Court Opinion

ID: 9683259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:25:31.266804+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:46.649848
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
In its zeal to write new law the majority reaches far beyond the evidentiary issue raised by the first ground of error that is dispositive of it to thrash a recent panel opinion of the Court, to shake up part of the practice commentary and to extend to multinational corporations what it perceives as needed protection through something called “the greater right of possession theory.” The majority has overreached itself.
McGee v. State, 572 S.W.2d 723 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) is “wrong,”1 says the majority, *254because it invited the reader to “see” the practice commentaries which, in turn, “had no basis in the statute as adopted.” As the majority sees it, “The writer of the practice commentary was apparently basing his opinion that the greater right to ownership [sic] applied where there was a claim of right by the alleged thief upon the proposed code, Section 31.01(6)...” That proposed code, “Texas Penal Code, A Proposed Revision,” (Final Draft, October 1970), West Publishing Co., provides the context and cornerstone of the analysis that follows.2 From that is structured the meaning of “owner” to apply in theft cases.
Let it be noted at the outset that the proposed code did not define “owner” in the general provision Section 1.07. Rather, each chapter that embraced a bundle of related offenses in which ownership was an ingredient carried its own definition of “owner,”3 albeit more often than not the definitions were the same or similar.
For purposes of the theft offense:
“(6) ‘Owner’ means a person other than the actor who has possession of property, or any interest other than a mortgage, deed of trust, or security interest in property, even if the possession or interest is unlawful.”
The Committee Comment in pertinent part explained:
“Section 31.01 defines ‘owner’ broadly so that the new theft offense protects a deprivation of another’s ‘interest’ in the property, whether or not that interest is possessory. This changes present law, which, except for offenses involving conversion, is directed primarily toward interference with rights of possession, Penal Code arts. 1410, 1415. * * *
“Penal Code arts. 1416 and 1417 now restrict theft by an owner or part owner of his own property to instances where another had a right of possession at the time of the acquisition. The new theft offense, by requiring deprivation from the ‘owner,’ and defining owner broadly, will expand the theft responsibility of joint owners and others with part interests in property, see Section 31.09 (actor’s interest in property) and comment.
“The definition of owner excludes, however, those who have a security interest in property in possession of the debt- or, even if legal title is in the secured creditor pursuant to a conditional sales contract or other security agreement.... [T]he behavior of debtors and vendees of secured property is not readily amenable to control by theft. Their conduct with respect to secured property and the concomitant protection of secured creditors is accordingly governed by the fraud chapter, e. g., Section 32.33 (hindering secured creditors).”
Nothing could be plainer from this explication of the definition of “owner” for theft purposes: the proposal was deliberately broader than subsisting law, designed to protect a wider “interest” in property and intended to expand theft responsibility of joint owners, but excluded security interest from the concept of ownership. However, the proposed definition, with all its intend-ments, was not enacted. Still the majority somehow draws comfort from that historical non-event.
What the Legislature ultimately did was to remove every definition of “owner” from its related chapter in favor of a single, all-purpose meaning for illuminating ownership when it is a constituent ingredient of a particular offense. Thus, Section 1.07(a)(24):
*255“ ‘Owner’ means a person who has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor.”
The majority correctly opines, “it is clear that the Legislature intended to expand the class of individuals to be protected from theft,” but errs in seeing “greater right of possession” as the expansion.
In rejecting the proposed broad definition of “owner,” the Legislature retreated, ironically enough, to principles of “ownership” that had been tried and found true. Thus, title was an indicia of ownership, Osborne v. State, 93 Tex.Cr.R. 54, 245 S.W. 928, 929 4 (1923); possession alone could base theft, Articles 1414 and 1415, P.C. 1925,5 Committee Comment, ante; and a doctrine of greater right of possession was prevalent, Articles 1416 and 1417, P.C. 1925.6 Therefore, the real novelty in the enacted definition of “owner” is its introduction of “title” as a particular form of ownership subject to being stolen.
Accordingly, the authors of the former committee comment, see page 2 ante, appropriately modified the first paragraph and, as modified, brought it forward in the same position in the Practice Commentary following § 31.03:
“Section 1.07(24) defines ‘owner’ so that the new theft offense protects a deprivation of another’s title7 in the property, whether or not the owner possesses the property. This changes prior law, which, except for offenses involving conversion, was directed primarily toward interference with rights to possession, Penal Code arts. 1410, 1415. * * *”
