Court Opinion

ID: 9781599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:54:18.537591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:11:09.161020
License: Public Domain

PHIPPS, Presiding Judge,
concurring fully and specially.
I concur fully that Gregoire waived the contention set forth in Division 1 of the majority. I concur specially with the majority’s determination in Division 2 that Gregoire has failed to show reversible error in the trial court’s conclusion that he was not entitled to a new trial based upon his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, pursuant to Strickland v. Washington,3 a defendant must establish that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance was prejudicial to his defense.4 The majority has determined that the trial court did not err in concluding that the performance component was not met (and thus did not reach the prejudice component). Because I believe that the record shows that Gregoire satisfied the performance component, but not the prejudice component, I write separately.
Gregoire complains, specifically, that his trial counsel failed to object to four cited instances in which he claims the state elicited testimony that bolstered the credibility of the two boys, B. C. and his younger brother B. T. The first instance cited by Gregoire occurred during direct examination of the boys’ mother. The prosecutor asked her, “Did you have any reason not to believe what B. C. was telling you?” She answered, “No, he’s my child.” The second instance *314occurred on redirect examination of the mother. The prosecutor asked the mother: “Okay. And you do believe it happened to [B. C.]?” She responded, “I believe my child. I have to; I’m his mother.” The third instance occurred on redirect examination of B. T.’s father. The prosecutor asked, “And do you have any reason to not believe what [B. C. and B. T] were telling you that day?” He answered, “No, not at all.” And the fourth instance cited by Gregoire occurred on redirect examination of the DFCS child protective services investigator assigned to the boys’ case. The prosecutor asked, “And did [the mother] say anything in regards to whether she believed the disclosure from her children?” He responded, “She stated that she believed her children.”
“A witness, even an expert, can never bolster the credibility of another witness as to whether the witness is telling the truth. Credibility of a witness is not beyond the ken of the jurors but, to the contrary, is a matter solely within the province of the jury.”5 Accordingly, “ [testimony that another witness believes the victim impermissibly bolsters the credibility of the victim.”6 The trial court attributed the lack of any objection or request for curative measure by Gregoire’s lawyer to trial strategy. When Gregoire’s trial lawyer was asked at the new trial hearing why she had not objected, she responded, “[P]art of our sort of theory of the case was that these children weren’t necessarily lying. But that they were so young at the time, that they may not have been saying things that they believed to be true, but that in fact weren’t really — weren’t accurate.” Gregoire’s trial lawyer gave no explanation regarding how not objecting to testimony bolstering the boys’ credibility advanced such strategy.
1. Performance component. The majority has determined that the “trial court made a factual finding at the hearing that counsel’s decision not to object when a witness testified about believing a child’s statement was not an unreasonable trial strategy.” The majority thus concludes, “applying the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard to our review, the trial court did not err in concluding that trial counsel’s performance was not ineffective.” Further, the majority states that trial counsel’s “strategy must have been at least partially successful, because the jury acquitted Gregoire of the more serious charges.” For the following reasons, I cannot agree with the majority’s analysis, nor with the resulting outcome that the prejudice component of the ineffectiveness inquiry need not be addressed.
*315The Court in Strickland v. Washington instructed: ‘ both the performance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact.”7 And as reiterated in Suggs v. State,8 “the question of ineffectiveness, including both the performance and prejudice prongs, is a mixed question of law and fact.”9 “Under [that] standard, we accept the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations unless clearly erroneous, but we independently apply the legal principles to the facts.”10 “[T]he clearly erroneous standard applies solely to the trial court’s factual findings and ... we owe no deference to the trial court’s legal conclusions.”11 Contrary to the underpinnings of the majority’s analysis, “[wjhether an attorney’s trial tactics are reasonable is a question of law, not fact.”12
The majority has resolved Gregoire’s contention by accepting, as a factual matter, that Gregoire’s trial lawyer employed some type of strategy. But merely invoking the word “strategy” or “tactics” — even if there is evidence to show that some defensive strategy or tactics were employed — “does not automatically immunize trial counsel against a claim that a tactical decision or strategic maneuver was an unreasonable one no competent attorney would have made under the same circumstances.”13 Nothing in the record supports a conclusion that trial counsel’s failure to object to four instances of plainly impermissible testimony that bolstered what was essentially the crux of the state’s case was “a reasonable decision a competent attorney would have made under the same circumstances.”14 The majority does not explain, nor did Gregoire’s trial counsel even claim, that her failure to object was a decision made in advancement of a trial strategy she employed.
Moreover, the majority provides no record support for crediting Gregoire’s trial counsel for the not guilty verdicts returned by the jury. “[Ajppellate courts cannot know and should not speculate why a jury acquitted on one offense and convicted on another offense. The reason could be [lack of sufficient evidence,] an error by the jury in *316its consideration or it could be mistake, compromise, or lenity.”15 Stated another way, it is “imprudent and unworkable” to thus speculate whether, and to what extent, a not guilty verdict factors into a defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.16
