Court Opinion

ID: 9385914
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-10 19:00:32.563393+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:59.459027
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10991    Document: 36-1      Date Filed: 04/10/2023   Page: 1 of 13

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-10991
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellee,
        versus
        SYNDY ANAIA FELIX,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20085-CMA-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court               22-10991

        Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and JORDAN and BRANCH, Cir-
        cuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Syndy Felix appeals her convictions and sentences for one
        count of the use of unauthorized access devices, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2,
        1029(a)(2), and three counts of aggravated identity theft, id. §§ 2,
        1028A(a)(1). Felix argues that the district court erred by denying
        her motions for a mistrial and for a new trial because the prosecu-
        tor’s misstatement during rebuttal closing argument was a deliber-
        ate comment on her constitutional right to silence. Felix also ar-
        gues that her sentence of 64 months of imprisonment is procedur-
        ally and substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
               Before trial, Felix stipulated to the fact that she owned a
        white Chrysler 200 and that she was the individual depicted in sev-
        eral photographs in the government’s exhibits. During her opening
        statement, Felix stated that she had used debit cards that did not
        belong to her but disputed that she had the knowledge or intent to
        defraud.
              At trial, the government presented testimony from Roger
        Kennedy, a senior field investigator at Regions Bank. Kennedy re-
        ceived a daily report from the debit-card-claims department and
        noticed that Regions debit cards belonging to individuals outside
        of southern Florida were being used in Miami-Dade and Broward
        Counties. Kennedy reviewed transaction records and surveillance
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        22-10991                Opinion of the Court                         3

        video for automated teller machines, which depicted a woman
        driving a white Chrysler 200 with an unobscured license plate that
        was registered to Felix. Kennedy identified Felix as the individual
        who had been using the stolen debit account numbers.
               Kennedy estimated that, between February 2 and March 22,
        2017, Felix was responsible for approximately 90 successful or un-
        successful debit card transactions at 12 machines involving 38 bank
        accounts. Kennedy determined that Felix was able to withdraw
        over $17,000 and was unsuccessful in her attempts to withdraw
        slightly less than $17,000. Kennedy noticed that Felix sometimes
        stood at teller machines for up to 15 minutes making multiple
        transactions with more than one debit card and personal identifica-
        tion number, and she did not attempt to hide her face or her license
        plate. Kennedy also noticed that Felix used the same debit account
        number multiple times in a single night by withdrawing $800,
        which was the daily withdrawal limit set by Regions Bank, before
        midnight and another $800 a few hours after midnight. Kennedy
        believed that another individual was involved because some pho-
        tographs depicted a passenger in Felix’s vehicle, but he could not
        determine the passenger’s identity.
               Felix testified in her defense and denied being a “thief.” Felix
        stated that, from the end of January to the end of March 2017, she
        had a boyfriend named “Matthew,” whom she called “Cashew.”
        They met at a New Year’s Eve party, and he took her on dates to
        nice restaurants and nightclubs and paid for everything, including
        bottles of liquor. Before they would go out, “Matthew” would ask
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10991

        Felix to drive to a teller machine to obtain cash. He never drove
        because his license was suspended, but he sometimes accompanied
        her and stayed in the passenger’s seat while Felix made the with-
        drawal. Felix explained that she was on the phone with “Matthew”
        during many of the transactions because she could not remember
        his personal identification number. Whenever the card he gave her
        did not work, “Matthew” would tell her that he gave her the wrong
        card or that there was not enough money in the account. All of the
        cards looked like Regions Bank cards, and she recalled glancing at
        one of the cards and seeing “Matthew” printed on it. Felix did not
        think that it was unusual for a person to have more than one card
        with a single bank. Felix did not cover her face or license plate be-
        cause she was unaware that she was committing a crime until she
        was indicted three years later. Felix stated that her mistakes were
        “dating the wrong guy, trusting the wrong person.”
                On cross-examination, Felix stated that Matthew never told
        her his last name. Felix knew that Matthew lived in a house in
        Miramar, but she did not know if he lived alone. Felix believed that
        he was 25 years old and that he owned businesses, but the only
        business she knew about was a dirt bike repair business. Felix ex-
        plained that he sometimes asked her to make multiple withdrawals
        in a single night because he had bills to pay in the morning. Felix
        stated that she broke up with Matthew because they grew apart.
              During closing argument, defense counsel told the jury,
        “Don’t just listen to what [] Felix said on the stand, but look at the
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        22-10991               Opinion of the Court                         5

