Court Opinion

ID: 9665586
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:52:09.571873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:16.228619
License: Public Domain

Roberds, J.,
(dissenting).
We have crossed the Rubicon. The Court has now held that every employer, who is within the Workmen’s Compensation Act, is liable for every injury inflicted by one employee on a co-employee while working together at the place of work, even though the injury results from personal malice on the part of the wrongdoer towards the injured employee. There is no claim here that the injury arose out of the employment other than in the sense that both were employed and were working at, or about, the same place. In other words, every employer is the guarantor against eccentricities, habits, temperament, disposition, inclinations, emotions, and foolish whims of all of his employees. With deference to my brethren I do not think the phrase ‘£ arising out of * * * employment”, as used in the Act, means that, nor that the Legislature intended for it to mean that. Now, as to the meaning of the phrase:
So far as this Court is concerned we have settled upon the definition of that meaning in the opinion this day handed down sustaining a suggestion of error in the case of Brookhaven Steam Laundry, v. Watts, Miss., 59 So. (2d) 294. I can do no better than to quote what we there say:
££In holding that the claimants are not entitled to recover in this case we do not lose sight of the fact that the Workmen’s Compensation Act, Chapter 354, Laws of 1948, should be given a liberal interpretation in order to effect its salutary purposes. Deemer Lumber Co., v. Hamilton, 211 Miss. 673, 52 So. (2d) *846634. But we must also not lose sight of the fact that it is the duty of the court to construe the Act as it is written. In section 2(2) of the Act the word “injury” is defined as follows: ‘ “Injury” means accidental injury or accidental death arising out of and in the course of employment, and includes injuries to artificial members; and also includes an injury caused by the wilful act of a third person directed against an employee because of his employment, while so employed and working on the job.’
“ ‘While the interpretation of the phrase “arising out of the employment”, as used in workmen’s compensation acts to define the injuries compensable thereunder, has given rise to many questions of considerable difficulty, as to which the decisions are not harmonious, there is general agreement upon the proposition that an injury arises out of an employment when but only when there is a causal connection between such injury and the conditions under which the work is required to be performed, it is not sufficient that the employee is at the place of his employment at the time of the accident and doing his usual work.’ 58 Am. Jur., Workmen’s Compensation, p. 718, Par. 211.
“In discussing the meaning of the words ‘Arising out of and in the course of employment’ Schneider, often quoted by the courts in compensation cases, says: ‘As has already been indicated, it has been held quite uniformly that an injury arises out of the employment when there is a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. * * * The fact that one is working at the time he is injured, and would not have suffered injury had he not been employed, does not show a causal connection between the employment and the injury, nor will a showing that the employment brought the party to *847the place where injured and that he would not have met with the accident elsewhere show a proximate causal relation between the employment and the injury.’ ‘The risk must be reasonably incidental to the employment * * *. There must be some connection between the injury and the employment other than the mere fact that the employment brought the injured party to the place of injury.’ Schneider, Vol. 6, pages 7, 32 and 33.”
Thus it is seen we have adopted the rule there must be a causal relation, between the employment and the injury — something in the relation or about the work — which produces the injury, such, for instance, as a dispute with a foreman over the manner of doing the work, or that the act which caused the injury was in furtherance of the master’s business.
Logically, it is difficult to see any causal relation whatever between this assault and the work at hand. It did not promote the work. The employees, at that time, were not about the work. Their acts had nothing to do with the employment. Indeed, they had turned aside and were about their own play, which ultimately resulted in a malicious assault by Stewart, prompted solely and alone by personal anger and animosity. Stewart himself testified he was as “mad as an old hen”, and the nature of the weapon he used, the manner of its use and the unfortunate result all show conclusively this was an angry malicious attack.
I turn now to the specific holdings of the courts as to liability for injuries resulting from skylarking, or fooling, as well as from malicious assaults from personal animosity. I discuss both because both are here involved, although in the final analysis the nature of the act is re-' duced to a willful personal assault.
Now, as to skylarking, horseplay, or fooling: The rule is stated in 58 Am. Jur., pg. 769, Sec. 268, in these words: “It is generally'held that no compensation is recoverable under the workmen’s compensation acts, for injuries sus*848tained through practical joking or sportive acts done independently of and disconnected from the performance of any duty of the employment, since such injuries cannot ordinarily be regarded as having arisen o.ut of the employment within the meaning of the acts ’ ’.
