Court Opinion

ID: 9841396
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-22 07:09:39.319392+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:08.446937
License: Public Domain

In The

                               Court of Appeals

                    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                             ________________

                             NO. 09-22-00039-CR
                             ________________

                NICHOLAS DAVID MOSQUERA, Appellant

                                        V.

                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
________________________________________________________________________

                   On Appeal from the 359th District Court
                        Montgomery County, Texas
                      Trial Cause No. 20-11-14063-CR
________________________________________________________________________

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      A jury convicted Nicholas David Mosquera of the third-degree felony offense

of evading arrest or detention with a motor vehicle and made an affirmative finding

that Mosquera used the vehicle as a deadly weapon. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §

38.04(a), (b)(2)(A). After finding an enhancement paragraph true, the jury assessed

punishment at eighteen years of confinement plus a $500 fine. See id. § 12.42(a)

(providing enhanced punishment for habitual offenders). In three issues, Mosquera

                                        1
argues that: (1) the trial court erred by failing to give a newly court-appointed

attorney a ten-day continuance to prepare for trial; (2) the trial court violated his

right to a speedy trial; and (3) the trial court violated his right to counsel. As

discussed below, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                         PERTINENT BACKGROUND

      Since Mosquera’s issues focus on procedural matters and alleged violations

of his constitutional rights, we limit our background discussion to matters necessary

to resolve those issues. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (requiring appellate court to hand

down opinion as brief as practicable).

Pretrial Background and Procedural Posture

      Mosquera was arrested on November 13, 2020. Mosquera was found to be

indigent and on December 4, 2020, he was appointed his first attorney, Oscar

Sommers. Mosquera filed a pro se Motion to Dismiss Court-Appointed Counsel, and

the certificate of service states he filed it two days after the first attorney was

appointed.1 He argued, among other things, that Sommers did not support the Black

Lives Matter movement and refused to set him for a speedy trial, so he wanted

Sommers removed from the case. He also requested that the trial court appoint a

different attorney. On December 22, 2020, Mosquera also filed a pro se Motion for

      1The record indicates it was file-stamped by the clerk on December 22, 2020.

                                         2
Speedy Trial. On January 26, 2021, the grand jury indicted Mosquera for evading

arrest or detention with a motor vehicle. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.04(b)(2). In

April 2021, Mosquera filed a second pro se Motion to Dismiss Court-Appointed

Counsel (Oscar Sommers) alleging similar complaints and again asked for a

different attorney.

      Later in April 2021, Mosquera sent correspondence to the trial court asking

about several motions, including his pro se Motion for Speedy Trial and Motion to

Dismiss Court-Appointed Counsel, and requested a hearing. On April 29, 2021, the

trial court conducted a Zoom hearing on Mosquera’s pro se Motion to Dismiss

Court-Appointed Counsel. During the hearing, Sommers relayed to the court that he

met with Mosquera via Zoom, which Sommers characterized as “not very fruitful.”

Sommers explained that Mosquera did not want to discuss the facts of his case, and

instead, spent the entire time complaining about the system being biased against him

and “about how I could not be unbiased because of my career path.” The trial court

explained that she would not remove Sommers from the case and asked Mosquera

to cooperate with him. Mosquera said that he did not agree and felt that Sommers

should have handled plea negotiations with the District Attorney’s Office

differently. Mosquera further argued that he did not believe Sommers could act in

his best interest and insisted he wanted a “black attorney” and complained that trying

to make him continue with Sommers would be “a waste of time” and would “be
                                          3
keeping me in jail even longer.” The trial court asked Mosquera to try to work with

Sommers and explained that she did not want Mosquera to be unrepresented and

they would return in a week after she considered the Motion to Dismiss Court-

Appointed Counsel, and Mosquera responded, “That’s fine.”

      On May 10, 2021, the trial court appointed Mosquera his second attorney,

Charles Crowl. In a pro se letter dated May 19, 2021, Mosquera requested a hearing

on various pro se motions he filed, including his Motion for Speedy Trial. During

Crowl’s appointment, Mosquera filed multiple pro se motions and continued to send

correspondence to the trial court. On May 27, 2021, Crowl appeared at a bond

hearing for Mosquera, but Mosquera repeatedly interjected and addressed the trial

court directly. As Crowl explained the bond issues to the trial court, Mosquera

interrupted and tried to address his Motion for Speedy Trial, among other things.

The trial court stated, “Mr. Mosquera, your attorney is really on top of

things[.]”Mosquera responded, “No, he is not.” The trial court then told him, “Hold

on. I believe everything you’re asking for will be addressed by what Mr. Crowl has

worked hard to put together for this Court. So I’m going to recognize your attorney

of record at this time. And I’ll let him go ahead and help us – guide us through these

eight charges.” She then assured Mosquera that she would allow him to speak after

this attorney. Crowl proceeded to go through the bond amounts and what they were

requesting on eight charges. The State then responded it opposed any reduction in
                                          4
bonds as Mosquera had picked up six other felony charges while in jail for attacking

guards. Crowl and Mosquera both represented to the court that he would be unable

to pay even the reduced bonds. The trial court reduced the bonds on the six new

charges but kept the bond amounts the same on the evading arrest charge and

explained she had to consider the seriousness of the charges. The trial court said she

would set the matter for trial in 90 days.

      On September 7, 2021, Crowl filed “Counsel for Defendant’s Motion to

Clarify Scope of Counsel’s Representation Regarding Hybrid-Representation.” In

that Motion, Crowl noted an October 25, 2021, trial setting and that Mosquera had

“filed many pro se motions” while represented by counsel. Crowl further explained

that Mosquera repeatedly made counsel aware “that he, Defendant, considers

himself co-counsel in these matters and believes he has the right to both be

represented by counsel while also representing himself.” Crowl did not believe

Mosquera had the right to hybrid representation and opposed it, “as it would both

place counsel in an ethical quandary where he had to adopt particular motions or

filings despite believing those motions lack legal merit or are procedurally incorrect.

Further, it is counsel’s position that allowing ‘hybrid representation’ would

ultimately harm the Defendant when it comes to trial.” Crowl asked for a hearing to

address the hybrid representation and noted that he and Mosquera had significant

disagreements about trial strategy.
                                          5
      On September 23, 2021, the trial court held a status hearing. During the

hearing, the trial court explained Mosquera was not entitled to hybrid representation

and asked whether Mosquera wanted to proceed with appointed counsel or represent

himself. Mosquera maintained that he was entitled to hybrid representation, but the

jail would not allow him any time in the law library to research the issue. The trial

court noted that was likely due to his behavior and multiple other harassment charges

he picked up at the jail. The trial court then asked Mosquera again if he wanted to

represent himself or proceed with Crowl. Mosquera asked for a continuance to allow

him to research whether he is entitled to hybrid representation. Crowl noted he was

the second appointed attorney and had been on the case since May.

