Court Opinion

ID: 9893628
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-28 00:00:28.499002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:42.842147
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-20456     Document: 00516947764        Page: 1    Date Filed: 10/27/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                       Fifth Circuit
                               ____________                          FILED
                                                              October 27, 2023
                                No. 22-20456
                                                                Lyle W. Cayce
                               ____________
                                                                     Clerk
   Rogelio Lopez Munoz

                                                                          Plaintiff,

                                     versus

   Intercontinental Terminals Company, L.L.C.,

                                                                      Defendant,
   ---------------------------------------------------------------

   Texas Aromatics, L.P.,

                                                          Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                     versus

   Intercontinental Terminals Company, L.L.C.,

                                                         Defendant—Appellee,
   ------------------------------------------------------------------
   Rio Energy International, Incorporated,

                                                          Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                     versus

   Intercontinental Terminals Company, L.L.C.,

                                                          Defendant—Appellee,
Case: 22-20456     Document: 00516947764        Page: 2     Date Filed: 10/27/2023

   --------------------------------------------------------------------
   Gunvor USA, L.L.C.,

                                                            Plaintiff -Appellant,

                                     versus

   Intercontinental Terminals Company, L.L.C.,

                                                         Defendant—Appellee,
   ------------------------------------------------------------------
   Castleton Commodities Merchant Trading L.P.;
   Castleton Commodities Merchant Asia Company Pte,
   Limited,

                                                          Plaintiffs—Appellants,
                                     versus

   Intercontinental Terminals Company, L.L.C.,

                                                         Defendant—Appellee,
   ------------------------------------------------------------------
   Stolt Tankers, B.V.,

                                                           Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                     versus

   Intercontinental Terminals Company, L.L.C.,

                                                         Defendant—Appellee,
   ------------------------------------------------------------------
   Petredec Trading (U.S.), Incorporated,

                                                           Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                     versus

   Intercontinental Terminals Company, L.L.C.,

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Case: 22-20456           Document: 00516947764              Page: 3       Date Filed: 10/27/2023

                                                  Defendant—Appellee.
                        ______________________________

                        Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the Southern District of Texas
                         USDC Nos. 4:19-CV-1460, 4:20-CV-1387,
                               4:20-CV-1863, 4:20-CV-1867,
                                4:20-CV-1930, 4:21-CV-846,
                                       4:22-CV-201
                        ______________________________

   Before Jolly, Southwick, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   E. Grady Jolly, Circuit Judge:

              The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA”) 1 and Comprehensive
   Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
   (“CERCLA”)2 both create comprehensive remedial schemes that apportion
   liability for the costs of removing environmental pollutants. But OPA, unlike
   CERCLA, expressly allows for recovery of purely economic losses. Liability
   under both statutes depends on the type of pollutant released into the
   environment. As its title suggests, OPA deals only with oil, while CERCLA
   deals with “hazardous substances.”

              But which statute governs when oil is mixed with hazardous
   substances? That is the question in this case.

              In March of 2019, Intercontinental Terminals Company, LLC
   (“ITC”) spilled a mixture of oil and hazardous substances into the Houston

              _____________________
   1
       Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33
   U.S.C.).
   2
       Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 33, and
   42 U.S.C.).

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   Ship Channel. In response to the spill, Plaintiffs filed this suit against ITC,
   which seeks economic loss damages under OPA.3 Their OPA claims rest on
   one argument: that OPA’s definition of “oil” includes mixtures of oil and
   CERCLA-regulated hazardous substances.

             The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
   defendant, holding that the mixed spill containing oil and hazardous
   substances is not “oil” as defined by OPA. Consequently, it dismissed each
   of the Plaintiffs’ complaints. For the reasons set out below, we AFFIRM the
   judgment of the district court.

                                                 I.

                                                A.

             Because this case involves the interplay of OPA and CERCLA, we
   provide a brief overview of the two statutes before turning to the facts and
   procedural history.

             In 1980, Congress enacted CERCLA. See OHM Remediation Servs. v.
   Evans Cooperage Co., 116 F.3d 1574, 1578 (5th Cir. 1997). Its purpose is to
   facilitate the cleanup of hazardous substances that have been released into
   the environment and to shift the costs of the environmental response to those
   responsible for such a release. Id. To effectuate that purpose, CERCLA
   allows private parties to bring cost-recovery claims against responsible

             _____________________
   3
       The parties to this appeal asserted exclusively OPA claims in their complaints. They are
   Texas Aromatics, L.P., Rio Energy International, Inc., Gunvor USA, L.L.C., Castleton
   Commodities Merchant Trading, L.P., Castleton Commodities Merchant Asia Co. Pte.,
   Petredec Trading (U.S.) Inc., and Stolt Tankers, B.V. We will call them “Plaintiffs.”

