Court Opinion

ID: 9608274
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:08:44.248282+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:00:56.316663
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice TOAL.
In this case, we granted a writ of certiorari to review an order of the post-conviction relief (PCR) court denying Petitioner’s motion for (1) the return' of his trial file from the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) and (2) thé disqualification of the AGO attorneys who viewed the file. Petitioner argues that his attorney-client privilege was violated when, after he filed an application for PCR, trial counsel turned over his entire trial file to the AGO.1 We find that Petitioner’s attor*542ney-client privilege was not violated by the disclosure of his entire trial file to the AGO and affirm the PCR court’s order.
Facts/Procedural History
Petitioner was convicted of murder and first degree burglary, and he was sentenced to death. We affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. State v. Binney, 362 S.C. 353, 608 S.E.2d 418 (2005), cert denied, 546 U.S. 852, 126 S.Ct. 115, 163 L.Ed.2d 125 (2005).
On April 7, 2006, after his execution was stayed, Petitioner filed an application for PCR in which he alleged that trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt and sentencing phases of his trial. Petitioner alleged many grounds of ineffectiveness. In particular, three of the allegations were so broad as to encompass effectively the entire scope of trial counsel’s obligations in Petitioner’s defense. First, Petitioner alleged that “[trial] counsel failed to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the death of the victim.” Second, Petitioner alleged that “[trial] counsel failed to investigate, develop, and present all available, relevant, and admissible mitigating evidence.” Third, Petitioner alleged that “[trial] counsel failed to investigate and present evidence in support of all potential defenses in the guilt and innocence phase.”
On February 27, 2007, trial counsel met with attorneys from the AGO. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the allegations made by Petitioner in his application for PCR. Due to the breadth of Petitioner’s allegations of ineffectiveness, trial counsel determined that it was necessary to make an entire copy of the trial file available for review and copying by the AGO attorneys.
Petitioner later discovered that trial counsel made the entire trial file available to the AGO. Petitioner moved the PCR court to order that his file be returned and that the AGO *543attorneys who reviewed the file be disqualified from participating in his PCR proceedings, arguing that his attorney-client privilege had not been waived as to the entire file. Following a hearing, the PCR court denied Petitioner’s motion finding that the broad allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel contained in Petitioner’s PCR application waived the attorney-client privilege with respect to all material contained in the trial file.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal and a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the order of the PCR court. The PCR court’s denial of Petitioner’s motion is interlocutory, and thus not immediately appealable. Nonetheless, due to the exceptional circumstances of this matter, we granted Petitioner’s writ of certiorari to review the following issue:
Given the particular allegations. made in his April 7, 2006 application for PCR, did Petitioner completely waive his attorney-client privilege with respect to his trial file?
Standard of Review
If the PCR court’s findings are supported by any evidence of probative value in the record, they should be upheld. Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 119, 386 S.E.2d 624, 626 (1989).
Law/Analysis
Petitioner argues that he did not completely waive his attorney client privilege upon application for PCR and, therefore, this privilege was violated when trial counsel made his entire file available to the AGO. We disagree.
S.C.Code Ann. § 17-27-130 (1996), which describes a PCR applicant’s waiver of the attorney-client privilege, states in pertinent part:
Where a defendant alleges ineffective assistance of prior trial counsel ... as a ground for post-conviction relief ... the applicant shall be deemed to have waived the attorney-client privilege with respect to both oral and written communications between counsel and the defendant, and between retained or appointed experts and the defendant, to the extent necessary for prior counsel to respond to the allegation. This waiver of the attorney client privilege shall be deemed automatic upon the filing of the application *544alleging ineffective assistance of prior counsel and the court need not enter an order waiving the privilege. Thereafter, counsel alleged to have been ineffective is free to discuss and disclose any aspect of the representation with representatives of the State for purposes of defending against the allegations of ineffectiveness, to the extent necessary for prior counsel to respond to the allegation.
“In interpreting statutes, th[is] Court looks to the plain meaning of the statute and the intent of the Legislature.” Gay v. Ariail, 381 S.C. 341, 344, 673 S.E.2d 418, 420 (2009) (citing State v. Dingle 376 S.C. 643, 659 S.E.2d 101 (2008)). Furthermore,
