Court Opinion

ID: 9960135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 16:00:55.459106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:13.070464
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-3057     Document: 010111031872       Date Filed: 04/15/2024    Page: 1
                                                                                  FILED
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           April 15, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  SABRINA S. OVERFIELD,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,
                                                             No. 23-3057
  v.                                                (D.C. No. 5:21-CV-04093-JWB)
                                                               (D. Kan.)
  STATE OF KANSAS,

        Defendant - Appellee.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, TYMKOVICH, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. **
                  _________________________________

       Sabrina Overfield appeals an order granting summary judgment to the State of

 Kansas on her Title VII hostile work environment and retaliation claims. Her claims

 arise from her work as a court reporter in Parsons, Kansas, and her interactions with

 court personnel. We agree with the district court’s conclusion that Ms. Overfield

 failed to provide evidence sufficient to show that the conduct she challenged

 occurred because of her sex. Similarly, we agree that Ms. Overfield failed to provide

       *
          This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
 its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
        **
           After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
 argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 submitted without oral argument.
Appellate Case: 23-3057    Document: 010111031872        Date Filed: 04/15/2024       Page: 2

 evidence sufficient to show that she suffered an adverse employment action after

 filing misconduct complaints with the Kansas judicial disciplinary office. Given the

 State’s well-supported motion for summary judgment, judgment as a matter of law on

 both claims was appropriate. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we

 therefore affirm.

                                      I. Background

        A. Factual History

        For purposes of this appeal, all inferences are construed in the light most

 favorable to Ms. Overfield based on the summary judgment record developed in the

 district court.

               1. Interactions with Judge Johnson

        Ms. Overfield worked as a court reporter for District Court Judge Jeffery Jack

 at the Parsons Judicial Center in Kansas. Five women typically worked in the clerk’s

 office. Besides the judges at Parsons, no male employees worked in the district

 court’s clerk’s office. In 2017, Judge Fred Johnson joined the court. According to

 Ms. Overfield, people at the Eleventh Judicial District found working with Judge

 Johnson challenging. One example is Tasha Thurman. She was hired in 2017 on the

 condition that she complete the court reporter certification program within one year.

 She did not, and Judge Johnson harshly addressed Tasha Thurman several times,

 causing her considerable distress. These reprimands led to Ms. Thurman filing a

 complaint against Judge Johnson with the Kansas Commission on Judicial Conduct

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 (KCJC). Having not completed the program, Tasha stopped working for Judge

 Johnson in 2018 and was replaced by Tammy Thomas.

       Further, Terri Thurman, Tasha Thurman’s mother and the District Court Clerk

 of the 11th Judicial District, also filed a complaint about Judge Johnson’s behavior.

 In May 2019, Judge Johnson questioned Terri Thurman about her retirement plans.

 When Terri Thurman replied that she had not set a retirement date, Judge Johnson

 harshly criticized her for previously telling him and Judge Jack that she would retire

 in July. Judge Jack—a fellow judge and Ms. Overfield’s supervisor—experienced

 similar conflicts with Judge Johnson. As Ms. Overfield testified, Judge Johnson

 would “speak to” Judge Jack and “put walls up” to Judge Jack, just like he did with

 Terri Thurman.

       After Judge Jack retired in January 2020, Ms. Overfield had a challenging

 experience with Judge Johnson. After discussing with Ms. Overfield potential

 candidates to replace Judge Jack, Judge Johnson insisted Ms. Overfield sit down and

 discuss why she would not help him in his courtroom and why Ms. Overfield had a

 problem with Tammy Thomas—his court reporter. Up until that point, and for

 reasons unknown, Ms. Overfield had been keeping notes on Ms. Thomas’s work

 activities, including instances where Judge Johnson gave her permission to travel,

 take time off, leave early, or work remotely. When Judge Johnson asked her about

 the issue, Ms. Overfield replied, “There [was] no communication” and that she

 “need[ed] to be helped,” but denied having a problem with Ms. Thomas. The

 conversation escalated, and Judge Johnson’s subsequent tone and behavior toward

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 Ms. Overfield made her uncomfortable, so she left Judge Johnson’s chambers. Ms.

 Overfield and Judge Johnson reported the incident to District Court Administrator

 Mac Young—stationed in Pittsburg—who advised them to document what happened.

       The next day, Ms. Overfield entered work and locked her office door and the

 door to the visiting judge’s chambers. Judge Johnson testified that he attempted to

 leave mail for the visiting judge in the visiting judge’s chambers. When Judge

 Johnson discovered that the door to the visiting judge’s chambers was locked, he

 knocked on the door. He then knocked on Ms. Overfield’s door, requesting her to

 unlock the doors. She did not. Judge Johnson said he would call Mr. Young and left.

 Ms. Overfield called Mr. Young, and he told her that she needed to unlock the door.

 That afternoon, Mr. Young emailed Ms. Overfield, among other things: “I am told

 that you have locked the door to the Judge’s office as well as your own. Not

 appropriate.”

                 2. Formal Complaints

       The next day, Ms. Overfield emailed Mr. Young, carbon-copying all the

 Eleventh Judicial District judges, detailing the incidents with Judge Johnson.

 Someone later submitted Ms. Overfield’s complaint to the Kansas Commission on

 Judicial Conduct (KCJC). Shortly after, Tasha and Terri Thurman also filed

 complaints against Judge Johnson with the KCJC. After reviewing the complaints,

 the KCJC concluded that human resources should handle the issues administratively

 as personnel matters. The KCJC also found insufficient information to establish that

 Judge Johnson violated judicial conduct codes.

