Court Opinion

ID: 9651494
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 16:20:15.565353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:27.553702
License: Public Domain

GARRECHT, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I concur in the opinion of Judge HEALY.
WILBUR, Circuit Judge (concurring).
I am authorized to say that Judge MATHEWS joins me in this opinion. We concur in the opinion of Judge HEALY concerning the effect and existence of martial law in the Territory of Hawaii and in the conclusion that the appellees should be returned to the custody of the respective appellants.
We also concur in the conclusion stated in the opinion of Judge HEALY, that the proclamations hereinafter referred to were not intended to terminate the suspension of the privilege of the writ and did not have that effect. We further hold that such changed conditions as had occurred in the Territory did not restore the right to the writ of habeas corpus. This conclusion on this matter would also require that the appellees be restored to the custody from which they were taken under the writ of habeas corpus and the orders discharging them from, custody be reversed.
We deem it desirable to state this additional ground for reversal of the orders of the trial court because the undetermined nature and effect of martial law whether exercised by virtue of the necessities of war or under express authorization, constitutional or statutory, is a matter of great doubt when sought to be applied in individual instances, as in the cases at bar. The right to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is derived directly from the Constitution of the United States. Such suspension is also authorized by the organic law of the Territory of Hawaii, and the power is sought to be broadened by that law to situations where there is imminent danger of invasion as well as actual invasion, although the two phrases are probably of identical significance when reasonably interpreted.
We now consider the rights of the ap-pellees with reference to the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
The trial judge, feeling himself bound by previous decisions of the United States District Court for the Territory of Hawaii, announced that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was not suspended at the time of the appellees’ application. This conclusion was based upon the proposition that the order suspending the privilege of the writ had been set aside by subsequent orders, as will be presently stated. Our discussion of the subject is shortened by the fact that we have already considered and decided, in Ex parte Zimmerman, 132 F.2d 442, the question as to whether or not the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was suspended in Hawaii from and after December 7, 1941, and if so, the effect of such suspension. We there held, Judge Healy writing the opinion, that for the reason that the suspension of the writ pre-*585eluded such action, the court was powerless to release from custody a citizen of the United States detained by the military authorities in Hawaiian Territory. The facts with relation to the various proclamations and orders suspending the privilege of the writ are set out in that opinion and need not be here repeated. Suffice it to say that it was there held that the Territory of Hawaii was invaded by the Japanese on the morning of December 7, 1941; that the proclamation of the Govern- or of the Territory of Hawaii, approved by the President of the United States, lawfully suspended the privilege of the writ as authorized by section 67 of the Organic Law of the Territory of Hawaii, passed April 30, 1900, 31 Stat. 153, 48 U.S.C.A. § 532. The Constitution of the United States, Article I, section 9, clause 2, provides: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” We start then with the proposition heretofore determined by this court, that the proclamation of the Governor suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and declaring martial law, approved by the President of the United States, was valid and binding on the courts. If the privilege of the writ is still suspended, then under our decision in Ex parte Zimmerman, supra, the action of the trial court must be reversed and the appellees remanded to the custody of the appellant where he had been placed by the military authorities.
The appellees’ claim that the .privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is no longer suspended in the Territory of Hawaii is based upon two distinct propositions: First, that it was officially ended by appropriate proclamation on February 8, 1943, and, second, that even if there was no such formal restoration as a matter of fact the necessity for martial law and the suspension of the writ has ceased and, therefore, by reason of such changed conditions martial law no longer exists and the suspension of the writ is no longer effective. We shall first consider the contention with reference to the restoration of the privilege of the writ by proclamation of February 8, 1943.
