Court Opinion

ID: 9959063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 16:11:30.876177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:25.435166
License: Public Domain

J-S08017-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  JUSTIN P. HACKLING, BY AND                   :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  THROUGH HIS POA DENISE A.                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
  HACKLING                                     :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ASHELY M. HUNTING-HACKLING                   :   No. 1715 MDA 2023
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: DALE AND DENISE                   :
  HACKLING                                     :

              Appeal from the Order Dated November 20, 2023
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Wyoming County Civil Division at
                            No(s): 2017-01284

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                                FILED APRIL 10, 2024

       Dale Hackling (Grandfather) and Denise Hackling (Grandmother)

(collectively, Appellants) appeal from the order denying their petition to

intervene in the underlying child custody action between Appellants’ adult son,

Justin P. Hackling (Father), and Ashley M. Hunting-Hackling (Mother)

(collectively, Parents). After careful review, we affirm.

       The facts are not in dispute. Parents were previously married, separated

in 2017, and have two minor children, B.W.H. (born July 2013) and E.L.H.

(born October 2015) (collectively, the children). After Parents’ separation,

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Father briefly resided at Appellants’ residence and exercised his periods of

supervised1 partial custody of the children at Appellants’ residence during that

time.2    Grandmother, acting as Father’s attorney-in-fact, commenced the

underlying child custody action via a complaint filed in November 2017.3

Pursuant to Parents’ current custody order, Mother has primary physical

custody of the children and Father has periods of partial custody.               See

Stipulated Order, 5/27/20, ¶¶ 1, 3.

       Appellants filed the petition to intervene on September 11, 2023,

seeking modification of the underlying custody order to grant Appellants

periods    of   partial    custody     of      the   children.   Appellants   claimed

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1 Grandfather was the court-ordered supervisor. Order, 11/17/17, ¶ 17.
Grandfather is no longer the supervisor of Father’s custody periods. See
Stipulated Order, 5/27/20, ¶ 4.

2 After Parents’ separation, Mother had primary physical custody of the
children; Father had periods of partial custody pursuant to Parents’ custody
order. See Order, 11/17/17, ¶¶ 1, 3. In this order, the trial court also
appointed the children a guardian ad litem, Brenda Kobal, Esquire (GAL). Id.
at p. 2. The GAL filed a brief in the instant appeal.

3 Grandmother acted pursuant to Father’s power of attorney naming her as

attorney-in-fact.

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standing pursuant to Section 5325(2) of the Domestic Relations Code,4 “as

they are paternal grandparents, the [P]arents have commenced a custody

proceeding and they will not allow visitation” by Appellants.          Petition to

Intervene, 9/11/23, ¶ 19; see also id. ¶¶ 17, 18 (invoking Pa.R.C.P. 2327

and 2328 (governing petitions to intervene)).        According to Appellants, it

would be in the children’s best interests for the trial court to grant the petition

to intervene. Id. ¶¶ 13, 15; see also id. ¶ 10 (claiming Appellants and the

“children share a loving and close bond”).

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4 Section 5325(2) provides as follows:

       In addition to situations set forth in section 5324 (relating to
       standing for any form of physical custody or legal custody),
       grandparents and great-grandparents may file an action under
       this chapter for partial physical custody or supervised physical
       custody in the following situations:

                                          ***

          (2) where the relationship with the child began either with the
          consent of a parent of the child or under a court order and
          where the parents of the child:

              (i) have commenced a proceeding for custody; and

              (ii) do not agree as to whether the grandparents or great
              grandparents should have custody under this section[.]

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325(2); see also M.W. v. S.T., 196 A.3d 1065, 1069 (Pa.
Super. 2018) (“Generally, the Child Custody Act does not permit third parties
to seek custody of a child contrary to the wishes of that child’s parents. The
Act provides several exceptions to this rule, which apply primarily to
grandparents and great-grandparents.” (citation omitted)).

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       On September 12, 2023, the trial court issued a rule on Mother to show

cause why the court should not grant Appellants’ petition to intervene.5

Mother timely filed an answer on November 15, 2023. Mother emphasized

that she and Father “jointly agree that [Appellants] should not be permitted

to intervene, nor have contact with the [] children.” Answer, 11/15/23, ¶ 13.

Mother further claimed that Appellants’ intervention was contrary to the

children’s best interests. Id. ¶ 15.

