Court Opinion

ID: 9396925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-23 22:03:37.504354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:19.390491
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/23/23 Napitupulu v. Mad Science Laboratories CA2/1
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                           SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                          DIVISION ONE

 JONATHAN NAPITUPULU,                                                 B317570

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                   (Los Angeles County
                                                                      Super. Ct. No. SC129321)
           v.

 MAD SCIENCE LABORATORIES,
 LLC,

           Defendant and Respondent.

     Appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, H. Jay Ford, III, Judge. Affirmed.
     Law Office of Gene H. Shioda, Gene H. Shioda and James A.
Kim for Plaintiff and Appellant.
     Kingfisher Law, Nithin Kumar; Bird, Marella, Boxer,
Wolpert, Nessim, Drooks, Lincenberg & Rhow, Ekwan E. Rhow
and Thomas R. Freeman for Defendant and Respondent.

                             ______________________________
       This appeal involves a wage claim by appellant Jonathan
Napitupulu (Napitupulu), a laboratory scientist, against respondent
Mad Science Laboratories, LLC, doing business as “Rehab Lab”
(Mad Science). For the reasons more fully set forth below, we
affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Mad Science
on the ground that he had no wages due.
       In 2016, Mad Science hired Napitupulu to serve as its
technical supervisor. Mad Science agreed to pay Napitupulu an
annual salary of $170,000 for his work in that role. Mad Science
also transferred a five percent ownership interest in its business
to Napitupulu, which entitled him to additional compensation
in the form of profit-sharing payments. Napitupulu’s 2016 profit-
sharing compensation totaled approximately $115,490. The parties
agree that Mad Science employed Napitupulu on an “at will” basis,
and on August 9, 2016, Napitupulu signed an “employee statement”
containing an acknowledgement to that effect. (Capitalization
omitted.)
       In January 2017, Mad Science informed Napitupulu that
it could no longer afford to pay him a fixed annual salary, but
that it would continue to make monthly profit-sharing payments.
Notwithstanding the reduction in his compensation, Napitupulu
continued working as Mad Science’s technical supervisor through
mid-October 2017. Between January and October 2017, he received
10 profit-sharing payments from Mad Science totaling at least
$103,500. On October 17, 2017, however, Napitupulu sent an
email to Mad Science in which he resigned and stated his
“inten[tion] to file a wage claim with the Labor Department for
the wages [Mad Science had] failed to pay [him] since January
2017.” (Capitalization added.)
       On May 24, 2018, Napitupulu filed a complaint against
Mad Science in the Los Angeles County Superior Court asserting

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a single cause of action for failure to pay wages under Labor Code
sections 201, subdivision (a), 204, subdivision (a), and 204.2.1
Napitupulu alleged that under “the terms of [his 2016] employment
agreement, [Mad Science] promised [him] a fixed compensation
of a monthly salary in the amount of $14,166.16 in exchange
for the performance of his job duties,” and that he “was in fact
never paid any of his wages for the approximate[ly] nine months
[he] performed his duties . . . in 2017.” He sought $134,578.52 in
unpaid wages, as well as waiting time penalties equal to “[30] days
of wages in the amount of $14,166.16.”2 Napitupulu’s complaint

      1Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references are to
the Labor Code.
      Section 201, subdivision (a) requires the immediate payment
of any “wages earned and unpaid at the time of [an employee’s]
discharge.” (§ 201, subd. (a).) Section 204, subdivision (a)
mandates, with certain exceptions, that “[a]ll wages . . . earned by
any person in any employment are due and payable twice during
each calendar month, on days designated in advance by the
employer as the regular paydays.” (§ 204, subd. (a).) Finally,
section 204.2 provides, in relevant part, that “[s]alaries of executive,
administrative, and professional employees of employers covered
by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 . . . earned for labor
performed in excess of 40 hours in a calendar week are due
and payable on or before the 26th day of the calendar month
immediately following the month in which such labor was
performed.” (§ 204.2.)
      2Although the complaint alleges that “[t]he total amount
of unpaid wages due . . . is calculated at $1345,578.52,” this is
a typographical error. Napitupulu’s declaration in opposition to
summary judgment provides that the total amount of allegedly
unpaid wages is $134,578.52. The complaint’s reference to “the
waiting time penalties set forth in . . . [section] 204” appears to be