Viewed under applicable tests, the record shows that Gregoire’s trial counsel’s failure to object or otherwise seek curative measure from the trial court amounted to deficient performance.17 Therefore, contrary to the majority, I believe that the prejudice component of the ineffectiveness inquiry must be addressed.
2. Prejudice component.
The Strickland Court set forth the appropriate test for determining prejudice: “The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”18
Subjected to this test, the record fails to show that a new trial is warranted.
In analyzing the issue presented here, this court has repeatedly considered whether the jury had evidence, other than the bolstering testimony, from which it could assess the credibility of the person(s) at issue.19 The record shows that the jury did have such evidence in this case. The boys’ accounts of Gregoire’s acts remained consistent — to their mother, to B. T.’s father, to a forensic interviewer (as to B. T), and to the police investigator. The jury was presented with a video recording of B. T.’s forensic interview, as well as audio recordings of both boys’ separate interviews with the police investigator. And before these recordings were played, the forensic interviewer testified as an *317expert about proper and improper techniques and procedures for interviewing children of the ages of B. T. and B. C.; about indicia of credibility, including factors such as the age and developmental levels of children; and about the types of language used by young children describing abuse.20 And the expert testified that, during B. T.’s interview,21 the child exhibited no sign of having been coached.22
The dissent points out that the boys were young at the time of the crimes. However, the dissent overlooks the fact that the jury was presented with the boys’ specific ages, and with that evidence, the jury could assess whether, and to what extent, the boys’ ages factored into their credibility. The dissent further points out that the boys’ credibility was not tested by cross-examination before the jury. But the dissent overlooks the fact that Gregoire had the opportunity to cross-examine the boys, and chose to forgo it. At the outset of the trial, the court specifically asked whether both boys were available to testify at trial. The prosecutor and Gregoire’s trial lawyer confirmed that they were so available. Thereafter, neither side called either boy as a trial witness. The decision whether to call a certain witness is a matter of trial strategy and tactics.23 Gregoire makes no contention that he was not given fair opportunity to cross-examine the boys and fully explore their credibility in the presence of the jury; nor does Gregoire lodge any complaint that his trial lawyer’s performance was deficient for not calling either boy to the stand. “We will not speculate or make arguments on [Gregoire’s] behalf; to do so would improperly change this court’s role from disinterested decision-maker to appellate advocate.”24 We can only conclude, from the circumstances presented by this case, that Gregoire had full and fair opportunity to test the boys’ credibility by cross-examination in front of the jury, but as part of his trial strategy and tactics, elected not to do so.
While the dissent also points out that there were repeated instances of bolstering testimony, there is no bright line rule regarding any specific number of instances. Moreover, the record reveals that the four instances of bolstering concerned the beliefs of only two individuals — the children’s parents. The boys’ mother — whose belief of B. C.’s account led to three of the four complained-of *318instances — explained that her belief was based partly on the fact that she was his mother and therefore felt a duty to believe him. Because the jury was thus explicitly apprised that any credibility opinion expressed by the mother was not an unbiased evaluation of the child’s veracity, its potential to influence the jury was diminished.25
Moreover, the mother testified that, while she had already begun having talks with her boys about their private areas and had told them to tell her if they thought anyone was touching them inappropriately, she had never specifically mentioned to them anyone using lotion on their private areas or lying on top of them; she had no personal knowledge as to how they could have known about what they described. Likewise, B. T.’s father testified that he had not had any “birds and bees” talk with either child and had never talked to them about anything like what they had described. B. T.’s father testified that he had “never heard them talk about sex before or anything of that nature.”
Given these circumstances, the record shows no reversible error. As set forth above, the potential for the mother’s complained-of credibility opinion to influence the jury was diminished. Furthermore, the jury had evidence, other than the bolstering testimony, from which it could assess the boys’ credibility. The jury was presented with a video recording of B. T.’s forensic interview, as well as audio recordings of both boys’ separate interviews with the police investigator. Before these recordings were played, the jury was presented expert testimony about proper and improper techniques and procedures for interviewing children as young as B. T. and B. C.; about indicia of credibility, including factors such as the age and developmental levels of children; and about the types of language used by young children describing abuse. And the expert testified that, during B. T.’s interview, the child exhibited no sign of having been coached. In addition, the boys’ accounts of Gregoire’s acts remained consistent — to their mother, to B. T.’s father, to a forensic interviewer (regarding B. T), and to the police investigator. And neither the boys’ mother nor B. T.’s father had any personal knowledge of how their young children could have known about the sexual acts that they were describing and that B. C. was demonstrating.
Given these circumstances, the record shows that Gregoire failed to establish a reasonable probability that, but for his trial counsel’s failure to object to the cited bolstering testimony, the *319outcome of his trial would have been different.26
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Miller joins in this opinion.

