Court Opinion

ID: 9487245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:11:41.357564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:09.973606
License: Public Domain

REINHARDT, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent. Once again, “fairness and due process” take an unnecessary beating in the courts. How easy it would be to afford individuals the full rights Congress provided them. Instead, our careless and hasty treatment of criminal cases all too often makes it difficult for defendants to receive a fair trial.
Here, we narrowly, grudgingly, and erroneously apply the Court Interpreters Act, a statute designed to make certain that defendants understand what is happening to them during criminal proceedings. By reviewing the factual, but not the legal, basis for the district court’s decision, the majority has created the misleading impression that the district court’s casually, if not inadvertently, adopted approach to determining whether language difficulties inhibit a defendant’s understanding constitutes an appropriate application of the Act.
Nothing in the legislative history or statutory language supports the narrow application of the Act by the district court. While the majority reaches the correct result with regard to the procedural default issue, I cannot endorse its failure to review de novo the district court’s erroneous ruling. Although the majority’s opinion limits itself to reviewing the district court’s factual findings for clear error, my colleagues’ haphazard treatment of Gonzalez’s claim might lead another court to assume incorrectly that they have created a new legal standard for determining when an interpreter must be provided under the Act.1
The language of the Act is reasonably clear. It provides:
The presiding judicial officer ... shall utilize the services of the most available certified interpreter ... if the presiding judicial official determines on such officer’s own motion or on the motion of a party that such party ...
(A) speaks only or primarily a language other than the English language ... so as to inhibit such party’s comprehension of the proceedings or communication with counsel or the presiding judicial officer.
28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1). It is quite evident what the Act requires in this case. As soon as the presiding judicial officer became aware that Gonzalez primarily spoke Spanish, he should have immediately conducted a full factual inquiry into whether language difficulties in any way inhibited the defendant’s comprehension of the proceedings.2 As the Fifth Circuit noted in a case upon which the majority relies, “any indication to the presiding judicial officer that a criminal defendant speaks only or primarily a language other than the English language *1053should trigger the application of Sections (d) and (f)(1) of the Court Interpreters Act.” United States v. Tapia, 631 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir.1980) (emphasis added).
In making its factual inquiry, the district court should have focused on a single question: did the fact that Gonzalez primarily spoke Spanish in any way “inhibit” his comprehension of the proceedings? That is what the plain language of the statute requires and, absent evidence to the contrary, a court must follow its common, everyday meaning. See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 314, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979); United States v. $191,910.00 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d 1051, 1067 (9th Cir.1994). The common meaning of “inhibit” is “hinder.” Random House Dictionary of the English Language 732 (1979). Thus, the statutory language could not be clearer: a judicial officer must appoint an interpreter whenever the party in question speaks only or primarily a language other than English, unless his comprehension of the proceedings is not hindered.
Although I believe that the majority was required to reverse under any standard, its error stems in large part from its unfortunate decision to review the district court’s factual finding for clear error instead of reviewing its legal conclusions de novo. Had my colleagues properly reviewed the district court’s legal conclusions under the appropriate standard, I believe they would not have voted to affirm the decision to deny Gonzalez the benefit of an interpreter. There is absolutely no indication in the statute or its legislative history that a defendant must have a “major” language problem to be granted an interpreter, and the district court erred in reading such an additional requirement into the Act. Congress mandated the appointment of interpreters whenever a “language-handicapped” defendant’s comprehension of the proceedings is impaired because Congress concluded that the appointment of an interpreter represents “a fundamental premise of fairness and due process for all.” H.Rep. No. 1687, 95th Cong.2d Sess. 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4652, 4654 (quoting Congressman Fred Richmond). Whether the defendant suffers irom a major language problem is irrelevant under the statute. The only question, and the sole permissible inquiry, in the case of defendants like Gonzalez is whether the defendant’s comprehension is impaired for purposes of the judicial proceeding. Any other inquiry is improper. Had the majority examined the language and purpose of the statute in a more attentive manner, it surely would not have ignored such a clear congressional mandate.
The reason that Congress chose the standard outlined in the statute, and why the district court erred in applying a different one, is quite evident from what occurred below. Many people may be capable of speaking enough rudimentary English to function at a very basic level in this country but lack the ability to comprehend complex criminal proceedings. Others may speak English so fluently that, even though English represents their second language, they can follow the most complicated of criminal proceedings. Congress presumably had the latter group in mind when it required that language difficulties “inhibit” the defendant’s comprehension of the proceedings for an interpreter to be appointed. This provision is designed to prevent the appointment of an interpreter when one is wholly unnecessary rather than to subdivide those who cannot speak English fluently into groups with “major” or “minor” difficulties.
In this case, as the majority itself notes, the record indicates that both judges quickly perceived that Gonzalez did not speak English well, that the defendant’s responses were “brief and somewhat inarticulate,” and that he could not read English at all. Gonzalez’s marked inability to respond to simple, direct questions provides a strong indication that language difficulties prevented him from fully comprehending the proceedings against him.3
*1054A defendant’s full comprehension of criminal proceedings implicates cherished constitutional values. See United States v. Lim, 794 F.2d 469, 470 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom Dong Joon Ahn v. United States, 479 U.S. 937, 107 S.Ct. 416, 93 L.Ed.2d 367 (1986); H.Rep. No. 1687, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4652, 4653-54. A failure to understand those proceedings leads to the most serious of consequences. Indeed, as in this case,4 a defendant’s inability fully to comprehend the proceedings against him may determine their outcome.
Had the district court made the proper inquiry using the correct legal standard, we would have had a fully developed record to evaluate the defendant’s claim. In this case, however, we do not. All we know is that the questioning was cursory and that the district judge found that the defendant did not have a “major” language problem. Because there is absolutely no basis for concluding that, under the proper statutory standard, this primarily Spanish-speaking defendant did not need an interpreter, we should reverse the district court’s decision.
Finally, the majority’s unfortunate decision to review only the factual, and not the legal, basis for the district court’s decision has led my colleagues to err in an additional respect. The district court based its decision in part upon the fact that Gonzalez had been assisted by his wife in explaining the proceedings to him. Relying upon such a factual finding is directly contrary to the clear mandate of the Act, which is to provide qualified, impartial interpreters to criminal defendants who are language impaired. Again, had the majority reviewed the district court’s legal conclusions de novo, I believe it would not have affirmed the district court’s decision. Instead, it would have paid close attention to the House Report accompanying the Act, which clearly notes that “the appointment of certified interpreters is designed to insure not only an accurate translation but also an impartial one.” H.Rep. No. 1687, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4652, 4656 (emphasis added). The district court had no evidence that Gonzalez’s wife was an accurate or impartial interpreter; to the contrary, the fact that she was a codefendant in the case renders her involvement highly questionable. Accordingly, the district court’s reliance upon the assistance of Gonzalez’s wife in making its determination was improper as a matter of law.
I am extremely concerned that the majority’s erroneous approach to this appeal may create the misleading impression that this decision involves something more than a review of a factual finding under the clear error standard. Regrettably, that is all that occurred here. I respectfully dissent.

