Court Opinion

ID: 9850082
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:52:00.825451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:31.559060
License: Public Domain

Rees, J.:
I dissent.
Defendant Randy Bristor stands charged of operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (K.S.A. 8-1567), that is, DUI. On the ground of denial of the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and made obligatory upon the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, the trial court suppressed the results of a blood alcohol breath test administered shortly after Bristor’s arrest. The State appeals the suppression order.
On July 30, 1982, in Dodge City, Kansas, Highway Patrol Trooper Jim Brooks arrested Bristor for DUI. At the scene of his arrest, Bristor was given a field coordination test and his Miranda rights were read to him. Within twenty minutes after the arrest, Trooper Brooks had transported Bristor to the Dodge City Law Enforcement Center where, in accord with K.S'.A. 8-1001, Brooks requested Bristor to take a breath test. Bristor asked to be allowed to telephone a lawyer before deciding whether to take the test. That permission was denied and Bristor consented to take the test. After providing a breath sample, he was allowed to call his lawyer.
Following his entry of a not guilty plea, Bristor moved to suppress the test result. The trial court sustained the motion ruling the test result had been obtained in violation of Bristor’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
The State contends that, when an arrestee is confronted with an arresting officer’s request to submit to a blood alcohol test, refusal to allow the arrestee advice of counsel prior to the arrestee’s decision whether to refuse or accede to the request does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Bristor argues that the decision whether to refuse or accede to the test request constitutionally requires advice of counsel.
Having examined a myriad of judicial opinions directly and *416indirectly dealing with claims of entitlement to access to counsel in the context of so-called “implied consent” statutes, e.g., K.S.A. 8-1001 et seq., I find it imperative to note certain bounds of our review herein.
We are not concerned with application of statutory or court rule provisions for “early access” to counsel, that is, access to counsel before a constitutional right to counsel attaches, since Kansas has no such statutory or court rule provision. The judicial decisions to which we must look in determining the present controversy are those construing the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688, 32 L.Ed.2d 411, 92 S.Ct. 1877 (1972). The case before us does not concern an administrative proceeding for suspension or revocation of driving privileges, a civil proceeding. It concerns a criminal prosecution. As conceded by Bristor’s counsel, the question before us for review does not concern self-incrimination and the Fifth Amendment. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 74 L.Ed.2d 748, 753, 103 S.Ct. 916 (1983); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 87 S.Ct. 1926 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (1966). Instead, the question is whether Bristor was denied his right “in [a] criminal [prosecution] ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence” as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In particular, the question is whether Bristor had any Sixth Amendment right to counsel. We are not asked to and we need not decide the extent and nature of Bristor’s right to counsel under the existing circumstances, that is, if Bristor were entitled to implementation of that right, what factually would have sufficed for there to have been compliance.
Despite all else said on appeal by the parties, in the cases they have cited and in the innumerable cases to which those cases lead in pursuit of the answer to the issue before us (for example, State v. Jones, 457 A.2d 1116 [Me. 1983]), the question boils down to this: Did the refusal of Bristor’s request for permission to attempt to call a lawyer occur at a “critical stage of the prosecution”? This question is simply and directly answered by the United States Supreme Court decision in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, a case stemming from a post-arrest, pre-indictment identification showup. It is dispositive of the case before us.
*417At issue in Kirby was identification of the time at which a person’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches. It is apparent that when deciding Kirby in 1972, the Supreme Court undertook review and harmonization of its earlier relevant decisions. Because the reader has already read the majority’s direct quotation, I will reiterate the presently pertinent Kirby language in abbreviated fashion:
“[A] person’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him. [Citations omitted.]
“[W]hile members of the Court have differed as to existence of the right to counsel in the contexts of some of the above cases, all of those cases have involved points of time at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings — whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.
“The only seeming deviation from this long line of constitutional decisions was Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478. But Escobedo is not apposite here . . . .
“The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings . . . marks the commencement of the ‘criminal prosecutions’ to which alone the explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are applicable. . . .
“In this case we are asked to import into a routine police investigation an absolute constitutional guarantee historically and rationally applicable only after the onset of formal prosecutorial proceedings. We decline to do so. . . . ‘[A]n accused is entitled to counsel at any “critical stage of the prosecution” ... a post-indictment lineup is such a “critical stage.” ’ (Emphasis supplied.) [Citation omitted.] We decline to depart from that rationale today by imposing a per se exclusionary rule upon testimony concerning an identification that took place long before the commencement of any prosecution whatever.” (406 U.S. at 688-690.)
