Court Opinion

ID: 9390839
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 18:02:44.107327+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:37.486082
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/28/23 Estate of Trunnell CA1/4
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                            FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FOUR

 Estate of MALCOLM
 TRUNNELL, Deceased
 CATHLEEN ZAPPONE, as
 Administrator, etc.
      Petitioner and                                          A163313
 Appellant,
                                                              (Alameda County
 v.                                                           Super. Ct. No.
 TAWNYA L. TRUNNELL,                                          RG17879783)
              Objector and Appellant.

          Tawnya Trunnell sued Cathleen Zappone as administrator
of the estate of Malcom Trunnell, alleging the estate failed to pay
spousal support as required by a stipulated judgment dissolving
Tawyna and Malcom’s marriage.1 The trial court entered
judgment for Tawnya, awarding about $63,000 in damages for
unpaid support payments and special damages Tawnya suffered
after the missed payments, as well as prejudgment interest.

        Because Tawnya and Malcom Trunnell share the same
          1

last name, we refer to them by their first names to avoid
confusion. Except where otherwise stated, references to Zappone
in this opinion refer to her in her capacity as administrator of
Malcolm’s estate.

                                                      1
Tawnya and Zappone both appeal. Zappone argues the trial
court erred in finding Malcom’s estate breached the stipulated
judgment and should not have awarded any damages. Tawnya
argues the trial court should have enforced a liquidated damages
provision in the stipulated judgment, which states that if
Malcolm failed to pay the spousal support, Tawnya would have
the right to claim the true value of her community interest in
certain property that she had compromised in the stipulated
judgment.
      We agree with the trial court that Malcolm’s estate failed to
comply with the stipulated judgment and that the liquidated
damages provision is unenforceable, but we conclude the trial
court erred in awarding special damages and in its calculation of
prejudgment interest. We will therefore reverse the judgment
and remand for further proceedings.
                         BACKGROUND
      In September 2013, a family court judgment dissolved
Tawnya and Malcom’s thirteen-year marriage. The judgment
was based on a document titled “Stipulated Judgment for
Dissolution of Marriage,” which contained the details concerning
support and division of property and which is, in effect, a marital
settlement agreement. Tawnya and Malcom prepared the
document with the help of a paralegal, not a lawyer, and signed
it. The document was attached to the judgment, and the
judgment states that each attachment to the judgment “is
incorporated into this judgment, and the parties are ordered to
comply with each attachment’s provisions.” The judgment also

                                 2
states that the “settlement agreement”—i.e., the stipulated
judgment—is “attached and made a part of this judgment.”
Many of the provisions in the stipulated judgment are typed into
the judgment itself.
      The stipulated judgment awarded Malcolm a house in
Livermore and a flooring business. Tawnya received a payment
of $40,000 for her community interest in these assets, plus the
right to half of the proceeds of the sale of a timeshare above a
certain amount. Malcolm was required to pay Tawnya $1,200 per
month in spousal support from June 2013 through November
2018. The stipulated judgment and judgment both state, “If
[Malcolm] dies before the spousal support obligation has been
paid, the balance of spousal support due will be paid from
[Malcolm]’s estate.” Both documents also specify, “If [Malcolm]
fails to pay the spousal support as agreed, [Tawnya] shall have
the right to claim the true assessed value of her community
interest in the real property and business.” The signed
stipulation also contains an attorney’s fees provision.
      Until his death on May 16, 2017, Malcolm timely made all
spousal support payments via automatic payments from his bank
account. Malcolm died intestate. Three days after Malcolm’s
death, Zappone, who was Malcolm’s wife when he died, stopped
all automatic payments from his accounts, including Tawnya’s
support payment. She did this believing she was acting on behalf
of Malcolm’s estate, to preserve funds in order to pay the
employees of the flooring business.

