Court Opinion

ID: 9707766
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:20:54.295692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:37.949094
License: Public Domain

KELLY, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I join in that part of the majority opinion which quashes Louis Slaton’s cross-appeal from the trial court’s disposition of Slaton’s suppression motion. I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which denies the Commonwealth’s appeal from the portion of the trial court’s order which directed the suppression of fraudulent prescriptions seized from Slaton’s Pharmacy on December 6, 1983 and Decern*322ber 7,1983. Because of the potential impact of this case on future narcotics law enforcement efforts in this Commonwealth, I set forth the reasons for my dissent at length.
The principle issue in this case is whether Slaton validly consented to warrantless administrative inspections of his pharmacy prescription file on December 6, 1983 and December 7,1983. The trial court found that Slaton’s consent was invalid because his consent could not be deemed to have been granted knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily when the narcotics agents requesting consent failed to inform Slaton that he was then the focus of a criminal investigation. (Trial Ct.Op. at 2-3). The majority differs slightly from the trial court in sustaining the suppression order. The majority finds that Slaton’s consent was invalid because the agents failed to disclose their purpose as statutorily required, and because the agents permitted Slaton to labor under the misapprehension that his prescription file was being inspected for evidence against a person named Merriweather and his accomplices. Majority opinion, supra, 383 Pa.Super. at 307-312, 556 A.2d at 1346-1348. Judge Wieand, on the other hand, finds that Slaton’s consent was completely voluntary. I agree with Judge Wieand for the following reasons.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a decision of a trial court on a suppression motion, we are bound by findings of fact which have support in the record, but not by the trial court’s conclusions of law. See Commonwealth v. White, 358 Pa.Super. 120, 123, 516 A.2d 1211, 1212 (1986). In determining whether a finding is supported by the record, we must consider all evidence which supports the finding, from whatever source, and only so much evidence as negates the finding, which viewed in the context of the suppression hearing record as a whole, stands uncontradicted. Commonwealth v. Carelli, 377 Pa.Super. 117, 129 n. 1, 546 A.2d 1185, 1191 n. 1 (1988). We must also give due consideration to the trial court’s *323prerogative as fact finder to access credibility and to choose to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented. Id.1
II. ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTIONS
Fourth Amendment proscriptions against unreasonable searches and seizures apply only when the conduct challenged violates an actual expectation of privacy which society is prepared to accept as reasonable. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, —, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 1628, 100 L.Ed.2d 30, 36 (1988) (collecting cases). Though the Fourth Amendment protects people rather than places, the determination of whether an actual and reasonable expectation of privacy exists usually requires some reference to place. United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 582 (1967); id., 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S.Ct. at 516, 19 L.Ed.2d at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring).
While the degree of privacy recognized as reasonable with respect to commercial properties is different, and indeed lesser than that recognized with respect to private residences, commercial facilities nonetheless enjoy certain protections under the Fourth Amendment. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 2642, 96 L.Ed.2d 601, 612 (1987); Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 234, 106 S.Ct 1819, 1824, 90 L.Ed.2d 226, 235 (1986). Warrantless administrative searches of areas of commercial properties closed to the public are generally deemed unreasonable. See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 104 S.Ct. 641, 78 L.Ed.2d 477 (1984); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 99 S.Ct. 2425, 61 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 *324L.Ed.2d 486 (1978); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 18 L.Ed.2d 943 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967).
Search warrants based upon probable cause, however, are not always required for inspections of commercial properties. Rather, special administrative inspection warrants may constitutionally be granted based upon a determination that the inspection to be authorized is in furtherance of a general administrative plan to enforce legitimate health and safety regulations. See Michigan v. Clifford, supra; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); Michigan v. Tyler, supra; Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc., supra; Camara v. Municipal Court, supra. The Supreme Court has also held that in certain pervasively regulated industries limited warrantless administrative inspections may be permitted. See New York v. Burger, supra (junkyards engaged in dismantling automobiles); Donavan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (subsurface mining operations); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972) (firearms dealers); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 90 S.Ct. 774, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970) (alcohol); see also Commonwealth v. Lutz, 512 Pa. 192, 516 A.2d 339 (1986), remanded on other grounds 480 U.S. 927, 107 S.Ct. 1560, 94 L.Ed.2d 754 (1987), vacated on remand 517 Pa. 481, 538 A.2d 872 (1988) (solid waste); Peterson v. Pennsylvania State Horse Rac. Com’n, 68 Pa.Cmwlth. 353, 449 A.2d 774 (1982) (horse racing); Lanchester v. Pennsylvania State Horse Rac. Com’n, 16 Pa.Cmwlth. 85, 325 A.2d 648 (1974) (same).
