Court Opinion

ID: 9796407
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:56:53.374211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:12.221300
License: Public Domain

JONES, J.,
dissenting.
I am unable to read the Idaho Constitution in such a fashion as to allow the State Legislature, which was established by the people, to have the ability to exclude the people from any stage of the lawmaking process. The majority opines that since committees are not specifically mentioned in art. III, § 12 as being subject to the prohibition against transacting business in secret session, the Legislature can close committee meetings to the public. On the other hand, there is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes or provides for the Legislature to establish committees to conduct any of its legislative business. Just because the Legislature has chosen to conduct a good deal of its work in its various committees does not mean that the legislative business conducted in those committees can be shielded from public view. Based on my understanding of the role of committees and the history of art. III, § 12, I simply cannot accept the notion that the people would require the Legislature to conduct the people’s business in public yet intended to permit the Legislature to create smaller forms of itself and conduct that business behind closed doors. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I.
“The fundamental object in construing constitutional provisions is to ascertain the intent of the drafters by reading the words as written, employing their natural and ordinary meaning, and construing them to fulfill the intent of the drafters.” Sweeney v. Otter, 119 Idaho 135, 139, 804 P.2d 308, 312 (1990). We should also give constitutional provisions a “ ‘reasonable and practical interpretation, in accord with common sense.’” Taylor v. State, 62 Idaho 212, 231, 109 P.2d 879, 887 (1941) (Morgan, J., dissenting, citing 16 C.J.S. 50). As the majority accurately observes, something called a “committee” is obviously not “each house” or “the committee of the whole.” If one deems it necessary to begin and end the inquiry by examining only the words “each house” and “committee of the whole,” one might arrive at the majority’s holding. However, in my view such a *647reading overlooks the meaning of the words in art. III, § 12. To ascertain the meaning of that provision, one must consider it in its constitutional context and understand the nature and role of legislative committees in our constitutional scheme.
A.
It is undisputed that all political power in our system derives from the people. Indeed, Article I, Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution boldly states: “All political power is inherent in the people.” The people delegated the legislative function of their political power to the Legislature. Idaho Const, art. III, § 1. However, the delegation was not wholesale. The people reserved in themselves the power to enact their own laws and to repeal laws enacted by the Legislature. Id. They also maintained the right to instruct their representatives. Idaho Const, art. I, § 10. There is no indication in the Constitution that the people intended their right to instruct to stop at the doors of a closed committee meeting.
By definition, the Legislature exists “[t]o make or enact laws.” Black’s Law Dictionary 911 (7th ed.1999). That, therefore, is “[t]he business of” each house and the committee of the whole. See Mirriam-Webster Online (available at http://www .m-w.com) (defining “business,” in the possessive sense, as role or function).5 The houses of the Legislature, the committee of the whole, and the legislative committees each fill a niche in the lawmaking process.
1.
That each house, the committee of the whole, and legislative committees are “three distinctly different groups” is significant only in labeling their form. Only the House and the Senate conduct binding votes on legislation, thus formally moving it from one house to the other, and from the legislative branch to the executive’s desk. These votes are the last step in carrying out the legislative process. Prior to a vote, much work must be done. Enter the committee of the whole and legislative committees. In parliamentary parlance, the committee of the whole is the whole house acting as a committee. See Luther S. Cushing, Rules of Proceeding and Debate in Deliberative Assemblies 153 (rev. ed. by Edmund L. Cushing 1878). The committee of the whole originated as an informal deliberative body in seventeenth-century England, created by members of Parliament to debate and vote on matters outside the watchful eyes of the King’s “spy” in Parliament—the Speaker. See Michel v. Anderson, 817 F.Supp. 126,131 (D.D.C.1993) (citing 139 Cong. Rec. at H27-28 (Memo, of Don Wolfensberger) (Jan. 5, 1993)). The practice continued in colonial America, so members of colonial legislatures could avoid detection by King George III’s henchmen. Id. (citing IV Asher C. Hinds, Hinds’ Precedents of the House of Representatives of the United States 986-87 (1907)).
