Court Opinion

ID: 9860257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:16:25.33535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:19:44.228873
License: Public Domain

MESCHKE, Justice,
concurring.
I concur, but without enthusiasm.
I’m con cerned about two features of this decision: It does not set a brightline for Rule 54(b) action to make an interlocutory judgment final and thus appealable. Secondly, to the extent that it draws a small part of that line, it verges on an unsuitable one.
Of course, I agree that, generally, a final decision should be required for a civil appeal. Considerations of effective and efficient judicial administration support a strong tradition requiring finality. Estate of Stuckle, 427 N.W.2d 96, 101 (N.D.1988) (Meschke, Justice, concurring). But that is an easy generality; the more difficult proposition is what exceptions, if any, should be made to the general rule.
I am uncertain, and I am sure practitioners of the appellate arts will be uncertain too, about implications of the majority’s assumption, “without deciding, that an order granting an injunction may be appealed without regard to Rule 54(b).” That uncertainty is not lessened by the conjunctive placement of the footnote explaining the rationale in Gillan v. Saffell, 395 N.W.2d 148 (N.D.1986) which surely casts doubt on that assumption.
Notions of good judging commend a decision on the narrowest available ground for a substantive issue. But this decision deals with procedure, not substance. Procedure is the sphere of the Supreme Court. North Dakota Constitution, Article VI, Section 3. Uncertainty about procedure is unbecoming to the court. We should speak as clearly as possible when deciding procedure, to aid practitioners, not puzzle them. Particularly, we should demystify Rule 54(b).
It should be made clear when finality must be supplied under Rule 54(b) to make an interlocutory judgment or order appeal-able. Only a brightline can avoid continued dribbling of judicial and private resources in groping for the right approach. For procedure generally, certainty is more important than correctness. Therefore, either finality should be required for all civil appeals without exception, or the exceptions should be disclosed.
I sought to outline a solution in Stuckle, supra at 101: “Subject to appropriate exceptions, perhaps akin to the federal model, a final decision will generally be required for a civil appeal.” (Footnote omitted). Thus, my preference would be to acknowledge the same exceptions as the federal pattern from which we got Rule 54(b).
In the federal practice, neither lack of finality nor absence of Rule 54(b) action affects the appealability of some interlocutory orders, such as collateral orders, decrees directing the immediate turnover of property and an accounting, and injunctions. 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 54.27[3] (1988). See also Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1133, 99 L.Ed.2d 296 (1988). Our adoption of Rule 54(b) from the federal practice suggests that a judgment or order usually recognized by federal courts as appealable without finality also should be considered appealable in our practice.
An appeal from an order granting or refusing an interlocutory injunction has been authorized in federal courts by Congress since 1891. See Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 7, 26 Stat. 828, from which 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)1 is derived. The ex*206ception for an interlocutory order granting or refusing an injunction was evidently recognized “[bjecause rigid application of this [finality] principle was found to create hardship in some cases.” Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 83, 101 S.Ct. 993, 996, 67 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). The policy of finality correlated with Rule 54(b) does not apply to an interlocutory injunction in federal courts. Simmons v. Block, 782 F.2d 1545 (11th Cir.1986); 16 Wright, Miller, Cooper & Gressman, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3921 (1977).
Similarly, in North Dakota, an appeal from an interlocutory order granting, refusing, modifying, or dissolving an injunction has been authorized for over a century. See 1887 Laws of Dakota, ch. 20, § 23(3), approved March 11, 1887, and now codified, as amended, at NDCC § 28-27-02(3).2 Not too long ago, more than 25 years after 54(b) was promulgated in North Dakota, this court held such an order appealable without mentioning Rule 54(b). Advanced Business Telephones, Inc. v. Professional Data Processing, Inc., 359 N.W.2d 365 (N.D.1984).
While both Rule 54(b) and statutory provisions authorizing appeals from injunctions deal with interlocutory appeals, they implement different policies:
“Section 1292(a) is grounded in a belief that the enumerated orders are likely to be so important to the parties that an immediate appeal should lie even though the district court still may have one or more closely related questions before it. In effect the policy against piecemeal appeals is outweighed by the substantial harm that might be done by the continued effectiveness of an erroneous district court order. Thus, Section 1292(a) is a legislative exception to the finality principle. On the other hand, Rule 54(b) permits an immediate appeal because the policy against piecemeal appeals is not thwarted in a case in which one or more claims or the rights of one or more parties have been decided finally, leaving other matters unadjudicated that turn on different facts or principles and making it unlikely that the appellate court will be required to retrace its steps on successive appeals.” (Footnotes omitted). 10 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2658.1, pp. 73-74.
Regstad’s judgment here included an injunction. The federal analogue would acknowledge its appealability without Rule 54(b) action. We could easily conclude that an injunction is an appropriate exception to the general finality principle and allow this appeal.
In the three decades since we borrowed Rule 54(b), this court has not required 54(b) action to appeal an interlocutory injunction. I would not do so today because I believe there are sound reasons engrained in our tradition of recognizing appealability of an order granting, refusing, modifying or dissolving an injunction. But the majority chooses not to decide about doing so at this time.
Instead, the majority disdains the customary injunctive language quieting title as serving little purpose, belittling its importance as a genuine injunction, and concluding that it should not “make appealable a judgment that otherwise would not be....”
The hydraulic-like pressure of steadily expanding numbers of appeals makes the majority’s action understandable. No doubt that pressure has contributed to the full development of our finality doctrine. See Stuckle, supra. But that pressure should not submerge an important tradition.
The need for judicial economy and efficiency, which reasons against piecemeal ap*207peal of most civil matters, does not have the same forcefulness for an injunction. “[A] large majority of the jurisdictions now permit an appeal from an order granting, denying, or dissolving or refusing to dissolve, a temporary injunction.” (Footnotes omitted). 42 Am.Jur.2d Injunctions § 346 (1969). Thus, widespread experience tells us that conservation of judicial energy should yield to elimination of delays for review of injunctional orders. Review of an interlocutory injunction is largely limited to law, based as it is on an abuse of discretion standard. Fargo Women’s Health Organization v. Larson, 381 N.W.2d 176 (N.D.1986). If not reviewed before a final determination, an injunctional order often becomes moot. 42 AmJur. 2d Injunctions §§ 355 and 356 (1969). An injunction, issued or denied under a mistaken view of the law, can do a lot of harm while due process takes its serene course.
Nevertheless, the majority finds it easy to reject an appeal from a quiet title judgment with its customary injunction because a counterclaim is still pending on an interconnected money claim and because the judgment is unaided by express action under Rule 54(b).
Because this is the first case in which our recently matured doctrine of finality for appeals has confronted any kind of injunction, I fear that today’s majority opinion does not recognize an important exception to the rule of finality for a civil appeal. At least, the potential for such an exception goes unexamined.
I think it is unfortunate that we have not taken this opportunity to demystify Rule 54(b). We are missing a good opportunity to fully spell out when finality is necessary for an appeal and when it is not. But, since certainty is more important than the choice we make, I acquiesce in the holding: An interlocutory judgment quieting title is not appealable without the aid of Rule 54(b) action, even if it includes an incidental injunction.

. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) says:
"(a) ... the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
*206“(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts ... granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.”

. NDCC § 28-27-02 says:
"What orders reviewable — The following orders when made by the court may be carried to the supreme court:
******
"3. An order which grants, refuses, continues, or modifies a provisional remedy, or grants, refuses, modifies, or dissolves an injunction or refuses to modify or dissolve an injunction, ...”