Court Opinion

ID: 9712427
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:53:38.149058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:12.096960
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE O’MALLEY, dissenting: I believe that, under Kingbrook and its application in Muirfield, plaintiffs’ “Motion to Reconsider Court Order of April 13, 2007, and For Clarification of said Order” was a proper postjudgment motion for purposes of Rule 303(a)(1). In Muirfield, as here, the substance of the motion belied its caption and prayer for relief, but that did not change the character of the motion for purposes of Rule 303(a)(1). In Muirfield, the motion was captioned a motion to reinstate the plaintiffs’ cause of action and for leave to file an amended complaint. The prayer for relief likewise requested both leave to file an amended complaint and reinstatement of the plaintiffs’ cause of action. We determined that a request to reinstate a cause of action is “directed against the judgment” for purposes of Rule 303(a)(1). Muirfield, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 185. We also found it immaterial that the request was bare and undeveloped. We reasoned that, if (as Kingbrook held) a one-sentence motion requesting reconsideration of a judgment but specifying no grounds whatsoever qualifies as a postjudgment motion, then a similarly unadorned request for reinstatement of a cause of action also must qualify as a postjudgment motion. Muirfield, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 185-86. We noted that “substantively,” however, the motion sought only leave to file an amended complaint. See Muirfield, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 185. This additional content, we concluded, did not disqualify the filing as a postjudgment motion: “[I]t would be contrary to the supreme court’s intent in Kingbrook to hold that a motion with no detail but requesting the appropriate relief is sufficient to toll the 30-day time period, while a motion with plenty of irrelevant detail requesting the same relief is insufficient to qualify as a postjudgment motion. We will not penalize plaintiffs for incorporating more than they needed to in the motion, where they have at least requested the appropriate relief specified in section 2 — 1203(a) of the Code.” Muirfield, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 186. To put it otherwise: Given that neither Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) nor section 2 — 1203(a) of the Code imposes any content requirement, whatever content is added to a motion that contains an otherwise sufficiently phrased request for relief cannot detract from that motion’s nature as a postjudgment motion. The logic of Muirfield applies irresistibly here. Plaintiffs’ motion was captioned a motion to “reconsider” and for “clarification,” and the prayer for relief likewise sought “reconsider[ation] *** and/or clarif[ication].” The request for reconsideration, like the request for reinstatement in Muirfield, was sufficiently directed against the judgment. See Kingbrook, 202 Ill. 2d at 27 (single-sentence motion asking the court “ ‘to reconsider its decision granting [summary] judgment in favor of the Defendants’ ” qualified as a postjudgment motion). Here, as in Muirfield, there was additional content in which the relief sought — clarification—was not directed against the judgment. See Giammanco, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 755. No more here than in Muirfield, however, could such additional content lift the motion out of the scope of Rule 303(a)(1). The majority unsuccessfully attempts to distinguish Muirfield. The majority suggests that, in both Kingbrook and Muirfield, “the issue concerned the specificity of the motion and whether the filer was required to explain what he or she sought from the court and how and why the judgment should be modified.” 396 Ill. App. 3d at 139-40. “Here,” the majority remarks, “the question is whether plaintiffs sought any modification of the judgment at all.” 396 Ill. App. 3d at 140. I do not see the distinction. The central question in Muirfield was not whether the request for clarification failed for want of specificity but whether the additional content in the motion disqualified it as a postjudgment motion. Hence our comment that the case presented “a step beyond Kingbrook.” Muirfield, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 185. As for the question of “whether plaintiffs sought any modification of the judgment at all,” the majority overlooks Muirfield’s logic and lets the body of plaintiffs’ motion override the prayer for relief, which, because it seeks “reconsider[ation]” as an alternative to “clarifi[cation],” brings this case squarely under Kingbrook. This conclusion is not undermined by either In re County Treasurer or Shutkas. In In re County Treasurer, the petitioner, Craig, was