Court Opinion

ID: 9393686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-10 20:02:34.86991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:54.802507
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/10/23 Vu v. Yang CA2/4
              NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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         IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION FOUR

HANNAH VU,                                                             B317516

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     (Los Angeles County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. BC620507)
         v.

HUNG-CHIH YANG,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Stephen I. Goorvitch, Judge. Affirmed.
         Peter C. Chen, for Defendant and Appellant.
         Stuart Kane, Donald J. Hamman, and Eve A. Brackmann, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
                              INTRODUCTION
      Respondent Hannah Vu leased an office property in the City of El
Monte from appellant Hung-Chih Yang. The parties signed a written lease.
Under the lease, Yang, the landlord, was responsible for making “[a]ny
alterations required by Law,” except those that were “a result of Tenant’s
use.” According to the lease, the property had recently passed “final
inspection.”
      Shortly after Vu took possession of the property, city officials declared
that the property did not comport with the city’s zoning code and that Vu
could not occupy it. Vu left the premises, and Vu and Yang sued each other.
A bench trial followed.
      The trial court found that the property’s zoning issues predated the
lease, meaning that they were inherent to the property itself and not a result
of Vu’s use of the property. It found that bringing the building into
compliance with the city’s rules was Yang’s responsibility. It found that the
property had not passed final inspection. It thus found Yang had breached
the lease. It also found for Vu on other claims, including negligent
misrepresentation.
      Yang contends on appeal that the trial court erred by:
(a) misinterpreting the El Monte Municipal Code; (b) not crediting evidence
favorable to Yang; (c) finding him in breach based on incompetent evidence, a
misinterpretation of the contract, and improper reliance on a specific
paragraph in the contract; and (d) failing to apply judicial estoppel. For the
reasons explained below, we reject these contentions. We affirm the
judgment.

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             FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
      A. The Lease
      On May 16, 2013, Vu and Yang executed a lease of real property in the
City of El Monte as tenant and landlord, respectively. The property was to be
used for a medical office.
      Paragraph 19 of the lease reads as follows: “GOVERNMENT
IMPOSED ALTERATIONS: Any alterations required by Law as a result of
Tenant’s use shall be Tenant’s responsibility. Landlord shall be responsible
for any other alterations required by Law.” “Law” is defined in the lease as
“all local, state and federal laws, regulations and ordinances.”
      According to Paragraph 41.6 of the lease, “This office is completely
new/built and recently passed all final inspection on 04-09-2013. This office
lease for PREMISES CONDITION is base on as its. All changes for tenant
uses are at tenant expenses including the requirement by Law &/or City.” 2

      B. Code Compliance Problems Prior to the Lease
      The parties disputed whether the building had, prior to the lease,
received necessary certificates of occupancy from the City of El Monte. At
trial, Steve Willkomm, who managed the Code Enforcement division for the
city in 2013 and was involved with the city’s determinations involving the
property, described the city’s permitting regime.

1      On review following a trial on the merits, “[w]e recite the facts in the manner
most favorable to the judgment and resolve all conflicts and draw all inferences in
favor of respondent[] . . . . Conflicts in the evidence are noted only where pertinent
to the issues on appeal.” (Meister v. Mensinger (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 381, 387.)

2     All errors in the quoted passage are original to the lease agreement.

                                          3
      First, the city required a “Certificate of Occupancy” certifying
compliance with the state Building Code. According to Willkomm, this
certificate would ordinarily issue when a “building is either brand new, you
change the occupancy from one building occupancy to the other and/or you
make significant improvements to a property.”
      Second, the city had another kind of occupancy permit, which required
a building owner to demonstrate compliance with the city’s zoning code and
other rules. Willkomm explained that this kind of certificate of occupancy “is
provided for in section 17.16.010 of the El Monte Municipal Code.” Willkomm
testified that the city also referred to this second kind of certificate of
occupancy as a “business occupancy permit.”
      According to Willkomm, the property had received the first kind of
occupancy permit before the lease was signed but had not received the
second. The city issued a certificate of occupancy for the property with a
“[f]inal date” of December 29, 2011. But this permit, according to Willkomm,
was the first kind of certificate of occupancy; the permit’s text identifies it as
“issued pursuant to the requirements of Section 110 of the California
Building Code” and “certifying . . . substantial compliance with the various
ordinances of the City regulating building construction”. Nothing in the
record demonstrated that the second kind of permit, i.e., the business
occupancy permit, ever issued. Rather, the record reveals unresolved zoning
violations, which Yang knew about before signing the lease but failed to
correct.
      On February 21, 2012, Minh Thai, the city’s Assistant Economic
Development Director, sent a letter to Yang identifying a “Final Inspection
Correction List.” Thai, on behalf of the city, stated that “[i]n order for the
Planning Division to approve the construction and final occupancy for the

