Court Opinion

ID: 9829267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:08:36.606622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:59.267548
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellee insists in his motion for rehearing that the objection made to the introduction of the evidence as to the purchase of the big tractor was not sufficient to present the grounds of objections on which the evidence was held to be inadmissible. The objection to the evidence was that there was no pleading to authorize the introduction of such evidence, and that it was “wholly irrelevant, immaterial and prejudicial to the rights of the defendant.” We take it that if the evidence was not admissible the objection to it came within the general ground of irrelevancy. The admissibility of evidence of this'kind is treated by Mr. Chamberlayne, under the general title of “Relevancy.” In discussing the admissibility of such evidence he says:
“The extrajudicial statement of one to be benefited by the truth of that which he asserts ' cannot be received in proof of the facts alleged either for the declarant’s benefit or for that of Ms successors in interest. In most cases such statement is plainly irrelevant for the purpose. * » * Little probative relevance is gained from the circumstances under which the self-serving declarations may have been made. ⅜ * ⅜ irreievanCy 0f a self-serving statement being inherent, it is equally inadmissible when offered by representatives of the declar-ant, etc.” Chamberlayne on Evidence, § 2734.
See, also, Jones on Evidence, §§ 135 and 235a ; Greenleaf on Evidence, § 52. In some instances an objection to testimony that it is irrelevant, immaterial, incompetent, and the like, is too general to merit consideration, but that is not true in all eases. Rule 57 for the district and county courts, is as follows:
“Exceptions to the admission of evidence on the trial, where no reason is assigned for objecting to it, shall not be sustained where the evidence is obviously competent and admissible, as tending to prove any of the facts put in issue in the pleadings; and in all cases the court, when deemed necessary, may call upon the parties offering the evidence to.explain the object of its admission and also upon the party excepting, the reason of his objections, which when done in either or both cases may form a part of the bill of exceptions.”
Prior to the adoption of this rule it had been the ruling, at least by inference, of the Supreme Court, that where the objection went to the relevancy of the evidence a gen*226eral objection was sufficient. Ryan v. Jackson, 11 Tex. 391; Croft v. Raines, 10 Tex. 520; Cheatham v. Riddle, 8 Tex. 162; Norvell v. Phillips, 46 Tex. 161. See, also, State v. Ellison, 287 Mo. 139, 229 S. W. 1059, and Roche v. Llewellyn Iron Works Co., 140 Cal. 563, 74 Pac. 153. There seems to be no good reason to believe that the trial court was in any way misled by the generality of the objection. Appellee himself, until the filing of this motion for rehearing, had treated the objection as sufficient, and in his original brief ■of the case replied to the proposition complaining of its admission by an argument in favor of the relevancy of the evidence as tending to establish the fact that the contract for the purchase of the tractor was actually made as alleged by plaintiff. We are of the opinion, therefore, that we would not be justified in refusing to consider the assignment because of the generality of the objection to the introduction of the evidence.
It is again argued that no controversy as to the making of the contract had occurred at the time of this act, and that therefore it is admissible as corroborating evidence on contradiction and impeachment'of plaintiff’s evidence as to the making of the contract. As a matter of fact, defendant had offered no contradiction of plaintiff’s evidence at the time this evidence was introduced; it being offered while plaintiff, ,the first witness on the stand, was testifying on direct examination. But, even if plaintiff had been at the time contradicted, it would not have been in our opinion admissible. The transaction oc-cured after the time when plaintiff claimed to have made the contract. The defendant denied that any such contract was in fact made. In the case of Etna Insurance Co. v. Eastman, 95 Tex. 34, 64 S. W. 863, the suit was on a fire insurance policy, and the defendant pleaded that the policy was voided because of the breach of a provision therein against additional insurance. The defendant'pleaded that the provision was waived by reason of the fact that he had notified defendant’s agent of such additional insurance, and no action was taken to cancel the policy. On the trial the evidence as to whether plaintiff had given notice to the insurance agent was conflicting. Under these circumstances the trial court permitted a witness to testify that the plaintiff had told the witness on the day after the additional insurance was taken out, and before the fire, that he had notified the insurance agent of the fact that additional insurance had been taken. The Supreme Court held that the admission of this evidence was error.
“It was a self-serving declaration. Whether his [plaintiff’s] interest in the matter induced him to make the statement or not is 'not, as we understand, a question to be inquired into by the court in determining the admissibility of the declaration. If the motive did not exist, the evidence is admissible. If it did, it should be excluded. At the time he gave his testimony the loss had accrued, and his interest was more immediate, and the motive more potent. It is nevertheless true that at the time of the alleged statement it was to his interest to make it. At the last-named period, if notice had not been given, the policy was void and worthless. If it had, it was valid .and a thing of value. Therefore, while the motive at the time of the alleged statement may have differed in degree from that at the time of the trial, it did not differ in kind.’’
We think the case directly in point on this contention, and it decides it against the ap-pellee.
Evidence of self-serving conduct is in the same class as, that of self-serving declarations. 22 O. J. p. 230.
It is also urged for the first time that other testimony to the same effect was admitted without objection. The additional evidence thus referred to occurs in plaintiff’s testimony as to a conversation with defendant’s agent, Kiser, in which plaintiff testified as follows:
“The machine hadn’t come (referring to the thresher which he claimed to have contracted for), and I told him about this tractor and having it there to pull this machine with, and he tóld me he didn’t think they would ever come.”
We do not think the defendant should be deprived of the benefit of its objection to the introduction of the evidence as to plaintiff’s buying the tractor by failure to after-wards object to evidence that merely refers incidentally to such matter. When a party-once makes an objection to certain evidence, and preserves his objection thereto so that the evidence is in the record for all purposes, it ought not to be necessary for him to thereafter incumber the record by exceptions on every occasion when such evidence is incidentally referred to in the further trial of the case on penalty of losing the benefit of his objection to the introduction of the evidence in the first instance.
The motion for rehearing will be overruled.