Court Opinion

ID: 9704720
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:44:05.309701+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:04.631942
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(specially, concurring).
I do not agree with the strident command of the majority opinion to affix child support arrearages in a certain dollar amount. We are not in a fact-finding business at the appellate level. We have an equitable situation before us and not an arithmetic problem.
The “equitable adjustment,” which the court entered by way of a money judgment to $2,000.00, was not based upon an explicit finding of “change of circumstances.” Implicit, however, in the findings of fact and conclusions of law appear facts which do sustain a “change of circumstances.” The “change of circumstances” is that appel-lee/former husband has experienced a rather dramatic improvement of his financial condition since the decree of divorce was entered as reflected by Finding of Fact VI. He was, per the settlement agreement, upon which a default divorce was granted, unemployed.* The original decree required the father to pay child support of $250.00 per month for two children and provided further “reduced, until the [husband] obtains employment, to One Hundred Fifty Dollars ($150.00)” per month. This decree of divorce was entered by default in 1982. In 1983, he earned $9,036.91 and in 1984 he earned $10,037.00. Considering his present spouse’s income in 1983, he and his spouse had a combined adjusted gross income of $12,224.00. In 1984, he and his spouse had a combined adjusted gross income of $17,-074.00.
Therefore, there was not a reduction in ex-husband’s income, but rather a dramatic enhancement in income. Under State ex rel. Larsgaard v. Larsgaard, 298 N.W.2d 381, 384 (S.D.1980), it would appear that an enhancement of income would not justify a retroactive modification to then lower an expunged back child support. Although I agree that the findings of fact and conclusions of law are technically deficient on an explicit finding of “change of circumstances,” I would predicate a reversal upon an abuse of the trial court’s judicial discretion. Rykhus v. Rykhus, 319 N.W.2d 167 (S.D.1982). Also, there are no findings of fact nor conclusions of law with respect to the *658ex-wife/appellant’s income and the needs of these children. This creates great problems for a review court. See second-to-last sentence of this writing. Our Legislature has directed that trial courts “shall ... find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon.... ” SDCL 15-6-52(a). We have held that a trial court’s failure to enter proper findings of fact and conclusions of law constitutes reversible error. Stanton v. Saks, 303 N.W.2d 819 (S.D.1981) (per curiam); Talbert v. Talbert, 290 N.W.2d 862 (S.D.1980).
Hence, I would reverse but with directions for the trial court to take further evidence/enter explicit findings of fact and conclusions of law on the critical matters which appear to be unaddressed and then permit the trial court to enter a judgment for the proper amount of arrearages. I do not quarrel with the concept and holding that the ex-husband/appellee should be required to pay child support arrearages, for I note in Finding of Fact VII, “Defendant had the ability to comply with the Order of this Court requiring the payment of support and his failure to comply with such Order has been wilfull [sic] and contumacious.” In Finding of Fact XVI, he is likewise found to be in contempt of the court's order for failing to “substantially comply with the child support provision contained in said Decree.”
As I view the “equitable adjustment” concept of the trial judge herein, I surely do not fault him for doing what he though was best. He was sitting in Equity. Particularly, I note Finding of Fact XV, which finds appellant/mother in contempt of court based upon “her refusal to allow the Defendant [father] his right of visitation and contact with his children.” This conduct is cruel — to both the children and their father. This probably influenced the trial judge’s decision. True, the father should pay his child support so the children have shelter and something to eat; she, too, owes some humanity: Fathers become disheartened when they cannot visit their flesh and blood. Children can be psychologically damaged when a parent is entirely cut out of their life. This case deserves a new hearing/new findings of fact and conclusions of law. Then, apropos to a new judicial setting, justice may be accomplished hereby.

 Support of children in a divorce case lies within the discretion and good judgment of a trial judge. A settlement agreement on child support which does not make financial sense — which is not equitable — should not be approved by a trial judge.