Court Opinion

ID: 9882681
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:18:27.354673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:43.406298
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Goble v. CNX Gas Co., L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-3603.]

             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                            SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 MONROE COUNTY

                                 GREGORY A. GOBLE et al.,

                                       Plaintiffs-Appellants,

                                                    v.

                             CNX GAS COMPANY, LLC, et al.,

                                     Defendants-Appellees.

                       OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
                                        Case No. 22 MO 0014

                                    Civil Appeal from the
                        Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County, Ohio
                                     Case No. 2020-414

                                          BEFORE:
                  Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Mark A. Hanni, Judges.

                                             JUDGMENT:
                                               Affirmed.

Atty. Cody Smith and Atty. Sean Jacobs, Emens, Wolper, Jacobs & Jasin Law Firm Co.,
LPA, One Easton Oval, Suite 340, Columbus, Ohio 43219 Atty. Todd M. Kildow, Emens,
Wolper, Jacobs & Jasin Law Firm Co., LPA, 250 West Main Street, Suite A, St. Clairsville,
Ohio 43950, for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Atty. Rodger L. Puz, Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., Two PPG Place - Suite 400,
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222-5402, for Defendant-Appellee CNX Gas Company, LLC

Atty. Kyle W. Bickford and Atty. Erik A. Schramm, Jr., Hanlon, McCormick, Schramm,
Bickford & Schramm Co., LPA, 46457 National Road West, St. Clairsville, Ohio 43950,
for Defendants-Appellees Dillon, et al.
                                                                                      –2–

                              Dated: September 28, 2023

WAITE, J.

       {¶1}   Appellants Gregory A. and Brenda S. Goble appeal an August 23, 2022

judgment entry of the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas which granted summary

judgment in favor of Appellees CNX Gas Company, Vivian L. Dillon, Larry J. Dillon, Trudy

Ensinger, Tracy Pyles, and the Estate of Paul E. Bierie and Patricia A. Rude. Appellants

argue the trial court erroneously determined that a one-half interest in oil and gas rights

constituted a deed exception rather than a reservation, and claim that words of

inheritance were necessary in order to create an inheritable fee simple interest. For the

reasons provided, Appellant’s arguments are without merit and the judgment of the trial

court is affirmed.

                             Factual and Procedural History

       {¶2}   This oil and gas action involves a dispute over the ownership of a one-half

interest in the oil and gas rights underlying a 115.891 acre tract of land located in

Switzerland Township, Monroe County. There appears to be no dispute that Appellants,

the surface owners, own the remaining one-half interest. This dispute solely involves the

remaining one-half interest which was created within an August 17, 1914 deed.

       {¶3}   In that deed, C.C. and Belle C. Webb conveyed the property to C.C. and

Emma Ross. Within the deed, the Webbs included the following clause: “The Grantors

Case No. 22 MO 0014
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hereby reserve an equal one half interest in the oil and gas lying in and under the above

described premises.” (Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. A.)

        {¶4}   On July 12, 1930, Silas W. Blue conveyed the property to Lot W. Blue within

a deed that referenced the Webb clause. It is unclear how Silas obtained the property,

as Appellants failed to include all of the deeds in the chain of title.

        {¶5}   On April 19, 1931, C.C. Webb died. On February 25, 1958, Belle C. Webb

died.   Although none of the deeds were provided in the record, the property was

apparently conveyed multiple times from Belle’s death until Appellants obtained the

property on June 23, 2005. According to Appellants, the Webb interest does not appear

within these deeds.

        {¶6}   On September 17, 2012, Appellants entered into an oil and gas lease with

CNX. At some point in 2017, drilling commenced and the property has produced both oil

and gas ever since. In May of 2018, Appellee-heirs recorded two certificates of title that

reference the Webb interest. Shortly thereafter, Appellee-CNX entered into ten oil and

gas leases with Appellee-heirs that involved the subject property. Appellee-CNX paid

one-half of the royalties to Appellee-heirs and the other one-half to Appellants.

        {¶7}   On October 21, 2020, Appellants filed a complaint for declaratory judgment,

quiet title, and breach of contract against Appellees, collectively. The first two claims

pertained to the Appellee-heirs and the latter was a claim against Appellee-CNX.

Appellee-heirs filed an answer and counterclaim. On December 18, 2020, Appellee-CNX

filed a motion to dismiss. On January 4, 2021, the Appellee-heirs filed a motion for

judgment on the pleadings.

