Court Opinion

ID: 9894861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-03 14:12:32.68278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:53.572541
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Richard A. Breuer, Esq.,                         :
                  Appellant                      :   No. 1377 C.D. 2022
                                                 :
            v.                                   :   Submitted: October 10, 2023
                                                 :
Borough of Malvern                               :

BEFORE:          HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
                 HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
                 HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH                                           FILED: November 3, 2023
                 In this Right-to-Know Law (RTKL)1 case, Richard A. Breuer, Esq.
(Requester) appeals from the October 25, 2022 order of the Court of Common Pleas of
Chester County (trial court), which dismissed, as moot, Requester’s Petition for
Review (PFR) of a September 15, 2022 Final Determination of the Office of Open
Records (OOR). Requester argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his PFR as
moot and requests a remand to the trial court for de novo review of the OOR’s Final
Determination. After careful review, we affirm.
                  I.     FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                 The facts underlying this appeal are not disputed and are taken chiefly
from Requester’s PFR.2 They can be summarized as follows.

       1
           Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§ 67.101-.3104.

       2
         Because the trial court dismissed Requester’s PFR prior to obtaining the record from the
OOR, the documents that presumably would be in that record, including the Request, the Borough’s
response, Requester’s appeals to the OOR, and the parties’ position statements, are not included in
the record in this Court. We omit from our summary the significant amount of extraneous material
in the PFR.
                On June 29, 2022, Requester emailed a RTKL request (Request) to
Appellee Borough of Malvern (Borough) seeking documents related to the Borough’s
Home Rule Charter. (PFR ¶ 3.) On July 1, 2022, the Borough’s Open Records Officer
(ORO) responded to Requester by email and invoked a 30-day extension to respond to
the Request pursuant to Section 902 of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.902.3 The ORO cited

      3
          Section 902(a), (b) provides as follows:
                (a) Determination.--Upon receipt of a written request for access, the
                open-records officer for an agency shall determine if one of the
                following applies:
                   (1) the request for access requires redaction of a record in
                   accordance with [S]ection 706[, 65 P.S. § 67.706];
                   (2) the request for access requires the retrieval of a record stored
                   in a remote location;
                   (3) a timely response to the request for access cannot be
                   accomplished due to bona fide and specified staffing limitations;
                   (4) a legal review is necessary to determine whether the record is
                   a record subject to access under [the RTKL];
                   (5) the requester has not complied with the agency’s policies
                   regarding access to records;
                   (6) the requester refuses to pay applicable fees authorized by [the
                   RTKL]; or
                   (7) the extent or nature of the request precludes a response within
                   the required time period.
                (b) Notice.--
                   (1) Upon a determination that one of the factors listed in
                   subsection (a) applies, the open-records officer shall send written
                   notice to the requester within five business days of receipt of the
                   request for access under subsection (a).
                   (2) The notice shall include a statement notifying the requester that
                   the request for access is being reviewed, the reason for the review,
                   a reasonable date that a response is expected to be provided and
                   an estimate of applicable fees owed when the record becomes
                   available. If the date that a response is expected to be provided is
(Footnote continued on next page…)

                                                     2
as reasons for the extension that the Request required legal review and that the extent
or nature of the Request precluded a response within the typical five-day period. (PFR
¶ 4.)4 Requester appealed the Borough’s invocation of the extension to the OOR on
July 1, 2022, arguing that its reasons for doing so were pretextual. (PFR ¶ 5.) On July
6, 2022, the OOR dismissed Requester’s appeal as premature, declining to review the
Borough’s invocation of the extension and advising Requester that he could file a new
appeal after any denial or deemed denial of the Request pursuant to Section 1101(a)(1)
of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.1101(a)(1). (PFR ¶ 6.)
               The Borough timely responded to the Request on August 3, 2022,
indicating that, after a good faith search, it could not locate any responsive records.
(PFR ¶ 7.) Requester filed a second appeal to the OOR, again challenging, in pertinent
part, the Borough’s invocation of an extension pursuant to Section 902.5 (PFR ¶ 8.)
The OOR issued its Final Determination on September 15, 2022, concluding that the
Borough satisfied its burden to establish that no responsive records exist. The OOR

                   in excess of 30 days, following the five business days allowed for
                   in [S]ection 901[, 65 P.S. § 67.901], the request for access shall be
                   deemed denied unless the requester has agreed in writing to an
                   extension to the date specified in the notice.
                   (3) If the requester agrees to the extension, the request shall be
                   deemed denied on the day following the date specified in the
                   notice if the agency has not provided a response by that date.
65 P.S. § 67.902(a), (b).

