Court Opinion

ID: 9960063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 10:09:33.167863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:07.818085
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued April 11, 2024

                                      In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                     For The

                         First District of Texas
                            ————————————
                              NO. 01-22-00923-CR
                           ———————————
                           FELIX VALE, Appellant
                                        V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 339th District Court
                           Harris County, Texas
                       Trial Court Case No. 1711921

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

     A jury convicted appellant Felix Vale of the first-degree felony offense of

aggravated sexual assault.1 After Vale pleaded true to the allegations in an

1
     See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.021(a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(2)(A)(iv).
enhancement paragraph, the jury assessed Vale’s punishment at eighty-two years’

confinement.

      In his sole issue on appeal, Vale argues that the jury charge, which submitted

“various theories of aggravated sexual assault” to the jury in the disjunctive,

erroneously allowed the jury to convict him on less than a unanimous verdict. We

affirm.

                                     Background

      During Winter Storm Uri in February 2021, the Houston area experienced

near-record cold temperatures, and many homes and businesses lost power for

prolonged periods of time. On the evening of February 16, the complainant A.F.

(“Alex”)2 and his roommate, Eric, lost power. After dropping Eric’s daughter off at

her grandfather’s house in Conroe, Alex and Eric decided to go to the Fountainhead,

a local bar near their house in Spring, to spend time and warm up.

      Few people had decided to venture outdoors in the cold weather, but Alex and

Eric were not alone at the Fountainhead. In addition to the bartender, Vale and his

friend Ariel Cordoba were also present. Vale, Eric, and Alex were all regular

customers of the bar.

      For several hours, the atmosphere in the bar was relaxed and congenial. The

four patrons all had multiple drinks, Alex used his cell phone to play music over the

2
      In this opinion, we refer to the complainant by a pseudonym to protect his privacy.
                                           2
bar’s speakers, and everyone engaged in friendly conversation. However, shortly

after 2:00 a.m. on February 17, Cordoba became upset and started yelling and

insulting Eric’s wife. Eric walked away to a different part of the bar, and Cordoba

threw a shot glass at Alex, which hit him in the face. Both Vale and Cordoba then

assaulted Alex with their fists, boots, and pieces of broken barstools. Cordoba also

hit Alex in the head with a gun and fired a gunshot inside the bar.

      Throughout the assault, Vale repeatedly yelled vulgarities and made violent

threats, including a threat to sexually assault Alex by anal penetration. Surveillance

footage from inside the bar showed Cordoba assisting Vale in pulling Alex’s pants

partially down while Alex was lying on the floor. The footage also showed Vale with

his hand down Alex’s pants, and Vale could be heard narrating his actions. The

actual act of penetration was not visible on the footage. Eric and the bartender hid in

other parts of the bar and did not directly witness this portion of this assault. Alex

was unconscious for most of the assault, and he was unable to remember what had

happened. Alex was severely injured, and he required multiple surgeries, including

dental implants and placement of a metal plate underneath his eye.

      The grand jury charged Vale with the offense of aggravated sexual assault. 3

The six-paragraph indictment read as follows:

3
      The grand jury also charged Vale with the offenses of aggravated assault and
      aggravated robbery, but those offenses were not tried in the underlying proceeding.
                                           3
The duly organized Grand Jury of Harris County, Texas, presents in the
District Court of Harris County, Texas, that in Harris County, Texas,
FELIX VALE, hereafter styled the Defendant, heretofore on or about
February 17, 2021, did then and there unlawfully, intentionally and
knowingly cause the penetration of the anus of A.F., hereinafter called
the Complainant, by placing the fingers of the Defendant in the anus of
the Complainant, without the consent of the Complainant, namely, the
Complainant had not consented and the Defendant knew that the
Complainant was unconscious and physically unable to resist, and in
the course of the same criminal episode, the Defendant used and
exhibited a deadly weapon, namely a firearm.
It is further presented that in Harris County, Texas, FELIX VALE,
hereafter styled the Defendant, heretofore on or about February 17,
2021, did then and there unlawfully intentionally and knowingly cause
the penetration of the anus of A.F., hereinafter called the Complainant,
by placing the fingers of the Defendant in the anus of the Complainant,
without the consent of the Complainant, namely, the Complainant had
not consented and the Defendant knew that the Complainant was
unconscious and physically unable to resist, and in the course of the
same criminal episode, the Defendant used and exhibited a deadly
weapon, namely a boot.
It is further presented that in Harris County, Texas, FELIX VALE,
hereafter styled the Defendant, heretofore on or about February 17,
2021, did then and there unlawfully intentionally and knowingly cause
the penetration of the anus of A.F., hereinafter called the Complainant,
by placing the fingers of the Defendant in the anus of the Complainant,
without the consent of the Complainant, namely, the Complainant had
not consented and the Defendant knew that the Complainant was
unconscious and physically unable to resist, and in the course of the
same criminal episode, the Defendant used and exhibited a deadly
weapon, namely a stool.
It is further presented that in Harris County, Texas, FELIX VALE,
hereafter styled the Defendant, heretofore on or about February 17,
2021, did then and there unlawfully intentionally and knowingly cause
the penetration of the anus of A.F., hereinafter called the Complainant,
by placing an unknown object in the anus of the Complainant, without
the consent of the Complainant, namely, the Complainant had not
consented and the Defendant knew that the Complainant was

