Court Opinion

ID: 9956291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 18:01:11.816536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:03.172844
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11349    Document: 80-1      Date Filed: 04/01/2024   Page: 1 of 32

                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-11349
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        HAITHAM YOUSEF ALHINDI,

                                                   Defendant- Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 9:22-cr-80085-AMC-1
                           ____________________

        Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
USCA11 Case: 23-11349      Document: 80-1     Date Filed: 04/01/2024     Page: 2 of 32

        2                      Opinion of the Court                23-11349

        PER CURIAM:
               Mental competence is the key to a criminal defendant’s abil-
        ity to unlock the value of his constitutional trial rights. Indeed,
        without mental competence, a defendant cannot take advantage of
        “the right to effective assistance of counsel, the rights to summon,
        to confront, and to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to testify
        on one’s own behalf or to remain silent without penalty for doing
        so.” Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139–40 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
        concurring). For that reason, the Supreme Court has recognized
        that trying only mentally competent defendants “is fundamental to
        an adversary system of justice.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162,
        171–72 (1975). And sometimes, defendants may need medical
        treatment to attain this essential competence.
               At the same time, involuntary hospitalization for mental-
        health treatment “constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty.”
        Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979). So “due process re-
        quires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some rea-
        sonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is commit-
        ted.” Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
               Federal law attempts to balance these concerns, among oth-
        ers. Towards that end, 18 U.S.C. § 4241 sets forth the procedures
        for determining a defendant’s competency to stand trial and ad-
        dressing any incompetency.
               This case raises two questions about how we apply § 4241.
        First, we must decide whether the statute permits a court to order
        more than one competency hearing and commitment order for the
USCA11 Case: 23-11349     Document: 80-1      Date Filed: 04/01/2024    Page: 3 of 32

        23-11349              Opinion of the Court                        3

        same defendant in a single case. Second, we must determine what
        exactly the four-month limitation in § 4241(d)(1) restricts: the de-
        fendant’s commitment to the Attorney General under the district
        court’s commitment order or the defendant’s hospitalization.
              On the first question, we conclude that district courts have
        authority to order more than one competency evaluation and com-
        mitment order. This text-based conclusion protects both the de-
        fendant’s right not to be tried while incompetent and the defend-
        ant’s right to avoid unnecessary hospitalization. As for §
        4241(d)(1)’s four-month limitation, we hold that, by § 4241(d)(1)’s
        terms, the period begins with the defendant’s hospitalization.
               Applying these rules here, we determine that the district
        court’s second commitment order did not violate § 4241 and was
        not otherwise an abuse of discretion. We also conclude that §
        4241(d)(1)’s four-month limitation did not bear on the district
        court’s authority to issue the second commitment order. So we
        affirm the district court’s ruling.
                             I.     BACKGROUND

                              A.     18 U.S.C. § 4241

              To understand the factual background and the legal issues
        before us, it’s important to know how 18 U.S.C. § 4241 works. So
        we begin by summarizing that law.
              Section 4241 specifies the procedures for determining a de-
        fendant’s mental competency to stand trial. Under it, either party
        can move for a competency hearing “[a]t any time after the
USCA11 Case: 23-11349      Document: 80-1      Date Filed: 04/01/2024     Page: 4 of 32

        4                      Opinion of the Court                 23-11349

        commencement of a prosecution” and “prior to the sentencing of
        the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). If “reasonable cause to believe
        that the defendant may” be incompetent exists, the statute requires
        the court to grant the motion or order a competency hearing on its
        own motion. Id.
              To help resolve a competency question under § 4241, the
        court may order a psychiatric or psychological examination of the
        defendant before the competency hearing. Id. § 4241(b).
                After the hearing, if the court finds that the defendant “is
        presently suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him
        mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand
        the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to
        assist properly in his defense,” the court must commit the defend-
        ant to the custody of the Attorney General. Id. § 4241(d); United
        States v. Donofrio, 896 F.2d 1301, 1303 (11th Cir. 1990).
               Once the court commits the defendant to the Attorney Gen-
        eral’s custody, the Attorney General, acting through the Federal
        Bureau of Prisons (“Bureau”), must “hospitalize the defendant for
        treatment in a suitable facility . . . for such a reasonable period of
        time, not to exceed four months, as is necessary to determine
        whether there is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable fu-
        ture he will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go for-
        ward.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)–(d)(1).
              If the defendant does not attain competency during that
        treatment period and the pending charges against him are not oth-
        erwise “disposed of according to law,” the defendant may remain
USCA11 Case: 23-11349       Document: 80-1      Date Filed: 04/01/2024    Page: 5 of 32

        23-11349                  Opinion of the Court                      5

        hospitalized for “an additional period of time.” Id. § 4241(d)(2). But
        for that to happen, the district court must determine that a substan-
        tial probability exists that the defendant will attain the necessary
        competency for criminal proceedings to go forward. Id.
               If the defendant does not attain competency even after an
        additional reasonable period of hospitalization and the charges re-
        main pending, the defendant becomes subject to other commit-
        ment provisions. Id. § 4241(d).
              With this sketch of § 4241 in mind, we explain the factual
        and procedural background of this appeal.
                             B.      Arrest and Indictment

                In May 2022, Haitham Yousef Alhindi was arrested on cy-
        berstalking charges. The superseding indictment charged him with
        five counts of cyberstalking under 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(A). That
        same month, after a detention hearing, the magistrate judge found
        that Alhindi presented a danger to the community and ordered pre-
        trial detention.
                       C.     Initial Competency Determination

               Several weeks later, on July 14, 2022, Alhindi’s counsel
        moved unopposed for a competency evaluation. The district court
        promptly granted the motion and ordered Alhindi to submit to a
        psychological examination under §§ 4241 and 4247. The district
        court also ordered the Bureau to complete that evaluation and pre-
        pare a report no later than August 26, 2022.
USCA11 Case: 23-11349      Document: 80-1     Date Filed: 04/01/2024     Page: 6 of 32

