Court Opinion

ID: 9476606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:00:21.119332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:24.607588
License: Public Domain

ROSENN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Even if the negligent pipefitters were not HOVIC’s borrowed employees as a matter of law, I cannot agree that the Tysons presented sufficient evidence of Litwin’s continued control over them to support the jury's conclusion that the pipefitters remained Litwin employees for the purpose of this action. I believe the district court should have granted Litwin’s motion at the close of all the evidence for a directed verdict. In addition, I disagree with the majority’s holding that Litwin’s objections to the jury verdict form were meritless, and I would hold that the district court’s denial of Litwin’s motion to substitute a proper form constituted an alternative basis for reversal.
I.
Either the borrowing employer, the loaning employer, or both may have respondeat superior liability for injuries caused by the negligence of the borrowed worker. Standard Oil v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215, 29 S.Ct. 252, 53 L.Ed. 480 (1909). The test is
whose is the work being performed, a question which is usually answered by ascertaining who has the power to control and direct the servants in the performance of their work. Here we must carefully distinguish between authoritative direction and control, and mere suggestion as to the details on the neces*1261sary cooperation, where the work furnished is part of a larger undertaking.
212 U.S. at 222, 29 S.Ct. at 254.
All the Litwin employees involved in the installation of the drainpipe were Type I employees. In Vanterpool v. HOVIC, 766 F.2d 117 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1059, 106 S.Ct. 801, 88 L.Ed.2d 777 (1986),1 a worker’s compensation case, the question was whether a Litwin Type I worker injured by HOVIC’s alleged negligence was limited to recovery under the worker’s compensation statute. Vanterpool was a Type I employee engaged in turnaround work, just as are the employees in question in the present case. Like them, he had signed a rehire form agreeing that at no time should he receive “or act under instructions from Litwin supervision.” We noted that in Anderson “the Court emphasized the element of control as determinative of the question of vicarious liability.” Id. at 119, 122-23. Upon examination of the same HOVIC-Litwin agreement as in the present case, we concluded that “any assigned Type-I employee would necessarily work under the direct supervision and control of HOVIC.” Id. at 120. The district court had held that in light of this agreement and the rehire form, Vanterpool was a borrowed employee of HOVIC as a matter of law. We agreed and affirmed. Id. at 121.
The majority apparently rejects the precedent of Vanterpool because the court in Vanterpool “did not evaluate evidence of contemporaneous control by Litwin and HOVIC such as is present here.” Maj. op. at 5. Contrary to the majority’s position, however, the court in Vanterpool, did deal with the legal effect of the HOVIC-Litwin agreement, the same agreement as is before us in this case, with respect to control of the borrowed employee. As in the instant case, the Vanterpool court had before it evidence of some employer functions that were continued to be performed by the general employer while the borrowed employee was on loan status. The court concluded, however, that the evidence of control by the general employer over the borrowed employee at the time of the accident was insignificant. “Borrowed employees, such as Vanterpool, who was borrowed by HOVIC from Litwin remained on the Lit-win payroll and Litwin made insurance premiums to the statutory workers’ compensation fund____ HOVIC, in turn, reimbursed Litwin for all payroll expenses incurred for borrowed employees, including workers’ compensation premiums.” Vanterpool, 766 F.2d at 120.
As I discuss more fully at a later point, I can see no significant, relevant evidence of dual control in this case shared between Litwin and HOVIC over the borrowed employees responsible for Tyson’s accident. There is very little to distinguish the HOV-IC-Litwin agreement and the control exercised here from the control over the responsible borrowed employee in Vanterpool and the effect of the HOVIC-Litwin agreement that we apparently relied on to a great extent in that case. Accordingly, either because Vanterpool is controlling precedent or because the same agreements are at issue and compel the same conclusion in the present case, I would hold that the Type I employees were the borrowed employees of HOVIC as a matter of law.
