Court Opinion

ID: 9789280
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:33:13.356842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:21.253197
License: Public Domain

Justice KOURLIS
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari in People v. Grant, 30 P.3d 667 (Colo.App.2000), to interpret the waiver provision of section 19-2-511, 6 C.R.S. (2001) ("juvenile statements statute").1 Seventeen-year-old Jeron Grant spoke with police about a double homicide while his parents waited in a nearby room. Under the statute, such interview is permissible only when the juvenile and his parents expressly waive in writing the statutory requirement of parental presence. Grant's parent signed a waiver, but Grant did not. The statutory phrase "[this express waiver shall be in writ*545ing" in subsection 19-2-511(5) does not direct whether the juvenile must sign such waiver, and we therefore find it ambiguous. After resorting to the tools of statutory construction, we conclude that the legislature never intended written unsigned waivers to be conclusively ineffective. In this case, where the waiver was in writing, bore the signature of a parent, was obtained after full advisement, and was supported by ample evidence that the juvenile consented, we determine that the statutory mandate was satisfied. We therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
I. Facts
Police arrested Jeron Grant in connection with the murder of two teenage boys. Because Grant was a juvenile, the officers awaited the arrival of his parents at the police station before interviewing . him. When Grant's mother and stepfather arrived, the officers explained the reasons for Grant's arrest and requested permission to question him about the murders. They advised Grant and his parents of the juvenile's Miranda rights. On a printed "Fact Sheet," the officers filled in relevant information, pointed out the Miranda rights that were printed at the bottom, and had both Grant and his parents sign the form after they indicated their understanding.
The officers then began interviewing Grant who denied committing the murders and instead blamed the crime on an individual named "Quick." One Officer, Detective Crouch, told Grant he did not believe the story and asked Grant why he was lying. Shortly thereafter, Grant asked to speak with the officer alone. Crouch asked Grant's parents for their consent, which they gave verbally, but not in writing. The parents left the interview room and waited across the hall.
Crouch resumed the interview with Grant; however, the juvenile continued to deny his involvement. He accepted Crouch's offer to take a polygraph test. Crouch and Grant then moved into the polygraph room while Grant's parents moved into an adjoining room where they could watch. Before the polygraph started, Crouch told Grant, "You don't really want to waste my time with this [the polygraph], do you? You know I know the truth. Why don't you come clean?" At this point Grant broke down in tears and told Crouch that he was afraid of going to jail.
Crouch asked Grant if he was ready to relate what really happened, and Grant responded in the affirmative. Crouch told Grant that if he was responsible for the boys' deaths, it would be "extremely tough on [Grant] to live with." At that point, Grant admitted his previous version of events was "a lie." At Crouch's request, Grant wrote out a statement and signed it. The statement implicated Grant in the murders. During these events, Grant's parents remained in the adjoining room where they could see, but not hear. Crouch took Grant's written statement to the parents who signed it without reading its contents. The officers then led Grant back to the initial interview room where his parents joined him; the officers later transferred Grant to Zebulon Pike Juvenile Detention Center.
'At trial, the judge suppressed this statement as rendered in violation of the juvenile statements statute, see § 19-2-511, because it was taken outside the presence of Grant's parents and absent a written waiver. That decision is not at issue in this proceeding.
After the officers took Grant to the detention center, Crouch learned of changes to the juvenile statements statute that required a written waiver for interviews conducted outside the presence of a juvenile's parents. He decided to reinterview Grant, this time in compliance with the statute. Crouch had his office prepare a written waiver form, and he made arrangements for Grant and his parents to return to the station. He did not tell them the reasons for this second interview.
When Crouch arrived at the center to pick up Grant for the second interview, Grant showed the detective the business card of a public defender and told him, "I'm not supposed to talk to anyone until tomorrow." Crouch asked whether the public defender represented him; Grant responded that he did not know, but that he had "signed some-
*54648 PACIFIC REPORTER, 3d SERIES
546 Colo.
thing.”2 Crouch told Grant to “go ahead and come with us down to the [police station],” and that, “his folks would be there.” Grant complied and allegedly told the officers during the drive that he would consent to the second interview, but only if his parents were not present.
