Court Opinion

ID: 9647886
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:54:10.583971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:55.796453
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
In the final grounds of error treated by the majority opinion, the merits of appellant’s complaints regarding the State’s exclusion of veniremen R. L. Schlosser, D. C. Merdian and Clarence Ellis are avoided by asserting that a careful review of the record reflects that his objections “were directed to the disqualification of the jurors under V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 12.31(b);” thus, according to the majority, appellant’s failure “to specify in his objections that the jurors’ exclusions were inconsistent with Witherspoon waived such error on appeal.”
It seems to me that evasion of meritorious claims on this basis is nothing more than a semantical variation on the late notion that V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 12.31(b) and Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968) are “separate and independent bases for excluding jurors in Texas.” Whatever inadequacy a majority of the Court might otherwise attribute to the Supreme Court’s guidance in the realm of capital jury selection, it cannot be gainsaid that the premise offered by the majority opinion here, in its quietus, has already been constitutionally interred:
“As an initial matter, it is clear beyond preadventure that Witherspoon is not a ground for challenging any prospective juror. It is rather a limitation on the State’s power to exclude: if prospective jurors are barred from jury service because of their views about capital punishment on ‘any broader basis’ than inability to follow the law or abide by their oaths, the death sentence cannot be carried out. Witherspoon. . . . While this point may seem too obvious to bear repetition, it is apparent from their frequent references to Witherspoon as a ground for ‘disqualifying’ prospective jurors that the State, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, might have fallen into the error of as*350suming that Witherspoon and § 12.31(b) are both grounds for exclusion. . . . ”1
Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2527-2528, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980).
The idea that Witherspoon and § 12.31(b) may coexist as separate and independent bases for excluding capital veniremen was specifically rejected because § 12-31(b) focuses the inquiry on the prospective jurors’ “attitudes,” “opinions,” “beliefs” regarding the death penalty, thus § 12.31(b) — like any other criterion which so focuses the inquiry — falls within the scope of Wither-spoon. And the scope of Witherspoon constitutes “a limitation on the State’s power to exclude” prospective jurors because of their “views about capital punishment.” Adams, supra, 448 U.S. at 48, 100 S.Ct. at 591.
In view of the fact then that Witherspoon identifies not a ground for disqualification, but a constitutional limitation on the application of any ground of exclusion which focuses on attitudes about capital punishment, it seems that appellant’s objection— as described by the majority — was the hy-pertechnically correct one: that the jurors were being excused under an impermissible application of § 12.31(b), and thus were not excludable thereunder at all. As the Supreme Court specifically stated,
“The State could, consistently with With-erspoon, USE § 12.31(b) to exclude prospective jurors whose views on capital punishment are such as to make them unable to follow the law or obey their oaths. But the USE of § 12.31(b) to exclude jurors on broader grounds based on their opinions concerning the death penalty is impermissible.” Adams, 448 U.S. at 48, 100 S.Ct. at 2528.
In sum then, I have no disagreement with the majority opinion’s characterization of appellant’s objections, for it is clear to me that his complaints were indeed being directed to juror exclusions under impermissible, incorrect and unconstitutional applications of § 12.31(b).2 But the majority opinion’s conclusion — having no more substance than its apparitional premise — entirely dissipates on closer inspection.
Indeed, the very inspection suggested, though not undertaken, by the majority opinion itself is the most appropriate: “a careful review” of the voir dire testimony supplies the context and, thus, the meaning of the objections voiced and the understanding of all parties concerned. The voir dire examination of venireman Schlosser is illustrative of the point. It is treated fully in Appendix “A,” to which the reader is now referred.
Easily discerned from the examination of Schlosser is the focus of interest on the part of the questioners. The trial judge, as he stated and his questions clearly indicated, felt that what was really in issue was whether the juror could say that his deliberations on fact issues would not be “affected” by the possibility of the death penalty. V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 12.31(b). Ultimately sensing this, the prosecutor abandoned his leading attempt to exclude Schlosser on the ground that he had “a bias . .. against [a] phase of the law upon which the State is entitled to rely,” Article 35.16(b)(3), V.A.C. C.P., and citing Hovila v. State, 562 S.W.2d 243 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), challenged for cause upon Schlosser’s unwitting incantation that his “deliberations would be affected.”
Clearly, the majority correctly analyzes the record by referencing the disqualification of Schlosser as being “under 12.31(b).” But just as the record discloses the basis for the prosecutor’s challenge for cause, so too does it reveal defense counsel’s ground of objection thereto.
Indeed, there is nothing oblique about the preceptive orientation of defense counsel’s *351concern; the genesis of every question he put to Schlosser was the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra: would the juror consider the death penalty in a proper case; would he automatically vote against imposition of capital punishment regardless of the evidence; could he follow the law as given and instructed by the court? And indeed whatever “equivocation” this record reflects on the part of Schlosser, it was never in his responses to defense counsel’s questions.
In Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), it was stated:
“The generally acknowledged policies of requiring specific objections are twofold. First, a specific objection is required to inform the trial judge of the basis of the objection and afford him the opportunity to rule on it.1 Second, a specific objection is required to afford opposing counsel an opportunity to remove the objection or supply other testimony. * * Thus, where the correct ground of [objection] was obvious to the judge and opposing counsel, no waiver results from a general or imprecise objection.
1 A collateral but important ramification of this function is to provide the trial court with an opportunity to attempt to cure any harm resulting from the action giving rise to the objection. [Citations omitted].”
