Court Opinion

ID: 9728400
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:07:01.953083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:48.417545
License: Public Domain

KIRSCH, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Prior to our legislature’s 1987 amendment2 to the incest statute, the evidence relied upon by the majority may have been sufficient. That version of the statute provided:
“A person eighteen (18) years of age or older who engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct with another person, when he knows that the other person is his parent, stepparent, child, stepchild, grandparent, grandchild, sibling, aunt, uncle, niece, or nephew, commits incest....”
IC 35-46-1-3(a) (1986) (emphasis added). Under this version a biological relationship was not a necessary element of the crime of incest, and a conviction could rest on a non-biologieal relationship, such as that between an adoptive parent and his adopted child, or that between a stepparent and his stepchild. See Bryant v. State, 256 Ind. 587, 271 N.E.2d 127 (Ind.1971) (affirming stepfather’s conviction of incest with stepdaughter).
In 1987, our legislature amended the incest statute, requiring a biological relationship between defendant and victim and deleting the terms “stepparent” and “stepchild.” Thus, under the current statute, one who adopts a child, or who becomes a child’s stepparent, cannot be convicted of incest with that child, even though that person is in a parental relationship with the child. A parent of an adopted child or stepchild stands in the same shoes under the current incest statute as does any adult stranger to the child victim; while such a person may be convicted of some other crime, e.g., child molest, he may not be convicted of incest.
Because our legislature has eliminated non-biological relationships from the incest statute, we must look beyond the parental relationship for evidence sufficient to prove a biological relationship.
The State established through T.J.’s testimony that Patricia Jackson was T.J.’s biological mother, that Patricia and Leon Jackson were divorced, that T.J. has the Jackson family name, and that Jackson paid T.J.’s mother child support for T.J. after the couple’s divorce. T.J. also testified that with her mother’s consent she moved into Jackson’s home and he financially supported her. Prior to her move to Indianapolis, T.J. routinely visited Jackson, spending significant portions of summers with him in Indianapolis, Arizona, and Florida. Although such testimony would be consistent with the conclusion that Jackson is T.J.’s biological father, it does not prove such a relationship; it is equally consistent with and does not exclude the conclusion that Jackson is T.J.’s adoptive father.
*569The State did not establish that Jackson was biologically related to T.J.; indeed, the issue of biological relationship between the two was never raised. The only reference to a biological relationship is State’s exhibit 6 entitled “Application for Benefits from the Sex Crime Victim Services Fund.” This document lists the “suspect” as Leon Jackson and answers the question “Does patient/victim know suspect(s)?” with “yes/biologieal father.” Record at 215. The State contends that this statement is sufficient evidence of a biological relationship. This evidence, however, is an unverified statement made by an unnamed declarant and it has no probative value.
I believe that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Jackson was biologically related to T.J. and, accordingly, insufficient to support Jackson’s conviction.
I would reverse the decision of the trial court.

. P.L. 158-1987, Sec. 5.