Court Opinion

ID: 9724704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:09:28.031255+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:04.967779
License: Public Domain

GARTZKE, P. J.
(concurring). I conclude that the free speech provisions in Wis. Const, art. I, sec. 3, are intended to protect persons only from state action. Because the plaintiff mall operators are private persons and the malls are privately owned, the defendants have no constitutional right to exercise free speech on the malls. The plaintiffs have a common law right generally to prevent other persons from trespassing on the malls. Since the defendants persist in trespassing on the malls, the plaintiffs are entitled to an injunction.
The constitutional provision at issue is the third section of the Declaration of Rights in the Wisconsin Constitution, art. I, sec. 3, which provides:
Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right, and no laws shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions or indictments for libel, the truth may be given in evidence, and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous be true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact.
That Wisconsin may grant greater constitutional rights to persons within its borders than does the United States Constitution is well established. Both the United States Supreme Court and the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognize this principle. That Wiscon*125sin may endow private persons with state constitutional rights enforceable against other private persons is equally well established.
The question before us is more limited. The question is whether Wis. Const, art. I, sec. 3, as adopted in 1848, grants private persons a right of free speech enforceable against other private persons.1 Only if we affirmatively resolve that question do we reach the issue of reasonable restrictions on the exercise of that right.
We cannot resolve the question by deciding whether it is good public policy to give private persons a right of free speech enforceable against other private persons. We "are not obliged to explain that what is constitutional is also good, nor that everything good also is constitutional." Linde, E Pluribus— Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 Ga. L. Rev. 165, 180 (1984).
Nor does the answer lie in how the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the first amendment to the United States Constitution, which prohibits Congress from "abridging the freedom of speech." Although the first amendment creates no constitutional right of *126free speech enforceable by private persons against each other, Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518-19 (1976), state constitutions may do so. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980). See McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 139, 121 N.W.2d 545, 548 (1963) (state may permit greater freedom of speech than federal constitution requires).
The answer lies in the proper interpretation of Wis. Const, art. I, sec. 3. Constitutional interpretation, like statutory interpretation, is a question of law, a task for the courts. State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Dam-mann, 201 Wis. 84, 88-89, 228 N.W. 593, 595 (1930).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has articulated the analysis which every court must use when interpreting a provision in the Wisconsin Constitution. State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d 122,136, 341 N.W.2d 668, 675 (1984). The analysis requires a court first to examine the plain meaning of the words in the context used. If the meaning is not plain, the court then makes an historical analysis of the constitutional debate and of the practices in 1848 which may reasonably be presumed were known to the framers of the 1848 constitution. The next step is to examine the earliest legislative interpretation of the provision as manifested in the first law passed following adoption of the constitution. Id. at 136-37, 341 N.W.2d at 675; Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 568, 247 N.W.2d 141, 149 (1976); Board of Education v. Sinclair, 65 Wis. 2d 179, 182-84, 222 N.W.2d 143,145-46 (1974). If these rules of constitutional interpretation do not provide an answer, the court may look to the objectives of the framers in adopting the provision. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d at 138, 341 N.W.2d at 676.
The Beno court dealt with Wis. Const, art. IV, secs. 15 and 16. Article IV describes how the legislature per*127forms its functions. We deal with Wis. Const, art. I, sec. 3. Before applying the Beno analysis to art. I, sec. 3, it is necessary to explain why the presumption should exist that a specific provision in art. 1 is intended to protect persons only from state action.
The constitutional context of the free speech provision is the Declaration of Rights. Section 3 has been part of this state's Declaration of Rights since 1848. In that year the people ratified not only the constitution but those sections separately set off from all others as a Declaration of Rights. That heading was adopted as part of the constitution. Accordingly, the heading of art. 1, Declaration of Rights, is not something which may be ignored as may, for example, a statute's title.2 The heading is as much a part of the constitution as sec. 3 itself.
A proper understanding of the free speech provisions in Wis. Const, art. I, sec. 3, therefore requires an examination of the function of a declaration or bill of rights in a state constitution. A declaration or bill of rights is, at its very least, a solemn statement of those powers, privileges and liberties considered basic and most important. Compare Black's Law Dictionary 149 (rev. 5th ed. 1979) (a "bill of rights" is a "formal and emphatic legislative assertion and declaration of popular rights and liberties usually promulgated upon a change of government;. . . the summary of the rights and liberties of the people, or of the principles of constitutional law deemed essential and fundamental, contained in many of the American state constitutions").
