Court Opinion

ID: 2964761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:30:40.457332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:37:25.774929
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                ____________________
       No. 96-2082
                                 ANNETTE B. DeMAURO,
                                Plaintiff, Appellant,
                                         v.
                JOSEPH M. DeMAURO, EDWARD MARTIN, DeMAURO CO., INC.,
          NICHOLAS DeMAURO, TRI-AREA DEVELOPMENT CO., INC. and JOAN MARTIN,
                               Defendants, Appellees.
                                ____________________
                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
                   [Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Judge]
                                ____________________
                                       Before
                                Boudin, Circuit Judge,
                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                              and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                ____________________
            S. James Boumil for appellant.
            Kathleen M.  Morrissey  with  whom  Bernard  A. Dwork,  Roger  T.
       Manwaring, Barron & Stadfeld, P.C., Richard L. Fox and Carragher & Fox
       were on brief for appellees Edward Martin, DeMauro Co., Inc., Nicholas
       DeMauro, Tri-Area Development Co., Inc. and Joan Martin.
                                ____________________
                                    June 11, 1997
                                ____________________

                 BOUDIN,  Circuit  Judge.   In  this  case,  one  of  the
            participants in  a  pending divorce  action has  invoked  the
            federal racketeering statute to challenge asset transfers  by
            her spouse.   The district court responded by dismissing  the
            complaint without prejudice  on abstention grounds.   Because
            dismissal  was on  the  pleadings,  we assume  the  truth  of
            statements in the complaint, cautioning that they have yet to
            be proved.
                 Annette and Joseph DeMauro were married in 1979.  Joseph
            worked 
                  in 
                     the construction business and, according to Annette,
            earned "millions of dollars," promising to share monies  with
            Annette.  But  the marriage proved  less successful than  his
            business.  The couple separated, and in 1994, Annette--a  New
            Hampshire resident--sued for  divorce in New Hampshire  state
            court.
                 The divorce  action  has  been a  bitter  and  prolonged
            contest.  At various times, Joseph has refused to pay spousal
            support 
                   orders (which total more than $250,000), has failed to
            appear for court proceedings, has resisted discovery requests
            concerning his income and property interests by invoking  the
            Fifth 
                 Amendment, 
                            and 
                               has 
                                   been held in contempt of court.  After
            more than two years, the divorce action remains unresolved.
                 In 
                   May 
                       1996, 
                            Annette 
                                    filed the instant suit in the federal
            district court in Massachusetts.  The complaint named  Joseph
            and 
               five 
                    other defendants:  Joseph's 42-year-old son, Nicholas
                                         -2-
                                         -2-

            DeMauro; Joseph's sister and brother-in-law, Joan and  Edwar
                                   ons allegedly controlled by Joseph and
             icholas--DeM
                        auro Co., Inc. and Tri-Area Development Co., Inc.
            Joseph
                                                                        d
            Martin; 
                   and 
                      two 
                          corporati
            N      was alleged  to have a residence in Massachusetts  and
            both corporations had offices in the state.
                 The 
                    complaint 
                              set 
                                 forth 
                                       a RICO claim for civil conspiracy,
            18 U.S.C. S 1961  et seq., specifying predicate  racketeering
            acts of (1) mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. S 1341, (2) wire fraud,  18
            U.S.C. S  1343,  and (3)  "extortionate threats,"  18  U.S.C.
            S 1951.  The complaint also alleged pendent state-law claims1
            for intentional infliction  of emotional distress, breach  of
            fiduciary 
                     duty, 
                          conspiracy, fraudulent conveyances, and illegal
            telephone recordings.
                 In 
                   support 
                           of the RICO claim, the complaint charged inter
            alia  that  Joseph  and  the  other  defendants  fraudulently
            concealed 
                     from 
                         Annette 
                                 separate and marital property to prevent
            her 
               from 
                    sharing in these assets.  Annette alleged that Joseph
            and the other defendants
                 by means of  false pretenses, representations,  and
                 devices established bank and investment accounts in
                 Switzerland,    [the]    Middle    East,    France,
                 Liechtenstein, several states of the United  States
                 and 
                    various 
                            and sundry other locations most of which
                 accounts 
                         were established under the names of straws,
                 sham   trusts,    shell   companies    and    phony
              
              
               
                
                1
                 Diversity 
                          jurisdict
                                   ion was not available because although
            Joseph 
                  is 
                     apparently not a New Hampshire resident, Annette and
            the Martins are New  Hampshire residents, thus defeating  the
            complete 
                    diversity 
                             requirement.  Casas Office Machines, Inc. v.
            Mita 
                Copystar America, Inc., 42 F.3d 668, 673 (1st Cir. 1994).
                                         -3-
                                         -3-

