Court Opinion

ID: 9562148
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:22:33.74281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:13.803427
License: Public Domain

Gregory, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to Division 2 of the majority opinion. I cannot agree that OCGA § 33-7-11 (j) (Code Ann. § 56-407.1) contemplates a claim for bad faith penalty and attorney fees must be brought in the action against the uninsured motorist. The insurer is given the right under OCGA § 33-7-11 (d) (Code Ann. § 56-407.1) to defend the claim against the uninsured motorist either in its own name or in the name of the uninsured motorist. This is designed to prevent disclosure to the jury of the existence of insurance coverage if the insurer so elects. The majority opinion will eliminate that option where there is a bad faith claim unless we also construe the statute to *873provide for a bifurcated trial where the underlying claim is first presented to the jury and after verdict the bad faith claim is presented. The statute certainly does not expressly provide for a bifurcated trial. The point is that the legislative intent must have been to, at least, permit a separate trial on the issue of bad faith.
I would hold, contrary to the Court of Appeals, that bad faith can exist, even prior to a judgment against the uninsured motorist, when the requirements of OCGA § 33-7-11 (4) (Code Ann. § 56-407.1) are met, and that a separate suit may be brought against the insurer for the bad faith claim after judgment in the suit against the uninsured motorist. Therefore, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.