Court Opinion

ID: 9351919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-04 07:09:44.327535+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:36.036559
License: Public Domain

AFFIRMED as MODIFIED and Opinion Filed December 28, 2022

                                          S    In The
                                      Court of Appeals
                               Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                      No. 05-21-00388-CR
                                      No. 05-21-00389-CR

                           JEREMY ALAN ANDREWS, Appellant
                                         V.
                             THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                     On Appeal from the 219th Judicial District Court
                                  Collin County, Texas
                         Trial Court Cause No. 219-81590-2021

                              MEMORANDUM OPINION
                         Before Justices Myers, Carlyle, and Goldstein
                                 Opinion by Justice Goldstein
         Following a jury trial, Jeremy Andrews was convicted on two counts of

assault on a woman he was dating: (1) third-degree assault causing bodily injury1

and (2) second-degree assault by impeding breathing and circulation,2 both enhanced

by a prior conviction for family violence. The jury assessed punishment at twenty

years’ confinement on the first count and life imprisonment on the second. Appellant

claims the trial court erred by admitting certain extraneous evidence pursuant to

   1
       TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(2)(A).
   2
       Id. § 22.01(b)(2)(B).
Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.371 and the rules of evidence. We affirm in

this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

      Appellant complains the evidence was (1) not in the indictment; (2) confused

the jury; (3) inflamed the jury’s passions; and (4) was more prejudicial than

probative. He suggests the fact that the jury would also hear about his prior

adjudicated offense, an element of the charged offense in this case, had an effect as

well. He recites the concern that the jury reached its verdict based on “character

conforming acts and fear rather than the evidence presented.”

      But beyond reciting legal standards and providing a bare history of the hearing

admitting the 38.371 evidence, appellant does little else. He mentions in his

statement of facts that six of the eight witnesses the State presented in its case in

chief testified to extraneous assaultive acts, citing the fourth and fifth volumes of the

reporter’s record as a whole but no associated page references. He notes that, at

punishment, the State presented seven more witnesses testifying to assaultive

violence but does not point us to any punishment-phase objection on the grounds he

raises on appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. Appellant provides exactly zero examples

of the testimony about which he complains, no citations to the record directing us to

the testimony, and no analysis why admitting the testimony of any witness, much

less specific witness testimony, was an abuse of discretion. See Lewis v. State, No.

AP-77,045, 2017 WL 1493489, at *20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (not designated for

publication) (inadequate briefing to generally complain about extraneous offense

                                          –2–
evidence without specifically identifying it). Appellant fails to explain how the

alleged errors were harmful, other than to complain—without citation—that the

State argued the jury should convict him “because he is a bad person regardless of

the strength of the underlying facts of the case.” See Wilson v. State, 473 S.W.3d

889, 901 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (citing Cardenas v. State,

30 S.W.3d 384, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)) (inadequate briefing when appellant

fails to address harm). Appellant’s issues on appeal are inadequately briefed and

present nothing for our review. See Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 896–97 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2011); TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).

      Assuming appellant had adequately briefed his complaints, they fail. We

review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or bad acts

for an abuse of discretion. Powell v. State, 63 S.W.3d 435, 438 (Tex. Crim. App.

2001). Under that standard, we affirm admissibility rulings when they are within the

zone of reasonable disagreement. James v. State, 623 S.W.3d 533, 541 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2021, no pet.). We have reviewed the record and cannot find a ruling

that falls beyond the zone of reasonable disagreement, considering Code of Criminal

Procedure article 38.371 and the applicable rules of evidence.

      Article 38.371 “provides another non-character-conformity purpose for

admitting extraneous-offense evidence” in addition to those listed in Texas Rule of

Evidence 404(b)(2). James, 623 S.W.3d at 545. The court allowed the victim in these

cases to testify during the State’s case-in-chief regarding appellant’s prior

                                         –3–
continuous physical and mental abuse of her. This evidence showed the physical and

mental control appellant exerted over the victim and explained her fear of him, which

led to her reticence to report the abuse to authorities and her repeated decisions to

remain in a relationship with him. See id. at 545–46; Brickley v. State, No. 03-19-

00784-CR, 2021 WL 1418978, at *8 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 15, 2021, pet. ref’d)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (evidence of past incident of abuse

admissible under article 38.371 because it contextualized the nature of the

relationship between defendant and victim and helped explain some of victim’s

conduct during the incident and her hesitancy in reporting the offense); TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.371; TEX. R. EVID. 404(b).

      Regarding the rule 403 complaint, we cannot agree that the evidence at trial

misled the jury, caused undue delay, or was unnecessary and cumulative. Though

damaging to his case, appellant has not overcome the presumption that “relevant

evidence is more probative than prejudicial.” See Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d

372, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on reh’g). The extraneous abuse evidence was

probative of appellant’s culpability for the charged offenses, which were strikingly

similar to the others. See Miller v. State, No. 06-20-00015-CR, 2020 WL 4044717,

at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana July 20, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (evidence of prior assaults against the same victim bears on the nature

of the relationship between defendant and victim and is relevant).

                                        –4–
      To evaluate the probative and prejudicial value of evidence, we consider

several factors: (1) the inherent probative force of the evidence; along with (2) the

proponent’s need for it; balanced against any tendency of the evidence (3) to suggest

a decision on an improper basis, (4) to confuse or distract the jury from the main

issues, (5) to be given undue weight by a jury that has not been equipped to evaluate

the probative force of the evidence, and (6) the likelihood that presentation of the

evidence will consume an inordinate amount of time or merely repeat evidence

already admitted. Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006).

