Court Opinion

ID: 9960327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 21:17:56.696539+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:23.878086
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 DANIELLE STERLING and DARREN                     No. 85448-8-I
 STERLING, wife and husband,
                                                  DIVISION ONE
                           Appellants,

                  v.

 STATE OF WASHINGTON, by and                      UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 through THE UNIVERSITY OF
 WASHINGTON, d/b/a “UW Medicine,”
 “UW Physicians,” and “Harborview
 Medical Center,”

                           Respondents.

       BOWMAN, J. — Danielle Sterling and her husband appeal the trial court’s

order dismissing her medical negligence lawsuit against the state of Washington,

University of Washington (UW), UW Medicine, UW Physicians, and Harborview

Medical Center. Sterling argues the trial court erred by dismissing her lawsuit for

failure to file a claim with the Department of Enterprise Services (DES) Office of

Risk Management (ORM) under chapter 4.92 RCW. We affirm.

                                      FACTS

       On December 26, 2019, EvergreenHealth hospital admitted Sterling with

pancreatitis. EvergreenHealth put Sterling into a medically induced coma

because of complications in her treatment. Her condition worsened, and on

January 9, 2020, EvergreenHealth transferred Sterling to Harborview. On

January 23, 2020, Sterling’s providers discovered that she had developed a
No. 85448-8-I/2

“sacral pressure ulcer” on the base of her spine. On February 22, 2020, Sterling

regained consciousness and learned about the injury. The ulcer had become

infected and necrotic, requiring debridement, surgery, and rehabilitative therapy.

       On December 30, 2022, Sterling filed a “UW Claim Form” with UW Claim

Services, seeking $2.5 million in damages.1 On January 5, 2023, Harborview

acknowledged receipt of Sterling’s claim form. On January 19, 2023, UW Claim

Services also acknowledged receipt of Sterling’s claim form, stating that it “will

investigate the claim and provide a written response,” which “may take from 60 to

90 days to complete.”

       On February 3, 2023, 15 days later, Sterling sent a demand letter to UW

Claim Services, again seeking $2.5 million to settle her claims. She informed

UW Claim Services that she intended to “immediately proceed to litigation” if it

did not accept the demand within 15 days. On March 1, 2023, Sterling and her

husband sued the state of Washington, UW, UW Medicine, UW Physicians, and

Harborview (collectively State), alleging medical negligence. Then, on April 3,

2023, Sterling sent the UW Claim Form to ORM.

       On April 28, 2023, the State moved for summary judgment, arguing that

Sterling failed to comply with the claim procedures outlined in chapter 4.92 RCW.

The trial court granted the motion and dismissed Sterling’s lawsuit.

       Sterling appeals.

       1
           UW Medical manages Harborview.

                                            2
No. 85448-8-I/3

                                       ANALYSIS

       Sterling argues that the trial court erred by dismissing her medical

negligence lawsuit for failure to file a claim with ORM under chapter 4.92 RCW.

We disagree.

       We review orders on summary judgment de novo, engaging in the same

inquiry as the trial court. Kim v. Lakeside Adult Fam. Home, 185 Wn.2d 532,

547, 374 P.3d 121 (2016). “Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Rublee v. Carrier Corp., 192 Wn.2d 190, 198, 428 P.3d 1207

(2018); CR 56(c). We consider facts and inferences in a light most favorable to

the nonmoving party. Id. at 199.

       The legislature enacted chapter 4.92 RCW to abrogate sovereign

immunity and establish procedures for suing the state. Hyde v. Univ. of Wash.

Med. Ctr., 186 Wn. App. 926, 929, 347 P.3d 918 (2015). The statutory filing

procedures preclude tort actions against the state unless the plaintiff first files a

claim with ORM:

       All claims against the state, or against the state’s officers,
       employees, or volunteers, acting in such capacity, for damages
       arising out of tortious conduct, must be presented to [ORM].[2]

RCW 4.92.100(1). And the claimant must file the claim with ORM at least 60

days before commencing an action:

       No action subject to the claim filing requirements of RCW 4.92.100
       shall be commenced against the state, or against any state officer,

       2
        RCW 4.92.006(3) defines ORM as “the office within [DES] that carries out the
powers and duties under this chapter relating to claim filing, claims administration, and
claims payment.”

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No. 85448-8-I/4

       employee, or volunteer, acting in such capacity, for damages
       arising out of tortious conduct until [60] calendar days have elapsed
       after the claim is presented to [ORM].

