Court Opinion

ID: 9775253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:51:56.844219+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:24.030006
License: Public Domain

John I. Purtle, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the majority in this case for reasons to be set out below. The problem presented to the court is whether Act 705 of 1979 as amended is applicable to the present facts. We are particularly concerned with that part of the code designated as Ark. Stat, Ann. § 34-1214 (Supp. 1981). Section (A) of the Act provides that all marital property shall be distributed one-half to each party unless the court finds such division to be inequitable. The criteria for distribution of marital property, in case equal division is inequitable, are set out in § (A) (1). Section (A) (2) of the Act provides: All other property shall be returned to the party who owned it prior to the marriage unless the court shall make some other division that the court deems equitable taking into consideration those factors enumerated in subparagraph (A) above, in which event the court must state in writing its basis and reasons for not returning the property to the party who owned it at the time of the marriage. Section (B) provides: For the purpose of this statute “marital property” means all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage except: (1) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent; (2) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;... I see nothing ambiguous about the language of the above-quoted statute. It is quite obvious that the legislature intended that one party would not be allowed to pull a shenanigan on the other simply by marrying, getting property transferred into his name, and then shucking the spouse for someone else. Any interpretation other than the plain language of the statute requires a little bit of judicial legislation and a fertile imagination. Let us look at what the husband said about how the property was acquired. He stated: ... I did not contribute a dime to the purchase of the real property. Every dime that was put into the real property we acquired during the marriage was received from her inheritance from her father. I never made a house payment from my funds. *** I was in the used car sales business and the money that financed the business came from my wife’s guardianship estate left to her by her father. All of the money came from my wife’s guardianship estate. *** The only income I had was from the business of selling autos and she furnished the money for that. I lost money and got out of the business and there was money left which I paid bills with. *** I’d say her money was my money, that’s the way I looked at it. I came out of the business with the Corvette and I paid 55 for it and spent well over $1500 fixing it up. I have it in my possession now and it is titled in both our names. *** The only thing I had when we got married was a cár and I couldn’t even tell you what car that was. I believe it was a ’76 Cutlass and my wife helped pay for it, it just came out of the account. ... After the parties were separated the husband went to Texas where he obtained employment for a salary netting him $250 per week. During this time he was living with his girlfriend in Texas and helping pay the rent, utilities and some of the groceries. Between the temporary hearing and order of October 10,1979, and the final hearing in November 1980 the appellee paid only $61 child support, creating a delinquency of $1677.50. These parties were married in January 1978 and separated in September 1979- They were ages 17 and 19 at the time of the marriage. The only reason Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1215 (Supp. 1981) remains on the books is to convert tenancy by the entirety to tenancy in common in case the chancellor fails to make a ruling as to that particular property. § 34-1215 is the codification of Act 340 of 1947, as amended by Act 457 of 1975. Act 705 is the latest legislative action and should take precedence over the earlier law in case of a conflict. The purpose of Act 705 was to bring our divorce statutes in line with our decisions and to update the law. The majority opinion is a step backwards. It is contrary to the trend in Arkansas divorce law and infringes into the rights of the legislature. I would follow the plain language of Act 705 and thereby prevent the appellee from enjoying the mistakes his former wife made.