It continued in the Continental Congress, the Congress of the Confederation, and the Federal Convention where the U.S. Constitution was drafted. Michel, 817 F.Supp. at 131 (citing Wolfensberger Memo., 139 Cong. Rec. at H28). The delegates at our Idaho Constitutional Convention used the committee of the whole, as well. I Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of Idaho 1889 52-53 (I.W. Hart ed.1912) (hereinafter “Proceedings and Debates ”). Today, the committee of the whole still has no authority to formally pass any bill, but remains as a procedural tool to facilitate full-house debate on pending legislation. See Mason’s Manual of Legislative Procedure § 683 (2000) (hereinafter “Mason’s Manual”); see also Idaho Sen. R. 22; Idaho House R. 48. Our Constitution, rather than shielding such proceedings from public view, as had been done in the past, departed from tradition and required the business of the committee of the whole to be conducted in full public view.
2.
Attendant to the Legislature’s lawmaking authority is the authority to determine its *648own rules of proceeding. Idaho Const, art. III, § 9.6 Presumably in reliance on this provision, each house has created a handful of committees, which are comprised of some number of legislators from the particular house. See Idaho Sen. R. 19, 20; Idaho House R. 53. That committees conduct “[t]he business of’ each house cannot be seriously disputed. For starters, the Legislature, at least on its website, says so. See How a Bill Becomes a Law, Idaho State Legislature (available at http://www. legislature.idaho .gov/aboutyhowabill becomesalaw.htm) (noting that “[e]ach committee to which a bill is referred conducts a study of all information that may help the committee determine the scope and effect of the proposed law”).
The very manual each house has adopted7 agrees: “Committees are instruments or agencies of the body appointing them, and their function is to carry out the will of that body.” Mason’s Manual § 615(1) (2000); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 267 (defining committees as “[a] group of legislators appointed to help the legislature conduct its business, esp. by providing careful consideration of proposals for new legislation within a particular field so that the entire body can handle its work efficiently without wasting time and effort on unmeritorious submissions”) (emphasis added).
Delegating much of the task of lawmaking to committees is not some newfangled concept. Cushing—whose 1878 manual was adopted by the delegates at our convention— notes:
Committees are appointed to consider a particular subject either at large or under special instructions; to obtain information in reference to a matter before the assembly, either by personal inquiry and inspection, or by the examination of witnesses; and to digest and put into the proper form, for the adoption of the assembly, all resolutions, votes, orders, and other papers, with which they may be charged.
Cushing at 154. Not only do committees do the work related to lawmaking, but they are vital to that process. Cushing observes:
The advantages of proceeding in this mode are manifold. It enables a deliberative assembly to do many things which, from its numbers, it would otherwise be unable to do; to accomplish a much greater quantity of business, by dividing it among the members, than could possibly be accomplished if the whole body were obliged to devote itself to each particular subject ...
Id. at 153-54. Cushing sums up committees as being the “eyes and ears” of the body, and, “for certain purposes they are also its ‘head and hands.’” Id. at 154. The delegates of our constitutional convention understood this, too, as they divided up the task of framing our constitution into several committees which then reported to the full convention. Interestingly, the committee of the whole performed a similar function on the macro level.
So it can be readily seen that committees owe their entire existence to, are controlled by, and conduct “[t]he business of,” the Legislature when they are considering legislation. Put differently, committees are necessarily components of each house. If they did not exist, the Legislature would have to do that work itself—and that work, of course, would be subject to art. Ill, § 12.
B.
And it is equally obvious that it was the legislative process, not the form of the body conducting it, that the delegates were concerned about. With the sole exception of whether the Senate should be able to hold executive sessions to consider nominations made by the governor, never was there expressed any intent to close any part of the *649lawmaking process. Rather, as we shall see, full openness was presumed.8
1.
Delegate Parker stated that he was “opposed to dark lantern or star chamber proceedings,” and observed that “[t]he legislature has our lives, liberties, and happiness at its hand, and I want the electric light of publicity turned upon every act that they do.” II Proceedings and Debates 1216-17 (emphasis added). Other participants expressed similar sentiments.
