Court Opinion

ID: 9739917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:23:33.576795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:14.736280
License: Public Domain

Abrams, J.
(dissenting). In my view, jurisdiction is proper in this case in the Superior Court under G. L. c. 214, § 7A (1986 *91ed.). On the merits, I think that the town is not entitled to summary judgment and that the matter should be remanded for trial with the licensee joined as a necessary party.
1. Jurisdiction. The narrow interpretation of G. L. c. 214, § 7A, adopted today is inconsistent with the broad remedial purpose of that statute. In Boston v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 364 Mass. 639, 646 (1974), this court wrote: “The legislative intent underlying [§ 7A] is broadly stated in the title under which it was enacted: ‘An Act establishing a cause of action in behalf of certain persons and political subdivisions for the purpose of protecting the natural resources and environment of the commonwealth. ’ St. 1971, c. 732. . . . We believe that these broad statements of purpose are incompatible with a narrow, technical interpretation of [§ 7A] which would limit the operation of the statute to the enforcement of only prohibitory environmental laws and regulations.” See also Cummings v. Secretary of Envtl. Affairs, 402 Mass. 611, 619 (1988) (Abrams, J., dissenting).
General Laws c. 130, § 67 (1986 ed.), imposes penalties on any activity “which may directly or indirectly injure the shellfish upon any [shellfish] grounds or beds,” without the consent of the person licensed to oversee and manage “the natural shellfish resources of the town.” See G. L. c. 130, § 57 (1986 ed.). In my view, § 67 is a statute “the major purpose of which is to prevent or minimize damage to the environment” within the broad meaning of G. L. c. 214, § 7A. I therefore conclude that the violation of § 67 alleged in this case satisfies the jurisdictional requirements of § 7A.
2. Merits. I agree with Justice O’Connor that the town is not entitled to summary judgment. However, I think it is inappropriate for this court to determine the issues in this case in the first instance.
Assuming, without deciding, that the town may grant a license to conduct “aquaculture” without violating the rights of landowners,1 the central issue for trial is whether the license *92in this case necessarily prohibits the defendant from mooring his boats properly in an appropriate place on his tidal flats. If so, then the shellfish license granted by the town may be invalid, because G. L. c. 130, § 57, provides that such licenses shall not “impair the private rights of any person.” However, if it were determined that the scope of the license could be limited to allow the defendant to moor his boats, then the license may be valid. Because the scope and validity of the license are in issue, it would be unfair to decide this case without joining the licensee as a necessary party. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 19 (a), 365 Mass. 765 (1974).

 I agree with the court that it is inappropriate on the present record to determine whether “aquaculture” may be considered “fishing” within the meaning of the Colonial Ordinance. See ante at 84 note 8.