Court Opinion

ID: 9384086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-31 18:06:50.592475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:50.443211
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Scott, 2023-Ohio-1091.]

                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                            ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 TRUMBULL COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                     CASE NO. 2022-T-0084

                  Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                                   Criminal Appeal from the
         - vs -                                    Court of Common Pleas

MATTHEW LARRY SCOTT,
                                                   Trial Court No. 2019 CR 00650
                  Defendant-Appellant.

                                             OPINION

                                        Decided: March 31, 2023
                                          Judgment: Affirmed

Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecutor, and Ryan J. Sanders, Assistant
Prosecutor, Administration Building, Fourth Floor, 160 High Street, N.W., Warren, OH
44481 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Mandy J. Gwirtz, Gwirtz Law, LLC, 20050 Lakeshore Boulevard, Euclid, OH 44123
(For Defendant-Appellant).

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.

        {¶1}      Appellant, Matthew Larry Scott, appeals from the judgment of the Trumbull

County Court of Common Pleas, sentencing him to serve an indefinite prison term of four

to six years. Appellant challenges the trial court’s imposition of the prison term as well as

the constitutionality of Ohio’s indefinite sentencing statutory scheme, i.e., the Reagan

Tokes Act. For the reasons discussed in this opinion, we affirm the trial court.

        {¶2}      Appellant was indicted on two counts of rape, in violation of R.C.

2907.02(A)(1)(c) and (B), felonies of the first degree; and two counts of rape, in violation
of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) and (B), felonies of the first degree. On May 4, 2022, appellant

waived his rights and entered a guilty plea to a bill of information on one count of felonious

assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and (D)(1)(a), a felony of the second degree;

and one count of abduction, in violation of R.C. 2905.02(A)(2) and (C), a felony of the

third degree. The trial court ordered a presentence investigation report. After a hearing,

appellant was sentenced to serve an indefinite prison term of four to six years on the

felonious assault count and a prison term of 24 months on the abduction count. The trial

court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently. This appeal follows.

       {¶3}     Appellant assigns five errors. Because the initial four are related, we shall

address them together. They provide:

       {¶4}     “[1.] The defendant-appellant’s indeterminate prison sentence of four to six

years that was ordered pursuant to the ‘Reagan Tokes Act,’ AKA Senate Bill 201, must

be reversed as the Reagan Tokes Act is unconstitutionally void for vagueness.

       {¶5}     “[2.] The defendant-appellant’s indeterminate prison sentence of four to six

years that was ordered pursuant to the ‘Reagan Tokes Act,’ AKA Senate Bill 201, must

be reversed as the Reagan Tokes Act unconstitutionally violates the doctrine of

separation of powers.

       {¶6}     “[3.] The defendant-appellant’s indeterminate prison sentence of four to six

years that was ordered pursuant to the ‘Reagan Tokes Act,’ AKA Senate Bill 201, violates

his constitutional right to trial by jury as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 5 of the Ohio

Constitution.

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       {¶7}     “[4.] The defendant-appellant’s indeterminate prison sentence of four to six

years that was ordered pursuant to the ‘Reagan Tokes Act,’ AKA Senate Bill 201, violates

his constitutional rights to fair trial and due process as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 5 & 10

of the Ohio Constitution.”

       {¶8}     Although he does not specifically identify the nature of his constitutional

challenges, because his presumptively minimum prison term has yet to be extended, they

must be generally construed as facial challenges to the Reagan Tokes Act. See State v.

Stenson, 2022-Ohio-2072, 190 N.E.3d 1240, ¶ 31 (6th Dist.) (the “ODRC has not sought

to extend [appellant’s] term beyond the presumptive minimum sentence * * * [and his]

challenge to the Reagan Tokes Law is necessarily a facial challenge”).             “A facial

challenge to a statute is the most difficult to bring successfully because the challenger

must establish that there exists no set of circumstances under which the statute would be

valid.” (Citation omitted.) Harrold v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-Ohio-5334, 836

N.E.2d 1165, ¶ 37. “The fact that a statute might operate unconstitutionally under some

plausible set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid.” (Citation

omitted.) Id.

       {¶9}     With this standard in mind, appellant did not raise any objections or

constitutional challenges to the statutory scheme in the trial court. “‘[T]he question of the

constitutionality of a statute must generally be raised at the first opportunity and, in a

criminal prosecution, this means in the trial court.’” State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d

464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 15, quoting State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120,

122, 489 N.E.2d 277 (1986). Still, a reviewing court has “discretion to consider a forfeited
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Case No. 2022-T-0084
constitutional challenge to a statute” and “may review the trial court decision for plain

error, but we require a showing that but for a plain or obvious error, the outcome of the

proceeding would have been otherwise, and reversal must be necessary to correct a

manifest miscarriage of justice.” (Citations omitted.) Quarterman at ¶ 16. “The burden of

demonstrating plain error is on the party asserting it.” (Citation omitted.) Id. The Supreme

Court of Ohio has also “stated that a forfeited constitutional challenge to a statute is

subject to review ‘where the rights and interests involved may warrant it.’” Id., quoting In

re M.D., 38 Ohio St.3d 149, 527 N.E.2d 286 (1988), syllabus.

