Court Opinion

ID: 9373678
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:06:39.153692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:48.475281
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     MICHAEL E. SHEIMAN,                             DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        SF-0752-15-0372-I-2

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,                     DATE: May 24, 2022
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Ryan Green, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

           Mikel C. Deimler, Esquire, San Francisco, California, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chair
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review and the appellant has filed a cross
     petition for review of the initial decision, which mitigated the appellant’s removal
     to a 30-day suspension. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the petition
     for review, DENY the cross petition for review, REVERSE the initial decision,
     and SUSTAIN the appellant’s removal.

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        The agency received an anonymous letter dated September 16, 2011,
     alleging that the appellant, a GS-13 Senior Appraiser for the agency’s Internal
     Revenue Service (IRS) in Honolulu, Hawaii, was abusing his work time by,
     among other things, “golfing in the early afternoons during the work week.”
     Sheiman v. Department of the Treasury, MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-15-0372-I-1,
     Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 10 at 13-14.          From September 26, 2011, to
     February 18, 2014, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administr ation
     (TIGTA) conducted an investigation which purportedly found that between
     August 2006, and August 2013, the appellant “golfed during official IRS duty
     hours on at least 205 days for which he claimed no annual leave on his official
     IRS timesheets.” Id. at 4. The investigative report also showed that out of those
     205 days, the appellant claimed sick leave on 30 days, was on official travel for
     5 days, and either he or his vehicle were observed at various Hawaii golf courses
     during official duty hours on 4 days. Id.
¶3        The agency issued an October 24, 2014 notice proposing the appellant’s
     removal on 2 charges comprising 168 specifications of providing false
     information   regarding   his   official     time   and   attendance   records,   and
     29 specifications of providing misleading information regarding his official time
     and attendance records. IAF, Tab 9 at 120-36. Under each specification of the
     first charge, the agency contended that the appellant had golfed during duty hours
     but did not take leave. Id. at 120-33. Under each specification of the second
     charge, the agency alleged that the appellant had played golf on a day that he took
     sick leave and had failed to use that leave for the purpose intended. Id. at 133-36.
     The appellant made a written reply to the notice in which he asserted that despite
     the fact that he may have played golf on any particular workday, he had a flexible
     schedule and always worked an 8-hour day, such that he did not intentionally
     provide false or misleading information regarding his official time and attendance
     records.   IAF, Tab 24 at 45-51.           After considering the evidence and the
                                                                                          3

     appellant’s written response, the agency issued a decision sustaining all the
     specifications and charges and removing the appellant effective February 6, 2015.
     IAF, Tab 7 at 31-35. The appellant elected to retire effective February 5, 2015. 2
     Id. at 29.
¶4         The appellant appealed his removal. IAF, Tab 1. After holding a 2 -day
     hearing, the administrative judge found that the agency failed to prove the first
     charge, sustained the second charge, rejected the appellant’s affirmative defenses,
     and mitigated the removal to a 30-day suspension. Sheiman v. Department of the
     Treasury, MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-15-0372-I-2, Refiled Appeal File (RAF),
     Tab 19, Initial Decision (ID).
¶5         The administrative judge found that the agency failed to establish its first
     charge, providing false information regarding time and attendance records,
     determining after an exhaustive review of each specification that the agency
     failed to demonstrate that the appellant had the intent to defraud or deceive
     necessary to prove a falsification charge.      ID at 12-13.     She found that the
     agency’s hearsay evidence, obtained from the Golf Handicap and Information
     Network (GHIN) website, was insufficient to prove that the appellant golfed
     during duty hours because GHIN was “not designed for the purpose of keeping an
     accurate record of golf tee times and dates,” and was inconsistent with other
     agency evidence. ID at 6-7.
¶6         More importantly, the administrative judge found that the appellant’s
     consistent explanation of his understanding that he had the discretion to fashion
     his own schedule as long as he worked for 8 hours per day and 40 hours per week
     was not inherently improbable. ID at 12. She also found t hat his understanding
     was consistent with the agency’s time reporting system, which only required him

