Court Opinion

ID: 9930718
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 17:00:51.195306+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:06.213694
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-3165    Document: 010110996281   Date Filed: 02/07/2024   Page: 1
                                                               FILED
                                                   United States Court of Appeals
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS         Tenth Circuit

                            FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                     February 7, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                    Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                        Clerk of Court
     JOHN F. FRANCIS,

           Petitioner - Appellant,

     v.                                                 No. 22-3165
                                              (D.C. No. 5:21-CV-03079-DDC)
     CHANDLER CHEEKS, Lansing                            (D. Kan.)
     Correctional Facility Warden;
     DEREK SCHMIDT, Attorney
     General of the State of Kansas,

           Respondents - Appellees.
                      _________________________________

                             ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, KELLY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
                _________________________________

          This appeal involves a habeas action, which arose from the killing of

 Mr. John Francis’s cousin. For that killing, Mr. Clem Hollingsworth IV

 was charged. Believing that Mr. Hollingsworth was guilty, Mr. Francis

 allegedly tried to obtain bond for Mr. Hollingsworth in order to murder

 *
      Oral argument would not help us decide the appeal, so we have
 decided the appeal based on the record and the parties’ briefs. See Fed. R.
 App. P. 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).

       This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except
 under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
 But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if
 otherwise appropriate. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
Appellate Case: 22-3165   Document: 010110996281    Date Filed: 02/07/2024   Page: 2

 him. This alleged effort didn’t succeed, but Mr. Hollingsworth later

 obtained release when his mother bonded him out. The next day,

 Mr. Hollingsworth was shot to death. For this shooting, the trial court

 convicted Mr. Francis of first-degree murder.

          After exhausting remedies in state court, Mr. Francis sought habeas

 relief in federal district court. The district court denied habeas relief, and

 Mr. Hollingsworth appeals. We address two main issues:

          1.   The materiality of information undermining the credibility of a
               bondsman who had testified against Mr. Francis

          2.   Actual innocence of Mr. Hollingsworth

 1.       Nondisclosure of information about the bondsman’s credibility
          doesn’t entitle Mr. Francis to habeas relief.

          In the habeas petition, Mr. Francis claimed that the prosecution had

 withheld exculpatory information about a bondsman who testified at the

 trial.

          a.   We defer to the state supreme court’s decision as long as the
               court reasonably applied precedent of the United States
               Supreme Court.

          The state supreme court rejected this claim, and Mr. Francis

 unsuccessfully renewed this claim in his habeas petition. We conduct de

 novo review over the district court’s ruling. Menzies v. Powell, 52 F.4th

 1178, 1195 (10th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 122 (2023). In

 conducting that review, we apply the same standard that governed in

 federal district court. Id. There the court had to apply a deferential

                                         2
Appellate Case: 22-3165   Document: 010110996281   Date Filed: 02/07/2024   Page: 3

 standard before considering the merits. Id. Under this deferential standard,

 the district court couldn’t grant relief on the merits unless the state

 supreme court had

       •      acted contrary to Supreme Court precedent,

       •      unreasonably applied such precedent, or

       •      unreasonably determined the facts.

 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2).

       b.     The state supreme court didn’t unreasonably apply Supreme
              Court precedent.

       In his opening brief, Mr. Francis argues that the state supreme court

 unreasonably applied a test created by the United States Supreme Court for

 evidence undermining the credibility of a prosecution witness. For this

 argument, Mr. Francis claims that the prosecution withheld evidence that

 the bondsman had post-traumatic-stress disorder (PTSD) and had expressed

 confusion about some matters that he was expected to testify about.

       When the nondisclosed evidence is material, the Supreme Court has

 said that nondisclosure violates the defendant’s right to due process. Giglio

 v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972). When the state supreme

 court issued its decision, the United States Supreme Court had regarded

 evidence as material if disclosure would have created a reasonable

 probability of a different result. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682

 (1985).

                                        3
Appellate Case: 22-3165   Document: 010110996281   Date Filed: 02/07/2024   Page: 4

       We consider not only this test but also the federal district court’s

 standard for evaluating the state supreme court’s application of the test.

 This standard prevents habeas relief if the state supreme court’s

 application of the test was reasonable. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The court’s

 application of the test was reasonable unless the state supreme court made

 an error so “well understood and comprehended in existing law” that it lay

 “beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement.” Harrington v.

 Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). In considering the possibility of fair-

 minded disagreement, we give considerable leeway to the state supreme

 court in light of the generality of the Supreme Court’s standard for

 materiality. See Andrew v. White, 62 F.4th 1299, 1330 (10th Cir. 2023)

 (stating that we provide “substantial deference” to the state appellate court

 in light of the generality of the Supreme Court’s “disclosure rule . . .

 announced in [Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)]”).

       Finally, we consider the reasonableness of the state supreme court’s

 reasoning based on the arguments that Mr. Francis had presented.

