Court Opinion

ID: 9471758
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:40:25.854131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:33.849139
License: Public Domain

KEITH, Circuit Judge,
with whom GEORGE CLIFTON EDWARDS, Jr. and NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting.
The decision by the majority today, upholding the warrantless search of an airplane, undermines the viability of the Fourth Amendment and has a “chilling effect” on the rights that it was enacted to protect.
A reading of the majority opinion requires us to recite the purpose of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const.Amend. IV.
As the Supreme Court has recognized: “These words are precise and clear. They reflect the determination of those who wrote the Bill of Rights that the people of this new Nation should forever ‘be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects’ from intrusion and seizure by officers acting under the unbridled authority of a general warrant.” Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-85, 85 S.Ct. 506, 509-11, 13 L.Ed.2d 431 (1964); see also Marcus v. Search Warrant 367 U.S. 717, 724-29, 81 S.Ct. 1708, 1712-14, 6 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1960).
The Fourth Amendment guarantees citizens and their possessions the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. It is well-recognized that any “search conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate is per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1957). In the present case, the majority found, based on the totality of circumstances, that there was probable cause, i.e., a sufficient factual basis upon which a reasonably prudent person could believe that the airplane contained incriminating evidence. We disagree.
The officers were aware prior to the search of the plane that Brian Corp landed the DC-6 with a feathered engine. They also knew he did not have a pilot’s license on his person. However, he was pleasant and voluntarily identified himself to a Federal Aviation Administration official who wanted to discuss the feathered engine problem. Corp also discussed the purpose and domestic origin of his flight with the official. Later, Corp became annoyed and told the official it was illegal for him to be on the ladder, and asked him to “please leave”. Soon after the official reached the ground Corp delivered the aircraft’s records to him.
Subsequently, Federal Aviation Administration officials detained and interrogated Corp. He refused to identify himself or discuss the domestic origin of his flight a second time. He also refused to indicate whether he had a general declaration. Later, however, he identified himself with a passport which indicated that he had exited a foreign country two months earlier.
The officers were also aware that the aircraft was first sighted two miles northeast of the airport. During its first few hours on the ground, three men associated with the aircraft made a cash downpayment *110to obtain servicing from Hi-Air. Later, they cashed a check at a local bank and paid the balance of the bill in cash. Hi-Air personnel were not allowed aboard the aircraft while they serviced the feathered wing engine. The aircraft had a plywood cabin door and an exterior padlock on the cargo door. The windows of the DC-6 were covered. The underside of the aircraft and propellers had nicks which the officers associated with the use of a gravel runway. The aircraft also had the ability to fly from a foreign point non-stop to Memphis.
In reviewing these facts, we cannot reach a conclusion that there was probable cause to justify a search. First, the majority states that the plane had nicks in its underside and on its propellers, thus concluding that landings and takeoffs had occurred outside the United States. However, mere nicks on a plane cannot logically lead to an irrebuttable conclusion that there had been landings outside the United States. The whereabouts of the plane, and its takeoffs and landings prior to its arrival at Memphis are mere speculation. Second, Corp identified himself with a passport. The passport was being used for identification purposes only, not to gain admission to a country. The possession of a passport does not lead to an irrefutable conclusion that an international border had been crossed. Third, there was a padlock on the door of the plane, and the windows were covered. This was a private aircraft, which had the configuration of a cargo plane. It is not beyond reason that the windows of a cargo plane would be covered for protection. Nor, is it beyond reason that a plane’s door would be padlocked to ensure the security of the plane’s contents. None of these facts lead to an uncontrovertible conclusion that the cargo could be evidence of a crime. Based on these facts, we find that the majority erred in concluding that there was probable cause to search the plane.
Even if there was probable cause, as the majority asserts, failure to obtain a search warrant in light of the facts of this case was an egregious error of constitutional magnitude. The majority justifies the war-rantless search by relying on the premise that the inherent mobility of an airplane creates an exigent circumstance. We find this argument to be unpersuasive.
The facts of this case clearly evince the absence of mobility. When James Wright, Chief of the Memphis Control Tower, arrived at the scene, he positioned his car in front of the plane. This prevented the plane from moving forward without incurring substantial damage. A plane cannot move in reverse. Throughout the episode, automobiles of local officials surrounded the plane. These facts provide uncontroverted evidence that the airplane was totally immobilized. Therefore, the mobility which provides the exigency for the automobile exception just did not exist in this case.
Moreover, the absence of exigent circumstances is further supported by several factors. First, Corp had been arrested, handcuffed, and placed in a patrol car prior to the search. Second, the other two persons associated with the plane were seen leaving the airport. Third, the engines of the airplane had been shut down and the doors were locked. Fourth, there were no sounds emanating from the plane which indicated that anyone else was on board. In light of these facts, and the totality of circumstances, it reaches the epitome of absurdity to state that this plane was mobile. To the contrary, the total immobilization of this plane makes it quite clear that the exigent circumstances of mobility did not exist in this case. Therefore, the warrantless search was unjustified.
Furthermore, the time period over which this episode transpired is of special significance. The airplane arrived at the Memphis Airport at approximately 8:30 a.m. This incident occurred over at least a two hour period. This was more than sufficient time to obtain a search warrant. A local magistrate was less than a half-hour away. A warrant could also easily have been obtained from a federal magistrate in a few moments by placing a telephone call. Fed.R.Crim.P. 41(c)(2). Yet, no attempt was ever made to obtain a search warrant. The United States Supreme Court stated in Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979) that:
*111The prominent place the warrant requirement is given in our decisions reflects the “basic constitutional doctrine that individual freedom will best be preserved through a separation of powers and divisions by functions among the different branches and levels of the Government.” By requiring that conclusions concerning probable cause and the scope of a search be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime, we minimize the risk of unreasonable assertions of executive authority. 442 U.S. at 759, 99 S.Ct. at 2590 (citations omitted).
In light of the time period, the absence of exigent circumstances, and the immobilization of the plane, there was no basis for a warrantless search.
This warrantless search was an unreasonable assertion of executive authority. This is exactly the type of action that the Fourth Amendment was enacted to prevent. It is the duty of this Court to uphold the rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. Instead, today, this Court has capitulated its responsibility and failed in this duty. Accordingly, we would reverse the decision of the district court.