Court Opinion

ID: 9550076
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:28:56.730097+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:06:41.561363
License: Public Domain

TUCKETT, Justice
(dissenting) :
I respectfully dissent. It seems to me that the main opinion places a strained construction upon provisions of Sec. 77-65-1 and 77-65-2, U.C.A.1953, as amended. Key provisions of the section quoted in the main opinion are as follows:
. he shall be brought to trial •within ninety days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the county attorney of the county in which the indictment, information or complaint is pending and the approriate court written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition.
The fact that the legislature used the words “indictment,” “information” and “complaint” would simply indicate that it intended to include any charge no matter in what form it might be or in what court the case was pending. It should be noted that the statute provides that for good cause shown the court having jurisdiction might grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. This provision is undoubtedly intended to cover those situations where the prosecutor or the defendant finds the problem of proceeding to trial *277insurmountable. In the ordinary run-of-the-mill cases, 90 days is ample to bring the case to trial where no cause for delay exists. The legislature undoubtedly thought that period of time was sufficient, and I agree.
HENRIOD, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of TUCKETT, J.