Court Opinion

ID: 9566050
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:32:40.521399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:59.606027
License: Public Domain

Hunstein, Justice,
dissenting.
While I concur with the majority that a remand is the proper remedy for consideration of Drane’s challenge to the use of peremptory strikes pursuant to J. E. B. v. Alabama,_U. S._(114 SC 1419, 128 LE2d 89) (1994), I respectfully dissent to the majority’s holding that a remand is also required for the trial court to further analyze whether testimony by Guthrie regarding the cellblock statement of Drane’s co-indictee, Willis, should be excluded from the guilt-innocence phase of this case.
The trial court excluded evidence that during the time Willis was confined in prison Willis informed Guthrie at some unspecified period of time after the crime occurred that he shot the victim and slit her throat. The record reveals that the trial court excluded this testimony on hearsay grounds, not by some “mechanistic” application of the evi-dentiary rule, as condemned in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U. S. 284 (93 SC 1038, 35 LE2d 297) (1973) and Green v. Georgia, 442 U. S. 95 (99 SC 2150, 60 LE2d 738) (1979), but rather on the basis that the evidence proffered by appellant fell woefully short of the reliability demonstrated by the statements in issue in Chambers and Green.
In Chambers and Green the United States Supreme Court recognized that under the Constitution, evidence that is highly relevant to a critical issue in either the guilt-innocence phase or the penalty phase but which is generally inadmissible under an evidentiary rule must not automatically be excluded if tendered in a capital case. Rather, the Supreme Court in these cases adopted a balancing approach to the admission of such evidence, in which the value of the tendered evidence “must be weighed against the harm resulting from the violation of the evidentiary rule. [Cit.]”6 Collier v. State, 244 Ga. 553, 567 (9) (261 SE2d 364) (1979), overruled on other grounds, Thompson v. State, 263 Ga. 23 (2) (426 SE2d 895) (1993).
In Chambers, the testimony was deemed trustworthy because the three spontaneous confessions were made to close friends shortly following the murder, each confession was corroborated by other evidence in the case, the alleged perpetrator had been observed with the murder weapon, and the declarant was present in the courtroom and available for cross-examination. Similarly in Green in introducing mitigating evidence it was shown that the statement was made spon*262taneously to a “close friend,” there was ample evidence corroborating the confession and the statement was against interest. Furthermore, in Green the confession had previously been used by the state in its prosecution of the declarant.
Decided March 17, 1995
Reconsideration denied March 30, 1995.
Lavender & Lavender, Robert W. Lavender, for appellant.
Lindsay A. Tise, Jr., District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney Gen*263eral, Peggy R. Katz, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
*262Both Chambers and Green involve circumstances providing considerable assurances of the reliability of the evidence. No further evidence is required here to support the conclusion drawn by the trial court because Drane cannot establish a similarly compelling case. Willis’ statement was made to a mere cellmate, not a close acquaintance. It was not shown to be close in time to the murder and it contained a factual inaccuracy. Moreover, the statement cannot be said to be unquestioningly against interest in that Guthrie acknowledged that inmates often exaggerate their crimes as a form of protection from other inmates. Finally, although it is not determinative of the issue, the record reflects that Willis was not present in the courtroom and available for cross-examination had it been necessary to question him about the veracity of the statement.7
Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, the trial court fully considered the proffer of Guthrie’s testimony before excluding it and no further findings are either needed or required to support the trial court’s ruling.8 Furthermore, that the proffered testimony would have had no bearing on the outcome of the guilt-innocence phase of the trial is amply demonstrated by the fact that Guthrie’s testimony, presented at the sentencing phase of the trial, had no mitigating effect on the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s exclusion of this testimony from the guilt-innocence phase of the case.
I am authorized to state that Justice Carley and Justice Thompson join in this dissent.

 This balancing test must be applied consistent with this Court’s policy against placing unnecessary restrictions on mitigating evidence offered during the sentencing phase. Romine v. State, 251 Ga. 208, 217 (305 SE2d 93) (1983).

 I disagree that the State’s use of Guthrie’s statement against Willis in Willis’ trial can serve as an indicia of reliability in Drane’s trial. Drane was tried over a year before Willis was convicted in October 1993. Research has revealed no authority, and the majority has cited none, wherein post-trial developments justify disturbing a trial court’s evidentiary ruling under circumstances like those present here. Trial courts do not have the advantage of this Court’s hindsight when issuing evidentiary rulings.

 This is especially apparent inasmuch as the record reflects that Willis had been tried and convicted at the time the trial court ruled on Drane’s motion for new trial.