        way she said it. . . . She answered every question and she answered
        honestly and she answered respectfully.”
               In rebuttal, the prosecutor stated that Felix “had deliberately
        closed her eyes to something that was very, very much apparent to
        her.” The prosecutor also addressed Felix’s testimony about her
        boyfriend:
              There is a man we hear about for the first time today
              named Matthew. Matthew doesn’t have a last name,
              goes by Cashew, and he lives in a cul-de-sac in a house
              in Miramar. That’s all we know about Matthew; quite
              literally, specifically that’s all we know.
               After Felix reserved a motion, the district court instructed
        the jury that “[a]nything the lawyers say is not evidence and is not
        binding on the [jury].” The district court also instructed the jury on
        deliberate avoidance of knowledge.
               After the jury left to deliberate, Felix moved for a mistrial
        based on the prosecutor’s statement that this was the first time that
        the government learned about “Matthew.” Felix argued that the
        statement was an improper comment on her right to remain silent.
        Felix also submitted a statement from one of the government’s po-
        tential witnesses that stated that Felix’s new boyfriend “went by
        Peanut or Nut.” Felix argued that, based on the statement, it was
        “obvious this person existed” and the prosecutor’s misstatement
        “cast the entire [d]efense in doubt based upon a wrongful fact.” The
        government responded that it was not clear that “Cashew” and
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                22-10991

        “Peanut,” or “Nut,” were the same person and argued that the re-
        buttal statement responded to the credibility of Felix’s characteri-
        zation of her boyfriend and did not dispute his existence.
               The district court denied the motion for a mistrial but
        brought the jury back in and instructed, “[T]he [g]overnment made
        the statement, This is the first time we hear of a Matthew or a
        Cashew. You are to disregard that statement in its entirety. That
        statement is stricken.” The jury convicted Felix on all counts.
               Felix moved for a new trial. Felix argued, in relevant part,
        that the prosecutor’s rebuttal statement was plainly erroneous and
        a violation of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). Felix argued that
        the prosecutor had used her post-arrest silence to impeach her ex-
        culpatory testimony about her boyfriend, despite having learned
        from a potential witness that Felix had dated someone called “Pea-
        nut” or “Nut” who flaunted money, jewelry, and nice cars.
                The district court denied Felix’s motion for a new trial. The
        district court ruled that no Doyle violation occurred because, at
        least as of two weeks before trial, the police had never interviewed
        Felix, and there was no occasion where Felix would have received
        a warning under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The dis-
        trict court also ruled that any Doyle violation would have been
        harmless in the light of the overwhelming evidence of Felix’s guilt
        and the curative instruction to the jury.
               Felix’s presentence investigation report provided a criminal
        history category of I, a base offense level of six, United States
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        22-10991               Opinion of the Court                         7

        Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1(a)(2), a four-level enhance-
        ment because the loss was more than $15,000 but less than $40,000,
        id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(C), and a two-level enhancement because the of-
        fense involved the production of counterfeit access devices, id.
        § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B)(i). The aggravated identity theft convictions car-
        ried a mandatory consecutive term of two years of imprisonment,
        which “may, in the discretion of the court, run concurrently, in
        whole or in part, only with another term of imprisonment” im-
        posed on additional aggravated identity theft convictions. 18 U.S.C.
        § 1028A(a)(1), (b)(2), (b)(4); U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(a), cmt. n.2(B).
                The government objected that the report failed to include
        an enhancement for obstruction of justice, U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The
        government argued that Felix could have testified without resort-
        ing to misrepresentations of fact, but instead, she testified that she
        carried out 90 transactions at over 10 locations with over 30 differ-
        ent debit cards, each with a different personal identification num-
        ber, all while believing that each of the cards and the cash belonged
        to her boyfriend.
                The district court sustained the objection and found that Fe-
        lix’s “testimony was frankly incredible” and “remarkable.” With
        the obstruction enhancement, Felix’s guideline range sentence be-
        came 15 to 21 months of imprisonment and a consecutive 24
        months of imprisonment on the three counts of aggravated iden-
        tity theft, to run consecutively or concurrently.
               The district court heard Felix’s allocution, in which she
        stated that she was naïve but had been reformed. In addressing the
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                 22-10991

        sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court stated that
        “[t]here was no reason for [Felix] to get involved in this except
        greed and the lack of respect for others” and that the surveillance
        videos of Felix showed that she was “doing it without any remorse,
        without any concern for what impact this would have on others.”
        The district court stated that the nature of the offense was serious
        because “identity theft is a plague” and stated that the sentence
        should promote respect for the law and deter Felix and others.
               The district court sentenced Felix to 16 months of imprison-
        ment followed by two consecutive terms of 24 months of impris-
        onment and a concurrent term of 24 months of imprisonment, for
        a total sentence of 64 months of imprisonment. The district court
        also ordered Felix to pay $17,160 in restitution and a $7,500 fine.
               Felix challenges the denial of her motions for a mistrial and
        a new trial, which we review for an abuse of discretion. United
        States v. Reeves, 742 F.3d 487, 504 (11th Cir. 2014).
                Felix argues that the prosecutor made a deliberate misstate-
        ment of fact in her rebuttal closing argument, but we disagree.
        Prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument warrants a new
        trial only when the remarks were improper and prejudiced the de-
        fendant’s substantial rights. Id. at 505. Viewing the comments in
        the context of the trial as a whole, we consider “(1) whether the
        challenged comments had a tendency to mislead the jury or preju-
        dice the defendant; (2) whether the comments were isolated or ex-
        tensive; (3) whether the comments were deliberately or acci-
        dentally placed before the jury; and (4) the strength of the
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        22-10991               Opinion of the Court                         9

        competent proof establishing the guilt of the defendant.” Id. A
        prosecutor may draw conclusions from the evidence and, “as an
        advocate, is entitled to make a fair response to the arguments of
        defense counsel.” Id. If the district court issued a curative instruc-
        tion, we will reverse only if the evidence is so highly prejudicial as
        to be incurable. See id. at 506.
                The prosecutor’s statement did not affect Felix’s substantial
        rights because there is no reasonable probability that, but for the
        statement, the outcome would have been different. Felix presented
        no evidence that the government was aware of a “Matthew” before
        she testified. And even if the government suspected during Felix’s
        testimony that “Cashew” could be the same person who its poten-
        tial witness called “Peanut” or “Nut,” that suspicion alone did not
        render the prosecutor’s statement a deliberate falsehood. Further,
        viewed in the context of the entire trial, this isolated statement did
        not undermine Felix’s testimony that another person was involved.
        Indeed, Kennedy testified that, based on his investigation, he be-
        lieved that another individual was involved in the scheme. And
        many of the government’s exhibits depicted either a passenger in
        Felix’s vehicle or Felix with her cell phone to her ear when she was
        making the withdrawals.
               The evidence of Felix’s guilt was overwhelming too. In less
        than two months, Felix made or attempted to make over 90 cash
        withdrawals totaling $33,960 using 38 stolen debit account num-
        bers, each of which required a different personal identification
        number. Surveillance video captured Felix and her vehicle at the
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10991

