Court Opinion

ID: 2963561
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Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:12:05.028467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:41.712518
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 94-2182

                                    UNITED STATES,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                FREDERICK ALAN PIERCE,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                              FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE

                     [Hon. Morton A. Brody, U.S. District Judge]
                                            ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before
                                           
                                Boudin, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________
                      Aldrich and Bownes, Senior Circuit Judges.
                                          _____________________
                                 ____________________

            J. Hilary Billings for appellant.
            __________________
            F. Mark Terison, Assistant United States  Attorney, with whom  Jay
            _______________                                                ___
        P. McCloskey, United States Attorney, and James L. McCarthy, Assistant
        ____________                              _________________
        United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                    July 21, 1995
                                 ____________________

                      BOWNES,  Senior  Circuit Judge.    In  this appeal,
                      BOWNES,  Senior  Circuit Judge.
                               _____________________

            defendant-appellant  Frederick  Alan  Pierce  challenges,  on

            several grounds, his convictions and sentence for  conspiracy

            to  possess cocaine  with intent to  distribute, 21  U.S.C.  

            846, and carrying  a firearm during and in relation to a drug

            trafficking crime,  18 U.S.C.    924(c)(1).   After carefully

            considering Pierce's arguments, we affirm.

                                          I.
                                          I.
                                          __

            A.  Factual Background
            A.  Factual Background
            ______________________

                      On June 28, 1993, pursuant to  a prior plan, Pierce

            and a fellow Maine resident, codefendant David Leland Maddox,

            drove to  Lawrence, Massachusetts, in order  to purchase four

            ounces of cocaine.  Paul Abraham, an acquaintance of Pierce's

            who  was  to "middle"  the  deal,  informed drug  enforcement

            personnel  of the arrangements.  The sale did not go through.

            Pierce  and  Maddox were  arrested  on Interstate  95  in New

            Hampshire while  returning to Maine.   The arresting officers

            seized  $3,333.50  from Pierce;  they  also confiscated  drug

            paraphernalia  and  a  loaded  gun  from  the  car.    Maddox

            subsequently pleaded guilty and became a cooperating witness.

            B.  Procedural History
            B.  Procedural History
            ______________________

                      On October 12, 1993, Pierce was arraigned on a two-

            count indictment charging him  with the crimes of conviction.

            On that same day, Magistrate-Judge Beaulieu appointed Gary M.

            Growe to  represent him.   In the  ensuing month and  a half,

                                         -2-
                                          2

            problems developed between Growe and Pierce, and, on November

            30, 1993, the day before jury selection was to commence,

            Growe filed a motion  to withdraw as counsel.   Pierce joined

            in  the  motion.   The  government  opposed Growe's  request,

            pointing  out  that Pierce  already  had  been provided  with

            Jencks discovery  material and arguing that  Pierce might use

            the material to create problems for potential witnesses.  The

            district court  heard argument on Growe's  motion on December

            1, 1993.

                      At the hearing, Growe maintained that a personality

            conflict was compromising his ability to evaluate objectively

            certain defense theories proposed  by Pierce.  After spending

            some time inquiring into the particulars of the problem,  the

            court  denied the motion.   In so doing,  the court described

            the conflict as "not so great that it results in a total lack

            of communication preventing an  adequate defense."  That same

            day, the court also empaneled the jury for the case.

                      On  December  6,  1993,  two  days  before  opening

            statements  were scheduled  to  be delivered,  Growe filed  a

            second motion  to  withdraw.   Again,  Pierce joined  in  the

            motion.    On December  7, 1993,  the  district court  held a

            hearing to address the motion.  The essence of Growe's second

            withdrawal request was that  his relationship with Pierce had

            deteriorated  to  the point  where  (1)  Pierce was  ignoring

            Growe's advice and talking  to the press about the  case; and

                                         -3-
                                          3

            (2)  Pierce  believed  Growe  was  wrongfully  providing  the

            government with  "vital  information."   After inquiring  for

            some time into  the basis  for the second  motion, the  court

            denied it.  In so doing, the court pointed out  that the case

            was "literally  on the eve of  trial."  It also  stated:  "At

            some point, the Court has to take the position that the whole

            system just cannot be  -- come down  to its knees because  of

            the inability of the  defendant and counsel to agree on -- on

            how their case  should be  tried."  The  court did,  however,

            grant Growe's motion to  withdraw from representing Pierce in

            another  matter  that  was  scheduled  to  go  to  trial  the

            following month.

