Court Opinion

ID: 9556235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-16 16:09:28.894516+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:39:27.209645
License: Public Domain

J-S08028-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  SHAWN NASIM CONNELLY                         :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1004 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 13, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-36-CR-0005480-2019

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                        FILED AUGUST 16, 2023

       Shawn Nasim Connelly (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of

sentence of life imprisonment without parole imposed in the Lancaster County

Court of Common Pleas, following his jury conviction of, inter alia, first-degree

murder and attempted murder1 for a June 2019 double shooting. On appeal,

Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress

his identification by the surviving victim and challenges the sufficiency and

weight of the evidence presented at trial identifying him as the shooter. For

the reasons below, we affirm.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2501(a)(1) and 901(a), respectively.
J-S08028-23

       The facts underlying Appellant’s identification as a suspect and his

subsequent conviction were summarized by the trial court as follows:

             In the early morning hours of June 16, 2019, . . . the
       Lancaster City Bureau of Police (“LCBP”) responded to a call in the
       area of the 600 block of Lafayette Steet, Lancaster, reporting a
       shooting. Upon arrival[,] officers found victim Anthony Marshall
       with a gunshot wound through his left chest area, with an exit
       wound in his back, and victim Tyquane Christian with a gunshot
       wound in his right arm; police determined that Mr. Marshall was
       Mr. Christian’s father. Shortly after arrival at Lancaster General
       Hospital (“LGH”), Mr. Marshall died from his wounds.

              Through their investigation LCPB Officers and Detectives
       learned that the altercation resulting in the death of Mr. Marshall
       and injuries to Mr. Christian began earlier in the night at [a] house
       party at 610 Lafayette Street, Lancaster, when Mr. Marshall and
       Mr. Christian attempted to intervene in a fight happening outside
       the residence between Josean Maldonado and a then unidentified
       man. Mr. Maldonado broke free and ran away from the home. At
       the same time, recovered surveillance videos showed Mr. Marshall
       and Mr. Christian departing 610 Lafayette Street when they were
       quickly approached by four men, one of whom pulled a firearm
       from the waist band of his pants. The shooter fired five shots in
       the direction of the victims, striking both, as well as [a] residence
       . . . and a 2000 Honda Accord.

             On June 18, 2019, Officers [Adam] Flurry, [James] Boas,
       and [Jason] Hagy of LCBP reviewed the surveillance videos.[2] All
       three officers were familiar with and positively identified the
       shooter as Appellant[;] all three officers also positively identified
       the other three individuals with Appellant at the time of the
       shooting as Naheem Gorham, Kristen Hodge-Majette, and a
       juvenile, R.H.

             [Shortly after the shooting, then Detective, now Sergeant,
       Todd Grager spoke with Mr. Maldonado’s parents who claimed
       they had “information on who shot” Mr. Christian. See N.T. Trial,
____________________________________________

2 Officers Flurry, Boas, and Hagy were members of the Selective Enforcement

Unit, which is the “drug and vice unit” in the department. N.T. Suppression
H’rg, 12/20/21, at 49.

                                           -2-
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       2/7/22, at 212-13. Sergeant Grager asked them to forward the
       information to him in an email, which they did. See id. The email
       contained a photograph of several males with “one male in
       particular . . . circled in red[.]” Id. at 214. Sergeant Grager later
       identified that male as Appellant. Id.]

              [The night of the shooting, after] Mr. Christian was
       stabilized and brought to a private room at LGH, . . . Sergeant[ ]
       Grager asked [him] if he knew who shot him, but [Mr. Christian]
       was unable to supply any details aside from the fact that four black
       men approached [him] and his father, and one of the men shot
       them.

             After his release from the hospital then Detective, now
       Sergeant [Eric] McCrady and Detective [Thomas] Ginder from
       LCBP met Mr. Christian [a second time] at his mother’s home
       where he was recovering from his injuries on June 21, 2019.
       During that meeting, detectives presented Mr. Christian with three
       photographic arrays, asking if there was anyone in the
       photographs he remembered being present the night of the
       shooting. Mr. Christian identified Naheem Gorham and Kristen
       Hodge-Majette as being present at the shooting and Appellant as
       being the other party in the fight with Mr. Maldonado; Mr.
       Christian did not identify Appellant as “Shawn Connelly,” but
       instead used the nickname “Shiz.”[3]

             On August 28, 2019, Mr. Christian met with Sergeants
       Grager and McCrady [a third time] at the LCBP station for a
       follow[-]up interview. At that time, Mr. Christian reiterated his
       account of the events from June 15-16, 2019, identified [Gorham]
       and . . . Hodge-Majette as being two of the four men present at
       the shooting, and Appellant, Shiz, as being the other party
       involved with the fight with Mr. Maldonado.

