Court Opinion

ID: 9440334
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 16:07:47.363215+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:46.191067
License: Public Domain

J-S11028-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 IRVIN HARPER                              :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :   No. 1331 EDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 29, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0011481-2016

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
              v.                           :
                                           :
                                           :
 IRVIN HARPER                              :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :   No. 1332 EDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 29, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0011482-2016

BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                       FILED AUGUST 03, 2023

      Irvin Harper appeals from the order denying his Post Conviction Relief

Act (“PCRA”) petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Harper maintains that

the court erred in denying his PCRA petition because he raised meritorious

claims of ineffectiveness of counsel. He also contends the court erred by failing

to hold an evidentiary hearing on his petition. We affirm.

      The PCRA court summarized the facts as follows:
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     The testimony presented at trial was that in December of 2015,
     [F.V.] was living at the Covenant House, a homeless shelter in the
     Germantown section of Philadelphia. (N.T. 6-28-2018, pp. 42-45).
     The shelter required the residents to obtain employment or be
     enrolled in school, or they would be asked to leave. [F.V.] was
     walking in a park near the shelter when she was approached by
     [Harper] who asked her if she needed a job, offering her
     employment hairdressing, washing hair and cleaning. (N.T. 6-28-
     2018, pp. 46-48). She accepted the offer and accompanied Harper
     to his house, where [Harper] said he had to retrieve something.
     (N.T. 6-28-2018, pp. 47-49). [F.V.] related that once inside,
     [Harper] brandished a gun from the inside of his jacket and told
     her to remove her clothes and to do what he told her. (N.T. 6-28-
     2018, pp. 49-55). [F.V.] further testified that [Harper] told her to
     perform oral sex upon him and then engage in sexual intercourse
     with Harper ejaculating on her chest, and that she was too scared
     to say anything, just complying to get it all over with. (N.T. 6-28-
     2018, pp. 49-55). Harper had told the [F.V.] that his nickname
     was “Gotti.” (N.T. 6-28-2018, pp. 63, 65). [F.V.] returned to
     Covenant House but admitted that she had exchanged phone
     numbers with [Harper] and that the incident was repeated later
     because she was still scared of him and somehow thought he
     would still get her a job. (N.T. 6-28-2018, pp. 57-60). [F.V.]
     further testified that sometime later, she was outside the
     homeless shelter when [Harper] approached, telling her he
     wanted her again. [F.V.] told him no and ran back inside the
     shelter. Obviously upset and shaking, her roommate pressed her
     as to what was wrong and she told her roommate everything,
     eventually being moved from the shelter and making a statement
     to the police. (N.T. 6-28-2018, pp. 60-65). In the statement,
     [F.V.] admitted to having previously be[en] involved in
     prostitution a few years earlier when living in Egypt. (N.T. 6-28-
     2018, pp. 64-66).

     [J.T.] testified that when she was twenty-one years old[,] she
     resided at the Covenant House around October 2016 for
     approximately three months. (N.T. 6-28-2018, pp. 96-98).
     [Harper] approached her, in a group of people, and offered her
     money to help him with a drug run. (N.T. 6-28-2018, pp. 98-100).
     [J.T] checked with [“]Robin[”], another resident of the Covenant
     House, and after receiving assurances that he was alright, [J.T.]
     left with [Harper]. (N.T. 6-28-2018, pp. 97-103). Harper left her
     in the park for a short time and then reappeared with a car. They
     rode around for a while, evidently completing his drug run, ending

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     back at his house with hoagies. (N.T. 6-28-2018, pp. 97-101). Mr.
     Harper had informed [J.T.] as well that his nickname was “Gotti.”
     (N.T. 6-28-2018, pp. 97-114). [J.T.] testified that while upstairs
     [Harper] told her she needed to keep her word, that he had given
     her twenty-five dollars for a drug run, bought her a hoagie and a
     drink and then he stripped down to his underwear. [J.T.] stated
     that she repeatedly told him she did not want to do this, but felt
     pressured. [J.T.] stated that [Harper] forced her to perform oral
     sex on him while she was sitting on the bed. (N.T. 6-28-2018, pp.
     130-133). She finally removed her clothes and [Harper] had
     sexual intercourse with her. (N.T. 6-28-2018, pp. 114-119).
     Harper put his telephone number in [J.T.]’s cellphone and dropped
     her off a short distance from the Covenant House. Later that day,
     [J.T.] told another resident of what happened, then an
     administrator, and subsequently the police. (N.T. 6 28-2018, pp.
     119-126).

