Court Opinion

ID: 9913909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-28 22:09:00.335787+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:30.550896
License: Public Domain

J-S34026-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 ROBERT WIDEMAN                            :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :   No. 1012 WDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 9, 2022
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
             Criminal Division at No: CP-02-CR-0009496-1975

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                     FILED: December 28, 2023

      Appellant, Robert Wideman, appeals from the order the Court of

Common Pleas of Allegheny County entered on August 9, 2023. Counsel has

filed a brief and petition to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386

U.S. 738 (1967) and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).

Upon review, we grant counsel’s petition for leave to withdraw and affirm the

order dismissing Appellant’s petition for collateral relief filed pursuant to the

Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

      Following a jury trial in July 1976, Appellant was convicted of second-

degree murder and robbery.        On July 10, 1978, the trial court sentenced

Appellant to life imprisonment.

      [Appellant] appealed to our Supreme Court.         In addition,
      [Appellant] filed a pro se application for reconsideration and
      request for the appointment of new counsel.       [Appellant]’s
      application was denied, but his request for new counsel was
J-S34026-23

      granted. During the pendency of his appeal, [Appellant] further
      filed a post-conviction petition[,] which was dismissed without
      prejudice. The Supreme Court remanded the matter to the trial
      court for an evidentiary hearing.

      The evidentiary hearing was held in February of 1980, following
      which the trial court affirmed its disposition. [Appellant] again
      appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed. See Commonwealth
      v. Wideman, [436 A.2d 982 (Pa. 1981)].

Commonwealth       v.   Wideman,     2273    Pittsburgh   1998,   unpublished

memorandum at *3 (Pa. Super. filed May 19, 2000) (footnote omitted).

      On January 16, 1996, Appellant filed his second PCRA petition.       In

October 1998, the PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing. On November 23,

1998, the PCRA court awarded Appellant a new trial.       The Commonwealth

appealed. On May 19, 2000, we reversed the PCRA court’s order. Id. at *12.

Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal was denied by the Supreme Court

on January 5, 2001. See Commonwealth v. Wideman, 766 A.2d 1248 (Pa.

2001).

      After unsuccessfully pursuing two additional PCRA petitions, Appellant

filed the underlying petition, his fifth, on August 9, 2021. The PCRA court

dismissed Appellant’s petition on August 9, 2022.

      On September 1, 2022, Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal to the

Superior Court. On November 3, 2022, the PCRA court appointed counsel to

represent Appellant in the instant appeal.

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       On December 28, 2022, counsel submitted a timely statement of intent

to file an Anders/McClendon brief in lieu of filing a statement of errors

complained of on appeal.

       We first address counsel’s application to withdraw.1 In order for PCRA

counsel to withdraw under Turner/Finley2 in this Court:

       (1) PCRA counsel must file a no-merit letter that details the nature
       and extent of counsel's review of the record; lists the appellate
       issues; and explains why those issues are meritless.

       (2) PCRA counsel must file an application to withdraw; serve the
       PCRA petitioner with the application and the no-merit letter; and
       advise the petitioner that if the Court grants the motion to
       withdraw, the petitioner can proceed pro se or hire his own lawyer.

       (3) This Court must independently review the record and agree
       that the appeal is meritless.

Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816, 817-18 (Pa. Super. 2011).

       We find that counsel for Appellant has complied with these procedural

and substantive requirements. Counsel stated in his petition to withdraw that,

after conducting a thorough review of the record, he found that the underlying

petition was untimely and that the claims Appellant intended to raise were

frivolous. Petition to Withdraw as Counsel, 7/18/23, at 4-5 (unnumbered).

____________________________________________

1 It is well-settled that Anders applies only when counsel seeks to withdraw

from representation on direct appeal, and that Turner/Finley applies when
counsel seeks leave to withdraw from a collateral appeal such as the present
case.    Even so, we will accept counsel’s Anders brief in lieu of a
Turner/Finley no-merit letter, because an Anders brief provides greater
protection to Appellant. Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816, 817 n.2
(Pa. Super. 2011) (accepting Anders brief in lieu of Turner/Finley letter).
2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988).

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Counsel attached to his petition a copy of the letter he sent to Appellant

advising him he could retain private counsel or proceed pro se. Id. Counsel

also provided Appellant a copy of the brief that summarizes the facts and

procedural history, includes issues that could arguably support Appellant’s

appeal, and explains why the issues are meritless. Accordingly, we turn to

the issues raised in this appeal.

      Appellant    argues   that    his   current   petition   is   timely   under

Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1276 (Pa. 2020) because the opinion

created a new constitutional right that applies retroactively to his case. In

particular, Appellant argues that Small effectively overturned our decision

issued on May 19, 2000 (2273 Pittsburgh 1998), in which we reversed the

PCRA court’s order granting Appellant’s petition for a new trial.        Appellant

believes that the disposition hinged on “the public record presumption,” which

Small subsequently repudiated. We disagree with Appellant’s contention that

Small now affords him relief.

      On appeal,

      [w]e review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in the
      light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level.
      Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 1260, 1267 (Pa. Super.
      2010). This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and
      the evidence of record. Id. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s
      ruling if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal
      error. Id. This Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any
      grounds if the record supports it. Id. We grant great deference
      to the factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those
      findings unless they have no support in the record.
      Commonwealth v. Carter, 21 A.3d 680, 682 (Pa. Super. 2011).
      However, we afford no such deference to its legal conclusions.

