Court Opinion

ID: 9966256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-06 16:01:55.423872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:26:10.449871
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

    TARRON T. ADAMS,                          §
                                              §
          Defendant Below,                    § No. 398, 2023
          Appellant,                          §
                                              § Court Below: Superior Court
          v.                                  § of the State of Delaware
                                              §
    STATE OF DELAWARE,                        § Cr. ID No. 1709014557 (K)
                                              §
          Appellee.                           §
                                              §

                               Submitted: March 15, 2024
                                Decided: May 3, 2024

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices.

                                            ORDER

         After consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it appears

to the Court that:

         (1)    The defendant below-appellant, Tarron T. Adams, filed this appeal

from a Superior Court order denying his first motion for postconviction relief under

Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.1 For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the

Superior Court’s judgment.

         (2)    In September 2017, the police obtained and executed a search warrant

for the residence Adams shared with his wife. During the search, the police found

1
    State v. Adams, 2023 WL 6566923 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 2023).
cocaine, Alprazolam, and a gun. A grand jury charged Adams and his wife with

multiple drug and weapon crimes. In September 2018, a jury found Adams guilty

of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited (“PFBPP”), receiving a stolen

firearm, two counts of possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug

paraphernalia. The Superior Court sentenced Adams to fifteen years of Level V

incarceration, suspended after ten years for probation. On direct appeal, this Court

affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment.2

         (3)    In February 2020, Adams filed a motion for postconviction relief. He

also requested appointment of counsel.                  The Superior Court appointed

postconviction counsel to represent Adams.

         (4)    In February 2022, postconviction counsel advised the Superior Court

that he believed there were no meritorious postconviction claims and moved to

withdraw. The Superior Court granted the motion to withdraw and informed Adams

that he could proceed with his original postconviction motion or file an amended

motion. Adams advised that he wished to proceed with his original postconviction

motion.

         (5)    In May 2023, following submission of an affidavit from Adams’s trial

counsel and the State’s response to Adams’s motion for postconviction relief, a

Superior Court Commissioner issued a report recommending that Adams’s claims

2
    Adams v. State, 2019 WL 4410271 (Del. Sept. 13, 2019).
                                               2
be denied as procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(3) and Rule 61(i)(4). Adams filed

a motion for reconsideration. On October 9, 2023, the Superior Court denied

Adams’s motion for postconviction relief.3            The court declined to accept the

Commissioner’s recommendation that Adams’s claims were procedurally barred,

but accepted the Commissioner’s recommendation that Adams’s claims were

without merit. This appeal followed.

       (6)    We review the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for postconviction

relief for abuse of discretion.4 We review questions of law de novo.5 The procedural

requirements of Rule 61 are applied before consideration of the merits of any

underlying claims for postconviction relief.6 As the Superior Court recognized, the

procedural bars of Rule 61 do not bar a timely claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel.7 To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must

demonstrate that: (i) his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness; and (ii) but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable

probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.8 There

3
  Adams, 2023 WL 6566923, at *4.
4
  Baynum v. State, 211 A.3d 1075, 1082 (Del. 2019).
5
  Id.
6
  Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
7
  Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 748, 759 (Del. 2016).
8
  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).
                                              3
is “a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance.”9

       (7)     As he did in the Superior Court, Adams argues that he was deprived of

his right to confront the confidential informant referenced in the search warrant and

that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call his wife as a trial witness. For

the first time on appeal, Adams contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to challenge the search warrant.           He also questions his postconviction

counsel’s filing of a motion to withdraw. Adams has waived appellate review of

claims he raised below, but did not argue on appeal.10

       (8)    Rule 61(i)(4), which precludes consideration of any ground for relief

that was previously adjudicated, bars Adams’s claim that he was deprived of his

right to confront the confidential informant. Adams argued on direct appeal that he

was deprived of his right to confront the confidential informant at trial. The Court

rejected that claim, holding that Adams “was not entitled to know the identity of the

confidential informant, much less compel his presence, unless he could show the

informant could have been able to provide testimony that would materially aid his

defense” and that Adams was unable to make this showing.11 Because Adams’s

9
  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
10
   Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997); Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del.
1993). In the Superior Court, Adams argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
cross-examine State witnesses.
11
   Adams, 2019 WL 4410271, at *3.
                                               4
claim that he was deprived of his right to confront the confidential informant was

previously adjudicated, Rule 61(i)(4) bars consideration of this claim.

       (9)     Adams next contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

call his wife as a witness at trial because her testimony would have resulted in a

different verdict. During the trial the State played a recording of Adams’s post-

Miranda statement to police in which he initially said his wife bought the gun for

protection, but then said he acquired the gun from someone named Tommy Lightfoot

in Virginia. Adams’s wife was also his co-defendant and faced the same drug and

weapon charges as Adams. In his affidavit, Adams’s trial counsel stated that he

spoke to the wife’s counsel, who advised that he would not allow the wife to testify

at trial because she would incriminate herself. Trial counsel also spoke to Adams’s

wife before trial and she said she would not testify on Adams’s behalf. Given these

circumstances, the Superior Court did not err in concluding that trial counsel’s

decision not to call Adam’s wife as a witness fell “within the range of acceptable

representation.”12

       (10) Adams did not argue that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

challenge to the search warrant until this appeal so we review for plain error.13

12
  Adams, 2023 WL 6566923, at *3.
13
  Supr. Ct. R. 8. (“Only questions fairly presented to the trial court may be presented for review;
provided, however, that when the interests of justice so require, the Court may consider and
determine any question not so presented.”).

                                                5
“Under plain error review, a defendant must show a material error on the face of the

record that is basic, serious, fundamental in character, and so clearly prejudicial to

substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”14

There is no plain error here.

         (11) Adams correctly notes that the affidavit of probable cause did not

include the exact dates and times of the controlled purchases, but it is plain from the

affidavit that those purchases occurred in the days before execution of the affidavit.

In claiming that marked money was not used for the controlled purchases, he ignores

that the affidavit described the process for controlled purchases as including, among

other things, the recording of serial numbers for the money given to the informant

to purchase the drugs. And to the extent Adams suggests the drugs purchased by the

confidential informant had to be included with the affidavit of probable cause for

issuance of a search warrant, he is mistaken. Because Adams has not identified any

reasonable basis to challenge the search warrant, he has failed to show error on the

part of his trial counsel that prejudiced him. As to Adams’s questions concerning

his postconviction counsel’s filing of a motion to withdraw, postconviction counsel

may withdraw if he “considers the movant’s claim to be so lacking in merit that

counsel cannot ethically advocate it, and counsel is not aware of any other substantial

14
     Ryan v. State, 2024 WL 1673648, at *2 (Del. Apr. 18, 2024).

                                                6
ground for relief available to the movant.”15 The Superior Court did not err in

denying Adams’s motion for postconviction relief.

          NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior

Court is AFFIRMED.

                                     BY THE COURT:
                                     /s/ Karen L. Valihura
                                     Justice

15
     Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(e)(7).
                                       7