Court Opinion

ID: 9941302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 15:14:28.395779+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:30.851106
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 9, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2023-CA-0112-MR

CLARENCE COFIELD                                                   APPELLANT

                   APPEAL FROM HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT
v.                  HONORABLE JOHN D. SIMCOE, JUDGE
                         ACTION NO. 21-CR-00187

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                             APPELLEE

                                OPINION
                 AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART,
                           AND REMANDING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, GOODWINE, AND JONES, JUDGES.

GOODWINE, JUDGE: Clarence Cofield (“Cofield”) appeals the January 17, 2023

judgment and sentence on the verdict of the jury of the Hardin Circuit Court. We

affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

                                 BACKGROUND

             On February 6, 2021, Kentucky State Trooper Ethan Whitlock

(“Whitlock”) observed a minivan traveling north at 97 miles per hour (“mph”) in a
70-mph zone on I-65 in Hardin County, Kentucky. Whitlock began following the

vehicle as it continued to speed and observed it crossing the center line multiple

times without using a signal. Whitlock did not lose sight of the vehicle during the

time he was following it. Just after they entered Bullitt County, Kentucky,

Whitlock pulled the vehicle over and identified Cofield as the driver.

             When he approached the vehicle, Whitlock smelled marijuana. He

also observed a partially smoked marijuana cigarette on the center console of the

vehicle. Cofield confirmed the cigarette contained marijuana. On this basis,

Whitlock asked Cofield to get out of the vehicle. Cofield complied.

             Whitlock asked if Cofield had any weapons on his person. Cofield

said he did not. Upon patting him down, Whitlock discovered a handgun in a

holster tucked into Cofield’s waistband. When asked if there was anything else in

the vehicle, Cofield informed Whitlock there was another handgun under the

driver’s seat. Whitlock retrieved the second firearm and found a bag of marijuana

under the seat. He also found loose rounds of ammunition in a ski mask in the

vehicle’s passenger seat. Whitlock found a second burnt marijuana cigarette in a

bottle in the driver’s side cupholder. The cigarettes appeared to have been recently

smoked. He also uncovered a pill that was later found to contain

methamphetamine.

                                         -2-
                Based on his observations, Whitlock initiated a series of six field

sobriety tests. During two of the tests, Cofield showed no signs of impairment.

During a third, he showed potential impairment. During the remaining three tests,

Cofield showed signs of impairment. Whitlock arrested Cofield.

                Cofield was charged with speeding,1 reckless driving,2 operating a

motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicants (“DUI”),3 possession of a handgun

by a convicted felon,4 possession of marijuana with a gun enhancement,5 first-

degree possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) with a gun

enhancement,6 carrying a concealed deadly weapon by a prior deadly-weapon

felony offender,7 possession of drug paraphernalia,8 and being a first-degree

persistent felony offender (“PFO”).9

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 189.390(5)(B). This charge was later dismissed.
2
    KRS 189.290. This charge was later dismissed.
3
    KRS 189A.010(1)(c).
4
    KRS 527.040, a Class C felony.
5
    KRS 218A.1422, a Class B misdemeanor. The gun enhancement was later dismissed.
6
    KRS 218A.1415(a)(c), a Class D felony. The gun enhancement was later dismissed.
7
    KRS 527.020(10), a Class D felony. This charge was later dismissed.
8
    KRS 218A.500(2), a Class A misdemeanor. This charge was later dismissed.
9
    KRS 532.080(3).

                                               -3-
             Cofield testified on his behalf at trial. He claimed his mother rented

the vehicle and, except for the marijuana, he had no knowledge of the items found

therein. He testified Whitlock had not found a handgun in a holster on his person

and that he did not inform Whitlock of the location of the second firearm.

             On direct examination, Whitlock testified the two firearms were

operable, and he had test-fired two rounds using the firearm found on Cofield’s

person. On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Whitlock about the

circumstances of the test. Counsel elicited testimony that the test was conducted

on the prosecutor’s father-in-law’s property and that the prosecutor was present

and recorded a test video. The Commonwealth then moved to play the portion of

the video showing Whitlock firing two rounds from the handgun. Cofield

objected. The trial court overruled his objection, and the Commonwealth played

the video. After that, Cofield insisted the entire video be played for the jury. The

Commonwealth then played the video in its entirety which included the prosecutor

identifying himself and describing the firearm.

