Court Opinion

ID: 9759005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:59:45.874516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:58.082342
License: Public Domain

Betty C. Dickey, Justice, dissenting. I disagree with the majority’s finding that CCS is entitled to a directed verdict on Preston Huffstuttler’s outrage claim arising out of the allegations of clandestine surveillance at the school. The majority articulates its holding as follows: The record, however, does not reflect any evidence that the video ever recorded any footage at the school. The essence of Preston’s outrage claim is that the school could have used the camera to video tape him as he changed clothes. Yet, based up on our strict approach in claims for outrage, the mere possibility that the school could have taped him does not support a claim for outrage. In coming to its decision, the majority has usurped the role of the jury in direct contradiction of our standards of review. For this reason, I disagree and respectfully dissent. It is not this court’s province to try issues of fact; we simply examine the record to determine if there is substantial evidence to support the jury verdict. City of Caddo Valley v. George, 340 Ark. 203, 9 S.W.3d 481 (2000). It is the jury’s exclusive province to weigh the evidence and draw inferences of fact not established by direct proof. Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Lee, 253 Ark. 151, 484 S.W.2d 874 (1972). When reviewing the denial of a motion for directed verdict, this court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict is sought and gives that evidence the highest probative value, taking into account all reasonable inferences that can be derived from it. Conagra, Inc. v. Strother, 340 Ark. 672, 13 S.W.3d 150 (2000). Moreover, a motion for a directed verdict should be granted only when the evidence viewed is so insubstantial as to require the jury’s verdict to be set aside. Id. Finally, a motion for a directed verdict should be denied when there is a conflict in the evidence or when the evidence is such that fair-minded people might reach different conclusions. Id. With these standards in mind, it is appropriate to turn to the record to determine if there was substantial evidence to support a verdict in favor of Preston Huffstuttler on his claim for outrage stemming from the surveillance. The record indicates as follows: • School officials placed a hidden camera in a classroom that was used as a dressing room by students. • The hidden camera was located in a vent and designed to transmit video to a receiver, television, and VCR located in an adjoining room. • The camera was operable while it was in the vent. • Preston changed in the room while the camera was in the vent. • When confronted with the discovery of the camera, school officials initially denied its existence. • A teacher at the school denied the existence of the TV and VCR in her room, though other teachers testified that her room did contain a TV and VCR. • After the complaints about the camera, and before any possible objective investigation, school officials removed the camera, and had access to the TV and VCR. Although we give a narrow view to the tort of outrage, we have never held, and should not hold, that a jury cannot draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial. A review of the record indicates that there was, in fact, substantial circumstantial evidence to support a verdict in favor of Preston. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dolph, 308 Ark. 439, 825 S.W.2d 810 (1992), (holding that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to meet the substantial evidence test). By insisting on direct proof of surveillance, and ignoring the reasonable inferences that indicate surveillance, the majority also ignores the applicable standard of review in the present case. The fact that the school placed a hidden camera in a dressing room used by children may alone give rise to an inference of wrongdoing. In Johnson v. Allen, 272 Ga. App. 861, 613 S.E.2d 657 (2004), a group of women filed suit against Timothy Johnson, and his employer Atlas Cold Storage, for invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraud. The women alleged that Johnson installed video surveillance equipment in the women’s restroom located at Atlas. In response, Atlas argued that the surveillance system was installed to address rumors that drugs were being sold on the premises, specifically in the women’s restroom. Ultimately, the Georgia court of appeals denied Atlas’s motion for summary judgment holding that — based on the evidence presented — a reasonable jury could infer that an operable camera was concealed in the women’s restroom and that the defendants knew of its existence. Like Johnson, Preston has presented evidence that an operable camera was installed and that CCS knew of its existence. In addition, Preston has shown that when questioned, CCS and its employees were evasive and mendacious in their statements concerning the camera’s existence. Furthermore, CCS removed the camera prior to any possible investigation as to the occurrence of actual recording. In sum, there is circumstantial evidence that could give rise to a reasonable inference that Preston was filmed whilst in a state of undress. As such, the majority was incorrect to usurp the role of the jury and decide this issue as a matter of law. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. I also join in the dissent handed down by Justice Glaze. Glaze, J., joins in this dissent.