Court Opinion

ID: 9690705
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:36:15.153795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:10.270607
License: Public Domain

KEM THOMPSON FROST, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Victor Rodarte has perfected appeal in his representative capacity; however, I l’espectfully disagree with the analysis the majority uses to reach this conclusion.
In determining the capacity in which a party has asserted a claim in the trial court, the focus must be on the party’s pleadings. Likewise, in determining the capacity in which a party has appealed from an adverse judgment, the focus must be on the party’s notice of appeal. In both instances, this court must construe the operative language liberally. Under a liberal construction of the relevant trial court pleading, Victor Rodarte sued not just in his representative capacity, as the majority concludes, but also in his individual capacity-
In his live trial-court petition, Victor, as plaintiff, did not state that he was suing in his individual capacity or as representative of his brother Gregorio, or both. Both Rodarte brothers (Victor and Gregorio) as well as Domingo Gonzales were named as plaintiffs; however, Victor’s capacity was not specified. Rather, Victor was referred to as “Plaintiff Victor Rodarte” with no further explanation. Though the terms “Plaintiff’ and “Plaintiffs” are used throughout the petition, these terms are not defined. Victor alleged in his trial court pleading (1) that he “is the lawful agent of real-party-in-interest, Gregorio Rodarte, with respect to all suits arising from the real property in question,” (2) that Gregorio “executed special and general power of attorney agreements appointing Victor, as Gregorio’s agent with respect to the Property,” and (3) that “these power of attorney agreements vest Plaintiff [no specification] with full authority over Gregorio’s interest in the Property, including authority to prosecute any and all legal actions relating to the Property.” Victor, however, did not state that he was bringing suit in his capacity as agent for Gregorio. No party filed a motion requesting the trial court to compel Victor to show that he had capacity to assert claims in the litigation, nor did any party take any other action to place in issue Victor’s capacity to assert such claims.
Well-timed special exceptions to Victor’s trial-court pleading would have clarified the capacity issue. However, because no special exceptions were filed or sustained *414against the petition, this court must construe the petition liberally to contain any claims that reasonably may be inferred from the language used in the petition. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Doe, 903 S.W.2d 347, 354-55 (Tex.1995). Though the majority believes it is clear that Victor sued only on Gregorio’s behalf as Gregorio’s attorney-in-fact, under a liberal construction of the petition, Victor sued both in his individual capacity and in a representative capacity.
Appellees, relying on Elizondo v. Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission, contend that Victor perfected appeal in his individual capacity only. See 974 S.W.2d 928 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, no pet.). They assert Victor lacks standing in this court because, in his individual capacity, he has no interest in the subject property. See id. However, in Elizondo, the plaintiff expressly stated in her trial-court petition that she was suing in both her individual capacity and in a representative capacity. See id. In contrast to the plaintiff in Elizondo, Victor did not expressly address in his trial-court pleading the capacity in which he brought suit. Therefore, the Elizondo case is not on point. See id.
When Victor appealed the adverse judgment by filing a notice of appeal in this court, he continued to use the same vague terminology he used in his trial court pleading. In his notice of appeal, Victor does not specify the capacity in which he is appealing. Instead, Victor states only that the appellant is “Plaintiff Victor Ro-darte” — the same vague term used in the trial court petition to refer to Victor suing in both an individual capacity and as representative of Gregorio. The record reflects that Victor is relying heavily on his representative capacity, and there is no apparent basis upon which Victor could sue in his individual capacity. In this context, the notice of appeal should be deemed sufficient to perfect an appeal by Victor in his representative capacity. See Warwick Towers Council of Co-Owners ex rel. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Park Warwick, L.P., 244 S.W.3d 838, 839 (Tex.2008) (holding that court of appeals should have reached the merits of insurance company’s appellate arguments and that insurance company had made a bona fide attempt to invoke the court of appeals’ jurisdiction, even though notice of appeal did not mention the insurance company and referred only to the insurer/subrogor as the appellant). Victor’s notice of appeal is not so deficient that it fails to invoke this court’s jurisdiction over the disputed claims. Appellees argue that Victor lacks standing because he appealed only in his individual capacity; however, for the reasons stated above, this argument lacks merit.