Court Opinion

ID: 9895795
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 18:00:39.612569+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:38.183682
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                No. 22-10300

             Plaintiff-Appellee,       D.C. No. 1:21-cr-
                                         00110-HG-1
 v.

DANIEL K. VINGE,                           OPINION

             Defendant-Appellant.

      Appeal from the United States District Court
               for the District of Hawaii
      Helen W. Gillmor, District Judge, Presiding

        Argued and Submitted October 4, 2023
            University of Hawaii Manoa

                Filed November 8, 2023

Before: Marsha S. Berzon, Eric D. Miller, and Lawrence
              VanDyke, Circuit Judges.

              Opinion by Judge VanDyke
2                          USA V. VINGE

                          SUMMARY *

                         Criminal Law

    The panel affirmed a sentence for possession with intent
to distribute methamphetamine, in a case in which Daniel
Vinge argued that the district court should not have applied
the leader-or-organizer enhancement under Section 3B1.1(c)
of the Sentencing Guidelines because no evidence suggests
that he “exercised control over others” in the organization.
    Because recent cases have not been entirely clear with
respect to the distinction between an organizer and a leader
under § 3B1.1(c), the panel reiterated that the level of control
required to be an organizer is only “the ability and influence
necessary to coordinate the activities of others to achieve the
desired result.” Applying that understanding, the panel held
that the facts in the presentence report adopted by the district
court more than support the enhancement’s application here.
    The panel held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing a longer sentence on Vinge than his
coconspirator, as the two were not similarly situated.
    The panel wrote that Vinge’s challenge to a supervised
release condition restricting him from interacting with felons
is not yet ripe. The panel thus affirmed the sentence without
prejudice as to the challenged condition such that Vinge may
raise the argument again by asking the district court to
modify the condition when the issue is no longer speculative.

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                         USA V. VINGE                        3

                         COUNSEL

Harlan Y. Kimura (argued), Harlan Y. Kimura AAL ALC,
Honolulu, Hawaii, for Defendant-Appellant.
Marshall H. Silverberg (argued), Assistant United States
Attorney; Micah Smith, Chief of Appeals; Clare E. Connors,
United States Attorney; United States Attorney’s Office,
Honolulu, Hawaii; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

                         OPINION

VANDYKE, Circuit Judge:

    Daniel Vinge participated in a drug distribution
operation in Hawaii. He appeals his sentence for possession
with intent to distribute methamphetamine and heroin,
arguing that the district court should not have applied the
leader-or-organizer enhancement under § 3B1.1(c) of the
Sentencing Guidelines because no evidence suggests that he
“exercised control over others” in the organization. United
States v. Kabir, 51 F.4th 820, 826 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Because our recent cases have not
been entirely clear with respect to the distinction between an
organizer and a leader under § 3B1.1(c), we reiterate that the
level of control required to be an organizer is only “the
ability and influence necessary to coordinate the activities of
others to achieve the desired result.” United States v. Doe,
778 F.3d 814, 824 (9th Cir. 2015).
                     BACKGROUND
    Daniel Vinge pleaded guilty to possession with intent to
distribute methamphetamine and heroin. In early 2021,
4                       USA V. VINGE

investigators identified a suspicious parcel en route from Las
Vegas to Maui. After determining that the parcel contained
about 24 pounds of methamphetamine and three pounds of
heroin, the investigators conducted a controlled drop of the
parcel. They removed the drugs, placed a tracking device
and beeper in the parcel, and delivered the parcel to its
destination, the home of Vinge’s coconspirator, Genghis K.
Kaihewalu. When Vinge retrieved and opened the parcel,
investigators entered Kaihewalu’s home, prompting Vinge
to flee, discarding small bags of cocaine. Vinge’s and
Kaihewalu’s hands were covered in traces of powder that
investigators had placed in the parcel before the controlled
drop.
    After waiving his Fifth Amendment rights, Vinge made
incriminating statements about both the intercepted
shipment and past drug shipments in which he was involved.
He made further statements during his change of plea
hearing clarifying the process by which he obtained and
distributed the drugs. He explained that he would reach out
to his source on the mainland, pool money from his friends
on the island who “want[ed] to put in and buy something,”
place the order, set the price, and then distribute the drugs
once they arrived.
    Vinge’s coconspirator, Kaihewalu, pleaded guilty under
a plea agreement and was sentenced to 120 months’
imprisonment. Vinge pleaded guilty without a plea
agreement. Vinge’s final presentence report contained a
two-level enhancement for his role as “an organizer or
leader.” His total offense level was 37 and his Criminal
History Category was II, making his sentencing range under
the Sentencing Guidelines 235 to 293 months in prison. The
district court departed downward and sentenced Vinge to
200 months.
                        USA V. VINGE                        5

