Court Opinion

ID: 9966402
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-06 22:02:43.189961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:56.839486
License: Public Domain

IN THE

   Indiana Supreme Court
             Supreme Court Case No. 24S-CT-159
                                                                         FILED
         Christine Cosme and Roy Cosme,                             May 06 2024, 3:22 pm

                           Appellants,                                   CLERK
                                                                     Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                        Court of Appeals
                                                                          and Tax Court

                               –v–

 Debora A. Warfield Clark, Dan Churilla d/b/a
Churilla Insurance, and Erie Insurance Exchange,
                            Appellees.

        Argued: December 14, 2023 | Decided: May 6, 2024

  Appeal from the Lake Superior Court Civil Division Room One
                      No. 45D01-1803-CT-39
               The Honorable John M. Sedia, Judge

    On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals
                        No. 22A-CT-1897

                  Opinion by Justice Slaughter
  Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Goff, and Molter concur.
Slaughter, Justice.

   After a plaintiff rests his case, the trial court may enter a directed
verdict (or judgment on the evidence) against him if there is insufficient
evidence on any element of his prima facie case. We reaffirmed this
standard in Purcell v. Old National Bank, 972 N.E.2d 835 (Ind. 2012). There,
we held a trial court may review evidence both quantitatively and
qualitatively. But this standard left open a question we must resolve
today—whether a court may take on the jury’s fact-finding role to weigh
evidence and assess witness credibility at the close of the plaintiff’s case.
We hold that at the directed-verdict stage, the court can review whether
inferences from the evidence are reasonable, but it cannot weigh
conflicting evidence or assess witness credibility. To do otherwise would
deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional right to a jury trial. Applying this
standard here, we hold the trial court erred in directing the verdict for
defendant Erie Insurance Exchange, but we affirm the directed verdict for
defendant Churilla Insurance.

                                              I

                                             A

    This case arises from an insurance claim filed after the insurer cancelled
an insurance policy. The plaintiffs, Christine and Roy Cosme, had an
automobile insurance policy with Erie Insurance Exchange. The policy
listed their son, Broyce Cosme, as a driver. The Cosmes’ troubles began
with a misunderstanding between Broyce and the Indiana Bureau of
Motor Vehicles.

  In February 2017, Broyce, who was 19 years old at the time, was a
passenger in his friend’s car when Hobart police pulled them over. Broyce
and his friends were arrested for possessing marijuana. After the arrest,
BMV records showed mistakenly that Broyce was the driver and that he
did not provide proof the car was insured. Based on this mistake, the BMV
suspended Broyce’s license. Upon learning of the suspension, Broyce
contacted both the BMV and the officer, Kevin Garber, who wrote the
police report. Garber assured Broyce “he would fix it”. But Garber did not
“fix it”, and Broyce’s license remained suspended.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CT-159 | May 6, 2024             Page 2 of 20
   In August 2017, the Cosmes’ insurance policy automatically renewed
for another year. While doing a routine motor-vehicle-report search for
underwriting, Erie discovered Broyce’s suspended license. On September
27, Erie sent a letter to the Cosmes stating that, because Broyce’s license
was suspended, it would cancel their insurance policy unless it could
exclude coverage for Broyce. The letter explained the policy would cancel
effective November 1, 2017, unless the Cosmes submitted a coverage-
exclusion form removing Broyce from the policy by October 28.

   After receiving the letter, Roy waited until October 26 to call Erie.
When he called, Erie directed his call to Janine Aguilar, an insurance agent
at Churilla Insurance. Aguilar and Roy gave different accounts of this
phone call at trial. According to Aguilar, after Roy explained the mistaken
license suspension, she advised Roy still to sign the exclusion form to
remove Broyce from the policy and have Broyce reinstated later. But Roy
rejected this advice. Instead, he said he would have Broyce send
paperwork to Aguilar showing the suspension was a mistake.

   Roy agrees that Aguilar mentioned signing the exclusion form. But he
says he told Aguilar that if Broyce got his license reinstated, they “could
just have this fixed” without taking Broyce off the insurance. He says
Aguilar did not tell him he needed to sign the exclusion form or he would
lose the insurance even if Broyce’s license were reinstated. If she had, Roy
says he would have signed the form. According to Roy, Aguilar also did
not mention the possibility of Roy getting other insurance for the family,
including for Broyce.

   After her phone call with Roy, Aguilar emailed and called Megan
Malena, an underwriter at Erie, to ask her not to cancel the Cosmes’ policy
since Broyce’s suspension was a mistake. Malena responded that the
underwriting system still showed a license suspension, and the only way
to maintain coverage for Christine and Roy was to remove Broyce from
the policy. Aguilar and Roy spoke the next day, and Aguilar asked Broyce
to provide his reinstatement papers. Roy says Aguilar did not mention
signing the exclusion form or obtaining other insurance.

