Court Opinion

ID: 9586722
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:14:16.707675+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:48.679833
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
Even given the discretionary nature of the dismissal of criminal appeals under Court of Appeals Rule 14,1 fully concur with Presiding Judge Deen because the facts of the case totally warrant, if not demand, it.
Appellant had employed counsel at trial. During the sentencing phase, the trial court advised defendant regarding the procedure for an appeal bond, the right to appeal, the right to an attorney for an indigent on appeal, and the right to sentence review.
Trial counsel moved for an appeal bond and for new trial. A bond was immediately set, and appellant apparently made it. Some months thereafter, counsel was permitted to withdraw based on his motion to the effect that he was getting no response from defendant and that he had not been paid for trial nor for any appellate work.
In setting the hearing on the motion for new trial, the court advised defendant of the procedure for obtaining a court-appointed attorney for the motion and appeal, if he was indigent and did not wish to represent himself. No application was made, and subsequently the motion for new trial was denied.
Appellant chose to represent himself before this Court but has neglected or refused to pursue the appeal. Not only has he failed to comply with the rules for bringing the merits before us, but he has *593ignored our sua sponte order granting an extension of time to comply.
Decided July 8, 1987.
Willie Conyers, pro se.
Dupont K. Cheney, District Attorney, for appellee.
No reason being given nor appearing why this Court should itself undertake a review of the proceedings below, the appeal should be dismissed. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U. S. 387 (105 SC 830, 83 LE2d 821) (1985) does not construe the United States Constitution as requiring state appellate courts to search the record in criminal cases for reversible error upon the mere filing of a notice of appeal. Nor is it a wise policy to adopt. It casts the role of appellant’s advocate upon the Court itself. It increases the Court’s workload with frivolous appeals. It unnecessarily delays the finality of judgments in criminal cases. It penalizes the Rules-abiding appellants who receive a review only of the errors they enumerate.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen joins in this dissent.