Court Opinion

ID: 9896411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-11 01:00:27.40543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:52.964357
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-40242        Document: 00516963879             Page: 1      Date Filed: 11/10/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                              Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________
                                                                                            FILED
                                                                                     November 10, 2023
                                      No. 23-40242
                                    Summary Calendar                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                    ____________                                            Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Cerissa Lynette Sanders,

                                              Defendant—Appellant.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Eastern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 4:20-CR-32-1
                     ______________________________

   Before Higginbotham, Stewart, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Cerissa Lynette Sanders was convicted of unlawful possession of a
   firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The
   district court sentenced her to 21 months of imprisonment and three years of
   supervised release.

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-40242      Document: 00516963879           Page: 2     Date Filed: 11/10/2023

                                     No. 23-40242

          Sanders appeals the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress
   the firearm that was found during a search of her vehicle. We review “factual
   findings for clear error and the ultimate constitutionality of law enforcement
   action de novo.” United States v. Robinson, 741 F.3d 588, 594 (5th Cir. 2014).
   A factual finding is not clearly erroneous as long as it is “plausible in light of
   the record as a whole.” United States v. Bass, 996 F.3d 729, 736 (5th Cir.
   2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The clearly erroneous
   standard is particularly deferential where, as here, “denial of a suppression
   motion is based on live oral testimony . . . because the judge had the
   opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses.” United States v.
   Gibbs, 421 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and
   citation omitted). Moreover, we must view the evidence in the light most
   favorable to the prevailing party, which in this case was the Government. See
   United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 347 (5th Cir. 2010).
          First, Sanders contests the legality of the traffic stop that occurred
   prior to the search of her vehicle. A traffic stop is only justified at its
   inception if the officer had an “objectively reasonable suspicion that some
   sort of illegal activity . . . occurred, or [was] about to occur, before stopping
   the vehicle.” United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir.
   2005). In general, “the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where
   the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has
   occurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). Relevant here,
   Texas law provides that a driver “facing only a steady red signal shall stop at
   a clearly marked stop line,” and only after stopping, standing, and yielding
   may the driver turn right. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 544.007(d)(1).
          The district court found that Sanders committed a traffic violation,
   which established probable cause for the seizure. The district court based its
   conclusion on one officer’s “unequivocal[]” testimony that he “observed
   Sanders’s car fail to stop at the designated point before entering the marked

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Case: 23-40242         Document: 00516963879               Page: 3       Date Filed: 11/10/2023

                                           No. 23-40242

   crosswalk at the red light in question.” Furthermore, the district court found
   that this testimony was consistent with the “incident report” and
   “photograph evidence.” Finally, although recognizing Sanders’s competing
   version of events, the district court concluded that it found the officer’s
   testimony “more credible.” Based on these factual determinations, the
   district court the detectives had probable cause to believe that Sanders
   violated the Texas Transportation Code and were justified in initiating the
   traffic stop. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 810; see also United States v. Andres, 703
   F.3d 828, 832-33 (5th Cir. 2013). Although the record contains some
   evidence casting doubt on the officers’ version of events, this Court cannot
   reverse “simply because it is convinced that it would have decided the case
   differently.”1

           _____________________
           1
              Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). In particular,
   the “photographic” evidence in the form of dash camera and body camera footage neither
   disproves nor corroborates the officers’ statements. At best, it is neutral. Moreover, the
   officers first saw Sanders while she was legally parked in an apartment parking lot. Detec-
   tive Villalvazo testified that he performed a computer check on Sanders’s vehicle while
   parked in the lot. He further testified that, although the check indicated Sanders’s license
   plate tags were expired, Sanders was within the statutory grace period to renew her license
   tags so that she had not yet committed a traffic infraction. However, he went on to explain
   that the officers waited in the lot and later followed Sanders to “wait to see for another
   violation.” These statements are inconsistent and may have supported Sanders’s assertion
   that she was not pulled over for a traffic infraction but for another reason, which she as-
   cribed to racial profiling. Nonetheless, the trial judge had the opportunity to observe the
   witnesses’ demeanors, and credibility determinations underlying findings of fact are af-
   forded deference. See United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 440 (5th Cir. 2010) (“A
   finding is clearly erroneous only if the court is left with a definite and firm conviction that
   a mistake has been committed . . . The clearly erroneous standard is particularly deferential
   where ‘denial of the suppression motion is based on live oral testimony ... because the judge
   had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses.’”) (citations omitted).

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Case: 23-40242      Document: 00516963879           Page: 4    Date Filed: 11/10/2023

                                     No. 23-40242

          Next, Sanders contests the legality of the search of her vehicle and the
   bag in which the firearm at issue was discovered. A warrantless search is
   presumptively unreasonable unless the circumstances fall under an exception
   to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. United States v. Guzman,
   739 F.3d 241, 245-46 (5th Cir. 2014). If law enforcement officials have
   probable cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, a warrantless
   search is permitted under the “automobile exception.” United States v.
   Fields, 456 F.3d 519, 523 (5th Cir. 2006). Moreover, this belief, when
   supported by probable cause, justifies the search of “every part of the vehicle
   and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” California v.
   Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 570 (1991) (internal quotation marks and citation
   omitted). Relevant here, the odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle
   constitutes the requisite probable cause. See United States v. Moore, 329 F.3d
   399, 405 (5th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Ibarra-Sanchez, 199 F.3d 753,
   760 (5th Cir. 1999). Because the detective testified that he smelled marijuana
   coming from the vehicle, and this was corroborated by the body camera
   video, the detectives had probable cause to search the vehicle and the bag.
   See Moore, 329 F.3d at 405; see also Ibarra-Sanchez, 199 F.3d at 760. Because
   the odor of marijuana provided the necessary probable cause for the search,
   the Court need not address whether the officers performed a lawful inventory
   search.
          The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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