Court Opinion

ID: 9546424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:29:13.639305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:25.258132
License: Public Domain

KRUCKER, Judge
(dissenting).
I regret that I must dissent, not being able to agree with the opinion of my esteemed colleagues on the question of notice. I believe this to be a question of law and not a question of fact. It is undisputed that notice was sent to Dr. Fridena in strict and full compliance with the bylaws of the Association. This is admitted by Dr. Fridena himself in his testimony.
I believe, contrary to the majority opinion, that the Association did follow its bylaws to the letter and that any failure to receive the notice was entirely due to the fact that Dr. Fridena, through his own ac*237tions, circumvented the receipt of notice by instructing his employees not to receive registered mail and having them return the same to the post office. Dr. Fridena received these registry slips, had his employees investigate at the post office and knew that the notices were from the Association.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), cited by the majority, is not in point. In that case, the trust company failed to send notice by mail to those members of a trust fund for which it had addresses, and, instead, notified everyone by publication. The Court clearly held that those with known addresses had to be sent individual notices. Such is not the case here.
The Arizona Supreme Court has held that registered mail is a method reasonably calculated to give notice under the due process concepts, and that proof of mailing of the registered letters is compliance with those requirements, whether or not the individual actually receives the notice. Goodman v. Jones, 102 Ariz. 532, 433 P.2d 980 (1967).
In Robel v. Highline Public Schools District No. 401, King County, 65 Wash.2d 477, 398 P.2d 1 (1965), cited by the majority, a school teacher was sent regular registered mail and at least one notice of the arrival of such. She knew the customary procedures and that her employment contract was recommended for non-renewal, yet she failed to call for or request delivery of her mail. The court held her dismissal was valid and that she could not close her eyes to such notice. The majority opinion states that the instant case does not have the same compelling evidence as Robel but I disagree. In this case, formally drawn charges were sent by registered mail to Dr. Fridena, who had at one time been a member of the Ethics Committee. He knew that charges were pending because he had previously appeared before that Committee and received a letter of reprimand. Dr. Fridena asked his secretary who had been sending the registered mail and was told it was the Association. He still refused to let the office receive the mail. I think Robel is clearly in point in this case.
I strongly disagree that the Association was bound to take into consideration the peculiar eccentricities of this particular member by sending him regular mail and/or phoning him until he had actual notice. I believe the majority view stated in 39 Am.Jur. Notice § 12 is the better rule:
“When a party has information or knowledge of certain extraneous facts which of themselves do not amount to, nor tend to show, an actual notice, but which are sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man upon an inquiry * * * then the party is absolutely charged with a constructive notice. * * * A person has no right to shut his eyes or his ears to avoid information, and then say that he had not notice; he does wrong not to heed the 'signs and signals’ sent to him.”
There is some testimony that Dr. Fridena inquired of Dr. Call about the notices. Dr. Call not only denies these conversations, but I believe a board member should not deal individually with a member against whom a complaint is pending. It must also be noted that Dr. Fridena was fully familiar with the by-laws and rules of the Association and knew the registered mail from the Association had a special and important connotation. I cannot conceive of two rules coexisting, one for members who are eccentric and another for members who are not. If this were the case, any member of the Association could avoid notice by acting in an abnormal and eccentric manner in the way he handled his business and ran his office. I do not believe that the rule as to giving notice to a member, as provided for in the by-laws, should differ or be changed to fit the odd and peculiar notions of a particular member.
I concur with the majority position on the question of splitting of actions.
The judgment of the trial court in granting the writ of mandamus should be reversed.