Court Opinion

ID: 9637659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:14:16.832734+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:58.812320
License: Public Domain

SAUFLEY, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
[¶ 55] I join Justice Alexander’s dissent. Although I concur in the Court’s decision affirming the judgment on the issue of res ipsa loquitur and vacating the judgment on the issue of negligence, I write additionally in dissent regarding the Court’s adoption of a strict liability cause of action in this case.
[¶ 56] Strict liability allows the imposition of economic damages without proof of wrongdoing. Reynolds v. W.H. Hinman Co., 145 Me. 343, 347-48, 75 A.2d 802, 804 (1950). In the 1950s, we held that strict liability does not apply in blasting cases. See id. at 361-62, 75 A.2d at 811; Cratty v. Samuel Aceto & Co., 151 Me. 126, 130, 116 A.2d 623, 626 (1955). Thus, for more than fifty years, it has been the settled expectation of businesses and insurers that blasters must act reasonably to protect local property, and that they will be held responsible if they are negligent. Today, by eliminating a plaintiff’s burden of proving negligence, the Court expands the financial responsibility of developers who must engage in blasting. The expansion of fiscal responsibility to cases where there has been no wrongdoing changes a long-established financial business equation.
[¶ 57] Unfortunately, the Court exercises its authority to expand liability without any factual demonstration of the need for such change or the potential effect on Maine’s economy. Without a record containing this important information, the Court risks increasing the costs of doing business (typically insurance costs) and decreasing employment opportunities in Maine.
[¶ 58] As a matter of jurisprudential policy, this is the wrong approach at the wrong time.
[¶ 59] Accordingly, I join Justice Alexander’s dissent on the issue of strict liability.