Court Opinion

ID: 9891661
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-19 14:17:51.295513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:00:04.908894
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Price, 2023-Ohio-3790.]

                                COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                    :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,              :
                                                           No. 111921
                 v.                               :

DEANDRE PRICE,                                    :

                 Defendant-Appellant.             :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 19, 2023

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                              Case No. CR-20-655277-C

                                            Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Jeffrey S. Schnatter and Margaret Graham,
                 Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.

                 Russell S. Bensing, for appellant.

LISA B. FORBES, J.:

                   Deandre Price (“Price”) appeals his convictions for aggravated

murder, murder, and felonious assault, with all counts carrying firearm

specifications. After reviewing the facts of the case and pertinent law, we affirm the

trial court’s decision.
I.   Facts and Procedural History

               On the night of September 12, 2020, Malik Moore (“Moore”) was shot

nine times in Cleveland Heights and pronounced dead upon his arrival to the

hospital. Police responded to a call of shots fired and recovered 13 shell casings from

the street and yards of two adjacent properties. Several witnesses heard two rounds

of gunshots, separated by a brief pause, and saw a dark-colored car with a distinctive

taillight and a loud exhaust speed away from the scene.

               On January 11, 2021, Price and codefendant Quincy Hubbard

(“Hubbard”) were indicted for aggravated murder, murder, and felonious assault.

Codefendant Tyrell Wilkins (“Wilkins”) was indicted for tampering with evidence

and obstructing justice. Wilkins ultimately pled guilty to attempted tampering with

evidence and was sentenced to community-control sanctions.

               The case against Price and Hubbard proceeded to trial on May 24,

2022. On June 3, 2022, a jury found Price guilty as charged in the indictment.

Hubbard was found guilty of felonious assault, acquitted of the remaining charges,

and sentenced to 8 to 12 years in prison. In August 2022, the court sentenced Price

to life in prison with parole eligibility after serving 28 years.

               Price now appeals, raising two assignments of error for our review.

      I.    The trial court erred in admitting testimony by a witness that the
      victim’s blood was found in the Defendant’s car, and to allow the
      witness to testify without stating that his conclusions were to a
      reasonable scientific certainty.

      II.    The Defendant’s conviction was against the manifest weight of
      the evidence.
II. Trial Testimony and Evidence

      A. Undisputed Facts — For Background and Context

              Much of the evidence presented through witness testimony in this

case is undisputed and unchallenged on appeal. The following is a summation of

this testimony to serve as context for Price’s appeal. As stated, several witnesses

consistently testified that they heard shots fired on the night of Moore’s murder and

saw a dark car with atypical taillights and a loud exhaust speed away from the scene.

One witness testified that he saw a “figure move behind the car from the driver’s side

to the passenger’s side.” Witnesses also testified that Price, Hubbard, and Moore

had a history of disagreements dating back to 2014.

              Video-surveillance footage from several security cameras in the area

led police to a Dodge Charger registered to Price (the “Charger”). Price was seen in

the video footage entering and exiting local establishments at the same time as

Moore. This took place approximately 6 minutes to 30 minutes before Moore was

murdered. Cell-phone data introduced into evidence showed that Price, Hubbard,

and Jerry Howard (“Howard”) communicated several times on the night in question

around the time Moore was killed. Additionally, some of the communications

between Price and Hubbard on that night had been deleted prior to the authorities

taking possession of Price’s phone.

              Forensic evidence showed that all 13 shell casings recovered from the

scene of Moore’s murder, along with seven bullets that were recovered during

Moore’s autopsy, “were fired from the same unknown Glock 9 millimeter caliber
pistol.” Evidence was presented that Price purchased a Glock firearm, along with a

flashlight attachment and ammunition, less than three months prior to Moore’s

murder. Forensic evidence further showed that Moore’s DNA was found on the

driver-side and front-passenger side floor mats of the Charger.

