Court Opinion

ID: 9472333
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:56:53.392256+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:52.334461
License: Public Domain

REAVLEY, Circuit Judge:
Kristine Naragon, insisting that it is not the right, or any concern, of the Louisiana State University at Baton Rouge (LSU) to interfere with an instructor’s intimate relationship with a freshman student, complains that LSU administrators violated her constitutional rights when they failed to include teaching in her duties as a graduate assistant. Naragon went to federal court seeking a declaration that her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated and an injunction to compel defendants to grant her teaching duties. After a bench trial, and with a thorough opinion, the district court rejected Naragon’s claim, 572 F.Supp. 1117. We affirm.
I
Naragon came to LSU in 1980 to pursue studies for a degree of Doctor of Musical Arts. At the same time she served as a graduate assistant with responsibility for teaching a music appreciation class. Her appointment as graduate assistant was re*1404newed each term until the fall of 1982 when she was appointed full time visiting instructor during the sabbatical of a music professor. She then met a 17 year old freshman music major, whom we shall call Jane Doe. Though Doe was not in a class taught by Naragon, they were in musical groups where they rehearsed and performed together. The 29 year old instructor and 17 year old freshman rapidly became very dear friends. By late November or early December Doe had moved into Naragon’s home, and the relationship included physical intimacy.
When Doe’s parents learned of these developments, difficulties arose. Friends of the parents went to discuss the matter with Doe at a shopping mall where she worked. Naragon appeared, whereupon an angry exchange took place which was ended by security guards who ejected Naragon and took Doe to the mall’s office to await her parents. The next day Doe’s father picked up her belongings at Naragon’s place and told Naragon that Doe wanted no further contact with her. The following day, however, Naragon was talking to Doe at the music building when Doe’s father arrived. Despite the intervention of the Dean of Music, the exchange between the father and the instructor had to be quelled by campus police. Whereupon Naragon left Baton Rouge to spend the Christmas holidays in Ohio, and Doe went along.
Doe’s parents met with the LSU Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs during the holidays and insisted that the school do something to stop the undue influence that Naragon was exercising over their daughter. Meetings of school administrators followed, and the Dean of Students was directed to speak to Jane Doe. After meeting with Doe's parents, who told him of their anxiety, he wrote to her asking her to meet with him. Later she called and they made a date to meet the following day. However, Doe arrived at the Dean’s office an hour later, not alone but with Naragon. The three conferred, and Naragon controlled Doe’s participation — answering questions directed at Doe, insisting that their relationship was not the University’s concern, and ultimately announcing that the meeting was over as she took Doe’s arm to leave.
Primarily to avoid worsening the alienation of Doe from her parents, the University allowed Naragon to continue her teaching duties during the spring 1983 term. Thereafter, she was reappointed as a graduate assistant with the same compensation, but her duties no longer included teaching undergraduates. Nothing of the reasons for the change was shown in Naragon’s record.
II
Naragon sued three University administrators to retain her teaching duties, seeking no damages but only declaratory and injunctive relief, costs, and attorney’s fees. The district court rendered judgment for the defendant school officials, finding that they responded well to a difficult problem, intruding into Naragon’s private life only to the least extent possible given their legitimate view that intimate relationships between teachers and students are unprofessional and likely to be detrimental to the students and to the University. 572 F.Supp. 1117 (M.D.La.1983).
Naragon persists. She argues that the real reason for her change of duties was that she is homosexual, and that denying her teaching duties for that reason is an Equal Protection violation and infringes her right to privacy as well as her First Amendment right of association.1 However, the district court found that the University officials were motivated by consid*1405erations unrelated to Naragon’s sexual preference.2 If that be the fact, we will be required to proceed no further. There would be no need to consider, for example, whether the University would be entitled to be more concerned and take different action in a case where a teacher becomes intimate with a 17 or 18 year old freshman of the same sex than in a case where they are of different sexes. If the reasons for the decision of the defendants were unrelated to Naragon’s sexual orientation, and even unrelated to that feature of her relationship with Doe, none of the argument about Naragon’s constitutional rights need be discussed.
Ill
