Court Opinion

ID: 9942898
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 08:13:52.708389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:53.580049
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS
                                 EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                                      EL PASO, TEXAS

 KEYVAN PARSA, M.D.                                 §                No. 08-23-00135-CV

                                 Appellant,         §                   Appeal from the

 v.                                                 §             41st Judicial District Court

 WESTSTAR TITLE, LLC,                               §              of El Paso County, Texas

                                 Appellee.          §                (TC# 2023DCV0848)

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appellant, Keyvan Parsa, appeals from a summary judgment rendered in favor of appellee,

WestStar Title, LLC.

       Thematically, WestStar claims that Parsa sold a piece of property, promised to give good

title, but then chose not to pay off an existing lien on the property. After a title insurer stepped in

to pay-off the lien, litigation ensued with WestStar seeking to recoup that pay-off amount. Parsa

takes a different tact, urging that the case is much more complicated based on how the parties

structured the transaction. But to resolve this appeal, we need not endorse either theme. The trial

court granted summary judgment against Parsa on six different theories, each of which requires

him to pay back what was owed on the note that secured the lien. We need only address one of
those theories—Parsa’s personal guaranty of the note—which is independent of the fact issues that

he claims exist on other theories. We affirm.

                                    FACTUAL BACKGROUND

       We start with the factual background taken from the summary judgment exhibits filed by

both parties. Although other persons and entities are parties to the underlying litigation, this

opinion addresses only those facts relevant to the litigation between WestStar and Parsa.

       A. The property at issue and RIC’s first lien

       Albert Flores and his cousin owned a parcel of land at the intersection of Doniphan Drive

and Johannsen Street in El Paso’s Upper Valley. After deciding to develop the land, Flores

eventually sold the land to Deborah Jordan, who had formed a corporation called Johannsen

Development Group, Inc. (JDG). Parsa was one of the investors in JDG. Flores and his cousin

agreed the cousin would take his portion of the sale in cash and Flores would take a promissory

note, payable in a lump sum in six months. When JDG defaulted on the note, Flores allowed JDG

to refinance. The refinancing lender—Right Immix Capital, LLC (RIC)—was willing to lend

$700,000 to JDG. The loan was secured by the land. Jordan and Parsa signed the promissory note

with RIC and both signed a personal guaranty of the loan. Flores agreed to subordinate the balance

of his lien on the land to RIC’s lien.

       Later in time, Flores decided to foreclose on the property because he was not receiving

payments on his note. In January 2020, Parsa emailed Flores’s attorney informing him that he

(Parsa) and Flores “as partners” wanted to proceed with a February 2020 foreclosure. In this same

email, Parsa also stated that he had had a conversation with a representative of Uprising

Investments, the company that serviced the RIC loan, and confirmed Parsa and Flores would

assume the payment to them after the foreclosure.

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       B. Conveyance of land to Montoya Park Place and subsequent sale to IDEA Public
          Schools

       In February 2020, Flores’s attorney foreclosed on the property. The next day, Flores and

Parsa formed Montoya Park Place, Inc. for the purpose of developing the land. That same month,

Flores conveyed title to the land to Montoya Park Place in exchange for $280,000. And a few

months later, a representative of IDEA Public Schools approached Montoya Park Place about

buying the land. Montoya Park Place subsequently sold the land to IDEA for $1,950,000.

       By the time of the closing with IDEA, Flores and Parsa signed a Special Warranty Deed,

which named Montoya Park Place as grantor and IDEA as grantee. Flores and Parsa both signed

as shareholders/directors of Montoya Park Place. Parsa and Flores also signed an affidavit on

behalf of Montoya Park Place stating there were no liens on the property. WestStar was the closing

agent on the sale and acted as agent for Fidelity National Title Insurance Company, which issued

an Owner’s Policy of Title Insurance in favor of IDEA. WestStar disbursed to Montoya Park Place

net sale proceeds totaling $1,829,295.40.

       C. Dispersal of funds from the sale of the land

       The day after the sale of the land closed, Parsa opened a bank account for Montoya Park

Place at Western Heritage Bank; he was the only signatory on the account. All proceeds from the

sale were paid into the account. At Flores’s request, Parsa paid Flores $280,000 out of the proceeds.

