Court Opinion

ID: 9960086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 12:02:04.028556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:10.413948
License: Public Domain

************************************************
   The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-
ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-
cially released” date appearing in the opinion.
   All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
  The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Jour-
nal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Page 0                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                      0, 0

         2                         ,0                          0 Conn. App. 758
                            Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

                   JUSTINE LYONS v. BIRMINGHAM LAW
                          OFFICE, LLC, ET AL.
                              (AC 45631)
                              (AC 45632)
                               Moll, Cradle and Westbrook, Js.

                                            Syllabus

         Pursuant to statute (§ 52-59b (a)), ‘‘a court may exercise personal jurisdiction
            over any nonresident individual [or] foreign partnership . . . who in
            person or through an agent: (1) Transacts any business within the state;
            (2) commits a tortious act within the state . . . [or] (3) commits a
            tortious act outside the state causing injury to person or property within
            the state . . . if such person or agent (A) regularly does or solicits
            business . . . or derives substantial revenue from goods used or con-
            sumed or services rendered, in the state, or (B) expects or should
            reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and derives
            substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce . . . .’’
         The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the
            underlying action against several defendants for lack of personal jurisdic-
            tion. The plaintiff’s complaint alleged, inter alia, negligence against the
            defendants arising from their involvement in the sale of Vermont real
            property owned by D. The plaintiff was the longtime girlfriend of D and
            lived with him for years prior to his death in December, 2020. The
            plaintiff and D were Connecticut residents at all relevant times. In 2020,
            D’s attorneys, B and B Co., represented D in the sale of the Vermont
            property to a buyer from Massachusetts represented by the buyer’s
            attorneys, S and S Co. The plaintiff had no ownership interest in the
            Vermont property and was not a party to the real estate transaction.
            Throughout his representation of D in the sale of the Vermont property,
            B communicated with D at various times while D was in Connecticut.
            B was the sole member of B Co., a Vermont law firm, practiced law
            exclusively in Vermont, and was not admitted to the Connecticut bar.
            S Co. was located in and conducted business in Vermont and, although
            S had previously practiced law in Connecticut, she moved her law
            practice to Vermont in 2013 and retired from the practice of law in
            Connecticut in 2019. S Co. had represented clients from across the
            Northeast, as evidenced by the testimonials on its website from out-of-
            state clients, none of which were from a Connecticut resident. S was
            also listed as lead counsel for a party to a federal action in the United
            States District Court for the District of Connecticut as late as 2019, but
            the party that she represented was no longer actively involved in the
            action at that time. The sale of the Vermont property closed on December
            23, 2020, and D’s attorneys were instructed by D to have the buyer’s
            attorneys wire the sale proceeds to the plaintiff’s bank account. D’s
0, 0                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                       Page 1

       0 Conn. App. 758                                  ,0                           3
                          Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC
            attorneys forwarded the provided bank account information to the buy-
            er’s attorneys. On December 24, 2020, the buyer’s attorneys attempted
            to wire the money to the account, but they could not do so because
            the provided account information was incorrect. The buyer’s attorneys
            subsequently emailed D’s attorneys to notify them that the wire transfer
            could not be completed with the account information provided. On
            December 26, 2020, D died, and D’s attorneys subsequently contacted
            the buyer’s attorneys to notify them of D’s death. D’s attorneys instructed
            the buyer’s attorneys to wire the money from the sale proceeds to their
            attorney trust account, which the buyer’s attorneys did. Upon receiving
            the sale proceeds, D’s attorneys held the money in the account until
            they spoke with W, the attorney for the fiduciaries of D’s estate. D’s
            attorneys then released the sale proceeds to W to hold in escrow until
            the Probate Court could determine ownership of the funds. D’s attorneys
            and the buyer’s attorneys filed separate motions to dismiss the plaintiff’s
            complaint, arguing that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over
            them as nonresidents of Connecticut because the plaintiff failed to prove
            that the requirements of § 52-59b (a) were satisfied as to any of the
            defendants. To support her claim that the defendants were subject to
            personal jurisdiction in Connecticut, the plaintiff pointed to evidence
            including, inter alia, a portion of the website for D’s attorneys that was
            titled ‘‘Attention: out of state sellers,’’ B’s deposition testimony that B
            Co. had clients from ‘‘all over the place,’’ and language from the website
            for the buyer’s attorneys indicating that they provided legal services in
            the Northeast. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the
            defendants’ motions to dismiss, concluding that it did not have personal
            jurisdiction over the defendants pursuant to § 52-59b (a) and that the
            defendants had insufficient minimum contacts with Connecticut to sat-
            isfy constitutional due process requirements. Held:
       1. The trial court properly determined that D’s attorneys were not subject
            to personal jurisdiction pursuant to § 52-59b (a):
           a. The plaintiff failed to meet her burden of establishing that D’s attorneys
           transacted any business in Connecticut within the meaning of § 52-59b
           (a) (1): D’s attorneys derived only minimal income from Connecticut
           residents, did not solicit business in Connecticut, and did not promote
           themselves as a national firm, and, with respect to the sale of the Vermont
           property, D’s attorneys performed all legal services exclusively in Ver-
           mont and did not meet with D or the plaintiff in Connecticut; moreover,
           D’s attorneys were retained to represent D in the sale of real property
           located in the state of Vermont and, although both D and the plaintiff
           were Connecticut residents at all relevant times and D’s attorneys con-
           versed with D several times while he was in Connecticut, those facts
           were insufficient to establish that D’s attorneys transacted business in
           the state without additional evidence that D’s attorneys had projected
           themselves into Connecticut in such a manner that they purposefully
Page 2                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                      0, 0

         4                         ,0                          0 Conn. App. 758
                            Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC
             availed themselves of the benefits and protections of its laws; further-
             more, contrary to the plaintiff’s claim, the transfer by D’s attorneys of
             the sale proceeds to and their communication with W and W’s firm,
             Connecticut residents, were insufficient to satisfy the requirements of
             § 52-59b (a) (1), as the plaintiff failed to provide any evidence that D’s
             attorneys affirmatively and purposefully contacted W or W’s firm or that
             a contract existed between D’s attorneys and W or W’s firm.
             b. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court had
             personal jurisdiction over D’s attorneys pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (2); the
             plaintiff failed to meet her burden of establishing that D’s attorneys
             committed a tort in Connecticut, given that B clearly denied in his affida-
             vit that he committed any tortious acts in Connecticut, the plaintiff
             failed to refute those claims, and the plaintiff failed to present evidence
             demonstrating that the act of wiring the money from the sale proceeds
             involved false representations made by D’s attorneys regarding anyone
             or anything related to the subject real estate transaction or, specifically,
             regarding the plaintiff and/or her alleged property or assets.
             c. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court had
             personal jurisdiction over D’s attorneys pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (3):
             although the plaintiff argued that D’s attorneys regularly solicited busi-
             ness in Connecticut by virtue of their website and pointed to B’s deposi-
             tion testimony that B Co. had clients from ‘‘all over the place,’’ that
             evidence, at best, merely established that D’s attorneys had previously
             had clients who were not Vermont residents and that they had informa-
             tion available for potential out-of-state sellers on their website, but the
             evidence was too attenuated to establish that D’s attorneys had either
             done any business in the state of Connecticut or had specifically solicited
             business in the state; moreover, there was no evidence that D’s attorneys
             received any revenue from Connecticut other than minimal income
             received from D in connection with the sale of the Vermont property,
             and the plaintiff failed to present any facts to support her claim that D’s
             attorneys received substantial revenue from Connecticut; furthermore,
             although the evidence cited by the plaintiff may support a claim that
             D’s attorneys derived some revenue from interstate commerce, the plain-
             tiff did not provide specific evidence demonstrating the number of inter-
             state clients or amount of interstate revenue derived by D’s attorneys
             but, rather, provided vague evidence that was insufficient to support
             a conclusion that the amount of revenue D’s attorneys received from
             interstate commerce was substantial.
         2. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the buyer’s attorneys
              were subject to personal jurisdiction pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (3):
             a. Even assuming, arguendo, that the buyer’s attorneys committed tor-
             tious acts outside of Connecticut causing injury to the plaintiff within the
             state, the plaintiff provided insufficient evidence that the jurisdictional
             requirements in § 52-59b (a) (3) (A) were satisfied: the plaintiff’s claim
             that the buyer’s attorneys regularly solicited business in Connecticut
0, 0                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                      Page 3

