Court Opinion

ID: 9423690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:08:48.504105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:45.551462
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice White,
dissenting.
Whether or not Evans’ confession was inadmissible against him, nothing in that confession which was relevant and material to Bruton’s case was admissible against Bruton. As to him it was inadmissible hearsay, a presumptively unreliable out-of-court statement of a non-party who was not a witness subject to cross-examination. Admitting Evans’ confession against Bruton would require a new trial unless the error was harmless.
The trial judge in this case had no different view. He admitted Evans’ confession only against Evans, not against Bruton, and carefully instructed the jury to disregard it in determining Bruton’s guilt or innocence.* *139Contrary to its ruling just a decade ago in Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U. S. 232 (1957), the Court now holds this instruction insufficient and reverses Bruton’s conviction. It would apparently also reverse every other case where a court admits a codefendant’s confession implicating a defendant, regardless of cautionary instructions and regardless of the circumstances. I dissent from this excessively rigid rule. There is nothing in this record to suggest that the jury did not follow the trial judge’s instructions. There has been no new learning since Delli Paoli indicating that juries are less reliable than they were considered in that case to be. There is nothing in the prior decisions of this Court which supports this new constitutional rule.
The Court concedes that there are many instances in which reliance on limiting instructions is justified— “Not every admission of inadmissible hearsay or other evidence can be considered to be reversible error unavoidable through limiting instructions; instances occur in almost every trial where inadmissible evidence creeps in, usually inadvertently.” Ante, at 135. The Court asserts, however, that the hazards to the defendant of permitting the jury to hear a codefendant’s confession implicating him are so severe that we must assume the jury’s inability to heed a limiting instruction. This was the holding of the Court with respect to a confession of the defendant himself in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964). There are good reasons, however, for distinguishing the codefendant’s confession from that of the defendant himself and for trusting in the jury’s ability to disregard the former when instructed to do so.
First, the defendant’s own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him. Though itself an out-of-court statement, it is admitted as reliable evidence because it is an admission of guilt by the defendant and constitutes *140direct evidence of the facts to which it relates. Even the testimony of an eyewitness may be less reliable than the defendant’s own confession. An observer may not correctly perceive, understand, or remember the acts of another, but the admissions of a defendant come from the actor himself, the most knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of information about his past conduct. Certainly, confessions have profound impact on the jury, so much so that we may justifiably doubt its ability to put them out of mind even if told to do so. This was the conclusion of the Court in Jackson, and I continue to believe that case to be sound law.
Second, it must be remembered that a coerced confession is not excluded because it is thought to be unreliable. Regardless of how true it may be, it is excluded because specific provisions of the Constitution demand it, whatever the consequences for the criminal trial. In Jackson itself it was stated that “[i]t is now axiomatic that a defendant in a criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his conviction is founded, in whole or ha part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity of the confession .. ..” 378 U. S., at 376. See id., at 385-386. In giving prospective effect only to its rules in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), the Court specifically reaffirmed the principle that coerced confessions are inadmissible regardless of their truth or falsity, Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 729, n. 9 (1966). The Court acknowledged that the rules of Miranda apply to situations “in which the danger [of unreliable statements] is not necessarily as great as when the accused is subjected to overt and obvious coercion.” Id., at 730. And, in Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U. S. 406, 416 (1966), holding the rule of Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609 (1965), not retroactive, the Court quite explicitly stated that “the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination is not *141an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth. That privilege, like the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment, stands as a protection of quite different constitutional values . . . .” The exclusion of probative evidence in order to serve other ends is sound jurisprudence but, as the Court concluded in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S., at 382, juries would have great difficulty in understanding that policy, in putting the confession aside, and in finding the confession involuntary if the consequence was that it could not be used in considering a defendant’s guilt or innocence.
The situation in this case is very different. Here we deal with a codefendant’s confession which is admitted only against the codefendant and with a firm instruction to the jury to disregard it in determining the defendant’s guilt or innocence. That confession cannot compare with the defendant’s own confession in evidentiary value. As to the defendant, the confession of the eodefendant is wholly inadmissible. It is hearsay, subject to all the dangers of inaccuracy which characterize hearsay generally. Furthermore, the codefendant is no more than an eyewitness, the accuracy of whose testimony about the defendant’s conduct is open to more doubt than would be the defendant’s own account of his actions. More than this, however, the statements of a codefend-ant have traditionally been viewed with special suspicion. Crawford v. United States, 212 U. S. 183, 204 (1909); Holmgren v. United States, 217 U. S. 509, 523-524 (1910). See also Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 495 (1917); Mathes, Jury Instruction and Forms for Federal Criminal Cases, 27 F. R. D. 39, 68-69 (1961). Due to his strong motivation to implicate the defendant and to exonerate himself, a codefendant’s statements about what the defendant said or did are less credible than ordinary hearsay evidence. Whereas the defendant’s own confession possesses greater reliability and eviden-*142tiary value than ordinary hearsay, the codefendant’s confession implicating the defendant is intrinsically much less reliable.
