Court Opinion

ID: 9395478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-18 00:00:25.016681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:08.807631
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50435    Document: 00516754264        Page: 1    Date Filed: 05/17/2023

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                                                                            FILED
                                                                        May 17, 2023
                                No. 22-50435                           Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                            Clerk

   La Union Del Pueblo Entero, et al.,

                                                                    Plaintiffs,

                                    versus

   Gregory W. Abbott, in his Official Capacity as Governor of Texas,
   et al.,
                                                                  Defendants,

   LULAC Texas; Vote Latino; Texas Alliance for Retired
   Americans; Texas AFT; United States of America,

                                                         Plaintiffs—Appellees,
                                    versus

   Senator Bryan Hughes; Senator Paul Bettencourt;
   Representative Briscoe Cain; Representative Andrew
   Murr,

                                                                   Appellants.

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Western District of Texas
                           USDC No. 5:21-CV-844
                           USDC No. 1:21-CV-786
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                                         No. 22-50435

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Wiener and Willett, Circuit
   Judges.
   Don R. Willett, Circuit Judge:
           After the Texas Legislature amended the Election Code in 2021, the
   United States and others sued, alleging the changes were racially
   discriminatory. When the plaintiffs sought discovery from individual, non-
   party state legislators, those legislators withheld some documents, citing
   legislative privilege. The district court largely rejected the legislators’
   privilege claims, and they filed this interlocutory appeal. We REVERSE.

                                                I
           The Texas Legislature recently amended the Election Code as it
   relates to voter registration, voting by mail, poll watchers, and other aspects
   of election integrity and security. 1 The United States, LULAC Texas, and
   dozens of other plaintiffs sued (together, “Plaintiffs”). They argued that the
   Legislature acted with racially discriminatory intent, and thus that the
   amendment violates the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act. 2 The
   district court consolidated many of the suits. Plaintiffs then sought discovery
   from individual, non-party legislators related to the circumstances
   surrounding the amendment’s proposal and passage. The legislators
   produced some documents, but they withheld others, citing legislative
   privilege. Plaintiffs moved to compel production. The district court rejected
   most of the legislators’ privilege claims and ordered them to produce about
   220 documents. But the district court stayed that order while the legislators
   pursued this interlocutory appeal.

           1
            See An Act Relating to Election Integrity and Security, S.B. 1, 87th Leg., 2d Spec.
   Sess. (2021); La Union del Pueblo Entero v. Abbott, 29 F.4th 299, 304, 307 (5th Cir. 2022)
   (discussing drafting and provisions of the amendments).
           2
               See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a).

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                                               No. 22-50435

                                                     II
             Our appellate jurisdiction generally extends only to “final decisions of
   the district courts.” 3 But as the Supreme Court explained in Cohen v.
   Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation, courts have “long given” this
   restriction “a practical rather than a technical construction.” 4 Under that
   construction, we have jurisdiction over “‘a narrow class of decisions . . .’
   immediately appealable as collateral orders even if no final judgment has been
   rendered.” 5 Orders are immediately appealable under this rule only if they
   “(1) conclusively determine the disputed question, (2) resolve an important
   issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) [are]
   effectively unreviewable on appeal.” 6 “[T]he decisive consideration is
   whether delaying review until the entry of final judgment ‘would imperil a
   substantial public interest’ or ‘some particular value of a high order.’” 7
   Another constraint is that we do not apply this rule case-by-case or in an
   “individualized” manner. 8 Instead, “our focus is on ‘the entire category to
   which a claim belongs’” and on “the class of claims[] taken as a whole.” 9
   The class at issue in this appeal consists of orders denying non-party state-

             3
            Vantage Health Plan, Inc. v. Willis-Knighton Med. Ctr., 913 F.3d 443, 448 (5th Cir.
   2019) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1291).
             4
                 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
             5
             Vantage Health Plan, Inc., 913 F.3d at 448 (quoting Digit. Equip. Corp. v. Desktop
   Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994)).
             6
                 Id. (quoting Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164, 171 (5th Cir.
   2009)).
             7
             Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 107 (2009) (quoting Will v.
   Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 352–53 (2006)).
             8
                 Id. (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 473 (1978)).
             9
                 Id. (quoting Digit. Equip., 511 U.S. at 868).

