Court Opinion

ID: 9404581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-23 15:08:41.06162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:15.322652
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Acker, 2023-Ohio-2085.]

                                           COURT OF APPEALS
                                         HOLMES COUNTY, OHIO
                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    STATE OF OHIO                                  :   JUDGES:
                                                   :
                                                   :   Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
           Plaintiff-Appellee                      :   Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
                                                   :   Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
    -vs-                                           :
                                                   :   Case No. 22CA008
                                                   :
    CORY ACKER                                     :
                                                   :
                                                   :
           Defendant-Appellant                     :   OPINION

  CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                             Appeal from the Holmes County
                                                       Municipal Court, Case No. 21CRB00177

  JUDGMENT:                                            AFFIRMED

  DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                              June 21, 2023

  APPEARANCES:

    For Plaintiff-Appellee:                            For Defendant-Appellant:

    ROBERT K. HENDRIX                                  PATRICK BROWN
    Assistant Prosecutor                               439 North Market St., Suite A
    Holmes County                                      Wooster, OH 44691
    164 E. Jackson St.
    Millersburg, OH 44654
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008                                                         2

Delaney, J.

       {¶1} Appellant Cory Acker appeals from the August 12, 2022 judgment entry of

conviction and sentence of the Holmes County Municipal Court, incorporating the trial

court’s July 8, 2022 Judgment Entry. Appellee is the state of Ohio.

                         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       {¶2} The following facts are adduced from the record of appellant’s bench trial

on July 8, 2022.

       {¶3} On September 29, 2021, Deputy (now Sgt.) Bernhart of the Holmes County

Sheriff’s Department was dispatched to a noise complaint on Township Road 506.

Bernhart testified that upon dispatch, he customarily checks the driving status of an

identified suspect before responding. In this case, appellant was the suspect identified in

the noise complaint, and upon checking his driving status, Bernhart discovered an active

warrant.

       {¶4} Defense trial counsel immediately objected to Bernhart’s testimony about

the existence of the warrant, arguing the statement was offered for the truth of the matter

asserted. The prosecutor responded that the statement was offered for its effect on the

listener, and the trial court overruled the objection.

       {¶5} Bernhart and another deputy responded to the address. Bernhart is familiar

with appellant and recognized him on sight. The door of the shop was open and appellant

was visible inside, listening to music and spraying undercoating on a semi. The deputies

approached appellant and Bernhart advised him of the noise complaint, which was

remedied.
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008                                                            3

       {¶6} Bernhart further advised appellant of the active warrant and appellant

disagreed that a warrant existed, stating his attorney told him the matter was resolved.

       {¶7} Appellee asked Bernhart how deputies confirm the existence of an active

warrant, and Bernhart replied that “during Covid,” the deputy would call dispatch or

corrections to check for active warrants, and were also required to contact a “corrections

sergeant.” Bernhart testified he took those steps in the instant case and defense trial

counsel objected. The trial court overruled the objection. Bernhart further testified he

confirmed the existence of an active warrant, and counsel again objected. The trial court

overruled the objection.

       {¶8} Bernhart testified his next step would have been to take appellant into

custody. Appellant showed him texts on his phone from his attorney, purporting to

establish there was no warrant. Bernhart testified appellant’s demeanor throughout the

encounter was cooperative and polite, although he became more agitated as the deputies

disagreed with him about the existence of the warrant. When he realized deputies

intended to execute the arrest warrant, appellant said he had an obligation out of state

the next day. Appellant walked around the corner of the semi, momentarily out of

Bernhart’s sight, and ran away.

       {¶9} Bernhart told the other deputy to pursue appellant as Bernhart went to his

vehicle. Bernhart yelled at appellant to stop, and warned he would release his K-9 if

appellant didn’t return. Appellant briefly stopped, turned, and looked at Bernhart, then

continued running around the corner of the house. Bernhart heard a loud vehicle exhaust

and saw a silver passenger car speed away.
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008                                                       4

       {¶10} Deputies were ordered to terminate the vehicle pursuit and lost sight of

appellant’s vehicle. Deputies put out a BOLO for appellant in Holmes and adjacent

counties. Appellant was not located that evening. Bernhart testified it would have taken

about 30 minutes to process appellant on the warrant, but because he fled, he spent the

rest of the shift looking for him.

