Court Opinion

ID: 9381272
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-22 16:00:55.564604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:31.304217
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11679    Document: 34-1      Date Filed: 03/22/2023    Page: 1 of 13

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-11679
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        MICHAEL FLOYD,
        an individual,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellant,
        versus
        ZACHARY E. STOUMBOS,
        an individual,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-11679

                     D.C. Docket No. 6:20-cv-00353-RBD-EJK
                           ____________________

        Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               In this chapter of a long-running feud between two
        neighbors, we must decide whether Michael Floyd’s malicious
        prosecution claim against Zachary Stoumbos survives summary
        judgment. At Stoumbos’s urging, state prosecutors charged Floyd
        with disorderly conduct, stalking, and aggravated stalking—
        charges that they later dropped. But Floyd has not shown a lack of
        probable cause to support the criminal case, so we affirm the
        court’s grant of summary judgment to Stoumbos.
                                         I.
                As the district court put it: “Plaintiff Michael Floyd and
        Defendant Zachary Stoumbos were neighbors—though certainly
        not in the biblical sense, as there was no love lost between them.”
        Floyd and Stoumbos owned adjacent lakefront properties in
        Windermere, Florida. Stoumbos, a criminal defense attorney,
        lived in a home on his property while Floyd, an Irish national, lived
        in the United Kingdom. Floyd’s property was mostly vacant except
        for a small shed.
              Over a decade ago, the two began fighting over Floyd’s
        planned construction of a boat dock on his property. Eventually,
        Stoumbos sued Floyd in Florida state court, alleging that Floyd
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        22-11679               Opinion of the Court                         3

        built his dock out of compliance with an agreement between the
        two. He also claimed that Floyd continued installing cameras near
        his property line—despite repeated requests to stop—that filmed
        Stoumbos’s property and even inside his house. Undeterred, Floyd
        added more cameras on this property line over the next few years,
        eventually totaling eighteen.
                While this lawsuit was ongoing, another conflict arose.
        Floyd placed an outdoor radio on his dock that played loud music
        continuously from early morning until late evening. Floyd put the
        radio there, he explained, to “deter otters and birds” from “using
        the dock as a bathroom.” He also placed a radio in a shed on the
        property to scare away would-be intruders, among other reasons.
        Stoumbos claims that the noise from the radios was “brutal” and
        “life altering.”
                Near the end of 2013, Stoumbos decided to take action. He
        first called the police, who sent an officer to the property. He told
        the officer that he could hear the dock radio from his property,
        including from his patio. The officer confirmed that he could hear
        the radio from Stoumbos’s property. The officer called Floyd, and
        Floyd told him the radio was on a timer and kept wildlife away.
        Floyd also said, according to the officer, that it was “not to[o] loud
        in his opinion and that he has no intentions of turning it off or
        down.”
               The music played on. In January 2014, Stoumbos secured
        an injunction in state court against Floyd, barring him from playing
        music from the radios that could be heard beyond fifty feet away.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court               22-11679

        One day after the injunction was entered, Stoumbos called the
        police again. The deputy who responded estimated that music was
        still “clearly audible” 100 feet away from the dock. He turned the
        music off.
               Five days later, Stoumbos called the police yet again. A
        different deputy responded, although this deputy knew about the
        previous visit. This time, the deputy heard music coming from the
        shed around 200 feet away. He executed an arrest affidavit for
        Floyd. Eventually, the radios “were turned off” in mid-March 2014,
        about two months after the injunction.
               A state prosecutor filed charges against Floyd for disorderly
        conduct and stalking related to the music and cameras. Along the
        way, Stoumbos had pressured the prosecutors. Writing on his
        attorney letterhead, he requested that the case be “prosecuted to
        the fullest extent of the law” and he later sent “an in depth
        Memorandum of Law” to the state attorneys and asked for their
        thoughts. At one point, he told a prosecutor that he knew the
        elected State Attorney and would let him know how the
        prosecutors were handling his grievance. He even told a
        prosecutor that he would be “very angry” if charges were not filed.
               After the prosecutor filed charges, a state court judge found
        probable cause for all counts and issued a warrant for Floyd’s
        arrest. When Floyd returned to Florida, he was arrested and then
        released with instructions not to contact Stoumbos. Several
        months later, the prosecutor added another charge of aggravated
        stalking based on Floyd’s installation of more cameras near
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        22-11679                Opinion of the Court                         5