Does the majority seriously contend that it was not obvious both to the trial court, and the prosecutor that defense counsel believed the venireman was being excused in violation of Witherspoon? Clearly, neither the prosecutor nor the trial judge felt that the limitations on exclusion established by Witherspoon constituted “the test” in Texas, in view of the approved application of § 12.31(b), supra, by this Court.3 But that does not mean they failed fully to appreciate appellant’s position on the matter.
Indeed, the prosecutor, having been “afforded an opportunity to remove the objection or supply other testimony” took a different tack, easily maneuvering Schlosser’s “bias” (as the prosecutor characterized it first) against death as a punishment for a non-trigger capital defendant, into the “magic words” he knew the trial court would act on and this Court would approve. In short, it is clear that nothing done here would have differed had defense counsel uttered the word “Witherspoon.”
Schlosser was — in the classic sense — an “Adams juror.” Not once did he depart from his initial statements that he believed in capital punishment in appropriate cases, would follow the law, would consider imposition of the death penalty, and would never automatically vote against its imposition. Yet, with ease he was excluded because he could not swear that his scruples, his hesitancy to be involved in the process, would not “affect” him. It was this recurrent anomaly in Texas cases which finally forced the hand of the United States Supreme Court.
According to Adams, the State has no “legitimate interest” in excluding jurors who would follow the law and abide by their oaths notwithstanding their opinions or beliefs about capital punishment; further, the implementation by the State of any “practice” which exceeds that “legitimate interest,” “seriously prejudice[s]” the accused. Adams, supra, 448 U.S. at 43, 100 S.Ct. at 2525, 65 L.Ed.2d at 588. In the instant case, the defendant’s objection was more than adequate to convey his belief that the State had failed to show itself entitled to the exclusion of venireman Schlosser.
Furthermore, defense counsel was correct: The State did not show its entitlement to the exclusion and the trial court erred by excusing Schlosser on the State’s *352challenge for cause.4 Adams, supra. I would hold that the disqualification of Schlosser alone requires vacation of the death sentence. Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122, 97 S.Ct. 399, 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976).5
As in the case of venireman Schlosser, the record discloses that Merdian was fully qualified to sit on the jury which tried appellant for capital murder; conversely, the record does not indicate that the State met its burden of establishing its entitlement to his exclusion. Witherspoon, supra. The State’s practice, as revealed by this record, seriously prejudiced appellant by depriving him of his constitutional right to an impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 10 of the Constitution of this State. Adams, supra.
At a time when the Court should lead the effort to repair the damage this State has sustained through the unchecked use— recently condemned — of § 12.31(b), an attempt to continue its sanction by the majority opinion seems uncommonly inappropriate. I am therefore constrained to dissent to the invitation extended by the majority opinion for the spectre to haunt us for many years to come.
TEAGUE, J., joins.
APPENDIX “A”
After introducing himself and the attorneys, and advising Schlosser of the charge against appellant, as well as the mandatory penalties, the trial judge continued,
“Now, would the fact that the . .. two possible punishments of death or life . .. would that affect your deliberations on any fact issue in the case? * * *
I’m really trying find out how you feel about the imposition of the death penalty. Now you would be disqualified unless the penalties of death or imprisonment for life will not affect your deliberation on any issue of fact.
Would the mandatory penalty of death or life imprisonment affect your deliberations on any issue of fact?
A: No sir.”
The court informed Schlosser that the attorneys would “go into the principles of law involved” in the case and cautioned that the jury is required to take an oath to follow those principles and base its decision “solely upon the evidence.” At this point the prosecutor took over, and during his preliminary comments told Schlosser that appellant was indicated for hiring another to kill the alleged victim; he explained that such conduct constituted a capital offense in Texas. He then asked Schlosser whether he “agreed or disagreed” with that law. Schlosser replied that “it may be more the responsibility of the man that actually pulled the trigger.” The prosecutor replied:
“Now, the law provides that the person who does the hiring is subject to the maximum penalty of life or death also. * * * This Defendant is charged with that. He is not charged with doing the murder itself.
*353A: I would have to follow the law as a Juror.
Q: * * * Could you follow the law if the Court tells you that the Defendant or the person that does the hiring is subject to the . .. penalties of death or life imprisonment?
< : Yes sir.
O’ : * * * I'm not going to try to talk you into a position one way or the other. * * * If you disagree with the law or if you think in your own mind you couldn’t put out of your mind the way you feel, that’s fine. * * * Now if you disagree with [the law] or if you don’t think that that ought to be the law or you don’t think looking in your own mind, as only you can, that you could be fair to the State, we would just like to know about it now.
A: Well, I believe in capital punishment. If a man sheds another man’s blood, then by that man that blood should be required. It seems to me that the man that actually did the murder would be the one . . . subject to capital punishment.
Q: Under our law he is [too]. * * What are your feelings about the person who actually does the hiring?
A: I would have to go by the law. I’m here to abide by the law.
Q: But how are your feelings?
A: I couldn’t ... give you a yes or no answer on that .. . without studying it and thinking about it.
Q: Well ... after you are on the jury that’s too late to give us an answer. That’s what this is all about ... is to see how you feel. * * * We will take as long as you want. * * * If you don’t think, sir, that you could sit fairly on that type of jury, just let us know. I know you will obey the law as best you could, but sometimes our personal feelings, you know, are important to us. However you feel makes no difference to me. if you can, fine. If you cannot, just let us know.
A: I really couldn’t decide . . . right now ... on whether I could sit, you know, with an open mind on his situation.
THE COURT: He’s not asking you what you are going to do in this case. He is asking you about your attitude toward capital punishment * * *. The question is: Do you believe in capital punishment as applied to a person who hires . . . someone to do the killing?
MR. SCHLOSSER: That’s where my problem is.
THE COURT: You have to answer—
MR. SCHLOSSER: I don’t think I could.
MR. POE [Prosecutor]: Excuse me. Are you through, Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes.
BY MR. POE:
q. * * * ¾¾6 answers that we need from you are yes or no. I know it’s human nature — and I say it all the time — I believe I could, I think I could, and that type of thing, or I don’t think I could.

