Court Opinion

ID: 9695791
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:29:26.23099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:16.545690
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I agree with the majority except as regards a judge’s ability to impose a sentence consecutive to another sentence not yet imposed.
The majority relies on Rule 1406(a), which provides:
Whenever more than one sentence is imposed at the same time on a defendant, or whenever a sentence is *385imposed on a defendant who is incarcerated for another offense, such sentences shall be deemed to run concurrently unless the judge states otherwise.
According to the majority, “incarcerated for another offense” refers to a situation where the defendant has been convicted for another offense and is in prison awaiting sentence but not yet sentenced. This interpretation cannot be correct.
Rule 1406(a) contemplates two situations, which are described, respectively, in the first two phrases of the rule.
The first situation is described by the phrase, “[wjhenever more than one sentence is imposed at the same time on a defendant.” Suppose that the defendant is before Judge A, having been found guilty of more than one offense; for example, a jury has found him guilty of burglary and robbery. The judge will then be obliged to impose “more than one sentence” — one for burglary and one for robbery. Under Rule 1406(a), if the judge wants the sentences to be consecutive, he must say so; otherwise they will be concurrent.
The second situation is described by the phrase, “or whenever a sentence is imposed on a defendant who is incarcerated for another offense.” Here, our hypothetical defendant is before two sentencing judges, Judge A and Judge B. If Judge A has already imposed sentence on the defendant for a separate conviction, then Rule 1406(a) is applicable to Judge B’s sentence. Under the rule, Judge B’s sentence will be concurrent with Judge A’s sentence unless Judge B specifically says it is to be consecutive.1
*386A third situation is presented if, when Judge B imposes sentence, the defendant has not yet been sentenced by Judge A for the other offense (although he may be in prison awaiting Judge A’s sentence). In this situation —which is the present case — Rule 1406(a) does not apply. Judge B is not impowered to decide that the sentence he is about to impose will run consecutive to a sentence still to be imposed by Judge A. This is so because in providing that Judge B’s sentence “shall be deemed to run concurrently unless the judge states otherwise,” Rule 1406(a) necessarily assumes the existence of a prior sentence. The sentence of Judge B cannot run either beside or after the sentence of Judge A if Judge A’s sentence does not exist.
This conclusion is simply a matter of logic, or grammar. However, considerations of good sentencing practice lead to the same conclusion. For Judge B to say, “My sentence shall be consecutive to whatever sentence Judge A some day decides to impose”, can accomplish nothing except an interference with Judge A. Suppose Judge B thinks the proper sentence for the offense he is concerned with is 5 to 10 years; then he should sentence the defendant to 5 to 10 years. Nothing can be gained so far as determining what is a fair sentence by making the sentence consecutive to whatever sentence Judge A decides to impose. The only result will be to deprive Judge A of the option of making his sentence concurrent with or consecutive to Judge B’s. Suppose that when the defendant appears before Judge A, Judge A is told that Judge B has impose'd a sentence to run consecutive to whatever sentence Judge A imposes. This is the same as telling Judge A that he has been deprived of the ability that he would otherwise have had to provide that his sentence should run consecutive to Judge B’s. There is no reason why Judge A should be thus deprived; indeed, he should not be, for it can only interfere with his ability to frame a sentence appropriate to the case before him.
*387The majority says that if its interpretation of Rule 1406(a) is not accepted, “unnecessary complications” will occur. Majority opinion at p. 384. The majority does not, however, say what these complications will be. In fact, by interpreting the rule to require Judge B to make his sentence concurrent with or consecutive to an existing sentence, complications will be avoided: Judge A will know, as he should know, what Judge B has done. He will therefore be able without interference to frame his sentence as seems to him just.
Finally, history is against the majority. The Act of May 28,1937, P.L. 1036, § 1,19 P.S. § 894, provided:
all sentences ... of persons who at the time sentence is imposed are held in custody in default of bail, or otherwise, shall ... be computed from the date of commitment . . ., unless the person sentenced shall then be undergoing imprisonment under a sentence imposed for any other offense or offenses, in which case the said sentence shall . be computed, either from the date of imposition thereof or from the expiration of such other sentence or sentences, as the court shall, in its discretion, direct.
It is true that the Act has been suspended by the new rules on sentencing. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1415(c). That does not mean, however, that any substantial change was contemplated. In 1972 the legislature enacted chapter 13 of the Crimes Code, which dealt in a comprehensive manner with the authority of the court in sentencing. 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 1301-1382. This enactment was then supplemented by the promulgation by the Supreme Court of the new rules on sentencing (some of which suspended parts of the Crimes Code). Pa.R.Crim.P. 1401-1415. Thus the law as regards sentencing was codified. Some changes resulted but some requirements remained the same. The adoption of Rule 1406 did change the sentencing process to the extent of presuming a concurrent effect of a sen*388tence on previous sentences; the Act of May 28, 1937, supra, 19 P.S. § 894, did not provide for such a presumption. However, in my view, what has not been changed is the requirement of the Act that if a judge wants to impose a sentence consecutive to another judge’s sentence, he must wait until that other judge’s sentence has been imposed.
In summary, the majority, relying solely on Rule 1406, has approved a practice hitherto forbidden by the Act of May 28, 1937, supra, 19 P.S. § 894. There is no need to interpret Rule 1406 to have this effect. To do so, moreover, is contrary both to logic and good sentencing practice.
I would affirm the conviction but vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
JACOBS and HOFFMAN, JJ., join in this opinion.

. It may be granted that Rule 1406(a) does not address itself to the situation where Judge A’s sentence is not a sentence of imprisonment, i. e., where, at the time Judge B imposes sentence, the defendant is not “incarcerated”. This situation would arise if Judge A’s sentence were a sentence of probation. It seems curious that the rule does not address itself to this situation, but we need not concern ourselves with that now.