Court Opinion

ID: 9642681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:06:14.495097+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:50.964284
License: Public Domain

LIMBAUGH, Judge,
concurring.
The traditional escape rule provides that a defendant who escapes from custody during the proceedings against him waives his right to appeal the merits of the conviction and sentence. It is the escape itself, not the duration of the escape, that effectuates the rule. State v. Smith, 815 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Mo.App.1991). Without any stated reason for doing so, the majority today brings about a fundamental change to the escape rule, so that the rule is triggered not by the fact of the escape, but instead by a determination that “the escape adversely affects the criminal justice system.” I write separately because I cannot fathom how the new rule improves upon the old.
The majority’s position is apparently a reaction, an unnecessary reaction, to the recent 5-4 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Ortegar-Rodriguez v. United States, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1199, 122 L.Ed.2d 581 (1993), which, as the majority acknowledges, is limited to an interpretation of federal statutory law and is not binding on this Court. The Ortega holding permits dismissal of appeals only if the escape had “a significant interference with the operation of [the] appellate process.” Although the majority disavowed this holding, it then, without analysis, discarded the traditional escape rule and replaced it with a watered-down version.
In formulating an escape rule that turns on whether the “escape adversely affects the criminal justice system,” the majority fails to recognize that every escape has an adverse effect on the criminal justice system. Regardless of the duration of the escape, whether it lasts for six months, as in this case, or for six days, or even for six hours, an adverse effect invariably results. I suppose that the purpose of the modification of the rule is to allow defendants to appeal when an escape produces an adverse effect that is only nominal. For example, the escape rule may not apply when the defendant is recaptured or otherwise returns to custody within a short time after the escape. In my view, however, a determination of adverse effect is a difficult task, especially when no guidelines are given for that determination. Furthermore, I question whether courts can be consistent in their determinations of adverse effect from case to case.
*813A more compelling reason to retain the traditional escape rule, and a reason that the new rule does not take into account, is that the act of escape shows that the defendant no longer wishes to avail himself or herself of the rights afforded under the criminal justice system. Indeed, it can hardly be said that a defendant who escapes from custody has any expectation that he or she will be allowed to pursue an appeal in the event of recapture or return to custody. The escape, therefore, operates as a waiver of any right to appeal.
In sum, the bright line of the traditional escape rule is the proper response to the defendant’s waiver. Moreover, the bright line rule, grounded also in recognition of the fact that every escape produces an adverse impact on the system, is far superior to a rule that requires the courts to evaluate the degree or extent of that adverse impact. I would apply the escape rule to preclude all appeals pertaining to errors that occurred prior to the escape. Because the majority disallowed the appeal in this ease, albeit by faulty rationale, I concur in the result.