                                         4
building and site development as approved under Design Review No. 06-08,
the following issue[s] must be resolved.” The email identifies various
structural concerns the city had regarding the property. For example, it
noted that the “elevation design, finish and material were not completed in
accordance to the approved design,” that a “retaining wall” “was not
approved,” and that there were issues regarding the striping of the parking
lot, the trash enclosure, and the “[u]ndergrounding” of “wired utilities.”
      On March 7, 2012, Yang responded to the city’s letter. He did not agree
to many of the required changes. For example, some of Yang’s answers were
“[t]he general consensus from the public is that it looks fine,” “[w]e will do our
best,” and “[w]e can’t do it.”
      Yang did obtain some additional approvals. The record contains a
“Final Completion Form,” the significance of which the parties disputed. The
form has signature lines, and provides that “After all signatures have been
obtained, return this document to your Building Inspector. A Final
Inspection can now be accomplished.” The form shows certain signatures,
including one from the “Planning Department,” dated April 9, 2013.
However, Yang admitted that no final inspection of the property ever took
place. He claimed that after visiting the city’s building department, he was
told that no final inspection was needed. According to Yang, he believed that
the original permit he had received (dated 2011) was the governing certificate
of occupancy.
      Joseph Lambert, who signed the “Final Completion Form,” was called
as a witness by Yang. At the time of the lease, Lambert was a non-employee
contractor working in the city’s planning department. Lambert testified that
his signature on the Final Completion Form meant that the “planning
department” had approved the premises. He testified that he believed that

                                        5
the 2011 “Certificate of Occupancy” likely meant that the property had
satisfactorily complied with a zoning inspection in 2013, with the form back-
dated. But Lambert conceded that he did not remember “for sure” whether
the distinction Willkomm drew between the different kinds of permits was
correct, or whether there was a valid certificate of occupancy in 2013.
Ultimately, the trial court did not credit Lambert’s testimony. Instead,
noting that “Lambert gave the impression that he was not familiar with the
certificate of occupancy process,” the court found that Lambert had a “limited
role in the inspection process” and that his job was not to “resolve” issues.

      C. The City Refuses to Let Vu Occupy the Property Because of the Code
         Compliance Problems

      Yang and Vu signed the lease on May 16, 2013. On May 31, 2013, Vu
went to the city to apply for a business license to operate her medical
practice. But she was told she could not obtain a license from the city to
operate her business, because the building had not been certified for
occupancy.
      On June 4 or 5, 2013, Vu met with Willkomm, who told her that she
could not occupy the property due to zoning issues. She was shown
deficiencies, including issues with a wall, a fallen fence, a parking lot post
lamp, and the garbage bin on the property. When she asked if she herself
could make the required alterations, she was told that “these changes can
only be performed by the owner because the owner would have to take out the
permits to make these changes. A tenant can’t take out the permits to make
these changes.”
      At trial, Willkomm confirmed that the city did not, and would not, issue
a permit allowing Vu to operate her business from the property because of

