Court Opinion

ID: 9894895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-03 16:08:07.501231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:56.507790
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Tipp City Edn. Assn. v. Tipp City Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2023-Ohio-4000.]

                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                        MIAMI COUNTY

 TIPP CITY EDUC. ASS'N, et al.                           :
                                                         :
       Appellants                                        :    C.A. No. 2023-CA-16
                                                         :
 v.                                                      :    Trial Court Case No. 23 CV 90
                                                         :
 TIPP CITY EXEMPTED VILLAGE                              :    (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas
 SCHOOL DISTRICT BD OF EDUC.                             :    Court)
                                                         :
       Appellee                                          :

                                                 ...........

                                                 OPINION

                                     Rendered on November 3, 2023

                                                 ...........

STEPHEN R. KEENEY & SUSAN D. JANSEN, Attorneys for Appellants

LISA M. BURLESON, SUSAN KEATING ANDERSON, ADRIENNE B. KIRSHNER, &
DAVID S. HIRT, Attorneys for Appellee

                                               .............

HUFFMAN, J.

        {¶ 1} Plaintiffs-Appellants Tipp City Education Association (“TCEA”) and Jennifer

Wightman appeal from the trial court’s order dismissing their complaint for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. For the reasons outlined below, the judgment of the trial court will be

affirmed in part and reversed in part.
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                           I.     Facts and Procedural History

       {¶ 2} TCEA is the exclusive collective bargaining representative and a party to a

certain collective bargaining agreement (“the CBA”) representing a bargaining unit of

teachers and other employees at Defendant-Appellee Tipp City Exempted Village School

District Board of Education (“the District”). Wightman is an elementary teacher in the

District and a member of TCEA.

       {¶ 3} The CBA executed between the District and TCEA governs employee wages,

hours, and terms and conditions of employment in the District, and it includes a four-step

grievance procedure. In September 2022, the District received complaints from parents

regarding Wightman. Thereafter, TCEA filed a grievance on behalf of Wightman pursuant

to Section 5.03 of the CBA, which sets forth the grievance procedure and includes non-

binding mediation in the final step. In the grievance, TCEA alleged that the District had

violated Section 7.12 of the CBA when it received parental complaints about Wightman

but failed to encourage the complainants to first discuss their complaints with her.

       {¶ 4} Subsequently, Wightman was issued an unpaid suspension by the District.

In October 2022, Wightman filed another grievance alleging that the District had violated

Section 7.11(B)(2) and 7.11(B)(3) of the CBA when it disciplined Wightman without good

and just cause and failed to apply discipline in a progressive manner. According to the

parties, TCEA, Wightman, and the District proceeded through grievance steps I through

IV as outlined in the CBA but were unable to resolve the grievances. According to the

CBA, if consensus is not reached during mediation, the grievant “may seek resolution

through legal options.”
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       {¶ 5} In March 2023, TCEA and Wightman filed their complaint in the trial court

pursuant to R.C. 4117.09(B)(1) alleging a breach of the CBA. Thereafter, the District filed

a motion to dismiss the complaint, claiming that the trial court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction under Civ.R. 12(B)(1). Specifically, the District argued that TCEA and

Wightman’s claims arose from the CBA and that the Ohio State Employment Relations

Board (“SERB”) had exclusive jurisdiction over such claims. In turn, TCEA and Wightman

argued that the trial court had jurisdiction over breach of contract claims related to the

CBA under R.C. 4117.09(B)(1) and, thus, the District’s motion to dismiss should be

denied.

       {¶ 6} The trial court subsequently granted the District’s motion to dismiss, finding

that SERB had exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute and, thus, the trial court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction. In so holding, the trial court reasoned that the dispute between

the parties had arisen from the grievance procedure delineated in the CBA and, thus,

SERB had exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute. The trial court dismissed the complaint,

and TCEA and Wightman appealed.

                                 II.     Assignment of Error

       {¶ 7} TCEA and Wightman assert the following assignment of error:

       The trial court erred when it granted defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack

       of subject matter jurisdiction.

       {¶ 8} The threshold issue before the trial court was whether it had subject matter

jurisdiction over Plaintiffs-Appellants’ claims. See Turner v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.,

180 Ohio App.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-6608, 904 N.E.2d 566, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.) (“Whether there
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is subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold question that will prevent a court from reaching

the underlying issues in a case.”). Civ.R. 12(B)(1) allows parties to move for dismissal

based on “lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Everhart v. Merrick Mfg., 2d Dist.

