Court Opinion

ID: 9718472
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:24:57.876325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:59.543964
License: Public Domain

Beasley, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
My reading of the record indicates a deliberate, studied effort by defendant to delay and disrupt his trial. The trial judge acted with commendable *717patience in considering defendant’s effort to delay the on-going trial by an effort to fire his court-appointed counsel. There is no indication that defense counsel was derelict in his duty; no good cause was shown for his discharge.
On this record, I would find defendant’s belated claim at the time of jury selection that he wanted to assert an alibi defense, where no notice of alibi had been given, was an obviously spurious effort to delay the trial.
In addition, it should be noted that the witness whom defense counsel was unwilling to call, Sandra Callington, was a witness at defendant’s first trial on this charge. At that trial, she testified that defendant had been at her home on the evening of the robbery and had remained there until sometime between 1:00 and 1:30 in the morning. She admitted, however, that she recalled this only on the prompting of her husband. Evidence also indicated that defendant had been arrested before 1:00 on the morning in question, rendering the time sequence testified to by Mrs. Callington impossible. Given these circumstances, it would seem that counsel’s unwillingness to call Mrs. Callington as a witness at defendant’s second trial was based on sound reasons. Counsel indicated he had read the transcript from the previous trial twice; he should not be faulted for an apparently wise exercise of his professional judgment as to trial strategy.1
Disagreement between counsel and defendant did not, under the circumstances, deny defendant the use of a substantial defense, and, since refusal to call the disputed witness was likely in the best interests of defendant, the disagreement did not present adequate cause for substitution of appointed counsel. I would hold that there was no *718abuse of discretion by the trial judge in refusing defendant’s request for substitution of counsel.2
Defendant’s other claims of error are equally without merit.
I would affirm.

 People v Thompson, 69 Mich App 465; 245 NW2d 93 (1976).

 Spalding v Spalding, 355 Mich 382, 384-385; 94 NW2d 810 (1959).