Court Opinion

ID: 9564724
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:05:53.429028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:38.243695
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
specially concurring and dissenting.
I am in accord with the result reached by the majority opinion, and I agree completely with the portions of the majority opinion that address the sufficiency of the evidence. On the basis of Kwallek v. State, 596 P.2d 1372 (Wyo.1979), however, I approach the application of the plain error doctrine quite differently. I have no disagreement with what Justice Golden has offered in his specially concurring opinion, but my approach is different from the one he espoused.
The conclusion of the majority opinion is that a clear and unequivocal rule' of law was violated, but that Urrutia failed to establish material prejudice. I quote from Kwallek, 596 P.2d at 1376:
As a general proposition, courts have found that prejudice results where the accused made timely objection5 and has requested curative action by the trial court which refused or failed to eliminate the disclosure.
I believe the Kwallek rule is clear in requiring a timely objection to the disclosure of a guilty plea by another person who has been charged with an offense arising out of the same circumstances. It is my rationalization of Kwallek that, in the absence of an objection by the defendant, there is no error. Hence, under the plain error doctrine, no clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated. If Kwallek is not as clear as I read it, it is at best equivocal, and for that reason the rule of the case does not meet the plain error requirement.
The reason, as I see it, why an objection is required to such a disclosure is that the circumstances of the trial are themselves inherently equivocal. When the prosecution seeks to introduce this evidence to blunt the effect of its being introduced on cross-examination, the defendant may well prefer that it come in at that point. It may be preferable as a matter of tactics to cross-examine about the details of the conviction and why the witness was able to make a deal with the prosecution. On the other hand, the defense may prefer the opportunity to introduce the subject on cross-examination and will object to the use of the information by the prosecution. Then, as Kwallek holds, it will be perceived as prejudicial error to permit the presentation to proceed. In fact, the defense may prefer that the matter not be presented at all, but it is unlikely the trial court will foreclose the information completely.
As we said in Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724, 739 (Wyo.1986), where we specifically were invited to place the burden of justifying admissibility of hearsay on the State:
Appellant suggests that the State must satisfy its burden and the court make a determination of admissibility even though appellee makes no objection to receipt of the hearsay evidence. Appellant is not correct in this contention. To hold as suggested would impose an impossible burden upon a trial court to, on its own motion, require proof that opposing counsel has not demanded. Besides, opposing counsel may choose not to object to receipt of the offered evidence for many reasons. Trial strategy may dictate no objection; the opposing party may believe the offered evidence will be favorable; the opposing party may believe that impeachment may be more damaging and choose not to exclude the evidence. (Emphasis added.)
The Kwallek holding is that prejudice results when the accused has objected and the trial court fails to grant relief. It must follow that there is no prejudice to the accused when no objection is made. This approach matches the holding of the proposed opinion *972that Urrutia has failed to demonstrate prejudice, but it also honors the rule announced in Kwallek.

 It is well established that the accused must register timely objection to the disclosure. State v. Marshall and Brown-Sidorowicz, P.A., 2 Kan. App.2d 182, 577 P.2d 803, 817, and cases cited therein (1978).