Court Opinion

ID: 9819619
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:28:54.51377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:22.888363
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BOWMAN, dissenting: I respectfully dissent in part. With respect to defendant’s contention that the trial court failed to conduct a preliminary inquiry into his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the “trial court did not err in failing to investigate the nonexistent claims.” 349 Ill. App. 3d at 131-32. Rather, a preliminary investigation was not only warranted, but required in this case. Defendant, from Honduras, speaks only a limited amount of English. An interpreter aided his communication with the court. When the court questioned him, defendant gave several unusual responses that evinced a lack of understanding of the proceedings. On December 10 and 11, 2001, while in court for pretrial proceedings, the trial court held a Rule 402 conference (see 177 Ill. 2d R. 402) with the State and defendant’s assigned attorneys from the public defender’s office, Theodore Potkonjak and Scott Wineberg. When the trial court asked defendant if his attorneys had explained what a Rule 402 conference entails, defendant responded, “What should I say, yes or no?” After the trial court repeated the question, defendant stated, “I really don’t understand. I don’t know.” The trial court then attempted to describe the purpose of a Rule 402 conference. Defendant said that he understood, “[m]ore or less.” Following the Rule 402 conference, Potkonjak informed the trial court that he had spoken with defendant about the conference and advised him that a plea could be arranged with a recommended sentencing cap of 30 years for first degree murder, likely resulting in a sentence of 20 to 25 years. The trial court then asked defendant if Potkonjak had explained the plea offer and defendant replied, “That I am not guilty?” In response to defendant’s apparent confusion, the trial court described to him in detail what happened during the conference. Defendant then agreed that Potkonjak had explained to him the results of the Rule 402 conference. Potkonjak requested that defendant be given until the following day to decide if he wanted to accept the plea offer. The next day, the trial court asked defendant if he wished to accept the plea, with a sentencing cap of 30 years, to which defendant replied, “A minimum of 30 years?” After the court attempted to explain the meaning of a sentencing cap, defendant stated “My attorney just told me that it’s less than 25 years. I can’t take 30 years. That’s too much.” The court attempted to explain the plea offer once more. Following the court’s admonishment, defendant accepted the plea offer and pleaded guilty to first degree murder. On February 15, 2002, the parties appeared in court for defendant’s sentencing, but the presentence investigation report (PSI) was unfinished. Potkonjak informed the trial court that he had received a call from Dana Paschall, the probation officer preparing the PSI. She advised Potkonjak that, when she attempted to interview defendant for the PSI, defendant refused to cooperate. Defendant told Paschall that he did not understand the plea, he was not guilty of first degree murder because he acted in self-defense, he did not wish to plead guilty to first degree murder, and he pleaded with the understanding that he was pleading guilty to second degree murder. Potkonjak continued by informing the court that he had spoken with defendant and that defendant wanted to withdraw his plea. The trial court directed Potkonjak to prepare a written motion. The parties returned to court on March 15, 2002, and Potkonjak informed the court that defendant had decided against withdrawing his plea and wished to go forward with sentencing. The court asked defendant whether he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant replied, “Well, yes. Yes, I would like to withdraw.” Potkonjak then said that “this keeps going on and on and on, and he’s just not — we tell him something, and it seems to sink in, but it doesn’t.” However, the trial court denied a request by Potkonjak for a fitness evaluation, finding no bona fide doubt of fitness. Potkonjak further related to the court that he was leaving the active practice of law and that Wineberg alone would be handling defendant’s case. Two weeks later, on April 2, Wineberg filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. In the motion, Wineberg stated that Potkonjak had become a circuit court judge and that “defendant asserts that his lawyers have failed to provide effective representation and that he now wishes to withdraw his plea of guilty and proceed to a jury trial.” The motion further provided: “The defendant and counsel have come to an impasse and there has been a total breakdown in communication. The defendant expressed that he no longer wishes for the Public Defender to represent him in this case and that he would be asking the Court to appoint another attorney to represent him. Further representation of this defendant in pursuit of his motion to withdraw his plea means that counsel will have to allege the ineffectiveness of himself and a man who has since been bestowed a judicial robe. If the defendant has a motion to withdraw his guilty plea denied, counsel will be left in the precarious position of representing the defendant for sentencing purposes. The ‘cleaner’ solution is to appoint outside counsel at the earliest juncture.” On April 8, Wineberg appeared in court on his motion to withdraw as counsel. He related to the court that, while he was on vacation, he sent an investigator from his office to meet with defendant. During defendant’s conversation with the investigator, defendant claimed that his attorneys did not help him, he did not understand that he pleaded guilty to first degree murder, he wanted a prison term of less than 20 years, and he refused to plead guilty to first degree murder. Wineberg asserted that he could no longer assist defendant because defendant’s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel created a conflict of interest. The trial court responded