Court Opinion

ID: 9954804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 22:11:48.888916+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:03.206326
License: Public Domain

03/26/2024
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                          AT JACKSON
                          Assigned on Briefs March 5, 2024

             STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JAMIEUM ALVIN REID

                 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County
                    No. 20-701-B        Donald H. Allen, Judge
                     ___________________________________

                           No. W2023-00925-CCA-R3-CD
                       ___________________________________

Defendant, Jamieum Alvin Reid, was indicted by a Madison County Grand Jury for
possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of 0.5 grams or
more of cocaine with intent to deliver, and possession of methamphetamine. Defendant
pled guilty as charged and agreed to an effective eight-year sentence, with the manner of
service to be determined by the trial court. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve
his sentence in confinement. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying alternative sentencing because he was already approved by a
community based program, and the State failed to present evidence that an alternative
sentence was inappropriate. Following our review of the record, the briefs of the parties,
and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

  Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

JILL BARTEE AYERS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT L.
HOLLOWAY, JR., and ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JJ., joined.

Anna B. Cash, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jamieum Alvin Reid.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Katherine C. Redding, Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Jody Pickens, District Attorney General; and Shaun A. Brown, Assistant
District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                       OPINION

                         Factual and Procedural Background

       On November 30, 2020, Defendant was indicted by a Madison County Grand Jury
for possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell (count five), possession
of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver (count six), and possession of
methamphetamine (count seven).1 On April 30, 2023, Defendant pled guilty as charged.
Pursuant to the plea agreement, counts five and six merged and Defendant agreed to an
eight-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender and a $2,000 fine. For count seven,
Defendant agreed to a concurrent sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days at seventy-
five percent release eligibility and a $750 fine. The manner of service was to be determined
by the trial court. The transcript of the plea submission hearing is not in the record, but the
relevant facts underlying the plea, as provided in the presentence report (“PSR”), are as
follows:

       On February 28, 2020[,] Investigators assigned to Jackson Madison County
       Metro Narcotics observed a tan vehicle . . . traveling south on North Highland
       following too close near the rear bumpers of several vehicles while switching
       lanes. . . . . Upon initiating the traffic stop the front seat passenger jumped
       out the vehicle and ran leaving behind approximately 10.4 grams of
       marijuana, 8 suspected ecstasy pills and approximately 4.3 grams of
       suspected crack cocaine. The passenger was shortly taken into custody and
       identified as [Defendant].

       The trial court conducted the sentencing hearing over three separate dates. Prior to
the hearing, the State filed a notice of request for enhanced punishment based on
Defendant’s criminal record. At the hearing on May 15, 2023, the State introduced the
PSR which showed that Defendant’s criminal history spanned from January 2002, when
he was convicted of multiple counts of burglary, vandalism, and theft, through his most
recent conviction, prior to the current case, for attempted assault by strangulation in April
2016 in Michigan. In total, Defendant had eighteen felony convictions and twenty-two
misdemeanor convictions. Defendant reported that he dropped out of school after the tenth
grade but later obtained his G.E.D. in 2002 while incarcerated, and he had been diagnosed
with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, split personality disorder, and schizophrenia.
Defendant reported that he began “using drugs at age seven, and alcohol at age 10” and
had not received substance abuse treatment. The validated risk and needs assessment
resulted in a risk level of “high violent” with high needs in education and mental health,
moderate needs in attitudes/behaviors, and low needs in employment, residential, friends,
alcohol/drug use, family, and aggression.

      Monique Houston, Defendant’s wife, testified that she had been in a relationship
with Defendant for a year and three months at the time of the hearing and had lived with
him in Clarksville, Tennessee, throughout their relationship. Until he was arrested,
Defendant had not been working but was attending management courses because he

   1
     Defendant was indicted in a seven count indictment along with a co-defendant. Defendant was charged
in counts five through seven.
                                                 -2-
wanted to open his own business. Defendant had been invited to “the Honor’s Society
because of his grades[.]” Ms. Houston explained that Defendant “had a hard life[,]” and
his mother was his only support system until she passed away. She said that Defendant
was in Jackson, Tennessee, on the date of his arrest to attend his mother’s funeral, and
Defendant “turned to drugs” to cope with his mother’s passing. According to Ms. Houston,
Defendant “ha[d] four personalities” and was “dyslexic[.]” Ms. Houston thought the Day
Reporting Center (“DRC”) would be beneficial to Defendant because it “would give him
the structure [and motivation] he needs.” Ms. Houston agreed that she and her family
would help Defendant succeed in the DRC.

