Court Opinion

ID: 9543624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:47:12.669294+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:42.943998
License: Public Domain

COFFEY, J.
(dissenting). The majority holds that sec. 102.66(1), Stats., 1975, • applies retroactively to claims barred before the effective date of the statute because the statute of limitations, sec. 102.17 (4) hadi expired. The majority does not rely on any express language in sec. 102.66(1). The majority relies on an amendment to sec. 102.17(4), which was part of the same act creating sec. 102.66(1). The amendment to sec. 102.17 (4) repealed the statute of limitations in cases of occupational disease, “except that benefits or treatment expense becoming due [after the limitation period would have expired] shall be paid from the work injury supplemental benefit fund . . . .” The majority looks to the opening words of sec. 102.66(1), “[i]n the event that there is an otherwise meritorious claim for occupational disease barred solely by the statute of limitations under s. 102.17(4) . . . .” Because there is no longer any statute of limitations for occupational disease, the majority construes the reference to sec. 102.17 (4) to mean the statute as it existed prior to amendment. Thus far, I am in accord with the majority. However, I part company when the majority says:
“A prospective application of sec. 102.66(1), Stats., would render its language relating to the barred claims under sec. 102.17 (4) meaningless since the event which triggers the department’s payment of funds, a barred claim for occupational disease, can not occur under sec. 102.17 (4), Stats. 1975. The department, therefore, would be forever precluded from directing payment to any claimant under sec. 102.66(1), Stats. 1975.” Supra, at 404.
Sec. 991.07, Stats., provides as follows:
*409“In any case when a limitation or period of time prescribed in any act which is hereby repealed for the acquiring of any right or the barring of any remedy or for any other purpose shall have begun to run and a limitation or period of time for such purpose shall be prescribed in these revised statutes, the limitation or period prescribed by these statutes shall be held to apply only to such rights or remedies as shall accrue subsequently to the time when the same shall take effect; and the act repealed shall be held to continue in force and operative to determine all such limitations and periods of time, which shall have previously begun to run, unless in special cases in these revised statutes a different rule shall be prescribed.”
A similar provision is contained in sec. 990.06, Stats. I would hold that these statutes apply even though no fixed time period is now applicable to claims for compensation because of occupational disease. I can see no difference between repealing a limitation period entirely and substituting a different period. Under secs. 991.07 and 990.06 the abolition of the limitation period for occupational disease under sec. 102.17(4), Stats. 1975, applies only to those claims accruing after the effective date of the statute. For claims which accrued prior to the effective date, the predecessor statute of limitations continues to apply, even though the limitation period has not expired. It is clear, therefore, that sec. 102.66(1) can apply to barred claims prospectively. After December 30, 1975, there was still an unexpired six-year statute of limitations in effect for some injuries, and an unexpired twelve-year statute of limitations in effect for others. The statute would not be rendered meaningless by a prospective application.
The majority rejects the state’s argument that only those claims where the period of limitation expired after the effective date of the 1975 act are included within sec. 102.66(1), stating:
*410“[T]he legislature could have included express provisions within the statute, specifying such a limited retroactive application, if that had been its intent.” Supra at 405.
There was no need for the legislature to include any express provisions. The legislature was entitled to rely on secs. 991.07 and 990.06, Stats., which specify the application the majority rejects. This is not a “limited retroactive application,” it is a prospective application because the statute is applied to events occurring after its effective date.
The majority also holds that the Worker’s Compensation Act is a remedial statute, and therefore the rule of prospective application does not apply. Sec. 102.17(4), Stats., is a statute of limitations. It is subject to the rules set forth in secs. 991.07 and 990.06, and therefore must be held to apply prospectively only. The running of the statute of limitations bars not only the remedy but also the right. The defendants recognize this well-established principle of Wisconsin law by arguing that sec. 102.66 (1) creates a new right against the state fund for supplemental benefits. The general rule is that a statute creating a new right is not to be given retroactive effect unless the intent to do so is clearly expressed. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Railroad Comm., 187 Wis. 380, 204 N.W. 612 (1925). There is no clear expression of legislative intent to have sec. 102.66(1), Stats., applied retroactively. But more importantly, sec. 102.66(1) creates a new remedy for an extinguished right, not a new right.