      The trial court admonished,

             Mr. Mosquera, I have gone over several things with you under
      the Faretta case, which is, -- there is a list of things I would ask if you
      know how to do or not, how to perform as an attorney. Because if you
      represented yourself, you would be held to those standards. And I don’t
      personally believe there’s any amount of research in the law library that
      could get you up to – up to the level that you would need to be for me
      to have you represent yourself.
             I’m urging you again, because you don’t know the Rules of
      Evidence, you don’t know the Rules of Criminal Procedure, you told
      me that before. You don’t know anything about how trials are
      conducted and how—and how to choose jurors, jury selection, all the
      rules that are involved during voir dire.
             Do you know how to do those things, Mr. Mosquera?

Mosquera admitted he did not know how to do those things, which is why he was

requesting hybrid representation. The trial court cited several cases noting he did not
                                          6
have an absolute right to hybrid representation and explained that although it was in

her discretion whether to allow it, she did not believe it would work. The trial court

reasoned,

      He is asking that it be—that counsel help him in a hybrid capacity. And
      I am finding that to be not in—the discretion of this Court, I’m not
      permitting that to happen here. And if he continues to insist on that with
      only the aid of counsel in a hybrid capacity, then I would regard his
      assertion of the right of self representation as conditional, equivocal,
      and ineffective. And so, I’m compelling this Defendant to accept
      representation by Mr. Crowl.
       ...
      From every moment that I have seen you before me in court, you have
      demonstrated that you do not cooperate with people. That you do not
      accept or trust attorneys who have researched this, who are
      experienced, it would not work. I do not think that there is any way
      hybrid representation would work.”

      During this hearing, Crowl warned Mosquera that if he refused to

communicate with counsel, he may find it necessary to withdraw. Later in the

hearing, the trial court told Mosquera, “I wanted to make positively sure that you

understand that you have the right to represent yourself. Do you understand that?”

She then inquired again if he wanted to represent himself, and he repeatedly

responded that he could not give the court an answer but wanted hybrid

representation and to be treated as co-counsel.

      Crowl told the judge he did not think hybrid representation would succeed or

be in Mosquera’s best interest, because Mosquera wanted to employ strategies that

Crowl believed would hurt him at trial and invite error. The State noted that
                                          7
Mosquera has a constitutional right to represent himself, but no right to hybrid self-

representation, and Mosquera had consistently requested hybrid representation and

had not requested to represent himself. The court explained to Mosquera that he had

a right to represent himself and a right to an attorney but not to both at the same time.

The trial court told Mosquera he should do the safest thing and encouraged him to

accept Crowl as attorney of record. The trial court then said, “So, what I’m

understanding is you do not want to represent yourself. You do want to represent

yourself if Mr. Crowl is there in hybrid representation?” to which Mosquera

answered, “Yes.” The trial court denied Mosquera’s request for hybrid

representation and asked him if he wanted to represent himself or Crowl to represent

him. Mosquera again said he wanted hybrid representation. The trial court said that

Mosquera had chosen hybrid representation – not to represent himself, which she

was not allowing, and Crowl was the attorney of record. Mosquera then said he

needed to file another Motion for Continuance, because he may have to dismiss

Crowl.

      About one week after this hearing, Crowl filed a Motion to Withdraw, citing

a breakdown in communication. He also noted Mosquera’s statements on the record

that he is “deeply suspicious of Counsel and any legal advice” and that Mosquera

objected to the motion. The Motion to Withdraw also mentioned an October trial

setting and that granting the Motion would likely delay the trial setting, but a greater
                                           8
harm would result if it was denied. On September 30, 2021, the trial court held a

hearing on Crowl’s Motion to Withdraw. At the hearing, Mosquera objected to the

Motion to Withdraw, because it would require the case to be reset and “prolong it[.]”

Crowl denied that he filed the Motion to delay the case, but Mosquera did not trust

him and refused to follow his advice. Mosquera expressed his desire to be

represented by counsel and complained about the delay. On September 30, 2021, the

trial court granted Crowl’s Motion to Withdraw and appointed Michael Valdez as

Mosquera’s third attorney.

      On October 4, 2021, Valdez filed a Motion for Continuance, and Mosquera

continued to file various pro se motions. On October 18, 2021, Mosquera filed

another pro se Motion to Dismiss Court-Appointed Counsel. Mosquera complained

that Valdez would not listen to him regarding strategy and asked for a different

attorney. After filing his first pro se Motion to Dismiss Valdez, Mosquera filed

several other pro se motions with the trial court, including a Motion to Dismiss the

charges against him based on delay. Mosquera also filed a second pro se Motion to

Dismiss Valdez in November 2021, again complaining about disagreements in trial

strategy and requesting a different attorney who had “no history of working as a

prosecutor[.]”

      On November 16, 2021, the trial court conducted a hearing on Mosquera’s

pro se Motion to Dismiss Court-Appointed Counsel. The trial judge noted she
                                         9
reviewed the Motion but found the reasons provided did not require dismissing the

attorney and denied it. Mosquera told the judge, “I have a right to be heard the way

I want to be heard. I don’t want to be heard by Michael Valdez.” The trial court

explained that she did not find the allegations in the motion rose to the level of

dismissing the attorney and noted that Valdez was the third attorney appointed to the

case. The trial court further noted the January 24, 2022, trial setting. On November

29, 2021, Mosquera also filed a pro se Motion to Quash the Indictment and argued

the trial court failed to provide him with a speedy trial. Mosquera also continued to

file pro se motions up until the time of trial, even though the trial court had not

dismissed Valdez as counsel.

      On January 13, 2022, the trial court conducted a pretrial hearing. The trial

court noted that Mosquera had requested to represent himself eleven days before a

jury trial, and she asked if he was still representing himself. Mosquera then said that

it was a mistake and he never asked to represent himself, is not able to do so, and

lacks sufficient knowledge of the law to represent himself. The trial court responded

that Valdez was appointed counsel and was willing to take over, but that Mosquera

had requested another attorney. When asked why he did not want Valdez as his

attorney, Mosquera complained that in their first meeting, Valdez said some things

Mosquera disagreed with, and they did not have the same strategy. The trial court

ruled it would not dismiss Valdez, Mosquera had been through three attorneys, and
                                          10
Valdez was in charge of the case. Mosquera repeatedly interrupted throughout the

hearing, and the trial court instructed him to let his attorney speak.

      On January 19, 2022, the trial court continued the pretrial hearing. One of the

items the trial court addressed was Mosquera’s Motion for Speedy Trial and Motion

to Dismiss based on his right to a speedy trial. The State argued the case was from

November 2020, and they were “barely in January 2022[.]” The State further cited

the four-part test for a Motion for Speedy Trial, noting: the length of delay was short

given the circumstances; the reason for the delay included six more charges while

he was in jail based on his conduct; and there was no prejudice or harm to Mosquera.

Valdez argued that “it’s the length of time that he’s had to endure the incarceration

during 2021. You know, COVID was horrible in 2020. But 2021, as you know, the

courts began to reopen, and it could have moved along . . . he’s been in jail for more

than a year.” The trial court then denied the Mosquera’s motion seeking a dismissal

on the basis that he had been deprived of his right to a speedy trial.

      During this pretrial hearing, Mosquera again urged another pro se Motion to

Dismiss Court-Appointed Counsel, complaining about disagreements with Valdez.

