Court Opinion

ID: 9941595
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 16:10:16.107915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:47.496118
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                              No. 125,184

               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                          STATE OF KANSAS,
                                              Appellee,

                                                    v.

                                       STEVEN AUSTIN DRAKE,
                                            Appellant.

                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Appeal from Douglas District Court; BARBARA KAY HUFF, judge. Submitted without oral
argument. Opinion filed February 16, 2024. Affirmed.

        Ryan J. Eddinger, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

        Brian Deiter, assistant district attorney, Suzanne Valdez, district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach,
attorney general, for appellee.

Before BRUNS, P.J., PICKERING, J., and TIMOTHY G. LAHEY, S.J.

        PER CURIAM: Steven Austin Drake was charged with intentional, premeditated
first-degree murder after he shot and killed Bryce Holladay inside of Drake's apartment,
following an unsuccessful attempt to physically remove Holladay from the dwelling. A
jury convicted Drake of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Drake
appeals his conviction, arguing the district court erred in denying his pretrial motion for
immunity based on self-defense, defense of others, and defense of a dwelling. Drake also
claims that the State presented insufficient evidence at trial from which the jury could
reasonably determine that he was not entitled to a presumption of immunity. Finding no
error, we affirm.

                                                     1
                       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       On September 19, 2017, Drake and his girlfriend, Logan Stone, drove from
Lawrence to Baldwin City to visit Riley Boyle-Wolf. As they were leaving Lawrence,
Drake and Stone saw Bryce Holladay standing on a sidewalk talking to two Lawrence
police officers. Drake knew Holladay because Drake previously lived with the mother of
Holladay's daughter. Drake and Stone did not stop and continued to Baldwin.

       After being at Boyle-Wolf's house for about an hour, Drake and Stone were
contacted by Jamie Dupuis, Drake's friend and roommate. Dupuis told them that
Holladay showed up at Drake and Dupuis' apartment in Lawrence, acting strange,
rummaging through everyone's belongings, and putting random items in his pockets.
Eventually Boyle-Wolf, who had known Holladay since grade school, spoke to Holladay
to calm him down. Boyle-Wolf told Holladay not to steal anything and to leave Drake
and Dupuis' apartment. During this conversation, Boyle-Wolf assumed that Holladay was
intoxicated, possibly under the influence of methamphetamine, because he was talking
very rapidly and seemed jittery. Regardless, by the end of their conversation, Boyle-Wolf
thought that he had convinced Holladay to leave Drake and Dupuis' apartment.

       Drake and Stone stayed at Boyle-Wolf's house for another 30 minutes or so before
returning to Lawrence. When they left, their plan was to stop by Drake's apartment to
pick up a change of clothes before heading to Stone's house to spend the night. After
arriving at Drake's, Stone and Drake realized that Holladay did not leave the apartment as
Boyle-Wolf instructed. When they walked in, Holladay was sitting on the couch with
Dupuis. Drake and Stone asked Holladay why he was still there and told him to leave.
They also told him to leave anything that he may have taken from the apartment. Drake
continued to talk to Holladay, but Stone left to buy cigarettes. Their interaction was
largely uneventful, but Drake grew increasingly frustrated with Holladay's presence at the
apartment and his odd behavior.

                                             2
       About the time Holladay was wanting to show a card trick, Drake sent a Facebook
message to Dupuis, who was in the same room, in which Drake stated, "'I'm bout to shoot
him with the 410.'" Dupuis responded, "'Do it!!! . . . He woke me up and I tried pushing
him out the door.'"

       Several minutes later, Drake texted Jessica Brown. Drake considered Brown to be
his stepmother because his father had a longstanding relationship with her. It was
Brown's apartment in which Drake lived, along with Dupuis and Drake's cousin. In the
recent past, after Brown discovered Holladay rummaging through Dupuis' car, she told
Holladay he was not allowed to come back to her apartment.

       In the text messages, Drake told Brown that Holladay was in their apartment, and
she needed to come there immediately. One of the texts that Drake sent Brown stated,
"about to shoot [Holladay] in the head with my shotgun, this is not a joke. Where the fuck
are you." In another he stated. "don't call me, just get here. I'm serious, I'm going to shoot
him." Brown received these texts while returning from a trip to Kansas City.

       When Brown arrived and pulled into the driveway, she could hear yelling from the
apartment. When she entered, she saw Drake and Holladay standing near the couch,
arguing. Brown told Holladay to leave, but Holladay refused. Stone returned from buying
cigarettes sometime after Brown arrived. Stone noticed that the atmosphere in the
apartment had become more "tense" than it was when she left.

