Court Opinion

ID: 9841490
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-22 16:10:53.227211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:51:53.789575
License: Public Domain

J-S28043-23

                                   2023 PA Super 176

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  MARQUICE DUPREE EVANS                        :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1093 WDA 2022

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 6, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
                         CP-25-CR-0000818-2010,
            CP-25-CR-0000819-2010, CP-25-CR-0002901-2015

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                        FILED: September 22, 2023

       Appellant Marquice Dupree Evans appeals from the September 6, 2022,

order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, which denied his

first petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§§ 9541-9546, following an evidentiary hearing. After a careful review, we

affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history have been set forth previously

by this Court, in part, as follows:

             On the evening of June 22, 2015, K.J. and his cousin, J.D.,
       spent the night with their great-grandmother, Sherry Lyons. The
       next afternoon, the granddaughter of one of Ms. Lyons’ friends,
       Teonia Kimbro, visited Ms. Lyons’ home. Ms. Kimbro arrived on a
       bicycle.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S28043-23

           Kimbro left Ms. Lyons’ home shortly after arriving, but she
     returned about ten minutes later asking for a cup of water.
     Kimbro left her bicycle in Ms. Lyons’ backyard. At some point,
     J.D. asked his great-grandmother if he and K.J. could go to Mighty
     Fine Doughnuts. Ms. Lyons consented, gave Kimbro her bank
     card, and asked Kimbro to accompany the boys.
           The three left Ms. Lyons’ residence on foot and arrived at
     Mighty Fine Doughnuts where Kimbro purchased half a dozen
     doughnuts with Ms. Lyons’ bank card. After they finished eating,
     they packaged the extra doughnuts to-go and walked to the
     Country Fair on the corner of 26th and State Street, across from
     Veteran’s Stadium. J.D. and K.J. saw Kimbro attempting to use
     Ms. Lyons’ bank card at the ATM machine inside the store.
           After leaving the Country Fair on the corner of 26th and State
     Street, the three walked to a car lot on 26th Street. While there,
     K.J. recalled that a short, dark-skinned male with dreadlocks
     approached Kimbro. The man was wearing a black t-shirt and
     black shorts, and he arrived on the same bike Kimbro left at Ms.
     Lyons’ home. K.J. believed the male was Kimbro’s friend, but
     stated the two argued, and the man left the car lot quickly.
            Instead of taking K.J. and J.D. back to their great-
     grandmother’s house, Kimbro took K.J. and J.D. to a park on
     23111 Street, and then to the Dollar General across the street
     from Mighty Fine Doughnuts, despite their requests to return to
     Ms. Lyons’ home. While at Dollar General, the children asked
     Kimbro to buy them candy. Kimbro told the children she couldn’t
     because she “lost” Ms. Lyons’ bank card. After leaving the Dollar
     General, Kimbro took K.J. and J.D. to a McDonalds on 26th Street,
     stating her phone was dying and she needed to call someone.
     While at the McDonalds, Kimbro used a landline phone and K.J.’s
     cell phone to place a call.
           Subsequently, Kimbro took the children to a friend’s home
     at the intersection of East 6th and State Streets. While there, K.J.
     noticed the same man who met Kimbro at the car lot arrived on
     the same bike, but he noticed he was wearing different clothing.
           Shortly after 8:00 p.m., K.J.’s mother, Talaysha, saw the
     children outside a corner store near East 6th and State Streets
     when she was on her way to pick up some items at a nearby shop.
     She also saw [Appellant] outside the store. Instead of taking the
     children back to Ms. Lyons’ home, Talaysha took the children to
     her home. Once K.J. and J.D. reached Talaysha’s home, K.J. told
     his mother Kimbro lost his great-grandmother’s bank card. After

