Court Opinion

ID: 9654913
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:54:30.487979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:14.668097
License: Public Domain

MAUZY, Justice,
dissenting.
In this extraordinary proceeding, the Republican Relators object to a redistricting plan designed to increase Mexican-Ameri-ean representation in the Texas Senate. This plan has received pre-clearance approval from the Department of Justice under the administration of President George Bush and has been approved in a timely manner by the trial court so as to avoid disruption of both the filing deadline and the election day for the party primaries. Finding this highly distasteful, and determined to have an appointed federal judiciary guide the process by which Texans elect their legislators, the Relators demand that this court accept their condemnation of Attorney General Dan Morales1 and declare void the redistricting plan he negotiated.
While careful to pay their personal respects to Mr. Morales as an individual, Justices Gonzalez and Cornyn enthusiastically agree with the Relators. Unwilling to accept this extremist view, which is wholly lacking in constitutional foundation and which would have incredible implications in handicapping the state’s handling of future litigation, Justices Hecht, Phillips and Cook specifically deny the very relief sought against the Attorney General. Majority Opinion at 721-722. These three must invent a basis for relief not urged by Rela-tors in their petition, briefs or oral argument but essential to achieving the result which was preordained the day this cause was set for argument.2
What Justices Gonzalez, Cornyn, Hecht, Phillips, and Cook have accomplished today is this:
Individuals who sat in a courtroom in judicial proceedings in Mena, without ever asking the trial judge to do anything, are furnished with an order from the Supreme Court that this trial judge abused his discretion by failing to listen to them. Moreover, this incredible order comes not two months after this court told the trial court that he could proceed with the settlement about which complaint is now made.
I.
The real issue in this proceeding concerns whether this court should adopt a special, unprecedented rule for a group of Republicans who literally sat on their rights on a bench at the Hidalgo County Courthouse quietly watching the trial court.3 For these particular parties, this *740court, of course, obliges. Republican is the self-description of Relators, whose principal complaint in the federal court proceeding is that the redistricting plan discriminates against their political party. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 118-27, 106 S.Ct. 2797, 2802-08, 92 L.Ed.2d 85 (1986); see also First Amended Original Complaint in Terrazas v. Slagle, No. A-91-CA-426 (W.D.Tex., filed June 7, 1991), at 4. Confidence in our system of justice is dependent upon our judiciary affording equal treatment under the law, regardless of political affiliation. We believe these particular Re-lators are entitled to equal treatment, but not the special treatment the majority today affords them. Today the majority responds to these Relators in a manner never done in the history of Texas and perhaps in the history of the United States.
A.
Most parties present their case to a fact-finder, and then seek review if they are dissatisfied with the trial court’s decision. The Relators in this case have managed to avoid all that. Instead of participating at trial, the Relators chose to start at the top by initiating their proceeding in this court. This should be a court of last resort, rather than first; thus, I would deny the mandamus.
Ordinarily, a writ of mandamus will issue only to correct a clear abuse of discretion or a violation of a duty imposed by law when there is no other adequate remedy at law. Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex.1985). Mandamus is not available as a substitute for a legal remedy. Industrial Accident Board v. Glenn, 144 Tex. 378, 190 S.W.2d 805, 807 (1945). Thus, if there is an adequate remedy by appeal, mandamus should be denied. Street v. Second Court of Appeals, 715 S.W.2d 638, 639 (Tex.1986).
As the Relators correctly note, a nonparty has no right to appeal a judgment. How, then, can an individual interested in a lawsuit obtain appellate review of the trial court’s adjudication? The answer is both simple and sensible: under the rules promulgated by this court, the individual must intervene in the trial court. See Tex. R.Civ.P. 60. Intervention allows individuals to assert their claims, and defend their interests, in an appropriate manner: by filing pleadings in the trial court and presenting evidence to support those pleadings. By encouraging affected parties to participate in a single trial, intervention promotes speedy disposition of suits, and prevents a multiplicity of actions. See St. Paul Insurance Co. v. Rahn, 586 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1979, no writ). Equally important, intervention ensures that affected parties will have prompt appellate review through normal channels. See, e.g., Coffee v. William Marsh Rice University, 403 S.W.2d 340, 341 (Tex.1966).4
B.
As Texas citizens, the Relators clearly had the right to intervene in the suits underlying this action. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204-08, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703-05, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962) (citizens have justicia-ble interests as voters); see also Guaranty Federal Savings Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 793 S.W.2d 652, 657 (Tex.1990) (setting out standards for intervention). In *741fact, in oral argument before this court, counsel for the Relators even acknowledged that they had the right to intervene. For the better part of a year, though, they deliberately chose not to do so.5 See Appendix A.