       Brown demanded that Holladay empty his pockets so she could see what he had
taken. Holladay emptied his pockets and then started disrobing in the living room. Brown
and Drake told Holladay they did not want to see him naked and looked away while he
put his clothes back on. When Holladay was getting dressed, Drake attempted to push
him out of the front door of the apartment. Brown recognized that Drake was not making
much progress as Holladay was bigger and stronger than Drake, so she picked up a

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baseball bat and threatened to hit Holladay with it. She decided not to use the bat for fear
that Holladay might get it from her and use it.

       Drake, Brown, Stone, and Dupuis joined forces in shoving Holladay to get him out
of the apartment. Stone would later testify that as they all pushed against Holladay, he
became more aggressive and violent. The four of them were still unable to get Holladay
out of the door; he was able to keep at least half of his body between the door and the
door jamb. Stone decided to mace Holladay, hoping that he would put his hands up to
wipe his eyes and create an opportunity for everyone else to shove him out through the
doorway, but the mace tactic backfired, and Holladay became enraged. Stone told the
jury that in response to being maced, Holladay struck her in the face. Stone also recalled
Holladay striking Brown several times with the door as he struggled to remain inside the
apartment.

       Like Stone, Brown also tried to mace Holladay as they all struggled in the
doorway. This, however, made Holladay more aggressive again. Brown then decided to
call the police, and she went to the kitchen to retrieve her phone and dialed 911. Drake
warned Holladay to leave because he was going to get a pistol. When Drake returned
with the gun, he pleaded with Holladay to leave, and ultimately gave him a final warning
that he had five seconds to leave or be shot. Drake then shot Holladay in the head, killing
him. When Brown heard the gunshot, she hung up on the emergency operator.

       After shooting Holladay, Drake put the gun on a coffee table in the living room
and partially disassembled it. The 911 operator called back, and Drake told her that
someone had broken into his apartment and that he had shot the man in the face. When
law enforcement arrived at the apartment, Drake went outside and submitted to his arrest.

       The State charged Drake with one count of first-degree murder, alleging Drake
killed Holladay intentionally and with premeditation. Drake filed a motion to dismiss,

                                             4
claiming he was immune from prosecution under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5231. Drake
claimed that his use of deadly force was justified under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5222
(defense of a person) and K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5223 (defense of a dwelling).

Evidentiary Hearing on Drake's Motion for Immunity

       The district court held a two-day preliminary hearing and considered the evidence
presented to decide Drake's immunity motion. The State presented testimony from most
of the parties already discussed—Boyle-Wolf, Brown, Dupuis, and Stone. Drake did not
testify at the hearing, but his statements to police were introduced into evidence. The
State also called an officer who responded to the scene, a forensic pathologist who
performed Holladay's autopsy, and the detective who interviewed Drake after the
shooting. Exhibits included Facebook messages between Drake and Dupuis the night of
the shooting and a video of Drake's interview with police.

       At the hearing, Dupuis said Holladay entered the apartment without permission
while Dupuis was sleeping. But he acknowledged that in his statement to police
immediately following the shooting, he said he let Holladay in the apartment. He told
police that that Holladay knocked on the door and asked to see Drake. Dupuis told
Holladay he could come into the apartment to wait for Drake.

       Dupuis' testimony indicated that, for the most part, the argument between Drake
and Holladay did not heat up or escalate too drastically. After Drake convinced Holladay
to empty his pockets, Holladay pulled out some things that he took from the apartment,
including an inactivated phone that belonged to Drake. Dupuis confirmed that Holladay
never fully left the apartment throughout the confrontation until after he was shot and his
body fell outside of the apartment door.

                                             5
       Stone testified that the conversation at the apartment was largely civil in tone, with
Drake asking Holladay to leave while Holladay was muttering things that didn't make
sense. Stone left to get cigarettes and when she arrived back, Brown was there, and the
tone was more heated. When everyone joined in trying to push Holladay out of the
apartment, Stone sprayed Holladay with mace, resulting in Holladay becoming angry and
becoming more difficult to push. He also hit Stone in the eye. She testified she did not
remember if Drake gave any warnings to Holladay. Drake retrieved the gun, and Stone
was standing next to Drake, facing Holladay when he was shot.

       The State argued that by the time Drake shoved Holladay out of the apartment and
started pushing the door, Holladay was not able to cause great bodily harm or imminent
death. The State admitted that the evidence showed that Holladay hit Stone but noted that
she was not injured. Moreover, according to the 911 call, the State argued that Drake was
unaware that Stone was ever struck and thus did not act in her defense when shooting
Holladay. The State also suggested the evidence showed that rather than in self-defense
or defense of others, Drake shot Holladay for other, unjustifiable reasons:

               "And what does he tell the detectives when he's being interviewed about why he
       shot [Holladay]? Well, some of the reasons are because he wanted to go to sleep. He had
       to work the next day. Because he was tired.
               "When asked why he didn't call the police, he said because it isn't something he
       does. And he would have just had to deal with [Holladay] again, and he didn't want to do
       that.
               "Detective Brown testified about the defendant's demeanor. He seemed to be
       proud of the fact that this had happened.
               "And you can watch him on the video. He shows no signs of remorse. He's
       joking. He's laughing. He's not showing anything that you would think somebody who
       just killed somebody would show."

