Court Opinion

ID: 9843741
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:42:38.984037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:53.767558
License: Public Domain

MARING, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 38] I respectfully dissent. I also apply the intermediate standard of review, but I reach a different result. I conclude the diverse treatment of injured persons bears no close correspondence to any legislative goal and, therefore, violates the equal protection clause of the North Dakota Constitution. N.D. Const, art. I, § 21.
[¶ 39] The majority states: “In assessing statutory classifications under an equal protection analysis, we may consider unar-tdculated, as well as articulated, legislative purposes and goals.” It cites to State v. Leppert, 2003 ND 15, ¶ 18, 656 N.W.2d 718; Olson v. Bismarck Parks and Recreation Dist., 2002 ND 61, ¶ 11, 642 N.W.2d 864; Haney v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 518 N.W.2d 195, 202 (N.D.1994); Bellemare v. Gateway Builders, Inc., 420 N.W.2d 733, 738 (N.D.1988). However, a reading of those cases reveals Leppert and Haney are cases in which we applied a rational-basis standard of review to a claim of denial of equal protection. Leppert, at ¶ 18; Haney, at 201. When we review an equal protection challenge using the rational-basis standard of review, we have said: “[I]t is not necessary that the Legislature have articulated the purpose or rationale supporting the classification, providing there is an identifiable purpose which the Legislature may have reasonably considered in adopting the classification.” Baldock v. North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau, 554 N.W.2d 441, 446 (N.D.1996) (citing NL Indus., Inc. v. North Dakota State Tax Comm’r, 498 N.W.2d 141, 149 (N.D.1993)); accord Haney, at 202; Leppert, at ¶ 18; State v. Knoefler, 325 N.W.2d 192, 195 (N.D.1982). “‘The Equal Protection Clause does not demand for purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature or governing decisionmaker actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification.’ ” NL Indus., Inc., at 149 (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15-16, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992)). Thus, even when the statute and legislative history is silent, the Court can review if the purpose “ ‘may reasonably have been the purpose and policy’ of the relevant governmental decisionmaker.” NL Indus., Inc., at 149 (quoting Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528-29, 79 S.Ct. 437, 3 L.Ed.2d 480 (1959)). Considering any conceivable purpose is part of the inquiry in the rational-basis standard of review, but not in the intermediate standard of review. For the proposition that any conceivable purpose can be used in an equal protection analysis under the intermediate standard of review, the majority opinion cites to two cases, Olson, 2002 ND 61, ¶ 11, 642 N.W.2d 864, and Bellemare, 420 N.W.2d at 738, Although Olson is a case in which we apply an intermediate standard of review, the cases cited for the proposition that we may consider unarticulated legislative purposes are both cases in which we apply the rational-basis standard of review. See Olson, at ¶ 11 (citing Haney, 518 N.W.2d at 202 and Knoefler, 325 N.W.2d at 195).
[¶ 40] In Bellemare, we cite to Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445, 453-54 (N.D.1979), for the proposition that we can conceive legislative goals that are not stated in the statute or legislative history. Bellemare, 420 N.W.2d at 738. Herman and Bellemare are both authored by the author of this majority opinion. Again, although we purport in Herman to apply an intermediate standard of review, we find unstated legislative goals to uphold the constitutionality of the statute by citing to goals set forth in a Colorado decision and an Alabama decision, both of *921which applied the rational-basis test in their analysis. 277 N.W.2d at 453-54.
[¶41] I cannot find any case law or treatise that supports using the rational-basis analysis of determining a “legitimate state interest” as a quid pro quo for determining a “legislative goal” under the intermediate standard of review. Under the rational-basis standard, our Court can review any identifiable purpose that may conceivably have been that of the Legislature. Under our strict scrutiny standard of review, the burden is on the state to articulate a “compelling governmental interest” that justifies the classification. See Gange v. Clerk of Burleigh County Dist. Court, 429 N.W.2d 429, 433 (N.D.1988) (outlining the standards for judicial scrutiny of equal protection claims). If our Court is not going to require under the intermediate standard of review some articulation of a legislative goal in either the statute or legislative history, then we should no longer use this standard as a guise for a “heightened” standard of review. If the majority has applied a more vigorous standard of review than rational-basis, I cannot discern it. The majority opinion professes to apply an intermediate standard of review, but in effect, applies a rational-basis standard of review.
