Court Opinion

ID: 9555049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-10 16:08:38.086819+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:40:58.321751
License: Public Domain

J-A10003-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ALBERT DUNKOWSKI                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1047 EDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 7, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0000225-2020

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.:                           FILED AUGUST 10, 2023

       Albert Dunkowski brings this appeal from the judgment of sentence

imposed following his conviction of three counts of endangering the welfare of

children, based on the neglect suffered by three of his children. We affirm.

       In August 2019, police discovered Dunkowski and his wife inhabiting an

automobile that was parked in the lot of the Woodbourn Train Station in

Middletown Township. Upon arriving at the scene, officers observed

Dunkowski lying face down in the grass. His wife was slumped over in the

front passenger seat. Four children occupied the rear seat area of the vehicle.

A cat was also living in the car. Officers noted that the vehicle was cluttered

with trash, clothing, food, and debris. They also noticed the strong odor of

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A10003-23

bodily excretions, cigarettes, and rotting food. Due to the visibly poor physical

condition of the children, the officers called Emergency Medical Services

(“EMS”). EMS took protective custody of the children and transported them to

the hospital.

      The trial court offered the following review of the condition of the various

children that were in the parental care of Dunkowski and his wife:

             At [the hospital], treating physicians made the following
      assessments: N.D., who suffered from cerebral palsy, was
      thirteen years old and weighed about ninety pounds. She was
      nonverbal, had a feeding tube, and started to develop bedsores
      from remaining in the same position for a significant amount of
      time. J.D. was four years old and weighed about forty pounds. She
      was still in diapers as she was not yet trained to go to the
      bathroom on her own and she needed extensive dental work - a
      root canal, a crown, and three fillings. Female L.D. was five years
      old and weighed about forty-eight pounds. She was also still in
      diapers and needed nine root canals, nine crowns, one filling, and
      four teeth pulled. She had never been to school. Male L.D. was
      nine years old and weighed about sixty pounds. He had bilateral
      clubfeet … as well as undescended testicles … . Both required
      procedures—several to improve Male L.D.’s clubfeet and one to
      surgically descend his testicles. Male L.D. also had such a severe,
      significant amount of dried, caked-on fecal matter on his diaper
      that when the doctor pulled it back, Male L.D.’s skin became raw
      and red. Dr. Torradas, the physician who treated the children,
      testified that, over the course of his lengthy career, he had never
      seen anything like what he saw on August 27, 2019.

            That same day, [Dunkowski] and [his wife] spoke with
      Detective Brian Hyams (hereinafter “Detective Hyams”) and told
      him that none of the four children found were enrolled in school.
      Detective Hyams asked if they had any additional children and
      they provided the names of three more minors in their care. They
      relayed that one child, R.[D]., was staying with a friend at the
      time, but neither [Dunkowski] nor [his wife] could provide any
      contact information to get in touch with her. Authorities eventually
      found R.[D]. and discovered that she missed almost the entire
      2018-2019 school year and had an abscess in her tooth that

                                      -2-
J-A10003-23

       rendered her unable to chew and required significant dental
       surgery. Fortunately, R.D did not require immediate, emergency
       medical treatment.

             Shortly thereafter, Detective Hyams discovered that
       [Dunkowski] and [his wife] had an eighth minor child—S.D.— they
       did not mention when previously asked. After some investigation,
       Detective Hyams located S.D. and [Dunkowski] agreed to “turn
       her over” to authorities in a McDonald’s parking lot. S.D.
       “appeared to be very thin, small, disheveled. Her hair was very
       short as if it wasn’t growing, or falling out. Her eyes were puffy
       underneath. She was very, very quiet, almost like she was
       lethargic.” Doctors later determined she weighed about forty-two
       pounds. S.D. was unable to walk because her legs were bent in a
       seated position. She also still needed diapers – at thirteen years
       old – because [Dunkowski] and [his wife] never taught her how
       to use the bathroom. Authorities immediately took protective
       custody of S.D. and transported her to [the hospital] with the
       other children.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/23/22, at 2-4 (citations omitted).

       On September 10, 2019, Dunkowski was charged with six counts of

endangering the welfare of children.1 Dunkowski’s wife was also charged with

the same crimes. A consolidated jury trial commenced on October 4, 2021.

On the third day of trial, Dunkowski and his wife failed to appear. The trial

court issued a bench warrant, held a hearing, and proceeded with the trial in

absentia. The jury convicted Dunkowski of three counts of endangering the

welfare of children and found him not guilty on the remaining three counts. 2

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(1).