There is a note on the subject beginning at page 540 of 13 A. L. R.. The annotator states this to be the rule: ‘£ It is generally held that no compensation is recoverable under the "Workmen’s Compensation Act, for injuries sustained through horseplay or fooling which was done independently of and disconnected from the performance of any duty of the employment, since such injuries do not arise out of the employment within the meaning of the acts”. Some forty or fifty cases are cited, from various states of the union, to sustain the stated rule. I will mention only a very few by way of illustration:
Where an employee ivas injured on an elevator while scuffling with fellow employees. Feda v. Cudahy Packing Co., 102 Neb. 110, 166 N. W. 190.
Where a domestic servant, while in the course of her duties, was struck and blinded by a rubber ball playfully thrown by another servant. Wilson v. Laing, (S. C.) 46 Scot. L. R. 843.
Where an employee was injured in the eye by a stick thrown in play by a fellow employee. Pierce v. Boyer-Van Kuran Lbr. & Coal Co., 99 Neb. 321, 156 N. W. 509, L. R. A. 1916D. 970.
Where there was an injury by the forcing of compressed air into the body of a workman engaged in the performance of his duties, by fellow employees who used a hose upon him in a spirit of fun. Tarpper v. Weston-Mott Co., 200 Mich. 275, 166 N. W. 857, L. R. A. 1918E, 507.
No compensation was allowed in any of these cases. Many more could be cited under this note.
The foregoing annotation was followed by others in 20 A. L. R. pg. 882; 36 A. L. R. pg. 1469, and 43 A. L. R. pg. 492. The same rule as to non-liability of skylarking, *849or horseplay, is deduced in all of them and perhaps a hundred cases, or more, are cited to sustain the stated rule. I mention only two by way of contrast. Where claimant, while going about his work, was playfully grasped from behind and felled by a fellow employee, his leg being broken by the fall* no recovery could be had. Washburn’s Case, 123 Me. 402, 123 A. 180.
Where an employee, angered by directions given him by another employee, hit the claimant with a steel rod and injured him. Maguire v. James Lee & Sons Co., 273 Pa. 85, 116 A. 679.
There are some four or five exceptions to the non-liability rule but the facts of this case do not bring it within any of them.
As to Personal 111 Will Assaults:
As stated, I think this, in the last analysis, was a personal assault from anger. Stewart said that himself.
The rule is stated in 6 Schneider, pg. 120: (2) in the following words: “Generally, if one employee assaults another employee solely to gratify his feeling of anger or hatred, the injury resulting from the voluntary act of the assailant cannot be said to arise either directly out of the employment or as an incident of it. Compensation is usually denied under such circumstances. ’ ’
58 Am. Jur., pg. 768, Sec. 266 sets out the rule in these words: “® * * it is generally held that an injury from an assault on an employee committed by one solely to gratify his personal ill will, anger or hatred does not arise out of the employment within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation acts, although there are decisions to the contrary”.
There are notes on this question in 15 A. L. R. pg. 594; 21 A. L. R. pg. 760; 29 A. L. R. pg. 441; 40 A. L. R. pg. 1126; and 72 A. L. R. pg. 113. The general rule is stated in 15 A. L. R. supra, in this language: “If the assault on an employee was committed by another solely to gratify his personal ill will, anger, or hatred, it is generally *850held that the injury did not arise out of the employment within the meaning of the workmen’s compensation acts”. The same rule is deduced in the subsequent annotations. Many, many cases are cited to support the rule. Time and space forbid my citing them. 1 will mention only enough to illustrate the difference between cases of liability and non-liability.
In Fey v. Bobrink, 84 Ind. App. 559, 151 N. E. 705, the assault of one employee by another was the result of a quarrel over the manner of doing' the work. There was liability. On the other hand, compensation was denied where an employee renewed a quarrel with a fellow workman during a rest period and killed such workman It was said that although the employment presented the. opportunity for the injury, they were not connected with the employment or incident thereto. Martin v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & I. Co., 216 Ala. 500, 113 So. 578. Compensation was allowed for the death of a mill superintendent who was killed by another employee whom he had discharged, and with whom he had had an argument about leaving the factory. Field v. Charmette Knitted Fabric Co., 245 N. Y. 139, 156 N. E. 642.
I will mention only a few other cases among many which might be cited, that are perhaps more in point with the case at bar than those above cited.
