Court Opinion

ID: 9452750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:50:49.35842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:20.584671
License: Public Domain

LUMBARD, Chief Judge
(dissenting) :
I dissent.
I agree with the majority that New York case law ought to be considered as “highly persuasive” in determining the content of the phrase “support, care and benefit,” since it is that state’s law which would ultimately determine the extent of the limitation, if any, upon the power of the trustee to invade corpus. “Support” and “care” are among the words used in clauses of limitation which have long been viewed as capable of providing an objective standard in New York, e. g., In re Martin’s Will, 269 N.Y. 305, 199 N.E. 491 (1936), as elsewhere. On the other hand, the New York courts have appeared to define the word “benefit” in broad terms, without other limits than those attendant the typical fiduciary relationship.1 E. g., In re Rachlin’s Will, *709133 N.Y.S.2d 151, 152 (Surr.Ct.1954); In re Emmons’ Will, 165 Misc. 192, 300 N.Y.S. 580 (Surr.Ct.1937). Compare Zentmayer’s Estate v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 488, 490-491 (3 Cir. 1964); Newton Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 175, 179-180 (1 Cir. 1947). Particularly in drafting of wills and trusts “additional words presumably import additional meaning,” State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 313 F.2d 29, 31 (1 Cir. 1963), and we cannot consider that the choice of wording here was inadvertent. Inasmuch as the disinterested trustee could in good faith under the New York decisions deplete the corpus when in the trustee's “opinion” the life beneficiary “is incapacitated through illness, age or other cause * * I do not see how it is possible to determine with any degree of certainty the extent of such invasion of principal. Compare DeCastro’s Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 155 F.2d 254 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 727, 67 S.Ct. 82, 91 L.Ed. 630 (1946); Commerce Trust Co. v. United States, 167 F.Supp. 643 (W.D.Mo.1958).
Further, while the majority goes to great length to demonstrate the importance of viewing the critical words of the will in their proper context, and attempts to distinguish the major cases on the grounds that additional broadening instructions appeared in the instrument, no consideration has been given to the fact that the trustee in the instant case in construing his own power to invade has been given “sole and absolute discretion” to apply all or part of the principal to the life beneficiary as long as the trustee believes such incapacity to continue. Compare, e. g., Henslee v. Union Planters Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 69 S.Ct. 290, 93 L.Ed. 259 (1949). I cannot agree with the opinion of the court which holds that the value of the remainder to be paid over to charity is capable of present ascertainment. I would therefore affirm the judgment.

. “The word ‘benefit’ is more comprehensive than the word ‘support’ and is ‘anything that works to the advantage or gain of the recipient.’ * * * If petitioner [trustee] determines that the payment of the principal sum will be for the widow’s benefit she has the discretionary power to do so. Such action must be motivated by a proper purpose and not by either the whim of the trustee or her personal convenience. It should be exercised only after full consideration of the impelling circumstances and not from caprice, careless good nature or to obtain relief from further fiduciary duties. * * * In making her determination pe*709titioner need not take into consideration or account the personal income of the beneficiary from any other source.” In re Rachlin’s Will, 133 N.Y.S.2d 151, 152 (Surr.Ct.1954) (citations omitted),