Court Opinion

ID: 9910570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 21:02:27.549788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:53:11.613639
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

OLENA SMITH,                                )
                                            )
       Plaintiff,                           )
                                            )
              v.                            )
                                            )   C.A. No. N23C-07-035 CLS
WILLIAM CAREY,                              )
                                            )
       Defendant.                           )
                                            )
                                            )
                                            )

                         Date Submitted: September 5, 2023
                         Date Decided: December 15, 2023

                   Upon Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. GRANTED.

                                     ORDER

Olena Smith, Newark, Delaware, 19711, pro se.

Ronald W. Hartnett, Jr., Esquire, Law Offices of Cobb & Logullo, Wilmington,
Delaware, 19806, Attorney for Defendant, William Carey.

SCOTT, J.

                                        1
      This 15th day of December 2023, upon consideration of William Carey’s

(“Mr. Carey”) Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted, failure to include a real party of interest and pursuant to the Statute of

Limitations and Plaintiff Olena Smith’s (“Ms. Smith”) Response, it appears to the

Court that:

      1. Ms. Smith filed her Complaint in this matter on July 10, 2023, arising from

         an incident involving Ms. Smith’s 10-year-old daughter, Katia, and an 8-

         year-old boy Ms. Smith believes to be Mr. Carey’s son, Elijah at a swim

         club occurring on July 10, 2021.

      2. In her Complaint, naming herself as the Plaintiff, Ms. Smith contends

         Katia, while playing at a swim club’s playground, was struck in the face

         with a plastic Captain America shield causing her to lose 85% of a front

         tooth. The accident caused Katia to need a partial root canal and veneer

         now, however, she may require a full root canal, a crown and/or an implant

         in the future.

      3. According to the Complaint, after Katia told Ms. Smith she was hit with a

         shield and once she “understood that a boy dressed like Captain America

         hit her,” she began searching for the Captain America boy. She could not

         find any child with a cape or shield but spotted both items on a blanket by

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   the fence and there was a boy sitting away from the blanket without

   parents.

4. Further, according to the Complaint, “Both Katia and [Ms. Smith] have

   been deeply affected by this incident,” the Complaint further described

   how “distraught” Katia was from the incident and how “[i]t has been an

   incredible amount of stress of a child who is kind and calm. Unfortunately

   the ordeal is far from over, therefore [Ms. Smith is] seeking financial

   compensation to help ease the burden that this traumatic and painful

   experience has cause to no fault of her own.” The Complaint concludes

   with Ms. Smith’s alleged damages including the past medical and dental

   expenses, future projected treatments and emotional distress compensation

   totaling $14,955.

5. On August 9, 2023, Mr. Carey filed this Motion. Mr. Carey sought

   dismissal pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 17(a) & 12(b)(6). Relying

   on Rule 17(a), Mr. Carey argued that every action shall be prosecuted in

   the name of a “real party of interest”. Mr. Carey points out that the “real

   party of interest” for both Plaintiff and Defendant is the minor children and

   not the parents who are listed. Relying on 12(b)(6), Mr. Carey argues there

   is no allegation of a claim upon which relief may be granted and no specific

   reference to any negligence or actions on the part of Mr. Carey listed in the

                                   3
         complaint. Mr. Carey argues the Court is left with simply a letter of

         complaint without any allegations of wrongdoing by any party involved in

         the incident at issue.

      6. Superior Court Civil Rule 17(a) provides in pertinent part: Every action

         shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An executor,

         administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express trust, a party with

         whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of

         another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in that person's own name

         without joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought.... No

         action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name

         of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after

         objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or

         substitution of, the real party in interest.” As explained, party of interest

         refers only to the plaintiff. Therefore, the question is whether Ms. Taylor

         is a party of interest. This Court has held that a parent, being the liable

         party, is the proper party to recover medical expenses for an injured minor.1

         Accordingly, this Court will not dismiss Ms. Taylor’s Complaint on Rule

         17(a) grounds.