Lest there be any misunderstanding of Justice Stewart’s plurality opinion, the dissenting opinion authored by Justice Brennan makes it clear by stating:
“The plurality apparently considers an arrest . . . not ‘the starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice’ .... An arrest, according to the plurality, does not face the accused ‘with the prosecutorial forces of organized society,’ nor immerse him ‘in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law.’ Those consequences ensue, says the plurality, only with ‘[t]he initiation of judicial criminal proceedings’ . . . .” Kirby, 406 U.S. at 698.
There can be no “critical stage of the prosecution” if no prosecution has begun. Bristor’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel guarantee attached and applied only at and after the initiation of this criminal prosecution, not before.
The majority concludes that when Bristor was requested to *418submit to a blood alcohol test “adversary judicial proceedings had commenced against defendant.” Expression of the factual basis for this conclusion is found in the statements in the majority opinion that Bristor “had been ticketed by the arresting officer” and the officer “had prepared a complaint charging defendant with . . . DUI.” I must respectfully disagree with both that conclusion and that factual recitation.
Our statutes directly prescribe how and when a criminal prosecution is commenced.
“Unless otherwise provided by law, a prosecution shall be commenced by filing a complaint with a magistrate.” K.S.A. 22-2301(1).
“When an indictment is returned ... a prosecution shall be deemed to have been begun.” K.S.A. 22-2303(1).
“In misdemeanor cases a prosecution may be begun by filing an information in the district court.” K.S.A. 22-2303(1).
“Whenever a person is halted by a police officer for any violation of any of the laws of this state regulating traffic on highways punishable as a misdemeanor and is not taken before a judge of the district court . . . the officer shall prepare a written traffic citation containing a notice to appear in court, the name and address of the person . . . the offense charged, the time and place when and where the person shall appear in court, and such other pertinent information as may be necessary .... The person charged with the violation may give written promise to appear in court by signing at least one copy of the written citation prepared by the officer . . . .” K.S.A. 8-2106(a), (d).
“In the event the form of citation provided for in K.S.A. 8-2106 includes information required by law and is signed by the officer preparing the same, then such citation when filed with a court having jurisdiction shall be deemed to be a lawful complaint for the purpose of prosecution . . . .” (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 8-2108.
By itself, an arrest does not initiate a criminal prosecution, that is, adversary judicial criminal proceedings.
Included in the record on appeal are a copy of the “ticket” and a copy of the Ford County District Court’s case jacket. The latter is the sole court record in the nature of an appearance docket. The earliest date appearing on the case jacket is “8/2/82.” The “ticket” is the familiar Uniform Notice to Appear and Complaint form which has been completed so as to read as follows:
*419UNIFORM NOTICE TO APPEAR AND COMPLAINT
Kansas Highway Patrol No. 3082138
State of Kansas )
County of Ford ) ss.
In the District Court of Ford Co. the undersigned, being duly sworn, upon his oath deposes and says:
On the 30 day of July, 1982 at 2255
(Time)
Name BRISTOR_
Last
_Randy_J._
First Initial
Street Address Box 1194___
City _Dodge City_State Ks._
Birth
date 07 31 58 Sex M Ht. 60 Wt. 155
Driv. Lie. No. B4F3K2 did upon a public highway, namely Highway No. U50, at milepost _ or (other location) Wyatt Earp & Gardner, D. C. Ks. in the State of Kansas, County
of Fo. unlawfully operate a vehicle to wit: ....
and did then and there commit the following offense
Other violations
Driving while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor or beverage
Section 81567 Misdemeanor
Area Rural
Highway 2 lane
Officers
Signature Jim Brooks No. 55 County 29
Sworn to and
Subscribed before me this 2 day of Aug., 1982 _S. Cox_
Clerk
Appear before District at Dodge
Name of Court City
On 9 day of Aug., 1982 at 10 AM I promise to appear in said court at said time and above for arraignment.
Signature_Lodged Ford Co. Jail_
The only other showing in the record which in any way relates to when Bristor was “ticketed” or when Brooks “had prepared a complaint charging defendant,” is in the following testimony by Brooks at the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress:
*420“Q. Where in the Law Enforcement Center did you take Mr. Bristor upon arrival?
“A. . . . There’s a room there - I - it’s a squad room - that’s what it is. . . . That’s where he was taken was in that room there.
“Q. All right, it’s your testimony that he was placed in that room and I believe you used the figure of 20 minutes before the test was given, is that a true statement?
