Court Opinion

ID: 9647494
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:38:15.275907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:50.151212
License: Public Domain

OPINION
CAMPBELL, Judge.
This is an original application for writ of habeas corpus wherein applicant requests that this Court issue a writ of habeas corpus and relieve him from an order of contempt entered by respondent judge during the pendency of a criminal trial. See Art. V, Sec. 5, Tex.Const. and Ex Parte Sheppard, 548 S.W.2d 414 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). This application presents a very narrow question, to wit: whether the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or Art. I, Sec. 8 of the Texas Constitution create a privilege whereby photo journalists are excused from testifying and from producing photographs of alleged criminal activity witnessed in a public place. To this narrow question we answer in the negative and deny relief.
Applicant is and was at all relevant times employed as a photographer for the Dallas Morning News. On the morning of September 23, 1983, applicant was assigned to cover a protest demonstration occurring outside the offices of Dallas Power and Light on Commerce Street in downtown Dallas. Applicant proceeded to the above location and took photographs of the demonstration and the subsequent arrest and removal of certain demonstrators, including Mavis Belisle. The following day the Dallas Morning News ran a photograph taken by applicant of Belisle being physically removed from the site by arresting officers.
Subsequently Belisle and two co-defendants were charged by information with violation of V.T.C.A. Penal Code Sec. 42.-03(a)(1), obstructing a public passageway. In so charging Belisle, the State specifically pled that the obstruction of the passageway was accomplished “by chaining himself to the said doorway of a public building.”
At trial on the merits Belisle admitted participation in the demonstration but specifically denied she had at any time been chained to the building. The State called the arresting officer and a security guard for Dallas Power and Light, both of whom testified to having personally observed Be-lisle chained to the doorway. The defense called Belisle and one of the demonstrators (who was allegedly closest to Ms. Belisle), both of whom testified that Belisle was never at any time chained to the doorway. *738Thus the central issue at trial was whether the defendant was chained to the doorway.
Belisle sought to subpoena applicant to present testimony as to his personal observations of the demonstration and Belisle’s activities.
Applicant filed a motion to quash the subpoena alleging, inter alia, that the First Amendment created a privilege for newspaper reporters and that defendant Belisle had failed to make a substantial showing as to what applicant claimed was required by Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 38 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972). After an extensive hearing the respondent held that applicant would be required to testify as to his personal observations. Prior to testifying, applicant, by his attorney, acknowledged that, as to his personal observations of alleged criminal activity, he was on the same footing as a layperson and therefore he would testify. He nonetheless sought to limit his testimony just to personal observation and continued to invoke a privilege not to answer any questions which encroached upon his status as a reporter. Applicant testified as to his observations. He testified that he believed1 that defendant Belisle was chained to the doorway; however, he admitted that he had, on a prior occasion, told his attorney that he did not remember whether defendant Belisle was chained. Significantly, he further testified that the photographs he took would probably show whether the defendant was in fact chained and would refresh his recollection. Subsequently, the defense requested that applicant be ordered to review his photographs. Respondent, after further argument by all parties, ordered applicant to review his photos and have the photos available for cross-examination. To this order applicant refused to comply and accordingly was held in contempt by respondent, and ordered jailed until he purged himself. This writ immediately followed.2
Applicant argues that the U.S. Constitution requires that courts recognize a qualified privilege for the press not to be required to testify. Applicant urges that by reading Justice Stewart’s dissent with Justice Powell’s concurrence in Branzburg, supra, a balancing test is required before a reporter will be ordered to divulge sources to courts or grand juries. We decline to adopt any combination of the dissenting and concurring opinions. The four justice plurality opinion in which Justice Powell concurred quite clearly found that no balancing was required. Branzburg, supra, at pp. 705-06, 92 S.Ct. at 2668-69. In a footnote in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978), Justice Powell clarified his position in Branzburg, observing that any press interests can be weighed in the regular subpoena process. Justice Powell specifically found no exception to the requirements of a subpoena for media personnel based upon the First Amendment. Zurcher, supra., concurring opinion, footnote 3 at 570, 98 S.Ct. footnote 3 at 1984.