During the debate, the convention considered whether to exempt the Senate from the openness requirement when it considers nominations. With regard to this proposal, Mr. Shoup stated that representatives “should say nothing nor east any vote but what everybody and especially all of his constituents should know just how he voted, and every word he said.” Id. at 1217. He concluded, “everything he does in his official duties should be public.” Id. Mr. Hasbrouck concurred, saying that “I do not believe there is any more necessity of anything being secret in a legislature than there is in a court ...” Id. at 1218. Mr. Mayhew stated: “I believe that in truth and in reason there is no occasion for any executive session in the senate of the state____ I am opposed to having any secret executive session of the legislature of the state.” Id. at 1218-19 (emphasis added). Mr. Ainslie said: “I believe the people have a right to know everything them representatives are doing in the legislature, and I am in favor of having all such matters above board, and not allowing secret sessions ...” Id. at 1219-20 (emphasis added). Finally, Mr. Parker rose again: “We have given all our powers and rights to the legislature, and if you give the legislature the power to transact its business in secret, the last vestige of representative government has departed from the people.” Id. at 1222 (emphasis added).
These comments pertained to the only proposed exception to the general openness requirement—they did not refer specifically to committees. But because committees are not separable from their parent bodies for purposes of interpreting art. III, § 12, I find it extremely doubtful that they intended committees to be outside the purview of art. III, § 12. Mr. Parker’s statement was submitted in support of language in art. III, § 12 that would keep the doors of the Legislature open—“The doors of each house and the committee of the whole shall be kept open.” II Proceedings and Debates 1223. However, as we know, that is not the final wording of the provision. Mr. Pinkham’s confusion regarding the meaning of “the doors” caused the substitution of the word “business.” This substitution, when considered in the context of the preceding debate, made it clear that the prohibition of secrecy was not confined to what occurred within the chamber doors of the House and Senate. “Business” simply clarified what the delegates were attempting to achieve—an open legislative process.
2.
The majority rests its holding primarily on the concept of expressio unius est exclusio alteñus, i.e., that the listing of some things excludes all others. As applied in this case, this maxim assumes that the omission of committees from art. III, § 12 necessarily demonstrates intent to exclude them: “The drafters could have written Section 12 to require that the business of each house and of all committees shall be transacted openly, and not in secret session, but did not do so.”
I do not agree that silence in this case demonstrates intent. To be sure, expressio unius is a longstanding principle of this Court and I believe in its application when the justification underlying it exists. But, as Judge Posner has put it, “Not every silence is pregnant; expressio unius est exclusio *650alterius is therefore an uncertain guide____” Illinois Dep’t of Public Aid v. Schweiker, 707 F.2d 273, 277 (7th Cir.1983). Indeed, the maxim is a tool of construction, not “an unimpeachable rule of law.” Noble v. Glenns Ferry Bank, Ltd., 91 Idaho 364, 367, 421 P.2d 444, 447 (1966). Whether it applies depends in all instances on “whether the legislative intent appears clear in terms of the statute.” Id. If the intent does not so appear, then intent is to be “collected from the context” and “according to what is consonant with reason and good discretion.” Id. (citing Offield v. Davis, 100 Va. 250, 40 S.E. 910, 912 (1902) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, courts refuse to apply the maxim when the drafters’ intent is to the contrary. See People v. Saunders, 232 Cal.App.3d 1592, 1596, 284 Cal.Rptr. 212, 214 (Cal.Ct.App.1991) (maxim is subordinate to primary rule that intent governs interpretation); State v. Carpenter, 616 N.W.2d 540, 543-44 (Iowa 2000); 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.23, p. 318 (6th ed.2000) (maxim does not apply if there is a “special reason for mentioning one thing and none for mentioning another which is otherwise within the statute”).9
The required assumption underlying the maxim enjoys only fragile integrity in the first place. See Cass R. Sunstich, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 Colum.L.Rev.2071, 2109 n. 182 (1990) (expressio unius “is a questionable [maxim], in light of the dubious reliability of inferring specific intent from silence”); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harv. L.Rev. 863, 873-74 (1930) (characterizing expressio unius as “one of the most fatuously simple of logical fallacies, the ‘illicit major,’ long the pons asinorum of schoolboys”). Thus, blind adherence to it is flatly illogical. When we look to the debates, we simply cannot find the justification underlying the maxim’s applicability. There was, as the majority states, no reference to committees. The majority infers from this silence intent to exclude committees. The support for this inference is simply not there. Not only was there no reference to committees, neither was there ever debate about the committee of the whole. It simply tagged along and was, without explanation, included in the initial and eventual versions of art. III, § 12. The only substantial debate was about whether to allow the Senate to hold secret sessions for gubernatorial appointments. II Proceedings and Debates at 1222-23. (Doubtless, these confirmations would have been considered to some extent in committee.) Yet, in spite of the general tradition that confirmations were held in secret, the delegates instead opted for total openness. So, again with the exception of the Senate when considering nominations, we cannot say that there was any debate about which, if any, body should be subject to the openness requirement. Thus the inference that committees were intended to be excluded is tenuous, at best.
