Court Opinion

ID: 9491401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:13:16.347599+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:43.294097
License: Public Domain

LOKEN, Circuit Judge,
with whom BEAM, Circuit Judge, joins,
concurring:
I agree with Judge Beam that we should simply dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Mr. Mandaniei lacks standing to appeal. Judge MeMillian has concluded that some discussion of the merits is in order. He then goes on to propose that whenever an independent counsel is conducting grand jury proceedings, the district court must investigate any charge that the independent counsel is tainted by an apparent political conflict of interest. With all due respect, I believe this startling proposition is sufficiently misguided — both legally and historically — to require a response.
Judge MeMillian cites no federal authority for his proposed rule. In fact, it is contrary to the Independent Counsel Act and the statutes and regulations governing other federal prosecutors. Initially, the Independent Counsel Act had no provisions regulating independent counsel conflicts of interest. In 1987, the Department of Justice announced that independent counsel were subject to federal conflict-of-interest laws as Department employees. Congress, rebelling at what some viewed as “a back-door assault on the independent counsel law,”24 amended the statute in 1988. First, Congress added 28 U.S.C. § 594(i), which declares independent counsel separate from the Department of Justice for these purposes. Of greater significance here, Congress added 28 U.S.C. § 594(j), which contains specific “standards of conduct applicable to independent counsel.” This statute places specific conflict-of-interest restrictions on permissible outside employment for a private attorney while serving as independent counsel, and on the clients that a former independent counsel may represent for one to three years after his or her duties as independent counsel terminate. Congress did not in this statute place any limitations on an independent counsel’s political activities. It appears that Mr. Mandaniei has never accused Independent Counsel Starr of even an arguable violation of this controlling statute.
Although independent counsel are not Department of Justice employees, they are directed, “except to the extent that to do so would be inconsistent with the purposes of this chapter, [to] comply with the written or other established policies of the Department of Justice respecting enforcement of the criminal laws.” 28 U.S.C. § 594(f).25 Thus, in looking at the question of an independent counsel’s political conflicts of interest, any standards governing other federal prosecutors are relevant, particularly because the federal statute addressing this subject, 28 U.S.C. § 528, was enacted as part of the Ethics in Government Act, the statute that first authorized the appointment of independent counsels. Section 528 directs the Attorney General to:
promulgate rules and regulations which require the disqualification of any officer or employee of the Department of Justice, including a United States attorney ... from participation in a particular investigation or prosecution if such participation may result in a personal, financial, or polit*753ical conflict of interest, or the appearance thereof.
In response, the Attorney General promulgated 28 C.F.R. § 45.2 (formerly 28 C.F.R. § 45.735-4), which provides in relevant part:
(a) Unless authorized under paragraph (b) of this section, no employee shall participate in a criminal investigation or prosecution if he has a personal or political relationship with:
(1) Any person or organization substantially involved in the conduct that is the subject of the investigation or prosecution; or
(2) Any person or organization which he knows has a specific and substantial interest that would be directly affected by the outcome of the investigation or prosecution.
(e) For the purposes of this section:
(1) Political relationship means a close identification with an elected official, a candidate (whether or not successful) for elective, public office, a political party, or a campaign organization, arising from service as a principal adviser thereto or a principal official thereof.
This is a narrow definition of a disqualifying political conflict of interest. By no stretch of the imagination does Independent Counsel Starr have a “political relationship” with Pep-perdine University or publisher Seaife within the meaning of § 528(c)(1). And it is nearly as preposterous to speculate that Pepperdine or even Seaife has a “specific and substantial interest” that would be “directly affected” by Mr. Starr’s grand jury investigations. Thus, the rule proposed by Judge McMillian finds no support in the most pertinent federal statutes and regulations.
Looking at the question more broadly, it is not surprising that federal law does not restrict or disqualify prosecutors on the basis of vaguely defined political conflicts of interest. Judge McMillian’s proposal seems premised on the notion that prosecutors should be subject to the same eonflict-of-interest standards as judges. But that ignores the very different public functions these officeholders perform. As the Supreme Court explained in Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248-50, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980):
Prosecutors need not be entirely “neutral and detached.” In an adversary system, they are necessarily permitted to be zealous in their enforcement of the law.... Prosecutors are also public officials; they too must serve the public interest_ [Tjraditions of prosecutorial discretion do not immunize from judicial scrutiny cases in which the enforcement decisions of an administrator were motivated by improper factors or were otherwise contrary to law.... But the strict requirements of neutrality cannot be the same for ... prosecutors as for judges, whose duty it is to make the final decision and whose impartiality serves as the ultimate guarantee of a fair and meaningful proceeding in our constitutional regime.
(Citations omitted.) For these reasons, prosecutor disqualification eases have primarily focused on issues specifically addressed in 28 U.S.C. § 594(j) — whether the prosecutor, or a private party who is a client of the prosecutor, has a direct personal or financial interest in the criminal proceeding at issue. Cf. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 805-08, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987).
As even a brief look at history will confirm, judicial reluctance to question a prosecutor’s political background or views is even more important in the type of criminal proceeding at issue in this case, the investigation of corruption and other misconduct by high-ranking government officials. The Independent Counsel Act reflects congressional recognition that effective investigation of ongoing misconduct requires prosecutors who “enjoy some measure of independence from the Executive Branch.” In Re Olson, 818 F.2d 34, 42 (D.C.Cir.1987). The impetus for aggressive investigations has usually come from an officeholder’s political opposition.26 *754Therefore, it is not surprising that some of our most well-known and successful corruption fighters have been investigators and prosecutors who brought to the task highly partisan backgrounds and strong personal political ambitions.
