Court Opinion

ID: 9750838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:36:56.621592+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:23.816399
License: Public Domain

SCHREIBER, J.,
dissenting.
The issues in this case are: (1) Whether the federal constitution’s Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to assistance of counsel is violated when the trial proceeds after an indigent defendant, who understands his rights, refuses representation by a competent assigned attorney and refuses to defend himself (assigned counsel being available for consultation), and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by not compelling assigned counsel to actively represent defendant over defendant’s objection during selection of the jury.
Defendant was found guilty of various offenses involving a larceny and a robbery arising out of three incidents, all of which occurred on the same day. There was substantial evidence in the record from which the jury could have concluded, as it apparently did, that the following events occurred.
About 10:00 a. m. on July 12, 1976, defendant, who had decided to rob a house in Galloway Township, was driven by William Booze from Atlantic City onto Route 9 near a wooded area in the township. Defendant then walked to the home of a Mr. and Mrs. Farkas where he broke into a bedroom and stole some rings and other jewelry. Defendant returned to Route 9 where he met Booze. They returned to Atlantic City, where defendant learned that the rings were only costume jewelry.
They decided to return to seek a more lucrative haul. Booze drove defendant back to the same spot on Route 9. This time defendant broke into the house of Alfred Crosson. Mr. Crosson’s father, who was bedridden with cancer, resided there with Mr. Crosson’s 65-year-old sister, Harriet Kinsell. Only Mrs. *382Kinsell and the father were home. Defendant came upon Mrs. Kinsell and savagely beat her with a tire iron that he had taken from Booze’s car. He stole some $135 and Mr. Crosson’s pocket knife.
The attack on Harriet Kinsell and the robbery were discovered shortly after. The police searched the surrounding area and came upon defendant. At first, defendant refused to stop walking and began to move at a fast pace. He finally yielded. A search of defendant uncovered two rings which were identified by Mrs. Farkas and the penknife which Mr. Crosson identified. Defendant said that the jewelry did not come from the house where the old woman had been beaten.
Mr. Richard I. Rosenberg of the Public Defender’s Office had been assigned as defense counsel. When the case came on for trial on the morning of November 3, 1976, defendant stated for the first time that he did not desire Rosenberg as his counsel and that his mother was going to retain private counsel. The trial court refused to adjourn the trial and advised defendant that if Mr. Rosenberg did not try the case, then defendant could act pro se and have Mr. Rosenberg’s advice. Defendant made it abundantly clear that he did not want Mr. Rosenberg as his counsel. Nor did he want his assistance or advice.
Defendant also refused to represent himself. While the jury was being selected, Mr. Rosenberg, as the court instructed, remained in the courtroom and was available for assistance. After the trial court explained fully to defendant his right to peremptory challenges in the jury selection, the court conducted the voir dire and on its own excused several jurors. Defendant did not exercise any peremptory challenges. After jury selection, the trial court ordered Mr. Rosenberg to proceed with the defense over defendant’s objection.
Both the Appellate Division and the majority of this Court agree that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to adjourn the trial. Not only was defendant dilatory, *383but there was no showing that he had retained a particular attorney or that defendant (or his mother) had the financial ability to compensate counsel. Further, the Appellate Division and the majority are satisfied that Mr. Rosenberg represented defendant thoroughly and competently. I am in complete accord with both conclusions.
The majority adopts the Appellate Division rationale that defendant was deprived of his right to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and by Art. I, par. 10 of the New Jersey Constitution. I do not agree with that proposition.
Once the trial was ready to proceed and the indigent defendant had rejected competent assigned counsel, we must ask if defendant was deprived of a residual constitutional right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.1 That Amendment reads in pertinent part that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” 2
It is settled that, although the indigent defendant must be provided with counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-340, 342, 83 S.Ct. 792, 794, 795, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 802, 804 (1963), he has no constitutional right to be provided with a particular attorney. United States ex rel. Carey v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210, 1215 (3 Cir. 1969), cert. den. sub nom. Carey v. Run*384dle, 397 U.S. 946, 90 S.Ct. 964, 25 L.Ed.2d 127 (1970); State v. Reddy, 137 N.J.Super. 32, 35 (App.Div.1975). When an indigent defendant is afforded the services of competent counsel, it is evident that the constitutional mandate has been satisfied.
It is important to recognize that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel is personal to him. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 820-821, 95 S.Ct. at 2533-2534, 45 L.Ed.2d at 573-574.3 Cf. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, - U.S. -, -, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 2909, 61 L.Ed.2d 608, 626 (1979), wherein the Supreme Court held that “the Sixth Amendment confers the right to a public trial only upon a defendant and only in a criminal case,” and Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 588, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 1662, 14 L.Ed.2d 543, 584 (1965), where he wrote: “Thus the right of ‘public trial’ is not one belonging to the public, but one belonging to the accused, and inhering in the institutional process by which justice is administered.”
