Court Opinion

ID: 9372838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:01:01.947489+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:38.014007
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     BETTY WILLIAMS NORWOOD,                         DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         DC-1221-13-0830-W-1

                  v.

     SMALL BUSINESS                                  DATE: February 15, 2023
       ADMINISTRATION,
                  Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           James A. Westbrooks, Fort Washington, Maryland, for the appellant.

           Nathania Bates, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     denied her request for corrective action under the Whistleblower Protection Act

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                      2

     (WPA). 2 For the reasons set forth below, we GRANT the petition for review. We
     VACATE the administrative judge’s findings that the appellant exhausted only
     one disclosure and that it was not protected or a contributing factor in the
     agency’s decision to take a personnel action against her, and the administrative
     judge’s alternate finding that the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence
     that it would have taken that action absent the appellant’s protected disclosure.
     We REMAND the case to the regional office for further adjudication in
     accordance with this Remand Order.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant was employed as an Audit Manager in the U.S. Small
     Business Administration (SBA) Office of Inspector General (OIG). Sometime in
     or after October 2010, the appellant developed concerns about a March 2010 audit
     report that had been the subject of testimony to Congress and which she believed
     contained omissions and several inaccuracies. 3 Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 24
     at 28-29. The appellant alleges having disclosed this information to a manager in
     the Credit Programs Group (CPG), the Assistant Inspector General for Auditing
     (AIGA), and the Deputy Inspector General who responded with “we will reissue
     the report.” Id. at 29. However, the manager, after being promoted in early 2011
     to Director of the CPG, decided not to reissue the report. Id.
¶3        The appellant subsequently expressed concerns to the CPG Director about
     the sufficiency of evidence in a 2012 audit report 4 and her beliefs about the 2010

     2
      The WPA was amended by the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012,
     Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 Stat. 1465, which took effect on December 27, 2012.
     3
       SBA OIG Audit Report No. 10-10, Audit of Premier Certified Lenders in the
     Section 504 Loan Program.
     4
       The 2012 report, referenced by the appellant as the “High-Risk Lenders report,”
     appears most likely to have been SBA OIG Audit Report No. 12-20, Addressing
     Performance Problems of High-Risk Lenders Remains a Challenge for the Small
     Business Administration. See IAF, Tab 24 at 25-26.
                                                                                        3

     report. Id. at 7, 25-26. The appellant shared her concerns the next day with the
     AIGA and met with the Inspector General on March 27, 2012, to discuss her
     concerns and to request reassignment under a different first-line supervisor. Id.
     at 25-26. She followed up with a letter to the Inspector General, recounting her
     history of disclosures regarding both audit reports, disclosing that the CPG
     Director had bragged that the Deputy Inspector General had preselected her as
     Director and moved the duty station in the Director vacancy listing from agency
     headquarters to a field office location purely for the Director’s benefit, and
     alleging that the CPG Director approved a nearly $1 million payment to a
     contractor to review loans, only to later have the work entirely redone by her own
     staff. Id. at 25-30.
¶4         In July 2012, the appellant met with an Equal Employment Opportunity
     (EEO) counselor to allege that the CPG Director had subjected her to harassment
     since September 2011 because of her race, sex, and age. IAF, Tab 10 at 67-73.
     Following an unsuccessful mediation, id. at 72, the appellant filed a formal EEO
     complaint naming the CPG Director, the AIGA, the since-retired Deputy
     Inspector General, and the Inspector General. IAF, Tab 11 at 64-82.
¶5         Meanwhile, the appellant sent an email to officials in the U.S. Congress, the
     Office of Government Ethics, and the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity
     and Efficiency (CIGIE), repeating the disclosures that favoritism towards the
     CPG Director had resulted in her change of duty station to a field office, the
     decision not to retract the deficient March 2010 audit report, and the waste of
     nearly $1 million. IAF, Tab 1 at 25-28. She further alleged that because of the
     favoritism, the field office where the CPG Director worked had been allowed to
     remain open when the agency’s three other field offices were closed in
     October 2011. Id. at 26. She raised similar allegations in a separate email to the
     President. IAF, Tab 10 at 35-38.
¶6         By letter dated September 25, 2012, the CIGIE Integrity Committee
     informed the appellant that it lacked jurisdiction to address the a llegations raised
                                                                                        4

