Court Opinion

ID: 9677151
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:44:54.614637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:54.277226
License: Public Domain

HECHT, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent.
The Court cannot hold that the evidence in this case is factually sufficient to support the judgment. Article V, section 6 of the Texas Constitution makes the court of appeals’ determination of the factual insufficiency of the evidence in a case “conclusive”. This Court has repeatedly acknowledged, as it must, that it has no authority to review that determination except to ascertain that it was lawfully made — that is, that the appeals court considered all the evidence and stated its reasons for judging the evidence insufficient to support a finding of fact. See Alm v. Aluminum Co. of America, 717 S.W.2d 588, 594-595 (Tex.1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 633-635 (Tex.1986); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1965); In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661-662 (1951).
Stymied by the constitution, the Court cannot decree the result it rather plainly wants to see in this case. To accomplish the desired end, the Court must keep reversing the judgment of the court of appeals until it reaches a result that the Court approves. Always the ground for reversal is that the appeals court either cannot or will not follow the law. For this Court to hold that an appeals court has not conducted its factual insufficiency analysis in a lawful manner, simply to coerce that court into changing its conclusion, is to usurp the constitutional prerogative of the court of appeals. That is what I believe is happening in this case.
Twice the court of appeals has reviewed the evidence in this case and judged it to be factually insufficient to support the judgment. The court of appeals’ opinions reflect that it has thoroughly reviewed the evidence in this case by the correct legal standards and concluded that it does not support the judgment. Twice this Court has reversed the court of appeals for failing to review the evidence by the proper legal standards. The Court assumes that the court of appeals “has honestly had difficulty” in recognizing the evidence and following the law. The Court’s stated basis for reversal is diaphanous, and its real reason apparent: the Court simply does not agree with the appeals court’s result. The Court may not agree with the constitutional delegation' of the exclusive power to review the factual sufficiency of evidence to the court of appeals; indeed, I suspect rather strongly that it does not. But surely the Court is constrained to follow the constitution, and it should not attempt to circumvent this disfavored provision by accusing the appeals court of failing to perform its legal duty.
The appeals court’s central conclusion, after twice reviewing the entire record in much detail, is that the evidence is overwhelming that defendant driver’s conduct was not a proximate cause of this accident. The evidence the court finds overwhelming indicates that the plaintiff drove his vehicle suddenly into the defendant driver’s path on a foggy night so that the defendant driver could not have avoided the collision. The appeals court calls this evidence undisputed, and it was, in the sense that the Court can point to no directly conflicting evidence. This is not to say that the evidence was not vigorously challenged. As the Court correctly notes, discrepancies in the witnesses’ testimony allowed the plaintiff to dispute the defendants’ position. At one point the appeals court calls the evidence that the plaintiff’s vehicle jumped in front of the defendant driver’s vehicle “irrefutable”. That characterization is exaggerated, to be sure, but the appeals court’s extensive opinion should not be judged by one overstated word.
*389This overstatement, however, is precisely the focus of this Court’s criticism. “The whole opinion,” the Court sweepingly declares, “is based on the premise that such factual conclusion was established as a matter of law.” In other words, the Court reads the court of appeals opinion to say that there is no evidence that the defendant driver’s conduct was a proximate cause of the accident.
The relief granted by the court of appeals manifests that the Court is wrong in its criticism. Had the court of appeals concluded that there was no evidence that defendant driver’s conduct was a proximate cause of the accident, it would have been required to render judgment for defendants rather than merely giving them a new trial, unless justice required a remand. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Frederick, 621 S.W.2d 595, 596 (Tex.1981). Absent any mention of considerations requiring a remand, the court of appeals’ duty was to render judgment for defendants if there was no evidence their actions were a proximate cause of the accident. See Nat’l Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Blagg, 438 S.W.2d 905, 909-910 (Tex.1969). The relief granted by the court of appeals, remand rather than rendition, establishes that it did not view the absence of proximate cause to have been established as a matter of law, contrary to this Court’s accusation.
Although the Court seems to suggest that the court of appeals has failed to review all the evidence in the case, I find no significant piece of evidence in the Court’s opinion omitted from the court of appeals’ opinions. The Court in its prior opinion singled out two conclusory statements, one in the appeals court majority opinion and one in a concurring opinion on motion for rehearing, and used them to suggest, most unfairly, that the appeals court’s entire opinion was nothing but conclusions. The appeals court’s opinions analyze the evidence in considerable detail.
The Court states: “The court of appeals disregarded the direct instruction of this court.” The harshness of the Court’s language toward the court of appeals appears to be in response to the statement of one member of the appeals court panel “respectfully disagree[ing]” with the Court’s first opinion. Certainly, the duty of the appeals court is to follow this Court’s opinions, not to express its agreement or disagreement. I would consider its failure to discharge its duty a serious matter. However, I believe the appeals court has fully discharged its duty in this case. One judge’s meek remonstration, born obviously of the frustration of having to repeat an analysis to meet unfair criticism, is hardly insubordination deserving of the Court’s blunt rebuke.
Now the court of appeals must take a third look at the evidence in this case. Perhaps it will omit the characterizations, “undisputed” and “irrefutable”, which the Court finds objectionable. Perhaps it will adopt the Court’s extensive, and unauthorized, analysis as its own, quoting it at length. Perhaps it will patiently follow every directive the Court has given, however unfair and unreasonable it may seem. Perhaps it will nevertheless reach the same conclusion, and test how far this Court will go in attempting to influence a decision the constitution denies the Court the power to make. Or perhaps the court of appeals will succumb to the pressure from the Court and abandon the conclusion it has now reached twice in what certainly appears to be good faith.
The Court rightly holds that the court of appeals may not substitute its judgment for the finder of fact. Likewise, the Court is constitutionally forbidden to substitute its judgment for the court of appeals. In his concurring opinion in Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 638 (Tex.1986), Justice Gonzalez expressed his fear that the Court was trying to fashion some justification for second-guessing the courts of appeals in the exercise of their constitutional prerogative to judge the factual sufficiency of the evidence in a case. Today, those fears approach reality.
Accordingly, I dissent.
PHILLIPS, C.J., and COOK, J., join in this dissenting opinion.