Court Opinion

ID: 9542463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:34:40.801302+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:08:01.190258
License: Public Domain

BROWN, J., Dissenting.
I would hold the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense forfeited by a defendant if not raised in the trial court. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I have already delineated what I perceive to be compelling considerations weighing in favor of a forfeiture rule in Cowan v. Superior Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 367, 383-393 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 458, 926 P.2d 438] (conc. and dis. opn. of Brown, J.). There is no need to reiterate those factors here. Rather, I simply note the reasons I remain unpersuaded by the majority’s conclusion.
The majority contends “[cheating a new forfeiture rule would be bad policy” because the “statute of limitations, when applicable, completely bars the prosecution. To allow defendants to lose the protection of the limitation accidentally could mean that persons could languish in prison under convictions that could not have occurred had they merely thought of the statute of limitations in time.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 341.) This is arguably true of any meritorious defense. Nevertheless, in our justice system we require defendants to affirmatively raise defenses for full exploration in the trial court. The same should obtain here. More importantly, a defendant who fails to raise the statute of limitations and is convicted of the underlying offense is not *348made less culpable of that offense because the time for prosecution may have run. The statute of limitations “ ‘constitutes no part of the crime itself.’ ” (People v. Crosby (1962) 58 Cal.2d 713, 723 [25 Cal.Rptr. 847, 375 P.2d 839].) Rather, it is simply a policy determination by the Legislature. Accordingly, failure to raise such a defense is similar to the failure to challenge the legality of a search, the peremptory strikes of a prosecutor, the voluntariness of a confession, or prosecutorial misconduct. In all of these cases, we have held that the failure to object or otherwise raise the issue generally forfeits the claim on appeal. (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 136 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 275, 973 P.2d 52]; People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 171-172 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521]; People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1072 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40], overruled on other grounds in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673]; People v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 172 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 852 P.2d 331].)
The majority concedes most jurisdictions have rejected what it calls California’s “former approach.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 341.) As a preliminary matter, by concluding defendant can raise the statute of limitations at any time, the majority does not stray far from McGee’s jurisdictional holding. (People v. McGee (1934) 1 Cal.2d 611, 613 [36 P.2d 378]; see maj. opn., ante, at pp. 339, 340.) Moreover, the majority does not discuss the validity of the analytical underpinnings that prompted some of these jurisdictions to adopt a forfeiture rule. Rather, whatever the justification for such a rule in law and reason, the majority claims such a rule would be “futil[e]” because defendants will simply achieve the same result by making a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 342.)
We have wisely rejected such fatalistic reasoning before. In People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627, 885 P.2d 1040], we held that complaints regarding the manner in which the trial court exercises its sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting reasons were forfeited unless challenged at the time of sentencing. (Id. at pp. 348, 356.) In response to the defendant’s argument that such a forfeiture rule would not promote judicial economy because any sentencing error would simply be raised on habeas corpus, presumably under the rubric of ineffective assistance of counsel, we said; “Taken to its extreme, . . . this argument would theoretically excuse the defense from objecting to any error committed during a criminal trial, including evidentiary error. Existing law does not support so radical a view. The point is that by encouraging counsel to intervene at the time sentencing choices are made, we hope to reduce the number of issues raised in the reviewing court in any form.” (Id. at p. 356, fn. 18, original italics.) Similarly, a forfeiture rule in the statute of limitations context *349encourages defendant and defense counsel to decide before or during trial whether to assert the defense.