*128A declaration or bill of rights is, however, more than a mere statement of rights. It is a statement of rights reserved and withheld from governmental action. It is a limitation and restraint on governmental action. It is a negative protection against state action. Thus, the modern dictionary definition of a bill of rights is "a summary of certain fundamental rights and privileges guaranteed to a people against violation by the state.. . ." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 216 (1976). This concept of a declaration or bill of rights has been accepted by historians, learned writers and legal commentators. It has also been accepted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
We look to the views of historians because history helps us understand the constitution. State ex rel. Weiss v. District Board, 76 Wis. 177, 203, 44 N.W. 967, 976 (1890) (Cassoday, J., concurring). We are to "put ourselves in the place the constitution makers occupied, — look at the situation they had in view through the same vista they observed it. . . ." State ex rel. Owen v. Donald, 160 Wis. 21, 81,151 N.W. 331, 350 (1915). We must try to think like mid-nineteenth century constitution makers probably thought, for sec. 3 of the Declaration of Rights has never been amended since its adoption in 1848.
By stating the people's retained rights, a declaration or bill of rights in the early constitutions satisfied the second part of a theory of government. That twofold theory distinguishes rights entrusted by the people to the state for safeguarding from retained rights withheld from state interference. The theory is described by C. H. Mcllwain in 2 Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences 545-46 (1930):
*129The basic theory underlying the early bills of rights is a belief in the rights of individual men and in rights existing in the law of nature independent of states or their laws, as set forth especially in Locke's Second Treatise of Government (1690). Some of these rights were regarded as alienable and might be entrusted by a people to its government for due compensation, but there are others of which no man is ever capable of divesting himself or his posterity even by consent or for compensation; they are inalienable. An instrument of government ought then to consist of two parts: a "frame" or form of government in which the first of these two kinds of rights, the alienable ones, are entrusted to the various organs of the state under proper safeguards for due compensation in the form of just and effective government; and a "bill of rights" enumerating the inalienable rights of the people which they cannot delegate to their government and which the latter is explicitly forbidden ever to infringe.
At the time of the American Revolution, a consensus existed that ”[n]o written constitution can be considered complete unless it embodies a specific declaration of rights." C. Rossiter, Political Thought of the American Revolution 185 (1953). "The bill of rights was to be something more than a symbol or incantation. The plan and powers of government had to conform to the people's own statement of the rights they were retaining." Id. at 186.
That the same point applied to state constitutions was recognized soon after the United States Constitution was adopted on September 18, 1787. Only four months later, January 17,1788, "Brutus" said, "[a]ll the state constitutions, contain either formal bills of rights, which set bounds to the powers of the legisla*130ture, or have restrictions for the same purpose in the body of the constitutions." Essays of Brutus, in The An-tifederalist 153-54 (H. Storing ed. 1985).
A legal historian, Professor James Willard Hurst, refers to "the liberty guaranteed by the negatives, which the Bill of Rights sets on official power." J. Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom 37 (1956). He describes the state constitutions as having "dealt largely with the limitation of powers that resided in state governments without the need of affirmative grant." J. Hurst, The Growth of American Law 241 (1950).
Other historians agree. In the first state constitutions the "[principal restraints placed on lawmaking bodies were the bills of rights designed to protect persons and property from arbitrary government action." A. Sturm, The Development of American State Constitutions, in Publius 61 (Winter 1982). Few changes in state bills of rights occurred between 1800 and 1860. Id. at 63. Professor W. Y. Elliott refers to bills of rights in state constitutions as "admonitions to the legislature which aimed at preventing the abuse of private rights." Elliott, The Constitution as the American Social Myth, in The Constitution Reconsidered 217 (C. Read ed. 1938) (emphasis in original). The same thought is expressed in C. Friedrich & R. McCloskey, The Roots of American Constitutionalism, in From the Declaration of Independence to the Constitution xix (1954): the key idea of a bill of rights is "that of the sacred sphere of human right which no government invades but at its peril."
In his historical discussion of liberty, Professor Roscoe Pound said that the "liberty guaranteed by our bills of rights is a reservation to the individual of certain fundamental reasonable expectations. . . ." *131Pounds, The Development of Constitutional Guarantees of Liberty, Part 1, 20 Notre Dame Law. 183, 183 (1945). "[BJills of rights are bills of liberties. They define circumstances and situations and occasions in which politically organized society will keep its hands off and permit free spontaneous individual activity; . . . ." Pound, The Development of Constitutional Guarantees of Liberty, Part III, 20 Notre Dame Law. 347, 379 (1945).
Justice Story, who served on the United States Supreme Court from 1811 to 1845, recognized the nature of a bill of rights. He wrote,
[A] bill of rights is important, and may often be indispensable, whenever it operates, as a qualification upon powers, actually granted by the people to the government. This is the real ground of all the bills of rights in the parent country, in the colonial constitutions and laws, and in the state constitutions.
