Court Opinion

ID: 2964251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:22:46.357287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:53.271490
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit

                                 ____________________

          No. 95-2324

                   ACKERLEY COMMUNICATIONS OF MASSACHUSETTS, INC.,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                              CITY OF CAMBRIDGE, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge]
                                               ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                 Cyr, Circuit Judge,
                                      _____________

                      Coffin and Bownes, Senior Circuit Judges.
                                         _____________________

                                 ____________________

               Andrew L. Frey with whom Eric M. Rubin, Walter E. Diercks,
               ______________           _____________  _________________
          Kenneth S. Geller, Charles Rothfeld, George A. Berman, Steven S.
          _________________  ________________  ________________  _________
          Broadley, and Joseph S. Berman were on brief for appellant.
          ________      ________________
               Peter L. Koff with whom Arthur J. Goldberg was on brief for
               _____________           __________________
          appellees.

                                 ____________________

                                    July 10, 1996

                                 ____________________

               COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge.   We are asked in  this appeal
                       ____________________

          to  sort  out  the  constitutional  principles  at  play  when  a

          municipality, in pursuit of improved  aesthetics, regulates signs

          and billboards.   In many respects,  this is a  case of deja  vu.

          Seven  years ago,  the same  plaintiff successfully  challenged a

          similar  sign ordinance as violative of the First Amendment.  See
                                                                        ___

          Ackerley Communications of Massachusetts  v. City of  Somerville,
          ________________________________________     ___________________

          878   F.2d  513  (1st   Cir.  1989).     Although  the  defending

          municipality has  changed -- Cambridge now  replaces its neighbor

          Somerville -- the central issue remains the same: the validity of

          distinctions  drawn  between  "onsite"  and  "offsite" signs  and

          between   commercial   and   noncommercial   messages.1      With
                              
          ____________________

               1 We repeat our explanation of the onsite/offsite
          distinction from City of Somerville, 878 F.2d at 513 n.1:
                           __________________

                    An onsite sign carries a message that bears some
               relationship to the activities conducted on the
               premises where the sign is located.  For example, an
               onsite sign may simply identify a business or agency
               ("Joe's Hardware" or "YMCA"), or it may advertise a
               product or service available at that location
               ("Budweiser Beer" at Parise's Cafe or child care at the
               Lutheran Church).  Depending upon the business or
               agency, the message on the sign may be deemed either
               commercial or noncommercial.  An offsite sign -- the
               category into which most billboards fit -- carries a
               message unrelated to its particular location.  These
               signs also may display either commercial or
               noncommercial messages.  For example, an offsite sign
               may advertise "Great Gifts at Kappy's Liquors," with
               Kappy's Liquors being located at some distance from the
               sign, or it may say "No one should be left out in the
               cold.  Write: Citizens Energy Corp." 

                    Thus, the onsite/offsite distinction is not a
               distinction between signs attached to buildings and
               free standing signs.  An offsite sign may be located on
               a building rooftop, but because the product, good, or
               service it advertises is not available at the sign's

                                         -2-

          appreciation for the difficulties faced by municipalities in this

          complicated  area,   we  nonetheless  conclude  that   the  First

          Amendment  bars enforcement  of the  challenged ordinance  in the

          circumstances present here.

                                I. Factual Background
                                   __________________

               Plaintiff   Ackerley   Communications  is   a  Massachusetts

          billboard  company  that  has  operated  an  outdoor  advertising

          business for more than 100  years.  In the City of  Cambridge, it

          maintains  46  signs on  32 separate  structures.   All  of these

          billboards became nonconforming  when Cambridge amended a  zoning

          ordinance  in 1991  to tighten  the restrictions  on the  height,

          size, number and  location of signs that may  be displayed in the

          city.2    Ackerley,  hoping  to  find  protection  in  the  First

          Amendment, has  displayed only  noncommercial messages since  the

          amended ordinance went into effect.

               The  ordinance itself  makes  no distinctions  based on  the

          messages displayed on the signs.  Such differential protection is
                              
          ____________________

               location, it is classified as offsite.  For example, if
               a sign advertising the products available at Joe's
               Hardware is located atop the Parise Cafe building,
               Joe's sign is offsite.

          In this opinion, we use the terms on-premise and off-premise
          interchangeably with onsite and offsite.