                      The  next  day,  the   jury  was  sworn  and  trial

            commenced.  On December  10, 1993,  the jury  returned guilty

            verdicts on both counts  of the indictment.  On  February 25,

            1994, Pierce  moved for  the appointment  of new counsel  for

            sentencing, and  on  March 16,  1994, the  court granted  the

            motion, appointing Pierce's present counsel to replace Growe.

            Meanwhile,  on  February 24,  1994,  the  government filed  a

            complaint seeking  civil forfeiture  of the  $3,333.50 seized

            from  Pierce at  the time  of his  arrest.   See 21  U.S.C.  
                                                         ___

            881(a)(6)  (subjecting to  civil forfeiture  "[m]oneys .  . .

            intended  to be  furnished by  any person  in exchange  for a

            controlled substance").   On April  5, 1994, Pierce  filed an

                                         -4-
                                          4

            answer  to  the  complaint.    Subsequently,  the  government

            withdrew its claim as to $1,000.

                      On October 20, 1994, Magistrate-Judge Beaulieu held

            a  bench trial on the  forfeiture action, and  on October 25,

            1994,  he  issued an  order of  forfeiture  in the  amount of

            $2,333.50.   Judgment entered on October 31, 1994.  That same

            day,  Pierce filed a motion  to dismiss the  criminal case on

            double jeopardy  grounds.   On  November 1,  1994, the  court

            orally denied the motion to dismiss and proceeded to sentence

            Pierce.

                      The  court  first  determined  that  Pierce's  base

            offense level was 18 for  the conspiracy conviction.  Relying

            on a 1984 Florida "withheld adjudication" in which Pierce had

            pleaded nolo  contendere to a charge  of delivering cannabis,
                    ____  __________

            and a 1985 Florida sexual battery conviction, the  court then

            adjusted  this level to 32  because it determined that Pierce

            was a "career offender" under U.S.S.G.   4B1.1 (1994) (person

            who  is more than eighteen  years old, stands  convicted of a

            crime of violence or a controlled  substance offense, and has

            two prior felony convictions for either crimes of violence or

            controlled substance offenses is a career offender subject to

            an  upward adjustment  of his base  offense level).   Because

            Pierce's  criminal  history category  was  VI,  see id.  (all
                                                            ___ ___

            career offenders have criminal history categories of VI), the

            applicable guideline  range was 210 to  the statutory maximum

                                         -5-
                                          5

            of 240 months.  The court then sentenced Pierce to 210 months

            on  his conspiracy conviction, and to the mandatory 60 months

            consecutive sentence on his firearm conviction, see 18 U.S.C.
                                                            ___

               924(c)(1) (firearm  sentence  must be  consecutive to  the

            underlying  sentence), for  a total  sentence of  270 months'

            imprisonment.  This appeal followed.

                                         II.
                                         II.
                                         ___

                      Pierce  makes five  arguments on  appeal:   (1) the

            entry  of judgment  in the  civil forfeiture action  bars the

            instant  criminal prosecution  under  the  Fifth  Amendment's

            Double  Jeopardy Clause; (2) the denial of the two motions to

            withdraw  constituted an  abuse of  discretion and  led to  a

            violation of his Sixth Amendment rights; (3) the 1984 Florida

            withheld adjudication was not a "conviction" cognizable under

            the  career offender  provisions of  the guidelines;  (4) the

            1985 Florida sexual  battery conviction was  not a "crime  of

            violence" as  that  term is  defined by  the career  offender

            provisions;  and (5) a conspiracy conviction cannot predicate

            a finding that a  defendant is a career offender.  We discuss

            each in turn.

            A.  Double Jeopardy
            A.  Double Jeopardy
            ___________________

                      Pierce  first contends  that  the  Double  Jeopardy

            Clause precluded  the  government from  further pursuing  his

            criminal  prosecution  once  judgment  entered  in  the civil

            forfeiture action.   In Pierce's view, the civil and criminal

                                         -6-
                                          6

            actions  were separate  proceedings arising  out of  the same

            criminal acts  and instituted  by the federal  government for

            penal  purposes.    See  United States  v.  $405,089.23  U.S.
                                ___  _____________      _________________

            Currency,  33  F.3d 1210,  1216-22  (9th  Cir. 1994)  (Double
            ________

