Court Opinion

ID: 9737071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:14:41.247619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:56.276441
License: Public Domain

TEIGEN, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. The majority have cited applicable law but unless it is intended to find that the favored driver’s duty to stop or slow his vehicle attached at a distance of a thousand feet or a half mile before the inferior vehicle reached the intersection they have not found at what point his duty to take steps to avoid a collision arose, nor have they measured his action after this point.
Section 39-10-24, N.D.C.C., and pocket parts, provides a preferential right of way at intersections may be indicated by stop or yield signs. Subsection 3 thereof provides that the driver of the vehicle approaching the yield sign shall in obedience thereto slow down to a speed reasonable for existing conditions and shall stop if necessary to yield the right of way to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on another highway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard. This section also provides that if such driver is involved in a collision with a vehicle after having driven past the yield sign such collision “shall be deemed prima-facie evidence of his failure to yield the right of way.”
It is conceded that the driver of the automobile in which the deceased was riding was negligent and that his negligence was *717a proximate cause of the collision which directly resulted in decedent’s death. However, the plaintiff suing for the wrongful death did not elect to bring action against the driver of that vehicle, but has elected to sue the owner of the truck with which the vehicle the deceased was riding in collided. The owner’s truck being driven by its employee at the time of the collision was upon a preferred highway to which access was controlled by yield signs, as authorized by § 39-10-24, N.D.C.C.
A driver upon a preferred highway, usually called an arterial or through highway, does not have an exclusive privilege which would require those crossing it to do so at their own risk but he must look for approaching vehicles upon an intersecting highway and his lookout must be such that he will see what a person in the exercise of ordinary care would see in like circumstances. Anderson v. Schreiner, N.D., 94 N.W.2d 294. Subject to this qualification, that he exercise reasonable care, he has the right to anticipate that a driver approaching upon an inferior highway will heed the yield sign by slowing down and stopping if necessary to yield the right of way to the favored vehicle in the intersection or approaching on the favored highway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard. We have so held several times relative to stop signs. See Austinson v. Kilpatrick, N.D., 105 N.W.2d 258; Satterland v. Fieber, N.D., 91 N.W.2d 623; Marsden v. O’Callaghan, N.D., 77 N.W.2d 522. The same law is applicable to yield signs.
Neither driver was speeding. The truck was traveling at about 40 m. p. h., the Boeing vehicle from 50 to 60 m. p. h. These were permissible speeds. The Boeing vehicle, however, did not yield to the truck which was traveling upon the favored highway. Upon the record in this case I have no doubt that the defendant’s driver was negligent in failing to have kept a proper lookout. He testified he did not see the subordinate vehicle until it was too late to avoid the collision. The question remains, however, whether it can be said that the negligence of the defendant’s driver in failing to .keep a proper lookout contributed proximately to the collision resulting in decedent’s death.
In Anderson v. Schreiner, supra, where a similar factual situation existed, we said:
Whether an observing driver has been negligent, and whether his. negligence was a proximate cause, depend on what he does after he has observed the circumstances and reached a judgment with respect thereto. The negligence of the non-observing driver is in not maintaining a lookout. In a sense this negligence is remote, because whether the 'failure to look proximately causes an injury depends, not upon the lack of observation, but upon what the driver does as a result of not looking. Therefore it is reasonable to say that if a jury may find that the conduct of an observing driver, who was aware of an approaching car and the possible danger at an intersection, was reasonable in the circumstances, they may also find that the conduct of a non-observing driver, who was unaware of the danger, was reasonable in identical circumstances, even though his ignorance of possible danger was due to his own negligence. The ultimate jury question is whether the' conduct of the driver on the arterial highway was reasonable in the light of what he saw or should have seen. Because óf his qualified right to rely on his preferred status there is no inescapable inference that a driver upon an arterial highway, who hadn’t looked for cars approaching on an intersecting highway would have behaved any differently if he had looked. It follows that whether his negligence in not looking was a proximate cause, was a question for the jury. * * ⅝*