       On Drake's behalf, defense counsel made the following statements regarding the
statutory presumption under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5224(a)(1)(A):
                                                     6
        "I don't think there's any dispute that Mr. Holladay was unlawfully in the dwelling home
        of Ms. Brown and Mr. Drake. . . . [A]s you heard, he had been ordered to leave two
        weeks before by Ms. Brown and never come back.
                "That night, he had been ordered to leave by everyone, including Mr. Dupuis,
        who had tried to get him out of the house before Mr. Drake had to be called in to help get
        him out of the house.
                "So we get the presumption set forth in 21-5224 that a person is presumed to
        have a reasonable belief that deadly force is necessary. The State has not overcome that
        presumption with the witnesses that they have presented. In fact, the evidence that the
        State presented is that that presumption should be applied."

        At the close of the hearing, the district court took the matter of immunity under
advisement and ultimately denied Drake's motion, finding the State satisfied its burden of
establishing probable cause that Drake's use of deadly force against Holladay was not
justified under the totality of the circumstances.

Trial

        At trial, in addition to the witnesses who testified at the preliminary hearing, the
State presented testimony from additional police officers and investigators. Drake
presented testimony from Misty Thompson and David Shane Williams. He also testified
on his own behalf.

        Thompson testified that on September 19, 2017—the same day that Drake shot
Holladay—as she was getting into her car after work, a man she did not know approached
her and asked for a ride. Thompson thought that the man was joking but still told him no.
Then, the man started circling her car and tried to put his hand inside of a window that
was cracked and also licked the window. Thompson was able to escape the situation and
reported the incident to police.

                                                    7
       Williams testified he was a patrol officer at the time and was dispatched to the
incident involving Thompson. Once at the address provided through dispatch, Williams
saw a man that met Thompson's description and identified him as Holladay. Williams
testified that he had encountered Holladay on several previous occasions. When Williams
approached Holladay, Holladay exhibited abnormal behavior, "using his fingers as finger
guns," and also told Williams that "he was high, but he wasn't on a substance."

       Stone's testimony at trial was largely consistent with her testimony at the
preliminary hearing. At trial however, she testified that before he retrieved the gun,
Drake warned Holladay, "if you don't leave the property, then I'm going to shoot you."

       Drake testified in his own defense, describing himself and his upbringing. He said
he moved into the apartment with Brown in 2016 and that in the summer of 2017, Dupuis
moved in too. Drake's cousin also moved in sometime around August 2017. Drake
explained that he knew Stone from high school but had just started spending time with
her during the two or three weeks before the incident at his apartment.

       Describing the events on September 19, Drake testified that when he and Stone
arrived at the apartment and confronted Holladay, the feeling was tense and Holladay was
"running around [the] house, just picking up everything . . . . He ran into the kitchen,
opened all the cabinets looking for his daughter. . . . He was talking about, the cops had
been chasing him all day, hurricane people were following him . . . . He was very
animated, and very manic." After a while, however, Holladay calmed down and started
falling asleep on the couch. Drake and Dupuis used this time to secretly retrieve things
out of Holladay's pockets that he had grabbed from their apartment earlier. But Holladay
eventually woke up and started acting erratically again. He eventually accused Drake of
hiding his child from him.

                                              8
       Drake testified that Holladay grabbed a deck of cards and wanted Drake to watch
him do a card trick. Drake, however, felt like this was a "ruse" and that Holladay was
going to pretend to do a card trick and then punch him in the face. Drake admitted that,
around that time, he texted Dupuis that he was going to shoot Holladay "with the 410,
and that it was serious." But he explained his comment was "essentially venting without
escalating the situation. I was doing my best to manage and control it." And eventually,
Drake "realized" when Holladay was putting his clothes back on, "that was [his] best
opportunity to try and shove [Holladay] out of [his] house." The record shows Drake
initiated the physical contact with Holladay, by shoving him "as hard as [he] could," in an
effort to get him out of the apartment.

       Soon after, everyone in the apartment got behind Drake to try and help him push
Holladay out. Stone and Brown maced Holladay, which made Drake recognize that
Holladay was able to be "hit . . . directly in the eyes, and [it] had no effect on him." As
the struggle continued, Holladay started swinging his fist in the doorway and Brown was
getting hit in the head with the door. Describing this part of the incident, Drake testified,
"I'm seeing out of the corner of my eye my mom getting hit in the head with the door, and
the last time, as she's falling to the ground, he immediately punches [Stone] in the face."

