Court Opinion

ID: 9387566
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 15:00:33.682768+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:14.525548
License: Public Domain

20-3135
     Acuna-De Garcia v. Garland
                                                                               BIA
                                                                     Christensen, IJ
                                                              A208 883 949/950/951
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                  SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 18th day of April, two thousand twenty-two.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7            JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
 8            RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
 9            MYRNA PÉREZ,
10                 Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   AURELIA ACUNA-DE GARCIA, M. S.
14   G-A, E. L. G-A,
15            Petitioners,
16
17                     v.                                  20-3135
18                                                         NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21            Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
23
24   FOR PETITIONERS:                  Carolyn M. Corrado, Esq., Jadeja
25                                     & Cimone, LLP, Hempstead, NY.
26
27   FOR RESPONDENT:                   Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
28                                     Attorney General; Keith I.
 1                                    McManus, Assistant Director; Nelle
 2                                    M. Seymour, Trial Attorney, Office
 3                                    of Immigration Litigation, United
 4                                    States Department of Justice,
 5                                    Washington, DC.

 6        UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 7   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

 8   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

 9   is DENIED.

10        Petitioners Aurelia Acuna-De Garcia, M.S. G-A and E.L.

11   G-A, natives and citizens of El Salvador, seek review of an

12   August 24, 2020 decision of the BIA affirming an August 21,

13   2018 decision of an immigration judge (“IJ”) denying asylum,

14   withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention

15   Against Torture (“CAT”). 1       In re Aurelia Acuna-De Garcia, et

16   al., Nos. A208 883 949/950/951 (B.I.A. Aug. 24, 2020), aff’g

17   Nos. A208 883 949/950/951 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 21,

18   2018).       We   assume   the    parties’   familiarity   with   the

19   underlying facts and procedural history.

20        We have reviewed the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions “for

21   the sake of completeness.”          Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland

     1 We refer primarily to Aurelia Acuna-De Garcia, as her two minor
     daughters were derivative beneficiaries on her application and
     also filed their own separate asylum applications.
                                         2
 1   Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006).                        We review factual

 2   findings for substantial evidence and questions of law and

 3   application of law to fact de novo.                        See Yanqin Weng v.

 4   Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009); Edimo-Doualla v.

 5   Gonzales, 464 F.3d 276, 282–83 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying

 6   substantial    evidence          standard        to    nexus     determination);

 7   Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1690–94 (2020) (applying

 8   substantial evidence standard to factual findings underlying

 9   CAT determination).            “[T]he administrative findings of fact

10   are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be

11   compelled     to       conclude       to       the    contrary.”             8 U.S.C.

12   § 1252(b)(4)(B).

13          To obtain asylum or withholding of removal, an applicant

14   must    establish       past     persecution          or   a    fear    of    future

15   persecution and “that race, religion, nationality, membership

16   in a particular social group, or political opinion was or

17   will be at least one central reason for persecuting the

18   applicant.”        8    U.S.C.    §    1158(b)(1)(B)(i);          see    also     id.

19   § 1231(b)(3)(A); Quituizaca v. Garland, 52 F.4th 103, 107-08

20   (2d Cir. 2022).          “To succeed on a particular social group

21   claim, the applicant must establish both that the group itself

                                                3
 1   was cognizable and that the alleged persecutors targeted the

 2   applicant ‘on account of’ her membership in that group.”

 3   Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014)(citations

 4   omitted).     The applicant must provide “some evidence” of the

 5   persecutor’s motives, “direct or circumstantial.”                    INS v.

 6   Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992).

 7          The agency did not err in finding that Acuna-De Garcia

 8   did not establish the requisite nexus.                   “[N]exus is not

 9   established    simply    because   a     particular      social    group   of

10   family    members   exists   and   the    family    members       experience

11   harm.”    Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 45 (B.I.A.

12   2017).    Acuna-De Garcia testified that she believed she was

13   targeted for extortion in 2015 because she was building a

14   house on the same plot of land that her father was building

15   on when her parents were killed in 1994.              She suspected that

16   the assailants wanted the land or were somehow otherwise tied

17   to her parents’ murders, or that they targeted her because

18   her husband was in the United States making money.                    These

19   reasons are insufficient to establish the requisite nexus

20   because they indicate that the individuals who extorted her

21   were    motivated   by   financial     gain.       See    Ucelo-Gomez      v.

                                        4
 1   Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007)(“When the harm visited

 2   upon members of a group is attributable to the incentives

 3   presented to ordinary criminals rather than to persecution,

 4   the scales are tipped away from considering those people a

 5   ‘particular social group’ within the meaning of the INA.”);

 6   Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 1999)

 7   (finding that “act[s] of random violence” do not constitute

 8   persecution); see also Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d

 9   138, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[W]hen a petitioner bears the

10   burden of proof, his failure to adduce evidence can itself

11   constitute the ‘substantial evidence’ necessary to support

12   the agency’s challenged decision.”).

13       The agency’s denial of CAT protection is also supported

14   by substantial evidence.     Acuna-De Garcia had the burden to

15   show that she is “more likely than not to be tortured in the

16   country   of    removal.”   8 C.F.R.   §   1208.16(c)(4).   In

17   determining whether torture is more likely than not, the

18   agency is required to consider any past torture and country

19   conditions.    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3).

20       Acuna-De Garcia never testified to any physical harm or

21   past torture.    See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(2) (“Torture is an

                                     5
 1   extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment and does not

 2   include lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment

 3   or punishment that do not amount to torture.”); Kyaw Zwar Tun

 4   v. U.S. INS, 445 F.3d 554, 567 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]orture

 5   requires proof of something more severe than the kind of

 6   treatment that would suffice to prove persecution.”).         She

 7   also did not allege that anyone in her family had been

 8   physically harmed since her parents’ murders in 1994.         And

9    her country conditions evidence documented general crime and

10   gang   violence,   not   that   someone    in   her    particular

11   circumstances would be singled out for torture.       See Mu Xiang

12   Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 432 F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2005)

13   (requiring “particularized evidence” beyond general country

14   conditions to support a CAT claim); Mu-Xing Wang v. Ashcroft,

15   320 F.3d 130, 144 (2d Cir. 2003) (requiring applicant to

16   “establish[]   that   someone   in   his   particular     alleged

17   circumstances is more likely than not to be tortured if

18   imprisoned in China” (emphasis omitted)).

19

20

                                     6
1       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

2   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

3   stays VACATED.

4                               FOR THE COURT:
5                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
6                               Clerk of Court

                                  7