Court Opinion

ID: 9786872
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:03:57.509508+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:49.422871
License: Public Domain

GOLDEN, Justice,
dissenting, with whom VOIGT, Justice, joins.
[¶ 59] Because I believe that Belden was denied his right to a fair trial by the improper admission of prejudicial uncharged misconduct evidence and judicial and prosecuto-rial misconduct, I1 must respectfully dissent.
[¶ 60] The fundamental issue in this case was the identity of the victim's attacker and killer. Proof of a motive could assist in identifying the killer; however, motive that is too general, universal or applicable to a large number of persons is not helpful for identification. In this case, the motive accepted by the trial court was too general under the specific facts of this case to have been admissible without violating W.R.E. 404 and 408. The trial court's instruction to the jury that Belden may have had a motive to kill the victim followed by statements that he had been accused of a crime, charged, but not convicted left the jury to guess as to what connection these statements had to the evidence in this case.
[¶ 61] No evidence showed that Belden was worried about another rape accusation or had felt compelled to kill other women that he had sexual intercourse with to avoid accusations, and to assign him that potential motive would have required jury speculation. The jury might have guessed that his motive was to eliminate the victim as a witness to his sexual assault upon her; however, that motive applied to whomever killed the victim and is too general to have been admissible as peculiar to Belden. Nor was there any evidence that Belden had increased incentive to kill this vietim for fear of severe punishment. Contrary evidence not revealed to the jury indicated that his experience with accusations led to very little punishment because he was previously acquitted of one charge and the other was dismissed after he pled guilty to a misdemeanor.
[T62] Furthermore, these" statements were too unfairly prejudicial to be admitted. *1092Belden was charged with sexual assault felony murder, meaning evidence of an intent to commit a murder was not required and the jury must first conviet of sexual assault before it could convict for felony murder. Admitting evidence that Belden had previously been accused of sexual assault was plainly too prejudicial because this evidence only proved that he had been accused of other sexual assaults. In other words, it was propensity evidence and was inadmissible.
[¶ 63] Uncharged misconduct that demonstrates evidence of a motive to commit the charged crime is admissible in a felony murder trial; however, the cireumstances that allow its admission are limited. Evidence of a potential motive, such as the one presented in this case, is rarely admissible. Proof of a motive that is "peculiar to the defendant" or arises from an emotion that is "directed at the victim or class of victims" are examples of admissible evidence of motive. The evidence is admitted because it reliably identifies the perpetrator while eliminating the risk that the accused will be convicted for his bad character. 1 Edward J. Imwinkelreid, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, § 8:15 to 8:18 (Rev. ed.1999). For example, had the trial court in this case found that proof existed that Belden had made statements indicating that he would kill to avoid another rape accusation then it is probable that the evidence would have been admissible as evidence of motive,. Because the ultimate fact for the jury to decide from this type of uncharged misconduct evidence is identity, if the previous misconduct was so similar to this case's facts because in those previous cases, Belden had left work and arrived at their residences, brutally beaten and sexually assaulted them and then had strangled them and it was only fortuitous that each had lived, then it is again probable that the evidence would have been admissible. Without this type of proof, the trial court could not admit previous sexual assault accusations without running afoul of Rules 404 and 408. The lack of motive evidence as well as the dissimilarity to this erime's facts resulted in an admission of evidence that simply proved that he had committed this crime because he had committed other crimes. My conclusion is borne out by the prosecutor's own words in his closing argument that stated:
And, finally, the evidence shows that in the past, the Defendant had had sexual intercourse with women and been accused of rape. It is our contention, Ladies and Gentlemen, that these facts point out one inescapable conclusion, that the Defendant sexually assaulted and murdered [the vie-tim.]
Such a statement by the prosecutor used the uncharged misconduct to prove the sexual assault and was in violation of the court's limiting instructions.
[¶ 64] The prosecutor also committed misconduct when he elicited an answer from an investigator that DNA indicated that Belden had "sexually assaulted" her and had left semen in her body. Eliciting an opinion of the accused's guilt in this manner is reversible error. Whiteplume v. State, 841 P.2d 1332, 1338 (Wyo.1992); Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879, 881 (Wyo.1990); Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 68 (Wyo.1989). Finally, in his closing argument, the prosecutor admonished the jury to "do your duty. Review all of the evidence and return with a just and proper verdict; that is, that the Defendant is guilty of the crimes of sexual assault in the first degree and murder in the first degree." This statement can only be read as an exhortation that implied this jury could only do its duty if it reached a certain verdict. Wilks v. State, 2002 WY 100, 1127, 28, 49 P.8d 975, 987 (Wyo.2002).
