Court Opinion

ID: 9624022
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:48:47.033553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:37.853633
License: Public Domain

Judge BIGGS
dissents.
I respectfully dissent for several reasons.
First, the application for the nontestimonial identification order was facially inadequate, in that it did not establish reasonable grounds to suspect that this defendant had committed the subject *521offenses. Special Agent Suttle with the SBI sought a nontestimonial identification order on 28 March 1986. The application presented information about two sexual assaults reported in November, 1985, and in February, 1986. The affidavit in support of the application set forth the following regarding reasonable grounds to suspect that the defendant committed the offenses: that he was “a black male, slender and muscular, approx. 5'8" tall,” and that “Pearson was caught by Lt. James Buchanan secretly peeping into apartments at Village Creek Apartments on March 7, 1895 around 9:00 P.M.” However, the evidence in the Record tends to show the following: Three rapes occurred in Morganton between July, 1985 and February, 1986. Interviews with the victims failed to yield a consistent description of the perpetrator, who was variously described by the victims as a tall (over 6') white man, as a short (5'8") medium skinned man, and as a medium height (5'8"-5'10") black man. None of the victims suggested to law enforcement officers that the assailant was a personal acquaintance. The third victim indicated that the assailant knew the names of her children, while the others were total strangers. Thus, the affidavit supporting the application for the nontestimonial identification order relied on allegations that the defendant was the same race and general build as the assailant, and that he had been seen peeping into apartments where one of the assaults had occurred, approximately eight (8) months before the rapes discussed in the application. This information falls far short of providing reasonable grounds to suspect this defendant.
In addition, the affidavit relied on false and misleading information that was knowingly supplied by the State. The trial court found in its order that the statement that the defendant had been “caught secretly peeping” into the Village Creek apartments was “an opinion reasonably drawn” from the investigating officer’s report. This finding is not supported by the testimony and evidence. During the suppression hearing, Agent Suttle testified that at the time that he applied for a nontestimonial identification order he knew that: (1) the defendant had not been observed looking into an apartment, much less “secretly peeping,” but had been seen squatting near an air conditioning unit; (2) the defendant had provided an explanation for his presence at the apartments, which had been substantially verified; and (3) the incident at the apartments had occurred eight (8) months prior to either of the assaults. Suttle was also aware that a third victim had provided a different description of her assailant, much less like defendant than the two assaults that were discussed in the application. None of this information was included in the affidavit.
*522If an application for a nontestimonial identification order contains a false statement made intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth, and without which there would not be reasonable grounds to suspect the defendant, then the nontestimonial identification order must be voided. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978) (search warrant that does not establish probable cause absent false statement must be voided); State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 536 S.E.2d 1 (2000) (challenge to false statements in search warrant affidavit requires evidence that affiant alleged false fact in bad faith). “A person may not knowingly make a false statement in good faith for the purposes of an affidavit in support of a search warrant.” State v. Severn, 130 N.C. App. 319, 323, 502 S.E.2d 882, 885 (1998) (search warrant void where affiant stated that he had recovered controlled substances from inside defendant’s house, when he actually had found them in trash outside the house). Compare with State v. Vick, 130 N.C. App. 207, 502 S.E.2d 871 (1998) (statement in application for search warrant held not intentionally false where officer’s affidavit makes it clear that his conclusion was his opinion, inferred from observed facts). If the words “secretly peeping” were removed and the affidavit properly characterized the investigating officer’s report, we would be left with this: the defendant was the same race and general size as the assailant described by two of the three victims, and had been seen after dark outside the apartment complex of one victim, some eight months prior to either of the subject offenses. Although the majority opinion sets out other facts that may have been within Agent Suttle’s knowledge when he prepared the application for a nontestimonial identification order, they were not included in the affidavit or the application. A nontestimonial identification order may be issued only upon reasonable grounds to suspect the defendant of commission of the felonies under investigation. Our state Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he invasion of a person’s body to seize blood, saliva, and hair samples is the most intrusive type of search[.]” State v. Grooms, 353 N.C. 50, 73, 540 S.E.2d 713, 728 (2000). Thus, while a nontestimonial identification order does not rise to the protection level of a search warrant, it must be based upon reasonable grounds. The application for the nontestimonial identification order in question did not provide the trial court with reasonable grounds to support the issuance of an order. Consequently, I believe that the trial judge erred in its denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the issuance of the 1986 non-testimonial identification order, which evidence impermissibly tainted the 1998 application for a search warrant.