     2
       If an employee elects to retire after receiving a removal decision, the Board retains
     jurisdiction over the removal action, regardless of the effective retirement date.
     5 U.S.C. § 7701(j); Mays v. Department of Transportation, 27 F.3d 1577, 1579-81
     (Fed. Cir. 1994).
                                                                                       4

     to record the total hours for each day and not his starting or ending time.     Id.
     She found that the appellant’s testimony before her was sincere, straigh tforward
     and believable, as compared to the equivocal testimony of the agency’s witnesses.
     ID at 12-13. Thus, she found the appellant understood that he was allowed to
     work a flexible schedule based on his duties and assignments, most of which
     occurred in the field and not in the office due to his work as an appraiser. Id.
     The administrative judge also found that the appellant’s testimony about his work
     hours was corroborated by the testimony of one of his colleagues, who also began
     his workdays early and reported observing the appellant in the office as early as
     5:00 a.m.        ID at 13; Hearing Transcript, October 2, 2015 (Tr. 2) at 21 -23
     (testimony of the appellant’s colleague).
¶7         The administrative judge sustained the second charge, which she interpreted
     as akin to a lack of candor, thus requiring a lesser showing of intent than
     falsification.     ID at 14-15.   She sustained 8 out of the 29 specifications of
     providing misleading information regarding official time and attendance r ecords,
     finding that the appellant requested and took sick leave on 8 days when he was
     neither seeking medical treatment nor incapacitated from work and that he knew
     or should have known that paid sick leave is for illness or medical treatment,
     not for engaging in recreational activity. ID at 18-19. For each of the remaining
     specifications in the second charge, the administrative judge either found that the
     agency failed to show that the appellant played golf on that day or determined
     that because he had taken 4 hours or less of sick leave, and the agency could not
     establish the actual time that he played, it was not unlikely that the appellant
     attended a medical appointment and then played golf later in the same day.
     ID at 15-16.
¶8         The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to prove his due
     process defenses because the ex parte communications at issue were not likely to
     result in undue pressure on the deciding official, and the appellant also failed to
     meet the significant burden necessary to demonstrate that the deciding official
                                                                                            5

      was biased.   ID at 19-22. The administrative judge also found that the appellant
      failed to prove his harmful error defense because he did not show that any
      procedural error likely caused the agency to reach a conclusion different from the
      one it would have reached absent the error. 3 ID at 22.
¶9          Although the administrative judge found that the agency established a nexus
      between the appellant’s misconduct and the              efficiency of the service,
      she nevertheless mitigated the penalty to a 30-day suspension, finding that
      removal was outside the tolerable limits of reasonableness.              ID at 23-25.
      She reasoned that, despite the loss of trust and the potential for notoriety that the
      agency cited in support of its choice of penalty, there were strong mitigating
      factors present, including the appellant’s 9 years of discipline -free Federal
      service and his rehabilitative potential, as demonstrated by his remorsefulness and
      his consistent compliance with time and attendance practices since his first
      TIGTA interview on the subject in February 2014. ID at 24.
¶10         In its petition for review, the agency argues that it proved the first charge.
      Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 3 at 10. It contends that the administrative
      judge gave the evidence from GHIN insufficient weight, arguing that it is not
      hearsay but instead represents an exception to the hearsay rules as an admission
      against interest. Id. at 10-13. Alternatively, the agency argues that even if the
      GHIN evidence is hearsay, it is entitled to significant weight and reliably
      demonstrates that the appellant played golf on the dates he entered information
      into GHIN.    Id. at 13-14.    The agency further argues that the totality of the
      circumstances demonstrated that the appellant’s actions were deliberate and not a
      mistake, showing the intent required to establish the first charge. Id. at 16-21.

      3
        The parties do not contest the administrative judge’s findings on the appellant’s due
      process and harmful error defenses. Therefore, we decline to revisit them on review.
      See Roche v. Department of Transportation, 110 M.S.P.R. 286, ¶ 13 (2008) (explaining
      that the Board generally does not consider issues that are not raised on review), aff’d,
      596 F3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115 (“The Board normally will
      consider only issues raised in a timely-filed petition or cross-petition for review.”).
                                                                                            6

