Court Opinion

ID: 9882374
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:08:52.965139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:39:51.238130
License: Public Domain

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
ex rel. Fluty v. Raiff, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3285.]

                                           NOTICE
      This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
      advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
      promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
      South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
      formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
      the opinion is published.

                          SLIP OPINION NO. 2023-OHIO-3285
          THE STATE EX REL. FLUTY v. RAIFF, CHIEF OF POLICE, ET AL.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
may be cited as State ex rel. Fluty v. Raiff, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-3285.]
Mandamus—Public-records requests—R.C. 149.43—Requester failed to present
        clear and convincing evidence establishing existence of a requested
        record—Requested record was not incorporated into another for purposes
        of Public Records Act—R.C. 149.43(B) does not require a public office to
        confirm delivery of a requested record—A public-records custodian may
        redact from an incident report identity of an uncharged suspect provided
        requirements of R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(a) are met—Requirements of R.C.
        149.43(A)(2)(a) are met when release of record would create high
        probability of disclosing identity of an uncharged suspect—Public Records
        Act does not authorize an award of statutory damages merely because a
        public office cites legal authority with which requester disagrees—Writ and
        requests for statutory damages, attorney fees, and court costs denied.
   (No. 2021-1250—Submitted May 16, 2023—Decided September 19, 2023.)
                                       IN MANDAMUS.
                                    _________________
                            SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

       Per Curiam.
       {¶ 1} This is an original action in mandamus brought under Ohio’s Public
Records Act, R.C. 149.43, by relator, Ashley Fluty, against respondents, the city of
Broadview Heights; its police chief, Steven G. Raiff; its law director, Vince Ruffa;
and its records clerk, Eric Grossnickle (collectively, “Broadview Heights”). Fluty
seeks a writ of mandamus to compel Broadview Heights to produce records related
to an incident of suspected child abuse. Fluty also requests awards of statutory
damages, attorney fees, and court costs. We deny all the requested relief.
                               I. BACKGROUND
       {¶ 2} On November 3, 2020, a student at the Insightful Minds Community
of Learning, a school that tailors to children with behavioral needs, climbed on top
of a mat located in one of the school’s seclusion rooms. Ochanya McRoberts, the
director of the school, asked the student to come down from the mat, and when the
student refused, McRoberts pulled the mat, causing the student to fall to the ground.
The school internally investigated the incident, and the student’s parents reported
it to the Broadview Heights Police Department as a case of possible child abuse.
       {¶ 3} After the school interviewed Fluty, a teacher at the school, about the
matter, McRoberts brought a defamation suit against Fluty. McRoberts apparently
did so because Fluty conveyed her understanding of what happened based on a
video of the incident and because she shared her opinions of McRoberts’s
effectiveness as a supervisor. On March 31, 2021, Fluty’s counsel, Brian Bardwell,
sent a request through the Broadview Heights Police Department’s online public-
records portal seeking “the initial incident report, along with any narrative
supplements, witness statements, etc.” regarding the November 3, 2020 incident.
       {¶ 4} Grossnickle fielded Bardwell’s request and consulted with Raiff. On
Ruffa’s advice, Raiff had written a letter in December 2020 to the student’s mother
rejecting her request for records regarding the same incident. In that letter, Raiff
explained that the records could not be released because they were confidential law-

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enforcement investigatory records (“CLEIR”) “that w[ould] reveal the identity of
an uncharged suspect in connection with the investigated conduct.” Consistent with
Raiff’s earlier approach as to the mother’s request, less than a half hour after
Bardwell submitted his request, Grossnickle sent an email to Bardwell, to which he
attached Raiff’s December 2020 letter and in which he explained that the records
would not be released but that Bardwell could follow up with Ruffa to discuss the
matter further.
        {¶ 5} Fifteen minutes later, Bardwell emailed Grossnickle to ask him to
release the records with redactions of what Bardwell termed the “exempt
information.” Grossnickle again responded that the records would not be released
but that Bardwell could contact Ruffa to discuss the matter further. Bardwell
emailed Grossnickle that night and, citing R.C. 149.43 and quoting a passage from
State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Maurer, 91 Ohio St.3d 54, 741
N.E.2d 511 (2001), stated his view as follows: “[T]he Ohio General Assembly and
the Ohio Supreme Court have already authorized you to release the report to me.”
Grossnickle did not respond.
        {¶ 6} On April 1, 2021, Bardwell called Ruffa and secretly recorded their
conversation. Bardwell told Ruffa that he was “trying to get [his] hands on an
incident report.” Ruffa responded, “We’re not releasing that * * * record * * *
[b]ecause it’s a confidential law enforcement investigatory record.” Bardwell then
told Ruffa that in Maurer, this court “held that initial incident reports * * * are not
confidential law enforcement investigatory records. And if they were, they need to
be released, except to the extent that they disclose certain types of information, and
* * * that type of information can be redacted, but the rest of it needs to be released.”
Ruffa, in response, explained that under the CLEIR exception, “if the record
pertains to a law enforcement matter of a criminal nature, where the release would
create the high probability of disclosing the identity of an uncharged suspect, it’s
not releasable.” Bardwell agreed, saying, “[I]n that case, yes, the correct procedure

