Court Opinion

ID: 9927068
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 05:04:26.249459+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:46.584553
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                            STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

In re Guardianship of IS.

ODETA MUCAJ,                                                        UNPUBLISHED
                                                                    January 25, 2024
               Appellant,

v                                                                   No. 367266
                                                                    Oakland Probate Court
ELISABETH DERY, Successor Guardian,                                 LC No. 2021-403561-DD

               Appellee,

and

SHALANDA C. LEGGS and HENRY SPAHIU,

               Other Parties.

Before: GLEICHER, C.J., and GARRETT and MALDONADO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        In this guardianship proceeding under the Mental Health Code (MHC), MCL 330.1001 et
seq., appellant Odeta Mucaj appeals as of right the probate court’s order removing her as a partial
coguardian of her daughter, IS. The probate court failed to comply with the procedures outlined
in the MHC for removal of a guardian, so we vacate and remand.

                                I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

        In 2007, when IS was a young child, she was injured in a car accident and suffered a
traumatic brain injury resulting in permanent disabilities requiring ongoing care into her early
adulthood. In November 2021, shortly after IS’s 18th birthday, Mucaj filed a petition seeking
appointment as IS’s plenary guardian. According to Mucaj, IS had substantial functional
limitations with self-care, mobility, economic self-sufficiency, receptive and expressive language,

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learning, and capacity for independent living. The probate court ordered an independent
evaluation of IS, as required by the MHC, MCL 330.1612(3), and appointed IS an attorney.

        Following numerous adjournments, on October 6, 2022, the parties signed a temporary
stipulated order agreeing that Mucaj and appellee, Elisabeth Dery, would serve as partial
coguardians of IS. The parties also agreed to share guardianship duties in an arrangement designed
to maximize IS’s independence. For instance, the order entitled Mucaj to make all of IS’s legal
decisions, Dery to manage IS’s finances, and IS to determine her own educational and employment
pursuits. The order also maintained IS’s current living arrangement and provided that IS and both
her parents must be consulted about her medical treatment, with any disputes resolved by Dery.
On October 17, 2022, the court entered a separate order granting Mucaj’s petition and appointing
Mucaj and Dery as partial coguardians for a term of five years. This order provided that Mucaj
and Dery had to file an acceptance of the coguardian appointment. Dery, but not Mucaj, did so.
Nonetheless, the probate court issued letters of guardianship to both individuals stating that they
were appointed and qualified to act as partial coguardians of IS.

        In December 2022, the probate court issued a notice to Mucaj stating that she was not
qualified to act as coguardian because she had not filed an acceptance of appointment. Mucaj was
then absent from the 90-day review hearing, during which both Dery and IS’s father expressed
concerns regarding Mucaj’s conduct. They alleged that Mucaj had isolated IS and barred them
from having any contact with IS. The probate court ordered Mucaj to allow IS to meet with Dery
by January 31, 2023, and that if Mucaj refused to cooperate, a modification of the guardianship
might be required.

        Before the next review hearing, IS’s appointed guardian ad litem (GAL) provided a report
to the probate court that recommended removal of Mucaj as partial coguardian. On June 13, 2023,
Mucaj was again absent from the review hearing. The GAL, Dery, and IS’s attorney complained
that Mucaj was prohibiting IS from exercising independence despite IS’s academic and personal
achievements and that Mucaj purposely thwarted the parties’ efforts to contact or meet with IS.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the probate court, on its own motion, removed Mucaj as partial
coguardian and appointed Dery as sole partial guardian. The court then issued an order modifying
the guardianship that memorialized the decisions made on the record. Mucaj moved for
reconsideration, but the probate court denied her motion. The court concluded that Mucaj was
never serving as partial coguardian because she never filed an acceptance of appointment, and this
“failure, refusal, or neglect . . . created the circumstances that resulted in her removal.”

       Mucaj now appeals.1

1
  We granted Mucaj’s motion to stay the proceedings in the probate court pending resolution of
this appeal. In re Guardianship of IS, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered
November 6, 2023 (Docket No. 367266).