      The agency also defends the choice of removal as within its reasonable discretion,
      arguing that the appellant was only remorseful after TIGTA discovered his
      misconduct. Id. at 22-23. It contends that the administrative judge placed too
      much reliance on the appellant’s performance and assigned insufficie nt weight to
      the loss of his supervisors’ trust and confidence. Id. at 23-24.
¶11         The appellant responds in opposition to the agency’s petition for review and
      submits a cross petition for review in which he argues that the administrative
      judge erred in sustaining the second charge. PFR File, Tab 5. The appellant also
      argues that the administrative judge erred in finding that he knew that his use of
      sick leave to play golf was improper and that he sought to deceive the agency
      when he submitted time and attendance information. Id. at 16-18. Following the
      October 1-2, 2015 hearing, the appellant filed motions regarding efforts by the
      agency to collect debts totaling $33,105.83, including fees, interest, and penalties.
      RAF, Tabs 13, 17. In his cross petition for review, the appellant argues that the
      administrative judge abused her discretion by not addressing the debt iss ue,
      and contends that the issue was ripe for adjudication. PFR File, Tab 5 at 18 -23.
¶12         The agency has submitted a reply to the appellant’s response to the petition
      for review, and a response in opposition to the appellant’s cross petition for
      review. PFR File, Tabs 6-7.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
      The administrative judge properly concluded that the agency failed to prove the
      falsification charge because it did not show that the appellant acted with the
      requisite intent.
¶13         To establish a charge of falsification, the agency must prove by
      preponderant   evidence    that   the   appellant   knowingly      supplied   incorrect
      information and that he did so with the intention of defrauding the agency. E.g.,
      O’Lague v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 340, ¶ 6 (2016), aff’d
      per curiam, 698 F. App’x 1034 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Boo v. Department of Homeland
      Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 100, ¶ 12 (2014).        For the reasons explained below,
                                                                                          7

      we agree with the administrative judge that the agency failed to prove that the
      appellant intended to deceive or defraud the Government when he completed his
      time and attendance records. ID at 13-14.
¶14         The   Board    must    defer   to    an   administrative   judge’s   credibility
      determinations when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on observing the
      demeanor of witnesses testifying at a hearing; the Board may overturn such
      determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so.
      Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002) . Based on
      the testimony before her, the administrative judge found the appellant’s
      explanation of his time and attendance practices was plausible and credible.
      ID at 14.   By contrast, she found the testimony of the agency’s witnesses
      regarding the appellant’s tour of duty and the flexibility afforded him was
      equivocal, and supported the appellant’s understanding that it was acceptable for
      him to work a flexible schedule based on his duties and assignments. ID at 13.
      She also found that the appellant’s supervisors consistently accepted his ti me and
      attendance submissions, even when they knew that he obviously was working
      more than 8 hours on occasion. ID at 12-13. For example, when the appellant
      was on travel, he did not record his extra time, and his first-level supervisor
      would permit him to use unofficial credit hours, essentially ratifying this practice.
      Id.
¶15         The agency identifies no sufficiently sound reasons to disturb the
      administrative judge’s demeanor-based conclusion that the appellant did not
      intend to defraud or deceive the Government when he completed his time and
      attendance records. Id. Thus, we agree with the administrative judge that the
      agency failed to prove its first charge.

      The administrative judge gave the GHIN evidence proper weight.
¶16         On review, as noted above, the agency challenges the administrative judge’s
      finding that the GHIN evidence is hearsay, arguing that it falls within
      an exception to the hearsay rule for admissions against interest. PFR File, Tab 3
                                                                                         8

