Court Opinion

ID: 9757354
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:36:06.010388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:38.607196
License: Public Domain

Hall, J.
(dissenting). The issue in this case is not whether a child of an employed mother is entitled to any *585compensation upon her work-connected death, but rather whether the Legislature has provided that such a child shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly financially dependent on the mother, irrespective of the actual fact, and thus shall automatically receive maximum benefits. When the history of N. J. S. A. 34:15-13g is carefully studied (L. 1911, c. 95, p. 139, § 12; L. 1913, c. 174, p. 305, § 2; L. 1919, c. 93, p. 205, § 2), it seems indisputable to me that N. J. S. A. 1 :1-2 has no proper application, that the presumption is confined to the case of death of the working father, and that the Appellate Division was certainly right in saying that “[t]o hold 'otherwise would be to give a tortured interpretation to words which are otherwise clear and unequivocal.” 90 N. J. Super., at p. 67. Even though a court feels a result to be socially desirable, it should not fail to accord a statute its plain meaning. Amendment is a legislative and not a judicial function. As the majority opinion points out in footnote 1, the Legislature recently did amend N. J. S. A. 34:15-13g to cover the situation here involved. But the amendment, of course, is prospective in operation and by its specific terms does not become effective until March 1, 1967. L. 1966, c. 126, §§ 2 and 19.
I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division.
For reversal — Chief Justice Weintraub and Justices Jacobs, Francis, Proctor and Schettino — 5.
For affirmance — Justice Hall — 1.