       {¶10} This court, in State v. Reffitt, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2021-L-129, 2022-Ohio-

3371, previously concluded the Reagan Tokes Act (1) is not unconstitutionally void for

vagueness, id. at ¶ 29-42; (2) does not unconstitutionally violate the doctrine of

separation of powers, id. at ¶ 44-50; (3) does not violate a defendant’s right to a trial by

jury, id. at ¶ 52-58; and (4) does not violate a defendant’s right to a fair trial and due

process, id. at ¶ 60-72. See also State v. Abdullah, 2022-Ohio-3977, 200 N.E. 3d 627,

¶ 62 (11th Dist.). Nevertheless, there are several points raised by appellant’s assigned

errors that were not directly covered in Reffitt. We shall therefore touch on those points

to ensure a comprehensive analysis.

       {¶11} First, under his void-for-vagueness challenge, appellant points out that,

pursuant to R.C. 2967.271(C)(1)(a), he can be held in prison beyond the presumptive

release date if the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“DRC”) determines he

committed a violation of the law that was not prosecuted while he was incarcerated.

Appellant reasonably points out the lack of clarity in the phrase “a violation of law that

was not prosecuted.” If an act goes unprosecuted, it is unclear who determines the action

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Case No. 2022-T-0084
was a violation of law. And, if an act is deemed by a functionary of the DRC (likely the

Rules Infraction Board set forth in Ohio Adm.Code 5120-9-08) as an unprosecuted

violation, appellant expresses concern that relying upon the act to extend his prison term

would essentially negate certain fundamental rights a criminal defendant would ordinarily

enjoy, e.g., the right to counsel, right to a jury trial, and the right to compulsory process.

       {¶12} In State v. Maddox, 168 Ohio St.3d 292, 2022-Ohio-764, 198 N.E.3d 797,

the Supreme Court of Ohio determined the Reagan Tokes Act is fit for facial constitutional

challenges on a defendant’s direct appeal. Id. at ¶ 19. This is so, in part, “because no

additional factual development is necessary * * *” to address the merits of the challenges.

Id. The perils appellant identifies, however, relate to the necessity of additional facts

which cannot be foreseen at this point. In other words, if and when the concerns appellant

raises materialize, he may then raise a constitutional “as-applied” challenge to the

statutory scheme. “An as[-]applied challenge of an infraction received under [the Rules

Infraction Board] would have to be raised through a separate writ upon imposition of the

infraction.” Abdullah at ¶ 62.     Accordingly, any challenges to the vagueness of the

enforcement of the statute by the Rules Infraction Board must be pursued through a

petition for an extraordinary writ, such as mandamus or perhaps habeas corpus. Id.,

citing State v. Delvallie, 2022-Ohio-470, 185 N.E.3d 536, ¶ 87 (8th Dist.). In this respect,

appellant’s as-applied challenge is not yet ripe.

       {¶13} Next appellant identifies similar language in R.C. 2967.271(C)(1)(a) that

permits an offender to be held beyond the presumptive release date if any of the alleged

infractions or violations demonstrate that the offender has not been rehabilitated.

Appellant again contends the phrase “demonstrate that the offender has not been
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Case No. 2022-T-0084
rehabilitated” is unconstitutionally vague. Appellant notes that the phrase is hopelessly

dependent upon value-laden subjective assessments and therefore unclear what may or

may not trigger this statutory condition. Much like appellant’s previous argument, this

challenge requires additional facts which have not developed (and may never occur). It

is therefore unripe and the subject of an as-applied challenge if and when appellant has

cause to raise it.

       {¶14} Appellant additionally takes issue with R.C. 2967.271(C)(1)(b).               That

subsection permits the DRC to rebut the presumption that appellant be released after the

minimum time if his behavior demonstrates he “continues to pose a threat to society.”

Appellant recognizes that his behavior while incarcerated will be measured against

institutional rules; the statute, however, indicates that other, unlisted potential or arguable

infractions may be used as a metric to determine whether he continues to pose a threat

to society. This argument, while potentially worth exploring if appellant is subjected to

additional incarceration beyond the minimum term, is nevertheless an as-applied

challenge. He must therefore wait to assert the challenge if and when such facts manifest

themselves.