Montgomery No. 29520, 2022-Ohio-4626, ¶ 31. “The standard of review for a dismissal

pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) is whether any cause of action cognizable by the forum has

been raised in the complaint.” Id., quoting State ex rel. Bush v. Spurlock, 42 Ohio St.3d

77, 80, 537 N.E.2d 641 (1989), citing Avco Fin. Loan, Inc. v. Hale, 36 Ohio App.3d 65,

67, 520 N.E.2d 1378(10th Dist.1987).

       {¶ 9} “Appellate review of dismissals under Civ.R. 12(B)(1) is de novo.” Everhart

at ¶ 31, quoting Cook v. Pitter Patter Learning Ctr., LLC, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29260,

2022-Ohio-961, ¶ 17, citing State ex rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn. v. State of Ohio,

146 Ohio St.3d 315, 2016-Ohio-478, 56 N.E.3d 913, ¶ 12. “This means we apply the

same standards as the trial court.” Id., citing Carter v. Trotwood-Madison City Bd. of Edn.,

181 Ohio App.3d 764, 2009-Ohio-1769, 910 N.E.2d 1088, ¶ 26 (2d Dist.).

       {¶ 10} Chapter 4117 of the Ohio Revised Code pertains to public employees’

collective bargaining. “The enactment of R.C. Chapter 4117 established a framework for

resolution of labor disputes in the public sector by creating new rights and by setting forth

specific procedures and remedies for asserting those rights.” Young v. Ohio State Univ.

Hosps., 10th Dist. Franklin No. No. 16AP-527, 2017-Ohio-2673, ¶ 14, citing Crable v.

Ohio Dept. of Youth Servs., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 09AP-191, 2010-Ohio-788, ¶ 9, citing

Franklin Cty. Law Enforcement Assn. v. Fraternal Order of Police, Capital City Lodge No.

9, 59 Ohio St.3d 167, 572 N.E.2d 87 (1991); see Dayton v. Fraternal Order of Police,
                                                                                           -5-

Captain John C. Post Lodge No. 44, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 18158, 2000 WL 706829

(June 2, 2000) (“R.C. Chapter 4117 sets forth the rights and obligations of public

employers, public employees, and public employee organizations insofar as they engage

in collective bargaining.”); see also State ex rel. Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor

Council, Inc. v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 76 Ohio St.3d 287, 289, 667 N.E.2d

929 (1996) (“[I]f a party asserts claims that arise from or are dependent on the collective

bargaining rights created by R.C. Chapter 4117, the remedies provided in that chapter

are exclusive.”).

       {¶ 11} “Subject-matter jurisdiction is the power conferred upon a court, either by

constitutional provision or by statute, to decide a particular matter or issue on its merits.”

Career & Technical Assn. v. Auburn Vocational School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 11th Dist. Lake

No. 2021-L-113, 2022-Ohio-2737, ¶ 25, citing State ex rel. Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d

70, 75, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998). SERB is a state agency created by R.C. Chapter 4117.

Id., citing R.C. 4117.02(A); see also State ex rel. Brecksville Edn. Assn., OEA/NEA v.

State Emp. Relations Bd., 74 Ohio St.3d 665, 666, 660 N.E.2d 1199 (1996). “When the

General Assembly intends to vest an administrative agency with exclusive jurisdiction, it

does so by appropriate statutory language.” State ex rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn. at

¶ 52, citing State ex rel. Banc One Corp. v. Walker, 86 Ohio St.3d 169, 171-172, 712

N.E.2d 742 (1999). Because SERB is a state agency and a creation of statute, it is limited

to the authority and jurisdiction conferred on it by statute. Id. at ¶ 51.

       {¶ 12} In their sole assignment of error, TCEA and Wightman first argue that the

trial court had subject matter jurisdiction under R.C. 4117.09(B)(1). R.C. 4117.09 sets
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forth certain requirements for written collective bargaining agreements. Specifically, R.C.