      B. Jerry Howard’s Testimony

              Howard testified that he is currently incarcerated on federal gun

charges. In September 2020, which was when Moore was killed, Howard was living

with Wilkins and Price. Howard has known Wilkins, Price, and Hubbard for “13

years, since middle school.” Howard testified that he did not know Moore.

              According to Howard, he received multiple calls from Price “around

like 9:30, 9:45” on the night of September 12, 2020, while Price was waiting in the

Charger for Hubbard to come out of Hubbard’s house. At the time, Howard was at

his ex-girlfriend’s house. Approximately 20 minutes later, Howard received another

call from Price and Price told him to “get to the house.” Howard testified that Price

was “in distress, like something * * * was going on, like he was in a rush. Like come

on, emergency.” Howard left his ex-girlfriend’s house and started driving toward

his, Price, and Wilkin’s house. On his way, Howard checked his security camera and

saw Price, who was driving his Charger, pull into the driveway. Hubbard was sitting

in the front-passenger seat. Price and Hubbard got out of the car and ran into the

house. When Howard arrived at the house, Price, Hubbard, and Wilkins were

already there. Price told Howard the following “story” of what occurred.
               Price saw Moore at a shop on Cedar and Lee Roads in Cleveland

Heights. Price sat in the Charger and waited for Moore to exit the shop. Price called

and picked up Hubbard “so that they could get” Moore. Hubbard drove the Charger,

and they “met” Moore while Moore was walking home.

      And as soon as they caught [Moore] [Price] jumped out the car. And
      when he jumped out the car, he upped the gun with the flashlight to
      blind [Moore]. * * * It was really no talking after that. [Price] pulled
      the trigger and shot him as many times — It was rapid fire. * * * He
      said that he emptied the clip, but he didn’t say how many times he hit
      him.

Howard testified that he had seen this particular gun of Price’s before. It was new,

and it was a “Glock 17 * * * Gen 5.”

               Price told Howard that Moore died “[b]ecause of how many times he

shot him.” Howard saw blood on Price’s pant leg and shoes. “[Price] said that after

he shot [Moore], he ain’t know if [Moore] was dead or not, so to make sure that he

was dead he kicked him in the head.” Price and Hubbard then left in the Charger.

At first, Hubbard was driving, but after seeing what Price did to Moore, Hubbard

“couldn’t really move. He said he was in shock, like he was * * * he couldn’t really

drive.” Price told Hubbard to “get out the driver’s seat and let me drive. So they

switched seats before they got to my house.” According to Howard, Hubbard said

that he watched Price kill Moore and “couldn’t really stomach it.” Hubbard “was

confirming everything that [Price] said.” Price still had the Glock with him at the

house, and he gave it to Wilkins and told Wilkins to “get rid of it.”
              Howard explained that he got a “sentence reduction” for accepting

responsibility for the federal gun charges and giving “substantial assistance and

cooperat[ing with] an investigation conducted by Cleveland Heights” into Moore’s

murder. However, according to Howard, he was told about the federal sentence

reduction approximately three months after he agreed to cooperate in Moore’s

murder investigation. “Basically in that situation was, they were trying to figure out

what was going on and what the involvement was. And I cleared my name in the

whole situation to let them know what was going on. And once * * * they did that, I

want to say three months after they knew that I was telling the truth, they came and

told me, like, okay, we’re going to go ahead and drop this down for you.” Howard

testified that his federal sentencing range went from “41 to 51 months” to a “31 to

37-month sentence.”

              On cross-examination, Howard testified that when he spoke with the

police in September 2020, he told them that he “knew nothing about any

homicides.” Howard admitted that this was not true and testified that his “reason

for doing that” was because he “had no attorney with [him] at the time. * * *

[E]verybody knows you don’t speak to the police without an attorney.” It was not

until December 11, 2020, that Howard agreed to cooperate with the government

regarding Moore’s murder. Additionally, it was not until March 2021 that Howard

entered into a plea agreement in his federal gun case. According to Howard, the

government did not “make any promises” to him in exchange for his cooperation.

