Court Opinion

ID: 9930299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 17:01:08.92473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:13:15.520759
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11090   Document: 39-1    Date Filed: 02/06/2024   Page: 1 of 11

                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 23-11090
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

        RONALD DAVID JONES,
                                                    Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        GADSDEN COUNTY SCHOOL,

                                                           Defendant,

        GADSDEN COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,

                                                  Defendant-Appellee.

                         ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11090

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Northern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cv-00320-MW-MAF
                            ____________________

        Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               In this appeal, Plaintiff-Appellant Ronald Jones contends that
        the district court erred in granting summary judgment on his
        employment discrimination claims to the Defendant-Appellee
        Gadsden County School Board. We disagree. Jones fails to show
        that the School Board’s reasons for failing to hire him for a full-time
        teaching position were pretext. We therefore affirm.
                                  I.     Background
               Ronald Jones, a 63-year-old black man, worked as a
        substitute social studies teacher for the Gadsden County School
        Board. In January 2020, Jones applied for seven full-time teaching
        positions at the school where he was a substitute. He was not
        hired. Among those who were hired for these positions, five were
        women, and all seven were between ages 23 and 38. All but one (a
        29-year-old white male) were black.
              The School Board says that Jones was not hired for two
        reasons.
              First, the school’s database flagged him as “ineligible”
        because of his criminal history. This was (viewing things in the
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        23-11090                  Opinion of the Court                                3

        light most favorable to Jones) 1 a mistake, because—while Jones had
        a criminal history—the Department of Education had cleared him
        to teach. Jones provided the DOE’s letter saying as much to
        Principal Pamela Jones (no relation).2
               Second, the principal deemed Jones’s classroom
        management unacceptable. For example, the vice principal
        observed Jones discipline some students—but not others—for
        using cell phones in the classroom. An unusually high number of
        “referrals” to the principal’s office came from Jones’s classes. He
        also gave students sodas and candy (Jones disputed selling such
        items) during class, which violated school policy. Given these
        infractions, the principal testified that she probably would not have
        hired Jones even if he had not been flagged as ineligible.
               Jones filed a discrimination complaint with the Florida
        Commission on Human Relations. Jones explained at the
        administrative proceeding that he believed he had been
        discriminated against because the School Board hired someone of
        younger or of a different race each time he applied for a full-time

        1 In reviewing a district court’s ruling on summary judgment, we “view the

        evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” See Thomas v.
        Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th Cir. 2007).
        2 Jones asserted below that someone in the School System intentionally

        flagged him as “ineligible” to deprive him of a chance to interview for the job.
        But the only evidence he supplied for that claim was the School System’s
        admission that he was the only person flagged this way by mistake. Jones does
        not raise the same argument on appeal, but—even if he had—it is not enough
        to create a genuine issue of material fact.
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        4                             Opinion of the Court                 23-11090

        teaching position.3 After a hearing, the ALJ recommended the
        Commission dismiss the complaint. Jones also filed an EEOC
        charge, and the EEOC issued a notice of right to sue.
               Jones then filed this lawsuit. In the operative complaint,
        Jones alleged that the School Board’s failure to hire him because he
        is an older male violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 4
        and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
        (“ADEA”). 5 After discovery, the parties both moved for summary
        judgment.
               The magistrate judge recommended the district court grant
        the School Board’s motion and deny Jones’s. The magistrate judge
        began by rejecting the School Board’s argument that the
        administrative proceeding meant Jones’s lawsuit was barred by
        collateral estoppel. Next, the magistrate judge rejected Jones’s
        Title VII claim. Jones had not pointed to any direct evidence of sex
        discrimination, and his only circumstantial evidence was that five
        of the seven people hired were women. The magistrate judge
        concluded that this was not enough to show a prima facie case.
        And, even if it were, Jones still could not show that the School
        Board’s legitimate reasons for not hiring him for a permanent
        position (being flagged as ineligible and poor classroom

        3 As discussed below, Jones does not allege a race discrimination claim in his

        operative complaint.
        4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

