Court Opinion

ID: 9765999
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:28:27.901661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:18.264540
License: Public Domain

Carleton Harris, Chief Justice, (concurring in part; dissenting in part). I agree with the majority that the jury should not be informed of a defendant’s prior criminal record during his trial for a current offense. Unquestionably, this could have some effect on the minds of the jurors in determining his guilt or innocence of the immediate offense charged. However, after the defendant has been found guilty, I strongly feel that the jury should be apprised of the number of prior convictions, and should then fix the amount of punishment. Under the prececlure set out by the majority, if a defendant, who has previously been convicted, pleads guilty to the previous conviction(s), the court, in its charge, will simply add one year to the minimum penalty for the offense charged (or 2 or 3 years, depending on the number of prior convictions), and the jury'will never be aware that the defendant has a previous record. The majority say: “If, on .the other hand, there is a verdict of guilty and the minimum punishment assessed by the jury is less than that provided by the previous conviction statute, the defendant’s guilt or innocence of the previous conviction charge can be submitted to the jury, and if there is a verdict of guilty on that charge, the punishment assessed by the jury on the principal offense can be increased to comply with the minimum provided by the previous conviction statute. ’ ’ I strongly disagree with this procedure, and do not feel that it complies with thelegislative intent as ex- I strongly disagree with this procedure, and do not feel that it complies with the legislative intent as expressed in the habitual criminal act. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2328 (Repl. 1964) provides: (1) If the second offense is such that, upon a first conviction, the offender could be punished by imprisonment for a term less than his natural life, then the sentence to imprisonment shall be for a determinate term not less1 than one [1] year more than the minimum sentence provided by law for a first conviction. (2) If the third offense is snch that, upon a first conviction, the offender conld be punished by imprisonment for a term less than his natural life, then the person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a determinate term not less than two [2] years more than the minimum sentence provided by law for a first conviction. (3) If the fourth or subsequent offense is such that, upon a first conviction, the offender could be punished by imprisonment for a term [not]2 less than his natural life, then the person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for the fourth or subsequent offense for a determinate term not less than three [3] years more than the minimum sentence provided by law for a first conviction.” The majority do not permit the jury to consider the accused’s past criminal record in determining whether more than the minimum sentence should be given. 'I consider this holding at variance with the provisions of the act. If the Legislature had intended to provide the procedure set out in the majority opinion, it would only have been necessary in Sub-section (1) to provide, “then the sentence to imprisonment shall be for one year more than the minimum sentence provided.” But the act reads entirely different from such an interpretation, for it provides that for a second offense, [third, fourth or subsequent] the offender shall be imprisoned “for a determinate term not less3 than one year [two, or three years, respectively] more than the minimum sentence provided.” This language, to me, clearly means that the jury may fix the sentence at any amount within the minimum (added for the prior offense or offenses), and the maximum penalty,provided by law for the crime committed. The majority offer no authority for reaching the present conclusions. In Volume 7, Arkansas Law Review, Page 334, there appears an article written by Edwin E. Dunaway, a former justice of this court. This article is entitled, “Acts Affecting the Administration of the Criminal Law,” and on Page 335, the author notes: “Many states have for years had habitual criminal laws in one form or another. Some have provided for doubling the penalties upon second and subsequent convictions. The original act in New York, the famous Baumes Law, provided for a mandatory life sentence upon conviction of a fourth or subsequent felony. Such stringent legislation led in practice to jury nullification, so that the trend in recent years has been toward allowing discretionary increases in penalties, but with higher minimum sentences as a starting point.”4  Comparison with procedures in other states is difficult to make, since statutes vary, but I have not been able to find a single state that permits only the adding of a short period of time to the minimum sentence of a convicted habitual criminal. In fact, several states add to the maximum penalty. In Michigan, for a second conviction, the defendant must be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not less than one-half of the longest term, and not more than one and one-half times the longest term prescribed for a first conviction. In New York, the law is similar — and there is no discretion in the trial judge. In Tennessee, one must have three felony convictions to be classed as an habitual criminal, but when this occurs, the defendant receives life with no parole, or reduced sentence for good behavior. In South Carolina, on the fourth conviction, the defendant receives the maximum prescribed for the crime involved. In Bhode Island, a person with prior convictions receives a twenty-five year maximum, in addition to any sentence imposed for the offense for which he was last convicted. Arizona, North Dakota, and Nebraska, likewise, provide substantial increases in the punishment for repeated offenders. Summarizing, I am persuaded that it is a jury function to determine the punishment meted out to an habitual criminal; further that the Legislature intended that the jury should be informed of the defendant’s past criminal record before setting the penalty, and, in my view, it is contemplated under the act that the punishment should vary between the minimum prescribed (for habitual offenders) and the maximum penalty provided by law. I truly feel that the majority holding in this case has emasculated the habitual criminal act, and' that the practical value of this act has been completely destroyed. Mr. Justice McFaddin is also filing a written dissent in this case, and there is only one difference in our views, vis, he would have the jury first fix the punishment for the current case, and then the jury would hear the charges against the defendant as an habitual criminal. If he should be convicted on this count, the jury would (I presume) add additional punishment to the sentence that he had received for the current offense. Under my theory, the jury would hear the current case, and determine only the man’s guilt or innocence. If they returned a verdict of guilty, the evidence against the defendant as an habitual criminal would be submitted. The jury would then retire to the jury room to consider the punishment to be given the defendant, which procedure would, of course, permit them to take into consideration his prior record, if they found him to be an habitual offender. For the reasons herein mentioned, I respectfully, but vigorously, dissent to the holding of the majority. Ed. F. McFaddin, Associate Justice, (concurring in part; dissenting in part). I agree with what is stated in the Opinion of the Chief Justice. We are “plowing new ground” on this matter of submitting to the jury the situation as regards the habitual criminal act; and for the benefit of future legislation or future decisions I want to give a blueprint of my thinking as to how the situation should be handled: 1. In the trial of guilt or innocence of the offense charged, no mention should be made of previous convictions, whether admitted or denied. 2. The question of guilt or innocence and the fixing of sentence for the offense charged should be submitted to the jury as heretofore. 3. If the jury acquits on the issue of guilt or innocence, then the entire case is ended. 4. If the jury convicts the defendant of the offense charged, then the jury fixes the sentence for the offense. 5. After the jury has convicted and fixed the sentence, if prior convictions are involved, then the same jury is kept without discharge. If the defendant has pleaded guilty of prior convictions, the jury is so informed and told of the habitual criminal act and sent back to the jury room to deliberate on the matter of increase of sentence under the habitual criminal act; and the jury reports its verdict to the court on that issue and fixes additional sentence under the habitual criminal act. 6. After the defendant has been convicted under Paragraph 4 above, and if prior convictions are involved, then the same jury is kept without discharge. . If the defendant has pleaded not guilty to previous convictions, the evidence is introduced to the jury on the previous convictions, with the right of the defendant to deny and offer counter evidence; and the issue is then submitted to the jury on previous convictions and the jury told of the habitual criminal act and sent back to the jury room to deliberate on guilt or innocence of previous convictions and increase of sentence under the habitual criminal act. I think these steps, as I have outlined them, will take care of the situation in all instances and would be much better than the method contained in the Majority Opinion.   Emphasis supplied.    The inclusion of this word is obviously an error in printing.    Emphasis supplied.    Emphasis supplied.