Court Opinion

ID: 9904805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 22:01:09.593591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:28.525161
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-14503     Document: 70-1      Date Filed: 11/27/2023    Page: 1 of 42

                                                                [PUBLISH]
                                     In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                  No. 21-14503
                           ____________________

        ROBERT PONZIO,
        ALEX ACUNA,
        BRIAN MADSEN,
        VANESSA M. MONTGOMERY,
        ROBERT MULL,
        HADIYA NELTHROPE,
        SAMUEL SALGADO,
        FREDERICK J. PARKER,
        On behalf of themselves and all others
        similarly situated,
                                              Interested Parties-Appellants,
        versus
        EMILY PINON,
        GARY C. KLEIN,
        KIM BROWN,
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 21-14503

        JOSHUA FRANKUM,
        TODD BRYAN,
        DINEZ WEBSTER,

                                                         Plaintiﬀs-Appellees,

        DAIMLER AG,
        MERCEDES BENZ USA, LLC,

                                                      Defendants-Appellees.

                             ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Georgia
                      D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-03984-MHC
                            ____________________

        Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.
        JORDAN, Circuit Judge:
               In this class action case, objectors to a proposed settlement
        agreement claimed that it left 80% of the class members without
        any benefits whatsoever. The district court took the allegation se-
        riously, addressed it at the fairness hearing, and ultimately rejected
        it as meritless. We come to the same conclusion and hold that the
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        21-14503               Opinion of the Court                         3

        district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the class ac-
        tion settlement.
                                          I
               According to Michel Pastoureau, a historian of colors, red
        was “the first color humans mastered, fabricated, reproduced, and
        broke down into different shades[.]” Michel Pastoureau, Red: The
        History of a Color 7 (Jody Gladding trans., Princeton Univ. Press
        2017). “It was with red that humans [conducted] their first color
        experiments, achieved their first successes, and then constructed a
        chromatic universe.” Id. at 12. Centuries later, humans continue
        to fabricate and reproduce shades of red, sometimes with varied
        degrees of success. One particular shade of the color is where this
        case begins.
               For years, Mercedes-Benz USA and Daimler AG have sold
        and leased a number of different Mercedes-Benz vehicles painted
        in a color called 590 Mars Red. Either due to a defect in the paint
        or some other reasons—the answer is not clear—the paint on some
        of these vehicles has deteriorated.
               Emily Pinon is the owner/lessee of a Mercedes-Benz vehicle
        painted in Mars Red. Soon after she purchased her car in 2016, she
        began to have issues with the paint—“it looked as though the clear
        coat was bubbling and peeling.” D.E. 1 at 8. In August of 2018, she
        filed a class action lawsuit in the Northern District of Georgia
        against Mercedes-Benz and Daimler. Ms. Pinon asserted numer-
        ous claims under federal and state law “for the design, manufactur-
        ing, marketing, and sale of vehicles with defective paint.” Id. at 1.
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        4                          Opinion of the Court                       21-14503

        She alleged that her vehicle, and thousands of others like it, “suf-
        fer[ed] from an irreparable defect in the exterior paint that re-
        sult[ed] in peeling, flaking, bubbling, erosion, and microblistering
        of the clearcoat.” Id. at 13. 1
               The third amended class action complaint, the operative
        pleading, named six other individuals as plaintiffs: Gary Klein, Kim
        Brown, Joshua Frankum, Nancy Pearsall, Dinez Webster, and
        Todd Bryan (collectively the “Pinon plaintiffs”). And it identified a
        number of “Class Vehicles”—vehicles painted in Mars Red—which
        allegedly “ha[d] a serious latent defect that cause[d] the exterior
        surfaces of the vehicles to microblister, peel, and bubble absent any
        external or environmental influence.” D.E. 55 at 2. The Pinon
        plaintiffs asserted twelve legal claims and requested that the district
        court certify the class, appoint them and their counsel to represent
        the class, grant declaratory and injunctive relief, and award com-
        pensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees.
              The Pinon plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of a pro-
        posed nationwide settlement class, advised the district court in De-
        cember of 2020 that they had reached a settlement with Mercedes-
        Benz and Daimler. The Pinon plaintiffs submitted a motion for
        preliminary approval of the proposed class action settlement agree-
        ment and preliminary certification of the nationwide settlement.
        The motion indicated that the proposed settlement “offer[ed]

        1 A couple of weeks before Ms. Pinon filed suit, other owners/lessees of Mer-

        cedes-Benz vehicles painted in Mars Red instituted a similar federal class action
        in New Jersey. More on that action soon.
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        21-14503                  Opinion of the Court                               5

        monetary reimbursement for [q]ualified [p]ast [r]epairs and ex-
        tended warranty coverage for [q]ualified [f]uture [r]epairs and . . .
        provide[d] direct benefits to current and former owners and lessees
        of over 72,500 Subject Vehicles sold and/or leased in the United
        States, which will likely include over one hundred thousand indi-
        viduals.” D.E. 70 at 9.
                So far, all of this seemed pretty routine for a class action. But
        this case seems to be as much about disputes between lawyers con-
        cerning control and money as it is about Mars Red paint. As noted,
        about two weeks before Ms. Pinon lodged her initial complaint,
        Robert Ponzio and others filed a similar class action complaint
        against the same defendants (Mercedes-Benz and Daimler) in the
        District of New Jersey. See Ponzio, et al. v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC
        et al., Case No: 1:18-cv-12544 (D. N.J.). Like the Pinon plaintiffs’
        complaint in the Northern District of Georgia, the complaint filed
        in the District of New Jersey was based on alleged defects with the
        Mars Red paint on Mercedes-Benz vehicles. Collaboration be-
        tween the Pinon plaintiffs and the plaintiffs in the District of New
        Jersey action (collectively the “Ponzio objectors”) may have ini-
        tially been forged with the goal of presenting a united front against
        Mercedes-Benz and Daimler in the two actions, but coordination
        and cooperation fell apart. 2

        2 The record is replete with accusations made by one set of lawyers against the

        other. For example, the Ponzio objectors’ counsel say that “the [Pinon] parties
        kept [Ponzio] counsel in the dark about covert negotiations.” Br. for Appel-
        lants at 20. They also claim that the [Pinon] litigation was a “copycat class
        action.” D.E. 72 at 6. For their part, the Pinon plaintiffs’ counsel claim that
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        6                         Opinion of the Court                       21-14503

                After the Pinon plaintiffs submitted their motion for prelim-
        inary approval of the settlement agreement in the Northern Dis-
        trict of Georgia, the Ponzio objectors filed a motion to intervene
        and to continue the hearing for preliminary approval. According
        to the Ponzio objectors, “the proposed settlement would release
        the primary economic loss suffered by [c]lass members for diminu-
        tion in value of their vehicles without any compensation whatsoever.”
        D.E. 72 at 9–10 (emphasis in original). Among other things, the
        Ponzio objectors asserted that “the timing and secrecy of the pro-
        posed settlement . . . raise[d] a red flag as to whether it was the
        product of a collusive ‘reverse auction.’” Id. at 23. The Pinon plain-
        tiffs, Mercedes-Benz, and Daimler submitted responses in opposi-
        tion.
               The district court denied the Ponzio objectors’ motion and
        granted the Pinon plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval of the
        proposed class action settlement agreement. Notice to the class
        was provided and, several months later, the Pinon plaintiffs sought
        final approval of the class settlement agreement.
              As required by Rule 23(e)(2), the district court held a fairness
        hearing. Counsel for the Pinon plaintiffs, the defendants, and the
        Ponzio objectors all presented arguments at the hearing. After the

