Court Opinion

ID: 9827865
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 17:54:00.807063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:38.151088
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Aside, from the assignments based upon the court’s rejection of certain provisions in the live stoat contract, appellant’s assignments are as follows:
(1) The court erred in refusing a peremptory instruction.
(2) “The mam charge of the court is erroneous in submitting any issues of fact to the jury, since a peremptory instruction for defendant should have been given, because,” etc.
(3) “The verdict of the jury is contrary to the law and the evidence, in that under the law the facts of this ease show no liability upon the part of the defendant, because,” etc.
(4) “Paragraph 1 of the court’s charge is erroneous, in submitting to the jury the issue as to whether or not plaintiff was the owner of the cattle alleged in his petition,” etc.
(5) “The court erred in paragraph 1 of its charge, in submitting to the jury the issue as to whether or not the defendant, through its agent, announced that it would not transport plaintiffs cattle from Bovina, to Kansas City and St. Joseph, Mo., nor permit them to be placed in the pens at Bovina, nor loaded on the cars at said point, without their first being dipped, without a certificate or permit, because the same is upon the weight of the evidence, * * * and because a mere announcement by defendant’s agent would not authorize the plaintiff to act thereon,” etc.
(G) “The court erred in excluding as evidence, and instructing the jury not to consider, the rules and regulations of the Live Stock Sanitary Commission of Texas, and in withdrawing them from the jury.”
The trial court charged the jury in part as follows:
“If you find and believe from the evidence that plaintiff was the owner of the cattle alleged in his petition, and that same were unin-spected exposed cattle,1 and that they were not infected with scabies or other communicable disease, and that from defendant plaintiff ordered cars in which, on October 24, 1913, to transport such cattle from Bovina, Tex., to Kansas City and St. Joseph, Mo., for immediate slaughter, and that defendant, though its agent, before the time for such transportation, announced that it would not receive and so transport such cattle, and would not permit them to be placed in the pens or loaded on the cars without they were first dipped, or without a certificate or permit, and that such announcement, if any, of defendant was made known or in any way communicated to plaintiff, and that the only lawful way by which such permit or certificate could be obtained was for such cattle to be dipped, and that in compliance with such announcement, if any, plaintiff caused such cattle to be dipped, and that the same sustained the injuries, or any of them, alleged in plaintiff’s petition, and that the proximate cause of such injuries, if any. was the dipping of such cattle, then you will find for plaintiff and assess his damage, unless you find for defendant under other instructions given you.”
He also instructed the jury that if they believed the defendant’s agent Lucas did not announce that he would not permit plaintiff’s cattle to enter defendant’s pens, or to be loaded on defendant’s cars, or that said cattle would not be transported by defendant, unless they were accompanied by a permit, but that such statements were voluntarily made to R. V. Moorhead by the inspector, L. L. Jones, either in person or by sending such information by some other person, without having been so directed or advised by defendant’s agent, John Lucas, to find for the defendant. He also directed the jury, if they believed that the cattle in question were visibly diseased with scabies, to likewise find for the defendant.
With the exception of the peremptory instruction, there were none presented to the trial court by the defendant, at least none brought forward into the brief, upon any theory or phase of the evidence exonerating the railway company. Additional to the testimony of Jones, shown in the original opinion, who was both state and federal inspector, as to his communication to appellant’s agent in regard to Hall’s right to ship these particular cattle, the statement of facts contains the following by Jones:
“When I told the agent that Hall had a right to ship these cattle as exposed cattle, he contended all the time that he would not accept them without a certificate or a permit”
Moorhead had charge of the ranch of Warren & Son, who were to deliver the cattle purchased by Hall at Bovina, with a “10 per cent, cut.” Moorhead says that,, in addition to a message from Jones, he telephoned to Lucas, the agent at Bovina, who positively informed him that he would not receive these cattle for shipment, nor even let him pen the same until they were dipped, and that he then telephoned to Hall, the purchaser of the cattle.
We necessarily infer that the jury believed that Jones, as federal inspector, informed Lucas, the agent, that under the federal regulations these particular cattle, purchased by Hall, had the right to go to Kansas City, Mo., for immediate slaughter. If under the federal regulations a permit for that purpose was necessary to be issued by Jones, it inferentially follows that Jones, as federal inspector, would have issued such a document. It also follows, we think, logically, that the agent had no right to refuse to receive unin-spected, clean cattle in the pens at Bovina for shipment for immediate slaughter at Kansas City and St. Joseph, Mo., unless the same were dipped. We infer that Jones, as state inspector, would not have issued a permit for the movement of these cattle from Warren & Son’s ranch to the stock pens, but also conclude that, if a permit were necessary, he would have issued one as federal inspector, permitting the movement of the cattle to Kansas City and St. Joe, Mo., for the open market for immediate slaughter. To the extent of the movement of the particular cattle from the ranch to the stock pens, we think that Lucas, as the agent of the railway company, had no legal concern. If uninspected clean cattle, though exposed to the disease of scabies, had been in the pens preparatory to shipment to Kansas City for immediate slaughter, and the federal inspector passed *539tlie shipment, it is clear to us that the railroad company, under the federal regulations, should have transported the cattle. The trial court’s charge is a simple presentation of the issues without any substantial technical objection to the same.
It is denied in the motion for rehearing that facilities existed in St. Joe and Kansas City, Mo., for the purpose of taking care of the class of cattle mentioned in this record. Dr. Pearson, employed by the United States Department of Agriculture as a veterinary inspector, in testifying in regard to the interstate shipment of uninspected exposed cattle, and the rules regulating the transportation of same, said:
“They have such pens as required by the above rule at both St. Joe and Kansas City, and did have in 1913.”
The motion for rehearing is overruled.