The Relators could have intervened as early as February of this year, when the Mena plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to require the State to develop new reapportionment plans. Conceding that they were fully aware of the proceedings in Mena, the Relators admit that they made a conscious decision to wait rather than to intervene.
The Relators were not sitting idle, however. While the Mena plaintiffs were making their case in state court, the Relators chose to press their claims in a separate action in federal court. In Terrazas v. Slagle, No. A-91-CA-426 (W.D.Tex., filed June 7, 1991), Louis Terrazas, Ernest Angelo, and Tom Craddick, with the same counsel that represents them here, challenged the constitutionality of the very reapportionment plan they now seek to reinstate.
The warning signal the Relators received in February, when Mena was filed, became a flashing beacon to intervene on July 29, when the Mena proceedings began to spill over into the Relators’ federal litigation. On July 29, the State defendants in Terrazas v. Slagle filed a “Motion for Stay of State Court Proceedings and Request for Expedited Consideration Due to Imminent Hearing,” along with copies of the Mena plaintiffs’ amended petition. The Relators were thus formally notified that the Mena plaintiffs sought injunctive relief ordering the State to develop alternative redistricting plans, and that the State considered developments in Mena imminent.
The Mena plaintiffs had the good sense to intervene in Terrazas v. Slagle to assert their interests and ensure their right to appellate review of any adverse ruling. The Terrazas v. Slagle plaintiffs — Relators here — did not follow suit, in any sense. Instead of intervening in Mena, the Rela-tors made a conscious decision to wait.
The Relators could have intervened after August 22, when the Mena court declared S.B. 31 unconstitutional. The court’s order temporarily enjoined the state from implementing S.B. 31, and directed the State to develop and submit to the trial court new redistricting plans. Again Relators made a conscious decision not to intervene.
The Relators could even have intervened in October, when state officials were publicly urging the Attorney General to agree to a new reapportionment plan. On October 3, the Lieutenant Governor sent a public letter to the Attorney General stating, “You have been requested by a majority of the Texas Senate to pursue a final settlement in the Mena v. Richards state district court lawsuit.” Additionally, nineteen senators signed a separate letter endorsing a specific reapportionment plan, and urging the Attorney General to “offer it to the district court in Mena v. Richards in final settlement of the Senate challenge of the case.” Here again, there is no suggestion that the Relators were unaware of the steps leading toward a settlement of Mena. Again Relators made a conscious decision not to intervene.
Two of the Relators, apparently realizing that state authorities were on the brink of resolving this matter, did choose to intervene — though not in Mena. The federal suit, Terrazas v. Slagle, was originally filed by only three of the five Relators here. On October 4 — one day after nineteen senators had endorsed the modified plan, and the same day the Lieutenant Governor urged the Attorney General to settle Mena — the other two Relators, Robert A. Estrada and Sim D. Stokes, III, intervened in the federal suit. Like their colleagues, *742these two made a conscious legal decision to confine their efforts to the federal forum.
The Relators could have attempted to intervene in Mena as late as November 27, the day the trial court signed its final judgment and permanent injunction ordering adoption of an interim election plan for the House of Representatives. Not until then did the trial court’s “Agreed Partial Final Judgment” of October 11 actually become final. See City of Arlington v. Texas Electric Service Co., 540 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Thus, Relators had more than six weeks after the October 11 interlocutory partial judgment in which to intervene, but they continued to decline the opportunity to do so.
The Relators’ most poignant snub of conventional procedure came on November 25, when the Mena case was called for trial on the remaining claims. The Relators may have been in Judge Ramirez’s Edinburg courtroom that day;6 but if so, they did not speak up. Relators may have acted deaf, dumb and blind in the trial court but they experienced no such handicaps in a more friendly forum. They spoke up vigorously here in Austin. While the trial court was considering its final decisions in Mena, the Relators filed their motions for relief in this court, seeking to invalidate the trial court’s judgment before it even became final.
C.
We have previously declined to issue mandamus to “those who slumber on their rights.” Callahan v. Giles, 137 Tex. 571, 155 S.W.2d 793, 795-96 (1941). Here, though, mandamus is even more inappropriate. The Relators were not slumbering; they were wide awake, watching, and waiting to present their claims to what they perceived as a more sympathetic court. By rewarding such tactics, the court today encourages all litigants to start at the top, bypassing the normal appellate process.
