Court Opinion

ID: 9517699
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:29:14.137694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:09.433632
License: Public Domain

MORAN, P. J., dissenting: I agree with the majority opinion up to the point where it holds that the defendant was guilty of certain acts which constituted a substantial step toward the commission of the offense charged. It is this facet of the case alone with which I disagree. While it is true that the distinction between the preparation and the substantial step toward the commission of an act, is one of degree, and must be determined by the circumstances of each case, nevertheless, I believe the facts in the case at bar are insufficient to establish the act which constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of the offense. The majority opinion relies upon, among others, The People v. Woods, 24 Ill2d 154, 158, 180 NE2d 475 (1962); however, in that case the defendant commenced toward performance of the act by giving the complaining witness a sedative, although not taken by her, nevertheless it was directed toward her. There was, in addition, the fact that the defendant had received a fee for services to be rendered; the fact that instruments needed to perform the operation were in a pan on the stove; and the fact that the complaining witness stated she was ready and began to remove her clothing. In the case at bar, while there is no doubt that the necessary intent was present, still there is no evidence that the defendant took a “first step” toward commission of the intended crime against Pinkston, the complaining witness. Pinkston, the only one present other than the defendant at the time of the alleged “act,” testified that the defendant unlocked the barbershop door, walked back to the barber chair and put on his smock. He further testified that he, Pinkston, walked over and set his briefcase down and the defendant “offered me to get into the chair; at that, I handed him my business card.” Thereafter, Pinkston looked around to see where his license was but did not see it. In addition, the defendant had his own barber tools present. This is the only evidence offered to establish the act which together with the intent is a necessary element to constitute the offense of an “attempt.” I would concede that if Pinkston had sat in the barber chair, as offered, and an overgarment placed upon him, then it could be said that a substantial step toward the commission of the offense charged had taken place — even though not one hair was clipped from his head. However, this is not the evidence. The best that can be said of the evidence adduced in this case toward the charge of attempting to practice barbering without a certificate of registration as a barber, is that the defendant started preparing himself but never got to the point of preparing the person against whom the attempt was to have been made. Therefore, I must, and do, dissent from my learned colleagues.