Court Opinion

ID: 4356412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2019-01-07 08:14:54.107484+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:42.609945
License: Public Domain

Cite   as   2013 Ark. App. 484

                   ARKANSAS COURT OF APPBALS
                                             DIVISION IV
                                             No. CV-13-29

                                                       opinion Delivered Septembet 71,, 20'13

                                                       APPEAL FROM THE
CECIL JAMES REYI\OLDS and                              INDEPENDENCE COUNTY CIRCUIT
DONNA REYI\OLDS, His \Wife; and                        COURT
CECILJ. RE,YNOLDS, SR.                                 [No. CV-2010-300]
                       APPELT,\NTS
                                                       HONORABLE ADAM I{4zuId. at
          ^t752.It
t7-1,8,382       S.W.3   d at752. The intention of the parties and the significance they attach to the

fence, rather than its location or condition, is what is to be considered . Id. at 78, 382 S.W.3d at

752. Neither a prior dispute about the boundary line nor adverse usage up to a fence is required

to establish     a   boundary by acquiescence. 1d.,382 S.W.3d atl52.

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       We have noted that the mere existence of a fence, without evjdence of rnutual

recognition, cannot sustain a finding of such a boundary. 1d.,382 S.!7.3d at752. Also, the fact

that a landowner puts a fence inside his boundary line does flot mean that he is acquiescing in

the fence as the boundary, theteby losing tide to the strip on the other side. 1/., 382 S.W.3d at

T|Z.Thatoccurs only if the neighbor takes possession and holds it fot the requisite number of

vears. 1d..382 S.!7.3d   at752-53.

       Finally, because the locatio n   of aboundary     is a disputed question of fact, we will affirm

unless the trial court's finding is cleatly against the pteponderance of the evidence' Id-,382

S.W.3d   atl53.A findingis    clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to supportit, the

reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite conviction tha;t a mistake was

committed.Id. at 18-19, 382 S.W.3d                Whether   a   boundary line by acquiescence exists is
                                         ^t753.
to be determined from the evidence in each individual case.Id. at1.9,382 S.!7.3d
                                                                                           ^t753-
         In the case at bar, the trial court found that the Reynoldses failed to prove their claim for

boundaryby acquiescence. The court specifically stated atthe conclusion of the trial thatto meet

their burden of proof, the Reynoldses would have to prove that the conduct, beliefs, and

intentions   of bothlandowners   established a tacit agreement that the fence line was the boundary

line. However, in this case, as found by the triai coutt, thete was an absence of this type of

evidence from the perspective of GFM ot its predecessors. No witness offered evidence that

GFM ot its predecessors believed or intended the fence to be the boundary line. And while each

of the Reynoldses'witnesses testified that theywete familiarwith the fence line, had been on the

property in dispute, andr.rray have thought that the fence line was the boundary line, none were

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certain where the boundary line benveen the parties' ptopetty was and none testified about

GFM's or its predecessors' tacit agreement or recognition that the fence line was the boundary

line.

          Notably,James Reynolds's testimony ptovided only half of the requirements needed to

establish boundary by acquiescence. He stated that he and his family had alvrays considered the

fence iine   a.s   the tror-rndasr line, tha.t they   r-rsecl   the disputed propertv for forq, years, and that they

maintained the disputed property. However, the mere subiective belief that a' fence is the

boundary line is insufficient to establish            a   boundary bet'ween two propeties- Boltsteru. Shoemake,

101     tuk. App. 148, 1,52,212 S.!f.3d 1.39,'143 (2008). James did not offer any evidence of

GFM's mutual recognition of the fence as the boundary. The trial court stated, "ffames

Reynolds] was veq/ frank in his testimony, he said . . . 'I always thought that [rny ptoperry]
                                                                                               went

up to the fence line . . . .'But he never really came out and said anything about some sort of
                                                                                               an

agreement either implicitly            or explicitly with any other landowner that would give you

acquiescence."

          Moreover, as pointed out by the uial court, thete was evidence of GFM's conduct that

                                                                                        testified that
 established that it did not believe the fence was the boundary line. Sevetal witnesses

 south of the fence ]ine, there were deer stands that wete maintained by GFM.
                                                                              Also, there was

                                                                      (at least annually) the
 evidence that the hunting club, owned by GFM, managed and maintained

 properry south of the fence.

                                                                  -7-
         Because there was an absence of testimony showing that GFM considered the fence to

be the property line and there was evidence of GFM's conduct to the contralT, we hold that the

tdal court did not cleady              er in refusing to find the fence was the boundary by acquiescence.