An accused has a constitutional right to reject assigned counsel and represent himself. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 807, 95 S.Ct. at 2527, 45 L.Ed.2d at 566. From a Sixth Amendment viewpoint, a defendant may refuse to accept the assistance of counsel. However, his refusal may not be accepted unless the relinquishment of the right was made knowingly and intelligently. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-465, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466-1467 (1938); United States v. Fay, 364 F.2d 219, 222-223 (2 Cir. 1966). It is important that when a defendant refuses legal assistance, he has been made aware of “the dangers and disadvantages” involved. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d at 582.
*385Once an effective waiver is made, the court must accede to that waiver if the defendant chooses to represent himself. This proposition follows because the Sixth Amendment has been held to grant him, albeit impliedly, the right to defend himself. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 819-820, 95 S.Ct. at 2533, 45 L.Ed.2d at 572-573. Furthermore, the Sixth Amendment does not prevent the defendant from remaining silent throughout the trial by failing to invoke both his right to counsel and his right to defend himself. An indigent’s constitutional right is to the assistance of assigned competent counsel, and no more. The majority apparently contends that defendant has not waived his constitutional right by insisting upon an attorney other than the assigned counsel. This presumes that defendant is entitled to the lawyer of his choice, which he is not, or that defendant did not truly understand the nature of his rights, which he did. If the majority contention is that defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to the services of assigned counsel despite objection, then it mistakenly presumes that this constitutional right to counsel may not be waived. As previously observed, the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel is personal and therefore waivable. No Supreme Court opinion has been brought to our attention which has ever held to the contrary. When a defendant dismisses assigned counsel and also declines to proceed pro se, he waives his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel.
Designation of counsel over the defendant’s objection is not supportable by the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel for the very essence of the attorney-client relationship is absent. The Supreme Court’s analysis in Faretta is predicated on this thesis. The Court commented:
The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an aid to a willing defendant—not an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally. To thrust counsel upon the accused, against his considered wish, thus violates the logic of the Amendment. In such a case, counsel is not an assistant, but a master; and the right to *386make a defense is stripped of the personal character upon which the Amendment insists. It is true that when a defendant chooses to have a lawyer manage and present his case, law and tradition may allocate to the counsel the power to make binding decisions of trial strategy in many areas. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 451, 85 S.Ct. 564, 569, 13 L.Ed.2d 408; Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7-8, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 1248-1249, 16 L.Ed.2d 314; Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439, 83 S.Ct. 822, 849, 9 L.Ed.2d 837. This allocation can only be justified, however, by the defendant’s consent, at the outset, to accept counsel as his representative. An unwanted counsel “represents” the defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction. Unless the accused has acquiesced in such representation, the defense presented is not the defense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a very real sense, it is not his defense. [422 U.S. at 820, 95 S.Ct. at 2533, 45 L.Ed.2d at 573]
A case strikingly similar to the one at bar is United States ex rel. Testamark v. Vincent, 496 F.2d 641 (2 Cir. 1974). There the defendant Testamark rejected the services of assigned counsel and refused to act as his own counsel. Assigned counsel was available throughout the trial, even though the defendant insisted that counsel not represent him, sit next to him or even be in the courtroom. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held Testamark had not been denied effective representation of counsel. It wrote:
Finally, Testamark’s actions at trial constituted a waiver of his right to counsel. He was given the choice between proceeding with appointed counsel, or proceeding pro se. He chose to do neither. .
Testamark’s refusal to participate in the trial or confer with counsel were of his own choosing. The court gave him the opportunity to proceed with counsel or to represent himself. Actually the court gave him both because Lipton [assigned counsel] was available at all times. [496 F.2d at 643-644]
In State v. Scarbrough, 55 Wis.2d 181, 197 N.W.2d 790 (Sup.Ct.1972), the trial court had advised the defendant that he could keep assigned counsel, try the case alone, or have counsel sit with him and be available for assistance. The defendant continued to reject the services of the attorney. The trial proceeded over his protest that he was incapable of trying the case because he was not a lawyer. At defendant’s request on two occasions during the trial the attorney sat with and assisted the defend*387ant. In both instances the defendant dismissed the lawyer after a short interval. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the conviction. It held that
