Court Opinion

ID: 9889920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 19:04:28.157561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:53.148292
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/11/23 First American Commercial Bancorp v. BB Co. CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION SEVEN

FIRST AMERICAN                                             B322842
COMMERCIAL BANCORP,
INC.,                                                      (Los Angeles County
                                                           Super. Ct. No.
         Plaintiff and Respondent,                         21STCV06522)

                   v.

BB CO., INC.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Richard J. Burdge, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
      Law Offices of Jaenam Coe PC and Jaenam Coe for
Defendant and Appellant.
      Frandzel Robins Bloom & Csato and Andrew K. Alper for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
                   __________________________
       BB Co., Inc. appeals from the default judgment entered in
favor of First American Commercial Bancorp, Inc. after the trial
court denied BB’s motion to set aside entry of default based on
excusable neglect under Code of Civil Procedure section 473,
subdivision (b).1 BB contends the trial court abused its discretion
in denying relief because BB reasonably relied on a third party’s
direction to disregard the complaint and BB did not receive notice
of First American’s request for entry of default. We affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.     The Complaint and Entry of Default
       First American filed this action on February 18, 2021,
asserting two causes of action for breach of lease agreements and
a third cause of action for claim and delivery. The verified
complaint alleged BB entered into two leases with First
American to lease printers, BB defaulted on both leases by failing
to make the required payments, and First American was
therefore entitled to take possession of the printers.
       BB signed the first lease (lease 1) in March 2019, under
which it leased four printers with monthly payments of $2,600 for
60 months.2 BB signed the second lease (lease 2) in October 2019
for three additional printers with monthly payments of $1,488,
also for 60 months.3 The leases stated the lease payments were

1    All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.
2     All dollar amounts are rounded.
3    First American attached as exhibits to the complaint
executed copies of the leases, delivery and acceptance certificates,

                                 2
“non-cancellable” and the leases could not be terminated. BB was
required to make payments “in advance of each month (or other
payment period) during the Term.” However, it failed to make
payments on both leases at the beginning of March, April, May,
and June 2020. BB and First American signed modifications to
the leases on June 30, 2020, reducing the payments for nine
months, then increasing the remaining payments to account for
the missed payments. Beginning on December 1, 2020, BB failed
to make monthly payments under the modified leases. For lease
1, the complaint sought $140,514 plus interest, $715 in late fees,
and $19,800 for the residual value of the printers, plus attorneys’
fees. For lease 2, the complaint sought $89,493 plus interest,
$398 in late fees, and $10,800 for the residual value of the
printers.
       On February 24, 2021 First American personally served BB
with the summons and complaint by serving Karen Frazier
(identified as BB’s president) at 1753 East 21st Street in Los
Angeles (21st Street address). BB did not file an answer or other
responsive pleading. On April 12, 2021 First American filed a
request for entry of default, and the clerk entered a default the
same day. The request for entry of default included a declaration
of mailing attesting that on April 12 notice of First American’s
request for entry of default was mailed to BB at the 21st Street
address. The record does not contain proof of service of entry of
the default on BB. On July 6, 2021 First American served its
case management statement on BB, addressed to Frazier at the

lease modifications, and financing statements. The leases gave
BB the right to purchase the equipment for fair market value at
the expiration of the lease term.

                                3
same address. The case management statement stated in two
places that a default had been entered against BB.

B.    First American’s Request for Default Judgment and BB’s
      Motion To Set Aside the Default
      On September 1, 2021 First American filed a request for a
default judgment in the amount of $235,694. The accompanying
packet included a summary of the case, request for dismissal
without prejudice as to Does 1 through 10,4 and a supporting
declaration from Chris Wuest, the senior vice president of asset
management for First American. The declaration of service
stated the request was served on BB by mail addressed to
Frazier5 at the 21st Street address.
      On October 5, 2021, at a hearing on an order to show cause
regarding entry of default judgment, Lan Quoc Nguyen appeared
as counsel for BB and informed the trial court that BB intended
to move to set aside the default. The court continued the hearing
to December 3, 2012. First American filed a second request for
court judgment on October 6, again seeking a judgment for
$235,694.
      On October 12, 2021 BB filed a motion to set aside entry of
default pursuant to the discretionary relief provisions of section
473, subdivision (b). BB filed a supporting memorandum and
declaration from Frazier, who identified herself as the chief

4     The clerk entered the dismissal of the Does on September
3, 2021.
5     Multiple documents were served on Kyoung K. Frazier at
the 21st Street address. Although most documents refer to
Karen Frazier, Frazier does not dispute she was properly served
as Kyoung Frazier.

