Court Opinion

ID: 9684052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:45:37.749002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:49.001092
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
On motion for rehearing, Moore contends that we erred in (1) applying the rules of civil procedure and (2) in misreading Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 43, 101 S.Ct. 970, 972, 67 L.Ed.2d 30 (1981).
First, appellant argues that we erred in applying the rules of civil procedure which permit court sanctions if a motion is not served on the adverse party three days prior to a hearing on the motion. Appellant points out that the State’s response to the court’s new trial order states that it learned the court had granted the new trial without a hearing. Appellant maintains that this response effectively rebuts the language of the new trial order which recites that appellant and his attorney were personally present at the hearing. Appellant, then, concludes that since the court granted the new trial without a hearing, we could not justify the court’s rescission of the new trial order as an appropriate sanction under Rule 73.1 Rule 73 sanctions apply only if a party fails to serve its motion prior to a hearing on the motion. We hold, however, that the language of the order, which recites that a hearing was held, is controlling.
*492Appellant’s contention is a reversal of his original position on appeal. In appellant’s brief, he argued that there was nothing in the record that rebutted the new trial order’s recital of the State’s presence at the hearing. In particular, appellant argued that the “unsworn” response of the State to the new trial order could not rebut the recitations of the order that all parties were present at a hearing on the Motion for New Trial. In support of this argument, appellant cited Martinez v. State, 504 S.W.2d 897, 899 (Tex.Crim.App.1974). The court in Martinez stated that the recitation in judgments are binding on a defendant “in the absence of direct proof to the contrary. ” Id. at 899 (emphasis added).
We agreed with appellant and based our holding that the State was not served with appellant’s motion, not on the State’s un-sworn response, but on the testimony of the attorneys in open court. This testimony was presented at the hearing in which the court considered the State’s response to the new trial order. We considered the entire record of testimony — the State’s attorney’s testimony that he was not served with appellant’s motion and was denied the opportunity to respond to the motion; and the appellant’s attorney’s testimony that he could not present a certificate of service or swear that he had hand-carried the motion. We held that this evidence was sufficient to rebut the new trial order’s recital of the State’s presence at the hearing.
Now, on motion for rehearing, appellant argues that the State’s “unsworn” response is sufficient to rebut the new trial order’s recital of the hearing itself. As a consequence, appellant maintains, we erred in applying the civil rules to a post-trial hearing that never took place. We cannot agree. The State’s unsworn response, without more, does not constitute “direct proof” that overcomes the recitals in the new trial order. Id. We also have reviewed again the testimony of the attorneys and conclude that there is no evidence in the record that rebuts the new trial order’s recital that a hearing was held in which appellant and his attorney were personally present.
In addition, appellant maintains that even if the rules of civil procedure were applicable to the post-trial proceeding, we erred in affirming the rescission order sanction under Rule 73 since there was no motion before the court that requested sanctions. Rule 73, in pertinent part, provides:
If any party fails to furnish the adverse party with a copy of any pleading [or motion] ... the court may in its discretion, on motion, order all or any part ... stricken ... or make such other order with respect to the failure as may be just.
Rule 73 gives the trial judge wide discretion in imposing sanctions. The statement that the court “in its discretion, on motion” may impose sanctions is not qualified by the requirement that a party must first make the motion. It does not state that the “court, only on motion by a party,” may impose sanctions. In light of the broad discretion given the trial judge, we hold that in the present case, the trial judge, on its own motion, properly imposed sanctions for the appellant’s counsel’s violation of Rule 73 and the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Finally, we consider appellant’s contention that we misread Hudson, 450 U.S. 40, 101 S.Ct. 970, 67 L.Ed.2d 30. Appellant asserts that under Hudson, he must be acquitted since the trial court granted him a new trial based on insufficiency of evidence.
Hudson, however, does not control the present case because the central issues in appellant’s argument were not addressed in Hudson. These are: (1) whether double jeopardy mandates acquittal if the trial court grants a new trial when the wrongful conduct of appellant’s counsel denies the State its statutory right to contest appellant’s motion for new trial; and (2) whether double jeopardy prohibits the appellate court from restoring the original conviction by holding that the evidence is legally sufficient when the trial court had granted a *493new trial based on a motion which alleged insufficiency of evidence. These issues were not addressed in Hudson, because in Hudson there were no violations of criminal procedure when the court considered the defendant’s motion for new trial, and the appellate court did not seek to restore the defendant’s original conviction by holding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. Hence, Hudson is not controlling in the instant case.
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569-570, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1353-54, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977), states that double jeopardy is not offended when the State appeals a ruling of the trial court if the appeal presents no threat of successive prosecutions. Id. at 569-570, 97 S.Ct. at 1353-54. Thus, when a defendant is convicted of an offense and that conviction is set aside by a later ruling of the trial court, the State may appeal because “the restoration of the guilty verdict and not a new trial would necessarily result if the Government prevailed.” Id. at 570, 97 S.Ct. at 1354.
In the instant case, the State’s efforts to set aside the granting of a new trial, when the appellant’s motion for new trial was never before the court in compliance with the Code of Criminal Procedure, does not offend double jeopardy because the State is not seeking to retry appellant. Also, our holding that the trial court properly rescinded its new trial order and our holding that the evidence is sufficient to sustain appellant’s conviction does not offend double jeopardy because we have only restored the original conviction. Hence, double-jeopardy has no relevance to this appeal.
Appellant’s motion is overruled.

. All references are to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.