Court Opinion

ID: 9945704
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 15:03:15.19907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:38.115865
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 143
                     ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                        DIVISION II
                                        No. CR 23-147

TRAVIS ROBERTS                                 Opinion Delivered February 28, 2024

                                               APPEAL FROM THE BENTON
                              APPELLANT        COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
                                               [NO. 04CR-19-2714]
V.
                                               HONORABLE BRAD KARREN,
                                               JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
                                APPELLEE       AFFIRMED

                          STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge

       Travis Roberts was charged by criminal information in Benton County with one

count of rape, one count of second-degree sexual assault, and two counts of distributing,

possessing, or viewing matter depicting sexually explicit conduct involving a child.1 A

Benton County Circuit Court jury convicted Roberts of second-degree sexual assault, for

which he was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment and thirteen years’ suspended

imposition of sentence, but it could not arrive at a unanimous verdict on the charge of rape.2

On appeal, Roberts argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for directed

       1
        The State nolle prossed the charge of distributing, possessing, or viewing matter
depicting sexually explicit conduct involving a child charge prior to trial.
       2
           The State also nolle prossed the rape charge after the jury was unable to reach a
verdict.
verdict on the charge of second-degree sexual assault because there was insufficient evidence

to support the conviction. We affirm.

       The victim, MC, who was seventeen at the time of trial, stated that she and her mother

moved in with Roberts when she was about three, and they lived with Roberts until she was

fourteen. She testified that Roberts abused her from ages three to about eleven, when her

mother became pregnant with her younger brother. MC revealed that Roberts sexually

abused her after they moved out.

       MC testified that Roberts would touch her and make her perform sexual acts on him.

Specifically, she testified that before her younger brother was born, Roberts would often take

her into the laundry room, where the lights would be off, and he would put his penis in her

mouth and tell her to pretend it was a sucker, but she knew it was not a sucker because she

could feel the hair on it in her mouth. MC further testified that toward the end of the

period of abuse, Roberts would pull her pants down, put her on the arm of the couch, and

“dry-hump” her against the couch; she stated that she would wait until he stopped and then

take a shower. She said that Roberts would touch her body with his penis; he would “finger”

her, meaning that he penetrated her with his fingers; and “there was the time where he even

performed oral on me,” which she explained was oral sex. MC also recounted an incident

in which she and Roberts were upstairs in Roberts and her mother’s bedroom lying on the

bed; Roberts was on top of her with his clothes on; she was holding her legs together; and

Roberts was “grinding” on her.

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       At the close of the State’s case, Roberts’s counsel moved for a directed verdict on both

counts, arguing that there were three events the State would argue went toward the rape

charge as to penetration. The first incident was MC’s testimony that Roberts would finger

her; however, he argued that there was no testimony as to where Roberts’s hands supposedly

were when he fingered her. Roberts’s counsel stated that he was going to proceed under the

assumption that the State was not going to say that fingering went toward the rape charge.

The second incident was MC’s testimony that Roberts performed oral sex on her; counsel

argued that oral sex was never defined, and MC never testified where Roberts performed

oral sex on her, i.e., where he touched her or with what part of his body he touched her.

The third incident identified by Roberts’s counsel was the allegation that Roberts put his

penis in MC’s mouth; however, he argued that it was dark when this happened, and MC

never saw his penis or explained how she knew it was his penis.

       As for second-degree sexual assault, Roberts’s counsel argued that there were two

incidents he assumed the State believed were sufficient to support that charge—the couch

incident in which MC testified Roberts “dry-humped” her, and the bedroom incident in

which she alleged Roberts lay on top of her in a bed and “grinded” against her. Counsel

argued that the terms “dry hump,” “grind,” and “on top of her” were not defined for the

jury, and there was never any evidence of where Roberts touched MC.

       In response, the prosecutor conceded that when MC described Roberts performing

oral sex on her, “that is not what the State is alleging is a rape in this case.” However, the

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prosecutor pointed to MC’s testimony that Roberts “fingered” her and argued that while

there was not a jury instruction defining “fingering,” it was within the jury’s purview “to

understand what the vic—what the witness was referring to and what the definitions of

commonly understood terms could be.”          The prosecutor noted MC’s testimony that

Roberts’s finger penetrated her. However, for purposes of the rape charge, the prosecutor

focused on the fact that MC testified that Roberts had put his penis in her mouth and that

she had known it was his penis and had described that it had hair on it.

