Court Opinion

ID: 9796444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:57:29.030012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:18.786068
License: Public Domain

WERDEGAR, J., Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Contrary to the majority and like both the Court of Appeal and the trial court below, I believe the fact an arbitrator, while serving as a superior court judge, was publicly censured by this court for making repeated, overt and demeaning sexual comments in chambers to his female staff members “could cause a person aware of the facts to reasonably entertain a doubt that the proposed neutral arbitrator would be able to be impartial” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.9, subd. (a)) in a gender-sensitive lawsuit over a female plaintiff’s cosmetic surgery. Under our arbitration law, the arbitrator therefore had an obligation to disclose this fact upon his nomination as a neutral in this matter (ibid.), giving the parties an opportunity to choose another neutral. His failure to do so is grounds for vacating the award. (Id., § 1286.2, subd. (a)(6)(A).)
To vacate an award for the nondisclosure of a matter that was of public record and could have been readily discovered beforehand is regrettable. Finality of awards is of great importance to our system of contractual arbitration, a fact reflected in the Legislature’s having limited the grounds upon which a court may vacate an award. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.2; see Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 27-28 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 183, 832 P.2d 899] [statutory grounds exclusive].) An equally vital principle, however, is that with such limited judicial review the arbitration system must have—and must be seen to have—sufficient integrity that parties can be confident they will receive a fair hearing and an impartial decision from the arbitrator. The system’s integrity, real and apparent, is crucially protected, among other ways, by the disclosure requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.9. In condoning the failure of disclosure here, the majority sacrifices system integrity on the altar of arbitral finality.
The majority opinion rests on two conclusions: that the facts of Judge Norman Gordon’s censure do not suggest bias against female litigants *396generally (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 390-391), and that the present case is not one that would reasonably raise particular doubts about his ability to be fair (id. at pp. 390-392). We need not decide here whether all female litigants would have grounds to reasonably doubt Judge Gordon’s impartiality. My disagreement with the majority is on the second point, i.e., whether one in possession of the facts of Judge Gordon’s censure could reasonably doubt his ability to be fair to the female plaintiff in this case. The standard, it bears emphasizing, is not whether Judge Gordon in fact would be biased, but whether his past conduct could cause a person aware of the facts to reasonably entertain a doubt that he could be impartial. Although acknowledging this standard, the majority in my view fails actually to apply it, instead opining that “nothing in the public censure would suggest to a reasonable person that Judge Gordon could not be fair to female litigants” (id. at p. 390, italics added), and “the circumstances underlying the public censure would not suggest to a reasonable person that Judge Gordon’s conduct and attitude toward women would cause him to favor a male physician over a female patient in a case in which the appearance of the patient who underwent cosmetic surgery instead was worsened” (id. at p. 391, italics added).
In assessing whether one aware of the facts could reasonably entertain a doubt about Judge Gordon’s ability to arbitrate this dispute without bias, of relevance is not only that he was publicly censured for “conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 18, subd. (d)(2)), but the nature of the conduct underlying that censure. The majority, drawing on this court’s decision in In re Gordon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 472 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 788, 917 P.2d 627], minimizes the judge’s sexually harassing conduct, observing that it did not occur in the courtroom, the Commission on Judicial' Performance (Commission) made no finding he acted out of malice toward his staff members, and our opinion censuring him referred to his “ ‘ostensibly joking manner.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 390.) A better understanding of the conduct censured is gained from the full decision and recommendation of the Commission, which this court adopted in our censure decision. (In re Gordon, at p. 474.)1 Although, as the *397majority states, the Commission’s factual findings were not before the trial court and we do not ordinarily take judicial notice of evidence not presented to the trial court (maj. opn., ante, at p. 379, fn. 2), we have the discretion to do so in unusual circumstances. (Vans Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 899, 926 P.2d 1085]; Brosterhous v. State Bar (1995) 12 Cal.4th 315, 325 [48 Cal.Rptr.2d 87, 906 P.2d 1242].) In my view, the circumstances here make notice of the Commission findings appropriate.2
The complainant in the Commission proceeding was a court reporter, referred to in the Decision as Ms. A, who served as the reporter for Judge Gordon from 1990 to 1992.3 In early 1992, Ms. A, who was married, made it known that she was attempting to become pregnant. Apparently with that effort in mind, Judge Gordon repeatedly referred to her as a “ ‘little copula-tor’ ”; asked her “ ‘Did you get any last night?’ ”; and, when she visited her gynecologist, asked after the condition of her vagina, using a vulgar slang term. While on vacation, Judge Gordon mailed to Ms. A, addressed to her at the courthouse, a postcard with a photograph of a female orangutan lying on *398her back, legs spread, with the printed caption, “Let’s face it I am lovable.” At about the same time, Judge Gordon sent Ms. B, his court clerk, a postcard showing a bare-breasted woman on a London street holding her nipples. In conversation with another court staffer, Judge Gordon referred to a female judge as “ ‘fatso’ ” and a “ ‘sow.’ ” Judge Gordon also used “crude and demeaning names and descriptions and an ethnic slur” (In re Gordon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 474) in referring to his female staff members. (See also Decision, supra, at pp. 4—5.)
