Court Opinion

ID: 9711178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:25:51.352603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:02.468745
License: Public Domain

MANDERINO, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. The majority opinion inaccurately portrays appellant’s argument that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at the guilty plea hearing as follows:
“To support his argument that counsel was ineffective, LaSane claims: (1) James Owens, co-counsel at the time the plea was entered, did not adequately prepare before advising him to plead guilty in that he did not review the ‘briefs of counsel and the decision of the court on the suppression application to evaluate the chances of having the denial [order] reversed on appeal’; and, (2) Owens failed to file a motion to dismiss the charges because of delay between arrest and trial.”
(footnotes omitted) (at p. 634.)
In the brief filed before us by LaSane’s counsel, however, question number two in the “Statement of Questions Presented” asks,
“II. Whether Appellant’s guilty plea was invalid because he was denied his constitutional right to effective representation of counsel.”
(appellant’s brief, p. 2)
Furthermore, in the “Summary of Argument” portion of appellant’s brief before us, the following is stated.
“II. Appellant’s guilty plea was also defective because he was denied his constitutional right to effective assist*640anee of counsel. The combined efforts of Mr. Feingold and Mr. Owens on his behalf fell far short of even the minimal representation to which he was entitled. Mr. Feingold had repeatedly proclaimed his lack of competence and his desire to withdraw from the case. Mr. Owens entered the case at the last minute and evidently focused very little attention on preparing a defense. In his judgment there was nothing special about the case and his conduct suggests that primary interest appears to have been to reach quick agreement on “favorable terms” for a guilty plea so that he might wrap up the matter as quickly as possible. Feingold and Owens did not communicate particularly well to each other and were at least as ineffective together as either of them might have been operating alone.”
(appellant’s brief p. 20(a))
In support of the above statement of the question and summary of argument, that section of appellant’s brief entitled “Statement of the Case” contains the following account of the circumstances surrounding counsel’s allegedly ineffective representation at the guilty plea hearing.
“There was lengthy testimony at the post conviction hearing concerning the circumstances leading up to the guilty plea by Thomas LaSane. As compared to Mr. Owens who indicated that he believed that the plea was intelligently and voluntarily made (P.C.H. 208-209, 212), Mr. Feingold testified that Mr. LaSane was ‘bewildered and upset’. He stated emphatically that LaSane did not seem to understand what was going on • and did not understand the charges against him (P.C.H. 104-105):
‘This was a community meeting. And what came out of it was that the family felt he’d have a better chance of pleading guilty and getting out of jail sooner than if he didn’t plead guilty and appealed ... it was a meeting, your Honor. It was the majority rules’ (P.C.H. 79).
When asked why he allowed the guilty plea to go on, Feingold replied:
*641‘Family wanted it. They were my clients. They hired me. They felt it was best for him. He said whatever the parents wanted to do, he would do, and that’s what he did ... he knew nothing. He was a boy. And this boy was held for a man’s crime. He was treated like a man. He should never be. The law has taken this boy and ruined him. And you can take it off the record or leave it on. He shouldn’t be where he is now. This case was handled wrong all the way along. The man should have been out two years ago. He was promised to be out, and he’s still in jail. That’s what I feel.’
Feingold went on,
‘This was a good boy. He never spit on the sidewalk in his life. And when his parents told him to do something, he did it’ (P.C.H. 105-106).
Feingold stated that after a decision Was made to have LaSane plead guilty, the boy was ‘told to say, yes, and smile to every question that he was asked and to say that he understood’ (P.C.H. 95-96). As to the answers to the questions posed to LaSane during the colloquy, Feingold stated, ‘it wasn’t him that was admitting to this. It was his father and stepfather and mother. They decided for him what he would do’ (P.C.H. 102).”
(appellant’s brief, pp. 16-18) (footnote omitted).
In my view the portions of appellant’s brief quoted above are sufficient to present this Court with the question of trial counsel’s effectiveness for not assuring that appellant’s decision to plead guilty was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.
We have held that a guilty plea cannot be knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered unless the record of the guilty plea hearing demonstrates a factual basis for the plea. Absent an on-the-record colloquy demonstrating such facts, an appellate court cannot conclude that the accused possessed an understanding of the law as it relates to those *642facts. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 466 Pa. 15, 351 A.2d 280 (1976).
Federal constitutional law mandates that ¿ person pleading guilty be aware of the nature of the charges against him. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976); Commonwealth v. Holmes, 468 Pa. 409, 364 A.2d 259 (1976); Commonwealth v. Ramos, 468 Pa. 404, 364 A.2d 257. As Mr. Justice Stevens, speaking for the majority of the Court, stated:
“[A guilty] plea cannot support a judgment of guilt unless it was voluntary in a constitutional sense. And clearly the plea could not be voluntary in the sense that it constituted an intelligent admission that he committed the offense unless the defendant received ‘real notice of the true nature of the charges against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process.’ ”
Henderson v. Morgan, supra, 426 U.S. at 644, 96 S.Ct. at 2257, quoting from Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 344, 61 S.Ct. 572, 574, 85 L.Ed. 859 (1941). The standards established by Pa.R.Crim.P. 319(a) and Commonwealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198, 316 A.2d 77 (1974) ensure that our courts meet this constitutional imperative.
Appellant here contends that the on-the-record guilty plea colloquy fails to establish a factual basis for the entry of the guilty plea. At the guilty plea hearing, appellant was asked if he understood that he had been indicted for murder. The indictment was not read. Appellant was asked only if he “did, in fact, kill [the victim] on October 19, 1971.” In Thompson, the only such factor elicited during the guilty plea was that the defendant had fired a shot killing the victim. In Thompson, we said:
“Thus, the first deficiency in this colloquy is that the judge failed to have elicited from appellant the facts he was admitting in pleading guilty. From this colloquy it is not clear that any criminal liability should attach. Murder requires more than the mere act of killing, it is essential that the killing be accompanied by malice. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 461 Pa. 557, 337 A.2d 545 (1975); *643Commonwealth v. Boyd, 461 Pa. 17, 334 A.2d 610 (1975); Commonwealth v. Coleman, 455 Pa. 508, 318 A.2d 716 (1974); Commonwealth v. McFadden, 448 Pa. 277, 292 A.2d 324 (1972). When the judge accepted the plea of guilt, she was only certain that appellant admitted causing the death of the victim. There was, however, absolutely no basis to make any determination as to whether he was admitting a malicious killing.
“ ‘Because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts.’ ” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, n. 5, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, n. 5 (1969), quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969).” (Footnote omitted.)
466 Pa. at 19, 351 A.2d at 282.
At a minimum, trial counsel’s obligation to an accused who indicates a desire to plead guilty to criminal charges, includes an obligation to assure that any such plea is entered voluntarily. Failure to insure that the accused possesses sufficient understanding of the law in relation to the facts to assure that the plea is voluntary, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel and requires that the judgment of sentence be reversed and a new trial granted.
Judgment of sentence should be reversed and a new trial granted.