Even if the question is not resolved as a matter of law, however, I believe that the evidence compels the conclusion that the Type I employees were within HOVIC’s control at the time of and with respect to their negligent conduct. The HOVIC-Litwin agreement and the pipefitters’ loanee forms, even if not binding upon the Tysons, nevertheless are very strong evidence of HOVIC’s control and the pipefitters’ status as borrowed employees, particularly in light of our analysis and conclusions in Vanterpool. The testimonial evidence of Litwin’s construction manager, HOVIC’s process operator, the Litwin loanee foreperson, Litwin’s office manager, Litwin *1262Type I employees, and of Tyson himself compels the same conclusion.
Litwin retained the right to hire and fire these employees without HOVIC’s consent, but apparently did so at HOVIC's behest. HOVIC assessed workers’ qualifications and agreed or refused to hire them, or else requested specific people. HOVIC designated which Type I workers would be forepersons. HOVIC chose the type of pipe to be used and the location of the line.
HOVIC alone controlled, directed, supervised, and gave instructions to the TYPE I employees; Litwin had no supervisory control over them. HOVIC was responsible for the day-to-day work and supervision of loanee crews, including loanee forepersons; Litwin did not control any operative detail of how work was to be done.2 Ryan Alleyne, a HOVIC supervisor, instructed the pipefitting crew. He asked for installation of the drainpipe and told the loanee employees where he wanted it. John Hughes, a Litwin foreperson on loan to HOVIC, assisted the pipefitters in installing the drainpipe and testified that he personally tightened the pipe. Hughes was a Type I employee, and took all his orders and instruction from HOVIC at all times.3 Alleyne, a HOVIC supervisor, directed him on the job. Alleyne inspected the completed work and approved it.
The facts upon which the Tysons rely are scanty. Litwin, as in Vanterpool, provided *1263services associated with payroll, but appears merely to have been acting as paymaster for HOVIC, which reimbursed Lit-win for all Type I employees’ wages, taxes, benefits, and insurance. Litwin provided safety gloves and glasses, but HOVIC supplied tools and equipment. Although the Tysons acknowledged that a HOVIC supervisor told John Hughes where to install the drainpipe, Hughes directed his crew in the actual installation. Hughes testified, however, that he was a “loanee foreman” and at no time acted under or received instructions from Litwin as to the pipe installation. See n. 3 supra. I cannot find the slightest evidence to show that Hughes was acting under Litwin’s control in directing the drainpipe installation. The remaining facts supporting the Tysons — the separate entrance and toilet facilities, union negotiations, and the like — are entirely irrelevant to control and are the sort of factors to be considered only when there are no indicia of control more closely related to the particular workers and the particular task.
The Tysons suggest that even under circumstances triggering the borrowed servant doctrine, an exception exists for skilled workers, citing In re Dearborn Marine Service, Inc., 499 F.2d 263 (5th Cir.1974), cert. dismissed sub nom. Monk v. Chambers & Kennedy, 423 U.S. 886, 96 S.Ct. 163, 46 L.Ed.2d 118 (1975). In Dearborn, the general employer supplied welders, sandblasters, and pipefitters. The special employer decided a valve had to be removed and got three borrowed employees, under its own supervisor, to do the work. One employee negligently welded a pipe. In holding that the general employer was liable, the Fifth Circuit noted that the negligence occurred within the performance of the skilled work for which the employees had been provided, and for which the general employer had represented them to be competent. 499 F.2d at 285. The Tysons acknowledge that Dearborn was decided under Texas law, but argue that the court relied on the authority of the Restatement (Second) of Agency. Restatements supply rules of decision for Virgin Islands courts in the absence of local laws to the contrary. See V.I.Code Ann. tit. 1- § 4.
