Court Opinion

ID: 9492890
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:52:44.825895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:32.488415
License: Public Domain

COX, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Because it appears reasonable to me that only a Brazilian court is a “court of competent jurisdiction” to determine the validity of an aircraft registration in Brazil under 14 C.F.R. § 47.37(b)(2), I respectfully dissent.
I understand our review to require substantial deference to the FAA’s interpretation of its own regulation. See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381, 2386, 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994); Interstate Brands Corp. v. Local Retail, Wholesale and Dep’t Store Union, AFL-CIO, 39 F.3d 1159, 1163 (11th Cir.1994). “Our task is not to decide which among several competing interpretations best serves the regulatory purpose” because an “agency’s interpretation must be given controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Interstate Brands Corp., 39 F.3d at 1163 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The history of this informal agency action does not support that the FAA’s interpretation of § 47.37 is merely a litigating position or a post-hoc rationalization of its action. In an October 17, 1996 letter to IAL, following IAL’s submission of the Dade County, Florida Circuit Court judgment, the FAA expressed concerns about international comity and invited further discussion regarding the judgment. The FAA formally explained its interpretation of the term “court of competent jurisdiction” to IAL in a June 23, 1997 letter. *1050Then, in its September 9, 1998 final decision, the FAA referred to the June 23, 1997 letter to provide at least some of the reasons for its refusal to register IAL’s aircraft. Thus, the FAA’s position was consistent throughout this informal adjudication, and its interpretation of the regulation was not a mere litigating position, advanced for the first time before this court. Cf. Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 156, 111 S.Ct. 1171, 1179, 113 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991) (noting that “agency ‘litigating positions’ are not entitled to deference when they are merely appellate counsel’s ‘post hoc rationalizations’ for agency action, advanced for the first time in the reviewing court.”).
The FAA’s short history of interpreting “court of competent jurisdiction” in 14 C.F.R. § 47.37(b)(2) does not undermine the level of deference due. Although the FAA has interpreted the term only twice, it has offered the same interpretation both times. See Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 897 (11th Cir.1998), vacated in 'non-relevant part by Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 119 S.Ct. 2176, 144 L.Ed.2d 540 (1999) (finding substantial deference due when the Attorney General had consistently adopted the same interpretation of a regulation); cf. William Bros., Inc. v. Pate, 833 F.2d 261, 265 (11th Cir.1987) (declining to accord deference to an administrative interpretation, in part, because a contradictory interpretation of the regulation had been offered in the past).
The FAA’s interpretation of the regulation furthers the policy behind international and U.S. law governing aircraft registration. Under international treaty obligations, “[a]n aircraft cannot be validly registered in more than one State.” Chicago Convention, art. 18, 61 Stat. at 1185. To comply with this obligation, Congress enacted a statute providing that, to be registered in the United States, an aircraft cannot be registered under the laws of a foreign country. See 49 U.S.C. § 44102(a). To administer this statute, the FAA promulgated a regulation providing that its Administrator may accept “[a] final judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction that determines, under the law of the country concerned, that the registration has in fact become invalid” as competent evidence that a foreign registration is invalid. 14 C.F.R. § 47.37. Administering this scheme, the FAA has required the “court of competent jurisdiction” to be a court in the foreign country where the aircraft is registered.
The majority faults the regulation for its internally inconsistent levels of specificity, contrasting the highly specific “official having jurisdiction over the national aircraft registry of the foreign country” of § 47.37(b)(1) with the more general “court of competent jurisdiction” of § 47.37(b)(2). The fact that inconsistent language appears between sections addressing different types of evidence from different sources, however, does not render the FAA’s interpretation of § 47.37(b)(2) unreasonable. My understanding is that we are to defer to the FAA’s interpretation if it is reasonable, not determine whether the regulation is internally inconsistent or whether its language would support another interpretation.
According to the FAA, the term “court of competent jurisdiction” implicitly includes a requirement that the court be in the foreign country where the aircraft has been registered. In light of international comity concerns, this interpretation appears reasonable. See Air One Helicopters, Inc. v. Federal Aviation Admin., 86 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir.1996) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). I do not find the majority’s interpretation of the statute unreasonable; rather, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that no deference is due the FAA’s interpretation. We must defer to the FAA’s interpretation unless an “alternative reading is compelled by the regulation’s plain language or by other indications of the [Administratorj’s intent at the time of the regulation’s promulgation.” *1051Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430, 108 S.Ct. 1306, 1314, 99 L.Ed.2d 515 (1988). Because I conclude that nothing compels an alternate reading of § 47.37(b)(2), I would affirm the FAA’s final determination not to register IAL’s aircraft.