  The Cosmes did not submit the exclusion form before Erie’s October 28
deadline. But the BMV reinstated Broyce’s license on October 28 after

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CT-159 | May 6, 2024            Page 3 of 20
Broyce paid a fee. After at first sending the reinstatement papers to the
wrong email address, Broyce emailed Aguilar a receipt on October 30
showing he paid to have his license reinstated. Aguilar confirmed receipt.
This confirmation gave Roy the impression that the issue on the policy
was resolved. And because Aguilar was still working with him past the
October 28 deadline, Roy thought the deadline no longer mattered
because he was doing what the agent had told him to do.

   On October 31, Malena told Aguilar that Erie could cancel despite the
reinstatement of Broyce’s license because Erie can cancel a policy midterm
if a listed insured has a suspended license at any time during the policy
period. Thus, the only way Roy could maintain coverage for his family
was to submit the exclusion form by midnight that day. Aguilar admits
she knew this before receiving Malena’s email. Aguilar left a voicemail for
Roy and Broyce on October 31 and sent an email to Broyce
communicating this information. Neither discovered the voicemails or
email until several days after Erie’s November cancellation date.
According to Roy, Aguilar’s voicemail was the first time she told him he
needed to sign the exclusion form or the policy would be cancelled
regardless of Broyce’s reinstatement.

   As threatened, Erie cancelled the Cosmes’ policy on November 1. Three
days later, an uninsured motorist, Deborah A. Warfield Clark, rear-ended
Roy and Christine. Roy and Christine did not receive notice that Erie had
cancelled their policy until November 6. Until then Roy “assumed we’re
good” because Broyce sent Aguilar the reinstatement papers, and they
had heard nothing in return. After discovering the policy cancellation,
Roy sent an email to Aguilar explaining that he “was under the
impression from [Aguilar] in [their] conversations that if he had [Broyce’s]
drivers license reinstated the insurance coverage for all [Roy’s] vehicles
would continue as it always ha[d].” He also wrote:

      if Broyce needed to be removed from my automobile insurance
      coverage policy[,] no matter what[,] why wasn’t that stated to
      me instead of you telling me you were taking it to the
      underwriter to have it checked if Broyce’s license was

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CT-159 | May 6, 2024          Page 4 of 20
      reinstated. Why would you do that? What was the point of
      that?

Once the Cosmes discovered the policy was cancelled, they submitted the
exclusion form and got the policy reinstated. On November 13, the trial
court in a separate matter ordered the BMV to expunge Broyce’s license
suspension from its record—as if the suspension never happened. The
Cosmes submitted the November 4 accident as a claim, but Erie denied
coverage because their policy was no longer in effect on that date.

                                             B

    After Erie denied the claim, the Cosmes sued Clark, Erie, and Churilla.
Against Clark, they brought a negligence claim for causing the accident.
The claim against her is not before us. Against Erie and Churilla, the
Cosmes alleged breach of contract and sought punitive damages, and they
requested declaratory relief that Erie and Churilla breached contractual
and common-law duties owed them under the insurance policy. And
against Erie alone, they brought a bad-faith claim, alleging Erie breached
its duty to deal with the Cosmes in good faith.

   In his opening statement at trial, Churilla’s counsel referenced the
initial phone conversation between Roy and Aguilar. He explained that
“what exactly was said” is “going to be a matter of dispute.” The jury, as
factfinder, is “just going to have to listen to the testimony, examine the
documentary evidence, and decide what happened.” The Cosmes then
presented their case-in-chief, including testimony from Roy, Christine,
Broyce, Aguilar, Malena, and their expert, Elliott Flood. The Cosmes also
presented documentary evidence, including the certified insurance policy,
emails between Roy and Aguilar, emails between Aguilar and Malena,
and the letters Erie sent to Roy.

   Relevant to our review here, the Cosmes presented various evidence on
the insurance policy’s effective dates. The Cosmes presented a letter from
Julia Swanson, who worked at Erie, to Erie’s counsel. In this letter,
Swanson certified that “from August 27, 2017 to August 27, 2018”—
notably including the November 4, 2017 accident date—“the enclosed
Declarations, policy form and endorsements were in effect . . . unless

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CT-159 | May 6, 2024         Page 5 of 20
otherwise modified or cancelled in the future.” But also in evidence was
Swanson’s affidavit stating that her certification included a scrivener’s
error about the date and should have said August 27, 2017, to November
1, 2017. The Cosmes’ expert, Elliott Flood, an insurance consultant and a
former insurance executive, testified that Swanson’s certification
suggested the November 4 accident was covered under the policy. Flood
explained that Swanson’s certification was “under oath”, and she had
“been trained . . . to be careful to make sure you get the official record”.
While he acknowledged that Swanson claimed the certification was a
mistake, Flood viewed this mistake as a “big red flag” because it made it
unclear whether the policy was in effect at the time of the accident.

