Court Opinion

ID: 9586119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:07:26.283637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:20.920323
License: Public Domain

Pope, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I fully concur with the majority opinion that West’s mother gave valid consent to the search of the bedroom and that the trial court’s ruling to the contrary must be reversed. Because the majority relies primarily on federal case law, I write separately in order to emphasize the Georgia cases on point.
A warrantless search of a residence may be authorized by the consent of any person who possesses common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises to be searched. [Cits.] “Common authority” is defined as: mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their own number might permit the common area to be searched. [Cit.]
(Punctuation omitted.) Smith v. State, 264 Ga. 87-88 (2) (441 SE2d 241) (1994).3
*188This Court has previously held that a parent, as the head of the household, has the authority to consent to the search of the room of a child who lives in the parent’s home free of rent. See Howard v. State, 207 Ga. App. 125,126 (1) (427 SE2d 96) (1993); Williams v. State, 166 Ga. App. 798, 800 (2) (305 SE2d 489) (1983); Montgomery v. State, 155 Ga. App. 423, 424 (1) (270 SE2d 825) (1980). In Howard v. State, we ruled: “it was uncontroverted that the appellant’s mother was a co-owner of the premises, and there was no landlord/tenant relationship between the appellant and his parents. Accordingly, we find that she was authorized to permit the officers to conduct the search.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Howard v. State, 207 Ga. App. at 126. See also Ford v. State, 214 Ga. App. 284 (1) (447 SE2d 334) (1994) (holding that appellant’s sister, who rented an apartment and was allowing appellant to stay in a bedroom in the apartment, could consent to a search of appellant’s bedroom).
In the instant case, it is true that West tried to maintain some privacy by locking his bedroom door. That fact, however, does not end the inquiry. West’s attempts at privacy and the authority of his mother to consent to the search are different issues. The trial court and the dissent have incorrectly focused on West’s privacy expectation in evaluating whether the search was valid. The dispositive question in this case is not merely if West tried to have privacy by locking his bedroom, but whether his mother had such authority over, or relationship to, the premises that she had the right to allow inspection of the room and that West assumed the risk that she might permit the room to be searched. See Smith v. State, supra. Pertinent to this inquiry are the facts that West’s mother and stepfather are co-owners of the house; that there is no landlord/tenant relationship because West was allowed to stay in the house without paying rent; and that West’s mother and stepfather have a key to the room. Given all the circumstances, it is clear that West’s mother had sufficient authority over her own house, that she had the right to consent to a search of the room and that West assumed the risk that she might permit the room to be searched.
[T]he voluntary consent of the head of a household to the search of premises owned or controlled by such head of *189the household is sufficient to authorize a search of the premises without a search warrant, and such search does not violate the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Tolbert v. State, 224 Ga. 291, 293 (2) (161 SE2d 279) (1968). Because the consent to search given by West’s mother was valid, the trial court’s ruling to the contrary is erroneous.

 Although I agree with the majority’s conclusion and much of its analysis, I disagree *188with the majority’s statement that a “common authority” analysis in this case is inappropriate. As noted in both the majority and this special concurrence, a third party with “sufficient relationship” to the premises can validly consent to a search. “Common authority,” or mutual use of the property by persons having joint access for most purposes, is simply one kind of “sufficient relationship” to the premises. In this case, there is evidence that West, his mother and his stepfather mutually used the house and had joint access to it. Thus, whether or not the mother had common authority over, or any other kind of sufficient relationship to, the premises is the appropriate inquiry.