Court Opinion

ID: 9891624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-19 08:10:53.173587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:40.599637
License: Public Domain

In The
                             Court of Appeals
                    Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                  No. 07-22-00364-CR

                      SEAN MICHAEL GRAVELLE, APPELLANT

                                           V.

                         THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

                          On Appeal from the 316th District Court
                                Hutchinson County, Texas
               Trial Court No. 12913, Honorable James M. Mosley, Presiding

                                  October 13, 2023
                             MEMORANDUM OPINION
                    Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ.

      Sean Michael Gravelle appeals his conviction for the third-degree offense of

possessing between one and four grams of methamphetamine and the ensuing 50-year

sentence levied. On appeal, he argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to

suppress and claims the sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate to the gravity

of the offense. We affirm.
       Background

       Appellant was stopped just after 10:30 p.m., upon then Deputy Edwards’s

observation of his driving his vehicle without lights. That lead to Edwards’s and a local

police officer’s giving chase due to the traffic violation. As they did, appellant activated

his lights “shortly after” Edwards “activated [his] lights.”

       When the officers made contact, appellant seemed “agitated,” and they smelled

the odor of marijuana. An ensuing search of the vehicle yielded methamphetamine, the

possession of which resulted in appellant’s arrest. Prior to trial, appellant moved to

suppress the contraband, arguing that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him.

The trial court denied the motion then and again prior to trial.

       Issue One—Motion to Suppress

       Appellant initially argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress.

Allegedly, Deputy Edwards’s reason for stopping him was “pretext and not supported by

the facts, testimony, or evidence.” We overrule the issue.

       The applicable standard for review is one of abused discretion. Marcopoulos v.

State, 538 S.W.3d 596, 600 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). It obligates us to view the evidence

in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, afford almost complete deference to

a trial court’s express or implied findings of historical fact, and consider de novo the

application of the law to those facts. Id.; Callaway v. State, 546 S.W.3d 899, 908-09 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo 2018, pet. ref’d).

       Next, the relevant standard and applicable law concerning the existence of

reasonable suspicion is explained in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20

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L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968) and Abney v. State, 394 S.W.3d 542, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

We apply them here.

       Appellant first cites alleged contradictions in Edwards’s testimony and a video as

proof he violated no traffic law, i.e., drove at night without lights activated. The video in

question did not capture the scene as Edwards first saw appellant. That being so, it did

not establish that appellant’s lights were on when Edwards first saw the vehicle.

       As for contradictions in Edwards’s testimony, the trial court, as trier of fact, was

free to believe his testimony that the vehicle’s lights were off upon first spying appellant

and the latter activated them after the deputy engaged his emergency lights. And, footage

from a body camera capturing appellant saying: 1) his lights were on “right now” and 2)

“ok” when told by Edwards that they were off earlier, tends to confirm Edwards’s

statement, or so the trial court could have interpreted the comments. Highlighting that

the lights were on “now” suggests they were not before, as does appellant’s

acknowledgement of “ok” when told they were off earlier.

       Given the foregoing testimony and evidence, we cannot say that the trial court’s

ruling fell outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. The record contains evidence

permitting the trial court to conclude that a traffic violation occurred which created

reasonable suspicion, if not probable cause, to detain appellant. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE

§ 547.302(a)(1) (stating that a “vehicle shall display each lighted lamp and illuminating

device required by this chapter to be on the vehicle . . . at nighttime”). Thus, the ruling

was not an instance of abused discretion or error.

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       Issue Two—Disproportionality of Sentence to Gravity of Offense

       By his second issue, appellant contends his sentence of 50 years of imprisonment

is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense for which he was convicted,

thereby constituting cruel and unusual punishment. We overrule the issue.

       Texas courts have “traditionally held that, as long as punishment is assessed

within the range set by the Legislature in a valid statute, the punishment is not excessive.”

Romero v. State, No. 07-15-00036-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 12176, at *4-5 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo Nov. 30, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

Nonetheless, they do “recognize that a prohibition against grossly disproportionate

sentences survives under the federal constitution apart from any consideration whether

the punishment assessed is within the statute’s range.” Id.

       In “determining the proportionality of a sentence, [we are] guided by the following

objective criteria: (1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty, (2) the

sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, and (3) the sentences

imposed for the commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.” Id. at *4-5.

Furthermore, legislative decisions regarding the extent of punishment for an offense

should be accorded substantial deference. Id. That said, we turn to the record before

us.

       The 50-year sentence levied at bar fell within the statutory range set by the

legislature for a third-degree felony enhanced by two prior felony convictions. TEX. PENAL

CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (specifying the range as life or from 25 to 99 years). So too was it

much less than the maximum to which he could have been sentenced. And, though

appellant may minimize the gravity of his current third-degree felony offense by

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characterizing as small the amount of methamphetamine possessed, it was not the only

criminal conviction before the trial court. The latter heard of his prior convictions for 1)

burglary, 2) forgery, 3) theft, 4) unauthorized use of a vehicle 5) twice assaulting a public

servant, 6) possessing marijuana, 7) evading arrest, 8) twice driving while intoxicated, 9)

criminal trespass, and 10) assault involving family violence. As we said in Hutto v. State,

No. 07-17-00088-CR, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 8353 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 11, 2018,

pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication), a repeat offender’s sentence is

based not only on his most recent offense but also on his general propensity to commit

criminal acts as demonstrated through his prior convictions and sentences. Id. at *8. The

multiple convictions we mention certainly provided the trial court fodder to conclude that

appellant had a high propensity to criminally offend. Nor was the trial court obligated to

ignore the increasing gravity of the drug problem in our society.

       Admittedly, appellant cited us to two cases wherein the defendant was assessed

a lesser sentence for committing the same crime. Neither involved a disproportionality

challenge, though. On the other hand, a 99-year sentence assessed against a habitual

offender (like appellant) for possessing between one to four grams of a controlled

substance (like appellant) withstood a disproportionality attack in Winkfield v. State, No.

11-10-00305-CR, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 7844, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Sept. 13,

2012, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Again, appellant’s sentence

was half that of Winkfield’s. Id. at *3.

       As for appellant’s citation of statutes in New Mexico, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and

Louisiana, those States may afford a lesser punishment for a like crime. Yet, appellant

did not commit his offense in them, but rather in Texas. And, to reiterate, we afford the

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legislature substantial deference in selecting the range of punishment. We opt not to

impugn our legislature for taking a stronger stance against criminal activity than the

legislatures of neighboring States.

       Our consideration of the foregoing indicia leads us to the following conclusion.

This is not one of those “exceedingly rare or extreme case[s]” in which the punishment

will be found grossly disproportionate. State v. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d 318, 322-23 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2016) (noting the rarity in finding sentences unconstitutionally disproportionate

to the crime).

       Having overruled each issue, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                        Brian Quinn
                                                        Chief Justice

Do not publish.

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