Court Opinion

ID: 9744982
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:27:24.975047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:54.494734
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON REHEARING Mr. JUSTICE DOWNING delivered the opinion of the court: We allowed plaintiff’s petition for rehearing1 upon the suggestion that we had misapprehended the record when we held in our original opinion (section II) that the trial court had not ruled on the anticipatory breach issue. In other words, plaintiff in the petition for rehearing urged that the trial court’s judgment in favor of plaintiff “includes the adjudication of anticipatory breach and the assessment of damages for lost profits.” In granting the petition, we ordered “ * * * that any additional portion of the trial court record pertinent to the anticipatory breach issue not previously filed in this court shall be filed by the Plaintiff-Appellee with its reply brief.” After the parties had filed an answer and reply, we were advised by the plaintiff “ * * * that the full trial court record is on file in this court, and for such reason no additional portion of the trial court record need be filed.” After reviewing the petition, answer, reply, trial court record, and our opinion, we are of the opinion that plaintiff’s petition is totally without merit, and the petition for rehearing was improvidently granted. Normally, under such circumstances, nothing further need be said. However, we feel the following comments are appropriate. Two issues were before the trial court: (1) whether plaintiff submitted an unconditional offer, and (2) whether plaintiff was entitled to recovery on the basis of an anticipatory breach. The matter was heard by the trial court, without a jury, and consumed four trial days spread out over a period of four months. The trial of any case in such a manner presents difficult practical problems, not only for the parties and attorneys, but also for a busy trial court who has before it a number of cases involving a variety of issues. In this case the record clearly indicates that during the trial the parties initially and primarily were concerned with the first phase of the case, i.e., the unconditional offer. But, from time to time the trial court and parties would discuss the anticipatory breach matter. The record clearly indicates that the trial court, with the parties’ agreement, deferred final ruling on the anticipatory breach issue until the unconditional offer issue was resolved. In fact, on the last trial day counsel for. plaintiff said: “[I]f you want to rule on this first thing, and then you don’t have to go into anticipatory damages, if you rule in our favor.” At one point the trial court, while engaged in colloquy, commented, “I don’t think there is any question here but that there was an anticipatory breach. It seems to me to be a foregone conclusion.” The plaintiff now tries to elevate this comment to a final judgment. The observation of defendants in their answer is directly on point, “If the trial judge had ruled in favor of the plaintiff would not counsel for plaintiff have rushed to prepare and submit a written order to that effect? If defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings had been denied would counsel for plaintiff have also failed to submit an order on that also?” The only judgment entered, on November 2,1973, by the trial court in this matter reads: “The Court having heard the evidence, and having on October 29,1973 filed its Findings and Opinion, the Court finds for plaintiff, ROLAND E. CASATI, and against defendants, GREATER HERITAGE CORPORATION, by change of name from AERO MARINE MANAGEMENT COMPANY, INC., and HERITAGE INSURANCE CO. OF AMERICA, and assesses plaintiff’s damages in the sum of *56,852.00. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that plaintiff, ROLAND E. CASATI, do have and recover from the defendants, GREATER HERITAGE CORPORATION, by change of name from AERO MARINE MANAGEMENT COMPANY, INC., and HERITAGE INSURANCE CO. OF AMERICA, the sum of *56,852.00 and costs of suit, and that execution issue forthwith.” The trial court’s findings and opinion is confined solely to the unconditional offer issue.  “Judgment,” as defined in Supreme Court Rule 2, “also includes decree, determination, decision, order, or portion thereof.