Court Opinion

ID: 9809185
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:03:01.424996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:24.183691
License: Public Domain

Stagy, 0. J.,
dissenting: The State Highway Commission is an agency of the State, charged with the duty of exercising certain administrative and governmental functions, chiefly-those enumerated in C. S., 3846(j). Latham v. Highway Commission, 191 N. C., 141; Road Commission v. Highway Commission, 185 N. C., 56; Carpenter v. R. R., 184 N. C., 400. And it is a statement of public policy so firmly embedded in our law as to amount almost to an axiom to say that when a State agency, clothed with administrative and governmental authority, acts within the law, and deals officially with a matter duly submitted for its decision, the courts are not permitted to interfere with its judgment or to control its discretion, except in case of oppression or manifest abuse, when there is no appeal from its judgment as allowed by statute. Cameron v. Highway Commission, 188 N. C., 84; Peters v. Highway Commission, 184 N. C., 30; Cobb v. R. R., 172 N. C., 61; Edwards v. Comrs., 170 N. C., 448; Supervisors v. Comrs., 169 N. C., 548; Newton v. School Committee, 158 N. C., 186; Howell v. Howell, 151 N. C., 575; Board of Education v. Comrs., 150 N. C., 124; Rosenthal v. Goldsboro, 149 N. C., 128; Glenn v. Comrs., 139 N. C., 412.
“Who made us judges over such matters?” Supervisors v. Comrs., 169 N. C., 548.
Speaking to the identical question in Peters v. Highway Com., 184 N. C., 30, the late Chief Justice Clark said: “The courts are not empowered to supervise the action of administrative boards because of a *64difference of opinion as to the action taken or contemplated by the officials charged with the duties of administration.” And in the same case the following was quoted with approval from the opinion of Hoke, J., in Newton v. School Committee, 158 N. C., 186: “In numerous and-repeated decisions the principle has been announced and sustained that courts may not interfere with discretionary powers conferred on these local administrative boards for the public welfare unless their action is so clearly unreasonable as to amount to an oppressive and manifest abuse of discretion (citing authorities). In some of the opinions, decided intimation is given that in so far as the courts are concerned the action of these administrative boards must stand unless so arbitrary and unreasonable as to indicate malicious or wanton disregard of the rights of persons affected. It is undesirable and utterly impracticable for the courts to act on any other principle.”
The- leading case in our Reports is probably that of Brodnax v. Groom, 64 N. C., 244, decided in 1870. What was said in that case is especially applicable here, for there, as in the instant suit, it was sought to enjoin commissioners, charged with the duty of deciding the question, from exercising their judgment in regard to providing means for building bridges “where none had been before — not connected with any public road,” hence, alleged to be “unnecessary and otherwise extravagantly expensive.” Pearson, C. J., writing the opinion of the Court, said: “So the case before us is within the power of the county commissioners. How can this Court undertake to control its exercise? Can we say such a bridge does not need repairs; or that in building a new bridge near the site of an old bridge it should be erected as heretofore, upon posts, so as to be cheap, but warranted to last for some years; or that it is better policy to locate it a mile or so above, where the banks are good abutments, and to have stone pillars, at a heavier outlay at the start, but such as will insure permanence, and be cheaper in the long run? In short, this Court is not capable of controlling the exercise of power on the part of the General Assembly, or of the county authorities, and it cannot assume to do so, without putting itself in antagonism as well to the General Assembly as to the county authorities, and erecting a despotism of five men; which is opposed to the fundamental principles of our government and the usages of all times past. For the exercise of powers conferred by the Constitution the people must rely upon the honesty of the members of the General Assembly and of the persons elected to fill places of trust in the several counties. This Court has no power, and is not capable if it had the power, of controlling the exercise of power conferred by the Constitution upon the legislative department of the government or upon the county authorities.”