The district court accepted the Tysons’ “skilled worker” theory, holding that Lib win was the master of the employees and liable for damages caused by their negligence because it held them out as skilled workers and HOVIC accepted them on that basis. Under this test it would be rare for any skilled worker to be a borrowed employee. Control need not extend to direction of technical details of skilled employees’ activities; rather, the more important factors are the right to control the time and place of services, for whom the services are done, and the degree and amount of the services. See 1C A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law § 48.30 at 8-502 (1986). Where the special employer controls the manner of work, gives instructions, and supervises and directs the employees’ time and activities, the workers’ skill is irrelevant. See A.J. Johnson Paving Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 82 Ill.2d 341, 45 Ill.Dec. 126, 130, 412 N.E.2d 477, 481 (1980); see also Huff v. Marine Tank Testing Corp., 631 F.2d 1140, 1143-44 (4th Cir.1980).
Dearborn is distinguishable both because it was under Texas law and because there was no written agreement assigning supervisory responsibility. Moreover, in Dearborn and in all the cases it cited, the general employer was supplying equipment, unlike Litwin. In such “worker and machine” cases, there is a presumption that the general employer wants to reserve control in order to protect its equipment, and that the employee’s duties include maintenance of the equipment, which is work performed for the general employer. See A. Larson, supra, § 48.30 at 8-505 to 8-510; Restatement (Second) of Agency § 227, comment c. Thus, Dearborn does not support the Tysons’ theory that this exception to the borrowed employee doctrine rests only on the skill of the worker and not on the element of the machine. Furthermore, neither in Dearborn nor in any of the cases it relied upon was there a contract assigning control to the special employer, which resolves the question of control, according to two of the cases relied upon in Dear-*1264born, Dugas v. Pelican Construction Co. v. McKay, 481 F.2d 773, 778 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1093, 94 S.Ct. 724, 38 L.Ed.2d 550 (1973), and Producers Chemical Co. v. McKay, 366 S.W.2d 220, 226 (Texas 1963), and as suggested by Dearborn itself. 499 F.2d at 285. The other cases upon which the Tysons rely, Beatty v. Owsley, 53 N.C.App. 178, 280 S.E.2d 484, 487-88 (1981), cert. denied, 304 N.C. 192, 285 S.E.2d 95 (1981), and Koirtyohann v. Washington Plumbing and Heating Co., 471 S.W.2d 217, 218-19 (Mo.1971), are also “worker and machine” cases. The evidence compels the conclusion that the negligent employees were in HOVIC’s control at the time of Tyson’s injury and were its borrowed servants, and that no “skilled worker” exception applies. I would therefore hold that the district court erred in denying Litwin’s motion for a directed verdict.
II.
I also disagree with the majority’s dismissal of Litwin’s objections to the jury verdict form as not constituting reversible error. Majority opinion at 1260.4 I find two flaws in the verdict form serious enough to warrant reversal.
The special verdict form given to the jury asked these six questions:
1. Were the persons who installed the temporary drainpipe on April 6, 1984, subject to the control or right to control of Litwin Panamerican Corporation as to that specific act?
_YES_NO
2. Was the temporary pipeline negligently installed?
_YES_NO
3. Was the negligent installation of the temporary drainpipe a proximate cause of the accident and injuries to Vernon Tyson?
_YES_NO
4. Was the plaintiff Vernon Tyson negligent with respect to the accident of April 6, 1984?
_YES_NO
5. Was Vernon Tyson’s negligence a proximate cause of the accident and his injuries?
_YES_NO
6. If your answer to No. 4 and No. 5 was “YES,” please apportion the fault as between Vernon Tyson and Litwin Panamerican Corp.
_% Vernon Tyson_% Litwin
Litwin objected, and appeals the judgment based on the impropriety and prejudice of the form. Specifically, the first question asked only about Litwin’s control; Litwin maintains it should have been phrased, “subject to the ... control of Lit-win or of HOVIC or of both ...” or should just have asked open-endedly who had control. Had the jury then answered, “Lit-win,” the result would have been the same as it was. Had they said, “HOVIC,” however, Litwin would have won. I believe that the phrasing was prejudicial because it focused the jury’s consideration on Litwin only and psychologically drew the jury’s attention away from HOVIC.