                 "foundations,
                             " all designed to conceal the location,
                 extent, and existence of assets from [Annette]  and
                 persons with whom [Joseph] did business.
                 The  alleged activity  was undertaken  not by  Annette's
            husband 
                   alone, 
                          but 
                             also 
                                  by others who comprised an alleged RICO
            "enterprise," and it  involves alleged concealments "well  in
            excess 
                  of 
                     a 
                       million dollars."  And, allegedly, Joseph not only
            threatened to deprive Annette of assets but also boasted that
            he had  bribed foreign officials  to secure  himself a  false
            identity and foreign passport.
                 In June 1996, all the defendants except Joseph moved  to
            dismiss 
                   the 
                       suit 
                           on 
                              various grounds, including lack of standing
            to 
              bring 
                    RICO claims and failure to plead fraud with requisite
            particularity, 
                          Fed. 
                              R. 
                                 Civ. P. 9(b).  Joseph did not join these
            motions because he  had not yet been served process,  despite
            efforts 
                   by 
                      Annette 
                             to 
                                locate and serve him.  Joseph was finally
            served  with process  while  appearing involuntarily  in  New
            Hampshire state court, having been arrested and brought there
            for a hearing on his failure to pay ordered spousal support.
                 On July 26, 1996, the district judge issued a seven-page
            order. 
                   
                   He 
                     expressed 
                               doubt whether Annette had shown a property
            interest protectible  under the  civil RICO  statute; but  he
            ultimately did  not decide this  issue and instead  dismissed
            without 
                   prejudice Annette's claims against all the defendants.
            The dismissal  was  based  upon the  doctrine  of  abstention
            established in Burford v.  Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315  (1943).
                                         -4-
                                         -4-

            Rather  than  staying  the  federal  proceedings,  the  court
            dismissed, noting that Annette could
                 replead if and when she can show a "property" right
                 which . . . has been denied her by the  defendants'
                 allegedly  illegal transfers--that  is,  after  the
                 resolution of the divorce action and the  attendant
                 allocation of marital assets.
                 The  parties  had  not  addressed  the  possibility   of
            abstention 
                      in 
                        their 
                              filings.  In August 1996, Annette moved for
            reconsideration, arguing that  abstention was not proper  and
            that, if it  were proper, the  court should stay  proceedings
            rather 
                  than 
                      dismissing 
                                 the action.  The court denied her motion
            without comment.  Annette now appeals.
                 1.  For reasons that will become evident, we begin  with
            the threshold issue bypassed  by the district court,  namely,
            whether the plaintiff has made out a claim of "injury" to her
            "business 
                     or 
                       property," 
                                  as is required for a civil RICO damages
            action.  18 U.S.C. S 1964(c).  This is sometimes described as
            a "standing" issue.   There is plainly a case or  controversy
            under 
                 Article III; but the statutory precondition of injury to
            business or property must  also be met.  Sedima, S.P.R.L.  v.
            Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985).
                 One  might think  it obvious  that a  precondition in  a
            federal 
                   statute 
                           would 
                                be 
                                   defined uniformly by federal law.  Cf.
            Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., Inc., 483  U.S.
            143, 147-49 (1987) (civil RICO statute of limitations).  This
            is especially so where the same phrase--injury to business or
                                         -5-
                                         -5-

            property--is also a long-standing requirement under section 4
            of  the  Clayton Act,  15  U.S.C. S  15(a).   Yet,  the  RICO
            precedents are filled with references to state property  law,
            which is  often said to  govern by implicit  cross-reference.
            E.g., Doe v. Roe, 958  F.2d 763, 768 (7th Cir. 1992)  (citing
            cases).
                 Some role does exist for state law.  There is no general
            federal law of property transfers, so the question who owns a
            piece 
                 of 
                    property 
                            is 
                               likely to be settled by state law.  On the
            other hand, one might expect federal law to decide whether  a
            given 
                 interest, recognized by state law, rises to the level of
            "business 
                     or 
                       property," 
                                  or whether "injury" has been done to it
            by 
              the 
                  acts 
                       alleged.2  Where to set the "business or property"
            threshold  depends on  federal  statutory purpose,  and  that
            purpose is  likely to support  a definition  that is  uniform
            throughout the country.
                 In all events, the assets that Annette ultimately claims
            to have been concealed are "property" by any definition:  the
            complaint 
                     alleges fraudulent concealment and transfers of real
            property 
                    and 
                        bank account funds by Joseph.  One difficulty--so
            far as we can tell from the undeveloped record--is that  most
            (perhaps all)  of this property may  have been held from  the
              