2 The jury convicted Dunkowski of the charges relating to S.D., N.D., and Male

L.D. He was acquitted of the charges pertaining to Female L.D., J.D., and R.D.

                                           -3-
J-A10003-23

      Authorities apprehended Dunkowski on November 3, 2021. On February

7, 2022, the trial court sentenced Dunkowski to serve an aggregate term of

incarceration of nine to twenty-one years. Dunkowski filed a timely post-

sentence motion, which the trial court denied. This timely appeal followed.

Dunkowski asks us to review whether the trial court erred in allowing him to

be tried in absentia, erred in permitting impact testimony from an EMS worker,

and abused its discretion in formulating his sentence.

      Dunkowski first asks us to address the issue of whether the trial court

erred in continuing his trial in absentia. See Appellant’s Brief at 12-18.

Dunkowski alleges the Commonwealth failed to prove by a preponderance of

the evidence that his absence from the final day of trial was without cause.

See id. He asserts the Commonwealth did not set forth sufficient competent

evidence to meet its burden. See id. We disagree.

      A criminal defendant has the right to be present at all stages of criminal

proceedings. See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 598, 712 A.2d 735, 737 (Pa.

1998). In Pennsylvania, the rule governing a trial in absentia is set forth in

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 602, which provides in relevant part

as follows:

      Rule 602. Presence of the Defendant

      (A) The defendant shall be present at every stage of the trial
      including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict,
      and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided
      by this rule. The defendant’s absence without cause shall
      not preclude proceeding with the trial including the return
      of the verdict and the imposition of sentence.

                                     -4-
J-A10003-23

Pa.R.Crim.P. 602(A) (emphasis added).

      Generally, a defendant who is absent without cause at the start of trial

may be tried in absentia. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 734 A.2d 864,

866-867 (Pa. Super. 1999). The rule authorizing trials in absentia embodies

the principle that, while the Sixth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution protect

the right of an accused to be present in court at every stage of a criminal trial,

this right may be waived in non-capital cases either expressly or implicitly by

a defendant’s actions. See Commonwealth v. Hill, 737 A.2d 255, 258 (Pa.

Super. 1999). Therefore,

      [w]here    the   Commonwealth        has    demonstrated      by a
      preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is absent
      “without cause” and that he knowingly and intelligently waived his
      right to be present, he may be tried in absentia. However, when
      a defendant is unaware of the charges against him, unaware of
      the establishment of his trial date or is absent involuntarily, he is
      not absent “without cause” and therefore cannot be tried in
      absentia.

Id. at 259 (citations omitted).

      Our Supreme Court has held that a review of the sufficiency of the

Commonwealth’s evidence is not necessary if the record, taken as a whole,

establishes that the defendant had notice of trial and nonetheless “willfully

decided to absent himself without cause or justification.” Commonwealth v.

Sullens, 619 A.2d 1349, 1352-1353 (Pa. 1992). In Sullens, the defendant

                                      -5-
J-A10003-23

admitted during sentencing that he knew of his trial date and knowingly

absconded. Id. at 1353.

      The decision to proceed with trial rather than to grant a continuance is

within the trial court’s discretion. See Johnson, 734 A.2d at 866, 867. This

Court reviews the determination of the trial court to proceed with a trial in

absentia for an abuse of that discretion. See Wilson, 712 A.2d at 738. See

also Commonwealth v. Bond, 693 A.2d 220 (Pa. Super. 1997) (finding that

the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the appellant’s

motion to suppress, conducted his trial and sentenced him in absentia). An

abuse of discretion is not a mere error of judgment; it involves bias, partiality,

prejudice, ill-will, or manifest unreasonableness. See Commonwealth v.

Busanet, 817 A.2d 1060, 1076 (Pa. 2002).