     in her email because they did not appear to involve the actions of either the
     Inspector General herself, an individual who reported directly to the Inspector
     General, or a person whose position had been designated by the Inspector
     General. IAF, Tab 1 at 33. The appellant responded by letter in November 2012
     asserting that the Inspector General, the Deputy Inspector General, the Counsel to
     the Inspector General, and the AIGA were all implicated in the actions she had
     described. Id. at 34-35, 40-41. She also alleged, inter alia, that the Inspector
     General was responsible for systemic race and age discrim ination, id. at 36-38,
     and that both the Inspector General and the AIGA had placed sensitive loan
     information at risk, id. at 39.
¶7         Responding by letter to the CIGIE Integrity Committee a month later, the
     appellant forwarded a copy of an email exchange between the CPG Director and
     the AIGA that had been copied to several other staff members. Id. at 20. The
     email conveyed the Director’s message that she was working in a back office in
     headquarters that day, and the AIGA responded with a symbol denoting a wink
     (“;-)”). Id. at 21. The appellant reported that several staff members had told her
     that the AIGA’s message was inappropriate and made them feel uncomfortable.
     Id. at 20. After the CIGIE Integrity Committee informed the appellant that the
     matter fell outside its jurisdiction, id. at 23, she reported the AIGA’s email to
     members of Congress, id. at 24.
¶8         During a December 2012 meeting between the CPG Director and the
     appellant to discuss the appellant’s performance during the prior fiscal year, the
     CPG Director told the appellant that she had received negative feedback from
     other employees about the appellant’s communication and collaboration.            On
     January 2, 2013, the appellant asked the CPG Director by email to identify the
     source of the negative feedback. The CPG Director responded with the names of
     two offices within SBA. IAF, Tab 10 at 84-85.
¶9         Five days later the appellant sent an email to several officials in the offices
     identified by the CPG Director, with copies to the AIGA and the CPG Director, in
                                                                                           5

      which she apologized “for any dialogue (verbal or written) that I exchanged o r
      actions that I took during FY 2012 that resulted in your perception of me as
      negative or obstructionist.” Id. at 94. She asked for their forgiveness as well as
      “any suggestions that will make for a more collaborative working relationship in
      FY 2013 and beyond.”         Id.   Having received no response, the appellant sent
      another email a week later in which she also requested “details about the specific
      dialogue and actions that I took in FY 2012 that left you feeling like you did not
      want to work with me.”        Id. at 104-05.    The day after the appellant’s second
      email, the AIGA informed her that her emails might raise an issue of auditor
      independence and/or objectivity.         Id. at 107.    He stated that he was seeking
      clarification   from   the    Auditing     Standards     Group   at   the   Government
      Accountability Office (GAO) regarding those issues, and he directed her not to
      send any further emails on the matter. Id. at 107.
¶10         The AIGA presented his concerns regarding the appellant’s independence
      and objectivity to GAO. Id. at 113-14. In a telephone conversation that was later
      confirmed in writing, an official from the GAO Auditing Standards Gr oup
      advised the AIGA that, while the appellant’s emails were inappropriate, they did
      not violate the Government Auditing Standard for Independence for either current
      or past auditing work. Id. at 125. However, the GAO official advised the AIGA
      that the appellant should not be assigned future work with the offices that
      received her emails because management in those offices could perceive the
      emails as threatening or intimidating.         Id.     On February 4, 2013, the AIGA
      informed the appellant that going forward, she was not to conduct any audit work
      involving the Office of Credit Access or its subordinate organizations.           IAF,
      Tab 1 at 53.
¶11         In the meantime, in January 2013, the appellant had forwarded her
      correspondence with CIGIE to the congressional committees with jurisdiction
      over the inspector general system. Id. at 24. The appellant also filed a complaint
      with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) on February 13, 2013, in which she
                                                                                            6

