Court Opinion

ID: 9372748
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:00:07.608287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:37.040381
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                       MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
                                        2023 MSPB 5
                              Docket No. DE-0752-15-0169-I-1

                                     Cathy Covington,
                                         Appellant,
                                              v.
                               Department of the Interior,
                                          Agency.
                                      January 13, 2023

           Nina Ren, Esquire, Washington, D.C., for the appellant.

           Frank Lupo, Esquire, and Jared M. Slade, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for
             the agency.

                                          BEFORE

                              Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member
                            Member Limon recused himself and
                    did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

                                  OPINION AND ORDER

¶1        The appellant has filed a petition for review of an initial decision that
     sustained her removal.      For the reasons set forth below, we GRANT the
     appellant’s petition, VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND this matter for
     further adjudication consistent with this Opinion and Order.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant was employed as a Forester in the agency’s Bureau of Indian
     Affairs (BIA), Trust Services, Navajo Region, in Fort Defiance, Arizona. Initial
                                                                                     2

     Appeal File (IAF), Tab 4 at 15-17, Tab 6 at 137. The Navajo Region serves the
     Navajo Nation, which it considers its “sole customer.” Hearing Transcript (HT)
     at 167 (testimony of the appellant’s first-level supervisor). The Navajo Region is
     concerned with maintaining a good relationship between the BIA and the Navajo
     Nation. Id.
¶3         Consistent with the Federal Government’s move toward greater autonomy
     for Indian tribes, the BIA’s Navajo Region and the Navajo Nation have entered
     into what are commonly known as “638 contracts” concerning timber and other
     trust assets. HT at 116 (testimony of a BIA Tribal Operations Specialist), 156-57,
     173-74, 209-10 (testimony of the appellant’s first-level supervisor). Trust assets
     are assets that the Federal Government holds “in trust for Indian tribes and
     individual Indians.”     25 C.F.R. § 115.002.   The term 638 contracts refers to
     contracts that are entered into under the Indian Self-Determination and Education
     Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, § 102, 88 Stat. 2203, 2206 (1975) (codified
     as amended, at 25 U.S.C. § 5321); HT at 156 (testimony of the appellant’s
     first-level   supervisor).   Under   these   self-determination   contracts,   tribal
     organizations are permitted to self-administer certain programs that would
     otherwise be administered on their behalf by the Federal Government.             HT
     at 156-57, 173-74; see 25 U.S.C. § 5321(a); Hinsley v. Standing Rock Child
     Protective Services, 516 F.3d 668, 670 (8th Cir. 2008).
¶4         The Navajo Region has a 638 contract with the Navajo Nation Forestry
     Department.     HT at 157 (testimony of the appellant’s first-level supervisor).
     Pursuant to a self-determination agreement with the BIA, the Navajo Nation
     Forestry Department self-administers aspects of its forestry management
     operations, including issuing permits for harvesting and selling timber products
     on Navajo Nation lands.      HT at 157, 169 (testimony of appellant’s first-level
     supervisor); IAF, Tab 5 at 26-33.     Nevertheless, the BIA’s Navajo Region is
     responsible for reviewing and approving permits for harvesting timber.         IAF,
     Tab 5 at 96-97; 25 C.F.R. §§ 163.1, 163.3, 163.10, 163.26.        The BIA Navajo
                                                                                        3

     Region’s self-determination officer oversees these 638 contracts with the
     assistance of awarding officials, who in turn are assisted by awarding official’s
     technical representatives (AOTRs) and sub-awarding technical representatives.
     HT at 157-58 (testimony of the appellant’s first-level supervisor).
¶5         In May 2013, while the appellant was serving a 1-year probationary period
     as a Supervisory Forester, the agency designated her as the AOTR for the BIA’s
     638 contract with the Navajo Nation Forestry Department. IAF, Tab 5 at 36, 51.
     On December 2, 2013, she received a telephone call from a Navajo Nation
     Forestry Department official.      IAF, Tab 5 at 19.     He expressed concern that
     “timber . . . was being harvested along right-of-way [for Arizona State Highway]
     264 . . . [without a] timber sale contract.” Id. at 19; HT at 378-79 (testimony of
     the appellant).    Highway 264 runs through the Navajo Nation.              HT at 163
     (testimony of the appellant’s first-level supervisor).
¶6         Two days later, the appellant visited the identified location and observed
     the Arizona Department of Transportation (ADOT) cutting down trees along
     Highway 264 and loading them onto trailers.          IAF, Tab 5 at 19-23, 34.       She
     interviewed two individuals who advised her that the trees were “being hauled to
     the Navajo Nation Forestry Department to be processed and cut into rough cut
     lumber.” 1 Id. at 20. She obtained a copy of a “Transportation Permit” issued by
     the Navajo Nation Forestry Department that allowed for removal of the timber at
     issue along the right-of-way. Id. at 19, 24.
¶7         The following day, the appellant wrote two memoranda notifying her
     first-level supervisor, the Regional Director, who was her second-level

