Court Opinion

ID: 9894834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-03 14:09:14.534541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:54.181792
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
                                  No. 22–0553

            Submitted September 14, 2023—Filed November 3, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,

      Appellee,

vs.

MURPHY LEE RUTHERFORD,

      Appellant.

      On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Washington County, Mark E.

Kruse, Judge.

      The defendant seeks further review from court of appeals decision

affirming his sentence following guilty plea. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS

AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT
AFFIRMED.
      Oxley, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Christensen, C.J.,

and Waterman, Mansfield, McDonald, and May joined. McDermott, J., filed an

opinion concurring specially.

      Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson,

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.
                                         2

OXLEY, Justice.
      Murphy Lee Rutherford entered a written guilty plea to second-degree theft

and two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm (all class “D” felonies)

after he was arrested for taking two firearms from an acquaintance’s home. The

district court sentenced him to three consecutive five-year sentences of

imprisonment. Rutherford appealed, and we transferred the appeal to the court

of appeals. The court of appeals found good cause to address Rutherford’s

challenge to his sentence as required by Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2021),

exercised jurisdiction over the appeal, and affirmed the sentence. But the court

of appeals declined to address Rutherford’s second argument on appeal—that

there was an inadequate factual basis to support his guilty plea to theft—because

it concluded that good cause was lacking on that issue.

      We granted Rutherford’s application for further review to confirm what we

said last year in State v. Wilbourn: “An appellate court either has jurisdiction

over a criminal appeal or it does not.” 974 N.W.2d 58, 66 (Iowa 2022). If good

cause is lacking, the court has no jurisdiction, and the appeal must be

dismissed. See State v. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d 98, 110 (Iowa 2021) (dismissing

appeal and explaining that “[b]ecause Treptow has not established good cause
to pursue a direct appeal as a matter of right, this court is without jurisdiction

to hear the appeal”). But “[o]nce a defendant crosses the good-cause threshold

as to one ground for appeal, the court has jurisdiction over the appeal.” Wilbourn,

974 N.W.2d at 66.

      I. The Distinction Between Jurisdiction and Authority.

      “Courts . . . have more than occasionally [mis]used the term ‘jurisdictional

. . . .’ ” Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 413 (2004) (alteration in original)

(quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004)); see also Holding v. Franklin
Cnty. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 565 N.W.2d 318, 319 (Iowa 1997) (en banc)
                                        3

(noting the “poetic justice” of our court’s attempt to correct a “widespread

misimpression that often confused a court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction

with a court’s lack of authority to act in a particular matter” where the confusion

could be traced to our own prior cases).

      There is an important difference between a court’s subject matter

jurisdiction and its authority to act. See, e.g., State v. Mandicino, 509 N.W.2d

481, 482 (Iowa 1993) (“The importance of this distinction becomes evident when

issues of waiver arise.”). “Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in

any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist,

the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and

dismissing the cause.” Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868). Once

a case is within a court’s adjudicatory power, other rules or statutes may limit

the court’s authority to act, but that does not make those provisions

jurisdictional. In Holding v. Franklin County Zoning Board of Adjustment, we

explained the distinction this way:

      Subject matter jurisdiction is not lacking in the present case be-
      cause the legislature has clearly given Iowa courts the power to act
      in challenges to decisions of county zoning commissions. At issue is
      only whether authority to act in this controversy should be withheld
      because of the claimed premature filing of the court challenge.

565 N.W.2d at 319. In Scarborough v. Principi, the United States Supreme Court

explained a similar distinction: “In short, [28 U.S.C.] § 2412(d)(1)(B) does not

describe what ‘classes of cases’ the [Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims] is

competent to adjudicate; instead, the section relates only to postjudgment

proceedings auxiliary to cases already within that court’s adjudicatory authority.”

541 U.S. at 414 (emphasis added) (quoting Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455).

Jurisdiction goes to a court’s power to adjudicate a particular class of cases,
                                           4

while authority goes to a court’s ability to act in a particular case within that

class.