If the scope or duration of an otherwise lawful administrative inspection exceeds the limits appropriate to its legitimate administrative purposes, the inspection becomes a search, and must be justified by a traditional search warrant or equivalent justification. See Michigan v. Tyler, supra. However, because legitimate administrative *325schemes may have the same ultimate purposes as penal laws, an otherwise lawful administrative inspection properly limited in scope and duration to that appropriate to fulfill the legitimate administrative purposes is not rendered invalid by the inspecting officers’ intent to use information and/or evidence obtained during the inspection in a subsequent criminal prosecution. See New York v. Burger, supra, 482 U.S. at 711-18, 107 S.Ct. at 2648-52, 96 L.Ed.2d at 620-23. Thus, evidence obtained in a lawful administrative inspection of a pharmacy may be used in a subsequent prosecution for criminal violations of drug laws. See Commonwealth v. Maras, 16 Pa.D. & C.3d 700, 706-07 (1979); see also United States v. Nechy, 827 F.2d 1161, 1165-66 (7th Cir.1987) (applying New York v. Burger); United States v. Brown, 763 F.2d 984, 988 (8th Cir.1985); United States v. Acklen, 690 F.2d 70, 73-75 (6th Cir.1982); Matter of Searches and Seizures, 665 F.2d 775, 776-77 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Jamieson-McKames Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 651 F.2d 532, 542 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Prendergast, 585 F.2d 69, 70-71 (3rd Cir.1978); United States v. Goldfine, 538 F.2d 815, 818-19 (9th Cir.1976); State v. Rednor, 203 N.J.Super. 503, 507, 497 A.2d 544, 547 (1985).
III. WARRANTLESS ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTIONS
The only issue properly raised by the Commonwealth in this appeal is whether valid consent was obtained to inspect Slaton’s prescription files. Nonetheless, I feel compelled to respond briefly to the majority’s gratuitous observation that, “[although the pharmaceutical field is a highly regulated industry, the Pennsylvania legislature has not seen fit to authorize warrantless searches.” Majority Opinion, supra, 383 Pa.Superior Ct. at 307, 556 A.2d at 1346.
I find that it is far from clear that such inspections have not been authorized. The relevant statute provides in pertinent part:
*32635 P.S. § 780-124. Administrative Inspections and Warrants.
* * * * * *
(b)(1) For the purpose of inspecting, copying, and verifying the correctness of records, reports, or other documents required to be kept or made under this act and otherwise facilitating the carrying out of his functions under this act, the secretary is authorized, in accordance with this section, to enter controlled premises and to conduct administrative inspections thereof, and of the things specified in this section, relevant to those functions.
(2) Such entries and inspections shall be carried out through officers or employes (thereinafter referred to as ‘officers’) designated by the secretary. Any such officer upon stating his purpose and presenting to the owner, operator, or officer in charge of such premises (i) appropriate credentials and (ii). a written notice of his inspection authority (which notice in the case of an inspection requiring, or in fact supported by, an administrative inspection warrant shall consist of such warrant), shall have the right to enter such premises and conduct such inspection at reasonable times.
(3) Except as may otherwise be indicated in an applicable inspection warrant, the officer shall have the right: (i) to inspect and copy records, reports, and other documents required to be kept or made under this act; (ii) to inspect, within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, controlled premises and all pertinent equipment, finished and unfinished drugs and other substances or materials, containers, and labeling found therein, and, except as provided in this subsection, all other things therein (including records, files, papers, processes, controls, and facilities) appropriate for verification of the records, reports, and documents referred to in subclause (i) or otherwise bearing on the provisions of this act; and (iii) to *327inventory any stock of any controlled substance therein and obtain samples of any such substance or article.
* * * * * *
(c) A warrant under this section shall not be required for the inspection of books and records pursuant to an administrative subpoena issued in accordance with any provisions of any Act of Assembly nor for entries and administrative inspections (including seizures of property):
* * * * * *
(5) In any other situations where a warrant is not constitutionally required.
(Emphasis added). Though I do not feel justified in passing on the question of whether the above provisions succeed in constitutionally authorizing warrantless pharmacy inspections, I note that an at least plausible argument could be made that § 780-124(c)(5) was intended to authorize such inspections, and that the provisions of § 780-124(b)(1-3) were intended to provide the necessary statutory schema for such inspections under the rationale of New York v. Burger, Donavan v. Dewey, United States v. Biswell, and Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States. Indeed, it might well be argued that the statutory authorization in § 780-124(b & c) is more explicit than that gleaned from the statutes analyzed in Lutz, Peterson, and Lanchester.2
*328We are, however, simply not called upon to address that issue in this case as it has been neither raised nor briefed by the Commonwealth here or in the trial court, and therefore must be deemed to have been waived.
IV. WARRANTLESS INSPECTIONS OF REQUIRED RECORDS .
Also not presented by this appeal is the question of whether a pharmacist has any legitimate expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment or Pa. Const. Art. I, sec. 8 as to the content of the prescription file which he is required by law to maintain.