   After the Cosmes rested their case, Erie and Churilla moved for
judgment on the evidence. Clark never appeared at trial and thus did not
make a similar motion. The trial court granted the motion, reasoning that
the Cosmes brought about their own lack-of-coverage injuries when they
failed to sign the exclusion form before October 28. The court denied the
Cosmes’ motion to correct error. The Cosmes then appealed, challenging
the order granting the motions for judgment on the evidence but not the
order denying their motion to correct error.

   The court of appeals affirmed, holding the Cosmes failed to present
sufficient evidence to support their claims against Erie and Churilla.
Cosme v. Warfield Clark, No. 22A-CT-1897, at *3 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2023)
(mem.). On the professional-negligence claim against Churilla, the
appellate panel found that if Churilla owed the Cosmes a duty, Churilla
met its duty of reasonable care by telling the Cosmes to sign the exclusion
form and attempting to persuade Erie not to cancel the policy. Id. at *14–
15. On the breach-of-contract claim against Erie, the panel found “the
evidence relating to cancellation overwhelmingly and entirely establishes”
that the policy was cancelled because the Cosmes failed to submit the
exclusion form. Id. at *18. “As such, it cannot be said that the Cosmes’
intended inference, i.e., that the Policy was in effect at the time of the
Accident, can logically be made from the evidence presented during their
case-in-chief.” Id. at *18–19. On the bad-faith claim, the panel found that
because there was no contract in place between Erie and the Cosmes when
Clark rear-ended Christine and Roy, “Erie could not have been found to

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CT-159 | May 6, 2024           Page 6 of 20
have breached its duty” when it denied the Cosmes’ insurance claim. Id. at
*20. And Erie did not cancel the policy in bad faith, the panel found,
because Broyce’s license was suspended when Erie cancelled the policy.
Id. at *20–21. Because all claims against Churilla and Erie failed, the
punitive-damages claim, which was derivative of the other claims, also
failed. Id. at *21–23.

   The Cosmes then sought transfer, which we now grant, thus vacating
the appellate opinion, Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

                                             II

   Under Trial Rule 50(A), a movant may seek judgment on the evidence
at the close of a plaintiff’s case if all or some of the issues are “not
supported by sufficient evidence”. Ind. Trial Rule 50(A). In Purcell v. Old
National Bank, we reaffirmed this standard for Rule 50(A) motions. 972
N.E.2d at 839. But Purcell left it unclear whether a court may weigh
evidence or assess witness credibility in deciding whether “sufficient
evidence” supports an issue. Today, we answer that question in the
negative. When ruling on a Rule 50(A) motion, a judge may assess both
the quantity and quality of the evidence presented by the nonmovant but
may not weigh the conflicting evidence or assess witness credibility; these
are fact-finding functions within the jury’s sole province.

   Here, we hold that the trial court erred in granting judgment on the
evidence to Erie because the Cosmes’ case-in-chief presented sufficient
(though conflicting) evidence to prove Erie breached its contract and
violated its duty of good faith. But the court correctly granted judgment to
Churilla because the evidence showed Churilla owed no special duty to
the Cosmes to procure insurance or advise on the insurance policy.

                                             A

   Under Purcell, we analyze Rule 50(A) motions both quantitatively and
qualitatively. Evidence fails quantitatively if no evidence supports finding
for the nonmovant (the any-evidence standard). Id. at 840. Evidence fails
qualitatively if the probative evidence cannot create a reasonable inference
that a jury could find for the nonmovant (the substantial-evidence
standard). Ibid. A nonmovant—usually a plaintiff—may fail the

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CT-159 | May 6, 2024          Page 7 of 20
qualitative prong “either because of an absence of credibility of a witness
or because the intended inference may not be drawn therefrom without
undue speculation.” Ibid. (quoting Am. Optical Co. v. Weidenhamer, 457
N.E.2d 181, 184 (Ind. 1983)). When evaluating the evidence, the court must
look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id. at
839.

   On this point, Purcell is inconsistent in both promoting and
simultaneously disavowing courts that would assess witness credibility
and weigh evidence at the directed-verdict stage. The qualitative prong
expressly permits the court to assess “an absence of credibility of a
witness”. Id. at 840 (quoting Am. Optical Co., 457 N.E.2d at 184). It also
implicitly permits the court to weigh evidence. The qualitative prong asks
“not merely whether a conflict of evidence may exist, but rather whether
there exists probative evidence, substantial enough to create a reasonable
inference that the non-movant has met his burden.” Id. at 841. This
suggests that a conflict of evidence would not defeat a directed-verdict
motion and that a court must assess both the “probative” value of
evidence and whether that evidence is “substantial”. Ibid.

