Court Opinion

ID: 9475350
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:24:26.966077+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:39.610263
License: Public Domain

ATKINS, Senior District Judge,
dissenting:
Defendant, a state prisoner, filed a writ of habeas corpus, and the district court entered a judgment granting his petition.1 The basic issue presented on appeal is whether the defendant made a voluntary and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.2 Specifically, appellee contends that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive *1069his right of counsel for two reasons. First, he urges that the court should have conducted an indigency inquiry to establish his right to a court appointed counsel. Second, he argues that the court failed to warn him of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation as required by Faretta and its progeny. After carefully reviewing the circumstances of this case, I would affirm the district court.
I. The Right to Counsel
I pause to review briefly the major cases which have discussed the right to counsel in criminal proceedings. By reviewing these cases, one can better understand the critical role that defense counsel provides, and the special safeguards that the court requires to ensure that this fundamental right is not waived lightly.
The right to counsel is firmly established. The Sixth Amendment specifically provides that a criminal defendant shall enjoy the right to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. Several significant cases have clarified the scope of this right.
In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), the Court emphasized the importance of counsel by holding that, absent a valid waiver, the assistance of counsel was a jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court’s authority to deprive an accused of life or liberty. Later, in Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), the Court held that the right to have the assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions was made obligatory upon the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The court determined that the assistance of counsel is a fundamental right and essential for fair trials.3 Many other cases have further clarified the scope of the right to counsel, but their common message is clear — before an individual may be deprived of life or liberty, he must be afforded a meaningful opportunity to have the assistance of counsel in preparing his defense. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979).
II. The Failure to Conduct an Indigency Inquiry
The indigency issue is troublesome. On the one hand, it seems clear that defendant was indigent. Yet, he expressly stated that he did not want a public defender, and he waived his right to a court-appointed counsel. Therefore, if the Faretta safeguards had been satisfied, this issue would be insignificant. Under the circumstances of this case, however, I believe that an indigency inquiry should have been conducted, because the indigency question is intricately interrelated with the Faretta issue.
A. The Importance of the Indigency Determination
In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), the Court held that a criminal defendant had a right to self-representation; however, the Court discussed special measures which would protect an accused. For example, the Court hinted that a trial judge could prevent many problems by appointing a qualified lawyer to act as a “standby counsel.” Id. at 834-35 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 n. 46 (“Of course, a State may — even over objection by the accused — appoint a ‘standby counsel’ to aid the accused if and when the accused requests help.”). Justice Burger further emphasized this protective measure in his dissent. Id. at 846 n. 7, 95 *1070S.Ct. at 2529 n. 7.4 The importance of the standby counsel is further enhanced when one recognizes that a defendant may waive his right to self-representation if he later decides to act as co-counsel, Raulerson v. Wainwright, 732 F.2d 803, 809 (11th Cir.1984), or if he abandons his initial request, Brown v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 607, 611 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc).
Because the court failed to determine that defendant was indigent, no standby counsel was appointed. Thus, defendant had no opportunity to request the assistance of counsel during the trial. In effect, the trial court prevented any subsequent waiver of defendant’s right to self-representation.
In this case, the absence of a standby counsel was significant. On the second day of trial, as the complexity of the case became apparent, defendant said, “I have to get a lawyer.” Later, defendant requested additional time to prepare his closing argument. He said, “I found out it’s very complex.” Under these circumstances, it is apparent that defendant wanted the assistance of counsel once the trial began.
B. Facts Demonstrating that Defendant was Indigent
The majority concludes that the trial judge made an implicit finding of fact that defendant understood the meaning of the term “indigency” and that this conclusion was not clearly erroneous. I cannot agree. The record conclusively establishes that defendant misunderstood the term.
The most poignant fact, of course, is that when a hearing was finally held, defendant was found to be indigent. Moreover, the state does not dispute the fact that defendant was indigent and unable to afford counsel at the time of trial. Additionally, several attorneys informed the court that defendant was indigent.5 Finally, defendant expressly indicated that he had a liquidity problem. Prior to trial, he stated that he was trying to raise the necessary funds by selling stock. Later, during his sentencing hearing, he said, “Is liquidity a ground, your honor, then I would like an attorney.” 6
III. The Faretta Issue