              
               
                
                2
                 E.g.
                     , 
                       A
                        ssociated Gen. Contractors of California, Inc. v.
            California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519,  529-45
            (1983) (examining the meaning of "injury" under section 4  of
            the Clayton Act); compare Roma Constr. Co. v. aRusso, 96 F.3d
            566, 579-80 n.10 (1st Cir. 1996) (Lynch, J., concurring).
                                         -6-
                                         -6-

            outset in  Joseph's name  or in the  name of  others such  as
            foundations 
                       that he controls.  The complaint also implies that
            most 
                (perhaps all) of the underlying assets were the result of
            the success of Joseph's construction business.
                 New 
                    Hampshire 
                              is 
                                not 
                                    a 
                                      community property state, see Baker
            v. 
              Baker
                   , 
                     421 A.2d 998, 1000 (N.H. 1980), and much of the real
            property and monies described in the complaint may not yet be
            Annette's property.  To  this extent, what Annette has is  an
            expectancy:  in the divorce proceedings, some or much of this
            property may be awarded  to Annette.  State law provides  for
            "equitable division" in divorce actions of "all tangible  and
            intangible property and assets  . . . belonging to either  or
            both 
                parties, 
                        whether 
                                title to the property is held in the name
            of either or both parties."  N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. S 458:16-a.
            An equal division is presumptively equitable.  Id. S  458:16-
            a(II).
                 If the real and other tangible property, or most of  it,
            belongs 
                   to 
                      Joseph, 
                             can 
                                 it still be said that Annette's divorce-
            suit claim to a share is also "property" protectible by RICO?
            Possibly so.  Some precedent, at least under the Clayton Act,
            extends 
                   protection 
                             to 
                                intangibles under certain circumstances.3
                 3E.g., E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour
            Manual 
                  Comm.,
                         467 F.2d 178, 184 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
            409 U.S.  1109  (1973) (contracts  are "property"  under  the
            Clayton Act); cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,
            430-33 
                  (1982) (right to use adjudicatory procedures created by
            state 
                 Fair 
                      Employment Practices Act is "property" protected by
            the Due Process Clause).
                                         -7-
                                         -7-

            But even if we assume arguendo that Annette's claim is itself
            protected property,  the  question remains  whether  Joseph's
            alleged efforts to  conceal what is still his property  (real
            property  and cash)  has  "injured" Annette's  property  (her
            inchoate claim).
                 Certainly, Annette  may  be  worse off  because  of  the
            concealment; 
                        but her legal claim remains intact, together with
            various 
                   remedies directed at concealment of assets.  (In fact,
            she has already obtained attachments in state court totalling
            $33 
               million 
                       on property owned partly or solely by Joseph.)  No
            one 
               knows 
                     what 
                         Annette 
                                 will be awarded in the divorce action or
            whether Joseph's alleged efforts  to conceal will hamper  her
            ability to collect.  In sum, any claim of present "injury" to
            her 
               claim 
                     is 
                        speculative, so long as we are concerned with the
            movement  of real property  or cash that  for now belongs  to
            Joseph.
                 Pertinent here  is a  decision of  this court  upholding
            dismissal of  a civil RICO claim  brought by a plaintiff  who
            alleged injury based on a "hypothetical inability to recover"
            if it won its pending contract lawsuit against the defendant.
            The 
               defendant 
                        had 
                            allegedly made fraudulent transfers of assets
            to his wife; but we held that the RICO claim was not ripe for
            adjudication because the claimed injury was too  speculative.
                                         -8-
                                         -8-