                                 3
      On May 31, 2017, Zappone petitioned a probate court to be
appointed administrator of Malcolm’s estate. The probate court
granted her petition and, on July 14, 2017, issued letters of
administration.
      Zappone paid certain estate expenses, such as mortgages
on the house, but did not pay the spousal support. Tawnya
submitted a creditor claim to Zappone in August 2017 for about
$1.15 million, which consisted of $21,600 for unpaid spousal
support and about $1.13 million for half the value of the house
and business. Zappone allowed the claim for $21,600 and
rejected the balance.
      In October 2017, Tawnya filed a complaint in civil court
against Zappone for breach of the stipulated judgment and
seeking a declaration of her interest in the house and business.
Zappone offered to pay Tawnya a lump sum of $21,600 for the
balance of spousal support remaining at Malcolm’s death, but
Tawnya declined the offer, insisting on receiving the full amount
of the claim she had submitted.
      After a bifurcated bench trial on liability, the trial court
found Malcolm’s estate breached its obligations under the
stipulated judgment. The court concluded that the estate could
have satisfied the judgment by either paying Tawnya monthly or
in a lump sum, but neither occurred. But the court found
Tawnya was not entitled to the value of her community interests
in the house and the business. It interpreted the stipulated
judgment as entitling Tawnya to such relief only if Malcolm
himself failed to pay the support as agreed, not his estate, and in

                                  4
this case it was Malcolm’s estate that failed to make the required
payments.
      After a second phase of trial on damages, the trial court
awarded Tawnya about $63,000 in damages. This consisted of
$22,800 in spousal support (after correcting the parties’ count of
the number of missed payments), special damages of $28,000,
and prejudgment interest running from the date of Malcolm’s
death. The trial court awarded the special damages based on
Tawnya’s testimony that after the spousal support payments
stopped, she fell into substantial debt and incurred late payment
fees and interest charges for expenses she would have been able
to pay with the spousal support. The trial court again rejected
Tawnya’s request for the value of her community property
interest in the house and business, but this time with a different
rationale. It characterized that aspect of the stipulated judgment
as a liquidated damages clause and found it unreasonable and
therefore unenforceable.
      After further proceedings, the trial court awarded Tawnya
about $100,000 in attorney’s fees and costs based on the
attorney’s fees provision in the stipulated judgment.2

      2 We asked the parties to address whether the trial court
properly had jurisdiction over this action, given that Tawnya is
attempting to enforce the stipulated judgment from the family
court. (See Neal v. Superior Court (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 22, 25–
26 [breach of contract and declaratory judgment action to enforce
family court judgment should not have been filed in civil trial
court].) Even assuming Tawnya should have proceeded in family
court (which we need not decide), Zappone forfeited the issue by
not objecting below. (Williams v. Superior Court (1939) 14 Cal.2d
656, 662 [conflict of priority between departments of a single

                                 5
                             DISCUSSION
I.   Administration of probate estates
        To evaluate many of the parties’ arguments, it is first
necessary to understand the general process for the resolution of
claims against estates. With an exception not relevant here,
“after the death of the decedent all money judgments against the
decedent . . . are payable in the course of administration and are
not enforceable against property in the estate of the decedent
under the Enforcement of Judgments Law.” (Prob. Code, § 9300,
subd. (a).)3 However, such judgments must be filed “in the same
manner as other claims” against the estate.4 (§ 9300, subd. (b);
Embree v. Embree (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 487, 493–494.) This

superior court is equivalent to the conflict between superior
courts of different counties]; People ex rel. Garamendi v.
American Autoplan, Inc. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 760, 769–774
[priority of one superior court over another is a rule of policy and
not jurisdictional in the sense that a failure to follow it renders
subsequent proceedings void]; Harnedy v. Whitty (2003)
110 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1345 [party was barred by waiver and
estoppel from raising for the first time on appeal a defect in trial
court’s jurisdiction that did not concern fundamental
jurisdiction].)
        3   Undesignated statutory references are to the Probate
Code.
        “ ‘The “personal representative” is the person or firm
        4

appointed by the probate court to administer the probate of a
decedent's estate. [Citation.] The personal representative may
be the executor, who is the person named as such in the
decedent’s will, or it may be the successor to the executor, or an
administrator appointed by the court where the decedent died
without a will naming an executor.’ ” (Estate of Wong (2012)
207 Cal.App.4th 366, 375, fn. 3.)

