Court Opinion

ID: 9718235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:19:20.280144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:58.080379
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, J.
(concurring). I write separately because I conclude that by his Alford plea1 Gil waived his right to appeal the trial court's order refusing to exclude the one-party consent recordings from the trial of all three charges, not just the drug charges as authorized by § 968.29(3)(b), STATS., 1993-94.
*548It is elementary "that a plea of guilty, voluntarily and understanding^ made, constitutes a waiver of non-jurisdictional defects and defenses, including claims of violation of constitutional rights prior to the plea." Hawkins v. State, 26 Wis. 2d 443, 448, 132 N.W.2d 545, 547-48 (1965). There is a very narrow exception to the guilty plea waiver rule found in § 971.31(10), Stats.:
An order denying a motion to suppress evidence or a motion challenging the admissibility of a statement of a defendant may be reviewed upon appeal from a judgment of conviction notwithstanding the fact that such judgment was entered upon a plea of guilty.
We have discussed the narrow scope of this exception in State v. Nelson, 108 Wis. 2d 698, 702, 324 N.W.2d 292, 295 (Ct. App. 1982):
From the unambiguous language of this statute, this court concludes that sec. 971.31(10), is applicable only in suppression situations. In addition, our supreme court made this clear when it stated: "Under the rule of statutory construction of expres-sio unius est exclusio alterius, this statute stops V7ith the single exception it creates." Foster v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 12, 20, 233 N.W.2d 411, 415 (1975). Thus, by its express terms, this statute excepts only motions to suppress evidence and motions challenging the admissibility of a defendant's statement. This statute cannot be construed so as to except from the rule of waiver every motion to exclude evidence.
The supreme court has considered the scope of the exception in § 971.31(10), Stats. In a case concerning the right of the State to appeal pretrial orders, the *549supreme court explained the difference between motions to suppress evidence and motions to exclude evidence. "The former generally bars admission of evidence at trial as a result of governmental misconduct, such as a constitutional violation. The latter generally involves only a violation of the rules of evidence." State v. Eichman, 155 Wis. 2d 552, 562-63, 456 N.W.2d 143, 147 (1990) (citations omitted). The supreme court went on to observe that it was unwilling to liberally construe the phrase "suppressing evidence" to encompass orders that merely exclude evidence. See id. at 563, 456 N.W.2d at 147.
It is obvious to me that we are to restrict the application of the § 971.31(10), Stats., exception to the guilty plea waiver rule. The exception becomes the rule if we liberally apply the exception to permit defendants to appeal orders denying motions to exclude evidence. The supreme court has limited the exception to those circumstances where governmental misconduct of constitutional proportions has occurred and the suppression of illegally obtained evidence or statements is necessary to deter and to discipline.
Although Gil styles his motion as a motion to suppress evidence, it is, in reality, a motion to exclude evidence based on a breach of the limitations on the use of one-party consent recordings found in § 968.29(3)(b), STATS., 1993-94. He concedes that the law enforcement officers complied with the requirements of the statute to conduct a one-party consent recording of what they expected to be a drug transaction. Gil does not assert that there was governmental misconduct rising to a constitutional level. Gil does contend that because he is challenging a violation of the rules of criminal procedure, he is not appealing from a violation of the rules of *550evidence and his Alford plea did not waive his right to appeal this issue.2
The exception to the guilty plea waiver rule in § 971.31(10), STATS., is limited to violations of an individual's constitutional rights; no such violations occurred in this case. The operation of the exception is dependent upon the substance of the motion and not the label of the motion. I conclude that under the facts of this case, Gil's Alford plea constitutes a waiver of his right to appeal the trial court's order admitting the contents of the recording into a trial on all three charges.
Although I would prefer a stricter application of the guilty plea waiver rule, I recognize that the rule is a rule of judicial administration and not of judicial power. See State v. Riekkoff, 112 Wis. 2d 119, 124, 332 N.W.2d 744, 747 (1983). In this case, the issue raised is a legal question, the parties were given the opportunity to submit supplementary briefs, there are no disputed issues of fact, and the issue is one of sufficient public interest. The issue raised is therefore within the bounds of discretion previously exercised by this court, *551and to provide a definitive answer to an unsettled area of the law, our consideration of the merits of Gil's appeal is appropriate. See Wirth v. Ehly, 93 Wis. 2d 433, 443-44, 287 N.W.2d 140, 145-46 (1980). It is for this reason that I join in the reasoning and the result of the majority opinion.

 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

 Gil argues that State v. Maloney, 161 Wis. 2d 127, 467 N.W.2d 215 (Ct. App. 1991), "establishes a precedent for treating motions to suppress evidence per strictures of the Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control Law as motions to suppress evidence within the meaning of § 971.31(10), STATS." Although Maloney entered a guilty plea after his motion to suppress a recording was denied and he appealed the order denying his motion, the question of whether the guilty plea waiver rule barred the appeal was not raised; therefore, the decision has no precedential value. Likewise, State v. Smith, 142 Wis. 2d 562, 419 N.W.2d 259 (Ct. App. 1987), rev'd, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989), is of no help to Gil because the applicability of the guilty plea waiver rule was not an issue.