Court Opinion

ID: 9407894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-10 18:04:34.054493+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:40.174165
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/10/23 In re J.P. CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 In re J.P., a Person Coming Under the                                H049923
 Juvenile Court Law.                                                 (Santa Clara County
                                                                      Super. Ct. No. 21-JD-026875)

 SANTA CLARA COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND
 CHILDREN'S SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 E.P. et al.,

           Defendants and Appellants.

         The parents in this dependency case contend the juvenile court abused its
discretion by quashing a subpoena that would have required the six-year-old boy who is
the subject of the proceedings to testify at the jurisdictional hearing. Finding no abuse of
discretion, we will affirm.
                                               I.     BACKGROUND
         The Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services initiated
dependency proceedings after a report of domestic violence between the father and
mother in the presence of their six-year-old son, J.P. The father reportedly strangled the
mother until she lost consciousness. The Department filed a petition under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300 alleging J.P. was at risk because of domestic violence and
the father’s untreated substance abuse issues. J.P. was detained, removed from his
father’s custody, and placed with his mother. He was soon afterward removed from her
custody and placed in foster care when the Department learned the father had resumed
living in the family home. After a jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the juvenile
court sustained the allegations of the petition and ordered reunification services. J.P.
continued at his foster placement with both parents allowed supervised visits.
       Once the mother moved to her own home away from the father, she was allowed
unsupervised and eventually overnight visits with J.P. But J.P. told social workers the
visits were “very bad.” He said his mother hit him (demonstrating with an open hand)
when he misbehaves and had a boyfriend whom she “ ‘kisses all day’ ” and with whom
she sometimes fought in front of J.P. Then J.P. told his foster mother he was being
sexually abused during the visits. He said his father was back in the house and the
parents had intercourse while J.P. was in bed with them, licked J.P.’s private parts, and he
did not want to lick his father’s “pino” anymore. When asked what a pino is, J.P. pointed
to his penis. He said his father touched him and liked to lick his butt and private parts. In
a later interview with a forensic analyst trained in interviewing child sexual abuse
victims, J.P. reported that his mother showered with him and would grab his hand and put
it on her private parts.
       In an interview with a police officer, J.P. drew a stick figure showing his mother
had touched him in the area between his legs. He said his parents told him not to tell
anyone about anything they did and his father said he would stop buying him things if he
told anyone. J.P. also spoke with a therapist and described being touched on his private
parts. Both parents denied engaging in any such conduct but were arrested and
criminally charged.
       The Department filed a second dependency petition alleging J.P. was at risk
because of sexual abuse. A contested jurisdictional hearing was set regarding the new
petition. The father’s counsel subpoenaed J.P. to testify at the hearing and J.P.’s counsel
moved to quash the subpoena. The juvenile court granted the motion to quash, finding
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the potential for psychological harm to J.P. outweighed the need for his testimony, given
that he had already described the alleged abuse in detail during multiple interviews.
       At a combined jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the court heard testimony
from a social worker detailing J.P.’s allegations of sexual abuse and from J.P.’s therapist
describing emotional trauma the abuse caused. The father testified and denied abusing
J.P., saying J.P. had been coached into making the allegations. The juvenile court
sustained the petition and issued dispositional orders for the continued removal of J.P.
from his parents’ care, supervised virtual visitation, and counseling and treatment
programs for the parents.
                                    II.   DISCUSSION
       The parents contend the juvenile court erred by quashing the subpoena for J.P. to
testify at the jurisdictional hearing. After carefully weighing the interests involved, a
juvenile court may exclude even relevant and otherwise admissible testimony of a child
who is the subject of dependency proceedings if the child would be psychologically
damaged by testifying and the testimony would not materially affect the issues to be
resolved. (In re Jennifer J. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1089.) That power derives “from
a recognition of the overriding objective of the dependency hearing—to preserve and
promote the best interests of the child. It would be a perversion of the procedure to
impose upon [the juvenile court] a requirement that the child’s testimony always be
presented, regardless of the trauma resulting to the child therefrom, and regardless of the
necessity of such testimony in the resolution of the issues before the court.” (Ibid.)
       Because the juvenile court must evaluate the competing interests and determine
whether psychological harm outweighs the need for the child’s testimony, we review the
court’s decision for abuse of discretion. (In re Daniela G. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 1083,
1090.) Under that deferential standard, we affirm the ruling unless it is outside the range
of permissible options afforded by the applicable law or the court acted arbitrarily or

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irrationally. (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012)
55 Cal.4th 747, 773.)
       We see no abuse of discretion here. In considering the motion to quash, the
juvenile court observed on the record that J.P. “is very young, six years old, and
diagnosed with PTSD, which is relatively rare in such a young child. And the evidence
indicates that [he] already has severe emotional distress and is experiencing night terrors
and is showing signs of having been severely traumatized … given that [he] has already
been asked these questions at least once, and maybe multiple times, and given that there
has been a forensic interview conducted by people qualified to ask questions of children,
I don't really see much of a need for him to testify here, given that the information has
already been provided and that's counterbalanced with the psychological detriment that
would likely happen if he is forced to talk about these traumatizing events yet again.”
The court’s comments show that it weighed the appropriate considerations and that its
decision was the product of rational thought and not arbitrary.
       The parents emphasize the importance of J.P.’s testimony to their case and argue
that if he were allowed to testify they could explore inconsistencies in his reports that
might cause the court to view the abuse allegations as less credible. But as the juvenile
court noted, J.P. had already been interviewed multiple times about the abuse allegations,
diminishing the need for his testimony. And even though J.P.’s credibility is highly
important to the parents’ position, it is not an abuse of discretion to decide that the
potential for psychological harm to him justifies quashing the subpoena. Given that the
overriding objective in a dependency proceeding is safeguarding the child’s best interests,
it is not an abuse of discretion for the juvenile court to prioritize J.P.’s wellbeing
“regardless of the necessity” of his testimony. (In re Jennifer J., supra,
8 Cal.App.4th 1083, 1089.)
       The parents advance two other reasons for their position that the court abused its
discretion. They assert there is an insufficient evidentiary basis for the finding that J.P.
                                               4
would suffer psychological harm. But the record contains ample evidence to support that
finding. The juvenile court indicated it was relying on the declarations of J.P.’s therapist
and the assigned social worker, both of which say J.P. would by psychologically harmed
were he required to testify.
       The parents fault the juvenile court for not considering less restrictive options,
such as allowing J.P. to testify in chambers. The record also belies that assertion. The
juvenile court specifically stated it had considered the possibility of alternative ways to
obtain J.P.’s testimony: “Even if [J.P.] were questioned in chambers with only attorneys
present or only a select number of people present in a less intimidating environment, still
asking these same types of questions, appears to me to be likely to be further
traumatizing.”
       The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that potential
psychological harm to the child outweighed the need for his testimony in this proceeding.
                                  III.    DISPOSITION
       The orders are affirmed.

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                                  ____________________________________
                                  Grover, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________
Greenwood, P. J.

____________________________
Lie, J.

H049923
In re J.P.; DFCS v. E.P. et al.