Court Opinion

ID: 9910379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 16:03:02.23422+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:30.495718
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

SEGWAY INC., a Delaware             )
corporation,                        )
                                    )
                Plaintiff,          )
                                    )
      v.                            )      C.A. No. 2022-1110-LWW
                                    )
HONG CAI, a/k/a/ JUDY CAI, an       )
individual,                         )
                                    )
                Defendant.          )

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION

                   Date Submitted: September 25, 2023
                    Date Decided: December 14, 2023

Francis G.X. Pileggi & Sean M. Brennecke, LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD &
SMITH LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Counsel for Plaintiff Segway Inc.

T. Brad Davey & Mathew A. Golden, POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON LLP,
Wilmington, Delaware; Barry Pollack, POLLACK SOLOMON DUFFY LLP,
Boston, Massachusetts; Counsel for Defendant Judy Cai

WILL, Vice Chancellor
      Segway Inc. brings this breach of fiduciary duty action against its former

President, Judy Cai. Cai was an officer at a time when Segway experienced

declining sales of its personal transportation devices and an increase in accounts

receivable. According to Segway, Cai was aware of but concealed and failed to

address these issues.      The magnitude of the problems allegedly remained

undiscovered until after Segway was acquired.

      One would be forgiven for assuming that Segway’s allegations underlie a

claim for breach of the duty of care. Yet Segway has disavowed any such claim. It

insists that it is pursuing a different theory against Cai for breaching her duty of

oversight.

      Segway appears to believe that the high bar to plead a Caremark claim is

lowered when the claim is brought against an officer. This is a distressing reading

of our law. As conceived by Chancellor Allen in Caremark, directors have a duty

to implement systems to detect and address wrongdoing at lower levels of the

company. Liability can only attach in the rare case where fiduciaries knowingly

disregard this oversight obligation and trauma ensues. Despite a proliferation of

modern jurisprudence, bad faith remains a necessary predicate to any Caremark

claim. Segway’s attempt to hold a corporate officer accountable for unexceptional

financial struggles flouts these enduring principles.

      Cai’s motion to dismiss is granted.

                                            1
I.        FACTUAL BACKGROUND

          The following facts are drawn from the Verified Amended Complaint (the

“Complaint”) and the documents it incorporates by reference.1

          A.        Segway’s Acquisition

          Plaintiff Segway Inc. is a designer and manufacturer of personal

transportation devices.2 As a standalone company, Segway remained relatively

small despite its early success. In 2015, for example, it had approximately $35

million of annual revenue and employed about 80 people nationwide.3

          In April 2015, Segway was acquired by a subsidiary of Ninebot (Beijing) Tech

Co., Ltd., which also produces short-distance robotic transportation devices.4

Segway began distributing Ninebot products alongside its own.5 Segway otherwise

continued to operate as it had pre-acquisition. Segway maintained its own board of

directors, officers, employees, and financial and accounting systems separate from

Ninebot.6

1
  Verified Am. Compl. for Breach of Fiduciary Duty (Dkt. 10) (“Am. Compl.”); see In re
Books-A-Million, Inc. S’holders Litig., 2016 WL 5874974, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 10, 2016)
(citing In re Gen. Motors (Hughes) S’holder Litig., 897 A.2d 162, 170 (Del. 2006)).
2
    Am. Compl. ¶ 6.
3
    Id. ¶ 8.
4
    Id. ¶¶ 3, 11.
5
    Id. ¶ 12.
6
    Id. ¶ 13.
                                            2
          B.     Cai’s Role at Segway

          Defendant Judy Cai is a former Segway employee.7 She was hired in 2015 as

Segway’s Vice President of Finance.8 In that role, she oversaw “the daily operations

of the finance department and provid[ed] leadership and coordination in [Segway’s]

administrative, business planning, accounting, and budgeting efforts.”9

          In December 2015, Cai was appointed Segway’s interim President and was

reappointed to that position in February 2017.10 She became Segway’s President in

2018.11 Cai continued to function as Segway’s in-house accountant “with complete

responsibility for [Segway’s] tax matters.”12 She remained “involved in compiling

and/or reviewing” financial information for “Ninebot’s management.”13

          C.     Segway’s Downturn

          After the Ninebot acquisition, Segway experienced declining sales and a

shrinking customer base.14       Segway turned away from its branded personal

7
    Id. ¶ 9.
8
    Id.
9
    Id.
10
     Id. ¶¶ 10, 14.
11
     Id. ¶ 14.
12
     Id. ¶ 15.
13
     Id. ¶ 18.
14
  Id. ¶ 21. Segway’s annual revenue from its personal transportation device line fell to
$3.5 million in 2020. Id.
                                           3
transportation devices and focused on selling Ninebot products instead.15 Segway

also began downsizing its operations. By 2018, it had just 60 employees with a

finance department of “5 or 6 people, including Cai.”16

           In 2020, Segway closed its Bedford, New Jersey headquarters and laid off

most of its employees.17 Cai stayed with the company.18 The remaining employees

were “tasked with transitioning [Segway’s] operations” and ensuring the orderly

closing of the [Bedford] facility.”19 Cai’s employment was terminated in November

