Court Opinion

ID: 9569140
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:10:50.600812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:49:31.739547
License: Public Domain

Justice MARTIN
dissenting.
By holding that a superior court judge may blow the breath of life into a functus officio summons, the majority today has overthrown a constant line of authority extending to the opening of this Court in 1819.
The alias summons in this case was issued on 2 May 1986 and served on 5 June 1986, admittedly not within the time required by statute. Thus, the alias summons became functus officio and plaintiff must then cause a pluries summons to be issued and served in order to avoid a discontinuance of the action. Williams *278v. Bray, 273 N.C. 198, 159 S.E. 2d 556 (1968). Service of a summons after the date of its return is a nullity and the court does not acquire jurisdiction. Webb v. R.R., 268 N.C. 552, 151 S.E. 2d 19 (1966).
The majority states that the above authorities are no longer binding because under Rule 6(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure the trial courts now have authority to “breathe new life and effectiveness into such a summons retroactively after it has become functus officio.” The majority overlooks the fact that Rule 6(b) is nothing new to our courts; it basically carries forward the provision of former N.C.G.S. § 1-152 which permitted the trial judges in their discretion to enlarge the time for the doing of any act. See N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 6(b) comment. Although this discretionary power by statute has existed since well before the turn of the century, see Austin v. Clarke, 70 N.C. 458 (1874), this is the first time this Court has sought to apply it to a nullity, a functus officio summons. Even with this discretionary authority vested in trial judges, they are not empowered to make something out of nothing.
It is well settled that where the requirements of service are not satisfied, the court is without jurisdiction over the defendant. Sink v. Easter, 284 N.C. 555, 202 S.E. 2d 138 (1974). Where the process is void, generally it cannot be amended, because it confers no jurisdiction. Harris v. Maready, 311 N.C. 536, 319 S.E. 2d 912 (1984). As Justice Meyer stated in his dissent in Smith v. Starnes, 317 N.C. 613, 619, 346 S.E. 2d 424, 428 (1986):
“ ‘[W]here a statute provides for service of summons or notices in the progress of a cause by certain persons or by designated methods, the specified requirements must be complied with or there is no valid service.’ ” Guthrie v. Ray, 293 N.C. 67, 69, 235 S.E. 2d 146, 148 (1967) (quoting S. Lowman v. Ballard & Co., 168 N.C. 16, 18, 84 S.E. 21, 22 (1915)).
Rule 4 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure clearly and specifically sets out the methods for obtaining jurisdiction by the service of process, and this procedure stands alone. By applying Rule 6(b) to revalidate a defunct summons, the majority has in effect amended Rule 4. Rule 6(b) does not address the legal validity of an instrument of process such as a summons but deals with such matters as extensions of time to file pleadings in various *279cases. Rule 4 provides a comprehensive, statutory framework for process and extension of time for service that requires no supplement from any other rule. Rule 6 cannot be interpreted to authorize a court to adjudicate matters beyond its jurisdiction, which the court would be attempting to do if it endeavored to authorize the service of a summons beyond the period allowed by statute.
The majority has permitted the trial judge to set aside the statute of limitations in this case retroactively by invoking Rule 6(b). Surely this was not the intent of the General Assembly in adopting the rule.
The majority states that the purpose of the rules was to take the “sporting element” out of the trial of lawsuits. Indeed, this is one of the goals sought by the rules, and close adherence to Rule 4 would serve this purpose by removing the “sporting element” from determining when the court has obtained jurisdiction over the person. Authorizing the trial judge to amend in his discretion the rules with respect to the service of summons after the time for the serving of the summons has expired would indeed foster and encourage the “sporting element” in the trial of lawsuits. Lawyers need definite rules to guide them with respect to the commencement of lawsuits and obtaining jurisdiction over parties. This is done by Rule 4. Injecting the discretionary actions of the trial judge through Rule 6(b) defeats this legislative purpose.
I find that service in this case was obtained upon the defendant on 10 September 1986 and the superior court did not obtain jurisdiction prior to that time. I vote to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Chief Justice Exum and Justice Meyer join in this dissent.