      alleged retaliation for whistleblowing, citing the AIGA’s decision to restrict her
      ability to perform certain audit work as an act of retaliation.           IAF, Tab 11
      at 44-59.
¶12         In April 2013, OSC informed the appellant of its initial determination to
      close its file regarding her complaint. IAF, Tab 1 at 89. In a written response to
      OSC’s determination that she had not provided enough specific information
      regarding her disclosures, the appellant argued that her November 2012 letter to
      the CIGIE Integrity Committee and her January 2013 letters to members of
      Congress constituted protected activity under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9). Id. at 14.
      She also alleged that the AIGA’s actions restricting her audit responsibilities
      violated 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(12). Id. at 16. By letter dated May 24, 2013, OSC
      informed the appellant that her response had not provided a sufficient basis to
      alter its initial determination to close its file, and also informed her of her right to
      seek corrective action from the Board. IAF, Tab 11 at 60-63.
¶13         The appellant remained in her position and continued performing other
      audit work. IAF, Tab 13 at 20. In June 2013, following the departure of another
      Audit Manager, the AIGA reassigned the appellant to serve in the same position
      in an audit group for which she was not prevented from performing any audit
      work within the group’s jurisdiction. Id.; IAF, Tab 11 at 99.
¶14         The appellant filed this individual right of action (IRA) appeal on July 7,
      2013. IAF, Tab 1. She initially requested a hearing, id. at 2, but later withdrew
      that request, IAF, Tab 26, Initial Decision (ID) at 1. The administrative judge
      issued an initial decision based on the written record.
¶15         In her initial decision, the administrative judge found that the appellant
      established having exhausted her administrative remedies as to only one of her
      alleged disclosures, i.e., that OIG allowed an erroneous audit report to be
      published on its website, but that she failed to show that she had provided OSC
      with sufficiently clear and precise information about her remaining disclosures to
      establish exhaustion. ID at 11. The administrative judge further found that the
                                                                                             7

      appellant nonfrivolously alleged that her disclosure was protected and that it was
      a contributing factor in the AIGA’s decision to restrict the scope of the audit
      work the appellant could perform beginning in February 2013, and that therefore
      the appellant had established Board jurisdiction over her IRA appeal.                 ID
      at 10-12. However, on the merits of the appeal, the administrative judge found
      that the appellant failed to prove by preponderant evidence that her audit report
      disclosure was protected or that it was a contributing factor in the personnel
      action at issue. ID at 13-15. The administrative judge further found that the
      agency established by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the
      same action absent the appellant’s disclosure.        ID at 15-17.    Accordingly, the
      administrative judge denied the appellant’s request for corrective action. 5          ID
      at 17.
¶16            The appellant filed a timely petition for review of the initial decision, in
      which she challenges several of the administrative judge’s factual findings .
      Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 5-11. She argues that the administrative
      judge failed to properly consider additional disclosures, id. at 11-14, and she
      challenges the administrative judge’s findings that she failed to prove that her
      disclosure was protected or that it was a contributing factor in the personnel
      action, id. at 14-15. Finally, the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s
      finding that the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would
      have taken the personnel action absent her disclosure. Id. at 15-17. The agency
      has responded in opposition to the petition for review, PFR File, Tab 3, and the
      appellant has filed a reply, PFR File, Tab 4.

      5
        Although the order language at the end of the initial decision indicates that the IRA
      appeal was dismissed, ID at 18, it is apparent from the administrative judge’s finding of
      jurisdiction that the actual disposition of the appeal was a denial of the appellant’s
      request for corrective action on the merits.
                                                                                            8

                                          ANALYSIS 6
¶17         The Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the appellant has
      exhausted   administrative    remedies    before   OSC    and   makes    nonfrivolous
      allegations that:    (1) she engaged in whistleblowing activity by making a
      protected disclosure; and (2) the disclosure was a contributing factor in the
      agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel action. Yunus v. Department
      of Veterans Affairs, 242 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In an IRA appeal, the
      standard for establishing subject matter jurisdiction and the right to a hearing is
      an appellant’s merely asserting a nonfrivolous claim, while the standard for
      establishing a prima facie case is that of preponderant evidence.            Langer v.
      Department of the Treasury, 265 F.3d 1259, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2001). When an
      appellant meets her burden to establish a prima facie case of reprisal for
      whistleblowing, the burden shifts to the agency to prove by clear and convincing
      evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action(s) absent the
      appellant’s whistleblowing. Scoggins v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R.
      592, ¶ 26 (2016).

