Court Opinion

ID: 9534139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:37:08.711501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:42.127807
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McLAREN dissents: By granting the defendant’s motion for leave to appeal and by providing an incomplete answer to the certified question, the majority ignores the purpose of interlocutory appeals. As the majority is aware, Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308) is an exception to the general rule that only final orders from a court are subject to appellate review. Thus, “[ajppeals under Rule 308 should be limited to certain ‘exceptional’ circumstances; the rule should be strictly construed and sparingly exercised.” Voss v. Lincoln Mall Management Co., 166 Ill. App. 3d 442, 445 (1988). This court may not grant leave to appeal an interlocutory order under Rule 308 unless (1) the interlocutory order involves a question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion; and (2) an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. 155 Ill. 2d R 308(a). The majority does not attempt to explain how the question certified by the trial court in this case satisfies these requirements. The first requirement can be satisfied when the issue is one of first impression (see Costello v. Governing Board of Lee County Special Education Ass’n, 252 Ill. App. 3d 547 (1993)) or when the issue is governed by conflicting authority (see Bright v. Dicke, 260 Ill. App. 3d 768 (1994)). The question presented to this court in this appeal was answered long ago. The majority acknowledges that the question was answered in 1954 by our supreme court in Fulford v. O’Connor, 3 Ill. 2d 490, 500-01 (1954). I believe the certified question was more clearly answered in Marcus v. Liebman, 59 Ill. App. 3d 337, 340 (1978) (false imprisonment could be proved where a psychiatrist allegedly forced a patient who was voluntarily committed to rescind her request to be released by threatening her with involuntary commitment; however, the psychiatrist never filed a petition). Nevertheless, it is uncontroverted that the question at issue in this appeal is not one of first impression. Further, no one claims that the question is governed by conflicting authority, and the majority fails to explain how the first requirement of Rule 308 has otherwise been met. This insufficiency renders the appeal unsuitable. In addition, the appeal fails to meet the second requirement. The second requirement, regarding the material advancement of the ultimate termination of the litigation, is satisfied where (1) “a finding of liability would require extensive accounting procedures”; (2) “a long trial would be necessary if a defense were overruled pertaining to the right to bring the action”; (3) the case involves a third-party defendant who is essential to the litigation; and (4) a transferee court’s jurisdiction is challenged. Voss, 166 Ill. App. 3d at 447, citing Lemer v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 690 F.2d 203, 211-12 (1982). This appeal does not fit any of these examples. Rather, like the improper Rule 308 question presented in Renshaw v. General Telephone Co., 112 Ill. App. 3d 58 (1983): “The principal case is one for damages for personal injury. The parties are few, and the issues are no more complicated than those of an ordinary personal injury case. [The] [t]rial *** should be of comparatively short duration ***.” Renshaw, 112 Ill. App. 3d at 64. In addition, the question presented to this court affects only one of 18 counts and the dismissal of this count does not eliminate any of the defendants from the case. Further, the majority does not even attempt to explain how entertaining this appeal will materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Moreover, the majority provides an incomplete answer to the question presented. The question presented (“whether an initially authorized detention under the Mental Health Code can become a false imprisonment when there is a failure to comply with the filing requirement for the commitment procedure”) is not" “yes,” as the majority contends. Because the plaintiff does not allege wrongful intent, the defendant does not allege good faith, and the required statement of fact is devoid of such, the answer to the question presented is “maybe.” The certified question concerns the failure to timely file a petition, regardless of intent. In Fulford (3 Ill. 2d 490), the case relied on by the majority, the supreme court found that false imprisonment could lie where there is a wrongful intent to avoid legal guidelines above and beyond the mere failure to follow the same. The majority in this case implicitly departs from the rationale in Fulford and determines that the mere allegation and proof of the failure to file are proof of wrongful intent. By failing to qualify its affirmative response to the question presented in this case, the majority has not done anything to materially advance the ultimate and correct termination of the litigation. In addition, the majority’s unequivocal answer wrongfully suggests that false imprisonment is a strict liability tort. The certified question arose from the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on a claim of immunity. However, the question and the majority’s answer, in essence, address whether the plaintiff stated a cause of action. The majority’s answer suggests that the defendant could prove no explanation that would preclude liability regarding its failure to file the petition. Thus, the majority ignores one of the propositions contained in Fulford, a case it relies upon, that intent is relevant in cases alleging false imprisonment. Fulford, 3 Ill. 2d at 500-01, see also Patton v. State, 47 Ill. Ct. Cl. 174 (1994); Howard v. State, 45 Ill. Ct. Cl. 214, 234 (1993). By failing to answer the question completely and by overreaching in its answer, the majority minimizes the already limited possibility that entertaining this appeal will materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. The majority’s statement that it disavows any interpretation of strict liability establishes that the majority has answered the certified question with a “maybe.” By limiting the certified question the majority exhibits an awareness of the inadequacy of the certified question and the statement of facts supporting the question. The majority’s qualification, though appropriately stated, supports my contention that the certified question is so ambiguous that attempting to answer it only results in further speculation. A substantial ground for a difference of opinion, as required by Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308(a)), cannot be made in a vacuum. Without some factual scenario to relate the answer to, there is no basis to form an opinion, let alone a difference of opinion. If this appeal materially advances the ultimate termination of the litigation, it is only through chance rather than through reasonable probability. I do not believe the requirements of Rule 308 have been satisfied, and the majority’s answer is incomplete. Therefore, I believe we should vacate our previous order allowing leave to appeal and dismiss this appeal as imprudently entertained. See Voss, 166 Ill. App. 3d at 453.