Court Opinion

ID: 9486814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:01:01.637544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:56.898303
License: Public Domain

COFFEY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
“We will not overturn an ALJ’s credibility determinations absent extraordinary circumstances. These [extraordinary circumstances] include a clear showing of bias by the ALJ, utter disregard for uncontroverted sworn testimony, or acceptance of testimony which on its face is incredible.” Central Transport, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 997 F.2d 1180, 1190 (7th Cir.1993) (citing NLRB v. Advance Transp. Co., 979 F.2d 569, 573 (7th Cir.1992); NLRB v. So-White Freight Lines, Inc., 969 F.2d 401, 407 (7th Cir.1992)). The law is equally clear that we will affirm the Board’s findings of fact if they are supported by “substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Central Transport, 997 F.2d at 1184. In most cases, an ALJ’s credibility findings would withstand a challenge that he was biased if the findings were supported by substantial evidence. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496, 71 S.Ct. 456, 468-69, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951); Kopack v. NLRB, 668 F.2d 946, 952-54 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994, 102 S.Ct. 2278, 73 L.Ed.2d 1290 (1982). In this case, the respondent-appellant, Q-l Motor Express, presents a compelling argument that the ALJ was in fact biased because the ALJ reached the exact opposite conclusion regarding the credibility of the witnesses than did the experienced U.S. district court judge who, after hearing testimony in open court from the same principal witnesses, see infra note 2, refused to grant the NLRB a preliminary injunction pending the outcome of the administrative hearing.1
I realize that the factual findings made by a trial judge in a 10(j) injunctive proceeding are not binding on the ALJ or the Board, National Labor Relations Bd. v. Acker Indust., Inc., 460 F.2d 649, 652 (10th Cir.1972), however, it causes me concern when an experienced U.S. district judge and an NLRB administrative law judge reach such conflicting conclusions as to witness credibility after *483hearing the testimony of essentially the same witnesses.2 Following the testimony of the truck drivers and the Q-l management, the U.S. district judge stated, “Generally, this court finds that Q-l Motor Express’ witnesses were more credible than the petitioner’s witnesses; the drivers’ testimony appeared to the court to have been ‘scripted,’ having been uniform in many details that would otherwise naturally yield to certain inconsistencies, and less than candid.” The ALJ, without giving an explanation as to why his credibility findings were directly opposed to those of the respected trial judge, credited the testimony of the drivers over that of Q-l President Sehroering throughout his decision. This inconsistency is especially troublesome in light of the fact that the hearing before the district judge occurred several months prior to the hearing before the ALJ and thus the witnesses’ memory and recollection of events, under usual circumstances, would be clearer and much more vivid when they testified in district court.
In addition to the variance in the credibility findings, there were several findings made by the ALJ suggesting that he was in fact biased against Q-l management. The Board properly “disavowed” each of these findings, yet affirmed the ALJ’s holding against Q-l. For instance, the ALJ based his decision against Q-l, in part, on six violations of § 8(a)(1) that the NLRB did not even allege in its complaint. The Board dismissed the ALJ’s six additional findings against the employer because Q-l did not have fair notice of these alleged violations. The fact that the ALJ went far beyond the complaint in search of additional violations against the employer strongly infers that he was less than objective about the NLRB’s' case. Second, the ALJ found one § 8(a)(1) violation against Q-1 based on dispatcher Leah Conrad’s report to President James E. Sehroering that union cards were being distributed. The Board disavowed this finding because both Conrad and Sehroering were supervisors and there were no employees (truck drivers attempting to unionize) present at the time the conversation occurred. Since no employees were present, the Board ruled the comments could not constitute an attempt to “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the right[ ]” to organize. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). Once again, this finding, which the Board disavowed, reveals the ALJ’s potential bias against Q-l. Third, the ALJ concluded that because James E. Sehroering consulted his attorney before discharging Donald Denham it “suggested] that [Sehroering] was plotting his course carefully from the outset,” i.e., that he was seeking to disrupt attempts at unionizing without running afoul of the law. The Board rejected this finding because merely seeking the advice of counsel before discharging an employee does not suggest antiunion animus but rather is a sound business decision in this climate of increasing employee lawsuits against employers. The fact that the ALJ interpreted Schroering’s consulting with his attorney as an indication of the president’s hostility toward the union is further evidence that the ALJ viewed the record with a jaundiced eye. Finally, the Board disavowed, without elaboration, the ALJ’s finding that there was a § 8(a)(5) violation as of May 19, 1991.
These four express instances of the Board rejecting the findings of the ALJ (each finding against Q-l), provide additional evidence that the ALJ had a bias against Q-l. He was not satisfied with the NLRB’s case against Q-l so he took it upon himself to manufacture more charges and construe the evidence in the light most unfavorable to Q-l rather than in a neutral and impartial fashion.
Based on the irreconcilable credibility findings of the district judge and the ALJ as well as the four instances of bias (which the Board “disavowed”), I would reverse the *484Board’s order and remand for a new factual hearing in front of a different, impartial ALJ. When considering the totality of the evidence, as we must, the evidence of bias certainly casts doubt on his decision. At the very least, a remand is necessary for the Board to explain why it accepted the ALJ’s credibility findings without even referring to the trial court’s credibility findings. Although the result after remand might very well be the same, the appellant is entitled to have its day in court and receive an explanation from the Board as to how it reconciled these inconsistent findings. In our judicial system, “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice” and administrative agencies, as well as administrative law judges, must avoid even the appearance of bias or partiality. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955).
Dissent.

. Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(j), permits a party to seek injunctive relief pending final Board action. In this case, the NLRB sought to enjoin Q-l from engaging in further unfair labor practices and to require Q-l to reinstate the three wrongfully discharged employees.

. As mentioned in the majority opinion we lack a transcript of the 10(j) proceeding, but the U.S. district judge made express reference to the testimony of James E. Sehroering, president of Q-l; Donald R. Denham, Dan W. Stevens, and Anthony Lupo, the discharged Q-l drivers; Leah Conrad, the Q-l dispatcher; her husband Mark Conrad, who was another Q-l driver; as well as James Hogan, another Q-l driver. The NLRB brief before this court only listed three witnesses that testified before the ALJ that did not testify in district court: Homer and Sandra Longoria and Shirley Glisson'.