         Iowa Code sections 814.6 and 814.7 are prime examples of the difference

between our court’s jurisdiction and its authority. “Iowa Code section 814.6

contains the standards for subject-matter jurisdiction for the review of a criminal

defendant’s appeal.” State v. Propps, 897 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Iowa, 2017). Section

814.6(1)(a) grants a right of appeal to a defendant from “[a] final judgment of

sentence,” with certain exclusions, one of which is an appeal from “[a] conviction

where the defendant has pled guilty.” Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3). As a result, we

generally lack jurisdiction over direct appeals from guilty pleas. But the provision

creates two exceptions to that exclusion: “This subparagraph does not apply to

a guilty plea for a class ‘A’ felony or in a case where the defendant establishes

good cause.” Id. So if a defendant who pleaded guilty to a non-class “A” felony

can establish good cause, the statutory prerequisites for appellate jurisdiction

are met, the ban on the right to appeal from a guilty plea does not apply, and the

defendant is entitled to appeal the entire case—the “final judgment of sentence”

from the guilty plea conviction as identified in section 814.6(1)(a). To that end,

section 814.6(1)(a)(3) creates a class of cases over which we have appellate
jurisdiction: guilty plea convictions where the defendant establishes good cause

to appeal.

         Section 814.7, on the other hand, addresses our authority over specific

claims. It provides:

                An ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a criminal case
         shall be determined by filing an application for postconviction relief
         pursuant to chapter 822. The claim need not be raised on direct
         appeal from the criminal proceedings in order to preserve the claim
         for postconviction relief purposes, and the claim shall not be decided
         on direct appeal from the criminal proceedings.
                                        5

Id. § 814.7 (emphasis added). “Section 814.7 does not limit jurisdiction; it limits

the authority of Iowa’s appellate courts to resolve ineffective-assistance claims

on direct appeal.” State v. Jordan, 959 N.W.2d 395, 399 (Iowa 2021); see also

Treptow, 960 N.W.2d at 109 (“Because we have just upheld the constitutionality

of section 814.7, this court is without authority to decide ineffective-assistance-

of-counsel claims on direct appeal.” (emphasis added)).

      The court of appeals was concerned about not circumventing our holding

in State v. Treptow. See 960 N.W.2d at 109 (holding that defendant failed to

establish good cause to appeal from a guilty plea because “[h]is failure to file a

motion in arrest of judgment preclude[d] appellate relief” under our criminal

rules of procedure). But in that case, Treptow’s only challenge on appeal was

that his guilty plea lacked a factual basis, and our prior caselaw required that

challenge to be brought as an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim because

the defendant failed to file a motion in arrest of judgment. See id. at 103. And

because section 814.7 now prevents us from considering ineffective assistance

of counsel on direct appeal, we could provide no relief to Treptow on the sole

issue raised on appeal. Id. at 109. As such, Treptow failed to establish good cause

and could not avoid the ban on his appeal from a guilty plea. Id. at 109–10.
      Once good cause is established under section 814.6(1)(a)(3) as to one

issue, we have jurisdiction over the entire appeal even if section 814.7 otherwise

limits our authority with respect to specific issues raised in the appeal. See

Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d at 66 (“We may lack authority to consider all issues, but

that is a different matter.”). Thus, when the court of appeals properly found good

cause to address Rutherford’s appeal of his discretionary sentence, see State v.

Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020) (“[G]ood cause exists to appeal from a

conviction following a guilty plea when the defendant challenges . . . a
discretionary sentence that was neither mandatory nor agreed to as part of her
                                         6

plea bargain.”), it had jurisdiction over the entire appeal. Indeed, the court of

appeals exercised that jurisdiction by affirming the district court’s judgment

against Rutherford’s challenge that the district court abused its discretion by not

suspending his sentences in light of his medical condition. We let the court of

appeals decision stand on this issue. See Farnsworth v. State, 982 N.W.2d 128,

135 (Iowa 2022) (“When we grant further review, we may exercise our discretion

to let the court of appeals decision stand as the final decision on particular

issues.” (quoting State v. Fogg, 936 N.W.2d 664, 667 n.1 (Iowa 2019))).

        Having jurisdiction over the appeal, the court of appeals should have also

addressed his challenge to the factual basis supporting his guilty plea. We do so

now.

        II. Rutherford’s Challenge to the Factual Basis to Support His Guilty
Plea.

        Rutherford argues that his guilty plea to the charge of theft in the second

degree is not supported by an adequate factual basis, see generally State v.