                                   4
      unconscious and physically unable to resist, and in the course of the
      same criminal episode, the Defendant used and exhibited a deadly
      weapon, namely a firearm.
      It is further presented that in Harris County, Texas, FELIX VALE,
      hereafter styled the Defendant, heretofore on or about February 17,
      2021, did then and there unlawfully intentionally and knowingly cause
      the penetration of the anus of A.F., hereinafter called the Complainant,
      by placing an unknown object in the anus of the Complainant, without
      the consent of the Complainant, namely, the Complainant had not
      consented and the Defendant knew that the Complainant was
      unconscious and physically unable to resist, and in the course of the
      same criminal episode, the Defendant used and exhibited a deadly
      weapon, namely a boot.
      It is further presented that in Harris County, Texas, FELIX VALE,
      hereafter styled the Defendant, heretofore on or about February 17,
      2021, did then and there unlawfully intentionally and knowingly cause
      the penetration of the anus of A.F., hereinafter called the Complainant,
      by placing an unknown object in the anus of the Complainant, without
      the consent of the Complainant, namely, the Complainant had not
      consented and the Defendant knew that the Complainant was
      unconscious and physically unable to resist, and in the course of the
      same criminal episode, the Defendant used and exhibited a deadly
      weapon, namely a stool.

      The jury charge tracked the language of the indictment and authorized the jury

to convict Vale of aggravated sexual assault based on any of the six theories alleged

in the indictment: (1) penetration with Vale’s fingers while using or exhibiting a

firearm; (2) penetration with Vale’s fingers while using or exhibiting a boot;

(3) penetration with Vale’s fingers while using or exhibiting a stool; (4) penetration

with an unknown object while using or exhibiting a firearm; (5) penetration with an

unknown object while using or exhibiting a boot; or (6) penetration with an unknown

object while using or exhibiting a stool. The charge also authorized the jury to
                                          5
convict Vale based on Cordoba’s actions under the law of parties for each of the six

alleged theories. Thus, the charge included twelve application paragraphs set out in

the disjunctive. Vale did not object to the charge on the basis that it authorized a

non-unanimous verdict.

      The jury found Vale guilty of the offense of aggravated sexual assault “as

charged in the indictment.” After Vale pleaded true to the allegations in an

enhancement paragraph, the jury assessed Vale’s punishment at eighty-two years’

confinement. This appeal followed.

                                 Jury Unanimity

      In his sole issue, Vale argues that the jury charge—which submitted in the

disjunctive twelve application paragraphs setting out “various theories of aggravated

sexual assault”—permitted the jury to convict Vale without being unanimous on all

elements of the offense.

A.    Standard of Review and Governing Law

      We use a two-step analysis when addressing claims of jury charge error.

Alcoser v. State, 663 S.W.3d 160, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). First, we determine

whether the charge is erroneous. Id. If it is, then we must decide whether the

erroneous charge harmed the defendant. Id. When, as here, the defendant does not

object in the trial court to the jury charge, the record must show “egregious harm.”

Id.; Marshall v. State, 479 S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (“If the

                                         6
defendant did not timely object to the jury instructions, then reversal is required only

if the error was so egregious and created such harm that the defendant did not have

a fair and impartial trial.”).

       Charge error causes egregious harm if it “affects the very basis of the case,

deprives the defendant of a valuable right, or vitally affects a defensive theory.”

Marshall, 479 S.W.3d at 843; Cosio v. State, 353 S.W.3d 766, 777 (Tex. Crim. App.

