Court Opinion

ID: 9555251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-11 14:09:53.137067+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:42:01.555420
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: AUGUST 4, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2022-CA-0986-MR

RACHEL HURT                                                           APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
v.              HONORABLE KELLY MARK EASTON, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 18-CR-01239

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; GOODWINE AND TAYLOR,
JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Rachel Hurt (“Appellant”) appeals from an order

of the Hardin Circuit Court denying her motion for Kentucky Rules of Civil

Procedure (“CR”) 60.02 relief from judgment. Appellant argues that her guilty

plea was not valid, thus constituting extraordinary circumstances justifying CR

60.02 relief. After careful review, we find no error and affirm the order on appeal.
                       FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                On January 14, 2020, Appellant entered a guilty plea in Hardin Circuit

Court to one count of sexual abuse in the first degree and two counts of assault in

the fourth degree.1 The charges arose from an incident occurring on October 24,

2018, at the Communicare mental health treatment facility in Elizabethtown,

Kentucky. Appellant was receiving counseling at the facility when she attempted

to escape.2 In the process of trying to flee, Appellant sexually assaulted

Communicare personnel by grabbing their breasts and genitals, biting, spitting, and

using sexually explicit language. She also threatened to commit suicide. She was

arrested, charged, and subsequently entered the guilty plea.

                By the time Appellant was sentenced, she had already served out her

one-year sentence. After the service of her sentence, Appellant remained in

custody for about 10 weeks while her guardian and legal counsel sought to find an

appropriate treatment facility. Upon release from incarceration, Appellant was

placed on five years of sexual offender post-incarceration supervision (“SOPIS”).

She began SOPIS on April 1, 2020. The following month, Appellant failed to call

her probation and parole officer as instructed. On May 21, 2020, a parole violation

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 510.110 and KRS 508.030.
2
 The record contains evidence that Appellant has mood disorders, bipolar disorder, a learning
disability, and an I.Q. of 67.

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warrant was issued on the grounds of absconding from supervision. Hearings were

conducted, and there was general agreement between the parties and court that

Appellant suffered from significant mental health issues. During this period,

Appellant was treated at University of Louisville Emergency Psychiatric Services

and Seven Counties Services.

             It was later determined that Appellant had been arrested in Indiana.

On June 22, 2020, and after her release from detention in Indiana, Appellant was

served with a notice of a preliminary hearing alleging that she had violated her

SOPIS by absconding. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that

Appellant absconded from supervision, and the matter was referred to the Parole

Board. On August 27, 2020, a hearing on the matter was conducted, which

resulted in revocation of her SOPIS.

             On July 18, 2022, Appellant, through counsel, filed a motion for CR

60.02 relief from judgment. In support of the motion, Appellant alleged that her

guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because she did not fully

understand what the five-year SOPIS meant when the plea was entered. On

August 21, 2022, the Hardin Circuit Court entered an order denying her motion

and this appeal followed.

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                             STANDARD OF REVIEW

             “Our standard of review of a trial court’s denial of a CR 60.02 motion

is whether the trial court abused its discretion. The test for abuse of discretion is

whether the trial court’s decision was ‘arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or

unsupported by sound legal principles.’” Age v. Age, 340 S.W.3d 88, 94 (Ky. App.

2011) (citations omitted).

             The decision as to whether to grant or to deny a motion
             filed pursuant to the provisions of CR 60.02 lies within
             the sound discretion of the trial court. The rule provides
             that a court may grant relief from its final judgment or
             order upon various grounds. Moreover, the law favors
             the finality of judgments. Therefore, relief may be
             granted under CR 60.02 only with extreme caution and
             only under the most unusual and compelling
             circumstances.

Id. (citations omitted).

                           ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS

             Appellant, through counsel, argues that the Hardin Circuit Court erred

in denying her motion for CR 60.02 relief. She maintains that she did not

understand her guilty plea, which constitutes an extraordinary circumstance

justifying relief and which renders the judgment void. Appellant contends that she

made the guilty plea only because she believed the plea would allow her to get out

of custody sooner, if not immediately, at the time of the plea.

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             Appellant’s counsel notes that Appellant has significant mental health

and behavioral issues. Counsel directs our attention to statements Appellant made

at arraignment, a pre-trial conference, and the plea hearing, in support of counsel’s

assertion that Appellant did not understand what she was agreeing to and simply

sought to get out of jail as quickly as possible. Counsel also points to a comment

Appellant made to the court about the mandatory evaluation prior to sentencing,

which counsel argues demonstrates that Appellant did not know what she was

doing.