      at 10-14 (citing Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)). In support of its argument,
      the agency cites Social Security Administration v. Whittlesey, in which the Board
      found that an agency proved an employee was engaged in the unapproved outside
      practice of law through documents he submitted to a state agency before which
      he practiced. Whittlesey, 59 M.S.P.R. 684, 692 (1993), aff’d per curiam, 39 F.3d
      1197 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Table); PFR File, Tab 3 at 13. The Board found that these
      documents were not hearsay because they contained admissions.            Whittlesey,
      59 M.S.P.R. at 692.
¶17        However, we find it unnecessary to determine whether the evidence w ould
      more properly have been considered by the administrative judge as non -hearsay
      evidence. Regardless of how the GHIN evidence is characterized, we agree with
      the administrative judge that it had limited probative weight because the appellant
      did not necessarily enter data on the website on the same date that he golfed.
      ID at 6-7. We agree with the administrative judge that this evidence, at most,
      indicates that the appellant played golf on a particular day, and does not purport
      to indicate what time of day he did so or whether it was during his duty hours.
      ID at 6. Specifically, the columns on the GHIN website include the date of a
      particular game, but not the time that the game was played, and the only time
      reflected in the database is the time that the user updated the record. IAF, Tab 10
      at 124.   Thus, as the administrative judge aptly pointed out, although GHIN
      reflects that the appellant played golf on June 10, 2012, there is no information in
      GHIN as to what time he played that day; GHIN merely shows that the appellant
      updated the record on June 14, 2012, at 10:55 p.m. Id.; ID at 6-7.
¶18        The agency also argues that it did not need to establish that the appellant
      played golf at any specific time, only that it was more likely than not true that
      he was not engaged in the performance of official duties during all his work
      hours. PFR File, Tab 3 at 15 (citing Minyard v. Department of Health & Human
      Services, 21 M.S.P.R. 229, 230-31 (1984)). Although the cases bear significant
      similarities, both involving an anonymous tip that an employee was playing golf
                                                                                         9

      during duty hours, we do not agree with the agency that the administrative judg e
      misconstrued the charge. Rather, she correctly found that the agency’s proof was
      insufficient. The proof offered in the instant matter pales in comparison to the
      strong case built by the agency in Minyard, which included testimony from the
      golf professional at the course where the appellant in that case allegedly played,
      sign-in logs for each of the games, and affidavits from two of that appellant’s
      frequent golf partners. Minyard, 21 M.S.P.R. at 230-31.
¶19         The agency’s evidence in this case is not of the same weight and contains
      almost no corroboration for the agency’s allegations, supporting only 3 out of
      168 specifications in the first charge with a first-hand observation of the appellant
      at a golf course during his alleged duty hours. ID at 8. Thus, as noted above,
      the agency failed to establish that it was more likely than not that the appellant
      provided false information regarding his official time and attendance records .

      The administrative judge properly sustained the second charge of providing
      misleading information.
¶20         In his cross petition for review, the appellant contends that the agency
      failed to prove the second charge, providing misleading information regarding his
      official time and attendance records. PFR File, Tab 5 at 16-18. He argues that
      the administrative judge erred in finding that he had knowledge of the agency’s
      rules for sick leave because she improperly placed the burden on him instead of
      the agency. Id. at 17. The appellant also argues that the administrative judge
      erred in finding that he was deceptive by claiming sick leave for the same days
      he played golf. Id. at 18.
¶21         In her initial decision, the administrative judge painstakingly reviewed the
      agency’s evidence on each specification, finding that the agency established that
      the appellant took 8 hours of sick leave and played golf during the work day on
      8 out of the 29 dates it specified he had done so. ID at 14 -19. The administrative
      judge did not sustain the specification for the remaining 21 dates. She found that
      although the appellant had taken up to 4 hours of sick leave (or, in one instance,
                                                                                      10

      administrative leave) and had reported on GHIN that he had golfed on that
      particular date, the GHIN data did not establish that he golfed during hours
      he was taking sick leave. ID at 15-17. As noted above, the administrative judge
      found it was not unlikely under the circumstances that the appellant attended a
      medical appointment and then played golf later in the day. ID at 15 -16.
¶22        The appellant does not dispute that he golfed on the 8 days which the
      administrative judge found he had taken a full work day of sick leave. He instead
      argues that the agency failed to prove that he knew or should have known “that
      using paid sick leave for self-treating a poor disposition excluded the game of
      golf and was prohibited.”    PFR File, Tab 5 at 18.     The administrative judge
      considered and rejected the appellant’s contention that he was not aware that such
      use of sick leave was proscribed. As noted above, based on the testimony before
      her, which included the appellant’s explanation of his justification for golfing
      while on sick leave, the administrative judge found that the appellant “knew or
      should have known that paid sick leave was for illne ss or medical treatment, not
      for engaging in a recreational activity or sport such as golfing.” ID at 18 -19;
      Tr. 2 at 68-73 (testimony of the appellant). As noted above, the Board must defer
      to an administrative judge’s credibility determinations when th ey are based,
      explicitly or implicitly, on     witness demeanor, and may overturn such
      determinations only when it has “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so.
      Haebe, 288 F.3d at 1301. The appellant’s assertions here provide no such basis
      for disturbing the initial decision. Broughton v. Department of Health & Human
      Services, 33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (finding no reason to disturb the
      administrative judge’s findings when she considered the evidence as a whole,
      drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned conclusions on issues of
      credibility); see Gray v. U.S. Postal Service, No. 05-3074, 2005 WL 1368093,
      at *3 (Fed. Cir. June 9, 2005) (finding that an administrative judge did not err in
                                                                                          11

      concluding that an employee with 9 years of service had knowledge that working
      another job while on sick leave was against the rules). 4

