Court Opinion

ID: 9918807
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-16 17:17:23.320681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:10.270209
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVNIA

Ian M. Dougherty,                           :
                      Petitioner            :
                                            :
              v.                            :       No. 131 M.D. 2022
                                            :       Submitted: October 10, 2023
PA. Dept. of Corrections, et al.,           :
                  Respondent                :

BEFORE:       HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
              HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
              HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY SENIOR JUDGE LEAVITT                             FILED: January 16, 2024

              Ian M. Dougherty (Dougherty), pro se, has filed a petition for review
in this Court’s appellate and original jurisdiction. He contends that the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections (Department) violated his due process rights and
subjected him to inhumane treatment as punishment for a positive drug test. In
response, the Department has filed preliminary objections, demurring to the petition
for review and challenging our appellate jurisdiction to consider this matter.1 For
the reasons to follow, we quash the petition for review to the extent it is addressed
to our appellate jurisdiction and sustain the preliminary objections in the nature of a
demurrer to the extent it is addressed to our original jurisdiction.

1
  An objection to this Court’s appellate jurisdiction should be presented in a petition to quash.
PA.R.A.P. 1516(a) (no pleading, including a preliminary objection, can be filed in response to an
appellate petition for review). In the interest of judicial economy, the Court will treat the
Department’s challenge to this Court’s appellate jurisdiction as a motion to quash the appellate
portion of the petition for review. See Zinc Corporation of America v. Department of
Environmental Resources, 603 A.2d 288, 289 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992).
               Dougherty’s petition for review alleges the facts that follow.
Dougherty is an inmate currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution –
Houtzdale. In December 2021, the Department collected urine for drug testing and
thereafter notified him that he had tested positive for Buprenorphine.2 Petition for
Review at 2. Consequently, the Department issued a misconduct report (No.
D504674) for possession/use of a controlled substance.
               The petition alleges that at a disciplinary hearing on January 5, 2022,
Dougherty pleaded not guilty to the misconduct report. He requested witness
appearances, the lab report, and representation, all of which were denied by the
hearing examiner, who stated, “I don’t need to see the results. You are . . . guilty,
put in an appeal.”3 Petition for Review at 2-3. As a consequence, Dougherty was
placed in the prison’s Restricted Housing Unit for 30 days, which Dougherty
believes will adversely affect his chances for parole.
               Dougherty appealed the misconduct in accordance with the
Department’s inmate grievance system. In the grievance, Dougherty claimed that
the hearing examiner did not follow “policy, procedure and/or due process laws”
because Dougherty was not permitted to call witnesses or provided a copy of the
urinalysis test result. Petition for Review at 3. Without the urinalysis test results,

2
  “Buprenorphine is a medication approved by the Food and Drug Administration for treatment of
opioid addiction and is intended for use in combination with counseling and behavioral therapy.”
Feliciano v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 250 A.3d 1269, 1272 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2021). This medication “produces effects such as euphoria or respiratory depression at low to
moderate doses . . . . Because of [B]uprenorphine’s opioid effects, it can be misused, particularly
by people who do not have an opioid dependency.” Id. (quotation omitted). In Pennsylvania,
Buprenorphine is a Schedule III controlled substance. 28 Pa. Code §25.72(d)(10).
3
  This averment is contradicted by the documents attached to Dougherty’s petition. See Petition
for Review, Attachments DC-141 Part 1 (Misconduct Report), DC-141 Part 2(B) (Disciplinary
Hearing Report), and DC-141 Part III (Program Review Committee Action). The Court need not
accept as true averments in the petition that conflict with documents attached to the petition.
Savage v. Storm, 257 A.3d 187, 191 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021).

                                                2
Dougherty claims he was deprived notice and prevented from “marshaling the facts
and preparing a defen[s]e[.]” Id.
               Dougherty’s petition seeks a declaratory judgment that the
Department’s actions have violated his rights under the Fifth,4 Eighth5 and
Fourteenth6 Amendments to the United States Constitution and a writ of mandamus.
For relief, the petition requests the Court to “grant” his “petition for review and make
a briefing for both parties.” Petition for Review at 6.
               The Department has filed preliminary objections in the nature of a
demurrer. First, the Department argues that this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction to
review its inmate grievance process. Second, the Department argues that Dougherty
has not stated a due process claim because the hearing examiner has discretion to
determine what evidence is relevant and necessary, and an inmate does not have a
liberty interest in remaining in general population. Third, the Department argues
that Dougherty has not stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment because the use
of restricted housing units is not cruel and unusual punishment.                        Fourth, the
Department argues that the petition for review does not comply with PA.R.CIV.P.
1022 because it is not divided into paragraphs numbered consecutively.
               Dougherty did not file a brief in opposition to the Department’s
preliminary objections.7

