Court Opinion

ID: 9469301
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:37:03.232801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:19.315715
License: Public Domain

WEICK, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. This appeal presents the spectacle of a single district judge, in a habeas corpus proceeding, granting the writ and overturning the judgment of conviction in the Criminal Court of Knox County, Tennessee, entered by the judge upon a unanimous verdict of guilty of twelve jurors of murder in the first degree in the perpetration of robbery, which judgment was affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee and by a divided Supreme Court of Tennessee.
The robbery was perpetrated by Stacy and two confederates. Stacy, who had a criminal record, did the shooting and his defense was insanity. Stacy had sense enough to flee after the robbery and shooting and was not apprehended until sometime later. The confederates did not claim to be insane. The facts are set forth in the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals and the majority opinion of the Supreme Court of Tennessee and they are binding on the federal courts in habeas proceedings.
The district court also detailed the facts in a 51 page opinion in which it acted as an appellate judge reviewing as upon direct appeal. It had no appellate jurisdiction as a habeas petition constitutes a collateral attack upon the judgment of conviction. The district judge did rely on Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) and closed with the statement that no rational trier of facts could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, the twelve jurors were not rational, the trial judge who entered judgment on the guilty verdict was not rational, the three judges on the Court of Criminal Appeals were not rational, and the three Justices on the Supreme Court of Tennessee were not rational. The result is that only the two dissenters on the Supreme Court of Tennessee and the district judge were rational.
It was not disputed at the criminal trial that a jury issue was presented. Stacy did *1217have mental problems, but they were controllable by medication and he then acted normally. He also had been admitted at different times to three mental institutions, but was last released from the F. S. D. unit of the maximum psychiatric unit at Middle Tennessee State because he was no longer in need of high security. He was described in hospital records as being “one of our best patients” who got along well with the staff, had a very pleasant attitude and was a model.
Reliance upon our decision by a divided court in the Michigan habeas corpus case of Fuller v. Anderson, 662 F.2d 420 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 102 S.Ct. 1734, 72 L.Ed.2d 150 (1982) is misplaced. The fact that the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Fuller does not mean that the Supreme Court approved our decision. Justice Stevens in his response to the denial of certiorari stated his belief “that Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 was decided incorrectly.” - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 1734, 72 L.Ed.2d 150.
It is noteworthy that Chief Justice Burger, joined by Associate Justice O’Connor, dissented from the denial of certiorari. Chief Justice Burger stated, inter alia:
The District Court and the Court of Appeals incorrectly applied Jackson. There we held that “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S. at 319,99 S.Ct. at 2789. It is sheer nonsense to suggest that, on this record, the 12 jurors acted irrationally. With all respect, I suggest that the District Court and the Court of Appeals’ majority forgot that it is the function of the jury to determine who is telling the truth. Judges betray their function when they arrogate themselves over the legal fact-finder. Either we accept the jury system with the risk of human fallibility or we ought to change the structure of the system and redefine the standard of review under the habeas corpus statutes. The District Court and the Court of Appeals did not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, as the law and their oaths require. If they had, they could not have rationally concluded that the jury could not reasonably reach the result it reached. Instead, the courts reweighed Coleman’s testimony, noting that he was young, that he had been placed in a youth house because he ran away from home, and that he attended a “special school.” Put simply — and bluntly, as this case demands — the federal judges who set aside this state court judgment acted like jurors, not jurists.
This Court cannot sit as a court of errors to correct every mistake by other courts. But the decision here warrants consideration by this Court because the courts have misapplied Jackson in a way that threatens to lead to reversals of state court criminal convictions whenever a federal court chooses to sit as a jury and set aside the lawful jury’s findings of fact. There was a flagrant refusal here to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, as the law commands. Jackson did not authorize such gross interference with the functioning of state criminal justice systems.
I would grant certiorari and reverse the decision below, with appropriate reminders to our colleagues as to certain fundamental propositions concerning their role. Our heavy docket is an insufficient reason to allow this erroneous judgment to stand. - U.S. -, -, 102 S.Ct. 1734, 72 L.Ed.2d 150.
In my opinion, Chief Justice Burger has correctly stated the law and we should follow his decision. We should also follow the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Bergman v. Burton,-U.S. — ., 102 S.Ct. 2026, 72 L.Ed.2d 478, which decision summarily vacated our opinion in Bergman v. Burton, 649 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1981) and remanded to us for further consideration in light of Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982).