the defendant waived his right to counsel by dismissing his appointed counsel at the eleventh hour and by his rejection of the reasonable efforts of the court to furnish him with the assistance of counsel. We are of the further opinion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to appoint another counsel and insisting that the trial proceed without counsel for the defendant. [55 Wis.2d at 188, 197 N.W.2d at 793-794]
In Kates v. Nelson, 435 F.2d 1085 (9 Cir. 1970), the deféndant dismissed assigned counsel in the midst of trial. Although he advised the court that he did not wish to represent himself, counsel was permitted to withdraw and the trial proceeded. The court held that the defendant was not entitled to complain, for he had knowingly created the very situation of which he was complaining.
In Missouri v. Gaye, 532 S.W.2d 783 (Mo.Ct.App.1976), the defendant refused designated counsel and rejected the offer to try the case himself. The trial proceeded and the defendant was convicted. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. After noting that the defendant was aware of his right to and need for counsel, it stated: “If appellant may lje said to have been denied the benefit of counsel, it is a case of self-denial; if wounded by not having counsel actively defending him, it was a self-inflicted wound.” 532 S.W.2d at 790.
This is not to say that a trial court may not exercise its discretion under certain circumstances and order that counsel defend an accused over his objection. Thus, where a defendant, having discharged his counsel, leaves the courtroom, it is desirable as a matter of policy ‘that counsel be ordered to proceed. See State v. Wiggins, 158 N.J.Super. 27 (App.Div.1978). Such policy grows out of the public interest in the integrity of the judicial process. United States v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 448, 452 (7 *388Cir. 1978), cert. den. 435 U.S. 952, 98 S.Ct. 1581, 55 L.Ed.2d 803 (1978). It is not founded on the accused’s Sixth Amendment constitutional right. See Faretta. Nor is the effectuation of that policy contrary to the defendant’s constitutional right, for its waiver does not necessarily “carry with it the right to insist upon the opposite of that right.” Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 23, 34-35, 85 S.Ct. 783, 790, 13 L.Ed.2d 630, 638 (1965).
Here the trial court’s decision to permit defendant to proceed pro se with assigned counsel standing by cannot be said to have been so plainly improvident as to constitute an abuse of the broad discretion vested in it. Cf. State v. Davis, 45 N.J. 195, 198-199 (1965). Defendant had been made fully aware of his right to represent himself or have Mr. Rosenberg continue to represent him. The trial court patiently iterated and reiterated defendant’s rights. A substantial part of the first 50 pages of the transcript are devoted to the court’s explanation to defendant. Defendant made it clear that he did not want Mr. Rosenberg to represent him. He claimed that he did not understand what was going on,4 but refused any assistance from assigned counsel. Under these circumstances, the trial court ordered defendant to act pro se, keeping Mr. Rosenberg available at all times.
The trial court explained to defendant that he had a right to strike any 20 jurors for any reason. When asked if he understood, defendant refused to respond. The trial court then conducted the voir dire. R. l:8-3(a). Throughout, Mr. Rosenberg remained in the courtroom and could have advised or taken charge upon defendant’s request.
The trial court on its own motion excused a juror who was acquainted with the son of the victim, Harriet Kinsell, and *389another juror whose nephew was a friend of the prosecutor. It also excused a juror whose husband had been the victim of a robbery. Three other jurors were excused for cause. There is no evidence, and defendant makes no claim, that the jury was biased or prejudiced or that any juror should have been excused for cause. The verdict was just and clearly supported by the evidence,5 and “a retrial would needlessly burden the administration of justice and would grossly disserve the interests of society.” State v. Singletary, 80 N.J. 55, 65 (1979) (Jacobs, J., concurring).
I would reverse and remand the matter to the Appellate Division to consider the other issues raised by defendant.
Chief Justice HUGHES and Justice MOUNTAIN join in this opinion.

The Appellate Division analysis interpreted the United States Constitution and construed the New Jersey Constitution in accordance with that interpretation.

The New Jersey Constitution contains comparable language. “In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to have the assistance of counsel in his defense.” N.J.Const. (1947), Art. I, par. 10.
The Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel is applicable to the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2532, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 572 (1975).

In Faretta, all the justices agreed to that proposition. See dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun in which he states, “I believe the specific guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are personal to the accused . . 422 U.S. at 848, 95 S.Ct. at 2547, 45 L.Ed.2d at 589.

At the sentencing hearing, it was revealed that defendant had had eight prior convictions over a period of years.

Defendant contends that certain other trial errors warrant a reversal of his conviction, but these claims were not argued or considered on the appeal before us.