The trial court again explained that this was his third attorney, and he needed to

“distinguish between things that they’re telling you that you disagree with and aren’t

happy to hear, and things that are ethically permissible and that they believe, after

all their years of experience is the route to go, the strategy . . . I will certainly . . .
                                            11
understand your discussions and disagreement, but I don’t think that’s a cause to

dismiss an attorney.” Mosquera complained, “I’m having opposing views with this

attorney. He wants to go about this case and this trial the same way, and I’m telling

him that’s not the way I want to do it. That’s not how I agree to do it.” The trial court

denied Mosquera’s pro se Motion to Dismiss Court-Appointed Counsel.

January 25–27, 2022: Guilt/Innocence

      Voir dire began on January 25, 2022, and on January 26, 2022, the

guilt/innocence phase of trial commenced. When the trial court asked if the parties

were ready, Mosquera’s attorney announced ready, but Mosquera responded, “We

are not ready. We are not ready.” The trial court admonished Mosquera to speak

through his attorney, and he responded, “I told you, the attorney – we need to get a

continuance.” Then, the following exchange occurred:

      THE COURT: No. Don’t talk to me –
      MOSQUERA: I asked to dismiss the attorney because the attorney is
      not – he’s – he doesn’t have my best interest at heart. He’s not doing
      things the way I want them to be done.
      THE COURT: Well, you’re not an attorney yourself, Mr. Mosquera.
      You don’t have the training and the experience. And we have been
      through –
      MOSQUERA: And that’s why I need another one.
      THE COURT: Don’t interrupt me while I’m talking. If you do that
      during the trial, this is exactly what I’m going to say is not to interrupt
      anymore. And that would not look good in front of a jury. Okay. So,
      Mr. Mosquera, Mr. Valdez needs to speak for you.

                                           12
Mosquera continued to complain that counsel was not saying what he wanted him

to say, so he would speak for himself. The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss

Court-Appointed Counsel. As the trial proceeded, Mosquera continued interrupting

the proceedings, speaking over the trial judge and counsel, and the trial court

admonished him repeatedly to stop talking.

      While the jury was out, Mosquera addressed the trial court directly and said,

“I wasn’t ready for trial. I told him that I wanted a continuance but he still announced

ready. . . . I said I’m not ready.” Mosquera told the trial court that he was not ready,

“[b]ecause it’s a lot of motions that I need to file[]” in response to some of the

evidence he received. Mosquera again complained that he asked for Valdez to be

dismissed and that “I have actually talked to an attorney today and he gave me his

card. So I would like to go with this attorney. I need a continuance.” The trial court

denied the requested continuance and advised Mosquera that he had provided no

reason to dismiss Valdez.

      As the proceedings in front of the jury resumed, Mosquera continued to

interrupt and talk over counsel with the trial court repeatedly admonishing him

regarding speaking out. Once the State rested, the defense moved for an acquittal

and moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court denied. The defense then

rested without calling any witnesses, at which point, Mosquera stated, “I’m saying

do not rest. We have a defense.” The trial court then asked Mosquera outside the
                                          13
jury’s presence what the problem was. Mosquera began to argue about some of the

evidence admitted, and the trial court asked the attorney if the defense still wanted

to rest, and the attorney answered, “We’ve rested, Your Honor.” Mosquera disagreed

with counsel’s decision to rest and told the judge “that’s why I said I needed another

attorney. This guy is ineffective. I don’t agree with him.” After additional discussion

with the trial court, Mosquera said, “The video shows – if he’s not going to do it, he

might as well get dismissed right now. I’ll represent myself. I tell you in open court

right now I’ll represent myself. . . . I’m saying I want to represent myself and I have

a right to do so. I have a right to represent myself. And we can move to get a

continuance[.]” The parties agreed that Mosquera did not ask to represent himself

until after Valdez rested. A discussion ensued about prior hearings and Mosquera’s

desire to be represented by counsel with Mosquera stating, “I said I did not feel I

was educated enough to represent myself. I feel like that – I didn’t go to school for

this. I did not have a license in the State of Texas to practice law or anything. So I

didn’t feel like it was – it would be right to represent myself.” The trial court

explained to Mosquera that his attorney had rested the case before he said he wanted

to represent himself, and she would let him represent himself but asked Valdez to sit

at the table in case Mosquera had any questions. Mosquera also told the trial court

he wanted to file a motion for continuance so he could prepare himself. The trial

                                          14
court noted that Valdez was third in a line of experienced attorneys who represented

him.

       The trial court explained,

       Okay. Hold on, Mr. Mosquera. Right now you’re in the middle of a jury
       trial – we’re at the end of a jury trial. Your side has rested. I’m not
       seeing any reason to give you a continuance or to have any other
       evidence before these jurors. You have been ably represented by an
       experience[d] attorney and experienced investigator[.]

       After this, Mosquera complained about the admission of a redacted video of

the police chase, which eliminated portions of him speaking about things the trial

court determined would be prejudicial to him. The trial court ultimately told him to

stop talking and that “I have heard your argument. I do not think it has any merit. I

think it is very ill-advised for you to represent yourself, but . . . you have the right to

do that. I’m going to keep Mr. Valdez at the table there to advise you.”

       Outside the jury’s presence, Mosquera again expressed his desire to file a

motion for continuance. The trial court noted that he made an oral motion for

continuance, which she denied. Mosquera said he wanted to file a written motion for

continuance. The trial court allowed him to write a motion and provided him a copy

of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 29.13 governing continuances after a

trial had begun, and he filed his motion. The Motion for Continuance requested six

additional months “to gather proper evidence, subpoena witnesses and prepare a

genuine, valid defense[.]” The State argued that the Motion for Continuance
                                            15
contained a fatal defect of being unverified and did not state a reason that would

justify a continuance under article 29.13, which required some unexpected

occurrence which no reasonable diligence could anticipate. The State further

contended,

             What’s happened here is that Mr. Mosquera has had these
      charges pending for months. He’s been through three attorneys, none
      of which he would reasonably assist in his defense. He’s been
      obstreperous, obstructionist, talking throughout this trial, and has really
      done everything to – to prevent the trial from taking place. Nonetheless
      he’s received an extremely fair trial, and has been ably assisted by
      counsel, right up to the point where counsel made the very prudent
      decision to rest behind our case.
             After defense counsel rested, then Mr. Mosquera decided that he
      wanted to derail the trial further by representing himself. He’s
      attempting to make a mockery of these proceedings and has completely
      failed to state anything that would even begin to justify a continuance
      under Article 29.13.
             And for those reasons, we ask that the pro se defendant’s motion
      for continuance be denied.

The trial court allowed Mosquera to swear to the truth of the Motion for Continuance

on the record since he lacked access to a notary. Mosquera responded that the

unexpected occurrence under article 29.13 was him representing himself. The trial

court then went through the requirements for a continuance under article 29.13 after

trial begins and reasoned he failed to explain what witnesses he would need to bring

or how any evidence would be material to his case. Mosquera again complained

about the admission of a police video of the chase and his arrest, arguing it was

incomplete and inauthentic, and the trial court explained that she granted his
                                          16
attorney’s request to redact the video and exclude certain portions that were unduly

prejudicial to him. The trial court denied the Motion for Continuance and found it

did not allege specific facts required by article 29.13. The proceedings in front of the

jury did not resume that day while the trial court addressed the issues Mosquera

raised after he insisted on representing himself. Despite being instructed by the trial

court to review the charge and determine whether he had objections, Mosquera

refused to do so and instead focused on re-arguing the Motion for Continuance the

trial court denied.

