Court Opinion

ID: 9765973
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:27:15.483768+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:03.571415
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge
(concurring).
I concur in the Majority’s disposition of the instant case. Nonetheless, I cannot join its opinion because I believe that it has applied an incorrect standard to determine whether points for charge on breach of warranty and strict liability under § 402A Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), should have been submitted to the jury.
The lower court refused to charge the jury on the § 402A and breach of warranty issues. The Majority affirms and holds that “where an explanation consistent with the existence of a defect is as probable as an explanation inconsistent with the existence of a defect, the plaintiff cannot be held to have met his burden.” (Slip opinion at 4). I cannot agree with the application of this standard to determine whether an issue should be submitted to the jury.
In an action for breach of warranty or strict liability under § 402A the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case in order to have it submitted to the jury. “Strict lia*96bility [under 402A] requires, in substance, only two elements of requisite proof: the need to prove that the product was defective and the need to prove that the defect was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.” Berke-bile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893, 898 (1975). However, “ [i]t is not necessary, under Pennsylvania law, that every fact or circumstance point unerringly to liability; it is enough that there be sufficient facts for the jury to say reasonably that the preponderance favors liability. . . . Also, it is beyond the power of the court to say whether two or more reasonable inferences are ‘equal’. . . . The facts are for the jury in any case whether based upon direct or circumstantial evidence where a reasonable conclusion can be arrived at which would place liability on the defendant. It is the duty of plaintiff to produce substantial evidence which, if believed, warrants the verdict he seeks.” Smith v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania, 397 Pa. 134, 138, 153 A.2d 477, 480 (1959). Additionally, “[i]n order to avoid a nonsuit or a judgment n. o. v., it was not the plaintiff’s duty to negate all other possible causes of the accident.” Jones v. Treegoob, 433 Pa. 225, 230, 249 A.2d 352, 355 (1969). On the other hand, a Plaintiff must rebut such reasonable secondary causes as are fairly suggested by the evidence. MacDougall v. Ford Motor Co., 214 Pa. Super. 384, 257 A.2d 676 (1969).
Thus, it is clear from Pennsylvania case law that the plaintiff in a breach of warranty of § 402A case need only prove a prima facie case to reach the jury. Berke-bile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., supra. The Majority’s standard requires a greater degree of proof for the plaintiff in the instant case. Its standard would permit the court to decide, as a matter of law, issues properly left for the jury. That is, where the probability of the existence of a defect is just as likely as its nonexistence, the court could, under the Majority’s holding, decide that no defect exists, and refuse to charge the jury.
*97In withholding an issue from a jury by refusing a plaintiff’s points for charge, a judge may not weigh one probability against another; if two or more reasonable inferences are permissible, the court must offer the point for charge and allow the jury to resolve the issue. Rohay v. Breyak, 409 Pa. 568, 186 A.2d 913, 915 (1963). Only if the evidence leaves no doubt does the issue become a matter of law for the judge. Rohay v. Breyak, supra at 57, n. 1, 86 A.2d at 915, n. 1.
In the instant case, the trial judge considered that there was no rational basis upon which the jury could find a breach of warranty or a violation of § 402A. An examination of the evidence reveals that he is correct. The appellant failed to show any causal connection between any act or omission by appellee and the accident; nor did appellant show that a defect existed at the time of sale which occurred four-and-one-half-years prior to the accident. Further, appellant failed to rebut reasonable secondary causes suggested by the evidence such as the deflection of the floor, worn needle valves, or misuse of the walls by the Press Club employees. Also, on cross-examination, appellant’s expert stated that he had no idea what caused the wall to collapse. Based upon appellant’s failure to establish a prima facie case under breach of warranty or § 402A, the evidence was insufficient to charge the jury on those points. The lower court’s decision should be affirmed. Therefore, I concur in the result reached by the Majority.
SPAETH, J., joins in this concurring opinion.