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is to redact the name of the uncharged suspect and release the record.” Ruffa
responded, “[T]hat may be right,” agreed to look at R.C. 149.43, and said he would
get back to Bardwell.
        {¶ 7} Later that day, Ruffa emailed a packet of records to Bardwell, along
with the accompanying message: “Attached are the records you requested. Per our
discussion, the name of the uncharged suspect has been redacted. Please let me
know you received this email and call if you have any questions.” The records
contained a document titled “Incident/Offense Report” and dated November 17,
2020, from the Broadview Heights Police Department; a document titled
“Investigative Report” and dated November 20, 2020, from the Broadview Heights
Police Department; handwritten statements from McRoberts, the student’s mother,
and a schoolteacher, all dated November 17, 2020; and the school’s November
2020 findings from its investigation. Ruffa redacted McRoberts’s name from each
of these records. The investigative report referred to two videos attached to it—
one of the police department’s interview with McRoberts and the other of the
incident itself—but Ruffa did not send the videos. The evidence also establishes
that, for unknown reasons, Bardwell never received Ruffa’s email.
        {¶ 8} Fluty filed this mandamus action on October 5, 2021, at which point
Ruffa learned that Bardwell had not received the April 1, 2021 email with the
packet of records attached. Fluty acknowledges in her brief that on October 25,
2021, counsel for respondents emailed Bardwell the “redacted report.”
        {¶ 9} In December 2021, Broadview Heights released the unredacted
packet of records and the two videos to Bardwell after learning that McRoberts,
who had been considered an uncharged suspect, publicly disclosed her identity by
filing suit against Fluty.

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                                January Term, 2023

                                  II. ANALYSIS
                                     A. Motions
       {¶ 10} Broadview Heights issued a subpoena to the Chandra Law Firm,
L.L.C., a nonparty that formerly employed Bardwell, seeking a deposition
concerning email correspondence between Bardwell and Broadview Heights. Both
Fluty and the Chandra Law Firm have filed motions asking this court to quash this
subpoena. Broadview Heights has since withdrawn the subpoena, so we deny these
motions as moot.
       {¶ 11} Fluty also asks this court to compel Broadview Heights to produce
written discovery relating to “Ruffa’s email server logs.” Fluty states that the server
logs would help establish whether Broadview Heights made any attempt to comply
with her request. Because Broadview Heights has since produced to Fluty a log
listing the emails Ruffa sent on April 1, 2021, we deny the motion as moot.
       {¶ 12} Last, Fluty asks this court to set this case for oral argument. We
deny the motion because none of the factors in support of oral argument is present
and the parties’ briefs are sufficient to resolve the issues raised. See State ex rel.
Lorain v. Stewart, 119 Ohio St.3d 222, 2008-Ohio-4062, 893 N.E.2d 184, ¶ 17-21;
see also S.Ct.Prac.R. 17.02(A).
                                   B. Mandamus
       {¶ 13} Mandamus is an appropriate remedy to compel compliance with
Ohio’s Public Records Act. State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for Responsible
Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 108 Ohio St.3d 288, 2006-Ohio-903,
843 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 6; R.C. 149.43(C)(1)(b). To obtain the writ, Fluty must show
that she has a clear legal right to the requested relief and that Broadview Heights
has a clear legal duty to provide it. See State ex rel. Ellis v. Maple Hts. Police
Dept., 158 Ohio St.3d 25, 2019-Ohio-4137, 139 N.E.3d 873, ¶ 5.
       {¶ 14} Despite Broadview Heights’s release of the unredacted packet of
records and the videos in December 2021, Fluty maintains that Broadview Heights