In the instant case a jury was waived and the case was tried on the question of liability to the court. On a de novo appeal from the judgment it becomes the duty of this court, as finders of the facts, to deter*718mine whether an observing driver would have been reasonably prudent in proceeding through the intersection under the circumstances. To say that the conduct of an observing driver in the circumstances was reasonable but that the conduct of a non-observing driver was not reasonable in identical circumstances would be logically inconsistent. It is therefore the duty of this court to find at what point the driver of the favored vehicle (the truck) if he had observed the approach of the inferior vehicle should take action to avoid collision in the intersection. The Supreme Court of Michigan discussed this question in a similar case in McGuire v. Rabaut, 354 Mich. 230, 92 N.W.2d 299, at page 301 thereof, wherein they state:
The difficulties in this case, as in other arterial highway versus subordinate street cases, arise from an apparent conflict between 2 equally sound and equally applicable principles of law. The first is that a driver on an arterial highway is entitled to assume that subordinate drivers will yield him the right of way. He is not bound to anticipate unlawful or negligent acts on their part. At the same time, however, the favored driver must conform to the standard of due care imposed upon him as well as the rest of mankind, namely, that he shall exercise reasonable care for his own protection. But what does this actually mean in terms of arterial travel ? Therein lies our problem. Its importance to the motoring public may justify its comprehensive re-examination.
It is clear, at the one extreme, that the favored driver is not permitted to lower his head, close his eyes, and charge blindly through intersections on the theory that such is his “right” simply because he is the favored driver. It was Justice Holmes who said that “such words as ‘right’ are a constant solicitation to fallacy.” The favored driver’s rights are not so broad. It remains his duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. We explored this matter in Krause v. Ryan, 344 Mich. 428, 74 N.W.2d 20, 22, holding that:
“It is not necessary in approaching an intersection, as we said in Arnold v. Krug, supra, [279 Mich. 702] 707 [273 N.W. 322] that he ‘have his car under such control * * * that he may stop at once and avoid collision with persons who may illegally come into his path.’ Lacking notice otherwise, he may assume that others using the highways will comply with the rules of the road and properly posted signs and he is not guilty of contributory negligence in acting upon such assumption. It should not, however, be assumed from the foregoing that he may proceed blindly upon the' arterial, secure in the supposition that he can do no wrong. He must remain alert to the hazards surrounding him and with which he is confronting others. We do not propose to attempt an enumeration of the various actions required of him. So far as the question in this case is concerned, he is undoubtedly required to make observation of the traffic apparently to cross his path from intersecting streets and to act reasonably in the light of such observation.”
The favored driver is thus not required to have his car under such control as to be able to avoid collision with a subordinate driver coming illegally into his path. At what point, then, does the second principle (that of exercising reasonable care for his own protection) come into operation, requiring him to take steps to avoid collision with a subordinate driver? Only at that point when his continuing observations (which he must make, despite the fact that he is on an arterial highway) reveal, or should reveal to the reasonably prudent man, an impending danger. It is at this time that his duty of care with respect to the subordinate driver arises, and his post-observation negligence, or lack thereof, is measured by his actions after this *719point. Consequently, in the case before us the favored driver was entitled to assume, as he approached the Hastings intersection, that his right of way would not be contested by a subordinate driver. He was entitled to rely upon this assumption until it became clear to him (or, until, as a reasonable man, considering pertinent surrounding circumstances of traffic and terrain, it should have been clear to him) that a subordinate driver was going to challenge or obstruct his right of way. At this point his duty to attempt to avoid the impending collision began. It is from this point onward, and not before, with respect to a crossing subordinate driver appearing in his path, that we scrutinize his acts to determine whether or not he is guilty of negligence for failure to act as a reasonably prudent person, and, in all fairness to him, we must measure his conduct in the light of the emergency then presented, if not of his making.
