Court Opinion

ID: 9956226
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 16:00:39.009636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:14.807590
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 19-1709

        MAIMOUNA AMELIE BOUNTOULOUGOU,

                            Petitioner,

                     v.

        MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

                            Respondent.

        On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

        Submitted: January 26, 2021                                       Decided: March 26, 2024

        Before KING, AGEE, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.

        Petition granted by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: John E. Gallagher, Catonsville, Maryland, for Petitioner. Jeffrey Bossert
        Clark, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Mary Jane Candaux, Assistant Director, Remi
        da Rocha-Afodu, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, UNITED STATES
        DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               The   petitioner    in   these   immigration     proceedings,    Maimouna   Amelie

        Bountoulougou, petitions for our review of the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

        (the “BIA”) dismissing her appeal from the adverse decision of an immigration judge

        (“IJ”). The IJ not only denied Bountoulougou the relief she sought — including asylum

        and withholding of removal — but also deemed her permanently ineligible for benefits

        under the Immigration and Nationality Act (the “Act”) on the premise that she had filed a

        “frivolous” asylum application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6). 1 As explained herein, because

        of error in the IJ’s frivolousness analysis, we grant the petition now before us and remand

        for further proceedings.

                                                     I.

                                                    A.

               Bountoulougou is a native and citizen of the West African country of Burkina Faso

        who was admitted to the United States in December 2012 at age 20 as a nonimmigrant

        student. In April 2013, with the assistance of a non-lawyer “preparer,” she submitted to

        the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) an application for asylum and

        withholding of removal, asserting fears that she would be subjected to female genital

        mutilation and forced marriage if she returned to her home country (the “Original

               1
                Bountoulougou also unsuccessfully requested protection under the Convention
        Against Torture, but she has since abandoned any claim for that form of relief.

                                                     2
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        Application”). In arguable tension with those alleged fears, the Original Application

        indicated that Bountoulougou had voluntarily wed her boyfriend a few days before

        departing for the United States, and it listed the name of a husband (a man named Idrissa

        Kone) who remained in Burkina Faso. The Original Application also stated, inter alia, that

        her grandfather and uncles had previously beaten Bountoulougou with a whip because of

        her resistance to forced marriage, and that, following her arrival in the United States,

        Bountoulougou discovered she was pregnant.

               During a May 2013 interview at a USCIS asylum office, Bountoulougou confirmed

        that she had wed Idrissa Kone in Burkina Faso just before leaving the country, and she said

        that Kone was the father of her then-unborn child. The Department of Homeland Security

        (“DHS”) thereafter initiated removal proceedings against Bountoulougou because she was

        no longer attending school in the United States, Bountoulougou obtained a lawyer, and a

        series of hearings before the IJ ensued.            During a December 2014 hearing,

        Bountoulougou’s counsel remarked that Bountoulougou had a “husband” who was “in

        Africa” and “not helping out.” See A.R. 139-40. 2

               In November 2016, however, Bountoulougou filed an amended application for

        asylum and withholding of removal, stating that she actually was not married (the

        “Amended Application”). The Amended Application also stated that Bountoulougou had

        a son who was born in the United States in August 2013. In support of the Amended

               2
                Citations herein to “A.R. __” refer to the contents of the Administrative Record in
        these proceedings.

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        Application, Bountoulougou asserted not only fears that she would be subjected to female

        genital mutilation and forced marriage upon her return to Burkina Faso, but also a fear that

        her son would be subjected to an “honor killing” for being born out of wedlock.

               During a November 2016 hearing on the Amended Application, Bountoulougou

        testified that she had never had a husband. Bountoulougou explained that she told the

        Original Application’s preparer that she was not married, but the preparer took it upon

        himself to include the statement that Bountoulougou had wed Idrissa Kone in Burkina Faso

        just before departing for the United States. According to Bountoulougou (whose native

        language is French and who could read but not fluently speak English), she asked the

        preparer after reviewing the Original Application why it said that she was married, and the

        preparer responded that he was “used to doing these for people” and that saying

        Bountoulougou was married was “the way it [was] done.”                  See A.R. 201-02.