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still has not produced a “call screen” record and a letter written by Ruffa in which
he said that McRoberts should not be criminally charged.
       {¶ 15} The evidence establishes that the police department’s dispatch center
will typically generate a call-screen record when it receives a 9-1-1 call. The call-
screen record reflects the information that the dispatch center received during the
call. As Broadview Heights correctly argues, the police department would not have
generated a call-screen record because the incident was reported by way of an in-
person visit at the Broadview Heights Police Department rather than a 9-1-1 call.
Raiff’s deposition testimony reinforces this conclusion—when asked whether the
incident/offense report included a call-screen record, Raiff answered, “No.”
Because Fluty has not presented clear and convincing evidence establishing the
existence of a call-screen record, her mandamus claim seeking production of such
a record fails. See State ex rel. Griffin v. Sehlmeyer, 166 Ohio St.3d 258, 2021-
Ohio-3624, 185 N.E.3d 58, ¶ 4 (mandamus will not lie to compel the production of
a nonexistent record).
       {¶ 16} As to Ruffa’s letter, Raiff has explained that Ruffa sent it to the
police department as an attachment to “the report.” Although Fluty did not ask for
Ruffa’s letter when she sent her original request, she now argues that Broadview
Heights should be ordered to produce it because, she says, Ruffa “incorporated” it
into the records that her counsel had requested.
       {¶ 17} Fluty points to Maurer, 91 Ohio St.3d 54, 741 N.E.2d 511, to support
her argument. Before going further, a caveat regarding Maurer is appropriate. As
we explain below when addressing Fluty’s request for statutory damages, Maurer’s
rule requiring disclosure of incident reports in unredacted form, which we refer to
as Maurer’s “core holding,” is no longer good law. But Maurer’s analysis of
whether one record may be incorporated by reference into another for purposes of
the Public Records Act still applies.

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                                  January Term, 2023

        {¶ 18} In Maurer, a deputy sheriff had prepared an incident report after a
law-enforcement officer shot and killed a person. Id. at 54. In a space on the
incident report used to describe the events, the deputy sheriff wrote “taped
narrative” and attached transcribed statements from several law-enforcement
officers who were present at the scene. Id. In response to requests for the incident
report, the sheriff’s office produced the incident report and the attached transcripts
but redacted the law-enforcement officers’ names to avoid potentially disclosing
the identity of an uncharged suspect. Id. at 55. This court determined that the
incident report constituted a public record and was not subject to the CLEIR
exception. Id. at 56. The sheriff’s office therefore had to release an unredacted
version of the incident report despite the risk that it might reveal an uncharged
suspect’s name. Id. (“incident reports initiate criminal investigations but are not
part of the investigation”). This court also determined that the attached transcripts
were public records, reasoning that because the deputy sheriff had “incorporated
[them] by reference in the incident report,” he had “consequently incorporated them
in a public record.” Id. at 57.
        {¶ 19} Fluty reads Maurer’s analysis of the incorporation issue too broadly.
We did not hold there that anything attached to a public record automatically
becomes incorporated into the public record to which it is attached. The deputy
sheriff in Maurer affirmatively incorporated the attachments by making a notation
on the incident report that directly referred to them. This case is distinguishable
from Maurer because the incident/offense report at issue lacks such a notation to
Ruffa’s letter.
        {¶ 20} In summary, we deny Fluty’s request for a writ of mandamus.
                                  C. Statutory damages
        {¶ 21} “R.C. 149.43(C)(2) provides that a requester who transmits a public-
records request by electronic submission * * * in a manner that fairly describes the
requested records, shall be entitled to statutory damages if a court determines that

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the public office failed to comply with an obligation of R.C. 149.43(B).” State ex
rel. Horton v. Kilbane, 167 Ohio St.3d 413, 2022-Ohio-205, 194 N.E.3d 288, ¶ 15.
A requester is entitled to receive “$100 for each business day the office failed to
meet one of R.C. 149.43(B)’s obligations, beginning on the day the requester files
a mandamus action, up to $1,000.” Id., citing R.C. 149.43(C)(2).
       {¶ 22} Fluty advances two main arguments to support her claim for an
award of statutory damages. First, she argues that Broadview Heights failed to
“make copies of the requested public record available,” as required under R.C.
149.43(B)(1). Second, she says that Broadview Heights did not provide her with
an “explanation, including legal authority, setting forth why the request was
denied,” as required by R.C. 149.43(B)(3).
                       1. The packet of records and videos
       {¶ 23} We begin by examining the redacted packet of records that Ruffa
sent to Bardwell by email on April 1, 2021.           The uncontradicted evidence
establishes both that Ruffa sent the email and that Bardwell did not receive it.
Although neither side explains this anomaly, we conclude that Ruffa did all that
was necessary under the law to make the packet of records available to Bardwell.
       {¶ 24} Nothing in R.C. 149.43(B) requires a public office to confirm
delivery of an email or to follow up to ensure receipt. And we have said that a
“public-records requester has an obligation to cooperate with the [public agency],
including an obligation to inform the public agency when she feels that a request
has been incomplete or slow.” State ex rel. DiFranco v. S. Euclid, 144 Ohio St.3d
565, 2015-Ohio-4914, 45 N.E.3d 981, ¶ 25. Here, over six months of silence passed
before Fluty complained that she had not received any records.
       {¶ 25} Fluty argues that even if Broadview Heights did make the packet of
records available in a general sense, it still failed to fully make responsive records
available within a reasonable time, because it redacted McRoberts’s name from the
packet in contravention of Maurer, 91 Ohio St.3d 54, 741 N.E.2d 511. In response,

