Court Opinion

ID: 9629703
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:47:36.861865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:58.251450
License: Public Domain

Ringold, J.
(dissenting) — My colleagues and I depart from our common road here, not by virtue of any disagreement with the law applicable, but in considering the appropriate role of an appellate court.
*481I would reverse. The defendant's contention that he was entitled to an instruction that simple assault was within the facts of this particular case, a lesser included offense within the robbery charge, is correct. Failure of the trial court to so instruct the jury was error.
Relying on State v. Bresolin, 13 Wn. App. 386, 534 P.2d 1394 (1975), Boyd argues (1) that the assault he admits is the same assault alleged by the State as the act constituting the infliction of force or fear necessary to convict of robbery, and that this assault was committed in an effort to protect Plith, and (2) the evidence of his intoxication and his testimony was sufficient so the jury could have found that he was guilty of a simple assault without intent. See State v. Norby, 20 Wn. App. 378, 579 P.2d 1358 (1978). Therefore, he concludes, the jury should have been instructed that simple assault is a lesser included offense within robbery, and the refusal by the trial court to so instruct constitutes error.
The latest pronouncement on the subject of lesser included offense is the case State v. Bishop, 90 Wn.2d 185, 580 P.2d 259 (1978), decided June 15, 1978. The court restated the rule from State v. Roybal, 82 Wn.2d 577, 583, 512 P.2d 718 (1973):
A lesser included offense exists when all of the elements of the lesser offense are necessary elements of the greater offense. Put another way, if it is possible to commit the greater offense without having committed the lesser offense, the latter is not an included crime.
(Citation omitted.) The court then proceeded to hypothesize in the abstract a means, viz., a consensual entry, by which burglary could be committed without trespass having been committed and thereupon concluded that trespass must not be considered a lesser included offense of burglary.
I am of the opinion that the Bishop analysis treating the question in the abstract, rather than in relation to the facts of the particular case, goes beyond the Roybal rule on which it relies. The rule must be applied in light of the *482facts of the case, and whether one crime is a lesser included offense within a greater crime is a question which must be answered on a case-hy-case basis.2 In the present case, Boyd's putting the hotcomb to Plith's neck constituted simple assault, "an attempt, with unlawful force, to inflict bodily injury upon another, accompanied with the apparent present ability to give effect to the attempt if not prevented." State v. Murphy, 7 Wn. App. 505, 511, 500 P.2d 1276 (1972). This assault was necessarily proved by the State in establishing Boyd's "use or threatened use of immediate force", an element of robbery. RCW 9A.56.190. On the facts of this case all the elements of the lesser offense, simple assault, were necessary elements of the greater offense, robbery.
It is error for a trial court not to give a lesser included offense instruction where there is a genuine conflict in the evidence as to an element of the offense which element is not shared by the lesser included offense. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Carmona, 422 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1970). Such conflict must be comprised of evidence which produces a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the lesser offense. Model Penal Code § 1.07(5) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). The element of the greater offense not a part of the lesser offense is intent to rob.
The evidence of Boyd's intoxication, in addition to the testimony that he had no intent to rob, provides a sufficient evidentiary basis for a jury to consider whether or not a *483reasonable doubt existed as to the defendant's intent. It must be recalled that substantial evidence to create a "reasonable" doubt must of necessity be of lesser quantity and quality than the evidence necessary for the State to propound in order to convict.
At least two instructions given by the trial court provided a basis for the jury to find a reasonable doubt that the defendant lacked intent. First was the instruction with respect to voluntary intoxication. No matter how slim that testimony may have been, the jury would be entitled to believe it and find a reasonable doubt. In the second instance, the trial court also gave an instruction dealing with an accomplice and provided as follows:
A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of a crime if, with knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime, he:
(a) solicits, commands, encourages, or requests such other person to commit it; or
(b) aids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or committing it.
But, before anyone can be convicted as an accomplice to another's crime, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) that the accused, at the time the crime was committed, shared a criminal intent with the person who actually committed the crime; and
(2) that the accused knowingly associated himself with the venture, participated in it as something he wished to bring about and sought by his actions to make it succeed
The trial court instructed the jury as to the implications of intoxication and the requirement for one to be an accomplice. The majority is second-guessing the trial court and holding as a matter of law that the voluntary intoxication instruction and the emphasized portion of the accomplice instruction should not have been given. No appeal has been taken from either instruction and both instructions therefore become the law of the case.
It is not the function of an appellate court to scrutinize *484the testimony to determine whether or not sufficient evidence was produced for the jury to consider to warrant the granting or the denial of a particular jury instruction to which no error has been assigned by either the State or the defendant. We must assume that substantial evidence was presented in order to justify the trial court to submit the instructions to the jury. This the trial court has done. Our view of the credibility of the defendant's assertions as to lack of intent, or the credibility of the witnesses whom he has presented that he lacked intent must be considered by the jury.
I would reverse for failure to submit the lesser included offense instruction.
Reconsideration denied November 16, 1978.
Review granted by Supreme Court July 27, 1979.

Were we to follow State v. Bishop, 90 Wn.2d 185, 580 P.2d 259 (1978), the • analysis would be in the abstract as follows: Robbery is comprised of the "use or threatened use of immediate force, violence or fear of injury to that person [the victim] or his property." RCW 9A.56.190. Hence, the force may be directed against the victim's property rather than against his person and the defendant still be found guilty of robbery. Assault, however, requires that the attempted injury be directed against the person. State v. Murphy, 7 Wn. App. 505, 500 P.2d 1276 (1972). Thus, because robbery is possible of commission without an assault necessarily having been committed, assault is not a lesser included offense within robbery. We do not believe this is the result intended by the Bishop court. (Italics mine.)