Court Opinion

ID: 9868672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 18:47:38.445158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:52.574873
License: Public Domain

On Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing.
Appellant contends that money in bank is not “property * * * subject to execution” within the meaning of R. S. art. 3997. This point was not urged in the original briefs, and we gave it no consideration; assuming that since money in bank is property, and can be reached bj garnishment (a species of execution), it came within the statute. This exact question seems to be one of first impression in this state. We have reached the conclusion that on principle, having in view the purpose of the statute, the term execution should be limited to its ordinary and general meaning, and should not be held to include extraordinary or ancillary process, available to the creditor to reach property or interests therein which cannot be reached by the ordinary writ of execution.
We believe this conclusion follows from the holding in Walker v. Loring, 89 Tex. 668, 36 S. W. 246, 247. Certainly it follows from the reasoning in the opinion in that case by Chief Justice Gaines. We quote: “The purpose of the statute is the protection of creditors against voluntary conveyances by their debtors. It is based upon the maxim that a man must be just before he is generous. It denounces a voluntary conveyance as fraudulent, and void against existing creditors with one exception, and that is that he still retains sufficient property from which the creditors may make their debts by due process *1075of law. It does not mean that the conveyance is valid if the property, at a fair market value, is sufficient to cover the debts. Nor does it mean that it is enough merely that the property, if discovered, is subject 'to levy and sale. But it means that he must retain property of which he has the open and visible ownership of such value that when subjected to forced sale it will yield a sufficient sum to pay all the existing debts as well as the taxable costs of their collection. What protection is the statute to a creditor if the debtor may conceal a part of his property and give away the remainder? What advantage accrues to him from his debtor’s ownership of property, if he is unable to discover it? We think, therefore, that the words, ‘subject, to execution’ mean not only that the property should be such as may be legally levied upon and sold by the sheriff, but that it should also be such as is actually capable of being levied upon.”
Money in bank is a credit in one of its most liquid forms. It can only be reached by> garnishment which must be supported by affidavit. Its existence and ownership is not discoverable by any record available to the creditor as a matter of right, and to that extent it is concealed from creditors. Its ownership, real or apparent, can be transferred with the greatest facility and ease without any character of publicity. The situation presented by the instant case is a striking illustration of the facility with which an unliquidated claim may be defeated entirely, if money in bank is to be taken into consideration in determining solvency (after disposing of all physical property by gift to relatives) within the statutory test of being “possessed of property * * * subject to execution sufficient to pay his existing debts.”
The rule announced in the above quotation from the Lybrook Case has never been questioned. See Ramsey v. Abilene, etc. (Tex. Civ. App.) 57 S.W. (2d) 877; Kelley v. Stubblefield (Tex. Civ. App.) 26 S.W.(2d). 281; 20 Tex. Jur. p. 418, § 61. De Ruiter v. De Ruiter, 28 Ind. App. 9, 62 N. E. 100, 91 Am. St. Rep. 107, seems directly in point.
Excluding the bank deposits, the record negatives the solvency of Sorrell, measured by the statutory standard as above interpreted.
There is no merit in appellee’s contention that since the remedy pursued by. appellant was an equitable one, it was not available to him because he did not show that he had exhausted his legal remedies. Legal remedies, precluding equitable relief, must be available; and to be available they must be effective and adequate. Appellant made every effort to find other assets of Sorrell to subject to the discharge of his judgment; but without success. The law does not require that one do a fruitless thing.
Our judgment of affirmance is set aside, the trial court’s judgment is reversed, and judgment is here rendered in favor of appellant awarding him the relief he seeks.
Motion granted.
On Appellee’s Motion for Rehearing.
Appellee’s motion for rehearing is predicated in the main upon questions of practice, largely with reference to the manner in which appellant briefed the case. As shown in our original opinion, appellant filed in the trial court a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, which was overruled. Error was properly assigned upon this ruling and carried into the brief. Whether in other respects the brief met every test of the rules for briefing is a matter largely within the discretion of this court. The briefs of both parties were such as to require this court to examine the entire record, which we have carefully done, and conclude that the motion for judgment was improperly sustained under our holding that money in bank cannot properly be taken into consideration in determining solvency within the pertinent statute. This proposition appellee now concedes in the motion as “no doubt correct.” Implicit in this concession is the admission that if the judgment is affirmed, the ends of justice will be defeated through rules of practice which are prescribed to attain the ends of justice. It would serve no useful purpose to discuss in detail the various points urged in this regard, but would only encumber further the already overburdened law reports with procedural holdings, which would add nothing to the jurisprudence of the state. Suffice it to say that we have carefully considered all the questions presented, and conclude that none of them is jurisdictional.
The fact that there was no objection to the evidence of the bank deposits is not controlling, since the evidence had no probative force on the issue of insolvency. Henry v. Phillips, 105 Tex. 459, *1076151 S. W. 533; Webb v. Reynolds (Tex. Com. App.) 207 S. W. 914.
Appellee prays that if the judgment is not affirmed, the cause be remanded “and give appellee an opportunity to prove the existence of other items of property sufficient to show the solvency of J. E. Sor-rell.”
The general rule is that when a judgment is reversed for insufficient evidence, the cause will be remanded, unless it affirmatively appears from the record that it has been fully developed, or that no reasonable probability exists that appellee could upon another trial produce evidence which would support (here, 'defeat) recovery. We are not prepared to say that the record demonstrates full development upon the issue of insolvency; and this especially in view of the fact that the bank deposits we.re pleaded and proved without objection, and appellee evidently relied upon them as supporting solvency.
The motion is overruled in so far as it prays that our judgment of reversal be set aside. In so far as it prays to set aside our judgment rendering judgment for appellant, it is granted, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
Granted in part, and in part overruled.