Court Opinion

ID: 9743960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:51:07.985865+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:45.964443
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BOWMAN, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. Our supreme court has pointed out that the two-pronged test for ineffectiveness of counsel should not be viewed as “mechanical rules” and that the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged. (People v. Caballero (1989), 126 Ill. 2d 248, 282.) While there is a strong presumption that the challenged action or lack of action might be the product of “sound trial strategy” (Caballero, 126 Ill. 2d at 260), not all conduct committed under the guise of trial strategy should be excused if it denies a defendant the effective assistance of counsel. Even when presented with a difficult case, counsel must provide reasonably effective assistance to a defendant. People v. Chandler (1989), 129 Ill. 2d 233, 250. While at first blush counsel’s conduct appears to be justifiable as trial strategy, it is a strategy that effectively denied defendant a reasonable defense. By allowing Ms. Forth to testify that defendant delivered the cocaine to her rather than to Agent Cooper, defendant’s own attorney introduced evidence sufficient to convict him absent Agent Cooper’s testimony. (See People v. Bell (1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 197, 198.) As a result of defendant’s attorney’s strategy, the jury was presented with two bases of guilt, the State’s version that defendant delivered the cocaine to Agent Cooper directly and Ms. Forth’s version that he delivered it to her first. Moreover, Ms. Forth testified that the cocaine was for defendant and that Agent Cooper gave money to defendant for the cocaine. Consequently, Ms. Forth’s testimony bolstered the State’s theory that defendant intended to deliver the cocaine to Agent Cooper. This was prejudicial to defendant’s defense regardless of whether defendant testified. Furthermore, defendant’s case suffered in the eyes of the jury by virtue of the seemingly inconsistent stories presented by his counsel. His first witness, Ms. Forth, told one version. He told a completely different story. There is a strong likelihood that such internal inconsistencies in the defense would not have been received favorably by the jury. While defense counsel’s approach, attempting to attack the credibility of the State’s occurrence witness, would seem to be a reasonable defense under the circumstances, it was rendered completely unreasonable by Ms. Forth’s testimony that defendant delivered the cocaine to her with the knowledge it was for Agent Cooper. Ms. Forth’s testimony was sufficient to support a guilty verdict absent any evidence by the State. The ineffectiveness of such an approach was accentuated by defendant’s testimony, which consisted of a denial of any delivery or transaction. Had Ms. Forth not testified, the jury would have been left to decide whether to believe defendant or Agent Cooper. While such a decision is ultimately beyond this court’s contemplation, it is evident that the jury must have been heavily persuaded in favor of the State after hearing defendant’s own witness testify that he delivered cocaine to her. Finally, defense counsel’s apparent motivation for having Ms. Forth testify, to create a contradiction with Agent Cooper’s testimony, was misguided at best. Rather than contradicting Agent Cooper’s testimony, Ms. Forth offered a version very similar to Agent Cooper’s with only immaterial differences. Under the law, and consistent with the instructions in this case, the State need only prove a knowing delivery. Whether the delivery was to Agent Cooper or to Ms. Forth is of no consequence to the crime charged. The immateriality of any discrepancies between Agent Cooper’s and Ms. Forth’s testimony is further evidenced by the prosecutor’s closing argument wherein he pointed out that two witnesses testified that defendant delivered cocaine. Thus, defense counsel assisted the State in proving its case rather than attacking it. Under these circumstances, defendant was denied a fundamentally fair proceeding, the outcome of which was the direct result of defense counsel’s conduct. Accordingly, I believe that defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel under the sixth amendment.