Court Opinion

ID: 9742794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:20:29.049519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:36.703250
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Chief Justice,
concurring.
Mayo’s contention that his two Alabama convictions are “related” for purposes of Indiana’s habitual offender statute presents an intriguing question, but we are too late in the day to consider it.
The statutory provision at issue, Ind.Code § 35-50-2-8, hardly articulates the requirements recited in today’s opinion (commission of the second offense after sentencing for the first offense, and so on). These detailed requirements became “what the statute requires” through judicial action in Miller v. State, 275 Ind. 454, 417 N.E.2d 339 (1981). We have applied them in hundreds of cases since that announcement.
The Miller gloss is usually regarded as increasing the burden of the prosecution, imposing a requirement of proof more elaborate than the authors of the legislation likely intended. In this case, however, the door swings in the opposite direction. A prisoner with a semi-plausible claim that two of his priors were “related” finds himself unable to make much headway in light of the relatively mechanical rule of Miller.
Still, because we have enforced this rule so uniformly (and efficiently, the benefit of most bright line tests), to the apparent satisfaction of the General Assembly, I cannot justify turning back the clock. I thus join the Court in rejecting Mayo’s claim.