      Removal is a reasonable penalty for the sustained charge.
¶23         Because the agency did not prove one of its charges, the administrative
      judge reweighed some of the penalty factors. ID at 23-25; Douglas v. Veterans
      Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981) (providing a nonexhaustive list of
      factors relevant to penalty determinations). She found the deciding official gave
      insufficient mitigating weight to the appellant’s expressions of remorse an d
      rehabilitative potential, as well as his 9 years of discipline-free service. Compare
      ID at 24-25, with IAF, Tab 7 at 32-33. On review, the agency disagrees with the
      administrative judge’s assessment of these factors and reasserts that removal is
      an appropriate penalty for the two charges.       PFR File, Tab 3 at 22-24.        The
      appellant argues that, because the administrative judge did not sustain the first
      charge, she properly mitigated the penalty. PFR File, Tab 5 at 14-16. While we
      have agreed with the administrative judge that the agency proved only one of its
      charges, we find that she erred in reweighing some of the Douglas factors on this
      basis. We sustain the appellant’s removal.
¶24         The Board will review an agency imposed penalty only to determine if the
      agency conscientiously considered all the relevant factors and exercised
      management discretion within tolerable limits of reasonableness.             Douglas,
      5 M.S.P.R. at 306.     The Board will give due weight to the agency’s primary
      discretion in matters of employee discipline and efficiency, recognizing that the
      Board’s function is not to displace management responsibility but to assure that
      managerial judgment has been properly exercised. Id. at 302. When the Board
      sustains fewer than all of the agency’s charges, and the agency either indicates
      that it would have imposed the same penalty based on the sustained charges,

      4
       The Board may rely on unpublished decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
      Federal Circuit if it finds the court’s reasoning persuasive, as we do here. See, e.g.,
      Mauldin v. U.S. Postal Service, 115 M.S.P.R. 513, ¶ 12 (2011).
                                                                                         12

      or does not indicate to the contrary, the Board’s role is not to independently
      determine the penalty, but to decide whether the agency’s ch oice of penalty is
      appropriate.    Negron v. Department of Justice, 95 M.S.P.R. 561, ¶ 32 (2004)
      (citing Lachance v. Devall, 178 F.3d 1246, 1258-59 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); see Blank
      v. Department of the Army, 85 M.S.P.R. 443, ¶ 9 (2000) (explaining that when
      not all of the agency’s charges are sustained and the agency has not indicated it
      desires a lesser penalty under this eventuality, the Board may presume that the
      agency desires the maximum reasonable penalty and must examine whether the
      agency-imposed penalty is within the maximum limits of reasonableness ), aff’d,
      247 F.3d 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The Board cannot “substitute its will” for that of
      the agency, which is entrusted with managing its workforce.                  Negron,
      95 M.S.P.R. 561, ¶ 32 (quoting Lachance, 178 F.3d at 1258). Rather, the Board
      “may mitigate an unreasonably severe agency penalty to bring the penalty within
      the bounds of reasonableness.” Id. (quoting Lachance, 178 F.3d at 1258).
¶25        In the instant case, the deciding official stated in his decision letter that
      removal was an appropriate penalty for each charge independently. IAF, Tab 7
      at 31-32.      Without acknowledging this statement, the administrative judge
      reweighed the penalty, determining it was appropriate to mitigate to a 30 -day
      suspension based on the appellant’s expressions of remorse and rehabilitative
      potential, 9 years of service, and lack of prior discipline. ID at 24 -25. In light of
      the deciding official’s determination that removal was the appropriate penalty for
      either charge, we find the administrative judge erred in revisiting his penalty
      assessment on the basis that the agency only proved one of its two charges .
¶26        We also disagree with the administrative judge’s assessment of the
      appellant’s rehabilitative potential. The administrative judge found the appellant
      was remorseful, acknowledged that he made mistakes in his time and attendance
      practices, and complied with all time and attendance requirements after his first
      interview with the TIGTA investigator. ID at 24. She also consid ered that the
      majority of the proven misconduct occurred 4 years or more before the
                                                                                    13