In mid-July 2020, Montoya Park Place loaned Westmount Group the remainder of the sale

proceeds in exchange for which Montoya Park Place received a promissory note. By the end of

July 2020, Parsa had closed the Western Heritage account.

       Despite demand from RIC, no money was ever paid to RIC by Parsa or Montoya Park

Place. WestStar’s President, Liliana Miranda, stated what happened next:

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          A deed of trust lien in favor of [RIC] remained on the Property after the closing.
          The Renewal and Extension Deed of Trust in favor of [RIC] as beneficiary was of
          record at the time of closing, having been recorded at Document #20190051396,
          Official Records of El Paso County, Texas. The Renewal and Extension Deed of
          Trust (the ‘[RIC] lien’) secured a $700,000.00 Promissory Note (the ‘[RIC] Note’)
          . . . . The [RIC] Note is personally guaranteed by Deborah Jordan and Keyvan Parsa
          pursuant to a Guaranty . . . . A portion of the sale proceeds should have been used
          to satisfy the [RIC] Note.

          Fidelity paid [RIC] $722,949.42 to pay the [RIC] Note and obtain a release of the
          [RIC] Lien. In April of 2022, WestStar made a payment to Fidelity to satisfy its
          indemnification obligations under an Issuing Agency Contract. Fidelity then
          assigned to WestStar all of its claims . . . pursuant to an Assignment of Claims and
          Causes of Action . . . . Fidelity also transferred and assigned to WestStar the [RIC]
          Note, [RIC] Lien, and Guaranty pursuant to a Transfer and Assignment of Loan
          Documents . . . . WestStar is the owner and holder of the [RIC] Note, [RIC] Lien,
          and Guaranty.

          According to a Payoff received from the loan servicer for the [RIC] Note, the
          balance owing was $722,949.42 as of August 26, 2020. . . . According to the Payoff
          interest has accrued and continues to accrue on the [RIC] Note at the per diem rate
          of $222.25 from August 26, 2020 until paid.

                                  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
          Flores sued Parsa and Montoya Park Place for a declaratory judgment of unjust enrichment,

fraud in a real estate transaction, equitable subordination, fraud in a stock transaction, unjust

enrichment in a stock transaction, breach of contract, fraudulent transfer, and common law fraud.

WestStar intervened asserting a variety of claims against Montoya Park Place, Parsa, Flores, and

Jordan.

          Relevant here, WestStar moved for a partial traditional summary judgment against

Montoya Park Place and Parsa on the following claims: (1) breach of warranty of title, (2) breach

of covenant against encumbrances, (3) fraud in a real estate transaction, (4) negligent

misrepresentation, (5) unjust enrichment, and (6) breach of guaranty. The court granted the motion

(without specifying which ground(s) it found meritorious) and ordered that WestStar recover from

Parsa and Montoya Park Place, jointly and severally, judgment in the amount of $895,637.67, plus

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post-judgment interest. WestStar separately submitted its claims for attorney’s fees supported by

affidavit, and the trial court made an award of attorney’s fees. The trial court later severed

WestStar’s claims against Parsa and Montoya Park Place. It subsequently entered an amended final

summary judgment that disposed of all the claims of WestStar against Parsa and Montoya Park

Place.1 Parsa now appeals this judgment.

                                          STANDARD OF REVIEW
         We review a traditional motion for summary judgment de novo, “taking as true all evidence

favorable to the nonmovant and indulging every reasonable inference in the nonmovant’s favor.”

See JLB Builders, L.L.C. v. Hernandez, 622 S.W.3d 860, 864 (Tex. 2021); Fibela v. Wood, 657

S.W.3d 664, 670 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.). When, as here, the trial court’s order does

not specify the grounds for granting the summary judgment, we must affirm the judgment on any

theory presented to the trial court and preserved for our review. Fibela, 657 S.W.3d at 670.

         To prevail on a traditional motion, the movant has the burden to prove there is no genuine

issue of material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P.

