Court Opinion

ID: 9662669
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:14:59.344202+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:41.202001
License: Public Domain

Tom Glaze, Justice, dissenting. The majority court appears to retreat from its earlier decisions that the trial court is not required to conduct a “rigorous analysis” under Ark. R. Civ. P. 23, and that this court will reverse a trial court’s certification order only when the court has abused its discretion. Tay-Tay, Inc. v. Young, 349 Ark. 675, 80 S.W.3d 365 (2002). In making this determination, this court has consistently reviewed the evidence in the record to determine whether it supports the trial court’s ultimate conclusion regarding certification. (Emphasis added.) Id, see also Direct Gen..Ins. Co. v. Lane, 328 Ark. 476, 944 S.W.2d 528 (1997). Moreover, our court has not previously required the trial court to enter into the record a detailed explanation of why it concluded that certification was proper. Id. Our court has taken this more liberal view in initially certifying a class action at the early stage of litigation because such a certification may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits. Fraley v. Williams Ford Tractor and Equipment Co., 339 Ark. 322, 5 S.W.3d 423 (1999). This court explained this position in Fraley as follows: Rule 23 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure specifically states that “[a]n order under this section may be conditional and it may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.” Ark. R. Civ. P. 23; See also Newberg on Class Actions, supra § 7.47. Class ruhngs are often reconsidered, and subsequently affirmed, altered, modified, or withdrawn. Id. [Although the court’s initial decision under Rule 23(c)(1) that an action is maintainable on a class basis in fact may be the final resolution of the question, it is not irreversible and may be altered or amended at a later date. This power to change the class certification decision has encouraged many courts to be quite liberal in certifying a class when that decision is made at an early stage, noting that the action always can be decertified or the class description altered if later events suggest that it is appropriate to do so. Wright, Miller & Kane: Federal Practice & Procedure 2d § 1785 at pp. 128-31 (2d Ed. 1986) (citations omitted). “The ability of a court to reconsider its initial class rulings ... is a vital ingredient in the flexibility of courts to realize the full potential benefits flowing from the judicious use of the class device.” Newberg on Class Actions, supra § 7.47 at pp. 7-416. Class-action certification is necessarily an ongoing process in light of Rule 23’s opt-out and decertification provisions. The majority court here seems to retreat from our prior holdings set out above, and, while the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law, this court holds those findings are insufficient, thus deciding the trial court abused its discretion. The majority opinion relates that the trial court must undertake enough of an analysis to enable this court to conduct a meaningful review of the certification on appeal, and requires more than a cursory mention of the six criteria under Ark. R. Civ. P. 23. The majority, for example, holds that the trial court’s order does not state what the questions of law or fact are common to the class. The trial court, however, reviewed Chandler’s complaint and the record and determined the ultimate common question in the case is the unauthorized practice of law, by charging a preparation fee for the preparation of legal documents in real estate closing transactions. The trial court also found the defendant, Lenders Title Company, had conducted over 35,000 such real estate closings during the years from 1997 to 2000, and it was typical and normal practice for Lenders to charge a document fee in connection with these closings. In arguing Chandler’s case, counsel alluded to the trial court’s findings and the record to support those findings. It is my view that the trial court did all it was required to do in rendering its findings, and if the trial court made an error, it can easily correct that mistake by decertification. I would add mention of BPS, Inc. v. Richardson, 341 Ark. 834, 20 S.W.3d 403 (2000), since the majority seems to rely on that decision in ruling as it does. Undoubtedly, BPS appears to be somewhat restrictive and contrary to many of our precedents, and that holding appears to require a “rigorous analysis” — a feat this court has held is unnecessary. However, there was no mention or comparison of the trial court’s authority to decertify a class or this court’s rationale as to why it relies on a liberal view when granting a class action. For the above reasons, I dissent.