Moreover, as I have explained, committees are not different from, but necessarily within the contemplation, of, each house and the committee of the whole. The United States Supreme Court’has aptly explained the associative relationship necessary to support the maxim:
[expressio unius ] properly applies only when in the natural association of ideas in the mind of the reader that which is expressed is so set over by way of strong contrast to that which is omitted that the contrast enforces the affirmative inference that that which is omitted must be intended to have opposite and contrary treatment.
*651Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 611, 47 S.Ct. 531, 537, 71 L.Ed. 793, 801 (1927). Here, that which is expressed is not so set over by way of strong contrast to that which was omitted. Thus, we simply have no reason to infer, as rigid application of expressio unius might dictate, that the omission of committees was intentional.
Furthermore, application of expressio uni-us in this ease does not comport with common sense. As the Arkansas Supreme Court has put it,
it appears to us somewhat incongruous that a parent body cannot go into executive session ... but its component parts (the committees) which actually investigate the complaints, and act on those complaints by making recommendations to the board, are at liberty to bar the public from their deliberations. Surely a part (of a board) is not possessed of a prerogative greater than the whole.
Arkansas Gazette Co. v. Pickens, 258 Ark. 69, 522 S.W.2d 350, 354 (1975) (holding committees of university trustees’ board subject to open meeting provision in state’s freedom of information law, where law did not specifically mention committees).
The potential mischief of rigidly applying the doctrine can be seen in the context of art. III, § 9. This is the provision which the Legislature contends gives it authority to establish committees. However, art. III, § 9 gives each house a number of powers, including the power to “determine its own rules of proceeding,” but does not give either house the ability to establish committees and does not allow for delegating any of the legislative workload to committees. By applying expressio unius to its logical (perhaps, illogical) end, one could argue that by virtue of not specifically allowing either house to establish committees, no part of the legislative workload can be delegated to committees and all of the legislative process must occur in non-secret sessions of each house or the committee of the whole. At the time the Constitution was adopted, the word committee did not appear in Art. III. By virtue of a 1976 amendment, the words “committee chairmen” were added to provide for certain per diem for those individuals. If art. III, § 12 is construed to not apply to committees, perhaps it was the intent of the constitutional drafters that the Legislature not be empowered to establish committees by virtue of the omission of that authority in art. III, § 9.
The further potential mischief of the majority’s conclusion is illustrated when, for example, it is applied to the so-called speech- and-debate clause, found in art. III, § 7. That section provides that no member, “for words uttered in debate in either house, [shall] be questioned in any other place.” (Emphasis added.) Applying the Legislature’s distinct entity/expressio unius theory, it seems to me, would limit the speech-and-debate clause to debate, literally, in “either house.” In other words, members could be sued for comments made when the House or Senate have resolved into the committee of the whole or for comments made in committee hearings. Whether this was the drafters’ intent, I do not express an opinion. But in answering the question would we look solely at the bare words? I submit that this example demonstrates the need to look not beyond, or merely at, the words, but to truly ascertain the meaning of them.
3.
And there is yet another reason why silence in this case does not demonstrate intent to allow closed committee meetings. The majority presupposes that art. III, § 12 is a limit on the inherent authority of the Legislature to close its proceedings. However, on those occasions that we have applied expressio unius to constitutional provisions, we were not dealing with questions relating to the relationship between the people’s inherent political power and the extent to which the people authorized the Legislature to transact its business behind closed doors. Instead, we were dealing with the extent of a clearly delegated power. For instance, in Profit, supra n. 5, the question concerned a constitutional provision (art. XVIII, § 3) that when part of a county left the county and joined another county, the jettisoned part of the old county was liable for its ratable portion of liabilities. 11 Idaho at 771, 84 P. at 714. The Court held that under expressio unius, since the provision said one *652part of the territory paid those liabilities, that meant that no other territory did. Id. In Clayton, supra n. 5, the Court held that where art. XVIII, § 6 provided county commissioners could hire counsel whenever necessary, that provision limited county commissioners’ authority to hire counsel and denied all other county officials the authority to hire counsel. 52 Idaho at 424, 16 P.2d at 1058.
