Court Opinion

ID: 9743042
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:24:35.444395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:38.783369
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION UPON DENIAL OF REHEARING Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE SIMON delivered the opinion of the corut: The defendant complains in his petition for rehearing that the opinion failed to discuss three of the arguments he advanced. Also, relying on People v. Suggs (1977), 50 Ill. App. 3d 778, 365 N.E.2d 1118, filed 2 days prior to the opinion in this case, defendant ruges the court to conclude that Gonzalez was improperly rehabilitated through the use of prior consistent statements.  Defendant argues that he was deprived of a speedy trial because in receiving an extension of the 120-day term to locate witnesses, the State failed to establish that the witnesses were material. One of the missing witnesses was Alverez, and defendant acknowledges his counsel conceded that Alverez was material. The police investigator searching for the other witnesses testified he believed they might lead him to Alverez, and this testimony showed the other witnesses also were material. While defendant complains the investigator was prompted to make this statement when he was asked the same question three times at the hearing on the State’s application for an extension, it is significant that the investigator did find Alvarez, who then testified at trial.  Moreover, the record of proceedings reveals that defense counsel indicated he would not require a showing of the materiality of the other witnesses. The colloquy concerning them was: “The Court: State, you are alleging that they are material and essential. Assistant State’s Attorney: Yes. If Counsel would like, I will get— Defense Counsel: I hate to take the Court’s time. ° * *” As we interpret this colloquy, defense counsel cut off the prosecutor from presenting evidence of the materiality of the witnesses with his apology that he did not want to take the court’s time; defendant should not now be entitled to complain of that which his counsel brought about. More important, however, the State easily could have established the materiality of the witnesses who were the subject of the search — Alvarez, Hernandez, James Bosques, Olvin Bosques and Mercado. All of them, except Mercado and Hernandez, were witnesses at the trial, and the opinion previously filed in this case demonstrates how material their testimony was, as well as how material the testimony of Mercado would have been. Second, defendant argues that the court’s opinion did not respond to his contention that photographs of one of the victims should have been excluded as suggestive of rape. The defendant did not object at trial to the admission of the photographs on this specific ground; his only objection was that they were inflammatory and prejudicial. In any event, we believe the photographs had the probative value described in the opinion, and were more demonstrative of murder than of rape. Based on the principles of law cited in the opinion and acknowledged by the defendant in his petition for rehearing, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the photographs.  Defendant’s final contention regarding points not discussed in the opinion relates to an argument made for the first time in a footnote at the end of his brief under a heading entitled, “Summary.” In discussing conversations the investigators had with various people while searching for Torres, the prosecutor argued to the jury: “They are looking all over this area trying to find Jose Torres. You didn’t hear what they told them because all the questions were objected to, they are not telling the police anything.” The prosecutor’s statement was not objected to at the trial; consequently, the defendant has waived any objection he might have to it. In any event, the statement was not prejudicial, for it implied neither that the defense concealed evidence favorable to the State, as the defendant argues in his petition, nor that matters not in evidence would have been favorable to the prosecution, as defendant argued in his principal brief. The prosecutor’s statement was not comparable to the prosecutor’s conduct in People v. Hovanec (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 15, 351 N.E.2d 402, with which defendant tries to equate it. In Hovanec, the objectionable statement was repeated several times over the defendant’s objection, which the trial judge consistently sustained. The three objections reviewed above do not justify a rehearing. Further, we have reviewed People v. Suggs and concluded that it is not inconsistent with the opinion in this case. Suggs’ conviction was reversed primarily because the prosecutor in that case improperly emphasized defendant’s post-arrest custodial silence. The Suggs opinion characterized the use of prior statements to rehabilitate a witness as being only one of two additional areas of prosecutorial misconduct, and pointed out that the use of the prior statements only “cumulated” with the other errors to deny Suggs a fair trial. Suggs is distinguishable for another reason. There, it was the prosecutor who first called attention to “defense counsel’s possession of potentially impeaching witness’ statements,” and then commented “that the lack of impeachment from those documents proved that the statements were corroborative of the witness’ testimony.” In the Torres trial, though, the crucial question the prosecutor put to Gonzalez referred to the prior statements about which defense counsel already had cross-examined Gonzalez. The prosecutor’s question limited the inquiry to the prior statements which had been referred to in that cross-examination. On his cross-examination, defense counsel brought out that Gonzalez’s prior statements to the police did not include details which he testified to on his direct examination. The response elicited in the redirect examination, that in his prior statements Gonzalez has asserted Torres was the murderer, demonstated that Gonzalez’s direct testimony was consistent with his prior statements. This redirect testimony, then, properly rebutted the inference that Gonzalez had recently fabricated the details which were included in his direct examination, but omitted from his prior statements. The Suggs opinion does not support the contention that the testimony of Gonzalez was improperly bolstered upon his redirect examination. Defendant also contends, relying on 4 Wigmore, Evidence §1128, at 270 (Chadbourn rev. 1972), that an accomplice cannot be rehabilitated by evidence of prior consistent statements. The State responds by contending that Wigmore states that even an accomplice can be rehabilitated by prior consistent statements when the basis of impeachment is recent contrivance. We need not resolve the meaning of Wigmore’s statements on this subject, however, because our opinion did not conclude that Gonzalez was an accomplice. Our references to Mostafa and Wilson merely pointed out that since even uncorroborated accomplice testimony is a sufficient ground to warrant a conviction, Gonzalez’s testimony in this case was, if believed by the jury, enough to convict Torres. The petition for rehearing is, therefore, denied. McNAMARA and JIGANTI, JJ., concur.