Court Opinion

ID: 9750841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:37:00.105056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:23.888229
License: Public Domain

AARON, J.—dissenting:
A. Introduction
The majority holds that it is reasonable, as a matter of law, for an elementary school to fail to supervise the after-school dismissal of a six-year-old first grader, allowing her to wander off school property and into the street to be hit by a car five minutes after the school bell rings. The majority further holds that an elementary school that has adopted specific policies and regulations governing the supervision of students after school including one entitled, “Students Left on Site After School Hours,” that requires school personnel to notify the principal, attempt to reach parents or guardians, and “[rjemain on site until an adult comes to retrieve the student” has not assumed responsibility for a child, such as Norma, who is not picked up by her parent or guardian immediately at dismissal time. Because I cannot agree that the school owed no duty to Norma under the circumstances of this case, I dissent.
*275B. South Bay Owed Norma a Duty of Care
California Supreme Court cases have “long established that a school district bears a legal duty to exercise reasonable care in supervising students in its charge and may be held liable for injuries proximately caused by the failure to exercise such care.” (Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City Sch. Dist. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 508, 513 [150 Cal.Rptr. 1, 585 P.2d 851] (Hoyem).) “The standard of due care imposed on school authorities in exercising their supervisorial responsibilities is that degree of care which a person of ordinary prudence, charged with comparable duties, would exercise under the same circumstances.” (Brownell v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 787, 795-796 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 756] (Brownell), citing Hoyem, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 513.)
In Hoyem, the court considered “whether, under California law, a school district may be held liable when, as a result of school authorities’ negligent supervision of students on school premises, a pupil leaves the school grounds during school hours and is subsequently injured by a motorist.” (Hoyem, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 511-512.) In concluding a school district could be liable under such circumstances, the court noted: “[N]o California decision suggests that when a school district fails to properly supervise a student on school premises, the district can automatically escape liability simply because the student’s ultimate injury occurs off school property. [Citation.] . . . [Sjchool districts must exercise reasonable care in supervising their pupils while the pupils are on school premises. A district may be held liable if its breach of that duty proximately causes a student’s injury.” (Id. at p. 515, italics added.)
It is also established that a school district may be liable when, as a result of a school’s failure to supervise students on school grounds after school, a student leaves the premises and is injured. (See Brownell, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at pp. 795-796.)
In Brownell, the Court of Appeal considered whether a high school owed a duty of care to a student who was shot by a gang member while waiting for a bus off school grounds, after school hours. The court concluded, “[A] school district may be held liable for injuries suffered by a student off school premises and after school hours where the injury resulted from the school’s negligence while the student was on school premises.” (Brownell, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 795.)
With particular relevance to this case, the Brownell court held that a school has a duty to exercise reasonable care in supervising the dismissal of students and specifically, in permitting students to leave school premises: “[T]he trial *276court properly instructed the jury: ‘School personnel are under a duty to adequately supervise students while those students are on school premises, and to exercise reasonable care in permitting students to leave school premises. A failure to perform these duties is negligence. A school district may be held liable for injuries to a student occurring off school premises, if the occurrence is a reasonably forseeable [szc] result of the conduct of school personnel on the school premises.’ ” (Brownell, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 796, fn. 3, italics added.)
Norma claims that South Bay “failed to supervise the students when school ended . . . .” It is undisputed that South Bay provides no supervision for students such as Norma, who are waiting for a parent or guardian to pick them up after school is dismissed. The accident occurred just five minutes after school ended for the day, when Norma left school property and entered the street.
In its briefs, South Bay acknowledges that it does in fact owe some duty of care to its students for a period of time after dismissal. South Bay asserts that it has taken “general precautions to minimize the risk of injuries to students after school” by providing a patrolled crosswalk and an after-school program, and also by explaining to parents that they must be on time to pick up their children at dismissal. Relying on Brownell, South Bay claims, “[tjhese general precautions show that South Bay satisfied its duty of care.” (Italics added.)
On the other hand, South Bay has argued both in the trial court and in this court that it had “no duty to supervise students after the close of the school day . . . .” However, in my view, the cases, cited above make it clear that a school’s duty to act reasonably with regard to the supervision of a six-year-old entrusted to its care does not end on the ringing of the final school bell. Under the express language of Brownell, South Bay was under a duty to “exercise reasonable care in permitting [Norma] to leave school premises.” It is a question of fact whether South Bay fulfilled that duty under the circumstances of this case. (Brownell, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 796, fn. 3.)