Even more problematic, however, is that the phrasing completely precludes a finding of dual control, which by the Tysons’ admission was a very legitimate possibility. Had the jury found dual control, the liability should have been apportioned between HOVIC and Litwin; even if under the Worker’s Compensation Act HOVIC would not have to pay part of the judgment, Lit-win’s share would be limited to the proportion it was responsible (which, it appears from the evidence, might well be small). This apportionment is called an “equitable credit” or “Murray credit,” after Murray v. United States, 405 F.2d 1361 (D.C.Cir.1968), in which the court held that a third-party defendant may reduce the amount of its liability to the plaintiff upon a finding that the plaintiff’s employer was also negli*1265gent, even if the plaintiff could not recover from the employer. Id. at 1365-66.5
When Litwin moved to use a verdict form reflecting the Murray credit doctrine, the district court held that the doctrine does not apply in the Virgin Islands because the Virgin Islands comparative negligence statute, V.I.Code Ann. tit. 5 § 1451, is phrased in terms of apportionment among defendants, not tortfeasors. In Beloit Power Systems v. HOVIC, 18 V.I. 317 (D.V.I.1981), decided under § 1451, however, the court stated that the statute does not limit contribution to codefendants, and that the use of the word “defendants” does not exclude other forms of contribution. Id. at 323-24. Tyson’s suggestion that § 1451(d) says that liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and several is at best disingenuous. Subsection (d) refers to “defendants”; indeed, any other tortfeasors not defendants could not share liability for a judgment to which they were not subject.
The Tysons argue that the Murray doctrine is invalid under the Supreme Court’s decision in Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 99 S.Ct. 2753, 61 L.Ed.2d 521 (1979), disallowing a Murray-type credit (although not mentioning Murray specifically) and citing to the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 879, 880. Id. at 260 n. 8, 99 S.Ct. at 2756 n. 8. Edmonds, however, was decided not under those Restatement sections, which are in any case inapplicable to master-servant liability; see § 875 comment a, but under amendments to the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq., with the dissent noting that the fairness rule would have the opposite result. 443 U.S. at 274, 279-81, 99 S.Ct. at 2763, 2766-67 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Moreover, the Tysons admit that this circuit has specifically stated in Sarauw v. Oceanic Navigation Corp., 622 F.2d 1168, 1175 and n. 8 (3d Cir.1980), vacated on other grounds, 451 U.S. 966, 101 S.Ct. 2039, 68 L.Ed.2d 344 (1981), that longshoremen’s cases are a specific exception to the Murray credit doctrine after Edmonds.
Litwin also objected that the jury verdict form was deficient with respect to causation. Affirmative answers to both questions No. 1 and No. 2 do not necessarily mean that the jury found Litwin’s employees’ negligence was the cause: it could have been Alleyne’s, a HOVIC supervisor. He chose the size and length of the pipe and the location of the tie-in, and directed the workers how to lay the pipeline. He failed to tell Hughes the line was pressurized and would therefore need to be anchored. The Tysons’ and Litwin’s experts testified that these decisions were at least in part the cause of Tyson’s injury. I therefore conclude the jury verdict form was critically deficient because it precluded findings of negligence by HOVIC’s supervisor or operators and because the findings of negligent installation and control by Lit-win of the pipefitters do not mean their negligence and no one else’s was the cause of the injury.
III.
In sum, I would hold that the Type I employees were borrowed servants of HOVIC and that no exception to the assignment of liability under the doctrine applies because the pipefitters were skilled workers. As this was apparent from the Vanterpool decision, the HOVIC-Litwin agreement, the loanee workers’ rehire forms, and the facts pertaining to the laying of the pipeline specifically, the district court erred in denying Litwin’s motion for a directed verdict, if not its motion for summary judgment.