 See Menzies v. Powell, 52 F.4th 1178, 1201 (10th Cir. 2022) (“We review

 the reasonableness of the Utah Supreme Court’s decision based on the

 arguments presented.”), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 122 (2023); Wellman v.

 Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 952 F.3d 1242, 1249 (10th Cir. 2020) (“[U]nder

 Section 2254(d), we review the reasonableness of the state court’s decision

 in light of the arguments the petitioner raised in the state court.”).

                                        4
Appellate Case: 22-3165   Document: 010110996281     Date Filed: 02/07/2024   Page: 5

       To the state supreme court, Mr. Francis asserted that the PTSD and

 confusion were material because the bondsman was an important witness:

       The evidence that the State’s witness, [the bondsman] told Det.
       Daniels that he had post-traumatic stress and was confusing the
       issues in this case was material impeachment information which
       would have affected the outcome of the trial. Evidence at trial
       proved that [the bondsman’s] testimony was integral to the
       State’s case. The failure of the State to disclose the information,
       which was explicitly requested by the defense, was a direct
       violation of the Brady rule and its progeny and K.S.A. § 22-
       3212. The State’s discovery violation irreparably prejudiced the
       Defendant and denied him a fair trial. The trial court abused its
       discretion in denying the Defendant’s motion to dismiss, or
       alternatively, grant him a new trial due to the discovery
       violations.

 Appellant’s Opening Br. at 82–83, No. 04-92087-5 (Kan. 2005), available

 at 2005 WL 2395690. But Mr. Francis didn’t say why PTSD or confusion

 would have materially undermined the bondsman’s credibility.

       Given the lack of discussion about the importance of the PTSD or

 confusion, the state supreme court acted reasonably in concluding that the

 new evidence hadn’t satisfied the United States Supreme Court’s test for

 materiality. The bondsman testified at trial that

       •      Mr. Francis and others had tried to get a bond for
              Mr. Hollingsworth,

       •      the group had said that Mr. Hollingsworth would be out only a
              few days,

       •      Mr. Francis had said that his cousin had been killed by
              Mr. Hollingsworth, and

       •      someone in the group had said that the bondsman would be off
              the bond as soon as Mr. Hollingsworth’s body was found.
                                        5
Appellate Case: 22-3165   Document: 010110996281    Date Filed: 02/07/2024   Page: 6

       Shortly before the bondsman testified at trial, however, he had

 expressed concern to the lead detective. The bondsman said that he had

 PTSD and his own son had been murdered, creating confusion “on a couple

 of issues.” State v. Francis, 145 P.3d 48, 70 (Kan. 2006). The prosecution

 didn’t disclose that statement, and Mr. Francis claims that the Constitution

 entitled him to the information before the bondsman testified.

       The state supreme court disagreed. The court acknowledged that the

 bondsman was a “key witness” who gave “important testimony.” Id. at 71.

 But the court concluded that the PTSD and confusion wouldn’t have

 created a reasonable probability of a different result. Id. at 72. For this

 conclusion, the court reasoned that

       •      the bondsman was unlikely to confuse his son’s murder with
              the unusual solicitation of a bond for someone who the group
              wanted dead and

       •      the bondsman’s account was consistent during the
              investigation, the preliminary hearing, and the trial.

 Id.

       Perhaps the court could have applied the facts differently and arrived

 at a different result. After all, the bondsman was undoubtedly a key

 witness for the prosecution. But the state supreme court acknowledged the

 importance of the bondsman’s testimony. It was the peculiarity of the

 situation that magnified the testimony: Mr. Francis and others approached

 the bondsman to issue a bond for Mr. Hollingsworth, but the group
                                        6
Appellate Case: 22-3165   Document: 010110996281   Date Filed: 02/07/2024   Page: 7

 obviously hated Mr. Hollingsworth. According to the bondsman,

 Mr. Francis said that a close relative had been killed by Mr. Hollingsworth,

 calling him a “mother******.” Then, the group assured the bondsman that

 his risk would end in just a few days when Mr. Hollingsworth’s body was

 found. The state supreme court reasonably concluded that the bondsman

 was unlikely to confuse these circumstances with those surrounding his

 son’s murder.

       Granted, the bondsman said shortly before testifying that he was

 experiencing some confusion on “a couple of issues” that the prosecution

 wanted him to testify about. In analyzing the bondsman’s confusion,

 however, the state supreme court needed to address an ambiguous record:

 No one ever asked the bondsman what he was confused about. So the court

 needed to assess probabilities and concluded that the confusion was

 unlikely to involve the critical parts of the bondsman’s account. Though

 jurists might weigh the probabilities differently, the state supreme court’s

 analysis was reasonable. See McCray v. Capra, 45 F.4th 634, 644–45 (2d

 Cir. 2022). 1 So the district court couldn’t grant habeas relief unless the

 1
       There the petitioner was convicted of rape, and the central issue was
 whether the sex had been consensual. McCray, 45 F.4th at 637–38. The
 petitioner sought habeas relief based in part on the prosecution’s
 withholding of prior assessments of the victim’s mental health. Id. at 640–
 41, 644–45. The state appellate court rejected the claim, and the Second
 Circuit held that the state court could reasonably view the assessments as
 immaterial because they were ambiguous as to the victim’s ability to
 remember whether the sex had been consensual. Id. at 644–45.
                                        7
Appellate Case: 22-3165   Document: 010110996281   Date Filed: 02/07/2024   Page: 8

 state court had (1) acted contrary to Supreme Court precedent or (2)

 unreasonably determined the facts. See p. 3, above.

       c.     We decline to consider whether the state supreme court
              acted contrary to a precedent by the United States Supreme
              Court or unreasonably determined the facts.

       In his reply brief, Mr. Francis argues that the state supreme court

 acted contrary to precedent from the United States Supreme Court and

 unreasonably determined the facts. For two reasons, Mr. Francis waited too

 long to make these arguments.

       First, Mr. Francis failed to preserve these arguments by failing to

 raise them in federal district court. Menzies v. Powell, 52 F.4th 1178, 1201

 (10th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 122 (2023). If Mr. Francis had

 urged plain error, we could address the arguments under the plain-error

 standard. See Hancock v. Trammell, 798 F.3d 1002, 1011 (10th Cir. 2015).

 But Mr. Francis didn’t urge plain error. So we consider the arguments

 waived. Id. 2

 2
       Our precedents are inconsistent in discussing preservation in cases
 involving habeas review. We sometimes treat unpreserved issues as
 waived, sometimes as forfeited. See Harmon v. Sharp, 936 F.3d 1044,
 1085–91 (10th Cir. 2019) (Holmes, J., concurring) (discussing this
 inconsistency in our case law). The difference here is academic. If the
 issue involves forfeiture rather than waiver, we could consider the issue
 under the plain-error standard. United States v. Carrasco-Salazar, 494 F.3d
 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2007). But Mr. Francis has not argued plain error, so
 we would not entertain the issue even if it had been forfeited rather than
 waived. See Hancock v. Trammell, 798 F.3d 1002, 1011 (10th Cir. 2015).

                                        8
Appellate Case: 22-3165   Document: 010110996281   Date Filed: 02/07/2024    Page: 9

       Second, in his appellate briefing, Mr. Francis waited until his reply

 brief to make these arguments. The reply brief was too late for these

 arguments, resulting in a second waiver.

       For both reasons, we consider the arguments waived.

 2.    Mr. Francis hasn’t shown actual innocence.

       A habeas petitioner must generally follow state procedural

 requirements before raising the same underlying claims in a habeas

 petition. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731–32 (1991). The failure

 to satisfy these requirements can generally trigger a procedural default,

 preventing habeas relief. Davila v. Davis, 582 U.S. 521, 527 (2017). An

 exception exists when the petitioner demonstrates actual innocence.

 McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 392 (2013).

       The district court regarded five of the habeas claims as procedurally

 defaulted:

       1.     refusal to consider the jury’s question about an instruction

       2.     refusal to instruct the jury on the need to show more than mere
              association or presence with someone who committed the crime

       3.     introduction of evidence involving ownership of a gun and
              ammunition

       4.     permission for the lead detective to sit near the prosecution
              table

       5.     presence of cumulative errors

                                        9
Appellate Case: 22-3165   Document: 010110996281   Date Filed: 02/07/2024   Page: 10

  To avoid the procedural defaults, Mr. Francis has invoked the exception

  for actual innocence. The district court concluded that Mr. Francis hadn’t

  satisfied his burden, and we engage in de novo review. Taylor v. Powell,

  7 F.4th 920, 932 (10th Cir. 2021). On de novo review, we agree with the

  district court.

        For actual innocence, the petitioner must present evidence that

        •      is new and reliable and

        •      shows “that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror
               would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.”

  Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324, 327 (1995). Trying to satisfy this

  exception, Mr. Francis relies on three categories of new evidence:

        1.     evidence undermining the credibility of Mr. Hollingsworth’s
               mother,

        2.     an affidavit from Mr. Corey Shannon, a friend of both
               Mr. Francis and Mr. Hollingworth, and

        3.     evidence about the bondsman’s PTSD.

  In our view, the combination of new evidence doesn’t make an acquittal

  more likely than not.

        Mr. Hollingsworth’s mother testified that she was driving her son

  when the killing took place. According to the mother, Mr. Hollingsworth

  was in the back seat of her car, another car pulled next to her, and multiple

  individuals started shooting into her car. She said that she saw Mr. Francis

  in the front seat of the shooters’ car.

                                            10
Appellate Case: 22-3165   Document: 010110996281   Date Filed: 02/07/2024   Page: 11

        At trial, Mr. Francis’s attorney thoroughly cross-examined the

  mother, eliciting admissions that

        •     Mr. Francis had been to her house only once,

        •     she had given the police the names of two other individuals
              who might want to harm Mr. Hollingsworth,

        •     someone had been watching Mr. Hollingsworth,

        •     the mother thought that she had ducked when the gunfire
              started,

        •     she didn’t actually see a gun,

        •     she had said after the shooting that she was not certain and had
              “just suspected” that it was Mr. Francis in the car, Appellant’s
              Supp. App. Vol. IV at 248–49, and

        •     she had told the police that she wished that she “had seen for
              sure,” id. at 252.

        Despite the existing impeachment of Mr. Hollingsworth’s mother,

  Mr. Francis refers to new evidence undermining her credibility. The new

  evidence consists of an affidavit from a private investigator. In the

  affidavit, the investigator said that he had spoken to someone (Reggie

  Gant), who in turn had said that the mother had tried to convince him to

  confess to the murder. Mr. Francis’s appellate argument about this

  evidence consists of one sentence: “Additionally, the district court’s

  failure to analyze Gant’s affidavit is reversible error because this Court

  held in [Fontenot v. Crow, 4 F.4th 982 (10th Cir. 2021)] that all newly

                                        11
Appellate Case: 22-3165   Document: 010110996281   Date Filed: 02/07/2024   Page: 12

  presented evidence must be analyzed in the gateway innocence calculus.”

  Appellant’s Opening Br. at 29.

         Though Mr. Francis points out that the district court didn’t discuss

  this evidence, he doesn’t say why it is important. Generally, double-

  hearsay adds little to a claim of actual innocence. See Thomas v. Williams,

  822 F.3d 378, 387 (7th Cir. 2016) (stating that “hearsay within hearsay”

  had “little probative value” in establishing actual innocence). Even if we

  were to accept what Mr. Gant had purportedly said, it would have added

  little to the existing impeachment. Mr. Hollingsworth’s mother admitted

  that

         •    she had given the police the names of two other individuals
              who might have wanted to harm her son and

         •    she still thought that these two individuals had been involved
              in the murder.

  Appellant’s Supp. App. Vol. IV at 246.

         Mr. Francis also points to three affidavits involving Mr. Corey

  Shannon. In the affidavits, Mr. Shannon said that (1) Mr. Francis had

  nothing to do with the murder of Mr. Hollingsworth and

  (2) Mr. Hollingsworth’s mother acknowledged in a phone call that she

  hadn’t seen the fatal shots. The district court regarded this evidence as

  insufficient for actual innocence.

         So do we. The mother never said that she had seen the fatal shots.

  She instead said that she had seen Mr. Francis, along with others, shooting
                                        12
Appellate Case: 22-3165   Document: 010110996281   Date Filed: 02/07/2024   Page: 13

  from the nearby car. And Mr. Shannon didn’t say how he would have

  known who had shot Mr. Hollingsworth. At the time of the shooting, Mr.

  Shannon was in a Missouri prison.

        Lastly, Mr. Francis points to new evidence about the bondsman’s

  confusion and PTSD. We’ve concluded above that the state supreme court

  reasonably regarded that evidence as immaterial. For similar reasons, we

  conclude that this evidence added little to Mr. Francis’s claim of actual

  innocence.

        Mr. Francis argues that the PTSD and confusion would have

  undermined the bondsman’s credibility. Even if Mr. Francis were correct,

  the evidence wouldn’t have shown that Mr. Francis was actually innocent

  of the crime. See Stafford v. Saffle, 34 F.3d 1557, 1562 (10th Cir. 1994)

  (stating that the new evidence was “only impeachment evidence, rather

  than evidence of actual innocence”).

        Regardless of whether the new evidence is viewed separately or

  together, Mr. Francis failed to show a likelihood that no jury would have

  found him guilty. 3 So we reject his claim of actual innocence.

                                      ** *

  3
        In his reply brief, Mr. Francis also points to new evidence that the
  bondsman later recanted his trial testimony. But Mr. Francis failed to make
  this argument in district court or in his opening appellate brief. The reply
  brief was too late. See pp. 8–9, above.

                                         13
Appellate Case: 22-3165   Document: 010110996281   Date Filed: 02/07/2024   Page: 14

        We affirm the denial of habeas relief. 4

                                         Entered for the Court

                                         Robert E. Bacharach
                                         Circuit Judge

  4
        Mr. Francis moves for judicial notice and a certificate of
  appealability on other issues. The requested judicial notice involves
  materials from the state-court record. The government doesn’t object, and
  we grant the motion. But we deny a certificate of appealability on all
  issues other than those discussed above.

                                        14