Court Opinion

ID: 9795422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:28:35.54616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:29:56.550879
License: Public Domain

Judge ROY
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I concur in the majority's disapproval of the trial court rulings challenged by the People, I respectfully dissent with respect to defendant's cross-appeal.
I conclude that the trial court erred in failing to suppress an incriminatory statement defendant made to the police because the statement was taken in violation of § 19-2-511, C.R.8.1999.
Section 19-2-511 states in pertinent part: (1) No statements or admissions of a juvenile made as a result of the custodial interrogation of such juvenile by a law enforcement official concerning delinquent acts alleged to have been committed by the juvenile shall be admissible in evidence against such juvenile unless a parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian of the juvenile was present at such interrogation and the juvenile and his or her parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian were advised of the juvenile's right....
(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, the juvenile and 'his or her parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian may expressly waive the requirement that the parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian be present during interrogation of the juvenile. This express wativer shall be in writing and shall be obtained only after full advisement of the juvenile and his or her parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian of the juvenile's rights prior to the taking of the custodial statement by a law enforcement official. If said requirement is expressly waived, statements or admissions of the juvenile shall not be inadmissible in evidence by reason of the absence of the juvenile's parent, guardian, or legal or physical custodian during interrogation .... (emphasis added)
When construing a statute, a court must give effect to the intent of the General Assembly and adopt the construction that best effectuates the purpose of the statutory scheme. M.S. v. People, 812 P.2d 632 (Colo.1991). To determine intent, a court should look first to the language of the statute and give the words their ordinary meaning. People in Interest of G.W.R., 943 P.2d 466 (Colo.App.1997).
The supreme court construed and applied § 19-2-511 in Nicholas v. People, 973 P.2d 1213 (Colo.1999). In that case, citing 2A N.J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 47.23 at 217 (5th ed.1992), the court held that the statute was to be strictly construed. The court also recognized that the General Assembly had instituted the parental presence rule out of a recognition that children require additional protection and assistance.
There are, of course, several reasons for requiring that an act be "in writing," the primary one being to resolve any future disputes as to whether the act, or any terms or conditions associated with it, was performed. Another reason, in my view, is to impress on the party acting that the act is important, may have serious consequences, and needs to be formalized or ritualized.
In my view, when, as here, the statute requires that a person's act "shall be in writing", the writing must, by some means, be the writing of the person acting. Therefore, it must be a writing of, or attributable to, the defendant by virtue of the fact that it is written, signed, acknowledged, or ratified by the defendant as his or her own.
I recognize that some statutes requiring a writing also require, by additional language, that the writing be signed or subscribed by the person against whom it is to be enforced. See, e.g., § 18-1-405(4), C.R.8.1999 (waiver *677of the statutory right to speedy trial and agreement for a continuance signed by the defendant). Based, in part, on such statutes, the majority concludes that the requirement of a writing is separate from the requirement of a signature. I would conclude that the separate signature requirement is a redundancy in most, if not all, instances.
Alternatively, the majority concludes that the writing is attributable to the defendant based largely on the surrounding cireum-stances of its preparation and the fact that the defendant does not deny that he wanted to waive the presence of his parents. However, the only evidence from which it can be argued that the writing is attributable to the defendant is that he saw the form after it was signed by his mother, was not asked any questions concerning it, and made no comments about it. That is clearly insufficient.
The defendant did not dispute in the trial court, or on appeal, that he did not want his parents present during any interrogation, and so stated. The only issue presented is whether his waiver of his parents' presence was adequate under the statute. I conclude it was not adequate for the reasons stated.
I am cognizant that some will view the statute as a "hyper-technicality" under the circumstances of this case in light of the fact that the defendant does not deny that he orally waived his right to have his parents present, and did not want them to be present, during the interrogation. If the statute is a "hyper-technicality," it is the creation of the General Assembly. I am also aware that the officers made a good faith effort, with some slight of hand, to comply with a new statute with which they were unfamiliar at the time of the first statement. However, I am concerned that the majority's opinion will, at best, dilute what I perceive to be the plain meaning of the phrase "shall be in writing" or, at worst, render the phrase meaningless.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.