Court Opinion

ID: 9368882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-07 13:04:56.913305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:11.459898
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                      No. COA22-326

                               Filed 07 February 2023

New Hanover County, No. 20 CRS 51367

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

             v.

DARYL SPENCER SCOTT

      Appeal by Defendant from a judgment entered 21 September 2021 by Judge

William W. Bland in New Hanover County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of

Appeals 21 September 2022.

      Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General T. Hill Davis,
      III, for the State.

      Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Amanda S.
      Zimmer, for Defendant.

      WOOD, Judge.

      Defendant appeals from a conviction of possessing a firearm as a felon alleging

the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence of a firearm found

during a search he contends was unconstitutional and increased his prior record level

at sentencing. We disagree.

                                 I.     Background

      Wilmington Police Officer Pagan was surveilling the parking lot of Sam’s

Minimart in Wilmington on 14 February 2020. The parking lot was located in an
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                                  Opinion of the Court

area of the city where drug sales and shootings were not uncommon. He observed

Defendant’s Honda Accord park on the lot next to a silver sedan whose owner Officer

Pagan knew had a history of drug dealing. Defendant and a passenger exited the

Honda and approached the silver sedan. Shortly thereafter, Defendant and his

passenger returned to the Honda and drove away. Officer Pagan followed them a

short distance in his patrol car and noticed the Honda’s license plate appeared

expired. He then activated the blue lights on his patrol car to conduct a traffic stop

of Defendant’s vehicle. Defendant promptly pulled over.

      Officer Pagan approached Defendant and informed him that he was stopped

because of the expired license plate.      Defendant did not appear nervous and

responded that the registration should not be expired. Upon request, Defendant

produced his driver’s license but was unable to locate the car’s registration. Officer

Pagan returned to his patrol vehicle with Defendant’s license where he learned from

his car’s computer system that Defendant was designated as a “validated gang

member” and had previously been charged with murder. Relevant to this case,

Officer Pagan was aware of a local gang war between two prominent gangs at the

time. Officer Pagan retrieved a clip board from his trunk and briefed an arriving

officer of the situation before re-approaching Defendant.

      Upon returning to Defendant’s vehicle, Officer Pagan asked Defendant to step

out of the vehicle so that he could perform a weapons frisk. Defendant complied, and

Officer Pagan frisked him at the rear of the Honda. Officer Pagan did not find a

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weapon on Defendant’s person. He then asked the three passengers to exit the vehicle

as backup officers arrived. After Officer Pagan performed a non-intrusive pat down

of Defendant, Defendant informed him that a pocketknife was present in the front,

driver-side door compartment. With this information, Officer Pagan returned to the

vehicle to retrieve the pocketknife, and Defendant asked Officer Pagan if he would

retrieve Defendant’s phone near the center console. Officer Pagan obliged Defendant

and found an open beer can in the center console. He then rummaged through the

front, driver-side door compartment but did not initially find a pocketknife, so he next

peered under the driver’s seat where he discovered a pistol.

      After securing the pistol, Officer Pagan ordered Defendant and all passengers

be detained and placed in handcuffs. A further search of the passenger compartment

revealed a scale and bags consistent with heroin paraphernalia. On 24 August 2020,

Defendant was indicted for possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 14-415.1 (2021) and possessing drug paraphernalia in violation of N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 90-113.22(A) (2021).

      On 21 September 2021, in a pretrial motion, Defendant moved to suppress

evidence of the firearm. Defendant argued that Officer Pagan’s frisk of Defendant’s

vehicle was constitutionally impermissible and therefore produced unlawfully

acquired evidence. Defendant did not argue that the traffic stop was impermissibly

extended beyond the scope of Officer Pagan’s original mission. The trial court denied

Defendant’s motion.

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      During his trial, which took place on 23 September 2021, Defendant generally

objected to the evidence obtained during the frisk of his vehicle, specifically the

firearm. The trial court overruled Defendant’s objection. On the same day, the jury

found Defendant guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon and not guilty of

possession of drug paraphernalia.

      During the sentencing hearing, the trial court calculated Defendant’s sentence

by using a prior record level worksheet for structured sentencing. The worksheet

listed a subtotal of nine points from the prior crimes of second-degree murder and

three misdemeanor convictions. The court then added one point for committing a

crime “while the offender was on probation, parole, or post-release supervision.”

