Court Opinion

ID: 9695729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:28:17.71996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:15.845720
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Justice,
dissenting and concurring.
I respectfully dissent.
The majority distinguishes Levey v. N.D. Workers Compensation Bureau, 425 N.W.2d 376 (N.D.1988), which upheld a Bureau decision to award vocational rehabilitation benefits for two years rather than four years because the “extent of pre-inju-ry earning capacity to which a claimant is entitled to be restored was not raised by Levey in his brief or in the petition for rehearing” and was not addressed in that opinion. The issue may not have been presented in precisely the manner conceptualized by the majority opinion but Levey did observe that the Bureau normally awards only two years of vocational rehabilitation benefits; that Levey was informed prior to enrolling in a four-year program that the Bureau normally grants only two years of vocational-rehabilitation benefits; and that there are numerous two-year-degree programs for persons interested in mathematics and science which would *265qualify a person for employment. I believe that Levey controls this case also and I disagree with the rationale employed by the majority to reach a desired result.
My major disagreement with the majority opinion involves its conclusion that under applicable law an applicant may be entitled to four years of vocational rehabilitation. The Bureau normally grants only two years of vocational rehabilitation. Le-vey, supra. Chapter 65-05.1 was, as the majority notes, enacted in 1975. The Bureau is charged with its administration and it has interpreted the Act as requiring only two years of vocational rehabilitation. The interpretation of an agency charged with the administration of an Act is entitled to weight in construing the Act. Johnson v. Wells County Water Resource Bd., 410 N.W.2d 525 (N.D.1987). Furthermore, although it is not conclusive of the intent of the Legislature enacting the statutes, subsequent legislation, when it contains a clear sense of direction, may be considered in interpreting statutes. We can take that sense of direction in determining what legal concept or principal of law should be applied [Jerry Harmon Motors v. Farmers U. Grain Term., 337 N.W.2d 427 (N.D.1983)], and, absent anything contrary, it also indicates that the interpretation was in accord with earlier public policy [Davis v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 420 N.W.2d 347 (N.D.1988) ]. Thus we have considered subsequent amendments to a statute in ascertaining the legislative intent and purpose of a prior version of a statute. State ex rel. Spaeth v. Eddy Furniture Co., 386 N.W.2d 901 (N.D.1986).
Here, the “clear sense of direction” is unmistakably obvious. The 1989 Legislature amended Section 65-05.1-06.1(2)(b), N.D.C.C., to provide that the rehabilitation allowance must be limited to one hundred four weeks, except in cases of catastrophic injury which is defined therein, and Smith’s injuries are not within that definition. That amendment comports exactly with the Bureau’s interpretation of the 1975 enactment.
The majority opinion ignores these obvious indicia of legislative intent and relies on one sentence, taken out of context, from the drafter’s notes to the bill which created the 1975 law, to wit: “The term ‘comprehensive rehabilitation services’ is the key to this bill. It is quite evident that the Bureau must supply more than simply vocational training in- the area of rehabilitation.” But that comment does not support the result reached by the majority. Rather, its obvious reference is to the last sentence of Section 65-05.1-01, prior to the 1989 amendment, which states that the services the claimant is to receive are to include “medical, psychological, economic, and social rehabilitation.” It is thus apparent, as the drafter stated, that the Bureau must supply more than vocational training in the area of rehabilitation. It must also supply medical, psychological, and social rehabilitation.
The majority opinion imposes an entire standard which the Bureau would have to meet in rehabilitation cases, but for the 1989 legislation, which I believe was not required or even contemplated by the Legislature. I disagree with much of that standard. One of the most glaring deficiencies is the adoption by the majority of Smith’s claim that the “accountants have a rule of thumb that considers anything above 10 percent to be material.” The majority concludes that “absent a contrary suggestion from the Bureau, we will apply this ‘10 percent rule’ and conclude that a claimant is substantially rehabilitated if he can be employed to within 10 percent of his pre-injury earning capacity.” There is little in the record, other than Smith’s claim that anything above 10 percent is material, to support his position. The majority opinion is a good example of what may happen when a court sets out to formulate the policies under which an agency endowed by the Legislature with certain functions is to operate. What the majority refers to as a “rule of thumb” on one page of the opinion becomes the “10 percent rule” on the next page!