                                    6
requires a creditor seeking payment of a judgment from an estate
to file a claim with the personal representative of the decedent’s
estate within a certain period or be barred from enforcing their
claims. (§§ 9100, 9150, subd. (d).) “The purpose of the
requirement is to give the personal representative an opportunity
to ascertain speedily the obligations against the estate and the
method of payment.” (15 Witkin, Summary of California Law
(11th ed. 2022) Wills and Probate § 657.)
      Upon the filing of a claim, the personal representative must
allow or reject the claim, in whole or in part. (§§ 9250, subd. (a);
9255, subd. (a).) When a personal representative rejects a claim,
in whole or in part, a creditor must “bring an action on the claim”
or the rejected part of the claim within a specified period or the
claim will be barred. (§§ 9255, subd. (b), 9353, subd. (a).) A claim
that is allowed by a personal representative appointed with
authority under the Independent Administration of Estates Act
(§§ 10400–10592) (IAEA), like Zappone, is “included among the
debts [of the estate] to be paid in the course of administration.”5
(§§ 9003, 10552; cf. § 9251 [court must approve or reject a claim
allowed by a non-IAEA personal representative].)
      The Probate Code specifies the order of priority of different
types of debts of an estate, including established claims.
(§§ 11401, 11420.) Leaving aside debts owed to the state or

      5Zappone was appointed with limited authority under the
IAEA. A personal representative with limited authority cannot
engage in certain transactions involving real property but
otherwise has the same power as a representative with full
authority. (§ 10403.)

                                  7
federal governments, the expenses of administration of the estate
are the first priority, followed by obligations secured by a lien like
a mortgage or deed of trust, funeral expenses, expenses of the
decedent’s last illness, a family allowance, wage claims, and,
finally, “[g]eneral debts, including judgments not secured by a
lien and all other debts not included in a prior class.” (§ 11420,
subd. (a).) After reserving funds to pay for the expenses of
administration, the personal representative “shall pay” funeral
expenses, expenses of last illness, a family allowance, and wage
claims, meaning such payments are mandatory. (§§ 12, 11421.)
Except for those types of debts, “the personal representative is
not required to pay a debt until payment has been ordered by the
court.” (§ 11422.) The court generally orders payment of claims
at an accounting after the claims-filing period has closed.
(2 Bender, California Probate Practice (2023) § 14.02[2].)
      Section 11423, subdivision (a) states that interest accrues
on a debt from the date the court orders payment of it. For debts
based on contracts, “Notwithstanding subdivision (a), interest
accrues at the rate and in accordance with the terms of the
contract.” (§ 11423, subd. (b).) According to a comment by the
Law Revision Commission, which drafted section 11423, “In the
case of a debt reduced to judgment, interest commences on entry
of the judgment.” (Recommendation Proposing New Probate
Code (December 1989) 20 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. 1001
(1990) p. 1781; People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 106, 129
[when Legislature adopts Law Revision Commission’s proposal,

                                  8
its comments “are persuasive evidence of the Legislature’s
intent”].)
      Section 10552 gives personal representatives under the
IAEA the authority to allow, pay, and compromise or settle
claims against the estate. (§ 10552, subds. (a) & (b).) Personal
representatives can exercise this authority without court
supervision. (§ 10500 [IAEA personal representatives can
administer estate as provided in the IAEA, which includes
§ 10552, without court supervision]; Ross & Cohen, California
Practice Guide: Probate (The Rutter Group 2020) ¶9:75.)
However, several treatises caution personal representatives
against exercising this authority too freely because of the
personal risks to the personal representative if the estate does
not have enough money to pay debts of higher priority. Thus, one
treatise cautions, “the personal representative must exercise
extreme care in paying any debts without a court order, because,
should the estate ultimately be found to be insolvent, the
representative will be exposed to liability.” (2 Bender, California
Probate Practice, supra, § 14.02[2].) Another treatise similarly
advises, “Except for those debts which must be paid without prior
court order . . . , the representative normally will receive
optimum protection from liability by holding off payment until
settlement of an account. Unless the debt clearly is not
disputable and the estate clearly is solvent, payment without
court order risks surcharge should the particular claim ultimately
be disallowed . . . or the estate turns out to be insolvent (thus
requiring that the approved debts be prioritized for payment

