Court Opinion

ID: 9914857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-03 16:03:13.019769+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:15:05.294867
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                        Opinion filed January 3, 2024.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D23-1469
                        Lower Tribunal No. 23-3255
                           ________________

                        James F. Chmiel, et al.,
                                 Appellants,

                                     vs.

                   NXTLVL Services, LLC, et al.,
                                 Appellees.

     An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-
Dade County, Peter R. Lopez, Judge.

      Black Law, P.A., and Kelsey K. Black (Fort Lauderdale), for
appellants.

     Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., and John Cody German, Justin S. Maya
and Nicholas M. Nash, II, for appellees.

Before EMAS, LINDSEY and GORDO, JJ.

     PER CURIAM.
     Affirmed. LPP Mortgage Ltd. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 826 So. 2d 462,

463–64 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (“Whether relief should be granted pursuant to

Rule 1.540 is a fact specific question and the trial court’s ruling should not

be disturbed on appeal absent a gross abuse of discretion.”); Somero v.

Hendry Gen. Hosp., 467 So. 2d 1103, 1106 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (“[W]here

inaction   results   from   clerical   or   secretarial   error,   reasonable

misunderstanding, a system gone awry or any other of the foibles to which

human nature is heir, then upon timely application accompanied by a

reasonable and credible explanation the matter should be permitted to be

heard on the merits.”); Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Coral Bay Section C

Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 979 So. 2d 318, 322 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (“Florida

has a long-standing policy in favor of deciding lawsuits on their merits.”);

Lloyd’s Underwriter’s At London v. Ruby, Inc., 801 So. 2d 138, 139 (Fla.

4th DCA 2001) (“In implementing this policy, ‘if there be any reasonable

doubt in the matter [of vacating a default], it should be resolved in favor of

granting the application and allowing a trial upon the merits.’” (quoting N.

Shore Hosp., Inc. v. Barber, 143 So. 2d 849, 852–53 (Fla. 1962)).

                                       2