                                    -2-
J-S28043-23

     learning K.J. knew where to find Kimbro, Talaysha sent him to
     retrieve the card. However, K.J. was unable to recover it.
           Talaysha testified that, before she found the children, she
     attempted to reach Ms. Lyons just before 8:00 p.m. However, Ms.
     Lyons did not answer the phone. Once Talaysha and the children
     arrived home, Talaysha called Ms. Lyons again. No one answered.
     Talaysha became worried and called her aunt, Darlene, who had
     a key to Ms. Lyons’ home.
           Talaysha, Darlene, and several of Ms. Lyons’ nieces arrived
     at Ms. Lyons’ home around 11:00 p.m. Talaysha testified the
     family saw blood around the entryway of the home and on the
     floor as soon as they entered the residence. When the family
     entered the living room, they saw more blood on the carpet near
     the couch and on the wall, but no signs of Ms. Lyons. The family
     searched the upper floors of the home for Ms. Lyons with no
     success. The family then directed their search to the basement.
            Talaysha testified she saw more blood at the top of the
     basement stairs and a large hole in the wall at the foot of the
     stairs. A pool of blood was beneath the hole.
           The family found Ms. Lyons in one of the back basement
     rooms. Ms. Lyons was lying on her back with her shirt pulled up
     around her middle, a television on her chest, and one leg in the
     air. Duct tape was wrapped around Ms. Lyons covering her eyes,
     nose, and mouth. The family found Ms. Lyons’ cordless phone had
     been running for six and a half hours, close to the last time a
     neighbor saw her sitting on her front porch.
            Various members of the Erie Police Department were
     dispatched to the Lyons residence around 11:50 p.m. for a
     possible homicide. Detectives arrived at the scene at
     approximately 1:30 a.m. on June 24, 2015. Detective Kensil, one
     of the detectives on duty, took photographs of the Lyons residence
     capturing the blood pooling and blood splatter [sic] found
     throughout. Included in these photographs were pictures of a roll
     of duct tape found on the couch where blood was also present,
     and pieces of a broken, decorative wooden spoon. The detective
     also took a picture of the hole found at the bottom of the basement
     steps. He described the hole as being “about the size of a human
     head,” and stated he saw drag marks left in blood on the
     basement carpet leading to the room where Ms. Lyons was found.
           The detective also observed Ms. Lyons before she was taken
     for autopsy. He corroborated the family’s testimony that her head

                                    -3-
J-S28043-23

     was wrapped in duct tape. In fact, the detective stated the tape
     covered Ms. Lyons’ head so completely it was impossible to
     identify her. He also testified she appeared to have been beaten,
     and dragged by her legs, which explained the manner in which her
     shirt was rolled up from her waist. The detective observed a large
     TV on the ground next to Ms. Lyons’ body.
           Other evidence found at the home included a sweatshirt
     matching Ms. Lyons’ clothing, two broken pieces of a wooden
     spoon, a Fago soda pop bottle, and a pizza crust. Several surfaces
     were processed for fingerprinting and DNA evidence including the
     front door and threshold, pill bottles, blood on various floor
     surfaces, walls, pieces of the wooden spoon, and duct tape. The
     detective also acquired a pair of white Nike shoes from [Appellant]
     when he was arrested. No forensic evidence was retrieved from
     the duct tape. Any other item recovered with potential evidence
     was sent to the PSP crime lab for analysis and verification.
            After autopsy, the forensic pathologist concluded Ms. Lyons
     died from suffocating asphyxiation secondary to the application of
     multiple loops of duct tape around her face with a concurrent
     component of incapacitating blunt force trauma to the head. The
     doctor testified the blunt force trauma Ms. Lyons sustained could
     have been caused by the wooden spoon handle recovered from
     the crime scene. The fracture to her skull could have been
     consistent with an injury sustained after being thrown down a
     flight of stairs.
            In addition to the injuries to Ms. Lyons’ brain and skull area,
     the doctor found several contusions on the inside of her calves
     and on her right upper arm, which he described as “fingertip
     contusions.” The doctor also found brush burn abrasions in the
     middle of Ms. Lyons’ lower back, which he described as “rug burn,”
     rib fractures, and a disruption of the bone between her right collar
     bone and the sternum of her breastbone. The doctor explained
     these fractures would be consistent with a large, heavy object,
     such as a TV, being placed on Ms. Lyons’ chest. It was also the
     doctor’s opinion that at the time the TV was placed on Ms. Lyons’
     chest she was alive.
           Of the pieces of evidence submitted to the forensic lab, Tim
     Gavell, a forensic scientist with the Pennsylvania State Police DNA
     Lab, matched DNA lifted from the spoon handle to Ms. Lyons and
     [Appellant]. No other DNA was present on the spoon handle.
     Gavell also confirmed the blood splatter [sic] found on the living
     room wall matched Ms. Lyons' DNA. The DNA found on the Fago

