Court Opinion

ID: 9368240
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-03 15:05:36.339402+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:07.677715
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JANUARY 27, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                          TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2021-CA-1137-MR

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
TRANSPORTATION CABINET                                               APPELLANT

               APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.            HONORABLE SUSAN SCHULTZ GIBSON, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 21-CI-000476

ESTATE OF ZAVIER FROEBER;
AND COMMONWEALTH OF
KENTUCKY, PUBLIC PROTECTION
CABINET, BOARD OF CLAIMS                                             APPELLEES

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, CALDWELL, AND LAMBERT, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: This case involves the tragic death of a young man, Zavier

Froeber, which occurred when his vehicle was struck by a train. The Estate of

Zavier Froeber (hereinafter “the Estate”) alleged that the Appellant, the Kentucky

Transportation Cabinet (hereinafter “Transportation Cabinet”) was liable to the
Estate for the death because it negligently failed to warn Zavier of the approaching

train as he exited a work zone. The Board of Claims agreed, finding the

Transportation Cabinet 20% responsible for the accident, apportioning the

remaining 80% of responsibility to the decedent. The Jefferson Circuit Court

affirmed the order of the Board of Claims.1 The Transportation Cabinet now

appeals pursuant to KRS 49.160.

                                         FACTS

              On March 29, 2016, 19-year-old Zavier Froeber was driving

northbound on KY-1020 in Bullitt County on his way to attend a mandatory work

meeting at his place of employment. He encountered a Transportation Cabinet

work zone as he approached the final turn to his workplace, Sabert Corporation,

which is located off Blue Lick Road. After Zavier turned left onto Blue Lick

Road, his vehicle was immediately struck by a train, and he was killed. At the time

of the accident, Zavier was less than a mile from Sabert Corporation’s location.

              Transportation Cabinet employees had set up a work zone to do work

excavating a ditch on the shoulder of northbound KY-1020, a state highway. The

Transportation Cabinet had received reports of water collecting in the shallow

1
 In 2021, the former Claims Commission was replaced by the Office of Claims and Appeals,
Board of Claims. See Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 12.020, KRS 13B.020, and KRS
49.010 et seq.

                                            -2-
ditch between the road and the railway, flooding the road. The railway ran parallel

to KY-1020 and intersected Blue Lick Road.

            After holding a meeting concerning how to properly conduct the work

in the work zone, the Transportation Cabinet employees had erected signage on

KY-1020 indicating to drivers they were approaching a work zone; the road would

narrow to one lane, and traffic onto the lane would be controlled by flaggers. One

flagger, Jeremy Nichols, was positioned beside the northbound lane on the south

end of the zone and equipped with a “slow/stop” paddle. Another employee, Paul

Beckham, was similarly equipped and positioned on the west side of the road by

the southbound lane. Both flaggers had a pick-up truck beside them with lights

flashing.

            A dump truck and a backhoe were in the closed northbound lane,

along with Nichols’ pick-up truck. Zavier proceeded north, now travelling in the

southbound lane as directed by Nichols; all traffic was directed to the southbound

lane, with the flaggers communicating via radio as to which of them would allow

traffic to proceed and which would turn his paddle to “stop.”

            Beckham was responsible for controlling southbound traffic, as well

as traffic turning left onto KY-1020 and into the work zone from East Blue Lick

Road, which ran perpendicular to KY-1020 to the east. Traffic on East Blue Lick

Road would have to cross railroad tracks which ran across Blue Lick Road just

                                        -3-
before it ended at the junction with KY-1020. The railroad tracks were about

forty-five feet from KY-1020. Beckham also had to control traffic leaving an auto

service business to the west of KY-1020. Nichols was responsible for controlling

northbound traffic on KY-1020, as well as traffic entering and leaving Solite

Corporation, which was located at the southern edge of the work zone.

             Zavier’s vehicle was not the lead vehicle when northbound traffic was

released to proceed but was either the second or third vehicle. Megan Jones was

stopped in the southbound lane by Beckham and was second in line behind another

vehicle while they waited for northbound traffic to clear the lane. Megan Jones

watched in horror as Zavier turned east onto Blue Lick Road and into the path of a

northbound train. The crossing had lights and bells, which had activated. It had no

gate.