       4
         See Section 902(a)(4) (“a legal review is necessary to determine whether the record is a
record subject to access under [the RTKL]”) and (7) (“the extent or nature of the request precludes a
response within the required time period”) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.902(a)(4), (7).

       5
         Requester also appears to have challenged before the OOR the substance of the Borough’s
request that no responsive records existed. See OOR Final Determination at 1.

                                                   3
did not address the propriety of the Borough’s invocation of an extension pursuant to
Section 902. (PFR ¶ 9; OOR Final Determination at 4.)
             Requester filed the PFR in the trial court on October 17, 2022. In it,
Requester challenged only the Borough’s invocation of a Section 902 30-day
extension; he did not dispute the Borough’s substantive response that no responsive
records exist. (PFR ¶ 10.) More specifically, Requester alleged as follows:
             [Requester] avers that there is no factual support for the
             [Section][]902 extension. [Requester] further avers that the
             Borough’s invocation of the extension is for improper
             purposes and as retaliation against [Requester and his
             client].
(PFR ¶ 10.) Requester further disputed the Borough’s explanation that “[o]ne reason
why it took so long [to respond] is that [Requester] and one of his clients have filed
[26] [RTKL] requests with the Borough since January 1, 2022.” (PFR ¶ 11.) Petitioner
further alleged:

        19. [Section] 902 provides for extension of an agency’s
            response time upon a determination by the agency’s open
            records officer that one or more of seven circumstances
            exist[s]. [Requester] suggests that the use of the word
            “determination” and the listing of seven specific criteria in
            [Section] 902 imply that the officer must have a factual basis
            on which to conclude that one or more of the criteria are
            met. A reading that the extension is based merely on the
            agency’s [“]discretion,[”] a word that appears nowhere in
            [Section] 902, untethered to any facts, would eradicate
            “determination” and the list of criteria. The result would be
            to permit an extension to be invoked arbitrarily.
        20. [Requester] accepts the Borough’s response that it has no
            responsive documents. [Requester] also accepts that since
            the extension period has now passed, the question is
            technically moot. [Requester] suggests that this case should
            nevertheless be decided, since it presents a question that is
            likely to reoccur and because [ ] the timing issues would

                                           4
             otherwise evade review. A decision construing the
             operation of [Section] 902 will be valuable to guide the
             parties in their future conduct.

(PFR ¶¶ 19-20.) Requester therefore requested that the trial court conclude that Section
902 “requires a factual basis for an extension” and “find that the Borough lacked a
factual basis for the extension in this case.” (PFR at 8.) Requester also requested an
award of counsel fees, costs, and a civil penalty against the Borough pursuant to
Sections 1304 and 1305 of the RTKL, 65 P.S. §§ 67.1304-05.
             Approximately eight days later, on October 25, 2022, the trial court issued
an order dismissing the PFR as moot prior to receiving the record from the OOR and
prior to receiving any additional evidence, argument, or briefing by the parties. In its
order, the trial court noted that Requester admitted that the validity of the Borough’s
Section 902 extension technically was moot and concluded that none of the exceptions
to the mootness doctrine applied. (Trial Court October 25, 2022 Order at 2.) Requester
appealed to this Court on November 21, 2022, and the trial court ordered the filing of
a Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure (Pa. R.A.P.) 1925(b) Concise Statement
of Errors Complained of on Appeal (Concise Statement) on November 28, 2022.
Requester timely filed his Concise Statement on November 28, 2022, therein asserting
several errors, including, inter alia, that the trial court erred in applying the mootness
doctrine and in dismissing the PFR without receiving the record from the OOR or
permitting Requester to present additional evidence or argument. (Concise Statement
at 2-3; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 28a-29a.) In its Pa. R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion (Trial
Ct. Op.), the trial court further explained its decision as follows:
             Contrary to Requester’s suggestion in his Concise
             Statement, the [trial court] did not dismiss his [PFR] without
             proper consideration. Rather, the [trial court] analyzed
             whether perhaps an exception to the mootness doctrine
             might be present in this case. [The trial court] nevertheless

                                             5
                 properly concluded that such was not the case here.
                 Following its review of the [PFR], the assertions made
                 therein and the OOR’s [Final] Determination, the [trial]
                 court concluded that the question presented was not one of
                 great public importance, but appeared to stem from
                 animosity between litigants. In fact, Requester sought
                 review so that, in Requester’s words, the [trial] court could
                 “guide the parties in their future conduct.” Issuance of a
                 future case management or discovery order, however, is not
                 the task of the reviewing court.

