Court Opinion

ID: 9405195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-27 19:01:45.645653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:20.202316
License: Public Domain

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                                File Name: 23a0298n.06

                                           No. 22-3475

                          UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT                               FILED
                                                                              Jun 27, 2023
                                                                          DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
                                                 )
SHARI S. DRERUP,
                                                 )
        Plaintiff - Appellant,                   )       ON APPEAL FROM THE
                                                 )       UNITED STATES DISTRICT
v.                                               )       COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN
                                                 )       DISTRICT OF OHIO
NETJETS AVIATION INC.,                           )
        Defendant - Appellee.                    )
                                                                                 OPINION
                                                 )

             BEFORE: CLAY, McKEAGUE, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.

    CLAY, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which STRANCH, J., joined.
McKEAGUE, J. (pp. 26–29), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

        CLAY, Circuit Judge.       Plaintiff Shari S. Drerup brought this action alleging that

Defendant NetJets Aviation Inc. (“NetJets”) terminated her employment based on sex

discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”) and Ohio Rev. Code

§§ 4112.02(A) and 4112.99. The district court granted NetJets’ motion for summary judgment,

and Drerup appeals from that judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the district

court’s judgment and REMAND for trial.

                                      I.     BACKGROUND

     A. Factual Background

        Shari S. Drerup was hired by NetJets in November 2016 to fly a specific aircraft, the

Phenom 300 (“Phenom”).           After evaluation and training, NetJets terminated Drerup’s
Case No. 22-3475, Drerup v. NetJets Aviation Inc.

employment, claiming that Drerup was not qualified to fly the plane they had hired her to fly.

Drerup contends that discrimination—not qualification—was the cause of her termination.

        In November of 2016, Drerup was hired as a pilot by NetJets, a private aviation company.

Drerup had been a pilot for eleven years, primarily as a contract pilot for individuals and

companies. At the time she applied to NetJets, she worked for a private company flying a Citation

V jet, “three or four times a month.” (Drerup Dep., R. 45-3, Page ID # 216–217). Drerup is

certified to fly (i.e., type-rated1 in) five aircrafts, including two that were in NetJets’ fleet—the

Citation Encore+ and the HS-125 Hawker 800/900. To secure her position with NetJets, Drerup

was required to fly in a Citation EXLS airplane simulator, and she completed the simulation

without issue. NetJets subsequently informed Drerup that she “passed [ ] all phases of the

interview process” and offered her employment to fly the Phenom. (Drerup Dep., R. 45-3, Page

ID # 217–18). Like all pilots hired by NetJets, Drerup was subject to a one-year probationary

period during which unsatisfactory performance could result in termination.

        1. Indoctrination Training

        At the start of their NetJets employment, pilots attend two weeks of classroom-based

training referred to as indoctrination (“Indoc”) training. Drerup’s Indoc training began on

December 5, 2016, and her class included twelve other pilots, ten men and two women, who were

all hired to fly the Phenom. During Indoc training, pilots are trained to follow NetJets company

policies, safety protocols, and operating principles. The training is generalized and not aircraft

specific.

        1
          A type rating is a designation on a pilot’s license that serves as proof that the pilot holding
the license can fly that particular model and type of aircraft. “A type rating is required for any
aircraft over 12,500 lbs MGTOW and/or with a turbojet powerplant.” Pilot Certificates, Ratings,
and     Endorsements,       Fed.    Aviation      Admin.       (May     11,     2023,     5:00     p.m.),
https://www.faasafety.gov/gslac/alc/libview_normal.aspx?id=6577.

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Case No. 22-3475, Drerup v. NetJets Aviation Inc.

       While Drerup was in Indoc training, two NetJets employees expressed concerns regarding

her demeanor to Sean Kennedy, NetJets’ Director of Training. Specifically, Christopher Eastman,

then Assistant Director of Training and Standards for NetJets, reported that his impression of

Drerup was that she was “gruff and unrefined” and that his interactions with her left him with a

“very strong impression” that her demeanor “was not aligned” with his expectations of the level

of service NetJets requires for its pilots. (Eastman Dep., R. 45-6, Page ID # 378, 403). And

Janessa Krause, the Project Manager of Training and Standards for NetJets, described Drerup as

“dismissive and aloof” and “that Drerup’ demeanor was not one she would expect from a NetJets

pilot.” (Krause Dep., R. 45-7, Page ID # 448, 453). Both Krause and Eastman testified that their

impressions of Drerup at the time of her Indoc training did not rise to the level of an issue that

needed to be formally reported. Moreover, Drerup purports that she was never made aware of

these concerns, and she offers evidence that they were not documented until February 28, 2017,

nearly 2 months after Drerup completed Indoc training and one day before she received her

termination letter on March 1, 2017. Regardless, Drerup proceeded to the next phase of the course,

passed the necessary tests, and graduated from Indoc training

       2. Fit Test

       In preparation for Indoc training, new hires are required to fill out a “fit test form.” (Drerup

Dep, R. 45-3, Page ID # 218). The form requested “[m]easurements of your body in a seated

position, hip to the knee, knee to the toe” and the pilot’s general height. (Id.). The Phenom

uniquely “has a panel that gets in the way of some with longer femurs,” which makes it “unlike

other aircraft[s].” (Eastman Dep., ECF No. 45-6, Page ID # 387). The fit test form is intended to

provide NetJets with the information to determine if pilots can “fit” in the aircraft. (Eastman Dep.,

ECF No. 45-6, Page ID # 387; Kennedy Dep., ECF No. 45-10, Page ID # 583). NetJets uses the

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Case No. 22-3475, Drerup v. NetJets Aviation Inc.

fit test measurements to determine whether a pilot is too tall for the Phenom and should therefore

be reassigned, not whether the pilot is too short. Although some taller pilots could fly the Phenom

safely by “[finding] a way to make it work,” there were enough complaints about the safety and

comfort of flying Phenom from taller pilots that NetJets developed the “fit test.” (Eastman Dep.,

ECF No. 45-6, Page ID # 387).

       After successfully completing her Indoc training, Drerup was assigned to the Phenom fleet.

