Court Opinion

ID: 9809094
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:00:42.542448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:24:52.198789
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4622      Doc: 19         Filed: 08/30/2023     Pg: 1 of 4

                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-4622

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        BRENDON TYRE GARNER, a/k/a Breeze,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at
        Huntington. Robert C. Chambers, District Judge. (3:21-cr-00140-1)

        Submitted: May 12, 2023                                           Decided: August 30, 2023

        Before DIAZ, Chief Judge, RUSHING, Circuit Judge, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Glen Conway, CONWAY LAW OFFICE, Huntington, West Virginia, for
        Appellant. William S. Thompson, United States Attorney, Ryan A. Keefe, Assistant
        United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston,
        West Virginia, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4622       Doc: 19          Filed: 08/30/2023      Pg: 2 of 4

        PER CURIAM:

               Brendon Tyre Garner appeals his conviction and the 100-month sentence imposed

        following a jury trial for possessing ammunition as a convicted felon, in violation of

        18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2018). On appeal, Garner argues that the district court

        erred by declining to instruct the jury on a justification defense and by enhancing his

        sentence based on acquitted or uncharged conduct. We affirm.

               “A defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which

        there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.” United States v.

        Ricks, 573 F.3d 198, 200 (4th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). The defendant bears the burden of

        proving an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Dixon v. United States,

        548 U.S. 1, 17 (2006). “Whether an affirmative defense is established is a factual issue

        that is usually a function of the jury, and the trial court rarely rules on a defense as a matter

        of law.” United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 621 (4th Cir. 1994). However, where there

        is insufficient evidence to support any element of an affirmative defense, the district court

        may preclude a defendant from presenting evidence of the defense at trial “or, if some

        evidence is already presented at trial, the court can refuse to instruct the jury on the

        . . . defense.” Id. (citing United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 414, 416 (1980)). “A

        district court’s refusal to instruct the jury on such a defense presents a question of law that

        we review de novo.” Ricks, 573 F.3d at 200.

               A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of justification if he puts

        forth sufficient evidence that he

                                                       2
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4622      Doc: 19         Filed: 08/30/2023      Pg: 3 of 4

               (1) was under unlawful and present threat of death or serious bodily injury;
               (2) did not recklessly place himself in a situation where he would be forced
               to engage in criminal conduct; (3) had no reasonable legal alternative (to both
               the criminal act and the avoidance of the threatened harm); and (4) that there
               was a direct causal relationship between the criminal action and the
               avoidance of the threatened harm.

        United States v. Mooney, 497 F.3d 397, 406 (4th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up). We have

        construed the justification defense “very narrowly” in cases concerning felons in

        possession of firearms, and “we reserve its application for the rarest of occasions.” Id.

        (internal quotation marks omitted).

               Upon review, we conclude that the district court did not err by declining to give a

        justification instruction. The evidence presented at trial shows that Garner had the

        opportunity to avoid meeting the victim in person but, regardless of his worries about the

        safety of the meeting, he nonetheless chose to meet him. He also decided to acquire a

        firearm and ammunition to take with him to the meeting. This is not the “extraordinarily

        uncommon” scenario in which the justification defense is applicable. United States v.

        Gilbert, 430 F.3d 215, 219 (4th Cir. 2005). Thus, the district court did not err in finding

        there was insufficient evidence to support giving the requested instruction.

               As for Garner’s challenge to his sentence, “[s]entencing judges may find facts

        relevant to determining a [Sentencing] Guidelines range by a preponderance of the

        evidence, so long as that Guidelines sentence is treated as advisory and falls within the

        statutory maximum authorized by the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Medley, 34 F.4th

        326, 335 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has held

        “that ‘a jury’s verdict of acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from considering

                                                     3
USCA4 Appeal: 22-4622       Doc: 19         Filed: 08/30/2023     Pg: 4 of 4

        conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by a

        preponderance of the evidence.’” Id. at 335 (quoting United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148,

        157 (1997)). Thus, a district court may consider uncharged or acquitted conduct at

        sentencing without violating a defendant’s constitutional rights. Id. at 336. Garner

        acknowledges this precedent but nonetheless argues that the district court erred at

        sentencing by finding he committed an aggravated assault, even though he was not charged

        with that offense and the jury had acquitted him of other charges in relation to the same

        conduct. However, as we recently explained, “[w]hether or not we agree or disagree with

        the precedent from the Supreme Court and this Court, we are bound to follow it.” Id.

        Accordingly, we conclude that Garner’s argument is foreclosed by the binding precedent

        supporting the district court’s findings.

               We therefore affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument

        because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

        court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                        AFFIRMED

                                                     4