Court Opinion

ID: 9390522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 18:02:38.525906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:35.221973
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/27/23 P. v. Woody CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B318525

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. VA139893)
           v.

 CHARLES LEE WOODY,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Superior
Court of Los Angeles County, Olivia Rosales, Judge. Affirmed.
      Robert D. Bacon, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A. Lieberman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                    ______________________
                        INTRODUCTION
      In an information filed on September 6, 2017, the People
charged defendant Charles Lee Woody with first degree murder
for the killing of Michael Ramirez, a rival gang member (Pen.
Code,1 § 187, subd. (a); count 1), and with being a felon in
possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 2). The
information further alleged firearm and gang enhancements with
respect to count one (§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C), 12022.53, subds.
(b)-(d)) and a gang enhancement with respect to count two
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)). After a jury trial, defendant was
convicted on both counts and the special allegations found true.
The trial court sentenced defendant to a total prison term of 50
years to life (25 years to life for the murder, plus 25 years to life
for the firearm enhancement on the murder count). The court
stayed the sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm.
       On appeal, defendant raises four issues. First, he contends
that during jury selection two prospective jurors made
statements about gangs that prejudicially contaminated the
entire venire. Second, he contends that the trial court erred in
failing to bifurcate trial of the gang enhancement allegations
(and the related admission of gang-related evidence to support
those allegations) from the trial on the charges for murder and
being a felon in possession of a firearm. Third, he contends that
when defense counsel filed a new trial motion, arguing in part
that counsel herself had rendered ineffective assistance in
representing defendant, the trial court should have sua sponte
substituted in new counsel to represent defendant with regard to

      1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code,
unless otherwise noted.

                                  2
the new trial motion. Fourth, defendant contends we should
remand for resentencing because the trial court misunderstood
its sentencing discretion with regard to the firearm enhancement.
       We find defendant’s arguments unpersuasive and affirm.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      We summarize only those portions of the facts and
proceedings necessary to our discussion of the issues raised on
appeal.
A.     Pre-trial Proceedings
       On October 15, 2019, the defense moved to bifurcate the
trial on the gang enhancements and the court denied the motion
the following day.
       Voir dire took place on October 16, 17, 18 and 21, 2019. On
the last day of voir dire, defense counsel moved for a mistrial
based on comments from two prospective jurors during
questioning before the entire venire. The court denied the
motion.
       We discuss the details of the bifurcation motion, the voir
dire, and the mistrial motion below in connection with our
analysis of defendant’s appellate arguments concerning those
events.
B.    The Trial
      Testimony began on October 21, 2019.
      1.    Prosecution Case
            a.    The Crime
      Michael “Charlie” Ramirez was shot and killed on the
street next to Los Nietos Park in Santa Fe Springs shortly after
9:00 p.m. on Sunday, December 7, 2014.

                                3
      At the time of the shooting, Ramirez was homeless and
rode around on a bicycle. He was in his 50s.
            b.    Defendant’s and the Victim’s Gang Affiliations
       Whittier Police Detective Sal Murillo testified as a gang
expert for the People. He described his knowledge of gang
culture generally and information he had learned about two
specific gangs, Los Tres Palmas (LTP) and Canta Ranas.
       Detective Murillo identified defendant as a member of LTP
based on defendant’s tattoos. According to Detective Murillo,
LTP had approximately 20 members. It claimed territory in
Santa Fe Springs bordered by Los Nietos Road on the north,
Telegraph Road on the south, Norwalk Boulevard on the east,
and the San Gabriel River on the west.
       Ramirez was a member of Canta Ranas, a rival of LTP.
“Canta Ranas” is Spanish for singing frogs. Detective Murillo
testified that Canta Ranas was a larger gang, having 100 to 120
members. The heart of Canta Ranas’s territory was Los Nietos
Park. The gang also claimed as its territory the immediate area
around the park, including Millergrove Drive. Canta Ranas’s
territory bordered LTP’s territory near Los Nietos Park.
       Detective Murillo testified that gang members can gain
respect within their gang and “move up the chain of command”
through fear and intimidation and committing violent crimes. He
also testified that gangs use fear, intimidation and violence to
keep rival gangs out of their territory, so that they can engage in
crimes that bring in money for the gang, such as sales of
narcotics and firearms.

                                4
            c.    Witness Testimony About the Evening of
                  December 7, 2014
       On the night of the shooting, at about 5:30 p.m.,
Christopher Cisneros, who lived near the park, saw defendant
drive past Cisneros’s property in a light-colored SUV. Cisneros
was familiar with defendant and had seen him in the
neighborhood before.
       In June 2014, defendant purchased a silver Mercury
Mountaineer.
       Robert Ochoa, a Canta Ranas gang member, lived on
Millergrove Drive near the park. Ramirez was Ochoa’s best
friend. On the day Ramirez was killed, Ochoa was in the
driveway of his home and defendant passed by in a car. Ochoa
testified, “I think it was a Honda. I don’t know.” Ochoa could not
recall defendant saying anything to him but agreed that he
(Ochoa) testified truthfully at the preliminary hearing that
defendant asked him, “Where is all your homeboys?” and Ochoa
replied, “I don’t know, I’m at home and they’re probably asleep.”
Ochoa heard gunshots about 15 minutes after defendant passed
by his house. Ochoa believed the gunshots came from the park.
After he heard gunshots, Ochoa sent Ramirez text messages and
called him, but Ramirez did not respond. Although Ochoa
testified that he heard the gunshots during the day, the
prosecution presented evidence, discussed further below, that
Ochoa called Ramirez’s cell phone at 9:15 p.m. and sent him a
text at 9:17 p.m. warning him about the gunshots.
       On cross-examination, Ochoa testified that police officers
came to interview him several times even though he told them he
did not know anything about the shooting. Ochoa admitted he
had not divulged during these interviews that he had seen

                                5
defendant before the shooting. The first time Ochoa provided
this information was during an interview with police officers and
a deputy district attorney the day before the preliminary hearing
was scheduled (the hearing was later continued and took place
about four months later). Ochoa testified that he did not recall
saying during the interview that defendant was driving a black
Honda, but he could have said it. Defense counsel impeached
Ochoa with his prior testimony from the preliminary hearing in
which Ochoa’s description of his interaction with defendant was
different as to what specifically defendant said and whether or
not defendant got out of his car.
       The prosecutor played an audio recording of the interview
Ochoa gave to the police and the deputy district attorney before
the preliminary hearing. During this interview, Ochoa said that
he had safety concerns about testifying, stating “if I go in the
stand, there’s some—they find out that I’m going in the stand,
then they’re gonna get me. No matter where, they’ll get me.”
The deputy district attorney asked, “testifying is considered
snitching, correct?” and Ochoa responded, “Um, yeah.” Ochoa
then disclosed that he had spoken with defendant about 10
minutes before the shooting. Ochoa stated that he was in front of
his house and defendant drove up in a black Honda and got out of
his car; the two spoke briefly and defendant asked Ochoa if he
was going to go to the park.
       At about 9:11 p.m., Cristian Perez, who lived near the park,
heard gunshots. Perez looked out his living room window and
saw an SUV quickly drive past his house. He told the police the
SUV was a Ford Explorer, but the officers showed him

