Court Opinion

ID: 9860379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:19:54.525603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:21:42.604853
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE LINN, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the admission of evidence of a crime committed by defendant following the murder of Betty Quinn was sufficiently prejudicial to justify a reversal of defendant’s conviction and a new trial. In my view, it was not error for the trial court to admit evidence of the second criminal incident. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that this evidence was erroneously admitted, I believe the error was harmless in view of the overwhelming proof beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant murdered Quinn with a “malignant and abandoned heart.” People v. Cruz (1974), 23 Ill. App. 3d 838, 320 N.E.2d 180 (abstract). The majority correctly cites the general rules that evidence of extra-indictment offenses is inadmissible to show defendant’s propensity to commit crimes (People v. Connors (1980), 82 Ill. App. 3d 312, 402 N.E.2d 773), but that such evidence is admissible if it is relevant to show motive, intent, identification, absence of mistake, or modus operandi (People v. McCambry (1979), 76 Ill. App. 3d 314, 395 N.E.2d 129). The majority then concludes that the evidence of the Preze incident was not sufficiently similar to the crime charged to render it admissible on the issue of defendant’s intent. I agree with this holding, not because of the lack of similarity, but because evidence of a second offense may not be used to show intent to commit a first offense; such use would defeat any presumption of innocence. People v. Brand (1953), 415 Ill. 329, 114 N.E.2d 370, cert. denied (1954), 347 U.S. 959, 98 L. Ed. 1103, 74 S. Ct. 709. I disagree, however, that because evidence of the second crime was inadmissible to establish intent, it was therefore inadmissible for any purpose. The circumstances of defendant’s apprehension following Preze’s report to the police are relevant to the prosecution of the crime charged in that the gun found in his possession directly linked him to the Quinn murder. This court has repeatedly held that the State has a right to introduce evidence of the circumstances of defendant’s arrest when it forms a continuous narrative of the context of the arrest. If this narrative includes evidence of connected crimes, that evidence is necessarily admissible as part of the sequence of events, even though it implicates defendant in the commission of another crime. (People v. Tucker (1969), 118 Ill. App. 2d 136, 255 N.E.2d 31; People v. Sessions (1968), 95 Ill. App. 2d 17, 238 N.E.2d 94.) Accordingly, I would hold that there was no error in admitting evidence of the Preze incident as part of the narrative of events that led to defendant’s arrest and indictment for the murder of Betty Quinn. However, even if the evidence of the second incident should have been excluded, its admission was certainly harmless error. The State’s evidence established that the parking lot was well illuminated, and no cars or obstacles interfered with defendant’s view. After personally evaluating the lighting conditions present at the scene, the jury concluded that defendant had seen the four people standing in the parking lot, had voluntarily fired a gun in their direction, and was therefore guilty of murder. As the majority correctly states, the jury did not have to conclude that the defendant intentionally shot at Quinn in order to find him guilty of murder. “If a person voluntarily and wilfully does an act the direct and natural result of which is to destroy another’s life, the conclusion * * * is that the destruction of another’s life was intended ” * *. It is sufficient if the killer * * * is actuated, in making the assault, by that wanton and reckless disregard of human life which denotes malice. [Citations.]” People v. Wesley (1959), 18 Ill. 2d 138, 156, 163 N.E.2d 500, 509. In People v. Forrest (1971), 133 Ill. App. 2d 70, 73, 272 N.E.2d 813, 815, defendant’s attempt to shoot into a passing automobile was held to be such a “wanton and reckless disregard of human life” that his murder conviction was unanimously affirmed. In People v. Gonzales (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 233, 242, 239 N.E.2d 783, 789, the court held that deféndant’s act of intentionally shooting into a group of men from a moving car was so clearly murder that to give a manslaughter instruction would be erroneous. “It is not necessary to show that [defendant] formed an intent to kill any particular person since there can be no question but that the natural tendency of this act would be to destroy another’s life. In a situation such as this the criminal intent to murder may be implied from the character of the act.” 40 Ill. 2d 233, 242, 239 N.E.2d 783, 789. The vicious act of defendant Bar tall, strikingly similar to the acts of the defendants in Forrest and Gonzales, demonstrates that same indiffer- ence to the value of human life. One who “can coolly shoot 0 0 0 persons guiltless of any wrongdoing toward him or provocation for such attack is, if possible, worse than the man who endures insult or broods over a wrong * * * and then * * * kills his personal enemy.” Banks v. State (1919), 85 Tex. Crim. 165, 168, 211 S.W. 217, 218. In my view, defendant cannot shield himself from the consequences of his wicked and unprincipled act by objecting to admission at his trial of evidence concerning another criminal offense. The jury found defendant guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The record affirmatively indicates that this verdict was based on overwhelming evidence, and I would therefore affirm defendant’s conviction. Defendant claims the admission of other prejudicial evidence warranting reversal. I would find the claim to be without merit, since at best the claimed error was harmless in nature and additionally the evidence of guilt, in my judgment, was overwhelming.