Court Opinion

ID: 9492994
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:55:07.079673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:35.417451
License: Public Domain

TERENECE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Rice should have the burden of establishing that she would have been retained if she had not been on FMLA leave. While I am not saying this issue can only be sensibly resolved in one way, it seems to me that it’s better resolved by requiring the employer to shoul-' der the burden.
When a statute is not clear, we owe deference to the interpretation by an agency charged with enforcing it if that interpretation is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron U.S.A v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Quite naturally, this principle applies to regulations of the Department of Labor. See Thorson v. Gemini Inc., 205 F.3d 370, (8th Cir.2000) (explicitly giving Chevron deference to the Department of Labor in its interpretation of “serious health condition” under the FMLA); and Price v. City of Fort Wayne, 117 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir.1997) (relying on FMLA regulations to interpret the phrase “serious health condition” with no explicit discussion of Chevron principles). Section 2614(a)(3)(B) gives employers an exemption but it is silent, and therefore unclear, as to who bears the burden of proof on the issue. Thus, the Department of Labor has promulgated regulations which state that an “employer would have the burden of proving that an employee would have been laid off during the FMLA leave period and, therefore, would not be entitled to restoration.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a)(l)(1997). Under this view, § 2614(a)(3)(B) creates an affirmative defense.
This agency interpretation of § 2614(a)(3)(B) is entirely reasonable. The FMLA provides a substantive right (a “statutory entitlement”), Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711 (7th Cir.1997), and an antidiscrimination component. Id.; King v. Preferred Technical Group, 166 F.3d 887 (7th Cir.1999). The “statutory entitlement” provisions of the FMLA should be treated, we said in Diaz, similarly to those in the National Labor Relations Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act. Under those Acts, a burden can be placed on employers to prove that a provision does not apply to them. See NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 103 S.Ct. 2469, 76 L.Ed.2d 667 (1983); Coming Glass v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974) (the Equal Pay Act); Sutton v. Engineered Systems, Inc., 598 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir.1979) (the Fair Labor Standards Act).
On a practical level, it makes sense to require the employer to bear the burden of proof on this issue. The employer is in control of the evidence. Of course, one might say that the same is true in discrimination eases, and there, to use the McDonnell Douglas model for summary judgment, the employer only has to produce evidence that there was a legitimate reason for the employment action and the employee must show that the reason given is pretextual. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). But there are problems with the approach. Even in discrimination cases, the McDonnell Douglas framework does not apply at trial. Postal Service v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983). And we have said, in a way that can hardly be misunderstood, that we disapprove of a McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach in FMLA cases, not involving discrimination. Diaz. Nevertheless, I think the majority here has allowed a McDonnell Douglas-style analysis to cast too dark a shadow over its view of this case.
What must- be remembered is that this is a labor case, not a discrimination case. Congress has given the employee the sub*1020stantive right to be treated as she would have been had she had not taken leave. She should not have to prove that the company would have provided her a certain benefit except for her taking leave. It makes sense that the company, which must produce evidence on the issue even under the majority’s analysis, should have to prove she would not have received the benefit. In short, in rejecting the Labor Department’s reasonable interpretation of the substantive provisions of the FMLA, the majority requires an analysis appropriate to discrimination cases, not to a statute that confers substantive rights. I would affirm.