               2 Article 7.000 of the Zoning Ordinances of the City of
          Cambridge provides, inter alia, that four categories of
                              _____ ____
          nonconforming signs must be removed within four years from the
          statute's enactment, or from the first date that the sign became
          nonconforming.  The signs required to be removed are those on
          rooftops, freestanding signs exceeding 30 square feet, wall signs
          exceeding 60 square feet and projecting signs exceeding 10 square
          feet.    7.18.1.  All of Ackerley's signs fall into at least one
          of these categories.

                                         -3-

          conferred instead  by a  state statute, the  Massachusetts Zoning

          Act,  Mass.  Gen. L.  ch. 40A,     6, which  mandates grandfather

          protection for all nonconforming uses -- including signs  -- that

          are in  existence at the  time a zoning  ordinance is enacted  or

          amended.   The  statute excludes  from such  protection, however,

          billboards, signs  and other  advertising devices subject  to the

          jurisdiction  of  the  Massachusetts  Outdoor  Advertising  Board

          (OAB).  The OAB regulates so-called "off-premise" signs.3

               The combined  effect of the  local ordinance and  state law,

          therefore, is to protect signs that do not conform to the amended

          Cambridge  ordinance only if they carry onsite messages.  None of
                               ____

          Ackerley's billboards are grandfathered under this scheme because

          all of its messages  are offsite ones -- i.e., they are unrelated

          to  the  property  on  which  they  sit.    Thus,  Ackerley's  46

          noncommercial, off-premises  messages must be taken  down while a

          large number of nonconforming commercial signs are protected.

               Cambridge  officials  recognized the  limited nature  of the

          grandfather  provision, and, indeed,  endorsed its preference for

          onsite signs, finding:

               Nonconforming  off-premise  signs, which  traditionally
               have been used primarily to  advertise commercial goods
               and services not available on the same premises, have a
               significantly greater adverse aesthetic impact  than on
               premises signs  because of their larger  sizes, greater

                              
          ____________________

               3 Ackerley accurately points out that the descriptive terms
          "off-premise" and "on-premise" can be misleading when used to
          modify the word "sign", since the applicable category is
          determined not by a sign's location, but by its message.  As
                                     ________             _______
          noted supra, at note 1, a sign attached to a building can carry
                _____
          either off-premise or on-premise messages.  

                                         -4-

               heights,  less  attractive  appearances,   and/or  more
               intrusive locations.

          Zoning  Ordinance  Article  7.000,    7.11.1(F).    The  Findings

          section  of  the  ordinance  further states  that  "[t]he  public

          interest is served  by use of signs by businesses and services to

          identify  their  premises,  or  the products  or  services  there

          available, or  to display noncommercial  messages."  Id.  at (G).
                                                               ___

          The  importance  of  noncommercial  messages is  reflected  in  a

          "substitution provision"  in the ordinance,  which provides  that

          "[a]ny  sign permitted under this Article may contain, in lieu of

          or  in addition  to any  other copy, any  noncommercial message."

          Article 7.000,   7.17.

               Consistent with this scheme,  when the ordinance's four-year

          grace period  expired in  1995, Cambridge informed  Ackerley that

          its signs would have to come down.  Ackerley sought a preliminary

          injunction barring enforcement of  the ordinance, arguing that it

          violates  the  First Amendment  because  it favors  nonconforming

          signs  that carry  commercial  messages over  similar signs  that

          carry  noncommercial  messages.4     The  district  court  denied

          injunctive relief.  It found that Ackerley had not demonstrated a

          likelihood of success  on the  merits because  the ordinance  "in

          effect[] distinguishes between on-site and off-site  signs, which

          is  permissible, and  not  between commercial  and non-commercial

          messages."

                              
          ____________________

               4 Ackerley also alleged a Fifth Amendment takings claim,
          which is not before us at this time.

                                         -5-

               Ackerley consequently  filed this  appeal, arguing  that the

          district  court  misapplied relevant  First  Amendment  law.   It

          contends that the Supreme Court's decision in Metromedia, Inc. v.
                                                        ________________

          San  Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), and  our own decision in City of
          __________                                                _______

          Somerville,  878  F.2d  at  513, require  a  conclusion  that the
          __________

          Cambridge  ordinance is unconstitutional as applied to Ackerley's

          signs.

               Although this case comes to  us as an appeal of a  denial of

          preliminary relief,  both parties  at oral  argument urged  us to

          resolve the dispute on its merits  because the issue is purely  a

          legal  one that needs no  further record development.   We accept

          the invitation  to make  the ultimate determination,  and proceed

          with our analysis from that perspective.   

