Court Opinion

ID: 9819519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:26:59.316848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:31.024840
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part: I respectfully specially concur in part and dissent in part. I would affirm on both grounds, including the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress. The majority recognizes that Cox, Gonzalez, and Bunch all affirmatively state that a police officer may detain a driver beyond the completion of the traffic stop if an officer has articulable suspicion. Cox, 202 Ill. 2d at 468, 782 N.E.2d at 279; Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 227, 789 N.E.2d at 265; Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d at 16. However, the majority finds that the officer in the instant case did not have articulable suspicion at the completion of the traffic stop, and therefore, defendant was illegally seized. I disagree. In the instant case, Cessna observed defendant commit a traffic violation and initiated a traffic stop. While investigating the violation and making permissible inquiries, Cessna’s suspicions were further aroused to the extent that Cessna became aware of specific and articulable facts that, taken together with rational inferences therefrom, warranted defendant’s continued detention and investigation into matters unrelated to the traffic stop. Cessna testified that his articulable suspicion was based upon (1) the odor of air freshener coming from defendant’s rental car, (2) defendant’s criminal drug history, (3) defendant’s outstanding warrant for his arrest in Cook County, (4) the revocation of defendant’s Illinois driver’s license, and (5) the inconsistent stories from defendant and Martin regarding their destination. While any one of these factors standing alone may not be sufficient to justify defendant’s detention, the court considers the totality of the facts when determining if reasonable suspicion existed. People v. Ortiz, 317 Ill. App. 3d 212, 223, 738 N.E.2d 1011, 1020 (2000). Based upon the totality of the facts, Cessna had reasonable suspicion based upon specific and articulable facts to detain defendant to conduct a canine test. Even accepting arguendo the majority’s finding that the traffic stop was complete when Cessna handed defendant the warning citation (which was before Cessna spoke to the passenger and was told of a different destination), I still find that the totality of the facts warranted Cessna’s continued detention. Cessna still had articulable suspicion based on (1) the odor of air freshener coming from defendant’s rental car, (2) defendant’s criminal drug history, (3) defendant’s outstanding warrant for his arrest in Cook County, and (4) the revocation of defendant’s Illinois driver’s license. Moreover, I find the majority’s assumptions regarding Cessna’s belief as to when he had established articulable suspicion inappropriate. The majority states that “in Cessna’s own mind,” Cessna did not believe that he had reasonable and articulable suspicion to extend the stop after issuing defendant the warning citation. 343 Ill. App. 3d at 706. That was not Cessna’s testimony. To the contrary, Cessna testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress that he was already suspicious of criminal activity when he made the decision to go talk to the passenger. Moreover, once an officer has articulable suspicion, the investigation does not halt. Rather, the officer is justified in briefly continuing his investigation to confirm or dispel his suspicions. Requesting a consent to search the vehicle or, as in the instant case, conversing with the passenger is part of that continuing investigation, which was based upon Cessna’s already established articulable suspicion. Therefore, I would affirm the trial court on both grounds.