       {¶11} Upon cross-examination, Bernhart acknowledged there was no noise

ordinance for appellant’s location and he would not have been cited for the noise

complaint. However, Bernhart pointed out that he customarily responds to noise

complaints and speaks to the parties involved to resolve disputes. Bernhart

acknowledged he did not have a paper copy of an arrest warrant for appellant and did not

show appellant an arrest warrant.

       {¶12} Appellee rested at the conclusion of Bernhart’s testimony without

presenting additional witnesses or introducing any exhibits. Defense trial counsel moved

for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A), arguing appellee failed to present

any evidence that a warrant existed; thus appellee failed to prove Bernhart was engaged

in an authorized act and appellant could not be guilty of obstructing official business.

Appellee responded that Bernhart testified to his customary procedure in checking for a

warrant and confirmed the presence of a warrant, therefore his testimony established he

was a public official performing an authorized act in his official capacity.

       {¶13} The trial court overruled the motion.

       {¶14} Appellant testified as the sole defense witness. He stated he was painting

a truck on the evening of September 29 when deputies entered his shop without
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008                                                         5

permission. Appellant was surprised to see the deputies and did not believe there was a

warrant for his arrest because his attorney assured him there was no warrant.

       {¶15} Appellant confirmed he spoke to the deputies and showed them text

messages on his phone. Bernhart returned to the cruiser and appellant fled. When asked

why he fled, appellant testified he needed to be in Texas that weekend for a truck show,

and he believed the deputies could have printed a copy of the warrant in their vehicles if

one existed. Therefore, in his estimation, the deputies had no lawful reason to arrest him

and he was entitled to flee.

       {¶16} Upon cross-examination, appellant acknowledged he was convicted in a

separate case in the same court and sentenced to a jail term. He testified he called the

jail twice on the day he was ordered to report but someone told him he “was not on the

schedule.” T. 19. He “didn’t hear anything back from the courts” and therefore believed

no warrant was issued, although he never served any of the jail sentence. Appellant

reiterated the deputies had no reason to arrest him so he ran and drove off. He did not

go to Texas that weekend but called his attorney the next day.

       {¶17} Defense trial counsel renewed the motion for acquittal at the close of all of

the evidence. The trial court asked counsel if appellant’s purpose was to obstruct or delay

the exercise of what he believed to be an improper act, and defense trial counsel agreed

this was a fair characterization of the evidence. Appellant’s purpose was to get away

from the deputies because he didn’t believe their actions were authorized. T. 24.

       {¶18} The trial court overruled the motion for acquittal and found appellant guilty

as charged, finding that the “evidence is clear Mr. Acker’s purpose is to clearly delay or

obstruct the officer’s performance of [his] duties,” and even if the officer was mistaken
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008                                                        6

about the validity of the warrant, the process of confirming and executing a warrant were

part of the deputies’ official duties.

                Misdemeanor charge, bench trial, conviction, and sentence

       {¶19} Appellant was charged by criminal complaint with one count of obstructing

official business pursuant to R.C. 2921.31(A), a misdemeanor of the second degree.

Appellant entered a plea of not guilty and the matter proceeded to bench trial on July 8,

2022. The trial court found appellant guilty as charged and issued a written Judgment

Entry containing findings of fact. On August 12, 2022, the trial court sentenced appellant

to a jail term of 30 days with 20 days suspended and a fine of $250.

       {¶20} Appellant now appeals from the judgment entries of his conviction and

sentence.

       {¶21} Appellant raises three assignments of error:

                                 ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

       {¶22} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING HEARSAY TESTIMONY

ABOUT A WARRANT INTO EVIDENCE.”

