Court Opinion

ID: 9840477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-18 18:03:43.766859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:46:35.018042
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/18/23 Hansen v. Volkov CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 JACQUELYNN L. HANSEN,                                           B311524

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                             (Los Angeles County
                                                                 Super. Ct. No.
           v.                                                    20STR005408)

 OLEG VOLKOV,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Christine Byrd, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
         Oleg Volkov, in pro. per., Defendant and Appellant.
         Buchalter and Robert Collings Little for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                                   _____________________
       Jacquelynn L. Hansen and Oleg Volkov, both members of
the State Bar, represent opposing parties in a
dissolution/annulment proceeding pending in Los Angeles
Superior Court (Wright v. Platokhina (Super. Ct. L.A. County,
2019, No. 19STFL03890)). Following an incident at Hansen’s
office relating to the canceled deposition of Volkov’s client, Iuliia
Platokhina, Hansen obtained a three-year civil harassment
restraining order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 527.6 (section 527.6), protecting her, as well as her
paralegal and office receptionist, from further harassment by
Volkov and authorizing Volkov in connection with his
representation of Platokhina to contact Hansen only by United
States mail or email and only for purposes of service of legal
papers.
       On appeal Volkov contends, in part, that all of the conduct
upon which the trial court based its findings of harassment was
constitutionally protected activity (litigation-related emails and
his appearance at Hansen’s office for his client’s deposition) and
there was insufficient evidence his actions, to the extent not
constitutionally protected, were directed at Hansen, caused
Hansen substantial emotional distress, or would cause a
reasonable person substantial emotional distress as required to
support issuance of the restraining order. Volkov also contends
the court erred in including in the order members of Hansen’s
office staff as protected individuals. We reverse.
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      1. Hansen’s Request for Civil Harassment Restraining
         Orders
      Hansen filed her request for civil harassment restraining
orders on October 2, 2020 and included, without notice to Volkov,

                                  2
a request for issuance of a temporary restraining order. In the
portion of the Judicial Council form permitting the petitioner to
request protection for other family or household members,
Hansen asked that two of her employees, Anita Collette Darby
(her receptionist) and Robin Rouse (a paralegal), be included as
protected individuals.
       In her declaration in support of the request for orders,
Hansen explained that she represents Philip Wright in family
law proceedings in which Volkov represents Platokhina.
Platokhina had alleged Wright engaged in domestic violence, and
Volkov represented Platokhina in a failed effort to obtain a
domestic violence restraining order. Prior to the hearing in that
matter, Wright was unsuccessfully prosecuted by the Los Angeles
City Attorney for domestic violence against Platokhina. Volkov
“appeared throughout the criminal proceedings and was ‘booted’
from the Courtroom at the request of Larry M. Bakman [Wright’s
counsel] for allegedly recording the proceedings in violation of the
Superior Court rules.” According to Hansen, “Since the
dismissal/loss of the criminal proceedings, Mr. Volkov has been
aggressive, harassing and threatening toward myself, my co-
counsel, Larry M. Bakman, my client and my client’s family.”
       Hansen declared she was scared of Volkov because he
repeatedly came to her office (“no less than five (5) times over the
last year”), insisted on speaking to an attorney about the pending
family law matter and refused to leave despite demands by her
office staff. Hansen attached as an exhibit a letter sent to Volkov
on October 31, 2019 (that is, approximately one year prior to the
request for the restraining order), which, after asserting that
Hansen’s objections to Volkov’s written discovery had been timely
served, stated, “I understand you recently came to my office and

                                 3
badgered my staff as well about the discovery objections. Your
conduct is unbefitting of an attorney. I understand your position
regarding discovery. Please do not harass me or my staff any
further.”
       Hansen’s declaration then described the October 2, 2020
incident, summarizing in part the accompanying declarations of
Rouse and Darby concerning the events of the morning. Hansen’s
declaration attached as exhibits a September 29, 2020 letter (sent
via email) canceling Platokhina’s deposition, previously
scheduled for October 2, 2020, because Volkov had failed to
confirm his client would appear, and a portion of the email
exchange between Hansen and Volkov restating the deposition
had been canceled. Notwithstanding notice that the deposition
had been canceled, Platokhina appeared at Hansen’s office at
9:05 a.m. on October 2 for the deposition. Rouse informed
Platokhina the deposition had been canceled, as Volkov had been
advised, and asked her to leave, which she did. Volkov then
arrived a few minutes later. Volkov walked past Darby in the
suite’s waiting room and entered the inner office area. (Hansen
noted that three of her children were in the conference room
attending school remotely when Volkov entered the office.) Rouse
saw Volkov and told him he had to return to the waiting room.
Once the two of them were in the reception area, Rouse told
Volkov there was no deposition and he had to leave. Volkov
responded he would not leave until he received written
confirmation there was no deposition. Rouse again told Volkov
he needed to leave and added, “There are children here.”
       According to Hansen, she entered the suite at this point,
saw Volkov in the waiting room and repeatedly demanded he
immediately leave the office. Hansen held the door open for him.

