Court Opinion

ID: 9853128
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:42:54.443618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:41.167678
License: Public Domain

BURKE, J.
I concur in the affirmance of the judgment as to guilt but dissent from the reversal of the judgment as to penalty.
The majority hold that a few isolated remarks of the prosecutor selected out of his closing arguments that extend over 35 pages of transcript require reversal of the judgment as to penalty even though at the trial no objection was made to the remarks. Most of the 35 pages of the prosecutor’s arguments concerned matters such as the brutal nature of the killing, the fact that defendant “emptied this gun into [his victim’s] body, some from the back and some from the front,” defendant’s long history of criminal and other antisocial conduct, and his repeated failures to take advantage of opportunities given him to rehabilitate himself. At one place alone in the argument the prosecutor stated, ‘ ‘ During the many years that I have been a prosecutor, I have seen some pretty depraved *534character [sic]. Usually they are kind of old because it takes a little while to become this depraved. But it has seldom been my misfortune to see a more depravee [sic] character than this one. If Mr. Walter Ashley Smith has forfeited his right to live at the hands of Mr. Bandhauer, I don’t think that we should be particularly upset about Mr. Bandhauer now having to forfeit his life for the life that he has led in the past few years. It is not a very equal trade, is it ? ”
Subsequently the prosecutor stated, “I can readily see in some cases of first degree murder—and I have stood before this court on occasions and recommended life imprisonment in first degree murder cases—for example, ’' and the prosecutor went on to state two examples of cases where the death penalty might not be justified: the first, a crime of passion where one spouse was found in a compromising position by the other spouse; and, the other, a crime in which the particular participant took no active part in a robbery and murder, except to drive the getaway car and had told his partner not to use a loaded gun because he did not want to be involved in any killing. The prosecutor then stated that in the instant case “You don’t have just a trigger man. You have a vicious, cold-blooded killer here. This man wanted to make sure Mr. Walter Ashley Smith was dead. There was only one reason for that—so he couldn’t get on this witness stand and tell us what happened- This man has had enough of State Prison and didn’t want to go back, and the one man who could send him back . . . [was] Mr. Walter Ashley Smith.”
In People v. Lopez, 60 Cal.2d 223, 251-252 [32 Cal.Rptr. 424, 384 P.2d 16], which affirmed judgments imposing the death penalty, this court unanimously held that a statement by the prosecutor "that he had never seen a more cold-blooded killing” was a proper argument at the penalty trial. The prosecutor in Lopez had not taken the stand to testify, and this court apparently was of the view that the quoted statement was not to be interpreted literally but rather was merely a way of saying that the killing was an extremely coldblooded one, a fact fully warranted by the evidence. The prosecutor’s statement in Lopez is similar to the prosecutor’s statement here that defendant was one of the most depraved characters that the prosecutor had seen. If the instant statement were construed as merely an assertion that defendant was extremely depraved, the argument is not improper since the evidence fully justified such an assertion. (People v. Terry, 57 Cal.2d 538, 561 [21 Cal.Rptr. 185, 370 P.2d 985]; *535People v. Wein, 50 Cal.2d 383, 395-396 [326 P.2d 457].) There was evidence that defendant robbed and intentionally killed the decedent by firing six bullets into the victim’s body including one that entered his heart and that defendant shot the decedent from the back as well as the front. The evidence also showed that defendant has a juvenile court record, was dishonorably discharged from the armed services, and has been convicted of various crimes including receiving stolen property, forgery, and escape from a county farm.
Even if the prosecutor’s statements pointed to by the majority were improper, defendant may not now complain since he made no objection at the trial. Had one been made, the trial court could easily have removed any harmful effect of the remarks by instructing the jury to disregard them. (People v. Jackson, 59 Cal.2d 375, 381 [29 Cal.Rptr. 505, 379 P.2d 937] ; People v. Brice, 49 Cal.2d 434, 437 [317 P.2d 961] ; People v. Hampton, 47 Cal.2d 239, 240-241 [302 P.2d 300].)
Moreover, the remarks of the prosecutor referred to by the majority are but a minor portion of his arguments, and at the close of the arguments the jury was instructed that it should not consider as evidence any statement made by counsel during the trial unless such statement is made as an admission or stipulation conceding the existence of a fact or facts and that the jury should decide the case solely upon the evidence presented to it and the instructions given by the court. Under the circumstances any error in the arguments in question was not prejudicial under article VI, section 13, of our Constitution. (People v. Wilson, 60 Cal.2d 139, 156 [32 Cal.Rptr. 44, 383 P.2d 452] ; People v. Pike, 58 Cal.2d 70, 96 [22 Cal.Rptr. 664, 372 P.2d 656] ; People v. Garner, 57 Cal.2d 135, 156 [18 Cal.Rptr. 40, 367 P.2d 680]; People v. Lane, 56 Cal.2d 773, 787 [16 Cal.Rptr. 801, 366 P.2d 57].)
I would affirm the judgment in its entirety.
McComb, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied May 24, 1967. Peters, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.