4
  U.S. CONST. amend. V. It states, in part: “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law[.]” Id.
5
  U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. It states that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” Id. (emphasis added).
6
  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. It states, in part, that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.” Id., §1.
7
  By order dated December 9, 2022, the Court noted that Dougherty’s brief had been due on
October 31, 2022, and had not been filed. The Court directed Dougherty to file his brief on or

                                                  3
              “[T]he question presented in a demurrer is whether, on the facts
averred, the law indicates with certainty that no recovery is possible.” Stilp v.
General Assembly, 974 A.2d 491, 494 (Pa. 2009).                  In ruling on preliminary
objections in the nature of a demurrer, this Court must consider as true all well-
pleaded material facts set forth in the petition and all reasonable inferences that may
be drawn from those facts. Torres v. Beard, 997 A.2d 1242, 1245 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2010). We “need not accept as true conclusions of law, unwarranted inferences from
facts, argumentative allegations, or expressions of opinion.”               Id.   To sustain
preliminary objections, “it must appear with certainty that the law will not permit
recovery, and any doubt should be resolved by a refusal to sustain them.” Id.
              “When ruling on a demurrer, a court must confine its analysis to the
complaint.” Torres, 997 A.2d at 1245. “Thus, the court may determine only
whether, on the basis of the [petitioner’s] allegations, he or she possesses a cause of
action recognized at law.” Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 5 by McNesby v.
City of Philadelphia, 267 A.3d 531, 541 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021).                   “[D]ocuments
attached as exhibits [and] documents referenced in the complaint . . . may also be
considered.” Id. at 542.
              The Department has promulgated regulations that give inmates the
vehicle for reviewing and resolving inmate grievances. The Pennsylvania Code
provides, in relevant part, as follows:
              The Department will maintain an inmate grievance system which
              will permit any inmate to seek review of problems which the
              inmate experiences during the course of confinement. The
              system will provide for review and resolution of inmate
              grievances at the most decentralized level possible. It will also

before December 27, 2022. Instead of filing a brief, Dougherty requested another extension. The
Court granted the extension, and Dougherty’s brief in opposition to preliminary objections was
due on or before March 1, 2023. Dougherty did not file a brief.

                                              4
              provide for review of the initial decision making and for possible
              appeal to the Central Office of the Department. An inmate will
              not be disciplined for the good faith use of the grievance systems.
              However, an inmate who submits a grievance for review which
              is false, frivolous or malicious may be subject to appropriate
              disciplinary procedures. A frivolous grievance is one in which
              the allegations or the relief sought lack any arguable basis in fact
              as set forth in DC-ADM 804--Inmate Grievance System, which
              is disseminated to inmates.

37 Pa. Code §93.9(a). See also Department of Corrections Policy Statement DC-
ADM             801          (relating          to          inmate          discipline),
https://www.cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/Documents/DOC%20Policies/801%20Inmat
e%20Discipline.pdf (last visited January 16, 2024).
              With this background, we address the Department’s preliminary
objections.
              The Department first argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction to
consider an appeal of Dougherty’s denial of a grievance. We agree.
              “Inmate misconducts are a matter of internal prison management and,
thus, do not constitute adjudications subject to appellate review.” Hill v. Department
of Corrections, 64 A.3d 1159, 1167 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). As our Supreme Court
explained in Bronson v. Central Office Review Committee, 721 A.2d 357, 358-59
(Pa. 1998) (internal citations and quotations omitted):
              Unlike the criminal trial and appeals process where a defendant
              is accorded the full spectrum of rights and protections guaranteed
              by the state and federal constitutions, and which is necessarily
              within the ambit of the judiciary, the procedures for pursuing
              inmate grievances and misconduct appeals are a matter of
              internal prison administration and the full panoply of rights due
              a defendant in a criminal prosecution is not necessary in a prison
              disciplinary proceeding.      Therefore, the [C]ommonwealth
              [C]ourt does not have appellate jurisdiction, under 42 Pa. C.S

                                           5
             §763, over inmate appeals of decisions by intra-prison
             disciplinary tribunals.

