Court Opinion

ID: 9702111
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:54:56.895649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:33.749565
License: Public Domain

*692M. J. Kelly, P.J.
(dissenting). On August 18, 1978, a complaint and warrant were filed in district court charging defendant with violations of the Controlled Substances Act. This charge has hung unresolved over defendant’s head for nine years, and trial has still not begun.
The guarantee of a speedy trial ensured by the Sixth Amendment "is an important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself.” United States v Ewell, 383 US 116, 120; 86 S Ct 773; 15 L Ed 2d 627 (1966).
The safeguards afforded by the guarantee of a speedy trial "may be as important to the accused when the delay is occasioned by an unduly long appellate process as when the delay is caused by a lapse between the initial arrest and the drawing of a proper indictment . . . .” United States v Loud Hawk, 474 US 302; 106 S Ct 648; 88 L Ed 2d 640, 652 (1986).
In Barker v Wingo, 407 Mich 514; 92 S Ct 2182; 33 L Ed 2d 101 (1972), the United States Supreme Court established a four-part balancing test to determine when a defendant has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The four factors to be balanced include length of delay, reason for delay, defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and prejudice to defendant because of delay. Id. at 517-518. Barker made clear that the weight assigned a delay depends upon the reason for delay. Id. at 531. This is also the standard used for determining speedy trial violations under the Michigan Constitution. People v Hill, 402 Mich 272; 262 NW2d 641 (1978).
In applying the second factor of the Barker *693balancing test, reason for delay, wilful attempts to delay for purposes of impairing the defense are weighed heavily against the governmént, institutional delays are considered neutral, and delays for valid reasons are considered justified. See Barker, supra at 531; Loud Hawk, supra at 654. Significant delay, for actions less culpable than deliberate delay but more culpable than institutional delay, has also been recognized. See Sell v United States, 525 A2d 1017 (DC App, 1987).
Applying the Barker balancing test, the Loud Hawk Court held that "delays in bringing the case to trial caused by the government’s interlocutory appeal may be weighed in determining whether a defendant has suffered a violation of his rights to a speedy trial.” Loud Hawk, supra at 655.
In Sell, twelve months of a twenty-four month delay were held attributable to the government because of the prosecution’s failure to follow a court rule and seek expedition of an interlocutory appeal. In weighing the delay in Sell, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia concluded that fifty-one months, including twelve months of unnecessary appellate delay, was too long to prosecute a simple case.
Similarly, on the facts presented here, 108 months is too long for the prosecution of this case. The delay that has taken place due to the prosecution’s interlocutory appeals has been significant. In July, 1980, the people brought their first appeal from the district court’s dismissal. The circuit court, twenty-eight months later, reversed. Leave to appeal was denied defendant by this Court six months after that. Concurrently the case was dismissed again and the people appealed in January, 1983. Nine months later the circuit court again reversed. In December, 1984, the district court for a third time dismissed the case with the circuit *694court again reversing nine months subsequent. This latest appeal is the reason this case is now before this Court.
At some point in time a defendant’s Sixth Amendment guarantee to a speedy trial is violated by significant delays due to the appellate process. This writer believes that, on the facts established in this case, that point has been passed. The overall length of delay is approximately nine years, a significant portion of that delay is attributable to interlocutory appeals brought by the government, defendant has asserted his right to a speedy trial, and because of the many years that have elapsed since the arrest, we should presume that prejudice has occurred.
I would order the charges dismissed.