Court Opinion

ID: 9726928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:13:01.599404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:31.901406
License: Public Domain

COLOGNE, Acting P„ J.
I must respectfully dissent.
When the plea bargain was struck, Alkire agreed to waive his constitutional rights and plead guilty to one count of aggravated assault (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)) on the condition, among others, the court at the upcoming probation and sentence hearing would not sentence him to serve more than two years.
The full statement of the bargain in the change of plea form which Alkire initialed in the margin and signed was as follows: “Defendant to cop § 245(a) [count I]; people to dismiss all remaining counts and allegations. Defendant to be examined by appropriate body pursuant to Penal Code § 1203.03. Judge promises that should further custody be imposed, a term no greater than 2 years, the mitigated term shall be imposed. Defendant to make full restitution to victim for medical costs.”
The trial court’s full statement reflecting this aspect of the change of plea was: “The Court: Now, on the back here on paragraph 12 it says, ‘Defendant to change his plea to Penal Code section 245(A), count one. People to dismiss all remaining counts and allegations. Defendant to be examined by appropriate body pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.03. Judge promises that should further custody be imposed in—
“Mr. Smith [defense counsel]: Does it say no more than two years?
“The Court: ‘No greater than two years.’ ‘A term no greater than two years, the mitigating term shall be imposed. Defendant to make full restitution to victim for medical costs.’
“Do you understand all that?
*127“Defendant Alkire: Yes, sir.”1
The court could have sentenced him to two years and he would have had no complaint. Instead, Alkire was accorded more leniency than he bargained for—he was given probation on certain specified conditions and he was advised if “parole” was violated he could be given up to four years in prison. The consideration for waiving his constitutional rights was fully given. If he had objected to probation or other terms of the bargain, he could have withdrawn his plea; he did not. Now, having eaten his cake, he wants it too.
In People v. Turner (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 753 [118 Cal.Rptr. 924], the defendant initially pled guilty with a stipulation any time served would be local. At sentencing, the trial court rejected the stipulation and the plea was withdrawn. The case went to trial and following a mistrial, defendant entered a plea of guilty with the same agreement he would only be given local time and, further, his prior felony conviction allegation would be stricken. He was granted probation. Thereafter revocation proceedings were instituted and defendant was given an indeterminate state prison sentence. On appeal, the defendant contended the trial court violated the plea bargain by ordering state prison time. In response, this court opined: “Here Turner pled guilty to a charge of burglary; he bargained for local time; he received probation. Probation was a more, not less, lenient sentence than Turner bargained for. There was nothing in this plea providing for what would happen if probation were violated. Needless to say, such a bargain would be difficult to negotiate since neither party would know in advance what the violation of probation might be. Here, after the violation occurred, there was no plea bargain involved because the bargain contemplated the initial sentencing proceeding only. It was within the discretion of the trial court to look at the situation anew .. . . ” (People v. Turner, supra, 44 Cal.App.3d 753, at p. 757.)
*128This case is dispositive of the. issue before the court. Its essential holding is that where a defendant receives at the initial sentencing hearing the bargain or a more lenient sentence than the bargain provided, and he is granted probation, then the bargain is fulfilled and upon any future violation of probation the court may “look at the situation anew.”
There is no distinction between that case and this. By the process of judicial notice (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459), it is to be determined imposition of sentence was suspended in Turner’s case just as it was in Alkire’s.2 Thus, Penal Code section 1203.2, subdivision (c), applies to each case permitting the court upon revocation of probation to “pronounce judgment for any time within the longest period for which the person might have been sentenced.”
Contrary to the majority’s characterization of the facts, I believe when the trial court here referred to “further custody,” it clearly was speaking of nothing more than custody immediately following Alkire’s commitment to the Department of Corrections for the diagnostic study under Penal Code section 1203.03, the subject of the sentence just preceding the one using the quoted words. It is improper in my view to analyze the trial court’s words without reference to the whole content of the bargain, and particularly the sentence immediately preceding the sentence using the phrase “further custody.” Thus, as I read the trial court’s statement of the bargain, it had to do only with the upcoming hearing for sentencing pursuant to the plea bargain just completed. As in Turner, it had nothing to do with sentencing after a revocation of probation.
The record discloses at the sentencing hearing Alkire was advised the maximum penalty could be four years custody. The court asked Alkire if he understood the maximum sentence he could receive and his counsel stated “four years for the crime, two years on the plea bargain,” but the court stated “four years in state prison and a fine of $5,000 is the maximum”; the court then followed with “and if you were sent to state *129prison and parole revoked, you could be sent back to state prison for four years. Do you understand that?” Alkire replied he did.3
The fact Alkire’s original sentence (probation) was more lenient than that bargained for removes the necessity of advising him he had a right to withdraw the plea if he was then sentenced to a term greater than that provided in the plea bargain since there would be no prejudice. He has had more than ample warning of the consequences in the event of a probation violation and a postjudgment order.
The failure to observe the condition of probation to abstain from alcohol, which very clearly is a cause of his violent behavior, justified the sentence ultimately imposed especially when one considers the earlier probation report which suggested the upper term plus three years extra for a Penal Code 12022.7 enhancement. The Department of Corrections’ diagnostic report referred to him as “an extremely high risk candidate for probation.” The ultimate sentence imposing the three-year middle term without enhancement was not an abuse of discretion.
In connection with certain other points made by the majority, I cannot agree there is ambiguity in the language of Penal Code section 1203.2, subdivision (c), permitting application of a most favorable construction for defendants. The phrase allowing judgment upon probation revocation for the “longest period for which the person [or defendant] might have been sentenced” has been in the codified law since 1903 (see Pen. Code, § 1203, as amended by Stats. 1903, ch. 34). I am convinced the quoted phrase neither had nor has any possible reference to a plea bargained sentence inasmuch as plea bargaining was not even officially recognized until 1970 (see People v. Collins (1978) 21 Cal.3d 208, 215 [145 Cal.Rptr. 686, 577 P.2d 1026]; People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595 [91 Cal.Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409]; Pen. Code, § 1192.5, as added by Stats. 1970, ch. 1123).4
*130The reference to the “longest period” is to the time period prescribed by the statutes, not to any plea bargained lesser sentence. Plain meaning of the phrase is reflected in decisions such as People v. Turner, supra, 44 Cal.App.3d 753, and People v. Allen (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 583 [120 Cal.Rptr. 127], in which it is said (at page 590): “[P]ost-judgment modification of probation can make the ultimate disposition of the case more onerous to the defendant than originally bargained for.”
Valuable and correct precedents such as Turner and Allen should not be overturned.
Finally, viewing the record in support of the trial court’s judgment, it cannot be said the court relied on facts arising postjudgment. At the sentencing hearing in which the judgment under review was made, in fixing the length of sentence, the court said nothing about events arising after the original grant of probation. Accordingly, contrary to Alkire’s argument, rule 435(b)(1) of the California Rules of court was not violated and the holding of the case of People v. Colley (1980) 113 Cal. App.3d 870 [170 Cal.Rptr. 339], is inapplicable.5
I would affirm the judgment.
Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied October 28, 1981. Mosk, J., and Richardson, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 Benefits of the plea bargain to Alkire, aside from the reduced maximum term on the aggravated assault to which he was pleading, included:
a. Dismissal of the allegation he personally inflicted great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.7—additional term of three years in prison).
b. Dismissal of charge of battery with serious bodily injury, count two (Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243—punishable as misdemeanor or by two, three or four years prison).
c. Dismissal of allegations of five prior felony convictions with terms separately served by Alkire (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)—additional one-year prison term for each).
d. Alkire’s commitment to Department of Corrections for diagnostic study before actual sentencing occurred (Pen. Code, § 1203.03).

