Court Opinion

ID: 9409395
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-18 00:00:33.608154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:50.204032
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40607         Document: 00516823693             Page: 1      Date Filed: 07/17/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                               Fifth Circuit
                                      ____________                                           FILED
                                                                                         July 17, 2023
                                       No. 22-40607
                                     Summary Calendar                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                             Clerk
                                     ____________

   United States of America,

                                                                       Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Adrian Kevin Campbell,

                                               Defendant—Appellant.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Southern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 6:21-CR-121-3
                      ______________________________

   Before Haynes, Graves, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Adrian Kevin Campbell pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with
   intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and was sentenced to a
   below-guidelines term of 120 months in prison with five years of supervised
   release. In this pro se appeal, he challenges the district court’s jurisdiction
   and argues the court erred by denying various motions. Campbell also

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-40607      Document: 00516823693           Page: 2    Date Filed: 07/17/2023

                                     No. 22-40607

   disputes the sufficiency of the factual basis for his guilty plea and contends
   his right of self-representation was violated.
          The Government is correct in urging that Campbell’s unconditional
   guilty plea waived any nonjurisdictional defects preceding the plea. See
   United States v. Daughenbaugh, 549 F.3d 1010, 1012 (5th Cir. 2008). These
   include an alleged violation of his right to a speedy trial. See United States v.
   Bell, 966 F.2d 914, 915 (5th Cir. 1992). In addition, Campbell has failed to
   brief any argument concerning the denial of two motions filed while he
   awaited sentencing, and this constitutes another waiver. See Yohey v. Collins,
   985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1993). This court construes pro se filings
   liberally, but even pro se litigants must brief arguments to preserve them. Id.
          As to the jurisdictional issues presented, our review is de novo. See
   United States v. Isgar, 739 F.3d 829, 838 (5th Cir. 2019); Quick Techs., Inc. v.
   Sage Grp. PLC, 313 F.3d 338, 343 (5th Cir. 2002). Federal courts “have only
   the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes
   enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.” Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch.
   Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). Campbell’s main contention is that the
   district court was without jurisdiction based on a defect in the indictments.
   He argues that because the Government failed to allege that his offense
   injured the general public, it failed to establish the existence of a case or
   controversy supporting the exercise of jurisdiction under Article III.
          The Supreme Court has observed that the violation of a federal
   criminal statute necessarily gives rise to a justiciable case or controversy. See
   Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771
   (2000). Campbell does not argue otherwise; the defect he alleges is one of
   form. But as the Government points out, it is well established that defects in
   an indictment do not deprive the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction.
   See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630-31 (2002); Isgar, 739 F.3d at

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                                         No. 22-40607

   838. As Campbell fails to show that a different conclusion is warranted here,
   we reject his claim that the district court lacked jurisdiction under Article III.
          Campbell’s remaining jurisdictional arguments fare no better. His
   attacks on the district court’s personal and territorial jurisdiction are
   meritless. See United States v. Dunham, 995 F.2d 45, 45 (5th Cir. 1993);
   United States v. Vicars, 467 F.2d 455, 456 (5th Cir. 1972). And any technical
   defects in the criminal complaint are immaterial. See Denton v. United States,
   465 F.2d 1394, 1395 (5th Cir. 1972).
          The next issue is whether Campbell is correct that his factual basis
   fails to prove an agreement or other facts necessary to support his conviction.
   Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(3) provides that a guilty plea must
   be supported by admissions sufficient to establish a violation of the offense to
   which the defendant is pleading guilty. See United States v. Trejo, 610 F.3d
   308, 313 (5th Cir. 2010). Campbell admitted to a factual basis that shows he
   played an active, managerial role in an ongoing scheme to use couriers to
   transport large amounts of cocaine. This sufficed to prove each element of
   the offense. See United States v. Scott, 892 F.3d 791, 798 (5th Cir. 2018);
   United States v. Bams, 858 F.3d 937, 945 (5th Cir. 2017).
          Campbell represented himself in the district court, and his final claim
   concerns a continuance motion filed by the attorney appointed to act as
   standby counsel. According to Campbell, the motion was filed without his
   consent and violated his right of self-representation.1                 See Faretta v.
   California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20 (1975). Standby counsel must not infringe
   on a defendant’s right to represent himself, and an improper denial of the
   right cannot be harmless. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 & n.8

          _____________________
          1
              We do not address whether this claim was waived by Campbell’s guilty plea.

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                                    No. 22-40607

   (1984). We review claims invoking the right de novo. United States v. Cano,
   519 F.3d 512, 515-16 (5th Cir. 2008).
          The instant claim is deficient in two respects. First, Campbell fails to
   show that the continuance affected his defense or his “control [over] the
   organization and content” thereof. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 174. Second,
   standby counsel’s participation undermines Faretta rights only if it is “over
   the defendant’s objection,” and Campbell did not object to the continuance.
   United States v. Long, 597 F.3d 720, 728 (5th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations
   and citation omitted). He disputes this, writing that although a transcript
   records him saying he “won’t oppose” a continuance, he in fact said
   opposite. Campbell did not attempt to correct any errors in the record and
   does not suggest he was prevented from doing so. See Fed. R. App. P.
   10(e). This court “[c]an only take the record as it finds it,” and we find no
   support for Campbell’s assertion in the record before us. Brookins v. United
   States, 397 F.2d 261, 262 (5th Cir. 1968) (internal quotation marks and
   citation omitted).
          We do not construe Campbell’s argument concerning the
   continuance motion as alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, as “a
   defendant is not entitled to relief for the ineffectiveness of standby counsel.”
   United States v. Oliver, 630 F.3d 397, 414 (5th Cir. 2011). Even assuming the
   existence of an attorney-client relationship, a claim of ineffective assistance
   would be premature on this record. See Isgar, 739 F.3d at 841. To the extent
   Campbell suggests he was pressured into pleading guilty, the suggestion is
   refuted by statements made in his plea colloquy. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431
   U.S. 63, 74 (1977).
          For these reasons, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

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