Court Opinion

ID: 9460658
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:57:12.613084+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:43.754509
License: Public Domain

GODBOLD, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
When all the evidence is considered this was a normal jury case.
(1). How did the accident happen? The majority conclude that it occurred from lack of coordination among the members of the stevedore crew. But merely examining the testimony quoted in the majority opinion reveals that there are two versions. One is that when Shephard’s side of the spreader bar was still engaged and the other side disengaged, the winch lifted up on the spreader, causing the other end to swing around and strike Shephard. The other version (see quoted testimony of Ward and Mills) is that when a pallet was being lowered into the hold the spreader bar struck Shephard on the head. Ward *968described in detail that, rather than the spreader bar being disengaged by the workmen in the hold, it jumped loose from the pallet because of the manner in which the pallet was loaded, after which, before Shephard could get out of the way, the winchman let the loose spreader down on Shephard’s head.
Choice between these competing versions was for the jury. The selection of versions is important, because, if the jury chose to believe that Shephard was struck during a lowering operation, then this additional testimony of Mills, Shephard’s partner, becomes vital:
A. They lowered down on him, do you understand what I mean? He wasn’t expecting it, because it just missed me. You know what I mean. It almost got me. The meat was blocked out, you understand, and he had no room to get out of the way.
Q. Did that hook that hit him disengage or come loose from the falls?
A. It did not come loose, but it hit him, you understand what I mean? I got out of the way, hut he couldn’t go nowhere hut right there, and it hit him, you understand what I mean.
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A. Wait, Cap, let me tell you. I told you'all exactly how it happened. I said when they lowered the whole thing down, that’s what hit him.

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Q. And that’s [the hook holding the spreader bar] what hit him, is that right?
A. They lowered it down, and it hit him, yes sir.
(2). Crowded conditions in the hold. Two gangs, close to 20 men, were working in the hold under crowded conditions. The gangs were using two pallet boards, on each of which was piled packages of meat, after which the loaded pallet was winched out through the hatch opening. The men were working back to back between the two pallets. The foreman of Shephard’s crew described it as a “dangerous disposition” to have two gangs in this particular hold. He referred to the unloading procedure thusly:
Q. Could you describe the dangerous condition that you said existed in the lower hold at that time ?
A. Well, it was a hazard working like that.
Q. Like what, sir ?
A. I mean, working them men between them boards, two gangs— no way to get out of the way.
Oftentimes two gangs work in the same hold of a refrigerator ship, but the union delegate testified that he had never before heard of two gangs working in the particular hold of this vessel because of its small hatch. Prior to the accident one or more stevedores considered the working conditions so dangerous in the hold that a complaint was made to the union representative. A union delegate was called and came aboard to intercede concerning the dangerous conditions. He told the foreman the hatch was too small for two gangs to be working. The foreman referred him to the superintendent with whom the delegate then discussed the matter. The delegate was still aboard when Shephard was hurt. The delegate stopped one of the gangs from working because of the conditions. The gang was pulled off for about an hour and a half, and was put back to work on orders of the superintendent. After that the accident occurred.
To this evidence, the majority responds with findings to this effect: (a) there was no evidence connecting the crowding to the accident; (b) crowding is not unseaworthiness as a matter of law; (c) in any event, the crowded conditions cannot be attributed to the shipowner because the loading operation was performed and supervised by the stevedoring company.
As to (a), as I already have pointed out, witness Mills squarely relates crowding to the accident. As to (b), the *969issue is not whether crowding rendered the area unsafe as a matter of law but whether, with evidence having been presented of crowding and of its causal relation to the accident, the trial judge may decline to submit to the jury the issue of the lack of safety from crowded conditions.1 As to the third reason,
It is well settled that an improper method of handling cargo employed by a stevedore can create an unseaworthy condition. Morales v. City of Galveston, 1962, 370 U.S. 165, 170, 82 S.Ct. 1226, 8 L.Ed.2d 412; Marshall v. Ove Skou Rederi A/S, 5 Cir. 1967, 378 F.2d 193, 196. Thus, the determinative question on this appeal is whether or not defendant employed an improper method of handling cargo.
Baker v. S/S Cristobal, 488 F.2d 331, 332 (CA5, 1974). For a lengthy catalogue of some of the federal cases holding unsafe unloading to be unseaworthiness, see Blassingill v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 336 F.2d 367 at 369 (CA9, 1964). The crowded conditions and the fog were conditions that had been in effect for several hours and are not even arguably “instantaneous unseaworthiness.”
(3). The issue of signals. The winch operator was “blind,” unable to see into the hold because of the construction of the ship. A derrickman was “flagging” the winch by receiving signals from the men in the hold and in turn signaling to the winch operator. The derrickman testified that just before Shephard was hurt a pallet was loaded into the hold, and he saw a man reach around and unhook the spreader bar and give a signal. He described it this way:
I saw the figure of a man, giving me a signal, because it was just that vague, and I hauled up, to bring it to the offshore side to pick up a load, and that’s when somebody hollered, “A man is hurt.”
It was for the jury to decide whether this ambiguous reference related to impaired visibility because of the fog or vagueness of the meaning of a perceived signal. Also the derrickman described the foggy condition in the hold as “really bad down there,” and explained that he could not see all of the men but could see those closer to him.
(4). The foggy condition in the hold. While acknowledging that the hold was filled with vapor or fog, the majority meet appellant’s argument concerning visibility by selectively extracting from the testimony evidence that tends to show that visibility was not impaired — i. e., that the longshoremen were able to identify numbers on the packages of meat and that longshoreman Jones had been able from a distance of 15 to 17 feet to see details of the accident. Only a few of many references in the testimony serve to demonstrate that impairment of visibility was for the jury and not for judges, trial or appellate:
Q. Wait just a minute. What did the fog have to do with the hook hitting him?
A. [Longshoreman Mills, Shephard’s partner] What I mean, well, it was all foggy, and you couldn’t hardly see nothing, you understand. It was awful foggy, and you couldn’t see nobody else down there.
Q. You couldn’t see anything?
A. No, sir, it was awful foggy.
Q. How could you load the pallet board if you couldn't see anything ?
A. Well, we’ve got to try to work anyhow, you understand. You got to do the best you can.
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*970Q. You say it was foggy. Do you know what was causing that fog?
A. Well, I don’t know what caused the fog, but it was awful foggy. You couldn’t see nothing at all.
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A. . After he got hurt, we still kept on working, but it was still too hard to work down there.
Q. Why do you say that, “it was too hard to work” ?
A. Well, you still couldn’t see anything. You can’t see in the hold when it’s foggy like that.
Q. Did they have lights ?
A. Are you kiddin’? Just like I told you, or anybody else, the lights they had on ship, you couldn’t see with the lights. It was just that foggy.
I have not attempted to lay out everything in the record relevant to these issues. This kind of exploration of factual issues is for the trier of fact. I respectfully dissent.

. In Wilson v. Societa Italiana de Armamento (Sidarma), 409 F.2d 484, 485 (GA5, 1969), cited by the majority, the district court as finder of fact in a bench trial had found the allegedly cramped area not unsafe. On appeal we found this factual finding not clearly erroneous and held also that cramped conditions were not unsafe as a matter of law. This is hardly authority that where there is evidence of unsafe and dangerous conditions from overcrowding, the court may hold the conditions safe as a matter of law.