Court Opinion

ID: 9855106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:19:33.834212+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:40.614515
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). Procedural due process requires, perhaps above all else, that before a binding decision is made, all affected parties must be given an opportunity to be heard. The defendant Cope was denied this fundamental constitutional right when the trial judge denied his motion to quash evidence seized by the police without allowing him to present evidence in support of his motion and in opposition to the people’s proofs.
The evidence, a gun, was obtained by the police in defendant’s apartment contemporaneously with his arrest. The people’s witness, a police officer, testified for several hours and was cross-examined *19by defendant’s counsel. While the people contend that there was probable cause for a warrantless arrest and the gun was validly seized as an incident to that arrest, they concede that the adequacy of the cause is arguable and rely as well on the defendant’s alleged consent to enter and search his apartment.
The defendant’s motion to quash denied both that the police had probable cause to arrest him without a warrant and that he consented to a search. The facts preceding the arrest, as testified to by the police officer, were not admitted by the defendant. There is also a dispute as to whether the defendant was arrested when the police entered the apartment or after the gun was found.
A motion to suppress presents an issue to be decided by the judge alone. Cf. People v. Ferguson (1965), 376 Mich 90; People v. Doverspihe (1969), 382 Mich 1. In order to decide that issue he must often resolve sharply disputed questions of fact. Manifestly, a defendant has the right to present his version of the facts and to contradict or explain the testimony offered by the people. Clearly, the trial judge erred in closing the suppression hearing and ruling the gun admissible after hearing only the people’s witness.1
When the defendant’s counsel protested, the trial judge reiterated his ruling. Then counsel for a co-defendant protested and in response the judge said that if anything came out at the trial which changed his mind he would declare a mistrial.
The defendant offered no evidence at the trial either on admissibility of the gun or on the issue *20of guilt. The admissibility of the gun was not in issue at the trial, having been decided at the suppression hearing. The defendant had no obligation to put in evidence at the trial on the nonissue of admissibility of the gun in order to preserve his objection to the trial judge’s ruling denying him the opportunity to put in proofs at the suppression hearing.
Furthermore, the defendant had the right to testify on the admissibility issue without testifying before the jury or waiving his right not to testify at the trial. He should not have been put in a position of choosing between these rights:
“A separate hearing also enables the defendant to testify on the collateral issue of suppression without waiving his privilege against self-incrimination on the merits of the charge or creating the possibility, if he were to testify on the suppression issue before the jury but stand mute on the merits of the charge, that the jury would draw the prohibited adverse inference from his conduct.” United States v. Blalock (ED Pa, 1966), 253 F Supp 860, 862, 863.2
I would remand for a complete evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of the gun. Upon such a hearing, if the gun is found to be inadmissible, the defendant would be entitled to a new trial. If the gun is found to be admissible, then his conviction should be deemed affirmed as I agree with the majority that the other alleged errors do not justify a new trial.

 See State v. Pike (1968), 273 NC 102 (159 SE2d 334), which presents the identical factual situation. There also the court heard a State’s witness but erroneously refused to hear the defendant. See, also, Jackson v. United States (1964), 117 App DC 325 (336 F2d 580).

 The trial judge’s ruling clearly barred further evidence on the issue of admissibility except at the trial. That ruling, absent a contrary expression of the judge, could justifiably be understood by the defendant to mean that if he wished to be heard he must take the stand before the jury and possibly waive his right not to incriminate himself as well. Cf. People v. Wiejecha (1968), 14 Mich App 486; Gabbiness v. State (1967), 241 Ark 898 (410 SW2d 867).