      The appellant fully exhausted all her claims before OSC and established the
      Board’s jurisdiction over her appeal.
¶18         The Board has recently clarified the substantive requirements of exhaustion.
      Chambers v. Department of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶¶ 10-11. The
      requirements are met when an appellant has provided OSC with sufficient basis to
      pursue an investigation. The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those issues that
      have been previously raised with OSC. However, an appellant may provide a
      more detailed account of whistleblowing activities to the Board than she did to
      OSC. An appellant may establish exhaustion through her initial OSC complaint,
      evidence that she amended the original complaint, including but not limited to

      6
        We have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted since the filing of this appeal and
      find that it does not impact the outcome.
                                                                                          9

      OSC’s determination letter and other letters from OSC referencing any amended
      allegations, and the appellant’s written responses to OSC referencing the
      amended allegations. An appellant may also establish exhaustion through other
      sufficiently reliable evidence, such as an affidavit or declaration attesting that the
      appellant raised with OSC the substance of the facts in the Board appeal. Id.
¶19         Here, while the administrative judge correctly found that the appellant
      established exhaustion before OSC regarding her disclosure of the erroneous audit
      report, the administrative judge further found that the appellant “failed to show
      that she provided OSC with sufficiently clear and precise information about her
      remaining disclosures.” ID at 11. The administrative judge recognized that OSC
      acknowledged receiving additional information in response to its initial
      determination, but she found that the appellant failed to establish what that
      additional information comprised. ID at 7. However, it appears that the appellant
      included with her initial MSPB appeal copies of her additional disclosures as
      attachments to her response to OSC’s initial determination.        IAF, Tab 1 at 12,
      17-45. We find that the appellant’s submissions were adequate to provide OSC
      with a sufficient basis to pursue an investigation. Accordingly, we find that the
      appellant fully exhausted all her claims before OSC.
¶20         We agree with the administrative judge that the appellant nonfrivolously
      alleged that she made at least one protected disclosure that was a contributing
      factor in the challenged personnel action.        ID at 11-12.     Accordingly, the
      administrative judge properly found that the appellant establ ished jurisdiction
      over her IRA appeal.

      The appellant established that she made protected disclosures.
¶21         On the merits of the appellant’s reprisal claims, the administrative judge
      found that the appellant failed to establish either that her disclosures about the
      erroneous 2010 audit report were protected or that they were a contributing factor
      in the AIGA’s decision to restrict the scope of the appellant’s audit work
      beginning in February 2013. ID at 12-15. Having found that the appellant failed
                                                                                        10

      to exhaust her administrative remedies as to her other disclosure s, the
      administrative judge did not address those disclosures on the merits.
¶22         In considering whether the disclosures about the deficient 2010 audit report
      were protected, the administrative judge found that the appellant did not establish
      by preponderant evidence that she reasonably believed that her disclosures
      evidenced any violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or gross mismanagement,
      a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger
      to public health or safety. ID at 13-14; see 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A). In part, the
      administrative judge relied on the Department of Transportation (DOT) OIG
      employees’ finding that the 2010 report at issue in this appeal did not need to be
      recalled and reissued. ID at 13. However, any such finding by the DOT OIG is
      not dispositive of whether the appellant’s initial belief—that posting an erroneous
      report constituted a rule violation—was reasonable. IAF, Tab 24 at 7. As SBA’s
      OIG itself noted in its pleadings, its audits must “comply with standards
      established by [GAO’s] Comptroller General.” Id. at 10. We find that the GAO
      audit standards constitute “rules” for the purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). A
      central pillar of the GAO auditing standards is reducing “the risk that auditors
      will not detect a mistake, inconsistency, significant error, or fraud in the evidence
      supporting the audit,” and “[a]uditors should determine the overall sufficiency
      and appropriateness of evidence to provide a reasonable basis for the findings and
      conclusions[.]”   GAO, Government Auditing Standards, GAO-12-331G, ch. 6,
      ¶¶ 6.05,   6.69    (Dec.    2011),    https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-12-331g.pdf.
      Additionally, SBA’s OIG has its own audit policies, which we find also constitute
      “rules” for the purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). IAF, Tab 1 at 77.
¶23         Moreover, that SBA OIG engaged DOT OIG for a “special quality
      assessment review” through the lens of its 2010 auditing policies and procedures
      indicates that the appellant’s concerns were not unreasonable. IAF, Tab 24 at 7,
      20-21, 31-32. That the appellant’s disclosures regarding the report resulted in
      remedial revisions to the SBA OIG’s audit process further highlights the
                                                                                           11