“A. Yes, sir. That’s from the time we first observed him which would have been, I believe, the ticket was written at 22 something hours. It was a good - it was over 30 - at least 30 minutes. I don’t have my copy with me right now ... if the Judge has it up there I can tell you the exact time - close to it.” (Emphasis added.)
In my view, the record evidence wholly fails to establish Bristor was “ticketed” or that Brooks “had prepared a complaint charging defendant” when the test request was made. The traffic citation bears no recitation of the time any part of it was written by Brooks. The “22 something hours” spoken of in Brooks’ testimony is shown by the citation to be the time at which the offense allegedly occurred. There is no signature of Bristor acknowledging his promise to appear in court; for aught that appears from the citation, no copy of it was ever delivered to Bristor (the signature line for the promise to appear has the inserted words “Lodged Ford Co. Jail”).
Perhaps the most important matter disclosed by the completed citation form is the district court clerk’s signature attesting that Brooks signed the complaint before her on August 2, three days after Bristor’s arrest and the events from which this appeal stems.
I find it beyond question that under our statutes this criminal prosecution was commenced no earlier than August 2, 1982. It was not until then that Brooks signed the citation and it was filed with the district court. See K.S.A. 8-2108 and K.S.A. 22-2301(1). The criminal prosecution of Bristor had not begun when any of the events on the night of July 30 transpired. The quoted testimony by Brooks is wholly inadequate to support a finding or conclusion that on the night of July 30 there existed a criminal prosecution so as to bring this case within the Sixth Amendment mandate that “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”
The majority opinion represents that in Minnesota, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Ohio and Washington it has been *421adjudicated that an arrestee for DUI has a right to the assistance of counsel prior to making the decision whether to refuse or accede to a proper request to submit to a blood alcohol test. With the exception of Minnesota and New York, the majority opinion cites no supporting authority. With the exception of New York, in each of the enumerated states, early access to counsel is provided for by state statute or court rule. See:
Minnesota — Minn. Stat. §481.10 (1982); Prideaux v. State, Dept. of Public Safety, 310 Minn. 405, 415-423, 247 N.W.2d 385 (1976) (driver’s license revocation proceeding; explicit refusal to decide the constitutional issue, 310 Minn, at 414.)
Missouri — Mo. Rules of Court 37.89 (15th ed. 1984); Gooch v. Spradling, 523 S.W.2d 861, 865, (Mo. App. 1975) (driver’s license revocation proceeding; single issue for decision was whether there was a refusal such as to invoke statutory sanction of license revocation; 523 S.W.2d at 863).
North Carolina — N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15-47 (1965) (repealed 1973, now 15A-501 [1983]); State v. Hill, 277 N.C. 547, 552, 178 S.E.2d 462 (1971) (criminal prosecution for DUI).
Ohio — Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§2935.14, 2935.20 (Page 1982); Dayton v. Nugent, 25 Ohio Misc. 31, 37-39, 265 N.E.2d 826 (1970) (criminal prosecution for DUI); McNulty v. Curry, 42 Ohio St. 2d 341, 344-46, 328 N.E.2d 798 (1975) (criminal prosecution for DUI; constitutional right to counsel not applicable because consent decision not a “critical stage” of a “criminal prosecution”; compliance with statutory right to counsel).
Washington — Wash. Rev. Code § JCrR 2.11 (1983); State v. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d 436, 441, 449, 610 P.2d 893 (1980); State v. Fitzsimmons, 94 Wash. 2d 858, 620 P.2d 999 (1980); Tacoma v. Myhre, 32 Wash. App. 661, 664, *422648 P.2d 912 (1982) (criminal prosecutions for DUI).
From New York, there is the decision of that state’s Court of Appeals in People v. Gursey, 22 N.Y.2d 224, 292 N.Y.S.2d 416, 239 N.E.2d 351 (1968). The Gursey opinion is quoted at some length by the majority. Within the bounds of our review I have previously described, to my knowledge Gursey is the only material authority which may be said to support the result reached by the majority. I cannot ascribe to Gursey precedential authority in the case before us. Gursey was decided four years prior to Kirby. I know of no reported New York decision wherein the effect of Kirby upon the decision in Gursey has been addressed. In People v. Rinaldi, 107 Misc. 2d 916, 436 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1981), the town court of the town of Chili, Monroe County, displays no consideration given by it to Kirby or any authority other than Gursey. As I see it, Kirby has overridden Gursey.
Other than State v. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d 436, which I have spoken of above and which I will address later, and Prideaux v. State, Dept. of Public Safety, 310 Minn. 405, which I also have spoken of above, I do not find the “other cases” from other states which the majority says support their position.
