Court Opinion

ID: 9752811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:35:58.066258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:46:44.805114
License: Public Domain

HANDLER, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Equity may insist that a stepfather accept a continuing obligation to support his minor stepchildren upon the termination by divorce of his marriage to their mother. I firmly believe that this is an appropriate case to recognize that defendant be required, under principles of equitable estoppel, to continue to provide child support for his minor stepchildren. In my opinion, the record discloses sufficient facts to call for the imposition of such an obligation. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division.
The Court today quite fittingly acknowledges that the interests of the parties in a matrimonial dispute can be resolved by the application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. As noted by the majority, courts have invoked the principle of equitable estoppel to enforce a continuing duty of support of minor stepchildren. Ante at 163 (citing A.S v. B.S., 139 N.J.Super. 366 (Ch.Div.1976), aff'd, 150 N.J.Super. 122 (App.Div.1977), and Ross v. Ross, 126 N.J.Super. 394 (J. & D.R.Ct.1973), aff’d, 135 N.J.Super. 35 (App.Div.1975)). However, as the Court points out, the cited cases involved situations in which it was found that the stepfather expressly promised to care for the stepchildren and the wife relied on that promise, thus establishing *172sufficient consideration to create a continuing obligation to support the children after a divorce.
We have in other contexts recognized the justness in imposing support obligations founded on a promise expressly made or reasonably implied from a course of conduct. Crowe v. DeGi-oia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378 (1979). In this case, no evidence was presented that plaintiff married defendant on his promise or representation that he would support her daughters. In consequence, plaintiffs cause of action is not grounded on a theory of express or implied contract, but is appropriately based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
Equitable estoppel is a doctrine that is designed to bring an uniquely individualized controversy to a just and fair disposition, taking into account the special and particular relationship and course of dealing between the parties. The doctrine, well understood in its classic definition, requires of one party a representation, and of the other party expected, consequential, and detrimental reliance. See Carlsen v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan Trust, 80 N.J. 334, 339 (1979); Malaker Corp. Stockholders’ Protective Comm’n v. First Jersey Nat’l Bank, 163 N.J.Super. 463 (App.Div.1978), certif. denied, 79 N.J. 488 (1979). Equitable estoppel may be appropriate in any equitable cause of action or defense. In this case, its application is especially compelling because children are involved. Consequently, the doctrine, in this setting, requires a somewhat broader conceptualization.
In the matrimonial context, when the rights and interests of innocent children are at stake, we should consider in applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel whether there was a course of conduct that, in its cumulative impact, was tantamount to a representation made by one party with the expectation that other persons would rely on this conduct, and whether, as a natural and probable consequence, such persons did in fact reasonably rely, resulting in a detriment to them. That detri*173ment — the disadvantage or change of position — can occur because of the actor’s subsequent repudiation of his or her conduct and disavowal of the expectations engendered by that conduct.
Equitable estoppel so understood should be available in matrimonial causes, especially when the best interests of minor children are implicated. In Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 551 (1982), I stated in concurrence:
These considerations impel me to urge that the controversy in this case be resolved by the application of equitable principles which focus solely and sharply upon the actual conduct of parties in resolving the merits of the central issue. The unerring focus of equity upon party conduct, I submit, is uniquely appropriate for the resolution of matrimonial disputes and especially conducive toward reaching the fair, sound, and right disposition — that elusive ultimate end that is often so difficult to identify and demonstrate in matrimonial causes.
In this case, the gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint is, and the evidence presented shows, that by a pronounced and purposeful course of conduct, defendant induced his stepdaughters to rely on him as their father and as their sole source of paternal sustenance and support. Further, in so doing, he frustrated and cut off the girls’ relationship with their natural father. There is little question that when defendant terminated his marriage and ended his familial relationship with his wife and his stepdaughters, he left the children at a substantial financial disadvantage. In effect, he repudiated his prior course of conduct and disavowed the expectations he himself created. I am satisfied that the record meets plaintiff’s evidential burden to demonstrate that defendant equitably should be estopped from disclaiming a continuing duty to support these children.
