Court Opinion

ID: 9353222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-11 15:00:43.053472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:09:12.777314
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1555   Document: 30     Page: 1    Filed: 01/11/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

          WILLIAM HENRY STARRETT, JR.,
                 Plaintiff-Appellant

                            v.

                   UNITED STATES,
                   Defendant-Appellee
                 ______________________

                       2022-1555
                 ______________________

     Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
 in No. 1:21-cv-01168-EMR, Judge Eleni M. Roumel.
                  ______________________

                Decided: January 11, 2023
                 ______________________

    WILLIAM STARRETT, JR., Richardson, TX, pro se.

     JIMMY MCBIRNEY, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
 Division, United States Department of Justice, Washing-
 ton, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
 BRIAN M. BOYNTON, STEVEN JOHN GILLINGHAM, PATRICIA
 M. MCCARTHY.
                  ______________________

    Before TARANTO, CHEN, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
Case: 22-1555    Document: 30      Page: 2    Filed: 01/11/2023

 2                                             STARRETT   v. US

 PER CURIAM.
      William Starrett, Jr., sued the United States in the
 U.S. Court of Federal Claims (Claims Court), asserting
 three counts of breach of contract and seeking approxi-
 mately 11 trillion dollars in damages. In his complaint, Mr.
 Starrett alleged that he has been forced “[a]gainst his pro-
 tests” to “advise” in the federal government’s alleged re-
 mote monitoring of civilians and that he has been subjected
 to “remote neural monitoring.” Claims Ct. Dkt. No. 8 ¶¶ 3–
 7, 28–29, 31, 40. The Claims Court dismissed the com-
 plaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Starrett v.
 United States, No. 21-cv-1168, 2021 WL 7627745 (Fed. Cl.
 Sept. 10, 2021); Claims Ct. Dkt. No. 19. We affirm.
                               I
     On April 5, 2021, Mr. Starrett, proceeding pro se, sued
 the United States in the Claims Court, including three
 counts in his complaint, each alleging a breach of contract.
 Claims Ct. Dkt. Nos. 1, 8. The complaint, filed under seal,
 was unsealed on May 21, 2021. Claims Ct. Dkt. Nos. 6, 11,
 12. In the complaint, Mr. Starrett sought damages from
 and an injunction against the United States. Claims Ct.
 Dkt. Nos. 1, 8.
      In his complaint, Mr. Starrett alleged that, “[a]gainst
 his protests,” he has been forced to “advise” in the federal
 government’s alleged remote monitoring of civilians.
 Claims Ct. Dkt. No. 8 ¶¶ 3–7, 31, 40. Mr. Starrett also al-
 leged that he himself has been subjected to “remote neural
 monitoring,” with “satellite-relayed or satellite-based tech-
 nologies being forced upon [him].” Id. ¶¶ 28–29. The com-
 plaint cites the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, as the basis
 for the Claims Court’s jurisdiction, Claims Ct. Dkt. No. 8
 ¶ 8, and the complaint’s appendix contains, among other
 things, Mr. Starrett’s demands to various government
 agencies that “all harassment . . . end immediately,”
 Claims Ct. Dkt. No. 8-1, at 17 (ECF pagination); invoices
 that he sent to the U.S. Departments of Defense, Justice,
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 STARRETT   v. US                                            3

