Court Opinion

ID: 9955829
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 16:03:04.486856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:26.221029
License: Public Domain

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             DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

                                 No. 22-CV-0567

                           CLAUDIA ALLEN, APPELLANT,

                                         V.

                        DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, APPELLEE.

                          Appeal from the Superior Court
                           of the District of Columbia
                               (2020-CA-3374-B)

                      (Hon. Shana Frost Matini, Trial Judge)

(Argued October 3, 2023                                    Decided March 28, 2024)

      Matthew E. Stubbs, with whom Christopher T. Nace was on the brief, for
appellant.

      Elissa R. Lowenthal, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Brian L.
Schwalb, Attorney General, Caroline S. Van Zile, Solicitor General, Ashwin P.
Phatak, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, and Carl J. Schifferle, Deputy Solicitor
General, and Jeremy R. Girton, Assistant Attorney General, were on the brief, for
appellee.

      Before BECKWITH, MCLEESE, and DEAHL, Associate Judges.
                                           2

      DEAHL, Associate Judge: Claudia Allen sued the District of Columbia 1 in

relation to a late payment penalty that was levied against her when she failed to

timely pay a traffic ticket. It is undisputed that Allen in fact timely sent her payment

in using the pre-addressed envelope provided by the District, but the post office

failed to deliver it and it was ultimately returned to Allen as undeliverable mail. That

failed delivery, Allen asserts, was a result of the District’s use of red (rather than

black) ink on pre-addressed payment return envelopes, which in her telling is hard

for the United States Postal Service’s machines to read and thereby increases failed

delivery rates.

      Allen sued the District for negligence on her own behalf and also sought to

certify a class of similarly situated people who were assessed late payment penalties

during the period when the District used red ink on its payment return envelopes.

The trial court granted summary judgment for the District on Allen’s individual

negligence claim, concluding that the evidence would not permit a reasonable jury

to conclude that the use of red ink is what caused her payment to go undelivered.

      1
         Allen has at times styled her suit as against the District’s Department of
Motor Vehicles, but both her operative complaint and her notice of appeal name the
District of Columbia as her opposing party. The District has asked that we caption
this case to reflect that, Allen has not raised any objection, and so the caption now
reflects that the District of Columbia is the opposing party in this case.
                                           3

The court also rejected her request for class certification on the basis that she did not

satisfy the Rule 23 requirements for certifying a class action.

      Allen now appeals. We agree with the trial court that Allen adduced no

evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the use of red ink caused

her payment to go undelivered, so we affirm the grant of summary judgment. And

because Allen has no viable claim of her own, she cannot represent any class of

claimants, so we likewise affirm the denial of her motion to certify a class.

                               I. Factual Background

              The Traffic Ticket, the Failed Payment, and the Penalty

      Allen received a Notice of Infraction, mailed September 6, 2018, stating that

a vehicle registered to her was photographed exceeding the posted speed limit of

thirty-five miles per hour in Northeast D.C. The notice stated that Allen was being

assessed a $100 fine that would be doubled if she did not pay or contest the ticket

within thirty days. Allen attempted to pay the fine by mailing a $100 check using

the return envelope included with the notice. That return envelope bore the address

of the DMV’s adjudication services division and a pre-applied Intelligent Mail

Barcode (“IMB code”), used to assist in automatically sorting mail. Both the address

and the IMB code were printed in red ink.
                                           4

      The next month, Allen received a notice stating that she had failed to pay or

contest her ticket within thirty days, resulting in the additional $100 penalty. Allen

called the DMV and told a representative that she had timely mailed a check in

response to the citation in order to pay it. The representative responded that the

DMV had not received Allen’s payment and had therefore levied the additional $100

penalty. Allen then paid both the initial fine and penalty, totaling $200, over the

phone via credit card.

      Later that month, Allen’s mailed payment envelope was returned to her

adorned with a yellow sticker, which read: “Return to Sender,” “Unclaimed,”

“Unable to Forward.” The postmark on the envelope indicated that it had been

processed by USPS on September 22, 2018, well within Allen’s thirty-day initial

window for timely payment. Allen called the DMV and explained that she had proof

of timely mailing her payment, but was informed that she could not obtain a refund

of the $100 late penalty because it was properly assessed by virtue of the fact that

the District did not receive her payment on time.

      Allen retained counsel, who in March 2019 notified the District that she

intended to sue on the basis that it was the District’s own use of red ink on its return

envelopes that caused Allen’s payment to go undelivered. Shortly thereafter, the

District instructed its subcontractor tasked with printing the pre-addressed return
                                         5

envelopes to stop using red ink and to instead use black ink. Within months, the

DMV had moved to printing all of its pre-addressed return envelopes in black ink.

