Court Opinion

ID: 9569183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:11:14.530053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:50:13.537155
License: Public Domain

Sognier, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. “Any statement or conduct of a person, indicating a consciousness of guilt, where such person is, at the time or thereafter, charged with or suspected of the crime, is admissible against him upon his trial for committing it.” Hixon v. State, 130 Ga. 479, 482 (2) (61 SE 14) (1908); Moon v. State, 154 Ga. App. 312, 315-316 (5) (268 SE2d 366) (1980); Conner v. State, 160 Ga. App. 202, 203 (4) (286 SE2d 441) (1981); Parker v. State, 181 Ga. App. 590, 591 (2) (353 SE2d 83) (1987); Bridges v. State, 246 Ga. 323, 324 (2) (271 SE2d 471) (1980).
This court decides cases based on Georgia law, not on the Federal Rules of Evidence or law review articles expressing the author’s personal opinion on specific subjects. It is only when there is no authority in Georgia on a given issue that we look to foreign jurisdictions or possibly legal encyclopedias to resolve the issue. As seen from the *452cases cited above, there is ample authority in Georgia to resolve the issue presented.
Decided March 18, 1988.
Glenville Haldi, for appellant.
Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Harvey W. Moskowitz, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
United States v. Gullo, 672 FSupp. 99, 103, supra, does not support the statement in the majority that a serious Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments Miranda problem is created by admission of the objected-to evidence. On the contrary, Gullo held specifically that the introduction into evidence of Gullo’s statements made during arbitration did not violate his constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and did not render his statements involuntary. Id. The basis of the holding in Gullo that evidence from the arbitration proceeding was not admissible was the fact that a New York statute specifically provided that statements made during arbitration would be confidential, and could not be used against a person in subsequent legal proceedings. The New York statute obviously has no application here.
The mediation proceedings in this case occurred while appellant was under criminal charges, and his conduct in signing a mediation agreement acknowledging his liability is conduct indicating a consciousness of guilt. Hence, under the rule enunciated repeatedly in the cases cited above, the evidence was admissible as bearing on appellant’s guilt or innocence. Accordingly, I would affirm appellant’s conviction.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray and Presiding Judge Banke join in this dissent.