Court Opinion

ID: 9941942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-19 18:06:17.840365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:27.740745
License: Public Domain

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 1       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

 2 Opinion Number:

 3 Filing Date: February 12, 2024

 4 No. A-1-CA-39929

 5 D.R. HORTON, INC. and DRH SOUTHWEST
 6 CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

 7         Plaintiffs-Appellants,

 8 v.

 9 TRINITY UNIVERSAL INSURANCE
10 COMPANY; KEMPER CORPORATION;
11 MERASTAR INSURANCE COMPANY;
12 and AMTRUST INSURANCE COMPANY
13 OF KANSAS, INC. f/k/a TRINITY UNIVERSAL
14 INSURANCE COMPANY OF KANSAS, INC.,

15         Defendants-Appellees.

16 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY
17 Francis J. Mathew, District Court Judge

18 Landry & Ludewig, L.L.P.
19 Stephanie Landry
20 Glenn R. Smith
21 Albuquerque, NM

22 Stalter Law LLC
23 Kenneth H. Stalter
24 Albuquerque, NM

25 for Appellants
 1 Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A.
 2 Jennifer A. Noya
 3 Jeremy K. Harrison
 4 Albuquerque, NM

 5 for Appellees

 6 Stiff, Garcia & Associates, LLC
 7 John S. Stiff
 8 Edward F. Snow
 9 Albuquerque, NM

10 for Appellee Amtrust Insurance Company of Kansas
 1                                      OPINION

 2 WRAY, Judge.

 3 {1}    Having granted the motion for rehearing and considered the response, we

 4 withdraw the opinion filed December 18, 2023, and substitute the following in its

 5 place. This case involves the intersection of an insurer’s well-established duty to

 6 defend and an insured’s contractual duties under an insurance policy. In the district

 7 court, Appellants D.R. Horton, Inc. and DRH Southwest Construction, Inc.

 8 (collectively, Horton) alleged, in addition to many other claims, that the insurers,

 9 Appellees Trinity Universal Insurance Company (Trinity Universal), Trinity

10 Universal Insurance Company of Kansas (Trinity Kansas), and Amtrust Insurance

11 Company of Kansas, Inc. (Amtrust) (collectively, Defendants), had a duty to defend

12 a series of claims relating to construction defects. We refer to Trinity Kansas and

13 Trinity Universal collectively as “Trinity.” The district court concluded that

14 Defendants suffered substantial prejudice from Horton’s multi-year delay in

15 providing notice of the claims to Defendants and granted summary judgment in

16 Defendants’ favor. Horton appeals the dismissal of its claims as well as a series of

17 other summary judgment denials and discovery rulings. Despite evidence that

18 Horton intentionally delayed notifying Defendants of the claims, contrary to the

19 requirements of the insurance policies at issue, Trinity did not defend Horton when

20 it received actual notice of a claim that was arguably covered. See Garcia v.
 1 Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 2008-NMSC-018, ¶ 16, 143 N.M. 732, 182 P.3d

 2 113. As a policy matter, New Mexico law prioritizes the duty to defend over

 3 potential contract defenses—like the failure to give notice. See id. ¶¶ 18-19; Dove v.

 4 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2017-NMCA-051, ¶ 15, 399 P.3d 400; State Farm Fire

 5 & Cas. Co. v. Price, 1984-NMCA-036, ¶¶ 30, 33, 101 N.M. 438, 684 P.2d 524,

 6 overruled on other grounds by Ellingwood v. N.N. Invs. Life Ins. Co., 1991-NMSC-

 7 006, ¶ 17, 111 N.M. 301, 805 P.2d 70. Thus, if a jury determines that the insurer

 8 breached the duty to defend, the insurer “suffers serious consequences,” including

 9 the loss of certain contract-based defenses—like the insured’s failure to give notice.

10 Price, 1984-NMCA-036, ¶¶ 32-33. As a result, under New Mexico law, when the

11 duty to defend remains in dispute, summary judgment may not be granted on

12 defenses that implicate the insured’s breach of the insurance contract provisions. Id.

13 We therefore reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment in Defendants’

14 favor based on notice to the insurer. Otherwise, we affirm.

15 BACKGROUND

16 {2}    Horton began the development of subdivisions in 2005, and Vinyard &

17 Associates, Inc. (Vinyard) provided Horton with geotechnical consulting services as

18 a subcontractor. Horton and Vinyard entered into multiple contracts for this work,

19 and under each contract, Vinyard was required to obtain a commercial general

20 liability policy that included Horton as an additional insured. Using an insurance

                                             2
 1 agency, Berger Briggs Real Estate & Insurance, Inc. (Berger Briggs), Vinyard

 2 obtained a commercial general liability policy from Trinity Kansas (the CGL Policy)

 3 and an umbrella policy from Trinity Universal (the Umbrella Policy), with both

 4 policies (collectively, the Trinity Policies) covering the period between October 28,

 5 2006 to October 28, 2007. The Trinity Policies include both (1) an obligation for the

 6 insured to notify the insurer of occurrences, offenses, claims, or suits; and (2) “the

 7 right and duty” for the insurer to defend the insured against any suit for damages to

 8 which the insurance applied.

 9 {3}    In 2008, Horton received notice that some subdivision homes could be

10 experiencing construction defects. Horton and Vinyard communicated about the

11 defects and claims by the homeowners, and Horton involved other subcontractor

12 insurers, including Acadia Insurance Company (Acadia) and BITCO General

13 Insurance Corporation (BITCO). The homeowner complaints began to be filed in

14 November 2009 and a large number were eventually made part of a “consolidated

15 arbitration.” See Lyndoe v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 2012-NMCA-103, ¶¶ 2-3, 5, 287 P.3d

16 357 (describing the homeowner complaint litigation at issue in the present case).

17 Communications continued between Horton and Berger Briggs, Horton and

18 Vinyard, and Vinyard and Berger Briggs. Beginning in 2012, two individual

19 arbitrators in the homeowner cases determined that Horton did not heed Vinyard’s

20 advice. On March 5, 2014, a few months before the first consolidated arbitration

                                             3
 1 hearing, the consolidated arbitrator determined that “certain liability findings” from

 2 the prior two arbitrations, including Horton’s failure to follow Vinyard’s advice,

 3 would have preclusive effect—though for future claims, Horton would be permitted

 4 to question the relevancy of the specific findings.

