Court Opinion

ID: 9604915
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:28:14.559264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:25.296157
License: Public Domain

KAUGER, Justice,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority's conclusion in parts I and IV that the father had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Oklahoma adoption statutes, and that the father should have been permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. I dissent from the holdings in parts II, III, and V for the reasons stated below.
Although, it is well settled that statutes involving Indians are to be construed liberally in their favor,1 in this case, the Indians were cut off at the pass after the trial court, with the acquiescence of the majority, ignored the Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Act. (OICWA). The Oklahoma Act clarifies state policies and procedures to insure that both the intent and the provisions of the federal ICWA are enforced.2 The announced policy of the OICWA is to cooperate fully with the Indian tribes of the state. All custody proceedings involving children who are members of an Indian tribe, eligible for tribal membership, or biological children of tribal members fall within its purview.3
*1072Well before this country became a nation, the insensitive precedent had been cast to destroy Indian culture and tribal cohesiveness by removing Indian children from their families and tribal environments.4 Continuing separation of Indian children from their heritage is one of the most tragic and destructive aspects of contemporary Indian life. State intrusion into Native American parent-child relationships impedes the ability of the tribe to perpetuate itself, and, ultimately, it unjustifiably results in a coerced assimilation of the First Americans into a larger more homogenous society.5 Congress recognized that Indian children are the most vital component to the continued existence of the tribes when it enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq., in an attempt to meet its responsibilities as the guardian and protector of American Indians.6 The majority, exercising traditional Anglo-Saxon notions of child custody proceedings, has failed completely to recognize essential tribal relations, and the right which Native Americans possess to preserve their identity as a people.
I
THE TRIBE AND THE PUTATIVE FATHER OF AN INDIAN CHILD BORN OUT OF WEDLOCK ARE ENTITLED TO NOTICE OF PENDING ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS
If a trial court has reason to believe that an infant subject to adoption is an Indian child, it must first seek to verify the child’s status with the tribe(s) which may be the tribe of the Indian child, or with the Bureau of Indian Affairs.7 Here, the adop*1073tion is invalid because the court, ignoring the mandate of the Act, as well as due process of law, failed to seek a determination of the child’s status from either the tribe or the BIA, or to notify the tribe or the putative father of the impending adoption proceedings. Even though the father was a resident of Pottawatomie County, and the tribe’s official office was maintained in Seminole County, the only notice of the pending adoption was by publication in a Stephens County newspaper.8 The majority opinion, sanctioning the adoption, is grounded in flawed premises: 1) that the Indian Child Welfare Acts are inapplicable to children who are not domiciled in Indian homes; and 2) that the provisions of the federal act do not pertain to unwed fathers.
A careful perusal of the federal ICWA reflects that unwed fathers are not excluded unless paternity has not been acknowledged or established.9 The father in this case attempted to acknowledge paternity, and the adverse parties have never contended seriously that the putative father was not the biological father.10 A literal reading of the federal act dictates applicability here.
On this point, the fatal fallacy in the majority opinion is that it distinguishes, without citation of authority, biological parents who actually have exercised responsibility for rearing their children from those who have not. At birth, the infant was adopted directly from the hospital, and the Indian father was given no opportunity to comply with the standards of Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983), Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979), and Quilloin v. Wallcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978), or to institute a relationship with his son. The adoption proceedings were telescoped, thereby excluding his, his family’s, and the tribe’s claim to the child. The discriminating treatment of parents of children born out of wedlock from other parents by providing substandard procedures for termi*1074nation of their parental rights is an impermissible violation of the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and of the Okla. Const, art. 5 § 59.11 The Oklahoma Legislature has recognized that a proceeding such as this denies due process and equal protection. It has amended 10 O.S. 1981 § 60.6 to require notice and hearing before fathers of children born out of wedlock may have their parental rights terminated.12 [The procedural requisites were in place before the amendments — the amendments merely codified extant constitutional law]