            Lincoln  House, Inc. v.  Dupre, 903 F.2d  845, 847 (1st  Cir.
            1990).  This and like decisions4 seem directly on point.
                 To be sure, there is a certain arbitrariness in  drawing
            the line here.   But while RICO  is to be construed  broadly,
            Sedima, 473  U.S. at  498,  "injury to  property" is  not  an
            infinitely 
                      elastic 
                             concept.  And in cases like this, it is hard
            to 
              see 
                  how 
                      a 
                        court would calculate damages now, given the dual
            uncertainties of what Annette will be awarded and how it will
            be 
              affected 
                       by concealment.  See First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt
            Funding Corp., 27 F.3d 763, 768 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
            115 
               S. 
                  Ct. 
                      728 (1995) ("[A]s a general rule, a cause of action
            does 
                not 
                    accrue under RICO until the amount of damages becomes
            clear and definite.").
                 This conclusion--that Annette has not adequately alleged
            injury to her  property--applies only to the extent that  the
            concealed  property currently  belongs  solely to  Joseph  or
            others.  However, the complaint also asserts that Joseph  has
            sought to conceal  "marital" or "separate" property.  To  the
            extent that Annette is claiming a present ownership interest,
            she appears to be asserting injury to her property within the
            terms 
                 of 
                    the 
                       RICO 
                            statute.  Cf. Grimmett v. Brown, 75 F.3d 506,
                 4See  Barnett v. Stern, 909 F.2d 973, 977 n.4 (7th  Cir.
            1990); Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096, 1106  (2d
            Cir. 1988), cert.  denied, 490 U.S.  1007 (1989); Capasso  v.
            Cigna Ins. Co., 765 F. Supp. 839, 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
                                         -9-
                                         -9-

            516-17 
                  (9th 
                       Cir.), 
                             cert. 
                                   granted, 116 S. Ct. 2521 (1996), cert.
            dismissed, 117 S. Ct. 759 (1997).
                 Admittedly,  Annette's  allegations  of  ownership   are
            confusing 
                     and 
                         in 
                           certain 
                                   respects lack supporting detail.  They
            certainly could be explored through inquiry and discovery and
            could be tested,  if doubtful, by a  motion to dismiss or  by
            summary  judgment.   Still,  on  the  present  pleadings  the
            possibility remains  that Annette  already owns  some of  the
            property allegedly concealed  by Joseph and others.  On  that
            premise, we turn to the issue of abstention.
                 2. 
                    
                    We 
                       note 
                           at 
                              the 
                                  start 
                                        that the district court's remedy-
            -dismissal 
                      on 
                        abstention 
                                   grounds--is not permissible.  Just two
            months 
                  before 
                        the 
                            district court issued its ruling, the Supreme
            Court 
                 held 
                      that abstention, under Burford or otherwise, may be
            appropriate 
                       in 
                          suits 
                               for 
                                   damages.  Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins.
            Co.
              , 
                116 
                    S. 
                       Ct. 1712, 1728 (1996).  But the Court further held
            that in a damages action, the district court may only order a
            stay 
                pending 
                        resolution of state proceedings; it cannot invoke
            abstention to dismiss the suit altogether.  Id.
                 The rationale of  Quackenbush is  that damages  actions,
            unlike suits for equitable relief, do not invoke the  court's
            equitable 
                     discretion.  Id. at 1727.  This rule may seem rather
            wooden, 
                   given 
                         the 
                            merger 
                                   of law and equity, but the Court means
            what 
                it 
                   says: 
                          
                         Quackenbus
                                   h held that the dismissal of a damages
            action  on Burford  grounds  was  reversible  error,  without
                                        -10-
                                        -10-

            deciding whether "a more limited abstention-based stay  order
            would have been warranted on the facts of this case."  Id. at
            1728.  There  is no question that  the present RICO claim  is
            primarily a damages action.  See complaint, qq 62-67.  It  is
            uncertain 
                     whether 
                            equitable relief is even available to private
            plaintiffs under civil RICO.  Lincoln House, 903 F.2d at 848.
                 The  question remains  whether  the district  court  has
            authority 
                     at 
                        least 
                             to 
                                stay Annette's federal suit on abstention
            grounds,  pending resolution  of  the New  Hampshire  divorce
            proceeding.    In that  proceeding,  the  state  court  might
            determine what property  is currently owned by Annette.   See
            N.H. 
                Rev. 
                     Stat. Ann. S 458:16-a(II).  For this reason, another
            district court--cited by the district court in this case--has
            abstained 
                     from adjudicating a federal RICO action brought by a
            spouse involved  in pending divorce  proceedings.  Farkas  v.
            D'Oca, 857  F. Supp. 300, 303-04  (S.D.N.Y. 1994).  See  also
            Dibbs v. Gonsalves, 921 F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.P.R. 1996).
                 This 
                     is 
                        not 
                           a 
                             wholly 
                                    persuasive reason given New Hampshire
            law's stress  on an equitable  division of  all the  parties'
            property. 
                      
