Court Opinion

ID: 9686150
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:31:32.053941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:15.256351
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(dissenting). The opinion of the Court "hold[s] that the underlying intent of the framers would best be effected by requiring circuit courts to review final decisions of the crc de novo by taking a fresh look at the evidence and testimony in the record produced before the agency, and by determining whether the crc’s factual findings and legal conclusions are supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence.” Ante, p 590. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant case, however, no evidence, testimony, or record was produced by the agency. Walker filed a charge of discrimination on April 23, 1980, and was advised on October 17, 1980, that the Civil Rights Commission had found insuf*619ficient grounds to issue a charge and, therefore, his complaint had been dismissed. Accompanying the order of dismissal was a statement of the findings and conclusions of the commission. While these refer to "witnesses including those named by the claimant,” there was no hearing at which witnesses testified.
The Department of Civil Rights investigates a charge of discrimination. Witnesses are interviewed in the course of the investigation. The investigator files a report and, on the basis of that report, an administrative decision is made whether to file a complaint with the commission or to dismiss for lack of probable cause. The only "record” is the file compiled by the investigator in the course of the investigation.
The contents of the investigative file will depend on the thoroughness of the investigation and the industry of the investigator. The investigative file may or may not contain a full, complete, and objective record of all the evidence that the complainant supplied. It may or may not contain an accurate report of the evidence that the witnesses who were interviewed would, if called to testify, provide. All the witnesses may not have been interviewed.
A circuit judge, on review of such a "record,” would find only what the investigator placed in the file which, again, may not be a complete record of all that could or should be placed in the file.
Unless the investigative file "record” can be expanded, the complainant would not have an opportunity to refute or supplement what the investigator has reflected in the file. Unless the file "record” can be expanded, the circuit judge ordinarily could not evaluate the quality or extent of the investigation. Only if on the face of the materials placed by the crc in the file it is apparent *620either that the investigator made an erroneous determination of no probable cause or that the investigation was so woefully deficient as to amount to no investigation at all would the circuit judge be able to grant relief to a complainant.
i
While the question here is whether the crc erred in failing to find probable cause, what is said by the Court in this case will be read as applying where there has been a crc hearing following a finding of probable cause. The practice until now has been to provide a new trial on appeal following a crc hearing. The opinion of the Court will henceforth deprive both sides — employers and other defendants as well as workers and other complainants — of the opportunity to try the cause anew.
The constitution provides that appeals from final orders of the commission, including refusals to issue complaints, "shall be tried de novo before the circuit court . . . .” Const 1963, art 5, §29. The Address to the People, in explaining what the words "tried de novo” mean, stated that "appeals from final orders of the commission shall be tried anew before the circuit court having jurisdiction.”1 (Emphasis supplied.) The words "tried anew” should, in my opinion, be given their ordinary every day meaning, namely, a new trial.
The record of the Constitutional Convention supports the view that a new trial, a trial anew, is the intended meaning. The delegate who offered the amendment said: "The words 'de novo/ of course, mean a new trial. It means that a person who is really aggrieved has the opportunity to represent his evidence before a court of law.” (Em*621phasis supplied.) Another delegate who spoke said that "the person aggrieved, whether he be plaintiff or defendant, [would have] the right to have a new trial before a court. He novo* means 'anew,’ which means that they shall try the case from the beginning.”2 (Emphasis supplied.)
The opinion of the Court dismisses the clear statements of the proponent of the amendment that its adoption would permit the aggrieved party to "re-present his evidence” and of the delegate who said that this would permit the aggrieved person to "try the case from the beginning” because another delegate said that he would vote for the amendment although he didn’t fully understand the de novo terminology and still another had adverted to the fepa, which provided for a "trial de novo” and this Court had, in Lesniak v FEPC, 364 Mich 495; 111 NW2d 790 (1961), construed this to mean that the appeal would be heard on the administrative record.3