*65This case has been followed and cited with approval in Wilson v. Charlotte, 74 N. C., 759; London v. Wilmington, 78 N. C., 109; Ashcraft v. Lee, 79 N. C., 35; Evans v. Comrs., 89 N. C., 158; Tate v. Greensboro, 114 N. C., 392; Vaughan v. Comrs., 117 N. C., 434; Herring v. Dixon, 122 N. C., 422; Stratford v. Greensboro, 124 N. C., 132; Black v. Comrs., 129 N. C., 125; Wadsworth v. Concord, 133 N. C., 594; Small v. Edenton, 146 N. C., 527; Peters v. Highway Commission, supra, and many others too numerous to be mentioned, probably two hundred in all. See Shepard’s Citations and Allen’s Reported and Cited Cases, 1926.
Plaintiffs do not allege that the State Highway Commission has abused its discretion in relocating the road from Statesville to Newton, but they seek to restrain its action in the present proceeding solely upon the ground that, in relocating said road, two county seats have been disconnected in violation of chapter 2, Public Laws 1921, which provides that the proposed roads, shown upon the map attached to said act, may be “changed, altered, added to or discontinued by the State Highway Commission: Provided, no roads shall be changed, altered or discontinued so as to disconnect county seats, principal towns, State or national parks or forest reserves, principal State institutions and highway systems of other states.”
It is conceded that the northern route as proposed by the State Highway Commission comes in physical contact with the paved-street system of Statesville, the county seat of Iredell County, and with the paved-street system of Newton, the county seat of Catawba County, and reduces, not only the cost of road construction and maintenance^ but also the distance between the two places by 1.39 miles over the southern route, for which the plaintiffs contend. How, then, can it be said, as a matter of law, that the two county seats will be disconnected by the proposed change, when in fact they will still be connected by the highway ? How is it practical to connect two county seats or principal towns with a highway, except by making physical contact with the street systems of the two places ? It is the declared purpose of the Legislature that the various county seats and other principal towns shall be connected “by the most practical routes,” such practical routes to be determined and established by the State Highway Commission.
But it is said that the road as proposed by the State Highway Commission is not a substantial compliance with the statute which requires the various county seats and other principal towns to be connected by the most practical routes, and that the change, as contemplated, will have the effect of disconnecting the two county seats in violation of the proviso above quoted. If it be conceded that the primary purpose in *66building the road from Statesville to Newton is to connect these two county seats, then the only practical difference between the two routes, so far as concerns a traveler going from the courthouse in Statesville to the courthouse in Newton, is that on the northern route he would approach the town of Newton from the north and drive down main street to the courthouse, whereas on the southern route he would approach the town of Newton from the south and drive up main street to the courthouse, and returning, he would retrace his steps on either route.
If local connections, therefore, are to be given primary consideration in construing the statute, what local objections can be made to the road as proposed by the State Highway Commission? The objections, it seems to me, are not based on any failure to make local connections, but rather on the ground of through travel; and it should be remembered that the statute provides for a State system of dependable roads as well as for local connections.
However, going from courthouse to courthouse is admittedly not the test of connecting two county seats in building the State system of highways. And it is correctly said in the majority opinion that the commission may make changes so as to avoid traffic congestion in the various county seats, principal towns, etc., from which it would seem to follow, as a necessary corollary, that the exact location of the different roads, going to make up the State system, is a matter which rests, and was intended by the Legislature to be lodged, in the sound discretion of the State Highway Commission, limited only by the terms of the proviso above set out. This is the meaning of the statute as I understand it.
Lincolnton, the county seat of Lincoln County, is southwest of Newton, while Hickory, one of the principal towns of Catawba County, is northwest of Newton, and Statesville is northeast of Newton. All of these places must be connected with the State highway system. The Statesville-Newton-Lincolnton road, as proposed by the State Highway Commission, passes directly through the town of Newton. But if the plaintiffs’ view is to prevail, this road will touch only the southern part of the town of Newton, as the proposed Statesville-Newton-Hickory road touches only the northern part of the town of Newton. At present the main line of travel is over the Statesville-Newton-Hickory road, but, if in time this should shift to the Statesville-Newton-Lincolnton road, what would then be the attitude of Newton towards the southern route? The plaintiffs are now interested in having the principal line of travel pass over the main street of Newton and in front of the courthouse, but a few years from now, in all probability, Newton, like many other places in North Carolina, will be confronted with the problem of traffic congestion. Then what? Shall-not the commission look to the future?
