Court Opinion

ID: 9578209
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:42:53.710832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:15.930692
License: Public Domain

ROVIRA, Justice,
specially concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the court, but take exception to the dictum set • out in footnote 3 of the opinion.
Where; as here, we have expressed our agreement with the People’s position that section 18-l-405(6)(d), C.R.S.1973, contem*1053plates “any additional period of delay that may be fairly attributable to the defendant as a result of his voluntary unavailability,” and that resolution decides the issue before us, I see no sound reason for deciding the effect of another statute or rule.
In addition, I am not convinced that the argument of the People as to the applicability of section 18-1-405(3) and Crim.P. 48(b)(3) is all that unpersuasive. In an appropriate case we might wish to consider this argument, and I do not believe it prudent to resolve the question by dictum encased in a footnote.
I also take issue with the court’s statement to the effect that the result we reach is warranted because there is no indication that the defendant has suffered any prejudice as a result of the delay. The corollary to that proposition is that if the defendant had suffered prejudice then we might well agree with the trial court and dismiss the charges.
In my view, any prejudice which the defendant may suffer in these circumstances is brought about by his own acts. Failing to appear at trial and thereby violating the conditions of his bond should preclude this court from weighing or considering any prejudice which might result as a result of those acts.
A person charged with a crime who is out on bond has a duty to be present in court when required. Failure to adhere to that responsibility should not result in advantage to him.