Court Opinion

ID: 9900351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:11:28.196219+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:04.617967
License: Public Domain

No. 500            September 27, 2023                 267

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                  In the Matter of B. P.,
                          a Child.
          DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
                  Petitioner-Respondent,
                             v.
                            R. F.
                         and M. F.,
                        Appellants.
             Clackamas County Circuit Court
                  19JU08136; A180340

  Todd L. Van Rysselberghe, Judge.
  Submitted July 24, 2023.
  Aron Perez-Selsky filed the brief for appellants.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Inge D. Wells, Assistant Attorney
General, filed the brief for respondent.
  Before Mooney, Presiding Judge, and Lagesen, Chief
Judge, and Armstrong, Senior Judge.
  LAGESEN, C. J.
  Affirmed.
  Mooney, J., dissenting.
268   Dept. of Human Services v. R. F.
Cite as 328 Or App 267 (2023)                            269

        LAGESEN, C. J.
          Pursuant to ORS 419B.116, appellants R. F. and M. F.
(collectively, the “Fs”) moved to intervene in this juvenile
dependency case regarding three-year-old B. B is an enrolled
member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe (the tribe), making this
case subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1975 (ICWA),
25 USC sections 1901-1963, as well as to the Oregon Indian
Child Welfare Act (ORICWA), ORS 419B.600 to 419B.665.
In a previous dependency case, R. F. and M. F. served as B’s
foster parents for 22 months, until B was reunified with her
mother. After the Department of Human Services (DHS)
removed B from her mother’s care for a second time and placed
her with a different set of foster parents in this case, R. F.
and M. F. sought to intervene for the purpose of having the
juvenile court direct that B be placed with them again. The
juvenile court denied the motion. It determined that appel-
lants failed to show, as required by ORS 419B.116(5)(c)(D),
that the existing parties could not adequately present the
case. We affirm.
         The relevant historical facts are not disputed. After
B was removed from her mother’s care shortly after her
birth in 2019, B was placed with R. F. and M. F., who are
the adoptive parents of B’s cousins. At the time, although
neither R. F. nor M. F. is a tribal member, DHS viewed them
to be relatives of B for purposes of ICWA. The Fs cared for B
for 22 months, at which point B was returned to her mother.
Thereafter, Fs continued to provide respite care for B.
         About seven months after B was returned to mother,
DHS again removed her from her mother’s care and initi-
ated the present dependency case. Instead of placing B with
appellants again, DHS placed her with the Ls after having
been informed by a representative of the tribe that it did not
view Fs to be relatives of B for purpose of ICWA. DHS placed
B with the Ls because of their membership in the Cherokee
tribe, which made them a preferred placement under ICWA.
One of the Ls is a Multnomah County Circuit Court judge.
         R. F. and M. F. then moved to intervene in this
case, for the purposes of requesting that B be placed with
them. At the request of DHS, the case was transferred to
270                           Dept. of Human Services v. R. F.

Clackamas County Circuit Court from Multnomah County
Circuit Court because of the potential conflict created by the
fact that one of the Ls serves as a judge of that court. Shortly
thereafter, the tribe reversed positions and determined that
R. F. and M. F. qualified as a relative placement, making
them a preferred placement under ICWA, although the tribe
“indicated to [DHS] that there was good cause to have the
child placed in the home that the child was currently placed
in[,] the tribal home.” At that point, DHS requested a home
study for R. F. and M. F., which it would provide to the tribe
so that the tribe could make an updated recommendation
regarding placement. That process was in progress at the
time of the hearing on the motion to intervene.
          At the hearing, the trial court heard testimony from
M. F., R. F., and two DHS workers involved with B’s case.
In closing, the Fs argued that they met the statutory stan-
dard for intervention. Addressing the requirement that they
demonstrate that the existing parties could not adequately
litigate the case, they argued that “with all due respect
to all of the parties in this court and the attorneys in this
courtroom, there are certain professional and institutional
restrictions that will limit their ability to adequately pres-
ent this case,” given that one of the Ls was a judge. DHS, B’s
court-appointed special advocate (CASA), and B—through
her attorney—all opposed the motion. The trial court ulti-
mately denied it, focusing on the fact that it was not per-
suaded that the existing parties could not adequately pres-
ent the case:
       “The [Fs] established that they are able to act in [B’s]
   best interest as caregivers. However, the statute requires
   more. Proof of acting in [B’s] best interest, even when the
   caregivers are highly dedicated and nurturing like the
   [Fs], is not enough to meet the second prong of the statutory
   analysis. The statute requires proof that their interven-
   tion is in [B’s] best interest, which poses a bigger question
   because intervention entails party status.
      “The court is not convinced, by a preponderance of the
   evidence, that the existing parties cannot adequately pres-
   ent the case. The professional resources allocated to [B’s]
   case are sufficient without promoting the [Fs] to party
   status.
Cite as 328 Or App 267 (2023)                                271