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                3. Administrative Order No. 166: Transfer Order

          The court transferred Judge Johnson to another courthouse in January 2020.

 The chief judge entered Administrative Order No. 166:

                Beginning January 27, 2020, Hon. Fred W. Johnson (D03)
                will be sitting in Oswego for office hours and court until
                further order.

 Aplt. Br. at 13 (citing Aplt. App. at 33). Judge Johnson testified that he had no

 problems with the order because he lived in Oswego and could conveniently work

 there. He understood the order to prohibit him from conducting business in the

 Parsons courthouse and recalled coming to Parsons only to retrieve files or similar

 items.

          In January 2021, Ms. Overfield emailed Judge Lynch and Mr. Young,

 expressing her concerns about Judge Johnson’s plan to return to the Parsons

 courthouse. Ms. Overfield stated in her email that she “did not feel safe working in

 the Parsons courthouse when [Judge Johnson] would be there.” A few days later, she

 followed up with another email—this time only to Mr. Young. In this latest email,

 Ms. Overfield told Mr. Young she was “concerned” that she had not yet received a

 response from him or Judge Lynch regarding her previous email. And Ms. Overfield

 shared that she “learned through other sources” that Judge Johnson intended to work

 in the courthouse over several days. She stated that she “fe[lt] very uneasy” about

 Judge Johnson working there, as well as “not having any notification from [Mr.

 Young] or Judge Lynch or [the Office of Judicial Administration] for that matter.”

 Ms. Overfield and Terri Thurman planned to work together at Parsons, but Ms.

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 Overfield did not consider it “wise” to do so. Ms. Overfield stated that she “d[id] not

 feel comfortable” being “alone” in the office with Judge Johnson, even with another

 judge present.

              4. Administrative Order No. 175: Rescission Order

       On February 20, 2021, Judge Lynch issued Administrative Order No. 175,

 rescinding Administrative Order No. 166 and thus removing the formal

 administrative encumbrance to Judge Johnson working from Parsons. He explained

 that “in order for orderly functioning of the Court to proceed, [he] felt like it was no

 longer advisable to direct [Judge Johnson] to be in Oswego all the time.” Judge

 Lynch testified that “an arrangement” allowed Ms. Overfield and Terri Thurman to

 work remotely on days when Judge Johnson held court at the Parsons courthouse.

       In March 2021, Judge Johnson returned to the Parsons courthouse after a year-

 long absence. According to Ms. Overfield, Judge Johnson “refused to communicate

 with [her]” about monthly staff Zoom meetings and other meetings related to court

 proceedings and hearings. Although Terri Thurman “told [her]” about these meetings

 “[e]very time,” Ms. Overfield contends that Judge Johnson’s lack of communication

 affected her work performance because it was “hard to run a courthouse without

 communication with all staff.”

       Furthermore, Ms. Overfield testified that she faced challenges while working

 from home, such as using her personal phone for work, performing her tasks because

 of being away from the courthouse, and hearing issues because of the poor courtroom

 sound system.

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               5. Performance Evaluation

        By the summer of 2021, Ms. Overfield’s 2019-2020 evaluation remained

 incomplete. Mr. Young discussed this with Allyson Christman—Director of

 Personnel for the Official of Judicial Administration—and agreed he should decline

 to evaluate Ms. Overfield because he was named in Ms. Overfield’s KHRC

 complaint. Judge Lynch also declined, citing a lack of knowledge of Ms. Overfield’s

 work. Judge Lynch discussed Ms. Overfield’s evaluation with Judge Stockard—a

 new judge and Ms. Overfield’s boss—and Judge Stockard expressed concern that he

 was still too new to the bench to evaluate Ms. Overfield properly. Judge Fleming

 declined to complete the evaluation as well.

        So Mr. Young contacted Ms. Christman. She advised him that an “evaluation

 document must be completed at some point by someone . . . even if all else is simply

 marked successful.” After asking for and receiving Ms. Overfield’s consent for him

 to perform the evaluation, Mr. Young did so. Consistent with Ms. Christman’s

 advice, Mr. Young gave Ms. Overfield a successful rating in all categories. A

 “successful” rating suffices for an employee to receive a pay increase and longevity

 bonus, both of which Ms. Overfield received in 2020 and 2021 in a timely manner.

 Ms. Overfield disagreed with the successful rating and challenged the evaluation.

 Judge Fleming ultimately revised the evaluation rating from “successful” to an

 overall “beyond expectations.” The evaluation was not included in Ms. Overfield’s

 employment records. In the fall, Ms. Overfield left to work as a court reporter for

 another judicial district.

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       B. Procedural History

       Ms. Overfield sued the State of Kansas, alleging a hostile work environment

 claim based on Judge Johnson’s conduct and a retaliation claim based on Judge

 Lynch’s order rescinding Administrative Order No. 166. The State moved for

 summary judgment on both claims. The district court granted the State’s motion for

 summary judgment. This appeal followed.

                                      II. Discussion

       We review de novo an order granting summary judgment, applying the

 standard in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate

 “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A fact is

 material if, under the governing law, it could have an effect on the outcome of the

 lawsuit.” Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d 1206, 1215 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal

 quotation marks omitted). “A dispute is genuine if there is sufficient evidence so that

 a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way.” Throupe v. Univ. of

 Denver, 988 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).

