Court Opinion

ID: 9752769
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:33:57.841417+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:22.111380
License: Public Domain

Allen, C.J.,
concurring in the result. I do not agree with the majority’s assertion that the unanimity of authority and its reasoning since Press-Enterprise II was decided should be persuasive on the issue of the correct standard for sealing or closure. The reasoning in the first case cited in support of this proposition, In re State-Record Co., 917 F.2d 124, 128 (4th Cir. 1990), simply consists of the statement that the issue had been resolved in an earlier Fourth Circuit case. State-Record Co. also inexplicably1 stated that the standard for the issuance of orders prohibiting potential witnesses, parties and attorneys from discussing a pending case with the media required a showing of no more than a reasonable likelihood of prejudice for their issuance. No suggestion is given as to why the standard for the issuance of a “gag” order should differ from the issuance of a closure order. The case upon which In re State-Record Co. relies is In re Charlotte Observer, 882 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1989). The “reasoning” in that case was a statement that the presumption of openness may be overcome by finding that there is a substantial probability that defendant’s right to a fair trial will be prejudiced, citing Press-Enterprise II. Oregonian Publishing Co. v. United States District Court, 920 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1990), is likewise poor authority for the proposition for which it is cited. There, the district judge, at the defendant’s request, sealed a plea agreement, concluding that the safety of the de*355fendant and his family would be placed in jeopardy if its contents were disclosed. While the opinion states that the Press-Enterprise II requirements must be met before documents may be closed to the public, the sealing had nothing to do with the defendant’s right to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment. The holding in Russell v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 570 So. 2d 979 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990), suffers from the same infirmity. The issue there was the relevant inquiry for a court in determining whether a prior order expunging court records should be vacated. The court concluded that the Press-Enterprise II standards should be followed, but again the defendant’s right to a fair trial was not at issue. 570 So. 2d at 983. State ex rel. The Repository v. Unger, 28 Ohio St. 3d 418, 504 N.E.2d 37 (1986), cited for the proposition “that closure ... to the public can be done only where the Press-Enterprise II standard has been met,” simply does not say this. This leaves Associated Press v. Bell, 70 N.Y.2d 32, 39, 510 N.E.2d 313, 317, 517 N.Y.S.2d 444, 448 (1986), where the Court of Appeals of New York did state that the defendant must demonstrate a substantial probability of prejudice on the authority of Press-Enterprise II.
The Supreme Court of Utah has adhered to the lesser standard for closure. In Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Lewis, 685 P.2d 515, 524 (Utah 1984), the court extended the openness of trials to preliminary hearings, but held that preliminary hearings in criminal cases may be closed when openness presents “a realistic likelihood of prejudice” to a defendant’s right to a fair trial. The preliminary hearings in this state are used to determine if there is “probable cause to believe that the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant committed it.” Id. at 520. In Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1177 (Utah 1987), the court continued to follow this standard when it extended it to pretrial competency proceedings in criminal cases. “There is no apparent reason to distinguish between the factors relevant to closure of a preliminary hearing and closure of a competency proceeding; therefore, we conclude that the steps to be followed by a trial court in either instance are [those] set forth in Kearns-Tribune.” Id. at 1178.
The only other court which has expressly addressed the issue dividing this Court is the Superior Court of New Jersey, which *356stated that the right to an open trial prevails unless a defendant can “demonstrate that there is a realistic likelihood that his right to an impartial jury will be threatened from adverse publicity.” State v. Halsey, 218 N.J. Super. 149, 154, 526 A.2d 1165, 1167 (1987). It then observed that this test might arguably be no longer viable under Press-Enterprise II. Id.
It might be said that we are quarreling over semantics. I believe otherwise. The prejudice that may result from disclosure of matters that are ultimately suppressed is well set forth in Westchester Rockland Newspapers v. Leggett, 48 N.Y.2d 430, 439, 399 N.E.2d 518, 523, 423 N.Y.S.2d 630, 635 (1979):
If these hearings were open to the public and the press in a well-publicized case, it is most likely that the substance of the evidence would be disclosed to the community from which the jurors would be drawn, even though the court may ultimately rule that the evidence should not be submitted to the jury at trial. This would not only destroy the purpose for which the hearing was held, but would, perversely, have the very opposite effect of that intended and desired. Instead of shielding the jurors from evidence they should not hear, the public airing at the pretrial suppression hearing would serve to broadcast the evidence to most, if not all potential jurors.
