Court Opinion

ID: 9547699
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:50:37.403097+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:57.562043
License: Public Domain

Dimmick, J.
(dissenting) — I dissent. I find the duties imposed on the county assessors by the tax assessment statutes to be mandatory.
This court recently held: "Presumptively, the use of the word 'shall' in a statute is imperative and operates to create a duty rather than to confer discretion." Clark Cy. Sheriff v. Department of Social & Health Servs., 95 Wn.2d 445, 448, 626 P.2d 6 (1981) (Rosellini, J.). Moreover, we have continuously adhered to the general rule that
the use of the word "shall" in a statute is imperative and operates to create a duty (State v. McDonald, 89 Wn.2d 256, 571 P.2d 930 (1977); State Liquor Control Bd. v. State Personnel Bd., 88 Wn.2d 368, 561 P.2d 195 (1977); Spokane County ex rel. Sullivan v. Glover, 2 Wn.2d 162, 97 P.2d 628 (1940); State v. Dolman, 22 Wn. App. 917, 594 P.2d 450 (1979)), and should be given its usual and ordinary meaning unless a contrary intent appears. See Strenge v. Clarke, 89 Wn.2d 23, 569 P.2d 60 (1977).
State ex rel. Nugent v. Lewis, 93 Wn.2d 80, 82, 605 P.2d 1265 (1980).
I recognize that this court and others have held that "shall" may be directory rather than mandatory. However, the instant case is not one warranting our straying from the general rules of construction.
The majority justifies its result by pointing to legislative intent indicating the directive nature of the statute. In doing so the majority asserts that the Legislature attached no special significance to the time schedule. Majority opin*629ion, at 626. It also states that the provisions are not designated to protect any interest of the taxpayer. Majority opinion, at 626. I cannot agree with such broad statements. This court must assume that the Legislature intended to make the statutes effective. The deadlines are intended to forestall any unwarranted delays by the county. Additionally, the assessors' deadlines are important to taxpayers. The taxpayer is required to pay the property taxes on April 30, 11 months from the valuation deadline. The taxpayer may pay one-half of those taxes in October. It is apparent that the May deadline is important to taxpayers as it allows them sufficient time to budget payments and to fully appeal the assessment. The verb "shall" is used throughout RCW 84.40. RCW 84.40.380 provides the taxpayer "shall" pay by April 30. I doubt any excuse would be acceptable if the taxpayer failed to meet this deadline. In fact, severe penalties are imposed if he is untimely. Conversely, a late evaluation by the county should result in its being penalized to the extent that it can only collect for the year taxes based on the previous valuation. This would not severely thwart the purpose of the taxing statutes as asserted by the majority at page 627.
The majority authorizes the county officials to ignore the legislative mandates. In doing so the majority recognizes the oft-heard excuse that the assessor's office was understaffed. It is not uncommon for county staffs to be inadequate. However, such an excuse cannot justify delayed actions contrary to statutory provisions. Although the County in the instant case valued the property within 2 months of the deadline and sent the notices out 35 days later, what is to prevent a county assessor from waiting 5 or 6 months before appraising the property and mailing out notices several months later? The statute, as now interpreted by the majority, does not prevent such abuses and the majority itself expresses no concern for such results.
I cannot join in the majority's circumvention of a clear legislative mandate imposing deadlines on county assessors.
*630Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court.
Brachtenbach, C.J., and Dore, J., concur with Dimmick, J.