Asked if he decided “out of the goodness of your heart, to tell the police the truth,”
Howard responded as follows: “Absolutely. I’m clearing my name. I’m going to clear

my name. I had absolutely nothing to do with that.”

      C. Curtiss Jones’s Testimony

              Curtiss Jones (“Jones”) testified that he is “the supervisor of the trace

evidence unit at the Cuyahoga County Medical Examiner’s Office.” Jones testified

as follows regarding issues pertinent to Price’s appeal.

              The Cleveland Heights Police Department submitted two floor mats

for trace-evidence testing. First was the driver-side floor mat from the Charger.

Jones testified that there was no “visible staining” on this floor mat. “[R]andom

testing across the surface of the floor mat” revealed “a location where there was some

positive presumptive test for blood.”     Jones further testified that a “[s]econd

presumptive test” also showed a “reaction” for blood. A “sample was collected from

within that circle and transferred to the DNA unit.”

              The second item tested was the front passenger-side floor mat from

the Charger. There was no visible staining, but “random chemical testing of the

surface * * * showed one portion of the surface had positive reaction, presumptively

for blood.” A second presumptive test was “performed on the entire surface, of

which in that same area there was positive reaction.” A “sample was collected and

transferred to the DNA unit.”

              Jones testified that no “confirmation” testing was done on the floor

mats after the “presumptive testing for blood.” Jones further explained why:

      Typically in samples that aren’t visible — so these are samples that had
      tested presumptive positive through randomized testing or through an
      overall spray or they’re latent, we can’t see them, we kind of have to
      make a decision about what’s best for the sample in terms of — you
      don’t know how much is there anyway. So what we typically like to do
      is once we have that presumptive positive, we’ll just submit those to the
      DNA unit in hopes that they can take whatever amount of sample they
      need, and keeping in mind that they have to retain some for future
      testing if necessary, in a hope that they can take that sample and get a
      DNA profile from that.

              Jones further testified that, had he conducted more testing,

      the result that we could get would be a forensic confirmation for human
      blood. It wouldn’t tell us that it’s absolutely human blood as opposed
      to any other material in the world. So the trace evidence unit’s thought
      is that it’s best to let DNA get a shot at it in [an] attempt to get a DNA
      profile and not consume the sample they may need if they don’t get a
      profile, so that’s typically where we just do presumptive and send to
      them.

              Jones ended his direct-examination testimony by agreeing that his

“conclusions and results” are “to a reasonable degree of forensic science certainty.”

      D. Carey Boucher’s Testimony

              Carey Boucher (“Boucher”) testified that she is a forensic scientist in

the DNA unit of the Cuyahoga County Regional Forensic Science Laboratory in the

Cuyahoga County Medical Examiner’s Office. Boucher tested two items that “were

transferred from the trace evidence department to the DNA department” and are

pertinent to Price’s appeal. First, she tested “[s]wabs of staining from driver side

floor mat” of the Charger. Second, she tested “[s]wabs of staining from passenger

side floor mat” of the Charger. Boucher also obtained DNA standards for Moore,

Price, Hubbard, and Wilkins.

              Boucher testified as follows regarding the swab from driver-side floor

mat: “A likelihood ratio was calculated assuming [this] item * * * contained DNA
from three unknown contributors, [and] a match was identified between [this] item

and * * * Moore.” Boucher also testified that “a match was identified between [the

driver side floor mat swab] and * * * Price.” Furthermore, “[n]o statistical support

for a match was identified between” this floor mat swab and Hubbard or Wilkins.

               Boucher testified as follows regarding the front passenger-side floor-

mat swab: “A likelihood ration was calculated assuming [this] item * * * contained

DNA from four unknown contributors. A match was identified between [this] item

and * * * Moore.”      Boucher further testified that “due to insufficient genetic

information, match support for * * * Price to [the front passenger-side floor-mat

swab] is inconclusive, and no statistical support for a match was identified between

[this] item * * * and * * * Hubbard * * * or * * * Wilkins.”