On the other hand, in Eberle v. Nielson, supra n. 5, the Court ruled that a constitutional provision allowing compensation for a legislator’s services did not prevent the Legislature from enacting a law providing for compensation of $5 per day for serving on a committee. In this case, there was a preexisting right, established by the Constitution, to pay legislators for their services. That compensation fell within the constitutional provision and, in the absence of limiting language in the constitutional provision, the statute was not unconstitutional, 78 Idaho at 580, 306 P.2d at 1087.
The majority tells us that there was no common-law right to attend government meetings. It notes the English and Colonial history and explains that the United States Senate began holding its sessions in public in 1794 and that the House started doing so after the war of 1812. And, we are told, U.S. House and Senate committee meetings were not opened until 1946 and their rules still contain provisions for closed sessions. However, the Federal Constitution contains nothing like our art. III, § 12, prohibiting secret sessions. Indeed, the Federal Constitution (art. I, § 5) authorizes either house to maintain secrecy of parts of its journal of proceedings. Although the Idaho Constitution does not specifically prohibit keeping the Legislature’s journals secret, a reasonable reading of art. III, § 12 would surely prohibit the practice.
We are also told that when Idaho’s Constitution was drafted, state legislative committee meetings were typically closed. We are not cited to a source telling us this but, instead, we are directed to the constitutions of the 42 states that joined the Union before Idaho did. Among them, there was either no express requirement that legislative meetings or committee meetings be open, or there was a requirement of openness but an exception when secrecy was desired or for the senate to hold executive sessions. That’s fine, but we did have an openness requirement, and the delegates, even when Mr. Gray noted that “confirmations and matters of that kind” are generally held in secret, opted to depart from the norm and allow no such exception. Because our history and our Constitution are unique to our State,10 we should rely on that, not on what had been happening in other states or in the federal system.11
II.
In spite of the reality that legislative committees conduct “[t]he business of’ the Legislature and in spite of the statements of the delegates themselves, the majority nevertheless holds that “[t]he business,” as found in art. III, § 12, is defined by art. III, § 10. That provision provides, in full:
A majority of each house shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may compel the attendance of absent members in such manner and under such penalties as such house may provide. A quorum being in attendance, if either house fail to effect an organization within the first four (4) days thereafter, the members of the house so failing shall be entitled to no compensation from the end of *653the said four (4) days until an organization shall have been effected.
(Emphasis added.) Thus, the majority holds, defining “business” as something other than a quorum of each house creates an inconsistency.12
It is asserted that because “business” appears in art. Ill, § 10, its definition there defines the business of the Legislature in art. Ill, § 12. However, when read in context, art. Ill, § 10 in no reasonable sense attempts to define “business” as that word is found in art. Ill, § 12. Note first the reference to “each house”—not “each house and the committee of the whole.” Note also the reference to a smaller number than a quorum being able to adjourn. Adjourn from what? A meeting of the House or Senate, of course. In other words, “business” in art. Ill, § 10 denotes activity; “business” in art. Ill, § 12 denotes role or function. One should also note the fact that in art. Ill, § 12 the constitution drafters spoke of “the business”, providing that “the business” shall be transacted openly and not in secret session. In art. Ill, § 10 the drafters required a quorum “to do business”, not “the business”. As used in art. Ill, § 12, business was used in a substantive sense. In art. Ill, § 10, it is used in a generic sense.
In many of our statutes referring to a quorum requirement, it is common to refer to a quorum being necessary for the doing or transacting of “business.” See I.C. § 43-303 (majority of members of irrigation district “shall constitute a quorum to do business”); I.C. § 50-705 (majority of the full council of a municipal corporation “shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business”); I.C. § 50-2006 (majority of members of urban renewal agency shall constitute quorum “for the purpose of conducting business”); I.C. § 54-5206 (majority of Idaho contractors board shall constitute a quorum “for the transaction of business”); I.C. § 33-2805 (majority of board of trustees of University of Idaho Board of Regents necessary “for the transaction of business”). The list goes on. None of these requirements of quorums to do or transact business purport to define the business of the entity. In the context of private business, one would hardly expect a quorum provision in the articles of incorporation of a corporation to delineate the business that the corporation was authorized to transact. In other words, saying a majority of members shall constitute a quorum to do business is simply a way of phrasing the requirement that the house, when it is sitting as a house, have a majority of members to transact proceedings.
