Court Opinion

ID: 9641517
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:33:49.060749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:38.074604
License: Public Domain

Douglas, J.,
concurring:
While I concur with the opinion I feel the matter of class actions should be addressed in this case.
*681The trial court correctly determined that this case is an appropriate class action, and that the class is composed of all present and future initially eligible unemployment compensation claimants. Defendants argue that class actions do not lie in New Hampshire, since there is no statute establishing this type of judicial remedy. I disagree. Class actions, or representative suits, have been recognized by this court for over one hundred years. The class action originated in England in the Court of Chancery as an exception to the equitable rule requiring joinder of all parties necessary to achieve a just result in the case. 3B J. Moore, Federal Practice 23.02 [1] (2d ed. 1978). Class representation in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England was grounded on necessity or convenience. Foster, The Status of Class Action Litigation, American Bar Foundation, No. 4, 2-4 (1974).
In the United States, class suits were also permitted on the basis of necessity and convenience. The Supreme Court allowed a representative suit which bound all members of the class, stating, “[f] or convenience, therefore, and to prevent a failure of justice, a court of equity permits a portion of the parties in interest to represent the entire body, and the decree binds all of them the same as if all were before the court.” Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 303 (1853). The leading case in New Hampshire is Smith v. Bank of New England, 69 N.H. 254, 45 A. 1082 (1898), in which separate claimants having a community of interest against the same defendant were joined as plaintiffs in a bill in equity. Class representation was permitted to prevent a failure of justice where individual common claims were too small to support separate actions. “Cases may often happen where a rejection of . . . [an] application for equitable intervention to prevent a multiplicity of suits would operate practically as a denial of justice.” Id. at 256, 45 A. at 1083. This view “voices a concern for the avoidance of the economic infeasibility of multiple actions that could well be emulated by present-day courts.” Starrs, The Consumer Class Action, 49 B.U.L. Rev. 407, 433 (1969).
In Textile Workers Union v. Textron, Inc., 99 N.H. 385, 111 A.2d 823 (1955), an unincorporated employees’ association was permitted to bring an action against the defendant employer to recover back wages owed to former employees and union members. The court reasoned that “it should not force the parties to the costly absurdity of bringing 2700 separate suits where one will suffice.” Textile Workers, 99 N.H. at 387, 111 A.2d at 824. Citing Smith v. Bank of New England, 69 N.H. 254, 45 A. 1082 (1898), the court concluded that justice and convenience required that “one suit be brought to dispose *682of many.” Textile Workers, supra at 387, 111 A.2d at 824. Six years later, in a taxpayers’ suit challenging the constitutionality of a legislative mileage statute, this court did not require that the 424 members of the legislature be made parties to the proceeding. Chief Justice Kenison reasoned, “We think that this is a representative suit and that the intervening defendants, individually and in their capacities as the presiding officers of the two branches of the legislature, could and did fairly represent the interests of all legislators. . . .” Monitor Publishing Co. v. Hill, 103 N.H. 397, 402, 173 A.2d 725, 727 (1961).
In 1975, the legislature enacted RSA 358-A:10-a, which provides that persons entitled to bring private actions under the consumer protection statute, RSA 358-A:10, can institute representative actions. Later that year, the legislature passed a class action bill (House bill No. 888) which was vetoed by the Governor. Senator Bradley commented favorably on the proposed bill, stating:
The present law is silent on this.. . . The procedures in this are parallel and comparable to the procedures we just passed in HB 917 with respect to the Consumer Protection Division. That law provided for class actions in that area. This provides for the same kind of procedure generally.
N.H.S. Jour., 29 May 1975, at 949. Although the legislature did not override the veto, its ultimate failure to enact the bill does not prevent the courts from recognizing the validity of a class action. “The legislature expresses its will by enacting laws, not by failing to do so. . . .” Merrill v. City of Manchester, 114 N.H. 722, 728, 332 A.2d 378, 382 (1974).
This court’s acceptance of representative suits and the legislature’s statutory authorization of class actions under the consumer protection statute are indicative of New Hampshire’s continued willingness to allow class actions in the interest of justice and convenience. This case presents an ideal opportunity to outline the prerequisites for a class action in this State. The exact form and substance of procedures for instituting and governing class actions, including provisions regarding notice, certification, scope of class, methods of payment of damages, and award of attorneys’ fees should be established by superior court rule. RSA 490:4 (Supp. 1977).
The federal class action rule and codification of class action procedures by States has generally expanded class action coverage. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (1966); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (1938); Uniform Class Actions Act (National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, final draft adopted August 5, 1976). Class action *683rules in the States are diverse, although a majority of States have adopted amended Federal Rule 23. A few States, including New Hampshire, have common-law procedures. 1 H. Newberg, Class Actions 1210a (1977). Despite the differences among class action rules, statutes, and common-law class action doctrines, there are general prerequisites for all class actions. First, there must be a definable class, consisting of numerous persons whom it would be impractical to join. Second, named plaintiffs or defendants must have claims or defenses typical of those of the represented class, and must adequately represent the unnamed members. Starrs, supra at 496. The federal rule and most State variations also require that questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting individual members, and that the class action be a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. See Morrissy, State Courts as Forums for Class Suits, 21 Trial Lawyer’s Guide 425, 432 (1978); Scher, Opening State Courts to Class Actions: The Uniform Class Actions Act, 32 Business Lawyer 75 (1976).
In this case, the class of all present and future initially eligible unemployment compensation claimants delineated by the trial court is definable and consists of numerous persons whom it would be impractical to join. Royer, the named plaintiff, questions the authority of the department to terminate employment benefits without affording him a prior hearing. His claim that both New Hampshire and federal statutory authority and State and federal due process require a prior hearing is typical of the entire class. The claim presents common questions of law and fact which predominate over individual questions. The class is not extremely large and the size of the interest of the named plaintiff is proportionate to the interests of other class members. Thus plaintiff Royer satisfies the requirement of adequate representation. Starrs, supra at 500. Plaintiff’s action is suitably brought as a class action under the general prerequisites.