Court Opinion

ID: 9550871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:44:01.999746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:36.535995
License: Public Domain

BUTTLER, J.,
dissenting.
I would affirm the trial court’s sustaining of defendant’s demurrer to the complaint on the ground *68that the underlying statute is unconstitutionally vague. Accordingly, I dissent.
Even if we add to the statute the language which the majority derives from the New York cases, "narrowing” the meaning of the statute, the vagueness remains. Presumably, ORS 166.025(1)(h) would then read:
"(1) A person commits the crime of disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he:
"* * * * *
"(h) Created a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any act which he is not licensed or privileged to do, [thereby disrupting a group of persons or a substantial portion of the community.]” (Emphasis supplied.)
I accept the majority’s test, as stated in State v. Sanderson, 33 Or App 173, 575 P2d 1025 (1978), and can see no distinction between the statute held void for vagueness in Sanderson and the statute here involved. The majority’s attempted distinction is one without a difference. Sanderson held to be overly general and subjective, the phrase "alarms or seriously annoys.” The majority states that the inclusion here of the adjective "physically’ before the word "offensive” excludes trivial annoyances and therefore is not overly general and subjective. In Sanderson, however, we said:
"* * * The inclusion of the word 'seriously evidences a legislative recognition of the problem and informs us that not every tease or social slight was intended, but it has limited definitional value. It does not enable one to distinguish between innocent and criminal annoyance as a matter of degree.” 33 Or App at 177.
It seems to me that the word "seriously” has at least as much definitional value as does the word "physically’ in the context of the statutory language here involved.
*69Since the defendant was only charged with "creating a physically offensive condition,” not a "hazardous” one (also included under ORS 166.025(1)(h)), we are only concerned with that portion of the subsection, and I would hold that portion void for vagueness.