      “Furthermore, there is no proof that the efforts of the
   professionals will be compromised in any way due to the
   occupation of [B’s] current resource caregiver. Any conclu-
   sion otherwise would require speculation, and therefore
   the law requires the Court to deny the motion.”
On appeal, the Fs assign error to the juvenile court’s denial
of their motion to intervene, contending that it erred in
determining that they had not proved that they met the stat-
utory requirements. The Fs have not requested us to review
de novo. We therefore review to determine whether, on the
record before it, the juvenile court permissibly concluded
that they had not met their burden of demonstrating that
they satisfied the statutory prerequisites for intervention.
Dept. of Human Services v. S. E. K. H./J. K. H., 283 Or App
703, 705-06, 389 P3d 1181 (2017) (articulating standard of
review applicable to factual determinations by the juvenile
court when the Court of Appeals does not engage in de novo
review). As we explain, that standard of review requires us
to affirm the trial court’s ruling.
         ORS 419B.116 confers discretion on a juvenile court
to allow intervention in a dependency case by a person who
has a “caregiver relationship” with a child, as that term is
defined by statute. ORS 419B.116(5)(c). The court may exer-
cise that discretion only if the person seeking intervention
first “proves by a preponderance of the evidence” a range
of factors, including that “[t]he existing parties cannot ade-
quately present the case.” Id. Here, the juvenile court found
that the Fs had not proven, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that the existing parties could not adequately present
the case. Under our standard of review, that finding binds
us on appeal because the evidence before the court did not
compel a contrary conclusion: “Unless the evidence in a case
is such that the trial court as finder of fact could decide a
particular factual question in only one way, we are bound
by the trial court’s factual findings, including a finding
that a party’s evidence is not sufficiently persuasive.” Prime
Properties, Inc. v. Leahy, 234 Or App 439, 449, 228 P3d 617
(2010) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). In
fact, the record affirmatively supports the conclusion that
the existing parties could adequately litigate the case and,
in particular, would ultimately present the case for what
272                        Dept. of Human Services v. R. F.

would be in B’s best interest. On cross-examination, M. F.
acknowledged that there was nothing that caused her to
think that B’s lawyer “can’t adequately present this case on
behalf of” B.
         Before us, R. F. and M. F. nonetheless argue for a
contrary conclusion. They first point to the fact that neither
B’s lawyer nor B’s CASA objected to B’s placement with the
Ls as demonstrating that B’s interests were not represented.
But, as noted, at the time of placement, the tribe had com-
municated that it did not view the Fs as a relative placement
for purposes of ICWA, making it difficult to infer from the
failure to object that B’s lawyer and her CASA could not
adequately present the case.
          The Fs also stated that “there was a reasonable
probability that the decision-making capacity of [B’s] attor-
ney, mother’s attorney and the attorney for DHS with respect
to [B’s] case would be materially limited by the professional
obligations to other clients in matters heard by” the resource
parent who was a judge. They suggest that the potential
“need to investigate, subpoena, examine, cross-examine, or
impeach” the judge and spouse compels the conclusion that
the other parties to the case could not adequately present it
because they would be concerned about potential ramifica-
tions in future cases before the resource parent.
         The concern raised by the Fs is not unreasonable.
That is, it is not unreasonable for them to fear that the
judicial status of one of the resource parents could influ-
ence the behavior of the other parties to the case in a
way that could affect their presentation of it. But, as the
juvenile court correctly recognized, ORS 419B.116(5)(c)
requires that potential intervenors demonstrate not just
that there is a risk that “the existing parties cannot ade-
quately present the case,” it requires a showing by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence—meaning that it is more likely
than not—that the existing parties cannot adequately
present the case. See Riley Hill General Contractor, Inc. v.
Tandy Corp., 303 Or 390, 402, 737 P2d 595 (1987) (explain-
ing that proof by “a preponderance of the evidence” sets a
more likely than not standard). This record is not one that
would compel a finding that the Fs satisfied their burden of
Cite as 328 Or App 267 (2023)                                                 273