 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).

 Conaway v. State, 277 Ga. 422, 424 (2) (589 SE2d 108) (2003).

 Manzano v. State, 282 Ga. 557, 560 (3) (b) (651 SE2d 661) (2007) (citation and punctuation omitted).

 Buice v. State, 239 Ga. App. 52, 55 (2) (520 SE2d 258) (1999), affirmed on other grounds, 272 Ga. 323 (528 SE2d 788) (2000).

 Strickland v. Washington, supra at 698 (IV).

 272 Ga. 85 (526 SE2d 347) (2000).

 Id. at 87 (4).

 Id. at 88 (4) (footnote omitted).

 Id. (emphasis supplied).

 Jefferson v. Zant, 263 Ga. 316, 318 (3) (a) (431 SE2d 110) (1993) (punctuation omitted).

 Benham v. State, 277 Ga. 516, 518 (591 SE2d 824) (2004) (“tactics” and “strategy” provide no talismanic protection against an ineffective assistance of counsel claim). Compare, e.g., Powell v. State, 272 Ga. App. 628, 631-632 (2) (c) (612 SE2d 916) (2005) (record supported finding that not objecting to credibility testimony was consistent with defense counsel’s trial strategy).

 Benham, supra (emphasis in original).

 Turner v. State, 283 Ga. 17, 20 (2) (655 SE2d 589) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted).

 See generally id.

 See Mann v. State, 252 Ga. App. 70, 72-73 (1) (555 SE2d 527) (2001).

 Miller v. State, 285 Ga. 285, 286 (676 SE2d 173) (2009), quoting Strickland, supra at 694.

 See, e.g., Carrie v. State, 298 Ga. App. 55, 64 (7) (679 SE2d 30) (2009) (considering that jury was allowed to form its own assessment of victim’s credibility and defendant had opportunity to test victim’s credibility in front of the jury); Al-Attawy v. State, 289 Ga. App. 570, 573-574 (1) (657 SE2d 552) (2008) (considering that jury had other evidence from which it could assess credibility of victim and victim was subjected to cross-examination); Anderson v. State, 282 Ga. App. 58, 62-63 (3) (a) (637 SE2d 790) (2006) (considering that defendant had opportunity to test victim’s credibility in front of the jury), overruled in part on other grounds, Schofield v. Holsey, 281 Ga. 809, 811-812, n. 1 (642 SE2d 56) (2007); Frazier v. State, 278 Ga. App. 685, 691 (3) (a) (629 SE2d 568) (2006) (considering that jury was allowed to form its own assessment of victim’s credibility and defendant had an opportunity to test victim’s credibility during trial), overruled in part on other grounds, Schofield, supra.

 See generally Anthony v. State, 282 Ga. App. 457, 459 (2) (638 SE2d 877) (2006) (officer’s testimony that she was trained to look for “certain behaviors in people who might be making false statements” and that victim had not exhibited any of those behaviors did not impermissibly bolster the victim’s credibility).

 B. C. was not interviewed by this individual.

 See generally Anthony, supra.

 Manriquez v. State, 285 Ga. 880, 881 (2) (684 SE2d 650) (2009).

 Pierce v. State, 251 Ga. App. 600, 605 (5) (554 SE2d 787) (2001) (footnote omitted).

 See Al-Attawy, supra (the impact of the bolstering testimony was diminished, where bolstering witness retreated from her credibility opinion).

 See Strickland, supra; Carrie, supra (ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on alleged improper bolstering of victim’s credibility by psychologist who interviewed victim failed because requisite prejudice was not demonstrated, where jury was allowed to form its own assessment of victim’s credibility, victim’s outcry statements had remained consistent, and defendant had opportunity to test victim’s credibility in front of the jury); Al-Attawy, supra (ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on alleged improper bolstering of victim’s credibility by psychologist who interviewed victim failed because requisite prejudice was not demonstrated, where jury had other evidence from which it could assess credibility of victim; state showed child’s videotaped statement to jury, state called outcry witnesses, and victim was subjected to cross-examination; also, psychologist discussed various indicia by which a disclosure of abuse may be assessed, and psychologist’s retreat from bolstering testimony diminished its impact); Frazier, supra (ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on alleged improper bolstering of victim’s credibility by counselor who had interviewed victim failed because requisite prejudice was not demonstrated, where jury was allowed to form its own assessment of victim’s credibility; victim’s videotaped statements in interview with counselor were played during trial, victim’s account of sexual abuse remained consistent during her outcries, and defendant had an opportunity to test victim’s credibility during trial). Compare cases cited by the dissent: Mann, supra at 73-74 (requisite Strickland prejudice shown, where the only evidence concerning allegations against defendant came through testimony of victim and outcry witnesses; case hinged on victim’s credibility, yet victim’s testimony was “far from compelling,” victim’s outcry statements had varied in material respects, victim’s allegations had arisen only after victim found himself in trouble; victim’s family members testified that victim had lied previously about other people having abused him; and victim acknowledged that he sometimes blamed wrongdoing on others). The dissent also cites Pointer v. State, 299 Ga. App. 249, 252 (1) (682 SE2d 362) (2009), which does not concern testimony by a witness that he or she believed the victim and also reverses conviction based upon an inappropriate standard of review: “trial court’s finding that a defendant was afforded effective assistance of counsel must be upheld on appeal unless clearly erroneous” and elsewhere concludes that “it was highly probable that counsel’s failure to object to this testimony contributed to the verdict.” But see Suggs, supra at 87 (4).