                                4
As Volkov began walking toward the door, he started recording
the interaction on his phone. Volkov then leaned his body into
the door so it would not close and claimed Hansen had hurt him
with the door (apparently because she had released her grip on
the self-closing door as he was walking out of the suite and it
struck him). After Volkov left, Hansen locked the door and asked
Darby and Rouse what had happened prior to her arrival. She
then called the 911 emergency number and reported what had
happened. Hansen concluded her declaration by stating she
believed she, her family and her staff needed protection from
Volkov “as he routinely comes to my place of business and refuses
to leave, despite my repeated requests.” She added, “His filming
of me without my permission and false allegations that I ‘hurt’
him are also equally threatening/harassing.”
      The court issued a temporary restraining order on
October 2, 2020 and set Hansen’s request for a permanent civil
harassment restraining order for an evidentiary hearing.
     2. The Hearing on Hansen’s Request for Civil Harassment
        Restraining Orders
     The hearing on Hansen’s request was held December 4,
     1
2020. Both Hansen and Volkov were represented by counsel.
Hansen’s and Rouse’s declarations were received in evidence,

1
       Volkov apparently filed a response to Hansen’s request for
civil harassment restraining orders although, as Volkov stated in
his request to augment the record with a copy of that response,
the filing is not reflected in the superior court’s register of
actions, and the copy provided with the motion to augment does
not including any notation reflecting that it had been filed.
Nonetheless, Volkov’s counsel at the hearing stated the response
was included in the exhibit binder provided to the court.

                                5
subject to cross-examination. Hansen, Volkov and Rouse were
present and testified.
         a. Volkov’s testimony
      Volkov, originally testifying as the first witness in Hansen’s
case-in-chief pursuant to Evidence Code section 776,
subdivision (a), explained he personally served all documents in
the family law case between Platokhina and Wright rather than
using an attorney service. He denied he went to Hansen’s office
with the intent to annoy and harass her.
      Turning to the events leading to the incident on October 2,
2020, Volkov acknowledged he had received via email, apparently
sent at 2:12 p.m. on September 29, 2020, Hansen’s letter stating
Platokhina’s deposition, scheduled for October 2, 2020, had been
canceled because of Volkov’s objections. But, he continued, he
understood from Hansen’s subsequent email sent at 2:48 p.m. on
September 29, 2020 that the deposition had not actually been
canceled. Volkov explained he had emailed Hansen at 2:46 p.m.
stating, “We clearly have communication issues. I clearly stated
                                                  2
that I and my client are going to follow the law.” Hansen
responded in her 2:48 p.m. email, writing, “I do not understand
your statement—‘I am going to follow the law’—please tell me
whether you and your client will be appearing in person on
Friday at my office at 10 am.” Then at 3:00 p.m. Hansen again
emailed, saying, “Mr. Volkov—at this juncture, given your
gamesmanship. We will simply file the Motion to Compel your

2
      The 2:46 p.m. email followed one at 2:40 p.m. from Volkov
stating, “I and my client will follow the law and appear at the
deposition. I’ve never stated that either I or my client refused to
appear.”

