Court Opinion

ID: 9539382
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:03:24.870164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:47.357127
License: Public Domain

*261Mr. Chief Justice Hall
dissenting:
I dissent from the majority opinion.
Evidence in the case is direct and uncontradicted that the warehouse was entered and a typewriter and adding machine removed therefrom; that defendants were in possession of a truck belonging to Gower Delivery Service, Inc., and of six Ford brand gum balls and one adding machine tape.
There is no proof whatsoever that either of the defendants was ever in the warehouse or in the vicinity thereof. There is not one word of testimony in the record that anything other than a typewriter and adding machine was taken or missing from the warehouse.
Significantly, the defendants were not in possession of either of the items proved to have been taken. There is not one word of testimony that any gum balls or any adding machine tape had been taken, nor any evidence that any such tape was on the machine at the time of the burglary or elsewhere in the building.
The evidence is uncontradicted that the 1953 Chevrolet truck was not in the building at 10:30 A.M. on Saturday; it was in defendants’ possession at 1:30 A.M. Monday. Where it was in the interval is undisclosed by the record. The majority opinion states that:
“ * * * The testimony of the witness Gower when considered in the light of and in conjunction with all the circumstances of the case justified the legitimate and reasonable inference that (1) the 1953 Chevrolet truck belonging to Gower Delivery Service, Inc., was housed in the company’s warehouse on the weekend of October 17, 1959 and (2) that sometime during this weekend it was feloniously taken therefrom (3) by these defendants (4) who forcibly entered the warehouse (5) with the intent to commit larceny. * * (Emphasis and numbering supplied.)
Thus it appears from the majority opinion by a progression of successive inferences that every element *262of the crime of burglary is supplied. It is inferred that the truck was locked up in the warehouse on Saturday. To reach this conclusion it must be inferred that the driver returned the truck and parked it in the warehouse. There is no evidence from which either inference can logically be drawn.
The majority opinion states that:
“ * * * the drivers, after completing their deliveries for Saturday morning, customarily return their trucks to the warehouse where they are kept over the weekend. * * * However, as was noted supra, the obvious inference to be gained from Clarence Gower’s testimony is that it was the practice to keep these delivery trucks in the warehouse over the weekend(Emphasis supplied.)
If the record warrants this pronouncement without doing violence to the processes of reasoning, I have been unable to discover it. Even so, evidence of habit, or of what one customarily does, is not admissible, even in a civil suit, to establish what was done on a specific occasion.
“ * * * Ordinarily it cannot be proved that a person did a particular thing on one occasion by showing that he did it at another time or times.” 22A C.J.S., Criminal Law 412, §604; State v. Lapan, 101 Vt. 124, 141 Atl. 686.
The majority infer that there was a practice to keep the trucks in the warehouse over the weekend, then on this inference they again infer that the truck was in the warehouse on the weekend in question. This court, in dealing with such a situation in Tate v. People, 125 Colo. 527, 247 P. (2d) 665,said:
“ * * * Any finding in this case of deliberation, premeditation, willfullness or any of the other ingredients of either first or second degree murder could only be based upon a suspicion as foundation for a presumption and then finally another presumption based upon the primary presumption. Presumption and inferences may be drawn only from facts established, and presumption may not rest on presumption or inference on inference. *263Dodo v. Stocker, 74 Colo. 95, 219 Pac. 222; Mountain Motor Fuel Co. v. Rivers, 65 Colo. 561, 170 Pac. 1164; Elliott v. People, 115 Colo. 382, 174 P. (2d) 500; and this rule is doubly applicable in criminal cases.” (Emphasis supplied.)
I am firmly convinced that there is no evidence in this record, circumstantial or otherwise, to establish the guilt of defendants of the offense of burglary, beyond a reasonable doubt or at all.
I am unwilling to infer that the trucks were kept in the warehouse over weekends (in fact, Gower admitted that he drove one home); unwilling to infer that the truck in question, known not to be in the warehouse at 10:00 A.M. on Saturday, was returned thereto. I am unwilling in a criminal case to substitute, for proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, surmise, conjecture, guess, imagination and inference upon inference, obvious or otherwise.
The majority opinion seeks to distinguish Lombardi v. People, 124 Colo. 284, 236 P. (2d) 113, from the case at bar. I too would distinguish that case and conclude that the evidence against Lombardi was much stronger than that in the case before us. In Lombardi the proof, as in the present case, was clear that the premises had been broken into — there the similarity ends. Lombardi admitted being in the burglarized store after midnight of the night of the burglary; he described in detail how he thought the burglary had been committed. This testimony serves to distinguish Lombardi from the case at bar, where there is not one scintilla of evidence that either of the defendants was ever in the vicinity of, much less actually in, the burglarized premises.
In Lombardi there was uncontradicted testimony that fifteen cases of whisky, a Motorola record changer and a Bendix radio were taken from the premises, and that Lombardi had sold from his residence to two different persons liquor similar to that taken from the burglarized premises. This testimony serves to distinguish Lombardi *264from the case at bar, where there -is no evidence that anything, other than a typewriter and adding machine (never recovered), was taken from the warehouse.
In reversing Lombardi’s conviction of burglary, this court said:
“The evidence, that soon after a store was broken into and robbed, defendants were found in possession of goods similar to those taken, but which no one could identify as those taken, is insufficient to sustain a conviction. State v. Martin, 118 S.C. 21, 110 S.E. 78.
“There was insufficient evidence to warrant the submission of the case to the jury. Other errors assigned need not be discussed. The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to the trial court to discharge the defendant.”
I am of the opinion that the motion for a directed verdict of not guilty should have been sustained and the defendants discharged.
Mr. Justice Day and Mr. Justice Frantz join in this dissent.