Court Opinion

ID: 9750309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 14:49:09.210013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:07.003569
License: Public Domain

JIM HANNAH, Chief Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. The Commission is wrong in its interpretation of Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-74-210 (Repl. 1994). The location where Seiz Sign Company sought a permit to erect a billboard was in an unzoned commercial or industrial area as required by Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-74-204(a)(2) (Repl. 1994) and as defined under paragraph 1.H.2 of AHTD’s Regulations. Further, the site was not in a predominately residential area as defined in Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-74-210 (Repl.1994). In 1967, the legislature passed the Arkansas Highway Beautification Act, which provided that nothing shall prevent billboards in unzoned commercial or industrial areas. See Ark.Code Ann. § 27-74-204(a)(2). The Act allowed the Commission to define unzoned commercial or industrial area. See id. In 1972, the Commission defined the term in pertinent part as “land occupied by the regularly used building, parking lot, and storage or processing area of a commercial, business, or industrial activity, and that land within 600 feet thereof on both sides of the highway. See Regulations for Control of Outdoor Advertising, 001-00-005-8 Ark.Code R. App’x 3(1)(H) (Weil 2008). The unzoned land shall not include ... (2) “Land predominantly used for residential purposes.'” Id. (emphasis added). In 1979, the legislature amended the Act to include section 27-74-210, which defined the term “land predominantly used for residential purposes” for the Commission. Section 27-74-210 provides in pertinent part as follows: (a) It is the legislative intent and purpose of this section to specifically define a certain term used in the [Regulations for Control of Outdoor Advertising ] “predominantly used for residential purposes” as that term is used in enumerating exclusions in the definition of “unzoned commercial, business, or industrial areas,” in order to ... enable the [Commission to more effectively and efficiently and uniformly administer the provisions of this chapter.... (b) “[L]and predominantly used for residential purposes” means only those tracts of land within an unzoned commercial, business, or industrial area ... which are occupied by a building regularly and principally used as a residence .... Under the plain language of section 27-74-210, the Commission may define as predominantly residential only those specific tracts of land within unzoned commercial, business, or industrial areas that contain residential structures. Because only the tracts containing residences may be predominantly residential, the remaining tracts within the unzoned commercial area are open for billboard erection under the statute. Generally, “[a]n administrative agency’s interpretation of its own regulation will not be overturned unless it is clearly wrong.” Nash v. Ark Elevator Safety Board, 370 Ark. 345, 351, 259 S.W.3d 421, 425 (2007). While we defer to the Commission’s factual determinations, we review issues of statutory construction de novo because it is this court’s duty to decide what a statute means. Johnson v. Bonds Fertilizer, Inc., 365 Ark. 133, 135, 226 S.W.3d 753, 755 (2006). While it is true that an agency’s interpretation is highly persuasive, where a statute is not ambiguous, we will not interpret it to mean anything other than what it says. Ford v. Keith, 338 Ark. 487, 494, 996 S.W.2d 20, 25 (1999). The first rule in considering the meaning and effect of a statute is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Richard’s Honda Yamaha, 344 Ark. 44, 52, 38 S.W.3d 356, 360 (2001). The Commission’s decision is wrong because, contrary to the plain meaning of the statute, the AHTD denied Seiz a billboard permit where the proposed site was found to be “predominantly residential,” even though the tract had no residential structures. The decision to deny the permit was based upon the residential nature of nearby tracts of land. The plain meaning of section 27-74-210 is that only the tracts of land occupied by a residence are to be considered “land predominantly used for residential purposes.” Because there are no residences located on the tract of land at issue, the AHTD and the Commission misapplied the law in finding the tract to be “land predominantly used for residential purposes.” Therefore, the Commission erred when it failed to reverse AHTD’s decision denying Seiz’s application for a billboard permit.1   . The desirability of billboards in an area near residences is not at issue. The court's duty is to apply the statute as it is written.