Court Opinion

ID: 2964665
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:29:08.286228+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:59.442928
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 96-2061

                            HECTOR VEGA-RODRIGUEZ, ET AL.,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                        PUERTO RICO TELEPHONE COMPANY, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                              _________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

                  [Hon. Juan M. Perez-Gimenez, U.S. District Judge]
                                               ___________________

                              __________________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                            Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

                              __________________________

               Rick Nemcik-Cruz,  with whom  Charles S. Hey-Maestre  was on
               ________________              ______________________
          brief, for appellants.
               Vannessa Ramirez,  Assistant Solicitor General,  Puerto Rico
               ________________
          Dep't of Justice, with  whom Carlos Lugo-Fiol, Solicitor General,
                                       ________________
          Garcia  &  Fernandez,  and John  M.  Garcia  were  on brief,  for
          ____________________       ________________
          appellees.

                              __________________________

                                    April 8, 1997
                              __________________________

                    SELYA,  Circuit Judge.    As employers  gain access  to
                    SELYA,  Circuit Judge.
                            _____________

          increasingly  sophisticated  technology,  new  legal  issues seem

          destined  to suffuse the workplace.   This appeal  raises such an

          issue.  In it, plaintiffs-appellants Hector Vega-Rodriguez (Vega)

          and  Amiut  Reyes-Rosado  (Reyes)  revile  the  district  court's

          determination  that  their employer,  the  Puerto Rico  Telephone

          Company  (PRTC),  may  monitor  their  work   area  by  means  of

          continuous    video    surveillance    without   offending    the

          Constitution.1   Because  the red  flag of  constitutional breach

          does not fly from these ramparts, we affirm.

          I.  FACTUAL SURVEILLANCE
          I.  FACTUAL SURVEILLANCE

                    In conformity with  accepted summary judgment protocol,

          we  recount the undisputed facts  in the light  most congenial to

          the  appellants and adopt  their version  of any  contested facts

          which  are material  to our  consideration of  the issues.   See,
                                                                       ___

          e.g.,  Garside v.  Osco Drug,  Inc., 895  F.2d 46,  48 (1st  Cir.
          ____   _______     ________________

          1990).

                    The  Executive Communications  Center  (the Center)  is

          located  in  the  penthouse  of  the  PRTC's  office  complex  in

          Guaynabo, Puerto  Rico.   It maintains communication  between the

          company's  various operating  units and  the senior  executive on

          duty,  but it does not  have primary corporate responsibility for
                              
          ____________________

               1To  the  extent that  other  parties are  involved  in this
          litigation   for  example, the  plaintiffs' complaint  identifies
          their wives  and conjugal  partnerships as additional  plaintiffs
          and names two  PRTC executives as  codefendants   their  presence
          makes  no discernible  difference  from  an analytic  standpoint.
          Consequently,  we treat  the case  as if  it involved  only Vega,
          Reyes, and PRTC.

                                          2

          security and  it does not house  communication switching centers,

          cables, transmission  lines, or kindred equipment.   For security

          reasons, access  to the Center  is restricted; both  the elevator

          foyer on the penthouse  floor and the doors to  the Center itself

          are inaccessible without a control card.

                    PRTC  employs  Vega, Reyes,  and  others as  attendants

          (known colloquially as "security operators") in the Center.  They

          monitor  computer banks  to detect  signals emanating  from alarm

          systems at PRTC facilities throughout Puerto Rico, and they alert

          the  appropriate  authorities  if  an  alarm  sounds.    Although

          individual  employees  work  eight-hour  shifts,  the  Center  is

          staffed around the clock.

                    The work space inside the Center consists of a large L-

          shaped  area  that  contains  the computers,  the  monitors,  and

          assorted  furniture (e.g.,  desks, chairs,  consoles).   The work

          space  is  completely  open and  no  individual  employee has  an

          assigned office, cubicle, work station, or desk.

                    PRTC  installed  a  video  surveillance  system at  the

          Center in 1990 but abandoned the project when employees  groused.

          In  June  of 1994,  the  company  reinstated video  surveillance.

          Three  cameras survey  the work  space, and  a fourth  tracks all

          traffic passing through the main entrance to the Center.  None of

          them  cover  the  rest  area.   The  surveillance  is exclusively

          visual;  the  cameras  have  no microphones  or  other  immediate

          eavesdropping  capability.  Video  surveillance operates all day,

          every  day; the cameras implacably record every act undertaken in

                                          3

          the work area.   A video  monitor, a switcher  unit, and a  video

          recorder  are  located in  the  office  of the  Center's  general

          manager,  Daniel  Rodriguez-Diaz, and  the videotapes  are stored

          there.  PRTC has  no written policy regulating any  aspect of the

          video surveillance, but  it is  undisputed that no  one can  view

          either  the monitor  or  the completed  tapes without  Rodriguez-

          Diaz's express permission.