Disregarding the months of litigation (and non-litigation) in Mena, the plurality keeps its focus fixed on the Quiroz judgment, and in doing so loses sight of the real dispute. The proceedings in Quiroz amount to no more than a footnote in the history of the Mena case: Quiroz was filed on October 7 as a procedural device7 to expedite submission of the modified plan to the Justice Department prior to an October 8 federal deadline.8 Apart from that one objective, the parties never relied on the Quiroz judgment as a final settlement of their dispute over S.B. 31; instead, they filed a motion in this court the same day that judgment was rendered fully informing us of the separate proceeding and seeking our specific approval for the trial court to incorporate their agreement in the Mena proceedings. If that were not the case — if the Quiroz judgment were standing in isolation, with no relation to the Mena proceedings — then this issue would take on a very different complexion. The proceedings in Quiroz, though, do not excuse the Relators’ failure to intervene in Mena. Even if the Quiroz judgment were set aside, the Mena judgment would still remain.9
*743The plurality simply ignores the fact that the Relators indisputably could have intervened in Mena anytime during the eight months before Quiroz. Moreover, the plurality makes no attempt to explain how the judgment in Quiroz would have prevented the Relators from obtaining relief in Mena.
The plurality offers two excuses for the Relators’ failure to seek relief in the trial court: that the stay granted by this court prevented their intervention and that any attempt to intervene would have been futile because, the plurality prophesies, “the district court’s intention to render the judgment to which plaintiffs and the state defendants agreed was not reasonably subject to being altered by any request of relators.” Majority Op. at 725.
The stay issued by this court would not have prevented the filing of a motion to intervene by Relators, who were not parties at the time the stay was issued nor covered by its express terms. Moreover, there is no reason they could not, as did the State, petition this court to lift the stay to allow consideration of such a motion.
As authority for its conclusion that intervention would have been futile, the plurality relies on Stoner v. Massey, 586 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex.1979). In Stoner, a court of appeals had issued a judgment which read, in part, “It is hereby ordered that no further motion for rehearing will be entertained in this cause; none may be filed.” The effect of such order was to deny a right of appeal to this court. Because the court of appeals’ order was clear in its effect and the parties to which it applied, we did not require a further motion to be filed, because “it would have been pointless to make such an attempt.” Stoner is a unique exception to the traditional rule that mandamus requires “a legal duty to act; a demand for performance and a refusal.” 586 S.W.2d at 846. In the absence of a court order expressly noting the existence of a duty and the breach thereof, Texas courts have refused to waive the requirement of an actual demand and refusal:
The general rule is that the writ will not be granted in anticipation of a supposed omission of duty, however strong the presumption may be that the person sought to be coerced by the writ will refuse performance at the proper time. An important reason for refusing the writ in such cases is, that until the duty is due, no practical question can be presented to the court, but simply a supposed case.
Love v. Wilcox, 119 Tex. 256, 28 S.W.2d 515, 526 (1930).
In twisting the Stoner exception to encompass the facts before us today, the plurality greatly expands the court’s ordinary deference to the trial court to make a ruling before that ruling can be overturned by mandamus. By not asking to intervene, Relators have forfeited their right to appeal. By the plurality’s analysis, Relators are excused from this failure to make any request of the trial judge and allowed to bootstrap the right to the extraordinary remedy of mandamus.
The plurality’s conclusion that Judge Ramirez would have denied intervention is pure speculation. The fact that the trial court denied intervention by two state senators is not tantamount to denying intervention by all other interested persons, regardless of the grounds they assert as allowing their participation at trial. The plurality’s implication is that the trial court gave no real consideration to the attempted interventions by Senators Lucio and Sims, and presumably would give no consideration to claims brought by any others who might intervene.
In reality, the trial court held hearings for two days on the Senators’ intervention, and subsequently issued a four-page order discussing the merits of their claims. Moreover, in this mandamus proceeding, the court has not been provided with a full record of the proceedings below, including the motions to intervene in Quiroz. The order denying intervention, attached as Exhibit B to Relators’ Reply to Responses of Respondents and Intervenors to Petition for Writ of Mandamus, indicates the trial court based its decision on the lack of standing of elected officials to contest whether districts have been properly drawn, citing Tarrant County v. Ashmore, *744635 S.W.2d 417 (Tex.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038, 103 S.Ct. 452, 74 L.Ed.2d 606 (1982). The limited basis of this order, coupled with a limited record, provides no reason to presume that, presented with a properly drawn motion to intervene, the trial court would not exercise its discretion properly. The plurality’s reasoning, contrary to Wilcox, anticipates a supposed omission of the trial court to perform its duties. Taking issue with the trial court’s denial of intervention of parties not before this court, the plurality apparently suggests that any trial judge who makes a decision the plurality disagrees with must be totally predisposed to reach the wrong result.
The order in Quiroz denying the Senators’ intervention is not now before this court; and the correctness of the trial court’s reasoning is not in issue. The real question is whether a party can totally bypass a trial court on the sole ground that the court made an arguably erroneous ruling concerning claims made by others.
