Court Opinion

ID: 9635763
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:03:31.356517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:26:07.718407
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mb. Justice Benjamin R. Jones :
I respectfully dissent, from that portion of the majority opinion which considers the propriety of appellee’s answer at trial to the- effect that a certain statement was taken by an “insurance man” at the hospi-. tal.1 The majority opinion overlooks the fact that this answer was not made .innocently or. inadvertently, *197but was a- “deliberate attempt”2 on tbe part of tbe appellee to inject insurance into the trial of tbis negligence case.
The general rule on tbis subject, — long recognized in Pennsylvania and salutary in its effect, — is that in a negligence action tbe fact that a defendant is insured is irrelevant and tbe injection of such an issue is prejudicial to tbe extent that it calls for tbe withdrawal of a juror and the continuance of tbe case: Hollis v. U. S. Glass Co., 220 Pa. 49, 69 A. 55; Lenahan v. Pittston Coal Co., 221 Pa. 626, 70 A. 884; Curran v. Lorch, 243 Pa. 247, 90 A. 62; Conover v. Bloom, 269 Pa. 548, 112 A. 752; Kaplan v. Loev, 327 Pa. 465, 194 A. 653; Dively v. Penn-Pittsburgh Corporation, 332 Pa. 65, 2 A. 2d 831; Harriett v. Ballas, 383 Pa. 124, 117 A. 2d 693.
On various occasions tbis general rule has been subjected to certain exceptions and modifications which are not presently relevant.3 However, this rule has never been modified where there has been a deliberate attempt to inject the insurance issue into the trial. Such an attempt was disapproved in Kaplan v. Loev, 327 Pa., supra, when this court refused to countenance a cross-examination where it was “obvious that it [eross*198examination] was to be carried on to inject something into the case which our decisions bar”. The majority opinion in this respect nullifies Kaplan v. Loev, honors the general rule only in the breach thereof and places the stamp of approval of this court on a “deliberate attempt” to violate a rule long adhered to and followed in this court.
I would reverse the lower court’s ruling in this respect and grant a new trial.
Mr. Justice Bell joins in this dissent.

 Appellee admitted signature on statement was his, admitted certain portions of statement and denied certain other portions. Statement was not introduced in evidence nor was statement taker called as witness.

 So characterized by the trial judge when the answer was given.

 Amey v. Erb, 296 Pa. 561, 146 A. 141; Ellsworth v. Lauth, 311 Pa. 286, 166 A. 855; Cain v. Kohlman, 344 Pa. 63, 22 A. 2d 667; Capozi v. Hearst Pub. Co., 371 Pa. 503, 92 A. 2d 177; Strout v. American Stores Co., 385 Pa. 230, 122 A. 2d 797; Hendrickson v. Quaker City Cab Co., 84 Pa. Superior Ct. 218; King v. Keller, 90 Pa. Superior Ct. 596; Portner v. Wible Bros., 91 Pa. Superior Ct. 522; McCaulif v. Griffith, 110 Pa. Superior Ct. 522, 168 A. 536; Baymond v. Sternberger, 116 Pa. Superior Ct. 451, 176 A. 787; Jury v. N. Y. Central R. Co., 167 Pa. Superior Ct. 244, 74 A. 2d 531; Richardson v. Wilkes-Barre Transit Corporation, 172 Pa. Superior Ct. 636, 95 A. 2d 365.