Court Opinion

ID: 9828278
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:15:48.749005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:46.889238
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[4] While we are not disposed to recede from any of the legal propositions upon which this judgment was affirmed, a more careful inquiry into the facts has convinced us of the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict of the jury. If the appel-lee’s right to recover depends upon proof of a negligent failure on the part of the appellant’s agent to give the correct name of the consignee of the goods as alleged in its original petition, it was also required to prove that such failure was the proximate cause of the loss of the goods.
The failure of the appellant’s agent to give the correct name of the new consignee is conceded. But the question is, Has it been shown by satisfactory evidence that such failure was the proximate cause of the loss of the goods? It appears from the record that the goods arrived safely at Tampico, Mexico, on March 1st, where they were stored and held for some time thereafter for the payment of a Mexican import tax and the accrued charges; that this tax was never paid or its payment arranged for in any manner ; and that the goods were sold for the purpose of satisfying those charges. The goods were, destined to Columbus, which was a flag station about 40 miles from Tampico in the interior of Mexico. Under the regulations existing at the time the freight charges to that point were required to be paid in advance; The evidence shows that no arrangements had been made by the appellee for the payment of those charges. Warren, appellee’s-.manager, testified that he expected to get the goods into Mexico without the payment of an import tax. It is therefore reasonable to infer that he had consigned them without stipulating for any such payments. It is true that McGill, an agent of the appellee, testified in its behalf that Murray, the party to-whom the appellee intended to ship the goods,, had called at Tampico, and in response to his inquiries was told that no goods were-there.for him. But the evidence fails to show *620when lie made those inquiries; neither is there any evidence that Murray was ready and willing to prepay the import tax and the freight charges to which the goods were subject. The only testimony tending to show the amount of this import tax places it at a sum about equal to the invoice value of the goods. Considering that fact and the further fact that the appellee expected the goods to go into Mexico duty free, it is not to be assumed without proof that Murray would have accepted them upon the conditions under which he would have been compelled to take them at Tampico. Moreover, it is made apparent that the testimony that Murray had called for the goods was hearsay. Our Supreme Court has held that such testimony, when unsupported, is insufficient to establish an essential fact. Henry v. Phillips, 105 Tex. 459, 151 S. W. 533. If that hearsay testimony should be disregarded, we then have no evidence that Murray ever called for the goods. If he did not, then it is reasonable to infer that the goods would have met the same fate had he been named as the consignee. We must assume that the shipper was fully aware in advance of the necessity for arranging for the payment of the taxes and charges required in ordering that the goods might go to their destination, unless it is made to appear that the consignee had assumed that burden. Furthermore, the testimony tends to show that soon after the goods left the port of Texas City in the latter part of February Warren had been furnished with a copy of the bill of lading, showing that the goods had been consigned to Ida 'Muller. In rebutting the evidence of that fact Warren merely stated that he did not remember receiving such a bill of lading. He admits, however, that he had been advised by the Wolvin Line of the arrival of the goods at Tampico and the amount of the customs the appellee would be required to pay, but failed to remember the date upon which he received that information. Beatty, the agent of the Wolvin Line, who testified by deposition, stated that on March 11th he telegraphed to Warren, and two days later he wrote him the following letter:
“Please see your telegram March 11 regarding car of crates shipped to Mrs. Ida Muller, Columbus, Mexico, diverted to A. E. Graham Forlorn, Mexico. This is to advise you that the shipment is now on hand at Tampico, Mexico, having been refused by consignee. Please advise disposition as soon as possible to avoid the storage accruing.”
[5, 6] Evidently that letter and telegram furnished the information Warren received. This witness further testified that he had been instructed, after the arrival of the goods at Tampico, to divert them to A. E. Graham at Forlorn, Mexico, by a telegram from the ap-pellee dated March 11, 1913, and that Graham had refused to receive the goods. The record shows that after that time no effort was made by the appellee to make any disposition of the goods. It is difficult to understand why the jury should disregard the positive statements of this witness, who testified by deposition, or infer a miscarriage of the mails from the mere statement of Warren that he did not remember receiving the communications which fully advised him as to how the goods had been billed out of Texas City. If the appellee knew or was in possession of facts from which it might be reasonably inferred that the goods had been billed to Ida Muller and were being held in Tampico for the charges to which they were subject, and made no effort to redeem or forward them, it cannot be said that the failure of the appellant's agent to correctly designate the new consignee in the order of diversion was the proximate cause of their loss. A re-examination of the record has convinced us that the evidence upon which the verdict of the jury rests is too unsatisfactory.
We do not pass upon those assignments of error which complain of an excessive verdict, as the determination of that question is not necessary in view of a new trial.
The judgment heretofore rendered affirming this easel will be set aside, and the judgment of the trial court will be reversed, and the cause remanded.