Court Opinion

ID: 9571697
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:34:20.14327+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:49.457768
License: Public Domain

*691W ENNER STRUM, J.
(dissenting) — I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I am firmly convinced that the conclusions reached are unsound, that our prior opinions do not support the general holding therein announced, that it is a departure from our previously announced conclusions pertaining to recklessness cases, and in my opinion, commits this court to the holding that from mere inferences a claim of recklessness can be maintained.
It would be of no benefit to the bench and bar to again summarize our repeated comments on what is and is not recklessness. It is sufficient to say that in order to make out a prima facie case of recklessness sufficient for submission to the jury it is necessary that the evidence offered be of such a character as to warrant the jury in believing that the grounds of recklessness have been established. Welch v. Minkel, 215 Iowa 848, 851, 246 N.W. 775. On the basis of this announced holding it is impossible for the writer of this dissent to see how it can be said that in the case now before this court the evidence is of such a character as to warrant a jury in believing that the grounds of. recklessness have been established. In the instant case there is a total absence of such grounds. It is even doubtful if evidence has been presented from which an inference of recklessness can be drawn. If this court is to follow the reasoning and conclusions of the majority opinion all recklessness cases where the evidence is alone based on inferences must be submitted to a jury for consideration regardless of the facts presented or the failure to present them. In the case of Shenkle v. Mains, 216 Iowa 1324, 1328, 247 N.W. 635, 637, this court said:
“The two grounds upon which recovery may be predicated under section 5026-bl [321.494, 1946 Code] are exceptional and not general. The general rule is that a guest cannot recover. The exceptional grounds are: (1) ‘intoxication’ of the driver, (2) ‘reckless operation’ by the driver. The exceptional character of these grounds implies an infrequency of application thereof. To use and apply the exceptions as the general rule, and in effect to supplant the general rule with the constant use of the exceptions, is to di*ive against a red light. If the application of the exceptions becomes more frequent than that of the general *692rule, it may well be deemed a warning sign that we are misapplying the exceptions. ‘Reckless operation’, as a ground of recovery, cannot be very satisfactorily defined in hard and fast terms. Nevertheless it may be readily recognized in the concrete case. In the Siesseger case, we held that it devolves upon the court to recognize it when the material facts are not in conflict. This means that we may not cast upon the jury our duty to say in any case whether the evidence discloses a case of reckless operation as distinguished from negligence. We cannot therefore permit a case of negligence to be converted into a case of reckless operation by the mere importunity or emphasis of argument. Such is the course, which we have aimed to follow in the cases above cited. All of such eases purported to. follow' the rule set dovm in the Siesseger case.” (Italics supplied.)
This court said in Wilde v. Griffel, 214 Iowa 1177, 1180, 1181, 243 N.W. 159, 160, that the plaintiff must show some act which would be pronounced as an utter indifference to the safety of the guest in his car. It was stated in the last cited case:
‘‘‘The evidence must disclose something from which recklessness could be legitimately inferred, and as the trial court said in his finding:.
“ ‘If the only thing you can infer from the evidence is negligence, then the court should not submit the question to the jury. * * * It seems to me as if this statute, if it means what it says, means that the plaintiff must show some act as would be pronounced by every person as an utter indifference to the safety of the guest in his car. Here, we have no intimation that the driver didn’t do everything he could to stop, no evidence at all on that question as to what he did.’ ”
Applying the holding in the Wilde ease to the present case I am unable to find under the recoi’d presented any act on the part of the driver of the car which “would be pronounced by every person as an utter indifference to the safety of the guest in his car.” In the instant case as in the case quoted there is no intimation that the driver did not do everything he could to stop.
Is there any evidence in the present case from which recklessness could be legitimately inferred ? I do not think so. There *693is no question tbat the appellee-driver was operating a car at a speed not in excess of 20 to 25 miles an hour. > When within approximately 27 feet of a pole the car veered to the right and the running board sideswiped the pole resulting in injury to the appellant. The car was brought to a stop within 4 to 10 feet beyond the pole. It may be admitted that the appellee-driver knew that the particular pole was there but can it be said from all the facts disclosed by the evidence that a legitimate inference can be drawn that the driver operated the car with a heedless disregard for or indifference to the rights of others and a disregard for consequences. I am unable to reach such a conclusion and am likewise unable to conclude that in operating the car it is shown by all legitimate inferences that the driver had an utter disregard for the welfare of his guests. It must be remembered that there is no evidence of the driver making any statements as to how or why the car was driven or what caused it to go off the road. It is true there was a statement made concerning this matter by Hennagir but his statement cannot be attributed to the driver. As heretofore stated in Wilde v. Griffel, supra, the evidence must disclose something from which recklessness could be legitimately inferred. The majority opinion therefore must be construed to mean that this court is holding there is sufficient evidence by which recklessness could be legitimately inferred. If recklessness can be found from the facts in this case it must be upon the inferred theory that.the driver deliberately drove the ear off the road and for the purpose of coming close to the pole and. thereby frightening his guests. I do not see how this can be inferred from the facts. This court has heretofore held that in the matter of proof the litigant is not justified in inferring a fact as proven from the mere possibility of its existence. Even negligence cannot be predicated upon presumption or inference. Phillips v. Briggs, 215 Iowa 461, 465, 245 N.W. 720. In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Des Moines National Bank, 8 Cir., Iowa, 145 F. 273, it is held that an inference of fact cannot be legitimately drawn from a rebuttable presumption but only from premises which are certain. In the record as presented I am unable to find any evidence from which it can be held with certainty that the suggested inference is justified.
