Court Opinion

ID: 9931665
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Date Created: 2024-02-09 17:05:23.175686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:16.866296
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OPINION

                                            IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                                        James T. Morgan,                    FILED
                                        Appellant-Respondent,          Feb 09 2024, 8:46 am

                                                                            CLERK
                                                                        Indiana Supreme Court
                                                    v.                     Court of Appeals
                                                                             and Tax Court

                                         State of Indiana,
                                          Appellee-Petitioner.

                                           February 9, 2024

                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                           23A-CR-1489

                                        Appeal from the
                                   Montgomery Superior Court

                                         The Honorable
                                     Heather L. Barajas, Judge

                                       Trial Court Cause No.
                                       54D01-2304-RF-1224

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1489 | February 9, 2024   Page 1 of 14
                                    Opinion by Senior Judge Shepard
                                     Judges Brown and Pyle concur.

      Shepard, Senior Judge.

      Statement of the Case
[1]   In 2005, Indiana adopted a “Red Flag Law” authorizing the seizure of firearms

      from demonstrably dangerous individuals. It did so in response to the death of

      Indianapolis Officer Jack Laird the year before.

[2]   This case tests the level of evidence necessary to support such a seizure. The

      Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department (“MCSD”) seized firearms and

      ammunition from James Morgan while investigating a domestic dispute.

      Morgan appeals the trial court’s judgment ordering MCSD to retain the seized

      firearms and ammunition. Concluding the trial court did not err, we affirm.

      Issues
[3]   Morgan raises two issues, which we restate as:

              I.       Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence.

              II.      Whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the trial
                       court’s judgment.

      Facts and Procedural History
[4]   On April 19, 2023, Morgan was at home with his children, whom the record

      does not identify; his fiancée Brooke Geller; Brooke’s daughter Kayleigh Geller;

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1489 | February 9, 2024         Page 2 of 14
      and Elly Benjamin, who was in a relationship with Brooke’s son Michael
                 1
      Geller. Morgan and Benjamin argued about who was responsible for a dog

      kept at the house. Brooke was “upset” and expressed disapproval of Morgan’s

      argumentative behavior. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 68.

[5]   Benjamin went outside and met Kayleigh, who had gone for a walk. Benjamin

      and Kayleigh drove away from the house but returned a short time later with

      Michael, who went inside while Kayleigh and Benjamin stayed outside. Next,

      Morgan walked outside, wielding a handgun. He had a second handgun “in his

      pocket,” id. at 51, and was carrying a shotgun on his back. Morgan approached

      the car, waving the handgun “back and forth” as he cursed, yelled, and ordered

      Kayleigh and Benjamin to leave. Id. at 35. Brooke rushed outside barefoot and

      told Benjamin, “just go, right now just go.” Id. at 70. Kayleigh became

      frightened and called 911 as they drove away. She texted her mother to inform

      her she had called 911.

[6]   Deputy Shelby Curtis of the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office was

      dispatched to investigate a domestic disturbance at the home. He wore a body

      camera. Several other officers were present when Deputy Curtis arrived. Some

      of them had drawn their weapons, including rifles, because Morgan was still

      holding a handgun as he stood outside the house. Morgan was arguing with

      1
          We refer to Brooke, Kayleigh, and Michael by their first names to avoid confusion.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1489 | February 9, 2024                     Page 3 of 14
      Brooke, who yelled at him to drop the handgun. The deputy told Brooke to

      walk away.

[7]   Morgan temporarily went out of Deputy Curtis’s sight, and he did not have the

      handgun when he returned. The deputy ordered Morgan to walk backwards

      toward him and get on his knees, and Morgan complied. Deputy Curtis

      handcuffed Morgan and questioned him. As they talked, the deputy noted

      Morgan was “[u]nstable” and “not cooperative” with questioning. Id. at 14.

      Morgan cursed at the officers and told them they “didn’t need to be there.” Id.

