Court Opinion

ID: 9632536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:18:22.212741+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:17.859022
License: Public Domain

Wendell L. Griffen, Judge, dissenting. Although the majority professes continued allegiance to the long-settled principle that a change of custody requires proof that a material change of circumstances has occurred since the last custody order, and that a change of custody is indeed in the best interest of the child, today it has reversed a trial court decision which found a material change in circumstances, but also found that appellant, a noncustodial parent, failed to prove that a change of custody to her was in the best interest of the child. I do not understand how this result is consistent with the clearly erroneous standard of review. It is not consistent with our practice of deferring to trial court assessments of witness credibility in this sensitive area of Arkansas law. Instead, the majority opinion abandons our established standard of review while paying lip service to it, and amounts to a transparent exercise in redeciding credibility issues in a child-custody case. Moreover, the majority opinion asserts the logically implausible proposition that a party who initiates a change of custody proceeding does not have to prove that a change of custody is in the best interest of the child. Aside from being logically implausible, that proposition violates years of Arkansas case law as well as an Arkansas statute. The law in this case is well established: For a trial court to change the custody of children, it must first determine that a material change in circumstances has transpired from the time of the divorce decree and, then, determine that a change in custody is in the best interest of the child. Lewellyn v. Lewellyn, 351 Ark. 346, 355, 93 S.W.3d 681, 686 (2002) (citing Lloyd v. Butts, 343 Ark. 620, 37 S.W.3d 603 (2001)). One of our very recent decisions, authored by Judge Neal, addressed the legal requirements for a change of custody: Custody should not be changed unless conditions have altered since the decree was rendered or material facts existed at the time of the decree but were unknown to the court, and then only for the welfare of the child. The court must first determine that a material change in circumstances has occurred since the last order of custody; if that threshold requirement is met, it must then determine who should have custody with the sole consideration being the best interest of the child. Middleton v. Middleton, 83 Ark. App. 7, 113 S.W.3d 625, 629 (2003) (citations omitted) (emphasis provided). The Middleton court also emphasized that “the party seeking modification has the burden of showing a material change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a change in custody.” Id. The court found that a “change of circumstances of the noncustodial parent, including a claim of an improved life because of recent marriage, is not alone sufficient to justify modifying custody.” Id. In another case, this court stated: The principles governing the modification of custodial orders are well-settled and require no citation. The primary consideration is the best interest and welfare of the child. All other considerations are secondary. Custody awards are not made or changed to punish or reward or gratify the desires of either parent. Although the chancery court retains continuing power over the matter of child custody after the initial award, the original decree is a final adjudication of the proper person to have care and custody of the child. Before that order can be changed, there must be proof of material facts which were unknown to the court at that time, or proof that the conditions have so materially changed as to warrant modification and that the best interest of the child requires it. The burden of proving such a change is on the party seeking the modification. Word v. Remick, 75 Ark. App. 390, 393, 58 S.W.3d 422, 424 (2001) (citations omitted) (emphasis provided). Before today’s decision, our court clearly recognized that the party seeking modification of custody bears the burden of proof to show a material change of circumstances and that a custody change is in the best interest of the child. The Word court also stated that upon appellate review we do not disturb the trial court’s findings unless clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 394, 58 S.W.3d at 424. The question of the preponderance of the evidence turns largely upon the credibility of the witnesses and we therefore defer to the trial court’s superior position to evaluate witness credibility. Id. In fact, in cases involving child custody, we particularly rely on the trial court’s “powers of perception” to evaluate the witnesses. Id., 58 S.W.3d at 424-25. From this, we should recognize that a trial court’s findings concerning material changes as well as what is in the best interest of the child are questions of fact; accordingly, we must apply the clearly-erroneous standard of review. Again, in Eaton v. Dixon, 69 Ark. App. 9, 9 S.W.3d 535 (2000), we acknowledged that [a] judicial award of child custody should not be modified unless it is shown that there are changed conditions that demonstrate that a'modification of the decree is in the best interest of the child, or when there is a showing of facts affecting the best interest of the child that were either not presented to the chancellor or were not known by the chancellor at the time the original custody order was entered. 69 Ark. App. at 11-12, 9 S.W.3d at 537 (citations omitted) (emphasis provided). In other words, the party seeking change of custody must show proof that there are changed conditions and that those changed conditions warrant a custody modification in the best interest of the child. The principle that the proponent of a change of custody carries the burden ofproofonboth the question of whether material changes exist and whether a change of custody is in the best interest of the child was also reflected in Jones v. Jones, 326 Ark. 481, 931 S.W.2d 767 (1996). In that case, our supreme court stated: A judicial award of custody should not be modified unless it is shown that there are changed conditions that demonstrate that a modification of the decree is in the best interest of the child, or when there is a showing of facts affecting the best interest of the child that were either not presented to the chancellor at the time of the original custody order or were not known by the chancellor at the time the original custody order was entered. 