Court Opinion

ID: 9831577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:12:54.036288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:35.107360
License: Public Domain

.On Motion for Rehearing.
The plaintiffs in error, in their motion for rehearing, for the first time, present to us a question of fundamental error in this:
That the Ninety-Ninth judicial district court not being in existence at the time this suit was filed, nor at the time of the filing of the cross-action upon which the judgment is based — the only district court of Lubbock county, Tex., at those times, being the Seventy-Second judicial district court of Lubbock county, and that being the court in which this suit was filed — and there being no provision of the law transferring suits filed in the Seventy-Second district court to the Ninety-Ninth district court, which last court was not created until long after this suit and the filing-of the cross-action of defendants in error, the Ninety-Ninth district court was without jurisdiction to render a judgment in this cause against plaintiffs in error.
As indicated above, this suit was filed in the Seventy-Second judicial district. The Ninety-Ninth judicial district court was thereafter created by the Legislature. It is apparent from the record that Hon. Clark M. Mullican was the judge of the Seventy-Second judicial district court and that on the creation of the Ninety-Ninth judicial district court he was appointed judge of that court, and that Hon. Homer L. Pharr, one of the attorneys in this cause, was appointed judge of the Seventy-Second judicial district court. Judge Mullican of the Ninety-Ninth judicial district court exchanged benches with Judge Pharr, and while acting under such exchange, as judge of the Seventy-Second judicial district court, made and entered the following order, to wit:
“State of Texas, County of Lubbock.
“In the Judicial District Court of Seventy-Second Judicial District of Texas, Lubbock County, Texas. April 4, A. D. 1927.
“The following case is hereby transferred from the Seventy-Second judicial district court of Texas to the district court of the Ninety-Ninth judicial district of Texas, for the reason that the presiding judge of the Seventy-Second judicial district is disqualified to sit in the trial of said case: No. 2567, Charles Garrett v. W. R. Kelley et al.
“The district clerk in and for Lubbock county, Texas, is hereby instructed and directed to correct and adjust the records in the district clerk’s office to show the above list of cases on the docket hereafter in the Ninety-Ninth district court of Lubbock county, Texas. Clark M. Mullican, Judge Ninety-Ninth Judicial District of Texas. Acting by Exchange as Judge of the Seventy-Second Judicial District of Texas.”
The contention of appellants is that the order so entered by Judge Mullican was and is wholly void on the ground that such judge had no authority to transfer a case from the Seventy-Second judicial district court to the Ninety-Ninth judicial district court, on the ground of the disqualification of the judge of that court to try this case, and therefore the Ninety-Ninth judicial district court had no jurisdiction to render judgment on appellees’ cross-action.
The act creating the Ninety-Ninth judicial district court contained the following provision :
“See. 3. The district clerk of Lubbock county shall act as the district clerk for the court herein created. Immediately upon this act taking effect the district judge of the 72nd judicial district shall enter an order transferring a portion of the cases on the docket in the said 72nd judicial district court in Lubbock county to the district court of the 99th judicial district herein created, and said district clerk shall thereupon transfer such cases accordingly and enter the same upon the docket of said court created by this act, together with all records and papers relating thereto.” Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. 1925, art. 199, subd. 99, § 3.
The act reorganizing the Seventy-Second judicial district provided, among other things:
*418“Sec. 4. The 72nd judicial district of Texas and the 99th judicial district of Texas and the courts of said judicial districts in Lubbock county shall have concurrent jurisdiction with each other in said county in all matters over which jurisdiction is given or shall hereafter be given by the Constitution and laws of this state to district courts. Either of the judges of the said district courts for said county may in their discretion in term time or in vacation transfer a case or cases, civil or criminal, to said other district court, with the consent of the judge of said other district court, by order entered on the minutes of his court from which said ease is transferred or minutes or orders made in chambers as the case may be, which orders when made shall be copied and certified to by the district clerk of said Lubbock county, together with all orders made in said case and such certified copies of such orders together with the original papers shall be filed among the papers of any ease thus transferred and the fees thereof shall be taxed as a part of the costs of said suit, and the clerk of said court shall docket any such case in the court to which it shall have been transferred and when so entered the court to which same shall have been thus transferred shall have like jurisdiction therein as in cases originally filed in said court and the same shall be dropped from the docket of the said court from which it was transferred, provided that all process and writs issued out of the district court from which any such transfer is made shall be returnable to the term of court to which said transfer is made according to the terms of the district court of said respective courts as fixed by this act, and that all bonds executed and recognizances entered into in any district court from which any such transfer is made shall bind the parties for their appearance or to fulfill the obligations of such bonds and recognizances at the terms of said court to which said transfer is made as said terms are fixed by this act in the respective counties.” Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. 1925, art. 199, subd. 72, §4.
It is clear, from the language of the act creating the Ninety-Ninth district, and from the wording of the provision quoted from the act reorganizing the Seventy-Second district, that' a case pending upon the Seventy-Second district court’s docket could be transferred to the docket of the district court of the Ninety-Ninth district, at the discretion of the judge sitting as judge of the Seventy-Second district court.
This exercise of discretion is ordinarily presumed. The fact that the order transferring the case recites that the presiding judge of the Seventy-Second district court was disqualified in the case obviates the necessity of his consenting to the transfer.
The fact that, in exercising his discretion in transferring the case and in so ordering, the judge sitting by exchange of benches recites that he does so because of the fact that the judge of the Seventy-Second district was disqualified to try it, does not render that discretion inoperative; and if the judge, in so transferring the case, assigned a wrong reason for his judgment, but did render a judgment or enter an order which was authorized by law, his erroneous reason therefor would not affect its legality.
If the conclusion reached be right, it is not material that the court may have given a wrong reason therefor. Dean v. Crenshaw, 47 Tex. 10; Swift v. Trotti, 52 Tex. 498, 503; Galveston v. Hemmins, 72 Tex. 558, 11 S. W. 29, 13 Am. St. Rep. 828; Mainwarring v. Templeman, 51 Tex. 205.
The motion for rehearing is, in all things, overruled.