Court Opinion

ID: 9946555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 21:02:25.766737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:04.565727
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/29/24 Zand v. Sukumar CA1/4

                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FOUR

 AFSHIN ZAND,
     Cross-complainant and                                             A163376
 Appellant,
                                                                       (Alameda County Super. Ct.
                           v.                                          No. RG20064932)
 PONANI SUKUMAR,
     Cross-defendant and
 Respondent.

         In this action arising from a contract dispute, Afshin Zand, proceeding
in propria persona, appeals after the trial court (Hon. Dennis Hayashi) struck
his cross-complaint against Ponani Sukumar under the anti-SLAPP
(strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute (Code Civ. Proc.,1
§ 425.16). Zand contends in part that reversal is warranted because
Sukumar’s underlying complaint against Zand contained falsehoods and
perjury. We reject Zand’s arguments and affirm.

         1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

                                                               1
                             I. BACKGROUND
   A. Sukumar’s Complaint
      On June 15, 2020, Sukumar initiated the present action by filing a
complaint against Zand, asserting several causes of action, including breach
of contract, unjust enrichment, intentional and negligent misrepresentation,
and unfair competition.2 In the complaint, Sukumar alleged that, in early
2019, he purchased and installed solar panel systems to generate electricity
at properties in which he has an ownership interest. Sukumar “became
concerned about electromagnetic emissions (including radiation) and
interference (collectively, ‘EMI’) generated by such systems, and its
potentially adverse impacts on human health and well-being.”
      Sukumar believed many other people share those concerns, and he
decided to try to develop devices to mitigate EMIs. “The goal of this work
was to develop commercially marketable EMI mitigation and remediation
devices which . . . could be used by [Sukumar], and could be sold to other
solar system owners and users. [Sukumar] was aware of other devices on the
market which are intended for this purpose, but desired to invent, develop,
and build a better, and more economical device.”
      The complaint states Sukumar retained Douglas Grimes to assist in
performing EMI research and development. Sukumar directed Grimes to
find a consultant with appropriate experience and qualifications, so Sukumar
could hire the consultant to assist with the EMI research. Grimes contacted
Zand based on a craigslist posting where Zand offered tutoring services in
various fields. Sukumar alleges that, following discussions between Grimes

      2 Sukumar later filed an amended complaint in January 2021, but the

original complaint was the focus of Zand’s cross-complaint and the anti-
SLAPP proceedings in the trial court.

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and Zand (during which Grimes allegedly told Zand that Sukumar was
Grimes’s client), Sukumar “verbally hired” Zand to assist Sukumar in
developing and inventing the EMI devices.
      Sukumar alleges that, between approximately September 28, 2019, and
November 17, 2019, Zand requested payment, and Sukumar paid him
$10,237.50 for engineering consulting services that Zand claimed he had
performed. Sukumar asserts, however, that Zand did not provide timesheets
describing his work and did not submit any work product. On or about
December 2, 2019, Sukumar asked Zand to stop work on the project until a
written agreement formalizing the arrangement between them could be
prepared.
      Although Sukumar provided draft agreements to Zand, no final written
agreement was reached. Among other issues, the parties disputed who would
own the work product developed from the research. In addition, Zand
demanded further payments from Sukumar totaling $62,600, including
$9,975 for work performed between November 18, 2019, and December 1,
2019; $37,625 for work performed between December 2, 2019, and
January 24, 2020; and $15,000 to assign Zand’s ownership rights in the
project work to Sukumar.
      Based on these alleged facts, Sukumar claimed Zand breached the oral
contract between them by failing to perform or document any compensable
work and by claiming ownership of the work product. Sukumar also alleged
Zand made false representations about his qualifications that induced
Sukumar to hire him. Sukumar sought compensatory and punitive damages
and injunctive and declaratory relief.
   B. Zand’s Cross-Complaint
      Zand filed a cross-complaint on August 3, 2020, and a first amended
cross-complaint (FACC) on August 14, 2020. The FACC alleges Sukumar