Unquestionably, prescription files contain extremely private and potentially embarrassing information about the pharmacist’s clients. For this reason, pharmacists are charged with a duty to exercise great care to preserve the legitimate privacy expectations of their clients regarding the information contained in the prescription file. See generally Turkington, Legal Protection for the Confidentiality of Health Care Information in Pennsylvania, 32 Vill.L. Rev. 259, 336-37 (1987); Fox, “Medical and Prescription Records — Patient Access and Confidentiality,” in Strauss, The Pharmacist and the Law, at 38-42 (1980).
It does not follow, however, that as custodian of prescription records Slaton acquired vicariously a legitimate expectation of privacy in the records which may be asserted by Slaton against officers authorized by law to inspect such prescription records. See United States v. Acklen, supra, 690 F.2d at 74-75; United States v. Jamieson-McKames Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra, 651 F.2d at 541-42. Rather, warrantless inspections of prescription files by appropriate law enforcement personnel may be authorized under the “required records” doctrine. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948); State Real Estate Com’n v. Roberts, 441 Pa. 159, 271 A.2d 246 (1970), cert. denied 402 U.S. 905, 91 S.Ct. 1367, 28 L.Ed.2d 645 (1971); Reiter v. Commonwealth Ins. Dept., 105 Pa.Cmwlth. 623, 629, 525 A.2d 446, 450 (1987) alloc. denied 517 *329Pa. 590, 534 A.2d 770 (1987). This justification for warrant-less inspections stands on grounds separate and distinct from those discussed above for warrantless administrative inspections of pharmacies generally. Cf. Reiter v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Ins., supra (finding no statutory authorization for warrantless administrative inspections of insurance offices generally, while noting that the inspection would have been valid if it had been limited in scope to required records).
This issue, too, was waived by the Commonwealth’s failure to raise and argue it in the suppression court.
V. VALIDITY OF SLATON’S CONSENT
We are left then with the only issue properly presented by this appeal, ie. whether Slaton’s consent to the inspections of his prescription files was valid. The majority posits two reasons for concluding that Slaton’s consent was invalid. First, the majority finds that the narcotics officers failed to state their “purpose” as required by 35 P.S. § 780-124(b)(2). The majority construes the statement of the “purpose” to require disclosure of the fact that Slaton had become the focus of the officers’ suspicions by the time of the challenged inspections. Second, the majority finds that in accordance with Commonwealth v. Poteete, supra, the officers’ “deception” in that respect rendered Slaton’s consent invalid. I cannot agree.
A. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
Pursuant to 35 P.S. § 780-124(b)(2), the narcotics officers were required to state their purpose, identify themselves and present evidence of their authority to inspect before conducting their administrative inspections. Slaton contends, and the majority agree, that the officers failed to properly state their “purpose” when they failed to inform him that he had become the focus of their investigation. I would find, however, that the mandate of the statute was completely fulfilled by the officers’ statements that they *330wanted to inspect Slaton’s prescription file for fraudulent prescriptions.
The purposes for which administrative inspections may be conducted are set forth in 35 P.S. § 780-124(b)(1) as follows:
For the purpose of inspecting, copying, and verifying the correctness of records, reports, or other documents required to be kept or made under this act and otherwise facilitating the carrying out of his functions of this act, the secretary is authorized, in accordance with this section, to enter controlled premises and to conduct administrative inspections thereof, and of the things specified in this section, relevant to those functions.
(Emphasis added). Pursuant to 35 P.S. § 780-124(b)(2), officers authorized by the secretary are required to identify themselves, state their purpose, and provide written notice of inspection upon seeking to conduct an administrative inspection. Read together with § 780-124(b)(1), it is apparent that the requirement in § 780-124(b)(2), that the purpose of the inspection be stated, related to the type of inspection to be conducted and not the motivation or grounds for suspicion which gave rise to the decision to inspect.
State and federal authorities are authorized to conduct administrative inspections which range in scope and duration from a simple inspection of the pharmacy’s prescription file to a prolonged audit and review of every facet of the pharmacy’s operation. In order to inform the pharmacist of the type and scope of the administrative inspection to be conducted, both state and federal law uniformly require the officers conducting the inspection to state their purpose (i.e. the type of inspection to be conducted) before commencing the inspection. The reason for this requirement has been cogently explained as follows:
2. Entry: Statement of purpose, presentation of credentials and Notice of Inspection. Federal regulations require that upon seeking to gain entrance into a place which manufactures, holds or distributes controlled substances, a DEA investigator must state the purpose of his *331visit, must present his/her credentials, and must provide the operator of the establishment with a Notice of Inspection. The statement of purpose is an important piece of information to obtain. If the DEA investigators announce that the purpose of the visit is a general inspection, the operator of the establishment to be inspected can plan on the investigators being at the establishment for a period of 3-6 weeks. If, on the other hand the DEA investigators announce that their visit is for the simple purpose of checking the firm’s biennial inventory report, the establishment operator can calculate that the investigators will probably be at the plant for a short period of time. This statement of purpose will enable the operator to plan Ms personnel’s time accordingly.
Davids, DEA Administrative Inspections, 31 Food Drug Cosmetic Law Journal 229, 234 (1981).
