Court Opinion

ID: 9912460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 15:06:39.634515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:59:27.146404
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-0242-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

COLBY DESSOURCES,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Submitted December 12, 2023 – Decided December 22, 2023

                   Before Judges Mayer and Enright.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 17-12-3564.

                   Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
                   appellant (John Joseph Bannan, Designated Counsel,
                   on the brief).

                   Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex County
                   Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Braden Bendon
                   Couch, Special Deputy Attorney/Acting Assistant
                   Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      Defendant Colby Dessources appeals from a July 19, 2022 order denying

his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We

affirm.

      The facts leading to defendant's conviction for aggravated manslaughter,

N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a), are set forth in State v. Dessources, No. A-3811-18 (App.

Div. Jan. 6, 2021) (slip op. at 2). We need not repeat them here.

      On July 12, 2018, defendant agreed to plead guilty to first-degree

aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2 2C:11-4(a)(1).         In November 2018,

defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea based on alleged unforeseen

immigration consequences. Defendant's motion was denied.

      On January 18, 2019, defendant appeared for sentencing. Defense counsel

asked the judge to apply two mitigating factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b).

Specifically, defendant requested mitigating factor seven, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(b)(7), no criminal history, and mitigating factor eleven, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(b)(11), excessive hardship to his dependents. The judge found no mitigating

factors were applicable and sentenced defendant to a ten-year term of

imprisonment with an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility under the

No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.

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      In April 2021, defendant filed a pro se PCR petition. On February 18,

2022, assigned counsel filed an amended PCR petition, supplementing

defendant's prior PCR submission, asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim against defendant's sentencing attorney. Defendant claimed sentencing

counsel failed to advocate for application of mitigating factors two, four, eight,

and nine. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(2), (4), (8), and (9). Thus, defendant asserted he

was not afforded an opportunity to seek a sentencing downgrade in the second-

degree range.

      In a July 19, 2022 order and accompanying written decision, the PCR

judge denied defendant's petition. The PCR judge addressed mitigating factors

two, four, eight, and nine, and explained why each factor was inapplicable.

Because the additional mitigating factors were inapplicable, the judge concluded

sentencing counsel was not ineffective in raising arguments that lacked merit.

In addition, the judge determined, "even if this [c]ourt had pre-supposed the

mitigating factors now sought, it would not be possible . . . to find that the

mitigating factors substantially outweigh[ed] the aggravating ones." Thus, the

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judge denied defendant's PCR petition, finding defendant failed to meet his

burden of demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel.1

      On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:

      POINT I

            THE PCR COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
            MITIGATING FACTORS ARGUMENT WAS
            PROCEDURALLY BARRED.

            (A) Legal Standards Governing Applications For Post-
            Conviction Relief.

            (B) The Mitigating      Factors   Argument        is   not
            Procedurally Barred.

      POINT II

            BECAUSE    MR.   DESSOURCES   RECEIVED
            INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, THE
            PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR.
            DESSOURCES' PETITION FOR PCR.

            (A) Legal Standards Governing Applications for Post-
            Conviction Relief.

            (B) Defense Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to
            Raise All Applicable Mitigating Factors at Sentencing.

1
  In addition to denying defendant's PCR petition on the merits, the PCR judge
found defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was procedurally
barred. However, we review orders on appeal rather than opinions or reasons
proffered for the ultimate conclusion. See Do-Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway,
168 N.J. 191, 199 (2001).

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                                       4
            (C) Appellate Counsel was Ineffective for Failing to
            Raise the Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel in
            Failing to Raise All Applicable Mitigating Factors at
            Sentencing and Failing to Argue That the Trial Court
            Failed to Consider All Applicable Mitigating Factors at
            Sentencing.

      POINT III

            IN THE ALTERNATIVE, BECAUSE THERE ARE
            GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT IN
            DISPUTE, THE PCR COURT ERRED IN DENYING
            AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

            (A) Legal Standards Governing Post-Conviction Relief
            Evidentiary Hearings.

            (B) In the Alternative, Mr. Dessources is Entitled to an
            Evidentiary Hearing.

      We need not address defendant's arguments related to the PCR judge's

determination that the petition was procedurally barred because the judge also

reviewed, and denied, defendant's petition on the merits. For the reasons that

follow, we reject defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel arguments related

to the failure of his sentencing counsel and appellate counsel to argue for

additional mitigating factors.

      To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must

satisfy the two-part test under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687

(1984), adopted by New Jersey in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). First,

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the defendant must show counsel's performance "fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness" and was therefore deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 687-88. Second, the defendant must show "a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result . . . would have been different."