             Following this meeting, Sergeant McCrady sought and
       received approval from the Lancaster County District Attorney’s
       Office to show Mr. Christian the surveillance videos recovered by
       police. On August 30, 2019, Mr. Christian met with investigators
       once more at the LCBP station with the purpose of watching the
       surveillance videos, at which, after watching, Mr. Christian pointed
       out the four men and identified each by name (or known
____________________________________________

3 Appellant’s nickname is spelled “Shizz” in the trial transcript.   However, we
will use the same spelling as the trial court in its opinion.

                                           -3-
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       nickname). Mr. Christian was also able to positively identify the
       shooter in the videos as Shiz, or [Appellant].

Trial Ct. Op., 10/28/22, at 1-4 (record citations omitted & paragraph break

added).     Sergeant McCrady stated that Mr. Christian claimed he did not

“initially see [Appellant] because he was standing behind Mr. Gorham.” N.T.

Trial, 2/8/22, at 425; see also N.T. Suppression Hrg, 12/20/21, at 92-93,

125.

       Appellant was subsequently arrested and charged with first-degree

murder, attempted murder, firearms not to be carried without a license, and

two counts of discharging a firearm into an occupied structure.4 On June 15,

2020, Appellant, then represented by the Office of the Public Defender, filed

an omnibus pretrial motion asserting, inter alia, his identification as a suspect

was “unreliable and unduly suggestive.”             See Appellant’s Omnibus Pretrial

Motion, 6/15/20, at ¶ 191. It does not appear from the record that the trial

court ever ruled on this motion.

       On April 22, 2021, Richard Coble, Esquire, entered his appearance as

privately retained counsel.         Attorney Coble filed a (second) suppression

motion on November 18, 2021, asserting Mr. Christian’s identification of

Appellant as the shooter was unreliable and the result of unduly suggestive

and coercive police procedures.                See Appellant’s Motion to Suppress,

11/18/21, at 4-6 (unpaginated).           The trial court conducted a suppression

hearing on December 20, 2021, at which time both Sergeants Grager and
____________________________________________

4 See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6106(a) and 2707.1(a), respectively.

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McCrady testified. The Commonwealth also admitted into evidence the photo

arrays, from which Mr. Christian identified Appellant and his cohorts, as well

as the relevant surveillance video footage of the shooting.          See N.T.,

Suppression Hrg, at 52-53, 84-99. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial

court denied Appellant’s motion.

       The case proceeded to a jury trial commencing on February 7, 2022.

On February 10th, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all charges. See

N.T. Trial, 2/10/22, at 707-08.         However, the court subsequently granted

Appellant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the firearms

non-licensure charge because the Commonwealth did not establish the “length

of the firearm” allegedly used in the shooting.5 See id. at 710-11. Appellant

proceeded to sentencing on May 13, 2022, at which time the court imposed a

mandatory term of life imprisonment for his conviction of first-degree murder,

a consecutive term of 9 to 20 years’ incarceration for attempted murder, and

two terms of 3½ to 7 years’ incarceration for discharging a firearm into an

occupied structure, imposed to run concurrently with each other but

consecutively to the first-degree murder sentence.

       On May 23, 2022, Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion,

challenging the weight and sufficiency of the evidence to support his

____________________________________________

5 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 6102 (defining a “firearm” as “[a]ny pistol or revolver with

a barrel length less than 15 inches [or] with an overall length of less than 26
inches”).

                                           -5-
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conviction, and asserting a purported Brady6 violation and a violation of

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 645(C).7 The trial court denied the

motion on June 17, 2022, and this timely appeal followed.8

       Appellant presents the following three issues for our review:9

       I.     Did the trial court err by failing to suppress [Appellant’s]
              identification resulting from unduly suggestive police
              procedures?

       II.    Did the Commonwealth present sufficient evidence to prove
              [Appellant] was the perpetrator where the only evidence
              linking him to the crime was witness identifications from
              video, and the Commonwealth offered no corroboration or
              reason why the witnesses were better suited to make the
              identification than the jury?

       III.   Did the trial court commit reversible error by denying
              [Appellant’s] post-sentence motion seeking a new trial
              because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence?

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

       In his first issue, Appellant insists the trial court erred when it denied

his motion to suppress his pretrial identification as the shooter. His argument

is two-fold. First, he maintains the “photo array identification procedure . . .
____________________________________________

6 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

7 Rule 645 outlines the process for seating an alternate juror.          See
Pa.R.Crim.P. 645. Appellant does not raise either the Brady or Rule 645 claim
on appeal.