       {¶23} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING MR. ACKER’S CRIMINAL

RULE 29 MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL, AS THERE WAS

INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION.”

       {¶24} “III. MR. ACKER’S CONVICTION IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT

OF THE EVIDENCE.”
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008                                                              7

                                         ANALYSIS

                                               I.

        {¶25} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred in

admitting hearsay evidence of the existence of the warrant. We disagree.

        {¶26} “[A] trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining the admissibility

of evidence in any particular case, so long as such discretion is exercised in line with the

rules of procedure and evidence.” Huth v. Kus, 5th Dist. No. 2017 AP 06 0015, 2018-

Ohio-1931, 113 N.E.3d 140, ¶ 30, quoting Rigby v. Lake Cty., 58 Ohio St.3d 269, 271,

569 N.E.2d 1056 (1991). An abuse of discretion is more than a mere error in judgment;

it is a “perversity of will, passion, prejudice, partiality, or moral delinquency.” Pons v. Ohio

State Med. Bd. 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621, 614 N.E.2d 748 (1993). When applying an abuse

of discretion standard, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the

trial court. Id.

        {¶27} “Hearsay” is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while

testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter

asserted. Evid.R. 801(C). Hearsay is generally not admissible unless it falls within one of

the recognized exceptions. Evid.R. 802; State v. Steffen, 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 119, 509

N.E.2d 383 (1987); MCM Home Builders, LLC v. Sheehan, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 18

CAE 09 0074, 2019-Ohio-3899, ¶ 37. To constitute hearsay, two elements are needed:

first, an out-of-court statement; and second, the statement must be offered to prove the

truth of the matter asserted. State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 262, 473 N.E.2d 768

(1984). If either element is not present, the statement is not “hearsay.” Id.
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008                                                         8

       {¶28} Appellant argues the trial court should not have admitted “the dispatcher’s

statement that a warrant existed” because such evidence is inadmissible hearsay. Brief,

5. We are unable to find any such “statement” made by any out-of-court witness. Our

examination of the record reveals the following testimony regarding Bernhart’s inquiry into

the warrant:

                      * * * *.

                      [Bernhart]: So typically when a call for service comes in

               typically before we start to respond we’ll take a second look at our

               notes on our MDT or Mobile Data Terminal to see what the calls

               about. A lot of times we’ll check the complainant if we know who a

               possible suspect would be, a lot of times we’ll check them as well.

               What I mean by check them a lot of times; we’ll run their driver’s

               license checking for active warrants something like that.

                      [Prosecutor]: Okay so is it common for you to know what type

               of call you’re going to?

                      [Bernhart]: Yes.

                      [Prosecutor]: What, where that call was located?

                      [Bernhart]: Yes.

                      [Prosecutor]: And the parties involved?

                      [Bernhart]: Yes correct.

                      [Prosecutor]: And specifically with the parties involved do you

               often times in advance know whether or not they have a warrant?

                      [Bernhart]: Yes that is correct.
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008                                                         9

                   [Prosecutor]: So in this specific situation how did you start that

           call?

                   [Bernhart]:So prior to responding I had looked at the, the call

           notes and the complainant or the complaint for the call for service

           was that [appellant] was playing loud music at 9:30 at night. I

           checked [appellant’s] driving status, which comes up when I

           checked him it came up that he had an active warrant.

                   [Prosecutor]: And is [appellant] an individual (unintelligible).

                   [Defense trial counsel]: I would object I, that’s offered for the

           truth of the matter asserted Your Honor that he actually had a warrant

           anything dispatch told him or anything a computer (unintelligible). I

           understand he’s just testifying about the call for service, but I

           just object at that facts offered to the fact that he actually had a

           warrant (sic).

                   THE COURT: Response, [prosecutor].

                   [Prosecutor]: Your Honor I think it’s offered for the effect on

           the listener that how the officer was trying to carry out his public

           duties at the time (sic). It was his impression that he had a warrant

           at the time and he was going to well, the testimony that is going to

           be provided is going to show that he acted on that information.

