Court Opinion

ID: 9588055
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:29:22.113258+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:56.939029
License: Public Domain

Carley, Judge,
concurring specially.
I completely agree with the majority that the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress evidence in this case. Further, if I could accept the analysis of the factual circumstances postulated by the majority, I could adopt in toto the rationale of the majority opinion. In other words, if the officer actually opened the cooler, this would be, as stated by the majority, “an unlawful search for incriminating evidence.” If this were true, the majority would be absolutely correct in also holding that such a “momentary unlawful intrusion of the automobile space, which produced no evidence and was not a contributing factor in the discovery of the contraband, was an insufficient wrong, in and of itself, to require the suppression of the contraband.”
However, the majority’s finding that the officer’s action was “an unlawful search for incriminating evidence” is explained by footnote 1 to the majority opinion as follows: “That the officer reached into the car and opened the cooler is a conclusion on our part based upon what we consider to be the most reasonable interpretation of the officer’s testimony that he ‘checked’ the cooler on the floorboard. Had we interpreted ‘checked’ as meaning that he merely looked inside an already open cooler, there would be no doubt that the search and seizure in this case was proper.” I am unable to accept the majority’s “conclusion” that “the most reasonable interpretation of the officer’s *414testimony that he ‘checked’ the cooler on the floorboard” is that the officer actually reached into the car and physically opened the cooler. In this connection, the trial court, in its written findings of fact, stated as follows: “On August 4th, 1981, at approximately 2:40 A.M., Bibb County Sheriffs Department Deputy Anthony Strickland was dispatched by the radio to Neal Drive in Macon, Bibb County, Georgia for the purpose of investigating what had been determined to be a suspicious vehicle with suspicious persons therein. On arriving on Neal Drive on the morning in question, Officer Strickland observed a green Chevrolet Camaro parked on the shoulder of the road on Neal Drive. On approaching the vehicle, Officer Strickland determined that two males were sitting in the vehicle. The person under the driver’s side, the steering column, was determined to be Lonnie O. Key, Jr., and the other person was a passenger in the vehicle. Officer Strickland asked both males to exit the vehicle and asked them to identify themselves at the rear of the vehicle, and they did so. After the two males properly identified themselves, Officer Strickland began a walk around the automobile wherein he observed through one of the windows an ice chest with one beer can. Also on walking around the vehicle, Officer Strickland, on the driver’s side of the vehicle, observed a clear plastic bag that contained what he described as a green, leafy material, which he believed to be marijuana, that was in plain view.” (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear the trial judge, who heard the testimony of the witness and observed his demeanor, concluded that the officer’s observation (that the ice chest contained one beer can) was made “through one of the windows.” Therefore, according to the trial court, the method of observing the contents of the ice chest was the same as that utilized to discover the bag of marijuana on the floor and, thus, both objects of observation were in “plain view.” “Factual and credibility determinations of this sort made by a trial judge after a suppression hearing must be accepted by appellate courts unless such determinations are clearly erroneous.” Johnson v. State, 233 Ga. 58 (209 SE2d 629) (1974). Since I believe that we are bound by the trial judge’s factual determination in this case, I find no “unlawful search for incriminating evidence” and, for that reason, I would reverse the trial court’s suppression of the evidence.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray joins in this special concurrence.