Court Opinion

ID: 9865921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 23:48:17.488217+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:08:05.198153
License: Public Domain

DREW, Judge
(dissenting).
I seriously dissent from the majority opinion of this court in this case. Although I seldom write a. dissenting opinion, I feel called upon to do so now owing to the fact that it is my belief, if the majority opinion herein be allowed to stand, that all former jurisprudence of the Courts of Appeal and Supreme Court of this state, defining an “accident” within'the intendment of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of Louisiana, is overruled, and we will start with this decision under a new line of jurisprudence, in so far as what constitutes an accident under said act.
I think the, decision is in direct conflict with the. leading cases on the subject, such as: McMullen v. Louisiana Central Lbr. Co., 2 La. App. 773 and Id., 3 La. App. 562; Becton v. Deas Paving Co., Inc., 3 La. App. 683; Patrick v. Grayson & Yeary, 13 La. App. 228, 127 So. 116; Wright v. La. Ice & Utilities Co., 14 La. App. 621, 129 So. 436, and Id., 19 La. App. 173, 138 So. 450; Anderson v. La. Oil Ref. Corp., 16 La. App. 294, 134 So. 343; Hicks v. Meridian Lbr. Co., 152 La. 975, 94 So. 903; Blackman v. Hope Engineering & Supply Co., 11 La. App. 92, 120 So. 682; Womack v. Highway Const. Co., 18 La. App. 111, 137 So. 210; Mustack v. Union Indemnity Co. (La. App.) 147 So. 749; and numerous other cases involving hernia caused by straining, in performance of the usual and customary work of the employee.
The majority opinion holds that, regardless of an employee’s diseased condition, if he were doing the work he was employed to do in the customary and úsúal manner, even though the work is so heavy that his condition will not stand for it, and in performing this work he receives an injury which caused death, it is not an accident within the intendment of the Workmen’s Compensation Act of Louisiana.
This doctrine in my opinion is set forth in the following part of the majority opinion:
“While the petition alleges that deceased ‘stooped to an awkward, cramped position and lifted a cross tie from the ground to the height of a man’s shoulder so that he sustained an unusual strain,’ there is no testimony that Pack was in a cramped or awkward position or suffered an unusual strain. He was disabled while doing the usual work he was employed to do, in the same way’ he had been doing it for many years, without the intervention of any .sudden happening of any kind. Unquestionably it is an effort to stoop and lift, to the height of a man’s shoulder, even with the assistance of another man, a cross tie weighing over 200 pounds; but it was not an unusual effort to this negro laborer. He was not even doing the work in the most arduous way, as the testimony shows that on many occasions the men ‘head’ the ties themselves, that is, each man, bearing the whole burden of its weight, lifts and carries his own tie. We have gone into the nature of the work done and the particular happenings on this occasion at some length because one of the defenses urged is that the disability was not due to an accident, as defined in our Workmen’s Compensation Act (No. 20 of 1914, as amended).
“Section 2 of that act, as amended by Act No. 85 of 1926, provides that if an employee ‘receives personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of such employment his employer shall pay compensation in the amounts and on the conditions and to the person or persons hereinafter provided.’
“Then, to recover under the act, a workman must not only suffer an injury in the course of his employment, but that injury must be caused by an accident arising out *796of said employment. This is emphasized by the fact that in section 38 the act, as amended by Act No. 38 of 1918, proceeds to define as follows just exactly what it means by accident: ‘That the word “Accident,” as used in this act shall, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the context, be construed to mean an unexpected or unforeseen event happening, suddenly or violently, with or without human fault and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury.’
“The only thing happening suddenly and unexpectedly in this ease was the disability, not any event causing it, which could be construed as an accident.
“We are aware, and approve of, the decisions of our courts to the effect that the terms of the act should be construed liberally in favor of the workman (Knispel v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 174 La. 402, 141 So. 9; Clements v. Luby Oil Co., 170 La. 910, 129 So. 526); but article 13 of our Civil Code reads that ‘when a law is clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded, under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.’ Construction cannot be employed where there is nothing in the nature of an accident to construe, such as unusually heavy exertion while in a strained or awkward position, stumbling, sudden shifting of the weight of a heavy burden, overworking in extreme heat, etc. If the workman in this case suffered an accident at time specified, he suffered one every time he lifted a tie during the many years of his employment. So, in this case where the only proof offered is that of disability, to allow compensation we would have to bodily delete the word ‘accident,’ as defined, from the act, a purely legislative function beyond the power of courts.”
