Court Opinion

ID: 9536107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:54:58.938913+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:27.385209
License: Public Domain

ELLETT, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent.
The crime of murder is divided into degrees by our statutes. Section 76-30-3, U.C.A. 1953, reads:
Every murder perpetrated by poison,, lying in wait or any other kind of wilful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated' killing; or committed in the perpetration, of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson,, rape, burglary or robbery; or perpetrated from a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being other than the one who is killed; or' perpetrated by any act' greatly dangerous to the lives of others and evidencing a depraved mind, regardless of hitman life; — is murder in the first degree. Any other homicide committed under such circumstances as. would have constituted murder at common law is murder in the second degree-
It thus is apparent that some killings are-murder in the first degree regardless of whether there was deliberation or premeditation. In such cases there can be no included offenses. It is either “not guilty” or “guilty of murder in the first degree.”’
*379The Utah case of State v. Mewhinney, 43 Utah 135, 134 P. 632 (1913), L.R.A. 1916D, 590, Ann.Cas.1916C, 537, is in point. There defendant while attempting to perpetrate a robbery killed a person other than the victim in order to effect an escape. There, as in the instant case, error was claimed because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on second degree murder. The court at pages 151 and 152 of the Utah Reports at page 638 of 134 P. said:
* * * In this connection it is contended that inasmuch as the information was framed upon the theory of a deliberate and premeditated murder and in view that the court submitted the case to the jury upon that theory as well as upon the statute which provides that murder “committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate robbery” also constitutes murder in the first degree without •deliberation or premeditation, therefore the court should also have submitted the •question of second degree murder to the jury. It is true that the court submitted the elements of deliberation and premeditation to the jury. From that it does not follow, however, as contended, that the court should also have submitted the ■question of an unpremeditated or second degree murder to the jury. Where there -was some evidence in this case from which the jury could have found a deliberate and premeditated murder, yet the jury would not have been justified in finding that the murder in question was not committed in an attempt to perpetrate a robbery, and upon the latter question there is not even room for doubt or conflict. Under our statute a murder so committed constitutes murder in the first degree and legally can constitute nothing else. True, a jury in any homicide case has the power to disregard the evidence and may find one who is clearly guilty of first degree murder guilty of manslaughter or acquit him.
From this it is assumed that, because a jury may do this, therefore a court must submit all the degrees of murder, and thus give the jury the right to pass upon the several degrees of murder. This contention loses sight of the legal principle involved in the statute just referred to which does not segregate murder committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a robbery into degrees. * * *
There are many cases to be found in the Decennial Digest under “Homicide,” § 308(3), only a few of which will be referred to in this dissent.
Green v. United States, 95 U.S.App.D.C. 45, 218 F.2d 856 (1955), was a case where defendant was found guilty of arson and of murder in the second degree. He appealed on the grounds that the only murder of which he could be found guilty was murder in the first degree and that the *380trial court erred in instructing the jury on murder in the second degree. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and in doing so said at page 857:
The first degree murder section of the District of Columbia Code, * * * enlarges the common law definition of that crime by adding thereto, inter alia, the unpurposed killing of another in perpetrating arson. So, when the evidence at a trial tends to show the defendant committed arson, and that the fire was the sole cause of the victim’s death, the defendant is either guilty of murder in the first degree or he is not guilty.
In State v. King, 433 S.W.2d 825, 828 (Mo.1968), the court held:
This evidence pointed to a killing by one lying in wait, the distinguishing element of murder in the first degree. The evidence showed only such an offense and the court was not required to instruct on second degree murder.
In Silliman v. People, 114 Colo. 130, 162 P.2d 793 (1945), the evidence showed that the defendant had poisoned his wife. The court at page 800 said:
An instruction, to which an objection was made, limited the jury to three verdicts, i. e., (1) murder of the first degree; (2) not guilty, and (3) not guilty by reason of insanity. Defendant took the position at the trial that under the evidence he could be found guilty of murder of the first degree, or murder of the second degree, or involuntary manslaughter. Our statute (sec. 32, c. 48, ’35 C.S.A.) specifically provides that murder perpetrated by means of poison shall be deemed to be murder of the first degree. The evidence conclusively established that if the defendant was guilty of a crime in connection with the death of his wife, it was perpetrated by means of poison, and, consequently, if the jury was convinced of defendant’s guilt and sanity, no other verdict was proper. If the jury determined from the evidence that defendant committed the crime charged and was legally responsible for his act, it had no choice in the matter; it was obligated to find him guilty of murder of the first degree. * * *
In the present case after the defendant had precipitated an altercation in the home of her ex-adulterous companion by slapping his face, she left the house, went to her automobile, and after securing a revolver returned and fired not less than seven shots at random through a partly opened window into the bedroom, where she knew human beings were located. She could not see where she was shooting, nor did she care.
It well may be that had she shot at her ex-paramour or at his naked companion, the trial judge would have instructed as the main opinion now directs him to do. But this is not a case of shooting at a par*381ticular person which might or might not afford some elements of justification for the intended act. Rather, it is a case of perpetrating an act greatly dangerous to the lives of more than one individual, which act evidences the depraved mind of one who is indifferent to who gets killed, be it friend or be it foe. A killing under these circumstances is by our statute murder in the first degree only, and there are no included offenses contained therein.
It matters not how enraged a football player may become. He has no right to throw a hand grenade into the bleachers so as to endanger the lives of others. If he does so, he can only be guilty of murder in the first degree or not guilty. There are no included offenses for him to dangle before the jury in the hopes of having them violate their oath to render a just and true verdict according to the law and the evidence.
The emphasized section of our statute first set out above clearly shows that the killing in this case is murder in the first degree or it is nothing. There was evidence as to the mental condition of the defendant, which the jury considered. By their verdict they rejected any claim of defense by reason of mental incapacity, and this court ought not reverse it simply because the trial court properly instructed the jury as to the permissible verdicts.
If there was ever a case of a killing “perpetrated by an act greatly dangerous to the lives of others and evidencing a depraved mind, regardless of human life,” this is it. This is a case of murder in the first degree or it is nothing.
As to other assignments of error, I would find them to be without merit and would affirm the judgment.