Court Opinion

ID: 9368017
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-02 18:00:53.181701+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:05.183158
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 20-8056      Document: 010110807268        Date Filed: 02/02/2023
                                                                      Page: 1
                                                                   FILED
                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS          Tenth Circuit

                               FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                         February 2, 2023

                                                                           Christopher M. Wolpert
   UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                                    Clerk of Court

            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                                                            Nos. 20-8056 & 20-8057
   v.
                                                      (D.C. Nos. 1:20-CR-00033-SWS-1;
                                                           2:13-CR-00225-SWS-2)
   LEVI WAYNE MASSMANN, a/k/a                                      (D. Wyo.)
   Levi W. Massman,

            Defendant - Appellant.

                                ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 Before MORITZ, SEYMOUR, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.

        In September of 2020, Levi Massmann’s supervised release was revoked for the

 second time and he was sentenced to eighteen months in prison followed by twelve

 months of supervised release. On the same day, Mr. Massmann was sentenced to seventy

 months in prison for being a felon in possession in a related case. The district court

 imposed the seventy-month sentence after applying an enhanced base offense level under

        *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
 argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments. It may be
 cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir.
 R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 20-8056     Document: 010110807268         Date Filed: 02/02/2023      Page: 2

 U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) based on a 2011 Wyoming conviction for delivery of

 marijuana. On appeal, Mr. Massmann argues, and the government concedes, that the

 district court plainly erred in imposing a revocation sentence that exceeded its authority

 under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h). Mr. Massmann also argues that the district court plainly

 erred in applying § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) because his 2011 conviction is not a “controlled

 substance offense” under the sentencing guidelines.

        We hold that the district court’s revocation sentence included a term of supervised

 release four months longer than the term authorized by statute. We also hold that Mr.

 Massmann failed to show plain error in the district court’s application of § 2K2.1.

 Therefore, we vacate Mr. Massmann’s revocation sentence and remand for resentencing

 but affirm his felon in possession sentence.

                                        Background

        In 2014, Mr. Massmann was sentenced in federal court to sixty months’

 imprisonment followed by thirty-six months of supervised release for conspiracy to

 possess stolen firearms. He began his first term of supervised release in 2017. His

 release was revoked in 2018, and he was sentenced to ten months’ imprisonment

 followed by twenty-six months of supervised release. In 2019, Mr. Massmann began his

 second term of supervised release. On September 24, 2020, his release was once again

 revoked and he was sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment followed by twelve

 months of supervised release.

        On September 24, 2020, Mr. Massmann was also sentenced in a related case to

 seventy months’ imprisonment followed by thirty-six months of supervised release for

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 being a felon in possession. At sentencing, Mr. Massmann’s base offense level was

 increased to 20 under § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) for having a prior felony conviction of a

 “controlled substance offense.” This enhancement was predicated on a 2011 Wyoming

 state conviction for delivery of marijuana.

        Mr. Massmann did not object to either sentence in district court, but he has

 appealed both.

                                      Standard of Review

        We typically review the procedural reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of

 discretion. United States v. Mendoza, 543 F.3d 1186, 1190 (10th Cir. 2008). However, we

 review for plain error where, as here, the issue was not preserved below. Id. “To satisfy the

 plain error standard, a defendant must show that (1) the district court erred; (2) the error was

 plain; (3) the error affects the defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) the error seriously

 affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v.

 Sabillon-Umana, 772 F.3d 1328, 1333 (10th Cir. 2014). “An error is plain if it is ‘clear or

 obvious at the time of the appeal.’” United States v. Koch, 978 F.3d 719, 726 (10th Cir.

 2020) (quoting United States v. Salas, 889 F.3d 681, 686–87 (10th Cir. 2018)).

        An illegal sentence exceeding the statutory maximum is per se reversible, even under

 plain error review. United States v. Titties, 852 F.3d 1257, 1264 (10th Cir. 2017).

                                            Discussion

    A. Mr. Massmann’s Revocation Sentence

        When a defendant’s supervised release is revoked, the sentencing court may

 impose a new term of supervised release not to “exceed the term of supervised release

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 authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in the original term of supervised

 release, less any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised

 release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h). A court imposing such a term of supervised release “must

 aggregate and give a defendant credit for all terms of imprisonment imposed upon a

 revocation.” United States v. Porter, 905 F.3d 1175, 1181 (10th Cir. 2018).