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also sought attorney’s fees and interest under sections 218.5 and
218.6.
       After more than three years of litigation, on July 19, 2021,
Mad Science moved for summary judgment on the ground that
it had no obligation to pay Napitupulu a fixed annual salary in
2017. Mad Science argued that it had the authority to unilaterally
modify the terms of Napitupulu’s at-will employment, including
by reducing his wages. As a result, once it notified Napitupulu
in January 2017 of its decision not to continue paying him a fixed
annual salary in addition to profit-sharing payments, it ceased to
have any obligation to do so.
       In response, Napitupulu filed both (1) an opposition to Mad
Science’s motion, along with supporting declarations, and (2) a
motion for leave to file an amended complaint, which sought to add
new causes of action against Mad Science and to name additional
defendants. Napitupulu did not file objections to any evidence
supporting Mad Science’s motion. Mad Science then filed a reply
brief and evidentiary objections.
       On October 19, 2021, the trial court heard argument on
the motions and then took the matters under submission. In a
subsequent written ruling, the court granted summary judgment
in favor of Mad Science and denied Napitupulu’s motion for leave
to amend. The court did not rule on Mad Science’s evidentiary
objections. Napitupulu timely appealed.
       Although Napitupulu identifies five “issues on appeal”
(capitalization omitted), in reality, he makes two arguments:

another typographical error. Section 204 does not contain any
provisions concerning waiting time penalties, and we assume that
Napitupulu intended to refer to the penalties available under
section 203.

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(1) the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Mad
Science, and (2) the court abused its discretion in denying his
motion for leave to file an amended complaint. We disagree with
both contentions.
       Applying a de novo standard of review, we conclude that the
trial court properly granted summary judgment to Mad Science.
(See Peralta v. The Vons Companies, Inc. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th
1030, 1034 [“[w]e review a trial court’s granting summary judgment
de novo”].) “[A]n employer may unilaterally alter the terms of
an [at-will] employment agreement,” including by reducing an
employee’s wages, “provided such alteration does not run afoul
of the Labor Code.” (Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc. (2009) 47 Cal.4th
610, 619–620, citing DiGiacinto v. Ameriko-Omserv Corp. (1997) 59
Cal.App.4th 629, 637.) “An ‘employee who continues in the employ
of the employer after the employer has given notice of changed
terms or conditions of employment has accepted the changed terms
and conditions.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 620.)
       Here, Mad Science has presented undisputed evidence
of Napitupulu’s status as an at-will employee. Mad Science also
has presented undisputed evidence that it notified Napitupulu
in January 2017 of its decision to cease paying him a fixed salary,
and that Napitupulu nonetheless continued to work as the lab’s
technical supervisor until October 2017. Although Napitupulu
urges that he never expressly “agreed to a loss of his wages,” he
accepted the changed terms and conditions of employment by virtue
of his decision to continue working for Mad Science. (See Schachter,
supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 610.) We therefore agree with Mad Science
that it had no obligation to pay Napitupulu any fixed salary
payments in 2017.

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       As he did before the trial court, Napitupulu advances three
alternative theories of liability that he contends defeat summary
judgment. First, Napitupulu insists that Mad Science’s 2017
profit-sharing payments do not “qualify as substitute wage
compensation” under California law or the Fair Labor Standards
Act. Napitupulu’s argument appears to be that because the
profit-sharing compensation he received in 2017 cannot qualify
as “wages,” he effectively worked for Mad Science for free in 2017,
and Mad Science therefore violated California’s minimum wage
laws. Second, Napitupulu contends that Mad Science violated
sections 204 and 2263 by failing to make timely profit-sharing
payments and by failing to provide wage statements reflecting
those payments. Third, Napitupulu urges that Mad Science
breached the parties’ profit-sharing agreement by ceasing to
pay profit-sharing payments to him following his October 2017
resignation.
       As to Napitupulu’s first theory, Schachter instructs that
“[i]ncentive compensation, such as bonuses and profit-sharing
plans, . . . constitute wages” under California law. (Schachter,
supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 618.) Napitupulu concedes this legal
principle, but argues that the profit-sharing payments at issue
here are distinguishable from those in Schachter because his
ownership interest in Mad Science is fully vested. Even if the
vesting status of Napitupulu’s ownership interest affects whether
his profit-sharing compensation qualifies as wages (a point we need
not decide), Napitupulu fails to point to any evidence demonstrating

      3Section 226 sets forth, inter alia, information that an
employer must include in an employee’s wage statements. (§ 226.)

