Court Opinion

ID: 9630267
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:06:50.571978+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:35.077481
License: Public Domain

DON E. BURRELL, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I do so not to commend the practice of striking a party’s pleadings for failure to comply with pen-dente lite child support orders. As pointed out by the majority, in a dissolution of marriage case involving children, the line between defending a claim and seeking affirmative relief is a fine one, and a judge who strikes pleadings in this context is certainly asking for trouble. On the other hand, a party who chooses to obstruct the trial court’s lawful orders at every turn and continually thumbs his nose at the very judicial process he now seeks to benefit from should not be allowed to do so absent a very compelling reason.1
That being said, my disagreement with the majority in this case has to do with my belief that Husband has failed to demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice from the striking of his pleadings and the resulting inability to call his own witnesses. “[T]he trial court’s decision in a court-tried case is presumed correct, and the appellant has the burden of showing error. We will not reverse the trial court’s judgment if there is no showing of prejudice as a result of that judgment.” Shields v. Shields, 59 S.W.3d 658, 660 (Mo.App. S.D. 2001) (internal citations omitted); See also Rule 84.13(b).2
In McAllister v. McAllister, 101 S.W.3d 287 (Mo.App. E.D.2003), a dissolution of marriage case scheduled for a one-day trial, the trial court abruptly ended the trial at 5:00 p.m. after a five-minute warning that it would do so. At 5:00 p.m., the wife was on the witness stand and the husband’s counsel was cross-examining her when the trial court stated “[a]nd I’m going to have to interrupt at this point, although you haven’t answered the question, because we are out of time. This case was set for one day. That’s what you requested, and we have had one day of trial.” Id. at 290. The trial judge then ruled the case from the bench and read his decision into the record. Id. After asking a question about one portion of the judge’s announced decision as to property division, counsel for the husband “stated he would ‘like to make a statement for the record,’ to which the court responded ‘[w]e are out of time, I’m sorry.... It would have had to be done prior to 5:00, but thank you very much for offering anyway.’ ” Id.
The husband claimed on appeal that he had not finished his cross-examination of his wife and was also prevented from presenting any rebuttal evidence. Id. at 289. After strongly disapproving of the trial court’s decision to abruptly terminate the trial, the Eastern District of this Court held that, because he failed to make a timely offer of proof, the husband’s “claims *225lack specificity as to what evidence he would have presented if given additional time, and he has not provided us with an adequate record on appeal.” Id. at 291. “A party who complains about the exclusion of evidence should make an offer of proof to inform the trial court of the content of the evidence proffered and to allow this court to determine the prejudicial effect of the exclusion.” Colquitt v. Muhammad, 86 S.W.3d 144, 152 (Mo.App. E.D. 2002) (citing Brady v. Brady, 39 S.W.3d 557, 560-61 (Mo.App. E.D.2001)); accord B.J.D. v. L.A.D., 23 S.W.3d 793, 797 (Mo. App. E.D.2000).
In the instant case, as in McAllister, we are unable to evaluate whether Husband suffered any prejudice as a result of the striking of his pleadings because he made no offer of proof as to what his evidence would be. Unlike McAllister, Husband did not even ask the trial court to allow him to do so.3 Husband complains that he was limited to cross-examining Wife’s witnesses, but does not identify what other witnesses he would have called or what their testimony would have been. Subject to a narrow exception not applicable here, “an appellate court does not review the question of excluded evidence without a specific offer of proof.” Ijames v. Ijames, 909 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Mo.App. S.D.1995) (citing In re Marriage of Swofford, 837 S.W.2d 560, 563 (Mo.App. S.D.1992)); May v. May, 801 S.W.2d 728, 733 (Mo.App. E.D.1990).
Husband complains that the income tax statements offered by Wife as proof of his income were stale but did not request that he be allowed to introduce any more current evidence of his income. Husband did not indicate what evidence he would have offered that might have persuaded the trial court to change its custody award. Husband’s failure to make an offer of proof requires this Court to speculate as to what Husband’s evidence might have been. See Vehlewald v. Vehlewald, 853 S.W.2d 944, 954 (Mo.App. E.D.1993).
As earlier indicated, Husband has the burden of establishing not just that the trial court erred, but also that he was prejudiced as a result. By failing to make an offer of proof, Husband has failed to provide us with the information we would need to determine whether the trial court’s judgment might have been different if Husband had been allowed to present additional evidence. Without prejudice, there is no reversible error. Brady, 39 S.W.3d at 561. I would affirm the judgment.

. I am not insensitive to the fact that this case involved questions of child custody and a request that all of Husband’s contact with the children be supervised. Fortunately, the record indicates that the children's Guardian ad Litem conducted an independent investigation into the facts of this matter, actively participated at trial, and presented a recommendation on the issues of eustody and visitation that was consistent with the judgment.

. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to rales are to Missouri Court Rules (2008).

. I strongly disagree with the concept that a trial court’s pre-trial announcement regarding any limitations it intends to place on a party’s participation is the equivalent of denying a specific request to be allowed to make an offer of proof.