Court Opinion

ID: 9640946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:19:22.51481+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:33.929289
License: Public Domain

MIRABAL, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The gist of appellee’s affidavit and deposition testimony is that he did not entrust his automobile to either Fontenot or Thomas, and that the vehicle was being operated without his knowledge, consent or permission. His testimony is uncontroverted by any direct evidence; there is no affidavit or deposition testimony from Fontenot or Thomas or anyone else stating that appel-lee did give Fontenot or Thomas permission to drive his car.
At the time of the summary judgment proceeding, Fontenot and Thomas were named with appellee as defendants, but the record does not indicate that either Fonte-not or Thomas were ever served with process. At the time of his deposition, appel-lee testified that he had talked to Fontenot on only two occasions since the accident, and that he did not know the present whereabouts of either Fontenot or Thomas.
Rule 166a(c) permits the granting of a summary judgment on the basis of “uncon-troverted” testimony of an interested witness if that evidence is “clear, positive, and direct, otherwise credible and free from contradictions and inconsistencies, and could have been readily controverted.” Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c). If the credibility of the affiant is likely to be a dispositive factor in the resolution of the case, then summary judgment is inappropriate. Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 558 (Tex.1989).
Even though there is no direct evidence contradicting appellee’s denial of having given Fontenot or Thomas permission to use his car on the date of the accident, I *366believe there is circumstantial evidence from which a fact finder might reasonably infer that Fontenot had appellee’s express or implied permission to use the automobile. Therefore, I believe appellee’s credibility is likely to be a dispositive factor, and thus that summary judgment is inappropriate.
Appellee admitted that he had had a year-long social relationship with Fontenot and that he had visited her at her apartment on an estimated 20 occasions. He also admitted that he gave Fontenot access to his car on the day of the accident. He stated he authorized Fontenot to “sit” in his car for approximately six hours, from 3:00 p.m. through the normal dinner hour to approximately 9:00 p.m. He further admitted that he kept a spare key in the glove compartment of the car, and that this key was found in the ignition after the accident. When appellee first reported his car was missing, he did not state it had been stolen, because he “really hadn’t thought about it”; instead, he told the officer that he was concerned it might have been in an accident.
Although a jury might be persuaded by appellee’s denial that he had given Fonte-not permission to use his car, it might also disbelieve appellee and instead reach the conclusion, based upon the circumstances presented, that appellee had given Fonte-not express or implied permission to use the automobile as long as she was back at the school by the time he returned from coaching the game.
The majority holds that the circumstantial evidence presented in this summary judgment record is not sufficient to raise a fact issue, citing Texas Department of Corrections v. Jackson, 661 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.). I respectfully submit that the standard of review applicable to the Jackson case is different from the standard of review applicable to this summary judgment case. In Jackson, this Court held that the circumstantial evidence was factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding of proximate cause, reasoning that the prevailing party had the burden to establish the ultimate fact of proximate cause by a preponderance of the evidence, and the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to satisfy the burden. In this summary judgment ease, the issue is whether the circumstantial evidence raises a fact issue about the ultimate fact of consent. The burden was on appellee here to demonstrate the lack of a genuine issue of material fact regarding “consent” as a matter of law, and all doubts are resolved against appellee as the movant. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678-79 (Tex.1979). A movant has met the burden if he or she produces evidence that would be sufficient to support an instructed verdict at trial. Braden v. New Ulm State Bank, 618 S.W.2d 780, 782 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
In Drooker v. Saeilo Motors, 756 S.W.2d 394 (Tex.App.—ouston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied), we affirmed a take-nothing summary judgment in favor of one defendant in a negligent entrustment suit, because that defendant’s sworn denial of en-trustment was not contradicted by either direct or circumstantial proof. Id. at 399. We reversed and remanded, however, as to the remaining defendants, because of circumstantial proof from which a jury might reasonably have inferred that those defendants had given express or implied authority to the driver of the vehicle. In that case, the circumstantial proof consisted of evidence that the employee had driven the defendants’ vehicles on prior occasions with the knowledge and consent of other employees, and that one of the defendants’ managers was aware of such use. Id. at 399. We held that such circumstantial evidence constituted “some evidence” that the defendants had authorized the employee to drive the defendants’ vehicles in general. Id. at 399; see also Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Blacksher, 477 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1972, no writ) (permission to drive a motor vehicle may be express or implied).
Here, the circumstantial proof is not as strong as the proof discussed in Drooker. However, I believe a jury could reasonably infer, from all the circumstances shown, that appellee had given Fontenot either express or implied authority to drive his auto*367mobile. Since I conclude that appellee’s credibility will likely be a dispositive factor in the case, I would hold that the summary judgment was improper.
Accordingly, I would reverse the take-nothing summary judgment, and remand the cause for trial.