Court Opinion

ID: 9669119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:39:53.481133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:52.596277
License: Public Domain

TERRIE LIVINGSTON, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the majority opinion in several respects.
No Starting Presumption Against Waiver
First, I question the applicability of a presumption against waiver in a case such as this, in which the parties entered into a contract containing a jury waiver provision. The case the majority cites for the proposition that every reasonable presumption against waiver should be indulged, Aetna Insurance Co. v. Kennedy, is a 1937 Supreme Court case dealing with whether a party could waive its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial by its *160conduct during trial. 301 U.S. 389, 393, 57 S.Ct. 809, 811-12, 81 L.Ed. 1177 (1937) (holding that party did not waive right to trial by jury by requesting directed verdict); see U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Seventh Amendment has not been extended to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 217, 36 S.Ct. 595, 596, 60 L.Ed. 961 (1916); Lucas v. U.S., 757 S.W.2d 687, 710 n. 10 (Tex.1988) (Phillips, C.J., dissenting). So Aet-na’s “starting point” presumption against waiver applies only to cases litigated in the federal courts.1 See Bombolis, 241 U.S. at 217, 36 S.Ct. at 596; Chester S. Chuang, Assigning the Burden of Proof in Contractual Jury Waiver Challenges: How Valuable is Your Right to a Jury Trial?, 10 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 205, 208 (2006).
Should such a “starting point” presumption apply in cases tried in Texas state courts as advocated by the majority? There are no Texas cases imposing such a requirement. Indeed, in Prudential and General Electric Capital Corp., our supreme court mentioned no such presumption, nor did it employ one. In re Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 203 S.W.3d 314, 316 (Tex.2006) (orig.proceeding); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., Inc., 148 S.W.3d 124, 133-34 (Tex.2004) (orig.proceeding). And although the right to a jury trial is a fundamental right that is also included in the Texas constitution,2 Brosseau v. Ranzau, 81 S.W.3d 381, 398 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2002, pet. denied), Texas also strongly favors freedom of contract, enforcing contracts as written unless they are unconscionable or against public policy. See Tex. Const. art. I, §§ 15, 16; Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 129 & n. 11; Lawrence v. CDB Servs., Inc., 44 S.W.3d 544, 553 (Tex.2001). Our supreme court has already determined that contractual jury waivers do not violate public policy and are not per se unconscionable. Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 129-33.
In Prudential, the Texas Supreme Court observed that nearly every state court that had considered whether parties have the right to contractually waive a jury trial had held that parties may so agree. Id. at 132. In fact, the court specifically noted that the sole Texas intermediate appellate court that had addressed the issue had also concluded that parties have the right to contractually waive their right to a jury trial. Id. at 133 (citing In re Wells Fargo Bank Min., N.A., 115 S.W.3d 600, 606-08 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding)). The supreme court clearly adopted the Houston Fourteenth Court’s position in Wells Fargo as correct. Id. (“We believe this overwhelming weight of authority is correct.”). The Wells Fargo opinion acknowledges the constitutional basis for jury trials, but further notes that “no Texas law *161prohibits parties from waiving that constitutional right — whether contractually or otherwise.” 115 S.W.3d at 606.
Furthermore, our state’s policy is to encourage all forms of alternative dispute resolution. See Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 154.002 (Vernon 2005); Stephens v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 50 S.W.3d 621, 628 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, pet. denied). Therefore, we should not apply a presumption against contractual waiver once it has been shown that the parties have entered into a contract that contains such a provision. Instead, I believe that when a contractual jury waiver exists, we should examine the record according to the factors and burden of proof discussed by our supreme court in Prudential and General Electric, which, although they appear to require us to construe such a provision narrowly, do not automatically employ a presumption in favor of or against such a waiver. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 203 S.W.3d at 316;3 Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 133-34.
The majority also contends that a contractual jury waiver should be approached differently from an agreement to arbitrate because in Texas, there is a specific statutory presumption in favor of arbitration. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 171.001 (Vernon 2005). But in light of Texas’s strong public policy of enforcing freedom of contract, it does not make sense to treat valid contractual jury waivers — which preserve many of the same rights to a litigant as a jury trial, most importantly access to the court system and its protections — differently from arbitration agreements, which preclude access to the courts altogether. See Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 131-32; Brian D. Weber, Note, Contractual Waivers of a Right to Jury Trial— Another Option, 53 Clev. Stat. L.Rev. 717, 733-34 (2005-06). There is no presumption against the validity of arbitration agreements. Although arbitration is legislatively favored, practically, it makes little sense to treat a predispute contractual jury waiver (as opposed to a waiver by conduct) any differently than a predispute contractual agreement to arbitrate. See Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 130.4 In fact, Prudential takes that very position. Id. at 132. The court observed,
[W]e think it preferable to enforce that agreement [to waive a jury trial] rather than leave [the parties] with arbitration as their only enforceable option. By agreeing to arbitration, parties waive not only their right to trial by jury but their right to appeal, whereas by agreeing to waive only the former right, they take advantage of the reduced expense and delay of a bench trial, avoid the expense of arbitration, and retain their right to appeal.
