Court Opinion

ID: 9573723
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:57:59.350281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:10.126990
License: Public Domain

*216Deen, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
While concurring fully with the majority opinion, I articulate and advance additional aspects:
Justice Murphy set forth three categories of unprotected speech concerning which prevention and punishment may ensue without posing constitutional problems: “These include [1] the lewd and obscene, the profane, [2] the libelous, [3] and the insulting or ‘fighting words’ — those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” (Emphasis supplied). Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (62 SC 766, 86 LE2d 1031) (1942). Note that Justice Murphy used the word “or,” the disjunctive, in his summary. It is clear he is saying that certain words are not protected in categories [1] and [2], as they inflict injury by their very utterance. After the use of the word “or,” he then addresses category [3] pertaining to fighting words, as those tending to incite an immediate breach of peace.
The precise question we have to decide in this case is whether the words uttered by appellant to and about a certain security guard are proscribed by, and fall within, any of the three listed prohibited areas: “ T don’t want the son of a bitch,’ ‘give me my goddamn sweater,’ ‘get out of my mother fucking way,’ ‘I’m not going no goddamn where!’ ” I would concur and agree that these words are obscene in that they inflict injury. As Justice Murphy, who was a champion of the First Amendment, pointed out, these words are not an essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are only of slight value so as to be outweighed by social interest in order and morality; therefore, they are unprotected in category [1]. However, these words as uttered do not seem, at first blush, to be prohibited within category [3] as they were not spoken or addressed in a personal or derogatory way to the officer. Compare Brooks v. State, 166 Ga. App. 704 (305 SE2d 436) (1983) where the officer was called “a dog,” and Johnson v. State, 143 Ga. App. 826 (240 SE2d 207) (1977), where the female officer was labeled “a bitch.” The court, in these two cases, found these utterances to be fighting words. In the instant case, appellant also struck the officer’s body. Therefore, in the context of the situation, the words combined with the body-blow fit category [3].
The words, “fk the draft,” Cohen v. California, 403 U. S. 15 (91 SC 1780, 29 LE2d 284) (1971), have been adjudicated not to be prohibited as obscene because they also were not fighting words (category [3]). It appears to this writer that the words in Cohen should have been considered obscene under the first category, but the court there ignored, for whatever reason, that possibility. See also “Have a nice day fk somebody.” Professor Jules B. Gerard, “May Society Preserve a Modicum of Decorum in Public Discourse?” Benchmark, Vol. II, Nos. 5 & 6, p. 244.
*217Decided September 14, 1987.
Lee Sexton, Lillian L. Neal, for appellant.
James L. Webb, Solicitor, Christina A. Craddock, Assistant Solicitor, for appellee.
Georgia apparently does not have an obscenity statute dealing only with category [1], which does not include what is called “fighting words.” If such a statute existed, this conviction would best be affirmed under category [1], rather than the court’s being required to determine also if the words uttered are of a fighting nature. All of our determinations in these areas are subjective findings made on a case-by-case basis. Justice Harlan in Cohen opines “that one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.” Assuming arguendo that this statement may be in part true, it does not mean that some words and utterances inflicting injury (not amounting to fighting words) are not, nevertheless, in some instances obscene. These words are no more difficult to pinpoint, prohibit, and proscribe, than are words and utterances that constitute “fighting words.”
In summary, our state presently does not have a pure obscenity prohibition statute but has an obscenity statute only where the words unprotected are also of a fighting nature. Whether or not this gap or hiatus should be plugged or filled addresses itself to the legislature rather than this court.