3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States sec. 1858, at 718 (Boston 1833).3
*132Other nineteenth century law commentators agreed with Story that state declarations or bills of rights are limitations on state action. A declaration of rights in a state constitution "is inserted in the constitution for the express purpose of operating as a restriction upon legislative power." T. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 176 (Boston 1868). "The separate states have also adopted constitutions which contain . . . limitations upon the local governments. It is a fact, therefore, that the entire legislative and administrative power of the whole country, whether wielded by the nation or by the states, is subject to restraints. . . ." J. Pomeroy, An Introduction to the Constitutional Law of the United States sec. 230, at 145 (New York 1868). Bills of rights in state constitutions establish a line beyond which "no human legislation should be suffered to conflict with the rights declared to be inherent and inalienable." W. Bateman, Political and Constitutional Law sec. 16, at 14 n.l (St. Louis 1876) (emphasis in original)4 .
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has recognized that our Declaration of Rights creates limitations or restrictions on state action. Section 1 of the Declaration of *133Rights contains no reference to laws or express limitation on state action.5 In State ex rel. Zillmer v. Kreutz-berg, 114 Wis. 530, 532, 90 N.W. 1098,1099 (1902), the supreme court said, "[a]t this late date it cannot be doubted that this declaration of the purpose to be accomplished is to be construed as a limitation upon the powers given." See also Pauly v. Keebler,' 175 Wis. 428, 430-31,185 N.W. 554,556 (1921) (art. 1, sec. 1, is a "limitation of legislative power"); State v. Redmon, 134 Wis. 89,101,114 N.W. 137,138 (1907) (art. 1, sec. 1, contains a "broad general restriction of legislative power"); Nun-nemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 230,108 N.W. 627,640 (1906) (Dodge, J., dissenting) (art. 1, sec. 1, is a "limitation upon the powers delegated to the government'); State ex rel. Kellogg v. Currens, 111 Wis. 431, 434-35, 87 N.W. 561,562 (1901) (art. 1, sec. 1, imposes a "limitation" on the legislature).
Section 9 of the Declaration of Rights contains no reference to laws or express limitation on state action.6 Durkee v. City of Janesville, 28 Wis. 464, 469-71 (1871), nevertheless held that sec. 9 is a limitation upon the power of the state to discriminate between the rights of different parties to the same litigation. See also City *134of Janesville v. Carpenter, 77 Wis. 288, 301, 46 N.W. 128, 132 (1890) (statute taking property without compensation or due process and denying person equal protection violated art. 1, secs. 9 and 13); Hincks v. City of Milwaukee, 46 Wis. 559, 566,1 N.W. 230, 232 (1879) (art. 1, sec. 9 invalidates legislative immunity granted to one municipality but not to others).
*133Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character; he ought to obtain justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformably to the laws.
*134Section 22 of the Declaration of Rights contains no reference to law and no express limitation on state action.7 State ex rel. Milwaukee Medical College v. Chit-tenden, 127 Wis. 468, 521,107 N.W. 500, 517-18 (1906), nevertheless refers to "the implied inhibition" in that section.
By 1910 the supreme court could state generally that the Declaration of Rights "constitute^] inhibitions of legislative interference by implication, and with quite as much efficiency as would express limitations, as this court has often held." State ex rel. McGrael v. Phelps, 144 Wis. 1, 15, 128 N.W. 1041, 1946 (1910).
Given these repeated references to the Declaration of Rights as a limitation on state action, we should find some support in the decisions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court for the proposition that our Declaration does not protect private persons from private interference. Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court has seldom had to recognize the principle, a few decisions support it.
*135Section 18 of the Declaration of Rights guarantees freedom of religion to every person in this state.8 Section 18 does not refer to state action except that preference may not be given to any religious establishment or mode of worship and state funds may not be used to benefit religious organizations. When, however, a mother bequeathed annual payments to her son on condition that he attend a named church, the supreme court rejected his argument that the condition was repugnant to sec. 18. In re Paulson's Will, 127 Wis. 612, 618, 107 N.W. 484, 486-87 (1906).
In Barry v. Order of Catholic Knights, 119 Wis. 362,96 N.W. 797 (1903), a widow sued on a death benefit certificate issued by a Roman Catholic association from which her husband had been expelled, his marriage to her having caused his excommunication. She contended that provisions in the association's constitution and bylaws that require members to be "practical Catholics" violated sec. 18 of the Declaration of Rights. The Barry court rejected the argument. Id. at 366, 96 N.W. at 799.
In State ex rel. Dame v. LeFevre, 251 Wis. 146, 28 N.W.2d 349 (1947), an expelled union member sought reinstatement. The LeFevre court rejected his claim *136that he could not be expelled without due process of law. The court said, "The due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions are not applicable to contract relationships between individuals." Id. at 152, 28 N.W.2d at 353.
Section 11 of the Declaration of Rights protects persons against unreasonable searches and seizures, but does not expressly limit the right against unreasonable searches and seizures to those conducted by the state.9 Ware v. State, 201 Wis. 425, 230 N.W. 80 (1930), held that defendant's diary was admissible in evidence against her. Defendant's former husband had taken a key from her purse, unlocked the chest in which the diary was kept and apparently delivered it to the prosecution. The Ware court held that procurement of the diary did not violate some constitutional right of the defendant. Id. at 427, 230 N.W. at 80-81. See also Pot-man v. State, 259 Wis. 234,239-40,47 N.W.2d 884,886-87 (1951) (search by private persons without defendant's consent does not violate sec. 11 ).