                                  The Litigation

      Allen sued the District asserting an individual claim for negligence and also

seeking to certify a class of similarly situated claimants. Allen sought $100 in

damages for her individual claim and $10 million in damages on behalf of a class of

individuals who were assessed late payment penalties during the period when the

District printed its return envelopes using red ink. She further sought injunctive

relief prohibiting the DMV from using red ink on its pre-addressed return envelopes.

Allen introduced an expert report from Peter Wade, a longtime USPS employee,

while the District submitted its own expert report from John Mashia, an executive at

a mass mailing operation.

                       The Expert Reports and Depositions

      Wade, Allen’s expert, opined that the DMV’s pre-printed envelope that Allen

had used to pay her ticket “[did] not meet the basic USPS requirements for such mail

as the return address is printed in red ink.” He cited to various USPS guidelines

related to information printed on mail, and they generally recommended using black

ink (and in one instance specifically advised against red ink) for various types of
                                          6

mailings. 2 Wade also noted that the IMB code printed on Allen’s returned envelope

was “invalid” because it “[did] not match the intended address.” Wade concluded

that “[t]hese failings made the returned envelope unreadable by the automated mail-

processing equipment used by USPS and, ultimately, caused it to be returned to

Claudia Allen instead of reaching its intended destination.”

      Mashia, the District’s expert, countered that the IMB code printed on Allen’s

return envelope was accurate and that the failed delivery could not be traced either

to it or to the use of red ink. Instead, Mashia explained that USPS had repeatedly

sprayed a different barcode over the accurate, pre-applied barcode, which prevented

USPS processing machines from correctly reading and sorting the envelope and thus

prevented the delivery of Allen’s envelope. Mashia did not opine on what caused

USPS to spray those inaccurate barcodes, but maintained (1) that he had seen the

“same error numerous other times,” so it was “not uncommon,” and (2) that red ink

      2
         They were: (1) USPS Publication 25, which provides requirements for the
minimum print reflectance difference for information printed on letter-size mail, and
states that “[b]lack ink on a white background usually satisfies this requirement, and
the Postal Service recommends it”; (2) USPS Publication 177, which applies to flat-
size mail and recommends the use of “black ink against a light background”;
(3) USPS Publication 28, which provides general recommendations for “Postal
Addressing Standards” and states that addresses should be printed “in dark ink on a
light background”; and (4) Section 202 of the USPS Domestic Mail Manual, which
specifies that automated mail “[n]ot contain phosphorescent or red fluorescent
colorants.”
                                            7

was not the culprit, noting that it “would not cause [the envelope] to be unreadable

or returned.” Mashia characterized the failed delivery as a “fluke”: “[N]ot the result

of any systemic inability to read or process the envelope or others like it,” but just a

USPS slip up that happens from time to time no matter how clearly marked an

envelope may be. Mashia also pushed back on the USPS guidelines that Wade relied

upon in his initial report, asserting that they “do not apply to letter-size, full-postage,

First-Class mailpieces like Ms. Allen’s [e]nvelope.” They instead applied only to

“automated mail and related” discounted mailings.

      Wade supplied a supplemental report in response. Wade conceded that the

original IMB code printed on Allen’s envelope was accurate and that the spraying

of additional barcodes caused the delivery error, largely backtracking from his initial

report and agreeing with Mashia. But, he asserted, “the simplest explanation for the

USPS’s spraying of additional barcodes over the preprinted barcode” was the

District’s use of red ink, which USPS mail sorting machines were unable to

recognize and interpret. Wade also asserted that USPS Publication 25, cited in his

original report, applied to Allen’s envelope because it was “letter-size mail”—

regardless of it being first class—and that the remaining guidelines were simply

included “to illustrate the USPS’ clear and stated preference for printing address

information in black ink.”
                                           8

      Both experts were deposed. In his deposition, Wade estimated the likelihood

of an envelope printed in black ink going undelivered at “less than 2 percent,” while

he estimated the likelihood of an envelope printed in red ink going undelivered as

“very remote.” He agreed that it was possible for USPS mail sorting machines to

read red ink. Wade also declined to offer a “final definitive opinion” on what caused

Allen’s envelope to go undelivered. During his deposition, Mashia testified—

consistent with his report—that the printing of multiple barcodes over the original

accurate IMB code caused Allen’s envelope to go undelivered, not the red ink.

