Court Opinion

ID: 6419446
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-06-25 11:58:38.215152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:51:43.288699
License: Public Domain

Colt, J.
This action proceeds upon the ground that the defendant failed to discharge a legal duty which she owed the plaintiff, resulting in the injury complained of. The question is whether the evidence relied on by the plaintiff would justify a verdict in favor of the child; and, in the opinion of a majority of the court, it would not.
It appears that the defendant was originally employed only as a midwife. The parents had employed her twice before in that capacity. There was no competent evidence that the treatment of diseases of the eyes which might be developed in the child was embraced in the duties which the defendant undertook as midwife; and there was no evidence that the defendant was an skilful or negligent in the performance of any of the duties with which she was properly chargeable in that capacity.
But it is insisted that, independently of the employment as midwife, the jury upon this evidence might properly find that the defendant, professing to have superior skill and experience, held herself out as competent to cure this particular disease, and thereupon was permitted by the mother to assume the treatment of it. The evidence on which it is sought to charge the defendant with this additional duty is found in the testimony of the mother; and that testimony must be construed with reference to the character and relation of the parties, and the admitted facts in the case.- The services of the defendant in respect to the cure of this disease were wholly gratuitous; they were performed as acts of benevolence only. The defendant was a midwife; the jury would not be justified in finding that she claimed to possess, or might reasonably be expected from her calling to have, the peculiar knowledge, skill, and experience of an expert in such mat* *20ters. The representations of the defendant, that she could cure the child with simple remedies and washes, that she had cured other children in the same way, who were similarly afflicted, and that there was no need of a doctor, were but the expression of an opinion as to the efficacy of her remedies, and did not imply that she undertook to use that higher skill of the medical profession which is required in the treatment of the more com plicated and delicate organs. The question was whether she had discharged the duty which she assumed with that skill which she professed to have, and with that diligence which might reasonably have been expected of her. Upon that question, the fact that the service was rendered without compensation must have an important, if not decisive, bearing. It is often said, that a gratuitous agent is liable for gross negligence only; but without regard to degrees of negligence, it is plain that the duty imposed upon such an agent is less stringent than when the service undertaken is founded upon a consideration paid. Under the rule requiring ordinary care as applied to this case, we see no evidence of neglect in any degree. A physician must apply the skill and learning which belong to his profession; but a person who, without special qualifications, volunteers to attend the sick, can at most be only required to exercise the skill and diligence usually bestowed by persons of like qualifications under like circumstances. To hold otherwise would be to charge responsibility in damages upon all who make mistakes in the performance of kindly offices for the sick. Gill v. Middleton, 105 Mass. 477, 479. Leighton v. Sargent, 11 Foster, 119. Simonds v. Henry, 39 Maine, 155. Lanphier v. Phipos, 8 C. & P. 475. Hancke v. Hooper, 7 C. & P. 81.
The defendant was attentive and diligent in her treatment of the child, and in the use of the remedies she proposed. There was evidence, it is true, from regular physicians, that, if other and more powerful remedies had been seasonably applied, they would probably have effected a cure; but these were remedies known to the medical profession, of which the defendant neither had nor professed to have knowledge. It was not a case where the defendant, as in the cases cited by the plaintiff, assumed to act as a regular surgeon or a regular practitioner. Ruddock v. Lowe, 4 F. & F. 519. Jones v. Fay, 4 F. & F. 525.
*21The question put by the plaintiff to Mrs. Higgins was properly excluded. The knowledge which the witness had of the duties which the defendant usually took upon herself in the general course of her business as midwife was immaterial. There was no evidence that she was employed to do more than was com manly required of midwives, or that she undertook or volunteered tc da more, except in the way previously considered.

Exceptions overruled.