Court Opinion

ID: 2964675
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:29:16.40175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:58.839691
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-1949
                           ABIODUN ABRAHAM and HENRY AJAO,

                                Plaintiffs, Appellees,
                                          v.

                                    JOSEPH NAGLE,
                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________
        No. 96-2008

                           ABIODUN ABRAHAM and HENRY AJAO,
                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.
                                JOSEPH NAGLE, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.
                                      __________

                                  PERRY ROY, ET AL.,
                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________
                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
                     [Hon. Nancy J. Gertner, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________
                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________
                          Boudin and Lynch, Circuit Judges.
                                            ______________

                                 ____________________

            Susan   M.  Weise,  Chief  of  Litigation,  City   of  Boston  Law
            _________________
        Department, with whom  Merita A. Hopkins, Corporation  Counsel, was on
                               _________________
        brief for defendants.
            George C.  Deptula,  with whom  George  C.  Deptula, P.C.  was  on
            __________________              _________________________
        consolidated brief for plaintiffs.

                                 ____________________

                                     June 9, 1997
                                 ____________________

                 BOUDIN, Circuit  Judge.  Abiodun Abraham  and Henry Ajao
                         ______________

            sued several police officers and the City of Boston for false

            arrest  and for  other  alleged wrongs.    During trial,  the

            district judge directed  a verdict  in favor of  Ajao on  his

            false  arrest claim  against  the  defendant  officer  Joseph

            Nagle; the jury found in favor of the defendants on all other

            claims.  Before us are cross-appeals by the plaintiffs and by

            Nagle.

                 Our main concern is  with the directed verdict and,  for

            that  purpose alone, we set  forth the evidence  in the light

            most  favorable  to Nagle.   Fashion  House,  Inc. v.  K mart
                                         _____________________     ______

            Corp., 892  F.2d 1076, 1088  (1st Cir. 1989).   On August 18,
            _____

            1990, at about 11 p.m., the plaintiffs, both black immigrants

            from  Nigeria, arrived with three white women at the Venus de

            Milo  nightclub in Boston.  After waiting in line for several

            minutes,  the group  reached the  club entrance.    The three

            women were admitted, but the plaintiffs were not.

                 The  bouncer told  Abraham that  he could not  enter the

            club because he  was wearing  jeans and  because Abraham  and

            Ajao were "a  little intoxicated."  The plaintiffs  said that

            other people wearing  jeans were being admitted  and that the

            real  reason for excluding them was their race.  When Abraham

            continued  to  protest, a  club  employee  summoned Nagle,  a

            Boston  police  officer  who   was  "on  detail"  at  another

            establishment down the block.

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                 Nagle talked with the  plaintiffs for 15 to  20 minutes,

            telling them  that the club was  not going to  admit them and

            that they  should leave;  he says  that the  plaintiffs never

            told  him   of  the  alleged  discrimination.     During  the

            discussion, Abraham became  increasingly agitated,  continued

            to protest loudly,  and at one point  hit or pushed Nagle  in

            the  chest.   Nagle  then  arrested Abraham  for  assault and

            battery on a police officer.

                 Nagle   sought  to  handcuff   Abraham  but  the  latter

            struggled free.  Nagle  radioed for help and was  soon joined

            by  officer   Thomas  Boyle.    Together,   Nagle  and  Boyle

            handcuffed Abraham and tried to bring him to Boyle's cruiser,

            which was  double-parked in the street.   Abraham resisted by

            going limp.  As Nagle and Boyle sought to move Abraham to the

            car, Ajao circled the officers and yelled, "why are you doing

            this to my  friend," "this isn't  South Africa, you're  white

            racist cops."

                 According to  Boyle, Ajao was "trying to prevent us from

            getting to the police car."  At one point Boyle  said that he

            "had to actually push [Ajao]  out of my way" as the  officers

            wrestled with Abraham.  Several  times the officers told Ajao

            to "get  away."   Eventually,  with Ajao  still present,  the

            officers pushed Abraham  into the  back seat of  the car;  he

            then  prevented the door from  closing by kicking  at it, but

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            the officers forced it closed.  By this time a crowd of 20 or

            so had gathered to watch.