Thus, Defendant’s prior record points totaled ten points, and he was sentenced as a

prior record level IV offender. Absent the additional point, Defendant would have

been sentenced as a prior record level III offender.

      The trial court sentenced Defendant to an active term of a minimum of

nineteen and a maximum of thirty-two months imprisonment.

      Defendant appeals as of right pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444(a) (2021).

He contests the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence and contends

he did not receive notice of the additional point for committing a crime while on

probation, parole, or post-release supervision and was, therefore, sentenced

improperly.

                           II.   Standard of Review

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      We review the denial of a motion to suppress to determine “whether competent

evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact and whether the findings of fact

support the conclusions of law.” State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 167-68, 712 S.E.2d 874,

878 (2011) (citing State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 140-41, 446 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994)).

We review conclusions of law de novo. State v. Johnson, 225 N.C. App. 440, 443-44

(2013). “Under a de novo standard of review, this Court considers the matter anew

and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the trial court.”        Reese v.

Mecklenburg Cnty., 200 N.C. App. 491, 497, 685 S.E.2d 34, 38 (2009) (citations

omitted).

      We review “[t]he determination of an offender’s prior record level [as] a

conclusion of law that is subject to de novo review on appeal.” State v. Bohler, 198

N.C. App. 631, 633, 681 S.E.2d 801, 804 (2009) (citing State v. Fraley, 182 N.C. App.

683, 691, 643 S.E.2d 39, 44 (2007)).

                               III.     Discussion

A. Evidence Suppression

      Defendant first alleges error with the trial court’s denial of his motion to

suppress evidence of the firearm. Defendant argues that the evidence should have

been suppressed because it was obtained in violation of Defendant’s right to be free

from an unreasonable search and seizure and challenges the trial court’s conclusion

of law holding otherwise.      Specifically, Defendant argues that Officer Pagan

improperly frisked Defendant and his vehicle and impermissibly extended the

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duration of the traffic stop. We are not persuaded.

      During the motion to suppress, the trial court concluded:

                    But up to that point of seeing the firearm under the
             driver’s seat in which the defendant had been driving, the
             court does not find any constitutional violation of the
             defendant's rights. The officer has conducted a legitimate
             stop and taken appropriate actions for his safety and for
             the safety of the defendant as well as the passengers in the
             defendant’s vehicle; and therefore the motion to suppress
             is respectfully denied.

We review this conclusion of law de novo to determine if Officer Pagan overstepped

his constitutional limits.

      The State may not unreasonably seize or search people. N.C. Const. art. I, §

20; U.S. Const. amend. IV. If it does, evidence obtained from that illegal conduct

must be suppressed at trial. State v. Pope, 333 N.C. 106, 113-14, 423 S.E.2d 740, 744

(1992). “[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by

judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject

only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” State v. Fizovic,

240 N.C. App. 448, 452, 770 S.E.2d 717, 720 (2015) (quoting Katz v. United States,

389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 585 (1967)).

      Defendant concedes, and we agree, that Officer Pagan’s initial traffic stop was

proper. “[A] traffic stop is considered a ‘seizure’ ” for our purposes. State v. Otto, 366

N.C. 134, 136, 726 S.E.2d 824, 827 (2012). Officer Pagan observed Defendant’s

vehicle bearing an expired license plate, and we have held that this observation alone

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supports a seizure. State v. Edwards, 164 N.C. App. 130, 136, 595 S.E.2d 213, 218

(2004).   We therefore next evaluate Defendant’s claims that the frisk and time

extension were unjustified and, therefore, unconstitutional.

   1. Weapons Frisk

      If, during a lawful stop, an officer “reasonably believes that the person is armed

and dangerous, the officer may frisk the person to discover a weapon or weapons.”

State v. Pearson, 348 N.C. 272, 275, 498 S.E.2d 599, 600 (1998). (citing Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)). An officer may also frisk a vehicle

to include even the passenger compartment and other such places where a “suspect

may gain immediate control of weapons” but “limited to those areas in which a

weapon may be placed or hidden.” State v. Johnson, 378 N.C. 236, 2021-NCSC-85, ¶

16 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3481, 77 L. Ed.

