Court Opinion

ID: 9725516
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:51:07.796621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:16.148622
License: Public Domain

M. J. Kelly, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority has joined the growing number of Court of Appeals panels in disagreement with the opinion I authored in People v Sturdivant, 91 Mich App 128; 283 NW2d 669 (1979). Without finding it necessary to reiterate *489my position I will respectfully note my dissent from the majority’s rejection of Sturdivant. See People v White, 102 Mich App 156; 301 NW2d 837 (1980), in which I qualified somewhat the Sturdi-vant rationale.
In this case the seminal fluid analysis places the defendant within a group comprising 36 percent of the population. I would hold that its probative value could not outweigh the prejudicial effect and that therefore the trial court erred in admitting this blood-type evidence.
However, as in Sturdivant, reversal is not required. In this case the victim testified to her several opportunities to observe the defendant at the time of the attack and positively identified him at trial. I therefore conclude that the error injected by the admission of the blood-type evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the standards set forth in People v Christensen, 64 Mich App 23, 32; 235 NW2d 50 (1975).
I concur in affirmance.