        In response to Roberts’s counsel’s argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence

for second-degree sexual abuse, the prosecutor noted that MC specifically stated Roberts’s

fingers penetrated her and that he also performed oral sex on her. The prosecutor said he

did not know whether the State could prove penetration on the basis of MC’s testimony that

Roberts performed oral sex on her, but he argued sexual contact could be proved on the

basis of that testimony. The prosecutor then addressed the “dry-humping” incident on the

couch, arguing that the definition of “dry-humping” was clear and coupled with MC’s

testimony that Roberts pulled her pants down and “dry-humped” her, “those two facts taken

together indicate that there was sexual contact by the touching, directly or through the

clothing, of her sex organs or buttocks or breasts.” The prosecutor also addressed the

bedroom incident, stating that was a second instance of “dry-humping,” and he believed the

jury had sufficient evidence to determine that sexual contact occurred in that instance as

well.

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       Roberts’s counsel responded that he understood the State was not alleging that the

oral sex was penetration for purposes of the rape allegation, but he argued that the

“fingering” incident also could not support rape because there was no evidence of what body

part was penetrated. Counsel argued that regarding the couch incident, the State failed to

prove where on MC Roberts was allegedly “dry-humping,” and as for the bed incident, there

was no testimony as to where on MC Roberts was supposedly “grinding.” The directed-

verdict motions were denied; they were renewed at the close of all of the evidence, at which

time they were again denied.

       In closing arguments, the prosecutor set forth the elements of rape and then argued,

              Let’s talk about the evidence and how the State has met its burden of proof as
       to Count Number One, rape. The jury instruction also says it is no defense to the
       charge of rape that the alleged victim consented to the conduct because at her age
       [MC] was incapable of consenting.

              Here’s what you can take to the bank. Here’s what happened in trial. [MC]
       told you unequivocally that in the laundry room downstairs, isolated from the rest of
       the house, the defendant -- that the defendant told her he had a sucker for her, and
       she described in vivid detail that he placed his penis in her mouth. She described that
       she could feel his hair, she could feel his pubic hair, I would argue, in her mouth, on
       her mouth. And, ladies and gentlemen, that is such a vivid, scarring memory. It’s clear
       from watching her yesterday that that is seared in her brain forever.

               She told you that she was less than ten years old when it happened, so she was
       certainly less than fourteen years old. And moreover, she said it happened before her
       six-year-old brother was born. So, we’ve proven that she was less than fourteen.

               That’s rape, ladies and gentlemen. If you believe her testimony there and you
       believe that we’ve proven that charge beyond a reasonable doubt, that’s the ballgame
       as to that charge. Then you can consider the rest of her testimony when she said that
       he fingered her, penetrated her, and that she didn’t know years ago when she first
       told people about this that she didn’t understand that that also constituted rape, you

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      can consider all of that when you’re making your decision. But his placing his penis
      in her mouth is absolutely, unequivocally rape. And all you need is to believe her
      testimony as to that count and you must return a verdict of guilty on the count of
      rape.

      The prosecutor then set forth the elements of sexual assault in the second degree and

argued,

             I also want to point out, ladies and gentlemen, -- and you will get to read this
      instruction when you go back there. Read it for yourselves. You don't have to take my
      word for it. That could be the defendant touching, directly or indirectly or through
      the clothing, of [MC’s] sex organs or buttocks or anus or her breasts, or it could be
      the defendant using [MC’s] body to touch his own sex organs. That’s an important
      distinction or that is an important thing that you can consider both of those things
      in considering whether the State has proved that sexual contact occurred between
      the defendant and [MC].

              So let’s talk about the evidence that came in, and there was a plethora of
      testimony of countless times where sexual contact occurred. You just have to pick
      one. [MC] described a time when her mom was asleep that the defendant pulled down
      her pants, pushed her over the couch, and dry-humped her. Ladies and gentlemen,
      that’s him pushing his private parts against hers. I don’t think there’s any dispute
      about what that means or what [MC] was talking about.