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                                          II. ANALYSIS

        Mucaj advances three principal arguments on appeal. First, Mucaj argues that the probate
court erred by requiring that she file an acceptance of guardianship as a condition of her
appointment as coguardian. Second, she contends that the probate court violated the procedures
laid out in the MHC by removing her as coguardian on its own motion rather than in response to
a petition seeking such relief. Third and finally, she asserts that her right to due process was
violated because the virtual hearing during which she was removed as coguardian was conducted
in her absence while she was stuck in a Zoom waiting room.2

                     A. FILING AN ACCEPTANCE OF GUARDIANSHIP

       We begin with Mucaj’s contention that the probate court erred by requiring her to file an
acceptance of appointment of the guardianship.

        “[E]xcept in the case of minors, a guardian for a developmentally disabled person may be
made pursuant only to chapter 6 of the [MHC].” In re Geror, 286 Mich App 132, 133; 779 NW2d
316 (2009) (cleaned up). See also MCL 330.1604(2). If the court determines that a guardianship
is necessary, a partial rather than plenary guardianship is preferred. MCL 330.1602(2). The court
may appoint a partial guardian for an individual with a developmental disability who “lacks the
capacity to do some, but not all, of the tasks necessary to care for himself or herself . . . .” MCL
330.1618(4). In its order appointing a partial guardian, the court “shall define the powers and
duties of the partial guardian so as to permit the individual with a developmental disability to care
for himself or herself and his or her property commensurate with his or her ability to do so.” MCL
330.1620(1).

         Mucaj points out that the MHC, unlike the Estates and Protected Individuals Code, MCL
700.1101 et seq., contains no requirement to file an acceptance of appointment as a guardian.
Therefore, in Mucaj’s view, the probate court could not condition Mucaj’s ability to act as
coguardian on filing this document. Whether or not Mucaj is correct, the probate court issued
letters of guardianship to Mucaj despite Mucaj having never filed an acceptance of appointment.
“[A] court speaks through its written orders and judgments,” In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich
App 656, 678; 765 NW2d 44 (2009), and the letters of guardianship unambiguously stated that
Mucaj was appointed and qualified to serve as partial coguardian of IS. Even if the trial court did
not intend as much, the issuance of those letters granted Mucaj the authority to act as IS’s partial
coguardian. Under these circumstances, it is immaterial whether the trial court erred by requiring
Mucaj to file an acceptance of appointment. We therefore decline to resolve the issue on its merits.

2
  Because of our resolution of this appeal, it is unnecessary to address Mucaj’s due-process
argument.

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                       B. SUA SPONTE REMOVAL OF COGUARDIAN

        Turning to the dispositive issue, Mucaj argues that the probate court erred by removing her
as partial coguardian.

         We begin with a brief point about issue preservation. In most civil cases, Michigan follows
the “raise or waive” rule. Walters v Nadell, 481 Mich 377, 387; 751 NW2d 431 (2008). That
means the party claiming error generally must have raised the issue in the trial court to preserve it
for appeal. See Glasker-Davis v Auvenshine, 333 Mich App 222, 227; 964 NW2d 809 (2020).
Under the “raise or waive” rule, “[i]f a litigant does not raise an issue in the trial court, this Court
has no obligation to consider the issue.” Tolas Oil & Gas Exploration Co v Bach Servs & Mfg,
LLC, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 359090); slip op at 3. But
exceptions to the general rule apply. For example, a party “need not preserve an objection to ‘a
finding or decision’ made by the trial court, MCR 2.517(A)(7), or, at least under some
circumstances, to other acts or omissions undertaken sua sponte by a court.” Glasker-Davis, 333
Mich App at 227-228, citing In re Gach, 315 Mich App 83, 97; 889 NW2d 707 (2016). And even
when an issue is unpreserved, we retain discretion to “overlook preservation requirements if the
failure to consider the issue would result in manifest injustice, if consideration is necessary for a
proper determination of the case, or if the issue involves a question of law and the facts necessary
for its resolution have been presented.” Tolas Oil, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 3 (cleaned up).

