Court Opinion

ID: 9664357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:15:38.264796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:04.650035
License: Public Domain

STUMBO, Justice
Dissenting.
Respectfully, I must dissent. I believe that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to determine that Howard Baer, Inc. regarded Schave as having an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity.
In reviewing a judgment entered upon a jury verdict, this Court is limited to a determination of whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a directed verdict motion. Bierman v. Klapheke, Ky., 967 S.W.2d 16, 18 (1998). On a motion for directed verdict, the trial judge is required to give the opposing party the benefit of all reasonable inferences and deductions to be drawn from the evidence. Id. A jury verdict should not be disturbed unless found to be “palpably or flagrantly against the evidence so as to indicate that it was reached as the result of passion or prejudice.” Id. The trial judge’s decision should not be disturbed upon appeal unless found to be clearly erroneous. Id.
Here, Schave presented evidence, particularly Baer’s “100%” rule, that indicated Baer regarded Schave as having an impairment (inability to lift 40 lbs. over his head) that substantially limited his ability to perform one or more major life activities (lifting and working). Although Schave’s impairment may have legitimately precluded him from performing certain aspects of the milk peddler job, Baer excluded him from any type of employment by removing his name from the entire annual bid list for all truck driving positions, including those that had differing physical requirements. There was also testimony presented that most other trucking companies utilize a similar “100%” policy for truck-driving jobs. Therefore, it would not have been flagrantly against the evidence for the jury to have found that Schave was substantially limited in his ability to perform an entire class of jobs, as Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999), requires.
In addition, “[w]here the 100% rule is applied to mildly impaired persons to exclude them from a broad class of jobs, it may be treating them as disabled even if they are not, thereby qualifying them for protection under the ADA and parallel statutes.... ” Henderson v. Ardco, Inc., 247 F.3d 645, 653 (6th Cir.2001) (reversing grant of summary judgment for employer with “100% rule,” where employee was prohibited from all employment at a plant due to lifting restrictions). In Henderson, which was decided a few months prior to Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002), the court found that the plaintiff had presented evidence that her employer had perceived that there was no job at all for her at the Ardco plant, and that such evidence “gives an indication of the employer’s perception about her suitability for a class of relevantly similar employment.” Henderson, supra, at 654. Likewise, the jury here could have reasonably inferred that Baer had perceived Schave unsuitable for any job in the trucking industry, as evidenced by its “100%” rule that excluded Schave from any type of employment at Baer.
The decision in Williams, supra, did not affect the Sixth Circuit’s analysis. Williams dealt with an employee’s sub*596stantial limitation in the major life activity of .performing manual tasks. The Court specifically stated that it expressed no opinion on the employee’s arguments that she had been “regarded as” disabled by being substantially limited in her ability to perform such major life activities as lifting or working. Id. at 192-193, 122 S.Ct.. at 688-689. The Court did reiterate that when considering the major life activity of working, the employee must show their “inability to work in a ‘broad range of jobs,’ rather than a specific job.” Id. at 200, 122 S.Ct. at 693 (quoting Sutton, supra, at 492, 119 S.Ct. at 2151). Here, a reasonable jury could have found that Schave was regarded as being unable to perform a broad range of jobs.
Accordingly, I feel that the jury had substantial evidence to conclude that Baer regarded Schave as disabled under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act and that decision should not be disturbed on appeal.
KELLER, J., joins this dissent.