             Christopher Pollett is a highway superintendent and was in charge of

the worksite. He would ensure the zone was properly set up, perform other

supervisory duties, and then proceed to another worksite in his jurisdiction. He

happened to be onsite at the time of the accident involving Zavier. He was in his

Transportation Cabinet vehicle at the stop sign on Blue Lick Road, leaving the

worksite to proceed to his next supervisory detail. He was waiting for Beckham to

release him to turn left onto southbound KY-1020. He heard the train whistle and

observed the lights of the crossing signal and so he pulled his truck up a bit closer

                                         -4-
to KY-1020, to ensure the bed was not on the tracks. He made eye contact with

Zavier as Zavier turned right onto Blue Lick Road. He briefly saw the collision in

his rear-view mirror as the train slammed into Zavier’s vehicle.

             No Transportation Cabinet employee on the worksite gave any

warnings about the train to any vehicles proceeding through the worksite. Though

the dump truck and excavator were approximately eleven feet tall and were

occupying the space between traffic and the railroad tracks, effectively blocking

the view of those travelling through the work zone, no employee believed they had

any duty to warn motorists as to the approach of the train as it was not located on

the worksite. The worksite ended, they believed, before the railroad tracks and

Blue Lick Road was not a part of the work zone, though the southbound flagger

had to control traffic entering KY-1020 from Blue Lick, whether proceeding north

or southbound on KY-1020.

             The Estate filed a claim with the Kentucky Board of Claims (formerly

the Kentucky Claims Commission, hereinafter “the Board”). The Estate claimed

that the Transportation Cabinet employees were negligent in setting up the work

zone, which led to Zavier’s view of the train being obstructed. The Estate also

alleged that the activity of the work zone created distractions and confusion which

increased the likelihood that a driver would miss the alerts that a train was

approaching from the rear, and that the Transportation Cabinet employees failed to

                                         -5-
warn Zavier about the approaching train. The Transportation Cabinet admitted it

owed an ordinary duty of care to all drivers passing through the work zone but

disclaimed any responsibility for drivers’ safety once they had left the work zone.

The Transportation Cabinet specifically denied it was negligent in any way which

led to the death of Zavier.

             On October 30 and 31, 2019, the Board held a hearing on the claim.

The Estate called Andrea Davis, formerly of the human resources department at

Zavier’s employer, Sabert Corporation, to establish his earnings. The Estate also

called six Transportation Cabinet workers present at the time of the accident:

Christopher Pollett, who was the Bullitt County supervisor; Raymond Allen, who

was the on-site supervisor; flaggers Jeremy Nichols and Paul Beckham; dump

truck operator James Lawson; and backhoe operator William Peabody. The Estate

also presented the testimony of accident reconstructionist Joseph Stidham, a retired

Kentucky State Trooper and reconstruction trainer, and Megan Jones, who

witnessed the accident. Zavier’s mother, Bridgett, and his father and executor of

his estate, Scott, also testified. The Transportation Cabinet called only Christopher

Pollett and its retained expert, Kenneth Agent.

             Following the hearing, the hearing officer issued findings of fact,

conclusions of law and a recommended order which found the Transportation

Cabinet twenty percent responsible for the accident. In so finding, the hearing

                                         -6-
officer found the Transportation Cabinet violated Section 6B.01(5) of the Manual

on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways (“MUTCD”), which

is the standard by which the Transportation Cabinet operates.2 The hearing officer

further found:

              In this case, the Hearing Officer concludes that the
              obligation of the Respondent to warn motorists of
              foreseeable dangers in or immediately adjacent to its
              work zone was ministerial. Its employees may well have
              had discretion in how they went about giving those
              warnings, but they were not free to fail to do so at all.

              The Hearing Officer reasoned that the Transportation Cabinet had

failed to warn motorists of foreseeable dangers, i.e., a train approaching and the

view of said train being obstructed by the equipment, as well as the distraction of a

work zone. The hearing officer apportioned eighty percent of the fault to Zavier.

The hearing officer found the duty to warn to be a ministerial function of the

Transportation Cabinet. The hearing officer found that the future earning capacity

2
  KRS 189.337; 603 Kentucky Administrative Regulations (“KAR”) 5:050 (“This administrative
regulation establishes that the MUTCD shall be the uniform system of traffic control devices in
Kentucky.”). Section 6B.01(05) of the MUTCD contains Fundamental Principles of Temporary
Traffic Control and reads as follows:

       Road user and worker safety and accessibility in TTC zones should be an integral
       and high-priority element of every project from planning through design and
       construction. Similarly, maintenance and utility work should be planned and
       conducted with the safety and accessibility of all motorists, bicyclists, pedestrians
       (including those with disabilities), and workers being considered at all times. If
       the TTC zone includes a grade crossing, early coordination with the railroad
       company or light rail transit agency should take place.

