Court Opinion

ID: 9926389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-24 17:08:17.966028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:44.328829
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re E.M.P., 2024-Ohio-237.]

                                             COURT OF APPEALS
                                          FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO
                                         FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    IN THE MATTER OF: E.M.P.                         :    JUDGES:
                                                     :
                                                     :    Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
                                                     :    Hon. John W. Wise, J.
                                                     :    Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
                                                     :
                                                     :    Case No. 23CA23
                                                     :
                                                     :
                                                     :
                                                     :
                                                     :    OPINION

  CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                               Appeal from the Fairfield County Court
                                                         of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division,
                                                         Case No. DL20230052

  JUDGMENT:                                              AFFIRMED

  DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                                January 23, 2023

  APPEARANCES:

    For Plaintiff-Appellee:                               For Defendant-Appellant:

    GENYLYNN COSGROVE                                     KRISTOPHER K. HILL
    ASST. FAIRFIELD CO. PROSECUTOR                        GRAHAM & GRAHAM CO., LPA
    239 W. Main St., Ste. 101                             17 N. Fourth St., P.O. Box 340
    Lancaster, OH 43130                                   Zanesville, OH 43702-0340
Fairfield County, Case No. 23CA23                                                        2

Delaney, J.

       {¶1} Appellant minor E.M.P. appeals from the May 15, 2023 Entry of the Fairfield

County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division. Appellee is the state of Ohio.

                        FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       {¶2} The following facts are adduced from the record of appellant’s bench trial

before the Muskingum County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division.

       {¶3} This case arose on February 15, 2021, when Jane Doe and appellant, her

stepbrother, were both 15 and living in a home in Muskingum County, Ohio, with Mother,

Father, and two young siblings. Mother and Father were out of town for a short vacation.

Step-Grandmother was at the house babysitting the younger siblings with the help of Jane

Doe and appellant.

       {¶4} An unidentified friend of Step-Grandmother was also present; at some

point, this person provided Jane and appellant with a bottle of vodka. Jane testified she

tasted alcohol before, but did not regularly drink and had never been “drunk.” At first,

Jane poured the vodka into a shot glass and drank at least six shots, but then poured the

remainder into a soda can and a soda bottle that she continued to drink from.

       {¶5} Jane helped Step-Grandmother prepare the younger siblings for bed. Jane

testified she was unsteady and held herself up against a wall, but Step-Grandmother did

not ask if anything was amiss. Appellant told Jane to “slow down” on the vodka because

the effects would creep up on her.

       {¶6}   Jane went to her bedroom and spoke to her boyfriend, “J.J.,” on the phone.

J.J. could tell Jane was drunk and told her to stay in her room and go to sleep; he assumed
Fairfield County, Case No. 23CA23                                                       3

she followed his advice, although he realized later she eventually left the house and was

45 minutes away.

       {¶7} Jane and appellant were friends before their parents married and had the

same friend group at school, although Jane didn’t know appellant’s Girlfriend well. While

still in her bedroom, Jane Facetimed on her phone with Girlfriend and their mutual friend

John Roe, both also minors at the time. John Roe was a neighbor and rode the bus with

Jane and appellant. Jane and appellant made plans to sneak out of the house that night

to go to Girlfriend’s house after everyone was asleep.

       {¶8} Girlfriend testified Jane was “obviously drunk” during the Facetime chat,

describing Jane laying on the floor “with her behind hanging out” and slurring her words.

T. 170. Jane was at first in bed and then on the floor during the Facetime chat. At some

point, appellant came into Jane’s bedroom and joined her on the Facetime call.

       {¶9} Girlfriend testified appellant took the phone away from Jane because she

was “being too much,” talking about wanting to have sex with John Roe due to issues she

was having with J.J. Appellant took Jane’s phone from her and ended the Facetime chat.