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   legislators’ assertions of legislative privilege. 10 We agree that the orders in
   this class are immediately appealable.
            This class satisfies “the three traditional Cohen conditions.” 11 The
   order’s conclusiveness is apparent, among other reasons, because “failure to
   comply with it may result in sanctions against” the legislators. 12 The class
   also “involves important questions” 13 such that “the cost of allowing
   immediate appeal” is justified. 14 The importance derives from the purpose
   of legislative privilege, which is not to protect against disclosure in general,
   but to foster the “public good” by protecting lawmakers from “deterrents to
   the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty.” 15 Requiring legislators to
   negotiate protective orders or to suffer contempt proceedings would
   diminish that protection. For the same reason, this class of claims is not
   “adequately vindicable” at a later stage of the litigation. 16 For one thing,
   litigation itself distracts lawmakers from the job that voters sent them to do.
   They cannot get that time back. But even setting that aside, once the
   legislators produce documents, an appellate court cannot “remedy the

           10
              See Leonard v. Martin, 38 F.4th 481, 488 (5th Cir. 2022) (defining the “class of
   orders at issue” as “those denying a nonparty’s motion to quash a subpoena on undue
   burden grounds”).
           11
                Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 107 (referencing Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546).
           12
                Whole Woman’s Health v. Smith, 896 F.3d 362, 367 (5th Cir. 2018).
           13
              Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 107 (citation omitted). Cohen’s second condition “insists
   upon ‘important questions separate from the merits.’” Id. (quoting Swint v. Chambers Cnty.
   Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995)) (emphasis added). Despite Mohawk’s directive toward
   categorical rules, determining whether a question is “separate from the merits” will
   typically require case-by-case analysis. We express no view about the case-by-case aspect
   of any future privilege claims that otherwise fall within the class we address today.
           14
                Id. at 108.
           15
                Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951).
           16
                Mohawk, 558 U.S. at 107 (quoting Digit. Equip., 511 U.S., at 878).

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   improper disclosure of privileged material in the same way [it can] remedy a
   host of other erroneous evidentiary rulings: by vacating an adverse judgment
   and remanding for a new trial in which the protected material and its fruits
   are excluded from evidence.” 17 As non-parties, the legislators cannot move
   for a new trial. And even if they could, a new trial cannot retract privileged
   information that has been shared into the public domain. For all those
   reasons, we have interlocutory jurisdiction under Cohen.
          The class of claims also satisfies Mohawk’s formulation, which allows
   interlocutory jurisdiction when delaying review would harm “a substantial
   public interest” or “some particular value of a high order.” 18 Delaying
   review for this class of claims would imperil both of those interests. The
   public has a substantial interest in ensuring that elective office remains an
   invitation to draft legislation, not defend privilege logs. Freedom from
   constant distraction is a high-order value. That is especially so for this class,
   which consists solely of claims from non-parties who “lack appellate
   remedies available to the contenders in litigation.” 19
          It should come as no surprise, then, that our jurisdiction has long
   extended to adjacent classes of claims. In Overby v. United States Fidelity and
   Guarantee Company, we considered a dispute between a bank and a surety
   company. 20 The surety company sought to discover certain documents in the
   bank’s possession, but the Acting Secretary of the United States Treasury
   filed a “formal claim of privilege” over the documents. 21 We held that the

          17
               Id. at 109.
          18
               Id. (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 352–53 (2006)).
          19
               Vantage Health Plan, 913 F.3d at 448.
          20
               224 F.2d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 1955).
          21
               Id.

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   district court’s denial of privilege was immediately appealable under the
   collateral order doctrine, “even though the main suit between the bank and
   the surety ha[d] not been concluded.” 22 Why? Because “[a]fter such
   production, there would be no further point to the claim of privilege, it would
   be irretrievably breached and beyond the protection of an appellate court.” 23
              Likewise, in Carr v. Monroe Manufacturing Co., we held that
   “discovery orders may be appealable where a governmental privilege is
   asserted and the government is not a party to the suit.” 24 We reasoned that
   “[i]n such cases,” our exercise of jurisdiction is warranted because “the
   asserted governmental interest may be ‘irretrievably breached’ by disclosure,
   and the government has no remedy on appeal from a final judgment in the
   original action.” The governmental interest is no less breached “where the
   matter sought to be discovered is held by one of the parties on the
   government’s behalf.” 25 And just days ago, in Jackson Municipal Airport
   Authority v. Harkins, we held that “appellate jurisdiction exist[ed]” over a
   class of claims involving legislators who were themselves parties in that
   case. 26
              Plaintiffs argue that Mohawk bars interlocutory jurisdiction. There,
   the Supreme Court held that the collateral-order doctrine does not cover a
   private litigant’s assertion of attorney–client privilege. 27 This case is different
   in all three respects: here we have governmental (not private) non-parties

              22
                   See id. at 162 & n.3 (collecting cases).
              23
                   Id.
              24
                   431 F.2d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 1970).
              25
                   Id. (quoting Overby, 224 F.2d at 162).
              26
                   No. 21-60312, 2023 WL 3333607, at *2 (5th Cir. May 10, 2023).
              27
                   558 U.S. at 114.