                      The 
                         New 
                             Hampshire decree may just as well not decide
            who owned specific property  prior to the divorce:  its  main
            concern 
                   is 
                      with who will own what after the divorce.  And, the
            Supreme Court has discouraged abstention based solely on  the
            ground that a related state court action may address  similar
            issues,  Colorado River  Water Conservation  Dist. v.  United
                                        -11-
                                        -11-

            States
                 , 
                   424 
                      U.S. 
                           800, 
                                817 (1976), with only limited exceptions,
            e.g., Railroad Comm'n of  Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.  496
            (1941). 
                 A more  plausible basis for  abstention is the  possible
            interference 
                        that a civil RICO action at this time might cause
            to the state court's decision as to how to divide property in
            the divorce.  The so-called domestic relations exception does
            not preclude federal  courts from  adjudicating tort  actions
            merely 
                  because the parties were married and are in the process
            of 
              divorce. 
                        
                        Ankenbrandt
                                   
                                   v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992).
            But this  case is  not just a  tort action between  divorcing
            parties: 
                     
                     the 
                        civil 
                              RICO 
                                   claim is directed to the same property
            that is going to be allocated between the parties as a result
            of the decree.  Cf. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 819.
                 In 
                   this 
                        instance, 
                                 the 
                                     state court may be unlikely to award
            Joseph any interest in property now owned solely by  Annette,
            but that  is hardly so clear  with respect to property  owned
            jointly.  Suppose  Annette were awarded  the value (or  three
            times 
                 the 
                     value) 
                           of 
                              disputed jointly owned property in the RICO
            case 
                and 
                    the 
                       state 
                             court 
                                   then determined that the same property
            ought to be allocated to Joseph.  At the very least, there is
            a    possibility     of    conflict    between     judgments,
                  requiring one of them to be modified to take account of
            the other.   Otherwise, the  state divorce decree's  intended
            allocation of property could easily be frustrated.
                                        -12-
                                        -12-

                 Another 
                        potential 
                                 conflict is Annette's expressed interest
            in 
              seeking 
                     interim 
                             relief from the federal court, presumably by
            way 
               of 
                 provisional 
                             attachments or other ad litem remedies.  Cf.
            Fed. R. Civ. P. 64; Teradyne, Inc. v. Mostek Corp., 797  F.2d
            43, 53 (1st Cir. 1986).  The federal court's ability to reach
            and freeze out-of-state property may well be greater than the
            New Hampshire  divorce court's.   At the  same time,  interim
            allocations of property are standard fare for divorce courts,
            and the obvious potential for interference with this function
            is an extremely serious matter.
                 Our 
                    case, 
                          and those kinds of threatened interference, are
            not a  perfect fit  with the  Burford doctrine.   There,  the
            Supreme Court  approved abstention to  avoid conflict with  a
            comprehensive  state regime  of  business regulation.5    But
            abstention 
                      doctrines are not "rigid pigeonholes," Pennzoil Co.
            v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S.  1, 11 n.9 (1987), and the  ultimate
            question is whether there are "exceptional circumstances"  in
            which  abstention "would  clearly serve  an important  . .  .
            interest." 
                       
                       Colorado 
                               Rive
                                   r, 424 U.S. at 813 (citation omitted).
            Such an interest is potentially present here.  See also Minot
            v. Eckardt-Minot, 13 F.3d 590, 593-95 (2d Cir. 1994).
                  5Burford, 319  U.S. at 326 (allocation of oil  drilling
            rights). 
                     
                     See
                         also Alabama Public Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry.
            Co.
              , 
                341 
                    U.S. 341, 346-48 (1951) (scheduling of local railroad
            service); 
                     All
                        state Ins. Co. v. Sabbagh, 603 F.2d 228, 229 (1st
            Cir. 1979) (setting of automobile insurance rates).
                                        -13-
                                        -13-

                 Not 
                    only 
                         divorce, but the allocation of property incident
            to a  divorce, are longstanding  local functions governed  by
            state  law.    Ankenbrandt,  while  curtailing  the  domestic
            relations 
                     exception, 
                               nevertheless made clear the priority given
            the state resolution of family law issues, including  alimony
            determinations.  504 U.S. at  704, 706.  See also Friends  of
            Children, Inc.  v. Matava, 766 F.2d  35, 37 (1st Cir.  1985).
            Divorces 
                    are 
                       frequently 
                                  accompanied by disputes about property,
            including 
                     both 
                         interim 
                                 and final allocations.  Such state court
            authority 
                     would be threatened if civil RICO actions become the
            shadow proceeding for policing such disputes.
                 We conclude  that abstention  by use  of a  stay may  be
            permissible 
                       where 
                             a 
                              RICO 
                                   action is directed against concealment
            or transfer of property that is the very subject of a pending
            divorce 
                   proceeding. 
                                
