Court Opinion

ID: 9962430
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-23 17:00:31.500987+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:53.073952
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

WINFRED A. INFINGER,                            DOCKET NUMBER
              Appellant,                        AT-0831-19-0539-I-1

             v.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL                             DATE: April 22, 2024
  MANAGEMENT,
              Agency.

        THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Winfred A. Infinger , The Villages, Florida, pro se.

      Jane Bancroft , Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                           Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                        Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                  FINAL ORDER

      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
affirmed the Office of Personnel Management’s (OPM) reconsideration decision
denying the appellant’s request to revoke his waiver of his military retired pay
and separate his military retired pay from his Civil Service Retirement System
(CSRS) annuity. For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s
1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and REVERSE OPM’s
reconsideration decision because the determination regarding revocation of the
waiver of military retired pay rests with the military, and OPM exceeded its
authority when it determined that the appellant could not waive his entitlement to
military retired pay.

                                   BACKGROUND
      The appellant retired from the U.S. Air Force (USAF) on July 31, 1969,
after 22 years, 6 months, and 15 days of service. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 7
at 27-28.     He entered on duty with the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) on
January 24, 1970, and was employed with the agency until he retired under CSRS
effective July 1, 1989, with just over 19 years and 5 months of creditable civilian
service. 2 IAF, Tab 7 at 37, Tab 8 at 17-18, 23-25. At the time of his retirement
from the USPS, the appellant was 61 years, 4 months, and 12 days of age. IAF,
Tab 8 at 23. Because the appellant had not yet reached 62 years of age and had
not completed 20 years of service at the time of his retirement, he was not
eligible for immediate retirement based solely on his Federal civilian service. See
5 U.S.C § 8336(a)-(b) (noting that, in order for a covered employee to be eligible
for immediate retirement, he must be at least 55 years of age with 30 years of
creditable civilian service, or at least 60 years of age with 20 years of creditable
civilian service); see also Johnson v. Office of Personnel Management,
2
  There appears to be some inconsistency concerning exactly how much creditable
service the appellant had at the time he retired. The retirement record computation
sheet OPM provided below reflects that the appellant had 19 years, 5 months, and
7 days of creditable service at the time he retired. IAF, Tab 7 at 37. OPM’s initial and
reconsideration decisions reflect the same service total, and clarify that 2 of the days
are credit for unused sick leave. Id. at 12, 17. The initial decision reflects the same
total. IAF, Tab 15, Initial Decision at 2. However, in its submission to the
administrative judge, OPM asserted that the appellant had 19 years, 5 months, and
2 days of creditable service. IAF, Tab 7 at 5. Nevertheless, we need not resolve the
apparent discrepancy because either figure still falls short of the 20 years of creditable
service required for eligibility for an immediate retirement, without including any
military service.
                                                                                      3

102 M.S.P.R. 589, ¶ 7 (2006). Instead, he gained such eligibility by waiving his
military retired pay and thus receiving credit toward his CSRS annuity for his
22 years, 6 months, and 15 days of military service.           IAF, Tab 7 at 24-27;
see 5 C.F.R. § 831.301(c); Johnson, 102 M.S.P.R. 589, ¶ 7.
      In a number of correspondences dating back to November 2004, the
appellant requested to revoke his waiver of his military retired pay and to
separate his military retired pay from his CSRS annuity. IAF, Tab 7 at 21-23, 49.
OPM informed the appellant that, because he was under 62 years of age at the
time he retired and did not have the requisite 20 years of Federal civilian service
at that time, his military time was necessary for him to receive a CSRS annuity
and, therefore, he could not revoke his waiver of military retired pay.              Id.
at 21-23. In an initial decision dated March 7, 2018, OPM formally denied the
appellant’s request to separate his military retired pay from his CSRS annuity.
Id. at 17. After the appellant requested reconsideration of that decision, OPM
issued a final decision affirming its initial decision.         Id. at 15-16.     OPM
subsequently rescinded the reconsideration decision 3 and issued a new
reconsideration decision concluding that the appellant would not have been
entitled to CSRS benefits based on the amount of covered Federal civilian service
he had at the time of his retirement, and, therefore, he could not revoke his
waiver of his retired military pay and separate his military service pay from his
CSRS annuity. Id. at 12-13.
      The appellant subsequently filed the instant Board appeal challenging
OPM’s reconsideration decision. IAF, Tab 1. In his initial appeal, the appellant
also argued that his former employing agency, USPS, incorrectly calculated his
amount of creditable service, and provided a copy of a service award certificate
3
  The appellant filed a Board appeal of the rescinded reconsideration decision, which
the administrative judge dismissed for lack of Board jurisdiction. Infinger v. Office of
Personnel Management, MSPB Docket No. AT-0831-18-0777-I-1, Tab 9, Initial
Decision. On April 22, 2024, the Board denied the appellant’s petition for review of the
initial decision. Infinger v. Office of Personnel Management, MSPB Docket No. AT-
0831-18-0777-I-1, Final Order at 2 (Apr. 22, 2024).
                                                                                       4