        6                      Opinion of the Court                23-11349

               The Bureau failed to comply with that order. About three
        weeks after the court’s deadline, on September 15, 2022, a Bureau
        warden sent a letter to the district court explaining that the Bureau
        had placed Alhindi in a facility in California for his competency
        evaluation. Alhindi arrived eight days before the report was due.
        But he had to quarantine under COVID protocols until August 29,
        three days after the report was due. Based on these circumstances,
        the Bureau asked for an extension through November 23 to com-
        plete the evaluation and report.
                The court denied that request, instead ordering the Bureau
        to conduct an expedited competency evaluation and submit a re-
        port by October 14, 2022. The resulting report, dated October 14,
        concluded that Alhindi was incompetent. But the report was care-
        ful to note that it was based on limited information. So the report
        recommended commitment only “[o]ut of an abundance of cau-
        tion.”
               The court held the first competency hearing on November
        28, 2022. Based on the evidence, the district court found that
        Alhindi was incompetent and should be hospitalized under §
        4241(d)(1) to attain competency. The district court ordered the Bu-
        reau to issue a report and recommendation by February 28, 2023,
        either requesting more time to treat Alhindi or recommending that
        he attained sufficient competency to continue criminal proceedings
        (“First Commitment Order”). To consider the Bureau’s antici-
        pated report and recommendation, the court scheduled a status
        conference for March 2, 2023.
USCA11 Case: 23-11349      Document: 80-1      Date Filed: 04/01/2024     Page: 7 of 32

        23-11349               Opinion of the Court                         7

              Again, the Bureau failed to comply. At some point close to
        the deadline for its report, the Bureau notified the court that it had
        not even hospitalized Alhindi yet. So on February 27, 2023, the
        court again ordered the Bureau to hospitalize Alhindi in compli-
        ance with the First Commitment Order.
               Then, on March 2, the Chief of the Bureau’s Psychological
        Evaluations Section filed a sealed letter reporting that Alhindi was
        not exhibiting any signs of mental illness. She recommended a sec-
        ond competency evaluation before committing Alhindi to the hos-
        pital.
                      D.     Second Competency Determination

               That same day, the district court ordered a second compe-
        tency evaluation over objection from Alhindi’s counsel. In doing
        so, the court relied on the March 2 letter, including its statement
        that Alhindi said he wanted a second competency evaluation, and
        the fact that the October 2022 competency report was based on
        limited information. The district court rejected Alhindi’s counsel’s
        arguments that ordering a second competency evaluation violated
        Alhindi’s statutory and due-process rights. To enable the district
        court to rule on Alhindi’s competency, the district court ordered
        the Bureau to submit its new report within a few weeks, by March
        29, 2023.
              This time, the Bureau complied, filing a report on March 29.
        That report concluded that Alhindi was incompetent.
USCA11 Case: 23-11349      Document: 80-1     Date Filed: 04/01/2024     Page: 8 of 32

        8                      Opinion of the Court                23-11349

               After another competency hearing on April 10, the district
        court again found Alhindi incompetent to proceed. Alhindi ob-
        jected that further commitment would violate due process. He
        also moved to dismiss the indictment on due-process grounds and
        requested that the court decline to extend his commitment.
                On April 21, 2023, the district court denied Alhindi’s motion
        to dismiss the indictment and ordered the Bureau to begin the eval-
        uative hospitalization of Alhindi under § 4241(d)(1) by July 1, 2023.
        That order, the “Second Commitment Order,” required the Bu-
        reau to submit an evaluative report on Alhindi’s condition by Oc-
        tober 1, 2023. In the Order, the court rejected Alhindi’s arguments
        that, under § 4241(d)(1), the Bureau had only four months from the
        date of the First Commitment Order in November 2022 to hospi-
        talize and evaluate Alhindi’s competency. Instead, the district
        court held that § 4241(d)’s four-month time limit begins at hospi-
        talization, not at entry of the commitment order.
               The Bureau admitted Alhindi to the hospital on June 21,
        2023, under the Second Commitment Order. Three-and-a-half
        months later, on October 6, the Bureau filed its report. The report
        concluded that Alhindi remained incompetent but that he could at-
        tain competency through further treatment. So the Bureau re-
        quested an extension of Alhindi’s hospitalization under §
        4241(d)(2)(A).
              For additional hospitalization, § 4241(d)(2)(A), by its terms,
        requires a court finding that the defendant is likely to attain com-
        petency through further treatment. § 4241(d)(2)(A) (authorizing
USCA11 Case: 23-11349       Document: 80-1      Date Filed: 04/01/2024      Page: 9 of 32

        23-11349                Opinion of the Court                          9

        hospitalization “for an additional reasonable period of time . . . if
        the court finds that there is a substantial probability that within such
        additional period of time he will attain the capacity to permit the
        proceedings to go forward” (emphasis added)). But the district
        court did not respond at that time to the Bureau’s recommendation
        for further treatment.
                               E.     Procedural History

                Alhindi appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss the in-
        dictment and the Second Commitment Order. Another panel of
        this Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the part of Alhindi’s ap-
        peal that asserts the length of time he spent in pre-hospitalization
        detention violated his due-process rights. It did so because it con-
        cluded that this argument was, in effect, a speedy-trial challenge
        that is not reviewable on interlocutory appeal. On the other hand,
        that panel held that we have jurisdiction over the challenge to the
        Second Commitment Order.
              For its part, the Government moved to dismiss the appeal as
        moot, arguing that Alhindi’s hospitalization under the Second
        Commitment Order has ended. It asserted that Alhindi’s commit-
        ment under § 4241(d)(1) ended when the Bureau requested on Oc-
        tober 6 under § 4241(d)(2) that the district court extend his com-
        mitment. So, the Government contends, an appeal of the Second
        Commitment Order under § 4241(d)(1) is now moot.
              At the end of January 2024, we heard oral argument on
        Alhindi’s appeal of the Second Commitment Order.
USCA11 Case: 23-11349     Document: 80-1      Date Filed: 04/01/2024    Page: 10 of 32