                                         3
and his attorneys filed a false, malicious complaint against Zand (i.e., the
complaint in the present case). The FACC also alleges Sukumar and his
attorneys “obstruct[ed] justice” by “derail[ing]” Zand’s earlier-filed small
claims court action against Holistic Vegetarian House (HVH), a company
owned by Sukumar. One of Zand’s principal assertions in the FACC is that
he contracted with HVH (and initially did not know about Sukumar or his
involvement), so the statements in Sukumar’s complaint describing the
contract as having been between himself and Zand were false.
      Based on this alleged conduct by Sukumar and his attorneys, the FACC
asserts ten “causes of action”—for malicious prosecution, false claim,
obstruction of justice, fraud, perjury, libel and slander, intentional
misrepresentation, “affirmative relief (post-filing period),” declaratory relief,
and punitive damages.
   C. The Anti-SLAPP Motion
      On October 19, 2020, Sukumar filed a motion to strike Zand’s FACC
under the anti-SLAPP statute. After receiving briefing and hearing
argument, the trial court granted the motion in an order filed on April 23,
2021. As to the first prong of the anti-SLAPP test (which we discuss below),
the court ruled Sukumar had met his initial burden to show that the basis of
the claims in Zand’s cross-complaint was Sukumar’s alleged misconduct in
filing and prosecuting the present action.
      On the second anti-SLAPP prong, the court agreed with Sukumar that
Zand could not establish a probability he would prevail on his claims, because
most of them were barred by the litigation privilege in Civil Code section 47,
subdivision (b). As to Zand’s claim for malicious prosecution (which the court
noted “is usually excepted from the coverage of the litigation privilege”), the
court found Zand could not establish a likelihood he would prevail on that
claim either, because “he [did] not plead facts showing that he obtained a

                                        4
favorable result in the small claims case or this case.” Pursuant to
section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), the court awarded $5,500 in attorney fees
and costs to Sukumar (reduced from the $9,949.50 Sukumar had requested,
which the court found “excessive under the circumstances”).
      Zand appealed the court’s order.
                              II. DISCUSSION
   A. Legal Standards
      The anti-SLAPP statute provides for the filing of a “special motion to
strike” a cause of action that allegedly arises from protected communicative
activities, if the cause of action lacks minimal merit. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1);
Young v. Midland Funding LLC (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 63, 78.) Specifically,
section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1), the key provision of the anti-SLAPP
statute, provides: “A cause of action against a person arising from any act of
that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech
under the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike,
unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a
probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”
      Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) does not “insulate defendants from
any liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or speech.”
(Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.) Instead, the statute “only
provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims
arising from protected activity.” (Ibid.)
      “ ‘Courts analyze anti-SLAPP motions using a familiar two-step
analysis.’ ” (Young v. Midland Funding LLC, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 78.)
“ ‘ “First, the court decides whether the defendant has made a threshold
showing that the challenged cause of action is one ‘arising from’ protected
activity. [Citation.] If the court finds such a showing has been made, it then

                                         5
must consider whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of
prevailing on the claim.” ’ ” (Barry v. State Bar of California (2017) 2 Cal.5th
318, 321.) “ ‘Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-
SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and
lacks even minimal merit—is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the
statute.’ ” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820.)
      We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion.
(Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 325 (Flatley).)
   B. Protected Activity
      The trial court correctly concluded Sukumar met his initial burden to
show the causes of action in Zand’s cross-complaint are based on protected
petitioning activity. As noted, the cross-complaint seeks relief based on
Sukumar’s filing and prosecution of his complaint in this action. Zand
alleges in the cross-complaint that (1) the party he contracted with was HVH,
and therefore (2) Sukumar’s complaint, which alleges Sukumar was the
contracting party, is “false,” “malicious,” and constitutes “perjury” and
“fraud.” Zand claims injury from the “false claim,” including that it diverted
him from productive work and exercise.
      A statement or writing made during judicial proceedings, including a
complaint for relief, is conduct covered by the anti-SLAPP statute.
Section 425.16, subdivision (e) defines the scope of activity protected by the
statute to include “any written or oral statement or writing made before
a . . . judicial proceeding” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1)), as well as “any written or
oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a . . . judicial body” (id., subd. (e)(2)). The claims
asserted by Sukumar in his complaint fall within the statute, as a claim for
relief filed in court “indisputably is a ‘statement or writing made before