        Stoumbos’s property in violation of the no contact order. These
        extra cameras were 360-degree dome cameras that could save
        footage, and at least one contained a sign facing Stoumbos’s
        property. The sign read “WARNING 24HR CCTV” and “Images
        are remotely stored & monitored for the prevention and detection
        of crime.”
                Two-and-a-half years after first filing charges, the prosecutor
        dropped all four counts. By his assessment, although there was “a
        reasonable likelihood of prevailing at trial when the case was
        initially filed, that likelihood has decreased substantially through
        the discovery process.” He elaborated that it would be hard for the
        State to prove that Floyd knew about the court orders, installed the
        music or cameras himself, and did not have a legitimate purpose.
        After the charges were dropped, Floyd sued Stoumbos in federal
        court for malicious prosecution.
                When Stoumbos moved for summary judgment, the court
        granted the motion. It reasoned that Floyd could not show that
        Stoumbos was the legal cause of the proceeding and that there was
        no absence of probable cause, both of which are required for a
        malicious prosecution claim under Florida law. There was no legal
        cause, it said, because Stoumbos did not knowingly provide any
        false information and none of his actions were “the determining
        factor” in Floyd’s prosecution. What’s more, “probable cause
        supported every stage” of the proceeding brought against Floyd.
               Floyd now appeals.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court               22-11679

                                        II.
               We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Josendis
        v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1314 (11th
        Cir. 2011). On summary judgment, we must view the evidence
        and make all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
        the nonmoving party. Lehman v. Lucom, 727 F.3d 1326, 1330
        (11th Cir. 2013).
                                        III.
                To show malicious prosecution under Florida law, a plaintiff
        must prove six elements: “(1) The commencement or continuance
        of an original criminal or civil judicial proceeding. (2) Its legal
        causation by the present defendant against plaintiff who was
        defendant in the original proceeding. (3) Its bona fide termination
        in favor of the present plaintiff. (4) The absence of probable cause
        for such proceeding. (5) The presence of malice therein.
        (6) Damage conforming to legal standards resulting to plaintiff.”
        Burns v. GCC Beverages, Inc., 502 So. 2d 1217, 1218 (Fla. 1986)
        (quotation omitted). “If any one of these elements is lacking, the
        result is fatal to the action.” Id. (quotation omitted).
              To show the fourth element, a plaintiff must prove that the
        proceeding was “initiated by the defendant without probable
        cause,” meaning that we evaluate probable cause from the
        perspective of the malicious prosecution defendant. Id. at 1219
        (emphasis added); see also Alterra Healthcare Corp. v. Campbell,
        78 So. 3d 595, 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). Here, that is
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        22-11679                  Opinion of the Court                               7

        Stoumbos. And under Florida law, probable cause is “a reasonable
        ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently
        strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that
        the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
        charged.” Burns, 502 So. 2d at 1219. Proving the lack of probable
        cause is an “onerous requirement.” Id.
               Floyd cannot meet that onerous requirement. When
        relevant facts are undisputed, we may decide probable cause “as a
        question of law.” Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Mancusi, 632 So. 2d
        1352, 1357 (Fla. 1994) (quotation omitted). Floyd cannot show that
        Stoumbos lacked reasonable suspicion, supported by the
        circumstances, for any of the four counts. 1 As a result, his
        malicious prosecution claim fails. 2
                                              A.
               We first address disorderly conduct. Under Florida law, a
        conviction for disorderly conduct can result from acts that “affect
        the peace and quiet of persons who may witness them.” Fla. Stat.
        § 877.03.
               Stoumbos had probable cause to believe that Floyd violated
        this statute. Floyd does not dispute that music played from the