We can see that a quorum to do or transact business is the way such provisions were commonly phrased when our Constitution was drafted. Again, Mi’. Cushing:
In all councils, and other collective bodies of the same kind, it is necessary that a certain number, called a quorum, of the members, should meet and be present, in order to the transaction of business.
No business can regularly be entered upon until a quorum is present; nor can any business be regularly preceded with when it appears that the members present are reduced below that number ...
Cushing at 20-21 (emphasis added). Mason’s Manual employs the same phraseology: “A quorum of a deliberative body, whether a legislative body, an administrative board or a court, must be present in order to transact business, and to make its acts valid,” and, “[t]he majority of the membership of a body constituted of a definite number of members constitutes a quorum for the purpose of transacting business.” Mason’s Manual § 500(1), (2) (emphasis added). And finally, *654the ordinary definition of “quorum”: “[t]he minimum number of members ... who must be present for a body to transact business or take a vote.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1263 (emphasis added).
Simply because the word “business” means one thing in one place does not mean it means the same thing in the next place. The meaning of a word depends on the context in which it is found. Noscitur a sociis; State v. Hammersley, 134 Idaho 816, 821, 10 P.3d 1285, 1290 (2000). The Legislature itself certainly understands the distinction, having statutorily declared:
The people of the state of Idaho in creating the instruments of government that serve them, do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies so created. Therefore, the legislature finds and declares that it is the policy of this state that the formation of public policy is public business and shall not be conducted in secret.
I.C. § 67-2340 (emphasis added).13 Thus, it is not at all inconsistent to say that “business” in art. Ill, § 10 means something different than in art. III, § 12. In context, it is perfectly sound.
III.
The question in this case is really whether we derive the intent of art. III, § 12 from the meaning of its words and thus define the scope of the Legislature’s business by examining the responsibility delegated to that body by the people of Idaho, or whether we ignore the substance and context of the words used and instead derive the drafters’ intent by hastily applying a tool of construction and by defining the Legislature’s business narrowly by another provision that requires a quorum of the House and Senate to do House and Senate business on the floor. Article I, § 10 provides that the people shall have the right to instruct their representatives and to petition the Legislature for the redress of grievances. If the people are allowed in on only the last act of the Legislature’s business, they have not been given the full benefit of the authority they reserved in themselves.
The fact that the Legislature has chosen to establish committees and delegate a good deal of the legislative work to those committees should not deprive the people of the ability to have access to, and input in, meetings of committees where legislative business is being conducted. Bills are formulated in the committees, competing proposals are considered, amendments are made, public policy is formulated, and the people are entitled to participate. They have a limited ability to do so when the Legislature debates and votes in full session. If legislative committee work is shielded from public view, what is there to keep either house from conducting even more of its legislative work in committee, including perhaps the final debate, leaving only the final vote to occur in open session? This is not a wise road upon which to embark.
I would reverse the district court’s ruling and hold that legislative committees, when meeting and considering matters related to legislation, are conducting “[t]he business of’ the Legislature and are therefore subject to art. Ill, § 12. This is not to say, however, that all activities in which the Legislature engages are subject to art. Ill, § 12. Indeed, the Legislature’s constitutional duty to make laws should be analyzed separately from the duties in which it engages that are not related to the legislative process. For instance, the Legislature does on occasion find itself engaged in matters related to litigation and may occasionally be informed of threats to the state. Members of the Legislature may be meeting with constituents, interest groups, or the like (see I.C. § 67-412), but these activities would not be considered “the business” of either house. These activities may attend a legislator’s duty as a member of the house to which he or she belongs, but they are not related to the Legislature’s constitutional duty of making laws. The committees do not enter the legislative pro*655cess until they are presented with a bill. In other words, committees enter the process when they are conducting legislative activity which the House or Senate has delegated to them.14
Justice BURDICK concurs.

. Only context and common sense can pin down the definition of "business.” Mirriam-Webster offers no fewer than ten definitions of the word.

