Court Opinion

ID: 9905818
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 16:05:13.673087+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:59.633573
License: Public Domain

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
  constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
  the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
    cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
  Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
           should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

                                                                 SUMMARY
                                                          November 30, 2023

                               2023COA114

No. 22CA1611, Tender Care v. Barnett — Torts — Defamation;
Courts and Court Procedure — Action Involving Exercise of
Constitutional Rights — Anti-SLAPP — Special Motion to
Dismiss — Issue of Public Interest — Public Issue

     In this defamation action, a division of the court of appeals

considers whether an online review of a veterinary clinic was made

in connection with an issue of public interest such that it is subject

to the protections of Colorado’s anti-SLAPP statute, § 13-20-1101,

C.R.S. 2023. Recognizing that a private dispute concerning the

quality of veterinary services may implicate a public interest, the

division determines that (1) there must be some nexus between the

challenged statements and the issue of public interest; (2) labelling

speech a “warning” does not automatically warrant protection
under the anti-SLAPP statute; and (3) such protection is not

warranted where protected statements are merely incidental to

unprotected conduct.

     Examining the entire context of the statements made here —

including the speaker, audience, purpose, and content — the

division concludes that statements made primarily for the purpose

of airing a private dispute, and that are merely incidental to any

protected conduct, are not protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.

     Consequently, the division affirms the district court’s decision

denying a special motion to dismiss the action.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS                                       2023COA114

Court of Appeals No. 22CA1611
El Paso County District Court No. 22CV30676
Honorable David Prince, Judge

Tender Care Veterinary Center, Inc.,

Plaintiff Counterclaim Defendant-Appellee,

v.

Jennifer Lind-Barnett and Julie Davis,

Defendants Counterclaimants-Appellants.

                             ORDER AFFIRMED

                                 Division I
                         Opinion by JUDGE DAILEY
                        Dunn and Harris, JJ., concur

                       Announced November 30, 2023

Relevant Law, Tanner W. Havens, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Plaintiff
Counterclaim Defendant-Appellee

Kane Law Firm, P.C., Mark H. Kane, Colorado Springs, Colorado; Law Office of
Steven D. Zansberg, LLC, Steven D. Zansberg, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendants Counterclaimants-Appellants
¶1    Defendants, Jennifer Lind-Barnett and Julie Davis, filed a

 special motion to dismiss defamation claims brought by plaintiff,

 Tender Care Veterinary Center, Inc. (Tender Care), pursuant to

 Colorado’s anti-SLAPP statute, section 13-20-1101, C.R.S. 2023.

 The district court denied their motion, and they now appeal. We

 affirm.

                          I.    Background

¶2    According to Tender Care’s complaint, in January 2022, Lind-

 Barnett brought her puppy, Pinkerbell, to Tender Care for

 emergency veterinary services; a vet examined the puppy and

 released her back to Lind-Barnett’s care. When the puppy did not

 appear better, Lind-Barnett administered her own treatment to the

 puppy at home. The next morning, she brought the puppy to a

 different vet clinic, where the dog was diagnosed with pneumonia

 and successfully treated. Several days later, Lind-Barnett

 contacted Tender Care to inform it that it had improperly treated

 her puppy. Tender Care initiated a review of the puppy’s treatment

 and, after determining that the puppy had received the requisite

 standard of care, refused Lind-Barnett’s request for a refund.

                                   1
¶3    In March 2022, Davis took her dog, Spicy, to Tender Care for

 ataxia, or difficulty walking and balancing. After an examination

 and bloodwork, Tender Care diagnosed the dog with a resolved

 seizure. Davis took her dog home, and when the dog continued to

 have symptoms overnight, Davis brought her to a different vet

 clinic, where the dog was diagnosed with vestibular disease and

 treated.

¶4    In February and March 2022 — after Tender Care declined

 Lind-Barnett’s refund request — Lind-Barnett posted six online

 reviews about her experience with Tender Care on her personal

 Facebook page, Tender Care’s Facebook page, and four different

 community-based Facebook pages.1

¶5    In March 2022, Davis responded to several of Lind-Barnett’s

 posts with similar posts about the adequacy of care her pet received

 at Tender Care and Tender Care’s business practices.