*67Likewise, tbe Lincolnton-Newton-Hickory road runs through the heart of Newton. Hence, in no sense can it be said, as a matter of law, that Newton is not connected with the Statesville-Newton-Hickory road, or the Lincolnton-Newton-Hickory road; the two roads meet within the corporate limits of the town of Newton. Nor can it be held, in my opinion, as a legal conclusion, that Newton and Statesville will be disconnected by the proposed change.
The commission was fully warranted in believing, and the Attorney-General in so advising, that the location of the road as proposed was a sufficient compliance with the law as declared by this Court in the recent cases of Cameron v. Highway Commission, 188 N. C., 84, and Road Commission v. Highway Commission, 185 N. C., 56. In both of these cases, substantial departures from the roads designated on the map attached to the act of 1921, were sanctioned and approved, because such “proposed roads” were only tentative, and the State Highway Commission was expressly authorized to “change, alter, add to, or discontinue” any of the proposed roads shown upon the legislative map, subject only to the limitation contained in the proviso above set out.
But it is now said, “the spirit of the Road Act contemplated that all county seats in North Carolina should be served by the highway system substantially as designated on the map.” If the Court means by this to overrule, or to modify, what was said in Cameron v. Highway Commission, supra, and Road Commission v. Highway, Commission, supra, I think it should specifically call attention to the fact, so that the State Highway Commission and its legal advisers may know how to proceed in the future. If all the roads going to make up the State highway system have been located in advance by legislative fiat, “substantially as designated on the map,” and such is the Court’s interpretation of the statute, the authorities, or those charged with the building of the roads, ought to know it so that the highway engineers may understand the limitations within which they must work.
If all the county seats in- the State are to be served by the highway system substantially as designated on the map, then the authority of the State Highway Commission to “change, alter, add to, or discontinue” any of the proposed roads shown upon said map, must be understood as limited by a double, rather than a single, proviso, as follows: Provided, no roads shall be changed, altered or discontinued so as to disconnect county seats, principal towns, etc. Provided further, that all county seats shall be served by the highway system substantially as designated on the map.
I cannot think the Legislature intended to locate all the roads going to make up a great State system, or even those connecting the county seats, by the simple device of drawing lines upon a map. This would *68be a species of legislative engineering utterly at variance with every consideration of wisdom and economy in the construction and building of highways. The different roads were designated on the map wholly without regard to the topography of the country. Straight lines were drawn across rivers, swamps and mountains as they appear on the map, with no regard for exact location, and surely the Legislature did not intend for the roads to follow these lines, not even substantially so, if other routes connecting the various county seats, principal towns, etc., were more practical. Section 1 of the act contains express provision to the contrary.
In the instant case, the northern route is shorter and more economical than the southern route. They both connect Statesville with Newton, and vice versa. Tested by the standard of substantial compliance with the map, I am unable to see wherein the Legislature has forbidden the selection of the route as proposed by the State Highway Commission.
It is conceded that, from the standpoint of through travel, the position of the plaintiffs in favor of the southern route is not without its strength of appeal, if Newton is entitled to have such travel routed over its principal street. But the reasons advanced by the plaintiffs were not deemed convincing or compelling in the forum charged with the duty of deciding the matter. Nor was it thought that all consideration for through travel should be sacrificed to local advantage, if such it be.
These arguments are mentioned only to show that the question presented is one to be determined, primarily and in the first instance at least, by the State Highway Commission in the exercise of a sound, but not arbitrary, judgment. Indeed, the determination of such matters is a part of the duties and responsibilities imposed upon it by the statute under which it was created. Cameron v. Highway Commission, 188 N. C., 84.
Let it be observed that this is not an appeal from a decision of the State Highway Commission, as authorized by C. S., 3846 (p), nor are we passing in review on the wisdom or impolicy of the action of the Commission in relocating the road in question. Either route might have been selected, without objection, so far as the law is concerned. Our duty, in a proceeding like the present, begins only where the authority of the Commission ends. The question before us is not whether we agree with its decision, but is it lawful? ¥e are passing upon the legality of its act, and nothing else.
I think the plaintiffs have failed to make out a case calling for judicial interference or injunctive relief, and, for the reasons given, I must dissent from the decision of the majority.
Adams, J., concurs in dissenting opinion.