When the parties - arrived at the police station, Grant and his parents met alone in the interview room for several minutes to discuss “a family matter.” Crouch then entered and requested permission to conduct the second interview.
When Crouch received the parents’ verbal consent, he provided them with a second “Fact Sheet” containing the written Miranda warnings. He again explained those rights and had all three of them initial the appropriate space on the form to signify their understanding. Crouch then presented a form entitled “Juvenile Interview Waiver.” He asked Grant’s mother to read it, and if she agreed, to sign it. She read and signed the waiver. Grant’s stepfather initialed the form. Grant looked at the form, but was not asked to, nor did he, sign it. There was, in fact, no space on the form for his signature. At that time, however, he verbally agreed to an interview conducted outside his parents’ presence.
Crouch’s second interview with Grant lasted a few hours. At the end, Grant wrote out a statement that was substantially similar to his earlier statement but contained slightly more detail. The admissibility of this statement is at issue here.
In a written order, the trial judge denied Grant’s motion to suppress the second statement finding that it did not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment.3 In a motion to reconsider, defense counsel argued that the second statement should be suppressed based solely on the fact that Grant did not sign the waiver form and that without his signature, the document was invalid under the statute. The trial court rejected this argument finding that the waiver complied with the intent of
2. Grant had signed an "Application for Court
Appointed Counsel.”
3. The defense filed one pretrial motion to suppress both statements. After a hearing, the trial
the statute and that such waiver need not be signed by both the juvenile and the parents. A jury acquitted Grant of first-degree murder, but convicted him of accessory to murder and accessory to manslaughter.
[1] The court of appeals affirmed. The court noted that the statute requires all waivers to be “in writing,” but that it does not specify that both the parents and the juvenile must affix their signatures to such writing. The court went on to reason that a “requirement for a writing is separate and distinct from a signature requirement” in Colorado’s statutory law. Grant, 30 P.3d at 673 (citing § 2^4-401(17), 1 C.R.S. (1999) (“ ‘Written’ or ‘in writing’ includes any representation of words, letters, symbols, or figures; but this provision does not affect any law relating to signatures.”)). After listing several statutes that specifically require signatures as part of a writing, the court concluded that the juvenile statements statute contained no such requirement. Ultimately, so long as the written waiver was “attributable to the person against whom it is to be enforced,” the court ruled that such waiver was valid and, therefore, Grant’s second statement was properly admitted. Grant, 30 P.3d at 673. We review a lower court’s statutory interpretation de novo. Fogg v. Macaluso, 892 P.2d 271, 273 (Colo.1995).
II. Statutory Interpretation
[2-7] This court follows a well-worn path in interpreting our state’s statutes. “Our primary task in construing a statute is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. ... To discern that intent, a court should look first to the plain language of the statute.” Farmers Group, Inc. v. Williams, 805 P.2d 419, 422 (Colo.1991). When we determine that statutory language is ambiguous, we may look to rules of statutory construction and to the legislative history as indications of the legislature’s intent. Rodriguez v. Schutt, 914 P.2d 921, 925 (Colo.1996). We give effect both to the spirit and to the
judge granted the motion in part and denied in
part, suppressing the first statement, but refusing
to suppress the second one.
*547intent of the legislators in enacting the statute. Hall v. Walter, 969 P.2d 224, 229 (Colo.1998). "Although we must give effect to the statute's plain and ordinary meaning, the General Assembly's intent and purpose must prevail over a literalist interpretation that leads to an absurd result." Lagae v. Lackner, 996 P.2d 1281, 1284 (Colo.2000). Thus, we try to ascertain the intent of the general assembly in promulgating the juvenile statements statute and the waiver provision. When we deem the statute itself to be ambiguous, we look to statutory interpretation tools to aid us in the analysis.
Here, the statute requires that a juvenile be accompanied by a parent when making statements to the police, unless the juvenile and parent expressly waive that right. Specifically, the statute reads in relevant part:
(1) No statements or admissions of a juvenile made as a result of the custodial interrogation ... shall be admissible in. evidence against such juvenile unless a parent . was present at such interrogation....