 1 Tender Care’s practice is in Falcon, Colorado.
                                               Lind-Barnett posted
 her comments on the Black Forest Community Facebook Page; the
 Falcon, Peyton, Calhan, Black Forest and Surrounding Areas
 Community Facebook Page; the Calhan, CO and Surrounding Areas
 Community Facebook Page; and the Neighborhood Network of Black
 Forest and Surrounding Areas Community Facebook Page.

                                   2
¶6    In their posts, defendants asserted, among other things, that

 Tender Care was guilty of professional “malpractice”; that it

 employs “incompetent,” “inept,” and “less than adequate” doctors

 and staff who are “ignoran[t]” and “dishonest,” “lack training[ and]

 misdiagnose,” and repeatedly commit “malpractice”; that Tender

 Care has numerous “complaints” filed against it “with the labor

 board”; that Tender Care allowed and encouraged “covid positive

 employees to come into work”; that “dozens of others” have

 “post[ed]” that the Tender Care owner’s “elderly father,” a former

 lawyer, was used “to threaten people”; that Tender Care isn’t

 “actually an emergency clinic” but “the biggest scam to ever walk

 into our town”; that Tender Care used “lies” and “intimidation,” and

 “harassed,” “threaten[ed],” and “bull[ied]” people; that Tender Care

 “refuse[d] to take responsibility for anything — especially their own

 ineptness”; and that Tender Care “blame[d] [its] client for their

 animal’s illness just because they posted a bad review.”

¶7    After defendants refused to remove their posts, Tender Care

 instituted the present action for defamation per se against each

 defendant, based on 104 of Lind-Barnett’s statements and 10 of

 Davis’s statements. Defendants responded, filing a special motion

                                    3
 to dismiss under Colorado’s anti-SLAPP statute. After reviewing the

 parties’ briefs and accompanying materials and holding a

 nonevidentiary hearing, the district court denied defendants’

 motion.

¶8    In its order, the court concluded that defendants had failed to

 establish that their statements addressed “matters of public interest

 or a public issue,” and that, consequently, the matter did not fall

 within the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute:

           The statements described in the parties’
           submissions are a private business dispute,
           essentially a pair of customer complaints. The
           complaints were statements of alleged fact
           regarding the Defendants’ individual customer
           experiences. For one Defendant, these
           expanded to generalized allegations levelled at
           the business, qualifications, and business
           practices. Those statements were made on the
           internet in social media fora that had
           restricted distribution rather than fully public.

           . . . [A]s in Zueger [v. Goss, 2014 COA 61], the
           allegations made here are of a private business
           dispute made on the internet. The court does
           not find that anything about the nature of
           veterinary services or their arguable location in
           a “small community” (in context this
           characterization of this community on the
           border of a large city is questionable) renders
           such matters of public interest for purposes of
           the [anti-SLAPP statute].

                                   4
¶9     In the alternative, the court determined that, even if the case

  had fallen within the scope of the statute, it could not be dismissed

  because Tender Care had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of

  prevailing on its claims.

¶ 10   Defendants now appeal, contending that the district court

  erred by denying their special motion to dismiss.

              II.   Legal Principles and Standard of Review

¶ 11   The General Assembly enacted section 13-20-1101 “to address

  lawsuits aimed at stifling or punishing the exercise of the First

  Amendment rights to free speech and to petition the government.”

  L.S.S. v. S.A.P., 2022 COA 123, ¶ 1. The statute’s purpose is to

  “encourage and safeguard” the exercise of these rights “to the

  maximum extent permitted by law and, at the same time, to protect

  the rights of persons to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable

  injury.” § 13-20-1101(1)(b).

¶ 12   To effectuate the balancing of these interests, the statute

  provides a process for weeding out, at an early stage,

  nonmeritorious lawsuits brought in response to a defendant’s

  petitioning or speech activity. See Salazar v. Pub. Tr. Inst., 2022

  COA 109M, ¶ 12. If a plaintiff’s claims arise from any act by a

                                     5
  defendant in furtherance of his or her right of petition or free

  speech in connection with a public issue, the court must grant the

  defendant’s special motion to dismiss unless it determines that the

  plaintiff has shown a reasonable likelihood that he or she will

  prevail on the claims. § 13-20-1101(3)(a).

