Court Opinion

ID: 9740654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:39:38.127162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:19.476032
License: Public Domain

MOSER, P.J.
(dissenting). The majority permits an interrogator to repeat in court the out-of-court statement of another witness, a statement which the majority admits cannot meet the requirements of sec. 908.03(5). *205Initially, the majority states that to be admissible under subsection (5), the recorded recollection of the proffered statement must exist in some physical form. Majority opinion at 189. Subsequently, the majority implies that there are only four prerequisites for admission under subsection (5), all of which are present. Majority opinion at 194-195.1 note however, that the "four prerequisites" listed do not include the vital "physical form" initially found to be dispositive when the majority rejected the use of the statement pursuant to sec. 908.03(5).
The majority opinion states that the recitation has "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness that are comparable to the past-recollection-recorded exception under Rule 908.03(5), Stats.," majority opinion at 192 (emphasis added), paving the way for its admission under the residual exception, sec. 908.03(24), Stats., even though the recitation itself is not admissible under Rule 908.03(5). Because this reasoning is circular, I dissent. I disagree that the recitation in question does in fact have the required "comparable guaranties of trustworthiness."
On its face, subsection (5) presents four1 "circumstantial guaranties of trustworthiness":
1) a memorandum or record,
2) the witness' knowledge of the matter of concern,
3) a showing that the recollection was fresh when the memorandum or record was made, and
4) a showing that the memorandum or record reflects the witness' knowledge correctly.
*206The memorandum or record itself is not just a formality, its existence and physical immutability guarantee that the "fresh recollection" is accurately brought before the fact-finder. The existence of a physical record is thus one of the most important circumstantial guaranties of trustworthiness to be found in subsection (5). Even more importantly, the showing that the memorandum or record reflects the witness' knowledge correctly is another, independent and important guarantee of trustworthiness. The majority substitutes the "presumptive" finding of this element by the trial court for an explicit finding, based upon record evidence. Majority opinion at 195. To blithely presume that a trial court, which erroneously admitted testimony clearly lacking one required element of subsection (5), has in fact correctly scrutinized the remaining four elements, sets a dangerous precedent with constitutional overtones for the defendant in this criminal case. I would require that the necessary comparable guarantees be supported by evidence of record and not hold, as the majority does, that the trial court presumptively found the remaining elements of subsection (5). Nothing in the record supports such a presumption. The trial court merely allowed DiMotto's testimony to stand.
Despite DiMotto's sincere and accurate (after reading the written report of the officer) reporting of the words he heard spoken by the boy, DiMotto can only assure the court that the memorandum accurately reflects the words spoken by the boy out of court. DiMotto, as former interrogator, cannot be permitted to assure the jury by his personal demeanor, credibility and current title that that statement reflects the boy's knowledge correctly. Introduction of a statement on the theoretical grounds that its trustworthiness is supported by guarantees comparable to those of sec. 908.03(5) *207requires that a reasonable substitute for all of those guaranties be present, not merely substitutes for some of them. Stated another way, I cannot accept that the focus of an exception to the exclusion of hearsay is merely an accurate physical record of an unexamined and therefore possibly inaccurate statement. See majority opinion at 195.
In my opinion, the records of the officers recording DiMotto's questioning of the boy might be permitted to augment the boy's testimony about events that he can no longer remember, pursuant to sec. 908.03(24). However, these records cannot permit DiMotto to testify about those events. At a minimum, the prosecution should be required to present the boy's additional testimony concerning his current belief that his earlier statements accurately reflected his childish perceptions at the time of the murder. Cf. United States v. Edwards, 539 F.2d 689, 692 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 984.
Finally, it is important to note that the underlying rationale for the introduction of DiMotto's recitation is lacking. This is not a case where we seek to balance a "presumed trustworthiness" against the "need for evidence." Majority opinion at 193. The prosecution was merely faced with a tactical choice: to introduce the written record of the statement (the officers' reports) after making a showing of the five elements required by subsection (5) or to present DiMotto's recitation of that statement.
In essence, the majority opinion in this case would permit members of the prosecution staff to testify to the truth underlying any statement that they had ever heard, provided someone had accurately recorded the statement at the time it was made. Such testimony cannot be allowed, under the aegis of the statutory catch-all of subsection (24) and an easily overlooked substitution *208of "presumptive trial court findings" for record evidence. Appellate decisions concerning the rules of evidence are applied in a wide variety of settings, not just difficult criminal cases. The majority opinion would require that in the future any personable witness with a refreshed recollection of accurately recorded statements could be substituted for documentary evidence. The opposing party is thereby forced to confront not the declarant, who by definition lacks memory, and possibly other attributes of reliability such as maturity, sobriety, or sanity, but the proponent's selected witness.

 Subsection (5) has an additional requirement, present recollection insufficient for testimony, which cannot be classified as a guaranty of trustworthiness.