             Regarding the PFO charge, the Commonwealth tendered copies of

Cofield’s prior convictions in Georgia. Because inadmissible information was

included in those documents, the Commonwealth also provided a summary of the

convictions. Defense counsel initially argued the summary was insufficient and

the jury should be provided with certified copies of the judgments. However, after

                                         -4-
conferring with Cofield, counsel agreed to the admission of the summary. The

court asked Cofield if he agreed, and Cofield affirmed the decision.

             The jury convicted Cofield of operating a motor vehicle under the

influence of intoxicants, possession of marijuana, first-degree possession of a

controlled substance (methamphetamine), being a convicted felon in possession of

a handgun, and being a first-degree PFO. The jury recommended a sentence of

fifteen years’ imprisonment for being a PFO to run concurrently with three years’

imprisonment for possession of a controlled substance, forty-five days’

imprisonment for possession of marijuana, and thirty days’ imprisonment for

operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicants. The trial court

marked a box waiving court costs in the judgment affixing Cofield’s sentence. The

court also checked the box ordering Cofield

             pursuant to KRS411.265 and KRS 532.356 to reimburse
             costs & fees of incarceration in the amount of record with
             the Hardin County Jailer as of the date of sentencing.
             The costs & fees shall be reimbursed to the Hardin
             County Jailer. The Court takes judicial notice of Hardin
             County Fiscal Court Resolution 2005-063 and its
             successor resolutions authorizing and adjusting such
             costs and fees.

Record (“R.”) at 81.

             This appeal followed.

                                         -5-
                                STANDARD OF REVIEW

                The standard of review for denying a motion for a directed verdict is

“whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

any rational juror could have found all the elements of the crime.” Quisenberry v.

Commonwealth, 336 S.W.3d 19, 35 (Ky. 2011) (citation omitted).

                We review a trial court’s decisions on the admissibility of evidence

for abuse of discretion. Mulazim v. Commonwealth, 600 S.W.3d 183, 190 (Ky.

2020) (citation omitted).

                Cofield has requested we review his unpreserved claims for palpable

error under RCr10 10.26. Under palpable error review, a defendant must show “the

probability of a different result . . . so fundamental as to threaten his entitlement to

due process of law.” Huddleston v. Commonwealth, 542 S.W.3d 237, 245 (Ky.

2018) (citation omitted). We must determine whether the alleged defect “is so

manifest, fundamental and unambiguous that it threatens the integrity of the

judicial process.” Id. (citation omitted).

                                         ANALYSIS

                On appeal, Cofield argues: (1) the trial court improperly denied his

motion for change of venue in violation of KRS 452.510 and Section 11 of the

Kentucky Constitution; (2) he was entitled to a directed verdict on the DUI charge

10
     Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

                                             -6-
because the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence of intoxication; (3)

the trial court erred by admitting evidence of Whitlock’s test firing the handgun

because of the prosecutor’s involvement in the test; (4) the jury instructions

erroneously failed to instruct the jury to fix an underlying penalty for the felon in

possession of a handgun charge before fixing an enhanced PFO penalty; (5) the

records of Cofield’s prior convictions were not properly exemplified under KRS

422.040; and (6) the trial court erred in ordering him to pay jail fees.

             First, Cofield’s motion for a change of venue was untimely.

Generally, “the venue of criminal prosecutions and penal actions is in the county or

city in which the offense was committed.” KRS 452.510. However, “[w]here an

offense is committed partly in one and partly in another county, or if acts and their

effects constituting an offense occur in different counties, the prosecution may be

in either county in which any of such acts occurs.” KRS 452.550. Venue is not

jurisdictional and may be waived by the defendant, “and the failure to make a

timely motion to transfer the prosecution to the proper county shall be deemed a

waiver of the venue of the prosecution.” KRS 452.650; see also Derry v.

Commonwealth, 274 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Ky. 2008).

             On April 25, 2022, the trial court entered an order setting the trial in

this matter on September 14, 2022. By order entered on October 7, 2022, the court

rescheduled the trial to begin on November 14, 2022. Cofield moved to examine

                                          -7-
evidence, including any photographs of the scene of his arrest on October 26,

2022. The trial court granted his motion on November 3, 2022, giving him twenty-

seven photographs. Eleven days later, on the day of trial, Cofield moved to change

venue from Hardin County to Bullitt County. He alleged the photographs showed

he was pulled over in Bullitt, not Hardin County. R. at 59. Before initiating voir

dire, the trial court heard the parties’ arguments and denied Cofield’s motion on

the record.