Through Zerbst, Gideon, and other cases, the Court established that a criminal defendant must be provided with an opportunity to have the assistance of counsel before he could be deprived of life or liberty. As the years passed, however, the right to counsel evolved from a privilege to a requirement in many courts. It was in this context that Mr. Anthony Faretta found himself forced to accept legal assistance, although he insisted that he wanted to conduct his own defense.7
Ultimately, the Court held that a criminal defendant had a constitutional right to conduct his own defense. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S.Ct. at 2541-42. Yet, the Court reached this conclusion reluctantly and with a certain degree of trepidation.
For example, the court stated, “There can be no blinking the fact that the right of an accused to conduct his own defense *1071seems to cut against the grain of this Court’s decision holding that the Constitution requires that no accused can be convicted and imprisoned unless he has been accorded the right to the assistance of counsel. For it is surely true that the basic thesis of those decisions is that the help of a lawyer is essential to assure the defendant a fair trial. Id. at 832-33, 95 S.Ct. at 2539-40 (citations and footnotes omitted).
The Court’s solution was to emphasize an individual’s freedom of choice. In other words, the Constitution requires that a defendant have an opportunity to have legal representation, but that right may be waived by a defendant who knowingly and intelligently chooses to represent himself after being made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Id. at 833-36, 95 S.Ct. at 2540-42.
Subsequent cases have examined the relationship between the right to assistance of counsel and the right of self-representation. Overwhelmingly, the courts have concluded that the right to counsel is preeminent over the right to self-representation.8 Brown, 665 F.2d at 610. Therefore, the law requires the special protections of a clear and unequivocal assertion of the right to self-representation and that a defendant understand the risks and disadvantages of self-representation. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541.
A. The Clear and Unequivocal Assertion of the Right of Self-Representation
The case law clearly indicates that assistance of counsel is strongly preferred over self-representation. If defendant is silent on the subject, counsel should be provided. If defendant vacillates on the issue, counsel should be provided. If defendant abandons his request, counsel should be provided. With this point in mind, the facts demonstrate that defendant failed to waive his right to counsel.
In this case, defendant made numerous attempts to hire private counsel. He only reluctantly decided to represent himself when his attempts to hire a lawyer proved fruitless. The trial judge ordered defendant to obtain private counsel or proceed pro se unless he moved for an indigency inquiry prior to May 28. Since he made no motion prior to this deadline, and was unable to hire a private attorney, he had no choice but to represent himself. Under these circumstances, his decision seems a far cry from an affirmative, clear and unequivocal assertion of the right to self-representation. Instead, the record demonstrates that defendant earnestly desired the assistance of counsel, but was unable to afford one.
B. Understanding the Dangers and Disadvantages of Self-Representation
The majority states that a waiver hearing regarding the disadvantages of a pro se defense is recommended but not absolutely essential, provided that the defendant actually understood those dangers and disadvantages.9 Yet, the Eleventh Circuit has consistently indicated that this hearing is mandatory. Raulerson, 732 F.2d at 808; United States v. Edwards, 716 F.2d 822, 824 (11th Cir.1983); Hance, 696 F.2d at 949; United States v. Chaney, 662 F.2d 1148, 1152 (5th Cir.1981) (Unit B). I see no reason to abandon our well established procedure.10
The mandatory nature of the Faretta inquiry is justified because the Court has recognized that a defendant’s decision to go pro se is tantamount to pleading guilty — the process is just a little slower *1072and perhaps move painful.11 For example, Justice Sutherland once wrote:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 S.Ct. 55, 64, 77 L.Ed.2d 158 (1932). Similarly, the majority in Faretta recognized that a pro se defendant “relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541. Furthermore, the dissenting justices emphasized this point. Chief Justice Burger asked, “The fact of the matter is that in all but an extraordinarily small number of cases an accused will lose whatever defense he may have if he undertakes to conduct the trial himself.” Id. at 838, 95 S.Ct. at 2543. Justice Blackmun said, “The court concludes that self-representation must be allowed despite the obvious dangers of unjust convictions in order to protect the individual’s right of free choice. As I have already indicated, I cannot agree to such a drastic curtailment of the interest of the State in seeing that justice is done in a real objective sense.” Id. at 851, 95 S.Ct. at 2549. In short, the Faretta inquiry functions much like the guilty plea procedure — both protect a defendant by educating him and ensuring that his decision is “voluntary and intelligent.”
IV. Conclusion12
Defense counsel provides an important role in ensuring that criminal trials lead to just results. In this case, the judge knew three crucial facts. First, he knew defendant wanted the assistance of a private attorney. Second, he was informed by several attorneys, including one prosecutor, that defendant could not afford counsel. Third, he knew that it would be a disaster for defendant to proceed pro se. Nevertheless, he failed to hold an indigency hearing and he failed to hold a Faretta waiver *1073hearing. Under these circumstances, the trial court erred.

