Court Opinion

ID: 9721248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:53:17.415748+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:24.344620
License: Public Domain

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 48. (dissenting). Today's decision expands the liability of public officers far beyond the confines established by more than a half-century of precedent. The result of this expansion could expose not only the Wisconsin State Fair Park to liability, but also villages, towns, cities, school boards, and other state and local government treasuries at a time when these entities can least afford it.
¶ 49. Just last term, we reaffirmed the narrow definition of ministerial duty and recognized that "[t]he definition of ministerial duty has remained substantially the same since it was adopted in 1955[.]" Umansky v. Fox, 2009 WI 82, ¶ 11, 319 Wis. 2d 622, 769 N.W.2d 1 (citing Meyer v. Carman, 271 Wis. 329, 73 N.W.2d 514 (1955)). A ministerial duty imposed by law is an "absolute, certain and imperative duty." Lister v. Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 301, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976). It involves "the performance of a specific task" when the law "defines the time, mode and occasion for its performance with such certainty that nothing remains for judgment or discretion." Id.
¶ 50. To determine whether a public officer or employee can be held liable, courts have always looked to the written language of the relevant statute, regulation, policy, or procedure to see if it fits within the very limited ministerial duty exception to immunity. See, e.g., Bicknese v. Sutula, 2003 WI 31, ¶¶ 27-28, 260 Wis. 2d 713, 660 N.W.2d 289; Lodl v. Progressive N. Ins. *68Co., 2002 WI 71, ¶¶ 27-28, 253 Wis. 2d 323, 646 N.W.2d 314. Today, however, the majority abandons this time-tested approach.
¶ 51. Tucked away in a footnote, the majority explains that it is untethering its analysis from the language of the relevant written procedure. Majority op., ¶ 38 n.14. Instead it analyzes and relies on the extraneous opinions of coworkers about how to safely perform the job.
¶ 52. The problem with relying on the opinions of coworkers to inform the nature of the ministerial duty is two-fold: (1) the majority essentially rewrites the text, expanding the duties beyond those found in the written procedure; and (2) it conflates the analysis of negligence with the ministerial duty immunity defense. Both the writing in of ministerial duties beyond those that appear in the text and the conflation of negligence with immunity will result in diminished governmental immunity and increased exposure of all levels of government to costly lawsuits.
¶ 53. I conclude that there is another way to resolve this case. In examining the text of the take-down procedure, I determine that the procedure suffers from a critical lack of particularity as to time, mode and occasion for performance. The written procedure is not sufficiently particularized to remove McMillon's discretion as he faced the dilemma of what to do when the stalls became stuck together. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
I
¶ 54. The majority begins by examining the language and parameters of the take-down procedure. Majority op., ¶ 26. The written procedure provides: *69"Always have someone holding up the piece that you are taking down."1 Initially focusing on the language of that instruction, the majority determines that the word "always" imparts a mandatory requirement. Id., ¶ 34.
¶ 55. The majority apparently recognizes that the written procedure is insufficiently particularized to impose a ministerial duty. It departs from the language of the instruction and examines instead testimony of State Fair Park employees about their understanding of their duties. Id. ¶ 38 & n.14. Although the written take-down procedure does not mention chains or discuss their proper use, the majority concludes that the "purely ministerial duty encompasses a proper use of chains." Id., ¶ 38.
¶ 56. Ultimately, the majority appears to conclude that the written procedure does not mean what it says. Although the written procedure provides that McMillon should "[ajlways have someone holding up the piece that [he is] taking down," the majority determines that actually, McMillon need not always have someone holding up the piece that he is taking down. Rather, according to the majority, McMillon could choose between securing the stalls by having someone hold them up or securing the *70stalls with chains — as long as McMillon "ensure[s] that the stall pieces [are] secure from falling." Id., ¶ 39, ¶ 38 n.14.
A
¶ 57. By untethering its analysis from the language of the written procedure, the majority departs from our established approach. Although courts have reviewed employee testimony to confirm that an employee is responsible for complying with the text of a specific statute, regulation, or procedure, they have not used testimony to change the meaning of that text, as the majority does here.
