Court Opinion

ID: 9909615
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 19:09:34.642319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:08.199767
License: Public Domain

12/13/2023
                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                                AT NASHVILLE
                               Assigned on Briefs November 1, 2023

                 WILLIAM D. CROWDER v. TRE HARGETT ET AL.

                      Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County
                          No. 22C2547 Joseph P. Binkley, Jr., Judge
                          ___________________________________

                                 No. M2023-00590-COA-R3-CV
                             ___________________________________

Appellant appeals the dismissal of his second lawsuit seeking damages and injunctive relief
against four defendants allegedly associated with his criminal prosecution. The trial court
dismissed the second lawsuit as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed and
                                    Remanded

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P. J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which D. MICHAEL
SWINEY, C.J., and JEFFREY USMAN, J., joined.

William D. Crowder, Antioch, Tennessee, Pro se.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Hollie R. Parrish, Assistant Attorney
General, for the appellees, Tre Hargett and Glenn Funk.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée Sophia Blumstein, Solicitor
General; and Meghan Murphy, Senior Assistant Attorney General for the appellee, David
Raush and Robert Burghardt.

                                    MEMORANDUM OPINION1

1
    Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee provides:

          This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse
          or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion
          would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it
          shall be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION,” shall not be published, and shall not
          be cited or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.
                    I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       This case involves three separate legal actions, two of which were civil and one of
which was criminal in nature. On June 2, 2022, Plaintiff/Appellant William D. Crowder
(“Appellant”) filed a complaint (“the First Complaint”) in Davidson County Circuit Court
(“the trial court”) against Defendants/Appellees Secretary of State Tre Hargett, District
Attorney General Glenn Funk, Director of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (“TBI”)
David Rausch, and TBI Special Agent David Burghardt (collectively, “Appellees”). The
First Complaint alleged that Appellees committed malicious prosecution against Appellant
by contributing to or overseeing a process by which Appellant was falsely charged with a
felony. According to Appellant, this damaged his reputation and employability.

       The First Complaint was eventually dismissed on September 7, 2022, on the
following bases: (1) as to Secretary Hargett, under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 8.01
because the complaint did not allege any facts against Secretary Hargett that amount to a
cause of action and under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12.02(6) because he had
absolute immunity as a state employee and cabinet-level executive officer under Tennessee
Code Annotated section 9-8-307(h); (2) as to District Attorney General Funk and Director
Rausch, under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) because they also enjoyed
absolute immunity; and (3) as to Special Agent Burghardt, because the complaint failed to
make any allegations that amount to a cause of action under Rule 8.01. Appellant’s motions
for post-judgment relief were denied by order of December 13, 2022. The dismissal of the
First Complaint was not appealed, and the judgment on the First Complaint became final
when Appellant did not appeal by January 12, 2023.

       Meanwhile a criminal action against Appellant was proceeding (“the Criminal
Action”). Eventually, on September 14, 2022, Appellant pleaded nolo contendere to one
misdemeanor charge of possession of an illegal item. Appellant was not convicted of any
felony charges.

       On December 13, 2022, Appellant filed a second civil complaint (“the Second
Complaint”) against Appellees in the trial court. The Second Complaint alleged that
Appellant was subjected to a false felony charge by District Attorney General Funk due to
Special Agent Burghardt’s false testimony. Appellant further alleged that Director Rausch
and Secretary Hargett were aware of the actions of their subordinates. So once again,
Appellant alleged that Appellees committed malicious prosecution and defamation against
him. Appellant further asserted that District Attorney General Funk was guilty of official
misconduct under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-402, a class E felony, and that
Special Agent Burghardt was guilty of aggravated perjury under Tennessee Code
Annotated section 39-16-703, a class D felony. Appellant asked that he be awarded $10
million in damages, the removal of the “illegitimate felony charge” from his record, the
issuance of a statement describing the circumstances, the payment of Appellant’s legal
fees, and the return of his laptop and phone.
                                            -2-
       After the judgment dismissing the First Complaint became final, Appellees filed
motions to dismiss the Second Complaint, arguing, inter alia, that the claims were barred
by the doctrine of res judicata.2 The trial court entered an order on March 30, 2023,
dismissing the claims against Director Rausch and Special Agent Burghardt as barred by
the doctrine of res judicata.