                                    II. Discussion
                                        __________

          A. Background
             __________

               The City of Cambridge has been working for a number of years

          to  improve  its aesthetic  environment through  the increasingly

          restrictive  regulation of signs.  The 1991 revisions to its sign

          ordinance  for the  first time required  removal of  certain non-

          conforming signs.  Although the ordinance affects many more signs

          than  just  the  large,  visually  demanding  --  some would  say

          offensive -- ones that most of us would identify as billboards, a

          comprehensive  report prepared  in  connection  with the  revised

          ordinance  reveals  that  they   are  the  city's  most  pressing

                                         -6-

          concern.5   Billboards  typically  carry offsite  messages.   The

          state's  grandfathering provision --  exempting nonconforming on-
                                                                        __

          premise  signs  -- therefore  nicely  dovetails  with Cambridge's

          priority to eliminate  billboards as soon  as possible.6   Onsite

          signs,  most of which are business signs, may stay; offsite signs

          --  many of  which  at the  moment  in Cambridge  are  billboards

          carrying noncommercial messages -- must go.    

               Ackerley offers two primary reasons why this scheme violates

          the  First  Amendment.    First, it  claims  that  the  Cambridge

          ordinance  directly  conflicts  with  our  decision  in  City  of
                                                                   ________
                              
          ____________________

               5 The report on the Cambridge sign environment concluded
          that off-premise signs -- a term it equated with billboards --
          were more troubling than onsite signs because, inter alia, they
                                                         _____ ____
          dominate the surrounding environment, both visually and
          physically, and are not likely to be removed except as the result
          of a total redevelopment of the site on which they are found. 
          The report found that on-premise signs, in contrast, have a more
          "limited and contained" aesthetic impact because "they are placed
          low on their host buildings, they are obscured from afar by
          street trees and almost without exception they do not approach
          the sheer size and dominance of off-premise signs."  In addition,
          the report stated that onsite signs were likely to be less
          permanent, since businesses are likely to change hands and new
          signs would not be grandfathered.

               6 For purposes of our discussion, we treat the state
          grandfathering provision as part-and-parcel of the Cambridge
          ordinance, and certain of our references to "the Cambridge
          ordinance" will assume that the grandfathering provision is
          contained within it.  Indeed, as noted supra, at pages 4-5, the
                                                 _____
          ordinance seems to incorporate the state grandfather provision as
          part of its regulatory scheme.
                 We emphasize that the validity of the state statute, as an
          independent matter, is not a question before us.  The issue we
          must decide is whether Cambridge may enforce its sign ordinance
          to require Ackerley to remove its billboards.  As Cambridge's
          counsel acknowledged at oral argument, the impact of the state
          grandfathering provision is relevant to that inquiry regardless
          of the statute's constitutionality.

                                         -7-

          Somerville,  where we  found  the ordinance  to be  impermissible
          __________

          based on a grandfathering provision that exempted only signs that

          had  carried  no  offsite   commercial  speech  during  the  year

          preceding  the  ordinance's enactment.    We held  that  "[i]t is

          without  question that the government may not impose a penalty --

          in this case, denying the right to continue speaking  by means of

          nonconforming  signs --  because of  a  person's constitutionally

          protected past speech."  878 F.2d at 519.  

               Ackerley contends  that Cambridge's ordinance,  when applied

          in  light of the state statute, suffers from essentially the same

          flaw:  the  right to  use nonconforming  signs  in the  future to

          express  noncommercial  messages  is  given  by  the substitution

          provision only to certain speakers, based on their past speech --

          in this instance, to those who were displaying onsite messages on

          the  day the  ordinance  was enacted.    Ackerley maintains  that

          distributing  the future right to  speak in a  certain way (i.e.,

          through  large,  nonconforming signs)  based  on  the content  of

          earlier speech  is  impermissible whether  the restriction  looks

          back a  year in time,  as it  did in Somerville,  or only  a day.

          This must be so, it asserts, because the practical effect  of the

          two ordinances  is identical; both  reserve the right  to display

          noncommercial  messages  primarily  to   a  limited  category  of

          speakers, business owners.