                                     -4-
J-S28043-23

     pop bottle submitted to the lab provided only a partial profile, and
     matched someone in [Appellant’s] paternal lineage.
            Detective Lorah testified K.J. identified [Appellant] as the
     man he saw with Kimbro from a picture line up shortly after the
     police investigation began. Juan Garcia, [Appellant’s] cousin,
     identified Kimbro as [Appellant’s] “baby mom.”
           Video footage and bank records were recovered from
     various places of business and a Northwest Savings bank, which
     placed Ms. Lyons’ bank card in [Appellant’s] hands after he was
     seen with Kimbro in the car parking lot, and after Ms. Lyons’
     death. Bank statements confirmed a transaction at Mighty Fine
     Doughnuts, and also showed a denied attempt to withdraw
     $500.00 from an ATM at the Country Fair located at 26th and State
     Streets at 5:12 p.m. After this attempt, another was made in the
     amount of $200.00 at the same Country Fair at 5:32 p.m. Another
     withdrawal attempt was made at the Country Fair located at 802
     East Avenue for $150.00 around 7:52 p.m., with another denied
     at that same location a half hour later. [Appellant] was also seen
     making a purchase around 10:30 p.m. at the Shell gas station on
     6th and Parade. The video footage recovered from these locations
     showed Kimbro using the bank card at the 26th and State Street
     Country Fair, and [Appellant] attempting to withdraw funds with
     that card at the other locations.
           Text messages were also recovered from Kimbro’s cell
     phone after she was taken into custody linking [Appellant] to Ms.
     Lyons’ death and the use of her bank card. In Kimbro’s phone,
     police found a conversation she had with a contact named “Quice”
     that named him as the father of her child, a picture of a positive
     pregnancy test, and “selfies” of one person being sent to the
     other. Many of the messages referenced bank transactions
     associated with Ms. Lyons’ card that occurred on June 19th.
           Other messages directly referenced Ms. Lyons’ murder
     including those which read: “Either you going to kill this bitch
     before the 1st or you going to give it back;” “Okay. You got my
     word. She a goner;” and “go over there and handle that quietly.”
     Others asked one if the other knew whether Ms. Lyons’ door was
     unlocked. One message stated they had to kill [Ms. Lyons] before
     she went to the police about getting her money back. Call records
     also showed the number associated with “Quice” called Kimbro’s
     phone at the time [Appellant] used the victim’s ATM card at a
     Northwest Savings Bank, and 22 other times on June 23, 2015.

                                    -5-
J-S28043-23

       Coincidentally, the phone number associated with the “Quice”
       contact disappeared once Kimbro was taken into custody.
              Finally, Christopher Hazel, an inmate at SCI Westmoreland,
       testified about the last contact he had with [Appellant]. Hazel
       testified [Appellant], whom he casually knew as “Quice,”
       contacted him in the middle of June 2015, telling him he was going
       to visit him in Pittsburgh soon. Eventually, the two met at a
       Greyhound bus station in Pittsburgh. Hazel testified [Appellant]
       told him he was in trouble up in Erie County, that he [“]caught[”]
       a homicide, and the police found the body within five hours of
       when he did it. [Appellant] also told Hazel he bashed the victim’s
       face in and only got $400.00 off the victim’s debit card before the
       police froze the account.
              According to Hazel, [Appellant’s] “baby mom” was in jail for
       the offense and agreed to “take the case” for him. Originally,
       [Appellant] told Hazel his girlfriend was going to try to distract the
       victim, and he was going to sneak up on her and choke her so
       they could steal her credit card, but the plan didn't work because
       the victim saw [Appellant’s] face. [Appellant] described the
       injuries he caused to the victim as being “horrendous and the
       gruesomest [sic] murder ever seen in Erie, Pennsylvania.”
       [Appellant] also told Hazel it was his girlfriend’s plan to steal the
       money, and, if necessary, kill the victim.

Commonwealth v. Evans, No. 1925 EDA 2016, at 1-6 (Pa.Super. filed

2/26/18) (unpublished memorandum) (bold omitted) (citation omitted).

