Court Opinion

ID: 9949069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 18:03:21.690686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:35.237270
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/8/24 P. v. Brackett CA1/1
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                        A169041
 v.
 CHRISTOPHER BRACKETT,                                                  (Humboldt County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. CR2103519)
           Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Christopher Brackett appeals from an order placing him on
probation after he pleaded guilty to a felony count of driving under the
influence (DUI). His appellate counsel asked this court for an independent
review of the record to determine if there are any arguable issues. (People v.
Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) After conducting such a review, we requested
and received supplemental briefing on whether (1) the trial court erred in
imposing a “court fine” of $3,287 and (2) Brackett’s four-year probation period
was unauthorized.
         Having reviewed the parties’ briefing, we conclude that remand is
required for the trial court to specify the statutory bases for the $3,287
charge. We also conclude that the four-year probation period is unauthorized
and that Brackett may challenge it on remand. Otherwise, we affirm.

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                                    I.
                          FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
                               BACKGROUND
      Brackett was charged with three DUI counts based on a July 2021
incident during which he crashed his car into a utility pole.1 In August 2023,
under a plea agreement, he pleaded guilty to driving under the influence and
admitted four previous DUI convictions. He also admitted there were
aggravating circumstances justifying an upper-term sentence and waived his
custody credits. The remaining counts were dismissed.
      At the same August 2023 hearing, the trial court sentenced Brackett to
the upper term of three years in prison and suspended execution of the
sentence. He was placed on probation for four years with the condition that
he serve 180 days in jail. The court also imposed various fines and fees,
including “the court fine of $3,278.”
                                         II.
                                  DISCUSSION
      A.    Remand Is Required for the Trial Court to Specify the Statutory
            Bases for the $3,278 Charge.
      As the parties agree, the trial court erred by not identifying the
statutory bases for the $3,287 “court fine.” As a result, we remand for the
court to clarify this monetary charge.

      1 Brackett was charged with felony counts of driving under the

influence under Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a), and driving with
a .08 percent blood alcohol content under Vehicle Code section 23152,
subdivision (b), and a misdemeanor count of driving with a suspended license
under Vehicle Code section 14601.1, subdivision (a). As to the felony counts,
it was also alleged that (1) Brackett had four prior convictions for DUI
offenses within the meaning of Vehicle Code section 23550.5 and (2) various
aggravating circumstances might apply under Penal Code section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2). All further statutory references are to the Vehicle Code
unless otherwise noted.

                                         2
      At sentencing, the trial court imposed “the court fine of $3,287,” $1,000
of which it “suspend[ed] . . . pending [Brackett’s] successful completion of
probation.” The court also imposed a $300 restitution fine under Penal Code
section 1202.4, subdivision (b), a $40 court operations fee under Penal Code
section 1465.8, subdivision (a), and a $30 criminal conviction fee under
Government Code section 70373, and it imposed and stayed a $300 probation-
revocation restitution fine under Penal Code section 1202.44. The written
probation order, which was based on the probation department’s proposed
order, states that the $3,287 charge is “pursuant to Section 23552” and
“includes penalty assessments.”
      A trial court must “specify the statutory bases for the fine[s], fees, and
penalty assessments imposed.” (People v. Hartley (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th
620, 636.) Courts have some flexibility in how they comply with this duty,
but the record must sufficiently identify the statutory authority for each
component of each charge. (Id. at pp. 636–637.) The “failure to specify the
amount and statutory basis for each fine, fee, and penalty assessment is a
‘legal error[] at sentencing’ that can be reviewed on appeal ‘ “regardless of
whether an objection or argument was raised.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 637.)
      As the parties agree, the trial court did not comply with this
requirement in imposing the $3,287 charge. Section 23552, the statute
identified in the written probation order, provides for “a fine of at least three
hundred ninety dollars ($390) but not more than one thousand dollars
($1,000).” (§ 23552, subd. (a)(1).) We cannot determine which part of the
$3,287 charge represents the base fine and which part represents the penalty
assessments, especially since the court stayed $1,000 of it. Thus, remand is
required for the court to specify the statutory bases for the charge. (See
People v. Hartley, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 637.)

                                        3
      B.    The Four-year Probation Period Was Unauthorized, and Brackett
            May Challenge it on Remand.
      Brackett claims, and the Attorney General effectively concedes, that
the four-year probation period was unauthorized under Assembly Bill
No. 1950 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 1950). But the parties
differ on whether Brackett is entitled to have this court modify the
unauthorized term in the first instance. We conclude that if Brackett wishes
to avoid the term, he must pursue the issue on remand to give the People the
opportunity to withdraw from the plea bargain.
      Effective January 1, 2021—over two years before Brackett was
sentenced—Assembly Bill No. 1950 amended Penal Code section 1203.1 to
limit the maximum probation period for felony offenses. (People v. Kite
(2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 986, 992 (Kite).) Under prior law, “the length of felony
probation could not exceed five years or the maximum possible sentence of
imprisonment, whichever was longer.” (Ibid.) Now, the statute provides
that, with certain exceptions, felony probation “may continue for a period of
time not exceeding two years.” (Pen. Code, § 1203.1, subds. (a), (l).)
      One of these exceptions is relevant here: For “an offense that includes
specific probation lengths within its provisions,” the trial court may grant
probation for a period “not exceeding the maximum possible term of the
sentence.” (Pen. Code, § 1203.1, subd. (l)(1).) This exception “includes
felonies for which the law specifies only a minimum probation length, even if
the minimum is set forth in a different code section from the crime itself.”
(Kite, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 993.) Under section 23600,
subdivision (b)(1), if the defendant is granted probation for a violation of
section 23152, as Brackett was, “the period of probation shall be ‘not less
than three nor more than five years; provided, however, that if the maximum
sentenced provided for the offense may exceed five years in the state prison,

