Court Opinion

ID: 9377141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-07 00:00:35.101573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:12.207557
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                               FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

 FELICIA BINION WILLIAMS,

                  Plaintiff,
                                                         Civil Action No. 23-312 (RDM)
        v.

 BERYL A. HOWELL, et al.,

                  Defendants.

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

       This case is before the Court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss pro se Plaintiff Felicia

Williams’s nearly one-thousand-page complaint against two United States District Court Judges,

Dkt. 5, as well as Williams’s motion to remand this case to Superior Court, Dkt. 4. The Court

will GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 5, and will DENY Williams’s motion to

remand, Dkt. 4.

       Williams’s complaint must be dismissed for several reasons. Most basically, the Court

cannot discern the nature of Williams’s claim from the complaint that she filed, although she

does appear to be seeking damages. Dkt. 1-1 at 1 (requesting $10,001 in damages). The

complaint is for the most part comprised of various unlabeled documents that Williams has

annotated by hand. See generally id. Her annotations reference matters such as copyright law,

workplace harassment, the Merit Systems Protection Board, whistleblowers, the FDA, due

process of law, fraud, and other assorted terms. Although pleadings by pro se litigants such as

Williams are held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines

v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), they must still comply with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, see Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain a short and plain statement of the grounds upon

which the Court’s jurisdiction depends, a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a). The Rule is designed to “give the defendant notice of what the . . . claim is and

the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

       Williams’s complaint does not comply with Rule 8. It offers no intelligible description of

the factual basis for her claims, what injuries she allegedly suffered, and why she is entitled to

the relief she seeks. Even construed liberally, Williams’s allegations, such as they are, leave the

Court and Defendants in the dark. Put another way, Williams has not given Defendants or the

Court adequate notice regarding the claims she intends to assert, because her complaint lacks “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that [she] is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2).

       Even if the nature of Williams’s claims was more apparent, dismissal would still likely be

in order under the doctrine of judicial immunity. Judicial immunity extends to “all actions taken

in the judge’s judicial capacity, unless the[ ] actions are taken in the complete absence of all

jurisdiction.” Sindra v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Mireles v. Waco,

502 U.S. 9, 9–10 (1991) (describing a long line of Supreme Court precedents that have found

“judge[s] . . . immune from . . . suit for money damages”). Here, Williams’s complaint

repeatedly references another action in which she is involved and over which Defendant Judge

Contreras is presiding, Williams v. Department of Health and Human Services et al., Civil

Action No. 22-1084 (RC). See, e.g., Dkt. 1-1 at 4, 22, 29 (Compl.). Thus, venturing a guess, the

                                                   2
Court infers that Williams is seeking relief against Judge Contreras for actions he took or did not

take in his judicial capacity. As such, Judge Contreras is entitled to absolute immunity. See

Jenkins v. Kerry, 928 F. Supp. 2d 122, 134 (D.D.C. 2013) (“[A] judge acting in his or her

judicial capacity—i.e., performing a ‘function normally performed by a judge’—is immune from

suit on all judicial acts, as long as the judge was not acting in the complete absence of

jurisdiction.” (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12)). Although the basis for Williams’s action

against Chief Judge Howell is even more elusive, it appears that she may be attempting to hold

Chief Judge Howell liable based on a mistaken belief that, as Chief Judge, Judge Howell

supervises Judge Contreras. If that is what Williams has in mind, Chief Judge Howell is also

entitled to immunity.

       The Court must also deny Williams’s motion to remand. Dkt. 4. Defendants properly

removed the action to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), because they are federal officers

(apparently) being sued in their official capacities, see Jefferson Cty, Ala. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423,

431 (1999).

        The Court will, accordingly, GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 5, and will

DISMISS Williams’s Complaint, Dkt. 1-1, without prejudice. The Court will also DENY

Williams’s motion to remand, Dkt. 4.

       A separate order will issue.

                                                      /s/ Randolph D. Moss
                                                      RANDOLPH D. MOSS
                                                      United States District Judge

Date: March 6, 2023

                                                 3