2011). Typically, when examining the record to determine whether charge error is

egregious, we consider: (1) the entirety of the jury charge itself; (2) the state of the

evidence; (3) arguments of counsel; and (4) any other relevant information revealed

by the entire trial record. Marshall, 479 S.W.3d at 843; Cosio, 353 S.W.3d at 777.

A finding of egregious harm must be based on actual rather than theoretical harm.

Alcoser, 663 S.W.3d at 165. This is a fact-specific analysis that is made on a case-

by-case basis. Id.; Marshall, 479 S.W.3d at 843.

       A criminal defendant in Texas has the right to a unanimous jury verdict on

each element of the charged offense. French v. State, 563 S.W.3d 228, 233 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2018). “Texas law requires that a jury reach a unanimous verdict about

the specific crime that the defendant committed. This means that the jury must ‘agree

upon a single and discrete incident that would constitute the commission of the

offense alleged.’” Cosio, 353 S.W.3d at 771 (quoting Stuhler v. State, 218 S.W.3d

706, 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)); Landrian v. State, 268 S.W.3d 532, 535 (Tex.

                                           7
Crim. App. 2008) (“The jury must agree that the defendant committed one specific

crime.”); Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 745 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Unanimity in

this context means that each and every juror agrees that the defendant committed the

same, single, specific criminal act.”). “It is error to authorize a jury to render a guilty

verdict without reaching a unanimous decision as to each element of the charged

offense.” French, 563 S.W.3d at 233.

      Although the jury must unanimously agree that the defendant committed a

specific crime, the jury is not required to unanimously “find that the defendant

committed that crime in one specific way or even with one specific act.” Landrian,

268 S.W.3d at 535; Young v. State, 341 S.W.3d 417, 422 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)

(“[T]he jury must unanimously agree about the occurrence of a single criminal

offense, but they need not be unanimous about the specific manner and means of

how that offense was committed.”). A jury charge does not violate the requirement

of jury unanimity if it “presents the jury with the option of choosing among various

alternative manner and means of committing the same statutorily defined offense.”

Jourdan v. State, 428 S.W.3d 86, 94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing Pizzo v. State,

235 S.W.3d 711, 715 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)); Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 745 (“The phrase

‘manner or means’ describes how the defendant committed the specific statutory

criminal act.”). “Therefore, different modes of commission may be presented in a

jury instruction in the disjunctive when the charging instrument, in a single count,

                                            8
alleged the different means in the conjunctive.” Jourdan, 428 S.W.3d at 94 (quoting

Pizzo, 235 S.W.3d at 715).

      Penal Code section 22.021 provides that a person commits the offense of

aggravated sexual assault of an adult if the person intentionally or knowingly:

      (1)    causes the penetration of the anus or sexual organ of another
             person by any means, without that person’s consent;
      (2)    causes the penetration of the mouth of another person by the
             sexual organ of the actor, without that person’s consent; or
      (3)    causes the sexual organ of another person, without that person’s
             consent, to contact or penetrate the mouth, anus, or sexual organ
             of another person, including the actor

and one or more aggravating factors—such as that the person uses or exhibits a

deadly weapon in the course of the same criminal episode—exists. See TEX. PENAL

CODE § 22.021(a)(1)(A), (a)(2); Nickerson v. State, 69 S.W.3d 661, 671 (Tex.

App.—Waco 2002, pet. ref’d) (“Section 22.021(a)(1)(A) of the Penal Code

proscribes three discrete acts which constitute the allowable units of prosecution in

a case in which the victim is an adult.”).

      Aggravated sexual assault is a “nature of conduct” offense. Gonzales v. State,

304 S.W.3d 838, 847–49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (stating such in context of

complaint about double jeopardy).4 In such offenses, “the act itself is the gravamen

4
      The Court of Criminal Appeals has stated that its double-jeopardy jurisprudence is
      “closely intertwined” with its jury-unanimity jurisprudence, and thus when it has
      construed different provisions of the aggravated sexual assault statute to “carve out
      separate offenses for double jeopardy purposes, [it has] essentially held that they are
                                             9
of the offense,” and “it is the act or conduct that is punished, regardless of any result

that might occur.” Young, 341 S.W.3d at 423. The different types of conduct that are

proscribed by the aggravated sexual assault statute “should ordinarily be regarded as

different offenses,” whether the acts are specified in different subsections of the

statute or are “specified within separate and disjunctive phrases in the same

subsection.” Gonzales, 304 S.W.3d at 848–49; see Aekins v. State, 447 S.W.3d 270,

278 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“This is true for acts violating not only different

statutes, but different subsections of a single statute, and even different discretely

prohibited acts within the same subsections.”).