                                  9
pursuant to Prob. C. § 11420). The best advice is not to pay
doubtful creditor claims before the claim-filing period expires, the
representative’s account is settled, and the order settling the
account and directing payment has become final.” (California
Practice Guide: Probate, supra, ¶8:257.3 [internal citations
omitted]; see also id. ¶9:84.1 [IAEA representatives must follow
fiduciary standard, which may require that IAEA powers not be
exercised in some situations].)
II.   Liability
      With this background, we turn now to Tawnya’s attempt to
enforce the stipulated judgment against Malcolm’s estate.
“Marital settlement agreements incorporated into a dissolution
judgment are construed under the statutory rules governing the
interpretations of contracts generally.” (In re Marriage of Iberti
(1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1439.) “ ‘The precise meaning of any
contract . . . depends upon the parties’ expressed intent, using an
objective standard. [Citations.] When there is ambiguity in the
contract language, extrinsic evidence may be considered to
ascertain a meaning to which the instrument’s language is
reasonably susceptible. [Citation.] . . . [¶] We review the
agreement and the extrinsic evidence de novo, even if the
evidence is susceptible to multiple interpretations, unless the
interpretation depends upon credibility. [Citation.] If it does, we
must accept any reasonable interpretation adopted by the trial
court. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘[W]here . . . the extrinsic evidence
is not in conflict, construction of the agreement is a question of

                                  10
law for our independent review.’ ” (ASP Properties Group, L.P. v.
Fard, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1266–1267.)
      The judgment and the stipulation attached to the judgment
both state, “If [Malcolm] dies before the spousal support has been
paid, the balance of spousal support due will be paid from
[Malcolm]’s estate.” This provision is ambiguous as to whether
Malcolm’s estate was obligated to make monthly payments until
the end of the spousal support period or pay all the remaining
support due in one lump sum. Tawnya testified that she and
Malcolm intended the provision to mean she was entitled to
monthly payments after Malcolm’s death, since she relied on the
monthly payments to pay her expenses. But Tawnya also
testified that she would have accepted a lump sum payment if
Zappone had made the lump sum payment promptly. Based on
this extrinsic evidence, either monthly payments or a lump sum
payment would have satisfied the stipulated judgment, as the
trial court ruled, but either form of payment had to occur
promptly.
      Zappone never made any support payments, lump sum or
otherwise, so she has failed to comply with the stipulated
judgment. Her various arguments against this conclusion are
unavailing. First, she argues that since the stipulated judgment
does not specify a time for the payment of support after
Malcolm’s death, by law a reasonable time is allowed. She cites
Civil Code section 1657 in support of this argument, which states
in full, “If no time is specified for the performance of an act
required to be performed, a reasonable time is allowed. If the act

                                  11
is in its nature capable of being done instantly—as, for example,
if it consists in the payment of money only—it must be performed
immediately upon the thing to be done being exactly
ascertained.” Even assuming the statute applied here, it would
not help Zappone. The support obligation was to pay money to
Tawnya, so by the terms of the statute, Zappone still had to pay
the support immediately upon learning of the obligation, and she
has not yet done so.
      Second, Zappone contends that payment of Tawnya’s
support from Malcolm’s estate was impossible until she was
appointed administrator. It is true that Zappone could not pay
the support until she was appointed, since generally “[a] person
has no power to administer the estate until the person is
appointed personal representative and the appointment becomes
effective.” (§ 8400, subd. (a).) But Zappone did not pay the
support even after she was appointed, so this argument cannot
justify a reversal of the trial court’s finding of liability. Moreover,
the Probate Code allows for the appointment of a special
administrator of an estate, to temporarily manage its affairs until
a personal representative is appointed. (§ 8540, subd. (a) [“If the
circumstances of the estate require the immediate appointment
of a personal representative, the court may appoint a special
administrator to exercise any powers that may be appropriate
under the circumstances for the preservation of the estate”]; Ross
& Cohen, California Practice Guide: Probate, supra, ¶14:5
[special administration usually involves matters where time is of
the essence, such as “[w]here tax or other obligations are

