Court Opinion

ID: 9665343
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:45:28.176951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:14.854226
License: Public Domain

WHITHAM, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result. I agree with the majority that the affidavits of interested witnesses, Omega’s employees, may not be relied upon for summary judgment because they raise a fact issue. I also agree with the majority that questions of foreseeability and reasonableness are inherently questions for the finder of fact and thus Omega has failed to establish as a matter of law that it was not negligent. Accordingly, I agree that the judgment be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court.
I write to express my disagreement with the majority’s holding on what the majority describes as the principal question presented. The majority states the principal question to be “whether proof of ownership of a vehicle causing an accident raises a legal presumption that the vehicle was being operated by an employee in the scope of his employment.” The majority holds that mere proof of ownership of a vehicle alone does raise such a presumption. I cannot agree. In my view the majority is basing a presumption on a presumption. In my view there are three linear facts requiring proof in the present case: (1) ownership of the vehicle, (2) employment of the driver by the owner and (3) that the driver is in the scope of his employment. The majority presumes facts two and three from fact one. It may be proper to presume fact two from fact one, but I cannot agree to the giant leap from fact one to fact three based upon the presumption of fact two. I would follow Moreland v. Hawley Independent School District, 163 S.W.2d 892 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1942, no writ), cited and quoted from by the majority. See also Longhorn Drilling Corp. v. Padilla, 138 S.W.2d 164 (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland 1940, no writ).
Moreover, I do not agree with the majority’s efforts to avoid the prohibition against basing a presumption upon a presumption by describing presumptions of (a) employment and (b) scope of employment as independent or parallel presumptions. Employment and the scope of that employment flow in an orderly sequence of events. A person is first employed and then he does what his employer tells him to do. Thus scope of employment is dependent on employment. Moreover, if we are to be about the business of presuming and since this accident occurred on a Sunday when Omega’s business was closed perhaps the proper presumption would be that the driver was not in the scope of his employment but using the vehicle for a Sunday drive.
The majority justifies its holding permitting a presumption on a presumption because it sees “no reason why injured parties should be automatically denied recovery because they cannot establish identity or employment of a vehicle’s driver.” I cannot agree that the majority’s concept of social and economic justice permits the courts to enter the contest in the present case on the side of Hunsucker. While I concur that Hunsucker should have her day in court, I disagree that Omega be required to bring its checkbook to court on that day.