Court Opinion

ID: 9931644
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 16:10:15.178388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:07.144231
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Lauderdale, 2024-Ohio-481.]

                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     MONTGOMERY COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO                                        :
                                                      :
       Appellee                                       :   C.A. No. 29753
                                                      :
 v.                                                   :   Trial Court Case No. 2022 CR 02569
                                                      :
  DELESHAWN LAUDERDALE                                :   (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
                                                      :   Court)
       Appellant                                      :
                                                      :

                                                 ...........

                                                 OPINION

                                     Rendered on February 9, 2024

                                                 ...........

MEGAN M. PATITUCE and JOSEPH C. PATITUCE, Attorneys for Appellant

MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by MICHAEL P. ALLEN, Attorney for Appellee

                                                .............

WELBAUM, J.

        {¶ 1} Appellant, Deleshawn Lauderdale, appeals from his convictions for rape and

gross sexual imposition following a jury trial in the Montgomery County Court of Common

Pleas. In support of his appeal, Lauderdale contends that his conviction for gross sexual
                                                                                            -2-

imposition was not supported by sufficient evidence. Lauderdale also contends that the

trial court committed plain error by failing to give a curative jury instruction at trial after

Lauderdale’s mother engaged in disruptive behavior in the gallery and after the victim had

an emotional outburst while testifying.      In addition, Lauderdale claims that his trial

counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to move for a mistrial or, alternatively,

a curative jury instruction, after the jury had observed the disruptive behavior of

Lauderdale’s mother and the victim’s emotional outburst. Lauderdale further claims that

the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by referring to the victim’s emotional

outburst during its closing argument.       Lastly, Lauderdale claims that the trial court

abused its discretion by overruling his post-verdict motion for new trial without holding a

hearing or reviewing the medical records that were at issue in the motion. For the

reasons outlined below, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.

                            Facts and Course of Proceedings

       {¶ 2} On September 22, 2022, a Montgomery County grand jury returned an

indictment charging Lauderdale with one count of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2),

a felony of the first degree, and one count of gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C.

2907.05(A)(1), a felony of the fourth degree. The charges stemmed from allegations that

on May 19, 2022, Lauderdale, who had just turned 18 years old, forced his cousin’s 16-

year-old daughter, F.W., to have vaginal intercourse with him. It was also alleged that

Lauderdale touched F.W.’s breast.

       {¶ 3} Lauderdale pled not guilty to the indicted charges and the matter proceeded
                                                                                          -3-

to a jury trial. At trial, the State called several witnesses, including F.W., F.W.’s mother,

and the officers who investigated the matter. The State also called a social worker who

had interviewed F.W., a sexual assault nurse examiner (“SANE nurse”) who had

examined F.W., and a DNA analyst who had analyzed swabs taken from F.W.                    In

addition, the State called a digital forensic examiner who had extracted data from F.W.’s

cell phone. Lauderdale also testified in his defense. The following is a summary of the

testimony and evidence that was presented at trial.

                           Lauderdale’s Relationship with F.W.

       {¶ 4} Lauderdale and F.W.’s mother (“Mother”) are first cousins. In May 2022,

Lauderdale began staying with Mother and her six children at Mother’s Dayton residence

in Montgomery County, Ohio. F.W. is the oldest of Mother’s six children. F.W. is close

in age to Lauderdale and has known Lauderdale all her life. Before the alleged sexual

assault, F.W. and Lauderdale were like best friends and spent a lot of time together.

However, F.W. denied engaging in any type of sexual activity with Lauderdale before the

alleged sexual assault. Lauderdale, on the other hand, claimed that he and F.W. had

previously engaged in some flirtations. Specifically, Lauderdale claimed that he had

digitally penetrated F.W. and that F.W. had grinded on his private area while they were

at a friend’s house.

                               The Alleged Sexual Assault

       {¶ 5} On the night of May 18, 2022, F.W. slept in Mother’s bed with her five-year-
                                                                                        -4-

old brother, her ten-year-old brother, and Lauderdale. F.W. claimed that they had fallen

asleep while watching television. During that time, Mother was at home sleeping on the

couch, but she left early the next morning for her nursing school program.

       {¶ 6} F.W., who fell asleep wearing a tan zipper jacket and jean shorts, woke up in

the middle of the night after she had felt someone rubbing between her legs. When she

woke up, she noticed that her breast was hanging out of her bra and jacket, which had

been unzipped.     F.W. then looked around and observed that everyone in the room

appeared to be sleeping. Thereafter, F.W. put her breast back inside her bra, zipped up

her jacket, and went back to sleep beside her five-year-old brother.

       {¶ 7} Later the same night, F.W. woke up a second time as a result of being moved

and feeling someone groping her. Specifically, F.W. felt someone grabbing her buttocks

area and moving her in a position that left her face-to-face with Lauderdale. When F.W.

looked around, she observed that everyone still appeared to be sleeping. F.W. then

moved back over by her brother and went to sleep.

       {¶ 8} F.W. woke up a third time to find her jean shorts down by her ankles and

Lauderdale having sex with her. F.W. specifically testified that Lauderdale had his penis

inside her vagina while she was lying on her side with Lauderdale’s chest facing her back.

F.W. also testified that Lauderdale pushed her head down when she looked back at him.

F.W. then told Lauderdale that she had to use the bathroom. After urinating, F.W.

immediately left the house and walked to the corner of the street, where she called her

Mother’s friend, Mikkel, for help.