Our judicial system has never allowed parties to circumvent traditional procedures on such flimsy grounds. Even when a trial court dismisses claims for want of jurisdiction, the individual bringing those claims is expected to pursue the normal appellate process, regardless of whether the dismissal was legally sound. See, e.g., Farah v. Fashing, 666 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1984, orig. proceeding) (mandamus relief denied because relator had adequate remedy by appeal to challenge the granting of a plea to the jurisdiction). Senators Sims and Lucio sought, within the time the trial court retained plenary power, to have the judgments in Qui-roz and Mena set aside and to intervene. They properly followed the procedural steps dictated by this court in Times Herald Printing Co. v. Jones, 730 S.W.2d 648, 649 (Tex.1987) (per curiam). Whether intervention was properly denied may be raised by them on appeal. Dickerson v. State, 169 S.W.2d 1005 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1943), rev’d on other grounds, 141 Tex. 475, 174 S.W.2d 244 (1943); see also League of United Latin American Citizens v. Lo-Vaca Gathering Co., 527 S.W.2d 507, 508 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (order striking intervention may be appealed after rendition of final judgment between the parties).
II.
Today’s decision should dispel any lingering notions that this court’s holdings are guided by its own precedent. The plurality today holds that a trial court abused its discretion in doing the very thing this court did, in the very same case, on the very preceding day.
On Monday, October 7, this court was called upon to decide whether the Mena court should be allowed to render an agreed judgment as to Senate redistricting based on the Quiroz judgment. On that day, the Attorney General filed a motion to modify the stay order that this court had issued in Mena. The motion stated that the Attorney General had concluded a settlement agreement resolving the dispute over S.B. 31, that the trial court in Quiroz v. Richards had signed an agreed final judgment based on the modified plan, and that the parties wished to present that plan to the trial court in Mena. Attached to the motion was a copy of the agreed final judgment in Quiroz. Two days later, at the request of this court, the plaintiffs/ap-pellees in Mena responded to the motion to modify, stating that they joined the Attorney General in asking that the stay order be modified for purposes of settlement.
Based on the motion and response, it was perfectly clear that the parties intended to settle the Senate portion of Mena on the basis of the Quiroz judgment. This was no secret agreement or back-room deal; the parties openly sought approval of the Supreme Court of Texas for the trial court to enter judgment adopting their settlement.
If the majority had legitimate concerns about the parties’ actions, if its true objective was sound public policy rather than public entrapment, it could easily have said so in this court’s prior order. It could have overruled the motion to modify the stay order. It could have issued a modified stay *745order directing the trial court to scrutinize the modified plan and to require testimony and statewide public notice before entering judgment. It could even have issued a modified stay order expressly instructing the trial court not to sign a judgment in Mena based solely on the judgment in Qui-roz.
This court did none of those things. Instead, it did exactly what the parties had asked: it modified the stay order to allow the parties to “present to the trial court for its consideration, a proposed settlement of plaintiff’s challenge to Senate Bill 31.”
As expected, the parties then went to Judge Ramirez with their Quiroz judgment, and filed a joint motion for entry of agreed judgment in Mena. What was the trial court to do then?
No doubt the trial court looked to this court for guidance, and no doubt the trial court found the guidance it sought. Sometimes our lead may seem difficult to follow — facts differ, times change, and the law evolves — but not this time. Less than twenty-four hours earlier, the Texas Supreme Court had signed off on this very matter. Faced with the same decision, based on the same record, this court had given unqualified approval.
The plurality downplays the October 10 order by likening it to the order of October 30, in which we remanded the remainder of the case for trial. The comparison could hardly be more inapt. The October 10 order was requested and issued so that judgment could be rendered based on the settlement agreement — a procedure for which we now announce new rules — while the October 30 order was requested and issued so that the case could proceed to trial. The comparison would be closer if the October 30 order had sanctioned a particular trial ruling, and this court subsequently held that the trial court abused its discretion in making that ruling. That result, like the present result, would be patently unfair.
Today the plurality provides new instructions to the trial court to govern its handling of the case on remand. We can only wonder what guidelines will prevail the next time this case comes before the court.
III.
Announcing a new approach to agreed judgments, the plurality holds that “[a]n apportionment statute cannot be invalidated and an alternate plan ordered without hearing and careful deliberation,” Majority Op. at 720, even in the context of a settlement agreement. The plurality further states that “[t]he hearing should provide sufficient evidence, adduced by testimony, documents, stipulations or some other manner, to permit the district court to make an informed ruling that can be reviewed on appeal.” Maj. Op. at 720.
