Court Opinion

ID: 9550596
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:37:52.176266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:55.553811
License: Public Domain

ASHBURN, J., Dissenting.
Appellant does not attack the finding that his failure to defend the action of Buck v. Sternbeck was due to inexcusable neglect. Nor does he attack finding IV: “That the liability of Leslie Herman Sternbeck for the acts referred to in case No. 624714 is clear, and that defendants herein were entitled to recover damages from Leslie Herman Sternbeck,” or finding III: “That if the case were re-tried, it is difficult to ascertain what ultimate disposi*836tion might he made as to an award of damages, although this Court believes that the award might be substantially less than that awarded in ease No. 624714.” His reply brief says: “Appellant seeks to clarify that point by unequivocally stating that he intends to and is only raising one issue before the Appellate Court, to wit—Did the delivery upon Appellant’s wife of the Summons and Complaint and subsequent delivery by her to Appellant constitute personal service upon Appellant within the meaning of Section 411(8) of the Code of Civil Procedure.”
The findings show that the court adopted the testimony of Mrs. Dolores Sternbeck, the wife of appellant. She testified that she was in the driveway when the process server, Smith, approached her saying: “Pardon me.” She asked if she could help him and, being identified as Mrs. Sternbeck, told him in response to his inquiry that her husband was in the back yard. “And then he says, ‘I have some papers for him. Will you see that he gets them?’ And I said yes, I would, right away. Of course- . . . Q. A man handed you some documents, is that right? A. Yes. He did. . . . Q. Did he say anything to you about what these papers were? A. No. He said he had some papers for my husband, for Mr. Stern-beck. . . . Well, the man handed me the papers. And I said, ‘I will see that my husband gets them.’ And I turned and walked away. And he left.” Within five to ten minutes she handed the papers (a summons and complaint) to her husband, saying “Here is some papers from Marie Buck.” Appellant himself testified: “Well, she brought the papers back and says, ‘Here is papers from Marie Buck.’ Or ‘The Bucks.’ Something-something of that kind. So when she took-I didn’t like it when she took them because he was supposed to serve me. . . . Q. What did you do with them when she gave them to you ? A. I took them and read them. And that was all I did with them that day.” He also said: “I don’t recall what date it was. I was served the papers-1 got the papers on Saturday. And I believe I went up there [attorney’s office] Monday or Tuesday, within the next few days, to take care of it.” Concededly, after reading the documents he took them to an attorney for the purpose of making a defense.
The essence of personal service of process is the passing of the document from the hand of the process server into the hands of the defendant, or an equivalent act in case defendant refuses to take the same. (Hunstock v. Estate De*837velopment Corp., 22 Cal.2d 205, 209, 210 [138 P.2d 1, 148 A.L.R. 968].) Any person other than a party to the action may make the service (Code Civ. Proc., § 410). That person may be actually interested in the result, for it may be the plaintiff’s attorney (Sheehan v. All Persons, 80 Cal.App. 393, 398 [252 P. 337]; Guardianship of Andrews, 17 Cal.2d 500, 505 [110 P.2d 399]). No type of ritual is essential to good service. Merely placing the process in defendant’s hands without a word is enough where he is named as a defendant. It is the fact and not the accuracy of the proof of service that fastens the court’s jurisdiction onto the defendant. (Vail v. Jones, 209 Cal. 251, 255 [287 P. 99]; 21 Cal.Jur. § 57, p. 538.) If a process server designates a subagent for the purpose of service that is no affair of defendant’s. The receipt of summons and complaint, with understanding of its nature, is what counts. In this instance defendant fully understood the documents, as is evidenced by the fact that after reading the same he took them to an attorney for the purpose of defending the action.
