Court Opinion

ID: 990263
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-03 23:18:27.458079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:43:06.505361
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                   No. 95-5909

LINDA VERNELL BAILEY,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington.
W. Earl Britt, District Judge.
(CR-95-1-BR)

Submitted: July 25, 1996

Decided: August 19, 1996

Before LUTTIG and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and
PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Wayne James Payne, POWELL & PAYNE, Shallotte, North Caro-
lina, for Appellant. Janice McKenzie Cole, United States Attorney,
John Samuel Bowler, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Linda Vernell Bailey pleaded guilty to two counts of distribution
of cocaine base (crack), 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1) (West Supp. 1996).
Bailey appeals the 135-month sentence imposed pursuant to those
convictions. Bailey's sole contention is that the district court erred
when it included as relevant conduct* 378.7 grams of crack that Bai-
ley purchased before she committed the offenses to which she pleaded
guilty. Both her acquisition of the crack in question and the two distri-
bution offenses occurred while she was a major player in a drug ring
in Jacksonville, North Carolina. As such, the prior purchases "were
part of the same course of conduct . . . as the count[s] of conviction."
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2), comment. (backg'd). Because the district
court correctly found that those purchases qualified as relevant con-
duct, we affirm.

The Jacksonville Police Department documented 180 drug transac-
tions that occurred between March 1, 1990, and October 14, 1994, in,
or in the area around, the "Hopkins Building." Owned by Bailey's
father, the Hopkins Building served as a de facto"safe haven" for
street-level drug dealers. Bailey resided in an apartment on the second
floor of the building. She and her son and co-defendant used her
apartment and the unoccupied space across from her apartment for
various purposes, including cutting, packaging, selling, and storing
crack. The two sales resulting in the distribution convictions occurred
in August and December 1994 at Bailey's apartment.

Two drug dealers informed agents that they had sold crack to Bai-
ley at or near the Hopkins Building. Stephen Rodney testified that
during a six-month period in 1991, he sold a total of 10.6 grams of
_________________________________________________________________
*United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual,
§ 1B1.3(a)(2) (Nov. 1995).

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cocaine to Bailey, once when she was operating a cash register at the
Hopkins Building. Dermon Murchison informed agents that he sold
crack to Bailey once or twice a week for a one-year period in 1991
and 1992. Bailey purchased 368.1 grams from Murchison during this
period. All transactions occurred either in or around the Hopkins
Building.

At the sentencing hearing, the district court found that the Govern-
ment had established by a preponderance of the evidence that 439.3
grams of crack were attributable to Bailey: the .9 grams and .7 grams
involved in the two distribution offenses; 59 grams seized from Bai-
ley's apartment and the storage area in the Hopkins Building; and the
378.7 grams which investigators learned about from Rodney and
Murchison. The court therefore overruled Bailey's objection to the
presentence report, in which she claimed that she was accountable
only for the 1.6 grams which she admitted to distributing.

Bailey argues on appeal that the Rodney and Murchison transac-
tions were temporally remote from the distribution offenses and there-
fore were not relevant conduct. When computing a defendant's base
offense level, district courts are to consider all the defendant's con-
duct that is related to the offense of conviction. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3.
"[I]n a drug distribution case, quantities . . . of drugs not specified in
the count[s] of conviction are to be included in determining the
offense level if they were part of the same course of conduct or part
of a common scheme or plan as the count of conviction." U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.3, comment. (backg'd).

In determining whether conduct is relevant under§ 1B1.3(a)(2), the
court looks to the nature of the defendant's acts, her role, and the
number and frequency of those acts, as well as the similarity, regular-
ity, and temporal proximity between the offense of conviction and the
uncharged conduct. United States v. Mullins, 971 F.2d 1138, 1143-44
(4th Cir. 1992); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, comment. (n.9(A)). We
review the district court's factual findings as to the amount of drugs
constituting relevant conduct for clear error. United States v. Banks,
10 F.3d 1044, 1057 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied , ___ U.S. ___, 62
U.S.L.W. 3755 (U.S. May 16, 1994) (No. 93-8404).

In the subject case, Bailey's purchases from Rodney and Murchi-
son were plainly part of the same course of conduct: extensive drug

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dealing in and around the Hopkins Building. Police in Jacksonville
documented 180 drug transactions there between March 1, 1990, and
October 14, 1994. The Rodney and Murchison transactions occurred
in 1991 and 1992, while the two distributions of which Bailey was
convicted occurred in 1994. We think it clear that the transactions in
1991 and 1992, like those in 1994, were all part of the same course
of conduct. As such, the district court's finding that the Rodney and
Murchison transactions qualified as relevant conduct was not clearly
erroneous.

We dispense with oral argument because our review of the materi-
als before us reveals that argument would not aid the decisional pro-
cess. The sentence is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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