     [A.C.] testified that she was a resident of the Covenant House in
     the spring of 2015 when [Harper] approached her and asked if
     she needed a job. [A.C.] responded no and walked away from Mr.
     Harper. (N.T. 6-28-2018, pp. 189-194). This witness further
     testified that she was walking with her roommate, [F.V.], when
     “Gotti” was walking by the door of the Covenant House and said
     something to [F.V.] which made her extremely upset and she then
     ran away. When pressed, [F.V.] told her that “Gotti” had offered
     her a job and that when they went back to his place to fill out an
     online application on his computer that he pulled out a gun and
     told her to go upstairs and get undressed. (N.T. 6-28-2018, pp.
     190-196).

     Toni Seibert is a registered nurse who has worked for the
     Philadelphia Sexual Assault Response Center for the past twenty
     years and testified that on October 17, 2016, she examined [J.T.]
     and as part of that exam she took a report on what [J.T] said
     happened with [Harper]. (N.T. 6-29-2018, pp. 54-72). Aimee
     Della Porta testified that she was a social worker at the Covenant
     House since March of 2015, and that she spoke with both [F.V.]
     and [J.T.] as to the allegations concerning [Harper]. (N.T. 7-2-
     2018, pp. 6-12).

     Detective Daniel O’Malley of the Special Victims Unit of the
     Philadelphia Police Department testified that he was assigned
     detective of [Harper’s] cases, that he reviewed the reports as to
     both victims, including photo arrays and acknowledgments that
     626 Federal Street was the place of both occurrences and that he

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      applied for the search warrants in these cases as well as assisted
      in the execution of the warrants. (N.T. 7-2-2018, pp. 37-92).
      Detective O’Malley testified that [Harper] and others were present
      when the warrants were executed, [and the police recovered] the
      blue steel handgun with a silver barrel and trigger loaded with
      nine live rounds recovered from a piece of Tupperware from the
      kitchen in the property; a large amount of narcotics on the kitchen
      table with packaging and scales, as well as in a bowl in the kitchen
      cabinet; and money that [Harper] attempted to hand to the
      landlord when the police entered the premises. (N.T. 7-2-2018,
      pp. 60-68).

      Officer Kevin Key[s] testified that he is employed by the
      Philadelphia Police Department in the Narcotics Field Unit and is a
      stipulated expert in the field of narcotics. Officer Key[s] said he
      reviewed the reports concerning the confiscated 134 grams of
      cocaine, two baggies of heroin weighing 20.118 grams, grinders,
      a scale and packaging, and came to the conclusion that the drugs
      were possessed with the intent to deliver. (N.T. 6-29-2018, pp.
      35-45).

PCRA Court Opinion, filed July 12, 2022, at 4-8.

      A jury found Harper guilty in July 2018 of possession with intent to

deliver and possession of a firearm without a license. However, it acquitted

him of rape by forcible compulsion, involuntary deviant sexual intercourse,

sexual assault, and kidnapping. Harper thereafter pled guilty to possession of

a firearm prohibited. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 10 to 20

years’ incarceration followed by seven years of probation. Harper filed a post-

sentence motion, which was denied. Harper appealed and we affirmed the

judgment of sentence. Commonwealth v. Harper, No. 3468 EDA 2018,

2020 WL 5981672, at *1 (Pa.Super. 2020) (unpublished mem.).

      Harper filed the instant, timely PCRA petition, his first, in February 2021.

The court appointed counsel who filed an amended petition. The PCRA court

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issued a Rule 907 notice of intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing.

See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. The court denied the petition on April 29, 2022. This

timely appeal followed.

      Harper raises the following issues:

      1. Whether the court erred in not granting relief on the PCRA
         petition alleging counsel was ineffective.

      2. Whether the court erred in denying [Harper’s] PCRA petition
         without an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised in the
         amended PCRA regarding trial counsel’s ineffectiveness and on
         newly discovered evidence.

Harper’s Br. at 7.

      On appeal from the denial or grant of relief under the PCRA, our review

is limited to determining “whether the PCRA court’s ruling is supported by the

record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Presley, 193 A.3d 436,

442 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation omitted).