[¶ 42] The United States Supreme Court is using an intermediate standard of review in equal protection cases “that is not as difficult for the government to meet as the compelling interest test, but which involves far less deference to the legislature than does the rationality test.” Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law — Substance and Procedure § 18.3, at 219 (3d ed.1999). Our Court recognized this development in Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 776 (N.D.1974), and concluded that such standard was similar to our intermediate standard of review. See also Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133 (N.D.1978). The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 135 L.Ed.2d 735 (1996), in applying this intermediate standard of review states that: “The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation.” In the present case, the legislative history makes it crystal clear that the statute of repose was designed to remedy the rising cost of malpractice insurance. Hearing on S.B. 2348 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 44th N.D. Legis. Sess. (Feb. 5, 1975) (testimony of H.W. Wheeler, Counsel for the North Dakota Medical Association). The majority, recognizing its weakness under Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319 (N.D.1986), and Dickie v. Farmers Union Oil Co. of LaMoure, 2000 ND 111, 611 N.W.2d 168, uses its professed authority to find “unarticulated” legislative goals to conclude that the Legislature must have intended “to limit what would otherwise be virtually unlimited and perpetual exposure to liability” and “to avoid the difficulty in proof and record keeping which suits involving older [claims] impose.” The first “unarticulated” goal is taken from Bellemare, 420 N.W.2d at 737, and the second is taken from Golden v. Johnson Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 66 Conn.App. 518, 785 A.2d 234, 241 (2001), a decision using the rational-basis test to determine “legitimate state interest.”
[¶ 43] Our Court’s decisions in Hanson and Dickie correctly apply the intermediate standard of review to an equal protection challenge to a statute. Hanson, 389 N.W.2d 319; Dickie, 2000 ND 111, 611 N.W.2d 168. The issue in both Hanson and Dickie is whether the statute of repose in the Product Liability Act is unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the North Dakota Constitution. In both cases, we found it unconstitutional. Hanson, at 330; Dickie, at ¶ 13. In Han*922son, we quoted the statute, N.D.C.C. § 28-01.1-01, which indicated the goals of the Legislature:
4. The legislative assembly finds that the number of lawsuits and claims for damages and the amount of judgements and settlements arising from defective products has substantially increased in recent years. Because of these increases, the insurance industry has drastically increased the cost of products liability insurance. The effect of increased insurance premiums and increased claims has increased product cost through manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers passing the cost of premiums to the consumer. Certain product manufacturers are discouraged from continuing to provide and manufacture certain products because of the high cost and possible unavailability of products liability insurance.
5. Because of these recent trends and for the purpose of alleviating the adverse effects which these trends are producing in the manufacturing industry, it is necessary to protect the public interest by enacting measures designed to encourage private insurance companies to continue to provide products liability insurance.
6. It is the purpose of sections 28-01.1-01 through 28-01.1-05 to provide a reasonable time within which actions may be commenced against manufacturers, while limiting the time to a specific period for which products liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and to provide other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims.
Hanson, at 327-28 (emphasis added). In Hanson, the same legislative goals, now cited by the majority to justify the classification under the medical malpractice statute of repose, were identified; i.e., a “ ‘crisis’ facing North Dakota manufacturers because of unaffordable” or unavailable “products liability insurance,” a need for early evaluation and settlement of claims and the ability for persons “to plan their affairs with a reasonable degree of certainty” as a matter of policy. Hanson, at 327-28; see also ‘Dickie, at ¶ 7. In Hanson and Dickie, we concluded that there was no close correspondence between the “legislative goal of providing certainty in litigation or of reducing insurance costs” and the classifications established by the products liability statute of repose. Dickie, at ¶ 7; see also Hanson, at 328. Our Court could not find any showing within the statute, the testimony before the legislative committees, or the data submitted:
that litigation brought by victims injured more than 10 years from the initial date of purchase of a product or 11 years from its manufacture, as compared to persons injured within those time periods, has caused inequity, unfairness, or unreasonable exposure and unpredictability for manufacturers or suppliers in civil litigation. There is simply no demonstration by the testimony or evidence submitted to the legislature which shows harm or prejudice to sellers and manufacturers resulting from damage awards against them for injuries incurred more that 10 years from initial purchase or 11 years from manufacture of defective products. We, therefore, hold there is not a close correspondence between the legislative objectives under N.D.C.C. § 28-01.3-08 and the classification created thereunder to withstand an equal protection challenge under N.D. Const, art. I, § 21.
*923Dickie, at ¶ 9 (emphasis added); see also Hanson, at 329 (Levine, J., specially concurring) (“No one ... was able to present data that established a close correspondence between eliminating claims for relief of persons injured by products after ten years from sale, and controlling the rising premiums for products liability insurance”).
