Court Opinion

ID: 9771670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:50:47.408796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:35.233232
License: Public Domain

GONZALEZ, Justice,
dissenting.
In granting this mandamus, the Court rewrites its previous opinion under the guise of enforcing its judgment. See Lee v. City of Houston, 807 S.W.2d 290 (Tex.1991) (Lee I). This revision long after the motion for rehearing was overruled, and *650after the term of the Court has expired, is highly irregular. I dissent.
The first principle ignored by the Court is our lack of jurisdiction. Our term is coterminous with the calendar year. Tex. Const, art. V, § 3a. The Court loses jurisdiction to alter its judgment at the end of the term in which it was rendered, unless a motion for rehearing has been filed, or the time to do so has not expired. Wilson Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Weaver, 187 S.W.2d 221, 222 (Tex.1945). “While this court has the power, in a proper case, to overrule its prior opinions, it does not have the power to set aside or modify its judgments rendered at a prior term.” Federal Royalty Co. v. State, 98 S.W.2d 993, 996 (Tex.1936).
Although the Court grants this mandamus under the pretense that the judgment of the trial court conflicts with its mandate, in reality, it rewrites the previous opinion by filling in gaps in Lee I, and by directing the trial judge to make findings that were not ordered in the earlier opinion. A brief review of the authorities cited by the Court and the history of the case will clearly demonstrate that, under the circumstances of this case, mandamus is not the proper remedy.1
Cherokee Water Co. v. Ross, 698 S.W.2d 363, 365 (Tex.1985, orig. proceeding) involved a dispute over an oil and gas lease. The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs and severed defendants’ counterclaim. The court of appeals reversed, but the Supreme Court reinstated the judgment of the trial court. The Supreme Court’s judgment read:
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the judgment of the trial court affirmed. It may proceed with the severed matter, the action for reformation, (emphasis added.)
Thereafter, a different trial judge granted a defendant’s motion to consolidate factual issues of the original action with the severed claim and announced his intention to set the consolidated cause for trial. The Supreme Court held that when "the opinion and mandate of this court prohibit relit-igation of some issues on remand, or direct that only some expressly severed issues or causes may still be litigated, and the parties and the trial court attempt relitigation beyond that which was expressly permitted, a writ of prohibition will issue to prohibit relitigation.” Cherokee, 698 S.W.2d at 366, citing City of Orange v. Clark, 627 S.W.2d 146 (Tex.1982). It also conditionally granted a writ of mandamus to prevent interference with the Court’s prior mandate. No interference with the Court’s pri- or mandate existed in the case now before the Court.
City of Orange v. Clark, 627 S.W.2d 146, 147 (Tex.1982, orig. proceeding) involved a dispute between the cities of Orange and West Orange over the annexation of property. West Orange sued Orange to have certain 1970 annexation ordinances of Orange declared invalid. In that suit, it was necessary to determine the 1963 population of both cities. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals only as to the validity of the ordinance purporting to annex a certain strip of land and remanded the cause to the trial court. The Court wrote: “The trial upon remand should not include a retrial of the population issues which have already been once fairly tried.” Id. at 147, quoting City of West Orange v. State ex rel. City of Orange, 613 S.W.2d 236, 239 (Tex.1981).
Similar language appeared in the mandate. It became apparent that West Orange intended to relitigate the 1963 population determination and that the trial court was going to allow this relitigation. The Supreme Court held that this relit-igation interfered with our former judgment and conditionally granted a writ of mandamus to prevent the relitigation of these issues. City of Orange v. Clark, 627 S.W.2d at 146-47. No relitigation of issues which interfere with our former judgment exist in the case now before the Court.
*651In Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. City of Beaumont, 373 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. 1964, orig. proceeding), the underlying suit was a claim by some plaintiffs against the railroad and the City of Beaumont for damages to residential property caused by flood water. The railroad filed a cross action against the City for contribution and indemnity. The jury made liability findings against both the railroad and the City. However, the trial court rendered judgment only against the railroad and denied the railroad’s request for contribution or indemnity from the City. The court of appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals on the basis that the judgment should have been rendered against both defendants as joint tortfeasors. The cause was remanded to the trial court with instructions to “enter” judgment accordingly.2
On remand, the trial court rendered a judgment for the plaintiffs against the railroad and the City in accordance with the judgment and mandate of the Supreme Court. Thereafter, the City attempted to relitigate the issue of its liability to the railroad. The Supreme Court held that such a trial would interfere with the judgment and mandate of this Court and that it would not be permitted. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 373 S.W.2d at 744.
In each of these three cases, the trial court reopened a matter foreclosed by this Court’s mandate. On the other hand, in this case, the Court chastises the trial court for failing to reopen a matter not mentioned in the prior judgment. Furthermore, in the cases cited by the Court in Lee II, the trial court acted in a manner contradictory to this Court’s judgment. In the present case, the trial court acted consistently with this Court’s judgment and mandate but is now being faulted for failing to prophesy what the Court would say in the following term.
As the next section will demonstrate, these cases are clearly distinguishable from the case now before us and the legal principles applied in the above cases have no application here. Indeed, it is a situation of a round peg in a square hole. A review of the circumstances of this case will clearly show that the Court is modifying the prior judgment, not merely enforcing it.