I would also hold that the district court erred in holding that the Virgin Islands does not recognize the Murray credit doctrine. Thus, Litwin properly objected to the jury verdict form, which did not allow the possibility of apportionment of responsibility between Litwin and HOVIC, and *1266the district court’s failure to include in the jury form the possibility of apportionment severely prejudiced Litwin. The form was also fatally deficient with respect to causation. Therefore, even if we were to assume Litwin is not entitled to reversal on the borrowed employee issue, I would vacate the jury verdict and grant Litwin a new trial on the basis of the improper jury verdict form. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

. As the majority notes, the Vanterpool rule of borrowed employee liability was abrogated by statute with respect to suits by borrowed employees against entities other than their general employees. V.I.Code Ann. tit. 24 § 263a (1986 Supp.). That statute reversed only the operation of the doctrine in those circumstances, however, not the holding in Vanterpool that Type I employees are within HOVIC’s control and are its borrowed employees.

. Tyson deposed Frank Comly, Litwin’s construction manager, who testified as follows:
Q: So, the final authority as to who has hired or fired — who was hired or fired on that job was actually HOVIC’s decision; correct?
A: That’s correct.
Q: Is it also not correct that HOVIC actually assigns the employees to particular jobs?
A: That’s true.
Q: And, where you stated that they were Litwin Panamerican employees on the time sheet, it is not true that those were, indeed, Litwin Panamerican employees who are on loan to HOVIC and at the time they were on loan to HOVIC, they were actually employees of HOVIC?
A: That’s correct.
Q: Can you explain to me who supervises Type 1 employees?
******
THE WITNESS: Hess.
Q: And, can you define to me the type of supervision that Hess gives Type 1 employees? A: They tell them everything that is required to do on the job.
Q: Does Litwin have any supervisory control of Type 1 employees when they are with Hess?
A: None.
Q: You stated that Litwin keeps time sheets for HOVIC. Is a timekeeper for HOVIC a Type 1 or Type 2 employee?
A: The timekeeper that keeps the time sheets in question is a Type 1 employee.
Q: As a Type 1 employee, who controls the supervisory ability of that employee?
A: He is supervised and directed by HOVIC.
Q: Are these time sheets prepared for the benefit of Litwin or the benefit of HOVIC?
A: Prepared for the benefit of HOVIC.

. Hughes testified:
Q: Now, on ... April 6, 1984, what were you in the position of while working at Hess Oil? A: Foreman.
Q: All right. Now, was that a loanee foreman under this agreement?
A: Loanee foreman.
Q: Under those circumstances, did you agree that at no time would you receive or act under instructions from Litwin supervision? A: That's correct.
Q: Did you agree that Hess would provide you with safety equipment and would insure that all safety conditions surrounding your work were met?
A: That’s what I said.
Q: And, on that day you said John DeWear was your foreman?
A: He was the supervisor.
Q: And, he worked for Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corporation?
A: That’s correct.
******
Q: Okay. And, what did Mr. [Alleyne, a HOVIC supervisor] tell you to do?
A: Well, he point me out he want a line run from that area come down and go to the sewer line.
Q: All right. Did he tell you how he wanted it run?
A: Well, I take the instructions from him. He just tell me run it that way and come down. He just want a temporary drain line. Q: And now, he called it a temporary drain line, did he?
A: That's correct.
Q: Did anyone tell you that was a pressurized drain line with hot pitch in it?
A: No.
Q: Did he tell you you had to anchor it because it was pressurized?
A: I’m afraid not.
We note that in any event direction by a loanee foreperson is not inconsistent with a finding of control by the special employer or borrowed employee status. Vanterpool, 766 F.2d at 121 n. 3.

. I do agree that the district court's denial of Litwin’s motion to dismiss for the Tysons’ failure to join the Commissioner of Labor was not erroneous, because the purpose of the statute requiring joinder is for the benefit of the Commissioner, not any party, and is not a jurisdictional requirement. Moreover, I would hold that Litwin's motion to dismiss on this basis was not timely raised.

. In Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465 (3d Cir.1967) (codified in § 1451(d)), this court explained that the comparative negligence doctrine, the basis for the Murray rule, is a "rule of reasoned fairness” that prevents a windfall to plaintiffs. See also Murray v. Fairbanks-Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 157-58 n. 11 (3d Cir.1979).