Consequently, this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction to review the Department’s
decision on Dougherty’s grievance.
             Accordingly, we quash the portion of Dougherty’s petition for review
addressed to this Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
             The Department next argues that the original jurisdiction portion of
Dougherty’s petition for review does not state a due process claim, whether in
mandamus or declaratory judgment. The Department contends that Dougherty
received all the process he was due on his misconduct, notwithstanding the denial of
his witness request and a copy of his urinalysis test results. Further, Dougherty has
no right to a hearing before being placed in the restricted housing unit as a sanction
for his misconduct.
             In the context of prison disciplinary proceedings, procedural due
process requires three components: (1) a written notice of the violation at least 24
hours in advance of the hearing, (2) a written statement by the fact finder regarding
the evidence relied upon and reasons for the disciplinary action, and (3) a qualified
right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence where institutional safety
or correctional goals will not be placed in hazard. See Robson v. Biester, 420 A.2d
9, 12 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980) (citing to Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974)).
Dougherty asserts that the Department did not comply with the third component.
             This Court has explained that the first inquiry is whether the inmate is
even entitled to procedural due process in the inmate’s particular circumstances.
             Procedural due process rights are triggered by deprivation of a
             legally cognizable liberty interest. For a prisoner, such a
             deprivation occurs when the prison “imposes atypical and
             significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

                                          6
             incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 []
             (1995). Lesser restraints on a prisoner’s freedom are deemed to
             fall “within the expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by
             a court of law.” Id. If a prisoner ha[s] no protected liberty
             interest in remaining free of disciplinary custody, then the state
             owes him no process before placing him in disciplinary
             confinement.

Feliciano v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 250 A.3d 1269, 1275-76 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2021) (emphasis added) (quoting Brown v. Blaine, 833 A.2d 1166, 1172
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2003)). This Court has adopted the test announced in Aref v. Lynch,
833 F.3d 242 (D.C. Cir. 2016), for determining whether a legally cognizable liberty
interest has been adversely affected by the inmate’s housing:
             [The court must] consider (i) the conditions of confinement
             relative to administrative segregation, (ii) the duration of that
             confinement generally, and (iii) the duration relative to length of
             administrative segregation routinely imposed on prisoners
             serving similar sentences. We also emphasize that a liberty
             interest can potentially arise under less[ ]severe conditions when
             the deprivation is prolonged or indefinite.

Feliciano, 250 A.3d at 1279 (quoting Aref, 833 F.3d at 255).
             In his petition for review, Dougherty states that he requested to call
Corrections Officer (CO) Bloom as a witness at his misconduct hearing. Attached
to his petition was a form titled “Inmate Request for Representation and Witnesses,”
on which he wrote: (1) at the time of the urinalysis, “this CO told me and showed
me the urinalysis cup had a foreign substance in it, and he still sealed it after I asked
what it was, said I was willing to piss again[;]” and (2) “the video from date said on
report not same day that I was there shows a fire in R&D [urinalysis room] at time,
may have affected sample.” Petition for Review, Attachment 1-D. Dougherty
requested a copy of the lab results to see the “test date, results, signature.” Id. The

                                           7
hearing officer denied his request, explaining that “witnesses are not needed to
establish guilt or innocence.” Id., Attachment 4-A.
               “Inmates in misconduct hearings are not entitled to ‘the same panoply
of procedural rights afforded a criminal defendant.’” Commonwealth ex rel. Jackson
v. Wetzel (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 47 M.D. 2017, filed July 21, 2022) (unreported),8 slip
op. at 6 (quoting Melton v. Beard, 981 A.2d 361, 365 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009)). “An
inmate’s rights are allowed to be restricted by ‘the nature of the regime to which [he
has] been lawfully committed.’” Commonwealth ex rel. Jackson, slip op. at 6
(quoting Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556). The Department’s policy allows an inmate to call
witnesses where their testimony is necessary “to establish the guilt or innocence of
the inmate.” Department of Corrections Procedural Manual DC-ADM 801, Section
3.D. See also 37 Pa. Code §93.10(b)(3). Whether an inmate’s request meets that
standard is committed to the discretion of the hearing examiner. Commonwealth ex
rel. Jackson, slip op. at 6.
               Here, the written report of CO Bloom established Dougherty’s guilt.
The testimony of CO Bloom would not establish Dougherty’s innocence and, thus,
was unnecessary.9 Petition for Review, Attachment 4-A. Dougherty does not
explain that CO Bloom’s report was false or how he was prejudiced in having his

