Court Opinion

ID: 9854755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:13:27.239493+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:20.218644
License: Public Domain

SCHAUER, J.,
Dissenting. — I am in accord with the opinion authored for the District Court of Appeal (reported at (Cal.App.) 9 Cal.Rptr. 153) by Justice Ashburn and concurred in by Presiding Justice Pox and Justice pro tempore *734Kincaid, and by reference adopt it as explanatory of the reasons why I cannot join my associates in affirming the judgment of the superior court.
Although Justice Ashburn’s opinion is fully adequate and impelling to the conclusions reached, it, of course, was written before the opinion of my associates and, in view of their position, it appears proper to add emphasis to those facts which essentially distinguish this case from cases relied on by the majority.
Preliminarily it is to be noted that it is now, and at all pertinent times has been, provided in the Constitution of this state that “When any person aggrieved thereby appeals from a decision of the department . . . revoking any license . . . the [Appeals] board shall review the decision. ...” (Canst., art. XX, § 22; italics added.) Most important here is the fact that until the District Court of Appeal acted in the matter now at bench, no appellate tribunal, either administrative or judicial, had ever exercised jurisdiction over the appeal of plaintiff-appellant; i.e., that party had never been accorded its constitutionally granted right. Each and every tribunal which possessed potential constitutional authority to act had expressly refused to pass on the matter. Chronologically the events were as follows:
1. On March 22, 1956, the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control revoked plaintiff’s on-sale license.
2. Plaintiff filed timely notice of appeal to the Appeals Board.
3. The Appeals Board refused to exercise its jurisdiction ; it did not review the decision; it neither affirmed nor reversed; it dismissed solely for asserted want of jurisdiction although as a matter of law on the undisputed facts it did not have jurisdiction to dismiss (see City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court (1959), 53 Cal.2d 236, 243-244 [2, 3] [347 P.2d 294]; Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941), 17 Cal.2d 280, 288, 291 [3, 4] [109 P.2d 942, 132 A.L.R 715]); it was mandatorily bound to review the decision. (“When any person . . . appeals from a decision of the department . . . the board shall review the decision. ...” (Canst., art. XX, §22).)
4. Plaintiff sought relief in the superior court. That court declined to exercise jurisdiction to review; it sustained a demurrer to plaintiff’s complaint, without leave to amend, on the indisputably untenable theory that it had no jurisdiction to review the Appeals Board's dismissal of plaintiff’s *735appeal because plaintiff had taken no (timely) appeal to the board. To repeat, the trial court shared with the Appeals Board the erroneous notions that no appeal had been taken to the Appeals Board, that by failing to appeal to that board plaintiff had failed to exhaust its administrative remedy and, hence, that “the courts have no jurisdiction to review the proceeding.” (Hollywood Circle, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1957), 153 Cal.App.2d 523, 526 [4] [314 P.2d 1007]; hearing denied by Supreme Court, Schauer, J., dissenting.)
5. Plaintiff appealed and the District Court of Appeal, although recognizing the injustice of the matter, shared the view of the Appeals Board and the trial court that, for the admittedly untenable reason above stated, “the courts have no jurisdiction to review the proceeding.” And, as above noted this (Supreme) Court, by a divided vote, denied a hearing. Obviously this court shared the same untenable view that it, as the lower courts had held, had no jurisdiction because no appeal had been taken to the Appeals Board.
Approximately one year later this court, in Pesce v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1958), 51 Cal.2d 310, 312-313 [1-3] [333 P.2d 15], Gibson, Chief Justice, and Tray-nor, Justice, dissenting (see also Silva v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1958), 51 Cal.2d 885, 886 [333 P.2d 18], with the same justices dissenting) expressly disapproved the holding of the earlier Hollywood Circle case and properly recognized that an appeal taken under the circumstances of both the Hollywood Circle and the Pesce eases is timely and that the Appeals Board has jurisdiction thereof. There was no relevant change in the Constitution or in any statute between the first Hollywood Circle case and the Pesce decision. The law was then as it is now. And still Hollywood Circle has never had its day in court on appeal; it has never had the review granted to it by section 22 of article XX of the Constitution.
Constitutional jurisdiction of the subject matter — of the res of a cause — is not something which can be turned on or off by administrative agencies or courts. (See In re Carmen’s Petition (1958), 165 F.Supp. 942, 949-951 [6-8], affmd. 270 F.2d 809, cert. den. 361 U.S. 934 [80 S.Ct. 375, 4 L.Ed.2d 355], rehrg. den. 361 U.S. 973 [80 S.Ct. 585, 4 L.Ed.2d 553] ; see also In re Byrnes (1945), 26 Cal.2d 824, 827-828 [1-2] [161 P.2d 376].) When a timely notice of appeal has been given, *736the appellate tribunal acquires jurisdiction and that jurisdiction continues until it has been exercised or lawfully terminated ; it is neither exercised nor terminated by the arbitrary dismissal of a timely appeal, on the mistaken assumption that no such appeal has been taken. Hence, plaintiff’s appeal is still pending, and mandamus should issue to compel the Appeals Board to recognize and to exercise its jurisdiction thereof.
In the interests of justice as well as obedience to the law, I would reverse the judgment with directions that plaintiff be granted the relief sought.
McComb, J., concurred.