     1
       Although the appellant was not aware of it at the time, ADOT was removing trees
     along its right-of-way to widen the highway. HT at 164-65, 170 (testimony of the
     appellant’s first-level supervisor). ADOT gave the trees it cut down, free of charge, to
     the Navajo Nation Forestry Department.          HT at 165, 170-71 (testimony of the
     appellant’s first-level supervisor); IAF, Tab 5 at 38. The Navajo Nation later directed
     the Forestry Department to share the wood within the community, including with a
     tribal member who lost his previous home in a fire. IAF, Tab 5 at 38, 41.
                                                                                   4

     supervisor, and the awarding official, that she had shut down this project, which
     she described as a “timber permit sale.” Id. at 19-20. The appellant was under
     the impression that the right-of-way along Highway 264 was subject to a
     638 contract between the BIA and the Navajo Nation.         IAF, Tab 5 at 24; HT
     at 380 (testimony of the appellant). Such an agreement would require the Navajo
     Nation to follow BIA regulations. IAF, Tab 5 at 22; HT at 380, 418 (testimony of
     the appellant).   She believed that the Navajo Nation Forestry Department had
     violated these regulations by failing to have a timber sale contract in place. HT
     at 380 (testimony of the appellant). She shut the project down on that basis. Id.
¶8         In her December 5, 2013 memoranda, the appellant asserted that the Navajo
     Nation Forestry Department was not authorized to retain any revenues from the
     timber sale absent a tribal resolution to that effect and that it was a conflict of
     interest for the Navajo Nation Forestry Department to have obtained the timber
     sale permit for its own benefit because it distributed the permits.    IAF, Tab 5
     at 19-21, 51. It is undisputed that shutting down work was outside the scope of
     the appellant’s authority as the AOTR. HT at 160-61, 166-67 (testimony of the
     appellant’s first-level supervisor), 417-18 (testimony of the appellant); IAF,
     Tab 5 at 47-49, 52.    By shutting down the Highway 264 project, she caused
     tensions between the BIA and the Navajo Nation.           HT at 168, 172-73, 245
     (testimony of the appellant’s first-level supervisor).
¶9         The Navajo Region later determined that the land from which trees were
     being cut was not subject to a 638 contract.       HT at 170-71 (testimony of the
     appellant’s first-level supervisor). Instead, the agency, with the concurrence of
     the Navajo Nation, had provided ADOT with a right-of-way, giving it “rights and
     claims” within the area at issue along the highway, which apparently included the
     right to dispose of timber located along the right-of-way as they saw fit. HT
     at 170 (testimony of the appellant’s first-level supervisor); IAF, Tab 5 at 34. The
     Regional Director determined that “[t]he [Navajo Nation] forestry department
     ha[d] partnered with ADOT to collect and remove all timber to be utilized for
                                                                                          5

      local community needs at no cost” and advised the appellant that “BIA supports
      this arrangement” between the two parties. IAF, Tab 5 at 38.
¶10         By letter dated March 11, 2014, the Regional Director returned the
      appellant to her prior nonsupervisory position based on the appellant’s actions in
      stopping ADOT’s work along Highway 264. Id. at 36. She faulted the appellant
      for making a “premature decision” and demonstrating a “lack of expert guidance”
      by interfering in the arrangement between ADOT and the Navajo Nation Forestry
      Department.    Id.     According to the Regional Director, the appellant’s action
      resulted in an “unnecessary delay of the project” and “forced [BIA] to enter into
      an unnecessary [memorandum of understanding] with [ADOT].”                    Id.   The
      appellant returned to her prior position effective March 16, 2014. 2 Id.
¶11         Between late December 2013 and early January 2014, as well as on or
      around June 18, 2014, the appellant reported additional alleged agency
      wrongdoing to the agency’s Office of Inspector General (OIG).               IAF, Tab 6
      at 27-29, Tab 33 at 10. She also sent a September 11, 2014 email to the Navajo
      Nation Forest Manager raising concerns that certain Navajo Nation-proposed tree
      harvesting projects did not comply with the National Environmental Policy Act
      (NEPA) and other Federal laws. IAF, Tab 5 at 39. The awarding official and the
      appellant’s first-level supervisor learned of this email to the Navajo Nation later
      that month. Id. at 43, 45.
¶12         On November 6, 2014, the appellant’s first-level supervisor proposed her
      removal based on a charge of “Failure to Safeguard Government Records.” IAF,
      Tab 6 at 47-48.      In its first specification, the agency asserted that on July 22,
      2014, despite receiving instructions requiring her to complete an inventory of