               After establishing that Moore’s DNA was found on the floor mats of

the Charger, Boucher was next asked about “how DNA can end up on the pieces of

evidence you test.” Boucher explained as follows: “So essentially our whole field is

based on the concept of transfer, that every time you come into contact with a

person, place, thing, you have the opportunity to leave something of yourself

behind.” “Primary transfer” occurs when a person touches something. According

to Boucher, “You’re directly depositing your DNA on it.” “Secondary transfer”

occurs when a person touches something that a second person has previously

touched and then deposits that second person’s DNA onto another surface.

According to Boucher, “[I]f I went to touch something * * * I could possibly deposit

[another person’s] DNA on the next surface that I touched. * * * [The other person]
didn’t directly touch that thing, whatever that second thing I touched is, but perhaps

some of her DNA was left there by me touching it.” Boucher testified that “it’s

possible that you didn’t actually come into contact with a surface, but your DNA

might be found on it.”

               Boucher next explained the difference between “touch DNA” and

“bodily fluid DNA.” Touch DNA most often involves skin cells, while bodily fluid

DNA involves substances such as blood or saliva. Boucher further testified as

follows: “So a bodily fluid is going to be more stable and more hardy [sic]. Skin cells

are more susceptible to * * * elements. They can be more easily transferred or

removed potentially by handling. So in general, touch DNA is less stable, shall we

say, than body fluids.”

               Boucher further explain that, in addition to touch DNA being

transferrable, bodily fluid DNA can be transferred to an object. “Possibly, if it — yes,

remains on the surface it was transferred to, to be then transferred to the next

surface.” According to Boucher, she is able to conclude that a person’s DNA was

found on a floor mat, but she is not “able to say that person was inside that vehicle.”

               The prosecutor next asked Boucher the following hypothetical

question: “If — let’s speak about blood in particular. If somebody has either blood

on their shoes or pants or on their person after they even exited that vehicle, would

that make it more likely that they would have deposited it if that surface came in

contact within that vehicle?” Boucher responded with the following answer: “So if

someone had blood or a bodily fluid on their clothing, got into a car, left it into the
car, and then got out of the car, they would leave it behind.” Boucher further testified

that

       it would be easier to leave biological materials such as blood behind if
       the surface is wet. That would be an easy transfer. If it’s dry, that’s
       possible too. It would be more crumbly in nature than just the direct
       easy transfer of a wet stain. But, so if you transferred blood, however
       mode that may be, then you would — you may still have some on your
       clothing to then leave the vehicle or leave whatever object you were in
       contact with.

                 The prosecutor next asked Boucher another hypothetical question:

       Q: If a person were to come in contact with * * * Moore’s blood outside
       of the vehicle with his foot by kicking him, * * * picking up some of his
       blood, and [this person] got into the passenger side of a vehicle, would
       that be a reasonable explanation for why * * * Moore’s blood is found
       inside of * * * Price’s vehicle on the floor mat in the passenger side?

       ***

       A: Yes, that could be an explanation.

       Q: And if the individual who kicked * * * Moore were to switch and
       then begin driving the vehicle, would that be a reasonable explanation
       for why * * * Moore’s blood is found both on the passenger side and the
       driver side?

       ***

       A: Yes, that could be an explanation.

       ***

       Q: The conclusions you found and you testified to, are they to a
       reasonable degree of medical certainty or scientific certainty?

       A: Yes. All of our conclusions in our reports are based on our standard
       operating procedures, yes.

       Q: And the answers to my hypotheticals I asked you, are they based on
       all of your training and experience and knowledge of DNA?

       A: Yes.
              On cross-examination, Price’s defense counsel asked Boucher if she

tested any of the evidence for blood. Boucher answered that she did presumptive

testing for blood regarding the swabs taken from Moore’s hands, but “[n]one of the

other] evidence items that I did DNA testing on did I do any presumptive test for the

presence of blood.” Boucher testified that “whether it is saliva, whether or not it’s

skin cells or any other genetical material,” she tests for DNA. “I can’t tell you in a

sample, in a mixture, what specifically the DNA is coming from * * *.”