            Jeopardy Clause is violated where the same criminal acts give

            rise to  both a criminal  prosecution and  a separate,  civil

            forfeiture  action   under  21  U.S.C.      881(a)(6);  civil

            forfeiture under   881(a)(6) is "punishment"); but see United
                                                           ___ ___ ______

            States  v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 297-300 (5th Cir.) (deeming a
            ______     ______

            particular civil forfeiture brought  under   881(a)(6) not to

            be punishment), cert.  denied, 115 S. Ct. 573  (1994); United
                            _____  ______                          ______

            States v.  One Single  Family Residence,  13 F.3d  1493, 1499
            ______     ____________________________

            (11th  Cir.  1994) (viewing  a  criminal  prosecution and  an

            overlapping  forfeiture  action  to  be part  of  "a  single,

            coordinated prosecution"); United  States v.  Millan, 2  F.3d
                                       ______________     ______

            17, 19-21 (2d Cir. 1993) (same), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922
                                             _____ ______

            (1994).   Besides arguing  that we should  reject $405,089.23
                                                              ___________

            and  adopt  the  reasoning   of  Tilley,  One  Single  Family
                                             ______   ___________________

            Residence,  and Millan,  the  government  responds  that  the
            _________       ______

            Double Jeopardy Clause, if violated, would bar only the civil

            forfeiture proceeding, and not Pierce's criminal prosecution.

            Because we agree with this last argument, we reject  Pierce's

            double  jeopardy  challenge  without  deciding   whether  the

            forfeiture action was a separate penal proceeding.

                                         -7-
                                          7

                      In relevant part,  the Fifth Amendment states  that

            no person  shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice

            put in  jeopardy of life  or limb."   It is  well established

            that  this  Double  Jeopardy  Clause  protects  against  both

            successive  punishments and  successive prosecutions  for the

            same  criminal offense.  E.g., United States v. Dixon, 113 S.
                                     ____  _____________    _____

            Ct.  2849, 2855 (1993).  The Clause does not even potentially

            come into play, however, until  the defendant has first  been

            put  into jeopardy.    Crist v.  Bretz,  437 U.S.  28,  32-33
                                   _____     _____

            (1978).  And even then, it is only the second proceeding that
                                                   ______

            is constitutionally endangered, for the Clause's basic design

            is  "to protect  an individual  from being  subjected to  the

            hazards of  trial and possible conviction more  than once for
                                                      ____  ____ ____

            an alleged offense."   Green v. United States, 355  U.S. 184,
                                   _____    _____________

            187 (1957) (emphasis supplied).

                      Our inquiry therefore reduces to whether Pierce was

            first subjected  to jeopardy for the  conduct underlying this

            action prior  to jeopardy attaching in this action.  Plainly,
                   _____  __

            he  was  not.   It is  settled  that jeopardy  attaches  in a

            criminal  jury case  when the  jury  is empaneled  and sworn.

            E.g.,  Crist, 437  U.S. at  35.   Pierce's criminal  jury was
            ____   _____

            empaneled on December 1, 1993, and sworn on December 8, 1993,

            several months prior to the inception of the civil forfeiture

            proceeding.  Thus, any double jeopardy problem arising out of

                                         -8-
                                          8

            the institution  of the civil forfeiture  proceeding can only

            be seen as imperiling that proceeding.

                      Pierce  does   not  challenge  any   of  the  legal

            principles  we have  set  forth;  nor  does he  dispute  that

            jeopardy first attached in the criminal proceeding.  Instead,

            he  disagrees with  our mode  of analysis.   Focusing  on the

            Double  Jeopardy  Clause's  prohibition   against  successive

            punishments, Pierce contends  that the  moment of  punishment
            ___________

            controls, asserting  that "the  issue is  not  so much  which

            jeopardy attaches first as which jeopardy is first complete."

            Because  jeopardy first "became complete," and punishment was

            first  imposed   (in  the  form  of   the  judgment  ordering

            forfeiture) in  the civil proceeding, Pierce  argues that his

            sentence in this case  is a "successive punishment" precluded

            by the Clause.  We are not persuaded.

                      Pierce's argument that the "completion" of jeopardy

            triggers  the Clause's protections  completely disregards the

            fact  that  the  Clause   protects  against  more  than  just

            successive punishments; it  also protects against  successive

            prosecutions.    To  illustrate, if  Pierce's  argument  were

            correct, he would not have been entitled to assert the double

            jeopardy bar in the  civil forfeiture action because jeopardy

            had  not yet  been "completed"  in this  criminal proceeding.