¶ 13   The resolution of a special motion to dismiss involves a two-

  step process. At the first step, the defendant has the burden to

  show that the conduct underlying the plaintiff’s claims falls within

  the statute — i.e., that the claim arises from the defendant’s

  exercise of his or her right of petition or free speech. L.S.S., ¶ 21.

  Under the statute, a protected act in furtherance of a person’s right

  of petition or free speech includes the following:

             (I) Any written or oral statement or writing
             made before a legislative, executive, or judicial
             proceeding or any other official proceeding
             authorized by law;

             (II) Any written or oral statement or writing
             made in connection with an issue under
             consideration or review by a legislative,
             executive, or judicial body or any other official
             proceeding authorized by law;

             (III) Any written or oral statement or writing
             made in a place open to the public or a public
             forum in connection with an issue of public
             interest; or

                                     6
            (IV) Any other conduct or communication in
            furtherance of the exercise of the
            constitutional right of petition or the
            constitutional right of free speech in
            connection with a public issue or an issue of
            public interest.

  § 13-20-1101(2)(a).

¶ 14   If the conduct does not fall within the statute’s scope, then the

  special motion to dismiss must be denied. If, however, the conduct

  falls within the statute’s scope, then the analysis proceeds to a

  second step. At this second step, the burden shifts to the plaintiff

  to establish a reasonable likelihood of prevailing on the claim.

  Rosenblum v. Budd, 2023 COA 72, ¶ 24; Salazar, ¶ 21.2 If the

  2 As the United States District Court for the District of Colorado

  recognized, divisions of this court differ on how to apply this second
  step. See Coomer v. Make Your Life Epic LLC, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___,
  ___, 2023 WL 2390711, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 7, 2023).

  One division, noting the similarity of the “reasonable likelihood of
  prevailing” standard to that used in evaluating requests for
  preliminary injunctive relief, would neither “accept the truth of the
  allegations nor make an ultimate determination of their truth,” but
  would simply analyze the pleadings and affidavits to determine
  “whether the allegations and defenses are such that it is reasonably
  likely that a jury would find for the plaintiff.” Salazar v. Pub. Tr.
  Inst., 2022 COA 109M, ¶¶ 17, 20-21.

  Other divisions, looking to California case law interpreting a
  similarly worded anti-SLAPP statute for guidance, have described

                                    7
  plaintiff makes such a showing, the motion to dismiss must be

  denied. If the plaintiff fails to make such a showing, the special

  motion to dismiss must be granted.

¶ 15   We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a special motion

  to dismiss. L.S.S., ¶ 19; Salazar, ¶ 21.

¶ 16   Because California’s anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code

  §§ 425.16-.17 (West 2023), closely resembles Colorado’s statute, we

  look to California case law for guidance in construing and applying

  section 13-20-1101. L.S.S., ¶ 20; see also Moreau v. U.S. Olympic &

  Paralympic Comm., 641 F. Supp. 3d 1122, 1129 (D. Colo. 2022)

  (explaining that, because of the similarities between California’s and

  the second step as involving more of a “summary judgment-like
  procedure” in which the court reviews the pleadings and proffered
  evidence, “accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true,” and determines
  “whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made
  a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable
  judgment.” L.S.S. v. S.A.P., 2022 COA 123, ¶ 23 (quoting Baral v.
  Schnitt, 376 P.3d 604, 608 (Cal. 2016)); accord Anderson v.
  Senthilnathan, 2023 COA 88, ¶ 11; Gonzales v. Hushen, 2023 COA
  87, ¶ 21; Creekside Endodontics, LLC v. Sullivan, 2022 COA 145,
  ¶¶ 31-33.

  Because of the manner in which we resolve this appeal, we need not
  decide which of these approaches we would use.

                                    8
  Colorado’s respective anti-SLAPP statutes, state and federal courts

  have looked to California case law in construing Colorado’s statute).

