Court Opinion

ID: 9847164
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:55:09.796131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:02.418139
License: Public Domain

GEER, Judge,
dissenting.
In contrast to the majority opinion, I would remand to the Full Commission for further findings of fact. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
The Full Commission found that “ [t]he primary issue before the Commission is whether Plaintiff’s temporary total disability benefits should be terminated effective December 2001, on the ground that Plaintiff did not have any continuing disability due to her workplace injury after that date.” (Emphasis added.) While plaintiff argues that the presumption set forth in Perez v. Am. Airlines/AMR Corp., 174 N.C. App. 128, 620 S.E.2d 288 (2005), disc. review improvidently allowed, 360 N.C. 587, 634 S.E.2d 887 (2006), and Parsons v. Pantry, Inc., 126 N.C. App. 540, 485 S.E.2d 867 (1997), should apply in this case, the Commission did not address that issue, and plaintiff has *242failed to assign error to the omission. As a result, applicability of the presumption is not properly before this Court. See N.C.R. App. P. 10(d) (“Without taking an appeal an appellee may cross-assign as error any action or omission of the trial court which was properly preserved for appellate review and which deprived the appellee of an alternative basis in law for supporting the judgment, order, or other determination from which appeal has been taken.”); Harllee v. Harllee, 151 N.C. App. 40, 51, 565 S.E.2d 678, 685 (2002) (“In the instant case, the additional arguments raised in plaintiff-appellee’s brief, if sustained, would provide an alternative basis for upholding the trial court’s determination that the premarital agreement is invalid and unenforceable. However, plaintiff failed to cross-assign error pursuant to Rule 10(d) to the trial court’s failure to render judgment on these alternative grounds. Therefore, plaintiff has not properly preserved for appellate review these alternative grounds.”).
On the causation issue addressed by the Commission, the Commission’s critical findings of fact state:
31. The Full Commission finds that Plaintiff’s chronic pain syndrome and the pain in her legs were caused by Plaintiff’s motor vehicle accident on September 21, 2000. Specifically, both Dr. Lawrence and Dr. Olson noted that Plaintiff’s onset of leg pain began approximately September 21, 2000, and both testified that a motor vehicle accident could have caused the rod to break in Plaintiff’s right leg; even though Dr. Olson was of the opinion that it is unlikely the accident caused the rod to break without fracturing the bone itself.
32. The Full Commission gives greater weight to the opinions of Dr. Lawrence versus the opinions of Dr. Olson ....
33. On September 21, 2000, Plaintiff sustained compensable injuries to her back, chest and legs, and suffers from chronic leg pain as a result of her compensable injury. . . .
I fully agree with the majority that the finding that the 21 September 2000 accident “could have caused” the rod in plaintiff’s right leg to break is insufficient to support a conclusion that the accident caused the broken rod.
If the Commission intended to find that plaintiff’s chronic leg pain was the result of the broken rod, then there would be no basis for its determination that the compensable accident caused plaintiff’s current disability. The Commission’s findings of fact are not, how*243ever, that clear. In finding of fact 31, the Commission references plaintiff’s chronic pain syndrome and pain in both legs, as well as the broken rod in the right leg, while finding of fact 33 finds that the compensable accident caused compensable injuries to plaintiff’s back, chest, and legs, as well as the chronic leg pain. In finding of fact 19, describing Dr. Lawrence’s deposition testimony, the Commission differentiated between the doctor’s opinions regarding chronic pain syndrome and the broken rod.
It may be, given the Commission’s extensive focus on the broken rod, that the Commission was basing its finding of causation solely on the broken rod.1 On the other hand, the Commission may also have been relying both on the broken rod and the chronic pain syndrome. There is no clear finding one way or the other whether the leg pain was related to the chronic pain syndrome. The record does contain evidence arguably supporting a finding that the chronic pain syndrome was caused by the accident. Dr. Lawrence, whom the Commission found credible, wrote that the pain syndrome “likely occurred as a result of [plaintiff’s] back injury” and ultimately assigned plaintiff a five percent rating to the back. The record also contains evidence supporting defendants’ position.
Because I cannot determine what the Commission intended to find or whether its conclusions would change with the omission of the broken rod, I would apply the principle that when the Commission’s findings of fact “ ‘are insufficient to determine the rights of the parties, the court may remand to the Industrial Commission for additional findings.’ ” Johnson v. Southern Tire Sales & Serv., 358 N.C. 701, 705, 599 S.E.2d 508, 512 (2004) (quoting Hilliard v. Apex Cabinet Co., 305 N.C. 593, 595, 290 S.E.2d 682, 684 (1982)). I would, therefore, remand to the Commission to make findings of fact regarding whether plaintiff’s current disability was • caused by the 21 September 2000 accident without consideration of the broken rod in plaintiff’s femur.

. I do not agree with plaintiff that the broken femur rod “is the proverbial red herring.” The broken rod is a primary focus of the Commission’s opinion and was also the primary subject addressed during the two medical depositions taken in this case.