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                                    No. 22-20456

   parties for the costs associated with responding to the release of “hazardous
   substance[s].” See Uniroyal Chem. Co. v. Deltech Corp., 160 F.3d 238, 242
   (5th Cir. 1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)), modified on reh’g, 160 F.3d 238
   (5th Cir. 1999). Thus, liability under CERCLA depends on what constitutes
   a “hazardous substance.”

          CERCLA defines “hazardous substance” by reference to substances
   listed under various other federal statutes. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). But
   CERCLA expressly excludes from its “hazardous substance” definition
   “petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not
   otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance.” Id. This
   exclusion is known as the “petroleum exclusion.” E.g., Ctr. for Biological
   Diversity, Inc. v. BP Am. Prod. Co., 704 F.3d 413, 428 n.4 (5th Cir. 2013).

          Ten years after CERCLA was enacted, and in the wake of the Exxon
   Valdez oil spill, Congress passed OPA in an effort “to streamline federal law
   so as to provide quick and efficient cleanup of oil spills, compensate victims
   of such spills, and internalize the costs of spills within the petroleum
   industry.” Rice v. Harken Expl. Co., 250 F.3d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing
   S. Rep. No. 101-94, at 1–2 (1989), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722,
   723). To that end, OPA, like CERCLA, creates a comprehensive scheme that
   governs and apportions liability for the costs of responding to oil spills. See
   Savage Servs. Corp. v. United States, 25 F.4th 925, 931 (11th Cir. 2022). OPA
   imposes strict liability on parties responsible for the discharge of oil in
   Section 1002(a) of the statute, codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a). That section
   provides the following:

          [E]ach responsible party for . . . a facility from which oil is
          discharged, or which poses the substantial threat of a discharge
          of oil, into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining

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          shorelines . . . is liable for the removal costs and damages
          specified in [Section 2702(b)] that result from such incident.

   33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (emphasis added). Thus, liability under OPA is limited
   to the discharge or “substantial threat of a discharge” of “oil.” OPA defines
   “oil” as:

          oil of any kind or in any form, including petroleum, fuel oil,
          sludge, oil refuse, and oil mixed with wastes other than dredged
          spoil, but does not include any substance which is specifically
          listed or designated as a hazardous substance under
          subparagraphs (A) through (F) of section 101(14) of the
          Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
          Liability Act [(CERCLA)] (42 U.S.C. [§] 9601) and which is
          subject to the provisions of that Act[.]

   33 U.S.C. § 2701(23) (emphasis added). As one can see, OPA’s definition of
   “oil” explicitly excludes substances covered by CERCLA in its “hazardous
   substance” exclusion.

          Critically here, as we have noted, OPA, unlike CERCLA, allows
   injured parties to recover economic losses resulting from oil spills. Id. §
   2702(b)(2)(E).

                                         B.

          Against this statutory backdrop, we return to the case at hand.
   Intercontinental Terminals Company (“ITC”) operates a chemical-storage
   facility at Deer Park, Texas. On March 17, 2019, a fire broke out at that
   facility. As emergency crews worked to control the fire, various tank
   products, fire water, and firefighting foam accumulated in ITC’s secondary

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                                    No. 22-20456

   containment area. The secondary containment area was enclosed by ITC’s
   “secondary containment wall surrounding the tank farm.” But on March 22,
   2019, damage to the secondary containment wall caused it to collapse
   partially, resulting in the discharge of an estimated 470,000 to 523,000
   barrels of the following products: fire water, firefighting aqueous film forming
   foams, benzene, ethylbenzene, naphtha, xylene, toluene, pyrolysis gas, and
   refined oils. Those unwelcomed products ultimately entered the Houston
   Ship Channel (“HSC”). Jumping into action, the Coast Guard temporarily
   restricted traffic on a portion of the HSC.

