Court Opinion

ID: 9931661
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 17:01:05.866759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:16.476522
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-14287    Document: 39-1      Date Filed: 02/09/2024   Page: 1 of 14

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-14287
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        MORGAN LAMAR MCCANTS,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Alabama
                   D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-00117-TFM-MU-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                  22-14287

        Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Morgan Lamar McCants appeals his 84-month, above
        guideline range sentence, which the district court imposed after he
        pleaded guilty to one count of possessing a firearm as a felon, in
        violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In support, he raises two points.
        First, he argues that the district court erred in applying a four-level
        enhancement for using or possessing a firearm in connection with
        another felony. Second, he argues that his sentence is substantively
        unreasonable. After careful review, we affirm.
                                  I.     Background
               In June 2022, McCants was charged with being a felon in
        possession of a firearm (Count One), and being a felon in
        possession of ammunition (Count Two), both in violation of 18
        U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). McCants pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written
        plea agreement, to Count 1 in exchange for dismissing Count 2.
               McCants’s presentence investigation report (“PSI”)
        described his offense conduct as follows. In August 2021, the
        Mobile Police Department (“MPD”) responded to a gas station
        shooting between two individuals. McCants was one of the
        individuals involved in the shooting. Officers were shown a
        surveillance video, which revealed that McCants had fired shots
        with a small pistol at Quince Ervin, who returned fire with a
        shotgun. McCants was not on scene when the officers arrived, but
        the officers recovered four shell casings from the scene.
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        22-14287               Opinion of the Court                        3

               Later that month, MPD detectives located McCants while
        on patrol. McCants had a backpack containing a 9mm pistol, which
        MPD linked to three of the four shell casings they had recovered
        from the scene of the gas station shooting. Because McCants was
        previously convicted of a felony, he was indicted for being a felon
        in possession of a firearm and possession of ammunition.
               McCants was assigned a base offense level of 14. Four points
        were added pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) because McCants
        “used or possessed the firearm in connection with another felony
        offense”—the gas station shooting. Three points were subtracted
        related to McCants’s acceptance of responsibility. The resulting
        total offense level was 15. McCants was also assigned a criminal
        history score of 15, which put him in a criminal history category of
        VI. With a total offense level of 15, and a criminal history category
        of VI, McCants’s guideline range was 41–51 months’
        imprisonment. The statutory maximum term of imprisonment
        was 120 months’ imprisonment.
               Prior to sentencing, McCants objected to the four-level
        enhancement for possessing a firearm in connection with another
        felony. Specifically, McCants contended that, contrary to the
        description of events in the PSI, he “was not the aggressor in the
        [gas station shooting] incident and did not commit a felony.”
               At sentencing, the government responded to McCants’s
        objection by calling Special Agent Nick Murphy as a witness.
        Murphy had reviewed the surveillance video of the shooting and
        described it to the court as follows. McCants approached a black
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-14287

        vehicle surrounded by several individuals at a busy gas station.
        One of the individuals was Ervin, with whom McCants was
        apparently in a dispute. As McCants approached Ervin, Ervin
        exited the black vehicle and went around the back of the vehicle.
        At that point, McCants produced a pistol. He then started to
        retreat after seeing Ervin produce a shotgun. While muzzle flashes
        could not be seen in the video, three pistol casings and one shotgun
        casing were found on the scene, suggesting that McCants fired
        three times and Ervin fired once. McCants also appeared to shoot
        at Ervin while Ervin was driving away. On cross-examination,
        Murphy admitted that he did not know the details of the dispute
        between Ervin and McCants.
             The government then argued that this incident showed that
        McCants committed a felony—attempted assault or attempted
        murder—and thus the four-level enhancement was appropriate.
                McCants then called Metissa Ann Lewis Leach to the stand,
        the mother of McCants’s girlfriend. Leach described a previous
        fight between Ervin and McCants that she had to break up, in
        which Ervin pulled a shotgun on McCants. Ervin had later fired a
        shotgun at the home that McCants, his girlfriend, and Leach were
        living in at the time. After this, Ervin and his brother began stalking
        McCants and his girlfriend, resulting in several incidents that were
        reported to the police.
               McCants then testified on his own behalf. He said that he
        was friends with Ervin until they got into an argument. The day
        after the argument, Ervin saw McCants and his girlfriend and
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        22-14287               Opinion of the Court                         5

