Court Opinion

ID: 9944331
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 16:40:35.025781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:55:46.981064
License: Public Domain

In Blansett v. State, 556 S.W.2d 322, at 325
(Tex.Cr.App. 1977), in a companion case *Page 276 
to this one, Commissioner Dally held, in an opinion approved by the Court, that "by the application of our statutes to the circumstances of this case, [Blansett] is guilty of capital murder apart from the felony murder doctrine, if heintentionally caused the death of Gray." Commissioner Dally went on to reason:
 "The evidence shows that [Blansett] along with Billy Wayne Dowden consciously went to the Orange city jail with firearms to use those firearms with a conscious disregard for life; they intentionally engaged in that conduct, as the term intentionally is defined by V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Section 6.04(a). [footnote omitted.] The shooting of Gray would not have occurred but for the conduct of [Blansett] and Billy Wayne Dowden, and this conduct was the cause of Gray's death, as causation is defined by V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Section 6.04(a). [footnote omitted.] The shooting of Gray by Windham was not a concurrent cause of Gray's death."
Id. In support of this last proposition the Court cited caselaw from California, much of which the majority revisits today. Finally it was noted that holdings similar to those found in the California cases may be found in this Court's precedents interpreting our former penal codes.
The court of appeals in the instant case relied upon our opinion in Blansett, and, elaborating upon the California case principally cited therein, People v.Gilbert, 63 Cal.2d 690, 47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365
(1965), correctly noted that in order to find an accused guilty of murder under California law for an act committed by a nonaccomplice third party, two determinations must be made. First there must be found proof of "malice aforethought," or, as the court of appeals translated it in context of our own statutory scheme, "proof of an intent to kill," on the part of the accused.1 Secondly, the killing must be attributable to the act of the accused or his accomplice. The court of appeals had little difficulty finding sufficient evidence of an intent to kill on appellant's part in this cause, and indeed, it is hard to argue that by firing upon the officers appellant did not manifest such an intent. However, after noting the second requirement, and quoting a germane passage fromGilbert, supra,2 the court of appeals failed to inquire whether in fact Officer Windham's shooting of Gray can be attributed to appellant — whether it can be said appellant "caused" Gray's death.
The majority now undertakes to resolve this latter inquiry by simply adhering to the Court's holding in Blansett,
supra, and uncritically reviewing the California authorities cited there, and other California cases decided since. It was my understanding, however, that the Court granted appellant's petition for discretionary review in this cause in order to take a second look at Blansett and its progenitors, to determine whether we erred in importing California common law wholesale into our interpretation of V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec.6.04(a).
Under California law, provoking a shootout with police may indeed constitute sufficient evidence of "malice aforethought," *Page 277 
the required mens rea for murder. Additionally, if the policeman's act of returning fire is reasonable in response to the provocation, the provocation itself may also supply the required culpable act, inasmuch as it "caused" the act which in turn resulted in the killing. The provocation is thus a "proximate cause" of death, and the policeman's act "cannot be considered an independent intervening cause for which the defendant is not liable[.]" People v. Gilbert,408 P.2d at 374. So far as the cases indicate, this California doctrine is purely court-made, with no basis in statute. The doctrine implies something more restrictive than a pure "but/for" concept of causation, but the limitations are still being hammered out by the California courts. E.g., Pizanov. Superior Court of Tulare County, 145 Cal.Rptr. 524,577 P.2d 659 (1978); People v. Caldwell, 36 Cal.3d 210,203 Cal.Rptr. 433, 681 P.2d 274 (1984). In my view there is no call for this Court to mimic the California courts' efforts to define the limits of culpable causation in this or any other context, because our Sec. 6.04, supra, provides its own limitation.
In Sec. 6.04(a), supra, notions of "proximate cause" found in our earlier caselaw were jettisoned in favor of a concept of "sufficient cause" — a result that would not have occurred in the way that it did "but for" the accused's conduct may be attributed to him "unless" there is a concurrent cause and "the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient." Bubany, Texas Penal Code of 1974, 28 S.L.J. 292, at 307-8 (1974). See also Robbins v. State, 717 S.W.2d 348
(Tex.Cr.App. 1986). In Blansett, supra, the Court found that "but for" the conduct of Blansett and appellant in entering the police station armed and with "a conscious disregard for life[,]" Gray would not have been killed. Hence, Blansett "caused" his death. That Officer Windham actually shot Gray was deemed not to be a concurrent cause. At first glance this latter holding seems pure ipse dixit.
Closer scrutiny reveals that it is by utilization of this notion of "proximate cause," gleaned from the California cases and Texas cases decided before enactment of the 1974 Penal Code, that the Court was able to conclude Windham's conduct was not a causal component to Gray's death. This seems to me a subversion of the statute. In order to avoid application of the new "sufficient cause" standard to determine whether Windham's conduct in actually shooting Gray would operate to exculpate Blansett of capital murder, the Court relied upon a doctrine of "proximate cause," the rejection of which was at least "partially achieved" in the final version of Sec. 6.04, supra, if we are to believe the Practice Commentary, at 94, to deny what would otherwise seem intuitively obvious — that Windham's conduct was in some sense a "cause" of Gray's death, and perhaps within what the legislature meant by "concurrent cause."