Case No. 22 MO 0014
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       {¶8}   In April and May of 2022, each party filed competing motions for summary

judgment. On August 23, 2023, the trial court granted Appellees’ motions and declared

that the heirs owned the one-half interest at issue. It is from this entry that Appellants

timely appeal.

                                    Summary Judgment

       {¶9}   An appellate court conducts a de novo review of a trial court's decision to

grant summary judgment, using the same standards as the trial court set forth in Civ.R.

56(C). Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996).

Before summary judgment can be granted, the trial court must determine that: (1) no

genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable

minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing the evidence most favorably in favor

of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, the conclusion is

adverse to that party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d

267 (1977). Whether a fact is “material” depends on the substantive law of the claim

being litigated. Hoyt, Inc. v. Gordon & Assoc., Inc., 104 Ohio App.3d 598, 603, 662 N.E.2d

1088 (8th Dist.1995).

       {¶10} “[T]he moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court

of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate

the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the nonmoving party's

claim.” (Emphasis deleted.) Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 296, 662 N.E.2d 264

(1996). If the moving party carries its burden, the nonmoving party has a reciprocal

burden of setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at

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293. In other words, when presented with a properly supported motion for summary

judgment, the nonmoving party must produce some evidence to suggest that a

reasonable factfinder could rule in that party's favor. Brewer v. Cleveland Bd. of Edn.,

122 Ohio App.3d 378, 386, 701 N.E.2d 1023 (8th Dist.1997).

       {¶11} The evidentiary materials to support a motion for summary judgment are

listed in Civ.R. 56(C) and include the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact that

have been filed in the case. In resolving the motion, the court views the evidence in a

light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Temple, 50 Ohio St.2d at 327, 364 N.E.2d

267.

                                ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

       The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee CNX

       Gas Company, LLC and Appellees Vivian L. Dillon, Larry J. Dillon, Trudy

       Ensinger, Tracy Pyles, Patricia Bierie, individually and as Administrator of

       the Estate of Paul E. Bierie, and Patricia A. Rude.

       {¶12} Appellants contend that when analyzing a reservation of an interest in a

deed executed prior to 1925, it is clear that words of inheritance are required in order to

create a fee simple interest rather than a life estate. Appellants argue that the trial court

failed to take the intent of the parties into consideration in this case when it found the

interest at issue amounted to an exception. They argue that use of the word “reserve” in

the 1914 deed is highly relevant, particularly as the parties did use words of inheritance

within the same deed when describing other interests.           Even if this Court were to

Case No. 22 MO 0014
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determine that ambiguity exists, Appellants contend that the language in the deed should

be construed against the Grantors.

       {¶13} Appellees collectively respond that precedent from both this Court and the

Ohio Supreme Court has held that where an interest is owned prior to the execution of

the deed that created it, then that interest is the subject of an exception and is owned in

fee simple. In other words, no words of inheritance are required to create a fee simple

interest if that same interest was owned prior to the execution of the deed.

       {¶14} “Prior to the enactment of G.C. 8510-1, now R.C. 5301.02, in 1925, if a

reservation in a deed was to be anything other than a life estate in the grantor, the deed

had to have contained words of inheritance. On the other hand, if the deed contained an

exception, it left title to that part of the realty excepted in the grantor and words of

inheritance were not required.” (Internal citations omitted.) Headley v. Ackerman, 7th

Dist. Monroe No. 16 MO 0010, 2017-Ohio-8030, ¶ 45, citing Holdren v. Mann, 7th Dist.

Monroe No. 592, 1985 WL 10385, *1 (Feb. 13, 1985) (overruled on different grounds).

Thus, a deed executed prior to 1925 that contains a reservation is usually required to also

contain words of inheritance to establish an interest greater than a life estate.

