Court Opinion

ID: 9634196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:04:01.934289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:45.800959
License: Public Domain

RAKER, Judge,
concurring in the judgment only.
I agree with the Court that “this decision is limited to its unique facts.” In particular, I am convinced that when the decision we review is that of the Maryland Tax Court, an administrative agency, “the [Tax Court’s] decision is viewed in *514a light most favorable to the agency, since decisions of administrative agencies are prima facie correct.” Supervisor of Assessments v. Keeler, 362 Md. 198, 209, 764 A.2d 821, 827 (2001) (citations omitted); see also Comptroller v. Digi-Data Corp., 317 Md. 212, 231, 562 A.2d 1259, 1269 (1989). Indeed, “[e]ven with regard to some legal issues, a degree of deference should often be accorded the position of the administrative agency. Thus, an administrative agency’s interpretation and application of the statute which the agency administers should ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing courts.” Division of Labor v. Triangle, 366 Md. 407, 416, 784 A.2d 534, 539 (2001) (emphasis added).
I am also persuaded that where a tax statute’s applicability, as opposed to a tax exemption, is ambiguous on its face, the ambiguity should be read in favor of the taxpayer. See Comptroller v. Mandel Re-Election Com., 280 Md. 575, 584, 374 A.2d 1130, 1135 (1977). The phrase “in connection with entertainment” is inherently ambiguous and — under the circumstances presented in the instant case and due to the deference owed to the agency’s decision — must be read in favor of Clyde’s.
I do not join that part of the Court’s opinion that relies upon the “amendment-rejection” theory of statutory interpretation. The inaction of the General Assembly with respect to a proposed amendment that may have clarified the meaning of § 4-101(b)(1)(v) of the Tax-General Article does not aid courts who must discover the intentions of the Legislature with respect to enacted provisions of the tax code. The reason for this is that the Legislature’s intentions by not acting on a proposed amendment are almost impossible to divine. Perhaps the General Assembly, knowing that this Court had granted certiorari for this case and would soon be answering the statutory question, decided to wait on the proposed amendment until after our decision; perhaps the General Assembly considered the tax code sufficiently clear; perhaps the General Assembly believed the proposed amendment in need of additional language to achieve its purpose; perhaps the General Assembly simply decided to save the proposed *515amendment for a more convenient time or for further study and deliberation. The point is, the rejection of an amendment tells this Court very little, and perhaps nothing, about the intentions of the General Assembly when it passed § 4-101(b)(1)(v), and it could just as easily indicate an intent contrary to the one divined by the Court. Such inferences from the legislative history are therefore unhelpful to the interpretive enterprise, and I would not rely on it here.
I do not join the rest of the Court’s opinion because I find the standard enunciated therein does not clarify the meaning of § 4-101(b)(1)(v) of the Tax-General Article. “Direct financial nexus” is just as ambiguous as “in connection with,” and I do not agree that the admissions tax will apply only where there is a specific charge for the performance or if the performers are conditionally paid in relation to the refreshments sold. Yet I am confident that should the General Assembly seek to impose Maryland’s admissions and amusement tax upon establishments like Clyde’s, it is fully capable of doing so by following the example of Congress in response to the federal district court’s opinion in Deshler Hotel Co. v. Busey, 36 F.Supp. 392 (S.D.Ohio 1941), aff'd, 130 F.2d 187 (6th Cir.1942), and, like Congress in 1942, can enact a statute that clarifies the meaning of § 4-101(b)(1)(v) of the Tax-General Article.