Addressed by a judge to his subordinate employees, such conduct, even if cloaked in a “ ‘joking manner’ ” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 390), is far from humorous and seems very likely to cause embarrassment or emotional injury. The conduct, moreover, took place in Judge Gordon’s chambers, a workplace he headed. He was either ignorant of his duty to maintain a respectful judicial work environment or, if aware, unable to control his impulse to denigrate women in this environment. In either case, a person aware of the facts could reasonably conclude not only that Judge Gordon harbored disrespectful, disdainful and denigrating attitudes toward women, but also that he was unwilling or unable to restrain himself from acting on those attitudes in his relationships with his judicial staff and, accordingly, might reasonably doubt whether Judge Gordon would be willing or able to put aside his contempt for women and his single-minded focus on their sexuality when acting as a neutral arbitrator in a gender-sensitive case. While none of the censured conduct was directed at female litigants, as noted in our decision in In re Gordon, “the result [of his behavior] was an overall courtroom environment where discussion of sex and improper ethnic and racial comments were customary.” (In re Gordon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 474.)
The majority reasons that plaintiff’s medical negligence and battery claims do not present the type of dispute in which gender stereotypes and biases are likely to play a part, making doubts as to Judge Gordon’s impartiality unreasonable even though his censured conduct demonstrates gender bias. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 390-391.) I do not share the majority’s blinkered view of how gender bias may affect judicial decisionmaking.
Contrary to the majority’s evident view, the effects of judicial bias are not limited to actions alleging discrimination or sexual harassment. In re Marriage of Iverson (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1495 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 70], a marital dissolution case, did not involve any allegations of harassment or other discrimination but turned, rather, on resolution of the validity of a prenuptial agreement. Yet the appellate court held the trial judge’s reference to the wife as a “ ‘lovely girl’ ” (id. at p. 1499), his assumptions about male and female attitudes toward marriage, and his invocation of the adage that a man would not “ ‘buy the cow when [he] get[s] the milk free’ ” (ibid.), showed the *399operation of disqualifying gender bias. (Id. at pp. 1499-1501; see also id. at pp. 1504—1505 (cone. opn. of Moore, J.) [the judge’s remarks, although not establishing actual bias, required his disqualification because they could have led a person aware of the facts to reasonably doubt his impartiality].)
In the present case, one could reasonably believe the subject matter could bring into play biased attitudes toward women. Cosmetic surgery is most commonly associated with women and is stereotypically associated with female vanity and superficiality. One could reasonably believe that a man disrespectful and disdainful of women, as Judge Gordon’s behavior demonstrated he has been, is likely to hold the stereotypical view that women generally are vain and superficial and hence would be likely to discount a woman’s claims that she received negligent and improper treatment during cosmetic surgery. Moreover, in her battery count plaintiff alleged the surgeon had performed a procedure without her consent, a claim depending on the premise she enjoyed full individual autonomy to choose her treatment. A person aware of the facts could reasonably suspect a man holding the demeaning attitudes toward women manifested by Judge Gordon might be resistant to accepting a woman’s full autonomy.
The majority asserts that even if Judge Gordon’s censured conduct could be seen as disparaging women on account of their physical appearance and as showing he “valued a woman’s physical attributes over other attributes that are more relevant to the workplace,” one might just as well speculate “a man who values physical attractiveness in women might be more sympathetic toward the female patient” seeking to improve her appearance through cosmetic surgery. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 391.) But I doubt any person aware of the facts would see evidence of a sympathetic attitude toward women in the embarrassing, belittling and disrespectful conduct and comments the Commission found occurred. At any rate, to draw the opposite conclusion— that is, to doubt the arbitrator would be fair to the female plaintiff’s claims of negligent cosmetic surgery—would at the least be “reasonable].” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.9, subd. (a).) That is all the statute requires for mandatory disclosure.4
Most important, Judge Gordon’s censured conduct demonstrated an unwillingness or inability to control his impulse to harass and belittle women, even in a context—employment in judicial chambers—in which he must have *400known such harassment could have serious consequences. A person aware of the facts of Judge Gordon’s censure could for this reason reasonably doubt whether he could resist giving sway to his biased attitudes and render an impartial decision.
The Judicial Council of California has cited Judge Gordon’s censured conduct as an example of the gender-biased behavior California judges should avoid. (Judicial Council of Cal., Guidelines for Judicial Officers: Avoiding the Appearance of Bias (Aug. 1996) p. 15.) I agree with the Chief Justice, who, in his letter introducing the Judicial Council guidelines, observed that “[t]he important principles set forth in the booklet serve to reaffirm the Judiciary’s continuing commitment to ensure access and fairness for all participants in the California judicial system.” (Id., introduction.) By its overly narrow application of Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.9, the majority, regrettably, fails to reaffirm that same commitment for participants in Cahfomia’s contractual arbitration system.
Like the superior court and Court of Appeal below, I would hold the neutral arbitrator in the circumstances of this case was required, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.9, to disclose his prior censure by this court. His failure to do so was grounds for vacating the award under Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2. Because the majority holds otherwise, I dissent.
Moreno, J., concurred.
On September 1, 2010, the opinion was modified to read as printed above.

