Court Opinion

ID: 9727813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:50:42.121794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:43.233494
License: Public Domain

LARSEN, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached in this case, but write separately to express my reasoning.
The opinion announcing the judgment of the Court makes a considerable effort to reconcile this Court’s opinions in Commonwealth v. Slaughter, 482 Pa. 538, 394 A.2d 453 *406(1978) and Commonwealth v. Ballard, 501 Pa. 230, 460 A.2d 1091 (1983). I think that this effort is unnecessary.
In Slaughter, this Court simply stated that testimony by a police officer concerning out-of-court identifications by two witnesses to a crime was hearsay. Since the admission of that testimony was harmless, however, there was no need for this Court to actually decide whether such testimony might be admissible under circumstances other than the ones presented in that case — for example, in a case where the admission of the testimony would not have been harmless. Slaughter is, therefore, of no precedential value in deciding this case, in which the admission of the testimony concerning Michael Alexander’s out-of-court identification was not harmless.
Nor do I think that Ballard applies to this case. The opinion in Ballard did not contain any factual details, but simply stated that “[testimony by a police officer concerning acts of pretrial identification by a witness is admissible, where the identifying witness is present in court and subject to cross-examination.” 501 Pa. at 233, 460 A.2d at 1092. However, the trial court’s opinion in Ballard reveals that not only was the witness present in court and subject to cross-examination, but that “during her direct examination she unequivocally stated she was certain of her identification at the time she made it.” Slip opinion at 5. In view of this fact, it would be unnecessary and inaccurate to now read Ballard as holding that testimony concerning a witness’s out-of-court identification is admissible in every case where the witness is present and available for cross-examination.*
*407Without these cases as precedents, it still remains to be determined whether and to what extent testimony concerning Michael Alexander’s out-of-court identification of appellee was admissible. I would hold that, under normal circumstances, such testimony is most like testimony concerning a prior inconsistent statement of a witness and should be admissible under the same circumstances as a prior inconsistent statement.
A prior inconsistent statement may be admitted into evidence after a foundation for its admission has been established — for example, if the witness denies ever having made the statement. McCormick, Evidence § 37 at 72 (2d ed. 1972). When such testimony is admitted, it is limited to the purpose of impeaching the witness’s trial testimony and may not be used substantively. Commonwealth v. Waller, 498 Pa. 33, 38, 444 A.2d 653, 656 (1982). Likewise, once a witness testifies at trial and denies ever having identified the defendant prior to trial, evidence of the witness’s prior identification becomes admissible, but only to impeach his credibility.
I would further hold, however, that this case did not involve the “normal circumstances” which would justify *408admitting testimony concerning Michael Alexander’s prior identification of appellee even for the purpose of impeaching Michael Alexander’s trial testimony, since the conduct of the Commonwealth in “laying a foundation” for the admission of this testimony was highly improper. In this case, the Commonwealth did not disclose the fact of Michael Alexander’s photographic identification of appellee to appellee’s counsel, even though there was a discovery request for such information. Under these circumstances, I would hold that the Commonwealth should not have been permitted to take advantage of the ignorance of appellee’s counsel, allowing him to unwittingly lay the foundation for the Commonwealth to introduce its own evidence, and I would conclude that the testimony concerning Michael Alexander’s out-of-court identification of appellee should have been excluded.
Even if it was not error to admit that testimony, however, I would agree with the opinion announcing the judgment of the Court that it was error for the trial court not to instruct the jury on the limited purpose for which the police officer’s testimony concerning the out-of-court identification could be considered, and on this basis, I concur in the disposition of this appeal.

 In fact, the admission of testimony concerning a witness’s out-of-court identification as substantive evidence under the circumstances present in Ballard is analogous to the admission of evidence under the past recollection recorded exception to the hearsay rule. See Commonwealth v. Shaw, 494 Pa. 364, 368, 431 A.2d 897, 899 (1981) (citation omitted) (“In order for the content of a writing to be admissible as past recollection recorded, the record must show that four requirements are met: ‘1) the witness must have had firsthand knowledge of the event; 2) the written statement must be an original memorandum made at or near the time of the event and while the witness had a *407clear and accurate memory of it; 3) the witness must lack a present recollection of the event; and 4) the witness must vouch for the accuracy of the written memorandum.’"). See also Commonwealth v. Harris, 479 Pa. 131, 387 A.2d 869 (1978) (out-of-court photographic identification testimony was properly admitted after witness testified that she had a good view of the perpetrator at the time of the crime, that she was certain he was the man depicted in the picture she identified, and that she was unable to make an in-court identification because of changes in the hairstyle and moustache of appellant). It appears that this was also the situation contemplated by the Superior Court in this case when it held that
[t]he reason for excepting any particular category of out-of-court statement to the hearsay rule is because experience shows that it is substantially more trustworthy than hearsay in general. We think that a fresh statement of identification made soon after a crime or other occurrence by a witness thereto is substantially more trustworthy than hearsay in general only if the witness vouches for the identification under oath at trial. Absent this important indicium of trustworthiness, we do not think that it merits exception to the hearsay rule.
327 Pa.Super. at 577, 476 A.2d at 418.