       According to Drake, at this point in the struggle, Drake yelled at Holladay to
"please leave" because he was going to get a pistol. Drake left the room to retrieve the
gun, a Glock 9mm. He inserted the clip, chambered a round, and returned to the front
room of the apartment. He noticed that Brown was no longer in the room. Drake
approached Holladay, who remained in the doorway area. According to Drake, he
approached Holladay, pleaded with him again to "please leave" and "gave several
warnings." Drake noted that Holladay was not listening or even acknowledging him, so
he gave a final warning to leave, saying, "Bryce you have five seconds to leave, or I am
going to shoot you." At the time of the warning, Holladay was unarmed, not fighting with
anyone, standing near the front door. Dupuis and Stone were also close by, while Brown

                                              9
was not in the room. After delivering the five-second warning, Drake testified that
Holladay "looked right at me in my eyes, and he drew his fist back. And I shot him."

Verdict and Sentencing

       The jury acquitted Drake of first-degree murder but convicted him of the lesser
included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Drake's motion for a durational departure
was denied, and the district court sentenced him to a prison term of 100 months.

       Drake timely appeals.

                                          ANALYSIS

Did the district court properly deny Drake's motion for immunity?

       Drake's first contention on appeal is that the district court erred by denying his
motion for immunity from prosecution under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5231. This statute
immunizes a person from prosecution when the person justifiably uses force to defend a
person or a dwelling. Here, Drake argues that he was justified in the use of deadly force
based on self-defense or defense of others. K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5222(b) ("A person is
justified in the use of deadly force . . . if such person reasonably believes that such use of
deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to such person
or a third person."). Drake contends he was likewise justified in his use of deadly force to
defend his dwelling. K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5223(b) ("A person is justified in the use of
deadly force to prevent or terminate unlawful entry into or attack upon any dwelling . . .
if such person reasonably believes that such use of deadly force is necessary to prevent
imminent death or great bodily harm to such person or another."). In conjunction with his
defense immunity claims, Drake asserts he was entitled to the statutory presumption
provided in 2017 Supp. K.S.A. 21-5224(a)(1)(A) that he had a reasonable belief that

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deadly force was necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm because Holladay had
unlawfully or forcefully entered Drake's apartment.

       Standard of Review and Basic Legal Principles

       To overcome a defendant's immunity claim under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5231, the
State has the burden to show that an ordinarily prudent and cautious person could
reasonably believe the defendant's use of force was not justified under either or both of
two scenarios: (1) The defendant did not honestly believe the use of force was necessary
under the circumstances; or (2) a reasonable person would not believe the use of force
was necessary under the circumstances. State v. Thomas, 311 Kan. 403, 412, 462 P.3d
149 (2020). Alternatively, the State may meet its burden of establishing probable cause
by showing the defendant acted as the aggressor and provoked the use of force. See
K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5226(c).

       The probable cause determination contemplated by K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5231
requires a district court to "consider the totality of the circumstances, weigh the evidence
before it without deference to the State, and determine whether the State has carried its
burden to establish probable cause that the defendant's use of force was not statutorily
justified." State v. Hardy, 305 Kan. 1001, 1011, 390 P.3d 30 (2017); see also State v.
Collins, 56 Kan. App. 2d 140, 150, 425 P.3d 630 (2018) ("[T]o overcome a defendant's
immunity claim, the State does not need to prove that the defendant's use of force was not
justified; it merely has to establish probable cause that the defendant's use of force was
not justified."), aff'd 311 Kan. 418, 461 P.3d 828 (2020).

     Appellate courts apply a bifurcated standard of review to a district court's
determination of probable cause pursuant to K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5231.

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     "When a district court's ruling entails factual findings arising out of disputed
     evidence, a reviewing court will not reweigh the evidence and will review those
     factual findings for supporting substantial competent evidence only. The ultimate
     legal conclusion drawn from those facts is reviewed de novo." Hardy, 305 Kan.
     1001, Syl. ¶ 5.

       Overview of the District Court's Findings and Drake's Appellate Claims

     The district court made a brief but thorough review of the evidence. It noted that
Drake remained at Riley-Wolf's house for 20-30 minutes after learning Holladay was in
his apartment. When he arrived back at his apartment, Drake spent up to 45 minutes
trying to convince Holladay to leave. Up to the time of the altercation at the door,
Holladay was not armed, was not fighting, and was not engaging in assaultive behavior;
at times, he was "nodding off on the sofa." After recounting the text messages in which
Drake said he was going to shoot Holladay, the court noted that the messages all
preceded any physical altercation. The court pointed out that even though the evidence
showed Holladay struck Stone, it did not result in a mark or require medical attention.
Finally, the court referenced Drake's statement to police when he was asked why he shot
Holladay. Drake said that Holladay had no right to be at the house, was taking stuff,
would not leave, and Drake wanted to go to sleep. Drake also stated that he believed
Holladay would have left the apartment if police were called, but Drake didn't call the
police because he knew Holladay would return to be a problem on another day.