I find that Slaton was properly apprised of the “purpose” of the inspection as required by statute, when the officers informed Mm that they wanted to inspect his prescription file to determine if forged or otherwise fraudulent prescriptions had been presented. Thus, while Slaton was not informed of the officer’s underlying motivations, he was fully informed of the type and limited scope of the administrative inspection intended and was thereby prepared for the inconvenience which such an inspection might entail. I do not construe the statute to require any further statement of the motivation or grounds for the decision to inspect. Hence, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the officers failed to comply with the statute.
B. CONSENT
The majority contends that the inspection cannot be deemed consensual under 35 P.S. § 780-124(c)(1) because the officers permitted Slaton to remain under the misapprehension that the officers were still looking for evidence against Merriweather and his associates, when the focus of the investigation had shifted by then to Slaton. The majori*332ty find that the officers’ “deception” in this respect vitiated any consent obtained from Slaton. I cannot agree.
1.
Early cases involving consent to search contained language which suggested that consent must be knowing and intelligent, i.e. made with full and express knowledge of the right to refuse consent. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948). However, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), our Supreme Court held that valid consent is established by demonstrating that it was given voluntarily, i.e. without coercion express or implied. Subsequent decisions have reinforced the ruling in Schneckloth that the prosecution need not establish that the party giving consent knew that consent could be refused. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974).
Early cases were also construed to provide that consent obtained by stealth, deceit, or misrepresentation was invalid. See Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Pa. 81, 190 A.2d 709 (1963), citing Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 41 S.Ct. 266, 65 L.Ed. 654 (1921), Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 41 S.Ct. 261, 65 L.Ed. 647 (1921),3 and Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). The Wright dictum was followed by this Court in the more recent cases of Commonwealth v. Poteete, 274 Pa.Super. 490, 418 A.2d 513 (1980) and Commonwealth v. Morgan, 353 Pa.Super. 463, 510 A.2d 754 (1986) (citing Poteete). The majority herein would also rely on the Wright dictum as stated in Poteete. Their reliance is misplaced.
Subsequent to Amos, Gould, and Weeks, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld consensual searches as valid despite deception as to the identity and/or *333the purpose of the person conducting the “search.” See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 99 S.Ct. 1465, 59 L.Ed.2d 738 (1979); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 28 L.Ed.2d 453 (1971) (plurality); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 87 S.Ct. 429, 17 L.Ed.2d 394 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 87 S.Ct. 424, 17 L.Ed.2d 312 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 88 S.Ct. 1381, 10 L.Ed.2d 462 (1963); Rathburn v. United States, 355 U.S. 107, 78 S.Ct. 161, 2 L.Ed.2d 134 (1957); On Lee v. United States, 348 U.S. 747, 72 S.Ct. 967, 96 L.Ed. 1270 (1952). Thus, the United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized that deception does not invariably vitiate consent.
Likewise, more recent cases of our Supreme Court demonstrate that the broad Wright dictum (that consent acquired by deception is invalid) does not accurately state the law of consent as it is currently understood in Pennsylvania. In Commonwealth v. Morgan, 517 Pa. 98, 534 A.2d 1054 (1987), our Supreme Court reversed the decision of a divided panel of this Court which had held that a suspect’s consent for a police officer to enter (by stating “come on in”) was rendered invalid by the officer’s deception as to his identity (by answering “Joe” to the suspect’s question “who’s there”). In Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 510 Pa. 603, 511 A.2d 764 (1986), cert. denied 480 U.S. 951, 107 S.Ct. 1617, 94 L.Ed.2d 801 (1987), our Supreme Court held that a suspect’s consent to search the trunk of his car was valid despite the fact that the uniformed officers did not inform the suspect that they knew from prior lawful observations that incriminating evidence was located in the trunk. Finally, in Commonwealth v. Brown, 437 Pa. 1, 261 A.2d 879 (1970), our Supreme Court held that a uniformed police officer’s deception as to the reason for wanting the suspect’s gun did not render the suspect’s consensual relinquishment of the gun invalid. In Brown, after citing Wright and acknowledging subsequent federal Supreme Court cases eroding the basis for the broad dictum set forth in Wright, our Supreme Court concluded:
*334It is not necessary for this Court to determine what deceptive devices are improper in light of Lewis, Hoffa and Lopez although that is a very difficult question as the United States Supreme Court seems to have granted broad powers to the police. The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 Harv.L.Rev. 112, 191-4 (1967). It is enough to state that in light of those three United States Supreme Court decisions, the police officer’s (Petrovich) tactics were constitutional, and the court below properly refused to suppress evidence of the gun, holster and bullets.
261 A.2d at 883.4 Thus, our Supreme Court has expressly recognized that deception does not invariably vitiate consent.
This Court, too, has retreated from the broad proscription in Wright, and has recognized that consent may be valid despite deception as to an officer’s identity and/or motivation in obtaining a suspect’s consensual relinquishment of privacy with respect to statements, contraband or other inculpatory facts or evidence.