8
  An unreported panel decision of this Court, “issued after January 15, 2008,” may be cited “for
its persuasive value[.]” Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth Court’s Internal Operating
Procedures, 210 Pa. Code §69.414(a).
9
 The hearing officer stated as follows:
        [Hearing examiner] believes Officer Bloom’s written report to be more credible
        than [Dougherty’s] denial. On 12/20/21 at 0835 hrs., [] Dougherty provided a urine
        sample to SCI Houtzdale staff for a random urinalysis drug screen test. []
        Dougherty’s sample yielded a positive result for Buprenorphine at a level of
        116ng/ml. SCI Houtzdale medical department informed Officer Bloom that []
        Dougherty is not prescribed any medication that would give a false positive reading.
Petition for Review, Attachment 4-A.

                                                 8
request denied. In short, the denial of Dougherty’s request to call CO Bloom as a
witness does not state a due process claim. See generally Henderson v. Wood (Pa.
Cmwlth., No. 700 C.D. 2009, filed July 17, 2009) (unreported) (inmate does not
state a due process claim where prejudice is not shown).
               Dougherty also claims that the Department violated his due process
rights10 by failing to provide him his urinalysis test results and internal reports on his
disciplinary sanction.11 In Tyler v. Department of Corrections (Pa. Cmwlth., No.
302 M.D. 2021, filed June 8, 2023) (unreported), the inmate requested that videos
of the incident that triggered the misconduct be viewed by the hearing examiner at
the hearing thereon. He also asked to call the corrections officer as a witness. The
hearing examiner viewed one video and took the testimony of the corrections officer
under oath, outside the inmate’s presence. The hearing examiner then determined
that it was unnecessary to view the second video. We concluded that the inmate did
not state a due process claim.

10
   In Coats v. Department of Corrections (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 329 M.D. 2022, filed October 2, 2023)
(unreported), this Court considered whether it has subject matter jurisdiction to consider the
substance of an inmate’s procedural due process claim. There, the inmate asserted that the
disciplinary proceedings afforded to him were atypical and caused him a significant hardship, but
he did not challenge the sanction imposed. In construing the inmate’s pleadings liberally, this
Court inferred that the inmate believed that the discipline would result in a denial of parole.
However, an inmate does not have a liberty interest in the grant of parole; therefore, the denial of
parole, without more, is not an atypical and significant hardship that can be presented to this Court
in an original jurisdiction action. By contrast, giving an expansive read to Dougherty’s petition
for review, he has pled an atypical hardship sufficient to trigger due process.
11
   In his internal grievances, Dougherty stated that, while waiting in the room to provide a urine
sample, a fire started and “a C.O. grabbed a fire extinguisher and put out the fire. However, the
room stayed smoky for about 40 minutes.” Petition for Review, Attachment 1-E. Dougherty
believes that the smoke could have contaminated his urinalysis because he used a cup that had
been on CO Bloom’s desk where the fire extinguisher was used. Dougherty does not explain in
either the internal grievances or in his petition for review how a fire or smoke could cause a false
positive reading.

                                                 9
               First, the inmate was not entitled to be present to hear the corrections
officer’s testimony or to cross-examine him. Second, the inmate was not entitled to
explain to the hearing examiner what was being said in the video that lacked audio.
Neither opportunity was required by Wolff, 418 U.S. at 567, and, thus, the inmate
did not state a due process claim.
               Like the inmate in Tyler, Dougherty requested information for a
misconduct hearing, specifically his urinalysis results, but the Department denied
his request. However, the lab results were available to the hearing examiner, see
Petition for Review, Attachment DC-141 Part III (Program Review Committee
Action), and he reviewed the results. Petition for Review, Attachments DC-141
Part2(B) (Disciplinary Hearing Report), DC-141 Part 1 (Misconduct Report).
Dougherty is not entitled to anything more. Accordingly, we are constrained to
conclude that the petition for review does not state a due process claim.12
               Dougherty next asserts that his placement in the restricted housing unit
violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
Dougherty asserts that the Department “cannot carry out abusive, inhumane
punishment of people found guilty of any crime (misconduct) without sufficiency of
evidence.” Petition for Review at 5. Dougherty argues that the allegations in his
petition show “that he has endured some kind of cruel and unusual punishment.”
Dougherty Answer to Preliminary Objections ¶7. The Department counters that
these allegations do not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment.

