Court Opinion

ID: 9409175
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-16 07:11:08.009525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:49.206874
License: Public Domain

Reversed and Memorandum Opinion filed July 11, 2023.

                                      In The

                     Fourteenth Court of Appeals

                               NO. 14-22-00477-CV

              JOE SELVERA AND TINA SELVERA, Appellants
                                         V.
  ESTELLA CHAVARRIA, AS THE GUARDIAN OF THE PERSON AND
  ESTATE OF FLORINDA SELVERA, AN INCAPACITATED PERSON,
                         Appellee

                       On Appeal from the Probate Court
                            Galveston County, Texas
                       Trial Court Cause No. PR-0082112

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellants, Joe Selvera and Tina Selvera, bring this interlocutory appeal of
the probate court’s temporary-injunction order that does not contain a trial date for
the permanent injunction. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(4).
The order enjoined the Selveras from selling their real property, “making any
changes to the home” located on the property, and destroying or removing any
personal property belonging to Florinda Selvera remaining on the property. We
conclude the probate court abused its discretion and declare the order void.

       The probate court signed the temporary-injunction order in a guardianship
proceeding after an evidentiary hearing. 1 On appeal, the Selveras argue that the
order is voidable because it: (1) does not set a trial date on the permanent
injunction; (2) destroys, rather than preserves, the status quo; and (3) there is no
evidence to demonstrate the guardian’s probable right of recovery.

       Whether to grant or deny a request for a temporary injunction is within the
trial court’s discretion, and we will not reverse that order absent a clear abuse of
discretion. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002); Walling
v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1993). There is no abuse of discretion as long
as some evidence reasonably supports the trial court’s order. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d
at 211. The procedural requirements of Rule 683 are mandatory. Qwest Commc’ns.
Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam). A
temporary-injunction order that does not meet these requirements is “subject to
being declared void and dissolved.” Id.; InterFirst Bank San Felipe, N.A. v. Paz
Constr. Co., 715 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam).

       Among other things, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683 requires every order
granting a temporary injunction to “[set] the cause for trial on the merits with
respect to the ultimate relief sought.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 683. Here, the order does not
set the cause for trial on the merits. While appellee admits the order does not
address a trial setting, she argues that the probate court set the case for trial on the

       1
          On June 9, 2023, the Selveras filed an amended petition for writ of mandamus in this
court. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221; see also Tex. R. App. P. 52. The Selveras asked this
court to compel the probate court to vacate the temporary restraining order that it signed and
dismiss the injunction proceeding, which was pending at the time. However, we denied the
petition concluding the Selveras had not established they were entitled to mandamus relief. In re
Selvera, No. 14-22-00400-CV, 2022 WL 2092817, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June
10, 2022, no pet.).

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merits via a docket-control order. Appellee also argues that the probate court has
indicated its intention to sign a modified temporary injunction. However, the
clerk’s record neither contains a modified temporary injunction, nor a
docket-control order; regardless, the order must be complete on its face to comply
with Rule 683. See Kaufmann v. Morales, 93 S.W.3d 650, 656–57 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (“including a general date on a docket sheet
does not meet the requirements or the purpose of Rule 683”).

       Because the probate court’s order does not comply with the mandatory
requirements of Rule 683, we conclude the probate court abused its discretion
when it signed the order. InterFirst Bank San Felipe, 715 S.W.2d at 641; Helix
Energy Sols. Group, Inc. v. Howard, 452 S.W.3d 40, 44 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.). Therefore, the temporary injunction order is void and
dissolved for failure to comply with Rule 683. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 683; see also
Qwest, 24 S.W.3d at 337.

       We sustain the Selveras’s sole issue and dissolve the probate court’s order
granting the temporary injunction.2

                                             /s/       Charles A. Spain
                                                       Justice

Panel consists of Justices Zimmerer, Spain, and Poissant.

       2
         We need not address Selveras’s remaining two arguments supporting this issue. See
Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. Because this is an interlocutory appeal of the probate court’s order granting
temporary injunction, only that order is before this court—not the entire trial-court case. We do
not remand the case to the trial court because the case is not before us. Chappell Hill Sausage
Co. v. Durrenberger, No. 14-19-00897-CV, 2021 WL 2656585, at *5 n.6 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] June 29, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).

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