Court Opinion

ID: 9576700
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:27:10.255465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:45.157527
License: Public Domain

Hill, Justice
dissenting.
Four members of the court have now dissented to the execution of Terry Lee Goodwin. Ordinarily four votes against death would be enough on this court. However, two Justices dissented when Goodwin’s case was here before, 236 Ga. 339, and two dissent now in the belief that he should be given a retrial as to sentencing.
In Spivey v. State, 241 Ga. 477, 481 (246 SE2d 288) (1978), this court retreated from its holdings, in Fleming v. State, 240 Ga. 142 (7) (240 SE2d 37) (1977), and Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327 (9) (240 SE2d 833) (1977). Now the court retreats from its holding in Spivey, supra.
In Spivey the court said (241 Ga. at 481): ". . . the ultimate test is whether a reasonable juror, considering the charge as a whole, [1] would know that he should consider all the facts and circumstances of the case as presented during both phases of the trial (which necessarily include any mitigating and aggravating facts), and [2] then, even though he might find one or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances to exist, would know that he might recommend life imprisonment.” (Matter in brackets added.) Here, in Goodwin’s ultimate struggle, the court declines to apply the ultimate test. The test has two parts. Satisfaction of the first part does not satisfy the second part.
Lockett v. Ohio, — U. S. — (98 SC 2954, 57 LE2d 973) (1978), requires that the judge clearly instruct the jury about mitigating circumstances and the option to recommend against death. See Chenault v. Stynchcombe, 581 F2d 444, 448 (5th Cir. 1978). Here the judge did not *198instruct the jury in any way, even unclearly, about the option to recommend against death as required by Lockett. I therefore must dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice Marshall joins in this dissent.