8 After requesting, and being granted, an extension of time, Appellant
complied with the trial court’s directive to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal. The trial court filed a responsive
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on October 28, 2022.

9 We have reordered Appellant’s claims for ease of disposition.

                                           -6-
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was unduly suggestive because it was not administered in a double-blind

fashion.” Appellant’s Brief at 30. Second, he asserts the police “coax[ed] Mr.

Christian into identifying [Appellant] in the surveillance video by showing

[Appellant’s] photo to [him] several times before he made the identification.”

Id. at 33.

      When considering a challenge to a trial court’s order denying a

suppression motion, “[o]ur standard of . . . is limited to determining whether

the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal

conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth v. Jaynes,

135 A.3d 606, 610 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). In making those

determinations,

         [w]e may consider only the evidence of the prosecution and
         so much of the evidence for the defense as remains
         uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a
         whole. Where the record supports the findings of the
         suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may
         reverse only if the court erred in reaching its legal
         conclusions based upon the facts.

      Moreover, it is within the lower court’s province to pass on the
      credibility of witnesses and determine the weight to be given to
      their testimony.

Id. (citations omitted).

      Furthermore, we emphasize:

      Whether an out of court identification is to be suppressed as
      unreliable, and therefore violative of due process, is determined
      from the totality of the circumstances. Suggestiveness in the
      identification process is a factor to be considered in determining
      the admissibility of such evidence, but suggestiveness alone does
      not warrant exclusion. Identification evidence will not be
      suppressed unless the facts demonstrate that the

                                    -7-
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       identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive
       as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
       misidentification. Photographs used in line-ups are not unduly
       suggestive if the suspect’s picture does not stand out more than
       the others, and the people depicted all exhibit similar facial
       characteristics.

Commonwealth v. Mbewe, 203 A.3d 983, 986–87 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citations & quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).

       First, Appellant insists that the photo array procedure was suggestive

because it was not administered in a double-blind fashion, that is “the array’s

administrator [Sergeant Grager] knew who the suspect was.”          Appellant’s

Brief at 30. He emphasizes that “[s]everal states now have laws requiring

double-blind administration” and that “voluminous independent research

shows that [an] identification procedure, which was not double-blind, is

inherently and unduly suggestive.” Id. at 31, 32.

       Upon our review of the record, we conclude this particular argument is

waived.    Although the preference for “blind or blinded photo arrays” was

referenced in the first suppression motion filed by former counsel in June of

202010 ─ a motion that was never ruled upon ─ it was not raised in the second

suppression motion filed by present counsel in November of 2021. Moreover,

at the suppression hearing, Appellant’s counsel did not ask Sergeant McCrady

any questions regarding his composition of Appellant’s photo array or highlight

any purported suggestive techniques employed by the sergeant in compiling

____________________________________________

10 See Appellant’s Omnibus Pre-trial Motion, 6/15/20, at ¶ 209 (noting federal

investigators are “encourage[d]” to employ “blind” photo arrays).

                                           -8-
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the array.   See N.T., Suppression Hrg, at 100-32, 135-38.          Furthermore,

counsel’s argument at the conclusion of the hearing did not address any

purported suggestiveness in the photo array compilation, but rather focused

on the fact that Mr. Christian identified Appellant as the shooter in the

surveillance video only after having failed to identify him when presented with

his photo array on two prior occasions. See id. at 140-44. Counsel neither

advocated for a “double-blind” photo array procedure, nor presented any of

the purported “voluminous” research studies on the topic. See Appellant’s

Brief at 32. Thus, Appellant’s contention that the photo array should have

been administered “double blind” is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues

not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time

on appeal.”).

      Moreover, even if we did not find this claim waived, Appellant would be

entitled to no relief. As this Court explained in Mbewe, “[s]uggestiveness in

the identification process . . . alone does not warrant exclusion . . . unless the

facts demonstrate that the identification procedure was so impermissibly

suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable

misidentification.”   Mbewe, 203 A.3d at 986 (citations & quotation marks

omitted). Here, Appellant has failed to demonstrate how the procedure used

by Sergeant McCrady to compile the photo array and present it to Mr. Christian

gave “rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”

See id.

