Court Opinion

ID: 9760227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:43:29.222322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:09.445947
License: Public Domain

Melvin Mayfield, Chief Judge, dissenting. About 6:45 p.m. on April 8, 1979, Gary and Carol Camp and their three children left Paragould to return to their home in Blythe-ville. They had traveled only about two miles when the appellant, coming from the opposite direction, drove his vehicle across the center line of the highway and hit the Camp vehicle which had been pulled onto the shoulder on its side of the road in an attempt to avoid the appellant’s vehicle. As a result of injuries sustained in the collision, Gary, who was then 35 years old, is now confined to a wheelchair, paralyzed from his armpits down, with no bowel or kidney functions, and in need of constant care. The appellant was returning to Jonesboro from southeast Missouri where he had spent the day drinking. By 5:00 p.m. he was so drunk that an acquaintance who rode with him from one bar to another would no longer ride with him and the state trooper who got to the scene of the accident about 7:00 p.m. testified the appellant was under the influence of alcohol at that time. Appellant had been convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor in February of 1977, in June of 1978, and in August of 1978. At the time of the collision in April of 1979, he did not have a valid driver’s license because it had been revoked. The majority of this court has found that appellant’s conviction of battery in the first degree should be reversed. I dissent. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE One reason given by the majority for reversal is that the court erred in admitting evidence of appellant’s prior D. W.I. convictions and evidence that his driver’s license had been revoked. I think this evidence was admissible under Rule 404 (b) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence. In Price v. State, 267 Ark. 1172, 599 S.W. 2d 394 (Ark. App. 1980) the court of appeals pointed out that this rule only codified the law in existence before the rule was adopted, and said: “In our view, the rule should be interpreted to exclude evidence of other offenses when its only purpose is to show the accused’s character or some general propensity he might have to commit the particular sort of crime in question.” The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed and affirmed that decision saying “the rule clearly permits such evidence if it has relevancy independent of a mere showing that the defendant is a bad character.” Price v. State, 268 Ark. 535, 597 S.W. 2d 598 (1980). And the court quoted from its prior decision in Alford v. State, 223 Ark. 330, 266 S.W. 2d 804 (1954) as follows: If other conduct on the part of the accused is independently relevant to the main issue — relevant in the sense of tending to prove some material point rather than merely to prove that the defendant is a criminal — then evidence of that conduct may be admissible .... Just when evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is independently relevant has been decided on a case-by-case basis. Price v. State, 267 Ark. 1172, supra; Conley v. State, 267 Ark. 713, 720, 590 S.W. 2d 66 (Ark. App. 1979). And in Thomas v. State, 273 Ark. 50, 615 S.W. 2d 361 (1981), the court said “it would be wise not to hold such evidence inadmissible as a matter of law and to leave it instead to the trial court’s discretion, subject to a case-by-case consideration.’ ’ It is clear that rule 404 (b) does not specifically list all the purposes for which such evidence is admissible. In addition to those listed, such evidence has been held admissible to show guilty knowledge and to corroborate the testimony of another witness, Price v. State, 268 Ark. 535, supra; and to establish the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense under what was called the “res gestae exception,” Young v. State, 269 Ark. 12, 598 S.W. 2d 74 (1980). A publicized example, from another jurisdiction, of when evidence of another crime has independent relevancy to the offense charged is the case involving Patty Hearst where she said she participated in a bank robbery because of duress and the court allowed evidence that she willingly participated with the same group in later criminal activity. United States v. Hearst, 563 F. 2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977). So, in the instant case, the first question is whether the D.W.I. convictions tended to prove some material issue involved in the case. That portion of the statute under which the defendant was charged required the state to prove that he caused serious physical injury to another person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Without the evidence of the D.W.I. convictions the jury could have found that the defendant spent the day drinking; that he was driving his car while drunk; and that the collision occurred because he was driving while intoxicated. The majority opinion seems to suggest that this evidence would be sufficient to support a finding that the defendant caused the injuries to Gary Camp under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, but that does not mean that the D.W.I. convictions are not relevant on that issue. It is one thing to have too much to drink and think you can drive home safely; it is quite another to drive for the fourth time in 28 months while intoxicated. I believe the jury was entitled to know about the prior D.W.I. convictions. Once the independent relevancy of the evidence is established, it must be scrutinized in the light of Uniform Evidence Rule 403 to determine if its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. Price v. State, 268 Ark. 535, supra; Young v. State, 269 Ark. 12, supra. Price says this balancing test is mandatory when there is an objection to the admission of the evidence but neither Price nor Young makes reference to the necessity of any oral or written finding to be made of record. Price cites United States v. Sangrey, 586 F. 2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1978) as authority for the rule that the determination must be made but Sangrey said “we refuse to require a mechanical recitation of rule 403’s formula on the record as a prerequisite to admitting evidence under rule 404 (b).’’ Price also cites United States v. Conley, 523 F. 2d 650 (8th Cir. 1975) where the only reference to how the trial judge is to perform the balancing test is found in the opinion of a judge who dissented from the court’s refusal to grant a rehearing and that opinion does not say that the trial court should make any express finding for the record with regard to the determination of the admissibility of the evidence. It does suggest, however, that a judge admitting such evidence should immediately caution the jury about its use unless the cautionary instruction is waived. In the instant case no request for such a limiting instruction was made and in Price the court stated it could not say the evidence’s potential for prejudice outweighed its probative value, especially in light of petitioner’s failure to request a cautionary instruction. In Young the supreme court affirmed the trial court in admitting evidence of other criminal activity and the opinion, which cites and relies on Price, makes no mention of any oral or written finding by the trial court reciting that a determination had been made that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. The Arkansas Supreme Court in both cases simply reviewed the record, found that it would support a finding in favor of allowing the evidence, and affirmed the trial court. This is our procedure in similar situations and this is the procedure we should follow here. See Toney v. Miller, 268 Ark. 795, 597 S.W. 2d 102 (Ark. App. 1980). We should also follow Price and Young which say that the trial court has wide discretion in determining the admissibility of this kind of evidence and that its determination will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. With regard to the evidence that appellant’s driver’s license had been revoked, I think this rides with the D.W.I. evidence. The defendant admitted his license had been revoked at the time of the collision and he admitted he had been convicted of D.W.I. within a year of that time. Under Ark. Stat. Ann. § 75-1029(Repl. 1979), his license could have been revoked for a year upon his conviction for D.W.I. Without anything else in the record we have to assume that this is why his license was revoked. Thus, the revocation was admissible as a part of his D.W.I. conviction. It is true that the trial court stated this evidence related to appellant’s credibility but we do not reverse just because the trial court gave the wrong reason for allowing it to be introduced. Sanders v. Neuman Drilling Co., 273 Ark. 416, 619 S.W. 2d 674 (1981). REQUESTED INSTRUCTION Another reason given for reversing this case is that the trial court refused to give appellant’s requested instruction telling the jury that a person acts under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life “if he intended to cause serious physical harm to another person or if he was practically certain that his conduct would cause serious physical harm to another person.” The majority opinion says this instruction should have been given because Martin v. State, 261 Ark. 80, 547 S.W. 2d 81 (1977) holds that a defendant must act with one of the culpable mental states defined in Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-203 (Repl. 1977). In my opinion, Martin holds to the contrary. There the court said of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1601 (1) (c) (Repl. 1977), which is the statute the appellant here is charged with violating: In the case at bar the phrase “circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life” indicates that the attendant circumstances themselves must be such as to demonstrate the culpable mental state of the accused. The language of the Arkansas statute does not require reasonable men to speculate as to its common understanding or application. In Martin the trial court had given the jury an instruction defining “purposely,” one of the culpable mental states defined in Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-203 (Repl. 1977), and the supreme court said that the appellant could not object because the trial court had imposed the highest burden upon the state, requiring it to prove that the appellant’s conduct was done purposely instead of knowingly or recklessly. But Martin did not hold that it was necessary for the court to define any of these terms. In my judgment, the case holds that the requisite culpable mental state is sufficiently defined by the language of the statute itself. SELECTION OF JURY One other reason given by the majority for reversal is that the trial court erred in not requiring the voir dire of prospective j urors to be conducted one at a time and each one either challenged or accepted before the next one was examined. The majority opinion concedes that the statute involved can be interpreted in more than one way and that the exact question presented here has not been decided by the Arkansas Supreme Court. Faced with this situation, I would reach a different result. In the first place, the statute involved, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-1903 (Repl. 1977), certainly does not say that prospective jurors must be examined in such one-at-the-time manner. And in the second place, the Clark and Roleson cases which the majority opinion relies upon “even though this precise issue was not decided” should not be extended, in my opinion, to apply to the case at bar. In both Clark and Roleson the state was allowed to exercise all its peremptory challenges at one time against a group of prospective jurors which the state had examined. This, the court held, gave the state the advantage of being able to exercise its challenges against the group and excuse those considered least desirable instead of having to reject them one at a time and perhaps use all its challenges before discovering those least desirable. Now it is easy to see how this would be beneficial to the state but it is difficult to understand why the defendant could not be given the same opportunity to enjoy an equal benefit. Surely there is no virtue in a rule adopted for the sole purpose of preventing peremptory challenges from being used to excuse undesirable jurors. But, in any event, whatever vice existed in Clark and Roleson does not exist in the instant case. Here, the court specifically ruled that before the state could exercise any challenge the defendant would have the option to examine prospective jurors as a group or one at a time and to submit them to the state for challenge either as a group or one at a time. Thus, no prejudice could have resulted to the defendant and no reversible error was committed in this regard. In addition, the process of voir dire already takes a great deal of time. To require that each prospective juror drawn be examined one at a time will require even more time. It is possible that the time spent in the trial of criminal cases could consume an organized society. I would affirm.