Id. And the Wells Fargo court likewise observed, “Although parties agreeing to arbitrate waive considerably more than just the right to a jury trial, arbitration is strongly favored under Texas law.” 115 S.W.3d at 607. Thus, contrary to the majority, I would conclude that the lack of a statute specifically authorizing contractual waiver of jury trials does not support the *162majority’s contention that there is a presumption against waiver.
For these reasons, I believe the majority opinion’s “starting point” of a limited presumption against waiver is contrary to the limited precedent from our state supreme court. See Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 203 S.W.3d at 316; Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 129-33.5 Although the supreme court has never expressly said that it does not indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver in a contractual jury waiver context, it is clear that it has never applied such a presumption against jury waiver in this context.
Appellants Conceded at Oral Argument That Bank of America Met Its Burden of Showing The Existence of a Valid Jury Waiver
Further, at oral argument, appellants’ counsel stated that under Wells Fargo,6 the initial burden was on Bank of America to establish that an agreement to waive a jury trial existed. Appellants’ counsel also conceded that Bank of America had met this burden and that the burden was therefore on appellants to rebut the presumption of a valid jury waiver. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 203 S.W.3d at 316 (“Such a conspicuous provision is prima facie evidence of a knowing and voluntary waiver and shifts the burden to the opposing party to rebut it.”) (citing Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 134, and Wells Fargo, 115 S.W.3d at 609). According to appellants’ counsel, although the parties agreed that Bank of America had met its initial burden, there was a “whale of a disagreement” over whether appellants had met theirs.
On appeal, we continuously recognize parties’ stipulations and arguments as to various matters, all in an effort to focus and narrow the appellate issues. I see no reason why we should not recognize the parties’ stipulation at oral argument on this issue as well.7 Thus, contrary to the majority opinion, I believe that my analysis not only correctly applies supreme court precedent, but also recognizes the parties’ agreement and appellants’ express concessions at oral argument. See Maj. Op. at 153 n. 11.
Shifting Burden Analysis Under Controlling Supreme Court Precedent
Although I disagree about the applicability of a presumption against waiver here, it does appear from the supreme court’s recent per curiam decision in General *163Electric that the initial burden is on the proponent of a contractual waiver to introduce some evidence that the waiver was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. 203 S.W.3d at 316. Only once the opponent challenges the enforceability of a contractual agreement to waive a jury trial on some ground should the proponent be required to introduce some evidence rebutting the claimed deficiency. Id. at 316; Wells Fargo, 115 S.W.3d at 609.
In General Electric, the proponent met that initial burden by showing the words that were actually used in the written waiver and that the jury waiver provision was conspicuous. Id. The supreme court held that a contractual jury waiver provision that is conspicuous is “prima facie evidence of a knowing and voluntary waiver and shifts the burden to the opposing party to rebut it.”8 Id. (citing Wells Fargo, 115 S.W.3d at 609). Thus, under the supreme court’s most recent opinion addressing this issue, it is clear that Bank of America’s initial burden was to produce an agreement containing a conspicuous jury waiver provision that contained language indicating it was entered into knowingly and voluntarily — not to produce evidence in addition to such a provision that would prove the waiver was knowing and voluntary. See id.
In Wells Fargo, adopted by the supreme court in General Electric, the appellate court looked to the words used in the waiver — that they were given “knowingly and voluntarily” by the maker and guarantor — stating that the wording was “conclusive” evidence of the knowing and voluntary nature of the waivers. 115 S.W.3d at 609. Accordingly, once the proponent shows some evidence of the validity of the waivers that rebuts the opponent’s claimed deficiency, the burden shifts to the opponent to rebut this evidence. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 203 S.W.3d at 316; Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 134; Wells Fargo, 115 S.W.3d at 609.
Here, the waiver provision included in the Addendum clearly states, “Seller and Buyer knowingly and conclusively waive all rights to trial by jury -” [Italics added.] If this language is conspicuous, it should be sufficient to at least be prima facie evidence of a knowing and voluntary waiver. See Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 203 S.W.3d at 316. But the majority concludes that, despite appellants’ concessions, Bank of America did not meet its initial burden here because the jury waiver provision is not conspicuous and because Bank of America failed to produce any other prima facie evidence that the waiver was entered into knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily-
This Waiver is at Least as Conspicuous as the Waiver in Prudential
I believe that the waiver in this case is at least as conspicuous as the waiver in Prudential and is sufficient to shift the burden to appellants to show that the waiver was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.9 The clause at issue here reads as follows:
*164Waiver of Trial by Jury. Seller and Buyer knowingly and conclusively waive all rights to trial by jury in any action or proceeding relating to this Contract.