The Commission’s decision and recommendation (Com.Jud.Perf., Inquiry No. 119, Decision and Recommendation (Apr. 15, 1996); hereafter Decision) is included in the record of our censure decision, of which we may, of course, take judicial notice irrespective of whether the parties have requested that we do so (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459; see also Assem. Com. on Judiciary com., reprinted at 29B pt. 1 West’s Ann. Evid. Code (1995 ed.) foil. § 452, p. 448), and its contents were reported in the press (see Weinstein, Judge Should Be Censured, Panel Says, L.A. Times (May 17, 1996) p. B-l). Had the parties been made aware of the censure they could have obtained the facts from either source.
Technically, I would take notice of the Decision only to show what facts the Commission found, rather than to show the truth of those findings, and would take notice of the cited newspaper article to show only that the findings were publicly reported. But as Judge Gordon *397did not contest the Commission’s findings in this court and we, on review of the record, found them justified (see In re Gordon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 473—474), a person aware of the findings and this procedural history could reasonably assume, or at least strongly suspect, their truth.

First, the Commission’s findings, although not presented to the superior court, were known to the initial decision maker—Judge Gordon, as arbitrator—at the time he was required to make disclosures under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.9. That is, at the time he made the decision not to disclose his censure, he knew the Commission had made such findings, that he had not disputed them in this court, and that we had found them supported by the evidence taken before the Commission. The Commission’s findings are thus not only highly material to the decision ultimately under review—the arbitrator’s failure to disclose his public censure— they were actually known to the decision maker at the time.
Second, we review the superior court’s ruling on vacation of the award de novo. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 385.) In comparable circumstances, de novo review of a superior court’s ruling on a summary judgment motion, notice of materials outside the appellate record has been held proper. (Shamsian v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 967, 975, fn. 5 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 635].)
Third, the notice taken here is supportive of the superior court’s judgment granting the petition to vacate the award. This case does not, therefore, present the problem of a party seeking to go outside the appellate record in order to impeach a superior court judgment with matters of which the lower court was unaware.
Finally, as mentioned above (see, ante, fn. 1), we need take notice only that the Commission made the findings it did. Courts have typically approved notice that certain findings had been made, even when notice of the findings’ truth would not be proper. (See Fowler v. Howell (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1746,1749 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 484]; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1564—1565 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 552].) That the Commission made the findings it did, and that those findings were publicly reported, are indisputable and highly pertinent facts to which this court is not required to blind itself.

Ms. A was also the plaintiff in a civil action alleging sexual harassment and wrongful termination, which was settled and dismissed prior to the Commission proceeding. (Decision, supra, at p. 3.)

Similarly, the majority’s reliance on the passage of time and the presumed effect of public censure (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 390-391) is misplaced in light of the statutory standard. While one might reasonably hope that discipline for judicial misbehavior will, together with the passage of time, produce reform, one might equally well “reasonably entertain a doubt” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.9, subd. (a)) that personal biases and their impact on one’s behavior and thinking are so readily changed.