Court Opinion

ID: 9408591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-13 15:00:42.377723+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:45.006202
License: Public Domain

21-2647
     Killoran v. Westhampton Beach UFSD

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                           SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING
A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1                  At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held
 2   at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
 3   on the 13th day of July, two thousand twenty-three.
 4
 5   PRESENT:
 6               MYRNA PÉREZ,
 7               ALISON J. NATHAN,
 8               MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN,
 9                     Circuit Judges.
10   ____________________________________________
11
12   Christian Killoran,
13
14                          Plaintiff-Appellant,
15
16   Terrie Killoran, individually and on behalf of
17   their son, A.K., a minor,
18
19                          Plaintiff,
20
21                  v.                                                          No. 21-2647
22
23   Westhampton Beach UFSD, Michael Radday,
24   Superintendent, Suzanne Mensch, James N. Hulme,
25   Halsey C. Stevens, Joyce L. Donneson, George R.
26   Kast, as Board of Education Members,
27
28                     Defendants-Appellees.
29   ___________________________________________
30

                                                      1
 1            FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:                                          CHRISTIAN KILLORAN, pro se,
 2                                                                              Killoran Law P.C., Westhampton
 3                                                                              Beach, NY.
 4
 5            FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES:                                         SCOTT J. KREPPEIN, Devitt Spellman
 6                                                                              Barrett, LLP, Smithtown, NY, Anne
 7                                                                              Leahey, Anne Leahey Law, LLC,
 8                                                                              Huntington, NY.
 9

10            Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New

11   York (Seybert, J.).

12            UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

13   DECREED that the order of the district court is AFFIRMED.

14            This is one of three appeals related to a long-running dispute between Plaintiff-Appellant

15   Christian Killoran (“Plaintiff”) and the Westhampton Beach School District (“Westhampton”)

16   over the education of Plaintiff’s son, A.K., a young man who has Down syndrome. 1

17            Plaintiff, on behalf of A.K., appeals from an order entered on October 11, 2021 by the

18   United States District Court of the Eastern District of New York (Seybert, J.), awarding summary

19   judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees, Westhampton and various Westhampton officials and

20   members of the Westhampton Board of Education, in their individual and official capacities

21   (collectively, “Defendants”), on Plaintiff’s claims under the Individuals with Disabilities

22   Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. 2 In awarding summary judgment, the district

     1
      See Killoran v. Westhampton Beach Sch. Dist., No. 22-204 (2d Cir.); Killoran v. Westhampton Beach Sch. Dist., No.
     22-1753 (2d Cir.).
     2
       At the outset, we resolve Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s: a) notice of appeal and b) appendix, as it represents
     a challenge to our jurisdiction. The motion is DENIED. Defendants argue that the notice of appeal improperly
     designated an order rather than a judgment, but a notice of appeal must “designate the judgment—or the appealable
     order—from which the appeal is taken.” Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Further, “[a]n appeal must
     not be dismissed . . . for failure to properly designate the judgment if the notice of appeal was filed after entry of the
     judgment and designates an order that merged into that judgment.” Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(7). As for the appendix, this
                                                                 2
 1   court upheld the decision of a State Review Officer (“SRO”) that affirmed the findings of an

 2   Impartial Hearing Officer (“IHO”) that Defendants provided A.K. a free appropriate public

3    education (“FAPE”) in the least restrictive environment (“LRE”) for the 2018–2019 school year.

4    We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case,

5    and the issues on appeal, which we discuss only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

6             I.       Standard of Review

7             We review de novo a district court’s award of summary judgment in an IDEA action. Bd.

8    of Educ. of Yorktown Cent. Sch. Dist. v. C.S., 990 F.3d 152, 165 (2d Cir. 2021). “In a district court

 9   proceeding under the IDEA, the parties and the court typically style the decision as a ruling on a

10   motion for summary judgment, but ‘the procedure is in substance an appeal from an administrative

11   determination, not a summary judgment motion.’” Id. (quoting M.H. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 685

12   F.3d 217, 226 (2d Cir. 2012)). The district court must conduct “an independent review of the

13   administrative record and make a determination based on a preponderance of the evidence,” but

14   “the role of the federal courts in reviewing state educational decisions under the IDEA is

15   circumscribed.” Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2007)

16   (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts generally “defer to the final decision of the state

17   authorities, even where the reviewing authority disagrees with the hearing officer,” A.C. ex rel.

