Court Opinion

ID: 9635448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:50:43.408024+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:29:06.435098
License: Public Domain

LIPEZ, Judge,
dissenting:
The law clearly requires the immediate unsealing of both the bill of particulars and the Starks hearing transcript in this case. Part I of this dissent deals with the bill of particulars; part II, with the Starks hearing transcript.
I.
Concerning the bill of particulars, defendant-appellee Catania contends: (A) this court has no jurisdiction to decide whether the bill of particulars should be unsealed; and (B) if we have jurisdiction, the media’s contention that the bill of particulars should be unsealed is without merit.
A.
Catania raises two arguments that we lack jurisdiction over the bill of particulars: (1) Judge Cherry (sitting as trial judge by special assignment) ordered the bill of particulars sealed on October 12, 1982, and the media failed to appeal that order; and (2) Judge Cherry never ordered the bill of particulars sealed, and therefore the media could not have appealed the question to this court, since there was no order from which to take an appeal.
1.
Catania’s claim that Judge Cherry ordered the bill of particulars sealed on October 12 is refuted by Catania’s own brief, which quotes the following as the “relevant part” of the October 12 order:
[I]t is found that prejudice to the defendants from the media coverage disseminated to protect all jurors in this case is substantial, and very well could result in the *431inability of the defendant or any of them to be tried before a fair and impartial jury.
It is further found the purpose of the Stark [sic] hearing is merely to determine questions separate and apart from the relevance, materiality and admissability of any of the lengthy intercepted recordings at trial on merits, and in the event that the same shall result in these proceedings.
It is therefore ordered that those aspects of the Stark [sic] hearing dealing with the playing of tape recordings, provision of transcripts allegedly made, therefrom and any testimony relating to the context of those recordings shall be and are hereby closed to the public until further order of the Court.
Any records of such proceedings which deal with the contents of the tapes and transcripts allegedly made therefrom as well as any testimony representing the contents of the tapes shall be and hereby will be sealed. While Catania’s brief is by no means clear on the point,
its argument seems to be that the phrase “such proceedings” in the last sentence includes the bill of particulars as well as the Starks hearing transcript. This is incorrect, since immediately preceding the phrase “such proceedings” Judge Cherry refers twice to the Starks hearing and nothing else. The portion of Judge Cherry’s order not quoted by Catania’s brief also contains no reference to the bill of particulars, but only to the media’s motion to open the Starks hearing and Catania’s motion to close it. Indeed, the entire 52 pages of transcript preceding Judge Cherry’s October 12 order contain not a single reference to the bill of particulars by anyone.
In addition to the October 12 order, which was stated orally on the record, Judge Cherry filed a written order covering the same subject with slightly different wording on October 13, 1982. This order also contains no reference to the bill of particulars. Judge Wickersham’s opinion states in footnote 12 that the October 13 order was “vague,” and that “it was not clear whether Judge Cherry *432intended to seal the Bill of Particulars.” To the contrary, Judge Wickersham’s own footnote 2 (which quotes the October 13 order in full) clearly shows that the order was anything but vague concerning whether it was intended to include the bill of particulars.
The October 13 order twice refers specifically to “the Starks hearing” and once to “proceedings undertaken in connection with the Commonwealth’s Motion for Hearing in Limine.” Besides the Starks hearing, the most this latter phrase could include would be defense counsel’s argument for suppression of the tapes immediately preceding the Starks hearing.
Judge Wickérsham’s opinion is apparently attempting to construe the phrase “record of those proceedings” in clause (2) of the last sentence of the October 13 order as including the bill of particulars. Read in context, “those proceedings” clearly refers to the “Starks hearing,” which is twice mentioned specifically just before “those proceedings.” Besides the Starks hearing, “those proceedings” could at most refer to the suppression argument-immediately preceding the Starks hearing;
Even if “record of those proceedings” in the October 13 order and “such proceedings” in the October 12 order are read out of context, the construction urged by Judge Wickersham and Catania is unreasonable, since a bill of particulars hardly constitutes a “proceeding.” Thus the record, as well as Catania’s own brief, conclusively refutes Catania’s claim that Judge Cherry sealed the bill of particulars.1 This brings us to Catania’s alternative claim, that Judge Cherry did not seal the bill of particulars.
