Court Opinion

ID: 9757477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:42:12.585236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:39.555465
License: Public Domain

Marbury, C. J.,
delivered the following dissenting opinion.
The appellant was the tenant of a two-story brick dwelling in the City of Baltimore which was searched by the police under a search warrant issued by one of the judges of the Supreme Bench. After the search, and based upon what was found, the appellant was indicted and convicted on three indictments in the Criminal Court of Baltimore, these indictments charging that he sold *575lottery tickets, kept a room for the purpose of selling lottery tickets, and had lottery tickets in his possession. He appealed from these judgments on the ground that the search warrant was illegal.
The question raised is that the warrant directed the police to enter and search the dwelling, and “to search the pockets of the clothing of all persons found in the premises, or who may enter the premises, for lottery paraphernalia”. It is contended that this is a general warrant and violates the statute authorizing search warrants, Sec. 306 of Article 27, as amended by Chapter 81 of the Acts of 1950. That section authorizes the issuance of warrants “provided that any such search warrant shall name or describe, with reasonable particularity, the individual, building, apartment, premises, place or thing to be searched * * *”. This statute carries out the provision in Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights which declares that “all general warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons, without naming or describing the place, or the person in special, are illegal and ought not to be granted.”
The reason for the prohibition against general warrants contained in our Declaration of Rights, in the Constitution of the United States, and in the constitutions of many other states, has been so frequently and recently discussed by this and many other courts that we think it unnecessary to reiterate. See Bass v. State, 182 Md. 496, 501, 35 A. 2d 155. Asner v. State, 193 Md. 68, 65 A. 2d 881. Suffice it to say that no one’s property or person may be lawfully searched before arrest, unless the safeguards provided by the Declaration of Rights and the Constitution are complied with. A general warrant is one which does not sufficiently specify the place or the persons to be searched.
It is contended by the State that similar warrants to the one before us have been before this court in several cases, and have been sustained. The case of Allen v. State, 178 Md. 269, 13 A. 2d 352, is quoted as holding that a warrant to search two separate buildings is not *576general. The case of Lucich v. State, 194 Md. 511, 71 A. 2d 432, is also urged as a case where the court held that a warrant to search all the buildings located on certain premises, and all persons who may be found on the premises, was not a general warrant. Again, in Asner v. State, supra, the warrant upheld was to enter and search for gambling paraphernalia in an automobile and also in a filling station. In all of these cases, the question was whether the designation of one or more buildings or locations made a warrant general, and, in view of the connection between the different places to be searched in each case, we disallowed the contentions. The warrants upheld were primarily directed toward buildings, or in the one case, an automobile, and the further direction to search all persons found on the premises was not attacked at all, and no point was made that the addition of those words made the warrants general warrants. In the case before us, however, a direct attack is made on the words used as to persons; These words, as we have already shown, not only authorize the search of all persons found on the premises, but all those who may enter the premises.
We cannot treat these words as surplusage or separable, because an officer, armed with a warrant, is obligated to carry out the instructions contained in that warrant, and he must therefore not only search the building, but all the persdns mentioned in the warrant: There can be no objection to a warrant which, directed mainly at a building, requires the search of all persons found therein who are engaged in the suspected criminal activities. We have held that a warrant to arrest all persons on the premises “participating in the bookmaking activity” is not general in its scope. Smith v. State, 191 Md. 329, 340, 62 A. 2d 287, 5 A. L. R. 2d 386.
The warrant in this case is directed to the whole world, or, at least, to that portion of it which may, during the time the officers are in the premises, enter those premises for any purpose whatever. It would not be more general if it were directed to all persons found on the *577street in front of the premises. The officers are directed “to search the pockets of the clothing of all persons * * * who may enter the premises”. That would include a postman who might be delivering the United States mail, a doctor who might have been called to attend someone who is ill, a minister who might be paying a pastoral visit, a plumber or other workman who has been called to remedy some defect in the building, or even a lawyer called after the entry in order to protect the rights of those in the property. None of these is immune from search, and, in fact, if the officers carry out the wording of the warrant, they are obliged to search them all.
In the case of DeAngelo v. State, 199 Md. 48, 85 A. 2d 468, we had before us a case where the police, operating under a search warrant, attempted to search a man who came in the door after they were in the premises. The man declined to permit it, and thereupon he was arrested and taken to the police station and searched there. Since no obvious misdemeanor was committed in the officer’s presence, the search was held unlawful as not being incident to a lawful arrest. The search warrant commanded the officer to bring in “all other persons who may be found participating in said lottery”, but we said this did not cover the accused who, so far as the evidence disclosed, was not participating in the lottery on the premises. Had the warrant in that case been the same as that in the instant case, the officer would have been authorized to arrest DeAngelo, and the evidence found on him would have been admissible. The warrant in the instant case, if held good, will change the rule of law which permits an arrest for a misdemeanor only where one is seen by the officer, or where he has a warrant for the arrest of an individual specifically charged. For this salutary rule, there will be substituted the right to arrest under a warrant which does not specify the parties to be arrested, and does not require that they be engaged in any illegal activities. Such a warrant does not describe “the person in special”, *578as provided-by- the Constitution,- or. “with reasonable particularity”, as required by the statute. -
.. The mere -fact that.-the appellant was-, not .a .person entering, the dwelling during the search, • does .not ,-prer vent him from-raising the question -of the validity; of the.wajrant as a whole. • He -was in possession of.the premises, and, if the warrant , was bad,, he was injured by the evidence procured under it and offered in his trial. Search warrants are strictly construed (Cornelius on Search and Seizure, 2nd-Ed., Secs. 181(97), 184 (109)), and are void as a, whole if,- in. any important particular, they violate the- statute. See Howard v. State, 199 Md. 529, 87 A. 2d 161. The instant warrant does- violate the statute, and should not be upheld, . The appellant’s motion to quash should have been granted.