Court Opinion

ID: 9527851
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:34:55.666739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:14.998928
License: Public Domain

ZIMMERMAN, Justice
(concurring):
I concur with the majority’s remand to join the estate of Etta Wood. However, I do not believe it goes far enough in providing the trial court guidance on remand. It is true that the estate of Etta Wood was not represented below. However, at oral argument, there was some indication that Mrs. Hiltsley had been appointed as a representative of the Etta Wood estate or that she had attempted to join the estate of Etta Wood in the instant lawsuit. Thus, there is no question in my mind that after this appeal is disposed of, the question of a constructive trust will rear its head in a new action by supposedly “new” parties on essentially the same facts. In fact, this is almost invited by the majority’s disposition of this case, since the remand leaves the door open for an entirely new trial on the issue of whether a constructive trust exists, once a proper representative of the Etta Wood estate becomes involved. Therefore, I would not decide this appeal on the narrowest possible ground, as does the majority.
Under Rule 30(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, “if a new trial is granted, the court will pass upon and determine all questions of law involved in the case presented upon the appeal and necessary to the final determination of the case.” This language is identical to former Rule 76(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; and all case law under Rule 76(a) is equally applicable to the interpretation of the new Rule 30(a). This language has been interpreted to apply to a remand for additional proceedings, in addition to outright retrial. Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 P.2d 119 (Utah 1977). The Court has previously held under old Rule 76(a) that “when a new trial or further proceeding is ordered, it is our duty to pass upon questions of law which may be pertinent and helpful in arriving at a final determination of the case.” Lopes v. Lopes, 30 Utah 2d 393, 395, 518 P.2d 687, 688 (1974). Accord LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Petersen, 18 Utah 2d 260, 420 P.2d 615 (1966); Anderson v. Utah County Board of County Commissioners, 589 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1979). We should extend this principle to resolve issues which are squarely before us on appeal when we can reasonably anticipate the reemergence of those issues in other proceedings hereafter. Cf. Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 58 (Utah 1986). This is such a case. The substantive question of whether a constructive trust exists is clearly raised by the decision of the trial court and has been argued and briefed by the parties on appeal. I would decide it.
The law of constructive trusts is summarized in section 160 of the Restatement of Restitution.1 The remedy is an equitable one where, in the absence of any express or implied intention to form a trust, one may be imposed to prevent unjust enrichment. Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708, 710 (Utah 1977); Haws v. Jensen, 116 Utah 212, 209 P.2d 229 (1949). The burden of proof is upon the one asserting a construc*1027tive trust to show by clear and convincing evidence that equitable grounds for imposing a trust exist. Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 682, 637 (Utah 1984); Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d at 710; Nielson v. Rasmussen, 558 P.2d 511, 513 (Utah 1976); Matter of Estate of Hock, 655 P.2d 1111, 1114 (Utah 1982). This burden cannot be met by simply showing that there was a transaction between the parties apparently to the benefit of one and that they had a close family relationship.
In order to impose a constructive trust, in addition to the family relationship, there must be shown [the grantor’s] age and infirmity on one hand, actual dominance on the part of the grantee, and established course of management of the grantor’s affairs by the grantee, or other similar facts making it inequitable to allow the grantee to prevail.
Matter of Estate of Coffin, 137 Ariz. 480, 482, 671 P.2d 921, 923 (Ariz.Ct.App.1983).
In the present case, the trial court specifically found that Mrs. Hiltsley’s allegations of fraud or willful or malicious conduct toward her by her deceased husband were not proven. Therefore, to prevail she must have shown that her husband’s conduct toward his sister was inequitable. The trial court found that this burden was met. I find nothing in the record that can support such a finding, especially when proof must be by clear and convincing evidence. All that was proven regarding the transactions between Etta May Wood and Mr. Hiltsley was that he received $30,000 from his sister in October of 1979, just three months before her death from an increasingly debilitating disease. It also appears that some of this money may have found its way into the accounts which are at issue. But there is absolutely no evidence as to why the money was given to Mr. Hiltsley by Mrs. Wood or as to the capacity in which it was received or held. The record in this regard is entirely neutral. Under these circumstances, the trial court’s imposition of a constructive trust was based on nothing more than conjecture. Speculation that a man of the cloth obtained or held by deceit the funds of his incapacitated sister during her final hours is not justified on this state of the record. Indeed, the court was required to presume that the transaction was in all respects regular, absent evidence to the contrary. Cf. Sims v. George, 24 Utah 2d 102, 466 P.2d 831 (1970) (a presumption of the donor’s competency exists and the burden of proving incompetency is on one who asserts it); see generally Koesling v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1975) (proponent of a proposition bears burdens of proof and persuasion).
I would advise the trial court that it erred in finding a constructive trust on the state of the facts before it. A general dislike for Mr. Hiltsley’s conduct vis-a-vis Mrs. Hallalene Ryder is not warrant for what the trial court did here.

. “Where a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it, a constructive trust arises.” Restatement of Restitution § 160 (1937).