Significantly, there is an inconsistency in ignoring the 1989 legislation limiting the period of education to two years and yet relying on the 1989 legislation amending Section 65-05.1-01(3) to conclude that the *266rehabilitation is to return the disabled worker to substantial gainful employment as measured by the worker’s average weekly earnings at the time of the injury. Those two provisions should be used together, as the Legislature intended, or not used at all. It is evident that if the two-year “cap” applied to exactly the factual situation represented in the record before us, Smith would not be entitled to four years of education even though the two years, according to the record as interpreted by the majority opinion, would not result in employment which produces Smith’s average weekly earnings at the time of the injury. Section 65-05.1-01(3), upon which the majority relies, is a statement of objective and it provides for a goal which will return the worker “as nearly as possible to the worker’s average weekly earnings at the time of injury, or to the average weekly wage in this state on the date the rehabilitation consultant’s report is issued under section 65-05.1-02.1, whichever is less.” However, under the same 1989 legislation the rehabilitation award is governed by Section 65-05.1-06.1(2)(c), which limits the allowance to 104 weeks, and there is no doubt that such specific limitation controls the other general objectives. Therefore, it is wrong to use the formula for calculating earning capacity as set forth in the 1989 legislation without also using the limitation that, too, is a part of the 1989 legislation. When two statutes relating to the same subject matter appear to be in conflict they should, whenever possible, be construed to give effect to both if that can be done without doing violence to either. O’Fallon v. Pollard, 427 N.W.2d 809 (N.D.1988). Here, the majority would violate the 104-week limitation.
Without the absolute limitation contained in the 1989 legislation there are two policies which may ultimately conflict, i.e., returning the employee to an earning capacity at least equivalent to what that employee earned prior to the injury while, at the same time, conserving the finite financial resources of the Bureau so that all eligible insured employees may receive benefits. Ordinarily an agency’s interpretation of the statute which represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies should not be disturbed by the courts. Heart v. Ellenbecker, 689 F.Supp. 988 (D.S.D.1988). We should apply that rule of restraint in this instance.
It is also inconsistent to observe that the conclusions drawn by Huss, the expert for the Bureau, are not properly before us for review but to draw inferences from selected conclusions which appear to support the result desired by the majority opinion and to ignore that evidence which would lead to the opposite result.
Finally, I must note that the Bureau, by its framing of its findings and conclusions, appears to have invited the very quest in which the majority has engaged. If the issue were solely whether or not Smith was going to be able to earn the same wage after a two-year rehabilitation program in accounting as he earned prior to his injury, I agree with the majority that the evidence indicates he would not. In that respect I agree that the finding of the Bureau that the “Claimant’s earning capacity following a 2 year vocational rehabilitation is substantially equivalent to, or higher than claimant’s pre-injury earnings capacity where he earned an average of $14,300.00 per year from 1974 through 1983” is not supported by the evidence and the conclusion that this two-year program is sufficient to rehabilitate his earning capacity to his pre-injury earning capacity is therefore incorrect. However, I do not believe this is, as the majority opinion appears to assume, the only standard. I believe the standard is, as stated elsewhere in the findings and conclusions of the Bureau, whether, considering the two-year limitation on rehabilitation, this program is sufficient for Smith to obtain salable and transferable skills for a return to employment which will, considering the limitation, give him a wage which restores as nearly as possible under the circumstances his average weekly earnings at the time of the injury. The Bureau in its findings and conclusions observed that Smith could be rehabilitated through various two-year vocational rehabilitation programs, some of which would provide the sam.e levels of income as he *267received prior to his injury and that the further an individual pursues vocational rehabilitation retraining the higher his earning capacity will be. It also observed that Smith made his vocational choice of his own volition, as he should be entitled to do. These findings and conclusions are unassailable and I would reverse the judgment of the district court and affirm the decision of the Bureau.
I concur in that portion of the majority opinion which concludes that Smith is not entitled to reimbursement for the expenses he incurred in relocating to Valley City to attend college.
GIERKE, J., concurs.