2d 1201, 1220 (1983)). This is a limited search and may only be justified if “the officer

develops a reasonable suspicion that the suspect of the traffic stop is armed and

dangerous.” Id. The “legitimate and weighty interest in officer safety” supports this

intrusion. State v. Johnson, 246 N.C. App. 677, 692, 783 S.E.2d 753, 764 (2016)

(quotation marks omitted) (quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 331, 129 S. Ct.

781, 786, 172 L. Ed. 2d 694, 702 (2009)). The necessary standard of “[r]easonable

suspicion demands more than a mere ‘hunch’ on the part of the officer but requires

‘less than probable cause and considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.’

” State v. Johnson, 378 N.C. 236, 2021-NCSC-85, ¶ 16 (quoting State v. Williams, 366

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N.C. 110, 117, 726 S.E.2d 161, 167 (2012)). It “requires only ‘some minimal level of

objective justification,’ and arises from ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken

together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant’ the intrusion.”

Id. (first quoting State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 414, 665 S.E.2d 438, 439 (2008); and

then quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906). “The crucial

inquiry is ‘whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be

warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.’ ” State v.

Johnson, 246 N.C. App. 677, 693, 783 S.E.2d 753, 764-65 (2016) (quoting Terry, 392

U.S. at 27, 88 S. Ct. at 1883, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 909). Officers are therefore “entitled to

formulate ‘common-sense conclusions’ about ‘the modes or patterns of operation of

certain kinds of lawbreakers.’ ” State v. Butler, 331 N.C. 227, 234, 415 S.E.2d 719,

723 (1992) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695, 66

L. Ed. 2d 621, 629 (1981).         “A court ‘ “must consider ‘the totality of the

circumstances—the whole picture’ in determining whether a reasonable suspicion”

exists.’ ” State v. Otto, 366 N.C. 134, 138, 726 S.E.2d 824, 828 (2012) (quoting Styles,

362 N.C. at 414, 665 S.E.2d at 440).

      Here, Officer Pagan observed Defendant visit a parking lot noted for its drug

sales and shootings, and while there, Defendant exited his vehicle and briefly

approached the vehicle of a known drug dealer. After Defendant was stopped, Officer

Pagan received caution data notifying him Defendant was a validated gang member

and had previously been charged with murder. Officer Pagan was aware that two

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                                   Opinion of the Court

local gangs were involved in a gang war, and in his experience, suspects involved with

drug and gang activity may be armed and dangerous.

      Each of these factors, standing alone, might not be sufficient to justify a

weapons frisk. See State v. Jackson, 368 N.C. 75, 80, 772 S.E.2d 847, 850 (2015)

(stating that defendant’s presence in a high-crime area alone is not sufficient), State

v. Johnson, 378 N.C. 236, 2021-NCSC-85, ¶ 18 n.2 (expressing hesitancy to use a

suspect’s prior criminal record as a factor except in specific circumstances), State v.

Butler, 331 N.C. 227, 233, 415 S.E.2d 719, 722 (1992) (stating that officer’s experience

and defendant’s presence around suspected drug dealers are not, on their own,

sufficient). However, “[w]e examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding

Officer [Pagan]’s interaction with [D]efendant in order to achieve a comprehensive

analysis as to whether the officer’s conclusion that [D]efendant may have been armed

and dangerous was reasonable.” State v. Johnson, 378 N.C. 236, 2021-NCSC-85, ¶

18.

      For example, our Supreme Court held in State v. Butler that the following

factors, when taken together, were sufficient to justify a weapons frisk:

             1) defendant was seen in the midst of a group of people
             congregated on a corner known as a “drug hole”; 2) [Officer]
             Hedges had had the corner under daily surveillance for
             several months; 3) Hedges knew this corner to be a center
             of drug activity because he had made four to six drug-
             related arrests there in the past six months; 4) Hedges was
             aware of other arrests there as well; 5) defendant was a
             stranger to the officers; 6) upon making eye contact with
             the uniformed officers, defendant immediately moved

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                                   Opinion of the Court

             away, behavior that is evidence of flight; and 7) it was
             Hedges’ experience that people involved in drug
             traffic[king] are often armed.