          The EPA coordinated response efforts with federal and state agencies,
   including the Coast Guard and Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
   (“TCEQ”). The agencies involved with the spill clean-up determined that,
   of the 50 chemicals released, 17 were “hazardous substances” under
   CERCLA, and five were “oils” under OPA. Because the spill contained both
   hazardous substances and oil, the EPA initially opened a “CERCLA fund”
   and the Coast Guard opened an account with the Oil Spill Liability Trust
   Fund (“OSLTF”) administered under OPA. Later, sampling by the TCEQ
   confirmed that the spill was oil mixed with hazardous substances. And as a
   result, the EPA and Coast Guard determined that the spill was a CERCLA
   incident. Thus, the Coast Guard closed the OSTLF account and transferred
   response costs to the CERCLA fund.

          Once the response costs were transferred to the CERCLA fund, some
   claimants unsuccessfully applied for compensation from the Coast Guard’s
   National Pollution Fund Center (“NPFC”), which administers the OSLTF.
   In denying those claims, the NPFC concluded that the mixed spill of both
   CERCLA-regulated hazardous substances and OPA oil fell within
   CERCLA’s definition of hazardous substances and therefore was excluded
   from OPA’s definition of oil. Other claimants sued ITC under OPA, alleging

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                                    No. 22-20456

   economic losses due to interruptions of their business activities caused by
   closures of the HSC.

          On April 17, 2020, Texas Aromatics filed its complaint against ITC
   and asserted two claims exclusively under OPA: (1) monetary damages for
   violations of OPA and (2) declaratory relief that OPA applies. Several other
   parties filed substantially identical complaints, which the district court
   consolidated herein.

          ITC and Plaintiffs agreed that resolving the threshold issue of OPA’s
   applicability would save time and expense. And so, in the early stages of the
   proceeding, the parties jointly filed a motion for leave to allow ITC to file a
   motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all OPA claims. The court
   granted the motion for leave. On September 4, 2020, ITC filed its motion for
   summary judgment limited to the issue of OPA’s applicability. ITC argued
   that OPA did not apply as a matter of law because the spill contained a
   mixture of both oil and CERCLA-regulated hazardous substances. The
   asserted claims against ITC were, therefore, covered exclusively under
   CERCLA. The Plaintiffs opposed that motion, arguing that both CERCLA
   and OPA can apply to a mixed spill of oil and CERCLA-regulated hazardous
   substances.

          On July 2, 2021, the Magistrate Judge issued a report and
   recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that the district court grant
   ITC’s motion for summary judgment. The R&R surveyed the text and
   structure of the statutes, their legislative histories, administrative guidance.
   It concluded that “OPA and CERCLA are mutually exclusive of each other”
   and that OPA “does not apply to spills containing a mixture of oil and
   CERCLA-regulated hazardous substances.” The R&R rejected Plaintiffs’
   argument that CERCLA and OPA could both apply to mixed spills. It

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                                          No. 22-20456

   reasoned that the Plaintiffs could not bring their OPA claim because the spill
   at issue—a spill containing both oil and hazardous substances—is not within
   the scope of the OPA’s definition of “oil.” That is, the “hazardous
   substance” exception in OPA’s definition of “oil” excludes substances
   covered by CERCLA, including mixtures of oil and hazardous substances
   that cannot be segregated.

           In a three-page order, the district court concluded that the R&R was
   “well founded and that it should be adopted,” granted ITC’s motion for
   summary judgment, and entered final judgment in Plaintiffs’ consolidated
   case.4 This appeal followed.

                                               II.

           The district court premised its summary judgment decision on the
   proposition that the commingled spill of oil and CERCLA-regulated
   hazardous substances is not “oil” within the meaning of OPA. Accordingly,
   we will review de novo the district court’s ruling on that question of law. See
   Grant v. Dir., Off. of Worker's Comp. Programs, 502 F.3d 361, 363 (5th Cir.
   2007) (citation omitted).

                                               III.

                                               A.

           _____________________
   4
     The district court’s consolidated summary judgment order dismissed all OPA claims
   against ITC. The Plaintiffs in this appeal exclusively asserted OPA claims. Thus, the order
   was final as to each of their complaints.

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                                         No. 22-20456

           As is always true in cases of statutory interpretation, we begin with the
   text of the statute. See In re DeBerry, 945 F.3d 943, 947 (5th Cir. 2019) (“In
   matters of statutory interpretation, text is always the alpha.”). “Statutory
   definitions control the meaning of statutory words . . . in the usual case.”
   Burgess v. United States, 553 U.S. 124, 129 (2008) (cleaned up); see also
   Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000) (“When a statute includes an
   explicit definition, we must follow that definition . . . .”).5

           Thus, OPA’s definition of “oil” warrants repetition:

           oil of any kind or in any form, including petroleum, fuel oil,
           sludge, oil refuse, and oil mixed with wastes other than dredged
           spoil, but does not include any substance which is specifically
           listed or designated as a hazardous substance under
           subparagraphs (A) through (F) of section 101(14) of
           [CERCLA] and which is subject to the provisions of that Act.