                    Soon  after  PRTC  installed  the  surveillance  system

          (claiming  that  it  was  desirable for  security  reasons),  the

          appellants  and  several   fellow  employees  protested.     They

          asserted,  among other  things, that  the system  had no  purpose

          other  than to  pry  into employees'  behavior.   When management

          turned a deaf  ear, the  appellants filed suit  in Puerto  Rico's

          federal  district  court.     They  contended  that  the  ongoing

          surveillance constitutes an unreasonable search prohibited by the

          Fourth    Amendment,   violates    a   constitutionally-conferred

          entitlement  to privacy, and abridges rights secured by the First

          Amendment.   After the parties had  taken considerable discovery,

          PRTC  moved  for  dismissal  and/or  summary  judgment,  and  the

          individual defendants  moved for summary judgment.   The district

          court  found  merit in  these  submissions  and entered  judgment

          accordingly.  The appellants then prosecuted this appeal.

                    In  the pages that follow, we deal first with a problem

          of how best to characterize the district court's ruling.  We then

          address the  appellants' illegal  search and invasion  of privacy

          claims.  Because  the appellants have neither briefed  nor argued

                                          4

          their First Amendment claim in this venue, we deem it waived  and

          do not pursue it.

          II.  THE CHARACTERIZATION QUESTION
          II.  THE CHARACTERIZATION QUESTION

                    In an effort to  put the characterization question into

          perspective,  we trace the events leading up to the lower court's

          dispositive ruling.  PRTC moved in the alternative for dismissal,

          Fed. R.  Civ. P. 12(b)(6), or  summary judgment, Fed. R.  Civ. P.

          56.  In passing upon the motion, the district court  employed the

          idiom of Rule  12(b)(6) (i.e., it said that it was dismissing the

          suit for failure  to state  a claim  upon which  relief might  be

          granted),  but  the  praxis  of  Rule  56  (i.e.,  it  considered

          materials dehors  the  pleadings).   It  is  imperative  that  we

          clarify  these mixed signals;  although these  two rules  share a

          certain family resemblance    both are designed to cut  short the

          litigation  of  cases   that  do   not  reach   a  threshold   of

          trialworthiness   they  operate from  different legal  templates.

          We  conclude that the district  court's order ought  to be tested

          against the summary judgment standard.

                    We start from the text  of Rule 12(b), which stipulates

          that  if "matters outside the  pleading are presented  to and not

          excluded  by the  court," a  motion brought  under  Rule 12(b)(6)

          "shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of  as

          provided  in Rule  56."   We have  noted before  that  the proper

          approach  to incipient  conversion  questions  implicating  these

          rules is  functional,  not mechanical.    See Garita  Hotel  Ltd.
                                                    ___ ___________________

                                          5

          Partnership v. Ponce Fed.  Bank, F.S.B., 958 F.2d 15,  18-19 (1st
          ___________    ________________________

          Cir.  1992) (stating the test as "whether the court actually took

          cognizance of  [supplementary materials], or invoked  Rule 56, in

          arriving at its decision").

                    Here, language in the district court's ruling indicates

          that  it must  have considered  materials outside  the pleadings.

          Thus,  under the Garita Hotel  test, conversion is  proper.  This
                           ____________

          circumstance militates  strongly in  favor of treating  the lower

          court's decree  as one  granting summary  judgment.   Perhaps the

          only  factor that tugs in  a different direction  is the district

          judge's choice of phrase   but an appellate tribunal is not bound

          by the label that a district court attaches to its rulings.  See,
                                                                       ___

          e.g., Estate of Soler v. Rodriguez, 63 F.3d 45, 47  n.1 (1st Cir.
          ____  _______________    _________

          1995); cf. Cloutier v. Town  of Epping, 714 F.2d 1184, 1188  (1st
                 ___ ________    _______________

          Cir.  1983)  (affirming  dismissal  under  the  summary  judgment

          standard  although  the lower  court  had dismissed  for  lack of

          jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) - (2)).

                    We  hasten  to  add  that application  of  the  summary

          judgment  standard produces  no  perceptible unfairness.   PRTC's

          motion invoked Rule 56 as one of two possible avenues for relief,

          and the  dispositive motions  filed by the  individual defendants

          asked exclusively for summary judgment.  The appellants responded

          to  these  motions in  kind.   By that  time,  there had  been an

          adequate  opportunity  for discovery  and  the  record was  well-

                                          6

          developed.2  We therefore treat the challenged ruling as an order

          for summary judgment.