 and Energy, id. at 28–50; and responses from the various
 agencies, id. at 19, 25. The agencies, in their responses,
 stated that insufficient evidence exists of the alleged gov-
 ernmental wrongdoing and that Mr. Starrett’s invoices “do
 not come within the immediate jurisdiction” of the agen-
 cies. Id.
     The United States did not file a response to Mr. Star-
 rett’s complaint within the 60 days allowed by Claims
 Court Rule 12(a)(1)(A). The United States thus defaulted
 on June 8, 2021, as the Clerk’s later entry of default con-
 firmed. Claims Ct. Dkt. Nos. 24, 25, 26. Mr. Starrett
 moved on July 15, 2021, for the entry of a default judgment
 against the United States. Claims Ct. Dkt. No. 14. One
 week later, on July 22, 2021, the government moved to dis-
 miss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or, alterna-
 tively, for failure to state a claim on which relief could be
 granted. Claims Ct. Dkt. No. 13, at 1. The Claims Court
 ordered the government to respond to Mr. Starrett’s de-
 fault-judgment motion and to explain why it had filed its
 motion to dismiss too late (after the entry of default).
 Claims Ct. Dkt. No. 16, at 2. The government responded
 that, “[d]ue to an oversight,” government counsel “mistak-
 enly calendared the response deadline to [Mr. Starrett’s]
 complaint based on the . . . date of the ECF notice reflecting
 the Court’s Order unsealing [the] complaint, rather than
 based on the complaint filing date [itself].” Claims Ct. Dkt.
 No. 17, at 2.
     On September 10, 2021, the Claims Court dismissed
 the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and denied
 as moot Mr. Starrett’s motion for the entry of default judg-
 ment against the United States. Starrett, 2021 WL
 7627745; Claims Ct. Dkt. No. 19. The Claims Court con-
 cluded that Mr. Starrett’s complaint does not sufficiently
 allege a source of entitlement to the damages he seeks—
 neither a money-mandating statute nor the existence of
 any express or implied contract with the United States.
 Starrett, 2021 WL 7627745, at *3–4; Claims Ct. Dkt. No.
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 4                                            STARRETT   v. US

 19, at 5–7. The Claims Court also concluded that it lacked
 authority to issue the requested equitable relief. Starrett,
 2021 WL 7627745, at *4; Claims Ct. Dkt. No. 19, at 7.
     The Claims Court entered judgment on September 14,
 2021, Claims Ct. Dkt. No. 20, and Mr. Starrett moved for
 reconsideration on October 7, 2021, Claims Ct. Dkt. No. 21,
 within the 28 days allowed by Claims Court Rule 59(b)(1).
 The Claims Court denied reconsideration on February 3,
 2022, concluding that it had properly dismissed the case,
 could not have entered a default judgment against the
 United States in these circumstances, and had properly un-
 sealed Mr. Starrett’s complaint. Starrett v. United States,
 158 Fed. Cl. 487, 491–94 (2022); Claims Ct. Dkt. No. 22, at
 4–11. Mr. Starrett timely filed a notice of appeal on March
 17, 2022, Claims Ct. Dkt. No. 29, within the 60 days al-
 lowed by 28 U.S.C. § 2107(b) and Federal Rule of Appellate
 Procedure 4(a)(4)(A)(iv). We have jurisdiction under 28
 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
                              II
     Mr. Starrett argues on appeal that the Claims Court
 erred by dismissing his complaint, by not entering a default
 judgment against the United States, and by unsealing his
 complaint. Starrett Br. at 6, 10–11, 16–17, 20–22, 27; see
 also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (instructing
 that pro se filings are “to be liberally construed”).
                              A
     We decide de novo whether the Claims Court correctly
 dismissed Mr. Starrett’s complaint for lack of subject-mat-
 ter jurisdiction. See Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. United States,
 862 F.3d 1370, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Fidelity &
 Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc. v. United States,
 805 F.3d 1082, 1087 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). Mr. Starrett, as the
 plaintiff, bears the burden of establishing the Claims
 Court’s jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.
 Brandt v. United States, 710 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
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 STARRETT   v. US                                            5

 2013) (citing Taylor v. United States, 303 F.3d 1357, 1359
 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). And although pro se plaintiffs’ com-
 plaints are interpreted liberally, Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106,
 pro se plaintiffs must still shoulder the burden of satisfying
 jurisdictional requirements, Kelley v. Secretary, 812 F.2d
 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
      The Tucker Act is a waiver of the United States’ sover-
 eign immunity, United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212
 (1983), and confers jurisdiction to the Claims Court over,
 among other things, “any claim against the United States
 founded either upon . . . any Act of Congress . . . or upon
 any express or implied contract with the United States,” 28
 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). “The Tucker Act itself does not create
 a substantive cause of action; in order to come within the
 jurisdictional reach and the waiver of the Tucker Act, a
 plaintiff must identify a separate source of substantive law
 that creates the right to money damages.” Fisher v. United
 States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Mitch-
 ell, 463 U.S. at 216; United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392,
 398 (1976)). “In the parlance of Tucker Act cases, that
 source must be ‘money-mandating.’” Id. (citing Mitchell,
 463 U.S. at 217; Testan, 424 U.S. at 398). Some statutes
 are money-mandating, though such statutes are “rare,”
 Maine Community Health Options v. United States, 140 S.
 Ct. 1308, 1329 (2020); and where a contract exists, there is
 a presumption that it is money-mandating, Boaz Housing
 Authority v. United States, 994 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
 2021). At the pleading stage, a source is money-mandating
 if the plaintiff makes “a non-frivolous allegation,” Fisher,
 402 F.3d at 1172, that the substantive law “can fairly be
 interpreted as mandating compensation by the [govern-
 ment],” United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 290
 (2009) (quoting Testan, 424 U.S. at 400); Maine Commu-
 nity, 140 S. Ct. at 1328.
     No qualifying statute is adequately pleaded. The com-
 plaint generally cites 10 U.S.C. §§ 271, 272, 2358, 2371b,
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 6                                             STARRETT   v. US