Under the section quoted, “unforeseen” means unforeseen by the person injured by its occurrence. The standard taken is not necessarily the intelligence or foresight of the average person. An occurrence is unexpected if it is not expected by the person who suffers by it, even though every other man of common sense, knowing the circumstances, would think it certain to happen. The fact that the result of exertion, such as was required of deceased in his usual employment, due to his physical impairment, would have been expected by or contemplated as a certainty by a physician, if he had previously examined him, means nothing in this regard. The words “unexpected” and/or “unforeseen” refer to the results and not to the cause. When deceased attempted to lift the cross-tie from near the ground to the height of a man’s shoulder, he intended to do exactly what he did; nevertheless if he strained himself in so doing and caused a hemorrhage of the stomach, due to his impaired condition, the injury was due to an accident. The exertion of lifting the tie was too much for his diseased and weakened condition, and the injury received was an accident arising out of his employment. If he had been a strong, healthy man, the lifting of the tie would not have caused any injury. However, the Workmen’s Compensation Act does not make any provision for the healthy alone. It protects the employee. It makes no distinction between the wise or foolish, skilled or inexperienced, healthy or diseased employees. All who are rightfully described as employees come within the act. It is the hazard of employment acting upon the particular employee in his condition of health. The term “violence to the physical structure of the body” may have originated from lifting heavy weights or from other provable causes, for instance, intense heat operating directly on the part of the body internally affected, which effect a sudden change in the physical structure or tissues of the body.
I think the record makes it certain that deceased did not know his condition. He had followed this same work for the past six years and had been employed by the same men. Just exactly 30 days prior to the date of injury, he was sick, and was attended by Dr. Johns, who diagnosed his case as constipation and gave him a laxative. He went back to work and continued until the morning of the accident. From all outward appearances, he was a healthy, robust man. On this particular morning he had worked from 7 o’clock until about 10, when he and his coworker picked up a tie weighing between two and three hundred pounds, and had raised it to about the height of a man’s shoulder when deceased dropped his end and remarked: “I done jerked a kink in my side.” Soon thereafter he spat up blood, later had a hemorrhage of the stomach, and continued to have them at intervals until he died some five or six days later, from hemorrhage of the stomach. An autopsy was held and the full and complete findings reduced to writing. From this finding all doctors in the case testified. The fact that Dr. Butler performed the autopsy to my mind places him in no better position to testify than the other doctors, as his testimony is based upon the same findings used by all the other doctors who testified.
The following doctors testified in the case: Dr. W. S. Kerlin, Dr. Frank Walke, Dr. Richard Brown, Dr. Harold Quinn, Dr. W. P. Butler, Dr. Boone, Dr. Paine, and Dr. Hewitt. All of the doctors, with the exception of Dr. Butler, Dr. Boone, and Dr. Paine, were of the opinion that the death of the deceased was hastened by the accident. Dr. Butler would not say whether it was or not. They all agree that if they had been treating the deceased and had known the condition he was in as was disclosed by the autopsy, they would have forbidden him to do the heavy work ^he was doing. The credibility of the doctors is not at stake, and the preponderance of the medical testimony is that the accident *797caused by tbe heavy work hastened the death of the deceased, and the strain he underwent, due to his weakened physical condition, was the cause of the hemorrhage of the stomach.
There was no strain on the man out of the ordinary in his line of work. No importance should be attached to that. Neither should we attach any importance to his state of health. An accident arises out of the employment when the required exertion producing the accident is too great for the man undertaking the work, whatever the degree of exertion or the condition of health. If the degree of exertion beyond that which was usual had to be considered in these cases, there would have to be some standard of exertion, varying in every trade. If the state of health had to be considered, there would have to be some standard of health varying with men of different age.
There can be no doubt that under any circumstances the deceased would not have lived many years longer than he did. And m my mind his death was hastened by the heavy work he was doing. I am convinced that plaintiffs death was caused by an accident arising out of his employment, and that plaintiffs are entitled to compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act of Louisiana.
I therefore dissent from the majority opinion in this case.