       0 Conn. App. 758                                  ,0                          5
                          Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC
           through their website was unavailing, as the language highlighted by the
           plaintiff was taken out of context and given that, read in its entirety,
           the website stated that the buyer’s attorneys provided services ‘‘in this
           beautiful part of the Northeast,’’ it appeared that the website advertised
           the legal work that S Co. did in Vermont specifically, rather than advertis-
           ing to the Northeast as a whole, and it was not apparent from that portion
           of the website that the buyer’s attorneys regularly conducted or solicited
           business in Connecticut; moreover, although the website noted that S
           was admitted to practice in Connecticut, the information provided was
           a resume only, intended to provide potential clients with further informa-
           tion about S, rather than a solicitation of Connecticut clients; further-
           more, there was insufficient evidence that the buyer’s attorneys derived
           substantial revenue from the state as, even assuming, arguendo, that S
           were still involved in the referenced District Court case, that did not
           support the assertion that the buyer’s attorneys derived substantial reve-
           nue from Connecticut, and, on the contrary, S’s affidavit supported her
           assertion that she had derived minimal, if any, revenue from the state
           since she retired from practicing law in Connecticut, and it was unlikely
           that, even if S were still involved in the District Court case, that the
           proceeds from that case alone would have demonstrated that the buyer’s
           attorneys could fairly have been expected to be haled into court in
           Connecticut for an entirely unrelated case.
           b. The plaintiff provided insufficient evidence from which to conclude
           that the buyer’s attorneys derived substantial revenue from interstate or
           international commerce that would subject them to personal jurisdiction
           pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (3) (B): although the testimonials on the website
           for the buyer’s attorneys may have supported a claim that the buyer’s
           attorneys derived revenue from interstate commerce, the plaintiff failed
           to provide sufficient evidence about these transactions from which the
           court could determine whether the buyer’s attorneys derived substantial
           revenue from interstate commerce and, rather, the plaintiff merely
           showed that the website contained testimonials from clients from states
           other than Vermont without further information about what percentage
           of the buyer’s attorneys’ revenues those non-Vermont clients made up,
           the amount of revenue derived from those clients, or any other relevant
           facts and, therefore, the plaintiff provided insufficient evidence to con-
           clude that, even if the buyer’s attorneys did derive some revenue from
           interstate commerce, that revenue was substantial enough to satisfy the
           requirements of § 52-59b (a) (3) (B).
       3. Because the plaintiff failed to meet her burden in establishing that the
            trial court could exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants pur-
            suant to § 52-59b (a), this court was not required to decide whether the
            defendants had sufficient minimum contacts with Connecticut to meet
            the constitutional requirements of due process.

                  Argued January 11—officially released April 16, 2024
Page 4                        CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                    0, 0

         6                        ,0                         0 Conn. App. 758
                           Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

                                     Procedural History

            Action to recover damages for, inter alia, negligence,
         and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in
         the judicial district of New Haven, where the court,
         Wilson, J., granted the motions to dismiss filed by the
         named defendant et al. and rendered judgment thereon,
         from which the plaintiff filed separate appeals to this
         court. Affirmed.
           Michael S. Taylor, with whom were Brendon P.
         Levesque, and, on the brief, Steven Berglass and Rosie
         Miller, for the appellant (plaintiff).
           Colleen Vellturo, with whom, on the brief, was Ste-
         phen P. Brown, for the appellees (named defendant
         et al.).
          Walter J. Klimczak III, for the appellees (defendant
         Marylou Scofield et al.).

                                           Opinion

            WESTBROOK, J. The plaintiff, Justine Lyons, appeals
         from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the
         underlying action against the defendants Birmingham
         Law Office, LLC, and Attorney Matthew Birmingham
         (Birmingham defendants); and Marylou Scofield, PC,
         and Attorney Marylou Scofield (Scofield defendants),1
         for lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff claims
         that the court improperly concluded that (1) personal
         jurisdiction over the defendants was not conferred
         under our state’s long arm statute, General Statutes
         § 52-59b, and (2) exercising jurisdiction over the defen-
         dants would violate the due process requirements of
            1
              The plaintiff additionally named as defendants The Law Offices of David
         L. Weiss and Attorney David L. Weiss (Weiss defendants). The Weiss defen-
         dants, however, are not participating in this appeal. Accordingly, all refer-
         ences to the defendants in this opinion are only to the Birmingham defen-
         dants and the Scofield defendants, collectively.
0, 0                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                     Page 5

       0 Conn. App. 758                                 ,0                          7
                          Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

       the United States constitution because they have insuffi-
       cient ‘‘minimum contacts’’ with the state.2 We disagree
       and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
          We consider the following facts as alleged in the
       complaint and those facts contained in the affidavits
       and exhibits submitted in support of the defendants’
       motions to dismiss and the plaintiff’s opposition
       thereto. The plaintiff was the longtime girlfriend of
       Alfred Ducharme (decedent) and lived with him for
       years prior to his death in December, 2020. Both the
       plaintiff and the decedent were Connecticut residents
       at all relevant times. The decedent owned property at
       137 Flatow Road in Ludlow, Vermont (Vermont prop-
       erty), in which the plaintiff had no ownership interest.
       In 2020, the Birmingham defendants represented the
       decedent in the sale of the Vermont property to a buyer
       from Massachusetts represented by the Scofield defen-
       dants. The plaintiff was not a party to this real estate
       transaction.
          Birmingham Law Office, LLC, is located and conducts
       business in the state of Vermont. Attorney Birmingham
       is the sole member of this firm. He practices law exclu-
       sively in Vermont. He is not admitted to the Connecticut
       bar. Throughout his representation of the decedent in
       the sale of the Vermont property, Attorney Birmingham
       communicated with the decedent at various times while
       the decedent was in Connecticut.3
          2
            The plaintiff additionally claimed that there was personal jurisdiction
       over the defendants pursuant to General Statutes § 33-929 (f), the state’s long
       arm statute pertaining to foreign corporations. It is well settled, however,
       that our ‘‘general long arm jurisdiction provision, § 52-59b, rather than our
       corporation specific long arm provision, § 33-929, applies to foreign [limited
       liability companies].’’ Matthews v. SBA, Inc., 149 Conn. App. 513, 546, 89
       A.3d 938, cert. denied, 312 Conn. 917, 94 A.3d 642 (2014). The plaintiff’s
       counsel conceded at oral argument before this court that § 33-929 (f) is
       inapplicable to the defendants.
          3
            The exact nature and extent of these communications are not clearly
       alleged. It appears, however, that the Birmingham defendants and the dece-
       dent communicated several times via telephone and email in connection
       with the sale of the Vermont property while the decedent was in Connecticut.
Page 6                        CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                   0, 0

         8                       ,0                         0 Conn. App. 758
                           Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

            Marylou Scofield, PC, is located and conducts busi-
         ness in the state of Vermont. Although Attorney Scofield
         previously practiced law in Connecticut, she moved her
         law practice to Vermont in 2013 and retired from the
         practice of law in Connecticut in 2019. Marylou Scofield,
         PC, has represented clients from across the Northeast,
         as evidenced by the testimonials on its website from
         out of state clients. None of the testimonials, however,
         is from a Connecticut resident. Attorney Scofield was
         additionally listed as the lead counsel for a party to a
         federal action in the United States District Court for
         the District of Connecticut4 as late as 2019, but the party
         that she represented was no longer actively involved
         in the action at that time.5
            A real estate closing occurred on December 23, 2020,
         and the Vermont property was sold. At the time of
         closing, the decedent instructed the Birmingham defen-
         dants to have the Scofield defendants wire the sale
         proceeds to the plaintiff’s bank account.6 The Bir-
         mingham defendants forwarded the provided bank
         account information to the Scofield defendants. On
         December 24, 2020, the Scofield defendants attempted
         to wire the money to the account but could not do so
         because the provided account information was incor-
         rect. The Scofield defendants subsequently emailed the
         Birmingham defendants to notify them that the wire
         transfer could not be completed with the account infor-
         mation provided.
         The complaint does not allege that Attorney Birmingham ever traveled to
         Connecticut to meet with the decedent.
           4
             See Wachovia Mortgage, FSB v. Toczek, Docket No. 3:18-CV-1965 (VLB),
         2019 WL 6837788 (D. Conn. December 16, 2019).
           5
             Attorney Scofield represented Wachovia Mortgage, FSB, in the District
         Court action. On June 10, 2013, the Superior Court entered an order granting
         the motion of Wachovia Mortgage, FSB, to substitute Wells Fargo Bank,
         N.A., as the plaintiff.
           6
             The bank account provided was held with a Florida bank, not a Connecti-
         cut bank.
0, 0                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                     Page 7

       0 Conn. App. 758                                 ,0                          9
                          Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

