Court Opinion

ID: 9493241
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:01:47.77968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:43.556967
License: Public Domain

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I join the majority opinion insofar as it addresses Hale’s claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), affirming the judgment of the District Court on the grounds that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over the claim and that, in any event, the claim is devoid of merit. I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s conclusion that the District Court improperly granted summary judgment on Hale’s § 1983 retaliatory demotion claim. That claim is based on the proposition that a person who merely forwarded a report, as required, lost his job as a result, even though the author of the report suffered no adverse consequences.
To prevail on his § 1983 claim, Hale must show that: (1) his conduct is entitled to First Amendment protection; and (2) defendants’ conduct was motivated by, or substantially caused by, Hale’s exercise of his protected free speech rights. See, e.g., Hankard v. Town of Avon, 126 F.3d 418, 421-22 (2d Cir.1997). I do not believe that Hale has satisfied the first element, because the “speech” for which he claims defendants retaliated was not protected by the First Amendment.
The majority states:
A jury could find that by forwarding the unaltered [Langbein] report, Hale endorsed the views expressed in it and thereby engaged in independent expression. In support of this position, there is evidence that Hale forwarded the Langbein report by a transmittal letter over his signature to Mann (and to the [New York State] Commission [of Correction] ) precisely because he wanted to influence [Office of Children and Family Services] policy.
Supra at 71. I find no support in the record for the conclusion that Hale “engaged in independent expression” in connection with the Langbein report. Hale admits that he did not' contribute to the preparation of the report. Nothing in the three-page report indicates that it conveys Hale’s views. Nor does the transmittal memorandum to which the majority refers offer any indication that Hale endorsed the policy prescriptions set forth by Lang-bein — who was not punished despite having authored the report that Hale claims his superiors found so objectionable. All Hale did,' then, was comply with a direct written request from the Commission to forward for its review a copy of the report. Critically, the majority opinion does not mention Hale’s admission that he believed he was required to turn over the report in response to the Commission’s request.1 Since Hale believed he had no choice but to forward the report, and since neither *74the report nor his brief transmittal memorandum refers to his own views concerning Langbein’s policy prescriptions, I do not see how it is possible to say that Hale “engaged in independent expression” by forwarding the report. Absent a demonstration that Hale engaged in protected speech, the judgment of the District Court granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing the § 1983 claim should be affirmed.
Moreover, even if it could be said that Hale had expressed himself by forwarding the report, defendants would be entitled to summary judgment. Less than a year ago, we explained that “we are most doubtful that the Constitution ever protects the right of a public employee in a policymaking position to criticize h[is] employer’s policies or programs simply because [h]e does not share h[is] employer’s legislative or administrative vision.” Lewis v. Cowen, 165 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir.1999) (quoting Moran v. State of Washington, 147 F.3d 839, 850 (9th Cir.1998) (emphasis added)). I believe this situation falls under Lewis: the record is clear that Hale was a policymaking public employee, who asserts that he was demoted in retaliation for having criticized his employer’s policies. In my view — and in the views of our Court in Lewis and the Ninth Circuit in Moran — the long reach of the First Amendment does not extend so far as to protect the jobs of non-civil service, policy-making public employees who insist on attacking the policies implemented by their superiors.
The job in which Hale served — Youth Facility Director 3 (“YFD3”) — clearly qualifies as a policymaking position under the standard we have established.2 In determining whether an employee is a policymaker, we consider several factors, including
whether the employee (1) is exempt from civil service protection, (2) has some technical competence or expertise, (3) controls others, (4) is authorized to speak in the name of policymakers, (5) is perceived as a policymaker by the public, (6) influences government programs, (7) has contact with elected officials, and (8) is responsive to partisan politics and political leaders. This list is not exhaustive, but instead serves as a guide; no one factor or group of factors is always dispositive.
Butler v. New York State Dep’t of Law, 211 F.3d 739, 744 (2d Cir.2000) (quoting Vezzetti v. Pellegrini, 22 F.3d 483, 486 (2d Cir.1994)). First, as a YFD3, Hale served at the pleasure of the Governor and was not entitled to civil service protection.3 Second, the job requirements for a YFD3 demonstrate that the position demands technical expertise, including “good knowledge of principles of general, adolescent and abnormal psychology,” “good knowledge of social casework techniques,” and “good knowledge of counseling techniques.” Third, a YFD3 directs the operations of a secure facility with 50-199 employees and a bed capacity of 50-99, thereby “controlling] others.”
Turning to the remaining four factors, we have noted that they “attempt to define the contours of a zone inside which governmental decisions are made,” and “encompass a principle upon which this circuit has placed primary importance: whether the employee in question is empowered to act and speak on behalf of a policymaker, especially an elected official.” Gordon v. *75County of Rockland, 110 F.3d 886, 890 (2d Cir.1997). In the instant case, facility directors are required to “serve as effective spokespersons in the community for the facility and [OCFS].” Among their specific responsibilities, facility directors must: (1) determine when youth are to be discharged; (2) meet and correspond with parents of youth to advise them of the progress of their children; (3) meet and deal with the members and representatives of the community surrounding the facility to influence them to accept and cooperate with facility programs; (4) meet with members of the community who have been damaged by the actions of facility residents, to learn of the damage and arrange restitution where necessary; and (5) authorize expenditure of monies for all items purchased by the facility. Hale’s decisions concerning when to discharge youth and his representation of the Goshen Secure Center in dealings with parents as well as members of the community clearly placed him within the “zone inside which governmental decisions are made.” Indeed, the first of these responsibilities (the power to decide when to discharge detained youth), standing alone, demonstrates that Hale acted as a policymaker. The added emphasis on interaction with the public. further reinforces this conclusion, indicating a general perception of a YFD3 as a policymaker. Cf. Butler at 743-45 (finding that a Deputy Bureau Chief of New York State Department of Law, who regularly appeared in state and federal court, served in a policymaking position); Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35, 46 (2d Cir.1999) (Deputy Counsel of the New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, who represented the agency in administrative and interdepartmental proceedings); Bavaro v. Pataki, 130 F.3d 46, 50-51 (2d Cir.1997) (associate and assistant counsel in the New York State Department of Health, who represented the state before the Board of Professional Medical Misconduct); Vezzetti, 22 F.3d at 486 (Orangetown Highway Superintendent, who frequently made pub-lie speeches); Regan, 984 F.2d at 579-81 (Deputy Tax Receiver of Islip, who attended Town Board meetings on the receiver’s behalf).
The majority attempts in a footnote to avoid the obvious implication of the clear statement on this point in Lewis, claiming that “defendants have not characterized Hale as a policymaker.... Instead, they have merely characterized Hale’s position as a policy-influencing position, held at the pleasure of the Governor.... ” Supra at 71 n. 4 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). First, there is no support in our caselaw for this novel distinction between policymakers and mere “policy-infiuencers.” The fact that Hale reported to others does not preclude his having served in a policymaking position. Cf. Butler, 211 F.3d at 744 (stating that the Court was “not persuaded by [plaintiffs] argument that she was not a policymaker because she had to consult her superiors or clients on policy issues. The issue is not whether [plaintiff] independently made policy from day to day, but rather what the general required duties of her position were.”). I see no reason to create some new category of public employee when there already exist criteria to distinguish policymakers from other public employees' — criteria which the majority fails to mention in the course of reviving Hale’s retaliation claim.
In addition, it is undisputed that Hale was notified in a 1994 letter from OCFS that his “position ha[d] been designated as policymaking” for financial disclosure purposes. Remarkably, this letter is cited in defendants’ brief at the conclusion of the very sentence relied upon by the majority to claim that defendants never asserted that Hale was a policymaker, but rather a “mere pohcy-influencer.” Accordingly, the record does not support the contention that OCFS did not consider Hale a policymaker; indeed, the record clearly supports the contrary conclusion.
*76To summarize: I join the majority opinion with respect to Hale’s FMLA claim. However, I would affirm the District Court’s decision granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs § 1983 claim, both because plaintiff has not offered any evidence that he engaged in protected expression and because, even if he had, defendants were entitled, following our recent decision in Lewis, to remove him from his policymaking position for criticizing his superiors’ policies. Accordingly, I dissent from so much of the majority opinion as holds otherwise.

