Court Opinion

ID: 9738566
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:56:20.550007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:06.934520
License: Public Domain

VAIDIK, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. First, I disagree with the lead and concurring in result opinions because I believe that the trial court correctly concluded that Otho Lafayette put his intent at issue during trial. Second, I believe that the evidence of Lafayette’s previous attempted rape was relevant. Therefore, I would hold that the trial court properly admitted testimony regarding Lafayette’s prior bad act, address Lafayette’s remaining claim of error, and affirm Lafayette’s convictions.
In order to convict Lafayette of Class A felony rape, the State had to prove that he “ha[d] sexual intercourse with a member of the opposite sex when ... the other person [wa]s compelled by force or threat of force” and that the offense was “committed by using or threatening the use of deadly force.” Ind.Code § 35-42-4-1. *745Evidence Rule 404(b) provides that, while evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts is generally inadmissible during a trial for an unrelated, offense, this evidence may. be admissible if the State wishes to introduce it as “proof of motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Ind. Evidence Rule 404(b). Because Lafayette admits that he had sexual intercourse with the victim, the relevant intent in this case is Lafayette’s intent to use or threaten force. Johnson v. State, 722 N.E.2d 382, 384 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). With this in mind, the trial court allowed the State to introduce evidence that in 1997 Lafayette was convicted of attempted rape after he tried to rape a woman at gunpoint and later claimed that his sexual encounter with the victim was consensual. Citing Evidence Rule 404(b), the trial court permitted this evidence as proof of Lafayette’s intent relating to his conduct in the instant case.
Lafayette contends that he did not place the victim’s consent at issue. We have previously determined that, where a defendant in a rape case alleges that intercourse was consensual, the defendant has placed his or her contrary intent at issue for the purpose of Evidence Rule 404(b). Johnson, 722 N.E.2d at 384; see also Udarbe v. State, 749 N.E.2d 562, 566 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (citing Johnson with approval). Lafayette argues that instead of “bringing consent up,” 12/13/07 Tr. p. 11,10 he challenged the victim’s credibility to “attack[ ] what the State had to prove, lack of consent,” Appellants Br. p. 10, and that this is somehow different from placing the victim’s consent at issue. See Tr. p. 156-57 (“[Defense]: It is relevant to the issue of her credibility maintaining lack of consent. [State]: So you are attacking consent?
[Defense]: No, it’s your element of proof I’m attacking. [State]: So you’re collaterally attacking consent without saying the word? [Defense]: No. [State]: Uh-huh.”). Despite defense counsel’s avoidance of the terms “consent” or “consensual” during trial, a review of the trial transcript makes it apparent that Lafayette did indeed place his own contrary intent, i.e., the victim’s consent, at issue. During the defense’s opening argument, defense counsel told the jury about the budding relationship between Lafayette and the victim, id. at 82, but he questioned the victim’s claim that Lafayette used force against her to facilitate sexual intercourse, id. (“The incident about being pushed or falling, if you see the medical evidence and when you have a chance to listen to the doctor, there is no evidence of any wounds.... ”). Later, during cross-examination of the victim, defense counsel compelled the victim to admit that there was no physical corroboration of her account of the force that Lafayette used against her, id. at 188 (“So there is no corroboration that you fell? No physical evidence that you fell?”), and challenged the victim’s account of her response to Lafayette’s use of force and threat of force with a gun, id. at 189-92. Only after Lafayette placed his contrary intent at issue before the jury during opening argument and cross-examination of the victim did the trial court admit evidence regarding Lafayette’s prior attempted rape conviction. Id. at 264-68.
Lafayette’s claim that he did not raise the issue of consent is further belied by statements made by defense counsel before and during trial. First, during a pretrial hearing regarding the State’s 404(b) motion, the following exchange took place:
*746THE COURT: What is the defense in this case?
[DEFENSE]: It’s insufficiency of evidence, Your Honor.
THE COURT: It’s not consent? [DEFENSE]: I can’t raise consent. If I raise consent as a defense, that opens the door to 404(b) evidence.
[STATE]: He’s just tap dancing around the issue, Judge. Insufficiency of evidence is one of three things in a rape case: I did’nt do it, sex never happened, or there was consent. That’s what a rape case is, and by saying insufficiency of evidence, all he’s doing is tap dancing around the issue, that he’s actually raising it as consent so he can avoid the h0h(b) trigger.
[DEFENSE]: Exactly.
[STATE]: That’s all he’s doing. [DEFENSE]: Exactly.
[STATE]: And he can’t do that. You can’t just say insufficiency of evidence and go, “Well, just because I did’nt say the word consent, it does’nt mean consent.”
⅜: ⅝ ⅜ ⅝ ⅜
[DEFENSE]: You know, I am dancing, absolutely, because I know what counsel knows; if we mention the word consent under [the case law], then [the State] can bring in 404(b) evidence. We are dancing, absolutely.
12/11/07 Tr. p. 8-9 (emphasis added). Further, during trial, defense counsel made the following remark outside of the presence of the jury: “Your Honor, what is this all about? They had sex, it is whether or not it was consensual.” Tr. p. 154 (emphasis added). Finally, during closing argument, defense counsel yet again expressed Lafayette’s disagreement with the victim’s characterization, of the sexual intercourse as nonconsensual: “That is another reason why I think this was consensual intercourse where the victim changed her mind.” Id. at 480.