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      Appellant’s second suppression argument focuses on the fact that

Detective McCrady showed Appellant’s photo to Mr. Christian on two different

occasions before Mr. Christian identified Appellant as the shooter in the

surveillance video. See Appellant’s Brief at 34. Relying on a decision of the

Supreme Court of New Jersey and two mugshot identification studies,

Appellant asserts “[i]dentification procedures involving more than one viewing

of the same suspect can create a risk of mugshot exposure and mugshot

commitment” which may then affect the reliability of a subsequent

identification. See id. at 33-34, citing State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872

(N.J. 2011). Appellant, however, fails to cite any precedential authority to

support his claim. Rather, he simply asserts that “[b]y repeatedly showing

Mr. Christian photo arrays that included [Appellant], the police non-verbally

communicated that they were not satisfied with his previous identifications.”

Appellant’s Brief at 35.

      The trial court addressed Appellant’s suppression challenge as follows:

      Appellant argues that the tactics used by LCBP’s officers were so
      unduly suggestive that it led to an unreliable identification of
      Appellant by Mr. Christian[.]      Appellant is mistaken. At the
      suppression hearing, Sergeants Grager and Mc[C]rady clearly
      detailed each interview with Mr. Christian, and no evidence
      presented supports a finding that any of the four instances where
      Mr. Christian interacted with police gave rise to a substantial
      likelihood of irreparable misidentification.     [W]e know that
      Appellant’s main concern with the identification process is that Mr.
      Christian did not identify Appellant as the shooter, or as being
      present at the shooting, until he viewed the surveillance videos on
      August 30, 2019, during his fourth interview with police.

           In his motion to suppress, Appellant states LCBP took
      advantage of Mr. Christian as an interested party in the case and

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      “pressured him through numerous and repetitive interviews in an
      attempt to compel an identification” of Appellant as the shooter.
      At no point during the suppression hearing was testimony elicited
      that would suggest pressure or force was used. In fact, the
      witnesses testified multiple times that Mr. Christian was very
      cooperative and was willing to help police in any way he could.
      Moreover, as acknowledged multiple times during the hearing,
      there was a lapse of more than two months between Mr.
      Christian’s second and third interviews, which does not suggest to
      this court that the interviews were n[u]merous or repetitive or
      that Mr. Christian felt any pres[s]ure to interact with police at all.

             There is no evidence of record showing Mr. Christian was
      compelled to identify the shooter. During the three interviews
      following his release from the hospital, Mr. Christian identified
      Appellant[ ] as being present the night of the shooting each time.
      Appellant implies that because [Mr. Christian] did not conclusively
      state Appellant was the shooter until he saw the surveillance
      videos his identification [was] unreliable. However, “[i]nitial
      equivocation does not render later identifications constitutionally
      unreliable per se.” Mr. Christian stalwartly identified Appellant as
      being present the evening of June 15-16, 2019, even though he
      was not initially sure of the identity of the shooter.            The
      explanation for Mr. Christian believing another suspect could have
      been the shooter was simply that Mr. [Gorham] was the man
      closest to him when the shooting occurred, and Appellant was
      standing directly behind Mr. [Gorham], which allowed Mr.
      Christian to initially believe the shooter was Mr. [Gorham].
      Assuming, arguendo, there was suggestiveness in the
      identification process, nothing of record gives rise to the level that
      there was a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
      misidentification.

      . . . In viewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
      identification process of Appellant by Mr. Christian, this court
      found both witnesses and their testimony to be credible, and found
      it more likely than not that the identification process was not
      unduly suggestive. Appellant’s claim of unduly suggestive tactics
      by police resulting in an unreliable identification by Mr. Christian
      of Appellant as [the] shooter is without merit.

Trial Ct. Op. at 8-10.

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         We detect no error of law or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling.

As the court explains, there was no evidence to suggest the officers coaxed or

coerced Mr. Christian into identifying Appellant as the shooter. Although the

officers met with Mr. Christian four times, the first time was immediately after

the shooting while Mr. Christian was still in the hospital.               See N.T.,

Suppression Hrg, at 7-12. While he provided a timeline of the events leading

to the shooting, Mr. Christian was unable to identify any of those involved.

See id. at 17-22, 32.

         Approximately a week later, after Mr. Christian was released from the

hospital, Sergeant McCrady and Detective Ginder met with him at his mother’s

residence and, for the first time, showed him the photo arrays. See N.T.,

Suppression Hrg, at 56-57, 59. The officers asked Mr. Christian “if he noticed

anyone within . . . the photographic array[s] that was there the night of the

shooting.” Id. at 59. They also directed him not to “guess” and stated, “if

you don’t know, you don’t know.” Id. Appellant identified both Mr. Gorham

and Mr. Hodge-Majette as being present when he and his father were shot.

See id. at 60, 64-65. He also positively identified Appellant as the “subject

that was in the altercation with [Mr.] Maldanado at 610 Lafayette Street.” Id.

at 66. Sergeant McCrady described Mr. Christian as “very cooperative.” Id.

at 69.