       {¶ 9} Mikkel picked up F.W. and took her to a friend’s house.          Mikkel was
                                                                                        -5-

eventually able to contact Mother and advise her of the situation. Mother left her nursing

program after speaking with Mikkel and went home to confront Lauderdale. Mother

recalled that when she accused Lauderdale of sexually assaulting F.W., Lauderdale

nonchalantly acted as if he did not know what she was talking about and denied any

wrongdoing. Mother called the police and then went to pick up F.W. at her friend’s

house, where she observed F.W. distraught and crying.

                                    The Investigation

       {¶ 10} After calling the police, Mother also flagged down a police cruiser in the

street and advised the officer that a rapist was at her house. The officer immediately

went to Mother’s residence and contacted Lauderdale. The officer was wearing a body

camera that captured his interaction with Lauderdale.        The first six minutes and

seventeen seconds of the body camera recording was admitted into evidence as State’s

Exhibit 21.    On the recording, the officer can be seen approaching Lauderdale in

Mother’s garage and asking him: “What’s going on, man?” In response, Lauderdale told

the officer:

               [F.W.] woke me up going to bathroom. I turned to the other side. I,

       uh, ended up waking up grabbing my computer, ok. She saying I touched

       her uh like physically or whatever I don’t know.

State’s Ex. 21.

       {¶ 11} For purposes of officer safety, the officer asked Lauderdale if he had any

guns or knives; Lauderdale said he had none. The officer then told Lauderdale that he
                                                                                      -6-

was going to be detained while the sexual assault allegations were investigated.

Thereafter, the officer took Lauderdale to his police cruiser and obtained Lauderdale’s

identification information. During that time, Lauderdale advised the officer that he had

been staying at Mother’s residence for the past two days. The officer testified, and the

body camera video confirmed, that the officer did not ask Lauderdale any investigative

questions. After Lauderdale was detained, the matter was turned over to detectives with

the Dayton Police Department, who interviewed Lauderdale at the department’s Safety

Building.

       {¶ 12} Lauderdale’s interview with the detectives was video recorded and admitted

into evidence as State’s Exhibit 25. During the interview, Lauderdale confirmed that he

and F.W. were each other’s favorite cousin. Lauderdale also confirmed that he and F.W.

had been sleeping in the same bed for the past two nights. However, Lauderdale initially

denied engaging in any type of sexual activity with F.W.

       {¶ 13} After Lauderdale denied engaging in sexual activity with F.W., the

detectives advised Lauderdale that DNA testing would be performed during the

investigation. The detectives explained to Lauderdale that the DNA testing could prove

that something had happened between him and F.W. and that it would be better if

Lauderdale just told them what had happened. Lauderdale continued to claim that he

never had sex with F.W. and voluntarily gave his DNA sample for testing.

       {¶ 14} After obtaining Lauderdale’s DNA sample, the detectives began to use an

investigative tactic whereby they minimized the situation. For example, the detectives

suggested that F.W. had probably come on to Lauderdale and that Lauderdale was too
                                                                                        -7-

embarrassed to talk about the situation. After this discussion, Lauderdale changed his

story and told the detectives that, over the past couple of years, he and F.W. had had a

few flirtations. Lauderdale claimed that F.W. had grinded on his private area at a friend’s

house and that he had digitally penetrated F.W.       Concerning the night in question,

Lauderdale told the detectives that he had licked F.W.’s breast and engaged in

consensual vaginal sex with F.W.

      {¶ 15} While the investigation was pending, Mother took F.W. to Dayton Children’s

Hospital to be examined. Before F.W. was examined, a social worker at the hospital

spoke with F.W. to assess her physical and medical needs. Based on that conversation,

the social worker recommended that F.W. undergo a sexual assault nurse examination

(“SANE exam”). The social worker testified that F.W. had a very quiet, sad, and solemn

demeanor during their conversation.

      {¶ 16} After F.W. spoke with the social worker, a SANE nurse examined F.W.

During the examination, the SANE nurse photographed F.W.’s genitals and took swabs

of F.W.’s mouth, tongue, fingernails, vagina, and anus. The nurse also swabbed an area

of F.W.’s hand where F.W. claimed that Lauderdale had kissed or licked her. The swabs

were sent to the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation (“BCI”) for analysis.

      {¶ 17} A forensic DNA analyst from BCI analyzed F.W.’s vaginal swabs and

determined that the swabs tested positive for semen. The analyst also determined that

there were two DNA contributors on the vaginal swabs. The first DNA contributor was

F.W., which was expected since the swabs were taken from F.W.’s vagina. The second

DNA contributor, i.e., the sperm cell contributor, was Lauderdale. Accordingly, the DNA
                                                                                        -8-

evidence established that Lauderdale’s semen was present inside F.W.’s vagina.

       {¶ 18} Later in the investigation, Mother advised the investigating detectives that

she had a security camera in her bedroom that constantly detects motion. Mother told

the detectives that she had noticed the camera had been unplugged for a five-hour period

on the day of the sexual assault. Mother provided the detectives with a screenshot video

of the cell phone application that was connected to the security camera in question. The

screenshot video showed that the camera did not detect any motion between 6:18 a.m.

and 11:24 a.m. on May 19, 2022. Mother testified that 6:18 a.m. was right after she had

left for nursing school. Mother also testified that she did not keep the camera pointed

toward her bed, but toward the ceiling. The screenshot video was admitted into evidence

as State’s Exhibit 20.