Facts & Procedural Posture

In the late 1980’s, the City of Houston began to reorganize its police department by consolidating some functions and by hiring additional civilians throughout the police department for managerial and technical roles. Its goal was to get more police officers to shuffle alleged criminals rather than to shuffle paper; that is, to free up more police officers to fight crime by patrolling the streets, making arrests, investigating crimes, etc. See Lee v. City of Houston, 807 S.W.2d 290, 296-97 (Tex.1991) (Gonzalez, J., dissenting). Toward this end, the City Council passed various ordinances which had the effect of consolidating some administrative functions and placing some civilians in positions of authority over several bureaus or departments previously headed by police officers. No one lost their job as a result of this reorganization, and the number of police civil service positions within the department was the same before and after the passage of the ordinances. Nonetheless, relators, police officers of various ranks, who were at or near the top of the promotion eligibility list for various positions, challenged the legality of these ordinances and alleged that they violated the Firemens and Policemen’s Civil Service Act (“Act”).3 After a non-jury trial in 1987, Judge Frank *652White4 held void the ordinances in question insofar as the ordinances attempted to create 5 certain civilian positions in contravention of the Act. Judge White enjoined the City from hiring civilians to fill certain positions and awarded back pay, promotion, and attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs.
The court of appeals reversed and rendered a take-nothing judgment against the police officers. 762 S.W.2d 180, 188. It said that the Firemens and Policemen’s Civil Service Act applied to
[tjhose who do “police work,” that is, who enforce the law, make arrests, and conduct criminal investigations_ Accordingly, article 1269m, § 8 does not require the classification of positions within HPD that do not involve the performance of law enforcement duties.
762 S.W.2d at 187. Since nothing in the record indicated that the newly created positions required exercise of law enforcement duties, the court of appeals held that the positions were not required to be classified. The court went on to declare that
neither have they in fact been classified by ordinance duly enacted by the city council, the only agency authorized to make such classification. Therefore, as a matter of law, no vacancies existed in an article 1269m classification for any of these positions.
762 S.W.2d at 188 (emphasis added).
This Court disagreed with the court of appeals’ construction of the Act. On March 6, 1991, the Court issued an opinion which noted that the legislature had failed to draw a “bright line” as to what positions in a police department are covered by the Act,6 noted that the Act’s most important definition, “policeman,” is circular,7 and vague,8 and that the proper boundaries of the police and firemen civil service system are unclear.9 The Court also declared that not
every high-level position in a police department must be held by a classified employee. If a particular job assignment requires no knowledge of police work and work in the police department, and entails no supervision of classified officers, the position need not be classified. Thus, the Act does not necessarily prohibit the vertical declassification of certain subdivisions within the department. Nor does the Act prohibit the holder of a police license from assuming a job assignment outside of the civil service system, when the assignment requires no knowledge of police work and work in the police department, as defined above.
807 S.W.2d at 295.
The Court concluded that the challenged ordinances contravened the Act. It reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, and “remand[ed] the cause to the trial court for entry of judgment in accordance with this opinion.”10 807 S.W.2d at 296 (emphasis added). In Lee I, I expressed my concern with the procedural disposition of the ease. 807 S.W.2d at 301-02.
On remand, the relators did not request that Judge Downey conduct an evidentiary hearing so that he could make the “findings necessary to apply the test set forth in *653Lee /” which is what the Court now says that he should have made. 842 S.W.2d at 649. Even though this Court did not reinstate the promotions, back pay, and attorney’s fees which were originally granted by the trial court and reversed by the court of appeals, relators asserted on remand that they were entitled to this relief.11 They presented Judge Downey with an 18-page proposed “reformed judgment” that would have reinstated the 1987 judgment.
Judge Downey refused to reinstate the prior judgment and wrote a letter to the parties explaining his decision. He said in part:
Enclosed please find the Court’s judgment in the above styled and numbered cause.
A word of explanation is appropriate. The decision of the Texas Supreme Court in this case is significant both for what it says and what it does not say.
Significant for what it says in that it orders this Court to enter a judgment consistent with this opinion; to wit, “We hold that the challenged placements contravened the Act’s requirement that all covered positions be filled in accordance with the statutory terms.” § 143.021(C) (See page 10)
Significant for what it does not say since there is no instruction to this Court to reinstate the trial court’s judgment of February 16, 1987.