        10                     Opinion of the Court                23-11349

                A couple of weeks later, on February 15, 2024, Alhindi
        moved in the district court for his immediate release from the hos-
        pital. He objected to his continued hospitalization without a court
        finding under § 4241(d)(2)(A) that a substantial probability existed
        that he would attain competency through additional treatment.
        On February 21, four-and-a-half months after the Bureau made its
        original request to the district court to extend Alhindi’s treatment
        to restore competency, the district court found under §
        4241(d)(2)(A) that a substantial probability existed that, with the
        added hospitalization, Alhindi would attain competency. Thus, the
        district court ordered his continued hospitalization.
              Then, on February 23, Alhindi appealed the district court’s
        order under § 4241(d)(2)(A) for additional hospitalization. He also
        moved to consolidate his two appeals. And he moved for a stay
        pending resolution of the motion to consolidate. We denied both
        motions.
              Alhindi remains hospitalized.
                        II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW

               This appeal requires us to consider whether the Second
        Commitment Order violates 18 U.S.C. § 4241. We review the
        grant or denial of a § 4241 motion for an abuse of discretion. United
        States v. Nickels, 324 F.3d 1250, 1251 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
        But to the extent that Alhindi challenges the Second Commitment
        Order as a violation of § 4241’s text, we review the district court’s
        statutory interpretation de novo. United States v. Castro, 455 F.3d
        1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
USCA11 Case: 23-11349       Document: 80-1       Date Filed: 04/01/2024       Page: 11 of 32

        23-11349                 Opinion of the Court                           11

                                 III.    DISCUSSION

                This case concerns whether 18 U.S.C. § 4241 permitted the
        district court to order a second competency evaluation and com-
        mitment for evaluative hospitalization. But before we can reach
        that question, we must first determine whether the district court’s
        order hospitalizing Alhindi for additional time under § 4241(d)(2)
        has mooted Alhindi’s appeal. We conclude it has not. So second,
        we consider whether § 4241 permits multiple competency evalua-
        tions and commitment orders. We conclude it does. Finally, we
        assess whether the Second Commitment Order violated the four-
        month time limit in § 4241(d)(1). We conclude it did not.
        A.      The interlocutory appeal of the Second Commitment Order is not
                                          moot.

               Article III of the Constitution requires that a case or contro-
        versy “exist at all times during the litigation.” Keister v. Bell, 29 F.4th
        1239, 1250 (11th Cir. 2022); U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. We lack juris-
        diction once an appeal becomes moot because it can no longer “be
        characterized as an active case or controversy.” Adler v. Duval Cnty.
        Sch. Bd., 112 F.3d 1475, 1477 (11th Cir. 1997).
               “[M]ootness concerns the availability of relief, not the exist-
        ence of a lawsuit or an injury.” Wood v. Raffensperger, 981 F.3d 1307,
        1317 (11th Cir. 2020). So an appeal becomes moot “only when it is
        impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the
        prevailing party.” Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Loc. 1000, 567 U.S.
        298, 307 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is, even if
USCA11 Case: 23-11349         Document: 80-1         Date Filed: 04/01/2024         Page: 12 of 32

        12                         Opinion of the Court                        23-11349

        full relief is no longer available, an appeal does not become moot
        when some relief remains possible. Church of Scientology of Cal. v.
        United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12–13 (1992) (“While a court may not be
        able to return the parties to the status quo ante . . . a court can fash-
        ion some form of meaningful relief in circumstances such as these .
        . . . The availability of this possible remedy is sufficient to prevent
        this case from being moot.”).
               The Government argues that Alhindi’s appeal is moot be-
        cause it challenges his confinement under § 4241(d)(1), and Alhindi
        is no longer confined under that section. Rather, he is now con-
        fined under § 4241(d)(2). As we’ve noted, the Second Commitment
        Order directed Alhindi’s evaluative hospitalization under §
        4241(d)(1). But on October 6, the Bureau filed its evaluative report
        in accordance with the Second Commitment Order. At that point,
        the Government asserts, Alhindi’s confinement under § 4241(d)(1)
        ended, and his hospitalization under § 4241(d)(2) began. So, the
        Government argues, vacating the Second Commitment Order will
        not affect Alhindi’s current hospitalization.
                We disagree. To be sure, on February 21, the district court
        ordered Alhindi’s further hospitalization under § 4241(d)(2). 1 But a
        district court can commit a defendant under § 4241(d)(2) only if it
        first enters a commitment order under § 4241(d)(1). Indeed, §

        1
         As we’ve noted, Alhindi filed a notice of appeal challenging the district court’s
        order for additional hospitalization. We express no opinion about whether
        Alhindi’s current confinement is permissible under § 4241(d)(2) as that issue is
        not presently before us.
USCA11 Case: 23-11349      Document: 80-1      Date Filed: 04/01/2024      Page: 13 of 32

        23-11349               Opinion of the Court                          13

        4241(d)(2) refers to an “additional reasonable period of time” for
        treatment. § 4241(d)(2) (emphasis added). That is, it contemplates
        a period added on to the § 4241(d)(1) hospitalization period. Put
        simply, the § 4241(d)(1) commitment order is a precondition to the
        court’s ability under § 4241(d)(2) to order additional hospitaliza-
        tion. See United States v. Mahoney, 717 F.3d 257, 264 (1st Cir. 2013)
        (holding that an appeal of a § 4241(d)(1) commitment order was
        not moot even though the defendant was later committed under §
        4246, reasoning that the defendant “continue[d] to hold a cogniza-
        ble interest in the review of the initial determination of incompe-
        tency because the initial finding triggered a series of events result-
        ing in his continuing confinement”).
               That means Alhindi still has an interest in determining
        whether the Second Commitment Order under § 4241(d)(1) was
        valid. Indeed, if we vacated the Second Commitment Order, the
        Bureau would lack a basis to continue to detain Alhindi under §
        4241(d)(2) because that section authorizes confinement only as ad-
        ditional treatment extending from a valid hospitalization under §
        4241(d)(1). So Alhindi has a live interest in the outcome of this ap-
        peal, and the appeal is not moot.
          B.     The district court had authority to issue a second competency
                   evaluation and the Second Commitment Order.