However, not all of Drerup’s classmates were assigned to the Phenom. NetJets reassigned three

male pilots, Eric Anderson, John Carrier, and Timothy Allan Buss, to the Citation Encore + “based

on [the pilots’] measurements” and their inability “to safely fit within and operate the Phenom.” 2

(NetJets Resp. to Interrogs., R. 52-1, Page ID # 727). Therefore, these three male pilots were never

required to fly or engage in simulator training for the Phenom. Beyond the fit test, no other

reasoning was provided for the their reassignment, and neither party has described how a

reassignment is processed and decided.

       3.   Flight Simulator Training

       After completing Indoc training, ground training, and passing the necessary Federal

Aviation Administration (“FAA”) oral examinations, NetJets pilots are provided flight simulator

training by FlightSafety International Inc. (“FSI”), a vendor NetJets uses to facilitate flight

training. At FSI, FAA-certified flight instructors take the pilots through a series of training

exercises for their aircraft. Pilots typically engage in seven simulator sessions, and each session

covers a specific set of skills or maneuvers that the pilot must be able to perform in order to be

recommended for the FAA-mandated practical test, called a “check ride,” that pilots take after

       2
        Drerup avers that “[a] fourth pilot requested to be placed in another plane and his request
was granted,” but she does not elaborate nor explain the relevance of this pilot to her claims.
(Drerup Am. Decl., R. 55-1, Page ID # 807).

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Case No. 22-3475, Drerup v. NetJets Aviation Inc.

completing the simulator training. FSI instructors use a four-point grading scale to evaluate pilots

on each required skill or maneuver during simulation. A “1” indicates proficient; a “2” indicates

normal progress; a “3” indicates needs additional training; and a “4” indicates unsatisfactory. A

pilot must be graded proficient in all maneuvers to be recommended for a check ride. A rating of

“3” means that a pilot is progressing slower than normal and needs additional training before being

recommended to a check ride. Such a rating is unusual and requires a report to the union. Drerup

received twelve ratings of “3” during her simulation training.

       Drerup was assigned to Charles Felton as her simulation partner. Felton was an employee

of NetJets and had been type-rated in NetJets’ planes. Drerup and Felton began their simulator

training on February 15, 2017. At the beginning of simulation training, Drerup’s course was

delayed, because Felton and the flight instructor did not get along. Felton asked Leon Lambert,

Phenom Program Manager for FSI, for a different FSI instructor. Lambert then reassigned Felton

and Drerup to Ashley Messenger, another FSI instructor.

       As Drerup continued her simulation training on the Phenom and was tasked with

controlling the plane during an engine failure (performing an “engine out maneuver”), “it became

apparent that [she] was struggling to maintain aircraft control with one engine operating on full

power and the other engine failing.” (Drerup Am. Decl., R. 55-1, Page ID # 807). Drerup claims

that she previously never struggled with performance in any of five aircrafts she is type-rated to

fly. With respect to the Phenom, however, Messenger testified that Drerup had difficulty pushing

the aircraft rudder pedal to the floor when one of the engines stopped working—a serious safety

issue because if the rudder is not to the floor, the plane can roll to the side of the nonworking

engine and crash. At one point, Messenger told Drerup that her legs were too short to fully reach

the floor with the rudder pedals to control the airplane during single engine operations.

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Case No. 22-3475, Drerup v. NetJets Aviation Inc.

Although Messenger does not deny making that remark, he maintains that this was just an “off

handed comment.” (Messenger Dep., R. 45-4, Page ID # 323).

       Messenger gave Drerup an unsatisfactory evaluation in connection with her seventh and

final simulation session, on February 22, 2017, concluding that “Shari’s stature precludes attaining

sufficient control authority.” (Messenger Dep. R. 45-4, Page ID # 319 (emphasis added)).

Messenger avers that he meant that Drerup “needed to ensure that she utilized the aircraft’s full

range of seat adjustment.” (Id.). In that final session, Drerup failed to perform proficiently on

three maneuvers and was therefore not recommended for a check ride. Drerup asserts that her

performance issues stemmed from her problems with the engine out maneuver and maintaining

control of the plane, which “affect[ed] every procedure, every maneuver, every approach that [she

did],” and that she was simply too short to complete the engine out maneuver. (Drerup Dep, R.

45-3, Page ID # 226). Drerup is 62 inches tall.

       4. Resulting Protocol for Drerup’s Unsuccessful Simulator Training

       After the seventh simulation, Drerup states that Messenger contacted Lambert to advise

him that Drerup was too short for the Phenom. (Drerup Am. Decl., R. 55-1, Page ID # 808;

Lambert Dep., R. 45-9, Page ID # 539–41). Lambert advised Messenger that he would sit in a

simulation to observe Drerup’s difficulty in reaching the rudder pedals. (Drerup Dep., R. 45-3,

Page ID # 228). While observing a simulation alongside Messenger and Felton, Lambert asked

Drerup to push her foot all the way to the floor of the cockpit to see if she was able to fully depress

the rudder pedal to the floor. Drerup testified that she demonstrated her inability to do so, even

with seat adjustments. Both Messenger and Lambert maintain that seat positioning, not stature,

was the issue. However, Felton testified that, during the simulation training, he heard Lambert

conclude that Drerup’s stature prohibited her from depressing the rudder pedal fully. (Felton Dep.,

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Case No. 22-3475, Drerup v. NetJets Aviation Inc.

R. 49-1, Page ID # 648). Lambert then informed the NetJets training department of Drerup’s

difficulty in completing the maneuver, and NetJets authorized more training.

       Prior to beginning the additional training simulations, Drerup spoke to Jim Queen, NetJets’

Senior Director of Training, about her inability to fly the Phenom due to her height. Queen told

Drerup to do whatever she needed to do to pass simulations and the check ride, including getting

a pillow to place on her seat or using platform shoes. Drerup made Messenger, Lambert, and

Queen aware of her safety concerns; she explained that her height prevented her from flying the

Phenom safely. Before any additional training, Drerup contacted Queen and requested to switch

planes, and informed Queen that she was type-rated in two other NetJets aircrafts. Queen then

contacted Eastman to inquire about changing Drerup’s plane, but he did not explain the reason for

Drerup’s request. Instead, Queen simply stated that Drerup requested a change in planes because

she “felt that she could not meet the rudder requirements in the Phenom.” (Queen Dep., R. 45-8,

Page ID # 485). Eastman denied Drerup’s request, and Queen informed Drerup that she needed

to “[m]ake this aircraft work.” (Id.). Queen testified that Drerup is “not the only pilot that [NetJets

has] that is of shorter stature,” and that “there are some techniques [to help fly the plane] that can

be done.” (Id., Page ID # 484).3

       5. Additional Simulator Training

       On February 23 and 26, 2017, Drerup completed additional simulator training focusing on

engine-out maneuvers. Drerup bought thick-soled shoes and pillows to use during these training

       3
         In its reply brief in support of its motion for summary judgment, NetJets included
evidence that it has two female pilots who are 62–63 inches tall who fly the Phenom. However,
beyond those pilots’ height, the record is silent as to whether they faced similar issues as Drerup,
or whether their leg measurements are similar to Drerup’s.

