Court Opinion

ID: 9862936
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 02:31:50.013793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:34:32.505181
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
Once again there is attributed to Daniels v. State, 645 S.W.2d 459 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), a holding that was not made: “that more than a bare claim of ‘fear’ is required to show sudden passion.” Maj. Opinion, 16. (All emphasis is mine).
In Daniels we were attempting to clarify significance of a statement in Luck v. State, 588 S.W.2d 371 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), that accused never indicated “he was in fear of the deceased,” id., at 374, because counsel for Daniels was pointing to his testimony that he had been “afraid that [the deceased] was going to kill [him].” Regarding the observation in Luck “as a factual one rather than a statement of legal reasoning, since an accused ... does not necessarily raise the issue of voluntary manslaughter by indicating that at the moment of taking action to defend himself he was fearful of his attacker,” we said, “In such circumstances, a bare claim of ‘fear’ does not demonstrate ‘sudden passion arising from adequate cause.’” Id., at 460.
Having explained in the remark in Luck, we then went on to examine other testimony of Daniels indicating that whatever “fear” he may have felt did not prevent him from evaluating his predicament; we found “[his] own appraisal of his situation reveals that he had reflected on it, knew what he had to do and did it.” Ergo, no “sudden passion” with cause, rendering “the mind incapable of cool reflection.” V.A.T.C. Penal Code, § 19.04(c).
With that understanding of Daniels, I join the opinion of the Court.