                              III.   Analysis

¶ 17   Defendants contend that the district court erred by not

  granting their special motion to dismiss Tender Care’s defamation

  claims. They assert that, contrary to the district court’s ruling,

  (1) their statements qualified for protection under step one of the

  anti-SLAPP analysis because they addressed a “public issue” or

  “issue of public interest”; and (2) Tender Care cannot, under step

  two of the analysis, show a reasonable likelihood of prevailing. We

  disagree with their first assertion and do not need to address their

  second.

                    A.    Step One: Protected Activity

¶ 18   Because defendants’ statements were not made in connection

  with any executive, legislative, or judicial body or function, see

  § 13-20-1101(2)(a)(I)-(II), the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute

  apply only if the statements were made “in connection with” a

  “public issue” or “an issue of public interest,” § 13-20-

  1101(2)(a)(III)-(IV). According to defendants, their statements

                                      9
  qualify as such because they were honest, online reviews of a

  veterinary practice serving a small, rural community.

¶ 19   Initially, we agree that internet sites available to the public

  (like Facebook) are “public forums” for anti-SLAPP purposes. See

  Muddy Waters, LLC v. Superior Ct., 277 Cal. Rptr. 3d 204, 214-15

  (Ct. App. 2021) (collecting California cases); see also Anderson v.

  Senthilnathan, 2023 COA 88, ¶ 24 (noting that statements made on

  social media and before the legislature qualified as having been

  made in a public forum). But not every website posting involves a

  “public issue” or an “issue of public interest.” D.C. v. R.R., 106 Cal.

  Rptr. 3d 399, 426 (Ct. App. 2010); see Bikkina v. Mahadevan, 193

  Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 508 (Ct. App. 2015) (“[A] person cannot turn an

  otherwise private matter into a matter of public interest simply by

  communicating it to a large number of people.”); Du Charme v. Int’l

  Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 501, 509 (Ct. App.

  2003) (“[M]ere publication . . . on a Web site[] should not turn

  otherwise private information . . . into a matter of public interest.”);

  cf. Zueger, ¶ 28 (holding that a widow’s statements on the internet

  about the plaintiffs’ business activity, stemming from her

  contention that the plaintiffs were making and selling unauthorized

                                     10
  reproductions of her deceased husband’s artwork, did not involve a

  matter of public concern).

¶ 20   There is no statutory definition of the terms “public issue” or

  “issue of public interest.” In applying these terms, the district court

  found useful those cases discussing “whether a matter is one of

  ‘public concern’” for First Amendment freedom of speech purposes.

  “Generally, a matter is of public concern whenever ‘it embraces an

  issue about which information is needed or is appropriate,’ or when

  ‘the public may reasonably be expected to have a legitimate interest

  in what is being published.’” Williams v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 943

  P.2d 10, 17 (Colo. App. 1996) (quoting Lewis v. McGraw-Hill Broad.

  Co., 832 P.2d 1118, 1121 (Colo. App. 1992)).

             Somewhat more specifically, a matter is of
             public concern when “it can be fairly
             considered as relating to any matter of
             political, social, or other concern to the
             community,” or when it involves “the use of
             names, likenesses or facts in giving
             information to the public for purposes of
             education, amusement, or enlightenment when
             the public may reasonably be expected to have
             a legitimate interest in” the subject.

  McIntyre v. Jones, 194 P.3d 519, 525 (Colo. App. 2008) (first

  quoting Barrett v. Univ. of Colo. Health Scis. Ctr., 851 P.2d 258, 263

                                    11
  (Colo. App. 1993); and then quoting Lewis, 832 P.2d at 1121); see

  City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83-84 (2004) (For First

  Amendment purposes, a matter is of public concern when it is “a

  subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general

  interest and of value and concern to the public at the time of

  publication.”); Zueger, ¶ 27 (“[A] matter of public concern is one that

  affects a broad segment of the community or affects a community in

  a manner similar to that of a governmental entity.” (quoting

  McIntyre, 194 P.3d at 526)).