      Thus, “[p]enetration of the anus constitutes a discrete act from penetration of

the sexual organ, even if they occur within a short period of time.” Gonzales, 304

S.W.3d at 849; see Vick v. State, 991 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)

(stating that aggravated sexual assault statute “is a conduct-oriented statute; it uses

the conjunctive ‘or’ to distinguish and separate different conduct; and its various

sections specifically define sexual conduct in ways that usually require different and

distinct acts to commit”). “With ‘nature of conduct’ crimes, the jury must be

unanimous about the specific criminal act.” Young, 341 S.W.3d at 424.

      separate offenses for jury unanimity purposes as well.” French v. State, 563 S.W.3d
      228, 233–34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (quoting Gonzales v. State, 304 S.W.3d 838,
      848 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)).
                                           10
      In Jourdan v. State, one of the questions before the Court of Criminal Appeals

was whether the charge given to the jury was erroneous because it authorized a

conviction without determining whether the defendant penetrated the complainant’s

sexual organ with his own sexual organ as opposed to with his finger. See 428

S.W.3d at 94–96. The court noted that the relevant subsection of the aggravated

sexual assault statute—the same subsection at issue in this case—“does not

disjunctively specify different types of conduct.” Id. at 95; TEX. PENAL CODE

§ 22.021(a)(1)(A)(i) (providing that person commits offense of aggravated sexual

assault if person intentionally or knowingly “causes the penetration of the anus or

sexual organ of another person by any means, without that person’s consent”).

Instead, the subsection “simply proscribes the same type of conduct—‘penetration’

(albeit of more than one statutorily specified orifice)—perpetrated ‘by any means.’”

Jourdan, 428 S.W.3d at 95.

      The court then analyzed the grammatical structure of the subsection to

determine the gravamen of the offense. Id. at 95–96. The court stated:

      Utilizing the so-called “eighth-grade grammar” test for discerning the
      gravamen of a given offense, we note that Section 22.021(a)(1)(A)(i)
      supplies a noun (“person”), a main verb (“causes”) and direct object
      (“penetration”), plus three adverbial phrases (“of the anus or sexual
      organ”/“of another person”/“by any means”). Ordinarily, we have not
      regarded adverbial phrases as “elemental” for jury unanimity purposes.
      But here, the first two adverbial phrases provide a level of specificity
      that arguably serves to define discretely actionable units of prosecution
      even within the same statutory subsection. Accordingly, a defendant
      may be susceptible to prosecution under Section 22.021(a)(1)(A)(i) for
                                         11
      as many “persons” as he penetrated during the same transaction, and
      for as many statutorily delineated orifices as the evidence may show he
      penetrated. The last adverbial phrase in the subsection, on the other
      hand, is non-specific, and we agree with the State that this signals a
      legislative indifference to how the penetrations may be accomplished.
      Thus defined, the gravamen of the subsection is penetration, not the
      various and unspecified “means” by which that penetration may be
      perpetrated, which are not elemental.

Id. at 96 (internal citations omitted). The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that

“the penetration of a single orifice”—the complainant’s sexual organ—during the

same transaction “constituted but one offense under Section 22.021(a)(1)(A)(i),

regardless of the various manner and means by which the evidence may show that

the penetration occurred.” Id. Therefore, the jury “was not required to reach

unanimity with respect to whether” the defendant penetrated the complainant with

his sexual organ or his finger during that transaction. Id.; see Aekins, 447 S.W.3d at

279 (stating that jury unanimity is required for “distinct acts” of penetrating anus or

sexual organ, but unanimity is “not required for the different means of committing a

single distinct act (e.g., penetrating the anus with the defendant’s finger, mouth, or

sexual organ)”).

B.    Whether the Jury Charge Permitted a Non-Unanimous Verdict

      Here, the indictment contained six paragraphs setting out allegations that Vale

committed aggravated sexual assault of Alex by intentionally and knowingly causing

the penetration of Alex’s anus while using or exhibiting a deadly weapon. In three

paragraphs, the grand jury alleged that Vale caused the penetration of Alex’s anus

                                          12
by placing his fingers in Alex’s anus while using or exhibiting a deadly weapon

during the course of the criminal episode. These three paragraphs then differed from

each other with respect to the deadly weapon allegedly used or exhibited: a firearm,

a boot, or a stool. The remaining three paragraphs of the indictment alleged that Vale

caused the penetration of Alex’s anus by placing an unknown object in Alex’s anus

while using or exhibiting a deadly weapon during the course of the criminal episode.