            Patently,  however, Pierce  was  so entitled  (presuming,  of

                                         -9-
                                          9

            course,  that the  forfeiture  action was  both separate  and

            punitive).  The Supreme Court has made quite clear that 

                      the  State  with  all its  resources  and
                      power  should  not  be  allowed  to  make
                      repeated    attempts   to    convict   an
                      individual   for   an  alleged   offense,
                      thereby subjecting  him to embarrassment,
                      expense  and ordeal and compelling him to
                      live in a continuing state of anxiety and
                      insecurity,  as  well  as  enhancing  the
                      possibility that even though  innocent he
                      may be found guilty.

            Green,  355  U.S. at  187.   This  sentiment, along  with the
            _____

            accused's interest  in retaining a chosen  jury, has fostered

            the view that jeopardy attaches in a jury trial when the jury

            is empaneled  and sworn.  See  Crist, 437 U.S. at  35-36.  It
                                      ___  _____

            also  has led  to the  rule that  the denial  of a  motion to

            dismiss on double jeopardy grounds is immediately appealable.

            Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661-62 (1977).    
            _____    _____________

                      Although  he  does  not say  so  explicitly, Pierce

            implies that  a criminal defendant  should have the  right to

            withhold objection to a  forbidden successive prosecution and

            raise a double jeopardy  argument only in the event  that the

            second  prosecution   leads  to  a  prior   and  less  severe

            punishment than that  meted out  in the original  case.   Put

            another way, a defendant  ought to have the option  to endure

            an  unconstitutional second  trial in  the hope that  it will

            both conclude first  and lead  to a  more lenient  punishment

            than  that eventually imposed in the first trial, and then to

            object to the punishment imposed in the first trial on double

                                         -10-
                                          10

            jeopardy grounds.  We cannot locate  any authority to support

            this proposition, and we reject it out of hand.

                      The Double Jeopardy Clause  is a shield against the

            oppression inherent in a duplicative, punitive proceeding; it

            is not a tool by which a defendant can avoid the consequences

            of  the proceeding in which jeopardy first attached.  The law

            of double jeopardy is quite complicated, and often (as here),

            the question whether a  second proceeding violates the Clause

            is  a close one.   Because, under Article  III of the Federal

            Constitution,  the  question  can  only be  answered  in  the

            context  of an actual case  or controversy, the  public has a

            strong interest in the government being able to institute the

            second proceeding without risking the first.  After all,  the

            government should  not be dissuaded from  bringing legitimate

            penal  proceedings,  and  opposing  counsel  and  the  courts

            (including the appellate  courts, see Abney, 431 U.S. at 661-
                                              ___ _____

            62)  are  there  to  protect the  defendant's  rights  if the

            government has miscalculated.  This simply is not a situation

            where  the price to society of allowing a defendant to parlay

            the government's miscalculation into a "get out of jail free"

            card is worth the deterrent effect such a regime might have.

                      Pierce's   theory   of  completed   jeopardy  would

            effectively trade away some  of the most valuable protections

            of the Double Jeopardy  Clause for rather dubious gains.   We

                                         -11-
                                          11

            therefore reject it,  and overrule  Pierce's double  jeopardy

            challenge to the penalty imposed in this proceeding.

            B.  Denial of Motions to Withdraw
            B.  Denial of Motions to Withdraw
            _________________________________

                      Pierce  next  asserts  that  the  district  court's

            denial of the two motions to withdraw constituted an abuse of

            discretion  and led  to  a violation  of his  Sixth Amendment

            rights.  To  the extent that Pierce is  taking issue with the

            adequacy  of  his  representation  after the  denial  of  the

            motions, we  think that his fact-specific  argument should be

            more fully developed and  presented to the district  court in

            the first instance.  Accordingly, we decline to address it at

            this  time.  See, e.g.,  United States v.  Jadusingh, 12 F.3d
                         ___  ____   _____________     _________

            1162,  1169-70 (1st  Cir.  1994)  (fact-specific  ineffective

            assistance claims ordinarily ought  first be presented to the

            district court in a 28 U.S.C.   2255 petition).  We therefore

            limit our  focus to  whether, in  light of the  then-existing
                                                            _____________

            circumstances,  the court erred  in denying the  motion.  Cf.
                                                                      ___

            United  States v. Torres, 793  F.2d 436, 440  (1st Cir. 1986)
            ______________    ______

            (in  evaluating the denial of  a motion for  a continuance to

            obtain new counsel, "we must pay particular attention to `the

            reasons  presented to the trial judge at the time the request
                                                  __ ___ ____ ___ _______

            is denied'") (quoting  Ungar v. Sarafite,  376 U.S. 575,  589
            __ ______              _____    ________

            (1964)) (emphasis supplied).  We detect no error.

