Court Opinion

ID: 9668764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:25:04.541063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:48.012608
License: Public Domain

ELLIS, Justice,
dissenting.
Because I believe the language of the Texas Wrongful Death Act does not compel preclusion of a wrongful death action under the instant circumstances, and because the majority’s construction denies recovery to those whom the statute was designed to protect, I respectfully dissent.
The majority holds that Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 71.003(a) precludes a wrongful death action where the decedent had prosecuted a personal injury action to judgment before death. The majority finds support for this construction of the statute in cases holding that a wrongful death action derives from the decedent’s cause of action. See Davenport v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 761 S.W.2d 70, 71 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ); Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 926 (Tex.1977); Thompson v. Fort Worth & R.G.Ry.Co., 97 Tex. 590, 80 S.W. 990, 991 (1904). Although case law has consistently held that a wrongful death action is derivative of the decedent’s cause of action, the statutory language upon which this judicial construction is based has changed. The present version of § 71.003(a) is a codification and amended version of Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4672, which provided:
The wrongful act, negligence, carelessness, unskillfulness or default mentioned in the preceding article must be of such character as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action for such injury.
In repealing the prior statutes and enacting the Civil Practice & Remedies Code, the legislature stated that this code was intended as a “topic-by-topic revision of the state’s general and permanent statute law without substantive change.” Tex.Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 1.001(a) (Vernon Supp. 1991). The language in art. 4672 is similar to the language in the original wrongful death statute, known as Lord Campbell’s Act, upon which most wrongful death statutes are based. See Alfone v. Sarno, 87 N.J. 99, 432 A.2d 857, 860 (1981). Section one of Lord Campbell’s Act provided:
[Whensoever the Death of a Person shall be caused by wrongful Act, Neglect or Default, and the Act, Neglect, or Default is such as would (if Death had not ensued) have entitled the Party injured to maintain an Action and recover Damages in respect thereof, then and in every *654such Case the Person who would have been liable if Death had not ensued shall be liable to an Action for Damages, notwithstanding the Death of the Person injured....
W.P. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on The Law of Torts, § 127 at 954 n. 6 (5th ed.1984) (quoting 9 & 10 Viet., Ch. 93). This language, as well as the language in art. 4672, indicates that the tortious nature of the conduct resulting in death is determinative. Agreeing with this interpretation of siich wrongful death statutes, Dean Prosser stated:
It is not at all clear, however, that such provisions of the death acts ever were intended to preVent recovery where the deceased once had a cause of action, but it has terminated before his death. The more reasonable interpretation would seem to be that they are directed at the necessity of some original tort on the part of the defendant, under circumstances giving rise to liability in the first instance, rather than to subsequent changes in the situation affecting only the interest of the decedent.
W. Prosser, The Law of Torts, § 127 at 911 (4th ed.1971). This interpretation is consistent with the remedial purpose of the Wrongful Death Act — to provide certain persons with the right to recover for the death of a family member. In applying this interpretation of § 71.003(a) to the instant case, appellants would not be barred from maintaining a wrongful death action because there was an original tort, Ohme-da’s defective design of the anesthesia machine, under circumstances giving rise to liability.
Section 71.003(a) of the Texas Practices & Remedies Code provides that the wrongful death statute is applicable “only if the individual injured would have been entitled to bring an action for the injury if he had lived.” The action to which § 71.003(a) apparently refers is the common law action for damages sustained by the injured person which, if the injury results in death, survives to the heirs, estate, or legal representative under Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 71.021 (Vernon 1986). See Landers v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 369 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Tex.1963). In bringing an action for injuries or a survival action, the plaintiff seeks compensation for the damages sustained by the injured party or the decedent as a result of the injuries. See id.
A wrongful death action, on the other hand, is a statutorily created remedy for certain beneficiaries who may not be entitled to participate in the pre-death action for damages1 or in a survival action. See Id. Furthermore, the damages recoverable in a wrongful death action are those suffered by the beneficiaries as a result of the decedent’s death. See id. Thus, the damages recoverable in a wrongful death action differ from those recoverable in an action for injuries or in a survival action, despite the observations in some Texas cases that the damages recoverable in these actions are the same. See Thompson v. Fort Worth and R.G.Ry.Co., 97 Tex. 590, 80 S.W. 990, 991-92 (1904); Blount v. Gulf, C. & S.F.Ry. Co., 82 S.W. 305, 306 (Tex.Civ.App.1904, no writ).