                 In the meantime,  as Abraham continued to  yell from the

            cruiser, Ajao circled  it and  came up behind  the left  rear

            quarter of the  car.  Ajao was told: "Police, leave, get away

            from  the cruiser"; Nagle later testified  that he had feared

            that Ajao might try to open the car door and release Abraham.

            Ajao  failed to move.  Nagle then  arrested Ajao, who in turn

            struggled with Nagle, Boyle and a third officer, once kicking

            Nagle in the mid-section, before being restrained.

                 In due course,  Abraham and Ajao were both  charged with

            assault and battery and disorderly  conduct.  Mass. Gen. Laws

            ch. 265,   13D; id. ch. 272,   53.  They were tried  in state
                            ___

            court in November 1990 and acquitted.  In February 1993, they

            in turn brought suit  in state court against Nagle  and other

            police officers,  and the city, charging  the defendants with

            false arrest under  42 U.S.C.   1983  and state law and  with

            various other  wrongs.1  The defendants removed the action to

            federal court and, following  discovery, trial began in March

            1995.

                 After all of the evidence  was taken, the district court

            granted  Ajao's motion  for a directed  verdict in  his favor

                                
            ____________________

                 1The other claims, some  of which were dropped  prior to
            or   during  trial,   charged  the   defendants  with   false
            imprisonment, racial discrimination, violation of free speech
            rights, assault and battery, and use of excessive force.

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            against Nagle, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a); in  an oral ruling,
                           ___

            the trial  judge declared  that Nagle was  liable under  both

            federal and state law for falsely arresting Ajao in violation

            of  the  latter's First  and  Fourth Amendment  rights.   The

            court's  primary rationale,  as we  read the  transcript, was

            that  (in the district judge's view)  Ajao's conduct prior to

            his arrest did not "rise to the level of disorderly conduct .

            . . ."  The balance of the case was submitted to the jury.

                 By responses to special interrogatories, the  jury fixed

            Ajao's  damages at  $8,500 to  vindicate his  "rights against

            false  arrest," but made  no separate award  for violation of

            free  speech rights.   On  all of  the plaintiffs'  remaining

            claims, the jury found against the plaintiffs and in favor of

            the defendants.  Thereafter,  the district court awarded Ajao

            attorney's fees  of $24,858.50.   Nagle now appeals  from the

            directed verdict  against him.   The plaintiffs  also appeal,

            urging  that  they  are entitled  to  a  new  trial on  their

            unsuccessful claims,  to  an  injunction,  and  to  increased

            attorney's fees.  We begin with Nagle's appeal.

                 On  review of a  directed verdict, we  take the evidence

            most  favorably to the losing party and ask de novo whether a
                                                        _______

            reasonable jury  had inevitably  to  decide in  favor of  the

            victor.   Smith v.  F.W. Morse &  Co., 76 F.3d  413, 425 (1st
                      _____     _________________

            Cir. 1996).  Here, putting aside some loose ends, the central

            question  is  whether Nagle  at the  time  of the  arrest had

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            probable cause to believe that Ajao had committed the offense

            of disorderly conduct.  If so, this largely defeats the false

            arrest  claim under  both federal  and state  law.   Logue v.
                                                                 _____

            Dore, 103  F.3d 1040, 1044 (1st Cir.  1997); see Commonwealth
            ____                                         ___ ____________

            v. Grise, 496 N.E.2d 162, 163 (Mass. 1986).
               _____

                 Of  course, it  would  be much  easier to  conclude that

            Nagle,  on his own version  of events, had  probable cause to

            charge  Ajao with assault  and battery: Nagle  said that Ajao

            kicked him.  But the kick occurred after Ajao's arrest; prior
                                               _____

            to  the  arrest, the  only  pertinent  charge was  disorderly

            conduct.   We  reserve for  another  day various  issues that

            would  arise  if the  original  arrest  were unjustified  but

            resistance  to  it  provided  grounds  for  a  valid  charge.

