Court Opinion

ID: 9687879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:52:25.701348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:08:15.197452
License: Public Domain

Robert W. Hansen, J.
(concurring). The writer joins the majority in holding, on the facts of this case, that as a matter of public policy plaintiff’s fear as to a future imagined consequence, having no reasonable basis, was not a recoverable element of damages in this case. The writer agrees that the long-standing rule on this point in this state is that . . [n] egligence plus an unbroken sequence of events establishing cause-in-fact does not necessarily lead to a determination that the defendant is liable for the plaintiff’s injuries. The determination to not impose liability in instances where a negligent act has been committed and the act is a ‘substantial factor’ in causing the injury rests upon considerations of public policy.” 1 Public policy is involved in determining whether a particular claim of damage is compensable as a matter of law.2 However, the writer would additionally make clear that a present fear as to a future harm (which describes the fear or “phobia” which the plaintiff here had that she would develop cancer in the future) is not compensable whenever the future harm feared cannot reasonably be apprehended to result from the injury *521sustained. This rule of law, based on public policy considerations, is the rule in most jurisdictions,3 with one state court going so far as to state, “. . . we know of no case where the injured party has been permitted to magnify the damages by calling the attention of the jury to fears that were altogether groundless and never materialized. ...” 4
For her contrary contention that the reality of the fear, not any reasonable basis for it, is all that ought be required for compensability, plaintiff relies upon three out-of-state decisions. One, a state court holding in an eastern state, does appear to hold that an entirely mistaken present fear of future harm is a compensable element of damages.5 But, in the second case relied upon, a federal district court decision in an eastern state, evidence was admitted to establish that the fear involved was reasonable, and the trial judge held only, “. . . Under the circumstances of this case I feel that it was entirely reasonable for this plaintiff to fear the development of cancer as the result of the severe injury to her breasts caused by this accident.” 6 In the third case *522cited, a state court case in an eastern jurisdiction, the court held admissible a statement made by the treating dermatologist to plaintiff that she should have a badly burned shoulder checked every six months inasmuch as the area of the burn might become cancerous, such six-month checkups being considered by the dermatologist essential as a protective measure, and the court concluded, “. . . It is entirely plausible, under such circumstances, that plaintiff would undergo exceptional mental suffering over the possibility of developing cancer. ...” 7 While requiring and finding a reasonable basis for any present anxiety as to future harm, the New York State case makes clear that: “‘Liability for damages caused by wrong ceases at a point dictated by public policy or common sense.’ ” 8
The writer would find the applicable rule of law in this state and elsewhere to be that, assuming negligence and causation, a fear of a future consequence is not compen-sable as an element of damages in a negligence action if there is established no reasonable basis for such fear. This court has said that recovery may be denied on public policy grounds where the “. . . injury is too remote from the negligence or too ‘wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tort-feasor’ ...” 9 Where there is, as in the case before us, no claim of connectedness between the injury sustained and a future eonse-*523quence of cancer,10 the injury is too remote, and the claim of damage is wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the tort-feasor. We have said that recovery may be denied where “. . . in retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary that the negligence should have brought about the harm ....”11 Here it is not even claimed that the negligence brought about an increased likelihood of the future consequence feared.12 We have said that recovery may be denied where “. . . allowance of recovery would place too unreasonable a burden . ...” 13 In the case before us, allowance of this element of damage would place a heavy and unpredictable burden upon the medical profession for the most minor and inconsequential of professional errors. We have said that recovery may be denied where its allowance would “. . . be too likely to open the way to fraudulent claims . . . .” 14 We have said that recovery may be denied where granting recovery “. . . would ‘enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point.’ ...” 15 If the slightest of fender-bender accidents could result in recovery for a baseless fear or claim of fear of developing cancer or arthritis years later, it would be difficult to draw the line between the various “phobias” claimed once a reasonable basis for any or all of them was held unneces*523asary to recovery. All of the reasons cited for disallowing recovery on public policy grounds converge in this case to make applicable here the generally followed rule that a present fear of a future harm is not to be a compensable element of damages in the absence of establishment of a reasonable basis for such fear being entertained and an increased possibility that the consequence feared will arise as a result of the injury sustained.
What the majority opinion appears to approach as an individuated response to a particular fact situation, the writer sees as the application of a generally accepted rule of law to the facts of this case. That rule holds that, as a matter of law based upon public policy considerations, a present fear as to a future harm is not a compensable element of damages if there is no reasonable basis established for the fear being entertained and no increased possibility of the consequence feared developing as a result of the injury sustained.

 Hass v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. (1970), 48 Wis. 2d 321, 326, 179 N. W. 2d 885.

 Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, Inc. (1952), 262 Wis. 229, 240, 55 N. W. 2d 29, this court holding: “. . . If the jury does determine that there was negligence, and that such negligence was a substantial factor in producing the injury, it is then for the court to decide as a matter of law whether or not considerations of public policy require that there be no liability. . . .” See also: Osborne v. Montgomery (1931), 203 Wis. 223, 236, 237, 234 N. W. 372.

 See: Annot. (1960), Damages — Anxiety—Future Condition, 71 A. L. R. 2d 338, 342, citing cases holding that anxiety about an imagined consequence, having no reasonable basis, is not a recoverable element of damages.

 Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Davis (1923), 199 Ky. 275, 278, 250 S. W. 978.

 Smith v. Railroad (1935), 87 N. H. 246, 258, 177 Atl. 729, holding testimony of a plaintiff, injured while walking along a railroad track, that she had by reason of the injuries a fear that her legs might in the future become paralyzed to be admissible and holding such fear to be an element of damages “. . . even though the fear was mistaken. . . .”

 Dempsey v. Hartley (D. C. Pa. 1951), 94 Fed. Supp. 918, 921, holding admissible evidence as to reasonable basis for present fear of future harm not only “. . . for the purpose of showing that this plaintiff did have a very real fear of the development of cancer of the breast,” but also to establish “. . . that her fears in this respect were reasonable. . . .” Id. at page 920.

 Ferrara v. Galluchio (1958), 5 N. Y. 2d 16, 22, 176 N. Y. Supp. 2d 996, 152 N. E. 2d 249, plaintiff “. . . was personally advised by a doctor specializing in dermatology that her wound might develop into cancer and that she should, therefore, have it checked every six months. ...”

 Id. at page 22 (citing Milks v. McIver (1934), 264 N. Y. 267, 269, 190 N. E. 487) the court also stating: “It is self-evident that every case must be decided according to the facts peculiar to it. . . . Each negligence case must, in turn, be solved ‘pragmatically.’ ”

 Colla v. Mandella (1957), 1 Wis. 2d 594, 599, 85 N. W. 2d 345.

 Plaintiff-respondent’s brief, at page 6, states: “Respondent neither intended nor attempted to prove that Mrs. Howard would develop cancer from the catheter pieces.”

 Colla v. Mandella, supra, at page 599.

 Plaintiff-respondent’s brief, at pages 6, 7, states: “The jury was told in opening statement that cancer was not a realistic possibility, and that Respondent would prove that she feared cancer. [Record citation omitted.] What the Respondent did prove to a reasonable medical probability was the fact of fear, not the fact of cancer. . . .”

 Colla v. Mandella, supra, at page 599.

 Id. at page 599.

 Id. at page 599 (Quoting Waube v. Warrington (1935), 216 Wis. 603, 613, 258 N. W. 497, and citing other cases).