 5 {4}    After the March 2014 collateral estoppel ruling from the consolidated

 6 arbitrator and consolidated arbitration hearings held in early June 2014, Acadia

 7 wrote to Trinity regarding the CGL and Umbrella policies. In letters dated June 23,

 8 2014, Acadia requested that Trinity contribute to Horton’s defense. Trinity formally

 9 responded on August 25, 2014, and indicated that Trinity had not previously

10 received notice of the claims but an investigation had commenced. Trinity explained

11 that Horton did not appear to have been added to the policies as an additional

12 insured—which had been required under the original contracts between Horton and

13 Vinyard—and additionally noted that the homeowner complaints that Acadia had

14 provided did not allege fault on Vinyard’s part—only fault by Horton for not heeding

15 Vinyard’s recommendations. Trinity requested that Acadia provide information to

16 assist the investigation and coverage analysis—specifically, information that would

17 demonstrate that Horton was an additional insured or that Vinyard was at fault.

18 Trinity wrote to Acadia again on October 1, 2014, November 17, 2014, and on

19 February 4, 2015. Having received no response from Acadia, in the February 2015

20 letter, Trinity advised Acadia that “Trinity formally denies your request on behalf of

                                             4
 1 Acadia Insurance to participate with Acadia in the defense of Horton in the” two

 2 identified proceedings. Trinity did not contact Vinyard, Berger Briggs, or Horton

 3 before sending the February 2015 letter denying Horton a defense.

 4 {5}    On December 18, 2015, BITCO wrote to Trinity and requested that Trinity

 5 provide a defense for Horton. Trinity responded on January 6, 2016, and observed

 6 that it had previously requested information from Acadia that was not provided,

 7 asked BITCO to provide the same information to further a renewed investigation,

 8 and raised the same concerns about coverage. It appears from the record that, like

 9 Acadia, BICTO did not respond to Trinity’s requests for more information.

10 {6}    On February 1, 2018—two years removed from the most recent

11 correspondence relating to the presence or absence of coverage for Horton under

12 Trinity policies and eight years removed from Horton’s first expression of concern

13 regarding the claims of homeowners—Horton wrote directly to Trinity’s counsel for

14 the first time. In that letter, Horton referenced the 2014 and 2015 letters from Acadia

15 and BITCO and argued that Trinity had failed to legitimately respond to those

16 demands for a defense. Trinity responded on June 7, 2018, and though the entire

17 letter does not appear to be in the record, the reviewable pages reiterate Trinity’s

18 objections to coverage.

19 {7}    On July 26, 2018, Horton filed suit against Trinity, other insurers who had

20 issued policies for different periods of time during the Horton-Vinyard contractual

                                              5
 1 relationship, and Amtrust, which, as a result of an asset purchase, had acquired the

 2 policies of Trinity Kansas. This complaint marks the start of the litigation currently

 3 before this Court. Horton brought multiple claims directly against Trinity and

 4 Amtrust as well as a claim for judgment on an arbitration award that Horton had

 5 secured against Vinyard for breach of contract. In the claim for a judgment, Horton

 6 alleged that Defendants must pay what Vinyard owed for the breach of contract,

 7 because Horton was an additional insured or Vinyard’s indemnitee.

 8 {8}    Between October 2020 and May 2021, Horton, Trinity, and Amtrust filed

 9 twenty motions for summary judgment. In Trinity’s motion for summary judgment

10 on Horton’s claim to coverage under the Umbrella Policy (the Umbrella Motion),

11 which Amtrust joined, and Trinity’s motion for summary judgment on all claims

12 based on Horton’s failure to give timely notice of the homeowner claims as required

13 by the Trinity Policies (the Notice Motion), Trinity set forth additional evidence that

14 Horton had intentionally not demanded a defense from Trinity.

15 {9}    This information, together with Horton’s explicit requests for a defense from

16 Acadia and BITCO, led Trinity to assert in the present case that the only reasonable

17 inference to draw was that Horton strategically chose not to pursue a defense from

18 Trinity in the early years of the homeowner litigation and therefore failed to give the

19 required notice under the Trinity Policies. In relevant part, Horton responded that

20 the reasons for not pursuing a defense from Trinity before 2014 were immaterial. At

                                              6
 1 the hearings related to Horton’s motion for summary judgment on Trinity’s breach

 2 of the duty to defend (the DTD Motion), Horton additionally argued, again in

 3 relevant part, that (1) Trinity could not assert Horton’s failure to cooperate as a

 4 defense if Trinity had breached the duty to defend; and (2) Horton’s reasons for not

 5 requesting a defense sooner were irrelevant because Horton sought no damages for

 6 the period before the 2014 notice was provided. Horton did not, however, deny that

 7 the decision to delay pursing a defense from Trinity was strategic.

 8 {10}   Of the twenty motions filed (between these parties), the district court granted

 9 only a portion of the Umbrella Motion and the Notice Motion. The remainder, with

10 the exception of four defense motions that were apparently unresolved, were denied.

11 Importantly, the district court denied Horton’s DTD Motion for summary judgment

12 based on the existence of disputed material facts, and Trinity had not filed a

13 competing motion for summary judgment on the duty to defend. In granting Trinity’s

14 Umbrella Motion, the district court ruled that “summary judgment should be entered

15 on any [of Horton’s] claim[s] that [it is] entitled to coverage as an additional insured

16 under the” Umbrella Policy—but did not grant summary judgment on “extra-

17 contractual claims related to the” Umbrella Policy. Regarding the Notice Motion,

18 the district court stated that Trinity had made a prima facie showing that it was

19 entitled to judgment as a matter of law and ruled that Horton’s response did not meet

                                              7
 1 the burden to demonstrate that disputed issues of fact would prevent summary

 2 judgment on notice. Specifically, the district court determined as a matter of law that

 3        Horton’s delay over a period of years in giving notice to [Trinity and
 4        Amtrust] of homeowner claims while engaging in litigation and/or
 5        arbitration proceedings and settling with homeowners or otherwise
 6        resolving claims created substantial prejudice to them. . . . Such delay
 7        relieved [Trinity and Amtrust] of both the duty to defend and the duty
 8        to indemnify.