      In addressing the issue, the trial court offered the following pertinent

analysis in support of its decision to proceed in absentia:

             When deciding to conduct trial in [Dunkowski’s] absence,
      this [c]ourt waited over an hour for [Dunkowski] and [his wife] to
      appear before deciding that it was clear they had voluntarily
      decided to avoid trial. N.T. 10/6/2021, p. 12. During that time,
      this [c]ourt instructed the parties to use all available resources to
      locate [Dunkowski] and [his wife]. Defense Counsel repeatedly
      attempted to contact [Dunkowski] and could offer no possible
      explanation for his absence. The Prosecutor contacted all local
      hospitals (including one out of state) and the Bucks County
      Correctional Facility, and found no indication that [Dunkowski]
      was there. Id. at pp. 7-8. The radio room reported that there were
      no accidents involving [Dunkowski’s] vehicle. Id. A police officer
      went to the location [Dunkowski] was believed to be living at (and
      the location [Dunkowski] listed on his Notice of Formal
      Arraignment), and family members indicated that, when they
      went to bed the previous night, [Dunkowski] and [his wife] were

                                      -6-
J-A10003-23

      present, but, the following morning, they were missing, and no
      one had heard from them since. Id. at pp. 8, 29. Lastly,
      caseworkers from Bucks County Children and Youth reported they
      had no contact with [Dunkowski] or [his wife] before they failed
      to appear. Id. at p. 11.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/23/22, at 9. The trial court further noted that “at

sentencing, [Dunkowski] admitted that he knew of the trial date but ran to

avoid punishment.” Id.

      Our review of the record reflects that it is undisputed that Dunkowski

knew of the trial dates in this matter. Indeed, he was present and offered

testimony in his own defense at the conclusion of the second day of trial.

Moreover, at the sentencing hearing, Dunkowski explained that he did not

appear for the third day of his trial because he was afraid that he was going

to be sentenced to jail, got scared, and ran. See N.T., 2/7/22, at 13-14.

Accordingly, Dunkowski admitted to knowingly absenting himself from trial

when offered this testimony to the trial court.

      Dunkowski has offered no evidence of record establishing that he had a

legitimate reason for not attending the remainder of his trial. In addition, the

record does not demonstrate that Dunkowski was unaware of the trial date,

nor does it suggest that his failure to appear was involuntary. Therefore,

because of Dunkowski’s admission on the record that he intentionally

absented himself from trial to avoid sentencing, we detect no basis upon which

to disturb the decision of the trial court to proceed with a trial in absentia.

                                      -7-
J-A10003-23

      Second, Dunkowski argues that the trial court erred in permitting the

Commonwealth to present evidence from an EMS worker concerning the

worker’s physical reaction to witnessing the child victims. See Appellant’s Brief

at 19-22. Dunkowski points to the following testimony permitted by the trial

court:

      Q. … But as a non-Army medic, after you had completed this
      case, did you have any physical emotional reaction?

      A. Yeah. I was disgusted and nauseated, and I started crying in
      one of the empty rooms in the hospital.

N.T., 10/5/21, at 15. Dunkowski contends that the testimony from the EMS

worker had no probative value, was unfairly prejudicial, and cumulative.

         “[Q]uestions concerning the admissibility of evidence are committed to

the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose rulings will not be disturbed on

appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.” Commonwealth v. Reed, 990

A.2d 1158, 1167-68 (Pa. 2010) (citation omitted). Abuse of discretion requires

a finding of misapplication of the law, a failure to apply the law, or judgment

by the trial court that exhibits bias, ill-will, prejudice, partiality, or was

manifestly unreasonable, as reflected by the record. See Commonwealth v.

Montalvo, 986 A.2d 84, 94 (Pa. 2009). The basic requisite for the

admissibility of any evidence in a case is that it be competent and relevant.

See Commonwealth v. Freidl, 834 A.2d 638, 641 (Pa. Super. 2003).

      A trial court should find evidence admissible if it is relevant, that is “if it

logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at

                                       -8-
J-A10003-23

issue more or less probable, or supports a reasonable inference or

presumption regarding a material fact.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 896

A.2d 523, 539 (Pa. 2006) (citation omitted). Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence

402 expressly provides that “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as

otherwise provided by law[,]” and “[e]vidence that is not relevant is not

admissible.” Pa.R.E. 402. Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 401 defines “Relevant

Evidence” as evidence having “any tendency to make a fact more or less

probable than it would be without the evidence;” and “the fact is of

consequence in determining the action.” Pa.R.E. 401.

     Likewise, Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 403 sets forth that relevant

evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is outweighed by a danger of

unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,

wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Pa.R.E. 403. The

comment to Pa.R.E. 403 defines “[u]nfair prejudice” as “a tendency to suggest

decision on an improper basis or to divert the jury’s attention away from its

duty of weighing the evidence impartially.” Pa.R.E. 403 cmt. Furthermore, our

Supreme Court has noted previously that “[e]vidence will not be prohibited

merely because it is harmful to the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Dillon,

925 A.2d 131, 138–139 (Pa. 2007). “[E]xclusion is limited to evidence so

prejudicial that it would inflame the jury to make a decision based upon

something other    than the legal propositions relevant to the case.”

