Court Opinion

ID: 9594302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:28:51.133873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:11.829275
License: Public Domain

JACOBSON, Presiding Judge,
concurring in part; dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s resolution of the issues regarding the substantive question whether the jury was improperly voir dired. My disagreement centers solely upon whether the state could properly enhance defendant’s sentence with two prior convictions arising out of the factual scenario presented in those cases. Defendant was approached by a police undercover agent who “placed an order” for a Lincoln Continental automobile. In order to fulfill this order, defendant stole a Lincoln Continental and delivered it to his customer a few hours later. He was subsequently convicted of one count of theft and one count of trafficking in stolen property, both class 3 felonies, and received concurrent sentences on these charges. The question is: under this fact situation, were the offenses “committed on the same occasion” for the purpose of applying AR.S. § 13-604(H), which provides:
Convictions for two or more offenses committed on the same occasion shall be counted as only one conviction for purposes of this section [allowing for enhancement of sentence based on prior convictions].
This area of the law is not without difficulty; this is highlighted by the fact that both the majority and I rely upon exactly the same eases in arriving at diametrically opposed conclusions. The majority correctly points out that State v. Noble, 152 Ariz. 284, 731 P.2d 1228 (1987), listed the following factors in concluding that the crimes of child molesting and kidnapping occurred on the same occasion: (1) the criminal conduct was continuous and uninterrupted; (2) the criminal conduct was directed to the accomplishment of a single criminal objective rather than multiple criminal objectives; (3) only one person was victimized; and (4) the time period involved was brief. The majority also relies upon State v. Shulark, 162 Ariz. 482, 784 P.2d 688 (1989), in concluding that an attempt to cash two forged checks at two different branches of the same bank did not constitute offenses committed on the same occasion. The Shulark court noted that, generally, “when different crimes, even though unrelated in nature, are committed at the same place, on the same victim or group of victims, and at the same time or as part of a continuous series of criminal acts they may be considered as having been committed on the ‘same occasion,’ for purposes of sentence enhancement.” 162 Ariz. at 485, 784 P.2d at 689 (emphasis added).
The majority, in concluding that the theft and trafficking did not constitute the same occasion, focuses on the difference in time, place, and victims of these two crimes and the fact that the “separate act of stealing did not require the subsequent act of trafficking.” This analysis is more germane in determining the restriction on imposition of consecutive sentences under AR.S. § 13-116, rather than enhancement under A.R.S. § 13-604(H). See State v. Griffin, 148 Ariz. 82, 713 P.2d 283 (1986); State v. Newman, 141 Ariz. 554, 688 P.2d 180 (1984). The trial court analyzed this issue from that perspective in reasoning, “legally, there were two separate distinct offenses that were committed previously.” I do not dispute the separate nature of the two offenses; indeed, that is why defendant was convicted of two felonies. However, the fact that they were committed on the same occasion necessitates their being counted as one prior felony conviction under A.R.S. § 13-604(H).
The problem with attempting to extract universal principles from fact-intensive eases is underscored by the majority’s recitation of the single victim factor noted in Noble. Of course, in Noble there was only one victim, a child who was both sexually molested and kidnapped. This does not mean that only a “one victim crime” can ever qualify as a *29“same occasion” crime as was noted by Shulark in its reference to “group of victims.” Moreover, the crime of trafficking1 of necessity requires two victims, the owner of the stolen property and the buyer/recipient of the property. Under a narrow reading of Noble, trafficking could never constitute a “same occasion” offense.
In my opinion, the teachings of Noble and Shulark are summed up in the emphasis in both cases on whether the criminal conduct “was directed to the accomplishment of a single criminal objective,” Noble, or whether the conduct was “part of a continuous series of criminal acts,” Shulark. The factors of time, place and number of victims are to be considered in assessing this criminal conduct, but A.R.S. § 13-604(H), in recognizing that separate crimes can be committed on “the same occasion,” does not make much sense if these factors alone are determinative.
If this analysis is correct, it is clear that, in this case, defendant’s conduct in fulfilling a specific order for a specific type of automobile was, in my opinion, directed to the accomplishment of a single criminal objective and was part of a continuous series of criminal acts. Unlike the case where a defendant steals a car with the ambiguous motive of using it personally or subsequently selling it and does sell it (which, in my opinion, should probably not constitute the “same occasion”), here the undercover agent’s specific request for this type of vehicle, before the defendant had taken control of such a vehicle, intertwined the two crimes into the same occasion. This is so because the stealing of the car (the theft) is driven by the same criminal objective as the trafficking: to provide this person with this type of car. In this sense, the trafficking offense and the theft offense were simultaneously ongoing and, thus, were committed at the same time and place.2 Although I do not propose that all thefts accomplished with the intent to resell must always constitute “same occasion” offenses, under the unique facts of this case, I conclude that here such is the case.
I would remand for resentencing utilizing only one prior conviction.

. A.R.S. § I3-230X(B)(3) defines "trafficking” as "to sell, transfer, distribute, dispense, or otherwise dispose of stolen property____”

. In this regard, one of the definitions of "deprive” under A.R.S. § 13—1801(A)(4) to constitute theft is "to transfer or dispose of it so that it is unlikely to be recovered.” Compare this definition to that of “trafficking” which is to “transfer ... or otherwise dispose of stolen property.” A.R.S. § 13-2301(B)(3).