                                6
photographs of a Mercury Mountaineer2 and Cisneros believed
that the pictured vehicle looked like the type of SUV he had seen
drive past his house.3
        At 9:14 p.m., an anonymous caller called 911 and reported
hearing gunshots three minutes earlier in the area of the park.
        Daniel Rangel testified under a grant of use immunity. In
December 2016, after being arrested for robbery, he offered
information about defendant in exchange for pretrial release on
his own recognizance; his conversation with police was recorded.
At trial, Rangel professed not to know defendant and to have no
memory of interacting with defendant on December 7, 2014,
before or after the shooting. He claimed to have a poor memory
due to using drugs. The prosecutor played portions of the audio
recording of Rangel’s conversation with police. In the
conversation Rangel recounted interacting with defendant in the
hours before and after the shooting. At that time, Rangel was
staying next door to defendant’s relatives, one of whom was “from
CR [(Canta Ranas)].” Rangel stated that “we were . . . in the
little shed, smoking weed,” when defendant arrived and showed
them his new gun, which defendant said was “a .45.” Defendant
said he saw “a frog” and that he was going to “whack him.”4

      2 These photographs were of a Mercury Mountaineer the
police had recovered, which was connected to defendant through
various evidence described below.
      3The person who sold the Mercury Mountaineer to
defendant testified that the Mountaineer and Explorer have the
same body shape but different lights and grilles.
      4Detective Murillo testified that “frog” is a reference to a
Canta Ranas gang member.

                                 7
Rangel said that defendant is in the “Las Palmas” gang.
Defendant left in a silver Ford Explorer. After defendant left,
Rangel heard gunshots. Later that night, defendant returned
and said he had to get rid of his truck. Defendant said he shot
Ramirez.
            d.    Investigation of the Crime
      At about 9:17 p.m., Whittier Police Officer Edward Nyberg
responded to an address on Millergrove Drive that was on “the
west side of the street across from the park.” Fire department
personnel were rendering aid to Ramirez, who was on his back on
the sidewalk. There was a bicycle at the scene.
      The medical examiner later determined that Ramirez
suffered five gunshot wounds, three to his back, one to his armpit
area, and one to his elbow. The medical examiner opined the
gunshot wounds caused Ramirez’s death.
      Whittier Police Detective Robert Wolfe saw the coroner pull
out a cell phone from Ramirez’s pocket. Detective Wolfe saw a
text on the phone from Ochoa’s number at 9:17 p.m., stating
something to the effect, “don’t come out ’cause there’s a shooting.”
Senior forensic specialist Steve Gardner from the Whittier Police
Department forensically examined the cell phone. He discovered
that the cell phone showed a missed call from Ochoa’s number at
9:15 p.m. on December 7, 2014, and a text message from Ochoa’s
number two minutes later, at 9:17 p.m.
      Forensic specialists from the Whittier Police Department
found 12 expended nine-millimeter casings at the scene. A
criminalist at the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
determined the casings were all fired from the same firearm, a
nine-millimeter Luger. A DNA specialist at a regional crime
laboratory found sufficient DNA on three of the casings to do a

                                 8
DNA comparison. The DNA on two of those casings came from a
single source; the DNA found on those two casings was consistent
with defendant’s DNA profile, with random match probabilities
(RMP) of 1 in 12 million and 1 in 940,000, respectively. The RMP
figure measures how frequently one would expect to find a given
DNA sample is consistent with a specific individual’s DNA
profile.
       Cell phone records showed that, around the time of the
shooting, a call involving defendant’s phone was routed through a
cell tower near the park. The records showed that, about four
minutes later, defendant’s cell phone was moving because calls
were routed through three different cell towers. In this time,
defendant’s cell phone was used to call Benjamin Medina’s cell
phone and defendant’s phone was moving towards the location of
Medina’s phone. Based on photos of Medina, Detective Murillo
testified that Medina was an LTP gang member. Based on the
cell towers utilized in the calls, Medina’s phone could have been
at 9512 Brockway Street in El Monte; the residence at that
address was later searched and evidence showed that Medina
lived there. Cell phone records showed that both defendant’s and
Medina’s phones were in the Victorville area the day after the
shooting; Medina was later found at a residence in Victorville.
       On December 12, 2014, someone reported an abandoned
Mercury Mountaineer in Whittier. A Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s deputy responded and found an insurance card with
defendant’s name on it inside the vehicle; he recognized
defendant’s name as being someone of interest to the Whittier
Police Department, so he contacted the department. A Whittier
police officer responded to the location and had the vehicle
impounded.

                                9
       Detective Wolfe and forensic specialist Gardner later took
the insurance card as evidence. Gardner testified that the
Mercury Mountaineer was silver or gray in color. Gardner
processed the vehicle for evidence. He collected DNA on a shirt
and shoe recovered from the vehicle that was consistent with
defendant’s DNA profile, with RMP of 1 in 5.3 sextillion. He
collected DNA on the inside door handles that was consistent
with defendant’s DNA profile, with RMP of 1 in 1.7 quintillion
and 1 in 190 quadrillion, respectively. Police found particles
characteristic of gunshot residue on the shirt; the particles had
three elements contained in bullet primer—lead, antimony, and
barium—in a form consistent with having been in primer fired in
a gun. Based on this, the prosecution’s expert opined these
particles “are gunshot primer residue.” Police also found
particles consistent with gunshot residue on the headliner above
the driver’s seat and on the gear shift knob. The expert opined
that, given the grouping of the elements and their morphology,
“gunshot primer residue is one explanation for both of those
particles to be present.” The expert explained that while there
are other potential sources for these elements, gunshot primer
residue is the only source which has all of them.
            e.    Defendant’s Tattoo
      On December 16, 2014, a photograph was posted on
Facebook showing defendant with a tattoo on his chin of the word
Locos (a clique of LTP), and of the letter C (a symbol for Canta
Ranas) with an X through it. The People’s gang expert, Detective
Murillo, opined such a tattoo “would signify . . . that [the
individual with it] put in work for the gang. . . . That they have
committed some form of violent crime against another.”

