Court Opinion

ID: 9943598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 21:03:01.862882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:25.228501
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/23/24 Attayeb v. Mullenweg CA1/5

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for pur-
poses of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

 ASMAHAN ATTAYEB,
            Plaintiff and Respondent,                             A166482
 v.
 MATTHEW C. MULLENWEG et al.,                                     (San Francisco City and County
            Defendants and Appellants.                            Super. Ct. No. CGC-22-600093)
 JENNIFFER L. WESTMORELAND,
            Plaintiff and Respondent,
 v.
 MATTHEW C. MULLENWEG et al.,                                     (San Francisco City and County
            Defendants and Appellants.                            Super. Ct. No. CGC-22-600095)

      Asmahan Attayeb and Jenniffer L. Westmoreland sued
Matthew C. Mullenweg, Kathleen Mullenweg, and Audrey HC,
LLC (collectively, appellants), alleging causes of action relating to
their employment.1 In response, appellants moved to compel
arbitration based on agreements they claimed Attayeb and
Westmoreland electronically signed. The trial court denied the
motions, concluding that appellants failed to meet their burden to
establish the existence of a valid arbitration agreement signed by
either plaintiff. On appeal (Code Civ. Proc., § 1294, subd. (a)),

        1   We use only Matthew’s and Kathleen’s first names for
clarity.
                                                1
appellants insist the trial court erred by applying the wrong legal
standard. We disagree and affirm.

                          BACKGROUND

       Audrey hired Attayeb and Westmoreland to provide in-
home nursing and personal assistance services to Matthew’s
mother, Kathleen. After resigning from their roles in 2022,
Attayeb and Westmoreland each filed a complaint against
appellants, which alleged (among others) causes of action for
violation of the Labor Code, wrongful termination, and sexual
harassment.

      Appellants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that both
Attayeb and Westmoreland had electronically signed binding
arbitration agreements. Appellants’ motions were supported by
declarations from Matthew and Ryan Wehr, the Director of
Product Management for Insperity PEO Services, L.P.
Matthew’s declarations attached (as exhibits) copies of the
arbitration agreements purportedly signed by Attayeb and
Westmoreland.

      Matthew’s declarations state that, as its manager, he is
familiar with Audrey’s on-boarding policies and processes; that
Audrey has a “comprehensive arbitration program”; and that
Audrey uses Insperity as a “professional employer organization”
to handle payroll and other human resources matters.

      At the conclusion of his declarations, Matthew states that
Audrey’s employment files, which it prepares and maintains in
the regular course of business, contain arbitration agreements
signed (respectively) by Attayeb and Westmoreland. The
attached arbitration agreements show printed electronic
signatures for “Asmahan Attayeb” and “Jenniffer Westmoreland
(vwbeetle24)” on the respective signature lines, along with the
dates “11/1/2021” and “2019.02.28” (respectively).

                                 2
      Wehr’s declarations describe the onboarding process and
security procedures Insperity uses to collect electronic signatures
on behalf of its clients. To begin reading and signing the
onboarding paperwork, which is hosted through Insperity’s
secure online onboarding system, “[e]ach clients’ new worksite
employee” must begin by creating a “unique identification and
password to enter the system by inputting their personal
information,” including their last name, date of birth, social
security number, phone number, and e-mail address. Wehr
states, “The . . . employee cannot proceed to the onboarding
documents until they have inputted the required personal
information” and “cannot enter the system without entering [the]
Login Id and password.”

       Attayeb and Westmoreland opposed appellants’ motion to
compel arbitration. Both argued (primarily) that appellants
failed to establish the authenticity of the electronic signatures on
the arbitration agreements. In support, Attayeb and
Westmoreland each filed a declaration in which they stated that
they “never saw, reviewed, received, submitted, agreed,
consented to or signed” (electronically or otherwise) an
arbitration agreement while working for appellants. Each
further stated, “[h]ad I been told that I would be required to enter
[such] an agreement . . . , I would not have accepted the job.”