                                                -7-
of Zavier had been $956,800 over his expected natural life span, and awarded the

Estate twenty percent of that amount, or $191,360.3

              The Board of Claims adopted the hearing officer’s recommendation in

a final order issued December 22, 2020. The Transportation Cabinet timely

appealed that determination to the Jefferson Circuit Court. After allowing

pleadings and conducting oral arguments, the Jefferson Circuit Court affirmed the

Board. The matter was then appealed to this Court. We affirm.

                               STANDARD OF REVIEW

              The standard of review for appeals from the Board of Claims is

limited in scope as to whether the factual findings of the Board are supported by

substantial evidence and whether the conclusions based thereon were clearly

erroneous. Department for Human Resources v. Redmon, 599 S.W.2d 474, 476

(Ky. App. 1980). Additionally, even if a reviewing court might disagree with the

conclusion reached by the Board, it is not to substitute its judgment for that of the

Board. Commonwealth, Department of Highways v. General & Excess Insurance

Co., 355 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Ky. 1962). With this standard in mind, we begin our

analysis.

3
  The statute controlling at the time of the incident was KRS 44.070(5), which limited recovery
to $200,000.

                                              -8-
                                         ANALYSIS

       Generally, the Commonwealth and its Cabinets and agencies enjoy

immunity from lawsuits. See Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 517-18 (Ky.

2001).4

                 Section 231 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that
                 “[t]he General Assembly may, by law, direct in what
                 manner and in what courts suits may be brought against
                 the Commonwealth.” Under this section, “no one can
                 sue the State without its consent, which is usually given
                 by a joint resolution of the General Assembly.” Bach v.
                 Bach, 288 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Ky. 1956).

Commonwealth Labor Cabinet v. Morris, 215 S.W.3d 49, 52 (Ky. App. 2006).

                 The Board of Claims was created by statute:

                 The Board of Claims created by KRS 49.010 shall have
                 the following powers and authority to investigate, hear
                 proof, and compensate persons for damages sustained to
                 either person or property as a proximate result of
                 negligence on the part of the Commonwealth, any of its
                 cabinets, departments, bureaus, or agencies, or any of its
                 officers, agents, or employees while acting within the
                 scope of their employment by the Commonwealth or any
                 of its cabinets, departments, bureaus, or agencies; except,
                 however, regardless of any provision of law to the
4
       [S]overeign immunity is a concept that arose from the common law of England
       and was embraced by our courts at an early stage in our nation’s history. [Reyes
       v. Hardin Memorial Hospital, 55 S.W.3d 337, 338 (Ky. 2001)]. It is an inherent
       attribute of a sovereign state that precludes the maintaining of any suit against the
       state unless the state has given its consent or otherwise waived its immunity.
       Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts § 895B(1) (A.L.I. 1979); 72 Am.Jur.2d,
       States, Territories, and Dependencies, § 99 (1974). This principle was
       recognized as applicable to the Commonwealth of Kentucky as early as 1828.
       Divine v. Harvie, 23 Ky. (7 T.B. Mon.) 439, 441 (1828).

Id. at 517-18.

                                               -9-
                contrary, the Commonwealth, its cabinets, departments,
                bureaus, and agencies, and its officers, agents, and
                employees, while acting within the scope of their
                employment by the Commonwealth or any of its
                cabinets, departments, bureaus, or agencies, shall not be
                liable for collateral or dependent claims which are
                dependent on loss to another and not the claimant or
                damages for mental distress or pain or suffering, and
                compensation shall not be allowed, awarded, or paid for
                such claims for damages.

KRS 49.020(5).5

                Our review of the determination of the Board of Claims and the circuit

court’s affirmance thereof is limited. Only if we find that the Board acted without

power, or in excess of its granted powers, that fraud was perpetrated to extract the

award, or that the findings of fact of the Board fail to support the determination, or

we find that the award is contrary to the provisions of the statutes establishing the

5
    Formerly KRS 44.070(1):

         A Board of Claims, composed of the members of the Crime Victims
         Compensation Board as hereinafter provided, is created and vested with full
         power and authority to investigate, hear proof, and to compensate persons for
         damages sustained to either person or property as a proximate result of negligence
         on the part of the Commonwealth, any of its cabinets, departments, bureaus, or
         agencies, or any of its officers, agents, or employees while acting within the scope
         of their employment by the Commonwealth or any of its cabinets, departments,
         bureaus, or agencies; provided, however, regardless of any provision of law to the
         contrary, the Commonwealth, its cabinets, departments, bureaus, and agencies,
         and its officers, agents, and employees, while acting within the scope of their
         employment by the Commonwealth or any of its cabinets, departments, bureaus,
         or agencies, shall not be liable for collateral or dependent claims which are
         dependent on loss to another and not the claimant, damages for mental distress or
         pain or suffering, and compensation shall not be allowed, awarded, or paid for
         said claims for damages . . . .