               Ackerley's second  theory is  that the ordinance  is invalid

          because it imposes an impermissible content-based  restriction on

          speech: whether a sign may remain is determined by the message it

                                         -8-

          carries.      Because   most   content-based   restrictions   are

          presumptively  invalid, see City of  Ladue v. Gilleo,  114 S. Ct.
                                  ___ ______________    ______

          2038,   2047   (1994)   (O'Connor,  J.,   concurring);   National
                                                                   ________

          Amusements,  Inc. v. Town of  Dedham, 43 F.3d  731, 736 (1st Cir.
          _________________    _______________

          1995),  and subject to  strict scrutiny, even  Cambridge seems to

          acknowledge  that,  if  this  traditional  content-based  inquiry

          applies,  its ordinance would fail.   See Burson  v. Freeman, 504
                                                ___ ______     _______

          U.S. 191, 211 (1992) ("[I]t is the rare case in which . . . a law

          survives strict scrutiny.").

               Cambridge responds that enforcement  of its ordinance is not

          inconsistent with City of  Somerville because the regulation does
                            ___________________

          not  use "past speech" as  the distinguishing criterion.   In its

          view, the grandfather provision permissibly distinguishes between

          categories of signs (onsite vs. offsite), and  such a distinction

          inevitably  must relate  to  the  signs  as  they  existed  at  a

          particular point in  time.  Cambridge  further contends that  its

          ordinance  is a  valid content-neutral  regulation that  does not

          require strict scrutiny.

               Under  traditional First  Amendment  analysis,  we  probably

          should address  as a threshold matter  whether the onsite/offsite

          grandfathering  restriction is  a  content-based regulation  that

          triggers strict scrutiny.7   See  City of  Ladue, 114  S. Ct.  at
                                       ___  ______________
                              
          ____________________

               7 In "commonsense" terms, the distinction surely is content-
          based because determining whether a sign may stay up or must come
          down requires consideration of the message it carries.  The
          Supreme Court made such an observation in City of Cincinnati v.
                                                    __________________
          Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1516-17 (1993), which
          _______________________
          involved a city policy banning newsracks carrying commercial
          handbills but not those carrying newspapers.  The Court noted:

                                         -9-

          2047  (O'Connor, J.,  concurring) ("The  normal inquiry  that our

          doctrine dictates is, first, to determine whether a regulation is

          content-based or  content-neutral, and then, based  on the answer

          to  that  question, to  apply  the proper  level  of scrutiny.");

          National Amusements, 43 F.3d at 736.   We choose to sidestep that
          ___________________

          difficult   question,  however,  because  we  conclude  that  the

          Cambridge  scheme  suffers  from two  readily  identifiable First

          Amendment flaws that bar its enforcement.

          B. Distinguishing Among Categories of Noncommercial Speech
             _______________________________________________________
                              
          ____________________

               Under the city's newsrack policy, whether any
               particular newsrack falls within the ban is determined
               by the content of the publication resting inside that
               newsrack.  Thus, by any commonsense understanding of
               the term, the ban in this case is "content-based."

          See also National Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d
          ___ ____ _________________________    ______________
          731, 738 (1st Cir. 1995); Whitton v. City of Gladstone, Mo., 54
                                    _______    ______________________
          F.3d 1400, 1403-04 (8th Cir. 1995) ("The Supreme Court has held
          that a restriction on speech is content-based when the message
          conveyed determines whether the speech is subject to the
          restriction."). 

          (cont'd)
          (7 cont'd)
               Cambridge acknowledges that the onsite/offsite distinction
          indirectly has a content-based effect because most on-premise
          signs are commercial in nature and most noncommercial messages
          are off-premise.  In Cambridge, the disadvantage to noncommercial
          speech is magnified because of Ackerley's decision to change all
          of its billboards to noncommercial messages.

               Several courts, however, have found the offsite/onsite
          distinction to be essentially content-neutral, at least for the
          purpose of determining the correct standard.  See, e.g., Rappa v.
                                                        ___  ____  _____
          New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1067 (3d Cir. 1994); Messer v.
          _________________                                     ______
          City of Douglasville, Ga., 975 F.2d 1505, 1509 (11th Cir. 1992). 
          _________________________
          In Rappa, a divided court noted that "[f]avoring onsite over off-
             _____
          site speech probably leads to the effect of favoring commercial
          speech over non-commercial speech as most conspicuous onsite
          speech is probably commercial, but this effect is too attenuated
          for us to take into account."  18 F.3d at 1056 n.19.