The majority claims that it cannot tell whether the words “Waiver of Trial by Jury” are bolded;10 however, it is plain to me from the copy in the record that those words are bolded because the font is objectively darker and larger than the font of the words in the rest of the sentence.11 In addition, appellants set out the provision on page 3 of their brief, and although they failed to show the underlining of the words “waive” and “trial by jury,” in the text, as correctly shown above, they did bold and underline the phrase “Waiver of Trial by Jury.” Thus, the parties, who most likely have access to a better copy of the addendum than we do, agree that the term is bolded. See Dissenting Op., supra, at page 162 n. 7.
While the majority acknowledges that the title, “Waiver of Trial by Jury” is underlined, it gives no weight to this in its “conspicuousness” analysis. See Maj. Op. at 155 n. 15. However, only five of the twenty paragraphs in the two-page addendum have captions at all; all five of those captions are underlined. The document that was considered by the trial court, as shown in the appellate record, shows that the caption of paragraph 13, the jury waiver paragraph, was underlined, and was one of only five paragraphs over two pages that contained an underlined caption. Because the appellate record provided to us is what we must use to determine appellants’ issues, we must determine the conspicuousness of the provision based on the version of the addendum provided in the appellate record. See Quorum Int’l v. Tarrant Appraisal Disk, 114 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) (“[W]e are bound to determine this case on the record as filed.”). And absent any evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the version of the addendum as signed by the parties had those words underlined. See id.
In Prudential, only the caption of the jury waiver clause was bolded, and it was not underlined as was the clause here. 148 S.W.3d at 127, 134. Also, the jury waiver was in the “53rd paragraph of a 67-paragraph document, 7 pages before the signature page.” Id. at 133.12 That lease was fifty legal-sized pages long and had up to thirty lines per page and up to fifteen *165words per line. Real Parties in Interest’s Resp. to Pet. for Writ of Mandamus, No. 02-0690, 2002 WL 32349429, at *1 (filed Aug. 27, 2002). In determining that the waiver in Prudential was enforceable as a matter of law, the supreme court noted that the waiver was “crystal clear,” was not printed in small type or hidden in other text, and was captioned in bold type. 148 S.W.3d at 134. It also observed that the opposing parties’ claim that they did not read the provision did not affect the validity of the provision absent a claim that they were tricked into agreeing to it, which they did not make. Id.
I believe the provision here is at least as conspicuous as the waiver in Prudential. Here, the clause was on the second, signature 13 page of a two-page addendum that was not a standard TREC contract addendum. Although the majority considers this fact to be in appellants’ favor, I believe that it is in Bank of America’s favor. Certainly, the clause is more conspicuous even on the second page of a two-page addendum, as opposed to near the middle to end of a multi-page contract with only a bolded caption as introduction. Also, in the addendum here, not all of the paragraphs had introductory captions. As mentioned above, there were twenty paragraphs in the entire addendum, with only five containing numbered, underlined, and bolded captions, so that “[m]any” did not begin with a descriptive phrase, as claimed by the majority. Maj. Op. at 148. On the page containing the jury waiver provision, only three of eleven paragraphs contain such an introduction, and “waive” and “trial by jury” are the only words within a paragraph that are underlined.14 And although the document is single spaced within paragraphs, it is double spaced between paragraphs.
I believe that the provision in this case was conspicuous precisely because it was captioned in the same way as only four other provisions that the drafter obviously chose to set apart from the other uncap-tioned provisions in the addendum. Thus, it does stand out from the other uncap-tioned paragraphs. Although the words within the provision are not in all caps, as was the provision in General Electric, that is not the only way to make a provision conspicuous. See Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 1.201(b)(10) (“Conspicuous,” ... means so written, displayed, or presented that a reasonable person against which it is to operate ought to have noticed it.”) & cmt. 10 (“Whether a term is conspicuous is an issue for the court. Subparagraphs (A) and (B) set out several methods for making a term conspicuous.... Although these paragraphs indicate some of the methods for making a term attention-calling, the test is whether attention can reasonably be expected to be called to it.”) (Vernon Supp.2006). And as I have observed above, the part of appellants’ brief containing this provision shows the caption bolded and underlined.
Therefore, I believe the provision here was at least as conspicuous as the provision described in Prudential and probably even more so due to the additional underlining of the words “jury” and “waiver.” In any event, as in Prudential, there is no evidence that Bank of America attempted to conceal the provision from appellants in any way. Accordingly, I believe that Bank of America brought forward prima facie evidence that the waiver was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently and that the burden then shifted to appellants *166to prove the contrary. See Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 203 S.W.3d at 316.
Appellants’ Evidence Does Not Rebut the Presumption That the Waiver Was Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary
I now turn to appellants’ evidence that they claim proves that their execution of the waiver was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Although waiver is ordinarily a question of fact, when the facts and circumstances are admitted or clearly established, the question becomes one of law. Motor Vehicle Bd. v. El Paso Indep. Auto. Dealers Ass’n, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 108, 111 (Tex.1999); Palladian Building Co. v. Nortex Found. Designs, Inc., 165 S.W.3d 430, 434 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).
In Prudential, the supreme court held, based on undisputed facts, that the jury waiver in a lease was knowing, voluntary, intelligent, and made with sufficient awareness even though