 “A dispute over a material fact is genuine if a rational jury could find in favor of the

 nonmoving party on the evidence presented.” Tabor, 703 F.3d at 1215. If “the non-

 movant fails to provide sufficient evidence supporting a necessary element” of the

 claim, then “the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law” on the

 claim. Throupe, 988 F.3d at 1250.

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        While we review the record de novo, “we conduct that review from the

 perspective of the district court at the time it made its ruling, ordinarily limiting our

 review to the materials adequately brought to the attention of the district court by the

 parties.” Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 671 (10th Cir. 1998).

    A. Hostile work environment

        Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from

 discriminating against any individual with respect to her compensation, terms,

 conditions, or privileges of employment because of her sex. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

 2(a)(1). Besides prohibiting discrete acts of discrimination, Title VII has been

 interpreted to prohibit “requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or

 abusive environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). “A

 hostile work environment claim is composed of a series of separate acts that

 collectively constitute one ‘unlawful employment practice.’” Nat’l R.R. Passenger

 Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1)).

        To successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment on a sex-based hostile

 work environment claim, a plaintiff must produce evidence that establishes a genuine

 dispute of material fact as to whether: (1) the plaintiff was discriminated against

 because of sex; and (2) the discrimination was sufficiently severe or pervasive such

 that it altered the terms or conditions of the plaintiff’s employment. Throupe, 988

 F.3d at 1251.

        To show discrimination because of sex, a plaintiff need only put forth evidence

 that sex was a “motivating factor.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). To do this, a plaintiff

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  may cite evidence of abusive conduct that is “facially sex-based.” Throupe, 988 F.3d

  at 1251. Facially sex-neutral abusive conduct, by contrast, may permit an inference

  of sex-based animus when that conduct is viewed in the context of other “overtly”

  sex-based discriminatory conduct. O’Shea v. Yellow Tech. Servs., Inc., 185 F.3d

  1093, 1097 (10th Cir. 1999). “If a jury could reasonably infer the conduct was

  related to the plaintiff’s sex, then it is for the fact finder to decide whether such an

  inference should be drawn.” Throupe, 988 F.3d at 1251 (cleaned up). In either case,

  summary judgment is appropriate if the plaintiff fails to provide evidence sufficient

  to support an inference about the defendant’s sex-related motives. See id.

                1. Discrimination against the plaintiff because of sex

         Ms. Overfield contends that a jury could find that Judge Johnson “treats men

  and women differently in the workplace.” Aplt. Br. at 24 (quoting Harsco Corp. v.

  Renner, 475 F.3d 1179, 1186 (10th Cir. 2007)). She cites evidence that Tasha

  Thurman and Terri Thurman experienced abusive conduct from Judge Johnson. See

  Aplt. Br. at 24 (citing Aplt. App. at 215-226). In addition to those concededly sex-

  neutral incidents, Ms. Overfield cites her declaration, where she asserts that: (1) she

  “observed Judge Johnson interact with male employees in the workplace” and that

  Judge Johnson “always treated [those] male employees with respect;” (2) she “never

  observed Judge Johnson treat any male employee in the same harassing and abusive

  manner which he treated [her], Terri Thurman, and Tasha Thurman;” (3) and there is

  “no evidence in the record that Judge Johnson treated any male employee in a

  harassing and abusive manner.” Aplt. Br. at 7 (citing Aplt. App. at 208). Ms.

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  Overfield argues that, from this evidence, a jury could infer that sex was a motivating

  factor in Judge Johnson’s conduct toward her. See Reply at 5.

        We disagree. We conclude that Ms. Overfield has not provided evidence

  sufficient to permit a jury to infer sex-based motivations from exclusively sex-neutral

  actions for three reasons.

        First, Ms. Overfield provided no evidence that the male employees she

  referred to were similarly situated to her. A plaintiff establishing “discriminatory

  animus” with evidence of differential treatment “bears the burden of showing that the

  comparison is legally relevant”—that is, that the employees are “similarly situated.”

  Hysten v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 296 F.3d 1177, 1182 (10th Cir. 2002).

  Similarly situated employees share a supervisor, must follow the same standards, and

  must engage in comparable conduct. See McGowan v. City of Eufala, 472 F.3d 736,

  745 (10th Cir. 2006).

        Here, Ms. Overfield’s declaration asserts that Judge Johnson engaged in

  abusive conduct towards three specified female employees and did not engage in

  such conduct towards an unspecified group of male employees. An initial issue is

  that Ms. Overfield did not dispute that no male employees worked in the clerk’s

  office where she was employed. See Aple. Br. at 5 (citing Aplt. App. at 121). But

  more to the point: Ms. Overfield’s claims lack factual support. She fails to identify

  any male employees, provide specific examples of their treatment, or demonstrate

  how they were otherwise similarly situated to her. Thus, her assertions about

  dissimilar treatment are “conclusory.” See, e.g., Bird v. W. Valley City, 832 F.3d

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  1188, 1206 (10th Cir. 2016) (assertion that “some of the men don’t work as hard but

  never get in trouble for it” is a conclusory statement unsupported by any examples).

  We may not “presume” that Ms. Overfield’s assertions embrace the “specific facts”

  necessary to oppose a well-supported motion for summary judgment. Lujan v. Nat’l

  Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990). And without those specific facts, “the jury

  is not entitled to draw an inference of discrimination” from Ms. Overfield’s evidence

  purporting to show differential treatment. Riggs v. AirTran Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d

  1108, 1117 (10th Cir. 2007).