166a(c). If the movant carries its burden and establishes a right to summary judgment, “the burden

shifts to the nonmovant to present issues or evidence precluding summary judgment.” Fibela, 657

S.W.3d at 670.

      PARSA’S OBJECTIONS TO WESTSTAR’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT EVIDENCE

         We first address Parsa’s objections to WestStar’s summary judgment evidence. In a

footnote contained in his response to WestStar’s motion for summary judgment, Parsa raised the

1
  The final severed amended judgment awarded $872,523.67 as the amount due on the RIC note as of the date of the
note’s maturity (an amount less than the trial court originally awarded). That final amended judgment also incorporated
the attorney’s fees award of $60,000, and awarded $98,017.47 in prejudgment interest. Parsa does not challenge the
calculation of the amount due, the attorney’s fees, or the amount of interest.

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following single objection: “The ‘summary judgment evidence’ that [WestStar] offers in its motion

is objectionable and should not be considered. Within this response, Defendants/respondents

reserve their objections to certain evidence attached to [WestStar’s] Motion, and Defendant asks

that the Court exclude and not consider such evidence in deciding [WestStar’s] Motion.” Another

part of the response sets out the standards for admissibility of summary judgment evidence, which

concludes by stating: “Defendants object to, and move to strike Plaintiff’s purported summary

judgment evidence. Specifically, Defendants object to each and every reference to a ‘sworn

statement’ made by Defendant Albert Flores or derivatives therefrom.” Other than a reference to

the Flores affidavit, Parsa did not specifically identify any other piece of evidence, and as apparent

from the text of his response, he never articulated any reason for his objection.

       For the first time on appeal, Parsa now specifically objects to Liliana Miranda’s affidavit.

Parsa contends the affidavit fails to state that each factual assertion in the affidavit is “true and

correct” and thus does not comply with Rule 166a(f). TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(f) (“[s]upporting and

opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be

admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the

matters stated therein.”). Parsa’s argument, however, runs head-long into preservation problems.

       To preserve a complaint for appellate review, “the record must show that . . . the complaint

was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion that . . . stated the grounds for

the ruling that the complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to make

the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the

context[.]” TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). Parsa’s global objection in the footnote to his response

preserved nothing for our review. It never called the trial court’s attention to the issue that he

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complains of on appeal. And because Parsa is now asserting a “form” objection to the Miranda

affidavit, he cannot raise the issue for the first time on appeal.

        For preservation purposes, objections to “form” and “substance” are treated differently.

Dailey v. Albertson’s, Inc., 83 S.W.3d 222, 225 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, no pet.). To preserve

objections to defects of form for appellate review, the objecting party must obtain a ruling from

the trial court, preferably in writing. Id.; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(2) (“As a prerequisite to

presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record must show . . . the trial court . . . ruled on

the request, objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly; or . . . refused to rule on the request,

objection, or motion, and the complaining party objected to the refusal.”); TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(f)

(“Defects in the form of affidavits or attachments will not be grounds for reversal unless

specifically pointed out by objection by an opposing party with opportunity, but refusal, to

amend.”). This ruling must be obtained at or before the court hears the summary judgment motion.

See McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 343 n.7 (Tex. 1993). On the other

hand, defects of substance can be raised for the first time on appeal. Dailey, 83 S.W.3d at 225.

        Miranda’s affidavit states she has “personal knowledge of each of the facts stated in” her

affidavit, but she does not attest that the statements contained in the affidavit are “true and correct.”

The failure to attest that the statements were “true and correct” is an objection to form. Landry’s

Seafood Restaurants, Inc. v. Waterfront Cafe, Inc., 49 S.W.3d 544, 551 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001,

pet. dism’d) (“The failure of Bryant’s affidavit to attest that the facts contained in the arbitrators’

memorandum were true and correct is a formal defect that Landry’s waived by not objecting in the

district court.”) (and cases cited therein); see also Mansions in the Forest, L.P. v. Montgomery

Cnty., 365 S.W.3d 314, 315 (Tex. 2012) (lack of a jurat on an affidavit is a defect of form that

must be raised and ruled on by trial court in summary judgment proceeding). Accordingly,

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Miranda’s affidavit must be fully accorded as summary judgment evidence. See Seim v. Allstate

Texas Lloyds, 551 S.W.3d 161, 166 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam) (recognizing that if a party fails to

obtain a ruling on an objection to the form of its opponent’s summary judgment evidence, the issue

is waived for appellate review, and the evidence remains part of the summary judgment proof).

