Court Opinion

ID: 9521281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:02:06.521324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:27.656899
License: Public Domain

GILBERT, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I believe the trial court retained jurisdiction to amend its findings when the Marzitellis timely moved for a new trial or for amended findings. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.02, 59.03. The majority of this court, however, now holds that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to correct its own error and that the Marzitellis are bound by an assessment that the trial court ultimately held to be unconstitutional. This anomalous result is the product of inconsistencies between the rules of civil procedure governing motions for a new trial and the rules of civil appellate procedure governing the time limit for appeals.
The rules of civil procedure provide that a trial court may grant a new trial for numerous reasons, including to correct errors of law made at trial. Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01(f). A hearing on a motion for a new trial or amended findings must be heard within 30 *908days after the notice of filing of the trial court’s decision, unless the court extends the time limit upon good cause shown. Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.02, 59.03. In this case, the hearing on the motion was scheduled for October 30, 1996, which was within the 30 day limit imposed by Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.03. Counsel for Little Canada was unable to attend a hearing on that date. Pursuant to a stipulation by the parties, a new date was agreed upon and the hearing was held on November 20, 1996. Little Canada did not object to the trial court’s jurisdiction at the hearing. On December 19, 1996, the trial court issued amended findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order for judgment, which were filed on December 23,1996.
According to the majority, notwithstanding timely Rule 52.02 and 59 motions, if the time for an appeal from the trial court’s order or judgment expires without an appeal having been taken, then the order or judgment becomes final and the trial court’s jurisdiction to amend the order terminates. Under Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 103.03(g), 104.01, and 104.03, an appeal in special proceedings must be taken within 30 days after service of written notice of filing of an order by the adverse party or within 30 days after the entry of a judgment. The majority cites Indianhead Truck Line, Inc., v. Hvidsten Transp., Inc., 268 Minn. 176, 183-84, 128 N.W.2d 334, 341 (1964) for the proposition that once the appellate process is terminated or the time for an appeal expires, an order becomes final and the trial court’s jurisdiction to amend that order is terminated. Under the majority’s expansive interpretation of Indianhead, a trial court is without jurisdiction to hear or to rule on pending Rule 52.02 and 59.01 motions after the time for appeal has run.1 Indianhead, however, does not explicitly make this holding.
In Indianhead, we addressed the question of when an order from the North Dakota Railroad and Warehouse Commission became final under North Dakota statutes and laws. Id, at 182-84, 128 N.W.2d at 339-41. While we acknowledged that “[t]he courts have generally observed that an order or judgment becomes final only after the appellate process is terminated or the time for appeal has expired,” we interpreted “final order” as meaning an “ultimate and conclusive order” and held that the commission’s final order was not issued until after the second remand because all earlier orders had been reversed on appeal by the district court. Id. at 183— 84, 128 N.W.2d at 340-41. In the present case, because Rule 52.02 and 59 motions were timely filed, there was no ultimate and conclusive order until the trial court’s amended order was filed on December 23, 1996. This conclusion is consistent with our holding in E.C.I. Corp. v. G.G.C. Co., 306 Minn. 433, 434-36, 237 N.W.2d 627, 629 (1976).
In E.C.I., we held that the time limit for taking an appeal was properly computed from the entry of an amended judgment rather than from the original judgment. Id. at 435, 237 N.W.2d at 629. The original judgment in E.C.I. was “clearly incorrect” and a new judgment was entered approximately 1 month later. We reasoned that the original judgment was not the final judgment of the trial court, thus, the time for appeal did not start to run until the modified judgment was entered. Id.
In the present case, the original order was also subsequently found to be incorrect by the trial court. Logic dictates that if the rules provide for a timely motion for a new trial, the trial court must retain jurisdiction to rule on that motion. Rules 52.02 and 59 provide a mechanism for trial courts to eor-*909rect errors before involving the appellate courts. An appeal would still be allowed from a denial of the motion or from the amended findings.
