Court Opinion

ID: 9830254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:02:03.334585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:16.915677
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rebearing.
Appellant insists in its motion for a rehearing that the portion of the court’s charge following special issue No. 4 is a general charge and not authorized where a case is submitted on special issues and cites in support of its position the case of the St. Louis Southwestern Railway of Texas v. Hudson (Tex. Com. App.) 17 S.W.(2d) 793, in which the Supreme Court held certain portions of the court’s charge were general charges and not authorized since the case was submitted on special issues. This court agreed with the Supreme Court in that • particular case that the charges constituted general charges on questions of fact which the jury were called upon to answer, but for other reasons held that the appellant in that case was es-topped to complain on appeal of the error committed by the trial court.
We think the question here is entirely different from that presented in the Hudson Case. In the case at hand the court submitted in the first two issues questions of fact and gave no general charge whatever in connection with them. The third and fourth issues were questions of law for the jury to determine from the facts under appropriate instructions by the court. Special issue No. 3 in this case required no explanation by the court except a definition of negligence which was given, and it was in connection with the fourth issue that the court gave an additional explanation to the jury of approximate cause that the appellant here insists was error.
As stated in our original opinion, this case was an unusual occurrence, and the case is equally as unusual in that both parties should plead and prove the acts of the same third parties; appellant contending that the act of the negroes was the sole cause of the derailment and injuries complained of, while appellee insists, equally as vigorous, that said acts of the negroes contributed with the negligence of appellant to cause the derailment and injuries. Under this condition of the facts, it was certainly proper for the court to a.dvise the jury what group of facts, if believed by the jury, would constitute proximate cause, and which would not, and we cannot understand how appellant could be injured by the instructions given.
If the instructions had not been given and the jury had answered “No” to said special issue, it would seem to us that plaintiff would have had just cause to complain for the very reason that they were not bound by the negligence of the defendant alone, as constituting proximate cause, as the question as submitted might have led the jury to believe, but were entitled to recovery if any negligence of defendant coupled with the acts of the. negroes constituted proximate cause.
Appellant again insists that the instructions given by the court to the jury upon the issue of damages was incorrect, and cites a federal case, Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Mosler, 275 U. S. 133, 48 S. Ct. 49, 72 L. Ed. 200, in support of its position. We think the rule with respect to the assessment of damages in Texas was complied with by the instructions given by the court, and, if the appellant desired the court to follow the rule •announced in the Mosler Case, it should have requested a correct charge embodying that rule. Western & A. R. R. Co. v. Hughes, 278 U. S. 496, 49 S. Ct. 231, 73 L. Ed. 473. This appellant did not do, and therefore cannot be heard to complain.
We have carefully considered appellant’s motion for a rehearing, and we are unable to agree with appellant that we were in error in our original opinion. Therefore, appellant’s motion for a rehearing is overruled.