[[Image here]]
(5) [The juvenile and his or her parent may expressly waive the requirement.... This express waiver shall be in awwriting and shall be obtained only after full advisement ... of the juvenile's rights prior to the taking of the custodial statement.... 69
§ 19-2-511, 6 C.R.S. (2001) (emphasis added). The question before this court is whether the written waiver signed by Grant's mother and initialed by his stepfather, but not signed by Grant himself, satisfies this statutory requirement. We hold that it does.
III. The Statutory Language Is Ambiguous
Of his own accord, but with the undisputed consent of his parents, Grant decided to reveal his involvement in the murders outside his parents' earshot. In 1996 the legislature amended the Children's Code to provide for precisely this situation; it added a waiver provision. See ch. 283, see. 1, § 19-2-511(5) 1996 Colo. Sess. Laws 1595, 1635-86. The new provision directs that "[this express waiver shall be in writing." § 19-2-511(5). Resorting to the plain meaning of the statutory language does not answer whether the general assembly intended "in writing" to require a signature to be effective.
On one hand, the general assembly frequently uses "in writing" in Colorado's statutes in a way that does not assume it encompasses signatures. For example, in the field of music copyrights, the legislature chose the following language: "A contract for the payment of the royalties by a proprietor to a copyright owner or society shall: (a) Be in writing; (b) Be signed by the parties." § 6-13-108(4), 2 C.R.S. (2001) (emphasis added). A statute governing forcible entry and de-tainer directs, "The demand ... shall be made in writing, specifying the grounds of the demandant's right to the possession of such premises, ... and shall be signed by the person claiming such possession." § 13-40-106, 5 CRS. (2001) (emphasis added). These are two of a multitude of examples whereby the legislature has treated "in writing" as separate and distinct from a signature requirement. Indeed, interpreting the phrase "in writing" to assume a signed doeument renders superfluous the separate "signature" language used in the above examples, an interpretation we are to avoid. See People v. Swain, 959 P.2d 426, 482 (Colo. 1998) ("[Interpretations that render statutory provisions superfluous should be avoided.").
On the other hand, Colorado statutes often contain the phrase "in writing" by itself, without accompanying "signature" language. In some of those instances, the legislature arguably intended the writings be signed. For example, section 4-2.5-309(5), 2 C.R.S. (2001), provides, "The interest of a lessor of fixtures... has priority ... if: ... (c) The encumbrancer or owner has consented in writing to the lease. . .." Surely, in this case, the "written" consent should bear the signature of the owner. Similarly, section 6-2-1118), 2 C.R.S. (2001), directs, "If any person, ... in writing and under oath, submits to the attorney general a statement setting forth facts sufficient to constitute a prima facie case of violation of .., this article...." Again, it is difficult to conceive that the legislature would require a "writing" under *548oath, but be indifferent as to whether that writing was signed.
At other times, however, a signature requirement is not necessarily implicit in instances when "in writing" appears alone. For example, in a statute governing unlawful telemarketing, the general assembly mandated, "The availability and terms of the return and refund privilege shall be disclosed to the consumer orally by telephone and in writing with any advertising or promotional material...." § 6-1-304(2), 2 C.R.S. (2001) (emphasis added). Another example appears in the UCC, section 4-2-609(1), 2 C.R.S. (2001): "When reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either party, the other may in writing demand adequate assurance of due performance...." (Emphasis added.) See also § 8-4-105(4), 3 C.R.S. (2001) ("Every employer shall at least monthly ... furnish to each employee an itemized pay statement in writing showing the following ....") (in this and following quotations, emphases have been added); § 8-4-120(1), 8 C.R.S. (2001) ("Ascertain and disclose in writing to each migratory laborer, in a language in which the migratory laborer is fluent...."); § 17-22.5-408(6), 6 C.R.S. (2001) ("[Tihe state board of parole shall ... modify the conditions of parole if cireumstances then shown to exist require such modifications, which cireumstances shall be set forth in writing, or revoke the parole and order the return of the offender to a place of confinement ...."); § 27-10.3-104(1)(b), 8 C.R.S. (2001) ("At the time of the assessment by the mental health agency, if residential services are denied, the mental health agency shall advise the family, both orally and in writing, of the appeal process available to them."). None of these examples would lead one necessarily to conclude that the writing must be signed.