                                 6
client’s deposition on a date certain with a discovery referee to be
present at the sole cost of your client. [¶] No further
communication on this is necessary.” Volkov sent several further
emails indicating he and his client intended to appear for the
deposition. Hansen did not respond to him after her 3:00 p.m.
email.
       Volkov testified that, when he arrived at Hansen’s office on
the morning of October 2, 2020, he asked the receptionist about
the deposition. The receptionist responded that he should speak
to Rouse and pointed toward Rouse’s office, which Volkov
believed to be an invitation to walk into the interior of the suite.
Rouse came out of her office and asked Volkov to leave the inner
area of the suite and go to the waiting room. After he returned to
the reception area, Hansen came into the suite and immediately
yelled at Volkov to leave. Volkov was in the process of drafting
an email to confirm he had appeared for the deposition when
Hansen ordered him out of the office. He then described how his
foot was caught in the door as he was leaving.
       During direct examination during the defense case, Volkov
testified he was in Hansen’s suite for approximately two minutes
on October 2, 2020 from the time he entered until he was hit by
the door. Volkov also explained he insisted on confirming he and
his client had been present that morning because he did not trust
his opposing counsel: “I was afraid that they would claim that I,
my client, didn’t appear at the deposition.” Volkov began
drafting an email on his phone, but Rouse told him to take a
video of the office rather than writing the email to memorialize
his appearance. At that point Hansen entered the suite and
demanded Volkov get out.

                                 7
         b. Hansen’s testimony
       In her testimony Hansen identified her October 31, 2019
letter to Volkov and explained she had sent it on behalf of her
employees, who had complained about Volkov’s appearance at the
office and demand to speak to them. Hansen estimated Volkov
had been at the office at least five times before she wrote the
letter. In the 11 months since writing the letter, Volkov had
come to her office “three or less” times; and her employees
complained that Volkov was “creepy, he won’t leave, he demands
to talk to the attorney.” Hansen conceded that, although she may
have been in the office when Volkov was there after October 31,
2019 and before October 2, 2020, she did not communicate with
him on any of those occasions, including personally asking him to
leave.
       Hansen next testified about setting Platokhina’s deposition
for October 2, 2020, Hansen’s letter of September 29, 2020
canceling the deposition, the subsequent email that reiterated
the deposition had been canceled, and her belief that there was
absolutely no reason for Volkov to be at her office on October 2,
2020. She explained, because of a blackout at her home, she
brought her children (eight, nine and 11 years old) to the office to
continue their remote schooling in the conference room and then
took her youngest child to preschool. While at the preschool, she
received a text that said, “Volkov is here.” When she received
that message, Hansen felt “sick to her stomach” and “scared”
because “I was afraid he wouldn’t leave and my kids were sitting
there.”
       Hansen returned to the office, went upstairs to her suite,
opened the door and said to Volkov, “Leave.” Volkov was typing
on his phone as Hansen repeatedly told him to get out of her

                                 8
office and said she would call the police if he refused. She then
described the episode with the door and Volkov’s recording of her
as he screamed he had been hurt by the door closing on him.
Asked how she felt after Volkov left, Hansen stated, “I felt
horrible that I put all these people in this situation, especially my
         3
kids.”
       Hansen also testified that, subsequent to October 2, 2020,
her building management contacted her and reported that Volkov
had requested any video recordings from that morning of
Hansen’s floor, building lobby and parking garage. That request,
she testified, made her “scared that he was trying to get more
information about me.” Hansen’s counsel explained he was not
offering that testimony for the truth but only for Hansen’s state
of mind.
       On cross-examination Hansen acknowledged that, when
Volkov came to her office prior to October 2, 2020, “he has served
paperwork,” before “demand[ing] to speak to an attorney in the
office, and he has refused to leave until somebody comes out to
speak to him, an attorney.” Asked to review the series of emails
that preceded the October 2, 2020 confrontation, Hansen
explained that she had clearly canceled the deposition, did not
understand what Volkov meant when he said he would “follow
the law and appear at the deposition,” and did not believe it was

3
       Rouse testified she was afraid when Volkov refused to leave
the office, explaining, “It was just me, Collette [Darby], who, you
know, we were both standing back. We were a little nervous.
And then the three children. And it’s a little worrisome when
somebody won’t leave. I didn’t know what was going to happen.”
According to Hansen, Darby was “very upset” after Volkov finally
left.