        pointed a shotgun at McCants. When McCants’s girlfriend stood
        between the two men, Ervin yelled “[m]ove out of the way . . . so
        I can shoot him.” The next day, Ervin drove by McCants and was
        yelling at McCants. Ervin then stopped “like four houses down”
        and was “fixing to run to the house to get [a] gun.” So McCants
        ran after him and tackled him, and a fight ensued. Later that day,
        Ervin shot a gun at the house McCants was staying at with his
        girlfriend.
               McCants then described other incidents with Ervin. During
        one, Ervin and his brother had driven down McCants’s street
        playing loud music and hanging out of the windows with pistols.
        During another incident, McCants and his girlfriend were
        returning from the store, when Ervin drove up, chambered a
        round, and said “I’ve got you now.” McCants then ran off.
        McCants testified that Ervin’s actions were “ongoing,” because
        every time he would return home, he would find shell casings in
        the yard from someone shooting towards the house. One time, he
        and his girlfriend had been in their home when someone had tried
        to pull the air-conditioner unit out of their window to get into their
        house.
               Addressing the incident at the gas station, McCants testified
        that he had been hanging out at the gas station with his girlfriend
        and others when he noticed Ervin’s car. McCants’s girlfriend
        approached Ervin’s car, trying to preemptively deescalate things.
        McCants did not have a firearm on him at this time, but a person
        at the gas station gave him a pistol, telling him to hold onto it “in
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                22-14287

        case you feel anything go wrong.” McCants had then “calm[ly]”
        walked towards the vehicle without drawing the pistol. But when
        he saw Ervin dive towards the vehicle, he knew that Ervin was
        retrieving the shotgun. When Ervin pulled out the shotgun,
        McCants brandished the pistol and took cover because he knew
        that Ervin would shoot. McCants’s girlfriend tried to calm things
        down, asking why they did not “kill the little beef,” but Ervin had
        gotten “loud and feisty” with her by responding that the “only way
        I kill it is if I kill him.” That made McCants step out from cover to
        see what was happening, as he thought Ervin was “getting feisty”
        with his girlfriend. Ervin then took out the shotgun and fired at
        McCants. McCants testified that he thought his girlfriend was in
        trouble, and that he only had the pistol to defend himself.
               Finally, McCants described an incident between him and
        Ervin that occurred after the gas station incident. Ervin
        approached McCants while McCants was parked at a gas station
        and started shooting at McCants. McCants was shot in the arm.
               McCants’s girlfriend also testified, confirming McCants’s
        version of events. She testified that, while she was talking with
        Ervin, he had not been violent with her, but was “high style
        verbally.” She also testified that, when McCants approached them,
        he did not have a weapon in hand, but instead was smoking a
        cigarette.
              McCants then argued that the court should remove the four-
        point enhancement because McCants was acting in self-defense,
        and that the court should sentence him to the low end of the
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        22-14287               Opinion of the Court                        7

        guideline range. The government argued that McCants’s actions
        satisfied the elements of attempted assault and attempted murder
        under Alabama law, and so the four-level enhancement was
        appropriate.
                The court overruled McCants’s objection and adopted the
        PSI. It then sentenced McCants to 84 months’ incarceration. The
        court found that the “guidelines range [wa]s inappropriate to the
        facts and circumstances of th[is] case and would not provide a
        reasonable sentence.” The court noted that, rather than leave
        when he noticed Ervin’s car, McCants “decided to stay and he
        decided to escalate it.” The court said that this was not the “wild
        west,” and found that McCants had initiated the incident at the gas
        station when he “approached the vehicle,” at which point Ervin
        shot back at him. The court also noted that McCants was a felon
        and “particularly the person this law [was] designed at getting after
        their conduct.” The district court then stated, “[t]he guidelines are
        advisory, and I decline to apply them. If I applied them, I would
        still impose the same sentence.” The court found that the sentence
        addressed “the seriousness of the offense and the sentencing
        objectives of punishment, deterrence, and incapacitation.”
              McCants objected, without success, to the court sentencing
        him above the guideline range. The court noted that it was “giving
        him an 84-month sentence instead of a 120-month sentence”
        because he pleaded guilty. But the court pointed out that it was
        “surprised that in the heat of this gun fight, that there were not
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 22-14287

        other [innocent] people . . . who were . . . hurt or killed.” McCants
        appealed.
                                   II.    Discussion
               McCants makes two arguments on appeal. First, he argues
        that the district court erred in applying a four-level enhancement
        for using or possessing a firearm in connection with another felony,
        pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Second, he argues that his
        sentence is substantively unreasonable. After careful review, we
        affirm on both issues.
        A. Whether the district court clearly erred in applying a four-level
        enhancement for using a firearm in connection with another felony.
               McCants argues that the district court clearly erred in
        applying a four-level enhancement for using or possessing a firearm
        in connection with another felony. He contends that he was not
        the initial aggressor in the encounter with Ervin, so he did not
        commit attempted assault. We disagree.
               When appropriate, we will review a district court’s legal
        interpretations de novo, and its factual findings for clear error.
        United States v. Rothenberg, 610 F.3d 621, 624 (11th Cir. 2010). When
        “a defendant objects to a fact contained in the PSI, the government
        bears the burden of proving that disputed fact by a preponderance
        of the evidence.” United States v. Martinez, 584 F.3d 1022, 1027 (11th
        Cir. 2009).
              The Guidelines provide for a four-level enhancement when
        a defendant used or possessed a firearm “in connection with
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        22-14287               Opinion of the Court                         9

        another felony offense[.]” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). The
        Guidelines commentary defines “another felony offense” as “any
        federal, state, or local offense, other than the . . . firearms
        possession . . . offense, punishable by imprisonment for a term
        exceeding one year, regardless of whether a criminal charge was
        brought, or a conviction obtained.” Id. § 2K2.1, comment.
        (n.14(C)).
               In Alabama, a person commits assault in the first degree if,
        “[w]ith intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he
        or she causes serious physical injury to any person by means of a
        deadly weapon,” or if “[u]nder circumstances manifesting extreme
        indifference to the value of human life, he or she recklessly engages
        in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person,
        and thereby causes serious physical injury to any person[.]” Ala.
        Code § 13A-6-20(a). A firearm is considered a deadly weapon under
        Alabama law. Id. § 13A-1-2(7). Assault in the first degree is a Class
        B felony. Id. § 13A-6-20(b). Under Alabama law, a “person is guilty
        of an attempt to commit a crime if, with the intent to commit a
        specific offense, he or she does any overt act towards the
        commission of the offense.” Id. § 13A-4-2. Attempt is a Class C
        felony if the offense attempted is a Class B felony. Id.
               The district court did not clearly err in applying a four-level
        enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). The testimony at sentencing
        reflected that McCants: witnessed Ervin arrive at the gas station;
        accepted a firearm from a person on the scene; approached Ervin,
        who was speaking non-violently with McCants’s girlfriend;
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        10                         Opinion of the Court                       22-14287

        initiated an encounter during which he fired at least three shots at
        a crowded gas station; and appeared to shoot at Ervin as Ervin
        drove away. The district court could have reasonably concluded
        that this conduct not only demonstrated an intent to cause serious
        physical injury to Ervin with a deadly weapon, but also
        demonstrated reckless conduct that created a grave risk of death to
        those nearby. Thus, the district court could have reasonably
        concluded that the government established by a preponderance of
        the evidence that McCants’s conduct satisfied the elements of
        attempted assault in the first degree under Alabama law, a Class C
        felony punishable by imprisonment for “not more than 10 years or
        less than one year and one day.” 1 Ala. Code §§ 13A-1-2; 13A-4-2;
        13A-6-20(a); 13A-5-6(a)(3); 13A-6-20(a), (b). Accordingly, the
        district court did not clearly err in determining, by a preponderance
        of the evidence, that McCants used or possessed a firearm “in
        connection with another felony offense.”                      U.S.S.G.
                          2
        § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).

        1 McCants argues for the first time on appeal that the district court’s statement

        that McCants should have retreated “runs contrary to Alabama’s Stand Your
        Ground Law, which abrogates the requirement to flee from ‘any place where
        [a person] has the right to be.’” However, the Alabama Stand Your Ground
        law does not apply when the person claiming self-defense was the initial
        aggressor. Ala. Code § 13A-3-23(c)(2). And based on the video evidence and
        testimony, the district court did not clearly err in determining, by a
        preponderance of the evidence, that McCants was the initial aggressor.
        2 Aside from arguing that the district court did not clearly err in applying the

        four-point enhancement, the government makes two other arguments. First,
        the government argues that McCants’s plea agreement contained an appeal
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        22-14287                 Opinion of the Court                             11

