Court Opinion

ID: 9576336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:23:20.722132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:05:49.783130
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Justice,
concurring specially.
I reluctantly concur. The ideal solution to this problem might be statutes that would permit the grandparents to adopt Kevin without the necessity of terminating, the natural father’s parental rights. But our statutes do not permit such a solution. Our law recognizes no more than one legal father and does not permit adoption without termination of parental rights of the natural parent.
This is an unusual case in which the impetus for adoption came from 14-year-old Kevin who wanted to be adopted by the grandparents who raised him and are, in fact, Kevin’s surrogate parents. This is not the situation we see occasionally on appeal in which the grandparents instigate of their own volition proceedings to terminate the parental rights of their natural child in order that they may adopt them. E.g., Sexton v. A.M.A., 439 N.W.2d 535 (N.D.1989). Kevin’s natural father is schizophrenic and not only is he currently on medication and in counseling but the prognosis for any substantial improvement in his condition is poor. The probabilities are that he never will be able to care for Kevin as a normal parent. An attempt was made to place Kevin in his father’s custody for a six-week period in 1984-1985, but Kevin was returned to his grandparents as a result of his father’s inability to provide proper care for Kevin.
Because Kevin is a deprived child within the meaning of our statute, his custody is determined by the juvenile court under Chapter 27-20, N.D.C.C. That custody determination must be reviewed every two years pursuant to Section 27-20-36(3), N.D. C.C.1 In the past Kevin’s father has opposed continued custody being given to the grandparents without any realistic possibility that he could be granted custody because of his mental illness. Nevertheless *422the evidence in the record reflects that the grandparents encouraged and assisted in maintaining the relationship between their son and grandson and did nothing to discourage visitation between the two. It is undisputed that Kevin requested that he be adopted by his grandparents. It is contended the reasons for the request are Kevin’s need for a sense of belonging and the fear of the custody battles which arise at two-year intervals. Kevin specifically testified that he wanted to continue to see his father and would continue to see his father.
Kevin is being well cared for by his grandparents — the persons whom he requested to adopt him and who petitioned to adopt him. The result of the majority opinion appears to be that the parent whose unfortunate circumstances resulted in foster care is entitled to take advantage of the good care provided by another for the purpose of arguing that there is no evidence that the conditions and causes of deprivation are likely to continue. Were Kevin to be in his father’s care there is little dispute in the record that he would be deprived. If the grandparents did not care for Kevin he would be in a foster home. Furthermore, the trial court did find deprivation and stated:
“Petitioners have shown by clear and convincing evidence that this ground [deprivation] does exist for termination of parental rights. There is no compulsion upon the court to grant the request because the statute is framed as a discretionary decision. Although the ‘harm’ done will probably not change, I do not find deprivation, alone, sufficient reason to cut the parental bond. He has received loving care from his grandparents and the situation will not be changed by whatever this court does.”
The trial court further stated:
“I find it to be in the best interest of the child to be adopted, however, this cannot override the right of the parent to custody where consent is not obtained or excused.”
Additionally, the trial court found that the father “has a singular reason for opposing the adoption; he fears that his visitation rights would be curtailed or limited.” The trial court concluded that “The fear expressed by the father about visitation is not well founded. There is no rational reason to think that once the adoption is completed that [the father] would be cut off from contact with his child. This has never happened in the past and the attitude of the [grandparents] indicates it will not happen in the future.”
The trial court discussed the various bases for terminating parental rights under either Chapter 27-20, the Juvenile Court Act, and Chapter 14-15, the Revised Uniform Adoption Act. Those reasons include abandonment and deprivation. The trial court indicated there was no evidence of abandonment and, that although there was deprivation, it was not a sufficiently compelling reason to terminate.
Section 14 — 15—06(j) provides:
“1. Consent to adoption is not required of:
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“j. A parent of the minor, if the failure of the parent to consent is excused by the court in the best interest of the child by reason of the parent’s prolonged unexplained absence, unavailability, incapacity, ...”
Section 27-20-44 permits the termination of parental rights if the child is a deprived child and the court finds that the conditions and causes of the deprivation are likely to continue or will not be remedied and that by reason thereof the child is suffering or will probably suffer serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm. The findings of the trial court, sustained in the record, are that this child is deprived and that the causes of deprivation are likely to continue.
I can understand sympathy for the father. I do not believe it outweighs the interests of the child. The record is replete with cause to terminate the parental rights and, as the trial court has noted, the only reason for the father’s refusal to consent to the adoption is an irrational reason that he would be denied the right to visit his son. There are some obvious benefits to Kevin from the adoption, not the least of *423which is the avoiding every two years the emotional trauma of a hearing in which his custody is disputed by a father who realistically will not be able to assume custody. More important, however, if Kevin were to be adopted it would assure Kevin that his future custody and well being will be determined by the loving grandparents. with whom he has lived nearly his entire life and not by an irrational father or a court!
Although the equities of this case are clearly with Kevin, the ultimate effect of the trial court’s denial of the adoption is unknown. It may be, as the trial court concluded, that the situation would not change whether the court granted or denied the petition for adoption or whether it terminated the parental rights of Kevin’s father. There is no testimony, expert or otherwise, in the record on that matter other than Kevin’s own testimony. Were there any expert testimony that the failure to allow Kevin’s grandparents to adopt him would have a deleterious effect on Kevin, I would reverse because the evidence of continued deprivation is substantial. The statute may, as the trial court believed, be discretionary, but it would be an abuse of that discretion to deny the adoption if there were evidence that the denial would seriously affect Kevin’s emotional well being.
ERICKSTAD, C.J., concurs.

. Section 27-20-36(3), N.D.C.C., provides that an order of disposition pursuant to which a child is placed in foster care continues in force for not more than eighteen months and that any other order of disposition continues in force for not more than two years. The 1989 Legislative Assembly amended subsection 4(d) of Section 27-30-36 which limits an extension of an order of disposition to not to exceed eighteen months from the expiration of an order limited by-subsection 3 or two years from the expiration of any other limited order, to provide:
"However, the court may order that the child permanently remain in foster care with a specified care giver and that the duration of the order be left to the determination of the court if the court determines that:
"(1) All reasonable efforts have been made to reunite the child with the child’s family;
"(2) The deprivation is likely to continue;
"(3) With respect to a child under the age of ten, termination of parental rights and subsequent adoption would not be in the best interests of the child; and
"(4) The placement of the child in permanent foster care is in the best interests of the child.” See S.B. 2295, 1989 Legislative Assembly.
Had such a provision been in force at the time of the hearing resulting in the order from which this appeal was taken, and had the trial court been able to implement the provision, it might have allayed some of Kevin’s uncertainty and fear of the periodic custodial battles.