                                  12
becoming immediately due and payable, and delay in payment
may result in penalties and/or interest”].) Zappone failed to seek
appointment or authority as a special administrator to pay
support to Tawnya.
      Zappone’s third argument relates to her second. She
argues that, after her appointment as administrator, she was and
is excused from paying the support until a probate court orders
her to do so, based on section 11422, which states in subdivision
(a) that with an exception not relevant here, a “personal
representative is not required to pay a debt until payment has
been ordered by the court.” But Zappone was appointed
administrator with authority under the IAEA. Once appointed,
she could have paid Tawnya’s spousal support claim without
court approval. (§§ 10500, 10552, subd. (a).) To be sure, she may
have had sound reasons for waiting until the probate court
ordered her to pay the support, to avoid incurring personal
liability to the estate if it turned out to be insolvent. (2 Bender,
California Probate Practice, supra, § 14.02[2]; Ross & Cohen,
California Practice Guide: Probate, supra, ¶¶8:257.3, 9:84.1.) But
that does not mean the obligation to pay Tawnya her support
disappears until a probate court orders payment.
      Zappone also cites section 10501, subdivision (a)(3) and (4)
as preventing her from paying the spousal support obligation
without court approval. That subdivision requires court approval
for settlement of accounts and preliminary and final distributions
and discharge. (§ 10501, subd. (a)(3)–(4).) Tawnya’s spousal
support payments were creditor claims. Zappone cites nothing to

                                 13
 suggest Tawnya’s support claim could be classified as an account
 or distribution for the purposes of this statute.
       Finally, Zappone points out that she terminated the
 automatic payment of Tawnya’s support before she was
 appointed administrator, so that action cannot be imputed to the
 estate. Again, Zappone is correct (Lamkin v. Vierra (1961) 198
 Cal.App.2d 123, 126–128), but it does not change the outcome
 here. As discussed ante, an estate can be liable for the legal
 consequences of not complying with an obligation even if no
 administrator is appointed, and Zappone did not pay the spousal
 support even after being appointed administrator.
III.   Remedy
       Having concluded that Zappone failed to satisfy the
 judgment by not promptly making monthly payments or a lump
 sum payment from the estate, we turn to the question of whether
 Zappone owes Tawnya anything beyond the $22,800 in support
 that Zappone admits is still due. Tawnya contends the estate’s
 failure to comply with the stipulated judgment triggers its
 liquidated damages provision, which states, “If [Malcolm] fails to
 pay the spousal support as agreed, [Tawnya] shall have the right
 to claim the true assessed value of her community interest in the
 real property and business.” In the alternative, Tawnya urges us
 to affirm the trial court’s award of contract damages. Zappone
 argues the trial court properly rejected Tawnya’s request for the
 value of her community property interests, and she further
 argues the trial court should not have awarded Tawnya special
 damages or prejudgment interest.

                                  14
   A.    Liquidated damages provision
        Civil Code section 1671, subdivision (b) provides that, with
some exceptions not relevant here, “a provision in a contract
liquidating the damages for the breach of the contract is valid
unless the party seeking to invalidate the provision establishes
that the provision was unreasonable under the circumstances
existing at the time the contract was made.” This places the
burden of proof on the party seeking to invalidate the damages
provision. (Ibid.; Vitatech Internat., Inc. v. Sporn (2017)
16 Cal.App.5th 796, 806 (Vitatech).) Civil Code section 1671
makes invalid a stipulated judgment that incorporates an
unreasonable liquidated damages provision. This is because “a
liquidated damages provision lacking a reasonable relationship to
the range of damages the parties reasonably could have
anticipated is unenforceable and void as against public policy,”
and “ ‘[a] court cannot validly enter a judgment or order which is
void even if the parties agree to it.’ ” (Vitatech, at p. 807.) Courts
will therefore refuse to enforce invalid liquidated damages
provisions in stipulated judgments. (Ibid.; Graylee v. Castro
(2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1107, 1114.)
        “A liquidated damages clause will generally be considered
unreasonable, and hence unenforceable under [Civil Code] section
1671(b), if it bears no reasonable relationship to the range of
actual damages that the parties could have anticipated would
flow from a breach. The amount set as liquidated damages ‘must
represent the result of a reasonable endeavor by the parties to
estimate a fair average compensation for any loss that may be