         The Reynoldses' next argument is that the ffial coutt cleady ered in finding that GFM

was entided to a prescriptive easement in the Reynoldses'toad. The following summarizes our

laur nh nreqctinfirre
        r-*----r      eacernenfs'

                         A prescriptive
                                easement may be gained by one not in fee possession of the land
         by operation of law in a manrrer similar to adverse possession. In Arkansas, it is generaliy
         required that one asseting an easement by ptescdption show by a preponderance of the
         evidence that one's use has been adverse to the true owner and under a claim of right fot
         the statutory period. This court has said that the statutory period of seven years for
         adverse possession applies to prescriptive easements.

                 Overt activity on the patt of the user is necessary to make it clear to the owner
         of the propetty that an advetse use and claim are being exerted. Mere permissive use of
         an easement cannot tipen into an adverse claim without clear action, which places the
         ownet on notice. Some circumstance or actin addition to, orin connecLion with, the use
         which indicates that the use was not merely permissive is required to establish a right by
         prescription. The determination of whether a use is adverse or permissive is a facttal
         question, and formet decisions are :,aely controlling on this factual issue. The plaintiff
         bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been
         adverse, not permissive, use of the land in question

             't
lY/illows,        .t C   u.   Bogl,201,3   A*.   App. 59, at 3 (citing   Roberts u. Jackson,2011   Ark. App. 335, 384

s.vr.3d 28).

         \We       teview cases that traditionally sound in equity de novo on the recotd, but we will not

reverse a finding of fact by the circuit court unless it is clearly erroneous. Acuna u. IWatkins,2012

Ark. App. 564, at 6,                                        A finding is cleady erroneous when, although there
                                  -S.W.3d -,           -.
is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been comrnitted . Id.,                        S.W.3d at            reviewing       tfl^l
                                                                                                                  ^
                                                                            -                -.In
                                                               -8-
court's findings, we give due deference to the tdal court's superiot position to determine the

credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be accorded to their testimoty. Id.                           6-7,
                                                                                                        ^t
                                                                                                                    -
S.!7.3d
          ^t
             _.    Disputed facts and determinations of witness credibility Newithin the province

of the fact-finder . Id.   at7   ,                           is our duty to revetse      if our own review of the
                                                ^t
                                     -S.!7.3d        -.It
record is in marked disagreement with the trial court's findings. Id.,                             at
                                                                                       -S.W.3d          -.
          In the case at bar, the trial court found that the Reynoldses' road had

          been used by the community for a long, long time, way befote-well, it's been used by
          the Reynolds, in fact, and [their predecessots]. It's been used so long that there is a
          prescriptive easement across it. The fact that they bought it, that's a switch in
          landowners, it's been used as a road long-probably even before [the Reynoldses'
          predecessors] owned it. So as fas as I'm concetned, there is a right-of-way actoss the
          toad.

The Reynoldses argue that the trial court's finding on this issue was cleat erot because there was

no evidence in the recotd that GFM, ot its ptedecessors, used the toad adversely for seYen years.

'We            No witness testified that GFM used the road in any fashion, much                less adversely and
      agree.

overtly, for seven years. And while every witness                      tirLa.l   testified that they had used the
                                                                  ^t
Reynoldses' road, none testified that they used it in a manner that was adverse or hostile to the

ownership rights of the Reynoldses. To the contary, there was ample evidence of permissive

use of the Reynoldses' road.          According to Quails, Downs, andJames and Donna Reynolds, since

2003, only the Reynoldses and those                  with their permission had used the toad. This                  was

coroborated by evidence that when Smith and Lemley recently traveled on the Reynoldses'

road, their use of the toad was interrupted by Donna and James Reynolds.

          \7hile the Reynoldses'road may have been used often in the past, there is no evidence

that that use was anything other than permissive. In tecent yeats, the evidence ptesented was that

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                                  Cite   as   2013 Ark. App. 484

only the Reynoldses and their friends used the road. There is a lack of evidence that for seven

years GFM adversely used the road. Therefote, we hold that the trial court cleady ered in

avzarding GFM a prescriptive easernent in the Reynoldses'road, and we reverse on that issue.

       Affirmed   ir   prrq tevetsed in prrt.

       lTHrreAKEn and HxsoN,JJ.,              agree.

     Bistow E Richardson, PLLC,by: Melissa B. Richardson, for appellants.

     Blair & Stroud,by: Robert D. Stroud, for appellee.

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