Even, assuming arguendo, that the federal ICWA is inapplicable, the State of Oklahoma, in the exercise of its sovereign powers, may provide individual liberties which are more expansive than those conferred by the United States.13 Although the majority refuses to acknowledge state supremacy in this matter the federal act does not. Title 25 U.S.C. § 192114 requires that state standards must be applied in lieu of federal law if the state affords a higher degree of protection to the rights of the parent of an Indian child. That a father of a child born out of wedlock has protected rights concerning his natural child is well documented in the OICWA, and by the recent amendment of § 60.6.15 The father and the tribe were entitled to notice and to an opportunity to be heard.
II
AN INDIAN CHILD NEED NOT BE DOMICILED WITH AN INDIAN FAMILY TO BE PROTECTED BY THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACTS
According to the majority opinion, the purpose of the federal ICWA is to prevent Indian children from being removed from existing Indian family units. It holds that the Act may be disregarded if the child has been living in a non-Indian familial setting. Again, the majority misconstrues the Acts.
Indian lifestyles differ markedly from those of the non-Indian world. Continuing tribal traditions result in a world view and a concept of group identity which create a culture within a culture, the values of which generally are unknown, unnoticed, or unrecognized by those who are unacquainted with tribal customs. The significant differences in tribal values concerning heritage, kinship, concepts of time, scheduling seasonal activities, geographical location, race, religion, economics, language, *1075historicity, sexual mores, and family practices and structure16 must be recognized,17 notwithstanding their apparent incompatibility with middle class mores.
Courts must not be victimized by cultural myopia in a well-intentioned attempt to represent majoritarian norms. Courts have an obligation to become more sensitive to different cultural values existing within our pluralistic society.18 In the case of the Native Americans, it must be realized that the relationship of Indian tribes to American society, is, and has always been, an especially unique relationship premised not upon race, but upon law created by the United States Constitution, and perpetuated by treaties, [albeit more often breached than honored], between sovereign nations. To those who fear that a child of mixed blood will not be stamped with the imprimatur of the dominant society, the answer is, the dominant society will impact on minority traditions and mores, but the heritage of the Indian people will not be transmitted and assimilated by its youth in the absence of exposure within the tribal community.
The 1960’s and 1970’s were watershed years for juvenile courts, and the social service personnel involved with them. In three decisions — In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1074-75, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1443, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1054, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966)— the United States Supreme Court advised the States that the informal parens patri-ae system had violated children’s rights and that significant changes in procedure were necessary. In 1974, and 1977, the United States Senate Subcommittee on Indian Affairs heard testimony that state juvenile courts were failing Indian children, their families, and their tribes.
The problems were so significant that Congress realized that federal intervention was necessary — the result was the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978. The evidence presented which prompted Congressional action established that Indian children were being removed from their homes and families in far greater numbers than non-Indian children. The Association on American Indian Affairs, a national non-profit organization founded in 1923, to assist American and Alaskan Native communities to achieve full civic, social and economic equality, conducted surveys in 1969 and 1974. The surveys reflected that approximately 25 to 35 percent of all American Indian Children were separated from their families and placed in foster homes or adoptive homes, and that nearly one in every four Native American infants under one year of age were adopted.19 Social worker misunderstanding of Indian family life was often the basis for the removals, which in a high percentage of cases, were based on perception of neglect rather than on allegations of physical abuse. Underlying social work, and court decisions, was the presumption, shared by others in the non-Indian world, that an Indian child was better off joining the larger society as soon as possible.
