Court Opinion

ID: 9918466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-13 01:00:47.023143+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:01:39.513958
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-10800        Document: 00517032116             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/12/2024

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________
                                                                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit
                                      No. 23-10800                                     FILED
                                     ____________                               January 12, 2024
                                                                                     Lyle W. Cayce
   Durand Toson,                                                                          Clerk

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Audrey M. Freeman, Sergeant; Alan W. Merchant, Captain,
   Robertson Unit; Dakota Thornton, Captain, Robertson Unit; John
   Doe #1, Unit Classification Committee, Robertson Unit; John Doe #2,
   Unit Classification Committee, Robertson Unit; Greg Rodriguez, Major,
   Robertson Unit; Jennifer Crozby, Senior Warden, Robertson Unit;
   John Doe #3; Audrey M. Freeman, Sergeant,

                                              Defendants—Appellees.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Northern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 1:22-CV-85
                     ______________________________

   Before Smith, Southwick, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         Durand Toson, Texas prisoner # 2206334, moves to proceed in forma
   pauperis (IFP) on appeal from the dismissal of his civil rights complaint as

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-10800       Document: 00517032116         Page: 2   Date Filed: 01/12/2024

                                    No. 23-10800

   frivolous and for failure to state a claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and
   1915(e)(2)(B). By moving in this court to proceed IFP, he is challenging the
   district court’s certification that the appeal is not taken in good faith. See
   Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997).
            Toson argues that the magistrate judge (MJ), who presided over the
   civil action with Toson’s consent, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), erred by
   analyzing his claim against defendant Audrey M. Freeman under the
   standards applicable to claims of sexual abuse, rather than the standards for
   sexual harassment claims. Toson asserts that he adequately pleaded an
   Eighth Amendment sexual harassment claim. However, Freeman’s verbal
   comments cannot support an Eighth Amendment claim. See Siglar v.
   Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997).
            Next, Toson contends that he did not raise any claims regarding the
   inadequate investigation of the incident involving Freeman and that the MJ’s
   dismissal of such claims against defendants Alan W. Merchant, Dakota
   Thornton, Greg Rodriguez, Jennifer Crozby, and the John Doe defendants
   lacks relevance. Because Toson has effectively disavowed his inadequate-
   investigation claims, and has not briefed them, those claims are deemed
   abandoned. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 1993);
   Brinkmann v. Dallas Cnty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir.
   1987).
            Toson contends that he pled claims under the Eighth Amendment
   based on the defendants’ failure to protect him, and he faults the MJ for
   failing separately to address such claims. However, the MJ mentioned
   Toson’s failure-to-protect allegations while discussing the inadequate-
   investigation claims. And in any event, our review of Toson’s filings shows
   that he did not adequately plead a failure-to-protect claim. See Jones v.

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Case: 23-10800      Document: 00517032116           Page: 3     Date Filed: 01/12/2024

                                     No. 23-10800

   Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 1999); Robertson v. Plano City of Tex.,
   70 F.3d 21, 24 (5th Cir. 1995).
          Finally, Toson argues at length that the MJ erred in dismissing his
   retaliation claims. However, because Toson merely asserted his personal
   belief that the defendants retaliated against him, and did not “produce direct
   evidence of motivation,” nor “allege a chronology of events from which
   retaliation may plausibly be inferred,” Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th
   Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), he cannot
   establish error as to the dismissal of his retaliation claims.
          In view of the above, the appeal is without arguable merit and is thus
   frivolous.   See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983).
   Consequently, the IFP motion is DENIED, and the appeal is
   DISMISSED as frivolous. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 n.24; 5th Cir.
   R. 42.2.
          The dismissal of this appeal as frivolous counts as a strike under 28
   U.S.C. § 1915(g), and the MJ’s dismissal of Toson’s underlying civil action
   also counts as a strike. See Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir.
   1996), abrogated in part on other grounds by Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532,
   537 (2015). Toson previously incurred a strike as a result of the dismissal, as
   frivolous, of another appeal. See Toson v. Taylor, No. 23-10793, 2023 WL
   8271965, at *2 (5th Cir. Nov. 30, 2023) (unpublished).
          Because he has now accumulated at least three strikes, Toson is
   BARRED from proceeding IFP in any civil action or appeal filed while he is
   incarcerated or detained unless he is under imminent danger of serious
   physical injury. See § 1915(g); McGarrah v. Alford, 783 F.3d 584, 585 (5th
   Cir. 2015) (unpublished).

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