        B. Whether McCants’s sentence is substantively unreasonable.
               McCants argues that his above-guideline sentence of 84
        months’ imprisonment is substantively unreasonable. We
        disagree.
                We review the substantive reasonableness of sentencing
        decisions under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall
        v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The party challenging the
        sentence bears the burden of showing that the sentence is
        unreasonable in light of the record, the factors listed in § 3553(a),
        and “the substantial deference afforded sentencing courts.” United
        States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015).
                Under this standard, we may affirm a sentence even though
        we would have imposed a different sentence had we been in the
        district court’s position. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189
        (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). A district court abuses its discretion at
        sentencing “when it (1) fails to afford consideration to relevant
        factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight
        to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of
        judgment in considering the proper factors.” Id.

        waiver which prevents him from challenging the four-level enhancement on
        appeal, notwithstanding the waiver’s exception that permits McCants to
        appeal any sentence in excess of the guidelines range. Second, the government
        argues that any sentencing error was harmless because the district court said
        it would have applied the same sentence regardless of the guidelines. Because
        we determine there was no sentencing error, we need not reach either
        argument.
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                 22-14287

               We will vacate a district court’s sentence “only if we are left
        with the ‘definite and firm’ conviction that the district court
        committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a)
        factors by arriving at a sentence that is outside the range of
        reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States
        v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213, 1222 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Irey, 612
        F.3d at 1190). “A district court has considerable discretion in
        deciding whether the § 3553(a) factors justify a variance and the
        extent of one that is appropriate.” United States v. Oudomsine, 57
        F.4th 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2023) (quotations omitted). Further, we
        “do not presume that a sentence outside the guidelines range is
        unreasonable and . . . must give due deference to the district court’s
        decision that the § 3553(a) factors support its chosen sentence.” Id.
        at 1267.
               The “overarching” instruction to sentencing courts in
        18 U.S.C. § 3553 is that any sentence, whether within the guideline
        range or a variance, must be sufficient but not greater than
        necessary to comply with the purposes listed in § 3553(a)(2).
        Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007); 18 U.S.C.
        § 3553(a). The proper factors as stated in § 3553(a) include the
        nature and circumstances of the offense, the personal history and
        characteristics of the defendant, the seriousness of the crime, the
        promotion of respect for the law, just punishment, and adequate
        deterrence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(2). The court must also
        consider the applicable guidelines range, any pertinent policy
        statements from the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid
        unwarranted sentencing disparities between similarly situated
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        22-14287               Opinion of the Court                         13

        defendants, and the need to provide restitution to any of the
        defendant’s victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7).
                We have “previously stated that a district court can rely on
        factors in imposing a variance that it had already considered in
        imposing a guideline enhancement.” United States v. Overstreet,
        713 F.3d 627, 639 (11th Cir. 2013) (alterations adopted) (quotations
        omitted). The district court also does not have to give all the
        factors equal weight and is given discretion to attach great weight
        to one factor over another. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254.
        Instead, the weight due each § 3553(a) factor lies within the district
        court’s sound discretion, and we will not substitute our judgment
        for that of the district court. United States v. Joseph, 978 F.3d 1251,
        1266 (11th Cir. 2020). However, we have cautioned that “[u]pward
        variances are meant to apply only after ‘serious consideration’ by
        the sentencing court, and only then when accompanied by a
        ‘sufficiently compelling’ justification.” United States v. Brown, 879
        F.3d 1231, 1240–41 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 46,
        50).
                The district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing
        McCants to an above-guidelines 84 months’ imprisonment, as the
        specific facts of this case warranted a more serious sentence. As the
        district court recounted, McCants, while armed with a firearm,
        initiated a confrontation with Ervin, whom he knew had a
        propensity towards firearm violence, while in a busy public place
        of business. He then further endangered the public by engaging in
        a shootout with Ervin. Thus, the district court determined that the
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        14                    Opinion of the Court                22-14287

        sentence appropriately “addresse[d] the seriousness of the offense
        and the sentencing objectives of punishment, deterrence, and
        incapacitation.” While McCants provided some potentially
        mitigating information related to the prior actions of Ervin, the
        weighing of these factors was firmly committed to the district
        court’s discretion, and we shall not substitute our judgment in its
        place. See Joseph, 978 F.3d at 1266. Moreover, McCants’s sentence
        is well below the statutory maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment,
        which is an indicator of reasonableness. See United States v.
        Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that a
        sentence that is below the statutory maximum is an indicator of
        reasonableness). Accordingly, we conclude that McCants’s
        sentence is substantively reasonable, and we affirm the district
        court.
              AFFIRMED.