Court Opinion

ID: 18381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-25 07:13:57+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:20.671011
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

                              _______________________

                                   No. 98-30996
                              _______________________

BRENDA B. CAMPBELL,

                                                           Plaintiff-Appellant,

                                         versus

NORMAN R. GORDON & ASSOCIATES; NORMAN R. GORDON; JEFFREY S. COX,

                                                          Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

           Appeal from the United States District Court
               for the Western District of Louisiana
                            (97-CV-1467)
_________________________________________________________________

                                    August 6, 1999

Before JONES, STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

               The court has carefully considered this appeal in light

of the parties’ briefs and oral argument and pertinent portions of

the record.       We reach the following conclusions.

               First,    assuming     arguendo    that    a    claim   exists   for

pregnancy harassment in violation of the Pregnancy Discrimination

Act,       appellant    has   not   adduced   facts     demonstrating    that   her

supervisor’s conduct rose to the level of actionable harassment

according to Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, _____ U.S. _____, 118
S. Ct. 2275,       2283-84      (1998).     That   is,    the   alleged   harassing

       *
      Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited sircumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
conduct, consisting of harangues and complaints by appellant’s

supervisor and requirements for doctors’ excuses for her absences,

was not so severe and pervasive as to alter the terms or conditions

of appellant’s employment.

          Second, appellant has not produced evidence to raise a

genuine issue of material fact that she endured disparate treatment

because of her pregnancy rather than because of her unreliable

attendance and difficulties keeping up with her job.

          Third, appellant’s claims of termination, retaliation,

and intentional infliction of emotional distress are not supported

by relevant summary judgment evidence.

          The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.