Subsequent to our Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, this Court stated in Commonwealth v. Weimer, 262 Pa.Super. 69, 396 A.2d 649 (1978), that, “stealth and strategy are necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police officer.” We found in Weimer that consent to enter a private hunting club was not invalid despite the officers’ deception as to their identities and their reasons for seeking entry. In Commonwealth v. Poteete, supra, this Court, citing Wright but not Brown, held that consent to enter the suspect’s home was invalid when the officer deceived the suspect by letting the suspect think that the officer was there to follow-up on the suspect’s stolen car report, when the officer was actually there to confirm his suspicion that *335property lawfully observed on a prior visit was in fact recently stolen property.
However, two months later in Commonwealth v. Morrison, 275 Pa.Super. 454, 418 A.2d 1378 (1980), cert. denied sub nom. Morrison v. Pennsylvania, 449 U.S. 1080, 101 S.Ct. 863, 66 L.Ed.2d 804 (1981), an en banc panel of this Court held that a landowner’s consent to enter a barn in which large quantities of marijuana were suspected to have been stored was not rendered invalid by the officer’s deception as to both his identity and his reason for wanting to see the barn. The en banc panel, without citing Brown or Poteete, expressly distinguished Wright as having been decided on the basis of federal precedent which had subsequently been substantially modified. 418 A.2d at 1381.
In Commonwealth v. Schalszberger, 285 Pa.Super. 586, 428 A.2d 200 (1981), consent to enter was deemed valid despite the fact that it was obtained by deception as to the officers’ identity and reason for seeking entry, i.e. in order to facilitate the safe and effective execution of a lawful search warrant. In Commonwealth v. Ginter, 289 Pa.Super. 9, 432 A.2d 1024 (1981), consent to enter was deemed valid despite the officers’ deception as to their identities and their reason for seeking entry, i.e, to confirm suspicions of liquor law violations. In Commonwealth v. Markman, 320 Pa.Super. 304, 467 A.2d 836 (1983), a panel of this Court stated unequivocally, “[cjonsent may be deemed voluntary even when procured by a police officer who misrepresents both his identity and purpose for making the search.” As noted previously, this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Morgan, which ignored Morrison, Schalszberger, and Ginter and instead relied on Poteete, was reversed by our Supreme Court. Finally, in Commonwealth v. Carelli, 377 Pa.Super. 117, 546 A.2d 1185 (1988), following a review of a majority of the foregoing cases, this Court held that neither Wright nor Poteete correctly stated the law regarding the effect of deception on consent as it is currently understood in Pennsylvania. I remain of that opinion.
*336In resurrecting Poteete, the majority herein offer three distinct justifications. I find each fatally flawed.
First, the majority attempts to distinguish Carelli based upon the presence in this case of a statutory duty on the part of the officers to state the purpose of their inspections. As explained above, I find that the statute requires no more than a statement of the type of authorized administrative inspection the officer intends or requests consent to conduct. Because the officer is not required by statute to disclose the reasons for seeking the inspection, this case is not distinguishable in that respect.
Second, the majority attempts to distinguish this case based upon their conclusion that the cases cited in Carelli, “were primarily cases involving undercover agents in fact situations uniquely suited to such police tactics; e.g. illegal narcotics dealings and illegal gambling operations." Majority Opinion, supra, 382 Pa.Superior Ct. at 311 n. 6, 556 A.2d at 1347 n. 6. While Morgan, Ginter, Schalszberger, Morrison, and Weimer arguably fit the restriction on the permissible use of deception which the majority suggests; Albrecht, Brown, and Carelli do not.
Albrecht involved uniformed officers investigating an arson case. Brown involved a uniformed officer investigating a murder case. Carelli involved a uniformed officer investigating a stolen truck case. Significantly, our Supreme Court explained in Brown:
The problem for this Court is to determine the permissible extent of police power in light of these United States Supreme Court decisions. Lewis (involving sales of marijuana to a federal narcotics agent), Hoffa (involving the planting of a government informer in defendant’s hotel room to overhear conversations), and Lopez (involving an attempted bribe of an Internal Revenue agent) clearly do not require the police to be completely open and truthful as to their identity and purpose when dealing with suspects. They recognize that undercover work is an essential weapon in the police arsenal. In this case the ‘undercover’ work was not as to Petrovich’s identity as a *337policeman but rather as to Ms motives in offering to sell the gun. It appears to us that there is no real difference between this deception and those found permissible in Lewis, Hoffa and Lopez.
261 A.2d at 881-82. (Emphasis added). Thus, this case is not distinguishable from Albrecht, Brown or Carelli based upon the fact that the officers involved here were not working undercover, nor is this case distinguishable based upon the type of crime under investigation.