18   M.C. v. Bd. of Educ. of Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist., 553 F.3d 165, 171 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal

19   quotation marks omitted), and “[d]eference is particularly appropriate when . . . the state hearing

20   officers’ review has been thorough and careful,” Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d

21   119, 129 (2d Cir. 1998).

     Court has discretion to decline to strike a brief or appendix for failure to comply with the relevant rules. See Amnesty
     Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 133 (2d Cir. 2004). We decline to strike Plaintiff’s appendix.
                                                                3
 1          II.     Discussion

 2                  A. The IDEA

 3          Under the IDEA, a school district must provide services “tailored to meet the unique needs

 4   of a particular child, and . . . reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational

 5   benefits.” Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 107 (internal quotation marks omitted). To administer these

 6   services, a school district must develop an individualized education program (“IEP”) each year for

 7   each student with a disability. M.H., 685 F.3d at 224.

 8          For an IEP to be adequate under the IDEA, it must be “likely to produce progress, not

 9   regression, and . . . afford[] the student with an opportunity greater than mere trivial advancement.”

10   Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 195 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks

11   omitted). It must also “ensure that ‘[t]o the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities

12   . . . are educated with children who are not disabled.’” T.M. ex rel. A.M. v. Cornwall Cent. Sch.

13   Dist., 752 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2014) (alterations in original) (quoting 20 U.S.C. §

14   1412(a)(5)(A)). “In other words, the state must seek to educate each child with a disability in his

15   or her LRE.” Id.

16          “In determining whether an IEP complies with the IDEA, courts make a two-part inquiry

17   that is, first, procedural, and second, substantive. At the first step, courts examine whether there

18   were procedural violations of the IDEA, namely, whether the state has complied with the

19   procedures set forth in the IDEA. . . . Courts then examine whether the IEP was substantively

20   adequate, namely, whether it was reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational

21   benefits.” R.E. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 694 F.3d 167, 189–90 (2d Cir. 2012) (alterations,

22   citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). Procedural inadequacies render a proposed

23   placement violative of the IDEA when they “cumulatively result in the denial of a FAPE even if

                                                       4
 1   the violations considered individually do not.” Id. at 190. Substantive inadequacies automatically

 2   render a proposed placement violative of the IDEA. Id.

 3                          1. Procedural Claims

 4          We agree with the district court and the SRO that any procedural violations in the

 5   development of the IEP did not “‘impede[] the parents’ opportunity to participate in the

 6   decisionmaking process regarding the provision of a [FAPE] to the parents’ child,’ or ‘cause[] a

 7   deprivation of educational benefits.’” T.M., 752 F.3d at 160 (second alteration in original) (quoting

 8   20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii)).

 9          Plaintiff correctly contends that in developing the IEP, the local Committee on Special

10   Education (“CSE”) should have considered A.K.’s New York State Alternate Assessment

11   (“NYSAA”) results, and its failure to do so was a procedural violation.             See 20 U.S.C.

12   § 1414(c)(1)(A) (requiring “review [of] existing evaluation data on the child, including . . . State

13   assessments”); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(1) (“In developing each child’s IEP, the IEP Team

14   must consider . . . [t]he results of the initial or most recent evaluation of the child[.]”). But the

15   error did not deprive A.K. of a FAPE because the CSE considered other information sufficient to

16   understand A.K.’s educational needs. See L.O. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 822 F.3d 95, 109–11 (2d

17   Cir. 2016) (concluding that, on its own, the lack of evidence that CSE reviewed child’s evaluative

18   material, though a procedural violation, did not deny child a FAPE). Here, there is evidence that

19   the CSE considered the testimony of the teacher who administered the NYSAA, spent significant

20   time reviewing A.K.’s progress and goals with his teachers, service providers, and parents, and

21   analyzed the result of other tests, including the Stanford-Binet Test, the Vineland Adaptive

22   Behavior Scales, and the Wechsler Individual Achievement Test. Under these circumstances, we

23   conclude that the procedural violation did not render the IEP legally inadequate.

