Court Opinion

ID: 9554217
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-08 12:09:24.738651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:58.372514
License: Public Domain

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

                                      NO. 03-21-00462-CR

                                Anthony Jesus Torres, Appellant

                                                 v.

                                  The State of Texas, Appellee

              FROM THE 207TH DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY
        NO. CR2013-363, THE HONORABLE DANIEL H. MILLS, JUDGE PRESIDING

                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

               Anthony Jesus Torres challenges the district court’s judgment on remand, which

assessed a twenty-year sentence for his conviction for the second-degree felony offense of sexual

assault. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 22.011(a), 12.33(a). In three issues, Torres challenges the

admission of evidence of a plea agreement between Torres and the State, which was rejected by

the previous trial judge during the guilt-innocence phase of trial. Torres contends that the

admission of that evidence violated Rules of Evidence 403 and 410 and constituted ineffective

assistance of trial counsel. We will affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                        BACKGROUND

               A jury found Torres guilty of the first-degree felony offense of sexual assault in a

prohibited relationship and assessed punishment at twenty-years imprisonment. Torres appealed

and this Court modified the conviction to a second-degree felony offense and remanded the case
to the trial court for a new punishment hearing.          Torres v. State, No. 03-14-00712-CR,

2017 WL 3124238, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin July 21, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated

for publication). On remand, the trial court sentenced Torres to twenty years’ imprisonment.

See Tex. Penal Code §§ 22.011(a), 12.33(a).

                                           DISCUSSION

Evidentiary Challenges

               Torres’s first and second issues contend that the trial court erred by admitting

evidence of his prior plea agreements from the guilt-innocence phase of his trial, which were

rejected by the previous trial judge, because they were inadmissible under Rules of Evidence 403

and 410. See Tex. R. Evid. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value

is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,

confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative

evidence.”), 410(b) (listing types of evidence regarding guilty pleas, plea discussions, and related

statements that are not admissible in criminal cases). The State correctly points out that Torres

did not object to the admission of the complained of evidence.

               To preserve a complaint for appellate review, (1) a party must have made a

timely, specific objection, request, or motion to the trial court that stated the specific grounds for

the ruling sought by the complaining party, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the

context, and (2) the trial court must have either ruled or refused to rule on the request—in which

case the complaining party must have objected to the trial court’s refusal to rule. Tex. R. App. P.

33.1(a). After reviewing the record, we agree with the State that Torres waived his evidentiary

complaints because he did not make any objection to the complained of evidence. See Saldano

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v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (explaining that failure to object to

admission of evidence waives appellate complaints regarding admissibility of that evidence even

if “the error may concern a constitutional right of the defendant”). Preservation of error is a

systemic requirement. Haley v. State, 173 S.W.3d 510, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Thus, we

do not address the merit of these arguments. See Ford v. State, 305 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2009) (“If an issue has not been preserved for appeal, neither the court of appeals nor this

Court should address the merits of that issue.”).

               We overrule Torres’s first and second issues.

Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

               In his final issue, Torres contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to either redact the record of the guilt-innocence proceeding to prevent the trial judge who

assessed punishment from knowing the details of the plea agreement presented to and rejected by

the previous trial judge or to object to the trial judge reviewing them.

               To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Torres must prove by

a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) the

deficiency prejudiced his defense.        Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984);

Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770, 772–74 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). The review of a trial

counsel’s representation on an ineffective-assistance challenge is highly deferential to the

counsel’s professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

               To meet the first prong of the Strickland test, Torres must overcome a strong

presumption that his counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonably professional

assistance. Id. “[A]ny allegation of ineffective assistance must be firmly founded in the record,

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and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness.” Thompson v. State,

9 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Generally, a reviewing court will not speculate

about counsel’s trial strategy. Mayhue v. State, 969 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998,

no pet.). When there is an absence of evidence in the record of counsel’s reasons for the

challenged conduct, we “will not conclude the challenged conduct constituted deficient

performance unless the conduct was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have

engaged in it.” Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). “A substantial risk

of failure accompanies an appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal.”

Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813.

               During the guilt-innocence phase of Torres’s trial, plea agreements were

presented to the judge on the record and rejected by the trial court. On remand, a different trial

judge heard the punishment evidence and assessed Torres’s sentence. At the beginning of the

punishment hearing, the sentencing judge stepped out of the courtroom so that counsel could

create a record, through testimony by Torres, regarding plea negotiations relevant to the

punishment hearing that was taking place without the sentencing judge hearing the details of the

plea negotiations. Torres testified that his trial counsel communicated the State’s offer but that

he rejected the offer because he would not accept anything less than “time-served,” which would

have been about six years at the time of the hearing. After this testimony concluded, the trial

judge returned and the hearing continued.

               The trial judge made a couple of references to parts of the guilt-innocence record

that were provided to him by the attorneys. First, he noted: “At the request of the parties for the

record, the Court was given a—some disks, so the Court has read most of the transcript of all of

everything through the guilt/innocence.” The trial judge also stated: “There—the Court noted in

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reading the transcripts that at some point in time there was a plea offer made during the trial that

apparently was rejected by [the previous judge], too. I don’t know how relevant that is, but, you

know, that—that was in the record that you gave me.” The full reporter’s record from the

guilt-innocence phase of trial was then admitted into evidence by the State, which included the

hearing at which the previous trial judge heard and rejected the terms of the parties’

plea agreement.

               On appeal, Torres contends that Rule 410 prohibited the admission of the portion

of the guilt-innocence record that mentioned the plea bargains. See Tex. R. Evid. 410. Rule 410

provides:

       In a criminal case, evidence of the following is not admissible against the
       defendant who made the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions:

       (1) a guilty plea that was later withdrawn;

       (2) a nolo contendere plea that was later withdrawn;

       (3) a statement made during a proceeding on either of those pleas under Federal
       Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 or a comparable state procedure; or

       (4) a statement made during plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting
       authority if the discussions did not result in a guilty or nolo contendere plea or
       they resulted in a later-withdrawn guilty or nolo contendere plea.

Id.

               We have no record from which we may discern that counsel’s performance was

not based on sound strategy. See Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813–14 (“A substantial risk of failure

accompanies an appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal. . . . In the

majority of instances, the record on direct appeal is simply undeveloped and cannot adequately

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reflect the failings of trial counsel.”). Although a motion for new trial was filed, it did not raise

this issue and no hearing was held. Torres relies heavily on the fact that his trial counsel made

sure to keep details of the plea negotiations regarding punishment from the sentencing judge but

allowed unredacted details of the earlier plea agreement to be entered into evidence.            He

contends that this demonstrates that his counsel was deficient because counsel knew that details

from plea negotiations should not be presented to the judge who would be assessing punishment.

However, the plea deals were for two different offenses. Torres does not explain how his trial

counsel’s decision to prevent the sentencing judge from knowing the details of plea negotiations

relevant to the offense he was being sentenced for makes it so that trial counsel could not have a

reasonable trial strategy for allowing in information about a different offense. We are not

convinced that under the facts of this case that failing to object to the admission of the reporter’s

record or request that the reporter’s record be redacted are so egregious that no competent

attorney would have acted similarly. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (“[A] court must indulge a

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances,

the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’”); Garcia, 57 S.W.3d at 440

(“[I]n the absence of evidence of counsel’s reasons for the challenged conduct, an appellate court

. . . will not conclude the challenged conduct constituted deficient performance unless the

conduct was so outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.”).

Accordingly, we overrule Torres’s ineffective-assistance claim.

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                                       CONCLUSION

              Because we overruled all of Torres’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                            __________________________________________
                                            Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Baker and Theofanis

Affirmed

Filed: August 2, 2023

Do Not Publish

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