       {¶15} Appellant makes two final arguments related to unconstitutional vagueness:

(1) Under R.C. 2967.271(C)(2), the DRC may invoke the indeterminate portion of his

sentence if he is placed in restrictive housing at any time within a year before his hearing;

and (2) Pursuant to R.C. 2967.271(C)(3), the indeterminate portion of the sentence may

be imposed if he is classified as a level three, four, five, or higher security level. Appellant

points out that each designation is dependent upon the discretion of the DRC and thus is

not simply vague (because no standards are articulated for their implementation), but also

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Case No. 2022-T-0084
potentially violative of due process and an inmate’s equal protection rights. As with

appellant’s previous arguments, these points will be ripe if and when they are used as a

means of keeping appellant in prison beyond the minimum sentence. At this point, these

as-applied challenges are not yet justiciable and cannot be reviewed.

      {¶16} With respect to appellant’s separation of powers argument, this court, in

Reffitt, thoroughly examined the nuances of the challenge and rejected the same. The

Reffitt panel concluded:

             In Reagan Tokes sentences, the court imposes both
             presumptive minimum and possible maximum prison
             terms in its sentence. Thereafter, the ODRC determines
             whether the offender's conduct warrants more than the
             minimum imposed. However, the ODRC cannot exceed
             the    judiciary’s   maximum        imposed     sentence.
             Therefore, [State ex rel.] Bray [v. Russell, 89 Ohio St.3d
             132, 729 N.E.2d 359 (2000)] does “not compel the
             conclusion that the Reagan Tokes Law violates the
             separation of powers doctrine.” Id.

Reffitt, 2022-Ohio-3371, at ¶ 49; see also Abdullah, 2022-Ohio-3977, at ¶ 68; State v.

Taylor, 2022-Ohio-3611, 198 N.E.3d 956, ¶ 55 (11th Dist.).

      {¶17} Similarly, in Reffitt, this court fully addressed the trial-by-jury challenge

alleged by appellant. In doing so, this court rejected the challenge and held:

             Because R.C. 2967.271 requires the trial court to
             impose a minimum and maximum indefinite term, the
             only discretion granted to the trial court is the minimum
             term. The court is not imposing a term greater than the
             maximum as prohibited under Apprendi[ v. New Jersey,
             530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000)].
             Further, the court is not imposing a sentence longer
             than the minimum term prescribed by statute based on
             findings of facts in addition to those considered by the
             jury in Blakely[ v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct.
             2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004)] or [State v. ]Foster[, 109
             Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470]. We do

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Case No. 2022-T-0084
              not find that R.C. 2967.271(C) or (D) is unconstitutional
              under Apprendi or its progeny.

Reffitt at ¶ 57; see also Abdullah at ¶ 71.

       {¶18} Finally, this court has previously and fully treated the due process argument

advanced by appellant. In Reffitt, this court rejected the due process challenge, pointing

out it requires an as-applied analysis. The panel determined:

              Appellant’s challenges to the Reagan Tokes Law are
              facial in nature and he must therefore establish that
              there exists no set of circumstances under which the
              statute would be valid. Harrold v. Collier, 107 Ohio
              St.3d 44 at ¶ 37. Appellant's arguments relating to a
              future hearing to rebut his presumptive release are a
              challenge to the due process safeguards that will be
              afforded in the future under R.C. 2967.271 through a
              hearing to rebut his presumption of release. “The fact
              that a statute might operate unconstitutionally under
              some plausible set of circumstances is insufficient to
              render it wholly invalid.” Id., citing Belden v. Union
              Cent. Life Ins. Co., 143 Ohio St. 329, paragraph four of
              the syllabus, and United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
              739, 745. “Should the Law ultimately be applied in a
              manner that is unconstitutional, an offender would not
              be precluded from challenging the Law as
              applied.” State v. Stenson, 6th Dist. No. L-20-1074,
              2022-Ohio-2072, 190 N.E.3d 1240, ¶ 33. (Emphasis
              original).

Reffitt at ¶ 67; Abdullah, 2022-Ohio-3977, at ¶ 79; Taylor, 2022-Ohio-3611, at ¶ 85.

       {¶19} In light of the foregoing, appellant’s first, second, third, and fourth

assignments of error are without merit.

       {¶20} Appellant’s fifth assignment of error provides:

       {¶21} “The individual prison terms imposed by the trial court on counts one and

two were unsupported by the record with respect to the factors the court must consider

pursuant to R.C. 2929.12 and thus, are contrary to law.”

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Case No. 2022-T-0084
       {¶22} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.11(A), “[a] court that sentences an offender for a

felony shall be guided by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing,” and it “shall

consider the factors * * * relating to the seriousness of the conduct” and “to the likelihood

of the offender’s recidivism.” R.C. 2929.12(A).