 9 Based on this conclusion, the district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims against

10 Defendants with prejudice. This appeal followed.

11 DISCUSSION

12 {11}   On appeal, Horton challenges nine of the district court’s summary judgment

13 orders and two discovery-related orders. We review only the district court’s grant of

14 summary judgment on the Notice Motion and the discovery rulings.

15 I.     The Insured’s Failure to Give Notice as Required by the Insurance
16        Contract Is Not an Available Defense to a Claim That the Insurer
17        Breached the Duty to Defend
18 {12}   We review the “grant of summary judgment de novo.” Dove, 2017-NMCA-

19 051, ¶ 10. As we have often explained, “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate where

20 there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

21 as a matter of law[,]” with “[a]ll reasonable inferences . . . construed in favor of the

22 non-moving party.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Should

23 there be “any question as to any issue of material fact, summary judgment is

                                              8
 1 inappropriate.” Allsup’s Convenience Stores, Inc. v. N. River Ins. Co., 1999-NMSC-

 2 006, ¶ 43, 127 N.M. 1, 976 P.2d 1 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

 3 While Horton contests the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment on the

 4 Umbrella Motion and denial of several other motions, its primary challenge is to the

 5 district court’s dismissal of its claims based on the grant of Trinity’s Notice Motion

 6 and the corresponding denial of Horton’s DTD Motion. The parties’ arguments

 7 implicate two seemingly separate lines of authority—the law regarding the duty to

 8 defend and the law regarding the duty of the insured to give notice, which we pause

 9 our analysis to review.

10 A.     The Duty of Insurers: The Duty to Defend

11 {13}   In New Mexico, “[t]he duty of an insurer to defend arises from the allegations

12 on the face of the complaint or from the known but unpleaded factual basis of the

13 claim that brings it arguably within the scope of coverage.” Am. Gen. Fire & Cas.

14 Co. v. Progressive Cas. Co., 1990-NMSC-094, ¶ 11, 110 N.M. 741, 799 P.2d 1113.

15 An insurer must defend (1) if a complaint filed “alleges facts potentially within the

16 coverage of the policy”; (2) if the facts in the complaint do not clearly assert the facts

17 so that the insurer can determine the action does not fall within the coverage of the

18 policy (because doubts about coverage are “resolved in the insured’s favor”); or (3)

19 “if the insurer is notified of factual contentions or if the insurer could have

20 discovered facts, through reasonable investigation, implicating a duty to defend.”

                                               9
 1 Dove, 2017-NMCA-051, ¶ 11 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As

 2 this Court has explained, “[t]he upshot of our case law in this realm is this: an insurer

 3 who refuses to defend a covered insured without seeking a judicial determination

 4 that the alleged insured is not covered under the policy or without a voluntary waiver

 5 from the insured does so at its peril.” Id. ¶ 14 (citations omitted). We described the

 6 insurer’s peril as follows: “[A]n insurer who unilaterally refuses to defend

 7 effectively waives its ability to later challenge the underlying merits as to coverage

 8 because the ultimate question of coverage is to be properly resolved in the primary

 9 action in order to protect the interests of the insured and for judicial efficiency.” Id.

10 ¶ 15. The duty to defend “may arise at the beginning of litigation or at some later

11 stage if the issues are changed so as to bring the dispute within the scope of policy

12 coverage.” Am. Gen. Fire & Cas. Co., 1990-NMSC-094, ¶ 11.

13 {14}   In Garcia, our Supreme Court held that “actual notice is sufficient to trigger

14 the duty to defend unless the insured affirmatively declines a defense,” 2008-NMSC-

15 018, ¶ 1, and that “for the purposes of determining when an insurer’s duty to defend

16 arises, actual notice means notice from any source sufficient to permit the insurer to

17 locate and defend its insured.” Id. ¶ 25 (alteration, quotation marks, and citations

18 omitted). The Court cautioned, however, that the duty to defend need not be

19 automatic and stated instead that on receiving actual notice, “the insurer may protect

20 its interests simply by contacting the insured to ascertain whether the insurer’s

                                              10
 1 assistance is desired[, and i]f the insured indicates that it does not want the insurer’s

 2 assistance, or is unresponsive or uncooperative, the insurer is relieved of its duty to

 3 defend.” Id. ¶ 19 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While the notice

 4 received by the Garcia insurer satisfied the new standard for actual notice in the

 5 context of the duty to defend, the case was nevertheless remanded. Id. ¶¶ 25, 27.

 6 Fact questions remained about whether the insured “was foregoing a defense from”

 7 the insurer, id. ¶ 26, because the insurer did not advise the insured that no demand

 8 had been made and the record contained “ambiguous communications” between the

 9 insurer and the estate representative, id. ¶¶ 22-23. Our Supreme Court, in remanding,

10 determined that “the key inquiry in this case is whether under all the circumstances,

11 including the correspondence exchanged between the [estate] and [the insurer], the

12 [estate] was foregoing a defense from [the insurer].” Id. ¶ 26 (alterations, quotation

13 marks, and citation omitted). Because the inquiry was “fact-driven” and required

14 interpretation of “an ambiguous letter,” summary judgment was inappropriate. Id.

15 ¶ 26. “Thus, while actual notice presumptively triggers a duty to defend, a jury may

16 nevertheless find, when warranted by the facts, that the insured knowingly declined

17 a defense, and the duty to defend was therefore not breached.” Id. ¶ 16 (internal

18 quotation marks and citation omitted). With this as context, we turn to the insured’s

19 contractual obligation to give notice to the insurer.

                                              11
 1 B.      The Duty of an Insured: The Obligation to Give Notice in the Context of
 2         the Duty to Defend

 3 {15}    The Trinity Policies each contain a notice provision, which requires the

 4 insured to notify the insurer “as soon as practicable” of an occurrence, claim, or suit,

 5 and the purpose of such a provision “is to enable the insurer to prepare to defend or

 6 make settlement as it sees fit.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Found. Rsrv. Ins.