         Sergeant McCrady met with Mr. Christian for a “follow-up interview” on

August 28, 2019. See N.T., Suppression Hrg, at 72. He explained that the

two-month delay was due to the fact that Mr. Christian’s “recovery took longer

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than usual” and “scheduling was an issue[,]” but that Mr. Christian “voluntarily

[came] to the station[.]”   Id. at 72-73.     Mr. Christian provided the same

account of the events which had occurred on the night of the shooting,

including the fact that Appellant was the person in an altercation with

Maldonado, and once again, positively identified Appellant in the photo array.

See id. at 74-75, 78.

      Sergeant McCrady then obtained permission from the Lancaster County

District Attorney’s Office to show Mr. Christian the video surveillance footage

of the shooting.    See N.T., Suppression Hrg, at 81.       He “invite[d]” Mr.

Christian to come back to the station, and Mr. Christian did so “voluntarily[.]”

Id. at 82. Upon witnessing the shooting on the video, Mr. Christian identified

Appellant (Shiz) as the shooter. Id. at 89. Sergeant McCrady described Mr.

Christian as “visibly upset” because “he thought someone else had shot

him[.]” Id. at 88-89. Mr. Christian explained that “it happened so quickly” it

was not until “he was able to see the video and see it play out” that he was

able to identify Appellant as the shooter. Id. at 90. Sergeant McCrady also

pointed out that Appellant was standing “directly behind” Mr. Gorham on the

video. Id. at 92.

      Accordingly, our review of the testimony and evidence presented during

the suppression hearing supports the court’s ruling. There is simply nothing

in the identification procedure to support Appellant’s allegation that Mr.

Christian’s identification of him was the result of suggestive police practices.

Furthermore, the non-binding New Jersey decision upon which Appellant relies

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is distinguishable. In Henderson, the Supreme Court of New Jersey crafted

a new procedure for assessing eyewitness identification based on a significant

amount of scientific evidence produced at a prior trial court hearing.      See

Henderson, 27 A.3d at 877-78. Further, in that case, the eyewitness testified

that he felt as though the police were “‘nudging’ him to choose [the]

defendant’s photo, and ‘that there was pressure’ to make a choice.” Id. at

881. Here, Appellant presented no evidence suggesting the officers pressured

Mr. Christian into making an identification, nor did Appellant present any

scientific evidence challenging the identification procedure used by the

officers. Thus, Appellant’s first claim fails.

      Next, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence identifying

him as the shooter.     See Appellant’s Brief at 17.   He emphasizes that his

identification was based solely on Detective Flurry’s and Mr. Christian’s review

of the surveillance video. Id. Appellant maintains that while this Court has

not directly considered how video identification evidence can support a

conviction, it has “broadly presented its view that witnesses may properly

narrate a video, but . . . may not necessarily identify someone depicted in

the video.” Id. at 17, 20, citing Commonwealth v. Childs, 63 A.3d 323 (Pa.

Super. 2013); Commonwealth v. Brown, 134 A.3d 1097 (Pa. Super. 2016);

Commonwealth v. Palmer, 192 A.3d 85 (Pa. Super. 2018).               Rather, he

requests that this Court craft a rule ─ adopted by several federal circuit courts

─ that a conviction may not rest solely “on a witness’s ability to identify a

suspect from a video unless (1) there is substantial corroboration and (2) the

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witness’s familiarity with characteristics of the defendant are not immediately

observable by the jury at trial[,]” such as when the defendant has changed

his appearance. Id. at 24.

      Appellant insists that neither Mr. Christian or Detective Flurry were

“particularly familiar” with him, “nor did the Commonwealth have any relevant

corroboration.” Appellant’s Brief at 24. Moreover, he emphasizes that his

name “first surfaced in the investigation when [the Maldonados emailed

investigators that they] ‘had heard things on the street.’” Id. at 25. Thus,

he maintains:

      Both the Special Enforcement Unit and Mr. Christian were
      especially likely to have encountered rumor and innuendo,
      perhaps even unwittingly.   And that is a critical factor in
      misidentifications based on confirmatory feedback and
      confirmation bias.

Id. Appellant cites to several studies in support of his claim that witnesses’

memories are easily tainted when they receive positive “feedback confirming

the ‘accuracy’ of the witnesses’ identification[.]”   See id. at 25-28.     He

summarizes:

      Absent meaningful corroboration, this Court should hold that the
      Commonwealth did not present sufficient evidence to support
      [his] convictions because the only identification evidence was
      made solely through video that the factfinder could review and
      draw its own conclusions without the aid of witnesses.