A reasonable juror could conclude that it was foreseeable that a six-year-old child, left unsupervised, might leave school grounds, enter the street adjacent to the school and be hit by a car, and could further conclude that precautions beyond those South Bay provided were warranted. A reasonable juror could conclude that in allowing Norma to leave school premises, the school failed to adequately supervise her. This is particularly so in view of Norma’s undisputed contention that school personnel knew she and her brother were to be picked up after school by car, by one of their parents or by their older sister.
*277Contrary to the majority opinion, the holding of Brownell was not limited to cases in which the school had “special knowledge of the potential for gang violence.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 270.) Rather, the duty the Brownell court articulated was “a duty to adequately supervise students while those students are on school premises, and to exercise reasonable care in permitting students to leave school premises.” (Brownell, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 796, fn. 3.) This is the very duty Norma contends exists, and was breached, in this case. If the high school in Brownell had such a duty toward its students, then certainly an elementary school owes at least the same duty of care to a first grader.
Even the majority seems to acknowledge that Brownell and other cases finding a duty of care for the safety of students off campus and after hours “arises from circumstances where school personnel did something on campus or failed in their supervisory duties on campus.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 270.) However, the majority fails to recognize that this is exactly what Norma alleges; she maintains that school personnel failed to properly supervise her while she was on campus, allowing her to wander into the street where she was hit by a car.
The majority incorrectly concludes that for Norma to prevail, the court would have to “construct a duty” to exercise reasonable care for the students’ safety “until the children have been safely picked up or perhaps safely returned home in the case of those who may walk home.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 270.) This is not Norma’s position, nor is it a correct statement of what this court would have to conclude to find in Norma’s favor. Norma does not propose that the court “construct” a new duty. Rather, the duty Norma asserts is one that is already established in the law—a duty on the part of a school to supervise students on school premises and to exercise reasonable care in allowing students to leave school premises. Norma, a six-year-old who school personnel knew was to be picked up by car by one of her parents or by her older sister, was allowed to leave school property unsupervised and walk into the street, where she was hit by a car just five minutes after school was dismissed. She alleges a failure on the part of school personnel to exercise reasonable care in supervising her on campus, not a failure to supervise her “on the public street [or] until . . . [she was] safely escorted home.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 270.)
The duty Norma alleges was breached—the duty to exercise reasonable care in allowing students to leave school premises—is one that is well established. In my view, whether the school satisfied its duty when it allowed a six-year-old child to leave school premises unsupervised is a question of fact for the jury.
*278C. South Bay Is Not Entitled to Immunity as a Matter of Law Pursuant to Education Code Section 44808
Education Code section 448081 provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, no school district, city or county board of education, county superintendent of schools, or any officer or employee of such district or board shall be responsible or in any way liable for the conduct or safety of any pupil of the public schools at any time when such pupil is not on school property, unless such district, board, or person has undertaken to provide transportation for such pupil to and from the school premises, has undertaken a school-sponsored activity off the premises of such school, has otherwise specifically assumed such responsibility or liability or has failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances, [f] In the event of such a specific undertaking, the district, board, or person shall be liable or responsible for the conduct or safety of any pupil only while such pupil is or should be under the immediate and direct supervision of an employee of such district or board.” (Italics added).
For the reasons that follow, I would conclude that South Bay was not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of the immunity provided in section 44808.
1. Section 44808 Does Not Provide Immunity for Injuries Resulting from Negligent Supervision on School Grounds
Under section 44808, a school district is not “liable for the conduct or safety of any pupil of the public schools at any time when such pupil is not on school property,” unless certain exceptions apply. In Hoyem, the California Supreme Court specifically rejected the “contention that the off-premises situs of [a student’s] injuries should absolve [a school district] of all responsibility,” pursuant to Education Code section 44808 when a student leaves school grounds because of negligent supervision. (Hoyem, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 516.) Instead, the court held that section 44808 does not in “any way limit[] a school district’s responsibility to supervise students during school hours on school premises.” (Hoyem, at p. 518.)
As in Hoyem, Norma alleges negligent supervision by school personnel on school grounds. Norma complains that as a result of the school’s failure to supervise her, she wandered into the street and was hit by a car. In my view, triable issues of fact exist as to whether there was negligent supervision on school property that led to Norma being injured in the public street adjacent to the school. Therefore, I would conclude, under Hoyem, that section 44808 does not provide immunity to South Bay as a matter of law under these circumstances.