that it had not received “anything” directly from defendant. The court directed Wineberg to speak with defendant and “file whatever needs to be filed.” Following the April 8 appearance, Wineberg did not file any further motions before defendant appeared for sentencing on April 19. On April 19, Wineberg informed the court that defendant wanted to proceed with sentencing. With respect to defendant’s past discussions and intimations regarding his desire to pursue a motion to withdraw his plea, Wineberg asserted that such a motion would not be “meritorious.” The trial court then asked defendant if he discussed withdrawing his plea with Wineberg. Defendant initially replied, “What? I didn’t understand.” After the trial court repeated the question, defendant acknowledged that he had discussed withdrawing his plea with Wineberg. The court next asked defendant if he wished to be sentenced today. Defendant responded, “No, I just want to get the sentence now.” He subsequently said “Yes” when the court rephrased its question regarding defendant’s desire to proceed with sentencing. Later, the court informed defendant that he had the right to speak with the court about any subject he wished. Defendant responded, “Yes. I just wanted to know how much the time is going to be for the sentence. I wanted to know the time.” The court then asked defendant if he had anything else he wanted to say, to which defendant remarked, “No. Just that. There is nothing more else [sic] to say.” The court sentenced defendant to 23 years in prison. It is important to note that on the day of sentencing, the trial court did not inquire about the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel contained in Wineberg’s April 2 motion to withdraw as counsel. Moreover, in the PSI that Paschall prepared, she stated: “On March 15, 2002, the defendant indicated he did not want to file a formal motion to reconsider his plea and agreed to proceed with this investigation. However, when probation attempted to interview the defendant following his last court appearance, he again refused to participate and expressed the same protests as before.” Defendant’s prior protests included his claims that he did not understand the plea, he was not guilty of first degree murder because he acted in self-defense, he did not wish to plead guilty to first degree murder, and he pleaded with the understanding that he pleaded guilty to second degree murder. The PSI also included the psychological evaluation of Dr. Karen Chandry. According to Dr. Chandry, defendant conveyed to her that he was often depressed and thought about committing suicide “on and off’ since his arrest. Dr. Chandry indicated that defendant experienced “cognitive defects complicated by depression” and that his “level of intellectual functioning is estimated to be low average,” his ability to concentrate is “compromised,” and his judgment and level of insight “were assessed as ranging from fair to poor.” On May 5, defendant, acting pro se, sent a letter to Judge Victoria A. Rossetti requesting an extension of time to file his appeal. He also sought transcripts and the aid of an attorney. Wineberg appeared in front of Judge Rossetti on May 29 on defendant’s pro se request for an extension of time to file his appeal. Defendant was not present at the May 29 proceeding. In fact, defendant did not attend any of the proceedings that occurred after his sentencing on April 19. He was located at Stateville Correctional Center in Joliet. Wineberg explained to the court that he had been shown defendant’s letter to Judge Rossetti. Wineberg said that he did not know why defendant did not contact him directly. The trial court told Wineberg to contact defendant and figure out what defendant wanted. Wineberg appeared again in court on June 19 on defendant’s request for an extension of time to file an appeal. Wineberg related to the trial court that he had sent letters to defendant on May 29 and June 7, inviting defendant to call his office and set forth the reasons why he believed the plea should be withdrawn. However, defendant never responded. The trial court continued the proceeding until July 19 to give defendant more time to respond. On July 19, Wineberg informed the court that he had received a letter from defendant on July 2. According to Wineberg, in the letter, defendant appeared to want to withdraw his plea for two reasons. First, defendant wished to claim self-defense. Second, defendant said that he pleaded guilty because he lacked an appropriate understanding of the law. Wineberg said that he felt the court had adequately explained everything to defendant. Wineberg continued that he assumed defendant was requesting that he file a motion to withdraw his plea. Wineberg stated, “I will do so because that is what he wants even though I don’t think that its [sic] meritorious. *** But in light of his other contention that may assert ineffectiveness, and I don’t know if that’s explicitly what he is saying or implicitly, perhaps other counsel should be appointed to investigate that claim.” The court told Wineberg that he should do whatever he thought was required. Then, after Wineberg again questioned the merit of the motion, the court instructed him to explain his misgivings to defendant, explore the allegations with him, and if conflict issues arose, bring them before the court for appointment of conflict counsel. On August 16, Wineberg appeared in court and related that he had attempted to contact defendant following the July 19 proceedings, but had not heard back from him. Wineberg said that, in the interests of justice, he had prepared a written motion to withdraw defendant’s plea with the contentions of error contained in defendant’s July 2 letter. I note that the July 2 letter is not included as part of the record on appeal. The court permitted Wineberg to file the motion and set a hearing date. The motion alleged: “The Defendant is neither a citizen born or naturalized in the United States nor a resident alien in the United States and, as such, is not familiar with the criminal justice system in this country. All communication with the Defendant has been with the aid of an interpreter, and