       Drake does not challenge the foregoing factual findings made by the district court.
Instead, Drake contends the court erred by identifying disputed factual issues and failing
to explicitly resolve them. He points out that when the district court announced its
decision, it indicated that certain disputed facts should be resolved by a jury:

               "Under the totality of the circumstances, the court finds that the State has met its
       burden of proof to show probable cause that the use of deadly force was not justified. The

                                                   12
        two separate texts that '"I'm going to shoot him in the head,'" with one adding that "'this is
        no joke,'" before Mr. Holladay was shot and before the altercation at the door began raise
        a question of premeditation for a jury to decide; the court cannot say as a matter of law
        that the events described constitute a threat of imminent death or great bodily harm to
        others.
                  "There is a question, also, about Mr. Holladay's condition and his demeanor at
        the time in question, and the accuracy of perceptions or credibility of witnesses, in light
        of toxicology reports showing no methamphetamine or any other substance being present
        in Mr. Holladay's body, and there are disputed facts found in the testimony that need to
        be resolved by a jury."

        The district court also found that Drake believed that Holladay was high on
methamphetamine during their encounter, but noted conflicting evidence—the toxicology
report—showed that Holladay was not under the influence of any drugs when he died.
But the court did not make a factual finding whether Holladay was under the influence.
And the court pointed out, but did not explicitly resolve, the conflicting testimony about
whether Holladay was invited by Dupuis to come into the apartment or Holladay "simply
walked in."

        Drake also faults the district court for failing to resolve the issue of whether Drake
was entitled to the statutory presumption of reasonableness. Here, he contends the district
court

        "omitted material facts such as [Holladay] repeatedly hitting [Brown] with the door,
        being in a state of rage after he was maced by [Stone and Brown], and being very close to
        regaining entry into the home when [Drake] shot him. These facts were all relevant to the
        trial court's duty to resolve the question of whether [Drake] was entitled to a presumption
        of reasonableness."

By failing to "heed evidence in the record," Drake argues the district court "completely
failed" to address Drake's statutory right to the presumption of reasonableness. Although

                                                     13
the district court made factual findings supporting its determination, it did not expressly
resolve every disputed fact. Drake contends "the trial court failed to perform its
gatekeeping function by failing to resolve disputed material facts against either party."
We find Drake's argument based on the district court's failure to resolve every disputed
fact to be unpersuasive.

       Sufficient Factual Findings Support the Probable Cause Determination

       The district court's ultimate decision reflects and explains the facts that led the
court to find probable cause that Drake's actions were not justified, and the district court
identified sufficient facts in its ruling to support its legal conclusion regarding the
probable cause determination.

       We initially note that Drake did not ask the district court for any additional
specific factual findings, nor contend the court made inadequate findings required under
Supreme Court Rule 165 (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. 234). See State v. Steward, 289 Kan. 715,
720-21, 217 P.3d 443 (2009) (holding counsel shares in the responsibility to ensure the
district court makes adequate findings and conclusions in the record and "a litigant who
fails to object to inadequate Rule 165 findings and conclusions in the district court is
foreclosed from making an appellate argument that would depend upon what is
missing"), overruled on other grounds by State v. Jolly, 301 Kan. 313, 342 P.3d 935
(2015). As his argument "depend[s] upon what is missing," from the district court
findings, Drake is foreclosed from now challenging the adequacy of the district court
findings.

       In State v. Phillips, 312 Kan. 643, Sy. ¶ 6, 479 P.3d 176 (2021), our Supreme
Court explained that when ruling on a defendant's motion for immunity,

                                              14
       "the district court need not make any particularized findings, but it must be apparent from
       the record that the district court not only recognized but also applied the appropriate legal
       standard in reaching its probable cause determination. In other words, the record should
       reflect that the district court considered the totality of the circumstances, weighed the
       evidence without deference to the State, and resolved conflicting evidence, in arriving at
       its legal conclusion regarding the probable cause determination."

The record shows that the district court complied with this process. The parties presented
disputed evidence, which the district court considered under the totality of the
circumstances and weighed without deference to the State, and the district court resolved
necessary conflicting evidence before ultimately determining that the State met its burden
of establishing probable cause. Cf. State v. DeLeon, No. 125,533, 2023 WL 6531080, at
*14-15 (Kan. App. 2023) (unpublished opinion) (reviewing facts which reasonable minds
could have weighed differently than the district court in deciding to grant self-defense
immunity, but ultimately upholding the district court's probable cause finding because the
district court adhered to the procedure prescribed by supreme court precedent for
deciding immunity claims).

