Court Opinion

ID: 9532445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:21:24.918074+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:45.989554
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
dissenting and concurring.
I.C. § 85-48-4-1 defining the crime of dealing in a narcotic drug provides:
"A person who:
(1) Knowingly or intentionally manufactures or delivers cocaine or a narcotic drug, pure or adulterated, classified in schedule I or II; or
(2) Possesses, with intent to manufacture or deliver, cocaine or a narcotic drug, pure or adulterated, classified in Schedule I or II; commits dealing in cocaine or a narcotic drug, a class B felony.
Appellant was charged under the second paragraph of this statute with possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver it. For some reason undisclosed in the record, the trial court gave the jury its final instruction No. 8 which stated that appellant was charged with knowingly or intentionally delivering cocaine, the offense defined in the first paragraph of this statute. There was no similar instruction given which explained the character of the offense as *1290initially charged. The verdict form returned showed guilty of dealing, a form consistent with a charge under paragraphs (1) or (2).
This instruction was erroneous in that it presented a charge not made, and the giving of it constituted fundamental error, an error which robbed the proceeding of required fairness. Appellant was not notified through the charge, before trial that he should defend against a charge of knowing or intentional delivery. The conviction itself is now beclouded by the distinct possibility that the jury verdict rests upon the conclusion that appellant "delivered" the drug, contrary to instruction #8, when he involuntarily surrendered the proven cocaine under threat of deadly force.
Accordingly, I would reverse the convietion for dealing in a narcotic drug and remand Count I for a new trial. However, I also vote to affirm the conviction for common nuisance pursuant to Count II.