[T65] Finally, I must disagree with the majority's conclusion after thorough examination of the judicial conduct in this case, that such conduct did not deprive Belden of a fair trial. Had Belden complained of a few individual statements, I would agree with the majority's conclusion; however, we cannot consider all of these many statements in isolation from one another. Both the majority and Justice Voigt's dissenting opinion find that the judge engaged in numerous incidents of improper conduct and it is this sheer number that requires that I depart with the view that the conduct was not prejudicial.
[¶ 66] I would reverse and remand this case for new trial.
*1093VOIGT, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 67] I agree with the reasoning and conclusions contained in Justice Golden's dissenting opinion. I write separately to emphasize that I would reverse primarily due to judicial misconduct. The record reveals that this was not a situation where a remark or two by the trial judge raised a question of potential bias. Instead, the record reveals judicial harassment and intimidation of counsel, and gross and continuing interference by the trial judge in counsels' attempts to try their respective cases. Beyond that, the trial judge's inappropriate attempts at levity endangered the sense of seriousness and dignity due a murder trial, The trial judge berated counsel for engaging in a "big stud duck" contest, but it is clear that he was the one most caught up in the contest for the jury's attention and approbation.
[¶ 68] The trial judge in this case violated several specific rules:
(1) Trial judges must be mindful of the influence they wield, and that their words may mold the opinion of the jurors to the extent that a party may be prejudiced. Randolph v. State, 117 Nev. 970, 36 P.3d 424, 483 (2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 845, 123 S.Ct. 188, 154 LEd.2d 72 (2002). The trial judge should be conscious of the fact that all concerned, including parties, witnesses and jurors, look to him for justice and that comments he makes and the attitude he conveys toward counsel and the trial may have an important effect thereon. State v. Sanchez, 611 P.2d 721, 722 (Utah 1980). The trial judge must exercise restraint over his conduct and utterances, must suppress his personal predilections, and must control his temper and emotions, and when it becomes necessary during trial for the judge to comment upon the conduct of witnesses, spectators, counsel, or others, he should do so in a firm, dignified and restrained manner. State v. Walker, 252 Kan. 279, 845 P2d 1, 11 (1993). The trial judge should be the exemplar of dignity and impartiality, should avoid repartee, should avoid any conduct that tends to demean the proceedings, and should not permit any person in the courtroom to embroil him in conflict. State v. Gadelkarim, 256 Kan. 671, 887 P.2d 88, 95 (1994).
(2) It is not the job of the trial judge to represent the defendant or to second-guess strategy employed by defense counsel. Kailukiak v. State, 959 P.2d 771, 776 (Alaska App.1998), abrogated on other grounds by Harmon v. State, 11 P.3d 398 (Alaska App.2000). The trial judge must not interject himself into the attorney-client relationship between the defendant and counsel. Rhyne v. State, 38 P.8d 163, 167 (Nev.2002). The trial judge must allow counsel freedom to present their respective cases, regardless of whether the trial judge may feel the case is proceeding on the wrong theory or that the trial judge would try the case differently. McCabe v. R.A. Manning Const. Co., Inc., 674 P.2d 699, 708 (Wyo.1983).
(3) Critical decisions in a eriminal case should not rest, in whole or in part, on an attempt to teach an attorney a lesson. State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 858 P.2d 1152, 1198 (19983), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1046, 114 S.Ct. 1578, 128 L.Ed.2d 221 (1994), The concept of judicial independence does not equate to unbridled discretion on the part of the judge to bully and threaten. In re Hammermaster, 189 Wash2d 211, 985 P.2d 924, 986 (1999).
(4) Well-conceived judicial humor may be a welcome relief in a long, tense trial. People v. Riel, 22 Cal .4th 11533, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969, 985 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1087, 121 S.Ct. 803, 148 L.Ed.2d 690 (2001) (quoting People v. Melton, 44 Cal.3d 713, 753-54, 244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 934, 109 S.Ct. 329, 102 L.Ed.2d 346 (1988)). Injecting levity into a trial may, however, create a scintillating and relaxed atmosphere that may adversely influence the jury's perception of the significance of the trial.7 Parodi v. Washoe Medical Center, Inc., 111 Nev. 865, 892 P.2d 588, 589-90 (1995). Further, counsel may fear interjecting disapproval of such atmosphere. Id.
[¶ 69] When read as a whole, the record compels the conclusion that the appellant did not receive a fair trial The multiple inci*1094dents of judicial misconduct colored the entire proceeding to such an extent that we cannot be assured that the verdict would have been the same in the absence of such misconduct. I would reverse and remand for a new trial.

. The jurors asking for popcorn to watch a videotaped exhibit comes to mind.