Court Opinion

ID: 9913028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-26 18:00:47.336208+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:52.579278
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        DEC 26 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GORKY JAVIER GALEANO-LAGUNA,                    No.    21-785

                Petitioner,                     Agency No. A077-868-721

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

                Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                     Argued and Submitted October 18, 2023
                           San Francisco, California

Before: BEA, CHRISTEN, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

      Gorky Javier Galeano-Laguna (“Petitioner”) petitions for review of the Board

of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal of the Immigration

Judge’s (“IJ”) final written decision, which ordered his removal to Nicaragua on the

grounds that he is (1) inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien

present in the United States who has not been lawfully admitted or paroled and (2)

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) as an alien convicted of a state

law “relating to a controlled substance.” The parties are familiar with the facts, so

we discuss them here only where necessary. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a). We deny the petition.

      We review the BIA’s factual findings for substantial evidence and questions

of law, including claims of due process violations, de novo. Grigoryan v. Barr, 959

F.3d 1233, 1239 (9th Cir. 2020). Where, as here, “the BIA issues its own decision

but relies in part on the immigration judge’s reasoning, we review both decisions.”

Flores-Lopez v. Holder, 685 F.3d 857, 861 (9th Cir. 2012).

      1.     While the BIA erroneously concluded that authentication of the 2004

Notice to Appear and Form I-213 was unnecessary to admit those documents to

prove Petitioner’s alienage, see Iran v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 656 F.2d

469, 472 (9th Cir. 1981), Petitioner failed to prove that he was prejudiced by this

error, Hernandez v. Garland, 52 F.4th 757, 766 (9th Cir. 2022). The IJ relied on

additional evidence in the record—the Form I-94 and the Form I-512—to conclude

that Petitioner was a citizen of Nicaragua. The IJ found that both documents were

properly authenticated under 8 C.F.R. §§ 287.6(a), 1287.6(a). Petitioner does not

challenge whether these documents proved his alienage or whether they were

properly authenticated under that rule. Thus, he has not demonstrated prejudice.

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      2.     The BIA did not err in finding that the IJ did not abuse his discretion

by admitting into evidence state court records demonstrating that Petitioner was

charged and then convicted of violating a law “relating to a controlled substance”

and was therefore removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). Those

documents—a copy of the criminal complaint, and an electronic docket report from

Petitioner’s state criminal case for possession of cocaine—were properly

authenticated as certified copies of public records under Federal Rule of Evidence

902(4)(B). See Iran, 656 F.2d at 472 n.8. The Government attached to each

document a certificate that attested to the document’s authenticity. Fed. R. Evid.

902(4)(B). The certificates were signed by the Executive Clerk of the Superior Court

of California, County of Los Angeles—the court where Petitioner was charged and

convicted. See Fed. R. Evid. 902(1)(B). Both certificates bore the seal of that court.

Fed. R. Evid. 902(1)(A). We therefore reject Petitioner’s argument that these

documents were not properly authenticated. 1 The IJ did not abuse his discretion by

admitting them into evidence.

      3.     Assuming that Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365 (9th Cir. 2010), entitled

Petitioner to his Alien File as a matter of due process, Petitioner failed to demonstrate

1
  Because this is Petitioner’s only argument challenging his removability under 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), we need not consider his challenge to the BIA’s
separate determination that he was also removable under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

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that the BIA erred in finding that the IJ’s denial of his Alien File request did not

prejudice him, id. at 373. Petitioner advances only one cogent prejudice argument:

that his Alien File may contain information explaining why his adjustment of status

application took several years to process, which could give him a colorable due

process argument against the Government. But “procedural delays, such as routine

processing delays,” of relief applications generally do not deny an alien due process

unless he “has a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ to have [his] application[] [for

relief from removal] adjudicated within a specified time.” Mendez-Garcia v. Lynch,

840 F.3d 655, 666 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Ruiz-Diaz v. United States, 703 F.3d 483,

487 (9th Cir. 2012)). Petitioner cites no authority entitling him to a timelier

processing of his adjustment of status application. Id. Thus, Petitioner did not prove

that the denial of his Alien File prejudiced him.

      4.     We agree with the BIA that Petitioner did not prove that the IJ violated

due process by denying Petitioner the opportunity to present evidence on certain

“crucial” issues. See Grigoryan, 959 F.3d at 1240. The record does not reflect that

the IJ denied Petitioner the chance to present evidence of his lawful admission into

the United States. Petitioner testified on his own behalf about this issue during his

March 2020 merits hearing. Nor does the record suggest that the IJ prevented

Petitioner from presenting evidence on (1) whether Petitioner received ineffective

assistance of counsel during his prior removal proceedings and (2) whether the

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Immigration and Customs Enforcement Immigration Detainer that the Department

of Homeland Security served Petitioner in 2018 violated the Fourth Amendment.

Petitioner presented evidence on both issues. Petitioner submitted an attorney

misconduct complaint that he filed against his former immigration lawyer, and a

copy of the allegedly unconstitutional Immigration Detainer.

      5.     Assuming the IJ denied Petitioner the opportunity to present evidence

(1) that his statements in the Form I-213 were coerced or (2) that the processing of

his adjustment of status application from 2000 was delayed, Petitioner did not

demonstrate “substantial prejudice.” Grigoryan, 959 F.3d at 1240 (citation omitted).

First, the Form I-213 was probative only of Petitioner’s alienage. As explained,

Petitioner does not dispute that other authenticated record evidence—the Form I-94

and Form I-512—independently established his alienage. Second, even if Petitioner

presented evidence demonstrating that the processing of his adjustment of status

application was delayed, this would not give rise to a colorable due process claim as

explained above. See Mendez-Garcia, 840 F.3d at 666.

      6.     Petitioner did not prove that the BIA erred in finding that the IJ properly

denied his motion to recuse the IJ. Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 497 F.3d 919,

926 (9th Cir. 2007). While the IJ characterized Petitioner’s counsel’s serial filings

of continuance motions and termination requests as a delay tactic and as raising

irrelevant issues, these comments “concerned [Petitioner’s] attorney’s conduct, not

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[Petitioner] or the merits of his case.” Id. at 927. They do not prove that the IJ “had

a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism [against Petitioner] that would make fair

judgment impossible.” Id. at 926.

      7.     Petitioner forfeited his argument that the IJ denied Petitioner due

process by failing to inform him of his eligibility for relief from removal. Cui v.

Garland, 13 F.4th 991, 999 n.6 (9th Cir. 2021). Petitioner’s brief “makes no

substantive argument” in support of this position beyond his conclusory statement

that the IJ “pre-judged” Petitioner’s eligibility for relief by finding him ineligible for

asylum, withholding of removal, and adjustment of status. Id.; see also Martinez-

Serrano v. I.N.S., 94 F.3d 1256, 1259–60 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Issues raised in a brief

that are not supported by argument are deemed abandoned.”).

      8.     The BIA did not abuse its discretion when it declined to consider the

merits of Petitioner’s challenge to the BIA’s July 2015 remand order. The BIA “may

address an argument by applying its default rules and explaining that it will not reach

the merits” of the argument, which is what the BIA did here. Honcharov v. Barr,

924 F.3d 1293, 1296 n.2 (9th Cir. 2019). The BIA refused to consider the merits of

Petitioner’s challenge after construing it as an untimely motion to reconsider its 2015

remand order.

      PETITION DENIED.

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