2020, following the Bedford facility’s closure.20

           D.    The Financial Discrepancies

           Segway continued to integrate its financial information into Ninebot’s

systems after Cai’s termination.21 During this process, “it became apparent that the

information Cai provided Ninebot did not match the actual numbers in Segway’s

financial records.”22 One “egregious discrepanc[y]” related to an excess of $5

15
     Id.
16
     Id. ¶ 20.
17
     Id. ¶ 28.
18
     Id.
19
     Id.
20
     Id. ¶ 29.
21
     Id. ¶ 30.
22
     Id. ¶ 31.
                                           4
million in accounts receivable that were “not properly recorded and/or booked.”23

Ninebot’s management was unable to “reconcile the discrepancies” despite

“considerable time and resources [spent] attempting to” do so.24 Cai declined

Ninebot’s request for assistance.25

           E.    This Litigation

           Segway commenced this action on December 2, 2022.26 Its initial complaint

advanced a single claim against Cai for breach of fiduciary duty.27 After Cai filed a

motion to dismiss, Segway filed its amended Complaint on February 24, 2023.28

Segway continued to press a breach of fiduciary duty claim against Cai and requested

money damages and an accounting for uncollected accounts receivable.29 Cai once

again moved to dismiss.30 After briefing was complete, the motion to dismiss was

argued on September 25, 2023.31

23
     Id. ¶ 32.
24
     Id. ¶ 33.
25
     Id. ¶ 34.
26
     Dkt. 1.
27
     Id.
28
     Dkts. 8, 10.
29
     Am. Compl. ¶¶ 35-40, Prayer for Relief.
30
     Dkts. 11-12; see also Dkts. 14, 15.
31
     Dkt. 18; see Tr. of Sept. 25, 2023 Hr’g on Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (Dkt. 19) (“Hr’g Tr.”).
                                               5
II.      LEGAL ANALYSIS

         Cai seeks dismissal of the Complaint under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6)

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The standard that

governs her motion is as follows:

         (i) all well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true; (ii) even
         vague allegations are “well-pleaded” if they give the opposing party
         notice of the claim; (iii) the Court must draw all reasonable inferences
         in favor of the non-moving party; and [(iv)] dismissal is inappropriate
         unless the “plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any
         reasonably conceivable set of circumstances susceptible of proof.”32

Although I “must draw reasonable inferences in favor” of Segway, I am “not

required to accept every strained interpretation of [its] allegations.”33

         A.     Segway’s Caremark Claim

         The nature of Segway’s claim is not obvious from its Complaint. Segway

alleges that Cai “knew or should have known that there were potential issues” with

“some of [Segway’s] customers, which caused [Segway’s] accounts receivable to

continuously rise.”34 It further avers that Cai breached her fiduciary duties as an

officer of Segway by “continuously ignoring” these “issues (and the resulting impact

32
     Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 896-97 (Del. 2002) (citation omitted).
33
  Gen. Motors (Hughes), 897 A.2d at 168 (quoting Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075,
1083 (Del. 2001)).
34
     Am. Compl. ¶ 37.
                                              6
on [Segway’s] profitability), fail[ing] to take any action to address them . . . and/or

fail[ing] to advise [Segway’s] board.”35

         Based on these allegations, I assumed Segway was claiming that Cai breached

her duty of care by neglecting to adequately compile, review, and report Segway’s

financial information.36 But Segway is adamant that it only intends to advance a

claim for breach of Cai’s duty of loyalty—specifically, her oversight obligation.37

I will proceed accordingly.

