Court Opinion

ID: 9757308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:30:23.592492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:37.920321
License: Public Domain

OPINION

Justice NIGRO.
In this appeal, we are asked to consider the constitutionality of Section 3103(a) of the Motor Vehicle Code (the “Code”), which provides:
Every person riding an animal or driving any animal-drawn vehicle upon a roadway shall be granted all of the rights and shall be subject to all of the duties applicable to the driver of a vehicle by this part, except those provisions of this part which by their very nature can have no application or where specifically provided otherwise.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3103(a) (emphasis added).1 For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the trial court below that Section 3103(a) is unconstitutionally vague and therefore affirm.
On April 7, 2002, the Pennsylvania State Police stopped Appellees Richard Carroll Noel and Keith Douglas Travis while they were riding horses on a public highway in Springfield Township, Mercer County because they appeared to be intoxicated. Appellees were subsequently charged with Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol (“DUI”) pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(a)(1),2 and Public Drunkenness pursuant to *54918 Pa.C.S. § 5505. Following a preliminary hearing, the trial court found that there was sufficient evidence to hold Appellees for trial, and both of the appellees waived arraignment.
On August 20, 2002, Appellee Travis filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and Appellee Noel filed the same on August 26, 2002. In their petitions, Appellees argued that, as horse riders, they were not subject to Pennsylvania’s DUI statute because that statute applies only to persons operating a “vehicle.” See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(a). In addition, Appellee Noel contended that Section 3103(a), which, as stated above, purports to subject a person riding an animal upon a roadway to many of the same duties of the Code applicable to a driver of a vehicle, was unconstitutionally vague. See id. at 3103(a). Following a hearing, the trial court granted Appellees’ petitions and dismissed the charges against them. The basis for the court’s decision was two-fold. First, the trial court agreed with Appellees that the term “vehicle,” as used in Section 3731(a)(1), does not encompass in its meaning an animal such as a horse. See id. at 3731(a)(1). Therefore, the court concluded that on its face, Section 3731(a)(1) could not apply to Appellees as they were riding horses and not operating vehicles when they were arrested.3 See id. The court then went *550on to consider whether Appellees could be subject to the DUI statute through Section 3103(a), and concluded that they could not, as that Section is both unconstitutionally vague and unconstitutionally delegates legislative power to the judiciary.
The Commonwealth appealed to the Superior Court, and the Superior Court relinquished jurisdiction and transferred the Commonwealth’s appeal to this Court pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 722(7).4 In its appeal, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court erred in concluding that Section 3103(a) is unconstitutionally vague. We disagree.
As this appeal raises the constitutionality of a statute, our scope of review is plenary. See Commonwealth v. MacPherson, 561 Pa. 571, 752 A.2d 384, 388 (2000). It is well-established in this Commonwealth that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and will only be invalidated as unconstitutional if it “clearly, palpably, and plainly violates constitutional rights.” Id. Moreover, this Court has made clear that a criminal statute must give reasonable notice of the conduct which it proscribes to those who are subject to it. Commonwealth v. Barud, 545 Pa. 297, 681 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa.1996). Statutes which are so vague that they fail to provide such notice violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Commonwealth v. Heinbaugh, 467 Pa. 1, 354 A.2d 244, 246 (1976). As this Court stated in Commonwealth v. Mayfield:
The terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its *551penalties.... [A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.
574 Pa. 460, 832 A.2d 418, 422 (2003) (citations omitted).
In finding Section 3103(a) to be unconstitutionally vague, the trial court below determined that it was impossible for the courts to ascertain which provisions contained in Part III apply “by their very nature” to a person riding an animal and which do not. The trial court, in reaching this conclusion, relied heavily on a concurring opinion in State of Utah v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Utah 1986). In Blowers, the Supreme Court of Utah concluded that a Utah statute virtually identical to the one at issue here was unconstitutional, stating:
Section 41-6-15 provides: “Every person riding an animal or driving any animal-drawn vehicle upon a roadway is subject to this chapter, except those provisions which by their nature can have no application.” This is a classic example of a criminal statute that is too vague in its prohibitions to survive a due process challenge. It is impossible for anyone to determine, even upon thoughtful reflection, which portions of the vehicle code the legislature thought should apply to animals and animal-drawn vehicles and which should not.