                    Before ending this discussion, we pause to rehearse the

          summary judgment  standard.  Given the  standard's familiarity, a

          lengthy exegesis  is unnecessary.   It   suffices to say  that we

          must  undertake  de   novo  review,  construing   all  reasonable

          inferences from the evidence in the nonmoving party's favor.  See
                                                                        ___

          Garside, 895  F.2d at 48.     Since the core  purpose of  summary
          _______

          judgment  is to  "pierce the  boilerplate of  the pleadings"  and

          examine the parties' proof to determine whether a trial  actually

          is necessary, Wynne  v. Tufts Univ. Sch.  of Med., 976 F.2d  791,
                        _____     _________________________

          794 (1st Cir. 1992), the entry of summary judgment is appropriate

          if (and only if) no genuine issue exists as to  any material fact

          and the  moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

          See id.;  see also   Fed.  R. Civ. P.  56(c).   In applying  this
          ___ ___   ___ ____

          formulation, a fact is  "material" if it potentially  affects the

          outcome  of the case, and an  issue is "genuine" if the probative

          evidence on it conflicts.  See Garside, 895 F.2d at 48.
                                     ___ _______

          III.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
          III.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

                    PRTC is a quasi-public corporation.  See P.R. Laws Ann.
                                                         ___

          tit.  27,     401-424  (1991).   It  is, therefore,  a government

                              
          ____________________

               2To be sure, the appellants opposed summary judgment in part
          for want of  an opportunity to  depose PRTC's president,  Agustin
          Garcia-Acevedo.    But  the appellants     who  conceded  at oral
          argument in this court that it  would not be unfair to scrutinize
          the  district court's order  under Rule 56    did  not renew that
          objection on appeal.  At any rate, given our ratio  decidendi, it
                                                       _____  _________
          is  difficult to  imagine how  this  deposition, if  taken, might
          shore up the appellants' case.

                                          7

          actor, see Kauffman v. PRTC, 841 F.2d 1169, 1170 (1st Cir. 1988);
                 ___ ________    ____

          Torres-Ponce  v. Jimenez, 113 P.R. Dec. 58, translated in 13 P.R.
          ____________     _______                    __________ __

          Sup. Ct. Off'l Trans. 77, 91-93 (1982), subject to the suasion of

          the  Fourth Amendment, see Buenrostro v. Collazo, 973 F.2d 39, 43
                                 ___ __________    _______

          (1st  Cir. 1992).   Building on  this foundation,  the appellants

          allege  that PRTC's continuous video surveillance contravenes the

          "right of the people to be secure in their persons . .  . against

          unreasonable searches."  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  We consider that

          allegation.

                     A.  Privacy Rights and the Fourth Amendment.
                     A.  Privacy Rights and the Fourth Amendment.
                         _______________________________________

                    Intrusions  upon  personal  privacy  do  not invariably

          implicate the  Fourth Amendment.   Rather, such  intrusions cross

          the constitutional line only  if the challenged conduct infringes

          upon  some  reasonable  expectation  of privacy.    See  Smith v.
                                                              ___  _____

          Maryland,  442  U.S. 735,  740 (1979).3    To qualify  under this
          ________

          mantra,  a  privacy expectation  must  meet  both subjective  and

          objective  criteria:    the   complainant  must  have  an  actual

          expectation of  privacy, and that  expectation must be  one which

          society recognizes  as reasonable.  See Oliver  v. United States,
                                              ___ ______     _____________

          466 U.S. 170,  177 (1984); Smith,  442 U.S. at 740.   Determining
                                     _____

          the   subjective  component   of   the  test   requires  only   a

          straightforward  inquiry into  the complainant's  state of  mind,

          and,  for purposes  of  this appeal,  we  are willing  to  assume

          arguendo  that   the  appellants,  as  they   profess,  had  some
          ________
                              
          ____________________

               3In  this  context,  courts  tend  to  use  adjectives  like
          "reasonable,"  "legitimate,"  or  "justifiable"  interchangeably.
          See Smith, 442 U.S. at 740.
          ___ _____

                                          8

          subjective  expectation of privacy while at work.  We turn, then,

          to the  objective reasonableness  of the asserted  expectation of

          privacy.

                    In previous cases, the  Supreme Court has answered this

          type  of  question  by  examining  such  diverse factors  as  the

          Framers'  intent, the  uses  to which  an  individual has  put  a

          location, and society's understanding  that certain areas (say, a

          person's  home)  deserve  heightened  protection  from government

          intrusions.  See Oliver, 466 U.S. at  178.  But the Court has not
                       ___ ______

          developed a routinized checklist that is capable of being applied

          across  the  board,  and  each  case  therefore  must  be  judged

          according  to  its own  scenario.   See,  e.g., United  States v.
                                              ___   ____  ______________

          Mancini,  8 F.3d  104, 109  (1st Cir.  1993)  (considering, inter
          _______                                                     _____

          alia,  the totality  of  circumstances, the  ability to  regulate
          ____

          access  to particular  premises,  and  the individual's  status).

          With  this in  mind,  we proceed  by  first surveying  the  legal

          principles  that relate to searches of business premises and then

          narrowing our focus to the facts of this case and the appellants'

          asseverational array.