                                  15
sustained.’ [Citation.] In the absence of such relationship, a
contractual clause purporting to predetermine damages ‘must be
construed as a penalty.” [Citation.] ‘A penalty provision operates
to compel performance of an act [citation] and usually becomes
effective only in the event of default [citation] upon which a
forfeiture is compelled without regard to the damages sustained
by the party aggrieved by the breach [citation]. The
characteristic feature of a penalty is its lack of proportional
relation to the damages which may actually flow from failure to
perform under a contract.’ ” (Ridgley v. Topa Thrift & Loan Assn.
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 970, 977.) As the Supreme Court has
explained, “In short, ‘[a]n amount disproportionate to the
anticipated damages is termed a “penalty.” A contractual
provision imposing a “penalty” is ineffective, and the wronged
party can collect only the actual damages sustained.’ ” (Ibid.)
“[I]t is essentially a factual question whether the parties
reasonably estimated foreseeable damages under the prevailing
circumstances [citations] that becomes a question of law when
the facts are undisputed and susceptible of only one reasonable
interpretation.” (Krechuniak v. Noorzoy (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th
713, 723.)
      The trial court found the liquidated damages provision was
intended to act as a penalty. It found nothing in the record to
show that Tawnya and Malcolm attempted to calculate the range
of damages Tawnya might incur if she did not timely receive her
payments. The court found no evidence that the value of
Tawnya’s community property interests bore any relationship to

                                 16
her anticipated damages in the event that Malcolm failed to
make the support payments.
      Tawnya points out that liquidated damages provisions are
generally enforceable unless found to be unreasonable, and she
argues Zappone failed to carry her burden of proving the
provision in the stipulated judgment was unreasonable. But
Tawnya testified that she needed the monthly payments to meet
her daily needs, discussed with Malcolm the monthly payments
continuing after his death, and did not want a lump sum
payment of support from Malcolm’s estate because she “would
already be hurting” while the probate administration process
proceeded. She would have been willing to accept a lump sum
payment, but only if the estate had paid the lump sum promptly,
without making her wait for several months or a year while her
bills went into arrears and her credit was ruined. This suggests
that the parties predicted in advance that a missed support
payment would cause Tawnya to have unpaid bills and pay late
fees, penalties, and the like—precisely the kinds of harm she did,
in fact, suffer. But Tawnya and Malcolm did not intend the
liquidated damages provision to approximate such harms. When
asked what she wanted the agreement to accomplish if the
monthly payments were not made as agreed, she said only that
she wanted to “go and get” her community property interests. In
other words, if Tawnya did not receive her monthly payments,
she wanted a form of quasi-rescission or restitution that deprived
Malcolm of the monetary benefit of Tawnya’s admittedly
generous division of community property (but which apparently

                                17
did not involve returning the payments she had already
received). This testimony supports the trial court’s conclusion
that the liquidated damages provision was not intended as an
approximation of Tawnya’s damages, but rather as the type of
penalty provision that Civil Code section 1671 forbids.
      Tawnya contends the liquidated damages provision is
reasonable because it merely restores to Tawnya what she gave
up in exchange for the security of monthly payments. This
argument confuses the consideration Tawnya exchanged for the
monthly payments with the damage she would suffer from an
interruption in the payments. Her compromise of her community
property interests has no apparent relationship with the
estimated harm from a breach of the support obligation.
Additionally, there is no indication in the record that the parties
placed a value on Tawnya’s community property interest in the
home, which would have been necessary if they intended the
value of that interest to approximate her harm from a breach of
the stipulated judgment. (See Vitatech, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at
p. 811 [stipulation for entry of judgment in the full amount
requested in a complaint imposed unlawful penalty where
defendant did not admit liability and there was no indication the
plaintiff was likely to recover its full damages at trial].) Tawnya
testified about how much equity she believed was in the home at
the time of the stipulated judgment, but the couple bought the
house in part using Malcolm’s separate property, so Tawnya’s
community property interest could not have been a simple one-
half share of the equity.

