Court Opinion

ID: 9742902
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:22:18.996803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:37.547128
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE JONES, dissenting: In my opinion the trial court committed prejudicial error requiring reversal when, over strenuous objection by defendant, the trial court gave Plaintiff’s Instruction 14 regarding nonassumption of the risk by plaintiff. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. The issue of assumption of risk was not invoked in the trial by either the pleadings or the evidence. Where the evidence of defendant’s negligence is narrow and poses a close question of fact, as I believe is the case here, the instruction could well have the effect of swaying the jury’s conclusion regarding defendant’s liability. The majority state that the giving of the instruction was justified by defendant’s cross-examination of plaintiff which brought out plaintiff’s years as a brakeman, his familiarity with the dropping off maneuver and his knowledge of the condition of the yard. This evidence was properly adduced in regard to defendant’s negligence as well as other facts of the case and cannot be ascribed solely to a “made up” issue of assumption of the risk, as the majority has done. The majority cite as authority for the giving of the instruction the case of Vandaveer v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., and admittedly that case does stand for the proposition assigned to it. However, the great weight of authority of the Federal courts holds to the contrary and it is their precedent that is controlling. (See Casko v. Elgin, Joliet, & Eastern Ry. Co., 361 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1966); Heater v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 497 F.2d 1243 (7th Cir. 1974), and cases cited; and Dilley v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 327 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1964).) The majority correctly states elsewhere in its opinion that Federal decisional law controls in determining whether the case warrants submission to a jury, citing the Vandaveer case. However, it is also true that Federal decisional law controls the propriety of instructions in FELA cases. (Dugas v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Lines, 473 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1973).) This rule, and the Federal authorities cited above, the majority has chosen to ignore in passing over what I feel is error requiring reversal of this case for a new trial.