reflecting that he had 29 years, 5 months, and 7 days of service with the agency,
and 47 years, 7 months, and 8 days of creditable civilian service after including
his military service. IAF, Tab 1 at 1; Tab 12 at 1. Additionally, the appellant
argued that he should have been provided with “combat service time” when he
retired, and stated that the only reason he retired when he did was to care for his
four sons and his wife, who was suffering from terminal kidney cancer. IAF,
Tab 1 at 1. The appellant did not request a hearing. 4 The administrative judge
subsequently issued an initial decision based on the written record, affirming
OPM’s reconsideration decision.         IAF, Tab 15, Initial Decision (ID).           He
concluded that OPM correctly determined that the appellant waived his right to
military retired pay in order to qualify for a CSRS annuity, and consequently, the
appellant could not revoke his waiver decision. ID at 1-4.
      The appellant has filed a petition for review and a supplement to his
petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3. The agency has
filed a response to the petition for review, and the appellant has not filed a reply.
PFR File, Tab 7.

                 DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
      On review, the appellant again requests to revoke his waiver of his military
retired pay, and appears to indicate that he does not want his CSRS annuity.
PFR File, Tab 1 at 1. The appellant also restates his argument that, at the time of
his retirement, his former employing agency informed him that he had 29 years,
5 months, and 7 days of Federal civilian service and consequently requests that he
be credited with the 6 months and 23 days of Federal service necessary for
entitlement to a CSRS annuity based solely on his Federal civilian service, and he
attaches a copy of the USPS service award certificate. PFR File, Tab 1 at 1-2,
Tab 3 at 1.

4
 On review, the appellant acknowledges the administrative judge’s assertion that he did
not request a hearing, but notes that he did not do so because he would not be physically
able to attend a hearing due to his disability. Petition for Review File, Tab 1 at 1.
                                                                                      5

      An appellant bears the burden of proving his entitlement to retirement
benefits by preponderant evidence.        See Cheeseman v. Office of Personnel
Management, 791 F.2d 138, 140 41 (Fed. Cir. 1986); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(ii).
Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8332(c)(1)(B), a Federal employee covered under CSRS
generally is entitled to credit, for purposes of computing a basic retirement
annuity, for “each period of military service performed after December 31, 1956,
and before the separation on which the entitlement to annuity under this
subchapter is based, only if a deposit (with interest, if any) is made with respect
to that period, as provided in section 8334(j) . . . .” 5 However, as detailed below,
section 8332(c)(2) provides that, except under certain circumstances, an employee
usually cannot receive both military and civilian retirement service credit for the
same periods.    See Forsythe v. Office of Personnel Management, 85 M.S.P.R.
593, ¶ 9 (2000). Section 8332(c)(2) states the following:
      If an employee or Member is awarded retired pay based on any period of
      military service, the service of the employee or Member may not include
      credit for such period of military service unless the retired pay is
      awarded—
      (A) based on a service-connected disability—
             (i) incurred in combat with an enemy of the United States; or
             (ii) caused by an instrumentality of war and incurred in line of
                    duty during a period of war as defined by section 1101
                    of title 38; or
      (B) under chapter 1223 of title 10 (or under chapter 67 of that title as in
      effect before the effective date of the Reserve Officer Personnel
      Management Act).
5 U.S.C. § 8332(c)(2).
      Under 5 U.S.C. § 8336(a), an employee who is separated from the service
after becoming 55 years of age and completing 30 years of service is entitled to a
CSRS annuity, and under subsection 8336(b), an employee who is separated from
the service after becoming 60 years of age and completing 20 years of service is