      2
        There is no evidence that the appellant sought to overturn this action before the Board
      or in any other forum. HT at 383-84 (testimony of the appellant). It is not at issue in
      this appeal. We mention it here for purposes of providing background for the
      appellant’s alleged protected disclosures. IAF, Tab 40 at 2-3.
                                                                                    6

      documents and get approval before moving those documents from her former duty
      station in Fort Defiance, Arizona, to her new office in Gallup, New Mexico, the
      appellant “removed and disposed of confidential [G]overnment records in a
      public dumpster that contain[ed] the PII [Personally Identifiable Information] of
      individuals [such as] names and social security numbers, date[s] of birth, and
      [F]ederal records including Indian [Fiduciary Trust] Documents” (e.g., maps). Id.
      at 47-49, 158-60.     The agency noted that other documents the appellant had
      placed in her vehicle were not recovered and it was unknown which of those files
      were missing because she did not complete the required inventory. Id. at 49. In
      its second specification, the agency alleged that on July 25, 2014, the appellant
      loaded inventoried records into a Government vehicle and transported them to her
      new office on her own, despite an instruction to travel with ano ther employee in a
      different Government vehicle. Id. The appellant filed a complaint with Office of
      Special Counsel (OSC) on November 25, 2014, alleging retaliation for
      whistleblowing. Id. at 4-35. After the appellant responded to the proposal notice
      orally and in writing, the deciding official sustained the charge and effect uated
      her removal on December 29, 2014. IAF, Tab 4 at 15, 17-22.
¶13        The appellant filed a Board appeal of her removal. IAF, Tab 1. She raised
      affirmative defenses of reprisal for whistleblowing and equal employment
      opportunity (EEO) activity and alleged a violation of her right to due process.
      IAF, Tab 1 at 6-8, Tab 33 at 4-5, Tab 40 at 2-3, Tab 41 at 4-7, Tab 45 at 1-2.
      After a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision affirming the
      removal. IAF, Tab 54, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 36. He found that the agency
      proved both specifications of its charge, nexus, and the reasonableness of the
      penalty.   ID at 7-13, 32-36.    He also held that the appellant did not prove
      retaliation for EEO activity or a violation of her due process rights. ID at 24-32.
      As to the appellant’s whistleblower reprisal claim, the administrative judge held
      that the appellant’s December 5, 2013 and September 11, 2014 disclosures
      were not protected.     ID at 15-17.    He reasoned that she reported alleged
                                                                                         7

      wrongdoing by the Navajo Nation, rather than the Federal Government.                   ID
      at 16-17.   However, he found that her OIG complaints and OSC complaint
      constituted protected activity. ID at 17-18. The administrative judge also found
      that the appellant proved that this activity was a contributing factor in her
      removal, and the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would
      have removed her absent this activity. ID at 18-24.
¶14         The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR)
      File, Tab 3.   The agency has responded to the petition for review, and the
      appellant has replied. PFR File, Tabs 5-6.

                                           ANALYSIS
      A disclosure of wrongdoing committed by a non-Federal Government entity is
      protected only when the Government’s interests and good name are implicated in
      the alleged wrongdoing. 3
¶15         In order to prevail on her whistleblower retaliation affirmative defense, an
      appellant must prove by preponderant evidence that she made a whistleblowing
      disclosure as described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in protected
      activity as described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D), and the
      disclosure or protected activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision
      to take or fail to take a personnel action outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A). 4
      5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1); Ayers v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R. 11, ¶ 12 &

      3
        On review, the parties do not challenge the administrative judge’s determination that
      the agency proved the charge and its nexus to the efficiency of the service and that the
      penalty of removal was within the tolerable limits of reasonableness. PFR File, Tabs 3,
      5-6. They also do not dispute that the appellant failed to prove her claims of EEO
      reprisal and a due process violation. Id. We discern no basis to disturb the
      administrative judge’s finding regarding the due process violation claim. Moreover,
      because the appellant does not challenge the administrative judge’s determination that
      the appellant did not prove her affirmative defense of retaliation for EEO activity, we
      do not further address this finding here.
      4
        It is undisputed that the appellant’s removal, which the agency took under chapter 75,
      is a personnel action under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(iii).
                                                                                         8

