Court Opinion

ID: 9717832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:11:07.580142+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:55.697003
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE JIGANTI, dissenting: The majority finds that the trial court in directing a finding at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case improperly applied the standard in ruling on that motion. The standard is set out in Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, section 2 — 1110 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2 — 1110) and in Kokinis v. Kotrich (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 151, 407 N.E.2d 43. I disagree with the majority for two reasons. First, the parties never raised an improper standard as an issue before the trial court nor in fact have they done so in this court. Other than for jurisdictional reasons, a reviewing court should not normally search the record for unargued and unbriefed reasons to reverse a trial court judgment. (Saldana v. Wirtz Cartage Co. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 379, 386, 385 N.E.2d 664.) Secondly, it is quite understandable why the parties did not raise improper standard as an issue, because it is in fact not an issue. The trial court had a total grasp of the law and applied it to the facts over which it had a complete command. At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case, the court noted that a motion was made under section 2 — 1110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that is, a motion to find for the defendant at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s evidence. That section provides: “Motion in non-jury case to find for defendant at close of plaintiff’s evidence. In all cases tried without a jury, defendant may, at the close of plaintiff’s case, move for a finding or judgment in his or her favor. In ruling on the motion the court shall weigh the evidence, considering the credibility of the witnesses and the weight and quality of the evidence. If the ruling on the motion is favorable to the defendant, a judgment dismissing the action shall be entered.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 2— 1110.) The trial court then noted that Kokinis provides that the trial court must first establish and satisfy itself that the elements of a cause of action have been proved and that the plaintiff’s testimony and evidence establishes a prima facie case, the court further noted that if the court finds that no prima facie case has been established, it must direct a finding without delay, but that if the court finds that the evidence presented by the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the court must then weigh the evidence. That is of course a proper statement of the law. Where I believe the majority erred is in its reading of the trial court's reasons for its decision which culminated in the judgment order. The majority reads the trial court’s findings and determines that the trial court found that the plaintiff did not make out a prima facie case. According to the majority, the trial court used a standard of clear and convincing evidence, which the majority finds as inappropriate in determining if a prima facie case is made out by the evidence. Regardless of the legal merits of that contention, I read the trial court’s findings differently. In my estimation, the trial court found that indeed there was a prima facie case. After it made that finding, which it was required to do under section 2 — 1110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the trial court weighed the evidence and found that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. In reaching my conclusion that the trial court found that there was a prima facie ease, I note that the trial court specifically commented on the code of Civil Procedure and on Kokinis. The court then analyzed the evidence in great detail and made specific findings that in its view a fiduciary relationship had not been established and that the evidence was not clear and convincing that there was any duress. In conclusion, the trial court stated that in order for the plaintiff to prevail in the relief he requested, the plaintiff “must do so on the weight and persuasion of his own testimony. He has failed to meet the quality of proof required for such relief.” The above leads only to the conclusion that the trial court read the Code of Civil Procedure and Kokinis like a road map and never strayed. The majority should not have gratuitously raised this inappropriate issue. This cause should be considered on the merits as briefed by the parties.