Court Opinion

ID: 9588462
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:34:38.259148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:58.951766
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent to the position articulated in the majority opinion, for the following reasons. Under Georgia law, conspiracy to commit a substantive offense merges with, or becomes a lesser included crime of, the substantive offense charged if and only if it is found that the substantive crime has been completed; in that fact situation the doctrine of merger prescribes that the accused be convicted of the greater — i.e., the substantive — offense only. OCGA § 16-4-8; Kilgore v. State, 251 Ga. 291 (305 SE2d 82) (1983); Roberts v. State, 242 Ga. 634 (250 SE2d 482) (1978); Scott v. State, 229 Ga. 541 (192 SE2d 367) (1972). If, and only if, the substantive crime has not been completed is conspiracy a separate offense. In Georgia, of course, as elsewhere, it is a violation of the due process provisions of the federal and state constitutions to convict one of a crime with which he has not been charged and indicted, unless the crime of which he is convicted is a lesser offense necessarily included in the crime named in the indictment. DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353 (57 SC 255, 81 LE 278) (1936); Goldin v. State, 104 Ga. 549 (30 SE 749) (1898). See Haynes v. State, 249 Ga. 119 (288 SE2d 185) (1982), dissenting opinion (Marshall, J.); State v. Estevez, 232 Ga. 316 (206 SE2d 475) (1974).
It is clearly apparent in the instant case that in appellant’s first trial, the court erroneously considered conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute as a lesser included offense of the substantive crime charged: possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. That court found appellant guilty not of the greater, substantive, offense, but rather of the lesser crime of conspiracy. On appeal, this court properly ruled that, in light of the principles stated, supra, the trial court erred in so treating conspiracy, and went on to hold that, because conspiracy was not charged in the indictment and in the given fact situation could not as a matter of law be considered *497a lesser included offense, the conviction could not stand. Rowe v. State, supra.
Decided January 9, 1987.
William A. Dowell, for appellant.
Spencer Lawton, Jr., District Attorney, David T. Lock, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
In treating conspiracy as a lesser included offense (the only possible means by which he could have arrived at a conviction for an offense not expressly charged in the indictment), the trial court necessarily examined the evidence and found it insufficient to support a conviction of the substantive crime. In convicting on the lesser (ostensibly included) offense, the trial court thus, albeit inadvertently, by implication acquitted the accused of the greater crime of possession. When an accused has once been placed in jeopardy of punishment for the substantive crime charged and has been found guilty not of that crime but of a lesser, purportedly included, offense, the procedural bar of double jeopardy prohibits his being tried again for the same offense upon which he was indicted. OCGA § 16-1-6; McCrary v. State, 252 Ga. 521 (314 SE2d 662) (1984); Middlebrook v. Allen, 234 Ga. 481 (216 SE2d 331) (1975); Davis v. State, 76 Ga. App. 427 (46 SE2d 520) (1948); Jordan v. State, 22 Ga. 545 (1857). But see Brantley v. Georgia, 217 U. S. 284 (30 SC 514, 54 LE 768) (1910); Perdue v. State, 134 Ga. 300 (67 SE 810) (1916); Bailey v. State, 26 Ga. 579 (1858). OCGA § 16-1-8 sets forth the conditions under which a prosecution is and is not barred by a former prosecution. Subsection (a) states that a prosecution is barred “if the accused was formerly prosecuted for the same crime based upon the same material facts, if such former prosecution: (1) [r]esulted in either a conviction or an acquittal. . .” Subsection (d) provides: “A prosecution is not barred within the meaning of this Code section if: ... (2) Subsequent proceedings [elsewhere defined as including an appeal] resulted in the . . . reversal ... of the conviction, unless the accused was thereby adjudged not guilty or unless there was a finding that the evidence did not authorize the verdict.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Because the trial court in the original trial proceeded to render judgment on an erroneous theory of law, I would hold that appellant was subjected to double jeopardy when forced to stand trial for a second time on the same indictment. In my opinion, this error of constitutional dimensions requires reversal of the judgment below. I therefore respectfully dissent to the majority opinion.