Court Opinion

ID: 9425076
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:13:39.117277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:53.521015
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Douglas,
dissenting.
I cannot agree with the majority that the privilege against self-incrimination was not available to the petitioner merely because she did not have possession of the documents in question and was not herself subject to compulsory process. The basic concerns which, in my opinion, underlie the privilege are more subtle and far-reaching than mere aversion to the methods of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber and their modern counterparts.1 The decision today sanctions yet another tool of the ever-widening governmental invasion and oversight of our private lives. As I urged in dissent in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 325, without the right of privacy “the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth are ready instruments for the police state that the Framers sought to avoid.”
I
By looking solely to the historical antecedents of the privilege and focusing on “the ingredient of personal compulsion,” the majority largely ignores the interplay *339of the fundamental values protected by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. As early as 1886, the Court recognized that issues often cannot be pigeonholed within one amendment or the other, thereby foreclosing consideration of related policies. Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616. In dealing with the compulsory production of a private paper for use in a forfeiture proceeding, the Court stated:
“The principles laid down [in Entick v. Carring-ton, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807] affect the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. . . . [T]hey apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employés, of the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public of-fence .... Breaking into a house and opening boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man’s own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of that judgment. In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other.” Id., at 630.
Although the subpoena in Boyd was directed at the person asserting the privilege, that fact cannot be allowed to obscure the basic thrust of the Court’s reasoning: the Fourth and Fifth Amendments delineate a “sphere of privacy” which must be protected against governmental *340intrusion.2 We confirmed in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U. S. 52, 55, that “our respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual 'to a private enclave where he may lead a private life’ ” is a fundamental policy underlying the Fifth Amendment.
The majority contends, however, that petitioner cannot reasonably claim “an expectation of protected privacy or confidentiality.” The reasons asserted for this position overlook the nature of the accountant-client relationship. The accountant, an agent for a specified purpose — i. e., completing the petitioner’s tax returns — bore certain fiduciary responsibilities to petitioner. One of those responsibilities was not to use the records given him for any purpose other than completing the returns. Under these circumstances, it hardly can be said that by giving the records to the accountant, the petitioner committed them to the public domain.3
*341I defined what I believe to be the boundaries of this right to privacy in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S., at 323:
“The constitutional philosophy is, I think, clear. The personal effects and possessions of the individual (all contraband and the like excepted) are sacrosanct from prying eyes, from the long arm of the law, from any rummaging by police. Privacy involves the choice of the individual to disclose or to reveal what he believes, what he thinks, what he possesses. The article may be a nondescript work of art, a manuscript of a book, a personal account book, a diary, invoices, personal clothing, jewelry, or whatnot. Those who wrote the Bill of Rights believed that every individual needs both to communicate with others and to keep his affairs to himself. That dual aspect of privacy means that the individual should have the freedom to select for himself the time and circumstances when he will share his secrets with others and decide the extent of that sharing.”
The majority, by the seeming implications of its opinion, has cleared the way for investigatory authorities to compel disclosure of facets of our life we heretofore considered sacrosanct. We are told that “situations may well arise where . . . the relinquishment of possession is so temporary and insignificant as to leave the personal compulsions upon the accused substantially intact.” I can see no basis in the majority opinion, however, for stopping short of condemning only those intrusions resting on compulsory process against the author of the thoughts or documents. Are we now to encourage med-*342riling by the Government and ever more ingenious methods of obtaining access to sought-after materials? The premium now will be on subterfuge, on bypassing the master of the domain by spiriting the materials away or compelling disclosure by a trusted employee or confidant.4 Inevitably, this will lead those of us who cherish our privacy to refrain from recording our thoughts or trusting anyone with even temporary custody of documents we want to protect from public disclosure. In short, it will stultify the exchange of ideas that we have considered crucial to our democracy.
II
The decision may have a more immediate impact which the majority does not consider. Our tax laws have become so complex that very few taxpayers can afford the luxury of completing their own returns without professional assistance. If a taxpayer now wants to insure the confidentiality and privacy of his records, however, he must forgo such assistance. To my mind, the majority thus attaches a penalty to the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination. It calls for little more discussion than to note that we have not tolerated such penalties in the past. Cf. Uniformed Sanitation Men v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U. S. 280; Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U. S. 273.
*343HH HH 1 — 1
Thus, I would reverse the decision below, finding that the subpoena violated both petitioner’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights.5 I offer one more observation. The majority cautions that respect for our constitutional principles is eroded “when they leap their proper bounds.” We should not be swayed by the popular cry for a formalistic and narrow interpretation of those provisions which safeguard our fundamental rights.
It is a Constitution we are construing, not a legislative-judicial code of conduct that suits our private value choices or that satisfies the appetite of prosecutors for more and more shortcuts that avoid constitutional barriers. Those constitutional barriers and the judicial traditions supporting them are the sources of the privacy we value so greatly. That privacy “protects people,” not places, under the Fourth Amendment, Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 353. And, as already noted, Boyd v. United States, supra, held that when it comes to the “forcible and compulsory extortion of a man’s own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods,” that is an illustration of the manner in which “the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other.” 116 U. S., at 630.
One’s privacy embraces what the person has in his home, his desk, his files, and his safe as well as what he *344carries on his person. It also has a very meaningful relationship to what he tells any confidant — his wife, his minister, his lawyer, or his tax accountant. The constitutional fences of law are being broken down by an ever-increasingly powerful Government that seeks to reduce every person to a digit.

 This is not to say, of course, that we must not be acutely alert to any “recurrence of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, even if not in their stark brutality.” Ullmann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422, 428 (1956). See, e. g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966).

 The Court in Boyd also stated that it was unable “to perceive that the seizure of a man’s private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against himself. We think it is within the clear intent and meaning of those terms.” Id., at 633. Subsequent decisions, however, have refused to apply the privilege to bar the introduction of “testimonial” evidence where the author no longer has any property rights or a valid claim to confidentiality and privacy. See, e. g., Perlman v. United States, 247 U. S. 7; Johnson v. United States, 228 U. S. 457. Obviously, the Court is not disposed to reconsider those decisions as they apply to instances where the author has not knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination. In any event, I do not believe it is necessary to reach that issue here because, as I will discuss below, I believe that the petitioner has a valid claim to confidentiality and privacy.

 The majority states that what information to disclose in the petitioner’s tax returns is largely in the accountant’s discretion. Therefore, it argues, the accountant’s own need for self-protection *341(to answer a possible charge of assisting in the preparation of a false return) would often require the right to disclose the information given him. It may be that the accountant’s fiduciary responsibilities must yield in this event, but that was not the case here.

 The majority notes that “the accountant himself worked neither in petitioner’s office nor as her employee.” I cannot see how that factor bears on whether the “ingredient of personal compulsion against [the] accused” is present, or whether the accountant was a confidant. The majority would seem to suggest, however, that petitioner, because her business did not call for, or because she could not afford, a full-time accountant, deserves less protection under the Fifth Amendment than a taxpayer more fortunately situated.

 In holding that “mere evidence” is not protected from seizure under the Fourth Amendment, the Court expressly refused to consider “whether there are items of evidential value whose very nature precludes them from being the object of a reasonable search and seizure.” Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 303. The answer to that question was clear to me when I dissented in that case and remains clear to me now.