       {¶ 19} Mother also gave the investigating detectives consent to search F.W.’s cell

phone. After receiving said consent, the lead detective asked a digital forensic examiner

from the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office to extract data from F.W.’s phone. The

extracted data established that Lauderdale and F.W. had exchanged text messages over

Instagram on the afternoon of May 19, 2022. F.W. testified that she had received the

messages from Lauderdale while she was at her mother’s friend’s house.                The

messages were admitted into evidence as State’s Exhibit 23 and stated, in relevant part,

the following:

       5/19/2022 11:55:05 AM -Lauderdale: [A]ye what u talking bout?

       5/19/2022 11:55:51 AM     -F.W.:         [You know] what you did there is no
                                                reason to lie now
       5/19/2022 11:56:34 AM     - Lauderdale: [L]ie about what. [All i know] is yo cousin
                                                                                           -9-

                                                or whatever talking bout touch
      5/19/2022 11:57: 35 AM - Lauderdale: [T]he only time i touched u
                                                THROUGHOUT the night was to put eli
                                                closer to u lil bru kept tryna get in my lil
                                                cover.
      5/19/2022 11:57:36 AM      - F.W.:        Listen stop tryna play stupid [please] ain’t
                                                [nobody] gone lie like that
      5/19/2022 11:58:19 AM      - Lauderdale: [S]tupid on what im geuniley (sic)
                                                confused u woke me going to the
                                                bathroom/
State’s Ex. 23.

        Heckling by Lauderdale’s Mother and F.W.’s Emotional Outburst at Trial

      {¶ 20} After Mother testified at trial, Lauderdale’s counsel advised the trial court

that there had been a “pretty big reaction” in the gallery that was noticed by some of the

jurors. Trial Tr. Vol. I, p. 131. Lauderdale’s counsel suggested that, once the jury left

the courtroom, the judge should remind the gallery not to react to the testimony. The

record does not indicate whether the judge gave any such instruction to the gallery.

      {¶ 21} The record thereafter indicates that during F.W.’s cross-examination, a

member of the gallery, later identified as Lauderdale’s mother, began to audibly heckle

and make faces, motions, and gestures at F.W. In response, F.W. blurted out: ”Yeah,

cause I’m trying to figure out what’s funny.” Trial Tr. Vol. I, p. 160. Following F.W.’s

outburst, counsel had a sidebar. During the sidebar, the State asked the trial court to

eject Lauderdale’s mother from the courtroom; Lauderdale’s counsel, on the other hand,

requested that Lauderdale’s mother simply be given an advisement. In response, the
                                                                                     -10-

trial court instructed Lauderdale’s counsel to lean over and quietly advise his client’s

mother to stop being disruptive.

      {¶ 22} After making the advisement, Lauderdale’s counsel continued to cross-

examine F.W. During the continued cross-examination, Lauderdale’s counsel asked

F.W. if she was embarrassed about having sex with her cousin. The State objected to

the question and the objection was sustained. F.W., however, became upset by the

question and responded as follows:

             F.W.:                 What. Are you serious?

             THE COURT:            Order.

             F.W.:                 Are you serious?

             THE COURT:            Ma ‘am sit down.

             F.W.:                 Am I embarrassed?

             THE COURT:            Sit down.

             F.W.:                 I didn’t have sex with him.     He raped me.

                                   That’s what happened.

             THE COURT:            Ma’am, sit down.

             F.W.:                 And I don’t get what’s funny.

             THE COURT:            Ma’am – you just –

             F.W.:                 What’s funny –

             THE COURT:            -- there’s no questions.

             F.W.:                 -- that your son raped me?

             THE BAILIFF:          Have a seat.
                                                                                           -11-

              THE STATE:              Ma’am.

              F.W.:                   No, I’m not going to have a seat. I’m angry.

              THE BAILIFF:            I get it, but you have to.

              F.W.:                   For months –

              THE COURT:              There’s no questions.

              F.W.:                   -- for months I’ve been dealing with this.

              THE COURT:              No questions.     Remain silent until there’s a

                                      question.

       THE COURT:               Let’s take a recess. * * *

Trial Tr. Vol. I, p. 164-165.

       {¶ 23} After the trial court ordered a recess, the jury left the courtroom and the trial

court made the following statement on the record:

              There was some disruptive behavior, activity during the examination

       of the witness, [F.W.]. The Court has discussed this situation with counsel

       off the record. I think the record does reflect that the witness became

       emotional, vocal, yelled. There may have been some cause of that or

       partially caused by behavior of a spectator. And the court is concerned

       about the behavior of that spectator that who I believe is a family member

       of the Defendant.        Of course, in this case related to the complaining

       witness.

              So there would be – been a previous indication by the Court to have

       to warn her.      Defense counsel did that.           And then there was some
                                                                                         -12-

       behavior on her part that contributed toward the emotional outburst of the

       complaining witness. So the Court is going to, during the testimony of

       [F.W.], which we have some more examination to take place. We’re going

       to not admit the spectator so as to not disrupt the proceedings.

               I think one has to behave very well during – when in court. Cannot

       do anything that disrupts the proceedings, impedes the proceedings,

       inflames a witness, intimidates a witness. To eliminate that potential, we’re

       going to have the spectator remain outside the courtroom during the

       testimony of this witness. Is there anything further that counsel would like

       to indicate for the record? * * *

Trial Tr. Vol. I., p. 165-166.

       {¶ 24} Following the trial court’s statement, neither party objected to how the trial

court handled the matter. The State thereafter conducted a redirect examination of F.W.

and called the remainder of its witnesses.

                                 Lauderdale’s Version of Events

       {¶ 25} After the State rested its case, Lauderdale testified in his defense.