                                        6
the lack of compliance with the city’s zoning code. Willkomm confirmed that
the zoning code violations had to be remedied by the property owner, not the
tenant. And, he confirmed that the zoning violations at issue were not due to
a particular use by Vu for the property—Willkomm agreed that there would
not have been “any permissible use of the building without the certificate of
occupancy.”
      On June 4, 2013, the city issued an administrative citation against the
property. The citation, issued to Yang, explained that “A certificate of
occupancy is required to occupy the building. Contact the City of El Monte to
complete this requirement.” On June 5, 2013, the City of El Monte Code
Enforcement Division sent a letter to Yang stating that “The above
referenced property has been inspected on several occasions; these
inspections have disclosed the existence of conditions that violate the El
Monte Municipal Code.” It noted that “A Certificate of Occupancy has not
been issued for this facility (EMMC 17.16.010).” Willkomm explained that
this letter issued because of the property’s failure to comply with zoning
issues.
      Vu asked Yang to bring the property into compliance. But Yang
refused, telling Vu that he would eventually be able to work things out with
the city and that she could remain on the property in the interim, sending her
letters to that effect on June 10 and 11, 2013. Vu, who testified that her
business depended on being able to make reliable appointments in advance
for her patients, made plans to move out. Meanwhile, Yang met with
Willkomm and other city officials on June 13, 2013. Willkomm told Yang
about the zoning issues and the reasons for the city’s letter. Yang promised
to bring the building into compliance, but did not do so.

                                       7
      Vu moved out, and her office manager returned the keys to the
property on July 31, 2013.

      D. Procedural History
      Vu filed a complaint on May 13, 2016. Yang cross-complained on
April 10, 2017, for breach of the lease. Vu’s operative complaint, filed during
trial, pleads causes of action against Yang for breach of contract, money had
and received, intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation,
unjust enrichment, declaratory relief, breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, and fraudulent concealment.
      The superior court held a bench trial between June 16 and June 22,
2021. The court issued a thorough and detailed tentative statement of
decision on August 30, 2021.
      In its tentative statement of decision, the trial court credited
Willkomm’s testimony. It also credited Vu’s testimony and her
“characterization of the record.” Based on those credibility findings, the trial
court had little difficulty finding that Yang had breached the lease.
      The trial court found Yang had breached Paragraph 19 of the lease by
failing to make alterations required “by law,” alterations that did not arise
from Vu’s “use” of the property. The court specifically found that the zoning
issues “did not relate to [Vu’s] use of the property” but rather “the property
itself,” making them Yang’s responsibility. It noted that the required
alterations could not have been due to Vu’s use of the property, because the
violations related to the underlying property and because the city first
identified the zoning issues before Vu had entered into the lease. The trial
court found that Yang failed to “sufficiently” respond to the city’s required
alterations.

                                        8
         The trial court also found a breach of Paragraph 41 of the lease, which
stated that the property had “passed all final inspection on 04-09-2013 [sic].”
The court interpreted this provision as a “warranty that the building is
suitable for occupancy, i.e., the building had passed final inspection by the
City and was ready to be used.” It found that no final inspection had taken
place.
         The trial court rejected Yang’s contention that the 2011 certificate and
the “Final Completion Form” meant that Yang had complied with the city’s
requirements. It also rejected Yang’s argument that other provisions of the
lease insulated him from liability.
         The trial court also found Yang liable for negligent misrepresentation.
It concluded that Yang’s representation in the lease that the building had
passed final inspection was false and unreasonable, and that Vu had
reasonably relied on that representation to her detriment. And it found for
Vu on her claims for declaratory relief, for money had and received and
unjust enrichment, and for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.
         On the other hand, the trial court found in Yang’s favor on Vu’s claims
for intentional misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment. It reasoned
that Yang’s false representation that the building had passed final
inspection, while unreasonable, was not an intentional misrepresentation,
because Yang was legitimately confused by the city’s requirements. Vu has
not appealed these determinations.
         Yang filed objections to the tentative statement of decision. The trial
court addressed and rejected the objections, adopting its tentative statement
of decision as a final statement with a single change on November 1, 2021.
Ultimately, it entered final judgment and awarded damages in Vu’s favor in

                                          9
the amount of $100,681.46, plus attorney fees and costs in the amount of
$208,746.80.3 Yang timely appealed.