These three paragraphs again differed from each other with respect to the deadly

weapon allegedly used or exhibited: a firearm, a boot, or a stool.

      The jury charge contained application paragraphs corresponding to each

paragraph alleged in the indictment. The charge also contained six additional

application paragraphs authorizing a conviction of Vale based on Cordoba’s actions

under the law of parties. For example, the first two application paragraphs in the

charge read as follows:

      Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on
      or about the 17th day of February, 2021, in Harris County, Texas, the
      defendant, Felix Vale, did then and there unlawfully, intentionally or
      knowingly cause the penetration of the anus of A F, by placing the
      fingers of the defendant in the anus of A F, without the consent of A F,
      namely, A F had not consented and the defendant knew that A F was
      unconscious or physically unable to resist, and in the course of the same
      criminal episode, the defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon,
      namely a firearm, or
      If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or
      about the 17th day of February, 2021, in Harris County, Texas, Ariel
      Cordoba, did then and there unlawfully, intentionally or knowingly
      cause the penetration of the anus of A F, by placing [her] fingers in the

                                         13
      anus of A F, without the consent of A F, namely, A F had not consented
      and Ariel Cordoba knew that A F was unconscious or physically unable
      to resist, and in the course of the same criminal episode, Ariel Cordoba
      used or exhibited a deadly weapon, namely a firearm, and that the
      defendant, Felix Vale, with the intent to promote or assist the
      commission of the offense, if any, solicited, encouraged, directed, aided
      or attempted to aid Ariel Cordoba to commit the offense, if he did,
      or . . . .

      The charge contained ten other application paragraphs. The other application

paragraphs authorized the jury to convict Vale: (1) as a principal actor if he used his

fingers to penetrate Alex and used or exhibited a boot; (2) as a party if Cordoba used

her fingers to penetrate Alex and used or exhibited a boot; (3) as a principal actor if

he used his fingers to penetrate Alex and used or exhibited a stool; (4) as a party if

Cordoba used her fingers to penetrate Alex and used or exhibited a stool; (5) as a

principal actor if he used an unknown object to penetrate Alex and used or exhibited

a firearm; (6) as a party if Cordoba used an unknown object to penetrate Alex and

used or exhibited a firearm; (7) as a principal actor if he used an unknown object to

penetrate Alex and used or exhibited a boot; (8) as a party if Cordoba used an

unknown object to penetrate Alex and used or exhibited a boot; (9) as a principal

actor if he used an unknown object to penetrate Alex and used or exhibited a stool;

or (10) as a party if Cordoba used an unknown object to penetrate Alex and used or

exhibited a stool. The charge submitted all twelve application paragraphs in the

disjunctive.

                                          14
      We agree with the State that each of the six paragraphs in the indictment

alleged the same statutorily defined offense, albeit by a different manner and means.

Each paragraph alleged “the penetration of a single orifice” (the anus) of a single

complainant (Alex) while an aggravating factor was present (the use or exhibition

of a deadly weapon) during the same transaction. See Jourdan, 428 S.W.3d at 96.

The paragraphs differed from each other only in what was allegedly used to cause

the penetration of Alex’s anus (fingers or an unknown object) and in which deadly

weapon was allegedly used or exhibited during the course of the criminal episode (a

firearm, a boot, or a stool). The State presented evidence that only one instance of

penetration occurred in the early morning hours of February 17, 2021, although it

was unclear what object was used to cause the penetration. This was, therefore, not

a situation in which the State presented evidence that Vale committed the charged

offense of aggravated sexual assault of Alex on “multiple but separate occasions.”

See Cosio, 353 S.W.3d at 771–72 (describing different situations in which non-

unanimity can occur, including when State presents evidence that defendant

committed charged offense on multiple occasions, and stating that because “[e]ach

of the multiple incidents individually establishes a different offense or unit of

prosecution,” trial court’s charge must instruct jury that “its verdict must be

unanimous as to a single offense or unit of prosecution among those presented”).

                                         15
      We also agree with the State that the jury was not required to be unanimous

on which deadly weapon Vale used or exhibited during the sexual assault. In

Landrian, the jury charge submitted in the disjunctive two different aggravating

factors that elevated the case from assault to aggravated assault: (1) the person causes

serious bodily injury to another; or (2) uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the

commission of the assault. See 268 S.W.3d at 534. In concluding that the jury was

not required to be unanimous on the aggravating factor, the Court of Criminal

Appeals noted that the gravamen of the offense of aggravated assault “is the specific

type of assault defined in [Penal Code] Section 22.01,” such as causing bodily injury

to the complainant. See id. at 537. Aggravated assault “increases the penalty for

simple ‘bodily injury’ assault” if an aggravating factor is present. Id. at 538.