          On December 26, 2020, the decedent died. The Bir-
       mingham defendants contacted the Scofield defendants
       to notify them of the decedent’s death. The Birmingham
       defendants instructed the Scofield defendants to
       instead wire the money from the sale proceeds to their
       IOLTA account,7 which the Scofield defendants subse-
       quently did. Upon receiving the sale proceeds, the Bir-
       mingham defendants held the money in their IOLTA
       account until they spoke with the defendant Attorney
       David L. Weiss of the defendant The Law Offices of
       David L. Weiss (Weiss defendants), the attorney for the
       fiduciaries of the decedent’s estate. The Birmingham
       defendants subsequently released the sale proceeds to
       Attorney Weiss to hold in escrow until the Probate
       Court could determine ownership of the funds.8
         The plaintiff commenced the present action by way
       of a three count complaint against the defendants on
       June 7, 2021. The complaint alleged negligence and
       violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices
       Act, General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., arising from the
       sale of the Vermont property.
         The Birmingham defendants filed a motion to dismiss
       for lack of personal jurisdiction on August 3, 2021. They
       argued that the court ‘‘lacks personal jurisdiction over
       the [Birmingham] defendants as nonresidents of the
       state of Connecticut. More particularly, the require-
       ments of the long arm statute . . . § 52-59b . . . have
       not been met because Attorney Birmingham practices
       exclusively in the state of Vermont and has not per-
       formed legal services in relation to any property or
         7
            ‘‘IOLTA stands for interest on lawyers’ trust accounts.’’ (Internal quota-
       tion marks omitted.) Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Miller, 335
       Conn. 474, 476 n.1, 239 A.3d 288 (2020).
          8
            Attorney Birmingham, in an affidavit, averred that he ‘‘sent the sale
       proceeds to [Attorney Weiss] based on his agreement to hold the funds in
       escrow until the probate court determined who was entitled to receive
       the funds.’’
Page 8                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                       0, 0

         10                  ,0                     0 Conn. App. 758
                       Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

         asset in this state. . . . The only connection with this
         matter is his former representation of a seller of real
         property located in Vermont. Moreover, personal juris-
         diction would violate constitutional due process
         because there are insufficient ‘minimum contacts’ with
         this state, which is required under due process. He has
         no offices or employees in Connecticut and does not
         own, possess or use real property in this state. It is not
         foreseeable that Attorney Birmingham would be haled
         into court in the state of Connecticut, and, as such,
         personal jurisdiction would offend traditional notions
         of fair play and substantial justice.’’
           The Scofield defendants also filed a motion to dismiss
         for lack of personal jurisdiction on August 4, 2021. The
         Scofield defendants argued that, ‘‘in this matter, the
         state of Connecticut does not have jurisdiction over the
         [Scofield] defendants because they did not transact any
         business within . . . the state of Connecticut, nor do
         the [Scofield] defendants meet the minimum contacts
         requirements . . . .’’
            The plaintiff filed objections to both motions to dis-
         miss, to which the Birmingham defendants and the Sco-
         field defendants each filed a reply. In her objections to
         the defendants’ motions to dismiss, the plaintiff argued
         that ‘‘the requirements of Connecticut’s long arm statute
         . . . are satisfied and due process is not violated by
         [the] court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the
         defendants.’’ Specifically, she argued that ‘‘[t]he Bir-
         mingham defendants engaged in Connecticut communi-
         cations and transactions, including legal representation
         of a Connecticut resident as well as negotiation and
         agreement with a Connecticut attorney, thus transfer-
         ring substantial monies to that Connecticut attorney.
         Attorney Birmingham is currently admitted in the Con-
         necticut Superior Court, and the Birmingham defen-
         dants’ Internet website solicits and advertises for out-
         of-state interstate clients. The instant action involves
0, 0                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                     Page 9

       0 Conn. App. 758                                ,0                         11
                          Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

       Connecticut conduct and improper actions of the Bir-
       mingham defendants.’’
         As to the Scofield defendants, the plaintiff argued
       that ‘‘[Attorney] Scofield currently maintains admission
       in the United States District Court for the District of
       Connecticut . . . the Scofield defendants solicit and
       advertise for Connecticut and interstate clients to pro-
       vide services in the Northeast . . . [are] registered in
       Connecticut, and [have] over twenty years of experi-
       ence serving clients in New York, Connecticut and Ver-
       mont. The instant action involves Connecticut residents
       and improper actions of the Scofield defendants.’’
          The court thereafter directed the parties to review
       our Supreme Court’s decision in North Sails Group,
       LLC v. Boards & More GmbH, 340 Conn. 266, 264 A.3d
       1 (2021), and to submit supplemental briefing on the
       case’s relevance to the issue of personal jurisdiction
       raised by the defendants’ motions to dismiss. The par-
       ties complied with the order and submitted supplemen-
       tal briefs. The court additionally ordered a Standard
       Tallow evidentiary hearing,9 which occurred remotely
       on February 1, 2022.
          Following the Standard Tallow evidentiary hearing,
       the trial court issued its memorandum of decision grant-
       ing the defendants’ motions to dismiss. In its memoran-
       dum of decision, the court concluded that it did not
       have personal jurisdiction over the defendants pursuant
       to § 52-59b (a) and that the defendants had insufficient
       minimum contacts with Connecticut to meet constitu-
       tional due process requirements.
         Specifically, the court concluded that it did not have
       personal jurisdiction over the Birmingham defendants
          9
            In Standard Tallow Corp. v. Jowdy, 190 Conn. 48, 459 A.2d 503 (1983),
       our Supreme Court concluded that, ‘‘[w]hen issues of fact are necessary to
       the determination of a court’s jurisdiction, due process requires that a trial-
       like hearing be held, in which an opportunity is provided to present evidence
       and to cross-examine adverse witnesses.’’ Id., 56.
Page 10                        CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                    0, 0

          12                        ,0                        0 Conn. App. 758
                            Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

          pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (1), (2) or (3). Turning first to
          § 52-59b (a) (1),10 the court stated that the plaintiff failed
          to meet her burden of showing that the Birmingham
          defendants transacted any business in Connecticut. The
          court explained that the ‘‘evidence shows that the dece-
          dent contacted [the Birmingham defendants] seeking
          representation, thereby initiating contact with the Bir-
          mingham defendants. It is not readily apparent, on the
          basis of the evidence submitted, that the Birmingham
          defendants’ subsequent communications with the dece-
          dent regarding the Vermont real estate transaction,
          while he was in Connecticut, shows that they were
          actively participating in business transactions within
          Connecticut, nor do they demonstrate that the Bir-
          mingham defendants were purposefully availing them-
          selves of the benefits and protections of Connecticut
          laws. . . . [T]he subject property was located in Ver-
          mont, the real estate transaction was completed in Ver-
          mont, and . . . neither [Attorney Birmingham] nor
          anyone acting on behalf of the Birmingham Law Office,
          LLC, performed legal services in Connecticut. . . .
          Considering these factors, neither the communications
          from the Birmingham defendants nor the wire transfer
          to the Weiss defendants amount to the transacting of
          business in the state. Accordingly, the plaintiff has not
          met her burden [of] showing that the Birmingham defen-
          dants transacted business in Connecticut, and the court
          does not have personal jurisdiction over the [Bir-
          mingham] defendants pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (1).’’
          (Citation omitted.)
            The court also concluded that it did not have personal
          jurisdiction over the Birmingham defendants pursuant
            10
              General Statutes § 52-59b (a) (1) provides in relevant part: ‘‘As to a
          cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a
          court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident individual,
          foreign partnership or foreign voluntary association, or over the executor or
          administrator of such nonresident individual, foreign partnership or foreign
          voluntary association, who in person or through an agent . . . [t]ransacts
          any business within the state . . . .’’
0, 0                        CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                     Page 11

       0 Conn. App. 758                                ,0                        13
                         Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

       to § 52-59b (a) (2)11 because the plaintiff failed to meet
       her burden of showing that the Birmingham defendants
       committed a tort within the state. According to the
       court, ‘‘[t]he act of wiring the money from the sale
       proceeds is not, in and of itself, a fraudulent misrepre-
       sentation. The plaintiff has failed to present evidence
       demonstrating that this wire transfer involved false rep-
       resentations made by the Birmingham defendants
       regarding anyone or anything related to the subject real
       estate transaction or, specifically, regarding the plaintiff
       and/or her alleged property or assets.’’
         Additionally, the court concluded that it did not have
       personal jurisdiction over the Birmingham defendants
       pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (3)12 because the plaintiff failed
       to meet her burden of showing that the Birmingham
       defendants derived substantial revenue from Connecti-
       cut or interstate commerce. The court reasoned that,
       even ‘‘[a]ssuming, arguendo, that the Birmingham
       defendants did commit a tort outside of Connecticut
         11
             General Statutes § 52-59b (a) (2) provides in relevant part: ‘‘As to a
       cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a
       court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident individual,
       foreign partnership or foreign voluntary association, or over the executor or
       administrator of such nonresident individual, foreign partnership or foreign
       voluntary association, who in person or through an agent . . . commits a
       tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation
       of character arising from the act . . . .’’
          12
             General Statutes § 52-59b (a) (3) provides in relevant part: ‘‘As to a
       cause of action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a
       court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nonresident individual,
       foreign partnership or foreign voluntary association, or over the executor or
       administrator of such nonresident individual, foreign partnership or foreign
       voluntary association, who in person or through an agent . . . commits a
       tortious act outside the state causing injury to person or property within
       the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising
       from the act, if such person or agent (A) regularly does or solicits business,
       or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial
       revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state,
       or (B) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences
       in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international
       commerce . . . .’’
Page 12                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                       0, 0