[¶ 44] In the present case, the legislative history and the statute are likewise devoid of any showing that litigation brought by victims of medical malpractice whose injury manifests itself more than six years from the initial act or omission of the alleged malpractice, as compared to persons injured within that time frame, has “caused inequity, unfairness, or unreasonable exposure and unpredictability” for physicians. Dickie, 2000 ND 111, ¶ 9, 611 N.W.2d 168. Similar to Justice Levine’s observation in Hanson, there is no evidence that establishes “a close correspondence between eliminating claims for relief of persons injured by [medical malpractice] after [six] years ... and controlling the rising premiums for [medical malpractice] insurance.” Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 329 (Levine, J., specially concurring). As we stated in Hanson and reiterated in Dickie, “when we are dealing with human life and safety we believe that more is required for a justification than a reference to the economics of suppliers of goods.” Hanson, at 328; Dickie, at ¶ 13.
[¶ 45] It must be noted that in Arneson, our Court held the Medical Malpractice Act, N.D.C.C. ch. 26-40.1 (1977) unconstitutional. Ameson, 270 N.W.2d at 126. We concluded that the legislative limitation of recovery to a maximum of $300,000 arising from any one occurrence is violative of the equal protection provision of the North Dakota Constitution. Id. at 136. The general purposes of the Act were stated to be:
“to assure the availability of competent medical and hospital services to the public in North Dakota at reasonable costs; to provide prompt and efficient methods for eliminating the expense involved in nonmeritorious malpractice claims; to provide adequate compensation to patients with meritorious claims; and to encourage physicians to enter the practice of medicine in North Dakota and remain in such practice as long as they are qualified to do so. The legislative assembly finds that the exercise of the sovereign and police power of this state for the good of the majority of its citizens is necessary to improve the availability of medical care, to assure its competency, and to reduce the cost thereof.” Sec. 26-40.1 01, N.D.C.C.
Id. at 127. We noted that “[i]n recent years, a number of States have reacted to what is described as a ‘medical malpractice crisis,’ and have adopted various kinds of statutes in response.” Id. at 130. We applied our intermediate standard of review. Id. at 133. We said:
When we examine the legislative purpose of the Act, we find that the incidence of malpractice claims in North Dakota is far lower than the average in the United States.... Evidence in the present case shows that one of the largest insurance companies is accepting applications for malpractice insurance in North Dakota, and using rates lower than the national averages.... One comparison of rates given to the Legislature shows that premiums in North Dakota are the sixth lowest in the United States.
Arneson, at 136. Our Court could not find an “availability or cost crisis” in North Dakota. Id. Our Court concluded that, although told there was a medical malpractice crisis, there was no evidence of such crisis and that the $300,000 limitation on *924recovery was a violation of the equal protection provision of the North Dakota Constitution. Id. Our Court held that the limitation of recovery of seriously damaged or injured victims of medical negligence did not promote the aims of the statute and violated the equal protection clause of the North Dakota Constitution. Id.
[¶ 46] In the present case, we should “question the solution” as we did in Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 328 and Dickie, 2000 ND 111, 611 N.W.2d 168. We should be “concerned about statutes which arbitrarily deny one class of persons important substantive rights to life and safety which are available to other persons.” Hanson, at 328. As Justice Levine stated in her special concurrence in Hanson,
If we do not understand the causes of a problem, even conceding that a problem exists, I do not believe that legislation, which destroys the important substantive rights of a class of persons whose misfortune it was to be injured by a product over ten years old satisfies equal protection. There can be no close correspondence between a statutory classification such as we have here and a legislative objective when that objective is grounded on guesswork, frustration, and little more than a wing and a prayer.
Id. at 329.
[¶47] The majority claims there is a distinction between Hanson and this case. It claims the Insurance Commissioner opposed the legislation in Hanson and testified in favor of it in this case. The legislative history reveals the Insurance Commissioner testified:
It is in a crisis situation. One company has decided to go out of the malpractice insurance business and others are threatening to do so. If a physician cannot get this type of insurance he is not going to be able to practice. There are now only nine companies who write this kind of insurance, and statistics show that they are paying more claims than the premiums they collect, so it is a losing proposition for them. These statistics are for the nation and we do not have North Dakota statistics. This insurance rate in North Dakota is still fairly low, but there has already been a 100% increase.
