Court Opinion

ID: 9640393
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:05:10.351991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:29.509004
License: Public Domain

JOHN S. ANDERSON, Justice,
concurring on remand on rehearing.
I concur in the result. I would, however, hold the summary judgment motion properly before the trial court, which Rit-zell filed before Jonathan was added as a plaintiff, did not address Jonathan’s claims. Accordingly, I would not reach the merits of Ritzell’s res judicata defense to those claims, but, instead, would hold the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Jonathan’s claims because, in so doing, the trial court was granting relief on claims not addressed in the motion. See Chessher v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 658 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex.1983); Guest v. Cochran, 993 S.W.2d 397, 405-06 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
It is axiomatic one may not be granted judgment as a matter of law on a cause of action not addressed in a summary judgment proceeding. Chessher, 658 S.W.2d at 564. Thus, when a plaintiff amends her pleadings to add causes of action after a defendant files a summary judgment motion, the defendant generally must amend or supplement his motion for summary judgment to address the additional causes. See Brandes v. Rice Trust, Inc., 966 S.W.2d 144, 148 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied). Nevertheless, to this rule, there is an exception: The defendant need not amend or supplement his motion if the grounds asserted in the summary judgment motion show the plaintiff could not recover from the defendant on the later-pleaded cause of action. See Wilson v. Korthauer, 21 S.W.3d 573, 579 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (holding, in part, affirmative defense of limitations extended to some of newly pleaded claims); see also Lampasas v. Spring Ctr., Inc., 988 S.W.2d 428, 437 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no writ) (holding no evidence summary judgment proper when amended pleadings merely reiterated same essential elements in different fashion).
Relying on the rule that the effect of a pleading is to be determined by its allegations and evident purpose, rather than its style, the majority reasons that Jonathan’s claims as a third party beneficiary to the contract were included in Espeche’s original petition even though Jonathan was not a named party in that petition. Majority op. at 8 (citing Hawkins v. Anderson, 672 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1984, no writ)). The majority then concludes that, because Jonathan’s claims under the contract were, included in the original petition, Ritzell’s contention res judicata barred the breach of contract-action was sufficient to address Jonathan’s claims under the contract. Majority op. at 8 (citing Farah v. Mafrige & Kormanik, P.C., 927 S.W.2d 663, 673 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ)).
In short, to determine the sufficiency of Ritzell’s motion, the majority focuses solely on the nature of Jonathan’s claims as set forth in Espeche’s original petition rather than looking at Jonathan’s status as a party in relation to Ritzell’s res judi-cata defense. A summary judgment motion addressing the causes of action brought by one plaintiff, however, does *669not necessarily address the same causes of action brought by another plaintiff. See Guest, 993 S.W.2d at 405-06 (holding summary judgment motion addressing only causes of action brought by plaintiff in individual capacity did not address same causes of action brought by plaintiff in his capacity as co-executor of estate).
The affirmative defense of res judicata requires the identity of parties or their privies in the prior and present lawsuits. See Amstadt v. U.S. Brass Corp., 919 S.W.2d 644, 652 (Tex.1996). Therefore, in the context of the present case, Jonathan’s status as a party was relevant to the sufficiency of the scope of Ritzell’s summary judgment motion, based, as it was, solely on the defense of res judicata. Ritzell recognized as much because, after Jonathan was added as a party, Ritzell specifically sought (but did not obtain) the trial court’s leave to move for summary judgment against Jonathan.1
Thus, I would hold the trial court erred in ruling on Jonathan’s claims. Accordingly, I agree summary judgment should be reversed as to Jonathan’s claims, albeit for reasons different from those stated in the majority opinion.
For these reasons, I respectfully concur in the result only.

. Ritzell did not argue to this court that the motion for summary judgment properly before the court encompassed Jonathan’s claims. Instead, Ritzell contended, based on a docket entry, the trial court had granted leave to amend his summary judgment motion. Ritzell implicitly admits the deficiency of his original motion with regard to Jonathan’s claims.