proof. Accordingly, the Fs have not demonstrated that the
juvenile court committed reversible error when it denied
the motion to intervene.
         Our conclusion that the juvenile court did not err
in denying the motion to intervene on the record before it
should not be understood to conclusively resolve the issue
of whether the Fs should be permitted to intervene in this
case. As noted, and central to our assessment of the juvenile
court’s ruling, at the time the court ruled on the motion,
DHS was still in the process of working with the tribe to
assess the appropriate placement for B under ICWA. See 25
USC § 1915(c) (child’s tribe may establish placement pref-
erences for child); see also ORS 419B.654 (providing the
same). As the Fs point out on appeal, they may qualify as
B’s “extended family,” and, as such, the preferred foster and,
if necessary, adoptive placement for B under ICWA, absent
proof of “good cause” for a different placement. See 25 USC
§ 1915 (a) and (b) (providing preference for placement with
a member of a child’s “extended family”); ORS 419B.654
(same); see also In re M. B., 350 Mont 76, 85, 204 P3d 1242,
1248 (2009) (upholding trial court’s determination, based
on testimony by tribal expert, that adoptive parents of an
Indian child’s siblings qualified as “extended family” under
ICWA).1 Should this case ultimately require the juvenile
court to determine whether the Fs qualify as B’s extended
family under tribal law or custom, or whether good cause
exists to depart from the ICWA preference for placement
with the Fs, if they do qualify as extended family, the juve-
nile court may need to permit the Fs to intervene if no exist-
ing party takes the position that they are the appropriate
    1
       ICWA states that the phrase
    “ ‘extended family member’ shall be defined by the law or custom of the
    Indian child’s tribe or, in the absence of such a law or custom, shall be a
    person who has reached the age of eighteen and who is the Indian child’s
    grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law,
    niece or nephew, first or second cousin or stepparent[.]”
25 USC § 1903(2). ORICWA defines “extended family member” almost identi-
cally, providing, in addition to the persons listed in ICWA that “extended family
member” also includes persons “as determined by the Indian child’s tribe, clan
or band member.” ORS 419B.603(3)(b). Thus, the question whether the Fs are
B’s extended family under ICWA and ORICWA turns on whether they qualify as
extended family members under tribal law and custom, a question that cannot be
resolved without the tribe’s input and, possibly, the assistance of a tribal expert.
274                                   Dept. of Human Services v. R. F.