*2792. There Are Triable Issues of Material Fact as to Whether South Bay Exercised Reasonable Care in Permitting Students to Leave School Premises
In Hoyem, the California Supreme Court also held that section 44808 does not provide immunity when a plaintiff alleges that a school district failed to exercise reasonable care in the exercise of its duty to supervise. “[T]he language of the statute itself specifies that its limitation on liability does not apply to the allegations of the instant complaint. Although the initial portion of the statute provides that ‘no school district shall be responsible ... for the conduct or safety of any pupil ... at any time when such pupil is not on school property,’ the section goes on explicitly to withdraw this grant of immunity whenever the school district, inter alia, 'has failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.’’ [Fn. omitted.] Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that the school district failed to exercise reasonable care. Assuming, as we must on appeal from a sustained demurrer, the truth of the allegations of the complaint [citations], section 44808, by its own terms, does not bar liability in the present case.” (Hoyem, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 517.)2
Further, the Hoyem court noted in the footnote omitted from the above quotation: “That the ‘reasonable care’ exception in the statute is not accidental is clear from the legislative history. The original bill, passed by the Assembly, was identical to the current statute but did not include the final phrase about reasonable care. That phrase was added by Senate amendment (4 Sen. J. (1972 Reg. Sess.) p. 6247) and then approved unanimously by the Assembly. (4 Assem. J. (1972 Reg. Sess.) p. 7049.) The intent of the Legislature is clear: when a school district fails to exercise reasonable care the immunity of this section evaporates.” (Hoyem, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 517, fn. 2, italics added.)
In this case, as in Hoyem, the plaintiff alleges that the school district failed to exercise reasonable care in the exercise of its duty to supervise its students. I would conclude that triable issues of material fact exist as to whether South Bay exercised reasonable care in the supervision of Norma, and accordingly, that pursuant to Hoyem, South Bay was not entitled to summary judgment under its affirmative defense of section 44808 immunity.
The majority concludes that the reasonable care exception to section 44808 immunity applies only to the failure to exercise reasonable care during one of *280the specified undertakings set forth in that statute. The majority’s conclusion directly conflicts with Hoyem. The breach of duty alleged in Hoyem was not tied to any of the specified undertakings in section 44808 and yet the Hoyem court held that the statute did not afford immunity. The majority’s conclusion also conflicts with the plain language of section 44808.
In the case relied on by the majority, Wolfe v. Dublin Unified School Dist. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 126 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 280], the Court of Appeal held that section 44808’s reasonable care exception to immunity applies only where a plaintiff alleges that a school failed to exercise reasonable care while conducting one of the specified undertakings set forth in section 44808. However, the Wolfe court itself recognized that its interpretation of section 44808 is contrary to the plain language of the statute and is also contrary to the holding in Hoyem. (Wolfe, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 129.)
Further, as the Hoyem court noted, the legislative history makes clear that the particular phrasing of the statute was intentional. (Hoyem, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 517.) While the Wolfe court expressed concern that section 44808 could be interpreted to mean that a “[school] is never liable in negligence, unless it acts negligently” (Wolfe, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 129), the legislative history suggests a possible reason why the legislature would have created such a broad exception to the immunity it imparted in section 44808 to clarify that teachers, and therefore school districts, were not to be held strictly liable for the conduct or safety of their students off campus. The legislative history notes that then existing law (§ 13557, current § 44807) provided that every teacher is to hold pupils to a “strict account” for their conduct on their way to and from school. (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Background Information on Assem. Bill No. 1326 (1972 Reg. Sess.) p. 1.) The statute provides that school districts will not be “responsible or in any way liable for the conduct or safety of any pupil . . . unless such district . . . has failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.” (§ 44808.)
The California Supreme Court’s holding in Hoyem is binding authority; the Court of Appeal’s contrary statement in Wolfe is not. (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937].) Accordingly, while the majority follows Wolfe, I believe we are bound by the Supreme Court’s decision in Hoyem. I would hold that South Bay was not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of section 44808 immunity because there are triable issues of material fact as to whether South Bay performed its duty to “exercise reasonable care in permitting students to leave school premises.” (Brownell, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 796, in. 3.)
*2813. There Are Triable Issues of Material Fact as to Whether South Bay Specifically Assumed Responsibility for Norma
In support of her opposition to South Bay’s motion for summary judgment, Norma submitted to the court specific school policies and administrative regulations which, in my view, raise at least a triable issue of material fact as to whether South Bay “specifically assumed . . . responsibility or liability” (§ 44808) for Norma’s care after the final dismissal bell rang. The majority ignores these policies and regulations, asserting, “the record is clear that South Bay has never undertaken to provide supervision for students who have been dismissed from school and who are awaiting their parents.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 272.)
South Bay administrative regulation AR-5142(a) provides in relevant part: “The principal of each school shall ensure that certificated employees, teacher aides or yard aides supervise the conduct and safety, and direct the play, of students of the school who are on school grounds before and after school, during recess, and during other intermissions.” (Italics added.) Although South Bay contends the school complied with this regulation by providing both a before-school program and an after-school program, the safety directive is neither expressly nor impliedly limited to providing supervision through such programs. On the contrary, the regulation broadly mandates that there “shall” be adult supervision of students after school, without any reference to whether students are in after-school programs or, instead, are waiting to be picked up after dismissal. A reasonable juror could conclude, on the basis of this administrative regulation alone, that South Bay “specifically assumed . . . responsibility or liability” (§ 44808) for children such as Norma, who are waiting for a parent or guardian to pick them up after dismissal. (South Bay admin, reg. AR-5142(a).)
In addition, South Bay has an administrative regulation, AR-5142(d), “Students Left On Site After School Hours,” which expressly sets forth procedures to be followed by school personnel when students remain on school property after dismissal. That policy provides in relevant part as follows:
“1. Notify the principal or designee immediately.
“2. Attempt to reach parents/guardians ....
“3. Remain on site until an adult comes to retrieve the student.
“4. Notify the Superintendent by 5 p.m. if there is a possibility that law enforcement may be called to assist the student.
*282“5. As a last resort, contact law enforcement who may remove the student.
“6. In cases of repeated incidents where parents/guardians have been late in picking up their child, notify the parents/guardians in writing of the parental responsibilities and consequences for their child.” (South Bay admin, reg. AR-5142(d).) By adopting this regulation, South Bay has plainly acknowledged that children should not simply be left alone on school grounds after school if a parent or guardian does not pick them up immediately at dismissal time.
The majority asserts that this policy, “does not state a plan, purpose or undertaking to deal with students who have left the school grounds.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 273.) However, the clear purpose of this policy is to ensure that students who are not promptly picked up after school is dismissed, as they are supposed to be, are not left unsupervised. The policy specifically refers to incidents where parents or guardians have been late in picking up their children, and requires school personnel to take action up to and including calling law enforcement authorities to assist such students.
Norma contends the school knew she was to be picked up by one of her parents or by her older sister, and South Bay does not dispute this assertion. Norma maintains she was left unsupervised immediately after school was dismissed, and that as a result, she wandered into the street and was hit by a car. Under the majority’s opinion, the determination whether, under this policy, South Bay was responsible for Norma after school was dismissed would turn on the fortuity of whether she left school property or not. But this begs the question. South Bay should not be allowed to escape liability on the ground that Norma was injured in the public street and not on school grounds when the school may be responsible for having improperly allowed her to leave the school grounds in the first place.
I would conclude that there is at least a triable issue of material fact as to whether South Bay “specifically assume[d] . . . responsibility or liability” for Norma under the circumstances of this case. (§ 44808.) In my view, the majority’s conclusion to the contrary is untenable.
D. Conclusion
I would hold that South Bay had a duty to supervise Norma while she was on school grounds after school, and to exercise reasonable care in permitting her to leave school premises. In my view, whether South Bay fulfilled its duty to Norma is a question of fact to be resolved at trial.
*283Further, I would conclude that section 44808 does not provide South Bay with immunity as a matter of law because there are triable issues of material fact as to whether there was negligent supervision on school grounds, whether school personnel failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances, and whether, by adopting policies and regulations pertaining to the supervision of children after school, South Bay specifically assumed responsibility for Norma under the circumstances of this case.

 All statutory references are to the Education Code, unless otherwise specified.

 (See also Stockinger v. Feather River Community College (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1014 [4 Cal.Rptr.3d 385, 400]; Brownell, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 795; Perna v. Conejo Valley Unified School Dist. (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 292, 296 [192 Cal.Rptr. 10] [all stating that Hoyem holds that section 44808 does not apply where a school has failed to use reasonable care in exercising a duty owed to students].)