        The government concedes that the district court committed plain error by

 sentencing Mr. Massmann to twelve months of supervised release. Conspiracy to possess

 stolen firearms is a Class D felony,1 see 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 3559(a)(4), subject to a three-

 year maximum term of supervised release, § 3583(b)(2). Because Mr. Massmann was

 sentenced to a total of twenty-eight months’ imprisonment for violations of supervised

 release relating to the conspiracy offense, the district court was permitted to sentence him

 to a maximum of eight months of supervised release. By sentencing him to a twelve-

 month term of supervised release, the district court imposed an illegal sentence that must

 be vacated.

        The parties agree that the district court can cure this error by reducing either Mr.

 Massmann’s term of imprisonment or his term of supervised release. We take no

 position on how the district court should reduce Mr. Massmann’s revocation sentence on

 remand.

        1
         The government erroneously asserts the offense is a Class C felony. This error is
 immaterial for our purposes because Class C and D felonies carry the same maximum
 terms of supervised release. See § 3583(b)(2).

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    B. Application of § 2K2.1

        On appeal, Mr. Massmann contends the base offense level for his felon in

 possession offense was improperly increased under § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) because his 2011

 conviction for delivery of marijuana is not a “controlled substance offense” as defined by

 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b).2 At the time of his Wyoming conviction, marijuana in all forms,

 including hemp, was a controlled substance under both state and federal law. However,

 Mr. Massmann argues that the state offense does not fit the guideline definition because

 hemp was excluded from the state and federal drug schedules by the time of the instant

 felon in possession offense.3 This argument relies on the premise that only offenses

 involving substances that are controlled at the time of federal sentencing, rather than at

 the time of the state conviction, qualify as controlled substance offenses under the

 guidelines. For the reasons we recently articulated in United States v. Harbin, 56 F.4th

 843 (10th Cir. 2022), we hold that Mr. Massmann has failed to show plain error.

        In Harbin, we reviewed the district court’s application of the career-offender

 enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 for plain error. Id. at 845. The career offender

        2
            Under § 4B1.2(b), a controlled substance offense is:

        an offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term
        exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export,
        distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit
        substance) or the possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit
        substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.
        3
          Mr. Massmann also argues that an offense involving hemp could not be a
 controlled substance offense because only drugs that are “behavior-altering” or
 “addictive” are controlled substances. However, Mr. Massmann has failed to identify
 authority making any such requirement clear or obvious.

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 enhancement applies if, in relevant part, the defendant has two prior felony convictions

 for crimes of violence or controlled substance offenses as defined by § 4B1.2(b). Id. at

 844–45. Similar to Mr. Massmann, the defendant in Harbin argued that his 2014

 Wyoming conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver was not a

 controlled substance offense because Wyoming had excluded hemp from its drug

 schedules in the time between his state conviction and federal sentencing. Id. at 846.

 This argument relied on defining “controlled substance offense” based on current state

 drug schedules rather than the schedules in effect at the time of the state conviction. See

 id. at 848.

        We rejected the defendant’s argument that our decision in United States v.

 Williams, 48 F.4th 1125 (10th Cir. 2022), resolved the issue, Harbin, 56 F.4th at 849–50,

 and noted that “the only published opinions to consider this specific issue have rejected

 the [defendant’s] position,” id. at 851. We also explained that the Supreme Court’s

 decision in McNeill v. United States, 563 U.S. 816 (2011), “seems to undermine [his]

 position,” Harbin, 56 F.4th at 851. Thus, we held that any error in applying the career-

 offender enhancement was not clear or obvious and affirmed the sentence. Id.

        Here, we similarly conclude that any error in applying § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) was not

 plain. Because Mr. Massmann’s argument fails on the second prong of the plain error

 test, we do not address the other prongs.

                                         Conclusion

        In sum, we hold that the district court plainly erred and imposed an illegal

 sentence by sentencing Mr. Massmann to a longer term of supervised release than

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 permitted by § 3583(h). However, we hold that the court did not plainly err in applying

 § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). Accordingly, we vacate Mr. Massmann’s revocation sentence and

 remand for resentencing. But we affirm Mr. Massmann’s felon in possession sentence.

                                                 Entered for the Court

                                                 Stephanie K. Seymour
                                                 Circuit Judge

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