              She also said that the defendant performed oral sex on her. I don’t think
      there’s any dispute that that’s sexual contact.

             [MC] also talked about another time before her brother was born when
      someone named Dewey Cope had been visiting the house before she was born, so she
      would’ve been under the age of fourteen. She said that the defendant was in bed, in
      his bed with her, he was on top of her grinding her and that she had hoped that
      Dewey Cope would come up the stairs and catch them in the act. Ladies and
      gentlemen, that is sexual contact. That is through the clothing the touching of his
      sexual organs onto [MC]. She told you that all of this happened -- she said all of the
      abuse happened when “I was between the ages of three and ten.” So she was under
      the age of fourteen.

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              We have proven sexual contact with her, that [MC] was not married to Travis
       Roberts, and that she was under the age of fourteen. Pick any of those awful things
       that [MC] described and that’s sexual assault in the second degree.

       A motion for directed verdict at a jury trial is considered a challenge to the sufficiency

of the evidence. Marbley v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 583, 590 S.W.3d 793. When reviewing a

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court must assess the evidence in the light

most favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict. Bahena

v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 261, 667 S.W.3d 553. We affirm a conviction if there is substantial

evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to support the verdict. Marbley, supra. Substantial

evidence is evidence of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty,

compel a conclusion one way or the other without resorting to speculation and conjecture.

Bahena, supra. Witness credibility is an issue for the fact-finder, which may believe all or part

of any witness’s testimony and may resolve questions of conflicting testimony and

inconsistent evidence. Id. A jury is not required to believe all or any part of a defendant’s or

witness’s statement and is entitled to draw upon common sense and experience in reaching

its verdict. Price v. State, 2019 Ark. 323, 588 S.W.3d 1.

       Second-degree sexual assault is committed when a person who is eighteen years of age

or older engages in sexual contact with another person who is less than fourteen years old

and not the person’s spouse. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-125(a)(3) (Supp. 2017). Sexual contact

is defined as any act of sexual gratification involving the touching, directly or through

clothing, of the sex organs, buttocks, or anus of a person or the breast of a female. Ark.

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Code Ann. § 5-14-101(10) (Repl. 2013). Sexual gratification is not defined by the statutory

code, but the two words have been interpreted according to their plain meaning. Gilton v.

State, 2018 Ark. App. 486, 562 S.W.3d 257. A sexual-assault victim’s testimony may

constitute substantial evidence to sustain a conviction for sexual assault. Bahena, supra. The

victim’s testimony need not be corroborated, and the victim’s testimony alone describing the

sexual contact is enough for a conviction. Id.

       Roberts, citing Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100 (1979), argues that, given the

specific delineation of incidents between rape and second-degree sexual assault that the State

made in its directed-verdict response and in its closing arguments, it locked in its “theory of

the case” at that time and cannot change its arguments on appeal. In Dunn, Dunn was

convicted of making false statements to a grand jury in June 1976 regarding one of Dunn’s

fellow inmates, Phillip Musgrave, which resulted in Musgrave’s being indicted for conspiracy

to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine. The indictment charged that Dunn’s

grand-jury testimony was inconsistent with statements he made in September 1976 while

under oath at Musgrave’s attorney’s office. At trial, the Government introduced, over

Dunn’s objection, parts of his grand-jury testimony; the sworn statement he gave at

Musgrave’s attorney’s office in September 1976; and testimony he gave at an October 1976

evidentiary hearing. Dunn was convicted, and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,

noting that the October hearing in which Dunn adopted his September statement was a

proceeding ancillary to a grand-jury investigation, and even though the indictment specified

                                              8
the September interview and not the October hearing, the Tenth Circuit held that the

discrepancy was a nonprejudicial variance between the indictment and the proof presented

at trial. The United State Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the decision of the

Tenth Circuit, holding, “A variance arises when the evidence adduced at trial establishes

facts different from those alleged in an indictment.” 442 U.S. at 105 (citing Berger v. United