331 N.C. 227, 233, 415 S.E.2d 719, 722 (1992).

      In the present case, similar factors are present: 1) Defendant’s presence in a

high-crime area; 2) Defendant’s interaction with a known drug dealer; 3) caution data

revealing Defendant’s prior charge of murder and gang involvement; 4) Officer

Pagan’s awareness of an active gang war; and 5) Officer Pagan’s own training and

experiences. Though Defendant did not exhibit “evidence of flight” as in Butler, we

hold that the additional factors of Defendant’s status as a validated gang member

and Officer Pagan’s awareness of an active, local gang war are more than sufficient

to cause an officer to reasonably suspect the individual is armed and dangerous. This

suspicion permitted Officer Pagan to search both Defendant and his vehicle for

weapons before continuing with the purpose of the stop. We, therefore, agree with

the trial court’s ruling and hold that Officer Pagan did not overstep his constitutional

bounds when he frisked Defendant and Defendant’s vehicle

   2. Extension of Stop

      Defendant next argues that evidence of the firearm should have been

suppressed because the stop was unlawfully extended beyond the scope of its purpose.

See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614, 191 L. Ed.

2d 492, 498 (2015). We note, however, that Defendant did not present this argument

at the suppression hearing or during trial. Instead, Defendant relied upon the above

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                                   Opinion of the Court

weapons frisk theory to support his suppression motion.

      “[A] criminal defendant is not entitled to advance a particular theory in the

course of challenging the denial of a suppression motion on appeal when the same

theory was not advanced in the court below.” State v. Hernandez, 227 N.C. App. 601,

608, 742 S.E.2d 825, 829 (2013). Such “argument is deemed waived on appeal.” State

ex rel Boggs v. Davis, 207 N.C. App. 359, 363, 700 S.E.2d 85, 88 (2010) (citing State

v. Augustine, 359 N.C. 709, 721, 616 S.E.2d 515, 525 (2005)).

      Because Defendant did not raise this argument in the trial court below, it has

been waived.

B. Sentencing

      Defendant next argues that he did not receive proper notice of the State’s

intent to prove the tenth prior record point and that the trial court did not properly

inquire into whether notice was given or otherwise waived. As with the preceding

argument, Defendant did not object to this alleged error with the trial court.

However, “[i]t is not necessary that an objection be lodged at the sentencing hearing

in order for a claim that the record evidence does not support the trial court’s

determination of a defendant’s prior record level to be preserved for appellate review.”

State v. Bohler, 198 N.C. App. 631, 633, 681 S.E.2d 801, 804 (2009) (citing State v.

Morgan, 164 N.C. App. 298, 304, 595 S.E.2d 804, 809 (2004)). We therefore review

this alleged error de novo. Id.

      Under North Carolina’s structured sentencing guidelines, a trial court may

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                                     Opinion of the Court

assign prior record points to a defendant if the defendant was previously convicted of

certain crimes and if the defendant committed the relevant crime while on probation,

parole, or post-release supervision. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.14(b) (2021). The sum

of these points total the prior record level to be used in calculating the severity of a

sentence. § 15A-1340.14(c). Among the list of possible point assignments stands

subsection (b)(7):

              If the offense was committed while the offender was on
              supervised or unsupervised probation, parole, or post-
              release supervision, or while the offender was serving a
              sentence of imprisonment, or while the offender was on
              escape from a correctional institution while serving a
              sentence of imprisonment, 1 point.

§ 15A-1340.14(b)(7). Subsection (b)(7) is unique in that, unlike with other point

assignments, “[t]he State must provide a defendant with written notice of its intent

to prove the existence of . . . a prior record level point under . . . (b)(7) at least 30 days

before trial.” § 15A-1340.16(a6). However, “[a] defendant may waive the right to

receive such notice.” Id. In either case, “[t]he court shall . . . determine whether the

State has provided the notice to the defendant . . . or whether the defendant has

waived his or her right to such notice.” § 15A-1022.1(a). The court is required to

follow this and other procedures outlined in Section 15-A1022.1 “unless the context

clearly indicates that they are inappropriate.” § 15A-1022.1(e).

       In the present case, before signing the worksheet, the trial court asked whether

the State gave Defendant proper notice of its intent to seek the additional point of

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                                    Opinion of the Court

committing a crime while on probation, parole, or post-release supervision.