       Following a two-day trial, at docket number CP-25-CR-0002901-2015

(“2901-2015”), a jury convicted Appellant of various charges, including first-

degree murder.1

____________________________________________

1 On July 6, 2010, Appellant pled guilty at docket number CP-25-CR-0000818-

2010 (“818-2010”) to one count of flight to avoid apprehension, and at docket
number CP-25-CR-0000819-2010 (“819-2010”), to one count of aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon. The crimes related to these docket numbers
occurred prior to the 2015 murder of Ms. Lyons, and Appellant was on
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -6-
J-S28043-23

He was sentenced to an aggregate of life in prison, plus 38 years and five

months to 77 years in prison. Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, which

was granted, in part, and denied, in part. Specifically, the trial court modified

Appellant’s sentence to an aggregate of life in prison, plus 25 years and six

months to 51 years and one month in prison.2

       Appellant filed a timely direct appeal wherein he averred the trial court

erred in denying his pre-trial motion seeking to limit and/or suppress the

statements made by his co-defendant, Kimbro, and the text messages. After

a careful review, we found no merit to Appellant’s claims, and, thus, we

affirmed. Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal, which our Supreme

Court denied on September 5, 2018. Appellant did not file a petition for a writ

of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.

       On January 2, 2019, Appellant filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition, and

the PCRA court appointed counsel to assist Appellant.          Counsel filed an

amended PCRA petition on behalf of Appellant on October 21, 2019, asserting

various claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness. On October 30, 2019, the PCRA

court provided Appellant with notice of its intent to dismiss the petition under

____________________________________________

probation when he murdered Ms. Lyons. Consequently, on November 10,
2016, after Appellant was convicted by the jury for the murder of Ms. Lyons,
the trial court revoked Appellant’s probation at 818-2010 and 819-2010, and
resentenced Appellant.

2 This sentence was imposed consecutively to the probation revocation
sentences imposed at 818-2010 and 819-2010.

                                           -7-
J-S28043-23

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 on the basis that Appellant’s “claims have been previously

litigated and addressed in the [trial court] opinions[.]” Appellant filed an

objection to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice. On November 19, 2019, the

PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition, and Appellant appealed to

this Court.

       On appeal, this Court concluded that, as a matter of law, the PCRA court

erred in determining Appellant’s claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness had

been previously litigated. Accordingly, we vacated the PCRA court’s November

19, 2019, order, and remanded for further proceedings. See Commonwealth

v. Evans, 1865-67 WDA 2019 (Pa.Super. filed 3/8/21) (unpublished

memorandum).

       Upon remand, the PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing on October

25, 2021, regarding Appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Following the hearing, the PCRA court provided the parties with the

opportunity to file briefs.      On September 6, 2022, the PCRA court filed an

order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition. This timely appeal followed,3 and all

Pa.R.A.P. 1925 requirements have been adequately met.

____________________________________________

3 We note that Appellant filed a single notice of appeal listing three separate

trial court docket numbers, including 818-2010, 819-2010, and 2901-2015.
In Commonwealth v. Walker, 646 Pa. 456, 185 A.3d 969 (2018), our
Supreme Court held that an appellant is required to file separate notices of
appeal when a single order resolves issues arising on more than one trial court
docket. However, in the case sub judice, we conclude a breakdown occurred
in the PCRA court, which permits us to overlook Appellant’s non-compliance
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -8-
J-S28043-23

       On appeal, Appellant sets forth the following issues in his “Statement of

the Questions Presented” (verbatim):

       (1)    The trial court erred in failing to find that trial counsel was
              ineffective for failing to file a motion arguing that the lack of
              an affidavit of probable cause in this case resulted in an
              illegal arrest, and thus that the testimonial evidence
              obtained as a result of that arrest should have been
              suppressed.
       (2)    The trial court erred in failing to find that trial counsel was
              ineffective in failing to file a motion for DNA testing of the
              tape that was over the victim’s face.

Appellant’s Brief at 1-2 (bold omitted).

       Initially, we note our standard of review for an order denying PCRA relief

is limited to whether the record supports the PCRA court’s determination, and

whether that decision is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Sattazahn,

597 Pa. 648, 952 A.2d 640, 652 (2008). “We must accord great deference to

the findings of the PCRA court, and such findings will not be disturbed unless

they have no support in the record.” Commonwealth v. Scassera, 965 A.2d

247, 249 (Pa.Super. 2009) (citation omitted).

____________________________________________

with Walker. Specifically, the PCRA Court’s September 6, 2022, order
provided “this represents the Final Order with respect to this matter, Petitioner
is hereby notified that he has thirty (30) days from the date of this Order to
file his Notice of Appeal.” The language in the PCRA court’s order refers to a
singular notice of appeal, and it does not correctly inform Appellant that three
separate notices of appeal should be filed. Accordingly, we conclude there
was a breakdown in the court and proceed to examine the merits of Appellant’s
appeal. See Commonwealth v. Larkin, 235 A.3d 350, 352-54 (Pa.Super.
2020) (en banc).

