Court Opinion

ID: 9832338
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:50:00.949959+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:45.788288
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
In our opinion in this case delivered on the 20th day of June, 1901, we held that the undisputed facts in evidence raised the presumption that the land in controversy was conveyed by James Baker to the vendors of appellees for the purpose of paying the community debts of himself and his deceased wife through whose heirs appellant claims, and there being no evidence in the record tending to contradict this presumption, appellant showed no right to a recovery, and therefore the trial court did not err in instructing the jury to return a verdict for the appellees. After a more thorough investigation we have concluded that we are not justified in holding, upon the meager statement in the record as to the recital in the deed from James Baker, that said deed conveyed the wife’s interest in said land, or was not intended as a conveyance of only the one-half interest of the said James Baker. The only statement in the record as to the contents of this deed is as follows: “Deed from James Baker to William C. and R. P. Baker, con*100veying all my right, title, claim, and interest to the locative interest, being one-fifth part of a league and labor survey in the name of Benjamin Clark, dated August 23, 1860, and acknowledged September 19, 1860, filed for record September 23, I860.”
No issue seems to have been made in the court below as to the construction of this deed, and there is no evidence in the record tending to show that it was other than what is indicated by the recital above set out, viz., a conveyance of James Baker’s interest in the land. It follows that the judgment of the court below can not be affirmed upon the ground on which our former opinion is based. If, however, upon another trial of the case the court should, under the established rules of law, conclude from a consideration of the entire deed and from the evidence as to the circumstances attending the transaction, that said deed conveyed the community interest of both James Baker and his deceased wife in said land, the evidence in this case requires that the issue as to the authority of Baker, as survivor of the community, to make said deed be submitted to the jury under proper instructions as to the presumption which arises from the long acquiescence of the heirs of Mrs. Baker in the conveyance of the land by her surviving husband.
Having reached the conclusion that the record does not present a case in which no other judgment than one in favor of appellees could have been rendered, it becomes necessary for us to consider the questions raised by appellants’ assignments of error.
We are of opinion that the plea of stale demand was not available as a defense to this suit. This is not a suit to enforce an equity against a legal title. Both parties claim title through the bond for title from McClure to James Baker, and appellees’ title which they deraign through James Baker is in no sense superior to the title claimed by appellants through the wife of said Baker. Upon the death of Mrs. Baker her title to her community interest in said land vested in her heirs. It is true that the title derived through the bond for title was equitable, but it is well settled that such title will support an action of trespass to try title, and is as potent for this purpose as a legal title. If appellant was seeking in this suit to enforce the equitable title to the land derived through the bond for title against the holder of the McClure legal title, it might be held that he had slept upon his rights for so long a time that equity would refuse him relief, and a plea of stale demand might be a complete defense to his suit. But appellees have not connected themselves with the McClure title except through the bond for title, and their title is as purely equitable as the one asserted by appellant. Where one equitable title is asserted against andther the plea of stale demand is not available as a defense, and lapse of time will not defeat the plaintiff’s title unless the defendant has held such adverse possession of the premises as will entitle him to prescribe under the statute of limitation. Scarborough v. Arrant, 25 Texas, 132; Martin v. Parker, 26 Texas, 253; Wright v. Dunn, 73 Texas, 296; Lumber Co. v. Panckard, 4 Texas Civ. App., 681.
*101The undisputed evidence shows that the lands claimed by the appellees Mrs. Alice Bickley and J. M. Chitty, and one of the .tracts claimed by J. D. Caskey, had been held by them adversely to appellants’ claim for more than ten years before the institution of this suit, such adverse possession being of the character required to support their plea of limitation, and that neither the appellant Stipe nor his vendor was under disability during any of the time in which the ten years adverse possession of above named appellees was accruing. The undisputed evidence further shows that the appellee J. D. Caskey has title to the other tract claimed by him under the five years statute of limitation. Under these facts the trial court properly instructed the jury to return a verdict for said appellees, and the judgment of the court below as to them will be affirmed. As to all of the other appellees the judgment of the court below will be reversed and this cause remanded for a new trial. Hone of appellant Stipe’s coplaintiffs have appealed, and the judgment of the court below as to them is undisturbed.
Appellees by cross-assignments complain of the action of the trial court in sustaining objections of the plaintiffs to the introduction in evidence of a judgment of the District Court of Fannin County, Texas, in case of Coleman v. Washington S. McClure et al., the execution issued upon said judgment and the sheriff’s return thereon, and the deed made by the sheriff to the purchaser at said execution. The only description in this deed of the land it purports to convey is as follows: “One certain tract or parcel of land lying and being in the county of Collin and State aforesaid, containing 900 acres, the said tract being a part of a survey made in the name of the heirs of Benj. Clark, levied on as the property of Washington S. McClure.” We think the trial court correctly held this deed void for insufficiency of description of the land •attempted to be conveyed. Wofford v. McKinna, 23 Texas, 36; Norris v. Hunt, 51 Texas, 609.
Appellees also offered in evidence a deed from A. J. Hall, the vendee in the sheriff’s deed above mentioned, to John H. Love joy, which contained the same description of the land attempted to be conveyed as said ■sheriff’s deed. This deed was, upon objection by the "plaintiffs, excluded by the court. We think there was no error in this ruling. The return on the execution under which the sale to Hall was made contains the same description of the land as the sheriff’s deed, and was therefore void for want of sufficient description of the land levied upon and offered for sale. Hall having acquired no title by the execution sale and the sheriff’s deed, could convey none to Love joy, and the deed by which he attempted to convey, like the deed from the sheriff to himself, is void for want of a sufficient description of the land, and was properly ex■cluded by the court.
We think none of appellees’ cross-assignments point out any material •error in the rulings of the trial court, and it would serve no useful purpose to consider said assignments in detail. We think it sufficient to •say that the levy and sale through which appellees seek to deraign title *102being void because of the insufficiency of description of the land levied upon and sold, no rights were acquired by the purchaser at said sale, and none of the evidence offered by the appellees and excluded by the court was material or tended in any way to show title in appellees.

Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.