Court Opinion

ID: 9768147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:44:15.987446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:33.288516
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
In their motion on rehearing, appellants have provided this Court with a cite to a trial exhibit showing a presentment to State Farm. In that document, Starlette "Whitehead made demand of the policy limits of Brent Taylor’s underinsured motorist coverage in settlement of her claim. The letter was mailed February 10, 1995, and no payment or offer was made within the thirty days following that date.
As previously set out in our opinion, the judgment awarded $20,000 to the "Whiteheads (Starlette and her parents) on their suit against State Farm based upon the underin-sured motorist provision of Taylor’s policy. It also awarded $20,000 to Taylor’s mother, Lesa Taylor-Shivers, on her suit (as interve-nor) against State Farm based upon that same provision.
Counsel has not directed us to any presentment of a claim by Taylor-Shivers. Because any recovery by Starlette "Whitehead’s parents was predicated upon Star-lette’s claim, we find the presentment by her individually to be sufficient to also act as presentment of a claim by her parents for recovery under the policy.
The Whiteheads and Taylor-Shivers contend in their appeal that the trial court erred by denying their request for attorney’s fees. They did not request findings of fact or conclusions of law; thus, the judgment implies all necessary findings of fact to support it are present, provided that the proposition is one raised by the pleadings and supported by the evidence, and that the judge’s decision can be sustained on any reasonable theory that is consistent with the evidence and the applicable law, considering only the evidence favorable to the decision.28
The insureds made the claim at trial under Section 88.001(8) of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which provides that attorney’s fees are recoverable for a suit on breach of contract. Section 38.006 provides that Chapter 38 does not apply to a contract issued by an insurer that is subject to Article 3.62 of the Insurance Code, Chapter 9 of the Insurance Code, Article 21.21 of the Insurance Code, or Article 21.21-2 of the Insurance Code. The insurer, State Farm, argues that this means that attorney’s fees are available in a suit against an insurer only in the specifically enumerated instances, and not in a straight suit on contract.
This section, however, has been held to apply only if attorney’s fees are actually available under the relief sought in the chapters listed, as shown by the discussion below. The recovery sought in the present ease is based solely on the written contract, not on insurance theory for which attorney’s fees are available.
The insured can be properly awarded attorney’s fees when the only cause of action tried in the case arises under an uninsured/underinsured motorists insurance contract when the insured establishes she had a valid claim, she was represented by an attorney, and she sent a timely presentment letter yet received no timely settlement offer. The insured is not required to prove a specific amount before the insured can recover attorney’s fees.29
In Burke, this Court stated that the purpose of the exclusions in Article 2226 (the precursor to Section 38.001) was to exclude only those actions under which attorney’s fees were already recoverable under another statute.30 The suit in the present case does not fall within one of the exclusions under Chapter 38, as the suit was brought solely for breach of contract. State Farm argues, *88among other things, that the Burke decision has been overruled sub silentio by the Supreme Court in Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Childress31 and Travelers Indem Co. v. Mayfield.32 Based upon these opinions, State Farm posits that Section 38.006 actually means that if any insurance company could be liable under the stated portions of the Insurance Code, then attorney’s fees are unavailable even for a simple suit on contract. This position has been adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Vacuum Tanks, Inc.33
The federal court’s analysis of Dairyland, however, is flawed. The Fifth Circuit noted that the Burke opinion’s analysis had been adopted by a number of other appellate courts, but then stated that it was bound by the Supreme Court’s decision in Dairyland, as it implied that “an insurer who falls within the provisions of Section 38.006 is exempt from the payment of attorney’s fees and that only those insurers who do not qualify for the exemption are subject to the payment of attorney’s fees.”
The decision in Dairyland actually held that, since a Mutual Insurance Company was not an insurer under the terms of the Insurance Code provisions, certainly it could not be exempt under Section 38.006. The Court did not take the additional step of holding that 38.006 always exempted insurers from attorney’s fees, no matter what the action against them might be.
Further, the Fifth Circuit erred in stating that the only time the Supreme Court had addressed the issue was in Dairyland. The Burke opinion from this Court was reviewed by the Supreme Court, which denied writ with the express notation that the Court of Appeals had correctly decided the case as it related to attorney’s fees.
The Travelers opinion relied upon by State Farm had not been written at the time of the Bituminous opinion. It is also distinguishable. In Travelers, attorney’s fees were available for a workers’ compensation claim under the specific terms of the Labor Code, and the Court held that those terms provided the specific authority for recovery in that situation. In dicta, the Court noted that the appellant had not contended that she could recover based upon the agreement between the parties, and then the Court stated:
Indeed, she cannot do so, as section 38.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which generally authorizes recovery of attorney’s fees for suits on a written contract, does not apply to insurance contracts subject to article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code.... The compensation policy issued by Travelers falls within this exception.34
This statement can be read to state that Section 38.001 will not apply when an insured can otherwise recover attorney’s fees under the Insurance Code. The Court then turned to the argument that appellant did raise, and held that the trial court could not award attorney’s fees under either the Government Code or its own inherent authority. This authority has not overruled the line of cases typified by Novosad and Burke.
State Farm also argues that attorney’s fees were unavailable because there was no duty to pay under the terms of the contract until the insureds showed themselves to be legally entitled to recover from the uninsured motorist. This position has been taken in connection with a suit against a carrier to recover on an uninsured/underin-sured motorist coverage claim and to seek attorney’s fees based upon Section 38.001.35 The courts reasoned that, since a motorist was not legally entitled to recover under the uninsured motorist provision until the amount of damages was determined,36 if un-*89liquidated damages were involved then the claim could not be presented until the damages were determined. Section 38.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code requires that:
To recover attorney’s fees under this chapter:
(1) the claimant must be represented by an attorney;
(2) the claimant must present the claim to the opposing party or to a duly authorized agent of the opposing party; and
(3) payment for the just amount owed must not have been tendered before the expiration of the 30th day after the claim is presented.
The claim was under a contract. Although the claim might turn out to be invalid, that does not mean that the presentment could not be made until the propriety of the claim was determined. If so, then attorney’s fees could never be available in a suit on contract, because until a court determined whether a party was actually liable under the contract, no presentment could be made.
An award of attorney’s fees to a plaintiff recovering on a valid claim founded on a written or oral contract, preceded by proper presentment, is mandatory.37
It is well established that no particular form of presentment is required.38 Nor is there a requirement that the presentment include any mention of a sum or amount owing.39 Furthermore, recovery is allowable even if the award is entirely offset by the opposing party’s claim.40
We have previously concluded that presentment was adequate as to the Whiteheads. No findings of fact were filed in this case, and attorney’s fees are not stipulated.
We conclude that the trial court erred by refusing to award attorney’s fees to the Whiteheads. Because no specific finding was made by the fact finder as to the amount of attorney’s fees to which the Whiteheads would be entitled, we are not in a position to alter the judgment by adding attorney’s fees. The question of reasonableness of attorney’s fees is generally a question for the fact finder.41 We find that the trial court erred in failing to award attorney’s fees, but we believe that this Court would be exercising original rather than appellate jurisdiction if we attempted to establish the proper amount of reasonable attorney’s fees.42 An appellate court should not usurp the fact finding function of the trial court.43
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed on all matters except its failure to award reasonable attorney’s fees to the Whiteheads in this breach of contract. The portion of this litigation concerning the amount of reasonable attorney’s fees for the Whiteheads is severed and remanded to the trial court for a determination and award thereof.

. Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex.1990).

. Novosad v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 546, 552 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1994, no writ); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 694 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burke, 614 S.W.2d 847, 850 (Tex.App.-Texarkana) (op. on reh’g), aff'd per curiam, 621 S.W.2d 596 (Tex.1981).

.Burke, 614 S.W.2d at 850.

. 650 S.W.2d 770 (Tex.1983)

. 923 S.W.2d 590 (Tex.1996) (orig.proceeding).

. 975 F.2d 1130, 1133 (5th Cir.1992).

. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Mayfield, 923 S.W.2d at 593.

. Sprague v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 880 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex.App.-14th Dist.1993, no writ); Sikes v. Zuloaga, 830 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ).

. Franco v. Allstate Ins. Co., 505 S.W.2d 789 (Tex.1974).

. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Aiello, 911 S.W.2d 463, 474 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 941 S.W.2d 68 (Tex.1997); Arguelles v. Kaplan, 736 S.W.2d 782, 786 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Caldwell & Hurst v. Myers, 714 S.W.2d 63, 65 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Gerdes v. Mustang Exploration Co., 666 S.W.2d 640, 645 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ).

. Jones v. Kelley, 614 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex.1981); Adams v. Petrade Int'l, Inc., 754 S.W.2d 696, 719 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied).

. Arch Constr., Inc. v. Tyburec, 730 S.W.2d 47, 50 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Stuckey v. White, 647 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ).

. McKinley v. Drozd, 685 S.W.2d 7, 10 (Tex.1985).

. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Long Trusts, 860 S.W.2d 439 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1993, writ denied).

. See International Security Life Ins. Co. v. Spray, 468 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tex.1971).

. Industrial Disposal Supply Co. v. Perryman Bros. Trash Service, 664 S.W.2d 756, 760-61 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Long Trusts, 860 S.W.2d 439 at 451.