        Bountoulougou testified that she did not prepare the Original Application herself because

        she did not know how to do so, and that the inclusion of the statement that Kone was her

        husband was not “done according to [her] free will.” Id. at 202. Further, Bountoulougou

        testified that she did not know Kone, but that she understood Kone to be the preparer’s

        nephew and someone for whom the preparer may have been seeking to obtain an

        immigration benefit. Bountoulougou also clarified that her son’s father was not Kone, but

        another man in Burkina Faso to whom she was not married.

               With respect to the May 2013 asylum interview, Bountoulougou expressed

        difficulty recalling what had occurred, explaining that she had been six months pregnant at

        the time and feeling physically unwell, stressed, and afraid. She acknowledged, however,

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        that she had falsely confirmed during the asylum interview that, as stated in the Original

        Application, she was married to Idrissa Kone. In addition to admitting that falsehood, she

        conceded that the Original Application incorrectly stated that her grandfather and uncles

        had beaten her with a whip, though she testified to physical abuse perpetrated by an aunt.

        Indeed, Bountoulougou’s lawyer proffered at the November 2016 hearing that “we’re

        ready to stipulate that [the Original Application] prepared by the non-attorney is rife with

        inconsistencies and incorrectness.” See A.R. 221.

                                                      B.

               The IJ denied the Amended Application by the adverse decision of April 2017 (the

        “IJ Decision”). 3 In pertinent part, the IJ Decision related that Bountoulougou “admit[ted]

        that [the Original Application] contained false information regarding her marital status,”

        but that she requested the IJ to disregard such false information “because she followed the

        instructions of a preparer . . . who completed and filed the [Original Application] on [her]

        behalf.” See IJ Decision 3. As for the response from DHS, the IJ Decision described

        DHS’s position as being that — because Bountoulougou “submitted the [Original

        Application] with false information and then repeated the alleged falsehoods in her

        interview with the asylum office” — she should be both denied any relief for lack of

        credibility and ruled forever barred from any immigration benefits under the Act for filing

        a frivolous asylum application. Id.

               3
                   The IJ Decision is found at A.R. 63-84.

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               The IJ Decision first assessed Bountoulougou’s request for asylum and the issue of

        her credibility. The IJ found that Bountoulougou was “not credible,” citing, inter alia, her

        admission that she “lied” about being married to Idrissa Kone in the Original Application

        and during her asylum interview. See IJ Decision 15. Additionally, the IJ attributed to

        Bountoulougou her lawyer’s remarks during the December 2014 hearing about

        Bountoulougou having a husband who was in Africa. Id. The IJ Decision explained that,

        although Bountoulougou “admitted these falsehoods” by the time of her Amended

        Application, her prior “attempts to deceive immigration officials [were] troubling and

        relevant to the determination of credibility.” Id. at 16. The IJ Decision further ruled that

        Bountoulougou failed to “provide independent evidence of past persecution or a well-

        founded fear of future persecution” sufficient “to overcome the adverse credibility

        finding.” Id. at 18-19. The IJ Decision thus concluded that Bountoulougou’s asylum claim

        “must be denied.” Id. at 19.

               The IJ Decision then turned to the 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6) analysis of whether

        Bountoulougou should be ruled permanently ineligible for immigration benefits under the

        Act for filing a frivolous asylum application. As a precursor to that analysis, the IJ Decision

        observed that “[a]n application is frivolous ‘if any of its material elements is deliberately

        fabricated.’” See IJ Decision 13 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.20 (2001)). Moreover, the IJ

        Decision related that the IJ “must provide cogent and convincing reasons for determining

        that a preponderance of the evidence supports a frivolousness finding.” Id. (citing In re Y-

        L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 151, 158 (BIA 2007)). The IJ Decision also recognized the BIA’s

        “four-part test” for a frivolousness determination. Id. Under that test,

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               (1) the respondent must receive notice of the consequences of filing a
               frivolous application; (2) the [IJ] must make a specific finding that the
               [respondent] knowingly filed a frivolous application; (3) there must be
               sufficient evidence that a material element of the claim was deliberately
               fabricated; and (4) there must be an indication that the respondent has been
               afforded a sufficient opportunity to account for any discrepancies or
               implausible aspects of the claim.