For example, a congressional investigation into the Gold Panic scandal during the Grant Administration was led by Republican James A. Garfield, later President of the United States. In the 1920’s, after being forced by a special act of Congress to investigate the Teapot Dome scandal, President Coolidge chose as investigators Democratic Senator Atlee Pomerene, then running for reelection,27 and Republican attorney Owen Roberts, who later became an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. In the early 1930’s, New York City’s Tammany Hall machine was broken by the relentless investigations of Judge Samuel Seabury, a long-time Democratic political activist who blamed the Tammany machine for his unsuccessful campaign for Governor of New York in 1916.28
Another famous investigator was the highly partisan Thomas E. Dewey, who actively sought appointment as a New York prosecutor to investigate mob criminal activity in 1935. “[F]rom the outset, Dewey and his allies saw the prosecutor’s post as a stepping-stone to the governorship and the White House,” and it was widely suspected that Dewey’s mentor, United States Attorney George Medalie, promoted Dewey for the position to gain control of the Republican party.29 After a long delay, Dewey was “reluctantly designated” by the Democratic Governor,30 Driven by ambition, Dewey pushed his staff relentlessly, searched for a case “that would bring glory to his investigation,” and in the process incited Mayor La Guardia to fits of jealousy. Ultimately, however, Dewey brought down bootlegger Waxey Gordon, various mafia loan sharks, and Lucky Luciano, feats which no other New York prosecutor had even dared.31 Republican Dewey’s prosecutorial fame later helped him become Governor of New York, and he made three unsuccessful runs for the Presidency, losing narrowly to President Truman in the 1948 presidential election.
Yet another well-known example of a politically active prosecutor who furthered his political career by successfully fighting official misconduct was “Big Jim” Thompson, the Republican County Attorney who in the early 1970’s investigated corruption by Democratic Chicago politicians and a United States Circuit Judge. Success in indicting and convicting members of Mayor Daley’s machine helped propel Thompson to the governor’s mansion and national political prominence.
Just as successful investigators of the past were usually political activists, the government officials under investigation invariably sought to undermine their efforts with charges that the investigations were tainted *755by partisan politics. The Teapot Dome scandal was shrouded in partisan debate. Democrats initiated the call for investigation and used congressional hearings to attack Republicans, for example, by staging debates with empty Republican chairs demanding to know more of the crisis.32 Conversely, investigators Roberts and Pomerene endured numerous attempts by the Republican administration to sabotage the investigations. At the Departments of Justice and the Navy, books were unavailable, requests for information ignored, witnesses could not recall key information, and on occasion sensitive materials had to be taken by force.33 Pomerene and Roberts ultimately won convictions, but the accused maintained they were victims of shrewd maneuvering by Democrats who had railroaded them into jail.34
Judge Samuel Seabury also found that entrenched political power rarely gives ground without a fight. When Tammany Hall’s initial roadblocks caused Seabury to intensify his investigations, those in power — -from Mayor Jimmy Walker down to the lowest City clerk — responded by blocking Seabury’s staff, cutting his budget, and forcing him to get court orders to obtain records.35 Judge Seabury’s investigations were assailed by Democrats and Republicans alike, whenever it suited their own political agendas. A common Tammany Hall tactic was to attempt to turn Seabury’s investigation into a political battle.36 Similarly, attorneys opposing prosecutor Thomas Dewey found it useful during closing arguments to tell jurors that Dewey was really running for Governor of New York.37 And when Jim Thompson prosecuted Judge Otto Kerner, a former Illinois Governor and Mayor Daley confidante, Kerner claimed he was the victim of a political witch hunt, while others claimed that President Nixon was seeking revenge from Illinois Democrats because he failed to carry the State in I960.38 A plethora of interviews, articles, and books painted Thompson as a politically motivated opportunist, and similar allegations were leveled by Cook County Clerk Edward Barrett after his conviction.39
History’s message is clear — investigating misconduct by those in high office is bruising political work. That message is confirmed by our more recent experience under the Independent Counsel Act. Targets from both political parties have invariably decided that the best way “to blunt the political damage posed by an investigation is to attack as biased the [independent counsel], or the judges that appointed him.”40
The question, then, is whether the judiciary should interfere in this process in the manner suggested by Judge McMillian and Judge Eisele, mounting judicial investigations of independent counsel whenever a citizen identifies an apparent political conflict of interest. In my view, the answer is a resounding no. America has benefitted from a long tradition of investigators and prosecutors who have zealously worked to uproot deeply entrenched official misconduct. Some of the most successful were activists with well-publicized political ambition. Most were derided for harboring partisan viewpoints and personal ambition. Such charges are to be expected when the political stakes are high. The very reason political activists are effective prosecutors is because of their “impure” political motives. Conversely, the worst corruption occurs when one political party is dominant, precisely because a healthy political opposition will stimulate investigation and, if needed, reform.41 If judges undertake to “investigate the investigators,” using vague standards such as ap*756parent political conflict of interest,42 it will inevitably politicize the judiciary and weaken legitimate efforts to weed out misconduct.
If independent counsel are to accomplish the purposes for which successive Congresses have created and consistently supported that Office, general allegations of partisanship, past political activity, and future political ambition cannot be grounds to disqualify an independent counsel or to launch a distracting judicial investigation. Of course, the judiciary must intervene when any prosecutor has a personal or financial conflict of interest in a particular prosecution, or otherwise infringes the rights of a criminal defendant or a target of a grand jury investigation. But Mr. Mandanici brings no such specific charges. He simply wants the judiciary to shackle this independent counsel to serve his own political goals. There is nothing wrong with citizen Mandanici having a political agenda. But it would be wrong, that is, unsound in both theory and practice, for the judiciary to provide a forum to further that political agenda. The district court was wise not to take action on his complaints.