        5 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.
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        23-11090                  Opinion of the Court                                5

        management) were pretext. 6 Finally, the magistrate judge
        concluded that the only evidence supporting Jones’s age
        discrimination claim was a chart showing the ages of the people
        hired, demonstrating that younger applicants were hired instead of
        Jones. The magistrate judge said that while that was enough to
        state a prima facie case of discrimination, it did not suffice to show
        that the School Board’s legitimate reasons were pretext. 7
               The district court accepted the report and recommendation,
        entering judgment for the School Board. 8 The district court
        declined to reach Jones’s argument that he had stated a prima facie
        case, pointing out that the magistrate judge also concluded Jones
        had not shown pretext. The court then overruled Jones’s
        objections to the pretext recommendation, explaining that Jones
        “[did] not point to any record evidence to rebut this point”—rather
        insisted that “he did not have issues with classroom management”
        and “[the School Board’s] reliance on . . . unofficial visits to [his]

        6 Jones also suggested that the refusal to hire him for a permanent position was

        race discrimination, as well, but the magistrate judge declined to consider
        Jones’s those arguments because Jones had not alleged race discrimination in
        the operative complaint. We do the same.
        7 The magistrate judge also seemed to conclude that the hiring of several other

        people as old or older than Jones “eliminate[d] the presumption of age
        discrimination” raised by Jones’s prima facie case. Because we conclude Jones’s
        claims fail for other reasons, we need not rely on this part of the magistrate
        judge’s reasoning, and so we do not.
        8 The district court’s order purported to dismiss Jones’s “first” amended

        complaint—that appears to be a scrivener’s error, since the court adopted an
        R&R disposing of the claims in Jones’s second (and operative) complaint.
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        6                          Opinion of the Court                        23-11090

        classroom to establish opinions on his classroom management . . .
        [was] impermissible.” Thus, the district court concluded, the
        School Board was entitled to summary judgment.
                Jones appealed. 9
                                  II.     Standard of Review
                We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
        novo, “view[ing] the evidence in the light most favorable to the
        non-moving party.” Thomas, 506 F.3d at 1363. Summary judgment
        is proper if the evidence shows “that there is no genuine dispute as
        to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
        matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When a movant shows that
        no genuine dispute of material fact exists, the burden shifts to the
        non-movant to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of
        material fact that precludes summary judgment. Clark v. Coats &
        Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608–09 (11th Cir. 1991). “A mere ‘scintilla’
        of evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not
        suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could
        reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577

        9 In his opening brief, Jones requests appointed counsel for the first time. We

        note that Jones failed to file a motion to that effect, and we conclude that there
        is not good cause to appoint counsel at this stage and on this record. See Fowler
        v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1088, 1096 (1990) (“Appointment of counsel in a civil case is
        not a constitutional right. It is a privilege justified only by exceptional
        circumstances, such as where the facts and legal issues are so novel or complex
        as to require the assistance of a trained practitioner.”). “Because [Jones] has
        not demonstrated exceptional circumstances,” we decline to appoint counsel
        at this stage. Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 846 n.* (11th Cir. 1996).
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        23-11090                   Opinion of the Court                                7

        (11th Cir. 1990); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith
        Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (“Where the record taken as a
        whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-
        moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” (quoting First
        Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288 (1968))).
                                       III.    Discussion
               Jones’s brief mostly addresses irrelevant issues, 10 but even
        where he does address sex and age discrimination, he does not offer
        any non-conclusory reason to believe that the School Board’s
        nondiscriminatory reasons for not hiring him were pretext. 11 We
        therefore find no error in the district court’s grant of summary
        judgment to the School Board.
               Jones’s claims arise under Title VII’s prohibition on sex
        discrimination and the ADEA. Title VII makes it unlawful for an
        employer “to fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual, or otherwise
        to discriminate against any individual with respect to his

        10 Jones argues at length, for example, that he “satisfies all 3 elements of a

        Retaliation claim” and states a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (by which he
        seems to mean an equal protection claim and a claim under Title I of the Civil
        Rights Act of 1964); he discusses the respondeat superior doctrine; he discusses
        the standard for granting a motion to dismiss; he cites various Florida statutes;
        and he insists that a pro se complaint must be interpreted with leniency.
        Because the operative complaint does not raise any of these claims, we—like
        the courts below—conclude that they are not a part of this lawsuit.
        11 Because we reach this conclusion, we need not address the magistrate

        judge’s ruling that Jones had also failed to show a prima facie case of sex
        discrimination.
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        8                          Opinion of the Court                         23-11090

        compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
        because of such individual’s . . . sex[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).
        The ADEA similarly makes it “unlawful for an employer . . . to fail
        or refuse to hire . . . any individual . . . because of such individual’s
        age[.]” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
                We analyze both claims in essentially the same way. “In
        order to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff alleging intentional
        discrimination must present sufficient facts to permit a jury to rule
        in h[is] favor.” Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1220 (11th
        Cir. 2019) (en banc) (Title VII); see also Liebman v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
        808 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 2015) (ADEA). Naturally, if the
        plaintiff has direct evidence of discriminatory intent, that is
        sufficient. Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1220 n.6; Liebman, 808 F.3d at 1298.
        Because employment discrimination plaintiffs rarely have such
        evidence, however, the more common route is “satisfying the
        burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas.” 12 Lewis,
        918 F.3d at 1220; Liebman, 808 F.3d at 1298. When proceeding
        under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff bears the initial burden to
        establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing (1) that he
        belongs to a protected class, (2) that he experienced an adverse
        employment action, (3) that he was qualified to perform the job,
        and (4) that his employer treated “similarly situated” employees
        outside his class more favorably. Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1220–21. “If
        the plaintiff succeeds in making out a prima facie case, the burden
        shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

        12 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973).
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        23-11090                   Opinion of the Court                                  9

        reason for its actions.” Id. at 1221. If he does, “then [the plaintiff
        must] demonstrate that the defendant’s proffered reason was
        merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination[.]” Id; see also id. (this
        burden “merges with the [plaintiff’s] ultimate burden of persuading
        the [factfinder] that [he] has been the victim of intentional
        discrimination.” (brackets in original) (quotation omitted)). To
        meet that burden, the plaintiff must meet the proffered reason head
        on—and rebut it. Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 1253,
        1266 (11th Cir. 2010). The plaintiff must show “weaknesses,
        implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions”
        in the employer’s reasons—such “that a reasonable factfinder could
        find them unworthy of credence.” Id. (quotation omitted). This
        requires showing (1) that the reason given was false and (2) that
        unlawful discrimination is the true reason. Id. at 1267. Simply
        quarreling with the reason given is not enough. See id. In all
        events, the question is whether the evidence permits an inference
        of discrimination. Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1220–21 & n.6. 13

        13 Though Jones does not raise it and the courts below did not address it, a

        plaintiﬀ may also survive summary judgment by showing (what we have
        sometimes called) a “convincing mosaic” of discrimination. See Berry v.
        Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th 1300, 1310–11 (11th Cir. 2023); cf. Tynes v. Fla.
        Dep’t. of Juvenile Justice, 88 F.4th 939, 947 (11th Cir. 2023) (“when we use what
        we have called the convincing mosaic standard, we look beyond the prima
        facie case to consider all relevant evidence in the record to decide the ultimate
        question of intentional discrimination”). As we made clear in Berry, the
        “convincing mosaic” theory “is a metaphor” for the bottom line question of
        whether there is a reasonable inference of discrimination—it is “not a[n
        independent] legal test[.]” Berry, 84 F.4th at 1310–11; Tynes, 88 F.3d at 947 (“we
        are answering that same question when using the McDonnell Douglas
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        10                         Opinion of the Court                        23-11090

               Jones’s Title VII and ADEA discrimination claims both fail
        because they fail to rebut the same legitimate, nondiscriminatory
        reason for declining to hire him: Jones’s poor classroom
        management.14 Indeed, the principal testified that even if Jones had
        not been flagged as ineligible, she probably would not have hired
        him because his classroom management was so poor. But Jones’s
        brief points to no record evidence showing that his students were
        not unruly, that he did not refer or “write-up” many students, that
        he did not selectively enforce the school’s cell phone rules, or even
        that he did not give students candy and soda in violation of school
        policy. Even below, the only evidence Jones offered to that effect
        was that some of his students were unruly and the teachers hired
        instead of him were mostly younger and women. Thus, Jones has
        not shown that this otherwise-legitimate reason not to hire him
        was false, let alone that sex or age discrimination was the true
        reason. Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1265–67.
                                       IV.     Conclusion
                We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary

        framework”—“the failure to establish a prima facie case is only fatal where it
        reﬂects a failure to put forward enough evidence for a jury to ﬁnd for the
        plaintiﬀ on the ultimate question of discrimination”); see also Sims v. MVM, Inc.,
        704 F.3d 1327, 1333 (11th Cir. 2013) (analyzing a “convincing mosaic”
        argument under the ADEA). Regardless, and simply put, our review of the
        record does not show a dispute of material fact on Jones’s claims of sex and
        age discrimination.
        14 We have no need, therefore, to rely on the School Board’s alternative

        reason: that Jones was flagged as ineligible by their computer system.
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        23-11090             Opinion of the Court                   11

        judgment to the School Board.
              AFFIRMED.