While I wholeheartedly embrace these new requirements, the plurality today demonstrates a markedly different attitude toward openness in government than its members have shown in other recent decisions. See, e.g., City of San Antonio v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 820 S.W.2d 762, 778 (1991) (Mauzy, J., dissenting) (noting that the court was thwarting the clear intent of the Open Meetings Act); Supreme Court Order (April 24, 1990) (Gonzalez and Hecht, JJ., dissenting) (opposing procedures to provide greater public access to court records); Supreme Court Order, Misc.Docket No. 92-0008 (Oct. 17, 1991) (Doggett, J., dissenting) (objecting to Supreme Court appointment of major campaign organizer to public office in closed meeting). To whatever extent this change is a lasting one, I welcome it. I have serious concerns, however, about the circumstances giving rise to the plurality’s new approach.
As noted above, a writ of mandamus ordinarily issues only to correct a clear abuse of discretion or a violation of a duty imposed by law when there is no other adequate remedy at law. Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d at 917. It is sometimes said that the respondent must have a clear ministerial duty to perform the act the petitioner seeks to compel. See, e.g., Jessen Associates, Inc. v. Bullock, 531 S.W.2d 593, 602 (Tex.1975); Turner v. Pruitt, 161 Tex. 532, 342 S.W.2d 422, 423 (1961).
*746The Relators’ repudiation of our traditional procedures makes mandamus relief wholly inappropriate, and this court’s prior action in the case makes it doubly so.10 In this setting, the newfound interest in public participation by Justices Gonzalez, Hecht, Phillips and Cook gives the appearance of a court desperately reaching out to find some plausible basis for the issuance of an extraordinary writ. This professed concern also flies in the face of the facts of this case, which indicate a highly publicized open proceeding, with public hearings in an open courtroom based upon open records, followed by public communications among some of the state’s leading public officials and following appropriate public communications with the highest court in Texas.
IV.
In their opinions,11 Justices Gonzalez and Cornyn would place severe and totally unjustified limitations upon the Attorney General of Texas in the performance of his constitutional duties. As the state’s chief legal officer, the Attorney General has always been understood to possess broad discretionary authority. See Tex. Const, art. 4, § 22. We recognized long ago the discretion essential to this authority:
The office of Attorney General is one of ancient origin, and in all jurisdictions its duties have been multifarious, necessarily involving at all times the exercise of broad judgment and discretion. Even in the matter of bringing suits the Attorney General must exercise judgment and discretion, which will not be controlled by other authorities.
Charles Scribner’s Sons v. Marrs, 114 Tex. 11, 262 S.W. 722, 727 (1924). See also Bullock v. Texas Skating Assoc., 583 S.W.2d 888, 894 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
The opinions by Justices Gonzalez and Cornyn suggest that the Attorney General’s authority is sharply limited by the separation of powers provision, Tex. Const, art 2, § 1. Both take a peculiarly formalistic approach to that provision, arguing that it bars the attorney general, as a member of the executive department, from acting in any manner resembling legislative or judicial functions. In adopting that view, Justices Gonzalez and Cornyn fall into the very trap which one respected commentator recently warned against:
The danger of the formalist approach is that the interpreter may read the constitution woodenly, losing sight of the purposes of separated powers — to prevent arbitrary and inefficient government.
Harold H. Bruff, Separation of Powers Under the Texas Constitution, 68 Tex. L.Rev. 1337, 1351 (1990). The consequences of accepting this formalist view would be catastrophic:
To insist that only the legislature make law, only the executive implement statutes,. and only the courts adjudicate controversies would destroy modern government. It also would pose insuperable practical and theoretical difficulties.
Id. at 1345.
The difficulties posed by the Gonzalez-Cornyn approach are countless. If their view were to prevail, no district attorney could ever negotiate a plea bargain in a criminal matter. The Attorney General could not issue opinions construing state law, and certainly could not construe a state law to be unconstitutional. Nor could the Attorney General settle troublesome cases, or even agree to stipulations to narrow the issues to be litigated. Cf. United *747States v. State of Texas, 523 F.Supp. 703, 712 n. 2 (E.D.Tex.1981).12
The consequences of the Gonzalez-Cor-nyn approach would be particularly devastating in the reapportionment context. Under their view, the Attorney General would have to fight every redistricting challenge ceaselessly, at taxpayers’ expense, all the way to the United States Supreme Court — even when the Attorney General determines that the proposed plan is unconstitutional, and even if a majority of the state’s legislators urge a settlement.
Especially baffling is the logic of Justice Gonzalez’s concurring opinion that by agreeing to settle the case, Attorney General Morales “inevitably acted adversely to part of his constituency.” Op. at 729. Of course, any settlement agreement involving citizens opposing each other may be adverse to part of the Attorney General’s constituency, since he represents all Texans. To distinguish between the settlement at issue and any other settlement, Justice Gonzalez simply asserts that “there is a vast difference” between the two, without attempting to explain what that difference is. Opinion at 729 n. 6.
V.
