Court Opinion

ID: 9492954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:54:05.955368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:34.152892
License: Public Domain

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The panel is unanimous in its view that the trial judge should have recused himself under § 455(a), which requires a judge to “disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Under the circumstances set forth in detail by the majority here, in any other circuit a new trial would be ordered. In this circuit, however, we can only review the trial judge’s decision against recusal when the issue is presented in a petition for a writ of mandamus. The .defendants did file a petition for mandamus relief from the trial judge’s decision not to recuse himself, and another panel of this court denied that petition without opinion. ■
The rule that mandamus is the only avenue by which a party can seek review of a ruling under § 455(a) is well-established in this circuit. See United States v. Horton, 98 F.3d 313, 316-17 (7th Cir.1996); Hook v. McDade, 89 F.3d 350, 353 n.2 (7th Cir.1996); United States v. Towns, 913 F.2d 434, 443 (7th Cir.1990). This circuit’s view has been that § 455(a) is intended to protect against the appearance of impropriety, and that, once the proceedings in the district court have been completed, the harm § 455(a) seeks to prevent has already occurred. See United States v. Troxell, 887 F.2d 830, 833 (7th Cir.1989). Thus, we have required litigants to bring mandamus petitions to cure potential problems under § 455(a) and to prevent a potentially tainted trial from ever taking place. See id.
No other court of appeals has' followed our approach. See Kenneth M. Fall, Note, Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.: The Supreme Court Encourages Disqualification of Federal Judges Under Section 455(a), 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 1033, 1056. Some circuits have rejected explicitly our position. The Third Circuit has said that mandamus is the preferred method of appeal, but allows review on direct appeal because it may provide a “partial cure” to any harm to the public perception of the judiciary. See In re School Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 777 n.12 (3d Cir.1992). The Tenth Circuit has held that, although § 455(a) is concerned with the rights of the public, the parties do retain some rights thereunder, and direct appeal may therefore be appropriate. See United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 996 n. 9 (10th Cir.1993). Other circuits have entertained § 455(a) arguments on direct appeal and, indeed, have addressed the merits or found the issue waived because it was not raised in the district court. See, e.g., Unit*650ed States v. Mosby, 177 F.3d 1067, 1068-69 (8th Cir.1999); United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34, 48-49 (2d Cir.1998); United States v. Barrett, 111 F.3d 947, 951-53 (D.C.Cir.1997); United States v. Sturman, 951 F.2d 1466, 1481-82 (6th Cir.1991); Diversified Numismatics, Inc. v. City of Orlando, 949 F.2d 382, 384-85 (11th Cir.1991) (per curiam); United States v. Arache, 946 F.2d 129, 140 (1st Cir.1991); United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1476-77 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Wade, 931 F.2d 300, 302-05 (5th Cir.1991); United States v. Mitchell, 886 F.2d 667, 671 (4th Cir.1989).
Moreover, we not only stand alone among the circuits in our approach to this question, but we also have taken a position in considerable tension with the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. Indeed, the Supreme Court appears to have taken a different path. Although the Court has not rejected explicitly that mandamus is the only avenue of review for § 455(a) matters, it has twice interpreted that section in cases brought to it .in the manner, of an appeal from final judgment. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994); Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988). These cases, especially Liljeberg’s approval of va-catur of a trial court’s judgment, clearly cast significant doubt on our view that mandamus is the only appropriate remedy under § 455(a). Nevertheless, we never have considered whether these decisions of the Supreme Court make our approach untenable; we have continued to follow our same approach even after the announcement of those Supreme Court decisions.
This case points out one of the pitfalls of our approach. As the Third Circuit has suggested, a trial judge well might appear unbiased at the outset of a trial, but later events might cause a judge’s impartiality to be reasonably questioned and thus make appropriate the “partial cure” of reversing the improperly obtained verdict. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d at 777-78. Indeed, in one recent case, the First Circuit, although denying mandamus relief, specifically left open the possibility that further development of the record could lead to a different conclusion on an appeal from final judgment. See In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 221 (1st Cir.1997). Regardless of whether this panel would have issued the same ruling as the earlier motions panel if it had been presented with the record available at that early stage of the litigation, the record made at trial has convinced us that recusal is necessary. There must be public confidence in a judgment that incarcerates defendants, in some cases for the rest of their lives. The trial of this matter was a difficult task. It required that the trial court make many rulings, both with respect to the admissibility of evidence and the enhancement of sentences, that required the exercise of a great deal of discretion.
After thorough review of the record, this panel - believes that the district judge should have -recused himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Only our rigid adherence to a procedural rule not followed in any other circuit and in significant tension with the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States prevents our giving the relief that, under ■ the prevailing national standards, would be granted. See, e.g., United States v. Bremers, 195 F.3d 221 (5th Cir.1999) (vacating conviction because trial judge should have recused himself under § 455(a)); Cooley, 1 F.3d at 998 (same); United States v. Brown, 539 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.1976) (same). See also United States v. Waskom, 179 F.3d 303, 315-16 (5th Cir.1999) (vacating sentence in guilty plea case even in the absence of specific allegation of sentencing error because trial judge should have recused himself); United States v. Reyes, 160 F.3d 258, 259 (5th Cir.1998) (vacating sentence in guilty plea case because of failure to recuse).
The majority characterizes the defendants’ reference to the earlier mandamus proceeding as a waiver of the argument *651that mandamus should mot be the only available remedy. The defendants state: “Defendants appeal the denial of recusal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455(b). The motion for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) could only be, and was, appealed by mandamus.” Appellant’s br. at 49. This was sufficient to put this court on notice of our rule that only mandamus relief is available under § 455(a). It is indeed a parsimonious reading of this statement to characterize it as a knowing and intelligent waiver. Far from ignoring the issue, the defendants specifically brought it to our attention. Because the defendants raised the matter, and clearly have maintained throughout this litigation that recusal under § 455(a) was required, this court should not be restrained from reconsidering in this case our position on the issue.1
Moreover, even if the defendants did not raise this issue, we are in no way precluded from raising it on our own in the interests of justice. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that it often decides cases on issues other than those argued fully by the parties:
“On a number of occasions, this Court has considered issues waived by the parties below and in the petition for certio-rari because the issues were so integral to decision of the case that they could be considered ‘fairly subsumed’ by the actual questions presented.” Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 37, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing cases). The court has not always confined itself to the set of issues addressed by the parties.
Kolstad v. American Dental Assoc., 527 U.S. 526, -, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 2127, 144 L.Ed.2d 494 (1999). The Court has also specifically instructed the courts of appeals that they, too, may raise issues on their own initiative:
The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases. We announce no general rule. Certainly there are circumstances in which a federal appellate court is justified in resolving an issue not passed on below, as where the proper resolution is beyond any doubt, or where injustice might otherwise result.
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976) (citations and quotations omitted); see also Niedert v. Rieger, 200 F.3d 522, 527(7th Cir.1999) (quoting Singleton); United States v. Brown, 739 F.2d 1136, 1145 (7th Cir.1984) (same).
Prior to Singleton, the Ninth Circuit explained the circumstances that might motivate a court of appeals to address a matter without the benefit of full briefing by the parties:
There is ... no rigid and undeviating judicially declared practice under which courts of review invariably and under all circumstances decline to consider all questions which have not previously been specifically urged. Indeed there could not be without doing violence to the statutes which give federal appellate courts the power to modify, reverse or remand decisions as may be just under the circumstances. Exceptional cases or particular circumstances may prompt a reviewing court, where injustice might otherwise result or where public policy requires, to consider questions neither pressed nor passed upon below.
Nuelsen v. Sorensen, 293 F.2d 454, 462 (9th Cir.1961) (citation and quotations *652omitted).2 As we did in Niedert and Brown, and as the Ninth Circuit did in Nuelsen, so too have other circuits acknowledged that they may, when justice requires it, raise critical issues of law sua sponte.3 The Ninth Circuit wisely cautioned that this power must be “exercised sparingly.” Nuelsen, 293 F.2d at 462. This case, however, is the sort of exceptional case that casts new light on procedures previously taken for granted.
If we may sua sponte raise and decide substantive questions of law, then surely we have the power to sua sponte alter the procedures we ask litigants to follow in their efforts to seek resolution of their substantive questions of law. It is well settled that stare decisis has less effect in the context of procedural rules, which do not serve as a guide to lawful behavior. See Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251-52, 118 S.Ct. 1969, 141 L.Ed.2d 242 (1998); United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995).
The prosecution of the El Rukn crime organization has been a deeply troubling episode. Chief Judge Aspen presided over the first trial of this particular case, and, in ordering a retrial, described the situation as tragic, noting that the prosecutorial misconduct in the case had wasted years of hard work by the courts, prosecutors, and law enforcement officers. See United States v. Boyd, 833 F.Supp. 1277, 1281 (ND.Ill.1993), aff'd, 55 F.3d 239 (7th Cir.1995). Two other El Rukn trials were also declared mistrials. See United States v. Andrews, 824 F.Supp. 1273 (N.D.Ill.1993); United States v. Burnside, 824 F.Supp. 1215 (N.D.Ill.1993). As the judiciary was quick to correct an abuse of power in another branch of government after the first trial, it also ought to be willing to correct an error in its own house — even one made in good faith — so that the public can have confidence that, even in the most notorious of criminal cases, the evenhand-edness of the judicial process is above reproach.
It is time for us to join the rest of the Country and permit review by appeal of a failure to recuse under § 455(a). I would vacate the judgments of conviction and order a new trial.