 7 Co., 1967-NMSC-197, ¶ 13, 78 N.M. 359, 431 P.2d 737. The principle is long-

 8 established that “[w]hen an insurance company seeks to avoid its obligations under

 9 a policy by claiming that the insured materially breached policy provisions, it must

10 demonstrate substantial prejudice as a result of the breach.” Price, 1984-NMCA-

11 036, ¶ 30. Generally, “substantial prejudice and whether the insurance company and

12 the insured acted fairly are . . . questions for a jury.” Id.

13 {16}    In Price, this Court considered intertwined “issues concerning coverage, the

14 duty of the insurance company to defend, and cooperation of the insured.” Id. ¶ 1.

15 The Price insured was involved in a car crash and notified his own insurer. Id.

16 ¶¶ 2, 4. In the lawsuit that followed, the parties reached a settlement. Id. ¶ 9. The

17 insurer was not a party and did not “participate in or consent to this settlement.” Id.

18 The insurer filed a declaratory judgment action against the insured, and the district

19 court ruled that the insurer had no duty to defend the insured in the car-crash suit

20 because the insured did not notify the insurer of the claim or demand a defense. Id.

21 ¶¶ 10, 17. This Court reversed, holding that “[a] jury should decide whether there

                                               12
 1 was a sufficient demand to defend and whether [the insurer] failed to defend” as well

 2 as “issues concerning [the insured]’s failure to cooperate, whether [the insurer] was

 3 prejudiced by [the insured]’s failure to cooperate, whether the settlement was made

 4 in good faith and whether it was reasonable in amount.” Id. ¶ 51. Specifically, this

 5 Court determined that

 6        [t]here is evidence in the record to support an inference that [the
 7        insurer] knew a suit had been filed, or knew of facts which imposed a
 8        duty upon it to find out whether litigation involving its insured was
 9        pending, and that it consciously disregarded the facts and failed to
10        defend its insured. The record also contains evidence which, if believed
11        by a jury, supports [the insurer]’s contention that [the insured] failed to
12        cooperate, causing substantial prejudice to the insurer.

13 Id. ¶ 31. While our Supreme Court in Garcia broadened the acceptable form of

14 notice of a claim from what Price required—from a demand by the insured to actual

15 notice from any source—Garcia and Price uniformly determine that the “policy of

16 encouraging insurers to perform their contractual obligations outweighs any

17 requirement that allows insurers to default on their obligation to defend simply

18 because the insured did not formally ask the insurer to do what the insurance contract

19 already requires.” Garcia, 2008-NMSC-018, ¶ 20 (internal quotation marks and

20 citation omitted); Price, 1984-NMCA-036, ¶¶ 31-32, 51 (same).

21 {17}   Price and Dove require that if disputed issues of fact exist regarding the

22 insurer’s breach of the duty to defend, the question must be submitted to the jury.

23 Price, 1984-NMCA-036, ¶ 51. Where the duty to defend and the duty to give notice

                                              13
 1 are both at issue, disputes of fact involving the duty to defend must be resolved as a

 2 threshold matter by the fact-finder, because notice-type defenses are unavailable to

 3 the insurer if the insurer breached the duty to defend. See id. ¶¶ 32-33, 53

 4 (recommending the use of special verdict forms on the duty to defend issue); Dove,

 5 2017-NMCA-051, ¶ 15 (outlining the peril of wrongfully denying the duty to

 6 defend). If the insurer is determined to have “unjustifiably fail[ed] to defend,” the

 7 insurer “suffers serious consequences” and “becomes liable for a judgment entered

 8 against the insured and for any settlement entered into by the insured in good faith.”

 9 Price, 1984-NMCA-036, ¶¶ 32-33. If, however, the fact-finder finds no breach of

10 the duty to defend, the insurer may argue notice as a defense—that the insured

11 breached the contract by failing to give the insurer timely notice and that the breach

12 substantially prejudiced the insurer—to any remaining claims raised by the insured

13 that are not contingent on the duty to defend findings. Id. ¶ 30; see also State Farm

14 Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fennema, 2005-NMSC-010, ¶ 17, 137 N.M. 275, 110 P.3d

15 491 (holding that the insurer must demonstrate substantial prejudice resulting from

16 an insured’s breach of a consent to settle provision). Regardless, an insurer is not

17 defenseless when facing allegations that it has breached the duty to defend. The

18 insurer may assert that the claim is not arguably covered by the policy, the insurer

19 did not receive actual notice of the claim, the insurer conducted a reasonable

                                             14
 1 investigation, or that the insured declined a defense. Garcia, 2008-NMSC-018,

 2 ¶¶ 16, 19; Dove, 2017-NMCA-051, ¶ 11.

 3 C.     The Impact of the Duty to Defend on the Present Case

 4 {18}   We return now from the abstract to the present case, which like Price, involves

 5 the duty to defend and the duty to notify, and like Price and Dove, the possibility

 6 that the insurer, Trinity, waived some defenses if it breached the duty to defend.

 7 And, as in Price and Garcia, we conclude that because factual disputes remain

 8 regarding the duty to defend, we must reverse the grant of summary judgment on

 9 Trinity’s Notice Motion. The district court granted the Notice Motion despite its

10 determination that factual issues remained regarding the duty to defend. Pursuant to

11 Price, however, any breach by Horton of the insurance contract’s requirement to

12 give notice or to cooperate would be defenses lost to Trinity in the event that Trinity

13 breached the duty to defend. See Price, 1984-NMCA-036, ¶¶ 31-33. That is not to

14 say, however, that Trinity may not use Horton’s pre-denial conduct to demonstrate

15 that the duty to defend was not breached at all. See Garcia, 2008-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 16,

16 26 (considering to be a question of fact whether ambiguous evidence demonstrated

17 that the insured knowingly declined a defense such that the insurer overcame the

18 presumption that the duty to defend was triggered by actual notice). As a result, the

19 district court’s determination that disputed facts exist about Trinity’s breach of the

20 duty to defend precluded summary judgment on the Notice Motion.

                                             15
 1 {19}   Trinity maintains that prioritizing the insurer’s duty to defend over the

 2 insured’s contractual obligation to give notice is contrary to Roberts Oil, Inc. v.

 3 Transamerica Ins. Co., 1992-NMSC-032, 113 N.M. 745, 833 P.2d 222. In Roberts

 4 Oil, our Supreme Court reaffirmed that an insurer must show “substantial prejudice”

 5 resulting from an insured’s “substantial and material breach” of the insurance

 6 contract in order to be excused from performing its duties to defend and indemnify.