        The summary judgment record confirms this result. Besides judges, two male

  employees are part of the equation: Mac Young and Shaun Higgins. It is undisputed

  that Mr. Young was a “Court Administrator”—a title different than Ms.

  Overfield’s—who was “stationed in Pittsburg”—a different district than Ms.

  Overfield. Aplt. App. at 144; see Lowe v. Angelo’s Italian Foods, Inc., 87 F.3d 1170,

  1175 (10th Cir. 1996) (explaining that equivocal evidence of job descriptions failed

  to establish employees were similarly situated for comparative purposes). Mr.

  Higgins is closer to the mark—he, like Ms. Overfield, worked as a court reporter.

  But Mr. Higgins was also stationed in Pittsburg, see Aplt. App. at 121, and only

  “cover[ed]” at Parsons when the courthouse “needed coverage on jury trials.” Aplt.

  App. at 159. See Glapion v. Castro, 646 F. App’x 668, 671 (10th Cir. 2016)

  (concluding that a male employee stationed in a different region cannot be deemed

  similarly situated and thus was ineligible to serve as a comparator in a sex-based

  hostile work environment claim). In any event, the record contains no evidence that

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  either interacted with Judge Johnson at similar frequencies or under the same

  circumstances as Ms. Overfield.

        Second, Ms. Overfield neither provided circumstantial evidence linking sex-

  neutral actions to sex-based bias nor disputed non-discriminatory reasons for sex-

  neutral actions, precluding a jury from inferring discrimination. In other words, Ms.

  Overfield’s evidence fails to permit an inference that “an overall animus and pattern

  of sexual discrimination and harassment” existed. Delsa Brooke Sanderson v. Wyo.

  Highway Patrol, 976 F.3d 1164, 1174 (10th Cir. 2020) (emphasis added). The

  undisputed evidence shows that the incident between Judge Johnson and Ms.

  Overfield happened because Judge Johnson wanted to discuss cooperation issues

  between Tammy Thomas (his court reporter) and Ms. Overfield. See Aplt. Br. at 5-6

  (citing Aplt. App. at 171-72). But isolated incidents, Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524

  U.S. 775, 788 (1998), and personality conflicts “cannot supply a basis” for a

  reasonable jury to infer discrimination. Parker v. Hous. Auth. of Kansas City, Kan.,

  996 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1993). And Judge Johnson’s decision to defend his court

  reporter in this context is insufficient to infer discriminatory animus. See Aramburu

  v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1406 n.4 (10th Cir. 1997) (“An employer’s . . .

  favorable treatment of protected employees does not support an inference of

  discriminatory animus.”).

        The same goes for Ms. Overfield’s evidence about Tasha Thurman and Terri

  Thurman’s experiences with Judge Johnson. See Aplt. Br. at 24 (citing Aplt. App. at

  215-226). There is no dispute Judge Johnson argued with Terri Thurman about her

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  retirement. Id. at 4-5 (citing Aplt. App. at 223-24, 253). Again, a single sex-neutral

  “isolated incident” does not permit an inference of discriminatory animus. As for

  Tasha Thurman, Ms. Overfield did not explain how—viewed individually or

  integrated contextually—Tasha Thurman’s year with Judge Johnson implies sex-

  based animus. Regardless, the undisputed facts compel a more anodyne explanation

  and preclude an inference of animus. We have recognized “actual performance” as a

  “legitimate basis” for differential treatment. Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 305

  F.3d 1210, 1218 (10th Cir. 2002). The record reveals two similarly situated

  employees: Tasha Thurman and Tammy Thomas. Ms. Overfield did not allege that

  Judge Johnson treated Tammy Thomas—Judge Johnson’s court reporter after Tasha

  Thurman—similarly. Nor did she dispute the State’s contention that he did not.

  Aple. Br. at 14. And this “differential treatment” is “explained by a

  nondiscriminatory motive” since the undisputed evidence also shows that Judge

  Johnson was upset over Tasha Thurman’s job performance. Swackhammer v.

  Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 493 F.3d 1160, 1168 (10th Cir. 2007). There is no dispute

  that Tasha Thurman was hired on the condition that she complete the court reporter

  certification program within one year of her start date; there is no dispute that Tasha

  Thurman made little progress toward achieving the certification and ultimately did

  not do so. Aplt. Br. at 3 (citing Aplt. App. at 93, 136). Indeed, Ms. Overfield

  testified that she heard Judge Johnson telling Tasha Thurman that she needed to do a

  “better job” and asking her about her progress with her certification. Aplt. App. at

  255. The district court correctly determined that “Judge Johnson was upset with

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  [Tasha Thurman] for not completing her court reporter certification” and was

  “critical of her work.” Aplt. App. at 265. Like the district court, we do not condone

  yelling at staff in the workplace. But Title VII does not protect an employee from

  reprimands for disappointing progress or poor work performance without evidence

  suggesting that the employee’s sex played a role in those reprimands. See Gross v.

  Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1545–46 (10th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing

  between general work-related criticism and sex-specific abusive conduct in the

  workplace). None exists here.

        Resisting this conclusion, Ms. Overfield cites two more incidents as evidence

  of a sex-based hostile environment, each stemming from her initial incident with

  Judge Johnson: (1) “Mr. Young reprimanded her verbally and in writing on January

  13, 2020” following an incident where she locked Judge Johnson’s door; and (2) Mr.

  Young “gave her an untimely annual performance” that “result[ed] in a lower rating

  than her previous evaluations. Aplt. Br. at 26. (citing Aplt. App. at 76, 81, 157-158).