        “[Ponzio] counsel . . . us[ed] and benefit[ed] from the work [Pinon counsel]
        did,” and that “[i]t was apparent that [Ponzio] counsel’s definition of ‘coordi-
        nation’ meant that [Pinon counsel] would relinquish control of [Pinon] and
        abide by whatever decisions were made by [Ponzio] counsel, which belied the
        notion of ‘coordination.’” D.E. 76 at 14, 18.
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        21-14503                Opinion of the Court                          7

        hearing, the district court accepted supplemental briefing from the
        parties and from the Ponzio objectors.
               Following its review and consideration of the post-hearing
        supplemental submissions, the district court approved the settle-
        ment agreement, certified the settlement class, confirmed appoint-
        ment of class counsel, and granted in part and denied in part the
        Pinon plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for attorneys’ fees, expenses,
        and class representative service awards. As relevant here, and as
        discussed in more detail later, the district court rejected the conten-
        tion of the Ponzio objectors that the settlement agreement failed
        to provide benefits to the great majority of the class members.
                                           II
                We review the approval of a class action settlement for
        abuse of discretion, with factual findings subject to the clear error
        standard. See Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1147
        (11th Cir. 1983); In re Equifax Inc. Customer Data Security Breach Liti-
        gation, 999 F.3d 1247, 1273 (11th Cir. 2021); Williams v. Reckitt
        Benckiser LLC, 65 F.4th 1243, 1251 (11th Cir. 2023). The abuse of
        discretion standard generally provides a district court with a range
        of choice, which in practice means that we will sometimes affirm
        even though we might have resolved the matter differently in the
        first instance. See Doe v. Rollins College, 77 F.4th 1340, 1347 (11th
        Cir. 2023); Waters v. Intern. Precious Metals Corp., 190 F.3d 1291, 1293
        (11th Cir. 1999). Our “judgment” in reviewing the district court’s
        approval of the settlement agreement is further “informed by the
        strong judicial policy favoring settlement as well as by the
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                   21-14503

        realization that compromise is the essence of settlement.” Bennett
        v. Behring Corp., 737 F.2d 982, 986 (11th Cir. 1984). See also In re U.S.
        Oil & Gas Litig., 967 F.2d 489, 493 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Public policy
        strongly favors the pretrial settlement of class action lawsuits.”);
        William B. Rubenstein, 4 Newberg on Class Actions § 13:44 (6th
        ed. 2022) (“The law favors settlement, particularly in class actions
        and other complex cases where substantial resources can be con-
        served by avoiding lengthy trials and appeals.”).
                                           III
               Under Rule 23(e)(2), a district court may approve a class ac-
        tion settlement that binds class members “only after a hearing and
        only on ﬁnding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate[.]” Since
        2018, Rule 23(e)(2)—in subsections (A)-(D)—has set out four core
        concerns the district court must consider in making this determi-
        nation. These are whether “[t]he class representatives and class
        counsel adequately represented the class”; whether “the proposal
        was negotiated at arm’s length”; whether “the relief provided for
        the class is adequate” (“taking into account” the “costs, risks and
        delay of trial and appeal,” “the eﬀectiveness of any proposed
        method of distributing relief to the class, including the method of
        processing class-member claims,” the “terms of any proposed
        award of attorney’s fees, including timing of payment,” and “any
        agreement required to be identiﬁed under Rule 23(e)(3)”); and
        whether “the proposal treats class members equitably relative to
        each other.” See Rubenstein, 4 Newberg on Class Actions § 13:58
        (explaining that “Rule 23 gave no further meaning” to the “fair, rea-
        sonable, and adequate” standard until Rule 23(e)(2) codiﬁed a list
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        21-14503                Opinion of the Court                           9

        of “four ‘core concerns’ that the Advisory Committee labeled ‘the
        primary procedural considerations and substantive qualities that
        should always matter to the decision whether to approve the pro-
        posal’”). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2), Advisory Committee’s
        Note to 2018 Amendment.
                Before the 2018 amendment to Rule 23(e)(2), we “also in-
        structed district courts to consider several additional factors called
        the Bennett factors.” In re Equifax Inc., 999 F.3d at 1273 (citing Ben-
        nett, 737 F.2d at 986). These factors are
               (1) the likelihood of success at trial; (2) the range of
               possible recovery; (3) the point on or below the range
               of possible recovery at which a settlement is fair, ade-
               quate and reasonable; (4) the complexity, expense and
               duration of litigation; (5) the substance and amount
               of opposition to the settlement; and (6) the stage of
               proceedings at which the settlement was achieved.
        Bennett, 737 F.2d at 986. At the end of the day, the district court acts
        “as a ﬁduciary for the class.” In re Equifax Inc., 999 F.3d at 1265. See
        also 7B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice &
        Procedure § 1797 (3d ed. & April 2023 update) (“The purpose of
        subdivision (e) is to protect the nonparty class members from un-
        just or unfair settlements aﬀecting their rights when the represent-
        atives become fainthearted before the action is adjudicated or are
        able to secure satisfaction of their individual claims by a compro-
        mise, abandoning the claims of the absent class members.”).
               We have not yet interpreted the 2018 amendment to Rule
        23(e)(2), see In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litigation MDL 2406,
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 21-14503

        ___ F.3d ___, 2023 WL 7012247, at *9 (11th Cir. Oct. 25, 2023), or
        examined its eﬀect on the Bennett factors. The 2018 amendment to
        Rule 23(e)(2) is not meant “to displace” the factors previously iden-
        tiﬁed by courts in reviewing class action settlement agreements,
        but “rather to focus the court and the lawyers on the core concerns
        of procedure and substance that should guide the decision whether
        to approve the proposal.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro 23(e)(2), Advisory Com-
        mittee’s Note to 2018 Amendment. The four core concerns set out
        in Rule 23(e)(2) provide the primary considerations in evaluating
        proposed agreements, see Williams, 65 F.3d at 1261, but we think
        that the Bennett factors can, where appropriate, complement those
        core concerns. For example, Bennett factors (1), (2), (4), and (6) can
        inform “whether the relief provided to the class is adequate” (core
        concern three). And Bennett factors (3) and (5) can inform “whether
        the proposal treats class members equitably relative to each other”
        (core concern four).
               The “[p]roponents of class action settlements bear the bur-
        den of developing a record demonstrating that the settlement dis-
        tribution is fair, reasonable and adequate.” Holmes, 706 F.2d at 1147.
        Accord Faught v. Am. Home Shield Corp., 668 F.3d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir.
        2011); Ault v. Disney World Co., 692 F.3d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir. 2012).
        Before addressing the Ponzio objectors’ challenges to the settle-
        ment agreement, we describe the agreement and the proceedings
        below in detail.
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        21-14503               Opinion of the Court                        11

                                          A
              The settlement class is deﬁned as “all current owners, for-
        mer owners, current lessees, and former lessees of Subject Vehicles
        who purchased or leased their Subject Vehicle in the United States.”
        D.E. 125 at 6. The term “Subject Vehicle” is deﬁned as any Mer-
        cedes-Benz vehicle originally painted in the 590 Mars Red color and
        purchased or leased in the United States. See D.E. 70-1, Exh.1 (Class
        Action Settlement Agreement and Release) at § 1.35.
               The class excludes certain persons. Not included in the class
        are those “who have settled with, released, or otherwise had claims
        adjudicated on the merits against [d]efendants that are substantially
        similar to the claims asserted . . . (i.e., alleging that 590 Mars Red
        paint is inadequate, of poor or insuﬃcient quality or design, or de-
        fective, due to peeling, ﬂaking, bubbling, fading, discoloration, or
        poor adhesion of the paint or clearcoat)[.]” D.E. 125 at 6-7.
                Under the settlement agreement, class members—those
        within the deﬁnition of the settlement class who have not elected
        to opt out—receive two types of beneﬁts: (1) reimbursement for
        qualiﬁed past repairs, and (2) coverage for qualiﬁed future repairs.
        Id. at 7. We describe each beneﬁt below.
               Reimbursement for Qualiﬁed Past Repairs. Class mem-
        bers can receive reimbursement for a qualiﬁed past repair. Such a
        repair is deﬁned as “a repair that occurred before the Eﬀective
        Date” of the settlement agreement—which is 14 days after the date
        on which any ﬁnal order and judgment entered becomes ﬁnal—
        “related to repainting any non-plastic exterior surface of a Subject
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        12                    Opinion of the Court                 21-14503