Third and finally, the majority suggests that because Wright has never been expressly overruled, Poteete and not Carelli correctly states the law with respect to the effect of deception upon consent in Pennsylvania. As explained in Carelli, however, Wright was decided by our Supreme Court based solely on federal law which was subsequently substantially modified. Moreover, subsequent decisions of our Supreme Court, while not overruling Wright expressly, have nonetheless expressly recognized this change in the law. See Commonwealth v. Morgan, supra; Commonwealth v. Albrecht, supra; Commonwealth v. Brown, supra. Thus, I remain of the opinion that Wright and Poteete no longer correctly state the controlling law, and that they were properly distinguished in Morrison and Carelli.
Of course, consent remains invalid if it is given in response to a false or invalid claim of authority. See LoJi Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 99 S.Ct. 2319, 60 L.Ed.2d 920 (1979); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 51 S.Ct. 153, 75 L.Ed. 374 (1931).5 Likewise, consent is exceeded when the scope of the search actually conducted is broader than that to which the individual has consented. See Gouled v. *338United States, supra; Commonwealth v. Shaw, 476 Pa. 543, 383 A.2d 496 (1978); see generally III LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.1(c), at 160-174 & nn. 48-108.
Whether other types of deception vitiate consent must depend upon a case by case determination of the voluntariness of the consent in light of the totality of the circumstances, including the challenged deception. See Commonwealth v. Brown, supra, 261 A.2d at 882; Commonwealth v. Morrison, supra, 418 A.2d at 1380-81. The voluntariness of consent need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2779, 97 L.Ed.2d 144, 153 (1987); United States v. Matlock, supra. With the foregoing in mind, I turn to the facts of this case.
2.
Despite the officers’ clear and uncontradicted testimony that Slaton was not the focus of the investigation when the challenged inspections were conducted on December 6, 1983 and December 7, 1983, the suppression court found that Slaton was in fact the focus of the investigation by December 6, 1983. The suppression court made its finding based upon the fact that numerous prescriptions seized in a prior, concededly lawful, consensual inspection of Slaton’s prescription file had been confirmed as being fraudulent. The trial court rejected as not credible the officer’s explanation that, though the forgeries and defects in the prescriptions were apparent to him as an experienced narcotics agent assigned to investigate such cases, the potential culpability of Slaton for knowingly filling fraudulent prescriptions did not receive the officers’ focused attention until after numerous additional prescriptions were seized during the challenged inspections, and statements implicating Slaton were made by some of the suspects who pled guilty to having passed the fraudulent prescriptions. Even then, the officers did not process charges against Slaton until they received expert opinions from doctors and pharmacists that *339the defects in the seized prescriptions were such that they should have been questioned by Slaton.6
Nonetheless, the burden of proof was on the Commonwealth and it was within the province of the trial court to access the officer’s credibility. Consequently, I reluctantly accept the trial court’s finding that Slaton had become the focus of the investigation by December 6, 1983, despite grave reservations in this regard. See Commonwealth v. Carelli, supra, 377 Pa.Superior Ct. at 129 n. 1, 546 A.2d at 1191 n. 1.
The “deception” which the majority concludes is so implicitly coercive as to vitiate Slaton’s consent is the deception implied from the fact that prior to the first lawful, consensual inspection of Slaton’s prescription file the officers had indicated that they were investigating the possibility that a man named Merriweather and his accomplices had been passing fraudulent prescriptions, but that prior to the subsequent challenged inspections, the officers failed to inform Slaton that he had become the focus of their investigation. I find this “deception” to be inconsequential.
Slaton knew that the officers had seized numerous prescriptions as being potentially fraudulent during the previous lawful consensual inspection. He received a receipt for each of the prescriptions seized. As a licensed pharmacist he must be presumed to be aware of the fact that it would be a crime for him to knowingly fill fraudulent prescriptions. Consequently, when the officers returned and indicated that they wanted to conduct further inspections of his prescription file, is it not just as likely that Slaton was aware of his own potential liability without being informed of it by the officers, as it was for the officers to have focused their investigation on Slaton’s potential culpability at that juncture? I think so.
Moreover, had Slaton been informed that he had become the focus of the investigation, is there any reasonable *340likelihood that he would then have withheld consent? I think not.
An “overwhelming percentage” of state administrative inspections of pharmacies are consensual. See Simonmeier, “Governmental Inspections of Pharmacies,” in Strauss, The Pharmacist and the Law, at 14 (1980). Likewise, federal administrative inspections of pharmacies and drug manufacturing facilities are also overwhelmingly consensual. See O’Reilly, Bad Actors Make Worse Law, 37 Food Drug Cosmetic Law Journal 368, 371 (1982) (an estimated 99.5% of FDA inspections are consensual); Levitt, FDA Inspections and Criminal Responsibility, 36 Food Drug Cosmetic Law Journal 469, 473 n. 2 (1981) (though the FDA conducted approximately 33,000 inspections in 1978 and 1979, only about 25 inspection warrants were sought per year).
