Court Opinion

ID: 9944550
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 17:27:28.023019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:14:04.956888
License: Public Domain

I dissent from requiring the trial judge to state his reasons for denying bail on appeal. Judicial action — not judicial motivation — is the proper subject for appellate review. (Lincoln v. Superior Court (1943) 22 Cal.2d 304, 315 [139 P.2d 13]; People v. Lang (1974) 11 Cal.3d 134, 143 [113 Cal.Rptr. 9, 520 P.2d 393] (Clark, J., dissenting).) "`The fact that the action of the court may have been based upon an erroneous theory of the case, or upon an improper or unsound course of reasoning, cannot determine the question of its propriety. No rule of decision is better or more firmly established by authority, nor one resting upon a sounder basis of reason and propriety, than that a ruling or decision, itself correct in law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for a wrong reason. If right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it must be sustained regardless of the considerations which may have moved the trial court to its conclusion.'" (D'Amico v.Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 18-19 [112 Cal.Rptr. 786, 520 P.2d 10], quoting Davey v. Southern PacificCo. (1897) 116 Cal. 325, 329 [48 P. 117].)
Disregarding this well-established rule, the majority require the trial court not only to act properly but also to give the "right" reasons for its action. There being no inherent reason to limit this new standard of appellate review to orders denying bail on appeal, the exception announced today may be expected to swallow the rule tomorrow.
The cases the majority rely on are inapposite. As they observe, "in Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of LosAngeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 513-518 [113 Cal.Rptr. 836,522 P.2d 12], we concluded as a matter of statutory interpretation that written findings were necessary to permit meaningful review of quasi-judicial administrative decisions." (Ante, p. 937.) The majority require a statement of reasons here, not as a matter of statutory interpretation, but rather as an exercise of our supervisory power over state criminal procedure. (Ante, p. 937.) Moreover, we here review an order made by the superior court, not a decision of a quasi-judicial administrative agency. *Page 940 
In In re Sturm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 258 [113 Cal.Rptr. 361,521 P.2d 97], the following grounds were given for requiring the Adult Authority to state its reasons for denying parole: "First, there is little inherent guard against careless decisions in the absence of a statement of reasons, especially in view of the Authority's tremendous caseload. Second, inmates may be denied the opportunity to formulate a persuasive application for relief if they are unaware of the reasons why parole was denied. Finally, courts may find review impossible without ordering an evidentiary hearing if the record of the action taken by the Authority is inadequate." (11 Cal.3d at p. 270; citations omitted.) Another ground given for requiring a statement of reasons in denying parole was to enable the prisoner to "`appropriately adjust his future conduct.'" (Id., at p. 270, fn. 14.)
Assuming arguendo that the circumstances of a typical parole hearing are conducive to "careless decisions," motions for bail on appeal are not considered under such circumstances. A parole hearing usually lasts no more than 10 minutes because the panel must hear approximately 25 cases a day; while one of the two panel members conducts the brief hearing, the other reads the file for the next case. (In re Sturm, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 262.) By contrast, the superior court acts on a motion for bail on appeal after considering the evidence resulting in conviction, the probation and sentence report, and other evidence pertinent to the motion. Moreover, the considerations pertinent to a motion for bail on appeal being well-established, a statement of reasons for denial of the motion is not required to enable the defendant to prepare a "persuasive application for relief." It is the defendant's responsibility to present all relevant evidence to the trial court in support of his motion (ante, p. 928, fn. 4), as it is the People's responsibility to present all relevant evidence in opposition thereto (Molinari, Bail Pending Appeal inCalifornia (1967) 1 U.S.F.L.Rev. 217, 221). Therefore, if the parties discharge their responsibilities, the record will be adequate for appellate review. Finally, a statement of reasons for denial of a motion for bail on appeal, unlike an application for parole, is not required as a guideline for rehabilitation.
The trial judge's ruling on a motion for bail pending appeal is not to be disturbed unless a "manifest abuse of discretion" appears. (In re Brumback (1956) 46 Cal.2d 810, 813 [299 P.2d 217].) No such abuse appears here. *Page 941 
The trial court's action here is supported by the record, particularly, the probation report. Denial of probation was recommended on the following ground: "[D]efendant's involvement in the transporting of such a large quantity of marijuana [85 pounds, having an estimated "street value" of $11,000] is an integral part of the drug distribution operation and . . . poses a serious threat to the community. . . ." (Italics added.) Defendant expressly admitted to the parole officer that he knew the marijuana was in the trunk of his car, that his sole motivation for agreeing to transport it was monetary gain, and that he was paid a "great deal of money" for transporting it because of the dependability of his new car and his knowledge of the area. Moreover, defendant told the parole officer that "he could reveal more about his drug connections, but that it would be detrimental to his life."
Defendant's guilt being admitted, the "danger to the community" posed by his criminal conduct being manifest, the remaining question is whether the record supports the trial court's conclusion that there was an unacceptably high risk that defendant would continue to traffic in drugs while on bail pending appeal. (See In re Scaggs (1956) 47 Cal.2d 416, 419 [303 P.2d 1009].) The record does support that conclusion. Only seven months earlier defendant had been arrested for possession of marijuana. On that occasion his involvement with drugs was adjudged sufficiently minimal to qualify him for "diversion." (See generally People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho) 11 Cal.3d 59
[113 Cal.Rptr. 21, 520 P.2d 405].) In the interim, he had become so deeply involved that, according to his own statement, his life was in danger. Moreover, there was no indication that the economic necessity allegedly motivating his involvement in drug trafficking had abated since his most recent arrest.
I would deny the writ with prejudice.
McComb, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied February 26, 1976, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Clark, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. *Page 942