Court Opinion

ID: 9748286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:58:55.056774+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:33.967790
License: Public Domain

JIM GUNTER, Justice, dissenting. |nThe majority has concluded that there was no overruling necessity for a mistrial; thus the trial court erred in granting the mistrial, and any subsequent prosecution is barred. The majority bases this conclusion on the finding that, if any error or prejudice resulted from defense counsel’s remarks during opening statements, such prejudice could have been corrected with curative relief such as an admonition or instruction to the jury. I cannot agree with this conclusion and must, therefore, respectfully dissent. First, a more detailed recitation of the facts leading up to trial is relevant. Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude certain evidence pertaining to the victim, including the victim’s autopsy report showing a blood-alcohol level of .15 and the presence of methamphetamine, the victim’s prior use of drugs, and prior violent conduct of the victim toward appellant, namely cutting him with a knife approximately a year and a half earlier. At a hearing on the motion, the State asserted that, to its knowledge, the defense had not pled self-defense and noted its belief that the defense would be accident. The State also indicated that, if the justification defense was used, that would change some of the State’s arguments and some of the contested evidence would be relevant. The defense unequivocally stated that it was going to use a justification defense, so the State conceded that, under a justification defense, the victim’s drug use at the time and her prior violent act toward appellant were relevant. 110At trial, during its opening statement, the State opted to pre-empt the defense’s introduction of this character evidence regarding the victim and informed the jury that it would hear evidence of the victim’s drug use, both in her past and the day of her death, and evidence of the victim’s prior assault with a knife. The State also, as the majority explains, referenced the various explanations for the victim’s death given to the police by appellant, including that her death was an accident. Defense counsel then proceeded as described by the majority, with counsel characterizing the victim’s death as occurring during a “momentary loss of control.” In its motion for mistrial, the State argued that, by explaining the victim’s death in this way, the defense had essentially asserted accident as a defense, not justification, and that had the State known accident would be the asserted defense, it would have opposed, rather than conceded, the admission of the character evidence regarding the victim. The majority characterizes the “core” of this case as a dispute over “remarks of defense counsel made during opening statements regarding evidence the prosecuting attorney had already explained to the jury would be admitted at trial.” However, the reference to accident, which I assume is to what the majority refers, was not the basis for the mistrial in and of itself; the necessity for a mistrial resulted from the references during voir dire and the State’s opening statement to negative character evidence of the victim, which would not have been mentioned by the State if not for the defense’s representation that self-defense was its |ntheory of defense, and the resulting prejudice to the State due to the inability to undo the jury’s knowledge of this evidence.1  The trial court, in explaining its grant of a mistrial, explained: What we have here is saying, you know, he had decided to use deadly force. He’s following her off the property and then he loses control and so, suddenly it’s an accident. I don’t think the way it was presented it can be either an — it’s got to either be an accident or it has to be intentional. It can’t be left up for the jury, in the Court’s opinion. So, based on that, based on the statement, I’ve also [taken] a couple of extra minutes to try to figure out a way to admonish the jury. I know the Model instructions say opening statements are not evidence, not to be considered by the jury. But after we’ve gone on through two hours of voir dire, through the State’s opening, and then we get down to the end and say, “Well, he lost control and ran over her,” I don’t think there’s any way to cure that. So I’m going to grant the State’s motion. I’m going to grant a mistrial in this case. In other words, the trial court found there was an overruling necessity for the grant of a mistrial, and this court should reverse such a ruling only when there has been an abuse of discretion. Koster v. State, 374 Ark. 74, 286 S.W.3d 152 (2008). The majority does not 112decide whether a change of defense had occurred but instead finds that if any error or prejudice did occur, an admonishment or jury instruction would have been sufficient curative relief. In my opinion, this decision amounts to a second-guessing of what is essentially a judgment call by the trial court, which does not comport to the deference that should be given to the trial court in such a situation. This court has held numerous times that the trial court is in the best position to decide the issue of prejudice because of its first-hand observation. Jackson v. State, 368 Ark. 610, 249 S.W.3d 127 (2007); Davis v. State, 365 Ark. 634, 232 S.W.3d 476 (2006); Barr v. State, 336 Ark. 220, 984 S.W.2d 792 (1999). In addition, in a case factually similar to the case at bar, the United States Supreme Court stated: We recognize that the extent of the possible bias cannot be measured, and that the District Court was quite correct in believing that some trial judges might have proceeded with the trial after giving the jury appropriate cautionary instructions. In a strict, literal sense, the mistrial was not “necessary.” Nevertheless, the overriding interest in the evenhanded administration of justice requires that we accord the highest degree of respect to the trial judge’s evaluation of the likelihood that the impartiality of one or more jurors may have been affected by the improper comment. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 511, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978). Likewise, I would accord a great deal of deference to the trial court’s determination that a mistrial was necessary in this case and would therefore affirm the denial of appellant’s plea of prior jeopardy. For this reason, I respectfully dissent.  . The majority also notes that the first reference to the victim’s death being accidental was made by the prosecution, alluding to appellant’s argument on appeal that the prosecution had "opened the door” to any mention of an accident. It is true that appellant’s video-taped statement to the police, during which he provided several explanations as to what had occurred, was no doubt admissible and quite possibly would have been admitted by the State as evidence of guilt. See Martin v. State, 346 Ark. 198, 57 S.W.3d 136 (2001) (finding that the jury could have considered the defendant's inconsistent and conflicting statements as evidence of guilt). But I cannot agree that merely telling the jury that appellant had previously given the police several explanations for the incident, including that the victim’s death was an accident, somehow "opened the door” for appellant to assert accident as his theory of defense after unequivocally stating to the court and the prosecutor that his defensive theory at trial would be self-defense.