326 Ark. at 491, 931 S.W.2d at 772 (citations omitted) (emphasis provided). One simply cannot read this body of law and correctly conclude that the party seeking custody modification does not have the burden to prove that a change of custody is in the best interest of the child. See also Mason v. Mason, 82 Ark. App. 133, 111 S.W.3d 855 (2003) (employing similar language concerning the burden of proof). This long-settled body of case law is being distorted and disturbed by the decision in this case. The trial court found a change in circumstances, but refused to change custody because appellant failed to prove that a change of custody would be in the best interest of the child. Here, both parties presented obvious faults. Appellant’s private life involved factors, such as working in the adult industry, that put into question her suitability to obtain physical custody over her minor son. In fact, one of the witnesses, William P. Wilcox, director of children’s studies at Southeast Arkansas Behavioral Health Care System, conducted a psychological evaluation of the parties. Notably, the majority opinion omits the pertinent statements that were available to the trial court before it made the determinations now subject to this appeal. Wilcox testified that his studies “didn’t find what we usually look for, which is a compelling reason to recommend one parent over the other.” According to Wilcox, the minor child was also aware of appellant’s promiscuous conduct at her home. Wilcox clearly stated that the minor “did mention these men in the interview. But he said nothing derogatory about them.” Specifically, Wilcox testified as follows: ... But there again, you see, there’s that other side when [the minor] mentioned like several, several men that come to visit mother and you know, their wives don’t come. He said this very innocently, you know, kids are not aware of what it means to[,] you know, be unfaithful or questions of adultery and that sort of thing. .. . Based on this testimony, we should find that the trial court was not clearly erroneous when it decided not to change custody. Arkansas law has long been adamantly clear that a parent’s illicit sexual conduct in the presence of children is against the best interest of the children. We have never condoned a parent’s promiscuous conduct or lifestyle when such conduct has been in the presence of the children. Ketron v. Ketron (Aguirre), 15 Ark. App. 325, 692 S.W.2d 261 (1985) (allowing mother custody over the child, but ordering her to discontinue living arrangements with a man who was married but separated from his wife); see also Scherm v. Scherm, 12 Ark. App. 207, 671 S.W.2d 224 (1984) (terminating custody because of promiscuous conduct). In fact, the supreme court has held that we outright presume that illicit sexual conduct on the part of a custodial parent is detrimental to the children. Digby v. Digby, 263 Ark. 813, 567 S.W.2d 290 (1978). All of this merely goes to say that the trial court could properly consider appellant’s current lifestyle and conclude that it was not in the best interest of the child to change custody to her, or, similarly, conclude that appellant had failed to show how a change of custody would be in the best interest of the child. This is particularly notable in light of the fact that Wilcox also quite clearly stated that neither parent offered a compelling reason to recommend one over the other. After all, appellee’s life also was checkered by misbehavior and controversy. Appellee is now in his third marriage and demonstrated a history of unfaithfulness. He lost his police job because of a sexual affair he had with a colleague’s wife. At the time of the hearing, he was in the process of establishing a restaurant business, with the typical uncertainties associated with a new venture. However, appellant failed to show how appellee’s changed circumstances affected the minor son so as to make a custody change in the child’s best interest. Appellant also failed to show why a change of custody from one admittedly not so good situation to yet another not so good situation would be in the best interest of the child. Both parents appear inclined to promiscuous behavior. Testimony established that the minor was actually aware of appellant’s continued change of male visitors. Appellee had repeatedly remarried and had extramarital affairs. It further remains unclear why a change in appellant’s occupation ought to lead to a change of custody. Appellee testified —and this is something else the majority opinion does not mention — that he intended to work at the restaurant only when his wife is at home with the child and that his wife, alternately, intends to work at the restaurant only when he stays home. Appellee also testified that, in part, he went into the restaurant venture to have more time for his family. For us to now disregard those statements is tantamount to holding that appellee’s statements somehow deserve less credibility than the trial court afforded them. Such a holding flies into the face of our well-established standard of review and practice of deferring to the trial court’s superior position to assess witness credibility in child custody cases. The trial court explained its decision in terms of appellant’s failure to show an “adverse impact” on the child from appellee’s remarriages, extramarital relationships, and new business venture (the restaurant) because appellant argued that those factors posed an “adverse impact” on the child. In each instance, the trial court merely addressed appellant’s “adverse impact” contention; it