       {¶23} R.C. 2953.08(G) governs our review of felony sentences, and provides, in

relevant part, that after an appellate court’s review of the record, and it “may increase,

reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate

the sentence and remand * * * if it clearly and convincingly finds * * * [t]hat the sentence

is * * * contrary to law.” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b); State v. Meeks, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No.

2022-A-0060, 2023-Ohio-988, ¶ 11.

       {¶24} “A sentence is contrary to law when it is ‘in violation of statute or legal

regulations’ * * *.” Meeks at ¶ 11, quoting State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-

6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, ¶ 34. Thus, “‘[a] sentence is contrary to law when it does not fall

within the statutory range for the offense or if the trial court fails to consider the purposes

and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors

set forth in R.C. 2929.12.’” State v. Shannon, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2020-T-0020, 2021-

Ohio-789, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Brown, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 24520, 24705, 2012-

Ohio-199, ¶ 74; see also State v. Wilson, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2017-L-028, 2017-Ohio-

7127, ¶18. The Supreme Court has further held that a sentence is contrary to law if “it is

imposed ‘based on factors or considerations that are extraneous to those [seriousness

and recidivism factors] that are permitted by R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.’” Meeks at ¶ 11,

quoting State v. Bryant, 168 Ohio St.3d 250, 2022-Ohio-1878, 198 N.E.3d 68, ¶ 22. “But

an appellate court’s determination that the record does not support a sentence does not

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equate to a determination that the sentence is ‘otherwise contrary to law’ as that term is

used in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b).” Jones at ¶ 32.

       {¶25} Further, this court has frequently noted that “even though a trial court is

required to consider the R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 factors, it is not required to make

specific findings on the record to comport with its statutory obligations.” Shannon at ¶ 17,

citing State v. Parke, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2011-A-0062, 2012-Ohio-2003, ¶ 24; State

v. Blake, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2003-L-196, 2005-Ohio-686, ¶ 16.

       {¶26} Appellant essentially argues that the record does not support the severity

of his sentence. Specifically, he notes that he was young at the time of the offense, 23-

years old and had matured significantly while the case was pending. After posting bond,

he was gainfully employed and had no violations prior to his conviction. And, while he

recognizes he had “some prior misdemeanor offenses,” he had never been convicted of

a felony prior to this case.

       {¶27} Regardless of appellant’s attempts to justify his position on appeal, as

outlined above, we cannot assess whether, under R.C. 2929.12, his sentence was

unsupported by the record. We must simply look to whether it was within the statutory

range (it was), and whether the trial court considered the purposes and principles of felony

sentencing (it did).

       {¶28} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated:

              The problem in this case is you were drinking and so
              was the victim in the case and it led to behavior that
              caused serious, serious psychological harm. And while
              some of the principles in sentencing are whether or not
              you can be rehabilitated, also some are you don’t want
              to demean the seriousness of the offense, and your
              conduct here involved some very outrageous injuries to
              the victim.
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Case No. 2022-T-0084
              The court will incorporate the pre-sentence investigation
              into this sentencing hearing and I’m going to find that
              the presumption in favor of prison has not been rebutted
              because the instant offense had serious consequences
              and the victim suffered physical and great psychological
              harm and the crime here was facilitated by drinking to
              excess along with a combination of drug consumption.

              The defendant also has a history of violent offenses not
              on a scale that is so severe, but it still demonstrates
              some violent history on your part involving domestic
              violence. And also you had an incident while you were
              incarcerated that involved some violence.

       {¶29} This court has frequently noted that even though a trial court is required to

consider the R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 factors, it is not required to make specific

findings on the record to comport with its statutory obligations. Shannon, 2021-Ohio-789,

¶ 17, citing State v. Parke, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2011-A-0062, 2012-Ohio-2003,

¶   24;   State   v.   Blake,   11th   Dist.    Lake   No.   2003-L-196,   2005-Ohio-686,

¶ 16. Nevertheless, at the sentencing hearing, the trial court pointed to the significant

harm appellant caused the victim; the severity of the nature of the conduct that led to the

charges; appellant’s criminal history; the fact that the crime was facilitated by drug and

alcohol use; the court also underscored appellant was involved in an incident of violence

which occurred while he was incarcerated in this case. These determinations relate to

the statutory factors which must be considered under R.C. 2929.12.

       {¶30} Furthermore, in its judgment entry, the trial court stated it had considered

the record, oral statements and any victim impact statements, as well as the purposes

and principles of felony sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and balanced the seriousness

and recidivism factors of R.C. 2929.12. Given the record as well as our standard of

review, appellant’s sentence is not contrary to law.

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      {¶31} Appellant’s final assignment of error lacks merit.

      {¶32} For the reasons discussed in this opinion, the judgment of the Trumbull

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,

MATT LYNCH, J.,

concur.

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