Court Opinion

ID: 9627338
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:42:27.988805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:44.884978
License: Public Domain

DE MUNIZ, J.,
concurring.
Defendant frames his arguments here as presenting a question of merger, but the issue is more correctly stated as whether ORS 163.095(1) creates multiple crimes of aggravated murder or whether it creates the single crime of aggravated murder that may be committed in alternative ways. See State v. Kizer, 308 Or 238, 242 n 3, 779 P2d 604 (1989) (merger should be reserved for narrow situation when completion of one offense necessarily includes commission of acts sufficient to constitute violation of another statute). The answer depends on whether the legislature intended to address separate and distinct legislative concerns. State v. Crotsley, 308 Or 272, 278, 779 P2d 600 (1989). The majority concludes that there are different harms that the legislature intended to punish separately. 153 Or App at 627-28. Although I agree, for the most part, that the majority’s holding is dictated by our opinions in State v. Hessel, 117 Or App 113, 844 P2d 209 (1992), rev den 318 Or 26 (1993), and State v. Burnell, 129 Or App 105, 877 P2d 1228 (1994), were I writing on a clean slate, I would hold otherwise for the following reasons.
The answer to whether the legislature was addressing separate concerns is a question of statutory interpretation. ORS 163.095 provides that aggravated murder is “murder as defined in ORS 163.115 which is committed under, or accompanied by,” certain circumstances; under ORS 163.115, murder is “criminal homicide” that occurs when a person intentionally “causes the death of another human being.” ORS 163.005(1). Murder, thus, is the “death of another” — a single act.
*632When a defendant is convicted of aggravated murder, the sentence for murder is “complete”: death, life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole or life imprisonment. ORS 163.105. Multiple convictions for the death of one victim make no difference to that sentence. A conviction for aggravated murder mandates at least a life imprisonment with a minimum term of incarceration, now 30 years. ORS 163.105. After 25 years, even for prisoners with consecutive sentences, a parole hearing must be held. Severy v. Board of Parole, 318 Or 172, 179, 864 P2d 368 (1993); see also Norris v. Board of Parole, 152 Or App 57, 59, 952 P2d 1037, rev allowed 327 Or 82 (1998). Thus, imposing separate sentences for the separate underlying harms is without practical effect — the offender is still eligible for consideration for possible release.
Accordingly, considering the aggravated murder statute in the context of the statutory scheme of punishment for conviction of that offense, PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993), I conclude that the legislature intended to specify alternative ways that the offense could be committed but did not intend that those alternatives be separately punished.1 In dicta, the Supreme Court has suggested that that is the answer. See State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 121 n 1, 806 P2d 92 (1991) (“Although defendant was convicted of killing only one person, the jury convicted him on three different theories of aggravated felony murder, ORS 163.095(2)(d), each based on a different underlying felony.”); State v. Boots, 315 Or 572, 577, 848 P2d 76 (1993) (question before court was whether *633trial court erred in limiting retrial of the defendant to existence of aggravating factor).
In Hessel and Burnell, our controlling precedent, we did not analyze the legislative concerns in the aggravated murder statute. Instead, in Hessel we summarily concluded that there were separate statutory violations, because the counts charged violations of different statutes, each requiring proof of an element not required in any of the other counts. 117 Or App at 122.2 In Burnell, we relied, without analysis, on Hessel. 129 Or App at 109. The Supreme Court has not revisited the issue of multiple convictions and sentences since our decisions and, for now, our precedents stand. However, I am now of the opinion that, under the PGE template, ORS 163.095(1) allows the state to plead and prove a charge of aggravated murder on alternative bases, but proof of more than one of those theories where there is but a single victim does not create a separate punishable offense.

 Legislative history does not show an intention to punish the underlying felonies separately. ORS 163.095 and ORS 163.105 were both part of HB 2011 (1977). Dennis Bromka, legal counsel for the House Judiciary Committee, explained that the measure was to avert a move to impose the death penalty and attempt a responsible, yet humane, way of dealing with a person who had committed a heinous crime. He explained that the Interim Judiciary Committee had taken the crime of murder, selected some categories of murder that it determined were especially heinous, and applied a 15-year minimum sentence; the bill was to designate the time that an offender would serve for that aggravated murder. He explained that the committee had decided that the sub-categories of murder should have a strict penalty of 15 years with no work release, leave, conjugal visits or opportunity to be outside prison walls. Minutes, House Judiciary Committee, January 18,1977, p 2. That original attempt to avert the death penalty has obviously failed.

 In State v. Hessel, 117 Or App 113, 844 P2d 209, rev den 318 Or 26 (1993), there was no issue of multiple sentences. The defendant’s eight convictions were “merged into count 8 for sentencing.” Id. at 122. Here, defendant’s only challenge to the sentences is that they should not have been imposed consecutively. I agree with the majority’s analysis of that argument.