¶ 58. To determine whether there is a ministerial duty, we have always examined the language of the applicable statute, regulation, or procedure. See, e.g., Bicknese, 260 Wis. 2d 713, ¶¶ 27-28 (examining the "clear mandate" of § 7.04 of the University of Wisconsin Faculty Policies and Procedures, which set forth the procedure for calculating tenure clocks); Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d 323, ¶¶ 27-28 (examining the text of Wis. Stat. § 346.40 and the Town of Pewaukee Police Department's Operations Policy).
¶ 59. In the past, we have referenced employee testimony to confirm that an employee was required to adhere to the text of a statute, regulation, or procedure. See, e.g., Bicknese, 260 Wis. 2d 713, ¶ 27 (discussing an employee's admission that one of his job duties was to calculate tenure clock according to the terms of § 7.04 of the University of Wisconsin Faculty Policies and Procedures); Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d 323, ¶¶ 29-30 (concluding that the Operations Policy set forth a guideline rather than a ministerial duty, relying in part on the drafter's statement that he could not sit in his office and dictate the best way for officers to do their many jobs).
*71¶ 60. However, we have not used employee testimony as the majority does here — to alter and expand the meaning of the text, adding new duties that cannot be found in the text of the procedure. Compare the duty identified by the majority — "ensure that the stall pieces [are] secure from falling" — with the text of the procedure, which provides that McMillon must "have someone holding up the piece that [he is] taking down."
¶ 61. Because the majority uses employee testimony to alter and expand the meaning of the text, the ministerial duty identified by the majority is much broader than any duty identified in the text of the take-down procedure. Under the majority's analysis, it would appear that McMillon has violated a ministerial duty any time that the stalls fall, regardless of whether he was adhering to the text of the written take-down procedure.
¶ 62. The result of the majority's innovation is an expansion of liability. By relying on sources extraneous to the text of the relevant law, it broadens the scope of duties that may be considered ministerial duties imposed by law. As a result, more duties will be considered ministerial in nature, increasing the exposure of state and municipal treasuries.
B
¶ 63. Further, by focusing on the testimony of employees and the circumstances of the case, the majority conflates the standards for negligence and immunity. Negligence and immunity are separate inquiries. "The immunity defense assumes negligence, focusing instead on whether the municipal action (or inaction) upon which liability is premised is entitled to immunity under *72the statute, and if so, whether one of the judicially-created exceptions to immunity applies." Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d 323, ¶ 17.
¶ 64. "[0]ne has a duty to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances." Hoida, Inc. v. M&I Midstate Bank, 2006 WI 69, ¶ 30, 291 Wis. 2d 283, 717 N.W.2d 17. If a person acts or fails to act in a way "that a reasonable person would recognize as creating an unreasonable risk of injury or damage," that person "is not exercising ordinaiy care under the circumstances, and is therefore negligent." Id.
¶ 65. Unlike the duty of ordinary care, a ministerial duty imposed by law is an "absolute, certain and imperative" duty. Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 301. It involves "the performance of a specific task" when the law "defines the time, mode and occasion for its performance with such certainty that nothing remains for judgment or discretion." Id. "Just because a jury can find that certain conduct was negligent does not transform that conduct into a breach of a ministerial duty." Kimps v. Hill, 200 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 546 N.W.2d 151 (1996).
¶ 66. A State Fair Park employee's testimony about how to safely perform his job may be relevant in determining whether McMillon was negligent for failing to use ordinary care. Such testimony could inform the factfinder's determination of whether a reasonable person would recognize that McMillon's actions or inactions would create an unreasonable risk of injury.
¶ 67. However, the same testimony is not relevant in identifying a ministerial duty. An opinion of an employee about how to safely perform his job does not create a duty that is "absolute, certain and imperative."
¶ 68. By conflating the standards for negligence and immunity, I am concerned that the majority opinion could be understood to hold that an officer who fails *73to exercise ordinary care has violated a ministerial duty. Such a departure from established law would broaden the narrow ministerial duty exception to encompass all cases involving negligence of public officers. Again, this expansion of the exception would result in increased liability for public officers and increased exposure for public treasuries.