                                  9
necessary to continue to discuss the matter with Volkov once the
deposition had been canceled.
         c. Rouse’s testimony
       Rouse testified (consistently with the description of the
October 2 incident in her declaration as summarized by Hansen)
that, when she saw Volkov in the inner office area, Volkov said he
was there for his client’s deposition. Rouse asked him to go back
to the reception area where she then told him the deposition had
been canceled, as he knew, and he had to leave. Volkov said he
needed confirmation he had appeared for the deposition and
began using his phone to type an email. Rouse told him he could
prepare his email downstairs (that is, not in Hansen’s office
suite), but Volkov ignored her. According to Rouse, Volkov was in
the office for approximately 10 minutes before Hansen arrived.
Once there, Hansen repeatedly asked Volkov to leave and held
the door open for him. Volkov started walking very slowly
toward the door. As he reached the door frame, he used his body
to stop the door from closing, held his phone up as if he was
recording, and said, “You’re hurting me; you’re hurting me.”
      3. The Trial Court’s Findings and Order
      At the conclusion of the hearing the court signed a three-
year civil harassment restraining order protecting Hansen,
Darby and Rouse from Volkov, which included a general
prohibition against any contact, direct or indirect, and ordered
Volkov to stay at least 100 yards away from each of them, as well
as Hansen’s home, workplace and vehicle and her children’s
school and place of child care. The order additionally provided
that Volkov, in connection with his representation of Platokhina
in the family law proceedings, was allowed to contact the
protected individuals by United States mail and email “for

                                10
purposes of service of legal papers only. No other contact of any
kind without authorization in advance by court order for such
contact.”
       Detailing its findings at the hearing, the court stated that
Volkov had “engaged in a course of conduct directed at petitioner,
Ms. Hansen, that seriously alarmed, annoyed, or harassed her;
that it was knowing and willful; that it served no legitimate
purpose; that it was not constitutionally protected; that it would
cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional
distress; and that it did actually cause substantial emotional
distress to the petitioner.” The court also found it highly
probable the conduct would continue in the future unless a
restraining order issued. The court, after explaining it found
Hansen’s and Rouse’s testimony to be credible and Volkov’s
testimony not credible, specifically found Volkov’s emails leading
up to the October 2, 2020 incident to be “civil harassment,
without question,” describing the multiple emails as
“argumentative and self-serving and entirely unnecessary and
part of a course of conduct of civil harassment. . . . There was no
reason for respondent to be sending email after email after email
after a clear and unequivocal cancellation of the deposition. That
in itself establishes a course of conduct.” Continuing, the court
stated, “It was entirely unreasonable for him to appear at the
office on October 2nd. There was no legitimate purpose for him
being there, and his conduct by coming to the office was more in
the course of conduct of civil harassment.”
                                                4
      Volkov filed a timely notice of appeal.

4
     Volkov filed his notice of appeal on February 2, 2021.
Volkov had previously filed a motion for a new trial (on
January 8, 2021), which was not heard until February 8, 2021

                                 11
                          DISCUSSION
      1. Governing Law and Standard of Review
      Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1),
provides, “A person who has suffered harassment as defined in
subdivision (b) may seek a temporary restraining order and an
order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in this
section.” Subdivision (b)(3) of section 527.6 defines harassment
as “unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing
and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that
seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves
no legitimate purpose.”
      A “‘[c]ourse of conduct’ is a pattern of conduct composed of a
series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a
continuity of purpose, including following or stalking an
individual, making harassing telephone calls to an individual, or
sending harassing correspondence to an individual by any
means . . . .” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).) “The course of conduct must
be that which would cause a reasonable person to suffer
substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause
substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.” (§ 527.6,
subd. (b)(3).) “Constitutionally protected activity is not included
within the meaning of ‘course of conduct.’” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).)
      At the hearing on a petition for a civil harassment
restraining order, the court “shall receive any testimony that is
relevant, and may make an independent inquiry.” (§ 527.6,
subd. (i).) The trial court may issue a restraining order only after
finding by clear and convincing evidence that unlawful

when the court denied the motion. Volkov’s appeal does not
challenge the denial of his new trial motion.

                                 12
harassment exists and is reasonably likely to recur. (§ 527.6,
subd. (i) [requiring showing “by clear and convincing evidence”].)
       “‘Section 527.6 was enacted “to protect the individual’s
right to pursue safety, happiness and privacy as guaranteed by
the California Constitution.” [Citations.] It does so by providing
expedited injunctive relief to victims of harassment.’” (Parisi v.
Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1227, disapproved on
another ground in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989,
1010, fn. 7; accord, Brekke v. Wills (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1400,
1412.) After finding harassment, upon a showing of good cause,
the court may include named family or household members in the
                                      5
restraining order. (§ 527.6, subd. (c).)
      “[W]hen presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence associated with a finding requiring clear and convincing

5
       The trial court, referring to section 527.6,
subdivision (b)(6)(A)(i) & (ii), which authorizes the court to grant
the petitioner exclusive control of an animal owned by or residing
with the petitioner and to order the respondent to stay away from
the animal, included Hansen’s office staff in the civil harassment
restraining order because, as the court stated, it was
uncomfortable that the legislation offered more protection to a
household pet than to the petitioner’s employees. Neither that
rationale nor the court’s additional finding that Hansen’s
employees were sufficiently similar to family or household
members justified naming a petitioner’s employees as protected
individuals in a section 527.6 restraining order. Rouse and
Darby could have filed requests for a civil harassment restraining
order, or Hansen could have sought a workplace violence
protective order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8
to safeguard her employees if she believed the somewhat
different requirements prescribed by that statute could be
satisfied.

