Court Opinion

ID: 9592222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:11:46.121947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:01.068073
License: Public Domain

Morris, Ch. J.
I concur in the opinion prepared by Judge Crimson and would emphasize the correctness of the result by these observations of my own. This is an original, proceeding in the supreme court upon the petition of Ivan Davidson for a writ of habeas corpus. The petition shows that he is imprisoned in the State Penitentiary at Bismarck, Burleigh County, North Dakota. It also appears that he made application for a writ of habeas corpus to the District Court of Burleigh County, which *156application was denied on February 19,1951. He challenges the legality of his duress upon the grounds that the judgment and sentence under which he is imprisoned is void.
The record discloses that on December 22, 1947, an information was -filed by the State’s Attorney of Cass County, North Dakota, charging the petitioner with committing the crime of rape in the first degree. He was tried before a jury and found guilty on January 7, 1948. On the 16th day of January, 1948, no sentence having been pronounced upon the defendant for his conviction of rape, the State’s Attorney of Cass County filed in the district court the following information:
“The State’s Attorney for the County of Cass in the State of North Dakota accuses Ivan Wilford Davidson of committing the crime of Conviction of three or more felonies prior to his conviction of Rape in the First Degree on January 7, 1948 and charges that heretofore, .to-wit: on the 7th day of January 1948, in the County of Cass and State of North Dakota, the said-defendant was duly convicted of the crime of Rape in the First Degree; that prior thereto, the said Defendant was duly convicted on the 21st day of June 1944 in the District Court of Cass County, North Dakota of the crime of Burglary in the third degree and was .sentenced to the State Penitentiary at Bismarck for a term of from three to five years; that prior thereto and on or about the 25th day of October 1939, the said Defendant was duly convicted of the crime of Burglary in the District Court Griggs County, North Dakota, and was sentenced to the State Penitentiary at Bismarck for a term of ten years; that prior thereto and on or about the 25th day of October, 1939, the said Defendant was duly convicted of the crime of grand larceny and was duly sentenced to the State Penitentiary at Bismarck for a term of three years, to run concurrently with the prior sentence imposed on the same date; that prior thereto and on the 20th day of June, 1935, the said Defendant was duly convicted in Wolf Point, Montana of the crime of burglary and was duly sentenced to the State Penitentiary at Deer Lodge, Montana for a term of five years; that prior thereto and on or about the 21st day of April 1932, the said defendant was duly convicted in the District Court of Foster County, North Dakota of the crime of burglary *157in the third degree and was duly sentenced to the State Penitentiary at Bismarck for a term of three to five years; that prior thereto the said defendant was on or about the 6th day of June, 1931 duly convicted of the crime of Burglary in the third degree in the District Court of Griggs County, North Dakota and was duly sentenced to a term in the State Penitentiary at Bismarck of one year. This against the Peace and Dignity of the State of North Dakota, and contrary to the form of the Statutes in such case made and provided.”
The State’s Attorney then advised the court that he was filing the information under the provisions of Section 12-0623 E.CND 1943, which insofar as is important here provides:
“If at any time before judgment and sentence, or at any time after judgment and sentence but before such judgment and sentence is executed fully, it shall appear that one convicted of a felony, previously has been convicted of crimes as set forth in sections 12-0618, 12-0619, 12-0620, and 12-0621, the state’s attorney of the county in which such conviction was had shall file an information with the court in which such conviction was had accusing such person of the previous convictions. The court shall cause the person, whether confined in prison .or otherwise, to be brought before it and shall inform him of the accusations contained in the information by reading it to him, and of his right to be tried as to the truth thereof according to law, and shall require such person to say whether he has been convicted as charged in the information or not. If he shall say that he has not been convicted as therein charged, or refuses to answer, or remains silent, his plea or the fact of his silence shall be entered of record and the court shall make an order directing that the truth of the accusations made in said information be submitted to a jury at the then present term of court, if in term time and a jury is in attendance, unless continued for cause, or at the next ensuing term of court when a jury is in attendance. If the jury shall find and determine by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused has been convicted one or more times as charged in said information, or if the accused acknowledges or confesses in open court, after being duly cautioned as to his rights, that he has been so convicted, the court shall sentence *158him to the punishment or penalty of imprisonment as provided in sections 12-0618, 12-0619, 12-0620, and 12-0621,, and shall vacate any previous judgment and sentence if one had been entered or imposed.”
Section 12-0621 referred to in the preceding quotation provides: “A person committing a felony within this state after having been convicted of felonies three or more times, either in this state or in any other state of the United States, may be punished by life imprisonment in the penitentiary.” The petitioner was represented by an attorney who participated in a discussion with the court and the State’s Attorney. The court asked the State’s Attorney'if he wanted to arraign the defendant and received^this reply: “Yes, I would like to make the arraignment at this time, prior to passing sentence on the rape charge.” The petitioner was then arraigned. The court advised him that he had a right to a trial and to have the charges made in the information proved by the state, or he could plead guilty. The court further stated: “I also inform you that if these charges are proved the penalty which can be imposed can be no greater than the penalty under the crime for which you were convicted in this county on the 7th of J anuary of this year.” Petitioner’s counsel then asked the court that if the defendant plead guilty to the habitual criminal act, could he later be sentenced to the charge of rape in the first degree? and the court said: '“If he admits these charges that are made here' and is sentenced upon this information, that precludes a sentence upon the conviction for first degree rape, provided that the court has proper jurisdiction of this proceeding and that the sentence imposed is within the limits prescribed by law; in other words, he is sentenced now upon this, if he admits it, rather than upon the rape charge, but I simply informed him that the maximum penalty under either is the same.” The petitioner then plead guilty.