          14                  ,0                     0 Conn. App. 758
                        Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

          that caused injury to a person within Connecticut . . .
          the plaintiff has failed to show that the defendants meet
          the additional requirements of either § 52-59b (a) (3)
          (A) or (B).’’ (Citation omitted.) The court noted: ‘‘In
          the present case, the plaintiff has not provided any
          evidence demonstrating that the Birmingham defen-
          dants have derived substantial revenue from Connecti-
          cut or interstate commerce, outside of the fact that, at
          minimum, they received revenue from their representa-
          tion of the decedent in the subject real estate transac-
          tion.’’ The court therefore concluded that ‘‘the Bir-
          mingham defendants do not now, and did not at the
          time of the alleged tort, regularly conduct or solicit
          business or derive substantial revenue from Connecti-
          cut, nor did they derive revenue from interstate com-
          merce so as to be subjected to Connecticut jurisdiction
          under § 52-59b (a) (3).’’
             The court also determined that the Birmingham
          defendants had insufficient minimum contacts with the
          state to meet constitutional due process requirements.
          ‘‘Because the Birmingham defendants did not transact
          business in Connecticut, did not commit a tort in the
          state of Connecticut, do not regularly conduct or solicit
          business from Connecticut, and do not derive substan-
          tial revenue from Connecticut or from interstate or
          international commerce with a commercial impact in
          Connecticut, the Birmingham defendants could not
          have reasonably anticipated being haled into court here.
          Accordingly, it would not be reasonable under the facts
          of this case for the court to confer personal jurisdiction
          over the Birmingham defendants. . . . [F]or the fore-
          going reasons, the plaintiff has failed to meet her burden
          of demonstrating that the court has personal jurisdic-
          tion over the Birmingham defendants.’’ (Citation omit-
          ted.)
            As to the Scofield defendants, the court concluded
          that it did not have personal jurisdiction over them
0, 0                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                       Page 13

       0 Conn. App. 758                       ,0               15
                     Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

       pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (3) and that they had insuffi-
       cient minimum contacts with Connecticut to meet con-
       stitutional due process requirements. The court rea-
       soned that, even ‘‘[a]ssuming, arguendo, that the
       Scofield defendants committed a tort, the plaintiff has
       failed to demonstrate that the [Scofield] defendants
       meet the additional requirements of either § 52-59b (a)
       (3) (A) or (B). As to subparagraph (A), the plaintiff
       argues, by way of printouts from the Scofield defen-
       dants’ public website and a [District Court] opinion that
       lists Attorney Scofield as lead attorney, that the Scofield
       defendants regularly conduct business in Connecticut
       and solicit and advertise for interstate clients through-
       out the Northeast, including in the state of Connecticut.
       . . . [T]he website printouts seem to support the con-
       clusion that the website is a recitation of Attorney Sco-
       field’s resume and for information purposes only. . . .
       The printouts do not demonstrate, or even suggest,
       that the Scofield defendants regularly conduct business
       outside of Vermont. Rather, they appear to confirm that
       the Scofield defendants provide services solely within
       Vermont.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; inter-
       nal quotation marks omitted.)
          According to the court, although Attorney Scofield
       previously represented clients and practiced law in Con-
       necticut, her affidavit states that ‘‘she has not practiced
       law in Connecticut since 2013 and officially retired from
       practicing law in the state of Connecticut in early 2019.
       . . . The plaintiff has not provided any evidence to
       counter Attorney Scofield’s affidavit regarding these
       attestations.’’ (Citation omitted.) The court further
       explained that, ‘‘[a]s to subparagraph (B), even if the
       Scofield defendants were aware of the plaintiff’s
       involvement in the transaction . . . they had no reason
       to expect that redirecting the money from the sale pro-
       ceeds to the Birmingham defendants, rather than the
       plaintiff, would result in consequences in Connecticut.
Page 14                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                      0, 0

          16                 ,0                     0 Conn. App. 758
                       Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

          None of the evidence produced by the plaintiff suggests
          that the Scofield defendants were aware that the plain-
          tiff resided or was located in Connecticut. . . . More-
          over . . . the plaintiff has not provided any evidence to
          demonstrate that the Scofield defendants have derived
          substantial revenue from services rendered in Connecti-
          cut.’’ The court accordingly concluded that the plaintiff
          had failed to demonstrate that the court had personal
          jurisdiction over the Scofield defendants under § 52-
          59b (a) (3).

             The court also found that the Scofield defendants
          had insufficient minimum contacts with the state to
          meet constitutional due process requirements. The
          court concluded that ‘‘the Scofield defendants had no
          contact with Connecticut related to or arising out of
          the real estate transaction in Vermont in which they
          represented a Massachusetts buyer, and there is no
          evidence that the Scofield defendants derived any reve-
          nue from Connecticut with respect to any alleged inter-
          state commerce activities in connection with the sub-
          ject real estate transaction. . . . The Vermont real
          estate transaction between the decedent and the Sco-
          field defendants’ client is the extent of the interaction
          among the parties upon which the plaintiff relies for
          the establishment of personal jurisdiction in Connecti-
          cut. . . . Rather, the evidence demonstrates that all
          acts, transactions, and occurrences regarding the real
          estate transaction occurred within the state of Vermont
          and without knowledge, on the part of the Scofield
          defendants, that they would have consequences in the
          state of Connecticut. . . . The evidence further dem-
          onstrates that the Scofield defendants have not actively
          practiced law in Connecticut since early 2019 and that
          a majority, if not all, of their business is done within
          Vermont. . . . The plaintiff has not provided evidence
          to counter these assertions or to show that the Scofield
0, 0                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                        Page 15

       0 Conn. App. 758                       ,0                 17
                     Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

       defendants derive substantial revenue from services
       rendered in Connecticut, as is her burden.
         ‘‘Because the Scofield defendants did not transact
       business in Connecticut, did not derive substantial reve-
       nue from Connecticut or from interstate commerce with
       a commercial impact in Connecticut, and could not
       have reasonably expected their alleged tortious conduct
       to have consequences within Connecticut, the Scofield
       defendants could not have reasonably anticipated being
       haled into court here. Accordingly, under the facts of
       the present case, it would not be reasonable for the
       court to confer jurisdiction over the Scofield defen-
       dants.’’ (Citations omitted.)
          In sum, the court concluded that the plaintiff had
       failed to meet her burden of showing that (1) the court
       may exercise jurisdiction over the defendants pursuant
       to Connecticut’s long arm statute and (2) the defendants
       had the requisite minimum contacts to satisfy constitu-
       tional due process requirements. The court accordingly
       granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. This consol-
       idated appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth
       as necessary.
         As a preliminary matter, we set forth our standard
       of review and other relevant legal principles. ‘‘A motion
       to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the
       record, the court is without jurisdiction. . . . Because
       a jurisdictional challenge presents a question of law,
       our review is plenary. . . . When, as in the present
       case, the defendant challenging the court’s personal
       jurisdiction is a foreign corporation or a nonresident
       individual, it is the plaintiff’s burden to prove the court’s
       jurisdiction. . . . In deciding a jurisdictional question
       raised by a motion to dismiss, a court must take the
       facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including
       those facts necessarily implied from the allegations,
       construing them in a manner most favorable to the
Page 16                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                        0, 0

          18                  ,0                     0 Conn. App. 758
                        Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

          pleader. . . . In most instances, the motion must be
          decided on the complaint alone. However, when the
          complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts estab-
          lished by affidavits submitted in support of the motion
          to dismiss . . . the trial court, in determining the juris-
          dictional issue, may consider these supplementary
          undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume
          the validity of the allegations of the complaint. . . .
          Rather, those allegations are tempered by the light shed
          on them by the [supplementary undisputed facts]. . . .
          If affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support
          of a defendant’s motion to dismiss conclusively estab-
          lish that jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to
          undermine this conclusion with counteraffidavits . . .
          or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action
          without further proceedings. . . . If, however, the
          defendant submits either no proof to rebut the plaintiff’s
          jurisdictional allegations . . . or only evidence that
          fails to call those allegations into question . . . the
          plaintiff need not supply counteraffidavits or other evi-
          dence to support the complaint . . . but may rest on
          the jurisdictional allegations therein.’’ (Citations omit-
          ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) North Sails
          Group, LLC v. Boards & More GmbH, supra, 340
          Conn. 269–70.

