Court Opinion

ID: 9831063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:46:15.004842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:29.581278
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellant insists that the court erred in refusing and failing to give its specially requested charge No. 6, which is set -out in the fourteenth assignment, and is, caption omitted, as follows; “You are instructed that one entering the employment of a railway company who is at the time engaged in interstate commerce assumed all the risks ordinarily incident to the business in the manner in which it is conducted, of which hie has actual knowledge, or, in the ordinary discharge of his duty, must necessarily have acquired knowledge. Therefore, if you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was notified by brakeman Sowell that the freight train did not clear the main line at the west end of the west-passing track, and if you further believe from the evidence that the plaintiff ran his engine into said cars at said point without knowing that the freight train had cleared the main line at the time and place he did, and if you further *98believe it was bis duty to bave known that said track was clear before proceeding past that point, then you are instructed that the plaintiff assumed all risk of running bis engine and train over the main line at said point without knowing that said track was clear; and in that event you will return a verdict in favor of the defendant.”
It is contended that it is a controverted issue as to whether it was the duty of appel-lee to know that the track was clear, and that, if such was his duty, and he ran his train into the other without first ascertaining if the danger had passed, he assumed the risk, and could not recover on account of the Employers’ Liability Act approved April 22, 1908.
“Assumed risk refers to a general course of action in connection with the master’s way of doing business and the appliances furnished; contributory negligence refers to the question as to whether .the servant acted prudently in connection with a certain matter that arose for his consideration at a certain time and place. The first is an intelligent choice; the latter is carelessness.”' El Paso & Southern Ry. Co. v. Foth, 101 Tex. page 137, 100 S. W. 173. There is no evidence that Bosher knew the way was still blocked at the time he pulled out with his train. The doctrine of assumed risk rests upon knowledge, because a risk cannot be assumed, unless the one assuming same has knowledge thereof. But we are told that there was evidence introduced strongly tending to show that it was appellee’s duty to know that the track was clear before proceeding with his train; to which we answer that, if such was his duty, and he did not perform it, he would be guilty, of contributory negligence. But he would *not be guilty of assuming the risk, unless he had knowledge of the presence of the train at the time he put his train in motion. There is no testimony that he had such knowledge, although he did know it had been there. “Assuming .the risk of an employment is one thing, and quite a different thing from incurring an injury through contributory negligence.” If appellant’s witnesses are correct that it was Bosher’s duty to know that the track was clear, and he did not perform that duty, he was guilty of contributory negligence. The court charged on that subject: “One having full knowledge of 'defects in machinery with which he is employed may yet use the utmost care to avert danger which they threaten. Assumption of the risk and contributory negligence approximate where danger is so obvious and imminent that no ordinarily prudent man would assume the risk of injury therefrom, but where the danger, though present' and appreciated, is one which many men are in the habit of assuming, and which prudent men' who must earn a living are willing to'-assume for extra compensation. One who assumes the risk cannot be said to be guilty of contributory' negligence, if, having in view the risk of danger he assumed, he uses care, reasonably commensurate with the risk, to avoid injurious consequences. One who does not use such care, and who by reason thereof suffers such injury, is guilty of contributory negligence.” Narramore v. Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co., 98 Fed. 298, 37 C. C. A. 499, 48 L. R. A. 68.
' So, if it was Bosher’s duty to know that the freight train had gone, and he did not so ascertain that fact, would he not then be guilty of contributory negligence? And if assumed risk rests on knowledge, and none is shown in this case, on part of appellee, as to the continued presence of the other train, we do not see that a charge on assumed risk as' to this phase of the case would be applicable. Assumed risk is a contract which may be expressed or implied; but contributory negligence is the breách of a legal duty imposed by law upon the servant.
Therefore, if appellant is correct that the evidence is conflicting as to the duty of Bosher to have known whether the track was clear at the time he put his train in motion, it would only have called for a charge on contributory negligence, which was given.
The motion is overruled.