Court Opinion

ID: 9893530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-27 16:09:27.289917+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:24.802943
License: Public Domain

J-S36037-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :         PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
  TERRY D. WALKER                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :       No. 409 EDA 2023

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 5, 2023
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
             Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0608421-2005

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                               FILED OCTOBER 27, 2023

       Appellant, Terry D. Walker, appeals pro se from the order entered in the

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, denying as untimely his fourth

petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On

January 20, 2005, Appellant bound Joseph Smith (“Victim”) with zip ties,

robbed him, and shot him multiple times in the back of a white minivan.

Following a trial presided over by the Honorable Renee Cardwell Hughes, a

jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder, robbery, and possession of

an instrument of crime on March 5, 2007.            On March 7, 2007, the court

sentenced Appellant to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without parole

____________________________________________

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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followed by an aggregate term of 12½ to 25 years of imprisonment. This

Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on June 15, 2009, and our Supreme

Court    denied   allowance   of   appeal    on   November     25,   2009.   See

Commonwealth v. Walker, 981 A.2d 325 (Pa. Super. 2009) (unpublished

memorandum), appeal denied, 603 Pa. 703, 983 A.2d 1249 (2009).

Thereafter, Appellant unsuccessfully litigated three PCRA petitions.

        On May 20, 2022, Appellant filed the current PCRA petition, his fourth,

alleging that the judge who presided over Appellant’s preliminary hearing

erred by allowing hearsay evidence alone to establish a prima facie case. On

November 22, 2022, the PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its

intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing. Appellant filed responses on

December 8, 2022, and December 16, 2022, alleging in part that he recently

learned that Judge Hughes’ reasonable doubt jury instructions were

unconstitutional. The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition as untimely

on January 5, 2023. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on January 27,

2023.    On February 8, 2023, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b),

and Appellant complied on February 22, 2023.

        Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

           Whether counsel provided effective assistance, pursuant to
           the 6th Amendment?

(Appellant’s Brief at 4) (subsections omitted).

        On appeal, Appellant asserts that this Court should take judicial notice

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of our Supreme Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Drummond,

___ Pa. ___, 285 A.3d 625 (2022), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 143 S.Ct.

1766, 215 L.Ed.2d 659 (2023), which invalidated a hypothetical used by Judge

Hughes to explain reasonable doubt to the jury.2 Appellant argues that Judge

Hughes gave a nearly identical hypothetical to the jury at his trial. Appellant

claims that our Supreme Court’s ruling in Drummond satisfies the newly

discovered fact and newly recognized constitutional right exceptions to the

PCRA time bar.       Appellant further contends that prior PCRA counsel was

ineffective for failing to raise the issue of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for

failing to object to Judge Hughes’ hypothetical. Appellant concludes that the

PCRA court erred in dismissing his PCRA petition as untimely, and this Court

should vacate the PCRA court’s order and remand for further proceedings. We

disagree.

       As a preliminary matter, the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a

jurisdictional requisite. Commonwealth v. Hackett, 598 Pa. 350, 956 A.2d

978 (2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1285, 129 S.Ct. 2772, 174 L.Ed.2d 277

(2009). Pennsylvania law makes clear that no court has jurisdiction to hear

____________________________________________

2 Our Supreme Court decided Drummond on November 23, 2022.           The Court
held that a hypothetical analogizing reasonable doubt to making a decision
about a serious surgery for a loved one was reasonably likely to cause the jury
to apply a diminished standard of proof. Nevertheless, the Court determined
that the appellant’s trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance for
failing to object to the jury instruction because counsel cannot be held
ineffective for failing to anticipate a change in the law.

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an untimely PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 575 Pa. 500, 837

A.2d 1157 (2003).      The PCRA requires a petition, including a second or

subsequent petition, to be filed within one year of the date the underlying

judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment

of sentence is final “at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary

review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9545(b)(3).

      To obtain merits review of a PCRA petition filed more than one year after

the judgment of sentence became final, the petitioner must allege and prove

at least one of the three timeliness exceptions:

         (i)      the failure to raise the claim previously was the
         result of interference by government officials with the
         presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or
         laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of
         the United States;

         (ii)     the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
         unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
         ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or

         (iii)    the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
         recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
         the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
         provided in this section and has been held by that court to
         apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Generally, “a claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel does not provide an exception to the PCRA time bar.”

Commonwealth v. Sims, 251 A.3d 445, 448 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal

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denied, ___ Pa. ___, 265 A.3d 194 (2021).

      Instantly, following Appellant’s direct appeal, our Supreme Court denied

allowance of appeal on November 25, 2009. Appellant’s judgment of sentence

became final ninety (90) days later, on or about February 23, 2010. See

U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13 (stating appellant must file petition for writ of certiorari with

United States Supreme Court within 90 days after entry of judgment by state

court of last resort). Thus, Appellant had until February 23, 2011 to file a

timely PCRA petition.

      Appellant filed the current PCRA petition on May 20, 2022, which is

facially untimely.     See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).       In his brief, Appellant

vaguely attempts to invoke the newly discovered facts and the newly

recognized constitutional right exceptions to the PCRA time bar, based on our

Supreme Court’s decision in Drummond. Nevertheless, judicial decisions do

not   constitute   a   “new   fact”   for   purposes   of   the   exception.   See

Commonwealth v. Watts, 611 Pa. 80, 23 A.3d 980 (2011) (explaining

subsequent decisional law does not constitute new “fact” per Section

9545(b)(1)(ii)).     Additionally, the Drummond Court did not hold that its

decision was to apply retroactively, as required to qualify for the newly

recognized constitutional right exception. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii).

See also Commonwealth v. Chambers, 35 A.3d 34, 41 (Pa.Super. 2011),

appeal denied, 616 Pa. 625, 46 A.3d 715 (2012) (stating that to satisfy newly-

recognized constitutional right exception under Section 9545(b)(1)(iii),

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petitioner must prove that there is new constitutional right and that right has

been held by Supreme Court of United States or Supreme Court of

Pennsylvania to apply retroactively). Therefore, Appellant has failed to prove

an exception to the PCRA timeliness requirements.3 Accordingly, we affirm.4

       Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

3 Appellant’s claims of prior PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness do not satisfy an

exception to the PCRA’s time bar. See Sims, supra. Moreover, trial counsel
would not have been ineffective for failing to anticipate the change in the law
(see Drummond, supra), so prior PCRA counsel would not have been
ineffective in failing to raise this claim. To the extent that Appellant purports
to rely on our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Bradley, ___
Pa. ___, 261 A.3d 381 (2021), that decision affords him no relief. In Bradley,
the Court expressly held “that a PCRA petitioner may, after a PCRA court
denies relief, and after obtaining new counsel or acting pro se, raise claims of
PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so, even if on
appeal.” Bradley, supra at ___, 261 A.3d at 401 (internal footnote omitted).
Nevertheless, this Court has declined to extend the holding of Bradley to
cases involving untimely or serial petitions. See Commonwealth v. Stahl,
292 A.3d 1130, 1136 (Pa.Super. 2023) (holding that Bradley does not create
right to file subsequent PCRA petition outside PCRA’s one-year time limit as
method of raising ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel or permit recognition of
such right). Further, Appellant appears to challenge prior PCRA counsel’s
ineffectiveness (presumably, counsel who represented Appellant in his first
PCRA petition); the current appeal would not be Appellant’s first opportunity
to have done so, as required by Bradley.

4 On October 6, 2023, Appellant filed an application for relief in this Court
seeking, inter alia, a hearing on his current PCRA claims. Based on our
disposition, we deny the requested relief.

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Date: October 27, 2023

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