Court Opinion

ID: 9566152
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:34:30.34114+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:18.208224
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
OCGA § 51-5-1 (a) defines a libel as “a false and malicious defamation of another, expressed in print, writing, pictures, or signs, tend*411ing to injure the reputation of the person and exposing him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule.” “ ‘ “A publication claimed to be defamatory must be read and construed in the sense in which the readers to whom it is addressed would ordinarily understand it. So the whole item . . . should be read and construed together, and its meaning and signification thus determined. When thus read, if its meaning is so unambiguous as to reasonably bear but one interpretation, it is for the judge to say whether that signification is defamatory or not.” ’ ” Fiske v. Stockton, 171 Ga. App. 601, 602 (320 SE2d 590) (1984).
Decided June 18, 1990
Rehearing denied July 16, 1990 — Cert, applied for.
Clark & Clark, Fred S. Clark, for appellant.
Bouhan, Williams & Levy, M. Brice Ladson, Wilbur D. Owens III, Walter C. Hartridge, for appellees.
The Carellas letter reasonably bears but one interpretation, i.e., that it is merely a letter soliciting business, expressing an opinion that the appellant company could provide better service than the competitor appellees. The letter was not libelous as defined by OCGA § 51-5-1 (a), and the trial court should have directed a verdict for the appellant. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s opposite conclusion.