Court Opinion

ID: 9881300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-30 06:09:55.625258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:08:14.036193
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed September 29, 2023

                                      In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                   __________

                              No. 11-22-00213-CR
                                  __________

               IVAN LEVI ANDREW ZAPATA, Appellant
                                         V.
                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 142nd District Court
                            Midland County, Texas
                        Trial Court Cause No. CR53808

                     MEMORANDUM OPINION
         Appellant, Ivan Levi Andrew Zapata, was indicted for the third-degree
felony offense of deadly conduct by discharging a firearm. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 22.05(b)(2), (e) (West 2019). The State charged Appellant as the principal actor
and as a party to the offense. Following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the
offense as charged in the indictment, and the jury assessed Appellant’s punishment
at eight years’ imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department
of Criminal Justice. The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly. On appeal,
Appellant raises a single issue: that the evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction. We affirm.
                                  I. Factual Background
      Appellant was a student at Premier High School in Midland.               During
lunchtime on May 13, 2019, Appellant and two of his classmates, Christopher Besaw
and Andres Villa, discussed playing a prank on their teacher, Mary Berryhill. As
their senior prank, Besaw suggested “chalking [Berryhill’s] car” or “egg[ing] her
house.” Villa testified that Appellant said, “[o]r [they] could shoot it up.” At some
point during the conversation, Villa shared with Appellant the name of the street
where Berryhill lived. Appellant commented that he would “remember that.”
      In her home later that night, Berryhill was suddenly awakened by a “horrific”
noise. Her husband left their bedroom first to investigate what caused the sound.
They noticed glass shards scattered everywhere and three bullet holes in the front
door. Realizing that someone had shot at their home, Berryhill next checked on their
children, who were still sleeping in their rooms. Berryhill testified that some bullets
had struck their children’s bedrooms including approximately one and one-half feet
above her daughter’s head. After Berryhill confirmed that no one was injured, she
then called 9-1-1.
      Sometime after 10:00 p.m. the same night, Appellant messaged Villa on social
media and admitted to discharging a firearm at Berryhill’s home eleven times; he
told Villa that he “did it with the 9.” Villa testified that Appellant’s comment
referred to a 9mm handgun. Villa also testified that a few weeks prior, Appellant
sent him pictures via social media of three weapons—an AR-15, a “Judge,” and a
9mm handgun.         Villa stated that because he was concerned by Appellant’s

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comments, he messaged Appellant a picture of Berryhill’s daughter’s vehicle to
verify if Berryhill was okay; however, there was no response. The morning after
shooting at Berryhill’s home, Appellant did not appear at school.
      Appellant’s cousin, Julisa Perez, testified that Appellant and his friend, Daniel
Campa—both of whom lived with Perez at the time—were present at her house on
the night of the incident. Sometime after 10:00 p.m. that night, Appellant asked if
he could borrow Perez’s silver Kia Forte. Perez agreed and gave Appellant the keys
to her vehicle. Perez testified that she believed that Appellant was the driver of the
vehicle that night. At about 1:00 a.m., Perez called Appellant and Campa to inquire
as to their whereabouts; the two eventually returned to her residence around 2:00
a.m. Perez testified that Appellant stayed home from school that morning.
      On the night of the incident, Officer Chane Blandford of the Midland Police
Department arrived at Berryhill’s home at approximately 11:00 p.m.; he investigated
and documented the presence of numerous bullet holes in and around the Berryhill’s
home. Officer Blandford testified that the perpetrator likely fired a weapon from
inside a vehicle because no shell casings were recovered, and that this appeared to
be a “targeted” incident because no other homes in the area were struck by bullets
that night. A neighbor provided the investigating officers with audio and video
footage from their home security camera that was situated in the direction of the
roadway in front of the Berryhill residence. On the home security video, eleven
gunshots could be heard before a light-colored vehicle was captured on the video
driving past the neighbor’s home. The neighbor testified that, based on the position
of the vehicle in the video footage, the shooter would have discharged their weapon
from the passenger side of the vehicle toward Berryhill’s residence.