        teller machines, and her face was visible in over two dozen of the
        government’s photographic exhibits. By stipulating to the conduct,
        Felix placed her intent and knowledge, and the credibility of her
        testimony, squarely at issue. But her story that she did not know
        any reasonable information about the boyfriend for whom she was
        making a significant number of cash withdrawals in a short period
        was not believable. And we also “presume that the jury followed
        the district court’s curative instruction[].” See United States v. Va-
        lois, 915 F.3d 717, 726 (11th Cir. 2019); Reeves, 742 F.3d at 506.
                Felix erroneously argues that the prosecutor’s rebuttal state-
        ment was a comment on Felix’s right to silence. Doyle held that
        the use of a defendant’s post-arrest, post-Miranda silence for im-
        peachment purposes violates due process. 426 U.S. at 619. But a
        defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence is admissible for im-
        peachment purposes because such silence may be probative “and
        does not rest on any implied assurance by law enforcement author-
        ities that it will carry no penalty.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.
        619, 628 (1993). And we “permit the prosecution to use a defend-
        ant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as direct evidence that may
        tend to prove the guilt of the defendant.” United States v. Wilch-
        combe, 838 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2016). Because Felix does not
        dispute that she never received a Miranda warning, her argument
        is foreclosed by precedent. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 628; Wilchcombe,
        838 F.3d at 1190.
              Felix argues that the district court procedurally erred by fail-
        ing to make an independent factual finding to support the
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        22-10991                Opinion of the Court                         11

        enhancement for obstruction of justice, U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. We disa-
        gree. We review factual findings regarding an obstruction of justice
        enhancement for clear error and the application of law to those
        facts de novo. United States v. Bradberry, 466 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th
        Cir. 2006). The Guidelines provide a two-level enhancement for a
        “defendant [who] willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to
        obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to
        the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant of-
        fense,” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, which includes attempting to evade con-
        viction by perjury, see id. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(b). “[I]t is preferable for
        a district court to address each element of the alleged perjury in a
        separate and clear finding.” United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87,
        95 (1993). But “a remand is not necessary when the record clearly
        reflects the basis for [an] enhancement and supports it.” United
        States v. Feldman, 931 F.3d 1245, 1263 (11th Cir. 2019) (alteration
        in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
                The determination by the district court that Felix gave false
        testimony was supported by the record and was not clearly errone-
        ous. The district court ruled that Felix’s testimony that she had no
        knowledge of the criminal nature of her conduct was “frankly in-
        credible” and “remarkable.” In denying Felix’s motion for a new
        trial, the district court explained that the government presented
        overwhelming evidence “showing [Felix’s] knowledge—or delib-
        erate avoidance of knowledge—that she was making unauthorized
        cash withdrawals” and that Felix attempted to shift the blame but
        “was discredited when she could not answer the most basic
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10991

        questions about her purported ex-boyfriend.” Although Felix com-
        plains that these findings were not specific enough, she failed to
        request more particular findings, so she cannot complain that the
        district court erred by failing to make them. See United States v.
        Hubert, 138 F.3d 912, 915 (11th Cir. 1998).
               Felix challenges the substantive reasonableness of her sen-
        tence, which we review for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United
        States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The district court “imposes a substan-
        tively unreasonable sentence only when it (1) fails to afford consid-
        eration to relevant factors that were due significant weight;
        (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or
        (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper fac-
        tors.” United States v. Taylor, 997 F.3d 1348, 1355 (11th Cir. 2021).
                The district court reasonably determined, after stating that
        it carefully considered all of the sentencing factors, that a total sen-
        tence of 64 months of imprisonment accounted for Felix’s “serious”
        offense conduct and provided adequate deterrence to her and to
        others. The selection of a sentence less than the statutory maxi-
        mum of ten years on the first count alone and within Felix’s guide-
        line range also suggests that the sentence is reasonable. See United
        States v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293, 1310 (11th Cir. 2016); United
        States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008). Felix argues that
        the district court failed to meaningfully consider her personal his-
        tory, but the district court heard her allocution and was “not re-
        quired to explicitly address each of the § 3553(a) factors or all of the
        mitigating evidence.” Taylor, 997 F.3d at 1354.
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        22-10991            Opinion of the Court                   13

              We AFFIRM Felix’s convictions and sentence.