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   (not litigants) asserting legislative privilege (not attorney–client privilege).
   Indeed, Mohawk “express[ed] no view on” how the collateral-order doctrine
   applies to “governmental privileges.” 28 We have held, too, that “Mohawk
   does not speak to the predicament of third parties, whose claims to
   reasonable protection from the courts have often been met with respect.” 29
   Nothing in Mohawk forbids jurisdiction here. Rather, Mohawk is relevant
   because it explains how to determine which classes of claims are immediately
   appealable. That test favors jurisdiction over this class of claims. Plaintiffs
   see Mohawk differently, but we disagree, as explained below.
           For instance, Plaintiffs suggest that “[t]he absence of . . .
   constitutional values” means that no “high order” issues are at stake here.
   But constitutional values cannot be the litmus test, for we already “allow[]
   immediate appeal of orders that unseal a nonparty’s confidential business
   documents.” 30 And even if some constitutional value were required,
   federalism and comity both fit the bill, and both are at stake when a federal
   court orders state lawmakers to produce documents. Plaintiffs also say that
   the legislators’ privilege claims are inseparable from the underlying case’s
   merits, because the order compels documents that “bear directly on” the
   merits. That argument misstates Cohen’s second factor, which requires
   separate “issue[s].” 31 Here, the underlying merits issue is whether the
   amendment violates federal law, while the issue in this appeal is whether the
   legislators can claim privilege. Those are separate issues.

           28
                Id. at 113 n.4.
           29
                Smith, 896 F.3d at 368.
           30
                Leonard v. Martin, 38 F.4th 481, 487 (5th Cir. 2022).
           31
            Id. at 486 (quoting Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, L.L.C., 566 F.3d 164, 171 (5th
   Cir. 2009)).

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           Finally, Plaintiffs point us to decisions from our sister circuits. We
   doubt that Overby and Carr leave us much room to import new law. Rather,
   we agree with the Eleventh Circuit, which is bound by our pre-1981
   precedent, 32 and which has held that Mohawk was “not the kind of ‘clearly
   on point’ Supreme Court precedent” that would justify disregarding the line
   of Fifth Circuit cases allowing immediate appeal of orders directing non-
   parties to produce material for which they assert a governmental privilege. 33
   Mohawk, that court concluded, “said nothing about . . . [legislative]
   privilege[] . . . or any governmental privilege for that matter. Nor did it alter
   the scope of the collateral order doctrine.” 34 Our jurisdiction here is secure.

                                                 III
           We review discovery orders “for abuse of discretion.” 35 “The district
   court’s legal conclusions should be reviewed de novo, and its factual findings
   should not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous.” 36
           “[L]egislative privilege . . . is an evidentiary privilege[] governed by
   federal common law, as applied through Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
   Evidence.” 37 We begin by defining the privilege’s scope—that is, the many
   actions and documents that are within “the legislative process itself” and

           32
                See Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1258 n.7 (11th Cir. 2018).
           33
              In re Hubbard, 803 F.3d 1298, 1306 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Garrett v. Univ. of
   Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trustees, 344 F.3d 1288, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003)).
           34
                Id.
           35
             Smith, 896 F.3d at 369 (citing Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812,
   817 (5th Cir. 2004)).
           36
             Id. (quoting Marceaux v. Lafayette City-Par. Consol. Gov’t, 731 F.3d 488, 491 (5th
   Cir. 2013)).
           37
              Jefferson Cmty. Health Care Ctrs., Inc. v. Jefferson Par. Gov’t, 849 F.3d 615, 624
   (5th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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   that the common-law privilege therefore traditionally protects. 38 We next
   hold that the legislators here did not waive the privilege by communicating
   with individuals who are outside the Legislature. We conclude by explaining
   why the privilege does not yield in this case.