                                  DISCUSSION
      A. Yang’s Legal Argument About the City’s Municipal Code Is
         Immaterial

      On appeal, Yang’s main argument is that the trial court erred as a
matter of law in in interpreting the El Monte Municipal Code. According to
Yang, both the City of El Monte and the trial court misconstrued Municipal
Code section 17.16.010—the provision the city cited in its June 5, 2013 letter
as making the property ineligible for a certificate of occupancy. Although
Willkomm, the city’s code enforcement manager at the relevant time, testified
that section 17.16.010 concerned a “business occupancy permit” that Yang did
not obtain, Yang asserts that Willkomm misinterpreted that provision.
Properly interpreted, argues Yang, El Monte Municipal Code section
17.16.010 only required Yang to have the Building-Code-related certificate
that he did obtain. Yang also argues that a separate provision of the city’s
Municipal Code, section 5.04.040, which relates to licenses to operate a
business, is the only relevant section under which a “business occupancy
permit” could issue.4 Thus, Yang argues, with the city’s code construed
according to his interpretation, he cannot have been liable for breach due to
his failure to obtain a second occupancy permit or to pass inspection.

3     Yang’s appeal neither challenges the trial court’s calculation of damages nor
addresses any issue involving attorney fees.

4     Yang’s motion to take judicial notice of the existence of Municipal Code
section 5.04.040 is granted.

                                         10
      We decline Yang’s invitation to construe the El Monte Municipal Code.
Legal interpretation of the city’s code does not determine the issues on
appeal. Here, we are not considering the propriety of the City of El Monte’s
enforcement decision, which might require us to consider conflicting
constructions of its municipal code as a matter of law.
      Rather, we are considering property alterations the trial court found
were in fact required by the City of El Monte. Even if the city wrongly
interpreted its own code in requiring the alterations (an issue we do not
decide),5 someone was required, pursuant to the city’s regulations, to make
them before the property could be occupied for use. The question for us is
whether the trial court erred in finding that, under the lease, Yang bore the
risk and responsibility of making those alterations. (See Hadian v. Schwartz
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 836, 845 (Hadian) [explaining that core question involving
“laws” clause in commercial lease was “allocation of risk” of compliance with
governmental orders].) We turn now to that question.

5      Although we do not decide the issue, we note that Yang’s interpretation of the
city’s municipal code appears incorrect. El Monte Municipal Code section 17.16.010
provides that a “Certificate of Occupancy” shall issue when “the following conditions
are met: [¶] . . . [¶] The real property complies with all discretionary land use
authorizations affecting the real property; and all other real property related
provisions of this code, most notably the provisions of Title 15 (Building and
Construction) and Title 17 (Zoning).” Thus, the code provision on its face
contemplates review of planning and zoning issues before a certificate of occupancy
issues. Nothing in the code provision suggests that the certificate under section
17.16.010 is the same, as a matter of law, as the certificate Yang obtained, which
was “issued pursuant to the requirements of Section 110 of the California Building
Code.” Nor does Municipal Code section 5.04.040, which requires businesses
operating in the City of El Monte to obtain a business “license,” appear to support
Yang’s position.

                                         11
      B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court’s Finding That the
         Lease Was Breached

      The relevant provisions of the lease are Paragraphs 19 and 41.6. (See
Hadian, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 844–845 [interpretation of lease “begins with
the language of the lease itself” which is “presumptively controlling in
determining the intent of the parties”]; Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Workers’
Comp. Appeals Bd. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 101, 111 [“The mutual intent of
the parties is ascertained from the contract language, which controls if clear
and explicit”].)
      Paragraph 19 makes “alterations” “required by Law as a result of
Tenant’s use” Vu’s responsibility. (Italics added.) Yang was “responsible for
any other alterations required by Law.” (Italics added.) The lease defined
“Law” as including “local . . . regulations and ordinances.” In Paragraph 41.6,
the lease stated that the property had passed “all final inspection [sic].”
These provisions are unambiguous on their face. Yang was responsible for
alterations required by local regulations that were not a “result of [Vu’s] use.”
And he warranted that the property had passed “all final inspection [sic].”
      Whether Yang violated these provisions depends on factual findings
made by the trial court. And those factual findings, in turn, are reviewed by
this court only for substantial evidence. “When a trial court has resolved a
disputed factual issue, an appellate court reviews the ruling according to the
substantial evidence rule. The trial court’s resolution of the factual issue
must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence.” (Heppler v. J.M.
Peters Co. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1265, 1290.) “On review for substantial
evidence, ‘all of the evidence must be examined, but it is not weighed. All of
the evidence most favorable to the respondent must be accepted as true, and
that unfavorable discarded as not having sufficient verity to be accepted by

