Court Opinion

ID: 9555929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 18:01:21.104443+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:36:52.665762
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50916         Document: 00516858124              Page: 1       Date Filed: 08/15/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                       ____________                                          FILED
                                                                                       August 15, 2023
                                         No. 22-50916                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                       ____________                                          Clerk

   Vanessa Quintero,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                              versus

   State of Texas - Health and Human Services
   Commission,

                                                Defendant—Appellee.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the Western District of Texas
                                USDC No. 3:20-CV-251
                      ______________________________

   Before Duncan and Wilson, Circuit Judges, and Schroeder, District
   Judge. *
   Per Curiam: †

          _____________________
          *
             United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by
   designation.
          †
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-50916      Document: 00516858124         Page: 2       Date Filed: 08/15/2023

                                   No. 22-50916

                               I. Background

                             A. Factual Background

          Appellee-Defendant State of Texas – Health and Human Services
   Commission (“HHSC”) hired Appellant-Plaintiff Vanessa Quintero as a
   pharmacy technician in January 2019. Appellant was pregnant at the time
   she was hired—she chose to disclose her pregnancy to her supervisor, Patty
   Dominguez, a few weeks into her new job. Quintero alleges Dominguez
   began harassing her because of her pregnancy. Eventually, Quintero was
   terminated    from   HHSC     for   failure    to   follow    instructions   and
   insubordination.
                           B. Procedural Background

          Quintero brought Title VII and Pregnancy Discrimination Act claims
   of pregnancy discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation
   against HHSC. HHSC moved for summary judgment on these three claims.
   The magistrate judge recommended granting HHSC’s motion, Quintero did
   not object to the report and recommendation, and the district judge adopted
   the magistrate judge’s findings in their entirety. Quintero timely appealed.
                              II. Jurisdiction

          We have jurisdiction because Quintero challenges a final judgment. 28
   U.S.C. § 1291.
                               III. Discussion

                             A. Standard of Review

          Quintero argues the grant of summary judgment should be reviewed
   de novo because the district court conducted “an independent review of the
   record” to determine whether the findings of the report and

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   recommendation were correct.         HHSC argues the grant of summary
   judgment should be reviewed for plain error because Quintero filed no
   objections to the report and recommendation and the district court explicitly
   stated it reviewed the report and recommendation for plain error.
          Although a grant of summary judgment is typically reviewed de novo,
   plain error review applies where “a party did not object to a magistrate
   judge’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, or recommendation to the district
   court” despite being “served with notice of the consequences of failing to
   object.” Valentine v. Varco, 712 F. App’x 347, 349 (5th Cir. 2017) (per
   curiam) (citations omitted) (unpublished); see Ortiz v. City of San Antonio
   Fire Dep’t, 806 F.3d 822, 825–26 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying plain error review
   to a grant of summary judgment when the appellant did not object to the
   magistrate’s report and recommendation); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto
   Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (creating the rule that bars
   a party from appellate review, except upon grounds of plain error, of
   “unobjected-to proposed findings and conclusions” by the magistrate judge
   that have been accepted by the district court if a party “has been served with
   notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object”),
   superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (extending the
   time to file objections from 10 to 14 days).
          A de novo review may be appropriate in limited cases, such as when a
   district court engages in an independent evaluation of the record despite the
   failure of a party to object to the report and recommendation. See Guillory v.
   PPG Indus., Inc., 434 F.3d 303, 308 & n.5 (5th Cir. 2005). In Guillory, the
   district court’s order did not state that it conducted a plain error review when
   it accepted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation based on an
   “independent review of the record.” See Guillory v. PPG Industries, Inc., Civ.
   2:03-cv-882-JTT-APW, No. 53 (W.D. La. Sept. 22, 2004). That is not the
   case here. Here, the district court explicitly stated it conducted a plain error

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   review of the report and recommendation before unequivocally adopting the
   magistrate’s report and recommendation. Accordingly, we review for plain
   error. See Ortiz, 806 F.3d at 825–26.
          Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is
   no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
   judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A factual issue is
   genuine if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict
   for the non-moving party, and material if its resolution could affect the
   outcome of the action.” Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222,
   226 (5th Cir. 2015) (citations and internal quotations omitted). “Courts
   must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party
   and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Cadena v. El Paso
   Cnty., 946 F.3d 717, 723 (5th Cir. 2020).
           B. Quintero’s Title VII Pregnancy Discrimination Claim

          A plaintiff asserting a Title VII discrimination claim carries the initial
   burden of establishing a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination. Young
   v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 228 (2015) (citing McDonnell
   Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). Quintero relies on
   statements made by Dominguez after the disclosure of her pregnancy,
   including statements made during the hiring of new staff to satisfy this
   burden. Accordingly, we agree with the district court’s finding that this
   evidence sufficiently carried Quintero’s initial burden of showing pregnancy
   discrimination.
          After the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the
   burden shifts to the employer “to articulate some legitimate, non-
   discriminatory reason[s] for” the adverse employment action against the
   plaintiff. Young, 575 U.S. at 213 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
   Appellee argues it dismissed Quintero because of her alleged insubordination

