Court Opinion

ID: 9940927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 17:14:22.231086+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:03.798205
License: Public Domain

J-A29015-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 REGINALD TIMOTHY WARD, JR.               :
                                          :
                      Appellant           :   No. 37 WDA 2023

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 5, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0003942-2022

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                         FILED: February 15, 2024

      Reginald Timothy Ward, Jr. appeals from the judgment of sentence of

one year of probation following his conviction for carrying a firearm without a

license. We affirm.

      The trial court summarized the pertinent facts as follows:

      On April 2, 2022, . . . Sergeant John O’Leary of the Jefferson Hills
      Police Department observed a red Pontiac tailgating another
      vehicle. Sergeant O’Leary initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle.
      He approached the vehicle and requested [Appellant’s] driver’s
      license and as [Appellant] was sifting through his wallet, he
      noticed a permit to carry a concealed weapon. [Appellant] did not
      have his driver’s license with him but provided an identification
      card. Sergeant O’Leary, at that point knowing that [Appellant]
      may have a concealed weapon, inquired, and [Appellant]
      responded in the affirmative. At that point, Sergeant O’Leary
      went to his vehicle to verify whether [Appellant] had a valid
      driver’s license given that [he] did not have the actual physical
      license with him.

      As was testified at the suppression hearing, Sergeant O’Leary
      utilized a database and ascertained that [Appellant] did not have
J-A29015-23

      a valid driver’s license. He also testified that there are various
      other data items that they check simultaneously, such as
      protection from abuse orders, outstanding warrants and
      concealed carry permits issued by the counties. Sergeant O’Leary
      became aware at this point that the conceal permit of [Appellant]
      was expired. Based upon these facts, [Appellant] was charged
      with carrying a firearm without a license, in addition to the motor
      vehicle violations.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/18/23, at 1-2 (cleaned up).

      Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence concerning the status

of his firearm permit due to what he claimed was an unlawful seizure. The

trial court held a hearing, wherein it denied Appellant’s motion.    The case

proceeded to a bench trial on the evidence adduced at the suppression

hearing. Appellant was convicted of carrying a firearm without a license, as

well as the two summary offenses of driving without a license and following

too closely. This timely appeal followed. The trial court ordered Appellant to

file a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant complied. The trial court thereafter issued

a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

      Appellant proffers the following question for our review: “Did the trial

court err by denying [Appellant]’s motion to suppress the evidence when the

police officer wrongfully extended a traffic stop to conduct an investigation

regarding whether [Appellant] possessed a firearm and valid permit?”

Appellant’s brief at 6.

      We begin with a review of the relevant legal principles. Preliminarily,

we set forth our standard of review for the denial of a suppression motion:

                                     -2-
J-A29015-23

      An appellate court’s standard of reviewing the denial of a
      suppression motion is limited to determining whether the
      suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record
      and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are
      correct. Thus, our review of questions of law is de novo. Our
      scope of review is to consider [the evidence offered by the
      Commonwealth] only and the evidence for the defense as remains
      uncontradicted when read in the context of the suppression record
      as a whole.

Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 209 A.3d 957, 968-69 (Pa. 2019) (citations

omitted). Where the issue on appeal relates solely to a suppression ruling,

we examine “only the suppression hearing record.”          Commonwealth v.

Yandamuri, 159 A.3d 503, 516 (Pa. 2017).

      Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to

suppress because the police officer impermissibly extended the traffic stop to

ascertain the status of his concealed carry permit. See Appellant’s brief at

11. Thus, he contends that he was subjected to an unreasonable seizure. It

is bedrock constitutional law that “[t]he Fourth Amendment to the United

States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution

guarantee the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers,     and   possessions   from   unreasonable   searches   and   seizures.”

Commonwealth v. Luczki, 212 A.3d 530, 542 (Pa.Super. 2019) (citation

omitted).

      Instantly, Appellant was stopped for committing a traffic offense while

driving a motor vehicle. The United States Supreme Court has observed the

following concerning traffic stops:

                                       -3-
J-A29015-23

         The tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context
         is determined by the seizure’s “mission” – to address the traffic
         violation that warranted the stop, and attend to related safety
         concerns. Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the
         stop, it may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate that
         purpose. Authority for the seizure thus ends when the tasks tied
         to the traffic infraction are – or reasonably should have been
         completed.

         A traffic stop can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the
         time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a
         warning ticket . . . . An officer, in other words, may conduct
         certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop.
         But . . . he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent
         the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining
         an individual.

Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354-55 (2015). In short, “[t]he

seizure remains lawful only so long as [unrelated] inquiries do not measurably

extend the duration of the stop.” Id. at 355 (cleaned up).

         In the case sub judice, Appellant argues that the “initial investigatory

detention for tailgating was improperly extended to inquire into a gun permit

issue”     because    Sergeant    O’Leary   checked    for   information   regarding

Appellant’s concealed carry permit. Appellant’s brief at 10, 22. Therefore,

Appellant avers that his constitutional rights were violated and suppression is

warranted.       Appellant analogizes his case to this Court’s decision in

Commonwealth v. Malloy, 257 A.2d 142, 149 (Pa.Super. 2021).                       See

Appellant’s brief at 19-20.

         Therein, an officer stopped a vehicle based upon the improper

placement of a license plate. When asked for identification, Malloy produced

a lanyard, which the officer associated with an individual working as an armed

                                         -4-
J-A29015-23

security guard, causing the officer to ask whether he had a firearm. Malloy

responded affirmatively. For safety, the officer directed him to exit the vehicle

so he could secure the firearm, and then requested his firearms credentials.