             ‘‘When a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction
          in a motion to dismiss, the court must undertake a two
          part inquiry to determine the propriety of its exercising
          such jurisdiction over the defendant. The trial court
          must first decide whether the applicable state [long
          arm] statute authorizes the assertion of jurisdiction over
          the [defendant]. If the statutory requirements [are] met,
          its second obligation [is] then to decide whether the
          exercise of jurisdiction over the [defendant] would vio-
          late constitutional principles of due process.’’ (Internal
          quotation marks omitted.) Id., 273. ‘‘It is axiomatic that
0, 0                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                       Page 17

       0 Conn. App. 758                       ,0               19
                     Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

       courts do not engage in constitutional analysis if a non-
       constitutional basis upon which to resolve an issue
       exists. . . . Therefore, we begin by examining the
       [defendants’] statutory claim to determine whether we
       may resolve the jurisdictional issue without addressing
       the constitutional issue.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
       quotation marks omitted.) Cogswell v. American Tran-
       sit Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 505, 516–17, 923 A.2d 638 (2007).

          ‘‘[O]ur general long arm jurisdiction provision, § 52-
       59b, rather than our corporation specific long arm provi-
       sion, [General Statutes] § 33-929, applies to foreign [lim-
       ited liability companies].’’ Matthews v. SBA, Inc., 149
       Conn. App. 513, 546, 89 A.3d 938, cert. denied, 312
       Conn. 917, 94 A.3d 642 (2014). ‘‘Section 52-59b grants
       jurisdiction to the Superior Court over nonresident indi-
       viduals.’’ Doyle Group v. Alaskans for Cuddy, 146 Conn.
       App. 341, 347, 77 A.3d 880 (2013).

                                      I

         We begin our analysis by examining the plaintiff’s
       claim that the court erred in concluding that § 52-59b
       (a) (1), (2) and/or (3) did not provide a statutory basis
       for personal jurisdiction over the Birmingham defen-
       dants. We disagree with the plaintiff and conclude that
       the trial court properly determined that the Birmingham
       defendants were not subject to personal jurisdiction
       pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (1), (2) or (3).

                                     A

         We first turn to § 52-59b (a) (1). The crux of the
       plaintiff’s claim regarding this provision is that the Bir-
       mingham defendants’ representation of and communi-
       cation with the decedent, a Connecticut resident, along
       with the transfer of money to the Weiss defendants,
       also Connecticut residents, satisfy the requirements of
Page 18                        CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                     0, 0

          20                        ,0                         0 Conn. App. 758
                            Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

          § 52-59b (a) (1).13 For the reasons that follow, we con-
          clude that they do not.

            ‘‘Our Supreme Court has explained that § 52-59b (a)
          (1) authorizes jurisdiction over nonresidents who trans-
          act any business within the state provided that the cause
          of action arises out of such transaction. . . .
          [A]lthough the term [t]ransacts any business is not
          defined by statute, [the Supreme Court has] construed
          the term to embrace a single purposeful business trans-
          action. . . .

             ‘‘[A] nonresident individual who has not entered this
          state physically nevertheless may be subject to jurisdic-
          tion in this state under § 52-59b (a) (1) if that individual
          has invoked the benefits and protection of Connecti-
          cut’s laws by virtue of his or her purposeful Connecticut
          related activity . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quo-
          tation marks omitted.) Id., 347–48. ‘‘In determining
          whether [the defendants’] contacts constitute the trans-
          action of business within the state, we do not apply a
          rigid formula but balance considerations of public pol-
          icy, common sense, and the chronology and geography
          of the relevant factors.’’ Gaudio v. Gaudio, 23 Conn.
          App. 287, 298, 580 A.2d 1212, cert. denied, 217 Conn.
          803, 584 A.2d 471 (1990). ‘‘There must be some definitive
          act taken by the defendant that evinces a purposeful
          availment of the privileges of conducting the subject
          activity within the forum state and that, subsequently,
          invokes the benefits and protections of its laws.’’ Wal-
          shon v. Ballon Stoll Bader & Nadler, P.C., 121 Conn.
          App. 366, 372, 996 A.2d 1195 (2010).
             13
                The plaintiff also argued before the trial court ‘‘that because the Bir-
          mingham defendants maintain pro hac vice admission in Connecticut, they
          should have reasonably expected to be haled into court in this state.’’ The
          plaintiff’s counsel conceded at oral argument before this court that the
          Birmingham defendants’ pro hac vice admission in an unrelated matter was
          irrelevant to the determination of personal jurisdiction in this case.
0, 0                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                      Page 19

       0 Conn. App. 758                       ,0              21
                     Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

          In the present case, the Birmingham defendants
       derived only minimal income from Connecticut resi-
       dents, did not solicit business in Connecticut, and did
       not promote themselves as a national firm. With respect
       to the sale of the Vermont property, the Birmingham
       defendants performed all legal services exclusively in
       Vermont and did not meet with the decedent or the
       plaintiff in Connecticut. Moreover, the decedent
       retained the Birmingham defendants to represent him in
       the sale of real property located in the state of Vermont.
       Although it is true that both the decedent and the plain-
       tiff were Connecticut residents at all relevant times and
       that the Birmingham defendants conversed with the
       decedent several times while he was in Connecticut,
       we agree with the trial court that those facts alone are
       insufficient to warrant a determination that the legal
       services rendered by the Birmingham defendants con-
       stituted the transacting of business in Connecticut
       within the meaning of § 52-59b (1) (a).
          This case is analogous to Rosenblit v. Danaher, 206
       Conn. 125, 537 A.2d 145 (1988), in which our Supreme
       Court concluded that the trial court could not exercise
       personal jurisdiction over the defendant pursuant to
       § 52-59b (a) (1) when ‘‘two Connecticut residents, [the
       plaintiffs], went to Massachusetts and there, with . . .
       a Massachusetts resident, hired an attorney, who
       resided and practiced law in Massachusetts, to bring
       an action that arose out of a series of contacts by the
       plaintiffs with Massachusetts residents in the main.’’
       Id., 140. The court also noted that ‘‘the proposed action
       concerned not only events that had occurred in large
       measure in Massachusetts and arose out of the plain-
       tiffs’ efforts to rehabilitate real property situated in
       Massachusetts, but also involved a number of potential
       witnesses from Massachusetts.’’ Id. The court found
       that, although the Massachusetts lawyer attended a
       meeting in Connecticut and communicated with the
Page 20                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                      0, 0

          22                         ,0                         0 Conn. App. 758
                             Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

          plaintiffs in connection with his representation of them;
          see id., 135–36; the plaintiffs had not met their burden
          in establishing that the defendant had transacted any
          business in the state. See id., 141–42; see also Ryan v.
          Cerullo, 282 Conn. 109, 119–23, 918 A.2d 867 (2007)
          (holding that court could not exercise personal jurisdic-
          tion over defendant New York accountant pursuant to
          § 52-59b (a) (1) when defendant performed accounting
          services for plaintiff Connecticut resident exclusively
          in New York, met with plaintiff exclusively in New York,
          and corresponded exclusively with New York tax offi-
          cials).
            In this case, the Birmingham defendants performed
          legal services for the decedent entirely in Vermont,
          never met with the plaintiff or the decedent in Connecti-
          cut, and have not otherwise engaged in any other rele-
          vant contact with Connecticut.14 As such, the facts that
          the plaintiff alleges in support of the ‘‘transacts any
          business’’ requirement of § 52-59b (a) (1) amount to far
          less than those found insufficient to establish personal
          jurisdiction in Rosenblit v. Danaher, supra, 206 Conn.
          125, and Ryan v. Cerullo, supra, 282 Conn. 119–23.
             14
                Although the plaintiff argues that the Birmingham defendants solicited
          individuals in Connecticut and other states on their website, pointing to a
          portion of the website that says ‘‘Attention: out of state sellers,’’ we are not
          persuaded. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
          has held that websites deemed ‘‘passive’’ cannot support personal jurisdic-
          tion. ‘‘Active websites are those where individuals can directly interact
          with a company over their Internet site, download, transmit or exchange
          information, and enter into contracts with the company via computer. . . .
          Active websites may support an exercise of personal jurisdiction. . . .
          [P]assive websites that require a potential customer to initiate contact with
          the foreign corporation by telephone, mail, or email, rather than allowing
          them to order directly over the Internet, cannot support personal jurisdic-
          tion.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cousteau Soci-
          ety, Inc. v. Cousteau, 498 F. Supp. 3d 287, 303 (D. Conn. 2020). We agree
          with the District Court’s reasoning.
             There is insufficient evidence that the Birmingham defendants’ website
          is active. We accordingly conclude that the website is an insufficient basis on
          which to find that the Birmingham defendants solicited out of state clients.
0, 0                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                      Page 21