       Attayeb and Westmoreland also filed a declaration from a
former Audrey employee, Jane Weber, who stated that, as
Audrey’s Director of Estate Operations, she was responsible for
hiring and supervising Kathleen’s nursing staff and personal
assistants, including Attayeb and Westmoreland. Weber stated
that Audrey did not require arbitration agreements for her
position or for any of the Audrey employees she supervised. She
also declared that she personally observed Matthew’s chief of
staff, Sadie Ferguson, processing paperwork for new hires. When

                                 3
appellants filed their reply briefs, they raised numerous
objections to the Weber declarations.

      The trial court denied appellants’ motions to compel
arbitration but did not rule on the evidentiary objections. No
statement of decision was requested or issued, but the court
implicitly found that appellants failed to meet their burden to
show that either electronic signature was “the act of” Attayeb or
Westmoreland. (See Civ. Code, § 1633.9, subd. (a).)2

                             DISCUSSION

      Appellants contend that they met their burden to prove the
existence of a valid arbitration agreement between the parties
and that the trial court, in concluding otherwise, misconstrued
the law. We disagree.

                                  1.

      “When . . . the court’s order denying a motion to compel
arbitration is based on the court’s finding that petitioner failed to
carry its burden of proof, the question for the reviewing court is
whether that finding is erroneous as a matter of law.” (Fabian v.
Renovate America, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1066
(Fabian).) Under that standard, “ ‘ “the question becomes
whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and
unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave
no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to
support a finding.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1067.)

       “ ‘ “[I]t is almost impossible for [the party bearing the
burden of proof] to prevail on appeal by arguing the evidence
compels a judgment in [its] favor. That is because unless the
trial court makes specific findings of fact in favor of the losing
[party], we presume the trial court found the [party’s] evidence
lacks sufficient weight and credibility to carry the burden of

      2   Undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code.
                                  4
proof. [Citations.] We have no power on appeal to judge the
credibility of witnesses or to reweigh the evidence.” ’ ” (Fabian,
supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 1067.)

      Furthermore, because appellants did not request a
statement of decision (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 632, 1291), “we apply
the doctrine of implied findings and presume the court made all
factual findings necessary to support its order—to the extent
substantial evidence supports such findings.” (Ruiz v. Moss Bros.
Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 842 (Ruiz).)

                                   2.

       Because the existence of an agreement to arbitrate is a
statutory prerequisite to granting a petition to compel arbitration
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2), “ ‘the petitioner bears the burden of
proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence.’
(Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14
Cal.4th 394, 413.) The party seeking arbitration can meet its
initial burden by attaching to the petition a copy of the
arbitration agreement purporting to bear the respondent’s
signature. (Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical
Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1060 (Espejo).) Where . . .
the respondent challenges the validity of the signature, however,
the petitioner must ‘establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the signature was authentic.’ (Ibid.) In such proceedings,
‘the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits,
declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral
testimony received at the court’s discretion, to reach a final
determination.’ ” (Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64
Cal.App.5th 541, 543-544 (Bannister), parallel citations omitted.)

       “[S]ection 1633.9, subdivision (a) governs the
authentication of electronic signatures. It provides that an
electronic signature may be attributed to a person if ‘it was the
act of the person.’ (. . . § 1633.9, subd. (a).) Further, ‘[t]he act of
the person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of
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the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the
person to which the . . . electronic signature was attributable.’
(Ibid.) For example, a party may establish that the electronic
signature was ‘the act of the person’ by presenting evidence that
a unique login and password known only to that person was
required to affix the electronic signature, along with evidence
detailing the procedures the person had to follow to electronically
sign the document and the accompanying security precautions.”
(Bannister, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 545, italics added.)

                                 3.

       Attayeb and Westmoreland met their burden to challenge
the signatures on the arbitration agreements; thus, appellants
were required to demonstrate that Attayeb and Westmoreland
did, in fact, sign the documents electronically. (See Trinity v. Life
Ins. Co. of North America (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1124-1125;
Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 846.)

       Appellants argue that the trial court applied the wrong
legal standard for authenticating an electronic signature with
circumstantial evidence of the employer’s security practices and
procedures. They claim the trial court improperly refused to find
the signatures authentic absent direct evidence—i.e., testimony
from a witness who watched the employee electronically sign an
arbitration agreement. They are mistaken.

