Court Opinion

ID: 9560182
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:44:56.840737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:16.954051
License: Public Domain

Miller, J.,
dissenting.
Without commenting upon the question of whether or not it should be permissible to call and examine a commissioner for the purpose of impeaching his award, I cannot, upon the evidence contained in this record and admitted without objection, agree that these awards are not quotient.
The majority opinion has failed realistically to appraise the testimony bearing upon this phase of the case. Commissioner Brown was the only witness who testified as to the procedure adopted by the commissioners to arrive at the awards. That the full import and meaning of what he said about how the awards were made may be realized, the material parts of his testimony bearing upon this question are set out below:
“Q. Do you recall there were three items, first, compensation for the rights taken, and their idea was $3900, and then damages to the residue resulting from the taking of $7,380 and a total figure of $11,280? Could you tell us and advise his Honor especially how you arrived at the award that we refer to there, and first, tell us about the item of compensation, and then tell us how you formulated the award as to the damages?
JL Jl. *n* *«• •«* •«* *jp TT
“A. We discussed the testimony of the witnesses for some time *284among ourselves, and a suggestion was made by one of our group —I cannot remember which one made the suggestion — that we write on a piece of paper our opinion as to these three figures, so we all did so and tabulated the five answers for each of the three figures, took an average and then rounded out the average to a few dollars one way or the other to make it come out more or less even numbers, and that is the way we arrived at the answer.
“Q. Was it agreed or was it suggested and later followed that you should average, add up the figures and then average them out and make that your award?
“A. As I say, it was suggested by one of our group that we felt that procedure should be followed, that we would write down each of our own answers, average them up and that would be it.
“Q. So it was suggested and agreed to by all five of the Commissioners that that procedure would be followed and then you actually did follow that procedure, is that correct?
“A. That is correct, as I say, after we arrived at the average, we made a slight variation one way or the other. I cannot remember now which way it was, but it was not material.
“Q. It was just to round off the figures, is that right?
“A. Yes, sir.
#######
“Q. What I am trying to find out, then, is how did you get $7,380, unless—
“A. That was the average of five figures.
J/. 4Í. M, J». J>. w *Jv* t? *Jr if
“Q. I want to focus your attention on the award in the Latham case, which is the next exhibit there that you see, and I will just ask you this question. Did the procedure that you have described when I had you on examination a moment ago as to the way the award was formulated in the Poland case approximate the procedure which was agreed to and followed by the Commissioners in making the award that you see here in the Latham case of compensation of $2,100, damages of $4,900, and a total of $7,000?
“A. Yes, sir. We used the same procedure for both cases.
“Q. And in getting up your own individual figures which you put in the pot, so to speak, you followed the same general formula *285as to the determination of the damage to the residue that you have described heretofore in regard to the Poland property?
“A. That is right.
#######
“Q. Those were your own valuations, finally determined for the land to be taken and the damage to the residue of the property?
“A. Let me think that over for a moment. Obviously, five men cannot come up with or can hardly be expected on a controversial issue to come up with identical figures. It is only natural that there should be some variation in the opinion. In order to resolve that variation, we used this method of averaging and rounding them out.
“Had there been a very wide variation, or had any one of us felt that the average, which was the answer that we proposed to fill in these blanks as to the final answer — if there had been any wide variation between us, in that answer, or if we had felt that our own opinion was out of line with the average, I am sure that the matter would have been raised and we would have discussed the matter at even greater length, but there was not, and so we arrived at this composite figure which we all agree to. Does that make it clear?
#######
“Q. Did I understand you to say there was a binding agreement or understanding that you would bring in an award in these cases on an average of what each one of you found?
“A. Nothing so formal as that. It was suggested that we put, each put down our own figures, and average them up, and that would be the method of arriving at the final figure.
“Q. Do you consider these figures fair and impartial awards?
“A. Yes, I do.
“Q. Suppose, for instance that somebody had put down a figure of $100,000 in several of these awards. It would have brought them way up. Would you have agreed to that?
“A. No, I would not. I might point out that our findings were well within the range of the figures submitted by the various witnesses. It would be interesting, as a matter of fact, to see, if you average up the witnesses, what sort of answer you would have gotten. I do not know. We did not do that.”
Quotient jury verdicts and quotient commission awards are con*286demned. The authorities are in accord that when a verdict or award is made by jurors or commissioners in pursuance of a previous agreement to accept the average amount of their several individual estimates as the measure of damages or as their award without the assent of their considered judgment to such final sum or award, then in such case the verdict or award is invalid.