There are simple yet very good reasons why pharmacists almost invariably consent to administrative inspections. First and foremost, the vast majority of pharmacists are conscientious professionals who have nothing to hide, and who are as interested as law enforcement officers in preventing criminals from obtaining drugs illegally by passing fraudulent prescriptions in their pharmacies.7 Second, refusal to grant consent may fuel nascent suspicions, while consent and cooperation, on the other hand, may be argued later in support of a defense that any irregularities discovered were innocent and inadvertent. See O’Reilly, supra, 37 Food Drug Cosmetic Law Journal at 370-71; Levitt, supra, 36 Food Drug Cosmetic Law Journal at 474-75; Davids, supra, 31 Food Drug Cosmetic Law Journal at 237; cf. Commonwealth v. Carelli, supra, 546 A.2d at 1197. Finally, an administrative warrant, if it is even needed (Parts III & IV, supra), may be easily obtained by the officers. Thus, resistance to inspection would often be a futile and potentially harmful gesture.
*341Assuming, arguendo, that knowledge of the officers’ suspicions would have outweighed the first possible motivation to consent, the second and third motivations would nonetheless apply. Based upon the fact that prescriptions lawfully seized previously had been confirmed as being fraudulent, there can be no doubt that an administrative warrant would have been issued authorizing further inspections of Slaton’s prescription file had Slaton refused consent. What possible effect then could refusal have had but to fan suspicions and forfeit potentially favorable exculpatory evidence, ie. that Slaton consented and cooperated freely because he at least believed he had nothing to hide? For this reason, I find the challenged deception inconsequential, and Slaton’s consent fully voluntary.
VI APPROPRIATENESS OF SUPPRESSION
Assuming, arguendo, that the consent was invalid and the inspection was therefore unconstitutional, it does not follow that the prescription records must be suppressed. To the contrary, I find the suppression of the prescription records inappropriate in this case.
The exclusionary rule generally prohibits the use of physical or testimonial evidence derived as the direct and proximate result of unconstitutional conduct. See Murray v. United States, — U.S. —, —, 108 S.Ct. 2529, 2532, 101 L.Ed.2d 472, 480 (1988). However, from its announcement in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), and Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914), to the present date, the exclusionary rule has remained a lightening rod for heated controversy. Though the United States Supreme Court has declined repeated invitations to abandon the exclusionary rule, it has acknowledged the high societal cost involved in the application of the rule, and has limited its application to cases where its general deterrent effects were perceived to outweigh its negative effects on the truth determining *342process. See Murray v. United States, supra, — U.S. at —, 108 S.Ct. at 2532-36, 101 S.Ct. at 480-84; California v. Greenwood, supra, 486 U.S. at 35, 108 S.Ct. 1625, 1630-32, 100 L.Ed.2d 30, 39-40 (1988); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 346-53,107 S.Ct. 1160, 1165-69, 94 L.Ed.2d 364, 373-77 (1987); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164-70, 107 S.Ct. 515, 520-24, 93 L.Ed.2d 473, 483-86 (1986); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (passim), reh. den. 468 U.S. 1250, 105 S.Ct. 52, 82 L.Ed.2d 942 (1984); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 624-28, 100 S.Ct. 1912, 1915-17, 64 L.Ed.2d 559, 564-66 (1980); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978) (passim); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482-96, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3046-53, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067, 1080-88 (1976); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 443-60, 96 S.Ct. 3021, 3010-19, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046, 1054-64 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) {passim).
Whether and to what extent there may be a state exclusionary rule in Pennsylvania arising from the Pennsylvania Constitution is uncertain in Pennsylvania. See Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 513 Pa. 138, 142-43, 518 A.2d 1197, 1199 (1986); Commonwealth v. Shaeffer, 370 Pa.Super. 179, 265-71, 536 A.2d 354, 398-400 (1988) (Kelly, J., concurring and dissenting). In Commonwealth v. Morgan, supra, our Supreme Court noted:
[Ejxclusion/suppression of evidence is not an appropriate remedy for every violation of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure concerning searches and seizures. It is only where the violation also implicates fundamental, constitutional concerns, is conducted in bad-faith or has substantially prejudiced the defendant that exclusion may be an appropriate remedy.
534 A.2d at 1056 n. 2, quoting Commonwealth v. Mason, 507 Pa. 396, 406-07, 490 A.2d 421, 426 (1985) (emphasis in original). In light of our Supreme Court’s resolute resistance to the federal exclusionary rule prior to Mapp v. Ohio, *343867 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), I find that recognition and application of an independent state exclusionary rale by this Court would be inappropriate absent a clear command by our Supreme Court. See Commonwealth v. Shaeffer, supra, 370 Pa.Superior Ct. at 267-269, 536 A.2d at 399 (Kelly, J., concurring and dissenting) (discussing the prospect of a state constitutional exclusionary rule). I note that our Supreme Court has applied the federal exclusionary rule cautiously. In Commonwealth v. Williams, 454 Pa. 368, 312 A.2d 597 (1973), they explained:
a prophylactic exclusionary rule is applied only in extreme cases where all other attempts to secure compliance have proven unsuccessful. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-52, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). In this area there has been no showing of widespread flagrant disregard to justify formulation of such a rule at this time.
