Court Opinion

ID: 9417227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 20:06:55.020927+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:37.991677
License: Public Domain

Mr. Chief- Justice Waiter
with!, whom concurred Mr. Justice Swathe, dissenting.
I am unable to agree to this judgment. -There are very few,' if any, of the general- principles of law so well stated in the opinion of the court, to which I do not give' my- assent. My objection is to the application which is- made of them to tile-fact's of this case. •
In the stipulation of the parties, it is “conceded that the ease relating to ^aid premises, set out in the answer of the respondent, had been appealed from the decision of the Commissioner of the .General Land-Office to the Secretary of the Interior, and was. pending before the said Secretary at the time-the demand for the patent was made on him, as.set forth in the -original petition of relator, and for some days thereafter, and that at the time of such demand, and for some days thereafter, the said patent was, with the papers in said case, as. an-exhibit in said case; in the office of the Secretary of the Interior, and was not in the General Land-Office.” This is, as I think, an admission that the case set out in the answer was pending, and permits us to look into the answer and ascertain what that case was. The- facts on which the case rests may not be admitted, but the existence of the case-as-set out is. -
Looking, .then, to the answer, we find that case to have been as followsOn the 24th of February, 1877, the corporate authorities of the city of Grantsville made an application for the cancellation of the entry of McBride on the lands in. controversy. This application .was forwarded to the Commissioner of the General Land-Office for final ad judication, and decision under the law and the established rules and practice of the department; and it came to a final decision by the Commissioner of the General Land-Office Feb. 7, 1879. On the 8th *406of April, 1879, McBride appealed to the Secretary ©f the Interior. In his appeal he claimed, 1st, that the decision of the commissioner was contrary to the preponderance of the evidence as shown in the record of the case, and,- 2d, that the decision is contrary to the law of the case.
In the original petition for this mandamus it is stated that the patent was dated Sept. 26,1877. It thus appears distinctly that when the patent was signed, sealed, and recorded there was a contest authorized by law pending in the department between McBride and the corporate - authorities of Grantsville as to who had the better right, under the laws of Congress,, to the land. It is not pretended that.any formal decision was made by any of the department officers charged with that duty that the patent should issue. Under these circumstances it may fairly be inferred, irrespective of the' positive averments to that effect in the answer, that the patent was improvidently issued through the neglect of some of the clerks having charge of the business details of the office. In my. opinion, it was the imperative duty of the Commissioner of the Land-Office, when these facts were brought to his attention, to direct that the delivery of the patent be withheld.
I agree that, when the right to a patent has become complete, the execution and delivery of the patent itself are the mere ministerial acts of the officers charged Vith that duty; and I further agree that when the right tó a patent has been determined, and the patent has actually been signed, sealed, countersigned, and recorded, no actual delivery is necessary to pass the title. When the last formalities of the law prescribed for the due execution of a patent have 'been complied with, the grant is complete, if it has before that time been determined in some appropriate way that the right to the patent exists. Ordinarily, the due execution of the patent will be evidence of such a determination. But certainly, as between the United States and the patentee, such evidence will not be conclusive. Different questions may arise if the rights of third person's, intervene; but, as- between the original parties, until the patent ought to issue, it may, in my opinion, be recalled at- any time before it gets out of the actual possession of the United States. In reality, it can convey only what the officers of the United *407States have the lawful right to grant; and, if it can convey nothing, the Secretary of the Interior ought not to be required by mandamus to do a vain thing.
The contest here was as to the right' of McBride to his homestead entry. Confessedly, the land is within the incorporated city of G-rantsville, and his entry was not made at the land-office until after the town was incorporated, although he settled on the land long before. It was a question, therefore, whether, under the circumstances, he had the right to' his entry. That question was pending before the department in the ordinary course of proceedings when the patent was executed. It involved the investigation of facts. 'This is apparent, both from the case, as set forth in the petition, and the appeal papers which McBride himself filed. That the facts were disputed, too; is apparent from the statement in the. appeal that the decision of the commissioner was contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. The patent ought not to have been executed if the entry was unlawful. Whether it was lawful or not was, at the time, the question at issue between McBride and the authorities of Grantsville in the contest then, pending in • the department. The law makes provision' for such contests; and we have over and over again held that, in the absence of fraud, the decision of ’ the -officers on the facts is final. Johnson v. Towsley, 18 Wall. 72. As the right of McBride to a patent depended on the result of that contest, will the execution of the patent have th& effect of a judgfnent on the facts before the hearing is concluded?
I will not pursue the subject further. Enough has already been said to show the grounds of my dissent. In my opinion, to direct the Secretary to deliver the patent is to give McBride execution iii his pending suit before judgment rendered, and may lead to inextricable confusion.
Note. — A motion was subsequently made to modify the order that each party should pay his own costs,, and to render judgment against the defendant for costs.
Me. Justice Miiaek
delivered the opinion of the court.
Our first impression was that as the defendant was sued in regard to the manner in which he had discharged certain official duties as Secretary of the Interior, in which no intentional wrong was charged or proven against him, it *408would be unjust to make him pay the costs of the proceeding out of his own pocket.
But a careful examination of the authorities leaves us no option but to follow thé rule that the prevailing party shall recover of. the unsuccessful one the legal costs which he has expended in obtaining his rights.
In Kendall v. United States (12 Pet. 524), the' leading case establishing the right of a citizen to the use of the writ of mandamus to compel a public officer to perform a duty merely ministerial, tire-relator recovered his costs. The duty, in that, as in the present case, was one enjoin.ed upon a cabinet officer, which he refused to perform. It is obvious that he thought he was right in refusing • to do the act demanded of him, yet this ccurt, as shown by the report of the case, rendered judgment for costs against him.
In United States v. Boutwell (17 Wall. 604), which was the case of a writ of mandamus against the defendant as Secretary 'of the Treasury, and which the court held to be abated by his retirement from office, it was said: “It is the personal default of the defendant that warrants the iinpetration of the writ, and if a. peremptory-writ 6f mandamus be awarded, the costs must fall upon the defendant.” And it is.argued that as it would be.unjust to make the successor in office of the delinquent secretary pay the post of defending the action of his predecessor, the writ must of -necessity abate.
We cannot, in the face of these cases, refuse the order for costs, however much w.e might wish it were otherwise. There may be a contingent or other fund of the department out of which they can be paid. If there is none, Congress may provide for it or enact generally that-when the officers of the government are sued with reference to the manner in which they have performed or failed to perform their official duties, they, as in revenue seizures and similar eases, shall be relieved from the expense of the suit if they have acted with good motives and upon reasonable grounds.
The relator must have judgment for his costs.