Since today’s writings will affect not only these parties but also the course of future redistricting litigation, I note those important issues on which at least seven justices agree:
1. The attorney general is constitutionally empowered to execute a settlement agreement in litigation challenging a legislative redistricting plan.
2. A trial court is constitutionally empowered to invalidate an unconstitutional legislative redistricting plan.
3. A trial court is constitutionally empowered to adopt a constitutional legislative redistricting plan as a remedy for an unconstitutional legislative redistricting plan.
4. Before rendering judgment to adopt a substitute legislative redistricting plan, a trial court, to the extent possible without disrupting the election process, should show due deference to the legislative and executive branches affording them a reasonable opportunity to remedy constitutional deficiencies.
5. Before rendering judgment to adopt a substitute legislative redistricting plan, recognizing the particular public interest involved in ensuring the integrity of the election process, a trial court should afford a full opportunity for all interested persons to be heard. This should include public notice of its intention to adopt a substitute plan, a reasonable opportunity for interested persons to intervene and be heard concerning same, even if the substitute represents a settlement, and a requirement that evidence be heard to support adoption of the substitute plan.
Our conflict centers on whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to apply these principles first announced today to these Relators, who never petitioned the trial court for this relief but consciously chose to sit, watch and complain later to this court when dissatisfied with the result he reached.
VI.
Redistricting cases are particularly time-sensitive; with filing deadlines closing in, and elections looming, the people of Texas have a vital interest in knowing for certain where district lines lie. All three departments of government have an obligation to recognize that interest, impacting as it does the very structure of our electoral system.
Until today, all three departments have been honoring that obligation. The executive branch, through the Attorney General, has worked assiduously to ensure that a viable plan would be timely submitted to the Justice Department. The legislative branch, through the Lieutenant Governor *748and nineteen senators, has given to that effort its informal support — the only kind of support it can offer without being called into session. And the judicial branch, through Judge Ramirez, has provided an orderly forum wherein any interested parties could resolve their disagreements in an efficient manner. All of those elements converged in a state courtroom in Edin-burg, where Judge Ramirez prudently expedited the proceedings so as to avoid postponing either the filing deadline or the elections.
Today the court thwarts all those concerted efforts.13 As a result of today’s ruling, the only prudent course for Judge Ramirez will be to postpone both the deadline for filing and the elections.14 Confusion will be widespread, and the costs will be enormous.
The real cost, though, cannot be stated in dollars. The real cost is the blow to our system of justice. Politics, not precedent or the rule of law, has determined the outcome of this action. Every Texan— Republican, Democrat, Independent — suffers when our laws are manipulated as they have been in this proceeding to accord special treatment to a privileged group.
DOGGETT, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.
APPENDIX A
1991 Events Which Relators
Made a Conscious Legal Decision to Ignore
February 7 Challenge to state redistricting filed in Mena v. Richards.
March 22 State’s answer asserts this is redistricting lawsuit.
June 19 Mena plaintiffs amend pleadings to assert redistricting claim. (Even counsel for Relators concedes in oral argument that this became a redistricting lawsuit at this point.)
July 29 Relators are formally served with copies of the Mena plaintiffs’ petition, along with a “Motion for Stay of State Court Proceedings and Request for Expedited Consideration Due to Imminent Hearing,” in Terrazas v. Slagle, Nos. A-91-CA-425, -426, and -428 (W.D.Tex.1991).
August 5-8 Mena plaintiffs present testimony at public court hearing challenging state redistrieting.
August 22 Trial court enjoins state redistricting and orders State to submit new plans by September 30.
October 3 Lt. Gov. Bullock issues public letter requesting Attorney General Morales to settle Senate portion of lawsuit.
October 4 19 state senators issue public letter requesting Attorney General to obtain court approval for their proposed settlement plan.
October 7 Settlement by Mena plaintiffs and defendants based upon proposal of October 4 is incorporated in an Agreed Final Judgment in Quiroz v. Richards, No. C-4395-91F. Because of this settlement, Relators determine that the Attorney General is no longer defending S.B. 31.
October 9 Mena plaintiffs join in State’s request to Texas Supreme Court that Stay be modified to allow settlement of claims involving S.B. 31.
October 10 Texas Supreme Court modifies stay order to permit “presentation] to *749the trial court for its consideration, a proposed settlement of plaintiffs challenge to Senate Bill 31.”
October 11 Trial court in Mena renders Agreed Partial Final Judgment essentially the same as the judgment of October 7th in Quiroz.
October 30 Texas Supreme Court lifts stay of proceedings in Mena so that the parties could proceed to trial and the trial court could render a final judgment.
November 25 Hon. Mario E. Ramirez, Jr., Judge of 332nd District Court of Hilda-go County, calls the Mena cause for trial.
Relators choose to ignore the call for trial in the Mena case and move for leave to file their petition for writ of mandamus in the Texas Supreme Court.