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                                January Term, 2023

Broadview Heights contends that Bardwell agreed to the production of redacted
records.
       {¶ 26} As noted above, Bardwell initially sought “the initial incident report,
along with any narrative supplements, witness statements, etc.” He then expressed
to Grossnickle that he would be satisfied by the production of records with “exempt
information” redacted. Based on those facts, Broadview Heights could fairly say
that Bardwell had agreed to accept redacted records.
       {¶ 27} But later that same day, Bardwell invoked Maurer as “controlling
law,” quoted the case’s statement that incident reports are public records
notwithstanding the fact that their disclosure might unveil an uncharged suspect’s
identity, and explained to Grossnickle that Maurer provided authority for
Broadview Heights to “release the report to [Bardwell].” After Bardwell invoked
Maurer, Broadview Heights could not reasonably conclude that Bardwell would
accept redacted records as satisfactory.
       {¶ 28} The evidence of Bardwell’s conversation with Ruffa the next day
does not require a different result. In that conversation, Bardwell and Ruffa spoke
about Maurer, 91 Ohio St.3d 54, 741 N.E.2d 511, and the CLEIR exception for
records containing the name of an uncharged suspect. The conversation concluded
with Ruffa telling Bardwell that he would “take a look at [the Public Records Act]
and give [Bardwell] a holler back.” This further cuts against Broadview Heights’s
argument, for if Ruffa had reached an understanding with Bardwell over the phone
that the redacted records would be sufficient to satisfy Bardwell’s request, it is
doubtful that Ruffa would have needed to look into the issue further after he
concluded the phone call with Bardwell.
       {¶ 29} Nevertheless, we conclude that Fluty is not entitled to statutory
damages even though Broadview Heights did not release the unredacted packet of
records and the videos until December 2021. Fluty places especial reliance on
Maurer in seeking statutory damages, but its core holding—that the name of an

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uncharged suspect on an incident report must be disclosed in unredacted form—
cannot provide the basis for such an award.1 As we understand it, the crux of
Fluty’s argument is that Maurer articulated a bright-line rule requiring disclosure,
for she describes the rule of Maurer as “clear,” “unambiguous,” and “firmly
established.” Fluty overstates Maurer’s significance to this case.
         {¶ 30} Our decision in State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v.
Akron, 104 Ohio St.3d 399, 2004-Ohio-6557, 819 N.E.2d 1087, superseded by
statute on other grounds as stated in State ex rel. DiFranco v. S. Euclid, 138 Ohio
St.3d 367, 2014-Ohio-538, 7 N.E.3d 1136, is instructive. In that case, we cautioned
that “in Maurer, we did not adopt a per se rule that all police offense-and-incident
reports are subject to disclosure notwithstanding the applicability of any
exemption.” Id. at ¶ 55. Rather, we explained that Maurer was a product of the
“facts of that case.” Akron at ¶ 55.
         {¶ 31} Based on Akron alone, we cannot agree with Fluty that Broadview
Heights departed from any requirements under Maurer, 91 Ohio St.3d 54, 741
N.E.2d 511, by redacting McRoberts’s name from the packet of records or
withholding the videos, or that as a consequence of failing to adhere to Maurer,
Broadview Heights shirked its obligations under R.C. 149.43(B).
         {¶ 32} Even if there were a lack of clarity about Maurer following Akron,
awarding statutory damages here would create a windfall contrary to our precedent,
see State ex rel. Dehler v. Kelly, 127 Ohio St.3d 309, 2010-Ohio-5724, 939 N.E.2d
828, ¶ 4 (“no windfall is conferred by the statute” authorizing statutory damages).
During this case’s pendency, we announced our decision in State ex rel. Sultaana
v. Mansfield Corr. Inst., __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-1177, __ N.E.3d __, which
abandoned Maurer’s core holding.