       The State did not cross-examine Ms. Houston. However, the trial court clarified
that Ms. Houston and Defendant began their relationship after the offense date in this case
and that Ms. Houston had known Defendant for one year and eight months in total.

       Defendant testified that he handled all of the arrangements when his mother passed
away because his family was not around. Defendant turned to using drugs because he was
“trying to find a way to ease the pain[,] but . . . knew it was wrong.” When he met Ms.
Houston and her son, he decided to “put everything away[.]” Defendant attended church
with Ms. Houston and became involved with her son’s life. He acknowledged that he was
dyslexic and testified that he had four split personalities. Defendant recalled that he had
never been offered a structured treatment program and thought the DRC program would
work for him:

      [b]ecause it can give me the tools that I need to go back into the community
      and gradually get a better understanding of things. Instead of throwing me
      away, give me a chance that, you know, to get myself together. You know,
      get [Defendant] together and give me the right tools that I need that I can,
      you know, further go on in my life . . . .

       Defendant recalled that he was ineligible for the Madison County DRC because of
where he lived, but he “spent almost an hour and [fifty] something minutes on the phone”
with Montgomery County DRC. The Montgomery County DRC conducted an assessment
over the phone and accepted Defendant into the program if he were allowed by the court.
The assessment and an email confirming Defendant’s acceptance were admitted into
evidence. The assessment showed a need for psychological and drug treatment. Defendant
agreed that it was “time to quit all of this” because he wanted to become a productive
citizen and good role model for Ms. Houston’s son.

        The State did not cross-examine Defendant. The trial court clarified that Defendant
met Ms. Houston while on bond for this case and had lived with her since. Defendant also
clarified that his mother passed away in August of 2020, but maintained that he had come
                                           -3-
from Michigan to Jackson, Tennessee, for her funeral when he was arrested on these
charges in February of 2020.

        After the close of proof, Defendant argued that “until the mental health and the
substance abuse issues are addressed and treated, this is going to be a lifetime cycle” and
asked the court to “show mercy and allow him to enter the DRC program as opposed to
serving the sentence.” The trial court took the matter under advisement because it believed
that the DRC program could not “accept someone who has a conviction for an aggravated
assault” and requested the parties to obtain a certified copy of the judgment from
Defendant’s most recent conviction in Michigan.

       On June 5, 2023, the trial court continued the sentencing hearing, and the State
introduced a certified copy of the Michigan judgment as requested. Defendant also
introduced a letter from the Montgomery County DRC stating that it was aware of the
Michigan conviction, and that it did not disqualify Defendant from the program. The trial
court reset the hearing for the next day to allow time to review this additional information.

       The following day, the trial court stated that it had considered all evidence presented
at the prior hearings, including the PSR and Defendant’s statement. The trial court also
considered “the principles of sentencing[,]” the arguments for alternative sentencing, “the
nature and characteristic of the criminal conduct involved[,]” noting that the current
offenses were “certainly serious offenses[,]” evidence of mitigating and enhancement
factors, and statistical information for the offenses provided by the administrative office of
the courts. The trial court noted that Defendant had posted bond, which was later revoked
because Defendant had failed to appear in court in June 2022, and he was arrested in
January 2023.2

       The trial court applied and gave great weight to three enhancement factors: that
Defendant had criminal history in addition to the convictions necessary to establish the
appropriate range; Defendant’s previous failure to comply with conditions of community
release; and that the instant offense was committed while on community release. See
T.C.A. § 40-35-114(1), (8), (13). Specifically, the trial court gave great weight to
Defendant’s criminal history, which included eighteen prior felony convictions and
twenty-two prior misdemeanor offenses, which made him “at least a Range [II][,] multiple
offender and could quite possibly be a Range [III][,] persistent offender.” The trial court
additionally found that based on the PSR, Defendant had criminal behavior involving drug
use “since he was actually a teenager.” The trial court also noted that “at least on four

   2
     While the trial court noted that Defendant’s bond was revoked for failure to appear, the record does
not include an order revoking his bond in June 2022, or an arrest in January 2023. The record reflects that
Defendant’s bond had been revoked in March 2022, but was reinstated in April 2022.
                                                   -4-
different occasions . . . [Defendant had] gone out and committed new offenses while under
release into the community.” The trial also considered that Defendant had failed to appear
for court in this case resulting in a revocation of his bond. Regarding enhancement factor
13, the trial court found that “at the time that [Defendant] committed these felony offenses
. . . he was on what would appear to be parole out of the State of Michigan. I do give that
great weight as well.” See T.C.A. § 40-35-114(13).