      n.1 (2015).      Regarding her December 5, 2013 and September 11, 2014
      disclosures, the appellant argues on review that there is no statutory provision
      requiring that a violation of law, rule, or regulation be committed by agency
      personnel.    PFR File, Tab 3 at 10, 13-14.         She contends that she reasonably
      believed that her disclosures evidenced a violation of law, rule, or regulation. Id.
      at 12-14.
¶16        The relevant statute provides that an agency may not remove an employee
      because of “any disclosure” that the employee reasonably believes evidences “any
      violation of any law, rule, or regulation.” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). The Board has
      held that a disclosure of wrongdoing committed by a non-Federal Government
      entity may be protected only when the Government’s interests and good name are
      implicated in the alleged wrongdoing, and the employee shows that she
      reasonably    believed   that   the   information    she   disclosed   evidenced   that
      wrongdoing. Miller v. Department of Homeland Security, 99 M.S.P.R. 175, ¶ 12
      (2005); Arauz v. Department of Justice, 89 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶¶ 6-7 (2001).
¶17        Relying on Arauz, 89 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 7, and Aviles v. Merit Systems
      Protection Board, 799 F.3d 457, 464-66 (5th Cir. 2015), the administrative judge
      found that the appellant’s December 5, 2013 and September 11, 2014 disclosures
      were not protected because she alleged wrongdoing by the Navajo Nation, rather
      than agency personnel. ID at 16-17. The appellant argues that the administrative
      judge erred in relying on Arauz because that decision was issued before the
      enactment of the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA),
      which reversed some judicially created limitations on whistleblower protections.
      PFR File, Tab 3 at 13.
¶18        In Aviles, 799 F.3d at 464-66, which was decided after enactment of the
      WPEA, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Fifth Circuit) agreed with
      the Board and held that, when enacting the WPEA, “Congress did not intend to
      protect disclosures of purely private wrongdoing.” As the appellant notes, Aviles
      is not necessarily binding on the Board. PFR File, Tab 3 at 13. Prior to late
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      2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit)
      generally was the Board’s sole reviewing court in cases of alleged whistleblower
      reprisal. Chambers v. Department of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 10 n.6
      (recognizing that prior to the passage of the WPEA, Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126
      Stat. 1465, 1469, the Board was bound by the decisions of the Federal Circuit in
      adjudicating whistleblower reprisal claims). However, since that time, pursuant
      to 5 U.S.C. 7703(b)(1)(B), an appellant who seeks review of a final Board
      decision and limits any prohibited personnel practice claims to those arising
      under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) and (b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), and (D) may seek review
      in any Federal circuit court of appeal of competent jurisdiction.           5 U.S.C.
      § 7703(b)(1)(B); Chambers, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 10 n.6.
¶19         Yet the appellant has pointed to no other circuit which has held contrary to
      the Board’s precedent in Arauz. The Federal Circuit recently had the opportunity
      to do so, but in a nonprecedential decision instead agreed that disclosures of
      purely private wrongdoing are not covered by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), and in fact
      cited Aviles in its decision.       Oram v. Merit Systems Protection Board,
      No. 2021-2307, 2022 WL 866327 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 23, 2022). 5 In the absence of
      any higher authority rejecting the Board’s position in Arauz, we decline to revisit
      it here.

      The appellant made disclosures regarding alleged wrongdoing by the Navajo
      Nation Forestry Department that implicated the Federal Government’s interests
      and good name.
¶20         We now consider whether the Government’s interests and good name were
      implicated in the alleged wrongdoing.      In Arauz, 89 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶¶ 5-7, the
      Board found that the Government’s interests and good name were implicated in a

      5
        The Board may rely on nonprecedential decisions of the Federal Circuit when we find
      their reasoning persuasive, as we do here. Alegre v. Department of the Navy,
      118 M.S.P.R. 424, ¶ 15 n.2 (2012).
                                                                                  10

      disclosure of a non-Governmental organization’s alleged violation of state voter
      registration laws because the organization was performing functions within the
      scope of a Government program and the agency was in a position to influence or
      exercise oversight over the organization’s performance of those functions.
      Similarly, in Johnson v. Department of Health & Human Services, 93 M.S.P.R.
      38, ¶¶ 9-11 (2002), the Board found that the Government’s interests and
      reputation were implicated by the appellant’s disclosure of alleged contract
      violations and illegal employment practices by a Government contractor because
      the appellant claimed that agency officials ignored the contractor’s conduct.
      Finally, in Miller, 99 M.S.P.R. 175, ¶¶ 12-13, the Board found that the Federal
      Government’s interests and good name were implicated by an appellant’s
      disclosure that state officials allegedly used excessive force because the alleged
      wrongdoing occurred during the joint execution of a search warrant by those
      officials and the agency.
¶21        With this guidance, we consider the appellant’s December 2013 and
      September 2014 disclosures in turn. As explained below, we conclude that the
      appellant’s disclosures concerned purported wrongdoing by the Navajo Nation
      that implicated the Federal Government’s interests, reputation, and good name.

            The appellant’s December 5, 2013 disclosures implicated the
            Federal Government’s interests and good name.
¶22        The administrative judge acknowledged that allegations of private
      wrongdoing may constitute protected whistleblowing, citing the Board’s decision
      in Arauz and the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Aviles, but determined that the
      December 5,    2013    memoranda    regarding    the   Navajo   Nation   Forestry
      Department’s securing of a timber harvesting permit were not protected because
      the appellant had not explained why she believed that agency personnel were
      violating rules or abusing authority, or made specific allegations of wrongdoing
      by agency officials. ID at 16-17. Instead, the administrative judge characterized
      the memoranda as expressing concerns about the Navajo Nation’s conduct. ID
                                                                                   11

