Court Opinion

ID: 9697303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:12:36.339207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:31.308555
License: Public Domain

Markman, J.
(concurring). We concur with the result reached in Judge Smolensk's opinion, but write separately to discuss several issues that we believe require further discussion.
At the outset, we note that the issue whether prior instances of sexual penetration by a defendant should be scored under Offense Variable (ov) 12 is sometimes obscured in the context of appropriate concern that such conduct be assessed in sentencing. The issue is not whether such prior conduct should be considered in sentencing. Such prior conduct demonstrates characteristics of the offender that are relevant to proportionate sentencing. Therefore, if no offense variable adequately addresses such conduct, it provides a strong rationale to depart upward from the guidelines’ range. See People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 659-660; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). Accordingly, the issue before us is only whether ov 12 covers prior instances of sexual penetration by a defendant, not whether evidence of such conduct is otherwise relevant in sentencing defendant.
*85We also preliminarily note our standard of review in deciding this issue. In People v Reddish, 181 Mich App 625, 628; 450 NW2d 16 (1989), this Court held:
Appellate review of guidelines calculations is very limited. ... A sentencing judge has discretion in determining the number of points to be scored provided that evidence exists adequate to support a particular score. . . . The Sentence Review Committee strongly recommends that this Court uphold scoring decisions for which any support exists. [Emphasis added.]
Accordingly, this Court is to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in scoring the prior instances of criminal sexual penetration under ov 12. However, before we reach this issue, this conflict panel must answer the preliminary legal question whether ov 12 covers instances of criminal sexual penetration outside the episode for which a defendant was convicted. This Court reviews questions of law de novo. People v Bloxson, 205 Mich App 236, 245; 517 NW2d 563 (1994).
Our analysis of the reach of ov 12 begins with the language of the variable itself. The majority correctly states that the Sentencing Guidelines are to be interpreted according to the rules of statutory construction. In People v Williams, 205 Mich App 229, 232-233; 517 NW2d 315 (1994), this Court stated:
In interpreting the guidelines, we are guided by the rules of statutory construction. . . . The first criterion of statutory interpretation is the specific language used; the meaning plainly expressed is presumed to be the meaning intended.. . . Unless defined, every word or phrase should be given its plain and ordinary meaning; technical terms are to be given their peculiar meaning. . . .
*86Another rule of statutory construction is that provisions must be read in context so as to produce an harmonious whole.
The instructions to ov 12 (criminal sexual penetration[s]) state: “Score all penetrations involving the offender arising out of the same criminal transaction.” Sentencing Guidelines (2d ed) at 45. Under ov 12, twenty-five points are scored for one criminal sexual penetration and fifty points are scored for two or more criminal sexual penetrations. The instructions note: “In CSC 1st and CSC 3rd do not score the one penetration that forms the basis of the conviction offense.” Id. The definitions section of the Sentencing Guidelines includes the following: “Transaction: The acts occurred in a continuous time sequence and displayed a single intent or goal.” Id. at 10.
On the basis of this definition, the question before us is whether prior instances of criminal sexual penetration may constitute acts “in a continuous time sequence” that “displayed a single intent or goal” with the conduct for which a defendant is convicted. Here, Judge Smolensk! concludes that defendant’s daily molestation of the victim displayed a single intent “to conceal his continued molestation of the victim during that extended period.” Ante at 83. However, our understanding of the facts convinces us that the more obvious “single intent” was to engage in sexual conduct when there was an opportunity to do so. Accordingly, the precise issue presented here becomes whether the prior instances of criminal sexual penetration are “in a continuous time sequence” with the conduct for which defendant was convicted.
“Continuous” is defined as “uninterrupted in time; without cessation.” Random House Webster’s College *87Dictionary (1992) at 295. The usage note under the entry for “continual” states in pertinent part:
Although the words are used interchangeably in all kinds of speech and writing, usage guides generally advise that continual be used only to mean “intermittent” and CONTINUOUS only to mean “uninterrupted.” [Id.]
If we interpret ov 12 consistently with the dictionary usage note definition of “continuous” as uninterrupted, ov 12 might be read to reach only penetrations that occurred during the same, uninterrupted episode as the conduct for which a defendant is convicted. In People v Polus, 197 Mich App 197, 199; 495 NW2d 402 (1992), this Court read ov 12 to reach only penetrations occurring during the episode for which a defendant is convicted.1
However, the dictionary usage note acknowledges that “continuous” is often used interchangeably with “continual” to mean intermittent. Definitions of “continuous” in 1 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993) at 495, include “[characterized by continuity” and “connected.” Under this broader definition of “continuous,” ov 12 could reasonably be interpreted to reach prior instances of criminal sexual penetration as long as they display a single intent with the conduct for which a defendant is convicted. Judge Smolensk! adopted the broader reading of ov 12’s “continuous time sequence” element but failed to *88specifically articulate his rationale for doing so.2 In the prior, vacated opinion in this case, 213 Mich App 801, 803 (1995), this Court stated that, were it not bound by Polus, supra, it would have concluded that the defendant’s prior instances of criminal sexual penetration of the victim were appropriately scored under ov 12 because they were part of “the same overall criminal transaction — years of molestation.”
We find both these readings of the “continuous time sequence” element of ov 12 reasonable and supported by the language of the guidelines. Accordingly, we conclude, as a matter of law, that ov 12 is broad enough to reach the prior instances of criminal sexual penetration here and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in so finding.
In reaching this conclusion, we also considered ov 25 (contemporaneous criminal acts), which arguably applies to prior instances of sexual penetration. The instructions to OV 25, Sentencing Guidelines at 46, state in pertinent part:
A. A criminal act is contemporaneous if: (1) it occurs within twenty-four hours of the offense upon which the offender is being sentenced or within six months if it is identical to or similar in nature and (2) it has not and will not result in a separate conviction.
Under OV 25, five points are scored for two contemporaneous criminal acts, and fifteen points are scored for three or more contemporaneous criminal acts.
Judge Smolensk considered the applicability of ov 25. He concluded that with respect to criminal sexual *89penetrations, ov 12, the guideline specific to penetrations, prevailed over ov 25, the guideline generally applicable to contemporaneous criminal acts. Judge Smolensk thus implicitly assumed that the prior instances of criminal sexual penetration could be scored under only one of these two offense variables. In the context of an assumption that factors should be scored under only one offense variable, the criminal sexual conduct offense variables are best read as an harmonious whole by clearly differentiating between conduct to be scored under ov 12 and conduct to be scored under ov 25. The conduct covered by these two variables is most clearly demarcated by interpreting ov 12 narrowly to reach only penetrations occurring during the uninterrupted episode for which a defendant is convicted and scoring prior instances of penetration under ov 25. Accordingly, if the offense variables are to be read so that particular factors are scored under only one variable, we believe that the better view would be to read ov 12 narrowly and score prior instances of criminal sexual penetration under ov 25. In that respect, we would disagree with the view expressed in Judge Smolensk’s opinion.
However, we do not believe that particular factors — here, prior instances of criminal sexual penetration — must be scored under only one offense variable. The guidelines’ instructions for evaluating the offense variables do not indicate that consideration of a factor in scoring one offense variable prohibits consideration of that factor in scoring another offense variable. Rather, they instruct the scorer to “[determine the offender’s score on each variable” and to “[e]valuate each of the Offense Variables.” Sentencing Guidelines at 5 (emphasis added).
*90In People v Vonins (After Remand), 203 Mich App 173; 511 NW2d 706 (1993), this Court considered this issue in the context of prior record variables (prvs). In Vonins, the trial court assessed points under prv 2, prior low-severity felony convictions, for the defendant’s conviction of possession with intent to deliver cocaine. Id. at 176. The trial court also assessed points under prv 6, prior relationship to criminal justice system, because the defendant was on parole status for the possession conviction at the time of the offense at issue. Id. The Vonins Court noted that the two variables were directed toward different purposes. Id. at 177. It held that the scoring of points under both prv 2 and prv 6 was not “impermissible ‘double counting’ ” and that the trial court’s assessment of points for both variables was proper. Id. at 176-177.
Similarly, the assessment of points for prior instances of criminal sexual penetration for both ov 12 and ov 25 would be proper.3 These variables are directed, at least arguably, toward different purposes: ov 12 specifically addresses penetrations arising out of the same criminal transaction whereas ov 25 addresses contemporaneous criminal acts. Yet most conduct covered by OV 12, under either the broad or narrow reading of it, would also constitute contempo*91raneous criminal acts under ov 25.4 Because these variables, although not identical, do overlap, the conduct that would support scoring under ov 12 would generally also support scoring under ov 25.
Accordingly, we should interpret the criminal sexual conduct guidelines with the understanding that factors may be scored under more than one offense variable. In this context, the rule that we should interpret specific variables so as to produce an harmonious whole does not support the narrow reading of the “continuous time sequence” element of OV 12 over the broader reading.
As discussed above, both the narrow reading and the broader reading of this element of ov 12 are reasonable. Therefore, under a de novo standard of review, we would not reverse the trial court’s reading of ov 12. We conclude that ov 12 is broad enough to reach the prior instances of criminal penetration at issue here. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s scoring of ov 12 for defendant’s prior instances of criminal sexual penetration. We additionally conclude that the same factor may be scored under more than one offense variable.
For these reasons, we would affirm the judgment of sentence.
Corrigan and Markey, JJ., concurred.