                      In the analogous context of a challenge to a denial

            of a defendant's motion to substitute counsel, we have stated

                                         -12-
                                          12

            that  we  will  "consider  several   factors,  including  the

            timeliness of the motion, the adequacy of the court's inquiry

            into  the defendant's  complaint,  and whether  the  conflict

            between  the defendant and his  counsel was so  great that it

            resulted  in  a total  lack  of  communication preventing  an

            adequate defense."  United  States v. Allen, 789 F.2d  90, 92
                                ______________    _____

            (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 846 (1986).  Of course, we
                        _____ ______

            are aware that the  trial court has a superior  vantage point

            for  evaluating  matters such  as  these;  we therefore  will

            reverse  only if we perceive an abuse of discretion.  See id.
                                                                  ___ ___

            We also are  mindful that when, as here, the  granting of the

            defendant's  request  would  almost certainly  necessitate  a

            last-minute   continuance,  the  trial  judge's  actions  are

            entitled to  extraordinary deference.   As the  Supreme Court

            has stated:

                      Trial judges necessarily require  a great
                      deal  of  latitude in  scheduling trials.
                      Not the  least of their  problems is that
                      of assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and
                      jurors  at  the same  place  at the  same
                      time,  and  this burden  counsels against
                      continuances   except   for    compelling
                      reasons.   Consequently, broad discretion
                      must  be granted trial  courts on matters
                      of continuances; only an  unreasoning and
                      arbitrary         "insistence        upon
                      expeditiousness   in   the   face  of   a
                      justifiable  request for  delay" violates
                      the right to assistance of counsel.

            Morris v. Slappy,  461 U.S. 1,  11-12 (1983) (quoting  Ungar,
            ______    ______                                       _____

            376 U.S. at 589).

                                         -13-
                                          13

                      In  view  of all  these  considerations,  the trial

            court's  decisions pass muster.  Taking first the final Allen
                                                                    _____

            factor, we note that, while Pierce has adduced proof that his

            relationship with  Growe was beset with problems,  he has not

            established  a total  lack  of  communication  preventing  an

            adequate  defense.  The record reveals  that Growe and Pierce

            were conversing  with one  another and had  some appreciation

            for  the other's opinions  and sensibilities at  the time the

            motions were filed.   We therefore have no basis  to conclude

            that the district  court clearly  erred in  finding that  the

            communication between the  counsel and client  was sufficient

            to  allow a satisfactory defense.   Cf. Allen, 793 F.2d at 92
                                                ___ _____

            (noting the discretion afforded to trial court determinations

            regarding substitution of counsel).   

                      Furthermore, when  presented with the  motions, the

            court  held hearings at which  it questioned Growe and Pierce

            at  some length regarding  the nature of  their problems with

            each other.  We  have read the transcripts of  these hearings

            and  find  the  court's  inquiries  to have  been  more  than

            adequate.   If  there  is  a  relative  lack  of  specificity

            regarding  the exact  reasons  for  the difficulties  between

            Growe and Pierce, it is a result of a lack  of elaboration on

            their part.   It certainly  is not a  result of  insufficient

            questioning by the court.

                                         -14-
                                          14

                      Finally,   the  motions   were,  by   any  measure,

            untimely.    Although we  appreciate  that  the docket  moves

            quickly in the District of Maine, the fact remains that Growe

            waited until the day  before empanelment before notifying the

            court  that there was a  problem.  More  importantly, a quick

            docket does not alleviate  the logistical problems engendered

            by a last-minute continuance.  See Morris, 461 U.S. at 11-12.
                                           ___ ______

            Nor  can  it  allay  the legitimate  concerns  about  witness

            intimidation   the  government  may   have  when  a  criminal

            defendant is in possession of Jencks material well before the

            inception of trial.  

                      In  sum, because  the circumstances  here  were not

            sufficiently compelling, the district court acted well within

            its discretion  in declining  to bring  the proceedings  to a

            halt  on  the eve  of trial.    We therefore  reject Pierce's

            argument  that the district  court committed reversible error

            in denying the two motions to withdraw.