1
 Myer v. Dyer, 643 A.2d 1382, 1386 (Del. Super. Ct. 1993) (citing Hobbs v.
Lokey, Del.Super., 183 A. 631 (1936); Mancino v. Webb, Del.Super., 274 A.2d 711
(1971)).
                                         4
      7. This Court's standard of review on a motion to dismiss is well-settled. The

         plaintiff's burden to survive dismissal is low.2 The Court must accept all

         well-pled allegations as true.3 The motion will be denied when the plaintiff

         is able to prove any facts entitling him to relief.4 “Delaware is a notice

         pleading jurisdiction and the complaint need only give general notice as to

         the nature of the claim asserted against the defendant in order to avoid

         dismissal for failure to state a claim.”5 Even if an allegation is “vague or

         lacking in detail, [it] is nevertheless ‘well-pleaded’ if it puts the opposing

         party on notice of the claim being brought against it.”6 If a complaint gives

         sufficient notice, the burden then shifts to the defendant to “determine the

         details of the cause of action by way of discovery for the purpose of raising

         legal defenses.”7 The motion will be granted “only where it appears with

2
  Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 458 (Del. 2005).
3
  Loveman v. Nusmile, Inc., 2009 WL 847655, at *2 (Del. Super. Mar. 31, 2009)
(citing Anglo Am. Sec. Fund, L.P. v. S.R. Global Intern. Fund, L.P., 829 A.2d 143,
148–49 (Del. Ch. 2003)).
4
  Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967, 968 (Del. 1978) (citations omitted).
5
  Nye v. Univ. of Delaware, 2003 WL 22176412, at *3 (Del. Super. Sept. 17,
2003).
6
  Precision Air, Inc. v. Standard Chlorine of Del., Inc., 654 A.2d 403, 406 (Del.
1995).
7
  Klein v. Sunbeam Corp., 94 A.2d 385, 391 (Del. 1952).
                                          5
         reasonable certainty that the plaintiff could not prove any set of facts that

         would entitle him to relief.”8

      8. Also, when appropriate, this Court will hold a pro se Plaintiff's complaint

         to a less demanding standard of review.9 However, “there is no different

         set of rules for pro se plaintiffs,”10 and this Court will accommodate pro se

         litigants only to the extent that such leniency does not affect the substantive

         rights of the parties.11

      9. Neither the facts of this case nor the claims which Plaintiff is seeking is

         entirely clear. The Court cannot tell the type of action Ms. Carey seeks

         here, whether it be an intentional tort or in negligence. If Ms. Carey is

         attempting sue for negligence of the child, assuming she does not need to

         plead with particularity as required in Delaware, she fails to plead any facts

8
  Ramunno v. Cawley, 705 A.2d 1029, 1034 (Del. 1998) (citing Spence, 396 A.2d
at 968).
9
  See, e.g., Vick v. Haller, 522 A.2d 865, *1 (Del.1985) (“A pro se complaint,
however inartfully pleaded, may be held to a somewhat less stringent technical
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers....”). Cf. In re Estate of Hall,
882 A.2d 761 (Del.2005) (“While this Court allows a pro se litigant leeway in
meeting the briefing requirements, the brief at the very least must assert an
argument that is capable of review.”).
10
   Draper v. Med. Ctr. of Del., 767 A.2d 796, 799 (Del.2001).
11
   Alston v. State, 2002 WL 184247, *1 (Del.Super.Ct.2002) (“While procedural
requirements are not relaxed for any type of litigant (barring extraordinary
circumstances or to prevent substantial injustice), the Court may grant pro se
litigants some accommodations that do not affect the substantive rights of those
parties involved in the case at bar.”).
                                          6
  to go toward negligence. If Ms. Carey is attempting to sue for an

  intentional tort, there is no allegation of intention. Even when taking all of

  Plaintiff's allegations as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff

  has not established reasonable circumstances and inferences wherein she

  could recover against Defendant for any claim, even if this Court could try

  to narrow down what the Ms. Carey is asking for. Accordingly, Plaintiff

  has failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

10.For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED

  and Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED.

  IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                                    /s/ Calvin L. Scott
                                                    Judge Calvin L. Scott, Jr.

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