Bruton and deceased were in the employ of a furniture company, Bruton as a sweeper by day and deceased as a night watchman. Between 1:00 and 3 o’clock at night Bruton, on account of domestic troubles between the two men, shot and instantly killed deceased while he was on duty as a night watchman. The claim was not compensable. The court quoted, apparently with approval, from the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, In re Employers’ Liability Corporation, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N. E. 697, this pronouncement: “ ‘It (the injury) arises “outof” the employment, when there is apparent to the rational mind upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the conditions under *851which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. Under this test, if the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person familiar with the whole situation as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment, then it arises “out of” the employment. But it excludes an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to which the workmen would have been equally exposed apart from the employment. ’ ’ ’ The court went on to say that the causative danger must be peculiar to the work; it must be incidental to the character of the business. The claim here was held to be non-compensable. Harden v. Thomasville Furn. Co., 199 N. C. 733, 155 S. E. 728, 729. It might be here noted that Stewart would just as likely and quickly have gone haywire and attacked Pittman had they been at a baseball game as he did under the circumstances here. The work did not in the slightest cause the assault.
In Industrial Commission v. Strome, 107 Colo. 54, 108 P. (2d) 865, claimant, while discharging his duties as an employee, was struck on the head by a shovel wielded by a fellow employee. The motive for the attack was not shown. The court held that this injury did not “arise out of” the employment. The court remarked “The general rule, with the reasoning supporting it, seems thus fairly stated: ‘Ordinarily, assault by co-employees cannot be considered as incidental to the employment; and so an injury to an employee assaulted by a fellow workman does not generally arise “out of the employment”.’ ” The court observed that the burden of showing that the injury arose out of, or was caused by, the employment was upon the claimant.
In January-Wood Co. v. Schumacher, 231 Ky. 705, 22 S. W. (2d) 117, 120, a night watchman on duty was killed by a nonemployee because of domestic difficulties. The court observed that the Kentucky statute, *852like ours, requires that the injury shall arise out of and in the course of the employment, two distinct factual requirements. The court said, “The Compensation Act does not afford compensation for injuries or misfortunes which are merely contemporaneous or coincident with the employment or collateral to it. There must be a direct causal connection between the employment and the injury. That is an essential connecting link to the operation of the act. It is absent in this case. Schumacher’s death cannot be traced to any cause set in motion in his employment. We cannot reason from the sequel to the cause.”
In Plouffe v. American Hard Rubber Co., 211 App. Div. 298, 207 N. Y. S. 373, the claimant, angered when a fellow employee took a pencil from behind claimant’s ear, slapped the fellow employee, who retaliated by striking the claimant on the jaw, causing an abscessed cheek, was not permitted to recover, the court holding that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of the employment.
In Griffin v. A. Roberson & Son, 176 App. Div. 6, 162 N. Y. S. 313, 315, there was a personal assault upon claimant by a fellow employee. The injury was not compensable. The court said “The case at bar is very similar in its essential and controlling features to the case of an accident arising out of horseplay. Diametrically opposite motives, it is true, occasion the injurious acts in the two classes of cases; but in both classes of cases the purpose is to gratify a personal desire. In one class of cases, the motive is a spirit of frivolity or playfulness. In the other the motive is anger, animosit}^, or vindictiveness. But in both the purpose is not to serve the master’s interest, but to serve a momentary personal emotion of the employees”.
In Scholtzhauer v. C. & L. Lunch Co., 233 N. Y. 12, 134 N. E. 701, 702, claimant was shot and killed by a fellow employee while both were on duty, because she refused to go out with him. The claim was non-com*853pensable. The court, responding to the argument of claimant, said, “The authorities cited by the respondent are not in point. The injury in such cases all arose over some dispute as to the work to be done by the employee or in some other way were directly traceable to and connected with the employment. Here the injury to the daughter, while it arose during the course of, did not arise out of, the employment. The only suggestion that the employment had any bearing on the injury was that the employment brought the two persons together. The murder, however, arose not out of the employment, but because the deceased refused to accept Arthur’s invitation, and his anger by reason thereof.”'
So was it in the case at bar. Stewart assaulted Pittman, not because they were working for the same master or because the assault had any relation, or causal connection whatever, with the work, but purely because of anger, aroused instantly and without justification, towards Pittman.
The majority opinion cites, quotes from, and evidently relies upon Horovitz, “Current Trends in Workmen’s Compensation”; Chambers v. Union Oil Co., 199 N. C. 28, 153 S. E. 594; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Cardillo, 72 App. D. C. 52, 112 F. (2d) 11; Ferguson v. Cady-McFarland Gravel Co., 156 La. 871, 101 So. 248; Keyhea v. Woodward-Walker Lbr. Co., La. App., 147 So. 830; Verschleier v. Stern & Son, 229 N. Y. 192, 128 N. E. 126; Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N. Y. 470, 128 N. E. 711, 13 A. L. R. 522; and Gillmore v. Ring Const. Co., 227 Mo. App. 1217, 61 S. W. (2d) 764.
It will be helpful to briefly examine these authorities.