             [PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, these convictions began
             back in 2002 running all the way up to his second-degree
             murder conviction in 2009 for which he was on parole at
             the time of this offense, and we have indicated that by
             adding the proper point in the prior sentencing worksheet.

             THE COURT: Had notice been given of that?

             [PROSECUTOR]: Yes, sir. We had discussed that.

             [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Judge.

             THE COURT: Okay.

And again, the trial court asked,

             THE COURT: Please. Have you -- you had a chance,
             [defense counsel], to look at this?

             [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I have, your Honor.

             THE COURT: Do you agree that the worksheet is an
             accurate representation of his prior record?

             [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I do, Judge.

Finally, the Court addressed the point specifically to confirm with both

the Defendant and Defendant’s counsel as to whether they were informed of

the extra point and that it increased the Defendant from 9 to 10 points

(resulting in a Level IV rather than Level III).

             THE COURT: I do see this point is the point that takes it
             from 9 to 10, that this offense was committed while on
             probation, parole, or post-release supervision. Any—you
             have anything to say regarding that point?

             [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Not regarding that particular

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                                         Opinion of the Court

                point, Judge.

After these inquiries, the court found that “the State and the defendant have

stipulated in open court to the prior convictions, points, and record level.” Both the

prosecutor’s and defense counsel’s signatures appear on the worksheet under the

“Stipulation” heading.

    1. Notice Requirement

        We first look to whether the State provided Defendant with written notice of

its intent to prove the prior record point of committing an offense while “on probation,

parole, or post-release supervision” as required by Section 15A-1340.16(a6).1 We note

the presence of a prior record level worksheet in the record that defense counsel might

have received as part of discovery, and a review of the transcript during sentencing

shows defense counsel was familiar with the worksheet; however, there is no

certificate of service within the file to allow us to conclude written notice was given

to Defendant.         The worksheet lists point assignments for Defendant’s prior

convictions, an additional point assignment for committing a crime while “on

probation, parole, or post-release supervision,” and a prior record level IV calculation.

Moreover, defense counsel’s signature appears alongside the prosecutor’s signature

under the heading “Stipulation” which states, “The prosecutor and defense counsel .

        1 This is a separate inquiry from determining if the State actually proved Defendant’s prior
record level by stipulation or other means. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.14(f) (2021); State v. Briggs,
249 N.C. App. 95, 99, 790 S.E.2d 671, 674 (2016).

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. . stipulate to the information set out in Sections I [scoring] and V [prior convictions]

of this form and agree with the defendant’s prior record level . . . .” However, this

court has held that merely providing a defendant with a proposed prior record level

worksheet during discovery is not sufficient to effectuate the written notice

requirement of Section 15A-1340.16(a6). State v. Crook, 247 N.C. App. 784, 797, 785

S.E.2d 771, 780 (2016). In the absence of any other writing, then, we must conclude

the State failed to deliver proper written notice to Defendant.

      Therefore, we next look to whether Defendant waived his right to notice. To

determine this, we look at the inquiry and responses made at the sentencing hearing.

The circumstances in this case are similar to those in State v. Wright, 265 N.C. App.

354, 357-58, 826 S.E.2d 833, 836 (2019). In Wright, “the trial court inquired about

the notice of the State’s intent to prove the aggravating factor, and [defense] counsel

responded that he was ‘provided the proper notice’ and had ‘seen the appropriate

documents.’ ” Wright, 265 N.C. App. at 360, 826 S.E.2d at 837. The trial court also

asked the defendant directly if he wished to “waive the right to have the jury

determine the aggravating factor and . . . stipulate to the aggravating factor?” to

which the defendant replied, “Yes, sir.”      Id.   The defendant’s and his counsel’s

affirmations constituted a sufficient waiver of notice. This Court reasoned that the

“defendant’s knowing and intelligent waiver of a jury trial on the aggravating factor

under the circumstances necessarily included waiver of the thirty day advance notice

of the State’s intent to use the aggravating factor.” Id. at 361, 826 S.E.2d at 838.

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“Even though the State had not technically given ‘proper notice’ because the

additional file numbers were added to the notice only twenty days before trial instead

of thirty days, defendant and his counsel had sufficient information to give an

‘intentional relinquishment of a known right.’ ”         Id. (quoting Ussery v. Branch

Banking & Tr. Co., 368 N.C. 325, 336, 777 S.E.2d 272, 279 (2015)).

