Court Opinion

ID: 9831684
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:17:07.440051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:37.004339
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[8] Appellee contends that we erred in holding that the suit for rent, in so far as it relates to the 17 acres found by the jury to have been taken possession of by appellant in addition to the 20 acres covered by the original written contract, was for a debt “evidenced by or founded upon any contract in writing.” Much is said about the statute of frauds, but it will be seen from -our original opinion that the application of the statute of frauds was not sought by any assignment of error, and that what we had to say had reference solely to the question whether the two-year statute or the four-year statute of limitation applied to the claim for rent of the 17 acres. We find in Cyc. vol. 25, p. 1038, the following statement:
“The statutory description of an action as ‘founded on an instrument in writing’ refers to contracts, obligations, or liabilities growing, not remotely or ultimately, but immediately, out of written instruments. Parol acceptance of an offer in writing does not give rise to an agreement or contract in writing, within the meaning *798of statutes relating to limitations governing actions on contracts in writing.”
In this case appellee sued appellant to recover the amount of lease due for the 20 acres covered by the written contract copied in our previous opinion, and also for the amount alleged to be due for lease of 'the seventeen acres. While it is true that the written contract is a proposal to rent to appellant such part of the 17 acres as he may elect to take, it is also true that it is more than that; for it is a contract signed by appellant, in which he binds himself to pay at the rate of $30 per acre per annum for the 17 acres if he elects to take same, or for such part thereof as he may elect to take. The contract was completed as to the 17 acres by appellant’s taking possession thereof. It may be stated that the suit for rent for the 17 acres is founded upon a written agreement to pay $30 per acre per annum for such part of said 17 acres as appellant should agree to take. It has been held in this state that a suit to recover the value of goods delivered pursuant to a written order is founded upon á contract in writing. Page v. Payne, 41 Tex. 143. And it was so held by this court, even though the order contained no promise to pay. JOaredo Electric Light & Mach. Co. v. U. S. Electric Lighting Co., 26 S. W. 310. A view not in accord with the holding in the last-mentioned case may be deduced from the opinions in the case of Voeleker v. McKay, 61 S. W. 424; Voelker v. McKey, 60 S. W. 798.
It has been held that, where a change was made by verbal agreement in the quality of iron to be used in an iron fence contracted in writing to be erected, the suit nevertheless was upon the written contract, the court explaining its holding as follows:
“It was evidently intended that the services rendered should be controlled by the terms of the written agreement, and that the subsequent agreement changing the quality of the material should not have the effect to destroy the written contract.” Hughes Bros. v. Smith, 83 Tex. 499, 18 S. W. 955.
It has also been held that a suit for the price of extras provided pursuant to a building contract which stipulated a certain price to be paid for the completion of the building according to specifications and for the payment “for all extras above the contract aud for all changes that might be made in the plans and specifications” was governed by the four years statute of limitation. The court said:
“The fact that the extent of extras and changes in' the plans were subsequently agreed to would create no new right or contract that was not fully provided for in the written contract. The making of such changes and extras is simply putting into operation a contingency that the parties contemplated might occur when they executed the contract, and for which they provided in this written agreement.” Wilkinson v. Johnson, 83 Tex. 392, 18 8. W. 746.
See, also, Stringfellow v. Elsea, 45 S. W. 418; Sanborn v. Plowman, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 484, 49 S. W. 639; Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Callaghan & Graham, 104 S. W. 1073. When the parties executed the written contract, they contemplated the contingency that appellant might take more land than the 20 acres, and provided in such contract for the payment of rent for such additional land, and also for obligations with reference thereto by appellant. The above cases indicate a tendency upon the part of our courts not to give a strict construction to the words “contract in writing” such as would classify all contracts as oral contracts which are partly written and partly oral, and we therefore hold that in this case the suit for rent of the 17 acres is governed by the four-year statute of limitations, and overrule assignments of error Nos. 4, 5, and 21. We realize that the question is one upon which legal minds may well differ, but believe that our decision thereof is in line with the views expressed in the cited cases.
The letter and advertisement relied upon by appellee speak for themselves. We cannot find therein any evidence that appellee accepted the offer to take the 17 acres. The same may be said concerning the cross-action, if, indeed, it can be considered.
We are unable to agree with appellee in his contention with reference to the other assignments of error sustained by us. The judgment reversing the judgment of the trial court and remanding the cause for another trial must therefore be permitted to stand. Our former opinion is modified as above indicated, but the motion for rehearing is overruled.