Court Opinion

ID: 9610626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:44:17.881554+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:02.665007
License: Public Domain

Given, Judge,
dissenting:
The pertinent statutes are quoted in the majority opinion. I think the conclusion reached in the opinion *507is correct in so far as it relates to the filing of the application for benefits. I agree that Section 15 of Article 4 of Chapter 23 of the Code, dealing with the time for the filing of the application, and Section 2 of Article 2 of Chapter 3 of the Code, dealing with computation of time, should be considered in pari materia and, when considered together, authorize the filing of the application for benefits. The mere filing of such an application, however, does not necessarily entitle the claimant to payment of benefits. To be entitled to benefits he must, in addition to the filing, show that his claim is one coming within the indispensable requisites of the statute.
As pointed out in the majority opinion, claimant ceased work more than two years before the claim was filed. Beyond question, therefore, claimant was not exposed to the hazard of silicon dioxide dust either for a period of two years before the filing of the application or for a period of sixty days within such two year period, for the simple reason that he had not worked for the employer a “single day” for more than two years before the date of filing. Code, 23-4-1, as amended, provides “that compensation shall not be payable for the disease of silicosis * * * unless * * * the employee has been exposed to the hazard of silicon dioxide dust over a continuous period of not less than two years * * Code, 23-4-15b, requires that “the commissioner shall determine whether the claimant was exposed to the hazard of silicon dioxide dust for a continuous period of not less than sixty days while in the employ of the employer within two years prior to the filing of his claim, and whether * * * the claimant was exposed to such hazard over a continuous period of not less than two years * *
Prior to the enactment of the silicosis statute, no liability existed against a subscriber to the fund as to the disease of silicosis. That act created new liability; in effect, a new cause of action. The liability, however, was not absolute. It was made to depend on different contingencies, or on the existence of certain definite facts. One of such requirements was that the claimant be actual*508ly exposed to the hazard for the period of sixty days of the two year period immediately before the filing of the application. In other words, such exposure was made an absolutely essential element of the liability so created. That essential element is not only clearly set out in the statutory provisions, but the character thereof is clearly preserved in the section dealing with the filing of the claim, Code, 23-4-15, as amended, in this language: “To entitle any employee to compensation for silicosis under the provisions hereof, the application therefor must be * * * filed in the office of the commissioner within two years from and after the last day of the last continuous period of sixty days” of hazardous, exposure. Since the essential element of liability is clearly established to be lacking, I can see no justifiable basis for any allowance of benefits. The action of the majority simply extends liability beyond that created by the statute.
The majority opinion attempts to justify its conclusion on the theory that the statutory provisions, Code, 2-2-3 and 23-4-15b, should be read in pari materia. I find no authority, however, which appears to permit two statutory provisions, having distinctly different subject matters, to be so read. Code, 2-2-3, deals solely with “The time within which an act” may be done, while the other pertinent statute deals with liability of an employer to an employee regarding the contracting of the disease of silicosis. “2. Laws relating to different subjects are not in pari materia.” White, Tax Commissioner v. Wirt County Court, 63 W. Va. 230, 59 S. E. 884. See Vest v. Cobb, 138 W. Va. 660, 76 S. E. 2d 885; Algoma Coal & Coke Co. v. Alexander, 136 W. Va. 521, 66 S. E. 2d 201; Thacker v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co., 129 W. Va. 520, 41 S. E. 2d 111; White v. Morton, Sheriff, 114 W. Va. 29, 171 S. E. 762; State of West Virginia v. Hoult, 113 W. Va. 587, 169 S. E. 241; Hayes v. Harris, 73 W. Va. 17, 80 S. E. 827. Moreover, “The rule that statutes which relate to the same subject should be read and construed together is a rule of statutory construction and does not apply to a statutory provision which is clear and unambiguous.” Point 1, Syllabus, State of West Virginia v. *509Epperly, 135 W. Va. 877, 65 S. E. 2d 488. See Douglass v. Koontz, State Tax Commissioner, 137 W. Va. 345, 362, 71 S. E. 2d 319; Board of Education v. County Court of Tyler County, 77 W. Va. 523, 87 S. E. 870.
Being of the view that the application for benefits, though properly permitted to be filed, discloses on its face no right in claimant, I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the orders of the State Compensation Commissioner and the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board.