                                       12
the trier of fact. If the evidence so viewed is sufficient as a matter of law, the
judgment must be affirmed.’” (OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v.
CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 835, 866 (OCM).) “‘To
warrant the rejection of the statements given by a witness who has been
believed by a trial court, there must exist either a physical impossibility that
they are true, or their falsity must be apparent without resorting to
inferences or deductions. [Citations.] Conflicts and even testimony which is
subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment.’”
(Bloxham v. Saldinger (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 729, 750.) And, under the
substantial evidence standard, “‘where the interpretation of the contract
turns upon the credibility of conflicting extrinsic evidence which was properly
admitted at trial, an appellate court will uphold any reasonable construction
of the contract by the trial court.’” (McLear-Gary v. Scott (2018) 25
Cal.App.5th 145, 158.)
      Here, substantial evidence supports a finding that the City did not
require the zoning-related alterations as a result of Vu’s use of the property,
meaning that Yang was responsible for the alterations under Paragraph 19 of
the lease. The city found the property out of compliance with its zoning
regulations—before any lease with Vu was contemplated—when Yang
received the “Final Inspection Correction List” in 2012. That list identifies a
host of structural issues. Those issues related exclusively to the underlying
property, not a tenant’s particular use. These same structural issues, and
related zoning issues, prevented the property from receiving a “business
occupancy permit.” As Willkomm testified and the trial court found, the
alterations would have been required before any tenant could have occupied
the property. The city’s requirements were thus “alterations,” required by

                                        13
“Law” that were not “a result of” Vu’s “use” of the property. They were
Yang’s responsibility under the lease.
      Equally, applying the facts as found by the trial court to Paragraph
41.6, substantial evidence supports a finding that the property never passed
a “final inspection.” Yang admitted that no such inspection took place. The
“Final Completion Form” relied upon by Yang shows that a final inspection
was contemplated, not completed. And the city issued citations and sent a
letter in June 2013, demonstrating that a final inspection never took place.
Thus, Yang’s warranty in Paragraph 41.6 that “This office . . . recently passed
all final inspection on 04-09-2013 [sic],” was false, based on the facts as found
by the trial court.
      On appeal, Yang points to contrary evidence. But to the extent that
Yang wishes to challenge the trial court’s factual findings—or to argue that
there is a factual conflict in the extrinsic evidence that would somehow bear
on the interpretation of the otherwise unambiguous language of Paragraphs
19 and 41.6—Yang ignores our powers as a reviewing court. For example,
Yang asks us to discount the credibility of Willkomm (whom the trial court
found credible) and to find that Lambert (whom the trial court did not find
credible) established that the second permit was unnecessary. Yang also
makes factual arguments regarding Vu’s conduct. But, under the substantial
evidence standard, we cannot reweigh the evidence in Yang’s favor or replace
the trial court’s credibility findings with new findings of our own. Rather, we
are required to “discard[]” the evidence favorable to Yang. Having done so,
we conclude that the evidence in Vu’s favor is sufficient under substantial
evidence review to support the finding of breach. (See OCM, supra, 57
Cal.App.4th at p. 866.)

                                         14
      In addition, we find that Yang has forfeited his right to substantial
evidence review. His brief fails to cite or discuss, much less fairly present or
explain, the bulk of the evidence supporting the trial court’s judgment. “An
appellant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment
must cite the evidence in the record supporting the judgment and explain
why such evidence is insufficient as a matter of law. . . . An appellant who
fails to cite and discuss the evidence supporting the judgment cannot
demonstrate that such evidence is insufficient.” (Rayii v. Gatica (2013) 218
Cal.App.4th 1402, 1408.) For this reason as well, we reject Yang’s challenge
to the trial court’s factual findings.