                                         -10-

               While  not  facially   preferring  commercial  messages   to

          noncommercial ones  -- a preference  barred by Metromedia  -- the
                                                         __________

          Cambridge   scheme  does  draw  a  line   between  two  types  of

          noncommercial speech --  onsite and offsite messages.8  This line
          _____________

          has the  effect of  disadvantaging the category  of noncommercial

          speech that is probably the most highly protected: the expression

          of ideas.  The only signs  containing noncommercial messages that

          are exempted are  those relating  to the premises  on which  they

          stand,  which inevitably  will mean  signs identifying  nonprofit

          institutions.

               In its report,  the city emphasizes the  important role that

          on-premise signs  play "in promoting activities  important to the

          well-being of the  City."   But with rare  exceptions, the  First

          Amendment  does not permit  Cambridge to  value certain  types of

          noncommercial speech more highly  than others,9 particularly when

          the speech disfavored includes  some -- like political  speech --

          that  is at  the core  of the  First Amendment's  value system.10
                              
          ____________________

               8 Ackerley does not contest the city's authority to require
          removal of nonconforming signs that display offsite commercial
                                                              __________
          messages.  See Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 512
                     ___ ________________    _________
          (1981) (a city lawfully may exempt signs bearing onsite
          commercial messages without also exempting those bearing offsite
          __________
          commercial messages).
          __________

               9 For example, an ordinance that exempted only highway speed
          and directional signs, and municipal street signs, probably could
          survive strict scrutiny.  See John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell,
                                    ___ ____________________    ________
          639 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1980).

               10 An affidavit from Ackerley's public affairs director
          through mid-1994 states that the material displayed on Ackerley's
          signs since the 1991 ordinance revisions has included election
          campaign information for candidates for City Council and County
          Commissioner, artwork created by Cambridge students, promotion of

                                         -11-

          See  Metromedia, 453  U.S.  at  514-15  ("Although the  city  may
          ___  __________

          distinguish between the relative value of different categories of

          commercial  speech,  the city  does not  have  the same  range of

          choice in  the  area  of noncommercial  speech  to  evaluate  the

          strength  of,  or  distinguish  between,   various  communicative

          interests. . . .  With respect to noncommercial speech,  the city

          may  not choose the appropriate subjects for public discourse . .

          . .");  see also Rappa v.  New Castle County, 18  F.3d 1043, 1063
                  ___ ____ _____     _________________

          (3d Cir.  1994) ("The rule against  content discrimination forces

          the  government to  limit  all  speech  -- including  speech  the

          government does not want to  limit -- if it is going  to restrict

          any  speech at all.   By deterring the  government from exempting

          speech the government  prefers, the Supreme  Court has helped  to

          ensure  that government only limits  any speech when  it is quite

          certain  that it desires to do so."); National Advertising Co. v.
                                                ________________________

          City of Orange, 861 F.2d 246, 248-49 (9th  Cir. 1988).11
          ______________

               Cambridge  does  not  suggest  that there  is  an  aesthetic
                                                                  _________

          difference  between   a  "Remember  to  Vote"   message  and  one

          announcing  the  location  of   the  public  library;  it  simply

          maintains that the  physical characteristics of  "Public Library"

                              
          ____________________

          a Cambridge literacy program, information about a Cambridge voter
          registration drive, and public service announcements about such
          topics as food stamps, the campaign against drunk driving, and
          AIDS prevention.

               11 The court in National Advertising invalidated the
                               ____________________
          ordinance at issue because of exemptions for specific types of
          noncommercial speech, while reserving judgment on whether a
          categorical limitation of noncommercial messages to onsite
          activities would be constitutional.  861 F.2d at 249 & n.3.

                                         -12-

          signs  are more likely to be less objectionable because they tend

          to be smaller and less obtrusive than most signs carrying offsite

          messages.  The ordinance, however, gives protection based  on the

          message  and not  the physical  characteristics, and  it  is that

          distinction that the  city must  justify.12  Perhaps  if a  total

          ban  of signs were at issue, signs identifying buildings would be

          a permissible limited exception  because, like traffic and safety

          signs, they would serve a substantial  need that could not be met

          in any other way.  In this case, however, we consider not a total

          ban,  but only  restrictions on  size, style  and location.   The

          identification  interest for  nonconforming signs  cannot satisfy
                                        _____________

          even  intermediate  scrutiny  when  the  ordinance  presumes that

          identification can  be accomplished  adequately in the  future by

          smaller signs.

