Court Opinion

ID: 9889264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-07 17:11:01.277868+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:49.179720
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-22-00563-CR

                           COURT OF APPEALS

                  THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                    CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

JORGE ROCHA JR.,                                                        Appellant,

                                         v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                      Appellee.

                  On appeal from the 139th District Court
                        of Hidalgo County, Texas.

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Silva and Peña
          Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Contreras

      Appellant Jorge Rocha Jr. appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled

substance in the amount of four grams or more but less than two hundred grams, a

second-degree felony. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(d). The jury

found Rocha guilty of the offense, and, after finding an enhancement paragraph true,
assessed his sentence at ten years’ imprisonment. By two issues, Rocha argues that

(1) the evidence adduced at trial was legally insufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict,

and (2) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the

warrantless entry of his home to secure his arrest. We affirm.

                                    I.      BACKGROUND

       At approximately 7:40 a.m. on June 27, 2021, Officer Arnoldo Villarreal of the

Mission Police Department responded to a hit-and-run accident in an alleyway behind a

small duplex apartment. Officer Villarreal testified that he arrived on scene to find an

abandoned Mustang vehicle and a ruptured water line that was pouring water into the

street. The vehicle’s bumper was damaged and the driver’s side door was open. Officer

Villarreal ran a check on the license plate and learned that the vehicle’s registered

address was about three blocks away from the accident site. As Officer Villarreal

inspected the vehicle, he found “a clear plastic wad that had a crystal[-]like substance” in

plain view in the handle of the driver’s side door. Meagan Huerta, the State’s forensic

scientist, testified that the crystal-like substance was methamphetamine.

       The vehicle was registered to Rocha’s mother, Cipriana Cruz, who testified that

Rocha was a mechanic and used the vehicle every day to get to work. It is undisputed

that Rocha’s tools were found in the vehicle’s trunk on the day of the accident. Cruz also

testified that she heard Rocha enter the home at approximately 8:00 a.m.

       Officer Hector Garcia, the second officer to arrive on the scene, interviewed Rafael

Gonzalez, an eyewitness. Gonzalez provided Officer Garcia with identifying information

that implicated Rocha as the suspect. Gonzalez also told Officer Juan Flores, the lead

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investigator on the case, that he had seen the suspect run away on foot wearing a light-

green shirt and cargo shorts. 1

        Officers Sarah Svedberg and Oscar Guzman drove to the vehicle’s registered

address. Both testified that the address was within walking distance, or about a twenty-

five- or thirty-second drive from the scene of the accident. They knocked on the door and

Nestor Vesera, 2 Cruz’s friend who was living there at the time, answered. Officer Guzman

asked Vesera if Rocha was inside the home and if they could search for him, and

according to the officers, Vesera “moved out of the way and nodded yes.” While searching

for Rocha, Officer Svedberg noticed a wet, light-green polo shirt and pair of cargo shorts

in the living room. The officers located Rocha while he was in the shower. After Rocha

emerged from the bathroom, he was arrested for suspicion of driving while intoxicated.

        Rocha was charged by indictment with the offense of possession of a controlled

substance, methamphetamine, in the amount of four grams or more but less than two

hundred grams. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(d). The jury found

Rocha guilty. During the punishment phase, the jury found an enhancement paragraph

alleging Rocha was a repeat felony offender to be true, and sentenced him to ten years’

confinement. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(b). This appeal followed.

                               II.      SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

        In his first issue, Rocha argues that the evidence adduced at trial was legally

insufficient to support his conviction.

        1 Gonzalez was not available to testify. Rocha objected to Officer Flores’ testimony about
Gonzalez’s description of the suspect, and the trial court sustained a hearsay objection to some of Flores’
testimony. We note that Rocha did not raise a Confrontation Clause issue at trial, nor is he arguing on
appeal that Gonzalez’s description of the clothes was improperly admitted.
        2 We note that the record also refers to Vesera by the last name ‘Hernandez.’   We further note that
Vesera passed away prior to trial and was thus unavailable to testify.

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A.    Applicable Law & Standard of Review

      We review the sufficiency of the evidence by considering all the evidence in the

light most favorable to the verdict and asking whether “a rational jury could find each

essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Stahmann v. State, 602

S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319

(1979)); see Villarreal Lopez v. State, 267 S.W.3d 85, 95 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg 2008, no pet.). We may not substitute our judgment for that of the jury by

reevaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence. See Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d

633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

      We measure the sufficiency by the elements of an offense as defined by a

hypothetically correct jury charge. Miles v. State, 357 S.W.3d 629, 631 (Tex. Crim. App.

2011). “The hypothetically correct jury charge ‘accurately sets out the law, is authorized

by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or

unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the

particular offense for which the defendant was tried.’” Id. (quoting Malik v. State, 953

S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)) (emphasis omitted).

