Court Opinion

ID: 9882717
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:19:00.461869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:04.806457
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Hicks v. Cleveland Museum of Art, 2023-Ohio-3633.]

                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                            EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IRIS HICKS,                                          :

                Plaintiff-Appellant,                 :        No. 112503

                v.                                   :

THE CLEVELAND MUSEUM OF ART, :

                Defendant-Appellee.                  :

                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 5, 2023

            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                Case No. CV-21-953099

                                           Appearances:

                Friedman, Domiano & Smith Co., L.P.A. and Marco G.
                Bocciarelli, for appellant.

                Keith D. Thomas, for appellee.

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:

                  Plaintiff-appellant Iris Hicks was injured after she fell into a large

planter box containing trees and other plants in the west atrium of the Cleveland

Museum of Art (the “museum”). She appeals the trial court’s order granting

summary judgment in favor of the museum on her negligence claim. She contends
that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether the museum owed a duty to

warn her regarding the hazard presented by the planter box. For the reasons that

follow, we affirm.

Procedural and Factual Background

               On February 12, 2020, at approximately 6:00 or 6:30 p.m., Hicks and

a friend, Hope Morgan, went to the museum’s west atrium to attend a discussion by

Dr. Runoko Rashidi, a guest speaker on Egyptology. The west atrium had two large

“planter boxes” containing trees and various other types of plants and “greenery.”

The bases of the planter boxes were a foot or more beneath the level of the atrium

floor. The tops of the plants were visible over the sides of the planter boxes but the

tree roots were not visible.

               Around the perimeter of each of the planter boxes were white-grey

cement walkways. In the aisle or walkway between the two planter boxes (the

“center aisle”), backless wooden benches abutted against and extended over the

planter boxes. The outside edges of the planter boxes were surrounded by a border

in a “contrasting color,” i.e., a darker grey, that helped define the outer edges of the

planter boxes. There was no such border along the sides of the planter boxes where

they abutted against the benches in the center aisle.

               Hicks testified that as she made her way to the area of the atrium in

which Dr. Rashidi was speaking, she proceeded down the center aisle, toward a

bench, where she could sit and listen to the discussion. The center aisle contained
four benches, two to her left and two to her right. The planter boxes were behind

the benches.

               Hicks stated that she had intended to sit on the right edge of the first

bench she encountered on her right. Attempting to make more room for Hope to sit

on the bench beside her, Hicks took a step to the right, stepping off the edge of the

walkway and into the greenery in the planter box behind the bench. Hicks tripped

and fell on her right side and back. As a result of her fall, Hicks experienced

significant pain in her right leg and knee.

               Hicks testified that she was aware of the presence of the “greenery” in

the planter box before her fall — i.e., she had “passed [the garden] section two times

that evening” when looking for Dr. Rashidi and had also seen the greenery as she

made her way down the center aisle. Hicks stated that the greenery “cover[ed] the

edge of the lip” of the walkway and that “the plants come up above the lip of the

floor.”

               Hicks testified that because the outer sides of the planter box were

surrounded by a decorative, “darker grey” “border” — which she had observed when

walking in the atrium earlier that evening — she had thought that “there was also a

border on the inside of the walkway,” where the benches were located, because it

“look[ed] dark,” it “look[ed] like there’ s a pattern on the inside as well” and “it would

be consistent with the pattern that’s on the outside.” Hicks stated that, when she

stepped to the right, she had “no intention of stepping in the greenery.” Rather, she
thought she was “stepping onto the border,” i.e., what she believed to be level

ground.

              As Hicks was “stepping over to give Hope a chance to sit down on the

edge of the bench,” she was also “acknowledging” Dr. Rashidi. Hicks testified that

she was either still looking right at Dr. Rashidi or was “on [her] way looking down,”

when she fell. Hicks acknowledged that if she had been looking at the area between

the two benches (rather than at Dr. Rashidi) before she took her step, she “would

have seen that [she] would have been stepping on greenery” and not the floor.

      The Litigation

              On September 15, 2021, Hicks filed a complaint in the Cuyahoga

County Court of Common Pleas, asserting a negligence claim against the museum.

Hicks alleged that the “poorly designed and maintained benches” “overhanging the

landscaping” presented a hazard to invitees that was not open and obvious, that by

failing to remove the hazard or warn against it, the museum was negligent and that

the museum’s negligence was a direct and proximate cause of her fall and injuries.

