Court Opinion

ID: 9833136
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 22:29:11.546127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:00.052705
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[1] In our former consideration of this case we overlooked the fact that in 1907 the Legislature amended subdivision 46 of article 642 of the Revised Statutes (Acts SOth Leg. c. 150). That article prescribes the purposes for which private corporations may be formed, and section 46 originally read: “For the organization of fire, marine, life and live stock insurance companies.” The act of 1907 adds two provisos to section 46, and the one applicable to this case reads as follows: “And provided further that all insurance companies mentioned in this subdivision shall be in all other respects subject to and shall comply with all of the provisions of title 58 of the Revised Statutes of Texas, and any and all laws supplementary to or' amendatory thereof.” Title 58 of the Revised Statutes contains nearly 100 articles, and undertakes to cover the entire subject of insurance, and article 3070, which is a part of that title, reads as follows: “Suits may be instituted and prosecuted against any life or health insurance company in any county where loss has occurred, or where the policy holder instituting such suit resides, and the process in any such suit may be served upon any person in this state holding a power of attorney from such company, and if no such person can be found in this state, upon affidavit of that fact being filed, process may be served by publication, as provided in the case of defendants who are nonresidents of this state.” As the act of 1907, amending the statute relating to live stock insurance companies, declares that such companies shall, in all respects, be subject to and comply with all the provisions of title 58 of the Revised Statutes, and as article 3070 is a part of that title, we now hold that the trial court ruled correctly when it overruled appellant’s pieas of privilege to be sued in another county, and that this court fell into error when it held otherwise in the opinion hereinbefore filed, and for that reason appellee’s motion for rehearing is granted, and we will now proceed to a consideration of the appeal.
[2] We sustain appellant’s sevfenth assignment of error, which asserts that appellant was not liable on the policy sued on, because it is stipulated therein that appellant insured the horse only while .situated in Rosenberg or Ft. Bend county, Tex., and the proof showed that the plaintiff carried the horse into another county, and that he died while there. The policy contains the stipulation referred to, and it seems to be conceded that the proof shows that the horse got sick, that there was no veterinary surgeon available in Ft. Bei}d county, and that the plaintiff drove it 30 miles to Eagle Lake in another county, and left him in care of a veterinary surgeon, and he died there. The written policy which contains the contract of insurance declares that appellant insures the plaintiff against loss by death to the amount of §180 on a certain gelding therein described “while situated in Rosenberg or Ft. Bend county, Tex.” It seems clear to us that the language quoted was intended to and must be held to constitute a limitation upon the promise to pay the §180, and that, unless the animal died and the loss occurred in Rosenberg or Ft. Bend county, appellant is not liable. Lawrence v. Leidigh, 58 Kan. 594, 50 Pac. 600, 62 Am. St. Rep. 631; Silvey v. Lindsay, 107 N. Y. 55, 13 N. E. 444; Wolcott v. Holcomb, 97 Mich. 361, 56 N. W. 837, 23 L. R. A. 215. In Langworthy v. Oswego & O. Ins. Co., 85 N. Y. 632, it was held that a policy of insurance which insured a hop-house from the 15th of August to the 15th of October “while drying hops, should be construed to limit the contract of insurance to the destruction of the building while being used for drying hops, and, if destroyed while not so used, the insured could not recover for the loss.” That case seems to be directly in point, and fully sustains our decision in this case.
It is true that the policy stipulated that the insured “shall see that the said animal shall be well eared for and not neglected or abandoned or exposed to danger; and in case of sickness or accident, that the same shall receive the care of a veterinary surgeon, or the best care and attention that can be procured,” but we do not think that stipulation of the contract should be so construed as to nullify or change the other stipulation limiting the insurance to the time while the animal was in Rosenberg or Ft. Bend county. The two provisions can be harmonized and so construed as to give effect to each and both. The one last quoted *1184providing for the care and welfare of the animal did not absolutely require the plaintiff to procure a veterinary surgeon when the animal got sick, but required him either to do that or give the animal the best care and attention that could be procured at reasonable expense. If the plaintiff had kept the animal in Ft. Bend county, and could not, as his evidence tends to show, procure a veterinary surgeon to treat it there, nevertheless, if he had given it the best care and attention which he was able to do under the circumstances, and it had died, appellant would have been liable for the insurance now sought to be recovered. And, if we are correct in that proposition, then it necessarily follows that the contract did not require the plaintiff to take the animal out of the county for the purpose of obtaining the care of a veterinary surgeon.
Our conclusion upon this point renders it unnecessary to consider the other questions presented in appellant’s brief; and, for the reasons stated, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and judgment here rendered for appellant.
Reversed and rendered.