Court Opinion

ID: 9580317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:03:59.443567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:12.329386
License: Public Domain

BIEGELMEIER, Judge
(dissenting).
Albers v. Ottenbacher, 1962, 79 S.D. 637, 116 N.W.2d 529, held violation of the statute requiring brakes to be in good working order without legal excuse constituted negligence in itself and the court erred in -submitting that issue to the jury, and in. Grob v. Hahn, 1963, 80 S.D. 271, 122 N.W.2d 460, passing a carat an intersection contrary to statute was negligence as a matter of law and a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's injuries requiring a directed verdict for defendant who had also negligently turned left without a signal. The facts as to defendant's negligence here are from his own testimony. He turned left over 20 feet north of the stop sign which was two feet north of Highway 44 or over 30 feet north (and to the left) of the center of the intersection. If this was an automobile 18 or 20 feet long we would declare this negligence as a matter of law without hesitation and direct that it not be an issue for the jury to determine. Defendant is to be saved from this only by his claim it was impossible for him to make the left turn with his truck as required by SDC 44.0316 and thus is excused from compliance therewith.
There are two reasons why this contention cannot be sustained. "The fact or facts which will excuse a violation of a statute or ordinance, however, must result from causes or things beyond the control of the person charged with the violation." 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 19(8), pages 640-641 where our Albers case is cited twice. Did defendant's evidence meet this test? A true application of this rule is in Gigliotti v. New York, Chicago & *92St. Louis R. Co., 107 Ohio App. 174, 157 N.E.2d 447, where the statute required a signal by whistle 80 rods from the crossing. The evidence was the whistle was sounded 33 feet from the highway while the engine was standing in a waterworks yard where it had dropped some cars. The railroad spur was not 80; rods long and the engine was never, and could never, be that far from the crossing. There performance was impossible and the statute could not be applied.
McConnell v. Herron, 1965, 240 Or. 486, 402 P.2d 726, is from the same court as Nettleton v. Jones, 212 Or. 375, 319 P.2d 879, which our court cited in Albers. The final question the court considered in McConnell was whether the offered proof measured up to the kind of evidence which would constitute a lawful excuse to violate the statute, there — failure to keep brakes in good working order. As to the offer to show the driver hit a bump crossing a ditch which caused his brakes to fail the court said:
"We hold only that unless a party can show impossibility of compliance, regardless of the degree of care, or that his failure to comply with the statute was caused by circumstances over which he had no control, he has not tendered a valid excuse. An offer of proof, to be received as a possible excuse, must contain facts which, if true, would show that compliance with the statute was clearly impossible, regardless of the degree of care, or was prevented by circumstances wholly beyond the party's control. No such facts were tendered in the case at bar." (Emphasis supplied)
Defendant's testimony does not entitle him to this excuse. As he testified, he had made this turn "Several hundred times" driving this truck and gave his opinion (after the trial court had denied similar evidence to the contrary by the sheriff) it was impossible for him to make the turn around the center of the intersection as the statute requires. This inability, if true, was of his own making and, if permitted, excuses him day after day from making a legal turn — or conversely approves and condones a constant exemption from the statute and denies its protec*93üon to others lawfully using the highway. No one should be permitted to drive a motor vehicle that cannot be operated on the highways as required by statute — be it as to inability to make a legal turn, without brakes or lights, etc.' — and claim excuse.
Secondly, the exhibits, photos and plat repudiate the opinion he expressed. They are physical proof he could have made a turn to the south of the three cars parked in the intersection in Exhibit 3; that exhibit shows the tracks of one of the autos making almost a U-turn on only a part of the intersection. These reasons require me ,to dissent.