Court Opinion

ID: 9671245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:33:21.41147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:08.893357
License: Public Domain

BECKER, Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur in the result. However, I cannot accept the broad statement, “An officer may search an automobile if he has reasonable or probable cause for believing it contains items which offend against the law.” This is the thesis of Mr. Justice White’s dissent in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564. Five (not four) Justices of the United States Supreme Court clearly rejected Mr. Justice White’s position in Division II of the majority opinion. I therefore believe the majority opinion as now written is in error when it implies that the view of a majority of the court accepts Mr. Justice White’s extension of the Carroll doctrine. The key vote in this analysis is that of Mr. Justice Harlan who said in part:
“Because of Mapp and Ker, however, this case must be judged in terms of federal standards, and on that basis I concur, although not without difficulty, in Parts I, II-D, and III of the Court’s opinion and in the judgment of the court. It must be recognized that the case is a close one. The reason I am tipped in favor of Mr. Justice Stewart’s position is that a contrary result in this case would, I fear, go far towards relegating the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to a position of little consequence in federal search and seizure law, a course which seems to me opposite to the one we took in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), two Terms ago.” (loc. cit. at p. 491, 91 S.Ct. at p. 2050, 29 L.Ed.2d at pp. 597-598).
Mr. Justice Harlan’s position must be clear from his dissent in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), where he states in part:
“In sustaining the search of the automobile I believe the Court ignores the framework of our past decisions circumscribing the scope of permissible search without a warrant. The Court has long read the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of ‘unreasonable’ searches as imposing a general principle that a search without a warrant is not justified by the mere knowledge by the searching officers of facts showing probable cause. The ‘general requirement that a search warrant be obtained’ is basic to the Amendment’s protection of privacy, and ‘ “the burden is on those seeking [an] exemption * * * to show the need for it.” ’ (Cases cited).
“Fidelity to this established principle requires that, where exceptions are made to accommodate the exigencies of particular situations, those exceptions be no broader than necessitated by the circumstances presented. * * (loc. cit. 399 U.S. at 61, 90 S.Ct. at 1986, 26 L.Ed.2d at 433-434).
“ * * * The Court holds that those steps include making a warrantless search of the entire vehicle on the highway — a conclusion reached by the Court in Carroll without discussion — and indeed appears to go further and to condone the removal of the car to the police station for a warrantless search there at the convenience of the police. I cannot agree that this result is consistent with our insistence in other areas that departures from the warrant requirement *659strictly conform to the exigency presented.” (loc. cit. 399 U.S. at 62-63, 90 S.Ct. at 1987, 26 L.Ed.2d at 434-435).
It is therefore unwise and unwarranted to accept Mr. Justice White’s probable cause-warrantless search doctrine as the view of a majority of the United States Supreme Court. Besides it is unnecessary. Here it can be found the driver and owner of the vehicle gave consent. This additional prickly point need not be handled.
In this case the evidence of consent to search is sufficiently satisfactory for me. I would affirm on that basis.