      The next day, when trial resumed, Mosquera filed a third pro se Motion to

Dismiss Court-Appointed Counsel Valdez. In the Motion, Mosquera argued he did

not agree with Valdez’s strategy, and he requested a different attorney. The trial

court told Mosquera that Valdez was dismissed yesterday, and he was representing

himself. Mosquera also filed another Motion for Continuance. Mosquera then argued

that he disagreed with representing himself without help and stated, “I don’t want to

represent myself. I have a right to counsel. And I do want counsel. I just don’t want

Valdez as counsel.” The trial court replied,

      Mr. Mosquera, that is totally different from what you told us yesterday
      afternoon, after we had the jurors out – back and forth, out and in to this
      courtroom. And then I listened to what you had to say and it was that
      you wanted to represent yourself. And I went over with you the—what
      that would mean, which is letting me know if you had any corrections
      of the jury charge, doing your own closing arguments. I asked Mr.
      Valdez to sit at your table since he’s been your appointed counsel

                                          17
      through all these . . . you said no. This morning you don’t even want
      him sitting there. So, you are – I’ll look at your Motion to Dismiss. He’s
      already off of the case. And he’s not even sitting at your table at your
      request today.”

The trial court determined the Motion to Dismiss Court-Appointed Counsel was

moot, because he was already off the case. Mosquera argued he needed a

continuance so he could get an attorney, which the trial court denied, reasoning he

had three attorneys, and yesterday, Mosquera advised he wanted to represent himself

and would not allow Valdez to sit near the counsel table.

      When Mosquera closed, he objected and said he did not agree to represent

himself but did not want Valdez to represent him, knew nothing about the law, and

asked the court for a continuance to retain a lawyer. Following closing arguments,

the jury found Mosquera guilty of the offense of evading arrest or detention with a

motor vehicle and found affirmatively on the deadly weapon question.

January 27–28, 2022: First Two Days of Punishment Phase

      During the punishment phase of trial and as the State presented its opening

statement, Mosquera repeatedly interrupted. Outside of the jury’s presence, the trial

court told Mosquera that “your constant disruptive behavior is causing a delay in

everything that we are doing in this trial.” The trial court then asked about having

Mosquera removed from the courtroom. Mosquera told the trial court “You can’t do

that. That’s illegal.” The trial court responded,

                                         18
      I can do that, Mr. Mosquera. . . . This has got to be an efficient good,
      clean trial. And, Mr. Mosquera, everything you’re doing is making that
      a very disruptive mess. I’m not going to have those jurors sit out here
      and listen to this. You would think that your own behavior, you would
      control that in front of the jury because you don’t want them to see you
      acting like that. . . . You have been rude, disruptive, belligerent.”

Mosquera demanded an attorney and cited his right to counsel, and the trial court

answered, “You had a right to counsel and I’ve given you three. You wanted all of

them off of your case. And then yesterday you told me . . . you want to represent

yourself.” The trial court told Mosquera she was not going to appoint him another

attorney “this late in the game.” Mosquera argued that he never waived his right to

an attorney and again said he needed an attorney. He then told the trial court, “I’ve

never waived my right to an attorney. I can have as many attorneys as I want to.” He

later asked for a continuance again “so that I can get the evidence that I need for an

acquittal” and “get an attorney to represent me.” The trial court explained that his

request for an attorney at 1:25 p.m. after the guilty verdict and while trying to start

the punishment phase was untimely and for “the sole purpose of delaying this trial

further and disrupting the order that I’m trying to establish in the trial. So it is

denied.” Mosquera continued to argue to the judge about matters she had ruled on.

The trial judge then again warned him he could be removed from the courtroom for

refusing to follow any rules. The trial court finally told Mosquera,

            I have been extremely patient with you, Mr. Mosquera. And I’m
      so careful and cautious that this jury doesn’t hear this disruption, that

                                          19
      they don’t see you in a certain light, and yet you’re doing everything
      you can to defeat all of that. And by your outbursts, in the presence of
      the jury. The best that I can do then is to excuse them out of this room
      so that we can have a discussion. But those discussions are over.
      Everything that you have been asking for has been denied. I find that
      your request for an attorney now would be only a delay tactic. That is
      not – an attorney has been yours three different times and you don’t
      want any of those people to represent you for various reasons. So as of
      yesterday afternoon, you wanted to be on your own and that’s where
      you are. You made that request in open court on the record. And we
      take those kinds of things very, very seriously. So when you invoke that
      right to represent yourself, that’s exactly what I did, is grant your right.
             So, now at 1:28 pm the afternoon in the beginning of the
      punishment phase, this is not the time to request an attorney.

Mosquera again requested an attorney and contended he never waived that right, but

the trial court explained that she considered “yesterday’s request a waiver of that

right. And then when you further told Mr. Valdez this morning that he couldn’t even

sit at counsel table with you, further waived that you wanted to do this on your own.”

The trial court repeatedly asked Mosquera if he would allow the State to finish its

opening, which Mosquera would not directly answer and insisted on speaking to the

trial court about other matters that it had ruled on. Mosquera then made an oral

motion for a court-appointed attorney. After further discussion, the trial court

appointed a fourth attorney, Benton Baker, to represent Mosquera for the rest of

punishment. The trial court provided background information to counsel.

      Baker requested a ten-day continuance to prepare. The trial court noted that

was impractical since they already had a jury. The State also argued this was the

                                          20
opposite of “unexpected” – it was Mosquera’s deliberate choice and in context, was

clearly “a tactic.” The trial court overruled the request for ten days extra to prepare

but noted that she would have the State finish then recess so Mosquera could have

over the weekend and start Monday. Mosquera then again requested ten days, and

the trial court replied, “The reason that you are asking for a continuance, basically,

is based upon your own behavior and a willful withdrawal of your representation of

yourself. And now I have been able to find an attorney to represent you during this

punishment phase.” The State completed its punishment opening, then began

presenting witnesses and evidence, which it continued the next day, January 28,

2022. Before testimony began on the second day of the punishment proceedings,

Mosquera again repeatedly tried to object and interrupted counsel as he spoke, so

the trial court again admonished him. The second day of the punishment

proceedings, the State rested its case-in-chief. The defense told the trial court it

would like to adjourn to prepare, so the trial court agreed to resume the proceedings

on Monday.

January 31, 2022: Third Day of Punishment

      On the third day of punishment, outside the jury’s presence, Mosquera's

counsel moved for a continuance until the afternoon, which the trial court denied,

noting it had given the defense the weekend to prepare. Counsel explained that the

investigator working on the case had been unable to locate any mitigation witnesses,
                                          21
and neither Mosquera nor prior counsel had provided any. The State noted that over

the weekend, Mosquera was allowed privileges to use the phone to locate witnesses,

and he declined to do so. Additionally, before the jury entered the courtroom, the

trial court repeatedly admonished Mosquera to stop talking out of turn and

threatened to have him removed if he did not follow the rules, and he told the judge,

“Kick me out of the court then.”

