Court Opinion

ID: 9742112
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:06:59.558266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:28.620056
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE ZWICK, dissenting: I dissent. Petitioner alleged that at the time he was convicted and incarcerated, he received a prisoner handbook from the Illinois Department of Corrections which officially advised that he had 10 years to file a petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. The legislature subsequently modified the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, shortening the filing period from 10 years to 3 years, effective January 1, 1992. However, petitioner was never informed of this modification or its impact upon his rights. This modification effectively terminated this avenue of redress for petitioner immediately upon passage. In my view, it is unconscionable to apply the statutory language in such a manner as to erect an insurmountable barricade to a preexisting statutory right. I am persuaded by the logic and reasoning of Justice Clark’s dissent in People v. Bates, 124 Ill. 2d 81, 529 N.E.2d 227 (1988). Not only law, but decency and principles of fair play demand that the petitioner be given a reasonable time to file his postconviction petition when the effect of the statute is to immediately and prematurely terminate his vehicle for challenging constitutional correctness. See Bates, 124 Ill. 2d at 90-92 (Clark, J., dissenting, joined by Stamos, J.). It is clear that the petitioner here is free from any negligence, let alone culpable negligence. My research has not disclosed any decision in which the court found that the delay in filing a late postconviction petition could be excused because of an absence of "culpable negligence” by the petitioner. It seems that the courts have universally emasculated the "absence of culpable negligence” language in the statute. Even mental illness isn’t enough to justify a delay. This construction effectively nullifies the intent of the legislature as expressed in the clear statutory language. In the instant case, the problem is even more egregious because the petitioner’s confusion was created by the conduct of the Department of Corrections. Although the Department of Corrections was under no obligation to inform inmates of their postconviction rights, it did so in the prisoners’ handbook. In the instant case, the Department of Corrections was a "volunteer” and caused the predicament facing the petitioner. Once having volunteered, the Department was under a duty to notify inmates of the change in the postconviction statute of limitations. This would have been a very easy task, and the failure cannot be excused to the detriment of the petitioner. It is clear that the petitioner in this case has alleged sufficient facts to bring the lack of culpable negligence into play, thereby removing the jurisdictional bar.