Hearing on S.B. 2348 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 44th N.D. Legis. Sess. (Feb. 5, 1975) (testimony of Bud Wigen, State Insurance Commissioner). The fact that the Insurance Commissioner testified there was a national medical malpractice insurance “crisis” is not the point, however. The point is that there is no testimony, no data, and no evidence to support any relationship, let alone a “close correspondence,” between the classification, which denies recovery to those injured by medical malpractice more than six years after the act of malpractice, and the alleged national medical malpractice insurance “crisis.” We are without any factual basis for the correlation between the limitation of recovery and the national medical malpractice crisis. The Insurance Commissioner said he did not have any North Dakota statistics and that the insurance rate in North Dakota is still “fairly low.” Hearing on S.B. 234-8, supra (testimony of Bud Wigen, State Insurance Commissioner). The record does not establish a “crisis” in North Dakota. The Insurance Commissioner testified the reason Aetna was going to discontinue their policies in North Dakota was that they were prevented from raising their rates in another state. Hearing on S.B. 2348, supra (testimony of Bud Wigen, State Insurance Commissioner).
[¶ 48] The majority opinion attempts to distinguish Hanson and contends this case is more like the majority author’s opinion *925in Bellemare. The majority reasons that because a person may live for decades before an act of medical malpractice manifests itself in an injury, there is a “possibility” of long-term liability. Therefore, this case is more like an improvement to real estate, which has a longer life than to a defective product, which has a limited useful life. Our Court, in Dickie, however, identified a different “crucial distinction between the classification of potential defendants.” Dickie, 2000 ND 111, ¶ 10, 611 N.W.2d 168. On the one hand, there are “[architects, contractors, engineers, and inspectors ... [who] do not have continuing control over or involvement with the maintenance of the improvement after ... initial construction.” Id. (quoting Bellemare, 420 N.W.2d at 738). On the other hand, there are “ [suppliers and manufacturers ... [who] can ... maintain high quality control standards in the controlled environment of the factory.” Id. The majority places physicians who are directly charged with the health, welfare, and safety of human beings in the same classification as architects who design improvements to real property, the construction of which is participated in by many. I do not agree.
[¶ 49] Finally, all of the cases from other jurisdictions cited by the majority in support of its conclusion that the medical malpractice statute of repose is constitutional use the rational-basis standard of review.
[¶ 50] Some courts, however, have found medical malpractice statutes of repose unconstitutional where exceptions were granted. See Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825, 830-31 (1980) (holding the medical malpractice statute violates the equal protection provisions of the New Hampshire Constitution under an intermediate level of scrutiny); Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41, 44 (Colo.1984) (applying the rational-basis test and holding the three-year statute of repose violated equal protection). Other states have held their medical malpractice statutes of repose to be unconstitutional on other grounds. See Martin v. Richey, 711 N.E.2d 1273, 1285 (Ind.1999) (holding that the statute of repose as applied to this particular plaintiff violated the privileges and immunities clause of the state constitution because the misdiagnosed plaintiff had a disease with a long latency period which prevented her from discovering the malpractice within the statutory two-year period); McCollum v. Sisters of Charity of Nazareth Health Corp., 799 S.W.2d 15, 19 (Ky.1990) (holding that the five-year medical malpractice state of repose violated the open courts provisions of the state constitution); Hardy v. VerMeulen, 32 Ohio St.3d 45, 512 N.E.2d 626, 629 (1987) (holding that the four-year statute of repose “as applied to bar the claims of medical malpractice plaintiffs who did not know or could not reasonably have known of their injuries, violates the right-to-a-remedy provision of ... the Ohio Constitution”); DeYoung v. Providence Medical Center, 136 Wash.2d 136, 960 P.2d 919, 926 (1998) (applying rational-basis review and holding that the eight-year statute of repose violated the privileges and immunities clause of the state constitution); Kohnke v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 140 Wis.2d 80, 410 N.W.2d 585, 588 (Ct.App.1987) (holding that the five-year statute of repose as applied, violated the right-to-a-remedy clause of the state constitution); cf. Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 688 P.2d 961, 967 (1984) (not reaching the issue, but advising that “any statute which bars a cause of action before it could legitimately be brought abrogates rather than limits the cause of action” offending the state constitution).
*926[¶ 51] In conclusion, I am of the opinion that the analysis of Hanson is correct and that “[s]ome rational basis must be advanced for the selection of the period of years for ‘bar’ or ‘repose,’ other than the economic interests ...” of insurance companies and physicians. Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 328. I would hold the statute unconstitutional and remand the case for further proceedings.
[¶ 52] WILLIAM A. NEUMANN, J., concur.