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   and failure to follow directions, identifying incidents such as Quintero’s
   failure to speak to a nurse and complete an assigned presentation.
   Accordingly, we agree with the district court’s finding that this proffered
   evidence was sufficient to show that HHSC had a legitimate, non-
   discriminatory reason for Quintero’s dismissal.
          Whether Quintero proffered substantial evidence to show pretext is a
   much closer question. Quintero failed to clearly articulate pretext arguments
   before the district court. In the district court, Quintero argued (1) she was
   not notified of the reason for her termination upon her dismissal, (2) the
   specific incidents of insubordination and failure to follow directions raised by
   Appellee did not occur or were not reasons for dismissal because there was
   no documentation or corrective action, and (3) the temporal proximity
   between the protected activity and her dismissal showed pretext. On appeal,
   Quintero has offered new theories of pretext. These new allegations of
   pretext will not be considered because Quintero did not articulate these
   theories before the district court. See, e.g., Intercity Ambulance Emergency
   Med. Technicians, LLC v. City of Brownsville, Texas, 655 F. App’x 1005, 1008
   (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam).
          First, there is no genuine dispute that Quintero was dismissed during
   her   probationary      period,    and    her      termination    letter   identified
   insubordination and failure to follow directions as the reason for her
   dismissal. Second, Quintero admitted she committed the incidents HHSC
   complained of, such as forgetting to prepare an assigned presentation and not
   following instructions. In light of these admissions, 1 Quintero does not offer
   evidence sufficient to show Appellee’s reasons for dismissal lack truth or
          _____________________
          1
            While before the district court, Appellant argued there was a “dearth” of
   evidence about the alleged insubordination and failure to follow instructions. Her own
   admission that these acts occurred renders the lack of documentation irrelevant.

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   credence. See e.g., Collier v. Dallas Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 827 F. App’x 373, 376
   (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2657 (2021) (finding
   appellant did not meet his burden when there was no dispute that certain
   insubordinate acts occurred, and no other evidence of pretext was offered).
   Finally, Quintero’s argument that the timing of her dismissal demonstrates
   pretext fails because Quintero has not shown she engaged in a protected
   activity. See infra, Section III.D.
          Accordingly, Quintero failed to show pretext before the district court,
   and we affirm its ruling regarding pretext at the motion for summary
   judgment phase.
                    C. Quintero’s Title VII Retaliation Claim

          Quintero argues that she presented sufficient evidence to support a
   retaliation claim because she “was retaliated against when [she] complained
   about the unfair treatment. . . because of my pregnancy.” Quintero also
   characterizes her termination as retaliation in response to her pregnancy.
          We affirm the district court’s finding that the retaliation claim should
   be dismissed. “An employee has engaged in protected activity when [she]
   has (1) ‘opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice’ by
   Title VII [opposition clause] or (2) ‘made a charge, testified, assisted, or
   participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing’ under
   Title VII [participation clause].” Riley v. Napolitano, 537 F. App’x 391, 392
   (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (alterations in original, citations omitted).
   Quintero’s disclosure of her pregnancy does not rise to the level of a
   protected activity for the purposes of a Title VII retaliation claim because a
   disclosure of this type does not fall under the opposition or participation
   clause. Similarly, Quintero’s general complaint about Dominguez’s “unfair
   treatment” and “rude behavior” does not rise to the level of making a charge
   of discrimination.    Making a general complaint about mistreatment or

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   “hostile work environments” does not qualify as a protected activity under
   Title VII. Davis v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 448 F. App’x 485, 493 (5th Cir.
   2011) (per curiam) (collecting cases to support a finding that a complaint
   about a “hostile work environment” did not comprise a “protected activity”
   under Title VII).
          Accordingly, Quintero has not raised sufficient facts to show she
   engaged in a protected activity.
          D. Quintero’s Title VII Hostile Work Environment Claim

          Quintero argues there was a hostile environment because Dominguez
   yelled at Quintero, changed Quintero’s shifts at the last minute and without
   notice, and falsely accused Quintero of being inflexible, insubordinate, and
   unable to follow instructions after Dominguez discovered Quintero’s
   pregnancy. Appellee argues that Dominguez is “a demanding supervisor and
   tough on everybody.” Appellee argues that even though the workplace may
   have been uncivil, Quintero did not show this lack of civility was based on
   Quintero’s status as a pregnant woman.
          The district court found that Quintero only offered unsubstantiated
   accusations and conclusory allegations that the alleged harassment occurred
   because of Quintero’s protected status.           But “[w]hether [Quintero’s]
   allegations are too vague to ultimately carry the day is a credibility
   determination, or requires weighing the evidence, both of which are more
   appropriately done by the trier of fact.” Harvill v. Westward Commc’ns,
   L.L.C., 433 F.3d 428, 436 (5th Cir. 2005). There is evidence on both sides
   as to whether Dominguez treated Quintero differently, and more harshly,
   than other employees, including the testimony of other employees. Similarly,
   there is evidence on both sides as to Dominguez’s motivation for the
   allegedly hostile conduct.

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          However, after reviewing the relevant evidence and drawing all
   reasonable inferences in Quintero’s favor without making any credibility
   determinations, we agree with the district court’s assessment that the
   conduct alleged by Quintero was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to affect
   a term or condition of her employment. Title VII is not a “general civility
   code” and the conduct Quintero complains of, even when taken as true,
   comprises “the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic
   use of abusive language,” poor communication, and scheduling issues.
   Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). The conduct at issue
   here does not rise to the level of “extreme” that amounts to a change in the
   terms and conditions of employment. Id. At most, Quintero’s evidence,
   when taken as true, shows that the work environment was uncomfortable—
   but an uncomfortable workplace is not sufficient to sustain a claim of hostile
   work environment under Title VII. See, e.g., Kumar v. Shinseki, 495 F. App’x
   541, 543 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
          For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s ruling on
   summary judgment.

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