Court Opinion

ID: 9692249
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:48:30.669388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:33.506269
License: Public Domain

CALKINS, J.,
dissenting.
[¶ 27] I respectfully dissent. I would vacate the judgment of the Superior Court, thereby affirming, and deferring to, the Superintendent’s decision.
[¶ 28] When we review an administrative decision we uphold the decision unless the agency has abused its discretion, made an error of law, or its findings are not supported by the evidence. Reardon v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2003 ME 65, ¶ 5, 822 A.2d 1120, 1122. We do not substitute our judgment for that of the agency. Seider v. Bd. of Exam’rs of Psychologists, 2000 ME 118, ¶ 29, 754 A.2d 986, 993. We do not overturn the agency’s factual findings unless the evidence compels a contrary finding. Green v. Comm’r of the Dep’t of Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Servs., 2001 ME 86, ¶ 9, 776 A.2d 612, 615. “[T]he unsuccessful party at the trial level, in order to disturb the [agency’s] findings, [has the] burden to show more than that there was competent evidence to support [its] position; [it] has to demonstrate that there was no competent evidence to support those findings.” Id. ¶ 12, 776 A.2d at 616.
[¶ 29] In my view, the issue on appeal is whether York Insurance has shown that there was no competent evidence to support the Superintendent’s finding that the insurer’s stated reason for nonrenewal was not rationally related to the insurability of the property. I would not conclude that the evidence presented by York Insurance *1162compelled a finding by the Superintendent that the insurer’s reason for nonrenewal was rationally related to the property’s insurability. York Insurance did not produce evidence before the Superintendent in the way of empirical data, claims information, or loss experience to support its speculation of possible exposure to defend against a claim. It was reasonable for the Superintendent to take into consideration the commercial policy covering the daycare business. The Superintendent viewed the evidence and concluded that the proof presented by York Insurance as to its reason for nonrenewal was not rationally related to the property’s insurability. Questions of insurability invoke the expertise of the Superintendent. I would defer to the Superintendent’s judgment because of the Superintendent’s knowledge of the insurance industry and expertise in evaluating the evidence produced by the insurer.
[¶ 30] I disagree with the Court’s framing the issue as one of statutory construction, specifically the interpretation of the phrase “rationally related” in 24-A M.R.S.A. § 3051 (2000). The phrase is not ambiguous, and there is no need to employ the rational basis test of constitutional litigation.3 As used in the context of section 3051, the phrase simply means that the rationale given for nonrenewal has to bear a relationship that is reasonable to the insurability of the property.
[¶ 31] I further disagree with the Court’s conclusion that the phrase “rationally related” has the same meaning as the rational basis test in equal protection litigation. The traditional rational basis test means that when government makes classifications that are neither suspect nor involve fundamental rights, the classifications are upheld if they are rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. The Court today borrows the meaning of the phrase from the case that uses it in its most minimal sense, and ironically, in its most deferential sense. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993). However, as judges and commentators have acknowledged, the rational basis test in equal protection cases has been fluid. See, e.g., Cent. State Univ. v. Am. Assoc. of Univ. Professors, Cent. State Univ. Chapter, 526 U.S. 124, 132, 119 S.Ct. 1162, 143 L.Ed.2d 227 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (comparing various articulations of the rational basis test); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc. 473 U.S. 432, 456-57, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part) (criticizing the Court for stating that it was applying the rational basis test when it was not); Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowax, 3 Treatise on Constitutional Law § 18.3(6), at 226 (3d ed. 1999) (stating that the meaning of the rational basis test is not clear). Sometimes “rationally related” as used -in equal protection cases means minimal rationality, and sometimes it means more.
[¶ 32] It is difficult to believe that the Maine Legislature, when it used the phrase “rationally related” in 24-A M.R.S.A. § 3051, intended the term to carry the heavy and shifting load of constitutional meaning, as opposed to the ordinary common sense meaning without the implication of “minimal” or other adjectives that have been added in constitutional cases. If the Legislature had intended that an insurance company could refuse to renew an insurance policy when it could show a “reasonably conceivable state of facts” re*1163lated to insurability “that could provide a rational basis” for the nonrenewal, it would have said so. Instead, the Legislature simply used the term “rationally related,” unencumbered with descriptive and limiting clauses. The very fact that the Court has had to equate “rationally related” with “reasonably conceivable,” demonstrates that we should defer to the Superintendent to whom the Legislature has delegated the responsibility for deciding whether the insurer’s reason for nonrenewal is “rationally related.”

. If the phrase is ambiguous, we should defer to the agency's interpretation of it, as long as that interpretation is reasonable, because the agency is charged with the implementation of the statute and the agency's expertise is appropriately utilized in determining its meaning. Conservation Law Found., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2003 ME 62, ¶23, 823 A.2d 551, 559; Guilford Transp. Indus, v. P.U.C., 2000 ME 31, ¶ 11, 746 A.2d 910, 913.