Court Opinion

ID: 9530220
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:58:23.177836+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:02.433120
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Garrard, J.
I respectfully dissent and would reverse the determination of the Industrial Board which, in effect, holds that an employee who suffers permanent injury arising out *424of. and in the course of his employment may not recover for permanent impairment unless he carries the burden of establishing both his damages and any mitigation thereof. ' I believe this result is contrary to both the specific portion of the statute which is at issue and to the general policy which guides, interpretation of the Act.
It is not disputed that on March 9, 1973, Anton suffered an injury which arose both out of and in the course of his employment. The only question relates to his claim of permanent partial impairment. Because there had been two prior injuries to Anton’s lower back and there was no specific evidence as to the amount of permanent partial impairment which resulted from those injuries, the Board found Anton had failed to carry his burden of proof. It therefore denied compensation for any permanent partial impairment.
I do not dispute that Anton had the burden of proof in his claim to the Board. Thus, if the evidence was in equipoise as tó whether Anton suffered any permanent impairment from the injury of March 9th, the Board should have found he failed to meet his burden of proof. Similarly, we would not disturb the Board’s finding on a credibility determination if some evidence supported Anton and other evidence supported the inference that there was no permanent impairment from the injury in question. The Board’s determination in this case cannot be sustained on either of these bases.
Dr. Papadopoulos, who testified for the claimant, stated that Anton had a permanent partial impairment of 15 % after the surgery which followed the March 9th injury. He testified that part of the impairment was from the prior injuries but that he could not give an opinión as to how much existed prior to March 9th.
Similarly, Dr. Stark, who testified for the employer, stated that Anton had permanent'impairment of 8%, that he could not break down the percentages to Anton’s three separate injuries, but that “they’ all contribute to some extent.”
*425The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence was that Anton suffered some permanent partial impairment from the March 9th industrial accident, but the amount of this impairment was uncertain because of the undetermined extent of his prior impairment.
Thus, the ultimate question we decide is whether an employee who establishes that he suffered a permanent partial impairment as the result of an industrial accident, but who cannot establish the percent of his impairment resulting from the accident because there is no evidence establishing the amount of impairment he had already sustained from a prior injury should (a) recover nothing for impairment on the ground he has failed in his burden of proof, or (b) should recover for the entire permanent partial impairment shown to exist after the industrial injury complained of.
In examining these choices it is well established that the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be liberally construed to effect its humane purposes. See, e.g., Homan v. Belleville Lumber and Stipply Co. (1937), 104 Ind. App. 96, 8 N.E.2d 127; Cunya v. Vance (1935), 100 Ind. App. 687, 197 N.E. 737.
The question of proceedings to secure compensation for subsequent permanent injuries is controlled by IC 1971, 22-3-3-12 (Burns Code Ed.) :
“If an employee has sustained a permanent injury either in another employment, or from other cause or causes than the employment in which he received a subsequent permanent injury by accident, such as specified in section 31 [22-3-3-10], he shall be entitled to compensation for the subsequent permanent injury in the same amount as if the previous injury had not occurred: Provided, however, That if the permanent injury for which compensation is claimed, results only in the aggravation or increase of a previously sustained permanent injury or physical condition, regardless of the source or cause of such previously sustained injury or physical condition, the board shall determine the extent of the previously sustained permanent injury or physical condition, as well as the extent of the aggravation or increase resulting from the subsequent *426permanent injury, and shall award compensation only for that part of such injury, or physical condition resulting from the subsequent permanent injury. Provided further, however, That amputation of any part of the body or loss of any or all of the vision of one or both eyes shall be considered as a permanent injury or physical condition.”
Two decisions have construed the statute although neither considered which party bears the risk when the evidence is inadequate to establish the amount of disability which resulted from the prior injury or injuries.
In Moore v. Staton (1950), 120 Ind. App. 339, 92 N.E.2d 564, the court pointed out that the present form of the statute arose from a 1945 amendment and was a radical departure from prior law which provided benefits for the total existing impairment undiminished by the portion attributable to a prior injury. In its decision the court noted the duty of the Board to determine the extent of the aggravation and remanded to the Board for further findings.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court decided Kinzie v. Gen. Tire & Rubber Co. (1956), 235 Ind. 592, 134 N.E.2d 212. The case actually concerned the second proviso, and the holding was that where the evidence established that there was no increase in impairment from the second injury the employee was not entitled to permanent partial impairment.1 The court, however, agreed with the Moore court, stating that the purpose of the amendment adding the provisos was to remove one of the major barriers against the employment of handicapped persons, and reiterated the duty of the Board,
“The above proviso not only authorized, it required that the board determine first the fact of a permanent injury and the extent thereof. It made it necessary that the board then determine whether the injury is a subsequent permanent injury. If it is determined that the injury is a subsequent injury, the board must then determine the extent *427of.the injured person’s previous ‘permanent injury or physical condition.’ If from these facts it is determined that the permanent injury for which compensation is claimed ‘results only in an aggravation or increase of the previously sustained injury or physical condition,’ then, as the statute provides, the board ‘shall award compensation only for that part of such injury, or physical condition resulting from the subsequent permanent injury.’ ” 235 Ind. 592, 602,134 N.E.2d 212, 217.
Thus, while the statute is open to construction on the question before us, it should be liberally construed to effect the humane purposes of the Act. Such a construction places nonpersuasion regarding the extent of impairment which has resulted from a prior injury on the employer once the employee has discharged his burden by establishing a com-pensable injury, that permanent impairment resulted therefrom, and the total amount of existing permanent partial impairment.
I believe that construction should be adopted as the more reasonable construction because:
(1) The history of the Act demonstrates that prior to 1945 such subsequent injuries were fully compensable.2 To alter that result the Legislature did not choose to fully rewrite the section. Instead it retained as the primary rule full compensation to which it appended an exception where the evidence established preexisting impairment from a prior injury. This approach and the Supreme Court’s seriate construction of the statute in Kinzie do not manifest an intent contrary to the general policy of liberal construction.
(2) Considering both the general policy and the specific purpose of the section as discussed in Kinzie it would not appear to place an unduly harsh burden on the employer to place upon it the risk of nonpersuasion regarding the extent of preexisting impairment; It may discover medical records of a claimant’s prior related injuries. Moreover, through *428employment and re-employment physical examinations it has a device readily available for securing evidence of an existing impairment.
I woüld-therefore reverse the decision of the Board with instructions to determine the permanent partial impairment of Anton consistent with this opinion.3
Note. — Reported at 363 N.E.2d 1286.

. The employee had been industrially blind in his left eye prior to the injury for which a claim was filed. The latter injury resulted in enucleation of the eye. The case was remanded, however, for determination that the prior condition was “permanent” and that the prior “industrially blind” condition had been calculated with glasses.

. See, e.g., Cunya v. Vance (1935), 100 Ind. App. 687, 197 N.E. 737.

. There remains for the Board’s determination the extent of the permanent partial impairment following the March 9th injury since the evidence was conflicting. Due to its conclusion regarding the effect of nonpersuasion as to the extent of the preexisting impairment, the Board made no finding of the extent of the total permanent partial impairment' which existed after the March 9th injury.