Court Opinion

ID: 9789934
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:44:06.166227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:25.262633
License: Public Domain

GORDON, Vice Chief Justice
(specially concurring):
Although I would affirm both the convictions and the sentences, I write to discuss the circumstances under which the aggravating factor of “committing [an] offense * * * in the expectation of the receipt of anything of pecuniary value” A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(5) should apply. In State v. Clark, 126 Ariz. 428, 616 P.2d 888, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1067, 101 S.Ct. 796, 66 L.Ed.2d 612 (1980), I specially concurred stating that former A.R.S. § 13-454(E)(4) and (5) read together, indicated that the Arizona Legislature intended that these aggravating factors only apply in situations where the defendant is the procurer of the killer or the actual killer in a murder for hire agreement. These sections, which have since been renumbered but are substantively identical, are now codified at A.R.S. § 13-703(F) and read as follows:
u * * *
4. The defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment, or promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value.
5. The defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in the expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value.
* * * »
The majority opinion in Clark stated that A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(5) is present “if the receipt of money is established as a cause of the murder.” 126 Ariz. at 436, 616 P.2d at 896. In other words, the murder must have been committed with a “financial motivation.” Id. Since Clark, this Court has consistently applied A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(5) in accordance with the majority opinion. .The State Legislature has met in several regular and special sessions over a period of three years since the Clark decision, and although there have been two amendments to unrelated portions of A.R.S. § 13-703, to date there have been no changes to the portions of the statute which were the subject of my special concurrence in Clark. It is a generally accepted principle that our elected representatives know the law and thus should be aware of judicial interpretations of statutes. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 72 L.Ed.2d 182 (1982). I must therefore conclude that the lack of legislative action on those sections of A.R.S. § 13-703 that deal with pecuniary gain suggests that the Legislature has ratified the majority’s decision in Clark. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 683, 74 L.Ed.2d 548 (1983) (in examining the cumulative application of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Court stated that Congress’ failure to address the cumulative nature of the Act, while making other substantial changes to the Act, suggests that Congress ratified judicial decisions applying Section 10(b) cumulatively). Thus, A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(4) and (5) apply not only to hired killer situations, but also to those cases in which the murder was committed with a “financial motivation.” State v. Adamson, 136 Ariz. 250, 665 P.2d 972 (1983); State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 659 P.2d 1 (1983); State v. Poland, 132 Ariz. 269, 645 P.2d 784 (1982).
The language in A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(5) makes clear, however, that this aggravating circumstances does not apply in every situation where an individual has been killed while at the same time the defendant has made a financial gain. It is limited to those situations where “the defendant committed the offense * * * in the expectation of the receipt of anything of pecuniary value.” A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(5) (emphasis added). In other words, the hope of pecuniary gain must provide the impetus for the murder. For example, if a beneficiary killed an insured in order to gain the proceeds of a life insurance policy this aggravating circumstance would be satisfied. On the other hand, an unexpected or accidental death that was not in furtherance of the defendant’s goal of pecuniary gain, which occurs *297during the course of or flight from a robbery, does not in itself provide a sufficient. basis for finding the same aggravating circumstance. The aggravating circumstance in paragraph 5 should be found only in those cases where the murder is part of the defendant’s overall goal of pecuniary gain, not merely when a death occurs during which time the defendant benefitted financially.