Court Opinion

ID: 9950602
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 16:00:53.837211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:11.942473
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10331   Document: 43-1    Date Filed: 03/14/2024   Page: 1 of 4

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 23-10331
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       THOMAS J. NESTOR,
                                                   Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       VPC3 II, LLP,
       a Florida Limited Liability,
       N.E. APARTMENTS ASSOCIATES, INC.,
       a Florida Corporation,
       JUDGE JACK DAY,
       In his oﬃcial capacity,

                                               Defendants-Appellees.

                         ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-10331      Document: 43-1       Date Filed: 03/14/2024     Page: 2 of 4

       2                       Opinion of the Court                  23-10331

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 8:20-cv-00265-CEH-TGW
                            ____________________

       Before BRASHER, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Thomas Nestor, proceeding pro se, appeals the magistrate
       judge’s order awarding attorneys’ fees pursuant to a settlement
       agreement after he voluntarily dismissed his complaint.
              We review appellate jurisdictional issues sua sponte and de
       novo. In re Walker, 515 F.3d 1204, 1210 (11th Cir. 2008). It is our
       duty to determine whether we have jurisdiction over a particular
       matter. Id. The parties are incapable of conferring upon us a juris-
       dictional foundation we otherwise lack simply by waiver or proce-
       dural default. United States v. Harris, 149 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir.
       1998); see also Hertz Corp. v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc.,16 F.3d 1126, 1131
       (11th Cir. 1994) (“Subject-matter jurisdiction can never be waived
       or conferred by the consent of the parties.”).
              Appellate jurisdiction is generally limited to “ﬁnal decisions
       of the district courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Federal Magistrates
       Act created the position of a federal magistrate judge that could be
       assigned to hear and determine nondispositive pretrial matters,
       subject to reconsideration by the district court if the order is clearly
       erroneous or contrary to law, and to conduct hearings and issue
       recommendations as to eight dispositive pretrial motions, subject
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       23-10331                Opinion of the Court                           3

       to the district court’s de novo review. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)-(B);
       see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a)-(b); Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858,
       867-69 (1989).
               In a narrow exception, if all parties consent, a magistrate
       judge “may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil
       matter and order the entry of judgment in the case.” 28 U.S.C.
       § 636(c)(1). “To signify their consent, the parties must jointly or
       separately ﬁle a statement consenting to the referral.” Fed. R. Civ.
       P. 73(b)(1). In this situation, “an aggrieved party may appeal di-
       rectly to the appropriate United States court of appeals from the
       judgment of the magistrate judge in the same manner as an appeal
       from any other judgment of a district court.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3);
       see also Int’l Cosms. Exch., Inc. v. Gapardis Health & Beauty, Inc., 303
       F.3d 1242, 1244 n.1 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that “[t]he fact that the
       order was issued by a magistrate [judge] does not aﬀect its appeal-
       ability” because “[t]he parties consented to the jurisdiction of a
       magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(c)(1)”).
              However, if there is no speciﬁc agreement in place, the dis-
       trict court reviews the magistrate judge’s recommendations and
       may accept, reject, or modify them. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). When a
       magistrate judge is proceeding under the supervision of a district
       court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), his actions “are not ﬁnal or-
       ders and may not be appealed until rendered ﬁnal by a district
       court.” Donovan v. Sarasota Concrete Co., 693 F.2d 1061, 1066-67
       (11th Cir. 1982). We lack jurisdiction to hear appeals directly from
       magistrate judges, because an appeal from a magistrate judge’s
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                   23-10331

       ruling must ﬁrst be taken to the district court, even as to nondis-
       positive decisions. See United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1359-
       60 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that we lacked jurisdiction to hear the
       defendant’s appeal of a magistrate judge’s order denying his mo-
       tion for self-representation); see also United States v. Renfro, 620 F.2d
       497, 500 (5th Cir. 1980) (“The law is settled that appellate courts are
       without jurisdiction to hear appeals directly from federal magis-
       trates.”). Moreover, subsequent adoption of a magistrate judge’s
       order by the district court does not cure a premature notice of ap-
       peal. See Perez-Priego v. Alachua Cnty. Clerk of Ct., 148 F.3d 1272, 1273
       (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that a magistrate judge’s report and rec-
       ommendation was not ﬁnal and appealable where the district court
       had not adopted it before the notice of appeal was ﬁled).
               Here, we lack jurisdiction to review the magistrate judge’s
       order because the parties did not consent to dispositive magistrate
       judge jurisdiction and Nestor failed to ﬁrst appeal the order to the
       district court. Accordingly, we dismiss Nestor’s appeal for lack of
       jurisdiction.
              DISMISSED.