Court Opinion

ID: 9644417
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:55:29.886201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:13.131789
License: Public Domain

*638ROBERTS, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority prevents Beatrice Friedman from sharing in any part of her husband’s estate, first by holding her to the terms of a hastily signed antenuptial writing, and then by refusing to enforce her husband’s unmistakable and enforceable promise to execute a will favorable to Beatrice. In so holding, the majority produces a result which, of course, would shock both Beatrice and Edward, as well as any other person familiar with the antenuptial agreement the couple so carefully formulated. Indeed, the undisputed facts demonstrate the existence of a clear and complete pre-marital plan. A will favorable to Beatrice is an essential and integral part of the package. Beatrice and Edward were afforded only enough time by Edward’s attorney to sign but one instrument. The majority views this single writing in isolation so as to deny Beatrice everything. Beatrice and Edward signed a single writing not through any fault of their own, but because of the scrivener’s asserted inability to make minor technical adjustments before Edward’s unanticipated death. The parties clearly did not realize that a hasty signing of the antenuptial writing, without the simultaneous execution of Edward’s will, could lead to the disastrous effects the majority’s decision now produces. The majority ignores the circumstances of the execution of this single writing, including the fact that Beatrice was without counsel, and overlooks the time pressures on the parties. Only by abandoning the cardinal principle that parties to an antenuptial agreement share a uniquely confidential relationship and owe each other “the duty of frank and unreserved disclosure of all circumstances which materially bear on the contemplated agreement,”1 can the majority give exclusive and controlling effect to the antenuptial writing signed in a less than “frank and unreserved” atmosphere. I must dissent.
*639On December 2, 1973, prior to their marriage, Edward Friedman, age 71, and Beatrice Kamile, age 58, met with Edward’s attorney, Gene McDonald in Latrobe, Pennsylvania, Edward’s home town. At that meeting, Edward expressed his wish that Beatrice receive all of his property upon Ms death except for $15,000. While disavowing all interest in Beatrice’s property, Edward expressed his desire to retain control over Ms own property only if the marriage ended in divorce. Beatrice stated that she wanted her property divided between her children upon her death. Following this meeting, FlcDonald undertook to prepare an antenuptial writing and wills embodying the clearly expressed intentions of Edward and Beatrice.
Because attorney McDonald did not have the antenuptial writing and wills prepared, the marriage planned for December 6 was postponed for one day. The documents were presented to Edward and Beatrice for the first time on December 7 in McDonald’s office, shortly before the marriage ceremony was to take place. Under the written terms of the draft of Edward’s will, Beatrice was to receive all of Ms assets except a $15,000 bequest to two nephews and a niece. Edward, however, expressed some reservation about the $15,000 bequest. McDonald said he could not redraft the $15,000 bequest in time for the scheduled marriage ceremony. instead, just minutes before the ceremony, McDonald suggested that the antenuptial agreement be signed immediately and the wills be taken care of after the marriage. At no time did FlcDonald or Edward offer any suggestion or evidence the slightest concern that this action might deprive Beatrice of the only significant benefit she was to receive from the antenuptial agreement and at the same time work a forfeiture of all her rights.
On the next day, December 8, McDonald brought the original draft of Edward’s will to Edward’s home in Latrobe. The provision for Beatrice was unchanged. At Edward’s suggestion, FlcDonald met with the couple several days later to discuss minor alterations in Ms will, none of which affected Beatrice’s rights. A new will with these adjustments was *640typed on December 17. On December 18, Edward Friedman died.
It is of great significance that under the antenuptial writing, as the majority interprets it, Beatrice was to give up all her rights to Edward’s property during and after his life. Unless she was provided for in Edward’s will, she received nothing in return. On the other hand, upon execution of the antenuptial writing, Edward received all that he expected. In these circumstances, it is simply not enough to say, as the trial court did, that “[bjoth the decedent and the claimant may have acted unwisely and with little caution in regards to the consequences of their haste in signing this [antenuptial] agreement.” The failure to inform Beatrice that the delay in the execution of Edward’s will might have adverse consequences upon her interests such as in the circumstances of this case, should compel this Court to respect the parties’ clear, mutual, and express intention rather than to view the antenuptial writing as the complete expression of their contract.