      He angrily refused to tell Deputy Curtis where he had put the handgun, telling

      the deputy it was none of his business. When Deputy Curtis asked Morgan

      about a report of an argument, Morgan said he would “plead the Fifth.” Tr.

      Vol. III, State’s Ex. 2 at 6:54. He also repeatedly said his children were in the

      house and expressed anger when officers entered it to perform a search. At one

      point, Morgan walked away from Deputy Curtis, defying his orders, and only

      stopped moving after the deputy physically directed him to sit down. The

      deputy told Morgan he did not want anyone to get hurt, including Morgan, and

      Morgan responded “I don’t give a f**k. Hurt me.” Id. at 8:27.

[8]   Next, Deputy Curtis interviewed other residents of the home. Brooke, who was

      crying and upset, said Morgan was “mentally unstable” and had been

      hospitalized in the past. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 17. She also told the deputy Morgan had

      refused to take his prescribed medications. Brooke next said she was scared of

      Morgan “at times” because she was “not sure what he’s capable of.” Id. at 18.

      And Brooke informed Deputy Curtis that Morgan had threatened to shoot if

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1489 | February 9, 2024      Page 4 of 14
       officers arrived because “he wasn’t going to jail.” Id. Finally, Brooke said

       Morgan “needed help.” Id. at 62.

[9]    At the end of the investigation, the officers seized the following: two handguns,

       four shotguns, one muzzleloader rifle, two .22 caliber rifles, and two .223 AR

       rifles, along with ammunition. On April 20, 2023, Deputy Curtis filed an

       affidavit of probable cause listing the firearms and ammunition the officers had

       seized. He explained the officers seized the items “for the safety of the family

       and others . . . using the ‘red flag law.’” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 9.

[10]   The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the MCSD’s seizure of the

       firearms. During the hearing, the State, without objection from Morgan, played

       a five-minute-long portion of Deputy Curtis’s body camera recording, which

       showed the deputy’s interaction with Morgan. In addition, Brooke testified

       Morgan was having “a manic episode” following a “bad night,” during which

       he experienced night terrors. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 59. Next, she said she manages

       Morgan’s medications, including for “schizophrenic tendencies.” Id. Brooke

       further acknowledged Morgan had a prior conviction of domestic battery
                                                                                                                   2
       against her. She claimed all of the firearms and ammunition belonged to her,

       and she said they could be released to her father-in-law.

       2
        She further stated some of the firearms had been “[g]ifts” for Morgan, but they were “all registered in [her]
       name.” Id. at 64. In any event, she allowed Morgan “full access” to the firearms. Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1489 | February 9, 2024                               Page 5 of 14
[11]   At the end of the hearing, the trial court stated, “there’s clear and convincing

       evidence that . . . Mr. Morgan is an individual who is likely to pose – who will

       present a risk of personal injury to himself or to another individual in the future,

       and that specifically on April 19 he did present a risk of harm to himself or

       another individual.” Id. at 85. The court declined to release the firearms to a

       third party, noting Brooke’s father-in-law had not appeared in court to confirm

       he would take custody of them. Later, the court issued an order stating:

               The court FINDS that JAMES T. MORGAN . . . is a
               ‘dangerous’ person within the meaning of I.C. 35-47-14-1 in that
               he presents an imminent risk of personal injury to himself or
               another individual, and it is probable he may present such a risk
               to himself or another individual in the future and is the subject of
               documented evidence that would give rise to the belief that he
               has a propensity for violence or emotionally unstable conduct.

               The court FINDS that [the firearms and ammunition] were
               properly seized April 19, 2023 from James T. Morgan by the
               Montgomery County Sheriff’s Department pursuant to I.C. 35-
               47-14-1 et. seq. and shall be retained by that department pursuant
               to statute until further order of this court.

               The court ORDERS that James T. Morgan’s ability to register a
               firearm in the State of Indiana is suspended until further order of
               the court.

       Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 13. This appeal followed.

