Court Opinion

ID: 9951004
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 15:17:25.552755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:53.094797
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                                No. 126,226

                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                            STATE OF KANSAS,
                                                Appellee,

                                                      v.

                                     ALEJANDRO NOEL BUSTILLOS,
                                             Appellant.

                                     MEMORANDUM OPINION

          Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; KEVIN M. SMITH, judge. Submitted without oral argument.
Opinion filed March 15, 2024. Affirmed.

          David L. Miller, of The Law Office of David L. Miller, of Wichita, for appellant.

          Boyd K. Isherwood, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Kris W.
Kobach, attorney general, for appellee.

Before GREEN, P.J., HILL and CLINE, JJ.

          PER CURIAM: In this appeal of his sentence, Alejandro Noel Bustillos argues the
sentencing court erred by imposing a modified prison sentence without first imposing
intermediate sanctions. Bustillos received probation rather than incarceration due to the
court granting a downward dispositional departure sentence. After his third probation
violation, the sentencing court revoked probation and sent him to prison. Our review of
the record leads us to conclude that the sentencing court properly exercised its discretion
to bypass intermediate sanctions and impose a modified prison sentence. Therefore, we
affirm.

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       Bustillos pled guilty to three felonies committed in April 2018:
       • Involuntary manslaughter – a severity level 4 person felony;
       • Leaving the scene of an accident – a severity level 6 person felony; and
       • Aggravated battery – a severity level 8 person felony.

       Bustillos caused a car accident that killed one person and injured another. He left
the scene, but police apprehended him later and conducted a blood exam. The results
revealed the presence of methamphetamine at levels that could impair Bustillos' driving.

       The State and Bustillos agreed to recommend a downward dispositional departure.
The State noted Bustillos' "good behavior in the two years since the incident and the
waiver of colorable factual and legal defenses." Bustillos received a downward
dispositional departure, resulting in a suspended prison term of 68 months, with 36
months of probation. The sentencing court granted the departure for several reasons:

       • He took responsibility;
       • The State agreed to a departure;
       • Availability of drug treatment; and
       • Bustillos' needed to support his family.

The record reveals a series of probation violations.

       Nearly a year later, Bustillos violated the terms of his probation by testing positive
for amphetamines and alcohol. Bustillos signed a waiver of rights and consented to serve
a 72-hour jail sanction.

       Then, about a year after the first violation, Bustillos violated the terms of his
probation a second time. The warrant alleged that Bustillos' urine samples tested positive
for amphetamines and methamphetamines and Bustillos failed to report a change in
employment status. Bustillos waived his right to a hearing and admitted the allegations

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listed in the warrant. Given this was his second probation violation, the sentencing court
ordered Bustillos to serve a three-day jail sanction and to obtain a drug and alcohol
evaluation.

       A few months after the second violation, another warrant alleged Bustillos
violated the terms of his probation for a third time. The allegation consisted of a signed
statement by Bustillos admitting to the use of methamphetamine. At the January 2023
probation revocation hearing, the sentencing court told Bustillos what possible sanctions
it could impose, including revoking probation due to the grant of a dispositional departure
sentence. See K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-3716(c)(9)(B).

       The sentencing court relied on the case history and previous probation violations
to conclude Bustillos posed a danger to others and himself because of his continued
methamphetamine use. Thus, the court revoked Bustillos' probation and ordered him to
serve a modified prison term, reducing the original 68-month term to 60 months.

The rules that guide us are well established law.

       Once a probation violation is established, a district court has discretion to revoke
probation unless the court is otherwise limited by statute. State v. Tafolla, 315 Kan. 324,
328, 508 P.3d 351 (2022). If a probation violation and an exception to the intermediate
sanctions requirement are established, a district court has discretion in determining
whether to continue or to revoke the probation and require the defendant to serve the
underlying prison sentence. State v. Brown, 51 Kan. App. 2d 876, 879-80, 357 P.3d 296
(2015), rev. denied 304 Kan. 1018 (2016). A judicial action constitutes an abuse of
discretion if (1) arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) based on a legal error; or (3)
based on a factual error. State v. Levy, 313 Kan. 232, 237, 485 P.3d 605 (2021). The party
alleging an abuse of discretion has the burden of proving its existence. See State v.
Anderson, 291 Kan. 849, 855, 249 P.3d 425 (2011).