something was lost in the translation such that the Defendant believes he was not made aware that he was pleading to first degree murder and/or that he could receive no less than 20 years in the Department of Corrections for such a plea. The Defendant did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his rights appurtenant with a trial. The . Defendant believes that the amount of wavering he did on and around the day of his guilty plea, recalling that this matter was set for trial at the time plea negotiations began in earnest and the Court conducted a R. 402 conference, indicate that he was pushed into making a hasty decision to forego his right to trial and that it was error for the Court to allow him to do so. The Defendant maintains that he has a meritorious defense, and a scar on his torso to support his claim that he acted in self-defense and that, therefore, he would be guilty of no more than Second Degree Murder.” On October 2, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant’s August 16 motion to withdraw his plea. Wineberg stated that he had corresponded with defendant by mail and had last received a letter from defendant on September 23. Wineberg indicated that he did not have anything further to add to the motion to withdraw the plea. He said nothing about allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, nor did the trial court ask Wineberg about the possible allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel that were discussed on July 19. The State argued that everything was done very carefully and thoroughly to explain the situation to defendant and that he knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. Wineberg did not offer any rebuttal, but instead rested on his written motion. After recounting the proceedings, the trial court denied the motion, concluding that defendant knowingly and intelligently entered the plea. Recently, in People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 77-78 (2003), the supreme court reiterated that, when a defendant presents a pro se posttrial ineffective assistance of counsel claim, new counsel is not automatically required. Rather, the trial court should first examine the factual basis of the defendant’s claim. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 77-78. The trial court may deny the pro se motion if the court determines that the claim lacks merit or pertains only to matters of trial strategy. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 78. However, new counsel should be appointed if the allegations show possible neglect of the case. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 78. “The operative concern for the reviewing court is whether the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry into the defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 78. In Moore, the trial court labored under a misapprehension that the defendant’s pro se claim of ineffective assistance of counsel could be resolved simply by appointing appellate counsel to address the defendant’s grievance on appeal. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 77-79. The supreme court rejected the State’s argument that the defendant waived the issue when he and his trial counsel “ ‘stood mutely and did nothing to request further inquiry.’ ” Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 79. The supreme court observed that it would be inappropriate for the trial counsel to argue a motion that is predicated on allegations of counsel’s own incompetence. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 79. Pertinent to the case at bar, the supreme court stated that “a pro se defendant is not required to do any more than bring his or her claim to the trial court’s attention.” Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 79. Where the defendant’s allegations have been brought to the trial court’s attention, the supreme court emphasized that the “law requires the trial court to conduct some type of inquiry into the underlying factual basis.” Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 79. In another pertinent case, we addressed a situation wherein a trial court denied a defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea of guilty to charges of possessing a controlled substance with the intent to deliver. People v. Friend, 341 Ill. App. 3d 139, 140 (2003). In Friend, the defense counsel filed the motion to withdraw the defendant’s guilty plea, alleging, inter alia, that the defendant had been “ ‘forced into a plea of guilty.’ ” Friend, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 140. At a hearing, the defense counsel explained that he had filed the motion based on the defendant’s statements in the presentence report. Friend, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 140. Those statements included the defendant’s claims that he had been “ ‘blackmailed’ ” into pleading guilty and that he questioned the quality of defense counsel’s representation. Friend, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 140. The defense counsel invited the trial court to question the defendant about his comments. However, the court refused, stating that the motion lacked any specific allegations to show the plea was coerced. Friend, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 140. The trial court thus denied the motion because it did not believe that the defendant “ ‘was operating under any type of misapprehension of law or fact.’ ” Friend, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 140. The trial court concluded that the defendant had made the statements because he was seeking leniency. Friend, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 140. The defendant renewed the motion after he was sentenced, but the court again denied it. Friend, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 140. We held that the defense counsel should have moved to withdraw as counsel when he realized that the defendant was questioning his professional judgment. Friend, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 141. More important to the case sub judice, the State argued that the trial court independently evaluated the defendant’s allegations of ineffective representation. Friend, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 141. We held that it was clear that the trial court did not adequately investigate the defendant’s claims. Friend, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 142. Moreover, we determined that it was irrelevant whether the defense counsel or the defendant brought the allegations to the trial court’s attention. Friend, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 142. In the present case, I disagree with the majority’s characterization of defendant’s claims as “nonexistent.” 