               Alhindi asserts that once the district court issued its first
        commitment order in November 2022, it lacked authority to enter
        a second evaluation or commitment order. For support, Alhindi
        points to the text of § 4241(d). As Alhindi notes, nothing in the text
USCA11 Case: 23-11349     Document: 80-1      Date Filed: 04/01/2024     Page: 14 of 32

        14                     Opinion of the Court                 23-11349

        expressly authorizes the district court to order a second compe-
        tency evaluation or commitment.
               But then again, nothing in the statute specifically prohibits
        such orders, either. So we need to take a closer look at any clues
        the text provides us. As we have noted many times, we start our
        analysis with the text when we conduct statutory interpretation.
        Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy Cnty., 59
        F.4th 1158, 1162 (11th Cir. 2023). And when the text resolves our
        question, we end with it as well. Id. Here, we focus on two aspects
        of the text.
               First, § 4241(a) empowers the defendant, the government,
        or even the court itself to trigger mental-competency proceedings.
        In other words, § 4241 allows any participant in the case to raise
        the issue of the defendant’s competency. This feature of § 4241(a)
        underlines the importance of protecting both a defendant’s right
        not to be tried if he is not mentally competent and the system’s
        legitimacy by trying only mentally competent defendants.
                And these concerns suggest, in turn, congressional intent to
        make the competency-evaluation process available as any partici-
        pant (defendant, government, or court) in the case may reasonably
        believe it necessary. The availability of this process to all partici-
        pants maximizes the likelihood that concerns over competency will
        be caught and addressed in real time. And as this case shows, dif-
        ferent participants may think it necessary at different times during
        the trial proceedings, meaning more than one competency evalua-
        tion or commitment could result. After all, what is the point of a
USCA11 Case: 23-11349     Document: 80-1     Date Filed: 04/01/2024    Page: 15 of 32

        23-11349              Opinion of the Court                       15

        mechanism for competency proceedings if the district court cannot
        order a competency evaluation even when it concludes reasonable
        cause exists to believe the defendant may be mentally incompe-
        tent?
               Second, § 4241 employs broad language. Besides availing all
        participants in the case of the process to ensure a defendant’s com-
        petency, the statute authorizes competency proceedings “[a]t any
        time” before sentencing. § 4241(a). The phrase “any time” means
        “[a]t whatever time.” Any time, Oxford Dictionaries, https://pre-
        mium.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_eng-
        lish/any-time?q=any+time (last visited April 1, 2024)
        [https://perma.cc/U34U-VNPG]. In other words, § 4241 places no
        limits on when or how often a participant in the case may seek
        competency proceedings for the defendant.
              So the text alone is enough for us to conclude that § 4241(d)
        authorizes district courts to order more than one evaluation. Even
        though that’s so, so we do not look further, we note that the pri-
        mary purposes that § 4241 serves are consistent with the plain
        meaning of the text.
                Section 4241’s procedures implicate three primary interests:
        (1) the government’s interest in prosecuting crimes, Sell v. United
        States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003), which includes the public interest
        in the criminal-justice system’s legitimacy; (2) a criminal defend-
        ant’s right not to be tried while incompetent, United States v.
        Cometa, 966 F.3d 1285, 1291 (11th Cir. 2020); and (3) a defendant’s
        liberty interest in avoiding confinement in a mental hospital,
USCA11 Case: 23-11349     Document: 80-1     Date Filed: 04/01/2024    Page: 16 of 32

        16                    Opinion of the Court                 23-11349

        Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 131 (1990). Because these interests
        can be in tension with one another, § 4241 seeks to direct the
        proper balancing of them.
               But reading § 4241 to limit district courts to entering only
        one order for a competency evaluation, no matter the circum-
        stances, would upset that proper balance. Take this case. By its
        own admission, the Bureau recommended a finding that Alhindi
        lacked competence based on limited information and only “out of
        an abundance of caution.” Not only that, but a few months after
        its recommendation and before Alhindi was hospitalized, the Bu-
        reau advised the court that Alhindi had not been exhibiting any
        signs of mental illness. And Alhindi himself allegedly asked for an-
        other evaluation. If § 4241 authorized only a single competency
        evaluation and Alhindi turned out to be competent, Alhindi would
        have been hospitalized unnecessarily under the First Commitment
        Order.
                On the flip side, suppose the Bureau recommends and the
        district court finds a defendant to be competent after an evaluation
        under § 4241, but the defendant later exhibits signs of incompe-
        tency. If the district court could issue only one order for a compe-
        tency evaluation under § 4241, it would be unable to order a second
        evaluation in those circumstances. And then the court would have
        no choice but to try the defendant when he could well be incom-
        petent.
              As the Supreme Court has recognized, mental competency
        can be fluid during criminal proceedings, and courts “must always
USCA11 Case: 23-11349       Document: 80-1         Date Filed: 04/01/2024        Page: 17 of 32