       0 Conn. App. 758                       ,0              23
                     Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

       Additionally, the Birmingham defendants’ communica-
       tions with the decedent while he was in Connecticut
       are insufficient to establish that the Birmingham defen-
       dants transacted business in the state, as ‘‘[t]elephone
       calls and written communications . . . generally are
       held not to provide a sufficient basis for personal juris-
       diction under the long-arm statute . . . . [T]elephone
       and mail contacts are jurisdictionally insufficient unless
       the defendant projected himself by those means into
       [the forum state] in such a manner that he purposefully
       availed himself . . . of the benefits and protections of
       its laws.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
       omitted.) Green v. Simmons, 100 Conn. App. 600, 605,
       919 A.2d 482 (2007).
          We additionally conclude that the Birmingham defen-
       dants’ transfer of sale proceeds to and communication
       with the Weiss defendants are insufficient to satisfy the
       requirements of § 52-59b (a) (1). The plaintiff claims
       that the Birmingham defendants entered into an oral
       agreement with the Weiss defendants to transfer the
       sale proceeds and that, because of this alleged contract,
       the Birmingham defendants therefore transacted busi-
       ness in the state of Connecticut. Through his affidavit,
       however, Attorney Birmingham established that neither
       he, nor anyone acting on behalf of Birmingham Law
       Offices, LLC, had entered into any contracts in the state
       of Connecticut. Although the evidence does show that
       the Birmingham defendants spoke with Attorney Weiss
       and subsequently transferred the sale proceeds to the
       Weiss defendants, the plaintiff has failed to provide
       sufficient evidence to establish that a contract existed
       between the Birmingham defendants and the Weiss
       defendants. In support of her claim, she points only to
       a portion of Attorney Birmingham’s affidavit that reads:
       ‘‘After speaking with Attorney Weiss, [Attorney Bir-
       mingham] sent the sale proceeds to [Attorney Weiss]
       based on his agreement to hold the funds in escrow
Page 22                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                       0, 0

          24                  ,0                     0 Conn. App. 758
                        Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

          until the probate court determined who was entitled to
          receive the funds.’’ She additionally has failed to provide
          any evidence that the Birmingham defendants affirma-
          tively and purposefully contacted the Weiss defendants.
          We conclude that the evidence presented is insufficient
          to establish that the Birmingham defendants contracted
          with the Weiss defendants. The plaintiff’s claim, there-
          fore, is premised exclusively on the Birmingham defen-
          dants’ communication with Connecticut residents,
          which is insufficient to establish that the ‘‘transacts any
          business’’ requirement of § 52-59b (a) (1) has been met.
          See Green v. Simmons, supra, 100 Conn. App. 605.
             In short, the plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of
          establishing that the Birmingham defendants transacted
          any business within the state. Accordingly, we conclude
          that the trial court may not exercise personal jurisdic-
          tion over the Birmingham defendants pursuant to § 52-
          59b (a) (1).
                                        B
            We next turn to § 52-59b (a) (2). The plaintiff claims
          that the Birmingham defendants committed a tort in
          the state by failing to deliver the sale proceeds to the
          plaintiff and, instead, transferring the money to the
          Weiss defendants to hold for the decedent’s estate. The
          plaintiff, however, does not clearly allege what tort
          was committed. Rather, she vaguely argues that the
          Birmingham defendants’ ‘‘communications involved
          misrepresentations and omissions’’ and that, in failing
          to deliver the sale proceeds as instructed by the dece-
          dent, the Birmingham defendants committed a tort that
          caused harm in Connecticut. For the following reasons,
          we disagree.
             Section 52-59b (a) (2) provides in relevant part that
          ‘‘a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any
          nonresident individual, foreign partnership or foreign
0, 0                        CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                     Page 23

       0 Conn. App. 758                                ,0                        25
                         Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

       voluntary association, or over the executor or adminis-
       trator of such nonresident individual, foreign partner-
       ship or foreign voluntary association, who in person or
       through an agent . . . commits a tortious act within
       the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation
       of character arising from the act . . . .’’
          The plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of estab-
       lishing that the Birmingham defendants committed a
       tort in Connecticut. ‘‘When, as in the present case, the
       defendant challenging the court’s personal jurisdiction
       is a foreign corporation or a nonresident individual, it is
       the plaintiff’s burden to prove the court’s jurisdiction.’’
       (Internal quotation marks omitted.) North Sails Group,
       LLC v. Boards & More GmbH, supra, 340 Conn. 269.
       Attorney Birmingham, in his affidavit, clearly denied
       committing any tortious acts in Connecticut.15 The
       plaintiff has failed to refute those claims. Rather, she
       relies solely on conclusory allegations in her complaint
       that the Birmingham defendants committed a false mis-
       representation communicated into Connecticut, that
       they improperly transferred the sale proceeds to the
       Weiss defendants within the state, and that they there-
       fore had committed a tort in the state. ‘‘If affidavits and/
       or other evidence submitted in support of a defendant’s
       motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdic-
       tion is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to undermine this
       conclusion with counteraffidavits . . . or other evi-
       dence, the trial court may dismiss the action . . . .’’
       (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
       Matthews v. SBA, Inc., supra, 149 Conn. App. 552.
         We conclude that Attorney Birmingham’s affidavit
       supports his assertion that jurisdiction pursuant to § 52-
       59b (a) (2) is lacking and that the plaintiff has failed
         15
           Specifically, Attorney Birmingham’s affidavit states: ‘‘I have not commit-
       ted a tortious act in the state of Connecticut, nor committed a tortious act
       outside the state causing injury to a person or property in the state of
       Connecticut.’’
Page 24                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                     0, 0

          26                        ,0                         0 Conn. App. 758
                             Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

          to undermine this conclusion. ‘‘A plaintiff, in presenting
          facts sufficient to establish the court’s jurisdiction, must
          present specific, and not simply conclusory, allega-
          tions.’’ Id. We agree with the trial court that ‘‘[t]he act
          of wiring the money from the sale proceeds is not,
          in and of itself, a fraudulent misrepresentation. The
          plaintiff has failed to present evidence demonstrating
          that this wire transfer involved false representations
          made by the Birmingham defendants regarding anyone
          or anything related to the subject real estate transaction
          or, specifically, regarding the plaintiff and/or her alleged
          property or assets.’’ We therefore conclude that the
          plaintiff has failed to meet her burden in proving the
          court’s jurisdiction pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (2).
                                                C
             We last turn to § 52-59b (a) (3). The plaintiff contends
          that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over the
          Birmingham defendants because (1) the Birmingham
          defendants committed a tortious act outside of Con-
          necticut,16 (2) that act caused injury to the plaintiff
          within the state, (3) the plaintiff’s cause of action arises
          from the Birmingham defendants’ tortious act, and (4)
          the Birmingham defendants (a) regularly do or solicit
          business in the state, (b) derive substantial revenue
          from the state, or (c) expected or reasonably should
          have expected that the act would have consequences
          in the state and derived substantial revenue from inter-
          state commerce. For the reasons that follow, we dis-
          agree.
             16
                The plaintiff has not clearly stated exactly what the claimed tortious
          act is. The plaintiff, instead, has vaguely argued that ‘‘[t]he Birmingham
          defendants’ communications involved misrepresentations and omissions.’’
          She argues that the Birmingham defendants’ failure to wire her the sale
          proceeds and instead transferring the money to the Weiss defendants ‘‘vio-
          lated [the decedent’s] written instructions to the Birmingham defendants
          that the plaintiff receive the monies at the closing. The foregoing constitutes
          false statements, misrepresentations, omissions, and tortious conduct.’’
0, 0                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                      Page 25

       0 Conn. App. 758                       ,0              27
                     Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

          Section 52-59b (a) (3) provides in relevant part that
       ‘‘a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any
       nonresident individual, foreign partnership or foreign
       voluntary association, or over the executor or adminis-
       trator of such nonresident individual, foreign partner-
       ship or foreign voluntary association, who in person or
       through an agent . . . commits a tortious act outside
       the state causing injury to person or property within
       the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation
       of character arising from the act, if such person or agent
       (A) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in
       any other persistent course of conduct, or derives sub-
       stantial revenue from goods used or consumed or ser-
       vices rendered, in the state, or (B) expects or should
       reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the
       state and derives substantial revenue from interstate
       or international commerce . . . .’’
          ‘‘[T]he substantial revenue requirement is designed
       to narrow the long-arm reach to preclude the exercise
       of jurisdiction over nondomiciliaries who might cause
       direct, foreseeable injury within the [s]tate but whose
       business operations are of a local character . . . . Put
       differently, substantial revenue means enough revenue
       to indicate a commercial impact in the forum, such that
       a defendant fairly could have expected to be haled into
       court there. . . . Because of the indefinite nature of
       the substantial revenue requirement, the determination
       of whether that jurisdictional threshold has been met
       in any particular case necessarily will require a careful
       review of the relevant facts and frequently will entail
       an evaluation of both the total amount of revenue
       involved and the percentage of annual income that that
       revenue represents.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quota-
       tion marks omitted.) Ryan v. Cerullo, supra, 282
       Conn. 125.
         The plaintiff has failed to meet any of the statutory
       requirements in § 52-59b (a) (3) (A) and (B), namely,
Page 26                        CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                     0, 0

