Court Opinion

ID: 7820938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:54:33.446383+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:44.252576
License: Public Domain

James.H. Pilkinton, Judge. Appellant was charged with second degree forgery in violation of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-2302 (Repl. 1977). The state specifically alleged that on April 2, 1977 Lewis uttered a check which was purported to have been drawn on one Don C. Clark, who had not authorized the appellant’s act. After entering his plea of not guilty, and after numerous continuances were granted at the request of both sides, a jury trial was held on February 8, 1979. Lewis was found guilty as charged and sentenced to two years imprisonment. I. Appellant first contends the trial court erred in refusing to grant his motion for a directed verdict of not guilty. We find no merit in this argument. A directed verdict is proper only when no fact issue exists. On appeal this court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee and will affirm if there is substantial evidence to support the verdict. Balentine v. State, 259 Ark. 590, 535 S.W. 2d 221 (1976); Harris v. State, 262 Ark. 680 at 682, 561 S.W. 2d 69 (1978). In the case before us, we cannot say that no factual issue existed. The trial court was correct in denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. II. An employee of Brandon Furniture Company in Little Rock testified that on April 2, 1977, appellant made a purchase and gave her the check in question for $41.20 payable to Brandon Furniture Company. At the time, appellant purportedly held himself out to be Don C. Clark. The Brandon employees were suspicious at the time, but having no poisitive proof, took the check nevertheless. However, they did take special note of the appearance and description of the individual involved. A little over a month later appellant appeared at the John Tucker Warehouse in Little Rock. Teresa Mukerjea, the employee at Brandon with whom appellant had dealt before, was then working for Brandon’s at the Tucker warehouse. She recognized appellant, and called the police after he had left the warehouse. The police arrested appellant a short time later. He now claims on appeal that his trial was not fair because the state withheld certain original statements made by witnesses from appellant’s discovery. We find no merit in this argument. It is undisputed that Brandon Furniture Company employees Teresa Mukerjea and Tommy Claussen gave written statements to the police with regard to the check in question. Each witness wrote out the statement in long hand. A police department secretary then typed copies of each statement. Appellant introduced both the handwritten statements, and the typed copies, into evidence at the trial as Defendant’s Exhibits 1 through 4. During the discovery period, defense counsel received copies of the typewritten statements via the “open file” policy of the Pulaski County Prosecuting Attorney’s office. The record is otherwise silent on the matter, but it was apparently only during the cross-examination of Officer Baer, who took the statements in the first place, that both the defense counsel and the state’s attorney learned that the longhand originals of the statements existed. The typewritten copies of the statements are identical to the handwritten originals except for the fact thát in the original statement of Ms. Mukerjea, some words were underlined by her, and this underlining was not shown on the typewritten version. Other than the underlineations, there are no differences whatsoever between the typed and handwritten documents. The wording is exactly the same. Thus no prejudice to the defendant could have occurred under the circumstances. The appellant’s argument, on appeal, that what happened constituted a violation of Rule 17.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure is without merit. Neither does this case fall under the holding in Williamson v. State, 263 Ark. 401, 565 S.W. 2d 415 (1978) as appellant claims. III. Appellant offered two proposed instructions concerning criminal simulation as defined.by Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-2311. His theory was that the crime of criminal simulation is a lesser offense including a charge of forgery. The language of the commentary which accompanies Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-2311 (Repl. 1977) (Criminal Simulation) states: It [Section 41-2311] is designed to cover the fraudulent simulation of “objects” that are not written instruments within the definition of § 41-2301 (9). Such “objects” include antiques, paintings, and other objects d’art, as well as more common articles. The commentary, although not legally binding, is highly persuasive in determining legislative intent. Britt v. State, 261 Ark. 488 at 495, 549 S.W. 2d 84 (1977). Assuming without deciding that criminal simulation is in fact a lesser included offense of forgery, still appellant in this case would not be entitled to the instructions offered under the facts here. See Caton & Headley v. State, 252 Ark. 420, 479 S.W. 2d 537 (1972). The principle of law announced in Catón was codified in Arkansas Criminal Code, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-105 (3) (Repl. 1977) as follows: The Court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. See also Frederick v. State, 258 Ark. 553 at 557, 528 S.W. 2d 362 (1975). In the case before us the defendant-appellant was either guilty of the greater charge or nothing at all. The trial court was correct in refusing both offered instructions on criminal simulation. IV. Appellant’s final argument is that he was denied a fair trial below due to his inability to discover the names of persons, or to view additional checks, which were involved in other alleged line-ups. We find no merit whatsoever in this contention. If there were other checks not the subject of the instant charge which appellant was supposed to have written, they were clearly unrelated with the case being tried. Consequently, we are unable to see how the appellant was prejudiced thereby, nor does he so inform us. And, as noted by the trial judge, these alleged “other” check(s) were never referred to by the prosecution, but rather were called to the attention of the jury by the defense on cross-examination. Any resulting prejudice, therefore, was invited, and cannot be raised as an error on appeal. Strode v. State, 259 Ark. 859, 537 S.W. 2d 162 (1976). Thus appellant is in no position here to argue that his rights under Rule 17.1 and under Williamson v. State, supra, were abridged. V. This court has carefully considered all points raised by appellant, but finding no error the judgment of the Pulaski County Circuit. Court must be affirmed, and the conviction upheld. Affirmed. Howard, J., and Penix, J., dissent.