       Still, relying on Phillips, Drake emphasizes the gatekeeping process contemplated
under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5231 requires a district court to "resolve[] conflicting
evidence." He notes that the court did not resolve every factual issue presented at the
hearing on his motion. Most notably, Drake claims that the district court failed to resolve
the factual disputes related to Holladay's erratic behavior and whether Holladay forced
his way into the apartment. Though the district court is tasked with resolving factual
disputes, there is no statutory obligation requiring the court to expressly resolve every
disputed fact, it's task is to consider the totality of the circumstances—something the
record shows was done by the district court.

       Drake's reliance on Phillips is somewhat misplaced because the facts of that case
are distinguishable from those presented here. In Phillips, the trial court made no findings
                                                    15
of fact but instead identified several facts that were still in dispute, including whether the
defendant was the aggressor and thus unable to assert a self-defense claim. The district
court then denied the defendant's motion for immunity based on the existence of the
factual disputes identified. 312 Kan. at 656-57 ("[I]n its ruling, the district court merely
found that several material questions of fact were in dispute and concluded that this
factual dispute precluded immunity.").

       Unlike the trial court in Phillips, here the district court identified specific facts
which established probable cause that Drake's use of deadly force was not statutorily
justified under the subjective and objective tests. See Thomas, 311 Kan. 403 at 411.
Findings which support the conclusion that Drake's use of deadly force was objectively
unreasonable include statements by Drake to police suggesting the decision to kill
Holladay was for reasons unrelated to defense of person or dwelling—he wanted
Holladay out of the apartment so he could get to sleep. Also, whatever blows that
Holladay may have landed on Stone or Brown did not leave any mark or require any
medical attention—not the type of blows that suggest any likelihood of imminent death
or great bodily harm. Perhaps most significantly, Drake's pre-altercation declarations that
he was going to shoot Holladay support the probable cause finding that Holladay was
killed for reasons other than defense of persons or a dwelling.

       Specific to whether Drake's use of deadly force was subjectively unreasonable,
Drake's statement to police that Holladay would have left the premises if police were
called also supports the conclusion that deadly force was not necessary—a call to the
police would have solved the problem. Drake suggested one of the reasons he did not
simply call the police was that he didn't want to have to deal with Holladay on some
future date. Other supporting facts include the text messages sent by Drake, which
indicate the intent to shoot Holiday well before there was any physical altercation;
Holladay was not armed with a weapon and did not cause any visible injury to anyone
during his time in the apartment; and in his statement to police, Drake referenced

                                               16
unjustified reasons for shooting Holladay, such as being tired, wanting to go to sleep, and
not wanting to deal with Holladay in the future.

       Under a totality of the circumstances, both objectively and subjectively, the State's
evidence established probable cause that Drake's use of force was not justified, so the
district court did not err in determining that Drake was not entitled to immunity under
K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5231. We thus find the district court's factual findings support its
legal conclusion that the State met its burden of establishing probable cause that Drake's
use of deadly force was not justified.

       Appropriate Consideration Given to Statutory Presumption

       As pointed out by Drake, under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5224(a)(1)(A), "a person is
presumed to have a reasonable belief that deadly force is necessary to prevent imminent
death or great bodily harm . . . if . . . [t]he person against whom the force is used, at the
time the force is used…has unlawfully or forcefully entered, and is present within, the
dwelling." In Hardy, our Supreme Court held that when ruling on an immunity claim,
district courts must consider statutory presumptions when they are factually implicated:

       "Because we have held herein that district courts must 'construe disputed
       evidence' against one party or the other in order to fulfill its gatekeeping role and
       give effect to the full scope of the plain meaning of the term 'immune' as used in
       K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5231, we conclude that district courts must consider the
       statutory presumptions when they are factually implicated." 305 Kan. at 1013.

       Drake claims that the district court wholly failed to consider this presumption of
reasonableness under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5224 when deciding Drake's motion. But the
district court clearly considered the statute, as it specifically quoted from the statute
during its ruling and discussed the facts surrounding Holladay's initial entry into the

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apartment. We nevertheless recognize the district court did not make explicit findings
about the exact manner of Holladay's entry into Drake's apartment, nor did the court
expressly find the statutory presumption was overcome by the State's evidence. However,
the core factual prerequisite in the context of the statutory scheme establishing immunity
from prosecution is that the person using deadly force must have a reasonable belief that
the use of force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm. The
statutory presumption is simply one of the factors in the "totality of the circumstances"
which the trial court is obligated to consider in making its determination. Hardy, 305
Kan. at 1011. After reviewing the evidence, the district court was plainly unpersuaded
"that the events described constitute a threat of imminent death or great bodily harm to
others." And the factual findings made by the district court support the conclusion that
Drake did not reasonably believe the use of force was necessary. Thus, we determine that
the statutory presumption was not factually implicated because the facts found by the
court are expressly inconsistent with the statutory presumption and do not support the
conclusion that Drake had a reasonable belief that deadly force was necessary. Stated
another way, even if the district court had explicitly determined that Holloway had
unlawfully entered Drake's apartment, the district court's other specific findings of fact
establish probable cause that Drake was not in actual fear of death or imminent bodily
harm to himself or anyone else, overcoming the statutory presumption.