        Vehicle because of bubbling, peeling or ﬂaking of the exterior clear
        coat and not caused by external inﬂuences such as automobile ac-
        cidents, scratches, or road debris.” D.E. 70-1, Exh. 1 at § 1.27.
               The settlement agreement provides diﬀerent reimburse-
        ment amounts based on the Subject Vehicle’s age and mileage.
        With certain limitations, a repair that occurred fewer than seven
        years or 105,000 miles from the vehicle’s original in-service date
        (whichever occurred ﬁrst) would yield a 100% reimbursement of
        the cost incurred to perform the repair. A vehicle not within that
        category that is fewer than ten years or 150,000 miles from the ve-
        hicle’s original in-service date (whichever occurred ﬁrst) would
        yield a 50% reimbursement of the cost incurred. And a vehicle not
        within either of those categories that is fewer than ﬁfteen years or
        150,000 miles from the vehicle’s original in-service date (again,
        whichever occurred ﬁrst) would yield a 25% reimbursement of the
        cost incurred to perform the repair.
               This leaves one ﬁnal category—vehicles with a past repair
        more than ﬁfteen years or 150,000 miles from their original in-ser-
        vice date (whichever occurred ﬁrst). Under the agreement, Mer-
        cedes-Benz and Daimler are not required to oﬀer any reimburse-
        ment for past repairs of these vehicles.
              The settlement agreement also provides for reimbursement
        for past repairs performed by “Independent Service Centers,”
        namely vehicle repair service providers that were not speciﬁcally
        authorized “at the time of repair or presentment to provide war-
        ranty services for Mercedes-Benz vehicles.” Id. at §§ 1.5, 1.15.
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        21-14503                Opinion of the Court                         13

        Speciﬁcally, these reimbursement claims are subject to the same
        age and mileage categories noted above with the caveat that “the
        reasonable repair cost to be reimbursed shall not exceed 10% of
        what the same repair would have cost if it were performed at an
        Authorized Service Center.” Id. at § 4.2.
                As the district court noted, “[t]here is no limit to the number
        of claims or total amount of money that Mercedes-Benz will pay
        to reimburse qualiﬁed past repairs, except for the per claim cap on
        claims performed by Independent Services Providers.” D.E. 125 at
        8 (citing D.E. 70-1, Exh. 1 at §§ 4.2, 5.1).
                 Coverage for Qualiﬁed Future Repairs. Class members
        also receive coverage for qualiﬁed future repairs. As with reim-
        bursement for past repairs, coverage for future repairs is deter-
        mined based on the vehicle’s age and mileage. For a vehicle need-
        ing a future repair less than seven years or 105,000 miles from its
        original in-service date (whichever occurs ﬁrst), a class member
        who presents the vehicle at an authorized service center with a
        qualifying claim will receive 100% coverage for the repair. For a
        vehicle needing a repair that does not fall within that category and
        is less than ten years or 150,000 miles after the vehicle’s original in-
        service date (whichever occurs ﬁrst), the class member will receive
        50% coverage for the repair. For a vehicle that does not fall within
        either of those categories, and that is fewer than ﬁfteen years or
        150,000 miles after the vehicle’s original in-service date (again,
        whichever occurs ﬁrst), the class member will receive 25% coverage
        for the repair.
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        14                       Opinion of the Court                    21-14503

                 The settlement agreement also provides parameters for re-
        lief for class members whose vehicles will need future repairs but
        which, at the time of the settlement notice date, were more than
        ﬁfteen years or 150,000 miles after their original in-service date
        (whichever occurs ﬁrst). In these instances, a class member “may
        submit documentary evidence showing that (i) he or she presented
        the [vehicle] to an Authorized Service Center for a qualifying repair
        or provided notice . . . when the vehicle had less than [ﬁfteen] years
        . . . and 150,000 or fewer miles . . . and (ii) that he or she was denied
        warranty or goodwill coverage for such repair at the time.” D.E.
        70-1, Exh. 1 at § 4.4(d). If the claim is approved, the percentage of
        coverage provided is determined by the age and mileage of the ve-
        hicle at the time it was originally presented for the qualifying repair
        or when notice was given. For vehicles that do not fall within this
        category, and that are more than ﬁfteen years or 150,000 miles after
        their original in-service date, the agreement expressly provides that
        Mercedes-Benz and Daimler are not required to oﬀer any coverage.
                                            B
                The court-appointed settlement administrator, JND Legal
        Administration LLC, provided notice of the proposed settlement
        “to all class members who could be identiﬁed with reasonable ef-
        fort.” This notice went out through a postcard via the United
        States Postal Service.3

        3 JND’s CEO, Jennifer Keough, submitted a declaration explaining how direct

        notice was provided to class members. See D.E. 100-1. Mercedes-Benz and
        Daimler “provided JND with a list of all eligible Vehicle Identiﬁcation
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        21-14503                  Opinion of the Court                             15

               Notice was also published on a “Settlement Website” main-
        tained by JND. As of July 28, 2020 (two days before the ﬁling of
        the motion for ﬁnal settlement approval), “the Settlement Website
        had tracked a total of 11,373 unique users who registered 54,908
        page views.” D.E. 100-1 at 6. JND also maintained an email address
        and a toll-free telephone number to receive and respond to class
        members’ inquiries. As of July 28, 2020, JND had received 708
        emails and 2,100 calls. See id. at 6–7. Counsel for the Pinon plain-
        tiﬀs indicated that they also received hundreds of emails and phone
        calls. See D.E. 100 at 14.
                The postcard notice informed class members “that anyone
        who wished to object to the [s]ettlement could do so by ﬁling an
        objection” with the district court on or before July 27, 2021. As of
        July 28, 2021, JND “[was] aware of four [ ] objections from eleven
        [c]lass [m]embers being ﬁled[.]” D.E. 100-1 at 7. The postcard no-
        tice further informed class members that all those who wished to
        be excluded from the settlement “w[ere] required to notify the
        [s]ettlement [a]dministrator . . . of their intent to opt out” by July
        27, 2021. Id. at 8. As of July 30, 2021, JND had received ten “timely
        and valid exclusion requests.” Id.

        Numbers (“VINs”) representing the Subject Vehicles included in the [settle-
        ment] [a]greement.” Id. at 2. JND then sent the VINs to the respective depart-
        ment of motor vehicles to gather mailing addresses and contact information.
        Before mailing the postcard notice, “JND reviewed the mailing data . . . to
        identify any undeliverable addresses and duplicate records based on name and
        address.” Id. at 3. On May 28, 2021, JND mailed the postcard notice to 168,817
        potential settlement class members. See id. at 4.
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                21-14503

               For “qualiﬁed past repairs,” the postcard notice advised class
        members that they could submit a claim “by July 27, 2021, for re-
        pairs that occurred before May 28, 2021, and within 60 days of the
        date of repair for repairs that occurred after May 28, 2021, and be-
        fore the Eﬀective Date.” Id. For “qualiﬁed future repairs,” the post-
        card notice advised class members of the following: “[I]f their Sub-
        ject Vehicle had 150,000 miles or more or was [ﬁfteen] years or
        more from the original in-service date as of May 28, 2021, and they
        were previously denied warranty or goodwill coverage for a quali-
        fying repair at a time the Subject Vehicle had both fewer than [ﬁf-
        teen] years from the original in-service date and fewer than 150,000
        miles,” they could participate in the settlement and receive reim-
        bursement by submitting a claim electronically or by mail post-
        marked by July 27, 2021. See id.
               As of July 28, 2021, JND had “received 1,532 [c]laim
        [f ]orms.” “[T]he average claimed reimbursement amount per
        [q]ualiﬁed [p]ast [r]epair (excluding claimed amounts of $20,000 or
        more) [was] between $2,000 and $3,000.” Id. at 9.
                                         C
               The district court held a fairness hearing on the settlement
        agreement. The Pinon plaintiﬀs, Mercedes-Benz, and Daimler
        spoke in support of the settlement agreement. The district court
        also heard from the Ponzio objectors and from Cindy Wensell, an-
        other objector to the agreement.
              As relevant here, the Ponzio objectors asserted at the hear-
        ing that “the vast majority of class members are left completely
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        21-14503               Opinion of the Court                         17