        1We do not decide whether probable cause must exist for all four counts
        because “no Florida court has taken a firm stand on this question.” Hall v.
        Sargeant, No. 18-80748, 2020 WL 1536435, at *27 n.30 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2020).
        2 We need not consider whether Floyd also failed to show legal cause.
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                22-11679

        dock during daylight hours and from the shed at regular intervals.
        Nor does he dispute that Stoumbos and the investigating officers
        heard music from Stoumbos’s property, some distance away from
        the radios. The parties dispute the exact distance and the exact
        decibel level, as well as how disruptive the noise was. But we need
        not decide those facts to find probable cause. Stoumbos had, at
        minimum, a reasonable suspicion that someone’s (his family’s)
        peace and quiet was affected, and this suspicion was supported by
        the fact that music was played for long stretches at discernible
        volumes on Floyd’s property. That’s enough for probable cause.
               The officer’s probable cause finding bolsters this conclusion.
        That an officer “clearly stated that there was probable cause to
        arrest” is some evidence of probable cause. Southland Corp. v.
        Bartsch, 522 So. 2d 1053, 1056 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988). Here, the
        officer who completed the arrest affidavit for disorderly conduct
        wrote on the affidavit that he could hear music 200 feet from the
        shed, and his report refers specifically to his “probable cause.”
               The same goes for the probable cause findings of the
        prosecutor and state judge. The filing of an information
        “constitutes evidence of reasonable grounds for the prosecution.”
        Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Scarbrough, 355 So. 2d 1181, 1185 (Fla.
        1977). The prosecutor’s information here not only charges Floyd
        with disorderly conduct, but also specifically referenced “playing
        loud music.” Likewise, the “Probable Cause Order” issued by the
        state court judge—after examining the affidavits and exhibits—
        buttresses the fact that Stoumbos himself had probable cause.
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        22-11679               Opinion of the Court                        9

                                         B.
              We next turn to the three stalking charges. In Florida, a
        person commits the offense of stalking when he “willfully,
        maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks
        another person.” Fla. Stat. § 784.048(2).
               Floyd’s repeated, continual playing of loud music and
        multiple camera installations at the property line underlie these
        stalking charges. We must decide whether Stoumbos could
        reasonably suspect that these actions were willful, malicious, and
        harassing under the statute.
              First, Stoumbos could reasonably suspect that Floyd’s
        actions were willful and malicious. No one disputes that Floyd
        intended to play the radios and install the cameras. Indeed, the fact
        that it happened on Floyd’s property is enough to suspect
        willfulness. Whether these actions were malicious is a closer
        question. On summary judgment, we must assume that Floyd
        intended for the music to deter wildlife and intruders, as he claims,
        and that he installed the cameras to prevent crime.
               But the relevant question is not what Floyd intended—it is
        how Stoumbos could have reasonably perceived the actions given
        the circumstances. Context is vital: the neighbors had a long
        history of bitter squabbles and retaliatory actions. In fact, they
        were embroiled in civil litigation at the time of the music and extra
        cameras. Moreover, the number and placement of the cameras—
        near the property line—support at least a suspicion of ulterior
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                22-11679