                               10
            f.    Gang Enhancement Evidence
       Defendant was charged with gang enhancements under
section 186.22, subdivision (b) on both counts. At the time of the
trial, section 186.22 provided for additional punishment for “any
person who is convicted of a felony committed for the benefit of,
at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street
gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any
criminal conduct by gang members.” (Fmr. § 186.22, subd. (b);
Stats. 2013, ch. 508.) Detective Murillo testified that LTP’s
“primary activities” in 2014 were attempted murders, assaults,
sales of narcotics, possession of illegal firearms, felony
vandalisms and kidnappings. To prove that LTP had engaged in
a pattern of criminal gang activity, Detective Murillo identified
David Elias Garcia as a member of LTP and evidence that Garcia
had been convicted of a crime was introduced. Counsel stipulated
that Jesse Anthony Ponce was also a member of LTP and had
been convicted of a crime. After being presented with a
hypothetical based on the facts of the case, Detective Murillo
opined that the murder was committed for the benefit of a gang,
and he explained the ways in which such a crime would benefit a
gang.
            g.    Defendant’s Stipulation to a Prior Felony
     Defendant stipulated to a prior felony conviction for
purposes of the felon in possession charge (count 2).
      2.     Defense Case
      Defendant did not testify.
      Defendant’s grandfather, Charles Woody, Sr., testified that
in the 1960s and 1970s he was a member of Canta Ranas and
that defendant’s father and approximately 20 other relatives had
been affiliated with Canta Ranas. Defendant lived in Whittier

                                11
but had family members who lived in the area of Los Nietos Park.
Defendant played handball at that park. Defendant was at the
park on the Fourth of July in 2014.
      Defendant’s cell phone location data expert, Ernest
Koeberlein, testified that, based on cell phone records, calls made
from defendant’s cell phone around the time Ramirez was shot
could have come from addresses which defendant’s grandfather
had testified were residences of defendant’s relatives in the area
of Los Nietos Park.
C.     Post-trial Proceedings
       After the jury convicted defendant, defense counsel filed a
motion for new trial based on various grounds, including alleged
jury contamination and ineffective assistance of counsel. The
prosecutor filed an opposition. The court held an evidentiary
hearing, heard oral argument, and denied the motion after taking
it under submission.
       Following amendments to section 186.22 enacted after the
trial (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 3), which the prosecutor conceded
applied retroactively to alter the elements of the gang
enhancements, the court granted the prosecution’s motion to
strike the gang enhancements prior to sentencing.
       After the court imposed sentence, defendant filed a timely
notice of appeal on February 22, 2022.
                         DISCUSSION
A.    The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
      Denying Defendant’s Mistrial Motion Based on
      Comments by Two Prospective Jurors
      Defendant contends that two prospective jurors made
statements before the entire venire during jury selection that

                                12
equated gangs with violence, and that these statements affected
the views of the other members of the venire such that the jury
was not fair and impartial.
      1.    Voir Dire
            a.    Prospective Juror No. 1287
       During jury selection, the trial court asked if any of the
prospective jurors, or someone close to them, had been a victim of
gang-related violence. Prospective Juror No. 1287 (No. 1287) and
several others raised their hand.
       The judge first questioned these prospective jurors as a
group, outside the presence of the entire venire. In this setting,
No. 1287 stated: “Well, I grew up in South Central, so I saw a lot
of gang violence when I was growing up. Like for me, I got a gun
pulled on me, seen friends get jumped with guns. Also, a relative
got shot in the head.” No. 1287 said it would be difficult to judge
this case solely on the evidence presented, but that he could try to
be fair.
       No. 1287 was later seated in seat number 2. Once seated,
and back before the entire venire, No. 1287 stated in response to
the court’s questioning, “My neighbor—well, two brothers were
killed by gang members.” The “murders happened a year apart,”
about 17 years ago. “One was really brutal. The other one was
just shot.” The trial court asked No. 1287 if there was anything
about those incidents that would affect the way he considered
this case. No. 1287 responded, “Yes, because I am really biased
towards gang activity since I seen a lot of it growing up.” The
court asked, “When you say you are biased towards it, you mean
you don’t like gangs?” No. 1287 answered in the affirmative.
       The trial court then asked “whether the fact that you have
that bias against gangs, would you hold it against . . . defendant

                                13
in this case?” No. 1287 replied, “Yes, because all my life I know
how gangs work. You have to be really violent to be in it. And—
.” The court interrupted, stating, “Okay. Let me stop you there.
Thank you,” and then started questioning another prospective
juror.
       When the prosecutor questioned him, No. 1287 indicated it
would be difficult to presume defendant was innocent because
No. 1287 had seen a lot of gang violence growing up. The
prosecutor asked, “Have you seen anything that has to do with
the particular person here today?” No. 1287 responded, “No, but
I know how gangs work.” Defense counsel objected and asked to
be heard at sidebar. The trial court denied a sidebar conference
but told the prosecutor, “Can you move on.” The prosecutor then
began questioning another prospective juror.
            b.    Prospective Juror No. 0188
       Prospective Juror No. 0188 (No. 0188) was seated in seat
number 4. When defense counsel asked if any prospective jurors
had an issue with tattoos, No. 0188 responded: “I don’t have an
issue with usual tattoos, but I just have to honestly say I have a
visceral response when I see somebody with massive tattoos on
their face.” Defense counsel noted that defendant “obviously” had
tattoos on his face. No. 0188 agreed it would be difficult to set
aside her feelings and be fair and impartial. No. 0188, who was a
physician, also stated: “I’ve worked in emergency rooms and seen
people come in who were shot and died in front of me and stuff
from gang violence.”
            c.    Defense Counsel’s Challenges for Cause and
                  Motion for Mistrial
      The trial court granted defense challenges to No. 1287 and
No. 0188 for cause. Defense counsel also requested a mistrial

                               14
based on No. 1287’s comment, “You have to be really violent to be
in [a gang].” Defense counsel argued No. 1287 was “almost like a
gang witness . . . . He has had a ton of experience with gangs.”
The trial court denied the mistrial motion, stating, “I don’t think
it rises to the level of contaminating the entire jury.” Defense
counsel did not make any mistrial request based on statements
by No. 0188.
      2.     Defendant Argues Jury Contamination in His
             Motion for a New Trial
      In his new trial motion, defendant argued the statements
from No. 1287 and No. 0188 prejudicially contaminated the jury.
In denying the motion, the trial court noted that neither juror
was seated, there was no evidence that the statements by Nos.
1287 and 0188 influenced the 12 jurors who were in fact seated,
and that the court had instructed the jurors “that they will make
their decision based on the evidence presented. And there’s
nothing to indicate that they did not do that in this case.”
       3.    Legal Principles and Standard of Review
       “An accused has a constitutional right to a trial by an
impartial jury. [Citations.] An impartial jury is one in which no
member has been improperly influenced [citations] and every
member is ‘ “capable and willing to decide the case solely on the
evidence before it” ’ [citations].” (In re Hamilton (1999) 20
Cal.4th 273, 293-294.) “ ‘ “ ‘A mistrial should be granted if the
court is apprised of prejudice that it judges incurable by
admonition or instruction. [Citation.] Whether a particular
incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative
matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion
in ruling on mistrial motions. . . .’ [Citation.] A motion for a
mistrial should be granted when ‘ “ ‘a [defendant’s] chances of