States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935)). The United Stated Supreme Court held that it was erroneous

to instruct the jury to rest its decision on Dunn’s September statement but for the court of

appeals to affirm the conviction on Dunn’s October testimony. The Dunn court held, “To

uphold a conviction on a charge that was neither alleged in an indictment nor presented to

a jury at trial offends the most basic notions of due process. Few constitutional principles

are more firmly established than a defendant’s right to be heard on the specific charges of

which he is accused.” 442 U.S. at 106. Roberts also cites Connecticut v. Robert H., 866 A.2d

1255 (Conn. 2005), in which the Connecticut Supreme Court recognized that while

evidence is construed in a light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, deference is given

to credibility determinations made by the finder of fact, and there is an assumption that “the

fact finder is free to consider all of the evidence adduced at trial in evaluating the defendant’s

culpability, and presumably does so, regardless of whether the evidence is relied on by the

attorneys,” 866 A.2d at 1270, and those principles cannot be applied in a vacuum and must

be “considered in conjunction with an equally important doctrine, namely that the state

cannot change the theory of the case on appeal.” Id. at 1271. The Connecticut Supreme

                                                9
Court affirmed the reversal of three convictions by the Appellate Court of Connecticut

because the State brought the charges under the “act” prong of the criminal statute at issue

and not the “situation” prong, but the evidence supported only the “situation” prong, not

the “act” prong of the criminal statute.

       Roberts contends that, pursuant to Dunn, the State can only argue on appeal the

sufficiency of the three incidents specifically delineated in the directed-verdict motions and

closing arguments at trial with regard to the second-degree sexual assault—the oral sex

comment, the couch incident, and the bed incident—to support his conviction for second-

degree sexual assault on appeal, and none of those three incidents are sufficient to support

his conviction.

       Roberts’s Dunn argument is unpersuasive. Roberts was charged with rape and second-

degree sexual assault as described above. In Dunlap v. State, 303 Ark. 222, 795 S.W.2d 920

(1990), our supreme court explained:

               We have held that it is only necessary that an indictment name the offense
       and the party to be charged. Defendants may be charged by either indictments or
       informations. The state is not required to include a statement of the act or acts
       constituting the offense, unless the offense cannot be charged without doing so. The
       true test of the sufficiency of an indictment is not whether it could have been made
       more definite and certain, but whether it contains the elements of the offense
       intended to be charged, and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be
       prepared to meet.

303 Ark. at 228, 795 S.W.2d at 923–24 (citations omitted).

       Here, Roberts was apprised of the offenses with which he was charged, and the jury

was not instructed that it was limited to applying certain conduct to rape and other conduct

                                             10
only to second-degree sexual assault. Witness credibility is an issue for the finder of fact,

who is free to believe all or a portion of any witness’s testimony and whose duty it is to resolve

questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence; the jury may accept or reject

testimony as it sees fits. Langlois v. State, 2023 Ark. App. 263, 666 S.W.3d 884. MC

described Roberts’s placing his penis in her mouth, which is sexual contact, and it is

sufficient to support Roberts’s second-degree sexual-assault conviction.

       Even if we were persuaded that Roberts’s Dunn argument was applicable, we would

still affirm because there is sufficient evidence to support Roberts’s second-degree sexual-

assault conviction in the evidence Roberts concedes can be considered on appeal for that

offense. Roberts argues that “dry humping” and “grinding” were left undefined for the jury

and were given no context or definition, and MC never clarified which parts of Roberts’s

body touched what parts of her body, leaving the jury to resort to pure speculation and

conjecture on those two issues. We disagree. A jury is entitled to draw upon common sense

and experience in reaching its verdict. Price, supra. In Gilton, supra, this court affirmed a

conviction for second-degree sexual assault on the testimony of the victim that the appellant

had “humped” her, which was taken to mean that he had inappropriately touched her. In

the present case, MC testified that Roberts pulled her pants down, put her over the couch,

and “dry-humped” her. A jury could determine that this action constituted sexual contact.

Likewise, MC testified that on one occasion, Roberts was lying on top of her in his and her

mother’s bed with his clothes on, she was holding her legs together, and he was “grinding”

                                               11
on her. This is sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that Roberts had

sexual contact with MC.

      Affirmed.

      GLADWIN and GRUBER, JJ., agree.

      Wilkinson Law Firm, by: Bryan Altman and Shane Wilkinson, for appellant.

      Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Brooke Jackson Gasaway, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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