Court Opinion

ID: 9725634
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:56:59.680084+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:17.319531
License: Public Domain

NAJAM, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. While I agree with the majority’s statement of the law, I cannot agree with its conclusion that the trial court erred when it suppressed the State’s evidence. The majority reasons that the trial court’s decision to suppress the evidence was based upon the fact that the traffic stop was a pretext to investigate drug activity. There is no question that when there is an objectively justifiable reason for a stop, the stop is valid even if the police officer making the stop has ulterior suspicions or motives. Hol-lins, 672 N.E.2d at 431. Thus, a lawful stop for a bona fide traffic violation, even if pre-textual, can lead to the lawful seizure of contraband.
Here, the record shows that the trial court understood and correctly applied the law. Although the court did not enter formal findings, at the suppression hearing it stated:
I hate these pretext stop allegations, because it seems to be that they’re more fact sensitive than anything ... I’ve had situations where they followed them for blocks and waited ‘till they made a left or right-hand turn without using their turn signal and I’ve upheld that.
Record at 100-01 (emphasis added). However, despite its previous rulings that upheld pretextual traffic stops, the court suppressed the evidence in this case.
The trial court displayed a personal knowledge of the streets involved in this stop. The area was at most five city blocks in length, and the court doubted that the officers had enough time to “pace” Voit’s ear. The court challenged:
I don’t know how they can catch up to the car, put a distance between it like Officer Reed said, follow it for a long enough period of time to get an accurate read ... [particularly, if she’s making a left-lane turn ... she’s going to be slowing down, unless she’s going to go on two wheels if she turns.
Record at 98-99. Considering the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences flowing from that evidence, it is apparent that the trial court did not believe the testimony that Voit had committed a traffic violation. As the majority acknowledges, the court noted the demeanor of one officer who testified and doubted his testimony.2 Our supreme court has indicated that where suppression is an issue and the trial court makes a determination that the evidence should be suppressed based upon the credibility of witnesses, we must give the trial court deference as the trier-of-fact. Foreman, 662 N.E.2d at 931-32 (upheld trial court’s grant of motion to suppress where trial court was not persuaded that police held reasonable belief they had obtained valid consent to search locked room).
*1364The majority contends that the record is not clear as to the precise basis of the trial court’s ruling. I cannot agree. The trial court clearly expressed its disbelief in the State’s account of events leading up to the stop. That is enough. We may reverse the judgment of the trial court only where the uncontradicted evidence will support no reasonable inference in favor of the ruling. State v. Jorgensen, 526 N.E.2d 1004, 1006 (Ind.Ct.App.1988); see Hollins, 672 N.E.2d at 430-31 (stop justified where trial court expressly found defendant committed traffic violation).
The trial court had upheld previous traffic stops where the primary motivation for the stop was to investigate drug activity. The court did not suppress the evidence because the traffic stop was a pretext to investigate drug activity but rather because the State’s claim of a traffic violation as the lawful predicate for the stop was not credible. The court’s finding was not clearly erroneous, and we should not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court on this question.
Trial judges who preside over criminal dockets are required to hear many motions that seek the suppression of evidence, and they will eventually run across an illegal search or seizure. See Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary, 80 Judicature 165, 170 (1997). In such cases, if the judge follows his oath, he is required to suppress evidence. Id. In this case, the trial judge noted that he rarely granted motions to suppress.3 His decision to suppress the evidence in this case was the result of his considered judgment.
Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s order granting Voit’s motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the State’s warrantless search.

. Officer Reed was asked why he decided to pace the car. He answered, “You mean for legality reasons?" Record at 67. The trial court later commented, "But I saw him visibly smile, I think, when the officer said that.” Record at 103.

. The judge stated:
I will grant — grant? I don’t do this often enough to know. I guess it's grant your motion to suppress.
Record at 104.