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the purportedly fully vested nature of his ownership interest.4
(Hutton v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th
486, 492 (Hutton) [once defendant makes the requisite summary
judgment showing, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to produce
evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of material
fact”].)
        Moreover, none of Napitupulu’s three alternative theories
appears anywhere in his complaint. “[T]he burden of a defendant
moving for summary judgment only requires that [it] negate
plaintiff ’s theories of liability as alleged in the complaint” (Hutton,
supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 493), and Napitupulu therefore cannot
rely on his unpleaded theories to defeat summary judgment.
        Nor do any of the purportedly disputed facts Napitupulu
identifies preclude summary judgment. He urges that the parties
dispute whether (1) Mad Science first hired Napitupulu directly in
2016 or indirectly through a staffing agency in 2015, (2) entities
allegedly affiliated with Mad Science that appear on some of
Napitupulu’s employment-related documents qualify as joint
employers for purposes of his wage claim, and (3) Mad Science
misrepresented to Napitupulu in 2017 that the Internal Revenue
Service prohibits paying a worker wages in addition to profit
distributions.

      4 We reject Napitupulu’s related argument that the trial
court erred by denying his request for a continuance to permit more
discovery on the vesting issue. In denying his request, the trial
court noted Napitupulu’s failure to present any “evidence why the
sought-after discovery was not obtained before the opposition [to
Mad Science’s summary judgment motion] was filed.” Napitupulu
similarly fails to identify any such evidence on appeal.

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       None of these disputes is material, however, because none
alters the three dispositive facts here—namely, that (1) at some
point prior to January 2017, Mad Science hired Napitupulu directly
as an at-will employee; (2) Mad Science notified Napitupulu in
January 2017 of its decision to modify the terms of his at-will
employment; and (3) Napitupulu nonetheless chose to continue
working for Mad Science through October 2017. Accordingly, we
conclude that Mad Science met its summary judgment burden, and
the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Mad
Science.
       We conclude further that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Napitupulu’s motion for leave to file an
amended complaint. (Record v. Reason (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th
472, 486 (Record) [denial of leave to amend reviewed for abuse of
discretion].) Through the proposed amendment, Napitupulu sought
to name five additional defendants and to add causes of action for
(1) breach of fiduciary duty against one of the new defendants,
and (2) “winding up and dissolution; sale of membership interest”
against Mad Science and several of the new defendants. (Boldface
and capitalization omitted.)
       We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that these new
claims are at best tangentially related to Napitupulu’s claim
for unpaid wages, and that “[n]othing in the proposed [amended
complaint] changes the[ ] undisputed material facts” that entitle
Mad Science to summary judgment on the wage claim. Moreover,
following three years of litigation, Napitupulu waited until just
six weeks before trial to seek leave to amend his complaint.
(See Record, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 486 [“ ‘even if a good
amendment is proposed in proper form, unwarranted delay in
presenting it may—of itself—be a valid reason for denial’ ”].) On

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this record, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion
in denying leave to amend.5

                             DISPOSITION
     We affirm the December 20, 2021 judgment. Mad Science is
awarded its costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                          ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

                  CHANEY, J.

                  WEINGART, J.

      5  We note that Napitupulu subsequently filed a separate
action asserting claims substantially similar to the new claims
he sought to present in his proposed amended complaint in
this action. (See Napitupulu v. Mad Science Laboratories, LLC
(Super. Ct. L.A. County, No. 22SMCV00132).) On February 21,
2023, the trial court overruled Mad Science’s demurrer to the
second amended complaint filed in that action, and set a case
management conference for June 7, 2023.

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