Defense counsel’s comments during his opening statement questioning the victim’s account of the force used by Lafayette to compel intercourse with her, and the defense’s cross-examination of the victim in such a way as to put at issue her account of the sexual encounter as nonconsensual, placed Lafayette’s contrary intent at issue during trial. This is further evidenced by comments made by defense counsel during a pretrial hearing, during trial (but outside of the presence of the jury), and during closing argument. Thus, pursuant to Evidence Rule 404(b), the State was not precluded from introducing evidence of Lafayette’s prior bad act as proof of Lafayette’s intent.
Further, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that evidence of Lafayette’s pri- or bad act is irrelevant to the question of intent to engage in nonconsensual intercourse and therefore also inadmissible under Indiana Evidence Rule 402. See op. p. 743 (“ ‘[t]he fact that one woman was raped has no tendency to prove that another woman did not consent’ ”) (quoting Malone v. State, 441 N.E.2d 1339, 1347 (Ind. 1982)). The evidence presented by the State regarding the 1997 attempted rape, however, was not simply that Lafayette attempted to rape a woman in the past. Rather, it revealed conduct nearly identical to the offenses that led to Lafayette’s latest convictions. E.C. testified that in 1997, when she was forty-three or forty-four years old, she met Lafayette, who was a stranger to her, at a gas station. Tr. p. 283-84. Lafayette approached her and struck up a polite conversation. Id. at 285-86. Lafayette lied to E.C. about his name and occupation and traded telephone numbers with her. Id. at 286-87. He called her that night and made arrangements to pick her up the following day to *747purportedly look at automobiles that he sold. Id. at 287-90. The next day, instead of taking E.C. to a car lot, Lafayette drove her to an apartment building and ordered her to get out of his car. Id. at 297-98. Once inside an apartment, Lafayette forced E.C.’s pants down and unsuccessfully tried to remove her underwear. Id. at 301-02. While E.C. fought, Lafayette “started talking to [her] about [E.C.] and him and a relationship ... some story about [E.C. and Lafayette] being in a relationship[.]” Id. at 301. He also instructed her to “raise up [her] legs against his chest and stop fighting.” Id. at 303. E.C, testified that Lafayette eventually gave up trying to have sexual intercourse with her, threw her down, and threatened to kill her and her relatives. Id. at 305-06. Lafayette then admired himself in the mirror, explained to E.C. how he styled his hair, talked to her about relationships, and compelled her to eat cake with him. Id. at 307-08. When Lafayette finally drove E.C. home, he spoke to her as though the two of them were involved in a romantic relationship, gave her a rose, and said that he wanted to see her again. Id. at 309-10.
With striking similarity, in the case before us today, Lafayette approached C.E., a woman in her late forties, at a gas station. Id. at 85-86. He struck up a conversation, lied about his name, and traded telephone numbers with her. Id. at 87-89. He called her that night. Id. at 91. Later that month, Lafayette visited C.E. at her home and then convinced her to join him for a meal at a restaurant. Id. at 105. With C.E. as a passenger in his car, Lafayette did not take her to a restaurant. Instead, he brandished a handgun and compelled C.E. into an apartment. Id. at 110-14. Once inside the apartment, Lafayette, still holding the gun, pushed C.E. onto a bed and forced her to remove her pants. Id. at 123. He ordered her to “lift [her] legs up” and compelled her to submit to sexual intercourse twice. Id. at 125-28. Afterward, while driving her home, Lafayette threatened to kill C.E. if she told anyone what happened. Id. at 133. Later that night, Lafayette called C.E, twice and left a voicemail, which C.E. recounted as follows:
He said that I was a good woman and I was a nice, descent [sic] woman, he could love a woman like me if I can get pas[t] this, he would be a good man to me and he could help me with a lot of things and he could really love me and be good to me because he can see I was a good woman.
Id. at 134-35. Given the uncanny similarities in Lafayette’s conduct toward C.E. and E.C.—before, during, and after his assaults upon them—I must disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence presented through E.C.’s testimony is irrelevant.11 Further, in my view, the highly probative nature of this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect, and it is therefore admissible. Ind. Evidence Rule 403; Wilson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1265, 1270 (Ind.2002).
In conclusion, I believe that Lafayette sufficiently placed his intent at issue to allow the State to present evidence of his prior bad act pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b). Further, I believe that the evidence of his 1997 attempted rape of another victim is relevant to the case before us. Therefore, I would hold that the trial court properly admitted testimony regarding Lafayette’s prior bad act, address *748Lafayette’s remaining claim of error, and affirm Lafayette’s convictions.

. Citations to the transcripts of pretrial hearings include the date of the hearing. Citations to the trial transcript are merely to “Tr.”

. Given the similarities between Lafayette’s present offenses and his prior bad act, I believe that the evidence of his 1997 offense was also admissible under Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) as evidence of a common plan or scheme.