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 2(b)(2).) A judgment is a court’s determination of a controversy before it (23 Ill. L. & Pr. Judgments §2 (1956)) and is the court’s last word in a judicial controversy. A final judgment is one which finally disposes of the rights of the parties, either upon the entire controversy or upon some definite and separate branch thereof. (Brauer Machine & Supply Co. v. Parkhill Truck Co. (1943), 383 Ill. 569, 575, 50 N.E.2d 836.) As the supreme court said in City of Chicago v. Coleman (1912), 254 Ill. 338, 341, 98 N.E. 521, “” ® * those orders of court which are made during the pendency of the suit are usually called orders while the order which takes the form of the final judgment is termed a judgment, and there are cases where the distinction is material.” The instant case was tried without a jury; therefore there was no jury verdict. In a bench trial the rendition of a judgment is the pronouncement by the trial court, followed by the clerk’s ministerial act of entry of judgment on the record. A judgment must dispose of the issue in controversy in favor of one of the litigants, or the other, and as to the said issue, must show that the rights of the parties in litigation have been finally adjudicated. See Kaybill Corp. v. Cherne (1st Dist. 1974), 24 Ill. App. 3d 309, 315, 320 N.E.2d 598; 23 Ill. L. & Pr. Judgments §21 (1956).  We next consider what formalities are needed for the trial court’s findings. In Robinhorne Construction Corp. v. Snyder (4th Dist. 1969), 113 Ill. App. 2d 288, 294-95, 251 N.E.2d 641, aff'd (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 349,265 N.E.2d 670, the court said: “While it is no longer necessary to the validity of a judgment or for review in a case either in equity or at law tried without a jury to make special findings (Ill Rev Stats 1967, c 110, par 64), in a complicated contract or accounting case, the trial court should at least make and file a memorandum opinion setting forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law in arriving at its judgment.” (Also see Long v. Arthur Rubloff & Co. (1st Dist. 1975), 27 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 1022, 327 N.E.2d 346.) In cases, such as this, involving multiple issues, it is very important for the trial court to always keep in mind the need to protect the record so that there can be no question, at any time, as to specifically what the trial court has considered and ruled on. It has long been the law in this State that appeals will lie only from final judgments, orders, or decrees, except in the few instances expressly authorized by supreme court rule expressly providing for appeals from interlocutory orders. Village of Niles v. Szczesny (1958), 13 Ill. 2d 45, 48, 147 N.E.2d 371. With these principles in mind, we review and consider the entire record before us. As to the anticipatory breach issue, the plaintiff has not pointed out anything in the record which amounts to a final judgment. And, we can find nothing either.  The record in this case clearly indicates that no final order or judgment was entered by the trial court on the anticipatory breach issue. For plaintiff’s counsel to suggest otherwise and not be able to point to such in the record demonstrates an unfortunate lack of understanding of such a fundamental precept, or an attempt to improperly persuade this court of a nonexisting fact. Whatever the reason may have been, there is no merit to plaintiff’s petition. The plaintiff’s petition for rehearing is dismissed. We adhere to our original opinion.  We think, however, that, in view of our remand for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in our original opinion, we should clarify that original opinion as to precisely what it was that we held that defendants waived on the matter of anticipatory breach. We held that by their pleadings and by their agreement to defer the matter of anticipatory breach, defendants waived their objection that the complaint did not contain a count for anticipatory breach owing to violation of section 33(2) of The Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 110, par. 33(2)). We did not hold that defendants waived the issue of whether that count, as pleaded, stated a legally sufficient cause of action for anticipatory breach in that it failed to allege the essential elements of such a cause of action. It is our view that, on remand, it will be mutually helpful both to the parties and the trial court for the parties to make a fresh start as to the count for anticipatory breach. Hence, defendants may, if they see St, move to strike the count for anticipatory breach for failure to state a cause of action. Should the count, as presently pleaded, be dismissed, the dismissal should be with leave to Sle an amended complaint for anticipatory breach within a reasonable time. This procedure will enable the parties to put in issue for the trial court the matter of what are the essential elements of a cause of action for anticipatory breach. After plaintiff’s petition for rehearing had been allowed, defendants Sled a petition for rehearing alleging substantially the same position they had asserted in their answer to plaintiff’s petition. We hereby deny defendants’ petition for rehearing. In summary then: Plaintiff’s petition for rehearing is dismissed. Defendant’s petition for rehearing is denied. Judgment reversed and remanded. STAMOS, P. J., and HAYES, J, concur.   Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 110A, par. 367.