       On April 6, 2023, the trial court entered an order also dismissing the claims against
Secretary Hargett and District Attorney General Funk on the basis of res judicata. The trial
court, however, also made several other rulings in the alternative. First, it ruled that the
claims of malicious prosecution were barred by the acceptance of the plea deal in the
Criminal Action. As to Secretary Hargett specifically, the trial court ruled that he enjoyed
absolute immunity as a cabinet-level state employee; District Attorney General Funk
enjoyed absolute prosecutorial immunity. Finally, the trial court ruled that to the extent
Appellant was attempting to bring criminal charges of official misconduct, those charges
were not proper in a civil action.

         Appellant thereafter filed a timely appeal to this Court.

                                       II. ISSUES PRESENTED

         On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues, which are taken directly from his
brief:

         Immunity - The Appellees claim that the “Absolute Immunity”, granted to
         the Appellees as employees of the State of Tennessee, extends to the
         commission of crimes. Pursuant to TCA § 9-8-307(h) elected employees of
         the State of Tennessee sacrifice their immunity when committing crimes and,
         in this case, the Appellant was framed for a crime he did not commit, which
         is a violation of TCA § 39-16- 402 and a Class E Felony.
         Res Judicata - Counsel for the Appellees assert that, having secured a
         positive judgement for the crimes of 6/4/2020 [in the action on the First
         Complaint], they are free to victimize the Appellant with separate and
         additional crimes from 10/14/2022 to present day without consequence.
         Jurisdiction - The Appellees claim that issues related to the crimes they
         commit can only be addressed in the criminal court, over which they have
         control. This is in violation of TN Const., art. I, § 19., which states that any
         Libel case involving elected officials be treated as a criminal case, and the
         power to interpret the law, as pertains to the case, transfers from the

         2
         Specifically, Director Rausch and Special Agent Burghardt filed their motion on January 17, 2023,
while Secretary Hargett and District Attorney General Funk filed their motion to dismiss on January 30,
2023.
                                                  -3-
      Appellees to the Jury. It would then fall upon the Jury to issue warrants and
      arrest, detain or question any they deem necessary for the victims to receive
      justice.

(Record citations omitted). Appellees raise as issues whether Appellant has waived his
appeal due to deficient briefing and whether the trial court correctly dismissed the Second
Complaint on the basis of res judicata.

                                      III. ANALYSIS

      As an initial matter, we must first discuss the state of Appellant’s brief, as all
Appellees have argued that his deficient briefing has waived all issues on appeal. Briefs
submitted to this Court are governed by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and
the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee. Rule 27(a) of the Tennessee Rules of
Appellate Procedure provides that the brief of the appellant shall contain:

      (1) A table of contents, with references to the pages in the brief;
      (2) A table of authorities, including cases (alphabetically arranged), statutes
      and other authorities cited, with references to the pages in the brief where
      they are cited;
      (3) A jurisdictional statement in cases appealed to the Supreme Court directly
      from the trial court indicating briefly the jurisdictional grounds for the appeal
      to the Supreme Court;
      (4) A statement of the issues presented for review;
      (5) A statement of the case, indicating briefly the nature of the case, the
      course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below;
      (6) A statement of facts, setting forth the facts relevant to the issues presented
      for review with appropriate references to the record;
      (7) An argument, which may be preceded by a summary of argument, setting
      forth:

          (A) the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented,
          and the reasons therefor, including the reasons why the contentions
          require appellate relief, with citations to the authorities and appropriate
          references to the record (which may be quoted verbatim) relied on; and
          (B) for each issue, a concise statement of the applicable standard of
          review (which may appear in the discussion of the issue or under a
          separate heading placed before the discussion of the issues);
      (8) A short conclusion, stating the precise relief sought.