II
¶ 69. Contrary to the majority, when I examine the take-down procedure here, I conclude that it does not impose a ministerial duty. To fit within the exception, the law imposing a duty must be both mandatory and highly particularized. "[F]or a duty to be ministerial, a public officer must be not only bound to act, but also bound by law to act in a very particular way, leaving nothing for judgment or discretion." Yao v. Chapman, 2005 WI App 200, ¶ 29, 287 Wis. 2d 445, 705 N.W.2d 272.
¶ 70. Just last term, we applied this standard in a case involving a death at Camp Randall stadium. See Umansky, 319 Wis. 2d 622. In that case, the plaintiff fell to his death while working on an unguarded platform located eight feet above ground. Umansky's estate argued that the director of facilities was required under the Wisconsin Administrative Code to adhere to an OSHA regulation, which mandated railings on all platforms located more than four feet above ground.
¶ 71. The regulation in Umansky was "highly specific." Id., ¶ 18. It stated: "Every open-sided floor or platform 4 feet or more above adjacent floor or ground level shall be guarded by a standard railing (or the equivalent as specified in paragraph (e)(3) of this section) on all open sides except where there is entrance to *74a ramp, stairway, or fixed ladder. . . ." Id., ¶ 6. It further provided specifications for a standard railing:
A standard railing shall consist of top rail, intermediate rail, and posts, and shall have a vertical height of 42 inches nominal from upper surface of top rail to floor, platform, runway, or ramp level. The top rail shall be smooth-surfaced throughout the length of the railing. The intermediate rail shall be approximately halfway between the top rail and the floor, platform, runway, or ramp. The ends of the rails shall not overhang the terminal posts except where such overhang does not constitute a projection hazard.
Id., ¶ 16 n.8.2
¶ 72. We agreed with and adopted the court of appeals' conclusion that "[t]he duty to have a railing meeting the regulation's requirements is imposed by law, it is absolute, certain and imperative, and it requires performance in a specified manner and upon specified conditions that are not dependent upon the exercise of judgment or discretion." Id., ¶¶ 3-4, 17. As the court of appeals had explained, "[i]t is the mandatory and specific nature of the duty the government has chosen to impose that triggers the expectation that the duty will be carried out and the concomitant imposition of liability if it is *75not." Umansky v. ABC Ins. Co., 2008 WI App 101, ¶ 35, 313 Wis. 2d 445, 756 N.W.2d 601.
¶ 73. By contrast, in Yao, 287 Wis. 2d 445, a regulation that contained mandatory language nevertheless lacked the requisite particularity to impose a ministerial duty. In that case, a researcher stored his cells in a nitrogen tank at a university laboratory. The cells were destroyed when a professor permitted students to access the tank without providing training or instruction. Id., ¶ 23. Yao introduced evidence that one of the students replaced the lid improperly, allowing the liquid nitrogen to evaporate. Id.
¶ 74. The Wisconsin Administrative Code mandates that laboratory employers ensure that their employees are properly trained to work with chemical cryogenics such as liquid nitrogen. Id., ¶ 30. The regulation states that employers "shall provide employees with information and training to ensure that they are apprised of the hazards of chemicals present in their work area," and "[s]uch information shall be provided at the time of the employee's initial assignment[.]" Id., ¶ 31.
¶ 75. Although the regulation contained mandatory language, the court concluded that it "suffer[ed] from a critical lack of particularity as to time, mode and occasion for [] performance." Id., ¶ 31. The court explained: "The standards say nothing about access to or control of a liquid nitrogen tank, how or how often to determine whether the liquid nitrogen level is sufficient, how to replenish the liquid nitrogen when it becomes necessary to do so, or how to properly open and refasten the tank lid." Id., ¶ 32.
¶ 76. Umansky and Yao make clear that mandatory language in a regulation is not enough to impose a ministerial duty. In addition to mandatory language, *76the regulation must be sufficiently particularized so that there is nothing left to the officer's discretion about where, when, and how to perform the duty.