The “rule” of Kirby has been acknowledged and applied in Kansas. State v. Irving, 231 Kan. 258, 262, 644 P.2d 389 (1982); State v. Estes, 216 Kan. 382, 385-86, 532 P.2d 1283 (1975); State v. Jackson, 212 Kan. 473, 473-74, 510 P.2d 1219 (1973); State v. McCollum, 211 Kan. 631, 637-38, 507 P.2d 196 (1973); State v. Anderson, 211 Kan. 148, 149, 505 P.2d 691 (1973); State v. McConico, 4 Kan. App. 2d 420, 426, 607 P.2d 93 (1980). From these, the majority finds sustenance in limited language appealing in Irving and Estes.
Within the majority’s quotation from Estes appears the sentence, “At the time of the physical lineup the appellant by his own testimony admits he was not under arrest on charges upon which this appeal was taken.” (216 Kan. at 386.) I am convinced the majority’s reliance upon the three words “not under arrest” is unacceptably strained. Those words are but a part of the phrase “not under arrest on charges.” I am satisfied that when all five words in the latter phrase are viewed in the context of the sentence in which they appear and the two preceding sentences, it is clear our Supreme Court was solely addressing the fact that *423in that case there was no existing criminal prosecution as an incident to which Estes was under arrest.
Likewise, I find unacceptable reliance by the majority upon the word “arrested” in the language of Irving. The sentence from Irving containing the word “arrested” and appearing in the majority’s quotation from that opinion is a verbatim repetition of a sentence in United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1338 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 452 U.S. 920 (1981). In both Irving and Kenny no criminal prosecution had been commenced when the defendant was assertedly denied right to counsel. It was immaterial to either decision that the defendant was not under arrest; determination of whether defendant was under arrest was not necessary to either decision.
“What is said in an opinion or the syllabus thereof always is to be read and interpreted in the light of the facts and questions present in the case. [Citations omitted.] Otherwise, language meaningful for one case may erroneously become dogma for other cases despite essential differences. [Citations omitted.]” State v. Reed, 8 Kan. App. 2d 615, 623-624, 663 P.2d 680 (1983).
See also Hartman v. Nordquist, 8 Kan. App. 2d 213, 214-215, 653 P.2d 1199 (1982), and cases cited therein.
I find no post-Kirby authority holding any Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches prior to initiation and commencement of criminal prosecution as identified in Kirby and which in this case would be the filing of a complaint or information. It follows that I find no authority to support the conclusion that when Bristor was requested to submit to a breath test there then was a “critical stage” entitling him to the Sixth Amendment guarantee of right to counsel. To the contrary, I find that right had not attached and we should conclude the order of suppression was erroneous.
I would be remiss if I failed to address State v. Fitzsimmons, 93 Wash. 2d 436, and Heles v. State of S. D., 530 F. Supp. 646 (D. S.D. 1982), two opinions containing reasoning particularly attractive to me and, I take it, the other members of this panel. The Fitzsimmons opinion, which is referred to by the majority, contains significant discussion of constitutional considerations but, on remand from the United States Supreme Court, 449 U.S. 977, 66 L.Ed.2d 240, 101 S.Ct. 390 (1980), the Washington Supreme Court narrowed the basis for its decision to a state court rule, commenting that the constitutional analysis in its former *424opinion was “persuasive,” not dispositive. State v. Fitzsimmons, 94 Wash. 2d 858. Heles was appealed to the Eighth Circuit but the plaintiff died. The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court judgment and directed dismissal of the complaint as moot. 682 F.2d 201, 202 (8th Cir. 1982). Thus, that district court opinion and discussion cannot be accorded precedential value.
As a matter of personal philosophy, I join the majority in feeling that a person arrested for DUI who makes appropriate request should be allowed reasonable opportunity to attempt to contact a lawyer prior to deciding whether to submit to a blood alcohol test, but I am unable to find supporting Sixth Amendment authority. In fact, the authority is to the contrary.
Bristor makes an alternative argument to us that fair play requires he should have been allowed to attempt to contact a lawyer by telephone so long as it would not have caused a significant or obstructive delay in administration of the blood alcohol test. I interpret this to be a due process claim analogous to that mentioned in Kirby stemming from the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 406 U.S. at 691. We are disabled from consideration of this argument. The record on appeal fails to affirmatively disclose that in the trial court Bristor asserted a constitutional claim more broad than the Sixth Amendment claim. Applicability of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the issue upon which the trial court ruled. It is the issue before us for review.
I would reverse.