      C. Yang’s Other Challenges to the Finding of Breach Do Not Succeed
      Yang also argues that there were other errors in the trial court’s
finding that the lease was breached. We are unpersuaded.
      First, Yang argues that the trial court erred in treating Willkomm as
an expert witness or in permitting him to testify based on his experience as a
city employee. The court did not treat Willkomm as an expert witness or err
in admitting his testimony. Willkomm was a code enforcement official for the
city. He knew personally, as a factual matter, why the city did not issue a
business occupancy permit. He thus had personal knowledge of both the
city’s permitting process and its application to the facts here. (See Evid.
Code, § 702, subd. (a); People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 356 [“In order to
have personal knowledge, a witness must have the capacity to perceive and
recollect”].) To the extent that Willkomm offered opinion testimony
regarding the city’s permitting process, the trial court was within its
discretion to admit such testimony as based on Willkomm’s perception and
helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony. (Osborn v. Mission Ready

                                         15
Mix (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 104, 112 [“opinion testimony by a lay witness is
admissible if it is based on the witness’s perception and helpful to a clear
understanding of the witness’s testimony”]; ibid. [decision to admit lay
witness opinion testimony within discretion of trial court and generally
permissible so long as cross-examination allowed].)
      Second, Yang asserts that the trial court failed to give due weight to
three additional provisions of the lease. He invokes Paragraph 12, which
states that “Tenant accepts the Premises subject to all local, state and federal
laws, regulations and ordinances (‘Laws’). Landlord makes no representation
or warranty that Premises are now or in the future will be suitable for
Tenant’s use. Tenant has made its own investigation.” He cites Paragraph
41, which describes the lease as a “lease for PREMISES CONDITION,” which
was based on “as its [sic].” And he mentions Paragraph 11, which states that
“Tenant has examined the Premises and acknowledges that Premise is clean
and in operative condition.” The sum of these provisions, Yang argues, is
that Vu was required to accept the property regardless of its non-compliance
with city regulations. Not so.
      “Courts will favor an interpretation that gives meaning to each word in
a contract over an interpretation that makes part of the writing redundant.”
(Yahoo Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. etc. (2022) 14 Cal.5th 58, 69; see
also National Ins. Underwriters v. Carter (1976) 17 Cal.3d 380, 386 [“Under
well established principles of contract interpretation, ‘. . . when a general and
particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former’”];
see Code Civ. Proc., § 1859.) Here, the lease contained a specific provision,
Paragraph 19. That provision addresses which party would bear the risk of
non-compliance with city regulations, as discussed above. Paragraph 19 is
explicit and precise—Yang is responsible for all “alterations” required by city

                                       16
regulations except those that arise “as a result of Tenant’s use.” Thus,
Paragraph 19 is the more specific provision. There is no basis for reading
Paragraph 19 out of the lease merely because Paragraph 12 generally
disclaims suitability for use, because Paragraph 11 warrants that Vu
inspected the property, or because Paragraph 41 generally warrants that the
lease is on an “as is” basis.6 Similarly, Paragraph 41.6’s representation and
warranty that the property passed “all final inspection [sic]” is a specific
promise. That specific promise was not trumped by the more general terms
of the lease.7
      Third, Yang asserts that the trial court was not entitled to rely on
Paragraph 19 in ruling against him because Vu did not specifically identify
Paragraph 19 in her complaint. This argument lacks merit. Vu attached a
copy of the lease to her complaint. She was entitled to plead breach of
contract by attaching the contract and pleading the facts supporting a breach,
without specifically identifying the individual contractual paragraphs

6      Indeed, even if the lease had not contained the specific provisions in
Paragraphs 19 and 41.6 allocating the risk of regulatory non-compliance, Yang
might still have been required to bear the costs of the alterations required by the
city. In short-term leases, Landlords ordinarily bear the risk of property
remediations, even when the lease language establishes a landlord-friendly “net”
lease. (See Hadian, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 846 [discussing issue in context of three-
year lease].) Here, the lease was for a period of slightly more than one year,
meaning this rule may apply. However, given our holding, we need not address this
issue.

7     For similar reasons, we reject Yang’s argument that the trial court
“constru[ed] the Lease as requiring Yang to provide the Premises to enable Vu to
immediately open and operate her business on-site without requirement of any
repairs or additional inspections or otherwise place the burden of any subsequently
required repairs and inspections on Yang.” The trial court did not do so. Rather, it
applied the lease’s Paragraphs 19 and 41.6 to the facts before it. For the reasons we
explain we find no error in the trial court’s determination.