*4332.
As just demonstrated, Catania’s contention that Judge Cherry did not order the bill of particulars sealed is true. It follows that Catania is also correct in saying that the media had no way of appealing the issue to this court. It does not follow, however, that we have no jurisdiction to decide whether the bill of particulars should be unsealed. Our jurisdiction to decide this issue is hot based on a nonexistent appeal from a nonexistent order (as Judge Wickersham’s opinion seems to imply in footnote 12). . Rather, what we are (or should be) deciding is whether to grant or deny the media’s “PETITION TO REVOKE AN ORDER IMPOUNDING CERTAIN RECORDS /PETITION TO OPEN CERTAIN RECORDS,” which was filed in this court on June 3, 1983. Catania filed a response to this petition on June 7, 1983. Judge Cavanaugh, sitting as motions judge for this court, heard argument and entered the following order:
AND NOW, this 30th day of June,. 1983, upon consideration of the petition seeking access to the District Attorney’s response to the Bill of Particulars filed below in this matter, and upon consideration of the responses, memoranda and argument of the parties, it is ordered that, for the purpose of preserving the status quo of the parties during the pendency of this appeal: (1) the oral order of The Honorable Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr. of June 2, 1983, continue in effect; and (2) the materials sought by petitioners remain sealed and be made part of the sealed record in this appeal.
The effect of this order was simply to leave the bill of particulars sealed until the issue could be briefed, argued, and decided by this panel in conjunction with the media’s appeal from Judge Cherry’s order denying them access to the Starks hearing transcript.
B.
In deciding whether to grant the media’s petition to unseal the bill of particulars, we come at last to the question which Catania’s convoluted jurisdictional argument *434begs: if Judge Cherry did not seal the bill of particulars, who did? The media and Catania agree that the bill of particulars was sealed by the Delaware County Office of Judicial Support2 on advice of an assistant county solicitor. The media and Catania disagree on whether the Office of Judicial Support was required to do this by an order of Judge Cherry. The media claim Judge Cherry never ordered the bill of particulars sealed (i.e., Catania’s second jurisdictional argument), while Catania reverts to the position of his first jurisdictional argument, that Judge Cherry did order the bill of particulars sealed. As demonstrated in part I.A.l. above, the record establishes that Judge Cherry never ordered the bill of particulars sealed, and that neither Catania nor anyone else ever requested that he do so. The Office of Judicial Support therefore had no authority to seal the bill of particulars. Its action was a legal nullity, and the media’s petition should be granted.
Catania argues further, however, that the media’s proper remedy was not to file a petition in this court, but rather to obtain relief from the court below. Judge Wieand’s concurring opinion raises essentially the same argument under the rubric of “jurisdiction”, contending that this court lacks the power to decide the media’s petition under 42 Pa.C.S. § 721(2). I do not believe it is necessary to decide whether section 721(2) might provide an alternative basis for jurisdiction, because it is clear that this court has inherent power to direct its own prothonotary to perform a ministerial act, viz., to provide records on file in the prothonotary’s office to members of the public who have made a proper request, if those records are legally required to be accessible to the public.
The concurring opinion suggests that “a request .for access should have been directed in the first instance to the judges of the trial court.” The papers and exhibits filed in this court in connection with the media’s petition indicate *435that the media filed a mandamus action requesting the court below to order the Director of the Office of Judicial Support to release the bill of particulars. The confusing mass of papers and exhibits also seems to indicate that the Director, represented by the same assistant solicitor who had decided that the bill of particulars should be sealed, defended against the mandamus action on the ground that the Office of Judicial Support no longer had possession of the record, because upon making his decision to seal the bill of particulars, the assistant solicitor had hand-delivered the entire record (including the now “sealed” bill of particulars) to the Superior Court’s prothonotary’s office. I do not find it necessary to determine precisely what occurred in the lower court, because even if the media filed nothing in the lower court, it would not change the result.