              Price’s defense counsel also asked Boucher about numerous

hypothetical scenarios concerning how a person’s DNA might end up on an object

that they did not touch. For example, defense counsel asked Boucher the following

questions: “Now, when we talk about transfer DNA, there are a number of scenarios

that can be painted — when I say painted, that could happen — that could cause the

presence of DNA being found in an area in which evidence is collected?”; “And in a

mixture itself, hypothetically a person whose standard is, quote, unknown, could

deposit DNA of someone else in that mixture that could be identified; would that be

fair?”; and “[T]heoretically an object, for instance, a shoe can — something from a

shoe can be transferred to another object. That’s possible?” In general, Boucher

answered that all of these defense-posed hypotheticals were possible.

              On redirect examination, Boucher testified that, regarding the swabs

taken from the Charger’s floor mats, “there is support that whatever was swabbed,

there was some blood there. There was support for that based on that presumptive

test” administered by Jones in the trace evidence unit.
III. Law and Analysis

      A. Admission of Evidence

               “The admission or exclusion of relevant evidence rests within the

sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 180, 510 N.E.2d

343 (1987). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision ‘“is unreasonable,

arbitrary or unconscionable.”’ Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450

N.E.2d 1140 (1983), quoting State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144

(1980). The Ohio Supreme Court recently explained that an abuse of discretion

“involves more than a difference in opinion * * *.” State v. Weaver, Slip Opinion

No. 2022-Ohio-4371, ¶ 24. That is, a trial court’s judgment that is “profoundly and

wholly violative of fact and reason” constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id.

               Pursuant to Evid.R. 401, relevant evidence is “evidence having any

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the

determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without

the evidence.” Relevant evidence is not admissible, however, “if its probative value

is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the

issues, or of misleading the jury.” Evid.R. 403(A). “Where evidence has been

improperly admitted in derogation of a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights,

the admission is harmless ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ if the remaining evidence

alone comprises ‘overwhelming’ proof of defendant’s guilt.” State v. Williams, 6

Ohio St.3d 281, 290, 452 N.E.2d 1323 (1983).
           1. The Victim’s Blood and DNA Evidence

               In the first part of Price’s first assignment of error, he argues that it

was improper for the prosecutor to refer to the “stains” on the Charger’s floor mats

as “blood” during Boucher’s testimony, because “there was no factual basis * * * that

the DNA sample taken from the floor mats was blood.” Price further argues that this

testimony should not have been admitted at trial.

               Evid.R. 705 states in part that an “expert [witness] may testify in

terms of opinion or inference and give the expert’s reasons therefor after disclosure

of the underlying facts or data.” Evid.R. 703 states that the “facts or data in the

particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those

perceived by the expert or admitted in evidence at the hearing.”

               To support his argument on appeal, Price cites to Armbruster v.

Hampton, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 05CA008716, 2006-Ohio-4530. In Armbruster, our

sister court found that the trial court acted within its discretion when it excluded “a

mere conclusory opinion statement from [the expert witness’s] report without any

disclosure of the underlying facts or data.” Id. at ¶ 73. The Armbruster Court

concluded that the “appellant failed to comply with the mandates of Evid.R. 705 and

lay a proper foundation for the admission of [the expert’s] testimony.” Id.

               Price also relies on this court’s holding in Werchola v. Premier Mfg.

Corp., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 37021, 1978 Ohio App. LEXIS 10244, 7 (Apr. 13,

1978), that expert testimony was inadmissible when “there [was] no testimony by

which to support * * * a two-hour exposure by the claimant to noxious carbon
monoxide.” The Werchola Court reasoned that “the hypothesis upon which an

expert witness is asked to state an opinion must be based upon facts within the

witness’ own personal knowledge or upon facts established by the evidence.” Id.

