Court Opinion

ID: 9766161
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:35:31.934737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:20.119817
License: Public Domain

ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
ONION, Judge.
The punishment assessed by the jury in this rape conviction was 28 years. The opinion on original submission was in error in reflecting the punishment assessed as 60 years.
*320On rehearing appellant again complains of the admission into evidence of his written extrajudicial confession particularly contending he was deprived of counsel during interrogation.
After appellant’s arrest about 9 p.m. he was taken to jail. He was then taken before a magistrate and warned in accordance with Article 15.17, V.A.C.C.P. It was the undisputed testimony of Sheriff Johnson that appellant at such time waived his rights and expressly stated he did not want an attorney. During the interrogation when the appellant indicated he desired to call an attorney the questioning ceased. The sheriff did tell the appellant not to call the attorney at that early morning hour since it would make the attorney “mad,” but there was no further interrogation and no statement was taken. Several hours later the appellant was permitted to call the particular attorney he indicated he desired to have. The attorney immediately came to the jail and conferred with the appellant, advising him, according to appellant’s testimony, that he did not have to take a lie detector test and recommending that he not do so. It appears to have been appellant’s desire to take such a test. Prior to the trip to Austin he was taken before a second magistrate and again warned in accordance with Article 15.17, supra, and informed he did not have to take a lie detector test. Such requirement is not a statutory one, but a requirement of the Texas Department of Public Safety before such agency will administer a lie detector or polygraph examination.
After the test in Austin the appellant was warned in accordance with Article 38.-22, V.A.C.C.P., by an officer who after a waiver of the right to counsel, etc., took from the appellant a written confession.
On the return to Grimes County it was discovered at Elgin that such confession had been lost. There another confession was taken after new warnings and a waiver. It was this confession which was introduced into evidence. Even the appellant acknowledged it was the same as the statement given in Austin.
If it be appellant’s contention that despite the warnings and waiver law enforcement officers were forever barred from future interrogation after appellant’s statement that he desired to call an attorney, we cannot agree. See Hill v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 429 S.W.2d 481.
Miranda,1 of course, teaches that even though an accused has been warned and has waived his rights, he may terminate the custodial interrogation at any point and reassert his privilege against self incrimination and his right to counsel.
The Court in Miranda said:
“Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked. If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent question. If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent.”
In Hill v. State, supra, this Court said:
“We do not interpret that portion of Miranda to mean that under no circum*321stances can there ever be any further interrogation, particularly where the prosecution has sustained its heavy burden of demonstrating that the accused knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self incrimination and his right to retained and appointed counsel. Only recently this Court in Gunter v. State, 421 S.W.2d 657, held admissible, under the circumstances there presented, a confession taken in absence of and without notification of accused’s court appointed counsel, in view of the clear cut affirmative waiver.”
We think Hill is applicable here. There is no evidence that the 34 year old appellant was threatened, tricked or cajoled into a waiver and no showing of lengthy interrogation or incommunicado incarceration which would mitigate against the finding of a valid waiver.
Caution, of course, is urged on law enforcement agencies in taking statements when counsel, either retained or appointed, has entered the picture. Here, however, in view of the clear cut affirmative waiver of counsel by the appellant prior to the taking of the confession and other surrounding circumstances, we remain convinced the confession was properly admitted into evidence. See Gunter v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 421 S.W.2d 657 (concurring opinion).
Appellant also vigorously complains of the disposition of his ground of error #4 on original submission. A re-examination of such contention reveals that appellant complained only that evidence he was subjected to a lie detector test was erroneously admitted.2 He correctly points out, however, that he did make a motion for a mistrial following the admission of such testimony and that the statement in the opinion on original submission to the contrary is erroneous.
The matter arose in the following manner during the direct examination of Sheriff Johnson, who related that the morning following appellant’s arrest he was taken before a second magistrate for another warning.
“Q. What was that warning, were you there when he gave the warning ?
“A. Yes, sir. It was a warning that he didn’t have to take a lie detector—
“Q. —just—Shh—shh—shhh—
“BY THE COURT:
“The jury will not consider that question or any answer, I don’t think he answered it, but they will not consider it for any purpose, and it’s withdrawn from the jury all together.”
Counsel then approached the bench, the jury was removed, and a motion for mistrial was made and overruled.
It has been the consistent holding of this Court that evidence of the results of a lie detector or polygraph test is not admissible on behalf of either the State or the defendant. Renesto v. State, 452 S.W.2d 498; Hart v. State, 447 S.W.2d 944; Wall v. State, 417 S.W.2d 59; Nichols v. State, 378 S.W.2d 335; Placker v. State, 171 Tex.Cr.R. 406, 350 S.W.2d 546; Davis v. State, 165 Tex.Cr.R. 456, 308 S.W.2d 880; Stockwell v. State, 164 Tex.Cr.R. 656, 301 S.W.2d 669; Peterson v. State, 157 Tex.Cr.R. 255, 247 S.W.2d 110, rehearing denied 157 Tex.Cr.R. 255, 248 S.W.2d 130.
In Paredes v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 368 S.W.2d 620, no error was shown in the nonresponsive answer of an officer to the effect that he had taken the accused “to a polygraph machine,” where the record did not indicate a test had been given, or if given, the results thereof. Further, in Ro*322per v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 375 S.W.2d 454, no reversible error was shown in a statement of an officer that the accused had been subjected to a polygraph test where the statement was unresponsive and the test result was not revealed and the jury was instructed to disregard.
While the question asked in the case at bar was somewhat double barreled, it does not appear to have been designed to elicit the answer given which we conclude was unresponsive. The court quickly on its motion instructed the jury to disregard the partial answer. The result of such test was not mentioned.
In light of the authorities cited above and the circumstances presented, we perceive no reversible error. We therefore remained convinced that ground of error #4 is without merit.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.

. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.

. Appellant’s ground of error #4 reads as follows:
“The court committed material error highly prejudicial to the rights of the defendant in permitting evidence to the effect that the defendant was subjected to a lie detector test or polygraph test as such testimony and any result thereof or purported results thereof is inadmissible as a matter of law.”