Court Opinion

ID: 9399854
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-06 17:04:40.449058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:40.380814
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/6/23 P. v. Rice CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                         (Butte)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C096000

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. Nos. 20CF05483,
                                                                                         21CF03525)
           v.

 JASON TALBOT RICE,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Jason Talbot Rice pleaded guilty to injuring a cohabitant and, after
failing to appear for sentencing, he was charged in a second case with, and pleaded guilty
to, failing to appear. At sentencing for both cases on March 24, 2022, the trial court
imposed the upper term for the injuring a cohabitant conviction because it found the
aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances. On appeal,
defendant contends the trial court imposed the upper term in violation of Penal Code
section 1170 (statutory section citations that follow are found in the Penal Code unless

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otherwise stated), which, at the time of sentencing, had been modified by Senate Bill No.
567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1) (Senate Bill 567). Defendant
contends he suffered ineffective assistance of counsel if we find this issue forfeited. We
find defendant did forfeit this issue and conclude he did not establish his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.

                      FACTS AND HISTORY        OF THE   PROCEEDINGS
       Defendant was charged with injuring a cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) and false
imprisonment by violence (§ 236). He pleaded guilty to injuring a cohabitant with a
maximum sentence of four years in exchange for dismissal of the other count.
       Defendant stipulated to the probation report for the factual basis of the plea. The
probation report, relying on a police report, stated defendant shoved the victim into a
bathroom closest, slapped her in the face multiple times “really hard,” stopped her from
leaving their home, and when the victim broke free, he grabbed her arm and threw her to
the ground. Officers saw the victim rub her jaw, had red marks on her chest, and
scratches on her neck. A witness also told police they heard defendant threaten to kill the
victim. Defendant told police he “ ‘thought it was legal’ ” to hit the victim “with an open
hand ‘when she deserved it.’ ”
       Defendant failed to appear for his June 24, 2021, sentencing hearing and was
charged in a second case with failing to appear on his own recognizance (§ 1320, subd.
(b)), with the enhancement he was on bail (§ 12022.1). Defendant pleaded guilty to
failing to appear and the enhancement was dismissed. He again stipulated to the
probation report as the factual basis for the plea.
       The supplemental probation report prepared for the second sentencing hearing
covering both cases provided defendant’s criminal history and detailed the “official
sources believed to be accurate and sufficient to provide the Court a certified record of
conviction for use at sentencing.” This history included misdemeanor convictions in

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2007 and 2008 (§ 602, subd. (m); Health & Saf. Code, § 11366.5, subd. (a)), then two
felony convictions in Virginia for “Unlawful Wounding” in 2010 and 2011. Defendant
had three total probation violations in his Virginia cases. The probation officer
recommended the upper term, in part, because “the aggravating factors before the Court
include those relating to the defendant’s record of conviction, which the Court may
consider under § 1170(b)(3) PC.”
       At the sentencing hearing on March 24, 2022, the trial court found no
circumstances in mitigation but found four aggravating circumstances: (1) “the crime
involved threatened great bodily harm, evidenced by the defendant[] threatening to kill
victim,” (2) the “defendant’s convictions are increasing in seriousness,” (3) the
“defendant has served a prior prison term,” and (4) defendant’s “prior performance on
probation was unsuccessful.” Consequently, the trial court found “on balance that the
circumstances [in] aggravation outweigh the circumstances in mitigation” and imposed
the upper term of four years on the injury to a cohabitant conviction. The court sentenced
defendant to a consecutive eight months (one-third midterm) for the failure to appear
conviction.

                                        DISCUSSION
       Defendant argues the trial court violated recently amended section 1170 because it
did not rely on aggravating factors found beyond a reasonable doubt, nor stipulated to by
defendant. Defendant contends he could not forfeit this argument because the trial court
imposed an unauthorized sentence. In supplemental briefing, defendant alleges he
suffered ineffective assistance of counsel if we find he forfeited his claims.
       Senate Bill 567 became effective January 1, 2022. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731; Cal.
Const., art. IV, § 8, subd. (c).) The act generally prohibits a trial court from imposing an
upper term sentence except where there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime
that justify imposing the upper term, and the facts underlying those circumstances (1)