But the judge, in order to make a ruling [of] law, requires you to answer yes or no to the questions.

♦ * * ⅜ ⅜ ⅜
So I will just ask you again. Knowing what you know, that the Defendant is not the trigger man in this case, I will tell you he’s not, but he is charged with capital murder—
MR. HOUSE [Defense Counsel]: I object to this type of questioning. The problem is he’s getting into the facts of the ease.... If he wants to present it in a hypothetical type question, that’s fine.
MR. POE: I have a right to tell him what he is charged with.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. SCHLOSSER: I would have to say no.
Q: You could not sit fairly to the State knowing that the Defendant is charged with doing the hiring as opposed to actually pulling the trigger; is that right?
A: Right.
*354Q: I think that was a yes answer?
A: Yes.
Q: And you have thought about this and you have come to the conclusion in your own mind, that you really couldn’t be totally fair to the State because of the nature of the offense he is charged with; is that correct?
A: That’s correct.
Q: And although you could be totally fair in another type of capital murder case, you could not be fair in this case because he is not the trigger man?
A: That’s correct.
Q: Is that your answer for the Record and for the Court ?
A: Yes.
Q: I take it I could spend the rest of the day talking to you about that and that would still be your answer, would it not?
A: Yes.
MR. POE: We will challenge him, Your Honor.
BY MR. HOUSE:
Q: Mr. Schlosser, the question really boils down to the fact that in a proper case, regardless of what the circumstances may be — because you don’t know the circumstances and you don’t know the facts and you won’t know until you hear it coming from the witness stand — you understand that — but the question is: In a proper case — can you think of any case that would be proper in which you could consider the death penalty for a person who allegedly hired someone to kill someone else? In other words, you are not just saying that automatically you wouldn’t vote for the death penalty; you could consider it ? That’s what I’m trying to find out.
A: You ask some hard questions. Would you repeat that?
Q: Sure. The key question here as I see it is whether or not in a proper case —and we don’t know what it could be — you could conjure up all kinds of horrendous things in your mind — you need to do that while I’m asking you this question — but in a proper case could you consider assessing the death penalty as a proper punishment if that was in fact an element of the punishment for a person who allegedly hired someone to kill someone else? In other words, you wouldn’t just automatically vote no to the death penalty; you could in fact consider it in a proper case? Is that true?
A: Yes.
MR. HOUSE: I will object to the challenge.
MR. POE: May I have a moment?
THE COURT: Yes.
BY MR. POE:
Q: My question was: Could you be fair and you told me you couldn’t really be fair to the State because of the way you feel. And apparently Mr. House talked to you a little different and a different aspect comes in. I’m just trying to ask you: Can you be totally fair to the State knowing that the Defendant didn’t do the shooting? * * * And I believe you told me that you couldn’t really be fair starting out to the State; you have some type of bias, maybe, against that type of offense being capital murder; is that right? Is that right?