        uncompensated.” D.E. 116 at 39. They claimed that “the proposed
        settlement forces tens of thousands of class members to give up
        their claims against [the defendants] but provides them nothing in
        exchange,” that “only [ ] a small number of class members [ ] are
        actually entitled to” 100 percent payment, and that “[t]he other
        class members are destined to the 25 or 50 percent discounts”—a
        “dubious value because of the fact that if a consumer is going to
        make a decision as to whether to repaint a portion of the vehicle or
        the entire vehicle, they’re going to look at what they have to spend
        and what they would get back if they spent.” Id. at 41, 52–53. The
        district court found this last claim to be “ﬂawed because you don’t
        have to do a full paint job on a car to be able to correct the bub-
        bling.” Id. at 54.
                 The Ponzio objectors also told the district court that the Pi-
        non plaintiﬀs had failed to provide an estimate of the range of pos-
        sible recovery and that, without such an estimate, “it’s impossible
        to determine the expected value going to trial, and likewise, impos-
        sible . . . or diﬃcult for this [c]ourt [ ] and the class members to
        evaluate what they are giving up in exchange for the proposed set-
        tlement. Id. at 58. Moreover, the Ponzio objectors argued that
        while compensation for a vehicle’s diminished value did not neces-
        sarily have to be included in the settlement, the agreement “has to
        include something. You can’t ask the people to release their claims
        . . . without giving them something.” Id. at 98.
               Given the issues raised during the hearing, the district court
        asked for supplemental brieﬁng. After receiving that supplemental
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                  21-14503

        brieﬁng, the district court issued an order certifying the class and
        approving the settlement agreement. With respect to the Ponzio
        objectors’ contentions and arguments, the district court found that
        “none . . . [were] suﬃcient to overcome the fairness of the [s]ettle-
        ment [a]greement.” D.E. 125 at 25.
                 First, the district court “observe[d] that out of the 168,817
        potential settlement class members, the total number of objectors
        (both timely and untimely) represent[ed] 0.007 percent of the class
        and . . . eleven objectors (one of whom submitted his objection out-
        of-time) were submitted by Ponzio’s [i]nterim [c]lass [c]ounsel.” Id.
        at 29 (italics omitted).
               Second, as to the assertion that most class members would
        receive no relief, the district court found that the Ponzio objectors
        and their experts reached that conclusion “based upon a signiﬁ-
        cantly ﬂawed premise—that every Subject Vehicle presented for re-
        pair will have to be repainted in its entirety.” Id. at 31 (emphasis in
        original). The district court explained that the settlement agree-
        ment “speciﬁcally provides that ‘qualiﬁed’ repairs are limited to ‘re-
        ﬁnishing of aﬀected areas only’”—“anyone who has had their vehi-
        cle damaged in an accident is aware that when a quarter panel,
        hood, trunk, or other separate unit is damaged but the rest of the
        automobile is not, there is a repainting of the damaged unit, not
        the entire vehicle[.]” Id. at 33. Ultimately, the district court con-
        cluded that because the Ponzio objectors’ “argument as to the in-
        adequacy of the settlement is based on this ﬂawed premise, none
        of their statements about most [c]lass [m]embers receiving
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        21-14503               Opinion of the Court                        19

        ‘nothing’ can be seriously considered.” Id. The district court pro-
        vided this explanation:
               [A]ll owners and lessees of Subject Vehicles whose au-
               tomobiles were placed in service prior to seven years
               ago with less than 150,000 miles will not be getting
               ‘nothing’ but are eligible for reimbursement for qual-
               iﬁed past repairs up to 100% of the amount paid for
               the repairs. Those same persons whose vehicles were
               placed in service between seven and ﬁfteen years ago
               are eligible for qualiﬁed past repairs at a rate of 25%
               to 50% depending upon the age of the vehicle. Even
               those vehicles who were placed in service over ﬁfteen
               years ago or with over 150,000 miles are eligible for a
               qualiﬁed future repair if they can show they pre-
               sented their vehicles for such a previous repair or no-
               tiﬁed [d]efendants of the need for the repair prior to
               the expiration of 15 years or meeting the 150,000 mile
               limit.
        Id. at 33–34.
                Third, the district court rejected the Ponzio objectors’ argu-
        ment that the settlement agreement was inadequate because it did
        not provide for the diminution in value of the vehicle after it is re-
        painted. The district court noted that the Ponzio objectors had
        failed to provide any case authority for the proposition that there
        had to be compensation for diminished value. Indeed, the case law
        suggested the opposite. See id. at 36 (citing cases approving settle-
        ment agreements that did not compensate for diminution in value).
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        20                      Opinion of the Court                   21-14503

              After we heard oral argument, we requested supplemental
        brieﬁng from the parties on a number of matters. One of them
        concerned how many class members were ineligible for beneﬁts
        (reimbursement or future coverage) under the settlement agree-
        ment.
                                           IV
                The Ponzio objectors raise four arguments on appeal. They
        assert that the district court abused its discretion in (1) “granting
        ﬁnal approval of the class action settlement where 80% of the class
        members are required to release their claims in exchange for no
        relief[,]” (2) “failing to properly assess the Rule 23(e)(2) and Bennett
        factors[,]” (3) “approving a settlement brokered by class represent-
        atives and class counsel who did not fairly and adequately represent
        the class[,]” and (4) “approving a class settlement where there was
        indicia of collusion, a reverse auction, and a coupon settlement.”
        Br. of Appellants at 18.
                It is “our obligation to closely review the issues [the Ponzio
        objectors] present,” In re Equifax Custom Data Security Breach Litiga-
        tion, 999 F.3d 1247, 1257 (11th Cir. 2021), but we note that they
        have, during the course of proceedings in the district court and on
        appeal, provided various diﬀerent (some would say shifting) expla-
        nations as to why they believe that the “vast majority” of the class
        members are ineligible for any relief under the settlement agree-
        ment. Normally we only consider the arguments presented to the
        district court, see, e.g., Harbourside Place, LLC v. Town of Jupiter, 958
        F.3d 1308, 1323 (11th Cir. 2020), but in an abundance of caution, we
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        21-14503                Opinion of the Court                         21

        will discuss all of the permutations presented by the Ponzio objec-
        tors on appeal.
               We have never provided a detailed explanation of what bur-
        den, if any, is borne by objectors to a proposed class action settle-
        ment. Given that this appeal concerns objections to the resolution
        of a class action complaint, we take the opportunity to set out
        some parameters.
                 Just as the proponents of a class action settlement bear the
        burden of developing a record demonstrating that the settlement
        is fair, reasonable, and adequate, see Holmes, 706 F.2d at 1147, objec-
        tors to the settlement have some obligations of their own. Rule
        23(e)(5)(A) requires that they “state with speciﬁcity” the grounds
        for an objection. This means that objections “must provide suﬃ-
        cient speciﬁcs to enable the parties to respond to them and the
        court to evaluate them.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(5)(A), Advisory Com-
        mittee’s Note to 2018 Amendment. And when the objections are
        factual in nature, they cannot be conclusory. See 1988 Trust for Allen
        Children Dated 8/8/88 v. Banner Life Ins. Co., 28 F.4th 513, 520-21 (4th
        Cir. 2022) (explaining that the standard is “somewhat analogous” to
        notice pleading under Rule 8(a)); Guidance on New Rule 23 Class Ac-
        tion Settlement Provisions, 102 Judicature 15, 21 (Nov. 2018) (asserting
        that the amended Rule 23(e)(5)(A) “requires greater speciﬁcity of
        objections”). See also In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643
        F.2d 195, 213 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[W]here there are objectors, the
        court is aided in its task; the proponents can be expected to present
        evidence and arguments suggesting that the settlements are within
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        22                     Opinion of the Court                  21-14503