      Beyond the experts, the District presented two other relevant witnesses to

support its position that the red ink on its return envelopes did not cause Allen’s mail

to go undelivered. The first witness was Gerald Inglesby, an executive at the

District’s printing subcontractor, who explained that since the District moved to

printing its pre-addressed return envelopes in black ink, there was no meaningful

difference in the number of late payment notices that were issued. In fact, there had

been the slightest uptick in the percentage of late payment notices sent since moving

to black ink, suggesting the red ink was not behind any systemic delivery failures. 3

      3
       Inglesby calculated the number of Notices of Infraction and the number of
follow-up late payment notices sent between August 2017 and March 2020.
Between September 2017 and August 2019, when the return envelopes were printed
                                            9

The second witness was Wanda Butler, who testified that in her seventeen years of

running the DMV’s adjudication services division, she had no record or memory of

any previous instance or complaint of a payment not being delivered because of the

red ink on the pre-addressed envelopes. 4

                              The Trial Court’s Rulings

      Allen sought to certify a class defined as every individual who failed to answer

a speeding ticket within thirty days between August 1, 2017, and September 16,

2019. The Superior Court denied Allen’s class certification motion, finding that

Allen produced no evidence indicating that any other putative class member had

incurred a late penalty due to a return envelope printed in red ink, and thus had failed

to establish the commonality, typicality, or adequacy requirements necessary to

certify a class under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 23(a). For the same reason, the court

in red ink, 37.22% of all Notices of Infraction required a follow-up late payment
notice. Between October 2019 and February 2020, when the return envelopes were
printed in black ink, that number increased slightly to 37.45% of all Notices of
Infraction requiring a follow-up late payment notice.           Inglesby excluded
September 2019 from his calculation because the transition from red ink to black ink
occurred in mid-September. The District stopped sending late payment notices in
March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
      4
        We take that testimony with a grain of salt, because even if a person’s
payment was returned due to the use of red ink, it seems unlikely that the person
would themselves piece that together.
                                          10

concluded that Allen failed to establish that common questions of law or fact

predominated over individual questions, as required under Rule 23(b)(3).

      Following the trial court’s denial of Allen’s class certification motion, both

parties cross-moved for summary judgment on Allen’s individual negligence claim.

The trial court granted the District’s motion, concluding that Allen failed to raise a

genuine dispute of material fact that the District’s use of red ink caused her initial

payment to go undelivered. Allen now appeals.

                                    II. Analysis

      Allen first argues that the Superior Court erred in granting the District’s

motion for summary judgment because, contrary to the trial court’s reasoning, the

evidence raised a genuine issue of material fact on the question of causation

sufficient to reach a jury. In concluding otherwise, her argument goes, the court

improperly intruded on the jury’s role of weighing conflicting expert evidence.

Allen next argues that the Superior Court repeatedly applied the wrong legal

standards in its analysis of the Rule 23 class action requirements and therefore

abused its discretion in denying her motion for class certification.
                                           11

      Because Allen “must have an individual cause of action of [her] own to assert

before [she] may be permitted to maintain a class action,” we address the summary

judgment ruling first. Ford v. Chartone, Inc., 908 A.2d 72, 80 (D.C. 2006).

                                A. Standard of Review

      “We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Aziken v. District of Columbia, 70

A.3d 213, 218 (D.C. 2013) (quoting Wright v. Howard Univ., 60 A.3d 749, 754

(D.C. 2013)). An award of summary judgment is appropriate “only when there are

no material facts in issue and when it is clear that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Bradshaw v. District of Columbia, 43 A.3d 318, 323

(D.C. 2012) (quoting Jones v. Thompson, 953 A.2d 1121, 1124 (D.C. 2008)). “A

plaintiff cannot stave off the entry of summary judgment through mere conclusory

allegations.” Aziken, 70 A.3d at 218 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)

(quoting Fort Lincoln Civic Ass’n v. Fort Lincoln New Town Corp., 944 A.2d 1055,

1063 (D.C. 2008)). “[T]here must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably

find for the plaintiff.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).

      A negligence claim requires a three-part showing: (1) that the defendant owed

the plaintiff a duty of care, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, and (3) that the
                                          12

breach proximately caused damage to the plaintiff. Freyberg v. DCO 2400 14th St.,

LLC, 304 A.3d 971, 976 (D.C. 2023).

      B. The Evidence Did Not Raise a Genuine Question Regarding Causation

      The trial court reasoned that Allen raised genuine issues of material fact as to

the first two elements of a negligence claim (duty and breach), but did not adduce

evidence from which a reasonable jury might conclude that the use of red ink

proximately caused her injury. It is that causation prong of the trial court’s analysis

that Allen now targets and where we now focus our analysis.