1. Fluty appears to characterize the packet of records and the videos as forming an incident report.
Broadview Heights contests this characterization, but for purposes of our analysis, we will assume
that Fluty is correct.

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                                   January Term, 2023

           {¶ 33} Sultaana involved, among other things, a request for incident reports
related to assaults committed by prison inmates. Id. at ¶ 1, 3. The prison produced
the reports but redacted the names and inmate numbers of the inmates involved in
the assaults. Id. at ¶ 1. One of the grounds invoked by the prison to justify the
redactions was that the inmate information was subject to nondisclosure under the
CLEIR exception because, in its view, the information’s release would have created
a “high probability of disclosing the identity of an uncharged suspect” under R.C.
149.43(A)(2)(a). Sultaana at ¶ 26.
           {¶ 34} In Sultaana, this court acknowledged the core holding of Maurer, 91
Ohio St.3d 54, 741 N.E.2d 511, but we also pointed to Akron, 104 Ohio St.3d 399,
2004-Ohio-6557, 819 N.E.2d 1087, and State ex rel. Myers v. Meyers, 169 Ohio
St.3d 536, 2022-Ohio-1915, 207 N.E.3d 579. Sultaana at ¶ 29. In Myers, we held
that “[e]ven the information that is included in an incident-report form may, in a
proper case, be redacted under a public-records exception other than the specific-
investigatory-work-product exception in R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c).” Id. at ¶ 46.
           {¶ 35} Based on this caselaw, we reasoned in Sultaana that “the inmate
names and inmate numbers could still be exempt from disclosure under R.C.
149.43(A)(2)(a) as records pertaining ‘to a law enforcement matter of a criminal,
quasi-criminal, civil, or administrative nature, but only to the extent that the release
of the [information] would create a high probability of disclosure of * * * [t]he
identity of a suspect who has not been charged with the offense to which the record
pertains.’ ” (Brackets sic.) Sultaana, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-1177, __
N.E.3d __, at ¶ 29, quoting R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(a). This court held that R.C.
149.43(A)(2)(a) did not apply, however, because the prison had not submitted
evidence supporting its claim that the inmates were uncharged suspects. Sultaana
at ¶ 30.
           {¶ 36} Although Sultaana did not make the point explicitly, its analysis
plainly vitiates Maurer’s core holding. Under Sultaana, a public-records custodian

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may redact from an incident report the identity of an uncharged suspect provided
the requirements of R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(a) are met. Sultaana at ¶ 29.
       {¶ 37} The evidence here establishes that the requirements of R.C.
149.43(A)(2)(a) are met. From the time that Bardwell initially communicated with
Grossnickle up to the time of Bardwell’s phone call with Ruffa, Broadview Heights
officials were concerned that releasing information containing McRoberts’s
identity would create a high probability of disclosing the identity of an uncharged
suspect. Unquestionably, had Broadview Heights released the unredacted packet
of records and the videos to Bardwell, McRoberts’s identity would have been
disclosed. The fact that McRoberts had apparently disclosed her identity to the
public prior to Fluty’s request by filing suit against Fluty or the fact that charges
were never brought against McRoberts does not change the analysis. See State ex
rel. Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. v. Mentor, 89 Ohio St.3d 440, 447, 732
N.E.2d 969 (2000) (“The uncharged-suspect exemption may still apply even though
the accusation of criminal conduct is already public knowledge”); State ex rel.
Master v. Cleveland, 75 Ohio St.3d 23, 30, 661 N.E.2d 180 (1996) (“The
uncharged-suspect exception applies despite the passage of time, the lack of
enforcement action, or a prosecutor’s decision not to file formal charges”).
       {¶ 38} We deny statutory damages as to the disclosure of the packet of
records and the videos.
             2. Broadview Heights’s responses to Fluty’s requests
       {¶ 39} Fluty next argues that Broadview Heights provided an invalid
explanation to her counsel for withholding the records because it failed to cite any
supporting legal authority when it first denied her request. Fluty admits that
Broadview Heights cited the uncharged-suspect exception but faults it for relying
on this exception because Maurer, 91 Ohio St.3d 54, 741 N.E.2d 511, “makes clear
that that exemption is not a legal authority to withhold the report.” Even if
Maurer’s core holding were still good law, Fluty’s argument fails because the

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                               January Term, 2023