The Supreme Court knows how to instruct the trial court to reinstate or modify its judgment, if that be their intention.

(emphasis added). He then rendered a judgment which read:
The Defendant’s use of unclassified employees in the nine positions at issue in this case violated Section 143.021(c) of the Texas Local Government Code. Such positions must be filled in accordance with the terms of such statute. All relief not granted herein is denied.
The Court today fills in some holes of the Court’s prior opinion and acts as if Judge Downey should have known all along that the Court meant in the prior opinion what it now says today. In fairness to Judge Dow-ney, there was no way for him, or anyone else for that matter, to divine that he was being required by this Court to make further findings.
Furthermore, Judge Downey and the parties should not be left in the dark as to whether he is being directed to make a decision after reading the voluminous, stale record or whether the parties may supplement the record with additional evidence. Either way, it is going to be an almost impossible task to filter 1987 evidence through a test or standard developed in 1992.12 In many respects this is unfair to the litigants because there is no way they could have anticipated the Court’s construction of the Act, and as a result, the parties have been deprived of an opportunity to try their case under this new standard.

Attorney’s Fees

The Court today summarily holds that Judge Downey abused his discretion in not awarding attorney’s fees to relators. The Court’s rationale is that “[T]he trial court judgment considered by this court in Lee I provided back pay and attorney’s fees.” 842 S.W.2d at 649 (emphasis added). However, in Lee I, the Court did not affirm the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to relators, and it is highly irregular to go back and “affirm ” any part of a judgment in a writ of mandamus proceeding. This is yet another stark example of how the Court is rewriting Lee I long after the *654motion for rehearing was overruled and after the term of the Court has expired.
Additionally, “[u]nder the terms of Article 1269m the total responsibility for creating and abolishing civil service positions in the Fire Department rests in the City Council; and a position so created in a duly enacted ordinance by the City Council is vacant so long as it is not filled, and until abolished by action of the Council.” Duckett v. City of Houston, 495 S.W.2d 883, 886 (Tex.1973).13 In Duckett, we held that the action or inaction of the Fire Chief had no legal effect on the existence or non-existence of a vacancy in the classified service. Here, the record is clear that there were no vacancies created by the City Council for Deputy Chief or Captain on January 20, 1986.14 However, because the Houston Police Chief reorganized the department on that date and assigned additional responsibilities to four civilian administrators, the Relators contend that thereby four Deputy Chief vacancies were created. Since only the City Council can create a vacancy, the action of the Police Chief had the same legal significance as the inaction of the Fire Chief in Duckett, for the Chief, acting alone, can neither create nor abolish a vacancy. All the judiciary is authorized to do is hold the city ordinance valid or invalid. If we hold the ordinance void, we cannot and should not award promotions and back pay. To do so is to substitute our opinion for that of the City Council.

Conclusion

Judge Downey did not interfere with our prior judgment, and mandamus is not the proper remedy. There is nothing in Lee I that awards promotions and back pay and attorney’s fees to relators. Additionally, the Court ignores the standards for issuance of mandamus set forth in Walker v. Packer. There is an adequate remedy on appeal, and it is a stretch of olympian proportions to say that Judge Downey’s decision was arbitrary and capricious so as to be a clear abuse of discretion.
PHILLIPS, C.J., and HECHT and CORNYN, JJ., join this opinion.

. It is also well settled that mandamus is intended to be an extraordinary remedy, available only when a trial court clearly abuses its discretion and there is no adequate remedy on appeal. Relator must establish that the trial court could reasonably have reached only one decision but failed to do so. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex.1992).

. Perhaps the Court meant to say that it was remanding the cause for "rendition" of judgment rather than for "entry" of judgment. Judges render judgments and clerks enter them on the minutes. Burrell v. Cornelius, 570 S.W.2d 382, 384 (Tex.1978); see Joachim v. Chambers, 815 S.W.2d 234, 235-36, 242 (Tex.1991) (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).

. This case was tried prior to recodification of Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. art. 1269m, repealed by Act of 1987, (ch. 149, § 49(1); 1987 Tex.Gen.Laws 1306). See now Tex.Local Gov’t Code § 143.001-.134.

. Sometime after the trial, Judge White died and was succeeded by Judge Downey.

. The Court today mischaracterizes the basis of the trial court’s ruling. It states that:
The trial court accorded relief in a judgment which (1) declared void four City ordinances as violative of a state statute because they eliminated the civil service status of certain HPD positions; ...
842 S.W.2d at 647 (emphasis added). However, throughout its judgment, Judge White speaks of the creation of certain civilian positions within the police department as the vice in contravention of the Act. This is also how the court of appeals described the basis for the trial court's decision. City of Houston v. Lee, 762 S.W.2d 180, 181 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.], 1988), rev’d, 807 S.W.2d 290 (Tex.1991).

. 807 S.W.2d at 294.

. 807 S.W.2d at 292.

. "Until the legislature clearly defines the scope of the Fire Fighters’ and Police Officers’ Civil Service System, courts will be left to apply the vague standard we discern today to increasingly complex bureaucracies.” 807 S.W.2d at 294 n. 9.

. 807 S.W.2d at 291.

. See n. 2.

. The relief relators seek is dependent on the existence of classified vacancies. The court of appeals determined that no classified vacancies had been created. 762 S.W.2d at 188. In Lee I, the Court said: “We do not reach the Petitioners’ contention that the Respondents’ actions amounted to abolition of existing classified positions.” 807 S.W.2d at 296 n. 11. Relators did not challenge this statement in their motion for rehearing.

. The Court today states that ”[I]n accord with [the] prior opinion, the trial court should have determined the exact dates of vacancies for these positions (unclassified positions entailing the duties of lieutenants) as well as sergeant, and the relevant eligibility lists." 842 S.W.2d 649. This will prove to be an insurmountable task. The record is unclear both as to exact dates of these vacancies as well as to the relevant eligibility list.

. Duckett was an employee of the Houston Fire Department. By virtue of a promotional exam, he was placed on the promotion list for assistant arson investigator. Not all authorized positions were filled because the fire chief was of the opinion that not all of them were needed. Duckett filed a mandamus action to compel the city to promote him to assistant fire investigator. The trial court granted him a summary judgment and the court of appeals reversed and remanded on the grounds that there was a fact issue as to whether or not a vacancy existed. We reversed and held that the civil service statute is not subject to a construction that the Fire Chief has discretion to abate civil service positions by not filling it.

. One of the relators, Lieutenant Defoor, conceded that no legal vacancy was created as a result of the January 20, 1986 reorganization. Relator Lee also admitted that no vacancy existed on that date but he asserted that "there should have been."