Court Opinion

ID: 9640598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:09:17.551651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:30.919942
License: Public Domain

Dissenting by
Justice STUMBO.
Respectfully, I must dissent from Section B of the majority opinion. KRS 411.184(5), the punitive damages statute, states, “[tjhis statute is applicable to all cases in which punitive damages are sought and supersedes any and all existing statutory or judicial law insofar as such law is inconsistent with the provisions of this statute.” Appellee met the standard of KRS 411.184(5) because she sought punitive damages. By applying the plain, commonly-accepted meaning of “supersede” which according to Webster’s New International Dictionary 2295 (3d ed. 1993) is, “to be superior to,” KRS 411.184(5) is superior to any inconsistent statute.
Next, we need to consider whether Ap-pellee met the oppression requirement necessary to access punitive damages as established in Hill v. Marshall, 962 F.2d 1209 (6th Cir.1992). The court in Hill held that a person has been oppressed when one is intentionally retaliated against for exercising his or her civil rights. Appellee successfully demonstrated to the jury that she was repeatedly denied a promotion because she filed an EEO complaint and that the basis for denial was retaliatory behavior that resulted in oppression. The jury and the Court of Appeals found that Appellee was entitled to punitive damages. I agree.
Further, I concur with the Court of Appeals’ interpretation that the phrase “any other remedies,” provided in KRS 344.450, includes punitive damages.
Appellants have argued that when the General Assembly wants to provide punitive damages, it does. I agree. As provided in KRS 446.015, rules of construction direct the application of the plain, commonly-accepted meaning to the language. The statute designated by the legislature to address punitive damages is KRS 411.184(5). Additionally, by enacting a statute that clearly defines itself as being superior to any conflicting statute, the legislature has eliminated any question about which statute to apply.
I agree with the analysis and holding of the Court of Appeals in that, “If McCullough can maintain an action against Sow-ders under KRS Chapter 344, she can seek recovery of the whole panoply of damages to which she is entitled by law including punitive damages.”
I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals as to both the Department of Corrections and Warden Sowders.