did not impose a different standard from the “best interest of the child.” Indeed, the trial court found that appellant failed to prove that a change of custody is in the best interest of the child despite agreeing with appellant that appellee’s conduct amounted to a change of circumstances. The fundamental flaw in the majority decision arises from its casual affirmation of an utterly indefensible proposition; namely, that the party seeking a change of custody does not face the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a change in custody is in the best interest of the child. The majority admits that it is not reversible error for the trial court to “consider whether there was adverse impact on the child when determining whether a material change in circumstances has occurred.” The majority also does not prohibit a trial court, in determining the best interest of the child, from considering “whether the material change in circumstances had an adverse impact on the child.” But the majority then asserts that “once the noncustodial parent has established a material change in circumstances, the court is to weigh the best interest of the child to determine which parent shall serve as the custodian of the child.” No matter how the majority may assert otherwise, this is a new development in child custody law. It plainly does not square with the supreme court’s holdings in Llewelyn v. Llewelyn, supra, and Jones v. Jones, supra. The majority’s new standard also cannot be reconciled with the judicial fact-finding process in child-custody litigation. Whether a change in custody is in the best interest of a child is a question of Jact, not a matter of law. As such, the best-interest criterion is susceptible of, and must be attended by, some proof. Yet, the majority today holds that the noncustodial parent, as the party seeking a change in custody, has no duty to produce proof on the hest-interest criterion. Moreover, the majority holds that a trial court commits reversible error if it denies the noncustodial parent’s petition to change custody because the noncustodial parent failed to carry its burden of proof on the best-interest issue. No other reasonable inference can be drawn from today’s decision, especially in view of the language in the majority opinion stating that the trial court “is to weigh the best interest of the child to determine which parent shall serve as the custodian of the child.” The majority is clearly mistaken. Arkansas Code Annotated' section 16-40-101 (Repl. 1999) is unmistakably plain: (a) The party holding the affirmative of an issue must produce the evidence to prove it. (b) The burden of proof in the whole action lies on the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be given on either side. (Emphasis added.) This statute applies just as much to child custody cases as to any other litigation. Section 16-40-101(a) therefore disproves the position asserted in this majority opinion that the noncustodial parent is somehow absolved from the burden of producing evidence to prove that the best interest of the child is served by changing custody to that person. Any other interpretation mocks the plain wording of the statute, not to mention years of Arkansas case law. Moreover, no other interpretation makes sense when one undertakes appellate review. If the best-interest criterion is a separate factor to be decided by trial courts in child-custody litigation, and if trial court decisions in such matters are subject to appellate review upon a clearly erroneous standard, then appellate judges must base our review on the evidence presented to and weighed by the trial court. If trial courts may not rule against noncustodial parents who fail to produce evidence going to the best-interest-of-the-child factor, upon what basis is the best interest to be determined and trial court decisions on that issue reviewed? The majority opinion appears oblivious, if not insensitive, to the fundamental requirement that noncustodial parents are obliged to prove “best interest” as well as “changed circumstances” by a preponderance of the evidence, and that proof of changed circumstances does not obviate the need for or lower the burden of proof regarding best interest of the child. This decision highlights the important work done by trial judges in weighing conflicting testimony and assessing the credibility of the competing parties in child custody litigation. Our appellate decisions have frequently declared that in no other area of the law do we defer as much to the superior position of trial judges to evaluate witness demeanor and credibility. In the present case, the trial judge has the benefit of several interactions with the disputing parents. Appellant was the custodial parent initially when the parties divorced. Custody was later changed to appellee after the trial court decided that changed circumstances and the best interest of the child justified a change in the custodial arrangement. Now the trial judge, having the benefit of that experience plus his firsthand assessments of the parties in this latest change of custody proceeding, is being reversed by judges who have never seen the parties or assessed their credibility (except from reading the cold record). What is worse, the appellate judges now compel the trial judge to disregard Ark. Code Ann. § 16-40-101. Given the facts of this case and our clear jurisprudence on change of custody, I would hold that the trial court was not clearly erroneous when it found a material change in circumstances, but found that appellant failed to discharge her burden of proving that a change of custody works in the best interest of the child. Even if my colleagues in the majority disagree with the decision reached by the trial judge, that disagreement does not excuse turning the principles of appellate review on their head and disregarding the enacted judgment of the Arkansas General Assembly concerning the burden of proof. I am authorized to state that Stroud, C.J., Pittman and Gladwin, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.