Court Opinion

ID: 9810049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:38:45.060798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:20.874104
License: Public Domain

*899JUSTICE. MARQUEZ,
dissenting.
€ 29 I respectfully dissent. For essentially the same reasons expressed in my dissent in People v. N.A.S., 2014 CO 65, ¶¶ 60-67, 329 P.3d 285, 298-300 (Marquez, J., dissenting), I believe we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The statements at issue amount to no more than Thames' consistent denial of any involvement in the murder. Indeed, Thames repeatedly insisted that he had no knowledge of, or contact with, the murder victim and that he first learned of the victim only after hearing that she had been killed, In this case, the People do not even suggest how Thames' suppressed statements denying any involvement or contact with the victim constitute an "extrajudicial confession or admission," nor do they articulate how 'Thames' denials form a "substantial part of the proof of the charge[s]" against him. See § 16-12-102(2), C.R.S. (2014); C.A.R. 4.1(a). Consequently, in my view, these suppressed statements do not justify an interlocutory appeal to this court under section 16-12-102(2) or C.AR. 4.1(a). Therefore, I would dismiss this case for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
30 Under the Colorado Appellate Rules, "appellate courts may not review interlocutory orders without specific authorization by statute or rule." Scott v. Scott, 136 P.3d 892, 897 (Col0o.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). The People seek to invoke our interlocutory appellate jurisdiction under seetion 16-12-102(2) and C.A.R. 4.1(a). Section 16-12-102(2) permits the prosecution to file "an interlocutory appeal in the supreme court from a ruling of the trial court ... granting a motion to suppress an extrajudicial confession or admission"-but only if the prosecution certifies to the trial court and this court that the appeal is "not taken for the purposes of delay and the evidence is a substantial part of the proof of the charge pending against the defendant." See also CAR. 4.1(a) (same). The statute and the rule provide very limited grounds for an interlocutory appeal by the prosecution. See § 16-12-102(2); CAR. 4.1(a), People v. Null, 233 P.3d 670, 674 (Colo.2010). This court will not exercise jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal under C.A.R. 4.1(a) outside of these "extremely narrow" cireum-stances. People v. Smith, 254 P.3d 1158, 1160 (Colo.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); Null, 233 P.3d at 674 (internal quotation marks omitted).
131 Given that compliance with the re- - quirements of section 16-12-102(2) and CAR. 4.1(a) concerns this court's jurisdiction, we have looked beyond the prosecution's certification in previous cases to determine whether those requirements in fact have been met. See People v. Garner, 736 P.2d 413, 413-14 (Colo.1987) (concluding that the prosecution's brief and the record did not support the certification); People v. Valdez, 621 P.2d 332, 333 (Colo.1981) (concluding from an independent review of the record on appeal that the defendant's suppressed statement did not form a "substantial part of the proof" against the defendant); see also 14 Robert J. Dieter & Nancy J. Lichtenstein, Colorado Practice, Criminal Practice & Procedure § 18.15 (2d ed. 2013) ("'The appellate court may dismiss the appeal if the prosecution's brief and the record do not support the conclusion that the statements are a substantial part of the evidence.").
1 32 Although we do not second-guess the prosecution's trial strategy, we have at least required that the evidence form affirmative proof of the charges against the defendant. Certainly, an "extrajudicial confession or admission" will almost always be affirmative proof of a charge. By contrast, where the prosecution intends to use a defendant's statement only for possible impeachment purposes, it is not a "substantial part of the proof of the charge." Garner, 736 P.2d at 413-14; see § 16-12-102(2); CAR. 4.1(a). In Garner, the prosecution appealed the trial court's suppression of a defendant's statement to an investigating officer. 736 P.2d at 413. The prosecution sought to use the statement to impeach the defendant in the event the defendant elected to testify in her own defense. Id. We concluded that, because the prosecution sought to use the statement for impeachment purposes only, "[t]he chronology and procedures followed in a criminal trial require[d] dismissal of thie] appeal because the evidence suppressed [was] not a substantial part of the proof of the charge." Id.
*9001 33 In this case, the People have charged Thames with first degree murder and first degree sexual assault with force. During a custodial interrogation, an investigator showed Thames a photograph of the murder scene and told him that his DNA had been found there. Thames repeatedly denied that he had killed the victim. Indeed, he consistently stated that he did not know her, he had never been to her apartment, he had never had sexual relations with her, and he did not know why his DNA would have been at the scene. He also stated that he had been out partying with his fiancée and other friends on the night of the attack, he did not get home until 8 or 4 a.m., and he first learned of the murder the following day from his fiancée.
1 34 In my view, the record and the People's briefing in this case do not support their certification under section 16-12-102(2) and C.AR. 4.1(a). See id.; Valdez, 621 P.2d at 333; N.A.S., 329 P.3d at 299 (Marquez, J., dissenting). First, nothing in the record before us allows Thames' suppressed statements to be characterized as an "extrajudicial confession or admission." See § 16-12-102(2); CAR. 4.l1(a). ple's briefing fails to articulate how Thames statements denying any contact with the vie-tim possibly form a "substantial part of the proof of the charge[s]" of first degree murder and first degree sexual assault with force. See § 16-12-102(2); C.A.R. 4.1(a). Moreover, the Peo-
185 In their opening brief to this court, the People argue only that these statements "undermine any attempt by the defendant or his counsel to argue that the defendant's DNA was at the crime seene because he had previously been in the victim's apartment consensually and/or had previously had consensual sex with the victim." In other words, the prosecution seeks to use these statements to possibly impeach Thames or rebut a defense theory. In their reply brief, the People simply assert that Thames' statements "denying any contact with the victim" are "compelling evidence" the People seek to introduce at trial in their case-in-chief. Compelling evidence of what? The People do not say, and I cannot discern from the ° record before us, how Thames' repeated denials form any affirmative "proof of the charge[s]" of murder or sexual assault-let alone a "substantial part" of such proof, as required by section 16-12-102(2) and C.AR. 4.1(a). Finally, the People assert for the first time in their reply brief that they intend , to argue at trial that Thames' "cool demean- or and utter lack of emotion" are consistent with his "truly being guilty of the alleged crimes." Even accepting this belated argument as properly raised, I fail to see how Thames' calm and repeated denial of the accusations against him forms a "substantial part of the proof of the charge[s]" against him. See § 16-12-102(2); C.AR. 4.1(a).
136 This court has made clear that it will not exercise jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal under C.AR. 4.1(a) outside of the "extremely narrow" cireumstances justifying our intervention under that rule and section 16-12-102(2). Smith, 254 P.3d at 1160 (internal quotation marks omitted); Null, 233 P.3d at 674 (Internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the People's briefing and the record do not support their certification that the suppressed statements form a "substantial part of the proof of the charge[s] pending against the defendant." See § 16-12-102(2); CAR. 4.l1(a) Thus, in my view, the trial court's suppression of such statements, erroneous or not, does not justify an interlocutory appeal under section 16-12-102(2) and C.A.R. 4.1(a). See N.A.S., ¶¶ 60, 67, 329 P.3d at 298-99 (Marquez, 'J., dissenting). Because I believe we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal, I respectfully dissent.