12
  In his Answer to the Department’s preliminary objections, Dougherty also states that his due
process rights were violated when he was not afforded representation at the misconduct hearing.
Dougherty claims that the Department was aware that he had a “record of mental disabilities.”
Dougherty Answer to Preliminary Objections ¶3. Dougherty does not identify any disability which
would prevent him from advocating for himself. Further, the documentation attached to his
petition for review directly contradicts his asserted mental disabilities and need for representation.
Petition for Review, Attachment DC-141, Part III.

                                                 10
              Under the Eighth Amendment, the government may not inflict “cruel
and unusual punishments.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. To that end, “[p]rison
officials must ensure that inmates are not deprived of the ‘minimal civilized measure
of life’s necessities,’ including food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and
personal safety.” Tindell v. Department of Corrections, 87 A.3d 1029, 1041 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2014) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981)).
              The Department is authorized to make rules concerning the
management of state correctional institutions. Small v. Horn, 722 A.2d 664, 669
(Pa. 1998).     The Department has exercised this authority by promulgating a
regulation at 37 Pa. Code §93.11 to govern housing of inmates; it provides as
follows:
              (a) An inmate does not have a right to be housed in a particular
              facility or in a particular area within a facility.
              (b) Confinement in a restricted housing unit (RHU), other than
              under procedures established for inmate discipline, will not be
              done for punitive purposes. The Department will maintain
              written procedures which describe the reasons for housing an
              inmate in the RHU and require due process in accordance and
              with established principles of law for an inmate who is housed in
              the RHU. Inmates confined in the RHU will be reviewed
              periodically by facility staff.

37 Pa. Code §93.11. Inmates found guilty of a Class 1 misconduct charge may be
subjected to one or more of the following sanctions:
              (i) Reduction of the classification of the misconduct to a Class II
              and any sanction permitted for Class II misconducts.
              (ii) A sanction permitted for Class II misconducts, without
              change in class of misconduct.
              (iii) Change of cell assignment, including placement in the
              restricted housing unit or restrictive confinement in a general

                                          11
             population cell for a period not to exceed 90 days for any one
             misconduct charge.
             (iv) Change of program level.

37 Pa. Code §93.10(a)(1) (emphasis added).
             Dougherty does not allege that he has been denied any of life’s
necessities, such as food or clothing. Placement in the restricted housing unit as a
sanction for his misconduct does not, in itself, violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban
on cruel and unusual punishment. Tindell, 87 A.3d at 1042 (use of restricted housing
units or isolation cells alone has not been held to constitute a violation of the Eighth
Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment). Moreover, “it is entirely a
matter of the Department’s discretion where to house an inmate.” Clark v. Beard,
918 A.2d 155, 160 (Pa. Cmwth. 2007). Under the Department’s regulation, an
“inmate does not have a right to be housed in a particular facility or in a particular
area within a facility.” 37 Pa. Code §93.11.
             Here, Dougherty’s Eighth Amendment claim is based upon his
placement in restricted housing for 30 days, which does not, in itself, constitute cruel
and unusual punishment. Accordingly, his petition for review does not state an
Eighth Amendment claim.
             For the reasons set forth above, we quash the petition for review to the
extent it is addressed to our appellate jurisdiction and sustain the preliminary
objections in the nature of a demurrer to the extent it is addressed to our original
jurisdiction. The petition is dismissed with prejudice.13
                             _____________________________________________
                             MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge Emerita

13
   Because of our disposition, we need not address the Department’s remaining preliminary
objection about the paragraphs in the petition being numbered.

                                           12
          IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Ian M. Dougherty,                     :
                    Petitioner        :
                                      :
             v.                       :     No. 131 M.D. 2022
                                      :
PA. Dept. of Corrections, et al.,     :
                  Respondent          :

                                    ORDER

             AND NOW, this 16th day of January, 2024, the preliminary objections
in the nature of a demurrer filed by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, et
al. to Ian M. Dougherty’s petition for review addressed to this Court’s original
jurisdiction are SUSTAINED, and the petition for review is DISMISSED. Ian M.
Doughtery’s petition for review addressed to this Court’s appellate jurisdiction is
QUASHED.

                            _____________________________________________
                            MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge Emerita