Court Opinion

ID: 9642216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:52:25.209112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:44.620492
License: Public Domain

WATKINS, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur with that portion of the Majority Opinion which holds that the lower court’s charge to the jury was fair and impartial and did not constitute a violation of the appellant’s Constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial.
I respectfully dissent to the second part of the Majority Opinion which holds that the Commonwealth failed to establish sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant’s conviction for the offense of criminal conspiracy.
*96In determining whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict we must consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, in this case the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 472 Pa. 435, 372 A.2d 771 (1977). A defendant may also be convicted on circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Long, 470 Pa. 204, 368 A.2d 265 (1977). It is not necessary to prove an explicit agreement to carry out a criminal act in order to prove conspiracy. Commonwealth v. Minnich, 236 Pa.Super. 285, 344 A.2d 525 (1975). While no explicit agreement was proven in the instant case the Commonwealth did prove: that the defendant was accompanied by three other persons in the stolen vehicle several hours after it was stolen; that all four actors left the stolen vehicle together after they heard the defendant tell the officer that he could produce proof of ownership of the vehicle if he were permitted to enter a certain house he had identified as his home; that all four actors entered the house together after which all the lights therein were extinguished; and that all four actors failed to respond to the officer’s subsequent repeated knockings on the door. From this set of circumstances, a jury could infer beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had conspired with the other actors to remove the vehicle from its owner.
The Majority holds that these facts are insufficient to establish that any of the three passengers in the vehicle had conspired with the defendant to commit the above-mentioned offenses. The Majority states that a fact finder could believe that the first time the passengers knew that the vehicle was stolen was after the policeman knocked on the door. While this is certainly possible, I would hold that the determination of this was a matter within the province of the jury. Of course, the jury did not believe what the Majority assumes. I would hold that there was sufficient évidence to enable the fact finder to decide as it did and would affirm the defendant’s conviction on the conspiracy charge.