                                         17
breached. (Davies v. Sallie Mae, Inc. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1086, 1091
[“‘Where a written contract is pleaded by attachment to and incorporation in
a complaint, and where the complaint fails to allege that the terms of the
contract have any special meaning, a court will construe the language of the
contract on its face to determine whether, as a matter of law, the contract is
reasonably subject to a construction sufficient to sustain a cause of action for
breach’”].) In any event, there is no question that, throughout the litigation,
Yang had notice that breach of the lease was at issue, notice of Paragraph 19,
and notice of the issues concerning regulatory compliance that were
exhaustively litigated at trial, so any error on this issue would be harmless.8

      D. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Declining to Apply Judicial Estoppel
      Finally, Yang asserts that the trial court erred by failing to apply the
doctrine of judicial estoppel. When Vu filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in
2015, she listed Yang as a potential creditor. In objections to the trial court’s
tentative statement of decision, Yang argued that Vu should have been
judicially estopped from asserting her claim against Yang because she listed
him as a creditor. We find no error in the trial court’s failure to apply judicial
estoppel.
      Judicial estoppel may apply when “‘“(1) the same party has taken two
positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial
administrative proceedings; (3) the party was successful in asserting the first

8      Yang argues that the supposed failure to adequately plead a breach of
Paragraph 19 of the lease means that the trial court improperly issued an “advisory
opinion.” The trial court’s judgment here, based on a specific contractual injury to
Vu, was in no way an advisory opinion. (See People ex rel. Becerra v. Superior Court
(2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 486, 496 [standing appropriate when party has “‘beneficial
interest that is concrete and actual, and not conjectural or hypothetical’”].)

                                        18
position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the
two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not taken
as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake.”’” (People v. Castillo (2010) 49
Cal.4th 145, 155.) Even when the necessary elements of judicial estoppel are
found, “‘because judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine [citations], whether
it should be applied is a matter within the discretion of the trial court.
[Citations.] The exercise of discretion for an equitable determination is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.’” (Miller v. Bank of America,
N.A. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1, 10.)
      Here, Yang failed to demonstrate the third and fourth elements
required for judicial estoppel. He made no showing that Vu’s identification of
Yang as a creditor in her bankruptcy proceeding was “successful.” Indeed,
Yang never identified any benefit at all that Vu obtained from listing Yang as
a creditor in her Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Nor did Yang show that Vu
had taken a “totally inconsistent” position before the bankruptcy court. He
made no showing (and offered no evidence or argument) that by listing Yang
as a potential creditor, Vu was also admitting the validity of Yang’s claim.
We find no error, and no abuse of discretion, in the trial court’s refusal to
apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel on these facts.
      On appeal, Yang argues for the first time two additional theories of
judicial estoppel: that Vu’s failure to list her lawsuit against Yang as an asset
of the bankruptcy estate should give rise to an estoppel, and that Vu’s
statements of income in a prior bankruptcy filing (a Chapter 11 filing in
2012) were inconsistent with her claims of damages put before the trial court.
Because Yang failed to raise these theories below, and because we lack a full
record on which we could consider them, we find that he has forfeited these
arguments on appeal. (Franz v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance (1982)

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31 Cal.3d 124, 143 [appellate courts generally will not consider arguments
first raised on appeal]; Gottlieb v. Kest (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 110, 138
[explaining how judicial estoppel based upon failure to disclose legal claim
may depend on specifics of decisions made in bankruptcy court].)9

                                  DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Vu is awarded her costs on appeal.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                              DAUM, J. *

      We concur:

      CURREY, Acting P.J.                     COLLINS, J.

9      In his reply brief, Yang also challenges the court’s finding on negligent
misrepresentation. We do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a
reply brief unless the appellant offers a good reason why the argument was not
asserted in the opening brief. (Alcazar v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2018) 29
Cal.App.5th 86, 100–101, fn. 5.) Yang offers none. We thus conclude that Yang
forfeited any challenge to the trial court’s judgment on the cause of action for
negligent misrepresentation. Were we to consider the argument, we would find
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that Yang’s representation
in the lease that the property had “recently passed all final inspection on 04-09-
2013 [sic]” was an unreasonably false misrepresentation of fact, and that Vu
actually and justifiably relied on that misrepresentation to her detriment.

* Judgeof the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6, of the California Constitution.

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