      The trial court found that “there’s really not anything mitigating” but took into
consideration Defendant’s mental health, including his history of treatment. The trial court
noted that Defendant’s “work history is not very good[,]” that the “risk and needs
assessment says he has a high risk of violence [and] a high risk of drug abuse as well.”
Ultimately, the trial court held:

       [a]fter considering all of this information that I’ve talked about and especially
       considering this long extensive criminal history that I’ve talked about, the
       [c]ourt finds that [Defendant] is not an appropriate candidate for alternative
       sentencing.

       The [c]ourt finds that measures less restrictive than confinement have
       frequently or recently been applied to [D]efendant without success. I say that
       because he was sentenced to serve felony sentences in Michigan, he got out
       and came back to Tennessee and committed more felony offenses while on
       release out of Michigan.

       The [c]ourt finds that any type of probation in this case would unduly
       depreciate the seriousness of these offenses especially in light of his long
       criminal history.

       You know, the [c]ourt considers the facts and circumstances, the previous
       actions of [D]efendant. His unwillingness to follow rules of probation or
       parole. Unwillingness to lead a productive life.

       I mean, he’s basically resorted to criminal activity pretty much his entire
       adult life as best I can tell.

       So, the [c]ourt finds the interests of society in being protected from his future
       criminal conduct is great.

       ...

                                             -5-
       I just don’t find him to be a good candidate for the [DRC] in Clarksville. I
       just find that he needs to serve the sentence.

       At the request of defense counsel, the trial court agreed to recommend that
Defendant be considered for a drug treatment program while in the Tennessee Department
of Correction (“TDOC”).

       After the trial court announced the sentence, Defendant explained that when he was
incarcerated at eighteen years old, he “did more than [his] [release eligibility] date” because
he tried to complete the drug treatment program, and that he had completed a one-year
treatment program while incarcerated in Michigan. The trial court pointed out that
Defendant’s bond in this case had been revoked because he had a positive drug test and a
second time because he failed to appear in court. Defendant stated that he started using
drugs again after his release to cope with his mother’s death because he did not have a
support system. The trial court suggested for Defendant to “take advantage of whatever
treatment programs” were available in TDOC. Defendant stated that he was trying to get
help because “[t]here’s more drugs in [TDOC] than on the street.” The trial court expressed
its concern that Defendant “would not report on a regular basis to treatment” based on his
history.

       Defendant filed a timely appeal, now properly before this court.

                                          Analysis

       Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying him an alternative sentence
because the State did not present evidence that an alternative sentence was inappropriate,
and the trial court failed to properly consider his acceptance into the Montgomery County
DRC. The State asserts that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying
alternative sentencing. We agree with the State.

       On appeal, the party challenging the sentence bears the burden of establishing that
the sentence is improper. State v. Branham, 501 S.W.3d 577, 595 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016).
The “abuse of discretion standard, accompanied by a presumption of reasonableness,
applies to within-range sentences that reflect a decision based upon the purposes and
principles of sentencing, including the questions related to probation or any other
alternative sentence.” State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 278-79 (Tenn. 2012); see State v.
Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. 2012). “A trial court abuses its discretion when it applies
incorrect legal standards, reaches an illogical conclusion, bases its ruling on a clearly
erroneous assessment of the proof, or applies reasoning that causes an injustice to the
complaining party.” State v. Phelps, 329 S.W.3d 436, 443 (Tenn. 2010) (citing State v.
Jordan, 325 S.W.3d 1, 38-40 (Tenn. 2010)). Here, the trial court properly considered the
                                             -6-
evidence presented, the purposes and principles of sentencing, and explicitly stated on the
record its reasoning for finding that confinement, rather than an alternative sentence, was
appropriate. Thus, the applicable standard of review is abuse of discretion with a
presumption of reasonableness.

        A defendant is eligible for alternative sentencing if the sentence imposed is ten years
or less. T.C.A. § 40-35-303(a). However, an eligible defendant must establish suitability
for alternative sentencing by demonstrating that it will “subserve the ends of justice and
the best interest of both the public and the defendant.” State v. Souder, 105 S.W.3d 602,
607 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002); T.C.A. § 40-35-303(b). Further, “a defendant is no longer
presumed to be a favorable candidate for alternative sentencing” because the sentencing
guidelines are merely “advisory[.]” State v. Johnson, No. W2022-01041-CCA-R3-CD,
2023 WL 6545015, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 9, 2023) (citing State v. Carter, 254
S.W.3d 335, 347 (Tenn. 2008)), no perm. app. filed; see T.C.A. § 40-35-102(6).