. I should also note, as I hope future panels will note, that the majority's opinion depends in part upon the fact that the defendant failed to object to the lack of an interpreter at trial.

. By "full factual inquiry,” I do not mean the cursory, half-hearted, and casual questioning by the magistrate judge in this case. The full text of this questioning is as follows:
Court: Do you understand?
Gonzalez: Yeah, little bit.
Court: What is your problem, language problem?
Gonzalez: Well, no. I don’t know how to read that much. I understand. I understand.
The magistrate judge was on notice that the defendant could not read the plea agreement, and even the brief exchange outlined above should have indicated that Gonzalez’s understanding of the proceedings was inhibited by his inability to speak English.
The district judge followed a similar approach, apparently attempting to compensate for Gonzalez’s inability to speak and understand English by asking only short, simple questions. The goal of the Act was to provide qualified interpreters for criminal defendants. See infra pp. 9121-23. A district judge cannot compensate for his failure to appoint an interpreter by asking the defendant only extremely basic questions. Ironically, in this case the defendant could not even follow the simple questions posed by the district judge, thus clearly indicating that he would be unable to comprehend the full implications of a complex plea agreement written in English.

. For example, Gonzalez was only capable of responding to the district judge's questions when they involved a "yes" or “no” answer; whenever the district court asked a question requiring a slightly more complicated answer, Gonzalez’s answers were non-responsive, even when he was coached by his lawyer. Consider the following exchanges:
*1054District Judge: Would you tell me what your understanding of Count 1 of the indictment is; that is, the conspiracy charge? What do you think they are charging you with by alleging you participated in the conspiracy?
Gonzalez’s Lawyer: He is asking you on the conspiracy what does that mean [sic]. What are you charged with? What did you do?
Gonzalez: With the telephone call?
District Judge: What did you do? Did you work with other people to buy drugs and sell them?
Gonzalez: I used the telephone.
District Judge: The point is, if you enter a plea of guilty now, you can't withdraw it later because you don'tlike [sic] the sentence that you get. Gonzalez: Yes.

. Gonzalez claims that he would not have pleaded guilty had he understood the proceedings against him.