Court Opinion

ID: 9543036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:41:33.648024+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:35.557008
License: Public Domain

HALLEY, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it sustains the demurrer to the evidence on behalf of the First National Building Corporation. I dissent from its so doing as to the defendant F. E. Reid, the owner and operator of the Rainbow Room.
In my opinion, the writer of the majority opinion has overlooked important evidence in this case, and also has disregarded a previous decision of this court on a similar state of facts. The Rainbow Room is situated in the heart of Oklahoma City, at the top of the First National Building, and it is uncontroverted that it holds itself out for the purpose of furnishing food to its customers, and also furnishes setups for drinks and has a place where its patrons may dance. On this particular evening on which the plaintiff was injured, the employees who worked in the same department with him at Tinker Field were having an office party, and forty or fifty of his friends were in attendance at this party on that particular night. It is understood that they went there to enjoy themselves and have a good time. The customers were transported to the 30th floor by elevators. After 12:30, the elevators did not go to the 30th floor, and the customers had to go down to the 29th floor to get on the elevator. On this particular evening, about 12 o’clock two ladies who were in the party with the plaintiff had occasion to go to the ladies’ rest room, located on the landing between the 30th and the 29th floors, and when they started down the stairway they found a slippery substance, undoubtedly vomit, on the steps. I quote from the evidence of the witness Julia Welch:
“Well, about the steps going down, there was something scattered on the steps, I couldn’t tell whether it had been dropped, or someone had become ill, so I held on to the steps, the railing, and for fear of falling, and then when I came back, I did the same thing, and as I went around the elevator, or around to the, — and going back to the party, there was a colored porter there, and I told him that he should mop those steps or have it done, on account of someone might hurt themselves.”
I also set out the evidence on this point of Mrs. Anita McDermott:
“When I started down the steps, I noticed that there was something on the steps about the second or third step, and I made the remark to Mrs. Welch,— (interrupted). Mr. Brown: Object to the remark as hearsay. The Court: Yes; sustained. Q. You did observe something on the steps? A. Yes; I did. Q. And you went on down? A. I went on down, I held to the handle. Q. Now, at about what time would you say that was? A. That was about a quarter to twelve; well, between a quarter to twelve and twelve o’clock.”
The testimony of the plaintiff showed that when he left at about 12:30 there was a sign directing people to go down the stairway to the 29th floor, and that when he reached about the second or third step, he slipped and lost his balance and fell head-first down the stairway. The witness Harry Johnson testified that he had taken possibly three step down the stairs when the plaintiff, who was directly behind him, struck his left shoulder, and that the witness attempted to arrest the plain*35tiff’s fall but was unable to do so. In my opinion, the evidence is sufficiently definite to establish the fact that the plaintiff fell at the very spot on the steps where the two lady witnesses testified there was a slippery substance not more than 45 minutes before. It would be reasonable for a jury to infer that the slippery condition existing 45 minutes before continued up to the time that the plaintiff fell.
The facts in this case are just as strong as the facts in S. H. Kress & Co. v. Maddox, 201 Okla. 190, 203 P. 2d 706, decided March 8, 1949, where a verdict was permitted to stand against Kress & Co. for injuries sustained in a fall upon the floor of a retail store in Ardmore. In that case, the evidence of the previous condition of the floor was by a Mr. and Mrs. Henry, who testified that they were in the store during the latter part of August and that the floor was heavily oiled, in fact, covered with oil, and there were puddles of oil on the floor; that a Negro boy was spreading the oil out with a kind of apparatus; that on the same day, and not more than an hour after they were in the store, they heard that someone had fallen therein, and that the newspaper, Ardmoreite, of that evening or the following evening, disclosed that Mrs. Maddox was the one who fell. The court made this statement:
“By reason of its nature, the condition testified to was admissible as tending to show the condition existing at the time of the fall, and the weight thereof was a question for the jury to be considered along with the other evidence pertinent thereto.”
I do not believe there is anything to distinguish that case from the one at bar, and certainly, if that case was permitted to go to the jury, the case at bar should be. This court has been liberal in permitting cases to go to the jury on similar injuries in business establishments. I call attention to Owen v. Kitterman, 178 Okla. 483, 62 P. 2d 1193; Halliburton-Abbott Co. v. Granberry, 179 Okla. 522, 66 P. 2d 505; Safeway Stores v. Whitehead, 190 Okla. 464, 125 P. 2d 194.
It has long been the rule in this state that a demurrer to the evidence admits all the facts which the evidence in the slightest degree tends to prove, and all inferences and conclusions which may be reasonably and logically drawn therefrom, and it is error to sustain such a demurrer unless there is an entire absence of proof tending to show a right to recover. See Davis v. Curry, 192 Okla. 32, 133 P. 2d 186; Criterion Theatre Corp. v. Starns, 194 Okla. 624, 154 P. 2d 92; Nelson, Adm’r, v. Wasteka Oil Co., 196 Okla. 439, 165 P. 2d 637; Adams v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 187 Okla. 478, 103 P. 2d 526; Campbell v. Peery, 186 Okla. 51, 96 P. 2d 22.
We have held many times that where reasonable men might differ as to the facts established and from the inference to be drawn therefrom, the question of negligence is one for the jury. City of Enid v. Smith, 167 Okla. 381, 29 P. 2d 765; Wisdom v. Bernhardt, 170 Okla. 385, 40 P. 2d 679; Casualty Reciprocal Exchange v. Sutfin, 196 Okla. 567, 166 P. 2d 434.
I respectfully submit that there was sufficient evidence in this case to entitle the plaintiff to go to the jury. I dissent from the majority opinion in sustaining the demurrer to the evidence of the defendant Reid.