I agree with Judge Wieand that the issue was one for the trial court in the first instance. If Catania wanted the bill of particulars sealed, he should have requested the lower court to do so. Catania made no such request; accordingly, the bill of particulars was not sealed, and there is nothing to overcome the presumption of openness of judicial records. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-98, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 1311-12, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978). The media, like all members of the public, were entitled to rely on the presumption of openness with respect to records which were not filed under seal, not required by rule or statute to be filed under seal, and never even requested to be filed under seal.
Determining whether to grant the media’s petition would not usurp the lower court’s function, but enforce it. All we need do is determine whether the media are correct in their contention that the lower court never ordered the bill of particulars sealed. Since the court did not seal the bill of particulars, the bill has never been legally sealed, and we should order our prothonotary to act accordingly by providing public access to the bill while the record is on file in this court. The concurring opinion’s approach does not constitute proper deference to the function of the lower court, but *436permits the lower court's jurisdiction to be usurped by lawyers and clerks, who not only can decide to deprive the public of knowledge to which it is legally entitled, but also can place that decision beyond the power of any court to enforce the law.
The fact that the lower court never ordered the bill of particulars sealed is sufficient in itself to require that the media’s petition be granted, and the argument on the merits which Catania has raised for the first time in this court should not even be considered. Moreover, even if we could consider the argument, it has no discernible merit. Catania concedes that there is a presumption of a right of access to, and copying of, judicial records. He adds that these presumptive rights are subject to exceptions under certain circumstances, but does not even allege any such circumstances exist here.
Catania’s brief asserts that a bill of particulars is not a judicial record. Since a bill of particulars is a pleading in a court case by a party (the Commonwealth) to the case, the contention that it is not a judicial record would seem to be a self-evident absurdity, unless it can be supported by reference to a statute or controlling case law. Catania’s brief states that Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978) is “instructive” on this point. Catania’s brief, however, fails to point out where the Nixon case provides this instruction. A close reading of the majority opinion in Nixon, as well as the dissenting opinions, does not reveal anything of even marginal relevance to the issue of whether a bill of particulars constitutes a judicial record.
Judge Wickersham’s opinion states that we cannot grant access to any portion of the bill of particulars based on the tapes for the same reason that we cannot grant access to any portions of the Starks hearing transcript based on the tapes. I disagree with his conclusion on the Starks hearing transcript for the reasons stated in part II, infra, but even if I agreed that the Starks hearing transcript should remain sealed, I would still disagree concerning the bill of particu*437lars, which is on an entirely different footing from the hearing transcript.
A bill of particulars is simply a supplement to the indictment or information. Its function is “to clarify the pleadings and to limit the evidence which can be offered to support the indictment or information.” Note, Pa.R.Crim.P. 304. The bill of. particulars is not itself evidence, nor is its purpose to reveal the evidence which the Commonwealth intends to use at trial. See Commonwealth v. Dreibelbis, 493 Pa. 466, 472-73, 426 A.2d 1111, 1114 (1981); Commonwealth v. Orlowski, 332 Pa.Super.Ct. 600, 636, 481 A.2d 952, 970 (1984). The remedy for a criminal defendant who is being prosecuted on the basis of illegally intercepted communications is a motion to suppress use of the intercepted communications as evidence. See 18 U.S.C. § 2515; 18 Pa.C.S. § 5721.