                                15
receiving a fair trial have been irreparably damaged.’ ” ’ ”
[Citation.] . . . .’ [Citation.]” (People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th
804, 848.)5
        “ ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for a
new trial under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.’
[Citations.] ‘ “A trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial is so
completely within that court’s discretion that a reviewing court
will not disturb the ruling absent a manifest and unmistakable
abuse of that discretion.” ’ ” ’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Parker
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 1, 88.) A trial court abuses its discretion when
it “ ‘exercise[s] its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd manner that result[s] in a manifest miscarriage
of justice.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983,
1004.)
      4.     Analysis
      We disagree with defendant’s assertion that the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to exclude the entire venire and
restart jury selection from scratch following the statements by
Nos. 1287 and 0188. In making this argument, defendant
primarily relies on Mach v. Stewart (9th Cir. 1997) 137 F.3d 630
(Mach). In that case, the Ninth Circuit overturned a defendant’s
conviction for sexually assaulting an eight-year-old girl because a
prospective juror said during voir dire “(a) that she had a certain

      5 Defendant argues, without support, that reversal is
required unless the prosecution can prove the alleged voir dire
errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We reject such
a proposed standard of review for the voir dire errors alleged
here, as it is inconsistent with governing case law. (E.g., People
v. Harris, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 848; People v. Medina (1990) 51
Cal.3d 870, 889.)

                                  16
amount of expertise in this area (she had taken child psychology
courses and worked with psychologists and psychiatrists; she
worked with children as a social worker for the state for at least
three years); and (b) [further made] four separate statements
that she had never been involved in a case in which a child
accused an adult of sexual abuse where that child’s statements
had not been borne out.” (Id. at pp. 632-633.) The Ninth Circuit
reversed because, “The bulk of the prosecution’s case consisted of
a child’s testimony that [the defendant] had sexually assaulted
her. We thus find [the prospective juror]’s statements to have
substantially affected or influenced the verdict . . . .” (Id. at
p. 634, fn. omitted.)
      This case is distinguishable from Mach because No. 1287
did not disclose having any specialized knowledge particular to
the case at hand. The pertinent questioning of No. 1287 before
the entire venire was short, and the trial court limited it to
prevent any prejudice. No. 1287’s statements were based on
personal experiences living in a different neighborhood from
defendant, the victim, and the murder location. There was no
connection between No. 1287’s personal experiences and
defendant, LTP, the victim, or Canta Ranas. Nothing indicates
No. 1287 had any knowledge of LTP. Referring to defendant, the
prosecutor asked No. 1287, “Have you seen anything that has to
do with the particular person here today?” and No. 1287
responded he had not. In addition, No. 1287’s opinion—that gang
members are violent—did not logically imply that defendant had
committed murder.
      No. 0188’s statement that she has “a visceral response
when I see somebody with massive tattoos on their face” was an
expression of her personal opinion. No. 0188’s statement that,

                               17
“I’ve worked in emergency rooms and seen people come in who
were shot and died in front of me and stuff from gang violence,”
was a generic statement regarding gang violence that did not
suggest she had any information about defendant or LTP. In
contrast, the prospective juror in Mach had specialized training
and referred to her work. In addition, neither No. 1287’s nor
No. 1088’s opinion was “directly connected” with defendant’s guilt
as was the prospective juror’s statement in Mach which directly
suggested that the complaining witness was telling the truth.
(Mach, supra, 137 F.3d at p. 634.)
       Furthermore, once jurors were seated (a group that did not
include either No. 1287 or No. 0188), the trial court instructed
the jury on how it could consider gang activity, including that it
was not to rely on evidence of gang activity to conclude defendant
“is a person of bad character or that he has a disposition to
commit crime.” (CALCRIM No. 1403.) The jury was also
instructed to decide what happened based only on the evidence,
and to not let bias or prejudice influence its decision. (CALCRIM
No. 200.) “Jurors are presumed to understand and follow the
court’s instructions.” (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 662.)
B.     The Trial Court Did Not Commit any Prejudicial
       Error in Refusing to Bifurcate Trial of the Gang
       Enhancement Allegations
       In moving before trial to bifurcate the gang enhancement
allegations, defendant argued that gang-related evidence was
unduly prejudicial because the prosecution’s case was weak and
circumstantial, so the prosecution would be relying on the jury to
infer defendant’s guilt based on gang affiliation. The trial court
denied the motion, finding the gang evidence was relevant to
motive, to identification (given that individuals involved in the

                                18
case went by both given names and gang monikers), to explain
language and terms used by witnesses, and to provide context for
other evidence such as witnesses’ reluctance to testify.6
      On appeal, defendant contends the court should have
bifurcated the gang allegations under either the law in effect at
the time of his pretrial motion, or under section 1109, a new law
which became effective after the trial in this case and requires
bifurcation of gang enhancement allegations upon a defendant’s
request. We first review the trial court’s ruling under the law at
the time the ruling was made, and then discuss section 1109.
      1.      The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
              Denying Bifurcation Under Then-existing Law
       At the time of defendant’s trial, a trial court had “discretion
to bifurcate the trial of a gang enhancement allegation from the
trial of the substantive offense.” (People v. Franklin (2016) 248
Cal.App.4th 938, 952 (Franklin), citing People v. Hernandez
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1049-1050 (Hernandez).) In Hernandez,
our Supreme Court held that, “To the extent the evidence
supporting the gang enhancement would be admissible at a trial
of guilt, any inference of prejudice would be dispelled, and
bifurcation would not be necessary.” (Hernandez, supra, at
pp. 1049-1050.) In addition, “Even if some of the evidence offered
to prove the gang enhancement would be inadmissible at a trial
of the substantive crime itself—for example, if some of it might be
excluded under Evidence Code section 352 as unduly prejudicial
when no gang enhancement is charged—a court may still deny
bifurcation.” (Id. at p. 1050.) Based on the interest in avoiding