. The Legislature seems to argue that this constitutional provision blocks the Court from interfering with its decision to close committee meetings. And the majority cites this provision and states that the Court “cannot exercise any powers properly belonging to the legislature” for essentially the same point. Of course, I doubt seriously that anyone would believe that art. Ill, § 9 would allow the Legislature to implement a rule that ran counter to another provision of the constitution. Cohn v. Kingsley, 5 Idaho 416, 436, 49 P. 985, 992 (1897).

. See Idaho Sen. R. 48; Idaho House R. 10.

. The majority writes that the Court "cannot use the arguments of the delegates to expand the meaning of a constitutional provision beyond its wording.” (Emphasis added.) I would agree with that statement. But while I agree that the delegates’ statements at the convention cannot be used to expand the meaning of the provision "beyond its wording,” I do not agree that the Press Club has argued that the court should give art. III, § 12 "a meaning broader than the language used in the provision." The Press Club’s argument is simply that committees are within the contemplation of art. III, § 12.

. Expressio unius is a doctrine generally applied when other more reliable rules of statutory construction fail and should therefore be employed with caution, especially when being used in a constitutional context. This Court has not used it frequently in the constitutional setting and, when it has been discussed in that context, the results have been inconsistent. In Shoshone County v. Profit, 11 Idaho 763, 84 P. 712 (1906), and Clayton v. Barnes, 52 Idaho 418, 16 P.2d 1056 (1932) the Court applied it to the Constitution. However, in Eberle v. Nielson, 78 Idaho 572, 306 P.2d 1083 (1957), without discussing either Profit or Clayton, the Court flatly stated, "the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius has no application to the provisions of our State Constitution.” 78 Idaho at 578, 306 P.2d at 1086. Three years later, in Penrod v. Crowley, 82 Idaho 511, 356 P.2d 73 (1960), the Court reiterated that the rule "does not apply to provisions of the state constitution." 82 Idaho at 523, 356 P.2d at 80. There was no language in either of these two cases to indicate the rule applied in some instances but not in others.

. Other provisions are not so unique and thus reliance on other jurisdictions' interpretations of similar constitutional provisions is entirely proper.

. It should be noted also that the language of the Idaho Constitution differs substantially from the U.S. Constitution with regard to the grant or delegation of legislative power. Article I, § 1 of the U.S. Constitution grants "All legislative powers" to the U.S. Congress. Article III, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution delegates the legislative power to the State Legislature but, as I have noted, reserves co-equal power in the people to enact laws or reject those enacted by the Legislature. The U.S. Constitution provides for the people to petition for redress of grievances (amend.I), as does our State Constitution (art. I, § 10), but the U.S. Constitution does not provide for the people to "instruct their representatives” (art. I, § 10) or prohibit the legislative branch from legislating in secret session (art. III, § 12).

. The majority also points out that "if the word ‘business’ included the work of all committees, then there would have been no reason to expressly include the committee of the whole within the provisions of Article III, § 12" and thus to read "business” as the Press Club asserts it should be read improperly renders reference to the committee of the whole "mere surplusage.” However, as I have noted, the transcripts of the debates indicate that reference to the committee of the whole simply went along, without much thought, with any reference to the Legislature. Without any debate about the committee of the whole as a separate entity, it seems the delegates just referenced the committee of the whole as a matter of course. On the other hand, the functions performed by the committee of the whole were and are similar to those performed by legislative committees.

. 71 find the Legislature's argument that it may under the Constitution close committee meetings a bit disingenuous, in light of I.C. § 67-2346: "All meetings of any standing, special, or select committee of either house of the legislature of the state of Idaho shall be open to the public at all times.” I am puzzled why the Legislature would codify an openness requirement for its committees and then assert the right to disregard it.

. The record does not reflect whether any of the closed meetings complained of by the Press Club were called for the consideration of legislation or, instead, for briefing on matters not related to the legislative process. The brief description provided by the Press Club indicates that some meetings were called to discuss the Snake River Water Rights Adjudication, one to discuss field burning and litigation surrounding it, and one to discuss the vulnerability of the state’s water supplies to terrorist action. If these were merely briefings to advise the committees of ongoing litigation or a threat of terrorist activity and not for the purpose of considering the Legislature's business of law making, they might fall outside the ambit of art. Ill, § 12. However, there is not sufficient information regarding the substance of the meetings to know whether or not that would be the case.