                                                 A
          State lawmakers can invoke legislative privilege to protect actions that
   occurred within “the sphere of legitimate legislative activity” 39 or within
   “the regular course of the legislative process.” 40 “[T]he privilege is not
   limited to the casting of a vote on a resolution or bill; it covers all aspects of
   the legislative process.” 41 As part of that process, lawmakers routinely
   “[m]eet[] with persons outside the legislature—such as executive officers,
   partisans, political interest groups, or constituents—to discuss issues that
   bear on potential legislation.” 42 “Consequently, some communications with
   third parties, such as private communications with advocacy groups, are
   protected by legislative privilege . . . .” 43 These cases teach, and we agree,
   that the legislative privilege’s scope is necessarily broad.
          While our analysis begins with the privilege’s scope, it does not end
   there. Records are not protected from production just because they are
   within the privilege’s scope. Instead, like other privileges, the legislative

          38
               Hubbard, 803 F.3d at 1308.
          39
               Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376.
          40
               United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 489 (1979) (internal quotation marks
   omitted).
          41
              Jackson Mun. Airport Auth. v. Harkins, No. 21-60312, 2023 WL 3333607, at *5
   (5th Cir. May 10, 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).
          42
               Almonte v. City of Long Beach, 478 F.3d 100, 107 (2d Cir. 2007).
          43
             Jackson Mun. Airport Auth., No. 21-60312, 2023 WL 3333607, at *5 (internal
   quotation marks omitted).

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   privilege is “qualified” by exceptions that serve “the normally predominant
   principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining the truth.” 44
          The district court properly concluded that the documents at issue
   “are subject to legislative privilege.” Likewise, on appeal, the parties agree
   that the legislators have properly invoked the privilege. That is, they agree
   that the documents fall within the privilege’s scope. For their part, the
   legislators rely on the privilege for each of the disputed documents. Plaintiffs,
   too, do not argue that the documents are non-legislative. Instead, they argue
   only that the privilege either “was waived” or “must yield.”

                                                 B
          The legislators did not waive the legislative privilege when they
   “communicated with parties outside the legislature, such as party leaders
   and lobbyists.” The district court’s contrary holding flouts the rule that the
   privilege covers “legislators’ actions in the proposal, formulation, and
   passage of legislation.” 45 An exception for communications “outside the
   legislature” would swallow the rule almost whole, because “[m]eeting with
   ‘interest’ groups . . . is a part and parcel of the modern legislative procedures
   through which legislators receive information possibly bearing on the
   legislation they are to consider.” 46
          Even glimpsing at Plaintiffs’ objections to the privilege log reveals as
   much. For example, Plaintiffs say that one of the legislators waived the
   privilege for hand-written notes that reveal his mental impressions—because
   the notes appear on a document that he received from a third party. Plaintiffs

          44
           Jefferson Cmty. Health Care Ctrs., 849 F.3d at 624 (quoting Perez v. Perry, No.
   SA-11-CV-360-OLG-JES, 2014 WL 106927, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2014)).
          45
               Hubbard, 803 F.3d at 1308.
          46
               Bruce v. Riddle, 631 F.2d 272, 280 (4th Cir. 1980).

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   also say that the legislators waived the privilege for correspondence that they
   solicited from constituents, or for advice that they solicited from the office of
   the Secretary of State. A privilege that protected so little of the lawmaking
   process would not rightly be called “legislative.” We see Plaintiffs’ “waiver”
   argument not as an exception, but as an indirect attack on the privilege’s
   scope. We reject that approach.
          Plaintiffs’ contrary arguments lack merit. For instance, Plaintiffs say
   that a non-waivable privilege would be anomalous. But this argument errs by
   assuming that the legislative privilege is non-waivable. On the contrary,
   “legislative privilege as to certain documents is waived when the Legislator
   publicly reveal[s] those documents.” 47 But that is not what happened here.
   The privilege log shows that the legislators did not send privileged
   documents to third parties outside the legislative process; instead they
   brought third parties into the process. That decision did not waive the
   privilege. The very fact that Plaintiffs need discovery to access these
   documents shows that they have not been shared publicly. On the other hand,
   if the legislators had shared the documents publicly, then they could not rely
   on the privilege to prevent Plaintiffs from introducing those documents as
   evidence. But here, where the documents have been shared with some third
   parties—but haven’t been shared publicly—the waiver argument fails.
          Plaintiffs also point us to district court opinions holding that the
   privilege’s purpose is to buttress the separation of powers by protecting
   lawmakers from the other branches’ threats of prosecution and conviction.
   Under this view, a federal court’s meddling in the state legislature does not
   strictly violate the separation of powers, and therefore there is no cause for
   alarm. But check and balances are not the privilege’s only purpose. It also

