Court Opinion

ID: 9736132
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:44:57.448414+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:04.585533
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE STOUDER, concurring in the decision: I concur in the affirmance of the conviction of defendant Marando and the reasons expressed for such affirmance, and since Judges Scott and Barry agree that counts II through V state a cause of action, and since I agree with Judge Scott that the conduct of the prosecution warrants a new trial, I concur in the reversal and remandment with respect to the other defendants. However, I am not convinced that counts II through V state an offense. These counts charge the defendants with violations of the Illinois Securities Law of 1953 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 121M, pars. 137.12(F), (G), (I)). The problem arises because these counts fail to allege specific intent. If the provisions are absolute-liability provisions, then this failure does not affect the validity of these charges. If the provisions are not absolute-liability provisions, then the failure to allege specific intent is fatal to the indictment and the charges must be dismissed. The Illinois Criminal Code states that an offense is an absolute-liability offense when “the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for the conduct described.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 4 — 9.) Thus, we must determine whether there was legislative intent to impose absolute liability in criminal cases under section 12. I believe there was none. The language of sections 12(F), (G) and (I) are virtually identical with the antifraud provisions of the Federal Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. §77g), and therefore I believe that the standards applicable to the Federal act are equally applicable to the Illinois act. It is well established that under the Federal antifraud provisions there must be specific intent to defraud. (Sparrow v. United States (10th Cir. 1968), 402 F.2d 826; Frank v. United States (10th Cir. 1955), 220 F.2d 559; Troutman v. United States (10th Cir. 1938), 100 F.2d 628.) Therefore, I believe that, to charge the defendants with fraud, the government must allege an intent to defraud or, at the very least, scienter. Judges Scott and Barry apparently conclude that the statute is an absolute-liability statute, and Home Indemnity Co. v. Reynolds & Co. (1962), 38 Ill. App. 2d 358, 187 N.E.2d 274, is cited as authority for this position. However, Home Indemnity Co. is a civil case, not a criminal case. While I would agree that the statute calls for absolute liability in a civil case, there is no evidence that the legislature intended it to be so in a criminal case. In the absence of a clear intent to make it an absolute-liability provision, it cannot be so considered. The majority further states that, regardless of whether or not the indictment needed to allege specific intent, there is precedent to the effect that it is sufficient if the intent is proved and the jury charged that finding is essential and a requisite to the conviction. The majority cites Tallman v. United States (7th Cir. 1972), 465 F.2d 282, and People v. Vraniak (1955), 5 Ill. 2d 384, 125 N.E.2d 513, for this proposition. Neither case is apposite. In Toilman the defendant failed to object to the indictment prior to trial and was collaterally attacking it. The court there held that where the intent was proved and the jury properly instructed, the indictment could not be collaterally attacked. In the instant case, there was a timely motion to dismiss the indictment. Because it failed to allege specific intent, the indictment should have been dismissed at that time. Therefore, whether or not intent was later proved and the jury properly charged is irrelevant. In Vraniak the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment for failing to allege intent. The court denied the motion, saying that the offense the defendant was charged with did not require intent. Since the offense in the instant case requires intent, Vraniak is clearly inapposite. Therefore, since the indictment needed to allege specific intent and did not, the defendants’ motion to dismiss it should have been granted. It is for this reason that I would simply reverse the lower court’s decision.