Court Opinion

ID: 9782507
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 18:53:28.908453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:03.735662
License: Public Domain

DAVIS, Presiding Judge
(concurring in the result):
1 19 I agree with the majority opinion that Hurt failed to challenge-either legally or factually-the district court's ruling that he consented to the search conducted by Officer Wurtz. Accordingly, I concur in the result reached in the case. However, I write sepa*276rately because had the adequacy of Hurt's consent been properly pursued on appeal, I would likely reach a different result.
T20 It is well settled that "(while the Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, it does not expressly preclude using evidence obtained in violation of its commands." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 47, 63 P.3d 650 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, even if police illegally detain a defendant-which we have determined did not occur in this case-"evidence obtained during a subsequent search may nevertheless be admitted if the person gave valid consent to the search." Id. In other words, even had we concluded that Hurt was illegally seized after the driver was arrested, see generally State v. Baker, 2008 UT App 115, ¶ 13, 182 P.3d 935, cert. granted, 199 P.3d 367 (Utah 2008), evidence of the contents of his eyeglass case "may [have] be[en] admitted if [he] gave valid consent to the search." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 47, 63 P.3d 650.
{21 A person validly consents to the search of their property if "(1) [tlhe consent was given voluntarily, and (2) the consent was not obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality." Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). While the determination of whether a person consented to a search presents a factual question, the voluntariness of that consent "is a legal conclusion, which is reviewed for correctness." Id. §51. "Consent is not voluntary if it is obtained as 'the product of duress or coercion, express or implied?" State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ¶ 47, 37 P.3d 1073 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)).
Factors indicating a lack of duress or coercion, which should be assessed in the totality of all the surrounding cireumstances, include, "1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers; 2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; 8) a mere request to search; 4) cooperation by the owner of the [property]; and 5) the absence of deception or trick on the part of the officer."
Id. (alteration in original) (additional quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). Pursuant to these factors, the district court concluded, as a matter of law, that Hurt had validly consented to the search.1 The district also made factual findings supporting this conclusion-which findings we must accept because Hurt has not properly challenged them on appeal, see State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ¶ 60, 28 P.3d 1278 (setting forth marshaling requirements). However, for the following reasons, I remain unconvinced that under the cireumstances of this case, Hurt voluntarily consented to the search.
122 First, at the time Hurt purportedly consented to the search, the driver of the car in which he was a passenger had been arrested on outstanding warrants and Hurt had been ordered to exit the car so that the car could be searched incident to that arrest. Second, three other officers besides Officer Wurtz arrived separately and were present at the scene while Hurt was being searched. Third, although not required, it does not appear that Officer Wurtz informed Hurt that he could refuse consent, see generally Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 59 n. 6, 68 P.3d 650 (noting that "officer[s] who include[ ] such a warning in [their] request for consent undoubtedly present[] a stronger case for a finding of voluntariness in a suppression hearing" (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Finally, when Officer Wurtz inquired about Hurt driving the car home, Hurt acknowledged that he did not have a driver license in his possession; a subsequent license check confirmed that Hurt did not have a valid license and, therefore, could not legally drive the car from the scene.2 Had the issue of consent *277been properly pursued on appeal, I would have concluded that these facts, when considered under a totality of the circumstances, see Bisner, 2001 UT 99, ¶ 47, 37 P.3d 1073, implied to Hurt that he was not free to refuse consent to the search of his eyeglass case and, therefore, his consent was not voluntary.

. As the majority correctly points out, "Hurt's appellate brief fails to even acknowledge the district court's [legal conclusion that Hurt consented to the search], much less present any reasoned argument or authority against it." Supra 116.

. The trial court also found that Hurt had his dog in the car at the time of the stop and that the dog had been retrieved by officers at the scene. It is unclear from the briefing whether and when the dog had been returned to Hurt. While certainly not dispositive, whether Hurt's personal property had been returned would factor into the volun-*277tariness of his consent, cf. State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ¶ 40, 63 P.3d 650 (" '[Aln encounter initiated by a traffic stop may not be deemed consensual unless the driver's documents have been returned to him.' " (quoting United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 979 (10th Cir.1996))).