Court Opinion

ID: 1000023
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 17:33:57.099915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:30.300983
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                       No. 99-4009

MICHAEL PARKER,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro.
N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., Chief District Judge.
(CR-98-35)

Submitted: September 28, 1999

Decided: October 12, 1999

Before MURNAGHAN, LUTTIG, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Scott Bratton, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. Walter C. Holton, Jr.,
United States Attorney, Michael F. Joseph, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Michael Parker was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent
to distribute cocaine hydrochloride and cocaine base, in violation of
21 U.S.C.A. § 846 (West Supp. 1999). He was sentenced to 262
months imprisonment, followed by ten years of supervised release.
Parker appeals.

At trial, Parker sought to introduce his brother's statement to the
police into evidence, pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). The district
court properly analyzed the statement to determine its admissibility.
United States v. Bumpass, 60 F.3d 1099, 1102 (4th Cir. 1995). We
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing
to admit the proffered evidence. United States v. Lowe, 65 F.3d 1137,
1145 (4th Cir. 1995). Therefore, we decline relief on this issue.

Parker next asserts that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
conviction. To establish a conspiracy under this statute, the Govern-
ment must prove that: "(1) an agreement to possess cocaine with
intent to distribute existed between two or more persons; (2) the
defendant knew of the conspiracy; and (3) the defendant knowingly
and voluntarily became a part of this conspiracy." United States v.
Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 857 (4th Cir. 1996). This court must sustain the
jury verdict on direct appeal "if there is substantial evidence, taking
the view most favorable to the Government, to support it." Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). We conclude that the evidence
introduced by the Government satisfies this standard.

Finally, Parker asserts that the district court erred at sentencing in
determining the amount of drugs attributable to him. We review for
clear error the district court's factual finding of the relevant quantity
of drugs at sentencing. United States v. Fletcher, 74 F.3d 49, 55 (4th
Cir. 1996). The Government must prove drug quantities by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. United States v. Goff , 907 F.2d 1441, 1444
(4th Cir. 1990). The district court's factual findings, based on the evi-
dence introduced at trial, are not clearly erroneous.

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We affirm Parker's conviction and sentence. We deny his motion,
via counsel, to strike a portion of the Government's brief, and his pro
se motion to file a supplemental, pro se brief. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately pre-
sented in the materials before the court and oral argument would not
aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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