Court Opinion

ID: 9670119
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:15:07.921124+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:02.694129
License: Public Domain

Adams, J.
(dissenting). This case involves an agreement and declaration of restrictions entered into on November 1, 1954, by all of the owners of certain acreage in Eaton county. The agreement is an elaborate one. Tucked away at the back of it is a section entitled “other restrictions” which prohibits Carolina or Lombardy poplar trees, the moving of buildings, regulates the rebuilding of buildings destroyed by fire, and forbids crops except kitchen gardens. In the second paragraph of this section the following provision appears:
*136“A purchaser of any lot in Huntington Acres Subdivisions No. 1, No. 2, or No. 3 agrees by such purchase for himself, his heirs and assigns to share proportionately with all other property owners in the cost of any improvements in his respective subdivision agreed to by the owners of a majority of the lots in his respective subdivision. For the purpose of voting on any proposed improvements, the holders of executory land contracts while in possession of said property shall be deemed to be the owners of said lot and entitled to cast the vote to which the lot is entitled. In other instances the holder of the record title shall be entitled to cast the ■vote of the lot.”
The agreement further provides that the restrictions, stipulations, and conditions need not be incorporated in any subsequent deed but shall be deemed incorporated therein.
The facts with regard to the proceedings under the above paragraph are set forth in the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Carr and need not be repeated here. However, it should be emphasized that even under the inadequate record available to this Court, it is clear that when it was proposed to construct the storm sewer in question, though some property owners were informally contacted, “Some of said owners were riot able to be contacted for 1 reason or another.”
The courts have long recognized and upheld covenants imposing burdens upon land. The earlier and more familiar types dealt with party walls and line fences. Such a party-wall agreement was held to be enforceable by a subsequent owner of the land on which the party wall was constructed but not by the assignee of the person who originally built the party wall in Adams v. Noble, 120 Mich 545. In that case, this Court clearly held that such an agreement can run with the land and that the rights and lia*137bilities thereunder accrue to subsequent owners of the real property.
To this extent, then, the present agreement presents no problem and, under the holdings of this Court, can be determined to run with the land. Its meaning and construction, however, present a question to which I would give a different answer than that proposed by Mr. Chief Justice Carr.
The appellee has cited several cases where specific covenants were held to impose a burden that runs with the land and binds subsequent property owners. Neponsit Property Owners’ Association, Inc., v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank (1938), 278 NY 248 (15 NE2d 793, 118 ALR 973), rehearing denied 278 NY 704 (16 NE2d 852), wherein a charge of $4 per lot was imposed for the maintenance of “roads,paths, parks, beach, sewers, and such other public purposes as shall from time to time be determined by the party of the first part, its successors or assigns”: Mueller v. Bankers Trust Co. of Muskegon, 262 Mich 53, wherein an agreement to build a bridge across a creek was upheld as a covenant essential to the enjoyment and use of the properties to be served by the bridge; Stephens Co. v. Lisk (1954), 240 NC 289 (82 SE2d 99), upheld a covenant that permitted the subdivider to make improvements at a cost per front foot; Mendrop v. Harrell (1958), 233 Miss 679 (103 So2d 418, 68 ALR2d 1013), imposed liability on a lot owner under a covenant which provided, “It is further understood and agreed that said Henry W. Harrell and his successors in title agree to bear all the expense required of them incidental to any street or sidewalk paving that may be done in the future.”
In all of these cases, the provisions for improvements are much more specific than the provision here under consideration. *. In none of 'these cases was there any mention of voting by the lot owners or agreement by a majority of them. Here we have-*138a sweeping agreement' for “any improvements.” With, such a broad agreement, the safeguard which evidently was intended was that before an improvement was undertaken, it would be voted upon by the lot owners. The procedure contemplated, if not fully expressed in the agreement, would be similar to that followed in making public improvements whereby an opportunity is given the property owners to be heard before the proposal is undertaken.
Had such a procedure been followed here, no one nould complain. All of the lot owners would have heen given an opportunity to examine the proposal 'or possible alternatives. For example, it is suggested that a public, 2-county drain known as the Banks Drain, a public corporation, had already been established by law to provide a drain for the property in question. It is suggested that by proper petition, a drain might have been installed and the cost allocated over the entire Banks Drainage District at less expense to each lot owner. Those property owners who had no notice whatsoever of the project had no opportunity to present this alternative which might or might not have been a feasible one.
Because the defendants were not notified of the proposed improvement, were not afforded an opportunity to consider the same or to propose alternatives, and were not afforded an opportunity, however informal, to vote, the decree for the plaintiff should be vacated.
There is a second reason why the decree of the. circuit court should not be allowed to stand. The storm sewer was in the nature of a public improvement. As a matter of public policy it is not necessary that all public improvements be made by public authorities. But, if such public improvements are to be carried out, as they were in this case, by private parties, the burden of showing clearly and un~ iequivocably that such improvements were made with *139the approval of and under the supervision of the proper public authorities should he upon those executing the projects.
In the present case the area in question was under the supervision of the Eaton and Ingham county drain commissioners. It appears that the Ingham county drain commissioner was not consulted. Certainly no approval by him appears in the record. As to the Eaton county drain commissioner, all that: appears is the following: ■ ■ - v;
“Clare Hodeman, engineer for the Eaton county road commission testified at length as to the manner in which the highway and sewers were put in,’ which was to the effect that it was done satisfactorily.
“Kay C. Smith, Eaton county drain commi'ssibner, testified to the same effect, namely, that the sewers were put in in a manner satisfactory to the county5 drain commission.” !
Official approval by the proper authorities should, he fully established before these defendants are required to pay for an improvement that was ■ constructed upon a public road. In the absence of'such approval, the improvement could be canceled out by those same authorities at any time, a new one made and these defendants compelled to pay for both.
I would reverse the decree of the circuit judge and dismiss the bill of complaint with prejudice;
Souris, J., concurred with Adams, J.