Court Opinion

ID: 9676077
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:14:02.859573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:43.521536
License: Public Domain

ORDER ON REHEARING
SANDSTROM, Justice, on petition for rehearing.
[¶ 32] In his petition for rehearing, Harmon argues his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel was violated when, having previously waived his right to counsel, he again during the course of the trial requested counsel, and the trial court granted and then reversed its grant of counsel.
[¶ 33] When bringing a constitutional challenge, the appellant must bring out the “heavy artillery.” See, e.g., Adams County Record v. Greater North Dakota Ass’n, 529 N.W.2d 830, 838 n. 2 (N.D.1995). In his motion for rehearing, as well as his original appellate brief, Harmon cited, but did not discuss, two cases addressing whether a defendant may revoke his waiver of counsel, and his main argument was the trial court *645could not consider the “untenable position” in which Anseth would be placed. Harmon has cited no ease indicating this was an unconstitutional consideration; his appellate brief merely states it was a “blatant violation of Mr. Harmon’s Sixth Amendment rights_” Harmon similarly fails to cite a case indicating the trial court’s “waffling” violated his rights.
[¶34] “[A]n accused who elects to proceed pro se need not be permitted to change her mind during the trial.” 3 Joseph G. Cook, Constitutional Rights of the Accused § 9:1 (3d ed. 1996). Several courts have held it is discretionary for a trial court to allow an accused to revoke a waiver of the right to counsel during trial. See United States v. Solina, 733 F.2d 1208 (7th Cir. 1984); People v. Woods, 931 P.2d 530 (Colo. Ct.App. 1995); People v. Price, 903 P.2d 1190 (Colo.Ct. App. 1995); State v. Richards, 552 N.W.2d 197 (Minn. 1996); State v. Blankenship, 337 N.C. 543, 447 S.E.2d 727 (1997), overruled on other grounds by, State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184, 481 S.E.2d 44, 69 (1997). Harmon cites Saucier v. State, 562 So.2d 1238 (Miss.1990), as a ease supporting an absolute right to reinstatement of the right to counsel. Saucier, however, relates to waiver of the right to' counsel during police questioning. See Saucier at 1244.
[¶ 35] The Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Richards, 552 N.W.2d 197, 205 (Minn.1996), addressed “whether a criminal defendant has an absolute right to reclaim his right to counsel, having once relinquished it....” The Court first stated “standby counsel’s role is fundamentally advisory,”2 but also noted there is little caselaw directly addressing whether “standby counsel should also fill the role of ‘second chair’ counsel and be ready to step in to continue the trial should the defendant be unable or unwilling to continue his or her own defense.” Richards at 206. The Court disagreed with Richards’ contention he had an absolute right to relinquish self-representation and “return his standby counsel to ‘active duty.’” Richards at 206. The Court also noted the trial court balanced Richards’ motion “against the progress of the trial to date, the readiness of standby counsel to proceed, and the possible disruption of the proceedings.” Richards at 206-07 (emphasis added). Richards is thus similar to the facts of this case. When the trial court initially let Anseth take over, it also refused Anseth’s request for a continuance. Part of the reason the trial court reversed itself — the “untenable position” Anseth was in — was because of the denial of the continuance. As such, the trial court would not have abused its discretion had it not permitted Anseth to take over at all. When the trial court allowed Anseth to take over, it reversed itself shortly thereafter. Harmon has provided no case, and we have found none, indicating why this short time period should change the analysis.
[¶ 36] The trial court did not err by considering Anseth’s readiness and need for a continuance, and Harmon has failed to cite any cases indicating the trial court’s “waffling” deprived Harmon of his constitutional rights. The petition for rehearing is denied.
[¶ 37] VANDE WALLE, C.J., and NEUMANN, MARING and MESCHKE, JJ., concur.

. In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541 n. 46, 45 L.Ed. 2d 562 (1975) (emphasis added), the United States Supreme Court stated a court “may .... appoint a ‘standby counsel’.... ” There is, however, no right to the appointment of standby counsel. See generally 3 Joseph G. Cook, Constitutional Rights of the Accused § 9:3 (3d ed.1996) (citing numerous cases). "Participation by [standby] counsel with a pro se defendant’s express approval is, of course, constitutionally unobjectionable”! McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 182, 104 S.Ct.944, 953, 79 L.Ed. 2d 122 (1984).