Court Opinion

ID: 9767485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:20:24.81301+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:31.417626
License: Public Domain

OSBORN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I concur with most of the analysis in the majority opinion and recognize that much of what has been cited to us as controlling is only dicta. My dissent stems from the fact that the State did not appeal (seek a writ of mandamus) following the entry of the trial court’s order on April 18, 1989, which required the District Attorney’s Office to turn over certain statements. If the State had sought a writ of mandamus following that order, I would vote to grant the writ because the trial court clearly had no discretion under Tex.Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art. 39.14 to order the inspection and copying of written statements of witnesses. But, that is not what this case is about.
The State chose not to challenge the April 18 order. The only issue now before this Court is with regard to the order filed May 4, 1989, which deals with discovery in accordance with Tex.Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art. 39.02. The issue now is depositions, not written statements. That issue comes before us from a discretionary ruling and not one of a ministerial nature.
We are initially faced with the problem raised by the language in Dickens v. Court of Appeals For the Second Supreme Judicial District of Texas, 727 S.W.2d 542 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), where Judge Campbell in Footnote 10 noted that the Court had no authority to review a discretionary ruling in a defendant’s favor on a pre-trial motion because the State has no right of appeal in criminal actions, even if presented via an application for writ of mandamus. Yes, that was dicta and perhaps that is the reason it appears in a footnote, rather than the text of the opinion. But, even if it is dicta, today we fly into the face of that dicta with no reason to believe it cannot become a proper holding in this case.
We also must decide if the discovery order was of a ministerial nature, as opposed to discretionary or judicial in nature. *716In State Ex rel. Curry v. Gray, 726 S.W.2d 125 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) the Court recognized that the State has no adequate remedy at law to correct what it perceives as an incorrect ruling by the trial court on a pre-trial order. That brings us to the second issue — was the ruling ministerial or discretionary? The Court spoke to that issue in the Dickens case. It said:
Decisions involving discovery in criminal cases are committed to the discretion of the trial court. Quinones v. State, supra 592 S.W.2d [933] at 940 [(Tex.Cr.App.1980) ]; see Art. 39.14, supra. This Court has consistently held that the trial judge’s acts involving discovery pursuant to Article 39.14, supra, are discretionary and, therefore, are not subject to writ of . mandamus.
We must conclude that if a discovery order under Article 39.14 involves the discretion of the trial judge, a similar order under Article 39.02 also involves discretion.
Finally, I would also hold that regardless of whether the motion was sworn to properly or had an affidavit attached as required by Article 39.02, the judge’s discretion was involved, even though it may have been error to grant a motion which did not meet all of the necessary requirements of the code.
The application for writ of mandamus/prohibition should be denied.