. "What has happened in the course of proceedings in the Valley is nothing more or less than the Attorney General having ignored and, indeed, trampled on the Texas Constitution. He has ignored his oath of office, he has ignored the separation of powers doctrine, and as importantly, he has ignored the right of the people of the State of Texas to vote_ [He has participated in what] was simply the product of a back-room deal.” Oral argument of John McCamish, counsel for Relators, December 10, 1991.

. Justice Hecht’s response to this statement is insightful. Majority Op. at 721 n. 11. He does not deny that the entire plurality opinion is based on grounds never urged in this proceeding. The "substantial body of redistricting litigation throughout the country," from which Justice Hecht derives the "principles" governing this mandamus action is nowhere referenced in Relators’ briefs or arguments before the court. Having taken an absolute stand that a settlement agreement could never be approved by the Attorney General or a state district court, Rela-tors never addressed nor attacked the procedural mechanisms for effectuating a settlement. The mandamusable defects in the trial court's actions are the plurality’s own invention.

.“They, it is a fair statement to say, have refused to intervene. They have known, both in regard to the House and the Senate, since, I would say February, when the lawsuit was filed, because our argument has always been it’s really a redistricting suit, not just a census suit. But certainly, since June, when the petition was *740amended in the state court suit to say this is clearly a redistricting suit. Since then, they have been on notice, they have attended the hearings, they have sat in the audience and watched. They have known of the existence of this proceeding and, ... they have refused to participate." Oral argument of Renea Hicks, Counsel for real parties in interest, Dan Morales and John Hannah, Jr., December 10, 1991. Counsel for Relators conceded that his clients were either in attendance or aware of all these proceedings from at least the point at which they filed their federal lawsuit in June. Oral argument of John McCamish.

