Court Opinion

ID: 9711058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:23:39.12197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:01.927027
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
Bobbitt, J.
I dissent from the majority opinion for the following reasons:
1. The motion for a change of venue in State ex rel. Fox, etc. v. LaPorte Cir. Ct. et al. (1956), 236 Ind. 69, 71, 138 N. E. 2d 875, alleged that the defendant could not have a fair trial “on account of bias and local prejudice” of the citizens of the county. These were the statutory grounds for a change of venue from the county in a criminal case. Acts 1927, ch. 132, §10, p. 411, being §9-1301, Burns’ 1956 Replacement.
In my opinion the facts alleged in the motion for a change of venue from the county in the present *644case are no different in substance than those in the Fox Case. But even if they were, this would not authorize this court to enact a new change of venue law by judicial fiat.
2. The right to a second or subsequent change of venue in the case of State v. Robert Lee Johnson1 was adjudicated in State ex rel. Fox, etc. v. La Porte Cir. Ct. et al., supra, and this decision is the law of the case and must be followed in all subsequent proceedings in that case, both in the trial court and in subsequent appeals.
F. W. and H., Ind. Tr. and Pract. § 2791, p. 375.
3. The majority opinion separates from the provision of Art. 1, §13, of the Constitution of Indiana which provides that, “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a public trial, by an impartial jury, in the county in which the offense shall have been committed; . . .”, the phrase “by an impartial jury” and holds that under certain named circumstances, “it becomes the duty of the judiciary to provide to every accused a public trial by an impartial jury,” without regard to the county in which the crime was committed. (My italics.)
As recently as December 17, 1956, this court -four members of the present court concurring—in State ex rel. Fox, etc. v. La Porte Cir. Ct. et al., supra (1956), 236 Ind. 69, at page 79, 138 N. E. 2d 875, at page 880, said:
_ “The language in this clause of Article 1, Section 13, supra, is plain and specific. It does not say that the accused may have a trial by an impartial jury in a county adjoining that in which the offense was committed. The phrase ‘by an impartial jury’ cannot be separated from the re*645mainder of the clause of which it is a part, but must be construed with and in relation to the other phrases ‘the right to a public trial’ and ‘in the county in which the offense shall have been committed.’
“Section 13 of Article 1 sets forth five specific rights (1) the right to a public trial, by an impartial jury, in the county in which the offense shall have been committed; (2) to be heard by himself and counsel; (3) to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof; (4) to meet the witnesses face to face; and (5) to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.
“These rights are of equal rank and importance. They are not vested rights and any and all of them may be waived by an accused. The provision for trial ‘by an impartial jury’ is not a separate specific right, granted without limitation as to the place where it is to be exercised, but rather is restricted by the phrase which follows it, viz., ‘in the county in which the offense shall have been committed.’ The only function of these two phrases is to describe and define the kind of public trial to which the accused is entitled.”
If this construction of Art. 1, §13, supra, is to be so soon cast aside in order to reach a desired result in the present case, then the Fox Case should be specifically overruled.
4. I also dissent because I believe the reasons advanced by the majority opinion and in the concurring opinion by Judge Achor in State ex rel. Fox, etc. v. LaPorte Cir. Ct. et al., supra, for denying a second change of venue from the county, apply with equal force in the present case.
5. The number of changes of venue is strictly limited in Indiana by statute. Acts 1905, ch. 169, §207, p. 584, being §9-1305, Burns’ 1956 Replacement. It has been held that the purpose of statutes which limit *646the right to a second change of venue “is to forbid dilatory procedure, that they are mandatory, and that a second change of venue in breach thereof cannot give jurisdiction to the court to which the action is removed, even though both parties appear and go to trial. Under other statutes, only one change of venue can be had, and the granting of one application precludes the allowance of another, . . .” 92 C. J. S., Venue, §211, p. 985. I think the above rule is controlling here.
I would dissolve the alternative writ and deny a permanent writ.
Jackson, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.
Note.—Reported in 159 N. E. 2d 713.

. See majority opinion.