Court Opinion

ID: 9858063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:13:50.259103+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:01:46.623246
License: Public Domain

RAWLINGS, Justice
(dissenting).
Being unable to agree with the reasoning in Divisions III-IV of the majority opinion and result reached I respectfully dissent.
I. As conceded by the majority, Gaines v. Jacobsen, 308 N.Y. 218, 124 N.E.2d 290 (1954), holds that the right to alimony under a prior divorce decree is terminated by subsequent marriage even though such remarriage, void or voidable, be annulled.
In support of that holding the court aptly stated, 124 N.E.2d 293-294:
“Since the function of alimony payments is to provide support for a wife not otherwise supported, the reason for such payments fails when the wife acquires a new source of support by remarrying, cf. Civ.Prac.Act, § 1172-c. And by a ceremonial marriage she receives the right to support — even though the circumstances are such that grounds for annulment exist — for the entire period that the parties live together as husband and wife, unless and until there is an actual judicial declaration of annulment. See Sleicher v. Sleicher, supra, 251 N.Y. 366, 370, 167 N.E. 501, 502; Bostick v. State, 1 Ala.App. 255, 55 So. 260; State v. Loyacano, 135 La. 945, 66 So. 307.
“The subsequent fortunes of the remarriage, and whether or not it is later terminated, are in no way material to the agreement; the husband’s obligations are by its terms to continue only until she remarries, and there is nothing in the agreement which can serve as a basis for subsequently reviving those obligations. No one contends that they would be revived if the remarriage ended in divorce, see Nelson v. Nelson, 282 Mo. 412, 418, 221 S.W. 1066; Brandt v. Brandt, 40 Or. 477, 67 P. 508, and it is difficult to see any reason for a different result when it ends in annulment. It is certainly unlikely that the parties intended the result to turn upon whether an unsuccessful remarriage is deemed in law void — as is the one in this case, Domestic Relations Law, Consol.Laws, c. 14, § 6 — or voidable Domestic Relations Law, § 7, or valid, until dissolved by a decree of divorce. Rather, the understanding must *159have been that, upon the wife’s remarriage, the husband could regard himself as free of the duty to support her. He could then assume new obligations — he could himself remarry, if he were of a mind to, but his means limited — without remaining forever subject to the possibility that his first wife’s remarriage would be annulled and the burden of supporting her shifted back to him. And the wife, too, must have understood that by remarrying she abandoned her rights to support under the agreement, for better or for worse, in favor of whatever support would be furnished her by her second mate.”
Subsequently, in Denberg v. Frischman, 24 A.D.2d 100, 264 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1965), New York reaffirmed Gaines, supra, and in so doing refuted the ad hoc or case by case approach here adopted by the majority with this statement, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 120:
“In final analysis, the courts do and must apply general rules to situations that come before them. To riddle the Gaines rule with exceptions to avoid a particular result in a particular case may produce a host of injustices in the cases to follow. To make such exceptions without a firm rational basis is even more perilous. * * * After all, it is the remarrying spouse who has stumbled, and who is to say where the genesis of the fault first arose.”
See also Herscher v. Herscher, 51 Misc.2d 921, 274 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1966).
II. But even if the Denberg reasoning, quoted above, be disregarded there is another facet of the case before us which weighs heavily against the majority view. Noticeably the majority places great stress upon trial court’s right to interpret its own decree. I suggest this is at best a dubious approach.
In the first place an examination of the record discloses trial court, in granting the divorce decree here involved, approved a stipulation entered into by Bill and Lela Peters. Property division and alimony provisions thereof were made a part of the decree. So, as to alimony, trial court did not here interpret its own decree but rather engaged in an interpretation of the separate agreement between plaintiff and defendant.
Next, as to alimony, the aforesaid stipulation provides:
“It is further mutually agreed that any and all alimony payments shall cease upon the death or remarriage of Lela Peters.