                               The 
                                   divorce proceedings might or might not
            resolve  the   federal  dispute--there   are  many   possible
            permutations and plenty of  unanswered legal questions.   But
            staying  the federal  RICO  claim  will reduce  the  risk  of
            interfering  with interim  state allocations  and permit  the
            federal court to  tailor any final federal judgment to  avoid
            undermining the divorce court's allocation of property.  
                 3.  While  abstention may be  permissible, it cannot  be
            automatic in  a case  of this kind.   A  decision to  abstain
            requires not only that certain preconditions be met, but also
            that 
                the 
                    district 
                            court 
                                  reasonably find that such abstention is
                                        -14-
                                        -14-

            appropriate in the case at hand.6  Of course, this may not be
            much of an issue when the particular abstention rubric itself
             resumes 
                    stro
            defendant  seeks a  federal  injunction interfering  with  an
            ongoing state criminal trial.  Younger, 401 U.S. at 45, 54.
                 Cases 
                      like 
                           the 
                              present 
                                      one differ markedly from situations
            like Younger.  Not only  do we have far less experience  with
            p           ngly in favor of abstention--for example, where a
            civil  RICO actions  that  overlap divorce  proceedings,  but
            extreme 
                   variations can be imagined both as to underlying facts
            and equitable concerns.  Certainly in some instances a  civil
            RICO claim  might be  so plausible  and so  distinct from  an
            ordinary divorce action property dispute as to undermine  any
            argument for a  stay; or even if  a trial were stayed,  there
            might be a compelling argument for interim relief to  protect
            the plaintiff's right to ultimate relief in the RICO action.
                 In  sum,  abstention  here is  a  possible,  but  not  a
            mechanical 
                      answer. 
                               
                              The 
                                  district court's judgment cannot stand,
            simply 
                  because it conflicts with Quackenbush.  Nor do we think
            that  the  dismissal on  abstention  grounds  can  simply  be
            transformed into  a stay;  such a stay  might in  the end  be
            equitably justifiable, but not  without giving the parties  a
                 6See Quackenbush, 116 S. Ct. at 1726-28; Colorado River,
            424 U.S. at 818; Younger  v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54  (1971);
            Bath 
                Memorial Hosp. v. Maine Health Care Fin. Comm'n, 853 F.2d
            1007, 
                 1015 
                      (1st 
                          Cir. 
                               1988); Friends of Children, Inc., 766 F.2d
            at 37.
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                                        -15-

            chance to address the matter and not without an appraisal  by
            the court that goes beyond the possible overlap in issues.
                 In 
                   making 
                          such 
                              an 
                                 appraisal, the district court is free to
            consider the  plausibility  of this  civil  RICO claim  as  a
            freestanding cause of action, the actual threat in this  case
            for 
               conflict 
                        between such a suit and the pending state divorce
            action, any threat of immediate harm associated with  alleged
            ongoing  civil RICO  violations,  and other  consequences  or
            concerns 
                    that make it equitably reasonable to accelerate or to
            defer consideration  of federal relief.   Once the  pertinent
            factors  are mustered  and  assessed,  the  district  court's
            exercise of  judgment  is  normally respected.    Friends  of
            Children, Inc., 766 F.2d at 37.
                 The district  court  has  no obligation  to  pursue  the
            abstention issue at all if the matter can be disposed of more
            appropriately on other grounds.  Motions to dismiss have been
            made for  lack of standing  (an issue  discussed above),  for
            failure to  plead  fraud with  particularity, and  for  other
            reasons.   Possibly,  further  exploration will  reveal  that
            Annette 
                   has 
                       no standing as to any of the property in question.
            In all  events, the order  in which to  consider issues is  a
            matter for the district judge.
                 The treatment  of the pendent  state claims depends,  in
            turn, on the outcome of the inquiries just described.  If the
            district  court finds  no  basis for  a  claim of  injury  to
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                                        -16-

            property, 
                     presumably 
                               it 
                                  will dismiss the pendent claims without
            prejudice.  See 28 U.S.C. S 1367(c)(3).  If it determines  to
            stay the  civil RICO claim  on abstention  grounds, then  the
            treatment of the  pendent claims is  less clear-cut, see  id.
            S 1367(c)(4), but the parties have not addressed that  issue,
            and we express no view upon it.
                 The judgment of  the district court  is vacated and  the
            matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with  this
            decision.
                 It is so ordered.
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