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have been stipulated to by the defendant, or (2) have been found true beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1), (2), added
by Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) An exception to this rule authorizes the court to consider
defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on certified records of
conviction without submitting the prior convictions to the jury. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3),
added by Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.)
       Defendant concedes he failed to object to the imposition of his sentence. This
forfeits his challenge to his sentence under the changes to section 1170 because those
changes were effective at his sentencing hearing. Thus, defendant could have, but did
not, object that an upper term sentence did not comport with amended section 1170’s new
sentencing requirements. (People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 856 [“a defendant
generally must preserve claims of trial error by contemporaneous objection as a
prerequisite to raising them on appeal”].)
       The record also shows the trial court, and the parties, were aware of the new
sentencing requirement because the probation report’s reference to the requirement
defendant’s criminal record be based on a certified record of conviction. This was not a
requirement prior to Senate Bill 567. (See former § 1170, subd. (b).) And, even
assuming the trial court did violate the modified provisions, defendant’s sentence was not
unauthorized because trial courts may still impose the upper term under section 1170.
Defendant’s challenge is to the procedural and factual basis of the sentencing decision,
and such challenges are waivable. (People v. Garcia (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1203, 1218
[“ ‘Claims of error relating to sentences “which, though otherwise permitted by law, were
imposed in a procedurally or factually flawed manner” are waived on appeal if not first
raised in the trial court’ ”], italics omitted.) Thus, defendant’s failure to object based on
Senate Bill 567’s changes forfeits his appellate challenge here.
       Attempting to avoid forfeiture, defendant argues his counsel was ineffective for
failing to object. The burden is on defendant to establish ineffective assistance of counsel

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by a preponderance of the evidence. (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 218.) To
do so, a defendant “must show both that trial counsel failed to act in a manner to be
expected of reasonably competent attorneys acting as diligent advocates, and that it is
reasonably probable a more favorable determination would have resulted in the absence
of counsel’s failings.” (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 623.)
       On direct appeal, as here, this burden is stringent. When the record on appeal
“ ‘ “sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged[,] . . .
unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there
simply could be no satisfactory explanation,” the claim on appeal must be rejected.’
[Citations.] A claim of ineffective assistance in such a case is more appropriately
decided in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th
264, 266-267; see People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1254 [ineffective assistance
claims properly resolved on direct appeal only where record affirmatively discloses no
rational tactical purpose for counsel’s actions].) Thus, we will reverse only if there is
affirmative evidence that counsel had no rational tactical purpose for an act or omission.
(People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198.)
       The record here is silent as to counsel’s reasons, if any, for failing to object to the
upper term sentence under the modified section 1170. Defendant claims there was no
reasonable tactical basis for trial counsel’s failure to insist on a proper recitation of
legally sufficient aggravating factors. We are not persuaded.
       A reasonable explanation is trial counsel believed the aggravating factors could be
established by section 1170’s evidentiary requirements. Three of the four factors were
based on defendant’s criminal history. The probation report, though not a certified record
itself, explained in detail the information’s sources to, in effect, provide the court with a
“certified record of conviction for use at sentencing.” Defense counsel could have
reasonably believed obtaining a certified record of conviction would not have changed
defendant’s criminal history, and therefore would not change the court finding

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defendant’s criminal history was increasing in seriousness, he served a prior prison term,
and his performance on probation was unsuccessful.
       As for the first aggravating factor, the trial court found the crime involved
threatening great bodily harm because defendant threatened to kill the victim. This came
from a witness’s statement in the probation report, which defendant agreed established
the factual basis for the plea. This is not the same as stipulating to the fact, but it does
provide context for defense counsel’s silence. Defendant’s counsel could have believed,
after independent research, what was contained in the probation report did in fact happen.
This is bolstered by the statements defendant made to police admitting to hitting the
victim because he believed it was legal to do so.
       After verifying the accuracy of the information included in the probation report,
either by confirming the information with defendant or by checking court records, trial
counsel could have concluded objecting under Senate Bill 567 would accomplish nothing
more than requiring the prosecution to introduce certified records or hold a trial to match
what defendant had already acknowledged and the probation report already detailed. In
other words, defense counsel reasonably could have determined raising a Senate Bill 567
objection would merely prolong the sentencing proceeding but would not change the
ultimate outcome. (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 387 [defense counsel does not
render ineffective assistance of counsel by declining to make objections that counsel
reasonably determines would be futile].)
       Because a reasonable tactical basis for the absence of an objection cannot be
excluded, defendant has failed to carry his heavy burden on direct appeal to show his
counsel provided ineffective assistance. (Burt v. Titlow (2013) 571 U.S. 12, 22-23
[“counsel should be ‘strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made
all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment’ ”].)

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                                  DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                           HULL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

EARL, J.

BOULWARE EURIE, J.

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