            C.  The 1984 Florida Withheld Adjudication
            C.  The 1984 Florida Withheld Adjudication
            __________________________________________

                      Pierce  argues  that  the district  court  erred in

            concluding  that the  1984 Florida  withheld adjudication  in

            which he  had pleaded nolo contendere  to delivering cannabis
                                  ____ __________

            constitutes a cognizable predicate conviction for purposes of

            the  relevant "career  offender" guideline.   See  U.S.S.G.  
                                                          ___

            4B1.1.   In  Pierce's  view, a  withheld adjudication  simply

            cannot  be regarded  as a  "conviction" under  this guideline

                                         -15-
                                          15

            because the term  "conviction" necessarily implies the  entry

            of a  final  adjudicatory judgment.    A careful  reading  of

            relevant guideline language and commentary persuades us  that

            Pierce's argument is incorrect.

                      Although there  is surface  appeal to the  argument

            that  there can be no  "conviction" unless and  until a final

            adjudicatory judgment is  entered, the sentencing  guidelines

            clearly  construe  the term  differently.   Section 4B1.2(3),

            which defines the terms used  in   4B1.1, states:  "The  date

            that a defendant has sustained a conviction shall be the date

            that the guilt of the defendant has been established, whether
                 ___ _____

            by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere." (emphasis
                                              ____ __________

            supplied).   Thus,  there is  a textual  basis in  the career

            offender guidelines for concluding that  a guilt-establishing

            event (such  as a plea where a  defendant states that he does

            not wish to contest the charges), and not the formal entry of

            an adjudicatory  judgment, determines whether  and when there

            has been a countable "conviction." 

                      This view  is borne  out by the  relevant guideline

            commentary.    Application note  4  to     4B1.2 directs  the

            sentencing  court  to  utilize  the  provisions  of     4A1.2

            (captioned  "Definitions  and   Instructions  for   Computing

            Criminal History")  in "the  counting of convictions  under  

            4B1.1."  Two provisions of   4A1.2 compel the conclusion that

            withheld adjudications following pleas of nolo contendere are
                                                      ____ __________

                                         -16-
                                          16

            countable convictions  under    4B1.2.  First,    4A1.2(a)(4)

            drives  home the point that there can be a "conviction" prior

            to,   and  therefore   without,  the   formal  entry   of  an

            adjudicatory  judgment:    "`Convicted  of  an  offense'  for

            purposes  of this  provision,  means that  the  guilt of  the

            defendant  has  been  established, whether  by  guilty  plea,

            trial,  or plea of nolo  contendere."  And    4A1.2(f), which
                               ____  __________

            governs     diversionary    dispositions     like    withheld

            adjudications, is  quite clear  that admissions of  guilt (or

            pleas  formally  declining  to  contest  guilt),  rather than

            formal entries of judgment, control countability:  

                      Diversion   from  the   judicial  process
                      without   a   finding  of   guilt  (e.g.,
                                                          ____
                      deferred prosecution) is not  counted [as
                      a  prior  sentence].     A   diversionary
                      disposition resulting from  a finding  or
                      admission of  guilt, or  a  plea of  nolo
                                                           ____
                      contendere, in a  judicial proceeding  is
                      __________
                      counted  as a  sentence under    4A1.1(c)
                      [of the criminal history guidelines] even
                      if a conviction  is not formally entered,
                      except  that    diversion  from  juvenile
                      court is not counted.

            The  application  note  corresponding  to  the  provision  is

            explanatory of  its  purposes:   "Section  4A1.2(f)  requires

            counting   prior  adult  diversionary  dispositions  if  they

            involved a judicial determination of guilt or an admission of

            guilt  in open court.  This reflects a policy that defendants

            who  receive the  benefit  of a  rehabilitative sentence  and

            continue  to commit crimes should not be treated with further

            leniency."    4A1.2, comment. (n.9).

                                         -17-
                                          17

                      Employing  an  extremely  literal  reading,  Pierce

            suggests that these guideline provisions are relevant only to

            the "counting" of convictions, and  that they have no bearing

            on  whether a  particular  event  should  be "defined"  as  a

            conviction.  The difference between "counting" and "defining"

            convictions  in  this  context is,  however,  only  semantic.