                                                -10-
Board of Claims may the award be reversed. KRS 49.150(5). The Transportation

Cabinet argues that the findings of fact do not support the determination in that the

acts here were not ministerial, but discretionary.

             “In any appeal from a decision of the [Board of Claims], the critical

inquiry is whether the allegedly negligent act is discretionary or ministerial.”

Commonwealth v. Russell, 578 S.W.3d 747, 750 (Ky. App. 2019).

                    In recent years, very little has been added to
             improve upon the explanation given more than 50 years
             ago by our predecessor court in Upchurch v. Clinton
             Cnty., 330 S.W.2d 428, 430 (Ky. 1959), and we find it
             worth repeating here:

                    The essentials of a ministerial as contrasted
                    with a discretionary act are thus set forth in
                    43 Am.Jur., Public Officers, sec. 258, p. 75:
                    ‘An official duty is ministerial when it is
                    absolute, certain, and imperative, involving
                    merely execution of a specific act arising
                    from fixed and designated facts; that a
                    necessity may exist for the ascertainment of
                    those facts does not operate to convert the
                    act into one discretionary in its nature.
                    Discretionary or judicial duties are such as
                    necessarily require the exercise of reason in
                    the adaptation of means to an end, and
                    discretion in determining how or whether
                    the act shall be done or the course pursued.
                    Discretion in the manner of the performance
                    of an act arises when the act may be
                    performed in one or two or more ways,
                    either of which would be lawful, and where
                    it is left to the will or judgment of the
                    performer to determine in which way it shall
                    be performed. However, an act is not

                                         -11-
                        necessarily taken out of the class styled
                        ‘ministerial’ because the officer performing
                        it is vested with a discretion respecting the
                        means or method to be employed.

Gaither v. Justice & Public Safety Cabinet, 447 S.W.3d 628, 633-34 (Ky. 2014).

                It is uncontroverted that the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control

Devices is “the national standard for all traffic control devices installed on any

street, highway, or bicycle trail open to public travel[.]” 23 C.F.R.6 § 655.603

(2010). KRS 189.337(2) requires the Department of Highways to “promulgate and

adopt a manual of standards” for control of traffic devices. The Transportation

Cabinet complied with KRS 189.337(2) in 603 KAR 5:050. “The MUTCD

published by the Federal Highway Administration shall be the standard for all

traffic control devices installed on any street, highway, bicycle trail, or private road

open to public travel in Kentucky.” 603 KAR 5:050 § 2(2)(a) (2013 version).

Thus, employees of the Cabinet must act in compliance with the dictates of the

MUTCD. The only question here is whether the Board correctly determined, and

the circuit court affirmed, that the decision not to warn motorists traversing

through the worksite was discretionary, and thus not a matter which subjects the

Cabinet to liability.

6
    Code of Federal Regulations.

                                             -12-
              The Transportation Cabinet insists that the decisions made at the

subject worksite were a matter of discretion, and that it cannot therefore be held

liable for any negligence which occurred. The evidence adduced at the hearing

establishes that the employees working the site that day in no way prepared for the

eventuality of a train arriving adjacent to the worksite. The Transportation Cabinet

argues that since the railroad track was without the work zone proper, it had no

duty to warn motorists of an approaching train, regardless of whether the activity

and equipment of the worksite impeded the view of or the warnings attendant to

the arrival of a train at a crossing.

              The hearing officer concluded that “if the [Transportation Cabinet] is

negligent inside of its work zone, and as a result causes injury or damage to a

motorist outside the work zone, especially if he has just left the work zone, the

[Transportation Cabinet] would be liable for such injury.” In short, the Board

found that it matters not if the injury or accident occurs within the work zone, so

long as the failure to warn occurred within the worksite and is a direct cause of the

injury. The circuit court affirmed this finding. We cannot say this finding was

clearly erroneous.

