Court Opinion

ID: 9689556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:40:15.863272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:50.322763
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(concurring in part; dissenting in part). I concur in Parts I through III of the Court’s opinion, except the sentences in Part III B and III F referring to "the convenient administration of justice” and the suggestion in Part III D(2) that "on remand the trial court may wish to consider” requiring the plaintiff to post security.
1 dissent from the excepted sentences in Part III and from Part IV, announcing a doctrine of convenient administration of justice. I also dissent from Part V which authorizes the trial court to require that, before the case may proceed to a determina*196tion of liability as a class action, notice be given to class members of a time within which they must, if at all, opt in, and requires that, after the time for opting in has expired, the trial court then rule whether permitting the case to proceed as a class action will promote the convenient administration of justice.
I
While this Court does not in terms direct the trial court to require the plaintiff to give notice, it indicates that notice ought to be given so that a determination can be made whether permitting the case to proceed as a class action "will promote the convenient administration of justice, in light of the principles discussed in this Court’s opinion and whether plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class”.
Manifestly, it is intended that such a determination will be made before "[the] case is allowed to proceed” as a class action, and it is expected that the trial court will direct the plaintiff to give notice and that the court "shall set a reasonable time period within which class members must opt in in order to be included in the case”.
The Court decides that such an order may be entered and all but directs that it be done without discussing whether there is justification for requiring the giving of notice and that class members opt in before a determination of liability.
A
The class action rule, GCR 1963, 208, incorporates the language of the original Federal class action rule (FR Civ P 23) and a proposed amendment to that rule which was never adopted. While *197there was some division of authority, the view ultimately accepted by most courts was that, where there is an identifiable class, unnamed plaintiffs will, after a determination of liability, be permitted "to intervene and share in the judgment obtained by their representatives, insofar as each is able to prove both membership in the class and damages”.1
*198The practice under the old Federal rule was to permit the case to be determined on the merits before absent class members were notified of their opportunity to opt in. This came to be called "one-way intervention” and was seen as objectionable because absent class members could take advantage of a favorable judgment but were not bofind by an unfavorable judgment; they had not been notified of the pendency of the action and, indeed, even if notified were not required to respond to the notice. That and other dissatisfaction with the rule brought about its amendment in 1966 (after GCR 1963, 208 took its present form) to require that notice be sent to each class member and to provide that unless he opts out by a specified date, the judgment, whether favorable or not, would be binding upon him.2
. Adoption by this Court of a corresponding rule change may be appropriate. This case, however, as the Court acknowledges, is governed by the language taken from the old Federal rule; under that rule, as it was construed and applied in practice, absent class members were not put to an election of whether to opt in until after a determination of liability.
*199B
The Court today adopts restrictive features based on both the new and old Federal rules; it incorporates the new rule’s requirement of notice3 before a determination of liability (but not its opt-out provision), and authorizes the judge to bar absent class members from opting in, pursuant to the old rule, after there has been a determination of liability.
The advisory committee on the revised Federal rule "specifically rejected the notion of requiring absent class members to opt-into the action to secure its benefits”.4 The reason for preferring opt out to opt in was that it "assures that small claimants who would be unable to protect their rights through separate suits can take advantage of the judgment in the class action without the burden of actually participating”.5
The Court, without any apparent recognition that what it may be doing is, in effect, to preclude the maintenance of class actions where small claimants are involved, chooses, without discussion, to establish this additional obstacle to the maintenance of a class action. The claimant, however small the amount of his claim, must hereafter take affirmative action to be included in the case before it is decided whether it may be maintained as a class action.6
To be sure, the old Federal rule, and rule 208 *200modeled on it, is an opt-in rule. It did not, however, discourage small claimants from taking advantage of a favorable judgment because, as construed and applied, they could take advantage of such a judgment although they did not intervene or participate until after the judgment had been rendered. It is the combination of opt in and barring intervention after a favorable judgment which will discourage small claimants.
II
The revised Federal rule provides for consideration of concepts similar to those which this Court today enunciates without revision of the court rule.7
The Court asserts that those concepts became part of our jurisprudence under "the rubric of the *201convenient administration of justice’ The Court refers to five Michigan cases, Young v Thendara, Inc, 328 Mich 42; 43 NW2d 58 (1950); Bajorek v Kurtz, 335 Mich 58; 55 NW2d 727 (1952); Hardware Dealers Mutual Ins Co v R H Hidey, Inc, 349 Mich 490; 84 NW2d 795 (1957) (Carr, J.); Palmer Park Theater Co v Highland Park, 362 Mich 326; 106 NW2d 845 (1961); and Freeman v State-Wide Carpet Distributors, Inc, 365 Mich 313; 112 NW2d 439 (1961).8
*202Of these, only in Young and Palmer Park Theater Co did the plaintiff, in the complaint, seek to maintain a class action, but in neither opinion did the Court advert to the phrase "convenient administration of justice”. The phrase was considered in Bajorek, Hardware and Freeman, where the issue was whether plaintiffs whose causes of action were several could join together in one action.