• the bargaining power of Prudential, with “assets exceeding a quarter of a trillion dollars”, greatly exceeded that of the Secchis [the appellants], “neither of whom were educated beyond the 8th grade, [and who] are immigrants to the United States who operate two local restaurants”; and
• the Secchis did not read the jury waiver, were not told that it was included, and did not bargain for it.
148 S.W.3d at 134. The supreme court noted that the Secchis had entered into commercial leases before, had been represented by counsel before, and were represented by counsel as to the lease with Prudential, which Jane Secchis went over with counsel and to which the Secchis had negotiated changes over a six-month period. Id. Thus, in addition to conspicuousness of the provision,15 the supreme court considered the bargaining power of the parties, whether the parties were represented by counsel, the experience of the parties, and whether the Secchis had an opportunity to negotiate and examine the contract in which the provision was included. Id.; see Chuang, 10 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. at 215 & n. 57 (“[T]here is substantial agreement [among courts] regarding what kinds of information is relevant [in determining whether a contractual jury waiver was entered into knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.] Courts typically consider any actual negotiations over the clause, whether the clause was presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, the conspicuousness of the waiver, the degree of bargaining disparity between the parties, and the experience and sophistication of the party opposing the waiver.”); Weber, 53 Clev. Stat. L.Rev. at 721.
Here, the evidence about the jury waiver is also undisputed; thus, whether the waiver is enforceable must be determined as a matter of law. See El Paso Indep. Auto Dealers, 1 S.W.3d at 111. I first note that both principals signed the waiver, Martin as President and Powell as Vice President. There is no evidence about Powell’s knowledge and understanding of the waiver. Thus, appellants offered no evidence about whether Powell’s execution of the addendum with the jury waiver included was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See Path v. Small, Craig & Werkenthin, L.L.P., 967 S.W.2d 511, 515 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied) (“Knowledge held by corporate officers or di*167rectors may be imputed to the corporation itself.”).
Martin, who signed as president, testified that she did not recall reading the waiver, but that is not dispositive because she is charged with knowledge of the addendum’s contents. Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 134; Broaddus, 569 S.W.2d at 492. “We presume that ‘a party who signs a contract knows its contents.’ ” In re Bank One, N.A., No. 06-0093, 216 S.W.3d 825, 826 (Tex. 2007) (orig.proceeding) (quoting Cantella & Co. v. Goodwin, 924 S.W.2d 943, 944 (Tex.1996)). Although Martin said that she did not understand the jury waiver provision, she agreed that she had been given an opportunity to review the addendum and could have reviewed it line for line if she had chosen to. She stated that Bank of America did not rush her into signing the addendum and that she could have retained counsel to review it if she had wished. It is undisputed that appellants did not attempt to negotiate the addendum despite the opportunity to do so.16 See Weber, 53 Clev. Stat. L.Rev. at 726 (“Courts are more likely to enforce a jury waiver where the party who submitted to the jury waiver negotiated the provision or voluntarily chose to forgo the opportunity to negotiate.” (emphasis added)).
Although appellants were not represented by counsel, they were represented by a real estate agent, who presented them with the addendum from Bank of America. The majority contends that appellants’ lack of counsel weighs in their favor. But Martin admitted that appellants could have hired counsel if they had chosen to do so, and Bank of America gave them an opportunity to review and negotiate the provision. What is important is that appellants were afforded such an opportunity and that they were not pressured to sign the addendum. Appellants should not benefit here from their choice to forego counsel.
The majority also contends, without explanation or citation of evidence from the record, that the bargaining power of the parties was unequal. Other than the fact that Bank of America produced the addendum and gave it to appellants’ agent,17 there is nothing in the record to indicate that Bank of America was in any appreciably better bargaining position than appellants.18 In fact, by presenting the addendum to appellants after the sales contract had already been signed, Bank of America was in a worse bargaining position than appellants with respect to the addendum. Although the sales contract gave appellants a ten-day “free-look” period during which they could terminate the contract for any reason, it allowed Bank of America *168to avoid its obligations to sell the property, without liability to appellants, only in the following circumstances: (1) by failing to cure any title objections made by appellants, (2) by refusing to agree to any lender-required repairs, and (3) by failing to make repairs in the event of a casualty loss to the property. So by the time Bank of America presented the addendum to appellants, it had the obligation to sell the property to them subject only to a few limited exceptions that were expressly conditioned upon specific occurrences; if Bank of America had attempted to terminate the sales contract for appellants’ failure to sign the addendum or for attempting to negotiate the addendum in any way (including the jury waiver provision), Bank of America would have subjected itself to liability to appellants.19 Thus, this factor does not weigh in appellants’ favor either.
