Court Opinion

ID: 9705657
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:15:09.649712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:13.278541
License: Public Domain

VAIDIK, Judge,
concurring in result.
I concur in the majority opinion but write separately to address several issues surrounding Williams' Sixth Amendment confrontation claim.
The majority concludes that the confidential informant's recorded statements are not hearsay because they only provided context for Williams' admissions during the drug deals. I agree that the C.L's statements furnished context for Williams' admissions. I also agree that providing context is recognized as a valid non-hearsay purpose. Accordingly, many courts have held that informants' statements during controlled buys constitute contextual non-hearsay, are thus not offered for their truth, and for that reason pose no Sixth Amendment confrontation problems. See, e.g., United States v. Van Sach, 458 F.3d 694, 701-02 (7th Cir.2006); United States v. Walter, 434 F.3d 30, 38 (1st Cir.2006); State v. Smith, 162 Ohio App.3d 208, 832 N.E.2d 1286, 1291 (2005).
These decisions have drawn criticism, however, for where a defendant's confrontation rights are at issue, admitting out-of-court statements as "context" is somewhat broad and imprecise. At least one noted legal authority calls context a flat-out "bogus theory" which "threatens to undermine the right of confrontation." 30A Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice & Procedure § 6371.2 (Supp. 2010).
On the other hand, statements offered solely for context may be admissible on other, more articulable non-hearsay theories. Where an informant's remarks during an illegal sale are introduced as providing "context" for the defendant's own admissible statements, for example, the C.L's words, which are so completely integrated into the transaction itself, might be better understood and properly admitted as "legally operative conduct" or "verbal acts." Id. § 6371.2 n. 498; see also 2 Kenneth S. Broun, McCormick on Evidence § 249 (6th ed. 2006) ("Explanatory words which accompany and give character to the transaction are not hearsay when under the substantive law the pertinent inquiry is directed only to objective manifestations rather than to the actual intent or other state of mind of the actor."); 30B Michael H. Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure § 7005 (Interim ed. 2006) ("[Ilncluded in the group of statements comprising operative legal acts are assertions which relate to and characterize a particular act."); Decile v. State 516 So.2d 1139, 1139-40 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987) (C.I's statement, "I am here, I need eight," followed by defendant's response, "No problem, come inside, I get you rocks," constituted verbal act in prosecu*613tion for cocaine dealing; "[the subject statements served to prove the nature of the act as opposed to proving the truth of the alleged statements"). This may especially be the case where, as here, the State not only alleges that the defendant dealt drugs, but also charges the defendant with maintaining a common nuisance by "offering for sale" and/or "selling" narcotics. Appellant's App. p. 17.
I have written separately only to point out that, if there exists a stronger explanation as to why statements do not constitute hearsay, we should identify that reason in lieu of resorting to the "context" justification. Overuse of the context crutch may ultimately disserve Crawford and the Sixth Amendment confrontation right.
In all other respects, I concur in the majority opinion.