    The district court also imposed conditions of supervised
release, including a prohibition on interacting with felons
without advance permission from the probation officer.
Vinge’s wife had recently entered guilty pleas to felony
charges, which the state court later deferred accepting for a
four-year period, in an unrelated state case.
    Vinge timely appealed his sentence, arguing that the
district court (1) erred in applying the leader-or-organizer
enhancement; (2) abused its discretion in imposing a
sentence disproportionate to Kaihewalu’s; and (3) erred in
imposing a condition of supervised release preventing him
from interacting with his wife.
               STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    “When reviewing sentencing decisions, we review the
district court’s identification of the relevant legal standard
de novo, its factual findings for clear error, and its
application of the legal standard to the facts for abuse of
discretion.” United States v. Dominguez-Caicedo, 40 F.4th
938, 959–60 (9th Cir. 2022); see also United States v.
Gasca-Ruiz, 852 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
When trial counsel fails to object to a supervised release
condition, we review that condition for plain error. United
States v. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d 1082, 1089 (9th Cir. 2012).
                       DISCUSSION
   I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
      applying the leader-or-organizer enhancement.
    Under the federal sentencing guidelines, a two-level
sentencing enhancement is appropriate “[i]f the defendant
was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any
criminal activity.”   U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c).       For the
enhancement to apply, “there must be ‘evidence that the
6                       USA V. VINGE

defendant [1] exercised some control over others involved in
the commission of the offense or [2] was responsible for
organizing others for the purpose of carrying out the crime.’”
Doe, 778 F.3d at 823 (quoting United States v. Whitney, 673
F.3d 965, 975 (9th Cir. 2012)). Vinge argues that this
enhancement should not apply because although he played a
central role in the drug distribution organization, he did not
exercise control over the other participants.
    As we explained in Doe, the organizer enhancement
applies when the defendant either “exercised some control
over others … or … was responsible for organizing others
….” 778 F.3d at 823 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(emphasis added). Doe explicitly rejects the proposition that
the enhancement always requires “supervision and some
degree of control over others.” Id. at 825. Because the
enhancement applies to four categories of participants—
“organizers, as well as … supervisors, leaders, or
managers”—and “effect is given to all its provisions, so that
no part will be inoperative or superfluous,” “[a]n organizer
need not … be a supervisor or a superior in a hierarchy of
criminal associates.” Id. at 824 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Instead, the enhancement “applies to defendants
who have the ability and influence necessary to coordinate
the activities of others,” even if they do not supervise or
control the other participants. Id. at 824. In other words, “a
defendant who has the ‘organizational authority’ necessary
to coordinate the activities of others to achieve a desired
result is an ‘organizer.’” Id. at 823 (internal citation
omitted) (quoting United States v. Lopez-Sandoval, 146 F.3d
712, 717 (9th Cir. 1998)). Based on this understanding, we
observed in Doe that “the organizer enhancement is
appropriately applied to defendants who coordinate drug
transactions,” just as Vinge did here. Id. at 823.
                        USA V. VINGE                       7

    Vinge disagrees that Doe controls his case, arguing that
subsequent cases require “control” even under § 3B1.1(c)’s
organizer category. Vinge’s confusion is not entirely
misplaced.    Though Doe provides a straightforward
explanation of what is required for the leader-or-organizer
enhancement, our subsequent cases have arguably been less
clear. Vinge relies on three cases in particular.
    First, in United States v. Holden, we determined that the
leader-or-organizer enhancement did not apply when the
defendant lacked control or influence over his coconspirator.
908 F.3d 395, 402 (9th Cir. 2018). We reiterated that the
evidence must show that the “defendant had control over
other participants or organized other participants,” and that
organization requires “the necessary influence and ability to
coordinate” coconspirators.”         Id. (emphasis added)
(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). We also
emphasized that it is insufficient “for a defendant to have
organized property or activities—the defendant must have
organized participants.” Id.
    Vinge points to this language in Holden and argues that
because “[m]ere facilitation” is not enough, id. (emphasis
omitted), control is required. While Holden’s language
might be read to require more direct authority over people
than Doe required, it does not need to be read that way. And
we decline to read Holden as conflicting with Doe. As in
Holden, we explained in Doe that it is not enough to organize
things. We noted that “the defendant must have been the
organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of one or more
other participants.” 778 F.3d at 823 (internal quotation
marks omitted). So Holden did not announce a new rule
different from Doe.
8                       USA V. VINGE