      Under this framework, the victim’s testimony regarding appellant’s prior

abuse established the nature of their relationship, see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.

art. 38.371(b); and was not cumulative because the repeated nature of the abuse over

time showed the complete picture of the relationship, see Camacho v. State, No. 01-

20-00282-CR, 2021 WL 2832970, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 8,

2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The evidence pertained to

appellant’s history of abuse against the victim, her fear, appellant’s level of control,

the victim’s reluctance to report and decision to stay. This evidence contextualized

the short-term relationship from April to September 2018; established relevance

beyond character conformity and demonstrated appellant’s intent to commit the

charged offenses near the end of September 2018. See James, 623 S.W.3d at 547–

48. As noted, the extraneous abuse evidence explained the delay in the victim

                                          –5–
reporting the charged assaults as well as her reluctance to disclose it even during the

police interview, which appellant used to attack her credibility during trial. See

James, 623 S.W.3d at 551.

        Also, presenting the extraneous evidence did not take an inordinate amount of

time. Only two witnesses during the State’s guilt-phase case-in-chief testified

specifically to extraneous assaults.3 The victim’s extraneous testimony took 30 of

her roughly 150 pages of testimony. It took 60 pages for the victim to testify

regarding the charged offenses. See Hernandez v. State, 203 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex.

App.—Waco 2006, pet. ref’d) (upholding admission of extraneous offense over rule

403 objection when it took less time to develop extraneous offense than charged

offense). The other extraneous witness spent some 4 pages of the transcript testifying

regarding the abuse she saw appellant visit on the victim, and appellant’s counsel

did not cross-examine her. See id.

        Finally, the extraneous evidence was violent in nature, but was similar to the

charged assaults, both including verbal threats, physical beatings, and strangling.

The trial court gave limiting instructions in the jury charge, and we presume the

instructions mitigated any potential the evidence had to irrationally affect the jurors.

See James, 623 S.W.3d at 549. Appellant failed to rebut this presumption. Id.

    3
      Two others were the victim’s co-worker, who described her observations of the victim, and the
victim’s neighbor, who provided observations of appellant and the victim.
     The State also introduced a video of appellant’s arrest by Trophy Club police, but he does not mention
this video in his brief, and we construe no complaint regarding the video.
                                                   –6–
      There is no requirement for the trial court to perform the balancing test on the

record, and when—as here—the record is silent, we presume the trial court

performed the appropriate balancing test before admitting the evidence. See

Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 195–96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); James, 623

S.W.3d at 551. On this record, were the issues adequately briefed, we could not find

the “clear disparity” between the prejudice this evidence may create and the

significant probative value in this case. See Hammer v. State, 296 S.W.3d 555, 568

(Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Appellant suffered no unfair prejudice. See Pawlak v. State,

420 S.W.3d 807, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“[A]ll evidence against a defendant

is, by its very nature, designed to be prejudicial.”). Rule 403 addresses only unfair

prejudice. Id. (citing Wheeler v. State, 67 S.W.3d 879, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)

(Keller, P.J., concurring) (“Rule 403 renders evidence inadmissible only when the

prejudice involved is ‘unfair.’”). The trial court’s actions did not amount to an abuse

of discretion given the allegations against appellant, the history between him and the

victim, and the interplay between article 38.371 and the rules of evidence.

      To the extent appellant complains of extraneous evidence at punishment, he

has failed to point us to an objection to that evidence during the punishment phase,

and we have found none. Were it adequately briefed this issue would present nothing

for our review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.

      On our own review, we note that the judgment in trial cause number 219-

81590-2021, appeal number 05-21-00388-CR, lists the incorrect statute of

                                         –7–
conviction. Instead of “22.01(b-2) Penal Code”, it should read “22.01(b)(2)(B)” and

we order that portion of the judgment modified to speak the truth.4

        We overrule appellant’s issues and affirm the judgment of the trial court as

modified.

                                                      /Bonne Lee Goldstein/
                                                      BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN
                                                      JUSTICE

Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
210388F.U05

    4
     This Court “has the power to correct and reform the judgment of the court below to make the record
speak the truth when it has the necessary data and information to do so.” Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526,
529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d); accord Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App.
1993).
                                                   –8–
                                  S
                           Court of Appeals
                    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

JEREMY ALAN ANDREWS,                         On Appeal from the 219th Judicial
Appellant                                    District Court, Collin County, Texas
                                             Trial Court Cause No. 219-81590-
No. 05-21-00388-CR          V.               2021.
                                             Opinion delivered by Justice
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                 Goldstein. Justices Myers and
                                             Carlyle participating.

   Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
MODIFIED as follows:

      On page 1, under “Statute for Offense,” we REMOVE the words
      “22.01(b-2) Penal Code” and INSERT “Penal Code § 22.01(b)(2)(B)
      in their place.

As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered December 28, 2022

                                       –9–
                                   S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

JEREMY ALAN ANDREWS,                          On Appeal from the 219th Judicial
Appellant                                     District Court, Collin County, Texas
                                              Trial Court Cause No. 219-81591-
No. 05-21-00389-CR          V.                2021.
                                              Opinion delivered by Justice
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                  Goldstein. Justices Myers and
                                              Carlyle participating.

    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered December 28, 2022

                                       –10–