The facts to this end are not disputed. Prior to her marriage to defendant, plaintiff was married to Ralph Febre. Shortly after the birth of their second child, plaintiff separated from and then divorced Ralph. Although there was no support provision in that divorce agreement, Ralph continued to support plaintiff and the children until he went to prison on a narcotics charge in 1968. Immediately prior to his going to prison, he gave plaintiff $5,000 for the support of his daughters. While in *174prison and after his release, Ralph continued to express his interest in and concern for his children. After his release, he advised plaintiff that he wanted to resume providing financial support for his daughters. However, when he did send a check to the girls, defendant, since married to plaintiff, tore it up. Defendant himself testified that he refused Ralph’s money because he was concerned that he and plaintiff would be associated with Ralph. Confronted with defendant’s strong opposition, Ralph finally stopped attempting to send money to the children. Consequently, during his marriage to plaintiff, defendant not only supported the children, claiming them as dependents on his 1979 tax return, but also actively terminated any support from their natural father. As expressly found by the Appellate Division, and reiterated in the majority’s opinion, ante at 161:
[U]pon Ralph’s release from jail he attempted to visit his children but defendant strenuously opposed any visitation and, in fact, prohibited it. He rejected all offers of Ralph to contribute to the support of his children and tore up a check tendered for that purpose. Ralph desisted from further attempts at visitation or payment of support.
The thrust of this matrimonial proceeding is child support. Thus, the critical focus should not be on whether defendant represented himself as the natural father of the children or whether the children came to love their stepfather as if he were their natural parent. Rather, the concern should be with whether, by word and deed, defendant affirmatively encouraged, and actually succeeded in attaining, the family’s financial dependence upon him and, further, whether defendant deliberately and aggressively cut off the support that the children had been receiving or might have received from their natural father.
I agree with the Court that the love between defendant and the stepchildren is not the pivotal consideration. The gist of the equitable cause of action here is rooted in the fact that defendant affirmatively established himself as the sole or primary supporter of the family and zealously deprived his stepchildren of the support they were otherwise entitled to secure *175from their natural father. Nevertheless, parental love may be a relevant factor to be weighed in making the equitable assessment. Thus, if this emotional bonding with the stepfather has contributed to or exacerbated the alienation of the children from their natural father and, as important, has served to discourage the natural father from maintaining a full parental relationship with his own children, it may have a material bearing on his failure to support his children.
Here, it is undisputed that throughout the seven years that plaintiff and defendant lived together, defendant developed a loving relationship with the two girls. The children came to refer to him as “daddy,” and called his mother and father “grandma” and “grandpa.” As the Appellate Division found:
[H]e was an affectionate father and took the girls everywhere. He held the girls out as his own children. He even became a Girl Scout Troop leader, so he could be with them. He enjoyed sports with them and they came to love defendant as a father.
At the trial both children testified separately in camera that they knew Ralph was their natural father, but they considered defendant their “father” and loved him very much. Further, although there were discussions between the Millers as to defendant’s adoption of the girls, Ralph refused to consent to the adoption. Therefore, the girls’ names could not be changed legally to Miller. Nevertheless, although it is disputed who initiated the change, it is uncontroverted that during the time the girls lived with* defendant, they began using the surname Miller at school, and their school records were changed to reflect that their name was Miller. These factors underscore and buttress the salient circumstance that defendant succeeded in driving a deep wedge between his stepchildren and their natural father.
In applying equitable estoppel, it is important to consider the public policy consequences of the particular outcome. New-burgh v. Artigo, supra, 88 N.J. at 551 (Handler, J., concurring). The majority suggests that the application of the doctrine in this case could serve to discourage loving relationships between *176stepparents and stepchildren. Ante at 168-169. Not so. Involved in this case is not simply the loving and affectionate relationship that can arise in the new family groupings that emerge in successive marriages. Rather, it is the conduct of a stepfather who has aggressively alienated children from their natural father and vigorously discouraged any financial support from their father. No sound public policy should countenance, encourage, or reward such conduct.
