Court Opinion

ID: 9772732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:28:11.959896+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:47.631427
License: Public Domain

*643
ORDER DENYING REHEARING

PER CURIAM.
In this case, Sprint has requested a rehearing. It argues that the Court has overruled prior authority without acknowledgment. We respectfully disagree. As our opinion carefully pointed out, longstanding precedent supports the proposition that two causes of action are available under the inverse condemnation statute. Likewise, the decisions of this Court acknowledge the availability of punitive damages in trespass eases in the jury’s discretion.
Sprint also challenges the decision on the basis that landowners are limited to relief authorized by statute. It cites four eases,1 none of which have any application to this case. In Fritts v. Leech, 201 Tenn. 18, 296 S.W.2d 884 (1956), a landowner brought suit against the state highway department. The sovereign immunity doctrine prohibited the landowner from seeking redress not specifically allowed by statute. See Tenn. Const. art. I, § 17. Likewise, in Zirkle v. City of Kingston, 217 Tenn. 210, 396 S.W.2d 356 (1965) and Monday v. Knox County, 220 Tenn. 313, 417 S.W.2d 536 (1967), property owners were limited in suits against governmental entities to that authorized by statute in derogation of constitutional sovereign immunity. Each of these eases stands for the elementary proposition that landowners with adequate legal remedies cannot seek extraordinary equitable ones. The principle which Sprint contends is deduced from these cases is incorrect.2
Finally, Sprint attacks two so-called factual findings in the opinion. Sprint’s concern that the Court has “found facts” against it is unfounded. The Court resolved only the propriety of the lower court’s decisions on motions to dismiss. It did not determine issues of fact, nor direct that trial court’s subsequent actions except as to the availability of a class action and, in an appropriate case, of punitive damages.
For all these reasons, the petition for rehearing is denied.

. The fourth case relied upon, Pleasant View Utility District v. Vradenburg, 545 S.W.2d 733 (Tenn.1977), is totally inapposite as it deals with the statute of limitations and proper forum for a statutory condemnation action.

. Equally unsupported is Sprint’s claim that the Court overruled Doty v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 123 Tenn. 329, 130 S.W. 1053 (1910). Again, petitioner incorrectly states the holding of the case which was, in fact, a dismissal of an ejectment action on statute of limitations grounds. The court’s holding concerned the telephone companies' rights to take for internal improvements under eminent domain proceedings. In dismissing the ejectment proceeding which was time barred, the court commented in dicta that the landowner was limited to a statutory remedy. Other cases cited and discussed in the opinion have clarified that over-simplification.