Public Records Act does not authorize an award of statutory damages merely
because a public office cites legal authority with which the requester disagrees.
       {¶ 40} Fluty also argues that Broadview Heights failed to provide her with
a valid explanation and failed to cite any legal authority in responding to what she
terms her “Second Request.” Fluty appears to believe that her counsel created a
new request when he sent a follow-up email to Grossnickle asking that he “[p]lease
redact any exempt information and release the remainder of the record.” But
Bardwell’s follow-up email did not create a “sufficiently different” request. See
State ex rel. Caster v. Columbus, 151 Ohio St.3d 425, 2016-Ohio-8394, 89 N.E.3d
598, ¶ 50. Rather, the follow-up email was a means of continuing and refining the
conversation regarding the original request.
       {¶ 41} Nor can we award statutory damages based on Fluty’s claim that
Broadview Heights took too long to initially inform her that she was not entitled to
the videos. See Myers, 169 Ohio St.3d 536, 2022-Ohio-1915, 207 N.E.3d 579, at
¶ 73 (determining that because R.C. 149.43(B)(3) does not contain a timeliness
requirement, “the city’s delay in providing [the requester] with an explanation for
its denial does not by itself entitle [the requester] to an award of statutory
damages”).
       {¶ 42} We deny statutory damages because Broadview Heights’s
communications with Fluty’s counsel did not fall below the standard prescribed by
the Public Records Act.
                 3. The call-screen record and the Ruffa letter
       {¶ 43} Last, Fluty argues that she is entitled to statutory damages because
Broadview Heights failed to make available the call-screen record and the Ruffa
letter. Based on our mandamus analysis above, Fluty is not entitled to statutory
damages regarding the call-screen record or the Ruffa letter.

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                                 D. Attorney fees
       {¶ 44} Fluty claims she is entitled to attorney fees because Broadview
Heights acted in bad faith by disregarding Maurer, 91 Ohio St.3d 54, 741 N.E.2d
511, in favor of its own policy preferences and by treating her arbitrarily. To
develop her bad-faith argument, Fluty relies partly on deposition testimony in the
record. Although R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(b)(iii) provides that “[n]o discovery may be
conducted on the issue of the alleged bad faith of the public office,” Broadview
Heights does not argue that this provision bears on the analysis.
       {¶ 45} Ohio law provides that a court “may” award reasonable attorney fees
to a relator if it determines that a public office “acted in bad faith when [it]
voluntarily made the public records available to the relator for the first time after
the relator commenced the mandamus action, but before the court issued any order
concluding whether or not the [office] was required to comply with division (B)”
of R.C. 149.43. R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(b)(iii). We have said:

               “ ‘The term “bad faith” generally implies something more
       than bad judgment or negligence.’ ” State v. Powell, 132 Ohio St.3d
       233, 2012-Ohio-2577, 971 N.E.2d 865, ¶ 81, quoting State v. Tate,
       5th Dist. Fairfield No. 07 CA 55, 2008-Ohio-3759, 2008 WL
       2896658, ¶ 13. Bad faith “ ‘ “imports a dishonest purpose, moral
       obliquity, conscious wrongdoing, breach of a known duty through
       some ulterior motive or ill will partaking of the nature of fraud. It
       also embraces actual intent to mislead or deceive another.” ’ ” Id.,
       quoting Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 6 Ohio St.3d 272, 276, 452
       N.E.2d 1315 (1983), quoting Slater v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 174
       Ohio St. 148, 187 N.E.2d 45 (1962), paragraph two of the syllabus,
       overruled on other grounds, Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 71 Ohio
       St.3d 552, 644 N.E.2d 397 (1994), paragraph one of the syllabus.

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State ex rel. McDougald v. Greene, 161 Ohio St.3d 130, 2020-Ohio-3686, 161
N.E.3d 575, ¶ 26.
       {¶ 46} The record does not reveal bad faith on the part of Broadview
Heights. To begin, the record does not show that Broadview Heights tried to
mislead or deceive Fluty about its reasons for withholding McRoberts’s identity or
that a dishonest purpose underlaid Broadview Heights’s conduct. Rather, the
record establishes that Broadview Heights had a legitimate concern that the
information sought in Fluty’s request would disclose the identity of an uncharged
suspect and that Broadview Heights repeatedly conveyed this concern to Fluty’s
counsel.   Our caselaw has spoken to the reasons underlying such concerns,
observing that the protections afforded to records containing the identities of
uncharged suspects protect those persons from adverse publicity and facilitate the
efforts of law enforcement to resolve cases. See Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent
Assn., 89 Ohio St.3d at 447, 732 N.E.2d 969. We cannot assign bad faith to
Broadview Heights for taking one or more of these concerns into account in
responding to Fluty’s request.
       {¶ 47} Fluty maintains that Broadview Heights’s position defies the core
holding of Maurer, 91 Ohio St.3d 54, 741 N.E.2d 511. But we have explained why,
since the release of Akron, 104 Ohio St.3d 399, 2004-Ohio-6557, 819 N.E.2d 1087,
in 2004, Maurer cannot be read to support the per se rule that Fluty would have us
apply. We have further explained that, in light of our decision in Sultaana, __ Ohio
St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-1177, __ N.E.3d __, Maurer’s core holding is no longer any
benefit to Fluty. Nor do we find that Broadview Heights elevated its subjective
policy preferences over those embodied in the Public Records Act. We find that a
more benign explanation fits here, which is simply that Broadview Heights strove
in good faith to balance its Public Records Act obligations with its law-enforcement
obligations.