In cases like this one, involving successive failed marriages, children are often left like the wounded on a matrimonial battlefield, that is alternately occupied and abandoned by adult combatants. The cement in the application of equitable estop-pel in this situation is not parental love; it is parental responsibility. We deal not with familial love or even emotional nurture, but with parental obligation. Equitable estoppel is triggered by the fairness and justness of attaching accountability to one’s actions. The imperative of the doctrine in this case is drawn from the indisputable fairness in preventing the defendant from denying that he has assumed a responsibility — of his own making — to continue to provide financial support for his minor stepchildren. In this case the application of the doctrine would promote the socially-desirable end of discouraging a stepparent from actively alienating his or her stepchildren from the support, as well as the affection, of their natural parent.
I would not in this case, or similar ones, involving dependent children, provide a different rule — a more stringent one in terms of whether the support application is for permanent support or for interim relief. Compare ante at 167. I also disagree with the Court’s insistence on almost absolute conditions for affixing liability upon the stepparent. With respect to establishing the prerequisites to the equitable cause of action, all that should be required is a representation or a course of conduct that equates with a representation that generates intended and natural expectations. The detriment to the children arises from their reliance on that course of conduct, in the form of a loss of support from their natural father. The *177substantial disadvantage to the children inheres in the fact that their natural father has long since been discouraged by their stepfather from giving them financial support, and, that now their stepfather himself refuses support. If, at the time of the demise of the second marriage, the natural father is hard to find, or unavailable or uncooperative or unamenable to legal process — if he has to be run down and sued to enforce his legal obligation — this burden constitutes a sufficient detriment. It is assuredly a probable consequence of the stepfather’s own purposeful course of alienation and hostility toward the natural father during the marriage. I would therefore leave the evidential onus upon the stepfather to prove otherwise, at least in a case like this one.
I do not agree that principles of equitable estoppel are to be applied with particular caution in such cases. Compare ante at 166, 170. An analysis of the complicated factual patterns that emerge in the matrimonial context should be based strictly on the equities. That sharp focus will lend greater clarity, sureness, and a sense of justness to the result ultimately reached. Newburgh v. Arrigo, supra, 88 N.J. at 550 (Handler, J., concurring). The Court’s cautionary caveat is unnecessary, as any party seeking to establish the elements of this equitable cause of action faces a difficult burden, and courts applying the doctrine can be expected to do so conscientiously and carefully.
In sum, I would find that when a stepparent walks away from his marital family, regardless of spousal fault, after a marriage characterized by a course of conduct on his part that has resulted in the cutting off of financial assistance from the natural parent, the stepparent should remain provisionally responsible for the family’s continued support. The responsibility is provisional because, as a matrimonial obligation, it is of course subject to modification or change. Changed circumstances may always be addressed by changing obligations, regardless of how fair these were when first imposed. See, e.g., Petersen v. Petersen, 85 N.J. 638 (1981). The support obligation, equitably imposed on the stepfather in this case, *178need not endure indefinitely and does not eliminate or supersede the natural father’s legal obligation to support his own children. Therefore, either party should be required, or .given the opportunity, to assert this obligation against the natural father. The trial court should be vested with the discretion to determine the circumstances under which it would be appropriate or necessary to shift the responsibility for child support to the natural father. However, unless and until the natural father can be brought back into the picture, equitable estoppel should prevent the stepfather from passing the buck — literally. In no event should the stepchildren be left holding an empty bag.
Justice CLIFFORD joins in this opinion.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices SCHREIBER, POLLOCK, O’HERN and GARIBALDI — 5.
For affirmance — Justices CLIFFORD and HANDLER — 2.