Court Opinion

ID: 9804594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 16:59:32.114088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:16:58.142916
License: Public Domain

Clark, J.,
dissents in a memorandum as follows: While I agree that defendant was in custody and that the pr e-Miranda questioning of defendant constituted interrogation, I depart from the majority in finding that the extent of the pr e-Miranda questioning and the nature of the information obtained were sufficient to dissipate the taint of the un-Mirandized custodial interrogation. I would therefore affirm the court’s decision and deny suppression of the post -Miranda statements.
Defendant was arrested on July 19, 2007, and charged in connection with the January 9, 2003 robbery and murder of 91-year-old Nellie Hocutt. Hocutt was found in her home, asphyxiated, bound to a chair, with a plastic bag tied around her head; she had apparently been forced to ingest wine shortly before her death.
The court conducted a Mapp/Dunaway/Huntley hearing, with regard to both defendant and Nadine Panton in September 2010. Defendant sought suppression of three statements she made to police and prosecutors on the night of her arrest. The court denied the motion to suppress the three statements.
The Court of Appeals has set forth a list of factors to be considered in determining whether there is a sufficiently definite, pronounced break in the interrogation to dissipate the taint of un-Mirandized custodial interrogation (see People v Paulman, 5 NY3d 122 [2005]). Those factors include “the time differential between the Miranda violation and the subsequent admission; whether the same police personnel were present and involved in eliciting each statement; whether there was a change in the location or nature of the interrogation; the circumstances surrounding the Miranda violation, such as the extent of the improper questioning; and whether, prior to the Miranda violation, defendant had indicated a willingness to speak to police” (id. at 130-131]).
The majority correctly concludes that the same police personnel were involved before and after the warnings; there was no *406change in the location of the interrogation; and defendant did not indicate a willingness to speak with the police before the Miranda violation. Notwithstanding, I disagree with the majority’s determination that defendant’s statements tended to incriminate her.
Our determination of this appeal requires an examination of both the extent of the un-Mirandized questioning and the nature of the information obtained as a result. As explained in Paulman, the court’s denial of the suppression motion must be based on “the circumstances surrounding the Miranda violation, such as the extent of the improper questioning” (5 NY3d at 130). The majority agrees that the extent of the improper questioning was very brief. Essentially, there were two statements made to defendant that were designed to elicit a response. One question at 6:55 p.m. was: “[D]o you know what you are here for?” The detective was interrupted, exited the room, and returned a few minutes later to ask: “[D]o you know what I am talking about now?” Thereafter, defendant stated to the detective that “her and Nadine went to her aunt’s house. She saw Ms. Nellie . . . and asked her if she could use her phone.” The detective immediately stopped defendant and administered the Miranda warnings. Until this point, defendant had not confessed or admitted to any wrongdoing.
It was not an incriminating response for defendant to imply that (1) she knew the victim; (2) she was with Nadine Panton; or (3) that she asked to used the victim’s phone. The record further demonstrates that defendant’s response was not incriminating since the defense case chiefly consisted of evidence that she had a good relationship with the victim and that she frequently visited the victim and often used her phone. In People v White, the Court of Appeals explained that “ ‘the absence of any incriminating responses to . . . police questioning’ can be one of several factors supporting a conclusion that post -Miranda confessions are not tainted” (10 NY3d at 291, quoting People v Kinnard, 62 NY2d 910, 912 [1984]). Thus, considering the brevity of the pr e-Miranda questioning and the inconsequential information obtained by the police, I find that the taint of the pr e-Miranda statement was sufficiently dissipated.
Further, while the majority indicates that there was no break between the Miranda violation and the Mirandized interview, it is important to note that the record is unclear in this regard since the evidence does not present the pace at which they spoke or a precise amount of time between the Miranda violation and defendant’s post -Miranda statement given at 7:10 p.m. I do not agree that this gap in the record establishes the immediacy that *407the majority finds. Having given consideration to the factors detailed above, I find that suppression was not required, and the post -Miranda statements were properly received in evidence.