      6 Defendant argued in his motion for a new trial that the
trial court’s denial of bifurcation was error.

                                 19
the increased expenditure of funds and judicial resources which
may result with bifurcation, “the trial court’s discretion to deny
bifurcation of a charged gang enhancement is . . . broader than its
discretion to admit gang evidence when the gang enhancement is
not charged.” (Id. at p. 1050.) We review the court’s exercise of
discretion on a motion to bifurcate “based on the record as it
stood at the time of the ruling.” (Franklin, supra, at p. 952.)
         In denying bifurcation, the trial court relied on the
relevance of gang evidence on the murder charge to motive,
identification, and providing context for terminology used by
witnesses as well as witnesses’ reluctance to testify. We conclude
the court acted within its discretion in making its ruling. (See
Hernandez, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1049 [“Evidence of the
defendant’s gang affiliation . . . can help prove identity, motive,
. . . or other issues pertinent to guilt of the charged crime”];
People v. Pettie (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 23, 44 [“Evidence of [the]
defendants’ gang involvement was . . . probative to explain why a
witness might be reluctant or afraid to testify against them”].)
         The prosecution’s theory of the case was that defendant
was a member of LTP and had murdered Ramirez, a member of
the rival Canta Ranas gang, to enhance defendant’s status within
LTP and the status of the gang itself. Thus, defendant’s
membership in LTP and Ramirez’s membership in Canta Ranas
were relevant to the underlying charges. In addition, testimony
regarding the culture of LTP and gangs in general was relevant
to explain why defendant would murder Ramirez, even though
there did not appear to be any history or substantial connection
between them. Evidence of gang culture was also relevant to
explain the context of some of the evidence, such as why
defendant would engage Ochoa before the murder at the risk of

                                20
implicating himself. Finally, evidence of gang culture was
relevant to explain Ochoa’s reluctance to testify.
      Similar factors led both the Hernandez and Franklin courts
to conclude that trial courts had acted within their discretion in
denying bifurcation. In Hernandez, the court explained that
much of the gang evidence at issue was relevant to the charged
offense, including the defendant’s motive. (Hernandez, supra, 33
Cal.4th at pp. 1050-1051.) The court found that “[e]ven if some of
the expert testimony would not have been admitted at a trial
limited to guilt,” “[a]ny evidence admitted solely to prove the
gang enhancement was not so minimally probative on the
charged offense, and so inflammatory in comparison, that it
threatened to sway the jury to convict regardless of [the]
defendants’ actual guilt.” (Id. at p. 1051.) Franklin likewise
concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying bifurcation where “[t]he prosecution’s theory was that
[the defendant]’s motive in committing the crimes was to protect
his status in the gang and strike back at [the victim] for
disrespecting him and his gang” and the gang evidence “was thus
relevant to the prosecution’s theory of motive.” (Franklin, supra,
248 Cal.App.4th at p. 953.) As was the case in Hernandez, the
modicum of additional evidence admitted in support of the gang
enhancements that was not relevant to the underlying charges
was not so minimally probative on the charged offense, and so
inflammatory in comparison, that it threatened to sway the jury
to convict regardless of defendant’s actual guilt. (Hernandez,
supra, at p. 1051.)
      Defendant relies on People v. Albarran (2007) 149
Cal.App.4th 214, but that case is distinguishable. There, a
divided panel held the trial court erred in admitting gang

                               21
evidence which “was used to create a motive not otherwise
suggested by the evidence.” (Id. at p. 226.) Here, in contrast, the
evidence suggested the motive for the murder was in fact gang-
related. There was evidence that defendant was an LTP gang
member, that Ramirez was affiliated with a rival gang (Canta
Ranas), and that the shooting took place near the purported
territorial border between the two gangs. There was also
evidence that before the shooting defendant announced his
presence to a Canta Ranas member, Ochoa, and that defendant
told Rangel that defendant had seen “a frog” (meaning a Canta
Ranas gang member) and that he was going to “whack him.”
Finally, after the murder a photograph was posted on Facebook
showing defendant with a tattoo on his chin of the letter C (a
symbol for Canta Ranas) with an X through it, signifying
defendant had committed a violent crime against a Canta Ranas
member.
      2.     Even if Section 1109 Applies Retroactively, Any
             Error in Failing to Bifurcate Was Harmless
       After the trial in this case had concluded, the Legislature
enacted section 1109 which requires a court to bifurcate the trial
of gang enhancement allegations if the defendant requests it.
(Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 5.) Section 1109 provides in relevant part:
“If requested by the defense, a case in which a gang enhancement
is charged . . . shall be tried in separate phases as follows: [¶]
(1) The question of the defendant’s guilt of the underlying offense
shall be first determined. [¶] (2) If the defendant is found guilty
of the underlying offense and there is an allegation of an
enhancement . . . , there shall be further proceedings to the trier
of fact on the question of the truth of the enhancement. . . .” (Id.,
subd. (a).) Section 1109 took effect on January 1, 2022. (Ibid.;

                                 22
People v. Perez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 192, 206, review granted
Aug. 17, 2022, S275090.)
       Defendant argues that section 1109 applies retroactively
under In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, and therefore the court
erred in denying his motion to bifurcate and the case must be
remanded for a new trial. The Courts of Appeal are split on
whether section 1109 applies retroactively or prospectively, and
the issue is pending before our Supreme Court. (People v. Boukes
(2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 937, 948 [§ 1109 applies only
prospectively], review granted Dec. 14, 2022, S277103; People v.
Montano (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 82, 108 [§ 1109 applies
retroactively to nonfinal cases]; People v. Ramirez (2022) 79
Cal.App.5th 48, 65 [§ 1109 applies only prospectively], review
granted Aug. 17, 2022, S275341; People v. Perez, supra, 78
Cal.App.5th at p. 207 [§ 1109 applies only prospectively], review
granted Aug. 17, 2022, S275090; People v. Ramos (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 1116, 1129-1130 [§ 1109 applies retroactively to non-
final cases]; People v. Burgos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 550, 568
[§ 1109 applies retroactively to nonfinal cases], review granted
July 13, 2022, S274743.)
       We need not decide whether section 1109 applies
retroactively because even if we assume it does, the court’s
failure to bifurcate was harmless. In People v. Tran (2022) 13
Cal.5th 1169 (Tran), our Supreme Court held that, even
assuming section 1109 applies retroactively (an issue which it did
not decide), a trial court’s error in failing to bifurcate trial of a
gang enhancement allegation under section 1109 is subject to
harmless error analysis. (Tran, supra, at p. 1208.)
       As an initial matter, we must determine the proper test to
apply when assessing the assumed error. Tran states that error

