Court Opinion

ID: 9610836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:47:58.38715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:05.376217
License: Public Domain

Webb, Judge,
dissenting.
Thelma Wiley sought from Georgia Power Company and James A. Smith $100,000 damages allegedly suffered by loss of "income and wages, humiliation, degradation, embarrassment, and cohesion,” resulting from an unlawful assault and battery by James A. Smith, "by laying his hands upon [her] in a grossly improper manner and without [her] permission or consent,” while she was employed by Georgia Power Company and under the supervision of James A. Smith, a supervisor for the Power Company. Mrs. Wiley alleged that the Power Company "knowingly let [her] be subjected to this incident and failed to take any steps to prevent the occurrence, although they had complete knowledge of the circumstances”; that she reported the incident to the proper authority of the Power Company; that thereafter the Power Company and Smith "pursued a course of threats and intimidations against [her] because of this incident including cursing and abusive language” and threats that she might lose her job; and that she in fact was replaced by a black employee.
The Power Company’s motion for summary judgment as to itself was granted, and it is from this judgment that Mrs. Wiley appeals. The trial court in its order granting summary judgment, after a review of the entire record, concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to three controlling issues: (1) The alleged acts of James A. Smith on October 17, 1972 were not the acts of Georgia Power Company, the employer, nor *195by its command, were not within the prosecution nor within the scope of employment of James A. Smith, and if they occurred, it was a personal matter between James A. Smith and Mrs. Wiley, the plaintiff; (2) Georgia Power Company had no notice or knowledge of facts or circumstances sufficient to put it on notice that its employee James A. Smith had committed immoral acts prior to October 17, 1972, nor that the relationship of supervisor-employee between him and Mrs. Wiley would likely result in the acts alleged as having occurred on October 17, 1972; and (3) Mrs. Wiley was a temporary employee of the Power Company and fellow servant with James A. Smith, she had actual personal knowledge of the prior alleged immoral acts and the immoral propensities of the co-defendant and her co-employee, James A. Smith, before the alleged incident of October 17, 1972, and she continued to work and was working with James A. Smith in the service of the Power Company with such knowledge at the time of the alleged incident.
Mrs. Wiley in her deposition affirmed that she was a temporary employee, and that after the alleged incident on October 17,1972 she continued to work in association with Mr. Smith until her employment terminated March 8, 1973.
1. The first ruling, that the alleged acts of James A. Smith, the supervisory employee of Georgia Power Company, were outside the scope of his employment, were not at the company’s command, and a personal matter between Smith and Mrs. Wiley, is supported by affidavits offered by movant Power Company and is correct.
"It is well settled that if a servant steps aside from his master’s business, for however short a time, to do an act which is entirely disconnected with it, and injury results to another person because of such independent voluntary act, the master is not liable for the tort.” Stafford v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 58 Ga. App. 213 (1) (198 SE 117).
"Where the tort of the employee is wholly personal to himself, it is not within the scope of his employment, and his employer, a proprietor of a place of amusement, is 'not required to anticipate the improbable, nor to take measures to prevent a happening which no reasonable person would have expected.’ [Cits.] The petition does not *196allege, and reason cannot conceive, in what manner the facts alleged here might possibly be connected with the employment rather than be deemed personal to the employee; and, this being so, the master cannot be held liable for such acts.” Community Theatres Co. v. Bentley, 88 Ga. App. 303, 305 (76 SE2d 632). See Falls v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co., 71 Ga. App. 547, 549 (2) (31 SE2d 426), and cases cited.
2. As to the second ruling, there is an issue of fact as to whether Georgia Power Company through its proper authorities had knowledge on October 17, 1972 of facts or circumstances sufficient to put it on notice that James A. Smith had committed immoral acts, or that the relationship of supervisor-employee between Smith and Mrs. Wiley would likely result in some such act as that alleged to have happened. Dwight J. Eavenson, in his affidavit of June 12,1974, submitted by Mrs. Wiley in her opposition to the Power Company’s motion for summary judgment, stated that he was a District Sales Supervisor for the Power Company at its Gainesville offices, that prior to October 17,1972 three female employees had told him of molestations by James A. Smith, asked him to give them protection and to be sure they were not left alone in the office with Smith, and that Mrs. Wiley "had come to him personally within a period of three (3) or four (4) months prior to October 17, 1972 and requested that she not be left alone in the office with James A. Smith.” The ruling by the trial court that there was no question of fact as to this issue was erroneous, and standing alone would preclude a summary judgment. Code Ann. § 81A-156; Sanders v. Alpha Gamma Alumni Chapter &c., 106 Ga. App. 137, 140 (126 SE2d 545); Bankers Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. O’Barr, 108 Ga. App. 220 (2) (132 SE2d 546).
