Court Opinion

ID: 9571229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:30:01.342095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:26:21.871512
License: Public Domain

Blackburn, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
Georgia common law makes it clear that any representative of an employer’s workers’ compensation insurance carrier making safety inspections on behalf of the carrier is considered an alter ego of the employer and is, therefore, immune to any tort action other than one seeking workers’ compensation. Mull v. Aetna Cas. &c. Co.11 Georgia statutory law, which, rather than being in derogation of this common law, has in essence codified and expanded it, extends this immunity broadly to “any person who, pursuant to a contract or agreement with an employer, provides workers’ compensation bene*758fits to an injured employee.” OCGA § 34-9-11 (a). In this present action brought by an employee, Nicholas Coker, for injuries resulting from an allegedly negligent safety inspection, the defendant, Deep South Surplus of Georgia, Inc., has submitted uncontroverted evidence showing that it is an insurance service agency which, pursuant to an agreement with the workers’ compensation insurance carrier of Coker’s employer, Mayo Company, Inc., administered the employer’s workers’ compensation program and performed related safety inspections. As such, whether one applies the “any representative” standard of Mull, supra, or the “any person” standard of OCGA § 34-9-11 (a), Deep South must be considered the alter ego of the employer in this case, and it is entitled to immunity from Coker’s action based on an allegedly negligent safety inspection. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority.
To establish those rights and remedies listed under the Workers’ Compensation Chapter of the Georgia Code as the exclusive rights and remedies of an employee against (1) his employer, (2) the employer’s workers’ compensation insurer, and (3) other persons who have certain contracts or agreements with the employer or insurance carrier, Georgia common law and statutory law have established the parameters of immunity from common law tort actions.
1. Georgia Statutory Law. Georgia statutory law explicitly provides that the rights and remedies granted to an employee under the Workers’ Compensation Chapter of the Georgia Code shall be his exclusive means of reparation against his employer or his employer’s insurance carrier,
provided, however, that no employee shall be deprived of any right to bring an action against any third-party tort-feasor, other than an employee of the same employer or any person who, pursuant to a contract or agreement with an employer, provides workers’ compensation benefits to an injured employee, notwithstanding the fact that no common-law master-servant relationship or contract of employment exists between the injured employee and the person providing the benefits.
(Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 34-9-11 (a).
For purposes of analyzing this provision, it must be remembered that “[i]f the employer is insured, [the] term [employer] shall include his insurer as far as applicable.” OCGA § 34-9-1 (3). Therefore, the following are granted explicit immunity under OCGA § 34-9-11 (a): (1) the employer; (2) employees of the employer; (3) any person who provides workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to a contract or agreement with the employer; (4) the employer’s insurance carrier; *759(5) employees of the employer’s insurance carrier; and (6) any person who provides workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to a contract or agreement with the employer’s insurance carrier.
In this case, there is uncontroverted evidence that Deep South had an agreement with the insurance carrier of Coker’s employer to provide certain workers’ compensation benefits, including administering the employer’s workers’ compensation program and conducting safety inspections. Therefore, OCGA § 34-9-11 (a) grants explicit immunity to Deep South as “any person” who provides workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to a contract or agreement with the employer’s insurance carrier.
The fact that the record contains no contract between Deep South and the insurance carrier, contrary to the majority opinion, does not change this result. OCGA § 34-9-11 (a) states clearly and unequivocally that the necessary relationship can be created by either a contract or an agreement. If the legislature had intended immunity to be extended only when a formal contract existed, it would not have included the term “agreement” in the immunity provision. The record before us establishes that Deep South had an agreement with the employer’s insurance carrier. As such, Deep South was entitled to immunity.
2. Common Law. Even before immunity was established by statute, it was extended to those in Deep South’s position by common law. For example, in Mull, supra, an employee’s widow brought suit against a workers’ compensation carrier and its agent for negligence in inspecting machinery. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the case, and this Court affirmed, saying, “[u]nder the circumstances alleged the workmen’s compensation carrier and its representative in making such inspection were the alter ego of the employer within the statutory definition equating the insurance carrier to the employer.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. In short, the immunity from liability extended, not only to the workers’ compensation carrier, but also to its representative which made the safety inspection.
The majority contends that Mull cannot be considered in this case because the immunity that it extended had not yet been codified by OCGA § 34-9-11 (a), which the majority argues must be strictly construed here. While it is a general truism that this Court must strictly construe statutory provisions which are in derogation of common law, the statutory immunity here does not appear to be in derogation of common law. To the contrary, it appears to adopt the common law and expand it. As such, Mull must be considered in this case. It presents complementary common law which provides insight regarding the legislature’s subsequent codification of the very kind of immunity established by Mull.