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Case No. 22-3475, Drerup v. NetJets Aviation Inc.

sessions. Lambert and Messenger also gave her seat positioning suggestions to accommodate her

short stature.

        To ensure her success in the simulation exercise, for the February 23, 2017 simulation,

Messenger warned Drerup when the engine out procedure was going to take place. Because

Drerup was aware of when the engine out was going to take place, she was able to slide down in

the seat, obtain rudder authority, and avoid losing control of the plane.    However, even with

advance warning, she did not perform the engine out maneuver successfully every time. After the

February 26, 2017 simulation, FSI certified to NetJets on Drerup’s training record that she was

proficient in all maneuvers, including the one that Drerup claims she could not perform due to her

height, and recommended her for a check ride. Messenger explained that how Drerup reached

proficiency was not his concern and concluded that “after [] seat positioning mitigation, she was

able to perform [the engine out] maneuver to standard . . . repeatabl[y].” (Messenger Dep., R. 45-

4, Page ID # 322). He also admitted that “she was sliding” but claimed “it did not appear it made

her uncomfortable.” (Id.). However, Drerup testified that she should not have been rated

proficient because when she was not forewarned of the maneuver, she only “squeak[ed] out a

maneuver once out of 20 to get a 1” in her final simulation to be approved for her check ride.

(Drerup Dep., R. 45-3, Page ID # 232).

        6. Check Ride

        After pilots complete simulation training, the FAA mandates that they successfully

complete a check ride before they can begin “initial operating experience” on the aircraft they are

certified to operate. (Queen Dep., R. 45-8, Page ID # 480). During the check ride, a FAA-certified

evaluator or check airman evaluates the pilot trainee in a simulator session on FAA-prescribed

aspects of flying the aircraft. On February 28, 2017, Drerup took the check ride and failed to

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Case No. 22-3475, Drerup v. NetJets Aviation Inc.

perform an engine out maneuver within the acceptable standard of performance—the same

maneuver that she claims her height prevents her from accomplishing. Unlike Drerup’s additional

simulation training, the maneuver was not announced in advance during the check ride, and she

did not obtain full rudder authority. The FAA stopped the check ride and failed Drerup.

       When a pilot performs a maneuver below standard during a check ride, the pilot has the

choice to stop the check ride completely or to continue and complete the remaining maneuvers. If

the pilot chooses to continue, the pilot will only be required to redo any failed maneuvers in a

subsequent check ride, not all of the tested maneuvers. Drerup chose not to continue her check

ride after she failed the engine out maneuver, explaining that she felt she could not succeed due to

her height. Drerup also declined additional training, feeling that it would have been futile because

she was “too short to safely fly this airplane . . . and there’s no amount of training that [she could

get] that makes [her] leg longer.” (Drerup Dep., R 45-3, Page ID # 240).

       7. Drerup’s Termination

       Sean Kennedy, then Director of Training at NetJets, was responsible for making a

recommendation regarding Drerup’s probationary period and continued employment. Kennedy

recommended that NetJets terminate Drerup.            In making that recommendation, Kennedy

considered that: (1) Drerup had failed her check ride and chosen not to continue; (2) she had

declined additional training to help her satisfactorily complete her check ride; (3) there were

concerns regarding Drerup’s demeanor during Indoc training; and (4) Drerup’s flight training

record showed she had been graded as proficient on the engine out maneuver just days before her

check ride.

       Drerup’s termination letter, dated March 1, 2017, stated that she was terminated “for failure

to successfully complete [her] probationary period.” (Termination Letter, R. 52-11, Page ID #

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Case No. 22-3475, Drerup v. NetJets Aviation Inc.

781). Drerup asserts that instead of terminating her employment, NetJets could have reassigned

her to another aircraft as it had done for three male employees, especially since NetJets had

scheduled trainings for two other aircrafts that she was qualified to fly. Kennedy explained that,

from 2016 to 2017, the Phenom was the primary aircraft for which NetJets hired. Reassignments

were done on an as-needed basis, and those too tall for the Phenom were placed in a plane with a

larger cockpit according to the availability of those planes. The record does not provide further

information as to the reassignment process and whether there is a limit to the number of

reassignments for tall pilots, i.e., whether some tall pilots were terminated due to no plane

availability for a reassignment. Prior to NetJets, Drerup had not been terminated by any employer.

At the time of her deposition in this matter, Drerup was a part-time professor of aviation at the

Louisiana State University at Alexandria.

   B. Procedural History

       Drerup filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”), which subsequently issued a dismissal and notice of rights letter. Drerup

then sued NetJets and Queen, the company’s Senior Director of Training, claiming that NetJets’

refusal to accommodate her request to switch planes and subsequent termination of her

employment was based on sex discrimination. Drerup alleged: (1) sex discrimination in violation

of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1), including a mixed-motive discrimination claim under 42

U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m); (2) sex discrimination under Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4112.02(A) and 4112.99;

and (3) aiding and abetting sex discrimination, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(J).

Drerup subsequently filed a substantially similar amended complaint. Two months later, Drerup

voluntarily dismissed all claims against Queen, and because he was the only party implicated in

                                              - 10 -
Case No. 22-3475, Drerup v. NetJets Aviation Inc.

the violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(J), the third cause of action did not proceed beyond the

motion to dismiss stage.4

       NetJets and Queen moved to dismiss Drerup’s complaint and amended complaint for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. NetJets argued that Drerup’s claims of

sex discrimination failed because she had not identified supportable comparators. Specifically,

she:

       does not compare herself to men with similar physical characteristics. She does not
       allege males of her height were reassigned while she was not, and she does not
       allege that males whose circumstances were equal or similar to hers were retained
       while she was not.

