Court Opinion

ID: 9629455
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:43:13.990286+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:43.997028
License: Public Domain

*560OLSZEWSKI, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
We agree with the majority that the trial'court did not have the authority to disregard the contract term regarding referral fees. We further agree that the trial court overstepped its authority in appointing a master. Nevertheless, we must respectfully dissent from the reversal of the trial court’s order regarding division of the fee balance. We agree with the trial court that a plaintiff suffers no compensable harm when clients discharge him by voluntary choice.
We agree with the statement of facts as presented by the majority; however, we wish to emphasize certain facts that were not presented by the majority. First, we note that immediately after the tortious conduct occurred, the Shein firm sent a “newsletter” to its clients telling them about the breakaway attorneys’ tortious acts. The letter said:
On another subject, this past Sunday we were shocked to discover that at 6:17 a.m. Robert E. Paul and at least one other person entered our offices and proceeded to improperly remove some case files and other legal documents, all of which are the property of this firm. Upon being observed, they departed out the back door with those files already packed, leaving others scattered about our offices.
When I questioned these unusual acts later that day he admitted to me that he had done so and that he and two other lawyers formerly of this firm were forming their own firm and intended to keep our files.
As a result, we filed an action against those three individuals in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas and a Preliminary Injunction has been issued requiring them to return all case files and property of this firm and prohibiting them at this time from representing or accepting the representation of any of our clients whom they have solicited,
Our firm is totally familiar with all aspects of your cases. All cases will continue to be handled by our eight *561lawyers and nine paralegals all of whom are experienced in asbestos litigation.
See Defendant’s Exhibit # 2, letter dated October 15, 1985.
After finding tortious interference with contract, the trial court also sent a letter to the affected clients. The court’s letter said:
Dear Client:
As you may be aware, Robert Paul, Alan Reich and Richard Myers have withdrawn from the law firm of Joseph D. Shein, P.C. to set up their own firm under the name of Paul, Reich and Myers. As a client you have a right to choose who will be your lawyer and represent you on your case. You can choose either firm. The purpose of this letter is to give you an opportunity to decide who you want to have as your lawyer and to tell the Court so that the Court can see that your wishes are carried out.
In order to tell the Court what you have decided, please fill out the enclosed form, and return it to me as soon as you have decided. This form must be completed and returned to me even if you have already signed another form within the past few weeks, as those forms are not binding and only the enclosed form will be considered by the Court. I urge you to consider this matter carefully, but not to delay in returning the form to me after your decision is made as this will assure that your case proceeds without delay.
I have ordered that neither firm should discuss the question of your choice of an attorney with you until you send back the enclosed selection form. As soon as I receive your selection, I will direct that the lawyers whom you have chosen contact you.
Letter dated November 11, 1985.
In March 1986, the Shein firm filed a supplemental complaint requesting monetary damages. Judge Gafni found that the clients’ discharge of the Shein firm was not caused by the tortious interference with contract. Findings of fact at 22. The trial court found that the Shein firm’s newslet*562ter and the court’s prompt actions removed any taint upon the attorney selection process. Findings of fact at 23. The clients’ ultimate choice of attorney was voluntary; consequently, the trial court decided to divide fees on a quantum meruit basis, as it would have done in the absence of tortious interference. See, e.g., Dorsett v. Hughes, 353 Pa.Super. 129, 509 A.2d 369 (1986). This appeal followed.
We believe that Judge Gafni’s acted within the scope of his discretion in fashioning a solution to this difficult problem. The newsletter and the court’s actions broke the causal link between the tortious act and the choice of attorney. The Shein firm’s loss of business was not a result of the tortious act; rather, it was a result of the clients’ voluntary decision to hire the breakaway attorneys. Under these circumstances, the trial court properly applied Dorsett v. Hughes, 353 Pa.Super. 129, 509 A.2d 369 (1986), and divided the fees on a quantum meruit basis. The trial court merely attempted to restore the position of the parties but for the tortious conduct of the appellees.
Judge Gafni did not “mislabel[] the clients as the damaged parties [and] misdefine[ ] the damage as that done to the clients’ free exercise of choice.” See, majority opinion at 5. He merely concluded that the Shein firm incurred no monetary loss as a result of the tortious interference in this case.
The majority’s reliance on Richette v. Solomon, 410 Pa. 6, 187 A.2d 910 (1963), is misplaced. In Richette, a client discharged his attorney solely because of pressure from his union. The client would not have terminated the contract in the absence of the tortious conduct. Thus, the tortious conduct caused the attorney’s loss of fees, and the attorney was entitled to compensation.
The present case is clearly distinguishable. According to the trial court, if appellees had left the Shein firm without committing any tortious act, the clients still would have discharged the Shein firm and engaged the new firm. The *563tortious conduct did not cause the loss of fees, so the Shein firm has incurred no compensable harm.
The majority points out that “there is no evidence of record to support a conclusion that the court’s remedy cured the taint in the clients’ minds.” Majority at 557. The majority seems to suggest that the trial court should have held hearings, sua sponte, to determine the effectiveness of its injunctive relief. We are unaware of any authority for this novel proposition.
In addition, the majority places the burden on the wrong party. As plaintiff below, the Shein firm had the burden of proving causation. If no evidence was presented to show that the tortious acts caused the clients to discharge the Shein firm, then the Shein firm failed to meet its burden of proof. The Shein firm cannot prevail now by complaining that the evidence it presented was insufficient.
Furthermore, as the Shein firm’s attorney noted at trial, a factual inquiry at this time could not prove or disprove the voluntariness of the clients’ choice. N.T., 9/16/86 at 49. It would be unrealistic to try to prove through factual inquiry the causes which impelled the clients to make decisions more than a year ago.
The trial court was in the best position to determine whether the choice was voluntary. Judge Gafni has presided over the proceedings in this case since February 1986. He has heard testimony from many of the clients in various hearings, and he has had contact with them through the attorney selection process. Judge Gafni did not merely “assume that [his] remedy worked.” Majority at 557. He made a reasoned decision based on his extensive experience with this case. We see no reason to interfere with that decision.
In summary, we would find that the breakaway attorneys are entitled to one-half of the net fee in all cases that they initiated, which is the referral fee provided in the employment contract. We would divide the remaining half on a *564quantum meruit basis. In cases not initiated by the breakaway attorneys, we would divide the entire fee on a quantum meruit basis, taking into account the value of the Shein firm’s referral.1 All work done by the breakaway attorneys while in appellant’s employ would be attributed to the Shein firm for the purpose of quantum meruit assessment, because the breakaway attorneys acted as appellant’s agents at that time, and were appropriately compensated for their work.

. The Shein firm, by assigning appellees to work on these cases, effectively "referred" the cases to appellees. This referral should be considered in assessing quantum meruit.