   33 U.S.C. § 2701(23). It would certainly seem that OPA’s definition of “oil”
   explicitly carves out any CERCLA-regulated substances in its “hazardous
   substance” exclusion.

           Plaintiffs contend, however, that the “hazardous substance”
   exclusion’s plain and unambiguous terms compel the conclusion that it does
   not apply to oil that has been commingled with hazardous substances; that is,
   since oil commingled with a hazardous substance is not “specifically listed”
   as a hazardous substance under CERCLA, OPA’s “hazardous substance”

           _____________________
   5
    We are aware of no federal court, aside from the district court in this case, that has been
   required to interpret the definition of “oil” under OPA as it relates to oil commingled with
   CERCLA hazardous substances.

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                                    No. 22-20456

   exclusion should be narrowly construed so that only unadulterated hazardous
   substance spills are precluded from OPA coverage. We cannot agree.

                                         B.

          As earlier noted, OPA was enacted against the backdrop of existing
   federal environmental laws, including CERCLA. See United States v. Am.
   Com. Lines, L.L.C., 759 F.3d 420, 424 (5th Cir. 2014). Thus, although the
   scope of OPA’s “oil” definition presents a question of first impression in this
   court, we are not “painting on a blank canvas.” See Savage Servs. Corp. v.
   United States, 25 F.4th 925, 943 (11th Cir. 2022). “[W]here, as here,
   Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress
   normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given
   to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the new statute.”
   Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978). Applied to this case, we can
   assume that when Congress enacted OPA in 1990, it was aware that courts
   had interpreted CERCLA’s “hazardous substance” definition to include
   mixtures of oil and hazardous substances.

          To reiterate, CERCLA defines “hazardous substance” to mean “any
   element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance” designated as such
   under CERCLA or other environmental statutes. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
   But CERCLA’s “hazardous substance” definition explicitly excludes
   “petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not
   otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance….” Id.

          In 1989, the Ninth Circuit became the first circuit to address the scope
   of CERCLA’s petroleum exclusion. In Wilshire Westwood Associates v.
   Atlantic Richfield Corp., 881 F.2d 801, 810 (9th Cir. 1989), the court
   interpreted the petroleum exclusion also to exclude oil products even when

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                                     No. 22-20456

   such products contain limited amounts of certain CERCLA-regulated
   hazardous substances, including components indigenous to petroleum or
   additives acquired during the normal refining process.

          That same year, this court addressed the meaning of the term
   “hazardous substance” under CERCLA, see Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc.,
   889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1989), when we held that CERCLA “fails to impose
   any quantitative requirement on the term hazardous substance.” Id. at 669.
   Stated differently, the particular concentration of hazardous substances
   “regardless of how low a percentage” is not relevant to liability
   determinations under CERCLA. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d
   1192, 1200 (2d Cir. 1992). Thus, “[w]hen a mixture or waste solution
   contains hazardous substances, that mixture is itself hazardous.” Id. at 1201.

          Finally, although it is subordinate to the language of the statute, we
   should at least take note of the EPA’s early interpretation of the scope of
   CERCLA’s coverage. In a 1987 memorandum, the EPA considered whether
   oil that has been contaminated by hazardous substances is excluded from
   CERCLA. It explained:

          The legislative history [of CERCLA] clearly contemplates that
          the petroleum exclusion will not apply to mixtures of
          petroleum and other toxic materials since there would not be
          releases ‘strictly of oil.’… [I]t was clear that the omission of oil
          coverage [from CERCLA] was intended to cover spills of oil
          only, and there was no intent to exclude from the bill mixtures
          of oil and hazardous substances.

   Memorandum from Francis S. Blake, Gen. Couns., U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency,
   to J. Winston Porter, Assistant Adm’r for Solid Waste and Emergency

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   Response, U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, Scope of the CERCLA Petroleum
   Exclusion Under Sections 101(14) and 104(a)(2) (July 31, 1987).

