Court Opinion

ID: 9450812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:58:10.86959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:27.655300
License: Public Domain

HAYS, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I dissent on the ground that the government failed to prove willfulness within the meaning of that term as it is used in 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1964) (“willfully fails to surrender himself within thirty days following the date” of forfeiture of bail).
That the trial court was troubled about this problem is indicated not only by the jury’s question as to willfulness but also by the judge’s inquiry of government counsel after verdict, an inquiry which was never satisfactorily answered:
“Now what I wanted to know is what evidence was there in the record of the fact that his failure to surrender within 30 days from forfeiture of his bail was wilful, and it seemed to me that implicit in that there must be evidence that he knew that his bail had been forfeited.
“Now, how do you say there was such evidence of such knowledge in the record?” (Emphasis added.)
A defendant is, of course, subject to arrest and return to prison at any time after he has failed to appear and his bail has been revoked. The penalty provided by § 3146 is added only after there has been a willful failure to surrender for a period of more than thirty days after forfeiture of bail. A defendant could escape that additional penalty if he surrendered on the thirtieth day. However, to take advantage of the statutory grace period the defendant must know when that period begins and ends. If the defendant’s failure to surrender were based upon a mistake as to when the thirty days ended, could he be said to have failed willfully to surrender- himself within the grace period? Can his action be said to be willful when it is based upon ignorance?
Could the police, knowing that defendant was unaware that his bail had been forfeited, keep him under surveillance until the thirty day period had elapsed and then charge him with a violation of § 3146?
Could the police apprehend the defendant within the thirty day period, but after he had absconded to Hawaii and told his cell-mates of his purpose to jump bail, and charge him with willful failure to surrender within thirty days ?
It seems to me that the statutory provision for the thirty day period is inextricably bound up with the requirement of willfulness, and that there can be no resolution of the problem except in terms which give the defendant the advantage of the grace period.
That this accords with the legislative purpose is indicated by the words of Representative PofE, who introduced into the House of Representatives the bill which became § 3146. Mr. Poff, speaking immediately before the adoption of the bill by the House, said:
“Having knowledge of the existence of the bail-jumping statute and its penalties and having wilfully violated its terms, [defendant] * * * has committed a crime even though he may actually be innocent on the original substantive charge.” (Emphasis added.) 1
Franco v. United States, 342 F.2d 918 (D.C.Cir.1964), appears to be the only authority in point. While the court in that case pointed out that “the statute does not state that the defendant must have knowledge that the forfeiture [of *884bail] has taken place,” the court went on to say:
“Since the purpose of the statute is to encourage persons on bail to meet the obligations in their bonds, notice to the person bailed of his obligation to appear should be sufficient. Notice of the revocation, in this case, informed appellant of his obligation to surrender himself. The terms of his bond clearly stated that he had such a duty, in the event of revocation. The information given by the agent also put him on inquiry about forfeiture of his bond.” 342 F.2d at 921.
I would reverse the conviction.

. 100 Cong.Rec. 11297 (1954).
In the Senate, the bill was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, was reported hack without amendment, and passed without debate. Id. at 11359, 12932, 14044.