Assuming arguendo, that the dissent in Branzburg did in fact recognize some sort of media privilege based upon the First Amendment, it is abundantly clear that the facts in Branzburg are much closer constitutionally than the limited facts in the case sub judice.
Branzburg involved three differing claims of privilege, basically centering on appearing before a grand jury and disclosing confidential sources. One of the reporters in Branzburg had, by virtue of a confidential informer relationship, witnessed and photographed the making of hashish. He was required to come forward and divulge “secret” information. We fail to discern any greater interest for applicant here, who allegedly witnessed a crime in a public place. If in fact any weighing of interests is required for requiring the press to divulge confidential informants, *739that issue is not presented today and we do not decide it.
In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 98 S.Ct. 1970, 56 L.Ed.2d 525 (1978) the Supreme Court held that nothing in the First Amendment exempted the press from being subject to a search for proof of criminal activity. We find the facts in Zurcher very similar to the instant case. Zurcher, supra, involved the search of a student newspaper office for photographs of a student demonstration wherein several police officers were injured. The State desired to identify possible defendants for criminal charges through the photographs. The Supreme Court upheld the search and stated:
“We finally note that if the evidence sought by warrant is sufficiently connected to the crime to satisfy the probable cause requirement, it will very likely be sufficiently relevant to justify a subpoena and to withstand a motion to quash.”3 Zurcher, supra at 566, 98 S.Ct. at 1982.
Thus implicitly, the Supreme Court has recognized that the press is not immune from subpoena. Although we find Zurcher factually less compelling than the case sub judice, we nevertheless believe that it is persuasive in its analysis of First Amendment privileges.
We are not unmindful of the important place of a free press in our society, see New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971); Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965); Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Shaver, 630 S.W.2d 927 (Tex.Cr.App.1982). Not to be forgotten, however, is the interest in protecting the integrity of the criminal justice system. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974).
In Nixon, supra, the Supreme Court was weighing the asserted right of presidential privilege versus the criminal justice system’s need for relevant, material evidence. While the Court did recognize a constitutionally based presidential privilege, that privilege had to give way to the criminal defendant’s rights and the integrity of the criminal justice system. The need to develop all facts in an adversarial system of criminal justice is fundamental and comprehensive. Nixon, supra.
Additionally, a citizen accused of crime has the right to confront and fully cross-examine all persons who have testimony relevant to criminal charges. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 311, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1107, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). As the Supreme Court noted in United States v. Nixon, supra:
“The right to production of all evidence at a criminal trial similarly has constitutional dimensions. The Sixth Amendment explicitly confers upon every defendant in a criminal trial the right ‘to be confronted with the witnesses against him and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor... It is the manifest duty of the courts to vindicate those guarantees and to accomplish that, it is essential that all relevant and admissible evidence be produced.” United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at p. 711, 94 S.Ct. at p. 3109.
Applicant cites us to many authorities from other jurisdictions, urging that a balancing test be adopted and applied to the instant case. We note that most of the cases cited deal with disclosure in civil actions or disclosure of confidential sources; as such we find them to be unpersuasive and not controlling. Moreover, we fail to see a hypothetical case wherein a weighing process would result in suppression of highly relevant personal observation of public criminal activity.
*740In light of the foregoing, we fail to see how applicant’s rights will be in any way diminished in requiring production of photographs of an alleged criminal offense occurring in a public place.
The application for writ of habeas corpus is denied. It is so ordered.
TEAGUE and CLINTON, JJ., concur in this opinion.
W.C. DAVIS and TOM G. DAVIS, JJ., and ONION, P.J., not participating.

. All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.

. It is this Court's understanding that applicant was immediately released on bail and did not pursuant to this contempt order, actually spend any time jailed.

. We recognize that the Texas Legislature has adopted a search shield law which provides more protection than the Zurcher court did. Art. 18.01(e), V.A.C.C.P. However, to this date the Legislature had not adopted a newspaper testimonial privilege, a reporter’s sources shield statute or excluded newspapers from subpoenas.