We effectively held as much in Gelin v. Hollister, 222 Minn. 339, 342-43, 24 N.W.2d 496, 499 (1946). In Gelin, we concluded that:
Where an application [for setting aside the trial court’s findings] is made within the time for appeal, the court has the power, for the correction of judicial error, to hear the motion for and to order the modification, vacation, or setting aside of its orders and its judgments after the tíme for such appeals has expired.
Id. Admittedly, there is no rule explicitly authorizing the tolling of the time limit for taking an appeal while a motion for a new trial is pending. Compare, Fed. R. Civ.App. P. 4(a)(4) (providing that, after a timely motion for a new trial is filed, “the time for appeal for all parties runs from the entry of the order disposing of * * * the motion * * * ”). However, in Gelin, we recognized the soundness of tolling the time for appeal while a motion for a new trial is pending, thereby extending the trial court’s jurisdiction to rule on a timely and properly made motion.
We have not previously overruled Gelin, nor do Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 103.03, 104.01 and 104.03 preclude a trial court from deciding timely post-trial motions for relief under Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.02 and 59. Therefore, under our prior ease law, and under Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.02, 59.01 and 59.03, the Marzitellis’ filing of a motion for a new trial vested continuing jurisdiction in the trial court to rule on the motion.
As the majority points out, a party who makes a motion for a new trial or amended findings may ask the court of appeals for a stay of the time limitation for appeal. If the stay is granted, it allows the trial court to retain jurisdiction to rule on the motion and also helps ensure that the trial court rules on the motion in an expedient manner. However, there is no assurance that the stay will be granted. In fact, in the case the majority cites to support the proposition that parties may request a stay on an appeal, the court of appeals denied a request for a stay and held that the trial court lost jurisdiction to amend a judgment after an appeal was filed. Gummow v. Gummow, 356 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn.App.1984). In Gummow, the court granted one request for a stay of appeal but denied a second, even though the trial court had not yet ruled on a pending motion to amend findings. Id. The court of appeals then declared the trial court’s amended order, which was filed after a notice of appeal was filed, to be of no effect. Id.
Even in special proceedings, a more efficient use of judicial resources would be to first allow the trial court to correct its errors before involving the court of appeals in the process. This process might result in some minor delay, but the delay is justified because:
[a] motion for a new trial provides both trial court and counsel with a unique opportunity to eliminate the need for appellate review or to more fully develop critical aspects of the record in the event appellate review is sought. * ⅜ ⅜ The trial court is given * * * the opportunity to correct its own errors without subjecting the parties and the appellate courts to the time, expense and inconvenience involved in an appeal.
Sauter v. Wasemiller, 389 N.W.2d 200, 201-02 (Minn.1986). Indeed, in Sauter, we held that a party’s failure to make a motion for a new trial under Minn. R. Civ. P. 59.01 precludes an appeal alleging trial errors under Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 103.04. Id. at 202. Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeals and hold that the trial court retained jurisdiction to rule on the Marzitellis’ motion for a new trial or amended findings.

. It may be argued that, to avoid an adverse ruling, the Marzitellis merely had to file a notice of appeal while their case was pending at the trial court. Such an option, however, does not remedy the procedural difficulty presented by Rule 104.01. If the Marzitellis had filed an appeal, the trial court would have been divested of jurisdiction and the court of appeals would have "confronted] either a 'missing' ruling, in which the district court has not ruled on the motion, or a 'late' ruling, in which the trial court ruled after the filing of the appeal.” J. Jeff Oxley, The Fate of Pending Motions on Appeal from Judgment: The Consequences of Minnesota’s Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 104.01, It Minn. L.Rev. 1041, 1045 (1992). The ambiguity surrounding Rule 104.01 impedes efficiency and puts litigants in a precarious position of trying to determine which course to follow, when none appear to be entirely proper. In addition, Rule 104.01 "makes the premature transfer of jurisdiction possible and thus exposes appellants to potential unfairness by depriving them of the trial court’s ruling.” Id. at 1061.