         Oversight duties arise from the duty of good faith, which is a subsidiary

element of the duty of loyalty.38 To plead a viable claim for breach of the duty of

oversight, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference

that the fiduciary acted in bad faith.39 Under Caremark, bad faith can be established

35
     Id. ¶ 38.
36
  See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 17-18. Even if Segway were raising a duty of care claim, it would fall
short of pleading gross negligence. See Buckley Fam. Tr. v. McCleary, Inc., 2020 WL
1522549, at *10 (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2020) (discussing the high standard applicable to the
duty of care and defining gross negligence as “conduct that constitutes reckless
indifference or actions that are without the bounds of reason”) (citation omitted).
37
   Hr’g Tr. 28 (describing Segway’s claim as brought under Caremark “[p]rong two, just
in ignoring red flags and not advising the people who she needed to advise. That’s it.”);
id. (“We are not asserting a breach of care claim.”); see also Pl.’s Answering Br. in Opp’n
to Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl. (Dkt. 14) (“Pl.’s Answering Br.”) 8 (asserting that Cai
argued under the “wrong” standard in moving to dismiss because she addressed gross
negligence while Segway was alleging bad faith).
38
     See Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 820-21 (Del. 2019).
39
   See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“Where directors fail to act in the
face of a known duty to act, thereby demonstrating a conscious disregard for their
                                             7
when fiduciaries (1) “utterly fail to implement any reporting or information system

or controls,” or (2) “having implemented such a system or controls, consciously fail

to monitor or oversee its operations,” which disables them “from being informed of

risks or problems requiring their attention.”40

         Segway argues that it has stated such a claim against Cai based on its reading

of the recent McDonald’s decision.41 In McDonald’s, Vice Chancellor Laster

observed that officers of Delaware corporations owe context-specific “duties of

oversight comparable to those of directors.”42 He emphasized that—barring extreme

facts—an officer’s duty of oversight would only extend to matters within the

officer’s remit.43 But he did not (as Segway seems to intuit) craft a lower standard

for oversight claims brought against officers.44

responsibilities, they breach their duty of loyalty by failing to discharge that fiduciary
obligation in good faith.”) (citation omitted).
40
     Id. (cleaned up).
41
  See Pl.’s Answering Br. 6-8, 10, 13-18; id. at 13 (arguing that its allegations describe
conduct that “mirrors” McDonald’s).
42
  In re McDonald’s Corp. S’holder Deriv. Litig., 289 A.3d 343, 370 (Del. Ch. 2023); see
also Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708-09 (Del. 2009) (explaining that “officers of
Delaware corporations, like directors, owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty”).
43
     McDonald’s, 289 A.3d at 370.
44
  Id. (“Officers only will be liable for violations of the duty of oversight if a plaintiff can
prove that they acted in bad faith.”).
                                              8
         B.     Whether Segway States a Claim

         As President of Segway, Cai owed fiduciary duties to the company and its

stockholders.45 Segway contends that Cai breached those duties by “conscious[ly]

disregard[ing]” certain financial discrepancies, giving rise to a claim under the

second prong of Caremark.46 To state such a claim, Segway must adequately plead

that Cai “consciously failed to act after learning about evidence of illegality—the

proverbial ‘red flag.’”47 Applying the McDonald’s framework invoked by Segway,

the alleged oversight violation would need to fall within Cai’s sphere of corporate

responsibility.48

         Cai was allegedly charged with overseeing Segway’s “financial performance,

including its accounts receivable.”49 She managed “the daily operations of the

finance department,” handled Segway’s “tax matters,” and was “involved in

45
  See Hampshire Gp., Ltd. v. Kuttner, 2010 WL 2739995, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 12, 2010)
(“As a general matter, our Supreme Court has found that the duties of corporate officers
are similar to those of corporate directors.”) (citing Gantler, 965 A.2d at 709).
46
   Am. Compl. ¶¶ 38-39; see Hr’g Tr. 28 (Segway’s counsel arguing that Cai “ignor[ed]
red flags and [did] not advis[e] the people who she needed to advise”); see also Stone, 911
A.2d at 370 (outlining the two formulations of a Caremark claim); Constr. Indus. Laborers
Pension Fund ex rel. SolarWinds Corp. v. Bingle, 2022 WL 4102492, at *6 (Del. Ch. Sept.
6, 2022) (explaining that the two types of oversight claims recognized in Stone are
“colloquially referred to as prongs one and two of Caremark”), aff’d, 297 A.3d 1083 (Del.
2023) (TABLE).
47
     South v. Baker, 62 A.3d 1, 15 (Del. 2012).
48
     See McDonald’s, 289 A.3d at 370.
49
     Am. Compl. ¶ 14.
                                              9
compiling and/or reviewing” summaries of Segway’s finances.50 According to