Tenn. R. App. P. 27.

      Appellees assert that Appellant’s issues are waived because he failed to designate
                                          -4-
as issues any of the arguments that he raised in the body of his brief and failed to provide
arguments for all of the issues he designated. We generally agree. In particular, the central
issue here is whether the trial court erred in ruling that the claims against Appellees were
barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Although Appellant raises the question of res judicata
in his issues, he wholly fails to address this issue in the argument section of his brief.
Rather, the entirety of Appellant’s argument is as follows:

       During the hearing for the case on 3/3/2023, the Judge points out how the
       Appellees crimes are only actionable in Civil Court when supported with
       evidence. When it was pointed out by the Appellant that there is ample
       evidence of the crimes, the Judge responds that the Appellees are immune.
       This is in direct violation of TCA § 9-8-307(h) which negates the immunity
       of employees of the State of Tennessee for criminal acts.
       The Judge also made it very clear he had no intention of allowing the case to
       be heard by a jury and would leave any resolution of the case up to the
       Appellate Court. This violates the Appellant’s Constitutional right of trial by
       jury pursuant to TN Const., art. I, §6.
       The counsel for Secretary of State, Tre Hargett (Appellee Hargett) and
       Tennessee Bureau of Investigations, Director, David Rausch (Appellee
       Rausch) deny their involvement in this case. However, these Appellees are
       aware of the ongoing crimes against the Appellant, are duty bound to act
       upon them, and by not doing so are in violation of TCA § 39-11-401 and
       TCA § 39-11-402(3).

(Record citations omitted). Clearly, nothing in this argument addresses the question of
whether the trial court properly dismissed the Second Complaint on the basis of res
judicata. Moreover, while Appellant has included proper references to the appellate record
in his brief, he has not cited any legal authority that addresses the res judicata ruling of the
trial court, as required by Rule 27(a)(7)(A). Under these circumstances, any argument that
the trial court erred in dismissing the Second Complaint on the basis of res judicata is
waived. See Sneed v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of Sup. Ct., 301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010) (“It
is not the role of the courts, trial or appellate, to research or construct a litigant’s case or
arguments for him or her, and where a party fails to develop an argument in support of his
or her contention or merely constructs a skeletal argument, the issue is waived.”).

       It is true that that Appellant is proceeding pro se in this appeal, as he did in the
proceedings in the trial court. “While entitled to fair and equal treatment before the courts,
a pro se litigant is still required to comply with substantive and procedural law as do parties
represented by counsel.” Gilliam v. Gilliam, No. M2007-02507-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL
4922512, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2008) (citing Hessmer v. Hessmer, 138 S.W.3d
901, 903 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)). As explained by this Court, “[t]he courts should take into
account that many pro se litigants have no legal training and little familiarity with the
judicial system. However, the courts must also be mindful of the boundary between fairness
                                               -5-
to a pro se litigant and unfairness to the pro se litigant’s adversary.” Jackson v. Lanphere,
No. M2010-01401-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 3566978, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2011)
(quoting Hessmer, 138 S.W.3d at 903 (internal citations omitted)). “[T]he courts must not
excuse pro se litigants from complying with the same substantive and procedural rules that
represented parties are expected to observe.” Hessmer, 138 S.W.3d at 903. As a result,
Appellant’s waiver is not excused by his decision to represent himself in this appeal.

        Still, this Court has authority to excuse an appellant’s deficient briefing for good
cause. See Tenn. R. App. P. 2. We have previously found good cause “when ‘the appellant
is self-represented, [the court’s] ability to address the sole issue appealed is not hindered
by the deficiencies, or the gravity of the issues is such that resolution is necessary.’” City
of Memphis v. Edwards by & Through Edwards, No. W2022-00087-SC-R11-CV, 2023
WL 4414598, at *1 (Tenn. July 5, 2023) (per curium order) (quoting City of Memphis v.
Edwards by & Through Edwards, No. W2022-00087-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 2159244,
at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2023) (Stafford, J., dissenting), vacated, 2023 WL
4414598). Although Appellant has clearly waived consideration of whether res judicata
was correctly applied in this case, we exercise our discretion to briefly address this issue.