   In practice, Purcell’s analysis allows courts to weigh some of the
evidence. There, we found a generalized, ambiguous interrogatory
response insufficient to link the defendant to the alleged fraud. Id. at 841–
42. We also considered the conflicting evidence—testimony explaining the
interrogatory response during trial that suggested the defendant was not
tied to the fraud. Ibid. Thus, along with looking at the quality of the
nonmovant’s evidence (what could be reasonably inferred from the
evidence most favorable to the nonmovant), we also weighed the
conflicting evidence not favorable to the nonmovant and found “as a
whole” the evidence could not defeat the directed verdict. Id. at 841.

   While permitting courts to assess witness credibility and weigh
evidence in the qualitative prong, Purcell simultaneously instructs courts
to refrain from either function: “It remains true that a court is not free to
engage in the fact-finder’s function of weighing evidence or judging the
credibility of witnesses to grant judgment on the evidence, where fair-
minded men may reasonably come to competing conclusions.” Id. at 842.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CT-159 | May 6, 2024            Page 8 of 20
Indeed, Purcell says, this function “has always been within the purview of
the jury.” Ibid.

   Given Purcell’s contradictory commands, we clarify that courts may not
weigh evidence or assess witness credibility—fact-finding functions
reserved for the jury—at the close of plaintiff’s case-in-chief. This is why,
historically, we have cautioned courts not to deprive juries of this role by
granting directed verdicts. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Borntrager, 122 N.E.2d 734,
734–35 (Ind. 1954). This approach also aligns with our summary-judgment
standard, which allows even a self-serving affidavit to defeat summary
judgment so a case can go to trial. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1004
(Ind. 2014). Only after both sides have rested and the jury returns its
verdict do we permit the trial judge to take a more substantive role in
assessing the evidence as a so-called thirteenth juror, empowering the
court to conclude that no reasonable jury could have reached the result it
did. Chi Yun Ho v. Frye, 880 N.E.2d 1192, 1196 (Ind. 2008). At the post-
verdict stage, the court is not impeding the jury-trial right. And directing
judgment after a jury verdict has a lower effect on judicial resources. If a
trial court sets aside a jury verdict erroneously, the appellate court can
reinstate the verdict. But if there is no jury verdict, the only suitable
appellate remedy is a new trial.

                                             1

   The core reason we bar weighing evidence and assessing witness
credibility at the directed-verdict stage is because our legal system
reserves the fact-finding function to juries. Our state constitution
expressly protects the jury-trial right in civil cases. And our historical
treatment of directed verdicts shows a reticence to remove any factual
issues from the jury supported by sufficient evidence to permit a
reasonable jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff.

   The Indiana constitution protects “the right of trial by jury” in all civil
cases. Ind. Const. art. 1, § 20. “The jury are the exclusive judges of the
evidence.” Rannells v. State, 18 Ind. 255, 257 (1862). Thus, parties have a
“constitutional right . . . to have a jury determine the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight that shall be given the evidence and to decide

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CT-159 | May 6, 2024             Page 9 of 20
the facts accordingly.” Novak v. Chicago & Calumet Dist. Transit Co., 135
N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. 1956).

   A directed verdict withdraws an issue from the jury and hands it to the
judge. But to maintain the jury-trial right, we cannot permit the court to
preempt the jury’s fact-finding function. We said as much in Purcell: “Our
decision does not alter the critical, invaluable, and constitutionally
protected role of the jury in Indiana’s system of jurisprudence. It remains
true that a court is not free to engage in the fact-finder’s function of
weighing evidence or judging the credibility of witnesses”. 972 N.E.2d at
842.

   Our precedent protects the jury’s function in civil cases. The first hint of
permitting courts to qualitatively review evidence and witness credibility
on directed verdicts was not until 1983 in American Optical, 457 N.E.2d at
184. Before American Optical, we followed the any-evidence rule and did
not permit a directed verdict if any evidence or legitimate inference
supported each material allegation of the nonmovant’s claim. Whitaker,
122 N.E.2d at 734–35. Under this rule, a court should not direct a verdict
unless “there is a total absence of evidence or legitimate inference in favor
of the plaintiff upon an essential issue; or where the evidence is without
conflict and is susceptible of but one inference” for the movant. Ibid.
“[T]he court will not weigh the conflicting evidence or inferences but will
consider only the evidence and inferences that are most favorable to the
[nonmovant].” Id. at 735. We embraced this rule to preserve the jury-trial
right, Novak, 135 N.E.2d at 5, and reaffirm it today.

