Court Opinion

ID: 9648819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:36:05.155359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:05.652595
License: Public Domain

TIREY, Justice
(dissenting).
After further consideration of appellant’s motion for rehearing, I am of the Opinion that the unanimous opinion of this court which .held in effect that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Mrs. Lightfoot’s plea of limitation to Lot- 29 in Block 2 of the Nelson-Beall Addition to the City of Waco is erroneous 'and to that extent I think appellant’s motion for rehearing should be granted and, for that reason, file my dissent.
The opinion of the court -referred to points out that Mrs. Lightfoot, while the wife of Haddaway, went into possession of the property with Haddaway as trespassers in September, 1933, and occupied the same until 'sometime prior to March, 1941, when she secured a divorcé from her husband, and he voluntárily abandoned the property. Mrs. Lightfoot continued in possession of the property and occupied the same as a hofne with their -children until the house burned in 1947. Haddaway did not testify in person or by deposition and the evidence shows that he is now living in California. It is appellant’s contention that the claim of Mrs. Lightfoot of ownership during cover-ture by reason of her marriage to Hadda-way would not be available to her for the purpose of -limitation, -since the law vests in the husband the .management and control *241of the community property and’ gives the •husband the power and authority to select and designate the homestead. I think this contention should be sustained. See Pearson v. Doherty, 143 Tex. 64, 183 S.W.2d 453; Warren v. Haverkorn, Tex.Civ.App., 191 S.W.2d 793; Eldridge v. Parish, 6. Tex.Civ.App. 35, 25 S.W. 49; Madison v. Fleming, Tex.Civ.App., 283 S.W. 589; and Coler v. Alexander, 60 Tex.Civ.App. 573, 128 S.W. 664.
There is no doubt that so long as Mrs. Lightfoot lived on the property with her husband Haddaway and occupied and used the same as a homestead that the presumption prevailed that Haddaway was claiming the property as a homested for himself and family; but when Haddaway and his wife became divorced and he voluntarily abandoned the property and made no''further claim to it, this presumption vanished. Since the evidence is without dispute that Haddaway is still 'living and the record is silent as to any claim he might have made to the property as a homestead, save and except the presumption that obtained by ■reason of his living thereon with his family, and since he abandoned the property voluntarily such presumption vanished as - a matter of law. Since such presumption vanished as a matter -of law, Mrs. Haddaway had nothing on which “to tack” her possession; and my view is that she failed to carry her burden showing possession • in compliance with the ten year statute of limitations. Art. 5510, Vernon’s'Ann. Civ.Stats. My view is that this ■ voluntary abandonment by Haddaway, the former husband of Mrs. Lightfoot, distinguishes this case •from the uniform holding of our courts' in the application of the law where one of the spouses died before their title ripened.under the statute of limitation, as pointed out in the original opinion and the authorities there cited. ’ ■ '
Believing that Mrs. Lightfoot failed to carry her burden, my view is that appellant’s motion for rehearing, to the extent here pointed out; should be' granted arid the judgment of the trial court, for the reasons ■stated, should be reversed and judgment rendered in this behalf. • -