                 Additionally, the question presented by Requester in his
                 [PFR] was not demonstrated to be such that it would elude
                 appellate review in the future. Any new request will be
                 reviewed in accordance with the specifics of that [ ] request,
                 the RTKL[,] and its applicable procedures. Finally, it was
                 conceded and accepted by Requester that none of the
                 requested records existed. Thus, any future detriment in this
                 case was not demonstrated and the [PFR] was properly
                 dismissed.
(Trial Ct. Op. at 4.) The trial court lastly denied Requester’s claim for attorneys’ fees,
costs, and civil penalties under Sections 1304 and 1305 of the RTKL, concluding that
Requester had not established the prerequisites for such an award under those sections.
Id. at 4-5.6
                 Requester now appeals to this Court.
                                              II.     ISSUES
                 Requester raises two separate, but interrelated issues in this appeal: (1)
whether the trial court erred in dismissing Requester’s PFR as moot; and (2) whether
the trial court erred in ruling on the mootness question without permitting Requester a
meaningful opportunity to be heard. In its brief, the Borough presents a third issue via

       6
           This aspect of the trial court’s decision is not at issue in this appeal.

                                                      6
a request for attorneys’ fees pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 2744. Therein, the Borough
contends that Requester’s appeal to this Court is frivolous.
                                        III.   DISCUSSION7
                                   A.      Dismissal of the PFR
                We first address whether the trial court erred or abused its discretion in
dismissing the PFR without first obtaining the certified record from the OOR and
without permitting any further filings, briefing, presentation of evidence, or argument
from Requester.
                In the RTKL context, due process requires that the parties be provided
with notice and an opportunity to present evidence to the factfinder, here, the OOR.
Wishnefsky v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 144 A.3d 290, 295 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2016). Section 1302(a) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.1302(a), governs appeals
from final determinations of the OOR. It provides as follows:
                (a) General rule.--Within 30 days of the mailing date of the
                final determination of the appeals officer relating to a
                decision of a local agency issued under [S]ection 1101(b)[8]
                or of the date a request for access is deemed denied, a
                requester or local agency may file a petition for review or
                other document as required by rule of court with the court
                of common pleas for the county where the local agency is
                located. The decision of the court shall contain findings of
                fact and conclusions of law based upon the evidence as a
                whole. The decision shall clearly and concisely explain the
                rationale for the decision.

       7
          In RTKL appeals in which this Court sits as the appellate court, our review of the trial court’s
order determines whether the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence or whether the
trial court committed an error of law or an abuse of discretion in reaching its decision. In re Right to
Know Law Request Served on Venango County’s Tourism Promotion Agency & Lead Economic
Development Agency, 83 A.3d 1101, 1104 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).

       8
           65 P.S. § 67.1101(b).

                                                    7
65 P.S. § 67.1302(a). Section 1303(b) of the RTKL governs the composition of the
record to be certified to a reviewing court and provides as follows:
             (b) Record on appeal.--The record before a court shall
             consist of the request, the agency’s response, the appeal
             filed under [S]ection 1101, the hearing transcript, if any, and
             the final written determination of the appeals officer.

65 P.S. § 67.1303(b). Section 1303(b)’s delineation of the items that must be included
in the record does not preclude a reviewing court from conducting a hearing or
supplementing the record as it deems necessary to permit its de novo, plenary review.
See Bowling v. Office of Open Records, 75 A.3d 453, 467, 474, 477 (Pa. 2013).
Additionally, and generally speaking, “[s]ua sponte consideration of issues deprives
counsel of the opportunity to brief and argue the issues and the court of the benefit of
counsel’s advocacy.” Wiegand v. Wiegand, 337 A.2d 256, 257 (Pa. 1975). It also can
“disturb[] the process of orderly judicial decision-making.” Johnson v. Lansdale
Borough, 146 A.3d 696, 709 (Pa. 2016).
             Here, Requester argues that the trial court, in dismissing his PFR as moot
sua sponte without first receiving the certified record from the OOR and without
permitting him any opportunity to brief, present evidence regarding, or otherwise
address the mootness question, violated his right to due process. We conclude that we
need not determine, in this instance, whether the trial court technically erred in these
respects because any such error, to the extent that it did occur, was harmless and did
not deprive Requester of due process.
             First, it is not disputed that the trial court dismissed the PFR prior to
receiving the certified record from the OOR. Pursuant to Section 1303(b), that record
would have included the Request, the Borough’s response, Requester’s appeal to the

