Court Opinion

ID: 9514436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:49:26.140435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:17.450205
License: Public Domain

MILLER, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
[¶ 23.] I respectfully dissent.
Standard of Review
[¶ 24.] First, I must point out that the standard of review set forth in the majority writing is not totally accurate and is possibly confusing. I can find no other situation where this or any other court has said that the appropriate standard of review in summary judgment actions is a clearly erroneous review of the facts. This confusion was probably caused by the unusual and unprecedented procedure followed by the trial court.
[¶ 25.] It is clear that the trial court, for some unexplained reason, conducted an evi-dentiary proceeding, complete with testimony by the parties and exhibits, under the auspices of considering a summary judgment motion, and then entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and summary judgment for Clarence. This was improper. Even the majority fails to note our well-settled principle that findings of fact are, at best, superfluous in a summary judgment. Koeniguer v. Eckrich, 422 N.W.2d 600, 601 (S.D.1988); Wilson v. Great N. Ry. Co., 83 S.D. 207, 211, 157 N.W.2d 19, 21 (S.D.1968). See also SDCL 15-6-52(a). Therefore, I suggest that the majority writing serves only to compound the trial court’s error.
[¶ 26.] Though seemingly a technicality, the distinction between a judgment and a summary judgment is critical to proper appellate review. Our review of a summary judgment motion differs significantly from our review of factual findings and conclusions of law which stem from a judgment. Com*788pare Grand State Property, Inc. v. Woods, Fuller Shultz & Smith, 1996 SD 139, ¶ 10, 556 N.W.2d 84, 87 (stating “[o]ur task [in reviewing a summary judgment] is to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the law was correctly applied.”) and City of Colton v. Schwebach, 1997 SD 4, ¶ 8, 557 N.W.2d 769, 771 (noting in reviewing a trial court’s judgment, findings of fact are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard and conclusions of law are- reviewed de novo). The fact that the trial court entered unnecessary findings of fact and conclusions of law and titled its order a judgment4 on a summary judgment motion does not entitle the ruling to a deferential standard of review on appeal. See Finer v. Jensen, 519 N.W.2d 337, 339 (S.D. 1994); Time Out, Inc. v. Karras, 392 N.W.2d 434, 436 (S.D.1986).
[¶ 27.] It is clear that the trial court put the proverbial cart before the horse by taking evidence on the ultimate issue of ambiguity at the summary judgment hearing. This procedural irregularity should not be condoned and the case should otherwise be remanded. However, remand in this case would arguably serve only to reproduce the record already before us on appeal. An economical use of judicial resources dictates that we review the trial court’s judgment at this juncture as if procedurally correct to avoid duplication and an unnecessary appeal.
Merits
[¶28.] I specifically dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the agreement is unambiguous as a matter of law. The majority disregards findings of the trial court and places its own spin on the language of the agreement, without regard for the plain language of the agreement and the evidentiary basis for the trial court’s ruling.
[¶ 29.] Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law which we review de novo. Ducheneaux v. Miller, 488 N.W.2d 902, 909 (S.D.1992). A contract is ambiguous when it is capable of more than one meaning when viewed objectively by a reasonably intelligent person in the context of the entire agreement. Id. (citing 17A AmJur2d § 338 (1991)). The majority concludes the prenuptial agreement is unambiguous because the agreement “clearly applies to the distribution of property upon the death of one of the parties.” I strongly disagree.
[¶ 30.] I am of the opinion that property distribution upon death is not the sole concern of the agreement. The plain language of the agreement shows it also contemplates preservation of existing property rights, future mortgages, medical expenses and insurance, and the residences of the parties. It specifically states that the marriage “shall not in any way change their legal right”' in their respective property, and that “all property” “shall be and forever remain the personal estate of said party.... ” Additionally, the agreement specifically states “each party shall have at all times the full right and authority, in all respects the same as each would have if not married, to use, enjoy, manage,. convey, and encumber such property as may belong to him or her.”
[¶ 31.] The foregoing provisions surely do not exclusively relate to “distribution of property upon death.” I assert that the language, taken together with the instrument as a whole, indicates the parties’ intention that the agreement apply to situations other than death in which property ownership might be at issue. Whether divorce proceedings are such a situation is arguably unclear from the plain language of the agreement. The agreement is therefore ambiguous as a matter of law.
- [¶ 32.] When a contract is ambiguous, evidence may be introduced to determine the intention of the parties. Ford v. Moore, 1996 SD 112, ¶ 10, 552 N.W.2d 850, 855. The intention of the parties is a question of fact for the fact finder. North River Ins. Co. v. Golden Rule Const., Inc., 296 N.W.2d 910, 912 (S.D.1980). The trial court found that “[Clarence and Alice] intended the Antenup-tial Agreement dated June 10, 1985, to be controlling in the event of divorce and [they] intended that neither [Clarence or Alice] *789would receive any property from the other in the event of a divorce.” The trial court further found that the parties’ actions prior to and during the marriage manifested their intention that the agreement controlled in the event of a divorce. We give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to observe the witnesses and the evidence first hand and will overturn its findings of fact only if clearly erroneous. In re Estate of Elliott, 537 N.W.2d 660, 662 (S.D.1995). The trial court’s findings have not been shown to be clearly erroneous. I therefore dissent, specifically from the majority’s paragraph 11, et seq. which ignores and, in essence, overrules the trial court’s specific evidentiary findings, without giving the “clearly erroneous” deference mandated by law.
[¶ 38.] Although disavowing the procedure followed by the trial court, I would affirm its ultimate holding.
[¶ 34.] I am authorized to state that Justice GILBERTSON joins in this dissent.

. The trial court’s order is titled "JUDGMENT DENYING DEFENDANT'S CLAIM FOR DIVISION OF PROPERTY."