                                 18
        Tawnya also asserts that Zappone waived any challenge to
the validity of the liquidated damages provision by not pleading
it in her answer. Tawnya is correct that Zappone failed to plead
the invalidity of the liquidated damages provision as an
affirmative defense, but she does not cite any authority to
support her contention that this necessarily requires reversal of
the trial court’s ruling on that basis, so we may disregard it. (Los
Angeles Unified School District v. Torres Construction Corp.
(2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 480, 498 [“We are not required to develop
appellants’ arguments for them. [Citation.] ‘We may and do
“disregard conclusory arguments that are not supported by
pertinent legal authority or fail to disclose the reasoning by
which the appellant reached the conclusions he wants us to
adopt” ’ ”]; see also Code Civ. Proc., §§ 469 [variance between
pleadings and proof is not material unless it misled the adverse
party to his or her prejudice], 475 [court must disregard defects
in pleadings which do not affect parties’ substantial rights].) 6
   B.       Special damages
        The trial court awarded Tawnya special damages to
compensate her for damage she suffered from Zappone’s failure to
pay the spousal support. Zappone argues these damages were

       Because we agree with the trial court that the liquidated
        6

damages provision is invalid and unenforceable, we need not
consider the trial court’s alternative rationale that the liquidated
damages provision applied only if Malcolm personally failed to
make a spousal support payment, not if his estate failed to make
a payment.

                                 19
improper because the stipulated judgment cannot be enforced
with contract damages. We agree.
      “If the court approve[s] the terms of [a marital settlement]
agreement as being fair and equitable, its enforcement may rest
in a cause of action for its breach. [Citation.] If, however, a
marital settlement agreement merges into the judgment, the
agreement is superseded by the decree and can only be enforced
as a judgment and not as a contract.” (In re Marriage of Lane
(1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 1143, 1147.) “Marital settlement
agreements merged into interlocutory judgments become part of
a judgment and enforceable by contempt. Marital settlement
agreements not merged into an interlocutory decree are
enforceable as a contract. [Citations.] A merged ‘ “. . . separation
agreement is superseded by the decree, and the obligations
imposed are not those imposed by contract, but are those imposed
by decree, and enforceable as such. Once the contract is merged
into the decree, the value attaching to the separation agreement
is only historical.’ ” [Citation.] ‘Merger, then, replaces the
obligations of the contract with those of the decree [and] the
merger itself has extinguished the contract’s obligations.’ ” (In re
Marriage of Jones (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1097, 1104.)
      “The question of whether a marital settlement agreement is
merged into the divorce decree is one of law.” (In re Marriage of
Corona (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1221.) “ ‘An examination of
cases dealing with the question of merger [citation], reveals that
the courts, in determining the intent of the parties and the intent
of the court rendering the decree [citation] have considered the

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following factors: (1) recitals in the agreement which indicate
that it is to be presented to the divorce court for approval [sic]
and/or incorporation in the decree; (2) the physical incorporation
of the words of the agreement in either the body of the decree or
as an exhibit attached thereto; (3) if not so attached, the extent to
which the decree expressly purports to incorporate the provisions
of the agreement, and the extent to which the agreement so
incorporated can be identified from the terms of the decree; and
(4) the extent to which the decree purports to order the
performance of the terms of the agreement.’ ” (In re Marriage of
Lane, supra, 165 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1147–1148.)7
      These factors all indicate that Tawnya and Malcolm’s
settlement agreement merged into the judgment. First and most
obviously, the stipulation was framed as a stipulated judgment
and included a signature line for a judge. Second, the words in
the stipulation relating to payment of spousal support, the
results of Malcolm’s failure to pay as agreed, and the obligation of
Malcolm’s estate to pay the balance of spousal support due were
all typed into the judgment’s spousal support order. Finally, the
stipulated judgment states, “Each attachment to this judgment is

      7 Rule 5.411 of the California Rules of Court addresses how
parties should request a stipulated judgment. Rule 5.411(b)
states, “A stipulated judgment constitutes a written agreement
between the parties as to all matters covered by the stipulation.”
Tawnya does not rely on this rule, and we do not interpret it as
being contrary to the long-established principle that marital
settlement agreements can merge into a judgment of dissolution.
Rather, we construe it as indicating that a stipulation can be
enforced as a contract before it is merged into a judgment.