  appellant’s removal.    Id.   We discern no basis to disturb the administrative
  judge’s credibility determination that the appellant expressed sincere remorse for
  some of his conduct. See Purifoy v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 838 F.3d
  1367, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that an administrative judge’s finding of
  rehabilitative potential is entitled to special deference when it is based explicitly
  or implicitly on witness demeanor).
¶27    Nevertheless, we find that the administrative judge failed to consider all of
  the relevant evidence in concluding that the appellant could be rehabilitated, and
  therefore this finding is not entitled to deference. See Faucher v. Department of
  the Air Force, 96 M.S.P.R. 203, ¶ 8 (2004) (recognizing that the Board does not
  owe deference to the administrative judge’s credibility determination when his
  findings are incomplete, inconsistent with the weight of the evidence, and do not
  reflect the record as a whole). First, the administrative judge did not consider
  that the appellant only admitted to his “timekeeping errors” after being
  confronted about them by the TIGTA Special Agent. This warrants a reduction
  in the weight accorded this factor.        See Saiz v. Department of the Navy,
  122 M.S.P.R. 521, ¶ 13 (2015) (giving reduced weight to the appellant’s
  expressions of remorse because he made them only after his misconduct was
  discovered); Singletary v. Department of the Air Force, 94 M.S.P.R. 553, ¶ 15
  (2003) (explaining that the timing of expressions of remorse is relevant in
  assessing rehabilitative potential), aff’d per curiam, 104 F. App’x 155 (Fed. Cir.
  2004).    Second, the appellant’s admissions only concerned the unproven
  misconduct set forth in the falsification charge. The appellant has never owned
  up to his misuse of sick leave or expressed any remorse for his lack of candor in
  the matter.    In fact, the appellant has maintained throughout the agency’s
  predecisional process and these Board proceedings, including on petition for
  review, that playing golf in order to relax and destress is an appropriate use of
  sick leave. IAF, Tab 1 at 14-15, Tab 10 at 5, Tab 12 at 128, Tab 24 at 5; Tr. 2
                                                                                         14

      at 72-73, 83-84 (testimony of the appellant); PFR File, Tab 5 at 18. We find that
      the appellant’s rehabilitative potential is at best, entitled to minimal weight.
¶28        Acknowledging the existence of some mitigating factors in this appeal, such
      as the appellant’s 9 years of service and consistently above-average performance,
      we conclude that removal is within the tolerable limits of reasonableness for his
      sustained misconduct. IAF, Tab 13 at 8-39; Hearing Transcript, October 1, 2015
      (Tr. 1) at 44 (testimony of the appellant’s former supervisor), 204 (testimony of
      the deciding official).    The nature and seriousness of the offense and its
      relationship to the appellant’s duties, position, and responsibilities is the primary
      factor that the Board will consider in assessing an agency’s penalty
      determination. See Arena v. U.S. Postal Service, 121 M.S.P.R. 125, ¶ 6 (2014),
      aff’d per curiam, 617 F. App’x 996 (Fed. Cir. 2015). As explained above, the
      agency proved 8 of the 29 specifications of providing misleading information
      because, on the dates in question, the appellant took sick leave when he was
      neither seeking medical treatment nor medically incapacitated from work but was
      playing golf instead, and in so doing he knowingly provided inaccurate
      information on his time and attendance records.           IAF, Tab 9 at 133-36;
      ID at 15 19. The deciding official considered this factor as aggravating, stating
      that the appellant’s misconduct was severe and egregious. IAF, Tab 7 at 32; Tr. 1
      at 201-02, 240 (testimony of the deciding official). We agree. L ack of candor is
      a serious offense that strikes at the heart of the employer -employee relationship.
      Ludlum v. Department of Justice, 87 M.S.P.R. 56, ¶¶ 28-29 (2000), aff’d,
      278 F.3d 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
¶29        This is particularly so considering the nature of the appellant’s position.
      As the deciding official observed, the appellant often worked remotely, and
      he was in a position of public trust that required him to have contact with the
      public. IAF, Tab 7 at 32; Tr. 1 at 203, 211 (testimony of the deciding official).
      This lack of on-site supervision required that the agency be able to trust the
      appellant on time and attendance matters. ID at 24; see Corbett v. Department of
                                                                                       15