              Armbruster and Werchola involve situations where the proponent of

expert evidence failed to lay a proper foundation. In other words, no foundational

evidence was introduced at trial to support the particular opinion testimony of an

expert witness. That is simply not the situation in the case at hand. Extensive

foundational testimony was introduced at Price’s trial regarding DNA evidence in

general and Moore’s DNA that was found on the Charger’s floor mats.

              The record shows, and Price concedes on appeal, that Jones testified

that two presumptive tests were positive for blood, but “no confirmatory test was

done.” Furthermore, Howard testified that he saw blood on Price’s shoes and pants,

and Price told Howard that he kicked Moore in the head after he shot Moore to make

sure Moore was dead.

              Boucher testified that swabs taken from staining found on the driver-

side and front-passenger side floor mats of the Charger contained evidence of

Moore’s DNA. The bulk of Boucher’s testimony concerned DNA evidence, and it

goes unchallenged that Boucher was qualified under Evid.R. 702 to testify as an

expert witness in the area of DNA evidence. Boucher testified that regardless of the

substance she tests, her testing concerns DNA, which can be extracted from the

simple “touch” of a surface or from various bodily fluids.
               Furthermore, evidence presented at trial established a “presumption”

that the swabs taken from the floor mats in the Charger contained blood. Boucher’s

testimony regarding the “blood” found on the floor mats was consistent with this

presumption that the swab of the floor mat contained blood.

               Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion

in allowing questions that the prosecutor asked Boucher about the “blood” on the

floor mats that contained Moore’s DNA.

           2. Expert Witnesses and Hypotheticals

               In the final part of Price’s first assignment of error, he argues that

Boucher’s testimonial responses to the prosecutor’s hypothetical questions were not

“made to a reasonable scientific certainty.”

               Evid.R. 702(C) states that expert-witness testimony must be “based

on reliable scientific, technical, or other specialized information.” See also State v.

Jackson, 92 Ohio St.3d 436, 448, 751 N.E.2d 946 (2001) (“An expert opinion is

competent if it is held to a reasonable degree of scientific or medical certainty.”);

State v. Samuels, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 81333 and 81334, 2003-Ohio-2865, ¶ 24.

Furthermore, Evid.R. 705 states in part that expert testimony “may be in response

to a hypothetical question * * *.”

               According to Boucher, the conclusions that she testified to were made

to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty. This is proper under Evid.R. 702(C).

The prosecutor additionally asked Boucher the following question: “And the

answers to my hypotheticals I asked you, are they based on all of your training and
experience and knowledge of DNA?” Boucher answered, “Yes.” The phrasing in this

question is grounded in Evid.R. 702(B), which states that a “witness is qualified as

an expert by specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education

regarding the subject matter of the testimony * * *.” Nothing in this colloquy leads

us to conclude that Boucher’s answers to the prosecutor’s hypothetical questions

were not based on her reasonable degree of scientific certainty. In other words,

Evid.R. 702(B) and 702(C) are not mutually exclusive — as long as expert-witness

testimony is based on reliable scientific information, it can also be based on

specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.

               Upon review, we find that the court acted within its discretion

regarding the admissibility of the prosecutor’s hypotheticals and Boucher’s answers.

Accordingly, Price’s first assignment of error is overruled.

      B. Manifest Weight of the Evidence

            1. Standard of Review

               In his second assignment of error, Price first argues that an “appellate

court in a manifest weight review should not defer to the jury’s findings of

credibility.” Specifically, Price argues that an “appellate court will never disagree

with the fact-finder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony if it invariably defers to

the fact-finder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.” The entirety of Price’s

argument that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence

follows:

      Price’s conviction hinged almost entirely on the testimony of Jerry
      Howard. Howard had admittedly lied to the police when he was first
      interviewed on September 20, 2020. He came forward only in the
      hopes of ameliorating the sentence in his Federal case. His testimony
      about the conversation with Price was not corroborated by Wilkins,
      who had the same motive to testify — mitigation of his sentence for
      tampering — as did Howard.