  Relying on Chavez v. New Mexico, she argues that “these acts of retaliation” show

  sex-based hostility. Aplt. Br. at 30 (citing Chavez, 397 F.3d at 835).

        We have no evidentiary basis to consider these assertions. “Unsupported

  conclusory allegations do not create a genuine dispute of fact.” Annett v. Univ. of

  Kansas, 371 F.3d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir. 2004). Ms. Overfield does not dispute that

  Mr. Young criticized her because locking the visiting judge’s door was “not

  appropriate.” And no reasonable jury could infer sex-based hostility from Mr. Young

  actions in any event. Chavez, 397 F.3d at 837. Considering that Ms. Overfield has

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  not provided sufficient evidence from which to infer sex-related motivations from

  Judge Johnson’s sex-neutral conduct, it would be a “far greater inferential leap” to

  impute whatever (unsubstantiated) motive Judge Johnson may have had to Mr.

  Young’s “facially neutral conduct[.]” Id. (cautioning against imputing sex-based

  motives from one individual’s sex-neutral conduct to another’s actions, especially

  when the latter’s conduct responds to a complaint unrelated to sex discrimination).

  Nor did Overfield argue—much less provide evidence—that any harm resulted from

  Mr. Young’s email. Indeed, Ms. Overfield did not receive a reprimand for locking

  the door, and the incident was not mentioned in her evaluations. Aplt. App. at 258.

  Consequently, no evidence supports Ms. Overfield’s assertion that Mr. Young’s

  criticism was retaliatory or motivated by sex-based animus.

        Similarly, no evidence supports Ms. Overfield’s assertion that the “successful”

  rating she received from Mr. Young was lower than previous evaluations. We have

  declined to assume that a lower evaluation was “a negative evaluation” simply

  because an employee alleges receiving “an evaluation lower than previous

  evaluations.” Stover v. Martinez, 382 F.3d 1064, 1075 (10th Cir. 2004). That said,

  no one disputes that Mr. Young considered a “successful” rating a good evaluation.

  According to the State’s policy, Ms. Overfield’s “successful” rating made her eligible

  for a pay increase and longevity bonus. See Aple. Br. at 8 (citing Supp. App. at 10,

  12; Aplt. App at 76). And Ms. Overfield does not dispute that she received a pay

  increase and longevity bonus. Consequently, Ms. Overfield has neither provided

  evidence to support her assertion that the rating she received was a lower rating, nor

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  provided evidence to dispute the State’s well-supported contentions that the rating

  she received was a good evaluation. See, e.g., Meredith v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 18

  F.3d 890, 896 (10th Cir. 1994) (alleging that an evaluation was negative is

  insufficient without evidence disputing the company’s characterization as

  ‘satisfactory,’ information about implications, and evidence of detrimental

  consequences). 1 Besides, Ms. Overfield challenged the evaluation, and Judge

  Fleming revised the rating to “beyond expectations.” See Somoza v. Univ. of Denver,

  513 F.3d 1206, 1214 (10th Cir. 2008) (considering an employee’s pursuit of a remedy

  despite allegedly retaliatory actions). All told, even when viewing the facts and

  inferences in her favor, Ms. Overfield has not provided evidence sufficient to show

  that the nature of her working environment supports an inference of discrimination

  because of her sex. See Stahl v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 19 F.3d 533, 538 (10th Cir.

  1994) (“If the nature of an employee’s environment, however unpleasant, is not due

  to her gender, she has not been the victim of sex discrimination as a result of that

  environment.”).

        Third, the undisputed facts show that Judge Johnson treated male colleagues

  similarly. Though not necessarily fatal to a plaintiff’s claim, we have recognized that

  evidence showing that an employee of the opposite sex faced similar adverse

  1
    The undisputed evidence shows that the evaluation was untimely because, among
  other things, Judge Stockard—Ms. Overfield’s boss—expressed doubts about his
  ability to evaluate Ms. Overfield properly and Mr. Young was named in her
  complaint to KHRC. Ms. Overfield has provided no evidence to justify cross-
  examination or otherwise warrant a trial.
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  treatment to the plaintiff “may undermine” the plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim.

  Strickland v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 555 F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir. 2009). Here,

  not only did Ms. Overfield fail to address the State’s assertion that Judge Jack

  “experienced communication difficulties with Judge Johnson and was treated in like

  manner” as Terri Thurman, Aple. Br. at 2 (citing Aplt. App. at 124), but she affirmed

  that Judge Jack “experience[d] the same problems” with Judge Johnson that Terri

  Thurman experienced. Aplt. App. at 124 (emphasis added). Ms. Overfield also

  affirmed that Judge Johnson “spoke to” and “put walls up with” Judge Jack as he did

  with Terri Thurman. Id. Indeed, Ms. Overfield characterized the “conflicts that Terri

  had with Judge Johnson” as “[t]he communication that [Judge Johnson] had with

  everyone.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Aple. Br. at 1 (citing Aplt. App. at 122-23)

  (“Judge Johnson didn’t want to work with anybody in the courthouse—not just

  women.”). Even if fellow judges are not similarly situated employees for these

  purposes, the same reasoning undermines the conclusion that Judge Johnson “treated

  men and women differently in the workplace,” and bolsters the conclusion that Judge

  Johnson had personality conflicts with co-workers, both male and female. 2

  2
    To be clear, we have cautioned that “an employer is not immunized from liability
  simply because some males received detriments before or contemporaneously with a
  Title VII plaintiff or because other protected classes received benefits instead of a
  Title VII plaintiff.” Pitre v. W. Elec. Co., 843 F.2d 1262, 1272–73 (10th Cir. 1988)
  (showing that male employees were also demoted does not necessarily preclude Title
  VII violation).