Moreover, as discussed more fully below, Mull was cited approv*760ingly by this Court in Fred S. James & Co. of Ga. v. King,12 a case which was decided one year after immunity languáge had been codified in substantially the same language it exists today. See Ga. L. 1980, p. 1145, § 2. To that extent, to render the opinion it now wishes, the majority would have to both overrule Mull and criticize James, both of which issue opinions consistent with the present immunity statute.
In James, the defendant, Fred S. James & Company (James), was an insurance broker who entered into a service agreement with Cagle’s, a self-insurer, to administer its workers’ compensation program. Under the service agreement, James was responsible, among other things, for safety inspections. King, an employee of Cagle’s, was injured and filed suit against James for its failure to inspect and warn of dangerous conditions.
James filed a motion for summary judgment, contending, as does Deep South, that it was entitled to the same immunity from liability as the employer. King contended “that only the workers’ compensation insurance carrier is entitled to the same immunity as the employer and that James is not an insurer, but an independent contractor who provides a service to Cagle’s.” James, supra at 698.
Citing Mull, the James Court noted that “[i]t is well settled in ' Georgia that a workers’ compensation insurer and its representatives are the alter ego of the employer and are entitled to the same immunity from liability as the employer under the Workers’ Compensation Act.” (Emphasis supplied.) James, supra at 699. The James Court went op to cite with approval Allen v. Employers Svc. Corp.13
The Allen court held that anyone who stands in the shoes of an employer or who, in privy with the employer or his privies, undertakes to perform or assist in the performance, of the statutory duties imposed on the employer by the Workmen’s Compensation Act (e.g., inspecting and advising as to the safety of employees) should bé immune from suit as a third party tortfeasor by an employee covered under the workmen’s compensation program. The court reasoned that to permit a suit against a service organization providing inspection services would act as a deterrent to employers from using such services because the service company’s fees would be greater if it were exposed to liability to injured employees.
James, supra at 700. The James Court found the reasoning of the *761Florida Second District Court of Appeal convincing and held that the trial court had erred in denying James’s motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the Court said:
We see no logical reason why a service agency which is responsible for the administration of a self-insured employer’s workers’ compensation program should not be included under the umbrella of immunity provided by the Act. By contract the service agency administers and facilitates the payment of benefits by the self-insurer, and anyone who “undertakes to perform or assist in the performance” of an employer’s statutory duties under the Workers’ Compensation Act should be immune from suit as a third party tortfeasor.
Id. In so reasoning, this Court accepted James’s contention that "immunity extended not only to the workers’ compensation insurance carrier, but also to the independent contractor who was providing safety inspection services under the Workers’ Compensation Act, and rejected Ring’s, and the majority’s position, that only the workers’ compensation carrier is entitled to immunity.
The majority attempts to distinguish James from the present case by arguing that its holding applies only to employers who are self-insured. Under the majority’s view, immunity should be extended in these cases presumably because the employer directly supervises the representatives handling its workers’ compensation program. This distinction is made irrelevant, however, by OCGA § 34-9-1 (3) which states, as discussed more fully above, that the term “employer” includes both the actual employer and its insurance carrier. Whether the employer is self-insured is irrelevant, as immunity is given to both employees of the employer and representatives of the employer’s insurance carrier. Therefore, representatives of the insurance carrier who carry out the employer’s workers’ compensation program pursuant to an agreement áre immune whether the employer directly supervises them or not.
Under both Mull, a case which did not involve an employer which was a self-insurer, and James, a case which did involve an employer which was a self-insurer, this Court has held that a representative of the workers’ compensation carrier was entitled to immunity from common law tort liability where workérs’ compensation coverage applies. Deep South, as the representative of the workers’ compensation carrier, stands in the shoes of Coker’s employer and is, therefore, entitled to the same immunity from liability. Denying immunity to Deep South would, as the Allen and James Courts feared, “áct as a deterrent to employers from using [safety inspec*762tion] services because the service company’s fees would be greater if it were exposed to liability to injured employees.” James, supra at 700.
Decided November 13, 2002
Reconsideration denied December 6, 2002
Orr & Edwards, W. Fred Orr II, James G. Edwards II, for appellant.
Downey & Cleveland, Russell B. Davis, Sean L. Hynes, Salter & Richards, Theodore Salter, Jr., Hawkins & Parnell, Michael J. Goldman, for appellee.
For all the reasons given above, I believe that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Deep South.

 Mull v. Aetna Cas. &c. Co., 120 Ga. App. 791 (172 SE2d 147) (1969).

 Fred S. James & Co. of Ga. v. King, 160 Ga. App. 697 (288 SE2d 52) (1981).

 Allen v. Employers Svc. Corp., 243 S2d 454 (Fla. App. 1971).