Court Opinion

ID: 9426753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:18:51.065492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:02.927815
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice White,
with whom Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Rehnquist join in part, dissenting in part.
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452 (1974), held that when state proceedings are not pending, but only threatened, a declaratory judgment may be entered with respect to the state statute at issue without regard to the strictures of Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971). But Steffel left *718open whether an injunction should also issue in such circumstances. 415 U. S., at 463. Then Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922 (1975), approved issuance by a federal court of a preliminary injunction against a threatened state prosecution, but only pending decision on the declaratory judgment and only then subject to “stringent” standards which should cause a district court to “weigh carefully the interests on both sides,” since prohibiting the enforcement of the State’s criminal law against the federal plaintiff, even pending final resolution of his case, “seriously impairs the State’s interest in enforcing its criminal laws, and implicates the concerns for federalism which lie at the heart of Younger.” Id., at 931. Although finding the issuance of a preliminary injunction not an abuse of discretion in that case, the Court also distinguished between a preliminary injunction pendente lite and a permanent injunction at the successful conclusion of the federal case; for “a district court can generally protect the interests of a federal plaintiff by entering a declaratory judgment, and therefore the stronger injunctive medicine will be unnecessary.” Ibid.
Doran was thus true to the teachings of Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157 (1943), where the Court held that an injunction against threatened state criminal prosecutions should not issue even though the underlying state statute had already been invalidated, relying on the established rule “that courts of equity do not ordinarily restrain criminal prosecutions.” Id., at 163. A threatened prosecution “even though alleged to be in violation of constitutional guaranties, is not a ground for equity relief . . . .” Ibid. An injunction should issue only upon a showing that the danger of irreparable injury is both “great and immediate,” citing the same authorities to this effect that this Court relied on in Younger v. Harris, supra. In each of the cited cases—and they do not exhaust the authorities to the same effect—criminal prosecutions were not pending when this Court ruled that a federal *719equity court should not enter the injunction. “The general rule is that equity will not interfere to prevent the enforcement of a criminal statute even though unconstitutional. . . . To justify such interference there must be exceptional circumstances and a clear showing that an injunction is necessary in order to afford adequate protection of constitutional rights.” Spielman Motor Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S. 89, 95 (1935).
The Court has plainly departed from the teaching of these cases. The whole point of Douglas v. City of Jeannette’s admonition against injunctive relief was that once a declaratory judgment had issued, further equitable relief would depend on the existence of unusual circumstances thereafter. Here the State’s enforcement of its statute prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality by the federal court would appear to be no more than the performance of their duty by the State’s law enforcement officers. If doing this much prior to the declaration of unconstitutionality amounts to unusual circumstances sufficient to warrant an injunction, the standard is obviously seriously eroded.
Under our cases, therefore, more is required to be shown than the Court’s opinion reveals to affirm the issuance of the injunction. To that extent I dissent.