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         In sum, under our Title VII precedents, Ms. Overfield did not provide evidence

  sufficient to support an inference of discrimination from her evidence of isolated,

  sex-neutral incidents. Consequently, Ms. Overfield failed to provide sufficient

  evidence that she was subject to discrimination because of sex. Accordingly, the

  district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the State on Ms.

  Overfield’s Title VII hostile workplace environment claim. 3

      B. Retaliation.

         Title VII also prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who

  oppose unlawful employment practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). To

  successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff

  must establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether: (1) she engaged in

  protected opposition to discrimination; (2) a reasonable employee would have found

  the challenged action materially adverse; and (3) a causal connection existed between

  the protected activity and the materially adverse action. Daniels v. United Parcel

  Serv., Inc., 701 F.3d 620, 638 (10th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).

         Ms. Overfield argues that her January 2021 email to Judge Lynch and Mr.

  Young expressing concerns about Judge Johnson’s return constituted protected

  3
    We also agree with the district court that, under our Title VII precedents, Ms.
  Overfield did not provide any evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find
  that the conduct at issue was severe or pervasive. Aplt. App. at 266 (citing Morris v.
  City of Colorado Springs, 666 F.3d 654, 665–68 (10th Cir. 2012)).

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  opposition to discrimination. See Aplt. Br. at 29. 4 Ms. Overfield also argues that the

  rescission of Judge Johnson’s transfer, ordered by Judge Lynch, constituted an

  adverse employment action against her because: (1) she worked from home on days

  Judge Johnson worked at Parsons, which substantially interfered with her work

  performance; and (2) Judge Johnson engaged in conduct that substantially interfered

  with her work performance. See Aplt. Br. at 30–31. Assuming—without deciding—

  that the only identified basis for Ms. Overfield’s retaliation claim constituted

  protected opposition, we assess whether a reasonable employee would find the

  rescission order materially adverse. 5

  4
    The State concedes that Ms. Overfield’s formal complaints are protected
  opposition, but disputes that her January 2021 email to Judge Lynch and Mr. Young
  qualifies as such. Aple. Br. at 22. The district court concluded that Ms. Overfield
  “failed to preserve” a retaliation claim relying on the January 2021 email as protected
  activity. Aplt. App. at 268 n. 15. Still, in assessing Ms. Overfield’s retaliation claim,
  the district court concluded that the January 2021 email “d[id] not constitute
  protected activity.” Aplt. App. at 268 n. 15. We do not address the matter because
  Ms. Overfield’s retaliation claim fails at the material adversity step.
  5
    The State’s argument that Ms. Overfield’s retaliation claim fails because the
  rescission order was “not . . . an employment action directed” at her is misplaced.
  See Argo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc., 452 F.3d 1193, 1202 n.2 (10th
  Cir. 2006) (noting that the Supreme Court rejected an adverse employment action
  requirement). To prevail on a Title VII retaliation claim, a plaintiff need only show
  that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially
  adverse. Id. Thus, the “challenged action” here is the rescission order. Aplt. Br. at
  30–31. Accordingly, the question is whether Ms. Overfield presented sufficient
  evidence to permit a jury to conclude that a reasonable employee would have found
  the rescission order materially adverse. As we explain, the answer is no.
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               1. Material Adversity

                      a. Work-from-home setup

        At the outset, Ms. Overfield’s evidence cannot show sufficient adversity

  required to sustain a retaliation claim, even assuming remote work could be

  construed as a detriment on these facts. Under our Title VII precedents, the

  “voluntary nature” of Ms. Overfield’s unofficial work-from-home accommodation—

  set up between her and Judge Lynch—negates “any material adversity” that a

  mandatory official action might have presented. Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 555

  F.3d 1182, 1187 (10th Cir. 2009). See also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524

  U.S. 742, 762 (1998) (“A tangible employment decision requires an official act of the

  enterprise, a company act.”); Hillig v. Rumsfeld, 381 F.3d 1028, 1037 n.5 (10th Cir.

  2004) (noting that we have applied the “tangible employment action” definition to

  describe an “adverse employment action”).

        For example, in Semsroth, the plaintiff claimed that she suffered a materially

  adverse action in retaliation for her past opposition to sex discrimination by being

  subjected to a fitness-for-duty exam without cause. The facts, however, showed that

  her supervisors only “informed her that the Department’s psychologists would be

  made available to her without charge if she wished, but the choice was hers; she was

  not required to undergo any testing or treatment in connection with her request for

  light-duty assignment.” Id. (emphasis added). When the plaintiff voluntarily met

  with the psychologist, the doctor administered a fitness-for-duty exam—indeed, an

  exam that her supervisor requested. But the plaintiff did not terminate the

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  appointment upon learning about this fitness-for-duty exam. We concluded that the

  fact the plaintiff “chose” to visit the doctor and, after learning it would involve a

  fitness-for-duty exam, “continue[d] that visit” entitled the City of Wichita to

  summary judgment on the materially adverse action issue “regardless of whether any

  of their supervisors may have acted from a retaliatory motive.” Semsroth, 555 F.3d

  at 1187.

        That logic applies here. Once Judge Lynch rescinded the transfer order, Ms.

