Court Opinion

ID: 9522938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:33:53.113009+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:19.496254
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KASSERMAN, dissenting: I am unable to agree with the majority in this case; therefore, I respectfully dissent. The majority apparently recognizes that, under section 503(b) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, eh. 40, par. 503(b)), the transfer of nonmarital property into some form of co-ownership during the marriage raises a presumption of a gift to the marriage. I find respondent’s testimony concerning the circumstances under which he made the transfer to himself and his wife as joint tenants insufficient to rebut the presumption of gift. Respondent stated that he made the transfer to avoid a dispute between his wife and children in the event of his death. This would result only if respondent did, in fact, effect an inter vivos gift of the property so as to create the joint tenancy; and I am unable to comprehend how it would have been possible for respondent to have made a conveyance of the real estate in question which would qualify as a gift for inheritance purposes but which would not otherwise qualify as a present gift. Therefore, it is my conclusion that the trial court did, in fact, err in classifying four-sevenths of such real estate as the non-marital property of respondent. Furthermore, the majority describes as harmless any error the trial court may have committed in classifying four-sevenths of the real estate in question as the nonmarital property of respondent. The majority concedes that the court erred in the dual classification of such property as four-sevenths nonmarital and three-sevenths marital; however, that error is also deemed to be harmless. In this regard, I find it to be an unwarranted conclusion for this court to assume that the trial court would make the same division of the marital property if it were faced with the necessity of justifying the award of the remaining four-sevenths of the real estate in question to respondent. Put in another way, if the court’s division of the marital property was equitable when made on the erroneous assumption that only three-sevenths of such real estate was being divided, how could it remain equitable when a proper determination of this controversy would require the addition of more than 33.5 acres and four-sevenths of a home to the marital estate? For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the trial court’s determination regarding the division of the parties’ property and remand the cause with directions for the court to conduct a new hearing regarding the division of the marital property.