“It is a rule of general application that quotient verdicts are illegal.” Kelly v. Rainelle Coal Co., 135 W. Va. 594, 602, 64 S. E. (2d) 606.
“A quotient award, like that of a quotient verdict, implies an agreement in advance among commissioners or jurors that each will put down the amount he thinks the award or verdict should be, the aggregate of such sums then divided by the number of commissioners or jurors, and the result reached shall be their award or verdict. 19 M. J., Verdict, § 8, page 491.” Virginia Electric and Power Co. v. Marks, 195 Va. 468, 476, 78 S. E. (2d) 677, 53 Am. Jur., Trials, §§ 1030, 1031.
“In reaching an award it is unfortunately too often the practice for each commissioner to make his estimate, and the average of the figures so obtained is taken as the award. This method is objectionable even if each commissioner states his honest opinion, since the law contemplates that the award shall be the sum which is in the opinion of the majority of the board, after due deliberation, the just compensation to which the owner is entitled, and not a figure arbitrarily obtained, which is not the correct amount in the opinion of any one of the commissioners; and it is doubly objectionable if one of the commissioners makes his estimate larger or smaller than what he really considers the proper amount, so as to make the average approximate his real opinion. Nevertheless, an award that is made by this method will not be set aside unless it appears that there is a previous agreement by the commissioners to be bound by the result.” 6 Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d ed., 1951), § 26.5312, p. 225.
Here the evidence discloses that the commissioners discussed the testimony of the witnesses for some time, and then the suggestion was made and agreed to that each commissioner put down what he thought should be allowed as compensation for the land taken, damages to the residue, and the total of these two items. Upon adding up the figures put down by the five commissioners and dividing the results by five, the sums so ascertained were to be *287abided by as the compensation for land taken, damages to the residue and the total awards. It is true that Commissioner Brown says that these average sums, when ascertained, were “rounded out” by either adding or subtracting a few dollars “to make it come out more or less even numbers,” but he says that the few dollars that were either added or subtracted to bring about “even numbers” were not material.
The impropriety lies in the agreement to abide the result. The fact that a few dollars were either added or subtracted from the awards to make even figures does not cure the vice inherent in the agreement to arrive at awards by this method.
“It appears from this affidavit that it was agreed by the jury that each juror should give the sum to which he thought the plaintiff below was entitled and that the sum of these amounts should be divided by the number of jurors; the quotient to be the amount of plaintiff’s verdict. This was done. The amount so found was nearly $300, but for the purpose of making the amount an even sum it was increased to $300. This verdict cannot be sustained. (Johnson v. Husband, 22 Kan. 277; Werner v. Edmiston, 24 id. 147.) After the amount was found by marking, aggregating and dividing there was no reconsideration. The addition to that amount was not made after a further consideration and decision of the cause upon its merits, but was for the one purpose of making an even amount. * * *” Ottawa v. Gilliland, 63 Kan. 165, 166, 65 P. 252, 88 Am. St. Rep. 232. Benjamin v. Helena Light & R. Co., 79 Mont. 144, 255 P. 20, 52 A. L. R. 33; and 52 A. L. R. 43.
The commissioner in definite language stated that upon suggestion it was agreed by all five that the procedure would be followed, which resulted in a quotient figure. After reciting what was agreed to, he said that the sums to be so arrived at “would be it.” It is also certain that after the agreement was made, the adopted procedure was adhered to, for he stated that the final awards of $11,280 and $7,000 to the respective landowners were the results of this quotient process, give or take a few dollars to make round figures.
“Where jurors by a previous agreement bind themselves to accept the quotient as their verdict, any subsequent assent to this result, however solemnly given, is made under a moral constraint which justly vitiates the verdict.” Thompson and Merriman, Juries (2d ed.) § 411, p. 511.
The testimony clearly shows that an agreement was made to *288abide the quotients when ascertained and was in each instance accepted and returned as the final awards by adding or subtracting a few dollars to make round figures.
It can hardly be doubted that each commissioner’s liberty of dissenting from the figures so ascertained was prevented or materially affected by the previous agreement that the sum so arrived at “would be it.” Their assent to the quotient was at best given under the moral constraint of their previous agreement and thus it does not represent the free will and considered judgment of the commission.
Because of this vice in the awards, they should be vacated and the cause remanded for the appointment of another commission.