          47
               Jackson Mun. Airport Auth., No. 21-60312, 2023 WL 3333607, at *5.

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   serves the “public good” by allowing lawmakers to focus on their jobs rather
   than on motions practice in lawsuits. 48
          Plaintiffs also criticize the legislators for drawing on caselaw involving
   either the Constitution’s Speech or Debate Clause or legislative immunity
   (rather than legislative privilege). As for the first point, the legislative
   privilege that protects state lawmakers “is similar in origin and rationale to
   that accorded Congressmen under the Speech or Debate Clause.” 49 Even if
   the federal privilege yields to fewer exceptions than the state privilege, we
   see no reason to differentiate between state and federal lawmakers when
   determining what counts as “legitimate legislative activity.” 50 In other
   words, the legislative privilege’s scope is similar for state and federal
   lawmakers—even if the privilege for state lawmakers has more exceptions.
   So too for legislative immunity, which the Supreme Court has often analyzed
   in parallel to legislative privilege. 51 Both concepts involve the core question
   whether a lawmaker may “be made to answer—either in terms of questions
   or in terms of defending . . . from prosecution.” 52 While the parallel between
   them may not run to the horizon, we follow the Supreme Court’s lead in
   drawing on both strands even though this case involves a privilege from
   disclosure rather than an immunity from suit or liability.

          48
               Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377.
          49
               Sup. Ct. of Va. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 732 (1980).
          50
               Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376.
          51
               See, e.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972).
          52
               Id. (emphasis added).

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                                                  C
          Nor is this one of those “extraordinary instances” 53 in which the
   legislative privilege must “yield[].” 54 The legislative privilege gives way
   “where important federal interests are at stake, as in the enforcement of
   federal criminal statutes.” 55 According to the Supreme Court, “in protecting
   the independence of state legislators, Tenney and subsequent cases on official
   immunity have drawn the line at civil actions.” 56 We have thus recognized
   that the legislative privilege “is qualified.” 57 While “important federal
   interests” 58 may be at stake in criminal as well as “extraordinary” 59 civil
   cases, the qualifications do not subsume the rule. The privilege would be of
   little value if legislators “could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience
   and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard
   of a judgment against them based upon a jury’s speculation as to motives.” 60
          This holds true even when constitutional rights are at stake. “The
   claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege.” 61 A court
   proceeding that probes legislators’ subjective intent in the legislative process
   is a “deterrent[] to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty.” 62 The

          53
               Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268 (1977).
          54
               See United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 373 (1980).
          55
               Id.
          56
               Id.
          57
               Jefferson Cmty. Health Care Ctrs., 849 F.3d at 624 (internal quotation marks
   omitted).
          58
               Gillock, 445 U.S. at 373.
          59
               Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268.
          60
               Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377.
          61
               Id.
          62
               Id.

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   Supreme Court explained in Tenney that “[t]he reason for the privilege is
   clear.” 63 “In order to enable and encourage a representative of the public to
   discharge his public trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably
   necessary[] that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he
   should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to
   whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.” 64 “Regardless of
   the level of government, the exercise of legislative discretion should not be
   inhibited by judicial interference . . . .” 65 “[I]t [i]s not consonant with our
   scheme of government for a court to inquire into the motives of legislators,”
   and courts are not to facilitate an expedition seeking to uncover a legislator’s
   subjective intent in drafting, supporting, or opposing proposed or enacted
   legislation. 66
           Even for allegations involving racial animus or retaliation for the
   exercise of First Amendment rights, the Supreme Court has held that the
   legislative privilege stands fast. In Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 67 a city employee
   sued the mayor, a city council member, and other city officials under 42
   U.S.C. § 1983, contending that they eliminated her position out of “racial
   animus and a desire to retaliate against her for exercising her First
   Amendment rights in filing the complaint against [a colleague].” 68 The city
   employee won a partial jury verdict.69 The First Circuit affirmed the

           63
                Id. at 374.
           64
                Id.
           65
                Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 52 (1998).
           66
                Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377.
           67
                523 U.S. 44.
           68
                Id. at 47.
           69
                Id.

