Court Opinion

ID: 9772035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:05:20.06833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:41.705870
License: Public Domain

REID, Chief Justice,
concurring and dissenting
I concur with the majority’s decision that the conviction of first degree murder be affirmed.
In dissent, I would hold that the defendant is not death-eligible because, in my view, the only aggravating circumstance found by the jury — the defendant “employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration,” T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(4) (Supp.1993), is invalid in this case.
By statute,
No death penalty ... shall be imposed but upon a unanimous finding that the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of one (1) or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances....
T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i) (Supp.1993). Consequently, if the only aggravating circumstance found by the jury is invalid or inapplicable to this case, the defendant cannot be sentenced to death.
As set forth in my dissent in State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 535 (Tenn.1994), use of this aggravator does not in fact narrow the class of death eligible defendants because “the same facts establish the crime and the aggravating circumstance; and, the aggravating circumstance adds no culpability beyond that necessary to establish first degree murder.” Consequently, use of this aggravator violates Article 1, Section 16 of *176the Tennessee Constitution and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 345-46 (Tenn.1992), cert. dismissed, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 48, 126 L.Ed.2d 19 (1993); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2742, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983) (“an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty”).
For these reasons, I would find that the defendant is not death-eligible and impose a sentence of life imprisonment.
Discussion of the other issues raised by the defendant with regard to sentencing are pretermitted.

ORDER ON PETITION TO REHEAR

CHARLES H. O’BRIEN, Special Justice.
Defendant has filed a Petition to Rehear in this case contending that the Court erred in its opinion by ruling he was not entitled to a jury instruction on nonstatutory mitigating circumstances in accordance with the provisions of T.C.A. § 39-13-204(e).
The Court ruled that the trial judge properly instructed the jury in accordance with the statutory law in effect on the date of the offense which was committed on 14 August, 1988. We held that T.C.A. § 39-11-112, enacted as Sec. 1 of Chapter 591 of the 1989 Public Acts was applicable in this ease. The statute provides in substance that when any penal statute is repealed or amended by a subsequent legislative act, any offense defined by the repealed statute committed while such statute or act was in effect shall be prosecuted under the act or statute in effect at the time of the commission of the offense, unless the subsequent act provided for a lesser penalty, in which event any punishment imposed shall be in accordance with the subsequent act.
The defendant insists that the Court’s reasoning is faulty due to the distinction between substantive and procedural law and that T.C.A. § 40-35-117(b), enacted as Sec. 6 of the Public Acts of 1989, Chapter 591, mandates that a defendant shall be sentenced under the statute. He overlooks the fact that T.C.A. § 39-11-112, cited by the Court in its opinion, was also enacted by Chapter 591 of the 1989 Acts as Sec. 1. The defendant contends that the definition of first degree murder and the punishment for first degree murder is substantive law entitling him to be tried under the definition of first degree murder at the time of the commission of the offense and to receive the punishment prescribed for first degree murder at the time of the commission offense. He says the manner of arriving at the punishment of first degree murder is procedural law and the new procedure applies regardless of the old law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense. He does not account for the fact that Chapter 11 of Title 39 and Chapter 35 of Title 40 were each enacted as part of Chapter 591 of the Public Acts of 1989.
We agree with the defendant that the distinction between substantive procedural law has long been recognized by the courts of this state. He has cited an early civil case to sustain his position.1 However, we do not believe that rule applies in this case. T.C.A. § 40-35-101 confirms this conclusion. It provides that the Chapter shall be known and cited as “Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989.” (Acts 1989, Ch. 591, Sec. 6). The first paragraph of the Sentencing Commission comments to this code section is as follows:
This and the following sections are a part of the comprehensive penal and sentencing reform legislation enacted in 1989 as proposed by the Tennessee sentencing commission. Prior revisions either modified substantive criminal law or dealt exclusively with sentencing provisions. The commission believes that a unified approach is necessary so that there is a clear relationship between the definition of an offense and the sentence for that offense.
T.C.A. § 39-11-112 was enacted as Section 1 of Chapter 591 of the Acts of 1989 creating the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act. It appears to have been enacted to accomplish the purposes of the Act as stated by the Sentencing Commission in their comments. It is not a new law. As far as can be ascertained, it *177was first noted in the Code of 1858 and has been part of our statutory law in one form or another since that time until its adoption by the 1989 legislature.2 We are satisfied that the analysis and the conclusion reached by the Court in our original opinion is correct.
Defendant argues that T.C.A. § 40-35-117(b) is mandatory because it includes the directory word “shall”, which is ordinarily construed as being mandatory and not discretionary. We observe that T.C.A. § 39-11-112 contains the same directory language. We have considered the matter at length and conclude the statutes are not incompatible.
In State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75, 82 (Tenn.1994), this Court said:
T.C.A. § 40-35-117, enacted as Ch. 591, § 6, Pub. Acts 1989, and a part of the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989, provides in subsection (b) for the sentencing of persons for offenses committed between 1 July, 1982 and 1 November 1989 under the 1989 Act except where constitutionally prohibited. Sentencing Commission Comments to T.C.A. § 40-35-117 and 118, however, indicate that first degree murder is excluded from the provisions of these sections. We, therefore, find controlling the general provisions of § 39-11-112 and the principles against retroactive application of statutes. The trial court correctly instructed the sentencing law in effect at the time the murder was committed.
The Petition to Rehear is denied. The sentence of death will be carried out as provided by law on the 1st day of July, 1995, unless otherwise ordered by this Court or other proper authority.
ANDERSON, C.J., and DROWOTA, REID and BIRCH, JJ., concur.

. Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc. v. Lobban, 204 Tenn. 79, 315 S.W.2d 514, 518 (1958).

. Code 1858, Section 45; Shan.Sec. 59a3; Code 1932, Sec. 8; Modified; T.C.A. (orig. ed.) §§ 1-208: 1955; Public Acts 1968, Chapter 513. See State v. Collins, 528 S.W.2d 814, 815 (Tenn. 1975).