Court Opinion

ID: 9679837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:10:33.560747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:21.959005
License: Public Domain

Donald L. Corbin, Justice, concurring. Because the State alleges error due to the circuit judge’s failure to recuse from the sentencing hearing based upon an appearance of impropriety, rather than an alleged error in the sentence itself, I must agree with the majority that under Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure - Criminal 3(c) this is not a proper State appeal. However, I write separately to express my concern with what has transpired in this case. There is no doubt in my mind that the ex parte communication between the circuit judge and the juror, coupled with the judge’s decision to reduce Appellant’s sentence, created an appearance of impropriety. The Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct states, in pertinent part: Canon 2. A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge’s activities. A. A judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The Commentary further explains that “[t]he test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge’s ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality, and competence is impaired.” This is not to say that any ex parte communication between a judge and a juror during the course of a trial and sentencing is per se error. It is an issue that must be examined on a case-by-case basis in order to uphold not only the judicial canons but also the integrity of the judicial system as a whole. As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Rushen v. State, 464 U.S. 114, 118-19 (1983) (per curiam) (footnotes omitted): The lower federal courts’ conclusion that an unrecorded ex parte communication between trial judge and juror can never be harmless error ignores these day-to-day realities of courtroom life and undermines society’s interest in the administration of criminal justice. This is not to say that ex parte communications between judge and juror are never of serious concern or that a federal court on habeas may never overturn a conviction for prejudice resulting from such communications. When an' ex parte communication relates to some aspect of the trial, the trial judge generally should disclose the communication to counsel for all parties. This case is such a situation where the communication was about the juror’s trepidation with the jury’s verdict and sentence, and the judge then subsequently reduced Appellant’s sentence and did away with the fine that the jury had imposed. It does not matter that there is no actual impropriety alleged, the proceedings are tainted by the appearance of impropriety. A criminal defendant is entitled to a fair and impartial trial. The State is equally entitled to a fair and impartial trial. While I am certainly aware that communications such as this may happen during the course of a trial, I do feel it necessary to remind the judges of this state that we are bound by the judicial canons to avoid the appearance of impropriety, which requires us to be proactive in protecting the integrity of the justice system. If a judge is approached by a juror to discuss any matter during the course of the trial, the practice should always be to record any communication with the juror, and to notify counsel for both parties of the situation so that they can be present, if at all possible, during the discussion. It is tantamount to the administration of justice that a judge maintain a record of all communications to avoid any appearance of impropriety as well as to avoid the possibility of having to reconstruct the record from memory. For that reason, we should always err on the side of caution.