Court Opinion

ID: 9766962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:04:43.88163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:27.479829
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I join the majority’s disposition of the sufficiency of evidence and damages issues, as well as their disposition of the recusal issue regarding the judge’s personal bias, which was initially raised pre-trial. I respectfully dissent to the majority’s disposition of the remaining recusal allegations raised by appellants.
Appellants argue that the trial judge was required to have recused himself in the instant case. In support of this argument, appellants allege four reasons in their brief to this court for recusal:
(1) the trial judge had a personal bias against counsel for appellant SEPTA, based on a previous, unrelated action;
(2) the trial judge was previously represented as a plaintiff in a class action suit by plaintiffs’ counsel;
(3) the trial judge’s son-in-law is associated with plaintiff counsel’s law firm; and
(4) the trial judge’s former law clerk is associated with plaintiff counsel’s law firm.
Appellants argue that Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct required disqualification of the trial judge because, based on these allegations, the trial judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. The relevant portions of Canon 3 state:
C. Disqualification
(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where:
*478(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(d) he or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(iii) is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
Only the allegation of personal bias against SEPTA’s counsel has any foundation in the record as certified to this court. On this aspect of the recusal argument, I join the majority’s holding that the issue was waived because of appellants’ failure to file a timely written recusal motion, as specified by the trial court in its Case Management Order of June 28, 1982. I further agree that based on the record, the issue is without merit.
As to the remaining recusal issues, I must dissent.
The issue of the judge’s representation by plaintiffs’ counsel in the class action, Kremer et al. v. Barbieri, was first raised in appellants’ post-trial motions. The associations of the judge’s son-in-law and former law clerk with plaintiff counsel’s law firm were not raised in post-trial motions, but only in appellants’ brief in support thereof. The allegations that Mr. Haaz, the former law clerk, (1) is the judge’s step-nephew, (2) acted as a lawyer in the instant case, (3) represented the trial judge in an unrelated case, as well as the allegation that (4) the trial judge previously represented Mr. Haaz and his mother in a former case, appear for the first time in appellants’ post-appeal pleading entitled Application for Leave to File Supplemental Brief and for such other Relief as may be Required to Perfect the Record, filed October 11, 1983.
*479None of the allegations, other than personal bias, has any factual support made as part of the record. No evidentiary hearing was held on these other issues, nor any stipulation of fact or affidavit, properly subscribed, filed. We are asked to rule on these recusal issues based solely on the allegations set forth by appellants in their various briefs and post-appeal motions. The law is clear that an appellate court must decide a case based on facts of record and not on allegations of fact contained in appellate briefs. Commonwealth v. Mazzochetti, 299 Pa.Super. 447, 445 A.2d 1214 (1982); Commonwealth v. Stanton, 294 Pa.Super. 516, 440 A.2d 585 (1982) (recusal issue); Dile v. Dile, 284 Pa.Super. 459, 426 A.2d 137 (1981). The record contains no facts relating to the remaining recusal issues. Therefore, such issues should not be decided, nor even reviewed, by this court under circumstances where the facts are not of record.
I note that the trial court en banc addressed the merits of the recusal issue first raised in post-trial motions and those two issues raised initially in appellants’ brief in support thereof. However, I am not persuaded that merely because these issues were addressed by the trial court in its opinion, that they are automatically subject to our review, as the opinion written by the trial court is not a part of the record. Independence Party Nomination, 208 Pa. 108, 57 A. 344 (1904); Commonwealth v. Schwartz, 267 Pa.Super. 170, 406 A.2d 573 (1979); but see Commonwealth v. Darush, 501 Pa. 15, 459 A.2d 727 (1983) (suggesting trial court statements in its opinion “... provide significant insight into a subject [impartiality of judge] uniquely within the trial court’s knowledge ...”).
The majority concedes this lack of record facts (at 439-444) but goes on to discuss the possible merits of these arguments and orders a remand for an evidentiary hearing before a different judge.
As I believe this court lacks the authority to permit even such limited relief, I dissent. To permit review of facts not of record and make any substantive determination based on *480such review involves a dangerous use of this court’s authority to review on appeal. By doing so, we invite parties to raise allegations not of record or not properly preserved. Granted, the majority’s review of the allegations concludes with a determination that a remand is necessary as to several of the allegations, but even such a remand should be based on a review only of facts of record. I agree with the approach taken in Commonwealth v. Stanton, supra, where this court refused to consider appellant’s argument that the PCHA hearing judge should have recused himself because the judge was defendant in a civil suit initiated by appellant. The court stated:
The record made at the PCHA hearing indicates quite clearly that at no time did Appellant’s counsel request that the hearing judge recuse himself. Nor are any of the “facts" concerning Appellant’s civil action contained in the record. Such information, if it is that, appears for the first time in Appellant’s appellate brief.
The practice of setting forth facts in a party’s brief but not of record has been specifically condemned and we may not, as a reviewing court, consider them.
294 Pa.Super. at 521-22, 440 A.2d at 587-88 (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
Hence, my dissent.
Appellants have also raised several other issues on this appeal: (1) the insufficiency of the evidence supporting liability on the part of defendants, (2) the excessiveness of the damages, (3) failure of the trial court to permit certain voir dire questions and (4) that the jury charge was prejudicial with respect to appellant SEPTA’s standard of care, duties owed by SEPTA to the victim and the victim’s own duty of care.
The majority holds the insufficiency issue to be without merit. I agree.
As to the damages issue, the majority finds one aspect to have merit and to require a new trial as to damages, namely. the trial court’s erroneous determination, as a matter of *481law, that damages attributable to the costs of the Woods School are not recoverable from the no-fault carrier and are therefore recoverable at trial. I agree with the majority that the question of whether these costs constitute “medical and rehabilitation services” under 40 P.S. § 1009.103 is a question properly directed to the jury on the facts in the instant case. I also agree that Woods School’s accreditation by the Department of Public Welfare constitutes accreditation by "... the equivalent governmental agency responsible for health programs”. Finally, I agree that the remaining issues as to damages are without merit.
The majority postpones review of the voir dire and jury charge issues, pending the determination by the trial court on remand for an evidentiary hearing. As I do not believe a remand on the recusal issue is appropriate on this direct appeal, I would address those issues. My review of the record, as well as the briefs and trial court opinion, convinces me that these issues are without merit.
I would therefore affirm the verdict, but remand solely for a new trial limited to the issue of damages.