 2373, and 2386. 1 Claims Ct. Dkt. No. 8 ¶¶ 44, 106–11. But
 Mr. Starrett did not make—and could not have made—a
 non-frivolous allegation that these statutes are money-
 mandating. Sections 271 and 272 permit the Secretary of
 Defense to provide to civilian law enforcement “any infor-
 mation collected during the normal course of military
 training or operations that may be relevant” to the civilian
 authorities’ jurisdiction, 10 U.S.C. § 271(a), and to make
 available to civilian law enforcement “any equipment . . . ,
 base facility, or research facility of the Department of De-
 fense . . . for law enforcement purposes,” id. § 272. Section
 2358 permits the Secretary of Defense to “engage in basic
 research.” Id. § 4001(a). Section 2371b permits the Direc-
 tor of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to
 “carry out prototype projects that are directly relevant to
 enhancing the mission effectiveness of military personnel.”
 Id. § 4022(a)(1). Section 2373 permits the Secretary of De-
 fense, among others, to buy, among other things, “space-
 flight, telecommunications, and aeronautical supplies.” Id.
 § 4023(a). And § 2386 allows “[f]unds appropriated for a
 military department” to be “used to acquire,” among other
 things, copyrights and patents. Id. § 3793.

     1   Sections 2358, 2371b, and 2373 were recodified at
 10 U.S.C. §§ 4001, 4003, 4004, respectively, effective Janu-
 ary 1, 2021. See William M. (Mac) Thornberry National
 Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, Pub. L. No.
 116-283, § 1841(b)(1), 134 Stat. 3388, 4243 (2021). Sections
 2371b and 2373 were further recodified at 10 U.S.C.
 §§ 4022, 4023, respectively, effective December 27, 2021.
 See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
 2022, Pub. L. No. 117-81, § 1701(u)(2)(B), 135 Stat. 1541,
 2151 (2021). Likewise, § 2386 was recodified at 10 U.S.C.
 § 3793 effective January 1, 2021. § 1833(o)(2), 134 Stat. at
 4234.
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 STARRETT   v. US                                             7

     None of these statutes can be fairly interpreted as man-
 dating compensation by the government for what Mr. Star-
 rett alleges. Rather, each statute permits officers of the
 United States to perform actions relating to defense, law
 enforcement, or research. Some of the cited statutes per-
 mit the government to award contracts to achieve the stat-
 utes’ ends. See, e.g., id. § 4001(b) (stating that the
 Secretary of Defense “may perform research and develop-
 ment projects . . . by contract”); id. § 4022(a)(2)(A) (stating
 that the “authority of this section” may be exercised by con-
 tract). But Mr. Starrett has not alleged that he was
 awarded any such contract.
    Mr. Starrett also has not adequately alleged the exist-
 ence of an express or implied contract with the govern-
 ment. We have said:
     The general requirements for a binding contract
     with the United States are identical for both ex-
     press and implied contracts. The party alleging a
     contract must show a mutual intent to contract in-
     cluding an offer, an acceptance, and consideration.
     A contract with the United States also requires
     that the [g]overnment representative who entered
     or ratified the agreement had actual authority to
     bind the United States.
 Trauma Service Group v. United States, 104 F.3d 1321,
 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). Here, Mr. Star-
 rett alleges that a person in a red pickup truck visited him
 and informed him that “he was a target” in a Department
 of Defense surveillance “exercise to engage and overtake a
 subversive individual who held ideals contrary to authori-
 tarian policy.” Claims Ct. Dkt. No. 8 ¶¶ 37, 39–40. But
 even if we accept these allegations as true, such facts do
 not plausibly allege that Mr. Starrett or the government
 intended to form a contract. Mr. Starrett repeatedly al-
 leges that this surveillance was “without his authorization
 or consent” and “[a]gainst his protests.” Id. ¶¶ 4, 40.
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 8                                              STARRETT   v. US