              The museum filed an answer in which it denied the material

allegations of the complaint and asserted various affirmative defenses, including

that Hicks’ claim was barred by the open-and-obvious doctrine.

      The Museum’s Motion for Summary Judgment

              After the parties conducted discovery, the museum filed a motion for

summary judgment, arguing that the “edge and greenery” where Hicks stepped,

leading to her fall, was open and obvious and that, therefore, the museum owed no
duty to warn Hicks of the alleged defect and was entitled to summary judgment as a

matter of law. In support of its motion, the museum submitted excerpts from Hicks’

deposition testimony and two photographs Hicks had identified during her

deposition that showed the area in which Hicks had tripped and fallen, including the

benches and the planter box.1 The museum argued that, based on the photographs

and Hicks’ testimony, there was no genuine issue of material fact that the edge of

the walkway and the greenery where Hicks stepped was “entirely visible” and “open

and obvious” to Hicks prior to her fall and that Hicks’ claim was, therefore, barred

by the open-and-obvious doctrine.

               Hicks opposed the motion for summary judgment, contending that

there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether (1) the “deceptive edge of

the planter box” and “hidden drop down to the ground” “concealed * * * underneath

the fauna” constituted “latent hazards” that were “not readily discernable by

ordinary inspection” and were, therefore, not “open and obvious,” (2) the museum

had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard presented by the “pit for the

planter box” that “dropped down 1-2 feet” and was “covered by fauna” and (3) the

museum breached its duty of care “by failing to inspect [its] premises in a reasonable

manner” and “by failing to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition.”

Hicks argued that because “the concealed drop underneath the fauna” in the planter

box “could not be detected by a business invitee” and “[t]he lack of a contrast edge

      1 In her deposition, Hicks claimed that the photographs of the atrium did not

accurately depict the area because there was sunlight in the photographs and her accident
occurred in the early evening.
on the inner walkway went unobserved by Ms. Hicks because of the pattern of

shadows cast by the plants in the box,” it could not be considered an open-and-

obvious hazard. In support of her opposition, Hicks submitted excerpts from her

deposition testimony; excerpts from the deposition testimony of Jaime Juarez (the

museum’s director of protective services and safety),2 excerpts from the deposition

testimony of Paul Krenisky (the museum’s director of facilities),3 an

unauthenticated “security video” on a “USB drive,”4 copies of two unauthenticated

photos and an affidavit from her expert, architect Richard Zimmerman.5

       2 Juarez testified regarding his job duties and responsibilities at the museum, his

knowledge of the incident, descriptions of the planter boxes, walkway and benches and
his knowledge of prior falls in the atrium. He testified that in the past 12 years,
approximately 5 other people had fallen in the atrium, but that, to his knowledge, none of
the incidents had involved a fall into a planter box from the walkway and no one had been
injured.

       3 Krenisky testified regarding his background, renovation projects at the museum,

his knowledge of the incident and investigation following the incident, descriptions of the
planter boxes (including the depth of the planter boxes), walkway and benches,
maintenance of the planter boxes and his knowledge of any prior falls involving the
planter boxes. Krenisky stated that he was aware of one prior incident where “somebody
was pushing another person, and she went off the edge of the planter.” To his knowledge,
no one was injured in that incident.

       4 In her opposition, Hicks indicates that the “security video,” exhibit No. 2 to Hick’s

opposition, was “provided via USB drive directly to the Court.” That “USB drive” was not
included in the record forwarded to this court on appeal. On September 12, 2023, a
paralegal for appellant’s counsel submitted a letter to this court enclosing “a flash drive
containing Security Video, exhibit 1 [sic] listed in Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition of
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.” This is not a proper means of
supplementing the appellate record. See App.R. 9(E).

       5 Civ.R. 56(C) places limitations on the types of evidence a party can use to support

or oppose a motion for summary judgment. Under Civ.R. 56(C), the materials that may
be considered include the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written
admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence and written stipulations of fact. Other
types of documents may be introduced as evidentiary material only through incorporation
Zimmerman’s affidavit incorporated by reference a resume and two expert reports

that he said were attached; however, the copy of the affidavit that is in the record

contains no attachments.6

               On February 13, 2023, the trial court granted the museum’s motion

for summary judgment. The trial court found that there were no genuine issues of

material fact, that the hazard presented by the planter box was open and obvious

and that the museum, therefore, owed no duty to Hicks to remove the hazard or to

warn against it.