In determining the degree of care required of a motorist who proceeds into an intersection protected by electric signals, we held as follows in Kuntz v. Stelmachuk, N.D., 136 N.W.2d 810, 816:
Whether a driver’s conduct, on reaching an intersection protected by electric signals, measures up to the standard of care required under the circumstances must be determined by the facts of the case which exist at the time of such conduct. While the presence of traffic signals at the intersection lessens the danger and thus lessens the degree of care required of a motorist who proceeds on a proper light, the existence of such lights does not do away with the necessity of some care and caution on the part of such motorist. He still must use care commensurate with the danger that continues to exist. He cannot place blind reliance upon the light, or upon conditions which he observes prior to entering the intersection. * * *
In Henke v. Peyerl, N.D., 89 N.W.2d 1, we held, at Syllabus 4, as follows:
A driver upon a through highway is entitled to assume that those approaching it will obey the law and stop. He is not obliged to have his car under such control at each intersecting road that he may stop at once and avoid a collision with persons who may illegally come into his path.
And in the text thereof, at page 7, we said:
The operator of a vehicle on an arterial highway has a right to assume that one approaching on an intersecting highway or crossroad will drive at a proper speed, and will respect the former’s right-of-way and stop before entering or crossing the arterial highway. Though it is not negligence for a favored driver to act on assumptions of this nature until he has or reasonably should have knowledge to the contrary, he is bound, after acquiring such knowledge, to exercise the care of an ordinarily prudent person. * * *
The above are reasonable and practical applications of the law. An exhaustive annotation on this and other similar questions is found in 3 A.L.R.3rd 180. Many cases are set forth in this annotation which hold that failure to stop at a stop sign or signal was the sole proximate cause of the ensuing collision with a vehicle on a favored highway. See § 47, page 450. A favored driver is not required to have his car under such control that he may bring it to a stop at each intersection he approaches upon the theory that some reckless driver will dispute his passage. This would bring traffic on arterial highways for all practical purposes to a complete stop. At each successive intersection the arterial driver would have to slow down and at blind corners he would be required literally to ease his vehicle forward into the intersection until he crosses the threshold of vision for the subordinate highway lest he be unable to stop if sufficient danger threatened. The purpose of through highways is to move volumes of *720traffic at relatively high speeds. Such purpose cannot be accomplished if our application of the standard of due care does not take into account the function of the arterial or through highway. Due care, for the driver on a through highway, includes the right that he will be afforded the right of way. This assumption may be relied upon by him until he is aware, or as a reasonably prudent driver should be aware, that his right of way is being challenged. Under the law as discussed above, which I think should be applied in this case, I feel the judgment of the trial court dismissing the action should be affirmed.
The trial court found that the driver of the defendant’s truck was under no obligation to sense danger until the vehicle in which the deceased was riding had reached a point distant from the intersection within which the vehicle in which the deceased was riding could brake to a stop, which point was 128 feet from the intersection, and that the driver of the defendant’s truck was entitled to assume, had he seen the other vehicle, that the driver of that vehicle would respect his right of way until he became aware the latter was not going to do so. The trial court also found that had the driver of the defendant’s truck seen the vehicle in which the deceased was riding before he reached a point 128 feet east of the intersection he still would have been unable to avoid the collision. These findings by the trial court have support in the evidence. Giving appreciable weight to the trial court’s findings, I adopt its findings as correct.
I find that when the subordinate vehicle was at a point about 128 feet distant from the intersection a reasonably prudent person driving the defendant’s truck upon the through highway would sense impending danger. At this point a duty of care arose with respect to the subordinate vehicle. The post-observance negligence — or lack thereof —must be measured by defendant’s driver’s actions after this point. Taking into consideration the respective speeds and all other circumstances the defendant’s vehicle was then too close to the intersection to avoid a collision. I therefore conclude that similar conduct of an observing driver, who was aware of the approaching vehicle, in which the deceased was riding and the possible danger at the intersection, would have been reasonable in the circumstances and that, therefore, the conduct of the defendant’s non-observing driver, who was unaware of the danger, was also reasonable even though his ignorance of possible danger was due to his own negligence. For these reasons, I find the negligence of the defendant’s driver in not keeping a lookout was not a proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of plaintiff’s deceased. I would affirm the judgment.
KNUDSON, J., concurs in the dissent of the Chief Justice.