  Overfield had the option, but not the obligation, to work remotely when Judge

  Johnson was in Court at Parsons. See Supp. App. at 25 (discussing work-from-home

  arrangement). Ms. Overfield did not dispute this or provide evidence to the contrary.

  See also Aplt. App. at 209 (“After February 20, 2021, I was allowed to work

  remotely on any days Judge Johnson held court in the Parsons courthouse.”)

  (emphasis added). No evidence supports classifying the work-from-home

  accommodation as an official act or concluding that Ms. Overfield was “required” to

  work from home. Semsroth, 555 F.3d at 1187. Accordingly, the district court

  correctly determined that Ms. Overfield worked remotely “by choice.” Aplt. App. at

  269. Since working remotely was Ms. Overfield’s voluntary decision, which negates

  “any material adversity” regardless of “retaliatory motive,” summary judgment was

  thus appropriate. Semsroth, 555 F.3d at 1187.

        On appeal, Ms. Overfield argues that Judge Lynch’s order constitutes

  retaliation because she “worked remotely on any days Judge Johnson held court in

  the Parsons courthouse.” This argument overlooks two important points. To begin

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  with, the material adversity inquiry focuses on the allegedly “retaliatory action”

  taken and “not the underlying discrimination” opposed. Id. at 1184. Equally

  important, the undisputed evidence establishes that Ms. Overfield was “not required”

  to work from home and instead “chose” to do so. Id. at 1187.

                      b. Challenges working from home

        Even if her work-from-home accommodation could be viewed as involuntary

  or the State’s official act, Ms. Overfield provided insufficient evidence to show

  material adversity under Title VII’s antiretaliation provision. “The antiretaliation

  provision protects an individual not from all retaliation, but from retaliation that

  produces an injury or harm.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S.

  53, 67 (2006). So “a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have

  found the challenged action materially adverse.” Id. An action is materially adverse

  “if the action ‘might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting

  a charge of discrimination.’” Kincaid v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas City,

  Kansas, 94 F.4th 936, 945 (10th Cir. 2024) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.

  Co., 548 U.S. at 68)). This is an “objective” inquiry, “not based on a plaintiff’s

  personal feelings.” Daniels, 701 F.3d at 638 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the

  critical evidentiary question is whether the record contains “objective evidence of

  material disadvantage” or “merely the bald personal preferences of the plaintiff.”

  Semsroth, 555 F.3d at 1185. “If only the latter, the retaliation claim fails.” Id.

        Ms. Overfield contends that a jury could conclude that a reasonable employee

  would have found Judge Lynch’s rescission order materially adverse. See Reply at

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  8. 6 Although she concedes that she was “allowed” to work remotely, she argues that

  working from home was materially adverse. Aplt. Br. at 15 (“[W]orking remotely

  substantially interfered with Ms. Overfield’s work performance.”). In support, she

  cites testimony detailing difficulties she encountered working from home, including

  using her personal phone to communicate with pro-se litigants and issues fulfilling

  her court reporter duties because of the poor sound quality and challenges with

  hearing. Aplt. Br. at 15–16, 31 (citing Aplt. App. at 209).

        Ms. Overfield provided insufficient evidence to show that a reasonable

  employee would find the rescission order materially adverse. To be sure, whether the

  challenges Ms. Overfield described substantially interfered with her ability to do her

  6
    The State contends that “the ‘unreasonably interferes with work performance’
  inquiry applies to hostile work environment claims, not retaliation.” Aple. Br. at 24.
  We have previously recognized that harassment that “create[s] a hostile work
  environment” may “itself constitute[] a materially adverse action.” See McGowan v.
  City of Eufala, 472 F.3d 736, 743 (10th Cir. 2006). A charitable reading of the
  record on appeal shows that Ms. Overfield did not “adequately argue” this theory
  before the district court, Kincaid, 94 F.4th at 944, presenting “merely a claim of
  retaliation.” Daniels, 701 F.3d at 640. So, she is “barred” from advancing on appeal
  a retaliation claim based on a hostile work environment. Id. (citing Hicks v. Gates
  Rubber Co., 928 F.2d 966, 970 (10th Cir. 1991)). So we analyze Ms. Overfield’s
  claim as a pure retaliation claim.

  Even if Ms. Overfield adequately argued this theory before the district court, she did
  not successfully oppose summary judgment. As the State correctly points out, Ms.
  Overfield did not provide any evidence that Judge Lynch (1) “orchestrated” Judge
  Johnson’s conduct or (2) “knew” about it and effectively “condoned” it. McGowan,
  472 F.3d at 743. See Aple. Br. at 24 (stating that Judge Lynch had “nothing to do”
  with Judge Johnson’s conduct and that Ms. Overfield “doesn’t allege informing
  him.”).

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  job is “probative” of whether those challenges were “serious enough” to constitute

  material adversity. See, e.g., Daniels, 701 F.3d at 640 (citing Williams v. W.D.

  Sports, N.M., Inc., 497 F.3d 1079, 1087 (10th Cir. 2007)). But subjective perceptions

  of adversity, without objective evidence of material disadvantage, are insufficient to

  show material adversity. See id. at 638 (“[T]he inquiry is an objective one, and not

  based on a plaintiff’s personal feelings”); Ford v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 45

  F.4th 1202, 1222–1223 (10th Cir. 2022) (personal beliefs without objective evidence

  of material disadvantage insufficient to create an issue of material fact) (citation

  omitted). Ms. Overfield’s testimony in her declaration and deposition shows the

  difficulties she encountered. But while both her declaration and deposition testimony

  describe challenges, neither provides objective evidence of any material

  disadvantage—much less substantial interference. Consequently, no objective basis

  supports concluding that a reasonable employee would find the rescission order

  materially adverse. See, e.g., Ford, 45 F.4th at 1223 (citing only deposition

  testimony without any other supporting evidence insufficient to show adverse

  employment action); Wheeler v. BNSF Ry. Co., 418 F. App’x 738, 751 (10th Cir.