4117.09(B)(1) states that a written collective bargaining agreement shall contain a

provision that “provides for a grievance procedure which may culminate with final and

binding arbitration of unresolved grievances, and disputed interpretations of agreements,

and which is valid and enforceable under its terms when entered into in accordance with

this chapter.” Furthermore, “a party to the agreement may bring suits for violation of

agreements or the enforcement of an award by an arbitrator in the court of common pleas

of any county wherein a party resides or transacts business.” (Emphasis added.) R.C.

4117.09(B)(1). Thus, R.C. 4117.09(B)(1) “expressly allows for suits alleging violations of

collective bargaining agreements to be brought in common pleas courts.” Young at ¶ 13,

quoting Moore v. Youngstown State Univ., 63 Ohio App.3d 238, 242, 578 N.E.2d 536

(10th Dist.1989).

       {¶ 13} Additionally, TCEA and Wightman argue that the trial court had subject

matter jurisdiction under the weight of legal authority in Ohio case law. In support of their

argument, TCEA and Wightman assert that the Third, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Districts

have held that common pleas courts have jurisdiction over claims for breaches of

collective bargaining agreements. Northwest State Community College v. Northwest

State Community College Edn. Assn. OEA/NEA, 3d Dist. Henry No. 7-16-11, 2016-Ohio-

8393, ¶ 37 (SERB did not have exclusive jurisdiction over union’s claim that state

community college had violated a collective bargaining agreement by eliminating a union

position and creating an equivalent non-union position; thus the case was subject to

arbitration where there was no assertion of unfair labor practices.); Akron Assn. of
                                                                                            -7-

Classified Personnel v. Akron City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 9th Dist. Summit No. 30098,

2022-Ohio-3216, ¶ 16 (SERB did not have exclusive jurisdiction over former employees’

claim that the school board denied their right to a retroactive pay raise as set forth in their

CBA because their claim did not arise from or depend on the collective bargaining rights

created by R.C. Chapter 4117); Moore at 241-42 (R.C. 4117.09(B)(1) specifies that suits

for violations of a collective bargaining agreement are to be brought in the common pleas

courts of this state); Bd. of Trumbull Cty. Commrs. v. Gatti, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2017-

T-0027, 2017-Ohio-8533, ¶ 15 (SERB did not have exclusive jurisdiction where a party’s

duty to pay his proportional share of a hospitalization-insurance premium and the other

party’s right to reimbursement of that share arose out of the CBA but there was no

provision under R.C. Chapter 4117 that created such rights or obligations and no

provision under which the breach of contract or unjust enrichment claims might have

fallen); Career & Technical Assn. at ¶ 28 (SERB did not have exclusive jurisdiction over

dispute where all teachers were required to engage in a planning period before

commencement of their classroom instruction day, as the substance of the allegations

did not relate to an unfair labor practice act under R.C. 4117.11); see also Fraternal Order

of Police, Capital City Lodge No. 9, 64 Ohio App.3d at 689, 582 N.E.2d 669 (“It is clear

[based on the language of R.C. 4117.09(B)(1)] that the intent of the General Assembly in

establishing this limited jurisdiction within the common pleas court is limited to those

instances where it is claimed that there has been a violation of a collective bargaining

agreement or for the enforcement of an arbitrator’s award.”).

       {¶ 14} “Exclusive jurisdiction to resolve unfair labor practice charges is vested in
                                                                                         -8-

SERB in two general areas: (1) where one of the parties filed charges with SERB alleging

an unfair labor practice under R.C. 4117.11 and (2) where a complaint brought before the

common pleas court alleges conduct that constitutes an unfair labor practice specifically

enumerated in R.C. 4117.11.” Career & Technical Assn. at ¶ 26, quoting State ex rel.

Ohio Dept. of Mental Health v. Nadel, 98 Ohio St.3d 405, 2003-Ohio-1632, 786 N.E.2d

49, ¶ 23. “Nowhere in R.C. Chapter 4117 does the General Assembly assign SERB

exclusive jurisdiction over all issues touching on that chapter’s provisions. Instead, the

General Assembly targeted specific issues for SERB to address in the first instance.” Id.,

citing State ex rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn. In fact, the Supreme Court has “expressly

acknowledged * * * that a plaintiff may raise in the common pleas courts rights that exist

independently of R.C. Chapter 4117, ‘even though they may touch on the collective

bargaining relationships.’ ” (Citations omitted.) Id. Thus, if a party “advances claims that

‘arise from or depend on the collective bargaining rights created by R.C. Chapter 4117,’

SERB has exclusive, original jurisdiction.” (Citations omitted.) Id. However, “if a party

asserts rights that are independent of R.C. Chapter 4117, the party’s complaint may

properly be heard in common pleas court.” (Citations omitted.) Id. See also State ex rel.