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incorporated into this judgment, and the parties are ordered to
comply with each attachment’s provisions.” The order dividing
Tawnya and Malcolm’s property repeats that “the settlement
agreement between the parties . . . is attached and made a part of
this judgment.” The signed stipulation is attached to the
judgment.
         Because Tawnya and Malcolm’s stipulation merged into the
judgment, the stipulated judgment cannot be enforced with
contract damages. The trial court therefore erred in awarding
Tawnya special damages.
   C.     Prejudgment interest
         Zappone faults the trial court for relying on Civil Code
section 3289, subdivision (b) to award Tawnya prejudgment
interest. She contends the Probate Code governs the calculation
of interest and under section 11423, subdivision (a), interest will
not accrue until the probate court orders her to pay Tawnya’s
claim.
         We agree that the Probate Code governs the calculation of
interest, and section 11423, subdivision (a) declares that interest
on a debt accrues from the date the court orders payment of it.
But section 11423 also states in subdivision (c), “Notwithstanding
subdivision (a), in the case of a debt for unpaid taxes or any other
debt for which interest is expressly provided by statute, interest
accrues at the rate and in accordance with the terms of the
statute.” Section 685.010, subdivision (a)(1) of the Code of Civil
Procedure establishes that the legal rate of interest applicable to
judgments like the stipulated judgment is 10 percent per year.

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The Law Revision Commission comment on section 11423 also
remarks that “[i]n the case of a debt reduced to judgment,” like
the stipulated judgment here, “interest commences on entry of
the judgment.” (20 Law Revision Com. Rep. 1001, supra, at
p. 1781.) By the terms of the Probate Code, then, Tawnya is
entitled to interest on her support payments, even though the
probate court apparently has not yet ordered payment of her
claim.
         Because the stipulated judgment required Malcolm or his
estate to make installment support payments, the calculation of
prejudgment interest is slightly more complicated than simply
calculating the interest from the date of entry of the stipulated
judgment. For spousal support orders, interest accrues for each
monthly installment of spousal support as it becomes due and is
not paid. (Code Civ. Proc., § 685.020, subd. (b) [“Unless the
judgment otherwise provides, if a money judgment is payable in
installments, interest commences to accrue as to each installment
on the date the installment becomes due”]; In re Marriage of
Cordero (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 653, 657.) Tawnya admitted she
would have accepted a prompt lump sum payment as a form of
prepayment of the support due. But in the absence of a prompt
lump sum payment immediately after Malcolm’s death, Tawnya
was entitled to monthly support payments until the support
obligation was satisfied. Accordingly, 10 percent interest began
accruing separately on each month’s unpaid spousal support on
the date each payment became due, starting with the May 2017
payment. The trial court’s calculation of prejudgment interest on

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the entire amount of support starting with Malcolm’s death is
therefore incorrect. We will remand for the trial court to
recalculate the prejudgment interest based on the correct
formula.
IV.   Attorney’s fees
      Zappone argues the trial court abused its discretion in
determining that Tawnya was the prevailing party entitled to
attorney’s fees under the attorney’s fees provision of the
stipulated judgment. Given that we have affirmed the finding of
liability but reversed the award of special damages and the
calculation of prejudgment interest, we will remand for the trial
court to exercise its discretion anew in determining which party,
if any, prevailed in this action. (Civ. Code, § 1717, subd. (b)(1)
[court determines who is the party prevailing on the contract for
purposes of contractual attorney’s fees]; DisputeSuite.com, LLC v.
Scoreinc.com (2017) 2 Cal.5th 968, 974 [“ ‘in deciding whether
there is a “party prevailing on the contract,” the trial court is to
compare the relief awarded on the contract claim or claims with
the parties’ demands on those same claims and their litigation
objectives as disclosed by the pleadings, trial briefs, opening
statements, and similar sources’ ”].)
                          DISPOSITION
      The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. The
parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

                                BROWN, P. J.

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WE CONCUR:

GOLDMAN, J.
WHITMAN, J.
Trunnell v. Zappone (A163313)

       Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of
Alameda, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,
section 6 of the California Constitution.

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