The district court found that the homosexual tendencies of Naragon was not a motivating factor in the decision of the defendants to change her assignment, and that the change in her work assignment was prompted by considerations much more compelling than her particular sexual preference. Our review of the record reveals clear support for that finding, and in nowise could we hold it to be clearly erroneous. The Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs and Provost of LSU, the defendant who made the ultimate decision on Nara-gon’s appointment, testified that it was Naragon’s relationship with Doe that was the basis for her decision and that it was not the fact that Naragon was homosexual. The issue was drawn by this question put to the Vice Chancellor by Naragon’s attorney: “What business is it of the University if a student who is above the age of majority has a relationship with anyone as long as there is not a teaching position where the person can give a grade or withhold a grade?”3
The Vice Chancellor responded to this inquiry and position, in the course of her testimony; by insisting that there may be an adverse effect upon the student and University, and upon the effectiveness of the teacher. In this case it appeared that Doe was confused and not thinking independently, and the breach with her parents was a serious problem. Teachers are role models, good or bad, for students. The Vice Chancellor considered intimacy between a teacher and student a breach of professional ethics on the part of the teacher, and thought- that it undermined the proper position and effectiveness of the teacher because of the perception of other students. Furthermore, if known, conduct of this nature between teacher and student would be damaging to relations with the public and parents, both present and prospective.
The Dean of the School of Music and the Dean of Students also testified that Nara-gon’s homosexuality was not a factor in the decision of the administration. The Dean of Music said that it is an obvious criterion for being a professional teacher to avoid intimate relationships with students. The Dean of Students recommended against giving Naragon teaching duties because her conduct had been unprofessional and a neglect of responsibility to students, faculty, and alumni. He explained that the role of teacher demanded that an example be set for students, and that the teacher should stand in a position of trust to instruct the student. That role, he said, Nar-*1406agon had compromised. Furthermore, he testified that his concern in this particular case was heightened because of Naragon’s control of Doe and because of what was happening between Doe and her parents. The Vice Chancellor for Research and the Dean of the Graduate School concurred in this decision of the administration.
We would be very reluctant to reject the-reasoning of these educators or to overrule their decision. All that can be said for a contrary view of the motivation of defendants is that they knew of the homosexual orientation of Naragon and that the Dean of Music had heard of a heterosexual relationship between a teacher and a student which brought no sanction. The Dean surmised that the fact the student had been married earlier, that her parents were aware of the relationship, and that no complaints were made may have borne on the different consequences there.
This is not a case where authorities automatically reacted out of personal prejudice. They reappointed Naragon with full teaching duties after they knew of her homosexuality and tried to act so as to avoid further damage between the student and her parents. The facts were explored. Nara-gon’s influence over Doe, and her insistence that the whole affair was entirely proper within the scope of University interest, were verified. Then Naragon was given another appointment with the same pay, and no entry on the record was made or verbal criticism spread abroad to impair her reputation or future career. We could not possibly disagree with the finding and decision of the district judge in this case.
AFFIRMED.

. Naragon asserts no procedural due process claim, for she concedes that her position as a graduate assistant expired at the end of each term and that LSU had no legal obligation to reappoint her. LSU could therefore have denied Naragon reappointment or changed her duties for no reason at all, but it could not do so for a constitutionally infirm reason. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2697, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). Thus, our only question is whether LSU altered Naragon’s duties for a constitutionally impermissible reason.

. Under Mt. Healthy School Board v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977), Naragon bore the initial burden to show that constitutionally protected conduct — e.g. her homosexuality or homosexual association, as she contends — was a "substantial” or "motivating” factor in LSU’s decision to change her duties. Id. at 287, 97 S.Ct. 576. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66, 97 S.Ct. 555, 563, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). If it were established that constitutionally protected conduct was a factor, and LSU failed to show that same decision would have been reached if the orientation and association were heterosexual, the action of LSU could then have been tested according to the balance established in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968).

. The question ignores the facts here that the relationship began, whether it reached the point of intimacy or not, while Doe was a 17 year old beginning freshman at the University and that the two were members of musical groups in which Naragon had a leadership role.