Court Opinion

ID: 9746059
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 13:55:00.200178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:20.691190
License: Public Domain

MOSK, J.
I concur in the result because California law appears to, be that a trial court may not disqualify an attorney for mere exposure to confidential information of the opposing party—that is, when there is no evidence that the attorney actually received or used such information. (In re Complex Asbestos Litigation (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 572, 589 [283 Cal.Rptr. 732] [“Mere exposure to the confidences of an adversary does not, standing alone, warrant disqualification”]; Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 294, 302-304 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 906]; Maruman Integrated *851Circuits, Inc. v. Consortium Co. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 443, 448 [212 Cal.Rptr. 497].)
I write separately, however, because I share the trial court’s unease with the facts here. Health Net, Inc., legal department employee Cynthia Brockett (Brockett) undisputedly accessed litigant Khybrette Neal’s (Neal) Health Net legal file and then, while still an employee of Health Net, met Neal’s attorney, Michael S. Traylor (Traylor) concerning her claim against Health Net. Brockett retained Traylor as her lawyer in connection with her claim. Both Brockett’s and Neal’s claims were for wrongful termination and discrimination, and thus both cases involved Health Net’s employment practices.
There are practical problems with the rule applied in this case. Even if none of Health Net’s confidential information was actually transmitted to Traylor by Brockett, the facts create a “nagging suspicion” that Neal and Traylor have been “unfairly benefitted” in litigating against Health Net. (See MMR/Wallace Power & Indus, v. Thames Associates (D.Conn. 1991) 764 F.Supp. 712, 727.) It is difficult for a litigant in the position of Health Net to establish actual receipt of confidential information by opposing counsel. (See, e.g., id. at p. 726 [“Of course, it is impossible to know for certain what information was actually discussed at attorney Forstadt’s meeting with Willett”].) Exposure of any communication between Traylor and his client Brockett cannot be compelled because it is protected by the attorney-client privilege. Moreover, “[e]ven if proof of receipt of confidential information is available . . . , ‘[one] may not be able to use it for fear of disclosure of the very confidences [one] wishes to be protected.’ [Citations.]” (NCK Org’n Ltd. v. Bregman (2d Cir. 1976) 542 F.2d 128, 135.) Demanding proof of actual possession of protected information, and thereby requiring its revelation, “undermine[s] the very purpose of protecting the confidentiality of the fiduciary attorney-client relationship.” (Ibid.; see also Williams v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (W.D.Mo. 1984) 588 F.Supp. 1037, 1043 [“To hold a hearing on whether Campbell Schanck has conveyed confidential information would very likely compromise the confidences”].)
Both Traylor and Brockett testified that no confidential information was acquired or transmitted. There is no evidence to the contrary. Even if we assume, as we do, that their testimony is truthful, what occurred leaves the unfortunate appearance that confidential information is vulnerable to disclosure. This appearance jeopardizes the public trust in the integrity of the bar.
The facts in Hull v. Celanese Corporation (2d Cir. 1975) 513 F.2d 568 (Hull) were somewhat similar to those in the instant case. In Hull, an *852attorney working for a corporate defendant in an employment case retained the plaintiff’s attorney to represent him in his claim against his employer. The court affirmed the disqualification of the plaintiff’s attorney. The court said, “the court need not ‘inquire whether the lawyer did, in fact, receive confidential information . . . .’ [Citation.] Rather, ‘where “it can reasonably be said that ... the attorney might have acquired information related to the subject matter of his subsequent representation,” [citation], it is the court’s duty to order the attorney disqualified.’ [Citation.] The breach of confidence would not have to be proved; it is presumed in order to preserve the spirit of the Code [of Professional Responsibility].” (Id. at p. 572, italics omitted; see also Ernie Industries, Inc. v. Patentex, Inc. (2d Cir. 1973) 478 F.2d 562, 571; In re Complex Asbestos Litigation, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at pp. 584, 593 [trial court found “reasonable probability” that confidential information was disclosed or used, presuming use once access to information was proven].)
Generally, courts have held that a party’s interest in not having confidential information used unfairly against it and the integrity of the judicial process outweigh a litigant’s choice of counsel. (See Hull, supra, 513 F.2d at p. 572; NCK Org’n Ltd. v. Bregman, supra, 542 F.2d at pp. 134-135; Williams v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., supra, 588 F.Supp. at p. 1046.) Our Supreme Court has agreed that these ethical concerns prevail over expediency and a litigant’s choice of counsel. (Comden v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 906, 915 [145 Cal.Rptr. 9, 576 P.2d 971, 5 A.L.R.4th 562].)
I acknowledge that disqualification should not result from every situation in which counsel had access to an opposing party’s confidential information. For example, there are occasions in which inadvertent access by an attorney to the opposing party’s confidential information does not, and should not, result in disqualification of the attorney. (State Comp. Ins. Fund v. WPS, Inc. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 644 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 799] [inadvertent disclosure of attorney-client privileged documents during discovery].)
Here, plaintiff’s attorney, Traylor, met with an adverse party’s current employee, Brackett, who worked in the defendant’s legal department and who had intentionally accessed confidential information about plaintiff’s lawsuit. The subject of the conversation between Traylor and Brackett involved the same subject as was involved in Neal’s case—Health Net’s employment practices. Under these circumstances, mere access should be sufficient to at least give the trial judge discretion to order disqualification. (See Triple A Machine Shop, Inc. v. State of California (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 131, 144 [261 Cal.Rptr. 493] [“Nor is respondent without remedy if appellants inadvertently or improperly obtain access to privileged information. If opposing counsel’s conduct is sufficiently egregious, the court may disqualify him or her from further participation in the case”].) *853I believe the law ought to be that access to an opposing party’s confidential information without proof of actual knowledge of the confidential information, can, in the discretion of the trial court, be a basis for disqualification of counsel—at least in situations such as the instant case. The trial court is in the best position to determine whether the access is such that the integrity of the judicial process would be compromised absent disqualification.
A petition for a rehearing was denied August 19, 2002, and respondents’ petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied October 30, 2002.