            Compare Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 635 (3d
            _______ ______    _____________________

            Cir.  1995), with United States v. Dawdy, 46 F.3d 1427, 1430-
                         ____ _____________    _____

            31 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 195 (1995).
                           ____________

                 In defining disorderly conduct, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272,

              53 provides  for the punishment,  inter alia, of  "idle and
                                                __________

            disorderly  persons."   In 1967,  the Supreme  Judicial Court

            rejected    a    challenge    that    this    provision   was

            unconstitutionally  vague by  interpreting it  to incorporate

            the  Model  Penal Code's  definition  of  disorderly conduct.

            Alegata v.  Commonwealth, 231  N.E.2d 201, 211  (Mass. 1967).
            _______     ____________

            That definition states:

                 A person  is guilty of disorderly  conduct if, with
                 purpose to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or

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                 alarm, or recklessly  creating a risk thereof,  he:
                 (a)  engages in  fighting  or  threatening,  or  in
                 violent  or  tumultuous  behavior;  or   (b)  makes
                 unreasonable noise or offensively coarse utterance,
                 gesture or  display, or addresses  abusive language
                 to any  person present, or (c)  creates a hazardous
                 or  physically offensive condition by any act which
                 serves no legitimate purpose of the actor.

          Id.  (quoting ALI,  Model Penal  Code   250.2  (Proposed Official
          ___                 _________________

          Draft 1962)).

                 Several years  later, the  Supreme  Judicial Court  struck

          down  subsection  (b)  of this  definition  as unconstitutionally

          overbroad.   Commonwealth  v.  A Juvenile,  334  N.E.2d 617,  622
                       ____________      __________

          (Mass. 1975).  And  to avoid First Amendment concerns,  the court

          ruled  that  the  remaining  subsections  (a)  and  (c)  must  be

          construed to cover only conduct, not activities which involve the

          "lawful exercise of a  First Amendment right."   Id. at 628;  see
                                                           ___          ___

          also Commonwealth v. LePore, 666 N.E.2d 152, 155 (Mass. App. Ct.)
          ____ ____________    ______

          ("To be disorderly within  the sense of the statute,  the conduct

          must disturb  through acts other  than speech  . . .  ."), review
                                                                     ______

          denied, 668 N.E.2d 356 (Mass. 1996).
          ______

                 Nagle  testified  that he  arrested Ajao  under subsection

          (c), not subsection (a),  and we doubt that Ajao's  conduct prior
                                                                      _____

          to his arrest would support a charge under subsection (a).  Thus,

          the question for us is whether a reasonable jury could have found

          that Nagle had probable  cause to believe that Ajao  had violated

          subsection (c) by "creat[ing] a hazardous . . . condition by  any

          act  which serves no legitimate purpose of  the actor."  We think

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          that a reasonable  jury, if  it accepted the  defense version  of

          events, could have so found.

                 An arrest  of a struggling  defendant--here, Abraham--is a

          serious  business.   Even without a  gathering crowd  and traffic

          blocked by a  police cruiser,  there is a  potential for  serious

          violence and of  injury both to  the suspect  and to the  police.

          Yet, assuming  the truth  of the defense  evidence, Ajao--despite

          repeated  requests to get  out of  the way--circled  the officers

          while shouting, at least once got directly in their way, and then

          refused to move away from the cruiser.

                 Such  behavior can fairly be taken to fall directly within

          the literal language of subsection (c): creating "a hazardous . .

          .  condition" by acts "which serve[] no legitimate purpose of the

          actor."   Indeed,  a number  of Massachusetts  cases have  upheld

          disorderly conduct arrests where a refusal to obey  police orders

          created  a safety threat.  See Commonwealth v. Mulero, 650 N.E.2d
                                     ___ ____________    ______

          360, 363 (Mass. App.  Ct.), review denied, 652 N.E.2d  145 (Mass.
                                      _____________

          1995); Commonwealth  v. Bosk, 556  N.E.2d 1055, 1058  (Mass. App.
                 ____________     ____

          Ct. 1990); Commonwealth v.  Carson, 411 N.E.2d 1337,  1338 (Mass.
                     ____________     ______

          App. Ct. 1980).  