In asserting a wrongful death action, the statutory beneficiaries seek compensation for the damages they have suffered or will suffer as a result of the decedent’s death. This includes lost pecuniary benefits and loss of society, companionship, and affection. See Castillo v. Hidalgo County Water Dist. 1, 771 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1989, writ requested). Because the damages sought and the parties entitled to bring a wrongful death action differ from those sought in a survival action, Texas courts have held that recovery based on one cause of action does not preclude a subsequent recovery based on *655the other. See Landers, 369 S.W.2d at 36; Carriere v. State Farm Mut.Auto.Ins.Co., 581 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Tex.Civ.App. — El Paso 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916, 926 (Tex.Civ.App. — Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). I find it illogical to allow parties to assert a wrongful death action after recovery of judgment in a survival action, but not to allow assertion of a wrongful death action after recovery of judgment during the decedent’s lifetime for personal injuries.
By holding that the prior judgment bars the wrongful death action, the majority enables the decedent to extinguish the beneficiaries’ cause of action before it accrues. If Christy Súber had not brought her action for injuries prior to her death, however, she would have extinguished both her own cause of action or a survival action and the beneficiaries’ wrongful death action under the statute of limitations. A panel of this court addressed such an issue in Davenport v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 761 S.W.2d 70 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
In Davenport, the decedent learned in 1977 that he had emphysema and cardiovascular problems caused by cigarette smoking. Id. at 71. The decedent did not bring an action during his lifetime, but at his death in 1986, his beneficiaries brought a wrongful death action against a number of cigarette manufacturers, distributors, and related organizations. Id. This court held that, by 1986, the statute of limitations had run on the decedent s cause of action for injuries. Id. at 72. Reasoning that the only cause of action in a wrongful death case was “one for the injuries incurred by the deceased,” the court held that extinction of decedent’s cause of action also extinguished the wrongful death action, despite the fact that the statute of limitations for wrongful death actions states that “[t]he cause of action accrues on the death of the injured person.”2 Id. (quoting Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Oode Ann. § 16.003(a) (Vernon 1986)). See also Russell v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 795 S.W.2d 243 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ granted).
In the instant case, the injury occurred on or about April 19, 1984; however, Christy Súber remained alive, though comatose, until February 1, 1989. Under Tex. Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 16.003(a), a person must bring a cause of action for personal injury not later than two years from the date the cause of action accrues. Because the nature of the injury was discovered soon after it occurred, the two-year statute of limitations would have run well before Christy Súber died. Thus, where individuals are injured but do not die from these injuries within two years, the holding in Davenport requires prompt institution of a person injury suit or both the action for injuries and a wrongful death action will be time barred. If, however, the decedent does prosecute an action for injuries to judgment prior to death, thereby avoid*656ing any limitations problem, the statutory beneficiaries remain unable to assert a cause of action for their damages under the majority’s interpretation of § 71.003(a).
The inequitable result of the majority’s construction is that the statutory beneficiaries, under circumstances such as those in the instant case, have no remedy for the damages they have suffered. The majority apparently does not find this a harsh result because the decedent recovered a substantial amount of damages prior to her death. The Supreme Court addressed this double recovery argument in Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 94 S.Ct. 806, 39 L.Ed.2d 9 (1974).
In Sea-Land, the decedent had recovered damages for loss of past and future wages, medical expenses, and pain and suffering. Id. at 591, 94 S.Ct. at 818. In determining that this prior recovery did not duplicate the damages recoverable in a wrongful death action, the court reasoned:
Obviously, the decedent’s recovery did not include damages for the dependent’s loss of services or of society, and funeral expenses. Indeed, these losses — unique to the decedent’s dependents — could not accrue until the decedent’s death. Thus, recovery of damages in the maritime wrongful-death action will not subject Sea-Land to double liability or provide the dependents with a windfall.
Id. at 591-92, 94 S.Ct. at 818. Cognizant of the apparent overlap between the decedent’s recovery for loss of future wages and the dependent’s claim for loss of support, the Court observed that collateral estoppel would preclude the relitigation of the issue of support which derives, at least in part from the decedent’s future wages. Id. at 592, 94 S.Ct. at 818.
In construing a statute similar to that in Texas, the Supreme Court of New Jersey also addressed the question whether to allow a wrongful death action despite a prior recovery of damages and considered the argument that to do so would result in duplication of damages. See Alfone v. Sarno, 87 N.J. 99, 432 A.2d 857 (1981). The Alfone court observed that courts in other jurisdictions “have allowed this problem so to confound the statutory rights of wrongful death beneficiaries as to wipe them out completely.” 432 A.2d at 866. Rather than denying a remedy to the statutory beneficiaries, the Alfone court held that, although a prior recovery of damages would not preclude a wrongful death action, collateral estoppel would preclude re-litigation of issues of liability and certain types of damages. Id. at 867-69.
I find the reasoning in Alfone persuasive. Because the parties in the instant wrongful death action seek damages that were not recoverable in the prior personal injury suit, the prior judgment should not bar a subsequent wrongful death action. This does not mean that a wrongful death action is independent in all respects from a prior personal injury action. Although a wrongful death action involves different parties and different interests, the right to bring a wrongful death action derives from the tortious act that caused the injury and, eventually, the death. Because appellees have already litigated the issue of liability for the injuries caused to the decedent, collateral estoppel should bar relitigation of this issue. See Bonniwell v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 663 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex.1984).