Regarding the incident in question, Lauderdale testified that he had kissed F.W.’s neck

to her breasts and grabbed her leg. Lauderdale also testified that F.W. had unbuckled

her jean shorts and helped him pull them off. Lauderdale testified that F.W. then turned

around and allowed him to put his penis inside her vagina while he was lifting one of her

legs. Accordingly, Lauderdale claimed that he and F.W. had engaged in consensual
                                                                                            -13-

vaginal intercourse. Lauderdale testified that he initially lied about his sexual activity with

F.W. because he was scared and embarrassed.

                          Verdict, Motion for New Trial, and Sentencing

       {¶ 26} After the defense rested its case and after closing arguments, the jury

deliberated and found Lauderdale guilty as charged in the indictment.                 Prior to

sentencing, Lauderdale filed a Crim.R. 33 motion for new trial. In the motion, Lauderdale

argued that a new trial was warranted based on newly discovered evidence. The newly

discovered evidence at issue was hundreds of medical records from Dayton Children’s

Hospital that pertained to F.W. There is no dispute that the State sent the medical

records to Lauderdale’s counsel approximately two and a half weeks after trial.

Lauderdale claimed that the inability to inspect the medical records prior to trial prejudiced

his substantial rights.

       {¶ 27} In response to Lauderdale’s motion for new trial, the State claimed that it

did not receive the medical records at issue until after the jury had reached its verdict. In

support of this claim, the State pointed out that the United States Postal Service time

stamp on the records was dated January 23, 2023, i.e., four days after trial, and that the

records show that they were printed on January 20, 2023, i.e., one day after trial. The

State also claimed that it had forwarded the records to Lauderdale immediately after

realizing the records had arrived. The State further claimed that the medical records

were either immaterial or duplicative of medical records that had been provided to the

defense in advance of trial.
                                                                                            -14-

         {¶ 28} On February 21, 2023, the trial court addressed Lauderdale’s motion for

new trial at the start of his sentencing hearing. In doing so, the trial court overruled the

motion on grounds that the medial records in question were not “really relevant or material

to the issues at trial.” Trial Tr. Vol. II, p. 327.

         {¶ 29} After overruling Lauderdale’s motion for new trial, the trial court sentenced

Lauderdale to a mandatory, indefinite term of four to six years in prison for rape and 18

months in prison for gross sexual imposition. The trial court ordered the two prison terms

to run concurrently, for a total indefinite term of four to six years in prison. The trial court

also designated Lauderdale a Tier III sex offender.

         {¶ 30} Lauderdale now appeals from his conviction, raising five assignments of

error for review. For purposes of clarity, we will review the assignments of error out of

order.

                                 Fourth Assignment of Error

         {¶ 31} Under his fourth assignment of error, Lauderdale contends that his

conviction for gross sexual imposition under R.C. 2907.05(A)(1) was not supported by

sufficient evidence.

         {¶ 32} “A sufficiency of the evidence argument disputes whether the State has

presented adequate evidence on each element of the offense to allow the case to go to

the jury or sustain the verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Wilson, 2d Dist. Montgomery

No. 22581, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 10, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678

N.E.2d 541 (1997). “When reviewing a claim as to sufficiency of evidence, the relevant
                                                                                           -15-

inquiry is whether any rational factfinder viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to

the state could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a

reasonable doubt.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 430, 683

N.E.2d 1096 (1997). “The verdict will not be disturbed unless the appellate court finds

that reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier-of-fact.”

(Citations omitted.) Id.

       {¶ 33} As previously discussed, Lauderdale contends that the State failed to

present sufficient evidence establishing that he had committed the offense of gross sexual

imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1).      That offense is committed when the

offender has “sexual contact with another, not the spouse of the offender,” and the

offender “purposely compel[led] the other person * * * to submit by force or threat of force.”

R.C. 2907.05(A)(1).

       {¶ 34} “Sexual contact” is defined as “any touching of an erogenous zone of

another, including without limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic region, or, if the

person is a female, a breast, for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either

person.” R.C. 2907.01(B).

       {¶ 35} “Force” is defined as “any violence, compulsion, or constraint physically

exerted by any means upon or against a person or thing.”                R.C. 2901.01(A)(1).

Accordingly, “ ‘[f]orce’ is satisfied by ‘any effort physically exerted.’ ” State v. Johnson,

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26961, 2017-Ohio-5498, ¶ 21, quoting State v. Snyder, 192

Ohio App.3d 55, 2011-Ohio-175, 947 N.E.2d 1281, ¶ 18 (9th Dist.). It is well established

that “the manipulation of a sleeping victim’s clothing in order to facilitate sexual conduct
                                                                                            -16-

constitutes force under R.C. 2901.01(A)(1) even though such force requires only minimal

physical exertion.” State v. Walker, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96662, 2011-Ohio-6645,

¶ 20, citing State v. Clark, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90148, 2008-Ohio-3358, ¶ 17. (Other

citations omitted.) Accord State v. Johnson, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2009-CA-38, 2010-

Ohio-2920, ¶ 18. See also State v. Burton, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 05CA3, 2007-Ohio-1660,

¶ 38 (“[w]hen the circumstances include a victim who is initially asleep when the sexual

conduct begins, the state may satisfy its burden with evidence of only the minimal force

required to manipulate the victim's body or clothing to facilitate the assault”); State v. H.H.,

10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-1126, 2011-Ohio-6660, ¶ 12 (“moving [the victim’s] body

and removing her clothes while she slept would constitute force”).