City of Cleveland v. Russo, 156 Ohio St.3d 449, 2019-Ohio-1595, 129 N.E.3d 384, ¶ 14,

citing Franklin Cty. Law Enforcement Assn., 59 Ohio St.3d 167, 572 N.E.2d 87, at

paragraph two of the syllabus. When determining SERB’s exclusive jurisdiction, “the

dispositive test is whether the claims arise from or depend on the collective bargaining

rights created by R.C. Chapter 4117[,]” not the collective bargaining agreement.

(Emphasis added.) Akron Assn. of Classified Personnel at ¶ 16, citing State ex rel.
                                                                                         -9-

Cleveland v. Sutula, 127 Ohio St.3d 131, 2010-Ohio-5039, 937 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 20.

       {¶ 15} Upon our review, we agree with TCEA and Wightman that the trial court had

subject matter jurisdiction under R.C. 4117.09(B)(1) and under the weight of authority in

Ohio case law. TCEA and Wightman did not file charges with SERB alleging an unfair

labor practice under R.C. 4117.11; rather, the claims in their complaint addressed

Wightman’s rights as set forth in the CBA regarding parental complaints, good and just

cause discipline, and progressive discipline and did not allege conduct that constituted

an unfair labor practice specifically enumerated in R.C. 4117.11. Thus, we cannot say

that the allegations here constitute unfair labor practices subject to SERB’s exclusive

review. Since the rights at issue are found in the CBA but not in R.C. Chapter 4117, SERB

did not have exclusive jurisdiction over this matter, and the trial court’s subject matter

jurisdiction came from the terms of the CBA, not from R.C. Chapter 4117.

       {¶ 16} TCEA, as the collective bargaining unit, is a party to the CBA. As already

explained, by its plain terms, R.C. 4117.09(B)(1) applies to violations of collective

bargaining agreements or the enforcement of an award by an arbitrator. Since the plain

language of R.C. 4117.09(B)(1) specifically grants a party the right to sue for a violation

of the collective bargaining agreement in the common pleas court, and because TCEA is

a party to the CBA and brought this action for breach of the CBA, we conclude that the

trial court erred in holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and in dismissing

TCEA’s claims. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court as it related to TCEA.

       {¶ 17} Lastly, however, the District argues that Wightman lacked standing in this

matter, as R.C. 4117.09(B)(1) specifically applies to a “party” to the CBA. As the District
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correctly points out, Wightman, as a public employee union member, was not a “party” to

the CBA between her union (TCEA) and the District. See Young, 10th Dist. Franklin No.

16AP-527, 2017-Ohio-2673, ¶ 16, citing Brondes v. Internatl. Unions of Police Assn.,

AFL-CIO Local 71, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-02-33, 2002-Ohio-5800, ¶ 12 (“Union

members are not ‘parties’ to a collective bargaining agreement.”); Daughriety v. State of

Ohio, Mount Vernon Dev. Ctr., 5th Dist. Knox No. 94 CA 03, 1994 WL 528026, *2 (Sept.

19, 1994) (noting the court’s previous holdings that “the union and the employer are the

proper parties in an action concerning public sector labor, and that an individual employee

cannot bring a private lawsuit [under R.C. Chapter 4117]”). Thus, R.C. 4117.09(B)(1)

does not afford Wightman the right to file a claim in the court of common pleas, because

such a claim is not cognizable in the court of common pleas. Young at ¶ 16, citing

Brondes at ¶ 12 (R.C. 4117.09 does not authorize “an original action by an individual

employee in common pleas court”). Because Wightman is an individual employee and

not a party to the CBA, we agree with the District that Wightman could not bring a private

lawsuit under R.C. Chapter 4117. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order of dismissal

with respect to Wightman.

       {¶ 18} Plaintiffs-Appellants’ assignment of error is sustained in part and overruled

in part.

                                      III.   Conclusion

       {¶ 19} The judgment of the trial court is reversed in part and affirmed in part as set

forth above.

                                      .............
                                   -11-

EPLEY, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.