“It is further agreed that Lela R. Peters shall not be entitled, under any circumstances to receive an increase in alimony at any time hereafter and that she will never, under any circumstances make application to the Court therefore, * * * »
Significantly, the above stipulated alimony-terminating-“remarriage” is devoid of any condition or qualification. Dodd v. Dodd, 210 Kan. 50, 499 P.2d 518 (1972), involved a situation peculiarly akin to that instantly presented. In resolving the problem thus posed, adverse to the majority position here taken, the Kansas Supreme Court said, 499 P.2d 522-523:
“Here the divorce decree approved and incorporated the parties’ written separation agreement as to alimony. In Drummond v. Drummond, 209 Kan. 86, 495 P.2d 994, we had this to say respecting such agreements:
“ ‘The intent of the parties to a separation agreement is determined by the agreement when its terms are plain and unambiguous, and when the language is clear and unequivocal the meaning must be gleaned from its contents alone and words cannot be read into an agreement which import an intent wholly unexpressed when the agreement was executed.’
“We already indicated, we have no difficulty in concluding that the agreed *160provisions for alimony are clear and unambiguous, leaving no room for outside matters to be used to change their meaning or to construe them. The agreement called for alimony payments ‘until and unless such time as the death or remarriage of plaintiff nullifies this agreement’, such payments to commence on a prescribed date and to continue ‘until the death or remarriage of the plaintiff’; further it specifically cautioned appellee she could not look to appellant for financial assistance in the way of alimony or property in any manner inconsistent with the terms or in violation of the agreement.
“The agreement says nothing about the status of the remarriage and termination of the alimony is not made to turn on its validity. Nothing in the agreement evinces an intent to provide, as was the case in Johnson County National Bank & Trust Co. v. Bach, supra (189 Kan. 291, 369 P.2d 231), that if the arrangement therein provided was altered, to substitute in its stead another source of income for support which could be accomplished only through a valid marriage status. The agreement simply provided that alimony was payable until appellee remarried. The word ‘Remarriage’ is an ordinary one in common usage and the agreement contains nothing to indicate anything other than its use in its popular or conventional sense was intended. Certainly appellee must have understood that by remarrying she was abandoning her claim for support under the agreement, for better or for worse, in favor of whatever support would be furnished by her new spouse. Appellee remarried and the alimony ceased. There is nothing in the agreement which can serve as any basis for its subsequent revival * * *
Finally on this subject, as the majority concedes, no extrinsic evidence was introduced bearing on intent of the parties hereto. Thus our holding in Hamilton v. Wosepka, 261 Iowa 299, 305-314, 154 N.W.2d 164 (1967) is not here applicable.
III. Furthermore, there is to me no persuasive premise upon which to hold the relevant New York and Iowa laws are materially distinguishable.
Section 236, Domestic Relations Law, McKinney’s Consol. Laws c. 14, formerly Section 1140-a of the New York Civil Practice Act states, in material part:
“In any action or proceeding brought (1) during the lifetime of both parties to the marriage to annul a marriage or declare the nullity of a void marriage, or (2) for a separation, or (3) for a divorce, the court may direct the husband to provide suitably for the support of the wife as, in the court’s discretion, justice requires * *
And § 598.24 of the 1966 Iowa Code provided :
“In case either party entered into the contract of marriage in good faith, supposing the other to be capable of contracting, and the marriage is declared a nullity, such fact shall be entered in the decree, and the court may decree such innocent party compensation as in cases of divorce.”
Additionally, the cited Iowa Code, § 598.14, said in relevant part: “When a divorce is decreed, the court may make such order in relation to the children, property, parties, and the maintenance of the parties as shall be right.”
See also The Code 1973, Sections 598.32 and 598.21.
I submit the phrase, “the court may decree such innocent party compensation as in cases of divorce", contained in The Code 1966, § 598.24, quoted above, means nothing other than that on annulment of marriage the court, per § 598.14, “may make such order in relation to the children, property, parties, and the maintenance of the parties as shall be right.”