      The police never located the gun that was supposedly used in the
      shooting, and frankly admitted that they could not discern a motive for
      Price’s killing of Moore. In viewing the totality of the evidence, it
      manifestly did not support Price’s conviction.

               A   manifest-weight-of-the-evidence       challenge    “addresses    the

evidence’s effect of inducing belief. * * * In other words, a reviewing court asks

whose evidence is more persuasive — the state’s or the defendant’s?” State v.

Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶ 25. “When a court

of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against

the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as the ‘thirteenth juror’ and

disagrees with the factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.” State v.

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). Reversing a conviction

under a manifest weight theory “should be exercised only in the exceptional case in

which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” State v. Martin, 20 Ohio

App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).

               The jury found Price guilty of the following offenses with firearm

specifications. R.C. 2903.01(A), which governs aggravated murder, states that “[n]o

person shall purposely, and with prior calculation and design, cause the death of

another * * *”; R.C. 2903.02(B), which governs murder, states that “[n]o person

shall cause the death of another as a proximate result of the offender’s committing

* * * an offense of violence that is a felony of the first or second degree * * *”; and
R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), which governs felonious assault, states that “[n]o person shall

knowingly * * * [c]ause serious physical harm to another * * *.” Price’s felonious

assault conviction is a second-degree felony.

           2. Manifest Weight in the Case at Hand

              Upon review, we find that the following evidence presented at trial

weighs in favor of Price’s convictions. Video-surveillance footage put Price in the

same area as Moore immediately prior to Moore’s murder. Witness testimony

established that Moore, Price, and Hubbard had a history of disagreements.

Witness testimony also established that multiple shots were fired and a car matching

the Charger’s description sped away from the scene. Forensic evidence showed that

Moore’s DNA was found on the Charger’s floor mats. Howard testified that Price

admitted that he and Hubbard followed Moore when Moore was walking home.

Howard further testified that Price admitted he shot Moore multiple times and

kicked Moore to make sure he was dead. Howard saw blood on Price’s pant legs and

shoes. Howard also testified that Price told him he both drove the Charger and sat

in the front-passenger seat of the Charger immediately after Price murdered Moore.

              Howard’s detailed testimony is corroborated by the forensic and

video evidence introduced at Price’s trial. Price’s argument that Howard’s testimony

was not corroborated by Wilkins’s testimony is not well-taken because Wilkins did

not testify at Price’s trial. Price’s argument that the police could “not discern a

motive for Price’s killing of Moore” is also not well-taken. First, “motive” is not an
element of aggravated murder, murder, or felonious assault. Second, testimony at

trial established that Price, Moore, and Hubbard had a history of disagreements.

               It is true that, in September 2020, Howard told the police that he did

not know anything about Moore’s murder, and in December 2020, Howard told the

police a detailed accounting of Moore’s murder based on what Price told Howard

immediately after the murder. It is also true that, in March 2021, Howard entered

into a plea agreement in his federal case, in which he received a “substantial

assistance reduction” of his sentence in exchange for his agreement to “cooperate

fully * * * in any state or local authorities in investigations and prosecutions * * *.”

               Additionally, it is true that the police did not locate the murder

weapon in this case. However, evidence in the record established that, under Price’s

instructions, Wilkins got rid of the gun Price used to kill Moore.

               We cannot say that the evidence presented at Price’s trial weighs

heavily in favor of reversal. Rather, the overwhelming evidence supports Price’s

convictions. “[T]he weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the

witnesses are primarily for the trier of facts.” State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230,

231, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967). “Murder convictions can rest upon circumstantial

evidence. * * * Indeed, circumstantial evidence may be more certain, satisfying and

persuasive than direct evidence.” State v. Richey, 64 Ohio St.3d 353, 363, 595

N.E.2d 915 (1992). This is not the exceptional case where the jury clearly lost its way

and created a manifest miscarriage of justice.            Accordingly, Price’s second

assignment of error is overruled.
              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.          The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

LISA B. FORBES, JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., and
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR