Court Opinion

ID: 9738880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:04:50.046149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:08.935793
License: Public Domain

Caporale, J.,
concurring.
It seems to me that my dissenting colleagues’ criticisms of the majority opinion inflate the judicial role. The plaintiff herein seeks workers’ compensation benefits because he is gradually wearing out. However, the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act compensates only those personal injuries which result from “accident or occupational disease, arising out of and in the course of. . . employment.” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-101 (Reissue 1988). The gradual wearing process falls neither within this jurisdiction’s definition of accident or occupational disease, see Maxson v. Michael Todd & Co., 238 Neb. 209, 469 N.W.2d 542 (1991), nor, I submit, within any reasonable definition of those terms. Although some do so at a slower rate than others, we need no evidential record to tell us that all humans gradually wear out until the process produces death.
Admittedly, some occupations contribute to the wearing process more than do others. Thus, there may be a basis for compensating gradual work-caused wear under some system or *42another. I suggest that the federal Social Security Act does precisely that. See 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1988). Nonetheless, there may be some who would argue that our compensation act should supplement any other existing system and be extended to cover gradual work-caused wear.
I submit, however, that such is a policy decision to be made by our Legislature after full study, debate, and understanding of the economics involved; it is not a burden to be forced upon the employers of this state by judicial fiat. See, Neb. Const, art. II, § 1 (divides powers of government into the legislative, executive, and judicial branches and, as a general matter, prohibits one branch from encroaching on duties and prerogatives of other branches); State ex rel. Spire v. Conway, 238 Neb. 766, 472 N.W.2d 403 (1991). See, also, Nebraska P.P. Dist. v. City of York, 212 Neb. 747, 326 N.W.2d 22 (1982) (function of Legislature to declare law by enactment of statutes); Bowers v. Maire, 179 Neb. 239, 137 N.W.2d 796 (1965) (court will not indulge in judicial legislation); State v. Tatreau, 176 Neb. 381, 126 N.W.2d 157 (1964) (duty of court to administer law as it exists).
Boslaugh, White, and Fahrnbruch, JJ., join in this concurrence.