Court Opinion

ID: 9743364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:31:47.583129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:40.790983
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE RARICK, dissenting: I dissent. In my view, defendant did not make simultaneous demands for trial, and the trial court correctly granted defendant’s motion to dismiss on the basis that the speedy trial term had run. The majority’s conclusion that a demand for speedy trial is automatically made by section 103 — 5(a) is premised on the fact that, under section 103 — 5(a), a defendant is not required to make a demand for speedy trial in order to initiate the running of the 120-day speedy trial term. This conclusion, in my view, does not logically flow from the premise. The majority expresses concern for the difficulty faced by a prosecutor who must prepare more than one case for trial against a defendant who, by being held in custody on one charge and having filed a demand for speedy trial on another charge for which he is released on bond, seeks to force the prosecutor to prepare both cases within a short time. It is clear to me that there is a statutory solution to this situation. The prosecutor can simply move to revoke the defendant’s bond, a procedure which the prosecution inexplicably overlooked in this case. One of the statutory conditions of defendant’s bond was that he not violate any criminal statute of any jurisdiction. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 110 — 10(a)(4).) His arrest on the new unrelated drug charge was clearly a violation of this condition, and the prosecution was free to petition the court for revocation of defendant’s bail. Defendant was charged with unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, 6.7 grams of crack cocaine (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 561/2, par. 1401(c)(2)), a Class 2 felony. Under the provisions of section 110 — 6(f) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 110 — 6(f)), the trial court was required to revoke defendant’s bail. A revocation would have brought the case clearly within the simultaneous-custody provision of section 103 — 5(e), thus avoiding the situation of having the prosecutor simultaneously preparing two separate cases for trial. The State concedes that the facts of this case do not fall squarely within the language of section 103 — 5(e). Consequently, I believe the majority’s strained construction and unnecessary expansion of section 103— 5(e) is unwarranted when a statutory remedy already exists. I also believe the majority opinion violates the often-stated rule that the speedy trial statute is to be liberally construed so as to give effect to the constitutional right to a speedy trial. (See People v. Brown (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 248, 259, 442 N.E.2d 136, 140.) In the instant case defendant was initially charged with first-degree murder on March 16, 1990, and released on bail on May 9, 1990. Over defendant’s objections, the case was continued upon motion of the State five times. Defendant was arrested on the unrelated drug charge on May 25, 1991, and, being unable to post bail on that charge, remained in custody. On November 8, 1991, the trial court again granted the State’s motion for another 60-day continuance, alleging that after the exercise of due diligence the State was unable to find a material witness. On January 22, 1992, some 20 months after the initial murder charge was filed, defendant filed his motion to dismiss alleging violation of his speedy trial rights. Given this sequence of events, I believe the majority’s interpretation of section 103 — 5(e) also conflicts with well-established principle that a criminal statute is to be strictly construed in favor of the accused, and nothing is to be taken by intendment or implication against the accused beyond the obvious or literal meaning of the statute. People v. Fosdick (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 524, 224 N.E.2d 242; see also People v. Arnhold (1987), 115 Ill. 2d 379, 383, 504 N.E.2d 100, 101-02.