       {¶10} Jane testified appellant ended the Facetime chat when he realized she was

so drunk she was falling asleep. Jane was laying on her stomach on the bed; she testified

appellant propped her legs up and pulled her pants down. She asked him what he was

doing. Appellant said “you’re fingering yourself” but appellant placed his own fingers in

her vagina. Jane was intoxicated but realized she was not doing this to herself. She

straightened her legs to push appellant off and said “this isn’t happening.” Appellant took

his belt and pants off, and his penis was out. Jane testified appellant penetrated her

vagina with his penis; she is sexually active and was aware of what intercourse felt like.
Fairfield County, Case No. 23CA23                                                       4

She continued to straighten her legs and pushed appellant off. Appellant put his clothes

back on and said, “Let’s go.”

       {¶11} Jane accompanied appellant to a cemetery down the street from their house

where they were picked up in a car by Girlfriend’s family member. Jane accompanied

appellant to Girlfriend’s house, where the three sat in Girlfriend’s bedroom with John Roe.

Girlfriend testified she and appellant were on her bed, and Jane and John Roe were on

the floor. Jane testified John Roe “tried” to have sex with her.

       {¶12} Girlfriend described events at her house in more detail. She said Jane

brought alcohol with her and was the only one drinking. Girlfriend did not notice any

strange behavior between appellant and Jane; Jane did not seem to be in fear of

appellant, or angry with him, or unwilling to be around him. She said Jane was “not all

the way drunk;” the trial court asked for clarification and Girlfriend said Jane was

“conscious” and could speak, but “wanted to have sex with everyone” for revenge on her

boyfriend, J.J. Girlfriend claimed Jane “begged” to have sex with John Roe and he

complied, although he was unsure because she was drunk.

       {¶13} Jane was eventually dropped off at the cemetery and she walked home.

Shortly after arriving home, around 5:00 a.m., Police Chief Rodney Walters knocked on

her door in response to a report of a sexual assault. Jane answered the door to Walters,

keeping her voice down because everyone was asleep. Walters advised Jane someone

reported she was sexually assaulted and Jane said she didn’t want to talk about it.

Walters testified he could tell Jane had been drinking, but she was able to speak

coherently and was not stumbling. After conversation with Step-Grandmother, Walters
Fairfield County, Case No. 23CA23                                                         5

transported Jane to Genesis (fka Bethesda Hospital) for examination by a SANE and

preparation of a rape kit.

       {¶14} Jane first told Walters she didn’t want to talk about it, then admitted she was

“messed with” sexually, but only by John Roe. She said appellant was part of the group

drinking together, but did not tell Walters appellant sexually assaulted her. Walters first

learned of the allegations against appellant when he observed Jane’s forensic interview

at Harcum House.

       {¶15} Jane arrived at Genesis around 6:45 and met with the SANE, who testified

at trial. Jane told the SANE she had too much to drink was laying down when an assailant

inserted his fingers and penis in her vagina. The SANE prepared swabs and collected

evidence for a rape kit which she gave to Walters.

       {¶16} Jane was subject to a forensic interview at Harcum House Child Advocacy

Center on February 24, 2021, and the interviewer was appellee’s witness at trial. The

interviewer testified she is part of a multi-disciplinary team who questions child victims of

alleged sexual assault to prevent the child from repeating the allegations and being re-

traumatized. Jane disclosed penetration by penis and fingers of two assailants, one of

whom she identified as her stepbrother, appellant. Jane told the interviewer she and

appellant were drinking; she went to bed and was on a Facetime call; appellant came into

the room and stopped the Facetime call; he placed his fingers and his penis in her vagina;

and afterward they left the house together. Jane further stated she and appellant went to

a second location where she was sexually assaulted by a second person.

       {¶17} Jane was questioned why she didn’t immediately tell Walters that appellant

sexually assaulted her in addition to John Roe, and why she voluntarily left the house with
Fairfield County, Case No. 23CA23                                                        6

appellant after the assault. Jane testified she was drunk, confused, and didn’t know what

to do. Her parents had recently obtained custody of appellant and she didn’t want to ruin

everything. Jane acknowledged she was very drunk, although she knew the sexual

intercourse was nonconsensual. She admitted she did not at first tell Walters about the

incident with appellant, but she admitted the entire story when she was interviewed by

the SANE at the hospital. Jane’s testimony on direct examination concluded with her

confirmation that she was not asleep when the sexual intercourse occurred; she was “not

in her normal state of mind” because she had been drinking; and she did not consent to

sex with appellant. T. 224.

