Court Opinion

ID: 9521671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:09:39.105472+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:50:04.758980
License: Public Domain

TOMLJANOVICH, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the second part of the court’s opinion. I agree that a trial court has broad discretion to grant or deny a jury’s request to have testimony read back to it; however, I do not believe — as the majority apparently does — that such discretion is unfettered.
In this case, the trial judge’s reasons for not reading back the requested portion of the police officer’s testimony are groundless. The jury made a specific request for a specific part of a specific witness’ testimony, testimony which bore upon the critical issue of M.J.’s identification of Lane. Because the jury already was giving prominence to that testimony in its deliberations, the trial judge would not have given undue prominence merely by granting the request. Moreover, the requested testimony represented a small, readily identifiable portion of testimony in a brief trial. I cannot accept the trial judge’s assertion that there was “no way” to locate and read back the requested testimony.
In view of our holding in State v. Daniels, I would not adopt the “give presumption” advocated by Lane. But I believe that a trial judge has an obligation to attempt to help a jury resolve any material, relevant issues that are hampering its progress toward a verdict. A trial judge’s terse refusal to do so, in response to a reasonable and relevant request, constitutes an abuse of discretion.
GARDEBRING, Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice TOMLJA-NOVICH.