       {¶ 36} In this case, the parties stipulated that Lauderdale and F.W. were not

spouses. F.W. testified that the first time she woke up on the night in question, she had

felt someone rubbing between her legs and noticed that her breast was hanging out of

her bra and jacket, which had been unzipped. F.W. also testified that she woke up a

second time as a result of being moved and feeling someone groping her. On cross-

examination, F.W. clarified that she had felt someone grabbing her buttocks area and

moving her in a position that had left her face-to-face with Lauderdale. Thereafter, F.W.

testified that she woke up a third time to Lauderdale engaging in non-consensual vaginal

intercourse with her.

       {¶ 37} F.W.’s testimony regarding the vaginal intercourse pertains to Lauderdale’s

rape conviction, which Lauderdale has not challenged on sufficiency grounds.                 As

previously discussed, Lauderdale is only challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
                                                                                        -17-

regarding his conviction for gross sexual imposition.        Lauderdale claims that his

conviction for gross sexual imposition was not supported by sufficient evidence because

F.W. testified that everyone was asleep when she noticed her breast was out, and

because no witness, including F.W., observed Lauderdale removing F.W.’s breast from

her jacket and bra. This argument, however, fails to account for the strong circumstantial

evidence presented at trial.

      {¶ 38} “ ‘Circumstantial evidence is the proof of facts by direct evidence from which

the trier of fact may infer or derive by reasoning other facts in accordance with the

common experience of mankind.’ ” State v. Lambert, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28655,

2021-Ohio-17, ¶ 28, quoting State v. Hartman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90284, 2008-Ohio-

3683, ¶ 37. “Circumstantial evidence has the same probative value as direct evidence.”

(Citations omitted.) State v. Phifer, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2020-CA-13, 2021-Ohio-521, ¶ 23.

“In fact, in some cases, ‘circumstantial evidence may be more certain, satisfying, and

persuasive than direct evidence.’ ” Id., quoting State v. Jackson, 57 Ohio St.3d 29, 38,

565 N.E.2d 549 (1991).

      {¶ 39} Here, the evidence established that the only other individuals in bed with

F.W. and Lauderdale were F.W.’s two younger brothers, who were five and ten years old.

The evidence also established that after F.W. put her breast back into her jacket, and

after she had felt someone rub between her legs and grope her buttocks, she later woke

up to Lauderdale raping her. From this evidence, the jury could have reasonably inferred

that Lauderdale was the individual who had removed F.W.’s breast from her jacket and

bra and was the individual who had rubbed between her legs and groped her buttocks.
                                                                                       -18-

       {¶ 40} Because breasts, buttocks, and thighs are considered “erogenous zones,”

and because the evidence established that Lauderdale ended up raping F.W. through

vaginal intercourse after touching those areas of F.W.’s body, a rational factfinder could

have concluded that Lauderdale had touched those areas for purposes of sexual arousal,

and therefore engaged in sexual contact as defined in R.C. 2907.01(B).         A rational

factfinder could have also reasonably concluded that the sexual contact was made by

force since F.W.’s testimony indicated that Lauderdale had facilitated the offense by

manipulating F.W.’s clothes and body while she was sleeping.

       {¶ 41} For the foregoing reasons, we find that when the evidence is viewed in a

light most favorable to the State, a rational factfinder could have concluded beyond a

reasonable doubt that all elements of gross sexual imposition were satisfied.

Accordingly, Lauderdale’s conviction for gross sexual imposition was supported by

sufficient evidence.

       {¶ 42} Lauderdale’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.

                             Second Assignment of Error

       {¶ 43} Under his second assignment of error, Lauderdale contends that the trial

court committed plain error by failing to sua sponte give a curative jury instruction

following F.W.’s emotional outburst at trial. According to Lauderdale, the trial court

should have instructed the jury to disregard the disruptive behavior of Lauderdale’s

mother and F.W.’s subsequent emotional outburst. Lauderdale also claims that the trial

court committed plain error by failing to strike the non-responsive statements made by
                                                                                                -19-

F.W. during her emotional outburst.

       {¶ 44} The record establishes that Lauderdale’s trial counsel never requested a

curative jury instruction or objected to its omission. Lauderdale’s trial counsel also never

requested that the trial court strike the non-responsive statements made by F.W. during

her emotional outburst. As such, we must review the instant assignment of error under

a plain error analysis.    See State v. Cunningham, 4th Dist. Ross No. 19CA3698, 2021-

Ohio-416, ¶ 50 (“the failure to request a curative instruction at trial forfeits all but plain

error on appeal”); State v. Johnson, 164 Ohio App.3d 792, 2005-Ohio-6826, 844 N.E.2d

372, ¶ 22 (2d Dist.) (“[o]rdinarily, a failure to bring an error to the attention of the trial court

at a time when the court could correct that error constitutes a waiver of all but plain error”),

citing State v. Wickline, 50 Ohio St.3d 114, 552 N.E.2d 913 (1990).

       {¶ 45} Crim.R. 52(B) provides appellate courts with discretion to correct “[p]lain

errors or defects affecting substantial rights.” Crim.R. 52(B). “In order for plain error to

exist, there must be an obvious defect in the trial proceedings that affected the

defendant’s substantial rights, meaning that the trial court’s error must have affected the

outcome of the trial.” State v. Petticrew, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2022-CA-29, 2023-Ohio-159,

¶ 18, citing State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E.2d 306, ¶ 16.

The question, therefore, “is whether, but for the error, the outcome of the proceedings

clearly would have been otherwise.” (Emphasis omitted.) State v. Hornbeck, 155 Ohio

App.3d 571, 2003-Ohio-6897, 802 N.E.2d 184, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Long, 53

Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978). “Notice of plain error is to be taken with the

utmost of caution, under exceptional circumstances, and only to prevent a manifest
                                                                                        -20-

miscarriage of justice.” Id.

