Court Opinion

ID: 9859289
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 19:38:20.781748+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:26:50.157821
License: Public Domain

MOORE, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the interpretation given Instruction 14 in Division I of the majority opinion and reversal of defendant’s conviction.
As pointed out by the majority the right of the legislature to enact properly drawn statutes creating evidentiary presumptions in criminal cases is now well established. To pass constitutional muster they must not be made conclusive of the issue involved and must have a rational relationship between the fact sought to be established and the one presumed.
The fundamental law in this area is thus stated in 29 Am.Jur.2d section 126, page 159:
“Statutes of the various states contain numerous enactments creating or declaring presumptions or specifying that certain facts shall constitute prima facie evidence of other facts, the effect of which is to relieve the party in whose favor they operate of the necessity of producing evidence upon an issue and cast upon the other party the burden of going forward with the evidence. They do not, however, shift the burden of proof, but simply permit one to make a prima facie case in a way that he could not make it without the statute.”
Statutes creating a presumption or inference of intoxication from specific percentages of alcohol in a person’s system must be made rebuttable. See Annot., 16 A.L. R.3d, p. 748, section 5.
Instruction 14 is Iowa Uniform Instruction 520.8. It was prepared and adopted by an able committee of the Iowa State Bar Association. We disagree with these *224uniform instructions reluctantly. Ness v. H. M. Iltis Lumber Company, 256 Iowa 588, 593, 128 N.W.2d 237, 240; McMaster v. Hutchins, 255 Iowa 39, 45, 120 N.W.2d 509, 512.
Throughout the instructions the trial court put the burden on the State to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Instruction 1 includes:
“To the charge in said County Attorney’s Information the defendant has entered a plea of not guilty. This is a denial of the charge and every part thereof, and places on the State the burden of proving the allegations therein beyond a reasonable doubt. The State must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt or you must acquit him.”
Instruction 4 states:
“You are to determine the questions submitted in this case from the evidence offered in the record, and the law as given you in these instructions.
“The court has not attempted to embody all the applicable law in any one of the instructions, but in the consideration thereof, each instruction should be construed in the light of and in harmony with every other instruction, and applied as a whole to all the evidence admitted at the trial.”
Instruction 7 states:
“The law presumes that the defendant in a criminal action is innocent and not guilty of the offense charged against him. This presumption requires you to put out of your minds all suspicion which might arise from the arrest, the information, the arraignment, or the present situation of the defendant. . The presumption of innocence must prevail unless the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense charged against him.”
Instruction 9 states:
“Before you can convict the defendant of the crime charged in the information in this case, the State must prove by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt each one of the following propositions :
“1. That the defendant herein, Daniel Jasper Hansen, did operate a motor vehicle upon the public highways of Warren County, Iowa.
“2. That at the time the defendant did so operate a motor vehicle he was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage.
“3. That said acts took place in Warren County, Iowa on or about the 1st day of January, 1971.
“If you find from the evidence that the State has established beyond a reasonable doubt each one of the above three propositions, then you should find the defendant guilty as charged in the information.
“If the State has failed to prove said propositions beyond a reasonable doubt, then you cannot convict the defendant and you should return your verdict of not guilty.”
The first sentence of Instruction 12 states: “The burden is on the State to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” It is followed by a definition of “reasonable doubt”.
In Instruction 14 the trial court instructed on the evidentiary presumption or inference authorized by Code section 321.281. It states:
“A statute of this State provides that if there is evidence that a person operating a motor vehicle upon a public highway, has at the time of said operation, more than ten one-hundredths of one percentum by weight of alcohol in his blood, the same shall be presumptive evi*225dence that such person was then under the influence of an alcoholic beverage,
“The rule established by the foregoing statute permits the jury to infer that the defendant was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, if it is found by the jury that at the time defendant was driving an automobile on the public highway his blood contained more than ten one-hundredths of one percentum by weight of alcohol.
“However, such inference is not conclusive, but is rebuttable. It may be overcome or rebutted by evidence to the contrary.”
This instruction merely states a rule of evidence as created by the statute. It makes no reference to the burden of proof. It imposes no burden or duty on defendant merely because a statutory rule of evidence has come into play. I fail to see wherein Instruction 14 presumes defendant’s guilt or relieves the State of its burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Such contentions by defendant are untenable.
Of necessity the instruction states any inference which may be drawn is not conclusive but is rebuttable. Somehow the majority interprets the instruction as making the permissive inference conclusive. I do not so read it. It specifically states “such inference is not conclusive.” It does not require defendant to do anything.
Instruction 14 simply states such evidence as referred to in the statute which permits the jury to infer defendant was under the influence of an alcoholic beverage may be overcome or rebutted by evidence to the contrary. The State’s evidence contains much rebuttal to the permissive inference. It includes the arresting officer’s testimony that defendant without difficulty produced his driver’s license, he readily responded to questions, he performed the breath test without difficulty and was at all times cooperative. Certainly it is not reversible error to tell the jury they may consider this other evidence together with the permissive inference.
I would affirm.
REES, UHLENHOPP and HARRIS, JJT-, join in this dissent.