        Because the probate court issued a sua sponte decision removing Mucaj as partial
coguardian, Mucaj did not have to object to this decision in order to preserve the issue for appeal.
See Glasker-Davis, 333 Mich App at 227-228; MCR 2.517(A)(7). Mucaj’s preserved challenge
to her removal implicates two different standards of review. While we review issues of statutory
interpretation de novo, we apply the more deferential abuse-of-discretion standard to a probate
court’s decision to remove a guardian. In re Conservatorship of Bittner, 312 Mich App 227, 235-
236; 879 NW2d 269 (2015). On de novo review, we “give respectful consideration, but no
deference” to the probate court’s decision, Wasik v Auto Club Ins Assoc, 341 Mich App 691, 695;
992 NW2d 332 (2022), whereas an abuse of discretion occurs “when the court’s decision falls
outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes, Bittner, 312 Mich App at 235. “A trial
court necessarily abuses it discretion when it makes an error of law.” Pirgu v United Servs Auto
Ass’n, 499 Mich 269, 274; 884 NW2d 257 (2016).

        Mucaj contends that the probate court erred in removing her as coguardian because the
court failed to comply with the MHC’s procedures for modification of a guardianship. Once a
guardian, whether partial or plenary, is appointed for a person under the MHC, the guardian may
be removed through the expiration of the term of the guardianship with no new petition being filed,
MCL 330.1626(3), or via the procedure outlined under MCL 330.1637 for modification or
discharge of a guardianship. The letters of guardianship stated that Mucaj’s term as partial
coguardian did not expire until 2027, so removal had to occur under MCL 330.1637. That statute
provides:

              (1) A guardian . . . appointed under this chapter may be discharged, or have
       his or her duties modified, when the individual’s capacity to perform the tasks
       necessary for the care of his or her person or the management of his or her estate
       have changed so as to warrant modification or discharge. The individual with a

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       developmental disability, the individual’s guardian, or any interested person on his
       or her behalf may petition the court for a discharge or modification order under
       this section.

               (2) A request under subsection (1), if made by the individual with a
       developmental disability, may be communicated to the court by any means,
       including oral communication or informal letter. Upon receipt of the
       communication the court shall appoint a suitable person who may, but need not be,
       an employee of the state, county, community mental health services program, or
       court, to prepare and file with the court a petition reflecting the communication.

               (3) The court, upon receipt of a petition filed under this section, shall
       conduct a hearing. At the hearing, the individual shall have all of the rights
       indicated in sections 615 and 617.

               (4) Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall enter a written order
       setting forth the factual basis for its findings and may do any of the following:

               (a) Dismiss the petition.

               (b) Remove the guardian and dissolve the guardianship order.

               (c) Remove the guardian and appoint a successor.

               (d) Modify the original guardianship order.

               (e) Make any other order that the court considers appropriate and in the
       interests of the individual with a developmental disability. [MCL 330.1637
       (emphasis added).]

         Given the procedures outlined by the MHC for removal and modification of a guardianship
order, the trial court abused its discretion by sua sponte removing Mucaj as coguardian without
the filing of a petition. The court had appointed a GAL and an attorney to protect IS’s interests,
and the GAL and Dery had the authority to petition the court to discharge Mucaj. See MCL
330.1637(1). Instead, the probate court removed Mucaj without the filing of a petition. While the
court was understandably frustrated with Mucaj’s alleged conduct as coguardian, the MHC did not
allow the court to remove her without the filing of a petition and a hearing.3 See MCL 330.1637(1).
Considering the sensitive interests involved in a guardianship proceeding, we decline to overlook
the enumerated removal procedures in the MHC and endorse a view of the statute that would allow

3
  MCL 300.1637(2) allows a modification request, when made by the individual with a
developmental disability, to be communicated to the court “by any means.” This subsection does
not apply to modification requests made by other interested persons, such as the GAL. Even if it
did, the subsection still requires the filing of a petition reflecting the communication. The GAL’s
report recommending removal of Mucaj therefore did not qualify as a petition for modification
under MCL 330.1637(1).

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the probate court to remove a guardian on its own initiative. Because the probate court legally
erred by sua sponte removing Mucaj, the court necessarily abused its discretion. Pirgu, 499 Mich
at 274.

         We vacate the trial court’s order modifying IS’s guardianship and removing Mucaj as
partial coguardian, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.

                                                           /s/ Kristina Robinson Garrett
                                                           /s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado

GLEICHER, C.J., did not participate.

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