Court Opinion

ID: 9658387
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:57:41.346499+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:54.356452
License: Public Domain

Justice Black,
dissenting, stated, (pp 637, 638):
“The 3 children of the parties are the record legal owners of the realty subject matter, subject to the respective life estates of record. Mr. Flynn’s petition for invalidation shows on its face all these facts and, in addition, discloses his recent vain effort to obtain quitclaim deeds from the 2 adult children and from the guardian of the third (yet a minor). In this state of things the children should have been brought in as necessary parties to any proceeding by which Mr. Flynn would cut off their record interest. We have a statute providing for such action (CL 1948, § 612.10 [Stat Ann § 27.662]) and the trial chancellor upon his own motion should have denied judicial action until such requisite parties were brought in and permitted to plead. Finally, no reason appears for failure to bring them in.
“The reason for such joinder of necessary parties is well known. ‘It is a general rule in equity that all parties entitled to litigate the same questions are necessary parties.’ ” (Citation omitted.)
102 ALR 814 contains an annotation dealing with the propriety of joining third persons as parties defendant in divorce actions because of their interest, alleged or actual, in property rights involved in the litigation. It is stated (p 814):
“It is generally held that third persons having, or claiming to have, an interest in property involved in a divorce action, are proper parties to such action.”
Cases from California, Illinois, Louisiana, New York, Oregon, Texas, Wisconsin, and England are cited in support of the rule.
The rule is stated in 24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 278, p 431, as follows:
*427“Where it is sought not only to secure a divorce, but also to have an adjudication of property rights or a division of property, it is generally held that third persons having or claiming to have an interest in the property involved are proper parties to such action. If the plaintiff desires a judgment determining his or her rights in such property, they are necessary and indispensable parties. Indeed, it is held that either party to the divorce action may bring in third persons interested in property involved, in order that their claims may be adjudicated in the divorce action. If neither party to the divorce action brings in third persons who claim an interest in the property involved in the suit, such third persons may themselves intervene to establish their rights. However, such a person’s right to be heard extends only to the protection of his interest in the property, and not to the question of the plaintiff’s right to a divorce.”
See, also, 24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 937, p 1071.
CL 1948, §612.10 (Stat Ann §27.662), referred to by Justice Black in his opinion in Flynn, supra, was repealed by the revised judicature act. It was replaced by GCR 1963, 205 — Necessary Joinder of Parties. See, also, GCR 1963, 206, as construed by this Court in Gervais v. Annapolis Homes, Inc. (1966), 377 Mich 674. GCR 1963, 721, Domestic Relations, provides: “Unless otherwise specified in these special rules, the procedure in the above actions shall follow the general rules of procedure.”
Under the current provisions of the General Court Rules and the decisions of this Court in some of the above cases, the oft-quoted statement that the jurisdiction of a court in divorce action is strictly statutory is incorrect. There is no good reason why a court should not exercise its customary equity powers in divorce actions as long as in so doing it *428does not disregard statutory provisions pertaining to divorce.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court are reversed. The provisions of the judgment for divorce under the heading “Property Settlement,” are stricken. The case is remanded for redetermination of the question of property settlement in accordance with GCR 1963 as between the present parties or as between them and William Yedinak and George Yedinak in the event they are properly joined as parties. Costs to appellant.
T. E. Brennan, C. J., concurred with Adams, J.
Black, J.
(for remand). I perceive no good reason for rehash of former decisions which, say as in Newton v. Security National Bank of Battle Creek (1949), 324 Mich 344, and Flynn v. Flynn (1962), 367 Mich 625, left doubt respecting the circuit court’s power to determine equities in a divorce case as Judge Smith has done in this case. With advent of the unitary Revised Judicature Act and General Court Rules of 1963, there now is no good reason why our circuit courts should not exercise their general equity powers in divorce actions just so long as they do not disregard statutory provisions pertaining to divorce. See particularly GCR 1963, 205 and 721, and comment in Gervais v. Annapolis Homes, Inc. (1966), 377 Mich 674, 678-680, upon the purposeful changes which the new rules have effected in the area of joinder of parties.
I would remand for redetermination of the question of property settlement as between the present parties and also William Yedinak and George Yedinak. Upon remand the trial judge should require that William and George be brought in as necessary parties, under GCR 1963, 205.1, and should *429see that the new “Property Settlement” division of the court’s judgment is so couched as to bind William and George to the decretal result which, upon such redetermination, is intended by the court. Costs if any should abide the final result.