Court Opinion

ID: 9928802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 22:10:48.824565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:43.389551
License: Public Domain

J-A24012-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  AMMAR ALKOZBARI AND LINA                     :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  ALKOZBARI                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                       Appellants              :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 2579 EDA 2022
  PATRICIA WANASELJA AND ERIK                  :
  WANASELJA                                    :

               Appeal from the Order Entered September 29, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                         Civil Division at No: 190607483

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                            FILED JANUARY 30, 2024

       Appellant, Ammar Alkozbari, and his wife, Lina Alkozbari,1 appeal from

the judgment entered in this motor vehicle case on September 29, 2022 in

the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County after a jury returned a

verdict in favor of Appellee, Patricia Wanaselja. Appellant contends the trial

court abused its discretion by denying his post-trial motion because the verdict

was against the weight of the evidence. Appellant also asserts two evidentiary

errors. Following review, we affirm.

       In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court detailed the underlying facts

of this case and the testimony presented at trial. See Rule 1925(a) Opinion,

____________________________________________

1 Although Ms. Alkozbari is an appellant in this action, for the sake of clarity,

we refer to Mr. Alkozbari only as “Appellant” herein.
J-A24012-23

1/20/23, at 1-5. Briefly, this case arises from a March 4, 2018 motor vehicle

accident between vehicles operated by Mr. Alkozbari (“Appellant”) and Ms.

Wanaselja (“Appellee”). Appellant was driving on Vine Street in Center City

when a Honda Pilot operated by Appellee ran a red light, striking the driver’s

side door of Appellant’s Jeep Grand Cherokee. That initial impact was followed

by Appellee’s Honda striking Appellant’s Jeep a second time, this time on the

rear driver’s side. The collision, which resulted in Appellant’s airbags being

deployed and both vehicles being “totaled,” was caused by Appellee’s

negligence, which she admitted.

      An ambulance arrived at the scene, but Appellant declined transport as

well as treatment at that time.      Appellant’s passenger was not injured.

Appellee testified that neither she nor any of her five passengers were injured.

She said that Appellant mentioned twice that he was “fine” but that his hands

hurt. Notes of Testimony, Trial (“N.T.”), 5/9/22, at 103.

      Three days after the accident, Appellant consulted a chiropractor at the

suggestion of his nephew, who is an attorney.          He began chiropractic

treatments that continued over a several-month period, interrupted by travel

to Syria following the death of a family member. MRIs of Appellant’s cervical

and lumbar spines performed on September 11, 2018 revealed herniations in

both areas of his spine. Therapeutic injections were suggested but Appellant

opted not to have them, citing, inter alia, fear of needles. Appellant did not

seek treatment beyond September 2018.

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        Appellant and his wife initiated this action by complaint filed on June 28,

2019.     Following discovery, the case proceeded to trial on May 9, 2022.

Appellant testified as to the neck and back injuries he sustained in the accident

and the impact those injuries have had on him. Medical experts for both sides

testified, with Appellant’s experts contending that the accident caused

Appellant’s neck and back injuries as well as headaches, and Appellee’s

experts asserting that Appellant was not injured in the accident. Appellee’s

experts offered their opinions that the herniations/disc bulges on Appellant’s

MRIs were solely degenerative in nature.

        The verdict slip provided to the jurors indicated that Appellee’s

negligence was the cause of the accident. As the court instructed the jurors:

        I want to remind you that both sides here agree that [Appellee]
        in this case was negligent and caused this accident to happen.
        The parties disagree, however, on the extent of [Appellant’s] harm
        caused by this negligence. You must decide the extent of harm
        [Appellee’s] negligence caused and then return a verdict that fully
        compensates [Appellant] for the harm he suffered.

N.T., 5/9/22, at 148.2

        The jury began its deliberations at the end of the day on May 9, 2022

and continued those deliberations on May 10, 2022. During their morning

deliberations on May 10, the jurors raised four questions, which will be

discussed below in the context of Appellant’s first issue. At 1:46 p.m., the

____________________________________________

2 The second question on the verdict slip asked if the jurors found Appellee’s

negligence “was a factual cause of the injuries” to Appellant. N.T., 5/9/22, at
155.