        23-11349                  Opinion of the Court                             17

        be alert” to changes in competency to ensure against trying incom-
        petent defendants. Drope, 420 U.S. at 181. Section 4241 empowers
        courts to account for changes in competency “at any time” by or-
        dering a competency evaluation. Limiting courts to only one order
        for a competency evaluation, no matter the defendant’s condition,
        would risk trying an incompetent defendant or unnecessarily hos-
        pitalizing a competent one. 2
              In sum, § 4241 authorizes district courts to enter more than
        one competency-evaluation order if the circumstances warrant it
        and satisfy § 4241(a)’s criteria.
                In reaching this conclusion, we find ourselves in good com-
        pany. Several of our sister circuits have construed § 4241 the same
        way. See, e.g., United States v. Kowalczyk, 805 F.3d 847, 860 (9th Cir.
        2015) (“[M]ultiple competency evaluations and determinations are
        permitted by § 4241[.]”); United States v. Martinez-Haro, 645 F.3d
        1228, 1233 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e read the statute to authorize a
        district court to order a second competency hearing when appro-
        priate.”); United States v. White, 887 F.2d 705, 709 (6th Cir. 1989) (“It

        2
         We recognize that the statutory language authorizes the district court to or-
        der a competency hearing “if there is reasonable cause to believe that the de-
        fendant may presently be suffering from” a mental incompetency. 18 U.S.C.
        § 4241(a). Here, the district court ordered the second competency evaluation
        in part because of new evidence that Alhindi may not have been suffering from
        a mental incompetency. But the power to order a competency evaluation
        when reasonable cause exists to believe the defendant is not competent to
        stand trial necessarily supposes the power to direct a competency evaluation
        when new evidence provides reasonable cause to believe a defendant found
        incompetent may not, in fact, be incompetent.
USCA11 Case: 23-11349     Document: 80-1      Date Filed: 04/01/2024     Page: 18 of 32

        18                     Opinion of the Court                 23-11349

        is . . . clear that the statute in no way limits the court to a single
        inquiry into a defendant’s competency.”); cf. United States v. Maryea,
        704 F.3d 55, 69 (1st Cir. 2013) (“Even if a district court has found a
        defendant competent when the trial begins, ‘a significant change in
        circumstances in the midst of trial may render a second compe-
        tency hearing proper.’”) (citation omitted); United States v. Aren-
        burg, 605 F.3d 164, 169 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that district courts
        have an obligation to revisit a defendant’s competency if there is
        reasonable cause to do so); United States v. Sherman, 912 F.2d 907,
        908–10 (7th Cir. 1990) (affirming the § 4241(d) commitment order
        entered after a second competency hearing); 1A Charles Alan
        Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 209 (5th
        ed. 2023) (“The court may order a second competency evaluation
        if one is needed.”).
               Alhindi invites us to set aside the second order for a compe-
        tency evaluation as the result of the Government’s alleged “very
        thinly veiled attempt to restart the four-month clock mandated by
        section 4241(d).” But we disagree with Alhindi’s premise. The rec-
        ord contradicts any inference that the Bureau precipitated a second
        competency hearing as a ploy to extend the clock.
                 As we’ve mentioned, on March 2, the district court received
        a letter from the Chief of the Bureau’s Psychological Evaluations
        Section reporting that Alhindi was not exhibiting any signs of men-
        tal illness and that he may not need to be hospitalized after all.
        Nothing in the record supports a conclusion that this letter was dis-
        ingenuous or that the Chief sent it to restart the clock. In fact, the
USCA11 Case: 23-11349     Document: 80-1      Date Filed: 04/01/2024     Page: 19 of 32

        23-11349              Opinion of the Court                         19

        letter accords with what the district court and other psychological
        evaluators had concluded before about Alhindi: he can present in a
        calm and composed way that makes it difficult to discern his com-
        petency. Plus, the Bureau made its first competency evaluation
        based on limited information and recommended hospitalizing
        Alhindi only “out of an abundance of caution.” So on these facts,
        a second competency evaluation was appropriate, if not necessary.
              In short, § 4241 empowers district courts to order multiple
        competency evaluations and commitments for hospitalization
        when appropriate under the statute’s terms. The district court
        acted within that authority here.
          C.    The Second Commitment Order did not itself violate statutory
                                  time limits.

               Next, Alhindi argues that the Second Commitment Order
        violated § 4241 for a different reason: § 4241(d)(1) sets a four-
        month time limit, and the district court filed the Second Commit-
        ment Order more than four months after it issued the First Com-
        mitment Order. In Alhindi’s view, that four-month clock began
        running when the court issued the First Commitment Order, and
        it never stopped running. So under Alhindi’s reading, the Second
        Commitment Order—which the district court entered about five
        months after it issued the First Commitment Order—violated §
        4241(d)(1) by ordering the defendant’s commitment beyond the
        four months that the statute allows.
               We disagree. As always, we begin with the statutory text.
        Sabal Trail, 59 F.4th at 1162.
USCA11 Case: 23-11349      Document: 80-1      Date Filed: 04/01/2024      Page: 20 of 32

        20                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11349

                Section 4241(d) states, “If, after the hearing, the court finds”
        that the defendant is incompetent, “the court shall commit the de-
        fendant to the custody of the Attorney General. The Attorney
        General shall hospitalize the defendant for treatment in a suitable
        facility—(1) for such a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four
        months, as is necessary to determine whether there is a substantial
        probability that in the foreseeable future he will attain the capacity
        to permit the proceedings to go forward . . . .” § 4241(d)–(d)(1)
        (emphasis added). We conclude that the four-month limitation ap-
        plies to the period of hospitalization.
               For starters, that is the grammatically correct reading of the
        provision. The phrase with the time limitation in it—“not to ex-
        ceed four months”—modifies the prepositional phrase it follows:
        “for such a reasonable period of time.” So we know that a “reason-
        able period of time” is four months or less. And “for such a reason-
        able period of time,” in turn, modifies the phrase it follows: “[t]he
        Attorney General shall hospitalize the defendant for treatment.”
        When we put it all together, the text leaves only one grammatically
        correct possible conclusion: the four-month period that §
        4241(d)(1) refers to is the period during which the defendant re-
        ceives “treatment” while he is “hospitalize[d].” And by the statu-
        tory terms, that period can begin only once the Attorney General
        “hospitalize[s] the defendant for treatment.”
              The Supreme Court has explained that “words are to be
        given the meaning that proper grammar and usage would assign
        them, [and] the rules of grammar govern statutory interpretation
USCA11 Case: 23-11349     Document: 80-1      Date Filed: 04/01/2024    Page: 21 of 32