Without intending the slightest criticism, I think it proper to observe that the main business of Mr. Horovitz, as commonly reputed, is the representation of claimants in compensation cases. It is noted, too, that the quotations are mainly expressions of what he thinks is, or ought to be, the law in these cases. He says in one place “* * * my view on the matter is quite de*854termined”. At least, these considerations should have some bearing upon the weight to be given his comments.
In the Chambers case the observations of the court applied only to horseplay. In the case at bar, the injury was the result of a wilful attack. In addition, the facts are not the same in the two cases. In the Chambers case both claimant and Loven were truck drivers delivering oil. Loven had been held up and either robbed, or attempted to be robbed, of the money of his employer, collected for the sale and delivery of oil. The drivers carried on their persons large sums of money of their employer. Loven had armed himself with a pistol for protection of his employer’s property. lie threw the pistol into his truck and it accidentally discharged striking claimant in the foot. Loven was about his master’s business when the injury occurred. The pistol was being used to protect the employer’s property. No wilful assault was involved.
The Hartford case has been given undue weight because Justice Rutledge, the writer of the opinion, later became a member of the Supreme Court of the United States. However, I think it must be admitted that much of the meaning is obscured by the language used in the opinion. Also a considerable part of the opinion is a discourse upon philosophy and social relations— not an analysis of legal principles. But the case is not authority for the bolding in the case at bar. The facts are entirely different. There Bridges and Downey were co-workers loading vegetables onto a truck for their employer. Downey was the checker in charge of the work, giving directions to Bridges. In the course of giving such directions, and as they proceeded with the work, Downey called Bridges a nickname, which Bridges resented, and as Downey persisted, Bridges called him a vile name, and Downey struck Bridges, the claimant. At once it is seen Downey was the superior of Bridges,' had a right to and did give him directions, and that this controversy arose through the relation of superior and *855inferior and ont of performance of duties. That is quite a different case from the one at bar. But, in addition to this, the statute there involved created a presumption “ ‘in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary —,(a) That the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter’ ” [72 App. D. C. 52, 112 F. (2d) 13]. No such statute is involved in the case under consideration. ’
In the Ferguson case claimant was about his work when he was hit by a co-employee with an iron bar. No motive was shown for the act; whereas in the case at bar the motive was shown to be entirely personal. Also, Louisiana had a statute which defined accident, for which the employer was liable, as “ ‘An unexpected or unforseen event happening, suddenly or violently, with or without human fault and producing at the time objective symptoms of injury’ [156 La. 871, 101 So. 249].
The 'Keyhea case dealt with, the same statute and cited the Ferguson case as authority for its holding.
The Verschleier case is authority for the holding of the majority. That decision was by a divided court.
In the Leonbruno case the claimant took no part in the horseplay. Fie was an innocent bystander. Some of the cases say that fact constitutes an exception to the rule of non-liability in horseplay cases.
In the Gillmore case the trouble arose over discussion of union rules and their violation as applying to the work; also the court said, “It is inferable from from the evidence that the conversation (giving rise to the assault) was concerning work on the construction in hand’’ [227 Mo. App. 1217, 61 S. W. (2d) 765]. In other words, the controversy arose over matters pertaining to the work the employees were performing.
Thus it is seen that in the main cases cited in the majority opinion and from which extensive quotations are made, only one supports the conclusion reached in *856that opinion and that was by a divided court. This becomes an important fact when there are hundreds of cases dealing with the questions' under consideration.
I stated above I did not believe the Legislature intended the result reached in the able controlling opinion. I say that for two reasons. The first is if it intended that liability could rest merely upon the fact of association of employees there was no need whatever to require the condition that the injury must arise out of the employment. The phrase “arising out of employment” might as well have been left out of the act. The section requires the injury must “arise out of and in the course of the employment”. Both facts must exist. If mere association is enough, the first requirement is useless.
The second reason is that we have judicial notice of the public policy of this State to induce industries to locate herein. That is shown by statutory enactments, tax exemptions and creation of boards, supported by public funds, charged with duties to induce industries to come into the state. The carte blanche liability imposed upon such employers by the rule laid down in the majority holding must necessarily discour age new industries from coming into this state and encourage those already here to move away. I don’t believe the Legislature would have intentionally done that. Seemingly they are faced with two alternatives; One is to carry large insurance coverage, at greatly increased premiums in view of almost certain liability, and the other might be to engage a psychiatrist to go about among the employees and weed out those likely to run amuck, and discharge them. However, that would probably bring about two unsatisfactory results: The specialist might overlook some employee of peculiar tendencies or eccentricities, and those dismissed would likely sue for damage for wrongful discharge.