       The matter proceeded to a hearing on November 15, 2024 (intervention

hearing). The trial court competently summarized the evidence adduced at

the intervention hearing:

       [I]t was represented to the [c]ourt that Mother and Father
       agreed that they did not want [Appellants] intervening in
       this matter. N.T., 11/15/23, at 7. [Mother] … testified that she
       and [Father] are the parents of … the … children at issue in this
       custody case. Id. at 9-10. [Appellants] have not had contact
       with the minor children since 2019[,] and [] prior to that[,
       Father] was residing with [Appellants] in 2018. Id. at 10. During
       2018, when [Father] resided with [Appellants], he had custody of
       the minor children every other weekend[,] Friday until Sunday.
       Id. at 11.      During some of [Father’s] periods of custody,
       [Grandmother testified,] she was [o]rdered to supervise the visits
       due to [Father’s] mental health issues. Id. at 14-17. … Although
       [Grandmother] testif[ied] she was directed to supervise the visits,
       it was actually [Grandfather who] was the supervisor. Id. at 27;
       see also Court Order dated November 17, 2017. Sometime in
       2019, [Father] moved out of [Appellants’] home and [Appellants]
       have not seen the children since. Id. at 13.

             [Mother] testified that her divorce and custody of the
       children with [Father] was tumultuous and through [family]
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5 There is no indication in the record whether the trial court issued a rule to

show cause upon Father as well.

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     therapy, [Father] and [Mother] had a breakthrough where they
     now have open communications regarding the children, as it is in
     the best interests of the children. Id. at 22. She further testified
     that she learned in therapy that the home life of [Father,] while
     [he was] living with [Appellants after Parents’ separation,] was
     detrimental to his mental health. Id. at 22-23. [Father] and
     [Mother] are now a unified team when it comes to raising their
     children. Id. [Father] and [Mother] are both remarried and the
     four (4) parents have agreed that it is in the best interests of the
     children not to have visits with [Appellants]. Id.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/11/24, at 2-3 (emphasis and footnote added; citations

modified).

     Father proceeded pro se at the intervention hearing. Father asked no

questions of any witness and presented no evidence.           The trial court

questioned Father as follows:

     BY THE COURT: Do you have a position in the matter, sir?

     [Father]: My position falls with [Mother].

     BY THE COURT: I’d like to hear your position, sir. For the record,
     please.

     [Father]: [] My concern is just with my children’s mental health
     and making sure their mental health and emotional health are
     protected and not exposed to a dysfunctional environment. That’s
     all I want.

     BY THE COURT: Okay are you … opposed to supervised visitations
     with [Appellants]?

     [Father]: Yes.

N.T., 11/15/23, at 28-29 (formatting modified).

     Finally, the GAL also appeared at the intervention hearing. The GAL

stated she had no position with respect to the petition to intervene, nor did

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she address the children’s best interests. Id. at 26; see also id. at 26, 27

(GAL stating she had no contact with the children, Mother, Father or

Appellants since 2019).

        The trial court denied Appellants’ petition to intervene on November 20,

2023.     This timely appeal followed.     Appellants and the trial court have

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

        Appellants present a single issue for review:

        Did the trial court abuse its discretion and err as a matter of law
        in denying [Appellants’] petition to intervene?

Appellants’ Brief at 5 (capitalization modified).

        We first confirm our jurisdiction, as the November 20, 2023, order

denying intervention is interlocutory. An appeal lies only from a final order

unless an exception to this general rule applies. J.C.D. v. A.L.R., 303 A.3d

425, 429 (Pa. 2023); see also Pa.R.A.P. 341(a). One such exception is the

collateral order rule, which is addressed at Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate

Procedure 313. J.C.D., 303 A.3d at 429; Pa.R.A.P. 313. Rule 313 “permit[s]

immediate appellate review” of a collateral order, which is defined as

        an order[: (1)] separable from and collateral to the main cause of
        action[; (2)] where the right involved is too important to be denied
        review[;] and [(3)] the question presented is such that if review
        is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be
        irreparably lost.

Pa.R.A.P. 313; see also J.C.D., 303 A.3d at 429.              An order denying

intervention in a custody matter constitutes a collateral order. K.C. v. L.A.,

128 A.3d 774, 781 (Pa. 2015). Thus, the instant appeal is properly before us.

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       Turning to the merits, Appellants claim the trial court erred in denying

intervention, where they established standing6 under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325(2),

supra. See Appellants’ Brief at 8-12. Appellants, however, concede that

“[P]arents oppose [Appellants’] intervention.”       Id. at 11.    Nevertheless,

Appellants argue the trial court should have

       granted the petition to intervene and then scheduled a custody
       hearing to be conducted[,] at which time the factors as set for[th]
       under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328 should have been applied.

Id. at 8 (capitalization modified); see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328 (detailing

factors trial courts must consider in ruling on child custody matters).

