Court Opinion

ID: 9840778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-20 06:08:10.682227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:22:30.827291
License: Public Domain

Affirm and Opinion Filed September 14, 2023

                                       In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-22-00357-CV

                   DAVID BLAIR, Appellant
                            V.
     THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF DALLAS, TX –
                ROSELAND ESTATES, Appellee

                On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4
                            Dallas County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. CC-20-01421-D

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
             Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Reichek, and Breedlove
                           Opinion by Justice Reichek
      In this eviction case, pro se appellant David Blair appeals the county court at

law’s default judgment awarding possession of certain property to the Housing

Authority of the City of Dallas, Texas – Roseland Estates (“DHA”). For reasons

that follow, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

      On March 4, 2020, DHA filed a sworn complaint for forcible detainer in

justice court against appellant and “all other occupants” of an apartment DHA leased

to appellant. DHA alleged appellant violated the terms of his lease by pointing a

shotgun at another resident on DHA property. Appellant was served but did not
answer, and the justice court awarded possession of the property to DHA. Appellant,

who also represented himself the trial court, appealed to the county court at law by

filing a statement of inability to pay. He filed an answer, and the case was eventually

set for a jury trial on April 19, 2022. The trial court’s judgment, signed that day,

recites that appellant did not appear for trial. The judgment orders that DHA is

entitled to possession of the leased premises and awards it attorney’s fees of $1,100

and court costs.

      On April 19, appellant filed a motion to set aside the default judgment,

supported by his unsworn declaration. In his motion, appellant stated his failure to

appear was due to accident or mistake rather than conscious indifference. According

to appellant, he arrived in the courtroom three minutes after the court granted

judgment for DHA. He was late because of difficulty “securing parking” and a delay

at security. He claimed he had several meritorious defenses, among them that he did

not breach the lease and had the right to defend himself, his property, and others.

      DHA did not respond to appellant’s motion to set aside the default judgment

or otherwise controvert the factual allegations about conscious indifference in

appellant’s motion. The motion to set aside was overruled by operation of law. This

appeal followed.

      On December 8, 2022, this Court notified appellant that his brief failed to

comply with Rule 38 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Appellant was

notified that his brief was deficient because it did not contain: (1) a complete list of

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all parties; (2) a table of contents; (3) an index of authorities; (4) a concise statement

of the case; (5) the issues presented for review; (6) a concise statement of facts

supported by record references; and (7) a succinct, clear, and accurate statement of

the argument supported by appropriate citations to authorities and the record. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1. We cautioned appellant that failure to file an amended brief

within ten days may result in dismissal of the appeal. Appellant did not file an

amended brief.1

       We construe liberally pro se pleadings and briefs; however, we hold pro se

litigants to the same standards as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with

applicable laws and rules of procedure. In re N.E.B., 251 S.W.3d 211, 211–12 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.). To do otherwise would give a pro se litigant an unfair

advantage over a litigant represented by counsel. Id. at 212. When a party fails to

adequately brief a complaint, he waives the issue on appeal. Id.

       Despite the deficiencies of appellant’s brief, we can identify three issues and

will address them to the extent necessary to resolve this appeal. Appellant contends

(1) his conduct at the apartment was in defense of himself and others and was a result

of DHA’s failure to address complaints about other residents; (2) he was denied his

right to a jury trial; and (3) the county court did not hold a hearing on his motion to

set aside the default judgment.

       1
          In addition, appellant did not request a reporter’s record and thus the appellate record
does not include a reporter’s record of the trial in the county court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 37.3(c).
                                               –3–
        This is a direct appeal from the county court’s default judgment. Before the

default judgment can be set aside, appellant must satisfy the Craddock v. Sunshine

Bus Lines, Inc. standard. Charles v. Crown Asset Mgmt., LLC, No. 05-18-01139-

CV, 2019 WL 6317867, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 26, 2019, no pet.) (mem.

op.); see Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. 1939).

Under Craddock, appellant must show: (1) his failure to appear was not intentional

or the result of conscious indifference; (2) he has a meritorious defense; and (3) the

granting of a new trial will not operate to cause delay or injury to DHA. Charles,

2019 WL 6317867, at *1.

        We first address whether the trial court was required to hold a hearing on

appellant’s motion to set aside the default judgment, which is equivalent to a motion

for new trial.2 Generally, a hearing on a motion for new trial is not mandatory.

Carson v. El Capitan Apartments, No. 05-13-01481-CV, 2015 WL 169879, at *2

(Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 14, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). A trial court is required to

conduct a hearing on a motion for new trial only when the motion presents a question

of fact upon which evidence must be heard.                        Id.    Here, because appellant’s

allegations in support of his motion for new trial were uncontroverted, the trial court

was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion. See Estate of Pollack

    2
      The county court’s docket sheet shows that a hearing on appellant’s motion was scheduled for the
afternoon of June 13, 2022. Appellant states in his brief that the hearing was to be held virtually and that
he logged on, but no hearing was held. DHA did not file an appellate brief. We will therefore accept this
factual statement as true. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(g).
                                                   –4–
v. McMurrey, 858 S.W.2d 388, 391–92 (Tex. 1993); Tactical Air Defense Servs.,

Inc. v. Searock, 398 S.W.3d 341, 348–49 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.); see

also In re Marriage of Sandoval, 619 S.W.3d 716, 721 (Tex. 2021) (if movant’s

uncontroverted factual allegations are sufficient under Craddock, it is an abuse of

discretion to deny motion for new trial).

      Appellant also complains that he was not afforded a jury trial despite having

requested one. A party who fails to appear at trial after filing an answer waives the

right to a jury trial. Bradley Motors, Inc. v. Mackey, 878 S.W.2d 140, 141 (Tex.

1994) (per curiam); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 220 (“Failure of a party to appear for trial

shall be deemed a waiver by him of the right to a trial by jury.”).

      Finally, we construe appellant’s brief to contend that he had meritorious

defenses to eviction. This is just one of the Craddock elements. Appellant has not

argued in this Court that he satisfied all three Craddock elements, and as a result,

has not met his burden to show the trial court erred in not setting aside the default

judgment. See Stewart v. C.L. Trammell Props., Inc., No. 05-14-01027-CV, 2005

WL 2234607, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 15, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.) (because

appellant raised only meritorious defense element of Craddock on appeal, this Court

could not conclude trial court abused its discretion in denying motion for new trial).

                                         –5–
     We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

220357f.p05                              /Amanda L. Reichek/
                                         AMANDA L. REICHEK
                                         JUSTICE

                                      –6–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                  JUDGMENT

DAVID BLAIR, Appellant                         On Appeal from the County Court at
                                               Law No. 4, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-22-00357-CV           V.                Trial Court Cause No. CC-20-01421-
                                               D.
THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF                       Opinion delivered by Justice
THE CITY OF DALLAS, TX –                       Reichek. Justices Partida-Kipness
ROSELAND ESTATES, Appellee                     and Breedlove participating.

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED.

      It is ORDERED that appellee THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY
OF DALLAS, TX – ROSELAND ESTATES recover its costs of this appeal from
appellant DAVID BLAIR.

Judgment entered this 14th day of September 2023.

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