Court Opinion

ID: 9529917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:55:29.309446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:57.175636
License: Public Domain

BURNS, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
Based on my disagreement with the majority’s definition of the words “use as a ... sleeping place[,]” in Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291C-112(b), I dissent.
HRS § 291C-112 states in relevant part that
(a)No person shall use any vehicle for purposes of human habitation, ..., while the vehicle is parked on any ... public property between the hours of 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m_
(b) As used in this section “purposes of human habitation” includes use as a dwelling place, living abode, or sleeping place.
(c) This section does not apply to the parking of vehicles and their use for purposes of human habitation in parks, camps, and other recreational areas in compliance with law and applicable rules and regulations, or under emergency conditions in the interest of vehicular safety.
HRS § 291C-112(a) and (b) prohibit the use of a vehicle during the prohibited hours on a prohibited place as a:
1. dwelling place, or
2. living abode, or
3. sleeping place.
A “dwelling” is “a building or construction used for residence: abode, habitation.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 706 (1981). An “abode” is a “place where one abides or dwells: home.” Id. at 4. Notwithstanding these dictionary definitions, the legislature expressly prohibited “use as a dwelling place, living abode, or sleeping place.”
Under the plain language of subsections (a) and (b), sleeping in a vehicle during the prohibited hours on public property violates the statute without any evidence that the sleeping in the vehicle is related to dwelling place or living abode purposes.
Subsection (c) contains two express exceptions. The second express exception allows the use of parked vehicles for purposes of human habitation “under emergency conditions in the interest of vehicular safety.” This exception applies more to sleeping than to dwelling.
Notwithstanding the plain language of the statute, the majority concludes that
[t]he terms “dwelling place” and “living abode” clearly denote habitation. The term “sleeping place,” taken alone, may *280arguably connote occupancy of a vehicle which might not amount to habitation. Read in the context of the statute, however, the phrase “sleeping place” is obviously modified by the preceding reference to “purposes of human habitation.” Thus, “sleeping place” as used in the definition is a place inhabited for sleeping purposes. Accordingly, HRS § 291C-112 plainly targets only activities associated with habitation.
The dictionary definition of “habitation” includes “the act of inhabiting: state of inhabiting or dwelling or of being inhabited: ... dwelling place: house, home, residence.” Id. at 1017. The only purpose for HRS § 291C-112(b) was to add “use as a ... sleeping place,” to the dictionary definition of “purposes of human habitation.” The majority interprets HRS § 291C-112(b) as if it does not contain the words “or sleeping place,” and interprets HRS § 291C-112 as if it does not contain subsection (b).
In my view, the majority’s definition violates the Hawaii Supreme Court’s often repeated instruction that
[w]hen construing a statute, “our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from language contained in the statute itself.” State v. Wells, 78 Hawai'i 373, 376, 894 P.2d 70, 73 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), reconsideration denied, 78 Hawai'i 373, 894 P.2d 70 (1995).
State v. Ganal, 81 Hawai'i 358, 371, 917 P.2d 370, 383 (1996).
The majority’s definition also violates the Hawaii Supreme Court’s rule of statutory construction that
[tjhis court presumes legislative enactments to be valid and, where possible, interprets every word, clause, and sentence of a statute to give them effect. Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, 76 Hawai'i 46, 54, 868 P.2d 1193, 1201 (citation omitted), reconsideration denied, 76 Hawai'i 247, 871 P.2d 795 (1994). As a general rule, unambiguous language will not be rejected if a construction can be found that will preserve and give force to all the words of a statute. Id. at 60, 868 P.2d at 1207[.]
Shimabuku v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 79 Hawai'i 352, 357, 903 P.2d 48, 52 (1995).
The majority’s definition also violates the maxim that “[wjhere the language [of a statute] is plain and unambiguous, the court’s sole duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning.” State v. Aluli, 78 Hawai'i 317, 320, 893 P.2d 168, 171 (1995).
The majority’s definition also violates the maxim noscitur a sociis.
The rule [noscitur a sociis ] will not be applied where there is no ambiguity, or to thwart the legislative intent, or to make general words meaningless. The maxim is only an extrinsic aid and should only be used when the clear meaning of the words used in the statute is doubtful.
N. Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.16 (5th Ed.1992) (footnotes omitted).
The majority does not explain why it interprets HRS § 291C-112(b) as if it did not contain the words “or sleeping place.” If their reason is the possibility that a literal interpretation would cause the statute to be unconstitutional, I question the validity of that reason. It appears probable that a literal interpretation would not cause the statute to be unconstitutional. Although not exactly on point, the following quote is relevant.
Besides panhandling, the conduct most typically associated with the homeless is sleeping on the streets and on public property. It is not surprising, therefore, that municipalities concerned with the attendant problems of homelessness have enacted prohibitions aimed at eliminating this type of behavior. Courts have generally, though not universally, upheld the constitutionality of such ordinances.
Comment, Compassion, Politics, and the Problems Lying on Our Sidewalks: a Legis*281lative Approach for Cities to Address Homelessness, 67 Temp.L.Rev. 1259, 1291 (1994) (footnote omitted.)