      the Treasury, 21 M.S.P.R. 544, 545-46 & n.2 (1984) (finding that removal was
      reasonable for an IRS employee who engaged in outside employment and
      falsified an official statement, notwithstanding his above-average performance,
      lack of prior discipline, and the allegedly mitigating circumstances surrounding
      his misconduct, because his position necessitated honesty and integrity and
      required him to work without continuous supervision).         It is clear from the
      deciding official’s testimony that his loss of trust and confidence in the appellant
      played a major role in his decision. IAF, Tab 7 at 32-33; Tr. 1 at 203-05, 210-12,
      219 (testimony of the deciding official).     Considering the facts of this case,
      including the nature of the appellant’s offense, his position within the IRS, and
      his continued attempts to justify his misuse of sick leave, the deciding official’s
      loss of trust is an aggravating factor. See Casteel v. Department of the Treasury,
      97 M.S.P.R. 521, ¶¶ 2, 8-10 (2004) (finding that removal was a reasonable
      penalty for a IRS Tax Examining Assistant with 22 years of service and
      acceptable performance because, as relevant here, her failure to pay her
      Government credit card bill on time and false claim of no prior instances of
      outstanding balances caused the agency to lose trust and confidence in her).
¶30        Further, as the administrative judge acknowledged, and the agency reasserts
      on review, removal is within the range of penalties in IRS’s Guide to Penalty
      Determinations for a first offense of making misleading statements. IAF, Tab 14
      at 81; ID at 25 n.11; PFR File, Tab 3 at 24. To the extent that the administrative
      judge found mitigation appropriate because lesser penalties were available, we
      disagree. ID at 25 n.11. The Guide states that “[p]ersons in positions of trust, or
      who deal directly with taxpayers, can be held to higher standards.” IAF, Tab 14
      at 71; see Southers v. Veterans Administration, 36 M.S.P.R. 213, 214-15 (finding
      that the penalty of removal was appropriate for charges of intentional
      falsification and false testimony, relying in part on the deciding official’s
      testimony that trust was particularly important because the appellant’s position
      required that he work independently and meet with the public when performing
                                                                                       16

      his duties), aff’d per curiam, 862 F.2d 321 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (Table).           The
      appellant is employed by an agency that must maintain public confidence in its
      image of integrity, depending as it does essentially on voluntary compliance of
      the public. See Fike v. Internal Revenue Service, 10 M.S.P.R. 113, 116 (1982);
      see also Acree v. Department of the Treasury, 80 M.S.P.R. 73, ¶ 19 (1998)
      (considering fact that the appellant’s actions undermined public confidence in an
      agency in affirming the penalty of removal), aff’d per curiam, 215 F.3d 1347
      (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Table). As the deciding observed, the appellant’s misconduct
      came to light through an anonymous source, and if the media found out, they
      would have a “field day.” Tr. 1 at 207 (testimony of the deciding official). We
      agree with the administrative judge that the deciding official properly considered
      this potential notoriety as a valid concern, especially for a politically sensitive
      organization like the IRS. ID at 23-24.
¶31         Although not addressed by the administrative judge or the parties on
      review, we also find that the deciding official appropriately considered
      alternative sanctions. See Douglas, 5 M.S.P.R. at 306. The deciding official
      testified that he considered suspending the appellant and reassigning him out of
      Hawaii, but because all field employees encumber positions of trust, he decided
      against that course of action. Tr. 1 at 205, 211-12 (testimony of the deciding
      official).
¶32         Having carefully considered the evidence and weighed the pertinent
      Douglas factors as a whole, we discern no basis to disturb the determination of
      the deciding official that removal is a reasonable penalty for the sustained
      charges and specifications.     Although the appellant has 9 years of good
      performance and demonstrated remorse, we find that these factors are outweighed
      by the nature and seriousness of his offense as it relates to his pos ition, duties,
                                                                                       17

      and responsibilities, particularly considering his employment by the IRS and the
      level of trust that is required for a Senior Appraiser. 5