Id. (citing U.C.A. § 41-6-15 (1953)(amended 1987)). Justice Howe authored a concurring opinion in Blowers, which the trial court below quoted at length. In his concurring opinion, Justice Howe elaborated on the majority’s conclusion that the Utah statute was unconstitutional,5 explaining:
In. Section 41-6-15, the legislature has declared that every person riding an animal upon a roadway is subject to all the provisions of that chapter (the traffic code), “except those provisions which by their nature can have no application.” *552Chapter 6 of title 41 deals with a myriad of traffic rules and regulations. They include obeying traffic signs and signals; reporting accidents; prohibiting driving while intoxicated and reckless driving; speed restrictions; regulations applicable to driving on the right side of the road; turns and signals on starting, stopping, or turning, standing and parking; required equipment; and various miscellaneous rules.... [A]n arguable position might be taken for and against the application of many provisions of the traffic code to persons riding animals upon the highway. Application in each instance may not always yield to our notions of common sense.... For example, if, while on a highway a rider breaks his arm as a result of being thrown off an unruly horse, does section 41-6-34 require the rider to notify the police? Would the rider need to fill out an accident report form as required by 410-6-35? Could a law enforcement officer issue a citation to a rider whose horse makes an unusual noise as proscribed by section 41-6-147? Must horses be equipped with headlamps and taillights as arguably required by section 41-6-130-5(a)?
Blowers, 717 P.2d at 1324 (Howe, J., concurring).
This reasoning is equally applicable to Section 3103(a) which, much like the Utah statute, essentially provides that horse-riders will be subject to those provisions of Part III of the Code which “by their very nature” are deemed to apply to horse-riders. Within Part III of the Code, there are five chapters, each of which contains several subchapters. These subchapters set forth a myriad of rules concerning this Commonwealth’s traffic laws, the rights and duties of automobile owners, and serious criminal offenses involving motor vehicles. In total, there are over one hundred and twenty provisions contained in Part III that, according to Section 3103(a), may or may not apply to horse-riders like Appellees. While the Commonwealth argues that “nothing beyond logic and common sense is required to make the determination” as to whether or not a particular provision in Part III is applicable “by its very nature” to horse-riders, and that, indeed, there is no “statute in Part III which, after its reading, leaves any *553question in the mind of its reader whether or not the statute applies,” we simply cannot agree. Cmwlth.’s Bf. at 12, 13.
For example, Section 3708, “Unauthorized driving over fire hose,” provides the following:
No vehicle shall be driven over any unprotected hose of a fire department when laid down on any highway, private road or driveway, for use at any fire or alarm of fire, without the consent of a fire department officer, a police officer or other appropriately attired person authorized to direct, control or regulate traffic at the scene.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3708. It is completely unclear whether this provision, by sheer virtue of being contained in Part III of the Code, applies to a rider whose horse steps over a fire hose as it passes the scene of a fire, or whether it is one that “by its very nature” can have no application to a horse-rider. Likewise, it is not clear whether an equestrians horse who momentarily traverses a sidewalk would be violating Section 3703 of the Code, “Driving upon a sidewalk,” which provides that “no person shall drive any vehicle except a human-powered vehicle upon a sidewalk or sidewalk area except upon a permanent or duly authorized temporary driveway.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3703(a). Nor is it clear whether a person thrown from an unruly horse would be required to notify the police under Section 3746, “Immediate notice of accident to police department,” which provides:
The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident shall immediately by the quickest means of communication give notice to the nearest office of a duly authorized police department if the accident involves ... injury to or death of any person ....
75 Pa.C.S. § 3746(a)(1).
These examples demonstrate that it is entirely unclear which provisions in Part III apply “by their very nature” to persons riding an animal and which do not. Indeed, as Justice Howe opined in his concurring opinion in Blowers, an argument could be made both for and against the application of these, and many other, provisions of Part III of the Code to *554persons riding an animal.6 Clearly, then, Section 3103(a) does not provide a reasonable standard by which an ordinary person. may contemplate his or her future conduct. See Barud, 681 A.2d at 166.7 As a result, we agree with the trial court that Section 3103(a) is unconstitutionally vague and thus invalid.8 The order of the trial court is affirmed.
Justice SAYLOR files a concurring opinion in which Justice NEWMAN joins.
Justice EAKIN files a dissenting opinion.