placement under ICWA.2 To ensure that the case regarding
the appropriate placement for B is presented adequately, the
position that the Fs are the appropriate placement must be
developed fully and fairly.
         The dissenting opinion reaches a different conclu-
sion than we do and would reverse with directions to the
juvenile court to grant the motion to intervene. 328 Or App
at 282 (Mooney, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion does
so by concluding that this is an exceptional case and that
the court should exercise its discretion to review de novo
and decide the motion to intervene ourselves. 328 Or App at
275 (Mooney, J., dissenting). As we have explained,
    “when we review de novo, we are not performing our more
    typical appellate-court function of assessing whether
    the evidence before a trial court was legally sufficient to
    support its ruling. Rather, we are deciding for ourselves
    whether the case made by the party with the burden of per-
    suasion persuades us that the party has proven its case.”
Dept. of Human Services v. L. M. B., 321 Or App 50, 52, 515
P3d 927 (2022).
         The primary difficulty we have exercising discre-
tion to review de novo in this case is that the Fs did not
request de novo review. Our rules contemplate that an
appellant seeking de novo review will make a request for it
and “shall concisely state the reasons why the court should
do so.” ORAP 5.40(8)(a). The requirement for a request oper-
ates to put the respondent on notice of the possibility that
the court will review de novo and of the reasons why that
might be an appropriate approach. The requirement of the
request gives the respondent a fair opportunity to address
    2
       We note that in M. B., the Montana Supreme Court confronted a case pre-
senting issues similar to those here. One issue was whether a non-Indian cou-
ple qualified as Indian children’s extended family under ICWA by virtue of the
couple’s adoption of the children’s sibling. M. B., 350 Mont at 78, 84-85, 204 P3d
at 1243-44, 1247-48. The children’s foster parents were permitted to intervene
to contest, among other things, that the adoptive parents of the children’s sib-
ling qualified as extended family members. Id. at 77-78, 204 P3d at 1243-44.
Qualified ICWA experts presented competing testimony on the issue, and the
trial court ultimately credited the testimony that, in the tribe’s culture, the adop-
tive parents of the siblings were extended family members. Id. at 84-85, 204 P3d
at 1247-48. M. B. illustrates circumstances in which a juvenile court might need
to permit intervention to ensure that genuine disputes about an Indian child’s
placement under ICWA are resolved in a full and fair way.
Cite as 328 Or App 267 (2023)                             275

the asserted reasons for de novo review and to craft respond-
ing arguments that account for the possibility that the court
will review de novo. The deprivation of this opportunity is
significant because, as noted, de novo review requires us
to perform a much different function than when we review
for evidentiary sufficiency. For that reason, although we do
not doubt our authority to review de novo absent a request,
doing so gives us pause.
         Further, the circumstances here do not overcome
that pause. Because the parties did not seek de novo review,
the parties have not had the opportunity to address some of
the considerations that animate the dissenting opinion. In
our view, in the absence of a request for de novo review and
full input from the parties on them, those considerations are
more appropriately taken into account on a renewed motion
for intervention, if the issue of B’s placement remains in dis-
pute once B’s tribe weighs in on the question whether the Fs
qualify as extended family members under tribal law and
custom.
          In sum, applying our usual standard of review, on
this record, the juvenile court permissibly concluded that
the Fs had not demonstrated that they satisfied the crite-
ria for intervention. As noted, this conclusion does not fore-
close the Fs seeking to intervene should it become clear that
no existing party will present the case that the Fs are the
proper placement for B under ICWA.
        Affirmed.
        MOONEY, P. J., dissenting.
        I do not view the record as the majority does and,
because of that, I respectfully dissent.
         Although not requested, I would vote to exercise our
discretion under ORS 19.415(3)(b) and ORAP 5.40(8)(c) to
review this matter on a de novo basis. This is an exceptional
case that concerns the welfare of an Indian child, B, who was
previously made a ward of the juvenile court, whose mother
has since died, and who has no legal father. The representa-
tives of B’s tribe, the Oglala Sioux, have not provided clear
direction about tribal placement preferences, leading to an
276                         Dept. of Human Services v. R. F.