¶ 77. Here, although the take-down procedure contains the word "always," I conclude that the procedure suffers from a critical lack of particularity as to time, mode and occasion for performance. The written procedure is not sufficiently particularizéd to remove McMillon's discretion and impose a duty that is purely ministerial. It does not describe how many workers are necessary to hold up a stall piece. It does not describe when and where those workers should be positioned. Rather, it provides more particularity about how to ensure that the stalls are properly stored to prevent loss or damage than it does about how to prevent injury when dismantling the stalls.
¶ 78. Critically, the procedure does not mention the use of chains, much less prescribe their use with such particularity that nothing is left to discretion or judgment. How many chains are need to safely secure a stall? Should chains be used at all times, or only after the top pins have been removed? Should the chains remain attached while the workers are lifting a particular stall piece off the bottom pins, or must the chains be removed before that time?
¶ 79. Finally, the procedure does not specify what an employee should do if the stalls become stuck together, as occurred in this case. Rather, the procedure does not seem to contemplate that the stalls could become stuck.
¶ 80. Because of the gaps in the procedure, an employee necessarily must use discretion in how best to dismantle the stalls. As a result, I conclude that the written procedure does not delineate a duty that is "absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely the *77performance of a specific task when the law imposes, prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion for its performance with such certainty that nothing remains for judgment or discretion."
Ill
¶ 81. In Scott v. Savers Property & Casualty Insurance Co., we acknowledged that governmental immunity could produce harsh results, especially when the negligence of a public officer "was so clear." 2003 WI 60, ¶ 37, 262 Wis. 2d 127, 663 N.W.2d 715. ’Yet," we concluded, "the doctrine of governmental immunity plays a significant role in our legal system. Imposing liability in this case would therefore not serve the policy underlying the doctrine of immunity."3 Id.
¶ 82. Over the years, we have adhered to a consistent approach to governmental immunity. In Umansky, for example, the injured plaintiff argued that we "should repudiate the current formulation of public officer immunity."4 We rejected the argument and declined to alter longstanding law. Id., ¶ 14 n.6.
¶ 83. Similarly, in Scott, we declined to alter our approach to municipal officer immunity. 262 Wis. 2d 127, ¶¶ 34-37. Writing in concurrence, the Chief Justice explained that "construing governmental immunity anew [would] have a far-reaching impact, and this court should only undertake such a task with the benefit of full information." Id., ¶ 59 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). Unfortunately, the majority's approach construes *78immunity anew without even acknowledging that it is doing so. For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 84. I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this dissent.

 Section 6 sets forth the entire written take-down procedure. It provides in full:
a. Always have someone holding up the piece that you are taking down.
b. Take out the top pins on the top of the stall piece and then lift the stall piece off the bottom pins.
c. The sides can be stacked horizontally with 15 to a stack.
d. Fronts must be stored vertically, if possible put in storage racks.
e. Make sure all of the pins are picked up and put into the storage box. (These can not be lost)

 The regulation also provided specifications for an equivalent rail: "Other types, sizes, and arrangements of railing construction are acceptable provided they meet the following conditions: (a) A smooth-surfaced top rail at a height above floor, platform, runway, or ramp level of 42 inches nominal; (b) A strength to withstand at least the minimum requirement of 200 pounds top rail pressure; (c) Protection between top rail and floor, platform, runway, ramp, or stair treads, equivalent at least to that offered by a standard intermediate rail...." Umansky v. Fox, 2009 WI 82, ¶ 16 n. 9, 319 Wis. 2d 622, 769 N.W.2d 1.

 One of the public policies underlying immunity is protecting the public purse and taxpayers against liability for money damages. See Lodl v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 71, ¶ 23, 253 Wis. 2d 323, 646 N.W.2d 314.

 Response Brief of Harold Umansky at 11, Umansky, 319 Wis. 2d 622, ¶ 11 (available at the Wisconsin Law Library).