Court Opinion

ID: 9519101
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:08:55.971216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:43:45.326945
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE DIXON dissenting: I am unable to agree with much that is said by the majority for the following reasons. The counterclaim states, “That the Board of Review employed I. J. Cox * * The motion to strike filed by the town alleges as grounds the following: 1. No facts are alleged showing that the Board of Review had any authority to employ I. J. Cox * * *. In 1971 there was no statutory provision authorizing a board of review to employ any person other than the clerk. The Board of Review has only such authority as is given it by statute. (People ex rel. Schuler v. Chapman, 370 Ill. 430, 440; People ex rel. Miller v. Doe, 22 Ill.2d 211.) If the county authorized the Board of Review to employ someone, that fact should have been alleged. The counterclaim further states, “that I. J. Cox made the assessment.” The motion to strike contends that the Board of Review cannot delegate its duty in the matter. I agree. In People ex rel. Cutmore v. Harding, 333 Ill. 384, 395-396, the court said, “The statute having designated the officers for the discharge of the duty of assessment and provided for the compensation they shall receive, neither the board of assessors nor the county board has any power to enter into a contract with any other person to perform that duty.” “The duties of the board of review are prescribed by statute, and the first duty enjoined upon the board is to ‘assess all property subject to assessment which shall not have been assessed by the assessors.’ * * * the power to list and assess omitted property is confined by law exclusively to the board of review.” Stevens v. County of Henry, 218 Ill. 468, 475; also see People ex rel. Shirk v. Glass, 9 Ill.2d 302. As a pure pleading matter, while the motion to dismiss admits all facts well pleaded in the complaint, the complaint in turn is to be appraised in the light of the principle that pleadings are construed strictly against the pleader. (Carroll v. Caldwell, 12 Ill.2d 487, 493.) The majority herein have assumed facts not pleaded. The constitutional amendment involved was a self-executing enactment. When it became effective on January 1, 1971, no implementing legislation was passed or required, it simply superceded all sections of the Revenue Act which provided otherwise. The action herein was taken by virtue of those statutes. The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute is void ab initio (in this case from January 1, 1971), ineffective for any purpose since unconstitutionality dates from the time of the enactment and not merely from the date of the decision so branding it. It affords no protection and justifies no acts performed under it. 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law sec. 177, 178; 11 I.L.P. Constitutional Law sec. 71; 34 I.L.P. Statutes sec. 14. It is general knowledge that millions of dollars were collected illegally in this State and refunded in toto after the decision of the United States Supreme Court. No one has had the temerity to suggest that a refund was improper because some spirit of life was breathed into the statutes from the date of the Illinois Supreme Court decision until the date of the United States Supreme Court decision. In that aspect the statutes involved were void ab initio. Why not here? I Will concede that there are exceptions to the general rule. For example the members of the board of review would not likely be held personally responsible for the action taken herein even though it ultimately proved to be worthless, I have found no exception to the general rule which allows a recovery as in this case. Further, money paid under an unconstitutional or void statute is deemed to have been paid under a mistake of law and is not recoverable. In Village of Morgan Park v. Knopf, 199 Ill. 444, 446, the court said, “There, was no fraud or mistake of fact and if there was any mistake it was one of law, and the money having been voluntarily paid under such circumstances, no action would lie to recover it back. This rule, which is well settled as between individuals, has been extended to municipal corporations under similar circumstances. People v. Foster, 133 Ill. 496.” If there ever was any financial benefit derived from the illegal collection of taxes as a result of the illegal assessment that benefit went to the county which held tire money in an interest-bearing account from the time collected in 1972 until after the United States Supreme Court decision in 1973. See Ill. Rev. Stat., 1972 Supp., ch. 120, par. 676.01.