To invoke the doctrine of collateral estop-pel, a party must establish:
(1) the facts sought to be litigated in the second action were fully and fairly litigated in the prior action; (2) those facts were essential to the judgment in the first action; and (3) the parties were cast as adversaries in the first action.
Id. at 820-21 (footnote omitted). In the prior personal injury action, decedent and her husband actually litigated the issue of liability with respect to all appellees. Following presentation of plaintiffs’ evidence, the trial judge granted the motions for directed verdict of the hospital defendants on the ground that plaintiffs had raised no fact issues as to these parties. The jury found Ohmeda negligent and assessed more than $6 million in damages. Thus, the issue of liability for the decedent’s injury that ultimately resulted in her death was fully litigated as to all appellees. Although *657decedent’s minor children and mother were not parties to this prior suit, the interests of the decedent and her husband, under the circumstances, adequately represented the same legal right. Consequently, collateral estoppel should operate to bar relitigation of the issue of liability as to all appellees.
Because a wrongful death action involves different types of damages than those sought in a personal injury action, collateral estoppel should be inapplicable to elements of damages not recoverable in the prior personal injury action. See Sea-Land, 414 U.S. at 591-92, 94 S.Ct. at 818; Alfone, 432 A.2d at 867-69. In the prior personal injury suit involved in the instant case, the decedent recovered damages for past and future medical expenses, past and future mental and physical impairment, and loss of decedent’s future earning capacity. The decedent’s husband recovered damages for past and future loss of consortium and past and future loss of decedent’s services. The damages recoverable in a wrongful death action are damages for mental anguish, loss of society and companionship, pecuniary loss or loss of support, and loss of inheritance. See Moore v. Lillebo, 722 S.W.2d 683, 686-88 (Tex.1986). Because the decedent’s husband already recovered damages for loss of consortium and services, collateral estoppel should bar relitigation of the husband’s damages for loss of consortium and services. Furthermore, the decedent’s recovery for loss of future earning capacity effectively constitutes the pecuniary loss, or loss of economic support, for which the beneficiaries in a wrongful death action may seek recovery. Thus, collateral estoppel should also bar relitigation of damages for lost pecuniary benefits. The only damages that appellants could seek in the instant wrongful death action, that were not recoverable in the prior action, are those for mental anguish suffered by appellants as a result of the death, the loss of society and companionship suffered by the beneficiaries other than the husband, and the funeral expenses.
Subject to the limitations imposed under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, I would reverse the summary judgment and remand the cause for trial.
SEARS, J., joins in this dissent.

. At the time of filing of the Suber’s personal injury suit, children could not recover damages in such a suit for loss of companionship, love, and society; however, the Texas Supreme Court has recently ruled that a “serious, permanent and disabling injury to a parent” also injures the parent-child relationship, a relationship worthy of judicial recognition. Reagan v. Vaughn, 804 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Dec. 19, 1990), clarified on reh'g, 804 S.W.2d at 467 (March 6, 1991). Thus, children may now join in a personal injury suit and seek damages for loss of parental consortium. Id.

. Although the statutes of limitations governing wrongful death actions in different jurisdictions vary in phraseology, the general rule is that the cause of action accrues at death. See St. Francis Hosp., Inc. v. Thompson, 159 Fla. 453, 31 So.2d 710, 711 (1947); Annotation, Time from which Statute of Limitations Begins to Run Against Cause of Action for Wrongful Death, 97 A.L.R.2d 1151, 1154 (1964). In construing the Indiana statute which required wrongful death actions to commence within two years of death, the Supreme Court reasoned:
To say, therefore, that, where the person injured dies one year and two days after being injured, no action can be maintained by the personal representative, is to go in the face of the statute, which makes no distinction between cases where death occurs within less than a year and a day from the injury and where it does not occur until after the expiration of one year and a day ... Was the death, in fact, caused by the wrongful act or omission of the defendant? That is the vital inquiry in each case. The statute imposes no other condition upon the right to sue. The court has no authority to impose an additional or different one.
Louisville, E. & St. L.R. Co. v. Clarke, 152 U.S. 230, 238-39, 14 S.Ct. 579, 580-81, 38 L.Ed. 422 (1894). Because the Texas statute of limitations for wrongful death actions expressly states that the cause of action accrues at death, I question this court’s authority to impose the additional requirement, not contained in the statute, that the statute of limitations must not have run on the decedent's right to sue for the injuries that ultimately resulted in death. Contra Russell v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 795 S.W.2d 243 (Tex.App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ granted).