                 Literal  language is  not  the full  story.   The  state's

          highest court has glossed  the statute not to apply  wherever the

          activities  are  themselves  the  "lawful  exercise  of  a  First

          Amendment right."  A Juvenile, 334 N.E.2d at 628.  And Ajao had a
                             __________

          free-speech right to protest the arrest of his companion, even if

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          this distressed  or annoyed the  police.  But by  the same token,

          "the  mere fact that the conduct of the defendant was accompanied

          by speech  does not preclude  a conviction" under  the disorderly

          conduct law.  Carson, 411 N.E.2d at 1337.  
                        ______

                 We  have  very  little  difficulty  in  separating  Ajao's

          protected  speech   from  his  physical  interference   with  two

          policemen  struggling to arrest and  detain a third person, which

          is  not protected.  Indeed, in Colten  v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104,
                                         ______     ________

          109  (1972), the Supreme Court  upheld a conviction  for far less

          disruptive conduct, observing that "Colten's conduct in  refusing

          to move on after being directed to  do so" was not protect by the

          First Amendment.  See also City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451,
                            ________ _______________    ____

          463 n.11 (1987).

                 In  some  cases,  peaceful  demonstration   and  protected

          expression  may appear  to  merge.   Possibly,  this may  explain

          Commonwealth  v. Feigenbaum,  536 N.E.2d  325, 328  (Mass. 1989),
          ____________     __________

          where  the state court  held that the  disorderly conduct statute

          did not  extend to  the blocking  of traffic in  the course  of a

          peaceful  political  rally  because the  defendant's  purpose was

          legitimate.   But Ajao's  alleged conduct in  the present  case--

          disrupting a  police attempt  to arrest a  struggling companion--

          seems to us both more dangerous and less legitimate.

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                 Further, even  if Feigenbaum  were given its  most extreme
                                   __________

          reading,2 making a good  purpose a complete defense, it  would be

          up to  a jury  to determine  whether Ajao  was acting  to express

          protected  speech or whether he also sought to interfere with the

          arrest.   The latter aim could not be a legitimate purpose on any

          view of the matter.  Yet a jury could infer, assuming it accepted

          the  defense version of events, that Ajao was trying to frustrate

          the arrest by getting  in the way or distracting the officers and

          not simply trying to convey his objections.

                 In  this case, the jury  certainly did not  have to accept

          the police  version of the  events.   The plaintiffs gave  a more

          benign   account   of  their   conduct   and   there  were   some

          contradictions  in the defendants' own testimony.  But it was the

          jury's province,  after observing Nagle, the  other officers, and

          the plaintiffs on  the witness  stand to decide  whom the  jurors

          believed.   We simply disagree  with the trial judge's conclusion

          that she was free to make that credibility determination.  If the

          district judge  thought that  the credibility issues  fell within

          her province, this  was a  mistaken view of  the governing  rule.

          See Smith, 76 F.3d at 425.3
          ___ _____

                                
            ____________________

                 2At  least two  state  court decisions  after Feigenbaum
                                                               __________
            suggest  that an extreme  reading is  unwarranted and  that a
            defendant can be liable for disorderly conduct even where his
            main objective is to  protest police decisions.  See  Mulero,
                                                             ___  ______
            650 N.E.2d at 363; Bosk, 556 N.E.2d at 1058.
                               ____

                 3Nagle  points to  the  trial judge's  comment (made  in
            discussing jury  instructions) that "I am  basing my findings
            with respect to Mr. Ajao on my evaluations of the credibility

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                 Three loose ends remain.   One is the possibility  that an

          arrest based on  probable cause  might still be  unlawful if  the

          police  officer  acted  simply   for  the  purpose  of  punishing

          protected speech.   There is  some law on  this subject,  compare
                                                                    _______

          Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996), with Sloman
          _____    _____________                                ____ ______

          v. Tadlock, 21  F.3d 1462, 1469 (9th Cir. 1994),  but we need not
             _______

          pursue the issue here.  Plaintiffs have not pointed to any direct

          evidence that Nagle acted  out of an improper motive  to suppress

          speech, and  certainly  nothing would  remotely justify  deciding

          that issue against him by a directed verdict.