I am inclined to hold not only that Windham's act of shooting was a concurrent cause of Gray's death, but also that it was "clearly sufficient" to cause that result, while appellant's conduct, even in "intentionally" entering the station "with a conscious disregard for life[,]" was, by itself, clearly insufficient. Had Windham not fired on Gray, he would not have been killed. On the other hand, appellant's "disregard for life" would not have resulted in Gray's death if Windham had not shot Gray.3 It seems to me that on the facts of this case appellant cannot be prosecuted for intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently "causing" Gray's death.4 This *Page 278 
is not to say he could not be found guilty of attempted capital murder or aggravated assault, in that he fired upon peace officers with an apparent intent to kill. SeeBubany, supra, at 308.
In adhering to the errors of Blansett, supra, the majority today engages in a chaotic analysis. First it observes that "all of appellant's actions were voluntary." At 273. While that is undoubtedly true, its significance escapes me. Next the majority declares that under our caselaw "the evidence is sufficient to prove that appellant intentionally and knowingly caused the death of Captain Gray. . . ."Id. Presumably this statement is simply an observation which the majority then endeavors in succeeding sentences to justify, for as analysis it utterly begs the question. What follows, however, does not rationally support the observation. "By acting intentionally," the majority continues, presumably referring to his having gone armed into the police station, "appellant showed he was aware of the nature of his conduct and that initiating a shoot-out in the police station would result in the death of one of the officers on duty." Id. Apparently by this the majority means that appellant's "conscious disregard for life[,]" as Commissioner Dally put it in Blansett, was such as to impute to him an awareness, i.e., "knowledge" that death would result. But result from what? The majority seems further to impute causation from guilty mens rea, for it concludes in a non sequitur "that appellant acted knowingly and therefore his malicious conduct was sufficient to hold him criminally responsible for Captain Gray's resulting death." By this I believe the majority awkwardly reiterates, in terms foreign to our statutory homicide scheme (i.e., "malice"), the same mistake we made in Blansett, supra, viz:
to identify a guilty intent, nonspecific to the killing itself, and from it attribute cause ("proximate cause") so as to escape the conclusion that Windham's act may have been a concurrent cause.5 In reality the Court is making the policy judgment that appellant's "malice" under the circumstances justifies holding him "criminally responsible" for a result we cannot easily conclude in ordinary terms he alone "caused."
Whether such a policy is laudable is not the issue here. The question we should confront, rather, is whether Sec. 6.04, supra, allows room for this Court to impute causation as it did in Blansett, supra. That is what I thought we granted appellant's petition to address. Because the majority does not, I must respectfully dissent.
1 "`Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice aforethought.' (Pen. Code, Sec. 187.) Such malice is implied under Penal Code section 188 when the defendant or his accomplice 'for a base, antisocial motive and with wanton disregard for human life, does an act that involves a high degree of probability that it will result in death.' (People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777, 782,44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 446, 402 P.2d 130, 134, quoting People v.Thomas, 41 Cal.2d 470, 480, 261 P.2d 1 [concurring opinion].) Initiating a gun battle is such an act."
408 P.2d at 373.
2 "When the defendant or his accomplice, with a conscious disregard for life, intentionally commits an act that is likely to cause death, and his victim or a police officer kills in reasonable response to such act, the defendant is guilty of murder. In such a case, the killing is attributable, not merely to the commission of a felony, but to the intentional act of the defendant or his accomplice committed with the conscious disregard for life. Thus, the victim's self-defensive killing or the police officer's killing in the performance of his duty cannot be considered an independent intervening cause for which the defendant is not liable, for it is a reasonable response to the dilemma thrust upon the victim or the policeman by the intentional act of the defendant or his accomplice."
408 P.2d at 373-74.
3 To answer that absent appellant's conduct Windham would not have been in a position accidentally to kill Gray is to read the "sufficient cause" standard right out of Sec. 6.04, supra, and render it a pure "but/for" test for causation, with no accounting whatsoever for intervening or "concurrent" cause.
4 Thus, I agree with the majority's conclusion appellant was not entitled to lesser included instructions for involuntary manslaughter and negligent homicide. The evidence no more raised these than it did murder. Whether appellant was entitled to an instruction on aggravated assault would seem to me under our law to depend on whether the evidence was susceptible to a finding that in firing on the officers appellant harbored no specific intent or awareness that death would result.
5 Even under California law, more than malice is required to impute criminal responsibility to the accused. Some act or provocation is also required, see text ante. The majority seems to blur the distinction, as indeed may have the California courts. See People v. Caldwell, supra (Bird, C.J., dissenting).