      at 17.      Consequently, he concluded that the appellant failed to show by
      preponderant evidence that she reasonably believed that she was disclosing any
      wrongdoing by agency personnel. Id.
¶23            The appellant argues on review that she reasonably believed the project
      along Highway 264 was covered by a 638 contract, and thus subject to the
      statutes and regulations concerning such projects. PFR File, Tab 3 at 12-13. We
      find that the appellant’s December 2013 disclosures are protected because they
      implicate the Government’s good name.
¶24            In 1868, the United States and the Navajo Tribe entered into an agreement
      that established a reservation covering, as relevant here, the area around
      Fort Defiance that was the subject of the appellant’s disclosures. Treaty Between
      the United States and the Navajo Tribe of Indians, ratified July 25, 1868, 15 Stat.
      667 (the Treaty of 1868); see McClanahan v. State Tax Commission of Arizona,
      411 U.S. 164, 173-75 (1973) (explaining that the Treaty of 1868 set aside a
      reservation for the Navajo “under general [F]ederal supervision”). The Federal
      Government, acting through the agency, generally manages and has pervasive
      control over Indian timber, land, and forests on reservation land.             See
      United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 207-09, 219-23 (1983) (discussing this
      control in the context of the Government’s 1861 treat y with the Quinault and
      Quileute Tribes, citing, among other authorities, 25 U.S.C. §§ 405-407, 466;
      25 C.F.R. part 163). Similarly, the agency has authority to grant rights-of-way
      through reservation lands with Tribal or individual owner consent.       Id. at 223
      (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 323-25; 25 C.F.R. part 169).     This control creates a trust
      relationship and resulting fiduciary obligation on the part of the Government
      toward the Indian people as to the Government’s “ management and operation” of
      these reservation resources. Id. at 224-26; see Navajo Nation v. U.S. Department
      of the Interior, 26 F.4th 794, 800, 809-12 (9th Cir. 2022) (finding that, under the
      Treaty of 1868, the United States had an implied trust obligation toward the
      Navajo Nation as it concerns its rights to access water from the Colorado River,
                                                                                       12

      which is “appurtenant to the Nation”), cert. granted, 143 S. Ct. 398 (2022)
      (No. 22-51).
¶25        Although     the   appellant   believed   that   the   timber   harvested   along
      Highway 264 was subject to a 638 contract, she was mistaken.              IAF, Tab 5
      at 19-23. Instead, the area in question was subject to a right-of-way, which gave
      ADOT the right to remove the trees. Id. at 38; HT at 170-71 (testimony of the
      appellant’s first-level supervisor). As discussed above, the agency has a fiduciary
      duty concerning the assets on the reservation land generally and the authority to
      award rights-of-way, such as the right-of-way that the agency provided to ADOT
      along Highway 264.      HT at 151, 170 (testimony of the appellant’s first-level
      supervisor); Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 223-26; e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 311, 323-35;
      25 C.F.R. §§ 169.5-169.6.      Accordingly, the appellant’s questioning of the
      activities along Highway 264 and her suggestion that the Navajo Nation Forestry
      Department had a conflict of interest in obtaining the timber from those activities
      implicated the agency’s reputation in its oversight of Indian resources and land.
      HT at 151 (testimony of the appellant’s first-level supervisor); see Arauz,
      89 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 7.

            The appellant’s September 11, 2014 disclosure implicated the
            Government’s interests and good name.
¶26        The administrative judge concluded that the appellant’s September 11, 2014
      email to a Navajo Nation Forest Manager raising concerns about the Navajo
      Nation’s proposed tree harvesting project did not constitute whistleblowing. ID
      at 17. He reasoned that the appellant failed to show that agency personnel were
      violating, or were complicit in the alleged violations of, NEPA.            ID at 17.
      We disagree.
¶27        By statute, the Federal Government has a trust responsibility for Indian
      forest lands.   25 U.S.C. § 3101(2).    Only the Secretary of the Interior or her
      designee can approve management activities on these lands, including harvesting
      timber and forest thinning.     25 C.F.R. §§ 163.1, 163.10; BIA, Indian Forest
                                                                                    13

      Management Handbook 53 IAM 2-H, Forest Management Planning, §§ 2.1, 2.4
      (2009),   https://www.bia.gov/sites/default/files/dup/assets/public/raca/handbook/
      pdf/53-IAM-2H-Forest-Management-Planning-HB_OIMT.pdf. In approving such
      activities, the Secretary must ensure the activities are compliant with applicable
      environmental laws, including NEPA. 25 C.F.R. § 163.34. Thus, the agency is
      responsible for ensuring that management activities on Indian forest lands are
      NEPA compliant.
¶28        Although not expressly stated in the record, it appears that the appellant’s
      September 11, 2014 disclosure concerned activities on Indian forest land. HT
      at 116 (testimony of a BIA Navajo Region Tribal Operations Specialist), 151-52,
      210 (testimony of the appellant’s first-level supervisor).     The BIA’s Navajo
      Region is responsible for providing services related to the activities in question,
      including reviewing and approving permits for harvesting timber.       IAF, Tab 5
      at 96-97; 25 C.F.R. §§ 163.1, 163.3, 163.10, 163.26.
¶29        In her September 2014 email, which the appellant sent to a Navajo Nation
      Forest Manager pursuant to her role as the AOTR for a proposed tree harvesting
      project on Navajo Nation land in the Assayi Lake fire area, she expressed
      concerns that the project did not comply with environmental laws and regulations.
      IAF, Tab 5 at 39-40. She put the Forest Manager “on notice” that all harvesting
      activities were obligated to meet the requirements under NEPA and other Federal
      environmental laws. Id. The appellant also noted that during a previous meeting
      with the Forest Manager, he seemed “agitated” about the appellant’s request for
      additional information to address her concerns about the project plans. Id.
¶30        In a September 15, 2014 response to the appellant’s email, the awarding
      official informed the appellant that if there were any potential problems that
      “threaten the performance of the contract, the AOTR must immediately contact
      the [awarding official] so that remedial measures may be taken.” Id. at 45. By
      suggesting the BIA may need to take actions, the awarding official acknowledged
                                                                                 14