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jury returned to the courtroom with the following “question”: “Vote has been

the same for past four hours. Excellent civil dialogue but no minds have been

changed.” N.T., 5/10/22, at 6. The trial court appropriately admonished the

jurors “to try once more” and reminded them that the “agreement” of the

jurors required only ten of the twelve to agree on a verdict. Id. at 7-9. See

Kreider v. Wellenbach, 619 A.2d 319, 322 (Pa. Super. 1993) (the trial judge

may admonish jury on importance of agreeing on verdict). Approximately one

hour later, the jurors returned with their verdict, finding that Appellee’s

negligence was not a factual cause of Appellant’s injuries. N.T., 5/10/22, at

11-12.

       Appellant filed a post-trial motion, which the trial court denied by order

entered September 29, 2022. This timely appeal followed. Appellant and the

trial court both complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.3

       Appellant presents three issues for our consideration:

       A. Whether the trial court abused [its] discretion by not granting
          Appellant/Alkozbari’s post trial motion for a new trial because
          [the] jury’s verdict of zero damages is against the weight of the
          evidence based on the jury’s questions about (1) when the
          claim was brought and (2) when the “determination” of
          negligence [was] made, evidence a lack of comprehension or a
          refusal to accept the stipulation of liability in light of the
          objective evidence of a violent collision with air bag
          deployment, significant property damage, complaints of injury
          at the accident scene, uncontradicted evidence of a closed head
____________________________________________

3 We remind counsel for Appellant that a copy of an appellant’s Rule 1925(b)

statement of errors complained of on appeal is to be attached to the
appellant’s brief. Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(11).

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          injury[4] and uncontroverted chiropractic care such that a 51
          year old man with degenerative disc disease would not suffer
          aggravation of his condition or any injury under these
          circumstances is inconsistent with normal everyday experience
          and is against the weight of the evidence?

       B. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law by allowing
          [Appellee] over [Appellant’s] objection to argue that because
          no one else was allegedly injured in this collision [Appellant]
          must not have been injured either?

       C. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law by preventing
          [Appellant] from arguing that the Defense Exhibit 3 and
          Defense Exhibit 4 were unworthy of belief based upon the
          contents of those records?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (some unnecessary capitalization omitted).

       In his first issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its

discretion by denying his post-trial motion for a new trial because, he

contends, the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. In Rissi v.

Cappella, 918 A.2d 131 (Pa. Super. 2007), we reiterated:

       [O]ur scope of review on a weight of the evidence claim is very
       limited. We will respect the trial court’s findings with regard to
       credibility and weight of the evidence unless it can be shown that
       the lower court’s determination was manifestly erroneous,
       arbitrary and capricious or flagrantly contrary to the evidence.

____________________________________________

4 In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court stated:

       Of note is that Appellant claims . . . that there was “uncontradicted
       evidence of a closed head injury.” The only evidence concerning
       Appellant’s head were his complaints of headaches. If that is what
       Appellant claims to equate to a “closed head injury,” Appellant is
       grossly mistaken.”

Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 1/20/23, at 9 (citing Appellant’s Rule 1925(b)
statement).

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Id. at 140 (quoting Hollock v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 842 A.2d 409, 417 (Pa.

Super. 2004)). In In re M.B., 228 A.3d 555 (Pa. Super. 2020), this Court

quoted the principles governing a weight of the evidence claim as stated by

our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049 (Pa. 2013).

There, the Court explained:

      A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against
      the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the
      trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere
      conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts
      would have arrived at a different conclusion. . . . It has often
      been stated that a new trial should be awarded when the
      [factfinder's] verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock
      one’s sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative
      so that right may be given another opportunity to prevail.

      An appellate court’s standard of review when presented with a
      weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of
      review applied by the trial court:

         Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise
         of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the
         verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because the
         trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the
         evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest
         consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the
         trial judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination that
         the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

In re M.B., 228 A.3d at 566 (quoting Clay, 64 A.3d at 1054-55) (internal

citations, quotations, and emphasis omitted).      “One of the least assailable

reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction that

the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence[.]” Id. (quoting

Clay, 64 A.3d at 1055).