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the [probation] period . . . may be for a longer period than three years but
may not exceed the maximum time for which sentence of imprisonment may
be pronounced.’ ” (Kite, at p. 994, quoting § 23600, subd. (b)(1).)
      In Kite, the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that “the phrase
‘maximum possible term of the sentence’ as used in [Penal Code]
section 1203.1, subdivision (l)(1)[,] refers to the maximum possible term of
imprisonment that could be imposed for the offenses, rather than the
maximum probation period allowable under any other law specifying a
specific probation length.” (Kite, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 994–995.)
Here, the maximum term for Brackett’s offense is three years. (See
§ 23550.5, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (h)(1).) Thus, under Kite, the
maximum probation period for Brackett’s offense is three years, and the four-
year period was unauthorized when imposed.
      The Attorney General does not contest that the four-year probation
period was unauthorized by law. Nonetheless, he claims that Brackett
cannot challenge it on appeal, based on both the absence of a certificate of
probable cause and principles of estoppel. We are not persuaded.
      As relevant here, if a defendant appeals after a guilty plea, a certificate
of probable cause is required unless the appeal is based on “[t]he sentence or
other matters occurring after the plea . . . that do not affect the validity of the
plea.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(2)(B); Pen. Code, § 1237.5,
subd. (b).) To determine whether an appellate challenge to a sentence is
permissible without a certificate of probable cause, “ ‘the critical inquiry is
whether a challenge to the sentence is in substance a challenge to the validity
of the plea.’ ” (People v. Buttram (2003) 30 Cal.4th 773, 781–782.) If a
defendant agrees to a specified term as part of a plea, then a challenge to the
sentence amounts to “an attack on the validity of the plea, for which a

                                         5
certificate [is] required.” (Id. at p. 782.) But “where the terms of the plea
agreement leave issues open for resolution by litigation, appellate claims
arising within the scope of that litigation do not attack the validity of the
plea, and thus do not require a certificate of probable cause.” (Id. at p. 783.)
      The Attorney General claims that under this authority, a certificate of
probable cause was required because Brackett’s “negotiated plea included a
probation period of four years.” But the record is ambiguous on this point.
On his plea form, Brackett initialed a box acknowledging that if he pleaded
guilty to the offense, the trial court would place him on probation for four
years. On the other hand, the form also stated that there was an open plea
“as to the People,” and the prosecutor initialed a box stating that he agreed
“with the terms of the plea agreement and the indicated sentence” but
handwrote next to this statement, “but open, do not agree with probation.”
And at the combined plea and sentencing hearing, the trial court stated,
“This was an open plea from the People. What the Court had indicated and
communicated to both counsel is that I would agree to place [Brackett] on
probation after reviewing the probation report as [the probation department
was] recommending the same.” Based on this record, we conclude that the
four-year probation period was not an agreed-upon term, and Brackett’s plea
was not to a specified sentence under People v. Buttram, supra, 30 Cal.4th at
p. 782.
      Whether Brackett is estopped from challenging the four-year probation
period is a closer question. Generally, “defendants may challenge an
unauthorized sentence on appeal even if they failed to object below,” but this
rule is “subject to an exception: Where . . . defendants have pleaded guilty in
return for a specified sentence, appellate courts will not find error even
though the trial court acted in excess of jurisdiction in reaching that figure,

                                        6
so long as the trial court did not lack fundamental jurisdiction. The rationale
behind this policy is that defendants who have received the benefit of their
bargain should not be allowed to trifle with the courts by attempting to better
the bargain through the appellate process.” (People v. Hester (2000)
22 Cal.4th 290, 295.) Although the People did not agree that Brackett should
be placed on probation, on the plea form he accepted a four-year probation
period. Thus, he arguably waived his current challenge to that term.
         Nevertheless, we conclude that the best course is to permit Brackett to
raise the issue on remand, since remand is required anyway. At the same
time, we agree with the Attorney General that Brackett is not entitled to a
reduced probation period while otherwise preserving the plea agreement’s
benefits. This is not a situation where an intervening change in the law
rendered the sentence unauthorized, in which case the prosecution cannot
withdraw from a plea deal. Rather, because Penal Code section 1203.1 was
amended well before Brackett was sentenced, the four-year probation period
was unauthorized when imposed, and the plea agreement was therefore
illegal. (See People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 974.) If, on remand,
Brackett chooses to challenge the unauthorized term, the People may either
accept a reduced probation period or withdraw from the plea agreement. (See
ibid.)
                                        III.
                                    DISPOSITION
         The matter is remanded for the trial court to specify the statutory
bases for the $3,287 charge. On remand, Brackett may challenge the
unauthorized probation period if he chooses to do so. The judgment is
otherwise affirmed.

                                         7
                                 _________________________
                                 Humes, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Banke, J.

_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.

People v. Brackett A169041

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