                                13
evidence, the court must determine whether the record, viewed as
a whole, contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable
trier of fact could have made the finding of high probability
demanded by this standard of proof.” (Conservatorship of O.B.,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1005.) “Consistent with well-established
principles governing review for sufficiency of the evidence, in
making this assessment the appellate court must view the record
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give
due deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the
credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and
drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Id. at p. 996.)
       “[W]hether the facts, when construed most favorably in
[petitioner’s] favor, are legally sufficient to constitute civil
harassment under section 527.6, and whether the restraining
order passes constitutional muster, are questions of law subject
to de novo review.” (R.D. v. P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 181,
188; accord, Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th
484, 497.)
      2. Volkov’s Emails Regarding His Client’s Deposition
         Constituted Constitutionally Protected Activity
       As discussed, the trial court expressly found the multiple
emails sent by Volkov after Hansen had notified him that
Platokhina’s deposition was canceled were “argumentative and
self-serving and entirely unnecessary.” Perhaps they were, and
maybe also seriously annoying. But they did not contain any
threats of violence (credible or otherwise). As such, Volkov’s
emails were constitutionally protected litigation activity.
(See Finton Construction, Inc. v. Bidna & Keys, APLC (2015)
238 Cal.App.4th 200, 210 [“‘all communicative acts performed by
attorneys as part of their representation of a client in a judicial

                                 14
proceeding or other petitioning context are per se protected as
petitioning activity by the anti-SLAPP statute’”]; Cabral v.
Martins (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 471, 479-480 [same]; see also
Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1056 [litigation
activities, including filing and prosecution of a lawsuit by an
attorney representing a client, constitute acts in furtherance of a
person’s right of petition or free speech]; Kolar v. Donahue,
McIntosh & Hammerton (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1537
[“anti-SLAPP protection for petitioning activities applies not only
to the filing of lawsuits, but extends to conduct that relates to
such litigation, including statements made in connection with . . .
litigation”].)
       Because the emails were constitutionally protected, it was
error for the court to conclude they were properly considered part
of a course of conduct of harassment. (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1)
[“[c]onstitutionally protected activity is not included within the
meaning of ‘course of conduct’”]; see Thomas v. Quintero (2005)
126 Cal.App.4th 635, 663 [even if petitioner had been seriously
alarmed, annoyed or harassed by respondent’s conduct—a public
demonstration at petitioner’s church protesting petitioner’s
eviction of respondent—there was no showing that respondent’s
injurious actions were part of a “course of conduct” within the
meaning of section 527.6 because the conduct constituted a form
of protected speech].)
      3. The Evidence of Volkov’s Nonprotected Conduct Did Not
         Support the Court’s Findings of a Willful or Knowing
         Course of Conduct That Would Cause a Reasonable
         Person, and Did Cause Hansen, Substantial Emotional
         Distress
      Other than Volkov’s pre-deposition emails, the trial court
identified only the incident at Hansen’s office on October 2, 2020

                                15
to support the findings that Volkov had willfully or knowingly
engaged in a course of conduct directed at Hansen that seriously
alarmed, annoyed or harassed her and that would have caused a
                                                        6
reasonable person to suffer serious emotional damage. Based on
the court’s credibility findings we accept, as we must, Hansen’s
and Rouse’s version of the incident—that is, Volkov came to
Hansen’s office knowing the deposition had been canceled and
without any other legitimate reason to be there, remained at the
office for approximately 30 minutes despite repeated demands
that he leave and then feigned injury and recorded Hansen
without permission when the door Hansen had been holding open
struck Volkov as he slowly left the suite. (Hansen concedes on
appeal, as Volkov testified, that Volkov had no reason to know
that Hansen’s children would be at the office on the morning of
October 2, 2020.)

