Court Opinion

ID: 9751645
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:42:09.42578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:53.381655
License: Public Domain

EPSTEIN, J.
I concur in the judgment. I believe that as a general proposition, a motion by a defendant to discharge counsel and proceed in propria persona, made so close to an upcoming trial date that the date must be vacated, witnesses resubpoenaed and schedules rearranged, is not made within a “reasonable time” under the Windham standard. (People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 121, 128 [137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187].) The tardiness of the motion does not mean that it must be denied; it simply means that the decision of whether or not to grant it is discretionary with the trial court. (Id., at p. 124.) On the other hand, a timely pro se motion brought by a defendant who is able to proceed in that manner (cf. People v. Manago (1992) 220 Cal.App.3d 982, 986 [269 Cal.Rptr. 819]; People v. Watkins (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 595, 600 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 5]) must be granted. (People v. Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 124.)
When the defendant in this case finally made an unequivocal motion to represent himself, on November 1, 1989, he said that he knew he could not be ready for trial by November 28, and that he did not know how much time would be needed. But when he said this, the trial date had been set only moments before, and no witnesses had been subpoenaed or schedules set. And it is plain from the colloquy between court and counsel that it was highly unlikely that the case would actually go to trial on November 28. In fact, defense counsel repeatedly and emphatically declined to announce that he would be ready by that date, and he fully explained why more time would be needed. Trial did not begin until two months after the announced date, on January 29, 1990.
Under these circumstances, I have to agree that the request was made within a “reasonable time” under Windham, and that the trial court was therefore required to grant it.