Court Opinion

ID: 9846100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:34:37.535556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:33.326986
License: Public Domain

Bussey, Justice
(dissenting) :
Being unable to concur in the proposed majority opinion, I most respectfully dissent. In my view, that opinion does not reach, adequately consider, or dispose of the real issues presented by the appeal. It is stated, incorrectly I think that
“The question for determination by this court is: Does the receipt of post-injury wages equal to pre-injury wages *491bar a finding of disability as contemplated by the Workmen’s Compensation Law where the employee is continuing to work on the same job at the same or better pay?” (Emphasis added.)
Several prior decisions of this court have either expressly or tacitly recognized that the mere receipt, as opposed to earning, wages, equal to preinjury wages, is not a bar to a finding of disability. The majority opinion in Owens v. Herndon, 252 S. C. 166, 165 S. E. (2d) 696, contains, inter alia, the following language:
“There is no suggestion that claimant’s post-injury wages do not represent actual earnings.”
At issue between the parties in this case is whether the post-injury wages which the claimant is admittedly receiving are, under the circumstances, in fact earned and, therefore, conclusive of his ability to earn wages equal to his preinjury wages. In my view, the evidence is susceptible of more than one reasonable inference as to this factual issue. The award of the hearing Commissioner was affirmed by a majority of the full Commission, two of whom were of the view that the findings of fact by the hearing Commissioner should be amended in certain particulars. Two members of the full Commission filed separate partial dissents.
Under these circumstances, it is, to say the least, difficult to ascertain precisely what facts, as opposed to conclusions of law, were found by a majority of the Commission. The claimant argues that there was a finding of fact by the Commission, supported by competent evidence, to the effect that the post-injury wages which he was receiving were not, in fact, being earned and not truly reflective of his diminished earning ability or capacity. To the contrary, the employer argues that there was no such finding of fact and that, even if there be such, it is not supported by any competent evidence. The foregoing contentions present for the determination of this court the following questions.
1. Precisely what did the Commission find as a fact?
2. Is that finding supported by competent evidence?
*492I lean strongly to the view that the claimant is correct as to what the Commission found as a fact and that such finding is supported by competent evidence. But, any doubt, as to what the Commission found the facts to be, should be resolved by remanding the case to the Commission for further and specific findings of fact. Should the case be remanded, it would be in order to expressly hold that the simple receipt of, as opposed to earning, post-injury wages equal to preinjury wages is not a legal bar to a finding of disability. Such principle of law has been heretofore tacitly and expressly recognized by this court, and is in accord with the entire weight of authority throughout the country.
Lewis, J., concurs.