        Id. (citing Y-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 155).

               The IJ Decision concluded that each element of the four-part test was satisfied in

        Bountoulougou’s case. See IJ Decision 19-20. Of particular relevance herein, the IJ found

        as to the second element that Bountoulougou “knowingly submitted an application

        containing false information,” in that she “conceded that she knowingly submitted an

        asylum application containing false information” — i.e., the Original Application — “and

        continued to perpetrate such falsehoods during her asylum interview.” Id. at 19. The IJ

        Decision elaborated that,

               [a]ccording to [Bountoulougou’s November 2016 hearing] testimony, she
               claimed that she was married to Mr. Kone in [the Original Application] and
               in her asylum interview when in fact she was not. Describing her motivation
               for including the fabrication, [Bountoulougou] explained that the preparer of
               [the Original Application] told her that saying she was married was “the way
               it [was] done,” so she followed his instructions. She also conceded that she
               lied in [the Original Application] when she stated that her uncle[s] and
               grandfather beat her.

        Id. (sixth alteration in original). As such, the IJ’s finding that Bountoulougou knowingly

        submitted a frivolous application was limited to the Original Application and her

        concessions of falsehoods therein, including the falsehood that she had wed Idrissa Kone

        in Burkina Faso.

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               With respect to the third element, the IJ Decision ruled that “the fabrication

        regarding [Bountoulougou’s] marital status is material to her asylum claim.” See IJ

        Decision 20. The IJ Decision’s materiality ruling proceeded as follows:

               [T]he fabrication regarding [Bountoulougou’s] marital status is material to
               her asylum claim because it is integral to the analysis of [her] suggested
               particular social group, defined as “uncircumcised Mossi women of Burkina
               Faso who are subjected to forced marriages.” [Bountoulougou] stated that
               she was married on three occasions: in [the Original Application], in her
               asylum interview, and [by way of her lawyer during the December 2014
               hearing]. However, during her [November 2016 hearing] testimony, she
               claimed that she was not married and therefore feared forced marriage and
               [female genital mutilation]. Assuming [Bountoulougou] is married, [the
               Amended Application] is baseless because the false statement regarding her
               marital status is material to her membership in the proposed particular social
               group.

        Id. (citation omitted). In other words, the IJ Decision based its materiality ruling on an

        “[a]ssum[ption]” — rather than a finding — that Bountoulougou lied in her Amended

        Application when she said she was not married in order to substantiate her alleged fears of

        forced marriage and female genital mutilation. Meanwhile, the IJ Decision did not address

        or decide in its frivolousness analysis the materiality of any falsehood that the IJ did find,

        including the falsehood in the Original Application that Bountoulougou had wed Idrissa

        Kone in Burkina Faso.

               Following its frivolousness determination against Bountoulougou, the IJ Decision

        considered her request for withholding of removal. Although the IJ Decision recognized

        that “[a] finding of frivolity shall not bar an application for withholding of removal,” see

        IJ Decision 13 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.20 (2001)), the IJ Decision concluded that

        Bountoulougou’s failure to substantiate her asylum claim meant “that she fail[ed] to meet

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        the higher burden of proof for withholding of removal,” id. at 20. Having thereby denied

        the entirety of the Amended Application, the IJ Decision ordered Bountoulougou removed

        to Burkina Faso. Id. at 22. The IJ Decision also reiterated that, because Bountoulougou

        “knowingly submitted an asylum application containing false information,” she “is

        permanently ineligible for any benefits under the Act.” Id. at 21.

                                                     C.

               The BIA subsequently dismissed Bountoulougou’s appeal from the IJ Decision by

        order of a single BIA member in June 2019 (the “BIA Order”). 4 In so doing, the BIA Order

        first reviewed the IJ’s adverse credibility finding. The BIA Order “discern[ed] no clear

        error in [that] finding,” specifically citing the IJ’s reliance on Bountoulougou’s “admission

        that she lied in [the Original Application and during her asylum interview] by stating that

        she was married to Idrissa Kone when in fact she was not married.” See BIA Order 1.