*523Finally, the State committed numerous statutory violations, the cumulative effect of which was to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. These include: (1) the application for a nontestimonial identification order did not contain information sufficient to provide reasonable grounds to suspect the defendant, as required by N.C.G.S. § 15A-273(2); (2) the order issued by the court did not state the facts intended to establish reasonable grounds to suspect the defendant, required by N.C.G.S. § 15A-278(4); (3) the defendant was not provided with an attorney to which he had a statutory right under N.C.G.S. § 15A-279(d), see State v. Grooms, 353 N.C. 50, 540 S.E.2d 713 (2000) (noting statutory right); (4) the order was not returned to the trial court within 90 days of its issuance, required by N.C.G.S. § 15A-280; (5) an inventory of nontestimonial identification procedures was not submitted to the trial court as required by N.C.G.S. § 15A-280; and (6) the defendant was not provided with a copy of the results of the nontestimonial identification procedures as soon as possible, as required by N.C.G.S. § 15A-282.
The most egregious of these statutory violations was the failure to afford the defendant an attorney during the identification procedures. This is not a case as suggested by the majority where the defendant was simply not reminded of his right to counsel. Rather, the defendant specifically asked on more than one occasion for counsel and was denied. The trial judge’s findings of fact detailed the defendant’s futile attempts to obtain counsel before the identification procedures were performed. The court concluded that the state had committed a substantial violation of statute in failing to provide defendant with counsel upon proper request. The right to counsel is so fundamental that the failure to provide counsel when required by law should be treated seriously.
If an attorney had been provided to defendant as authorized by statute, he or she would have been able to offer professional guidance regarding the defendant’s legal rights. That being so, the advice of counsel would likely not be restricted to issues connected with custodial statements of an accused, but would reasonably encompass information on the legal implications of the identification procedures, the legal consequences of making a statement, the defendant’s right to a copy of the results, and — most significantly — the defendant’s right under N.C.G.S. § 15A-280 to seek the destruction of the products and reports of the nontestimonial procedures. The statute provides that:
*524... If, at the time of the return [as required within 90 days of the nontestimonial identification procedure], probable cause does not exist to believe that the person has committed the offense named in the affidavit or any other offense, the person named in the affidavit is entitled to move that the authorized judge issue an order directing that the products and reports of the nontestimo-nial identification procedures, and all copies thereof, be destroyed. The motion must,, except for good cause shown, be granted, (emphasis added)
The prejudice from the failure to avail himself of the right to seek destruction of the test results is manifest; but for the DNA testing of the samples over ten years after the original issuance of a nontesti-monial identification order, there would have been no basis for a prosecution in this case. Although the evidence collected from the defendant pursuant to the nontestimonial identification order may not have been obtained as a result of the violation of the defendant’s right to counsel, it is a reasonable conclusion that it likely was retained for over a decade as a result of that violation.
While the majority concluded that each of the violations was not substantial or prejudicial, errors that may not warrant a new trial when considered separately may deprive the defendant of a fair trial when evaluated cumulatively. In this regard, the North Carolina Supreme Court has held:
Although neither of the trial court’s errors, when considered in isolation, might have been sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial, we are of the opinion that cumulatively they are sufficiently prejudicial that we are unable to say that defendant received a fair trial, and therefore a new trial is required.
State v. White, 331 N.C. 604, 610, 611, 419 S.E.2d 557, 561 (1992). See also State v. Dilldine, 22 N.C. App. 229, 206 S.E.2d 364 (1974) (cumulative effect of trial errors required new trial).
Even if no single statutory violation was substantial, their cumulative effect was that the defendant was subjected to the taking of hair and saliva samples without the required showing of reasonable grounds to suspect that he had committed the subject offenses; the defendant did not have an attorney present during the identification procedures; the defendant was not sufficiently informed of his rights in this situation, and; the defendant was not provided with the test results in a timely fashion, resulting in the test results and the defend*525ant’s hair and saliva being preserved for over a decade, despite the absence of probable cause to charge the defendant with any offense in North Carolina during that time. The effect of the many statutory violations was to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. For these reasons, I believe the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motions to suppress the evidence obtained from the 1986 nontesti-monial identification order and the 1998 search warrant. I would reverse and order a new trial.