   In line with our historical approach, we hold that Purcell’s qualitative
prong limits the court to reviewing only the reasonableness of inferences
drawn from evidence. See Whitaker, 122 N.E.2d at 735 (holding courts
view “all inferences which the jury might reasonably draw” on a directed-
verdict motion). Thus, the court cannot ignore direct evidence, but it can
assess whether proposed inferences to be drawn from circumstantial
evidence are reasonable or speculative. See ibid. Still, the court cannot
substitute its own view of the evidence for that of the jury since this
prerogative is solely the jury’s. See Novak, 135 N.E.2d at 5. A court views
the evidence with all reasonable inferences for the nonmovant, and the

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CT-159 | May 6, 2024           Page 10 of 20
court cannot assess witness credibility or weigh conflicting evidence (or
the conflicting inferences drawn from it). Whitaker, 122 N.E.2d at 735.

   In sum, under our current standard, we permit courts to ensure the
inferences supporting the nonmovant’s claims are reasonable, but courts
cannot take on the jury’s fact-finding functions of weighing conflicting
evidence and assessing witness credibility.

                                             2

   Limiting courts this way with directed verdicts aligns with our
approach in Rule 56 summary-judgment motions. Summary judgment is
appropriate when there is no disputed issue of material fact, and the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. T.R. 56(C);
Griffin v. Menard, Inc., 175 N.E.3d 811, 813 (Ind. 2021). On summary
judgment, we draw all reasonable inferences for the nonmovant. Griffin,
175 N.E.3d at 813. But “the non-moving party must designate some
evidence to defeat the moving parties’ motion”, and “speculation is not
enough to overcome summary judgment.” Id. at 814.

    While Rule 50(A) and Rule 56 motions occur at different stages of the
litigation, both have the same goal—withdrawing issues from the jury
when there are no factual issues for the jury to decide. Summary judgment
is available when the nonmovant cannot prove its claim based on the
undisputed evidence. Judgment on the evidence (directed verdict) is
available when the nonmovant has not proved its claim because no
reasonable jury could find for it. Thus, just as a self-serving affidavit can
defeat summary judgment, Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1004, so too can the same
self-serving trial testimony defeat a directed verdict.

  Consistent with Indiana’s approach, federal courts likewise apply
parallel standards on summary judgment and judgment on the evidence.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250–51 (1986). “In essence,
though, the inquiry under each is the same: whether the evidence presents
a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is
so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251–52.
Again, the primary difference between the summary-judgment and

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CT-159 | May 6, 2024         Page 11 of 20
directed-verdict standards is procedural—the former is made on evidence
adduced before trial, and the latter on evidence admitted at trial. Id. at 251.

   Given the two motions’ similar functions, it makes little sense to let a
case go to trial on some quantum of evidence but not to a jury. Evidence
that creates a factual dispute requiring a trial should also require a jury to
resolve that dispute. It would be paradoxical for courts to let a case
proceed to trial based on certain evidence but once at trial to withdraw the
case from the jury based on the same evidence.

                                             3

   While a trial court has no fact-finding role under Rule 50(A), the court
may take a more active role after the jury has returned a verdict, or after
the court has entered judgment. On a motion to correct error under Rule
59(J), a trial court shall grant a new trial if the jury’s verdict “is against the
weight of the evidence”. T.R. 59(J)(7). And the court shall enter judgment
notwithstanding the jury’s verdict if the verdict “is clearly erroneous as
contrary to or not supported by the evidence”. Ibid. On a Rule 59(J)
motion, the judge acts as the “thirteenth juror” and must “sift and weigh
the evidence and judge witness credibility.” Chi Yun Ho, 880 N.E.2d at
1196 (quoting Keith v. Mendus, 661 N.E.2d 26, 31 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)).