        Based on that falsehood as well as “other inconsistencies and implausibilities in the

        record,” the BIA Order concluded that the IJ “reasonably doubted” Bountoulougou’s

        veracity. Id. at 1-2.

               Next, the BIA Order approved the IJ Decision’s denial of asylum based on

        Bountoulougou’s failure to provide independent evidence sufficient to overcome the

        adverse credibility finding. See BIA Order 2. For similar reasons, the BIA Order also

        approved the IJ Decision’s denial of withholding of removal. Id.

               4
                   The BIA Order is found at A.R. 3-5.

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               Finally, the BIA Order addressed the IJ Decision’s ruling that Bountoulougou is

        permanently ineligible for immigration benefits under the Act for filing a frivolous asylum

        application. The BIA Order concluded there was no error in the IJ Decision’s application

        of the four-part test for a frivolousness determination. See BIA Order 2-3. Regarding the

        second element, the BIA Order discerned no clear error in the IJ’s finding that

        Bountoulougou “knowingly made a deliberate fabrication.” Id. at 2. The BIA Decision

        explained this was because Bountoulougou “conceded that she deliberately fabricated in

        [the Original Application] that she is married and perpetuated the fabrication in her asylum

        interview.” Id.

               As for the third element of the frivolousness test, the BIA Order summarily stated

        that there was no clear error in the IJ’s finding “that the deliberate fabrication was a material

        element of the asylum application.” See BIA Order 2. The BIA Order elaborated only that

        “[w]e discern no clear error in the [IJ’s] finding[] . . . that the false information is material

        to [Bountoulougou’s] asylum claim,” and that, “[t]hus, the [IJ] provided cogent and

        convincing reasons for finding that a preponderance of the evidence shows that material

        aspects of the claim were deliberately fabricated.” Id. This was the totality of the BIA

        Order’s discussion of the materiality issue.

               Bountoulougou timely filed her petition for this Court’s review of the BIA Order

        dismissing her appeal from the IJ Decision, and we possess jurisdiction pursuant to 8

        U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).

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                                                     II.

               By her petition for review, Bountoulougou challenges the adverse credibility finding

        and the denials of asylum and withholding of removal that underlie the order that she be

        removed to Burkina Faso. Additionally, Bountoulougou contests the determination that

        she is permanently ineligible for immigration benefits under the Act for filing a frivolous

        asylum application. As previously stated, we are granting the petition and remanding for

        further proceedings on the basis of error in the IJ Decision’s frivolousness analysis. We

        therefore need not — and do not — reach and resolve any other questions, including the

        issues related to the adverse credibility finding and the denials of asylum and withholding

        of removal. Nothing in our decision prevents the agency from revisiting those matters, as

        appropriate, on remand.

                                                     A.

               As the BIA itself recognized in its 2007 Y-L- decision formulating standards for

        frivolousness determinations, such a determination “is a preemptive determination” with

        “severe consequences,” in that, “once made,” it “forever bars an alien from any benefit

        under the Act.” See In re Y-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 151, 157 (BIA 2007). In the words of one

        of our sister courts of appeals, “[a] finding of a frivolous application carries catastrophic

        consequences” and “is the veritable ‘death sentence’ of immigration proceedings.” See

        Yousif v. Lynch, 796 F.3d 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

               The power to render a frivolousness determination stems from the asylum statute, 8

        U.S.C. § 1158, which provides in relevant part as follows:

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               If the Attorney General determines that an alien has knowingly made a
               frivolous application for asylum and the alien has received the notice under
               paragraph (4)(A) [advising of the consequences of knowingly filing such an
               application], the alien shall be permanently ineligible for any benefits under
               [the Act], effective as of the date of a final determination on such application.

        See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6). At the time of the BIA’s Y-L- decision (as well as the IJ

        Decision herein), the regulation pertaining to frivolousness determinations provided that

        “an asylum application is frivolous if any of its material elements is deliberately

        fabricated.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.20 (2001). 5

               The BIA’s Y-L- decision recognized that — “[g]iven the serious consequences of a

        frivolousness finding” — “the regulation provides a number of procedural safeguards.”