                      B.  Privacy Rights and Business Premises.
                      B.  Privacy Rights and Business Premises.
                          ____________________________________

                    Generally  speaking,  business  premises invite  lesser

          privacy expectations than  do residences.  See G.M. Leasing Corp.
                                                     ___ __________________

          v. United States, 429  U.S. 338, 353  (1977); 1 Wayne R.  LaFave,
             _____________

          Search & Seizure    2.4(b) (3d ed. 1996).   Still, deeply  rooted
          ________________

          societal expectations foster some cognizable privacy interests in

          business premises.  See  Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178  n.8; Mancusi v.
                              ___  ______                        _______

                                          9

          DeForte,  392  U.S.  364,  367  (1968).    The  Fourth  Amendment
          _______

          protections that  these expectations  entail are  versatile; they

          safeguard  individuals not  only against  the government  qua law
                                                                    ___

          enforcer but also  qua employer.  See National Treasury Employees
                             ___            ___ ___________________________

          Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989).
          _____    ________

                    The watershed case in  this enclave of Fourth Amendment

          jurisprudence  is  O'Connor  v.  Ortega,  480  U.S.  709  (1987).
                             ________      ______

          O'Connor's central thesis is that a public employee sometimes may
          ________

          enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her workplace

          vis- -vis searches  by a supervisor or other  representative of a

          public  employer.  Withal,  O'Connor recognized that "operational
                                      ________

          realities  of the  workplace," such  as actual  office practices,

          procedures, or regulations,  frequently may undermine  employees'

          privacy  expectations.   Id. at  717 (plurality  op.).   The four
                                   ___

          dissenting Justices shared this belief, see id. at 737 (Blackmun,
                                                  ___ ___

          J., dissenting), and subsequent case law  confirms it, see, e.g.,
                                                                 ___  ____

          Von Raab,  489  U.S.  at  669-72.   In  the  last  analysis,  the
          ________

          objective component  of  an employee's  professed expectation  of

          privacy  must be assessed in  the full context  of the particular

          employment relation.  See  O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 717;  Mancini, 8
                                ___  ________                    _______

          F.3d at 109.

                    O'Connor is a typical case in which a public employee's
                    ________

          workplace-based privacy  interests were  vindicated.   Dr. Ortega

          was on administrative  leave from  his post at  a state  hospital

          when  hospital  personnel,   investigating  misconduct   charges,

          entered his office and  removed personal items from his  desk and

                                          10

          file  cabinets.   480 U.S. at  712-13.   The Court  held that Dr.

          Ortega  had a reasonable expectation  of privacy in  his desk and

          file cabinets because he  did not share them with  other workers,

          he used them to store personal materials, and the hospital had no

          policy discouraging employees from stashing personal items there.

          See id. at 718-19.  Moreover, although the plurality eschewed the
          ___ ___

          issue,  a  majority  of the  Justices  believed  that Dr.  Ortega

          maintained a reasonable privacy expectation in his private office

          as well.  See id. at  731-32 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 732
                    ___ ___                                      ___

          (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

                    Applying  O'Connor in various  work environments, lower
                              ________

          federal courts  have inquired into  matters such  as whether  the

          work area in question  was given over to an  employee's exclusive

          use, compare Thompson v. Johnson  County Community Coll., 930  F.
               _______ ________    _______________________________

          Supp. 501,  507 (D. Kan. 1996) (finding no reasonable expectation

          of  privacy against  video surveillance  of an  unenclosed locker

          area  not  sealed  from  view  or  provided  for  any  employee's

          exclusive  use) with United States  v. Taketa, 923  F.2d 665, 673
                          ____ _____________     ______

          (9th  Cir. 1991)  (finding  a reasonable  expectation of  privacy

          against  surreptitious video  surveillance  by DEA  agents in  an

          office reserved for the defendant's exclusive use), the extent to

          which others had  access to the work  space, see O'Bryan v.  KTIV
                                                       ___ _______     ____

          Television,  868 F. Supp. 1146, 1159 (N.D. Iowa 1994) (finding no
          __________

          reasonable  expectation  of  privacy  in  an  unlocked  desk  and

          credenza located in an  "open, accessible area" of  the station),

          the  nature of the employment,  see Sheppard v.  Beerman, 18 F.3d
                                          ___ ________     _______

                                          11

          147,  152  (2d Cir.  1994)  (finding  that  a law  clerk  had  no

          reasonable expectation  of  privacy in  chambers'  appurtenances,

          desks, file cabinets, or other work spaces due to the open access

          of  documents  between judges  and  clerks),  and whether  office

          regulations placed  employees on  notice that certain  areas were

          subject  to employer  intrusions, compare Schowengerdt  v. United
                                            _______ ____________     ______

          States,  944 F.2d 483, 488 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding no reasonable
          ______

          expectation of privacy  in either office or locked  credenza when

          engineer  knew  of  security   regimen,  including  daily  office

          searches)  and American  Postal  Workers Union  v. United  States
                     ___ _______________________________     ______________

          Postal  Serv., 871 F.2d 556,  560-61 (6th Cir.  1989) (finding no
          _____________

          reasonable expectation  of privacy against  search of  employees'

          lockers  when  employer  had  promulgated  regulations  expressly

          authorizing random  inspections  in certain  circumstances)  with
                                                                       ____

          Taketa, 923  F.2d at 672-73 (finding  that unenforced regulations
          ______

          did not  defeat an  otherwise reasonable expectation  of privacy)

          and  McGregor v.  Greer,  748 F.  Supp.  881, 888  (D.D.C.  1990)
          ___  ________     _____

          (finding that public employee's own  desk or office, normally not

          entered  by co-workers  or superiors,  may engender  a reasonable

          expectation of privacy in the absence of any policy or regulation

          warning otherwise).