That the Wisconsin Declaration of Rights was intended when written to restrict state action therefore cannot be doubted. Mid-nineteenth century lawyers had to understand that the function of a declaration or bill of rights is to restrain state interference with individual liberties. Nineteen lawyers were members *137of the sixty-nine member state constitutional convention when it convened December 15,1847. Brown, The Making of the Wisconsin Constitution, 1952 Wis. L. Rev. 23, 24.
Hence, the suggestion that a specific provision in the Declaration grants rights to persons enforceable against other private persons proposes a new direction. The proposal would work a change from withholding rights from government action to granting rights in every person enforceable against all other persons. To hold that a negative restraint on government creates a positive right assertable against all other persons would be a sharp and unexpected deviation from the apparent original course.
Because the proposed change deviates from the original direction of the Declaration of Rights, we should presume that a specific provision in the Declaration is intended to protect persons only from state action unless strong evidence exists to the contrary. When constitution makers can be found, as here, to have had an intention consistent with a prevailing concept of government, but we are urged to find that they intended an additional theory, it is fair to force proponents of the new theory to prove that it also was intended.
The presumption that protection only from state action was intended accommodates those provisions in the Declaration of Rights which may protect persons from certain actions by private persons. Section 2 prohibits slavery or involuntary servitude except to punish for crime. Section 14 prohibits leases and grants of agricultural land for more than 15 years and voids restraints upon alienation. Section 16 prohibits imprisonment for debt. Section 17, requiring laws creating ex*138emptions from seizure or sale for payment of debt, may be another example.
The presumption should apply at every level when interpreting the Declaration of Rights, since the aim of constitutional analysis is to find the meaning intended by the framers. State ex rel. Zimmerman, 201 Wis. at 88-89, 228 N.W. at 595. This is true whether the analysis stops at the plain meaning stage or reaches the other methods of constitutional interpretation outlined in Beno.
Having outlined the presumption necessary when interpreting a section of the Declaration of Rights, I turn to the first stage of constitutional analysis mandated by the Beno court. 116 Wis. 2d at 136-37, 341 N.W.2d at 675.
Whether a constitutional provision has a plain meaning turns on the answer to a single question: can reasonable persons understand the provision differently? State v. Beno, 110 Wis. 2d 40, 48, 327 N.W.2d 712,716 (Ct.App. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 116 Wis. 2d 122, 341 N.W.2d 668 (1984).
Each of the two clauses in the first sentence of Wis. Const, art. 1, sec. 3, is grammatically complete. Standing alone, the first clause has a plain meaning. If "[e]very person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right. . .," the presumption provides the one reasonable meaning of these words: they protect only against state action. Standing alone, the second clause is also plain, given the presumption. If "no laws shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press," this clause protects persons only from state action. The express prohibition in the second clause against laws abridging free speech suggests, *139however, that unless the first clause protects free speech from private as well as state action, the first clause is redundant. When read together in a single sentence, the possible redundancy could deprive the two clauses of a plain meaning.
The redundancy issue was raised in Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, 469 A.2d 1201 (Conn. 1984). An advocacy group had demanded access to a privately-owned shopping mall for free speech purposes. Section 4 of the Connecticut Declaration of Rights provides, "Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty." Section 5 of the Connecticut Declaration provides, "No law shall ever be passed to curtail or restrain the liberty of speech or of the press." The advocacy group argued that to restrict the protection of free speech afforded by sec. 4 solely to instances of state interference would make that provision merely redundant of sec. 5. The Cologne court disposed of the redundancy argument in two ways.
First, the Cologne court said that sec. 5 "literally applies only to the passage of laws restraining freedom of speech or press and does not by its terms afford protection provided by sec. 4 against restrictions upon the exercise of those rights which government officials may impose whether or not sanctioned by law." 469 A.2d at 1209. The same approach would at least partially dispose of the redundancy issue regarding Wis. Const, art. 1, sec. 3.
Second, the Cologne court reviewed the debate at the Connecticut constitutional convention of 1818. The court read certain remarks at the convention to indicate that sec. 4 is a limitation on sec. 5. The limitation would authorize the passage of laws or the application *140of the common law with respect to defamation or sedition, but preclude any prior restraint. Id. at 1209 n.9. Thus, the Connecticut supreme court appears to have concluded that the redundancy problem was either minimal or did not exist.
I conclude that whether it is minimal or not, the redundancy issue regarding the first and second clauses in the first sentence of Wis. Const, art. 1, sec. 3, should be treated as depriving that sentence of a plain meaning.
