Court Opinion

ID: 9369613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-09 16:01:53.314318+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:16.265492
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11963    Document: 18-1      Date Filed: 02/09/2023   Page: 1 of 10

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-11963
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        BARRY ADDISON GRAY,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Alabama
                   D.C. Docket No. 5:96-cr-00049-CLS-JHE-1
                           ____________________
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        2                          Opinion of the Court                       22-11963

        Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Barry Addison Gray, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se,
        appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion for compassionate
        release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by § 603(b) of
        the First Step Act of 2018. 1 Gray argues that the District Court
        abused its discretion in denying his motion for compassionate re-
        lease because his advanced age and medical conditions constituted
        extraordinary and compelling reasons, the applicable 18 U.S.C.
        § 3553(a) factors supported his release, and he was no longer a dan-
        ger to the community. Gray also argues that the District Court
        abused its discretion in denying his motion for reconsideration.
                                               I.
               In 1996, a grand jury in the Northern District of Alabama
        indicted Barry Addison Gray on five counts, including armed bank
        robbery, possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, Hobbs Act
        robbery, and conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery. Gray pled
        guilty to bank robbery with a firearm, and the other charges were
        dismissed. 2 According to the presentence investigation report (the

        1 Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (Dec. 21, 2018) (the “First
        Step Act”).
        2 Gray escaped from the Riverbend Maximum Security Institution Nashville,
        Tennessee, in 1995; he robbed Compass Bank in Hunstville, Alabama, as well
        First Interstate Bank in Las Vegas, Nevada, prior to being recaptured.
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        22-11963                  Opinion of the Court                              3

        “PSR”), Gray had a total offense level of 31 and a criminal history
        category of VI, 3 which resulted in a guideline sentence range be-
        tween 188 and 235 months. He was sentenced to 235 months on
        May 27, 1997. 4
                On January 6, 2022, Gray, pro se, filed a motion for compas-
        sionate release pursuant to the First Step Act in the District Court
        for the Northern District of Alabama. Gray claimed to have ex-
        hausted his administrative remedies, and he described the “massive
        ongoing COVID-19 viral outbreak” at the United States Peniten-
        tiary (the “USP”) in Terre Haute, Indiana, where he is imprisoned.
        Gray tested positive for COVID-19 in August 2020 and claims he
        was “refused any treatment whatsoever.” He claims to suffer long-
        term symptoms from COVID, such as “breathing difficulty, muscle
        weakness, and persistent fatigue.” He argues that the COVID-19
        pandemic is an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for a sen-
        tence reduction. Gray further argues that he is a 75-year old man
        whose health is failing him, and that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

        3 It would be difficult to overstate Gray’s criminal history. Since 1968, Gray
        has spent most of his life in prison for various armed robberies. Each time he
        has been released—be it on bond, on parole, or by escaping—he committed
        another armed robbery within a very short period. When he committed the
        bank robbery for which he is currently imprisoned at USP Terre Haute, he
        was a fugitive after escaping prison in Nashville, Tennessee, where he was
        serving two life sentences.
        4 His term of imprisonment was to run concurrently to his undischarged
        terms of imprisonment for other crimes in Georgia, Tennessee, Florida, and
        Nevada and was to be followed by three years of supervised release.
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        4                        Opinion of the Court                    22-11963

        sentencing factors support his release, citing a letter of recommen-
        dation from a prison employee.
                The Government opposed Gray’s motion for compassion-
        ate release on several grounds. The Government argued that there
        was no extraordinary or compelling reason to release Gray. Ac-
        cording to the Government, Gray had not shown that he had a ter-
        minal illness, a condition that impaired his ability to care for him-
        self, or one that places him at an elevated risk for COVID.5 Fur-
        ther, the Government argued that USP Terre Haute did not have
        many current cases of COVID. Although Gray is 75 years old, his
        age alone does not qualify him for compassionate release because
        he had not shown that he was experiencing a serious deterioration
        in physical or mental health.
              The Government went on to argue that even if extraordi-
        nary and compelling reasons existed for Gray’s release, he would
        not qualify for compassionate release because he is still a danger to
        the community and the § 3553(a) factors do not support his release.
        According to the Government, the weight of the evidence against
        Gray was strong, he has an extensive and violent criminal history,
        and he was put in prison for armed robbery, all factors which point
        towards him continuing to be a danger to the community. Releas-
        ing Gray would not, in the Government’s view, reflect the

        5 The Government also pointed out that Gray has received three doses of the
        Pfizer vaccine.
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        22-11963               Opinion of the Court                         5

        seriousness of his offenses, promote respect for the law, or provide
        just punishment, as § 3553(a) requires.
                The District Court denied Gray’s motion “for all the reasons
        stated in the Government’s opposition to” Gray’s motion. Order,
        Doc. 79. Gray filed a motion for reconsideration. He claimed that
        because the Court denied his motion three days after the Govern-
        ment filed its response, he did not have adequate time to reply.
        Gray claimed (1) that his hypertension, COPD, hypothyroidism,
        and diabetes, along with COVID, created an extraordinary and
        compelling reason for his release; (2) that no authority required
        him to be terminally ill to obtain release; (3) that his age alone was
        an extraordinary and compelling reason; and (4) that he is not a
        danger to the community. The Government responded by “restat-
        ing all the reasons contained in [its original] response,” and arguing
        that Gray had not raised any new issues or arguments in his motion
        for reconsideration.
               The District Court denied Gray’s motion for reconsidera-
        tion because Gray “failed to raise any new issues or arguments that
        would justify granting his motion.” Order, Doc. 83. Gray timely
        appealed.
                                         II.
               We review a district court’s denial of a prisoner’s
        § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
        Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021). We will also review the
        denial of a motion for reconsideration in a criminal appeal for an
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                 22-11963

