Court Opinion

ID: 9757624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:50:02.862743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:41.602311
License: Public Domain

Jack Holt, Jr., Special Justice, concurring that this court ustice, as to the sufficiency of the ballot title. I agree with the majority that this court has jurisdiction under Amendment 7. I share the concerns and sentiments of all members of this court as expressed in their written opinions as to the chaotic proceedings that take place in submitting a proposed amendment on the ballot for a vote of the people. Surely, these procedures may be made clear by future constitutional amendments, appropriate legislation, or by court rule. Jurisdiction of this court is' well grounded in Amendment 7 and more recently in Amendment 80 (approved by the voters in 2000), as set out by Justice Hannah in his concurring opinion. Likewise, the discussion of Act 877 is superfluous. It is permissive, not mandatory. It provides an optional approach to the determination of the legal sufficiency of a popular name and ballot title, not the sufficiency of the petition itself which embraces popular name, ballot title, and signature requirements. In this instance certification as to the signature requirements and the requirements of Amendment 7 to place the amendment on the ballot was made by the Secretary of State on September 10, 2002. Petition for review was timely filed on September 12. This court has jurisdiction. The ballot title does not pass muster. Thus I respectfully dissent to the plurality opinion. Rather than embellish on Justice Hannah’s writings in this regard, which I adopt, I merely add the following: It has long been regarded as axiomatic that the majority of voters, when called upon to vote for or against a proposed measure at a. general election, will derive their information about its contents from an inspection of the ballot title immediately before exercising the right of suffrage. Id.; Hoban v. Hall, 229 Ark. 416, 316 S.W.2d 185 (1958); Westbrook v. McDonald, 184 Ark. 741, 43 S.W.2d 356 (1931). This, indeed, is the purpose of the ballot tide. Dust v. Riviere, supra; Hoban v. Hall, supra. Christian Civic Action Comm. v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 241, 244, 884 S.W.2d 605 (1994). In Dust v. Riviere, 277 Ark. 1, 4, 638 S.W.2d 663 (1982) we held that “[the voters] are allowed to make an intelligent choice, fully aware of the consequences of their vote.” Dust, supra. In Kurrus v. Priest, 342 Ark. 434, 452, 29 S.W.3d 669 (2000), we stated: This court has repeatedly held that the central question in resolving ballot tide issues is whether the voter is able to reach an intelligent and informed decision and to understand the consequences of his or her vote. See, e.g., Roberts v. Priest, 341 Ark. 813, 20 S.W.3d 371 (2000); Christian Civic Action Comm. v. McCuen, 318 Ark. 241, 884 S.W.2d 605 (1994). Kurrus, supra. There is no way the voters can examine this ballot title and make an informed decision, or be fully aware of the consequences of their vote. In order to determine what is meant by the words “food” and “medicine,” voters are referred to definitions contained in federal food stamp programs and state and federal nutrition programs. Mere reference to these programs do not provide sufficient information for the voters to make an informed decision on what food and what medicines will not be taxed. In short, the ballot title as written does not allow the voters to make an intelligent choice, fully aware of the consequences of their vote. Hannah, J., joins.