After listening to recommendations of petitioner’s counsel and the State’s Attorney, the court- addressed himself to the petitioner. The pertinent portion of what the court said in this:
“iphe crime of' which you were convicted on J anuary 7th was one which is most abhorrent to society . . . scientific testi*159mony in the case shows beyond any reasonable doubt that you were guilty of it; in view of your past record, and in view of that crime, there is nothing for me to do but to'accept the recommendation of the states attorney and impose the sentence that I am going to impose.
“And it is the sentence that you, Ivan Wilford Davidson, be confined to the state penitentiary, at Bismarck, North Dakota, at hard labor, for the balance of your natural life.” This is the sentence pronounced by the court.
The following written sentence was later signed by the court and attested by the clerk:
“Now, on this 16th day of January A.D. 1948, the States Attorney in and for the County of Cass, State of North Dakota, and the Defendant, Ivan Wilford Davidson come into Court, and this being the day fixed by the Court for the pronouncing of Judgment upon conviction of the Defendant, above named, of. the crime of Conviction of three or more felonies prior to his conviction of Rape in the First Degree on Jan. 7,1948, as charged in the Information heretofore" filed against said Defendant, in this court; and the defendant being informed by the Court of the nature of the Information and of his plea of ‘guilty’ and the verdict, and being asked whether or not he has any legal cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him, and none being shown, the Court does adjudge, and the sentence of the Court is that you, Ivan Wilford Davidson be imprisoned in the Penitentiary at Bismarck, in said State, for the term of life imprisonment at hard labor commencing at twelve o’clock, noon, of this day, and that you stand committed until thrnsentence be complied with or until discharged by due process of law.”
Chapter 29-26 RCND 1943 provides for judgment and sentence in criminal actions. The' sentence pronounced orally by the judge is the judgment of the court and the statute contemplates that the written judgment that is ultimately filed and made a part of the court records is a copy of the oral judgment pronounced by the court. In event of conflict between the oral and written *160judgments, the former prevails. In re Perry, 70 ND 599, 297 NW 132.
This is an application for a writ of habeas corpus and not a review upon appeal. This court has said:
“It is the settled rule in this state that ‘upon habeas corpus the court ordinarily will inquire no further than to ascertain whether the court or officer issuing the process on which the prisoner is detained had jurisdiction of the case, and acted within that jurisdiction in issuing process. . . . Mere errors or irregularities of procedure, not affecting the question of jurisdiction, are never reviewable on habeas corpus; and where the process is.regular and valid upon its face, the inquiry will go only to the question of jurisdiction.’ State ex rel Styles v. Beaverstad, 12 ND 527, 531, 97 NW 548. ‘The jurisdictional inquiry, however, will extend to the power of the court or magistrate to make the commitment. Jurisdiction to make the judgment or order is essential as is jurisdiction of the person and of the subject matter.’ Ibid. p. 532. See also State v. Floyd, 22 ND 183, 132 NW 662; Church, Habeas Corpus, 2nd ed. Section 305. The reason is that on habeas corpus the attack on the judgment is collateral. The rule is well settled, however, that if the ‘particular judgment in question’ was entered without authority, habeas corpus will lie.” Re Solberg, 52 ND 518, 203 NW 898.
There is no question but that the court had jurisdiction of the person of the petitioner and of the subject matter. The court pronounced a judgment and sentence of life imprisonment upon the petitioner. The sole question is whether or not he had jurisdiction to pronounce that judgment and sentence.
The statute under which the second information was filed, Section 12-0623 ECND 1943, contemplates two adjudications. The first adjudication is that of guilt of a new felony. The second is the adjudication of having been previously convicted of three cr more felonies. The first adjudication is that of criminal guilt, and the second is adjudication of a status or condition upon the establishment of which the court may impose greater punishment than that prescribed by law for the new offense.
*161The petitioner was convicted of rape in the first degree for which he could have been sentenced to life imprisonment. Before he was sentenced upon that conviction, he was charged in the second information with having been previously convicted of six named felonies. After he was duly cautioned as to his rights, the petitioner acknowledged or confessed in open court the former convictions. Upon his plea of guilty under the second information, he was also subject to life imprisonment under the provisions of Section 21-0621 BOND 1943. At the conclusion of the arraignment upon the second information, the petitioner stood before the court convicted of the crime of rape in the first degree upon which no sentence had been pronounced, and by his own confession, had been convicted of six prior felonies. Thus he came squarely within the provisions of Section 12-0623. Upon this record the court sentenced him to life imprisonment which it clearly had jurisdiction, power, and authority to do.
In support of the contention that the petitioner was sentenced for the nonexistent “crime of Conviction of three or more felonies prior to his conviction of Bape in the First Degree on January 7,1948,” the petitioner points to the statement made by the court to his counsel that if he was sentenced upon the second information “that precludes a sentence upon the conviction for first degree rape, . . . if he admits it, rather than upon the rape charge, but I simply informed him that the maximum penalty under either is the same.” The court clearly pointed out that if the petitioner was sentenced in the proceedings then before the court, he could not later be sentenced upon the rape charge. This, fairly implies that the court had in mind that the sentence which he would impose was a sentence and punishment for the rape, as well as the additional punishment that could be meted out by reason of his conviction of former felonies. This is borne out by the fact that the court, in his statement immediately prior to sentence, included the crime for which the petitioner was convicted-on January 7, as well as his past record. At the most, the manner in which the court pronounced his judgment and sentence was erroneous. Such defects as are apparent from this record are not fatal to the court’s jurisdiction to pronounce a *162•sentence of life, imprisonment upon the petitioner. They therefore afford no ground for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus or any determination by this court that the petitioner is unlawfully imprisoned. • ' • <