       Moreover, we again emphasize that the district court was not required to make
particularized findings. See State v. Nunez, 313 Kan. 540, 548, 486 P.3d 606 (2021)
(confirming that particularized findings are not required when ruling on an immunity
motion). Generally, particularized findings are not required when the applicable statue
does not call for such findings. See, e.g., State v. Tafolla, 315 Kan. 324, 330, 508 P.3d
351 (2022) (confirming that the dispositional departure exception [K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-
3716(c)(9)(B)] does not require particularized findings and finding no error of law in the
district court's decision to bypass graduated sanctions in probation violation case without
explicit findings); see also State v. Gregory, No. 113,207, 2017 WL 1104475, at *3 (Kan.

                                             18
App. 2017) (unpublished opinion) (withdrawal of plea for "good cause" does not require
express findings for all relevant factors). When particularity is not required pursuant to
the relevant statutes, implicit findings may be sufficient to uphold a district court's ruling
unless a party asks for more definite findings. See Tafolla, 315 Kan. at 332 ("If there is
no objection, we presume the district court 'found all facts necessary to support its
judgment.'"); State v. Roubideaux-Davis, No. 125,764, 2023 WL 5662765, at *8 (Kan.
App. 2023) (unpublished opinion) (quoting Tafolla in determining that implicit findings
may be enough to support a district court's decision to revoke probation where a
defendant does not object to the sufficiency of the district court's findings); see also State
v. Evans, 315 Kan. 211, 220, 506 P.3d 260 (2022) (upholding implicit finding regarding
credibility of testimony); State v. Salazar, 56 Kan. App. 2d 410, 419, 431 P.3d 312
(2018) (upholding implicit finding regarding evidence relevant to "plain view exception"
to a search where the implicit finding was supported by substantial competent evidence);
Aselco, Inc. v. Hartford Ins. Group, 28 Kan. App. 2d 839, 847-48, 21 P.3d 1011 (2001)
(upholding implicit findings regarding the duty to defend another for "procedural and
substantive reasons"). Thus, if the district court made sufficiently supported implicit
findings, reversal is not warranted because Drake did not ask for more specific findings.

       We acknowledge that in Phillips, our Supreme Court rejected an argument raised
by the State that implicit findings alone could provide sufficient support for the denial of
an immunity claim. However, the district court in Phillips made no factual findings to
support its decision to deny the defendant's overall claim and instead relied on the
existence of factual disputes as the basis for its decision. See 312 Kan. at 655-658. Here,
the district court made sufficient findings to support its probable cause determination.
And unlike the argument in Phillips, Drake simply challenges the lack of findings
specific to the statutory presumption under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5224. In this regard,
Drake tacitly suggests that the district court was required to apply the presumption and
thus grant his request for immunity unless it found Holladay did not unlawfully or

                                              19
forcefully enter the apartment when the killing occurred. Under these specific
circumstances, we disagree.

       The district court's explicit finding that the evidence showed probable cause that
Drake's use of force was not justified impliedly shows that the State sufficiently rebutted
the statutory presumption. We acknowledge that it is somewhat unclear from our
Supreme Court precedent that the presumption under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-5524 is
rebuttable. In Pennington v. State, No. 108,236, 2013 WL 5507291, at *3, (Kan. App.
2013) (unpublished opinion), this court concluded that the presumption is rebuttable but
did so in dicta after determining that the presumption was not triggered by the facts of the
defendant's case. Our Supreme Court in State v. Macomber, 309 Kan. 907, 924, 441 P.3d
479 (2019), noted that the Pennington panel made the finding in dicta and stated that
whether the presumption is rebuttable "arguably remains an open question." Still, the
Macomber court did not specifically find that the presumption is not rebuttable and also
noted that refutability "is supportable under the caselaw." 309 Kan. 924 (noting also that
Kansas Legislature has specifically drafted certain statutes as requiring "conclusive"
presumptions). Here, the State established probable cause that Drake's use of deadly force
was not necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm, and we find no
statutory intent that the presumption is intended to apply pre-trial when the court has
found substantial evidence showing the actual absence of imminent death or great bodily
harm. We thus find no reversible error in the district court's consideration of the statutory
presumption. Cf. State v. Trotter, No. 120,158, 2022 WL 2112212, at*5 (Kan. App.)
(unpublished opinion) (holding trial court made findings regarding probable cause and
statutory presumptions sufficiently explicit thus making remand unnecessary), rev.
denied 316 Kan. 763 (2022).

