Court Opinion

ID: 9673783
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:18:31.465271+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:24.170869
License: Public Domain

M. J. Kelly, J.
(dissenting). This case presents a question which apparently has not been considered before by the appellate courts of this state. The question is whether prior inconsistent statements may be introduced into evidence for purposes of impeachment when the witness sought to be impeached asserts her Fifth Amendment rights in response to foundational questions. In other words, can a witness prevent the laying of a foundation for the admission of impeaching statements by exercising her privilege against self-incrimination? After surveying the authorities I must conclude that, in such a case, the foundation is laid when the prosecutor asks the foundational questions, and the witness cannot nullify that foundation by refusing to answer on the grounds that she might incriminate herself.
In State v Haworth, 24 Utah 398; 68 P 155 (1902), the Supreme Court of Utah considered a problem very similar to the one at bar. There, as here, the witness was called by the defense and gave favorable testimony on direct examination. There the defendant was charged with first-degree murder and offered as an alibi witness one Reavis. On cross-examination, the prosecution sought to lay the foundation for impeachment by questioning Reavis about a conversation he had with a Mr. *222Grant. Reavis declined to answer on the grounds that his answer might tend to incriminate him. Afterwards Mr. Grant was placed on the witness stand by the state, and questioned about the conversation. Defense counsel objected on the grounds that Reavis had a right not to answer and thus the foundation had not been laid. The objection was overruled. The Supreme Court of Utah affirmed, explaining that the purpose of the rule is to give the witness an opportunity to respond:
"The reason of [sicjthe rule which prohibits a witness from being impeached by proof of his contradictory statements until, on cross-examination, he shall have first been interrogated in respect to the circumstances, and as to when, where, and to whom the statements were made, is aptly stated in 1 Greenleaf, Evidence (15th ed) § 462, as follows: 'This course of proceeding is considered indispensable, from a sense of justice to the witness; for, as the direct tendency of the evidence is to impeach his veracity, common justice requires that, by first calling his attention to the subject, he should have an opportunity to recollect the facts, and, if necessary, to correct the statement already given, as well as by a redirect examination to explain the nature, circumstances, meaning, and design of what he is proved elsewhere to have said.’ When the foundation for the impeachment is so laid, the reason of the rule is fully met; and it follows that unless the witness, on his cross-examination, admits the imputed statements, and they do not relate to a collateral and immaterial matter, the adverse party then has the right to prove the contradictory statements, and the witness cannot defeat that right by refusing to answer on the ground that he would thereby criminate himself, or by answering that he has no recollection of having made the statements imputed to him. This position is sustained not only on principle, but by the weight of both the American and English authorities. [Citations omitted.]” 68 P at 163.
According to Wigmore, the rule requiring that a foundation be laid for impeachment by prior in*223consistent statement had its genesis in The Queen’s Case, 129 Eng Rep 976 (1820). See III A Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourne Rev), § 1026, p 1021.
The opinion of Chief Justice Abbott in that historic case discusses the very problem with which we are faced in the case at bar. The relevant portion of The Queen’s Case, supra, was quoted with approval in State v Haworth, supra, 68 P at 163:
"' * * * If it be intended to bring the credit of a witness into question by proof of anything that he may have said or declared touching the cause, the witness is first asked upon cross-examination whether or no he has said or declared that which is intended to be proved. * * * If the witness declines to give any answer to the question proposed to him, by reason of the tendency thereof to criminate himself, and the court is of opinion that he cannot be compelled to answer, the adverse party has, in this instance, also, his subsequent opportunity of tendering proof of the matter, which is received, if by law it ought to be received. But the possibility that the witness may decline to answer the question affords no sufficient reason for not giving him an opportunity of answering, and of offering such explanatory or exculpatory matter as I have before alluded to.’ ” (Emphasis added.)
In the case at bar, the trial court ruled that the introduction of the tape recording which constituted the. impeaching conversation was permissible without the necessity of laying a foundation. Nevertheless, the prosecutor went on to ask the foundational questions. Thus the witness was given an opportunity to answer, and that is all that is required. The foundation was laid when the prosecutor asked the question; the failure of the witness to answer did not render the prior inconsistent statement inadmissible.
I would affirm.