                   [Defense trial counsel]: I don’t have a problem with that I

           would just object that that’s offered for the truth of the fact that he

           had a warrant. That’s my only objection. Thank you.
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008                                                         10

                  THE COURT: Well I think it falls under the public records

           exception on hearsay, but if it’s only being offered for the effect it had

           on the officer then objection will be overruled.

                  * * * *.

                  T. 5-6. (Emphasis added).

     {¶29} And the following testimony describes Bernhart’s encounter with appellant:

                  * * * *.

                  [Prosecutor]: Now so, when you get there your issue is two-

           fold essentially. You have a complaint and now you, you have this

           information that makes you believe there’s a warrant?

                  [Bernhart]: Correct yes.

                  [Prosecutor]: In your process what do you do next with

           regards to the warrant?

                  [Bernhart]: Sure so in, in, in that respect typically we will

           confirm the warrant. What I mean by that a lot of times it’s a simple

           phone call either to dispatch or to corrections. Typically the

           confirmation goes through dispatch. At the time due to Covid 19

           restrictions in corrections we also had to seek approval through the

           corrections sergeant at the time.

                  [Prosecutor]: Okay and did you go through that process

           in this case?

                  [Bernhart]: Yes I did.
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008                                                    11

                  [Defense trial counsel]: Objection to anything dispatch or

           anyone at the sheriff’s office told the sergeant.

                  [Prosecutor]:   I don’t think at this point he’s testified to

           anything about (unintelligible).

                  THE COURT: I haven’t heard any answer about that yet have

           I?

                  [Defense trial counsel]: I thought he testified.

                  [Prosecutor]: I don’t believe so.

                  [Defense trial counsel]: Okay I’m sorry I thought he testified

           that he had gone through that process in this case and that they told

           him there was a warrant. That’s what I heard, but if that’s not what

           he said then.

                  THE COURT: Okay. * * * *. Objection overruled at this point.

                  [Prosecutor]:   Had, were you able to go through that

           process and confirm the Defendant’s warrant?

                  [Bernhart]: Yes.

                  [Defense trial counsel]: Objection hearsay.

                  THE COURT: I’m going to overrule at this point I believe this

           falls under an exception to the hearsay rule.

                 [Bernhart]: Yes I was.

                  [Prosecutor]: So after you confirmed the warrant, what is your

           next step?
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008                                                         12

                     [Bernhart]: So then he, the next step after the warrant was

              confirmed would be to take [appellant] into custody.

                     [Prosecutor]: Okay and again, is this part of your routine job

              as at the time a deputy of the sheriff’s office?

                     [Bernhart]: Yes it is.

                     [Prosecutor]: Okay and when, when you’re done confirming

              the warrant do you go back and speak with [appellant]?

                     [Bernhart]: Yes I did.

                     * * * *.

                     T. 7-8. (Emphasis added).

       {¶30} Upon our review of Bernhart’s testimony, we do not find that he testified to

a statement by an out-of-court witness; instead, he testified about his own investigation

of the warrant. A “statement” is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct

intended to be an assertion. Evid.R. 801(A). For hearsay purposes, an “assertion” is “a

statement about an event that happened or a condition that existed.” State v. Wellman,

10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-386, 2006-Ohio-3808, ¶ 14, citing State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio

St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 61; State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545,

549, 1995-Ohio-104, 651 N.E.2d 965, quoting 2 McCormick, Evidence, Section 246, at

98 (4th Ed.1992), (“An ‘assertion’ for hearsay purposes ‘simply means to say that

something is so, e.g., that an event happened or that a condition existed.’ ”). There is no

“statement” for hearsay purposes where a witness does not testify about “what someone

else said, wrote, or did.” State v. Maiolo, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2015-CA-15, 2015-Ohio-4788,

¶ 14, citing Evid.R. 801(A).
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008                                                         13

       {¶31} Instead, Bernhart’s testimony related to his investigation of the noise

complaint, his discovery of the warrant, and the ensuing conversation with appellant.