The defendant’s own confession may not be used against him if coerced, not because it is untrue but to protect other constitutional values. The jury may have great difficulty understanding such a rule and following an instruction to disregard the confession. In contrast, the codefendant’s admissions cannot enter into the determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence because they are unreliable. This the jury can be told and can understand. Just as the Court believes that juries can reasonably be expected to disregard ordinary hearsay or other inadmissible evidence when instructed to do so, I believe juries will disregard the portions of a co-defendant’s confession implicating the defendant when so instructed. Indeed, if we must pick and choose between hearsay as to which limiting instructions will be deemed effective and hearsay the admission of which cannot be cured by instructions, codefendants’ admissions belong in the former category rather than the latter, for they are not only hearsay but hearsay which is doubly suspect. If the Court is right in believing that a jury can be counted on to ignore a wide range of hearsay statements which it is told to ignore, it seems very odd to me to question its ability to put aside the codefendant’s hearsay statements about what the defendant did.
It is a common experience of all men to be informed of “facts” relevant to an issue requiring their judgment, and yet to disregard those “facts” because of sufficient grounds for discrediting their veracity or the reliability of their source. Responsible judgment would be impossible but for the ability of men to focus their attention wholly on reliable and credible evidence, and jurymen are no less capable of exercising this capacity than other *143men. Because I have no doubt that serious-minded and responsible men are able to shut their minds to unreliable information when exercising their judgment, I reject the assumption of the majority that giving instructions to a jury to disregard a codefendant’s confession is an empty gesture.
The rule which the Court announces today will severely limit the circumstances in which defendants may be tried together for a crime which they are both charged with committing. Unquestionably, joint trials are more economical and minimize the burden on witnesses, prosecutors, and courts. They also avoid delays in bringing those accused of crime to trial. This much the Court concedes. It is also worth saying that separate trials are apt to have varying consequences for legally indistinguishable defendants. The unfairness of this is confirmed by the common prosecutorial experience of seeing codefendants who are tried separately strenuously jockeying for position with regard to who should be the first to be tried.
In view of the practical difficulties of separate trials and their potential unfairness, I am disappointed that the Court has not spelled out how the federal courts might conduct their business consistent with today’s opinion. I would suppose that it will be necessary to exclude all extrajudicial confessions unless all portions of them which implicate defendants other than the declarant are effectively deleted. Effective deletion will probably require not only omission of all direct and indirect inculpations of codefendants but also of any statement that could be employed against those defendants once their identity is otherwise established. Of course, the deletion must not be such that it will distort the statements to the substantial prejudice of either the declarant or the Government. If deletion is not feasible, then the Government will have to choose either not to *144use the confession at all or to try the defendants separately. To save time, money, and effort, the Government might best seek a ruling at the earliest possible stage of the trial proceedings as to whether the confession is admissible once offending portions are deleted. The failure of the Government to adopt and follow proper procedures for insuring that the inadmissible portions of confessions are excluded will be relevant to the question of whether it was harmless error for them to have gotten before the jury. Oral statements, such as that involved in the present case, will present special problems, for there is a risk that the witness in testifying will inadvertently exceed permissible limits. Except for recommending that caution be used with regard to such oral statements, it is difficult to anticipate the issues which will arise in concrete factual situations.
I would hope, but am not sure, that by using these procedures the federal courts would escape reversal under today’s ruling. Even so, I persist in believing that the reversal of Delli Paoli unnecessarily burdens the already difficult task of conducting criminal trials, and therefore I dissent in this case.
Mr. Justice Harlan joins this opinion without abandoning his original disagreement with Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, 427, expressed in his dissenting opinion in that case.

As the Court observes, “[i]f . . . the jury disregarded the reference to the codefendant, no question would arise under the Confrontation Clause . . . Ante, at 126. Because in my view juries can reasonably be relied upon to disregard the codefendant’s references to the defendant, there is no need to explore the special considerations involved in the Confrontation Clause.