Court Opinion

ID: 9626415
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:11:03.320084+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:04.166714
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
Because it is unreasonable under the risk-utility analysis to deem a manufacturer negligent for choosing of one of three safety restraint options authorized under Federal Motor Vehicle Safety *578Standard 208,1 dissent.
In Banks v. ICI Americas19 this Court adopted the risk-utility analysis for a design-defect products liability action. In a footnote, the court “note[d] that a manufacturer’s proof of compliance with industry-wide practices, state of the art, or federal regulations does not eliminate conclusively its liability for its design of allegedly defective products.”20 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208, which is involved in this case, was not applicable in Banks. Therefore, Banks is merely a starting point for the question presented in this case.
In Banks this Court reaffirmed the principle that Georgia products liability law does not render a manufacturer an insurer against all possible injuries from its product.21 This Court also stated that the concept of “reasonableness” is inherent in the risk-utility analysis. This concept of reasonableness includes whether the manufacturer acted reasonably in choosing a particular design and the reasonableness of the burden on the manufacturer to take steps necessary to eliminate any risk.22
At the time Doyle’s automobile was manufactured, Standard 208 required car makers to exercise one of three options in installing passive restraint devices. This Court is bound by the Eleventh Circuit’s determination that Volkswagen complied fully with one of these options in installing a passive restraint in Doyle’s vehicle. Doyle’s allegations are not that the option chosen was defectively designed or manufactured, but rather that Volkswagen was negligent because it failed to choose another option. When considering the concept of reasonableness in this context, it would be absurd and unfair to allow a jury to say Volkswagen acted unreasonably in choosing one particular design, when it was required to choose one of three and authorized to choose the one it did.
Additionally, recognizing Doyle’s claim in this case would result in countless suits and contradictory verdicts. In each case, car makers would face allegations that a plaintiff’s injuries would have been less if passive restraints were used instead of manual restraints, or if airbags were used instead of seatbelts, or if manual restraints were used instead of airbags. The conflicting verdicts from such litigation would not encourage the manufacture of safer cars. It would simply place a huge and unreasonable burden on car makers.
Finding that Georgia law would not recognize á claim based on a manufacturer’s choice of one restraint over another authorized by *579Standard 208 is also supported by the Georgia legislation in this area. OCGA § 40-8-76.1 requires that while a passenger vehicle is being operated on a public road all front seat occupants must be restrained by seatbelts approved under Standard 208. This express provision demonstrates some deference by the legislature to federal standards with regard to passenger restraint devices. Finally, an appellate court of this state23 and other states considering this issue have also concluded that within the limited field covered by Standard 208, compliance with the federal standard precludes a common-law action, even under the risk-utility analysis.24
Decided March 3, 1997.
Word & Simmons, Gerald P. Word, Tisinger, Tisinger, Vance & Greer, Kevin B. Buice, Doffermyre, Shields, Canfield & Knowles, Foy R. Devine, for appellants.
Welch, Spell, Reemsnyder & Pless, Ronald D. Reemsnyder, for appellees. ' *
Butler, Wooten, Overby, Cheeley & Pearson, Albert M. Pearson III, Keith A. Pittman, Joshua Sacks, Samuel W. Oates, Jr., Franklin, Taulbee, Rushing, Bunce & Brogdon, Elizabeth F. Bunce, King & Spalding, Chilton D. Varner, Steven J. Estep, Webb, Tanner & Powell, Ralph L. Taylor III, Cathey & Strain, Dennis T. Cathey, James E. Staples, Jr., David A. Sleppy, amici curiae.
For these reasons I would hold that compliance with Standard 208 precludes a products liability claim premised merely on a manufacturer’s choice of one option under Standard 208 over another.

 264 Ga. 732 (450 SE2d 671) (1994).

 Id. at 736, n. 6.

 Id. at 737.

 Id. at 734.

 Honda Motor Co. v. Kimbrel, 189 Ga. App. 414 (376 SE2d 379) (1988), cert. denied, 189 Ga. App. 912 (1989).

 See Cooper v. General Motors Corp., No. 92-CA-01334-SCT (1996 Miss. LEXIS 265); Schwartz v. Volvo North America Corp., 554 S2d 927 (Ala. 1989). The majority of courts addressing this type of suit reach the same result by focusing on federal preemption. See Cooper, 1996 Miss. LEXIS at 11 (citing cases).