                                           -9-
J-S28043-23

      Moreover, as relevant here, a PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only

when he proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or

sentence resulted from the “[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in the

circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining

process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken

place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). In reviewing Appellant’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claims, we are mindful that, since there is a presumption

counsel provided effective representation, the defendant bears the burden of

proving ineffectiveness. Commonwealth v. Ali, 608 Pa. 71, 10 A.3d 282

(2010).

      To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must establish

“(1) [the] underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of

conduct pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed to

effectuate his [client’s] interests; and (3) but for counsel’s ineffectiveness,

there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would

have been different.” Id., supra, 10 A.3d at 291 (citations omitted).

            We need not analyze the prongs of an ineffectiveness claim
      in any particular order. Rather, we may discuss first any prong
      that an appellant cannot satisfy under the prevailing law and the
      applicable facts and circumstances of the case. [C]ounsel cannot
      be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 635 Pa. 665, 139 A.3d 1257, 1272 (2016)

(citations omitted). See Commonwealth v. Daniels, 600 Pa. 1, 963 A.2d

409, 419 (2009) (“A failure to satisfy any prong of the ineffectiveness test

                                    - 10 -
J-S28043-23

requires rejection of the claim of ineffectiveness.”) (citation omitted)).    “A

claim has arguable merit where the factual averments, if accurate, could

establish cause for relief.” Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 707

(Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc) (citation omitted).

      Regarding the reasonable basis prong of the ineffective assistance of

counsel test, our Supreme Court has relevantly stated the following:

      When assessing whether counsel had a reasonable basis for his
      act or omission, the question is not whether there were other
      courses of action that counsel could have taken, but whether
      counsel’s decision had any basis reasonably designed to effectuate
      his client’s interest….[T]his cannot be a hindsight evaluation of
      counsel’s performance, but requires an examination of “whether
      counsel made an informed choice, which at the time the decision
      was made reasonably could have been considered to advance and
      protect [the] defendant’s interests.” Our evaluation of counsel’s
      performance is “highly deferential.”

Commonwealth v. Williams, 636 Pa. 105, 141 A.3d 440, 463 (2016)

(citations and quotations omitted).

      Further,

             To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that
      there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
      unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have
      been different. [A] reasonable probability is a probability that is
      sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the
      proceeding.

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 624 Pa. 4, 84 A.3d 294, 311-12 (2014) (citations,

quotation marks, and quotations omitted). See Commonwealth v. Gribble,

580 Pa. 647, 863 A.2d 455, 472 (2004) (“[A] defendant [raising a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel] is required to show actual prejudice; that is,

                                      - 11 -
J-S28043-23

that counsel’s ineffectiveness was of such magnitude that it could have

reasonably had an adverse effect on the outcome of the proceedings.”)

(quotation omitted)).

      With these relevant legal precepts in mind, we turn to the specific issues

raised by Appellant.

      In his first issue, Appellant contends he “was arrested in July of 2015

regarding the homicide charges before a criminal complaint had been filed

against him and before a warrant was issued for his arrest.” Appellant’s Brief

at 17.   He contends that since the criminal complaint did not contain an

affidavit of probable cause his arrest must be deemed illegal. He also suggests

that his statements, which he made to the Erie County police while he was in

custody, must be suppressed due to the alleged illegal arrest arising from the

defective   complaint.   Accordingly,     Appellant   argues   trial   counsel   was

ineffective in failing to file a pre-trial motion challenging the legality of

Appellant’s arrest, as well as the statements flowing therefrom as fruit of the

poisonous tree, due to the alleged defective complaint.