      In possession of controlled substance cases, two evidentiary requirements must

be met: (1) the defendant knowingly or intentionally exercised care, custody, control or

management over the controlled substance, and (2) the defendant knew the substance

was contraband. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(a) (providing that “a

person commits an offense if the person knowingly or intentionally possesses a controlled

substance listed in Penalty Group 1”); § 481.102 (including methamphetamine under

Penalty Group 1); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(39); see also Medina v. State, 565

                                            4
S.W.3d 868, 873 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d). Both elements of

possession may be established with circumstantial evidence. See Lassaint v. State, 79

S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2002, no pet.); Villarreal Lopez,

267 S.W.3d at 91.

       “To establish the first element, the State must prove that the defendant’s

connection with the controlled substance is more than just fortuitous.” Medina, 565

S.W.3d at 873. When the “accused is not in exclusive possession of the place where the

contraband is found” or “when the contraband is not found on the accused’s person,” it

cannot be presumed that the accused had knowledge of or control over the contraband

“unless there are additional independent facts and circumstances connecting or linking

the accused to the knowing possession of the contraband.” Villarreal Lopez, 267 S.W.3d

at 91–92. “The consequence of this ‘is that each defendant must still be affirmatively

linked with the drugs he allegedly possessed, but this link need no[t] . . . be so strong that

it excludes every other outstanding reasonable hypothesis except the defendant’s guilt.’”

Id. at 95 (quoting Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)).

       The factors a court may consider when determining whether the evidence

establishes affirmative links between the defendant and the controlled substance include:

       (1) the defendant’s presence when a search is conducted; (2) whether the
       contraband was in plain view; (3) the defendant’s proximity to and the
       accessibility of the narcotic; (4) whether the defendant was under the
       influence of narcotics when arrested; (5) whether the defendant possessed
       other contraband or narcotics when arrested; (6) whether the defendant
       made incriminating statements when arrested; (7) whether the defendant
       attempted to flee; (8) whether the defendant made furtive gestures;
       (9) whether there was an odor of contraband; (10) whether other contraband
       or drug paraphernalia were present; (11) whether the defendant owned or
       had the right to possess the place where the drugs were found; (12) whether
       the place where the drugs were found was enclosed; (13) whether the

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       defendant was found with a large amount of cash; and (14) whether the
       conduct of the defendant indicated a consciousness of guilt.

Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 414 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Evans v. State, 202

S.W.3d 158, 162 n. 12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). It is not the number of links that is

dispositive, but the combined logical force of all the evidence, direct and circumstantial.

Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162. “Although these factors can help guide a court’s analysis,

ultimately the inquiry remains that set forth in Jackson: Based on the combined and

cumulative force of the evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom, was a jury

rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?” Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 414

(citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19).

B.     Analysis

       Rocha argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove he knowingly or

intentionally exercised care, custody, control, or management over the controlled

substance because the State failed to show affirmative links connecting Rocha to the

methamphetamine. Specifically, Rocha argues that the “State failed to prove that he was

the sole occupant of the car involved in the collision that caused property damage; that

he fled from the scene; or, that at the time of the collision he was in possession, had

knowledge, or was even aware, of the baggie contain[ing] drugs in the car.”

       We disagree. Officer Villarreal found the methamphetamine in the driver’s side

door handle. Cruz testified that though she owned the vehicle, Rocha drove the car daily

to work. Rocha’s work tools were in the trunk of the vehicle on the day of the accident,

further supporting the State’s contention that he was operating or, at minimum, inside the

vehicle at the time of the accident. Cruz also testified that the first thing she heard after

waking up that morning was the sound of Rocha coming home. Officers Villarreal,

                                             6
Guzman, and Svedberg testified that Cruz’s home was within walking distance of the

accident. Gonzalez informed Officers Villarreal and Flores that the suspect was wearing

a light-green shirt and cargo shorts. Officer Svedberg found a wet, light-green polo shirt

and pair of cargo shorts in Rocha’s living room. Based on this evidence, a reasonable

juror could conclude that Rocha was driving the vehicle that day on his way home from

work and fled the scene after crashing the car, where the methamphetamine was found

in plain view in the handle of the driver’s side door.

       Rocha further contends that the evidence failed to show other affirmative links to

Rocha and the methamphetamine, including “that he was under the influence of either

drugs or alcohol; that he hid or destroyed any evidence; that he attempted to flee from

police when they arrived at his home; or, that the police found drugs or other

paraphernalia in . . . any place inside his home.” However, the jury could have reasonably

inferred from the trial testimony that Rocha fled the scene of the collision, which is a

criminal offense and could affirmatively link Rocha and the methamphetamine. See TEX.

TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 550.025(a); Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d at 414 (“(7) whether the

defendant attempted to flee; . . . (14) whether the conduct of the defendant indicated a

consciousness of guilt.”); see also Clay v. State, 240 S.W.3d 895, 905 n.11 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2007) (“Evidence of flight evinces a consciousness of guilt.”). In any event, “it is well

established that the absence of certain links do[es] not weigh against those that are

present.” See Ferguson v. State, 313 S.W.3d 419, 426 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2009, no pet.); see also Davenport v. State, No. 13-17-00363-CR, 2019 WL 613275, at

*6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Feb. 14, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (concluding sufficient affirmative links present despite several

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missing links and drugs being found inside another passenger’s genitals); Larios v. State,

No. 13-15-00022-CR, 2015 WL 9487107, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

Dec. 29, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding the jury could

have concluded the absence of some affirmative links was attributed to the appellant

being “careful and collected in the way she pursued her task”).

       In Rocha’s case, a number of affirmative links were present: he was within walking

distance from the accident and witnesses testified it would have been easy for him to run

from the scene to his home; the contraband was in plain view in the driver’s side door

when officers arrived on scene; Cruz said Rocha usually drove the vehicle to work;

Rocha’s tools were in the trunk; and a witness to the accident provided officers with

identifying information that implicated Rocha, including a description of clothing identical

to that found in Rocha’s home.

       Rocha seems to argue in his brief that the State’s case is insufficient because the

eyewitness to the accident was not at trial and his “version of the events” is all that the

State’s witnesses rely on. However, judging the reliability of the officers’ testimony is an

issue of credibility, which is in the sole discretion of the jury. See Villarreal Lopez, 267

S.W.3d at 95 (“In addressing a legal sufficiency challenge, we review all the evidence in

the light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the trier of fact resolved conflicts

in the testimony, weighed the evidence, and drew reasonable inferences in a manner that

supports the verdict.”).

       Viewing the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the verdict, we

conclude that a rational juror could have found there were sufficient affirmative links

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connecting Rocha to the methamphetamine. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.

§ 481.115(d); Villarreal Lopez, 267 S.W.3d at 97. Rocha’s first issue is overruled.

                          III.    INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

       In his second issue, Rocha argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by failing to argue that Officers Guzman and Svedberg violated Rocha’s

Fourth Amendment rights when they entered Rocha’s home to secure his arrest without

a warrant. Rocha contends that had his trial counsel not failed “to raise the warrantless

entry issue either in a motion to suppress or in a submission of an [a]rticle 38.23 jury

instruction to disregard the evidence,” he would not have been convicted. 3 Specifically,

Rocha argues that Vesera, a resident of the home, did not “freely and voluntarily” consent

to the officers’ request to enter the home. 4

A.     Standard of Review & Applicable Law

       We evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the two-part test set

forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687

(1984). See also Gonzalez v. State, 510 S.W.3d 10, 30 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg 2014, pet. ref’d). Under the Strickland standard, the appellant must show by a

preponderance of evidence that: (1) trial counsel’s representation fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that the result of

the proceeding would have been different but for the attorney’s deficient performance.

        3 We note that Rocha’s brief fails to specify what evidence should be suppressed due to the

allegedly improper entry of Rocha’s home. We construe his brief to mean that the light-green shirt and
cargo pants found by Officer Svedberg should have been suppressed.
       4 Rocha makes no argument in his brief that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest

Rocha, nor does he argue that Vesera did not have actual or apparent authority to consent to the search.
See, e.g., Hubert v. State, 312 S.W.3d 554, 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

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Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. We may address either prong first, and if an appellant fails to

prove one prong of the test, we need not address the other. Id.

       When evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance, we look at the totality of the

representation and the particular circumstances of the case. Hartwell v. State, 476

S.W.3d 523, 532 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2015, pet. ref’d) (citing Thompson

v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). Our review is highly deferential to

the trial counsel, and we strongly presume that the assistance counsel provided was

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id.; Gonzalez, 510 S.W.3d

at 30. In the absence of evidence of counsel’s reasons for the challenged conduct, an

appellate court will assume a strategic motivation and will not conclude that the conduct

was deficient unless the conduct was so outrageous that no competent attorney would

have engaged in it. See Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001);

Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814.

B.     Analysis

       Generally, law enforcement must obtain a warrant based on probable cause to

search for or arrest a person in their own home. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W.3d

680, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). However, voluntary consent is an exception to the

warrant requirement. Id. at 685–86; see also Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 331

(Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (“Consent to search is one of the well-established exceptions to

the constitutional requirements of both a warrant and probable cause.”). “The validity of

a consensual search is a question of fact, and the State bears the burden to prove by

clear and convincing evidence that consent was obtained voluntarily.” Gutierrez, 221

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S.W.3d at 685–86. To determine whether consent was freely given, and was not the result

of duress or coercion, we examine the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 686–87.

