Court Opinion

ID: 9487890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:29:16.331798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:32.727136
License: Public Domain

LOGAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority finds this case to be wholly within the “heartland” contemplated by the Sentencing Guidelines so that no departure is possible. Although I agree that we have to reverse the district court, I would remand for resentencing.
The district court obviously believed downward departure was warranted here. It stated, “This is a case that I think downward departure is not only authorized but absolutely essential.” II R. 27. As the majority opinion states, the district court mentioned three general bases as justification for his departure: defendant’s psychiatric history, the family situation — particularly the son’s need to have defendant care for him, and the “unsophisticated nature of the silencers.” I agree with the majority that the court’s statement of reasons is inadequate. But I here comment on each of the justifications given by the district court and why I believe there should be remand for resentencing instead of an outright reversal.
At sentencing defendant sought downward departure based upon U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13 (diminished capacity) p.s. When the district court relied upon defendant’s psychiatric history it may have meant defendant had diminished capacity. All the appellate record contains is the testimony and reports of two psychiatrists and a social worker that chronicle defendant’s psychiatric history, which is an extensive one.1 The psychiatric reports and testimony, however, do not address or conclude that defendant suffered from a “significantly reduced mental capacity.”
I cannot tell whether diminished capacity was a defense at trial, as we do not have the trial transcript. If diminished capacity was a defense at trial and the jury found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, then I believe that finding would be controlling on the district court for sentencing purposes. That situation is distinguishable from one in which a defendant is acquitted of a charged offense and the court, because the preponderance of the evidence standard is applicable to sentencing proceedings, can treat the defendant as if he had been convicted.
If diminished capacity was not a defense at trial, then I believe the court has the authority to ask the psychiatrists to address that issue in the sentencing proceedings, and make a determination based on the prepon*641derance standard. Although I think this is the weakest point in the district court’s justification for departure, without the trial transcript I am not as confident as the majority that no diminution is permitted on this ground.
I agree with the majority, of course, that the guidelines start from the premise that “[fjamily ties and responsibilities” are not relevant in sentencing, U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6 p.s.; therefore to justify a departure the district court must identify some extraordinary personal circumstances warranting mitigation in sentencing. However, as the majority recognizes, this court has upheld departures based in part upon the adverse effects of incarceration upon family members. United States v. Pena, 930 F.2d 1486, 1486 (10th Cir.1991). The majority opinion recites some of the evidence of the special relationship between defendant and his son, the son’s needs, and the unusual family situation. I think these factors possibly could serve as a basis for departure. They need to be further developed and explained, of course. But the majority opinion forecloses the district court from revisiting this issue.
Where I really have trouble with the majority’s conclusion is with respect to the silencers. I certainly agree that a mere reference to the “unsophisticated nature” of the silencers is not sufficient to explain why a downward departure is justified. Nevertheless, other than his convictions for possession of unregistered firearms and firearms not identified by a serial number, defendant’s only conviction was for possession of marijuana — which would produce an offense level of 4. Defendant’s offense level was 18 after a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The convictions for possession of unregistered firearms provided essentially all of the base offense level calculation under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(5) (eighteen points), with two more for lack of identifying serial numbers under § 2K2.1(b)(4). Although the Marlin .22 rifle, which had identification numbers, was referenced in each of these counts, the silencers had to provide the basis of the conviction for the following reasons.
The weapons offenses charged, violations of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) and (i), are part of the National Firearms Act, enacted under the government’s taxing power. That Act requires every “manufacturer; importer, and maker” of a firearm to register with the Secretary of the Treasury every firearm it manufactures or imports. Id. § 5841(b). The manufacturer or importer who makes a transfer has to register the firearm to the transferee; thus the burden of registration is on the transferor. See id. Firearms are defined to include silencers. Id. § 5845(a)(7).
The specific sections under which defendant was charged deal with receiving or possessing an unregistered firearm, § 5861(d), and receiving or possessing a firearm not identified by a serial number, § 5861(i). Defendant is not a “transferor,” and the rifle had identification numbers. The only items that could bring defendant under the Act were the ones he manufactured and had. no numbers — the silencers. Because defendant made the silencers involved in the charge he did not “receive” them; he only possessed them. Thus, as the majority notes, his duty as manufacturer was to stamp a serial number on the silencers and register them within twenty-four hours of the close of the day in which they were made. See United States v. Walsh, 791 F.2d 811, 818 (10th Cir.1986); 27 C.F.R. § 179.103. The government, of course, uses the “receive or possess” prohibition of unregistered or unidentifiable firearms to convict those who possess dangerous weapons such as machine guns—see Staples v. United States, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) — or hand grenades—see United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 91 S.Ct. 1112, 28 L.Ed.2d 356 (1971), not those who possess rifles purchased legally.2
*642Silencers on guns are often utilized by organized crime figures, and it is understandable that they would be included in the list as a “firearm” that the manufacturer must register and mark with identification numbers. But the silencers involved in the instant case were not what we think of as silencers, at least on the basis of the evidence in the appellate record. These silencers were made of “[o]ld toilet paper tubes and stuffing from some old stuffed animals.” I.R.Supp. 56. The evidence in the appellate record, which the district court quite apparently believed, was that in constructing these silencers defendant intended to muffle the sound of .22 rifle shots he intended to aim at animals invading defendant’s yard. Of course, it seems unrealistic to expect defendant to stamp an identification number on the toilet paper roll used as exterior covering of these homemade contraptions.
The silencers involved in the instant case are not included in the appellate record, nor does that record contain the evidence put on by the government with respect to those items.3 And we cannot tell by the short reference to the “unsophisticated” nature of the silencers the thinking of the judge or his reasoning for the particular departure he selected. But based on the record presented to us on appeal, I simply cannot imagine how the jury could have found defendant guilty on these firearms counts, or why the district court did not set aside those verdicts. Possibly there is more in the trial record than we have in the appellate record. But without more I simply do not believe that this is a “heartland” case with respect to these homemade toilet paper roll silencers. I would not deny the district court the right to rely upon this as a basis for departing downward.
For the reasons stated I respectfully dissent.

. The government, as appellant, has the responsibility of providing us a record sufficient to make an appropriate disposition of this appeal.

. Defendant's possession of a regular Marlin .22 rifle with an identifying serial number would not be a violation of this statute. See Staples v. United States, — U.S. —, —, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 1801, 128 L.Ed.2d 608 (1994) (“Moreover, despite the overlay of legal restrictions on gun ownership, we question whether regulations on guns are sufficiently intrusive that they impinge upon the common experience that owning a gun is usually licit and blameless conduct. Roughly 50 per cent of American homes contain at least one firearm of some sort, and in the vast majority of States, buying a shotgun or rifle is a simple transaction that would not alert a person to *642regulation any more than would buying a car.”) (footnotes omitted).

. The majority opinion in its footnote 3 recites all the evidence that is in the appellate record as to how these "silencers" were constructed.