No provision of either the federal or state wiretap statute provides for the sealing of any portion of a pleading, such as an indictment, information, criminal complaint or bill of particulars. Catania seems to have recognized this, since he has never contended, either in this court or the court below, that the criminal complaint should be sealed, even though one of his petitions filed in the court below claimed that the complaint was also based on the tapes. Indeed, as has previously been shown in this opinion, Catania never contended in the lower court that the bill of particulars should be sealed, and the argument which he raises for the first time in this court does not include the theory used by Judge Wickersham. Thus, in addition to being erroneous on the merits, Judge Wickersham’s theory is being applied sua sponte, which our Supreme Court has held we are not permitted to do. Commonwealth v. Simmons, 504 Pa. 565, 570, 475 A.2d 1310, 1313 (1984); Wiegand v. Wiegand, 461 Pa. 482, 337 A.2d 256 (1975); see generally Commonwealth v. Murphy, 305 Pa.Super.Ct. 246, 250-51, 451 A.2d 514, 516-17 (1982), petition for allowance of appeal denied (1983) (opinion announcing the judgment of the court; collecting cases).
*438In sum, the bill of particulars and the Starks hearing transcript present distinct questions. The bill of particulars should be unsealed regardless of the outcome with respect to the transcript, which should also be unsealed for the independent reasons now to be discussed in part II.
II.
While Judges Wickersham and Wieand agree that the Starks hearing transcript should remain sealed, their reasoning diverges widely. Judge Wickersham’s theory that a Starks hearing is not a “criminal proceeding” will be discussed in part A below; Judge Wieand’s “right of privacy” rationale will be discussed in part B. In addition, both opinions seem to rely on the fact that Judge Cherry never ruled on the lawfulness of the interceptions, although it is not clear in either opinion whether this is supposed to constitute an independent ground for affirmance, or merely supports affirmance in conjunction with the other theory. The effect of Judge Cherry’s failure to rule on the lawfulness of the interceptions will be discussed in part C.
A.
Judge Wickersham’s opinion concedes in footnote 10 that “under the amended version of the federal statute, and pursuant to the analysis in [United States v.] Cianfrani, [573 F.2d 835 (3d Cir.1978)] it would seem that, if the interceptions were lawfully made, we should grant access to the transcript of the Starks hearing____” As discussed in part C, infra, I believe that we can determine here that the interceptions were lawfully made. If we should not be making this determination on appeal, at the very least the case should be remanded so that the court below can determine the legality of the interceptions. Judge Wickers-ham, however, states “that even should the lower court or this court decide that the interceptions were lawfully made, the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, Act of October 4, 1978, P.L. 831, No. 164 § 2, 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5701-5726, precludes disclosure of the con*439tents of the tapes.” This conclusion is based on Judge Wickersham’s interpretation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 5717(b), which authorizes disclosure only at a “criminal proceeding.”
Judge Wickersham contends that “criminal proceeding” means only a full trial, and hence cannot include a Starks hearing. This determination is based on two premises which his opinion states in footnote 10: (1) “The district court in Cianfrani held that a Starks hearing was not included under the language ‘in any criminal proceeding,’ ” and (2) the court of appeals “reversed the district court because the statute had been amended to read ‘in any proceeding.’ ” These two propositions are gleaned from a confusing footnote in the court of appeals opinion in United States v. Cianfrani, supra, 573 F.2d at 859, n. 13.
Because this footnote is at the root of Judge Wickers-ham’s theory, it must be carefully examined in the context of the paragraph it accompanies in the text, which states:
The court below not only closed the hearing, it also sealed the resultant record until such time as the communications at issue were introduced into evidence at the full trial. The court did so in order to protect against what it feared might be the needless disclosure of private communications. Since the government might not have used the evidence at trial, or since the evidence might not have been admissible even if offered, the court believed that disclosure even after the determination that the recordings had been obtained by consent could result in the needless publication of “privileged” communications.
Id. at 859. The footnote to this paragraph states:
In so ruling, the district court relied on the language of the original version of § 2517(3) to bolster its position. As originally passed, § 2517(3) authorized disclosure only at “criminal proceedings.” The district court read that language restrictively to mean that public disclosure was authorized only at the full trial, in order to afford maximum protection to the privacy interests involved. In 1970, however, § 2517(3) was amended to authorize disclosure at simply “any proceeding” in federal court, thus *440broadening the circumstances under which legally intercepted communications could be divulged in court. Pub.L. 91-452, Title IX, § 902(b), Oct. 15, 1970, 84 Stat. 947.