The essential holding in all five cases was that because of the absence of the requisite common question of law or fact joinder was not permitted. In the instant case the Court acknowledges that the common questions of law or fact criterion has been satisfied.
In holding that the actions could not be maintained, the Court in Bajorek, Hardware and Freeman considered a statute concerning permissive joinder of parties which contains the phrase "the convenient administration of justice”. It provided that where there is more than one plaintiff, the *203causes of action "must be joint”, and if there is "more than 1 defendant, the liability must be one asserted against all of the material defendants, or sufficient grounds must appear for uniting the causes of action in order to promote the convenient administration of justice”. 1948 CL 608.1 (emphasis supplied).
The concept expressed in the statute has been carried forward into present GCR 1963, 206,9 permitting persons to join in one action as plaintiffs and the joinder in one action of defendants where the action could not otherwise be so maintained "if it appears that their presence in the action will promote the convenient administration of justice”. This, however, is not, under rule 206, a condition precedent to such permissive joinder if, among other factors, there is a common question of law or fact. It is an alternative basis for joinder if there is no common question of law or fact. The phrase "the convenient administration of justice” appears nowhere in class action rule 208; the sole joinder criterion for a spurious class action (subdivision 1[3]) is "a common question of law or fact affecting *204the several rights and a common relief is sought”.10 (Emphasis supplied.)
It is noteworthy that not one of the five Michigan cases relied on by the Court for its statement that the "convenient administration of justice” limitation applies to class actions is cited in the brief of either the plaintiff or defendant. One would think that if this Court had "recognized that there is [this] one further requirement” counsel for the defendant in their assiduous research would have discovered this requirement and brought it to the Court’s attention. Counsel for the *205defendant relies primarily on Federal cases decided under the new Federal rule which we all agree are not in point.11 Further, if there were cases in point decided under the old Federal rule, defendant’s counsel would, I expect, have relied on them; our own limited research failed to disclose any such case.12
The Court has failed to demonstrate that the old Federal rule, incorporated into GCR 1963, 208, as heretofore construed authorized a judge to dismiss a class action on the ground that its maintenance would not serve the convenient administration of justice.
Moreover, the Committee Report accompanying a proposed amendment to the old Federal rule, the gist of which was adopted as subdivision 4 of GCR 1963, 208, states that the authority there conferred must be exercised "based on inadequate representation, however, rather than on general considerations of convenient judicial administration.”13
Ill
The appropriateness of requiring security is not an issue on appeal and should not be injected by this Court on its own initiative.14
*206IV
The Court perceives a need to incorporate into the jurisprudence of this state concepts reflected in the revised Federal rule. If this is to be done at all, it should be done in an orderly way after study of the competing considerations and alternatives, promulgation of a revised court rule, appropriate notice to bench and bar, opportunity for comment and consideration of comments.
A revised rule could govern future conduct of this litigation. Until the rule is revised, however, this case should be decided in accordance with the concepts heretofore developed in the application of the old Federal rule and rule 208 as construed and applied in practice.
In all events, class members should not be required to opt in until the conclusion of the liability phase of the litigation.
For the reasons stated, I cannot join in the Court’s disposition.
V
This litigation and other cases, some of which have reached the appellate courts of this state, illustrate the inadequacy of our present class action rule. After decisions of the United States Supreme Court,15 which the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws said "se*207verely limited the availability of the present [revised] Rule 23 as a group remedy”, the commissioners promulgated a Uniform Class Actions Act/ Rule. The commissioners noted that because of the Federal decisions, "[m]ore classes with claims will be seeking redress in state courts”; since many states modeled their class action statutes or rules on the old or new Federal rules, there was a need for a class action statute or rule which would provide a means by which class actions could continue to be maintained. 12 ULA (Cum Supp, 1978) pp 11-12.
The Uniform Class Actions Act/Rule (annexed hereto as an appendix) incorporates a number of the features of the new Federal rule, but avoids making them preclusive. At the same time, it seeks to meet the more substantial objections to the old and new Federal rules that have been voiced by plaintiffs and defendants. Allan D. Vestal, chairperson of the committee on the uniform act/rule, describes it in Vestal, Uniform Class Actions, 63 ABA J 837 (1977). Critical comments by a lawyer for plaintiffs and a lawyer for defendants follow (pp 840 and 842). See, also, Comment, Class Actions and the Uniform Class Actions Act: Function and Structure, 11 Loyola of Los Angeles L Rev 335 (1978).
I do not mean to suggest that we should uncritically adopt a Uniform Class Actions Rule. It does, however, appear to be a more balanced approach from both plaintiffs’ and defendants’ points of view to the problems which confront state courts in considering class actions than either the old. or new Federal rules.
A Uniform Class Actions Rule would clearly be better than the approach adopted by the Court today in introducing new concepts and terms *208("practical problems”, "practical burdens”) into the jurisprudence without guidance to bench or bar regarding the meaning of these concepts and terms in this context.
I would publish for comment by bench and bar the Uniform Class Actions Rule as a proposed court rule with a view to considering suggestions of bench and bar and adoption of a revised rule 208.
Uniform Class Actions Rule

Section 1. Commencement of a Class Action.

One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all in a class action if:
(1) the class is so numerous or so constituted that joinder of all members, whether or not otherwise required or permitted, is impracticable; and
(2) there is a question of law or fact common to the class.

Section 2. Certiñcation of Class Action.

(a) Unless deferred by the court, as soon as practicable after the commencement of a class action the court shall hold a hearing and determine whether or not the action is to be maintained as a class action and by order certify or refuse to certify it as a class action.
(b) The court may certify an action as a class action, if it finds that (1) the requirements of Section 1 have been satisfied, (2) a class action should be permitted for the fair and efficient adju*209dication of the controversy, and (3) the representative parties fairly and adequately will protect the interests of the class.
(c) If appropriate, the court may (1) certify an action as a class action with respect to a particular claim or issue, (2) certify an action as a class action to obtain one or more forms of relief, equitable, declaratory, or monetary, or (3) divide a class into subclasses and treat each subclass as a class.

Section 3. Criteria Considered.

(a) In determining whether the class action should be permitted for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, as appropriately limited under Section 2(c), the court shall consider, and give appropriate weight to, the following and other relevant factors:
(1) whether a joint or common interest exists among members of the class;
(2) whether the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for a party opposing the class;
(3) whether adjudications with respect to individual members of the class as a practical matter would be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties to the adjudication or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests;
(4) whether a party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making final injunctive relief *210or corresponding declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the class as a whole;
(5) whether common questions of law or fact predominate over any questions affecting individual members;
(6) whether other means of adjudicating the claims and defenses are impracticable or inefficient;
(7) whether a class action offers the most appropriate means of adjudicating the claims and defenses;
(8) whether members not representative parties have a substantial interest in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(9) whether the class action involves a claim that is or has been the subject of a class action, a government action, or other proceeding;
(10) whether it is desirable to bring the class action in another forum;
(11) whether management of the class action poses unusual difficulties;
(12) whether any conflict of laws issues involved pose unusual difficulties; and
(13) whether the claims of individual class members are insufficient in the amounts or interests involved, in view of the complexities of the issues and the expenses of the litigation, to afford significant relief to the members of the class.
(b) In determining under Section 2(b) that the representative parties fairly and adequately will protect the interests of the class, the court must find that:
(1) the attorney for the representative parties will adequately represent the interests of the class;
(2) the representative parties do not have a conflict of interest in the maintenance of the class action; and
*211(3) the representative parties have or can acquire adequate financial resources, considering Section 17, to assure that the interests of the class will not be harmed.

Section 4. Order on Certiñcation.

(a) The order of certification shall describe the class and state: (1) the relief sought, (2) whether the action is maintained with respect to particular claims or issues, and (3) whether subclasses have been created.
(b) The order certifying or refusing to certify a class action shall state the reasons for the court’s ruling and its findings on the facts listed in Section 3(a).
(c) An order certifying or refusing to certify an action as a class action is appealable.
(d) Refusal of certification does not terminate the action, but does preclude it from being maintained as a class action.

Section 5. Amendment of Certiñcation Order.

(a) The court may amend the certification order at any time before entry of judgment on the merits. The amendment may (1) establish subclasses, (2) eliminate from the class any class member who was included in the class as certified, (3) provide for an adjudication limited to certain claims or issues, (4) change the relief sought, or (5) make any other appropriate change in the order.
(b) If notice of certification has been given pursuant to Section 7, the court may order notice of the amendment of the certification to be given in terms and to any members of the class the court directs.
*212(c) The reasons for the court’s ruling shall be set forth in the amendment of the certification order.
(d) An order amending the certification order is appealable. An order denying the motion of a member of a defendant class, not a representative party, to amend the certification order is appealable if the court certifies it for immediate appeal.

Section 6. Jurisdiction over Multi-State Classes.

(a) A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction over any person who is a member of the class suing or being sued if:
(1) a basis for jurisdiction exists or would exist in a suit against the person under the law of this state; or
(2) the state of residence of the class member, by class action law similar to subsection (b), has made its residents subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state.
(b) A resident of this state who is a member of a class suing or being sued in another state is subject to the jurisdiction of that state if by similar class action law it extends reciprocal jurisdiction to this state.

Section 7. Notice of Action.

(a) Following certification, the court by order, after hearing, shall direct the giving of notice to the class.
(b) The notice, based on the certification order and any amendment of the order, shall include:
(1) a general description of the action, including the relief sought, and the names and addresses of the representative parties;
(2) a statement of the right of a member of the *213class under Section 8 to be excluded from the action by filing an election to be excluded, in the manner specified, by a certain date;
(3) a description of possible financial consequences on the class;
(4) a general description of any counterclaim being asserted by or against the class, including the relief sought;
(5) a statement that the judgment, whether favorable or not, will bind all members of the class who are not excluded from the action;.
(6) a statement that any member of the class may enter an appearance either personally or through counsel;
(7) an address to which inquiries may be directed; and
(8) other information the court deems appropriate.
(c) The order shall prescribe the manner of notification to be used and specify the members of the class to be notified. In determining the manner and form of the notice to be given, the court shall consider the interests of the class, the relief requested, the cost of notifying the members of the class, and the possible prejudice to members who do not receive notice.
(d) Each member of the class, not a representative party, whose potential monetary recovery or liability is estimated to exceed $100 shall be given personal or mailed notice if his identity and whereabouts can be ascertained by the exercise of reasonable diligence.
(e) For members of the class not given personal or mailed notice under subsection (d), the court shall provide, as a minimum, a means of notice reasonably calculated to apprise the members of the class of the pendency of the action. Techniques *214calculated to assure effective communication of information concerning commencement of the action shall be used. The techniques may include personal or mailed notice, notification by means of newspaper, television, radio, posting in public or other places, and distribution through trade, union, public interest, or other appropriate groups.
(f) The plaintiff shall advance the expense of notice under this section if there is no counterclaim asserted. If a counterclaim is asserted the expense of notice shall be allocated as the court orders in the interest of justice.
(g) The court may order that steps be taken to minimize the expense of notice.

Section 8. Exclusion.

(a) A member of a plaintiff class may elect to be excluded from the action unless (1) he is a representative party, (2) the certification order contains an affirmative finding under paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of Section 3(a), or (3) a counterclaim under Section 11 is pending against the member or his class or subclass.
(b) Any member of a plaintiff class entitled to be excluded under subsection (a) who files an election to be excluded, in the manner and in the time specified in the notice, is excluded from and not bound by the judgment in the class action.
(c) The elections shall be made a part of the record in the action.
(d) A member of a defendant class may not elect to be excluded.

Section 9. Conduct of Action.

(a) The court on motion of a party or its own *215motion may make or amend any appropriate order dealing with the conduct of the action including, but not limited to, the following: (1) determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given as the court directs, of (i) any step in the action, (ii) the proposed extent of the judgment, or (iii) the opportunity of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to enter an appearance and present claims or defenses, or otherwise participate in the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) inviting the attorney general to participate with respect to the question of adequacy of class representation; (5) making any other order to assure that the class action proceeds only with adequate class representation; and (6) making any order to assure that the class action proceeds only with competent representation by the attorney for the class.
(b) A class member not a representative party may appear and be represented by separate counsel.

Section 10. Discovery by or Against Class Members.

(a) Discovery under applicable discovery rules may be used only on order of the court against a member of the class who is not a representative party or who has not appeared. In deciding whether discovery should be allowed the court shall consider, among other relevant factors, the timing of the request, the subject matter to be covered, whether representatives of the class are *216seeking discovery on the subject to be covered, and whether the discovery will result in annoyance, oppression, or undue burden or expense for the member of the class.
(b) Discovery by or against representative parties or those appearing is governed by the rules dealing with discovery by or against a party to a civil action.

Section 11. Counterclaims.

(a) A defendant in an action brought by a class may plead as a counterclaim any claim the court certifies as a class action against the plaintiff class. On leave of court, the defendant may plead as a counterclaim a claim against a member of the class or a claim the court certifies as a class action against a subclass.
(b) Any counterclaim in an action brought by a plaintiff class must be asserted before notice is given under Section 7.
(c) If a judgment for money is recovered against a party on behalf of a class, the court rendering judgment may stay distribution of any award or execution of any portion of a judgment allocated to a member of the class against whom the losing party has pending an action in or out of state for a judgment for money, and continue the stay so long as the losing party in the class action pursues the pending action with reasonable diligence.
(d) A defendant class may plead ás a counterclaim any claim on behalf of the class that the court certifies as a class action against the plaintiff. The court may certify as a class action a counterclaim against the plaintiff on behalf of a subclass or permit a counterclaim by a member of the class. The court shall order that notice of the *217counterclaim by the class, subclass, or member of the class be given to the members of the class as the court directs, in the interest of justice.
(e) A member of the class or subclass asserting a counterclaim shall be treated as a member of a plaintiff class for the purpose of exclusion under Section 8.
(f) The court’s refusal to allow, or the defendant’s failure to plead, a claim as a counterclaim in a class action does not bar the defendant from asserting the claim in a subsequent action.

Section 12. Dismissal or Compromise.

(a) Unless certification has been refused under Section 2, a class action, without the approval of the court after hearing, may not be (1) dismissed voluntarily, (2) dismissed involuntarily without an adjudication on the merits, or (3) compromised.
(b) If the court has certified the action under Section 2, notice of hearing on the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in a manner the court directs. If the court has not ruled on certification, notice of hearing on the proposed dismissal or compromise may be ordered by the court which shall specify the persons to be notified and the manner in which notice is to be given.
(c) Notice given under subsection (b) shall include a full disclosure of the reasons for the dismissal or compromise including, but not limited to, (1) any payments made or to be made in connection with the dismissal or compromise, (2) the anticipated effect of the dismissal or compromise on the class members, (3) any agreement made in connection with the dismissal or compromise, (4) a description and evaluation of alternatives consid*218ered by the representative parties and (5) an explanation of any other circumstances giving rise to the proposal. The notice also shall include a description of the procedure available for modification of the dismissal or compromise.
(d) On the hearing of the dismissal or compromise, the court may:
(1) as to the representative parties or a class certified under Section 2, permit dismissal with or without prejudice or approve the compromise;
(2) as to a class not certified, permit dismissal without prejudice;
(3) deny the dismissal;
(4) disapprove the compromise; or
(5) take other appropriate action for the protection of the class and in the interest of justice.
(e) The cost of notice given under subsection (b) shall be paid by the party seeking dismissal, or as agreed in case of a compromise, unless the court after hearing orders otherwise.

Section 13. Effect of Judgment on Class.

In a class action certified under Section 2 in which notice has been given under Section 7 or 12, a judgment as to the claim or particular claim or issue certified is binding, according to its terms, on any member of the class who has not filed an election of exclusion under Section 8. The judgment shall name or describe the members of the class who are bound by its terms.

Section 14. Costs.

(a) Only the representative parties and those members of the class who have appeared individu*219ally are liable for costs assessed against a plaintiff class.
(b) The court shall apportion the liability for costs assessed against a defendant class.
(c) Expenses of notice advanced under Section 7 are taxable as costs in favor of the prevailing party.

Section 15. Relief Afforded.

(a) The court may award any form of relief consistent with the certification order to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled including equitable, declaratory, monetary, or other relief to individual members of the class or the class in a lump sum or installments.
(b) Damages fixed by a minimum measure of recovery provided by any statute may not be recovered in a class action.
(c) If a class is awarded a judgment for money, the distribution shall be determined as follows:
(1) The parties shall list as expeditiously as possible all members of the class whose identity can be determined without expending a disproportionate share of the recovery.
(2) The reasonable expense of identification and distribution shall be paid, with the court’s approval, from the funds to be distributed.
(3) The court may order steps taken to minimize the expense of identification.
(4) The court shall supervise, and may grant or stay the whole or any portion of, the execution of the judgment and the collection and distribution of funds to the members of the class as their interests warrant.
(5) The court shall determine what amount of the funds available for the payment of the judg*220ment cannot be distributed to members of the class individually because they could not be identified or located or because they did not claim or prove the right to money apportioned to them. The court after hearing shall distribute that amount, in whole or in part, to one or more states as unclaimed property or to the defendant.
(6) In determining the amount, if any, to be distributed to a state or to the defendant, the court shall consider the following criteria: (i) any unjust enrichment of the defendant; (ii) the willfulness or lack of willfulness on the part of the defendant; (iii) the impact on the defendant of the relief granted; (iv) the pendency of other claims of other classes against the defendant; (v) any criminal sanction imposed on the defendant; and (vi) the loss suffered by the plaintiff class.
(7) The court, in order to remedy or alleviate any harm done, may impose conditions on the defendant respecting the use of the money distributed to him.
(8) Any amount to be distributed to a state shall be distributed as unclaimed property to any state in which are located the last known addresses of the members of the class to whom distribution could not be made. If the last known addresses cannot be ascertained with reasonable diligence, the court may determine by other means what portion of the unidentified or unlocated members of the class were residents of a state. A state shall receive that portion of the distribution that its residents would have received had they been identified and located. Before entering an order distributing any part of the amount to a state, the court shall give written notice of its intention to make distribution to the attorney general of the state of the residence of any person given notice under *221Section 7 or 12 and shall afford the attorney general an opportunity to move for an order requiring payment to the state.

Section 16. Attorney’s Fees.

(a) Attorney’s fees for representing a class are subject to control of the court.
(b) If under an applicable provision of law a defendant or defendant class is entitled to attorney’s fees from a plaintiff class, only representative parties and those members of the class who have appeared individually are liable for those fees. If a plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees from a defendant class, the court may apportion the fees among the members of the class.
(c) If a prevailing class recovers a judgment for money or other award that can be divided for the purpose, the court may order reasonable attorney’s fees and litigation expenses of the class to be paid from the recovery.
(d) If the prevailing class is entitled to declaratory or equitable relief, the court may order the adverse party to pay to the class its reasonable attorney’s fees and litigation expenses if permitted by law in similar cases not involving a class or the court finds that the judgment has vindicated an important public interest. However, if any monetary award is also recovered, the court may allow reasonable attorney’s fees and litigation expenses only to the extent that a reasonable portion of that award is insufficient to defray the fees and expenses.
(e) In determining the amount of attorney’s fees for a prevailing class the court shall consider the following factors:
(1) the time and effort expended by the attorney *222in the litigation, including the nature, extent, and quality of the services rendered;
(2) results achieved and benefits conferred upon the class;
(3) the magnitude, complexity, and uniqueness of the litigation;
(4) the contingent nature of success;
(5) in cases awarding attorney’s fees and litigation expenses under subsection (d) because of the vindication of an important public interest, the economic impact on the party against whom the award is made; and
(6) appropriate criteria in the state’s Code of Professional Responsibility.

Section 17. Arrangements for Attorney’s Fees and Expenses.

(a) Before a hearing under Section 2(a) or at any other time the court directs, the representative parties and the attorney for the representative parties shall file with the court, jointly or separately: (1) a statement showing any amount paid or promised them by any person for the services rendered or to be rendered in connection with the action or for the costs and expenses of the litigation and the source of all of the amounts; (2) a copy of any written agreement, or a summary of any oral agreement, between the representative parties and their attorney concerning financial arrangements or fees and (3) a copy of any written agreement, or a summary of any oral agreement, by the representative parties or the attorney to share these amounts with any person other than a member, regular associate, or an attorney regularly of counsel with his law firm. This statement *223shall be supplemented promptly if additional arrangements are made.
(b) Upon a determination that the costs and litigation expenses of the action cannot reasonably and fairly be defrayed by the representative parties or by other available sources, the court by order may authorize and control the solicitation and expenditure of voluntary contributions for this purpose from members of the class, advances by the attorneys or others, or both, subject to reimbursement from any recovery obtained for the class. The court may order any available funds so contributed or advanced to be applied to the payment of any costs taxed in favor of a party opposing the class.

Section 18. Statute of Limitations.

The statute of limitations is tolled for all class members upon the commencement of an action asserting a class action. The statute of limitations resumes running against a member of a class:
(1) upon his filing an election of exclusion;
(2) upon entry of an order of certification, or of an amendment thereof, eliminating him from the class;
(3) except as to representative parties, upon entry of an order under Section 2 refusing to certify the action as a class action; and
(4) upon dismissal of the action without an adjudication on the merits.

Section 19. Uniformity of Application and Construction.

This rule shall be construed and applied to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the *224law with respect to the subject of this rule among states enacting it.

Section 20. Short Title.

This rule may be cited as the "Uniform Class Actions Rule”.

Section 21. Repeal.

The following acts and parts of acts are repealed:

Section 22. Time of Taking Effect.

This rule shall take effect--

 Union Carbide & Carbon Corp v Nisley, 300 F2d 561, 588 (CA 10, 1961). Similarly, see Foster v Detroit, 405 F2d 138, 146 (CA 6, 1968); York v Guaranty Trust Co of New York, 143 F2d 503 (CA 2, 1944); Escott v Barchris Construction Corp, 340 F2d 731 (CA 2, 1965), cert den sub nom Drexel & Co v Hall, 382 US 816 (1965); Hurd v Illinois Bell Telephone Co, 234 F2d 942 (CA 7, 1956), cert den sub nom Seybold v Western Electric Co, 352 US 918 (1956); State Wholesale Grocers v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 24 FRD 510 (ND Ill, 1959); Tolliver v Cudahy Packing Co, 39 F Supp 337 (ED Tenn, 1941); see, also, American Pipe & Construction Co v Utah, 414 US 538, 549; 94 S Ct 756; 38 L Ed 2d 713 (1974); Katz v Carte Blanche Corp, 496 F2d 747, 759-760 (CA 3, 1974); Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U Chi L Rev 684 (1941). Cf. Pentland v Dravo Corp, 152 F2d 851 (CA 3, 1945).
But see, e.g., Abram v San Joaquin Cotton Oil Co, 46 F Supp 969 (SD Cal, 1942); Lockwood v Hercules Powder Co, 7 FRD 24 (WD Mo, 1947); Shipley v Pittsburgh & L E R Co, 7 FRD 33 (WD Pa, 1947); cf. Bascom Launder Corp v Telecoin Corp, 204 F2d 331 (CA 2, 1953). Most of the cases in which courts refused to allow intervention after a finding of defendant’s liability arose under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Even if barred from directly participating in a judgment favorable to the class, absent class members may, as a practical matter, benefit from a favorable decision. Other courts, on the basis of stare decisis, may follow the legal theory adopted in the earlier case. Also, a judgment favorable to the class may bind the defendant in subsequent litigation; the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel has fallen into disrepute, see Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc v University of Illinois Foundation, 402 US 313; 91 S Ct 1434; 28 L Ed 2d 788 (1971), and Parklane Hosiery Co v Shore, — US —; 99 S Ct 645; 58 L Ed 2d 552 (1979). Allowing intervention after a judgment favorable to the class may not, therefore, be unfair to the defendant, and may be useful insofar as it avoids unnecessary duplicative litigation likely to occur when absent class members expect to win on the basis of a prior decision. See 7A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 1784, pp 120-121, § 1800, p 260.
It was generally held that statutes of limitation are tolled during the pendency of a class action as to absent class members who intervene after a favorable judgment as well as to those who intervened before judgment. On this point Professor Moore and the decisions are in agreement. See 3B Moore’s Federal Practice, Appendix to *198Chapter 23, ¶[ 23.12, p 23-2919; American Pipe & Construction Co v Utah, supra, pp 549-550. See, also, 7A Wright & Miller, supra, § 1800, pp 262-264. Whether such tolling extends to those who do not intervene is indeed a separate question, raising policy questions regarding the propriety of differentiating between those who ultimately intervene and those who do not which may be avoided by allowing post-judgment intervention or possibly by adopting a revised rule (see Part V and Appendix) prescribing an opt-out procedure.
This Court acknowledges:
"The fact that the membership of the group may change during the course of the litigation does not render the group unidentifiable. If the members of the group can be identified at the time of the judgment, the requirement that the group be identifiable is satisfied.” (Emphasis supplied.)

 American Pipe & Construction Co y Utah, supra, p. 547; 7A Wright & Miller, supra, § 1789, p 175.

 The Court does not prescribe the form of the notice to be given on remand, which apparently can be by publication because those who do not opt in are not bound by the judgment.

 7A Wright & Miller, supra, § 1787, p 157.

 Id.

 Professor Vestal states one of the reasons the uniform act (see Part V and Appendix) adopts (as did the new Federal rule) opt out instead of opt in was that "all evidence points to a substantial lack of knowledge on the part of the members of the class of the conse*200quences of participation. The decisions made by many class members are not based on an understanding of the alternatives offered. It would seem to be reasonable to say that inaction should be interpreted as a willingness to participate in an action which will be beneficial”. Vestal, Uniform Class Actions, 63 ABA J 837, 838 (1977).
He adds: "This same problem — opt-in versus opt-out — was faced by the draftsmen of the new New York class action act. An early New York proposal provided that the court could limit the class to those opting in, but in the final version there is a provision only for opting out. In Canada the Combines Investigation Act Amendments proposed this year also provide for opting out.” Id., p 839.

 Revised FR Civ P 23 provides that where it is sought to maintain a class action on the ground that "questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members”, the court must find "that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy” and that in reaching that decision the court should consider “the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action”. The rule also requires that "[a]s soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained”. The old Federal rule and rule 208.1(3) require a common question of law or fact but do not mandate that the common question predominate.
Compare §§ 2 and 3 of the Uniform Class Actions Act/Rule in the attached Appendix.

 In the instant case, in contrast with the cases cited by the Court, it has been determined that there is a common question of law or fact.
In Young v Thendara, Inc, 328 Mich 42, 48; 43 NW2d 58 (1950), it was the disparity of sources from which titles to lots had been acquired, resulting in an absence of a common question of law or fact, which prompted the Court to speak of "the impracticability of considering all owners of lots in the subdivision as a class for the purpose of decreeing their individual rights, in the case at bar”. No reference was made to the former statute, 1948 CL 608.1, concerning joinder of parties or to the "convenient administration of justice”.
In Bajorek v Kurtz, 335 Mich 58, 63-64; 55 NW2d 727 (1952), the Court said that "some plaintiffs are seeking to recover for items of damage not asserted by other plaintiffs”. Nor was there a common question of law or fact: "It cannot be said with certainty that the same issues will be presented in all of the 25 cases alleged in the declaration and covered by the bill of particulars. Proofs may show damage in some cases, but not in others, and defenses may exist against the rights of certain plaintiffs that are not available against other plaintiffs.” The Court concluded that "in a situation of the character here involved”, plaintiffs failed to' show "sufficient grounds” for joinder of "causes of action in order to promote the convenient administration of justice”. 1948 CL 608.1.
It was similarly declared in Hardware Dealers Mutual Ins Co v R H Hidey, Inc, 349 Mich 490, 515; 84 NW2d 795 (1957) (Carr, J.) — where there was no majority opinion — that "it may not be said that the same questions will arise in each case”.
In Palmer Park Theater Co v Highland Park, 362 Mich 326, 343-344; 106 NW2d 845 (1961), the Court quoted from the portion of the Bajorek opinion which stated that "[i]t cannot be said with certainty that the same issues will be presented in all of the 25 cases”. (Bajorek, supra, p 64.) In stating that "the same rule of law would apply” to a class action, the Court did not incorporate the alternative basis for joinder, convenience in the administration of justice, into the class action rule as a precondition to the maintenance of any class action. The Court made very clear what it meant when it said that "the same rule would apply” by the language immediately following: "The trial court in the instant case had before it separate rather than *202joint actions and would have needed proofs with particular reference to the effects the ordinance would have upon each of the members of the class. No such proofs were offered. Therefore, he correctly decided this was an improper class action.” The Court, thus, said that the trial court reached the right conclusion because the requisite common question of law or fact was not shown to be present, not because maintenance of the action would not serve the convenient administration of justice.
In Freeman v State-Wide Carpet Distributors, Inc, 365 Mich 313, 320; 112 NW2d 439 (1961), the Court, speaking of Hardware, said: "Both opinions for affirmance relied upon the fact that different questions of law and fact would be involved in the various claims or in defense thereto.” Joinder was not permitted in Freeman because of "the very substantial disparity of issues of law and facts”. The complaint in Freeman did not assert a cause of action in behalf of a class. Plaintiffs nevertheless asked that it "should now be considered to be so amended as to constitute a class action”. In refusing to allow the action to be so maintained the Court did not discuss the "convenient administration of justice”. It spoke of "disparity of issues” and the absence of a common question of law or of fact: "Although the bank’s status as a holder of various promissory notes may be involved in each of the plaintiffs’ claims * * * the nature of these transactions, cannot be common to all plaintiffs or to any substantial number of them.” Id., p 321.

 "Permissive Joinder. All persons may join in 1 action as plaintiffs
"(1) if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative, in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the action; or
"(2) if it appears that their presence in the action will promote the convenient administration of justice.
"All persons may be joined in 1 action as defendants
"(1) if there is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the action; or
"(2) if it appears that their presence in the action will promote the convenient administration of justice.
"A plaintiff or defendant need not be interested in obtaining or defending against all the relief demanded. Judgment may be rendered for 1 or more of the parties against 1 or more of the parties as the rights and liabilities of the parties appear.” GCR 1963, 206.1.

 While neither the defendants nor the Court have suggested that rule 206.1(2) is a gloss on rule 208.1(3), I have considered that possible argument because of the Court’s blending of cases decided under the joinder statute with class action cases.
Rule 208.1(3), concerning spurious class actions, parallels rule 206.1(1) in that it requires a common question of law or fact for joinder; it differs in its omission of the rule 206.1(1) requirement that the causes of action joined arise from "the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences”. While many spurious class actions do not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence and, thus, would have to be brought under rule 206.1(2) if brought under rule 206 at all, this does not mean that rule 206.1(2) is a gloss upon rule 208.1(3). The differing language of rule 206 and rule 208 indicates that neither may justifiably be superimposed upon the other. Only one of the several criteria stated in rule 206 — common question of law or fact — is stated in rule 208.1(3); if it was intended that other criteria stated in rule 206 be incorporated in 208.1(3) one would expect that they too would be there stated.
Yet even if rule 206.1(2) were a gloss upon rule 208.1(3), nothing would be added to the already explicit requirements of that section. The term "convenient administration of justice” has acquired a meaning under rule 206 and its predecessor statute. In Bajorek v Kurtz, supra, because plaintiffs were seeking differing items of damage, and in Bajorek, Hardware, and Freeman v State-Wide Carpet, Inc, supra, because of the absence of a common question of law or fact, it was said that "sufficient grounds” had not been shown for joinder of causes of action to promote the convenient administration of justice. See footnote 8, supra. The phrase "convenient administration of justice” has not been defined in any other context. Old Federal rule 23, on which rule 208.1(3) is based, was specifically designed to permit class actions although the damages were of varying amounts. 3B Moore’s Federal Practice, Appendix to Chapter 23, ¶ 23.10[6], p 23-2721; 7 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 1752. Rule 208.1(3) expressly incorporates the common question of law or fact criterion.

 The memorandum opinion in Northview Construction Co v St Clair Shores (On Rehearing), 399 Mich 184, 202; 249 NW2d 290 (1976), which cites a case decided under the new Federal rule, appears to incorporate a limitation from the new Federal rule. I signed that opinion and acknowledge the apparent error.

 See Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 Harv L Rev 356, 390, fn 132 (1967), suggesting that the court has discretion in certifying a class where "the matter was too diffuse to be handled as a class action”. In the cases cited, however, the power of the court was invoked pursuant to its authority to determine the adequacy of representation.

 Excerpted in 3B Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 23.01[5], p 23-18. See fn 12 supra.

 This Court states pertinently:
"If, on the other hand, the judgment will bind only those members *206of the class who decide and affirmatively indicate that they wish to be included in the class and to be represented by the class representative and the chosen attorneys (commonly referred to as 'opting in’), then there is less reason for such finely drawn surrogate protection by the court as Federal cases mandate. Those not affirmatively 'opting in’ are not bound by any judgment.”

 Zahn v International Paper Co, 414 US 291; 94 S Ct 505; 38 L Ed 2d 511 (1973); Eisen v Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 US 156; 94 S Ct 2140; 40 L Ed 2d 732 (1974).