Court Opinion

ID: 9579999
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:00:40.666241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:57.074737
License: Public Domain

BENHAM, Justice,
concurring.
While agreeing with everything written in the majority opinion, I write separately to highlight the importance of ensuring that the jury selection process remains free not only of racial and gender prejudice, but also free of racial and gender stereotypes. In addition, I write separately to remind the bench and bar of the adverse effects a discriminatory jury selection process has on the community and the judicial system.
Seldom do we, as judges, recount personal experiences in an opinion, but sometimes it is necessary to explain the importance of a legal issue. I believe an experience I had while in private practice drives home the point I wish to make about the jury selection process, so I share it here.
*41Prior to the U. S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986), and J. E. B. v. Alabama, 511 U. S. 127 (114 SC 1419, 128 LE2d 89) (1994), while a lawyer and president of my local bar association, I witnessed female and minority jurors routinely being struck through the use of peremptory challenges with no explanation being given by the lawyer exercising the strike. As I sat observing court proceedings on one particular occasion, a peremptorily-stricken female minority juror approached me during recess and stated she knew she had been struck purely because of race and asked me what could be done. After expressing sympathy for her plight, I informed her lawyers had a right to peremptorily strike jurors for any reason as long as they did not engage in a pattern and practice of striking jurors on the basis of race or gender.
In response to my statement, the lady informed me that she had been humiliated by the whole process and that she saw the court system as sending a message to her that, because of her race, the legal system did not deem her fit to sit in judgment of her fellow citizens. She further stated, “The next time I receive a jury summons, I will call and say I am sick. The next time law enforcement officers ask for my help in investigating a crime, I will say I am busy. The next time the government needs my help, I will be unavailable.”
Such a statement shocked me, but I realized it reflected some of the real evils that result from an abuse of the exercise of peremptory strikes. The attitude she expressed is exactly what happens when people lose faith and confidence in our legal system. The spirit of cooperation is snuffed out and the government loses one of its most valuable resources, citizen input.
It is because of this fear of losing input from a cross-section of the community that I raise legal, ethical and professionalism concerns in the area of Batson challenges. Although lawyers are sometimes allowed to use fanciful reasons for the exercise of peremptory strikes, they may do serious harm to our legal system by eroding faith and confidence in the administration of justice.
Justice Anthony Kennedy, the author of Batson v. Kentucky, spoke at the dedication of the State Bar Headquarters of Georgia on January 15, 2005. He stated, “Jurors are one-time players in the governmental arena.” Since jury service is a one-time event for most citizens, we can assume they are highly impressionable and we, as lawyers, should work to ensure that they leave their encounter with a good impression, not only of the case in controversy, but also of the entire legal system. If we, through the use of peremptory strikes, exclude, for suspect reasons, individual jurors or entire cognizable segments of the population from service, we add to the erosion of respect for and confidence in our system of justice.
*42Jury service is one of the most highly regarded privileges of civic life. Jury duty preserves the democratic element of the law as it guards the rights of participants in the legal system and ensures continued acceptance of the nation’s laws. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U. S. 400, 407 (111 SC 1364, 113 LE2d 411) (1991). It affords many citizens a valuable opportunity to participate in a process of government which one hopes, fosters a respect for the law. Id. With the exception of voting, jury service may provide a citizen with his or her most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process. Id.
For many years the judiciary has recognized the terrible effects of a discriminatory jury selection process. Over a century ago, the U. S. Supreme Court acknowledged,
the very fact that [members of a particular race] are singled out and expressly denied ... all right to participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of their color, though they are citizens, and may be in other respects fully qualified, is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 308 (25 LE 664) (1879). Today, we are well into the Twenty-first Century and some citizens of this country are still not free from insidious discrimination during the jury selection process. While the constitutions of the United States and Georgia demand the total uncompromising neutrality of the jury selection process, some people remain unable to fulfill their role in the administration of justice because of the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Lingo v. State, 263 Ga. 664, 675 (437 SE2d 463) (1993).
The harm from the discriminatory use of peremptory strikes in the jury selection process extends well beyond that inflicted on the excluded juror. Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U. S. at 89. There is also injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution, and to the overall democratic idea reflected in the process of the courts. Ballard v. United States, 329 U. S. 187, 195 (67 SC 261, 91 LE 181) (1946). Because the right to a jury trial includes the right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, the right to a neutral and impartial jury belongs to the community as well. State v. McCollum, 261 Ga. 473, 477 (405 SE2d 688) (1991). Selection procedures that purposefully discriminate against certain people raise questions in the community as to the fairness of the proceedings conducted there and erode the public’s respect for the process. Edmonson v. Leesville *43Concrete Co., 500 U. S. 614, 628 (111 SC 2077, 114 LE2d 660) (1991). When courts allow jurors to be excluded as a result of discrimination, the courts become participants in the ultimate harm, a scheme that undermines the very foundation of our judicial system — the community’s confidence in it. McCollum, supra at 478.
Decided February 21, 2005.
Zell & Zell, Rodney S. Zell, for appellant.
Patrick H. Head, District Attorney, Dana J. Norman, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Frank M. Gaither, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
The overall integrity of the jury selection process, and thereby the entire judicial system, is enhanced when fitness for jury service is not determined through a discriminatory process. See Hayes v. State, 261 Ga. 439, 449 (405 SE2d 660) (1991). For too long we summoned jurors to serve, gave them orientation speeches about the importance of service, questioned them on voir dire about their fitness for service, and then allowed them to be stricken from jury panels through the discriminatory use of peremptory strikes. Glover v. State, 192 Ga. App. 798, 802 (386 SE2d 699) (1989). There stands a compelling public interest in protecting the integrity of the jury selection process and in enforcing citizens’ rights to fulfill their civic role through jury service untainted by discrimination. McCollum, supra at 478. By requiring courts to be responsive to the discriminatory use of peremptory strikes, our decision enforces the mandate of equal protection and reinforces the community’s confidence in the judicial system. McGuire v. State, 185 Ga. App. 233, 240 (363 SE2d 850) (1987).