Court Opinion

ID: 9676023
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:12:25.011775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:42.722547
License: Public Domain

Hood, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part?). I must respectfully dissent from the part of the majority opinion that rejects plaintiff’s equitable estoppel argument.
Plaintiff and defendant cohabited from 1986 to 1991 without the benefit of marriage. On November 25, 1989, defendant gave birth to a daughter. Plaintiff was listed on the birth certificate as the father of the child, the child was given plaintiff’s last name, and *103plaintiff believed the child to be his. He supported and raised the child after that time. He claims that defendant specifically led him to believe that he was the biological father of the child and that defendant fostered a parent-child relationship between the two. After plaintiff and defendant separated, they continued to maintain an intermittent intimate relationship, and defendant gave birth to a son on October 19, 1993. Plaintiff believes he is listed on the birth certificate as the father of the child. The child was given plaintiffs last name and plaintiff believed the child to be his. He supported and shared equal parenting responsibility for the minor boy after that time. He claims that defendant specifically led him to believe that he was the biological parent of the boy and fostered a parent-child relationship between the two. Plaintiff avers that he had “a very close and loving relationship with both children at all times and both children looked to [him] for all of their daily needs in regard to their health, safety, and welfare.” The children received health insurance through plaintiff and were the listed beneficiaries on his life insurance policy.
Defendant filed a paternity action against plaintiff on March 25, 1996, wherein she alleged and swore under oath that plaintiff was the father of the two children. The complaint was later withdrawn by defendant.
At some point the relationship between plaintiff and defendant soured. Plaintiff believes that the cause was his relationship with another woman. Defendant refused to allow plaintiff to see the children and thereafter ordered blood tests. Plaintiff was excluded as being the biological father of the chil*104dren. Plaintiff, wishing to maintain the parent-child relationship that he shared with the children, filed suit for visitation rights. He argued that he was an equitable parent of the children and, as such, was entitled to visitation. In the alternative, he argued that the mother of the children should be estopped from denying his rights as a parent to the children.
The trial court granted summary disposition, finding that the equitable parent doctrine applies only where there has been a marital relationship between the parties and that public policy favored finding against plaintiff. In this appeal, we are asked to extend the doctrine of equitable parenthood to nonmarital relationships or, in the alternative, to find that the doctrine of equitable estoppel bars defendant from depriving plaintiff of the opportunity to visit the children at issue. I agree that we should decline to expand the equitable parent doctrine as requested by plaintiff because I agree that there is no basis for applying the equitable parent doctrine to unmarried couples where there is no biological connection between the man and the child. I would, however, reverse on the grounds of equitable estoppel.
Contrary to the conclusion of the majority, I would find that the principles of equitable estoppel should preclude defendant, under the facts of this case, from arguing that plaintiff should not have visitation rights to the children. In Johnson v Johnson, 93 Mich App 415; 286 NW2d 886 (1979), the plaintiff married the defendant knowing that he might not be the biological father of the child she was carrying. He subsequently conducted himself as if he were the father and supported the child for more than nine years. This Court held that the plaintiff, even if he was not *105the biological father, was estopped from denying paternity of the child. Id. at 419-420. In Nygard v Nygard, 156 Mich App 94, 99; 401 NW2d 323 (1986), this Court ruled that the defendant was responsible for child support payments even though he was not the biological parent of the child. The defendant married the plaintiff while the plaintiff was pregnant and he knew the child was not his. Thereafter, he conducted himself as if he were the natural father of the child until the divorce action wherein he attempted to be relieved from paying child support. Applying the rules of equitable or promissory estoppel, this Court upheld the defendant’s obligation to pay child support. See also Johns v Johns, 178 Mich App 101, 106; 443 NW2d 446 (1989). Recently, this Court extended the equitable estoppel rules to a situation involving unmarried parties. Guise v Robinson, 219 Mich App 139; 555 NW2d 887 (1996).
In Guise, the parties never married. The plaintiff applied for welfare benefits before the birth of her son. At the time of her application, she informed the Department of Social Services that the defendant was the father of the child. The defendant subsequently acknowledged paternity and for the following nine years treated the child as his son. When the plaintiff finally filed an action for child support, the defendant moved for a paternity blood test. The results of the test excluded him from being the father of the nine-year-old child. Nevertheless, the trial court found that the defendant was estopped from denying paternity and paying child support on the basis of the facts. Id. at 143. We agreed, ruling that the fact that the parties were never married was a “distinction without a dif*106ference with respect to the elements of equitable estoppel.” Id. at 146-147.
Under Guise, defendant is free to hold plaintiff hable for support payments because he has always acted as if the children were his. The facts as set forth support that he would be estopped from denying liability for support payments. I respectfully submit that it would be inequitable to hold that plaintiff could be liable for support payments but could not enjoy the benefits of visitation because he is not related to the children by blood. Defendant should be bound by the same rules of equitable estoppel as plaintiff.
Equitable estoppel arises where a party, by representations, admissions, or silence intentionally or negligently induces another party to believe facts, the other party justifiably relies and acts on that belief, and the other party will be prejudiced if the first party is allowed to deny the existence of those facts. [Soltis v First of America Bank-Muskegon, 203 Mich App 435, 444; 513 NW2d 148 (1994).]
According to plaintiffs allegations, defendant led him, her cohabiting partner, into believing he was the father of the children. She allowed and fostered the father-child relationships, placed plaintiffs name on the childrens’ birth certificates, gave the children plaintiff’s surname, and accepted child support for the children. I would hold that defendant should be equitably estopped from contesting plaintiff’s rights to visit the children. Whether, and to what extent, visitation should be allowed would depend upon the trial court’s determination of where the best interests of the children lie.
*107I would reverse and remand for a determination whether visitation is in the best interests of the chil- . dren and, if so, what visitation is appropriate.