Court Opinion

ID: 9765915
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:24:32.557837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:16.671646
License: Public Domain

Grimes, J.,
dissenting: As I believe that the plaintiff’s dismissal was in violation of his rights under the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States and his rights under part I, article 22 of the New Hampshire constitution, I must respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court.
It is too late in the day to argue that public employment is a privilege which can be conditioned on the surrender of constitutional rights which could not be abridged by direct government action. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1439, 1445-46 (1968). The State “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests — especially, his interest in freedom of speech.” Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972); see Chitwood v. Feaster, 468 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1972).
It should be stressed that the plaintiff had given a talk to the chamber of commerce concerning a topic that in no way related to the pulp mill issue. Immediately following the talk, plaintiff was asked to participate in a question and answer period. It was at this point that a private citizen asked the plaintiff for his opinion concerning the establishment of the pulp mill. After articulating the department policy as to the pulp mill, the plaintiff gave his opinion on the project while making it clear it referred only to his personal opinion. There is no claim and no evidence that plaintiff was actively promoting his personal views on the pulp mill as opposed to the departmental policy, or that he has been publicly attacking the official policy. The sole basis for the dismissal was his honest response on this one occasion to a direct question. The petition for removal specifically articulates that the plaintiff’s statement constituted insubordination so as to justify dismissal.
The question and answer concerned a matter of vast political and economic importance for the residents of the State, and as such there can be no doubt that it falls within the parameters of free speech protection. As the right of free speech is not absolute, particularly in the area of public employment, it is the court’s responsibility to determine whether a dismissal because of the exercise of free speech rights is unconstitutionally restrictive. Although disagreeing with the majority’s result, I do agree that *464Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), does provide the standard of review in cases involving public employment and first amendment claims. Muller v. Conlisk, 429 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1970); Ruderer v. United States, 412 F.2d 1285 (1969); Brukiewa v. Police Commissioner, 257 Md. 36, 263 A.2d 210 (1970); Grossman, Public Employment and Free Speech: Can They Be Reconciled?, 24 Ad. L. Rev. 109 (1972).
Since the plaintiff’s first amendment rights are being infringed, the defendants have the burden of proving that the State’s interest in efficiency in public service outweighs the plaintiffs interest in free speech and the interest of society in free and open debate in matters of public concern. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. at 568, 573; see Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976).
The defendants have failed to show that the functions of the department of resources and economic development were being substantially impeded by the plaintiff’s statement. The defendants have failed to justify their contention with reasonable inferences flowing from concrete facts, but rather have merely abstractly suggested that the interests of the department were materially and substantially jeopardized. A mere tendency to impede the function of the department is not sufficient to limit the plaintiffs first amendment rights. Abbott v. Thetford, 529 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1976); Hostrop v. Board of Junior College Dist. No. 515, 471 F.2d 488, 492 (7th Cir. 1972); James v. Board of Education of Central Dist. No. 1, 461 F.2d 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972); L. A. Teachers Union v. L. A. City Bd. of Ed., 71 Cal. 2d 551, 455 P.2d 827, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969). It is not the content of the statement that is controlling, but rather the impact of the speech. Note, Judicial Protection of Teachers’ Speech: The Aftermath of Pickering, 59 Iowa L. Rev. 1256, 1267 (1974).
The defendants have also failed to show that plaintiffs statement impeded his performance as director of the division of economic development. Gieringer v. Center School Dist. No. 58, 477 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1973); Lusk v. Estes, 361 F. Supp. 653, 655 (N.D. Tex. 1973). I fail to see and defendants have failed to prove how plaintiffs single statement can cause any significant damage to the working relationship with his superiors. The citizenry’s interest in information concerning the pulp mill far outweighs any possible strain in the superior-subordinate relationship. In any event, there can be no governmental interest in “preventing the sort of disharmony which inevitably results from mere expression *465of controversial ideas.” L. A. Teachers Union v. L. A. City Bd. of Ed., supra at 561, 455 P.2d at 833, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 729; Lusk v. Estes, supra at 663; Starsky v. Williams, 353 F. Supp. 900, 923-24 (D. Ariz. 1972), modified, 512 F.2d 109 (9th Cir. 1975).
As to the impact of plaintiff’s statement on the public, the defendants have failed to show that the statement resulted in an unjustifiable loss of public confidence in the department of resources and economic development and caused actual damage to its integrity.
But the factor which must be of greatest weight is the existence or nonexistence of an issue of legitimate public concern. The issue of the establishment of a major pulp mill within the State of New Hampshire is of vital political, economic, and environmental concern to many of New Hampshire’s citizens. As the public’s concern with a matter increases, the State’s interest in restricting speech correspondingly decreases. Note, Judicial Protection of Teachers’ Speech: The Aftermath of Pickering, supra at 1261; Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475, 481 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1973); Gatti, Teachers and the First Amendment, 7 Willamette L.J. 435 (1971). Certainly this issue was of such legitimate public concern as to outweigh any interest the State may have had in restricting speech.
Although plaintiff can be dismissed for failing to fulfill his statutory duties, he cannot be dismissed under the guise of “insubordination” for exercising first amendment rights, particularly under the circumstances of this case where the statement involves a matter in which the public’s right to know is so substantial. Dismissal of State employees should not be used so as to stifle the free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance, which is the core value of the free speech clause of the first amendment and part I, article 22 of the New Hampshire constitution and lies at the very foundation of our free society. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
As I would hold that plaintiffs dismissal was in violation of his first amendment rights, I would not reach the other issues presented by this transfer.