Court Opinion

ID: 9919014
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 14:02:22.389417+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:56.259583
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                    Decided: January 17, 2024

                       S23A0842. THE STATE v. FRANKLIN.

         BOGGS, Chief Justice.

         Appellee Dequavius Dexter Franklin was indicted for the

murder of Jaquon Anderson and related offenses. Appellee filed a

generalized motion to suppress, through which he later challenged

the introduction of a statement he made to law enforcement while

in a hospital on January 4, 2022, and the State filed a corresponding

motion in limine to adjudicate the admissibility of the same. After

the trial court granted Appellee’s motion to suppress the January 4

statement he made to law enforcement on the basis that “the

statement was not voluntary” due to Appellee’s medication, medical

condition, and circumstances surrounding his physical condition,

the State appealed pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (4). The State

contends that Appellee’s statement was voluntary. We agree
because no evidence in the record shows that law enforcement

coerced Appellee’s statement and accordingly, reverse.

     1. When ruling on a motion to suppress, a trial court decides

whether a defendant’s statement is admissible based on the

preponderance of the evidence considering the totality of the

circumstances. See State v. Rumph, 307 Ga. 477, 477 (837 SE2d 358)

(2019). The State bears the burden of proof. See State v. Hinton, 309

Ga. 457, 457 (847 SE2d 188) (2020). We have previously explained

that “when reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a suppression issue,

an appellate court must construe the evidentiary record in the light

most favorable to the factual findings and judgment of the trial

court.” Walker v. State, 312 Ga. 332, 336 (862 SE2d 542) (2021)

(cleaned up). In cases where “some or all of the material facts [are]

undisputed,” we “properly may take notice of the undisputed facts

— even if the trial court did not — without interfering with the

prerogative of the trial court to resolve disputes of material fact.”

                                 2
Hughes v. State, 296 Ga. 744, 746 n.4 (770 SE2d 636) (2015).1

Finally, we review de novo the application of the facts to the law —

that is, the trial court’s ultimate conclusion whether, under all the

circumstances, the defendant’s statement was voluntary. See

Doricien v. State, 310 Ga. 652, 656 (853 SE2d 120) (2020). See also

Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 348 (96 SCt 1612, 48 LE2d

1) (1976) (“When [a voluntariness] claim is raised, it is the duty of

an appellate court, including this Court, to examine the entire

record and make an independent determination of the ultimate

issue of voluntariness.” (cleaned up)).

      2. Viewed in this light, the evidence in the record and presented

at the Jackson-Denno 2 hearing showed the following. The arrest

warrant affidavit recited 3 that on December 31, 2021, Detective

Alfred Hogan with the Atlanta Police Department responded to a

      1  Such undisputed facts include, among other things, those which
“definitively can be ascertained exclusively by reference to evidence that is
uncontradicted and presents no questions of credibility.” Hughes, 296 Ga. at
746 n.5. Audio- or video-evidence may match that description. See id. See also
Rumph, 307 Ga. at 477-478.
      2 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (84 SCt 1774, 12 LE2d 908) (1964).
      3 We recount the affidavit’s factual allegations only for background.

                                      3
911 call reporting a shooting and armed robbery by two masked

assailants at a residence in Fulton County. Detective Hogan

discovered Anderson’s body lying in the main room of the residence

and noticed a large amount of blood on the opposite side of the room

from Anderson as well as a black ski mask on the floor near his body.

Detective Hogan deduced that the blood on the opposite side of the

room did not belong to Anderson, and subsequent investigation led

Detective Hogan to believe that Anderson fired shots during the

robbery and injured an assailant and that the injured assailant fled,

leaving the blood and ski mask behind. Detective Hogan learned

while responding to the 911 call that someone wearing a black ski

mask delivered Appellee to Emory Hospital Midtown (“Emory”) and

that Appellee was suffering an abdominal gunshot wound. 4

      Appellee’s medical records were introduced at the hearing, but

there was no testimony offered about the records. Those records

show that Emory transferred Appellee to Atlanta Medical Center

      4 While at Emory, Appellee made a statement to law enforcement. The

trial court’s ruling that this statement was admissible is not at issue on appeal.
                                        4
(“AMC”) for surgery to remove his spleen, left kidney, and pancreas

and to repair his abdomen. AMC administered propofol, fentanyl,

and other medication to Appellee for anesthesia and pain relief. On

January 3, 2022, Appellee underwent a second surgery due to

respiratory failure and blood loss anemia and received nourishment

through a feeding tube.