¶ 21   California courts interpret the terms “public issue” or “issue of

  public interest” in their anti-SLAPP statute in a similar manner. “In

  articulating what constitutes a matter of public interest,” they

             look to certain specific considerations, such as
             whether the subject of the speech or activity
             “was a person or entity in the public eye” or
             “could affect large numbers of people beyond
             the direct participants”; and whether the
             activity “occur[red] in the context of an ongoing
             controversy, dispute or discussion,” or
             “affect[ed] a community in a manner similar to
             that of a governmental entity.”

  FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc., 439 P.3d 1156, 1162 (Cal.

  2019) (citations omitted); see also Woodhill Ventures, LLC v. Yang,

  283 Cal. Rptr. 3d 507, 512-13 (Ct. App. 2021) (noting “three

                                    12
  categories of statements or conduct that qualify as ‘public interest’:

  1. Statements or conduct that concern a person or entity in the

  public eye; 2. Statements or conduct that could directly affect a

  large number of persons beyond the direct participants; and

  3. Statements or conduct involving a topic of recognizing

  widespread interest”).

¶ 22   Here, defendants’ statements did not concern political or social

  issues, public officials, people or businesses that had been the

  subject of news articles, a large number of persons,3 or even a topic

  of widespread public interest. But defendants maintain that their

  statements nonetheless qualify for anti-SLAPP protection because

  they conveyed important consumer information about a significant

  “public issue” or “issue of public interest” — that is, the quality of

  veterinary services in a small, rural community.

  3 From the record, it appears that forty-nine people across six

  websites participated in discussing Tender Care’s services and
  business practices. Fourteen people (besides Lind-Barnett and
  Davis) related having had negative firsthand experiences with
  Tender Care; eleven others related negative information about
  Tender Care they’d “heard” from others; and several others reported
  having had positive experiences with Tender Care. (Tender Care
  asserted that it, its owners, and most of its staff were blocked or
  restricted from participating in the discussions on these websites.)

                                     13
¶ 23   While not identical, this position finds some support in

  California cases concluding that online postings about the quality of

  medical care or the competence of medical doctors or dentists can

  involve issues of public concern or interest. See, e.g., Haworth v.

  Pinho, No. B313430, 2023 WL 3017282, at *1-13 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr.

  20, 2023) (unpublished opinion) (posts or articles on website

  concerned doctor’s competence to perform surgical services, his

  professional conduct, and the financial fitness of his medical

  practice, “matters about which the public, including current and

  future patients, have a vital interest”); Yang v. Tenet Healthcare Inc.,

  262 Cal. Rptr. 3d 429, 433-34 (Ct. App. 2020) (physician’s allegedly

  deficient ethics and qualification constituted public issue);

  Healthsmart Pac., Inc. v. Kabateck, 212 Cal. Rptr. 3d 589, 599 (Ct.

  App. 2016) (Consumers “have an interest in being informed of

  issues concerning particular doctors and health care facilities.”);

  Wong v. Jing, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 747, 759 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding

  that negative Yelp review of experience with dentist involved a

  public issue where post discussed use of silver amalgam containing

  mercury in treating children); Gilbert v. Sykes, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 752,

  761 (Ct. App. 2007) (finding patient’s website concerned a matter of

                                    14
  public interest that, rather than solely attacking plaintiff doctor,

  contributed toward public discussion and debate about the benefits

  and risks of plastic and cosmetic surgery); see also Aristocrat Plastic

  Surgery, P.C. v. Silva, 169 N.Y.S.3d 272, 276–77 (App. Div. 2022)

  (posting reviews of experience with plastic surgeon “to provide

  information to potential patients, including reasons not to book an

  appointment with [the doctor],” was matter of public interest); cf.

  Carver v. Bonds, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 480, 493 (Ct. App. 2005)

  (newspaper article critical of medical practitioner involved an issue

  of public interest because it contained consumer warning

  information).

¶ 24   We perceive no reason why a different conclusion should be

  reached in cases involving consumer information about veterinary

  services. After all, “the welfare of animals, including pets, is an

  important concern of our society.” In re Marriage of Isbell, No.