Is that what you told me?

MR. HOUSE: I object to the form. The question has to be captioned in terms of whether or not you could consider the death penalty. * * * I don’t agree with that statement. I think it’s whether or not he could consider it in a proper case.
THE COURT: I’m inclined to agree with you, Counsel. I think the issue here is whether you comply with the 12.31.
MR. POE: The State has the right, as well as the Defense, to have 12 unbiased Jurors in any criminal case, whether it’s a capital offense or misdemeanor.
THE COURT: Let me ask you one more questions, [sic]
*355Mr. Schlosser, in a murder for hire case if you were selected as a Juror, you could not under any circumstances, as I understand it, vote and inflict the death penalty for a person who hired someone else to commit murder regardless of what the facts arel You could not do it; is that what you are saying?
MR. SCHLOSSER: Well, he mentioned—
THE COURT: You answer my question.
MR. SCHLOSSER: I want to explain my answer.
THE COURT: We don’t care — it really doesn’t matter why you feel. We want to know how you feel. Everybody is entitled to his own opinion. You don’t have to justify it.
* * * Can you, if you were selected as a Juror, under any imaginable set of facts vote to inflict the death penalty on a person convicted of hiring someone else to commit murder? That’s the question.
MR. SCHLOSSER: Not under any circumstances, no.
MR. POE: I renew my challenge.
THE COURT: I sustain the challenge.
MR. HOUSE: I object to the sustaining of the challenge.
Defense counsel, obviously skeptical that communication was occurring, continued, asking Schlosser whether he had understood the Judge’s question. He explained that what is crucial is that “you wouldn’t just automatically vote [against the death penalty]; could you in fact consider . . . assessing the death penalty if it was a proper case under the proper circumstances?” Schlos-ser replied, “Certain conditions I could think of where I could and certain where I couldn’t.” Defense counsel at this point stressed to Schlosser the fact that,
“You don’t know the facts of this case or any other case. But there are cases that you can imagine that you would definitely consider, as I understand it, assessing the death penalty to a person who allegedly hired someone to kill someone else? You would as to the person who allegedly hired him, consider the death penalty; is that right?
A: Yes.
Q: There are certain cases where that’s true?

A: Yes.

