Court Opinion

ID: 9747015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:52:42.115197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:19.419647
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Manderino :
I concur with the majority that Rule 301 of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas (see majority opinion) has no reasonable relationship to the objective the Rule was designed to meet; that the Rule provides no standards; and that the Rule is too vague and over-broad. T must add that the Rule also violates constitutional guarantees in tbat it does not apply to all attorneys appearing in the criminal courts. The Rule is specifically aimed at defense counsel. It has no application to counsel for the prosecution. The Rule is thus one-sided and an obvious violation of the petitioner’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
A criminal trial requires an attorney to represent the prosecution and an attorney to represent the defense. Any rule (although it is otherwise constitutional) which restricts a particular attorney in the representation of defendants but does not restrict a particular attorney in representing the prosecution raises what may be insurmountable problems under the equal protection guarantees.
Rule 301 is a court rule. It is not and should not be a prosecution rule. Certain court rules applying only to defense counsel and not to counsel for the prosecution may be valid. In the present context, however, in which the objective is to eliminate the delay of criminal trials by restricting representation, I fail to see any difference *318between the defense and the prosecution side since both sides must be represented in a criminal trial and that requires two attorneys, one on each side.
If counsel for the prosecution represents the prosecution in cases involving ten or more defendants whose indictments are over a year old, I fail to see why such representation should not be prohibited in exactly the same manner that representation by defense counsel is prohibited.
The Rule also contains provisions in order to insure that an attorney who is a member of a firm does not allow his partners or associates to enter an appearance in order to avoid the Rule. I fail to see why this same prohibition should not apply to counsel for the prosecution. If counsel for the prosecution enters an appearance in a given case, substitution of other counsel for the prosecution should not be permitted if the purpose is to avoid compliance with the Rule.
Like the majority, I commend the effort to eliminate delays in the trial of criminal cases. A rule, however, cannot be constitutional which assumes a one-sided posture in a context which requires a two-sided posture. In the context of Rule 301, defense counsel is not a reasonable classification justifying restrictions which are not imposed upon counsel for the prosecution. In terms of appearances by attorneys for a criminal trial, the only reasonable classification for a rule would be the classification of trial counsel including both defense counsel and counsel for the prosecution.
Any rule designed to eliminate delay in the trial of criminal cases must not only meet the constitutional standards set forth in the majority opinion, but must also protect the petitioner’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.