The results of misguided intervention do not validate its philosophical premises. What may appear to be advantageous developmentally for the small child may rob the child of his/her cultural heritage, and be detrimental to later development not only of Indian children, but of their families and communities as well. Psychiatrists and street level Indian social workers testified to significant social and psychological problems among Indian children placed in non-Indian homes. The problems particularly manifested themselves in adolescense and young adulthood when the protective cocoon provided by the adoptive or foster parents could no longer isolate the child *1076from the realities of “growing up Indian.” In many cases the result was suicide.20
This general principle of differing familial standards was discussed in In the Matter of Sherol A.S., 581 P.2d 884, 888 (Okla.1978). This Court, in a unanimous opinion, held that the fundamental integrity of the family unit is subject to state intrusion and dismemberment only if the child must be protected from harm; and that the state may not exact either conformity or an acceptable common value system and lifestyle from its citizen-parents. Finally, in 1982, the Oklahoma Legislature heard testimony regarding the federal Act and concluded that it was necessary to provide supplemental procedural safeguards. In 1984, Rule 8.2, Rules of District Court, 12 O.S.Supp.1984 Ch. 2, App., was promulgated by this Court requiring all relevant final orders to contain a finding of compliance with the Acts.
The word orphan, illegitimate, and adoption do not exist naturally in any Native American language,21 most likely because of the predominant cultural pattern of the extended family found among North American Indians. The phenomenon of the corporate tribal embrace was first described by the American anthropologist, Lewis Morgan, in 1871. He noted that within the tribes all members of the same generation knew one another as brother and sisters, while the parental generation were recognized as mothers and fathers. This kind of classification system reflects a feeling of unity within lineages. Morgan found that the care of children was a joint, rather than an individual responsibility. Morgan’s research also discovered that these people had a keen interest in their genetic relationships, and an obsession with tribal kinship.22 Generally, the dynamics of Indian extended families are misunderstood by well meaning social workers — and by well meaning jurists. The failure of the majority to recognize this is undoubtedly the underlying reason for its erroneous conclusion. Nevertheless, the extended family is as much entitled to constitutional recognition as is the more common nuclear family. Neither the Constitution of the United States nor the State of Oklahoma tolerate governmental or societal imposition upon Indians of suburbia’s preference in patterns of family living.23
States may not act if essential tribal relations are involved or if the rights of Indians are jeopardized.24 Child rearing is an essential tribal function,25 and the pertinent provisions of the Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1983), recognize this by requiring transfer of termination proceedings to the tribe [which the tribe or either parent may veto] even if an Indian child is not domiciled or residing within the tribal reservation.26 Obviously, the concept of a child’s tribal status or membership is much more important than the child’s domicile because of the tribe’s shared responsibility for all its *1077child members.27 The Acts clearly pertain to all Indian children.28 No distinction is made based on reservation status or environmental circumstance.
The putative biological father did not confide in his full-blood parents concerning the pregnancy. His mother, a Creek, discovered the fact on March 29, 1983. The extended family tradition is illustrated by her deposition testimony reflecting the grandmother’s reaction to the baby’s birth on March 4, and the adoption of the child on March 6. In answer to the question, “You would be proud to have your grandchildren? She replied “I wouldn’t give my baby away.” To the query, “Are you considering this your baby, then?” She responded, “Yes.” The record reveals that when the grandmother of this child learned of the birth, the father’s interest was triggered. This is in keeping with the traditional concept of automatic assumption of responsibility by the closest relatives of the extended family. Depending on tribal affiliation, the nearest relatives may be either on the matrilineal or the patrilineal side. In many Indian cultures, the day-to-day care of the children lodged with the grandparents even when the parents are alive. [The term grandfather also includes paternal great uncles, likewise the term grandmother includes great aunts.]29
Section 1915 of the Act states that in the absence of good cause, preference in adoption must be given to 1) a member of the child’s extended family, 2) other members of the child’s tribe, or 3) other Indian families. This section is to be interpreted, when possible, to keep the child within the tribe, but it does not preclude placement of an Indian child with a non-Indian family. However, in this case, the wagons were circled before the Indians could send up a smoke signal, much less appear on the bluff. Much of the Indian way of life is a separate and distinguishable culture worthy of preservation. Individual members, as well as the tribal corporate body, are entitled to constitutional protection.

. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 764-67, 105 S.Ct. 2399, 2403-04, 85 L.Ed.2d 753, 759 (1985); McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 174, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 1263, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675, 32 S.Ct. 565, 569, 56 L.Ed. 941 (1912). Ahboah v. Housing Auth. of Kiowa Tribe, 660 P.2d 625, 631 (Okla.1983).

. The purpose is stated in 10 O.S.Supp.1982 § 40.1:
"The purpose of the Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Act is the clarification of state policies and procedures regarding the imlementation by the State of Oklahoma of the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act, P.L. 95-608. It shall be the policy of the state to cooperate fully with Indian tribes in Oklahoma in order to ensure that the intent and provisions of the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act are enforced."

. Application of the Act is provided in 10 O.S. Supp.1982 § 40.3:
“A. The Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Act, in accordance with the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act, applies to all child custody proceedings involving any Indian child except the following:
1. A child custody proceeding arising from a divorce proceeding; or
2. A child custody proceeding arising from an adjudication of delinquency, unless there has been a request for termination of parental rights.
B. The Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Act applies only to a child who is a member of an Indian tribe or who is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.
C. The court shall seek a determination of the Indian status of the child in accordance with the preceding standard in the following circumstances:
1. The court has been informed by an interested party, an officer of the court, a tribe, an *1072indian organization or a public or private agency that the child is Indian; or
2. The child who is the subject of the proceeding gives the court reason to believe he is an Indian child; or
3. The court has reason to believe the residence or domicile of the child is a predominantly Indian community.
D. The court shall seek verification of the Indian status of the child from the Indian tribe or the Bureau of Indian Affairs. A determination of membership by an Indian tribe shall be conclusive. A determination of membership by the Bureau of Indian Affairs shall be conclusive in the absence of a contrary determination by the Indian tribe.
E. The determination of the Indian status of a child shall be made as soon as practicable in order to ensure compliance with the notice requirements of Section 5 of the Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Act."

.On June 17, 1744, the commissioners from Maryland and Virginia negotiated a treaty with the Indians of the Six Nations at Lancaster, Pennsylvania. The Indians were invited to send boys to William and Mary College. The next day, the Six Nations politely declined the offer. Their letter stated:
“We know that you highly esteem the kind of learning taught in those Colleges, and the Maintenance of our young Men, while with you, would be very expensive to you. We are convinced, that you mean to do us Good by your Proposal; and we thank you heartily. But you, who are wise must know that different Nations have different Conceptions of things and you will therefore not take it amiss, if our Ideas of this kind of Education happen not to be the same as yours. We have had some Experience of it. Several of our Young People were formerly brought up at the Colleges of the Northern Provinces; they were instructed in all your Sciences; but, when they came back to us, they were bad Runners, ignorant of every means of living in the woods ... neither fit for Hunters, Warriors, nor Counsellors, they were totally good for nothing. We are, however, not the less oblig’d by your kind Offer, tho’ we decline accepting it; and, to show our grateful Sense of it, if the Gentlemen of Virginia will send us a Dozen of their Sons, we will take Care of their Education, instruct them in all we know, and make Men of them.
See 1 Drake, Biography and History of the Indians of North America, Ch. 35, p. 27 (3d. ed. 1834).

. Guerrero, “Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A Response to the Threat to Indian Culture Caused by Foster and Adoptive Placements of Indian Children," 7 American Indian L.Rev. 51, 53 (1979).

. Title 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (1983) provides:
"... that there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and that the United States has a direct interest, as trustee, in protecting Indian children who are members of or are eligible for membership in an Indian tribe; ...”

. Notice requirements are set forth in 10 O.S. Supp.1982 § 40.4;
"In any involuntary Indian child custody proceedings of the Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Act, including review hearings, the court shall send notice to the parents or to the *1073Indian custodians, if any, to the tribe that may be the tribe of the Indian child, and to the appropriate Bureau of Indian Affairs area office, by registered mail return receipt requested. The notice shall be written in clear and understandable language and include the following information:
1. The name and tribal affiliation of the Indian child;
2. A copy of the petition by which the proceeding was initiated;
3. A statement of the rights of the biological parents or Indian custodians, and the Indian tribe.
a. to intervene in the proceeding,
b. to petition the court to transfer the proceeding to the tribal court of the Indian child, and
c. to request an additional twenty (20) days from receipt of notice to prepare for the proceeding; further extensions of time may be granted with court approval;
4. A statement of the potential legal consequences of an adjudication on the future custodial rights of the parents or Indian custodians;
5. A statement that if the parents or Indian custodian are unable to afford counsel, counsel will be appointed to represent them; and
6. A statement that tribal officials should keep confidential the information contained in the notice.”

.Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 797-801, 103 S.Ct. 2706, 2711-12, 77 L.Ed.2d 180, 187-88 (1983); Armstrong v. Man-ZO, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965); Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 213, 83 S.Ct. 279, 282, 9 L.Ed.2d 255, 89 A.L.R.2d 1398 (1962); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 318-20, 70 S.Ct. 652, 659-60, 94 L.Ed. 865, 875-76 (1950); Cate v. Archon Oil Co. Inc., 695 P.2d 1352, 1356 (Okla.1985); Bomford v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 440 P.2d 713, 718 (Okla.1968).

. The Federal definition of parent is provided in 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (1983):
"... (9) ‘parent’ means any biological parent or parents of an Indian child or any Indian person who has lawfully adopted an Indian child, including adoptions under tribal law or custom. It does not include the unwed father where paternity has not been acknowledged or established; ...”