(Mot. to Dismiss, R. 8, Page ID # 40–41). The district court denied NetJets’ motion, finding that:

(1) arguments as to the original complaint were moot; and (2) Drerup’s amended complaint

plausibly stated a claim for relief for discrimination and adequately “provid[ed] NetJets with fair

notice of the grounds of her sex discrimination claims.” (See Mot. to Dismiss Order, R. 16, Page

ID # 84).

       NetJets moved for summary judgment in late 2021, arguing that: (1) Drerup had failed to

furnish evidence that she was treated differently than a similarly situated employee who was not a

member of her protected class, and that the three male pilots were not valid comparators; and

(2) Drerup had failed to show that NetJets’ stated reasons for termination were pretext for

discrimination. NetJets did not mention Drerup’s mixed-motive claim. In its reply brief, NetJets

also attached an affidavit stating that “one female pilot in the Phenom fleet is 62 inches tall, the

same height as Ms. Drerup. Another female pilot in the Phenom fleet is 63 inches.” (Reply,

Eastman Aff., R. 54-1). Because NetJets did not provide this information regarding the other

       4
           That cause of action is also not on appeal.

                                                 - 11 -
Case No. 22-3475, Drerup v. NetJets Aviation Inc.

female pilots until its reply, Drerup was unable to probe into issues such as the body proportions

of the female pilots, their performance in flying the Phenom, or whether they were subjected to

the same pressures as she was during training. However, Drerup did not move to reopen discovery,

strike Eastman’s affidavit, or file a sur-reply.

        The district court granted the motion, issuing judgment in NetJets’ favor. Applying the

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the district court determined that Drerup failed

to establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination. The court reasoned that Drerup failed to

identify similarly situated comparators, and that the three tall men were not similarly situated.

Moreover, the fact that other shorter female pilots could fly the Phenom discredited Drerup’s

claim. The court also found that Drerup failed to cast “substantial doubt” on NetJets’ cumulative

reasons for termination and failed to show NetJets’ reasons for termination were pretextual.

(Summ. J. Order, R. 58, Page ID # 830). And as to Drerup’s mixed-motive claim, despite the fact

that NetJets did not explicitly move for summary judgment on that claim, the court determined

that because Drerup did not address it in her response to NetJets’ summary judgment motion, she

had abandoned that claim. Accordingly, the court granted NetJets summary judgment on both

Drerup’s single and mixed-motive claims. Drerup timely appealed. In her appeal, she challenges

the district court’s orders granting NetJets’ motion for summary judgment and terminating her

mixed-motive claim.

                                         II.       DISCUSSION

    A. Standard of Review

        The Court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. White v. Baxter

Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 389 (6th Cir. 2008). A district court should grant summary

judgment only if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

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Case No. 22-3475, Drerup v. NetJets Aviation Inc.

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). No genuine dispute

of material fact exists “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to

find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986) (citation omitted). The Court’s “function is not [] to weigh the evidence and determine

the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” White, 533 F.3d

at 390 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). In making that

determination, we “must draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”

Id. (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587). “However, ‘the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence

in support of the [non-moving party’s] position will be insufficient [to defeat a motion for summary

judgment]; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the’ non-moving

party.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).

   B. Analysis

       1. Single Motive Sex Discrimination Claim

       Drerup asserts that NetJets discriminated against her on the basis of sex in violation of Title

VII and Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(A) and 4112.99. This Court has recognized that “the elements

and legal standards for establishing unlawful sex discrimination are the same under” the federal

and Ohio state statutes. Laderach v. U-Haul of Nw. Ohio, 207 F.3d 825, 828 (6th Cir. 2000); see

also Noble v. Brinker Int’l, Inc., 391 F.3d 715, 720 (6th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, we evaluate

Drerup’s state and federal claims under Title VII’s framework.

       Title VII provides that an employer may not “discriminate against any individual with

respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”       42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).       A

discrimination claim under Title VII can be proven with either direct or circumstantial evidence.

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Case No. 22-3475, Drerup v. NetJets Aviation Inc.

Spengler v. Worthington Cylinders, 615 F.3d 481, 491 (6th Cir. 2010). Direct evidence is evidence

that does not require any inferences to be drawn regarding the employer’s motivations. Id. It is

undisputed that Drerup has not brought forth direct evidence of discrimination. (See Appellant

Br., ECF No. 17, 23). Accordingly, Drerup’s claims are subject to the tripartite burden-shifting

framework first announced by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792 (1973), and subsequently clarified in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450

U.S. 248 (1981). Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima

facie case of disparate treatment. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the plaintiff proves the

prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant “to articulate some legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.” Id. If the defendant carries that burden,

the plaintiff “must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the

legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for

discrimination.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; see McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.

           i. Drerup’s Prima Facie Case

       “The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous.”

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. “To establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that: ‘(1) she is a member of a protected group; (2) she was subjected to an adverse

employment decision; (3) she was qualified for the position; and (4) . . . similarly situated non-

protected employees were treated more favorably.’” Jackson v. VHS Detroit Receiving Hosp.,

Inc., 814 F.3d 769, 776 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Peltier v. United States, 388 F.3d 984, 987 (6th

Cir. 2004)).

       In this case, NetJets does not dispute that Drerup satisfies the first three elements of the

prima facie case. Therefore, the only question is whether Drerup has established that similarly

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Case No. 22-3475, Drerup v. NetJets Aviation Inc.

situated, non-protected employees were treated more favorably. NetJets argues that Drerup cannot

satisfy the fourth element because: (1) Drerup’s alleged comparators are not similarly situated, and

(2) Drerup did not identify a similarly situated male who was treated more favorably.

               a. Similarly Situated Pilots

       Drerup maintains that the three male pilots who were reassigned to other planes are

similarly situated comparators because, just like her, they were hired to fly the Phenom but could

not comfortably and safely fly the plane due to their stature. Those pilots, Drerup contends, were

accommodated in a way that Drerup was not: they were assigned to different planes. The district

court rejected that argument because the male pilots had not passed the “fit test,” or “struggled

during simulator training, failed check rides, declined to continue, and refused additional training.”