                                               3
       Bustillos advances three arguments on appeal.

       First, he argues that the sentencing court erred as a matter of law by leaving out
the possible 120- or 180-day intermediate sanction option during the court's recitation of
possible sanctions. In support, Bustillos points to the sentencing court's reference in the
journal entry to K.S.A. 22-3716(c)(7) as authority for revoking Bustillos' probation,
citing public safety and offender welfare reasons. Because that section does not refer to
the public safety and offender welfare exception, Bustillos claims that the court
incorrectly applied the 2019 amendments to the statute.

       Bustillos then suggests that the sentencing court abused its discretion because the
court "fail[ed] to appreciate the existence of the discretion it could exercise under the
2017 version of K.S.A. 22-3716." Finally, Bustillos asserts that the sentencing court's
"failure to exercise the discretion it had or even recognize it had the discretion to exercise
in this regard is itself an abuse of discretion."

The sentencing court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Bustillos' probation.

       Under the probation revocation statute in effect when Bustillos committed his
crime, K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-3716, once a sentencing court determines an offender
violated the terms of probation, graduated sanctions are required before revoking
probation and imposing the prison sentence. Four exceptions exist, however, that allow
the court to bypass intermediate sanctions if:

       1. The offender commits a new crime while on probation;
       2. The offender absconds from supervision;
       3. The district court finds and sets forth with particularity the reasons for
          finding that the safety of members of the public will be jeopardized or
          that the welfare of the offender will not be served by imposing
          intermediate sanctions; or

                                                4
       4. The offender originally received probation as the result of the grant of a
          dispositional departure. K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-3716(c)(5), (8), and (9).

See Tafolla, 315 Kan. at 328-29.

       Tafolla controls here. In that case, the sentencing court revoked probation after
Tafolla violated the terms of his probation a second time. While Tafolla only received
one prior intermediate sanction – a two-day jail sanction – our Supreme Court affirmed
the revocation of Tafolla's probation. Relying on the plain language of the statute, the
Supreme Court held that a court's reference to a departure sentence is enough to invoke
the exception. Tafolla, 315 Kan. at 325-26.

       The Tafolla court also held that a sentencing court need not expressly invoke the
dispositional departure exception to bypass intermediate sanctions under the statute. 315
Kan. at 330. Additionally, a defendant challenging the sentencing court's decision must
show that "the court was unaware of its discretionary powers or refused to analyze the
factors relevant to a discretionary decision." (Emphasis added.) 315 Kan. at 332. See also
State v. Stewart, 306 Kan. 237, 262, 393 P.3d 1031 (2017) (a court abuses its discretion
by failing to exercise it).

       Considering the court's ruling in Tafolla, it appears the sentencing court did not
abuse its discretion here. Bustillos received probation because of a dispositional
departure. The sentencing court acknowledged as much during its colloquy with Bustillos
at the probation revocation hearing:

       "I could extend your probation. And, in this case, since Judge Woolley [the original
       sentencing judge] actually -- I believe it was Judge Woolley, that he had dispositionally
       departed, so because of that, I could revoke your probation and order you to complete
       your underlying prison sentence." (Emphasis added.)

                                                   5
       While not expressly invoked, the sentencing court did acknowledge its discretion
to bypass intermediate sanctions under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-3716(c)(9)(B). Because the
sentencing court adhered to the proper statutory framework and the holding in Tafolla,
this court should affirm. See State v. Patton, 315 Kan. 1, 16, 503 P.3d 1022 (2022) (The
Kansas Court of Appeals is duty-bound to follow Kansas Supreme Court precedent
unless there is some indication that the Supreme Court is departing from its previous
position).

Conclusion

       The Legislature has given district courts broad discretion to hear probation
violation allegations, make factual findings, and impose reasonable sanctions under the
statutory framework of K.S.A. 22-3716. The sentencing court here reasonably exercised
this authority when it revoked Bustillos' probation and imposed a modified prison
sentence because Bustillos originally received probation due to a dispositional departure.
Given the reference to Bustillos' dispositional departure, we hold that the sentencing
court did not abuse its discretion when it bypassed intermediate sanctions and imposed
the modified sentence.

       Affirmed.

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