Court Opinion

ID: 9622273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:14:54.287765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:15.484872
License: Public Domain

*85Justice HUDSON
dissenting.
Because I do not agree that Thigpen v. Ngo, 355 N.C. 198, 558 S.E.2d 162 (2002), controls here and because the majority opinion demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of both the plain language of North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 9(j) (Rule 9(j)), which allows for an extension of the statute of limitations in a medical malpractice case, and the plain language of North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) (Rule 15(a)), which allows a plaintiff to amend his complaint as a matter of course and without leave of the trial court before the filing of a “responsive pleading” by a defendant, I respectfully dissent.
This is a medical malpractice case, initially filed by the plaintiff pro se, on 29 March 2006, alleging that negligence and medical malpractice caused the death of his father on 3 April 2004. The applicable statute of limitations provides that “[a]ctions for damages on account of the death of a person caused by the wrongful act, neglect or fault of another” must be brought within two years from the date of the person’s death. N.C.G.S. § 1-53(4) (2009). Under section 1-53(4), the statute of limitations would not have run on plaintiff’s claims on account of the death of his father until 3 April 2006. Until that time, plaintiff could have filed suit naming any and all persons and entities and alleging any and all claims he believed had merit.
Rule 9(j) contains the special provisions which are at issue here and which state, in pertinent part:
Upon motion by the complainant prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, a resident judge of the superior court. . . may allow a motion to extend the statute of limitations for a period not to exceed 120 days to file a complaint in a medical malpractice action in order to comply with this Rule, upon a determination that good cause exists for the granting of the motion and that the ends of justice would be served by' an extension.
Id. § 1A-1, Rule 9(j) (2009). Rule 9(j) also contains an expert certification requirement, which states that the complaint “shall be dismissed” unless it specifically alleges that “the medical care has been reviewed by a person who is reasonably expected to qualify as an expert witness under Rule 702 of the Rules of Evidence . . . who is willing to testify that the medical care did not comply with the applicable standard of care” or “has been reviewed by a person that the *86complainant will seek to have qualified as an expert witness . . . under Rule 702(e) ... who is willing to testify that the medical care did not comply with the applicable standard of care.” Id., Rule 9(j)(l), (2). Significantly, Rule 9(j) contains no language addressing when the expert must conduct the review of the medical care. Further, Rule 9Q) does not require that the expert certification be contained in the original complaint, nor does it address in any way the existing Rules of Civil Procedure regarding amendments to pleadings, such as Rule 15(a).
Plaintiff filed his complaint pro se on 29 March 2006, and on 31 March 2006, before the expiration of the statute of limitations, he filed a “Motion for 9 J Extension.” On 31 May 2006, a superior court judge allowed the motion for the 120-day extension, “retroactive to March 29, 2006.” By entry of this order, the trial judge extended the statute of limitations for 120 days from 29 March 2006 until 27 July 2006.1 Before the expiration of that period, plaintiff acquired counsel and filed: (1) a motion noting that, with the exception of defendant Kindred Nursing Centers East, L.L.C.,2 none of the other original defendants had answered plaintiff’s original 29 March 2006 pro se complaint, and consequently, “leave of Court is not required for purposes of filing” his amended complaint as to those defendants; and (2) an amended complaint adding two new parties defendant, Patricia Dix, N.P. and Eastern Carolina Family Practice, P.A. (“ECFP”). On 18 September 2007, defendants Patricia Dix, N.P., ECFP, and Steven Ferguson, M.D., who was named in plaintiff’s original pro se complaint, moved to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint. On 10 March 2008, the trial court entered an order allowing their motion to dismiss “pursuant to Rules 9(j), 12(b)(6), and 41 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure” and dismissed plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.
A majority of the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, because plaintiff “sought and received a Rule 9(j) extension and filed his amended complaint complying with Rule 9(j) within the extended limitations period.” Brown v. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. E., L.L.C., 196 N.C. App. —, —, 675 S.E.2d 687, 689 (2009). The majority in the *87Court of Appeals went on to explain that “[o]rdinarily, the issue with an amended [complaint]” filed after the statute of limitations has expired “is whether the amendments] ‘relate]] back’ ” to a time before the statute of limitations expired. Id. at-, 675 S.E.2d at 690-91. However, the court noted that because both the original and amended complaint were filed before the expiration of the extended statute of limitations, the “relation back” doctrine does not apply and that issue is not involved here. Id. at-, 675 S.E.2d at 691. The dissenting opinion would have affirmed the dismissal based on Thigpen, which the dissenter maintained requires that the medical care be reviewed by an expert before the plaintiff files the original complaint in order to comply with Rule 9(j). Id. at -, 675 S.E.2d at 692 (Elmore, J., dissenting).
Here the majority concludes that plaintiff did not receive a valid extension under Rule 9(j) because: (1) plaintiff titled his pro se request for an extension of the statute of limitations under Rule 9(j) as a “Motion for 9 J Extension” and the trial court’s order extending the statute of limitations merely states that it “grants Plaintiff’s motion for a 120 day extension for filing a 9 J statement”; and (2) plaintiff’s sole reason for requesting the extension — to locate an expert who was willing to testify on the record as to the standard of care — “is inconsistent with the General Assembly’s purpose behind enacting Rule 9(j).” I believe plaintiff did obtain a valid extension of the statute of limitations from 3 April 2006 until 27 July 2006 under Rule 9(j).
Rule 9(j) allows a superior court judge to extend the statute of limitations for a period of up to 120 days for a plaintiff “to file a complaint in a medical malpractice action in order to comply with this Rule.” N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 9(j). In essence, when plaintiff filed his pro se motion requesting an extension of time to obtain and include a Rule 9(j) certification, typically included in the complaint, he was requesting time to file a complaint that complied with Rule 9(j). Despite the imprecise language, it appears that plaintiff’s pro se motion could only mean that he was seeking additional time to file a complaint that complied with Rule 9(j). Thus, by extending the statute of limitations so that plaintiff could file a Rule 9(j) certification, the trial court was extending the time in which plaintiff could file a complaint. Nothing in Rule 9(j) indicates that, by enacting that rule, the legislature intended to prevent a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case from filing an original complaint before requesting a Rule 9(j) extension to locate a certifying expert who will testify on *88the record. In fact, Rule 9Q)’s plain language speaks of “a”, complaint, not an original or initial complaint. Id.
Rather than being based upon the plain language of Rule 9(j), the majority’s interpretation here originates from dictum in this Court’s opinion in Thigpen, to the effect that “[permitting amendment of a complaint to add the expert certification where the expert review occurred after the suit was filed would conflict directly with the clear intent of the legislature.” 355 N.C. at 204, 558 S.E.2d at 166. However, Thigpen is procedurally and factually distinguishable from this case in several material ways that lead me to conclude Thigpen does not control.
Here plaintiff filed the original, defective complaint before the statute of limitations ran, obtained a valid extension of the statute of limitations under Rule 9(j), and filed an amended complaint that complied with Rule 9(j) within the extended limitations period. In Thigpen, the plaintiff requested and obtained a valid extension of the statute of limitations under Rule 9(j) before filing any complaint. Id. at 199, 558 S.E.2d at 163-64. Then, she filed the original complaint lacking a Rule 9(j) certification after the original statute ran, but within the extended limitations period. Id. at 200, 558 S.E.2d at 164. She then sought to file an amended complaint containing a Rule 9(J) certification after the extended limitations period had passed. Id. Significantly, in Thigpen we held:
In sum, based on this record, we hold that once a party receives and exhausts the 120-day extension of time in order to comply with Rule 9(j)’s expert certification requirement, the party cannot amend a medical malpractice complaint to include expert certification. Further, we hold that Rule 9(j) expert review must take place before the filing of the complaint.