       In its written orders denying the motions, the trial court
recognized that circumstantial evidence of authenticity could
suffice. The court explained: Appellants’ “evidence of [Attayeb’s
and Westmoreland’s] login and the procedure [they] had to follow
to electronically sign, does not also prove the signature on the
arbitration agreement was ‘the act of the person’ under [section
1633.9, subdivision (a)] when Defendant does not also provide
evidence that the employee’s actions were the exclusive way an
acknowledgement form bearing the employee’s credentials could be

                                 6
created, or that the employer observed the employee click the ‘I
accept’ button to sign.” (Italics added.)

      The trial court’s explanation is entirely consistent with
section 1633.9 and this Division’s statement of the rule (above).
(See Bannister, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 545, italics added;
accord, Trinity v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, supra, 78
Cal.App.5th at p. 1125; Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 843-
845.)

       Although “the burden of authenticating an electronic
signature is not great” (Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 844-
845), the trial court did not err in finding appellants failed to
meet it here. True, appellants did present some evidence
suggesting that it was Attayeb and Westmoreland who affixed
the electronic signatures to the arbitration agreements. Wehr’s
declaration establishes that someone—with access to Attayeb’s
and Westmoreland’s personal information—would have had to
set up unique IDs and passwords and that the onboarding
documents (including the arbitration agreement) could only be
accessed with that information.

      Furthermore, appellants’ evidence included Insperity’s
audit records, which track every step of the onboarding process,
including each instance of a user accessing, modifying, or
executing a form. Insperity’s audit records, attached to Wehr’s
declaration, show that Westmoreland’s on-boarding forms were
completed by someone using the login ID “vwbeetle24.”
“[V]wbeetle24” began the on-boarding process at 1:31 p.m. on
February 27, 2019, and completed it at 8:08 a.m. on February 28,
2019. The audit records associated with Westmoreland show
that the arbitration agreement was electronically signed at 8:04
a.m. on February 28. The same records show that “vwbeetle24”
elected to participate in direct deposit less than a minute later, at
8:05 a.m., and then at 8:06 a.m. entered bank account
information.

                                  7
       Insperity’s audit records similarly show that Attayeb’s on-
boarding forms were completed by someone who selected the
login ID “asmaattayeb.” “Asmaattayeb” began the on-boarding
process at 6:48 p.m. on November 1, 2021, and completed it at
8:04 p.m. the same day. The audit records associated with
Attayeb show that the arbitration agreement was electronically
signed at 7:51 p.m. on November 1. The same records show that
“asmaattayeb” completed a form regarding paid sick leave less
than a minute later, at 7:52 p.m., and then at 7:57 p.m. and 7:59
p.m. (respectively) elected to participate in direct deposit and
entered bank account information.

      However, even after the plaintiffs denied signing the
arbitration agreement, appellants did not explain how the
electronic signatures could have only been placed by Attayeb and
Westmoreland. Neither Wehr’s declaration, nor Matthew’s,
establish that only Attayeb and Westmoreland could have
electronically signed the arbitration agreements because only
they had access to the IDs and passwords (or the underlying
personal information). Neither declaration provides any insight
about how Audrey handles its employees’ personal data or their
Insperity login information. In fact, Matthew does not in any
way explain the basis for his inference that the electronic
signatures on the documents were the acts of Attayeb and
Westmoreland.

      Appellants misplace their reliance on Espejo, supra, 246
Cal.App.4th 1047. In that case, to authenticate an electronic
signature, the defendant submitted a declaration from its
systems consultant who detailed the company’s “security
precautions regarding transmission and use of an applicant’s
unique username and password.” (Id. at p. 1062.) Specifically,
the systems consultant stated that the agreement was emailed to
the applicant, that access to the agreement required a username
and password that was only “provided by phone ‘directly and

                                 8
orally to the applicant,’ ” and that to proceed the applicant was
required to immediately reset the password. (Id. at p. 1053.) The
Espejo court concluded that these details were sufficient to
establish that the electronic signature was “the act of” the
plaintiff (§ 1633.9, subd. (a)) even if Espejo “did not ‘recall seeing
or accessing’ ” the arbitration agreement. (Espejo, supra, at pp.
1054, 1062.)