       “A sentence is based upon ‘the nature of the offense and the totality of the
circumstances,’ including a defendant’s background.” State v. Clark, No. E2022-00667-
CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 6442974, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 3, 2023) (quoting State v.
Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tenn. 1991)), no perm. app. filed. A sentence of
incarceration should reflect consideration of “[t]he potential or lack of potential for
rehabilitation or treatment of the defendant,” in addition to whether:

       (A) Confinement is necessary to protect society by restraining a defendant
           who has a long history of criminal conduct;

       (B) Confinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the
           offense or confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective
           deterrence to others likely to commit similar offenses; or

       (C) Measures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or recently
           been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant[.]

T.C.A. § 40-35-103(1)(A)-(C). When considering an alternative sentence, “the trial court
should consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s criminal
record, the defendant’s background and social history, the defendant’s present condition,
including physical and mental condition, the deterrent effect on the defendant, and the best
interests of the defendant and the public.” State v. Gregory, No. M2023-00166-CCA-R3-
CD, 2023 WL 8801163, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 20, 2023) (quotations omitted)
(quoting State v. Cathey, No. E2015-01284-CCA-R3-CD, 2016 WL 2641766, at *3 (Tenn.
Crim. App. May 6, 2016)), no perm. app. filed; see T.C.A. § 40-35-210(b)(1)-(8)
(sentencing considerations).
                                             -7-
       We note that the record does not contain a transcript from the guilty plea submission
hearing. “When a record does not include a transcript of the hearing, this court should
determine on a case-by-case basis whether the record is sufficient for a meaningful
review.” State v. Baker, No. E2022-00385-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 569398, at *3 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Jan. 27, 2023) (citing Caudle, 388 S.W.3d at 279), perm. app. denied (Tenn.
June 8, 2023). Here, the record contains a sufficient recitation of the facts underlying
Defendant’s plea in both the PSR and the trial court’s findings. Therefore, we determine
that the record is sufficient to allow for meaningful appellate review of the trial court’s
sentencing decision. See Caudle, 388 S.W.3d at 279.

         Defendant argues that “[w]ithout explicit evidence that [Defendant] could not
successfully complete the [DRC] in Clarksville, the trial court should not have
automatically determined that confinement was necessary. The State did not present any
evidence that [Defendant] would not be a suitable candidate for alternative sentencing.”
First, it was not the State’s burden to establish that Defendant was an unsuitable candidate
for alternative sentencing; rather, it was Defendant’s burden to establish that he was a
suitable candidate. See Johnson, 2023 WL 6545015, at *3. Additionally, the trial court
considered Defendant’s acceptance to the Montgomery County DRC as one factor in the
“necessary case-by-case analysis considering the nature of the offense and the totality of
the circumstances . . . including [D]efendant’s background.” See Gregory, 2023 WL
8801163, at *4.

        The record belies Defendant’s assertion that the trial court “automatically
determined that confinement was necessary.” To the contrary, the record reflects that the
trial court denied Defendant’s request to report to the Montgomery County DRC after
consideration of all the evidence presented at the sentencing hearings, including
Defendant’s criminal history, present physical and mental condition, and potential for
rehabilitation. First, the trial court found that although Defendant pled as a Range I,
standard offender, he would have been a Range II or even Range III offender, based on his
criminal history which spanned “pretty much his entire adult life.” See T.C.A. §§ 40-35-
106, -107 (defining multiple and persistent offenders). The trial court also found that
Defendant had previously been unable to comply with the terms of community release and
that the current offenses were committed while Defendant was on community release for
his Michigan conviction. The trial court also noted that Defendant’s bond had been
revoked twice in this case.

       Additionally, the trial court considered the purposes and principles of sentencing.
See T.C.A. §§ 40-35-210, -103(1). Specifically, the trial court considered that Defendant’s
validated risk and needs assessment resulted in a risk score of “high violent.” The trial
court also noted the serious nature and characteristics of these offenses which involved
                                           -8-
possession of controlled substances. The trial court considered Defendant’s acceptance to
the Montgomery County DRC, and in fact, continued the sentencing hearing for Defendant
to get additional proof of his eligibility for the DRC program in light of his aggravated
assault conviction. The record is clear that the trial court considered Defendant’s
acceptance into the program and his criminal history before it determined that Defendant
was not a good candidate for alternative sentencing.

       Further, based on Defendant’s extensive criminal history, including previous
revocations of both parole and probation, the trial court found that incarceration was
necessary to protect society and that less restrictive means had been unsuccessfully applied
to Defendant. Based on the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in sentencing Defendant to confinement. Defendant is not entitled to relief.

                                       Conclusion

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

                                             ____________________________________
                                             JILL BARTEE AYERS, JUDGE

                                           -9-