                                         6
a . . . judicial proceeding’ (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1)).” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002)
29 Cal.4th 82, 90.)
       Sukumar suggests Zand’s cross-complaint is also based in part on other
litigation conduct by Sukumar, such as the filing of a motion to consolidate
the prior small claims action with the present case. Such conduct is also
protected by the statute, either as a “statement or writing made before
a . . . judicial proceeding” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1)) or as a “statement or writing
made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by
a . . . judicial body” (id., subd. (e)(2)).
       Zand contends the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply because
Sukumar engaged in illegal conduct, specifically the presentation of false and
perjurious claims to the court. To support his assertion that Sukumar
presented false claims in the present case (superior court case
no. RG20064932), Zand relies on an order (entitled “order re: judgment”) that
was entered on September 16, 2020 in the small claims action that Zand filed
against HVH (superior court case no. RS20062830).3
       In the September 16, 2020 order in the small claims case, the court
(Hon. Karin Schwartz) ruled Zand was entitled to recover payment from
HVH for work Zand performed on or before December 2, 2019. The court also
rejected HVH’s argument that Sukumar was the contracting party. The

       3 Zand requests that we take judicial notice of the small claims

judgment and an earlier ruling in that case. In response, Sukumar asks that
we take judicial notice of two other documents filed in the small claims
matter: (1) HVH’s notice appealing the small claims judgment to the
superior court, and (2) a June 16, 2021 minute order reflecting that, on
appeal, the superior court found Sukumar was an indispensable party to that
case and dismissed the matter without prejudice on that ground. We grant
these requests for the purpose of providing background for the arguments
raised by the parties in the present appeal. We address Zand’s other
requests for judicial notice in part II.D, post.

                                              7
court stated in part: “[HVH] contends that the proper contracting party was
Mr. Sukumar, but uncontroverted evidence establishes that [Zand] was not
aware of Mr. Sukumar’s name or existence until 11/3/2019, more than a
month after the contract was formed.” As noted, HVH appealed the small
claims judgment, and in June 2021, the superior court in the small claims
appeal (Hon. Victoria Kolakowski) dismissed that case without prejudice on
the ground Sukumar was an indispensable party.
      Relying on the September 2020 order in the small claims action, Zand
asserts that certain statements by Sukumar in the present action (e.g.,
Sukumar’s allegations that he retained and paid Zand and was injured by
Zand’s breach) are inconsistent with the small claims court’s findings and
therefore are false and perjurious. We reject this argument.
      The Supreme Court has emphasized that “conduct must be illegal as a
matter of law to defeat a defendant’s showing of protected activity. The
defendant must concede the point, or the evidence conclusively demonstrate
it, for a claim of illegality to defeat an anti-SLAPP motion at the first step.”
(City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 424; Flatley, supra,
39 Cal.4th at p. 330 [attorney’s letter and phone calls constituted criminal
extortion as a matter of law].) Sukumar does not concede that he engaged in
illegal activity, and the evidence does not establish that he did. Instead, the
only conduct at issue here—Sukumar’s filing and prosecution of the present
action—was not illegal, and it was not rendered illegal by anything that
occurred in the small claims case.
      Even putting aside the fact that the small claims action was later
dismissed, Zand has cited no authority for the proposition that it is illegal for
a litigant to make claims or factual allegations that are arguably inconsistent
with findings made by a court in a related action. In some circumstances,

                                        8
there may be a defense based on principles of claim or issue preclusion, but
that does not mean it is “perjury” (which, among other things, requires that a
person “willfully . . . state[] as true any material matter which he or she
knows to be false” (Pen. Code, § 118, subd. (a)))4 or otherwise “illegal as a
matter of law” (as Zand contends) for a litigant to present the claim.
   C. Probability of Success
      As to the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the trial court
correctly concluded Zand did not show a probability of prevailing on the
claims in his FACC. First, as the court found, most of Zand’s claims (all but
his claim for malicious prosecution) are barred by the litigation privilege.
      The litigation privilege in Civil Code section 47 applies to “any
communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by
litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of
the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the
action.” (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212.) The litigation
privilege is “ ‘an “absolute” privilege, and it bars all tort causes of action
except a claim of malicious prosecution.’ ” (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at
p. 322.) The privilege is “relevant to the second step in the anti-SLAPP

      4 Penal Code section 118, subdivision (a) states in part:  “Every person
who, having taken an oath that he or she will testify, declare, depose, or
certify truly before any competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any of the
cases in which the oath may by law of the State of California be
administered, willfully and contrary to the oath, states as true any material
matter which he or she knows to be false, and every person who testifies,
declares, deposes, or certifies under penalty of perjury in any of the cases in
which the testimony, declarations, depositions, or certification is permitted
by law of the State of California under penalty of perjury and willfully states
as true any material matter which he or she knows to be false, is guilty of
perjury.”