      Within his first issue, Harper raises several ineffectiveness claims, which

we address separately below. “[C]ounsel is presumed to be effective and the

burden   of   demonstrating    ineffectiveness   rests   on   [the]   appellant.”

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 10 A.3d 1276, 1279 (Pa.Super. 2010). To obtain

relief based on a claim of ineffectiveness, a petitioner must establish: “(1) his

underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for

his action or inaction; and (3) the petitioner suffered actual prejudice as a

result.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014). Prejudice in

this context means that, “absent counsel’s conduct, there is a reasonable

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probability the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.”

Commonwealth v. Velazquez, 216 A.3d 1146, 1149 (Pa.Super. 2019)

(citation omitted). A failure to meet any of these prongs bars a petitioner from

obtaining relief. Commonwealth v. Sneed, 45 A.3d 1096, 1106 (Pa. 2012).

Further, “[t]rial counsel cannot be held to be ineffective for failing to take futile

actions or to raise a meritless claim.” Commonwealth v. Howard, 645 A.2d

1300, 1304 (Pa. 1994).

Failure to File a Motion to Suppress

      Harper first argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a

motion to suppress the evidence of the narcotics and firearm found at 626

Federal Street. Harper’s Br. at 15. He maintains he “sought to attack the

probable cause underlying the search warrants that led to his arrest, as well

as compel the officers who discovered incriminating evidence at 626 Federal

Street to appear in court.” Id. Harper concludes that counsel was ineffective

for failing to file a motion compelling those officers to testify as to their search.

Id. at 16.

      Where a petitioner alleges that counsel ineffectively failed to file a

suppression motion, “the inquiry is whether the failure to file the motion is

itself objectively unreasonable, which requires a showing that the motion

would be meritorious.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 179 A.3d 1153, 1160

(Pa.Super. 2018). “Where the challenge is to a failure to move for suppression

of evidence, the defendant must establish that there was no reasonable basis

for not pursuing the suppression claim and that if the evidence had been

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suppressed, there is a reasonable probability the verdict would have been

more favorable.” Commonwealth v. Melson, 556 A.2d 836, 839 (Pa.Super.

1989).

      Here, on direct appeal, this Court found that Harper himself declined to

litigate a motion to suppress. Thus, we found he was precluded from claiming

that a motion to suppress should have been filed. See Harper, 2020 WL

5981672, at *3 (citing Trial Court Opinion, dated 11/4/19, at 11-12). We also

noted that trial counsel advised Harper that he could not, in good faith, file a

“four corners” suppression motion because it was frivolous. Id.

      Harper fails to explain how the absence of the other officers’ testimony

at trial prejudiced him or that anything was improper with the search at 626

Federal Street. Accordingly, Harper has failed to meet his burden and his claim

of ineffectiveness fails. See Commonwealth v. Watley, 153 A.3d 1034,

1044 (Pa.Super. 2016) (stating counsel will not be found ineffective for failing

to file a motion to suppress if the grounds asserted for that motion lack merit).

Failure to File Request for Franks Hearing

      Harper next asserts that counsel should have filed a motion for a Franks

hearing. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978) (holding a

defendant may request a hearing to attack the validity of a warrant on the

basis that the affiant knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard

for the truth, included a false statement in the affidavit). He contends that

there was “ample confusion about [his] residence and the location of the

alleged underlying sexual assaults at trial[,]” and that “Detective O’Malley put

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no less than four addresses on [Harper’s] warrants.” Harper’s Br. at 16. Harper

claims that Detective O’Malley “had a reckless disregard for the truth” when

he “was fixated on obtaining a warrant to 626 Federal Street.” Id. at 17.

      Harper’s claim is without merit. Any alleged “confusion” about Harper’s

residence does not equate to a reckless disregard for the truth. Detective

O’Malley testified at trial that he obtained multiple addresses for Harper by

conducting numerous computer searches, including searches for “car stops

and ped investigations.” N.T., 7/2/18, at 48-49. He also conducted a Bureau

of Motor Vehicles check on Harper and found that his driver’s license was

registered to 626 Federal Street in Philadelphia. Id. at 49. Further, one of the

victims identified 626 Federal Street as the location where Harper raped her.

Id. at 50-52. Harper has failed to make a preliminary showing that any false

statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth,

was in the warrant affidavit, such that a hearing would be required. See

Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56. Therefore, counsel was not ineffective in failing

to request a Franks hearing.