Segway, Cai “was aware of serious issues” with customers that “led to significant

increases” in accounts receivable and “willfully ignored” problems within her areas

of responsibility. Segway maintains that Cai should be held liable for failing to

address these matters or advise the board of directors about them.51

         These allegations are an ill fit for a Caremark claim. No potential wrongdoing

(much less within Cai’s purview) is alleged. Segway does not, for example, state

that Cai overlooked accounting improprieties,52 fraudulent business practices,53 or

other material legal violations. It merely asserts that Cai learned (at some point)

about “issues” with unspecified customers, revenue decreases for a product line, and

increases in receivables.54 Such generic financial matters are far from the sort of red

flags that could give rise to Caremark liability if deliberately ignored.55

50
  Id. ¶¶ 9, 18. Oddly, the Complaint discusses Cai’s reporting of financial summaries to
Ninebot management rather than to the Segway board of directors. This presents another
problem with Segway’s legal theory.
51
     See id. ¶ 38.
52
   See Ash v. McCall, 2000 WL 1370341, at *4, *15 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000) (dismissing
claims and observing that allegations about directors’ personal knowledge of reported
“potential accounting improprieties” might support demand futility).
53
  See David B. Shaev Profit Sharing Acct. v. Armstrong, 2006 WL 391931, at *2 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 13, 2006) (dismissing Caremark claims concerning allegedly fraudulent business
practices where the plaintiff failed to allege bad faith).
54
     Am. Compl. ¶ 22.
55
  E.g., City of Detroit Police and Ret. Sys. v. Hamrock, 2022 WL 2387653, at *25 (Del.
Ch. June 30, 2022) (concluding that the board’s knowledge of “general risks” regarding
non-compliance with safety regulations was not a “red flag” of a “specific corporate
                                           10
       The Complaint also lacks facts suggesting that Cai acted in bad faith.

Segway—with 20/20 hindsight—wants Cai to answer for a decrease in sales and an

increase in receivables. “Oversight duties under Delaware law are not,” however,

“designed to subject [fiduciaries] to personal liability for failure to predict the future

and to properly evaluate business risk.”56 Bad things can happen to corporations

despite fiduciaries exercising the utmost good faith.57

       The Caremark doctrine is not a tool to hold fiduciaries liable for everyday

business problems. Rather, it is intended to address the extraordinary case where

fiduciaries’ “utter failure” to implement an effective compliance system or

“conscious disregard” of the law gives rise to a corporate trauma.58 These tenets of

trauma” that could support a Caremark claim); In re ProAssurance Corp. S’holder Deriv.
Litig., 2023 WL 6426294, at *14 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2023) (dismissing a Caremark claim
where the alleged misconduct involved a “classic business decision” and no “red flags of
illegality” had been pleaded); cf. McDonald’s, 289 A.3d at 378 (holding that it was
reasonably conceivable an officer faced Caremark liability where he allegedly ignored
“massive red flags” within his remit including multiple rounds of “coordinated EEOC
complaints,” widespread strikes, and a “thirty-city walkout”).
56
  In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Deriv. Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 131 (Del. Ch. 2009) (emphasis
omitted).
57
    See Stone, 911 A.2d at 373 (explaining that Delaware courts will not “equate a bad
outcome with bad faith”); In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., 2011 WL
4826104, at *23 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011) (“Good faith, not a good result, is what is required
. . . .”); see also Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 940 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Delaware
courts routinely reject the conclusory allegation that because illegal behavior occurred,
internal controls must have been deficient, and the board must have known so.”).
58
  Stone, 911 A.2d at 370; see Melbourne Mun. Firefighters’ Pension Tr. Fund v. Jacobs,
2016 WL 4076369, at *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 2016) (observing that a “complained-of
‘corporate trauma’ . . . must be sufficiently similar to the misconduct caused by the ‘red
                                             11
our law persist regardless of whether a Caremark claim is brought against a director

or an officer. Officers’ management of day-to-day matters does not make them

guarantors of negative outcomes from imperfect business decisions.59

                                 *             *             *

         Segway’s claim rests on the misimpression that an oversight claim pursued

against an officer is easier to plead than one against a director. Irrespective of the

defendant’s corporate title, a Caremark claim is “possibly the most difficult theory

in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”60 At a

minimum, a plaintiff pursuing an oversight claim against an officer would need to

demonstrate that the officer failed to make a good faith effort to monitor central

compliance risks within her remit that pose potential harm to the company or others.

No such reasonably conceivable claim is stated here.

III.     CONCLUSION
         For the foregoing reasons, Cai’s motion to dismiss is granted. The Complaint

is dismissed in its entirety under Rule 12(b)(6).

flags’ such that the board’s bad faith, ‘conscious inaction’ proximately caused that trauma”
(quoting South, 62 A.3d at 15, 17)), aff’d, 158 A.3d 449 (Del. 2017).
59
  See Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 124 (explaining that Delaware courts faced with claims to
hold fiduciaries liable for “business decisions that, in hindsight, turned out poorly” have
“doctrines to deal with them—the fiduciary duty of care and the business judgment rule”).
60
     In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
                                              12