                                                      5
 1                             2. Substantive Claims

 2           We also agree with the district court and the SRO that the IEP was substantively adequate.

 3   Plaintiff objects to the fact that the IEP did not incorporate the general education curriculum, align

 4   A.K.’s goals with grade-level learning standards, or attempt to mainstream him in an in-district

 5   public school. At bottom, these arguments fail because A.K.’s IEP was “reasonably calculated to

 6   enable [A.K.] to make progress appropriate in light of [his] circumstances.” Endrew F. ex rel.

 7   Joseph F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 580 U.S. 386, 399 (2017).

 8           Under the IDEA, a child’s “educational program must be appropriately ambitious . . . .”

 9   Id. at 402. Plaintiff asserts that this means that A.K.’s IEP must conform to the general education

10   curriculum and align with grade-level standards. But Plaintiff’s position misunderstands the law.

11   The IDEA requires a child’s educational program to be “appropriately ambitious in light of his

12   circumstances,” not in conformance with general education standards. Id. (emphasis added); see

13   also id. (“If [progressing smoothly through the regular curriculum] is not a reasonable prospect for

14   a child, his IEP need not aim for grade-level advancement.”). It is uncontested that A.K. is an

15   alternately assessed student who has significant learning disabilities, which makes adherence with

16   general education standards impossible. Because the IDEA requires the district to develop “an

17   educational program reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light

18   of the child’s circumstances,” but does not demand adherence with specific educational standards

19   or curricula, we reject Plaintiff’s argument that A.K.’s IEP was not “appropriately ambitious.” Id.

20   at 402–03.

21           Plaintiff also argues that the IEP’s recommended placement—in a special class 3 in an out-

     3
      Under New York law, a “[s]pecial class means a class consisting of students with disabilities who have been
     grouped together because of similar individual needs for the purpose of being provided specially designed
     instruction . . .” N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 8, § 200.1(uu).
                                                             6
 1   of-district public school—was not the LRE. To determine whether a student’s placement is the

 2   LRE, we apply a two-part test, which instructs us to consider (1) “whether education in the regular

 3   classroom, with the use of supplemental aids and services, can be achieved satisfactorily for a

 4   given child,” and (2) “if not, then whether the school has mainstreamed the child to the maximum

 5   extent appropriate.” P. ex rel. Mr. And Mrs. P. v. Newington Bd. of Educ., 546 F.3d 111, 120 (2d

 6   Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

 7          With respect to the first prong, we agree with the SRO’s well-reasoned conclusion that

 8   educating A.K. within a regular classroom could not be achieved satisfactorily even with the use

 9   of supplemental aids and services. Plaintiff does not dispute that A.K. placed at or below the first

10   percentile in reading comprehension, spelling, listening comprehension and mathematics; in the

11   low range in single-word reading and in the low average range in pseudo-word decoding; and

12   below the first percentile in speech-language skills. In light of A.K.’s unique needs, it is clear that

13   it would not be possible to educate him in a regular classroom even with the use of supplemental

14   aids and services. We also agree with the SRO as to the second prong because the record shows

15   that the CSE developed an IEP, with input from A.K.’s parents, that sought to mainstream A.K. to

16   the maximum extent appropriate. Indeed, the IEP recommended that A.K. receive his academic

17   instruction and services in a special class, but that he be mainstreamed for all other non-academic

18   activities. Accordingly, we conclude that A.K.’s IEP satisfied the IDEA’s LRE requirement.

19                          3. Other Claims

20          Finally, we reject Plaintiff’s argument that the decisions of the school district officials and

21   the underlying administrative decisions do not warrant the deference the district court gave them.

22   Plaintiff fails to provide a coherent argument for why the administrative decisions do not deserve

23   the deference that our case law instructs us to afford them. See Gagliardo, 489 F.3d at 113. Such

                                                       7
1   “[d]eference is particularly appropriate when, as here, the state hearing officers’ review has been

2   thorough and careful.” Walczak, 142 F.3d at 129. We therefore reject these claims.

3          We have considered the Plaintiff’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

4   Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court.

5
6                                                FOR THE COURT:
7                                                Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
8

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