355 N.C. at 205, 558 S.E.2d at 167 (emphasis added). In contrast to Thigpen, plaintiff here filed a complaint that complied with Rule 9(j)’s expert certification requirement before exhausting the extended limitations period. Furthermore, the expert review occurred before plaintiff filed the amended complaint, following a course of action that is not addressed by our holding in Thigpen.
The fact that the plaintiff in Thigpen filed the amended complaint after the expiration of the extended limitations period, not within it as plaintiff did here, is a critical distinction. This is because amendments to a complaint made after the statute of limitations has *89expired, as occurred in Thigpen, necessarily invoke the “relation back” analysis, contained in N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 15(c), whereas the complaint here does not. In contrast, here plaintiffs ability to amend his complaint was subject to Rule 15(a), which states, in pertinent part:.
(a) Amendments. — A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 30 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party[.]
N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 15(a) (2009). Under Rule 15(a), with the exception of Kindred Nursing Centers East, L.L.C., plaintiff did not need leave of court to amend his complaint because none of the other defendants had filed an answer to plaintiff’s original compláint. See, e.g., Pierce v. Johnson, 154 N.C. App. 34, 37, 571 S.E.2d 661, 663 (2002) (“Rule 15(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to ‘amend his pleadings once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served.’ Rule 7 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure identifies all of the pleadings that are allowed in a civil case and makes it clear that motions and other papers are not considered pleadings. Therefore, threshold motions under Rule 12 and dispositive motions under other rules are not responsive pleadings that prevent an amendment without leave of court under Rule 15(a).” (citing N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rules 7,15(a) (2001); Johnson v. Bollinger, 86 N.C. App. 1, 7, 356 S.E.2d 378, 382 (1987); 1 G. Gray Wilson, North Carolina Civil Procedure, § 15-2, at 292 (2d ed. 1995))). This Court has noted:
The date of the filing of the motion, rather than the date the court rules on it, is the crucial date in measuring the period of limitations. The timely filing of the motion to amend, if later allowed, is sufficient to start the action within the period of limitations. Plaintiff’s amendment was therefore not barred by the statute of limitations, and whether it would “relate back” to the filing of the original complaint was immaterial.
Mauney v. Morris, 316 N.C. 67, 71-72, 340 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1986). Plaintiff’s amended complaint here has the effect of simply superseding his original complaint. See Hughes v. Anchor Enters., Inc., 245 N.C. 131, 135, 95 S.E.2d 577, 581 (1956) (citation omitted).
*90Even if Thigpen does control, for this Court to require that the medical care be reviewed before the filing of the original complaint is not only a legislative act, but one that runs exactly contrary to the plain meaning of 9(j). Rule 9(j) permits the plaintiff to file a motion before the expiration of the statute of limitations which, if allowed, can extend the statute of limitations for up to 120 days “in order to comply with this Rule.” To say that plaintiff has to have complied with the Rule before the extension period renders the extension meaningless. Such a conclusion would mean that, in order to get an extension of the statute of limitations “to comply with” the Rule, plaintiff would have to not need the extension.
Finally, the majority’s approach would completely undercut the purpose of the 120-day extension permitted under Rule 9(j). The majority here even recognizes that the legislature created the 120-day extension in order to “lessen the additional burden” of the more “stringent procedure” now required in medical malpractice claims. The Court of Appeals recognized this as well. Brown, 196 N.C. App. at -, 675 S.E.2d at 691 (majority). Requiring plaintiff to have had the review completed before the extension period would do the opposite. I do not believe that this is logical or consistent with the intent of the legislature. I would affirm the Court of Appeals, and thus, I respectfully dissent.
Chief Justice PARKER and Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON join in this dissenting opinion.

. In effect, the trial judge extended the statute of limitations for 116 days from 3 April 2006 until 27 July 2006. This action complies with the plain language of Rule 9(j) allowing a superior court judge “to extend the statute of limitations for a period not to exceed 120 days.”

. In November 2006 plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Kindred Nursing Centers, East, L.L.C., Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc., and Kindred Healthcare, Inc., who therefore are not involved in this appeal.