Court Opinion

ID: 9792433
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:29:17.216938+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:42.828659
License: Public Domain

STERNBERG, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent because in my view the Industrial Commission erred in applying the limitation on benefits found in the vocational rehabilitation article, § 8-49-101(4), C.R.S.1973, to the major medical benefits provided under § 8-66-101 et seq., C.R.S. 1973.
At the time of this claim the Major Medical Insurance Fund Act did not contain any maximum limit for benefits. After claimant’s injury, that Act was amended to limit the combined benefits from both acts to 52 weeks. See Colo.Sess.Laws 1981, ch. 82, § 8-66-102(1) at 467. There is no indication, however, that benefits were intended to be limited prior to that time.
I would hold that because the General Assembly had not provided any limit in Article 66 for major medical benefits, there is none. Had the General Assembly intended a limitation, it would have provided one, and we err in inserting one by judicial fiat. See Tompkins v. DeLeon, 197 Colo. 569, 595 P.2d 242 (1979). Moreover, to do so is to run contrary to the liberal construction with which workmen’s compensation laws are to be interpreted. See University of Denver v. Industrial Commission, 138 Colo. 505, 335 P.2d 292 (1959).
As a matter of statutory interpretation, I believe it is wrong to read into the Major Medical Insurance Fund Act any limitation on benefits contained in the vocational rehabilitation statute prior to the pertinent 1981 amendment. By its terms, the purpose of the Major Medical Insurance Fund is to defray expenses for vocational rehabilitation which are in excess of those provided under the Workmen’s Compensation’ Act. The only reference to the Workmen’s Compensation Act contained in the Major Medical Insurance Fund Act requires that employees establish their entitlement to benefits under the Act. The amount of benefits was not linked until both acts were amended in 1981.
The fact that the General Assembly amended the Major Medical Insurance Fund Act in 1981, should lead to application of the rule of statutory construction that when the legislature enacts an amendment, there is a presumption that it is changing the meaning of the original act. As stated in Ridge Erection Co. v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 37 Colo.App. 477, 549 P.2d 408 (1976):
“When a statute is amended, it is presumed that the legislature intended the statute to have a meaning different from that accorded to it before the amendment.”
It was also explained in Ridge, supra, that the statute was amended “to supply some want and to correct some deficiency in the existing legislation.” See also 1A Suther*1100land, Statutes & Statutory Construction § 22.30 (rev. 4th ed. C. Sands) wherein it is stated:
“Not only is this presumption of change used in construing the provisions of the amendatory act, but it is frequently resorted to in litigation arising after the amendment to determine rights accrued under the original act. Thus, it is presumed that the provisions added by amendment were not included in the original act.”
This presumption of change here is strengthened by a review of the circumstances surrounding the amendment of the statute. The record in this case indicates that on January 9, 1979, in the ease of Widener v. Exeter Service Co., W.C. No. 2-929-617 MM, the Industrial Commission entered an order in which it held that the 52 week limitation of the Workmen’s Compensation Act did not apply under the Major Medical Insurance Fund Act. It was shortly after this decision that the General Assembly enacted the 1981 amendment. See Colo.Sess.Laws 1981, ch. 82 at 467. The action of the General Assembly in amending the statute in the face of this interpretation by the Industrial Commission lends further credence to the conclusion that the General Assembly intended to change the meaning of the statute as it previously existed.
For these reasons, I would set aside the order of the Industrial Commission denying benefits under the Major Medical Insurance Fund Act and remand with directions to award the extended benefits.