Court Opinion

ID: 9426646
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:18:34.66604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:02.139851
License: Public Domain

Mr. Chief Justice Burger,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the Court’s judgment and in all except Part II-A of the Court’s opinion. I cannot agree, however, with the Court’s construction of the identification provisions of § 2518 (1) (b) (iv), since I believe the application for surveillance in this case complied with statutory requirements. However, the precise reach of the identification requirement is irrelevant, because respondents are foreclosed from seeking suppression in any event.
Respondents Donovan, Robbins, and Buzzacco contend that, since their names were not contained in the wiretap application, suppression is required under the express exclusionary provision of Title III, § 2518 (10) (a). Their contention flies in the teeth of legislative history directly to the contrary. In the evolution of Title III, Congress considered and rejected a proposed amendment which would have expressly conferred the exclusionary benefit that respondents now seek. Specifically, Senators Long and Hart proposed the addition of a fourth subdivision to the suppression provision contained in § 2518 (10) (a). 114 Cong. Rec. 14718 (1968). Had that proposal been adopted, it would have allowed suppression of intercepted conversations at the behest of any aggrieved person on the ground that he or she was not named in *441the application or extension.1 In its comment on the proposal, the Department of Justice said:
“The amendment would permit intercepted communications to be used in evidence only against the persons named in the court order, not against other persons” Ibid. (Emphasis supplied.)
Consistent with the Justice Department’s recommendation, the Senate rejected the result which respondents now seek.
Even if the legislative history were silent with respect to suppression, however, I would nonetheless take issue with the Court’s analysis of the identification requirement. In my view, Congress required no more than that a wiretap application identify by name the primary user of the monitored facility.
Congress drafted this statute with exacting precision. As its principal sponsor, Senator McClellan, put it:
“[A] bill as controversial as this . . . requires close attention to the dotting of every T and the crossing of every't’ . . . .” Id., at 14751.
Under these circumstances, the exact words of the statute provide the surest guide to determining Congress’ intent, and we would do well to confine ourselves to that area. The statutory provision before us requires the wiretap application to specify the “identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted.” 18 U. S. C. § 2518 (1) (b) (iv). (Emphasis supplied.) As the Court correctly indicates, the identification requirement *442was carefully added in the wake of Berger v. New York, 388 U. S. 41 (1967). That case involved the constitutionality of a New York statute requiring the naming of “the person or persons whose communications . . . are to be overheard.” That very different statute plainly put Congress on notice that an identification provision could call, as did New York’s, for the naming of multiple parties. Indeed, while requiring only the identification of “the person” whose communications are to be intercepted, Congress anticipated the obvious fact that interceptions effected pursuant to a single application and order could potentially affect a large number of persons. Standing to object to intercepted communications is conferred upon “[a]ny aggrieved person §2518 (10)(a). In addition, a civil damages remedy is conferred upon “[a]ny person” whose communications are unlawfully intercepted or used in violation of the statute. Thus, in fashioning highly specific requirements with respect to wiretap applications, Congress failed to employ language found in other parts of the same statute and so carefully written into the state statute at issue in the Berger case.
The Court emphasizes, however, that the statute expressly recognizes that more than one person may be named in a wiretap application. Ante, at 425. That is indeed true. See §§ 2518 (1) (e), (8) (d). But I would think this is all the more reason for focusing upon the precise language in the provision establishing explicit requirements for an application. Since Congress expressly contemplated that applications might contain more than one name, its failure in §2518 (l)(b)(iv) to require the naming of “any person” or “the persons” whose communications are to be intercepted must mean that an open-ended identification requirement was never intended. In other words, Congress reasonably foresaw that, for a variety of reasons, actual wiretap applications might contain the names of more than one person. But Congress did not translate its recognition of what an appli*443cation might reasonably contain into a command as to what it must contain.
Assuming that plain words of a statute might have to bow, in some circumstances, to compelling legislative history to the contrary, nothing of that kind is found here. As the Court observes, the earlier bills introduced in the Senate contained no identification provision at all. After Berger and Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967), were decided, the requirement was added in what was plainly an abundance of caution. For this Court in Berger flatly discounted any value in New York’s broad identification requirement.
“It is true that the statute requires the naming of ‘the person or persons whose communications, conversations or discussions are to be overheard or recorded . . . .’ But this does no more than identify the person whose constitutionally protected area is to be invaded rather than ‘particularly describing’ the communications, conversations, or discussions to be seized.” 388 U. S., at 59. (Emphasis supplied.)
As shown by its rejection of the proposed suppression provision — which obviously would have had the practical effect of increasing the number of persons identified in wiretap applications — Congress correctly perceived little value in multiplying indefinitely the number of names to be set forth in wiretap applications and orders. This is particularly true since no Fourth Amendment values are served by a sweeping identification requirement. The Court has made clear:
“ ‘The Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to describe only “the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,” not the persons from whom things will be seized.’ ” United States v. Kahn, 415 U. S. 143, 155 n. 15 (1974). (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, the statute, as it presently stands, comports entirely with Fourth Amendment requirements, and thus achieves the *444express legislative purpose of “ 'reflect [ing] the constitutional commands of particularization.’ ” Ante, at 427. Under those circumstances, it ill serves this Court to speculate that our coequal branch of Government, despite the clear teaching of the Constitution, incorrectly surmised “that the Constitution [may have] required the naming ... of all suspects rather than just the primary user.” Ibid. In any event, if our own decisions have created confusion in the Congress, which is not surprising, nothing is gained by perpetuating that confusion in the face of Congress’ clear intent to comply with this Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
In short, the Court has redrafted a statute passed by Congress to make it identical to a statutory provision found valueless by this Court a few years ago in the Berger case. This undertaking, unfortunately, is not entirely without consequence, notwithstanding the Court’s refusal to approve suppression of the evidence here. Among other things, federal officers are potentially subject to a civil damages action, with compensatory damages of not less than $1,000, plus punitive damages, plus reasonable attorneys’ fees.2 Nor is this federal remedy exclusive. State-provided damages remedies are not pre-empted. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 107 (1968). Damages awards aside, the Court’s opinion — albeit in dictum — hints that suppression may indeed be in the offing if an intentional “violation” is shown. Finally, district judges will now be put to the task, at least in some cases, of determining whether probable cause exists with respect to each person listed in the application. § 2518 (3) (d). Judges may well wonder why such burdens are imposed upon them for a gain which the Court found illusory in the Berger case.
*445I would therefore interpret this statute to mean just what it says and no more. Wisely or not, Congress decided, consistent with Fourth Amendment strictures, to require only the identification of “the person” whose conversations are to be intercepted. Since Congress demonstrably knew how to use other language when it so chose, I would take Congress at its word and not try to “improve” on its draftsmanship.

The proposed addition provided:
“(iv) That he was not the subject of such application, authorization, or extension thereof.”
It is true that the proposal did not speak directly to instances, such as here, where persons arguably should have been named in the application and order, but were not. But respondents, as unnamed persons, would plainly have had a suppression remedy if the amendment had passed.

 18 U. S. C. § 2520. Since a court order will necessarily reflect the officers’ “violation,” it is not entirely certain that reliance upon a court order will provide a sufficient defense to a civil damages action.