Even if we strained to identify a “statement” made to Bernhart regarding the warrant, a

statement is not hearsay when offered for a purpose other than to prove the truth of the

matter asserted. State v. Moore, 5th Dist. Coshocton No. 14CA0028, 2016-Ohio-828, ¶

74, citing State v. Davis, 62 Ohio St.3d 326, 343, 581 N.E.2d 1362 (1991). Testimony

about finding the warrant and investigating appellant’s claims was necessary to explain

why the deputies took certain actions. State v. Anthony, 5th Dist. Stark No.

2020CA00126, 2021-Ohio-1755, ¶ 35, appeal not allowed, 166 Ohio St.3d 1428, 2022-

Ohio-743, 184 N.E.3d 98; see also, State v. Stephens, 5th Dist. Licking No. 21CA0068,

2022-Ohio-2944, ¶ 43 [extrajudicial statements by out-of-court declarant properly

admissible to explain actions of witness to whom statement directed]. As demonstrated

in the portions of the record cited supra, appellee did not offer Bernhart’s testimony to

establish the existence or validity of the warrant.

       {¶32} Finally, because this case was tried to the court, we presume, unless

affirmatively shown otherwise, that the court considered the testimony for proper

purposes. Even if the admission of the testimony was improper, since the case was tried

before a judge, it must affirmatively appear on the record that the judge relied on the

alleged improper testimony. State v. Hurst, 5th Dist. Richland No. 2019 CA 0091, 2020-

Ohio-4899, ¶ 28. We note that the trial court’s Judgment Entry of July 8, 2022, in which

appellant is found guilty, does not reference whether a warrant existed or not. See, State

v. Clifford, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 19 CAA 12 0068, 2020-Ohio-5095, ¶ 24, cause

dismissed, 163 Ohio St.3d 1426, 2021-Ohio-1733, 168 N.E.3d 512.
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008                                                           14

       {¶33} Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.

                                               II., III.

       {¶34} Appellant’s second and third assignments of error are related and will be

considered together. He argues his conviction upon one count of obstructing official

business is not supported by sufficient evidence and is against the manifest weight of the

evidence. We disagree.

       {¶35} The legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence and weight of the evidence

are both quantitatively and qualitatively different. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,

1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541, paragraph two of the syllabus. The standard of review

for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is set forth in State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio

St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991) at paragraph two of the syllabus, in which the Ohio

Supreme Court held, “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to

determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after

viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”

       {¶36} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the

evidence, the court of appeals functions as the “thirteenth juror,” and after “reviewing the

entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility

of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must

be overturned and a new trial ordered.” State v. Thompkins, supra, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387.
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008                                                             15

Reversing a conviction as being against the manifest weight of the evidence and ordering

a new trial should be reserved for only the “exceptional case in which the evidence weighs

heavily against the conviction.” Id.

       {¶37} Appellant was found guilty upon one count of obstructing official business

pursuant to R.C. 2921.31(A), which states: “No person, without privilege to do so and with

purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any

authorized act within the public official's official capacity, shall do any act that hampers or

impedes a public official in the performance of the public official's lawful duties.” Appellant

argues that absent evidence of the existence of the warrant, he cannot be convicted of

obstructing official business because he did not impede the deputies’ “lawful duties.”

       {¶38} The offense of obstruction of official business has the following elements:

“(1) an act by the defendant; (2) done with the purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay a

public official; (3) that actually hampers or impedes a public official; (4) while the official

is acting in the performance of a lawful duty; and (5) the defendant does so act without a

privilege to do so.” State v. Henry, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-846, 2018-Ohio-1128, 110 N.E.3d

103, ¶ 55, citing State v. Dice, 3d Dist. No. 9-04-41, 2005-Ohio-2505, 2005 WL 1205336,

¶ 19; R.C. 2921.31(A). Thus, under Ohio law, “[a] conviction under R.C. 2921.31(A)

requires proof of an affirmative act that hampered or impeded the performance of the

lawful duties of a public official.” Id., citing State v. Overholt, 9th Dist. No. 2905–M, 1999

WL 635717 (Aug. 18, 1999). In the instant case, appellant argues the deputies were not

acting in the performance of a lawful duty.