 7 Id. ¶¶ 19, 22. We do not disagree with this principle—we disagree with the timing

 8 of its application. As explained in Price and Dove, if the insurance company fails to

 9 defend after a demand, it “loses the right to claim that the insured breached policy

10 provisions.” 1984-NMCA-036, ¶ 33; see Dove, 2017-NMCA-051, ¶ 14. Thus, if the

11 duty to defend was triggered, that issue must be resolved before the defense that the

12 insured breached the policy comes into play.

13 {20}   To clear this hurdle Trinity argues that the district court’s final order on the

14 Notice Motion was correct because the duty to defend was not triggered. Trinity

15 maintains that the duty to defend was not triggered because Horton’s breach of the

16 contractual notice obligation happened first in time and it is only “[a]fter an insurer

17 declines to defend, [that] it ‘loses the right’ to point to post-denial actions by the

18 insured that would otherwise be a breach of policy conditions.” As we have

19 explained, however, New Mexico law requires that the duty to defend question be

20 resolved before contract defenses (like compliance with contractual notice

                                             16
 1 requirements) can be applied—even though the insured’s actions in delaying notice

 2 happened before the insured has an opportunity to defend. The resulting

 3 chronological disconnect is resolved by the insurer’s ability to argue in the context

 4 of the duty to defend that the insurer did not receive actual notice or the insured’s

 5 actions demonstrated that the insured intended to decline a defense. See Garcia,

 6 2008-NMSC-018, ¶ 1. If the insurer never received actual notice from any source

 7 that is “sufficient to permit the insurer to locate and defend its insured,” the insurer

 8 did not breach the duty to defend. See id. ¶ 25 (internal quotation marks and citation

 9 omitted). If the insured is found to have declined a defense by its actions before a

10 defense is denied, there is no breach of the duty to defend. See id. ¶¶ 1, 26. We

11 therefore need not strictly limit the analysis to the timing of the parties’ actions, but

12 instead leave for the fact-finder to consider the reasonable inferences to be gleaned

13 from those actions in the context of the duty to defend. See id. ¶ 26; Price, 1984-

14 NMCA-036, ¶ 31.

15 {21}   Trinity also contends that the duty to defend was not triggered because notice

16 under the Trinity Policies was a condition precedent to Trinity performing its

17 contractual duties—including providing a defense. A condition precedent, however,

18 “is generally understood as an event occurring after the formation of a valid contract,

19 an event that must occur before there is a right to an immediate performance, before

20 there is breach of a contractual duty, and before the usual judicial remedies are

                                              17
 1 available.” Rodriguez v. Sanchez, 2023-NMCA-076, ¶ 10, 536 P.3d 543 (alteration,

 2 internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). If “a contract contains a condition

 3 precedent to performance, the right to enforce the contract does not arise until the

 4 condition precedent has been fulfilled.” Id. ¶ 12. Other jurisdictions have held as

 5 Trinity argues, that notice is a condition precedent to coverage. See Philadelphia

 6 Indem. Ins. Co. v. Genesee Valley Improvement Corp., 834 N.Y.S.2d 802, 803-04

 7 (App. Div. 2007); E&L Chipping Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 962 S.W.2d 272, 278

 8 (Tex. App. 1998). A dispute of authority remains, see generally 14A Jordan R. Plitt

 9 et al., Couch on Insurance, § 202:13, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2023),

10 however, and New Mexico has rejected the view that the failure of a party to an

11 insurance contract to perform a condition excuses the other party from performance

12 as a matter of law. See Roberts Oil, 1992-NMSC-032, ¶ 33. As to this issue, we must

13 adhere to our Supreme Court’s view.

14 {22}   Our Supreme Court characterizes insurance contracts as “aleatory,” meaning

15 that “one or both parties’ performance is conditional on the happening of a fortuitous

16 event.” Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Receconi, 1992-NMSC-019, ¶ 21, 113 N.M.

17 403, 827 P.2d 118. A key aspect of an aleatory contract is that the promise of each

18 party “is not given in exchange for the prospect of performance of the other party’s

19 promise, and actual or prospective nonperformance by one party to the contract does

20 not discharge the other.” Id. In Jackson, the policy included an “express condition”

                                             18
 1 that the insured’s “health remain, at the time of delivery of the policy, as represented

 2 in the application.” Id. ¶ 20. Because of the aleatory nature of the contract, however,

 3 the insured’s failure to perform the promise—to notify the insurer if his health

 4 changed before delivery of the policy—did not discharge the insurer from

 5 performing “its aleatory promise to pay [the insured]’s beneficiary the face amount

 6 of the policy in the event of his death.” Id. ¶ 21; see also Roberts Oil, 1992-NMSC-

 7 032, ¶ 33 (explaining that “[t]he agreed exchange was [the insured’s] payment of the

 8 premium for which it received [the insurer’s] promise to defend and indemnify it if

 9 the insured risk materialized”). Certain additional promises can be converted into

10 conditions precedent, if performance of the promise “is made an express condition

11 to performance of the insurer’s promise.” Roberts Oil, 1992-NMSC-032, ¶ 34. In

12 Roberts, an insurer contended that it could “escape liability” because the insured

13 breached a contract provision and argued that the breached provision was a material

14 condition precedent because the contract contained a “no action” clause, which

15 expressly precluded an action against the insurer unless there was full compliance

16 with the terms of the policy. Id. ¶¶ 9, 19, 34. For purposes of that case, our Supreme

17 Court was “willing” to accept “the insurers’ argument that the no action clause does

18 indeed convert the voluntary payment clause from a promise by the insured to an

19 express condition to the insurer’s obligations.” Id. ¶ 34. Trinity similarly argues that

20 the notice provision is such a condition, because the Trinity Policies contain “no

                                              19
 1 action” clauses, which state that no party may bring an action against Trinity if all

 2 conditions are not performed, and Horton’s failure to perform is therefore a

 3 condition precedent to triggering Trinity’s duty to defend. As we have explained,

 4 however, the duty to defend is triggered by notice “from any source sufficient to

 5 permit the insurer to locate and defend the insured.” Garcia, 2008-NMSC-018, ¶ 25

 6 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The duty to defend is therefore

 7 triggered even without the insured’s compliance with the notice provision. As a

 8 result, because any actual notice is sufficient to trigger the duty to defend, in the

 9 present case, the “no action” clause cannot convert the notice provision into a

10 condition precedent to the duty to defend. See Roberts Oil, Co., 1992-NMSC-032,

11 ¶ 34.