      Initially, we note Appellant has cited no relevant authority in support of

his argument. In any event, in rejecting Appellant’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, the PCRA court relevantly indicated the following:

             [Appellant] argues that trial counsel was ineffective for
      failing to file a suppression motion based on the fact that the
      murder complaint did not have an affidavit of probable cause
      attached to it.
           This claim is not of arguable merit and counsel had a
      reasonable basis.  At the [PCRA] evidentiary hearing, [trial

                                        - 12 -
J-S28043-23

       counsel] addressed why he did not file a pre-trial motion
       addressing the lack of an affidavit of probable cause.
                                        ***
              Q. Did you actually consider it and reject it or did you
              just not consider it at all in terms of seeking to
              suppress certain evidence based on the lack—an
              [alleged] illegal arrest?
              A. I mean, everything is considered. I can’t tell you
              exactly what I thought of at that time. I know in my
              discussions with [Appellant], we talked about those
              types of things, but if I was to look back on it, I did
              not see legal grounds.
       N.T., 10/25/21, [PCRA hearing], at 8.
              [Appellant] argues that the lack of an affidavit [of probable
       cause attached to the complaint] somehow made his [previous]
       statements inadmissible, and thus he seeks to suppress
       statements he made at the time of his arrest in July of 2015.
       Significantly, [at the time Appellant spoke to Erie County police
       regarding the homicide of Ms. Lyons], he had been arrested [and
       was already in custody] on an [unrelated] bench warrant issued
       in June of 2015 [in Butler County]. He thereafter was told about
       the possible homicide charges and was interviewed [by Erie
       County police]. He voluntarily waived his Miranda[4] rights, and
       he made [incriminating] statements that were used against him.
             At the [PCRA] evidentiary hearing, [trial counsel] set forth
       his reasoning for not filing a “frivolous” motion to suppress
       [Appellant’s] statements to the Erie Police:
              Q. Why do you think that would be frivolous under
              [Appellant’s] case?
              A. Because he was [in custody already] and arrested
              by a police agency, not the Erie Police Department, on
              totally unrelated circumstances and voluntarily talked
              to them when they called to meet with him. I mean,
              the Erie police were called to go to the other county.
              Q. Before he spoke with them, is it your recollection
              that he signed that Miranda waiver?
              A. It’s clear from the document, yes.
____________________________________________

4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966).

                                          - 13 -
J-S28043-23

      N.T., 10/25/21, [PCRA hearing], at 19.
             The homicide complaint was not even presented to
      [Appellant] until August 19, 2015, [which is well after he made
      the incriminating statements].       Even if the complaint was
      insufficient, it would not warrant suppression of the statements,
      which [Appellant] voluntarily made more than one month earlier.
             [Trial counsel] obviously recognized that the lack of an
      affidavit [of probable cause attached to the complaint] was not a
      basis to suppress the statements. Moreover, [trial counsel]
      reviewed the complaint, and concluded that, based on his 33
      years’ experience, it contained sufficient probable cause, even
      without a separate attached affidavit. [N.T., 10/25/21, PCRA
      hearing, at 46-47.] He, therefore, reasonably concluded any
      action to suppress would be frivolous. Therefore, [there is no
      merit to Appellant’s claim,] and counsel had a reasonable basis
      for his action.

PCRA Court Opinion, filed 8/12/22, at 4-5 (footnote added).

      We find no abuse of discretion or error of law. As the PCRA court noted,

Appellant was already in custody on unrelated charges when he spoke to the

Erie County police about the homicide of Ms. Lyons.        Appellant does not

dispute he voluntarily waived his Miranda rights prior to being questioned

about the homicide of Ms. Lyons.     Rather, Appellant suggests the alleged

defective complaint, which was filed after he spoke to the police, somehow

negates the voluntary nature of his statements and/or requires the conclusion

he was illegally arrested such that the charges filed against him in connection

with Ms. Lyons’ homicide should have been dismissed.

      To the extent Appellant treats the voluntariness of his statements and

the validity of the complaint subsequently filed against him as one and the

same issue, we dispense with this based on the trial court’s well-reasoned

                                    - 14 -
J-S28043-23

analysis as set forth supra. Simply put, Appellant has neither demonstrated

nor cited relevant authority for the proposition that the voluntariness of his

prior police statements is negated by the alleged defects in the complaint.

