Court Opinion

ID: 9964900
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-01 13:08:53.955913+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:47.325873
License: Public Domain

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
ex rel. Martre v. Reed, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-1624.]

                                           NOTICE
      This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
      advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
      promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
      South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
      formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
      the opinion is published.

                          SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-1624
      THE STATE EX REL . MARTRE, APPELLANT , v. REED, JUDGE, ET AL.,
                                        APPELLEES.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
          may be cited as State ex rel. Martre v. Reed, Slip Opinion No.
                                     2024-Ohio-1624.]
Mandamus—Appellant’s appeal from trial judge’s posttrial order setting
        limitations on return of property seized from appellant constitutes an
        adequate remedy in ordinary course of law—Court of appeals’ dismissal of
        petition affirmed.
      (No. 2023-1111—Submitted March 26, 2024—Decided May 1, 2024.)
         APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Allen County, No. 1-23-22.
                                   __________________
        Per Curiam.
        {¶ 1} Appellant, Derrick Martre, appeals the Third District Court of
Appeals’ dismissal of his petition for a writ of mandamus against appellees, Judge
                                SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Jeffrey L. Reed of the Allen County Court of Common Pleas and Allen County
Prosecuting Attorney Destiny Caldwell.1
        {¶ 2} We affirm the Third District’s judgment because Martre had an
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. Martre has also filed a motion
for judicial notice, which we deny.
                   I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
        {¶ 3} In May 2017, Martre was arrested by the Toledo Police Department
for domestic abuse and possessing sexually explicit images of children on his
cellphone. The arrest was prompted by a police report filed by Martre’s then-
girlfriend indicating that Martre had assaulted her in a hotel room in Toledo. She
told police that Martre became angry after she had seen two videos on Martre’s
cellphone, each of them showing Martre touching a naked female child. She
recognized the children as the six- and nine-year-old daughters of Martre’s ex-
girlfriend, who lived in Lima and with whom Martre had recently been staying.
She gave Martre’s cellphone to Toledo police, who obtained a warrant to search its
contents.
        {¶ 4} In December 2017, an Allen County grand jury indicted Martre on six
felonies: two counts of gross sexual imposition, two counts of pandering sexually
oriented material involving a minor, and two counts of illegal use of a minor in
nudity-oriented material. Martre pleaded no contest to the indictment. The trial
court found Martre guilty of the charged offenses and sentenced him to an aggregate
term of 12 years in prison. The court also classified Martre as a Tier II sex offender.
        {¶ 5} In March 2021, Martre filed a motion for return of property in the
Allen County Court of Common Pleas, requesting that the court order the return of
his seized cellphone and its memory card. He argued that his cellphone was

1. Martre’s petition named former Allen County Prosecuting Attorney Juergen Waldick as the
second respondent. The Third District noted that Destiny Caldwell had succeeded Waldick as the
prosecutor, and it therefore automatically substituted her as a party under Civ.R. 25(D)(1).