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       Commonwealth v. Paddy, 15 A.3d 431, 442 (Pa. 2011);
       Commonwealth v. Reaves, 923 A.2d 1119, 1124 (Pa. 2007).
       Further, where the petitioner raises questions of law, our standard
       of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.
       Commonwealth v. Colavita, 993 A.2d 874, 886 (Pa. 2010).

Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations

omitted).

       All PCRA petitions, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be

filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final,” 3 unless an

exception to timeliness applies. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).4       “The PCRA’s

time restrictions are jurisdictional in nature. Thus, if a PCRA petition is

untimely, neither this Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction over the

petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to

address the substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520,

522 (Pa. 2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (overruled on

____________________________________________

3 It is undisputed that the underlying PCRA petition is facially untimely.  Our
Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on October 8, 1981.
The Supreme Court denied Appellant’s application for reargument on
November 25, 1981. Appellant, therefore, had 60 days from that date to file
a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, under
what was then U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 20.1. Because Appellant did not file a such a
petition, his judgment of sentence became final on January 25, 1982. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Appellant had one year from January 25, 1982, to
file a timely PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). The instant PCRA
petition was filed on August 9, 2021, approximately 39 years from January
25, 1982. The instant petition is, therefore, facially untimely.

4 The one-year time limitation can be overcome if a petitioner (1) alleges and

proves one of the three exceptions set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) of
the PCRA, and (2) files a petition raising this exception within one year of the
date the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).

                                           -5-
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other grounds by Small, supra). As timeliness is separate and distinct from

the merits of Appellant’s underlying claims, we must first determine whether

this PCRA petition is timely filed. Commonwealth v. Stokes, 959 A.2d 306,

310 (Pa. 2008) (consideration of Brady claim separate from consideration of

its timeliness). If it is not timely, we cannot address the substantive claims

raised in the petition. Id.

      In   Small,   our   Supreme   Court   discussed   the    “public   record

presumption,” which imputed knowledge of facts to a PCRA petitioner the

moment those facts became part of the public record. The presumption was

abandoned in Small, because as applied to incarcerated pro se petitioners, it

was inconsistent with the plain language of the PCRA.         Under subsection

9545(b)(ii), the newly-discovered facts exception to the PCRA’s jurisdictional

time bar, the delayed discovery of information in the public record by such a

petitioner will be excused if he has exercised due diligence. See Small, 238

A.3d at 1283-86.

      Appellant’s reliance on Small is misplaced. First, there is no authority

supporting Appellant’s claim that Small recognized a new constitutional right

that applies retroactively. Under the PCRA, a decision of our Supreme Court

(or of the United States Supreme Court) can be applied retroactively only if

our Supreme Court (or the U.S. Supreme Court) has recognized a new

constitutional right and has expressly held that such right is retroactively

applicable.   The Small decision, however, did not recognize a new

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constitutional right, let alone one that applies to preceding cases. See, e.g.,

Commonwealth            v.   Sprankle,       No.   1365     WDA     2022,   unpublished

memorandum         at    *4,   n.3    (Pa.     Super.     filed   October   10,   2023);

Commonwealth v. Dukes, No. 78 WDA 2022, unpublished memorandum at

*11-12 (Pa. Super. February 24, 2023).

       Second, the PCRA court found, and we agree, that “our decision in 2273

Pittsburgh 1998, does not . . . involve the public record presumption.” PCRA

Court Opinion, 5/11/23, at 3.

       Indeed, in prior appellate proceedings, we concluded that Appellant had

not raised a valid after-discovered evidence claim that would implicate the

public record presumption.5 To this end, we noted that

       [Appellant] introduced evidence at the PCRA hearing that he did
       not learn of the Morena’s family malpractice case until March of
       1995. The PCRA court accepted [Appellant]’s testimony. The
       PCRA court further concluded that the evidence was not available
       until 1981, when the Morena family settled with the defendant
       physicians.

       Notwithstanding the PCRA court’s conclusions to the contrary, the
       fact that [Appellant] failed to learn of the information does not
       mean that it could not have been obtained at or prior to the trial
       by the exercise of reasonable due diligence. All of his information
       was available and could have been discovered through the
       exercise of reasonable diligence by [Appellant] or his counsel at
       the time of trial. [Appellant] or his trial counsel could have sought
       to obtain the victim’s medical records or interviewed the medical
       personnel who rendered treatment to the victim. [Appellant]
____________________________________________

5 Appellant claimed he was entitled to PCRA relief due to his discovery of
evidence bearing on the issue of causation, i.e., that the victim’s death was
attributable to medical malpractice rather than the gunshot wound.
Wideman, 2273 Pittsburgh 1998, at * 4.

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     certainly did not need to wait until the victim family settled with
     the physicians in order to assert this defense at trial.

Wideman, 2273 Pittsburgh 1998, at *6-7 (internal citations omitted;

emphasis added).

     It follows from this analysis that, even if applicable retroactively, Small

would not be relevant here because we did not rely on the public record

presumption when reversing the granting of PCRA relief in prior appellate

proceedings. We simply held that Appellant was procedurally barred because

he had not exercised due diligence in discovering the facts on which he relied

in his petition. The holding of Small has no bearing on that determination.

     Thus, because the underlying PCRA petition is facially untimely and does

not meet the newly-recognized constitutional right exception, we have no

jurisdiction to entertain the merits of the challenge and the dismissal of

Appellant’s petition must be upheld.

     Counsel’s petition to withdraw granted. Order affirmed.

   12/28/2023

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