          C. The City of Somerville Problem: Penalizing Past Speech
             ______________________________________________________

               The regulation's second flaw arises from the manner in which

          it  seeks  to  protect  ideological  speech.    The  substitution

          provision guarantees that noncommercial messages may be placed on

          any exempted sign.   What this means, however, is  that Cambridge

          is  choosing which  speakers may  in the  future display  offsite

          noncommercial messages on nonconforming signs in the way  City of
                                                                    _______

          Somerville  held was impermissible --  by looking to past speech.
          __________

                              
          ____________________

               12 Indeed, although the city's sign report emphasized that,
          "almost without exception," on-premise signs have less of a
          negative visual and aesthetic impact than billboards, the report
          acknowledged that "[m]any on-premise signs are of course
          disappointing" and "can at times be too large, too high, too
          visually loud."

                                         -13-

          Only those speakers whose signs displayed onsite messages on  the

          day  of the  ordinance's enactment  may substitute  noncommercial

          messages  for the previous  ones.  We explored  at some length in

          City  of Somerville the dangers  of awarding future speech rights
          ___________________

          based on past speech.  See 878 F.2d at 519-20.
                                 ___

               Although  those  dangers  may  seem  less  likely  from  the

          Cambridge  regulation  because  it does  not,  like Somerville's,

          disqualify speakers based  on only  a single day's  display of  a

          non-preferred  message  (i.e.,  offsite  commercial)  during  the

          course of a  year, the Cambridge scheme's reliance on the date of

          enactment nevertheless eliminates speakers from future  access to

          a  particular medium based on their past choice of lawful speech.

          If  it is impermissible to  assign future speech  rights based on

          the  content of past  speech, the amount of  past speech does not

          strike  us as significant.  The chilling effect that results from

          linking  future speech to past speech exists even if the pressure

          to conform one's speech is compressed into a short time frame.

               Moreover, the division drawn here  between those who may and

          may not use nonconforming signs in the future, for the most part,

          isolates  business and property owners as a privileged class.  As

          Cambridge  freely   acknowledges,  onsite  signs   typically  are

          commercial in  nature.  Because the  substitution provision gives

          the  right to  display  noncommercial  messages on  nonconforming

          signs only  to those  individuals whose signs  previously carried

          onsite messages, the primary effect of the substitution provision

                                         -14-

          is  to give only commercial speakers the option of changing their

          signs to noncommercial messages.

               Giving an identifiable  group virtually exclusive access  to

          the use of a  medium is wholly inconsistent with  First Amendment

          principles;  it is  doubtful that  the noncommercial  messages of

          interest  to business  owners  would reflect  as  broad a  cross-

          section  of viewpoints as might  occur in a  marketplace in which

          every speaker has  equal footing  to speak.13   Indeed, the  case

          law makes it  clear that even  more problematic than the  loss of

          all noncommercial messages would be the selective preservation of

          them.  See  Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.  v. FCC, 114 S.  Ct.
                 ___  ________________________________     ___

          2445, 2476 (1994) ("Under the First Amendment, it is normally not

          within the government's power to decide who may speak and who may

          not,  at  least  on  private property  or  in  traditional public

          fora.");14 Somerville, 878 F.2d  at 518 ("Even if a  complete ban
                     __________
                              
          ____________________

               13 It should be noted that the Cambridge ordinance does not
          ban all noncommercial speech, except for that allowed on
              ___
          nonconforming signs by the substitution provision.  The ordinance
          also permits noncommercial messages on conforming signs, which
                                                 __________
          are those that do not exceed ten square feet in area.  At issue
          here, however, is the selective grant of the right to speak
          through the more effective medium of large, nonconforming signs.

               14 The Court in Turner Broadcasting further noted that time,
                               ___________________
          place and manner restrictions are permissible in large part
          because they apply to all speakers.  114 S. Ct. at 2476.  It
          continued:

               Laws that treat all speakers equally are relatively
               poor tools for controlling public debate, and their
               very generality creates a substantial political check
               that prevents them from being unduly burdensome.  Laws
               that single out particular speakers are substantially
               more dangerous, even when they do not draw explicit
               content distinctions.

                                         -15-

          on  nonconforming signs  would be  permissible, we  must consider

          carefully the government's decision to  pick and choose among the

          speakers permitted to use such signs.") (citing and quoting First
                                                                      _____

          National  Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-85 (1978)
          ________________________    ________

          ("In  the   realm  of   protected  speech,  the   legislature  is

          constitutionally disqualified  from dictating . .  . the speakers

          who may address a public issue.")).

