, supra.       Thus, we conclude

Appellant is not entitled to relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel.

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      After conducting our independent review, we are in agreement with

counsel that there is no basis for relief in the present case.            See

Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 931 A.2d 717, 721 (Pa.Super. 2007).

Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court’s dismissal of Appellant’s PCRA petition,

and we grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.

      Order affirmed. Counsel’s petition to withdraw granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/27/2023

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