Court Opinion

ID: 9758921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:56:09.038377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:01:31.184868
License: Public Domain

WATHEN, Chief Justice.
[¶ 1] Plaintiff Toni Brand appeals from an order of the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Saufiey, J.) dismissing her complaint against defendant Judith Seider, a psychologist. The court dismissed the complaint on the basis that plaintiff failed to file a notice of claim pursuant to the Maine Health Security Act (HSA), 24 M.R.S.A. § 2501 et seq. (1990 & Supp.1996).1 Plaintiff argues that the *847HSA does not apply because her claim for breach of confidentiality is not an “action for professional negligence” within the meaning of 24 M.R.S.A. § 2502(6) (1990). She argues in the alternative that if the claim is subject to the HSA, the appropriate remedy is to stay the action to permit her to comply with the notice requirement. We conclude that plaintiffs claim is governed by the HSA and that the court erred in denying plaintiffs request for a stay. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment.
[¶ 2] Plaintiffs complaint alleges that defendant provided psychological counseling services to her in February 1992, and thereafter provided similar services to plaintiffs daughter and the daughter’s father without plaintiffs knowledge. During the time that defendant provided these latter services, she allegedly disclosed confidential information about plaintiff and her son without plaintiffs consent. This confidential information was allegedly conveyed to the father of plaintiffs daughter and his attorney in December 1992, when plaintiff and the father were engaged in litigation over the custody and care of their daughter. The complaint further alleges that, despite plaintiffs protests, defendant continued her counseling relationship with plaintiffs daughter until October 1993.
[¶ 3] The complaint was filed on February 20, 1996. In defendant’s answer, she raised the affirmative defenses of failure to comply with the HSA, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and comparative negligence. She then moved to dismiss the claim for failure to comply with the notice of claim provisions of the HSA. At the hearing on the motion, the court ruled that the HSA governed plaintiffs claim and granted the motion to dismiss. The court denied plaintiffs request for a stay of the dismissal to allow her to comply with the HSA, stating that it had no authority to do so.
[¶ 4] We find no merit in plaintiffs first argument that the HSA applies only to traditional negligence claims and does not govern a claim for breach of confidentiality by a health care practitioner.2 The HSA defines an “action for professional negligence” as:
any action for damages for injury or death against any health care provider, its agents or employees, or health care practitioner, his agents or employees, whether based upon tort or breach of contract or otherwise, arising out of the provision or failure to provide health care services.
24 M.R.S.A. § 2502(6)(1990). In recognition of the legislative intent to have the HSA “fully occupy the field of claims brought against health care providers,” we have construed this statutory definition broadly. Dutil v. Burns, 674 A.2d 910, 911 (Me.1996) (strict liability and breach of warranty claims governed by the HSA) (citing Musk v. Nelson, 647 A.2d 1198, 1201 (Me.1994)). Plaintiff does not escape the provisions of the HSA merely by alleging a breach of a professional code of conduct as opposed to a breach of a standard of professional care.
[¶ 5] Plaintiff argues also that her action did not “aris[e] out of the provision or failure to provide health care services,” as required by section 2502(6), because the alleged breach occurred after the termination of the professional relationship. The trial court’s reasoning in this regard, however, is persuasive:
[T]he bottom line here is that the claims of Toni Brand, although they do not fall within the typical psychologist/patient period of treatment, do involve the provision of or failure to provide health care services because there was a continuing duty to Ms. Brand and that duty was a duty that arose out of the professional services provided by Ms. Seider to Ms. Brand and those professional services did not simply terminate on the date that the relationship terminated, but a continuing duty to treat information gained with confidentiality existed ... it is that duty that is alleged to have been violated.
Defendant’s alleged breach of confidence, the disclosure of information gained within the *848context of the patient-therapist relationship, constitutes a failure to perform her professional duties and a “failure to provide health care services.”
[¶ 6] Having determined that plaintiffs claim is governed by the HSA, we next address the appropriate remedy for her failure to comply with the notice requirement. Plaintiff argues that the court erred in ruling that it had no authority under the statute to stay the proceedings to permit her to serve the written notice of claim required by HSA. In Dougherty v. Oliviero, 427 A.2d 487 (Me.1981), we held that dismissal is not required by the statute as long as an action is commenced before the expiration of the statute of limitations. See also Michaud v. Northern Maine Medical Center, 436 A.2d 398 (Me.1981).3 In the present case, defendant has not raised the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. Under these circumstances, the court erred in denying plaintiffs request for a stay of the proceedings.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein.

. 24 M.R.S.A. § 2903 (Supp.1996) provides that “(n)o action for professional negligence may be commenced until the plaintiff has ... (s)erved *847and filed written notice of claim in accordance with section 2853.”

. It is conceded that a psychologist is a health care practitioner. 24 M.R.S.A. § 2502(1-A) (1990).

. In Dougherty and Michaud, we interpreted an earlier version of section 2903 (repealed and replaced by P.L.1985, c. 804) that provided “no action ... shall be commenced until at least 90 days after written notice of claim ... is served....” The statute has since been amended to provide that:
No action for professional negligence may be commenced until the plaintiff hás:
A. Served written notice of claim in accordance with section 2853;
B. Complied with the provisions of subchap-tcr IV-A (prelitigation screening panel process); and
C. Determined that the time periods provided in section 2859 have expired.
24 M.R.S.A. § 2903 (1990 & Supp.1996).