The legislature's varied use of the phrase "in writing" does not unequivocally answer whether a signature must accompany such writing. Where multiple interpretations are reasonable, we may find a statute's language is ambiguous. State v. Nieto, 998 P.2d 498, 502 (Colo.2000). Accordingly, we conclude that "in writing" as used in this statute is ambiguous.
IV. Statutory Construction
Legislative history is just one of several tools available to aid our resolution of ambiguous statutory terms. $ 24-203, 1 CRS. (2001). We may also consider the "objective sought to be attained," and "[the consequences of a particular construction." Id.
The hearings in the legislative committees prior to the passage of the waiver provision at issue reveal that the provision was but a small part of a substantial overhaul of the Children's Code. Originally, the proposed amendment contained only the language, "Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, the juvenile and his or her parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian may expressly waive the requirement." Hearings on H.B. 96-1005 Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 60th General Assembly, Second Regular Session (Jan. 25, 1996). With almost no debate, the provision passed the House Judiciary Committee in that form. Id.
In the Senate's judiciary committee, the provision received somewhat more attention. Hearings on H.B. 96-1005 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 60th General Assembly, Second Regular Session (Apr. 19, 1996). One committee member, advocating for the proposed amendment, noted that juveniles are frequently uncomfortable talking about their misdeeds, especially sexual crimes, in front of their parents and that the waiver was necessary to afford them the opportunity to cooperate with police, when the juvenile, together with his or her parents, decided to do so. Id.
A representative from the Colorado Criminal Defense Bar, testifying at the hearing, convinced the Senate's committee that, as it stood, the waiver provision appeared to allow police to interrogate a juvenile first, and then later garner the parent's consent. The committee accepted the Defense Bar's recommendation that the law require a written waiver be in place prior to the custodial interrogation.4 Id.
*549This testimony suggests the "written waiver" language was an attempt to allay fears that police might undermine the waiver provision's purpose by securing the waiver only after they had already interrogated the juvenile. By ensuring the consultation with the parent took place prior to any interrogation, and with the parties' written consent to prove it, the legislature sought to safeguard juveniles from an uninformed, unprotected interrogation, while still affording them the opportunity to cooperate with police without exposing the juvenile's parents to the details of the crimes. The legislative history does not reveal any specific intent on behalf of the lawmakers to require, or not to require, a signature as part of the written waiver.
We have previously observed that the general assembly added this statute to the Children's Code to afford juveniles some shelter from the rigors of custodial interrogation. "[The purpose in enacting the [Juvenile statements] statute is to ensure that a juvenile during police interrogation is advised and counseled concerning his or her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to counsel by someone whose interests are consistent with those of the child." People v. S.M.D., 864 P.2d 1103, 1106 (Colo.1994); see also People v. Raibon, 848 P.2d 46, 50 (Colo.App.1992) ("[Llegislative purpose [of subsection (1)] is to provide to the minor an opportunity to consult with a parent or guardian before deciding whether to assert or to waive his or her Fifth Amendment rights."). The erux of the statute, then, is that the juvenile have access to an adult who will help safeguard the child's constitutional rights in a custodial interrogation context.
Based upon the cumulative intent of the statute, as reflected in its language and the legislative history, we conclude that the legislature never intended that waivers not signed by both the parent and the juvenile should be found invalid per se, thereby rendering subsequent statements inadmissible. Rather, the general assembly intended the writing to serve as evidence, physical proof that law enforcement actually afforded the juvenile an opportunity to consult with an adult before the police undertook the juvenile's interrogation. We believe the general assembly also sought to ensure that the juvenile and parent were fully aware of the scope and content of the rights they were waiving and to impress upon them the importance of those rights.
