Court Opinion

ID: 9568521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:04:38.336598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:43:22.680580
License: Public Domain

Hood, J.
(dissenting in part). I respectfully dissent from that portion of Judge Kelly’s opinion which concludes that juror Mayotte should have been excused for cause.
Not only had Mayotte never heard of this case before, he knew nothing about it prior to reporting for jury duty. He stated that he believed he could be fair and impartial to both sides and render an impartial verdict based on the evidence submitted at trial. He said it would not be difficult to vote "not guilty” in a case such as this and then see his fellow officers again. He also said that his opinion was not slanted toward the prosecution, and he had no dislike for defense attorneys. He indicated that he did not think that criminals have too many rights in our society, and that he believed that the "beyond a reasonable doubt” standard was fair.
As indicated by the majority opinion, jurors are presumed to be competent and impartial and the *68burden of proving otherwise is on the party seeking disqualification. McNabb v Green Real Estate Co, 62 Mich App 500, 505; 233 NW2d 811 (1975).
I am not persuaded that juror Mayotte should have been disqualified from hearing the instant case. The fact that juror Mayotte was a police officer is not of itself sufficient to warrant an inference of bias. Nor is the mere fact that he was acquainted with the prosecuting attorney and several prosecution witnesses. The Supreme Court’s language in People v Hannum, 362 Mich 660, 666-667; 107 NW2d 894 (1961), — "Would any experienced trial lawyer, or for that matter, the public generally feel differently as to the ability of a local police officer to sit as a juror and consider impartially the case of defendant charged with a crime committed in the community? We think not” — was dictum. The basis for the reversal was the failure to disclose the relationship as a police officer and deputy sheriff. In this case, there was not only full disclosure of Mayotte’s occupation and relationship with the system and the participants, but a reassertion, after extensive voir dire, that the prospective juror could be fair and impartial. What we are really asked to determine in this case is that, despite the absence of any showing of actual bias or disqualification, there should be a judicially fashioned presumption of bias and lack of objectivity in circumstances such as those which existed in this case. I would decline to do so.
Prior to the effective date of 1978 PA 11, MCL 600.1307a; MSA 27A.1307(1), numerous exemptions for prospective jurors existed, including state and federal employees, county officers and their deputies, judges and attorneys. The 1978 statute, *69however, virtually eliminated all exemptions, and provided:1
(1) To qualify as a juror a person shall:
(a) Be an elector in the county for which the person is selected, and in the case of a district court in districts of the second and third class, be a resident of the district, and in the case of municipal courts of record, be a resident of the municipality.
(b) Be conversant with the English language.
(c) Be physically and mentally able to carry out the functions of a juror. Temporary inability shall not be deemed a disqualification.
(d) Not have served as a petit or grand juror, in a court of record during the preceding 12 months.
(e) Not be under sentence for a felony at the time of jury selection.
(2) A person more than 70 years of age may claim exemption from jury service and shall be exempt upon making the request.
(3) For the purposes of sections 1371 to 1376 a person has served as a juror if that person has been paid for jury service.
There is no requirement in either the statute or in the court rule that a police officer must be found not qualified for jury duty or removed for cause because he is acquainted with the prosecutor or with prosecution witnesses who are also police officers. As indicated above, and as stated in People v Williams, 143 Mich App 574, 588; 374 NW2d 158 (1985), "The burden was on defendant to show that the juror was biased and . . . should have been dismissed for cause.” Defendant did not meet that burden.
None of the issues raised in defendant’s supple*70mental brief, which is not even in minimal compliance with MCR 7.212(C), have any merit whatsoever. I would therefore affirm defendant’s conviction.

A 1986 amendment, not pertinent to this discussion, 1986 PA 104, has deleted the "elector” requirement and substituted only a requirement of United States citizenship and age of at least eighteen years.