                                THE BREACH OF GUARANTY CLAIM

         As one of its grounds, WestStar moved for summary judgment on its claim that Parsa was

liable through his personal guaranty for the note held by RIC. By the time of this litigation, the

obligations under the note and the guaranty had been assigned to WestStar. In support of its

guaranty claim, WestStar included in the summary judgment record a copy of the note where RIC

loaned JDG $700,000. WestStar also attached the personal guaranty signed by Parsa where he

“absolutely and unconditionally, jointly and severally, guarantee[s] and promise[s] to pay” the

$700,000 secured promissory note of JDG. WestStar attached excerpts of deposition testimony

where Parsa acknowledged signing the guaranty. Another exhibit and deposition excerpt

documented that the agent for RIC asked to be paid after the sale of the property. WestStar included

a sworn affidavit from Flores, who recounted that Parsa was aware of the obligation, but intended

to let Fidelity pay the debt.2

         Miranda’s affidavit then explains how Fidelity acquired the rights in the note to obtain a

release of RIC’s lien. At the time Fidelity obtained a release of the lien, the amount due on the

note totaled $722,949.42 It accrued interest at a per diem rate of $222.25 until paid. Miranda’s

affidavit further explains how WestStar made a payment to Fidelity to satisfy its indemnification

2
  Flores affidavit states in part, “I asked [Parsa] about the extra $720,000.00 and if that was money that should have
gone to UPRISING INVESTMENTS. (UPRISING INVESTMENTS is the servicing company for RIGHT IMMIX
CAPITAL). He said, ‘we paid $10,000 for the title insurance, so UPRISING will be taken care of. That’s what the
insurance is for.’ I was stunned.”

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obligations and in exchange obtained an assignment of Fidelity’s claims and causes of action. In

addition, WestStar was assigned and now owns the RIC note, lien, and guaranty.

       Parsa’s response to the motion for summary judgment raised no substantive challenge to

the breach of guaranty claim. Instead, the response acknowledged that WestStar had asserted six

different theories of liability. It then made a joint response because, according to Parsa, each claim

shares a “commonality of elements.” The response claimed the summary judgment record raised

a fact question over Parsa’s belief of whether Montoya Park Place delivered “clear title of the

subject property.” Parsa attached his own affidavit that substantively contained only two sentences:

“I relied on the assertion made by Albert Flores that he could foreclose on his lien thereby

conveying the property as described in the motion for summary judgment. I took Mr. Flores at his

word that he could actually accomplish his foreclosure at the direction of his attorney and the

trustee, Bud Kirk.” The response never explained, however, how Parsa’s subjective belief about

the state of title that passed at closing refutes his obligation to pay on the guaranty.

       On appeal, Parsa does not claim his own evidence creates a fact issue on the guaranty claim.

Instead, he contends that WestStar failed to prove each element of the claim. The parties do agree

on the elements of the cause of action. To prove a proper breach of a guaranty claim, the holder

must show four elements: (1) the existence and ownership of the guaranty agreement; (2) the terms

of the underlying contract by the holder; (3) the occurrence of the conditions upon which liability

is based; and (4) the failure or refusal to perform the promise by the guarantor. BBVA USA v.

Francis, 642 S.W.3d 932, 939 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.); Gold’s Gym

Franchising LLC v. Brewer, 400 S.W.3d 156, 160 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.).

       Parsa’s appellate brief acknowledges that the RIC Note has matured, is due and owing in

full, and that Parsa executed the guaranty. He also acknowledges that WestStar is the owner and

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holder of the RIC Note and guaranty. Rather, Parsa claims that WestStar did not show the “terms

of the underlying contract by the holder,” “the occurrence of the conditions upon which liability

is based,” or the “failure or refusal to perform the promise by the guarantor.” We disagree.