          28                        ,0                         0 Conn. App. 758
                            Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

          that the Birmingham defendants either do or solicit
          business in the state or derived substantial revenue
          from Connecticut or interstate commerce.17 In order to
          find that the trial court could exercise jurisdiction over
          the Birmingham defendants pursuant to § 52-59b (a)
          (3), the plaintiff must demonstrate that the additional
          requirements of either § 52-59b (a) (3) (A) or (B) are
          met. We address each in turn.
                                                i
             In order to exercise jurisdiction over the Birmingham
          defendants pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (3) (A), the plaintiff
          must establish, in addition to the tortious conduct ele-
          ment, that the Birmingham defendants either (1) regu-
          larly do or solicit business in Connecticut, or (2) derive
          substantial revenue from services rendered in the state.
          See General Statutes § 52-59b (a) (3) (A). We conclude
          that the plaintiff has provided insufficient evidence as
          to each and therefore conclude that the court may not
          exercise jurisdiction over the Birmingham defendants
          pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (3) (A).
            Although the plaintiff claims that the Birmingham
          defendants regularly solicit business in Connecticut, we
          are not persuaded. In support of her claim, the plaintiff
          argues that the Birmingham defendants regularly do or
          solicit business by virtue of their website. Specifically,
          she points to a portion of the Birmingham defendants’
          website that is titled: ‘‘Attention: out of state sellers.’’
          She argues that this, in light of Attorney Birmingham’s
          deposition testimony in which he stated that his firm
            17
               Although § 52-59b (a) (3) (A) would also be satisfied if the plaintiff
          established that the Birmingham defendants engaged ‘‘in any other persistent
          course of conduct’’ in the state, the plaintiff did not rely on this statutory
          language in arguing that the statutory requirements of § 52-59b (a) (3) (A)
          have been met. We, accordingly, consider only whether the other statutory
          requirements, namely, whether the Birmingham defendants have done or
          solicited business in Connecticut or derived substantial revenue from ser-
          vices rendered in the state, have been met.
0, 0                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                        Page 27

       0 Conn. App. 758                       ,0                29
                     Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

       ‘‘ha[s] clients from all over the place,’’ establishes that
       the Birmingham defendants regularly solicit business
       in the state. This evidence, however, is insufficient to
       establish that the Birmingham defendants regularly
       solicit business in Connecticut. At best, this evidence
       establishes that the Birmingham defendants have pre-
       viously had clients who were not Vermont residents
       and that they have information available for potential
       out-of-state sellers on their website. It is too attenuated,
       however, to establish that the Birmingham defendants
       have either done any business in the state of Connecti-
       cut or have specifically solicited business in the state.
          We additionally conclude that the plaintiff has failed
       to establish that the Birmingham defendants derive sub-
       stantial revenue from Connecticut. The Birmingham
       defendants acknowledge that they received minimal
       income from the state, namely, the payment received
       from the decedent in connection with the underlying
       representation of the decedent in the sale of his Ver-
       mont property. There is no evidence, however, that the
       Birmingham defendants received any further revenue
       from Connecticut or interstate commerce. The plaintiff
       has failed to present any facts to support her assertion
       that the Birmingham defendants have received any rev-
       enue from Connecticut, excepting that from the under-
       lying representation of the decedent, let alone facts
       supporting her claim that the Birmingham defendants
       have received substantial revenue from Connecticut.
       We therefore conclude that the plaintiff failed to estab-
       lish either of the statutory requirements of § 52-59b (a)
       (3) (A).
                                     ii
         In order to exercise jurisdiction over the Birmingham
       defendants pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (3) (B), the plaintiff
       must establish, in addition to the tortious conduct ele-
       ment, that the Birmingham defendants both (1) expect
Page 28                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                       0, 0

          30                  ,0                     0 Conn. App. 758
                        Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

          or should reasonably expect for their actions to have
          consequences in the state, and (2) derive substantial
          revenue from interstate or international commerce. See
          General Statutes § 52-59b (a) (3) (B). We conclude that
          the plaintiff has provided insufficient evidence to find
          that the Birmingham defendants derived substantial
          revenue from interstate or international commerce and
          therefore conclude that the court may not exercise juris-
          diction over the Birmingham defendants pursuant to
          § 52-59b (a) (3) (B).
             The crux of the plaintiff’s claim regarding § 52-59b
          (a) (3) (B) is substantially the same as her claim under
          § 52-59b (a) (3) (A). She again points to the Birmingham
          defendants’ website, arguing that ‘‘the Birmingham
          defendants’ Internet website advertises to clientele out
          of state, thus establishing interstate revenue . . . .’’
          She additionally points to Attorney Birmingham’s depo-
          sition, in which he stated that the firm has ‘‘clients from
          all over the place.’’ She additionally argues that the
          Birmingham defendants derived revenue from inter-
          state commerce because they ‘‘entered into a contract
          of representation of [the decedent], a Connecticut resi-
          dent . . . .’’ We are not persuaded.
             Although the evidence cited by the plaintiff may sup-
          port her claim that the Birmingham defendants have
          derived some revenue from interstate commerce, we
          are not persuaded that this evidence establishes that
          the Birmingham defendants derive substantial revenue
          from interstate commerce, as required by § 52-59b (a)
          (3) (B). ‘‘[S]ubstantial revenue means enough revenue
          to indicate a commercial impact in the forum, such that
          a defendant fairly could have expected to be haled into
          court there. . . . Because of the indefinite nature of
          the substantial revenue requirement, the determination
          of whether that jurisdictional threshold has been met
          in any particular case necessarily will require a careful
          review of the relevant facts and frequently will entail
0, 0                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                       Page 29

       0 Conn. App. 758                                 ,0                          31
                          Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

       an evaluation of both the total amount of revenue
       involved and the percentage of annual income that that
       revenue represents.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quota-
       tion marks omitted.) Ryan v. Cerullo, supra, 282 Conn.
       125. The plaintiff has not provided specific evidence
       demonstrating the number of interstate clients or
       amount of interstate revenue the Birmingham defen-
       dants derive. The evidence provided is vague and insuf-
       ficient to support a conclusion that the amount of reve-
       nue the Birmingham defendants received from
       interstate commerce was substantial.
         We therefore conclude that the plaintiff has failed to
       meet her burden of establishing that the trial court
       may exercise personal jurisdiction over the Birmingham
       defendants pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (3) (A) or (B).
       Accordingly, we need not decide whether the Bir-
       mingham defendants have sufficient minimum contacts
       with Connecticut to satisfy constitutional due process
       requirements because it is only ‘‘[i]f the statutory [long
       arm] requirements [are] met, [that the court then]
       decide[s] whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the
       [defendant] would violate constitutional principles of
       due process.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) North
       Sails Group, LLC v. Boards & More GmbH, supra, 340
       Conn. 273. We therefore conclude that the trial court
       properly determined that it could not exercise personal
       jurisdiction over the Birmingham defendants pursuant
       to § 52-59b (a) (1), (2) or (3).
                                              II
         The plaintiff claims that the trial court had personal
       jurisdiction over the Scofield defendants pursuant to
       § 52-59b (a) (3)18 because (1) they committed a tortious
          18
             The plaintiff additionally argued in her principal appellate brief that the
       court had personal jurisdiction over the Scofield defendants pursuant to
       § 52-59b (a) (1), an argument not made by the plaintiff before the trial court.
       The plaintiff’s counsel abandoned this claim during oral argument before
       this court.
Page 30                        CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                   0, 0