              It was the complete failure of those at the work zone to foresee the

reasonable likelihood that a train would appear on the tracks adjacent to the

worksite and that the equipment and activity associated with the operation might

                                         -13-
occlude the perception of the arrival of the train by motorists. The tracks, only

forty-five feet from KY-1020, were just adjacent to the worksite. The proximity of

the tracks to the worksite is relevant here. If the tracks had been further away – we

cannot say how far, the facts of each particular case determine relevance – we may

well have agreed with the Transportation Cabinet’s position. However, as the

circuit court pointed out:

                    The record reflects that the KTC did not consider
             the safety of motorists or warn them about the danger of
             turning right onto East Blue Lick Road as [Z]avier did
             while there was an oncoming train, and that the danger of
             a collision was foreseeable as multiple trains passed
             through that crossing every day, many cars turned onto
             East Blue Lick Road from KY 1020 every day and there
             had been other accidents at that crossing. The position
             taken by the KTC and its employees that they bore no
             responsibility after motorists proceed through the work
             zone after being waived through by a flagger is contrary
             to the fundamental principles stated in Section 6B 01(05)
             of the MUTCD. The Hearing Officer’s conclusion, as
             adopted by the Claims Commission, that the KTC was
             liable for breaching a ministerial duty within the work
             zone rendering it liable for damages because of
             [Z]avier’s death which occurred immediately outside of
             the work zone is legally sound and supported by
             substantial evidence.

             The proximity of the train to the worksite, coupled with the view of

the tracks being obstructed by the dump truck and backhoe for northbound drivers,

plus the inherent distraction of a worksite, all formed to require those employees

working and supervising that day to recognize the foreseeable eventuality of a train

                                        -14-
arriving adjacent to the worksite. One flagger was controlling traffic as soon as it

crossed the railroad tracks from Blue Lick Road, and he clearly saw the train

approaching from behind Zavier. Since the Transportation Cabinet employees had

not discussed this eventuality in the meeting prior to beginning work, nothing was

done to warn Zavier of the approaching train. However, when there is ongoing

construction or maintenance work, the Department of Highways not only has this

general duty, but also a specific duty, to warn motorists of known hazards.

Commonwealth, Dep’t of Highways v. Young, 354 S.W.2d 23, 24 (Ky. 1962)

(“[T]hose charged with the maintenance of highways are under a duty to safeguard

the traveling public while the highway is being repaired and anyone making repairs

is under duty to observe proper precautions by the erection of suitable barriers or

warning devices.”).

             The circuit court concluded its order:

             The record reflects that the KTC breached its duty under
             Section 6B.01(05) of the MUTCD by failing to plan (for)
             the foreseeable contingency of a train coming through
             next to the work zone and a motorist turning onto East
             Blue Lick Road at the same time, by failing to plan of
             [sic] a motorist failing to notice a train, because of the
             partial obstruction created by the KTC’s equipment and
             the distractions inherent in the work zone, and by failing
             to warn [Z]avier of such danger.

                                        -15-
             This conclusion of the circuit court finds support in the Supreme

Court determination in Gaither, 447 S.W.3d at 636, holding that certain rules of

safety are

             absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely
             execution of a specific act arising from fixed and
             designated facts.” Yanero[, 65 S.W.3d] at 522. It is “an
             essentially objective and binary directive.” Haney [v.
             Monsky, 311 S.W.3d 235, 242 (Ky. 2010)]. You follow
             the rule or you violate it; there is no in-between area for
             discretion about how to comply. Adherence to the rule
             may require some modicum of forethought and planning,
             but it requires no judgment.

We believe the same in this instance – the duty to warn of an approaching train, the

view of which your equipment will obstruct, and knowing the activity inherent in

the work of the day will serve as a distraction to drivers – is so fundamental here as

to be ministerial. Also, the hearing officer noted the evidence of other prior

accidents between vehicles and trains at that crossing, making it ever more

necessary to be cautious as to how the distraction of the worksite was ameliorated.

The crew had discretion in how they planned to warn drivers and protect against

accidents, but to not even contemplate the danger to motorists should a train

approach is violation of an absolute, certain, and imperative duty. We affirm.

                                        -16-
                                 CONCLUSION

             We agree with the circuit court. The findings of the Board are

supported by substantial evidence, and we discern no clear error in their

conclusions of law. The award to the Estate is affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE ESTATE OF
                                          ZAVIER FROEBER:
Marlin A. Jones
Frankfort, Kentucky                       Vanessa B. Cantley
                                          Patrick E. Markey
                                          Louisville, Kentucky

                                        -17-