   One reason we permit a more active role for the trial court after the jury
has entered its verdict is because, on appeal, if the appellate court
disagrees with the trial judge’s ruling under Rule 59(J), it can reinstate the
jury’s verdict. At that stage, there is a verdict to reinstate. But on directed
verdict, an appellate reversal requires a new trial before a different jury
because the first jury never got to render a verdict—an unwise, inefficient
use of judicial resources. An appellate court also can better review the
merits of how a trial court weighed evidence at the Rule 59(J) stage
because the court must detail its reasoning in a written order. When
ordering a new trial, the trial court must both “specify the general
reasons” for its ruling and “make special findings of fact upon each
material issue or element of the claim”. T.R. 59(J). Rule 50(A) does not
impose the same requirements.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CT-159 | May 6, 2024              Page 12 of 20
    The trial court does not circumvent the jury-trial right at the Rule 59(J)
stage. At this stage, the jury has already heard the evidence and returned
its verdict. If the trial court orders a new trial, it hands the case to another
jury rather than just taking the case from the jury. See Weida v. Kegarise,
849 N.E.2d 1147, 1151 (Ind. 2006). The court enters judgment
notwithstanding the verdict only when the verdict is “clearly erroneous”,
T.R. 59(J), which asks if any facts support the verdict, see Yanoff v. Muncy,
688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997) (applying clear-error review to trial-
court judgment on appeal). And the court cannot enter judgment if “such
relief is shown to be impracticable or unfair to any of the parties or is
otherwise improper”. T.R. 59(J). As we explained in Novak, this motion
protects the parties’ jury-trial right and protects the defendant from a
significant error by the jury:

      Thus it is that a complaining party, whose case is supported by
      some evidence of probative value upon every material issue, is
      given the benefit of his constitutional guarantee to have the
      right which he asserts finally affirmed or denied by a qualified
      and impartial jury. Thus also it is that a party-defendant is
      protected against the errors of a jury by the trial judge, whose
      duty it is to review the entire proceedings in the cause, and, in
      the light of his greater experience and understanding of the
      law, either affirm or reject the verdict of the jury.

135 N.E.2d at 5. Defendants concerned during trial about receiving an
unfair or erroneous jury verdict must wait to file a post-judgment Rule
59(J) motion to receive a judge’s more holistic, qualitative analysis that
considers and weighs all the evidence the jury heard.

                                             B

   Next, we apply our directed-verdict test to the Cosmes’ claims. But
before reaching the merits, we must first set out the standard of appellate
review.

  Our precedent has been unclear about what standard of review applies.
On one hand, we have said the reviewing court applies “the same

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CT-159 | May 6, 2024             Page 13 of 20
standard that the trial court uses”, Purcell, 972 N.E.2d at 839, which is de
novo review. But we have also said that “the trial judge is within his or
her discretion to issue judgment on the evidence”, id. at 842, which is an
abuse-of-discretion standard. We resolve the uncertainty by observing
that because trial courts do not weigh evidence or assess witness
credibility on directed verdicts, we must apply de novo review. The paper
record alone is enough for a reviewing court to assess whether, without
any weighing, the evidence supports any reasonable inference in favor of
the nonmovant. This standard of review aligns with our summary-
judgment standard of review, Griffin, 175 N.E.3d at 812–13, and with the
federal approach, Simstad v. Scheub, 816 F.3d 893, 900 (7th Cir. 2016).

   Turning to the merits, without assessing witness credibility or weighing
evidence, we hold that sufficient evidence supports the Cosmes’ claims for
breach of contract and bad faith against Erie. Based on the Cosmes’
evidence, a reasonable jury could find that the insurance policy was in
effect when Clark rear-ended Christine and Roy on November 4, 2017. A
jury could also find that Erie dealt with the Cosmes in bad faith when
communicating about the policy cancellation and when it ultimately
denied their insurance claim. Because a reasonable jury could find bad
faith, it could also award punitive damages against Erie. But insufficient
evidence supports the Cosmes’ professional-negligence claim against
Churilla because no reasonable jury could find Churilla owed the Cosmes
a special duty.

                                             1

   As for the claims against Erie, the Cosmes presented conflicting
evidence to support their breach-of-contract and bad-faith claims. We look
only to the evidence supporting the Cosmes’ claims, with all reasonable
inferences in their favor, to assess whether a reasonable jury could find for
them on all elements of their two claims. Though conflicting, the Cosmes’
evidence on both claims—one sounding in contract, the other in tort—is
enough to defeat a directed verdict. “[A]n insured who believes that an
insurance claim has been wrongly denied may have available two distinct
legal theories, one in contract and one in tort”. Erie Ins. v. Hickman ex rel.
Smith, 622 N.E.2d 515, 520 (Ind. 1993). The breach-of-contract claim

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CT-159 | May 6, 2024           Page 14 of 20
requires that a contract be in place at the time of the breach. Collins v.
McKinney, 871 N.E.2d 363, 370 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Whether a policy was
cancelled, making the contract no longer in effect, is the insurer’s burden
to prove. See Am. Fam. Ins. v. Ford, 293 N.E.2d 524, 526 (Ind. Ct. App.
1973). A related tort claim arises from an insurer’s duty to deal with its
insured in good faith. Erie Ins., 622 N.E.2d at 518–19. This duty
encompasses more than a coverage claim. Monroe Guar. Ins. v. Magwerks
Corp., 829 N.E.2d 968, 976 (Ind. 2005). We recognize four specific duties
that insurers owe insureds: (1) refrain from unfounded refusal to pay
policy proceeds; (2) refrain from unfounded delay in payment; (3) avoid
deceiving the insured; and (4) avoid exercising any unfair advantage to
pressure the insured into settling a claim. Ibid.