       {¶39} “The proper focus in a prosecution for obstructing official business is on the

defendant's conduct, verbal or physical, and its effect on the public official's ability to
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008                                                           16

perform the official's lawful duties.” Id., citing State v. Wellman, 173 Ohio App.3d 494,

2007-Ohio-2953, 879 N.E.2d 215, ¶ 12 (1st Dist.). Appellant’s argument shifts the focus

of the issue from his conduct, fleeing, to that of the deputies, investigating whether a

warrant existed for appellant’s arrest.

       {¶40} The parties agree the issue posed by this case is whether the deputies were

acting in the performance of a lawful duty. Appellant’s Brief, 5; Appellee’s Brief, 4. On

the record, appellant agreed with the trial court’s characterization of the encounter

between appellant and the deputies: appellant drove away to stop the exercise of what

he believed to be an improper act. T. 24-25. In closing, appellant reiterated he was

justified in fleeing because he did not believe the actions of the deputies were authorized.

       {¶41} We find there is no question the deputies were acting in performance of a

lawful duty in their encounter with appellant, including investigating the warrant, and

appellant’s act of fleeing the scene hampered them in performing that duty.

       {¶42} In State v. Dice, 3rd Dist. Marion No. 9-04-41, 2005-Ohio-2505, the Third

District Court of Appeals examined a case in which police attempted to stop and talk to

the appellant about allegations by his ex-wife as the appellant walked home from a store.

The appellant ran from police and was eventually charged with obstructing official

business. Id., ¶ 9-10. The appellant argued he didn’t act purposefully because he had

no knowledge police intended to arrest him, and he therefore did not “hamper or impede

the officers in the performance of their duties.” Id., ¶ 18.

       {¶43} The Third District found that the question whether appellant would or could

be arrested when police wanted to speak to him was irrelevant; appellant fled and

therefore impeded official police business:
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008                                                        17

                  It is unclear from the record in this case whether the officers

           were attempting to arrest Dice before he ran from them. Officer Cox

           testified that at the time Simona identified Dice to the police they had

           probable cause to arrest. However, none of the officers indicated to

           Dice that he was under arrest, and no officer testified that they were

           attempting to place Dice under arrest at that point in time. In fact, the

           prosecution submitted no evidence that the officers were placing

           Dice under arrest at this time.

                  However, it is clear that the officers were in the midst of

           conducting official police business. Dice testified that he saw

           numerous police cruisers with their lights on at Mom's Used Car Lot.

           He testified that he saw that Mason was in custody, that he saw

           Simona point him out to the police officers, and that the officers were

           coming towards him and ordering him to stop. It is irrelevant whether

           or not Dice was being placed under arrest—it was clear from the

           facts of the case that the officers wanted Dice in connection with their

           arrest of Mason, which is, of course, official police business.

                  Thus, it is clear from the facts of the case that Dice acted with

           the specific intent to prevent, obstruct, or delay the officers from what

           was obviously an ongoing investigation, part of their official duties.

           This fulfills the statutory element of purposefulness. Therefore,

           viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008                                                                 18

               sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude that Dice acted with

               the requisite mental state.

                      Moreover, it is evident that by running from the police, Dice

               did hinder the officers' performance of their lawful duty and that Dice

               was not privileged to do so. * * * *.

                      State v. Dice, 3rd Dist. Marion No. 9-04-41, 2005-Ohio-2505,

               ¶ 20-23.

       {¶44} Talking to suspects and serving warrants is a routine lawful duty of police;

part of that duty is determining whether a valid warrant exists. In In re E.C., 5th Dist.

