Court Opinion

ID: 9553502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:30:30.768061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:31:20.308144
License: Public Domain

Chief Judge STERNBERG
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the holding of the majority that the prosecution of the *482murder charge was barred by failure to join it with the theft charge. I also disagree with the majority’s holding that the trial courts erred in refusing to enforce the plea agreement. Thus, I would affirm the judgments of conviction as to all charges.
I.
For the compulsory joinder provisions of § 18-1-408(2), C.R.S. (1987 RepLVoL 8B) to apply, five elements must be present: 1) the offenses in question must have been committed in the same judicial district; 2) there must be a prosecution against the offender; 3) the prosecution must have had knowledge of the several offenses at the time of commencement of prosecution; 4) the offenses must have arisen out of the same criminal episode; and 5) the offender must previously have been subjected to single prosecution. People v. Patrick, 773 P.2d 575 (Colo.1989).
Further, as first noted in Jeffrey v. District Court, 626 P.2d 631 (Colo.1981), and restated in People v. Robinson, 774 P.2d 884 (Colo.1989), the focus in assessing whether joinder was required must be on prosecutorial knowledge “at that stage of the initial prosecution at which jeopardy commences.”
I disagree with the majority’s view that the state of prosecutorial knowledge of the murder offense at the time jeopardy attached in the theft case was sufficient to require joinder.
It must be borne in mind that, beginning in 1983, the police authorities of several counties in this state and of other states were participating in a tremendously complex investigation concerning, among other things, the disappearance of one Bert Do-noho.
In 1984, the police first began investigating the defendant, but this was with respect to the sale of a truck which Donoho had been driving when he disappeared. In the course of this investigation, there arose allegations that the defendant and others in his family, including his father, had been involved in several homicides, the hiding of the victims’ bodies, and other illegal activities.
It was not until January 1986 that, based upon information supplied by the defendant, Donoho’s body was found. As a result, defendant was thereafter accorded immunity under a written agreement that was to be void if evidence was developed that “the defendant personally committed the homicide of Bert Donoho or any other verifiable homicide.”
Because of the chronology by which the prosecution of defendant developed, I cannot agree with the majority that the prosecutors’ knowledge of the defendant’s involvement in the homicide was such that, as a matter of law, joinder of that charge with the theft charge was required. In my view it would be appropriate, therefore, to remand the cause for findings on this question.
However, when the defendant moved in the murder case to dismiss because of the failure to join, the trial court found that, at the time jeopardy attached for the theft case, i.e., the day of trial, there was no one who could join the charges because the district attorney’s office had previously been disqualified and a new prosecutor had not yet been appointed. The record supports that finding.
Thus, I would uphold the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss for failure to join or, alternatively, I would remand for findings on the issue of prosecutorial knowledge.
II.
The issue of enforcement of the plea agreement has been twice litigated. The courts in both the theft and murder cases held hearings on motions to enforce the plea agreement. Both heard evidence on the question and denied the motion on the basis that the defendant did not meet his obligation of “truthfully, faithfully, and fully” providing “accurate” information on the death of Donoho and the other homicide victims.
I agree with this conclusion of the trial courts. And, because there is record sup*483port for those courts’ findings of fact, they are binding on review.
People v. Romero, 745 P.2d 1003 (Colo.1987) is the seminal Colorado authority on the issue of enforcement of plea agreements. There, our supreme court set forth the factors to be considered in determining the existence and extent of the right to enforce a plea agreement. Those factors include:
whether a promise was made to the defendant by a governmental official with apparent authority to bind the government, and, if such promise was made, the scope of the promise; whether the defendant reasonably and detrimentally relied on the promise by performing his side of the bargain; and, if the defendant reasonably and detrimentally relied on the promise, the appropriate remedy to which the defendant is entitled, (emphasis added)
Simply stated, in my view, the defendant here was not entitled to enforcement of this plea agreement because, as found by two trial courts on supporting evidence, he had not performed his side of the bargain. There is abundant support in the record for the trial courts’ findings. Indeed, the defendant conceded that he had not provided information about everything because he would then “no longer be in control” of the situation.
The defendant changed his story on several significant points, including his brother’s involvement in the crime. He offered differing descriptions of the crimes. He changed his story about whether he actually saw his father hit Donoho with a hammer, about how many blows were struck, and about whether his father slit Donoho’s throat. In instances in which investigation took place attempting to corroborate certain of defendant’s statements, he would change his story when corroboration of the earlier version was not forthcoming.
The agreement in this case required that defendant “truthfully, faithfully and fully” provide information. There was no middle ground allowing him to provide truthful information about some things but not about others. He had to comply with the agreement fully, or not at all. He did not do so; thus, the trial courts properly refused to enforce the agreement. People v. Romero, supra.
Finally, I note that, under the specific terms of the agreement, the evidence of the defendant’s personal involvement in the slaying of Donoho would have served as a further basis for refusing to enforce it.
There being no other reversible error in the record of these trials, I would affirm the convictions.