 The probation order in Turner’s case read, in part: “IT IS THEREFORE NOW ORDERED by the Court that the imposition of sentence upon the defendant be and the same is hereby suspended for the term of three years from the date hereof, during which time the defendant is committed to the charge and supervision of the Probation Officer of said County of San Diego and of this Court; ... ’’

 I cannot find significance, as does the majority, in the trial court’s use of the word “parole” instead of “probation” in giving this admonition. The essential repercussions of a violation of the terms of one’s conditional freedom are similar whether that freedom is due technically to parole or to probation.

 Similarly, I cannot accept the majority’s inclusion of the plea bargained sentence within the meaning of the word “circumstances” in rule 435(b)(1). “Circumstances,” as used in the sentencing rules, refers to the crime or the defendant, not the plea bargained sentence (see Cal. Rules of Court, rules 419(a)(2) and (4); 421(a) and (b); 423(a) and (b)).

 Rule 435(b)(1) provides, in part: “The length of the sentence shall be based on circumstances existing at the time probation was granted, and subsequent events may not be considered in selecting the base term nor in deciding whether to strike or specifically not order the additional punishment for enhancements charged and found.”
Under the rule, the Colley case held it was reversible error to increase a middle term of three years pronounced at the time of commitment for diagnostic study under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d), to the upper term of four years based on defendant’s conduct while on probation following imposition of the middle term.