              A motion to change venue filed on the day of trial is untimely. Bryant

v. Commonwealth, 467 S.W.2d 351, 351 (Ky. 1971) (citations omitted); see also

Russell v. Commonwealth, 405 S.W.2d 683, 684 (Ky. 1966).11 Cofield was

arrested on February 6, 2021, and indicted on February 18, 2021. The location of

his arrest was known from the time it occurred. He also had ample notice of his

trial date. Even if we were to entertain his argument that he was unaware of the

exact location of his arrest until he reviewed the photographs, he still waited until

the day of trial, eleven days after receiving them, to file his motion. This delay is

unwarranted and unexplained by Cofield. Thompson v. Commonwealth, 862

S.W.2d 871, 874 (Ky. 1993), overruled on other grounds by St. Clair v.

11
  In these cases, the defendants petitioned for change of venue under KRS 452.220(2).
Although Cofield moved for change of venue under KRS 452.510, any motion to change venue
must be timely under KRS 452.650.

                                           -8-
Commonwealth, 140 S.W.3d 510 (Ky. 2004) (citation omitted). Cofield’s motion

was untimely, so venue was waived under KRS 452.650.

             Second, Cofield was not entitled to a directed verdict on the DUI

charge. “A person shall not operate or be in physical control of a motor vehicle

anywhere in this state . . . [w]hile under the influence of any other substance or

combination of substances which impairs one’s driving ability[.]” KRS

189A.010(1)(c). Cofield argues that the Commonwealth did not meet its burden of

proving he was intoxicated beyond a reasonable doubt. He claims the

Commonwealth argued only that the marijuana cigarettes found in the vehicle

proved Cofield was intoxicated.

             However, the Commonwealth presented the jury with more than the

marijuana cigarettes as evidence of intoxication. Whitlock testified to Cofield’s

speeding and crossing the center line without using a signal. He smelled marijuana

when he approached the vehicle. He saw the two marijuana cigarettes and found a

bag of marijuana and a pill containing methamphetamine. Both marijuana

cigarettes were partially smoked and appeared to have been recently smoked.

Cofield also showed signs of impairment on at least three of six field sobriety tests.

Given this evidence, we cannot find it unreasonable for a jury to find Cofield

guilty. See Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991) (citation

omitted).

                                         -9-
                Third, Cofield invited the admission of evidence of Whitlock’s test

firing of the handgun and the prosecutor’s involvement with the test. “Generally, a

party is estopped from asserting an invited error on appeal.” Quisenberry, 336

S.W.3d at 37 (citation omitted). Cofield argues evidence of the test firing should

not have been admitted because Whitlock did it on the prosecutor’s father-in-law’s

property, and the prosecutor recorded the video, which was eventually shown to

the jury. Cofield first moved to suppress the video and remove the prosecutor from

the case. The trial court denied both motions. At trial, Cofield, not the

Commonwealth, first raised the prosecutor’s involvement in making the recording.

Cofield also requested the entirety of the video, including the portion identifying

the prosecutor, be played for the jury. Cofield cannot now claim the prosecutor

attempted to use his official position to bolster the video’s credibility when he, not

the Commonwealth, made the prosecutor’s involvement known to the jury. To the

extent that there may have been any error, Cofield invited it. See Robertson v.

Commonwealth, 677 S.W.3d 309, 324 (Ky. 2023).

                Furthermore, the prosecutor did not insert himself as a witness by

recording the test firing of the firearm. “A lawyer shall not . . . in trial, . . . assert

personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness.” SCR12

12
     Rules of the Supreme Court of Kentucky.

                                               -10-
3.130(3.4)(e). The Supreme Court of Kentucky has found error when a prosecutor

made assertions of fact during direct examination which allowed “his or her

credibility to be substituted for that of the witness.” Holt v. Commonwealth, 219

S.W.3d 731, 737 (Ky. 2007); see also Fisher v. Commonwealth, 620 S.W.3d 1

(Ky. 2021). Here, the prosecutor in no way substituted his credibility for

Whitlock’s. Although how the firearm was tested may have been unusual, the

prosecutor’s actions did not amount to a violation of Cofield’s Fifth Amendment

rights.13

              Next, there was no palpable error in the jury instructions. This issue

was unpreserved. Cofield claims the jury instructions did not follow the procedure

in Commonwealth v. Reneer, 734 S.W.2d 794, 798 (Ky. 1987). Therein, the

Supreme Court held

                     If the accused is also charged as a persistent felony
              offender, the penalty phase and a persistent felony
              offender phase can be combined because the same
              evidence that is pertinent toward fixing the penalty is also
              pertinent for consideration in the enhancement of
              sentence, and the jury in the combined bifurcated hearing
              could be instructed to (1) fix a penalty on the basic
              charge in the indictment; (2) determine then whether the
              defendant is guilty as a persistent felony offender, and if