I find nothing in the cases cited in the majority opinion that persuade me to abandon the position I took in Tallman. The holding in Press-Enterprise II can be read, and should be read, to be limited to preliminary hearings as they are conducted in California. The danger from the stricter standard was well expressed by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 399-400 (1979), where, in response to the suggestion in Justice Blackmun’s opinion advocating the substantial probability requirement, he stated:
It is difficult to imagine a case where closure could be ordered appropriately under this standard. A rule of such apparent inflexibility could prejudice defendant’s rights and disserve society’s interest in the fair and prompt disposition of criminal trials. As a result of pretrial publicity, defendants could be convicted after less than the meticulously fair trial that the Constitution demands. . . . The question *357for the trial court, therefore, in considering a motion to close a pretrial suppression hearing is whether a fair trial for the defendant is likely to be jeopardized by publicity, if members of the press and public are present and free to report prejudicial evidence that will not be presented to the jury.
In Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984), the United States Supreme Court clearly stated that the party seeking closure of a suppression hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced. Press-Enterprise II did not expressly overrule Waller and, until it does so, this Court should adhere to a standard that recognizes the existence of the right to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment.2 The standard for closure adopted by the majority imposes too severe a burden on a defendant seeking closure. It is difficult to conceive of a fact pattern-where sealing or closure could ever be granted under the substantial probability standard.
I concur in the result because I do not believe that the trial court adequately explored the alternatives to closure in this case. But I also believe that the majority opinion overstates the effectiveness of the alternatives. Vermont is a small state with a small population. Major crimes are covered in all parts of the state by a relatively small number of newspapers, radio and television stations. The damage to the fair trial right can be devastating where the entire populace is exposed to the contents of a confession or evidence later suppressed. I do not believe, as the majority seems to suggest, that change of venue or effective voir dire can eliminate the potential for prejudice in every case. Change of venue suffers from the drawbacks set forth in Herald Ass’n v. Ellison, 138 Vt. 529, 534, 419 A.2d 323, 326 (1980).3 The majority’s suggestion that skillful cross-exam*358ination can always expose the juror who is not candid seems to contradict the observation by the author of the opinion in In re Nash, 158 Vt. —, — 614 A.2d 367, 375 (1991), Dooley, J., dissenting (“No amount of questioning of the juror alone would have shown the true facts.”).
The effectiveness of voir dire as a curative device for adverse publicity has been further undermined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mu’Min v. Virginia, — U.S. —, 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991), where the Court concluded that neither the Sixth nor Fourteenth Amendments require interrogation of a prospective juror with respect to what a juror has read or heard about the case. Content questions are not required. All that seems to be required is the acknowledgment by the juror that information has been acquired and the promise that the information would not affect the juror’s impartiality. In this case there would be no constitutional prohibition against allowing a juror to sit who had knowledge of the admissions and previous convictions, as long as the promise was made to keep an open mind and wait until the entire case was presented before reaching a final opinion. The assurance offered by such a promise is dampened by the observation in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961): “No doubt each juror was sincere when he said that he would be fair and impartial to petitioner, but the psychological impact requiring such a declaration before one’s fellows is often its father.”
Our responsibility is to assure the public’s First Amendment right of access while protecting the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. We do not carry out this responsibility by abrogating one right in favor of the other. The imposition of the substantial probability of prejudice standard seriously erodes the fair trial right.

 I say inexplicably because these orders, characterized as “gag” orders by the media, are often classic examples of prior restraint and are deemed to be “one of the most extraordinary remedies known to our jurisprudence.” Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976).

 Justice Stevens in his dissent concludes that Press-Enterprise II does reverse earlier holdings that a “reasonable probability of prejudice” is enough , to overcome the First Amendment right of access to a preliminary proeeeding. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 17 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

 “Change of venue, for example, is frequently referred to as a ready expedient for avoiding prejudicial publicity problems. However, it is a remedy which should not lightly be resorted to. Quite apart from the added expense *358tó the state and the taxpayers, and the burden and inconvenience to trial participants which it causes, a venue change erodes, at least in spirit, the defendant’s right to trial ‘by an impartial jury of the country.’ Vt. Const, ch. I, art. 10. That provision is some recognition of a common law right to be tried locally, and has legislative implementation in our venue statutes.” (Citations omitted.)