        See 24 I. & N. Dec. at 155. The Y-L- decision specified that

               [t]hese include the following requirements: (1) notice to the alien of the
               consequences of filing a frivolous application; (2) a specific finding by the
               [IJ] or the [BIA] that the alien knowingly filed a frivolous application;
               (3) sufficient evidence in the record to support the finding that a material
               element of the asylum application was deliberately fabricated; and (4) an
               indication that the alien has been afforded sufficient opportunity to account
               for any discrepancies or implausible aspects of the claim.

        Id. The regulatory requirements delineated in Y-L- are the elements of the “four-part test”

        for a frivolousness determination set forth in the IJ Decision herein. See IJ Decision 13

        (citing and paraphrasing this language of Y-L-).

               5
                  In its current form, the regulation pertaining to frivolousness determinations
        similarly provides that an asylum application filed on or after April 1, 1997, and before
        January 11, 2021, is frivolous if “[a]ny of the material elements in the asylum application
        is deliberately fabricated.” See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.20(a)(1) (2021).

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               With respect to the second and third regulatory requirements, the Y-L- decision

        explained that an IJ’s “specific finding that a respondent deliberately fabricated a material

        element of his asylum claim constitutes a finding that he knowingly filed a frivolous

        application.” See 24 I. & N. Dec. at 156. The Y-L- decision also emphasized that “a finding

        of frivolousness does not flow automatically from an adverse credibility determination.”

        Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, an IJ “must separately address the question

        of frivolousness, including a discussion of the evidence supporting a finding that the

        respondent deliberately fabricated a material element of the asylum claim.” Id.

               Furthermore, “[b]ecause of the severe consequences that flow from a frivolousness

        finding,” the Y-L- decision recognized that “the preponderance of the evidence must

        support an [IJ’s] finding that the respondent knowingly and deliberately fabricated material

        elements of the claim.” See 24 I. & N. Dec. at 157. Indeed, “the [IJ] must provide cogent

        and convincing reasons for finding by a preponderance of the evidence that an asylum

        applicant knowingly and deliberately fabricated material elements of the claim.” Id. at

        158; see IJ Decision 13 (recognizing the IJ’s obligation under Y-L- to “provide cogent and

        convincing reasons for determining that a preponderance of the evidence supports a

        frivolousness finding”).

               Of additional import, the Y-L- decision specified that it is the Government — and

        not the respondent — who bears “the ultimate burden of proof.” See 24 I. & N. Dec. at

        158. And, consistent with the fourth regulatory requirement, “particular attention [must]

        be given to providing the alien a sufficient opportunity to account for any discrepancies or

        implausible aspects of the claim relied on in the frivolousness finding.” Id. The BIA

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        considers the issue of “whether a fabrication was knowing or deliberate” to be “a factual

        question of intent that is reviewed for clear error”; the issue of “[w]hether a fabrication was

        material” to be a “mixed question[] of fact and law”; and the issue of “[w]hether the [IJ]

        properly applied the regulatory framework” to be a pure “question of law.” Id. at 159.

                                                      B.

               In these proceedings, as we have explained, the IJ’s finding as to the second

        regulatory requirement that Bountoulougou knowingly submitted a frivolous asylum

        application was limited to the Original Application and her concessions of falsehoods

        therein, including the falsehood that she had wed Idrissa Kone in Burkina Faso just before

        departing for the United States. See IJ Decision 19. Significantly, the IJ Decision did not

        expressly rule that the subsequent Amended Application was also frivolous, nor did the IJ

        state any finding that Bountoulougou lied in the Amended Application by asserting that

        she actually was not married. This reading of the IJ Decision is confirmed by the BIA

        Order, which understood the IJ’s finding that Bountoulougou “knowingly made a

        deliberate fabrication” to be supported by her concession “that she deliberately fabricated

        in [the Original Application] that she is married and perpetuated the fabrication in her

        asylum interview.”      See BIA Order 2.           Moreover, the BIA Order accepted that

        Bountoulougou “lied in [the Original Application and during her asylum interview] by

        stating that she was married to Idrissa Kone when in fact she was not married.” Id. at 1

        (emphasis added). The BIA Order did not contemplate that the IJ Decision found the

        Amended Application to be frivolous in any way.