       {¶18} Jane’s rape kit was analyzed by a B.C.I. forensic scientist and compared to

D.N.A. standards from J.J., John Roe, and appellant. A stain in Jane’s underwear

contained D.N.A. matched to J.J., who was eliminated as a source of consensual contact

within 72 hours of the reported sexual assaults. The stain also contained a mixture of

D.N.A. from two unknown males, as did vaginal and anal swabs. The analyst could not

conclusively match appellant or John Roe to these samples and ruled them

“inconclusive,” although neither appellant nor John Roe could be excluded as the sources

of D.N.A. found in the mixture. Swabbing from a front panel of Jane’s underwear was

later determined to be consistent with John Roe’s D.N.A.

       {¶19} At trial, appellant’s Girlfriend repeatedly described Jane as “drunk” when

she arrived at Girlfriend’s house after the sexual assault by appellant and during the

sexual assault by John Roe. Girlfriend testified she and appellant did not talk about that

night for about a month, until appellant told her why he was staying with his grandparents.

Girlfriend testified she “didn’t really remember” the specifics of what appellant told her,
Fairfield County, Case No. 23CA23                                                       7

but he did admit inserting his fingers into Jane’s vagina; appellant told Girlfriend Jane

wanted to have sex with him but he wasn’t sure because he knew Jane was drunk.

                            Charges, trial, findings, and disposition

       {¶20} Appellant was charged with one count of delinquency by means of rape

pursuant to R.C. 2152.02 and R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), a felony of the first degree [Count I];

one count of delinquency by means of rape pursuant to R.C. 2152.02 and R.C.

2907.02(A)(1)(C), a felony of the first degree [Count II]; one count of delinquency by

means of gross sexual imposition pursuant to R.C. 2152.02 and 2907.05(A)(1), a felony

of the fourth degree [Count III]; and one count of delinquency by means of gross sexual

imposition pursuant to R.C. 2152.02 and R.C. 2907.05(A)(5), a felony of the fourth degree

[Count IV].

       {¶21} The matter proceeded to adjudicatory hearing in Muskingum County. At

the close of testimony, appellee dismissed Counts III and IV. The magistrate took Counts

I and II under advisement. By judgment entry dated November 10, 2022, the magistrate

acquitted appellant upon Count I but found appellant delinquent by means of rape upon

Count II. Appellant objected to the magistrate’s decision and the trial court overruled the

objections on February 7, 2023.

       {¶22} On March 21, 2023, the case was transferred to Fairfield County,

appellant’s county of residence, for disposition. The Fairfield County Court of Common

Pleas, Juvenile Division noted appellant was found guilty upon Count II in Muskingum

County; placed appellant on probation with a suspended DYS commitment; imposed a

fine of $100 and court costs; ordered him to have no contact with the victim or children
Fairfield County, Case No. 23CA23                                                     8

under the age of 14; and ordered appellant to complete a Sexually Aggressive Youth

Treatment Program.

      {¶23} Appellant now appeals from the May 15, 2023 Disposition order of the

Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division.

      {¶24} Appellant raises two assignments of error:

                             ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

      {¶25} “I. THE STATE DID NOT ESTABLISH, BEYOND A REASONABLE

DOUBT, ALL ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE OF RAPE, A FELONY OF THE FIRST

DEGREE IN VIOLATION OF R.C. 2907.02(A)(1) AS ALLEGED IN COUNT II.”

      {¶26} “II. THE STATE DID NOT ESTABLISH, BEYOND A REASONABLE

DOUBT, THAT THE ALLEGED VICTIM’S ABILITY TO RESIST OR CONSENT WAS

SUBSTANTIALLY IMPAIRED BECAUSE OF INTOXICATION OR ANY OTHER MENTAL

OR PHYSICAL CONDITION; OR THAT THE ALLEGED DELINQUENT CHILD KNEW

OR HAD REASONABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THE ALLEGED VICTIM’S ABILITY TO

RESIST OR CONSENT WAS SUBSTANTIALLY IMPAIRED.”