      {¶ 46} In this case, we cannot say that the outcome of Lauderdale’s trial clearly

would have been otherwise had the trial court given a curative jury instruction and/or

stricken the non-responsive statements made by F.W. during her emotional outburst.

Although F.W.’s non-responsive statements were emotionally charged, they were

consistent with her trial testimony and did not add any new facts that would have changed

the outcome of the trial. Although the disruptive conduct of Lauderdale’s mother and

F.W.’s emotional outburst could have caused jurors to sympathize with F.W., we cannot

say that any such sympathy was the tipping point in this case, as the State presented a

significant amount of evidence against Lauderdale.       For example, the forensic DNA

evidence established that Lauderdale’s semen was present on F.W.’s vaginal swabs.

The evidence also indicated that the security camera in Mother’s bedroom had been

rendered inoperable around the time of the alleged rape. The evidence also established

that Lauderdale had lied multiple times to multiple individuals during the investigation.

Specifically, Lauderdale’s recorded interview with the investigating detectives established

that Lauderdale changed his story to his having had consensual sex with F.W. only after

the detectives deployed their minimization tactics and advised Lauderdale that DNA

testing would be performed.

      {¶ 47} F.W., on the other hand, made consistent, unwavering allegations of rape

against Lauderdale and even confronted Lauderdale about the incident via messages on

Instagram. It was also significant that both F.W. and Lauderdale testified that they had

been each other’s favorite cousin and that F.W. had thought of Lauderdale as a best
                                                                                           -21-

friend. The evidence of their close relationship established that F.W. had nothing to gain

by going through the uncomfortable process of accusing her favorite cousin of rape—a

process that required her to undergo an invasive SANE exam and to recount the

traumatic, embarrassing experience multiple times to various individuals, including the

jury.

        {¶ 48} Based on all this evidence, it is likely that the jury would have found

Lauderdale guilty of the charged offenses even if the trial court had given a curative jury

instruction regarding the disruptive behavior of Lauderdale’s mother and F.W.’s emotional

outburst and even if it had stricken F.W.’s non-responsive statements. Accordingly,

Lauderdale cannot establish that the trial court’s failure to do so constituted plain error.

        {¶ 49} Lauderdale’s second assignment of error is overruled.

                                First Assignment of Error

        {¶ 50} Under his first assignment of error, Lauderdale contends that his trial

counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to move for a mistrial or, in the

alternative, a curative jury instruction, after the jury observed the disruptive behavior of

Lauderdale’s mother and F.W.’s emotional outburst.

        {¶ 51} This court reviews alleged instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel

under the two-prong analysis set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104

S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), which was adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in

State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). Pursuant to those cases,

in order to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must show that his trial
                                                                                         -22-

counsel rendered deficient performance and that his counsel’s deficient performance

prejudiced the defense.      Strickland at paragraph two of the syllabus; Bradley at

paragraph two of the syllabus.      The failure to make a showing of either deficient

performance or prejudice defeats a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland

at 697.

       {¶ 52} To establish deficient performance, a defendant must show that his trial

counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable representation. Id.

at 688. In evaluating counsel’s performance, a reviewing court “must indulge in a strong

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance.” Id. at 689. “The adequacy of counsel’s performance must be viewed in

light of all of the circumstances surrounding the trial court proceedings.”        State v.

Jackson, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2004-CA-24, 2005-Ohio-6143, ¶ 29, citing Strickland.

       {¶ 53} To establish prejudice, a defendant must show that there is “a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the proceeding’s result would have been

different.” State v. Hale, 119 Ohio St.3d 118, 2008-Ohio-3426, 892 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 204,

citing Strickland at 687-688 and Bradley at paragraph two of the syllabus.             “ ‘A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.’ ” Bradley at 142, quoting Strickland at 694.

       {¶ 54} In reviewing ineffective assistance claims, this court “will not second-guess

trial strategy decisions[.]” State v. Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 157, 694 N.E.2d 932

(1998), citing Strickland at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Therefore, “ ‘trial counsel is allowed

wide latitude in formulating trial strategy[.]’ ” State v. Collins, 2d Dist. Miami No. 2010-
                                                                                                -23-

CA-22, 2011-Ohio-4475, ¶ 15, quoting State v. Olsen, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2009-CA-110,

2011-Ohio-3420, ¶ 121. “Debatable strategic and tactical decisions may not form the

basis of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, even if, in hindsight, it looks as if a

better strategy had been available.” State v. Conley, 2015-Ohio-2553, 43 N.E.3d 775,

¶ 56 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Cook, 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 524-525, 605 N.E.2d 70 (1992).

       {¶ 55} In this case, the decision of Lauderdale’s trial counsel to not request a

mistrial or a curative jury instruction was a matter of trial strategy. See State v. Jenkins,

2d Dist. Miami No. 2000-CA-59, 2001 WL 848582, *6 (July 27, 2001) (holding that trial

counsel’s decision not to request a mistrial or curative jury instruction “involved matters

of trial tactics, on which trial counsel’s decisions must be given broad deference”); State

v. Zeune, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-1102, 2011-Ohio-5170, ¶ 37, (“[t]he decision not

to request a mistrial is one of trial strategy best left to trial counsel”), citing State v. Seiber,

56 Ohio St.3d 4, 12, 564 N.E.2d 408 (1990).              Lauderdale’s trial counsel may have

believed that F.W.’s outburst made her look less credible in the eyes of the jury and may

have wanted the jury to consider the outburst during deliberations.                This notion is

supported by the fact that Lauderdale’s trial counsel referenced F.W.’s outburst during

closing argument. Specifically, counsel stated that F.W. “behave[d] badly and poorly on

the stand” in response to an “uncomfortable truth[.]” Trial Tr. Vol. II, p. 298. Therefore,

counsel’s decision not to request a mistrial or a curative jury instruction was a tactical one

that will not be second-guessed by this court. Because that decision was a matter of trial

strategy, it cannot form the basis of an ineffective assistance claim.