  B173850, 2005 WL 1744468, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. July 26, 2005)

  (unpublished opinion). “It cannot be doubted that a special

  relationship exists between humans and dogs. . . . The expression

  ‘a dog is a man’s best friend’ attests to the joy and closeness often

  experienced between people and dogs.” State v. Anderson, 566

                                     15
  N.E.2d 1224, 1225-26 (Ohio 1991). So too with cats and other pets

  — all of whom may require veterinary services to retain or maintain

  their health. See Sacks v. Haslet, No. D072372, 2018 WL 4659509,

  at *8-9 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 2018) (unpublished opinion)

  (whether trainer was qualified to care for animals and posed a

  danger to them were issues of public interest).

¶ 25   And as it does with the practice of medicine, Colorado

  promotes public health, safety, and welfare by regulating the

  practice of veterinary medicine to “safeguard[] the people of this

  state against incompetent, dishonest, or unprincipled

  practitioners.” § 12-315-102, C.R.S. 2023. A veterinarian is “a

  person who has received a doctor’s degree in veterinary medicine, or

  its equivalent, from a school of veterinary medicine,” § 12-315-

  104(18), C.R.S. 2023, and is subject to discipline by the State Board

  of Veterinary Medicine for “[i]ncompetence, negligence, or other

  malpractice in the practice of veterinary medicine,” § 12-315-

  112(1)(k), C.R.S. 2023.

¶ 26   Thus, while Tender Care maintains the posts aren’t subject to

  the anti-SLAPP statute because they relate to a purely private

  business dispute, we note that “speech or conduct, considered in

                                    16
  light of its context, may [nonetheless] reasonably be understood to

  implicate a public issue, even if it also implicates a private dispute.”

  Geiser v. Kuhns, 515 P.3d 623, 633–34 (Cal. 2022).

¶ 27   But the step-one analysis does not end with the identification

  of a public concern, issue, or interest to which statements could

  theoretically relate. A particular type of nexus must exist between

  the challenged statements and the asserted issue of public interest.

  FilmOn.com, 439 P.3d at 1165.

             Agile thinkers always can create some kind of
             link between a statement and an issue of
             public concern. All you need is a fondness for
             abstraction and a knowledge of popular
             culture.

             This pervasive potential means there must be
             “some degree of closeness between the
             challenged statements and the asserted public
             interest.” A tangential relationship is not
             enough. There is “a need to go beyond the
             parochial particulars of the given parties.”

  Woodhill Ventures, LLC, 283 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 513 (citations omitted).

¶ 28   “[I]t is not enough that the statement refer to a subject of

  widespread public interest; the statement must in some manner

  itself contribute to the public debate.” FilmOn.com, 439 P.3d at

  1166 (quoting Wilbanks v. Wolk, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 497, 506 (Ct. App.

                                     17
  2004)). And that determination can “hardly [be] undertake[n]

  without incorporating considerations of context — including

  audience, speaker, and purpose.” Id.; see McIntyre, 194 P.3d at 525

  (“In determining whether statements involve a matter of public

  concern, we . . . analyze ‘the content, form, and context of the

  statements, in conjunction with the motivation or “point” of the

  statements as revealed by the whole record.’” (quoting Barrett, 851

  P.2d at 263)).

¶ 29   To illustrate, in Gilbert, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 756, a patient who

  was unhappy with the results of her plastic surgery created a

  website that, among other things, provided consumer information

  and advice for those considering plastic surgery. The site also

  related her negative experiences with the doctor who performed her

  surgery. The doctor sued her for defamation. In granting the

  patient’s motion to dismiss under California’s anti-SLAPP statute,

  the court rejected the doctor’s claim that the statements did “not

  contribute to the public debate because they only concern[ed] [the

  patient’s] interactions with him.” Id. at 760. The court instead

  concluded that “plastic surgery is a subject of widespread public

  interest and discussion” and the patient’s website contributed to

                                    18
  the public debate about plastic surgery by providing information on

  the “benefits and risks of plastic surgery in general.” Id. The

  website did this by including not just the patient’s personal negative

  experience, but also general advice, information, and resources for

  those considering plastic surgery as well as a contact page for

  shared experiences. Id. Thus, the court concluded the website was

  a matter of public interest because it “was not limited to attacking

  [the physician], but contributed to the general debate over the pros

  and cons of undergoing cosmetic surgery.” Id. at 762; see also

  Wong, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 760 (Yelp review about a pediatric

  dentist’s use of nitrous oxide and silver amalgam for fillings was a

  matter of public interest because it “was not just a highly critical

  opinion of [the dentist]”; it “was [also] part of a public discussion”

  on the use of nitrous oxide and silver amalgam in treating children,

  which is an issue of public interest).