On that date the Governor of the Territory of Hawaii issued a proclamation declaring the partial suspension of martial law and it is claimed that the proclamation also, in legal effect, re-established the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, although not specifically declared. The proclamation of February 8, after stating: “Whereas, a state of martial law remains in effect and the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus remains suspended”, proceeds to restore civilian officers and agencies of the federal territorial and local governments to their “respective jurisdictions, functions and powers” concerning, among other things “judicial proceedings both criminal and civil”, with certain exceptions which are not of present concern. Governor Stainback, who issued the proclamation, testified that in his opinion it restored at least 95 per cent of civil authority. That the proclamation was not intended to effect the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is clear from what preceded, and what was contemporaneous with, the proclamation of the Governor. The proclamation resulted from a conference held in Washington, D. C., in which the Governor of the Territory of Hawaii, the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of War, and the Attorney General, joined in discussions and agreements leading to the approval by the President of the proposed proclamation of February 8, 1943, and to its promulgation. In the joint letter to the President of January 18, 1943, submitting to him the agreement above referred to, it was said: “Pursuant to this agreement the Governor of Hawaii and the Commanding General will issue simultaneous proclamations. Their effect is to leave unchanged the state of martial law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, to restore to the civil government the majority of civil functions hitherto exercised by the military authorities, and to provide emergency powers for the military government.”
The letter of the President dated February 1, 1943, addressed to the Secretary of War, acknowledged the receipt of the proposed proclamation to be issued concurrently by the Commanding General and the Governor of Hawaii and approved the same, stating: “In an area of such strategic importance as the Hawaiian Islands in a time of active war in the Pacific, I can readily appreciate the difficulty in defining exactly the boundaries between civil and military functions. I think the formula which this proclamation applies meets the present needs."
*586When Governor Stainback returned to Hawaii he issued the proclamation in accordance with the agreement above referred to and concurrently therewith published a statement which, among other things, says:
“After numerous conferences among representatives of the War, Justice, Interior Departments and myself, it ’ was agreed that martial law should be continued in Hawaii but that existing military control should be modified to restore to a large extent civilian control of. civilian matters. My proclamation is the result of this agreement.
“Under the Act of Congress the Govern- or is ‘responsible for the faithful execution of the laws of the United States and of the Territory’ within the Territory. On December 7, 1941, the Governor of Hawaii issued a proclamation placing the Territory under martial law, which proclamation was subsequently modified by me on September 2nd, 1942. This proclamation issued today continues martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus but modified those prior proclamations by restoring to the civil authorities jurisdiction in their respective fields over civilian affairs except for certain specified subjects which are primarily of military concern.”
It seems perfectly clear that the Govern- or, who is vested with the power to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under section' 67, supra, had no intention of restoring the privilege of the writ. It is a matter of doubt and undetermined whether or not the suspension of the writ, having been approved by the President and thus made an act of the President of the United States, could be restored by the unapproved action of the Governor. It is not necessary to determine this question for the reason that it is clear that the proclamation of the Governor, with the accompanying statement, shows that he had no intention of vacating the order which suspended the privilege. We conclude that so- far as the proclamation of February 3, 1943, is concerned, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus remains suspended.
As to the second point as to the effect of changed conditions, the trial court having concluded that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was restored by proclamation, its attention was directed to the question of the effect of the changed conditions upon the proclamation declaring martial law which had only been revoked in part by the proclamation of February 8, 1943. As to the part of the proclamation purporting to continue in force a part of martial law, the argument is that as there is no longer danger of invasion, imminent or otherwise, the necessity for martial authority in the Territory has passed; consequently, the court need no longer recognize the authority of the military to detain the appellee in custody, which was merely an incident of the necessity of martial law. (This argument is based upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 4 Wall. 2, 18 L.Ed. 281.) No case is cited and none is found in which it is held that a change of condition alone would result in the restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. But even if such were true the record does not disclose such a situation as would justify the application of such a rule, if it exists. A great deal of the testimony was directed to the military situation in the Territory at the time of trial and the trial court found as a fact that “while the Island of Oahu may have been on March 2, 1944, and thereafter to this day, subject to possible attack by enemies at war, that it was not then, nor is it now, in imminent danger of invasion by hostile forces, neither was or is it in rebellion.” The trial court found as a fact that the civil government was in efficient operation.1
In support of the claimed necessity for continued maintenance of partial martial law, Lieut. General Richardson of the United States Army, in command of that area, and Admiral Nimitz of the United States Navy, in charge of the naval operations through the Pacific, each testified that in his opinion the continuance of martial law was necessary in the Territory of Hawaii for the protection of the territory and of the United States. The trial *587judge, notwithstanding their, opinions and orders, concluded that there was no danger of invasion and no continued necessity for martial law and ordered the appellee released. We thus have diametrically opposed views of the situation by the General and Admiral responsible for the defense of the Hawaiian Territory, and also for the defense of the United States, and of the judge who had no responsibility therefor. Under such circumstances the question is not difficult of solution, for it has been held by our Supreme Court in Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 235, 236, 53 L.Ed. 410, decided in 1909, that the federal court had no jurisdiction of an action for false imprisonment against the Governor of the State of Colorado who had seized and imprisoned the plaintiff Moyer for 76 days and had suspended the privilege of the writ. The court said: “It is admitted, as it must be, that the governor’s declaration that a state of insurrection existed is conclusive of that fact. It seems to be admitted also that the arrest alone would not necessarily have given a right to bring this suit. * . * * But it is said that a detention for so many days, alleged to be without probable cause, at a time when the courts were open, without an attempt to bring the plaintiff before them, makes a case on which he has a right to have a jury pass. * * * So long as such arrests are made in good faith and in the honest belief that they are needed in order to head the insurrection off, the governor is the final judge and cannot be subjected to an action after he is out of office, on the ground that he had not reasonable ground for his belief. * * * Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process.”