      The court concluded that “simple ‘bodily injury’ assault is punished more

severely depending upon the degree of the victim’s injury or the manner in which

the defendant committed the particular assault.” Id. The Texas Legislature had

“evinced no intent that jurors need be unanimous about which aggravating factor or

element that they find—severity of injury or manner in which the defendant caused

the injury.” Id. at 538–39. Regardless of which aggravating factor is present, “[i]t is

still the same single criminal act and still the same single bodily injury to the victim.”

Id. at 539. Thus, “[b]ecause the aggravated-assault statute defines two or more

circumstances or factors by which the defendant’s punishment for a specific criminal

                                           16
act is increased, the defendant may be convicted if each juror concludes that at least

one of the aggravating factors or elements exist.” Id.; Miranda v. State, 391 S.W.3d

302, 310 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, pet. ref’d) (“[A]ggravating factors that

transform a sexual assault into an aggravated sexual assault, such as the assailant’s

use of a deadly weapon or threatening the victim with bodily harm, are only different

methods or means of committing a single offense.”).

      Here, each of the twelve application paragraphs alleged the same aggravating

factor to elevate the offense from sexual assault to aggravated sexual assault: that

Vale (or Cordoba) used or exhibited a deadly weapon in the course of the same

criminal episode as the sexual assault. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.021(a)(2)(A)(iv).

The only difference between the application paragraphs was the deadly weapon

allegedly used or exhibited: a firearm, a boot, or a stool. The application paragraphs

do not set forth different offenses; rather, they set out different manner and means

of committing the same offense of aggravated sexual assault in which a deadly

weapon is used or exhibited. The jury was not required to be unanimous on which

deadly weapon was used or exhibited during the offense. See Miranda, 391 S.W.3d

at 311 (“[T]he jury is not required to unanimously agree about which aggravating

factor is present in an aggravated sexual assault, because the various aggravating

factors do not constitute distinct offenses.”); see also Pizzo, 235 S.W.3d at 715 (“The

unanimity requirement is not violated when the jury has the option of choosing

                                          17
between alternative modes of commission.”); Woodard v. State, 294 S.W.3d 605,

608–09 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d) (following Landrian in

aggravated robbery case and holding that “unanimity as to the aggravating factors

was not required”).

      Finally, we agree with the State that the six application paragraphs authorizing

the jury to convict Vale as a principal actor and the six application paragraphs

authorizing the jury to convict Vale under the law of parties are also alternate manner

and means of committing one charged offense of aggravated sexual assault. The law

of parties does not define the prohibited conduct that comprises a criminal offense

but instead defines “conditions by which an accused may be deemed criminally

responsible for the conduct of another that satisfies the elements or gravamen” of

the offense. Leza v. State, 351 S.W.3d 344, 357 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). When there

is evidence that the defendant is guilty of every element of the charged offense—

either as a principal actor or under a theory of party liability—but there is a question

of the defendant’s precise role in the offense, “it would be plainly absurd to require

the jury to acquit the accused unless it can unanimously determine his status as a

principal actor or a party and, if the latter, what his exact party accountability might

be.” Id.; Miranda, 391 S.W.3d at 311–12; see also Holford v. State, 177 S.W.3d 454,

462–63 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d) (noting that disjunctive

application paragraphs allowing jury to convict defendant of capital murder as

                                          18
principal actor or as party “describes a different means of committing the same act”

and court was not required to instruct jury that it must unanimously agree on manner

of complainant’s murder).

      We conclude that the twelve application paragraphs disjunctively submitted

to the jury in the charge authorized the jury to convict Vale of one offense:

aggravated sexual assault by penetration of Alex’s anus in which a deadly weapon

was used or exhibited. The different paragraphs merely set forth different means of

committing the single charged offense. See Young, 341 S.W.3d at 422 (“[T]he jury

must unanimously agree about the occurrence of a single criminal offense, but they

need not be unanimous about the specific manner and means of how that offense

was committed.”). We hold that the trial court’s jury charge did not violate Vale’s

right to a unanimous verdict.

      We overrule Vale’s sole issue.

                                    Conclusion

      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                April L. Farris
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Countiss, and Farris.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

                                           19