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               Nevertheless, in ruling as to the third regulatory requirement that “the fabrication

        regarding [Bountoulougou’s] marital status is material to her asylum claim,” the IJ

        Decision relied on an “[a]ssum[ption]” that Bountoulougou lied in her Amended

        Application when she said she was not married in order to substantiate her alleged fears of

        forced marriage and female genital mutilation. See IJ Decision 20. That is, the IJ Decision

        reasoned that — “[a]ssuming [Bountoulougou] is married” — the Amended Application

        “is baseless because the false statement regarding her marital status is material to her

        membership in the proposed particular social group [of uncircumcised Mossi women of

        Burkina Faso who are subjected to forced marriages].” Id. The IJ Decision did not address

        or decide in its frivolousness analysis the materiality of any falsehood that the IJ did find,

        including the falsehood in the Original Application that Bountoulougou had wed Idrissa

        Kone in Burkina Faso.        And thereafter, the BIA Order summarily approved the IJ

        Decision’s materiality ruling without acknowledging and contending with the reasoning

        stated — and not stated — for that ruling. See BIA Order 2.

               In the briefs submitted to this Court, Bountoulougou challenges the IJ Decision’s

        materiality ruling and argues that the IJ could not have properly found that the Original

        Application’s fabrication of the marriage to Idrissa Kone was material because that

        fabrication “actually hurts” Bountoulougou’s asylum claim.            See Br. of Pet’r 13.

        According to Bountoulougou, “[b]y having a spouse listed [in the Original Application,

        she was] essentially foreclosing the portion of her claim in which she feared being forced

        to marry a man by her family.” Id. at 15. As such, Bountoulougou contends that — if the

        IJ had deemed the Original Application’s fabrication of the marriage to be material — that

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        would have been a finding that was “clearly erroneous.” Id. at 13-14. For support,

        Bountoulougou invokes authorities suggesting that a fabrication must be helpful to an

        asylum claim in order to be material. See id. at 14 (citing, e.g., In re Bosuego, 17 I. & N.

        Dec. 125, 130 (BIA 1980), explaining that a misrepresentation is material for purposes of

        an inadmissibility determination under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 “if either (1) the alien is excludable

        on the true facts or (2) the misrepresentation tends to shut off a line of inquiry which is

        relevant to the alien’s eligibility and which might well have resulted in a proper

        determination that he be excluded”); see also Y-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 159 (describing

        materiality in the frivolousness analysis as a “mixed question[] of fact and law”).

               The Government counters by insisting that — notwithstanding the IJ Decision’s

        language that it merely assumed that Bountoulougou lied about not being married in the

        Amended Application — the IJ Decision actually found both the Original Application and

        the Amended Application to be frivolous. See Br. of Resp’t 50 (asserting that the IJ

        Decision’s frivolousness “analysis rested on the reasoning that [the Amended Application]

        was also frivolous and that [Bountoulougou] amended [the Original Application] to fit her

        newly-proffered particular social group of ‘uncircumcised Mossi women of Burkina Faso

        who are subjected to forced marriages’”). The Government premises its theory on an

        implicit frivolousness finding and argues that — because the IJ found that Bountoulougou

        generally “was not credible” — the IJ “was not required to credit any of her statements”

        and thus “was eminently justified in concluding that [the Amended Application] was also

        fabricated.” Id. at 51. As the Government would have it, although the IJ Decision’s

        materiality ruling pertained only to the Amended Application, the frivolousness analysis is

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        unassailable because the IJ implicitly and properly found, based on Bountoulougou’s

        general lack of credibility, that the Amended Application was frivolous for falsely stating

        that Bountoulougou was not married.

                                                    C.

