Court Opinion

ID: 9604163
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:15:51.149033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:17:16.312578
License: Public Domain

BAXTER, J.
I reluctantly concur in the result. As the majority suggest, it is not clear that all of the in-school “misconduct” alleged in counsel’s letter was either so connected to the molestation, or so intentionally or inherently injurious in its own right, as to constitute uninsurable “wilful acts.” (Ins. Code, § 533.) Thus, at the time the summary judgment motion was decided, Horace Mann Insurance Company could not establish beyond doubt that Barbara’s action against Gary Lawrence Lee included only noncovered claims. On the other hand, Horace Mann offered no “undeniable” evidence that the defense of the potentially covered claims was severable. Accordingly, Horace Mann was not then entitled to escape defending the entire suit.
For example, among counsel’s allegations were that Lee gave Barbara tardy notes on request, allowed himself to be alone with Barbara in his office and in the band room, referred to Barbara as “Pebbles,” told other teachers to *1088assume Barbara was with him if she was late or absent from their classes, made Barbara a teacher’s pet, and behaved in a childish and immature manner. Acts such as these are not inherently sinister. In context, they may have been “wilful” and therefore noncovered, either because they were part of the molesting conduct or because they were otherwise intentionally hurtful, but the record on summary judgment does not compel that conclusion. On the other hand, Horace Mann did not attempt to establish that even if these acts might fall within policy coverage, they were so unrelated to the molestation as to be “undeniably]” separable for purposes of defense. Until Horace Mann could show that these acts were either clearly noncovered or clearly severable, it remained obligated to defend all aspects of Barbara’s suit.
However, I cannot accept the majority’s implication that certain other conduct, clearly “wilful” even on this limited record, might also support Horace Mann’s duty to defend. The majority insist that even the public hugging, kissing, and lap sitting alleged by Barbara’s counsel were not “wilful” wrongs beyond doubt. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1084-1085.) On this record, that conclusion strains common sense.
As the majority indicate, a teacher’s affectionate physical contact with a student is not necessarily a “wilful” tort. But I can draw no other inference from an allegation that Lee “allow[ed]” 13-year-old Barbara to sit on his lap in front of other students. I believe that behavior of this kind by an adult teacher toward this student, even when viewed in isolation, would be widely understood as purposeful harassment beyond all permissible bounds of the educational relationship. As with molestation itself, a purposeful act of sexual harassment “is the harm.” The perpetrator, insofar as mentally competent, cannot be heard to say that it was not “wilful” because he or she intended no injury. (Compare J. C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co. v. M. K. (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1009, 1021 [278 Cal.Rptr. 64, 804 P.2d 689].)
Public hugging and kissing by a teacher may not be quite so inherently suspect. As the Court of Appeal observed, however, sinister sexual context is supplied here by the undisputed fact of a private molestation during the same general time period. Though a majority of this court suggest otherwise, a fair and realistic appraisal of the entire summary judgment record leaves little room for legitimate dispute about the improper sexual motivation, and thus the “wilfulfness],” with which these alleged public acts were committed.1
The majority recognize the “unfortunate” public policy implications of providing this admitted child molester with a tort defense at his insurer’s *1089expense. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1086, 1087.) We should not enhance the damage by suggesting that inherently wilful acts of sexual harassment support the duty to defend.
Finally, I share Justice Arabian’s concern that the majority too easily dismiss the problem of artful pleading around J. C. Penney. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 1086.) As the majority suggest, the insurer is free to use the litigation process to winnow sham claims from a molestation suit. However, it is well to remember that from the insurer’s perspective, the duty to defend, with its attendant costs, imposes the pressure to settle.
Thus, it may well behoove a molestation victim to find any threadbare means of pleading the molester’s insurer into the suit. However groundless such pleading might ultimately prove, it can supply invaluable leverage toward a compromised recovery from the insurer’s funds. If the molester is judgment-proof except for insurance, the victim has every reason to seek even a much-discounted settlement rather than litigate to a worthless judgment against the uncovered tortfeasor. When analyzing duty-to-defend issues, we should never lose sight of these practical realities.
With these reservations, I concur in the majority’s result.

The majority imply (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 1084-1085) that so long as a dispute remains whether the public harassment actually occurred, Horace Mann must be held to its duty to defend potentially “groundless” claims. However, the duty to defend groundless claims only *1089applies when the claims, if not groundless, might be covered. There is no duty to defend against allegations which, whether true or false, are clearly beyond policy coverage. Thus, if it is clear that the acts alleged could only constitute wilful harassment, any dispute about their truth or falsity cannot form the basis for the duty to defend.