       {¶15} We have previously defined the terms “exception” and “reservation” as they

relate to this issue:

       A reservation by definition is a “creation of a new right or interest (such as

       an easement) by and for the grantor, in real property being granted to

       another.” Black's Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004) 1333. An exception is the

       “retention of an existing right or interest, by and for the grantor, in real

       property being granted to another.” Id. at 604. * * *

Case No. 22 MO 0014
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       “Although the terms ‘excepting’ and ‘reserving’ mean different things, the

       two terms are often employed ‘indiscriminately.’ Ricelli v. Atkinson (1955),

       99 Ohio App. 175 [58 O.O. 305, 132 N.E.2d 123]. As a result, the terms

       employed, in and of themselves, do not definitively establish whether an

       exception or a reservation has been created. * * * Thus, ‘whether the

       language creates a reservation or an exception depends upon the intention

       of the parties as evinced by a construction of the whole instrument in light

       of the circumstances of the case rather than upon the particular words

       used.’ Id. at 179 [58 O.O. 305, 132 N.E.2d 123], citing Gill v. Fletcher

       (1906), 74 Ohio St. 295 [78 N.E. 433]; Akron Cold Spring Co. v. Unknown

       Heirs of Ely (1923), 18 Ohio App. 74. ‘In case of doubt, it is said, the

       conveyance is to be construed most strongly as against the grantor, or in

       favor of the grantee on the theory, it seems, that the words used are to be

       regarded as the words of the grantor rather than of the grantee. Applying

       this rule, an exception or reservation in a conveyance is construed in favor

       of the grantee rather than of the grantor.’ Pure Oil Co. v. Kindall (1927),

       116 Ohio St. 188, 203 [156 N.E. 119], quoting 2 Tiffany, Real Property (2

       Ed.Rev.1920), Section 437.” Campbell v. Johnson (1993), 87 Ohio App.3d

       543, 547.

Am. Energy Corp. v. Datkuliak, 174 Ohio App.3d 398, 2007-Ohio-7199, 882 N.E.2d 463,

¶ 74-75 (7th Dist.).

       {¶16} As the deed at issue was executed in 1914, we must determine whether

words of inheritance were necessary. Again, words of inheritance must be used where a

Case No. 22 MO 0014
                                                                                         –8–

deed was executed before 1925 and the interest at issue is a reservation rather than an

exception.

       {¶17} It is important to reiterate that where the grantor owned the interest prior to

executing the deed, and merely retained this interest after conveying the bulk of the

property, the grantor has excepted that interest and retains fee simple ownership.

However, where the grantor creates a new right or interest within the deed, typically in

favor of a third party, that interest has been reserved, and words of inheritance must be

used in order for this interest to amount to more than a life estate.

       {¶18} There is no question in this matter that the Webbs already owned the one-

half oil and gas interest at the time the deed was executed, as they owned 100% of the

rights to oil and gas in the property prior to the deed’s execution. In accordance with the

established caselaw, the Webbs thus created an exception, and no words of inheritance

were required in order to create a fee simple interest to this one-half interest.

       {¶19} Appellant’s argument is centered on the fact that in other portions of the

deed where they used the word “reserve” the Webbs did use words of inheritance,

particularly where they were referring to coal interests. Hence, Appellants contend that

failure to use similar words of inheritance regarding only the language discussing the oil

and gas interest reflects an intention to actually reserve only a life estate in those rights.

       {¶20} In relevant part, the deed provides:

       Said Grantors for themselves and their heirs reserve all the coal except

       what is above the Pittsburgh or Wheeling Vein in and underlying said

       described premises, together with all mineing [sic] rights necessary and

Case No. 22 MO 0014
                                                                                        –9–

       useful in mining and carrying away all of said coal without liability for

       damages in mineing [sic] and carrying away said coal.

       Grantors agree to pay $100.00 per acre for any lands used for openings &

       etc.

       The Grantors hereby reserve an equal one half interest in the oil and gas

       lying in and under the above described premises and all the Estate, Title

       and Interest of the said Grantor C.C. Webb and Belle C. Webb his wife,

       either in Law or in Equity of, in and to the said premises, to-gether with all

       the privileges and appurtenances to the same belonging, and all the rents,

       issues, and profits thereof; to have and to hold the same to the only proper

       use of the said grantees, C.C. Ross and Emma Ross his wife, their heirs

       and assigns forever, and the said C.C. Webb and Belle C. Webb his wife,

       for themselves and their heirs, executors and administrator’s does hereby

       covenant with the said grantees * * * (Emphasis added.)

(Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Exh. A.)

       {¶21} It is noteworthy that the Ohio Supreme Court has recently addressed this

subject without even a mention of the grantor’s intent. See Peppertree Farms, L.L.C. v.