It would seem clear from this decision, as well as from principle, that the decision as to whether or not the continued suspension of the writ was necessary was one entirely for the executive authorities, if made in good faith and upon an honest belief. We shall examine that question for a moment.
Was the situation such that an executive could say that the continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was necessary?
Considering this question we not only have in evidence the public acts and declarations of a military Governor and of Admiral Nimitz, who are in charge of that area, but we also have their testimony under oath in this habeas corpus proceeding. Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, in response to the following question gave the following answer:
“Q. Now, General Richardson, based upon your appraisal of the military situation, will you state your opinion as to whether or not there is imminent danger of invasion of this Territory by the Japanese enemy ? A. I shall state from a soldier’s point of view the actual reality of the situation, without attempting to argue or define the academic definition of ‘imminent danger of invasion.’ We know that, at least we feel quite certain that, the Japanese are totally incapable of coming to these islands with a large land-based force for the purpose of seizing and capturing it. We do not think that is within their capability at all. The time for that is past. And, therefore, if that interpretation is paramount in the mind of the layman, it may be eliminated. But you must remember that in law, as in other branches and other professions, times change. There are new developments. When that phrase was written, ‘imminent danger of invasion,’ nor [neither] the submarine, nor the airplane were in existence, nor were they ever dreamed of. These two new weapons of war have enormous potentialities, and they have introduced into warfare the element of stealth, the element of surprise, and the element of speed. And, therefore, capitalizing on these new elements of warfare, our enemy, the Japanese, has at his disposal today a strong carrier force, destroyers, cruisers, battleships, and airplanes, and submarines, all of which combine those elements of stealth, surprise and speed.
“Therefore, they still have the capability of launching an attack, an invasion by air, an invasion by undersea, against these islands. And they have not only the capability itself; it is always impending, as long as their capability exists, the danger impends and the danger is imminent.”
Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, United States Navy, Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean areas, testified as follows:
“Q. Will you state, Admiral Nimitz, in a general way the strategic position of this Territory as part of your general command? .A. The Hawaiian area constitutes the only base for the Navy that we *588have in the Pacific Ocean at the present time. It has the greatest importance to the fleet and to- the Army for operations to the westward. Anything that is injurious to this area is prejudicial to our conduct of the war.
“Q. Do you believe, Admiral Nimitz, as a military matter or as a naval matter, that the Japanese enemy might or could attack these islands? A. Yes, they could. It is still within their capability to make carrier attacks behind the front, in spite of the daily searches that we make. We have never ceased, since December 7th, to search the areas from which we think those attacks are likely to come. Until the last Japanese carrier is destroyed, that capability will exist. * * *
“Q. Admiral Nimitz, in addition to the possibility of an attack by carrier-based planes, are there other military factors, major factors to be considered in determining the possibility of an attack by the Japanese on this Territory? A. Yes. The Japanese can land commando raiders, espionage parties, in spite of any reasonable preventive efforts that we make. And the information that they might possibly obtain would be — in my opinion — could be more injurious to our cause than if they came to these islands and established a beachhead on one of them. The information that they might as to prospective movements of our fleet, the presence of our fleet in these waters, or its absence, the deductions that might be made from the information they pick up mingling with the Japanese of the community might very well cause some of our operations in the far west, far westward of here, to be unsuccessful.