*161Moreover, it is to me evident the referential clause, “as in cases of divorce”, found in § 598.24, quoted above, clearly and unambiguously expresses the foregoing true legislative intent. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 344(f) (13); State v. Prybil, 211 N.W.2d 308, 311 (Iowa 1973); Iowa Civil Rights Com’n v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 207 N.W.2d 5, 7 (Iowa 1973); McKillip v. Zimmerman, 191 N.W.2d 706, 709 (Iowa 1971); Goergen v. State Tax Commission, 165 N.W.2d 782, 786 (Iowa 1969).
IV.Neither can I agree with the majority when it unequivocally says: “ * * * Lela did not have the choice of two means of support.”
Admittedly alimony, as such, is not awarded by Texas courts upon the granting of a divorce or annulment of marriage decree. See Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tex.1967).
Also, as to the matter of “permanent alimony”, Francis v. Francis says, 412 S.W.2d at 32: “In this State as in other states, alimony is an allowance for support and sustenance of the wife, periodic or in gross, which a court orders a husband to pay * * *
On the other hand, as further stated in Francis, 412 S.W.2d at 33: “* * * obligations assumed by the husband in separation agreements or contracts to make payments for the support of the wife after a divorce decree becomes final, are not obligations to pay alimony and do not violate the public policy of this State.” In other words support payments so ordered to be made are not deemed alimony in Texas. See Cornell v. Cornell, 413 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tex.1967).
Additionally, Tex.Fam.Code 1970, § 3.63 states: “In a decree of divorce or annulment the court shall order a division of the estate of the parties in a manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and any children of the marriage.”
Thus Lela was not without right to some relief in her Texas annulment action. See Tex.Fam.Code, § 3.63, quoted above.
In any event, the means by which Lela might have obtained compensation or support in connection with her Texas annulment is not here controlling. See 27A C. J.S. Divorce § 239(c), at p. 1147. Neither can the extent thereof, or share she could have had from the second husband’s estate, be instantly determinative.
V. Finally, research also reveals the rationale in Gaines, quoted supra, has been either expressly or tacitly approved by a respectable array of courts in other jurisdictions. See generally Fry v. Fry, 5 Cal.App.3d 169, 85 Cal.Rptr. 126 (1970); Torgan v. Torgan, 159 Colo. 93, 410 P.2d 167 (1966); Beebe v. Beebe, 227 Ga. 248, 179 S.E.2d 758 (1971); Keeney v. Keeney, 211 La. 585, 30 So.2d 549 (1947); Surabian v. Surabian, 285 N.E.2d 909 (Mass.1972); Bridges v. Bridges, 217 So.2d 281 (Miss.1968); Ballew v. Ballew, 187 Neb. 397, 191 N.W.2d 462 (1971); Chavez v. Chavez, 82 N.M. 624, 485 P.2d 735 (1971); Flaxman v. Flaxman, 57 N.J. 458, 273 A.2d 567 (1971). See also Evans v. Evans, 212 So.2d 107 (Fla.App.1968); 21 Drake L. Rev. 645 (1972); 18 Drake L. Rev. 291 (1969); Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 1033; cf. Nelson v. Nelson, 282 Mo. 412, 221 S.W. 1066, 1067 (1920).
VI. In light of the foregoing I see no reason to distinguish between divorce and annulment as here involved. And particularly under present day standards the wife should not be permitted the means by which to choose the more affluent of two marriage related sources of property allocation, alimony, maintenance or support.
VII. In the case at bar the record indicates nothing more than that Mrs. Peters’ remarriage annulling intoxication was voluntary. Stated otherwise, there is no showing from which it may be inferred the second marriage vitiating inebriation resulted from the exercise of force, duress, or coercion by anyone. Neither is there *162any basis upon which to find Mrs. Peters’ remarriage was induced by fraud.
Under these circumstances I would adopt the rationale in Gaines, supra, and other like cases cited above, and reverse on the instant appeal.
REES, J., joins this dissent.
MASON, J., dissents for the reasons stated in Division I of the dissent by RAWLINGS, J.