. Specifically, the following colloquy took place at Hale’s deposition on September 9, 1998:
Q: Did you ever write to the commission or speak to anyone thére and ask them why they wanted all these reports?
Hale: No. There was no need to ask them why. I was — they are an oversight agency. Whatever requests they make we have to provide.
(emphasis added). Obviously, this admission stands in stark contrast to the self-serving affidavit from which the majority quotes. Supra at 71 n. 4. Hale submitted that affidavit, in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, approximately three months after he had been deposed. In light of this temporal proximity, it is apparent that Hale’s sudden reversal was engendered by the necessities of his position in connection with the pending motion, and that the relevant statement in the affidavit is not credible. See, e.g., Buttry v. General Signal Corp., 68 F.3d 1488, 1493 (2d Cir.1995) (" '[I]t is well settled in this circuit that a party’s affidavit which contradicts his own prior deposition testimony should be disregarded on a motion for summary judgment.' ”) (quoting Mack v. United States, 814 F.2d 120, 124 (2d Cir.1987)).

. We have noted that ”[i]t is beyond cavil that an appellate court may affirm the judgment of the district court on any ground appearing in the record.” Shumway v. UPS, Inc., 118 F.3d 60, 63 (1997). As the facts concerning Hale’s responsibilities as a YFD3 were in the record before the District Court, I see no need to remand for consideration of whether Hale was a policymaker.

. We have recognized that "New York has considered many of the same criteria for non-civil service status as does a court in determining whether a position is exempt from First Amendment protection.” Regan v. Boogertman, 984 F.2d 577, 580 (2d Cir.1993).