Court Opinion

ID: 9756670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:46:43.550656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:27.619523
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
BENDER, J.:
¶ 1 The question before this Court is whether a common law rule that holds that one reaches a designated age not on the anniversary of one’s birth, as common contemporary custom has it, but instead the day before, should be applied to the sexual assault statutes. While the Majority provides an interesting historical perspective of the common law rule in question, and provides an impassioned plea and policy argument for why the common law rule should not be applied in the present case, the Majority’s disposition ignores critical aspects of the key decision in Commonwealth v. Iafrate, 527 Pa. 497, 594 A.2d 293 (1991), and also contravenes the rule of statutory construction requiring a strict construction of penal provisions. Thus, I dissent.
¶ 2 In the portion of the Majority’s Opinion devoted to legal analysis, the Majority cites to the Statutory Construction Act’s computation of time section, the section regarding presumptions in ascertaining legislative intent, the words and phrases section and common understanding/usage/custom, and concludes that the issue before us must be resolved against Appellant and in favor of the Commonwealth.
¶ 3 With respect to the computation of time section of the Statutory Construction Act, the Majority states “section 1908 clearly provides that the date of birth is determined by the anniversary date and not, as common law would provide, the day before.” Majority Opinion at 1205. This is a rather remarkable assertion inasmuch as neither the words “age,” “date of birth,” “birthday,” nor “birth date” appear in section 1908. The text of section 1908 provides as follows:
§ 1908. Computation of time
When any period of time is referred to in any statute, such period in all cases, except as otherwise provided in section 1909 of this title (relating to publication for successive weeks) and section 1910 of this title (relating to computation of months) shall be so computed as to exclude the first and include the last day of such period. Whenever the last day of any such period shall fall on Saturday or Sunday, or on any day made a legal holiday by the laws of this Commonwealth or of the United States, such day shall be omitted from the computation.
1 Pa.C.S. § 1908. A review of the text of section 1908 reveals that the section does not explicitly apply to the determination of age. Thus, the Majority makes a broad statement when it contends that section 1908 clearly provides that the date of birth is determined by the anniversary date.
¶ 4 A review of section 1908 reveals that, contrary to the Majority’s assertion, the section most rationally relates to provisions for the filing of documents or computing deadlines and/or statutes of limitation. How can this be discerned? The above premise is discernible from the section’s language regarding the omission of *1211Saturdays, Sundays or holidays. Literally read, for purposes of computing time, section 1908 excludes the last day if the day falls on a Saturday or a Sunday. This language strongly suggests that the section is meant to control deadlines for taking action.
¶ 5 Indeed, literal application of this section would mean that if one’s “birthday” fell on a weekend or holiday, for legal purposes one would remain the younger age until either Monday or the next business day. In point of fact, following section 1908 as it applies to birthdays would mean that bars that serve patrons on the 21st anniversary of their birth would violate the law if the 21st anniversary of birth fell on a Saturday, Sunday or a court holiday. The same result would occur for a store that sold cigarettes to a person turning 18 on a weekend or holiday. Does this make any sense? Viewing section 1908 in context reveals that extending a period of time to the next business day certainly is rational with respect to determining when a document is required to be filed or a limitations period runs, but has no rationality when construing when an individual becomes legally capable of purchasing cigarettes, alcohol or consenting to sexual activity. Clearly, when the whole of section 1908 is considered, there is no logical basis for pointing to that section as controlling the question before this Court.
¶ 6 The Majority seemingly accounts for this anomaly by stating, with regard to the provisions excluding weekends and holidays, “rather than the calculation of anniversaries, it is clearly evident that these additional days were intended by the legislature to allow for adequate notice and business calculations and to provide accommodation to business and legal proceedings.” Majority Opinion at 1204. The Majority would seemingly not apply the weekend and holiday provisions to the determination of one’s age because it is “clearly evident” that those provisions apply to business and legal proceedings. The question is, how is it clearly evident that those provisions apply only to some calculations of time and not others? Just as section 1908 does not specifically apply to calculations of age or birth dates, the language of the provision does not provide for any exclusions in its application. Thus, if reviewed in an objective fashion, the most that can be said about section 1908 is that it is uncertain whether it was meant to apply to the calculation of age.
¶ 7 The Majority next asserts that the legislature was obviously aware of the common law rule but must have intentionally omitted it from the Section 1908 so as to defeat its continuing application to determining one’s age. Majority Opinion at 1205. The Majority’s assertion is logically flawed in two respects. First, if it were truly the legislature’s intent to exclude the common law rule, the most unequivocal way to express this intent would be to explicitly exclude it, not to simply omit it from the text. Second, the Majority infers a positive intent from a negative, i.e., a non-action. Contrary to the Majority’s assertion, the failure to mention the common law rule entirely does not prove a positive intent to exclude the rule. Rather, it leaves the question unresolved and leaves open the possibility that the common law rule was never even considered in the first place, let alone considered and rejected. Again, an unbiased review of this section does little to resolve the interpretative puzzle provided by this case.
¶ 8 Lastly, the Majority points to the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the common law rule should not be applied to the provisions of the Juvenile Act in Commonwealth, v. Iafrate, 527 Pa. 497, 594 A.2d 293 (1991), as an additional basis for doing the same here. This reliance is where the Majority makes its largest analytical mis*1212take as the Majority fails to heed the approach utilized by the Supreme Court in solving the interpretative puzzle presented by this case. Indeed, given the Supreme Court’s discussion of this issue in Iafrate, this case is not as much about statutory interpretation as it is about interpreting a leading case on the matter issued by a higher authority than this Court.