5
  “Military service” means honorable active service in the armed forces. 5 U.S.C.
§ 8331(13). It is undisputed that the appellant’s military service qualifies under this
definition.
                                                                                  6

entitled to an annuity.   Additionally, as noted above, an employee entitled to
military retired pay who would otherwise be ineligible for an immediate
retirement under 5 U.S.C. § 8336 may nonetheless still qualify for a CSRS
retirement annuity if he executes a waiver of his right to military retired pay,
adding his military service to his Federal civilian service for annuity computation
purposes in order to meet the eligibility requirements identified above. 5 C.F.R.
§ 831.301(c). As the administrative judge correctly noted, the appellant did not
qualify for a CSRS annuity based on his civilian service alone and therefore
needed his retired military service included with his Federal civilian service in
order to be entitled to a CSRS annuity. 5 C.F.R. § 831.301; ID at 3.

OPM exceeded its authority when it concluded that the appellant was
“permanently bound” to his election to waive his military retired pay and could
not revoke that decision.
      Although the administrative judge correctly concluded that the appellant
needed his military retired service included with his Federal civilian service to
obtain entitlement to a CSRS annuity, it does not follow that OPM was correct in
denying the appellant’s request to revoke his waiver of his military retired pay.
In addressing a similar set of facts in Black v. Office of Personnel Management,
37 M.S.P.R. 544 (1988), the Board agreed with OPM’s concession that it lacked
the authority to make a determination regarding an appellant’s request to revoke
his waiver of his military retired pay, and instead, the authority to make that
determination rested with the military component responsible for administering
the military retired pay. Black, 37 M.S.P.R. at 545-47. As is the case here, the
appellant in Black retired from his Federal civilian position before obtaining
20 years of Federal civilian service, and before reaching 62 years old, and
therefore his military service was necessary to establish his entitlement to a CSRS
annuity. Id. at 545. After determining that he might be better off financially if
he remained in the military retirement system, the appellant in Black filed a
request with OPM to revoke his waiver of his military retired pay.       Id. OPM
                                                                                       7

denied the appellant’s request to revoke his waiver, noting that his military
service was necessary to establish entitlement to a CSRS retirement, and affirmed
the denial in a reconsideration decision. Id. After the appellant appealed OPM’s
decision to the Board, OPM moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction,
arguing that it had erred in concluding that it had the authority to determine that
the appellant could not revoke his waiver of his military retired pay,
acknowledging instead that this authority rested solely with the Department of the
Air Force—the military component with which the appellant completed his
military service.   Id. at 545-46.    Consequently, OPM rescinded its initial and
reconsideration decisions, divesting the Board of jurisdiction over the appeal, and
the Board affirmed the initial decision dismissing the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction on that basis. Id. at 546-47.
      Similarly, in Johnson, the Board applied the reasoning in Black to modify
the initial decision in that case to make clear that OPM did not have the authority
to make a determination regarding the appellant’s ability to revoke his waiver of
military retired pay, and thus OPM erred in its reconsideration decision when it
purported to determine that the appellant’s waiver was irrevocable.            Johnson,
102 M.S.P.R. 589, ¶ 9. Consistent with Black, the Board instructed Mr. Johnson
to petition the Department of the Army to seek revocation of his waiver. 6 Id.
Based on the Board’s decisions in Black and Johnson, we conclude that OPM did
not have the authority to determine that the appellant was “permanently bound” to
his election to waive his military retired pay and could not revoke that decision,
6
   The ultimate matter at issue in Johnson concerned the apportionment of the
appellant’s former spouse’s share of his annuity, of which the waiver revocation issue
only formed a part of the basis for the appellant’s OPM and Board appeals. Johnson,
102 M.S.P.R. 589, ¶¶ 2-5, 9. Consequently, for the purpose of resolving the
apportionment matter, the Board acknowledged that “for the meantime,” OPM and the
Board could rely on the fact that the appellant’s waiver remained in effect and had not
been revoked. Id., ¶ 9. Unlike in Johnson, however, in the instant case, OPM’s
erroneous determination that the appellant is “permanently bound” to his election to
waive his military retired pay forms the entire basis of the appellant’s appeal to OPM,
and a determination on this matter is necessary for resolution of this appeal. IAF, Tab 7
at 13; see Black, 37 M.S.P.R. at 545-46; cf. Johnson, 102 M.S.P.R. 589, ¶ 9.
                                                                                  8