Failure to File a Motion to Quash Indictment

      Harper maintains that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely

motion to quash his grand jury indictment. Harper’s Br. at 17. He argues that

counsel should have moved to quash the indictment and requested a

preliminary hearing instead. Id. at 17-18.

      Harper is not entitled to relief because he previously litigated this issue

on direct appeal. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3) (stating to be eligible for

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relief, a petitioner must show “[t]hat the allegation of error has not been

previously litigated or waived”). On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the trial

court’s finding that since there is no constitutional right to a preliminary

hearing by a defendant in a criminal proceeding, Harper was not denied a

constitutional right by proceeding by grand jury instead of by preliminary

hearing. See Harper, 2020 WL 5981672, at *3 (citing Trial Ct. Op. at 8-10).

      Further, Harper has not identified any basis as to why a preliminary

hearing would have been more favorable to him than a grand jury indictment.

Counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this meritless claim.

Failure to Investigate in Preparation for Trial

      Harper claims that trial counsel failed to adequately investigate in

preparation for trial. Harper’s Br. at 18. Harper’s argument on this issue, in

its entirety, is as follows:

         [Harper] claims that the statements of Robin Holmes, Cara
         Mastro, and [F.V.] taken by Detective O’Malley could have
         been used by trial counsel had he properly investigated.
         [Harper] claims that the statements of [J.T.] and Aimee
         Della Porta taken by Officer Cook would also have been
         useful to [his] defense. Additionally, [Harper] asserts that
         [J.T.’s] statement to Nurse Toni Seibert would have
         provided exculpatory information. [Harper] insists that the
         foregoing statements would have provided a basis for
         challenging the affidavits used to obtain the warrants, and
         ultimately [would have] led to an outcome favorable to
         [Harper].

Id.

      Harper’s claim is vague, conclusory, and undeveloped. He fails to

articulate what the alleged statements were and how they would have aided

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in his defense. “Boilerplate allegations have never been sufficient to discharge

th[e] affirmative burden to rebut the presumption of effectiveness” of counsel.

Commonwealth v. Simmons, 804 A.2d 625, 639 (Pa. 2001). This claim

fails.

Failure to Call Officers Who First Discovered Evidence

         Harper argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call the

officers who first discovered the narcotics and firearm at 626 Federal Street

during the execution of the warrant. Harper’s Br. at 19. He contends that these

officers were present at the time of his arrest and were known to trial counsel.

Id. He argues that “counsel was in the unique position to call these officers to

testify and failed to do so.” Id.

         Again, Harper has not explained how any additional testimony from

these officers would have supported or aided in his case. The court did not err

in rejecting this meritless claim.

Brady Issue

         Harper next argues that the Commonwealth committed a Brady1

violation when it denied him access to allegedly exculpatory police reports.

Id. Specifically, he claims that he was denied access to Report No. DC-2016-

25-8773 because he was indicted by a grand jury. Id. Harper argues that had

“this information been disclosed to him, he would have been able to utilize the

exculpatory evidence contained therein to alter the outcome of trial.” Id.

____________________________________________

1 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

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      Harper fails to specify the allegedly exculpatory evidence contained in

the police report or how access to this information would have altered the

outcome of his trial. Moreover, the Commonwealth provided Harper with all

required discovery in July 2017, almost one year prior to trial. See Docket

Entry, dated 7/24/17. Harper’s Brady claim is without merit.

Failure to Call Witnesses

      Harper alleges that trial counsel failed to investigate and call to testify

two witnesses, Janet Mancuso and Turquoise Claxton. Harper’s Br. at 21.

Harper claims that Mancuso was the landlord at 626 Federal Street and “could

have testified as to whether [Harper] actually resided at the location at which

the narcotics and firearm were found.” Id. He contends that Claxton, his

girlfriend, resided at 626 Federal Street and “may have testified that the

apartment was hers, not [Harper’s], contradicting the Commonwealth’s claim

and theory linking [Harper] to the firearm and narcotics.” Id. Harper

maintains that these two witnesses would have disputed the Commonwealth’s

claim that he resided at 626 Federal Street. Id. at 22. He concludes that

“[f]ailure to investigate and call these witnesses was prejudicial because the

only thing linking [him] to the firearms and narcotics was his constructive

possession of them by allegedly residing at the location in which they were

found.” Id.