349 Ill. App. 3d at 132. Not only did defendant face a language barrier, but he experienced “cognitive defects complicated by depression,” his “level of intellectual functioning [was] estimated to be low average,” his ability to concentrate was “compromised,” and his judgment and level of insight “were assessed as ranging from fair to poor.” Moreover, during the proceedings, defendant made several unusual remarks and provided confusing answers to many questions posed by the trial court. On February 15, 2002, Wineberg told the court that, based on a conversation between Paschall and defendant, defendant claimed that he did not understand the plea and entered it against his wishes. On March 15, defendant told the court that he did not want to withdraw his plea, but started off by stating, “Well yes. Yes, I would like to withdraw.” Potkonjak then expressed to the court the difficulty he was having communicating with defendant. In the April 2 motion to withdraw as counsel, Wineberg stated that defendant asserted that Wineberg and Potkonjak failed to provide effective representation and that defendant wished to withdraw his plea. The motion was based on a conversation an investigator from Wineberg’s office had with defendant in which defendant claimed that his attorneys did not help him and that he did not understand the plea and entered it against his wishes. However, at the next court appearance, defendant’s April 19 sentencing hearing, the court did not inquire into the allegations contained in the April 2 motion. I believe that the court was derelict in not inquiring into these prior allegations, in light of Paschall’s comments in the PSI that, between the March 15 appearance and the April 19 hearing, defendant again told Paschall that he did not understand the plea and entered it against his wishes. Moreover, defendant’s repeated demands at the sentencing hearing to just “know the time” indicate a wearied acquiescence to the process, which should have further prompted the court to explore the prior allegations. Beyond the problems surrounding the April 19 sentencing hearing, in defendant’s May 5 letter requesting an extension of time to appeal, defendant requested the assistance of an attorney. However, when Wineberg attempted to contact him, defendant did not respond until July 2. In his response, defendant asserted that he did not understand the law when he entered the plea. Based on his prior dealings with defendant, evidenced in particular by the April 2 motion to withdraw as counsel, Wineberg recognized that the effectiveness of his representation was probably being questioned and he conveyed his concerns to the trial court. On August 16, Wineberg informed the court that he had not heard from defendant since July 2. During this time, Wineberg never clarified what defendant specifically alleged in his letter even though Wineberg was aware that defendant was probably questioning his performance. Nonetheless, Wineberg, with the approval of the court, filed a motion to withdraw defendant’s plea. The August 16 motion to withdraw defendant’s plea did not allege ineffective assistance of counsel, which Wineberg could not properly allege anyway because of conflict issues. However, the motion stated that defendant was “pushed into making a hasty decision,” but it did not say who pushed him. Then, at the October 2 hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea, neither Wineberg, the trial court, nor the State spoke a single word about the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel or who “pushed [defendant] into making a hasty decision.” In fact, by this juncture, Wineberg was responsible for advocating a motion that three times he referred to as lacking merit. At the hearing, he did not give any oral argument, but simply rested upon the written motion. Based on my review of the record in this matter, I conclude that defendant’s allegations of ineffective representation were sufficiently brought to the attention of the trial court to require a preliminary investigation. However, as the proceedings unfolded, defendant’s allegations were either forgotten, ignored, or swept under the rug. The end result is that defendant has been denied a proper judicial inquiry into the underlying factual basis of his claims. In conclusion, since we do not have a clear understanding of what occurred during the conversations and correspondences between defendant and his attorneys, Potkonjak and Wineberg, no clear record exists on appeal to allow us to directly assess defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Thus, I would remand. See Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 81-82; see also Friend, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 143. However, I would not remand for a full evidentiary hearing and appointment of counsel on the issue of trial counsel’s competence. See Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 81. Rather, if, after the trial court performs the requisite preliminary investigation, it determines that the claims have merit, new counsel should be appointed and defendant should be allowed to pursue his motion to withdraw his plea, based on his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 81. If defendant’s claims are spurious or pertain only to matters of strategy, the trial court should simply leave standing defendant’s conviction and sentence, and defendant could pursue on appeal his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 81. For the aforementioned reasons, I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.