Court Opinion

ID: 9414817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 17:00:40.08108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:07.132892
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                 ___________

                                       No. 22-3257
                                       __________

                                  TYRONE K. WHITE,
                                             Appellant

                                             v.

        TINA PAGOTTO, CEO; BETHESDA PROJECT INC; KE SMITH, PHA
             Representative; PHILADELPHIA HOUSING AUTHORITY
                    ____________________________________

                     On Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
                         (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-03668)
                       District Judge: Honorable Chad F. Kenney
                      ____________________________________

                    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
                                    June 27, 2023

               Before: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

                              (Opinion filed August 2, 2023)
                                      ___________

                                        OPINION*
                                       ___________

*
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
PER CURIAM

       Appellant Tyrone White appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing

his amended complaint for failure to comply with the pleading requirements of Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b).

For the following reasons, we will affirm.

       In 2022, White filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1981,

the Rehabilitation Act, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, alleging that he

suffered discrimination and retaliation related to his participation in a subsidized housing

program managed by Bethesda Project, Inc. After granting White leave to proceed in

forma pauperis, the District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a clear basis

for a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and it granted White leave to file an amended complaint. White filed

a “Statement of Claim,” which the District Court construed as an amended complaint. In

that pleading, White argued that Bethesda Project, Inc. violated his equal protection

rights by treating him differently from other similarly situated residents of various races

who received different case management services related to their social security or

housing benefits. The District Court explained that White had failed to present a “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required

by Rule 8 and had also failed to state a claim. This time, it dismissed the complaint with

prejudice. White now appeals.

                                             2
       We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for abuse of

discretion the District Court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to comply with the

requirements of Rule 8, see Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 91 (3d Cir. 2019),

and exercise plenary review over the dismissal for failure to state a claim, see Allah v.

Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).1

       Whether Rule 8’s “short and plain statement” requirement is satisfied “is a

context-dependent exercise.” W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d

85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010). “Fundamentally, Rule 8 requires that a complaint provide fair

notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Garrett, 938 F.3d at 92

(cleaned up). In assessing whether a complaint complies with Rule 8, we “are more

forgiving of pro se litigants for filing relatively unorganized or somewhat lengthy

complaints.” Id. Meanwhile, as we have explained to White in affirming the dismissal of

similar claims he has raised in the past, to survive dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), “a

complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, taken as true, to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” White v. Barbe, 767 F. App’x 332, 334 (3d Cir. 2019)

(per curiam) (alteration omitted) (quoting Fleisher v. Standard Ins., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d

1
  To the extent that White’s appellate filings contain new arguments not raised in the
District Court, we decline to consider them. See In re Reliant Energy Channelview LP,
594 F.3d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that “we will not consider new claims for
the first time on appeal”).

                                              3
Cir. 2012)); see also White v. Bethesda Project Inc., 672 F. App’x 218, 219 (3d Cir.

2017) (per curiam).

       We conclude that the District Court did not err here. First, while White’s amended

complaint listed a single defendant, it did not identify specific actions taken by the

defendant in regard to his claims, nor did it present cognizable legal claims to which the

defendant could respond on the merits. See Garrett, 938 F.3d at 93–94. Given how

vague White’s pleading is, it is entirely unclear what actions the defendant took or what

harm, if any, occurred as a result.

       Relatedly, we agree with the District Court that White failed to state a claim for

relief. He sought to proceed under § 1983, but made no allegations showing that the

named defendant, Bethesda Project, Inc., is a state actor. And even more fundamentally,

while White asserted an equal-protection claim, he failed to allege that the defendants

took any specific racially motivated actions or that any similarly situated people were

treated differently from him. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d

Cir. 2008) (explaining that a complainant’s factual allegations must be enough to raise a

right to relief above the speculative level).2

2
  In his initial complaint, White also alleged that the defendants discriminated against him
on the basis of a perceived disability (despite that he was not disabled). We agree with
the District Court’s conclusion that White failed to state plausible equal protection or
disability discrimination claims because his allegations were conclusory and unsupported
by clear facts.

                                                 4
      In sum, despite being given multiple opportunities to do so,3 White failed to

comply with Rule 8 or state a plausible claim for relief. Accordingly, we will affirm the

District Court’s judgment.

3
  The District Court also did not abuse its discretion by dismissing White’s action with
prejudice. After White’s initial complaint was dismissed for failing to indicate specific
and cognizable allegations, he was given the opportunity to submit an amended
complaint. However, the amended complaint was even more conclusory and vague than
its predecessor. We agree that it would be futile to allow him to file another amended
complaint. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247,
251 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that a district court must offer amendment when dismissing
for failure to state a claim “unless doing so would be inequitable or futile”).
                                              5