The majority acknowledges that in reviewing the trial court’s entry of a compulsory nonsuit, it must afford the plaintiff the benefit of all favorable evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom and must resolve all evidentiary conflicts in plaintiff’s favor. Apple v. Reichert, 443 Pa. 289, 293, 278 A.2d 482, 484 (1971). Despite its awareness of this standard, the majority obscures the undisputed and controlling facts which, when properly viewed, entitle Beatrice to the benefit of Edward’s promise.
In Fahringer v. Strine’s Estate, 420 Pa. 48, 216 A.2d 82 (1966), this Court articulated the standard of proof necessary to show a contract to make a will. The majority determined that the requirements of Fahringer have not been met because the appellant did not demonstrate a promise to make a will by “clear, direct, precise and convincing” evidence. The majority further states that the draft' of Edward’s will differed significantly from appellant’s claim that Edward intended to bequeath all but $15,000 of his estate to appellant. The majority simply refuses to recognize the facts of record.
*641This is not a case in which an interested party offers uncorroborated testimony that a decedent has promised to include him in his will. Whatever suspicion may fairly be cast upon such testimony it is clear that in the present case there is no cause for such doubts. Here the decedent’s attorney has testified without contradiction or impeachment that Edward Friedman intended to devise all of his estate (except for $15,000) to his wife Beatrice and that he specifically directed his attorney to carry out that intention in drafting his will. The evidence, moreover, is clear that this bequest was to be part of a complete antenuptial agreement consisting of the writing and the wills. McDonald testified that he explained to Edward and Beatrice that their wills “fit together” with the antenuptial writing. To illustrate this point to Beatrice and Edward, McDonald interlocked his fingers. Assenting to that specific agreement, the parties were married. Edward’s drafted will, approved by him in all respects pertaining to Beatrice, itself demonstrates the exact terms of his expressly intended bequest. The draft of Beatrice’s will, by providing for the disposition of the bequest from Edward, further revealed that Edward’s will was an essential component of their understanding and agreement. It is unreasonable to conclude that there is no clear, direct, precise and convincing evidence that the execution of Edward’s will was a part of Edward’s contractual promise to Beatrice. On the contrary, the evidence clearly establishes that contractual promise.
A simple reading of the draft of Edward’s will demonstrates that appellant’s claim that she was entitled to receive all but $15,000 of Edward’s estate is meritorious. That estate was to be placed in trust for the benefit of Beatrice. The majority’s statement to the contrary is unexplainable.2
*642Finally we must consider the impact of the antenuptial writing itself. Of particular significance are the following terms:
“5. In the event that Edward predeceases Beatrice, then Beatrice shall receive no assets from the estate of Edward except those assets or interest in his estate which shall be devised to Beatrice in any Will which Edward shall make after the date of this agreement.”
“6. Nothing contained in this Agreement shall be deemed to constitute a waiver by either Edward or Beatrice of any bequest, legacy or interest in an estate that may be left by one to the other. The parties acknowledge that no promises have been made by either of them to the other with respect to any such bequest or legacy except as herein specifically provided.”
The majority ignores paragraph five’s reference to an interest in Edward’s estate which “shall be devised to Beatrice,” and determines that, regardless of all other evidence, paragraph six absolutely precludes the existence of a contract to make a will. Had no bequest whatsoever been promised, as the majority believes, the parties would not have had any reason to include the exception clause in paragraph six.