. Defendant was found guilty of four counts of selling unregistered securities, four counts of fraud, and four counts of grand theft on September 29, 1982.

. "In determining whether there is a competent, informed and intelligent waiver, the judge before whom an accused appears without counsel is charged with a serious responsibility that cannot be perfunctorily performed. All reasonable presumptions must be indulged against a waiver.” McConnell v. United States, 375 F.2d 905, 910 (5th Cir.1967) (citations omitted).

. Perhaps Justice Black best articulated the basis for legal assistance to all criminal defendants when he wrote these words:
The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law. Id. at 344, 83 S.Ct. at 796.

. The appointment of standby counsel is a well recognized safeguard, and one that is being employed by trial judges within this circuit. See United States v. Edwards, 716 F.2d 822, 824 (11th Cir.1983) (per curiam ). See also Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 940, 950 n. 6 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3544, 77 L.Ed.2d 1393 (1983), overruled on other grounds in Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383 (11th Cir.1985) (en banc).

. Mr. Weissman withdrew as defense counsel because defendant could not pay his fee. Then, Weissman along with the prosecutor, Mr. Harris, told the judge that defendant needed a public defender, because defendant could not afford private counsel. Later, Mr. St. John informed the court that defendant lacked sufficient assets to pay his retainer. Finally, Mr. Goldstein indicated that defendant was relying upon "family money” to pay his fee.

. At the sentencing hearing, defendant clearly "vacillated” on the issue of self-representation and effectively waived the right. See Brown, 665 F.2d at 611.

. The trial court's concerns were well founded. When the judge quizzed Mr. Faretta on basic legal principles, defendant demonstrated his inability to represent himself. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 808 n. 3, 95 S.Ct. at 2528 n. 3.

. “If on arraignment an indigent defendant stands mute, neither requesting counsel nor asserting the right of self-representation, an attorney must be appointed." Brown, 665 F.2d at 611.

. The facts demonstrate that defendant did not actually understand the problems of self-representation.

. A defendant may waive his right of self-representation by walking out of the Faretta hearing. Raulerson, 732 F.2d at 809.

. When a defendant pleads guilty, the court must critically evaluate the plea. First, the court discusses various items with the defendant to guarantee that he has a meaningful understanding of his decision. Second, the court determines whether there is a factual basis for the plea. Finally, the court ensures that the decision to plead guilty is voluntary. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11.

. In Faretta, one of the dissenting Justice’s concerns was that the case would invite increased appellate litigation. The majority’s holding, "that only rarely will the Faretta standards be satisfied absent a waiver hearing” suggests that a case-by-case review will be necessary in the future. Thus, increased litigation is invited once again. I would prefer to articulate the content of the Faretta colloquy so trial judges would be better guided in the future. For example, the court should inform a defendant that motions may be presented before, during, and after trial. Then the judge should ask the defendant to name one example of a pretrial motion, etc. Next, the court should warn a defendant that he will be required to adhere to the court’s rules of evidence and procedure, and quiz the defendant briefly on a couple of rules, as the trial judge in Faretta did. See id. at 808 n. 3, 95 S.Ct. at 2528 n. 3. Then, the court should inquire as to whether the defendant is familiar with each element of the offense charged. Further, the court should inquire as to whether a defendant is aware of any possible defense for each offense. Finally, the court should suggest that counsel could assist the defendant in all areas of defense.
The Court’s use of this colloquy would achieve three goals. First, the defendant would be appraised of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se. Second, defendant could still choose between the assistance of counsel and self-representation. Finally, its use would decrease appellate litigation because trial judges would be insulated from error when this colloquy was performed.