*694Inasmuch as appellant’s case is based on an inference of recklessness it is well to give consideration to what has been said concerning an inference of fact. In 31 C. J. S., Evidence, section 116b, page 727, it is said that an inference of fact should not be drawn from premises which are uncertain but the facts on which an.inference may legitimately rest must be established bjr direct evidence as if they were the very facts in issue. This inference of fact which the appellant must prove has not, in my opinion, been established by direct evidence. This court should recognize that fact.
In the case of Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Coogan, 271 U. S. 472, 477, 46 S. Ct. 564, 566, 70 L. Ed. 1041, in commenting upon a railroad-accident death case it is stated:
“It follows that, unless the evidence is sufficient to warrant a finding that the death resulted from the catching of deceased’s left foot under the bent part of the pipe line, the judgment cannot be sustained. As there is no direct evidence, it is necessary to determine whether the circumstances are sufficient to warrant a finding of that fact. Whenever circumstantial evidence is relied on to prove a fact, the circumstances must be proved, and not themselves presumed. United States v. Ross, 92 U. S. 281, 284, 23 L. Ed. 707, 708; Manning v. John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co., 100 U. S. 693, 698, 25 L. Ed. 761, 763.”
It is further stated in the last cited case as follows:
“Even if the appearance of the shoe and other circumstances are sufficient to justify an inference that the depression might have been made by the bent pipe, it cannot be said that they constitute any reasonable support for a finding that it was so made. And, assuming that the depression on the shoe counter was made by contact with the bent pipe, there is nothing to indicate whether it was made at the time deceased was knocked down or later while he was being dragged. But there is nothing to show that the pipe had any connection with the accident. The fact that deceased was run over and killed at the time and place disclosed has no tendency to show that his foot was caught.”
In Welsch v. Frusch Light & Power Co., 197 Iowa 1012, 1022, 193 N.W. 427, 432, it was stated by this court as follows:
*695“Ordinarily, proof of a material fact is not accomplished by inference from any one isolated incident or circumstance, but by the combination or aggregation of many related circumstances, each lending more or less support to the other and to the conclusion sought to be established.”
Here we only have one isolated fact — that the car-went off the road and from that fact alone the majority opinion holds that by an inference from this one isolated incident recklessness can be found. There is no combination or aggregation of many related circumstances from which recklessness- can be established. In fact up to the time the car went off the road it is shown to have been driven at a very moderate rate of speed.
Although the facts are not similar this court in the recent case of Olson v. Hodges, 236 Iowa 612, 624, 19 N.W.2d 676, 683, said:
“Driving at a speed of twenty-five miles an hour and slowing down for curves or other interference, and then going a little faster, maybe thirty miles per hour or a little more, on a ‘good stretch,’ is not operating a car in daylight on a country road with ‘no care,’ ‘utter indifference to safety,’ and ‘in heedless and entire disregard for consequences.’ ”
It is true that in this last cited case there was evidence of there being snow and mud on the road which may have caused the automobile to skid.
The state of Nebraska has a guest statute somewhat similar to the Iowa statute although “gross negligence” instead of recklessness must be shown in order to hold a driver liable for injuries to a guest. Despite the difference in statutes we believe the factual situation shown and the comments made in the case of Oakes v. Gregory, 133 Neb. 407, 409, 275 N.W. 607, 608, can advisedly be referred to in this dissent. This is particularly true when consideration is given to the near similarity of the facts. In the cited case the speed of the car was shown to be between 20 and 25 miles an hour at the time of the accident. The ear was being driven on a paved highway which had some snow and ice on it. By reason of some unaccountable cause the car left the road and struck a tree about 10 or 12 feet from the pavement. The plaintiff’s testimony, in part, was: “Well, it *696is just one of those accidents that yon can’t account for, it simply went straight into the tree and to my knowledge did not skid.” The statement of the Nebraska court can be applied to the facts in the instant case. It said:
“The evidence in this case shows that the driver of the ear had no knowledge of any impending danger. The car was being driven at a reasonable rate of speed and without any protest from the plaintiff. The evidence of plaintiff was that Mrs. Gregory had been driving carefully until the accident occurred. There is no evidence in the record as to the cause of the accident. Neither does the record disclose any act done by the driver of the car that even indicates that it was the result of any fault of hers. There is no evidence of any negligence on the part of the driver of the car, and necessarily no evidence of gross negligence as required by the guest statute.”
In another Nebraska ease — Munsell v. Gardner, 136 Neb. 214, 285 N.W. 555, the facts show that the driver of a car was operating it at a speed of 20 to 30 miles an hour. In making a turn at an intersection, the driver failed to put on the brakes, apparently lost control of the car and struck a tree approximately TO feet from the intersection and 5 or 6 feet from the curb. That court held there should have been a directed verdict because the facts as disclosed by the evidence did not show gross negligence.
My attention has been called to the case of Schneider v. Draper, 276 Mich. 259, 267 N.W. 831, where it is held that the case was properly submitted to a jury. It is shown that two boys had jumped on the running board of the. driver’s car, the ear proceeded several blocks during which a corner was turned and by reason of the weight of the boys on the running board the tires scraped the-fenders. It is further shown that the car was driven at or about the time of the accident at a speed of 45 miles an hour, and that the driver had been dodging in-and-out of the traffic. It was while the car was being so driven thát the automobile struck a pole near the curb with the resulting death to the two boys riding on the running board. The facts in the last cited ease are far different from those shown in the case this court is called upon to consider.
*697Inasmuch as I do not want a ghost of the past to later haunt me I desire to express my disapproval of the majority opinion. I would affirm.
Hale, Mantz and Hays, JJ., join in this dissent.