RCW 4.92.110.

       Under RCW 4.92.100(1), a claimant properly files a claim form when they

deliver it “in person or by regular mail, registered mail, or certified mail, with

return receipt requested, or as an attachment to email or by fax, to [ORM].” A

claimant must use the standard claim form maintained by ORM and posted on

the DES website. Id. The remedy for failure to comply with the claim filing

requirements is dismissal. Hyde, 186 Wn. App. at 929. But courts must “liberally

construe[ ]” these procedural and content requirements “so that substantial

compliance will be deemed satisfactory.” RCW 4.92.100(3).

       Sterling argues that she “substantially complied” with the procedural

requirements under RCW 4.92.100(1) by filing the UW Claim Form with UW

Claim Services—“the entity . . . responsible for investigating the claim.” She is

incorrect.

       “Substantial compliance . . . means that the ‘statute has been followed

sufficiently so as to carry out the intent for which the statute was adopted.’ ” Lee

v. Metro Parks Tacoma, 183 Wn. App. 961, 968, 335 P.3d 1014 (2014) (quoting

Banner Realty, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 48 Wn. App. 274, 278, 738 P.2d 279

(1987)).3 The purpose of RCW 4.92.100(1) and .110 is to provide notice of

claims to the state so that ORM can maintain a centralized claim tracking system

       3
        Lee addressed tort claim filing preconditions for lawsuits against municipalities
under RCW 4.96.020. 183 Wn. App. at 965-68. But the “substantial compliance”
standard under RCW 4.96.020(5) is identical to RCW 4.92.100(3).

                                            4
No. 85448-8-I/5

and provide agencies with accurate and timely data on the status of liability

claims. See RCW 4.92.210(2). The statutory procedure also enables ORM to

value claims and “delegate to the appropriate office to investigate, negotiate,

compromise, and settle the claim, or to retain that responsibility on behalf of and

with the assistance of the affected state agency.” RCW 4.92.210(4). And the

claim filing requirement under chapter 4.92 RCW “serves the reasonable purpose

of fostering negotiation and settlement without substantially burdening tort

claimants.” Hall v. Niemer, 97 Wn.2d 574, 581, 649 P.2d 98 (1982).

       Here, Sterling did not file an ORM claim form with ORM before initiating

her lawsuit. Instead, she filed a UW Claim Form with UW Claim Services.4

Notifying UW Claim Services of her claim did not sufficiently carry out the

legislature’s intentions behind RCW 4.92.100(1) and .110. She did not put ORM

on notice of her claim, so it could not track, value, and delegate the claim as part

of its centralized system. As a result, Sterling fails to show that she substantially

complied with the claim filing requirements of chapter 4.92 RCW.

       Citing Estate of Connelly v. Snohomish County Public Utility District No. 1,

145 Wn. App. 941, 187 P.3d 842 (2008), Sterling argues that the State cannot

assert noncompliance as a defense because it did not itself fully comply with the

statutory obligations of chapter 4.96 RCW. In Connelly, the plaintiff sued

Snohomish County Public Utility District No. 1 (PUD), a local government entity,

seeking tort damages. Id. at 943. PUD moved to dismiss the lawsuit as

untimely. Id. at 943-44. The estate argued that PUD could not assert a

       We note that the UW Claim Form advises users that “filing this claim with
       4

[UW] does not constitute a filing with [DES] pursuant to RCW 4.92.110.”

                                          5
No. 85448-8-I/6

timeliness defense because it failed to appoint an agent to receive claims for

damages as required under RCW 4.96.020. Id. We agreed. Id. at 948.

          Sterling argues that like the PUD in Connelly, RCW 4.96.020(3)(c)

precludes the State from raising a defense of noncompliance in her case

because the UW Claim Form did not provide proper instructions on how to

submit the form to ORM. But chapter 4.96 RCW governs the procedure for

claims against local government entities. RCW 4.96.010. Harborview is not a

local government entity. Rather, it is an arm of the state. Hontz v. State, 105

Wn.2d 302, 310, 714 P.2d 1176 (1986) (Harborview is an arm of the state

because it is operated and managed by UW, a state agency). As a result,

Sterling must comply with the claim filing requirements that apply to state

entities—chapter 4.92 RCW. And she offers no argument that chapter 4.92

RCW precludes the State from raising noncompliance as a defense.

          Because Sterling did not file a claim form with ORM at least 60 days

before she sued the State, the trial court properly dismissed her lawsuit. We

affirm.

WE CONCUR:

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