               We are constrained to conclude that the IJ Decision’s frivolousness determination

        was erroneous as a matter of law in that the IJ failed to properly apply the agency’s own

        regulatory framework.     See Y-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 159 (designating the issue of

        “[w]hether the [IJ] properly applied the regulatory framework” as “a question of law”); see

        also Yousif, 796 F.3d at 628 (explaining that “[w]hen reviewing a frivolousness finding,

        we review questions of law de novo”). In particular, the IJ Decision failed to make the

        required “specific finding that [Bountoulougou] deliberately fabricated a material element

        of [her] asylum claim.” See Y-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 156. Under the regulatory framework,

        the IJ Decision should have specifically found both a deliberate fabrication and the

        materiality of that same fabrication. Instead, the IJ Decision specifically found one

        deliberate fabrication (the Original Application’s statement that Bountoulougou was

        married to Idrissa Kone) but the materiality of another (the Amended Application’s

        statement that Bountoulougou was not married at all). Moreover, the IJ Decision merely

        “[a]ssum[ed]” the deliberate fabrication in the Amended Application, see IJ Decision 20,

        and it made no finding as to the materiality of the deliberate fabrication in the Original

        Application.

               In therefore concluding that the IJ Decision’s frivolousness determination was

        erroneous as a matter of law, we are not resolving whether we agree with Bountoulougou’s

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        contention that the IJ could not have properly found the deliberate fabrication in the

        Original Application to be material. That argument presents a hypothetical issue —

        whether the IJ would have erred as either a pure question of fact or a mixed question of

        fact and law if he had ruled that the Original Application’s fabrication was material — that

        is not properly before us.

               We do, however, reject the Government’s theory that — notwithstanding the IJ

        Decision’s plain language “[a]ssuming” the Amended Application’s deliberate fabrication,

        see IJ Decision 20 — the IJ implicitly and properly found, based on Bountoulougou’s

        general lack of credibility, that Bountoulougou lied in the Amended Application about not

        being married. The Government’s theory is palpably inconsistent with the BIA’s Y-L-

        decision, in that an implied finding of a deliberate fabrication cannot be said to qualify as

        the requisite “specific finding,” nor can a deliberate fabrication finding “flow automatically

        from an adverse credibility determination.” See 24 I. & N. Dec. at 156 (internal quotation

        marks omitted).

               The notion that the IJ somehow properly found that Bountoulougou lied in the

        Amended Application about her marital status is further contradicted by Y-L-’s recognition

        of the following: an IJ’s obligations to discuss the evidence supporting a deliberate

        fabrication finding and to “provide cogent and convincing reasons for finding [a deliberate

        fabrication] by a preponderance of the evidence”; the Government’s burden to prove a

        deliberate fabrication; and the opportunity that must be accorded to the respondent “to

        account for any discrepancies or implausible aspects of the claim relied on in the

        frivolousness finding.” See 24 I. & N. Dec. at 156-58. Here, the IJ Decision neither

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        discussed evidence tending to show that Bountoulougou actually was married when she

        stated in the Amended Application that she was not, nor provided any reason for finding

        such a deliberate fabrication by a preponderance of the evidence. The IJ Decision also did

        not mention any effort by the Government to prove that Bountoulougou lied about her

        marital status in the Amended Application.           See IJ Decision 3 (describing the

        Government’s position as being that Bountoulougou lied in the Original Application

        alone). And although it is undisputed that Bountoulougou was accorded a sufficient

        opportunity to account for the admitted falsehoods in the Original Application, there is no

        indication the same is true with respect to any alleged falsehood about her marital status in

        the Amended Application.

               At bottom, the Government’s theory does not save the IJ Decision from the

        conclusion that the IJ failed to properly apply the controlling regulatory framework.

        Simply put, before being subjected to the harsh consequences of the IJ Decision’s

        frivolousness determination, Bountoulougou was entitled to procedural safeguards that she

        was not afforded. Cf. Ndibu v. Lynch, 823 F.3d 229, 236 (4th Cir. 2016) (denying the

        petition for review where, contrary to the petitioner’s arguments, he received satisfactory

        notice of the consequences of filing a frivolous asylum application); Y-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec.

        at 162 (sustaining the respondent’s appeal from a frivolousness finding that did “not meet

        the regulatory requirement that the respondent be afforded a sufficient opportunity to

        explain perceived discrepancies or implausibilities”).

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                                                  III.

              Pursuant to the foregoing, we grant Bountoulougou’s petition for review and

        remand for such other and further proceedings as may be appropriate.

                                                                         PETITION GRANTED

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