(See Summ. J. Order, R. 58, Page ID # 826). However, the district court’s formulation of the

similarly situated standard is overly narrow and unmoored from this Court’s precedent.

       Drerup is not required to “demonstrate an exact correlation with the employee receiving

more favorable treatment in order for the two to be considered ‘similarly situated,’” but must

furnish evidence that shows she was similar in “all of the relevant aspects” to the three male pilots

in her class. Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 1998)

(quoting Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 802 (6th Cir. 1994)). Courts “make

an independent determination as to the relevancy of a particular aspect of the plaintiff’s

employment status and that of the non-protected employee.” Id. Interpreting the similarly-situated

standard to require an exact correlation would prevent a plaintiff with unique characteristics or job

responsibilities from ever being able to “successfully establish a prima facie case (absent direct

evidence of discrimination).” Id. at 353. Under such a narrow reading, this Court has observed,

                                                - 15 -
Case No. 22-3475, Drerup v. NetJets Aviation Inc.

“an employer would be free to discriminate against those employees occupying ‘unique’

positions.” Id.

        The three male pilots were similar to Drerup in all relevant aspects. They were: (1) hired

to fly the Phenom; (2) in Drerup’s hiring class; (3) subject to the same probation period; (4) subject

to the same “fit test”; and, most importantly, (5) precluded from flying the Phenom because of

their stature. NetJets provided a “fit test” and reassignment for the three men so they could

comfortably fly, but neglected to provide the same accommodation for Drerup, even though

Drerup was type-rated for the same plane to which the three male pilots were reassigned. Thus,

although NetJets accommodated men whose height made flying the Phenom unsafe and

impractical by reassigning them to a more appropriate plane, they did not provide the same

accommodation to Drerup.

        NetJets relies on two district court cases to argue that the comparators’ physical

characteristics must be similar for Drerup’s discrimination claim to succeed. See Lutz v. Ohio

Dep’t of Rehab. & Correction, No. 2:10-CV-877, 2011 WL 4964977, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 19,

2011); Ross v. William Beaumont Hosp., 678 F. Supp. 655, 679 (E.D. Mich. 1988). Neither case

is binding. Even if they were, Lutz and Ross support the conclusion that what matters for

determining whether someone is a similarly situated comparator is that their relevant physical

characteristics are: (1) similar in nature; and (2) similar in their impact on job performance. See

Ross, 678 F. Supp. at 678-79 (finding that the plaintiff, an overweight female doctor whose weight

required her to lean on patients, affecting the “sterility of the operation,” failed to identify similarly

situated doctors in the hospital because she did not identify a “doctor [that] had a malady which

threatened patients at the Hospital”); see Lutz, 2011 WL 4964977, at *3-5 (finding the plaintiff, a

correction officer that had several disabilities that inhibited her ability to perform her job, was not

                                                  - 16 -
Case No. 22-3475, Drerup v. NetJets Aviation Inc.

similarly situated to other correction officers with disabilities because she was less qualified for

the position than the correction officer she identified as a comparator and because her disability

was much more severe). In this case, Drerup’s height impacts her ability to safely and comfortably

fly the plane, as was the case for the three tall male pilots. The district court’s narrow definition

of “similarly situated” effectively removed Drerup from the protective reach of antidiscrimination

laws; the three pilots she identifies are proper comparators. See Ercegovich, 154 F.3d at 353.

               b. Disparate Treatment

       As to whether the similarly situated male pilots were treated more favorably than Drerup,

we turn to Drerup’s assertion of “disparate treatment.” To establish a disparate treatment claim,

Drerup is only required to show that her “employer simply treats some people less favorably than

others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Int’l Bhd. Of Teamsters v.

United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). In “some situations,” the employer’s discriminatory

motive can be inferred from the “mere fact of differences in treatment.” Id. In this case, Drerup

has furnished evidence that, as a woman whose stature prohibited her from flying a plane safely,

she was treated worse than men whose stature prevented them from flying the same plane safely.

Moreover, the lack of seriousness with which Drerup’s supervisors took her concerns raises serious

questions, especially given that failing to perform the engine out maneuver in an emergency

situation could have resulted in disastrous consequences had Drerup been able to pass the check

ride test. Drerup was treated in a noticeably different way compared to the tall male pilots, who

were allowed a reassignment to a new plane early in the training process based on a “fit test”

without requesting the change, and without having to prove their inability to fly the plane.

       The district court opined that Drerup failed “to explain why she struggled with flying

because of her height, but other small-stature female pilots are able to fly the Phenom.” (Summ.

                                               - 17 -
Case No. 22-3475, Drerup v. NetJets Aviation Inc.

J. Order, R. 58, Page ID # 826). However, this misses the point. Title VII does not require that

every member of the suspect class face discrimination for a plaintiff to have a viable claim. The

fact that two women with the same height as Drerup may have been able to fly the Phenom is not

enough to invalidate her claims that she was treated differently based on her sex. Further, the fit

test entailed more than a general height measurement: it also requested “[m]easurements of your

body in a seated position, hip to the knee, [and] knee to the toe.” (Drerup Dep, R. 45-3, Page ID

# 218). Even assuming that the two women pilots identified in NetJets’ reply had a stature similar

to Drerup, the record contains no facts beyond their height, and without more, we cannot conclude

that the two women pilots are sufficiently similar to Drerup in relevant respects.

        Because Drerup correctly uses the three tall male pilots who were accommodated based on

their stature as comparators for her claim, she has satisfied the similarly-situated requirement and

made out her prima facie case of discrimination.

            ii. Nondiscriminatory Reasons for Termination

        Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, “the burden shifts to the

defendant ‘to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.’”

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). In satisfying that burden,

“[t]he defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered

reasons.” Id. at 254 (citation omitted). Instead, “[i]t is sufficient if the defendant’s evidence raises

a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff. To accomplish this, the

defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for

the plaintiff’s rejection.” Id. at 254-55.