   Erie argues there was no bad faith and no breach of contract because
the policy was not in effect when Clark rear-ended the Cosmes. But the
Cosmes’ evidence suggests the policy was in place at the time of the
accident. An affidavit from Swanson, the Erie employee, certified that the
policy was in effect at the time of the accident in November 2017—“from
August 27, 2017 to August 27, 2018”. The Cosmes’ expert repeatedly
claimed that the certification was a valid basis to think the policy was in
force at the time of the accident. A jury could reasonably infer from this
evidence that the policy was in effect on November 4.

   Erie directs us to conflicting evidence, but weighing conflicting
evidence is reserved for the jury. After Swanson sent the policy
certification to Erie’s counsel, Swanson later testified the end date in her
certification was a scrivener’s error. The certification should have said the
policy was in effect from “August 27, 2017 to November 1, 2017”. But we
do not look to conflicting evidence to determine sufficiency. Erie admits
that the Cosmes presented “reed-thin quantitative evidence that a contract
was in place at the time of the accident”. But just as “reed-thin” evidence
is enough to defeat summary judgment, see Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1004, so
too is it enough to withstand a directed verdict. The jury may ultimately
agree with Erie that the initial certification was an error, and thus the
policy was not in effect at the time of the accident. But that factual dispute
is for the jury to decide after hearing all the evidence, not for the trial
judge to decide at the close of plaintiffs’ case.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CT-159 | May 6, 2024           Page 15 of 20
   The evidence that Erie cancelled the policy after discovering Broyce’s
suspended license is also conflicting. Erie is correct there is nothing
improper with cancelling an auto-insurance policy if a named insured’s
driver’s license is suspended “during the policy period”. Ind. Code § 27-7-
6-4(b). But the Cosmes’ evidence is that Erie’s conduct leading up to the
cancellation lulled them into believing Erie would not cancel their policy.
We hold that a reasonable jury could find that Erie breached the policy
and acted in bad faith first when it cancelled the policy and later when it
denied the Cosmes’ claim.

   To begin, when Aguilar, the Churilla employee, was communicating
with the Cosmes about the impending cancellation of their policy, Aguilar
was Erie’s agent. While an insurance agent is the agent of the insured
when procuring a policy, Filip v. Block, 879 N.E.2d 1076, 1085 (Ind. 2008),
once the policy is issued, an agent becomes the agent of the insurer, Aetna
Ins. Co. of the Midwest v. Rodriguez, 517 N.E.2d 386, 388 (Ind. 1988). When
the Cosmes were communicating with Aguilar about the policy
cancellation, the policy had been issued, and Aguilar was then acting as
Erie’s agent. Aguilar also had apparent authority because when Roy called
Erie about the imminent cancellation, Erie directed him to Churilla. This
manifestation by Erie gave the Cosmes reason to believe that Churilla had
authority to bind Erie on the policy-cancellation issues. See Gallant Ins. v.
Isaac, 751 N.E.2d 672, 675 (Ind. 2001). Thus, Aguilar could bind Erie, and
her actions may be imputed to Erie.

   With Aguilar’s actions imputed to Erie, a reasonable jury could find
Erie’s bad-faith conduct caused the policy’s cancellation. Aguilar’s
communications with the Cosmes led them to believe Erie would not
cancel their policy and deterred them from taking action that would have
kept the policy in effect. According to Roy, Aguilar never made clear that
he had to sign the exclusion form to avoid cancellation, or that providing
license-reinstatement documents would not preserve the policy. Rather
than insist that Roy sign the exclusion form, Aguilar sought Broyce’s
reinstatement papers and confirmed receipt of these papers on October 30.
From these communications, Roy believed that he had resolved Erie’s
threat to cancel the policy, and that the October 28 deadline to prevent
cancellation no longer applied—or so a reasonable jury could believe.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CT-159 | May 6, 2024          Page 16 of 20
   It was not until October 31, a day before the policy would cancel, when
Aguilar finally informed the Cosmes that signing the exclusion form was
the only way to keep the policy in force. Aguilar knew before this date
that the reinstatement documents would not prevent cancellation. But she
worked with the Cosmes to obtain the reinstatement documents anyway,
letting the Cosmes believe they were resolving the cancellation issue.