It is assumed, without record support, that the delegate who referred to the pepa and a majority of the delegates as well had become aware of this Court’s decision five months earlier in Lesniak and —despite the clear statements on the record of the Constitutional Convention that a trial de novo meant "re-presenting the evidence” and trying the case "from the beginning” — had adopted or intended the Lesniak construction of the term "tried de novo.”4 I would not indulge such an assumption._
*622II
The argument that a construction of "tried de novo” that would permit a new trial would undermine the importance of the crc begs the question. It was for the delegates to the Constitutional Convention and not the justices of this Court to decide whether there should be a new trial.
In this connection, we note that the Legislature has provided for dual remedies. A complainant need not present his case to the crc. Even if the complaint is presented to the crc, the complainant can thereafter file a circuit court action5 as long as he acts within the three-year statute of limitations allowed therefor.6
Since the practice has been that the complainant can file with the crc, go to a hearing before the crc, and obtain a new trial hearing on appeal to the circuit court, a complainant could obtain a trial hearing in the circuit court either upon appeal from the crc or by filing a separate action in the circuit court.7
There appears to be a preference on the part of complainants and defendants for a judicial determination of the issues involved in a civil rights case. Complainants will continue to be able to exercise their preference because they can file an *623action in the circuit court and avoid a determination by the crc.
Employers and other defendants will be particularly disadvantaged by today’s decision because they may not commence a circuit court action, and will not be able to supplement the record made before the commission. In those cases where the complainant chooses to file a complaint before the crc, obtains a probable cause determination and tries the merits before the crc, the record made before the crc will be the only record and cannot be expanded.
The provisions of the Civil Rights Act providing that the crc record shall be forwarded to the circuit court are not inconsistent with "representation of the evidence from the beginning.” The practice in de novo appeals has generally been to hear the complaint on the record made before the crc, expanded by such additional testimony and further examination of witnesses who have testified as either side desires.
The crc hearing thus has not been a useless or pointless consumption of time and resources. The crc appoints a hearing officer who will generally be a lawyer who hears all the evidence. That record is examined by the crc and a decision is made, and in the event of an appeal the record is forwarded to the circuit court. Although the parties have been at liberty on appeal to add to the record, the record made before the crc generally relieved the circuit court of rehearing the witnesses except to the extent either side wished to further examine a witness.
m
The opinion of the Court states two different standards for review before the circuit court. The *624Court states that "the circuit court shall review the record produced at the crc anew, drawing its own inferences and conclusions from that record,” and in the next sentence states that the "court shall determine whether the crc’s factual findings and legal conclusions are supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record, and whether it acted arbitrarily or without authority.” The second sentence provides for a limited judicial review, while the first sentence provides for de novo review.
Reading the two sentences together it appears that the Court not only eliminates a new trial on appeal to the circuit court, but provides for limited judicial review, not de novo review. It appears to call for the minimum review provided in the constitution for review of agency action, namely, whether the decision is supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record.8
In eliminating a new trial and providing for the limited judicial review that applies to all other agencies, the Court has in effect read "trial de novo” out of the constitution.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Levin, J.
Archer, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, pp 3383-3384.

 Id., p 3118.

 MCL 423.301 et seq.; MSA 17.458(1) et seq., repealed by 1976 PA 453 and replaced by the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et Seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq.

 The opinion of the Court acknowledges that the decision in Lesniak "was reached in part to avoid an interpretation which would unconstitutionally delegate factfinding functions of an agency to the courts . . . .” See Lesniak, supra, p 505.

 MCL 37.2801; MSA 3.548(801). See also Holmes v Haughton Elevator Co, 404 Mich 36; 272 NW2d 550 (1978).

 MCL 600.5805(8); MSA 27A.5805(8). See Mair v Consumers Power Co, 419 Mich 74; 348 NW2d 256 (1984).

 One of the consequences of today’s decision will be that a complainant who files with the crc, but does not also file a timely action in the circuit court runs the risk of never having a hearing before either the crc or the circuit court. There ordinarily will not be a record to review an adverse decision on the issue of probable cause unless there is a Rule 7 hearing (1979 AC, R 37.7) following an adverse determination on probable cause. If a Rule 7 hearing is provided, there would be a record to review, but that apparently did not occur in this case.

 Const 1963, art 6, § 28.