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       The gist of Appellant’s weight of evidence argument is that the collision

was violent; that Appellant complained of injuries at the scene and received

chiropractic treatment for injuries that his experts attributed to the accident;

and that the jurors asked questions evidencing their continued focus on a

determination of negligence and the timeline relating to Appellant bringing his

claim. He contends the jury’s return of a verdict of “zero damages” reflects

that the jury was corrupted and that its verdict was against the weight of the

evidence. See Appellant’s Brief at 12; 15-22.5

       The trial court rejected Appellant’s assertions, noting:

       Appellant argues that the court should now interpret [the jurors’]
       questions and find that they show a lack of comprehension or a
       refusal by the jury to accept the stipulation to liability. The
       concept that the court should, post-trial, engage in speculation
       into the minds of the jurors and guess at what precipitated their
       questions during trial is completely misguided. The questions
       were relevant and the court’s responses [were] agreed to by all
       counsel. Furthermore, this jury was properly instructed that the
       issues raised in the questions were not for their consideration.
       Appellant had no objection to the court’s response. Notably, the
       question as to negligence was pre-filled on the verdict sheet,
       therefore the first and only question for the jury’s consideration
       was whether the accident was the factual cause of injury to the
       Appellant. There was no indication that the jury did not accept
       the Appellee’s stipulated negligence.

Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 1/20/23, at 7-8 (some capitalization omitted).

____________________________________________

5 Although Appellant characterizes the verdict as “zero damages,” the jury did

not reach the issue of damages, having concluded that Appellee’s admitted
negligence was not the factual cause of injuries to Appellant.

                                           -7-
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      The trial court also acknowledged Appellant’s claim that facts elicited

during trial support his weight of evidence argument. Specifically, Appellant

highlights the violence of the collision, with airbag deployment; the property

damage; and testimony relating to his injuries reported at the scene and as

evaluated by his experts. However, as this Court has recognized:

      It is well-settled in Pennsylvania that the weight of the evidence
      and the credibility of witnesses are issues for the jury who is free
      to believe some, all, or none of the evidence presented. Nelson
      v. Hines, 653 A.2d 634, 637 (Pa. 1995). A jury cannot ignore an
      obvious injury, but an expert’s opinion does not turn the assertion
      into an indisputable fact.

Odato v. Fullen, 848 A.2d 964, 966-67 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).

      Recognizing that the jury was free to consider the factors Appellant

highlights regarding the accident and his injuries, the trial court also noted,

inter alia, Appellant’s refusal of treatment at the scene and the lack of any

medical care or consultation in the first three days after the accident;

Appellant’s decision not to follow the recommendation to have injections to

alleviate pain; Appellant’s contradictory and inconsistent testimony regarding

his injuries, including headaches; the questionable testimony regarding his

work and family activities before and after the accident; and the lack of any

evidence of lost income or additional expenses relating to securing employees

he claimed he hired. Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 1/20/23, at 8-10.

      The trial court reiterated that the jury “was free to believe all, some or

none of the evidence,” and concluded that “it did not shock [the court’s]

conscience that the jury found that the accident was not the factual cause of

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Appellant’s injuries.” Id. at 10. Appellant has not shown that the trial court’s

determination was “manifestly erroneous, arbitrary and capricious or

flagrantly contrary to the evidence.” Rissi, 918 A.2d at 140 (citation omitted).

      As this Court has stated, “If there is any support in the record for the

trial court’s decision to deny the appellant’s motion for a new trial based on

weight of the evidence, then we must affirm. An appellant is not entitled to a

new trial where the evidence presented was conflicting and the fact-finder

could have decided in favor of either party.” Corvin v. Tihansky, 184 A.3d

986, 992-93 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). Because there is support

in the record for the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s weight of the evidence

argument in this case, and because this was a case in which conflicting

evidence was presented such that the jury could have decided in favor of

either party, we shall not disturb the trial court’s determination. Appellant’s

weight of the evidence claim fails.

