Court Opinion

ID: 9626795
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:24:10.366173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:33.628526
License: Public Domain

SEARS, Chief Justice,
concurring specially.
Given the evidence before the trial court, I concur that Mann failed to show a sufficient level of interference with his property rights to justify a finding of a regulatory taking of his business property. The Court is therefore correct to uphold the trial court’s judgment denying Mann’s claim as it relates to his business. In rejecting this claim, the majority opines, correctly, that the phrase “employed by” in OCGA § 42-1-15 (b) (1) cannot, as a matter of statutory construction, be interpreted to prohibit mere ownership of a business within the 1,000-foot zone. However, the Court’s formulation of what the statute prohibits business owners from doing — i.e., that it bars any business ownership that requires the sex offender’s “physical presence” at the business or entity, presumably no matter how infrequent or short in duration — is too broad, since the statute is clear that it only bars owners from being “employed” (either full- or part-time) at a location within the prohibited zone.
I am authorized to state that Justice Melton joins in this special concurrence.
*763Albert B. Wallace, Stephen B. Wallace II, for appellant.
Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Joseph J. Drolet, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Michael L. Smith, James E. Bearing, Jr., R. Lynn Wood, for appellees.