My review of the factors examined by the supreme court in Prudential and by other courts reviewing contractual jury waivers indicates that most of the factors here actually weigh in favor of enforcing the jury waiver: appellants’ having the greater bargaining power as to the addendum (whether or not they perceived it), appellants’ opportunity to negotiate the addendum whether they chose to or not, the lack of pressure on appellants to sign the addendum, and the conspicuousness of the provision. Although appellants were not represented by counsel as the Secchis in Prudential were, nor did they negotiate the contract over six months as the Secchis in Prudential did, the record shows that appellants were not precluded from doing so and could have done so if they wanted. And the other facts of this case are similar enough to those in Prudential that I believe it is controlling here.
Based on the foregoing undisputed facts, I believe that the jury waiver here, and the circumstances under which it was signed, are substantially similar to the waiver and circumstances in Prudential. See Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 134; see also Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 203 S.W.3d at 316; Wells Fargo, 115 S.W.3d at 609-10 (holding that jury waiver stating that it was made knowingly and voluntarily raised presumption of same and that burden was on party challenging enforceability of jury waiver to present evidence overcoming presumption). Thus, I would conclude that Bank of America presented prima facie evidence of a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver, and that appellants did not meet their burden of proof to rebut that evidence.20 I would conclude and hold that as a matter of law the jury waiver here was entered into knowingly, voluntarily, intelligently, and with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.
Appellants’ Claims Fall Within the Scope of the Waiver
Because I believe appellants did not meet their burden to rebut Bank of Amer*169ica’s prima facie evidence that the waiver was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently — and, therefore, that the waiver is enforceable against appellants — I believe we should also determine whether the waiver extends to all of appellants’ claims against Bank of America. Appellants contend that their fraud, DTPA, negligent or intentional misrepresentation, breach of warranties, and negligence causes of action “concern the representations that were made regarding the property being offered for sale, and go beyond issues ‘relating to the contract.’ ” Appellants’ extracontrac-tual claims are premised upon their allegations that Bank of America misrepresented that it had good and merchantable title to the house at 3325 Meadowbrook and that it breached a duty to convey good and merchantable title to the property. In determining that the scope of the jury waiver at issue in Prudential extended to a fraudulent inducement claim, the supreme court followed the same rule it uses in the arbitration context and stated that as to that issue, it “agreefd] that the rule should be the same for all similar dispute resolution agreements.” Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 134-35. Thus, I believe that the supreme court would have us look to cases construing the scope of arbitration provisions in construing the scope of the contractual jury waiver language at issue here.
The interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law. MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co., 995 S.W.2d 647, 650-51 (Tex.1999); Heil v. Polar Corp., 191 S.W.3d 805, 809-10 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied). Here, the jury waiver in the addendum purports to apply to “any action or proceeding relating to” the sales contract. In the arbitration context, this language is construed broadly, In re Conseco Fin. Serv. Corp., 19 S.W.3d 562, 568 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, orig. proceeding), to encompass all claims at issue unless “it can be said with positive assurance that an arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation which would cover the dispute at issue,” Prudential Sec. Inc. v. Marshall, 909 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tex.1995) (orig.proceeding). Cf. Ex parte Cupps, 782 So.2d 772, 775-76 (Ala.2000) (stating that under Alabama law scope of jury waiver should be construed narrowly and strictly but analogizing to cases construing arbitration clauses and acknowledging that clause applying to claims “arising out of or relating to” contract has a broader application than clause applying to claims “aidsing under” or “arising from” contract); ST Sys. Corp. v. Md. Nat’l Bank, 112 Md.App. 20, 684 A.2d 32, 34 (1996) (acknowledging that “[generally, jury waiver provisions are strictly construed,” but holding that interpretation of jury waiver should not be artificially limited and should instead be interpreted according to general contract construction rules); Manderson & Assocs., Inc. v. Gore, 193 Ga.App. 723, 389 S.E.2d 251, 257 (1989) (construing scope of jury waiver in accordance with general rules of contract interpretation).
Although here appellants’ misrepresentation, DTPA, fraud, and negligence claims relate to some extent to matters occurring before formation of the contract, they are also directly related to the circumstances surrounding the execution and breach of the contract, and proof of those claims would necessarily require reference to and construction of the contract of sale and its breach. See, e.g., Conseco, 19 S.W.3d at 570; Hearthshire Braeswood Plaza Ltd. P’ship v. Bill Kelly Co., 849 S.W.2d 380, 391 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (“To determine whether [a] particular tort claim is subject to arbitration, the court must determine whether [it] is so interwoven with the contract that it could not stand alone or, on the other *170hand, is a tort completely independent of the contract and could be maintained without reference to the contract.”); see also Cupps, 782 So.2d at 776 (citing holding in Koullas v. Ramsey, 683 So.2d 415, 418 (Ala.1996), that for dispute to be characterized as arising out of or relating to the subject matter of the contract, it must at very least raise some issue that requires reference to or construction of contract for its resolution).21 Thus, I would conclude and hold that the trial court did not err by determining that the scope of the jury waiver encompassed all of appellants’ claims against Bank of America.
For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully dissent to the majority opinion and would affirm the trial court’s order.

