Court Opinion

ID: 9670556
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:22:24.938396+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:05.204078
License: Public Domain

DYKMAN, J.
(dissenting). The majority holds that an on-duty prison guard who has intercourse with a prisoner cannot be found guilty of misconduct in public office. This startling conclusion is reached because the majority concludes that sexual intercourse with prisoners is not part of a prison guard’s job description.1 This result should lead one to question the initial premise because statutes are to be construed to avoid absurd or unreasonable results. Green Bay Redevelopment Au*668thority v. Bee Frank, 112 Wis. 2d 1, 5, 331 N.W.2d 840, 842 (Ct. App. 1983).
1 conclude that the majority’s inquiry into the meaning of sec. 946.12, Stats., ends where it does because it starts off on the wrong road. The majority identifies the issue as one of statutory interpretation, but concludes that the statute is ambiguous, permitting inquiry into legislative history and canons of construction. Kimberly-Clark Cory. v. Public Service Comm., 107 Wis. 2d 177, 181, 320 N.W.2d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 1982), aff'd, 110 Wis. 2d 455, 329 N.W.2d 143 (1983).2 A statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood in different senses by reasonably well-informed persons. Id. The majority therefore identifies three possible meanings, but stops short of concluding that the statute could be interpreted by reasonably well-informed persons in any of the three senses suggested. The suggested meanings are:
1. Any public official who commits an act “he knows he is forbidden by law to do.”
2. Any public official who commits a crime.
3. Any public official who commits a crime while on duty.
The difficulty with accepting the majority’s first and second interpretations of sec. 946.12, Stats., as reasonable meanings is that these meanings ignore the very nature of the crime described by the statute. Section 946.12 is entitled “Misconduct in Public Office.” All subsections of sec. 946.12 except subsec. (1) speak of “in his capacity as such officer” or “under color of his office.” The statute is not a penalty enhancer. It does not declare an open season on public officials who commit crimes totally unrelated to their employment. The *669focus of sec. 946.12 is upon public officials whose office or job gives them the opportunity to commit crimes a private citizen could not commit. Therefore, the only reasonable meaning suggested by the majority is “any public official who commits a crime while on duty.”
I conclude that sec. 946.12, Stats., is not ambiguous. It prohibits any act done in the capacity of officer or employe which the officer or employe knows is forbidden by law to do in his or her official capacity. The majority agrees that at the time of the intercourse, fornication was a criminal act. There was no exception if one fornicated while at work. In this case, defendant was at work, in the capacity of an officer, and was presumed to know the law. State v. Collova, 79 Wis. 2d 473, 488, 255 N.W.2d 581, 588 (1977). It would be difficult, if not impossible, for members of the public to enter prisons for the purpose of clandestine fornication with prisoners. Defendant, while at work, committed a criminal act which could not have been accomplished were defendant not in an official capacity. I conclude that that act is prohibited by sec. 946.12.
I reach the same result under the new plain meaning rule recently adopted by the supreme court in City of Madison v. Town of Fitchburg, 112 Wis. 2d 224, 236, 332 N.W.2d 782, 787 (1983). In Fitchburg, the court held that the spirit or intention of a statute should govern over the literal or technical meaning of the language used. The spirit or intent of sec. 946.12, Stats., is to prohibit illegal acts by officers or employes of the public made possible because the officer is employed by the public. Defendant did what the law prohibited.
Using either plain meaning rule, I cannot accept a statutory interpretation which renders the statute nearly a nullity. Under the majority’s reasoning, as long as an officer made sure that his or her conduct was criminal, he or she could not be prosecuted for misconduct *670in public office because a criminal act cannot be done in an officer’s official capacity. That conclusion is not required by the plain meaning of sec. 946.12, Stats., and is contrary to reason. Therefore, I dissent.

 The majority notes that the fornication was consensual. Though the significance of this factor is not developed, I cannot agree that sexual intercourse between prisoner and guard can ever be consensual. There is always an element of coercion in that situation.

 This is the standard of review used until recently. A new plain meaning rule recently adopted by the supreme court will be discussed later in the opinion.