Court Opinion

ID: 9465790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:55:46.188813+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:22.328113
License: Public Domain

JAMES C. HILL, Circuit Judge,
dissent-
ing:
I cannot but agree with my Brother God-bold’s excellent statement of the law for the majority. However, I dissent because I cannot agree with the majority’s applica*941tion of that law to these facts. I .would hold that the Government Agents had probable cause to arrest the defendants and search their automobiles.
I agree with the majority that we must apply the two prongs of Aguilar1 and Spinelli2 to determine whether there was probable cause to make these warrantless searches. I agree with the majority that on-the-scene corroboration may buttress an otherwise deficient tip to justify a search on probable cause. I also agree with the majority that such corroboration may buttress both the “credibility prong” and the “criminal conduct prong.” 3 Finally, I agree with the majority that the “credibility prong” has been sufficiently buttressed here by corroboration. The majority and I part ways and take separate forks in the road in our conclusions about the “criminal conduct prong.”
The majority defines the “criminal conduct prong” as “sufficient revealed circumstances to indicate that the informer could conclude that the suspect was engaged in criminal, as opposed to innocent, activity.” Majority opinion at 938. The critical focus is on the reasonableness of the officer’s conclusion as to the informant’s state • of mind, and this can be measured only by an objective appraisal of the facts upon which the officer has based such a conclusion. The court must determine if the officer could reasonably believe that the informant was sufficiently aware to conclude that crime was afoot. I disagree with the majority’s opinion that “the corroborated facts paint an innocent picture of two cars heading north to Houston.” Majority opinion at 940. Here the corroborated details include: (1) identification of one of the driver-participants; (2) presence with Villarreal of his pregnant wife and child; (3) use of the multiple-vehicle modus operandi; (4) identification of the make and models of the automobiles; (5) the license numbers of the automobiles; (6) passage through the Sarita checkpoint; (7) convoy directed toward Houston. In addition, the letters stated that crime was afoot — an ongoing heroin smuggling operation. I believe that when the informant proved truthful about these corroborated details it was probable that the critical unverified facts were also true.4
I reach this conclusion in the entire context here. When corroboration consists of seemingly innocent conduct, more significance should be given to an informant’s accurate prediction of future activity than would be given a conclusion of criminal conduct in the past.5 That is, in those instances in which the informant describes a scheme of events to take place at some *942point forward in time and conduct is subsequently observed which follows the scheme outlined by the informant, the reliability of the informant’s assertion that the conduct is in aid of criminal activity is strengthened, even though the conduct itself in the absence of the tip would appear to “paint an innocent picture.” In addition, the law enforcement experience in this area of our country is that drugs are commonly smuggled through these checkpoints in multiple vehicle convoys. This Court often has depended upon this fact of border life to help establish a reasonable suspicion to justify the stop of these convoys.6 Whatever argument may be made for the innocence of cars of a specific make, model and license number travelling in tandem through a border checkpoint, no one can seriously attribute to happenstance that the two described vehicles would be travelling at a specific interval, through a specified checkpoint on an unspecified day in the future. The majority is correct to point out that some details were not corroborated, either because the search took place before corroboration was possible, e. g., the planned rendezvous at the roadside park, or because the actual events differ from the prediction, e. g., the driver other than Villarreal was Smith and not Montalvo as named in the letter, although it was later determined that Montalvo was the registered owner of the vehicle. However, I do not think that the prediction necessarily was wrong regarding the timing of the heroin smuggling. The final letter which was received on November 10 stated that the convoy passed through Sarita every few days; the defendants were intercepted on November 19. This could mean that an intervening convoy simply went undetected. In any event, the corroborated accuracy of this predictive tip was not outweighed in my opinion. The reliability of the tip justified a conclusion that the informer was indeed aware of criminal activity afoot. I believe that the “criminal conduct prong” was satisfied. This being so, probable cause existed for the search and the exigency of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement justified these arrests and searches.
I dissent because I believe that the majority is guilty of the failing it professes to avoid: “creating technical requirements that impede law enforcement and serve no other purpose.” Majority opinion at 940.

. See, e. g., United States v. Carroll. 591 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1979) and cases cited.

. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964).

. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).

. I accept the nomenclature the majority coins, although I fear that much of the confusion in this area of the law is the result of too many layers of analysis on the basic constitutional standard of reasonableness.

. Unquestionably, verification of arrival time, dress, and gait reinforced the honesty of the informant — he had not reported a made-up story. But if what Draper stands for is that the existence of the tenth and critical fact is made sufficiently probable to justify the issuance of a warrant by verifying nine other facts coming from the same source, I have my doubts about that case.
In the first place, the proposition is not that the tenth fact may be logically inferred from the other nine or that the tenth fact is usually found in conjunction with the other nine. No one would suggest that just anyone getting off the 10:30 train dressed as Draper was, with a brisk walk and carrying a zipper bag, should be arrested for carrying narcotics. The thrust of Draper is not that the verified facts have independent significance with respect to proof of the tenth. The argument instead relates to the reliability of the source: because an informant is right about some things, he is more probably right about other facts, usually the critical, unverified facts.
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 426-27, 89 S.Ct. 584, 594, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1959) (White, J., concurring), quoted in United States v. Tuley, 546 F.2d 1264, 1273 n. 7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 837, 98 S.Ct. 128, 54 L.Ed.2d 99 (1977) (Godbold, J., dissenting).

. Cf. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1959); United States v. Montgomery, 554 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Tuley, 546 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 837, 98 S.Ct. 128, 54 L.Ed.2d 99 (1977).