       The doctrine of res judicata is a “[r]ule that a final judgment rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their
privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the
same claim, demand or cause of action[.]” Richardson v. Tenn. Bd. of Dentistry, 913
S.W.2d 446, 459 (Tenn. 1995) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1172 (5th ed. 1979)). The
party who is defending an action on the basis of res judicata has the burden of
demonstrating the following:

        (1) that the underlying judgment was rendered by a court of competent
        jurisdiction;
        (2) that the same parties or their privies were involved in both suits;
        (3) that the same claim or cause of action was asserted in both suits; and
        (4) that the underlying judgment was final and on the merits.

Regions Bank v. Prager, 625 S.W.3d 842, 847–48 (Tenn. 2021). “A trial court’s decision
that a claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion involves a question
of law which will be reviewed de novo on appeal without a presumption of correctness.”
Jackson v. Smith, 387 S.W.3d 486, 491 (Tenn. 2012).

      Here, there can be no dispute that the circuit court has jurisdiction over tort actions
for malicious prosecution and defamation against Appellees.3 See Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-

        3
          Although the Second Complaint asserted that Appellees had committed various crimes, Appellant
sought only financial compensation and injunctive relief related to the reputational damage that he had
allegedly suffered. We conclude that despite the allegations of criminal misconduct, the gravamen of both
                                                  -6-
10-101 (“The circuit court is a court of general jurisdiction, and the judge of the circuit
court shall administer right and justice according to law, in all cases where the jurisdiction
is not conferred upon another tribunal.”). The same parties were also involved in both suits.
Moreover, although the two complaints are not identical, it is clear that the same set of
facts regarding malicious prosecution and defamation related to the Criminal Action were
asserted in both the First Complaint and the Second Complaint. See Creech v. Addington,
281 S.W.3d 363, 381 (Tenn. 2009) (“Two suits . . . shall be deemed the same ‘cause of
action’ for purposes of res judicata where they arise out of the same transaction or a series
of connected transactions.”). Certainly, nothing in Appellant’s brief can be fairly read to
undermine the trial court’s findings as to these elements. The first three elements are
therefore clearly met.

        Finally, the dismissal of the First Complaint was based on the lack of allegations
asserting a cause of action and immunity, resulting in a failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. See White v. Revco Disc. Drug Ctrs., Inc., 33 S.W.3d 713, 718
(Tenn. 2000) (addressing the failure to comply with Rule 8.01 as a basis for a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12.02(6)). “An order granting a [Tennessee
Rule of Civil Procedure] 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted is an adjudication on the merits.” Boyd v. Prime Focus, Inc., 83
S.W.3d 761, 766 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Dyer v. Intera Corp., 870 F.2d 1063, 1066
(6th Cir. 1989)). Thus, the judgment dismissing the First Complaint became a final
judgment on the merits when Appellant filed no appeal of it on or before January 12, 2023.
As such, the final element of res judicata is also met as to Appellant’s claims for damages
and injunctive relief against Appellees. The trial court therefore did not err in dismissing
the Second Complaint on the basis of res judicata. Because res judicata is a sufficient basis
for dismissing the complaint against all Appellees, all other issues and arguments are
pretermitted.

                                      IV. CONCLUSION

       The judgment of the Davidson County Circuit Court is affirmed, and this cause is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings as are necessary and consistent with this
Opinion. Costs of this appeal are taxed to Appellant William D. Crowder, for which
execution may issue if necessary.

                                             S/ J. Steven Stafford
                                             J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE

the First Complaint and the Second Complaint was a tort action against Appellees for their alleged
wrongdoing that harmed Appellant.
                                              -7-