“Q. Well, in other words, do you agree with General Richardson’s testimony that protection of these Naval operations to the westward from premature disclosure is a vital factor in your operations? A. It is of the utmost importance, and the security against espionage activity in these islands is of the utmost importance.
“Q. Admiral Nimitz, having in mind your duties here and your responsibility, and from your study of the situation, would you state whether or not, in your opinion, there is imminent danger of invasion of the Territory of Hawaii by the Japanese? A. Invasion by sea-borne troops in sufficient numbers to seize a bridgehead, no. I consider it neither imminent nor probable. But invasion by stealth, by submarine, commando raids, espionage parties, I consider it not only probable but imminent. It is constantly impending.
“Q. And what is your view on invasion by carrier-borne aircraft? A. I cited that in a previous answer, that it is possible, if the Japanese wish to take the risk; they have sufficient carriers and sufficient planes to make an attack on these islands similiar to the one that they made on December 7th.
In considering the danger of surprise referred to by both the General and the Admiral, it should be noted that the testimony shows that an advantage of a few minutes may be decisive in modern warfare.2
The Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 3, 4 Wall. 2, 3, 18 L.Ed. 281, was dealing with a situation in which Congress had provided that the suspension of the writ should not be effective where there was a failure to indict the petitioner within a time fixed by statute. The case, therefore, dealt not with the effect of the suspension of the writ but! rather with the right to try the petitioner by military tribunal during the period in which he was held by the military authorities. The Supreme Court held that the military authorities were without jurisdiction to try the petitioner and that the decision of the military court was void for that reason, the court holding that the situation did not justify the application of martial law in violation of the expressed will of Congress to the contrary. The court in that case divided upon the question of whether or not Congress, under the Constitution, could authorize trials other than by jury under the circumstances, disclosed in that record. This decision will be of importance in weighing the effect of the judgment of the provost court in this case, a question which we hold is not before us.
Assuming as we do for the purpose of this opinion, without deciding, that the court can ignore an order suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as to persons held in custody by the military authorities when such suspension is so arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable as *589to justify an inference of fraud on the part of the military authorities, we hold that in view of the existence of a global war in which this nation is involved and from the facts shown in evidence in the court below, the courts cannot say the decision of the military authorities or of the Governor of Hawaii to continue such suspension is so arbitrary, capricious or fraudulent as to justify the courts in ignoring the action of the military authorities and ordering the release of persons in their custody. The decision of the trial court based upon its own independent judgment of necessity for the continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, while supported by direct evidence of a number of witnesses including Governor Stainback, does not go far enough to sustain its order because it ignores the opinion of the military authorities to the contrary and does not find facts justifying its order. Without a finding of implied fraud on the part of the Governor and of the military authorities the decision cannot be sustained.
The appellees also claim that even if the writ of habeas corpus has been and now is-suspended within the Territory of Hawaii, such suspension does not apply to the type of offense committed by the appellee. The appellees contend that: “The Constitution contemplates a suspension of the privilege of the writ only in cases of persons engaged in aiding the rebellion or invasion.” The Constitution provides no such limitation and we see no reason for its application. Such an interpretation of the Constitution would leave open the question in every case as to whether or not the conduct of the persons detained by the military authorities came within the exception.
The decisions should be reversed and the trial court directed to return the appellees to the custody of the respective appellants.

 “I find from the evidence that at all times during the year 1943 and continuing to this day, conditions were such throughout all the principal islands of the Territory of Hawaii that the regularly constituted civil government was either in efficient operation or fully capable of such operation in all its branches and ordinary departments and was sufficiently equipped, capable and willing to perform all functions for which it was created.”

 The report of the Navy Department of December 5, 1942, states that all the anti-aircraft guns of the naval vessels at Pearl Harbor were in action within seven minutes after the attack at 7:55 a. m.