Id. at 17. We conclude no relief is due.

      Our review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is well-

settled:

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       The standard we apply . . . is whether viewing all the evidence
       admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner,
       there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
       element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the
       above] test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our
       judgment for a fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and
       circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
       preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a
       defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the
       evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
       probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
       circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
       proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by
       means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying
       the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
       evidence received must be considered. Finally, the [trier] of
       fact[,] while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
       weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none
       of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 255 A.3d 565, 578–79 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(citation omitted). Moreover:

       [E]vidence of identification need not be positive and certain to
       sustain a conviction. Although common items of clothing and
       general physical characteristics are usually insufficient to support
       a conviction, such evidence can be considered to establish identity
       in conjunction with other circumstances and identification
       testimony.

Id. at 579 (citations omitted).

       Here, Appellant’s claim focuses less on whether the Commonwealth

actually proved he was guilty of the crimes charged, including first-degree

murder,11 and more on the alleged impropriety of permitting two witnesses to

____________________________________________

11 “In the case of first-degree murder, a person is guilty when the
Commonwealth proves that: (1) a human being was unlawfully killed; (2) the
person accused is responsible for the killing; and (3) the accused acted with
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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identify him via surveillance video footage. Thus, his argument appears to

challenge the court’s admission of the eyewitness testimony evidence ─ an

issue he did not raise in his court-order Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement12 ─

rather than sufficiency thereof. We conclude he is entitled to no relief.

       Appellant first argues that “[i]n a trio of cases, this Court offered broad

guidance on using surveillance video in criminal prosecutions[,]” and insists

that while we generally permit witnesses to narrate a video, we do not

“necessarily” allow a witness to “identify someone depicted in the video.” See

Appellant’s Brief at 18, 20.       The cases upon which Appellant relies do not

support his claims.

       With regard to Childs, Appellant implies that this Court permitted

witness testimony identifying the defendant on surveillance video only

because there was corroborating evidence. See Appellant’s Brief at 18. In

that case, the victim identified the defendant on “dark surveillance video” as

the person who broke into her home; moreover, the defendant’s palm prints

were recovered on an open window and one of the victim’s stolen items was

pawned by the defendant’s girlfriend.          See Childs, 63 A.3d at 327.    The

____________________________________________

specific intent to kill. Commonwealth v. Clemons, 200 A.3d 441, 462 (Pa.
2019) (citations omitted); see also 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a).

12 See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the Statement and/or

not raised in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are
waived.”).

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defendant argued that his conviction was against the weight of the evidence

because the “facts linking him to the crimes [were] too tenuous[.]” Id. This

Court rejected the defendant’s weight claim, noting the trial “court was

shown the surveillance video that served to identify [the defendant] and was

able to draw its own conclusions.” Id.

      Childs provides no relief for Appellant.     The Childs Court did not

require the Commonwealth to provide corroborating physical evidence in

order to permit an eyewitness identification from surveillance video, nor did it

consider whether the identification evidence was sufficient to support the

verdict.   Rather, the Childs Court reviewed the weight of the evidence.

Moreover, here, like in Childs, both the trial court and the jury viewed the

relevant surveillance video and were able to draw their own conclusions

regarding the witnesses’ identifications.

      In Brown, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder

following a shooting. See Brown, 134 A.3d at 1101. Although two witnesses

initially identified the defendant as the person who shot the victim, they later

recanted, and the Commonwealth was forced to introduce their “initial

accounts of the shooting as prior inconsistent statements.” Id. at 1101-02.

Relevant herein, the Commonwealth also introduced surveillance video that

was played for the jury, and the trial court permitted a police detective to

“give limited testimony to direct the jury’s attention to specific images

depicted in the video.” See id. at 1105-06. As Appellant points out, the trial

court in Brown, however, prohibited the detective “from speculating as to the

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identities of individuals seen in the footage, and instructed the jury that their

own observations controlled.”       Id. at 1106.     On appeal, the defendant

challenged the detective’s testimony as inadmissible lay witness opinion

testimony. See id. A panel of this Court found no error.

      Here, Appellant has challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on

appeal, not the admissibility of the identification testimony. Moreover, the

Brown opinion provides no context as to why the trial court prohibited the

detective from identifying certain individuals in the video. See Brown, 134

A.3d at 1106. Perhaps the detective was not familiar with the individuals, or

had no basis upon which make the identification. The facts in the present

case are clearly distinguishable.