                                4
executive officer of BB. BB attached to its motion a proposed
answer and cross-complaint.
       In her declaration Frazier described BB’s leasing of the
printers under the leases. She explained that James Langridge
and his company Royal Office Solutions provided technical
support and printer services for BB, which is a manufacturer of
girls’ clothing. Langridge introduced BB to First American, and
BB agreed to lease the first four printers, but after a month, it
requested the printers be returned and replaced with smaller,
less expensive printers. Frazier claimed Langridge and Royal
made arrangements for First American to take back the four
printers, and BB entered into a second lease.6 Frazier
acknowledged that BB stopped making lease payments in
December 2020.
       According to Frazier, BB was served with the complaint in
February 2021. Frazier averred that BB “was surprised at
receiving said Complaint given that [First American] had
previously agreed to take back all 7 of its printers.” BB
immediately contacted Langridge, “who informed [BB] to
disregard [the complaint] and that they would speak to [First
American].” Langridge assured Frazier “there was a
misunderstanding and that it would be resolved and that [BB]

6      Frazier stated the second lease was intended to replace the
first lease, but the trial court sustained an evidentiary objection
to the statement. The court also sustained objections to Frazier’s
statements that Langridge and Royal were working with First
American to terminate the second lease and Langridge and Royal
picked up the three remaining printers. BB does not contend on
appeal the trial court erred in its evidentiary rulings. We
therefore do not include in the factual summary statements by
Frazier to which the court sustained evidentiary objections.

                                 5
need not worry about it.” BB heard “nothing about the
Complaint subsequently and thought that the matter had been
resolved.” Then, on or about September 6, 2021 BB “received in
the mail a Request for Court Judgment dated September 1,
2021.” At this point BB sought legal advice and was informed
that a default might have been entered against BB on April 12,
2021 in light of a docket entry that showed a request for entry of
default filed on that date. Frazier further averred that BB had
“never received any copy of the Request for Entry of Default that
was filed on April 12, 2021 and was unaware that [First
American] [had] sought and obtained a Default.”
       BB argued in its memorandum that it was entitled to relief
based on its excusable neglect because Langridge and Royal told
BB to disregard the complaint and that Langridge would resolve
the misunderstanding about the printers with First American.
Because BB did not receive notice of First American’s request for
entry of default, it was not on notice that a default had been
entered until receiving a copy of the request for default judgment
on September 6. Had BB received the request for entry of
default, it would have moved to set aside the default at that time.
BB also asserted public policy supported vacating the default in
light of BB’s meritorious defense that Langridge and Royal took
advantage of BB by arranging leases for large, expensive printers
that BB could not afford and did not need. Further, First
American took back the printers but continued to charge BB.
       On October 15, 2021 Frazier filed a supplemental
declaration attaching what she described as “text messages” from
Langridge to Frazier instructing Frazier not to respond to the
complaint. The attachments appear to contain screen shots of
words on a page with a date stamp but no other information. The
first message has a 9:51 a.m. stamp and states, “I am working

                                6
[with] them so do not respond please.” A message at 10:12 a.m.
states, “Just say it’s being [handled] and [we’ll] be in touch.” A
10:24 a.m. message states, “But if they call just ignore,” and at
10:32 a.m., “Ok no action for now.” The last message, stamped
11:56 a.m., states, “Karen. Spoken to Ken from collections. We
are good for now.” The messages do not show a sender, recipient,
or date, nor do they have any indicia that the words are part of a
text message.
      On November 12, 2021 First American filed an opposition
to the motion to set aside the default and evidentiary objections
to Frazier’s first declaration. First American also submitted
declarations from First American Assistant Vice President Jill
VanDeWalle and First American’s attorney, Andrew K. Alper, as
well as two declarations from Wuest. VanDeWalle attached to
her declaration a May 8, 2020 email (just after BB’s initial
default) from Danielle Naylon, First American’s portfolio officer
who handled collections, to Frazier, stating Naylon had spoken
with Langridge at Frazier’s suggestion, and Langridge “claims no
mention of [BB] being ‘relieved of [its] payment obligations,’ and
he gave no indication that his company would make the lease
payments on behalf of [BB].” Naylon demanded payment from
BB, or First American would escalate the matter to litigation.
Frazier and Wuest then exchanged emails discussing potential
reduced lease payments. On June 10, 2020 Wuest offered Frazier
a proposal for BB to pay 25% of the amount past due as a
condition of First American restructuring BB’s future lease
payments. Frazier thanked Wuest and accepted, explaining BB’s
business had “shrunken,” and it no longer needed the printers.
      As discussed, on June 30, 2020 BB and First American
negotiated modifications to the leases. But starting on
December 1, 2020, BB stopped making its lease payments under

