Court Opinion

ID: 9632782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:25:02.572884+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:22.625340
License: Public Domain

Justice LOHR
specially concurring:
I concur in the judgment of the court and in parts I and II of the majority opinion. I agree as well that the death penalty is not an available sanction for a crime of first-degree murder committed between July 9, 1991, the date of our decision in People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834 (Colo.1991), and September 20, 1991, the effective date of the current death penalty statute, commonly referred to as House Bill 1001, now codified at section 16-11-103, 8A C.R.S. (1992 Supp.), under the rationale adopted by a majority of the court in People v. District Court, 834 P.2d 181 (Colo.1992) (Thomas). See maj. op., part III, at 338-339. I adhere to the view expressed in my separate opinion in Thomas, however, that application of the death penalty for any first-degree murder committed between the July 1, 1988, effective date of Senate Bill 78, eliminating the fourth step of the process by which a *340jury is to determine whether the death penalty should be imposed on a person convicted of first-degree murder,1 and the September 20, 1991, effective date of House Bill 1001, reenacting the fourth step, would violate the Colorado Constitution’s prohibition of ex post facto legislation. See Thomas, 834 P.2d at 213-31 (Lohr, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
QUINN and KIRSHBAUM, JJ., join in this special concurrence.

. See ch. 114, secs. 3, 5, § 16-11-103, 1988 Colo. Sess.Laws 673, 675.