abrupt change in foster care placement after an unsuccessful
and traumatic attempt at reunification between B and her
mother. Rather than placing B back with the moving par-
ties (appellants), with whom B had lived since birth and to
whom she was well-bonded—a family that included B’s first
cousins who are enrolled members of the Oglala Sioux—she
was instead placed with foster parents she had never met,
one of whom was, at the time of placement, a juvenile court
judge in the judicial district exercising jurisdiction over B.
The majority does not “doubt our authority to review de novo
absent a request,” 328 Or App at 275, and while we rarely do
so, we should conduct de novo review here.
         Raising a child is no small task, even under the best
of circumstances. B was made a ward of the court because
her “circumstances [were] such as to endanger [her] wel-
fare.” ORS 419B.100(1)(c). Those circumstances complicated
things, requiring the involvement of the juvenile court,
DHS, B’s tribe, CASAs, and foster parents. The juvenile
court’s role is, generally, to apply “a series of complex stat-
utes and proceedings” to the facts of B’s circumstances in
order to protect her safety, well-being, and rights. Dept. of
Human Services v. F. J. M., 370 Or 434, 441, 520 P3d 854
(2022) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
         In general, the juvenile court specifies “the partic-
ular type of care, supervision or services to be provided by
[DHS] * * * but the actual planning and provision of such
care, supervision or services is the responsibility of [DHS].”
ORS 419B.337(2). In cases like this one, where the child is
an Indian child within the meaning of the Oregon Indian
Child Welfare Act (ORICWA) and the federal Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA), the court plays a more active role in
ensuring that specific foster care placements are made in
compliance with those Acts. ORS 419B.654(1), for example,
requires that when parental rights have not yet been termi-
nated, Indian children are to be placed in the “least restric-
tive setting” that (a) “most closely approximates a family,”
(b) provides for any special needs to be met, (c) “is in reason-
able proximity to the Indian child’s home, extended family
or siblings,” and (d)(A) is “in accordance with the order of
preference established by the Indian child’s tribe[.]” Indian
Cite as 328 Or App 267 (2023)                                      277

children must be placed within the tribe’s particular order
of preference unless the court finds good cause to deviate
from that order following an evidentiary hearing. 25 USC
§ 1915(b); ORS 419B.654(1)(d)(A); DHS v. Three Affiliated
Tribes of Fort Berthold, 236 Or App 535, 548, 238 P3d 40
(2010).
          B was placed in the home of appellants within days
of her birth in the fall of 2019. Less than two months later,
the juvenile court found B to be within its jurisdiction after
finding by clear and convincing evidence that (1) ORICWA
and ICWA apply, (2) custody of B by her mother was “likely
to result in serious emotional or physical damage to [B],”
and (3) B’s placement with appellants complied with “the
placement preferences established by 25 USC § 1915.” Those
findings were based upon the sworn testimony and written
declaration of a tribal representative, who testified that,
among other things, placement with the appellants was
“ideal” because it included B’s first cousins who are “native”
and because cousins often grow up together in the “tribal
family system.” The tribal representative further stated
that appellants’ family structure is “extremely positive for
[B]” and “promote[s] socialization in a very traditional way
* * *.” Placement with appellants was characterized by the
court as “relative foster care (placed in her cousins’ home).”
B spent the first two years of her life with appellants, and
she developed strong family bonds with them. They were the
only family and home B had ever known and she did very
well there.
         B’s birth mother worked successfully toward sobri-
ety, and, because of that, she was given an opportunity to
have B in her home. B was in her mother’s care for six or
seven months, but reunification was not successful, and B
was removed and placed back into foster care.1 Although
appellants had continued to see B and to provide respite
care for her during the attempt at reunification, B was not
placed with them when she was removed from her moth-
er’s home. She was, instead, placed with another family (the
current foster family), strangers to her, after a different

   1
       B’s mother died at some point after reunification failed.
278                                  Dept. of Human Services v. R. F.

tribal representative informed DHS that the tribe did not
view appellants to be a relative placement.
         Neither appellants nor the current foster family
include B’s “extended family member[s],” at least not as
defined by ORICWA and ICWA.2 The foster mother in each
family claims tribal heritage, but not to the Oglala Sioux.
The current foster mother is an enrolled member of the
Cherokee tribe. The appellant foster-mother is not enrolled
in a tribe. B’s tribe has given mixed messages to DHS about
appellants’ status as a relative placement, but when advised
by the tribe’s attorney that an exception to tribal placement
preferences would, in fact, be needed to support placement
with the current foster family, DHS disagreed and did not
seek an exception from the juvenile court. Thus, the issue
of which placement would best serve B’s interests was not
brought to the juvenile court’s attention.
         When B was placed with appellants, appellant-foster-
mother’s connection to two other tribes together with B’s
cousins’ connection to the Oglala Sioux tribe was said to be
consistent with tribal preferences. The first tribal represen-
tative gave sworn testimony to that effect. DHS acknowl-
edges that the two tribal representatives took “inconsistent
positions” on the tribe’s placement preference for B. But it is
not up to DHS, the juvenile court, or us to divine the tribe’s
position on tribal matters. There is a process for persons
who qualify as tribal experts to provide input both infor-
mally and through sworn testimony. Given that B’s cousins
are blood relatives who are enrolled members of B’s tribe,
and that B spent the first two years of her life living with