        abuse of discretion. United States v. Simms, 385 F.3d 1347, 1356
        (11th Cir. 2004). A motion for reconsideration “cannot be used to
        relitigate old matters, raise arguments or present evidence that
        could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Cummings
        v. Dep’t of Corr., 757 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal quo-
        tation marks omitted). Abuse of discretion review “means that the
        district court had a range of choice” and that we “cannot reverse
        just because we might have come to a different conclusion.” Har-
        ris, 989 F.3d at 912 (internal quotation marks omitted). However,
        a district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal
        standard, follows improper procedures in making the determina-
        tion, or makes clearly erroneous factual findings. United States v.
        Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1194 (11th Cir. 2011).
               A district court has no inherent authority to modify a de-
        fendant’s sentence and may do so “only when authorized by a stat-
        ute or rule.” United States v. Puentes, 803 F.3d 597, 605–06 (11th
        Cir. 2015). A district court may reduce a term of imprisonment,
        under § 3582(c)(1)(A), “if (1) the § 3553(a) sentencing factors favor
        doing so, (2) there are extraordinary and compelling reasons for do-
        ing so, and . . . (3) doing so wouldn’t endanger any person or the
        community within the meaning of § 1B1.13’s policy statement.”
        United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2021) (inter-
        nal quotation marks omitted). The district court may consider
        these factors in any order, and the absence of any of the three fore-
        closes a sentence reduction. See id. at 1237–38.
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        22-11963                Opinion of the Court                           7

                 Section 1B1.13 says that extraordinary and compelling rea-
        sons exist if the defendant is suffering from, among other things, a
        terminal illness or a serious physical or medical condition or dete-
        riorating physical or mental health because of the aging process
        that substantially diminishes his ability to provide self-care within
        the environment of a correctional facility and from which he is not
        expected to recover. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(A). An extraordi-
        nary and compelling reason based on the age of the defendant ex-
        ists if the defendant is at least 65 years old; is experiencing a serious
        deterioration in physical or mental health because of the aging pro-
        cess; and has served at least 10 years or 75 percent of his or her term
        of imprisonment, whichever is less. Id., cmt. n.1(B). The commen-
        tary further states that the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (the
        “BOP”) may determine that there exists in the defendant’s case an
        extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in combination
        with, the reasons described otherwise in the commentary. Id.,
        cmt. n.1(D).
               We have noted that the fact that a prisoner has a common
        ailment that could “possibly” make his risk of a serious illness
        “more likely” if he contracts COVID-19 is not the kind of debilitat-
        ing condition that meets the policy-statement definition of an “ex-
        traordinary and compelling reason” for early release from prison.
        See Harris, 989 F.3d at 912. Moreover, a district court does not err
        in finding a defendant ineligible for compassionate release where
        certain health conditions are manageable in prison, despite the ex-
        istence of the COVID-19 pandemic. United States v. Giron, 15
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                22-11963

        F.4th 1343, 1346 (11th Cir. 2021) (high cholesterol, hypertension,
        and coronary artery disease).
                In United States v. Bryant, we concluded that § 1B1.13 was
        applicable to all motions filed under the First Step Act, including
        those filed by prisoners, and, thus, a district court may not reduce
        a sentence unless a reduction would be consistent with § 1B1.13’s
        definition of extraordinary and compelling reasons. 996 F.3d 1243,
        1252–62 (11th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 583 (2021). We
        further concluded that only the Director of the BOP, not the dis-
        trict court courts, could determine other extraordinary and com-
        pelling reasons for compassionate release beyond those in the com-
        mentary under § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(D). Id. at 1262–65.
               Under § 3553(a), a district court’s sentence must be suffi-
        cient, but not greater than necessary, to achieve the goals of sen-
        tencing, which are as follows: reflecting the seriousness of the of-
        fense, promoting respect for the law, providing just punishment,
        deterring future criminal conduct, protecting the public, and
        providing the defendant with any needed training or treatment.
        18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Section 3553(a) also requires district courts to
        consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defend-
        ant’s history and characteristics, the kinds of sentences available,
        the Sentencing Guidelines, any pertinent policy statement, the
        need to avoid disparate sentences, and the need to provide restitu-
        tion to any victims. Id.
               “The weight given to any specific § 3553(a) factor is commit-
        ted to the sound discretion of the district court.” Tinker, 14 F.4th
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        22-11963                Opinion of the Court                         9

        at 1241 (internal quotation marks omitted). Even so, a district
        court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to afford consideration
        to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives signif-
        icant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a
        clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors. Id. In
        situations where consideration of the § 3553(a) factors is manda-
        tory, it is not necessary for the district court to state on the record
        that it has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to
        discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors. Id. Instead, an acknowledge-
        ment by the district court that it considered the § 3553(a) factors is
        sufficient. Id.
                Here, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in deny-
        ing Gray’s motion for compassionate release and finding that none
        of the conditions for compassionate release were present. That
        Gray potentially suffers from conditions that may make serious ill-
        ness more likely if he contracts COVID is not an extraordinary or
        compelling circumstance, and the health conditions he claims to
        suffer from are manageable in prison. See Harris, 989 F.3d at 912;
        Giron, 15 F.4th at 1346. The District Court also appropriately con-
        sidered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and did not commit a clear
        error of judgment in finding that early release would not reflect the
        seriousness of his offense, promote respect for the law, or afford
        adequate deterrence considering his present offense of armed rob-
        bery and his criminal history designating him as a career offender.
              Additionally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion
        in denying Gray’s motion for reconsideration because he did not
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        10                   Opinion of the Court              22-11963

        offer any new, substantive arguments that justified reconsidera-
        tion.
              AFFIRMED.