        23-11349               Opinion of the Court                       21

        unless they contradict legislative intent or purpose.” Nielsen v.
        Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 965 (2019) (cleaned up). We find no basis to
        conclude that the grammatically correct reading of § 4241(d)(1)
        contradicts congressional intent.
               In fact, we have suggested that § 4241(d)’s four-month limi-
        tation, by its terms, applies to the hospitalization period only. In
        United States v. Curtin, the defendant argued that the Bureau doc-
        tors’ report detailing their competency findings following the de-
        fendant’s hospitalization “should have been submitted within [§
        4241(d)’s] four-month period.” 78 F.4th 1299, 1308 (11th Cir. 2023).
        We rejected that notion. In so doing, we relied on the text, empha-
        sizing that § 4241(d) “prescribes a ‘reasonable period of time, not
        to exceed four months,’ in which the government may ‘hospitalize
        the defendant.’” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)) (emphasis added
        by the Curtin court).
               When, as here, the text “is unambiguous and ‘the statutory
        scheme is coherent and consistent,’” then our analysis ends. Rob-
        inson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (citation omitted).
               Alhindi disagrees with our analysis of the text. He notes that
        Congress enacted § 4241 in response to Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S.
        715 (1972). Jackson held that “due process requires that the nature
        and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the
        purpose for which the individual is committed.” Id. at 738 (emphasis
        added). Alhindi points to Jackson’s use of “committed” and § 4241’s
        mandate that the “court shall commit the defendant to the custody
        of the Attorney General” after an incompetency finding. 18 U.S.C.
USCA11 Case: 23-11349       Document: 80-1       Date Filed: 04/01/2024       Page: 22 of 32

        22                       Opinion of the Court                    23-11349

        § 4241(d) (emphasis added). Based on the matching verbs, Alhindi
        posits that Congress adopted the word “commit” from Jackson in-
        tending for the four-month period to refer to the entire commit-
        ment, not just the hospitalization period.
              We are not persuaded. Alhindi’s argument cannot over-
        come the plain text for two reasons.
               First, the grammatical structure of the statute does not sup-
        port Alhindi’s suggested reading of it. As we’ve explained, “not to
        exceed four months” modifies “for such a reasonable period of
        time,” which in turn modifies the verb phrase “shall hospitalize.” §
        4241(d)–(d)(1). Even if we ignored that the direction to the court
        to commit the defendant and the direction to the Attorney General
        to hospitalize the defendant are in separate sentences, it would
        make no difference to the textual analysis. If combined, the very
        long resulting sentence would look something like this: “. . . the
        court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney
        General, who shall hospitalize the defendant . . . for such a reason-
        able period of time, not to exceed four months . . . .” The phrase
        “not to exceed four months” would still modify “for such a reason-
        able period of time,” which in turn would still modify the verb
        phrase “shall hospitalize,” not “shall commit.” But see United States
        v. Donnelly, 41 F.4th 1102, 1108–09 (9th Cir. 2022) (Watford, J., con-
        curring).3

        3
         Judge Watford’s concurrence in Donnelly relied on a Senate Report accompa-
        nying the legislation that became § 4142(d) to conclude that the four-month
USCA11 Case: 23-11349        Document: 80-1         Date Filed: 04/01/2024         Page: 23 of 32

        23-11349                   Opinion of the Court                               23

                And second, to the extent that Alhindi argues the four-
        month period begins with the entry of the commitment order be-
        cause the Attorney General’s mandatory duty to hospitalize the de-
        fendant after entry of that order is immediate, we disagree. We
        think § 4241(d) implicitly recognizes that hospitalization cannot oc-
        cur instantaneously. After all, upon the district court’s entry of a
        commitment order, the Attorney General must find a “suitable fa-
        cility” in which to hospitalize the defendant. § 4241(d). And §
        4247(a)(2), in turn, defines a “suitable facility” as one based on “the
        nature of the offense and the characteristics of the defendant.” The
        Attorney General must then coordinate with the “suitable facility”
        and transport the defendant there. As a practical matter, the

        limitation referred to the commitment period. That Report explains, “In ac-
        cord with the Supreme Court’s holding in Jackson v. Indiana, commitment un-
        der section 4241 may only be for a reasonable period of time necessary to de-
        termine if there exists a substantial probability that the person will attain the
        capacity to permit the trial to go forward in the foreseeable future. Under
        section 4241(d)(1) the period may not exceed four months, however.” S. Rep.
        No. 98-225, at 236 (1983) (footnote omitted). Noting that the Report does not
        separate commitment time from hospitalization time, and instead refers to a
        singular period that “may not exceed four months,” Judge Watford concluded
        that the four-month restriction applies to the commitment period. Donnelly,
        41 F.4th at 1108 (Watford, J., concurring). That concurrence’s argument
        makes perfect sense, based on the Report. But we don’t get to the legislative
        history when the text is not ambiguous. And for the reasons we’ve already
        explained, most respectfully, we don’t think it is. Rather, a straightforward
        reading reveals that § 4241(d)’s four-month period limits only hospitalization.
        Plus, as we explain in the next paragraph of this opinion’s text, other features
        of § 4241 also suggest, as a practical matter, that the four-month period cannot
        begin with the defendant’s commitment.
USCA11 Case: 23-11349         Document: 80-1         Date Filed: 04/01/2024          Page: 24 of 32