454 Pa. at 372, 312 A.2d at 600; see also Commonwealth v. Musi, 486 Pa. 102, 115-16, 404 A.2d 378, 384 (1979).
The same may be said here. Even if we assume for the sake of argument that consent was rendered invalid by the officers’ “deception,” it nonetheless appears that the officers were acting on an objectively reasonable good faith belief that valid consent had been obtained. Cf. Illinois v. Krull, supra; United States v. Leon, supra; Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 373 Pa.Super. 384, 541 A.2d 368 (1988); Commonwealth v. Shaeffer, supra, 536 A.2d at 396 (Kelly, J., concurring and dissenting); Commonwealth v. Morris, 368 Pa.Super. 237, 533 A.2d 1042 (1987). There is certainly no indication of widespread flagrant disregard of suspects’ rights in this manner so as to justify application of the concededly drastic sanction of exclusion.
Moreover, had the absence of valid consent been known to the officers, a valid administrative warrant could and would undoubtedly have been secured, and an unquestionably lawful inspection and lawful seizure of the prescription *344records at issue would have been conducted. Cf. United States v. Murray, supra; cf. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). The inevitableness of the discovery of such evidence, of course, need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence. See Bourjaily v. United States, supra; Nix v. Williams, supra.
Thus, under the facts of this case, both the “inevitable discovery” doctrine and the rationale of the “good faith” exception preclude suppression. See United States v. Murray, supra; Illinois v. Krull, supra.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, I concur in part and dissent in part. I agree that Slaton’s appeal must be quashed. I find merit, however, in the Commonwealth’s appeal. Slaton’s consent to the inspection was valid, and even if it was not valid, suppression is inappropriate. I would reverse the portion of the suppression order directing the suppression of the prescription records seized on December 6, 1983 and December 7, 1983, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this concurring and dissenting opinion.

. If instead we considered only the evidence of the appellee and so much of the Commonwealth as remained uncontradicted, reversal would be mandated regardless of how implausible the testimony of the Commonwealth’s sole witness might have been. The appellee in this case presented no evidence at all at the suppression hearing. Plainly, the source of evidence presented at a suppression hearing cannot control if the trial court’s prerogative of accessing credibility and the Commonwealth’s burden of proof are to be given full effect. See Commonwealth v. Corelli, supra, 377 Pa.Superior Ct. at 129 n. 1, 546 A.2d at 1191 n. 1.

. I note, additionally, that courts of other jurisdictions which have considered this question have uniformly concluded that legislatures may constitutionally authorize warrantless administrative inspections of pharmacies provided the authorization adequately restricts the scope and manner of such inspections. See Greenblatt v. New Jersey Bd. of Pharmacy, 214 N.J.Super. 269, 518 A.2d 1116 (1986); State v. Rednor, 203 N.J.Super. 503, 497 A.2d 544 (1985); Cushing v. Dept. of Prof. Reg., 416 So.2d 1197 (Fla.App.1982); Mendez v. Arizona St. Bd. of Pharmacy, 129 Ariz. 89, 628 P.2d 972 (1981); Hosto v. Brickell, 577 S.W.2d 401 (Ark.1979); see generally Annotation, Propriety of Slate or Local Government Health Officer’s Warrantless Search—Post-Camara Cases, 53 ALR 4th 1168, 1187-91 (1987 & 1988 Supp.); Annotation, State and Local Administrative Inspection of and Administrative Warrants to Search Pharmacies, 29 ALR 4th 264, 268-72 (1984 & 1988 Supp.).

. Disapproved on other grounds Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967).

. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently approved and supplemented the reasoning and authorities of the majority opinion in Brown in rejecting Brown’s federal habeas corpus petition. See Brown v. Brierly, 438 F.2d 954 (3rd Cir.1971); see also United States v. Stribling, 437 F.2d 765 (6th Cir.1971) (demonstrating that the cases cited by the dissent in Brown were without precedential authority, in rejecting similar claims).

. Professor LaFave has suggested that, despite its broad dictum, Commonwealth v. Wright, supra, could reasonably be characterized as a "false claim of authority” case based upon the officer’s statement to the wife that her husband had sent them to pick-up the evidence, thus, implicitly asserting that her husband had consented to the seizure of the evidence. III LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.2(n), at 228 n. 273 (2d Ed.1987). Perhaps this explains why our Supreme Court has declined to overrule Wright expressly.

. I note that there is nothing in the suppression record to suggest that the prescriptions seized in the prior lawful inspection were viewed by the suppression court and deemed obviously fraudulent.

. With respect to FDA inspections, I note that in 1981 only 18 out of 36,258 administrative inspections resulted in prosecutions. See O’Reilly, supra, 37 Food Drug Cosmetic Law Journal at 371 n. 15.