Court Opinion

ID: 9601779
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:49:42.171244+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:23.677851
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
I believe the focus of the majority opinion is too narrow and I dissent. This appeal results from a jury verdict and judgment entered thereon following a lengthy trial on the issue of inverse condemnation. It was alleged that plaintiff’s land was being “taken” by the action of the State defendant-appellant in changing the flow of a stream and raising the water level to make plaintiff’s lands useless. The trial was the usual array of expert witnesses, together with voluminous exhibits and documentary evidence. As I perceive the record, the principal issues were whether the water cast upon plaintiff’s land was the result of action by the state and if so the extent of the damage to the plaintiff’s land by a comparison of the values of that land before, as contrasted with after, the State’s action.
The State, as appellant, raises numerous assignments of error on appeal, i. e., that the verdict of the jury is not supported by the evidence; that the court erred in failing to grant a jury view of the premises; that appellant’s motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim should have been granted; that the court erred in denying the State’s motion for summary judgment and also erred in denying the State’s motion for a bifurcated trial; that the court did not give accurate and proper instructions regarding the credibility of witnesses and impeachment and damages; that a special verdict instead of a general verdict should have been required and returned; that the court did not determine the State’s interest in the Rueth property and failed to grant the State title to that property in fee simple absolute; that the trial court should have admitted testimony as to mitigation of damages on redirect; and that the court erred in refusing to admit evidence of the price paid for certain nearby and abutting lands. Although the majority opinion reverses and remands for a new trial, none of the above issues raised by the State on its appeal are treated or resolved. Thereby, I think the majority opinion seriously errs since no guidance is given to the trial court upon remand. If we are to assume by the majority’s silence regarding these matters that no error was committed as charged by the appellant State, we are then left with the clear inference that the whole matter is being remanded for a new trial solely on the basis of what, in my opinion, on the facts and circumstances of this case, is harmless and nonprejudicial error.
Following the trial, a jury verdict was returned and a judgment entered thereon. No motion for a new trial was made by the appellant State. However, some five years after the events that allegedly damaged the defendant’s property, the State, during the course of its appeal to this Court, moved to augment the transcript of the proceedings below to indicate a communication “not in open court” between the judge and jury. At that point affidavits came flooding to this Court indicating various views of what had transpired between the time that the jury retired to consider its verdict and the time the verdict was returned. In my view, however certain matters are clear. A written note passed from the jury to the judge soliciting some additional instructions or advice. At the time of the receipt of the note, *212the judge found counsel for respondent available (at least counsel for the respondent states he was with the judge) and according to the affidavit of counsel for respondent, counsel for appellant State was not to be found in the courthouse. We are not told if the clerk of the court or the court reporter was in the courtroom or in the chambers of the judge at the time of the receipt of the note from the jury. According to their respective affidavits, neither the judge, the court reporter nor the clerk has any independent recollection of the events. According to the affidavit of counsel for respondent, he consulted with the judge regarding the request from the jury and advised the judge, in his opinion, that to avoid any error the judge should give no further instructions. He also states that the judge advised the bailiff to, in turn, advise the jury that it would receive no further instructions and they should follow the instructions they had already received.
It is against this background of facts that the majority opinion lays down its ruling that “there was some communication off the record and not in open court.” (Emphasis supplied.) Thereafter, the majority states the “winning party” must show what the communication was and that it “could not have had any effect ” (emphasis in original), otherwise, the judgment must be reversed. Thereafter, the majority opinion indulges in “conjecture” and speculation regarding what impact such communication might have had on the jury.
In my judgment, the majority fashions a rule which is neither necessary nor desirable considering the circumstances of the instant case. Further, I believe it will have a broad impact in the future in unnecessarily complicating the conduct of trials and will prevent the exercise of discretion by trial judges in their supervision of juries and the jury process, which considering the nature of the process must in many respects be based on practicalities and common sense.
The fashioning of the majority’s rule is based in large part on, and buttressed by extensive quotations from, the case of State v. Bland, 9 Idaho 796, 76 P. 780 (1904). That decision was in other times and what the majority does not tell us is that the circumstances underlying that decision were very different from the case at bar. In Bland the defendant was charged and tried for murder. In Bland the defendant moved for a new trial on the basis that “without the knowledge or consent of the defendant or his counsel, the trial judge, in response to the request from a juror, appeared in the jury room at about the hour of 9 o’clock on the morning of August 1st, and prior to the finding of the verdict, and had some conversation with one or more of the jurors * * * 9 Idaho 800, 75 P. at 780-81. Among other things, the judge discussed with the jurors certain included offenses and the effect of a recommendation of mercy and the lighest punishment that could be administered to defendant. The judge indicated to the jury that the lightest penalty would be a period of one year imprisonment in the state penitentiary. However, upon sentencing the trial judge promptly sentenced the defendant to a ten year sentence.