   Unfortunately, Aguilar’s last-minute attempt to inform the Cosmes
failed, and neither Roy nor Broyce received her messages in time. Thus,
unbeknownst to the Cosmes, their policy had already been cancelled
when Clark rear-ended them a few days later. After leading the Cosmes to
believe the policy issue was resolved, Erie then denied the claim because
the policy was no longer in effect. Construing all reasonable inferences in
the Cosmes’ favor, we hold that a reasonable jury could find that this was
an unfounded refusal to pay the claim and a bad-faith breach of contract
for which punitive damages may be proper. See Monroe Guar. Ins., 829
N.E.2d at 976.

   For these reasons, a reasonable jury could find that the policy was still
in effect at the time of the accident, and that Erie’s communications in
cancelling the policy and its subsequent denial of the Cosmes’ insurance
claim were a bad-faith breach of contract. Directed verdict for Erie was
thus improper.

                                             2

   Though the trial court erred in granting judgment on the evidence to
Erie, it correctly found insufficient evidence supported the Cosmes’ claim
against Churilla. Looking only at the evidence supporting their
professional-negligence claim, we hold the plaintiffs’ claim against
Churilla fails because Churilla owed no legal duty to the Cosmes.

   Two potential duties an insurance agent can owe to an insured are
relevant here: duty to procure and duty to advise. Under the duty to
procure, agents owe their clients “a general duty of reasonable care and
skill in obtaining insurance and following their clients’ instructions.” Ind.
Restorative Dentistry, P.C. v. Laven Ins. Agency, Inc., 27 N.E.3d 260, 264 (Ind.
2015).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CT-159 | May 6, 2024            Page 17 of 20
   The Cosmes frame their communications with Churilla as obtaining
insurance from Erie. But their discussions on the imminent cancellation of
the policy did not involve obtaining insurance. And Churilla had no duty
to offer the Cosmes alternative insurance. The duty to procure arises from
a contract to procure, which requires at a minimum that the insured give
the agent enough direction so the agent can obtain an insurance contract.
Id. at 269. Here, the Cosmes never directed Churilla to procure alternative
insurance. Thus, there was no contract to procure, and Churilla owed no
duty to the Cosmes.

   The Cosmes’ claim for breach of duty to advise also fails. An agent may
have a duty to advise insureds about coverage. Id. at 264. But this duty
arises only when a “special relationship” exists. Ibid. The nature and
length of the relationship determine whether it is “special”, and “[a]ll
special relationships are long-term”. Id. at 265. A special relationship
depends on four factors: (1) the agent exercises broad discretion to serve
the insured’s needs; (2) the agent counsels the insured on specialized
coverage; (3) the agent holds herself out as a highly skilled insurance
expert, and the insured relied on this expertise; and (4) the agent receives
compensation for expert advice. Ibid. The Cosmes argue a special
relationship exists because Churilla advised the Cosmes on the
cancellation and advocated with Erie to keep Broyce on the policy. But
these facts are irrelevant to finding a special relationship. The Cosmes
introduced no evidence to show the relationship was long-term, that
Churilla had broad discretion, or that Churilla had any special expertise or
obtained specialized coverage.

   Lacking evidence on the duty element of their professional-negligence
claim, the Cosmes cannot meet the quantitative prong of the directed-
verdict standard. Thus, we agree with the trial court that Churilla is
entitled to a directed verdict.

                                     *       *        *

  For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s directed verdict for Erie,
we affirm as to Churilla, and we remand for further proceedings
consistent with our opinion.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CT-159 | May 6, 2024          Page 18 of 20
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS, CHRISTINE COSME AND ROY
COSME
Angela M. Jones
The Law Office of Angela M. Jones, LLC
St. John, Indiana

Steven J. Sersic
Smith Sersic, LLC
Munster, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE, DAN CHURILLA D/B/A CHURILLA
INSURANCE
Trevor W. Wells
Reminger Co., L.P.A.
Merrillville, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE, ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE
James P. Strenski
Drewry Simmons Vornehm, LLP
Carmel, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE, DEFENSE TRIAL COUNSEL
OF INDIANA
Lucy R. Dollens
Quarles & Brady, LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana

Crystal G. Rowe
Kightlinger & Gray, LLP
New Albany, Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CT-159 | May 6, 2024   Page 19 of 20
ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE, INDIANA TRIAL LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION
Nicholas C. Deets
Tyler J. Zipes
Hovde Dassow + Deets, LLC
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE, INDIANAPOLIS BAR
ASSOCIATION, APPELLATE PRACTICE SECTION
Paul L. Jefferson
McNeely Law
Indianapolis, Indiana

Bryan H. Babb
Bose McKinney & Evans LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana

Christopher J. Bayh
Barnes & Thornburg LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana

Joel M. Schumm
Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law
Indianapolis, Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 24S-CT-159 | May 6, 2024   Page 20 of 20