Court Opinion

ID: 9495870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:12:30.662925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:14.802948
License: Public Domain

HUG, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The trial judge correctly instructed on the elements of second degree murder in the oral instructions, and in the written instructions that were sent to the jury room. The issue before the California Court of Appeal was whether the earlier instruction concerning general criminal intent created such ambiguity in the minds of the jurors as to require reversal. The California Court of Appeal stated:
All the standard instructions were given on first degree murder, second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, reasonable self-defense and unreasonable self-defense.
The Court of Appeal then cited those particular instructions that were given by the trial court. The Court of Appeal further stated:
Having ascertained the relevant law, the question before us becomes whether there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the jury properly understood such law and were the points appellant sought to make at trial adequately covered. “In resolving such question we look to the evidence, instructions and arguments of counsel.”
(citations omitted). The Court of Appeal then stated:
Regarding general intent, the jury was initially instructed: “In the crime charged, murder in the second degree based on implied malice, this instruction applies. [¶] There must exist a union or *634joint operation of act or conduct and general intent.... [¶] That applies only to murder in the second degree based on the theory of implied malice, and I’ll write that down in the form for you. [¶] ... [¶] In the crime of murder in the second degree, the necessary mental state is malice.”
(Ellipsis and paragraph designations in original.)
The Court of Appeals then noted that, after discussion with counsel outside the presence of the jury, the general intent instructions were modified to specify that they applied only to involuntary manslaughter and that the written instructions given to the jury so indicated.
After giving the instructions for first degree murder the trial court gave the following instructions concerning the elements of second degree murder.
Murder of the second degree is also the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought when there is manifested an intention unlawfully to kill a human being but the evidence is insufficient to establish deliberation and premeditation.
Murder of the second degree is also the unlawful killing of a human being when:
One, the killing resulted from an intentional act;
Two, the natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human life; and
Three, the act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to and with conscious disregard for human life.
The trial court then gave the instructions concerning the specific elements of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.
As the Court of Appeal noted the attorneys for the prosecution and the defense argued the case in terms of these instructions. The prosecutor never argued that the defendant could be found guilty based only on a finding of general intent.
At most the early instruction on general intent, that the majority believes requires a reversal, could only have created some ambiguity concerning the elements of second degree murder that were clearly spelled out in the later instructions. It was never stated that general intent was the only element that need be proved.
The Court of Appeal concluded that “The necessary mental states were fully defined and general intent was effectively limited to involuntary manslaughter.” It is significant that both the prosecuting attorney and the defense attorney believed this to be true because no further modification of the instructions was requested.
As the majority opinion recognizes, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) applies to this petition for habeas corpus.
Judge Illston, in reviewing this petition in the district court, correctly analyzed this case under AEDPA, appropriately applying the deference that is due to the state court determination, as follows:
This Court finds the Court of Appeal’s determination did not result in a decision that is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, nor did it result in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at trial. To obtain federal collateral rehef for errors in the jury charge, petitioner must show that the ailing instruction so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973). In review*635ing an ambiguous instruction, the court must consider the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record, and determine whether there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 n. 4, 112 S.Ct. 475; Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990). If so, the court must then decide whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict before granting relief in habeas proceedings. See Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 145, 119 S.Ct. 500, 503, 142 L.Ed.2d 521 (1998); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1722, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). This standard is met if the record on collateral review leaves the judge in “grave doubt” as to the effect of the constitutional error. See O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436, 115 S.Ct. 992, 994, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995).
Considering the instructions as a whole, this Court cannot say that there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 n. 4, 112 S.Ct. 475. Moreover, even assuming that the jury did apply the erroneous instruction, in light of the theories of the parties and the evidence introduced, this Court agrees with the Court of Appeal’s conclusion and cannot say that the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. See Calderon, 525 U.S. at 145, 119 S.Ct. 500.
I agree with the district court that the Court of Appeal did not err, and that its decision under our standard of review was certainly not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.
I would therefore affirm the decision of the district court denying the petition for habeas corpus.