       {¶ 56} Furthermore, Lauderdale cannot establish that he was prejudiced by his trial
                                                                                         -24-

counsel’s failure to move for a mistrial, because it is pure speculation whether the trial

court would have granted Lauderdale a mistrial had one been requested.              “ ‘Such

speculation is insufficient to establish ineffective assistance.’ ” State v. Short, 129 Ohio

St.3d 360, 2011-Ohio-3641, 952 N.E.2d 1121, ¶ 119, quoting State v. Perez, 124 Ohio

St.3d 122, 2009-Ohio-6179, 920 N.E.2d 104, ¶ 217. (Other citations omitted.)

       {¶ 57} Lauderdale also cannot establish that he was prejudiced by his trial

counsel’s failure to request a curative jury instruction. Given the significant amount of

evidence that was presented against Lauderdale at trial, there is not a reasonable

probability that a curative instruction would have changed the jury’s verdict. Because

Lauderdale failed to establish deficient performance and prejudice, his ineffective

assistance of counsel claim fails.

       {¶ 58} Lauderdale’s first assignment of error is overruled.

                               Third Assignment of Error

       {¶ 59} Under his third assignment of error, Lauderdale contends that the State

committed prosecutorial misconduct when it referenced F.W.’s outburst during its closing

argument.

       {¶ 60} “The test for prosecutorial misconduct is whether remarks were improper

and, if so, whether they prejudicially affected substantial rights of the accused.” State v.

Jones, 90 Ohio St.3d 403, 420, 739 N.E.2d 300 (2000), citing State v. Smith, 14 Ohio

St.3d 13, 14, 470 N.E.2d 883 (1984). “The touchstone of the analysis ‘is the fairness of

the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.’ ” State v. Garrett, 171 Ohio St.3d 139,
                                                                                           -25-

2022-Ohio-4218, 216 N.E.3d 569, ¶ 144, quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219,

102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982). “Where it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that

a jury would have found the defendant guilty even absent the alleged misconduct, the

defendant has not been prejudiced, and his conviction will not be reversed.” State v.

Stevenson, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2007-CA-51, 2008-Ohio-2900, ¶ 42, citing State v. Loza,

71 Ohio St.3d 61, 78, 641 N.E.2d 1082 (1994).

       {¶ 61} We note that prosecutors are afforded wide latitude in the presentation of

their closing arguments. State v. Arrone, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2005-CA-89, 2006-Ohio-

4144, ¶ 126; State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d 160, 165, 555 N.E.2d 293 (1990). They may

comment freely on “ ‘what the evidence has shown and what reasonable inferences may

be drawn therefrom.’ ” Lott at 165, quoting State v. Stephens, 24 Ohio St.2d 76, 82, 263

N.E.2d 773 (1970). Accord State v. Baker, 159 Ohio App.3d 462, 2005-Ohio-45, 824

N.E.2d 162, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.). “Both parties * * * may be ‘colorful or creative’ [during closing

arguments] but not purely abusive, inflammatory, or purely derogatory.”              State v.

Whitaker, 169 Ohio St.3d 647, 2022-Ohio-2840, 207 N.E.3d 677, ¶ 96, quoting State v.

Brown, 38 Ohio St.3d 305, 317, 528 N.E.2d 523 (1988).

       {¶ 62} In this case, Lauderdale claims that the State engaged in prosecutorial

misconduct during its closing argument when it made the following statements that

referenced F.W.’s emotional outburst on the witness stand:

          1. “[F.W.] had no idea when her cousin moved in with her just a few

              days prior to that that she would end up eight months later on a

              witness stand telling strangers about the worst thing that ever
                                                                                       -26-

               happened to her. That she would be berated and bullied. That she

               would have to come to the point where she was yelling because she

               was adamant about what had happened to her.” Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.

               292.

          2. “Unlike this Defendant, her story was the same all the way through

               * * * And she yelled it from that witness stand when she was so

               frustrated because she had been repeatedly berated about her

               story.” Id.

          3. “And then if that wasn’t enough, she’d be forced to shout it because

               the person she has to make believe—she was being attacked.” Id.

               at 297.

          4.    “You know, there’s a term that’s been thrown around quite a bit

               lately, gaslighting. I never really quite understood what that meant

               * * * But it clicked yesterday when [F.W.] was up there screaming

               about what happened to her because she was being manipulated

               into believing that her own reality was not what happened, because

               she was sitting there knowing that she knew what happened and

               knowing that this Defendant knew what happened. And she just

               couldn’t quite understand why she had to scream it.” Id.

      {¶ 63} The record establishes that Lauderdale did not object to any of the foregoing

comments at trial. As a result, the comments may only be reviewed for plain error.

State v. Miller, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2022-CA-58, 2023-Ohio-2508, ¶ 69. “Again, to prevail
                                                                                         -27-

on plain-error review, it must be established that, but for the misconduct in question, the

outcome of trial would have been clearly different.” Id. at ¶ 70, citing State v. Mammone,

139 Ohio St.3d 467, 2014-Ohio-1942, 13 N.E.3d 1051, ¶ 111. In the context of a claim

of prosecutorial misconduct, the alleged misconduct “constitutes plain error only if it is

clear that [the defendant] would not have been convicted in the absence of the improper

comments.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Carpenter, 116 Ohio App.3d 615, 621, 688

N.E.2d 1090 (2d Dist.1996).