      significance of the issues she raised. Id. at 20-21, 32. Furthermore, the appellant
      alleged that the SBA OIG had provided misleading testimony to Congress based
      on the report. Id. at 28-29. The same criminal statute prohibiting “materially
      false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement[s] or representation[s]”            to OIG
      employees, or “falsif[ying], conceal[ing], or cover[ing] up by any trick, scheme,
      or device a material fact,” applies to OIG employees themselves—both in their
      reports and their appearing before Congress. 7 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a). We therefore
      find that the appellant established by preponderant evidence that a reasonable
      person could believe—particularly prior to receiving the results of the DOT OIG
      review—that her disclosures about the audit reports evidenced a violation of law,
      rule, or regulation, and that those disclosures were thereby protected. 8

      Remand is necessary to determine if the appellant has established that her
      protected disclosures were a contributing factor in the agency’s taking a covered
      personnel action against her.
¶24         The term “contributing factor” means any disclosure that influences an
      agency’s decision to threaten, propose, take, or not take a personnel action
      regarding the individual making the disclosure.         Usharauli v. Department of
      Health   and   Human     Services,    116 M.S.P.R.    383,   ¶ 31   (2011);    5 C.F.R.
      § 1209.4(d). The most common way of proving the contributing factor element is
      the “knowledge/timing test.”         Chavez v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      120 M.S.P.R. 285, ¶ 27 (2013). Under that test, an appellant can prove that a
      disclosure was a contributing factor in a personnel action through evidence that
      the official taking the personnel action knew of the whistleblowing disclosure and
      took the personnel action within a period of time such that a reasonable person
      7
        Significantly, whether the 2010 report needed to be recalled appears to have hinged on
      whether the omissions and inaccuracies were “material” to the report’s findings and
      recommendations. IAF, Tab 24 at 20, 31-32.
      8
        With this finding, we need not decide whether the appellant’s subsequent disclosures
      to CIGIE and to Congress, which took place after the DOT OIG review found it
      unnecessary to reissue the 2010 report, were protected.
                                                                                     12

      could conclude that the disclosure was a contributing factor in the personnel
      action. Id. Satisfying the knowledge/timing test demonstrates that a protected
      disclosure was a contributing factor in a personnel action.          Gonzalez v.
      Department of Transportation, 109 M.S.P.R. 250, ¶ 20 (2008).
¶25        The appellant indicated in her OSC complaint that the AIGA knew about
      her disclosures to CIGIE and Congress through the Inspector General.         IAF,
      Tab 11 at 57-58. The Inspector General declared under penalty of perjury that
      she learned of allegations to the CIGIE Integrity Committee based on a letter
      from the committee, but that it did not identify the individual who made the
      allegations. IAF, Tab 24 at 33. The AIGA declared under penalty of perjury that
      he was not aware of the appellant’s disclosures until she appealed to the Board.
      IAF, Tab 13 at 20. The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to
      prove that anyone who was involved in the personnel action was aware of her
      disclosures before that action was taken. ID at 14-15. On review, the appellant
      argues that both the Inspector General and the AIGA must have known about her
      disclosures earlier, in part because they were both heavily involved in CIGIE
      activities. PFR File, Tab 1 at 15. She also argues that the Inspector General must
      have known about her disclosures to Congress because the Inspector General was
      “confirmed by Congress.” Id. However, there is no evidence that either official
      was involved in the CIGIE Integrity Committee to which the appellant made her
      disclosures, nor is there evidence that anyone who was involved in CIGIE
      activities necessarily would have been aware of those disclosures.      Similarly,
      there is no evidence that Congress would have shared the appellant’s disclosures
      with the Inspector General simply because she had been confirmed.
¶26        Nevertheless, the aforementioned communications outside of the appellant’s
      agency were not her first disclosures about the deficiencies in the 2010 audit
      report. Specifically, the appellant’s interactions with the CPG Director on the
      issue began in 2011.   IAF, Tab 24 at 29.    As recounted by the administrative
      judge, the appellant alleged having shared her concerns with the CPG Director
                                                                                     13