         WestStar included the underlying note payable to RIC. That note contains the amount of

principal, the repayment terms, the interest rate, the payor and payee, and other terms and

conditions typically included in commercial notes. WestStar also attached the guaranty that Parsa

signed which contained additional terms, such as a waiver of any right to presentment, demand,

notice of demand, or notice of nonpayment of the indebtedness. In the guaranty agreement, Parsa

acknowleged that the holder could proceed against him “directly and independently” and that other

than “full payment,” other traditional defenses “shall not in anywise affect the liability” of the

guarantor. The note and the copy of the signed guaranty contained all the “terms of the underlying

contract.”3

         WestStar also conclusively demonstrated that following the sale of the property, RIC’s

agent sought payment of the note. Parsa’s response itself included an email from RIC’s agent that

states “We did not receive a payoff from the title company and I was wondering if you knew

anything about the closing and why the 1st lien was not paid with the sale?” Parsa acknowleged in

his deposition that when he saw this email, he knew RIC was claiming it was owed money. And

in an affidavit, Parsa’s partner Flores, testified that he raised the non-payment of the RIC note with

Parsa. Flores testified that Parsa told him that after WestStar “demanded return of the money to

3
  Many Texas cases recite the second element of a breach of guaranty claim to require a showing of the “terms of the
underlying contract” by holder. See, e.g., BBVA USA v. Francis, 642 S.W.3d 932, 939 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.); Gold’s Gym Franchising LLC v. Brewer, 400 S.W.3d 156, 160 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013,
no pet.). The line of authority for that proposition often traces back to Barclay v. Waxahachie Bank & Tr. Co., 568
S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex. App.—Waco 1978, no pet.). That court stated the second element as “[t]he performance of the
terms of the contract by plaintiff.” Id. (emphasis supplied). The Barclay court concluded that the plaintiff proved that
element by a showing that it loaned the money to pay off a note owed to another creditor. Id. Even if the element is
expressed as performance, there is no dispute of performance here, as RIC in fact loaned the $700,000 to JDG and
Fidelity in fact paid money to RIC to obtain a release of the lien.

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satisfy the [RIC] lien, that he had moved the money out of Western Heritage Bank and ‘into

Mexico.’ He refused to say where in Mexico.” When Parsa did not resolve the lien, Fidelity was

required to step in. Through these proofs, WestStar proved the “occurrence of the conditions upon

which liability is based.”

         And on these facts, this “occurrence” element bleeds into the final element—the failure to

perform the promise by the guarantor. WestStar produced summary judgment proof that Parsa

refused to pay off the note. Having met its initial burden to conclusively show Parsa’s obligation

under the guaranty, Parsa was then required to offer some response raising a genuine issue of

material fact on the elements of the claim, or to raise some evidence supporting a defense. City of

Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979). As we note above, he did

neither in his response to the summary judgment.

         The trial court did not err in granting the partial summary judgment on the guaranty claim

and that theory supports all the elements of damages awarded in the final amended judgment.4

                                                  CONCLUSION
         For the reasons stated, we overrule that portion of Parsa’s second issue, repeated in his

sixth issue, challenging the consideration of the affidavit of Liliana Miranda. We overrule Parsa’s

sixth issue challenging the trial court’s granting of summary judgment on the breach of guaranty

claim. We need not reach the balance of Parsa’s issues (one through five) challenging the other

theories supporting the same damage award. We affirm the judgment below.

4
  Because this issue is dispositive of the appeal, we do not address Parsa’s other arguments attacking the other grounds
supporting the motion for partial summary judgment. See Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211,
216 (Tex. 2003) (“Because the trial court’s order does not specify the grounds for its summary judgment, we must
affirm the summary judgment if any of the theories presented to the trial court and preserved for appellate review are
meritorious.”); TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (“The court of appeals must hand down a written opinion that is as brief as
practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”).

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                                            JEFF ALLEY, Chief Justice

February 20, 2024

Before Alley, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.

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