Court Opinion

ID: 9765376
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:01:26.445022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:09.442964
License: Public Domain

NIX, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I have long been inclined to discard the well-established rule in this Commonwealth that a prior inconsistent statement may not be used as substantive evidence, and have urged the wisdom of the modern rule. Therefore, I am pleased to see that the Court has now altered its position.
I am compelled to write separately, however, to express my concern about the jurisprudential precedent being set in this case. Our prior rule was settled law and had been reaffirmed even in recent pronouncements. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Waller, 498 Pa. 33, 444 A.2d 653 (1982); Commonwealth v. Gee, 467 Pa. 123, 354 A.2d 875 (1976); Commonwealth v. Tucker, 452 Pa. 584, 307 A.2d 245 (1973). The trial court was therefore bound to apply it, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Schaller, 493 Pa. 426, 426 A.2d 1090 (1981); Commonwealth v. Mason, 456 Pa. 602, 322 A.2d *136357 (1974); Commonwealth v. Provident Trust Co. of Philadelphia, 319 Pa. 385, 180 A. 16 (1935), and its decision to ignore controlling precedent should not be allowed to pass without comment.
Although the concerns that the exclusion of the prior statement as substantive evidence would severely jeopardize the prosecution’s case and that an acquittal would preclude review of the issue are understandable, those concerns do not justify the course taken by the trial court. An appropriate avenue of appellate review was, in fact, available. The Commonwealth’s pretrial application to rule the prior statement admissible should have been denied. The Commonwealth could have then petitioned for permission to appeal from that interlocutory order, and obtained the trial court’s certification that the evidentiary issue was controlling. 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b); Pa.R.A.P. 1311. Thus a determination by an appellate court could have been obtained before trial and without willful disregard for the binding decisions of this Court.
The Court today condones the trial court’s actions, accepting its “invitation” to change the law. Regardless of how laudable the trial court’s intentions may have been, however, its unauthorized refusal to apply existing law cannot be tolerated. To permit such a practice will throw the administration of justice and the expectations of litigants into utter confusion.