     Detective Hogan testified at the hearing that during his

investigation, he narrowed the suspects down to Appellee and a

second, unidentified person. Detective Hogan obtained a search

warrant for Appellee’s DNA, and on January 4, 2022, he obtained

the permission of hospital staff to interview Appellee and did so in

his hospital room; the interview was audio-recorded. Before the

interview he “ma[d]e efforts to make sure that [Appellee] was

physically and mentally capable and well enough to speak with

[him] during [the] investigation” by contacting hospital staff. During

the interview, only Detective Hogan and Appellee were in the room,

although nurses occasionally entered and exited. Detective Hogan

testified that Appellee was not under arrest at the time; that he had

                                  5
not obtained an arrest warrant for Appellee; that Appellee was not

in handcuffs; and that neither Appellee’s hands nor feet were bound

together. Detective Hogan further testified that he believed that

Appellee comprehended English, understood the questions, and

answered the questions. Before leaving he executed the search

warrant for Appellee’s DNA by obtaining a buccal swab. He intended

to seek an arrest warrant for Appellee if the DNA results placed

Appellee at the crime scene.

     The medical records show that Appellee remained in the

hospital until January 19, 2022. According to Detective Hogan’s

testimony and the arrest warrant affidavit, Detective Hogan later

learned that the DNA at the crime scene matched that of Appellee.

After the arrest warrant was issued, Detective Hogan arrested

Appellee.

     Following the hearing, the trial court granted Appellee’s

motion to suppress the January 4 statement. In its order, the trial

court considered the testimony of Detective Hogan set forth above,

referenced Appellee’s medical records, and concluded:

                                6
           Based on this medical history it is readily apparent
     that the statement the State is attempting to admit
     should not be admitted as Mr. Franklin was in no physical
     or mental condition to give a knowingly voluntary
     statement or waive his Fifth Amendment privilege.
           Due to the medication the Defendant was receiving,
     his medical condition and the circumstances surrounding
     the Defendant’s physical condition, this Court exercises
     its[] discretion and finds that the statement was not
     voluntary and is inadmissible in the trial of this case.

     3. The State argues that the trial court erred in excluding the

statement on the ground that it was “not voluntary.” We agree.

     At the outset, we note that we read the trial court’s order as

ruling that Appellee’s statement was involuntary under the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the order

focuses on “the medication [Appellee] was receiving, his medical

condition and the circumstances surrounding [his] physical

condition.” See State v. Chulpayev, 296 Ga. 764, 779 (770 SE2d 808)

(2015) (distinguishing statutory and constitutional voluntariness

analyses). Although the issues of whether Appellee’s statement was

involuntary under OCGA § 24-8-824 and whether he should have

been notified of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436

                                 7
(86 SCt 1602, 16 LE2d 694) (1966), were raised by the parties, the

trial court’s order does not expressly make such rulings, and we do

not read the trial court’s order as making those determinations, so

we need not address them.

     Constitutionally, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment demands that a confession or inculpatory statement be

“the product of a rational intellect and a free will” under the totality

of the circumstances.5 Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206, 208

(80 SCt 274, 4 LE2d 242) (1960). See also Doricien, 310 Ga. at 657;

Chulpayev, 296 Ga. at 771 (explaining “that the rule as to the

admissibility of an incriminatory statement is the same as that

applied to a full confession” (cleaned up)). The Supreme Court of the

United States has held “that coercive police activity is a necessary

predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within

the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

     5 Appellee did not clearly raise a claim under the Due Process Clause of

the Georgia Constitution, so we need not address whether the same analysis
would apply under the federal and state Due Process Clauses. See Ga. Const.
of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. I.
                                     8
Amendment.” Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (107 SCt 515,

93 LE2d 473) (1986). In Connelly, the Supreme Court reversed the

suppression of a confession that a defendant gave “without any

prompting” by law enforcement and due to voices in his head that

demanded he confess. Id. at 159-163. The Supreme Court observed

that, although the mental condition of a defendant had become the

focus of voluntariness analyses “as interrogators . . . turned to more

subtle forms of psychological persuasion,” the Supreme Court’s

involuntariness cases remained “focused upon the crucial element of

police overreaching.” Id. at 163-164. The Supreme Court further

explained that requiring “state action” for a due process violation

was consistent with the general principle that “[t]he most

outrageous behavior by a private party seeking to secure evidence

against a defendant does not make that evidence inadmissible under

the Due Process Clause” and avoided applying the exclusionary rule

when it would not deter constitutional violations by the government.

Id. at 165-166.

     In the context of statements made by a defendant while

                                  9
intoxicated or under the influence of drugs, we have explained that

we determine whether a statement is involuntary by examining the

totality of the circumstances, including “lucidity, coherency, manner

of speech, and awareness of circumstances.”6 Evans v. State, 308 Ga.