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      Two days after the incident, a local news station aired a video excerpt of the
Berryhill’s home being shot. Perez noticed that when the video clip of the incident
aired on their television, Appellant and Campa appeared nervous and left the room.
      During the ensuing police investigation, Appellant and Campa soon became
suspects. On May 21, 2019, as part of the investigation, Sergeant Jason Claire of
the Midland Police Department was searching for a small silver vehicle. After he
had flagged down several vehicles with similar descriptions, he stopped a vehicle
matching the same description; Perez was operating this vehicle. Sergeant Claire
then seized Perez’s silver Kia Forte for purposes of the investigation.
      After the vehicle was impounded, crime scene specialist Kashmiere McGee
collected and photographed evidence that was found inside Perez’s vehicle. McGee
also used a gunshot residue (GSR) kit to collect GSR, which she sent to a forensic
laboratory in Tarrant County for analysis. Anne Koettel, a senior trace evidence
analyst at the Tarrant County Medical Examiner’s Office analyzed the contents of
the GSR kit and concluded that the samples collected from the inside of the
passenger door—as well as the driver’s seat and steering wheel—contained
characteristics of primer gunshot residue. Koettel testified that one explanation for
these results would be that a person inside the vehicle had discharged a firearm from
outside the passenger window.
      Appellant was indicted and later convicted of the offense. Perez testified that
she had received three separate phone calls from Appellant before Appellant’s trial
commenced. During these phone calls, Appellant told Perez “not to mess things up
for him,” and that she did not have to testify if she did not want to.
                   II. Standard of Review – Sufficiency of the Evidence
      We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, regardless of
whether it is denominated as a legal or factual sufficiency challenge, under the

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standard of review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v.
State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286,
288–89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we
review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine
whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Isassi v. State,
330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
      Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict requires that
we consider all of the evidence admitted at trial, including improperly admitted
evidence. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clayton v.
State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). As such, we defer to the
factfinder’s credibility and weight determinations because the factfinder is the sole
judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight their testimony is to be afforded.
Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 768; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at
778. This deference accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the
testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts
to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. We may
not reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence to substitute our judgment
for that of the factfinder. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999). Therefore, if the record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the
factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that
determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525–26
(Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
      Because the standard of review is the same, we treat direct and circumstantial
evidence equally. Isassi, 330 S.W.3d at 638; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778; Hooper v.
State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). It is not necessary that the evidence

                                         5
directly prove the defendant’s guilt. Rather, circumstantial evidence is as probative
as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor and can, without more, be
sufficient to establish his guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2013) (citing Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). A guilty verdict does not require
that every fact must directly and independently prove a defendant’s guilt. Hooper,
214 S.W.3d at 13.              Instead, the cumulative force of all the incriminating
circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Id. Therefore, in evaluating
the sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider the cumulative force of the
evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Murray v.
State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
                                           III. Analysis
        In his sole issue, Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to
support his conviction.1 Specifically, Appellant contends that the evidence is
insufficient because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
(1) Appellant knowingly discharged a firearm at a habitation and was reckless as to
whether the habitation was occupied at the time the firearm was discharged, and
(2) Appellant solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, and attempted to aid Campa to
knowingly discharge a firearm at or in the direction of a habitation.
        A person commits the offense of deadly conduct if he knowingly discharges
a firearm at or in the direction of a habitation and in doing so is reckless as to whether
the habitation is occupied at the time the firearm is discharged. PENAL § 22.05(b)(2).
A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed

        1
         In his brief, Appellant refers to challenging both the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence.
The Court of Criminal Appeals in Brooks held that “the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard is
the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to
support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 895; see also Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.

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as a result of his own conduct, the conduct of another for whom he is criminally
responsible, or both. Id. § 7.01(a) (West 2021). In relevant part, a person is
criminally responsible for an offense that is committed by the conduct of another if
he acts with the intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense by
soliciting, encouraging, directing, aiding, or attempting to aid the other person to
commit the offense. Id. § 7.02(a)(2).
      To convict the accused of the offense, the jury is not required to unanimously
agree as to whether the accused was the principal actor or a party for accountability
purposes. Leza v. State, 351 S.W.3d 344, 357 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (Section 7.02
“describe[s] alternative manners by which an accused may be held accountable for
the conduct of another who has committed the constituent elements of a criminal
offense, but they in no way define the offense itself.”). This is so even when there
is compelling evidence that an accused is guilty of every constituent element of the
charged offense as either a principal actor or as a “party” to the charged offense, but
there are evidentiary concerns with respect to his precise role in the commission of
the offense. See id. Thus, to prove the offense of deadly conduct by discharging a
firearm as charged in this case, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that either (1) Appellant was the shooter—that he knowingly discharged a
firearm at or in the direction of Berryhill’s home and acted recklessly to the
occupants of the home in doing so, or (2) Campa was the shooter and Appellant
assisted him in committing the offense—Appellant solicited, encouraged, directed,
aided, or attempted to aid Campa in the commission of the offense. PENAL §§ 7.01–
.02, 22.05(b)(2).
      A. Principal Actor
      To    support    Appellant’s    conviction   as   a   principal    actor   under
Section 22.05(b)(2), there must be sufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a