The next paragraph of the Practice Commentary is characterized by the majority as having “no basis in the statute as adopted.” Yet, as with the first paragraph, the authors of the erstwhile committee comments again took note of the altered definition. First, they modified “broadly” with “more” so that the phrase now read “defining owner more broadly.” Then they referred the reader to a related commentary following § 31.10, entitled “Actor’s Interest in Property.” 8 There the commentators become crit*256ical of the reduction in protection by the changed concept, viz:
“... thus [under the old code] some conduct by a joint owner could escape criminal sanction even though he deprived other owners of valuable interest, e. g., Hall v. State, 279 S.W. 464 (Tex.Cr.App.1926) (partner in possession cannot commit theft). This section, in its original form, would have removed any doubt about the penal responsibility of partners, tenants-in-common, and owners of joint bank accounts, for example.”
Further, they lamented:
“The proposal also defined 'owner’ more broadly for theft purposes. Originally, ‘owner’ would have included anyone with possession of any ‘interest’ (other than a nonpossessor security interest) in property. As enacted, an ‘owner’ is anyone who has ‘title, . . . possession, . . . or a greater right of possession ... than the actor.’ See Section 1.07(24). Thus some joint interest that would have been protected under the proposal are excluded, but the definition of ‘owner’ that was adopted, when read with the theft offense, indicates that protection extends to some joint interests that do not have an exclusive right to possession.”
Is not this, simply stated another way, our old friend Fairy v. State, supra, modestly clothed in modern attire?
In sum, the commentators, having knowledge of what was originally proposed, took cognizance of what was actually adopted and criticized abandoning the balance.9 In all of this their perceptions are never blurred; their commentaries do not, as the majority charges, lead one astray. The understanding of McGee is right. Greater right of possession lies in competing rights.
Finally, the majority pretends that another authoritative source of legislative history and statutory interpretation, cited by McGee, does not exist. In 2 Branch’s Texas Annotated Penal Statutes, 3rd Edition, § 31.03 it is written-according to the preface to the work,10 with “the participation of the Texas District and County Attorneys Association ... ” :
“OWNER:
Section 1.07(a)(24), defines ‘owner’ broadly .. . By having defined ‘owner’ to include ‘a person who has title to the property’ and not requiring that he have possession of the property, this may well be a departure from present law. OTHERWISE, IT APPEARS NOT TO CHANGE THE CONCEPT OF OWNER IN ANY OTHER RESPECT”
When seasoned commentators and interested prosecutors, who had a hand in writing it, concur in their respective interpretations of statutory language that in historical prospective is already facially clear, to presume their views are based on a proposed provision that failed of enactment is something other than reasoned adjudication.
Furthermore, like a loose cannon on deck, the majority has fired off a round of “ap-parency”-“The writer . . . was apparently basing his opinion that the greater right . . . applied where there was a claim of right by the alleged thief ...” Of course, the commentary says no such thing. The discussion throughout is not about “a claim of right” but concerning “a greater right of possession.” Indeed, the proposed code also contained § 31.10, entitled “Claim of Right,” and the same commentator, speaking for the committee, correctly commented on the matter:
“The object of the theft offense is to deter those who would acquire something of value knowing that they have no right to it .... This position is reflected in Texas case law, which has established *257that a genuine belief in one’s legal right to acquire something of value or an honest intent to pay for it is a defense to prosecution for theft... [citing cases].11
Section 31.10 restates this existing case law. * * * ” Section 31.10 did not make it through the legislative process. It is absurd to suggest one who researched the cases and wrote so incisively on the claim of right matter would become confused when he later discussed the separate issue of greater right of possession.
In short, the majority position will not withstand critical examination. It does not claim support in the authorities, for there is none. Unveiled, the majority opinion is but a statement of what is conceived to be a desirable public policy “to take cognizance to the increasing division of responsibility found in most major corporations.” That suggestion is better made to the Legislative Department and, as shall now be demonstrated, the Court needlessly concerns itself with this “increasing problem.”
After original submission a panel of the Court concluded that the first ground of error challenging sufficiency of the evidence in one particular should be sustained and, accordingly, reformed the judgment to show an acquittal. We granted motion for leave to file a motion for rehearing filed by the State on the assumption that the evidence failed to show that the person named in the indictment was the owner of the stolen property in the sense of having title or possession of it at the time it was stolen. Upon further examination of the record, however, the Court has determined that the assumption in the second sense was incorrect and, upon the factual analysis made, the State’s motion should be granted.12
Accordingly, I dissent to Part II of the majority opinion but concur in the judgment of the Court.
ODOM, J., joins.