582, 587 (842 SE2d 837) (2020). We take this opportunity to clarify

that the totality-of-the-circumstances standard we use to evaluate

voluntariness claims includes Connelly’s coercion predicate. Cf.

Nordahl v. State, 306 Ga. 15, 20 (829 SE2d 99) (2019) (observing the

“fundamental principle that this Court is bound by the Constitution

of the United States as its provisions are construed and applied by

the Supreme Court of the United States” (cleaned up)). Thus, even

if a defendant gives a statement while significantly intoxicated or

influenced by drugs, the statement is not involuntary as a matter of

constitutional due process absent some evidence of coercive conduct

by law enforcement in eliciting the statement. See Connelly, 479

      6 Of course, those factors are neither required nor exclusive. Cf. Clark v.

State, 315 Ga. 423, 429 (883 SE2d 317) (2023) (disapproving specific nine-factor
framework to determine whether a juvenile knowingly and voluntarily waived
his or her Miranda rights under the totality of the circumstances).
                                       10
U.S. at 164-167.

      Although we have not always clearly expressed the necessary

predicate of coercion, 7 our decisional law has incorporated this

predicate. See Torres v. State, 314 Ga. 838, 849 (878 SE2d 453)

(2022) (concluding that the defendant’s statement, given while

recovering from a gunshot wound, was voluntary, in part due to the

absence of evidence that officers threatened the defendant or

conditioned his receipt of medical care on his providing a statement

to them); Starling v. State, 299 Ga. 263, 266 (787 SE2d 705) (2016)

(rejecting the defendant’s argument “that the trauma of the

shooting, his recent surgery, and the pain medications he was taking

at the time rendered him incapable of knowingly and voluntarily

waiving his rights and making a statement” because, among other

things, there was no evidence that any promises or threats had been

made in connection with the interview); Rivera v. State, 282 Ga. 355,

359-360 (647 SE2d 70) (2007) (affirming admission of statements

      7 See, e.g., Russell v. State, 309 Ga. 772, 775-777 (848 SE2d 404) (2020);

Clay v. State, 290 Ga. 822, 826-827 (725 SE2d 260) (2012); Myers v. State, 275
Ga. 709, 713 (572 SE2d 606) (2002).
                                      11
obtained while the defendant was in a hospital where the defendant

“was neither threatened nor coerced”). That is because “[a]bsent

police conduct causally related to the confession, there is simply no

basis for concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal

defendant of due process of law.” Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164. See also

State v. Troutman, 300 Ga. 616, 619 (797 SE2d 72) (2017)

(“Likewise, though [the defendant’s] mental state and intellectual

disabilities are factors to be considered, those factors without more

— i.e., deliberate tactics calculated to break the will of the suspect

— are insufficient to support a conclusion of coercive police activity.”

(cleaned up)). Because coercive police conduct is a necessary

predicate for a claim that a defendant’s statement was not

voluntary, the mere fact that a person is taking medication or

recovering from injury is not sufficient support for a conclusion that

the statement was not voluntary. See, e.g., Torres, 314 Ga. at 849;

Rivera, 282 Ga. at 359-360. “[W]hile mental condition is surely

relevant to an individual’s susceptibility to police coercion, mere

examination of the confessant’s state of mind can never conclude the

                                  12
due process inquiry.” Connelly, 479 U.S. at 165. See also Troutman,

300 Ga. at 618-619.

     Here, the trial court erred to the extent that it concluded that

Appellee’s statement was involuntary under the Due Process Clause

without considering whether there was coercive police conduct.

Instead, the trial court reached its conclusion based on “the

medication [Appellee] was receiving, his medical condition and the

circumstances surrounding [his] physical condition.” The trial court

cited no authority at all in support of its conclusion, much less any

decisions supporting the conclusion that a statement was

involuntary based only on such reasoning, and settled precedent

from the United States Supreme Court and this Court are to the

contrary.

     The first two of the trial court’s bases for concluding that the

statement was not voluntary referred to Appellee’s medical

condition. But as we have just discussed, a defendant’s medical

condition — whether pain, the effects of medication, or some other

physical condition — is not by itself sufficient to render a statement

                                 13
involuntary. See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 165; Troutman, 300 Ga. at

618-619. See also Torres, 314 Ga. at 849; Brown v. State, 304 Ga.

435, 440 (819 SE2d 14) (2018); Rivera, 282 Ga. at 359-360.

