Court Opinion

ID: 9845567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:24:27.816553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:14.160894
License: Public Domain

Finney, Justice
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. In my view, appellant was deprived of a fair trial by virtue of the erroneous admission of appellant’s past crimes under State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803 (1923). Further, I dissent from the majority’s holding that appellant was not entitled to a jury charge to the effect that he would be ineligible for parole if sentenced to life in prison. I would reverse appellant’s conviction and remand for a new trial.

Admission of Evidence Under State v. Lyle

At trial, the State introduced appellant’s confessions to three past crimes involving the assault of elderly women for the purpose of showing that he entered the victims dwelling with the intent to commit a crime therein. In doing so, the State sought to satisfy the intent requirement of first-degree burglary, S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-311(A) (Supp. 1991). In my view, these past crimes do not meet the test of admissibility under Lyle, supra, inasmuch as they are factually dissimilar from the present case, or too remote in time, and in at least one instance, unduly prejudicial.
In order for evidence of other crimes to be admissible under the settled exceptions, the evidence must have “logical relevance to the particular excepted purpose for which it is sought to be introduced.” Lyle, 118 S.E. at 807. Due to the very nature of such evidence and “the dangerous tendency and misleading probative force,” its admission should be subject to rigid scrutiny by the courts. Should the court not clearly perceive logical relevance between the extraneous crime and the offense charged, the defendant should be given the benefit of the doubt and the evidence rejected. Id. See also State v. Douglas, 302 S.C. 508, 397 S.E. (2d) 98 (1990).
One prior incident on which evidence was admitted occurred more than one year prior to the offense for which appellant was on trial. I find this offense too remote in time to *447reasonably establish that because appellant entered this prior victim’s dwelling with intent to commit a crime, he did so in the present case, or that there was a common scheme or plan. Lyle, 118 S.E. at 808.
Even if the evidence of past crimes is deemed relevant, it may nonetheless be excluded if the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs its probative value. State v. Johnson, 293 S.C. 321, 360 S.E. (2d) 317 (1987).
The state was permitted to introduce evidence of appellant’s assault of his grandmother. I would hold that the prejudicial effect of this most egregious evidence was substantially outweighed by any probative value which may have been deduced therefrom. Johnson, supra.

Jury Charge On Parole Eligibility

Appellant contends the Circuit Court erred in declining to charge the jury that in the event he was sentenced to life in prison, he would be ineligible for parole under S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-640.1 agree.
Consistent with my opinion in State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 406 S.E. (2d) 315 (1991), I believe that appellant was entitled to a jury charge under § 24-21-640 since he “sought only to have the court declare correct and current law relevant to his case.” Id. 406 S.E. (2d) at 320.