    2
       Under ICWA and ORICWA, extended family members of the Indian child
enjoy a place on the hierarchy of preferences for foster care placement. 25 USC
§ 1915(b)(i); ORS 419B.654(1)(d)(B)(i). Both acts define the term “extended family
member” to include, among others, first and second cousins who have reached the
age of 18. See 25 USC § 1903(2) (“a person who has reached the age of eighteen”);
ORS 419B.603(3)(b) (“a person who has attained 18 years of age”). Appellants
adopted B’s first cousins, but those cousins are not yet 18 and, therefore, do not
qualify as extended family. DHS relies upon that point and urges that “to the
extent appellants believe that it is necessary for them to intervene to protect
[B’s] best interests because the juvenile court and the existing parties are failing
to comply with the requirements of ICWA/ORICWA, they are mistaken.” That
argument overlooks the fact that B and her cousins are blood relatives whose
relationship to each other has necessarily developed like that of siblings.
Cite as 328 Or App 267 (2023)                             279

them as family, it would have been especially important for
that established process to be followed here.
         It may be true that B’s cousins do not now qualify
as B’s “extended family” because of their age and, certainly,
B could not be placed with her cousins because they are not
yet adults and could not serve as her foster parents. But, as
already mentioned, ICWA and ORICWA require placement
in a setting that most approximates family, with particu-
lar emphasis on preserving sibling relationships and tribal
connections. The only sworn testimony on the topic is that
cousins often grow up together in the “tribal family system.”
         When DHS decided B’s current placement, the juve-
nile court was not presented with an argument that place-
ment with appellants continued to be in B’s best interest
because it would have preserved B’s connection with her own
tribe through her first cousins’ membership in that tribe.
The court was not advised that, by placing B with strangers
in a new home, it would disrupt her connection to her cous-
ins who will, at some point, qualify as her extended family.
Given the disruption in B’s life caused by the failed attempt
at reunification with her mother, and B’s life-long experi-
ence with appellants as her family, it was important that the
juvenile court be presented with appellants’ arguments as
to why B should be placed with them. It is especially import-
ant that the juvenile court hear those arguments now that
B’s birth mother is deceased and there is no legal father.
         Intervention may be ordered in a juvenile depen-
dency case following a hearing upon proof by a preponder-
ance of the evidence (1) of a caregiver relationship between
the moving party and the ward, (2) that intervention is in
the ward’s best interests, (3) the reason for intervention and
the relief sought are consistent with the ward’s best inter-
ests, and (4) the “existing parties cannot adequately pres-
ent the case.” ORS 419B.116(5)(c)(A) - (D). No party disputes
that appellants have a caregiver relationship with B. The
parties focus their arguments instead on whether the exist-
ing parties can adequately present the case.
       DHS filed a motion to transfer jurisdiction to
Clackamas County shortly after the motion to intervene was
280                          Dept. of Human Services v. R. F.

filed “due to the current resource parent being an employee
of the Multnomah County judicial department.” The motion
was granted, and DHS filed its objection to the motion to
intervene. After a number of procedural events, including
at least one Clackamas County judge removing herself from
further involvement in the case, there was a hearing on the
motion.
         The record contains this testimony from appellant-
foster-father:
      “[COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS]:
      “Q * * * have the resource parents been present at
  the—with their attorney at these hearings on our motion
  to intervene?
      “A   Yes.
      “Q Okay. So [DHS] testified that one of the [current
  foster] parents is a Multnomah County Circuit Court judge
  and that [the attorneys of record in this case] are all—all
  practice in Multnomah County. Correct?
      “A   Correct.
     “Q What concerns do you have about the ability of
  these attorneys to present this case—
     “[COUNSEL FOR DHS]: Objection. Relevancy. I am
  not sure how, with all due respect, [appellant] is able to talk
  about that. If there is a concern regarding the ability of
  counsel to be impartial, then I think that that’s something
  that the attorney can argue, but asking the witness—I
  think it’s well beyond a lay person and well beyond sort of
  the appropriate question to ask.
     “THE COURT: I’m going to overrule the objection. He
  can testify if that’s his concern and then—but counsel’s
  welcome to—I’d invite counsel to, if it’s appropriate, to, you
  know, argue the point.
      “[COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS]:
      “Q * * * [A]gain, what concerns do you have, if any,
  of the ability of the attorneys that I named to adequately
  present this case given the status of the—one of the [cur-
  rent foster] parents and the profession that these attorneys
  are part of—
Cite as 328 Or App 267 (2023)                                281

