Court Opinion

ID: 9410510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-21 16:10:27.520238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:58.270319
License: Public Domain

J-S08012-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    GLENN ANTHONY HOLDER                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1219 MDA 2022

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 9, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
                           CP-67-CR-0004274-1998,
                           CP-67-CR-0004275-1998

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    GLENN A. HOLDER                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1220 MDA 2022

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 9, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
                           CP-67-CR-0004274-1998,
                           CP-67-CR-0004275-1998

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                                 FILED JUNE 21, 2023

        Appellant, Glenn Anthony Holder, appeals pro se from the order entered

on August 9, 2022, which dismissed his eighth petition filed under the Post

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541 9546. We affirm.

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S08012-23

      We previously summarized the procedural posture that led to the

dismissal of Appellant’s sixth PCRA petition:

        [Appellant] was convicted on March 3, 1999, of rape,
        involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”), indecent
        assault, criminal solicitation to commit rape, criminal
        solicitation to commit IDSI, criminal solicitation to commit
        statutory sexual assault, four counts of corruption of minors,
        and two counts of endangering the welfare of children. On
        May 24, 1999, the trial court sentenced [Appellant] to an
        aggregate term of 31 ½ to 63 years’ imprisonment. This
        Court affirmed [Appellant’s] judgment of sentence on
        September 22, 2000. [Appellant] did not file a petition for
        allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

        On January 10, 2001, [Appellant] filed a PCRA petition, which
        the PCRA court dismissed on April 6, 2001. This Court
        affirmed the dismissal on September 10, 2002, and the
        Supreme Court denied allocator. Thereafter, on September
        15, 2005, [Appellant] filed his second PCRA petition, which
        was again dismissed by the PCRA court. This Court affirmed
        the dismissal on February 16, 2007, and the Supreme Court
        denied the petition for allowance of appeal. [Appellant] filed
        a third PCRA petition on October 16, 2008, which the PCRA
        court dismissed as untimely on October 23, 2008. This Court
        affirmed the dismissal on November 13, 2009, and the
        Supreme Court denied review on July 19, 2010.

        On July 16, 2012, [Appellant] filed his fourth PCRA petition.
        The PCRA court dismissed [Appellant’s] petition as untimely
        on July 30, 2012. This Court affirmed the dismissal on April
        8, 2013. [Appellant’s] fifth petition, filed on October 3, 2014,
        was dismissed as untimely. This Court affirmed the dismissal
        on May 15, 2015.

        Less than two months later, [Appellant] filed a document
        entitled “Petition of Actual Innocence.” The PCRA court
        treated the document as [Appellant’s] sixth PCRA petition,
        and once again dismissed the petition as untimely.

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Commonwealth v. Holder, 159 A.3d 579 (unpublished memorandum), at

1-2.

       On November 7, 2016, we affirmed the PCRA court’s order, which

dismissed Appellant’s sixth PCRA petition. Id.

       Appellant filed his seventh PCRA petition on August 30, 2019.      See

Appellant’s Seventh PCRA Petition, 8/30/19, at 1-10.         The PCRA court

dismissed the petition on September 5, 2019 and Appellant did not file a notice

of appeal. PCRA Court Order, 9/5/19, at 1-2.

       On August 3, 2022, Appellant filed the current PCRA petition, which

constitutes his eighth petition for post-conviction collateral relief under the

PCRA. See Appellant’s Eighth PCRA Petition, 8/3/22, at 1-9. The PCRA court

dismissed this petition on August 9, 2022 and Appellant filed a timely notice

of appeal. We now affirm the dismissal of Appellant’s patently untimely, serial

petition.

       We “review an order granting or denying PCRA relief to determine

whether the PCRA court’s decision is supported by evidence of record and

whether its decision is free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Liebel, 825

A.2d 630, 632 (Pa. 2003).

       The PCRA contains a jurisdictional time-bar, which is subject to limited

statutory exceptions.    This time-bar demands that “any PCRA petition,

including a second or subsequent petition, [] be filed within one year of the

date that the petitioner’s judgment of sentence becomes final, unless [the]

petitioner pleads [and] proves that one of the [three] exceptions to the

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timeliness requirement . . . is applicable.” Commonwealth v. McKeever,

947 A.2d 782, 785 (Pa. Super. 2008); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). Further, since

the time-bar implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of our courts, we are

required to first determine the timeliness of a petition before we are able to

consider any of the underlying claims. Commonwealth v. Yarris, 731 A.2d

581, 586 (Pa. 1999). Our Supreme Court has explained:

        All PCRA petitions including a second or subsequent petition,
        shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment
        becomes final. The PCRA’s time restrictions are jurisdictional
        in nature. Thus, if a PCRA petition is untimely, neither this
        Court nor the trial court has jurisdiction over the petition.
        Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal
        authority to address the substantive claims.

Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010) (quotation

marks, citations, and brackets omitted). “Because the timeliness [of a PCRA

petition] implicates our jurisdiction, we may consider the matter sua sponte.”

Yarris, 731 A.2d at 587.

      This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on September 22,

2000 and Appellant did not file a petition for allowance of appeal with the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Therefore, Appellant’s judgment of sentence

became final for purposes of the PCRA at the end of the day on Monday,

October 23, 2000. See, e.g., Pa.R.A.P. 903(a); see also 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908

(computation of time); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (“A judgment becomes final

at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the

Supreme Court of the United States . . . , or at the expiration of time for

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seeking the review”). Under the terms of the PCRA, Appellant thus had until

October 23, 2001 to file a timely PCRA petition. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).

As Appellant did not file his current petition until August 3, 2022, the current

petition is manifestly untimely and the burden thus fell upon Appellant to plead

and prove that one of the enumerated exceptions to the one-year time-bar

applied to his case.    See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); Commonwealth v.

Perrin, 947 A.2d 1284, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2008) (to properly invoke a

statutory exception to the one-year time-bar, the PCRA demands that the

petitioner properly plead and prove all required elements of the relied-upon

exception).

      Here, Appellant did not attempt to plead a valid statutory exception to

the PCRA’s one-year time-bar. See Appellant’s Eighth PCRA Petition, 8/3/22,

at 1-9.   Thus, since Appellant’s PCRA petition is manifestly untimely and

Appellant did not plead any of the statutory exceptions to the one-year

time-bar, our “courts are without jurisdiction to offer [Appellant] any form of

relief.” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 523 (Pa. Super. 2011).

We, therefore, affirm the PCRA court’s order, which dismissed Appellant’s

eighth PCRA petition without a hearing.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

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Date: 07/21/2023

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