        24                         Opinion of the Court                         23-11349

        Attorney General needs a reasonable amount of time to accom-
        plish these things. 4
                                             * * *
               In closing, we take a moment to emphasize the importance
        of district courts’ continued close supervision of competency pro-
        ceedings. Alhindi has been stuck in competency limbo for over
        twenty months, less than nine of which have been for hospital
        treatment. To be sure, the district court here was diligent in check-
        ing in with the Bureau for much of the time. And district courts
        have a lot on their dockets. But even so, more than a four-month
        delay occurred between the Bureau’s October 6, 2023, report re-
        questing additional hospitalization for Alhindi to attain compe-
        tency under § 4241(d)(2) and the district court’s entry of an order
        making the necessary § 4241(d)(2)(A) finding. And Alhindi had to
        move for such a finding before the court entered it. Adherence to
        Congress’s enumerated procedures is critical to ensure that defend-
        ants whose trial proceedings are delayed because of competency
        issues are receiving the help they need so timely trial proceedings
        may occur.
                                              ***

        4
         To the extent that Alhindi asserts that the Due Process Clause limits the time
        the Bureau has to hospitalize a defendant following a district court’s order di-
        recting it to do so, cf. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738, we lack jurisdiction to consider
        the argument. We leave resolution of that issue for a case in which it is
        properly presented.
USCA11 Case: 23-11349     Document: 80-1      Date Filed: 04/01/2024     Page: 25 of 32

        23-11349               Opinion of the Court                        25

               Ultimately, we conclude that a district court may order
        more than one competency evaluation and issue more than one
        commitment order when the circumstances warrant it. We also
        conclude that § 4241(d)’s four-month time limit applies to the pe-
        riod of hospitalization. For these reasons, we hold that the district
        court did not err and did not abuse its discretion in issuing both the
        second competency evaluation order and the Second Commitment
        Order.
                              IV.    CONCLUSION

             We affirm the district court’s entry of the Second Commit-
        ment Order.
              AFFIRMED.
USCA11 Case: 23-11349      Document: 80-1      Date Filed: 04/01/2024      Page: 26 of 32

        23-11349             ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring                        1

        ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge, Concurring:
               I write separately to point out that our holding that the four-
        month time limit in § 4241(d) applies to the hospitalization period
        does not mean that the Attorney General has free rein under the
        statute to hold a defendant for an unreasonable prehospitalization
        period after the court has ordered commitment. At some point,
        the length of prehospitalization commitment becomes unreasona-
        ble within the context of § 4241(d)’s directives. And when that hap-
        pens, the Attorney General violates § 4241. So if we’re going to
        hold, as we do today, that § 4241’s four-month time limit applies to
        hospitalization and that hospitalization does not have to occur in-
        stantaneously after entry of the commitment order, I think it’s im-
        portant to clarify that the prehospitalization period is also subject
        to reasonable limitations under § 4241.
                Section 4241(d) states that if the district court finds that the
        defendant is incompetent, it “shall commit the defendant to the
        custody of the Attorney General.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). Then §
        4241(d) provides that “[t]he Attorney General shall hospitalize the
        defendant for treatment in a suitable facility—(1) for such a reason-
        able period of time, not to exceed four months, as is necessary to de-
        termine whether there is a substantial probability that in the fore-
        seeable future he will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings
        to go forward; and (2) for an additional reasonable period of time . .
        . ” to restore competency or dispose of the charges against the de-
        fendant. Id. (emphases added).
USCA11 Case: 23-11349      Document: 80-1      Date Filed: 04/01/2024     Page: 27 of 32

        2                   ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring                23-11349

              Two aspects of § 4241(d) stand out immediately: (1) the
        term “shall” imposes a mandatory duty on the Attorney General to
        hospitalize the defendant; and (2) the treatment must be for no
        more than “a reasonable period of time.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d).
                First, the Supreme Court has explained that when Congress
        “distinguishes between ‘may’ and ‘shall,’ it is generally clear that
        ‘shall’ imposes a mandatory duty.” Me. Cmty. Health Options v.
        United States, 590 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1308, 1321 (2020) (citation
        omitted). Congress used both the terms “may” and “shall” in §
        4241. Indeed, § 4241(a) provides that “the defendant or the . . .
        Government may file a motion for a hearing to determine the men-
        tal competency of the defendant.” § 4241(a) (emphasis added).
        And § 4241(b) allows that the district court “may order . . . a psychi-
        atric or psychological examination of the defendant . . . .” § 4241(b)
        (emphasis added). Congress’s selective use of the terms “may” and
        “shall” in § 4241 reflects that Congress deliberately chose to impose
        a mandatory duty on the Attorney General to hospitalize the de-
        fendant for a “reasonable period of time.”
               As to the second point, Congress’s express limitation of the
        hospitalization to a “reasonable period of time” shows that Con-
        gress did not want the competency proceedings to drag on forever.
        Rather, Congress contemplated that reasonableness would govern
        the length of time that a defendant could be held in competency
        proceedings. Even though § 4241 does not expressly state a time
        limit for the period between the commitment order and hospitali-
        zation, no one could reasonably believe the statute permits an
USCA11 Case: 23-11349     Document: 80-1      Date Filed: 04/01/2024     Page: 28 of 32

        23-11349            ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring                       3

        unreasonable prehospitalization period. After all, it defies all logic
        to read § 4241 as imposing “reasonable period of time” (defined at
        one point as “not to exceed four months”) restraints on hospitali-
        zation only to tolerate the Attorney General’s excessive delay of
        hospitalization in the first place. Why bother limiting hospitaliza-
        tion to “a reasonable period” if the rest of the competency proceed-
        ings can last for an unreasonable period? That makes no sense and
        makes § 4241’s limitation of a “reasonable period of time” mean-
        ingless.
               Those two textual features of the statute work together to
        statutorily require the Attorney General to hospitalize the defend-
        ant within a reasonable period of time from entry of the commit-
        ment order. As I’ve noted, the text unambiguously requires the
        Attorney General to hospitalize the defendant. So the Attorney
        General cannot sit around forever waiting to do so. Rather, Con-
        gress has required him to act.
               And we know Congress required him to act to hospitalize
        the defendant within a reasonable period of the entry of the com-
        mitment order because of the rest of § 4241’s structure and context.
        Congress’s repeated use of “reasonable period of time” within the
        statute necessarily caps the prehospitalization period as well as the
        hospitalization period. Construing § 4241 to tolerate an unreason-
        able period of prehospitalization commitment would mean that
        only the Due Process Clause limits the Attorney General’s delay in
        hospitalizing a defendant. But delays that the Due Process Clause
        may tolerate may still amount to unreasonable delay under § 4241.
USCA11 Case: 23-11349      Document: 80-1      Date Filed: 04/01/2024     Page: 29 of 32

