Court Opinion

ID: 9522794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:32:23.052158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:56.338775
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SIMON, specially concurring: I agree with the court’s conclusion that boiling water is included within the category of caustic substances as used in the heinous-battery provision, section 12 — 4.1(a) of the Criminal Code of 196,1 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 12 — 4.1(a)), and therefore I concur in the reversal of the appellate court’s holding reducing the conviction from heinous battery to aggravated battery. I also agree that the imposition of consecutive sentences was appropriate in this case, but for reasons different than those stated by the majority. Section 5 — 8—4(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 8—4(b)) provides: “(b) The court shall not impose a consecutive sentence unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and character of the defendant, it is of the opinion that such a term is required to protect the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant, the basis for which the court shall set forth in the record.” (Emphasis added.) The trial judge complied with the requirements of section 5 — 8—4(b). He reviewed in detail the factors which he believed warranted the imposition of consecutive sentences, emphasizing the results of a psychological evaluation contained within the report of the presentencing investigation. The court noted the defendant’s history of similar behavior and the need for intensive long-term psychotherapy and long-term confinement in light of the threat posed by defendant to society (101 v. 2d at 375). The trial judge could not have more directly addressed the issues raised by section 5 — 8—4(b) than he did without employing the “magic words” of the statute itself. As the majority appropriately notes (101 Ill. 2d at 375), we have recently stated: “What is required is that the record show that the sentencing court is of the opinion that a consecutive term is necessary for the protection of the public” (People v. Pittman (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 169, 178). There is no need to repeat the language of the statute verbatim. (93 Ill. 2d 169, 177-78.) Since I believe that the trial court complied with section 5 — 8—4(b), I find no reason to reach the holding of this court in People v. Davis (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 155, a conclusion with which I disagreed.