Court Opinion

ID: 9891419
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-18 16:00:28.362265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:20.337419
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       OCT 18 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SHIRLEAN FANT RAND,                             No. 22-16257

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:21-cv-01220-DLR

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM *
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;
DONALD J. TRUMP; UNKNOWN
PARTIES,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Arizona
                   Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding

                           Submitted October 10, 2023**

Before:      S.R. THOMAS, McKEOWN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

      Shirlean Fant Rand appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing her action alleging various claims, including under the Federal Tort

Claims Act (“FTCA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
de novo. Dugard v. United States, 835 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 2016) (dismissal of

FTCA claim); Brown v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 2009)

(dismissal under absolute immunity). We affirm.

      The district court properly dismissed Rand’s claims against President Trump

on the basis of absolute immunity. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749-53

(1982) (explaining that a president is absolutely immune from “damages liability

predicated on his official acts”).

      The district court properly dismissed Rand’s FTCA claims because Rand

failed to establish that she could state viable claims against a private individual

under like circumstances under applicable state law. See Dugard, 835 F.3d at 918-

919 (the FTCA provides a limited waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity

where the government would be liable under analogous state law); Prescott v.

United States, 973 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[P]laintiff bears the burden of

persuading the court that it has subject matter jurisdiction under the FTCA’s

general waiver of immunity.”); see also Love v United States, 60 F.3d 642, 644

(9th Cir. 1995) (“The breach of a duty created by federal law is not, by itself,

actionable under the FTCA.”).

      The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rand leave to

amend because amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide

Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of

                                           2                                     22-16257
review and stating that leave to amend may be denied where amendment would be

futile).

       We reject as unsupported by the record Rand’s contentions that she was

entitled to a default judgment against defendants.

       AFFIRMED.

                                         3                                 22-16257