and thus erred when it made that determination in its final decision.     See IAF,
Tab 7 at 12-14.
      Regarding the appellant’s argument that his former employing agency
incorrectly calculated his amount of creditable service, as the administrative
judge noted, OPM did not address this argument in its initial or reconsideration
decisions, and therefore this matter is not properly before the Board. IAF, Tab 1
at 1; Tab 12 at 1-2; PFR File, Tab 1 at 1-2; Tab 3 at 1; ID at 4 n.2; see Smith v.
Office of Personnel Management, 114 M.S.P.R. 395, ¶ 8 (2010) (noting that,
generally, the Board has jurisdiction over OPM determinations affecting an
appellant’s rights or interests under CSRS only after OPM has issued a final or
reconsideration decision). If the appellant so desires, he may seek a decision
from OPM regarding the calculation of his civilian service, and if he is
dissatisfied with OPM’s final decision on that matter he may file a new appeal
with the Board consistent with law and regulation.       See 5 U.S.C. § 8347(d);
5 C.F.R. § 831.110. We note, however, that the undisputed record reflects that
the appellant was born in 1928 and retired from his position with the USPS in
1989 at 61 years of age.    IAF, Tab 8 at 13, 23.     The undisputed record also
reflects that, prior to beginning his Federal civilian service with USPS in 1970,
the appellant served with the U.S. Air Force from 1947 to 1969, for a total of
22 years, 6 months, and 15 days. IAF, Tab 7 at 28-29, 31-36. This would appear
to call into question the accuracy of the USPS service award certificate the
appellant provided reflecting that he had 29 years, 5 months, and 7 days of
Federal civilian service, because that timeline would have required the appellant
to have retired from the USPS at 71 years of age in 1999, which is not supported
by the record. See, e.g., IAF, Tab 8 at 13-14, 23; Tab 11 at 2.
      Finally, although not addressed in the initial decision, the appellant
referred to “combat service time” he completed while in the military in his initial
appeal filing and appeared to suggest that he was wrongfully deprived of credit in
some manner for that service. IAF, Tab 1 at 1. Although not entirely clear, the
                                                                                    9

reference to “combat service time” may be intended as a reference to
combat-related special compensation (CRSC) benefits.          5 U.S.C. § 8332(c)(2)
provides a limited exception to the requirement that an employee waive his
entitlement to military retired pay in order to receive an annuity in circumstances
where a portion of an annuitant’s military retired pay is “based on a
service-connected disability” that was “incurred in combat with an enemy of the
United States,” or “caused by an instrumentality of war and incurred in line of
duty during a period of war[.]”      See 5 C.F.R. § 831.301(a); Swan v. Office of
Personnel Management, 93 M.S.P.R. 622, ¶¶ 8-9 (2003).               Although OPM
addressed this potential claim in a submission to the administrative judge, it did
not address it in its initial or reconsideration decisions. IAF, Tab 7 at 7-8, 12-14,
17. Therefore, to the extent the appellant’s reference to “combat service time” is
intended as a claim that he is entitled to CRSC benefits, this matter is not
properly before the Board.       If the appellant so desires, he may also seek a
decision on this matter from OPM and, if he is dissatisfied with OPM’s decision,
file a new appeal with the Board consistent with law and the Board’s regulations.
See 5 U.S.C. § 8347(d); 5 C.F.R. § 831.110.
         For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the initial decision and reverse OPM’s
reconsideration decision based on the fact that OPM exceeded its authority when
it determined that the appellant could not revoke his waiver of his military retired
pay. 7

7
  We caution that it is unclear what effect successful revocation of the appellant’s
waiver of his military retired pay would have on his CSRS annuity, and the appellant
may wish to consult with an individual well-versed in retirement benefits before
seeking revocation from the military component.
                                                                                       10

                           NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 8
      This Final Order constitutes the Board’s final decision in this matter.
5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for
seeking such review and the appropriate forum with which to file.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b). Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights,
the Merit Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which
option is most appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do
not represent a statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within
their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general . As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you    must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:

8
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                   11

                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving   a   claim   of
discrimination . This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims —by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
                                                                                12

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues . 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012 . This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
                                                                                     13

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)
(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either
with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 9   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

9
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                       14

      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx .

FOR THE BOARD:                       ______________________________
                                     Gina K. Grippando
                                     Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.