During the ensuing fifteen to twenty minutes, the officer conducted various

checks with local detectives and the Pennsylvania State Police to determine

whether Malloy had a valid license to carry. He was subsequently arrested

after they determined that he did not. The trial court denied suppression, but

this Court rejected that conclusion. In so doing, we stated as follows:

      [O]nce [the officer] secured the firearm, [Malloy’s] legal authority
      to own or possess a gun clearly bore no discernible relationship to
      individual safety or security within the context of the traffic stop.
      Under these circumstances, where seizure of a firearm has
      substantially diminished the risk to officers and others who may
      be present during a lawful vehicle detention, we see no reason
      why the Fourth Amendment, in the absence of independent
      justification, suspicion, or cause, should tolerate even a 10- to 15-
      minute extension of a routine traffic stop for the investigation of
      a secondary criminal matter. Hence, the request challenged in
      this case does not fall within the category of actions the police
      may undertake during a lawful traffic stop based solely on
      concerns for safety and security and without independent
      justification or cause.

Malloy, supra, at 153.

      Appellant argues that, as in Malloy, the officer impermissibly prolonged

the traffic stop to investigate the status of Appellant’s concealed carry permit,

a matter that was not “mission-related.” Appellant’s brief at 22-23. Hence,

Appellant requests that we vacate the order denying suppression and remand

                                      -5-
J-A29015-23

for a new trial where any evidence of the status of Appellant’s firearm permit

is suppressed.1 Id. at 23.

       We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s contentions, as the certified record

supports the trial court’s findings that suppression was not warranted under

the circumstances of this case. As the trial court noted, after Appellant handed

Sergeant O’Leary his identification card, the sergeant returned to his vehicle

to examine the status of Appellant’s driver’s license. See Trial Court Opinion,

4/18/23, at 2. Sergeant O’Leary testified as to the other information that law

enforcement officials simultaneously receive as a result of this query. Id. at

2. Indeed, he detailed that when he checked his mobile data terminal (“MDT”)

to ascertain the status of Appellant’s driver’s license, a screen displaying the

status of Appellant’s concealed carry permit “[came] up at the same time.”

N.T. Suppression Hearing, 12/5/22, at 7. The MDT revealed that Appellant

did not have a valid driver’s license and “when the concealed carry screen

came up for Westmoreland County[,] it indicated that that permit to carry

____________________________________________

1  Appellant also relies upon Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d 916, 937
(Pa. 2019), wherein our High Court stated that mere possession of a concealed
firearm alone is not suggestive of criminal activity. Appellant avers that
Sergeant O’Leary had no reason to suspect Appellant was involved in criminal
activity and, accordingly, unlawfully investigated the legality of his concealed
carry permit. See Appellant’s brief at 21-22. However, Hicks is inapt
because, there, the officer stopped someone solely because he observed a
firearm. See Hicks, supra at 937. Here, Appellant was legally stopped by
Sergeant O’Leary for a traffic violation. Moreover, as discussed fully infra,
Sergeant O’Leary did not investigate the legality of Appellant’s concealed carry
permit; that information appeared on his screen automatically during the
permissible, routine check of Appellant’s driver’s license.

                                           -6-
J-A29015-23

concealed had expired over a year prior.”          Id. at 8.   Sergeant O’Leary

continued: “Various PennDOT form[s] come up; if somebody is wanted, a form

will come up, if they have a concealed carry permit or have ever had one, that

screen comes up as well, and it indicates validity.” 2 Id.

       Based on this testimony, the trial court correctly held that Sergeant

O’Leary’s discovery of the status of Appellant’s concealed carry permit did not

violate his constitutional rights as it occurred simultaneously with the mission-

related check of the MDT to learn the status of Appellant’s driver’s license.

See Trial Court Opinion, 4/18/23, at 5-6. In fact, as noted, Sergeant O’Leary

did not conduct a separate search to determine whether the concealed carry

permit that he had observed was valid.           See N.T. Suppression Hearing,

12/5/22, at 7-8. Accordingly, there simply was no extension of the stop. In

sum, the examination of the screen that appeared contemporaneously with

information regarding Appellant’s driver’s license did not extend the stop and,

as such, Appellant’s arguments do not entitle him to relief.3 See Rodriguez,

supra at 355.

____________________________________________

2 Sergeant O’Leary additionally confirmed that if a person has a Protection
from Abuse order lodged against him, a form so indicating will also appear
automatically. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 12/5/22, at 13.

3 Furthermore, contrary to Appellant’s implied assertion, Sergeant O’Leary
was permitted to inquire about whether Appellant had a firearm. This Court
has stated that such a request “falls within the category of actions police
officers may undertake during a lawful traffic stop based solely on concerns
for their safety and security and without independent justification or cause.”
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -7-
J-A29015-23

       For the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not err in denying

Appellant’s motion to suppress.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DATE: 2/15/2024

____________________________________________

Commonwealth v. Ross, 297 A.3d 787, 792 (Pa.Super. 2023). Notably, the
officer in Ross posed such a question with no knowledge as to whether Ross
had a firearm. Although not required, Sergeant O’Leary had independent
justification to inquire about the firearm since he observed the concealed carry
permit and, thus, there was an increased likelihood that Appellant had a
firearm on his person and may have posed a danger to the officer’s safety.
Hence, Appellant’s challenge to Sergeant O’Leary’s justification for asking
about the firearm fails.

                                           -8-