 Moreover, Mr. Starrett alleges that he “plainly communi-
 cated to [the government] that a signed customer services
 contract with initial payments issued, as to be agreed upon,
 would be required by [Mr. Starrett],” id. ¶ 51, but the com-
 plaint contains no allegation (or supporting exhibit show-
 ing) that such a signed customer services contract ever
 existed. Finally, Mr. Starrett points to no government
 statement or action that could plausibly be interpreted as
 manifesting a government intent to form a contract. The
 only government statements submitted with the complaint
 are agencies’ statements that disclaim jurisdiction over Mr.
 Starrett’s invoices. Claims Ct. Dkt. No. 8-1, at 19, 25 (ECF
 pagination).
     Because no statute identified in Mr. Starrett’s com-
 plaint is money-mandating, and because Mr. Starrett does
 not plausibly allege the existence of an express or implied
 contract with the United States, the Claims Court lacked
 subject-matter jurisdiction over the case and correctly dis-
 missed Mr. Starrett’s complaint.
     It follows that the Claims Court also correctly denied
 Mr. Starrett’s motion for the entry of default judgment
 against the United States. 2 Claims Court Rule 55(b)(2)
 states that a “default judgment may be entered only if the
 claimant establishes a claim or right to relief by evidence
 that satisfies the court.” “Before a default can be entered,
 the court must have subject-matter jurisdiction . . . .” 10A
 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, Fed-
 eral Practice & Procedure Civil § 2682 (4th ed. updated
 Apr. 2022). Because the Claims Court lacked subject-mat-
 ter jurisdiction over the case, the Claims Court correctly

     2   An entry of default, such as the one recorded by the
 Clerk of the Claims Court in this case, is not a default judg-
 ment. See Claims Ct. Rule 55(a), (b)(2), (c).
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 STARRETT   v. US                                            9

 denied Mr. Starrett’s motion for the entry of default judg-
 ment against the United States.
                              B
     Mr. Starrett appears to argue that the Claims Court
 incorrectly unsealed his complaint. Starrett Br. at 6, 10–
 11. The complaint has been unsealed and is currently
 available on the Claims Court’s docket. See Claims Ct.
 Dkt. No. 8. We see no reason in this case to depart from
 the general principle that unsealed matter should not be
 resealed. See, e.g., Constand v. Cosby, 833 F.3d 405, 410
 (3d Cir. 2016) (“We and our sister circuit courts have held
 that appeals seeking to restrain further dissemination of
 publicly disclosed information are moot. . . . Public disclo-
 sure cannot be undone . . . .” (internal quotation marks
 omitted)); Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133,
 144 (2d Cir. 2004) (“But however confidential [the infor-
 mation] may have been beforehand, subsequent to publica-
 tion it was confidential no longer. . . . We simply do not
 have the power, even were we of the mind to use it if we
 had, to make what has thus become public private again.”);
 Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 697 F.3d 1235, 1239 (9th Cir. 2012) (sim-
 ilar); C & C Products, Inc. v. Messick, 700 F.2d 635, 637
 (11th Cir. 1983) (similar); see also In re Kahn, 147 F. App’x
 187, 187 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[A]ll of the filed documents
 ha[ve] already been made part of the public record and,
 thus, his request [to seal] [i]s moot.”).
                              III
     We have considered Mr. Starrett’s remaining argu-
 ments and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing rea-
 sons, we affirm the Claims Court’s dismissal of Mr.
 Starrett’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
 and the denial of Mr. Starrett’s motion for the entry of de-
 fault judgment against the United States.
     The parties shall bear their own costs.
                         AFFIRMED