Court Opinion

ID: 9634917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:28:32.432955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:12.793919
License: Public Domain

MARY K. HOFF, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the trial court’s judgment granting St. Charles Nissan’s, Inc. motion to dismiss based on the fact that Clement has not sufficiently alleged that she has sustained any damages.
As indicated in the majority opinion, Count I of Clement’s petition alleges a cause of action under Chapter 407 RSMo (2000), the Merchandising Practices Act. Under Count II, Clement alleges fraud on the part of St. Charles Nissan, Inc.; that she was damaged; and requests actual and punitive damages. Other than mentioning that she has continued to make payments on the car lease, Clement does not state any loss. I do not believe that her continued lease payments are “an ascertainable loss of money or property” as required under the Merchandising Practices Act or are damages under a fraud claim; a private cause of action is given only to one who purchases and suffers damages. See Jackson v. Charlie’s Chevrolet, Inc., 664 S.W.2d 676 (Mo.App.E.D.1984). Clement’s lease payments and retention of the car are the benefit of the bargain under the signed lease. There has been no rescission of the lease or enforcement of a penalty. Under the circumstances of this case, I believe that merely alleging that continued lease payments are damages is not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss,