Court Opinion

ID: 9778366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:01:47.578842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:07.971718
License: Public Domain

John 1. Purtle, Justice, dissenting. Appellant and his employed counsel severed their relationship shortly before the case was scheduled for trial. When the case was called, appellant’s counsel informed the court he had been discharged and was not ready for trial. The court determined appellant desired a continuance and the implication is that his attorney did not request one because he saw no reason for it. Whatever the reason, the court offered a one-day delay as there was another trial ready to commence at the time. Appellant rejected the offer as not giving sufficient time for preparation of his defense and proceeded to trial representing himself. One reason the court gave for rejecting the request for a continuance was it was part of a “ploy” by people in Searcy County to obtain a continuance. No other reasons were given in support of this statement which would indicate appellant was part of such scheme. The former attorney was ordered to sit at the defense table with appellant for the purpose of assisting him “if so requested.” The attorney was not requested to assist the appellant if he observed errors or the like. He sat there until the court was ready to give instructions to the jury at which time the discharged attorney was handed the court’s instructions. No objection was made even though there was no instruction relating to an accomplice. The trial court had not at any time warned appellant of the dangers involved in going to trial without counsel. The record further reveals appellant had not been granted a previous continuance although the state had been granted one. The case had been pending less than 6 months. The fact that appellant discharged his attorney on the eve of trial does not waive the requirements of the Sixth Amendment that an accused has the right to the assistance of counsel. He was not even offered such assistance nor was his solvency questioned. This violates the rule in Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954) and, specifically, Tollett v. U.S., 444 F. 2d 622 (8 Cir. 1971). Such warning is required by Adams v. U.S., 317 U.S. 269 (1942). I also feel the instruction on accomplice should have been given on the volition of the court when an accused is not represented by counsel. Clearly, the evidence was sufficient to show Coy White was an accomplice. Therefore, I would reverse and remand.