        NetJets’ proffered legitimate non-retaliatory reasons for terminating Drerup are that:

(1) Drerup had failed her check ride and chose not to continue the check ride; (2) Drerup declined

                                                 - 18 -
Case No. 22-3475, Drerup v. NetJets Aviation Inc.

the opportunity to receive additional training to help her satisfactorily complete her check ride;

(3) there were concerns regarding Drerup’s demeanor during Indoc training; and (4) Drerup’s

flight training record showed she was able to perform all maneuvers “to standard” before the check

ride. NetJets supports its reasoning through sworn affidavits, deposition testimony, personnel

emails, and flight evaluation records. Thus, NetJets’ proffered reasons for its termination decision

are “clear and reasonably specific,” and are supported by “admissible evidence which would allow

the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision [was] not motivated by

discriminatory animus.’” White, 533 F.3d at 392 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257-58).

           iii. Pretext

       Because NetJets articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its termination

decision, we turn to the final part of the McDonnell Douglas analysis: Drerup’s showing of

pretext. Drerup must “prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered

by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Burdine, 450

U.S. at 253. She can establish pretext “either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory

reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered

explanation is unworthy of credence.” Id. at 256. “A plaintiff will usually demonstrate pretext by

showing that the employer’s stated reason for the adverse employment action: (1) has no basis in

fact, (2) was not the actual reason, or (3) is insufficient to explain the employer’s action.” White,

533 F.3d at 393 (citing Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 545 (6th Cir. 2008)).

“This burden is not heavy, [ ] as summary judgment is warranted only if no reasonable juror could

conclude that the employer’s offered reason was pretextual,” George v. Youngstown St. Univ., 966

                                               - 19 -
Case No. 22-3475, Drerup v. NetJets Aviation Inc.

F.3d 446, 462 (6th Cir. 2020), after drawing “all justifiable inferences” in the nonmoving party’s

favor, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.5

               a. Drerup’s Training and Evaluation

       Three of NetJets’ proffered reasons for terminating Drerup are her: (1) failed check ride;

(2) refusal to continue the check ride or receive additional training; and (3) flight training record.

NetJets argues that it had an honest belief that Drerup was able to perform all required maneuvers

in the Phenom, that its expectation for her to do so was reasonable, and that her objection to

continuing training and the check ride was unwarranted.

       The “honest belief” rule provides that “[w]hen an employer reasonably and honestly relies

on particularized facts in making an employment decision, it is entitled to summary judgment on

pretext even if its conclusion is later shown to be mistaken, foolish, trivial, or baseless.” Babb v.

Maryville Anesthesiologists P.C., 942 F.3d 308, 322 (6th Cir. 2019) (alteration in original)

(quoting Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394, 401 (2009)). But the “honest belief” rule is not

without limits. “[A]n employee can still overcome the ‘honest belief rule’ by pointing to evidence

that ‘the employer failed to make a reasonably informed and considered decision before taking its

       5
          Because Drerup’s job requires a high degree of skill, the district court placed a higher
burden on Drerup to show that NetJets’ termination reasons were pretextual, relying exclusively
on Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines, Inc., 568 F.2d 50, 54 (8th Cir. 1977) (an “employer bears a [ ] lighter
burden to show that his employment criteria are job-related” when the job requires a high degree
of skill). (See Summ. J. Order, R. 58, Page ID # 828–29). However, Boyd found that a height
requirement for pilots was not sex discrimination because it ensured the safety of the pilot. “Ample
evidence in the record” showed that “an individual’s ability to operate all the instruments in the
cockpit and reach the design eye reference point is dependent upon an individual’s height and is
essential to the safe and efficient operation of a plane.” Id. at 54. Drerup concedes that her stature
inhibited her ability to fly the Phenom safely, but any similarity with Boyd ends there. In Boyd,
the employer had no plane that could accommodate a shorter height. Id. at 52-53. By contrast,
NetJets had planes that Drerup says she could fly, one of which three men were reassigned to.

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Case No. 22-3475, Drerup v. NetJets Aviation Inc.

adverse employment action.’” Id. (quoting Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 807-08 (6th

Cir. 1998)).

       NetJets was aware of Drerup’s struggles during simulation training but argues that after

she successfully completed her final simulation sessions, there was “no reason to believe Drerup

was unable to proficiently perform any maneuver required of her in the Phenom.” (Appellee Br.,

ECF No. 19 –20). Furthermore, NetJets learned Drerup not only failed her check ride but also

refused to continue any further additional training that was offered to her, and this resistance

provided NetJets grounds for termination. NetJets avers that it was unaware of any reason that

Drerup would decline further training after the failed check ride. Poor job performance and refusal

to continue training are indeed legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for an employee’s

termination. See Imwalle, 515 F.3d at 546.

       But NetJets’ arguments are inconsistent with the record. First, during Drerup’s seventh

and final simulation session, on February 22, 2017, Messenger gave Drerup an unsatisfactory

evaluation on her FSI evaluation, concluding that “Shari’s stature precludes attaining sufficient

control authority.” (Messenger Dep. R. 45-4, Page ID #319). Messenger contacted Lambert to

advise him that Drerup was too short for the Phenom and Lambert advised Messenger that he

would sit in a simulation to observe Drerup’s difficulty in reaching the rudder pedals. Both

Lambert and Messenger then observed Drerup’s difficulty in obtaining rudder control. Lambert

then informed the NetJets training department of Drerup’s issues completing the maneuver, and

NetJets authorized more training. Drerup subsequently made Queen aware of her inability to fly

the Phenom due to her short stature by directly telling him; Queen then provided advice as to how

to overcome her short stature, such as by using a pillow and platformed shoes. Moreover, Eastman

testified that a pilot must be graded proficient in all maneuvers to be recommended for a check

                                              - 21 -
Case No. 22-3475, Drerup v. NetJets Aviation Inc.

ride, and that a rating of “3” is unusual and requires a report to the union. Drerup received twelve

ratings of “3” during her simulation training, which would have been reported to the union and

brought to NetJets’ attention. The record simply does not support an assertion that NetJets was

unaware of any issues that may prevent Drerup from passing her check ride. At a minimum,

Drerup has provided enough evidence for a reasonable juror to conclude that NetJets’ purported

ignorance of her performance was pretextual. See Youngstown, 966 F.3d at 462.