                                      ANALYSIS

                                          I., II.

      {¶27} Appellant’s assignments of error are related and will be considered

together. He argues his conviction upon one count of rape pursuant to R.C.

2907.02(A)(1)(C) is not supported by sufficient evidence. We disagree.

      {¶28} When assessing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, a reviewing court

must “examine [all] the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if

believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
Fairfield County, Case No. 23CA23                                                          9

doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the

syllabus. “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. A reviewing court is not to

assess “whether the state's evidence is to be believed, but whether, if believed, the

evidence against a defendant would support a conviction.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio

St.3d 380, 390, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). While a manifest-weight challenge questions

whether the state has met its burden of persuasion, the test for sufficiency of the evidence

requires a determination whether the state has met its burden of production at trial. Id. at

390.

       {¶29} Appellant was convicted upon one count of rape pursuant to R.C.

2907(A)(1)(c), which states: “No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another * * *

when * * * [t]he other person's ability to resist or consent is substantially impaired because

of a mental or physical condition * * *, and the offender knows or has reasonable cause

to believe that the other person's ability to resist or consent is substantially impaired

because of a mental or physical condition * * *.” “Sexual conduct” includes vaginal

intercourse between a male and female and, without privilege to do so, the insertion,

however slight, of any part of the body into the vaginal opening of another; penetration,

however slight, is sufficient to complete vaginal intercourse. R.C. 2907.01(A).

       {¶30} In the instant case, appellee alleged appellant penetrated Jane’s vagina

with his fingers and penis when Jane was substantially impaired by alcohol and unable

to consent, and appellant was aware Jane’s ability to consent was substantially impaired.
Fairfield County, Case No. 23CA23                                                         10

           Trial court’s findings on R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c) and R.C. 2908.02(A)(2)

                                     not contradictory

       {¶31} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court’s conclusions

of law are contradictory because he was found not guilty of rape pursuant to R.C.

2907.02(A)(2) but guilty of rape pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c).

       {¶32} R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) states, “No person shall engage in sexual conduct with

another when the offender purposely compels the other person to submit by force or

threat of force.” “Force” is defined by R.C. 2901.01(A)(1) as “any violence, compulsion,

or constraint physically exerted by any means upon or against a person or thing.” Some

amount of force must be proven beyond the force inherent in the crime itself. In re D.G.,

5th Dist. Stark No. 2023 CA 00019, 2023-Ohio-3859, ¶ 27, citing State v. Dye, 82 Ohio

St.3d 323, 695      N.E.2d 763 (1998). The “force” element of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) is

demonstrated through evidence the force was sufficient to overcome the victim's will.

State v. Rucker, 2020-Ohio-2715, 154 N.E.3d 350, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.), internal citations

omitted.

       {¶33} In the instant case, the magistrate specifically found no evidence of force

as defined supra, and we agree. Findings of Fact/Conclusions of Law, November 10,

2022, 2. Appellant’s argument on appeal equates “force” with the inability to consent to

sexual conduct, asking “How can you say that the alleged victim was not forced, while at

the same time stating that she was not able to give consent?” Brief, 4. The answer is

contained in the plain language of the rape statute because appellant was charged with

two different types of rape, each requiring proof of different elements.
Fairfield County, Case No. 23CA23                                                          11

       {¶34} A finding of guilt upon R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c) does not preclude a finding of

not guilty upon R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) and vice-versa. In the instant case, “force” pursuant

to R.C. 2901.01(A)(1), supra, is not present.

       {¶35} However, the trial court also found, and we agree, that the record is replete

with evidence appellant engaged in sexual conduct with Jane Doe when her ability to

resist or consent was substantially impaired because of her alcohol consumption, and

appellant knew or had reasonable cause to believe that her ability to resist or consent

was substantially impaired because of her alcohol consumption. R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c).

In his second assignment of error, appellant argues this finding is not supported by

sufficient evidence.

