Court Opinion

ID: 9776560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:39:04.642915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:39.779153
License: Public Domain

BURGESS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority holds, as a matter of law, the injuries suffered by Monica LeLeaux did not arise out of the operation or use of a motor vehicle. I disagree. I believe, in this case, there are fact issues to be determined.
The majority cites Hopkins v. Spring Independent School District, 736 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.1987); Naranjo v. Southwest Independent School District, 777 S.W.2d 190 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1989, writ denied); and Estate of Garza v. McAllen Independent School District, 613 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.), but not Mount Pleasant Independent School District v. Lindburg, 766 S.W.2d 208 (Tex.1989).
Hopkins, supra, involved a child who suffered seizures while riding a school bus. Garza, supra, involved the death of a student who was stabbed while riding a school bus. Both of these cases stand for the proposition that the section 101.051 exception to immunity does not apply when the injuries are not a proximate result of the use or operation of a bus, but the bus only provides the setting for the injury. Nar-anjo, supra, is just not related. A carburetor accident in an auto mechanics class is worlds apart from a student being injured while using the rear door of a bus.
Mount Pleasant, supra, is the more persuasive analysis. In that case, a child was killed, by a motorist, after she had gotten off a bus and the bus had departed before the child had crossed the road. The supreme court held the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the case. They did so, not as a matter of law, but because no issue was requested or submitted to the jury concerning whether the death of the child was proximately caused by the operation or use of the bus and because the evidence did not show, as a matter of law, that the death was caused by the operation or use of a motor vehicle, thus an essential element of the cause of action was waived. Id. 766 S.W.2d at 211, 212. The case is controlling because it recognizes that the question of “operation and use” may be a fact question.
In this case, the bus was being used for transportation. There was competent summary judgment evidence that (1) the bus driver had been instructed not to allow students to use the rear door as an entrance or exit, (2) the bus driver had not told the students they could not use the rear door, and (3) the bus driver was aware the students were using the rear door and told the students they could use the rear door, but to be careful. In my opinion, this raised a genuine issue of material fact and thus precluded summary judgment. Therefore, I would reverse and remand. Since the majority affirms, I respectfully dissent.