          32                       ,0                        0 Conn. App. 758
                            Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

          act outside of Connecticut, (2) that act caused injury
          to the plaintiff within the state, (3) the plaintiff’s cause
          of action arises from the Scofield defendants’ tortious
          act, and (4) the Scofield defendants (a) regularly do
          or solicit business in the state, (b) derive substantial
          revenue from the state, or (c) expected or reasonably
          should have expected that the act would have conse-
          quences in the state and derived substantial revenue
          from interstate commerce. We disagree.
             Even if we assume, arguendo, that the Scofield defen-
          dants committed tortious acts outside of the state, caus-
          ing injury to the plaintiff within the state, the plaintiff
          has still failed to meet the final statutory requirement,
          namely, that the Scofield defendants either do or solicit
          business in the state or derived substantial revenue
          from Connecticut or interstate commerce. In order to
          find that the trial court could exercise jurisdiction over
          the Scofield defendants pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (3),
          the plaintiff must demonstrate that the additional
          requirements of either § 52-59b (a) (3) (A) or (B) are
          met. We address each in turn.
                                              A
             We first turn to § 52-59b (a) (3) (A). In order to exer-
          cise jurisdiction over the Scofield defendants pursuant
          to § 52-59b (a) (3) (A), the plaintiff must establish, in
          addition to the tortious conduct element, that the Sco-
          field defendants either (1) regularly do or solicit busi-
          ness in Connecticut, or (2) derive substantial revenue
          from services rendered in the state.19 See General Stat-
          utes § 52-59b (a) (3) (A). We conclude that the plaintiff
            19
              As with the Birmingham defendants, the plaintiff did not argue that the
          Scofield defendants engaged ‘‘in any other persistent course of conduct’’ in
          the state in arguing that the statutory requirements of § 52-59b (a) (3) (A)
          have been met, and we, accordingly, consider only whether the other statu-
          tory requirements, namely, whether the Scofield defendants have done or
          solicited business in Connecticut or derived substantial revenue from ser-
          vices rendered in the state, have been met. See footnote 17 of this opinion.
0, 0                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                        Page 31

       0 Conn. App. 758                       ,0                 33
                     Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

       has provided insufficient evidence as to each and there-
       fore conclude that the court may not exercise jurisdic-
       tion over the Scofield defendants pursuant to § 52-59b
       (a) (3) (A).
          The plaintiff claims that the Scofield defendants regu-
       larly solicit business in the state through their website.
       Particularly, the plaintiff argues that the website says
       that the Scofield defendants provide services in the
       ‘‘Northeast’’ and highlights that Attorney Scofield is
       licensed to practice in Connecticut. We are not per-
       suaded.
          First, the portion of the Scofield defendants’ website
       quoted by the plaintiff is taken out of context. Read in
       its entirety, the website states that ‘‘[t]he Firm’s goal
       is to offer top level real estate services as well as general
       legal services and estate and probate work as needed
       to individuals and small business entities living and
       operating in this beautiful part of the Northeast.’’
       (Emphasis added.) It appears, in context, that the web-
       site advertises the legal work the firm does in Vermont
       specifically, rather than advertising to the Northeast as
       a whole. It is not apparent from this portion of the
       website that the Scofield defendants regularly conduct
       or solicit business in Connecticut.
          Additionally, although the website does note that
       Attorney Scofield is admitted to practice in Connecti-
       cut, we are not convinced that this alone demonstrates
       that the Scofield defendants solicited business in the
       state. The website states that Attorney Scofield is
       ‘‘[a]dmitted to practice in Vermont, Connecticut, and
       New York’’ and that she has ‘‘[o]ver 20 years of legal
       experience serving both public and private sector cli-
       ents in New York, Connecticut and Vermont.’’ We agree
       with the trial court that the provided information is a
       resume only, intended to provide potential clients with
Page 32                        CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                     0, 0

          34                        ,0                         0 Conn. App. 758
                            Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

          further information about Attorney Scofield, rather than
          a solicitation of Connecticut clients.
             There is also insufficient evidence that the Scofield
          defendants derive substantial revenue from the state.
          The plaintiff points to Attorney Scofield’s status as ‘‘lead
          attorney’’ in a case before the United States District
          Court in support of her contention that the Scofield
          defendants regularly conduct business in and derive
          substantial revenue from Connecticut. The Scofield
          defendants provided evidence showing that Attorney
          Scofield is no longer actively involved in the referenced
          case20 and that she has not practiced law in the state
          since 2019. Additionally, even assuming, arguendo, that
          Attorney Scofield were still involved in that District
          Court case, this does not support the assertion that the
          Scofield defendants derived substantial revenue from
          the state of Connecticut. Our Supreme Court has clearly
          stated that ‘‘substantial revenue means enough revenue
          to indicate a commercial impact in the forum, such that
          a defendant fairly could have expected to be haled into
          court there.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ryan
          v. Cerullo, supra, 282 Conn. 125. Attorney Scofield does
          not dispute that she previously represented clients in
          and practiced law in Connecticut, but her affidavit sup-
          ports her assertion that she officially retired from prac-
          ticing law in the state in 2019 and that she has derived
          minimal, if any, revenue from the state since that time.
          It is additionally unlikely that, even if Attorney Scofield
          were still involved in the referenced District Court case
          at the time of the sale of the Vermont property, the
          proceeds from that case alone would demonstrate that
          the Scofield defendants could fairly have been expected
             20
                Specifically, the Scofield defendants highlighted the fact that the case
          was closed in 2018, and that the later motion for reconsideration was filed
          by the defendant against the substitute plaintiff, not the party represented
          by Attorney Scofield. See Wachovia Mortgage, FSB v. Toczek, Docket No.
          3:18-CV-1965 (VLB), 2019 WL 6837788 (D. Conn. December 16, 2019); see
          also footnote 5 of this opinion.
0, 0                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                        Page 33

       0 Conn. App. 758                       ,0                35
                     Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

       to be haled into court in Connecticut for an entirely
       unrelated case.

         The plaintiff has provided no other evidence that the
       Scofield defendants derived any, let alone substantial,
       revenue from Connecticut. Therefore, we conclude that
       the plaintiff has failed to meet her burden in establishing
       that the court may exercise personal jurisdiction over
       the Scofield defendants pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (3) (A).

                                     B

          Finally, we turn to § 52-59b (a) (3) (B). In order to
       exercise jurisdiction over the Scofield defendants pur-
       suant to § 52-59b (a) (3) (B), the plaintiff must establish,
       in addition to the tortious conduct element, that the
       Scofield defendants both (1) expect or should reason-
       ably expect for their actions to have consequences in
       the state, and (2) derive substantial revenue from inter-
       state or international commerce. See General Statutes
       § 52-59b (a) (3) (B). We conclude that the plaintiff has
       provided insufficient evidence to conclude that the Sco-
       field defendants derived substantial revenue from inter-
       state or international commerce and, therefore, con-
       clude that the court may not exercise jurisdiction over
       the Scofield defendants pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (3) (B).

          In support of her argument that the Scofield defen-
       dants derive substantial revenue from interstate com-
       merce, the plaintiff points to a portion of the Scofield
       defendants’ website that contains testimonials from
       prior out-of-state clients. Although these testimonials
       may support a claim that the Scofield defendants derive
       revenue from interstate commerce, the plaintiff has
       failed to provide sufficient evidence about these trans-
       actions from which the court could determine whether
       the Scofield defendants derive substantial revenue
       from interstate commerce and accordingly establish
Page 34                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                       0, 0

          36                  ,0                     0 Conn. App. 758
                        Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

          jurisdiction pursuant to § 52-59b (a) (3) (B). The plain-
          tiff has simply shown that the website contains testimo-
          nials from clients from states other than Vermont with-
          out further information about what percentage of the
          Scofield defendants’ revenues these non-Vermont cli-
          ents make up, the amount of revenue derived from
          these clients, or any other relevant facts. Because ‘‘the
          determination of whether [the substantial revenue]
          threshold has been met in any particular case necessar-
          ily will require a careful review of the relevant facts
          and frequently will entail an evaluation of both the
          total amount of revenue involved and the percentage
          of annual income that that revenue represents’’; Ryan
          v. Cerullo, supra, 282 Conn. 125; we conclude that the
          plaintiff has provided insufficient evidence to conclude
          that, even if the Scofield defendants do derive some
          revenue from interstate commerce, that revenue is sub-
          stantial enough to satisfy the requirements of § 52-59b
          (a) (3) (B).
             Because we conclude that the plaintiff has failed to
          meet her burden in establishing that the court may
          exercise personal jurisdiction over the Scofield defen-
          dants pursuant to the relevant long arm statute provi-
          sion alleged, we need not decide whether the Scofield
          defendants have sufficient minimum contacts with Con-
          necticut to meet the constitutional requirements of due
          process, as it is only ‘‘[i]f the statutory [long arm]
          requirements [are] met, [that the court then] decide[s]
          whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the [defen-
          dant] would violate constitutional principles of due pro-
          cess.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) North Sails
          Group, LLC v. Boards & More GmbH, supra, 340
          Conn. 273.
            To summarize, we conclude that the trial court prop-
          erly determined that it could not exercise personal juris-
          diction over the defendants pursuant to § 52-59b (a).
0, 0                  CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                   Page 35

       0 Conn. App. 758                      ,0           37
                    Lyons v. Birmingham Law Office, LLC

       Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court
       granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss.
         The judgment is affirmed.
         In this opinion the other judges concurred.