Court Opinion

ID: 9854163
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:02:09.137429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:57.731205
License: Public Domain

MONTGOMERY, Justice (dissenting). This is a case in which our system for the trial of criminal defendants simply did not work. It is undeniable that one of every citizen’s most precious rights, guaranteed by the Bill of Rights in the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and in article II, section 14, of New Mexico’s own Constitution, is the right to trial by an impartial jury in which each and every juror " ‘is totally free from any partiality whatsoever.’ ” Fuson v. State, 105 N.M. 632, 633, 735 P.2d 1138, 1139 (1987); Mares v. State, 83 N.M. 225, 226, 490 P.2d 667, 668 (1971) (both quoting State v. McFall, 67 N.M. 260, 263, 354 P.2d 547, 548-49 (1960)). In this case, although the defendant committed a particularly heinous and atrocious act, she was entitled to be provided with this basic and fundamental right in her trial. It was particularly important in that trial that none of the jurors have any disqualifying bias on the, subject of mental illness. That defendant committed the acts with which she was charged was not in dispute at the trial and is not disputed here. Critically important to her fate is the answer to the question: Under New Mexico law, was the defendant “guilty but mentally ill” or was she “not guilty by reason of insanity” at the time she committed the acts at issue? Having a jury each member of which had an open mind on this subject was of bedrock importance to this defendant and, indeed, to the fairness with which our system of criminal justice operates in New Mexico. Defendant was denied such a jury in this case, and I would therefore reverse and remand for a new trial. I. There is no way in which the system can, with unfailing perfection, provide a pristinely pure jury in each and every case. Juries are made up of imperfect human beings, and their use in the trial of a criminal case is administered by imperfect human beings. The best that can be done is to devise measures to discover those potential jurors who may harbour feelings or attitudes inimical to the defendant and then to administer those measures in a manner calculated to weed out such unsuitable jurors. The principal measure our system has devised to date is the technique of voir doir examination: questioning of potential jurors by the trial judge and by counsel to elicit responses that may reveal attitudes and predilections that might otherwise go undetected. Fundamental to the proper operation of this part of the system is the requirement that each potential juror make a truthful and reasonably complete answer to the questions put to him or her on voir dire. It is the duty of a juror to make full and truthful answers to such questions as are asked, neither falsely stating any fact nor concealing any material matter. If a juror falsely represents his interest or situation or conceals a material fact relevant to the controversy and such matters, if truthfully answered, might establish prejudice or work a disqualification of the juror, the party misled or deceived thereby, upon discovering the fact of the juror’s incompetency or disqualification after trial, may assert that fact as ground for and obtain a new _ trial, upon a proper showing of such facts, even though the bias or prejudice is not shown to have caused an unjust verdict, it being sufficient that a party, through no fault of his own, has been deprived of this constitutional guarantee of a trial of his case before a fair and impartial jury. Mares, 83 N.M. at 227, 490 P.2d at 669 (quoting Marvins Credit Inc. v. Steward, 133 A.2d 473 (Mun.Ct.App., D.C., 1957) (emphasis added; court’s emphasis omitted)). In the case before us, when Mr. Griego was asked whether he had ever been treated by a psychiatrist or psychologist, his answer that he could not remember was perhaps true. But his additional statements — that he had had "kind of a dizzy spell,” that “they” thought he needed a psychiatrist; and that he didn't have to have a psychiatrist — were simply inadequate to provide even a clue to the revelation that he had been hospitalized for a year for depression manifested by an inability to talk. It is not necessary to ascribe fault to Mr. Griego or to find that he intentionally misrepresented his prior experience with mental illness to hold that the system in this case simply malfunctioned. Whether intentionally or not, Mr. Griego concealed his previous history with a mental disorder. In addition to his testimony at the post-trial hearing, a newspaper reporter and an investigator from the Public Defender’s office testified that he had told them he had “gone berserk” and had had a mental illness. If he had given any inkling of these events in his past in response to the trial court’s question, the system might have worked as it is intended to: The court or counsel could have explored the subject more fully and elicited facts on which to base a decision whether to challenge for cause or peremptorily. “ ‘Full knowledge of all relevant and material matters that might bear upon possible disqualification of a juror is essential to a fair and intelligent exercise of the right of counsel to challenge either for cause or peremptorily.’ ” Id. While I might agree with the opinion of the Chief Justice, which agrees with Williams v. United States, 418 F.2d 372, 377 (10th Cir.1969), that the fact that defendant might have lost her right to peremptorily challenge Mr. Griego is not alone sufficient to reverse her conviction, surely in a case like this, where loss of that right is combined with a showing of actual bias on the part of the juror (to which I shall return below), loss of this important right should be enough to reverse the conviction. As we said in Fuson, “prejudice is presumed when the right of peremptory challenge is denied or impaired.” 