Court Opinion

ID: 1001755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 18:00:29.141179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:26.654587
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                        No. 99-4400

PAUL JONES FRANCIS,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, at Danville.
Jackson L. Kiser, Senior District Judge.
(CR-98-77)

Submitted: May 25, 2000

Decided: June 6, 2000

Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Mark T. Williams, WILLIAMS, MORRISON, LIGHT & MOREAU,
Danville, Virginia, for Appellant. Robert P. Crouch, Jr., United States
Attorney, Joseph W. H. Mott, Assistant United States Attorney, Roa-
noke, Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Paul Jones Francis pled guilty to a cocaine, cocaine base, and mari-
juana conspiracy. Although Francis's guideline range was 57-71
months, he was subject to a statutorily required minimum sentence of
120 months. Based upon his substantial assistance, the Government
filed a motion for downward departure from the statutorily required
minimum sentence, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(e) (West Supp. 2000),
and from the guideline sentence, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Man-
ual § 5K1.1 (1998). The district court granted the motion and sen-
tenced Francis to 100 months.

On appeal, Francis asserts that, because the district court granted
the Government's motion under § 3553(e), he was no longer subject
to a statutorily required minimum sentence. Accordingly, Francis con-
tends that the starting point for the § 5K1.1 departure should have
been 57 months, the low end of the otherwise applicable guideline
range. Thus, Francis argues that the district court's sentence of 100
months was an upward departure that was unsupported by the district
court's findings.

Our recent decision in United States v. Pillow , 191 F.3d 403 (4th
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 68 U.S.L.W. 3534 (U.S. Feb.
22, 2000) (No. 99-7727), forecloses Francis's argument. In Pillow, we
found that § 3553(e) allows for a departure from, not the removal of,
a statutorily required minimum sentence. Because Francis remained
subject to the statutorily required 120 months, the district court prop-
erly used 120 months as the starting point for calculating the down-
ward departure pursuant to § 5K1.1. See id. at 407-08; see also USSG
§ 5G1.1(b) (when statutory minimum is greater than the maximum of
the applicable guideline range, statutory minimum shall be the guide-
line sentence).

Accordingly, we affirm Francis's sentence. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately pre-
sented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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