Court Opinion

ID: 9577673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:36:58.595596+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:01.535435
License: Public Domain

NESBETT, Chief Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I agree with the majority that this matter must be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with our holding in Thompson v. State.1
I must dissent, however, from that portion of the majority opinion which concludes that a petitioner under Criminal Rule 35(b) has an invariable right to be provided with counsel at state expense, based on that portion of article I, section 1, of the Alaska constitution which states:
* * * that all persons are equal and entitled to equal rights, opportunities, and protection under the law * * *.
Nor do I believe that such a right exists on any other constitutional ground.
The majority opinion expresses the view that
although the United States Supreme Court has not held that constitutional standards require the appointment of counsel for an indigent prisoner at a hearing of his motion to vacate sentence, we believe that the Court’s concern for the constitutional rights of indigent defendants, as exemplified by the cases we have discussed, points the way to that result.
I do not reach the same conclusion. None of the Supreme Court decisions cited and relied upon by the majority pertain to the rights of an indigent challenging his conviction by collateral attack which is the case now before us. In Douglas v. People of State of California,2 the defendants had been convicted of felonies and requested *257counsel on appeal. The request was denied under a California rule allowing the district courts of appeal to deny appointed counsel, if, after an independent investigation of the record, “in their judgment such appointment would be of no value to either the defendant or the court.” The United States Supreme Court held that such a procedure lacked the equality demanded by the 14th amendment. In so holding, however, the Court said:
We are not here concerned with problems that might arise from the denial of counsel for the preparation of a petition for discretionary or mandatory review beyond the stage in the appellate process at which the claims have once been presented by a lawyer and passed upon by an appellate court. We are dealing only with the first appeal, granted as a matter of right to rich and poor alike * * * from a criminal conviction. We need not decide now whether California would have to provide counsel for an indigent seeking a discretionary hearing from the California Supreme Court after the District Court of Appeal has sustained his conviction * * * or whether counsel must be appointed for an indigent seeking review of an appellate affirmance of his conviction in this Court by appeal as of right or by petition for a writ of certio-rari which lies within the Court’s discretion. But it is appropriate to observe that a State can, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for differences so long as the result does not amount to a denial of due process or an ‘invidious discrimination.’ * * * Absolute equality is not required; lines can be and are drawn and we often sustain them. * * * But where the merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor. 372 U.S. at 356-357, 83 S.Ct. at 816, 9 L.Ed.2d at 814. (Emphasis supplied by the U. S. Supreme Court.)
Alaska’s Criminal Rule 35(b) is identical with section 2255 of Title 28, U.S.C. In reviewing a lower court proceeding had under section 2255 the Supreme Court of the United States said:3
[W]e think it clear that the sentencing court has discretion to ascertain whether .the claim is substantial before granting a full evidentiary hearing. In this connection, the sentencing court might find it useful to appoint counsel to represent the applicant. (Emphasis added.)
The federal courts of appeal have uniformly held that the appointment of counsel in a section 2255 proceeding is a matter for the sound discretion of the trial court.4 Where the circumstances of a defendant or the difficulties involved in presenting a particular matter are such that a fair and meaningful hearing cannot be had without the aid of counsel, conceivably the requirements of the due process clause of the fifth amendment would dictate that counsel be appointed.5
In discussing an indigent’s right to the assistance of court appointed counsel in 28 U.S.C. section 2255 proceedings the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said: ■
The mandatory requirement of the Sixth Amendment regarding right to counsel does not apply to indigent mov-ants under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. This is the *258general view, it seems soundly based on the underlying purposes of the Amendment.
⅜ * * * ⅝ *
By interpreting the Amendment as conferring a right to counsel through direct appeal of the original conviction to the Courts of Appeals * * * the accused is assured of representation by counsel throughout those proceedings in which guilt is finally determined and reviewed as a matter of right. The same need for cotmsel is not invariably present where post-conviction remedies like motions under § 2255 are involved. They follow original criminal proceedings at every stage of which counsel has been provided * * * they are not a part of the basic processes for determining guilt * * * they may be resubmitted * * * and they are frequently frivolous * * *.6
Here counsel was provided for petitioner at the trial court level. His plea of guilty had been accepted, sentence had been imposed and no appeal was taken. Nearly a year later petitioner moved to vacate sentence on the ground that his plea of guilty had been coerced.
A single uncomplicated question of fact-was raised by petitioner’s allegation that the probation officer had threatened to see that his parole was revoked and that he would be charged as a habitual criminal if he did not enter a plea of guilty to the charge of embezzlement. The question of fact would be resolved by the trial court on the testimony of not more than three persons — the petitioner, his court appointed trial counsel, and the probation officer. In my opinion this situation illustrates the wisdom of the federal rule which leaves to the discretion of the trial judge the question of whether the complexity of the issue raised requires the appointment of counsel at state expense to represent petitioner.
It must be remembered that proceedings under Criminal Rule 35(b) occur only after conviction and sentence. If an accused is indigent and so requests, he is provided counsel at state expense for his arraignment, plea, and trial. If convicted and he so requests, he” is again provided counsel at state expense to prosecute an appeal. These safeguards have been established as constitutional rights of an indigent accused, by recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. But after guilt has once been established under the safeguards provided, the Supreme Court has not recognized that the convicted indigent has a constitutional right to court appointed counsel in his every attempt to collaterally attack his sentence.
The possibilities for alleging legal and factual issues requiring determination under Criminal Rule 35(b) are infinite. Experience has shown that by far the greatest number of the applications are without merit and many are frivolous. To require the appointment of counsel at state expense in every such application is not realistic. The question should be left to the discretion of the trial judge who can and should be entrusted with the duty of appointing counsel whenever necessary to adequately protect the petitioner’s rights.

. 412 P.2d 628 (Alaska 1966).

. 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 816, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963).

. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 21, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1080, 10 L.Ed.2d 148, 164 (1963).

. Mitchell v. United States, 359 F.2d 833 (7th Cir. 1966); Fleming v. United States, 367 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1966); Baker v. United States, 334 F.2d 444 (8th Cir. 1964); Richardson v. United States, 199 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1952).

.See Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445, 446 (9th Cir. 1962); State v. Weeks, 166 So.2d 892 (Fla.1964). See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 222, 72 S.Ct. 263, 273, 96 L.Ed. 232, 243 (1952) where the Supreme Court noted that “unlike the criminal trial where the guilt of the defendant is in issue * * * a proceeding under Section 2255 is an independent and collateral inquiry into the validity of the conviction.”

. Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445, 446, and n. 3 at 446-447 (9th Cir. 1962). (Emphasis added.)