                                    -9-
J-A10003-23

Commonwealth v. Page, 965 A.2d 1212, 1220 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation

omitted).

      In addressing the admission of evidence of the EMS worker’s reaction to

the condition of the children, the trial court offered the following analysis:

      Here, during the opening arguments of the case, [Dunkowski’s
      wife’s] Defense Counsel argued that the condition of the children
      was due to homelessness and other factors beyond [Dunkowski’s]
      and [his wife’s] control. Therefore, the Prosecutor sought to
      introduce this evidence to show the severity of the children’s
      conditions. He did not seek to introduce the EMT’s opinion, but
      rather a fact about the EMT’s reaction. As such, this Court found
      this information relevant as long as it was limited to the EMT’s
      experience outside of the military (because the conditions of the
      children were distinctly different from the conditions of those he
      treated in a combat zone). N.T. 10/5/2021, p. 12. As this decision
      was clearly not an abuse of discretion, [Dunkowski’s] argument
      that it was impermissibly admitted is meritless.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/23/22, at 11-12. Based on our review, we cannot

conclude this reasoning was an abuse of discretion.

      The prosecutor questioned EMS worker Lane Shore about his personal

reaction to the discovery and condition of Dunkowski’s children. See N.T.,

10/5/21, at 10. Dunkowski’s counsel objected based on relevance and

prejudice. See id. During a sidebar, the Commonwealth argued the evidence

was relevant to address the opening argument made by the defense that the

condition of the children was the result of homelessness. See id. at 10-11.

Moreover, the Commonwealth alleged that Shore’s testimony was necessary

to address the consistent attempts by the defense to minimize the condition

                                     - 10 -
J-A10003-23

of the children that occurred on the first day of trial. See N.T., 10/4/21, at

45-46, 49, 50-51, 60, and 96.

      Accordingly, the facts support the trial court’s conclusion that testimony

presented by Shore regarding his physical reaction to the condition of the

children was not offered to unfairly prejudice Dunkowski or inflame the jury.

Rather, this testimony was relevant to establish that the condition of the

children was the result of Dunkowski’s criminal behavior and not merely

homelessness. Moreover, the potential for prejudice from admission of this

evidence does not outweigh its probative value. Therefore, we conclude that

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.

Dunkowski’s contrary claim lacks merit.

      Dunkowski last argues that the trial court abused its discretion in

fashioning a sentence that was manifestly excessive. See Appellant’s Brief at

23-20. Dunkowski asserts that his sentence, which was double the aggravated

range of the sentencing guidelines, was unduly harsh and did not consider his

rehabilitative needs, history, and character, but relied upon the nature of the

offenses.

      It is well settled there is no absolute right to appeal the discretionary

aspects of a sentence. See Commonwealth v. Hartle, 894 A.2d 800, 805

(Pa. Super. 2006). Rather, where an appellant challenges the discretionary

aspects of a sentence, the appeal should be considered a petition for allowance

                                    - 11 -
J-A10003-23

of appeal. See Commonwealth v. W.H.M., 932 A.2d 155, 163 (Pa. Super.

2007).

      As we observed in Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162 (Pa.

Super. 2010):

      An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence
      must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

            We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1)
            whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal,
            see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was
            properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to
            reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P.
            720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect,
            Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a
            substantial question that the sentence appealed from
            is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42
            Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Moury, 992 A.2d at 170 (citation and brackets omitted).

      Here, the first three requirements of the four-part test are met.

Dunkowski brought an appropriate appeal, filed a post-sentence motion, and

included in his appellate brief the necessary concise statement of the reasons

relied upon for allowance of appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). We next

determine whether he has raised a substantial question requiring us to review

the discretionary aspects of the sentence imposed.

      Whether a particular issue constitutes a substantial question about the

appropriateness of sentence is a question to be evaluated on a case-by-case

basis. See Commonwealth v. Kenner, 784 A.2d 808, 811 (Pa. Super.

2001). As to what constitutes a substantial question, this Court does not

                                     - 12 -
J-A10003-23

accept bald assertions of sentencing errors. See Commonwealth v.

Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1252 (Pa. Super. 2006). Rather, an appellant must

show actions by the trial court inconsistent with the Sentencing Code or

contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process. See

Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 893 A.2d 735, 737 (Pa. Super. 2006).