Muskingum No. CT2012-0048, 2013-Ohio-2584, ¶ 2, police awakened the appellant from

sleep, told him he was under arrest, and he immediately fled. We found sufficient

evidence to find the appellant guilty of obstructing official business because “[w]hen

Appellant ran, he prevented the officers from arresting him, effectively ‘hamper[ing] or

imped[ing] a public official in the performance of the public official's [duty.]’” Id., citing R.C.

2921.31(A).

       {¶45} In State v. Willey, 5th Dist. No. 2014CA00222, 2015-Ohio-4572, 46 N.E.3d

1121, ¶ 4, we reviewed a case in which police were dispatched to investigate an alleged

fight at a party and encountered the appellant on a front porch; as police attempted to

investigate, the appellant refused to answer questions and yelled at other witnesses on

the scene, instructing them not to answer questions. Id. We found that the “official

business” impeded by the appellant was the officers’ investigation:

                      The officers' “official business” was to investigate the

               allegations * * * . When appellant refused to provide information and
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008                                                              19

                 prevented [another witness] from providing any, the focus shifted to

                 appellant. Her obstreperous behavior constituted an “act” within the

                 meaning of the statute. “[Her] persistence in disregarding [the

                 officers'] orders was sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of

                 fact could conclude that [she] acted with the specific intent to prevent,

                 obstruct, or delay [the officers] in [their] lawful duties.” State v.

                 Shepherd, 5th Dist. Richland No. 14CA63, 2015-Ohio-4330, 2015

                 WL 5917918, at ¶ 30; see also, State v. Friedman, 5th Dist. Stark

                 No. 2013CA00150, 2013-Ohio-4669, 2013 WL 5753770, ¶ 24; State

                 v. Brooks, 5th Dist. Knox No. 06CA000024, 2007-Ohio-4025, 2007

                 WL 2269414, ¶ 13.

                        State v. Willey, 5th Dist. No. 2014CA00222, 2015-Ohio-4572,

                 46 N.E.3d 1121, ¶ 22

       {¶46} In the instant case, therefore, the “lawful duty” of the deputies was the

investigation; whether a warrant existed, and appellant’s “belief” regarding its existence,

are irrelevant. In fleeing, appellant hampered or impeded the deputies in their

investigation.

       {¶47} It is well-established that running from deputies “[does] hinder the officers'

performance of their lawful duty * * *.” State v. Friedman, 5th Dist. Stark No.

2013CA00150, 2013-Ohio-4669, ¶ 22, citing Dice, supra, 3rd Dist. Marion No. 9–04–41,

2005–Ohio–2505, ¶ 23; State v. Davis, 140 Ohio App.3d 751, 753, 749 N.E.2d 322 (1st

Dist.2000) [appellant realized officers sought to detain him and he continued to walk

away]; State v. Harris, 10th Dist. No. 05AP–27, 2005–Ohio–4553, at ¶ 16 (‘[W]e hold that
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008                                                          20

fleeing from a police officer who is lawfully attempting to detain the suspect under the

authority of Terry, is an affirmative act that hinders or impedes the officer in the

performance of the officer's duties as a public official and is a violation of R.C. 2921.31,

obstructing official business.’).

       {¶48} We find appellant’s conviction is not against the sufficiency or the manifest

weight of the evidence. To the contrary, the judge appears to have fairly and impartially

decided the matters before him. The judge as a trier of fact can reach different conclusions

concerning the credibility of the testimony of appellee’s witnesses and appellant’s

arguments. This court will not disturb the trier of fact's finding so long as competent

evidence was present to support it. State v. Walker, 55 Ohio St.2d 208, 378 N.E.2d 1049

(1978). The judge heard the witnesses, evaluated the evidence, and was convinced of

appellant's guilt.

       {¶49} Finally, upon careful consideration of the record in its entirety, we find that

there is substantial evidence presented which if believed, proves all the elements of the

crime of obstructing official business for which appellant was convicted.
Holmes County, Case No. 22CA008                                                    21

                                   CONCLUSION

       {¶50} Appellant’s three assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of

the Holmes County Municipal Court is affirmed.

By: Delaney, J.,

Hoffman, P.J. and

Baldwin, J., concur.