. Coffee was a trustees' suit to construe a charitable trust. The Attorney General of Texas was the named defendant; but two groups of claimed beneficiaries intervened. Though the Attorney General chose not to appeal the trial court's judgment, one group of beneficiaries did appeal. After the court of appeals declined to consider the case, 387 S.W.2d 132, (Tex.Civ.App.1965) this court reversed, holding that the inter-venors had a sufficient interest to prosecute an appeal. 403 S.W.2d at 341.

. "[Relators] had every opportunity to fully try and participate in the case in front of Judge Ramirez.... They did not want to submit to the jurisdiction of the court, they did not want to have to sit in Edinburgh, go through the tedious trial, and have to participate in the conclusions that the judge reached because of the consequences they had to face.... They did not want to be bound by that judgment because they would have collateral estoppel and res judi-cata problems in their federal suit.” Oral argument of James Harrington, counsel for Inter-venors, December 10, 1991.

. See note 3, supra, concerning admissions of counsel for Relators in oral argument on this point.

. “Quiroz was a procedural device in order to move the Senate plan off to the Justice Department for approval — because we didn’t know how long it would take for you all to act and the consensus has always been, no matter how adversarial it’s been, that we want to have a new plan if possible for the spring primaries.” Oral Argument of James C. Harrington, counsel for Intervenors, December 10, 1991.

. "We were facing a deadline of October 8th from the Justice Department. And as I said before, no one doubted but that the Justice Department was going to invalidate S.B. 31 at that point. There’s nothing written down that says that, but no one doubted it. So there had to be a judgment made.” Oral argument of Renea Hicks, counsel for real parties in interest, December 10, 1991.

. Justice Hecht’s suggestion that through Qui-roz, "the parties in Mena constructed a trap for relators from which the dissent would not let them escape," Maj. Op. at 724, ignores the substance of this dissent.

. If any mandamus relief were appropriate, it certainly would not include directing the trial court to vacate the judgments. Any trial court failure to make a formal finding that S.B. 31 is unconstitutional, which moves the plurality to abandon the judgments completely, could be remedied with an order instructing the court to either amend the judgment or make findings and conclusions in support thereof.

. While entitling his writing a "Concurring Opinion," Justice Cornyn is clearly concurring but also dissenting, insofar as he would grant mandamus relief against the Attorney General. Since the plurality opinion expressly denies that relief sought by Relators, Justice Cornyn’s willingness to issue the writ places him firmly in a dissenting position as to that aspect of the judgment.

. "The state courts have repeatedly confirmed the broad discretion accorded the Attorney General in the exercise of his responsibility to protect the interests of the state through litigation.... Thus, under state law, the Attorney General necessarily had the power to enter into evidentiary stipulations as a strategic decision at trial.”

. The disruptive effect of today’s decision on upcoming elections will be all the more severe if, as argued to this court, it extends to the settlement applicable to redistricting of the House of Representatives. Oral argument of John McCamish, counsel for Relators (court’s decision “will be [determinative] ... if you grant the mandamus.”), and oral argument of Renea Hicks, counsel for real parties in interest (court's decision will "obviously” have an impact on House redistricting plan), December 10, 1991. If, as suggested by the November 27, 1991 judgment in Mena, the House plan was implemented by a settlement using similar procedural mechanisms found lacking here, it appears that today’s action will also disrupt Texans' elections of their state representatives.

. This postponement will be particularly essential if, as a result of the hearing the court mandates today, Judge Ramirez makes even the slightest change in the plans he has already approved, requiring resubmission of those plans to the Department of Justice.