105 N.M. at 634, 735 P.2d at 1140. See also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219, 85 S.Ct. 824, 835, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), overruled on other grounds, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986): “The denial or impairment of the right is reversible error without a showing of prejudice.” II. More serious even than the plurality’s inadequate treatment of what caused the system to go wrong in this case — the juror’s incomplete and misleading response to the trial judge’s question on voir dire— is their confusion of the applicable standard for reversal in a case of alleged juror bias and the resulting disregard of the clear and unmistakable actual bias held by the juror and its effect on the defendant. Quite simply, the plurality have confused the question of whether there was bias on the part of the juror with the quite different question of whether there was prejudice to the defendant as a result of such bias. The opinion of the Chief Justice states that defendant “has not shown how she was actually prejudiced by the juror’s sitting on the jury” and finds “no actual prejudice to [defendant] stemming from the juror’s answers on voir dire.” In this respect the plurality make the same error committed by the trial court in finding that the defendant had “failed to establish to the court’s satisfaction that actual prejudice has been shown by Mr. Griego’s having been seated as a juror.” “Actual prejudice” to the defendant need not be demonstrated in a case where actual bias on the part of the juror has been shown; in such a case prejudice to the defendant is, or should be, presumed. See Mares; State v. Sacoman, 107 N.M. 588, 593, 762 P.2d 250, 255 (1988) (“The fundamental right to an impartial jury is violated when one juror is unqualified for the reason that any verdict would thus be less than the unanimous verdict of twelve.”) (citation omitted); State v. Chavez, 78 N.M. 446, 432 P.2d 411 (1967); State v. Sims, 51 N.M. 467, 188 P.2d 177 (1947) (integrity of the jury is destroyed if one of the jurors serves while concealing bias); State v. Gallegos, 88 N.M. 487, 542 P.2d 832 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 89 N.M. 6, 546 P.2d 71 (1975) (to allow one unqualified juror to serve would violate state constitutional provisions which secure the right of trial by jury and guarantee an impartial jury); cf. State v. Coulter, 98 N.M. 768, 652 P.2d 1219 (Ct.App.1982) (alternate juror’s presence in jury room during deliberations creates a presumption of prejudice; since state made no showing to overcome presumption, defendant entitled to new trial). In this case the bias of Mr. Griego, and the ensuing prejudicial impact on the defendant, fairly leap off the pages of the transcript of the post-trial hearing. First, Mr. Griego revealed deep-seated attitudes on the subject of mental illness, based on his prior experience with it, and a proclivity to arrive at an immediate conclusion about the existence or the non-existence of that condition, and its severity, in the defendant. He was asked when during the course of the trial he arrived at the conclusion that defendant was not insane, to which he replied: “When did I make the conclusion? Since the first day.” Mr. Griego’s testimony continued: Q: And did you tell Mr. Domrzalski [newspaper reporter] that “I have seen people who were ten times worse than she was being in a mental hospital and be cured?” A: Right. Q: Did you say that to him? A: Yes. ****** Q: You stated that you have seen people far more crazy than Darci Pierce, far more insane than her, get cured. A: Yes, I have. Yes, I have. And that has — they have received shock treatments and they were well. They — they have already gotten over it and died, and I have seen them in my lifetime, yes. ****** Q: Okay. Again, calling your attention to your conversation with the Tribune reporter on the 29th of March, did you tell him that you had — you personally had electric shock therapy? A: No, I didn’t tell him that. I told him — I told him that I had seen people that had electric shock treatments, and they had gotten well. They were worse, ten times, than Darci Pierce. In addition, the reporter testified: A: * * * I had asked, “Do you think she could be cured,” meaning can Darci Pierce be cured, and he said, “Yes. I have seen people ten times worse than her get into the hospital and be cured.” And then he volunteered, said something like, “I was mentally sick” * * * A: * * * I asked him — this is not on the notes, but I asked him when, how, all that stuff, and he said, “12, or 13 or 14. I had to go into a hospital for a year. That’s why it was so easy to judge her case.” ****** Q: He did state to you, though, that because he was in the hospital, that that is why it was so easy for him to judge her case? A: Because he had been mentally sick. In addition to this juror’s attitudes on the subject of mental illness, he displayed a willingness to translate those feelings into a premature judgment about defendant’s guilt. While it is true that he answered in the affirmative when asked whether he made his decision based on the facts that he heard in evidence in the case, immediately preceding that answer he was asked when he had made up his mind about defendant’s guilt or innocence. He answered: “I think I made my mind up about the first — second or first day, because I really looked into the case right there and I said to myself, that person is — I mean, is guilty of murder.” Add to these statements the testimony quoted in the Chief Justice’s opinion to the effect that he could see the devil in defendant, saw in her “right away” witchcraft, “saw in her murder,” and a clearer case of bias on the part of a juror and resulting prejudicial impact on a defendant can scarcely be imagined. We have long held that a juror’s statement regarding his impartiality is not conclusive. Mares, 83 N.M. at 226, 490 P.2d at 668. Since it is not conclusive, an avowal of impartiality is not sufficient to protect the constitutional right to an impartial jury. Alvarez v. State, 92 N.M. 44, 46-47, 582 P.2d 816, 818-19 (1978). And, of course, a juror is required to refrain from coming to any decision on the merits of a case until he or she has heard all of the evidence and the case has been submitted. See SCR A 1986, 14-101. For the proposition that a party seeking a new trial because of non-disclosure by a juror during voir dire must show actual bias, the opinion of the Chief Justice relies on Baca v. Sullivan, 821 F.2d 1480 (10th Cir.1987), which in turn relied on United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir.1984). However, Perkins also said that “[ajctual bias may be shown in two ways: ‘by express admission or by proof of specific facts showing such a close connection to the circumstances at hand that bias must be presumed.’ ” 748 F.2d at 1532 (quoting United States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223, 1229 (5th Cir.1976)). In this case there is no need to presume bias; its existence was manifested unequivocally in the juror’s own testimony. That being the case, there was no occasion for defendant to go further and attempt to prove actual prejudice to herself; prejudice is presumed and, moreover, was amply demonstrated by the juror’s testimony at the hearing. The trial court’s decision denying defendant’s motion for new trial should therefore be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial, at which, hopefully, the system will function as it is intended to function. WILSON, J., concurs.