Finney, 834 N.W.2d 46, 55–63 (Iowa 2013) (discussing the requirements for

ensuring a guilty plea is supported by a factual basis in the plea record), because

there is no evidence in the record of the plea colloquy that he intended to
permanently deprive the owner of the firearms he took from her home, see Iowa

Code § 714.1 (defining theft alternatives). Even though we have jurisdiction over

Rutherford’s appeal, we must still consider whether we have the authority to

resolve his factual basis challenge.

        Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(3)(a) (2021) requires a defendant to

file a motion in arrest of judgment and bars a defendant from appealing issues

the defendant should have, but did not, raise through that motion. Rutherford

failed to file a motion in arrest of judgment, and he does not dispute that he was
advised of the need to file the motion and the consequences of failing to do so.
                                         7

See Treptow, 960 N.W.2d at 109 (discussing the two exceptions to the appeal bar

in rule 2.24(3)(a)). The only other way around the appeal bar—through an

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim—is seemingly cut off by Iowa Code

section 814.7 and our cases addressing that statute in very similar contexts. See

id. (“Because we have just upheld the constitutionality of section 814.7, this

court is without authority to decide ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on

direct appeal.”); see also State v. Jackson-Douglass, 970 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Iowa

2022) (declining to consider defendant’s claim that his counsel provided

ineffective assistance “in failing to file a motion in arrest of judgment to undo the

guilty plea” for lack of authority pursuant to Iowa Code § 814.7); State v. Tucker,

959 N.W.2d 140, 154 (Iowa 2021) (“[Under] section 814.7, this court is without

the authority to decide ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal.

Thus, the second exception no longer provides an avenue for relief on direct

appeal.”). Rutherford’s attempt to avoid those cases by challenging the

constitutionality of section 814.7 as applied to his appeal is foreclosed by our

recent cases. See, e.g., Treptow, 960 N.W.2d at 107 (“The right to the effective

assistance of appellate counsel where direct appeal is available does not create

an entitlement to direct appeal as a matter of right and a further entitlement to
present any and all claims on direct appeal as a matter of right.”); id. at 108

(“There is no due process right to present claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel on direct appeal. Due process merely requires an opportunity to present

those claims in some forum.”). Rutherford’s constitutional rights are protected

by his ability to challenge the factual basis for his plea through an ineffective-

assistance claim in postconviction proceedings. See id. (“For half of a century,

Iowa, like most states, has resolved claims of ineffective assistance in

postconviction-relief proceedings and not direct appeal. Iowa Code section 814.7
is consistent with that practice and does not violate due process.”).
                                                8

       Rutherford also attempts to avoid the limits of section 814.7 by arguing

the district court had an independent obligation to ensure his guilty plea was

knowing, voluntary, and supported by a factual basis, which, he asserts, it failed

to do. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b) (“The court . . . shall not accept a plea of

guilty without first determining that the plea is made voluntarily and intelligently

and has a factual basis.”). It is on this basis that he argues his own failure to file

a motion in arrest of judgment should be excused. In State v. Hanes, we recently

rejected a similar argument by a defendant alleging that his failure to file a

motion in arrest of judgment should be excused because rule 2.24(3)(c) allows

the district court to sua sponte arrest judgment upon finding an inadequate

factual basis. See 981 N.W.2d 454, 460 (Iowa 2022).1 “To do so would eviscerate

rule 2.24(3)(a)’s express prohibition on appeals where the defendant has failed

to file a motion in arrest of judgment.” Id. The same holds true of the district

court’s independent obligation under rule 2.8(2)(b) to ensure a factual basis

exists. While rule 2.8(2) imposes an independent obligation on the district court,

the rule also requires the district court to inform the defendant “that any

challenges to a plea of guilty based on alleged defects in the plea proceedings

must be raised in a motion in arrest of judgment and that failure to so raise such
challenges shall preclude the right to assert them on appeal.” Iowa R. Crim. P.

2.8(2)(d). In other words, even if the court fails its independent obligation to

ensure a factual basis, our rules still require the defendant to file a motion in

       1State v. Hanes also forecloses Rutherford’s reliance on State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d

189, 202 (Iowa 2022)—where we held a defendant did not need to file a motion for acquittal to
preserve for appeal a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence following a trial—to argue that
factual basis challenges to a guilty plea should be treated similarly. See 981 N.W.2d at 461
(“Crawford is inapposite . . . . [O]ur rules of criminal procedure demonstrate this distinction by
attaching a specific penalty—a bar to appeal—to a defendant’s failure to file a motion in arrest
of judgment. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(3)(a). By contrast, the rules impose no such penalty on a
defendant who fails to file a motion for judgment of acquittal. See id. r. 2.19(8).”).
                                                9

arrest of judgment in order to preserve the right to make that challenge on direct

appeal.