       {¶36} The term “substantially impaired” is not statutorily defined, therefore the

term must be given the meaning “generally understood in common usage.” State v. Zeh,

31 Ohio St.3d 99, 103, 509 N.E.2d 414 (1987). The state can show substantial impairment

by offering evidence “demonstrating a present reduction, diminution or decrease in the

victim's ability, either to appraise the nature of [her] conduct or to control [her] conduct.”

Id. at 103-104. It is well-recognized by Ohio courts that voluntary intoxication can

constitute a mental or physical condition that substantially impairs a person's ability to

resist or consent to sexual conduct. In re L.S., 6th Dist. No. OT-17-021, 2018-Ohio-4758,

125 N.E.3d 219, ¶ 18. Substantial impairment can occur when a person consumes large

amounts of alcohol in a short period of time. State v. Lasenby, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-13-36,

2014-Ohio-1878, 2014 WL 1801714, ¶ 28, citing State v. Hatten, 186 Ohio App.3d 286,

2010-Ohio-499, 927 N.E.2d 632, ¶ 22 (2d Dist.). “‘[S]tumbling, falling, slurred speech,

passing out, [and] vomiting,’ are all evidence that an intoxicated person is substantially
Fairfield County, Case No. 23CA23                                                           12

impaired.” Id., quoting Hatten at ¶ 24. “[T]he determination of substantial impairment is

made ‘on a case-by-case basis, providing great deference to the fact-finder.’” State v.

Canterbury, 4th Dist. Athens No. 13CA34, 2015-Ohio-1926, 2015 WL 2452024, ¶ 58,

quoting Lasenby at ¶ 27, citing State v. Brown, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-09-15, 2009-Ohio-

5428, 2009 WL 3258845, ¶ 22. It may be shown by the testimony of people who interacted

with the victim and by the trier of fact's assessment of the person's ability to control his or

her conduct. Canterbury at ¶ 58.

       {¶37} In the instant case, evidence of Jane’s alcohol consumption and her

resulting substantial impairment was demonstrated by the testimony of Jane and

witnesses including Girlfriend, J.J., and Walters.

       {¶38} Jane testified to her own consumption of a large quantity of vodka in the

hours leading to the sexual conduct. We acknowledge “substantial impairment

contemplated in the rape statute is not synonymous with intoxication.” State v. Foster,

8th Dist. No. 108340, 2020-Ohio-1379, 153 N.E.3d 728, ¶ 44, internal citations omitted.

Moreover, “substantial impairment does not have to be proven by expert medical

testimony; rather, it can be shown to exist by the testimony of people who have interacted

with the victim.” State v. Brady, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87854, 2007-Ohio-1453, 2007

WL 926365, at ¶ 78; see also State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101311, 2015-Ohio-

1818, 2015 WL 2250459, ¶ 43. The victim's own testimony is also sufficient to prove

substantial impairment. Hansing at ¶ 13, citing State v. Dasen, 9th Dist. Summit No.

28172, 2017-Ohio-5556, 2017 WL 2802235, ¶ 19.

       {¶39} In the instant case, while intoxication does not equate with substantial

impairment, when viewed in a light most favorable to appellee, the evidence showed Jane
Fairfield County, Case No. 23CA23                                                          13

consumed in excess of six shots of vodka and continued to sip on a can filled with vodka;

Jane described herself as “very drunk” as she helped her siblings get ready for bed; she

was falling asleep during the Facetime chat when appellant took the phone away from

her and turned off the call. Girlfriend testified Jane was drunk throughout the Facetime

chat. We find this evidence is sufficient to establish Jane’s intoxication and substantial

impairment at the time of the sexual conduct.

       {¶40} The law also requires appellee to produce legally sufficient evidence to

show appellant knew or had cause to believe Jane was substantially impaired. Foster,

supra, 2020-Ohio-1379, 153 N.E.3d 728, ¶ 46. Whether an offender knew or had

reasonable cause to believe the victim was impaired may be reasonably inferred from a

combination of the victim's demeanor and others' interactions with the victim. State v.

Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101311, 2015-Ohio-1818, ¶ 43, citing State v. Novak,

11th Dist. Lake No. 2003-L-077, 2005-Ohio-563, ¶ 25. Evidence that should have alerted

an offender to whether a victim was substantially impaired may include evidence that the

victim was stumbling, falling, slurring speech, passing out, or vomiting. State v. Hatten,

186 Ohio App.3d 286, 2010-Ohio-499, 927 N.E.2d 632, ¶ 50 (2d Dist.). Jane testified

appellant told her to slow down on the vodka and that the effects would creep up on her;

Jane and Girlfriend testified appellant took the phone away from her as Jane was falling

asleep on the Facetime chat. Therefore we find evidence appellant was aware of Jane’s

consumption of a large quantity of alcohol. See, Foster, supra, at ¶ 57. Moreover,

although Jane testified appellant also drank the vodka, there was no evidence he was

intoxicated or unable to perceive Jane’s condition. Girlfriend testified appellant later told
Fairfield County, Case No. 23CA23                                                         14

her Jane asked him to have sex with her that night but he hesitated because he knew

Jane was drunk.

       {¶41} The uncontroverted evidence at trial therefore established Jane’s ability to

resist or consent was substantially impaired because of her alcohol consumption, and

appellant knew or had reasonable cause to believe Jane’s ability to resist or consent was

substantially impaired. See, State v. Mason, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 15-CAA-02-0017,

2015-Ohio-5508; In re Jorgensen, 5th Dist. Licking No. 07-CA-96, 2008-Ohio-2967, ¶

236, appeal not allowed, 119 Ohio St.3d 1489, 2008-Ohio-5273, 894 N.E.2d 1245 [victim

testified to multiple alcoholic drinks and feeling drunk; witnesses observed victim drinking,

stumbling, and slurring words]; State v. Hogan, 5th Dist. Richland No. 09-CA-33, 2009-

Ohio-4728, ¶¶ 27-29.

       {¶42} Appellant points to Walters’ testimony that when he made contact with Jane

around 5:30 a.m., he could tell she had been drinking but she did not seem intoxicated.

We note the sexual conduct with appellant occurred hours earlier, after appellant ended

the Facetime chat, before the two left to walk to the cemetery. Girlfriend testified it was

evident Jane was “drunk” throughout the Facetime chat. T. 174. The sexual conduct

occurred after the Facetime chat ended. We find Walters’ observation of Jane hours later

not to be dispositive of her state of mind at the time of the rape.

       {¶43} Appellant cites Girlfriend’s testimony that Jane didn’t appear “all the way

drunk” and was “still conscious.” We note, however, that Girlfriend described Jane as

“obviously drunk” for the entirety of the call (T. 170), said Jane was “just being too much”

leading appellant to take the phone away from her (T. 173), and described Jane laying

on the ground “with her butt hanging out” because she was drunk. T. 174-175.
Fairfield County, Case No. 23CA23                                                          15

       {¶44} Moreover, Girlfriend testified appellant admitted penetrating Jane with his

fingers (T. 176) and appellant told her Jane asked to have sex with him but he was

uncertain because Jane was really drunk. T. 177. Appellant’s Girlfriend blamed Jane’s

drinking and minimized appellant’s culpability, but she was a compelling witness to the

immediate circumstances surrounding the sexual conduct and unwittingly established the

elements of a violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c).

       {¶45} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to appellee, we find the trial

court could have found the essential elements of rape proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The weight to be given to the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are issues for

the trier of fact. State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967). The trial

court, as the trier of fact in this case, was free to accept or reject any and all of the

evidence offered by the parties and assess the witness's credibility. “While the trier of fact

may take note of the inconsistencies and resolve or discount them accordingly * * * such

inconsistencies do not render defendant's conviction against the manifest weight or

sufficiency of the evidence.” State v. Nivens, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 95AP09-1236, 1996

WL 284714 (May 28, 1996).

       {¶46} Appellant’s conviction is supported by sufficient evidence and the two

assignments of error are overruled.
Fairfield County, Case No. 23CA23                                                    16

                                    CONCLUSION

       {¶47} Appellant’s two assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of the

Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division is affirmed.

By: Delaney, J.,

Hoffman, P.J. and

Wise, J., concur.