12 {23}    For its part, Horton maintains on appeal that the district court should have

13 granted summary judgment in its favor on the DTD Motion. Trinity responds that

14 the district court properly denied summary judgment on the duty to defend because

15 Horton was not arguably covered under the policy. This creates an unusual posture

16 for our review. The denial of summary judgment to Horton—based on disputed

17 issues of fact—is not final and generally not reviewable. See Jones v. City of

18 Albuquerque Police Dep’t, 2020-NMSC-013, ¶ 23, 470 P.3d 252 (noting that an

19 order denying summary judgment is interlocutory, not final, and “generally not

20 immediately appealable”). As we have noted, Trinity filed no cross-motion in the

                                            20
1 district court on the duty to defend, and the district court had no opportunity to grant

2 such a motion. Thus, the question of factual disputes on the duty to defend, which

3 the district court decided warranted a trial, is out of our reach on appeal.1

4 {24}   If the jury finds Trinity breached the duty to defend, Trinity “suffers serious

5 consequences,” including the “loss of the right to claim that the insured breached the

6 policy provisions . . . and the right to claim that the insured did not cooperate.” See

7 Price, 1984-NMCA-036, ¶¶ 32-33. In that scenario, any breach of the contractual

8 notice requirement becomes irrelevant. If, however, the jury finds that Trinity did

9 not breach the duty to defend, Trinity’s notice defense would become relevant to any

         1
          We note that the district court’s order partially granting Trinity’s Umbrella
  Motion for summary judgment determined that Horton was not covered as an
  additional insured under the Umbrella Policy. It is not clear whether the district court
  denied Horton’s DTD Motion because Horton was not covered by the Umbrella
  Policy and there was therefore no duty to defend, or whether the district court simply
  granted the Umbrella Motion that there was no coverage without any corresponding
  intent to rule on the duty to defend under the Umbrella Policy. The former ruling
  would be reversible, because the duty to defend can exist even in light of a
  subsequent determination of no coverage, see Price, 1984-NMCA-036, ¶¶ 16-17
  (affirming a directed verdict of no coverage but separately considering the duty to
  defend), and the coverage inquiry for the duty to defend is whether the insured was
  arguably or potentially covered. Dove, 2017-NMCA-051, ¶ 16. The latter ruling
  would stand, for the same reason—there may ultimately be no coverage even if there
  was a duty to defend at the time the insurer received notice. We presume the ruling
  simply determined that the Umbrella Policy did not cover Horton as an additional
  insured. See Bounds v. Hamlett, 2011-NMCA-078, ¶ 32, 150 N.M. 389, 258 P.3d
  1181 (“Generally, district court judgments are presumptively correct.”). We
  therefore do not reverse the grant of summary judgment on coverage under the
  Umbrella Policy and do not disturb the district court’s ruling that questions of fact
  precluded summary judgment on the duty to defend.

                                             21
 1 other claims Horton may have that are separate from the duty to defend. On appeal,

 2 Horton argues that its claims were not limited to those “as an insured,” but also

 3 included judgment-creditor claims relating to the Vinyard Judgment—the arbitration

 4 award that Horton obtained against Vinyard. Trinity responds that Horton failed to

 5 preserve the question of whether the grant of the duty to defend motion resolved all

 6 of the pending claims, and alternatively argues that judgment on all claims was

 7 appropriate based on Horton’s failure to give notice and the nature of the Vinyard

 8 Judgment. We conclude that Horton’s argument was sufficiently preserved—the

 9 district court denied both parties’ separate summary judgment motions related to the

10 Vinyard Judgment, which indicates disputes of material fact on the subject. In

11 dismissing Horton’s complaint completely, the district court relied on its finding that

12 “as a matter of law, Horton’s delay over a period of years in giving notice to [Trinity]

13 of homeowner claims while engaging in litigation and/or arbitration proceedings and

14 settling with homeowners or otherwise resolving claims created substantial

15 prejudice to them” and that the “delay relieved defendants of both the duty to defend

16 and the duty to indemnify.” Thus, the district court determined that summary

17 judgment on the notice question also resolved the Vinyard Judgment, despite

18 disputed questions of fact on the substance of the claim. Because claims unrelated

19 to the duty to defend and the Vinyard judgment claim could survive a fact-finder’s

20 determination that Trinity did not breach the duty to defend, we consider Horton’s

                                              22
 1 argument that summary judgment on the Notice Motion was inappropriate because

 2 the parties disputed material facts related to prejudice.

 3 {25}   Horton presented evidence that notice was timely for the homeowner claims

 4 that were added after Acadia’s 2014 notice to Trinity, the post-2014 homeowner

 5 claims were not the same as the earlier homeowner claims, and the consolidated

 6 arbitrator’s findings did not predetermine later cases. Trinity responds that (1)

 7 Horton’s intentional failure to tender a defense earlier was inherently prejudicial;

 8 and (2) Trinity was excluded from any control over or strategy regarding the initial

 9 homeowner arbitrations, bound by the arbitrators’ findings on the homeowner claims

10 such that “Horton’s negligence could no longer be contested,” and would have been

11 able to do nothing more than pay fees and judgments. From the evidence presented

12 on summary judgment, a reasonable fact-finder could conclude either that Trinity

13 was prejudiced by the inability to participate in the early proceedings to shape and

14 direct strategy and avoid preclusive findings, as Trinity maintains, or that as Horton

15 argues, the ongoing future homeowner proceedings were not predetermined by the

16 results from the consolidated arbitrations, and Trinity was not prejudiced. See Price,

17 1984-NMCA-036, ¶ 51 (recognizing the “jury issues” regarding the insured’s

18 cooperation). As a result, the district court’s grant of summary judgment on notice

19 must be reversed on this basis as well.