      In his second and third issues, Appellant challenges evidentiary rulings

made by the trial court, claiming that the court committed “error of law” by

allowing Appellee to argue that Appellant was the only one injured among the

eight passengers/drivers and by refusing to allow Appellant to argue the

contents of medical records offered into evidence.        We first note that,

“[g]enerally, our standard of review of a trial court’s evidentiary ruling is

whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Schroeder v. Jaquiss, 861

A.2d 885, 889 n.8 (Pa. 2004) (citing Zieber v. Bogert, 773 A.2d 758, 760

                                      -9-
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n. 3 (Pa. 2001)).6 “[If] the evidentiary ruling at issue turns on a question of

law, however, our review is plenary.” Id.

       In his second issue, Appellant complains that the trial court allowed

Appellee’s counsel to argue, during her closing argument, that “because no

one else was allegedly injured in this collision [Appellant] must not have been

injured.” Appellant’s Brief at 4.

       The transcript reveals the following exchange:

       APPELLEE’S COUNSEL: Eight people, ladies and gentlemen, eight
       people were involved in this motor vehicle [sic]. There’s no
       evidence at all that seven of them suffered any injury - -

       APPELLANT’S COUNSEL: Objection, Your Honor.

       THE COURT: Overruled.

       APPELLEE’S COUNSEL: Suffered any injury as a result of this
       accident.

N.T., 5/9/22, at 130.

       Counsel continued, addressing the burden of proof and offering the

scales of justice analogy concerning weighing the evidence to determine

whether Appellant sustained injuries in the accident. Id. at 130-31. Counsel

then noted the fact there was video of the accident that was shown to the

jury. Counsel stated:

____________________________________________

6 Although Appellant provided the scope and standard of review for the weight

of the evidence claim presented in his first issue, see Appellant’s Brief at 3,
he did not include the scope and standard applicable to his second and third
issues that challenged evidentiary rulings.

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       You got to see – a lot of times we don’t have video of the accident,
       so you did get to see that. You did get to see what happened.
       Everybody was able to get out of their vehicles. Everybody was
       able to walk around the scene. They went into a church. They
       came back out. An ambulance arrived. [Appellant] didn’t have
       any treatment from the ambulance[.]

Id. at 131-32. At no time during the remainder of counsel’s closing argument

did counsel refer to the other driver or to the occupants of the two cars or

“argue” that because the others did not suffer any injury, Appellant must not

have either. Importantly, prior to both counsel offering closing arguments,

the trial court reminded the jurors, “As I said to you, the lawyer’s arguments

are not part of the evidence, but they certainly are important, so please pay

careful attention to everything they have to say.” Id. at 109-10.7

       In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court addressed Appellant’s

contention with regard to the statements made by Appellee’s counsel and

indicated that “this was an accurate summary of the testimony given by the

parties, much of which was elicited by Appellant’s counsel. Appellant testified

on direct exam that after the accident, he made sure that his passenger was

not hurt and then confirmed that neither Appellee nor any of her five (5)

passengers were hurt.” Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 1/20/23, at 10-11 (citing N.T.,

5/9/22, at 35-36).        The court also noted that, “on cross-examination of

Appellee, Appellant’s counsel specifically asked Appellee, ‘So, it is your

____________________________________________

7 In opening remarks to the jury, the court had explained, “Statements by the

lawyers are not evidence, not their opening statements, not their closing
arguments.” Id. at 11.

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position here that because you weren’t injured, [Appellant] must not have

been injured either?’”   Id. at 11 (quoting N.T., 5/9/22, at 108). Appellee

responded, saying, “I have never said that.” Id.

      The trial court concluded that Appellant’s claim was without merit,

noting that “[s]ufficient testimony was introduced to support Appellee’s

counsel’s statement during her closing argument. Moreover, Appellant did not

request that the remarks be stricken nor that the court issue a curative

instruction.   Appellee’s counsel was suggesting that the jury make an

inference from properly admitted testimony.” Id. at 12. We agree. We find

no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court for not granting a new trial

based on comments made by Appellee’s counsel during closing argument. As

this Court reiterated in Hyrcza v. West Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc.,

978 A.2d 961 (Pa. Super. 2009), “Regarding statements during opening and

closing arguments, our Supreme Court has held that ‘so long as no liberties

are taken with the evidence, a lawyer is free to draw such inferences as he

wishes from the testimony and to present his case in the light most suited to

advance his cause and win a verdict in the jury box.’” Id. at 977 (quoting

Wagner v. Anzon, Inc., 684 A.2d 570, 578 (Pa. Super. 1996) (in turn

quoting Contractors Lumber and Supply Company v. Quinette, 126 A.2d

442, 444 (Pa. 1956)). Appellant’s second claim fails.