State v. Hess, 207 N.J. 123, 146 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

The failure to raise non-meritorious arguments does not constitute ineffective

assistance of counsel. State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 625 (1990).

      Defendant contends his sentencing counsel and appellate counsel were

ineffective in failing to advocate for mitigating factors two, four, eight, and

nine.2 We disagree.

      As our Supreme Court stated in Hess, "the failure to present mitigating

evidence or argue for mitigating factors" may establish ineffective assistance of

counsel. 207 N.J. at 154. However, in this matter, the PCR judge thoroughly

analyzed and explained why the additional mitigating factors were inapplicable.

2
   For the first time on appeal, defendant raised an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim as to his appellate attorney. Defendant never presented this claim
to the PCR judge. We may decline to consider any claim not advanced to the
PCR court if the matter does not involve jurisdictional issues or matters of great
public interest. See State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009) (citing Nieder v.
Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)). However, because we are
satisfied defendant's sentencing counsel was not ineffective in failing to advance
certain mitigating factors, we reject defendant's claimed ineffective assistance
of counsel on that same basis as to his appellate attorney.
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      Having reviewed the record, we agree with the PCR judge that mitigating

factor two, defendant did not contemplate that his conduct would cause or

threaten serious harm, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(2), was inapplicable. Defendant

admitted to driving his vehicle while intoxicated, resulting in the death of

another person. "Every driver is aware . . . of the responsibility to never drive

while intoxicated." State v. Locane, 454 N.J. Super. 98, 128 (App. Div. 2018).

Therefore, a sentencing court accords no weight to this factor in cases, such as

the present matter, where a defendant "voluntarily became intoxicated[] [while]

knowing [he] would drive." Ibid.

      We also agree with the PCR judge that mitigating factor four, substantial

grounds excusing or justifying defendant's conduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(4), was

inapplicable.   Defendant argues this factor was applicable because the

establishment continued to serve him alcohol after he became intoxicated.

However, because "[c]rimes committed under the influence of alcohol . . . do

not detract from the seriousness of the offense," a sentencing court should not

consider intoxication a mitigating circumstance under this factor.      State v.

Setzer, 268 N.J. Super. 553, 567-68 (App. Div. 1993).

      Nor did mitigating factor eight, defendant's conduct was the result of

circumstances unlikely to recur, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(8), and mitigating factor

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nine, defendant's character and attitude indicate he is unlikely to reoffend,

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(9), apply in this case. Mitigating factors eight and nine

"are not intended to trigger predictions that lack anchors in the record." Locane,

454 N.J. Super. at 129. "Driving and consuming alcohol are not uncommon

experiences," and defendant presented no evidence indicating the circumstances

were unlikely to recur. Ibid.

      Additionally, this was not defendant's first brush with the law. In 2004,

and again in 2005, defendant received two juvenile deferred dispositions.

Between 2007 and 2014, defendant had five disorderly persons convictions. In

2008, defendant was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to probation.

Defendant violated the conditions of probation twice.         Because defendant

demonstrated no improvement, his probation was terminated in 2013. Based on

his record, defendant failed to present evidence that he is unlikely to reoffend .

      We also recognize, as did the PCR judge, that defendant received an

extremely favorable sentence as a result of sentencing counsel's efforts,

including the State's dismissal of the most serious charges. If defendant had

gone to trial on all counts and been convicted by a jury, defendant faced a

potential sentence of thirty years. Instead, defendant received the minimum

sentence for a first-degree offense—ten years.

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      Defendant also claims that had his counsel advocated for mitigating

factors two, four, eight and nine, the sentencing judge may have downgraded his

offense to a second-degree offense and sentenced him to less than ten years in

prison. We reject this argument.

      "A sentencing court may downgrade a first- or second-degree offense to

one degree less for sentencing purposes." Locane, 454 N.J. Super. at 121 (citing

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2)). To warrant a downgrade, the court must find: (1) it is

"clearly convinced that the mitigating factors substantially outweigh the

aggravating factors," N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2); and (2) "there are compelling

reasons in addition to, and separate from, the mitigating factors, which require

the downgrade in the interest of justice," Locane, 454 N.J. Super. at 121 (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Jones, 197 N.J. Super. 604, 607 (App.

Div. 1984)).

      For the reasons previously stated, none of the mitigating factors defendant

claimed should have been presented to the sentencing judge applied. Thus,

defendant could not demonstrate the mitigating factors outweighed the

aggravating factors to warrant a sentencing downgrade.

      On this record, defendant failed to establish that the performance of his

sentencing counsel was deficient or, but for any alleged errors, the outcome of

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the matter would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Because

defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of

counsel, defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See State v.

Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992).

      Affirmed.

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