      To establish that counsel was ineffective for failing to call a potential

witness, the PCRA petitioner must demonstrate:

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      (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify
      for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known of,
      the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify
      for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of the
      witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair
      trial.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 536 (Pa. 2009) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 599 (Pa. 2007)). “The

failure to call a possible witness will not be equated with a conclusion of

ineffectiveness, absent some positive demonstration that the testimony

would have been helpful to the defense.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 652

A.2d 386, 389 (Pa.Super. 1995) (quoting Commonwealth v. Poindexter,

646 A.2d 1211, 1217 (Pa.Super. 1994)) (emphasis in Jones). Further, “[a]

failure to call a witness is not per se ineffective assistance of counsel for such

decision usually involves a matter of trial strategy.” Commonwealth v.

Auker, 681 A.2d 1305, 1319 (Pa. 1996); see also Poindexter, 646 A.2d at

1216 (stating that “[t]he decision whether to call a witness generally involves

a matter of trial strategy”).

      Harper has provided nothing to show that these witnesses were

available and willing to testify on his behalf. He did not produce a signed

certification, affidavit, or otherwise, from either witness. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9545(d)(1)(i) (stating “[w]here a petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing,

the petition shall include a certification signed by each intended witness

stating the witness’s name, address, date of birth and substance of testimony

and shall include any documents material to that witness’s testimony”). Since

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counsel is presumed to be effective, we will not deem counsel ineffective for

failing to call witnesses based solely on Harper’s unsubstantiated allegations

regarding the witnesses’ existence and willingness to testify on his behalf. See

Commonwealth v. Lopez, 739 A.2d 485, 496 (Pa. 1999). Harper is therefore

not entitled to relief on this claim.

Failure to File Post-Sentence Motion Challenging Weight of Evidence

      Harper next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a

post-sentence motion challenging the weight of the evidence. Harper’s Br. at

22. He contends that counsel should have filed such a motion because the

evidence that his conviction rested upon was “tenuous at best.” Id. at 23. He

points out that he was not seen in possession of the narcotics or firearm and

there was confusion about whether he resided at 626 Federal Street. Id. He

further argues that the firearm found at 626 Federal Street was dissimilar to

the one described by the complainant who claimed Harper assaulted her at

gunpoint. Id.

      The PCRA court concluded that the verdict was not so contrary to the

evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. PCRA Ct. Op. at 18. It found that

the evidence was not tenuous, but rather strongly supported the verdict. Id.

at 18-19. We agree with the PCRA court’s determination that Harper’s

underlying claim lacks arguable merit. Additionally, Harper has not shown that

there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would

have been different if trial counsel had filed a post-sentence motion

challenging the weight of the evidence. Therefore, we cannot conclude that

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trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve a challenge to the weight

of the evidence.

Newly Discovered Evidence Claim

      Harper asserts he is entitled to post-conviction relief because of newly

discovered evidence pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(vi). Harper’s Br.

at 24. Specifically, Harper contends that “a police report prepared by Officer

Bruce Cleaver contains exculpatory evidence that [Harper] was unaware of

due to the grand jury rules pertaining to withholding discovery from

defendants.” Id. He alleges that he “could not have obtained this information

before the conclusion of the trial because it was barred to him by the grand

jury rules” and the information “provides stand-alone exculpatory evidence

pertaining to the narcotics at issue in this case.” Id.

      Harper’s     claim   is   undeveloped     and   is   therefore   waived.   See

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 215 A.3d 36, 51 (Pa. 2019). Even if it is not

waived, it is without merit. Harper fails to explain what the alleged exculpatory

evidence found in the police report is or how the information would have

affected the outcome of his trial. This claim fails.

PCRA Court’s Failure to Grant an Evidentiary Hearing

      Harper’s final issue is that the PCRA court erred in failing to hold an

evidentiary hearing. Harper’s Br. at 24. He contends he raised issues of

material fact that required the court to hold a hearing. Id. at 25.

      A PCRA hearing is not a matter of right, and the PCRA court may decline

to hold a hearing if there is no genuine issue concerning any material fact and

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the petitioner is not entitled to relief as a matter of law. See Pa.R.Crim.P.

907(1); Commonwealth v. Morrison, 878 A.2d 102, 109 (Pa.Super. 2005)

(en banc).

     Here, the record supports the PCRA court’s findings that there were no

genuine issues of material fact and that no post-conviction relief was due to

Harper. Thus, an evidentiary hearing was not required.

     Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/3/2023

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