       Mother7 counters the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Appellants’ intervention, “as Appellants do not have any legally enforceable

interest where [P]arents present a unified interest in denying grandparent

contact.” Mother’s Brief at 5. According to Mother,

       there was no testimony to establish that [Mother and Father]
       were, in any way, unfit. There was clear testimony that both
       Parents agreed that contact with Appellant[s] [] was not
       appropriate for the subject children and that Mother and Father
       were in full agreement. Any decision that forces Mother and
       Father to permit contact with Appellants is in direct violation of []
       Parents[’] constitutional parent prerogatives and in violation of
       their Fourteenth Amendment rights.
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6 Appellants’ argument focuses entirely upon the matter of standing; they do

not address the children’s best interests with respect to the petition to
intervene. See Appellants’ Brief at 8-12; Helsel v. Puricelli, 927 A.2d 252,
256 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“the examination of the best interests of the child may
occur only after the trial court has determined that a grandparent has
standing.” (emphasis in original)).

7 Father did not file an appellate brief.

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Id. at 6-7 (capitalization modified). Mother argues that it would be contrary

to the children’s best interests to allow Appellants’ intervention.   Id. at 7

(pointing out testimony by Mother and Father about Father’s purportedly

“dysfunctional” home life when he previously resided with Appellants); see

also id. at 3 (Mother emphasizing that Parents “have not come back to court

in several years and have effectively co-parented.”).

      Finally, the GAL filed an appellate brief, concisely stating she “concurs

with the opinion of the trial court … and [] with the position of … [Mother] as

set forth in [Mother’s] brief….” GAL Brief at 1 (unpaginated) (capitalization

modified).    The GAL “requests that this [] Court sustain the denial of

Appellant[’s] petition to intervene[.]” Id. at 2 (unpaginated).

      “Threshold issues of standing are questions of law; thus, our standard

of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” M.S. v. J.D., 215

A.3d 595, 598 (Pa. Super. 2019). Under the traditional test for standing, “the

proponent of the action must have a direct, substantial and immediate interest

in the matter at hand.” Id.

      [I]n custody matters, courts evaluate the concept of standing on
      a fluid basis, which necessarily implicates the immediacy prong of
      a standing analysis—i.e., whether the interest the third-party
      seeks to protect is within the zone of interests sought to be
      protected by our custody statutes.

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Williams v. Williams, 276 A.3d 226 (Pa. Super. 2022) (unpublished

memorandum8 at 18 (citation and brackets omitted)); see also Troxel v.

Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality) (stating the “liberty interest of

parents in the care, custody, and control of their children is perhaps the oldest

of the fundamental liberty interests recognized” by the law).

       We reiterate that the statute Appellants invoked to establish standing,

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325(2), supra, provides, in relevant part, that

       grandparents … may file an action under this chapter for partial
       physical custody or supervised physical custody … where the
       parents of the child … have commenced a proceeding for custody[]
       and [] do not agree as to whether the grandparents … should
       have custody….

Id. (emphasis added).          Here, Parents agree Appellants should not have

custody of the children.       N.T., 11/15/23, at 23, 29; see also Trial Court

Opinion, 1/11/24, at 4 (“Since 2019, [Mother] and [Father] have been

coparenting the children and they do not believe it is in the children’s best

interests to allow [Appellants] to intervene in this matter.”).     Accordingly,

Appellants lack a legal interest. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325(2)(ii); Herron, 468

A.2d at 805 (affirming trial court’s denial of grandparents’ petition to modify

child custody, and stating where both parents “have chosen not to have their

children visit the grandparents[] to permit [] visitation,” there is no precedent

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8 Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(1)-(2), unpublished non-precedential
memorandum decisions of the Pennsylvania Superior Court filed after May 1,
2019 may be cited for their persuasive value.

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that “legitimizes such an intrusion by the courts into family life.”); Helsel,

927 A.2d at 254-55 (discussing Herron and affirming trial court’s ruling that

grandfather lacked standing to petition for visitation of his grandson, where

parents did not wish grandfather to visit child); see also Williams, 276 A.3d

226 (unpublished memorandum at 19, 20 n.15) (upholding trial court’s denial

of grandparents’ petition to intervene to seek partial custody of their grandson

under Section 5325(2), where (1) grandparents did not stand in loco parentis9

to their grandson, contrary to their claim; and (2) “although not the focus of

their argument on appeal, grandparents are also unable to establish standing

where parents did not disagree as to whether grandparents ‘should have

custody,’ 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325(2)(ii)” (capitalization modified)). Based on the

foregoing, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying Appellants’

petition to intervene.

       Order affirmed.

       Judge Olson joins the memorandum.

       P.J.E. Stevens concurs in the result.

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9 In the instant case, Appellants never argued they stand in loco parentis to

the children. Cf. Williams, 276 A.3d 226 (unpublished memorandum at 8-
20).

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 04/10/2024

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