Court Opinion

ID: 9893746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-30 16:00:36.961487+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:03.060944
License: Public Domain

23-128
     Richardson v. Edgewell Pers. Care, LLC

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                          SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1                 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
 2   held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 3   New York, on the 30th day of October, two thousand twenty-three.
 4
 5   PRESENT:
 6               GERARD E. LYNCH,
 7               MICHAEL H. PARK,
 8                     Circuit Judges.
 9               JESSICA G. L. CLARKE,
10                     District Judge. *
11   _____________________________________
12
13   Sherise Richardson, individually and on behalf
14   of all others similarly situated,
15
16                              Plaintiff-Appellant,
17
18                     v.                                                      23-128
19
20   Edgewell Personal Care, LLC,
21
22                     Defendant-Appellee.
23   _____________________________________
24
25
26
27
28
29

             * Judge Jessica G. L. Clarke, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
     York, sitting by designation.
 1   FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:                                          GLENN A. DANAS, Clarkson
 2                                                                     Law Firm, P.C., Malibu, CA
 3                                                                     (Neal J. Deckant and Brittany
 4                                                                     S. Scott, Bursor & Fisher,
 5                                                                     P.A., Walnut Creek, CA, and
 6                                                                     Timothy J. Peter, Faruqi &
 7                                                                     Faruqi, LLP, Philadelphia,
 8                                                                     PA, on the brief)
 9
10   FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE:                                           THOMAS H. DAVIS, Stinson
11                                                                     LLP, Kansas City, MO
12                                                                     (Megan McCurdy, Courtney
13                                                                     J. Harrison, and Logan T.
14                                                                     Fancher, Stinson LLP, Kansas
15                                                                     City, MO, and Kieran M.
16                                                                     Corcoran, Stinson LLP, New
17                                                                     York, NY, on the brief)
18

19          Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of

20   New York (Halpern, J.).

21          UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

22   DECREED that the judgment of the district court is VACATED and REMANDED for further

23   proceedings consistent with this order.

24          Plaintiff Sherise Richardson brought claims under New York General Business Law

25   (“NYGBL”) §§ 349 and 350 on behalf of a putative New York subclass, and a breach of express

26   warranty claim on behalf of a putative nationwide class. She alleges that Defendant Edgewell

27   Personal Care, LLC engaged in false advertising and deceptive behavior by labeling its sunscreen

28   products as “Reef Friendly*” on the front label and “*No Oxybenzone or Octinoxate” or “*Hawaii

29   Compliant: No Oxybenzone or Octinoxate” on the back label, even though the products contain

30   other reef-harming ingredients. She also alleges that the “Reef Friendly*” label amounts to an

31   express warranty. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural
                                                 2
 1   history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

 2   I.      Standard of Review

 3           We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo.

 4   “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

 5   true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Hernandez v. United States, 939 F.3d

 6   191, 198 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[W]e accept as true all

 7   factual allegations and draw from them all reasonable inferences; but we are not required to credit

 8   conclusory allegations or legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.” Id. (alteration in

 9   original).

10   II.     NYGBL Claims

11           NYGBL § 349 prohibits “[d]eceptive acts or practices” and NYGBL § 350 prohibits

12   “[f]alse advertising in the conduct of any business, trade, or commerce” in New York. To state a

13   claim under NYGBL §§ 349 and 350, a plaintiff must allege that “‘(1) the defendant’s deceptive

14   acts were directed at consumers, (2) the acts are misleading in a material way, and (3) the plaintiff

15   has been injured as a result.’” Chufen Chen v. Dunkin’ Brands, Inc., 954 F.3d 492, 500 (2d Cir.

16   2020) (quoting Maurizio v. Goldsmith, 230 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir. 2000)). Moreover, a plaintiff

17   must plausibly allege that “deceptive advertisements were likely to mislead a reasonable consumer

18   acting reasonably under the circumstances.” Fink v. Time Warner Cable, 714 F.3d 739, 741 (2d

19   Cir. 2013). “[I]n determining whether a reasonable consumer would have been misled by a

20   particular advertisement, context is crucial.” Id. at 742. “We therefore consider the challenged

21   advertisement as a whole, including disclaimers and qualifying language.” Mantikas v. Kellogg

22   Co., 910 F.3d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 2018). “[P]laintiffs must do more than plausibly allege that a

                                                      3
 1   label might conceivably be misunderstood by some few consumers.” Jessani v. Monini North

 2   America, Inc., 744 F. App’x 18, 19 (2d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

 3   Instead, “[p]laintiffs must plausibly allege that a significant portion of the general consuming

 4   public or of targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances, could be misled.” Id.

 5          The district court concluded that Richardson did not plausibly allege that Edgewell’s “Reef

 6   Friendly*” representation on the front label of its sunscreen products was materially misleading

 7   under NYGBL §§ 349 and 350. We disagree. First, the “Reef Friendly*” front label could

 8   plausibly mislead a reasonable consumer into thinking the products contain no reef-harming

 9   ingredients. Second, the back-label disclaimer, “*No Oxybenzone or Octinoxate” or “*Hawaii

10   Compliant: No Oxybenzone or Octinoxate,” is incomplete because it makes no mention of the four

11   other reef-harming ingredients found in the products. Taking the “Reef Friendly*” and “*No

12   Oxybenzone or Octinoxate” or “*Hawaii Compliant: No Oxybenzone or Octinoxate” labels

13   together, a reasonable consumer could conclude that the only substances known to harm reefs are

14   those listed in the back-label disclaimer.     Such a disclaimer cannot be seen as “clarifying

15   language” that may “defeat a claim of deception.” Fink, 714 F.3d at 742. Third, as in Mantikas,

16   Richardson is not expected to “look beyond misleading representations” on the front label “to

17   discover the truth from the ingredient list” that the product contains reef-harming ingredients. 910

18   F.3d at 637. Even if she were, a reasonable consumer cannot be expected to know the universe

19   of chemicals harmful to coral reefs such that she could discern from an ingredient list describing

20   the product’s contents in scientific terminology whether a product is in fact “Reef Friendly.”

21   Richardson plausibly alleges that she reasonably believed the “Reef Friendly*” statement on the

22   front label meant that the product was not harmful to reefs and that she was misled by that

                                                      4
 1   statement. We thus disagree with the district court’s conclusion that no reasonable consumer

 2   could be misled by the labelling as a matter of law. Whether Richardson’s allegations can be

 3   proved is a question to be determined on summary judgment or at trial.

 4   III.   Breach of Express Warranty

 5          The same analysis applies to Richardson’s express warranty claim. Express warranties

 6   are created as follows:

 7          “(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the
 8          goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the
 9          goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise. (b) Any description of the goods which
10          is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall
11          conform to the description.”
12
13   N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a)-(b).

14          “It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words

15   such as ‘warrant’ or ‘guarantee’ or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty.” Id. § 2-

16   313(2). “‘New York breach of express warranty claims require [i] a material statement amounting

17   to a warranty; (ii) the buyer’s reliance on this warranty as a basis for the contract with his

18   immediate seller; (iii) the breach of this warranty; and (iv) injury to the buyer caused by the

19   breach.’” Lugones v. Pete & Gerry’s Organic, LLC, 440 F. Supp. 3d 226, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)

20   (alteration in original) (emphases omitted) (quoting Brady v. Basic Rsch., L.L.C., 101 F. Supp. 3d

21   217, 235 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)).

22          The district court’s conclusion that Richardson did not plausibly allege that Edgewell’s

23   “Reef Friendly*” label amounted to an express warranty was incorrect. Claims for deception and

24   breach of express warranty both depend on what a reasonable consumer would believe, so

25   allegations sufficient to plead one generally suffice to plead the other. See Cooper v. Anheuser-

                                                     5
 1   Busch, LLC, 553 F. Supp. 3d 83, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (concluding that whether a plaintiff’s

 2   interpretation of a label “was erroneous or reflected a promise made by [the] [d]efendant

 3   necessarily depends on what a reasonable consumer would believe” (internal quotation marks and

 4   citation omitted)); Ault v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. 13-CV-3409, 2014 WL 1998235, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.

 5   May 15, 2014) (noting that plaintiff’s breach of express warranty claim, based on the defendant’s

 6   labeling of its product as “All Natural,” turned on “what a reasonable consumer’s interpretation

 7   might be”). Moreover, “[g]eneralized statements by the defendant . . . do not support an express

 8   warranty claim if they are such that a reasonable consumer would not interpret the statement as a

 9   factual claim upon which he or she could rely,” but what is considered “vague” or “generalized”

10   in the context we are presented with here is a question of fact that should not be decided at the

11   motion to dismiss stage. See Ault, 2014 WL 1998235, at *6 (“[W]hat a reasonable consumer’s

12   interpretation might be is a matter of fact which is not appropriate for decision on a motion to

13   dismiss.”). Thus, the district court erred in dismissing Richardson’s breach of express warranty

14   claim.

15                                             *     *    *

16            For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is VACATED and

17   REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order.

18

19                                                 FOR THE COURT:
20                                                 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
21

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