Court Opinion

ID: 9517894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:36:13.02538+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:16:19.032148
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
DeBruler, J.
Both our Federal and State Constitutions require that jury panels reflect a cross section of the community they are drawn from. Whitus v. Georgia (1967), 385 U.S. 545, 87 S. Ct. 643, 17 L. Ed. 2d 599; Smith v. Texas (1940), 311 U.S. 128, 61 S. Ct. 164, 85 L. Ed. 84; Dixon v. State (1946), 224 Ind. 327, 67 N. E. 2d 138. This requirement places an affirmative duty on jury commissioners to prepare jury lists which do in fact reflect a cross section. Avery v. Georgia (1953), 345 U.S. 559, 73 S. Ct. 891, 97 L. Ed. 1244; Thiel v. Southern Pacific (1946), 328 U.S. 217, 66 S. Ct. 984, 90 L. Ed. 1181; Glasser v. U.S. (1942), 315 U.S. 60, 62 S. Ct. 457, 86 L. Ed. 680. In our opinion in State ex rel. Brune v. Vanderburgh Circuit Court (1971), 255 Ind. 505, 265 N. E. 2d 524, we held that a statutory scheme of selecting jury panels, which was fair on its face, but which in practice excluded significant numbers of the adult citizens of the county would not meet constitutional requirements, “for the reason that in Vanderburgh County the names selected from the tax duplicates and schedules would not contain a list of persons that would be a representative cross section of the citizens of Vanderburgh County.” I agree with the majority that our holding Brune does not mandate the use of a voting list rather than a tax list. It does, however, stand for the principle that jury commissioners have an affirmative duty to compile and use a list which does indeed represent a cross section of the community.
The appellant in this case challenges the jury panel for much the same reason as the Brune challenge; that the list used for selection of prospective jurors does not contain a representative cross section of the county population. The *283affidavit attached to appellant’s challenge to the array states that there are approximately 25,000 adult persons in Daviess County of which approximately 2,000 adults are of the Amish Religion. However, the list used by the jury commissioners in that county reflected only 5 % of the adult Amish names or about .4% out of about 8% of the total adult Amish population, a differential of over 7 %.
These figures indicate to me that the selection procedure used by the commissioners work in their application to exclude an identifiable and substantial segment of the adult population of Daviess County and therefore appellant has made out a prima facie case of constitutional violations. Alexander v. Louisiana (1972), 92 S. Ct. 1221, (7% differential between black population and blacks on jury list); Preston v. Mandeville, 428 F. 2d 1392 (5th Cir. 1970) (15% differential between black population and blacks on master roll).
I believe that when such a prima facie showing of exclusion is made a hearing on the matter must be held and the burden then shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of unconstitutionality. Alexander v. Louisiana, supra; Turner v. Fouche (1970), 396 U.S. 346, 90 S. Ct. 532, 24 L. Ed. 2d 567; Black v. Curb, 464 F. 2d 165 (5th Cir. 1972); Muniz v. Dato, 434 F. 2d 697 (5th Cir. 1970). The State’s burden would not be met merely by asserting that the list used is neutral on its face or that the commissioners’ use of that list was not in any way designed to exclude an identifiable group of the community from the jury panel. A selection of a jury list which in its application excludes an identifiable group, whether unintentionally or intentionally, fails to meet constitutional standards. Jones v. Georgia (1967), 389 U.S. 24, 88 S. Ct. 4, 19 L. Ed. 2d 25; Smith v. Texas, supra. The Constitution mandates affirmative duties of jury commissioners which must be carried out to insure a constitutionally secure system. Avery v. Georgia, supra. The fact that jury commissioners have acted in good faith is not a defense to the failure to discharge the affirmative constitutional duty to *284provide and use a list which reflects a cross section of the community. Salary v. Wilson, 415 F. 2d 467 (5th Cir. 1969).
Nor do I believe, as the majority seems to imply, that appellant’s standing to object to the array rests on his being a member of that group which is being excluded. It matters not whether a defendant in a trial is a member of a group which is being excluded from a jury list. The crux is that a defendant has a constitutionally protected right to a cross section of the community on his jury list and when the list used fails to provide that cross section his standing, as a defendant, is established.
I should also point out that there exists no conflict between any First Amendment rights of the Amish and the duty to include their names on jury lists. Any such conflict would arise only on their being selected as jurors for a case. At that point the judicially recognized religious beliefs of the individual Amish may allow him to be excused from his obligation. Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), 92 S. Ct. 1526. However these instances must be based on individual information and circumstances and may not be grounded in the assumed beliefs of an entire group.
I would hold this appeal in abeyance and remand to the trial court for a hearing to afford the State an opportunity to rebut the presumption of unconstitutionality raised by appellant’s challenge to the array.
Note.—Reported in 295 N. E. 2d 600.