Court Opinion

ID: 9530989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:06:08.344699+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:18.714670
License: Public Domain

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting: I dissent. An examination of the statutory scheme shows clearly that neither the Secretary of State nor the licensee should have any right of appeal from the decision of the circuit court in a proceeding under section 11 — 501.1(d) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 9514, par. 11 — 501.1(d)). Section 11 — 501(c) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 9514, par. 11 — 501(c)) provides that the presence, at the time of the test, of stated percentages of alcohol in the individual’s blood gives rise to certain presumptions concerning his state of intoxication. Regardless of the presumption of sobriety or intoxication, the section contains no provision for revocation of the driver’s license until after conviction (section 11 — 501(i)). Section 11 — 501.1(d) expressly provides that the only purpose of the hearing is to determine “whether the person was placed under arrest for an offense as defined in Section 11 — 501 of this Act or a similar provision of a municipal ordinance, whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to believe that such person was driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, whether the person was informed orally and in writing as provided in Paragraph (a) that his privilege to operate a motor vehicle would be suspended if he refused to submit to and complete the test and whether, after being so advised, he refused to submit to and complete the test upon request of the officer.” The obvious purpose of the provision for suspension is to coerce submission to the test provided for in section 11 — 501(c), and the only effect of a finding adverse to the licensee in a proceeding brought under section 11 — 501.1(d) is that it permits summary revocation without awaiting conviction on the charge of driving while intoxicated. Assuming suspension under section 11 — 501.1(d), a licensee is entitled to a prompt hearing (section 2 — 118), and absent a conviction for driving while intoxicated or sufficient evidence to sustain the finding that he had done so, the suspension would be terminated. It would appear that if there were sufficient evidence of intoxication to warrant prosecution of the charge, the criminal case should be disposed of long before the appeal process can be completed. Assuming that were not the case, section 6 — 205 of tire Illinois Vehicle Code enumerates 14 situations in which the Secretary of State is required to revoke a driver’s license, and section 6 — 206 vests him with discretionary authority to do so in 20 additional sitúations. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 95%, pars. 6 — 205, 6 — 206.) It would not require much ingenuity to fit any factual situation which justified suspension of a license into one of the categories under which the Secretary of State is required, or has discretion, to suspend the license. The appellate court has held that the licensee has no right of appeal from an adverse decision. (People v. Dodd (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 805; People v. Kallem (1979), 69 Ill. App. 3d 658.) The same rule should apply to the People. MR. JUSTICE MORAN joins in this dissent.