      In his third issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it

prevented Appellant from arguing that two defense exhibits, Exhibits 3 and 4,

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were unworthy of belief based on the contents of those records.            Those

exhibits were records regarding Appellant’s visits with his family doctor on

June 18 and June 28, 2018. Again, the accident in question occurred on March

4, 2018. In neither record was there any mention of Appellant being involved

in or injured in a motor vehicle accident. His counsel attempted to highlight

entries in the records to discredit them, e.g., the fact Appellant was referred

to as “she” at one point in the record and that the records reflected a supposed

six-pound weight change in ten days.

      Appellee’s counsel objected, contending Appellant’s counsel was arguing

facts not in evidence.    N.T., 5/9/22, at 122.     The court commented that

counsel could not “just read from a medical report if neither expert, nor your

client, testified to it.” Id. The court called for a sidebar conference during

which Appellant’s counsel noted her belief that she could read from the records

because they were offered into evidence.        The court responded, “No, not

unless somebody has questioned a witness with the document regarding what

you’re trying to tell the jury. No one has testified to this. You’re talking about

weight.” Counsel responded, “Well, I was showing the change in the two. I’ll

take care – I will follow your instruction, Your Honor.”      Id.   Counsel then

resumed her closing argument without objection to the court’s ruling or further

mention of the June 2018 medical records.

      As the trial court correctly observed in its Rule 1925(a) opinion, “In

order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a timely, specific objection

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must be made on the record.       Issues that are not preserved by specific

objection in the lower court are waived.” Trial Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion,

1/20/23, at 13 (citing Jones v. Ott, 191 A.3d 782, 787 (Pa. 2018) (to

preserve issue for appellate review, litigant must place timely, specific

objection on the record)). “Issues that are not preserved by specific objection

in the lower court are waived.” Jones, 191 A.3d at 787 (citing, inter alia,

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)). Here, no objection was lodged. Therefore, the issue is

waived.

      As the trial court recognizes, even if not waived, Appellant’s assertion

would not entitle him to relief because to warrant a new trial based on an

evidentiary ruling, the ruling “must not only be in error, but also must be

harmful to the complaining party.” Trial Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion, 1/20/23,

at 13 (citing Antoniotti v. Eckels, 840 A.2d 1013, 1015-16 (Pa. Super.

2003)).

      While Appellee agrees with the trial court’s conclusion that this issue is

waived, Appellee nevertheless offers seven substantive bases for rejecting

Appellant’s argument. Appellee’s Brief at 40-45. For instance, the court’s

ruling did not prevent any party or witness from discussing Defense Exhibits

3 or 4 at trial. Moreover, counsel’s comments were not stricken from the

record. Therefore, the jury was able to hear and consider counsel’s argument,

defeating a claim of prejudice. Again, as the trial court reminded the jury,

statements in closing argument are not evidence. Further, a trial court has

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discretion to limit an attorney’s comments during closing argument. Id. at

42-43 (citing Commonwealth v. Jermyn, 533 A.2d 74, 80 (Pa. 1987)). See

also Commonwealth v. Pi Delta Psi, Inc., 211 A.3d 875, 885 n.5 (Pa.

Super. 2019) (trial court has great discretion in limiting closing arguments).

“[I]t was certainly within the court’s discretion to prevent counsel from

conjecturing about medical records that were never discussed in front of the

jury.” Appellant’s Brief at 43-44 (quoting Trial Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion,

1/20/23, at 14).

      We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court for limiting

Appellant’s counsel’s comments during closing argument. Therefore, even if

not waived, Appellant’s third issue would fail for lack of merit.

      Judgment affirmed.

Date: 1/30/2024

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