¶ 9 In Iafrate, our Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether, for purposes of the Juvenile Act, one turned 18 on the 18th anniversary date of one’s birth or the day before, as dictated by the common law rule. While the Supreme Court ultimately concluded that one turned 18 for purposes of the Juvenile Act on the anniversary date, as opposed to the day before, the language used by the Court, and the methodology employed in reaching their decision, compels a conclusion opposite to the one reached by the Majority.
¶ 10 Importantly, after acknowledging that Pennsylvania’s juvenile justice system is primarily rehabilitative in nature, the Court’s detailed analysis of the issue began with recognition that the Juvenile Act was silent with respect to the method of computing the age of an individual, thus, requiring interpretative efforts. Notably, after acknowledging the statute’s silence on the matter, the Court did not simply refer to the Statutory Construction Act’s section relating to computation of time and end its analysis with citation to the provisions of that section. Similarly, despite acknowledging the common conception was that one was under an age until the anniversary date of the person’s birth, it did not simply accept the common custom as controlling. Instead, although the Court referenced the Statutory Construction Act, it looked at broader principles of statutory construction embodied within that Act. Considering that the Juvenile Act is rehabilitative in nature, the Court concluded that an interpretation that made the benefits of the Act more extensive was consistent with the interpretative principle that “all but certain classes of statutes ‘shall be liberally construed to effect their objects and to promote justice.’ 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(c).” Iafrate, 527 Pa. at 501, 594 A.2d at 295. However, it is the next portion of the Court’s analysis that is particularly germane to the analysis here. Immediately after citing the principle that all but certain classes of statutes “shall be liberally construed to effect their objects and to promote justice,” id., the Court pointed out the class of statute to which the general rule does not apply, stating:
Conversely, since the Crimes Code is obviously penal in nature, its application should be strictly construed against the party seeking enforcement and in favor of the defendant. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(b)(1).
Id. (footnote omitted). If the importance of including this sentence, and its juxtaposition next to the preceding statement, happened to be lost upon readers, the Court seemingly hammered home the nature of its ruling when it stated, “[fjinally, our decision today is limited to a determination of age under our Juvenile Act. For purposes of the Act, an individual becomes a year older on the day of his birthday and not the day before.” Id.
¶ 11 By explicitly limiting its holding to the Juvenile Act, and in pointing out the contrasting principle of strict construction of penal statutes, the Supreme Court appeared to be laying a prospective analytical framework for analyzing a case that had yet to be decided involving application to various offenses contained in the Crimes Code. Today, in the present case, we are presented with that very circumstance. Since in this case we are dealing with a penal statute, the general principles of statutory construction relied upon by the Supreme Court in Iafrate dictate a narrow or strict construction of the issue of age determination. In this context, that *1213means that the common law rule, which favors the criminal defendant, must be relied upon unless the legislature explicitly dictates a different method of computation.
¶ 12 Although reaching the opposite interpretation as that reached in Iafrate, reference to controlling principles of statutory construction reveals that the opposite results are actually in harmony with the controlling principle. In Iafrate, the construction that favored the criminal defendant was a liberal one, which expanded by one day the reach of the Juvenile Act, thus providing the defendant the more lenient provisions found under that Act. Here, since we are dealing with a penal statute, the construction that favors the criminal defendant is a strict one, the construction that reduces by one day the exposure to criminal sanction for engaging in consensual sexual conduct with a person under the age of legal consent. In effect, both constructions follow the principle that the statute must be construed in favor of the defendant and against the party seeking enforcement of the statute which, of course, is the Commonwealth.
¶ 13 The Majority essentially eschews the points made by our Supreme Court in analyzing the issue before us, and conveniently so, as doing so allows the Majority to reach the destination their policy considerations predestine as a resolution of the matter. As with the Juvenile Act, the provisions in the Crimes Code dealing with statutory sexual assault, IDSI and indecent contact do not set forth the methodology for determining age. When confronted with this fact, the Supreme Court concluded this absence left the matter open to interpretation. The Majority, in relying upon Section 1908 finds clarity in that section where our Supreme Court did not and finds it applicable here even though our Supreme Court did not. In relying upon common custom, the Majority accords that factor weight our Supreme Court did not. Indeed, had the Supreme Court chosen to, it could have simply said “of course, one turns a given age on the anniversary of their birth, not the day before.” Instead, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the statute’s failure to set forth the methodology for computing age left the common law rule at issue. In Iafrate, the principles of statutory construction, i.e., liberal construction, dictated a rejection of the common law rule so as to expand the protections of the Juvenile Act. Here, as we are dealing with a penal provision, the paramount rule of statutory construction, that penal provisions are to be strictly construed, command the opposite. The Supreme Court recognized this dichotomy, which is why they did not simply espouse a one-size-fits-all rule.
¶ 14 The Majority sidesteps the approach utilized in Iafrate because it apparently feels compelled to offer an interpretation that favors to the maximum degree the interests of society in protecting minors even if it means ignoring a fundamental principle of statutory construction within the realm of criminal law. The Majority creates a compelling argument and, while I certainly favor protecting minors, I am unwilling to eschew long established rules of statutory construction to extend the scope of a penal provision a few more hours when it is clear that the length of the protection is essentially an arbitrary choice. In the court of public opinion, Appellant might rightfully be condemned as a “sleazeball” for his actions. In a court of law, however, Appellant is supposed to be deserving of the protections afforded all Americans, one of which compels the strict construction of penal provisions. Instead of adhering to this principle, the Majority utilizes a principle of broad construction. Thus, I dissent.