Court Opinion

ID: 9484190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:43:13.720121+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:50:04.669439
License: Public Domain

PLAGER, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the judgment reached by the majority — “[bjecause the Claims Court correctly concluded that the special master’s decision ... was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, we affirm.” Opinion at 1572. Unfortunately, the explanation the majority gives for how they arrived at that judgment departs from our precedents, creates confusion about our role, and leaves litigants with the unrealistic hope that there is a second bite here at the compensation apple. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s effort at so describing the applicable law.
1.
The question about which we differ is simply this: whom do we review, and by what standard. In two lengthy textual footnotes (op. at 1574 n. 3, and 1576 n. 4) the majority tells us its answer, which at bottom seems to be that the standard is a “legal” conclusion that we review “de novo,” and from that all else appears to follow automatically. But saying something is ‘legal’ hardly defines the universe of possible consequences — a fact deter*1577mined to be such ‘as a matter of law’ and therefore presumably ‘legal’ does not thereby become less of a fact.1 Since I am unable to find thaumaturgic qualities in such labeling, I seek the answer instead in the structure and words of the statute and in its legislative history.
There are a few simple propositions that leap out of a study of this vaccine compensation legislation, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-ll to 300aa-34 (1988 & Supp. I 1989 & Supp. Ill 1991) . The statute is sui generis — it creates a federal no-fault system for compensating injuries causally connected to the vaccines given to children. (For a full discussion of the statute and its purposes, see Munn v. Secretary of Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 970 F.2d 863 (Fed.Cir.1992) ). The causal connection is presumed if the administration of the vaccine and the injury are proven to be related in time and nature as specified in 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14 of the Act (a Table Injury), or if not so related, the connection may be established by other proof.2 Id. §§ 300aa-ll(c)(l)(C)(i) & (ii); see id. § 300aa-13(a)(l)(A). In either case, the issue is heavily dependent on the particular facts and circumstances.
After first doing it differently, Congress determined that fact finding and fact concluding were to be done by a group of specialists called Special Masters, under the overall supervision of the Claims Court, now the Court of Federal Claims (CFC).3 The responsibility originally assigned to the CFC judges for making these factual determinations was taken away, see id. § 300aa-12(d)(1) (Supp. V. 1987), and Congress left them instead with a limited appellate review role, and with orders to apply a highly deferential legal standard to the review of the special masters’ fact determinations. See id. § 300aa-12(e)(2).
In Munn, this court reviewed at length this history, and concluded that our own review role in turn must be equally if not more constrained. The statute directs that we “review the judgment of the [CJourt [of Federal Claims]” — the judgment that court reaches after its review of the special master. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(f). We agreed we would review that judgment on the same highly deferential standard that that court must apply to the special masters. I understand this to mean that we look at the judgment of the CFC, we read the judge’s opinion in support of that judgment, and with regard to fact-based determinations, we defer absent a clear showing that something went badly awry.
The majority opinion in this case is based on a quite different approach. The special master’s fact determinations come in for extensive review and discussion, and while they are ultimately upheld, the court makes clear that that is only because we find them acceptable. (The work of the CFC is mentioned occasionally in passing.) The majority believes it is our duty to do a second time what the statute has specifically assigned to the judges of the CFC: review the fact-based findings and conclusions of the special masters, and decide whether they should be upheld.
2.
There are two possible models for describing the review role to be played by this court under the Vaccine Act. One is the model used in review of decisions of the International Trade Commission (ITC), which decisions come to us after they have first been reviewed by the Court of International Trade (CIT). For all practical purposes, we ignore the work of the CIT judge, and re-examine the ITC decision as if no intermediate review had occurred. See Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 1577, 1578 (Fed.Cir.1991). The other model is one similar *1578to that mandated by statute in our review of the Court of Veterans Appeals (COVA) — factual determinations are excluded from our review, so that we review questions of law only. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7292(d)(1) & (2).
Unfortunately the Vaccine Act does not tell us which is the correct model for review under the Act. The structure of the Act, the legislative history, and respect for conservation of judicial resources in a time of resource constraint all dictate something closer to the COVA model than to the CIT model. That model is the one this court laid out in Munn, and recently reaffirmed in Phillips v. Secretary of Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 988 F.2d 111 (Fed.Cir.1993). The majority, in its justification of the result in this case, and in its justification for that justification, has substantially deviated from this controlling precedent. I fear this will add confusion to the law, and serve only to encourage useless appeals.
We should accept that we have no particular expertise to add to these fact- and credibility-controlled decisions, and we should acknowledge that our role is indeed limited as Congress undoubtedly assumed it would be.4 As the data show, the initial decisions by the special masters on fact issues when affirmed by a judge of the CFC are for all practical purposes final.5
Families seeking compensation under the Vaccine Act are victims of a great tragedy — they have a seriously injured infant who will require lifetime care. The compensation program established by Congress however is limited — only those infants found as a fact to have vaccine-caused injury within the scope of the Act are eompen-sated from the fund. Congress intended the 1989 revisions to provide a “quick, flexible, and streamlined system.”6 A duplicate appellate review of the special masters’ fact-finding hardly meets Congress’ purpose, and changes little if anything in terms of outcomes.
In a thoughtful book recently published, Professor Joseph Goldstein sets out five ‘Canons of Comprehensibility’ for opinion writing.7 While his focus is on Supreme Court exposition of the Constitution, his canons are equally applicable to Courts of Appeals interpreting Congressional legislation. He urges that judges “Write with candor and clarity,” and that they “Acknowledge and explain deliberate ambiguity.” 8 Candor suggests that we acknowledge the very real limits on this court’s review of these tragic cases, so that the families of these injured infants are not led to believe that there is a realistic chance of overturning a fact-based decision against them.9 We do our part when we insure that the special masters and the CFC understand and apply the correct law as we know it. For all the reasons suggested, I cannot join the opinion which supports the judgment we unanimously reach.

. ‘Legal’ is one of those slippery legal terms, like ‘jurisdiction.’ It can be contrasted with factual, with equitable, and even with illegal. And as the majority notes, the label ‘legal’ can be invoked in explaining what is or is not a jury question, an issue hardly related to a vaccine case.

. Preponderant evidence that the injury was in fact due to a non-vaccine related cause will result in a denial of compensation. § 300aa-13(a)(1)(B).

. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, Pub.L. No. 101-239, § 6601, 103 Stat. 2106, 2286-88 (1989); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-12(c) & (d).

. See House Conf.Rep. No. 386, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 3018, 3115-3122.

. Available data as of this writing shows: out of 27 appeals to this court by disappointed claimants for compensation, in no case did we reverse a decision of a special master which had been affirmed by the CFC; in one case we vacated and remanded but only on the calculation of damages. (In two of the 27 cases no petition for review was taken to the CFC, or if taken it was later withdrawn before a decision was reached; in 3 cases we affirmed the CFC’s reversal of the special master; one of the 27 was a pre-1989 Act case; which leaves 20 cases in which the special master was affirmed by the CFC, all of which we affirmed.)

. House Conf.Rep., n. 4, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3115.

. Joseph Goldstein, The Intelligible Constitution (Oxford U. Press 1992).

. Canon 2, at 114; Canon 3, at 116.

. I appreciate that families will not often have read the opinions of this court on the subject, but I assume that legal counsel will, and will give responsible advice to their clients.