Moreover, under the majority’s approach, a facially valid statute of limitations claim results in per se reversal. Under a forfeiture rule, a defendant’s collateral attack must do far more than merely incant the words “statute of limitations” for a conviction to be reversed. A defendant must demonstrate the attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-2065, 2068-2069, 80 L.Ed.2d 674].) Here, for example, the Attorney General asserts two reasons why the statute of limitations does not bar the conviction. Thus, the “tactical reason” for not seeking to have the charge dismissed was perhaps that there was no meritorious statute of limitations defense. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 342.) Defendant was sentenced to only three years in prison, and given credit at sentencing for over two years. By waiting to assert the claim on appeal, defendant gambled that either his conviction would be reversed outright, or reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, a hearing the People at that point might well decline to pursue. (See People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 758 [170 Cal.Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837]; People v. Morgan (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 32, 35-38 [141 Cal.Rptr. 863]; People v. Rose (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 415, 417-418 [104 Cal.Rptr. 702].) In any event, because defendants often have valid strategic reasons for not raising the statute of limitations, there is no reason to believe ineffective assistance of counsel claims would be any more successful or automatic in the statute of limitations context than in any of the many other areas in which we routinely apply forfeiture rules.
More critically, in cases involving lesser included offenses which are time-barred, the “possible tactical reason” for not raising the statute of limitations is obvious. Under the majority’s “nonforfeiture” rule, a defendant could remain silent in the hope he would be convicted of the lesser included offense. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 342.) If so, on appeal he could assert the statute of limitations and have the conviction reversed. For example, in People v. Rose, supra, 28 Cal.App.3d at page 416, the defendant was charged with murder. The trial court instructed the jury on both murder and the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter. (Ibid.) After the defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, the Court of Appeal, on its own motion, reversed the conviction on statute of limitations grounds. (Id. at pp. 416-418.) The court acknowledged that “the state of the record may be the result of defense strategy pointed at preventing the jury from having to choose between murder and acquittal.” (Id. at p. 417.) Nonetheless, citing *350People v. McGee, supra, 1 Cal.2d 611, the court concluded that “the conviction is jurisdictionally defective and must be reversed.” (People v. Rose, supra, 28 Cal.App.3d at p. 417.) In People v. Morgan, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d at pages 35-37, the Court of Appeal reached a similar conclusion with respect to an involuntary manslaughter conviction. These same results will obtain under the majority’s rule. Thus the majority’s assertion that they “see no significant potential for gamesmanship or sandbagging when the defendant is convicted of a charged offense that the charging document indicates is untimely,” is nothing short of myopic. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 346, fn. omitted.) While the majority attempts to leave to another day the question of lesser included offenses (id., at p. 346), the implications of the rule it affirms are in fact unavoidable.
Along these lines, the majority contends that “our long-standing rule requiring the prosecution to file a charging document that is not, on its face, time-barred . . . encourages the parties to focus on the issue at that level.” (Maj. opn, ante, at p. 345, italics omitted.) This judge-made rule seems, however, inconsistent with the Legislature’s liberal pleading requirements. For example, Penal Code section 950 provides that an “accusatory pleading must contain” only the title of the action, specifying the name of the court and the parties, and “[a] statement of the public offense or offenses charged therein.” Similarly, Penal Code section 955 states, “The precise time at which the offense was committed need not be stated in the accusatory pleading, . . . except where the time is a material ingredient in the offense.” (Italics added.) While this court may have concluded that an allegation regarding the statute of limitations is “material,” such a conclusion appears inconsistent with its recognition that the statute of limitations “ ‘constitutes no part of the crime itself.’ ” (People v. Crosby, supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 723.) Indeed, the Legislature does not even require the prosecution to charge lesser included offenses; this court, however, requires not only their allegation, but a description of why they are not time-barred. (Pen. Code, § 1159; People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 118 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073].) The purpose of the charging document is to put the defendant on notice of what crimes he is accused of committing, not to litigate a particular defense. (See Pen. Code, § 952 [statement of offense may be “in any words sufficient to give the accused notice of the offense of which he is accused”]; People v. Ortega (1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 698 [80 Cal.Rptr.2d 489, 968 P.2d 48]; cf. People v. Chadd, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 758 [“An amendment adding allegations tolling the statute of limitations does not ‘change the offense charged’ ”].) Once a defendant is on notice of those crimes, he should be required to raise whatever defense is appropriate, including the statute of limitations.
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. I am disinclined to “perpetuate[] dubious law for no better reason than that it *351exists . . . (Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 696 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 386, 881 P.2d 1083] (dis. opn. of Arabian, J.).)