                                            8
OOR, and the OOR’s Final Determination.9 It also would have included any other
evidence considered by the OOR in issuing its Final Determination, including any such
evidence contained in the parties’ position statements or affidavits. See Department of
Education v. Bagwell, 114 A.3d 1113, 1120 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). The trial court had
before it, either directly in Requester’s PFR or in an attachment to it, a significant
portion of the substance of those documents, including the OOR’s Final Determination,
the substance of the Borough’s response to the Request, the language utilized by the
Borough to invoke the Section 902 extension, and the substance of the attestation the
Borough submitted to the OOR. (R.R. at 15a-19a.) It is not clear whether the parties
submitted any additional evidence in their position statements to the OOR, and none is
referenced in its Final Determination. Thus, the trial court had before it all of the
material portions of the documents required by Section 1303(b).
              Moreover, the OOR did not consider or rule upon the validity of the
Borough’s Section 902 extension. It determined only whether the Borough’s response
to the Request was sufficient, which issue Requester did not appeal to the trial court.
The trial court then ruled only on the mootness question and accordingly needed only
those facts from the certified record that would permit it to do so. Mootness is a pure
question of law, Commonwealth v. Dixon, 907 A.2d 468, 472 (Pa. 2006), and in this
context, all of the facts governing whether the Borough’s Section 902 extension was a
moot issue were before the trial court, particularly since Requester admitted its
mootness in his PFR. Accordingly, to the extent that the trial court might have erred
in proceeding to issue a decision without having received the OOR’s certified record,
that error was harmless.

       9
          Because it does not appear that the OOR conducted a hearing, the record would not include
a transcript.

                                                9
             Finally, although the trial court’s sua sponte dismissal of the PFR
precluded the introduction of additional evidence, argument, or briefing by the parties,
Requester did not suffer any resulting prejudice. Again, the only question decided by
the trial court was the question of mootness. The trial court did not reach the merits of
whether Section 902 requires an agency to supplement its invocation of a 30-day
extension with sufficient facts to establish one of the seven grounds enumerated in
Section 902(a). All of the facts necessary to the disposition of the mootness question
were alleged in the PFR and were undisputed, and Requester set forth in his PFR the
reason why he believed an exception to the mootness doctrine applied. See PFR ¶ 20.
We simply will not reverse the trial court in this instance where the facts upon which
it based its decision were undisputed and the question before it was one of law that
could be resolved without further briefing or argument. We accordingly decline to
remand the matter and will consider the merits of the trial court’s ruling.
                                    B.     Mootness
             “The mootness doctrine requires an actual case or controversy to exist at
all stages.” Department of Environmental Protection v. Cromwell Township,
Huntingdon County, 32 A.3d 639, 651 (Pa. 2011). The existence of a case or
controversy requires (1) a legal controversy that is real and not hypothetical; (2) a legal
controversy that affects an individual in a concrete manner so as to provide the factual
predicate for a reasoned adjudication; and finally, (3) a legal controversy with
sufficiently adverse parties so as to sharpen the issues for judicial resolution. See
California Borough v. Rothey, 185 A.3d 456, 463 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (citation
omitted). Parties must continue to have “a personal stake in the outcome” of the suit.
Mistich v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole, 863 A.2d 116, 119 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2004). “An exception to mootness will be found [(1)] where [the] conduct complained

                                            10
of is capable of repetition yet likely to evade judicial review, [(2)] where the case
involves issues of great public importance[,] or [(3)] where one party will suffer a
detriment without the court’s decision.” Rothey, 185 A.3d at 463 (citation omitted).
             For ease of analysis, we address the three exceptions to the mootness
doctrine in reverse order. First, regarding the third exception, Requester admitted in
his PFR and admits again in this Court that he does not dispute the sufficiency of the
Borough’s response to the Request indicating that no responsive records exist.
Although Requester posits several theoretical reasons why a decision on an otherwise
moot issue concerning the interpretation of Section 902 might be helpful or beneficial,
he in no way has established that he continues to have any personal stake in the Request
or in the Borough’s invocation of the Section 902 30-day extension. Nor has he
established how he personally will suffer detriment if that issue is not addressed and
decided in this case. Thus, this mootness exception does not apply.
             Regarding the second exception, although access to public records under
both the letter and spirit of the RTKL is an important public policy long recognized by
this Court, that interest is not implicated in this case because the Borough’s substantive
response to the Request is not challenged; there is no dispute that the requested records
do not exist. The question of whether an agency must include factual support to invoke
a 30-day extension under Section 902 where the requester has suffered no prejudice,
and where the sufficiency of the agency’s RTKL response is not contested, simply is
not an issue of such importance as to require the Court to make an exception to its long-
held rule against issuing advisory opinions.
             Lastly, regarding the first exception to the mootness doctrine, i.e., that the
conduct complained of is capable of repetition yet likely to evade judicial review, the
exception involves two elements: “(1) that the duration of the challenged action is too

