Court Opinion

ID: 9494662
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:43:41.217622+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:32.777450
License: Public Domain

BRISCOE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur. Applying the Tuscarora/Co-eur d’Alene analytical framework outlined in Judge Murphy’s dissent, which I believe to be controlling in this case,1 the outcome, *1201in my view, turns on the effect of § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. Although the Supreme Court has characterized § 8(a)(3) as “arti-culatpng] a national policy that certain union-security agreements are valid as a matter of federal law,” Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, Int’l Union v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407, 416, 96 S.Ct. 2140, 48 L.Ed.2d 736 (1976), the Court has also made it clear that § 8(a)(3) was not intended by Congress to be preemptive. See id. at 417, 96 S.Ct. 2140 (noting § 14(b) of the NLRA “was designed to make clear that § 8(a)(3) left the States free to pursue their own more restrictive policies in the matter of union-security agreements”) (internal quotations omitted); Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 101, 84 S.Ct. 219, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963) (noting § 14(b) of the NLRA was enacted to “mak[e] clear and unambiguous the purpose of Congress not to preempt the field”); see also Algo-ma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 301, 307, 69 S.Ct. 584, 93 L.Ed. 691 (1949) (describing the predecessor to § 8(a)(3) as “merely disclaim[ing] a national policy hostile to the closed shop or other forms of union-security agreement”). Based upon these statements, I therefore agree with the majority that § 8(a)(3) does not preempt tribes from enacting right-to-work laws for business conducted on their reservations.

. I agree with Judge Murphy that the majority "offers no logical, precedential, or authoritative support" for its attempt to draw a distinction between a tribe's proprietary and sovereign interests. Dis. at 1204.