The majority opinion also suggests that the Idaho cases of State v. Sly, 11 Idaho 110, 80 P. 1125 (1905), and State v. Baker, 28 Idaho 727, 156 P.2d 103 (1916), are worthy of examination. As the titles would suggest, both cases were criminal in nature. In Sly the only question involved which is even remotely of interest here was the “separation” of the jury. There one juror was separated from the remainder of the jury because of illness and another was allowed to step aside from the remainder of the jury to call for his mail at the post office. The court said in Sly, “We are of the unanimous opinion, however, that the conduct of the jury bailiff in this case is reprehensible, and calls for severe rebuke,” 11 Idaho at 121, 80 P. at 1129. The court, after thoroughly castigating court personnel, stated, “As before observed, while some irregularities have occurred, we think the ends of justice have been met in this case, and the judgment will therefore be affirmed.” Id. at 122, 80 P. at 1129.
*213Baker was an appeal from an order denying a motion for a new trial. Baker had been convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, to-wit: a broom: It was argued that while the jury was viewing the premises on which the alleged assault took place, there were some conversations by or between the jury and the persons occupying the premises. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the conviction of the defendant on the basis that the appellant had failed to act promptly to advise the trial court of the alleged error.
In Guzzi v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 36 N.J.Super. 255, 115 A.2d 629 (1955), the court reversed a judgment based on the jury verdict because of error in instructions. The court stated, “The errors to which we have referred oblige us to reverse the judgment and direct another trial of the action. This consequence induces us to comment briefly upon two additional points agitated by the appellant.” 115 A.2d at 633. Thereafter the court in pure dicta criticized the action of the trial judge after the jury had sent word to the judge that they would like to be fed and they would like to have the testimony of one witness sent to them and the judge ordered them fed and sent word that they could not have the testimony of the witness. The dicta of that court does not recommend itself to me.
In Peters v. State Industrial Accident Comm’n, 236 Or. 27, 386 P.2d 800 (1963), a trial judge delivered additional and oral instructions after the jury had retired and without the presence of any counsel. Thereafter, upon a motion for a new trial, the trial judge recited those facts and stated, “ ‘For the foregoing reasons, the Court believes that the plaintiff was not afforded a fair trial, and that a new trial should be ordered.’ ” Id. From an order for a new trial, an appeal was taken and the trial court was affirmed.
Likewise, in Lloyd v. St. Louis Public Serv. Co., 360 Mo. 91, 227 S.W.2d 460 (1950), a trial judge granted a motion for a new trial on the basis that he, the trial judge, had improperly communicated orally with the jury during their deliberations and that order for a new trial was affirmed. The appellate court stated:
Granting a new trial for misconduct or indiscretion on the part of jurors, lawyers, and a trial judge, occurring prior to the rendition of a verdict, rests largely within the discretion of a trial court.
Id. at 461.
The majority places heavy reliance upon Iverson v. Pacific American Fisheries, 73 Wash.2d 973, 442 P.2d 243 (1968). Iverson is also a far cry from the case at bar. There, after retiring to consider a verdict, a jury became deadlocked at nine to three for the defendant. They so advised the trial judge and he returned the jury into open court and gave them the Washington “dynamite” instruction (presumably in the presence of counsel). They were returned to the jury room and ten minutes later returned with an eleven to one defense verdict. An application for new trial was made and granted by the trial judge, who stated:
I think, considering the length of time that this jury deliberated, and considering the jury’s note to me — which did reveal the majority and minority opinion— and considering what they did after I read WPI — 1, these things convinced me that the jury felt they were being ordered by the Court to reach a verdict, and without regard to what their honest conviction might be, and that the minority was being ordered to capitulate.
Id. at 244.
I believe the clear message of the authorities is that problems of communications during the time of jury deliberations are, in the first instance, for resolution by the trial judge in the sound exercise of his discretion. Here the trial judge was given no opportunity to so exercise his discretion by a motion for a new trial. The majority opinion in large part bases its reversal on speculation as to what the jury might have considered in their deliberations regarding a partial as contrasted with a complete taking. My reading of the record does not disclose that such was the subject issue at trial, was not the subject of any of defendant’s re*214quested instructions nor was it the focus of appellant’s assignments of error or argument upon appeal.
DONALDSON, J., concurs.