Id., n. 13.
From the court of appeals’ reference to the district court’s use of the repealed “criminal proceeding” language to “bolster its position,” Judge Wickersham has inferred that the district court’s holding was that a Starks hearing was not a “criminal proceeding.” We do not know how the repealed “criminal proceeding” language was used to “bolster” the district court’s position, since this portion of the district court’s opinion seems to have been deleted from the published version, which is “the consolidation of an edited’ version of a bench opinion, originally delivered on November 16, 1977, and a Memorandum Sur Motion for Reconsideration, originally filed November 21, 1977.” United States v. Cianfrani, 448 F.Supp. 1102, 1103, n. 1 (1978). In any event, it seems self-evident that a holding must involve a question before the court, and the court could not have before it a question of how to apply statutory language which, by virtue of its repeal, is inapplicable. Furthermore, the portion of the district court’s opinion discussing the issue plainly shows that the holding was that a Starks hearing fell outside the “proceeding” language applicable at the time of the Cianfrani case in 1977, rather than the “criminal proceeding” language repealed in 1970, as Judge Wickersham contends. Id. at 1114-18.
Thus any observation concerning how the “criminal proceeding” language should operate would be dictum, and only has the persuasiveness of its reasoning. This is important in analyzing the remainder of footnote 13 in the court of appeals’ Cianfrani opinion, because it can be read to imply what Judge Wickersham claims it does — that if the “criminal proceeding” language had applied, it would have limited disclosure to a full trial. Assuming that is what the court of appeals meant to say, however, this dictum is not persuasive, because it is in conflict with the court of ap*441peals’ own holding in Cianfrani, as well as the “plain meaning rule,” which is fundamental in statutory construction. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b).
The holding of the court of appeals in Cianfrani was that a Starks hearing (which by definition is not part of the trial) is a “proceeding” within the meaning of the current version of 18 U.S.C. § 2517(3). Since the word “proceeding” includes a Starks hearing, and the phrase “criminal proceeding” includes the word “proceeding,” it necessarily follows that the phrase “criminal proceeding” includes a Starks hearing. The function of the word “criminal” is obvious— to limit the applicability of the statute to proceedings in criminal cases. Judge Wickersham’s interpretation of the word “criminal” to mean “trial” violates section 1921(b) of the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, which provides: “When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b).
Judge Wickersham’s position also turns the entire area of wiretap prosecutions in Pennsylvania into a contradiction in terms. If, as he contends, a Starks hearing is not a “criminal proceeding” under 18 Pa.C.S. § 5717(b), then there is no authorization to reveal the contents of the tapes at a Starks hearing, despite the fact that the sole purpose of the Starks hearing is to review the tapes which (under Judge Wickersham’s reasoning) cannot be introduced. Since the Commonwealth would never be able to meet its burden at a Starks hearing, the evidence would always be inadmissible. The inevitable result of this reasoning would be that the legislature has created an extremely complex and enormously expensive system of gathering evidence, in order that it may be put to no use at all.
Yet another baffling aspect of Judge Wickersham’s opinion is that it never addresses the media’s principal contention — that the First Amendment requires access to the transcript of the Starks hearing. Even if his construction of the Pennsylvania statute were correct, it would seem that he should discuss why the statute, as construed in his *442opinion, does not conflict impermissibly with the First Amendment rights involved in the main issue in this appeal.
B.
Judge Wieand is unquestionably correct in stating that the media have no greater right of access under the First Amendment than the general public, but his conclusion that the media can make no claim under the First Amendment is a non sequitur, since it is their right of access as members of the general public that the media are claiming. There is no need to labor this point, however, because the media claim a right of access under both the First Amendment and common law. Judge Wieand at least concedes the existence of the common law right, and the result should be the same whether the media’s request for the Starks hearing transcript is analyzed under the First Amendment or common law.