13
   The Commonwealth correctly asserts that it did not have a burden to prove operability of the
firearm in this matter. Although inoperability is available as an affirmative defense, proof of
operability is only required where “non-speculative evidence” is presented which calls the
presumption of operability into reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Jones, 283 S.W.3d 665,
671 (Ky. 2009). Cofield presented no such evidence.

                                              -11-
              so; (3) fix the enhanced penalty as a persistent felony
              offender.
Id. This is considered the “better practice” for trial courts to follow. Sanders v.

Commonwealth, 301 S.W.3d 497, n.1 (Ky. 2010). 14 However, “a jury’s failure to

set a penalty for the underlying offense before finding PFO status does not violate

the provisions of the PFO statute.” Owens v. Commonwealth, 329 S.W.3d 307,

319 (Ky. 2011) (citation omitted). Furthermore, where there is no proof of an

illegal sentence, “any error in not requiring the jury to fix an underlying sentence

was a mere procedural defect[.]” Montgomery, 320 S.W.3d at 49 (citation

omitted).

              Here, Cofield argues the jury did not first fix a penalty for the

underlying charge of being a convicted felon in possession of a handgun before

finding him guilty of PFO and fixing the enhanced penalty. He does not allege this

resulted in an illegal sentence. Therefore, the trial court’s failure to follow the

Reneer procedure was not a palpable error.

              Additionally, Cofield waived his argument regarding the certification

of his prior convictions under KRS 422.040. Cofield concedes his argument is

unpreserved. Appellate review is not available where a defendant explicitly

14
  The “Reneer procedure is highly preferable because in those cases where the only reversible
error relates to the PFO charge, there is a sentence on the underlying charge, limiting the
necessary proceedings on remand.” Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 320 S.W.3d 28 n.4 (Ky.
2010).

                                             -12-
waives any objection to the admission of evidence. Tackett v. Commonwealth, 445

S.W.3d 20, 29 (Ky. 2014) (citation omitted).

             At trial, regarding his prior felony convictions, Cofield’s counsel

initially argued the jury should be provided with certified copies of each original

judgment instead of a summary. However, after further discussion, counsel stated,

“We don’t need to admit the judgments to the jury.” Video Record (“VR”)

11/16/2022 at 2:08:1-13. The court then asked Cofield if he had discussed this

decision with his counsel and whether he agreed with counsel. Cofield agreed. Id.

at 2:08:21. This amounts to a waiver of his argument.

             We further note that Cofield does not allege how the outcome of his

case might have been changed had the jury been provided with records that

complied with KRS 422.040. He does not allege such records would have

included any new or different information, which might have led the jury to reach a

different conclusion. Without such proof, there can be no palpable error.

             Finally, the trial court erred by sua sponte ordering Cofield to pay jail

fees. Cofield acknowledges his argument is unpreserved. The Commonwealth

concedes the trial court erred in imposing jail fees without hearing from the parties

on the issue. Cofield argues, in part, that the trial court should not have imposed

jail fees under KRS 441.265(1) because it previously found him indigent. A

prisoner in county jail shall be required to pay jail fees “except for good cause

                                         -13-
shown.” KRS 441.265(1). “Good cause” may include an inmate’s inability to pay,

but a prior finding of indigency does not necessarily bar a trial court from

imposing jail fees. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 382 S.W.3d 22, 33-34 (Ky.

2011). While the trial court’s prior indigency determination did not prevent the

imposition of jail fees, it erred when it did not allow Cofield to be heard. On

remand, the trial court must allow the parties an opportunity to be heard, and

Cofield may then present evidence of his inability to pay.

                                  CONCLUSION

             Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the Hardin Circuit Court is

affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for additional proceedings

consistent with this Opinion.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Erin Hoffman Yang                          Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky                        Attorney General of Kentucky

                                           Bryan D. Morrow
                                           Assistant Attorney General
                                           Frankfort, Kentucky

                                        -14-