20 D.     The Parties’ Remaining Summary Judgment Arguments

                                             23
 1 {26}   Horton also challenges the district court’s denial of summary judgment related

 2 to Amtrust’s joinder. The district court denied cross-motions on this issue based on

 3 disputed questions of fact. We need not address this issue because we remand for

 4 further proceedings as a result of our ruling on the Notice Motion. On remand, it is

 5 for the fact-finder to resolve these remaining issues of disputed material fact.

 6 II.    We Affirm the District Court’s Discovery Rulings

 7 {27}   Because we remand for further proceedings, we address Horton’s challenges

 8 to the district court’s discovery rulings that occurred close in time to the grant of

 9 summary judgment. Horton contends that the district court improperly (1) compelled

10 Horton to reveal privileged communications regarding Horton’s reasoning for

11 allegedly delaying a request for Trinity to defend (the Tender Communications); and

12 (2) refused to compel Trinity to reveal information regarding the “claims

13 investigation” conducted by Trinity’s outside counsel (the OC Documents). We

14 review discovery rulings for abuse of discretion and “[t]o the extent a discretionary

15 decision is premised on a construction of a privilege, it presents a question of law,

16 subject to de novo review.” See Pina v. Espinoza, 2001-NMCA-055, ¶ 12, 130 N.M.

17 661, 29 P.3d 1062.

18 {28}   “A client may claim attorney-client privilege to refuse to disclose confidential

19 communications between certain persons if the communications were made for the

20 purpose of acquiring legal advice for the client.” Santa Fe Pac. Gold Corp. v. United

                                             24
 1 Nuclear Corp., 2007-NMCA-133, ¶ 13, 143 N.M. 215, 175 P.3d 309 (citing Rule

 2 11-503(B) NMRA). Attorney-client privilege has four elements: “(1) a

 3 communication (2) made in confidence (3) between privileged persons (4) for the

 4 purpose of facilitating the attorney’s rendition of professional legal services to the

 5 client.” Id. ¶ 14. The party claiming the privilege has the burden to establish “a

 6 communication is protected as an exception to the ordinary rule” that “the public has

 7 a right to every man’s evidence.” Id. ¶ 13 (internal quotation marks and citation

 8 omitted). With these principles in mind, we consider the Tender Communications

 9 followed by the OC Documents.

10 A.     Horton Did Not Carry Its Burden to Demonstrate That the Tender
11        Communications Were Privileged

12 {29}   In order to investigate Horton’s motives for waiting to request a defense from

13 Trinity, Trinity sought discovery and eventually filed a motion to compel. The

14 district court granted Trinity’s motion, and on appeal, Horton argues that the district

15 court improperly compelled production because (1) Trinity’s request was

16 insufficiently specific; (2) the requested information was not relevant; (3) the

17 information was privileged legal—and not business—advice; and (4) Horton did not

18 waive the privilege. Because we conclude that Horton did not meet the burden to

19 establish that the documents were privileged, we do not address waiver.

20 {30}   We disagree with Horton’s first contention that Trinity’s motion did not

21 “identif[y] the request at issue or the specific documents sought” and did not attach

                                             25
 1 the discovery request in contention as required by Rule 1-037 NMRA. See

 2 Albuquerque J. v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Schs., 2019-NMCA-012, ¶ 15,

 3 436 P.3d 1 (“An abuse of discretion occurs when a ruling is clearly contrary to the

 4 logical conclusions demanded by the facts and circumstances of the case.” (internal

 5 quotation marks and citation omitted)). Trinity attached the requests for production

 6 to the motion, as well as portions of Horton’s privilege log, and sought to compel

 7 Horton to produce a witness to answer questions “that relate[] discretely to the tender

 8 of defense issues.” The district court noted that Trinity’s requests were “very broad”

 9 and exercised its discretion to narrow and specify the information sought because

10 some of the documents “may be legitimate privileges as asserted.” Because the

11 district court narrowed the request, Horton demonstrates no prejudice from any

12 failure by Trinity to sufficiently identify the requested information in the motion to

13 compel, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in compelling production.

14 See Doe v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Boise, Inc., 1996-NMCA-057, ¶ 21, 121 N.M.

15 738, 918 P.2d 17 (explaining that Rule 1-026(C) NMRA “invests the trial court with

16 the authority to reasonably limit discovery; therefore, it is incumbent upon [the

17 objecting party] to demonstrate that the limitation constituted an abuse of discretion

18 so as to prejudice [the party’s] case”).

19 {31}   As to Horton’s second contention, that the Tender Communications are not

20 relevant to the subject matter of the case, we have already determined that disputed

                                              26
 1 material facts prevented summary judgment on Trinity’s defense based on Horton’s

 2 alleged breach of the duty to provide notice and Horton’s claim for breach of the

 3 duty to defend, including whether Horton by its actions declined a defense. Thus,

 4 even though the fact-finder might determine that Trinity breached the duty to defend,

 5 which would put the notice defense out of Trinity’s reach, the information “appears

 6 reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” and therefore

 7 falls within the “scope of discovery”—provided that the information is “not

 8 privileged.” See Rule 1-026(B)(1).

 9 {32}   Turning to privilege, Horton’s arguments relate to two types of Tender

10 Communications: those between Horton’s in-house counsel and outside counsel

11 (Counsel Communications) and those between outside counsel and other entities

12 (Entity Communications). Horton’s argument regarding Counsel Communications

13 relates to Bhandari v. Artesia General Hospital, in which we explained that “[t]he

14 privilege protects communications generated or received by an attorney giving legal

15 advice but does not protect communications derived from an attorney giving

16 business advice or acting in some other capacity.” 2014-NMCA-018, ¶ 12, 317 P.3d

17 856 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Horton points to evidence that

18 the Counsel Communications were solely legal. Horton, however, also produced an

19 affidavit from in-house counsel stating that “the decisions regarding the tenders of

20 the defense of the Underlying Litigations and Arbitrations were a combination of

                                            27
 1 business and legal considerations, and the business considerations were integrally

 2 intertwined with the legal considerations and therefore cannot be discussed without

 3 disclosing attorney-client privileged information.” Horton argues that any legal

 4 purpose should shield the communication, but Bhandari forecloses that approach.