               What  made  this case  particularly  difficult  is that  the

          "offsite"  label,  in practical  terms,  embraces  not only  most

          noncommercial  signs  but  also   most  of  the  worst  aesthetic

          offenders.   In  addition,  most offsite  signs  tend to  display

          commercial   messages;   Ackerley's   present  configuration   in

          Cambridge is  a deliberate  departure from  its usual mixture  of

          messages (15% noncommercial) in order to place itself in the best

          possible  position to  retain use  of its  sign faces.   Limiting

          grandfather protection to onsite signs thus is an effective means

          of  accomplishing  the city's  legitimate objective  of improving

          aesthetics, and typically  would result in the  loss primarily of

          offsite commercial messages.

               The fact remains,  however, that the  grandfathering benefit

          is  conferred  in  content-based  terms that  have  no  aesthetic

          justification and  effectively penalizes  a category  of speakers

          based on their prior choice of message.  In addition, nearly  all

          of the  sign owners  privileged to display  offsite noncommercial

          messages on nonconforming signs may be  expected to share similar
                              
          ____________________

          Id.
          ___

                                         -16-

          views on certain matters  of public interest.   We hold that  the

          First Amendment does not allow Cambridge to achieve its aesthetic

          objective by allocating the right to speak in this way.15

          D. Remedial Option
             _______________

               We  recognize  that  our  conclusion  puts  Cambridge  in  a

          peculiar  position  because   the  content-based   grandfathering

          derives from state law.  Relief from this disability condition is

          beyond the scope of this court's  power in this case.  Any change

          in  state  law probably  must  be  left to  the  workings of  the

          political process.  As we noted in  Somerville, it is possible to
                                              __________

          construct  a  justifiable, content-neutral  grandfather provision

          that will advance the city's "dual objectives of eliminating most

          billboards while  giving substantial protection to onsite signs,"

          878 F.2d at  522.   A grandfather provision  could, for  example,

          exclude  from  grandfathering all  signs  over  a certain  square
                              
          ____________________

               15 The substitution provision does not cure the problem
          because it does not affect eligibility for exemption.  As in
                                     ___________
          Somerville, a speaker's willingness to display noncommercial
          messages in the future is insufficient to qualify that speaker's
          signs for exemption; eligibility for future use is based on past
                                                                      ____
          speech.
               Indeed, the substitution provision appears to lead to a
          potentially bizarre operation of the sign ordinance.  It seems
          that Ackerley could have protected its billboards by changing
          them to onsite commercial messages before the ordinance went into
          effect.  Although the onsite messages available for some of the
          signs likely would be limited, creative possibilities -- such as
          "No Trespassing" or "This Property Not for Sale" -- seem to
          exist.  The substitution provision apparently would have allowed
          Ackerley to revert to noncommercial messages the next day.  Such
          a scheme strikes us as irrational.  In addition, First Amendment
          values are inverted: Ackerley's signs would be protected if they
          contained (onsite) commercial messages but not if they contained
          (offsite) noncommercial ones.

                                         -17-

          footage on the  ground that the larger the  sign, the greater the

          aesthetic  harm.16   Indeed, Cambridge's  own ordinance  includes

          such a provision.

                                   III. Conclusion
                                        __________

               The  Cambridge ordinance  contains a  severability provision

          stating  that,  in  the event  some  portion  of  it is  declared

          invalid,  it is  the  City's intent  that  the remainder  of  the

          ordinance continue in full force  and effect.  We do not  in this

          decision rule  unlawful any particular section  of the ordinance.

          Rather,  because  the  constitutional  problem   stems  from  the

          interplay  of the ordinance and the state provision, we hold only

          that  Cambridge  may  not  require removal  of  signs  displaying

          noncommercial  messages based  on their exclusion  from exemption

          under the state provision.

               Reversed and remanded.
               ______________________

                              
          ____________________

               16 "Such an ordinance would fall directly within the time,
          place, or manner category of speech regulations, and would need
          to meet the three-part test established for content-neutral
          regulations. See Heffron v. International Society for Krishna
                       ___ _______    _________________________________
          Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-48, 101 S. Ct. 2559, 2563-
          ___________________
          64, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981)."  City of Somerville, 878 F.2d at 522
                                       __________________
          n.15.

                                         -18-