Court Opinion

ID: 9427507
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:21:00.146338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:07.579564
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Stewart,
with whom Mr. Justice Rehnquist joins,
dissenting.
The Court of Appeals dealt with three alleged instances of discrimination by the petitioners in hiring firemen: a minimum-height requirement, the use of a written test in 1969 to establish hiring priorities, and the threatened reliance on the results of a test administered in 1972. The Court of Appeals ruled that the height requirement violated federal law. That ruling has not been challenged here. It concluded that these respondents did not have standing to challenge the 1969 test results. All Members of this Court agree. Thus, only the third claim remains in this case.
At least some of the respondents do have standing to challenge the threatened use of the 1972 test. They had applied for employment with the county in 1971 and took the 1972 test. Clearly, they would be affected by the county’s decision to use the results of that test to select applicants for interviews. If the county’s proposed use of the test was illegal, those respondents were threatened with injury in fact. *635For the reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Powell, I believe that their controversy with the county is still alive.
I cannot agree with Mr. Justice Powell, however, that the § 1981 question is properly presented in this case. The respondents' second amended complaint alleged that the county had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The complaint included copies of “right to sue” letters from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Title VII became applicable to local governmental units in March 1972. The county decided to use the 1972 test to rank applicants at the end of 1972. The District Court held that the county had violated both § 1981 and Title VII. The Court of Appeals expressly affirmed that decision.
“Of course, this continued threat to use the 1972 test as part of the selection process right up to the filing of the complaint in this case is admittedly a violation of Title VII.” 566 F. 2d 1334, 1341 n. 14.
Mr. Justice Powell concludes that the Court of Appeals did not make a considered judgment on the Title VII issue. While it is true that the text of the court's opinion dealt almost exclusively with § 1981, the court clearly held that Title VII standards apply to alleged violations of § 1981. Under the court’s analysis, if a violation of § 1981 were made out and the conduct occurred while the defendant was covered by Title VII, Title VII must have been violated also. As the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals recognized, the decision on Title VII thus made completely unnecessary the court’s discussion of whether § 1981 requires proof of discriminatory intent. 566 F. 2d, at 1347.
The petitioners did not question the ruling of the Court of Appeals on the Title VII claim,* and any opinion this Court *636might render on the § 1981 question would not affect the judgment below that petitioners’ action was illegal under Title VII. Thus, it would truly be an advisory opinion.
It is clear, however, that the only violation remaining in this case, the threatened use of the 1972 test to rank job applicants, cannot justify the extensive remedy ordered by the District Court. “As with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy.” Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U. S. 1, 16. A simple order enjoining the illegal use of the 1972 test would seem sufficient to remedy the only violation of which the respondents had standing to complain. Therefore, I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the District Court with directions to narrow the scope of the remedy substantially.

The second question presented in the petition for certiorari does bear on Title YII, but not in a sense relevant to this question:
“Is a racial quota hiring order to be effective until the entire fire *636department achieves current racial parity with the general population beyond the jurisdiction of the court when:
“e. The plaintiffs had no standing to represent any pre-March 24, 1972 applicants and no discriminatory hiring has occurred subsequent to Title VIPs 'effective date.” (Emphasis added.)
This does not challenge the holding of the Court of Appeals that the threatened use of the 1972 test was itself a Title VII violation, nor, in fact, does it challenge any finding of violation at all. Rather, it is addressed solely to the remedy.
In their brief the petitioners argue that the mere threat to use the test results to rank applicants cannot constitute a violation of Title VII and that a pattern or practice of discrimination must be shown. They also urge that Title VII cannot be applied to local governmental units absent some showing of discriminatory intent. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 323 n. 1; Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U. S. 299, 306 n. 12. Because these issues were not raised in the petition for certiorari, it is unnecessary to address them.