      and the AIGA at least as early as February 2012. ID at 4; IAF, Tab 24 at 25-26.
      Subsequently, the appellant met with the Inspector General to discuss the
      allegedly deficient audits and other concerns, and she followed up with a letter.
      IAF, Tab 24 at 25; ID at 4.      Overall, as the SBA OIG acknowledges in its
      pleadings, the agency “was well aware of Appellant’s concerns prior to her
      disclosure of the same concerns to the CIGIE Integrity Committee.” IAF, Tab 24
      at 20. Accordingly, we find that the appellant did in fact put her supervisors on
      notice of her disclosures about deficient audits.      We further find that the
      personnel action that the agency took on February 4, 2013—that is, the AIGA’s
      decision informing the appellant that she was no longer to conduct any audit work
      involving the Office of Credit Access or its subordinate organizations —occurred
      within a period of time such that a reasonable person could conclude that the
      appellant’s protected disclosures were a contributing factor in that personnel
      action.   Thus, we find that, under the knowledge/timing test, the appellant
      established that her disclosures regarding the erroneous audit report were a
      contributing factor in the personnel action taken against her.        Mastrullo v.
      Department of Labor, 123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶¶ 18, 21 (2015).
¶27         The final hurdle to the appellant’s establishing a prima facie showing of
      retaliation for whistleblowing is to prove that the agency’s action is a covered
      personnel action. As is relevant here, a “personnel action” is defined under the
      WPA as a significant change in duties, responsibilities , or working conditions.
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii).   As noted, the personnel action at issue is the
      agency’s decision that the appellant was not to conduct any further audit work
      involving the Office of Credit Access or its subordinate organizations.
¶28         To meet the burden of proof in this regard, the appellant must provide
      sufficient information and evidence for the Board to determine whether the
      agency’s alleged action or actions were “significant.” See Shivaee v. Department
      of the Navy, 74 M.S.P.R. 383, 388-89 (1997). The Board has recently clarified
      this requirement, stating that only agency actions that, individually or
                                                                                         14

      collectively, have practical and significant effects on the overall nature and
      quality of an employee’s working conditions, duties, or responsibilities will be
      found to constitute a covered personnel action under section 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii).
      Skarada v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 16.
¶29        The administrative judge failed to make a finding on this issue . Given the
      Board’s recently-issued guidance and the findings we have made above, we deem
      it appropriate to remand this case to allow the administrative judge to determine
      if the appellant has established that she suffered a significant change in duties,
      responsibilities, or working conditions when, beginning on February 4, 2013, the
      agency restricted her ability to perform certain audit work. 9 If, on remand, the
      administrative judge finds that the appellant has failed to establish that she
      suffered a covered personnel action under section 2302(a)(2)(A)(xii), the
      administrative judge shall issue a new initial decision denying corrective action.
      If, however, the administrative judge finds that the appellant does make such a
      showing, thereby establishing a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation, the
      administrative judge must then determine if the agency has established by clear
      and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action
      absent the appellant’s protected disclosures. 10 Scoggins, 123 M.S.P.R. 592, ¶ 28.

      9
       The administrative judge may, in her discretion, allow the parties to present further
      documentary evidence on this issue.
      10
         If necessary, the administrative judge shall consider whether the additional
      disclosures we have found were exhausted with OSC, including inappropriate behavior
      by the AIGA, were protected and a contributing factor to the covered personnel action.
                                                                               15

                                       ORDER
¶30        The appeal is remanded for further adjudication in accordance with this
      Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                /s/ for
                                            Jennifer Everling
                                            Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.