Court Opinion

ID: 9737230
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:19:35.716867+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:57.452833
License: Public Domain

KLEIN, J.,
Concurring and Dissenting.
¶ 1 I join in that part of the majority’s decision that affirms the orphans’ court order awarding Ellin the difference from the reduced face value of the life insurance policy issued by Ward Foods. I disagree, however, with the majority’s determination of the Michaelsons’ claims.
¶ 2 The orphans’ court had determined that Ellin’s testimony was sufficient to es-top Blumenthal and Proffit from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to the Michaelsons’ claims. I agree with this. I also agree with the majority’s recognition that the Michaelsons, as intended third-party beneficiaries, are limited to Ellin’s rights under the contract. What the majority fails to recognize, however, is that Ellin’s testimony established that there was a modification of the agreement, that is, that “equalization” would occur at Bern-hard’s death. Clearly, Ellin knew of the disparity and was reassured by her husband that, relative to her children, he was in the better position to invest the money and that “[her] children would get it on his death, when they would need it.” N.T., 10/10/00, p. 61. What the majority also fails to recognize is that its decision implies that Ellin should have pursued legal action during Bernhard’s lifetime, while they were married, to enforce Bernhard’s obligation under the antenuptial agreement. It is certainly not the policy of this Commonwealth to encourage intra-family litigation, and neither should it be a byproduct of this decision.
¶ 3 Ellin’s deposition testimony establishes that she never told her children of Bernhard’s obligation under the agreement, that when she talked with Bernhard about the disparity in gifts, he reassured her that her children would receive the money upon his death. Relying upon that, and likely upon her desire to avoid splintering her family, Ellin’s reliance was justified.
¶4 This is not to suggest that Bern-hard’s statement was intended to deceive Ellin. The law of estoppel does not require a fraud in the strictest sense. Our Supreme Court stated in Schwab v. Cornell, 306 Pa. 536, 160 A. 449, 450 (1932):
If the circumstances are such that a man’s eyes should have been open to what is occurring, then the statute begins to run from the time when he could have seen, but if by concealment, through fraud or otherwise, a screen has been erected by his adversary which effectually obscures the view of what has happened, the statute remains quiescent until actual knowledge arises, (emphasis in original).
I would find, therefore, as the orphans’ court did, that the estate was estopped from asserting that the statute of limitation commencing in Bernhard’s lifetime. See Nesbitt v. Erie Coach Co., 416 Pa. 89, 204 A.2d 473 (1964) (in order for doctrine of estoppel to be applicable in bar of statute of limitations, it suffices that fraud in the broadest sense, including an unintentional deception, be proved; the criterion is not the intention of the party estopped, but the natural effect upon the other party).
¶ 5 Bernhard died in February, 1998; Ellin’s children brought their claim against the estate well within the four year limitation period. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5525. I would affirm the orphans’ court order.