Court Opinion

ID: 9576159
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:21:19.554657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:01:25.202899
License: Public Domain

HENRIOD, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. The main opinion invokes Title 41-1-72, a statute requiring registration before title passes, as a sort of “warning to buyers,” statute, something akin to the recording acts, pointing out that the buyer is put on inquiry in those cases where the statute applies. It then reasons that because the statute is inapplicable in this case, the buyer here can acquire good title from one who has no title. This is like saying *266that if there is no statute putting one on notice against thieves, then one may acquire good title from a thief, such that the true owner cannot assert his title. Title 41-1-72 has no place in this case since it applies to some other situation, and its injection here only confuses.
The same is true of Title 41-1-65, invoked by the main opinion. That section simply sanctions a short-cut transfer by a dealer who is a transferee. The majority opinion assumes two non-existent facts in this case: (1) that Bruce was a transferee and (2) that Bruce had title. The true owner specifically refused to (1) make Bruce a transferee or (2) make him an owner, by retaining title and all evidence of ownership save bare possession. Hence Title 41-1-65 has no place in this case since it applies to some other situation, and its injection here, also only confuses.
The same is true of Title 60-2-7, invoked by the main opinion, and without which the majority opinion could not survive. By using 60-2-7 to arrive at its conclusion, the majority opinion lapses into the biggest fallacy of all. Title 60-2-7 specifically states that the dealer here could not pass any better title than he had (which was none), unless the owner, by his conduct, was “precluded from denying the seller’s (dealer’s) authority to sell.” The main opinion says the owner in this case is so precluded by his conduct, and in arriving at such conclusion, succumbs to its own circuitous and erroneous reasoning: The majority opinion says that the owner granted Bruce more than mere possession because plaintiff, as a ivholesale distributor, willingly turned the car over to Bruce, knowing he was a licensed dealer and would take the car to Salt Lake for resale and place it with other stock. The opinion then says: “Such conduct on the part of * * * plaintiffs * * * clothed Bruce with an apparent ownership or authority to sell said cars in the ordinary course of business to the buying public which will preclude the original sellers from reclaiming the automobiles from bona fide purchasers.” The majority opinion uses the italicized portions to establish indicia of ownership beyond mere possession, — the language implying that mere possession would not be sufficient indicia of ownership to protect the buyer. The big fallacy that the majority opinion, in stressing the italicized portions above, erroneously indulges, is that it makes the test of what constitutes indicia of ownership, facts such as the roles of the owner in business and things that are in his mind, — things which a prospective buyer could not possibly see, or feel, or hear. The question that must be asked and answered to test whether the owner has given another such indicia of ownership as would preclude him from asserting his title as against an innocent purchaser ignorant of the facts, is: What has the owner given to the seller which makes it appear to the buyer that the seller is authorized to sell?
*267Indicia of ownership amounting to a representation upon which an estoppel might be bottomed, is determined by looking at the facts through the eyes of a reasonable buyer, who reasonably can believe the seller has authority to sell, — not through the eyes of the owner. In this case it could not possibly appear to the buyer that the owner was a wholesale distributor, or that the owner willingly turned the car over to Bruce, or that the owner knew Bruce would put it in stock for the purpose of resale. The only tangible thing the buyer could see here was plain, ordinary naked possession, — -nothing else, and the decision in this case must therefore stand for the unheard of proposition that one who permits another to have possession of the former’s personal property, cannot assert his title as against a vendee of the latter who is ignorant of the facts. Had the owner here given the dealer (Bruce) the documents of title, then there would have been ■a real indicia of ownership and 60-2-7 easily could apply, since in such event, a real representation would have been made, as was not the case here, upon which a true estoppel could be predicated.
To hold, as the majority opinion must do, after the window dressing is eliminated, that one cannot assert title against an innocent ' purchaser from one to whom the owner delivered bare possession of his personal property, makes hazardous the leaving of one’s car to be parked for a fee, leaving it for necessary repairs, or even loaning it to a dear friend. I am unaware of any case that has gone as far as this case, and I respectfully suggest that it is ignoring fundamental concepts relating to property and rights therein.