Because the first sentence of Wis. Const, art. 1, sec. 3, lacks a plain meaning, I reach the second analytical stage mandated by the supreme court in Beno: an examination of the constitutional debate in 1848. The record of that debate pertinent to sec. 3 of the Declaration of Rights is scant and unhelpful.
The 1848 convention convened December 15,1847. Journal of the Convention to Form a Constitution for the State of Wisconsin 3 (Madison 1848). One week later the committee on general provisions reported on an unnumbered article entitled "Declaration of Rights," sec. 3 of which became the present sec. 3 of the Declaration. Id. at 50. During the entire convention a single amendment to strike certain words in the second sentence was proposed to sec. 3. The motion failed. Id. at 92. The record of the 1848 debate therefore fails to illuminate the free speech provision in Wis. Const, art. 1, sec. 3, so far as is pertinent to the issue before us.
Since the debates in the 1848 constitutional convention do not help us, we turn to those in the 1846 constitutional convention. We look to the earlier convention if, as here, the present constitution and the rejected 1846 constitution contain a similar provision. State ex rel. Zilisch v. Auer; 197 Wis. 284, 289-90, 221 *141N.W. 860, 862 (1928). The first sentence of sec. 3 in the Bill of Rights, art. XVI, of the rejected constitution of 1846 is identical to that in sec. 3 of the Declaration of Rights in the 1848 constitution.
The 1846 convention convened October 5, 1846. Journal of the Convention to Form a Constitution for the State of Wisconsin 3 (Madison 1847). October 28, 1846, the committee on a bill of rights recommended adoption of a bill, sec. 5 of which provided: "The legislature shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition for a redress of grievances." Id. at p. 123. November 4,1846 the convention resolved itself into a committee of the whole for the consideration of the proposed bill of rights, "[a]nd after some time spent therein, the committee rose, and reported progress, and asked leave to sit again." Id. at 194-95. The committee continued to consider the bill of rights the next morning and afternoon. Id. at 197-98. Few other references to the bill of rights appear in the 1846 Journal. Id. at 294-301.
Milo M. Quaife, of The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, fleshed out both the 1846 and 1848 Journals. He did so because, "the constitutional fathers of Wisconsin were chary of devoting state funds to the printing of a record of their proceedings. The first convention preserved no record of its debates, while the official journal comprises a modest volume of 500 pages." The Convention of 1846, at 5 (M. Quaife ed. 1919). Quaife made a "painstaking effort... to reconstruct the debates and to assemble the other pertinent records pertaining to the birth of our commonwealth. . . ." Id. at 6. He reconstructed the debates "for the *142most part from the newspaper reports of the day (in large part from the Madison newspapers). . . Id.
Quaife's research partially fills out the November 4, 1846 debate on sec. 5. Quaife reports that on that day:
The fifth section, which reads in the original: "The legislature shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances," was very generally objected to as too indefinite. Several substitutes were proposed, and one, offered by Mr. Lovell, after being amended by Marshall M. Strong, was adopted.
Id. at 365. Quaife does not set forth Lovell's substitute. Our search of the records of the State Historical Society failed to reveal it.10 It is fair to infer, however, from the absence of other references in the 1846 Journal or by Quaife to sec. 5 of the proposed bill of rights, that Lovell's substitute became art. XVI, sec. 3, of the Bill of Rights in the rejected 1846 constitution, the first sentence of which is repeated in Wis. Const, art. 1, sec. 3.
Lovell's substitute for the original sec. 5 of the proposed bill of rights made the free speech provision more definite by expanding it. The substitute expanded the original proposal by including an affirmative statement that every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right, prohibiting a restraint as well as abridgement, and embracing liberty of the press as well as liberty of speech.
*143The expansion of sec. 5 does not indicate an intent to change the concept that a declaration of rights restrains the government from interfering with rights retained by the people. The change from the original free speech proposal in 1846 to the free speech guaranty in sec. 3 of the 1848 Declaration is therefore consistent with the presumption that a provision in the Declaration of Rights is intended as only a restraint on state action.
Since nothing in the 1846 or 1848 constitutional debates is inconsistent with the presumption that Wis. Const, art. I, sec. 3, is only a restraint on state action, I turn to the last analytical stage of constitutional interpretation outlined in Beno: the objectives of the framers.11 The sole objective of the framers inferable from the concept of government displayed by a mid-nineteenth century declaration of rights is protection of persons from state action. Nothing to contradict that inference has been called to our attention.
Because no showing has been made to justify the proposition that the free speech provisions in sec. 1 of the Declaration of Rights protects persons from private as well as state interference, the defendants have no right to remain on the malls contrary to the wishes of the owners. Because they persist in their trespass, they were properly enjoined by the trial court.
Having come to my conclusions after following the analysis required by the Wisconsin Supreme Court for interpretation of our state constitution, I need not examine the decisions of other state appellate courts regarding the free speech provisions in their constitutions. My conclusion is, however, consistent with those *144of the highest state courts which have analyzed their constitutions in terms of the intention of the framers.12