. Although appellants’ brief cites Texas constitutional provisions for the proposition that the right to a jury trial "has long been viewed as an important guarantee under” the Texas constitution, they never raised a Seventh Amendment challenge to the waiver here.

. Although the right to a jury trial is broader under the Texas Constitution than the Seventh Amendment in terms of the types of causes of action it applies to (i.e., it protects "the right to trial by jury in those cases where a jury would have been proper at common law” or "where that right existed at the time the Constitution was adopted”), Lucas v. U.S., 757 S.W.2d 687, 710 (Tex.1988) (Phillips, C.J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Credit Bureau of Laredo, Inc., 530 S.W.2d 288, 291 (Tex.1975)); Trapnell v. Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 850 S.W.2d 529, 544 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1992), aff'd, 890 S.W.2d 796 (Tex.1994), that does not change my analysis as to the applicability of a presumption against a contractual jury waiver as evidenced by the supreme court’s recent analysis in General Electric and Prudential.

. Indeed, the supreme court’s holding in General Electric, that a conspicuous waiver provision is "prima facie evidence” of a knowing and voluntary waiver, militates against a conclusion that we indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver once it is shown that such a provision exists. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 203 S.W.3d at 316.

. See also Wells Fargo, 115 S.W.3d at 609 (analogizing to arbitration context in discussing burden of proof for contractual jury waivers); Weber, 53 Clev. Stat. L.Rev. at 741 (pointing out that waiver of jury only could hardly be considered as offensive as waiver of judicial process altogether).