      that the BIA’s interests and reputation in overseeing the proposed harvesting
      project were implicated by the appellant’s disclosure. Id. at 45.
¶31        Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the administrative judge erred
      when he determined that the appellant’s disclosures concerned only the Navajo
      Nation.   ID at 16-17.   Instead, we conclude that, given the BIA’s fiduciary
      relationship with the Navajo Nation, as well as the oversight role and the
      significant amount of control it had over the Navajo Nation Forestry
      Department’s functions, the appellant’s disclosures implicated the Government’s
      reputation and good name.         Miller, 99 M.S.P.R. 175, ¶¶ 12-13; Johnson,
      93 M.S.P.R. 38, ¶¶ 10-11; Arauz, 89 M.S.P.R. 529, ¶ 7.

      The appellant reasonably believed that her December 5, 2013 disclosures
      evidenced wrongdoing under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
¶32        Because the administrative judge found that the appellant’s disclosures
      did not implicate the Federal Government, he did not address the reasonableness
      of her belief that her disclosures evidenced wrongdoing under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8).   ID at 16.   We find that the appellant proved she reasonably
      believed her December 2013 disclosures evidence wrongdoing, but did not prove
      the same regarding her September 2014 disclosure.

            The appellant’s December 5, 2013 disclosures were protected.
¶33        As to her December 2013 disclosures, the appellant argues on review that
      she reasonably believed the “timber harvesting” along Highway 264 violated the
      statutory and regulatory requirements concerning the administration of the
      agency’s 638 contract with the Navajo Nation. PFR File, Tab 3 at 10-14, Tab 6
      at 7-10. As previously discussed, the appellant’s belief that improper harvesting
      was occurring rested on her faulty assumption that the land being harvested was
      subject to a 638 contract, when it was instead being harvested as a part of a
      right-of-way agreement with ADOT. Nevertheless, there is no dispute that at the
      time the appellant drafted the memoranda that made this disclosure, it was her
                                                                                     15

      belief that the land at issue was subject to a 638 contract. IAF, Tab 5 at 19-23,
      HT at 47-49 (testimony of the appellant).
¶34         The appellant’s first-level supervisor also appears to have initially believed
      that the land at issue may have been subject to a 638 contract, and only
      discovered that it was not after the appellant made her disclosure.           In her
      testimony, the appellant’s first-level supervisor acknowledged that, after the
      appellant issued the December 2013 memoranda, BIA staff in charge of
      638 contracts and BIA managers “got together . . . to figure out what was going
      on” regarding the tree harvesting occurring on route 264.         HT at 169.     She
      indicated that BIA management was concerned with potential regulatory
      violations and also whether the Navajo Nation violated their 638 contract with the
      Federal Government by issuing a permit for the tree harvesting. HT at 169-70
      (testimony of appellant’s first-level supervisor). She further testified that only
      after the BIA reviewed the contract documents and additional documents
      provided by ADOT did it discover that the land was the subject of a right-of-way
      agreement with ADOT and not subject to a 638 contract between the BIA and the
      Navajo Nation. Id.
¶35         The test for assessing the reasonableness of an appellant’s belief that her
      disclosure was protected is not based on after-acquired information; rather, under
      the statute, the test for a protected disclosure is whether the appellant had a
      reasonable belief that she was disclosing a violation of law, rule, or regulation at
      the time she made the disclosure, not in light of events or conversations occurring
      thereafter. Webb v. Department of the Interior, 122 M.S.P.R. 248, ¶ 13 (2015)
      (citing 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)).   As explained above, the appellant and agency
      management believed at the time the appellant sent her December 2013
      memoranda that the trees being cut down were on land covered by a 638 contract.
      Further, the appellant testified without contradiction that, under this contract, the
      Navajo Nation was required to follow all BIA regulations.             HT at 379-80
      (testimony of the appellant).
                                                                                   16

¶36         One of the requirements she identified in her December 2013 memoranda
      was that the BIA regional director sign off on all timber sale permits. IAF, Tab 5
      at 21. Indeed, an agency regulation and an agency handbook provision mandate
      that “permits [for removal of forest products] must be approved by the Secretary
      [of the Interior].”   25 C.F.R. § 163.26(a); see IAF, Tab 5 at 28 (reflecting the
      same requirement in an agency handbook). Therefore, we find that, at the time
      the appellant wrote the memoranda, it was reasonable for her to conclude that the
      harvesting of timber with a permit that was not signed by the agency violated this
      requirement. IAF, Tab 5 at 21, 24, 26. We conclude that the appellant made a
      disclosure of conduct that she reasonably believed was a violation of law, rule, or
      regulation under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).

            The appellant’s September 11, 2014 disclosure was not protected.
¶37         The appellant also argues on review that she reasonably believed that her
      September 2014 disclosure evidenced a violation of NEPA.         PFR File, Tab 3
      at 13-14.   As discussed above, NEPA compliance is required for timber
      harvesting on Indian forest lands.        Thus, we find that the content of the
      appellant’s disclosure could evidence a violation of law, rule, or regulation. See
      Bump v. Department of the Interior, 69 M.S.P.R. 354, 361-62 (1996) (finding that
      an appellant reasonably believed a proposed timber sale potentially violated
      Federal laws, including NEPA).
¶38         The appellant stated in her September 2014 email that “NEPA issues”
      existed with respect to the Navajo Nation Forestry Department’s proposed timber
      harvesting activity on a portion of the reservation. IAF, Tab 5 at 39-40. The
      Board has found that an employee need not wait until an actual violation of law
      occurs for her disclosure to be protected under whistleblower reprisal statutes.
      Ward v. Department of the Army, 67 M.S.P.R. 482, 488 (1995).               Such a
      requirement would mean losing an opportunity to avert wrongdoing and would
      have a chilling effect on whistleblowing.       Id.   When, as here, a disclosure
      concerns a potential violation of law, as opposed to an event that has already
                                                                                      17

      taken place, an appellant must prove that she reasonably believed the potential
      wrongdoing was real and immediate.           Bump, 69 M.S.P.R. at 361; Ward,
      67 M.S.P.R. at 488-89.     In order to strike a balance between preventing
      Government wrongdoing on the one hand and encouraging “healthy and normal”
      discussions of “possible courses of action” that may avoid such wrongdoing on
      the other hand, the determination of whether the disclosure is protected “depends
      on the facts.” See Reid v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 508 F.3d 674, 678
      (Fed. Cir. 2007).
¶39        We find, under the circumstances presented here, that the appellant has
      failed to prove that she reasonably believed any NEPA violation was real and
      imminent. Although she stated at one point in her September 2014 email that the
      Navajo Nation Forestry Department “may be harvesting trees,” it appears from
      the context of her email and other statements that she was only referencing a
      proposed tree harvesting project that was under consideration, rather than activity
      that was already taking place or imminently about to occur. IAF, Tab 5 at 39-40.
¶40        Further, the appellant’s email reflects that over the course of August 2014,
      she had been discussing the potential harvesting with the Navajo Nation Forest
      Manager and others, and had requested maps of the affected area.          Id.    Her
      September 2014 email was a summary of those prior discussions and a follow up
      request for maps. Id. She did not state in her email that she believed harvesting
      had begun or would begin before NEPA compliance was assured, id., nor did she
      testify at the hearing regarding the situation leading to her September 2014 email.
      There is no evidence in the record supporting the conclusion that the harvesting
      was about to occur or that the appellant reasonably believed it was.
¶41        Moreover, within an hour of the appellant sending her September 2014
      email to the Navajo Nation Forest Manager, he responded by providing a proposal
      for a portion of the harvesting. Id. at 39. He indicated that other activities were
      in “the planning stages and [were] currently being GPS’d,” presumably in
      response to the appellant’s request for maps.     Id.   His response supports the
                                                                                      18

      conclusion that the Navajo Nation was in the process of discussing the projects
      with the BIA and intended to comply with the law. Because the appellant has
      neither claimed, nor provided evidence, that she reasonably believed a NEPA
      violation of law was real and imminent, we find that she failed to prove her
      September 2014 disclosure was protected.

      The appellant established that her disclosures were a contributing factor in the
      agency’s decision to remove her.
¶42          The administrative judge found that the appellant proved her OSC and OIG
      complaints were contributing factors in her removal. ID at 18-19. Because the
      administrative   judge   determined    that   the   appellant’s   December 5,   2013
      memoranda were not protected disclosures, he did not make any findings
      concerning whether the appellant met her burden to prove that they were a
      contributing factor in the agency’s removal decision. ID at 16-17. We conclude
      that she did.
¶43          To prove that a disclosure was a contributing factor in a personnel action,
      the appellant need only demonstrate that the fact of, or the content of, the
      disclosure was one of the factors that tended to affect the personnel action in any
      way.    Carey v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 93 M.S.P.R. 676, ¶ 10 (2003).
      The knowledge-timing test allows an appellant to demonstrate that the disclosure
      was a contributing factor in a personnel action through circumstantial evidence,
      such as evidence that the official taking the personnel action knew of the
      disclosure and that the personnel action occurred within a period of time such that
      a reasonable person could conclude that the disclosure was a contributing factor
      in the personnel action. Id., ¶ 11.
¶44          Here, the timing prong of the knowledge-timing test is met because the
      agency removed the appellant just over 1 year after she submitted the
      December 5, 2013 memoranda.           See Scoggins v. Department of the Army,
      123 M.S.P.R. 592, ¶ 25 (2016) (observing that a personnel action that occurs
      within 2 years of an appellant’s disclosure satisfies the timing prong of the
                                                                                    19

      knowledge-timing test). Further, the deciding and proposing officials were aware
      of the December 2013 disclosures prior to issuing the proposal and removal
      notices.   IAF, Tab 5 at 5, 19-21, 39-40, 43-44; HT at 164-65 (testimony of
      appellant’s first-level supervisor), 313-14 (testimony of the deciding official).
      Accordingly, we conclude that the appellant has proven contributing factor.