According to the wife’s testimony she was delegated by the process server to deliver the papers to her husband, expressly undertook to do so and actually performed that promise within five to ten minutes. The case of Vail v. Jones, supra, 209 Cal. 251, correctly interpreted, is directly in point. In that instance it appeared that the summons and complaint, in an action of one Jones v. Annie H. Vail had been delivered by the city marshal to the daughter of defendant Vail “for the mother,” as the opinion phrases it at page 254. Mrs. Vail and the daughter both denied that the latter delivered the papers to Mrs. Vail or that she, the defendant, ever knew of the action. The lower court found that the process had not been served by the marshal as stated in his return of service, but that it had been duly served (p. 254). At page 255 the court said: “It cannot avail appellant that the proof of service made in the quiet-title action differed from the fact of service, and, therefore, it becomes unimportant whether the service was made by Crosbie, as he alleged in his return, or whether it was made by someone else, as would follow from the trial court’s finding as to service. Jurisdiction does not depend upon the proof of service, but upon the fact that service has been made.” This language could refer to nothing other than a delivery by the daughter to the mother, as had been circumstantially shown. This being so the case is directly parallel with the one at bar. In Vail, the process *838server delivered the papers to defendant’s daughter who understood they were for the mother; she in turn delivered them and that was held to be valid service. In the present instance the papers were delivered to the wife with request to deliver the same to defendant husband; she agreed to do so and promptly performed. That should be held valid service here.
It is not suggested that leaving the process at the residence of defendant or with a relative, without more, is sufficient to effect personal service. But in my judgment the finding of personal service in the case at bar should be upheld upon the theory that Smith, the process server, delegated to Mrs. Sternbeck the task of completing service; that that was a delegable duty (cf. Civ. Code, § 2349; Steele v. Board, of Trustees, 121 Cal.App. 419, 422 [9 P.2d 217]; Knickerbocker v. Redlands High Sch. Dist., 49 Cal.App.2d 722, 725 [122 P.2d 289]); that it is legally inconsequential whether he had authority to delegate or not; that the subagent, Mrs. Stern-beck, performed the task and completed the service, the significance of which was understood by the defendant.
A petition for a rehearing was denied March 25, 1957. Ashburn, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. The following opinion was then rendered:
THE COURT.
Respondents’ argument on petition for rehearing is a reaffirmation of the age-old but oft’ repudiated doctrine that “the end justifies the means.” Respondents say that since appellant actually received the summons and complaint, it matters not that the service did not conform with the statutes or that the process server filed a perjured affidavit.  Section 411 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the summons must be served “by delivering a copy thereof ... 9. In all other cases to the defendant personally.” Section 410, Code Civil Procedure, provides that the summons (together with a copy of the complaint) may be served by certain peace officers, “or any other person over the age of 18, not a party to the action. ’ ’ With respect to the return it states: “When it is served by any other person, it must be returned to the same place, with the affidavit of such person of its service, and of the service of a copy of the complaint.” (Emphasis added.)
Read together, these sections mean that the summons and complaint must be delivered to the defendant personally, and *839that the person making the delivery must make the affidavit. No other conclusion can be reached.
The form of -summons currently in use in the County of Los Angeles has on its reverse side an “Affidavit of Service” reading in part as follows: “The undersigned being duly sworn, says: I am and was at the time of the service of the summons herein, over the age of 18 years, and not a party to the within entitled action; I personally served the within Summons on the hereinafter named defendants, by delivering to and leaving with each of the said defendants personally ...” (Emphasis added.) Thus it can be seen that the affidavit complies with the law.
For this court to hold that a process server can delegate his authority, as was done in the case at bar, and then legally execute and file the above affidavit, would be for us to encourage perjury in the filing of false affidavits. It matters not that the plaintiff in the instant case actually received the documents. To countenance the illegal practice in this ease would be to invite every process server to delegate his authority and then file an affidavit based upon the hearsay and uncorroborated statement of the delegatee that he had properly made the service. An affidavit thus prepared might lead to an invalid default judgment.
Ashburn, J., I dissent.
Respondents’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied April 25, 1957.