Court Opinion

ID: 9481553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:22:38.16851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:23.830394
License: Public Domain

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I believe that the innovative but ultimately deficient procedure used to accept Marx’s guilty plea here fails to meet constitutional standards. In addition, the government fell significantly short in carrying out its commitments under the plea agreement with respect to the return of the cows. I therefore respectfully dissent.
I.
It is a crucial constitutional requirement that, for a waiver of right to trial to be valid, a defendant’s plea must be knowing and voluntary. Haase v. United States, 800 F.2d 123, 127 (7th Cir.1986). The majority correctly points out that the district *1255judge here did not follow the prescriptions of Rule 11 in taking the plea. It is also true that fidelity to Rule 11 is not the issue on a collateral attack, such as this one. Nonetheless, because the change of plea proceeding did not include a recitation of the elements of the crime and because the offer of proof terminated very prematurely, I would vacate the plea and permit Marx to plead anew.
We have always treated procedures for acceptance of pleas as absolutely vital to ensuring that the plea is voluntary, knowing and intelligent. The standard we employ does not turn merely on the probability that Marx understood his plea. Rather, the record must support a reasonable belief that Marx knew the contours of the law and understood the relationship between his actions and the legal standards. United States v. Frye, 738 F.2d 196, 199 (7th Cir.1984) (defendant “must understand not only the nature of the charge against him or her, but also that his or her conduct actually falls within the charge”); Nevarez-Diaz v. United States, 870 F.2d 417, 420-21 (7th Cir.1989).
The record certainly does not support the conclusion that Marx had an understanding of the CCE offense. The majority’s reliance on inferences from certain surrounding circumstances — Marx’s education, the familiarity with the offense Marx arguably gained during the pre-trial period and the motions directed to the counts which Marx now alleges that he does not understand— involves only the most indirect clues that Marx had an understanding of either the elements of the CCE offense or of the offenses in his background that support the CCE conviction. The majority also points out that the Assistant U.S. Attorney and the judge actually recited the elements of the offense, albeit in a distressingly interrupted and halting manner. The entire extent of this recitation, while Marx held a copy of the plea proceedings in his hands, is as follows:
Q [Judge]: As to count twenty-four, commencing at the bottom of page eight and running over to the top of page nine, are you satisfied that those are the elements that you and your attorney discussed in connection with the proof that would be required of the government in this case before you could be found guilty?
A [Marx]: Yes, I am, your Honor.
Mr. Wagner [Assistant U.S. Attorney]: Your Honor, in connection with the second, just so the record is complete, the elements of count twenty-four, the CCE offense, really the first element is contained at the bottom of page eight, which is, there is at least three violations. That is then explained over paragraph nine, and paragraph ten.
Mr. Glynn [Marx’s Attorney]: Page nine and ten.
Mr. Wagner: Page nine and ten. And on page eleven are the final three elements of the CCE offense, that is paragraphs B, C, and D, violations were continuing series of violations, they were in concert with five people and substantial resources. Just for the sake of the record.
Change of Plea Tr. at 18-19.
As a recitation of the elements of the offense these quoted comments are strikingly deficient. In addition, the Assistant U.S. Attorney, in his earlier description of the offense, verbally outlined only a general description of the CCE charge. Tr. at 15-16. And as the quoted excerpt shows, the court did not provide an adequate, on-the-record recitation of the elements of the crime.
The Supreme Court has stated that a court may not, merely through the defendant’s representations about his offense, conclude that he understands the nature of the offense. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 1629, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977). That the defendant has read the plea agreement or has signed a statement of the facts is not enough to show that the plea is voluntary. United States v. Bernal, 861 F.2d 434, 436-37 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 203, 107 L.Ed.2d 156 (1989). The demonstration of knowledge and of voluntariness must be on the record and it must be clear. A defendant’s discussion with his attorney, which the court in part relied upon here, is *1256generally insufficient. United States v. Ray, 828 F.2d 399, 406, 410 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 964, 108 S.Ct. 1233, 99 L.Ed.2d 432 (1988).
The complexity of the offense is also an important determinant of the thoroughness demanded of the judge; a guilty plea to CCE — a highly complex criminal statute— certainly requires more than reference to a written summary. Nowhere in the transcript is there a clear and thorough description of the CCE elements. Perhaps the description in the copy of the plea agreement that Marx had before him was accurate. Perhaps he understood the elements correctly. Perhaps Marx’s attorney explained the elements adequately. But the court’s obligation is to ensure that any uncertainties are eliminated — on the record.