       To the extent Appellant contends the complaint’s lack of an affidavit of

probable cause requires the conclusion he was illegally arrested such that the

charges filed against him in connection with Ms. Lyons’ homicide should have

been dismissed,5 we note our Supreme Court has held that “any issue

concerning a defect [regarding] the affidavit of probable cause becomes moot

upon the district justice’s finding at the preliminary hearing that a prima facie

case has been established.” Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 612 Pa. 107,

____________________________________________

5  Moreover, we note that, in Commonwealth v. Davis, 454 A.2d 92
(Pa.Super. 1982), this Court held that alleged defects in a complaint did not
invalidate an appellant’s warrantless arrest, which was supported by probable
cause. This Court recognized that “[a] warrantless arrest for a felony will be
upheld where police have probable cause to believe (1) that a felony has been
committed, and (2) that the person to be arrested is the felon.” Davis, 454
A.2d at 95 (citation omitted). We further noted that “probable cause is said
to exist where facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting
officer are reasonably trustworthy and sufficient in themselves to warrant a
man of reasonable caution to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed the offense.” Id. (citation omitted).
       In the case sub judice, as indicated supra, Appellant was in custody on
unrelated charges when he made incriminating statements and the instant
complaint for the homicide case was filed against him. In any event, the police
had ample probable cause linking Appellant to Ms. Lyons’ homicide. For
instance, the police interviewed J.D. and K.J. the day after the homicide, and
K.J. chose Appellant’s photo from an array. N.T., 9/27/16, Trial, at 119-21.
The police also secured the text messages between Kimbro and Appellant, as
well as secured video surveillance of Appellant and Kimbro using Ms. Lyons’
ATM card on the day of and after the murder. Id. at 128-61. Thus, there is
no arguable merit to Appellant’s underlying claim. See Johnson, supra.

                                          - 15 -
J-S28043-23

30 A.3d 381, 422-23 (2011). Such occurred in the case sub judice.

Accordingly, we find Appellant is not entitled to relief on his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim. See Johnson, supra.

      In his next issue, Appellant claims trial counsel was ineffective in failing

to hire an expert to examine the duct tape for DNA evidence. He contends he

asked trial counsel to hire an expert to conduct such testing; however, trial

counsel failed to do so.

      Relevantly, this Court has held:

      In order to demonstrate counsel’s ineffectiveness for failure to call
      a witness, a petitioner must prove that the witness [ ] existed, the
      witness [was] ready and willing to testify, and the absence of the
      witness’ testimony prejudiced petitioner and denied him a fair
      trial. In particular, when challenging trial counsel’s failure to
      produce expert testimony, “the defendant must articulate what
      evidence was available and identify the witness who was willing to
      offer such evidence.” Commonwealth v. Bryant, 579 Pa. 119,
      855 A.2d 726, 745 (2004) (internal citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Luster, 71 A.3d 1029, 1047 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc)

(quotation marks, quotation, and citations omitted).

      In the case sub judice, during the PCRA hearing, trial counsel testified

the Commonwealth’s expert attempted to retrieve DNA evidence from the duct

tape, but no DNA evidence was recovered. N.T., 10/25/21, PCRA hearing, at

44-45. Appellant has failed to identify any forensics expert who would have

provided testimony to counter the Commonwealth’s expert’s findings. Thus,

there is no arguable merit to the underlying claim. See Stewart, supra.

                                     - 16 -
J-S28043-23

      Further, we agree with the PCRA court that Appellant has failed to

demonstrate he was prejudiced by counsel’s omission. In this vein, the PCRA

court indicated:

             The [PCRA] court also notes that even if there was a DNA
      test, there is not a reasonable probability the outcome [of the
      trial] would have been different. Indeed, [depending on the DNA
      findings], it may have benefitted the Commonwealth. As it
      [stood], [Appellant] [was able to argue at trial] that the
      Commonwealth did not present any evidence that his DNA was on
      the [duct] tape. However, [further forensic] testing could have
      resulted in [Appellant’s] DNA on the tape or no one’s DNA on the
      tape. Moreover, [during the PCRA hearing, trial counsel] testified
      that he did not believe that this was a significant issue.
            Q. Okay. Would you agree with me if his DNA was or
            was not on that [duct tape] mask [found on the
            victim’s face], that would have been a crucial piece of
            evidence?
            A. No, not a crucial part because there was other
            evidence; the text messages, there was DNA on the
            decorative spoon, a pizza crust that was at the scene,
            and a couple of other things.
      N.T., 10/25/21, PCRA hearing, at 44-45.

PCRA Court Opinion, filed 8/12/22, at 7-8.

      Here, given the extensive evidence that Appellant was the perpetrator

of the homicide, we agree with the PCRA court that Appellant has failed to

demonstrate that, but for counsel’s omission in having an expert test the duct

tape for DNA evidence, the outcome of Appellant’s trial would have been

different. See Gribble, supra. Thus, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

      For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

                                     - 17 -
J-S28043-23

     Affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/22/2023

                          - 18 -