                                          7
reasonable doubt that Appellant was the shooter, in that he “knowingly” discharged
a firearm at or in the direction of Berryhill’s home and was “reckless” as to whether
the home was occupied. Id. § 22.05(b)(2). “A person acts knowingly, or with
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct
is reasonably certain to cause the result.” Id. § 6.03(b). “A person acts recklessly
. . . when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur.” Id. § 6.03(c). The risk
created “must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all
the circumstances as viewed from the actor’s standpoint.” Id. Recklessness requires
that the defendant must actually foresee the risk involved and consciously decide to
ignore it. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
      Despite Appellant’s contentions that there was “plainly reasonable doubt
inherent in the investigation as well as the trial,” we conclude that there is sufficient
evidence from which the jury could have reasonably inferred and found beyond a
reasonable doubt that Appellant was the actual shooter. A jury may infer the intent
or knowledge of an individual by any facts which tend to prove its existence,
including the acts, words, and conduct of the accused, and the method of committing
the crime.      Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (citing
Manrique v. State, 994 S.W.2d 640, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (Meyers, J.,
concurring)).
      Perez testified that sometime after 10:00 p.m. on the day of the incident,
Appellant asked to borrow her silver Kia Forte and that Appellant and Campa left
together in her vehicle around the same time. Thus, while it is unclear whether
Appellant was the driver or passenger of the vehicle, the evidence shows that

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Appellant left Perez’s home in her vehicle with Campa, and that the incident
occurred approximately one hour later.
      Villa testified that he had a conversation with Appellant about “pranking”
Berryhill’s home, and that during that conversation Appellant suggested they “shoot
it up.” According to Villa, later that night, after 10:00 p.m., Appellant messaged
him on social media. Villa recalled his social media conversation with Appellant as
follows:
      APPELLANT: I did it.
      VILLA: Did what?
      APPELLANT: Berryhill.
      VILLA: What are you talking about?
      APPELLANT: I shot it . . . I shot up the house. . . . I shot it up eleven
      times.
      VILLA: Was a Navigator outside?
      APPELLANT: Don’t worry about it.
Villa also testified that Appellant disclosed that he “did it with the 9,” believing that
Appellant was referring to a 9mm handgun. Previous social media messages
between Villa and Appellant indicated that Appellant had access to a 9mm handgun.
      Video footage obtained from a neighbor’s home security camera that faced
the street in front of Berryhill’s home revealed that eleven gunshots could be heard
before a light-colored vehicle drove past the neighbor’s home. The neighbor
testified that the passenger door of the vehicle in the video would have been facing
Berryhill’s home. The vehicle that Appellant borrowed from Perez on the night of
the incident had evidence of gunshot residue on passenger side door, as well as the
driver seat and steering wheel. The gunshot residue found on the passenger side of
the vehicle is consistent with the video evidence, which shows the passenger side of

                                           9
a vehicle facing Berryhill’s home following the sound of gunshots. Even in the
absence of the video and forensic evidence, Appellant admitted to Villa that he shot
Berryhill’s home eleven times, all of which was captured on the neighbor’s home
security footage. As such, a jury could reasonably have inferred and found that
Appellant was the person who discharged a firearm at Berryhill’s home and was thus
the principal actor of the charged offense.
      From this evidence, the jury could also have reasonably inferred and found
that Appellant “knowingly” discharged the firearm and “recklessly” disregarded the
occupants of the habitation. PENAL § 22.05(b)(2). Appellant was the one to suggest
that he and his classmates shoot up Berryhill’s home, and he later admitted to Villa
that he did so. Appellant’s admission that he discharged a firearm at Berryhill’s
home could permit the jury to reasonably infer and find that Appellant was the actual
shooter, and that he acted knowingly when he discharged the firearm recklessly in
accordance with his planned “prank.”
      A rational jury could also have determined that Appellant acted recklessly to
the occupants of Berryhill’s home when he discharged the firearm. When Villa
asked Appellant if a “Navigator” (Berryhill’s vehicle) was outside the home at the
time of the incident, Appellant responded, “[d]on’t worry about it.” Berryhill
testified that both her daughter’s and husband’s vehicles were parked outside their
home on the night of the incident. Based on this testimony, the jury could have
concluded that two vehicles were present outside the home at the time of the incident,
indicating to a reasonable person that a home would likely be occupied if cars are
parked outside at night. Further, Appellant’s admission to Villa further indicates
that Appellant intended to shoot at Berryhill’s home and actively ignored the risk to
others who may have been present inside the home when the firearm was discharged.
As such, a reasonable factfinder could have reasonably determined that Appellant