Even if the antenuptial writing does not specifically include a promise to make a will, exclusive reliance upon paragraph six is a misapplication of the standard of review of compulsory nonsuits and evidences disregard for the clear, uncontradicted facts. Appellant has offered evidence that paragraph six, as interpreted by the majority, simply does not reflect the understanding of either of the parties. The testimony of Edward’s attorney firmly demonstrates that the parties intended to execute Edward’s will at the same time as the antenuptial writing. Their failure to execute the will in no way demonstrated an intent to modify their unmistakable antenuptial plan and agreement. Moreover, the suggestion that the signing of the will be delayed was made at a time just prior to the marriage ceremony when Beatrice, without independent counsel, was least likely to be able to exercise businesslike judgment. Her failure to ob*643ject to the delay and her failure to object specifically to paragraph six, under the circumstances, does not in and of itself defeat Edward’s contractual promise to make a will. Thus, Beatrice has adequately demonstrated that any contrary conclusion which might be drawn from paragraph six does not reflect the parties clearly expressed intentions.3 To hold otherwise would be to disregard the realities of the circumstances and the high fiduciary duty owed to Beatrice.
Although I conclude that Edward and Beatrice executed an enforceable contract to make a will under which Beatrice can recover, I would also note that at the very least, Beatrice is entitled to her statutory share of Edward’s estate. This court’s observations in Warner’s Estate, 210 Pa. 431, 59 A. 1113 (1904), where an antenuptial agreement was set aside, are particularly apt:
“She [the wife] was surrounded by Dr. Warner [her husband] and his attorneys, and it does not seem to have even been suggested she should have advice of friends. ‘To say she was bound, when the contract was proposed, to exercise her judgment; that she ought to have taken advantage of the opportunity that existed to obtain information; that, if she did not do so, it was her own fault — is to suggest what would be revolting to all the better feelings of women’s nature.’ Kline v. Kline, 57 Pa. 120, 98 Am. Dec. 206. To have selfish and interested motives at such a time cannot be imputed to her. She had a right to assume that her prospective husband would act justly with her.”
Beatrice, unaided by the advice of counsel, was entitled to believe that Edward would execute the will which had been drafted and which he had approved just prior to the marriage in all respects concerning her. That will was emphatically described as an interlocking part of the overall ante-*644nuptial plan. Beatrice was likewise entitled to assume that her prospective husband and his attorney would not deprive her of this benefit by a course of conduct which all concerned believed to have only technical significance. This Court stated the fundamental principle in Hillegass Estate, 431 Pa. 144, 149, 244 A.2d 672, 675 (1968):
“Parties to an Antenuptial Agreement providing for the disposition of their respective estates do not deal at arm’s length, but stand in a relation of mutual confidence and trust that calls for the highest degree of good faith . . .”
To hold in these circumstances that Beatrice should be barred by the isolated antenuptial writing from receiving the benefit of her statutory share of Edward’s estate is to deprive her of protection which this Court has always been eager to preserve. See Harrison Estate, 456 Pa. 356, 359, 319 A.2d 5, 7 (1974). The majority, therefore, compounds its error in refusing to recognize the contract to make a will by also denying appellant her statutory elective share.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse both the decree of the orphan’s court dismissing appellant’s objections to the probate of the 1967 will and the trial court’s grant of appellees’ motion for compulsory nonsuit. I would remand the case for entry of a decree consistent with this opinion.
LARSEN, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. Valish Estate, 431 Pa. 88, 97, 244 A.2d 745, 750 (1968). Accord, Harrison Estate, 456 Pa. 356, 319 A.2d 5 (1974); Hiliegass Estate, 431 Pa. 144, 244 A.2d 672 (1968); Warner Estate, 210 Pa. 431, 59 A. 1113 (1904).

. Recognition that the antenuptial agreement here included a contract to make a will does not threaten, as the trial court feared, to convert “virtually every estate plan prepared by a lawyer for a husband and wife” into a “contractual relationship.” Plainly, not every such plan may be an essential and integral part of an agreement by which a prospective wife otherwise forfeits all her rights to her husband’s property.

. Appellant argues, and this court has recognized, that a mistake in the terms of a written agreement need not prevent the effectuation of the parties’ true mutual intentions. See, e. g., Evans v. Marks, 421 Pa. 146, 218 A.2d 802 (1966); McFadden v. American Oil Co., 215 Pa.Super. 44, 257 A.2d 283 (1969); 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2417. Cf. Bollinger v. Central Pa. Quarry Stripping & Constr. Co., 425 Pa. 430, 229 A.2d 741 (1967).