Court Opinion

ID: 9541029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:21:54.046267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:20.270433
License: Public Domain

PRENTICE, Justice,
concurring.
I agree that the admission of the evidence of an unrelated shooting incident at International Harvester in Louisville is harmless error in this case.
The foundation for admission of evidence of unrelated crimes requires proof that the accused committed the unrelated crime. Parker v. State, (1981) Ind., 425 N.E.2d 628, 633; Bruce v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 180, 246, 375 N.E.2d 1042, 1077, cert. denied, (1978) 439 U.S. 988, 99 S.Ct. 586, 58 L.Ed.2d 662; Randolph v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 179, 181, 361 N.E.2d 900, 901; Hinkle v. State, (1980) Ind.App., 405 N.E.2d 556, 558. That proof is lacking here. Tódd v. State, (1951) 229 Ind. 664, 673, 101 N.E.2d 45, 49 (“ ‘Evidence of other crimes should appear to be substantial, and at least make out a prima facie case before it is admitted. If the evidence of another crime amounts only to a suspicion, it should not be received. Un-derhill, Criminal Evidence (4th Ed.), § 182, p. 327.’ ”). Having correctly recognized this deficiency, the majority incorrectly applies the harmless error rule.
The State certainly did not offer this evidence to encourage the jury to view Defendant as not guilty of the unrelated shooting. Obviously, it wanted the jury to consider this deed, along with evidence of Defendant’s other prior bad acts, for the disparaging effect those acts would have upon his alibi testimony. The evidence portrayed Defendant as a man who settled disputes with a gun. Consequently, the testimony that he was not a suspect in the International Harvester shooting would not alleviate the harm done by the improperly admitted prejudicial evidence. The majority’s analysis is not relevant for purposes of determining harmless error. When prejudicial evidence is erroneously admitted, we are required to consider all the evidence to determine if it may have contributed to the verdict, or conversely, if the State’s case is very strong, that the erroneously admitted evidence could not have contributed to the verdict. Loy v. State, (1982) Ind., 436 N.E.2d 1125; Miller v. State, (1982) Ind., 436 N.E.2d 1113; Williams v. State, (1981) Ind., 426 N.E.2d 662, 671; Mitchell v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 418, 287 N.E.2d 860.
In this case I am persuaded that this evidence did not contribute to the verdict. The record contains inculpatory circumstantial evidence, in addition to the extensive evidence related by the majority.
An inference can be drawn from the record that Defendant wanted his automobile safely out of the jurisdiction of the Indiana authorities. Witness David Sheperd testified that Investigation Services, Inc., the firm of which he was President, was employed by Mr. Sales, Defendant’s attorney, on April 28, 1980, four days after the Murders. At Sales’ request Shepherd, a former Louisville police officer, contacted Indiana authorities to learn whether or not there was a warrant outstanding for Defendant’s arrest. He learned that there was none, *467but that two detectives did want to talk to him. Shepherd conveyed this information to Sales, who requested that Shepherd go to a truck stop in Dale, Indiana, retrieve Defendant’s automobile and bring it to Louisville. Shepherd, accompanied by one Stewart, drove Defendant’s vehicle, at 8:00 p.m. that evening to Owensboro, Kentucky, where they stopped for supper, and then proceeded to his firm’s parking lot located near Louisville. The car remained there until June, 1980 when the wife of an FBI agent fortuitously copied the license plate number and referred it to her husband.
The record also discloses that Defendant’s alibi was not air tight. From all the testimony offered at trial, the murders occurred as early as 9:25 p.m. or as late as 9:35 p.m. More likely than not they happened before 9:30 p.m. because Mrs. Sizemore and her son-in-law, both of whom heard the gun shots, remembered that at that time a television program was “changing”, which I understand to mean that the program was going off the air. Moreover, Lennie Begley testified that Defendant and her husband returned to her apartment at “10 or 15” after nine and Defendant stayed, “Maybe 10 minutes, just a few minutes.” The brevity of Defendant’s visit is corroborated by the testimony of Lennie’s son, Larry Hol-lan:
“A. Well, mom and dad had a few words and he (Defendant) left and I heard a truck, Bill’s truck, and I looked out the window and it wasn’t there and then I heard it again opened the door and ran out ‘cause I knew he would probably come over to our house and he just kept on goin’ and I seen Larry behind him, his car." R. at 344.
The truck was moving at a faster rate of speed than the victim usually drove, and Defendant’s vehicle followed just five to six feet behind. The murder scene was approximately three blocks from where Larry Hollan had observed the vehicles.
In support of the defense, a witness testified that it took one hour and sixteen minutes at 65 m.p.h. to travel from the scene in Austin, Indiana to the tavern in Greenwood, where Defendant testified he had gone after leaving the Begley apartment. Another witness stated that the trip took at least an hour. Defendant testified that he checked the time, 10:28 p.m., when he arrived at the tavern, and a police officer in Greenwood observed Defendant pull in to the tavern parking lot at around 10:30 p.m.
Norma Sizemore observed a full size red car with a black vinyl top hurriedly depart from the scene. The automobile made a loud noise as if someone had “stomped” on the accelerator and proceeded “real fast” through the intersection. Thus, if Defendant left the murder scene at 9:25 p.m. in a hurry, he could have reached the tavern in Greenwood by 10:30 p.m. See White v. State, (1981) Ind., 425 N.E.2d 95, 97.
Finally, the evidence at the scene suggests that the victims knew their assailant. The victim’s truck had no blood on the outside of it before the bodies were removed. It was discovered with the gear shift in “park”, the lights on, and the motor still running. The driver’s window (left side) was rolled down. Both victims suffered bullet wounds to their left temples. The interval between the gun shots was, at most, two seconds. There was no evidence that suggested a motive of robbery or some other crime.
From the evidence, the jury could easily have inferred that the victims knew Defendant was following them and made some gesture for them to stop, which they did. Since they were acquainted with him, they had no reason to fear for their safety. It is reasonable to believe that at that moment, when Defendant approached the truck, the anger and resentment, which he had expressed toward his wife and her boy friend throughout that day, was completely released and that he “got even,” before the victims had realized they were in danger.
I join the majority opinion on the other issues and concur in the affirmance of the conviction.