 The issue was raised but not resolved in State v. Horn, 126 Wis. 2d 447, 377 N.W.2d 176 (Ct.App. 1985). The Horn defendants were prosecuted for having entered an abortion clinic to encourage patients not to have abortions. They argued that their criminal trespass convictions violated their state constitutional rights to freedom of speech. We found it unnecessary to decide whether the Wisconsin Constitution will ever protect free speech from private interference. We merely declined to extend the speech protection to trespass on property belonging to a small private medical clinic. Id. at 453, 377 N.W.2d at 179. In Prahl v. Brosamle, 98 Wis. 2d 130, 151, 295 N.W.2d 768, 780-81 (Ct.App. 1980), we held that a television cameraman had no first amendment privilege to trespass on private land to gather news.

 Because a title of a statute is not part of the statute, it cannot be considered when determining whether a statute is ambiguous. Hemerley v. American Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 127 Wis. 2d 304, 307, 379 N.W.2d 860, 862 (Ct.App. 1985); sec. 990.001(6), Stats.

 Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, supra, enjoyed great stature.
Taking them in the order of publication, Story's books upon the Constitution, upon conflict of laws and upon equity have had special influence. If Marshall made our public law, . . . Story authoritatively expounded it. The influence of his book is to be traced through Cooley into nearly all the texts of the last part of the nineteenth century. . . .
Pound, The Place of Judge Story in the Making of American Law, 48 Am. L. Rev. 676, 694 (1914). James Kent, author of Commentaries on American Law (New York 1826), described Story's Commentaries as a "most profound, learned, acute, and excellent production, distinguished for its accuracy, fulness, and judgment." *132Chief Justice John Marshall wished that Story's work "could be read by every statesman, and every would-be statesman in the United States." See Letters from James Kent and Chief Justice Marshall to Joseph Story, in 2 Life and Letters of Joseph Story 134— 35 (W. Story ed. 1851).

 That the Cooley, Pomeroy and Bateman texts were written in 1868 and 1876 does not detract from their usefulness when determining the understanding in 1848 of a declaration of rights. See Beno, 116 Wis. 2d at 139-40, 341 N.W.2d at 677 (1878 dictionary used when interpreting Wis. Const, art. IV, sec. 15).

 Section 1 of the Declaration of Rights, art. I, sec. 1, provides, "All people are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights; among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these rights, governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."

 Section 9 of the Declaration of Rights, art. I, sec. 9, provides:

 Section 22 of the Declaration of Rights, art. I, sec. 22, provides: "The blessings of a free government can only be maintained by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality and virtue, and by frequent recurrence to fundamental principles."

 Section 18 of the Declaration of Rights, art. I, sec. 18, provides:
The right of every person to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any person be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, without consent; nor shall any control of, or interference with, the rights of conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship; nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries.

 Section 11 of the Declaration of Rights, art. I, sec. 11, provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

 Quaife's source must have been the first page of The Madison Express issue for November 10, 1846. That issue does not set forth the amendment.

 I find no early legislative interpretation of Wis. Const, art. I, sec. 3. That stage of analysis under Beno is inapplicable.

 See Cologne, 469 A.2d at 1207-08 (Conn. 1984) (no evidence of intent in Connecticut Declaration to create privilege to exercise free speech right on private property of others); Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 378 N.W.2d 337, 344-48 (Mich. 1985) (intent in free speech provision in Michigan Declaration that constitutional protection limited to rights of individuals against government conduct); Shad Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 1215 (N.Y. 1985) (drafters intended New York Constitution to protect individual rights from governmental infringement and not to protect rights of private individuals against private individuals). Contra Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center 592 P.2d 341,346 (Cal. 1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (California free speech provision protects persons from private infringement, since framers could have adopted words of federal bill of rights but chose not to do so); State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 627-28 (N.J. 1980), appeal dismissed sub nom., 455 U.S. 100 (1982) (protection of free speech right on private property comports with presumed intent of framers of constitution, at least on privately-owned campus substantially devoted to public use); Alderwood Assoc, v. Wash. Envir. Council, 635 P.2d 108, 115 (Wash. 1981) (because Washington free speech provision contains no express mention of "state action," court chose to follow approach of Robins and Schmid). The Alderwood Assoc, author later concluded historical evidence also indicates that the Washington free speech provision protects against private abridgement of free speech rights. Utter, The Right to Speak, Write, and Publish Freely: State Constitutional Protection Against Private Abridgment, 8 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 157, 172-77 (1985).