Court Opinion

ID: 9580825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:09:19.203237+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:33.194527
License: Public Domain

Justice PLEICONES.
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the warrantless search and seizure in this case did not violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article I, section 10 of the South Carolina Constitution which prohibits unreasonable invasions of privacy. I also agree that the State’s failure to produce a return to the search warrant did not invalidate the warrant in this case. I write separately, however, because I disagree with the majority’s analysis of the vehicle seizure under the South Carolina Constitution.
The automobile exception to the search warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution is based on: (1) the ready mobility of automobiles and (2) the lessened expectation of privacy in motor vehicles which are subject to government regulation. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985). The South Carolina Constitution specifically prohibits “unreasonable invasions of privacy,” and this Court has stated, as the majority recognizes, that our constitution “favors an interpretation offering a higher level of privacy protection than the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Forrester, 343 S.C. 637, 541 S.E.2d 837 (2001).
*325In determining whether South Carolina’s privacy provision requires a warrant before the search and seizure of a vehicle located in the backyard of a private residence, the majority focuses on one justification for the automobile exception: the inherent mobility of the vehicle. This analysis is incomplete. We must further analyze the impact of this provision on the second prong of a Fourth Amendment automobile analysis, that is, the expectation of privacy in a private automobile. A holding that “the inherent mobility of the vehicle is all that is required to satisfy the state constitution” implies a lower degree of protection than that provided by the Fourth Amendment when addressing warrantless searches and seizures. This conflicts with our prior cases. See Forrester, supra.
Furthermore, the majority’s reliance on State v. Cox, 290 S.C. 489, 351 S.E.2d 570 (1986), is, in my opinion, misplaced. The search and seizure issue in Cox was analyzed solely under the Fourth Amendment and did not discuss Article I, section 10 of the South Carolina Constitution. Moreover, search and seizure cases analyzed under the Fourth Amendment have made distinctions between vehicles parked in public and private places. See G.M. Leasing Corp. v. U.S., 429 U.S. 338, 351-52, 97 S.Ct. 619, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977) (holding the warrantless seizure of vehicles did not violate the Fourth Amendment because “[t]he seizures of the automobiles in this case took place on public streets, parking lots, or other open places, and did not involve any invasion of privacy.”); Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 119 S.Ct. 1555, 143 L.Ed.2d 748 (1999) (noting the distinction between a warrantless seizure in an open area and a seizure made on private premises and concluding that because the police seized respondent’s vehicle from a public area, the warrantless seizure did not involve any invasion of respondent’s privacy); and Binder v. Redford Tp. Police Dept., 93 Fed.Appx. 701 (6th Cir.2004) (“Although probable cause suffices for the search or seizure of vehicles parked on public property [or even private property that is accessible to the public], no Supreme Court decision allows warrantless entry into areas of a home or business where the owner has a reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the police are in search of an automobile.”) (citing G.M. Leasing Corp., supra).
*326Analysis of the facts of this case with our privacy provision in mind reveals no state constitutional violation. Although one’s expectation of privacy in his automobile increases when that automobile is parked in the backyard of his private residence, the petitioner in this case was not the owner of the Jeep that was seized.4 More importantly, the vehicle was not parked at petitioner’s residence.
Our state constitution’s provision protecting unreasonable invasions of privacy necessarily requires some analysis of the privacy interests involved when a warrantless seizure is made on private property. However, petitioner cannot show he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the seized Jeep. Accordingly, I concur in the result reached by the majority.
TOAL, C.J., concurs.

. The record reveals that petitioner was one of several family members who had permission to use the Jeep.