Court Opinion

ID: 9474298
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:53:27.04924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:00.709475
License: Public Domain

ROSS, Circuit Judge,
with whom
FAGG and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting.
I dissent in part. I cannot agree with the majority’s holding that proof that race was a "discernible factor” is sufficient in a mixed-motive context to establish intentional discrimination and liability under Title VII1. I adhere to the position that when the evidence suggests mixed-motives the plaintiff must prove that race was a “motivating factor” before he or she can prevail at the liability stage. See Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292, 1297 n. 7 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 979, 101 S.Ct. 1513, 67 L.Ed.2d 814 (1981). Retention of this standard is warranted by the language of the statute, the case law and by practical considerations.
Title VII prohibits employment practices that discriminate against any individual “because of” such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Section 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982), makes ■it unlawful for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(Emphasis added.) The “because of” language is crucial to employment discrimination suits brought under the statute and any adverse employment decision that is not arrived at “because of” one of the protected criteria is not unlawful under the statute. The majority, quite simply, ignores these operative words of the statute.
The “because of” requirement of the statute is not satisfied by the majority’s “discernible factor” test2. While it is clear from the legislative history,3 that the “because of” language does not require that a *1331plaintiff, such as Bibbs, prove that race is the sole factor in the employment decision, at a minimum, it means that a plaintiff must prove some causal relationship between race and the employment decision. The “discernible factor” test is deficient because it contains no causal requirement. Title VII is not violated simply because an impermissible factor plays some minor part in the employer’s decision. See Whiting v. Jackson State University, 616 F.2d 116, 121 (5th Cir.1980). The Supreme Court has noted that to establish a violation of Title VII a plaintiff need only show that race was a “but for” cause. McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n. 10, 96 S.Ct. 2574, 2580 n. 10, 49 L.Ed.2d 493 (1976)
I object to the majority’s “discernible factor” test for the additional reason that it dilutes the requirement that every Title VII plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination. In every employment discrimination case brought pursuant to Title VII, the theory of disparate treatment requires the aggrieved employee to prove that the employer acted with a discriminatory intent based on an impermissible factor. The ultimate factual inquiry in a Title VII case is whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 1482, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983). The Title VII plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff and that the plaintiff has been the victim of intentional discrimination. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-56, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093-95, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). The presence of an illegal factor in the employment process, without more, does not in my opinion constitute intentional discrimination. The racial or discriminatory factor must be acted upon; it must be a basis for the employment decision, and not just perceived. As the Supreme Court has said, the plaintiff must demonstrate by competent evidence that whatever the stated reasons for his rejection, “the decision was in reality racially premised.” McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 n. 18, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1825 n. 18, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (emphasis added).
Because of the intentional discrimination requirement, the unlawful factor must be more than a “discernible factor”; it must be a “motivating factor”. Proof of illegal motivation is critical to Title VII disparate treatment cases, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1854 n. 15, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977), and a plaintiff can meet his or her burden of proof “by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer * * *.” Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095. Thus, a violation of Title VII is established when the plaintiff proves that the unlawful factor operated as a “motivating factor” in the employment process or decision4. By “motivating factor” is meant that the discriminatory purpose was acted upon and produced conduct or an employment decision affected by it.
This court applied a “motivating factor” approach prior to Burdine, supra. In Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 979, 101 S.Ct. 1513, 67 L.Ed.2d 814 (1981), this court noted:
In cases challenging adverse employment actions as racially discriminatory under section 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), we have held the court must look for the “motivating factor” when the evidence suggests mixed motives. See, e.g., Marshall v. Kirkland, 602 F.2d 1282 (8th Cir.1979); Clark v. Mann, 562 F.2d 1104, 1116-17 (8th Cir.1977) (42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. * * *
Id. at 1297 n. 7. Continued adherence to a “motivating factor” test is consistent with *1332the language of the statute and current Supreme Court caselaw and I see no justification for reducing a Title VII plaintiff’s burden to that of proving only that race was a “discernible factor.” 5
In addition to the legal considerations, I have concerns about the practical ramifications of the majority’s holding that proof that race was a “discernible factor” is sufficient to establish liability in a Title VII mixed-motive case. First, the majority failed to define what it means by “discernible” and this omission will result in confusion for the district courts. Secondly, this holding is an open invitation to attorneys to file frivolous or extremely marginal cases so that they can get attorneys’ fees for showing that an unlawful factor was “discernible.”
It is for all of the above reasons that I cannot join the majority’s adoption of a “discernible factor” test for Title VII mixed-motive cases. As for the disposition of the instant case, I would affirm the judgment of the district court6 and dismiss Bibbs’ complaint because he failed to establish that race was a “motivating factor” in his nonselection for promotion.
A true copy.

. Since the majority’s holding reverses the judgment of the district court on the issue of liability, the issue of liability is before the court en banc, notwithstanding Chief Judge Lay’s suggestion to the contrary. In his concurring opinion, Chief Judge Lay implies that the issue of liability is not before the court en banc because "the government did not dispute the finding of liability in the panel opinion and moved only to have this court adopt the 'same decision’ test for determining a remedy on remand.” Ante at 1325. I take exception to this suggestion for a number of reasons. First, “the finding of liability in the panel opinion” has been vacated. As Judge Arnold points out, ”[w]e granted the petition for rehearing en banc, thus automatically vacating the panel opinion.” Ante at 1319. Second, although the government chose to focus on the "same decision” test when arguing to this court en banc, in its petition for rehearing en banc it posed no less than four "questions of exceptional importance” relating to "a new dramatically reduced burden of proof” on the issue of liability. Third, the order granting the petition for rehearing en banc in this case did not limit the scope of the en banc proceedings to the remedy issue alone. The power over en banc proceedings resides with the court and not with the litigants. See FED.R.APP.P. 35; Western Pacific Ry. Corp. v. Western Pacific Ry. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 73 S.Ct. 656, 97 L.Ed. 986 (1953). Lastly, the holding of the majority is more than just a decision on the remedy issue. It is a reversal of the judgment of the district court on the issue of liability and the dissent is not foreclosed from expressing its disagreement with the rationale of that result.

. The majority clearly establishes a new test. Judge Arnold writes, "we now hold that plaintiff, having shown that race was a discernible factor at the time of the decision not to promote him, has established a violation of Title VIL” Ante at 1319-20.

. The Senate and the House both rejected an amendment which would have added the word solely to subsection (a) of section 2000e-2. 110 CONG.REC. 13,838 (1964); 110 CONG.REC. 2728 (1964).

. The relevant inquiry is causation, not quantification.

. Even the author relied upon by the majority, Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 Colum.L.Rev. 292 (1982), takes the position that a plaintiff who establishes that a prohibited criterion was a motivating factor in the challenged decision thereby establishes a violation of the Act and thus the defendant’s liability. Id. at 323 (emphasis added).

. I agree with the majority’s assessment that the district court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous, ante at 1321.