6
       The trial court did not identify as part of Volkov’s course of
conduct of harassment his several pre-October 2, 2020 visits to
Hansen’s office during which he served legal papers and
demanded to speak to an attorney about his client’s family law
case. Nor could it have properly done so. Even if this litigation-
related conduct did not constitute constitutionally protected
speech and petitioning activity, there was no evidence Volkov’s
actions were directed to Hansen, who admitted during the
evidentiary hearing that she never spoke to, or otherwise
interacted with, Volkov on any of those occasions. Indeed, in her
October 31, 2019 letter to Volkov Hansen described his conduct at
the office after serving papers as “badger[ing] my staff as well
about the discovery objections,” and Hansen testified she wrote
the letter because of her employees’ concerns and complaints that
Volkov was “creepy.”

                                 16
       This evidence was insufficient for a reasonable trier of fact
to make the findings necessary to support the restraining order
with the high probability demanded by the clear and convincing
standard of proof. (See Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th
at p. 1005.) Although “[s]ection 527.6 does not define the phrase
‘substantial emotional distress,’” in “the analogous context of the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the similar
phrase ‘severe emotional distress’ means highly unpleasant
mental suffering or anguish ‘from socially unacceptable conduct’
[citation], which entails such intense, enduring and nontrivial
emotional distress that ‘no reasonable [person] in a civilized
society should be expected to endure it.’” (Schild v. Rubin (1991)
232 Cal.App.3d 755, 762-763; accord, Cal. Judges Benchguides,
Benchguide 20, Orders Prohibiting Civil Harassment and
Workplace/Postsecondary School Violence (CJER 2016) § 20.6
[Definitions], pp. 20-7 to 20-8.) Here, Hansen testified only that
she felt sick to her stomach and scared that Volkov would not
leave when she received the text message that Volkov was at her
office and felt horrible once Volkov left because she had put
others (her staff and her children) in this situation. That
testimony was far from establishing that Volkov’s conduct,
however offensive or annoying it may have been, caused
Hansen—an experienced family law attorney who presumably
has litigated many cases with difficult opposing counsel—to
suffer intense, enduring and nontrivial emotional distress.
       But even were we to agree the evidence supported a finding
that, as a result of the October 2, 2020 episode, Hansen suffered,
and a reasonable person in her position would have suffered,
substantial emotional distress within the meaning of
section 527.6, a “single incident” is “insufficient to meet the

                                 17
statutory requirement of a course of conduct.” (Leydon v.
Alexander (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1, 4; accord, Brekke v. Wills,
supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1413-1414; Cal. Judges
Benchguides, Benchguide 20, supra, § 20.6, at p. 20-7.) The trial
court in its findings referred to Volkov’s presence at Hansen’s
office as a singular event (“his conduct in coming to the office”)
and found it “more in the course of conduct of civil harassment”
established by the pre-October 2, 2020 emails. Considered on its
own, the 30-minute episode (if, in fact, it lasted that long) does
not support issuance of the civil harassment restraining order.
       Although we reverse the civil harassment restraining order
because Volkov’s conduct was partially protected and failed to
cause Hansen severe emotional distress, that does not mean his
behavior was appropriate. Nor was it appropriate for Hansen to
seek a civil harassment restraining order against her opposing
counsel based on an argument over deposition scheduling that
reasonable attorneys could have resolved without court
intervention or because her office staff considered Volkov “creepy”
or annoying. Counsel’s mutual lack of civility in this case lends
all the more support for the recommendations of the California
Civility Task Force, which warned that “[d]iscourtesy, hostility,
intemperance, and other unprofessional conduct prolong
litigation, making it more expensive for the litigants and the
court system.” (Beyond the Oath: Recommendations for
Improving Civility, Initial Report of the California Civility Task
Force (Sept. 2021) p. 2.) Indeed, one of the Task Force’s
recommendations would have been particularly helpful in this
case: requiring attorneys to take an hour of mandatory
continuing legal education devoted to civility. (Id. at p. 3.) As
the Task Force concluded: “Civility matters not simply because

                                18
lawyers are examples to others on how to engage competing ideas
and interests. It matters because our system of justice simply
cannot function fairly and reliably with systemic incivility.” (Id.
at p. 6.)
                          DISPOSITION
       The civil harassment restraining order issued December 4,
2020 is reversed. On remand the trial court is directed to enter a
new order denying Hansen’s request for a restraining order. The
parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.

                                          PERLUSS, P. J.

      We concur:

            SEGAL, J.

            MARTINEZ, J.

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