                                7
the modified leases. VanDeWalle attached to her declaration
multiple emails from VanDeWalle and others at First American
to Frazier or Langridge. On December 14 a First American
employee told Langridge that First American needed to talk
directly to Frazier to address possible COVID-19 relief. On
December 16 VanDeWalle followed up, advising Frazier and Cecy
Mendoza (BB’s controller) in an email that she had received
information from Royal, but reiterating that First American
“cannot assist with a possible solution unless you speak with us.”
Frazier responded by email later that day that BB did not have
sufficient business to support having the printers, requesting
First American pick up the “balance” of the printers, and stating
Langridge would discuss the matter further with First American
in BB’s place. On December 29 VanDeWalle emailed Langridge
with an offer for BB to cure its December default by paying
approximately $5,300, to which Langridge responded that BB
“could offer a minimal amount” toward the December payment
“to keep the conversation channel open for now.” The record does
not reflect further email communications.
       On January 26, 2021 Alper mailed a letter to BB, directed
to Mendoza, advising the company that the leases were in default
and demanding payment and return of the printers. The letter
stated BB owed back payments of approximately $11,000, and if
it did not make the payments within 10 days, First American
would declare a default, and the full sum of $231,119 would be
due under the leases. Further, if payment was not made and the
printers were not returned, First American “[would] commence
litigation and [BB] [would] be liable for attorney’s fees and costs
in any such litigation.”
       Alper declared BB did not respond to the demand letter,
and First American filed the complaint on February 24, 2021,

                                 8
with personal service on Frazier at BB. On April 12 First
American lodged a request for entry of default and mailed the
request to BB at the 21st Street address. No one from BB
contacted Alper after receiving notice of the request for entry of
default, and the request was not returned as undeliverable. On
July 6 First American mailed its case management statement to
BB at the 21st Street address, which referenced the default in
two places. According to Alper, the case management statement
was not returned as undeliverable. BB first responded to the
complaint on September 28, 2021, at which time Nguyen sent a
letter on behalf of BB to Alper stating, “Perhaps we can engage in
settlement discuss[ions] once the entry of default is set aside.”
First American declined the offer.
       First American argued in its opposition that BB had not
shown excusable mistake or neglect because its reliance on
statements by Langridge was not reasonable, especially given
that Langridge was acting as BB’s agent, not First American’s.
Further, BB failed to respond to the April 12, 2021 request for
entry of default and July 6, 2021 case management statement,
which were served by mail on BB at the 21st Street address. Yet
Frazier falsely denied in her declaration that she had not
received any documents in the action prior to receiving the
default judgment packet on September 6, 2021. In the
alternative, First American argued that if the court were to set
aside the default, First American should recover its attorneys’
fees and costs incurred in opposing the motion pursuant to
section 437b, subdivision (c).
       In its reply, BB argued it reasonably relied on Langridge’s
representations given BB’s long-term business relationship with
him. Further, First American’s three declarants had no
knowledge of Langridge’s representations to BB. BB also relied

                                9
on Frazier’s statement in her declaration that she never received
the request for entry of default and did not recall receiving First
American’s case management statement. BB again asserted
public policy favored a trial on the merits.7
       After a hearing on November 29, 2021, the trial court
denied BB’s motion.8 The court sustained First American’s
objections to multiple paragraphs of Frazier’s declaration based
on hearsay and other grounds. The court found BB failed to show
good cause to vacate the default, explaining, “[BB] represents
that it did not timely respond to [BB’s] complaint because it was
relying on statements from Langridge and Royal that no response
was required. However, [BB] submits no admissible evidence
demonstrating . . . what statements Langridge and Royal
allegedly made or that its mistake, surprise or neglect in relying
on such statements was reasonable.” Further, the court pointed
to Frazier’s December 2020 emails to First American directing
the company to negotiate with Langridge about the missed
payments, to which First American “reiterated it needed to speak
with her.” The court found Frazier’s “reliance on Langridge to

7     BB also argued First American’s opposition was untimely
because, although it was timely filed and served, it was received
by BB just one day before BB’s reply was due. The trial court
rejected this argument, and BB does not raise it on appeal.
8      The minute order for the hearing reflects that BB’s
attorney called the courtroom staff to state he had signed up for a
telephonic appearance through “court connect” but was unable to
connect and make a remote appearance. The record does not
reflect whether BB’s attorney called courtroom staff before or
after the hearing. BB on appeal does not argue that proceeding
with the hearing without BB’s attorney being present was error.
The record does not contain a transcript of the hearing.

                                10
negotiate for her eliminates any inference that relying on any
statement from him was good cause not to respond to the
complaint.” The court found BB “was served with the Summons,
Complaint and Request for Entry of Default at the same
address.” The court observed the filing of a proof of service of
these documents created a rebuttable presumption that the
service was proper, and “[t]hus, the court is not persuaded that
[BB’s] failure to respond to the Complaint was reasonable.”
      On February 25, 2022 the trial court entered a default
judgment in favor of First American for $231,120, plus attorneys’
fees and costs. BB timely appealed from the judgment.

                           DISCUSSION

A.    Governing Law and Standard of Review
      Section 473, subdivision (b), provides in relevant part, “The
court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party . . .
from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken
against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief . . . shall
be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six
months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was
taken.” To qualify for discretionary relief under section 473,
subdivision (b), “the party seeking relief must show (1) a proper
ground for relief, and (2) ‘the party has raised that ground in a
procedurally proper manner, within any applicable time limits.’”
(Henderson v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th
215, 229 (Henderson); accord, Huh v. Wang (2007)
158 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1419 (Huh).)
      As the Court of Appeal in Henderson explained as to
inadvertence or excusable neglect, “‘[t]o warrant relief under

                                  11
section 473 a litigant’s neglect must have been such as might
have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the same
circumstances. The inadvertence contemplated by the statute
does not mean mere inadvertence in the abstract. If it is wholly
inexcusable it does not justify relief.’” (Henderson, supra,
187 Cal.App.4th at p. 230; accord, Austin v. Los Angeles Unified
School Dist. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 918, 929 (Austin) [“Within
the context of section 473(b) neglect is excusable if a reasonably
prudent person under similar circumstances might have made
the same error.”]; County of Los Angeles v. Financial Casualty &
Surety Inc. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 37, 44 [bond surety
demonstrated excusable neglect and surprise in failing to appear
to argue its motion to vacate a bail bond forfeiture after a
courtroom clerk misinformed its attorney on the morning of the
hearing that the court had already granted the motion].) The
trial court has discretion to grant relief under section 473,
subdivision (b), “based on its evaluation of the nature of the
mistake or error alleged and the justification proffered for the
conduct that occurred.” (Austin, at p. 928.)
       “[R]elief is not warranted unless the moving party
demonstrates diligence in seeking it.” (Huh, supra,
158 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1420-1421 [affirming denial of
discretionary relief under section 473, subdivision (b), where
appellant waited more than three months after service of notice
of entry of judgment to file his motion]; accord, Younessi v. Woolf
(2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1145 [“Given the absence of
evidence explaining the seven-week delay in seeking to set aside
the dismissal, the diligence requirement was not satisfied.”].)
“While six months—the longest time allowable—represents the
outside limit ‘of the court’s jurisdiction to grant relief in any
event, the “reasonable time” test stands as an independent

                                12
consideration and in any given situation, its determination,
within the maximum six-month period, “depends upon the
circumstances of that particular case.”’” (Huh, at p. 1422.)
Whether a party has acted diligently is a question of fact for the
trial court to be decided based on the circumstances of the
particular case. (Minick v. City of Petaluma (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th
15, 33; Younessi, at p. 1145.)
       “‘A ruling on a motion for discretionary relief under
section 473 shall not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear
showing of [an] abuse’” of discretion. (Zamora v. Clayborn
Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 257; accord,
Austin, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 929.) Under this standard,
“we may reverse only if we conclude the trial court’s decision is
‘“so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree
with it.”’” (Mechling v. Asbestos Defendants (2018)
29 Cal.App.5th 1241, 1249 [affirming grant of equitable relief
from default judgment].) “That a different decision could have
been reached is not sufficient because we cannot substitute our
discretion for that of the trial court. The trial court’s ruling must
be beyond the bounds of reason for us to reverse it.” (Mechling,
at p. 1249.)
       Where the underlying facts are disputed, we review the
trial court’s factual findings under section 473, subdivision (b),
for substantial evidence; where the facts are not in dispute, we
review the trial court’s determination whether the requirements
for section 473, subdivision (b), have been met de novo. (Bailey v.
Citibank, N.A. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 335, 348; Martin Potts &
Associates, Inc. v. Corsair, LLC (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 432, 437.)
In assessing whether there is substantial evidence, we review the
record in the light most favorable to the ruling, resolving all
conflicts and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of that

                                 13
ruling. (McClain v. Kissler (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 399, 415; King
v. State of California (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 265, 278-279.) We
defer to the trial court’s factual findings made in the exercise of
its discretion in reviewing the court’s ruling granting or denying
discretionary relief under section 473, subdivision (b). (Zamora v.
Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc., supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 258
[“‘“where there is a substantial conflict in the facts stated, a
determination of the controverted facts by the trial court will not
be disturbed”’”]; Fernandes v. Singh (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 932,
940 [“we defer to the trial court’s resolution of any factual
conflicts in the declarations”]; Minick v. City of Petaluma, supra,
3 Cal.App.5th at p. 24 [trial court’s “factual findings in the
exercise of [its] discretion are entitled to deference”].)
       However, there is a public policy favoring trial on the
merits. (See Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 978,
984 (Rappleyea) [trial court abused its discretion in denying
equitable relief from default judgment where defendants failed to
pay entirety of filing fee for answer due to incorrect information
from clerk’s office]; Fasuyi v. Permatex, Inc. (2008)
167 Cal.App.4th 681, 694, 701-703 [trial court abused its
discretion in denying motion under section 473, subdivision (b),
for relief from default judgment entered after defendant’s insurer
failed to file answer].) Moreover, “[t]he general underlying
purpose of section 473(b) is to promote the determination of
actions on their merits.” (Even Zohar Construction &
Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th
830, 839; accord, Austin, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 928.)
“Because the law favors disposing of cases on their merits, ‘any
doubts in applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of the
party seeking relief from default [citations]. Therefore, a trial
court order denying relief is scrutinized more carefully than an

                                14
order permitting trial on the merits.’” (Rappleyea, at p. 980;
accord, McClain v. Kissler (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 399, 413;
Fasuyi, at p. 696 [“[T]he remedial relief offered by section 473 is
‘highly favored and is liberally applied.’”].)

B.     The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying
       the Motion To Set Aside the Entry of Default
       BB contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying
discretionary relief based on its finding that BB unreasonably
relied on Langridge’s representation there was no need to
respond to the complaint because Langridge was resolving what
was a misunderstanding. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion.
       As discussed, Frazier stated that when she contacted
Langridge about service of the complaint, he told her there was a
misunderstanding, that Langridge would resolve the matter, and
as to the complaint, “BB need not worry about it.” BB argues it
was reasonable to rely on Langridge’s advice not to respond to the
complaint given BB’s long-time relationship with Langridge and
Royal, which served as a vendor of the equipment, whereas First
American “was a hence-unknown, third party to BB in the
transaction.”
       Contrary to BB’s position, however, First American was no
stranger to the transaction. The leases made clear that First
American was the lessor, and further, BB’s obligation to make
payments under the lease were “absolute, unconditional and non-
cancellable.” The delivery and acceptance certificate likewise
certifies that all equipment in the lease agreement between
“‘Lessee’ and First American Commercial Bancorp, Inc. (‘Lessor’)
has been delivered to and been received by Lessee.” Nowhere in
either the lease or the delivery and acceptance certificate is there

                                 15
a mention of Royal or Langridge. Certainly, BB could have
answered the complaint and argued on the merits that it was
excused from performance under the leases. But the fact BB
trusted Langridge and considered First American a third-party
stranger was not an excuse for ignoring a properly served
summons and complaint.
       Further, Frazier was very involved in the negotiations that
preceded the filing of this action. The record reflects that
starting in May 2020, when BB first defaulted on its lease
payments, Frazier negotiated directly with Naylon, who handled
collections for First American. Frazier then obtained the lease
modifications from Wuest, whom she thanked for the reduced
payments. After BB defaulted on the modified leases in
December 2020, Frazier again communicated directly with First
American, requesting VanDeWalle arrange for the remaining
printers to be picked up. It is true that VanDeWalle’s subsequent
communications were with Langridge (notwithstanding First
American’s demands to talk to Frazier directly), but the
negotiations fell through when Langridge rejected VanDeWalle’s
December 29 offer, stating BB could only pay a “minimal amount”
to keep the talks going. The next communication in the record is
Alper’s January 26, 2021 demand letter, followed by the filing of
this action.
       As the trial court found, BB presented no admissible
evidence of statements made by Langridge that Frazier claims
she relied on other than her recounting that Langridge stated
there was a misunderstanding with First American that he would
resolve. The purported texts from Langridge did not show the
date, sender, or recipient, or that they were transmitted as text
messages. And in light of the multiple email communications in
December 2020 that failed to resolve the dispute, leading to

                               16
Alper’s January 26 demand letter threatening litigation, it was
not reasonable for Frazier to have relied on a promise by
Langridge that he was going to resolve the litigation without BB
responding to the complaint. Moreover, Langridge was acting on
BB’s behalf and was not a representative of First American. And
BB failed to present any communications between First
American and Langridge following Langridge’s response to
VanDeWalle’s December 29, 2020 offer that would suggest there
were ongoing negotiations, or that First American was prepared
to stay the litigation to allow discussions to continue.
      Frazier’s averment that, after Langridge told her he would
resolve the misunderstanding with First American, BB “heard
nothing about the Complaint subsequently” and “thought that
the matter had been resolved” is likewise contrary to the
evidence. We defer to the trial court’s finding that Frazier
received notice of First American’s April 12, 2021 request for
entry of default in light of the proof of service of the request on
BB at the 21st Street address and Alper’s averment that the
notice was never returned to First American as undeliverable.
Frazier similarly denied receiving the July 6 case management
statement (which referred to entry of the default),
notwithstanding proof of service on BB at the 21st Street
address. Frazier provided no details as to how the notices could
have been lost, for example, a history of BB not receiving mail at
the 21st Street location.
      On these facts, BB failed to demonstrate excusable neglect
by presenting evidence showing a reasonably prudent person
under the same circumstances would have ignored the complaint.
(Austin, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 929; Henderson, supra,
187 Cal.App.4th at p. 230.) Nor did BB explain why it was
diligent in waiting until the precise six-month date from entry of

                                17
the default to file its motion to set aside the default, especially in
light of notice of the request for entry of default and case
management statement. (Huh, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1422.) BB did not contact First American after service of the
complaint for seven months, at which time Nguyen sent a letter
to Alper offering to discuss settlement if First American would
agree to set aside the default. BB did not call anyone at First
American to inquire whether BB needed to respond to the
complaint, nor did Frazier contact Langridge or VanDeWalle to
confirm that a resolution had been reached.9
       BB alternatively argues on appeal that the trial court
should have granted its motion to set aside the default pursuant
to its equitable powers to vacate a default based on extrinsic
fraud or mistake. (See Rappleyea, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 981; Lee
v. An (2008) 168 Cal.App4th 558, 566 [“a trial court retains
discretion to vacate a default on equitable grounds, even if
statutory relief is unavailable”].) However, BB did not in its
motion request discretionary equitable relief based on extrinsic
mistake, forfeiting the argument on appeal. (See Quiles v. Parent
(2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1013 [“‘Failure to raise specific
challenges in the trial court forfeits the claim on appeal.’”].) Even

9     We acknowledge that following service of the complaint,
Alper never contacted anyone at BB before requesting a default
just two months later. Although it does not appear that BB had a
lawyer at the time, Alper could (and should) have followed up
with Mendoza (to whom he sent the demand letter) or Frazier to
provide advance warning that he was going to request entry of a
default. However, given the failure of BB to respond to Alper’s
demand letter, the complaint, the request for entry of default, or
the case management statement, it was not an abuse of
discretion for the trial court to deny relief to BB.

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if the issue were not forfeited, to set aside a default based on
extrinsic mistake, BB needed to “articulate a satisfactory excuse
for not presenting a defense to the original action” and show
diligence in seeking to set aside the default. (Rappleyea, at
p. 982; see Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th
488, 503 [trial court abused its discretion in granting equitable
relief from default where defendant failed to explain nine-month
delay from the time of entry of judgment until filing motion for
relief].) As discussed, BB did neither.
       Although we recognize the strong public policy favoring a
trial on the merits (Rappleyea, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 978, 984),
we cannot say the trial court’s denial of relief was so irrational or
arbitrary that no reasonable person would agree with the
decision. (Mechling v. Asbestos Defendants, supra,
29 Cal.App.5th at p. 1249.)

                          DISPOSITION

      The default judgment is affirmed. First American is to
recover its costs on appeal.

                                      FEUER, J.

We concur:

      SEGAL, Acting P. J.             MARTINEZ, J.

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