      Remand is necessary for the administrative judge to conduct a new Carr
      factors analysis.
¶45         Because the appellant met her prima facie burden of proving that she made
      a whistleblowing disclosure that was a contributing factor in the agency’s
      decision to remove her, the burden shifts to the agency to prove by clear and
      convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel actions in the
      absence of the appellant’s whistleblowing.      5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(2); Scoggins,
      123 M.S.P.R. 592, ¶ 26. In determining whether an agency has shown by clear
      and convincing evidence that it would have taken the personnel action in the
      absence of the protected activity, the Board will consider all of the relevant
      factors, including the following factors (“Carr factors”): (1) The strength of the
      agency’s evidence in support of its action; (2) the existence and strength of any
      motive to retaliate on the part of the agency officials who were involved in the
      decision; and (3) any evidence that the agency takes similar actions against
      employees who did not engage in such protected activity, but who are otherwise
      similarly situated. Soto v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 6, ¶ 11;
      see also Carr v. Social Security Administration, 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed.
      Cir. 1999).
¶46         The administrative judge found that the agency met its burden to prove that
      it would have removed the appellant absent her OIG and OSC complaints. ID
      at 19-22. As to the appellant’s December 2013 and September 2014 disclosures,
      he separately stated that, even if protected, the agency had no motive to retaliate
      and the proposing and deciding officials credibly testified that they removed the
      appellant due to her misconduct. ID at 22. The appellant argues on review that
                                                                                        20

      the administrative judge improperly excluded from his Carr factor analysis a
      consideration of her protected disclosures. PFR File, Tab 3 at 14-17. In light of
      our findings above, we agree and remand the appeal for findings on this issue.
¶47         On remand, the administrative judge should conduct a new analysis of
      whether the agency met its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
      it would have removed the appellant in the absence of her protected
      December 2013 disclosures and her protected activities.            In conducting his
      analysis, the administrative judge should consider the agency’s combined motive
      to retaliate based on all of the appellant’s protected activities and disclosures, and
      reweigh all the Carr factors in light of the totality of the appellant’s protected
      activities and disclosures. See Whitmore v. Department of Labor, 680 F.3d 1353,
      1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding that “[e]vidence only clearly and convincingly
      supports a conclusion when it does so in the aggregate”). 6

      The appellant has not shown that the agency engaged in witness intimidation
      during the hearing.
¶48         The appellant contends that she felt intimidated by the presence of a human
      resources employee at the hearing.       PFR File, Tab 3 at 23-24.       Although the
      appellant testified that she felt intimidated at the hearing, HT at 368-69

      6
        In conducting his analysis of the third Carr factor, whether the agency took similar
      actions against similarly situated nonwhistleblowers, the administrative judge found the
      agency treated other employees similarly to the appellant. ID at 23. However, one of
      the comparators identified by the agency, an agency manager who was removed for
      sending server or router information to his personal email account and misrepresenting
      himself as a Government official, had engaged in protected activity. HT at 362-63, 365,
      367 (testimony of a human resources employee); Austin v. Department of the Interior,
      MSPB Docket No. DE-0752-13-0104-I-3, Initial Decision at 2-6, 21-22 (Apr. 21, 2017).
      Consequently, this employee was not a proper comparator under the third Carr factor.
      See Siler v. Environmental Protection Agency, 908 F.3d 1291, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
      (finding that the Board erred in considering the treatment of similarly situated
      whistleblowers under the third Carr factor). Evidence regarding his treatment may be
      relevant to Carr factor 2. Id. On remand, the administrative judge should take this fact
      into consideration in reanalyzing the Carr factors.
                                                                                 21

      (testimony of the appellant), she has not alleged or shown that other witnesses
      felt intimidated.   In any event, for the Board to find that an agency official
      intimidated a witness, an appellant must present evidence showing that the
      official threatened the witness with adverse consequences, such as disciplinary
      action, or suggested that the witness not testify or not testify truthfully.
      Gregory v. Federal Communications Commission, 84 M.S.P.R. 22, ¶ 17 (1999),
      aff’d per curiam, 232 F.3d 912 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Table). The appellant has made
      no such showing.

                                          ORDER
¶49         We remand the appeal to the Denver Field Office for further adjudication of
      the appellant’s whistleblower reprisal claim consistent with this Opinion and
      Order. To the extent appropriate, the administrative judge may adopt his prior
      findings regarding the appellant’s removal and the remaining affirmative defenses
      in the remand initial decision.

      FOR THE BOARD:

      /s/
      Jennifer Everling
      Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.