       NetJets’ argument that Drerup’s refusal to continue training constituted grounds for

termination is equally unavailing. Drerup has provided evidence that continuing training would

have been futile; no amount of training would add inches to her legs. Drerup made this concern

known to Lambert, Queen, and Messenger. And if Drerup had manipulated her stature enough to

pass the check ride, that would raise larger concerns. A reasonable juror could easily conclude

that Drerup’s refusal to continue to fly a plane that she was incapable of flying due to her stature

was the only responsible decision she could make. Instead, Drerup’s concerns were disregarded,

whereas her male comparators were reassigned to a new plane after the fit test without having to

demonstrate discomfort while flying the Phenom. Drerup has provided enough evidence that a

reasonable juror could conclude that NetJets’ insistence on additional training and the continuation

of the check test was unreasonable and pretextual. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.

               b. Drerup’s Demeanor

       During Indoc training, two NetJets employees expressed concerns about Drerup’s

demeanor to Kennedy, the Director of Training. The comments were not officially reported during

or immediately after Indoc training, and they did not prevent Drerup from proceeding to the next

phase of the course; she passed the necessary tests and graduated from Indoc training. Rather, the

concerns were purportedly documented on February 28, 2017, the same day Kennedy

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Case No. 22-3475, Drerup v. NetJets Aviation Inc.

recommended that Drerup be terminated and the day before Drerup received her termination letter.

A reasonable juror could infer that if NetJets honestly believed the alleged attitude problems to be

true or a terminable offense, it would have addressed the issue earlier, not two months after the

completion of the training course, where significant resources had been expended. A reasonable

juror could find that the emails were simply NetJets’ attempt to justify Drerup’s discriminatory

termination.

                  c. Shifting Explanation

       Drerup argues that that NeJets’ reasons for terminating her employment have changed over

time. “An employer’s changing rationale for making an adverse employment decision can be

evidence of pretext.” Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1167 (6th Cir. 1996),

amended on other grounds, 97 F.3d 833 (6th Cir. 1996). On this front, Drerup’s argument is

unavailing. At the time of Drerup’s termination, NetJets provided that she was terminated based

on the “failure to successfully complete [her] probationary period.” (Termination Letter, R. 52-

11, Page ID # 781). As described on appeal, NetJets’ reasons for termination are more detailed

than as described in Drerup’s termination letter, but they have remained consistent, and Drerup

has failed to identify any material changes. NetJets’ explanation may well be pretextual, but it is

not “shifting.”

       Thus, because Drerup correctly identifies as comparators the three male pilots who were

accommodated based on their stature, Drerup satisfies the similarly-situated requirement and has

established a prima facie discrimination case. Further, Drerup has furnished enough evidence to

establish a genuine dispute of material fact with regard to whether NetJets’ offered reasons for her

termination were pretextual. Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 572 (6th Cir.

                                               - 23 -
Case No. 22-3475, Drerup v. NetJets Aviation Inc.

2003) (“[T]he widely differing perspectives on whether . . . a discriminatory motivation [exists]

provide a classic example of a genuine issue of material fact.”). Summary judgment was improper.

       2. Mixed Motive Sex Discrimination Claim

       The district court held that Drerup abandoned her mixed motive claim because she did not

address it in her opposition to summary judgment. As a reminder, Drerup’s amended complaint

alleges that “NetJets discriminated against Plaintiff because of her sex in violation of 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(a)(1) and/or sex was a motivating factor in Defendant NetJets’ decision to terminate

Plaintiff’s employment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).” (Am. Compl., R. 7, Page ID #

33).

       The mixed motive framework applies in cases “where an adverse employment decision

was the product of a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate motives.” Wexler, 317 F.3d at 571

(citation omitted). Drerup can proceed on a mixed motive claim by demonstrating that her sex

was a motivating factor in her termination, even though other factors also motivated her discharge.

See Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 711-13 (6th Cir.2006). “[T]he ultimate question

at summary judgment on a mixed motive case is ‘whether the plaintiff has presented evidence,

direct or circumstantial, from which a reasonable jury could logically infer that [a protected

characteristic] was a motivating factor in [the defendant’s adverse employment action against the

plaintiff].”6 Id. at 713 (alterations in original) (quoting Harris v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 133 F. App’x

288, 297 (6th Cir. 2005)).

       6
          A different burden-shifting framework applies to mixed-motive claims, where “[o]nce
the plaintiff has shown that the unfavorable employment decision was made at least in part on a
discriminatory basis, the burden shifts to the employer to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that it would have taken the same adverse action even if impermissible factors had not entered into
its decision.” Wexler, 317 F.3d at 571.

                                               - 24 -
Case No. 22-3475, Drerup v. NetJets Aviation Inc.

       A mixed-motive analysis is triggered only if a plaintiff gives notice of such a claim. The

record cannot be “utterly silent as to mixed motives.” Spees v. James Marine, Inc., 617 F.3d 380,

390 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hashem-Younes v. Danou Enters. Inc., 311 F. App’x 777, 779 (6th

Cir. 2009)). Here, the record was not silent: Drerup included her mixed motive claim in her

complaint. Nor is she required to respond to the absence of an argument against her claim to

maintain her cause of action. “[A] district court cannot grant summary judgment in favor of a

movant simply because the adverse party has not responded.” Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 455

(6th Cir. 1991). Rather, the moving party “always bears the burden of demonstrating the absence

of a genuine issue as to a material fact,” and the district court is required “to examine the movant’s

motion for summary judgment to ensure that he has discharged that burden.” Id. at 454-55; see

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Drawing “all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,”

and given that NetJets’ motion for summary judgment made no argument as to Drerup’s mixed

motive claim, we find that the claim remains. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. The district court

erroneously expected Drerup to oppose an argument that NetJets never made.

                                        III.    CONCLUSION

       For the reasons set forth above, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment as to both the

single and mixed motive claims, and REMAND for trial.

                                                - 25 -
Case No. 22-3475, Drerup v. NetJets Aviation Inc.

       McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. Assuming, arguendo,

that Drerup established a prima facie case, judgment for NetJets was still proper as Drerup failed

to offer evidence such that a reasonable juror could reject NetJets’ proffered reasons for firing her.

See Goldblum v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 62 F.4th 244, 251–52 (6th Cir. 2023) (proceeding to the

pretext analysis without determining whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case).