3. Assuming arguendo the Power Company did in fact have knowledge of Smith’s amoral amorous propensities toward attractive female co-workers, any error as to the previous ruling was purged by the further ruling that Mrs. Wiley herself had actual knowledge, according to her own affidavit as well as that of Eavenson, of the prior alleged immoral acts and the immoral propensities of her co-employee, Smith, before the alleged incident of October 17, 1972, yet she continued to work *197with him. If the complainant knew of the immoral conduct and propensities of her co-worker, she should not have continued working with him after coming into such knowledge.
"The master is bound to exercise ordinary care in the selection of servants, and not retain them after knowledge of incompetency.” Code § 66-301. "In suits for injuries arising from the negligence of the master in failing to comply with the duties imposed by section 66-301, in order that the servant may recover, it must appear that the master knew or ought to have known of the incompetency of the other servant . . . and it must also appear that the servant injured did not know and had not equal means of knowing such fact, and by the exercise of ordinary care could not have known thereof.” (Emphasis supplied.) Code § 66-303.
"A servant injured by the negligence of a fellow-servant who had a 'Propensity to start machines after they were stopped,’ thereby nearly killing several of the servants on previous occasions (which propensity and its results were known to the master and to the injured servant), is not entitled to recover damages of the master, although the negligent one was retained in employment after the injury complained of.” (Emphasis supplied.) Smith v. Sibley Mfg. Co., 85 Ga. 333 (11 SE 616). "If the plaintiff knew that Benson was an inefficient and negligent servant, he should not have engaged in the same service with him, any more than he should work with a defective tool given him by his employer.” Smith v. Sibley, 85 Ga. 333, 336, supra.
Although a master is not ordinarily liable for the negligence of a fellow servant (Code § 66-304), in a proper case a servant may recover of the master for an injury occasioned by the act of a fellow servant.
"It is incumbent upon the injured servant, however, except where the employer is a railroad company, to show the following facts: first, that the fellow servant was incompetent; second, that the injury complained of resulted directly or proximately from such incompetency; third, either (a) that the master knew of such incompetency, or (b) that by the exercise of ordinary care he could have known of it; fourth, that the injured servant *198did not know of such incompetency; fifth, that by the exercise of ordinary care he (the injured servant) could not have known of it; and, sixth, that he did not have equal means with the master for acquiring knowledge of such fact. [Cit.]
"In such a case there is but one degree of care prescribed by law, namely, 'ordinary’ care, and that degree of care is prescribed alike for the master and for the servant. If the master has exercised such care, and has neither employed nor retained the alleged incompetent servant with knowledge of such incompetency, he is not liable. On the other hand, if the injured servant knew of such incompetency, or by the exercise of ordinary care could have known of it, or had equal means with the master for knowing it, but nevertheless continued in the master’s employ and sustained an injury as alleged, he can not recover, even though it appear that the master knew or ought to have known of the fellow servant's incompetency.” (Emphasis supplied.) Camilla Cotton Oil &c. Co. v. Walker, 21 Ga. App. 603 (3), (4) (94 SE 855); Newman v. Griffin Foundry &c. Co., 38 Ga. App. 518 (144 SE 386); Atlanta B. & C. R. Co. v. Mullis, 43 Ga. App. 692, 693 (159 SE 893); Story v. Crouch Lumber Co., 61 Ga. App. 210, 213 (6 SE2d 86); Windsor v. Chanticleer & Co., 89 Ga. App. 116, 118 (78 SE2d 871).
Mrs. Wiley’s own knowledge of her fellow-worker’s sensual proclivity vitiated the alleged knowledge thereof by his employer when she continued to work with him. Actually, it was not until after termination of her employment nearly five months following the alleged tortious incident that she felt pangs of embarrassment sufficient for the suit.
4. Counsel for Mrs. Wiley as appellant enumerates altogether ten alleged errors, and no citations of law appear in his brief, as was true when the case was heard in the trial court, although he makes argument on the facts. Ordinarily, in such cases the enumerations of errors are deemed abandoned. Rule 18 (c) (2), this court. Code Ann. § 24-3618. Those enumerations meritorious of consideration are covered by the foregoing opinion, and all others are without merit.
I therefore dissent, and am authorized to state that *199Judge Clark joins therein.