Court Opinion

ID: 9714704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:43:41.289456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:27.961366
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE TRAPP, dissenting: The judgments which are said to determine that Cooper was not exercising due care for his own safety were returned upon the admission of testimony which is seriously challenged upon review. If this court ultimately concluded that such evidence was inadmissible it would be necessary to reverse for prejudice and remand for a new trial. Within the analogy of the Civil Practice Act, section 48 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 110, par. 48(d)), no party has moved to dismiss the appeal in this court. Rather, the court sua sponte issued its rule to show cause why the remaining appeal should not be dismissed. I do not find any cases supporting the proposition that a court will act sua sponte to dismiss a pending appeal under the doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel. Cases collected in 9 A.L.R.2d 984, at page 990, have held that a failure to raise the prior judgment may constitute a waiver. Comparably speaking, in the trial court the burden is upon the party who relies to raise the issue of res judicata or collateral estoppel. Fraley v. Boyd, 83 Ill.App. 2d 98, 226 N.E.2d 81; Kedzierski v. Kedzierski, 86 Ill.App.2d 264, 229 N.E.2d 919. The rule of res judicata and its supplemental collateral estoppel is framed in terms that an issue which has been determined by judgment cannot again be litigated in a future action (Thomas v. Consolidated School District No. 429, 7 Ill.App.3d 45, 286 N.E.2d 536; Gillies v. Little Vermilion Special Drainage District, 401 Ill. 344, 81 N.E.2d 916) or that such judgment is a bar to a subsequent action. McCorkle v. McCorkle, 6 Ill.App.3d 1053, 287 N.E.2d 134, and Gudgel v. St. Louis Fire and Marine Insurance Company, 1 Ill.App.3d 765, 274 N.E.2d 597. As the principal opinion notes, these causes of action were brought up on review contemporaneously and were submitted in this court as one appeal. Within the purpose of such rule, the cross-claimant has not, in fact, sought to relitigate in a future and subsequent action those issues which have been disposed of on the merits.