Court Opinion

ID: 9458334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:49:07.570841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:43.397531
License: Public Domain

FAHY, Senior Circuit Judge
(dissenting specially):
Though appellant rejected appointment of counsel in the District Court, and no error should be attached to the absence of counsel in that court, he has requested in this court the appointment *1207of counsel to assist him.1 I think he is entitled to counsel and that our decision accordingly should await the assistance which counsel might give to him and to the court. He is under sentence of life imprisonment for first degree murder. In the instant collateral attack upon his conviction and sentence he raises numerous points.
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides that “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” This provision has been given generous scope by the Supreme Court in its interpretation of “criminal prosecutions.” See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1970) (preliminary hearing); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (lineup); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (pretrial interrogation); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963) (direct appeal); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (trial). An appeal from denial of a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 without a hearing, though in a formal sense a civil proceeding, is in substance comparable to a criminal proceeding within the intent of the Sixth Amendment provision for counsel. See Note, Developments in the Law — Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1038, 1197-1205 (1970). In another aspect of appeals the Supreme Court has extended its holding of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956), by guaranteeing indigents the right to a free transcript on appeal of denial of habeas corpus relief. Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192, 87 S.Ct. 362, 17 L.Ed.2d 290 (1966). The reasoning of the Court in Long and in the decisions there reviewed, involving post-conviction procedures subsequent to direct appeal, would seem to apply as well to the right to counsel, at least in the circumstances of this case, if not by reason of the Equal Protection Clause, then under the Due Process Clause read with the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel.
The constitutional question aside, however, even if appellant in a strict sense is not entitled to counsel by reason of the Constitution, I think denial of his request is a failure on our part to exercise a sound discretion.
I am unwilling to join with the court in finding that appellant in his brief filed pro se has explored every possible claim that might be raised on collateral attack by counsel who has studied the record, or that the points appellant has raised without counsel have been adequately briefed by him. I am reminded of the familiar aphorism regarding a lawyer who acts as his own counsel, even more acutely applicable to a prisoner who does so when under sentence of life imprisonment. It seems to me a derogation of the Great Writ — Section 2255 by analogy — to refuse a request for counsel on this appeal.

. Under date of August 20, 1970, appellant wrote to the Chief Judge of our court in part as follows:
This petitioner, pro se hereby request [s] the United States Court of Appeals, to appoint counsel on my appeal from collateral-attack on my conviction in the District Court.
Since I have raised some major constitutional issues, and this is an appeal from a first degree murder conviction, and the trial transcripts are over 2500 pages, please appoint two counsels.
As the record below will show, I am a pauper, without any means to pay counsel.
Respectfully submitted
Walter Lee Parman