The court of appeals ruled that the written document in this case satisfied the statute because it was "attributable" to the juvenile (and his parents, assumedly). We agree with this rationale. There exist a host of circumstances, in addition to or separate from signatures, that bear on the authenticity of a written document. We hold, therefore, that although it would clearly be preferable, an express, written waiver need not necessarily be signed in order to satisfy subsection (5) of section 19-2-511 so long as the cireum-stances surrounding that waiver clearly demonstrate that the child and parent agreed to waive their statutory rights.
v. Appliéation
We turn now to the cireum-stances that may bear on the reliability of a waiver under section 19-2-511(5). Certainly, signatures by both parent and juvenile would constitute strong evidence of the written waiver's credibility. Uncontroverted testimony that the juvenile verbally consented to the waiver, or audio or videotape with the same content, along with the signature of a parent, also would support the waiver.
However, a trial court may also examine the cireumstances that purportedly gave rise to the waiver: for example, where, when, and at what stage in the proceedings the writing appeared; whether the juvenile and parent agreed to the writing simultaneously or separately; whether their consent was garnered in person; whether they were offered ample opportunity to consult; whether they did consult, privately or with the police present; whether the parties were aware that the written waiver was a statutory requirement; whether there existed any
*550evidence that signatures, if present, were coerced; and whether any other evidence supports or undermines the validity of the waiver. This is clearly not an exhaustive list, as each case will have its own particularities bearing on the credibility of the waiver at issue. The trial court should examine all relevant cireumstances bearing on the reliability of the written waiver and uphold it when appropriately supported.
We are convinced that the written waiver in this case adequately recorded the intent of Grant and his parents to relinquish their statutory right to parental presence. Here, Grant's mother and stepfather were present before the interrogation began. They had ample opportunity to consult with him, and they did so. Detective Crouch explained the Miranda rights to Grant and his parents, twice, in fact. Both Grant and his parents signed a Miranda waiver, The statement Grant made was voluntary and in full compliance with his constitutional rights. The juvenile statements statute operated precisely as designed. We acknowledge that police failed to inform Grant or his parents of the statutory written waiver provision that necessitated the second interview. However, we also consider that there is no factual question whatsoever about whether Grant sought to waive this statutory right, or whether he disputed the contents of the waiver in any respect. Indeed, he insisted upon the interview outside the presence of his parents.
VI. - Conclusion
In sum, we decline to adopt a per se signature requirement. Written waivers under section 19-2-511(5) need not necessarily be signed by both the parent(s) and the juvenile so long as the cireumstances surrounding the waiver support its reliability. We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Justice HOBBS dissents, and Justice MARTINEZ and Justice BENDER join in the dissent.

. We granted certiorari specifically on the following issue: >
Whether [Petitioner's] second incriminating statement, was taken out of his parent's presence and without a valid waiver in violation of section 19-2-511, 6 C.R.S. (2000), of the Children's Code; the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and Article II, sections 1, 18, and 25 of the Colorado Constitution.
We address only the first basis, section 19-2-511, because we previously resolved these constitutional issues in Nicholas v. People, 973 P.2d 1213 (Colo.1999).

. The committee adopted the CCDB representative's language in its entirety: "This express *549waiver shall be in writing and shall be obtained only after full advisement of the juvenile and his or her parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian of the juvenile's rights prior to the taking of the custodial statement by a law enforcement official." See § 19-2-511.

. See People v. Grant, 30 P.3d 667, 677 (Colo. App.2000) (Roy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)('However, I am concerned that the majority's opinion will, at best, dilute what I perceive to be the plain meaning of the phrase 'shall be in writing' or, at worst, render the phrase meaningless.").

. Were it necessary to reach the signature issue, I would conclude that the General Assembly intended that a police-prepared written waiver must be signed, initialed, or in some other manner, expressly adopted by both the parent and the juvenile as their own. The majority demonstrates that the General Assembly has used "in writing" in some circumstances to include the requirement of a signature and sometimes has stated a signature requirement, in addition. Maj. op. at 547. Because the legislature intended the statute here to protect the juvenile, we should - construe the statutory language in favor of requiring the juvenile's formal adoption of the document in some manner.