Court Opinion

ID: 9880799
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-28 17:07:13.312728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:57:21.307011
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                   IN THE OFFICE OF THE
                                                                CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
                                                                    SEPTEMBER 28, 2023
                                                                 STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                  IN THE SUPREME COURT
                  STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

                                2023 ND 183

Kayla Jones,                                                    Petitioner
  v.
Mark Rath,                                      Respondent and Appellant

                                No. 20230018

Appeal from the District Court of Morton County, South Central Judicial
District, the Honorable William A. Herauf, Judge.

DISMISSED.

Opinion of the Court by Crothers, Justice.

Mark Rath, Bismarck, ND, respondent and appellant; submitted on brief.
                                Jones v. Rath
                                No. 20230018

Crothers, Justice.

[¶1] Mark Rath appeals from a district court order denying Kayla Jones’
petition for a disorderly conduct restraining order. Rath lacks standing to
appeal the favorable order because he prevailed in the district court. Rath also
raises unappealable issues concerning an interlocutory order and motions that
he as a vexatious litigant did not have court authorization to file. None of the
issues Rath has raised are properly before this Court and the appeal is
dismissed.

                                       I

[¶2] Jones filed a petition on behalf of the parties’ child seeking a disorderly
conduct restraining order against Rath. The South Central Judicial District
Court entered an ex parte temporary restraining order. The presiding judge
subsequently requested the case be reassigned to a judge in another district
because all of the judges in the SCJD have disqualified themselves from
matters relating to Rath. The case was reassigned to a judge from the
Southwest Judicial District.

[¶3] Rath, who is subject to a N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 58 vexatious litigant
pre-filing order, requested permission to file a number of documents, including
a cross-motion for a restraining order against Jones. The district court denied
his request. Rath filed a second request for permission to file. He sought
authorization to file a dismissal motion, a motion for sanctions, a demand for
a change of judge, and a response brief. The court granted Rath’s second
request for permission to file. Rath filed a motion requesting dismissal and a
finding that Jones is a vexatious litigant under N.D. Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 58.
The court held a hearing, made findings on the record, and entered an order
dismissing Jones’ petition. Rath appeals.

                                       1
                                      II

[¶4] Rath argues N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32.2-01, authorizing disorderly conduct
restraining orders is unconstitutional as-applied in this case. He asserts Jones
attempted to use a restraining order to violate his constitutional right to
parent. However, a party must be aggrieved by the order to have standing to
appeal from a district court’s order. Bell v. Pro Tune Plus, 2013 ND 147, ¶ 5,
835 N.W.2d 858. “[O]nly a party or person aggrieved by a judgment or order of
the district court can appeal from it to the Supreme Court.” Bernhardt v.
Rummel, 319 N.W.2d 159, 160 (N.D. 1982) (quoting State v. Bakke, 117 N.W.2d
689, 696 (N.D. 1962)). For purposes of appellate review, an aggrieved party is
someone whose interests are adversely affected by a court’s decision. Interest
of A.P., 2023 ND 39, ¶ 8, 987 N.W.2d 345. Rath is not an aggrieved party. The
district court ruled in his favor and dismissed Jones’ petition. Rath lacks
standing to appeal the dismissal order.

[¶5] Rath also challenges the district court’s decision to issue a temporary
restraining order. He claims the judges in the South Central Judicial District
had no authority to issue the order because they all previously recused
themselves from matters concerning him. The temporary restraining order is
not a final appealable order. See Devine v. Fitzpatrick, 258 N.W.2d 247, 248
(N.D. 1977) (“An ex parte restraining order is not appealable . . . .”). The
temporary restraining order was an interlocutory order subject to revision. See
Froehlich v. Froehlich, 2021 ND 133, ¶ 8, 962 N.W.2d 588 (stating an
interlocutory order may be revised prior to entry of a final judgment and is
generally not appealable). The final order dismissing Jones’ petition
superseded the temporary restraining order. See id.; see also Rebel v. Rebel,
2013 ND 164, ¶ 9, 837 N.W.2d 351 (holding subsequent disorderly conduct
restraining order superseded earlier orders). Therefore, the temporary
restraining order is not appealable.

[¶6] Rath asserts the district court erred by not addressing his motion to find
Jones is a vexatious litigant. He also argues the court erred by not granting a
disorderly conduct restraining order against Jones. These requests for relief
were not properly before the court. Rath is a vexatious litigant. See Burleigh

                                       2
Cnty. Soc. Servs. Bd. v. Rath, 2023 ND 12, ¶ 11, 985 N.W.2d 725. Under N.D.
Sup. Ct. Admin. R. 58(3)(a), a vexatious litigant first must obtain leave of court
before filing “any new documents in existing litigation.” Rath was denied leave
to file a motion for a disorderly conduct restraining order and did not have
authorization under Rule 58 to file a motion concerning whether Jones is a
vexatious litigant. Rath, who is subject to a pre-filing order, may not raise
issues on appeal concerning motions he did not have authority to file. See
Wheeler v. Sayler, 2022 ND 220, ¶ 8, 982 N.W.2d 573 (stating a decision
denying leave to file is akin to dismissal without prejudice and not appealable).

                                      III

[¶7] Rath’s remaining arguments have been considered and we conclude they
are either without merit or unnecessary to our decision. The appeal is
dismissed.

[¶8] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
     Daniel J. Crothers
     Lisa Fair McEvers
     Jerod E. Tufte
     Allan L. Schmalenberger, S.J.

[¶9] The Honorable Allan L. Schmalenberger, S.J., sitting in place of Bahr, J.,
disqualified.

                                        3