       The defense offered records showing that Mosquera had formed his own

company and incorporated a business, which the trial court admitted. After counsel

requested a continuance to find witnesses, which the trial court denied, the defense

rested. The jury found the enhancement true and assessed punishment at eighteen

years of confinement plus a $500 fine.

                                    ANALYSIS

                  Issue One: Denial of Motion for Continuance

      In his first issue, Mosquera complains that the trial court erred by denying his

Motion for Continuance to allow newly appointed counsel ten days to prepare for

the punishment phase of trial. In support of this argument, Mosquera cites Texas

Code of Criminal Procedure article 1.051(e). The State counters that the applicable

statute that should govern this analysis is article 1.051(h).

      Generally, “appointed counsel is entitled to 10 days to prepare for a

proceeding but may waive the preparation time with the consent of the defendant in
                                         22
writing or on the record in open court.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.051(e).

Yet an exception to this general rule is found in article 1.051(h):

      A defendant may withdraw a waiver of the right to counsel at any time
      but is not entitled to repeat a proceeding previously held or waived
      solely on the grounds of the subsequent appointment or retention of
      counsel. If the defendant withdraws a waiver, the trial court, in its
      discretion, may provide the appointed counsel 10 days to prepare.

Id. art. 1.051(h); see Barnes v. State, 921 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996,

pet. ref’d) (explaining that 1.051(h) “creates an exception to the general rule of

article 1.051(e)”). Article 1.051(h) applies to situations where an appellant withdrew

his prior waiver of right to counsel. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.051(h);

Cole v. State, 929 S.W.2d 102, 103 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1996, pet. ref’d).

      Mosquera was indigent, and three attorneys were appointed to him before

trial. Mosquera, for various reasons, criticized each of these appointed attorneys. He

repeatedly moved to dismiss two of them, demanded the trial court replace them

with counsel of his choosing, and refused to cooperate with them in preparing his

defense. He wanted an attorney that would follow his instructions and agree with his

trial strategy. He also repeatedly demanded hybrid representation and to be treated

as co-counsel. During the guilt/innocence phase of trial and after his attorney rested,

when the trial court refused Mosquera’s request to dismiss and replace his third

appointed attorney, Mosquera demanded to represent himself. Before punishment,

Mosquera attempted to revoke his waiver of counsel and requested appointment of
                                          23
yet another attorney. After initially denying this request, the trial court granted it and

appointed Mosquera his fourth attorney for the punishment proceedings. We agree

that the applicable statutory provision in this circumstance given Mosquera’s

withdrawal of his waiver of right to counsel is article 1.051(h).

      We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for continuance under article

1.051(h) for an abuse of discretion. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.051(h)

(vesting trial court with discretion to grant a continuance when defendant withdraws

waiver of right to counsel); Cole, 929 S.W.2d at 103 (noting trial court was within

its discretion to deny ten-day continuance under article 1.051(h)). A trial court

abuses its discretion when its decision lies outside the zone of reasonable

disagreement. See Heiselbetz v. State, 906 S.W.2d 500, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).

Given the record before us and multiple delays caused by Mosquera’s alternating

demands for hybrid representation, self-representation, and withdrawing his waiver

of his right to counsel during the middle of trial, the trial court’s decision to deny a

continuance was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. See id.; see also Tex.

Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.051(h). The trial court recessed the punishment

proceedings over the weekend to give counsel time to prepare. Further, jail staff

provided Mosquera phone privileges over the weekend, despite his documented poor

behavior, to attempt to contact potential witnesses, which he refused to do. We

conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appointed counsel’s
                                           24
requested continuance after Mosquera withdrew the waiver of his right to counsel

during trial. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.051(h); see Cole, 929 S.W.2d at

103; see also McCain v. State, No. 02-17-00210-CR, 2018 WL 3059964, at *8 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth June 21, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(concluding that the trial court did not err in denying continuance to allow appointed

counsel additional time to prepare where defendant withdrew waiver of right to

counsel the Friday before a Monday trial). We overrule issue one.

                         Issue Two: Right to Speedy Trial

      In his second issue, Mosquera contends the trial court violated his right to a

speedy trial. The State counters that the delay was largely attributed to Mosquera’s

counsel changes and six new charges he picked up for “his assaultive conduct while

incarcerated.”

      A criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to a speedy trial. See U.S. CONST.

amend. VI; Tex. Const. art. 1, § 10; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.05. When

determining whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, we

balance four factors: “(1) the length of the delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3)

assertion of the right; and (4) prejudice to the accused.” Johnson v. State, 954 S.W.2d

770, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530–31

(1972)); see also Dragoo v. State, 96 S.W.3d 308, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). In

conducting this balancing test, “we apply a bifurcated standard of review: an abuse
                                          25
of discretion standard for the factual components, and a de novo standard for the

legal components.” Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)

(citation omitted); Fields v. State, No. 09-21-00046-CR, 2022 WL 2231194, at *2–

4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 22, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (citations omitted). We also apply a de novo standard in balancing the

Barker factors. Johnson, 954 S.W.2d at 771. Alone, no single factor is sufficient to

require a trial court to find that a Sixth Amendment violation occurred. See Barker,

407 U.S. at 533; Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 648. Instead, we must engage in a

balancing process to determine whether the delays in bringing a defendant’s case to

trial deprived the defendant of a speedy trial. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 533; Zamorano,

84 S.W.3d at 648; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

Length of Delay

      First, we look at the length of delay. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530; Johnson,

954 S.W.2d at 771. Mosquera was arrested on November 13, 2020, indicted on

January 26, 2021, and trial began on January 25, 2022. Generally, delay approaching

one year is “presumptively prejudicial” and sufficient to trigger a speedy trial

inquiry. Shaw v. State, 117 S.W.3d 883, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (citations

omitted); see also Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651–52 & n.1 (1992). The

length of the delay is measured from the time the defendant was arrested or formally

accused. Shaw, 117 S.W.3d at 889. We also look at “the extent to which the delay
                                         26
stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the

claim.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652; see also Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 649. There was

an approximate delay of fourteen months from the time Mosquera was arrested and

the start of trial, which the State concedes is sufficient to trigger the analysis of the

remaining Barker factors. The fourteen-month delay only extended slightly beyond

the one-year “presumptively prejudicial” period. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652; see also

Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 649. Since the length of the delay did not stretch long

beyond the bare minimum to trigger the speedy trial inquiry, this factor does not

weigh heavily against the State. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 (explaining “the

presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifies over time”);

Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 649 (noting same); see also Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 314

(discussing length of the delay beyond the triggering period and explaining the

longer the period, the more heavily it is weighed against the State).

Reasons for Delay

      We next look to the reasons for the delay. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530;

Johnson, 954 S.W.2d at 771. Once it is determined that a presumptively prejudicial

delay occurred, the State bears the initial burden of explaining the delay. Emery v.

State, 881 S.W.2d 702, 708 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Comeaux v. State, 413 S.W.3d

176, 190–92 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013), aff’d, 445 S.W.3d 745 (Tex. Crim. App.

2014). Under Barker we give different weights to the reasons for delay. Barker, 407
                                           27
U.S. at 531; Munoz v. State, 991 S.W.2d 818, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). A

“deliberate attempt to delay the trial” is weighed heavily against the government.

Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 822 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531). We weigh less heavily

against the government a “‘more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded

courts[.]’” Id. (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531). We do not weigh a valid reason for

the delay against the government at all. See id. (valid reason for the delay “should

serve to justify appropriate delay”). Finally, a delay attributable in whole or in part

to the defendant may constitute a waiver of a speedy trial claim. Id. (citation

omitted).

      The record is silent about any reason for the delay attributable to the State.

Here, the State contends that the delay is “entirely attributable to the appellant’s

pretrial antics.” The record supports this assertion. During the January 19, 2022,

pretrial hearing on Mosquera’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of a speedy trial, the State

noted that delays in the trial setting were due to the other charges Mosquera picked

up while he was incarcerated. The State filed a Notice of Extraneous Offenses it

intended to use at trial outlining multiple incidents where Mosquera had assaulted

guards by spitting on them, throwing urine at them, hitting them, and exposing

himself to female guards as well as threatening to shoot an officer.

      During the fourteen months this case was pending, Mosquera moved to

dismiss Sommers and Valdez, citing disagreements over trial strategy. He also
                                          28
demanded in these motions that he be appointed a different attorney. Crowl moved

to withdraw after Mosquera refused to follow his advice and communicate with him,

despite being admonished to do so. The attorneys reported to the court that Mosquera

refused to assist with his defense and follow their advice. During one of the many

pretrial hearings, the trial court refused to dismiss Valdez before the trial, finding

the reasons listed in the pro se motion did not require dismissal. The trial court also

noted the January 2022 trial setting and explained that Valdez was the third

appointed attorney on the case. The trial court added that Mosquera did not have a

right to hybrid representation and recommended he keep Valdez as counsel, because

Mosquera demonstrated he did not have the knowledge to represent himself. In

another pretrial hearing, the court repeatedly tried to determine whether Mosquera

wanted to represent himself, which he refused to answer directly. Rather, he told the

court he wanted to be represented by an attorney of his choosing and treated as co-

counsel. We cannot conclude that the reason for the delay weighs against the State.

      Nothing in the record shows that bad faith by the State contributed to any

delay in the trial. At a May 2021 bond hearing, the trial court noted it wanted to set

the case as quickly as possible and preferably within ninety days. On October 4,

2021, Mosquera’s third appointed attorney filed a Motion for Continuance noting an

October trial setting and cited his recent appointment as the basis for the

continuance. As discussed, the record shows that three attorneys were appointed to
                                          29
represent Mosquera due to his demands and conduct. As for the delay, the State met

its burden of establishing that it was attributable to Mosquera’s conduct, thus this

factor weighs against Mosquera. See Emery, 881 S.W.2d at 708–09; Wells v. State,

319 S.W.3d 82, 88–89 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, pet. ref’d) (concluding delay was

attributable to appellant’s difficulties with appointed counsel, including his motions

to dismiss counsel and counsel’s motions to withdraw such that “this delay tips the

scales against the appellant”); Simonsen v. State, 662 S.W.2d 607, 611 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, pet. ref’d) (concluding delay was attributable to

defendant where he had an “apparent inability to work with” appointed counsel,

among other things).

Assertion of the Right

      We next look at when and how the defendant asserted his right to a speedy

trial. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 528–29; Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 825. A defendant’s

assertion or failure to assert his speedy-trial right is entitled to strong evidentiary

weight when determining whether he was deprived of the right. Balderas v. State,

517 S.W.3d 756, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 273, 283

(Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Motions for continuance may undercut an appellant’s

claimed desire for a speedy trial. See Emery, 881 S.W.2d at 709. “Filing for a

dismissal instead of a speedy trial will generally weaken a speedy-trial claim because

                                          30
it shows a desire to have no trial instead of a speedy one.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 283

(citing Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 651 n.40); see also Balderas, 517 S.W.2d at 771.

      In December 2020, about a month after his arrest and prior to indictment,

Mosquera filed a pro se Motion for Speedy Trial with a Motion to Dismiss Court-

Appointed Counsel. In April and May 2021, Mosquera sent correspondence directly

to the court and asked for a hearing on his Motion for Speedy Trial, among other

things, despite being represented by counsel. In May 2021, during a bond hearing,

Mosquera addressed the trial court directly and mentioned his Motion for Speedy

Trial. In October 2021, Mosquera filed a pro se Motion to Dismiss “due to delay.”

In November 2021, he also filed a pro se Motion to Quash the Indictment based on

the violation of his right to a speedy trial.

      Before trial, as discussed above, the record reflects that Mosquera refused to

cooperate with appointed counsel and repeatedly requested that attorneys be

removed from his case when they disagreed with his trial strategy. On October 4,

2021, Mosquera’s third appointed attorney filed a Motion for Continuance of an

October 25 trial setting based on his recent appointment as counsel. On January 26,

2022, Mosquera disputed his court-appointed attorney’s announcement of “ready,”

stated he was “not ready,” and told the court “we need to get a continuance.”

Mosquera continued to complain to the court about his court-appointed counsel, and

he told the trial court he wanted a continuance during the guilt/innocence phase of
                                         31
trial. After the defense rested, Mosquera insisted on representing himself, orally

requested a continuance, then filed a handwritten Motion for Continuance,

representing that he would now be representing himself and needed more time to

prepare. The next day, Mosquera filed another pro se Motion for Continuance,

stating he needed more time to hire an attorney. The State argued against each of his

requests to continue the proceedings, and the trial court denied his motions

explaining that the trial court had appointed Mosquera three different attorneys.

      Although Mosquera promptly invoked his right to a speedy trial, his conduct

before and during the trial undercuts his assertion of his claim that the State denied

him of his right to s speedy trial. See Balderas, 517 S.W.2d at 771; Cantu, 253

S.W.3d at 283; Emery, 881 S.W.2d at 709. To the contrary, it was Mosquera’s refusal

to cooperate with counsel, his repetitive filing of pretrial motions seeking to dismiss

the charges that had no legal or factual support, and his repeated requests for

continuance that lead us to weigh this factor against him. See Balderas, 517 S.W.2d

at 771; Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 283; Emery, 881 S.W.2d at 709.

Prejudice to the Defendant

      The fourth factor we look at is whether the defendant was prejudiced by the

delay. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280; Munoz, 991 S.W.3d

at 821. When examining whether there was prejudice caused by delay, we look to

these interests a speedy trial was designed to protect: “(i) to prevent oppressive
                                          32
pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii)

to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 532

(citations omitted); Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 285; Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 316. “Of these

types of prejudice, the last is the most serious ‘because the inability of a defendant

adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.’” Cantu, 253

S.W.3d at 285 (quoting Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d at 316). “The defendant has the initial

burden to make a showing of prejudice.” Emery, 881 S.W.2d at 709.

      With the first interest, the record does not show that Mosquera’s “pretrial

incarceration was used as an instrument of oppression.” Comeaux, 413 S.W.3d at

191. The record shows that he was granted bond and the trial court held a hearing in

which it reduced the bond amounts on multiple related charges. See id. Without

evidence of oppression, this interest does not support finding prejudice. See id.