. As a lower court, we are bound by supreme court precedent. Lubbock County v. Trammel’s Lubbock Bail Bonds, 80 S.W.3d 580, 585 (Tex.2002); Serv. Employment Redevelopment v. Fort Worth ISD, 163 S.W.3d 142, 158 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. filed).

. The supreme court had not yet handed down General Electric when this case was argued; however, appellants’ understanding of the parties’ respective burdens is consistent with the supreme court’s holding in that case.

. Appellate counsel regularly make concessions during oral argument and in their briefs and we recognize these concessions. See, e.g., In re Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 195 S.W.3d 672, 676 (Tex.2006) (orig.proceeding); El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Strayhorn, 208 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2006, no pet. h.); Phoenix Network Techs. (Europe), Ltd. v. Neon Sys., Inc., 177 S.W.3d 605, 622-23 & n. 22 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.); Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. City of Houston, 171 S.W.3d 240, 251 nn. 4, 6, 11 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.); Manon v. Tejas Toyota, Inc., 162 S.W.3d 743, 755 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.); see also Tex. Const. art II, § 1; Brooks v. Northglen Ass’n, 141 S.W.3d 158, 164 (Tex.2004) ("A judicial decision reached without a case or controversy is an advisory opinion, which is barred by the separation of powers provision of the Texas Constitution.”).