        ‘a range of reasonableness’ and the objectors will do the same for
        the contrary position.”).
               Once proper objections are lodged, the proponents of the
        settlement must show that the matters raised do not aﬀect the fair-
        ness, reasonableness, or adequacy of the agreement. See 1988 Trust,
        28 F.4th at 521. “The showing necessary to prevent an objection
        from derailing the settlement will, of course, vary with the
        strength of the objection itself.” Id. See also Cotton v. Hinton, 559
        F.2d 1326, 1331(5th Cir. 1977) (“The trial court must extend to the
        objectors leave to be heard. However, this is not to say that the trial
        judge is required to open to question and debate every provision of
        the proposed compromise.”). A “challenge for the [district court]
        is to distinguish between a meritorious objection and those ad-
        vanced for improper purposes.” David F. Herr, Annotated Manual
        for Complex Litigation § 21.643 (4th ed. & May 2023 update).
                                          A
                The Ponzio objectors’ ﬁrst argument is that the settlement
        agreement is “fatally ﬂawed because it releases claims for 100% of
        the class even though 80% are ineligible for any beneﬁts.” Br. of
        Appellants at 44. The claim that 80% of the class is ineligible for
        relief is our starting point because it is repeated throughout the
        Ponzio objectors’ brieﬁng. Whether the contention has merit will
        necessarily inform our assessment of the remaining arguments on
        appeal.
             In their initial brief, the Ponzio objectors claim that “the
        overwhelming majority of class members will receive no beneﬁts
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        21-14503               Opinion of the Court                        23

        under the settlement.” Id. at 46. They say that if there are 168,817
        class members, as the Pinon plaintiﬀs estimate, 99,702 (or 59%) are
        former owners or former lessees “who are obviously ineligible for
        future repainting beneﬁts because they no longer possess their Sub-
        ject Vehicles.” Id. In a footnote, they acknowledge that “[c]onceiv-
        ably, there may be a tiny fraction of former owners or lessees who
        paid to repaint their vehicles while still in possession of them, and
        who ﬁled a claim for reimbursement,” but they say that “this is all
        speculation” and “this ﬁgure would be at most 1,532 if 100% of all
        claims were made by former owners and lessees.” Id. at 46 n.9.
               This calculation, according to the Ponzio objectors, leaves
        69,115 class members who are current owners and lessees. In their
        view, the “[Pinon] [p]laintiﬀs’ estimates reveal 35,397 are ineligible
        due to the settlement’s age and mileage restrictions. Thus, taken
        together, roughly 135,099 of the 168,817 [c]lass [m]embers
        (80.03%) are ineligible for future beneﬁts under the settlement ap-
        proved by the district court.” Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
               Like the district court, we conclude that the Ponzio objec-
        tors’ contention is signiﬁcantly ﬂawed. Although the task of ex-
        plaining why is laborious, it is necessary.
                First, the underlying calculation of the Ponzio objectors
        does not account for vehicle owners/lessees who have not experi-
        enced (and will not experience) any paint defect on their vehicles.
        In this respect, it is worth recalling that the complaint ﬁled by the
        Pinon plaintiﬀs alleged that the defect with the Mars Red paint was
        latent, meaning that the bubbling may or may not take place during
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        24                     Opinion of the Court                  21-14503

        the ownership, lease, or life of the vehicle. See generally Black’s Law
        Dictionary 508 (10th ed. 2014) (deﬁning a hidden defect as a “prod-
        uct imperfection that is not discoverable by reasonable inspection
        and for which a seller or lessor is generally liable if the ﬂaw causes
        harm”) (emphasis added).
               Second, the calculation fails to recognize that there are class
        members who satisfy the requirements for reimbursement but
        choose not to ﬁle a claim, as well as class members who do not ﬁle
        a claim because they fail to meet the requirements for past or future
        coverage. These two categories of class members cannot be con-
        ﬂated into one group to ﬁgure out how many class members are
        categorically ineligible (in the Ponzio objectors’ words) to receive
        beneﬁts under the settlement agreement. The former group,
        though eligible, is uninterested in seeking reimbursement for one
        reason or another, and the decision of class members in that group
        to not ﬁle a claim does not mean that the settlement agreement
        provided no beneﬁts to those in the group.
                Third, the calculation ignores the settlement agreement’s
        provision for relief to class members who, at the time of the settle-
        ment notice date, have vehicles that are older than ﬁfteen years or
        have more than 150,000 miles and will need a future repair. See
        generally D.E. 70-1, Exh. 1 at 15–16. Recall that “a [s]ettlement
        [c]lass [m]ember may submit documentary evidence showing that
        (i) he or she presented the Subject Vehicle to an Authorized Service
        Center for a qualifying repair or provided notice to [d]efendants at
        a time when the vehicle had less than 15 years . . . and 150,000 or
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        21-14503               Opinion of the Court                         25

        fewer miles . . . and (ii) that he or she was denied warranty or good-
        will coverage for such repair at the time. Such [s]ettlement [c]lass
        [m]ember shall be entitled to submit to the [s]ettlement [a]dminis-
        trator . . . a completed and signed Qualiﬁed Future Repair Claim
        Form” and, if approved, will receive coverage “determined by the
        age and mileage of the Subject Vehicle at the time it was originally
        presented for the qualifying repair or notice was given to [d]efend-
        ants[.]” Id. at § 4.4.
                The Ponzio objectors state that 35,397 of the 69,115 class
        members who are current owners and lessees are ineligible for re-
        lief because of the settlement agreement’s age and mileage re-
        strictions. But this calculation ignores the beneﬁt described in the
        paragraph above and assumes—without explanation or evidence—
        that no class members would fall within this category of relief. In-
        deed, the Ponzio objectors ﬁrmly represent that “a class member
        who no longer possesses their Subject Vehicle . . . , or whose Sub-
        ject Vehicle has exceeded the age or mileage restrictions of the set-
        tlement (of which there are approximately 35,000 of these class
        members), cannot receive either a full or a partial repainting at all.”
        Br. for Appellants at 48 (emphasis in original). As noted, this ig-
        nores the relief provided to those who had warranty or goodwill
        coverage denied.
               Fourth, the Ponzio objectors’ own supplemental brieﬁng
        further undermines the claim that 80% of class members are ineli-
        gible for relief. We asked the parties to tell us how many class
        members are “categorically ineligible” to beneﬁt from the
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        26                         Opinion of the Court                        21-14503

        settlement agreement—i.e., class members who cannot receive
        from the settlement any compensation, in the form of monetary
        reimbursement, future coverage for repairs, or any other thing of
        monetary value—because at the time the settlement was reached,
        (1) their vehicles were more than ﬁfteen years old or had more than
        150,000 miles on them and (2) they had not had their vehicles’ paint
        or clearcoat ﬁxed or given notice to Mercedes-Benz that their vehi-
        cles’ paint or clearcoat was peeling, ﬂaking, bubbling, fading, dis-
        coloring, or poorly adhering. See Supp. Brieﬁng Notice at 1. Ac-
        cording to the Ponzio objectors, “the [Pinon plaintiﬀs] have an-
        swered this question by stating that the ‘vast majority’ of class
        members are not eligible . . . because they didn’t experience the
        paint defect” and, in the alternative, the “possible range is between
        one [c]lass [m]ember (~.00001%) and 35,396 [c]lass [m]embers
        (~20.97%), with the answer likely being much closer to 21% than
        0%.” Supp. Br. for Appellants at 23–24 (footnote omitted).
                The Ponzio objectors do not adequately explain why the in-
        eligibility percentage (even under the alternative scenario) is closer
        to 21% other than stating that “it is very unlikely that many of these
        [c]lass [m]embers previously repainted their Subject Vehicles or
        provided suﬃcient notice to [Mercedes-Benz] of the defect to ren-
        der them eligible now.” Id. at 24. Rather, they articulate a mathe-
        matical equation that highlights why, as the district court noted,
        “these absolute statements” just are not true. See D.E. 116 at 39. 4

        4 Understandably, the district court thought little of the Ponzio objectors’ blan-

        ket assertions that the “vast majority of class members get zero dollars.” D.E.
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        21-14503                   Opinion of the Court                                 27

                The equation proﬀered by the Ponzio objectors is as follows:
                                   X=A+B–C–D–E
        X represents the number of class members who are categorically
        ineligible for relief; A is the number of Subject Vehicles that are
        more than ﬁfteen years old; B is the number of Subject Vehicles
        that have more than 150,000 miles; C is the number of Subject

