Court Opinion

ID: 9694096
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:22:55.638568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:55.706887
License: Public Domain

HARRIS, Justice
(dissenting in part).
I believe the majority’s interpretation of rule 179 places unsuccessful litigants in an impossible situation, a situation not demanded nor contemplated by the rule. It seems to me the appeal in this case was timely and that we should consider it on the merits. On the merits I do not believe the plaintiff city' can prevail. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court.
I. There is some doubt that the conclusion reached by the trial court was demanded by our holdings in Berger v. Amana Society, 257 Iowa 956, 120 N.W.2d 465 (1965) and Petit v. Ervin Clark Constr., Inc., 243 Iowa 118, 49 N.W.2d 508 (1951). Nevertheless there was a certain amount of confusion and uncertainty on the question at the time those opinions were filed.
That uncertainty was answered by the amendment to rule 179(b) in 1973. By that amendment the trial court was given the power to enlarge or. amend its conclusions in addition to its findings. Prior to that time the rule provided only for an enlargement of the findings. The 1973 amendment was aimed at precisely the situation in this case. It should be considered in the light of important difficulties facing an unsuccessful litigant who is presented with an unfavorable, and seemingly incomplete, decree. At the outset, such a litigant is caught between two uncertain risks. On the one hand he must take care not to appeal from an interlocutory order without permission (under rule 2, Rules of Appellate Procedure). If he makes that mistake we are without jurisdiction to entertain his appeal. Citizen’s State Bank v. Central Sav. Ass’n, 267 N.W.2d 33 (Iowa 1978). At the same time the unsuccessful litigant must be careful not to act in the mistaken belief some final order was in fact interlocutory. If he falls into that error his time for appeal may pass. State v. Onstot, 268 N.W.2d 219 (Iowa 1978).
Concern with a premature or tardy appeal becomes even more difficult when rule 179(b) is considered. If unsuccessful counsel does not move for an enlargement he often waives error on appeal. Arnold v. Lang, 259 N.W.2d 749, 753 (Iowa 1977); Fjelland v. Wemhoff, 249 N.W.2d 634 (Iowa 1977). And if the unsuccessful litigant appeals without filing a motion under rule 179(b) he not only waives possible error but also divests the trial court of jurisdiction to further consider the matter. In re Marriage of Novak, 220 N.W.2d 592, 596 (Iowa 1974). At the same time, the litigant knows that if he does file the motion to enlarge under rule 179(b), he enjoys at least the hope that the trial court will rule in his favor.
To accommodate these concerns rule 179(b) was expanded in 1973 to toll the running of the time for filing appeal. In this way the trial court is accorded the jurisdiction and the opportunity to enlarge or amend its findings, conclusions, or decree. After the trial court has done so, or refused to do so, either litigant should be given the stated time for bringing appeal.
The scheme for enlargement motions, and their effect on time for appeal, was more recently accommodated in rule 5, R.App.P. (formerly rule 335, Rules of Civil Procedure). Under rule 5 a litigant may appeal within 30 days following the action of the trial court on the motion to enlarge.
I believe the majority’s holding will result in untold confusion — confusion our recent rule changes attempted to obviate. Setting the time for appeal according to whether a motion to enlarge seeks further consideration of the facts or the law will force litigants to make fine, error-prone judgments. What about mixed questions of fact and law? Will the litigant be left with no choice but to forego his motion and accept the waivers that might result on appeal?
Rule 179(b) should be a valuable and necessary tool. Use of the tool might obviate the need for appeal. But, under the majori*643ty’s holding, use of that tool will often waive the appeal itself.
I therefore dissent from the majority’s holding that this appeal should be dismissed.
II. I agree with defendant’s claim that the evidence did not establish either a fiduciary or confidential relationship, nor even create a genuine issue of material fact on that question. Popejoy v. Eastburn, 241 Iowa 747, 41 N.W.2d 764 (1950).
I likewise agree with defendants that the summary judgment was properly granted in their favor because there was no evidence on which the trial court could have found either fraud or the existence of a conspiracy between the defendants. Since there is no conflict in the evidence on that question, summary judgment was proper. Jacobs v. Stover, 243 N.W.2d 642, 643 (Iowa 1976).
I would affirm the trial court.