Court Opinion

ID: 9691991
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:34:44.739478+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:29.650429
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
PER CURIAM.
In deference to counsel, we will further respond to two contentions reasserted in argument on this rehearing: first, that the-right to use the driveway passed to complainant under the terms of the deed as an appurtenance to the estate granted and,, second, that the claimed agreement alleged' in the petition on which the rule nisi was-issued should be enforced to the result that the injunction be here made final.
With respect to the first insistence, we have pointed out that no mention-was made of the driveway in the conveyanee of the property to complainant and hence under the facts presented no right of way over the alley was thereby, conveyed.. A conveyance of a lot “with appurtenances-thereto” -without an intention therein manifest to include an easement (here the driveway) over the land of the grantor does not grant such an easement — unless, of course,, it is a way of necessity, which we have-shown it is not. It is only an easement which exists on land of a third person, which can be appurtenant to the land conveyed so as to pass with the conveyance without reference thereto in the deed. People ex rel. Standard Gaslight Co. of City of New York v. Cantor, 120 Misc. 183, 198 *663N.Y.S. 738, 28 C.J.S., Easements, § 46, note 11, p. 710; McMahon v. Blanchard 265 Mass. 56, 163 N.E. 761. See also Humphreys v. McKissock, 140 U.S. 304, 11 S.Ct. 779, 35 L.Ed. 473.
As regards the second contention, we are prompted to broaden our original discussion due to counsel’s strenuous insistence on his position. We will first refer to the legal status of the petition, termed a mandamus. Mandamus is not appropriate to enforce a private right against an individual. 55 C.J.S., Mandamus, § 239, p. 451. The remedy, properly treated, is by a motion made in this court to give effect to the alleged agreement and for the entry of a judgment here in accordance with it. Roebling Sons Co. v. Stevens Electric Co., 93 Ala. 39, 9 So. 369. While the instant petition prays for a mandamus and we issued the rule nisi, it is immaterial ■what it is called. Its purpose was for this court to give effect to the alleged agreement .and we have so treated it. Such a petition is not subject to the usual rules applicable ■to an original bill requiring an answer or •demurrer or some other appropriate act of pleading, Sims Chancery Practice, § 685; Johnson v. Johnson, 252 Ala. 366, 41 So.2d 287, or as applicable to mandamus requiring a return.
We must reemphasize that no showing is made by the petition — or indeed ■could be made if we have interpreted the record correctly, and we think we have — of any enforceable compromise settlement of this pending cause. As indicated on original deliverance, appellant is seeking to give effect to an agreement not in writing claimed to have been made by the attorneys for the parties to this litigation in an entirely different cause of action in another court between different parties. This question is, of course, limited by its legal status. Section 46, Title 46, of the Code and Supreme Court Rule 22 and Circuit Court Rule 14 limit agreements made between parties •or their attorneys. They must either be in writing or entered on the minutes of the court or made in open court where the cause is pending. Norman v. Burns, 67 Ala. 248; Prestwood v. Watson, 111 Ala. 604, 20 So. 600; Samuels v. Scott, 212 Ala. 679, 103 So. 848. Treating the petition with reference to that legal ■ status, we note that it does not show the agreement was in writing, or entered on the minutes of the'court, or made here in open court in this cause. The agreement, therefore, falls within the ban of the rule which inhibits enforcement of private agreements not in writing between counsel or parties. The fact that the agreement was made in another court or entered on the minutes in a different suit in a different court shows a failure to comply with the foregoing provisions of law and therefore ineffective and unenforceable.
Another reason which would stamp the agreement as ineffective is that the petition does not show that appellees’ attorney had authority to make any agreement of settlement and compromise. Indeed, the answers of the respondents to the rule nisi in the form of affidavits establish the contrary. An attorney employed to represent a litigant in the prosecution or- defense of a suit is a special agent of his client and has no implied or inherent authority or right to compromise -and settle it. National Bread Co. v. Bird, 226 Ala. 40, 145 So. 462; Life and Casualty Ins. Co. v. Bell, 235 Ala. 548, 180 So. 573; Birmingham Electric Co. v. Cochran, 242 Ala. 673, 8 So.2d 171.
Petitioner complains that he has had no opportunity to furnish proof of the agreement. Of course he had the same opportunity to offer supporting affidavits as did the appellees, but this is immaterial. His petition does not show the existence of an effective agreement. As stated, affidavits of the appellees show definitely the lack of authority of their attorney to make the alleged compromise settlement of the cause or any ratification of his acts in the premises and hence the agreement does not meet the requirements of said § 46 and Rule 22, supra.
Counsel for appellant suggests in argument that a letter signed by himself and the attorney for appellees on file in the- office of the clerk of this court might save the agree*664ment from the limitations of the aforestated rules. To the contrary, this letter seems to indicate that at the time of its transmission to this court, counsel for both the parties seemed to have conceded the non-enforceability of the agreement. The letter is as follows:
“Mr. Justice Joel B. Brown Presiding Judge of the Supreme Court Judicial Building Montgomery, Alabama
“In re: J. S. Crawford vs. Percy Tucker et al.
“Dear Sir:
“The Appellant and the Appellee made a settlement of the above cause which is pending in the Supreme Court of Alabama.
“It was contemplated that the appeal pending in this cause was to be dismissed and therefore that it would not be necessary for the Appellant to file brief and argument. It now appears that this settlement will not be consummated. Therefore, the undersigned solicitors for the Appellant and Appellee join in a request to the Court allowing Appellant 30 additional days in which to file his brief and argument. (Italics ours)
“Respectfully,
/s/ James J. Mayfield Attorney of Record for the Appellant
/s/ E. D. McDuffie Attorney of Record for the Appellee”
But we forego further discussion. It seems to be clear that appellant can take nothing by the alleged agreement. The limitations of the law must be observed.
So considered, the petition is due to be stricken and the rehearing is denied. So ordered.
Petition stricken and rehearing denied.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and BROWN, SIMPSON, GOODWYN and MERRILL, JJ., concur.