Court Opinion

ID: 9482905
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:04:19.760602+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:16.612090
License: Public Domain

LAY, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
After hearing oral arguments in this case, I tentatively agreed with the majority’s view that accommodation of the MST followers could be rendered by the Imam who ISP now hires as a part-time consultant to provide religious guidance for the Islamic religion. However, upon further study of the record and the magistrate judge’s findings of fact, as approved by the district court, I am persuaded that the Imam is not qualified to provide the MST followers sufficient guidance within the requirements of the first amendment. If it were not for the magistrate judge’s findings of fact, I could agree with the majority. However, the record must be examined in light of the facts and the result we reach must be based upon the findings of fact. It is axiomatic that we must adhere to the magistrate judge’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. There is nothing in the record to demonstrate that the findings of fact made in the present case are clearly erroneous. In order to agree with the majority’s conclusion I would have to substitute my own findings from the record and ignore those of the district court. Proper deference to the clearly erroneous rule precludes me from doing this.
In the present case the magistrate found as follows:
However, testimony by an MST expert indicated that the MST religious beliefs and practices radically deviate from those of the traditional followers of Islam in both form and substance. They do not share a common prophet, common prayer books, common holidays, common prayers or prayer modes.
Indeed, during the evidentiary hearing, the Imam candidly acknowledged that he does not believe that MST is a religion at all and, after having authored a paper on the subject, he believed that MST is a social movement. He also stated that MST is an extremist group and that he tries to teach the MST followers the basic tenets of Islam “to help to keep them properly focused.”
Therefore, as a practical matter, Plaintiffs’ ability to exercise their religious beliefs are limited to prayer, reading of the available MST literature, possessing religious artifacts to the extent other inmates may do so, and otherwise living their lives in conformity with their religious beliefs to the extent consistent with prison rules. In short, no special accommodations are made for the Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs and no avenue exists by which they can be properly educated in their religion. [The need for religious education was demonstrated through the testimony of Plaintiffs which indicated inconsistent understandings or misunderstandings of the history and practices of MST. The testimony of the MST expert helped to clarify the tenets of MST for the court as well as the Plaintiffs.]

Further, the teachings of the Imam appear to conflict so significantly with those teachings of MST that the Imam’s efforts may well undermine Plaintiffs’ efforts to practice their religion with the same freedoms that other derivative sects of other major religious groups at ISP enjoy.

Blair-Bey v. Nix, No. 8-87-CV-70478 (S.D.Iowa July 9, 1991) (Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation) (emphasis added).
Based upon these findings, it seems to me that the majority’s decision directly contradicts SapaNajin v. Gunter, 857 F.2d 463 (8th Cir.1988).1
On this basis, I respectfully dissent.

. In SapaNajin, in an opinion authored by now Chief Judge Arnold, the court held that where a *166district court found "sizeable differences in religious practices,” a Nebraska state prisoner was entitled to relief on the ground that the inmate’s first amendment rights were abridged. As here, SapaNajin did not involve an equal protection challenge. Although, I agree that each inmate is not entitled to his own personal religious advisor, it seems to me that if SapaNajin has any value or meaning as a precedent under Eighth Circuit law, then we are bound to provide the same relief as in SapaNajin. There, this court held “The [district] Court's solution of rotating a variety of different medicine men through the prison seems fair and calculated to meet the needs of the maximum number of inmates. It also has the advantage of being simple and no more expensive than the Department's former practice." 857 F.2d at 465. Under the circumstances of this case, based upon the findings of fact of the district court, the same relief should be afforded.