. At 572 S.W.2d 725 the McGee panel wrote: “While this phrase has found its way into several opinions which might have led to some confusion, it is clear that the ‘greater right of possession’ concept of ownership applies only in those cases where both the ‘owner’ and the ‘actor’ have some sort of joint interest in the *254property. See Practice Commentaries to §§ 31.03 and 31.10, V.T.C.A., Penal Code. See also 2 Branch’s 3rd ed. 401.”

. Contemporaneously called “The Bluebook,” each proposed section was accompanied by a “Committee Comment” which comments, it is explained in the foreword to the enacted penal code, are “an important source of legislative history,” 1 V.T.C.A., Penal Code xxiv. Of course, as also pointed out, if a proposed section was altered in the legislative process the original comment was modified before published as a practice commentary. Ibid.

. E.g., arson, Section 28.01(2); burglary, Section 30.01(2); theft, Section 31.01(6); fraud, Section 32.01(2),

. “A corporation may, in its corporate name, hold title (ownership) to personal property which is the subject of theft. It is equally true that the ‘actual care, control and management’ (the possession) thereof must of necessity be in some natural person, someone acting for the corporation.”

. Article 1414 provided, “To constitute theft it is not necessary that the possession and ownership of the property be in the same person at the time of taking.” Article 1415 provided, “Possession of the person so unlawfully deprived of property is constituted by the exercise of actual control, care and management of the property, whether the same be lawful or not.” “Custody” and “possession” were not convertible terms, Boatwright v. State, 121 Tex.Cr.R. 578, 51 S.W.2d 311, 313 (1932).

. From the Old Code through Article 1417, the statute provided:
“If the person accused of the theft be part owner of the property, the taking does not come within the definition of theft, unless the person from whom it is taken be wholly entitled to the possession at the time.”
As early as Fairy v. State, 18 Tex.App. 314 (1885) the court wrote in terms of one’s right of possession of personal property being “as good, if not a better right” than another’s, id. at 320. Other examples are collected in Hudiburg Chevrolet, Inc. v. Globe Indemnity Co., 394 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tex.1965). See also the interesting case of stolen sheep in Wall v. State, 110 S.W.2d 68 (Tex.Cr.App.1937), the accomplice having “no right to take possession of any of the sheep in question, notwithstanding he was part owner of same.”

. Compare with the former committee comment that the proposal defines owner “broadly” to protect deprivation of “another’s ‘interest’ in the property.” (All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.)

. Obviously the stated reference to “Section 31.09” is an inadvertence, it being the parallel provision in “The Bluebook.” Section 31.09 proposed:
“It is no defense to prosecution under this chapter that the actor has an interest in the property or service stolen if another person also has an interest that the actor is not entitled to infringe.”
As enacted, Section 31.10 provides:
“It is no defense to prosecution under this chapter that the actor has an interest in the property or service stolen if another person has the right of exclusive possession of the property.”
The approved language appears to be a transformation of former Article 1417, quoted in *256note 6 ante, into the format of the new code. Its clear implication is that the principle of Fairy v. State, supra, not only remains viable but also has been extended to the situation where “another person,” as well as “the person from whom it is taken,” Article 1417, supra, does not have “the right of exclusive possession of the property.”

. In the commentary following § 28.02 regret is similarly expressed concerning deletion of definition of “owner” as it related to the offense of arson.

. 1 Branch’s 3rd Ed. vi.

. A multitude is also gathered in 5 Branch’s Annotated Penal Code, 2nd Edition, § 2655, p. 105ff.

. Thus, without Part II of the majority opinion, I would not delve into the “greater right to possession” language of V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 1.07(a)(24), to determine whether the panel finding of McGee v. State, 572 S.W.2d 723, 725 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) is correct or to assay certain sections of the practice commentary to the penal code for accuracy. I am persuaded that a closer look at the relevant factual aspects of the case in light of established authority leads to the sound conclusion that J. Howard Coo-nen, the person alleged to be the owner of the stolen personal property, was shown to be just that by reason of his having possession of it. The decisional guide to follow is Eaton v. State, 533 S.W.2d 33 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), a unanimous decision by the Court. Having similarly come to that conclusion the majority has no mandate to “reach out” and gratuitously construe § 1.07(a)(24) and overrule McGee v. State.