               Hicks appealed, raising the following assignment of error for review:

      The trial court erred in granting Appellee’s Motion for Summary
      Judgment as there are genuine issues of material fact for a jury to
      decide.

by reference in a properly framed affidavit. Professional Bank Servs. v. Grossman DT,
Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107670, 2019-Ohio-2230, ¶ 10, citing Dzambasow v.
Abakumov, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80621, 2005-Ohio-6719, ¶ 26. We note that in this
case, the security video and photographs submitted by Hicks do not comply with Civ.R.
56(C). Where, as here, however, the opposing party fails to object to improperly
introduced evidentiary materials, the trial court may, in its discretion, consider those
materials in ruling on the summary judgment motion. Professional Bank Servs. at ¶ 11,
citing Zapata Real Estate, L.L.C. v. Monty Realty, Ltd., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101171,
2014-Ohio-5550, ¶ 27, and Dzambasow at ¶ 27.

      6 In both her brief in opposition to summary judgment and her appellate brief,

Hicks cites to opinions offered by her expert, Zimmerman (as purportedly set forth in his
expert reports), that the hazard presented by the planter box was not open or obvious.
Because these reports were not attached to Zimmerman’s affidavit, they could not have
been considered by the trial court in ruling on the museum’s motion for summary
judgment. Accordingly, we do not consider them here.
Law and Analysis

      Standard of Review

               We review summary judgment rulings de novo, applying the same

standard as the trial court. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671

N.E.2d 241 (1996). We accord no deference to the trial court’s decision and conduct

an independent review of the record to determine whether summary judgment is

appropriate.

               Under Civ.R. 56, summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine

issue exists as to any material fact and, viewing the evidence most strongly in favor

of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can reach only one conclusion that is

adverse to the nonmoving party, entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter

of law.

               On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party carries an

initial burden of identifying specific facts in the record that demonstrate his or her

entitlement to summary judgment. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293,

662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). If the moving party fails to meet this burden, summary

judgment is not appropriate; if the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving

party has the reciprocal burden to point to evidence of specific facts in the record

demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. at 293.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the nonmoving party fails to meet this burden.

Id.
      Negligence and the Open-and-Obvious Doctrine

              To prevail on a claim of negligence, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the

defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, (2) the defendant breached that duty and (3)

an injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by that breach of duty. Robinson v.

Bates, 112 Ohio St.3d 17, 2006-Ohio-6362, 857 N.E.2d 1195, ¶ 21, citing Menifee v.

Ohio Welding Prods., Inc., 15 Ohio St.3d 75, 77, 472 N.E.2d 707 (1984); Washington

v. Outrage, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109825, 2021-Ohio-2263, ¶ 19. When the

alleged negligence occurs in a premises-liability context, the applicable duty is

determined by the relationship between the premises owner or occupier and the

plaintiff. Lang v. Holly Hill Motel, Inc., 122 Ohio St.3d 120, 122-123, 2009-Ohio-

2495, 909 N.E.2d 120, ¶ 10, citing Gladon v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit

Auth., 75 Ohio St.3d 312, 315, 662 N.E.2d 287 (1996).

              There is no dispute in this case that Hicks was a business invitee of

the museum. Premises owners and occupiers generally owe their business invitees

a duty of ordinary care. This duty requires the owner or occupier to maintain the

premises in a reasonably safe condition and to warn of latent or concealed dangers

if it knows, or has reason to know, of them. Naso v. Victorian Tudor Inn, L.L.C.,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110652, 2022-Ohio-1065, ¶ 9, citing Perry v. Eastgreen

Realty Co., 53 Ohio St.2d 51, 52, 372 N.E.2d 335 (1978). A premises owner or

occupier is not, however, an insurer of its invitee’s safety. Lang at ¶ 11; Paschal v.

Rite Aid Pharmacy, Inc., 18 Ohio St.3d 203, 203, 480 N.E.2d 474 (1985).
              A premises owner or occupier ‘“owes no duty to persons entering

[the] premises regarding dangers that are open and obvious.’” Goodman v. Dan

Rich, LLC, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109581, 2021-Ohio-690, ¶ 13, quoting Armstrong

v. Best Buy Co., 99 Ohio St.3d 79, 2003-Ohio-2573, 788 N.E.2d 1088, ¶ 5. With

respect to open-and-obvious hazards, ‘“the open and obvious nature of the hazard

itself serves as a warning,”’ and the owner or occupier may, therefore, ‘“reasonably

expect that persons entering the premises will discover those dangers and take

appropriate measures to protect themselves.”’ Armstrong at ¶ 5, quoting Simmers

v. Bentley Constr. Co., 64 Ohio St.3d 642, 644, 597 N.E.2d 504 (1992). Where

applicable, the open-and-obvious doctrine “obviates the duty to warn and acts as a

complete bar to any negligence claim.” Armstrong at ¶ 5.

              Courts apply an objective standard in determining whether a hazard

was open and obvious. See, e.g., Goddard v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit

Auth., 2022-Ohio-2679, ¶ 15. Open-and-obvious hazards are hazards that are not

hidden, concealed from view or undiscoverable upon ordinary inspection. Id., citing

Lydic v. Lowe’s Cos., Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 01AP-1432, 2002-Ohio-5001,

¶ 10. The open-and-obvious doctrine focuses on the nature of the hazardous

condition itself, rather than the plaintiff’s conduct in encountering it. Armstrong at

¶ 13. The relevant inquiry is ‘“whether, under an objective standard, the danger

would have been discernible to a reasonable person.’” Naso, 2022-Ohio-1065, at

¶ 11, quoting Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 4th Dist. Ross No. 18CS3661, 2019-

Ohio-2425, ¶ 14.
                 Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court to determine.

Mussivand v. David, 45 Ohio St.3d 314, 318, 544 N.E.2d 265 (1989). Where

reasonable minds could differ with respect to whether a danger is open and obvious,

the issue is one for a jury to decide. Naso at ¶ 13, citing Klauss v. Marc Glassman,

Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84799, 2005-Ohio-1306, ¶ 17. Where, however, only

one conclusion could be reasonably drawn from the established facts, whether a

hazard was open and obvious is properly decided by the court as a matter of law.

Naso at ¶ 13.7

                 Hicks contends there are genuine issue of material fact regarding the

open-and-obvious nature of the hazard in this case because (1) the depth of the

planter box was not visible from the walkway, (2) the edge of the walkway by the

benches was unmarked and “concealed” by the “overgrowth of fauna” and (3) it was

not unreasonable for Hicks to step onto what she thought was a grey border, given

her knowledge of a border elsewhere around the planter box.8 We disagree.

                 A person does not need to observe a hazardous condition prior to a

fall for it to be ‘“an open and obvious condition under the law”’; ‘“the determinative

issue is whether the condition is observable.”’ Naso at ¶ 12, quoting Early v.

Damon’s Restaurant, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-1342, 2006-Ohio-3311, ¶ 7.

      7 Hicks does not argue that the attendant circumstances exception to the open-

and-obvious doctrine applies here. Accordingly, we do not address the issue.

      8 Hicks does not cite any cases in her appellate brief in which courts have found a

genuine issue of material fact for trial based on similar or analogous facts and
circumstances.
              Viewing the hazard objectively, based on the photographs, there is no

question that a reasonable person would have observed (1) the edge of the walkway,

(2) that the base of the planter box was below the level of the walkway (rather than

even with the walkway) and (3) that, if a person were to step off the walkway, he or

she would be stepping down into the planter box. As the trial court aptly explained

when granting the museum’s motion for summary judgment:

             The contrast between the garden area and the walkway is evident
      from the photos and security footage. The walkway path is quite
      distinct. Perhaps more importantly the planter box is not simply green
      area containing something that looks like grass. It contains plants and
      trees. The tree roots are not in line with the concrete or even visible. A
      reasonable observer would conclude that the bottom of the box where
      the tree roots are must be significantly below the walkway.

            Similarly, the leafy heads of the foliage only rise to the level of
      the concrete walkway and some of the plants do not even reach that
      high. A reasonable person would conclude these leafy heads have
      stems that are a significant ways down. Indeed, while her subjective
      perception is not dispositive, Hicks’s own perception of the area is in
      line with what a reasonable observer would see. When looking at the
      photo in deposition she stated, “[a]nd as you can see in the photo, the
      plants come up above the lip of the floor.” Just like any reasonable
      observer, she correctly perceived that the plants, and thus the base of
      the plant box, were below the level of the walkway. Because it was
      evident this area was not level with the walkway, the hazard was open
      and obvious.

