Court Opinion

ID: 9724084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:43:55.977402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:55.206715
License: Public Domain

SANDSTROM, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in parts 2 and 3 of the majority opinion, and dissent from part 1.
Prior inconsistent pleadings from one proceeding are generally admissible as an admission in another. Enquip, Inc. v. Smith-McDonald Corp., 655 F.2d 115, 118 (7th Cir.1981); Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 542, 543-44 (D.Kan.1989); Dreier v. Upjohn Co., 492 A.2d 164, 167 (Conn.1985). On appeal, the appellants do not dispute that the Minnesota pleadings were admissible.
While the pleadings are admissible, they are not conclusive and the party who made the admission may offer evidence to explain the admission. Enquip, Inc. at 118; Mason at 546; Dreier at 168; see Malarchick v. Pierce, 264 N.W.2d 478, 481 (N.D.1978). Explanation may consist of the various legal and subjective motivations underlying the admitting party’s decision to file the prior pleadings. Mason at 546. The fact that state*177ments in a prior pleading may have been made before discovery, at a time when the admitting party was uncertain as to the truth is a circumstance that may be explained. Dreier at 168. The circumstances under which the admissions were made go to the weight to be accorded the statements rather than their admissibility. Dreier.
The Minnesota judgment does not explain the Kunnanzes’ Minnesota pleadings. The judgment does not explain why the Kun-nanzes believed the injury occurred in Minnesota, or why they believed the Minnesota health care providers caused the injury. The judgment does not explain the various legal and subjective motivations underlying the Minnesota lawsuit.
The Kunnanzes assert the trial court erred in excluding the judgment because “[t]he jury verdict in the Minnesota ease was relevant to the issue of whether the injury occurred in Minnesota or in North Dakota....” The Minnesota judgment, however, is not admissible to prove the truth of the result of the Minnesota litigation — that the Minnesota health care providers were not negligent. See Bohn v. Johnson, 371 N.W.2d 781, 785 (N.D.1985). In Bohn, this Court concluded:
“A party to litigation is generally not bound by a judgment in a previous action to which he was not a party and the judgment and evidence introduced in the previous action have no evidentiary value against him. See Emmil v. Smith, 62 N.D. 174, 242 N.W. 407 (1932); Carlson v. Davis, 45 N.D. 540, 178 N.W. 445 (1920); Union National Bank v. Western Building Co., 44 N.D. 336, 175 N.W. 628 (1919); Tierney v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 4 N.D. 565, 62 N.W. 642 (1895).”
The Kunnanzes claim the judgment should have been admitted to eliminate possible jury speculation that the Kunnanzes were seeking double recovery for their injuries. The trial court, however, specifically instructed the jury not to consider the Minnesota litigation in deciding this case:

“OTHER LITIGATION

“Evidence has been introduced in this case of previous litigation between the Plaintiffs Ernest and Alouise Kunnanz against John C. Hulbert, David Hunter, and the Regents of the University of Minnesota. This litigation was brought in the District Court in Hennepin County, Minnesota.
“You are instructed and admonished to give no consideration or speculation as to the outcome or disposition of this litigation.”
The trial court correctly instructed the jury, and the jury is presumed to have followed the instructions provided by the court. State v. Marks, 452 N.W.2d 298, 302 (N.D.1990); State v. Lange, 497 N.W.2d 83, 87 (N.D.1993). Because of the introduction of the prior pleadings, the trial court had to be careful not to allow evidence of the Minnesota case to unfairly prejudice either the Kun-nanzes or Dr. Edge. The trial court had three choices. First, the court could have refrained from instructing the jury in any form of the prior judgment. This choice would have allowed the jury to speculate as to the outcome of the Minnesota litigation and the possibility of double recovery. This choice would have unfairly prejudiced the Kunnanzes. Second, the court could have admitted the Minnesota verdict, or informed the jury that the Kunnanzes were not seeking double recovery. This choice would have allowed the jury to speculate that because the jury in Minnesota found no negligence, Dr. Edge must have caused the injury, or that because the Kunnanzes had not recovered from the Minnesota defendants, the Kunnanzes should recover from Dr. Edge. This choice would have prejudiced Dr. Edge. Finally, the court could have done what it did, which was to pick a neutral middle position. By admonishing the jury not to consider the Minnesota case, without intimating as to the outcome, the court protected both the Kunnanzes and Dr. Edge from possible unfair prejudice.
The majority concludes the Minnesota judgment should have been received into evidence to explain the Kunnanzes’ prior pleadings in the Minnesota case. The majority, however, fails to elucidate how the judgment helps explain the prior inconsistent plead*178ings, or how its exclusion unfairly prejudiced the Kunnanzes’ case. None of the cases cited by the majority hold that a judgment “explains” the original pleadings.
The prior judgment is not evidence as to the ultimate issue of which, if either, doctor was negligent, and therefore, is not relevant to explain the factual inconsistencies between the Kunnanzes’ allegations in the two lawsuits. Its only relevance is to protect against possible jury speculation as to a double recovery. If the Minnesota judgment is included to protect against jury speculation or even to “explain” the prior pleadings, Dr. Edge’s defense will be unfairly prejudiced. Dr. Edge’s defense is premised on the fact that Ernest Kunnanz’s injury occurred at the University of Minnesota Hospital. By allowing the jury to learn that a Minnesota jury concluded the injury did not occur in Minnesota, the effectiveness of Dr. Edge’s defense will be greatly diminished. In Bohn, this Court explained:
“‘In general, a judgment in another cause finding a fact now in issue is not admissible. The fact that another jury had theretofore, in another case, determined the very questions at issue in the present trial would have had a strong tendency to induce the jury in the subsequent case to reach the same conclusion, and would therefore have been very prejudicial.’ ”
Bohn at 787, (quoting Allen v. Great Liberty Life Ins. Co., 522 S.W.2d 247, 250-51 (Tex.Civ.App.1975)).
The majority tacitly recognizes the potential for prejudice in its holding. The majority concludes: “On retrial, the trial court is free to consider excluding the Minnesota pleadings, if otherwise practical, in lieu of extending the trial by their use and explanations.” The majority gives Dr. Edge a choice: introduce the prior pleadings, which are admissible and relevant, and suffer the consequences of introduction of the prior judgment, which is not relevant and highly prejudicial; or, refrain from introducing the prior pleadings.
The jury was properly informed not to consider or speculate as to the outcome of the Minnesota litigation, thus protecting against any prejudice to the Kunnanzes due to jury speculation as to the possibility of double recovery. The verdict, therefore, should be affirmed.