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                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

        {¶ 48} We do find it questionable that Broadview Heights apparently
changed its policies regarding the release of incident reports around the time of the
child-abuse allegation concerning Insightful Minds. Fluty points to Grossnickle’s
deposition testimony, in which he stated that prior to this case, he had never
redacted the name of an uncharged suspect in responding to a request for an incident
report. In his deposition testimony, Raiff identified the reason for the change in
policy, explaining that he had felt uncomfortable releasing the records sought by
Fluty because they disclosed the identity of an uncharged suspect who had allegedly
engaged in misconduct toward a juvenile. It is not clear to us why this distinction
matters. The question whether a document’s release would create a high probability
of disclosing the identity of an uncharged suspect would seemingly depend little, if
at all, on whether the victim was a juvenile. That said, Raiff’s solicitude for juvenile
victims does not strike us as constituting bad faith.
        {¶ 49} We deny attorney fees because Broadview Heights did not engage
in bad faith.
                                    E. Court costs
        {¶ 50} A court shall award all court costs if it orders the public office to
comply with R.C. 149.43(B) or finds that the public office acted in bad faith under
R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(b)(iii). See R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(a)(i) and (ii). Because Fluty is
not entitled to a writ of mandamus and Broadview Heights did not engage in bad
faith, we deny court costs.
                                III. CONCLUSION
        {¶ 51} For the foregoing reasons, we deny the writ, statutory damages,
attorney fees, and court costs. We also deny Fluty’s motion for oral argument, deny
as moot her motion to compel and motion to quash, and deny as moot the Chandra
Law Firm’s motion to quash.
                                                                          Writ denied.

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                                  January Term, 2023

       STEWART, BRUNNER, and DETERS, JJ., concur.
       KENNEDY, C.J., concurs, with an opinion joined by FISCHER and DEWINE,
JJ.
       DONNELLY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and would award
statutory damages.
                                  _________________
       KENNEDY, C.J., concurring.
       {¶ 52} I agree with the majority that relator, Ashley Fluty, is not entitled to
a writ of mandamus, statutory damages, attorney fees, or court costs. I write
separately to emphasize that, in my view, State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing
Co. v. Maurer, 91 Ohio St.3d 54, 741 N.E.2d 511 (2001), is overruled in part by
today’s decision in this case.       Rejecting Maurer’s holding, this court now
recognizes that a law-enforcement agency’s record that reveals the identity of an
uncharged suspect is not a public record, even if that information is contained in a
routine police incident report.
       {¶ 53} In Maurer, a newspaper submitted a public-records request for an
incident report related to a police-involved shooting. Id. at 54. The sheriff released
a copy of the report but redacted the names of the law-enforcement officers who
were involved. Id. at 55. The newspaper sought a writ of mandamus from the court
of appeals to compel the sheriff to produce an unredacted version of the incident
report. Id. The court of appeals denied the writ. Id.
       {¶ 54} This court reversed, ordering the court of appeals to issue a writ
directing the sheriff to release an unredacted copy of the incident report. Id. at 58.
This court acknowledged that a confidential law-enforcement investigatory record
is not a public record and that a record pertaining to a law-enforcement matter is a
confidential law-enforcement investigatory record if its release would create a high
probability of disclosing the identity of an uncharged suspect. Id. at 56, citing R.C.
149.43(A)(1)(h) and (A)(2)(a). Nonetheless, we held that routine incident reports