                                         9
analysis in that it may present a substantive defense a plaintiff must
overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing.” (Id. at p. 323.)
      Here, Zand cannot prevail on his claims. The statements by Sukumar
and his attorneys that Zand contends were improper—principally the
allegations in Sukumar’s complaint itself—are communications made in a
judicial proceeding that are protected by the litigation privilege. (Action
Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1249
(Action Apartment) [“We contemplate no communication that is more clearly
protected by the litigation privilege than the filing of a legal action.”].) Zand’s
claims based on this conduct are barred.
      Zand contends the litigation privilege does not bar his claims because
the privilege does not apply to the crime of perjury. But the case on which
Zand relies—Action Apartment, supra, 41 Cal.4th 1232—does not support his
argument. In Action Apartment, the Supreme Court noted it had previously
established that the litigation privilege does not bar prosecutions for perjury,
subornation of perjury, and certain other offenses established by state
statute. (Id. at p. 1246.) The court stated: “The crimes of perjury and
subornation of perjury would be almost without meaning if statements made
during the course of litigation were protected from prosecution for perjury by
the litigation privilege.” (Ibid., fns. omitted.)
      Here, of course, Zand is a civil litigant, and his cross-complaint against
Sukumar is not a prosecution by government authorities seeking to enforce
state criminal or administrative statutes that are more specific than, and
therefore prevail over, the litigation privilege. (See Action Apartment, supra,
41 Cal.4th at pp. 1246–1247 [describing the basis for prior holdings that
prosecutions for perjury and certain other crimes are not barred by the
litigation privilege].) And, as discussed above, Sukumar’s presentation of

                                         10
claims and factual allegations that Zand believes are inconsistent with the
findings made in the small claims case does not establish Sukumar’s
statements are false or amount to perjury. Zand has not shown his claims
fall within any exception to the litigation privilege.
      Finally, as to Zand’s claim for malicious prosecution, the trial court
noted the litigation privilege does not bar such a claim where the necessary
elements are present. The Supreme Court has explained that “ ‘[t]he policy of
encouraging free access to the courts that underlies the absolute [litigation]
privilege . . . is outweighed by the policy of affording redress for individual
wrongs when the requirements of favorable termination, lack of probable
cause, and malice are satisfied.’ ” (Action Apartment, supra, 41 Cal.4th at
p. 1242.)
      The trial court correctly held, however, that, at least as to the element
of favorable termination, Zand has not shown a probability of prevailing. The
court noted Zand “cannot establish a likelihood that he will prevail on [the]
claim [for malicious prosecution] because he does not plead facts showing
that he obtained a favorable result in the small claims case or this case.”
Zand’s FACC alleges Sukumar’s complaint against him in the present
superior court action constitutes malicious prosecution, but Zand does not
allege in the FACC and does not contend on appeal that the present action
has terminated favorably to him.
      Zand asserts he did obtain a favorable result in the small claims action,
i.e., the September 16, 2020 order finding in his favor on his claim against
HVH. But as noted, the small claims action was later dismissed by the
superior court. In any event, the September 2020 order does not support
Zand’s claim that Sukumar engaged in malicious prosecution. The small
claims case was prosecuted by Zand against HVH, and Sukumar was not a

                                        11
party. Even if Sukumar, rather than HVH, had been the defendant in the
small claims action, “courts have long ‘refused to recognize a tort of malicious
defense.’ ” (Coleman v. Gulf Ins. Group (1986) 41 Cal.3d 782, 794, fn. 9.)
Zand has not shown a probability of prevailing on his malicious prosecution
claim.
      We have considered the remaining arguments in Zand’s appellate briefs
and find no basis for reversal.
   D. Zand’s Motions
      Concurrently with the filing of his opening appellate brief on
September 25, 2023, Zand filed a “Motion for Judicial Notice” and a two-
pronged motion: (1) “Motion to Determine, in View of Judicially-Shown
Perjurious Complaint, if Respondent Has Established Standing,” and
(2) “Motion to Vacate Order Under Appeal Due to Said Perjuries in Special
Motion to Strike.” We entered an order stating we would defer ruling on both
sets of motions until the merits of the appeal were addressed. We authorized
Sukumar to file any response or opposition concurrently with his
respondent’s brief, which he did on November 20, 2023.5
      We now deny in part and grant in part Zand’s motion for judicial notice,
and we deny his other motions. As to judicial notice, Zand asks that we take
notice of (1) an unpublished 2013 opinion from the Fourth District Court of
Appeal that is unrelated to the present case, (2) specified documents from the
small claims court case that Zand filed against HVH, and (3) the record from

      5 In our September 26, 2023 order, we also stated that no further

briefing by Zand on the motions was permitted without permission of the
court. Zand nevertheless filed on January 22, 2024 a “Reminder re Motion
from September Remaining to be Adjudicated,” in which he urged this court
to resolve one of his motions and asserted incorrectly that Sukumar’s
response to the motion was filed late. Zand’s “Reminder” was filed in
violation of this court’s September 26, 2023 order and is therefore stricken.