        4                   ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring                23-11349

        And if Congress wanted to limit the length of the competency pro-
        ceedings to only whatever the constitutional due-process require-
        ment tolerates, it would have had no reason to include the phrase
        “reasonable period of time” in § 4241. After all, Jackson v. Indiana,
        406 U.S. 715 (1972), had already held that “due process requires that
        the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable re-
        lation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.” But
        in § 4241, Congress limited hospitalization to “a reasonable period”
        as a check on Jackson, which requires that the commitment period
        bear only “some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the
        individual is committed,” (emphasis added), no matter the length
        of the commitment.
                And when we construe a statute, we must “consider the en-
        tire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and logical re-
        lation of its many parts, when interpreting any particular part of
        the text.” Regions Bank v. Legal Outsource PA, 936 F.3d 1184, 1192
        (11th Cir. 2019) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also
        King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (explaining that courts
        “must read the words ‘in their context and with a view to their
        place in the overall statutory scheme.’”) (citation omitted); Biden v.
        Nebraska, 600 U.S. ––––, 143 S. Ct. 2355, 2378 (2023) (Barrett, J.,
        concurring) (citing A. Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 37 (1997)
        (“In textual interpretation, context is everything.”)). And we
        “strive to avoid” interpretations that render statutory text surplus-
        age. United States v. F.E.B. Corp., 52 F.4th 916, 927 (11th Cir. 2022)
        (citing A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
        Texts 174 (2012)).
USCA11 Case: 23-11349      Document: 80-1      Date Filed: 04/01/2024      Page: 30 of 32

        23-11349             ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring                        5

               All that is to say, the only reading of § 4241 that honors Con-
        gress’s limitations on hospitalization to a “reasonable period” is the
        one that imposes reasonable limitations on the Attorney General’s
        delay in hospitalizing a defendant in the first place. Otherwise, §
        4241’s limitation on hospitalization to “a reasonable period” does
        nothing to contain the period of competency proceedings. And any
        suggestion that § 4241 does not limit the Attorney General’s delay
        between commitment and hospitalization risks implicitly authoriz-
        ing the Attorney General to ignore Congress’s clear intent to limit
        competency proceedings—including admission of a defendant for
        hospitalization—to a reasonable period.
               During oral argument, the Government said that the aver-
        age wait time for hospital treatment over the past few years has
        reached as much as nine months. The Government has chalked up
        the delay to a COVID backlog and says it now has the delay down
        to four to five months. That is still a long time.
               Given the statutory text’s requirement that the Attorney
        General find and place the defendant in a “suitable facility,” and all
        that entails, I join today’s opinion holding that § 4241 does not re-
        quire hospitalization to occur instantaneously after the commitment
        order. But § 4241 provides no reason to believe that Congress ex-
        pected the process of finding a suitable facility in which to hospital-
        ize the defendant to meaningfully extend the competency proceed-
        ings. See United States v. Donnelly, 41 F.4th 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2022)
        (Watford, J., concurring) (“Congress . . . certainly [had] no reason
        to anticipate the lengthy pre-hospitalization delays that have now
USCA11 Case: 23-11349     Document: 80-1      Date Filed: 04/01/2024     Page: 31 of 32

        6                   ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring               23-11349

        become routine . . . . [The] process [of designating a suitable facil-
        ity] can reasonably be expected to take days, not months.”).
                As I’ve explained, § 4241 imposes upon the Attorney Gen-
        eral an obligation to timely evaluate and hospitalize defendants—
        that is, to do so within a reasonable period. In short, the Attorney
        General, acting through the Bureau of Prisons, must ensure that
        hospitalization occurs within a reasonable period from entry of the
        commitment order. When a defendant who requires hospitaliza-
        tion sits in detention without receiving his necessary treatment,
        that not only risks his health, but it also delays his ultimate recov-
        ery. And that in turn guarantees a delay in even the possibility of
        trial. No one contests the power of Congress to have enacted §
        4241(d). So the Attorney General, on whom § 4241(d) expressly
        imposes duties, must comply with § 4241(d). It is not optional. Nor
        do we, as the Judiciary, have the power to excuse the Attorney
        General’s failure to comply with Congress’s directive in § 4241(d).
               It may sound basic, but Congress enacts the laws. The Ex-
        ecutive carries them out. And we interpret them consistent with
        congressional intent as we discern it from the statutory text. That
        is how the separation of powers works. Patchak v. Zinke, 583 U.S.
        244, 249–50 (2018); Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U.S. 26 (1913) (“It is the
        province of the legislature to make the laws and of the courts to
        enforce them.”). And it is what has kept our country functioning
        for more than two-hundred years. So when Congress is clear in its
        mandates and those mandates are constitutionally sound, the
USCA11 Case: 23-11349     Document: 80-1      Date Filed: 04/01/2024    Page: 32 of 32

        23-11349            ROSENBAUM, J., Concurring                      7

        Attorney General must follow them, and we must hold the Attor-
        ney General to do so.
               We as judges do not have the power to relieve others—es-
        pecially another branch—of complying with constitutional, duly
        enacted laws of Congress. And so, while we hold that the four-
        month time limit that § 4241(d) expressly mandates applies to only
        the hospitalization period, it is equally clear that the statute does
        not authorize unreasonable prehospitalization wait times.