Court Opinion

ID: 9543246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:43:38.754275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:01.323375
License: Public Domain

Hunter, J.
(dissenting)—I dissent. The majority opinion states the court committed reversible error by admitting evidence tending to prove that the appellant Pacific Power & Light Company failed to acquire an easement to angle its transmission line over portions of the K & S building. I agree this constituted error, but I am convinced it does not justify a reversal.
In view of the record in this case, it was superfluous and harmless to the jury’s consideration of the issue of the appellant power company’s negligence in proximately causing the decedent’s death. It is an obvious conclusion that the decedent’s death was not effected by reason of the appellant having or not having an easement for the location of the power line. The jury was properly instructed on the issue of the appellant’s duty to locate and properly safeguard a high voltage transmission line for the protection of the public from its lethal danger. There was no *638inference in the court’s instructions that this duty had any relation to obtaining an easement for its location. In fact, neither the word “trespass” nor “easement” is mentioned in the instructions.
We have said that the jurors are possessed with at least average intelligence and integrity, and they are sworn to return a verdict in accordance with law and the evidence. State v. Figlenski, 169 Wash. 38, 13 P. (2d) 5 (1932); State v. Buttry, 199 Wash. 228, 90 P. (2d) 1026 (1939); Cf. State v.Moe, 56 Wn. (2d) 111, 351 P. (2d) 120 (1960).
It is not reasonable for a person of average intelligence to conclude the decedent’s death had any relation to the appellant’s failure to obtain an easement. Therefore, the appellant could not have been prejudiced by the admission of the objectionable testimony.
This is a case where the record of negligence and proximate cause is so clear that the error committed by reason of the admission of improper evidence could not affect the result. The language of Judge Hill in his concurring opinion in the case of Seattle-First Nat. Bank v. Rankin, ante p. 288, 367 P. (2d) 835 (1962), is most appropriate:
“. . . I concur in the result of the majority opinion because the evidence of negligence and of proximate cause is so overwhelming that I cannot believe that the errors discussed in the dissent in any way affected the result.”
I would affirm.
Finley, C. J., and Foster, J., concur with Hunter, J.