Court Opinion

ID: 9757364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:36:37.926595+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:38.671539
License: Public Domain

Holden, C.J.
Dissenting. When the question of the petitioner’s character was previously considered by this Court, we held his prior convictions of criminal offenses indicated — “the want of that integrity which the law demands of those who are allowed the privilege of practicing law.” At that time the report of the board of bar examiners demonstrated “an absence of that high character which the state intends shall be possessed of those who desire to practice as attorneys in the courts of this state.” We concluded the decision of the board was well founded on sound premises and valid grounds. In re Monaghan, 122 Vt. 199, 206, 207, 167 A.2d 81, 86.
*67The record in the present proceedings reconstructs the details of the prior offenses. This is entirely appropriate, for in determining whether the applicant’s character is good, the nature of the offenses he has committed must be taken into account. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed. 2d 796, 64 A.L.R. 2d 288, 296.
To my mind, this further scrutiny in the hearings by the commissioner does not aid him. Concerning the 1952 offense, the evidence is undisputed that the petitioner, after mistreating his wife, went to an upstairs bedroom to obtain a gun. The arresting officer went upstairs to find “Mr. Monaghan — pointing a gun at his son Buzzy, who in turn had a gun, and the gun was taken away from Mr. Monaghan and he was arrested and brought to jail.”
Neither was there contradiction of the police officer’s testimony that the 1959 conviction for careless and negligent operation followed the petitioner’s involvement in a motor vehicle accident in which the petitioner left the scene without stopping, until later apprehended by the police. The petitioner had been drinking, was forcibly uncooperative with the police and refused to submit to any of the prescribed chemical tests to determine the amount of alcohol present in his body fluids following the offense.
After having been denied the privilege of taking the bar examinations in 1960, the petitioner again became involved in an altercation with the police in the early summmer of 1962. On this occasion the petitioner was a passenger in his own vehicle. When a police officer undertook to check the license and registration of the operator the petitioner intruded himself into an argument with the officer. With abusive and offensive language he offered to fight the whole police department until he was forcibly restrained and lodged in jail.
Commendably, the petitioner has refrained from the use of intoxicants since this conviction and there is no record of subsequent offenses. His direction toward reformation and his recent history as a peaceable citizen in the four-year interval is indeed meritorious and praiseworthy. But in my judgment it does not establish satisfaction of the character requirement demanded of one seeking to enter the profession of the law.
The offenses which preceded rehabilitation involved dishonorable conduct, a predisposition to violence, even against members of his own family. These transgressions indicate a disrespect for law and *68for those officers whose duty it is to enforce it. Such conduct is inconsistent with the sense of responsibility expected and required of one seeking to enter the legal profession. To be sure, alcohol may have been a predominant factor which might palliate the penal consequences of the offenses. But our concern in this instance is not with mitigation nor with sanctions.
Proceedings to gain admission to the bar are for the purpose of protecting the public and the courts from the ministrations of persons unfit to practice the profession. Attorneys are officers of the court appointed to assist the court in the administration of justice. Into their hands are committed the property, the liberty and sometimes the lives of their clients. This commitment demands a high degree of intelligence, knowledge of the law, respect for its function in society, sound and faithful judgment and, above all else, integrity of character in private and professional conduct. Heiberger v. Clark, 148 Conn. 177, 169 A.2d 652, 655, 657. Investigation of character, like examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness. In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 116 N.E. 782, 783.
By his admission the court endorses the applicant and holds him out to the public at large as an advocate possessing the knowledge, character and stability required to render him a worthy member of the profession. In admitting a candidate to practice law, we certify him to be a counselor “to whom all could safely confide and entrust their rights to property, liberty and life.” In re Enright, 67 Vt. 351, 354, 31 Atl. 786, 787.
Where conditions of admission have been broken by past misconduct the applicant must prove his change in moral character is such that he can inspire public confidence. He must assure the court such confidence will be faithfully kept.
The record presented here establishes that the petitioner-has been registered pursuant to the rules of the Supreme Court since 1955. As a candidate for admission to the bar he placed himself under the solemn obligation to obey the law and be ruled by it. This condition has not been fulfilled. Accordingly, I am unable to certify with the majority that the petitioner has the requisite high moral character which the law demands and the public has the right to expect of members of the bar of this state.
Mr. Justice Shangraw joins in this dissent.
*69Motion for Reconsideration
Present: Holden, C.J., Shangraw, Barney, Smith and Keyser, JJ.
Per Curiam,
The State has moved for reconsideration of the decision in this matter. It questions the result as an overruling of the Board of Bar Examiners, without meeting the test as to abuse of discretion set forth in In re Monaghan, 122 Vt. 199, 205-6, 167 A.2d 81.
As the opinion states, the application of Carleton Monaghan to take the 1966 bar examination has never been before the Board for disposition. On the contrary, the application was made directly to this Court and, at the specific recommendation of the Board, referred to a commissioner for hearing in the first instance. In accordance with the Board’s suggestion, the rule provided that the commissioner’s report be made direct to this Court. No action of the Board is under review in this case. No ground for reconsideration has been made to appear.

Motion denied.