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                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

are never confidential law-enforcement investigatory records because they initiate,
but are not part of, an investigation, so the sheriff had to release an unredacted copy
of the incident report “despite the risk that the report may disclose the identity of
an uncharged suspect.” Id. at 57. This court indicated that once the names of the
uncharged suspects were included in the incident report, the custodian could not
“remove the ‘public records cloak.’ ” Id., quoting State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer
v. Hamilton Cty., 75 Ohio St.3d 374, 378, 662 N.E.2d 334 (1996). So even though
the incident report in Maurer pertained to a law-enforcement matter and revealed
the name of an uncharged suspect, this court required the sheriff to release it without
redaction.
       {¶ 55} Maurer, 91 Ohio St.3d 54, 741 N.E.2d 511, was wrongly decided.
When Maurer was issued, Ohio’s Public Records Act exempted confidential law-
enforcement investigatory records from release as public records, and it still does
today. See R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(h); Sub.H.B. No. 448, 148 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3883,
3902-3903. And R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(a) has continuously provided that a record that
pertains to a law-enforcement matter of a criminal, quasi-criminal, civil, or
administrative nature is a confidential law-enforcement investigatory record “to the
extent that the release of the record would create a high probability of disclosure of
* * * [t]he identity of a suspect who has not been charged with the offense to which
the record pertains.” See 148 Ohio Laws, Part II, at 3902-3904.
       {¶ 56} Ohio’s Public Records Act is unambiguous. A law-enforcement
record is not a public record if it reveals the identity of an uncharged suspect, and
that remains true even when that information is contained within a routine incident
report. Yet Maurer disregarded the words of R.C. 149.43 and created a blanket
rule that all police incident reports are public records subject to release without
redaction, regardless of whether their release would identify an uncharged suspect.
That blanket rule cannot be squared with the plain language of the Public Records
Act. Under the statute, if the release of an incident report reveals the identity of an

                                          18
                                 January Term, 2023

uncharged suspect, then the incident report is a confidential law-enforcement
investigatory record and is not a public record until it is redacted.
        {¶ 57} We have tried to walk back Maurer’s blanket rule. In State ex rel.
Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Akron, this court said that Maurer did not adopt
a per se rule that all police incident reports are subject to disclosure. 104 Ohio St.3d
399, 2004-Ohio-6557, 819 N.E.2d 1087, ¶ 55, superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in State ex rel. DiFranco v. S. Euclid, 138 Ohio St.3d 367, 2014-
Ohio-538, 7 N.E.3d 1136. In State ex rel. Myers v. Meyers, we noted that
information in an incident report could be redacted if a public-records exception
applied to it, but we did not specifically question the viability of Maurer. See 169
Ohio St.3d 536, 2022-Ohio-1915, 207 N.E.3d 579, ¶ 46. And in State ex rel.
Sultaana v. Mansfield Corr. Inst., this court repeated the language from Akron
indicating that Maurer did not create a per se rule and similarly stated that the
names of uncharged suspects in an incident report could be exempt from disclosure.
__ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-1177, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 29. None of these cases,
however, expressly overruled Maurer, and parties continue to rely on it. Notably,
neither of the two major legal-research databases, LexisNexis and Westlaw, show
that Maurer has been overruled.
        {¶ 58} Our decisions therefore have not gone far enough to disavow the
holding in Maurer, 91 Ohio St.3d 54, 741 N.E.2d 511. Maurer does not accurately
state the law in Ohio on this issue, and it must be overruled in part. And I read the
majority opinion’s statements describing Maurer’s holding as “no longer good
law,” majority opinion, ¶ 17, and “vitiate[d],” id. at ¶ 36, to mean that this court
overrules this aspect of Maurer.
        {¶ 59} Today’s decision does not, however, undermine our holding in State
ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson (and its progeny) that routine incident reports that do
not contain information exempted from release by the Public Records Act are
public records subject to immediate release. 70 Ohio St.3d 420, 435, 639 N.E.2d

                                          19
                           SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

83 (1994), overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. Caster v. Columbus, 151
Ohio St.3d 425, 2016-Ohio-8394, 89 N.E.3d 598, ¶ 47. Instead, today’s decision
simply recognizes the rule that “if a law-enforcement agency maintains routine
factual information and [information that is exempt from release under R.C.
149.43(A)(2)] in the same overall record, then the records custodian may disclose
the incident-report form after redacting any information that is considered to be
[exempt].” Myers at ¶ 107 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
       {¶ 60} For these reasons, I concur in the majority opinion in this case.
       FISCHER and DEWINE, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion.
                              __________________
       Speech Law, L.L.C., and Brian D. Bardwell, for relator.
       Walter Haverfield, L.L.P., R. Todd Hunt, and Alejandro V. Cortes, for
respondents.
                             ___________________

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