                                           11
short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration; and (2) that there is a
reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same
action again.” Philadelphia Public School Notebook v. School District of Philadelphia,
49 A.3d 445, 449 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012) (citation omitted). Although it appears at first
blush that the first element of this exception could be satisfied, the second clearly is
not. Requester has not alleged or established how he will be subjected to another
Section 902 extension as a matter of course. That will be determined by whether he
submits a RTKL request to the Borough and it invokes the Section 902 extension. We
simply cannot conclude that there is any reasonable expectation that Requester would
again object to a circumstance where, as here, an agency timely invokes a Section 902
extension that works no prejudice to Requester, and the agency further timely submits
a complete and sufficient response to Requester’s RTKL request that Requester does
not challenge. These facts again simply do not warrant an exception to the mootness
doctrine.
             In sum, none of the mootness exceptions apply, and the trial court did not
err or abuse its discretion in dismissing the PFR as moot.
                C.     Attorneys’ Fees Pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 2744
             Pa. R.A.P. 2744 permits an appellate court to award reasonable attorneys’
fees “if it determines that an appeal is frivolous or taken solely for delay or that the
conduct of the participant against whom costs are to be imposed is [‘]dilatory, obdurate,
or vexatious.[’]” Pa. R.A.P. 2744. Awarding attorneys’ fees under Rule 2744 is within
this Court’s discretion.    Canal Side Care Manor, LLC v. Pennsylvania Human
Relations Commission, 30 A.3d 568, 579 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). An appeal is frivolous
if “no justifiable question has been presented” and the appeal “is readily recognizable
as devoid of merit in that there is little prospect of success.” Id. (citing Department of

                                           12
Transportation v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Tanner), 654 A.2d 3 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1994)). In exercising our discretion in this respect, we are “mindful of the
need to avoid unjustly penalizing an appellant for exercising her right to fully exhaust
her legal remedies.” Id. (citing Watkins v. Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review, 689 A.2d 1019, 1022 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997)).
             The Borough argues that, because Requester admitted in his PFR filed in
the trial court that no documents responsive to the Request existed and that the issue
concerning the Borough’s Section 902 extension was technically moot, his appeal to
this Court is frivolous. (Borough Br. at 13.) The Borough further contends that
Requester’s argument that the Borough improperly invoked a 30-day extension under
Section 902 flies in the face of the plain language of the statute and is equally as
frivolous. Id. at 14.
             Although we agree with the Borough concerning Requester’s admissions
below, we cannot conclude that his appeal to this Court, albeit without merit, is
frivolous, particularly with regard to his procedural argument challenging what he
characterized as the trial court’s premature dismissal of the PFR. Although we
conclude that any error by the trial court in this regard was harmless and that the issue
raised in Requester’s appeal is moot, we cannot say that no “justifiable question has
been presented” or that the appeal “is readily recognizable as devoid of merit.” We
accordingly conclude that an award of attorneys’ fees under Rule 2744 is not warranted
here.
                                IV.    CONCLUSION
             The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in dismissing Requester’s
PFR on mootness grounds.        Further, to the extent that the trial court erred in
prematurely deciding the mootness question prior to its receipt of the certified record

                                           13
from the OOR or the submission of additional evidence, argument, or briefing by the
parties, such error was harmless.    We accordingly affirm the trial court’s order
dismissing Requester’s PFR. Because Requester’s appeal to this Court was not
frivolous, we deny the Borough’s request for attorneys’ fees.

                                          ________________________________
                                          PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

                                         14
              IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Richard A. Breuer, Esq.,               :
                  Appellant            :    No. 1377 C.D. 2022
                                       :
         v.                            :
                                       :
Borough of Malvern                     :

                                    ORDER

              AND NOW, this 3rd day of November, 2023, the October 25, 2022
Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County hereby is AFFIRMED. It
further is ORDERED that Appellee Borough of Malvern’s request for attorneys’ fees
pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2744, Pa. R.A.P. 2744, is
DENIED.

                                           ________________________________
                                           PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge