Court Opinion

ID: 9674203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:24:37.653359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:25.480861
License: Public Domain

Moore, Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. While I do not disagree with the finding of either the juvenile court or the majority opinion that the best interests of Kevin are not served by terminating jurisdiction, I believe that the plain language of the compulsory education statutes, together with the jurisdictional principles noted in In re Interest of Steven K., 11 Neb. App. 828, 661 N.W.2d 320 (2003), affirmed in part and in part dismissed 261 Neb. 55, 671 N.W.2d 777, requires an affirmance of the trial court’s dismissal of the juvenile petition in this case.
Interpretation of a statute presents a question of law, in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the court below. Johnson v. Kenney, 265 Neb. 47, 654 N.W.2d 191 (2002); In re Interest of Steven K., supra. In construing a statute, a court must determine and give effect to the purpose and intent of the Legislature as ascertained from the entire language of the statute considered in its plain, ordinary, and *647popular sense. In re Interest of Valentin V., 12 Neb. App. 390, 674 N.W.2d 793 (2004).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-201(3)(d) (Cum. Supp. 2004) provides an exception to the compulsory education requirement where the child “[h]as reached the age of sixteen years and such child’s parent or guardian has signed a notarized release discontinuing the enrollment of the child on a form provided by the school.” In the instant case, Kevin’s mother signed a notarized release on a form provided by the school, discontinuing Kevin’s enrollment in compliance with the statute.
The State, having a high responsibility for the education of its citizens, has the power to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education. State ex rel. Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d 571 (1981). The Legislature, in the context of the law requiring children to regularly attend school, which the Legislature implicitly determined was in the best interests of children, carved out an exception, recognizing the right of a parent or guardian to disenroll a child who has reached the age of 16. The Legislature put no limitation on this right, and according to the statute’s plain language, all that must occur is that the child reach age 16 and that the parent sign the required form. The effect of the majority opinion is to place a limitation on § 79-201(3)(d) by excluding children who are under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. While this may certainly be an appropriate limitation on this section, it is for the Legislature, and not the courts, to make this decision.
Further, Kevin was adjudicated solely under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(b) (Cum. Supp. 2004), whereby the court found that he had been habitually truant from school. By virtue of the execution of the release by Kevin’s mother, Kevin can no longer be considered truant under the compulsory education laws. Under this circumstance, and where there is no other basis for the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, the juvenile court can no longer retain jurisdiction. See In re Interest of Steven K., supra.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the case manager assigned to Kevin’s case recommended that the case be dismissed because truancy no longer applied. The case manager further opined that it was in Kevin’s best interests that the case be closed, as there *648were no further services available in connection with the basis for Kevin’s adjudication.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the decision of the juvenile court terminating its jurisdiction in this case.