Court Opinion

ID: 9569511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:14:32.586267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:03:22.441855
License: Public Domain

Justice Copeland
dissenting.
No one can dispute that the law regarding presumptions is riddled with confusion. As the majority opinion correctly points out, often a logical inference is loosely termed a “presumption of fact,” yet that concept and a “true” presumption, or a “presumption of law,” are different in theory and in practical application. This Court has noted that “a presumption of fact used in the sense of an inference is a deduction from the evidence, having its origin in the well recognized relation between certain facts in *386evidence and the ultimate question to be proven.” In re Will of Wall, 223 N.C. 591, 595, 27 S.E. 2d 728, 730 (1943). Such an inference is “to be considered merely as an evidential fact or a circumstance, rather than as a presumption which would impose a burden [of producing evidence] on the defendant.” Id. at 595, 275 S.E. 2d at 731. It is clear that we are dealing in this case with a “true” presumption [hereinafter referred to merely as a presumption].
The majority view of presumptions, and the one to which North Carolina subscribes, is the “bursting bubble” theory, which means that “[i]n practical terms, . . . although a presumption is available to permit the party relying upon it to survive a motion for directed verdict at the close of his case, it has no other value in the trial.” McCormick on Evidence § 345 (2d ed. 1972). (Emphasis added.) Once the presumption has been sufficiently rebutted, it completely disappears from the case. See generally In re Will of Wall, supra. Therefore, when the defendant in this case introduced evidence tending to show that the insured’s death was not an accident, the trial court was required to rule on its renewed motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence as if the presumption had never existed. “The opponent of the presumption may still not be entitled to a directed verdict, but if his motion is denied, the ruling will have nothing to do with the existence of a presumption.” McCormick on Evidence, supra at § 345.
The majority opinion apparently gave the plaintiff in this case the benefit of a true presumption, requiring the defendant to come forward with evidence rebutting death by accident, and the benefit of a prima facie case, entitling her to get to the jury regardless of the evidence showing death by suicide. This is not the law. In North Carolina a case goes to the jury “unless it appears, as a matter of law, that a recovery cannot be had by the plaintiff upon any view of the facts which the evidence reasonably tends to establish.” Graham v. North Carolina Butane Gas Co., 231 N.C. 680, 683, 58 S.E. 2d 757, 760 (1950). (Emphasis added.) See also Manganello v. Permastone, Inc., 291 N.C. 666, 231 S.E. 2d 678 (1976). Thus, in this situation, a trial court must make a case by case determination to see whether the evidence would support a verdict for the plaintiff. The plaintiff does not get to the jury as a matter of right, and the defendant’s evidence that does not con*387flict with that of the plaintiff is to be considered by the court. See, e.g., Blanton v. Frye, 272 N.C. 231, 158 S.E. 2d 57 (1967).
Of course there will be cases dealing with this issue in which the facts and circumstances indicate a reasonable possibility that the death of the insured was an accident. In this situation, as in any other case, the plaintiff would be entitled to have the jury decide the cause of death. In Gorham v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Association of Omaha, 114 F. 2d 97 (4th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 688, 85 L.Ed. 1125, 61 S.Ct. 615 (1941), Judge John J. Parker said the following:
“A suicide case should be tried like any other case, and metaphysical reasoning about presumptions and burden of proof should not be permitted to obscure the real issue, as has been done in so many cases. If the evidence is conflicting, or if different inferences can reasonably be drawn from it, the case is for the jury. If, however, the evidence is so clear as to leave no room to doubt what the fact is, the question is one of law, and it is the right and the duty of the judge to direct a verdict.” Id. at 100. See also Annot., 85 A.L.R. 2d 722 (1962) for other cases dealing with this subject.
The evidence in this case permits only one reasonable, yet unfortunate, conclusion — the cause of the insured’s death was suicide. The uncontradicted facts are as follows:
1. The insured had a long history of periods of mental disturbance, which “illness” resulted in him going into “manic” states, for which he had been treated three times in the past. The last treatment occurred a few months before his death on 14 September 1973.
2. When the insured left home to go to Virginia on 14 September 1973, the day of his death, he made a point of telling his wife and daughter that he loved them.
3. The insured was found dead in the early morning of 15 September 1973 in front of his car on a road near his farm in Virginia. A .32 caliber revolver belonging to the insured was found on the ground next to the deceased, which had five unfired shells and one spent shell in the cylinder.
*3884. There were “heavy” powder burns around the wound,- and Dr. Early testified that in his opinion the gun was within two inches of the skull when fired.
5. The insured owned several guns, he usually carried a gun, and his widow testified that he “was proficient with firearms.”
6. When he was found, the keys to the insured’s car were in the ignition, and his wallet containing $91.00 was in a pocket of his pants.
7. There was no sign of a struggle or that anyone else had been there.
8. Dr. Early estimated the time of death to be 10:00 p.m. on 14 September 1973.
Under these facts, the trial court correctly granted defendant’s motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence. For this reason, I respectfully dissent and vote to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and to reinstate the judgment of the trial court.