       Discussion and Decision
       I. Admission of Evidence
[12]   Morgan argues the trial court erred in allowing Deputy Curtis to testify about

       statements Brooke made to him, claiming the statements were inadmissible

       hearsay. “Whether to admit or exclude evidence is a determination entrusted
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1489 | February 9, 2024       Page 6 of 14
       to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Mundy v. Angelicchio, 623 N.E.2d

       456, 460 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). “We will reverse the trial court’s decision to

       admit evidence for an abuse of discretion only when it is clearly erroneous and

       against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or the reasonable

       inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Id.

[13]   Hearsay is “a statement that . . . is not made by the declarant while testifying at

       the trial or hearing; and . . . is offered in evidence to prove the truth of the

       matter asserted.” Ind. Evid. Rule 801(c). Hearsay is generally inadmissible,

       subject to exceptions set forth in the Indiana Rules of Evidence or in other law.

       Ind. Evid. Rule 802.

[14]   “A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant

       was under the stress of excitement” caused by the event or condition, is “not

       excluded by the rule against hearsay . . . .” Ind. Evid. Rule 803(2). Such a

       statement is known as an “excited utterance.” See id. “For a hearsay statement

       to be admitted as an excited utterance, three elements must be shown: (1) a

       startling event, (2) a statement made by a declarant while under the stress of

       excitement caused by the event, and (3) that the statement relates to the event.”

       Davenport v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1144, 1148 (Ind. 2001). “Determining whether a

       statement constitutes an excited utterance is essentially a factual determination

       subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review, sometimes described as []

       functionally equivalent [to] abuse of discretion.” Id.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1489 | February 9, 2024         Page 7 of 14
[15]   Morgan argues the State failed to show Brooke was still under stress when she

       spoke with Deputy Curtis. In particular, he claims the deputy did not speak

       with Brooke until he had been at the home for fifteen minutes, implying any

       stress had dissipated by then. Morgan’s claim lacks evidentiary support because

       he cites a portion of the deputy’s body camera recording that was not played for

       the trial court during the evidentiary hearing. We will not reverse the court’s

       ruling via evidence not presented to the court. See Brendenwood Common v.

       Kahlenbeck, 421 N.E.2d 421, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (refusing to consider

       affidavit presented for the first time on appeal), on reh’g, trans. denied.

[16]   In any event, Deputy Curtis’s interaction with Brooke occurred shortly after

       Brooke had witnessed her fiancé angrily wielding a firearm while yelling at her

       daughter and her son’s girlfriend, followed swiftly by her fiancé having an

       armed confrontation with several officers, during which Brooke had told her

       fiancé to put down the handgun. Brooke appeared to be upset and cried as she

       spoke with the deputy. This evidence supports a conclusion Brooke was still

       under the stress of the event when she spoke with Deputy Curtis. See Holmes v.

       State, 480 N.E.2d 916, 918 (Ind. 1985) (no error in admission of officer’s

       description of witness’s statement; witness had seen a shooting several minutes

       prior and was still emotionally distraught).

[17]   Next, Morgan claims Brooke’s statements to the deputy did not relate to

       Morgan’s armed confrontations with her daughter and the police. We disagree.

       Brooke told the officers about Morgan’s mental health history, his refusal to

       take his medication, and his need for help. Brooke also said she was scared of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1489 | February 9, 2024          Page 8 of 14
       Morgan. These statements related to Morgan’s recent frightening behavior

       while armed. See Stinson v. State, 126 N.E.3d 915, 921 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (no

       error in admitting witness’s descriptions of another person’s statements; the

       person had witnessed a stabbing, and the statements about who committed the

       stabbing related to the event). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

       admitting Deputy Curtis’s testimony about Brooke’s statements to him.