The right of access, as Judge Wieand correctly notes, is not absolute. Judge Wieand states that he would affirm Judge Cherry’s holding that in this case “the public’s right of access had to yield to the individual’s right of privacy.” The principal difficulty with this position is that Catania has not even alleged any protected right of privacy which could be weighed against the right of access.
Judge Wieand relies on the statement in In re National Broadcasting Company, Inc., 653 F.2d 609, 613 (D.C.Cir. 1981) that exclusion of the public has been justified “to protect trade secrets, or the privacy and reputations of victims of crimes, as well as to guard against risks to national security interests, and to minimize the danger of an unfair trial by adverse publicity.” This statement provides no support for Judge Wieand’s position, since none of the listed interests are involved here. Judge Wieand states that these are not necessarily the only situations in which access should be denied, but he fails to mention anything in Catania’s situation which would justify creating a new right for him. Indeed the very opinion on which Judge Wieand relies, In re National Broadcasting Company, Inc., su*443pra, seems to refute his position, since the court in that case ordered release of the tapes sought by the media, noting that the defendant had “made no claim that releasing the tapes will cause him the type of embarrassment which we have recognized might be worthy of protection, such as that flowing from ‘republication of highly personal matters’, for example, ‘recordings of bedroom or other intimate conversations.’ ” Id. at 619, n. 55, quoting United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1263 (D.C.Cir.1976), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978). Catania likewise has failed even to allege any facts which might provide a basis for finding some cognizable privacy interest here.
Judge Wieand also relies on statutory provisions which require nondisclosure of illegally obtained communications. These sections of the wiretap statutes do not provide a basis for the trial judge to exercise discretion, as Judge Wieand contends. If applicable (i.e., if the communications were illegally obtained), the statutes absolutely require nondisclosure. Judge Wieand does not even claim that the communications involved here were obtained illegally, and as demonstrated in part II. C., infra, Catania’s contention that the communications were illegally obtained is without merit. Hence the statutory provisions cited by the concurring opinion are inapplicable.
The opinion of the court below also gives no clue concerning why a new privacy right was created in this case, or why the alleged privacy right outweighs the public’s access rights under either the First Amendment or common law. The only relevant authority cited in Judge Cherry’s opinion is the following quotation from the Supreme Court of the United States:
Furthermore, any denial of access in this case was not absolute but only temporary. Once the danger of prejudice had dissipated, a transcript of the suppression hearing was made available. The press and the public then *444had a full opportunity to scrutinize the suppression hearing.
Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 393, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 2912, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979). The “danger of prejudice” which had dissipated in Gannett was possible harm to the defendants’ fair trial rights. Dissipation of this danger gave rise to the immediate release of the transcript in Gannett. In the case before us, there is no longer any possible danger to fair trial rights, since there will be no trial. Therefore, to the extent the quoted passage from Gannett is relevant, it supports the precise opposite of Judge Cherry’s conclusion.3
C.
The final problem is that Judge Cherry never ruled on Catania’s argument that the interceptions were unlawfully obtained. In petitioning the court below for access to the Starks hearing transcript, the media took the position that the interceptions were lawfully obtained, while Catania maintained his position that they were not.4 A court cannot hand victory to one side in a dispute simply through its own failure to rule on a question properly before it. See, e.g., Nigrelli v. Cody, 281 Pa.Super.Ct. 156, 159, 421 A.2d 1195, 1196 (1980), rearg. denied.