        motives in their installation. The same goes for the radio’s timing
        and volume. Altogether, the circumstances support a reasonable
        suspicion of maliciousness.
              Second, Stoumbos could reasonably suspect that these
        actions constitute harassment. The stalking statute defines
        “harass” as engaging “in a course of conduct directed at a specific
        person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person
        and serves no legitimate purpose.” Fla. Stat. § 784.048(1)(a).
        Courts have clarified that “emotional distress” refers to an
        objective, reasonable person standard. Bouters v. State, 659 So. 2d
        235, 238 (Fla. 1995). For probable cause, Stoumbos needed to only
        suspect—not prove—such objective emotional distress. He could
        here. Floyd’s actions were close enough to the kind of repeated
        conduct that Florida courts have found create emotional distress
        under the stalking statute. See, e.g., Robertson v. Robertson, 164
        So. 3d 87, 88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015); Johnstone v. State, 298 So.
        3d 660, 665 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020).
               Like our “maliciousness” analysis, Stoumbos could suspect
        that Floyd directed his actions at him (not the otters) without
        legitimate purpose. In assessing legitimate purpose, we can
        consider the actions collectively because stalking “is a series of
        actions that, when taken individually, may be perfectly legal.”
        Huch v. Marrs, 858 So. 2d 1202, 1203 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
        Moreover, we judge not only Floyd’s actions, but also “the manner
        they were performed.” Johnstone, 298 So. 3d at 665.
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        22-11679               Opinion of the Court                        11

               In the context of the neighbors’ ongoing fights, Stoumbos
        could reasonably question Floyd’s extensive measures. Music may
        effectively deter animals or intruders, but the alleged harassment
        stemmed from its volume and incessantness. And cameras
        logically deter crime and have other uses, but the alleged
        harassment came from their ever-growing number and position on
        the property line. The manner by which Floyd performed these
        actions casts doubt on the legitimacy of their purpose.
                Of course, we do not decide whether Floyd actually stalked
        Stoumbos. Whether his conduct was malicious, harassing, or
        without legitimate purpose is not before us. In fact, when the
        prosecutor dropped the charges, he cited concerns with proving
        some elements of stalking at trial. Even so, Stoumbos could have
        reasonably suspected that Floyd’s actions were stalking. That’s
        sufficient for probable cause.
               Aggravated stalking requires something more: stalking after
        a “court-imposed prohibition of conduct toward the subject person
        or that person’s property.” Fla. Stat. § 784.048(4). The prosecutors
        charged Floyd with two counts of aggravated stalking. One count
        was based on a violation of three court orders: the initial injunction
        limiting the music and two later orders compelling compliance.
        The second aggravated stalking count was based on the “no
        contact order” entered after Floyd’s arrest.
              Probable cause existed for both aggravated stalking charges.
        For the latter “no contact” order, no one disputes that cameras
        were installed after the order. As explained above, Stoumbos could
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11679

        reasonably suspect that the installation of these cameras—
        especially given the escalation of the neighbors’ feud—constituted
        stalking. He also could reasonably suspect, based on the cameras’
        positions and signage, that they filmed him, and that this filming
        violated the “no contact” order. The prosecutor even visited
        Floyd’s property to inspect the cameras himself before adding this
        charge, underlining the existence of probable cause.
               Probable cause also exists for the injunction violation. Floyd
        does not dispute that loud music played after the injunction. He
        does claim, however, that he did not know about the injunction
        when the officer visited shortly after it issued. This argument fails
        on multiple fronts. To start, it does not explain any violation of the
        later orders to comply with the injunction—Floyd admits that he
        received a certified copy of the order one day after it was entered.
        Even if Floyd never knew about the injunction, no one disputes
        that his attorney attended the injunction hearing. That alone
        would be enough to create reasonable suspicion that Floyd knew
        about the court’s order.
               In short, probable cause existed from Stoumbos’s
        perspective for all three stalking charges and the disorderly conduct
        charge. The undisputed facts create a reasonable suspicion, under
        the circumstances at the time, that Floyd committed those crimes.
        For all charges, the probable cause findings by the officers,
        prosecutor, and state judge support this conclusion. After all,
        probable cause is generally “not a high bar.” See J.J. v. State, 312
        So. 3d 116, 119–20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020) (quotation omitted).
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        22-11679             Opinion of the Court                    13

                                *      *     *
              We AFFIRM the district court’s order.