       II. Retention of Firearms and Ammunition
[18]   Morgan claims the trial court’s order directing the MCSD to retain the firearms

       and ammunition lacks sufficient evidentiary support. When “a law

       enforcement officer seizes a firearm from an individual whom the law

       enforcement officer believes to be dangerous” without first obtaining a warrant,

       the officer must submit an affidavit to a circuit or superior court describing why

       the officer believes the individual is dangerous. Ind. Code § 35-47-14-3(a)

       (2020). If the court finds probable cause exists to believe the individual is

       dangerous, the court shall order the law enforcement agency to retain the

       firearm. I.C. § 35-47-14-3(d). The court shall next conduct an evidentiary

       hearing. Ind. Code § 35-47-14-5(a) (2019). At the hearing, the State must prove

       “by clear and convincing evidence” material facts demonstrating the individual

       is dangerous. Ind. Code § 35-47-14-6(b) (2020).

[19]   “The clear and convincing evidence standard is an intermediate standard of

       proof greater than a preponderance of the evidence and less than proof beyond

       a reasonable doubt.” K.H. v. M.M., 151 N.E.3d 1259, 1267 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2020), trans. denied. “In order to be clear and convincing, the existence of a fact
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1489 | February 9, 2024      Page 9 of 14
       must be highly probable.” Commitment of B.J. v. Eskenazi Hosp./Midtown CMHC,

       67 N.E.3d 1034, 1038 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). As the Indiana Supreme Court has

       stated:

               [I]n reviewing a judgment requiring proof by clear and
               convincing evidence, an appellate court may not impose its own
               view as to whether the evidence is clear and convincing but must
               determine, by considering only the probative evidence and
               reasonable inferences supporting the judgment and without
               weighing evidence or assessing witness credibility, whether a
               reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the judgment was
               established by clear and convincing evidence.

       In re Guardianship of B.H., 770 N.E.2d 283, 288 (Ind. 2002).

[20]   In the context of proceedings for the seizure and retention of firearms, the

       General Assembly has defined “dangerous” as follows:

               (a) . . . an individual is ‘dangerous’ if:

               (1) the individual presents an imminent risk of personal injury to
               the individual or to another individual; or

               (2) It is probable that the individual will present a risk of personal
               injury to the individual or to another individual in the future and
               the individual:

               (A) has a mental illness (as defined in IC 12-7-2-130) that may be
               controlled by medication, and has not demonstrated a pattern of
               voluntarily and consistently taking the individual’s medication
               while not under supervision; or

               (B) is the subject of documented evidence that would give rise to
               a reasonable belief that the individual has a propensity for violent
               or suicidal conduct.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1489 | February 9, 2024        Page 10 of 14
               (b) The fact that an individual has been released from a mental
               health facility or has a mental illness that is currently controlled
               by medication does not establish that the individual is dangerous
               for the purposes of this chapter.

       Ind. Code § 35-47-14-1 (2019).

[21]   We focus our analysis on subsection (a)(2) of the statute. Based on a plain

       reading of the text, the State must prove an individual “will present a risk of

       personal injury to the individual or to another individual in the future” and then

       also prove circumstances supporting either subsection (a)(2)(A) or subsection

       (a)(2)(B). Id.; see also West v. Off. of Ind. Sec’y of State, 54 N.E.3d 349, 353 (Ind.

       2016) (courts “start with the plain language of the statute, giving its words their

       ordinary meaning and considering the structure of the statute as a whole”).

[22]   Here, after experiencing night terrors and refusing to take his prescribed

       medicine for only one day, Morgan escalated an argument over a dog to the

       point of waving a handgun while yelling and cursing at Benjamin and Kayleigh.

       He was also armed with another handgun and a shotgun. Brooke was so

       frightened she rushed outside barefoot and told Benjamin and Kayleigh to “just

       go, right now just go.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 70. And Kayleigh called 911 because she

       was also scared.