             This conclusion would not change even if the lighting were
      slightly different on the night of the incident as Hicks suggests. Unless
      it was much darker, and Hicks does not claim that it was, the contrast
      would still be evident and the fact that the plants were coming up from
      the ground would still be readily observable.

(Footnote omitted.)
               Further, Hicks admitted not only that “the plants come up above the

lip of the floor” but also that she would have seen that she was stepping on the

“greenery” in the planter box, rather than the walkway, if she had looked down

between the benches (rather than at Dr. Rashidi) when she took her step. Although

“[t]he benchmark for the court is not whether the person saw the object or danger,

but whether the object or danger was observable,” Hopkins v. Greater Cleveland

Regional Transit Auth., 2019-Ohio-2440, 139 N.E.3d 491, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.), Hicks’

admission further supports the conclusion that the hazard presented by the planter

box was open and obvious and discoverable by ordinary inspection. Naso, 2022-

Ohio-1065, at ¶ 12 (noting that “[e]ven in cases where the plaintiff did not actually

notice the condition until after she fell, courts have found no duty where the plaintiff

could have seen the condition had she looked”).

                    Because the only reasonable conclusion that could be drawn

  from the facts here was that the hazard presented by the edge of the planter box

  was open and obvious, the museum owed no duty to Hicks to warn her of the

  hazard, as a matter of law. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in entering

  summary judgment in favor of the museum. Cf. LaFollette v. Taylor Bldg. Corp.

  of Am., 2d Dist. Clark No. 06-CA-40, 2007-Ohio-4085, ¶ 1, 24-35 (trial court

  properly granted summary judgment in favor of property owner because hole

  between the sidewalk and the street left when a mailbox pole was removed — into

  which the victim stepped — was an open-and-obvious hazard; the only reason that

  the victim did not see the hole before stepping into it was because he was walking
backwards at the time, not looking in the direction he was moving); Vaughn v.

Firehouse Grill, LLC, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-160502, 2017-Ohio-6967, ¶ 10-15

(summary judgment properly granted in favor of a restaurant owner on

customer’s negligence claim stemming from her trip and fall down a handicap

ramp because reasonable minds could only conclude that the condition of the

ramp was open and obvious; plaintiff’s testimony that the color of the ramp and

the abutting parking line hid the change in elevation between the ramp and the

parking lot, making it appear as if the entire painted area was a part of the ramp

did not, by itself, create a genuine issue of material fact); Armentrout v. Meyer’s

Garden Ctr. & Landscaping, Inc., 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2004-12-315, 2005-

Ohio-5901, ¶ 9-10, 12-13 (trial court property granted summary judgment in favor

of property owner because black edging used along one side of landscaping bed to

separate mulch bed from brick pavers and concrete walkway was open-and-

obvious hazard from which owner could reasonably expect that plaintiff would

discover and protect herself; appellate court rejected plaintiff’s claim that

landscape edging was not open and obvious because the edging and the mulch in

the landscaping bed were both black and difficult to discern, and her view was

hampered by shadows shading the landscaping bed during the time of her fall);

Galligan-Dent v. Tecumseh Outdoor Drama, 4th Dist. Ross No. 16CA3534, 2016-

Ohio-7907, ¶ 21-23, 27 (hazard associated with “drop-off” on left side of asphalt

ramp/apron at the base of the stairway was open and obvious as a matter of law,

rejecting argument that insufficient lighting contributed to the latent nature of
  the hazard); Jordan v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., Ct. of Cl. No. 2019-00758JD,

  2021-Ohio-1526, ¶ 10-13 (no genuine issue of material fact that grade change on

  the edge of basketball court was an open-and-obvious hazard where an ordinary

  inspection would have revealed the elevation change; photographs of the edge of

  basketball court showed that elevation change from the basketball court to the

  dirt and grass was observable and plaintiff agreed that the grade change was

  noticeable when looking at the court from the grass).

              Hicks’ assignment of error is overruled.

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the Cuyahoga County Court of

Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J., and
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCUR