Court Opinion

ID: 9777286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:06:06.569588+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:51.658508
License: Public Domain

TEAGUE, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent to the disposition the majority makes of appellant’s first ground of error that “the evidence is insufficient to establish that the Appellant was guilty of the charged offense of possession of more than four ounces of marijuana,” and would hold that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the verdict of the trial court and would order the conviction reversed. To do otherwise, in my opinion, is to engage in rank speculation. See Earnhart v. State, Tex.Cr. App., 575 S.W.2d 551 (1979).
I also question whether the majority may consider Shoquist’s statement, in its summary, as to what appellant was going to do with the “spiral notebook,” for the record reflects the following:
Q And what did he [Wasaff] do with the box once he arrived in the living room? A They apparently set the boxes down, because they were later — I found them in the — or that’s what the marihuana was contained in. And they showed them to me in that bedroom, but they apparently set them down in the front bedroom and then came back in the living room.
Q They being—
A Wasaff and Hobbs. And then we all more or less had a discussion about where we were going to weigh them at, and Hobbs said he had a little triple beam scale which would only weigh about one brick at a time. And apparently Mr. Pollan was going to record the weights and total them up at the end.
MR. STERNBERG: I object to that statement, Your Honor. It’s a conclusion on the part of this witness.
THE COURT: He may testify as to what his opinion was based on, but not his opinion.
Unfortunately, the prosecutor did not ask and Shoquist did not say what “his opinion was based on.”
I have my suspicions as to the part appellant was to play in this transaction, with the “spiral notebook,” but I do not choose, as the majority apparently does, to affirm a conviction on suspicion or speculation and, therefore, must respectfully dissent. Compare Harrison v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 555 S.W.2d 736, 737 (1977). “However, a finding of joint possession cannot be justified solely by proof of mere presence of an accused at a place where contraband is being used or possessed.” “Possession means more than being where the action is; it involves the exercise of dominion and control over the thing allegedly possessed.” Shortnacy v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 474 S.W.2d 713, 715, 716 (1972). See also Underwood v. *598State, 571 S.W.2d 7 (1978); Ayers v. State, 570 S.W.2d 926 (1978); and Armstrong v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 542 S.W.2d 119 (1976).
In order to establish the offense of possession of an unlawful substance such as marihuana, as I understand the law of possession, it is mandatory for the State to prove two components: (1) knowledge of what the substance is, and (2) actual or constructive care, custody, control or management of the substance. See Art. 4476-15, Sec. 1.02(23), V.A.T.C.S., the Controlled Substances Act, where the word “possession” is defined. The State may very well have proved the first component, but they failed to establish the second, and it is mandatory that both be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
If it be argued that appellant constructively possessed the marihuana, that argument fails: at no time did appellant utter any words of encouragement; he was never, other than by mere presence, connected to the residence where the marihuana was seized and where he was arrested; there is no showing that appellant ever exercised any control or handling of the boxes which contained the marihuana; there is no evidence of flight; there is no showing there was any odor or aroma of marihuana in the air; there were no furtive gestures; and there is no showing appellant was under the influence of any drug, including marihuana. In sum, to show even constructive possession, I thought there had to be some affirmative link existing between the person accused and the unlawful contraband. For an excellent discussion of this point, the reader’s attention is directed to the opinion of Hausman v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 480 S.W.2d 721 (1972), a case which reflects facts far stronger than those here, but which was reversed by this Court.
It now appears, by the holding of the majority, there is an exception to the rule that mere presence of an accused at a place where contraband is being used or possessed by others is not sufficient to establish joint possession. That exception is that if the accused is ever in close juxtaposition to the contraband and is present when the contraband is displayed to the prospective purchaser, then he is as guilty as those who actually possessed the illegal contraband. Previously, I thought, by the cases of this Court, that possession meant more than being where the action is. However, if one is present where the action is and fails to make like the proverbial three monkeys, by failing to cover his eyes, failing to cover his ears, and failing to unseal his lips, he will now be guilty of the offense of possession of illegal contraband. To this holding I respectfully dissent.