                                              2
                                January Term, 2024

unlawfully seized in that the warrant issued to search his cellphone was void due to
alleged noncompliance with inventory procedures set forth in R.C. 2933.241.
       {¶ 6} In April 2021, Judge Reed issued a judgment entry granting the
property motion subject to certain limitations. The entry specifically stated, “[T]he
motion is granted to the extent that any items seized from [Martre], that are being
held by any law enforcement agency in Allen County, Ohio, that are not contraband
or illegal for defendant to have, and that are not being held for evidence, shall be
returned to [him].” The entry did not address Martre’s contention that the search
warrant was void.
       {¶ 7} Martre appealed Judge Reed’s decision to the Third District Court of
Appeals. The Third District summarized Martre’s argument as contending “that by
ordering the return of his property the trial court actually granted a post-sentence
‘suppression’ motion, and thus the trial court’s entry granting Martre the return of
his property should have also vacated his convictions in this matter.” Martre’s
argument stemmed from the text of R.C. 2981.03(A)(4), which allows “[a] person
aggrieved by an alleged unlawful seizure of property” to challenge the seizure; the
provision also states that “[i]f the motion is filed by a defendant after an indictment
* * *, the court shall treat the motion as a motion to suppress evidence.”
       {¶ 8} The Third District rejected Martre’s argument and affirmed Judge
Reed’s decision. The Third District noted that Judge Reed had not concluded that
the warrant to search Martre’s phone was void, and it determined that it was not
necessary for the judge to reach that issue to rule on the property motion. This court
declined to accept Martre’s appeal from the Third District’s judgment. State v.
Martre, 165 Ohio St.3d 1504, 2022-Ohio-85, 179 N.E.3d 120.
       {¶ 9} In May 2023, Martre petitioned the Third District for a writ of
mandamus against Judge Reed and the Allen County prosecutor. Martre asserted
that because Judge Reed granted his property motion, he had a right to a suppression
hearing, a right to a judgment of acquittal of the charges relating to the images

                                          3
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

found on his cellphone, and a right to findings of fact and conclusions of law from
Judge Reed. Martre asserted that the judge “now has a duty to dismiss any and all
charges related to the suppressed cellular device” and that the prosecutor “has an
obligation to see that Martre is accorded justice.”
        {¶ 10} Judge Reed and the prosecutor moved to dismiss the petition. In
their motion, they argued that Martre’s claim was barred by res judicata, citing his
appeal from the order granting his property motion. They also argued that “[t]o the
extent that res judicata does not preclude [Martre’s] claims, he has alternative
remedies available at law, which also bars relief in mandamus.” Martre opposed
the motion to dismiss, repeating the arguments made in his petition.
        {¶ 11} In August 2023, the Third District dismissed Martre’s petition under
Civ.R. 12(B)(6). The court concluded that the petition failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted because Martre had an adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of the law to raise his arguments, either through direct appeal or
postconviction motions.
                                   II. ANALYSIS
                            A. Motion for judicial notice
        {¶ 12} Martre filed an unopposed motion for judicial notice in this court.
“A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is
either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2)
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned.” Evid.R. 201(B). Evid.R. 201 “governs only
judicial notice of adjudicative facts; i.e., the facts of the case.” Evid.R. 201(A).
        {¶ 13} Martre’s motion proffers two “facts,” neither of which may be the
subject of judicial notice under Evid.R. 201. First, Martre argues that when the
Third District denied his appeal from the order granting his property motion, it
erroneously found that “there was no properly filed suppression motion before the
trial court.” (Emphasis omitted.) Second, Martre asks this court to take judicial

                                           4
                                 January Term, 2024

notice of a discrepancy between the Third District’s summary of his criminal case
and unauthenticated copies of police reports and the search warrant that were
attached to his petition.
        {¶ 14} We reject both of Martre’s requests for judicial notice. First, the
details of Martre’s prosecution are not public knowledge. Second, this court is
under no obligation to take judicial notice of facts that are not significant to the
disposition of the case before us. See State ex rel. Ware v. Akron, 164 Ohio St.3d
557, 2021-Ohio-624, 174 N.E.3d 724, ¶ 10 (denying motion for judicial notice
because the proffered facts were “not relevant to the substantive issues before us”);
see also Home S. & L. Co. v. Eichenberger, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 12AP-1, 2012-
Ohio-5662, ¶ 26 (“Courts are not required to take judicial notice of facts that are
irrelevant to the proceedings”). The threshold issue in this appeal is whether Martre
has asserted a cognizable claim for mandamus relief—specifically, whether his
appeal from Judge Reed’s decision granting the property motion provided an
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. As explained below, Martre has
failed to assert a cognizable mandamus claim; therefore, we need not consider
Martre’s allegations of errors made by Judge Reed in crafting his order granting the
property motion. The matters of which Martre asks this court to take judicial notice
thus are not relevant to the issues before this court.
        {¶ 15} Martre’s motion for judicial notice is denied.
                                    B. Mandamus
        {¶ 16} On appeal, Martre asks this court to reverse the Third District’s
dismissal of his mandamus petition and remand the case to that court, directing it
to reach the merits of his claim that Judge Reed’s decision granting the property
motion entitles Martre to a suppression hearing and ultimately dismissal of the
charges relating to the images found on his cellphone.
        {¶ 17} This court reviews a court’s judgment of dismissal under Civ.R.
12(B)(6) de novo. State ex rel. Brown v. Nusbaum, 152 Ohio St.3d 284, 2017-

                                           5
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Ohio-9141, 95 N.E.3d 365, ¶ 10. Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted is appropriate “if, after all factual
allegations of the complaint are presumed true and all reasonable inferences are
made in [the] relator’s favor, it appears beyond doubt that [the] relator can prove
no set of facts warranting relief.” Clark v. Connor, 82 Ohio St.3d 309, 311, 695
N.E.2d 751 (1998).
       {¶ 18} To state a claim for a writ of mandamus, a relator must allege facts
showing (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the
part of the respondent to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Love v. O’Donnell, 150 Ohio St.3d 378,
2017-Ohio-5659, 81 N.E.3d 1250, ¶ 3.
       {¶ 19} Martre argues that the Third District abused its discretion by
determining that he had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law
through direct appeal or postconviction motions. In the context of an extraordinary-
writ claim that asks a superior court to intervene in a criminal case, this court has
determined that direct appeals and postconviction motions constitute adequate
remedies at law. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sands v. Culotta, 165 Ohio St.3d 172, 2021-
Ohio-1137, 176 N.E.3d 735, ¶ 12. Courts have classified requests for the return of
seized property under R.C. 2981.03(A)(4) as postconviction motions. See State v.
Glenn, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112696, 2023-Ohio-4654, ¶ 12, citing State v.
Martre, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-21-1199, 2022-Ohio-639, ¶ 23, and State v.
Holloway, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-20-021, 2021-Ohio-1843, ¶ 11-24.
       {¶ 20} Martre had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law
because he could—and did—appeal Judge Reed’s decision granting the property
motion to the Third District. That the Third District did not adopt Martre’s
interpretation of R.C. 2981.03(A)(4) did not render the appeal an inadequate
remedy. “ ‘The fact that a prior appeal was unsuccessful or even wrongly decided
does not mean that it was not an adequate remedy.’ ” (Emphasis sic.) State ex rel.

                                          6
                                 January Term, 2024

Mobarak v. Brown, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2024-Ohio-221, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 9,
quoting State ex rel. Peoples v. Johnson, 152 Ohio St.3d 418, 2017-Ohio-9140, 97
N.E.3d 426, ¶ 11. We affirm the Third District’s judgment because it correctly held
that Martre had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.
       {¶ 21} Similarly, to the extent that Martre requests a writ to compel Judge
Reed to revise or remove the limitations he included in his order granting Martre’s
property motion, such relief is not available through a writ of mandamus.
“ ‘Mandamus will not lie to control judicial discretion, even if that discretion is
abused.’ ” State ex rel. Martin v. Russo, 160 Ohio St.3d 21, 2020-Ohio-829, 153
N.E.3d 20, ¶ 10, quoting State ex rel. Rashada v. Pianka, 138 Ohio St.3d 44, 2006-
Ohio-6366, 857 N.E.2d 1220, ¶ 3.
                              III. CONCLUSION
       {¶ 22} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Third
District Court of Appeals. We deny Martre’s motion for judicial notice.
                                                                 Judgment affirmed.
       KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER,
and DETERS, JJ., concur.
                                 _________________
       Derrick Martre, pro se.
       Destiny Caldwell, Allen County Prosecuting Attorney, and John R.
Willamowski Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
                                 _________________

                                         7