      Similarly, in Palmer, the defendant challenged the admissibility of a

detective’s testimony, identifying individuals in a video, as improper lay

opinion testimony. See Palmer, 192 A.3d at 99. In that case, the video

surveillance footage of a shooting revealed “[a] man . . . extending his arm in

a position consistent with firing a gun” immediately before the driver of a car

passing by was struck by a bullet. See id. at 87. The defendant admitted he

was in the area of the shooting, and his DNA was recovered from the area

where fired cartridge casings were located. See id. at 100. The detective

“identified the shooter by finding and watching the video surveillance of the

shooting, then examining earlier portions of the video for other instances

where the suspect appeared.”        Id. at 100-01.    This Court held that the

detective’s testimony was properly admitted based on his perceptions of the

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video footage, and that the jury was “free to reach a different conclusion if it

disagreed with [the detective’s] conclusion that it was [the defendant]

depicted on the video at specific moments in the footage.” Id. at 101.

       Again, here, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, not

the admissibility of the witnesses’ identification testimony. Moreover, while

he emphasizes that there was corroboration evidence in Palmer ─ i.e., the

defendant’s DNA at the scene ─ the panel did not consider whether such

evidence is required in order to find an identification from a video to be

sufficient. Appellant’s attempt to grasp any language in these cases to support

his claim fails.

       We also refuse Appellant’s invitation to adopt the holdings of several

federal   circuit   courts    which,     he    asserts,   require   both   “substantial

corroboration” and a witness’ “familiarity with the characteristics of the

defendant [which] are not immediately observable by the jury at trial.” 13 See

Appellant’s Brief at 24.        He describes these circumstances as when the

defendant has changed his appearance, or when the quality of the video “is

such that a reasonable factfinder would need assistance[.]” Id. We conclude

these considerations are a proper consideration for a weight of the evidence

claim, not a sufficiency claim.

____________________________________________

13 It is well-settled that we are “not bound by decisions of federal courts
inferior to the United States Supreme Court[.]” Commonwealth v. Ragan,
743 A.2d 390, 396 (Pa. 1999).

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      In the present case, Detective Flurry testified that when he and two

other members of the Selective Enforcement Team were asked to review the

surveillance video of the shooting, he was generally aware that there had been

a shooting but was not aware of any “persons of interest,” including Appellant.

See N.T. Trial, 2/9/22, at 529. Rather, Sergeant McCrady told them “he had

a couple of videos that he wanted us to look at to see if we could recognize

anybody that was in the videos.” Id. at 531. Detective Flurry testified that

he had “multiple observations and/or interactions” with Appellant from 2017

until the spring of 2019. Id. at 524. He stated that he was “[w]ithin arm’s

reach” of Appellant “[a]t least once[,]” and was “familiar with [Appellant’s]

physical features and characteristics as of June of 2019[.]”        Id. at 525.

Although Appellant’s face was not clearly depicted on any of the surveillance

videos, Detective Flurry described in detail how he identified Appellant based

upon his body type, jaw line, complexion, hairline, and positioning of tattoos.

See id. at 538-46. He also explained that Appellant was known to “associate”

with two of the other men present at the shooting.        See id. at 578.    We

conclude that the detective’s familiarity with Appellant was sufficient to permit

him to identify Appellant on the surveillance video. Whether his identification

was credible was for the jury ─ who also viewed the surveillance video ─ to

decide. See Williams, 255 A.3d at 578-79.

      Moreover, although Mr. Christian did not have any interaction with

Appellant prior to the night of the shooting, he positively identified Appellant

as the person who was in an altercation with Mr. Maldonado earlier that

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evening. According to Sergeant McCrady, when he showed Mr. Christian the

surveillance video, Mr. Christian “started to feel a little sick” because “he didn’t

know that [Appellant] was behind Mr. Gorham.” N.T. Jury Trial, 2/8/22, at

423, 425. However, he “[f]airly quickly, . . . maybe [within] a minute[,]”

identified Appellant as the shooter. Id. at 425.

      Furthermore,     at   trial,   Mr.    Christian   testified   that   he   actually

remembered Appellant was the person who shot him “days after [he] had

been in the hospital[,]” but he “was just in too much shock” and not “in the

right state of mind” to identify him prior to viewing the video surveillance

footage.   See id. at 370.       To the extent that his testimony contradicted

Sergeant McCrady’s account, any inconsistencies was for the jury to weigh

and consider. See Williams, 255 A.3d at 578-79.

      Lastly, we note that Appellant implies that prior to their identifications,

both Mr. Christian and Detective Flurry were aware of the circulating “rumor

and innuendo” that Appellant was the shooter. See Appellant’s Brief at 25.