            Section 4B1.1 directs that "convictions" of a certain type be

            counted, and other guidelines and  commentary which elaborate

            upon the events to  be counted essentially define that  which

            is  a conviction.  In other words, the sentencing court is to

            "count"  whatever is "defined" as a conviction (so long as it

            is  for  a  crime  of  violence  or  a  controlled  substance

            offense).

                      When     4A1.2(a)(4)  and  (f) are  applied to  the

            question presented (as    4B1.2, comment. (n.4) dictates), it

            becomes clear that the diversionary disposition at issue here

            --  the  1984  Florida  withheld adjudication  --  should  be

            counted as a  conviction under   4B1.1   See United States v.
                                                     ___ _____________

            Jones,  910  F.2d  760, 761  (11th  Cir.  1990) (per  curiam)
            _____                                            ___  ______

            (withheld  adjudication  following  a  nolo  contendere  plea
                                                   ____  __________

            constitutes  a conviction  for career  offender status).   We

            therefore reject Pierce's  argument that  the district  court

            erred in  counting the  withheld adjudication as  a predicate

            conviction for purposes of the career offender guideline.

            D.  The 1985 Florida Sexual Battery
            D.  The 1985 Florida Sexual Battery
            ___________________________________

                                         -18-
                                          18

                      Pierce's fourth argument is that the district court

            erred in deciding that his 1985 Florida conviction for sexual

            battery is a  "crime of violence" and  therefore a cognizable

            predicate conviction for purposes of   4B1.1.  Central to his

            argument  is  an  assertion  that the  statute  defining  the

            offense  for  which  he  was  convicted,  Fla.  Stat. Ann.   

            794.011(5), does  not, inter  alia, have  as an element  "the
                                   _____  ____

            use,  attempted  use  or  threatened use  of  physical  force

            against  the person  of another."   See    4B1.2(1) (defining
                                                ___

            phrase  "crime  of  violence"   for  purposes  of     4B1.1).

            Regardless  of whether  Pierce is  correct about  the current
                                                                  _______

            version  of  the statute  (a matter  on  which we  express no

            opinion), a  plain reading of the statute  under which Pierce

            was convicted reveals that, in 1985,  the use of force was an
                                                                   ___

            element of the  offense.   See Fla. Stat.  Ann.    794.011(5)
                                       ___

            (West  1984) ("A  person who  commits sexual  battery  upon a

            person  12  years  of  age or  older,  without  that person's

            consent, and in the  process thereof uses physical force  and
                                                 ____ ________ _____  ___

            violence  not  likely to  cause  serious  personal injury  is
            ________

            guilty of  a  felony .  .  . .")  (emphasis supplied).    And

            because the statutory formulation of the predicate crime, and

            not the actual facts of the case itself, dictates whether the

            offense  is a crime of  violence for purposes  of the federal

            sentencing guidelines,  see United States v.  DeLuca, 17 F.3d
                                    ___ _____________     ______

            6, 8 (1st Cir. 1994), our inquiry is at an end.

                                         -19-
                                          19

                      The  1985 Florida  sexual  battery was  a crime  of

            violence  under    4B1.2(1).   We  therefore reject  Pierce's

            argument that the district court erred in counting the sexual

            battery as a predicate conviction for purposes of the  career

            offender guideline.

            E.  Conspiracy and Career Offender Status
            E.  Conspiracy and Career Offender Status
            _________________________________________

                      Pierce's final  claim, made solely to  preserve the

            issue  for further  appeal, is  that a  conspiracy conviction

            cannot  serve  as  a  triggering  or  predicate  offense  for

            purposes   of  the   career   offender  guideline.     Pierce

            acknowledges that we recently decided this issue against him,

            see United States  v. Piper,  35 F.3d 611,  616-19 (1st  Cir.
            ___ _____________     _____

            1994),  cert. denied, 115 S.  Ct. 1118 (1995),  and that this
                    _____ ______

            panel is  duty-bound to  follow Piper,  see, e.g.,  Metcalf &
                                            _____   ___  ____   _________

            Eddy,  Inc. v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth., 991 F.2d
            ___________    ____________________________________

            935,  939 n.3  (1st Cir.  1993) ("in  a  multi-panel circuit,

            newly constituted  panels, generally speaking,  are bound  by

            prior decisions on point").  We therefore reject the claim.

                                         III.
                                         III.
                                         ____

                      For  the  reasons  stated   above,  we  affirm  the

            convictions and sentence of defendant Frederick Alan Pierce.

                      Affirmed.
                      Affirmed
                      ________

                                         -20-
                                          20