MR. HOUSE: I think he qualifies.
MR. POE: Let me ask some questions. * * * It seems like each one of us get a different answer. * * * Do you have some difficulty or problem with [the law that the person who does the hiring is subject to the death penalty]?
A: Yes. Like I told you at the start, I disagree with that.
* * * * * *
Q: The fact that you feel that way means that you would carry that feeling throughout the trial, wouldn’t you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I hate to use the word bias. * * * But you feel in your own mind that you wouldn’t really put that feeling aside because we can’t really put our feelings aside; that’s impossible; is that right?
A: That’s right.
Q: * * * And if you are a Juror in this case would you be able to put that aside or not? If you can’t, just tell the Court.
A: No, sir.
MR. POE: It will be a challenge for bias.
MR. HOUSE: I need to ask a couple more questions. * * * Mr. Schlosser, you have already indicated that there are certain cases in which you could consider the death penalty [as a proper punishment] for the person who allegedly hired . . . another person to kill a third party — as a proper punishment?
A: Yes.
Q: Now, the question here is: Even though you have a bias, the question is: Can you follow the law? The Judge is going to give you the law and if that law is that . . . the State is seeking the death penalty on a particular individu*356al, the question is: Can you follow the law and consider the death penalty despite your bias'! Because we all got biases.
A: A bias — I have been influenced by biases. The law is not always perfect.
* * * * * *
Q: The question is whether or not, because of your bias, you would automatically veto a consideration of the death penalty in this type of case, . .. [murder for hire] as to the person who hired him if in fact it were a proper case and whether or not you could follow the law . . . ?
A: Well, I think I would still be influenced by bias.
Q: Could you set aside your bias and follow the law and at least consider the death penalty ...? In other words, would you automatically veto the death penalty or the consideration of [it] because of your bias?
* * * * * *
A: I couldn’t automatically veto.
Q: So you would consider it?
A: Yes.
Q: So your bias itself could be overcome in a proper case; is that what you’re saying?
* * * * * *
A: I couldn’t answer yes or no on that because you are always influenced one way or another.
Q: But the question is, Mr. Schlosser, could you follow the law and in a proper case consider the death penalty despite your bias? That’s the real question.
A: Yes, I could.
MR. HOUSE: I object to the challenge.
MR. POE: One more question.
* * * * * *
Q: You disagree with the law, is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: Can you answer out?
A: Yes.
Q: And you have a strong feeling that it would affect your deliberations in the case; is. that right?
A: Right. My bias.
Q: We call it bias. I hate to use that term. But let’s call it that because we know what we’re talking about. * * * [If you] had to make the decision whether it was a death penalty or life imprisonment, the way you feel would really affect your deliberations, wouldn’t it ?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: We are not talking about ... whether or not you could follow the law because you would be a Juror and you would be sworn to follow the law. I’m talking about your bias affecting your deliberations. It would affect you, wouldn’t it?
A: Right. Yes.
MR. POE: Thank you. It will be a challenge.
MR. SHAVER [Prosecutor]: In support of that, Your Honor, we would like to show Avila vs. State, which was returned by Criminal Court of Appeals on February 8th of this year.1 The very question was answered that way.2
At this juncture, the trial judge was shown the opinion in question; thereafter, he stated, “All right. The Court will sustain the challenge. You will be excused, Mr. Schlosser.”
*357But defense counsel objected to the court’s ruling before he could question the venireman further. The trial court told him to go ahead. Counsel elicited reaffirmations from Schlosser that he did believe in the law of capital punishment, that he personally disagreed with the law in the respect previously discussed, and then asked,
“Q: But the question is: Despite your bias or your disagreement with that law, could you follow the law?
MR. POE: I object to that. That is not in issue.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Defense counsel then requested an opportunity to make a bill of exceptions.

. All emphasis is mine unless otherwise indicated.

. The only other possible meaning of an objection “directed to the disqualification ... under ... § 12.31(b)” would be that the defense believed the jurors had stated their deliberations would not be affected and were therefore not excludable under § 12.31(b) as that provision was being interpreted at the time. This, however, cannot be seriously advanced simply because the voir dire testimony reflects otherwise. See Appendix “A” post.

. As of the date of the voir dire here, this Court had held, then reaffirmed, that when a venire-person was excludable under the “State statutory” ground for disqualification, § 12.31(b), it was “unnecessary to consider” the prospective juror’s “qualification” under Witherspoon. E. g., Hovila, supra; Shippy v. State, 556 S.W.2d 246 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Burns v. State, 556 S.W.2d 270 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), relief granted sub nom. Burns v. Estelle, 592 F.2d 1297 (5 CA 1979), rehearing en banc granted, 598 F.2d 1016 (5 CA 1979), order granting relief aff'd, 626 F.2d 396 (5 CA 1980) and Moore v. State, 542 S.W.2d 664 (Tex.Cr.App.1976).

. Apropos of the exclusion of Schlosser is the following passage from Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522, n. 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1777 n. 21:
“Just as veniremen cannot be excluded from cause on the ground that they [voice general objections to the death penalty or express conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction], so too they cannot be excluded for cause simply because they indicate that there are some kinds of cases in which they would refuse to recommend capital punishment. And a prospective juror cannot be expected to say in advance of trial whether he would in fact vote for the extreme penalty in the case before him. The most that can be demanded of a venireman is that he be willing to consider all of the penalties provided by state law, and that he not be irrevocably committed, before the trial has begun, to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings.”

. As further illustrative of the abuse of § 12.-31(b), supra, that the decision of the Supreme Court in Adams, supra, is patently designed to check, I will address the voir dire examination of venireman Merdian in Appendix “B,” but suggest to the Court that it not be published in the interest of space considerations. For simple brevity, I pretermit completely discussion of venireman Ellis.

. This reference is apparently to Hovila v. State, 562 S.W.2d 243 (Tex.Cr.App.1978).

. In Hovila, supra, Venireman Glass was held to have been appropriately excluded on the State’s challenge for cause under § 12.31(b), supra, because it was clear that his “perception of the facts” would be “affected” by the mandatory penalties. Similarly, the exclusion of Venirewoman Boyd was upheld because her voir dire examination disclosed that she would be “unconsciously deceptive.”
Both Glass and Boyd — like Schlosser in the instant case — readily admitted that the possibility of the death penalty would “affect” their deliberations.