                 The second is  the possibility, on remand, of  a qualified

          immunity  defense for  Nagle.   This  defense,  preserved in  the

          district  court, has  been successfully  invoked in  this circuit

          where a police  officer made a reasonable,  if arguably mistaken,

          call on a  close legal issue.  E.g., Joyce  v. Town of Tewksbury,
                                         ____  _____     _________________

          112 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 1997); Veilleux v. Perschau, 101  F.3d 1, 3
                                       ________    ________

          (1st Cir. 1996).  We have ignored the issue here only because the

          city  has chosen, for reasons not explained, to fight this appeal

          on the merits.

                 Third, for the sake of completeness, we note that in 1995-

          -well after  the incident  in this case--Massachusetts  enacted a

          separate "resisting arrest"  statute that also covers  situations

          in which the person charged prevented or attempted to prevent the

                                
            ____________________

            of the witnesses as well as my evaluations of the sufficiency
            of the evidence . . . ."  

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          arrest of another.  Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 268,   32B.   We need not

          consider whether Ajao could have been charged under this statute,

          which is narrower in focus but  more severe in penalties than the

          disorderly conduct statute applied here.  There is no  indication

          that the adoption  of the new statute  was meant to  eliminate or

          alter  the availability of the  disorderly conduct law  as a less

          severe remedy for addressing  disorderly interference with police

          activity.

                 Turning now to the plaintiffs' appeal, we begin with their

          claim that the district  court erred in denying them  a new trial

          on  their other  claims which  were rejected  by the  jury.   The

          arguments are largely conventional ones  turning on the weight of

          the evidence,  the propriety  of closing arguments,  and possible

          confusion on the part of the jury evidenced by an inquiry made by

          the jury during its deliberations.

                 The  denial of a new trial motion  under Fed R. Civ. P. 59

          is reviewed for abuse of  discretion.  Bogosian v.  Mercedes-Benz
                                                 ________     _____________

          of  North America,  Inc.,  104 F.3d  472,  482 (1st  Cir.  1997).
          __  ____________________

          Without describing  the plaintiffs' arguments in  detail, we find

          no abuse here in rejecting each of the new-trial grounds thus far

          mentioned.  A  potentially more  serious claim is  that the  jury

          pool  may  have  excluded  minorities, but  the  plaintiffs  have

          pointed to nothing in the record to support the charge or to show

          that it was even raised in the trial court.

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                 The plaintiffs also object to the district court's failure

          to grant injunctive relief.  The relief sought was to prevent the

          Boston police from continuing to  use, at least without revision,

          a  training  bulletin  that  sets  forth  the  Model  Penal  Code

          definition  of  disorderly conduct  but  fails  to indicate  that

          subsection  (b) has  been  struck down  by  the Supreme  Judicial

          Court.  The city, which has not responded on this point, would be

          well advised to clarify the manual on its own.

                 But the plaintiffs were  not charged under subsection (b);

          in  fact, Nagle testified that he had been taught that subsection

          (b) had been held invalid.  Nor did the plaintiffs show that they

          faced  any  real threat  of future  injury,  e.g., by  threats to
                                                       ____

          enforce subsection (b) against them  in the future.  City  of Los
                                                               ____________

          Angeles v. Lyons,  461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983).   The district court,
          _______    _____

          exercising its  equitable authority  to grant or  deny injunctive

          relief, certainly did not have to grant any here.

                 To conclude, we vacate the  judgment against Nagle on  the
                                 ______

          false arrest  claim and the  now-mooted award of  attorney's fees

          against him and otherwise affirm the judgment entered on the jury
                                    ______

          verdicts in favor of the  defendants.  The false arrest claim  is

          remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
          ________

                 It is so ordered.
                 _________________

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