Court Opinion

ID: 9834123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:18:51.373484+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:11.827125
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In Ruling Case Law, vol. 3, p. 834, it is said: “The essential requisites of a promissory note are an unconditional promise to pay money, a fixed time for payment, and a definite amount to be paid. No contract or agreement is a promissory note, either negotiable or nonnegotiable, which does not provide for payment absolutely and unconditionally. If payment depends on a contingency which may never happen, it is not a promissory note. So an instrument in writing, whereby one party agrees to pay the other a certain sum of money on or before a given date on the completion by the promisee of certain work agreed to be performed for the promisor is not a promissory note. And an instrument acknowledging a certain sum to be due and payable when a suit in litigation is settled is not a promissory note.”
And again on page 870: “When instruments are executed at the same time, for the same purpose, and in the course of the same transaction, they are to be considered as one instrument, and are to be read and construed together as such. So, it is well settled that a bill or note and a contemporaneous written instrument intended to control the bill or note, made between the -same persons, may be read and construed together as if one in form,”
To the same effect, Lane Co. v. Crum (Tex. Com. App.) 291 S. W. 1084, and authorities therein cited.
What is termed as the “materialman’s note,” upon which plaintiff sought a recovery, following a stipulation for the payment of $1,200 on or before the 19th day of December, 1925, contains this provision: “This note is given for the purchase price of certain lumber and materials bought by the makers hereof from the Kelsay Lumber Company and to secure the payment of which the Kelsay Lumber 'Company has been granted a lien upon the following described property located in Tarrant County, Texas: Lot No. One (1), Block No. Five (5), of the Walker Addition to the City of Fort Worth,’ Tarrant County, Texas, which lien is evidenced by contract and deed of trust executed by the makers hereof, on the above described property, to which reference is here made, and the same is made a part hereof, and this obligation is subject to all the terms and provisions of said contract and deed of trust.”
The materialman’s lien, executed contemporaneously with that document, recites that the Kelsay Lumber 'Company agreed to sell and deliver to the maker of the note the lumber and material for making the improvements on the property “in accord with figured bill, the selling price of which aggregates the sum of $1200.00. * * * ” It also recites that Crowell had at the same time executed a note to the Kelsay Lumber Company in the sum of $1,200, payable on or before the 19th day of December, 1925. Then follows, among others, the following provision:
“This contract having been entered into prior to the furnishing or delivery by the said company of any of the contemplated lumber or materials, and for the consideration aforesaid, it is further mutually agreed between.the parties hereto as follows:
“The company agrees that any material delivered hereunder and found to be either excessive or not necessary in the construction of the improvements herein referred to, may be returned by the owner, if in as merchantable condition as when delivered to said company, and said company agrees to give the owner credit therefor on said owner’s obligation at the invoice price of any such material.”
Both of those documents were alleged in plaintiff’s petition and relied on as a basis for a recovery, and therefore, under the authorities above cited and many others which might be cited to the same effect, they clearly show that the obligation to pay $1,-200 to the Kelsay Lumber Company was n'ot a promissory note either negotiable or nonnegotiable, in that it was not a definite and unconditional promise to pay the sum of $1,-200. While the contract evidenced by the instrument denominated as a materialman’s lien does not specifically require the lumber company to furnish the lumber before the maturity of the note, yet that obligation was clearly implied from the quoted provision, to the effect that the maker of the note would be entitled to a credit on his obligation for any lumber returned. It follows, therefore, that article 5933, Revised Statutes of 1925, to the effect that, in a suit upon a negotiable instrument, it will be presumed that the same was executed upon the valuable consideration paid, has no application.
Since the obligation sued on 'was neither a negotiable nor nonnegotiable note, and that document in connection with the mortgage lien executed at the same time constituted a mere contract which was executory on the part of both parties, the lien contract implying the same obligations as implied in *372the promissory note, the burden was on the plaintiff to plead and prove that it had performed its part of the contract as a condition of its right to recover thereon, to the same extent as would be required in a suit upon any other executory contract.
Furthermore, the facts alleged in defendant’s plea of estoppel and the evidence introduced to support the same without objection on the part of appellant showed that plaintiff had been overpaid, and, although a plea of estoppel was predicated on those facts, the answer further contained a prayer for general relief, and under that prayer, and independently of reasons first stated above, the defendant should be given the benefit of such plea and evidence showing that the plaintiff had been overpaid; otherwise a manifest injustice would be done. As said in an opinion by the Commission of Appeals in Camden Fire Ins. Ass’n v. Sutherland, 281 S. W. 927, 930: “No court in the world would permit the Murray Company [mortgagee] to keep the proceeds of the Lloyd’s policy and then collect the'mortgage indebtedness from Sutherland [mortgagor].”
The motion for rehearing is overruled.