When the iower court has failed to make a necessary determination of an issue before it, we should remand the *445case so that the determination can be made in the first instance by the lower court, if there is a factual dispute or some other reason the lower court should make the determination first. Commonwealth v. Guinther, 290 Pa.Super.Ct. 441, 447 & n. 4, 434 A.2d 834, 837 & n. 4 (1981); see Nigrelli v. Cody, supra, 281 Pa.Super.Ct. at 161, 421 A.2d at 1198; cf. Commonwealth v. Bellis, 497 Pa. 323, 331 & n. 12, 440 A.2d 1179, 1183 & n. 12 (1981), rearg. denied (1982). If there is no factual dispute and we already have an adequate record before us, however, we can make the determination ourselves. See, e.g., Lucas Enterprises, Inc. v. Paul C. Harman Company, Inc., 273 Pa.Super.Ct. 422, 424, 417 A.2d 720, 721 (1980); see also Commonwealth v. Aldinger, 292 Pa.Super.Ct. 149, 155, n. 6, 436 A.2d 1196, 1199, n. 6 (1981). I would favor the latter approach here, since there are no facts in dispute and we can easily determine the issue on the record before us. A review of Catania’s argument on the issue shows that, assuming it has not been waived or abandoned, it is frivolous on the merits.5
The majority’s determination not only sanctions a decision which violates the public’s First Amendment rights, but also insulates that decision from appellate review because the lower court failed to rule on a properly presented issue. These egregious errors are compounded by allowing the *446decision to seal the bill of particulars to stand. That decision, an even plainer First Amendment violation, was not even made by the lower court, but by an assistánt county solicitor giving clearly erroneous advice to clerks in the Office of Judicial Support. In the words of former Justice Roberts (later Chief Justice, and now a senior judge assigned to this court), “Today’s decision is without support in law, fact, reason or public policy ____ This compels vigorous dissent.” Citizens Committee to Recall Rizzo v. Board of Elections of City and County of Philadelphia, 470 Pa. 1, 82, 367 A.2d 232, 274 (1976), reh’g denied (dissenting opinion).

. Catania’s claim that the media failed to appeal the order is also refuted by the record, which shows that the media filed an appeal to this court on October 13, 1982. This resulted in Judge Cavanaugh’s order of October 14, 1982, remanding the case so that the media could petition for access to the Starks hearing transcript. Since both of the factual allegations which serve as the basis for Catania’s first jurisdictional argument are false, there is no need to decide whether he would be entitled to any rdief if either or both of them were true.

. The Delaware County Office of Judicial Support performs the same functions as the prothonotary and clerk of the courts. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 2731-2737, 2751-2757.

. Even if the privacy right, for which no one has been able to locate any authority, is assumed to exist, we would still have the problem of how to review the lower court’s determination that the privacy right outweighed the public’s access rights. Judge Cherry made no factual findings to support his conclusion. This is understandable, since Catania made no factual allegations, but it is difficult to see how we could determine whether the lower court’s action was an abuse of discretion when there is nothing to review.

. Catania’s brief attempts to make much of the fact that one of the attorneys for the media has at times incorrectly referred to a "stipulation” that the interceptions in this case were consensual. While it is true that there was no written stipulation filed in the lower court, the effect is the same, since Catania did not challenge Richard Burke’s consent in arguing for suppression of the tapes in the court below. Instead, Catania relied on the statutory construction argument outlined in note 5, infra.

. Insofar as it is comprehensible, Catania's argument appears to be that the Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act only authorizes an "investigative or law enforcement officer,” as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 5702, to investigate the state offenses enumerated in 18 Pa.C.S. § 5708. Therefore, Catania reasons, the federal authorities here violated the state law, since they were only investigating federal offenses, which necessarily were not among the enumerated state offenses. Catania’s argument depends on an assumption that Pennsylvania has made it a crime for federal law enforcement officers to investigate federal offenses in accordance with federal law. There is no reason to think that the Pennsylvania legislature even attempted such an absurdity in the Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, and even if it did, such an attempt would be a nullity. Indeed the Act itself explicitly refutes Catania’s argument by providing in section 5717(c) that communications obtained in accordance with federal law may be disclosed in testimony under oath in Pennsylvania courts. 18 Pa.C.S. § 5717(c); see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Trignani, 334 Pa.Super.Ct. 526, 483 A.2d 862 (1984).