¶ 30   Defendants argue their posts are similarly protected because

  their posts (or at least a few of them) related to their claim that

  Tender Care had misdiagnosed their pets. But unlike the patient’s

  consumer website in Gilbert, defendants’ posts did not contribute to

  any broader public discussion about pet health care or connect to

                                     19
  any broader issue of public concern — for example, veterinary

  diagnostic issues, shortages in or access to veterinary care,

  oversight of veterinarians, the general quality of care for animals

  outside large cities, veterinarians’ lack of training for the care of

  smaller dogs, or how overbreeding can cause health problems for

  certain animals. See Gilbert, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 761; Jackson v.

  Mayweather, 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d 234, 246 (Ct. App. 2017) (“[S]imply

  because a general topic is an issue of public interest, not every

  statement somewhat related to that subject is also a matter of

  public interest within the meaning of [the statute].”); cf. Whitelock v.

  Stewart, 661 S.W.3d 583, 596 (Tex. App. 2023) (“[C]ommunications

  about animal abuse can be considered of concern to the public or of

  interest to the community.”).

¶ 31   Rather, read in context, the posts’ purpose was, in Lind-

  Barnett’s own words, “to deal with [Tender Care] once and for all” —

  that is, to exact some revenge by putting it out of business. See

  Woodhill Ventures, LLC, 283 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 516 (“Courts must

  scrutinize the purpose of the statements . . . .”). “But ‘an attempt to

  exact a personal revenge’ by causing others to ostracize the target is

                                     20
  not a protected public interest statement.” Id. at 515 (quoting

  Wilbanks, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 508 n.6).

¶ 32   And even if we assume a couple of the diagnostic statements

  went beyond defendants’ parochial issues concerning their pets’

  disputed diagnoses and connected to some broader public

  discussion, when a plaintiff pleads claims based on both protected

  and unprotected conduct, anti-SLAPP protections don’t apply if “the

  protected conduct is ‘merely incidental’ to the unprotected

  conduct.” Comstock v. Aber, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 589, 601 (Ct. App.

  2012) (quoting Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter

  & Hampton LLP, 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 31, 40 (Ct. App. 2005)); see

  Gaynor v. Bulen, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 243, 257-58 (Ct. App. 2018);

  accord Hylton v. Frank E. Rogozienski, Inc., 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 805,

  810 (Ct. App. 2009) (“If the core injury-producing conduct upon

  which the plaintiff’s claim is premised does not rest on protected

  speech or petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions to

  protected activity will not trigger application of the anti-SLAPP

  statute.”).

¶ 33   Here, the posts related to the alleged misdiagnoses are far

  eclipsed by the numerous posts expressing Lind-Barnett’s personal

                                     21
animosity toward the business. Specifically, of the thirty-seven

statements Lind-Barnett initially posted on Tender Care’s Facebook

page, only eight expressly related to information regarding

Pinkerbell’s treatment and diagnosis by Tender Care.4 Most of the

posts simply attack Tender Care and its staff. Specifically, Lind-

Barnett expressed her displeasure with the clinic personnel’s

response to her complaints (she called them bullies and liars who

tried to intimidate her) and with the Tender Care’s refusal to refund

her money and apologize to her.5 Similarly, with the exception of

4 This posting is reproduced as Appendix A to this opinion. It was
reposted, in its entirety, on the community Facebook pages. And it
was reposted on Lind-Barnett’s Facebook page with four additional
sentences, none of which related to diagnostics or business
practices. See Appendix B (Lind-Barnett’s posting on her Facebook
page).