[23]   When the police arrived, Morgan at first refused to put down his handgun

       despite being confronted by multiple heavily armed officers, choosing instead to

       step out of view and return without it. He then refused to tell the officers where

       he had put it. Morgan was also argumentative and attempted to walk away

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1489 | February 9, 2024          Page 11 of 14
       from Deputy Curtis during questioning until the deputy physically directed him

       to sit down. Brooke later told Deputy Curtis she was scared of Morgan “at

       times” because she was “not sure what he’s capable of.” Id. at 18. And

       Morgan was “mentally unstable,” id. at 17, and “needed help,” id. at 62. She

       also said Morgan had threatened to shoot the officers.

[24]   Morgan argues he does not pose a probable future risk of harm to himself or

       others because Brooke, Benjamin, and Michael testified they trust him to not

       repeat his behavior. Morgan also notes Brooke said he is now taking his

       medication reliably. Finally, Morgan claims he allowed the officers to handcuff

       him and spoke with them in a “logical” manner, thus demonstrating some

       degree of reasonableness. Appellant’s Br. p. 15. These arguments amount to a

       request to reweigh the evidence, which our standard of review forbids. B.H.,

       770 N.E.2d at 288. The trial court could reasonably conclude the State

       established, by clear and convincing evidence, a probability Morgan will

       present a risk of personal injury to himself or to another individual in the future

       for purposes of Indiana Code section 35-47-14-1(a)(2).

[25]   We next consider whether there is clear and convincing evidence to show

       Morgan “is the subject of documented evidence that would give rise to a

       reasonable belief that the individual has a propensity for violent or suicidal

       conduct.” Ind. Code § 35-47-14-1(a)(2)(B). Morgan has a prior conviction of

       misdemeanor domestic violence against Brooke, the owner of the firearms and

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1489 | February 9, 2024     Page 12 of 14
                                        3
       ammunition in question. Further, when Deputy Curtis told Morgan he did not

       want to see him get hurt, Morgan, who appeared to be unstable, said he did not

       care and asked the deputy to hurt him. We also note Brooke testified that

       Morgan’s refusal to take his medication, which led to his angry armed

       confrontation, was related to his ongoing “night terrors,” which she described

       as provoking a “manic episode.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 59. Brooke did not say

       Morgan’s night terrors and manic episodes had stopped, merely that he was

       taking his medication. This evidence demonstrates a high probability Morgan
                                                                       4
       has a propensity for violent or suicidal conduct. See Redington v. State, 992

       N.E.2d 823, 845 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (affirming order for police to retain

       Redington’s firearms; Redington was taking anti-psychotic medication at the

       time of the hearing, but he still experienced symptoms that could lead to

       potentially dangerous behavior), trans. denied.

[26]   Morgan argues the trial court should have released the firearms to a third party.

       If a court orders a law enforcement agency to retain a person’s firearm, the

       person “may petition the court to order the law enforcement agency to . . .

       transfer the firearm to a responsible third party . . . .” Ind. Code § 35-47-14-

       10(a)(1) (2019). But the proposed third party must express willingness to “enter

       3
        We do not hold a prior conviction for domestic battery or a similar offense will always support a
       determination an individual has a propensity for violent conduct. But Morgan’s conviction is a pertinent
       piece of evidence here.
       4
        We need not determine whether the trial court’s order is supported by clear and convicting evidence under
       Indiana Code section § 35-47-14-1(a)(1).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1489 | February 9, 2024                           Page 13 of 14
       into a written court agreement” to accept the firearm. Ind. Code § 35-47-14-

       1.5(3) (2019). Here, Brooke stated her father-in-law could take possession of

       the firearms and ammunition, but he did not personally appear and state he

       would enter into a written agreement. Morgan’s third-party claim must fail

       because he did not comply with the plain language of Indiana Code section 35-

       47-14-1.5(3).

       Conclusion
[27]   For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[28]   Affirmed.

       Brown, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

       ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
       Aaron J. Spolarich
       Bennett Boehning & Clary LLP
       Lafayette, Indiana

       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
       Theodore E. Rokita
       Attorney General of Indiana

       Ian McLean
       Supervising Deputy Attorney General
       Indianapolis, Indiana

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CR-1489 | February 9, 2024   Page 14 of 14