Court Opinion

ID: 9449170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:59:43.167621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:44.645945
License: Public Domain

WASHINGTON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) .
In this case, the Board found that the following sequence of events had taken place: Shortly after the strike by the other employees of the Company was settled and new contracts were signed with unions representing those employees, a meeting was called by the Company in response to inquiries by some of the plumbers as to whether their wages might also be increased as those of the striking employees had been. On July 21, 1960, the Company’s vice president told the plumbers that they could secure increases only if they would accept contracts similar to those that had been concluded with the other unions. In the alternative, they could continue work under their old contract, then in force. Compton, who was shop steward and one of the two employees soon to be discharged, called the Union’s business agent, who expressed the view that the contract then in effect could not be changed at that point. The next morning, a Friday, the Company’s chief engineer — -Way-—brought a “letter of intent” and a new contract to the plumbing shop and explained what the letter, which indicated approval of the new contract, *418“was supposed to do.” While the record fails to elucidate the meaning or details of Way’s statement, it is clear that the men understood that they could not have the wage increase unless they signed the letter. Four of the six men in the shop signed but Compton and Boone refused, relying on the advice of the Union’s business agent. Later in the day, Way returned and informed Compton and Boone that if they did not sign the letter of intent they “could not work.” No work was assigned to the men for the rest of the day.
The next morning Way called Compton at his home and instructed him and Boone to report for work at 12:30 p. m'. Way stated that the men would be given back pay for the work they had missed. Compton expressed confusion and told Way that he would like to talk to the business agent before deciding whether to follow the order to report to work. He called the business agent but was unable to reach him over the weekend. Way called again on Monday morning at 11 a. m. and told Compton that he and Boone must return to work by 12:30 that day. Compton told Way that he had not yet reached the business agent and that he was still confused about what to do in view of the business agent’s instruction the previous Friday to wait until he heard from him before taking any action. The men did not report to work at 12:30, but Compton did call Way at 2.30 that afternoon, immediately after he had spoken to the business agent and been told by the latter that everything was straightened out and that they should go back to work. Way told him, however, that he and Boone could not return to work because of their failure to comply with the 12:30 deadline.
All of the findings set forth above were —-in my view — clearly supported by substantial evidence. On the basis thereof, the Board concluded that the Company had violated Sections 8(a) (1), 8(a) (3), and 8(a) (5), and ordered that the men be reinstated with back pay. The majority opinion, as I understand it, enforces only that part of the Board’s order finding a violation of Section 8(a) (1). I would enforce the order in its entirety.
There is little question in my mind that the Company, by telling Compton and Boone on Friday that they must sign the letter of intent or they could not work, and then refusing to assign work to them when they would not comply with that demand, violated the prohibition of Section 8(a) (3). If there were any doubt on this score, the Company’s conduct on Monday certainly removed it. In light of Compton’s position that he had been instructed by the Union not to sign, the Company’s action clearly tended to discourage union membership within the meaning of the Act. See National Labor Relations Board v. Ra-Rich Mfg. Corp., 276 F.2d 451, 454 (2d Cir., 1960).
With respect to the alleged violation of Section 8(a) (5), the Board’s decision stated:
“3. We also conclude that the Respondent violated Section 8(a) (5) by its demand that Compton and Boone sign the letter of intent and by attempting to deal directly with the employees in the bargaining unit, without notice to the Union and without regard for its right to act as their representative.”
It seems to me to be beyond dispute that the coercive actions of the Company violated Section 8(a) (5), since they bore an immediate relation to the effort to obtain approval of proposed contractual modifications. Merely because they also amounted to a violation of Sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3) does not render them irrelevant to the Section 8(a) (5) determination. Moreover, I cannot separate the Company’s submission of the letter of intent from its coercive effort to obtain unanimous approval of the letter from the employees in the bargaining unit. Whatever practices the Union may reasonably be thought to have acquiesced in, I cannot reach the conclusion, on the basis of the record before us, that it acquiesced in the course of conduct pursued by the *419Company in this instance. Consequently, I think the Board’s finding that-the Company violated Section 8(a) (5) should be affirmed.
The remaining question for decision is, as I view the case, whether the Board exceeded its power in ordering reinstatement as a remedy for these violations. The source of the Board’s authority to order reinstatement with or without back pay is Section 10(c) of the Act, which reads, in relevant part, “If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue -x- * * an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act * (Emphasis supplied.) This language is clearly designed to give the Board the widest latitude in its selection of remedies once it has duly found that an unfair labor practice has been committed. See National Labor Relations Board v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346, 73 S.Ct. 287, 97 L.Ed. 377 (1953); Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 319 U.S. 533, 63 S.Ct. 1214, 87 L.Ed. 1568 (1943). In the Virginia Electric & Power Company case the Court stated that the Board’s choice of remedy “should stand unless it can be shown that the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act.” Id., at 540, 63 S.Ct. at 1218. The majority opinion does not specifically conclude that the order of reinstatement with back pay in this case was “a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act,” and I think such a conclusion could not be justified on this record. I would accordingly uphold that portion of the Board’s order, and in fact the order as a whole.