In addition, the district court’s method of accepting the government’s offer of proof fails, in my mind, to meet constitutional standards. The proof was likely to be long — fifty-some pages — and so the judge accepted the suggestion of Marx’s attorney that the formal presentation of the proof be eliminated because Marx and his attorney largely agreed with its contents. The judge then asked Marx whether he understood the contents of the offer, and Marx responded that he did. This procedure does not ensure that Marx in fact understood the offer, and Rule 11, though not directly applicable here, rejects this approach. Marx acknowledged that he had listened to his lawyer and read the offer of proof. But there is no indication that the judge satisfied himself that Marx understood fully the contents of the offer.
The majority holds the failure of the court to follow traditional plea-taking procedures harmless because Marx purportedly understood the charges against him. The “totality of the circumstances” test is flexible, and when employed, a strong presumption must still be given to what is in the record. Here, in my mind, neither the transcript alone nor the totality of the circumstances adequately supports a finding of voluntariness. Consistent with McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 472, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1174, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969),1 Marx should have the opportunity to plead anew.
II.
Nor is the return of the cows a simply trivial matter. From the briefs and the district court’s ruling, it appears that twenty-one cows were in issue. The majority now deduces from circumstantial evidence in the record that only two cows are actually at stake. The picture constructed by the majority has required a fair amount of detective work that I think inappropriate when the government makes no such claims for itself. The district court, ruling on Marx’s section 2255 motion to vacate sentence, does not mention the number of cattle. Decision and Order (Jan. 20, 1989), at 2-7 (Appellant’s App. at 29-34). Nonetheless, even if only two cows are at stake, I would vacate this plea because of the government’s inexplicable failure to abide by the terms of the agreement.
The consideration surrendered by a defendant in entering a plea agreement is no less than his right to a trial and, often, his freedom. Plea agreements must be interpreted strictly. With respect to the transfer of the cows, the district court held that “upon” meant “sometime after.” The majority, not dealing with this point, instead concludes that the government’s delay in returning the two (twenty-one?) cows was justified because the government first had to resolve conflicting lienholders’ claims to the cattle under Section VII of the agreement. This procedure, the majority claims, is compelled because the twenty-one head of cattle are mentioned not only in Section VIII(B)’s promise from the government to return the cattle but are also listed in At*1257tachment C’s schedule of assets to be forfeited.
Section VII appears to govern disposition of the property listed in Section VIII. But this procedure cannot possibly include all of Section VIII. It is true that Section VII clearly governs the property list in Section VIII(A), which references Schedule C’s list of cattle. However, Section VII(B) provides:
It is further agreed and understood by the parties to this agreement that in accordance with the terms of this agreement the court shall order the disposal by the United States Marshal Service and under the auspices of the court, all of the assets and properties described in Attachment C of this agreement by sale or any other commercially feasible means, and shall further order that the proceeds derived from the sale or other commercially feasible disposal of the assets and properties described in Attachment C of this agreement be distributed in accordance with the order and sequence of distribution set forth below in section VIII of this agreement, making due provisions to protect the interest of the United States and third parties.
Plea Agreement at 19-20 (emphasis in original). Yet Section VIII(B) clearly commands return of the cows and not cash from their sale. I therefore conclude that Section VIII(B) must be read independently of the lien-clearing provisions of Section VII. These cows were to be returned upon sentencing (immediately or, at least, promptly) — not after determining how to protect lienholders under 21 U.S.C. § 853(a), and certainly not, under the totality of Section VII, upon their sale.
I also find the majority’s reasoning unconvincing because it appears to compel the conclusion that the government should have satisfied the outstanding obligations on the cows before their return. The majority justifies late delivery of the cows because of the government’s obligation under 21 U.S.C. § 853(a), as incorporated in Section VII. This rests on Section VII(B)’s mention of Attachment C, which includes livestock from Maple Tree Farms. Yet when Attachment C assets are again mentioned in Section VIII(A), the majority prefers not to make the cows eligible for the lien-clearing procedure. A more consistent interpretation is that Section VIII(B)’s reference to the cows — in Attachment F — is distinct from both the hindrance of Section VII’s delay and the lien clearance provision of Section VIII(A).
The defendant has shown why the prompt return of the cows was of moment to him and to his daughters. It was treated as a substantial term of the plea bargain. It should certainly not be our job to speculate and search the record for excuses for the government’s non-compliance with the agreement.

. McCarthy involved application of Rule 11, and the addition of Rule 11(h) in 1983 narrowed the holding’s scope. Rule 11(h) states "[a]ny variance from the procedures required by this rule which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” Because Marx’s rights to trial and to understand completely the charges to which he pleaded are substantial, his situation is not susceptible of "harmless error” analysis.