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acted recklessly because he could have actually foreseen the risk involved in
shooting at an occupied home and he consciously decided to ignore it. See Williams,
235 S.W.3d at 751.
       Appellant argues that finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt “does not
appear to be a conclusion that ANY rational or reasonable trier of fact could reach.”
However, it is the jury’s role to assess the credibility of the witnesses and to give the
evidence its proper weight. Winfrey, 393 S.W.3d at 768; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899.
If any inconsistencies or conflicting inferences in the evidence exist, we must
presume that the factfinder resolved any conflict in favor of the verdict. Merritt, 368
S.W.3d at 525–26.
       B. Party Liability
       Although there is sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could have
reasonably inferred and found and that Appellant was the person (the principal actor)
who discharged a firearm at Berryhill’s home, we also conclude that the evidence is
equally sufficient from which the jury could have reasonably inferred and found that
Appellant was guilty as a “party” to the charged offense. See Leza, 351 S.W.3d at
357.
       As stated above, a jury may infer the intent or knowledge of a person by any
facts which tend to prove its existence. Hart, 89 S.W.3d at 64. Evidence that
Appellant was present at the time the offense is committed, alone, is not sufficient
to convict him as a party to the offense. Beier v. State, 687 S.W.2d 2, 4 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1985). Rather, “[e]vidence is sufficient to convict the defendant under the law
of parties where [the defendant] is physically present at the commission of the
offense, and [he] encourages the commission of the offense either by words or other
agreement.” Id. at 3. To determine if a person was acting as a party to the offense,
courts may look to events that occur before, during, and after the commission of the

                                           11
offense, including the defendant’s actions which show an understanding and
common design to commit the prohibited act. Id. at 4 (citing Medellin v. State, 617
S.W.2d 229, 231 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)).
      While it is unclear as to where Appellant was located in the vehicle at the time
the firearm was discharged, the jury could have reasonably inferred and concluded
that Appellant was present in the vehicle because he admitted to Villa that he “shot
up” Berryhill’s home. Further, there was evidence presented which showed that,
leading up to the events in question, Appellant (1) suggested to Villa and Besaw the
idea of discharging a firearm at Berryhill’s home, (2) had access to three different
firearms including a 9mm handgun, and (3) asked to borrow Perez’s vehicle—which
resembled the vehicle depicted on the neighbor’s home security footage and the
interior of which later tested positive for gunshot residue. Perez also testified that
she believed Appellant was the driver of the vehicle that night.
      Finally, Appellant made multiple phone calls to Perez in an apparent attempt
to influence her testimony or discourage her from testifying. Appellant’s attempt to
“tamper” with or influence Perez’s testimony or her participation at trial is evidence
of his “consciousness of guilt” of the charged offense, and the jury was entitled to
consider such evidence and so infer in determining Appellant’s guilt. Wilson v.
State, 7 S.W.3d 136, 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). From the cumulative force of the
evidence presented, the jury could have reasonably inferred and determined that
there was a clear understanding and common design between Appellant and Campa
to commit the indicted offense. Beier, 687 S.W.2d at 4; Villa, 514 S.W.3d at 232.
      Consistent with the applicable standard of review, we have thoroughly
reviewed all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. As
such, we conclude that the record before us contains sufficient evidence from which
a rational jury could have inferred and found beyond a reasonable doubt that

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Appellant was guilty of the offense of deadly conduct by discharging a firearm as
charged. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue on appeal.
                                   IV. This Court’s Ruling
      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                               W. STACY TROTTER
                                               JUSTICE

September 29, 2023
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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