        116 at 39. The district court noted “that’s not true for [Ponzio’s] own objec-
        tors. They don’t get zero dollars. . . . they are treated just like everyone else.”
        Id. The district court then addressed each of the eight objectors:
                Objector Montgomery complain[ed] about receiving ‘noth-
                ing,’ but her vehicle was totaled, she apparently incurred no
                costs to repaint her vehicle, she received an insurance payment
                about the market value of the vehicle, and she offer[ed] no ev-
                idence that the [s]ettlement [a]greement adversely affect[ed]
                her in the slightest. Objector Acuna appear[ed] not to have
                incurred any costs to repair his Subject Vehicle (he could re-
                cover those costs if he did and submitted a claim) and suffered
                no loss in the market value of the vehicle after his trade-in.
                Objectors Nelthrope’s, Ponzio’s, and Madsen’s Subject Vehi-
                cles are eligible for a repair at 50% of cost. Objector Mull has
                had his Subject Vehicle repainted twice, once where [d]efend-
                ants actually paid for the repaint . . . and the second repaint
                came at a time when Mull would be eligible for a full reim-
                bursement if he timely submits his claim. Although Objector
                Salgado’s mileage takes his Subject Vehicle out of automatic
                coverage, if he can show he presented his automobile to an
                Authorized Service Center or notified [d]efendants within the
                first fifteen years, he is entitled to coverage similar to others.
                Objector Parker sold his vehicle in 2020 and does not contend
                that he received less than the market value of that vehicle.
        D.E. 125 at 35.
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        28                        Opinion of the Court                      21-14503

        Vehicles more than ﬁfteen years old and more than 150,00 miles—
        which is subtracted to avoid double counting; D is the number of
        otherwise ineligible Subject Vehicles that were repainted; and E is
        the number of otherwise ineligible Subject Vehicles that were not
        repainted but made a claim prior to becoming ineligible.
              The Ponzio objectors have ﬁlled in the equation with the in-
        formation they say they have:
                         X = 12,814 + 32,833 – 10,251 – D – E
        Critically, what is missing is D and E—the numbers of otherwise
        ineligible vehicles that were repaired/repainted and those that
        were not but whose owners made a claim prior to the vehicles be-
        coming ineligible. The Ponzio objectors say that “it is likely impos-
        sible to determine [D] with speciﬁcity,” and E “is likely very low
        due to the onerous notice provisions of the [s]ettlement.” Supp.
        Br. for Appellants at 26–27. In their view, it is unlikely that class
        members received documentation or chose to hold on to such doc-
        umentation of a rejected claim for a repair that did not take place.5

        5 As far as we can tell, there is only one class member, Samuel Salgado, who is

        ineligible under this category. But the record is not clear if he is ineligible
        because of the allegedly “onerous notice provisions” described. See Supp. Br.
        of Appellants at 24 n.13. Mr. Salgado submitted a declaration stating that his
        vehicle currently has 180,000 miles, that he has experienced “peeling, flaking,
        or bubbling” of the exterior paint or clearcoat, and that he has not had his
        vehicle repainted. See D.E. 96-5. Significantly, however, he does not say why
        he has not had his vehicle repainted or whether he has ever presented the ve-
        hicle to an Authorized Service Center or elsewhere for repairs. See id.
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        21-14503               Opinion of the Court                         29

               So we are left with X = 35,396 – D – E, and the Ponzio ob-
        jectors’ assertion that “it is likely that the values for D and E are
        quite low.” Supp. Br. for Appellants at 26. This latter claim is un-
        supported, and the Ponzio objectors acknowledge that the range
        of “categorically ineligible” class members on this basis is any-
        where between zero and 35,396.
               We also asked the parties to tell us how many class members
        are “categorically ineligible” to beneﬁt from the settlement agree-
        ment because, at the time the agreement was reached, (1) they
        were former owners or lessees and (2) they did not, while they
        owned or leased their class vehicles and while their vehicles were
        ﬁfteen or fewer years old and had 150,000 or fewer miles on them,
        either have their vehicles’ paint or clearcoat ﬁxed or give notice to
        Mercedes-Benz that their vehicles’ paint or clearcoat was peeling,
        ﬂaking, bubbling, fading, discoloring, or poorly adhering. See Supp.
        Brieﬁng Notice at 1. Again, in response to this question, the Ponzio
        objectors claim that the Pinon parties have answered this question
        (we assume they mean that the vast majority of owners/lessees did
        not experience a paint defect) and, alternatively, they assert that the
        possible range they can calculate “is between three [c]lass [m]em-
        bers (~.00002%) and 99,702 [c]lass [m]embers (~59.06%), with the
        answer likely being much closer to 59% than 0%[.]” Supp. Br. For
        Appellants at 29. As for why they believe that the actual number is
        closer to 59%, they say—again, without support—that “it is very
        unlikely that many of these [c]lass [m]embers previously repainted
        their Subject Vehicles and whether they provided suﬃcient notice
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        30                      Opinion of the Court                  21-14503

        to Mercedes of the defect is irrelevant to former owners and les-
        sees.” Id.
               Even accepting the Ponzio objectors’ proposed ranges, the
        number of class members categorically ineligible for relief spans
        anywhere from ~0.00001% and ~20.97% plus anywhere from
        ~.00002% and ~59.06%. In other words, the number is anywhere
        from .00003% to 80.03% or “between four [c]lass [m]embers and
        135,098 [c]lass [m]embers.” Id. at 31. The breadth of this range
        makes it clear that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
        weighing the Ponzio objectors’ purported “evidence” against the
        proponents’ evidence and determining that the settlement agree-
        ment was fair, reasonable, and adequate. It is simply not true—at
        least not on this record—that the settlement agreement failed to
        provide any relief for 80% of class members. See, e.g., Cotton, 559
        F.2d at 1330 (“The [district] court should not make a proponent of
        a proposed settlement justify each term of settlement against a hy-
        pothetical or speculative measure of what concessions might have
        been gained; inherent in compromise is a yielding of absolutes and
        an abandoning of highest hopes.”) (internal quotation marks omit-
        ted).
                                           B
               In tandem with their assertion that the district court abused
        its discretion because it approved a settlement agreement that
        leaves 80% of the class ineligible for relief, the Ponzio objectors also
        argue that the court ignored a number of red ﬂags and committed
        a series of legal errors.
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        21-14503                 Opinion of the Court                           31

                                            1
              The Ponzio objectors argue that the district court failed to
        adequately address the Bennett factors and the Rule 23(e)(2) criteria.
        As part of this argument, they ﬁrst state that the district court
        “summarily rejected” their objections “in a single sentence . . . and
        thus made no ﬁnding or conclusions that might facilitate appellate
        review; instead, [it] oﬀered only rote, boilerplate pronouncements”
        which is “itself a basis for reversal.” Br. for Appellants at 54 (inter-
        nal quotation marks and citation omitted).
                A review of the district court’s 58-page order, as well as the
        transcript of the fairness hearing, belies the claim of summary ad-
        judication. See D.E. 125 at 26–44. The district court discussed the
        quantity and identity of the objectors—noting that they comprised
        only .007% of the class members—and then proceeded to consider
        the various objections made, including objections to the adequacy
        of relief, objections to the terms of the attorneys’ fee application,
        and objections as to the adequacy of class counsel and class repre-
        sentatives. See id. at 26–43. The district court also addressed the
        objection that the settlement agreement was the result of collusion
        and a reverse auction, as well as the objection that the proposed
        settlement failed to satisfy the Bennett factors. See id. at 43–44. The
        district court’s analysis of the Bennett factors cites to its earlier anal-
        ysis in the order—in Part III.B at pages 20–26—which examined the
        likelihood of success at trial and the complexity, expense, and du-
        ration of litigation; the range of possible recovery and the point at
        which the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable; the sub-
        stance and amount of opposition to the settlement; the state of the
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        32                     Opinion of the Court                  21-14503

        proceedings at which the settlement agreement was achieved; and
        the judgment of class counsel. This is not a case where the district
        court “made no ﬁndings or conclusions that might facilitate appel-
        late review,” Johnson v. NPAS Sols., LLC, 975 F.3d 1244, 1248–49 (11th
        Cir. 2020), as the Ponzio objectors claim.
               Next, the Ponzio objectors claim that the district court
        “failed to address the range of possible recovery for the [Pinon]
        [p]laintiﬀs’ claims and the point on or below the range of possible
        recovery at which the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable.”
        Br. for Appellants at 54–55. “Determining the fairness of the set-
        tlement is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and we will
        not overturn the court’s decision absent a clear showing of abuse
        of that discretion.” Bennett, 737 F.2d at 986. See also Faught, 668
        F.3d at 1240.
                The parties to the settlement agreement initially submitted
        a declaration from Lee M. Bowron, an actuary with Kerper and
        Bowron LLC, a consulting and actuarial ﬁrm. See D.E. 92-2. Class
        counsel had requested that Mr. Bowron’s ﬁrm calculate a range of
        the economic impact of the then-proposed settlement agreement.
        See id. at 3. During the fairness hearing, the district court discussed
        and identiﬁed certain issues it had with Mr. Bowron’s declaration.
        For example, it had concern with Mr. Bowron incorporating in his
        calculation certain costs to Mercedes-Benz (e.g., marketing and ad-
        ministrative costs) because that’s “looking at it . . . from [Mercedes-
        Benz’s] stead, not from the plaintiﬀs’ stead.” D.E. 116 at 15. In
        other words, the district court was directly (and correctly)
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        21-14503                   Opinion of the Court                           33

        concerned with “what [the agreement is] worth to the class, not
        what the cost to [Mercedes-Benz] is.” Id. at 17. Indeed, the district
        court made clear that
                [f ]rankly, [it didn’t] care a whole lot about that . . . .
                [Mercedes-Benz and Daimler] are sucking it up to set-
                tle this case . . . . the value to the class is how many
                vehicles are going to get repaired, what’s going to be
                the average cost of the repair from a low and a high
                standpoint. That’s the value to the class. And that
                would be the value of an extended warranty to the
                class members. Not what the cost is to [Mercedes-
                Benz].
        Id. at 17–18. Given its concern with “look[ing] at it as to the beneﬁt
        to the class, not the cost to [Mercedes-Benz],” the district court al-
        lowed the proponents of the settlement to submit an amended dec-
        laration from Mr. Bowron after the fairness hearing. See id. at 20.
        See also D.E. 125 at 39. 6
                In his supplemental declaration, Mr. Bowron provided an es-
        timate of the amounts that Mercedes-Benz was expected to pay.
        His revised calculation excluded “costs related to administering and
        selling the hypothetical extended warranty and the estimated value
        of past repairs”—the latter, because actual values of past repairs
        were determined. See D.E. 117-2 at 4–5. Mr. Bowron estimated the
        value of future repairs to be $13,130,000, with a range between a

        6 The district court also allowed the Ponzio objectors to supplement the rec-

        ord after the fairness hearing.
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        34                      Opinion of the Court                   21-14503

        low of $10,504,000 and a high of $15,756,000. See id. at 6. “Includ-
        ing the value of the 1,532 claims for repairs submitted by [c]lass
        [m]embers ranging from $3.1 million to $4.6 million . . . the total
        value of the settlement [was] now estimated by [the] [p]laintiﬀs as
        averaging between $16.2 million and $17.7 million.” See D.E. 125
        at 39–40.
               The Ponzio objectors submitted their own supplemental
        declaration by Richard Eichmann, a managing director for NERA
        Economic Consulting. See D.E. 121-2. Mr. Eichmann rejected Mr.
        Bowron’s analysis and estimated the potential value of future qual-
        ifying repairs to be $6.26 million. See D.E. 121-2 at 20.
                 On its review of this evidence, the district court found Mr.
        Bowron’s revised analysis to be reliable. But it also noted that even
        if it rejected that analysis and credited the Ponzio objectors’ valua-
        tion of future repairs as set forth in Mr. Eichmann’s declaration, it
        would still ﬁnd that the relief aﬀorded under the settlement agree-
        ment was adequate. See D.E. 125 at 40. This was not an abuse of
        discretion. The district court carefully reviewed the evidence on
        valuation of the settlement agreement, discussed its concerns with
        class counsel and the objectors during the fairness hearing, re-
        quired additional evidence when it found the evidence to be lacking
        and not adequately focused on the class members, and reconsid-
        ered the parties’ supplemental brieﬁng before reaching its conclu-
        sion. The district court clearly “[took] on a type of ﬁduciary role
        for the class,” see In re Equifax Inc., 999 F.3d at 1265, when it ensured
        that the value of the settlement be determined from the class
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        21-14503                Opinion of the Court                         35

        members’ perspective, and not that of Mercedes-Benz and Daim-
        ler. See D.E. 116 at 17.
                We are also unpersuaded by the Ponzio objectors’ conten-
        tion that the district court improperly analyzed the ﬁrst, fourth,
        and sixth Bennett factors. These factors are, respectively, “the likeli-
        hood of success at trial,” “the complexity, expense and duration of
        litigation,” and “the state of proceedings at which the settlement
        was achieved.” Bennett, 737 F.2d at 986. During the fairness hear-
        ing, the district court noted that the Pinon plaintiﬀs (and the Ponzio
        objectors in their action in the District of New Jersey) had “a lot of
        their claims” dismissed at the motion to dismiss stage of the litiga-
        tion. D.E. 116 at 41. In its ﬁnal order, the district court explained
        that there was “signiﬁcant uncertainty as to whether [p]laintiﬀs
        could succeed on their remaining claims . . . either at the summary
        judgment phase or at trial” and “[e]ven if a jury awarded the settle-
        ment class more in damages that [sic] they will receive under the
        [s]ettlement [a]greement, such an outcome is far from guaranteed
        and any such relief would occur, if at all, after years of protracted
        litigation, including appeals.” D.E. 125 at 17–18.
               One of the main contentions the Ponzio objectors asserted
        below was that the agreement did not provide relief for diminution
        in value of the vehicles caused by the latent paint defect. To obtain
        such monetary relief would require not only survival at the sum-
        mary judgment phase, but ultimate success at trial on both liability
        and on a diminution-of-value damages theory—a feat the district
        court expressly found to be “highly unlikely.” Id. at 22. And even
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        36                     Opinion of the Court                21-14503

        then, the district court noted, “the case would likely undergo a pro-
        tracted appellate process with an aﬃrmance of the district court’s
        decision far from certain.” Id. at 22–23. As we explained in Ault v.
        Walt Disney World Co., 692 F.3d 1212, 1218 (11th Cir. 2012), “[t]he
        issue before us is not who prevails over whom, but rather the ques-
        tion is whether the district abused its discretion in its ﬁnding re-
        garding who was most likely to prevail at trial.” To add to the un-
        certainty of success, and without expressing a view on the issue,
        we note that “a number of courts presented with class action
        claims for the diminution in value of allegedly defective vehicles
        have honed in on the inherent diﬃculties in attempting to calculate
        such damages on a classwide basis,” and—at least as of a decade
        ago—case law “regarding the use and availability of subclasses to
        address diminution in value issues in vehicle class actions [wa]s
        sparse.” Scott Elder & Travis Thompson, Recent Developments in
        Automobile Consumer Class Actions, 41 Brief 44, 47–48 (A.B.A. 2011).
        The Ponzio objectors have presented no recent data to the con-
        trary.
                The district court considered the likelihood of class mem-
        bers’ success at trial and, in doing so, deemed the settlement agree-
        ment fair and reasonable. Neither Rule 23 nor the Bennett factors
        require a district court to ﬁnd that a settlement agreement provides
        the same scope of relief that could be obtained if class members
        were wholly successful at trial. See Bennett, 737 F.2d at 986 (“[O]ur
        judgment is informed . . . by the realization that compromise is the
        essence of settlement.”); Cotton, 559 F.2d at 1330 (“Neither should
        it be forgotten that compromise is the essence of a settlement.”).
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        21-14503                  Opinion of the Court                             37

        “As we have emphasized elsewhere, ‘a just result is often no more
        than an arbitrary point between competing notions of reasonable-
        ness.’” Bennett, 737 F.2d at 987 (quoting In re Corrugated Container
        Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d at 1325).
                Finally, in its analysis, the district court also found it “signiﬁ-
        cant that few civil trials in [its] district [had] been scheduled since
        the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic and, given the backlog
        of criminal cases . . . and the likelihood of dispositive motions being
        ﬁled . . . it is unlikely that this case would be tried within the next
        two years, if then.” D.E. 125 at 18 n.7. And during this “protracted
        litigation process, [c]lass [m]embers, many of whom possess vehi-
        cles with model years over a decade old, would be without any rem-
        edy while their vehicles experience further depreciation from age
        or wear and tear.” Id. at 23. We see no abuse of discretion with
        this reasoning either.7
                                              2
               The Ponzio objectors argue that the settlement agreement
        has the “[h]allmarks of [i]nadequacy of [c]ounsel.” Br. for Appel-
        lants at 62. They state that “the class representatives receive[d] sig-
        niﬁcantly better treatment than the majority of class members who
        suﬀered the same damages from identical conduct.” Id. at 63. This
        argument largely rests on the underlying claim that “80% of the

        7 The Ponzio objectors’ remaining arguments against the district court’s anal-

        ysis of the Rule 23 criteria are based on the claim that 80% of the class mem-
        bers receive nothing. Because we have already rejected that claim, we do not
        further discuss these remaining arguments.
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        38                      Opinion of the Court                  21-14503

        class members [ ] are ineligible for any beneﬁts.” Id. But for the
        reasons already explained, we are unpersuaded by this claim. So
        the assertion that “[n]o competent counsel or class representative,
        tasked with representing the 80% who receive nothing, would ever
        have agreed to such a settlement,” id. at 64, while seemingly correct
        as an abstract principle, is inapplicable here. The district court was
        “entitled to rely upon the judgment of experienced counsel for the
        parties. Indeed, the [court], absent fraud, collusion, or the like,
        should be hesitant to substitute its own judgment for that of coun-
        sel.” Cotton, 559 F.2d at 1330.
                For essentially the same reason, we also reject the Ponzio
        objectors’ argument that “the economic interests of substantial
        portions of the [c]lass [m]embers are in substantial conﬂict” and
        the “interests of the [Pinon] class representatives are not aligned
        with, and are actually antagonistic to, the interests of a majority of
        [c]lass [m]embers—those who are not eligible for any relief and
        those eligible for less relief than the class representatives for no le-
        gitimate reason.” Br. for Appellants at 76. Again, the Ponzio ob-
        jectors’ argument here is based on the claim that the “vast majority
        [of the class] get[s] nothing.” Br. for Appellants 74–75. As we have
        explained, that is simply not the case.
                                           3
              The Ponzio objectors assert that the settlement agreement
        reﬂected collusion, a reverse auction, and the absence of arm’s-
        length negotiations. The district court rejected these assertions,
        and determined that the settlement agreement “was not the
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        21-14503               Opinion of the Court                       39

        product of fraud or collusion but negotiated at an arm’s-length for-
        mal mediation conducted by a neutral, highly respected media-
        tor[,]” former United States District Judge James F. Holderman.
        D.E. 125 at 17.
               The record before the district court included a declaration
        from Judge Holderman stating, among other things, that he “per-
        sonally witnessed that each side and their [c]ounsel conducted their
        mediated settlement negotiations in an adversarial, arm’s length,
        and non-collusive manner” and that “both sides approached the set-
        tlement negotiations in good faith and worked accordingly while
        vigorously maintaining integrity to their positions.” D.E. 70-3 at 3.
        Judge Holderman also indicated that “after the agreement-in-prin-
        ciple was reached . . . as to the terms and conditions of the pro-
        posed class settlement, each side’s [c]ounsel then mediated attor-
        ney fees, expenses, and class incentive awards to reach an agree-
        ment on those issues.” Id. at 3–4. Thus, “[t]he issue of attorney
        fees, expenses, and class incentive awards had not been discussed
        prior to the [p]arties reaching an agreement-in-principle on the
        terms and conditions of the proposed class settlement.” Id. at 4.
        This sequence helps avoid a claim of conﬂict on the part of class
        counsel. See Herr, Annotated Manual for Complex Litigation § 21.7
        (“Separate negotiation of the class settlement before an agreement
        on fees is generally preferable.”).
               The district court acted within its discretion in crediting
        Judge Holderman’s perspective and opinion. As it explained, “[t]he
        close participation of . . . Judge Holderman in multiple mediation
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        40                        Opinion of the Court                      21-14503

        sessions support[ed] the procedural fairness of the [s]ettlement
        [a]greement.” D.E. 125 at 17. The Ponzio objectors have shown
        no error, much less reversible error. See, e.g., Robinson v. Nat’l Stu-
        dent Clearinghouse, 14 F.4th 56, 59 (1st Cir. 2021) (concluding that a
        class action settlement agreement reached in mediation before a
        retired judge was the product of arm’s length negotiations). 8
                                              4
                Finally, the Ponzio objectors assert that the settlement con-
        stitutes a disfavored coupon settlement that required, but did not
        receive, heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., In re HP Ink Jet Printer Litiga-
        tion, 716 F.3d 1173, 1178 n.4 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating that coupon set-
        tlements are “generally disfavored,” but explaining that they can
        sometimes “be appropriate”). We again disagree.
               Coupon or paper settlements “typically involve the exten-
        sion or expansion of an existing warranty or coupons for rebates
        on future purchases from defendants.” Davis v. Carl Cannon Chev-
        rolet-Olds, Inc., 182 F.3d 792, 798 (11th Cir. 1999) (Nangle, J. concur-
        ring). See also Rubenstein, 4 Newberg on Class Actions § 12:8 (“In
        a coupon settlement, a class action is litigated, and the class’[ ]
        claims are settled in return for a coupon or voucher applicable to
        future purchases of the defendant’s products.”). The district court

        8 For the same reasons, we are also unpersuaded by the Ponzio objectors’ char-

        acterization of the settlement agreement as a reverse auction—a scenario “in
        which a defendant picks out a plaintiff with weaker claims and weaker counsel
        in an effort to negotiate a more favorable settlement.” Tech. Training Assocs.,
        Inc. v. Buccaneers Ltd. P’ship, 874 F.3d 692, 695 (11th Cir. 2017).
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        21-14503                Opinion of the Court                           41

        concluded that the settlement agreement was not an “improper
        coupon settlement” because it “does not involve any coupons or
        vouchers but direct cash payments to those [c]lass [m]embers who
        previously paid for repairs or coverage for future repairs.” D.E. 125
        at 37.
                 The Ponzio objectors argue that “[t]he 20% of class mem-
        bers eligible for relief receive no cash for possible future repairs . . .
        and this 20% is merely eligible for discounts on possible future re-
        pairs at an Authorized [Mercedes-Benz] Service Center.” Br. for
        Appellants at 79. We are, in part for reasons already discussed, un-
        persuaded. The settlement agreement, as the district court cor-
        rectly noted, does not involve coupons or vouchers. Rather, § 9.8
        of the agreement provides that “[s]ettlement [c]lass [m]embers
        may elect to receive payment of their claims via electronic payment
        (e.g.[,] Venmo or PayPal) in a form agreed to by the [s]ettling [p]art-
        ies, or by written check.” D.E. 70-1, Exh. 1 at § 9.8.
                                           V
               We have carefully reviewed the parties’ briefs and the rec-
        ord, including the transcript of the fairness hearing, the supple-
        mental brieﬁng below and on appeal, and the order approving the
        class action settlement. We are satisﬁed that the district court took
        the objections of the Ponzio objectors seriously and, after rejecting
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        42                         Opinion of the Court                       21-14503

        those objections, acted within its discretion in approving the settle-
        ment agreement. 9
                AFFIRMED.

        9 The Ponzio objectors request that the district court replace the Pinon plain-

        tiﬀs’ counsel and their class representatives “with adequate counsel and repre-
        sentatives” and “consider the creation of subclasses with separate class repre-
        sentatives and separate counsel to ensure adequate structural protection of
        the interests of absent class members.” Br. for Appellants at 81. Because we
        do not ﬁnd that the district court abused its discretion in approving the settle-
        ment agreement, this request is denied as moot.