Court Opinion

ID: 9828816
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:45:45.620711+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:53.477912
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing by Appellee Wendlandt.
Appellee Wendlandt first contends that there was no pleading sufficient to raise the issue of his bona fides, except the allegation by plaintiffs that they were in possession of the property, using it as homestead, when he inspected the land, and that, since their possession alone was not sufficient to take the case to the jury on this issue, the directed verdict was proper.
We overrule this contention for the following reasons:
Appellants’ pleadings set forth fraud in the execution of the Ramirez-Bell deed; its recited $5,000 cash consideration; its date; and the fact that it was recorded; also, that the land was then worth $125 an acre. They recite that Wendlandt inspected the property and found appellants in possession, occupying and using the property as a homestead, and allege:
That Wendlandt “was put upon inquiry, and that the exercise, of ordinary diligence would have led to a knowledge of the facts therein set out, and the nature of plaintiffs'’ claim, and, had he used said ordinary diligence and pursued the knowledge that he had, the said Charles Wend-landt, Jr., would have ascertained that the plaintiffs herein were claiming, using, and occupying said land, as owners of said land, and that the alleged deed was in fact void, and was obtained through fraud and mistake and of no effect as to them as hereinbefore set out.”
It is further alleged that:
“It was the duty of the said Charles Wend-landt to inform himself of the nature and extent of their said ownership and possession before he made such loan to the said Bell, and failing to so inquire, knowing of their occupancy of the premises, the said Wendlandt is not an innocent holder of said mortgage, but took the same with knowledge and notice of their said rights therein.”
Wendlandt, in addition to resisting plaintiffs’ suit, filed a cross-action setting up his notes, asking that they be established as a lien upon the property, and that the lien be foreclosed. In this pleading he affirmatively asserted that he was an innocent purchaser, having made the loan upon representation by Bell that he owned the property, and upon advice of his attorney that the title was good, based upon abstracts furnished by. Bell. He set up the Ramirez-Bell deed, giving its date and the date it was recorded, and claimed to be an innocent purchaser because of that deed and its recitals, and the fact that he had no knowledge or notice of any infirmity therein. He also alleged the purchase of the property in 1910 by Ramirez from Seelig, and while the total consideration is not shown, he alleged that there were vendor’s lien notes to the amount of $6,250. The abstracts showed the Ramirez-Bell deed, and the homestead designation, and their respective dates and record dates. These were in-, troduced in evidence by Wendlandt, and his attorney testified that he passed the title upon examination of these abstracts and what they contained.
The judgment not only denied Ramirez’s prayer to cancel the trust deed, but also granted the prayer of Wendlandt in affirmatively establishing his trust deed lien and foreclosing it against both Ramirez and wife and Bell.
The pleadings of both parties clearly put in issue the bona fides of Wendlandt, and called for a submission of'that issue to the jury upon all the facts and circumstances bearing thereupon which the evidence raised.
It is next contended that there was no evidence of any conveyance from Seelig to Ramirez, and consequently no showing that the total consideration for such conveyance was $7,000. We think this issue was immaterial. The inadequacy of consideration in Bell’s deed, together with the other circumstances noted, was sufficient, we think, to raise the issue of Wendlandt’s bona fides,, even if there were in fact no evidence of the consideration paid by Ramirez to Seelig.
We should state, however, in this connection, that while the deed from Seelig to Ramirez, which was introduced by both Ramirez and Wendlandt, was dated in 1912, and showed a total consideration of $7,000, of which $1,000 was cash, the property described in this deed was lot 22 and part of lot 23 in Ed Seelig’s subdivision; whereas, the property involved in this suit was lot 35 of that subdivision. It is quite apparent that the introduction of this deed was a mistake, but it appears to have been participated in by all parties to the suit, and the error was not discovered until after our original opinion in this case was handed down., It does appear, however, from Wendlandt’s cross-action that Seelig conveyed the property in question on November 26, 1910, to Ramirez, by deed recorded in volume 48, p. 252, Bastrop County Deed Records (the 1912 deed in evidence being recorded in volume 53, p. 73, of said records), and that this deed retained a vendor’s lien to secure notes aggregating $6,-298.40; that this amount had on November 10, 1922, been reduced to $1,860, and the lien ■extended; and that when the deed of trust was executed the amount still due was $1,-434.20, and there was additionally due $439.-75 taxes. It therefore appears from Wend-landt’s own pleadings that the consideration Ramir.ez paid Seelig for the land was $6,298.-40 in notes alone.
Wendlandt further contends that the homestead designation was not a link in his chain of title, and therefore he was not *930charged with knowledge of it, there being no evidence that he actually knew of it. This designation was set out in full in the abstract of title Doom examined and approved, and showed on its face that it was executed 5 days before the Bell deed, and was not recorded until 11 days thereafter. Wendlahdt had actual knowledge of the occupancy and use of the property by Ramirez and his family as a home, and knowledge of this homestead designation was brought home to his attorney in passing upon the title for the purpose of making the loan. Whatever significance may be attached to the designation as a circumstance is a proper evidentiary matter.
The onty remaining contention in Wendlandt’s motion which we deem worthy of notice is expressed in the following quotation:
“In a suit between grantor and an innocent holder under his immediate grantee evidence in disparagement of grantor’s duly executed deed is not admissible and is incompetent and cannot form the basis of a finding of fact, or be the predicate for a judgment on such findings.”
This is correct as an abstract proposition of law where there is in fact a bona fide purchaser, or, as expressed in the quotation, “an innocent holder.” But to be a bona fide purchaser or innocent holder one must acquire without notice. If the quoted proposition were correct where one purchased with notice, it would be imposible in any case to set aside a deed absolute in form as against one holding for value under the grantee in such deed.
The motion is overruled.