Court Opinion

ID: 9553061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:21:21.434744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:29:37.585526
License: Public Domain

RIGGS, J.,
dissenting.
Defendant waited over two years for a final disposition in her misdemeanor case. The majority now reverses the trial court’s judgment of dismissal and remands the case for a new trial. At this point, defendant has waited over three and one-half years since her arrest. Because I believe that the trial court correctly decided that defendant had not been granted a speedy trial, I dissent.
*179In analyzing defendant’s state constitutional right to a speedy trial, the majority correctly states the three-factor test from State v. Mende, 304 Or 18, 741 P2d 496 (1987). However, the majority then applies that test incorrectly. An expansion of the facts set out by the majority would not benefit bench or bar; instead, I simply note that the Oregon Supreme Court has said:
“[E]ach of the [Mende] factors involves primarily factual inquiries, so that the decision of the trial court granting a dismissal is entitled to great weight.” State v. Ivory, 278 Or 499, 508 n 7, 564 P2d 1039 (1977).1
After examining the trial judge’s analysis of those factors, I cannot say that the trial court made factual or legal errors. I, therefore, dissent.

 Although State v. Mende, supra, was decided after State v. Ivory, supra, the test in Mende is derived from the test in Barker v. Wingo, 407 US 514, 92 S Ct 2182, 33 L Ed 2d 101 (1972), which was the subject of the quote from State v. Ivory, supra.