If possible, legislative intent should be found in the plain language of the statute itself. If a statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the Court has no right to impose another meaning.
Id. (citing State v. Gaines, 380 S.C. 23, 667 S.E.2d 728 (2008)).
We find that the language of S.C.Code Ann. § 17-27-130 (1996) is plain and unambiguous. Section 17-27-130 clearly states that an applicant’s “waiver of the attorney client privilege shall be deemed automatic upon the filing of the application alleging ineffective assistance of prior counsel....” In so far as it applies to this case, we find that Petitioner’s waiver of the attorney-client privilege was automatic upon the filing of his application for PCR on April 7, 2006. In order to determine the scope of a PCR applicant’s waiver pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 17-27-130 (1996), the specific allegations made in the initial application are controlling. Due to the automatic nature of this waiver, its scope cannot be whittled down by the subsequent amendment of the application.2
Furthermore, § 17-27-130 states that an applicant’s waiver is made “to the extent necessary for prior counsel to respond to the allegation.” It is clear from the language of this provision that the General Assembly did not intend for the scope of this waiver to be entirely limited or automatically complete. We find that the plain language of § 17-27-130 *545makes clear that the General Assembly intended for the scope of the automatic waiver to be directly proportional to the breadth of the allegations made in each individual PCR application.
Turning to the facts of this case, upon application, Petitioner waived his attorney-client privilege “to the extent necessary for prior counsel to respond to the allegation[s]” of ineffectiveness. S.C.Code Ann. § 17-27-130 (1996). We find that the particular allegations made in Petitioner’s application for PCR were so broad as to effectuate a complete waiver of his attorney-client privilege.
Although Petitioner’s application alleged many grounds of ineffectiveness, we find that the breadth of three particular allegations constituted a complete waiver of Petitioner’s attorney-client privilege. Specifically, Petitioner’s application alleges that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to (1) “investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the death of the victim,” (2) “investigate, develop, and present all available, relevant, and admissible mitigating evidence,” and (3) “investigate and present evidence in support of all potential defenses in the guilt and innocence phase.” The breadth of these allegations, which encompass in effect the entirety of trial counsel’s obligations in presenting a defense, necessitated a review of the entire trial file in order for the AGO, on behalf of trial counsel, to properly “respond to the allegation[s]” in Petitioner’s application.
Finally, pursuant to the clear and unambiguous language of § 17-27-130, prior counsel was justified in disclosing the entire trial file for reviewing and copying. Section 17-27-130 states,
[Cjounsel alleged to have been ineffective is free to discuss and disclose any aspect of the representation with representatives of the State for purposes of defending against the allegations of ineffectiveness, to the extent necessary for prior counsel to respond to the allegation.
This provision permits prior counsel, when faced with extremely broad allegations of ineffectiveness, to provide representatives of the State with any information he deems necessary for the defense of his representation. Under the specific facts of this case, prior counsel was justified in making Petitioner’s entire trial file available to the AGO.
*546Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we rule that Petitioner completely waived his attorney-client privilege pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 17-27-130 because the allegations made in his application for PCR were so broad as to encompass in effect nearly the entire scope of trial counsel’s obligations in Petitioner’s defense.
WALLER, BEATTY and KITTREDGE, JJ., concur.
PLEICONES, J. dissenting in a separate opinion.

. The issue presented by this matter is novel and capable of arising in every PCR proceeding. We granted a writ of certiorari in this case due to these exceptional circumstances. See In re Breast Implant Product Liability Litigation, 331 S.C. 540, 503 S.E.2d 445 (1998); see also Laffitte v. Bridgestone Corp., 381 S.C. 460, 674 S.E.2d 154 (2009) (finding that, where a matter is not otherwise immediately appealable, this Court may issue a writ of certiorari due to “exceptional circum*542stances”). In Bridgestone, we "granted a petition for a writ of certiorari in our original jurisdiction.” Bridgestone, 381 S.C. at 464, 674 S.E.2d 154. Writing for the Court in that matter as I do here, my statement of the procedural posture was incorrect. A matter may not be before this Court by a writ of certiorari and in our original jurisdiction. The questions presented by Bridgestone, just as the issue presented here, were before this Court by way of a writ of certiorari issued due to exceptional circumstances, and not in our original jurisdiction.

. Petitioner amended his application for PCR on May 7, 2007 and May 25, 2007. These amended applications are of no consequence in determining the degree to which Petitioner waived his attorney-client privilege.