      In the present case, Defendant’s counsel stated affirmatively that he had

received notice of the State’s intent to assess the sentencing point, which was

confirmed by the attorney for the State. When asked by the trial court if the State

provided notice of its intent to prove Defendant was on parole at the time of the

offense, the prosecutor stated, “Yes, sir. We had discussed that,” and defense counsel

responded, “Yes, Judge.” Though the trial court did not question Defendant directly

about his intent to waive notice, as in Wright, we hold that defense counsel’s

stipulation and affirmation on behalf of his client was sufficient to constitute waiver

of the notice requirement.

      Moreover, Defendant’s counsel affirmed that Defendant was on parole at the

time of the commission of the present crime and signed the sentencing worksheet

which indicated that the Defendant was on parole. Furthermore, the second-degree

murder conviction that was the basis for Defendant’s conviction for a felon in

possession of a firearm was the basis of this sentencing point. This conviction was

stipulated to by Defendant at trial, and the judgment in that case was introduced as

State’s Exhibit 7 at trial.   This conviction was also referenced in Defendant’s

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                                  Opinion of the Court

indictment in this case.

   2. Court Inquiry

      Finally, we consider whether the trial court performed its procedural duties

under Section 15A-1022.1, the Blakley Act.         This statute requires the court to

“determine whether the State . . . provided the notice to the defendant required by

G.S. 15A-1340.16(a6) or whether the defendant . . . waived his or her right to such

notice.” § 15A-1022.1(a). When a defendant admits to a prior record finding for the

offense of committing a crime while on probation, parole, or post-release supervision,

the trial court must also perform a mandatory colloquy with

             the defendant personally and advise the defendant that:

             (1) He or she is entitled to have a jury determine the
             existence of any aggravating factors or points under G.S.
             15A-1340.14(b)(7); and

             (2) He or she has the right to prove the existence of any
             mitigating factors at a sentencing hearing before the
             sentencing judge.

§ 15A-1022.1(b). Further, it must “determine that there is a factual basis for the

admission, and that the admission is the result of an informed choice by the

defendant.” § 15A-1022.1(c). These procedures may be ignored, however, if “the

context clearly indicates that they are inappropriate.” § 15A-1022.1(e).

      Exploring the context necessary to cast aside the requirements of Section 15A-

1022.1, this Court held in State v. Marlow that certain “circumstances under which

defendant’s prior record was stipulated” were sufficient to fall within this exception.

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229 N.C. App. 593, 602, 747 S.E.2d 741, 748, (2013).

             After asking defense counsel if they had a chance to review
             the prior record level and have a discussion with
             defendant, defense counsel responded “[h]e did [stipulate],
             yes, sir.” Defense counsel had the opportunity to inform
             defendant of the repercussions of conceding certain prior
             offenses and defendant had the opportunity to interject had
             he not known such repercussions. Yet, even after being
             informed, defendant neither objected to nor hesitated when
             asked about such convictions. With such a routine
             determination as to whether defendant was convicted of
             possession of drug paraphernalia while on probation for
             another offense, we see no reason to have engaged in an
             extensive colloquy with defendant.

Id.

      Here, we likewise hold that the court’s interaction with defense counsel

amounted to the same “routine determination.” Defense counsel affirmed he had seen

the prior record level worksheet and that it was “an accurate representation of his

prior record.” Defendant, through his counsel, stipulated to the addition of the prior

record point as evidenced by defense counsel’s signature. As in Marlow, defense

counsel “had the opportunity to inform defendant of the repercussions of conceding

certain prior offenses and defendant had the opportunity to interject had he not

known such repercussions” and did not object to the point at sentencing.            Id.

Therefore, the trial court was not required to follow the precise procedures prescribed

in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022.1 (2021), as defendant acknowledged his status and

violation by arrest in open court.

                                IV.      Conclusion

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      Evidence of the firearm was properly obtained such that the trial court did not

err by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. Though the State did not provide

written notice of its intent to prove a unique prior record point, Defendant waived

such notice, and the trial court was not required to perform a colloquy under the

Blakely Act. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1022.1 (2021). We find no error in the jury’s

verdict or the judgment entered by the trial court.

      NO ERROR.

      Judges TYSON and CARPENTER concur.

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