Court Opinion

ID: 9582829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:31:46.211328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:34.620193
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Presiding Justice,
dissenting in part.
I dissent to Division 1 (b) because the aggravated assault count merged with the felony murder conviction as a matter of law and, therefore, the trial court erred in sentencing Lowe on both counts. Although the evidence would support the finding that two assaults occurred, there is no way to tell which assault the jury relied upon in convicting Lowe of felony murder. The indictment specified only one assault. Neither the jury instructions nor the verdict form required the jury to distinguish between the two assaults or to specify which assault it relied upon as the underlying felony in the felony murder count. In construing this ambiguous verdict, this Court must give the defendant the benefit of the doubt.2 The majority refuses to follow this principle of law and instead erroneously uses the standard of review appropriate for a review of the sufficiency of the evidence.3 Application of the proper analysis requires a holding that the aggravated assault conviction merged as a matter of law into the felony murder conviction. Accordingly, I dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice Sears joins in this dissent.

 Lindsey v. State, 262 Ga. 665 (424 SE2d 616) (1993).

 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979) (evidence viewed in light most favorable to jury’s determination of guilt).