                                 23
under section 1109 is subject to the state-law harmless error
standard under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson),
unless the error rendered the trial “ ‘fundamentally unfair,’ ” in
which case the stricter harmless error standard under Chapman
v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman) applies. (Tran,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1209, italics omitted.)
      The court’s denial of bifurcation in this case did not cause
fundamental unfairness such that the Chapman harmless error
standard would apply. The prosecution did not rely solely on
gang evidence to prove guilt. Rather, the prosecution relied on
forensic DNA and gunshot residue evidence that tied defendant
to the murder, cellphone records and eyewitness testimony
placing defendant in the area of the murder at the time it
happened,7 Rangel’s recorded statement that defendant said he
was going to murder a Canta Ranas gang member and later
admission he had done exactly that, and defendant’s
abandonment of his vehicle and flight to Victorville after the
murder. (See Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1209 [trial not
fundamentally unfair where prosecutor relied on “testimony and
prior statements of a few key witnesses”].)
      We therefore apply the state law harmless error standard
articulated in Watson to weigh the assumed error. (Tran, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 1209; see People v. Oliva (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th
76, 91-92 & fn. 8 [applying Watson standard]; People v. Ramos,

      7 Defendant presented his own cell phone location data
expert to make the point that, while the data did show he was in
the area of the park at the time of the murder, he could have
been at one of his relative’s houses in the surrounding
neighborhood. However, defendant did not present testimony
from any relative to corroborate this theory.

                                24
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 1131 [same]; People v. E.H. (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 467, 480 [same].) To determine whether any error
here was prejudicial under Watson, we analyze whether exclusion
of the evidence which was necessary only to prove the gang
enhancement “would have been reasonably likely to change the
jury’s verdict of guilt as to the underlying [offenses].” (Tran,
supra, at p. 1209; see Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 837 [test is
whether it is “reasonably probable that a result more favorable to
[the] defendant would have been reached in the absence of the
error”].) We conclude that a more favorable result to defendant
was not reasonably likely and therefore any error was harmless.
       As noted above, the vast majority of the gang evidence
introduced at trial was relevant to the murder charge and the
prosecution presented compelling evidence of defendant’s guilt,
including DNA and gunshot residue evidence linking defendant
to the murder, and eyewitness testimony and cellphone evidence
placing defendant at the murder scene. Given this, exclusion of
the evidence that was admitted solely to prove the gang
enhancement was not likely to change the jury’s verdict.
       That evidence fell largely into two categories. First,
Detective Murillo testified that the primary activities of LTP in
2014 were attempted murders, assaults, sales of narcotics,
possession of illegal firearms, felony vandalisms and
kidnappings, and that a murder committed under the
circumstances present in the case would have been done for the
benefit of LTP. This testimony overlapped with evidence
relevant to defendant’s motive to commit murder that one way for
gang members to move up in the hierarchy of their gang is to
commit crimes, including violent crimes against rival gang
members, that gang members would be permitted by the gang to

                               25
get tattoos after committing crimes (such as the “C” with an X
through it defendant displayed after the murder), and that gangs
engage in acts of intimidation and violence to maintain their
territory in order to facilitate crimes that bring in money for the
gang. To the extent it did not overlap with testimony that would
have been admissible on the underlying charges, Detective
Murillo’s opinion testimony on the criminal activities of LTP was
concise and did not include any details of specific crimes that
could have inflamed the passions of the jury.
       Second, information about the identity and criminal
activities of other gang members was introduced. Detective
Murillo identified Garcia as a member of LTP, a minute order
showing that Garcia had been convicted of a crime was admitted,
and counsel stipulated that Ponce was a member of LTP and had
been convicted of a crime. Neither Garcia nor Ponce was involved
in the case otherwise, nor did any evidence connect defendant to
either of them. The prosecution did not elicit any potentially
inflammatory testimony about the details of Garcia’s or Ponce’s
crime.
       The exclusion of both these categories of evidence, when
viewed in the context of the entire record, was not likely to lead
to a different verdict and is therefore harmless under Watson.
(See Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1209.) This is especially true
given that, following the presentation of evidence, the trial court
instructed the jury, “You may not conclude from . . . evidence [of
gang activity] that . . . defendant is a person of bad character or
that he has a disposition to commit crime.” (CALCRIM
No. 1403.) We presume that the jurors understood and followed
this instruction. (People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 662.)

                                26
C.     The Trial Court Did Not Commit Reversible Error in
       Addressing Defense Counsel’s Conflict of Interest
       In the motion for a new trial, defense counsel argued she
had rendered ineffective assistance in several ways that required
a new trial: by failing to consult with experts in
memory/eyewitness identification and gangs, failing to excuse a
juror who disclosed during trial that his wife’s nephew appeared
in a picture of several Canta Ranas gang members (none of whom
testified at trial),8 and failing to move to exclude the DNA and
gunshot residue evidence because there was a reasonable
likelihood such evidence was contaminated. The motion was
supported by declarations from defense counsel, a psychologist,
and a gang expert.
       At the hearing on the motion, the psychologist gave live
testimony regarding his expertise in eyewitness memory and
suggestibility. Defense counsel and the gang expert were not
questioned and did not testify beyond their submitted
declarations, although both defense counsel and the prosecutor
presented argument. Defendant was present during the hearing
but did not personally contend that defense counsel had been
incompetent and did not make any type of statement regarding
the motion or the issues it addressed. After taking the matter
under submission, the trial court denied the motion.
       On appeal, defendant does not argue the merits of the
underlying issues raised in the new trial motion, that he in fact
received ineffective assistance of counsel, or that the claimed

      8Following the disclosure, the court indicated outside the
presence of the jury that it would excuse the juror if the defense
so requested; no such request was made.

                                27
errors by his counsel prejudiced the trial’s outcome. Instead,
defendant argues the trial court erred by not inquiring as to
defense counsel’s potential conflict of interest in arguing her own
incompetence and, if defendant did not waive that potential
conflict, by not requiring that independent counsel represent
defendant in connection with the new trial motion. Defendant
contends we should remand this matter, so that the new trial
motion may be relitigated with new counsel.
      The Attorney General urges us to apply Marsden9-related
case law to this conflict of interest issue, and find defendant’s
claim forfeited because neither defense counsel nor defendant
gave a clear indication to the trial court that substitute counsel
was needed. (E.g., People v. Sanchez (2011) 53 Cal.4th 80, 89-90.)
Marsden motions, however, are all or nothing procedures
involving appointed counsel; “ ‘[w]hen a Marsden motion is
granted, new counsel is substituted for all purposes in place of
the original attorney, who is then relieved of further
representation. If the Marsden motion is denied, at whatever
stage of the proceeding, the defendant is not entitled to another
attorney who would act in effect as a watchdog over the first.’ ”
(Sanchez, supra, at p. 88.)
      Defendant, on the other hand, was represented by retained
counsel; he could replace his counsel for any reason he wished.
(People v. Ortiz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 975, 984.) More importantly, the
alleged conflict here was not an irreparable breakdown in the
attorney-client relationship that would involve new counsel for
all purposes, but instead a potential conflict relating to defense

      9   People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).

                                 28
counsel litigating a specific set of issues raised in the new trial
motion. It is therefore unclear whether we should follow
Marsden case law stating that a trial court needs to conduct a
hearing “only when there is ‘at least some clear indication by
[the] defendant,’ either personally or through his current counsel,
that [the] defendant ‘wants a substitute attorney’ ” (People v.
Sanchez, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 90), or instead case law relied
upon by defendant that, “When a trial court knows or should
know of a possible conflict of interest between a defendant and
defense counsel, the court must inquire into the circumstances
and take appropriate action.” (People v. McDermott (2002) 28
Cal.4th 946, 990.)
       We need not decide this issue because any error from the
failure to inquire as to defense counsel’s potential conflict of
interest does not require reversal of the ruling on the new trial
motion along with remand for re-argument of the motion with
different counsel. Defendant argues we should not assess
prejudice from the claimed conflict as part of this appeal, but case
law is to the contrary. Where a trial court fails to inquire
regarding a conflict of interest, reversal is only required where
the reviewing court concludes that counsel provided ineffective
assistance due to the conflict. (Mickens v. Taylor (2002) 535 U.S.
162, 164, 174 [120 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291] (Mickens); People
v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1137; People v. Bonin (1989) 47
Cal.3d 808, 837-838.) As summarized by our Supreme Court,
Mickens “confirmed that claims of Sixth Amendment violation
based on conflicts of interest are a category of ineffective
assistance of counsel claims that . . . generally require a
defendant to show (1) counsel’s deficient performance, and (2) a
reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s deficiencies, the

                                29
result of the proceeding would have been different. ([People v.]
Rundle [(2008)] 43 Cal.4th [76,] 169, citing Mickens, supra, . . . at
p. 166.) In the context of a conflict of interest claim, deficient
performance is demonstrated by a showing that defense counsel
labored under an actual conflict of interest ‘that affected counsel’s
performance—as opposed to a mere theoretical division of
loyalties.’ (Mickens, supra, . . . at p. 171; see Rundle, supra, . . .
at p. 169.)” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 417-418
(Doolin).) This test is the same under both the federal and state
constitutions. (Id. at p. 421 & fn. 22.)
        “[A] determination of whether counsel’s performance was
‘adversely affected’ . . . ‘requires an inquiry into whether counsel
“pulled his punches,” i.e., whether counsel failed to represent
[the] defendant as vigorously as he might have, had there been
no conflict. [Citation.] In undertaking such an inquiry, we are
. . . bound by the record. But where a conflict of interest causes
an attorney not to do something, the record may not reflect such
an omission. We must therefore examine the record to determine
(i) whether arguments or actions omitted would likely have been
made by counsel who did not have a conflict of interest, and
(ii) whether there may have been a tactical reason (other than
the asserted conflict of interest) that might have caused any such
omission.’ [Citation.]” (Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 418.)
When “the record sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to
act in the manner challenged, the reviewing court should not
speculate as to counsel’s reasons.” (People v. Diaz (1992) 3
Cal.4th 495, 557.) “When . . . counsel’s reasons are not apparent
from the record, we will not assume inadequacy of representation

                                 30
unless counsel had no conceivable legitimate tactical purpose.”10
(Id. at p. 558.)
       It is at least a potential conflict of interest for defense
counsel to argue that a new trial is warranted because they
rendered ineffective assistance to their client. (See People v.
Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 690 [acknowledging “the obvious
conflicts defense attorneys have in defending themselves from
claims of incompetence by the very clients they are supposed to
represent, and in arguing that their clients are entitled to some
sort of relief—such as a new trial or withdrawal of a guilty plea—
because of their own ineffectiveness”]; People v. Stewart (1985)
171 Cal.App.3d 388, 391 [acknowledging “the conflict that usually
will arise when a defendant unable to retain a new attorney
requests the one who represented him at trial to argue his own
incompetence as a ground for new trial”], disapproved on other
grounds in People v. Smith, supra, at pp. 694, 696.)
       The situation here does not involve a lawyer’s refusal to
argue their own ineffectiveness at their client’s request.11 Nor

      10 “Because the appellate record ordinarily does not show
the reasons for defense counsel’s actions or omissions, a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel should generally be made in a
petition for writ of habeas corpus, rather than on appeal.”
(People v. Diaz, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 557-558.)
      11  Defendant relies on People v. Stewart, supra, 171
Cal.App.3d 388, but in that case the defendant “personally
instructed his appointed trial counsel to file a motion for new
trial on the basis of incompetence of counsel,” and defense
counsel filed a motion which listed incompetence of counsel as a
ground for a new trial but “did not state why the attorney was
incompetent.” (Id. at p. 393.) Defense counsel also argued that
the court should appoint a new attorney to represent the

                                31
does anything in the record suggest counsel pulled her punches in
litigating the new trial motion. Counsel filed a robust motion
detailing her alleged ineffectiveness supported by evidence to
buttress the claims. On appeal, defendant identifies only one
aspect of defense counsel’s advocacy on the new trial motion
which he contends was deficient. Specifically, defendant
contends that the declaration from the gang expert “offers no
opinions that counsel could have presented to the jury.”
       As an initial matter, we fail to see how this alleged
deficiency relates in any way to the alleged conflict of interest in
counsel arguing her ineffectiveness; it is instead a complaint of
ineffective assistance entirely unrelated to the alleged conflict of
interest. Put another way, it does not follow that because counsel
had a potential conflict in arguing her own ineffectiveness, she
was somehow inclined to include a less than robust declaration
from an expert she nevertheless vigorously argued she was
ineffective for not consulting pre-trial. Second, contrary to
defendant’s characterization of the gang expert’s declaration, the
expert did identify information the expert could have presented
to the jury. The expert declared that he could have provided
defense counsel with information about a federal indictment of
the Canta Ranas gang and the history of the gang. But the
record shows defense counsel was aware of the indictment during

defendant on the motion. (Ibid.) The court thus addressed what
procedure should be followed “[w]here a defendant requests the
substitution of new counsel after trial in order to assist in the
preparation of a motion for new trial based on the inadequacy of
trial counsel.” (Id. at p. 395.) Here, in contrast, neither
defendant nor defense counsel indicated that defendant desired
to have a new attorney represent him on the new trial motion.

                                32
the trial and questioned Detective Murillo about it. The gang
expert additionally stated in his declaration, “I am aware that
[LTP] and Canta Rana[s] criminal street gangs have had
incidents involving members from these two gangs, but that
[LTP] is certainly not one of Canta Rana[s]’s ‘biggest enemies[.’]”
If the defense had called the gang expert to offer this opinion, it
would have been of little moment: it shows the two gangs had
past incidents between them and were antagonistic to one
another even if Canta Ranas had bigger enemies than LTP.
Finally, to the extent defendant suggests the gang expert could
have offered some other relevant and exculpatory opinion, but did
not because of counsel’s alleged conflict, he fails to identify it and
more importantly why the alleged conflict hindered counsel from
presenting it as part of the new trial motion.
       We find defendant’s reliance on California Rules of
Professional Conduct, rule 3.7(a) (rule 3.7(a)) similarly
unavailing. As relevant here, rule 3.7(a) prohibits a trial lawyer
from being both an advocate and a witness unless “the lawyer has
obtained informed written consent from the client.” (Rule
3.7(a)(3).) Defendant argues that rule 3.7(a) is implicated
because defense counsel submitted her own declaration in
support of the motion and discussed her thought process during
oral argument. But rule 3.7(a) is not relevant to the issue we
must decide, namely, whether the record indicates counsel’s
performance was adversely affected by a potential conflict of
interest. Even assuming that defense counsel should have
obtained defendant’s written consent and failed to do so, this does
not suggest that counsel’s performance in arguing the new trial
motion was adversely affected by any conflict of interest. (See
Nix v. Whiteside (1986) 475 U.S. 157, 165 [106 S.Ct. 988, 89

                                 33
L.Ed.2d 123] [“breach of an ethical standard does not necessarily
make out a denial of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of
assistance of counsel”].) To the extent defendant contends that
defense counsel would have provided additional testimony beyond
her declaration had she not felt bound by rule 3.7(a), the
argument fails because there is no indication counsel held back
additional testimony for this or any other reason, and defendant
does not identify any testimony that counsel could have provided
but failed to present based on rule 3.7(a).
        In sum, nothing in the record shows that any potential or
actual conflict “ ‘adversely affect[ed] counsel’s performance.’ ”
(Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 418, quoting Mickens, supra, 535
U.S. at p. 172, fn. 5.) Our review of the new trial motion
proceedings does not disclose any reason to conclude that counsel
“ ‘failed to represent defendant as vigorously as [s]he might have,
had there been no conflict.’ ” (Doolin, supra, at p. 418.) Given
the failure to demonstrate prejudice, remand for further
proceedings on the new trial motion is unwarranted.
D.     Defendant’s Contention that the Case Should Be
       Remanded to Consider Striking the Firearm
       Enhancement or Substituting a Lesser Included
       Enhancement Fails
       Defendant lastly contends the trial court misunderstood its
sentencing discretion concerning the firearm enhancement, and
we therefore should remand for the trial court to consider
whether to strike the firearm enhancement or impose a lesser
included enhancement. In making this argument, defendant
relies on two cases, People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688
(Tirado) and Nazir v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 478
(Nazir).

                                34
       In Tirado, our Supreme Court held that a trial court has
discretion to strike a section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm
enhancement and impose one of the lesser enhancements.
(Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 697.) The court issued its
decision on January 20, 2022, 13 days before the court sentenced
defendant. Defendant argues we should remand for resentencing
because the record does not indicate the court or counsel was
aware of Tirado, and the court and counsel spoke only of whether
or not to strike the enhancement altogether instead of potentially
reducing it to a lesser enhancement.
       While there was no discussion on the record about the
Tirado decision or about striking the enhancement and replacing
it with a lesser enhancement, there is likewise no indication that
the court was unaware of its ability under Tirado to strike the
enhancement and replace it with a lesser enhancement. “Absent
evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court knew
and applied the governing law.” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58
Cal.4th 1354, 1390.) We thus presume the trial court was aware
of its sentencing discretion under Tirado and decided not to
exercise it.
       Relying on Nazir, defendant argues the trial court failed to
understand the scope of its sentencing discretion because, in
responding to a defense argument that imposition of the firearm
enhancement would be inequitable because the district attorney
stopped filing such enhancements after defendant’s trial, the
court stated, “I don’t follow the directive of the district attorney’s
office.” In Nazir, the prosecutor moved to dismiss firearm
enhancements alleged under sections 12022.5 and 12022.53
based on the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Special Directive 20-
08, which “instructed deputy district attorneys in pending cases

                                 35
to move to dismiss or withdraw sentence enhancement
allegations.” (Nazir, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 486-488.) The
trial court in that case denied the motion based on its belief that
it was not permitted to rely on the directive under People v.
Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148 (Williams). (Nazir, supra, at
pp. 497-498.) The Nazir court held that Williams did not
preclude the trial court from relying on the district attorney’s
directive, and thus the trial court “misunderstood the scope of its
discretion when it refused to consider Special Directive 20-08 in
determining whether to grant the motion to dismiss the firearm
enhancements.” (Nazir, supra, at p. 497.)
       The situation in this case does not compare to Nazir. Here,
in response to defense counsel’s request that the trial court strike
the firearm enhancement based on Special Directive 20-08, the
trial court first stated, “I don’t follow the directive of the district
attorney’s office.” The court then went on to clarify to defense
counsel, “If you want to bring up the merits of that, you can, but I
don’t follow the D.A. just because the D.A. tells me to.” Defense
counsel agreed, and clarified she was “not saying that the court is
in any way mandated to follow what the D.A.’s office says. I
actually believe that the complete opposite is what holds true.
The court is not mandated to do anything that the D.A.’s office
tries to direct the court to do.” Defense counsel then argued it
would be inequitable for the court to impose the firearm
enhancement when the district attorney was not charging
similarly situated defendants with firearm enhancements
because of the directive. Counsel further argued that defendant
was young at the time of his arrest, and he had no prior
convictions for a similar crime.

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      The court decided not to strike the firearm enhancement,
stating, it was “exercis[ing] its discretion not to strike the gun
allegation. The reason being is that the victim was this older
man on a bike, not posing a threat to anyone. He was shot five
times. . . . [A]nd . . . defendant had a prior conviction, a felony
conviction in which he had already served a term in state prison.
So even though he was young, he was not somebody who . . . had
no prior criminal record and this came out of nowhere.”
       Thus, unlike in Nazir, nothing in the record shows that the
court misunderstood its sentencing discretion. Rather, the court
properly indicated the district attorney’s directive did not bind it,
gave defense counsel an opportunity to discuss any factors
underlying the directive which defense counsel believed applied
to the case, and exercised its discretion based on the facts of the
case before it. (See Nazir, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 499 [a trial
court may deny a motion made by the People to dismiss an
enhancement under Special Directive 20-08].) Accordingly, there
is no need to remand this case for re-sentencing.
                          DISPOSITION
      The judgment and order are affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                            WEINGART, J.

We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P.J.               CHANEY, J.

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