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a prior appeal in this court (No. A164804) that arises from the same trial
court proceedings as the present appeal.
      Sukumar opposes the first request, and we agree there is no basis to
take notice of the unpublished appellate opinion submitted by Zand, which is
irrelevant to the issues raised in this appeal and does not fall within any
exception to the rule governing citation of unpublished opinions. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.1115.) As to the small claims court documents, we have
granted (in fn. 3, ante) Zand’s request for notice of two documents and
Sukumar’s responsive request for notice of two others. Finally, as to the
record in appeal No. A164804, Sukumar does not respond to this portion of
Zand’s judicial notice request, but we have not found it necessary to look
beyond the record in the present appeal (which Zand states “contain[s] the
exact same records”). We therefore deny this request to the extent it may
encompass documents outside the record of this appeal.
      Turning to Zand’s other motions, we deny his “Motion to Determine, in
View of Judicially-Shown Perjurious Complaint, if Respondent Has
Established Standing.” As discussed above, the small claims court ruling on
which Zand relies does not establish Sukumar has committed perjury. More
broadly, Zand has shown no basis for this court to take the unusual step of
taking evidence and making findings about whether Sukumar has standing
(a potential defense by Zand to Sukumar’s complaint), a question that is
unrelated to the merits of the present appeal of the trial court’s order striking
Zand’s cross-complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. (In re Zeth S. (2003)
31 Cal.4th 396, 405 [authority under § 909 to make factual findings on appeal
“ ‘should be exercised sparingly’ ”; “ ‘[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, no
such findings should be made’ ”].)

                                       13
      We also deny Zand’s “Motion to Vacate Order Under Appeal Due to
Said Perjuries in Special Motion to Strike.” Zand has not shown perjury, nor
has he established any basis to “vacate” the order he is challenging in the
present appeal.6
   E. Attorney Fees
      Section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1) states that, subject to exceptions not
relevant here, a defendant prevailing on a motion to strike under the anti-
SLAPP statute “shall be entitled to recover that defendant’s attorney’s fees
and costs.” As noted, the trial court awarded $5,500 in attorney fees and
costs to Sukumar. Sukumar has filed a motion asking this court to direct
that he also be awarded attorney fees incurred on appeal, with the amount to
be determined by the trial court on remand. Zand filed an opposition.
      Sukumar’s motion is granted. An award of attorney fees, which must
include fees incurred on appeal, is mandatory under the anti-SLAPP statute.
(Trapp v. Naiman (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 113, 122.) Zand’s wide-ranging
arguments to the contrary provide no basis to disregard this rule. The
amount of appellate attorney fees shall be determined by the trial court on
remand. (Area 51 Productions, Inc. v. City of Alameda (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th
581, 605.)7

      6 In connection with his opening appellate brief and the accompanying

motions, Zand submitted two volumes of exhibits and a supporting
declaration. We disregard these filings to the extent they include materials
that are not part of the appellate record or the subject of a granted request
for judicial notice.
      7 In addition to the motions we have discussed in the text, Sukumar

filed a “Notice of Errata” to correct certain record citations in his respondent’s
brief. The notice was followed by an objection from Zand, a reply from
Sukumar, and a further opposition by Zand. To the extent these filings
suggest further or revised briefing should occur, those requests are denied.

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                           III. DISPOSITION
      The order granting Sukumar’s motion to strike Zand’s FACC under the
anti-SLAPP statute is affirmed. Pursuant to section 425.16,
subdivision (c)(1), Sukumar’s request for attorney fees incurred on appeal is
granted, with the amount to be determined by the trial court on remand.
Sukumar shall recover his costs on appeal.

                                                    STREETER, J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, P. J.
GOLDMAN, J.

       Finally, in response to this court’s “Notice of Oral Argument Election”
directing the parties to notify the court if they are aware of a reason why any
of the justices in this division should not participate in the proceeding, Zand
filed a document suggesting one justice should be recused. The suggestion is
without merit and the recusal request is denied.

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