       {¶ 64} Upon review, we cannot say that it is clear that Lauderdale would not have

been convicted absent the comments at issue. As previously discussed, there was a

significant amount of evidence presented at trial supporting Lauderdale’s convictions.

Because it is not clear that the outcome of Lauderdale’s trial would have been different

absent the alleged improper comments, the plain error standard has not been satisfied.

       {¶ 65} Lauderdale’s third assignment of error is overruled.

                               Fifth Assignment of Error

       {¶ 66} Under his fifth assignment of error, Lauderdale contends that the trial court

erred by overruling his post-verdict motion for new trial without holding a hearing and

without reviewing the medical records at issue in the motion.

       {¶ 67} Crim.R. 33(A)(6) provides that a motion for new trial may be granted “[w]hen

new evidence material to the defense is discovered which the defendant could not with

reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial.” To grant a properly

filed motion under this rule, the trial court must find, among other things, that the newly-
                                                                                         -28-

discovered evidence “discloses a strong probability that it will change the result if a new

trial is granted” and is “material to the issues[.]” State v. Quinn, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2014-

CA-95, 2016-Ohio-140, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Petro, 148 Ohio St. 505, 76 N.E.2d 370

(1947), syllabus.

       {¶ 68} “The defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing [on a motion for new

trial] when the allegations in the motion demonstrate substantive grounds for relief.”

(Citation omitted.) State v. Hatton, 169 Ohio St.3d 446, 2022-Ohio-3991, 205 N.E.3d

513, ¶ 28. Whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted is within the sound discretion of

the trial court. State v. Moore, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2017-CA-49, 2018-Ohio-318, ¶ 14.

Accordingly, we review a trial court’s decision on a Crim.R. 33 motion for an abuse of

discretion. State v. Matthews, 81 Ohio St.3d 375, 378, 691 N.E.2d 1041 (1998); State

v. Beavers, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22588, 2009-Ohio-5604, ¶ 23.

       {¶ 69} “A trial court abuses its discretion when it makes a decision that is

unreasonable, unconscionable, or arbitrary.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Darmond, 135

Ohio St.3d 343, 2013-Ohio-966, 986 N.E.2d 971, ¶ 34. “A decision is unreasonable if

there is no sound reasoning process that would support that decision.” AAAA Ents., Inc.

v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553

N.E.2d 597 (1990). “A decision is arbitrary if it is made ‘ “without consideration of or

regard for facts [or] circumstances.” ’ ” State v. Hill, 171 Ohio St.3d 524, 2022-Ohio-

4544, 218 N.E.3d 891, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Beasley, 152 Ohio St.3d 470, 2018-Ohio-16,

97 N.E.3d 474, ¶ 12, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 125 (10th Ed.2014). “A decision is

unconscionable if it ‘affronts the sense of justice, decency, or reasonableness.’ ” State
                                                                                           -29-

v. Harris, 2023-Ohio-3994, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 72 (10th Dist.), quoting Fernando v. Fernando,

2017-Ohio-9323, 102 N.E.3d 657, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.).

       {¶ 70} We note that Lauderdale references Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83

S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), in his appellate brief even though his motion for new

trial did not allege a Brady violation. This is pertinent because when a Brady violation is

alleged within the framework of a Crim.R. 33(A)(6) motion for new trial, a de-novo-due-

process review applies as opposed to an abuse-of-discretion review. See State v. Smith,

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27853, 2018-Ohio-4691, ¶ 24-25.               Lauderdale, however,

asserts in his appellate brief that an abuse-of-discretion review applies to the trial court’s

decision overruling his motion for new trial. Because Lauderdale’s motion for new trial

did not allege a Brady violation, we agree that an abuse-of-discretion review is

appropriate.

       {¶ 71} As previously discussed, Lauderdale’s motion for new trial was based on

newly discovered medical records pertaining to F.W. There is no dispute that the State

provided the medical records at issue to the defense two and a half weeks after

Lauderdale’s trial. The trial court overruled Lauderdale’s motion for new trial without a

hearing on grounds that the medical records were not “relevant or material to the issues

at trial.” Trial Tr. Vol. II, p. 327. The trial court also found that the State had provided

all relevant and material medical records to the defense prior to trial.

       {¶ 72} Lauderdale contends that the trial court’s decision overruling his motion for

new trial was an abuse of discretion because the trial court did not hold a hearing on his

motion or review the medical records in question. The record establishes that, when
                                                                                         -30-

overruling the motion, the trial court relied solely on the arguments raised in Lauderdale’s

motion and the State’s opposing memorandum. We find it significant that Lauderdale

did not provide the trial court with any of the medical records at issue. In addition,

Lauderdale did not specify what information in the medical records was material to the

issues raised during his trial or how the information in the medical records would have

changed the outcome of his trial.           Instead, Lauderdale simply made a blanket,

unsupported allegation of prejudice in his motion. Because of this, Lauderdale failed to

provide the trial court with “substantive grounds for relief” to warrant a hearing on his

motion or a review of the medical records. Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s

decision overruling Lauderdale’s motion for new trial was reasonable and not an abuse

of discretion.

       {¶ 73} Lauderdale’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.

                                           Conclusion

       {¶ 74} Having overruled all assignments of error raised by Lauderdale, the

judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                      .............

LEWIS, J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.