      As to the second interest, Mosquera fails to argue the incarceration “delay

caused him any ‘anxiety or concern beyond the level normally associated with being

charged with a felony....’” Id. (quoting Shaw, 117 S.W.3d at 890). Rather, the only

contention Mosquera makes on appeal regarding the prejudice to him was the

frustration experienced by the delay and his continued incarceration, which led to

six more charges being brought against him. Mosquera implies that the delay in the

proceedings caused his frustration, which led him to act out. The record does not

support his claim. Instead, the record shows that Mosquera began assaulting jail staff
                                         33
shortly after he was jailed, with additional assaults that occurred after that which he

failed to tie to any specific delay.. The additional charges he incurred while in jail

are attributable to Mosquera’s conduct, as he failed to prove they were caused by

any specific delay attributable to the State. This interest therefore does not weigh in

favor of a finding of prejudice.

       Finally, under the third interest, we must examine whether the delay impaired

Mosquera’s ability to present a defense. See Barker, 407 S.W.3d at 532; Comeaux,

413 S.W.3d at 191. Under this prong, an “appellant must show that the witnesses are

unavailable, that their testimony might be material and relevant to his case, and that

he has exercised due diligence in his attempt to find them and produce them for

trial.” Harris v. State, 489 S.W.2d 303, 308 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Comeaux, 413

S.W.3d at 191. Mosquera does not complain that his defense was impaired because

of lost evidence, destroyed evidence, or that witnesses were no longer available to

testify due to the delay. Thus, we conclude this interest likewise does not weigh in

favor of a finding of prejudice. Harris, 489 S.W.2d at 308; Comeaux, 413 S.W.3d at

191.

       Based on this record and balancing the four Barker factors, we conclude the

delay Mosquera complains of did not result in a violation of his right to a speedy

trial. See Barker, 407 at 532; Kelly v. State, 163 S.W.3d 722, 724, 729–30 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2005) (balancing the Barker factors and concluding that seventeen-
                                          34
month delay did not violate defendant’s right to a speedy trial); Dragoo, 96 S.W.3d

at 316 (concluding that on balance, three-and-a-half-year delay did not violate right

to speedy trial). We overrule issue two.

                          Issue Three: Right to Counsel

      In his third issue, Mosquera contends the trial court violated his right to

counsel. In support of this issue, Mosquera argues that he consistently expressed a

desire for counsel, the trial court failed to properly admonish him about the dangers

of self-representation, and he did not sign a waiver. Specifically, Mosquera

complains that he was denied counsel in closing argument in the guilt-innocence

phase of the trial and the part of the punishment phase of his trial before the trial

court appointed an attorney to pick up where Mosquera’s representation stopped.

      A criminal defendant has the right to assistance of counsel and the right to

waive counsel and represent himself. See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, XIV; Tex. Const.

art. 1 § 10; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.05. The Sixth Amendment and the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant’s

right to counsel. See Thomas v. State, 550 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).

Still, the right to appointed counsel doesn’t grant a defendant the right to appointed

counsel of the defendant’s choice. See id. at 68.

      The Sixth Amendment also implies that a criminal defendant has the right to

waive counsel and represent himself. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819
                                         35
(1975). A waiver of counsel must be made (1) competently, (2) knowingly and

intelligently, and (3) voluntarily. See id. at 834–36; see also Godinez v. Moran, 509

U.S. 389, 400–01 (1993); Collier v. State, 959 S.W.2d 621, 625–26 (Tex. Crim. App.

1997). “The decision to waive counsel and proceed pro se is made ‘knowingly and

intelligently’ if it is made with a full understanding of the right to counsel, which is

being abandoned, as well as the dangers and disadvantages of self-

representation.” Collier, 959 S.W.2d at 626 (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834–36). A

written waiver under article 1.051(g) is not mandatory. See Burgess v. State, 816

S.W.2d 424, 430–31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Even so, the trial court must make a

defendant “aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation,” so that

the record establishes he knew what he was doing and made an informed decision.

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S.

269, 279 (1942)); see also Goffney v. State, 843 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Tex. Crim. App.

1992). The record must show the trial court thoroughly admonished the defendant.

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834–36; Collier, 959 S.W.2d at 626 n.8. “[T]he record must be

sufficient for the reviewing court to make an assessment that the defendant was made

aware of the dangers and disadvantages of the self-representation.” Goffney, 843

S.W.2d at 585 (citation omitted). In other words, “[w]hen a defendant asserts his pro

se rights, analysis must center not on a traditional waiver of counsel analysis, but on

whether the defendant is aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
                                          36
representation.” Johnson v. State, 760 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). In

determining whether a defendant’s waiver of counsel was knowingly and

intelligently made, we consider the totality of the circumstances, including the

accused’s background, experience, and conduct. See Grant v. State, 255 S.W.3d 642,

647–48 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2007, no pet.). The totality of the circumstances may

include a defendant’s education or sophistication, the simplicity of the charge, and

the stage of the proceeding. Id. at 648. Other considerations include whether counsel

represented defendant before trial, whether standby counsel was appointed, and

whether a defendant had prior experience with the criminal justice system. Id.

      A trial court may replace appointed counsel for good cause. See Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.04(j)(2). Yet “[a]ppointment of new counsel is a matter

solely within the discretion of the trial court[,]” and the “trial court is under no duty

to search for a counsel until an attorney is found who is agreeable to the

accused.” Solis v. State, 792 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); see King v.

State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 566 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). “A defendant does not have the

right to choose appointed counsel, and unless he waives his right to counsel and

chooses to represent himself, or shows adequate reasons for the appointment of new

counsel, he must accept court-appointed counsel.” Maes v. State, 275 S.W.3d 68, 71

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, no pet.) (citation omitted); see Renfro v. State, 586

S.W.2d 496, 499–500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Trammell v. State, 287 S.W.3d 336,
                                           37
343 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.) (“Texas courts have specifically held

that an indigent defendant does not have a right to the counsel of his own

choosing.”). Personality conflicts and disagreements concerning trial strategy are

typically not grounds for withdrawal. King, 29 S.W.3d at 566. A defendant’s right

to counsel cannot be manipulated to obstruct the judicial process or interfere with

the administration of justice. Id.

      The record reflects that Mosquera struggled to get along with multiple

appointed attorneys. Several months before trial, during the September 2021 status

hearing, the trial judge explained to him what his options were since she was not

allowing hybrid representation – he could proceed with appointed counsel or he

could represent himself, which he had an “absolute right” to do. The trial court then

admonished him about the dangers of self-representation, advised him against it, and

encouraged him the safest thing would be to proceed with appointed counsel. He

continued to insist on hybrid counsel and acknowledged he did not have legal

knowledge, but the trial court explained,

      He is asking that . . . counsel help him in a hybrid capacity. And I’m
      finding that to be not in – the discretion of this Court, I’m not permitting
      that to happen here. And if he continues to insist on that with only the
      aid of counsel in a hybrid capacity, then I would regard his assertion of
      the right of self representation as conditional, equivocal and ineffective.
      And so, I’m compelling the defendant to accept representation by Mr.
      Crowl.

                                          38
See Hathorn v. State, 848 S.W.2d 101, 123 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (citing

Funderburg v. State, 717 S.W.2d 637, 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)) (“[A]n accused’s

right to proceed pro se does not attach until he clearly and unequivocally asserts it.”).

      The reasons Mosquera argued for dismissing his appointed attorneys were

disagreements on trial strategy and personal conflicts, which do not justify

dismissing an attorney. See King, 29 S.W.3d at 566. The trial court had no duty to

search for appointed counsel agreeable to Mosquera. See Renfro, 586 S.W.2d at 499–

500; Trammell, 287 S.W.3d at 343; Maes, 275 S.W.3d at 71. Further, although a trial

court has discretion to allow hybrid representation, there is no right to hybrid

representation. Hathorn, 848 S.W.2d at 123; Scarbrough v. State, 777 S.W.2d 83,

92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Given Mosquera’s difficulties following the advice of

counsel and disagreements over strategy, we hold the trial court was not outside the

zone of reasonable disagreement in denying it Mosquera’s request for hybrid

representation. See Hathorn, 848 S.W.2d at 123 n.12; Scarbrough, 777 S.W.2d at

92; Ganther v. State, 187 S.W.3d 641, 648 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006,

pet. ref’d) (discussing trial court’s discretion in permitting hybrid representation).

      Against this backdrop of prior discussions regarding Mosquera’s right to

counsel, demands for new attorneys, demands for hybrid representation, and

admonishments, we turn to Mosquera’s decision to represent himself during the

middle of trial. After his attorney rested for the guilt/innocence phase, Mosquera
                                           39
demanded to represent himself, claiming that he was unhappy that the strategy

employed by his appointed counsel. The trial court asked Mosquera if he wanted to

represent himself, and he said he did “100 percent.” The trial court again admonished

Mosquera it was “very ill-advised” for him to represent himself, but he had a right

to do so. The trial court asked his appointed counsel to remain at the table in case

Mosquera had any questions, but Mosquera insisted he did not want the attorney

there. In the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, the trial court then allowed Mosquera

to represent himself during charge conference and in closing argument. As discussed

above, the record shows that in a prior status hearing and during trial the trial court

explained to Mosquera the pitfalls of self-representation and advised against it, yet

he exercised this right to self-representation despite having acknowledged his

limitations. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; Collier, 959 S.W.2d at 626 n.8; Goffney,

843 S.W.2d at 585. Thus, when we examine the record as a whole, it shows

Mosquera was fully aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation

and that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. See Johnson,

760 S.W.2d at 278.

      The next day, before closing arguments began, Mosquera attempted to

withdraw his waiver of counsel, and he asked the trial court to appoint another

attorney to represent him. The trial court refused his request and required Mosquera

to continue to represent himself in the closing argument part of the guilt/innocence
                                          40
phase of his trial. After the jury found Mosquera guilty, he was still representing

himself when the punishment phase of the trial began. At the beginning of the State’s

opening statement, Mosquera was so disruptive that the trial court had to stop the

proceedings and send the jury out of the courtroom. At that point, the trial court

denied Mosquera’s request for an attorney as untimely and found that it was “for the

sole purpose of delaying the trial further and disrupting the order that I’m trying to

establish in the trial.” Yet Mosquera persisted in asking for an attorney, and an

attorney who was present in the courtroom offered to assist. The trial court and

Mosquera agreed to allow the attorney who volunteered to represent Mosquera to

represent him during what remained the rest of the trial.

      As is clear from this record, Mosquera made continuous demands to change

attorneys and represent himself in an effort to affect the outcome of proceedings.

Under Texas law, “[a] defendant may not use his right to counsel to manipulate the

court or to delay his trial.” Culverhouse v. State, 755 S.W.2d 856, 861 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1988); see also Webb v. State, 533 S.W.2d 780, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)

(citations omitted). In the interest of minimizing disruptions and maintaining

continuity at trial, “an accused may not wait until the day of trial to demand different

counsel or to request that counsel be dismissed so that he may retain other

counsel.” Webb, 533 S.W.2d at 784 (citations omitted). Likewise, the defendant may

only withdraw a waiver of his right to counsel when the decision will not disrupt the
                                          41
orderly administration of trial court business. See Medley v. State, 47 S.W.3d 17, 23

(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2000, pet. ref’d) (noting defendant does not have the right to

repeatedly alternate his position on the right to counsel and delay the trial or obstruct

the orderly administration of justice); see also Davis v. State, No. 09-15-00450-CR,

2017 WL 1953277, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 10, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.,

not designated for publication). Generally, a defendant seeking to withdraw a

previous waiver of a right is entitled to do so if his request is made “sufficiently in

advance of trial such that granting his request will not: (1) interfere with the orderly

administration of the business of the court, (2) result in unnecessary delay or

inconvenience to witnesses, or (3) prejudice the State.” See Marquez v. State, 921

S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (discussing the withdrawal of a waiver of

the right to a trial by jury); Medley, 47 S.W.3d at 24 (applying Marquez analysis to

waiver of the right to counsel). A trial court has discretion to grant or deny a request

to change counsel on the morning of trial. Medley, 47 S.W.3d at 23 (citing United

States v. Magee, 741 F.2d 93, 95 (5th Cir. 1984)); see also Davis, 2017 WL 1953277,

at *2. A trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying a request for appointed

counsel when it correctly determines a defendant is manipulating the right to counsel

for purposes of delay. See Davis, 2017 WL 1953277, at *2 (citations omitted).

      We have already described Mosquera’s refusal to work with counsel and his

outbursts during the trial. As to his alternating demands for self-representation and
                                           42
a new attorney, the trial court found he engaged in the conduct for the purpose of the

delay. See id. Even though the trial court ultimately appointed another attorney to

represent Mosquera when a volunteer appeared in the courtroom acceptable to the

court and to Mosquera, the trial court did not abuse its discretion on this record by

requiring Mosquera to represent himself in response to his representation that he

wanted to represent himself. See id.; see also Culverhouse, 755 S.W.2d at 861;

Webb, 533 S.W.2d at 784; Medley, 47 S.W.3d at 23.

      Based on the totality of the circumstances, even absent a written waiver, the

trial court sufficiently admonished Mosquera about the dangers of representing

himself, and the record shows Mosquera knowingly and intelligently chose to do so,

thereby effectively waiving his right to counsel. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835;

Collier, 959 S.W.2d at 626 n.8; Goffney, 843 S.W.2d at 585; Burgess, 816 S.W.2d

at 430–31. The record supports the trial court’s finding that Mosquera used his right

to counsel and right to self-representation as a delay tactic. See Culverhouse, 755

S.W.2d at 861; Webb, 533 S.W.2d at 784; Medley, 47 S.W.3d at 23. Accordingly,

we also conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by requiring Mosquera

to proceed pro se in the periods in which he represented himself. See also

Culverhouse, 755 S.W.2d at 861; Webb, 533 S.W.2d at 784; Medley, 47 S.W.3d at

23. We overrule issue three.

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                              CONCLUSION

     Having overruled each of Mosquera’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

     AFFIRMED.

                                               W. SCOTT GOLEMON
                                                    Chief Justice

Submitted on July 21, 2023
Opinion Delivered September 20, 2023
Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Wright, JJ.

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