Court Opinion

ID: 9718759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:33:15.116503+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:02.441833
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE WOODWARD, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. This case involves an interpretation of section 13 — 217 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 13 — 217) (formerly section 24 of the Limitations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 83, par. 24a). The pertinent portion of said statute (hereinafter referred to as the statute) as applied to this case provides as follows: “In the actions specified in Article XIII of this Act *** where the time for commencing an action is limited, if *** the action is voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff, *** then, whether or not the time limitation for bringing such action expires during the pendency of such action, the plaintiff *** may commence a new action within one year or within the remaining period of limitation, whichever is greater, *** after the action is voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff ***.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 13 — 217.) The factual chronology of this case is as follows: Date Explanation 12/31/83 First suit filed by plaintiff in Indiana Federal court. 2/22/84 First suit voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. 3/9/84 Second suit filed by the plaintiff in Illinois Federal court. 4/13/84 Second suit voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. 10/29/84 Third suit filed by plaintiff in Du Page County circuit court. As set forth above, plaintiff filed both the second and third suits during the one-year period after the dismissal of the first suit. The majority has interpreted the phrase in the statute “commence a new action within one year” to permit only one or a single action to be filed within one year after the date of dismissal of the first suit; the authority cited for this construction is based on Phillips v. Elrod (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 70, 478 N.E.2d 1078; La-Barge, Inc. v. Corn Belt Bank (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 741, 428 N.E.2d 711; Smith v. Chicago Transit Authority (1978), 67 Ill. App. 3d 385, 385 N.E.2d 62. See also Harrison v. Woyahn (7th Cir. 1958) 261 F.2d 412, 413. The factual chronology in Smith v. Chicago Transit Authority (1978), 67 Ill. App. 3d 385, is as follows: Date Explanation 5/5/70 Suit filed for personal injury. 1/11/73 First suit dismissed for want of prosecution. 10/2/73 Second suit filed pursuant to section 24. 9/3/76 Second suit dismissed for want of prosecution. 6/21/77 Third suit filed; dismissed by trial court and affirmed on appeal. It is apparent from the facts of the Smith case that the third suit was not filed within one year from the date of dismissal of the first suit. This is an important difference that distinguishes the case now before the court for the reason that both the second and third suits were filed within one year of the dismissal of the first case. By reason of this factual distinction, the Smith case does not support the trial court’s dismissal of the case presently before this court. The second Illinois case cited by the majority is LaBarge, Inc. v. Corn Belt Bank (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 741, 745, 428 N.E.2d 711, which states that the statute as interpreted by Smith precludes the possibility of a plaintiff endlessly refiling new cases against the defendant in successive one-year periods. LaBarge did not involve a third suit and for that reason the above statement is dicta. Phillips v. Elrod (1985), 135 Ill. App. 3d 70, 478 N.E.2d 1078, is the principal case relied on by the majority, and it does hold that the statute “permits only a single refiling within a year of dismissal.” However, neither the Smith case nor LaBarge cited in support of Phillips v. Elrod factually involved a second and third suit both being filed within one year of dismissal of the first case. The majority also cites the case of Harrison v. Woyahn (7th Cir. 1958), 261 F.2d 412, 413, which is not factually the same as the case under consideration for the reason that the second suit was started within one year of the dismissal of the first suit; however, the third suit was not started until more than two years had elapsed after the dismissal of the first suit. The narrow issue in this case is whether or not the statute permits the plaintiff to file more than one action within one year after the original action has been dismissed. The majority interpretation of the phrase “commence a new action within one year” construes the statute to permit only one or a single new action within one year after the date of dismissal of the first suit. Certainly, the statute does not permit the endless refiling of the same lawsuit “within tidy yearly units of time” as stated in Smith, LaBarge, and Phillips, but the statute itself does not explicitly limit a party to one filing within the one year period specified. The majority opinion cites Roth v. Northern Assurance Co. (1964), 32 Ill. 2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 415; in that case, Justice Schaefer quoted the following language from Sachs v. Ohio National Insurance Co. (7th Cir. 1942), 131 F.2d 134, 137, relative to the purpose of the predecessor of the statute here in question: “ ‘The act is remedial, reflecting a legislative intent to protect the party who brings the action in good faith from complete loss of relief on the merits merely because of procedural defect. Such remedial statutes should be liberally construed, so as to prevent destruction of the purpose of the legislation. *** In both common law nonsuit and dismissal for want of jurisdiction the order is due to some defect in the procedure of proof which prevents a trial on the merits. The obvious purpose of the statute was to give a plaintiff an opportunity to try the merits ***.’ ” 32 Ill. 2d 40, 42, 203 N.E.2d 415. The Roth case further discusses the purpose of limitation statutes, namely, to afford a defendant a fair opportunity to investigate the circumstances upon which liability against him is predicated while the facts are accessible; however, the purpose of the statute of limitations is no longer applicable here since the defendant had notice at the time the first suit was started that the plaintiff was endeavoring to enforce a claim, and by reason of this fact, a liberal construction should be applied in construing this remedial statute. In conclusion, it is noted that the court in Smith v. Chicago Transit Authority (1978), 67 Ill. App. 3d 385, 385 N.E.2d 62, concluded its opinion in the following language: “[T]he real nature of section 24 is that it is a saving clause to prevent the bar which otherwise would be applicable. It thus acts as a limited extension to prevent injustice; it should not be permitted to become a harassing renewal of litigation. The statute should be liberally construed, but a liberal construction does not warrant an addition to the period fixed by statute.” 67 Ill. App. 3d 385, 388, 385 N.E.2d 62. A ruling favorable to the plaintiff in this case would not result in an addition to the period fixed by the statute; there is every reason to believe that the Smith court would have permitted the plaintiff here to maintain his lawsuit since it was filed within the one-year period described in the statute. In line with the foregoing, the doors to the courthouse should not be closed to the plaintiff since both suits that the plaintiff instituted after the first suit were dismissed voluntarily by the plaintiff. The second suit was dismissed for good reason, inasmuch as plaintiff had learned that the defendant was an Illinois resident, and there was, therefore, no diversity of citizenship. The remedial and saving philosophy of this statute should be carried forward to give plaintiff a trial on the merits. I would reverse the decision of the trial court in this case and remand the case for further proceedings.