He insists that this led to “confirmatory feedback” which made the witnesses

“more confident in the accuracy of [their] identification, even if [they] had

identified an innocent person.” Id. However, Appellant does not provide any

record citation to support this claim, and our review reveals there is simply no

evidence in the record that either Mr. Christian or Detective Flurry was aware

of the purported rumors surrounding Appellant prior to their identifications.

Thus, Appellant’s sufficiency claim fails.

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      In his final issue, Appellant again challenges his identification as the

shooter ─ this time, in a weight of the evidence claim.                He insists Mr.

Christian’s “unbelievable testimony . . . was repeatedly contradicted by other

Commonwealth witnesses[,]” and Detective Flurry’s “vague testimony”

identifying   Appellant   in   the   surveillance   video   “merited    no   weight.”

Appellant’s Brief at 36. Indeed, Appellant notes that Detective Flurry “gave

only general physical characteristics to establish the perpetrator’s identify”

and conceded he could not distinctly see the culprit’s face or tattoos. Id. at

39.   Accordingly, he contends the trial court abused its discretion when it

denied his weight of the evidence claim. See id. at 40.

      Preliminarily, we note Appellant properly preserved his weight claim in

a timely filed post-sentence motion.             See Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(1)-(3)

(challenge to weight of the evidence must be raised before trial court);

Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion for New Trial, 5/23/22, at 7-11. Our review

is well-established:

            A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is
      against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion
      of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a
      mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same
      facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. When a trial
      court considers a motion for a new trial based upon a weight of
      the evidence claim, the trial court may award relief only when the
      jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s
      sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so that
      right may be given another opportunity to prevail.

            The inquiry is not the same for an appellate court. Rather,
      when an appellate court reviews a weight claim, the court is
      reviewing the exercise of discretion by the trial court, not the

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      underlying question of whether the verdict was against the weight
      of the evidence. The appellate court reviews a weight claim using
      an abuse of discretion standard.

Commonwealth v. Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1080 (Pa. 2017) (citations &

quotation marks omitted; paragraph break added).

      Here, the trial court considered and rejected Appellant’s contention that

his conviction was against the weight of the evidence. See Trial Ct Op. at 18.

The court opined that upon a “thorough review of the testimonial evidence, [it

could] find no issues concerning the credibility of the testimony given by any

witness, and specifically Mr. Christian and law enforcement officers.”      Id.

Further, the court stated Appellant “did not offer or elicit testimony

contradicting the testimony of” the Commonwealth’s witnesses. Id.

      Appellant first notes that Mr. Christian’s account of his and his father’s

activities prior to arriving at the house party differed from the account

provided by his father’s friend, who accompanied them for part of the evening.

See Appellant’s Brief at 37-38. These discrepancies concerning events prior

to the shooting, however, do not impact Mr. Christian’s identification of

Appellant.

      Appellant also emphasizes that “Sergeant McCrady twice admitted that

Mr. Christian’s testimony differed from his statements to the police” ─

specifically, regarding the fact that he knew Appellant shot him before he

viewed the surveillance video footage, and his trial testimony that he did not

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identify Mr. Gorham and Mr. Hodge-Majette.14 See Appellant’s Brief at 38.

However, despite these inconsistencies, the trial court found “Mr. Christian’s

identification was not unreliable.” Trial Ct. Op. at 16. We detect no basis to

disagree. Regardless of whether the jury believed Mr. Christian knew who

shot him immediately after the incident and for some reason did not tell police,

or he did not initially notice Appellant standing behind Mr. Gorham until he

saw the surveillance footage, he positively identified Appellant as the shooter

─ as did Detective Flurry. Moreover, the jury (as well as the trial court) was

able to view the surveillance video and assess the reliability of both witnesses’

identifications. Although Detective Flurry candidly admitted that he identified

Appellant based on his physical characteristics, not facial recognition, again,

the jury was able to weigh that testimony in determining whether the

identification was credible. We agree with the trial court’s determination that

“none of the verdicts . . . shock a person’s sense of justice[,]” and, therefore,

Appellant’s challenge to the weight of the evidence fails. See id. at 19.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

____________________________________________

14 During cross-examination, Mr. Christian was asked if he was “able to
identify the other two people from the photographic arrays in the video[,]” to
which he responded, “No.” N.T., 2/8/22, at 373. However, Sergeant McCrady
later testified that Mr. Christian was able to identify the other men involved
when he viewed the surveillance footage. See id. at 463. When Appellant’s
counsel’s pointed out the discrepancy, the officer responded, “I’m not sure if
he’s confused or what.” Id.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 08/16/2023

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