Court Opinion

ID: 9791010
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:03:12.148387+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:33.337445
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
It is difficult for me to reconcile the principle of justice under the law with the concept that court procedure is like a machine which rolls so blindly and inexorably on that neither the trial court nor this court is able to rectify what impresses me as an obvious injustice. I say this because the effect of this decision is to take away from the plaintiff, a 10-year-old boy, a special verdict in which the jury found he had suffered damages in the sum of $736.80 actual expenses (special damages) and $2500 general damages which I think it fair to assume that they intended and believed he was to receive.
The question arises: Why not enter judgment on that verdict? The answer is that there is an inconsistency because they found plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence. The next question arises: Which verdict of the jury should prevail? Wouldn’t it be just as logical to honor the-verdict favoring the plaintiff and ignore *300'th'e verdict favoring the defendant as vice vérsa? Ih view of such conflict it seems 'to me unfair that the special verdicts fa-Vo'ring the plaintiff should be ignored and those favoring the defendant given effect. T would agree that the reverse is likewise true. From the facts that after finding the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence, and that it proximately caused his injury, the jury proceeded to determine and award him the damages above mentioned, the logical conclusion is that the jury was confused by the various special verdicts submitted.
In addition to the foregoing, and even 'more important, is the fact that I cannot see any basis whatsoever in the evidence to justify submitting 'the question of plaintiff’s negligence to the jury. It is my 'opinion that in observing his older brother, i who preceded him under the wire, and in making inquiry before he attempted to pass, he exercised at least the degree of care which a boy ten years of age should be expected to observe, (The main opinion makes no suggestion to the contrary). It was therefore error for the defendant to request, and for the trial court to submit, the issue of the plaintiffs contributory negligence to the jury.
In fairness to the decision of this court, T müst concede that the main opinion is correct as to these aspects of procedure: (1) that plaintiffs requested instruction No. 12 did deal with the duty of care imposed upon a child, which would seem to indicate an assumption on the part of plaintiff’s counsel that the issue of plaintiffs contributory negligence would be submitted; (2) that he did not make a motion for a directed verdict on that issue; (3) nor did he ask for a new trial. Nevertheless, under the particular circumstances of this case, I do not think that the trial court and this court should consider themselves powerless to rectify an injustice.
My conclusion is consistent with the spirit and purpose of our rules of procedure.
Rule 1(a), U.R.C.P., provides in part that:
* * * they shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action;
and Rule 51 states that:
* * Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement, [stating objections and the grounds therefor] the appellate court, in its discretion and in the interests of justice, may review the giving or failure to give an instructon.
There is both text and case law supporting this practical view of doing justice.1
*301For the reasons discussed above: (1-) there was an obvious impropriety in giving the instruction and in submitting the question of the plaintiff’s contributory negligence where there was no evidence to justify doing so; (2) the special verdicts arrived at were themselves inconsistent; which (3) seem to indicate that the jury was confused by the verdicts, it is my opinion that the interests of justice would best be served by remanding this case for a retrial upon all issues.

. -See 4 G.J.S. Appeal and Error § 332, p. 1077, noting- exception to the general rule, " ‘stktiñg-'that," “notwithstanding the ab-senee of exceptions in the trial court, alleged errors in submitting issues to a jury may be considered on appeal when *301required in the interest of justice.” Citing, N. Y. Con. R. R. Co. v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 184 N.Y.S. 243, 193 App.Div. 438, affirmed 135 N.E. 912, 233 N.Y. 547, wherein the court states that “if it was error to submit to a jury a question of the defendant insurer’s liability * * * the appellate court may reverse under its plenary power, although no exception toas taken below, * * * because a fair trial was not had.” And cf. Sutton v. Otis Elevator Co., 68 Utah 85, 249 P. 437, where the court held that in special circumstances in the interest of justice failure to give proper instructions was reviewable an appeal, though no such instructions were requested.