Thonen, 167 Ohio St.3d 61, 2022-Ohio-396, 188 N.E.3d 1069 (“Peppertree II”). The

Court focused solely on whether the interest discussed was already owned by the grantor

or whether the grantor created the interest for the first time within the reservation. See

Peppertree II at ¶ 22 (“The oil and gas and his interest in it existed at the time of the

transaction, and he owned that interest in fee simple with rights of inheritance. Therefore,

Case No. 22 MO 0014
                                                                                     – 10 –

because the conveyance did not create a new property right that reverted back from the

grantee, words of inheritance were not necessary for Jones to retain more than a life

estate in the share of the oil and gas that he owned.”)

       {¶22} Despite this recent precedent, at oral argument Appellants urged this Court

to rely on Gill, supra, which based its holding on the intent of the parties. However, Gill

has questionable value at this point, as it was decided nineteen years before enactment

of the 1925 statute. We note that Gill was not even cited in the most recent Peppertree

case. While Gill was cited in Peppertree I, this was because the Court explained that the

1925 statute abrogated the requirement of words of inheritance, which was the focal point

of Gill. The Court expressly stated that “the distinction between a reservation and an

exception no longer carries the same historical importance in Ohio that it did prior to

1925.” Peppertree Farms, L.L.C. v. Thonen, 167 Ohio St.3d 52, 2022-Ohio-395, 188

N.E.3d 1061 (“Peppertree I”). Thus, it appears the Court indirectly determined that Gill

has been superseded based on the 1925 statute. The Court in both Peppertree cases

decided the determinative factor is whether the interests reserved were owned at the time

the deed was executed.

       {¶23} Appellants also cite one of our recent cases and contend that it offers

support for their interpretation. 4 Quarters, LLC v. Hunter, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 20 BE

0035, 2021-Ohio-3586. However, in 4 Quarters we declined to address the instant issue

due to the lack of evidence in the record on appeal and because the appellant failed to

provide substantive arguments on the issue to the trial court in their Civ.R. 60(B) action.

Id. at ¶ 37.

Case No. 22 MO 0014
                                                                                        – 11 –

       {¶24} Appellants urge that even though the interests in this case were owned by

the grantors at the time of the conveyance, the grantors used words of inheritance when

excepting coal interests in the deed but did not use those same words when discussing

the oil and gas interests at issue. Appellants argue that their choice of words was

intentional and reflects an intent to create only a life estate as to the oil and gas interests

but to retain a fee simple interest in the coal.

       {¶25} While it appears clear that resolution of this issue in no way requires

consideration of a grantor’s intent, there is nothing in this record to suggest that the

grantors intended to reserve only a life estate. We have previously reviewed a deed

executed post-1925 where the parties disputed whether the interchangeable use of the

terms “reserving” and “excepting” demonstrated an intent to retain a fee simple or life

estate in the minerals. This Court held that the interest was an exception, explaining that,

regardless of the terms used, the grantors “clearly intended to ‘except’ part of the land

being transferred from the grant by retaining those minerals. The minerals already

existed as corporeal parts of the property and were already owned by Ernie and Louise

Morris, joint and survivor, at the time they sold the surface.” Crum v. Yoder, 7th Dist.

Monroe No. 20 MO 0005, 2020-Ohio-5046, ¶ 87.

       {¶26} In this case, regardless of the terms used by the grantors, the inconsistency

appears to be nothing more than an oversight. Based on the nature of the right owned

prior to the execution of the deed, the language in the deed regarding the right being kept,

and its effect on the transfer, the grantors expressed throughout that they were keeping

for themselves all the rights to the specific minerals (including oil, gas, and coal) that they

enjoyed prior to the transfer of the remainder of the property. Without question, the

Case No. 22 MO 0014
                                                                                       – 12 –

grantors enjoyed the right to these minerals in fee simple prior to executing the deed in

question. Hence, pursuant to Ohio law, the grantors’ language was an expression of their

retention of their fee simple interest, whether or not specific words of inheritance appear

in the deed. Appellants’ sole assignment of error is without merit and is overruled.

                                       Conclusion

      {¶27} Appellants argue that the trial court erroneously determined that an interest

in oil and gas rights constituted an exception rather than a reservation. For the reasons

provided, Appellants’ arguments are without merit and the judgment of the trial court is

affirmed.

Robb, J. concurs.

Hanni, J., concurs.

Case No. 22 MO 0014
[Cite as Goble v. CNX Gas Co., L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-3603.]

        For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, Appellants’ assignment of

error is overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of

the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs taxed against

the Appellants.

        A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in

this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a

certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.

                                       NOTICE TO COUNSEL

        This document constitutes a final judgment entry.