       Finally, Drake points to other facts he contends the district court should have
relied upon in making its determination. However, the record shows that the district court
considered the facts presented by the parties. And our appellate review does not allow us

                                             20
to reweigh the evidence. See Hardy, 305 Kan. 1001, Syl. ¶ 5 (appellate court will not
reweigh the evidence and will review factual findings for supporting substantial
competent evidence only).

The jury's conclusion that Drake was not entitled to a presumption of immunity is
supported by the evidence.

       In his second and final argument, Drake claims that the State presented
insufficient evidence to overcome the statutory presumption that his use of deadly force
was reasonable under K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5224.

       "'When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, we review
the evidence in a light most favorable to the State to determine whether a rational
factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v.
Aguirre, 313 Kan. 189, 209, 485 P.3d 576 (2021). This is a high standard that requires
this court to uphold the verdict unless the evidence "is so incredible that no reasonable
fact-finder could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Meggerson, 312 Kan.
238, 247, 474 P.3d 761 (2020). When reviewing the evidence this court does not assess
witness credibility, reweigh evidence, or resolve conflicts in the evidence. Aguirre, 313
Kan. at 209.

       The district court gave the jury the following instruction on the statutory
presumption, an instruction not challenged in this appeal by Drake:

               "You must presume that a person had a reasonable belief that use of physical
       force likely to cause death or great bodily harm was necessary to prevent imminent death
       or great bodily harm to someone else, if you find the following: One, at the time the force
       likely to cause death or great bodily harm was used, the individual against whom the
       force was used was forcefully entering the dwelling of the person using the force.

                                                   21
               "And two: The person using the force knew or had reason to believe that the
       individual was forcefully entering the building. This presumption may be overcome if
       you are persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the person did not reasonably believe
       that the use of force likely to cause death or great bodily harm was necessary to prevent
       imminent death or great bodily harm to someone.
               "Bodily harm is any touching of a person against a person's will with physical
       force in an intentional, hostile, and aggravated manner. The word great distinguishes
       bodily harm that is slight, trivial, minor, or moderate harm, and as such, it does not
       include mere bruises."

       The State therefore needed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Drake did
not reasonably believe that the use of force likely to cause death or great bodily harm was
necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to someone. Drake primarily
emphasizes the lack of consent that Holladay had to be in the apartment and the
witnesses' beliefs that Holladay was on drugs or "suffering a mental breakdown, making
him violent, unpredictable, and frightening." Drake also notes that Holladay hit Stone in
the face with his hand and Brown in the face with the door. He also notes that Stone and
Brown used mace on Holladay, but neither that nor the force from the four people
attempting to push him out of the apartment succeeded in actually removing him. Drake's
argument ignores the limitations of this court's review—we do not assess witness
credibility, reweigh evidence, or resolve conflicting evidence. Aguirre, 313 Kan. at 209.
Additionally, based on our review of the record, Drake's overall claim here is
unsupported.

       Our analysis of this issue is straightforward. From witness testimony, the jury
could conclude that (1) Holladay did not forcefully enter the apartment, he was invited in;
(2) Holladay was never outside the apartment after he was permitted to enter until after
he was shot and fell outside; (3) Holladay was not forcefully entering the apartment at the
time he was shot by Drake—he was standing in the entry, refusing to leave; and (4)

                                                    22
evidence shows Drake did not reasonably believe his use of force was necessary to
prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to anyone.

       The State correctly notes that although Holladay may have hit Stone and Brown,
they sustained no visible injuries. Also, unlike Drake, Stone, and Brown—who had a gun,
mace, and a baseball bat—Holladay did not have a weapon. Additionally, the State's
toxicology report refuted the witnesses' claims that Holladay was high on drugs at the
time of the shooting. Holladay also remained in the apartment with Dupuis for more than
an hour without engaging in any physical altercation by the time Drake arrived. Also,
based on the approximate time that Drake arrived at the apartment and the time that
emergency dispatch sent police to the apartment, Drake and Holladay stayed in the
apartment for around an hour before things escalated to a physical altercation. The
physical altercation was initiated by Drake when he tried pushing Holladay out of the
apartment.

       As recounted earlier in this opinion, Drake's text messages and statements to
police support the jury's determination that Drake was not justified in his use of deadly
force. Evaluating the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, as we must, we find
the evidence is sufficient to overcome any statutory presumption that Drake was justified
in his use of deadly force.

       Affirmed.

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