      “A   Sure.
      “Q —and where they work?
       “A Sure. No, I would personally, from mere logical per-
   spective, have concerns that if one of the attorneys present
   in this case were to appear future—in a future hearing—
   unrelated hearing—that I believe it could sway an opinion
   or the approach to remove a child from a judge’s home if
   they’re going to have to appear before that judge in a dif-
   ferent hearing.”
         Appellants were, thus, concerned that the current
foster mother’s position as a judge might give her an unfair
advantage in the continued placement of B in her home. B’s
case was transferred to a different judicial district precisely
to avoid such concerns. But the judge/foster mother attended
the hearing. To be sure, as a foster parent, she was enti-
tled to notice, and she was entitled to attend the hearing. I
assume that she attended in good faith as B’s foster mother.
But her presence in the courtroom did not go unnoticed, and
everyone involved in that hearing knew that the case had
been transferred to that courthouse to avoid the appearance
of impropriety related to the current foster mother’s role as
a judge. It should not have been a surprise to anyone that
her presence in the courtroom while testimony was taken
and while the juvenile court made its ruling presented an
appearance of impropriety, at least for appellants. Even
the majority acknowledges that “it is not unreasonable for
[appellants] to fear that the judicial status” of the current
foster mother “could influence” how the case is presented to
the juvenile court. 328 Or App at 272.
        The juvenile court made this finding, among others,
when it denied the motion to intervene:
   “[T]here is no proof that the efforts of the professionals
   will be compromised in any way due to the occupation of
   [B]’s current resource caregiver. Any conclusion otherwise
   would require speculation, and therefore the law requires
   the Court to deny the motion.”
But it was not appellants’ burden to prove improper influ-
ence or duress to prevail on their motion. They raised the
concern that their role in B’s life and their suitability for her
continued or future placement would not be presented by the
282                                 Dept. of Human Services v. R. F.

existing parties because the attorneys and DHS casework-
ers appear in the current foster mother’s courtroom on other
matters. In other words, appellants believed it unlikely that
the existing parties would present them as a suitable place-
ment option for B when the other choice is the juvenile court
judge sitting in the back of the courtroom. DHS opposed
intervention and supported placement with the current
foster family. It did not present appellants as a placement
choice for the court to consider after reunification with B’s
mother failed. That record supports the conclusion that the
existing parties either cannot or will not adequately present
the case for decision.3 That is what appellants were required
to establish.
         The majority suggests that appellants take a wait-
and-see approach. They could certainly do that. But this
is not the time to watch the wheels of justice slowly turn.
All too often, the imminent need to address a child’s living
situation is overtaken by the passage of time, which then
becomes the reason to leave things as they are. That pas-
sage of time in a dependency case becomes the thing that
is most sharply debated on questions of placement and case
planning. Disruptions in a child’s life are part and parcel
of the dependency process and they are often traumatiz-
ing. While an old-fashioned tincture of time may be good
medicine for many situations, it is not the remedy called for
here. The emotional and financial costs of litigation present
formidable barriers to participation, especially after losing
the first time. I would reverse and remand this case to the
juvenile court with direction to allow intervention.

    3
      The majority notes that B opposed the motion to intervene through her
attorney. B is little more than a toddler, and there is no evidence or suggestion
that she expressed a preference to be placed with strangers. Moreover, her attor-
ney, like the other attorneys, appears before the current foster mother in her
courtroom on other matters. Those facts weigh in favor of intervention.