             Taken together, these interpretations of CERCLA reflect a
   recognition that when oil contains a hazardous substance that is not
   indigenous to the refining process, the commingled mixture is itself a
   hazardous substance covered by CERCLA.6 And when Congress exempted
   CERCLA-regulated hazardous substances from OPA’s coverage, it did so in
   the light of those interpretations. To the point: Congress intended to exclude
   “hazardous substances”—including oil that has been commingled with
   hazardous substances—from the OPA’s coverage.

             OPA’s legislative history, again subordinate to text, confirms this
   understanding. The House Conference Report notes:

             The definition [of “oil”] . . . does not include any constituent
             or component of oil which may fall within the definition of
             “hazardous substances”, as that term is defined for the
             purposes of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
             Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). This ensures
             that there will be no overlap in the liability provisions of
             CERCLA and the Oil Pollution Act.

             _____________________
   6
       When interpreting the scope of CERCLA’s petroleum exclusion, at least one court has
   determined that “Congress intended that the petroleum exclusion address oil spills, not
   releases of oil which has become infused with hazardous substances.” Tosco Corp. v. Koch
   Indus., Inc., 216 F.3d 886, 893 (10th Cir. 2000) (applying CERCLA to spill of “hazardous
   wastes [that] have commingled with the petroleum products in the soil and [were] floating
   on the groundwater beneath the refinery…”).

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   H.R. Rep. No. 101-653, at 2 (1990) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1990
   U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 780. Congress’s intent is lucid: OPA and CERCLA
   create mutually exclusive liability regimes. See Am. Com. Lines, 759 F.3d at
   424 (“[W]hen Congress enacts a carefully calibrated liability scheme with
   respect to specific remedies, the structure of the remedies suggests that
   Congress intended for the statutory remedies to be exclusive.” (cleaned up)).

          Plaintiffs argue, however, that interpreting CERCLA and OPA as
   mutually exclusive liability regimes will lead to an absurd result; that is, such
   an interpretation incentivizes the intentional or reckless commingling of oil
   with hazardous substances so that those responsible may not be sued for
   economic losses under OPA. We cannot agree with such a sinister
   characterization.

          As outlined above, parties who are found responsible for the discharge
   of oil mixed with hazardous substances, do not escape liability. For example,
   under CERCLA, those parties responsible for such a discharge are still liable
   for their equitable share of the cleanup costs incurred by both the government
   and private parties. See Amoco, 889 F.2d at 667–68 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§
   9607(a)(4)(B), 9613(f)). Furthermore, CERCLA does not close the door for
   liability under state or other federal laws, including common law.

          To be sure, we hold that the Plaintiffs may not bring economic loss
   claims under OPA because the mixed spill is covered under the terms of
   CERCLA. And undoubtedly, our holding will affect the Plaintiffs’ respective
   means to recovering economic losses. But even if we believed that Congress
   had failed properly “to appreciate the effect” of its chosen words, the
   governing absurdity standard, controlling our review, is too high to
   accommodate such an opinion. See Tex. Brine Co. v. Am. Arb. Ass’n., 955 F.3d
   482, 486 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,

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   Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 238
   (2012)). “Absurdity requires more than questionable policy.” Little v. Shell
   Expl. & Prod. Co., 690 F.3d 282, 291 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). It
   requires a result that “no reasonable person could intend.” See Tex. Brine,
   955 F.3d at 486. Thus, “vague notions” about OPA’s overall purpose cannot
   “overcome the words of [OPA’s] text” that, as earlier discussed, exclude the
   mixed spill at issue here from its coverage. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508
   U.S. 248, 262 (1993)(quotation omitted).7

                                              IV.

           To sum up: We hold that the district court correctly interpreted
   OPA’s definition of “oil” to exclude a commingled mixture of oil and CER-
   CLA-regulated “hazardous substances.” Consequently, the district court
   correctly granted ITC’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Plain-
   tiffs’ OPA claims. The judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs’
   OPA claims is, therefore,

           _____________________
   7
           Plaintiffs make several additional arguments on appeal that are either conclusory,
   unpreserved, or asserted positions that this opinion rejected—that is, that OPA governs
   spills of substances governed by CERCLA and that their respective jurisdictions are not
   mutually exclusive. See OOGC Am., L.L.C. v. Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C., 975 F.3d 449, 456
   n.10 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov’t of Turkmenistan, 345 F.3d 347, 356
   n.7 (5th Cir. 2003)) (“[A]rguments raised in a perfunctory manner, such as in a footnote,
   are waived.”). The district court did not err in granting ITC’s summary judgment motion.
   Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam)
   (citations omitted).

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                                                           AFFIRMED.

                                   16