. As used in this provision, "this part” refers to Part III of the Code, which is codified in Sections 3101 through 3755, 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3101-3755.

. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731, which is contained in Part III of the Code, provides in relevant part:
(a) Offense defined.—A person shall not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle in any of the following circumstances:
(1) While under the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders the person incapable of safe driving.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3731 has since been repealed by Act of 2003, Sept. 30, P.L. 120, No. 24, § 14, effective Feb. 1, 2004. It was amended and recodified at 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802.

. Although the court noted that the Commonwealth had waived the issue of whether a horse is a vehicle for purposes of the Code for failure to raise the issue in its 1925(b) statement, the court nonetheless proceeded to address the issue. In doing so, the court specifically reasoned that because Section 3731(a)(1) applies only where a person "drive[s], operate[s] or [is] in actual physical control of the movement of any vehicle,” see 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(a), Appellees could only be subject to that Section if a horse is considered a ‘‘vehicle.” The court then noted that the Code defines a ‘‘vehicle” as any "device in, upon or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway____” See 75 Pa.C.S. § 102. As the Code does not define “device," the court looked to the word's common definition, which is “a[n] invention or contrivance; any result of design,” see Black's Law Dictionary 462 (7th ed. 1999), and concluded that a horse clearly could not be considered a “device” and therefore is not a “vehicle” for purposes of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(a)(1). Notably, in its brief to this Court, the Commonwealth does not challenge the trial court's conclusion that it had waived the “vehicle" issue below, nor does the Commonwealth clearly challenge the trial court's determination that a horse is, in fact, not a vehicle for purposes of Section 3731(a)(1). See Cmwlth.'s Bf. at 9 (stating that whether or not a horse is a vehicle is *550“irrelevant” in light of its primary argument regarding constitutionality and applicability of Section 3103(a)). Thus, this issue is not before our Court.

. 42 Pa.C.S. § 722(7) states:
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of the courts of common pleas in .... [mjatters where the court of common pleas has held invalid as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, or to the Constitution of this Commonwealth, any treaty or law of the United States or any provision of the Constitution of, or of any statute of, this Commonwealth, or any provision of any home rule charter.

. Justice Howe agreed with the majority that the Utah statute was. unconstitutionally vague, but also believed that the statute impermissibly delegated legislative power to the judiciary.

. The Commonwealth attempts to argue that Justice Howe's rationale in his concurring opinion is totally inapplicable to Section 3103(a). In ' support of its argument, the Commonwealth points to two examples cited in Justice Howe’s opinion, the ones relating to noise and lights, and notes that the comparable requirements in Pennsylvania are not, in fact, contained in Part III of the Code and thus, would not be applicable to Pennsylvania horse-riders via Section 3103(a). However, as Appellee Noel counters, this argument “completely ignores the other twelve examples given by Justice Howe which would be covered by Part III,” Appellee Noel’s Bf. at 5 (emphasis added), and therefore does not in any way dilute the underlying reasoning of Justice Howe's opinion.

. While Justice Saylor opines in his concurring opinion that. Appellees' vagueness challenge must fail because it is obvious that the drunk driving provision is not one that “by [its] very nature” cannot apply to horse-riders, we disagree. As an initial matter, we simply do not agree that Section 3103(a) put Appellees on reasonable notice that riding a horse on a roadway while intoxicated would violate the Vehicle Code when, to reach such a conclusion, Appellees would be required to assign a workable meaning to the language of Section 3103(a), and that language is, as made clear above, simply too imprecise to enable them to do so. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3103(a). Indeed, contrary to Justice Saylor's contention, any attempt to apply that language to the DUI provision- only serves as yet another example of how "it is impossible for anyone to determine, even upon thoughtful reflection, which portions of the vehicle code the legislature thought should apply to animals and animal-drawn vehicles and which should not.” See Blowers, 111 P.2d at 1323. Specifically, we reiterate that the DUI provision prohibits driving "while under the influence of alcohol to a degree which rentiers the person incapable of safe driving," and note that it is not at all clear, among other things, that a horse, which unlike a car is not fully controlled by the rider, would allow itself to be "driven” in an unsafe manner. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(a)(l)(emphasis added). Thus, whether or not the DUI provision "by [its] very nature” can be summarily applied to horse-riders is simply not as clear as Justice Saylor suggests.

. Given our finding that Section 3103(a) is void for vagueness, we need not reach the question of whether that Section is also unconstitutional *555on the closely related ground that it impermissibly delegates legislative power to the judiciary.