. Legitimization by acknowledgement is provided in 10 O.S.1981 § 55:
“The father of an illegitimate child by publicly acknowledging it as his own, receiving it as such, with the consent of his wife, if he is married, into his family, and otherwise treating it as if it were a legitimate child, thereby adopts it as such, and such child is thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of its birth. The status thus created is that of a child adopted by regular procedure of court.”
See also In Re Estate of LaSarge, 526 P.2d 930, 932 (Okla.1974).

. Wilson v. Foster, 595 P.2d 1329, 1333 (Okla.1979).

. See H.B. 1308, 7 Okla. Sessions Law 1521, 1524 (1985), which provides in pertinent part:
"3. The father or putative father of a child born out of wedlock if
a. prior to the hearing provided for in Section 4 of this act, and having actual knowledge of the birth or impending birth of the child believed to be his child, he fails to acknowledge paternity of the child or to take any action to legally establish his claim to paternity of the child or to exercise parental rights or duties over the child, including failure to contribute to the support of the mother of the child to the extent of his financial ability during her term of pregnancy, or
b. at the hearing provided for in Section 4 of this act:
(1) he fails to prove that he is the father of the child, or
(2) having established paternity, he fails to prove that he has exercised parental rights and duties toward the child unless he proves that he had no knowledge of the child or had no opportunity to exercise parental rights and duties toward the child, or
c. he waives in writing his right to notice of the hearing provided for in Section 4 of this act, or
d. he fails to appear at the hearing provided for in Section 4 of this act if all notice requirements have been met...."

. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 2040-41, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W.Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859, 864 (1979); Bailey v. City of Tulsa, 491 P.2d 316, 318 (Okla.Crim.1971); Dean v. Crisp, 536 P.2d 961, 963 (Okla.Crim.1975).

. Title 25 U.S.C. § 1921 (1983) provides:
"In any case where State or Federal law applicable to a child custody proceeding under State or Federal law provides a higher standard of protection to the rights of the parent or Indian custodian of an Indian child than the rights provided under this subchapter, the State or Federal court shall apply the State or Federal standard.”

. Evans, "Independent Adoptions: In Whose Best Interests?" 53 O.B.J. 1805, 1808 (1982).

. See note 5, supra.

. Wisconsin Pottawatomies v. Houston, 393 F.Supp. 719, 724 (N.D.Mich.1973); Carle v. Carle, 503 P.2d 1050, 1055 (Alaska 1972); Alvarado v. State, 486 P.2d 891, 902 (Alaska 1971).

. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501, 508, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1936-37, 1940, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977).

. McCartney, "The American Indian Child Welfare Crisis: Cultural Genocide or First Amendment Preservation,” 7 Cal. Human Rights L.Rev. 529 (1975).

. Berlin, "Anglo Adoptions of Native Americans: Repercussion in Adolescence,” 17 Journal of the American Academy of Child Psychiatry 387-88 (1978); Green, “Risks and Attitudes Associated with Extra-Cultural Placement of American Indian Children: A Critical Review,” 22 Journal of the American Academy of Child Psychiatry 63 (1983). Benefield, "The Indian Child Welfare Acts,” Training Manual of the Foster Care Review Board (1984).

. Report on Bottle Hollow, Utah Conference on Supportive Care, Custody, Placement and Adoption of American Indian Children, American Academy of Child Psychiatry, p. 19 (1977).

. C. Darlington, The Evolution of Man and Society, Ch. 3, p. 50-1 (Simon and Schuster 1975).

. See Moore v. East Cleveland, note 18 supra.

. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220-21, 79 S.Ct. 269, 270-71, 3 L.Ed.2d 251, 254 (1959).

. Wakefield v. Little Light, 276 Md. 333, 347 A.2d 228, 237-38 (1975).

. Title 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1983) provides:
"... In any State court proceeding for the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child not domiciled or residing within the reservation of the Indian child’s tribe, the court, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, shall transfer such proceeding to the jurisdiction of the tribe, absent objection by either parent, upon the petition of either parent or the Indian custodian or the Indian child's tribe: Provided, That such transfer shall be subject to declination by the tribal court of such tribe.”

. See note 5, supra.

. The U.S. Const, art. I § 8(3) provides:
"To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;”

.See notes 5, 19, 20, 21, supra.