Court Opinion

ID: 9580835
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:09:28.330129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:33.527698
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of the trial court’s grant of Rheinlander’s motion to suppress. The majority disregards the trial court’s credibility determination and further ignores factual determinations made by the trial court concerning Rheinlander’s driving.
The State argues, and the majority seems to agree, that the trial court misconstrued and ignored the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, and failed to consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop, including that it was 2:00 a.m., the officer’s 18 years of experience, and the testimony that the officer’s patrol car had flashing strobes in the brake lights. It further maintains that the trial court’s factual finding that Rheinlander might have had difficulty seeing the police vehicle because it was not *628equipped with exterior lights was erroneous because the evidence showed that there was exterior illumination from the strobe lights located on the brake lights.
Pretermitting whether the trial court incorrectly found that the interior illumination may have prohibited Rheinlander from seeing the patrol car, its ruling was based upon finding that the cumulative facts did not establish reasonable articulable suspicion sufficient to support the stop. The officer testified that Rheinlander never went into the other lane, but struck the yellow line — once when Rheinlander’s car passed his patrol car, and at some other time before the officer stopped the car. He testified that he observed no other indication of wrongdoing. Moreover, contrary to the majority’s finding that Rheinlander “got within ‘5 to 10 feet’ of the rear of [the officer’s] patrol car before suddenly changing lanes,” the officer actually testified that “I couldn’t tell you if it was 5 to 10 feet. But with all those blue lights going he had ample room to change lanes.”
The majority relies heavily upon the officer’s testimony about Rheinlander’s proximity to his cruiser before he switched lanes, suggesting that Rheinlander “appears to have violated [OCGA § 40-6-16 (a)]” (when approaching emergency vehicles, drivers have duty to stop, slow down, or change lanes). Yet, the evidence shows that the officer did not stop Rheinlander for this supposed infraction. The officer testified that he watched Rheinlander’s car go downhill after it changed lanes, then “he strikes the yellow line ... he corrects and comes back over. And then I said, well, to myself, I said you know you almost hit me.” The officer, at that point, decided to follow Rheinlander “not going real fast, the speed limit is 40 miles an hour, I believe through there. I caught up to him at Hillcrest at about Willaby, and continued to follow him.” In fact, the officer followed Rheinlander until he saw the car “drift” in the lane again, and then he turned on his blue lights to initiate the stop. The officer’s action, or lack thereof, did not indicate that Rheinlander’s stop was predicated on any violation of OCGA § 40-6-16 (a), or the officer’s concern about Rheinlander “almost hit[ting]” him. If this were the case, the officer would have stopped Rheinlander immediately after the lane change.
Moreover, it was never argued below or to this Court that Rheinlander violated OCGA § 40-6-16 (a). While we have under certain circumstances applied the “right for any reason” rule to reach issues unaddressed by either party in order to affirm a judgment as right for any reason, it does not follow that we “apply [the] ‘wrong for any reason’ rule to reverse incorrect rulings on issues not raised or ruled upon in the trial court. City of Gainesville v. Dodd, 275 Ga. 834 (573 SE2d 369) (2002).” Lowery v. Atlanta Heart Assoc., 266 Ga. App. 402, 405 (2) (597 SE2d 494) (2004). Thus, contrary to the majority’s statement, my concern is not the “right for any reason” rule, but the *629majority’s application of what can only be termed the “wrong for any reason” rule. It is not the responsibility of this Court to make arguments for the prosecution on appeal which the prosecution never asserted in the trial court.
Decided July 16, 2007.
Shawn E. LaGrua, Solicitor-General, Jessica K. Harris, Assistant Solicitor-General, for appellant.
Marny J. Heit, for appellee.
In its order the trial court found that Rheinlander did not “weave, speed, go through a red light, or commit any other traffic violation, nor did [he] exhibit any other manifestations of dangerous driving.” The trial court further found that “although the officer testified that [Rheinlander] came too close to the rear of the officer’s vehicle, the officer’s subjective belief must be analyzed in the context of the total facts and circumstances.” The trial court either did not believe the testifying officer or chose to draw inferences from the evidence to which we must defer. As noted in State v. Sanders, 274 Ga. App. 393, 397 (617 SE2d 633) (2005), “the trial court on a motion to suppress is not required to accept the testimony of any witness, even if that testimony is uncontradicted.” (Footnote omitted.) As a “court for the correction of errors of law . .. [we] cannot draw a different inference from the evidence or make a credibility determination contrary to the one made by the trial court.” (Footnote omitted.) Id. at 398. Further, a “reviewing court must construe the evidence most favorably to the upholding of the trial court’s findings and judgment. Anderson v. State, 133 Ga. App. 45, 47 (209 SE2d 665) (1974).” Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 54 (1) (440 SE2d 646) (1994).
Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent to this Court’s reversal of the trial court’s grant of the motion to suppress.