       Thus, Rutherford might be able to avoid relying on his counsel’s

ineffectiveness in allowing him to plead guilty without a factual basis by pointing

to the district court’s independent obligation to ensure it exists, but there is

another layer to challenging the factual basis on direct appeal: a motion in arrest

of judgment. That brings us back up against what we said in Treptow and

reaffirmed in Hanes: as long as a defendant is adequately informed of the need

to file a motion in arrest of judgment and the consequences for failing to do so,

the only way around that failure is through an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel

claim. Treptow, 960 N.W.2d at 109; Hanes, 981 N.W.2d at 46. And section 814.7

divests our authority to review that claim on direct appeal.2

       We therefore do not reach the merits of Rutherford’s challenge to the

factual basis supporting his guilty plea to theft in the second degree.

       III. Conclusion.

       Rutherford’s judgment of sentence is affirmed.

       DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN
PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
       All justices concur except McDermott, J., who concurs specially.

       2It  is axiomatic that we decide only the case before us. The special concurrence’s
suggestion that we reach the merits of Rutherford’s factual basis claim would create an end run
around the general assembly’s directive in section 814.7 that ineffective-assistance claims be
brought in postconviction proceedings. See Iowa Code § 814.7. As previously noted, the
availability of that proceeding protects Rutherford’s constitutional rights. The concern identified
by the special concurrence for pro se defendants is not before us, and those concerns do not
inform our analysis in this case where Rutherford can pursue his factual basis claim through
postconviction proceedings.
                                         10

                                                     #22–0553, State v. Rutherford

MCDERMOTT, Justice (concurring specially).
      Some twenty years ago, we boldly declared that “under no circumstances

may a conviction upon plea of guilty stand if it appears that the facts of the

charge do not state a violation of the statute under which the charge is made.”

State v. Mitchell, 650 N.W.2d 619, 620 (Iowa 2002) (per curiam). But as the ma-

jority opinion once again demonstrates, our unflinching stance has not aged well.

      Rutherford argues in this appeal that the district court erred in accepting

his guilty plea because the record failed to establish facts to support his theft

conviction. The majority affirms his conviction without addressing the merits,

holding that because Rutherford failed to file a motion in arrest of judgment

under rule 2.24(3)(a), we lack authority to address his claim. Although I agree

with the majority’s conclusion that Rutherford loses this appeal, I respectfully

disagree that his failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment compels that result.

      Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(b) (2021) states that “[t]he court

. . . shall not accept a plea of guilty without first determining that the plea is

made voluntarily and intelligently and has a factual basis.” This rule imposes a

duty on judges. Judges cannot permit defendants, for mistaken reasons or stra-

tegic ones, to plead guilty to a crime having no factual basis. See id. “Endorsing

such strategies,” we have said, “would erode the integrity of all pleas and the

public’s confidence in our criminal justice system.” State v. Hack, 545 N.W.2d

262, 263 (Iowa 1996). “It makes a mockery of the justice system when a defend-

ant is punished for violating a statute that he unquestionably did not violate.”

Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360, 379 (Iowa 2005).

Judges violate the rule when they accept a guilty plea and enter a judgment of
                                         11

conviction even though the facts in the record fail to establish that a defendant

committed the particular crime.

      Rutherford requests that if we refuse to find that he had a right of direct

appeal, we treat his notice of appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari. Iowa Rule

of Appellate Procedure 6.107 states that a party asserting that a district court

judge “exceeded the judge’s jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally” may file a

petition for writ of certiorari in the supreme court. (Emphasis added.) Review

through a grant of certiorari is unnecessary in this case because, as the majority

correctly concludes, we have appellate jurisdiction over the entire case—includ-

ing Rutherford’s challenge to the factual basis—under Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a).

      Rutherford argues that the judge acted illegally by accepting his plea with-

out a factual basis in violation of rule 2.8(2)(b). Whether a factual basis exists for

the guilty plea presents a purely legal challenge to the validity of his guilty plea.