                 C.  Privacy Interests in the Appellants' Workplace.
                 C.  Privacy Interests in the Appellants' Workplace.
                     ______________________________________________

                    We  begin   with  first  principles.     It  is  simply

          implausible to suggest that society would recognize as reasonable

          an employee's  expectation of privacy against  being viewed while

          toiling  in the  Center's  open and  undifferentiated work  area.

                                          12

          PRTC  did  not  provide  the  work  station  for  the appellants'

          exclusive use, and its physical  layout belies any expectation of

          privacy.   Security operators do  not occupy  private offices  or

          cubicles.  They toil instead in a vast, undivided space    a work

          area  so patulous as to render a broadcast expectation of privacy

          unreasonable.  See O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 717-18.
                         ___ ________

                    The  precise  extent  of an  employee's  expectation of

          privacy often turns on the nature  of an intended intrusion.  See
                                                                        ___

          id. at 717-18;  id. at 738  (Blackmun, J., dissenting).   In this
          ___             ___

          instance the  nature of the intrusion  strengthens the conclusion

          that no reasonable expectation of  privacy attends the work area.

          Employers  possess   a  legitimate  interest   in  the  efficient

          operation of the workplace,  see id. at 723, and one attribute of
                                       ___ ___

          this  interest is that supervisors may monitor at will that which

          is in plain view within an  open work area.  Here, moreover, this

          attribute  has  a greater  claim  on our  allegiance  because the

          employer acted overtly  in establishing  the video  surveillance:

          PRTC  notified its work force in advance that video cameras would

          be installed and disclosed the cameras' field of vision.4  Hence,
                              
          ____________________

               4While  this  circumstance   bears  heavily   on  both   the
          subjective   and  objective   reasonableness  of   an  employee's
          expectation of privacy, we do not  mean to imply that an employer
          always can defeat an expectation of privacy by pre-announcing its
          intention to intrude into a specific area.  See, e.g., Smith, 442
                                                      ___  ____  _____
          U.S. at  740  n.5 (hypothesizing  that  "if the  Government  were
          suddenly  to announce  on  nationwide television  that all  homes
          henceforth would be  subject to  warrantless entry,"  individuals
          still might entertain an  actual expectation of privacy regarding
          their homes, papers,  and effects); see  also Heather L.  Hanson,
                                              ___  ____
          Note, The Fourth Amendment in the Workplace:  Are We Really Being
                ___________________________________________________________
          Reasonable?,  79 Va.  L. Rev.  243, 250-52 (1993).   In  cases in
          ___________
          which  notice would  contradict  expectations  that comport  with

                                          13

          the  affected workers were on  clear notice from  the outset that

          any  movements they might make and any objects they might display

          within the work area would be exposed to the employer's sight.

                    The  appellants  concede  that,  as  a general  matter,

          employees should  expect to  be under supervisors'  watchful eyes

          while  at  work.   But at  some  point, they  argue, surveillance

          becomes unreasonable.  In  their estimation, when surveillance is

          electronic and,  therefore, unremitting   the  camera, unlike the

          human eye, never  blinks   the  die is cast.   In  constitutional

          terms,  their theory  reduces to the  contention that  the Fourth

          Amendment precludes management from observing electronically what

          it lawfully  can see with the  naked eye.  This  sort of argument

          has failed  consistently under  the plain  view doctrine, and  it

          musters no greater persuasiveness in the present context.5  See 1
                                                                      ___

          LaFave, supra,    2.7(f)  (expressing skepticism about  finding a
                  _____

          Fourth Amendment violation by  fixed police video surveillance of

          a  person's public  activities).   When  all  is said  and  done,

          employees must accept some circumscription  of their liberty as a

          condition  of continued employment.  See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S.
                                               ___ ___    _______

          210, 218 (1984).

                    Once we put aside the appellants' theory that  there is

                              
          ____________________

          traditional  Fourth Amendment  freedoms, a  normative inquiry  is
          proper  to   determine  whether   the   privacy  expectation   is
          nonetheless  legitimate.  See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525
                                    ___ ______    ______
          n.7 (1984); Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 n.5.
                      _____

               5We caution, however, that cases involving the covert use of
          clandestine cameras, or  cases involving  electronically-assisted
          eavesdropping, may be quite another story.

                                          14

          something constitutionally sinister about videotaping, their case

          crumbles.  If there is constitutional parity between observations

          made  with the  naked  eye and  observations  recorded by  openly

          displayed video cameras  that have no greater range, then objects

          or articles that an  individual seeks to preserve as  private may

          be constitutionally protected from  such videotaping only if they

          are not located in plain  view.  See Taketa, 923 F.2d at 677.  In
                                           ___ ______

          other words, persons cannot reasonably maintain an expectation of

          privacy  in that  which  they display  openly.   Justice  Stewart

          stated the  proposition in no uncertain terms  three decades ago:

          "What a person knowingly  exposes to the public, even in  his own

          home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."

