Court Opinion

ID: 9670802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:26:24.562547+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:06.596632
License: Public Domain

MacKenzie, J.
(dissenting). I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that plaintiff is entitled to no-fault benefits under MCL 500.3111; MSA 24.13111 and MCL 500.3114(1); MSA 24.13114(1) because he was domiciled in his parents’ Michigan home at the time he was injured.
The controlling facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Oklahoma while in the process of moving from his old residence in Nevada to his parents’ home in Michigan, which was his intended new residence. Defendant is the no-fault automobile insurance carrier for plaintiff’s parents. MCL 500.3111; MSA 24.13111 and MCL 500.3114(1); MSA 24.13114(1) afford no-fault personal protection insurance benefits to a relative "domiciled” in the same house*496hold as a no-fault policyholder. The issue here, therefore, is whether plaintiff was domiciled in his parents’ Michigan home at the time of the accident. In my opinion, he was not.
It is well established that, as a general rule, domicile requires two elements — intent and physical presence — and that these elements must concur in time. Wisconsin Potowatomies of Hannahville Indian Community v Houston, 393 F Supp 719, 732 (WD Mich, 1973), citing In re Fox Estate, 3 Mich App 501; 142 NW2d 866 (1966). Further, it is generally held that an old domicile is not abandoned until a new one has been established. Wisconsin Potowatomies, supra at 732, citing Restatement of Conflicts, § 15. See 1 Restatement Conflict of Laws, 2d, § 15, pp 61-62. As explained in 25 Am Jur 2d, Domicil, § 17, p 14:
As a general rule, the principal elements of domicil, physical presence in the locality involved and intention to adopt it as a domicil, must concur in order to establish a new domicil. No change of domicil will result if either of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicil without actual residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of a domicil ....
Applying this rule to a person moving from an old residence to a new residence, such as the plaintiff in this case, it is clear that the old domicile is not relinquished until the person is physically present at the intended new location.
Since a domicil once established continues until a new one is acquired and a new domicil is not acquired until there has been a concurrence of intent and physical presence, it is held that the domicil of one who is in itinere from an old to a new home continues to be the old domicil until the new is reached. [25 Am Jur 2d, Domicil, § 35, p 26]
*497See also anno: Domicil while in itinere from old to new home, 5 ALR 296 ("It is a general rule that the domicil of one who is in itinere from an old to a new home continues to be the old domicil till the new is reached”.)
Cases from other jurisdictions have recognized that persons moving from an old residence to a new one remain domiciled at the old location until they are physically present at the new location:
When a person starts on an extended journey, intending never to return to the domicile he is leaving, and to establish a new domicile elsewhere, he does not lose the one left until the new one is actually established, and while in transit he retains the former domicile. [Talley v Commonwealth, 127 Va 516, 522; 103 SE 612 (1920).]
Her domicile in California continued until she acquired a new one, even though she may have left California intending eventually to go to Utah and not to return to [California]. A new domicile cannot be acquired until a person actually lives in a new state with the intention of remaining there. [Sampsell v Superior Court, 32 Cal 2d 763, 774, n 2; 197 P2d 739 (1948); citations omitted.]
Other cases are in accord. See Barhydt v Cross, 156 Iowa 271; 136 NW 525 (1912); In re Jones Estate, 192 Iowa 78; 182 NW 227 (1921); Boyd v Commonwealth, 149 Ky 764; 149 SW 1022 (1912); Ness v Comm’r of Corporations & Taxation, 279 Mass 369; 181 NE 178 (1932); Reynolds v Lloyd Cotton Mills, 177 NC 412; 99 SE 240 (1919); Northwestern Mortgage & Security Co v Noel Construction Co, 71 ND 256; 300 NW 28 (1941).
In my opinion, the rule embodied in these authorities should be applied in this case. I would hold that persons in transit between a former residence and an intended future residence remain *498domiciled at the former location until they are physically present at the intended new location. In this case, plaintiff, at the time of injury, had not yet arrived at his parents’ home in Michigan, which he intended to be his new residence. He was therefore not domiciled in his parents’ household. Because plaintiff was not domiciled in his parents’ home, he was not entitled to personal protection insurance benefits under their no-fault policy. Accordingly, I would reverse.