    Holden is also different in an important way from Doe
and from Vinge’s case. In Holden, the criminal activity
involved only two codefendants who exercised equal roles
in planning and coordinating the activity and evenly split the
profits. 908 F.3d at 402. Unlike in Doe, where the defendant
influenced others in the organization by “ensur[ing] the
drugs, money, and participants arrived when and where
needed,” 778 F.3d at 826, in Holden the two participants
agreed on a plan and executed it together, 908 F.3d at 402.
There was no evidence that either participant “exercised
sufficient control or organizational authority over” his
coconspirator. Id. at 403 (emphasis added).
    Second, in United States v. Harris, we explained that
“[t]o qualify as” an organizer or leader, the defendant “must
have exercised ‘control over others.’” 999 F.3d 1233, 1235
(9th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Avila, 95 F.3d 887,
892 (9th Cir. 1996)). Harris discussed only the leadership
prong of the Doe test and explained that without “evidence
that [the defendant] exercised control over [his
coconspirator], the district court abused its discretion in
applying the leadership enhancement.” Id. at 1237. We
made clear that while “[t]he enhancement may also apply if
the defendant exercises organizational authority over
others,” that was not at issue because “there was no criminal
organization” in Harris. Id. at 1235 n.1 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Because Harris explicitly does not interpret
the “organizational authority” basis for the enhancement, its
discussion of control is not relevant to that basis. Id.
    Finally, in Kabir, we tersely stated that “[t]o qualify as
an organizer or leader, a defendant must have exercised
control over others.” 51 F.4th at 826 (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks omitted). But we went on to
explain that only “some control,” which could include
                             USA V. VINGE                               9

“organizational responsibility,” is necessary to apply the
enhancement. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[S]ome control” in Kabir is not in conflict with Doe’s
recognition that supervisory control is unnecessary for the
organizer enhancement. Id. (emphasis added). The ability
to coordinate and influence others necessary for
organizational authority could also be characterized as a
form of “control.” To the extent that “control” is required
for an organizer role, it is this form, which includes influence
and coordination. Our caselaw has never required direct,
supervisory control over others in order to apply the
organizer sentencing enhancement. 1
    We thus reiterate that for the organizer enhancement to
apply, what is required is “the necessary influence and
ability to coordinate the behavior of others so as to achieve
the desired criminal result.” Doe, 778 F.3d at 826. These
softer forms of authority or control are sufficient for a
determination that a defendant is an organizer. Applying
that understanding, the facts in the presentence report
adopted by the district court more than support the
enhancement’s application here. Vinge admits he “gathered
up everybody’s money,” placed the order with his contact on
the mainland, followed the tracking, picked up the packages,
“g[a]ve [the drugs] to the people” on the island, and
collected the proceeds. These activities are enough to
support the district court’s determination that Vinge
coordinated and exercised organizational authority over the

1
  Importantly, the analysis in Kabir also suggests that the record in that
case would have supported the enhancement under either a leadership or
organizer role. The defendant in Kabir both gave “directives” to his
coconspirators (evincing supervisory control) and “arranged” for their
travel (showing organizational authority). 51 F.4th at 826–27.
10                       USA V. VINGE

other participants in the scheme. The district court did not
abuse its discretion by applying the enhancement.
     II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
         imposing a longer sentence on Vinge than his
         coconspirator.
    In determining an appropriate sentence, a district court
must consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar conduct.”          18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(6). Vinge argues that because he received the
leader-or-organizer enhancement, his sentence of 200
months was disproportionate to his coconspirator’s sentence
of 120 months. But for two reasons, Vinge and Kaihewalu
were not “similarly situated,” so the disparity was not
unwarranted. United States v. Osinger, 753 F.3d 939, 949
(9th Cir. 2014).
    First, the district court clarified that, while Vinge and
Kaihewalu “were both involved” in the conspiracy, it did not
think “they were both equal” in their roles. Vinge’s
argument that his sentence is an unwarranted deviation from
Kaihewalu’s essentially repeats his argument opposing the
enhancement. For the reasons explained above, that
enhancement was appropriate.
    Second, even putting the enhancement aside, Vinge and
Kaihewalu were not similarly situated. Unlike Vinge,
Kaihewalu signed a plea agreement that contained certain
concessions in exchange for the 120-month sentence,
including waivers of his right to appeal and his eligibility for
a “safety valve.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). Kaihewalu’s
involvement in the scheme was also far less sophisticated.
Unlike Vinge, he did not manage or earn money from
“subdistributors,” and he did not place orders at all.
                               USA V. VINGE                                 11

Kaihewalu also had significant health issues that
distinguished him from Vinge, including obesity, diabetes,
and a leg amputation. Given those distinctions, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Vinge’s 200-
month sentence.
       III. Vinge’s challenge to his supervised release
            condition is not yet ripe.
    Finally, we do not address whether the district court
erred in imposing Standard Condition Number 8, which
restricts Vinge from interacting with felons. Vinge’s
challenge is not yet ripe. The state court granted his wife’s
Motion for Deferred Acceptance of Guilty Plea, and the
four-year deferral period began on January 19, 2023. She
may never be convicted of the felony charges. We thus
affirm the sentence the district court imposed, but without
prejudice as to the challenged condition of supervised
release such that Vinge may raise the argument again by
asking the district court to modify the condition when the
issue is no longer speculative. 2 See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2).
       AFFIRMED.

2
    Vinge’s Request for Judicial Notice, filed July 11, 2023, is granted.