The claim of McKinley Cowden is based upon a set of operative facts constituting a cause of action which was barred by the running of the six-year period provided by the former sec. 102.17(4). At the time his cause of action was barred, his sole remedy was against his employer or the insurer of his employer. Sec. 102.66(1), Stats. 1975, established a new fund for payment of occupational disease claims. However, the statute clearly *411states that the facts constituting the claim are unchanged from those which supported the earlier claim: “An otherwise meritorious claim for occupational disease barred solely by the statute of limitations” but the claim, being barred by the statute of limitations cannot be revived by a legislative enactment.
In light of this court’s decision in Haase v. Sawicki, 20 Wis.2d 308, 121 N.W.2d 876 (1963), I am unable to conclude that the result obtained by the majority or the reasoning of the concurring opinion is in accord with the due process clause of either the state or federal constitutions.
McKinley Cowden’s claim against his employer accrued in 1966. The parties agree that under then existing law, his claim was extinguished in 1972 with the running of the applicable statute of limitations. The constitutional question presented by this controversy is whether the subsequent enactment of sec. 102.66(1), Stats., see Laws of 1975, ch. 147, sec. 53, should be construed to allow Cowden to reassert his previously barred claim.
As noted, it is well established in Wisconsin that the expiration of the limitations period absolutely extinguishes a claimant’s right and remedy. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Beleznay, 245 Wis. 390, 393, 14 N.W.2d 177 (1944). Once a statute of limitations has run, the legislature is without authority to revive the barred claim. See: e.g., Estate of Peterson, 66 Wis.2d 535, 225 N.W.2d 644 (1975); Heifetz v. Johnson, 61 Wis.2d 111, 115, 211 N.W.2d 834 (1973); Haase v. Sawicki, supra.
In Haase v. Sawicki, supra, the court considered the validity of an attempt to retroactively change the statute of limitations applicable to claims for wrongful death. By virtue of legislation effective in 1962, the legislature sought to alter the limitations period for all claims arising on or after July 1, 1955. Id. at 310. The plaintiff commenced an action in 1962 which, but for the statutory amendment, would have been barred some time in 1961. *412In holding- this retroactive legislation to be without effect, the court wrote:
“The legislature may not constitutionally enact retrospective laws creating new obligations with respect to past transactions. [Citations omitted.] If a statute of limitations extinguishes the right as well as the remedy, then a statute which attempts to reinstate a cause of action that has been barred is constitutionally objectionable under the foregoing rule. This is because the statute seeks to impose a new duty or obligation even though none existed when the retrospective statute was enacted.” Id. at S12.
As construed by the majority, sec. 102.66(1), Stats., allows claimants like McKinley Cowden to recover from the work injury supplemental benefit fund despite the fact that their cause of action had been extinguished by sec. 102.17(4), Stats. 1973, the applicable statute of limitations. The majority’s construction of sec. 102.66 (1), sanctions the revival of a barred claim with respect to a past transaction and therefore violates the principles articulated in Haase. It is suggested by the majority that sec. 102.66(1) is a remedial statute which creates a new obligation with respect to Cowden’s previous injury. The general rule is that, if the intent is clearly expressed, the legislature may provide for the retroactive application of new remedies. Sands, Sutherland’s Statutory Construction, §41.09 at 281 (1973). This rule, however, does not provide authority for the legislature to create a duty to remedy a wrong which by virtue of the operation of a statute of limitations, did not exist at the time the statute was enacted. As pointed out in Haase v. Sawicki, supra, such a legislative enactment violates the due process clause of the state and federal constitutions.
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Chief Justice Bruce F. Beilfuss and Mr. Justice Donald W. Steinmetz join in this dissent.