     The trial court’s third reason for concluding that Appellee’s

statement was involuntary — “the circumstances surrounding [his]

physical condition” — is also arguably grounded only in Appellee’s

medical condition. But even assuming the trial court could have

been referring to something besides his medical condition or the

influence of medication alone, we see no evidence in the record of

any non-medical, coercive “circumstances surrounding [Appellee’s]

physical condition” that could support a conclusion that Appellee’s

statement was not voluntary as a matter of due process. We

reiterate that any such conclusion must rest on some evidence of

coercive police conduct, see Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164-167;

Troutman, 300 Ga. at 618-619, but no such evidence appears in the

record before us. The trial court’s order makes no mention of

coercion, much less any finding that Detective Hogan engaged in any

manner of coercive conduct; Appellee has never argued that any part

                                14
of the record showed coercive police conduct of any kind; and even

viewing the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s

findings and judgment, see Walker, 312 Ga. at 336, no such conduct

is apparent. Absent evidence of coercive police conduct, and

considering all the circumstances here, we conclude that Appellee’s

January 4, 2022, statement to Detective Hogan was voluntary. See

Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167. See also Torres, 314 Ga. at 849;

Troutman, 300 Ga. at 618-619; Starling, 299 Ga. at 266; Livingston

v. State, 264 Ga. 402, 408 (444 SE2d 748) (1994) (“Regardless of a

suspect’s mental state, coercive police activity is a necessary

predicate to the finding that his confession is not voluntary within

the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. As there is no evidence of coercive police activity in this

case, [the defendant’s] contention that his statements were not

voluntary under the Fourteenth Amendment must fail.” (cleaned

up)); Wilson v. State, 257 Ga. 444, 448 (359 SE2d 891) (1987)

(applying Connelly to reject the defendant’s argument that, even in

the absence of any evidence of law enforcement coercion, his

                                 15
statement was involuntary due to his alleged insanity).

     Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order suppressing

Appellee’s statement.

     Judgment reversed. All the Justices concur.

                                16
     WARREN, Justice, concurring.

     I agree wholeheartedly with the majority’s conclusions that the

trial court did not apply the correct legal test in evaluating whether

Franklin’s statement to Detective Hogan was voluntary; that

Franklin did not contend that the record showed coercive police

conduct; that no such evidence is apparent from the record on

appeal; and that we should reverse the trial court’s suppression

order as a result.

     I write separately, however, to flag my concern about an issue

related to the review of video and audio recordings contained in

records on appeal. Specifically, I am concerned about extending to

audio recordings our approach to reviewing video recordings, which

the majority opinion touches on here in footnote 1.

                                  *

     It is well established that when reviewing a trial court’s grant

or denial of a motion to suppress “in which the trial court has made

express findings of disputed facts,” this Court’s scope of review is

                                 17
limited. Hughes v. State, 296 Ga. 744, 746 (770 SE2d 636) (2015).

We have summarized that review as follows:

          First, an appellate court generally must accept
          those findings unless they are clearly
          erroneous. Second, an appellate court must
          construe the evidentiary record in the light
          most favorable to the factual findings and
          judgment of the trial court. And third, an
          appellate court generally must limit its
          consideration of the disputed facts to those
          expressly found by the trial court.

Id. at 746 (cleaned up).

     On the other hand, we have noted that in cases where

          some or all of the material facts may be
          undisputed, as where the defendant concedes a
          fact unhelpful to his cause in his motion to
          suppress, where the State admits a fact
          unhelpful to its case in connection with the
          motion, or where the State and defendant
          expressly stipulate to a fact[,] . . . an appellate
          court properly may take notice of the
          undisputed facts—even if the trial court did
          not—without interfering with the prerogative
          of the trial court to resolve disputes of material
          fact.

Id. at n.4 (emphasis added).

     As the majority opinion notes, video recordings in the record

                                  18
are one potential source of “undisputed facts” of which an appellate

court may “take notice.” Hughes, 296 Ga. at 746 & n.5. Cf. Walker

v. State, 312 Ga. 332, 336 (862 SE2d 542) (2021); Vergara v. State,

283 Ga. 175, 178 (657 SE2d 863) (2008), disapproved of on other

grounds by Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423 (883 SE2d 317) (2023); Green

v. State, 275 Ga. 569, 572 & n.11 (570 SE2d 207) (2002). We have

emphasized the limited scope of this approach; we may take notice

only “to the extent that material facts definitively can be ascertained

exclusively by reference to evidence that is uncontradicted and

presents no questions of credibility.” Hughes, 296 Ga. at 746 n.5

(citing Vergara, 283 Ga. at 178).

     I acknowledge that we have occasionally applied the same

principle to an audio recording. See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 314 Ga.

566, 573 (878 SE2d 208) (2022); Taylor v. State, 312 Ga. 1, 9 (860

SE2d 470) (2021); Rosser v. State, 308 Ga. 597, 605 (842 SE2d 821)

(2020); State v. Rumph, 307 Ga. 477, 481 (837 SE2d 358) (2019);

State v. Estrada, 300 Ga. 199, 199 (794 SE2d 103) (2016). But as far

as I can tell, this Court did so without grappling with potentially

                                    19
relevant and material differences between video and audio

recordings.     See, e.g., Mitchell, 314 Ga. at 573 (looking to

uncontradicted facts in audio-recorded statements to determine

whether OCGA § 24-8-824 was violated when a defendant made

statements to law enforcement, but citing for that proposition a case

in which we referenced only “a recording of a police interview”);

Taylor, 312 Ga. at 9 (looking to undisputed facts in an audio-

recorded      statement   to   determine   whether   the   defendant

unambiguously invoked his right to counsel under the United States

Constitution, but citing for that proposition a case in which we took

notice of undisputed facts from a video-recorded statement); Rosser,

308 Ga. at 605 (looking to undisputed facts from an audio-recorded

statement to analyze whether OCGA § 24-8-824 was violated when

the defendant made a statement to law enforcement, but citing for

that proposition a case in which we took notice of undisputed facts

from only a video-recorded statement); Rumph, 307 Ga. at 480-481

(looking to undisputed facts from one audio- and one video- recorded

statement, and noting that the trial court had not made express

                                  20
credibility findings related to either recording and that the

defendant did not object to the admission of either recording);

Estrada, 300 Ga. at 200 (looking to undisputed facts from two audio-

recorded statements to determine if the defendant unequivocally

invoked his right to counsel under the United States Constitution

during the statements, but citing for that proposition a case in which

we took notice of undisputed facts from only a video-recorded

statement). Those differences might include more easily correlating

a voice with the person who is speaking, being able to visually

identify a person’s body language, and being able to visually identify

overt acts of coercion that an audio tape might not reveal, just to

name a few.8 I am thus concerned that extending this principle to

audio recordings may be more fraught than we realize. 9

      8 Practically speaking, these differences might mean that parties have

more to dispute with respect to the contents of an audio recording than they
would for a video recording.

      9  That our review of video recordings is limited to ascertaining and
taking notice of undisputed facts should cut against most concerns about that
principle or its extension to audio recordings. And we have conducted a review
of this type for both video and audio recordings where a defendant did not
object to the introduction of such recordings into evidence. Cf. Rumph, 307 Ga.

                                      21
      Nevertheless, my concern about how we define and apply these

principles to video and audio recordings does not affect the bottom

line in this case. That is because we need not take notice of any facts

in the audio-only recording of Detective Hogan’s interview of

Franklin to conclude that Franklin’s claim fails. To that end, the

record shows that Franklin did not even raise (let alone offer

evidence of) the specter of law-enforcement coercion in hearings

before the trial court—hearings that included testimony and other

evidence beyond just the audio recording of his interaction with

Detective Hogan—and the trial court did not find that any type of

at 480 (looking to undisputed facts from one audio- and one video-recorded
statement; defendant’s counsel interposed objections to neither). I remain
concerned, however, that a lack of precision in how we have historically
explained this limited review could lead to appellate courts reviewing video
recordings in a manner that extends beyond taking notice of undisputed facts
and resembles something more like the fact-finding trial courts generally
conduct in the first instance. Compare, e.g., Vergara, 283 Ga. at 178 (“‘[W]here
controlling facts are not in dispute, . . . such as those facts discernible from a
videotape, our review is de novo.’”) (quoting Lyons v. State, 244 Ga. App. 658,
659 (535 SE2d 841) (2000)) and Lyons, 244 Ga. App. 659 (“Where controlling
facts are not in dispute, however, such as those facts discernible from a video
tape, our review is de novo.”) (citing Vansant v. State, 264 Ga. 319, 320 (443
SE2d 474) (1994)) with Vansant, 264 Ga. at 320-321 (“[W]here the evidence is
uncontroverted and no question regarding the credibility of witnesses is
presented, the trial court’s application of the law to undisputed facts is subject
to de novo appellate review.”). Any such concern would be amplified if applied
to audio recordings for the reasons described above.
                                       22
coercion had taken place. I therefore do not view footnote 1 as being

part of the majority opinion’s holding, and we can save for another

day a more comprehensive examination of the issues I note above.

                                 23