       In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Dunkowski argues the trial court abused

its discretion by relying solely on the facts of the case and failing to consider

certain mitigating factors, including his family history, age and rehabilitative

needs, when it imposed a manifestly excessive sentence. See Appellant’s Brief

at 23-24. This Court has held that an assertion that a sentence was excessive

and that the trial court failed to properly consider the factors set forth in 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b)3 raises a substantial question. See Commonwealth v.

Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 770 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc). See also

Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating

that “an excessive sentence claim—in conjunction with an assertion that the

court failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a substantial question”)

(internal citation omitted). We therefore grant permission to appeal and

proceed to review the merits of Dunkowski’s sentencing claim.

____________________________________________

3 The factors to be considered under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) include: the
protection of the public, gravity of offense in relation to impact on victim and
community, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9721(b).

                                          - 13 -
J-A10003-23

      In his brief, Dunkowski argues that the aggregate sentence of nine to

twenty-one years “should be vacated because the court improperly focused

solely on the nature of the crime when fashioning sentence.” Appellant’s Brief

at 28. He claims that the trial court did not give any consideration to his

character, history or condition, and the court failed to give any consideration

to Dunkowski’s rehabilitative needs. See id.

      Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing

judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse

of discretion. Commonwealth v. Bankes, 286 A.3d 1302, 1307 (Pa. Super.

2022). In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error

in judgment. See id. Rather, an appellant must establish by reference to the

record that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, or arrived at a

manifestly unreasonable decision. See id.

      The sentencing judge has broad discretion in determining the proper

penalty, and this Court accords the sentencing court great deference, as it is

the sentencing court that is in the best position to view a defendant’s

character, displays of remorse, defiance, or indifference and the overall effect

and nature of the crime. See Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961

(Pa. 2007) (quotations and citations omitted). As we have stated, “a court is

required to consider the particular circumstances of the offense and the

character of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804 A.2d 1, 10 (Pa.

                                     - 14 -
J-A10003-23

Super. 2002) (citation omitted). “In particular, the court should refer to the

defendant's prior criminal record, his age, personal characteristics and his

potential for rehabilitation.” Id. (citation omitted).

      In addition, “[o]ur Supreme Court has determined that where the trial

court is informed by a pre-sentence report, it is presumed that the court is

aware of all appropriate sentencing factors and considerations, and that where

the court has been so informed, its discretion should not be disturbed.”

Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1133 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citing

Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12 (Pa. 1988)).

      Our review of the record reflects that, at Dunkowski’s sentencing, the

trial court received and reviewed a pre-sentence report. N.T., 2/7/22, at 3-4.

Indeed, the trial judge made the following comment concerning the quality of

the presentence report:

      First, let me say that the presentence report is quite thorough,
      comprehensive, and given the nature of the case and the
      complexities of the issues involved in this case, I might suggest
      to you it is one of the better [pre-sentence] reports I have seen
      in all my years on the bench. It has addressed all of the issues
      that each of you have so eloquently argued. And I really have to
      compliment the Department of Probation and Parole and for its
      thoroughness and comprehensive reporting.

Id. at 41.

      Immediately prior to announcing the judgment of sentence, the trial

court meticulously detailed its reasoning for imposing the sentence, which

included a thorough discussion of the case and elicited a complete

understanding of the relevant sentencing factors as they pertained to

                                      - 15 -
J-A10003-23

Dunkowski. See id. at 41-49. As the trial court stated in its written opinion,

“after taking into account the facts of the case, [Dunkowski’s] background and

need for rehabilitation, and the Sentencing Guidelines, this [c]ourt found the

Sentencing Guidelines to be inappropriate and a sentence of total confinement

was warranted.” Trial Court Opinion, 6/23/22, at 15. The court further noted

that “the reasons for sentencing were clearly outlined on the record, despite

[Dunkowski’s] unfounded and perplexing argument to the contrary.” Id. Upon

review of the record, we agree.

      Therefore, we conclude the reasons the trial court offered for the

sentence imposed were more than sufficient to conclude that the court

properly considered all relevant factors in fashioning Dunkowski’s sentence.

Also, because the trial court had been fully informed and relied upon the

presentence report, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

creating the instant sentence. Ventura, 975 A.2d at 1133. Accordingly,

Dunkowski’s claim that the trial court failed to consider the appropriate factors

in imposing the sentence lacks merit.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/10/2023

                                     - 16 -