5 Lind-Barnett stated several times that what she initially wanted

was a refund from Tender Care:
         “I gave them a chance to make it right and instead of an
          apology we got false accusations and were treated cruely
          (sic) and with distain (sic).”
         “As the PRETEND ‘head vet’ clearly stated in her verbal
          assault on me (which we recorded) they DO NOT give
          money back.”
         “All I want is for them to make it right. My money back
          would be a great start. An apology would be such an
          amazing way to handle such mistreatment of their
          customers.”

                                 22
  four sentences recounting her dog’s treatment, Davis’s comments

  are primarily commentary on/agreement with Lind-Barnett’s

  personal attacks.

¶ 34   Lind-Barnett insists that many of her statements served the

  public interest of warning others of Tender Care’s allegedly

  substandard care. But in context, the purpose of her “warnings”

  was simply to call others to join her crusade against Tender Care to

  punish it for what she thought was an inadequate response to her

  criticisms.6 Labelling a diatribe against a business as a “warning”

  does not transform the statements into protected conduct under the

  anti-SLAPP statute. See Woodhill Ventures, LLC, 283 Cal. Rptr. 3d

  at 516 (where the purpose is simply to gather “‘ammunition for

  another round,’ it is not in the public interest”) (citation omitted);

  6 To that end, we note the following about the “warnings”:

           In response to Lind-Barnett questioning how Tender Care
            could still be in business, a commentor wrote, “Hopefully
            they won’t be when you get done with them,” to which
            Lind-Barnett replied, “I[]hope so!”
           Lind-Barnett called other commentors to action, stating
            “I have a group of folks wanting to go to court and deal
            with this once and for all.”
           Lind-Barnett warned the other posters, “THEY ARE
            GOING TO WISH THEY HAD NEVER TRIED TO BULLY
            ME AND MY FAMILY.”

                                     23
  see also Jeppson v. Ley, 257 Cal. Rptr. 3d 921, 928–29 (Ct. App.

  2020) (online post reigniting neighborhood feud didn’t become a

  matter of public concern just because one neighbor purportedly felt

  compelled to warn others of a second neighbor’s potential for gun

  violence). If that were the case, any statement, no matter how

  defamatory, would be protected by simply adding some generic

  consumer “warning” in the statement.

¶ 35   In sum, the vast majority of Lind-Barnett’s and Davis’s

  statements cannot be said to involve a “public issue” or “issue of

  public interest” because they weren’t directed at “seek[ing] public

  discussion of anything”; they appeared, instead, to be aimed at

  “whip[ping] up a crowd for vengeful retribution.” Woodhill Ventures,

  LLC, 283 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 513.

¶ 36   Focusing, as we must, “on ‘the specific nature of the speech,’

  rather than on any ‘generalities that might be abstracted from it,’”

  FilmOn.com, 439 P.3d at 1167 (quoting Commonwealth Energy Corp.

  v. Investor Data Exch., Inc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 395 (Ct. App.

  2003)), we conclude that the core of defendants’ conduct does not

  rest on protected speech and, thus, is not protected under the anti-

  SLAPP statute. See Sacks, 2018 WL 4659509, at *8-9 (Anti-SLAPP

                                    24
  protection does not apply “any time individuals have a dispute over

  a particular animal merely because the subject of animal welfare is

  important to many people. The public interest aspect of the anti-

  SLAPP statute applies only when the specific challenged speech is

  directed at the larger public issue.”).

                  B.   Step Two: Likelihood of Prevailing

¶ 37   Because we conclude that defendants’ speech does not fall

  under the protection of the anti-SLAPP statute, there is no need for

  us to additionally determine whether Tender Care can prove a

  reasonable likelihood of prevailing in its defamation suit.

                              IV.   Disposition

¶ 38   The order denying the special motion to dismiss is affirmed.

       JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE HARRIS concur.

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                             Appendix A

    These images are reproduced in their original format, with

redactions to remove other comments.

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27
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                              Appendix B

     These images are reproduced in their original format, with

redactions to remove personal information unrelated to this action.

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