 People v Chesebro, 206 Mich App 468, 472; 522 NW2d 677 (1994), and People v Hyland, 212 Mich App 701, 712-713; 538 NW2d 465 (1995), followed the interpretation of ov 12 articulated in Polus. While they read ov 12 consistently with the dictionary usage note regarding “continuous,” we note that none of these decisions explicitly referred to the guidelines definition of “transaction” and its “continuous time sequence” element.

 In People v Warner, 190 Mich App 26; 475 NW2d 397 (1991), and People v Bivens, 206 Mich App 284; 520 NW2d 711 (1994), this Court similarly adopted the broad reading without articulating its reasons for doing so.

 This issue also arises in the context of the guidelines for other offenses. For example, the guidelines for burglary include ov 10, possession of burglar’s tools, and ov 25, contemporaneous criminal acts. Because the possession of burglary tools is a criminal act, MCL 750.116; MSA 28.311, it could be scored under both ov 25 and ov 10. We note that ov 25 is a crosscutting offense variable that applies to all the crimes for which there are guidelines.

 We note that penetrations that arise out of the same criminal transaction and result in a separate conviction would be covered by ov 12 but not ov 25. Also, under the broad reading of ov 12, penetrations that arise out of the same criminal transaction but occurred more than six months before the conduct for which a defendant is convicted would be covered by ov 12 but not ov 25.