      In contrast, here, Attayeb and Westmoreland affirmatively
denied signing an arbitration agreement. And there is additional
countervailing evidence suggesting someone else at Audrey may
have electronically signed the agreements. Weber’s declaration
states that she observed Matthew’s chief of staff processing the
onboarding forms for some unidentified Audrey employees.
Attayeb also presented a text chain showing that she had
provided Matthew, on November 2, 2021, with her social security
number and copy of her driver’s license so that he could complete
the I-9 form. According to Wehr, that same personal information
is used by the employee to create a unique identification and
password.

      Westmoreland said that she did not even own a computer
at the time she purportedly signed the arbitration agreement.
Yet appellants do not refute this point with evidence, for
example, that Westmoreland electronically signed the agreement
on a computer at work (see Bannister, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p.
546) or that Audrey sent a hyperlink to her email address. (See
Espejo, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 1053.) In fact, neither
Matthew, nor Wehr, provided any evidence about Audrey’s
procedures for guiding a new hire to the online Insperity portal,
much less any evidence about Audrey’s security procedures for
transmission and use of its employees’ Insperity IDs and
passwords. (Cf. id. at p. 1062.)

      Appellants point to the Insperity audit records and the fact
that neither plaintiff disputes receiving direct deposit of their

                                  9
paychecks. On this record, the evidence does not compel a
finding that Attayeb and Westmoreland themselves entered the
necessary information. (See Bannister, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at
p. 548 [“[defendant] does not explain the basis for its assumption
that no one other than the employee could complete a W-4 or
emergency contact form”].) We cannot reweigh the trial court’s
implicit finding that Attayeb’s, Westmoreland’s, and Weber’s
declarations are credible. (Fabian, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p.
1067.)

      Appellants’ evidence was neither uncontradicted nor “ ‘ “ ‘of
such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial
determination’ ” ’ ” that it was insufficient to meet their burden.
(Fabian, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1067, 1070.) The trial
court was not compelled to find the electronic signatures
authentic.

                                 4.

       Appellants ask us to ignore Weber’s declaration, asserting
(in conclusory fashion) that it lacks foundation. We assume
(without deciding) that appellants’ failure to obtain a ruling from
the trial court did not forfeit their objections to Weber’s
declaration and that her declaration was admitted. (See Reid v.
Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 534; Valentine v. Plum
Healthcare Group, LLC (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1089.)
Nonetheless, we conclude that any evidentiary challenge was
forfeited by appellants’ failure to adequately brief it on appeal.
(See Reid, supra, at p. 534; City of Crescent City v. Reddy (2017) 9
Cal.App.5th 458, 463; Flake v. Neumiller & Beardslee (2017) 9
Cal.App.5th 223, 229, fn. 4.)

      Appellants raised more than 50 objections to Weber’s
declaration below. But their opening brief fails to identify which
implicit rulings they challenge on appeal. They also fail to cite
any authority in support of their evidentiary argument. It is not

                                10
our role to construct arguments on appellants’ behalf. (See In re
Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830.)

                                  5.

      Appellants also insist that the trial court (a) failed to
resolve factual disputes, and (b) could not do so without holding
an evidentiary hearing. They are wrong.

       First, appellants’ failure to request a statement of decision
forfeits their argument that the trial court failed to make express
findings. (Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227,
237; In re Marriage of McHugh (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1238,
1248.)

       Second, trial courts properly resolve petitions to compel
arbitration via summary procedure. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1290.2;
Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951,
972 [“trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits,
declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral
testimony received at the court’s discretion, to reach a final
determination”].) Appellants did not ask the trial court for an
opportunity to present oral testimony. Accordingly, appellants
forfeited any argument that the court abused its discretion by
resolving conflicts without an evidentiary hearing. (See People v.
Coulthard (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 743, 762.)

                            DISPOSITION

       The order denying appellants’ motion to compel arbitration
is affirmed. Plaintiffs are entitled to their costs on appeal. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rules 8.278(a)(1), (2).)

                                                           BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:

JACKSON, P.J.
SIMONS, J.
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Attayeb v. Mullenweg et al. / Westmoreland v. Mullenweg et al. (A166482)

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