      The Board currently has no jurisdiction over the agency’s debt collection action.
¶33         As noted above, following the hearing, the appellant filed motions
      regarding the agency’s efforts to offset his retirement benefits to collect debts
      totaling $33,105.83, including fees, interest, and penalties. RAF, Tabs 13, 17.
      In his cross petition for review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge
      abused her discretion by not addressing the debt issue, contending it was ripe for
      adjudication. PFR File, Tab 5 at 18-23. He asserts that the administrative judge
      erred in failing to ensure that the agency afforded him due process in conjunction
      with the alleged debt. Id. at 22. Although the agency argues that the debt is “not
      integral to the issues regarding the appeal,” it appears that a portion of the debt
      may relate to the appellant’s use of sick leave at issue in his removal. PFR File,
      Tab 7 at 8, 11.
¶34         Regardless of whether the debt is related to the use of sick leave underlying
      the removal, the Board is without authority to order cancelation or amendment of
      the debt in this appeal. Mattern v. Department of the Treasury, 88 M.S.P.R. 65,
      ¶¶ 3-4, 11, 14-15 (2001) (finding that the Board could not award either back pay
      or status quo ante relief for the appellant’s placement on restricted leave or
      administrative leave, even though these actions were related to his subsequent
      removal, which the Board reversed), aff’d, 291 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). If the
      appellant believes that the debt itself amounts to a suspension of more than
      14 days, or a furlough of 30 days or less, he may wish to file a separate Board
      appeal of any such alleged adverse action. 5 U.S.C. § 7512(2), (5); see Engler v.
      Department of the Army, 121 M.S.P.R. 547, ¶ 6 (2014) (explaining that a

      5
        Even if the Board had mitigated the appellant’s removal and the appellant had been
      entitled to back pay, any back pay amount would need to be offset by his retirement
      annuity. See Crazy Thunder-Collier v. Department of the Interior, 115 M.S.P.R. 82,
      ¶ 11 (2010); 5 C.F.R. § 550.805(e)(2)(i).
                                                                                           18

      suspension is temporarily placing an employee in a nonpay, nonduty status);
      Harris v. U.S. Postal Service, 119 M.S.P.R. 583, ¶ 8 (2013) (explaining that a
      furlough is temporarily placing an employee in a nonduty, nonpay status because
      of lack of work or funds or for other nondisciplinary reasons). We lack sufficient
      information to determine whether the Board would have jurisdiction over such a
      claim.
¶35         In addition, if the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) attempts to
      collect the alleged debt through administrative offset of the appellant’s retirement
      annuity payments, the Board may have authority to conduct a limited review.
      See Ramirez v. Department of the Army, 86 M.S.P.R. 211, ¶¶ 6, 8-11 (2000)
      (explaining that, in the context of an OPM offset, the Board can review whether
      an appellant’s former employing agency afforded him a hearing in connection
      with a debt, but not whether he is liable); see also Fagone v. Office of Personnel
      Management, 85 M.S.P.R. 49, ¶ 9 (2000) (the Board generally lacks jurisdiction
      over an appeal of an OPM action absent a final decision or evidence that OPM
      does not intend to issue such a decision).           The appellant alleges that the
      Department of Treasury has suggested his retirement benefits may be offset by his
      debt. IAF, Tab 17 at 5; PFR File, Tab 5 at 22. However, he does not allege that
      the agency has actually sought to do so and he has not provided copies of the
      relevant correspondence or indicated that OPM has initiated such offsets.
¶36         Accordingly, the administrative judge properly denied his motions seeking
      to stop collection.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 6
               This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this
      appeal. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(c). You may obtain review of this final decision.

      6
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in an y matter.
                                                                                      19

5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time
limit for seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).    Although we offer the following summary of available
appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice
on which option is most appropriate for your situation and the rights described
below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases
fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision,
you should immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully
follow all filing time limits and requirements.         Failure to file within the
applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen
forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
                                                                                    20

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving    a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).              If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
                                                                                21

      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
                                                                                      22

of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 7 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

7
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdicti on.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                       23

      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found a t their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                        Jennifer Everling
                                        Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.