 5 {33}   This Court in Bhandari concluded that “a court faced with a situation where

 6 the primary purpose of a communication is not clearly legal or business advice

 7 should conclude the communication is for a business purpose, unless evidence

 8 clearly shows that the legal purpose outweighs the business purpose.” Id. ¶ 18. The

 9 evidence presented established an admittedly mixed purpose. Horton points to no

10 evidence to demonstrate that the legal purpose “clearly” outweighs the business

11 purpose. The district court applied the correct legal standard to decide the privilege

12 question, and the evidence presented supported the district court’s conclusion that

13 Horton did not meet the burden to establish the privilege. Under these circumstances,

14 we discern no abuse of discretion. See id. ¶ 9 (reviewing de novo whether the

15 appropriate standard for privilege was applied and concluding that the evidence

16 supported the district court’s determination as to whether the communications were

17 business or legal advice).

                                             28
 1 {34}   Horton additionally argues that the Entity Communications were protected by

 2 the common interest privilege. 2 Attorney-client privilege “may be established by

 3 demonstrating that the communication occurred ‘between the client or client’s

 4 lawyer and another lawyer representing another in a matter of common interest.’”

 5 Albuquerque J., 2019-NMCA-012, ¶ 19 (alteration omitted) (quoting Rule 11-

 6 503(B)(3)). Horton points to affidavits that it argues demonstrate an agreement

 7 between Horton, Acadia, and BITCO regarding “a cooperative and common

 8 enterprise towards an identical legal strategy” for the homeowner claims. The party

 9 asserting the common interest privilege, however, must establish a factual basis for

10 two additional elements, in addition to an agreement. Id. Assuming that Horton’s

11 affidavits establish a preexisting or contemporaneous agreement of the parties,

12 Horton does not demonstrate that the agreement reflected a “shared identical legal

13 interest” or that the protected communications were each “made during the course

14 of a joint defense effort between the resisting party and the third party and in

15 furtherance of that effort.” See id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

16 As a result, Horton did not meet “the burden of proving all elements of the privilege

17 as to each communication claimed to be privileged.” See id.

          Horton refers also to the work product doctrine and the mediation privilege—
          2

   two separate protections from discovery with separate analyses and controlling facts.
   We decline to address either as these protections are raised in two sentences without
   application of the cited law, Rule 11-503(B)(3) and NMSA 1978, Section 44-7B-4
   (2007), to the facts of the present case.

                                            29
 1 B.     Horton Did Not Meet the Burden to Compel Production of the OC
 2        Documents

 3 {35}   Last, Horton argues that the district court should have compelled Trinity to

 4 identify the documents that Trinity sent to outside counsel in order to facilitate

 5 investigation of Acadia’s 2014 notice of claim and to produce unredacted

 6 communications between Trinity’s adjustors and outside counsel. Horton does not

 7 appear to contend the OC Documents were not privileged. As a result, Horton once

 8 again bore the burden to show that either the documents should have been compelled

 9 or the communications unredacted. See Santa Fe Pac. Gold Corp., 2007-NMCA-

10 133, ¶ 25 (placing the burden on the party seeking the documents after a prima facie

11 case for privilege is made).

12 {36}   As to the request to identify documents, Trinity notes that it had no list of the

13 documents that were provided to outside counsel and the entire claims file was

14 produced to Horton. In reply, Horton asserted that the district court should have

15 compelled Trinity to “confirm” outside counsel’s testimony that he delivered his file

16 to Trinity. We see no prejudice, and therefore no abuse of discretion, in the district

17 court’s denial of Horton’s motion to “confirm” outside counsel’s testimony about

18 which documents were reviewed. See Doe, 1996-NMCA-057, ¶ 21.

19 {37}   As to the redaction of documents, Horton argues that (1) any privilege

20 associated with the communications between Trinity’s adjustors and outside counsel

21 was waived because Trinity seeks to rely in good faith on outside counsel’s advice;

                                             30
 1 (2) attorney-client privilege does not shield communications that are relevant to the

 2 insurer’s bad faith; and (3) Horton nevertheless has “substantial need” for the

 3 material. Trinity, however, has stipulated that it does not intend to assert a reliance-

 4 on-counsel defense and instead points to retaining counsel only as a step performed

 5 to investigate. Horton contends that this distinction makes no difference, but because

 6 Trinity does not intend to justify its decision not to defend by relying on counsel’s

 7 advice, Trinity has not waived the privilege in this respect. See Pub. Serv. Co. of

 8 N.M. v. Lyons, 2000-NMCA-077, ¶ 23, 129 N.M. 487, 10 P.3d 166 (requiring

 9 “offensive or direct use of privileged materials before the party will be deemed to

10 have waived its attorney-client privileges”). We are further unpersuaded by the out-

11 of-state authority that Horton cites for the proposition that attorney-client privilege

12 should not prevent discovery in bad faith cases. See, e.g., Boone v. Vanliner Ins. Co.,

13 744 N.E.2d 154, 211-12 (Ohio 2001) (“The issue before us is whether, in an action

14 alleging bad faith denial of insurance coverage, the insured is entitled to obtain,

15 through     discovery,    claims    file   documents      containing    attorney-client

16 communications and work product that may cast light on whether the denial was

17 made in bad faith.”). An insurer’s good faith beliefs regarding coverage have no

18 bearing on the duty to defend analysis. See Dove, 2017-NMCA-051, ¶ 13 (explaining

19 that “a good faith belief” that the insured is not covered “is not a defense to the

20 breach of the duty to defend” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). We

                                              31
 1 conversely cannot justify invading the privilege when evidence of the insurer’s good

 2 or bad faith is not at issue. And truly last, Horton’s reference to a “substantial need”

 3 invokes an exception to the work product doctrine and not attorney-client

 4 privilege—the two are distinct and separate. See Santa Fe Pac. Gold Corp., 2007-

 5 NMCA-133, ¶ 38. Horton has not contested that the OC Documents are privileged

 6 and therefore, we need not consider the separate work product doctrine and its

 7 exceptions.

 8 {38}   Under the facts of the present case and based on the arguments raised on

 9 appeal, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion by denying

10 Horton’s motion to compel the OC Documents.

11 CONCLUSION

12 {39}   For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand

13 for further proceedings.

14 {40}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

15                                         __________________________________
16                                         KATHERINE A. WRAY, Judge

17 WE CONCUR:

18 _________________________________
19 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge

20 _________________________________
21 GERALD E. BACA, Judge

                                              32