  2011) (similar). Accordingly, her claim fails. Semsroth, 555 F.3d at 1185.

        The uncontroverted evidence compels this conclusion. Ms. Overfield does not

  dispute that, because of the pandemic, she had already been “work[ing] remotely 2-3

  days a week,” which saved her “a 35-mile commute.” Aple. Br. at 8–9 (citing Aplt.

  App. at 120, 161). Nor does she dispute the State’s assertion that the Eleventh

  District scheduled other employees to work from home because of the pandemic. Id.;

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  cf. Somoza v. Univ. of Denver, 513 F.3d 1206, 1218 (10th Cir. 2008) (no disparate

  treatment where duties voluntarily undertaken without evidence showing significant

  consequences or unequal treatment). Indeed she does not dispute that she was “at

  times already scheduled to work remotely when Judge Johnson was coming to

  Parsons.” Aple. Br. at 9 (citing Aplt. App. at 153). Although the State asserted that

  Ms. Overfield did not even “request[] a work phone,” Aple. Br. at 9, Ms. Overfield

  did not dispute the State’s assertion or explain why she did not request a work phone.

  See, e.g., McGowan v. City of Eufala, 472 F.3d 736, 743 (10th Cir. 2006) (observing

  no evidence suggesting that plaintiff requested shift change and concluding that

  failure to reassign shift was not materially adverse). In sum, no objective evidence

  supports concluding that remote work’s impact on Ms. Overfield’s performance was

  anything more than a minor inconvenience—if not “self-imposed.” Aple. Br. at 17.

  See Semsroth, 555 F.3d at 1187 (voluntary undertakings negate material adversity). 7

                      c. Judge Johnson’s conduct

        The same rationale applies to Ms. Overfield’s contention that a jury could

  conclude that a reasonable employee would have found Judge Lynch’s rescission

  order materially adverse, Reply at 8, because “Judge Johnson’s conduct substantially

  interfered with Ms. Overfield’s work performance.” Aplt. Br. at 16. In support, she

  7
     Relevant also is that Ms. Overfield continued to perform her job satisfactorily.
  See, e.g., Johnson v. Weld Cnty., Colo., 594 F.3d 1202, 1216 n.5 (10th Cir. 2010)
  (noting plaintiff’s strong performance rating, despite negative experiences after filing
  a discrimination claim, to bolster conclusion that plaintiff failed to show challenged
  conduct was materially adverse and would dissuade a reasonable employee from
  filing or supporting discrimination claims).
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  cites her testimony that Judge Johnson “refused to communicate” with her about

  “monthly staff Zoom meetings and numerous other meetings concerning the court

  proceedings and hearings. Aplt. Br. at 16, 31, (citing Aplt. App. at 209). The State

  argues these contentions are conclusory and do not show material adversity.

        We agree. While regrettable, the passive behavior Ms. Overfield challenges is

  insufficient to show material adversity. See Johnson, 594 F.3d at 1216 (concluding

  that “cold shoulder” and general avoidance from supervisors are insufficient to show

  material adversity). Ms. Overfield needed to show that Judge Johnson’s conduct rose

  above a petty slight, minor annoyance, or a simple lack of good manners. See

  McGowan, 472 F.3d at 742.

        Yet Ms. Overfield stated only that running a courthouse without

  communication with all staff is hard. That may be true, but without “objective

  evidence of material disadvantage” resulting from Judge Johnson’s poor

  communication, Ford, 45 F.4th at 1222, or “evidence suggesting an objective

  advantage” to having Judge Johnson communicate better, Semsroth, 555 F.3d at

  1185, Ms. Overfield’s statement amounts only to an “undefined subjective

  preference.” McGowan, 472 F.3d at 743. Consequently, Ms. Overfield provided

  only evidence of mere personal preferences, which are insufficient to support a

  conclusion of material adversity. Daniels, 701 F.3d at 638. Accordingly, her

  retaliation claim fails. Semsroth, 555 F.3d at 1185. 8

  8
   In any event, Ms. Overfield did not dispute that Terri Thurman informed her of the
  meetings “[e]very time.” Aple. Br. at 9 (citing Aplt. App. at 153). See, e.g., Daniels,
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        In sum, under our Title VII precedents, Ms. Overfield did not provide evidence

  sufficient to permit a jury to find that a reasonable employee would have found the

  rescission order materially adverse. Thus, a jury could not find that the rescission

  order would dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of

  discrimination. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary

  judgment in favor of the State on Ms. Overfield’s retaliation claim.

                                     III. Conclusion

        We AFFIRM the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor

  of the State on Ms. Overfield’s hostile work environment and retaliation claims.

                                              Entered for the Court

                                              Timothy M. Tymkovich
                                              Circuit Judge

  701 F.3d at 639–40 (rejecting contention that decreased communications, while
  perceived as professionally isolating, were materially adverse considering evidence
  of plaintiff’s sustained satisfactory performance); Wheeler, 418 F. App’x at 749
  (concluding that receiving work assignments from a co-worker, rather than a
  supervisor, absent other objective evidence of any material impact, cannot alone
  support a jury finding of material adversity).
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