      In Rocha’s case, the trial record supports a finding that Vesera consented to the

search. The only evidence of the exchange between Vesera and Officers Svedberg and

Guzman was the officers’ trial testimony. When the officers arrived at the home, Vesera

opened the door. He seemed to primarily speak Spanish. Officer Guzman led the

conversation with Vesera because he spoke Spanish fluently. Officer Guzman asked

Vesera if Rocha “was inside the residence” and according to Officer Guzman, Vesera

“nodded” and “moved out of the way” to indicate his consent:

      [The State]:      Okay. And what did you tell [Vesera]?

      [Guzman]:         We asked him if [Rocha] was inside the residence.

      [The State]:      Okay. Without saying what he said, what happened next?

      [Guzman]:         Well, he just nodded?

      [The State]:      It was a nod. Could you show the jury what a nod
                        means?

      [Guzman]:         It was a slight nod in a way kind of saying yes or no. It
                        wasn’t very compliant.

      [The State]:      It wasn’t a shaking of the head left or right or was it up
                        and down?

      [Guzman]:         It was a very simply, you know, nod.

      [The State]:      Okay. Did you get consent to go inside the house?

      [Guzman]:         That we did, yes, sir.

On cross-examination, Officer Guzman stated that he received consent from Vesera

when he “moved out of the way and nodded yes.”

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       [Counsel]:        Okay. And when you asked him for consent to search did
                         he answer you verbally?

       [Guzman]:         He actually just moved out of the way and nodded yes.

                         ....

       [Guzman]:         All I know was that [Vesera] was inside the residence and
                         he opened the door.

       [Counsel]:        Okay. So just because he opened the door that means to
                         you that he is giving you consent to come in, yes?

       [Guzman]:         Yes.

       Rocha’s case is similar to Gallups v. State, 104 S.W.3d 361 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2003), aff’d, 151 S.W.3d 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). At issue in that case was whether

an officer received consent via a non-verbal gesture to enter the defendant’s home. Id. at

365. The officer said that as he approached the door to the home, he saw Gallups, the

defendant, through the front glass door, and asked him to step outside, to which Gallups

responded by waving his arm for the officer to come in. Id. Gallups and his mother testified

that no one in the home waved for the officer to come inside. Id. The court first concluded

that the trial court “implicitly accepted [the officer’s] testimony on the issue and

disregarded both Gallups’ and his mother’s testimony to the contrary.” Id. It then upheld

the trial court’s judgment, finding that the officer received consent to enter the defendant’s

home because the officer requested the defendant to come outside, there was no

evidence of “a cultural or language disparity,” and the non-verbal gesture was affirmative

in nature and not ambiguous or neutral. Id. at 368.

       In Rocha’s case, the officers announced their presence and talked with Vesera at

the front of the home before requesting to come inside. Though Vesera primarily spoke

Spanish, Officer Guzman spoke fluent Spanish, thus mitigating any language barriers. Cf.

                                             12
Reyes-Perez v. State, 45 S.W.3d 312, 316–19 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

2001, pet. ref’d) (holding that defendant did not consent to the search of his car because

there was a language barrier between him and the arresting officer, who did not speak

Spanish and communicated with the defendant primarily through hand gestures).

       Officer Guzman also testified that Vesera nodded at the officers and moved out of

the way for them to enter, gesturing in the affirmative for the officers to enter. Cf. Roth v.

State, 917 S.W.2d 292, 297–98, 300 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, no pet.) (holding that the

State failed to show consent to enter because the officer testified that the resident of the

home only “looked as though” he wanted the officer to come in and did not request or

invite the officer to enter). Furthermore, Rocha has failed to point to any evidence of

coercion or duress in the record. See Gutierrez, 221 S.W.3d at 686–87; cf. State v. Pena,

464 S.W.3d 389, 397 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2014, pet. ref’d) (holding that

the defendant did not consent to a warrantless search of his home because after he

denied the officer’s requests to enter, the officer told him that if he did not consent

everyone in the house would go to jail).

       Because the record indicates that Officer Guzman received consent to enter the

home and search for Rocha, any complaint regarding the validity of the warrantless arrest

would have been futile. Accordingly, we find that Rocha’s representation at trial did not

fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

Since the first part of the Strickland test is not satisfied, we need not analyze the second

part of the test. Id. Rocha’s second issue is overruled.

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                                  IV.    CONCLUSION

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                      DORI CONTRERAS
                                                      Chief Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the
5th day of October, 2023.

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