          Katz v. United States,  389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).   Consequently,
          ____    _____________

          no legitimate expectation of privacy exists in objects exposed to

          plain  view as long as the viewer's presence at the vantage point

          is lawful.   See  Horton v.  California, 496  U.S. 128,  133, 137
                       ___  ______     __________

          (1990); Oliver,  466 U.S. at  179.   And the mere  fact that  the
                  ______

          observation is  accomplished by  a video  camera rather  than the

          naked eye, and  recorded on  film rather than  in a  supervisor's

          memory, does  not transmogrify  a  constitutionally innocent  act

          into a constitutionally forbidden  one.6  See 1 LaFave,  supra,  
                                                    ___            _____

                              
          ____________________

               6It  is true, as  the appellants repeatedly  point out, that
          human observation  is less  implacable  than video  surveillance.
          But we  can find no principled basis for assigning constitutional
          significance  to   that  divagation.     Both  methods      human
          observation and  video surveillance   perform  the same function.
          Thus,  videotaping  per  se  does not  alter  the  constitutional
          perspective in any material way.
                     

                                          15

          2.7(f)  (stating  that individuals  can  record  what is  readily

          observable from a nonintrusive viewing area).

                    The bottom line is that since PRTC could  assign humans

          to  monitor the work  station continuously without constitutional

          insult, it could choose instead to  carry out that lawful task by

          means of unconcealed video cameras not equipped with microphones,

          which record only what the human eye could observe.

                D.  The Appellants' Other Fourth Amendment Arguments.
                D.  The Appellants' Other Fourth Amendment Arguments.
                    ________________________________________________

                    The  appellants  trot  out a  profusion  of  additional

          asseverations  in their  effort  to convince  us that  continuous

          video surveillance of the workplace constitutes  an impermissible

          search.    First,  invoking  Orwellian  imagery,  they  recite  a

          catechism  pasted  together  from  bits and  pieces  of  judicial

          pronouncements   recognizing  the   intrusive  nature   of  video

          surveillance.    These  statements  are  taken  out  of  context.

          Without    exception,   they    refer   to    cameras   installed

          surreptitiously during  the  course of  criminal  investigations.

          See,  e.g., United  States v.  Mesa-Rincon, 911  F.2d 1433,  1442
          ___   ____  ______________     ___________

          (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d  248,
                            _____________    ______________

          251  (5th Cir. 1987); Hawaii  v. Bonnell, 856  P.2d 1265, 1276-77
                                ______     _______

          (Haw. 1993).  Concealed cameras which infringe upon the rights of

          criminal  defendants  raise troubling  constitutional  concerns  

          concerns not implicated by the employer's actions in this case.

                    By like token,  the appellants'  attempts to  analogize

          video monitoring to physical searches are unavailing.  The silent

          video surveillance which  occurs at the Center is  less intrusive

                                          16

          than  most  physical searches  conducted  by  employers.   PRTC's

          stationary  cameras do not pry behind closed office doors or into

          desks,  drawers, file  cabinets, or  other enclosed  spaces, but,

          rather,  record  only what  is  plainly visible  on  the surface.

          Sounds  are not recorded; thus,  the cameras do  not eavesdrop on

          private  conversations between  employees.   And while  the Court

          occasionally  has  characterized  the  taking of  pictures  as  a

          search,  it is a constitutionally permissible activity if it does

          not transgress an objectively  reasonable expectation of privacy.

          See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v.  United States, 476 U.S. 227,  238-39
          ___  ____  _____________     _____________

          (1986) (upholding a search by  aerial camera when the photographs

          taken  were limited  to  the outline  of  the surveilled  plant's

          buildings  and equipment,  even though  the photos  revealed more

          detail than could be seen by the human eye).

                    Next, the appellants complain  that while at work under

          the  cameras'  unrelenting eyes  they  cannot  scratch, yawn,  or

          perform  any other  movement in  privacy.   This  complaint rings

          true, but it begs the question.  "[T]he test of legitimacy is not

          whether  a   person  chooses  to   conceal  assertedly  `private'

          activity," but whether the intrusion is objectively unreasonable.

          Oliver, 466  U.S. at 182-83;  accord California  v. Ciraolo,  476
          ______                        ______ __________     _______

          U.S. 207, 212 (1986).

                    Finally, the  appellants tout the potential  for future

          abuse,  arguing,  for  example,  that  PRTC  might  expand  video

          surveillance "into the restrooms."   Certainly, such an extension

          would raise a serious constitutional question.  See, e.g., People
                                                          ___  ____  ______

                                          17

          v. Dezek, 308 N.W.2d 652, 654-55 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (upholding
             _____

          a reasonable expectation of privacy against video surveillance in

          restroom  stalls).   But  present fears  are  often no  more than

          horrible  imaginings,  and  potential  privacy  invasions do  not
                                      _________

          constitute searches  within the purview of  the Fourth Amendment.

          See Dow  Chem., 476 U.S. at  238 n.5; United States  v. Karo, 468
          ___ __________                        _____________     ____

          U.S. 705, 712 (1984).

                    We have said enough on this score.  The appellants have

          failed  to demonstrate the existence of an issue of material fact

          sufficient  to  withstand   summary  judgment  on  their   Fourth

          Amendment  claim.   Because  they  do  not enjoy  an  objectively

          reasonable  expectation of  privacy against  disclosed, soundless

          video  surveillance while at work,  they have no  cause of action

          under the Fourth Amendment.7

          IV.  THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
          IV.  THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY

                    In  addition  to  their  Fourth  Amendment  claim,  the

          appellants contend that the  Constitution spawns a general right,

          in  the nature  of  a  privacy  right,  to  be  free  from  video

          surveillance in the workplace.8  We do not agree.

                    Although  the  Constitution  creates  no  free-floating
                              
          ____________________

               7In light of this conclusion, we need not reach the question
          of whether the intrusion  attributable to PRTC's video monitoring
          is reasonable under the circumstances.  See O'Connor, 480 U.S. at
                                                  ___ ________
          725-26.

               8As  presented  in this  proceeding, this  claim necessarily
          rises or falls on  principles of federal constitutional law.   We
          are aware both that privacy interests are somewhat more zealously
          guarded by Puerto Rican norms, see, e.g., P.R. Const. art. II,   
                                         ___  ____
          1, 7, and that the appellants have a parallel suit pending in the
          local courts.

                                          18

          right  to  privacy,  see  Katz,  389  U.S.  at  350-51,  specific
                               ___  ____

          guarantees may create  protectable zones of privacy.  See Paul v.
                                                                ___ ____

          Davis,  424 U.S. 693,  712-13 (1976); Roe v.  Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
          _____                                 ___     ____

          152-53  (1973).    Thus,  the appellants'  privacy  claim  cannot

          prosper  unless it  is anchored  in an  enumerated constitutional

          guaranty.

                    The Fourth  Amendment obviously is unavailable for this

          purpose.  See supra Part III(C) & (D).  The appellants' effort to
                    ___ _____

          introduce  the Ninth  Amendment  is similarly  misdirected.   The

          Ninth Amendment    which stipulates that "the  enumeration in the

          Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or

          disparage others  retained  by  the  people"    does  not  create

          substantive rights beyond  those conferred by governing law.  See
                                                                        ___

          Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d  532, 537 (6th Cir. 1991); see  also
          ______    ________                                      ___  ____

          John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law   11.7 (5th
                                             __________________

          ed.  1995) (observing that "the Ninth Amendment has not been used

          as  the basis  for defining  rights of  individuals") (collecting

          cases).

                    The appellants' privacy claim  thus hinges upon a right

          to privacy  which has  its origin  in the  Fourteenth Amendment's

          concept  of personal liberty.9  Such privacy rights do exist, see
                                                                        ___

          Roe, 410 U.S. at  152, but they have been limited  to fundamental
          ___

          rights  that are implicit in  the concept of  an ordered liberty.

          See  Paul, 424 U.S. at 713.  On the facts of this case, the right
          ___  ____
                              
          ____________________

               9The Fourteenth  Amendment guarantees,  inter alia,  that no
                                                       _____ ____
          state  shall "deprive any  person of life,  liberty, or property,
          without due process of law."  U.S. Const. amend. XIV,   1.

                                          19

          to be free from disclosed video surveillance while at work in  an

          open, generally accessible area does not constitute a fundamental

          right.

                    The courts  have  identified two  clusters of  personal

          privacy  rights  recognized by  the  Fourteenth  Amendment.   One

          bundle of rights relates  to ensuring autonomy in making  certain

          kinds  of significant  personal decisions;  the other  relates to

          ensuring  the confidentiality of personal matters.  See Whalen v.
                                                              ___ ______

          Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977); Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836,
          ___                                _______    ____

          840 (1st Cir. 1987).  PRTC's monitoring does not implicate any of

          these rights.

                    The autonomy  branch of the  Fourteenth Amendment right

          to privacy is limited to decisions arising in the personal sphere

             matters  relating  to  marriage,  procreation,  contraception,

          family relationships, child rearing, and the like.  See Paul, 424
                                                              ___ ____

          U.S.  at  713;  Griswold v.  Connecticut,  381  U.S. 479,  485-86
                          ________     ___________

          (1965).     The  type  of  privacy  interest  which  arguably  is

          threatened  by workplace surveillance  cannot be  shoehorned into

          any of these categories.  Because the appellants do not challenge

          a   governmental  restriction  imposed   upon  decisionmaking  in

          uniquely personal  matters, they cannot bring  their claim within

          the reach of the "autonomy" cases.

                    The  appellants'  argument  is no  stronger  under  the

          confidentiality  bough  of  the  Fourteenth  Amendment  right  to

          privacy.   Even  if  the right  of  confidentiality has  a  range

          broader  than that associated with the right to autonomy, but cf.
                                                                    ___ ___

                                          20

          Borucki,  827  F.2d  at  841-42  (suggesting  that  the  right of
          _______

          confidentiality protects  only  information relating  to  matters

          within  the scope of  the right to autonomy),  that range has not

          extended  beyond  prohibiting profligate  disclosure  of medical,

          financial,  and other intimately personal  data.  See  id. at 841
                                                            ___  ___

          n.8  & 842 (collecting cases).  Any data disclosed through PRTC's

          video surveillance  is qualitatively  different, if for  no other

          reason than that it has been revealed knowingly by the appellants

          to all observers (including the video cameras).  This information

          cannot   be   characterized    accurately   as   "personal"    or

          "confidential."

                    The appellants also appear to rely upon the substantive

          component of the Due Process Clause as a source of the envisioned

          privacy  right.   To  this extent,  they  are whistling  past the

          graveyard.   The boundaries  of substantive due  process analysis

          are  not sufficiently  flexible  to  accommodate the  appellants'

          claim.   See, e.g., Paul,  424 U.S. at 713  (declining to enlarge
                   ___  ____  ____

          the  scope  of  substantive  due process  to  include  a  privacy

          interest in preventing publication  of a person's arrest record);

          see  generally Collins v. City  of Harker Heights,  503 U.S. 115,
          ___  _________ _______    _______________________

          125  (1992)  (expressing reluctance  "to  expand  the concept  of

          substantive due process").

                    Insofar as this claim invites a substantive due process

          analysis by purporting to  challenge the existence of a  rational

          relationship between PRTC's video surveillance and its legitimate

          needs qua employer, the claim is a non-starter.  Even if we leave
                ___

                                          21

          security concerns to one side,10 video surveillance is a rational

          means to advance the employer's legitimate, work-related interest

          in monitoring  employee performance.   See O'Connor, 480  U.S. at
                                                 ___ ________

          724 ("[P]ublic employers have a direct and overriding interest in

          ensuring that the work of the agency is conducted in a proper and

          efficient manner.");  Alinovi v.  Worcester Sch. Comm.,  777 F.2d
                                _______     ____________________

          776,  782  (1st Cir.  1985) (stating  that an  employee's privacy

          interest  may  be  lessened  due to  a  "supervisor's  legitimate

          oversight  responsibilities and  the special  duties that  may be

          owed by the employee by virtue of his employment").

          V.  LEAVE TO AMEND
          V.  LEAVE TO AMEND

                    In a last-ditch effort to save the day,  the appellants

          assert  that the district court should have granted them leave to

          amend  and that its  failure to  do so  requires vacation  of the

          judgment.  The assertion is meritless.

                    The short, dispositive answer to the appellants' plaint

          is that they never sought permission to amend in the court below.

          See Beaulieu  v. United States IRS, 865 F.2d 1351, 1352 (1st Cir.
          ___ ________     _________________

          1989) ("[I]t is  a party's  first obligation to  seek any  relief

          that might  fairly have  been thought  available in  the district

          court  before seeking it on  appeal.").  The  slightly longer but

          equally  dispositive answer  is that  where, as  here, plaintiffs

                              
          ____________________

               10The  appellants  berate  the  district  court  for  taking
          improper judicial  notice of the  Center's role in  assisting law
          enforcement agencies authorized to  perform wiretaps.  Our review
          has been plenary, and whether PRTC coordinates wiretaps  does not
          bear  on our analysis.  Accordingly, any error in this regard was
          harmless.

                                          22

          elect  to stand upon their  complaint and appeal  from an adverse

          judgment, we have been exceedingly  reluctant to direct the trial

          court  to permit amendment upon affirmance of the judgment.  See,
                                                                       ___

          e.g., Dartmouth Review v.  Dartmouth Coll., 889 F.2d 13,  23 (1st
          ____  ________________     _______________

          Cir. 1989).  Nothing in this  case warrants a deviation from that

          sound  praxis.   The  facts necessary  to  support the  entry  of

          judgment are undisputed and  the appellants have not  adverted to

          any  additional facts which,  if inserted into  the record, could

          breathe  new life into their moribund federal claims.  Under such

          circumstances,  leave to amend would  be an empty  exercise.  See
                                                                        ___

          Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903  F.2d 49, 59 (1st Cir.
          _______________    __________________

          1990); Dartmouth Review, 889 F.2d at 23.
                 ________________

          VI.  CONCLUSION
          VI.  CONCLUSION

                    We need go no  further.  Because the appellants  do not

          have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the open

          areas  of their  workplace, the  video surveillance  conducted by

          their  employer  does not  infract  their  federal constitutional

          rights.   PRTC's employees may  register their objections  to the

          surveillance system  with management, but they may  not lean upon

          the Constitution for support.

                    Affirmed.
                    Affirmed.
                    ________

                                          23