. “A prima facie case represents the minimum quantity of evidence necessary to support a rational inference that the allegation of fact is true.” Lynn Smith Chevrolet-GEO, Inc. v. Tidwell, 161 S.W.3d 738, 741 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (quoting Rodriguez v. Printone Color Corp., 982 S.W.2d 69, 72 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied)).

. I question whether it even matters in this case whether the provision was conspicuous or not. Martin testified that she did not recall reading the waiver. By signing a contract, a party is presumed to have read and understood its contents. Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 134; Town N. Nat'l Bank v. Broaddus, 569 S.W.2d 489, 492 (Tex.1978). In Prudential, the opponents “did not read the jury waiver, *164were not told that it was included, and did not bargain for it.” Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 134. I do not see how a provision's conspicuousness is relevant when a party who admittedly does not remember reading a contract signed it anyway. A person should not be able to avoid the consequences of a contract that he or she voluntarily signed without reading it. In other words, here, voluntary ignorance should not excuse one from the consequences of a voluntary contract. However, I acknowledge that jury waiver analysis has moved away from the application of this basic contract principle to include a more detailed inquiry into the circumstances surrounding execution of the contract in which the waiver is included. See Chuang, 10 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. at 215.

. The majority contends that even if the caption is bolded, it is not unique because other paragraphs on the page are introduced by similar looking captions. However, out of eleven paragraphs on the same page, only two other paragraphs contain any introductory caption at all, which differentiates those paragraphs from all others on the page; therefore, whether the caption of the jury waiver paragraph is bolded does not change my conclusion that the provision is conspicuous. See Maj. Op. at 17 n. 13.

. E.g., the word ‘‘jury” in the caption of this paragraph is measurably larger than the word "jury” in the text of the paragraph.

. Additionally, the caption was entitled "Jury Trial,” rather than "Waiver of Trial by Jury,” as was the provision here.

. The signature block is at the bottom of the page, and the jury waiver provision is the fourth paragraph from the top of the page.

. No entire sentences are underlined on the second page of the addendum.

. Although in Prudential the supreme court declined to hold that a contractual jury waiver must be conspicuous, it nevertheless considered this factor and concluded that the provision in that case was conspicuous. Id.

. The majority contends in several places that there is no evidence that either the sales contract or the addendum were negotiated. However, I note that although the sales contract is a standard TREC form, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the parties did not attempt to negotiate the discretionary provisions of that form, which in several places requires the parties to either check among several options or fill in blanks. Thus, I do not believe we can draw any conclusions from the record as to the extent the parties negotiated the sales contract (or not).

. There is nothing in the record to indicate why Bank of America chose to present the addendum this way; however, I believe that this separate presentation of the addendum actually renders the jury waiver provision more conspicuous than it would have been otherwise.

. Unlike Prudential, in which the supreme court noted that Prudential had "assets exceeding a quarter of a trillion dollars,” there is no evidence in this record as to the size or holdings of Bank of America. Although I recognize that it is probably common knowledge that Bank of America is a sizeable corporation, there is no evidence that its size made any difference in this instance, nor is there any evidence as to its expertise in real estate sales.

. On the signature page of the sales contract, there is a list of the documents that the parties intended to attach to the contract. The box marked "Other” is checked, with "Bank of America Mortgage Addendum to Contract” filled in. Thus, it appears that the parties contemplated attaching this agreement when the sales contract was signed. In any event, even if Bank of America had attempted to pressure appellants to sign the addendum because that box in the contract was checked, appellants, unlike Bank of America, could have terminated the sales contract without losing their earnest money.

. Moreover, I note that based on these undisputed facts and the similarity of this case to Prudential, I would hold that even if the burden of proof did not shift from Bank of America to appellants, based on the factors examined in Prudential and employed by other courts, Bank of America proved that the waiver here was entered into knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

. Appellants contend that although the contract is related to the acts giving rise to the tort claims, those acts are not related to the contract because they occurred before its formation and breach. I believe that this is a distinction without a difference.