issued a tax deed for the respondent’s, Brown’s, property. Brown moved to vacate the tax deed and to have certain provisions of the property tax code declared unconstitutional. Craig filed a response to the motion to vacate and also moved for summary judgment on the constitutional issue. The trial court granted Craig’s motion. In re County Treasurer, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 1104-06. Craig thereafter filed a motion whose only description in the disposition was as follows: “Craig’s August 20, 2004, motion to reconsider asked the trial court to reconsider and strike two factual findings included in the court’s August 13, 2004, order — namely, that (1) the ‘verified motion to vacate the tax deed establishes [Brown’s] equitable ownership of the subject premises’ and (2) ‘[Brown] attempted to redeem the property but was prevented from doing so.’ ” In re County Treasurer, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 1109. The court concluded that “Craig’s August 20, 2004, motion did not challenge the trial court’s judgment.” In re County Treasurer, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 1109. In re County Treasurer presents interpretive problems because the motion is only paraphrased in the decision. I assume the interpretation that renders the case consistent with Kingbrook. That is, I assume that the difference in those cases’ outcomes lies in whether and how the plea for reconsideration in each case was tempered. In King-brook, the plea for reconsideration was general and unspecified. In In re County Treasurer, as I interpret it, there never was a plea for “reconsideration” that was distinguishable from a request for striking certain factual findings that were nonessential to the judgment. Indeed, given that Craig was the prevailing party, he hardly would have been expected to make a more substantive attack on the judgment. In contrast, it was the nonprevailing party in this case who made the motion, as in Kingbrook. Moreover, the “reconsideration” sought was not clearly identical to the “clarification” sought. Rather, the “reconsideration” and “clarification” were pleaded alternatively in the prayer for relief. Shutkas also is distinguishable. The motion (brought by the non-prevailing party) in Shutkas was captioned a motion to “ ‘[mjodify’ ” and the appellate court consulted the “body” of the motion for further clues as to its substance, ultimately concluding that the motion sought leave to add a party plaintiff and file a second amended complaint, neither of which requests amounted to relief directed against the judgment. Shutkas, 366 111. App. 3d at 81. The court’s further inquiry was justified. A request for “modification,” without more, does not bring a motion within the ambit of Rule 303(a)(1). See Giammanco, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 755, quoting Marsh, 138 Ill. 2d at 461 (“even where a motion seeks to modify the judgment, it does not constitute a post-trial motion within the meaning of [Rule 303(a)(1)] unless it is ‘directed against the judgment’ ”). In Shutkas, as in In re County Treasurer, the appellate court only paraphrased the “body” of the motion. I presume that the motion in Shutkas never used the word “reconsider,” “reconsideration,” or like language, otherwise the court would have had to examine whether that request for reconsideration had any immediate qualification, as I presume the request in In re County Treasurer had. In In re County Treasurer (at least, on the reading I believe is consistent with Kingbrook), the request for reconsideration was never presented but as a request for the striking of certain factual findings. Here, by contrast, the motion in at least one place suggested that the reconsideration sought was not identical to the clarification sought. The majority believes that Kingbrook and Muirfield allow a court to take the full measure of a motion in order to test whether it really is, as it states, a motion to “reconsider” or for “reconsideration.” In fact, Kingbrook and Muirfield together hold that, where a motion requests “reconsideration” and such request is not immediately qualified, as in In re County Treasurer, in such a way that it is obvious that the request is actually for relief (such as clarification) that is not against the judgment, then whatever additional substance the motion contains cannot lift it out of the scope of Rule 303(a)(1). See R&G, Inc. v. Midwest Region Foundation for Fair Contracting, Inc., 351 Ill. App. 3d 318, 325 (2004) (noting in dicta that, under Kingbrook, counsel could have “avoid[ed] the jurisdictional hurdle” by “add[ing] a tag line to the motion to clarify requesting rehearing”). The motion at hand contained a request for “reconsideration” that was not obviously tantamount to “clarification,” and so, under Kingbrook and Muirfield, the motion was a postjudgment motion per Rule 303(a)(1).