       NetJets provided four reasons for Drerup’s termination: “(1) she failed her check ride and

chose not to continue; (2) she declined the opportunity for additional training designed to help her

pass the check ride; (3) NetJets employees raised concerns regarding Drerup’s demeanor during

initial classroom training; and (4) her flight training record demonstrated she struggled

significantly during flight simulator training.” Appellee’s Br. at 2. Drerup does not dispute that

these are legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating a person’s employment. See

Imwalle v. Reliance Med. Prods., 515 F.3d 531, 546 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Poor performance is a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating a person’s employment and, by articulating

such a reason, [a defendant meets] its initial burden under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine

framework.”); Appellant’s Br. at 30. Thus, the burden is on Drerup to prove by a preponderance

of the evidence that the “reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a

pretext for discrimination.” Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (citing

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973)).

       To establish that NetJets’ reliance on her failures during training and the check ride was

pretext, Drerup repeatedly claims that that she is unable to fly the Phenom due to her stature, see,

e.g., Appellant’s Br. at 38 (“There is nothing honest in NetJets alleged belief that Appellant was

capable of operating the Phenom.”), implying that NetJets’ concerns lack a factual basis or were

insufficient to motivate Drerup’s termination. But when an employer has an honest belief in their

                                                - 26 -
Case No. 22-3475, Drerup v. NetJets Aviation Inc.

proffered reason for taking adverse employment action, and such belief arises “from reasonable

reliance on the particularized facts before the employer when it made the decision, the asserted

reason will not be deemed pretextual even if it was erroneous.” Upshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 576

F.3d 576, 586 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Sybrandt v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 560 F.3d 553, 559 (6th

Cir. 2009)); see also Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., LLC, 681 F.3d 274, 285 (6th Cir. 2012).

Accordingly, what NetJets knew when it fired Drerup is crucial.

       NetJets knew that Drerup struggled with the engine out maneuver, and failed her February

22, 2017, simulation session. But, after that failed simulation:

       •   Jim Queen, NetJets’ Senior Director of Training, called Drerup to discuss
           techniques that could help her satisfy the rudder requirements, including wearing
           shoes with a larger sole, using a pillow in her seat, and a technique that involved
           the placement of her feet at the time the engine goes out.
       •   Following that conversation with Queen, Drerup purchased new shoes and
           procured pillows.
       •   Drerup received two extra training sessions to focus on passing the engine out
           maneuver. At both sessions she received passing scores and completed the engine
           out maneuver. Leon Lambert, another pilot brought in to fly with Drerup during
           the additional sessions, helped Drerup find seat positions that, according to
           Messenger and Leon, contributed to Drerup’s success in completing the engine out
           maneuver.
       •   After successfully completing those additional sessions, Drerup was recommended
           for her check ride.
       •   At her check ride, Drerup failed the engine out maneuver.
       •   After failing the engine out maneuver, Drerup declined to continue the test in
           attempt to pass the other maneuvers.
       •   Drerup declined NetJets’ offer for additional training.

Thus, although NetJets was aware that Drerup initially had difficulty completing the engine out

maneuver, NetJets intervened to provide extra assistance to Drerup so that she could successfully

complete the engine out maneuver. At the time NetJets terminated Drerup’s employment, it had

received a report that Drerup successfully completed the engine out maneuver in her extra

                                               - 27 -
Case No. 22-3475, Drerup v. NetJets Aviation Inc.

simulations, yet she failed to complete the maneuver on test day and subsequently declined to

continue the test or complete additional training. Thus, NetJets’ belief that Drerup was capable of

flying the Phenom and passing her check ride will not be deemed pretextual even if it was

erroneous. See Upshaw, 576 F.3d at 586.

        NetJets also contends that it was motivated to terminate Drerup’s employment in part due

to concerns about her demeanor. In support of this justification, NetJets relies on Drerup’s refusal

to complete additional training or continue with her check ride. NetJets also references reports by

two employees who recalled negative interactions with Drerup during her initial training. At

NetJets’ request, these employees documented their negative experiences the day before NetJets

fired Drerup. According to Drerup and the majority, the timing of the allegations could lead a

reasonable juror to find that the allegations were “fabricated and elicited to paper the file.”

Appellant’s Br. at 21; Maj. Opn. at 22. But even when a plaintiff believes timing is suspicious,

“the law in this circuit is clear that temporal proximity cannot be the sole basis for finding pretext.”

Seeger, 681 F.3d at 285 (quoting Donald v. Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2012)); see

also Goldblum, 62 F.4th at 256. Since Drerup fails to provide additional evidence of pretext, the

timing of these reports about Drerup’s attitude “cannot alone prove pretext.” Goldblum, 62 F.4th

at 256 (citation omitted); cf. Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 809 (6th Cir. 1998) (“The

doubt raised over Chrysler’s second alternative justification for firing Smith does not translate into

an inference that the true motivation behind Smith’s discharge was his disability.”).

        Because Drerup has not rebutted that her refusal to continue with the check ride or to accept

further training, in combination with perceived attitudinal issues, led to her termination, she has

not met her burden of establishing pretext. See Conley v. City of Findlay, 266 F. App’x 400, 406

(6th Cir. 2008) (“But none of these complaints, if assumed to be true, demonstrate that the City’s

                                                 - 28 -
Case No. 22-3475, Drerup v. NetJets Aviation Inc.

reason for terminating Conley lacked a factual basis, failed to motivate its decision to terminate

her, or were insufficient to motivate her discharge.”); Burks v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 258 F. App’x

867, 875 (6th Cir. 2008) (“As in Wright [v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 709 (6th Cir. 2006)],

Burks “has offered no evidence to indicate that [the defendant] made its decision on grounds other

than those offered.”). Thus, summary judgment for NetJets was proper.

       The majority further concludes that the district court erred in finding Drerup’s mixed

motive claim abandoned. Maj. Opn. 23–25. But because there is no evidence that NetJets did not

honestly believe its proffered reasons for firing Drerup or that NetJets relied on unlawful motives

when it fired her, I would find any error in failing to reach the mixed motive claim harmless. See

Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 714 (6th Cir. 2006); Williams v. Zurz, 503 F. App’x

367, 376 (6th Cir. 2012).

       For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would affirm.

                                              - 29 -