No additional fact-finding is required. “[O]ur first and only inquiry is whether the

record shows a factual basis for [the defendant’s] guilty plea to the charge.” State

v. Schminkey, 597 N.W.2d 785, 788 (Iowa 1999) (en banc). Appellate courts are

unquestionably equipped to read the record made at sentencing and decide

whether it contains a factual basis for the plea.
      The majority declines to decide the merits of Rutherford’s plea challenge

and leaves him to pursue his claim through a civil postconviction-relief lawsuit.

Using postconviction relief to resolve factual basis challenges such as this one

creates waste (unnecessary delay and unnecessary burdens on parties and the

judicial system) with little upside to show for it. And it raises a troubling ques-

tion: What becomes of defendants who are not represented by counsel in these

situations? A defendant can’t claim ineffective assistance of counsel if the de-

fendant had no assistance of counsel. See State v. Hutchison, 341 N.W.2d 33, 42
(Iowa 1983). In such a case, the district court’s erroneous acceptance of a guilty
                                       12

plea would appear to have no remedy, leaving self-represented defendants “des-

tined to serve out their sentences without any means to challenge the spurious

conviction.” State v. Hanes, 981 N.W.2d 454, 466 (Iowa 2022) (McDermott, J.,

dissenting).

      And let’s be clear: Rule 2.24(3)(a)’s requirement that defendants must file

a motion in arrest of judgment before we will consider a plea challenge on appeal

is not inviolate. How do we know? Because we do not require a motion in arrest

of judgment to challenge a guilty plea in cases where a judge fails to advise the

defendant that such a motion is required. See, e.g., State v. Loye, 670 N.W.2d

141, 149–50 (Iowa 2003). Rule 2.8(2)(d) requires the court to “inform the defend-

ant that any challenges to a plea of guilty based on alleged defects in the plea

proceedings must be raised in a motion in arrest of judgment and that failure to

so raise such challenges shall preclude the right to assert them on appeal.” Iowa

R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(d). When the court neglects this duty, we excuse a defendant’s

failure to file a motion in arrest of judgment and will decide in a direct appeal—

on the merits—challenges to a guilty plea. See State v. Oldham, 515 N.W.2d 44,

46 (Iowa 1994). Our hard line requiring motions in arrest of judgment when the

court is alleged to have violated rule 2.8(2)(b) all but disappears when the court
is alleged to have violated subsection d.

      Our court is equipped to resolve the tension that exists in this situation

between rules 2.8(2)(b) and 2.24(3)(a). I would get to the merits of Rutherford’s

challenge to the guilty plea. Based on my review of the sentencing record, I would

affirm the conviction on the merits.

      Rutherford argues that the record fails to establish that he intended to

permanently deprive Melissa Beaudette of two AR-15 rifles that he took from her

home. The plea agreement authorized the district court to review the minutes of
testimony. The minutes stated that Beaudette would testify that “she is the
                                        13

owner of the firearms and that [Rutherford] did not have permission or authority

to deprive her of those firearms.” Beaudette contacted the police to report that

Rutherford “stole two AR-15 rifles and left [her] residence on foot.” When law

enforcement located Rutherford, he had the two firearms and a backpack con-

taining other items that belonged to Beaudette (a watch, notebook, phone card,

and gloves). Rutherford claimed that Beaudette “asked me to get them out of the

house.” But Beaudette asserted that she’d done no such thing and that she

wanted to pursue theft charges.

      From Beaudette’s statements and pursuit of theft charges and Ruther-

ford’s contradictory statements, the district court could infer that Rutherford

fabricated an excuse about having permission to take the firearms. We have rec-

ognized that “[a] false story told by a defendant to explain or deny a material fact

against him is by itself an indication of guilt.” State v. Cox, 500 N.W.2d 23, 25

(Iowa 1993). Rutherford’s written waiver establishes the rest of the factual basis:

“I admit that . . . I took control of property, 2 guns, that were not mine and de-

prived the owner of them.” So although I respectfully disagree with the majority’s

refusal to consider the merits of Rutherford’s appeal, I conclude that the sen-

tencing record provides a factual basis for the plea, and I thus concur with the
majority’s judgment affirming his conviction.