             Counsel contends that Appellant needs help with daily living,

including finances, healthcare, and living arrangements. She asserts that at the

revocation proceeding, no one, including Appellant’s parole officer and the court,

wanted to revoke Appellant’s probation. Appellant contends that revocation is not

the solution for extreme mental illness. The focus of her argument is that because

of her mental illness, Appellant did not understand her guilty plea, the plea was

fundamentally unfair, and the circuit court erred in failing to grant her motion for

CR 60.02 relief.

             CR 60.02 states:

             On motion a court may, upon such terms as are just,
             relieve a party or his legal representative from its final
             judgment, order, or proceeding upon the following
             grounds: (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
             neglect; (b) newly discovered evidence which by due
             diligence could not have been discovered in time to move

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                for a new trial under Rule 59.02; (c) perjury or falsified
                evidence; (d) fraud affecting the proceedings, other than
                perjury or falsified evidence; (e) the judgment is void, or
                has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
                judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
                otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
                judgment should have prospective application; or (f) any
                other reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief.
                The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and
                on grounds (a), (b), and (c) not more than one year after
                the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
                A motion under this rule does not affect the finality of a
                judgment or suspend its operation.

                In Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 857 (Ky. 1983), the

Kentucky Supreme Court set out the procedure for a post-conviction collateral

attack on a judgment. It stated,

                        [w]e hold that the proper procedure for a defendant
                aggrieved by a judgment in a criminal case is to directly
                appeal that judgment, stating every ground of error which
                it is reasonable to expect that he or his counsel is aware
                of when the appeal is taken.

                      Next, we hold that a defendant is required to avail
                himself of RCr[3] 11.42 while in custody under sentence
                or on probation, parole or conditional discharge, as to any
                ground of which he is aware, or should be aware, during
                the period when this remedy is available to him. Final
                disposition of that motion, or waiver of the opportunity to
                make it, shall conclude all issues that reasonably could
                have been presented in that proceeding. The language of
                RCr 11.42 forecloses the defendant from raising any
                questions under CR 60.02 which are “issues that could
                reasonably have been presented” by RCr 11.42
                proceedings.

3
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

                                            -6-
Id. “CR 60.02 . . . may be utilized only in extraordinary situations when relief is

not available on direct appeal or under RCr 11.42.” Foley v. Commonwealth, 425

S.W.3d 880, 884 (Ky. 2014) (citation omitted).

             In the matter before us, Appellant waived her right to direct appeal by

entering a guilty plea, and she did not prosecute a collateral attack on the judgment

via RCr 11.42. Those were the proper avenues to challenge her guilty plea. Per

Gross and Foley, she is procedurally barred from seeking CR 60.02 relief.

             Arguendo, even if CR 60.02 were the proper mechanism for attacking

the judgment, we would find no error.

                    The test for determining the validity of a guilty
             plea is whether the plea represents a voluntary and
             intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action
             open to the defendant. North Carolina v. Alford, 400
             U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 164, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).
             There must be an affirmative showing in the record that
             the plea was intelligently and voluntarily made. Boykin
             v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1711, 23
             L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969). However, “the validity of a guilty
             plea is determined not by reference to some magic
             incantation recited at the time it is taken but from the
             totality of the circumstances surrounding it.” Kotas v.
             Commonwealth, Ky., 565 S.W.2d 445, 447 (1978),
             (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749, 90 S.
             Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970)).

Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Ky. App. 1986).

             Prior to Appellant entering the guilty plea, her counsel sought and

received funding for an expert to evaluate Appellant’s mental health issues and her

                                         -7-
capacity to stand trial. That expert found Appellant competent to understand the

proceedings and to make decisions relating to the defense of the charges against

her. Defense counsel acknowledged this finding. At the time of the plea,

Appellant and the court entered into the traditional plea colloquy, after which the

court found that Appellant understood the charges against her and the

consequences of her plea. Per Sparks, the totality of the circumstances

surrounding the plea supports the circuit court’s conclusion that Appellant’s plea

was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. The record does not reveal

“the most unusual and compelling circumstances” necessary to support CR 60.02,

Age, supra, and the Hardin Circuit Court properly so found. We find no abuse of

discretion and thus no error.

                                  CONCLUSION

             For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the Hardin Circuit

Court denying Appellant’s motion for CR 60.02 relief.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                         -8-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:             BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Jacquelyn “Jaye” Bryant-Hayes    Daniel Cameron
Bailey Brown                     Attorney General of Kentucky
La Grange, Kentucky
                                 Jenny L. Sanders
                                 Assistant Attorney General
                                 Frankfort, Kentucky

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