. Beth Nolan, Removing Conflicts from the Administration of Justice: Conflicts of Interest and Independent Counsels under the Ethics in Government Act, 79 Geo. L.J. 1, 29 (1990).

. Independent counsel are also "special Government employees” for purposes of the federal crimes relating to bribery, graft, and conflicts of interest. See 18 U.S.C. § 202(a). There has been no allegation that ■ Independent Counsel Starr has violated any of those criminal statutes.

. Independent counsel before and after Mr. Starr have usually been chosen from the opposing political party. The first independent counsel, Archibald Cox, had been Solicitor General in the Johnson Administration. The Honorable J. Harvie Wilkinson & The Honorable T.S. Ellis, *754The Independent Counsel Process: Is It Broken and How Should It Be Fixed?, 54 Wash. & Lee Rev. 1515, 1539 (1997). Republican Arthur Christy investigated President Carter’s Chief of Staff, Hamilton Jordan. Constance O’Keefe & Peter Safirstein, Fallen Angels, Separation of Powers, and the Saturday Night Massacre: An Examination of the Practical, Constitutional, and Political Tensions in the Special Prosecutor Provisions of the Ethics in Government Act, 49 Brook. L.Rev. 113, 124 n. 51 (1982). The Clinton Administration appointed Republican Robert Fiske to investigate the death of Vincent Foster. Gerard E. Lynch & Philip K. Howard, Special Prosecutors: What's the Point?, Washington Post, May 28, 1995, at C7.

.It was believed that Pomerene’s "prominence as co-counsel in the [case] would help him” in the election, but ironically he was defeated by a Harding Administration friend and defender. M.R. Werner & John Starr, Teapot Dome 211 n. 1 (1973). Pomerene remained active in politics. He withdrew as a Democratic candidate for President in 1928 in favor of Alfred E. Smith and was later appointed by President Hoover to chair the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in 1932.

. Corruption fighter Seabury was a Franklin Roosevelt rival for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1932. He became Mayor Fiorello La Guardia’s trusted advisor and made another unsuccessful run for Governor in 1934. Herbert Mitgang, The Man Who Rode the Tiger 335 (1963).

. Mary M. Stolherg, Fighting Organized Crime, 65 (1995).

. Rupert Hughes, Attorney for the People, 60 (1940).

. Stolberg, supra note 29, at 99, 107-08, 116.

. Burl Noggle, Teapot Dome: Oil and Politics in the 1920’s, 167-68 (1962).

. Werner & Starr, supra note 27, at 161-68.

. Werner & Starr, supra note 27, at 280.

. Mitgang, supra note 28, at 196-97.

. Mitgang, supra note 28, at 224 — 226, 259.

. Stolberg, supra note 29, at 148.

. HankMessick, The Politics of Prosecution, 102 (1978); Robert E. Hartley, Big Jim Thompson of Illinois 43 (1979).

. Hartley, supra note 38, at 55, 59.

. Julie O’Sullivan, The Independent Counsel Statute, 33 Am.Crim. L.Rev. 463, 464 (1996).

. George C.S. Benson, Political Corruption in America 65 (1978).

. Judge McMillian argues that I have inaccurately characterized his concerns as being limited to Mr. Starr’s apparent political conflict of interest. See ante p. 11, note 15. It is true that Judge Eisele’s opinion focused on Starr's alleged "personal, financial, and career interests." But in this situation, Mr. Mandanici's assertion of a personal conflict of interest is nothing more than a thinly veiled attack on Mr. Starr’s perceived political ambitions, like the attacks on prosecutors Seabuiy, Dewey, and Thompson in prior years. In other words, in this context, the perceived personal conflict of interest is a political conflict of interest. Moreover, the possibility that success may enhance a prosecutor’s career and thereby lead to future financial rewards does not alter the basic nature of the alleged conflict— the prosecutor’s political views and ambitions. What Mr. Mandanici fears is that success may propel Independent Counsel Starr’s political, i.e., his personal, financial, and career advancement.