. When a party does not make a fully formed argument that we should overrule our earlier precedent to align ourselves with other courts, the court may consider the argument waived. See United States v. Martin, 195 F.3d 961, 967 (7th Cir.1999). Waiver is not mandatory, of course, but instead, appellate courts have the discretion to find that arguments are waived. See, e.g., Smith v. Freeman, 892 F.2d 331, 337 n. 12 (3d Cir.1989) (collecting cases). We are therefore under no obligation to avoid this question.

. See also All Care Nursing Serv., Inc. v. Bethesda Mem. Hosp., 887 F.2d 1535, 1538 n. 3 (11th Cir. 1989) (quoting Nuelsen); Boals v. Gray, 775 F.2d 686, 691 (6th Cir.1985) (same); Cohen v. West Haven Bd. of Police Comm’rs, 638 F.2d 496, 500 n.6 (2d Cir.1980) (citing Nuelsen); McKissick v. United States, 379 F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir.1967) (quoting Nuelsen).

. See Curry v. Beatrice Pocahontas Coal Co., 67 F.3d 517, 522 n. 8 (4th Cir.1995) ("The normal rule of course is that the failure to raise an issue for review in the prescribed manner constitutes a waiver. But the rule is not an absolute one and review may proceed (even completely sua sponte) when the equities require.” (citation omitted)); Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir.1993) ("However, we have discretion to consider and decide sua sponte a dispositive issue of law."); Counts v. Kissack Water & Oil Serv., Inc., 986 F.2d 1322, 1325-26 (10th Cir.1993) ("Although it is rarely done an appellate court may, sua sponte, raise a dispositive issue of law when the proper resolution is beyond doubt and the failure to address the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice.”).