Court Opinion

ID: 9793046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:41:15.769965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:09.130252
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Justice
(dissenting).
It is not without some regret that I find myself unable to agree with the majority decision which affirms a jury verdict for a property damage which must have been distressing indeed to the plaintiff. Nevertheless, it does not necessarily follow that someone else must pay merely because a misfortune has befallen the plaintiff which inspires sympathy.1 The burden can be shifted to another only if he has been guilty of a wrongful invasion of the plaintiff’s rights, which caused the damage. Our concern should be not only with the immediate controversy, but whether the allowance of redress not properly grounded in law may open the “floodgates” to other litigation of the same character; and it is thus important that such a controversy be resolved by a court, or by a jury under correct instructions as to the law applicable thereto.
A distinction should be pointed out between the two bases upon which plaintiff’s claim against the University for damage to her property might be predicated: (1) that it resulted from an intentional invasion of her property rights or (2) that it resulted from the defendant’s negligence.
As to (1) above: I recognize the accuracy of the rule quoted in the main opinion from Dean Prosser relating to liability for the type of injury herein dealt with or an invasion of another’s land which is:
* * * intentional merely in the sense that the defendant has created *297or continued the condition causing the nuisance with full knowledge that the harm to the plaintiff’s interest is substantially certain to follow. * * *
This statement is essentially the same as Restatement of Torts, Sec. 825:
An invasion of another’s interest in the use and enjoyment of land is intentional when the actor
(a) acts for the purpose of causing it; or
(b) knows that it is resulting or is substantially certain to result from his conduct.
The comments to Sec. 825 point out that “It is not enough to make an invasion intentional that the actor realizes or should realise that his conduct involves a serious risk or likelihood of causing such an invasion.” Comment b, which deals with continuing or recurrent invasions, states, “In such cases the first invasion resulting from the actor’s conduct may be either intentional or unintentional, but when the conduct is continued after the actor knows that the invasion is resulting from it, further invasions are intentional.”
An essential of the factual foundation for the plaintiff’s claim was that the 21-inch pipe which was used to drain the area was inadequate. Because there had been a previous flooding condition, of which the University was aware as indicated, inter alia, by Pres. Fletcher’s letter, there was a basis in the evidence for giving instructions covering an intentional invasion. However, the difficulty is that the instructions given did not clearly and accurately cover this theory for recovery. They did not direct the jury’s attention to the question whether the defendant had “knowledge that the harm to plaintiff’s interests was substantially certain to follow” as re--quired by the rule quoted above. However, it did tell them that before they could find the University liable they must first find that:
The defendant knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known of the existence of either defective condition, if any (in either the culvert or other public improvement).
The fault in that instruction is that it fails to conform to the rule hereinabove referred to and approved in the main opinion by omitting the requirement that the defendant must be found to have created or continued the condition with knowledge that harm is “substantially certain to follow.” Moreover, by the use of the emphasized phrase, “or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known,” it imports an element included in the concept of negligence. Having done so, I think, it is regrettable that the trial court refused to submit the issue of the defendant’s negligence, and give the properly requested *298instructions, including defenses, relating to it. On that matter I am in agreement with what is said in Justice Ellett’s dissent in demonstrating that the question of the defendant’s negligence should have been submitted to the jury.
In view of the fact that the judgment is affirmed by the majority decision, it is perhaps unnecessary in this separate dissent, but for whatever value it may have, I further observe that in connection with a trial on the question of negligence, it is my opinion that there were other issues with respect to which the jury should have been permitted to determine the facts.
The first is whether this particular storm was one of such violent and unprecedented proportions that it was not something which the defendant in reasonable care and prudence should have been required to foresee and guard against. The other is correlated thereto: whether the defect in the drainage, if any, was a “latent defect,” i. e., one which was not readily observable upon inspection, and thus one for which immunity was not waived (Sec. 63-30-9, U.C.A.1953).
These issues should be determined by the jury under proper instructions. I would therefore agree with the second alternative suggested by Justice Ellett: to remand for a new trial, but upon the issues as stated herein. (Emphasis added.)

. See statement in Watkins v. Utah Poultry & Farmers Cooperative, 122 Utah 459, 251 P.2d 663.