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                                            No. 22-50435

   judgment against the Mayor and the city council member. But the Supreme
   Court reversed. 70 It held that the city officials were absolutely immune from
   suit under § 1983, because “the common law accord[s] [them] the same
   absolute immunity it accord[s] legislators at other levels of government.” 71
   In discussing “absolute legislative immunity,” the Supreme Court also noted
   that it had previously extended that immunity to an interstate regional
   planning agency because of the purposes of legislative immunity and the
   importance of such immunity in advancing the “public good.” 72
            Further, the Ninth Circuit has held that “plaintiffs are generally
   barred        from         deposing   local   legislators,   even     in    ‘extraordinary
   circumstances.’” 73 In Lee v. City of Los Angeles, the plaintiffs contended “that
   race was in fact the overriding motivation behind [the redrawing of a city’s
   voting district] boundaries.” 74 The plaintiffs sought to depose local officials,
   but the Ninth Circuit held that the legislative privilege applied. 75 That court
   “recognize[d] that claims of racial gerrymandering involve serious
   allegations,” and also that the “[d]efendants ha[d] been accused of violating
   that important constitutional right,” 76 because “‘[a]t the heart of the
   Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that
   the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components

            70
                 Id. at 47–48, 56.
            71
                 Id. at 49.
            72
             Bogan, 523 U.S. at 53 (quoting Lake Country Ests., Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency,
   440 U.S. 391, 404 (1979)).
            73
             Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 908 F.3d 1175, 1187–88 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting City of
   Las Vegas v. Foley, 747 F.2d 1294, 1298 (9th Cir. 1984)).
            74
                 Id. at 1183.
            75
                 Id. at 1188.
            76
                 Id.

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                                             No. 22-50435

   of a racial . . . class.’” 77 Still, the Ninth Circuit declined to recognize an
   “exception whenever a constitutional claim directly implicates the
   government’s intent,” because “that exception would render the privilege
   ‘of little value.’” 78
           Plaintiffs’ attempt to require state legislators to produce documents is
   far closer on the continuum of legislative immunity and privilege to the suits
   under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 at issue in Tenney and Bogan than it is to the criminal
   prosecution under federal law at issue in Gillock. In Tenney, there was an
   “important federal interest[]” at stake: the vindication of civil rights under
   § 1983. 79 The issue in Tenney was “whether state legislators were immune
   from civil suits for alleged violations of civil rights under 42 U.S.C.
   § 1983.” 80 But despite the important federal rights that § 1983 aims to
   vindicate, the Supreme Court explained that the legislative privilege did not
   yield to those interests. “We cannot believe that Congress—itself a staunch
   advocate of legislative freedom—would impinge on a tradition so well
   grounded in history and reason by covert inclusion in the general language of
   § 1983.” 81 The Supreme Court held that “a state legislator’s common-law
   absolute immunity from civil suit survived the passage of the Civil Rights Act
   of 1871.” 82 By the same token, a state legislator’s common-law absolute
   immunity from civil actions precludes the compelled discovery of documents
   pertaining to the state legislative process that Plaintiffs seek here.

           77
                Id. (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995)).
           78
                Id. (quoting Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377).
           79
                Gillock, 445 U.S. at 373.
           80
                Id. at 371.
           81
                Id. at 372 (alteration adopted) (quoting Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376).
           82
                Id. (discussing the holding in Tenney).

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                                          No. 22-50435

           Finally, Plaintiffs’ reliance on Jefferson Community Health Care
   Centers, Inc. v. Jefferson Parish Government 83 is misplaced. That decision
   stated that “[w]hile the common-law legislative immunity for state
   legislators is absolute, the legislative privilege for state lawmakers is, at best,
   one which is qualified.” 84 But that case provides no support for the idea that
   state legislators can be compelled to produce documents concerning the
   legislative process and a legislator’s subjective thoughts and motives. There,
   a Louisiana parish sought to evict a health care center from property that the
   parish owned. 85 We rejected the city council members’ arguments for a
   legislative privilege that would have barred the court from even deciding
   whether to issue injunctive relief. 86 We said only that “[a]t any rate, even
   assuming that the councilmembers’ reasons for passing the resolutions are
   privileged in the sense that they cannot be directly compelled to disclose
   them, this evidentiary privilege cannot bar the adjudication of a claim.” 87 We
   held only that a claim for injunctive relief could proceed. That holding says
   nothing about cases like this one. 88
           We REVERSE.

           83
                849 F.3d 615.
           84
                Id. at 624 (quoting Perez, No. SA-11-CV-360, 2014 WL 106927, at *2).
           85
                Id. at 619.
           86
                Id. at 624.
           87
                Id.
           88
            Because we hold that the legislative privilege protects the documents at issue,
   we need not (and do not) address the other privileges that the legislators asserted.

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