      To establish proximate causation, the evidence must be sufficient for a

reasonable juror to conclude that there was “some direct relation between the injury

asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.” Fleming v. United States, 224 A.3d 213,

224 (D.C. 2020) (en banc) (quoting Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434, 444

(2014)); cf. id. (noting “[t]he concept of proximate causation is applicable in both

criminal and tort law”). There is no dispute here that if the red ink in fact caused

Allen’s letter to go undelivered, then it likewise proximately caused that result. The

District does not argue, for example, that the red ink factored into the causal chain

of non-delivery, but in such an attenuated fashion as to amount to a non-proximate

cause. Id. at 224 (proximate cause requirement “preclude[s] liability in situations

where the causal link between conduct and result is so attenuated that the
                                         13

consequence is more aptly described as mere fortuity”). We therefore focus on

causation in general, rather than on proximate causation in particular.

      On appeal, Allen argues that the competing explanations of Wade and Mashia

regarding whether the District’s use of red ink caused her envelope to go undelivered

constitutes a “battle of the experts” that should have been resolved by a jury. Allen

further asserts that the trial court granted summary judgment only after weighing the

conflicting testimony of Wade and Mashia and improperly resolving their

conflicting opinions in the District’s favor. In her view, Wade’s testimony alone

was evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the District’s use of

red ink played a role in the USPS returning her envelope, but the trial court

improperly intruded into the jury’s role by discrediting Wade’s opinion and crediting

Mashia’s. We disagree.

      It would simply not be possible for a jury to conclude, based on Wade’s

opinions (even when ignoring Mashia’s), that Allen’s payment went undelivered due

to the use of red ink. Most critically, Wade ultimately offered no support for the

proposition that an envelope addressed in red ink was less likely to be delivered than

one addressed in black ink. He estimated that an envelope printed in black ink would

fail to reach its destination “less than 2 percent” of the time, while estimating that

the likelihood of an envelope printed in red ink going undelivered was “very
                                         14

remote.” We do not see how a jury could conclude from that testimony that an

envelope printed in red ink was any more likely to go undelivered—Wade did not

suggest that a “very remote” chance was higher than two percent, and we see no

basis upon which a reasonable juror could have otherwise reached such a conclusion

in this context. And even if the use of red ink made it slightly more likely that her

envelope would go undelivered (an opinion Wade did not offer), that also would not

provide any basis to conclude that red ink was the likely cause of the failed delivery

here. Wade would have had to opine that the use of red ink was more likely the

cause of the failed delivery than the “less than 2 percent” chance that it was mere

human error, unattributable to anything in how the mail was addressed. And unlike

Wade, who offered no “final definitive opinion” on what caused the failed delivery

here, Mashia did offer an opinion: the likely explanation of the failed delivery here

was simple USPS error, unattributable to anything about how the envelope was

addressed.

      Wade also had to ultimately backtrack from his initial opinion that the pre-

addressed envelope came pre-printed with an invalid IMB code. In his supplemental

report, he abandoned that view and agreed with Mashia that USPS’s spraying of

additional barcodes over the original, accurate code is what caused the envelope to

go undelivered.
                                          15

      It is true that Wade further asserted in his supplemental report that the use of

red ink was “the simplest explanation for USPS’s spraying of additional barcodes

over the preprinted barcode,” but that unadorned statement cannot be squared with

the remainder of his testimony as it does not account for the baseline error rates that

he attributed to mailings printed in any color. His bare assertion—undermined not

only by Mashia’s testimony and the District’s other witnesses, 5 but by Wade

himself—is not sufficient to survive summary judgment, even when offered by a

qualified expert. Varner v. District of Columbia, 891 A.2d 260, 270 (D.C. 2006)

(“conclusory assertion” of expert was “insufficient to establish an objective standard

of care” for summary judgment purposes); Ferguson v. District of Columbia, 629

A.2d 15, 19-20 (D.C. 1993) (“Theoretical speculations, unsupported assumptions,

and conclusory allegations advanced by an expert . . . are not entitled to any weight

when raised in opposition to a motion for summary judgment.”). 6

      5
        As Inglesby’s declaration sets out, the District’s shift from red ink to black
ink resulted in a negligible increase in late payment notices being sent. While far
from dispositive, it undermines Allen’s claim that the use of red ink in the
prepayment envelopes led to failed deliveries in any systemic way.
      6
        We offer a word of caution here, because there are certainly times where an
expert’s opinion might be fairly described as conclusory but would nonetheless be
sufficient to raise a question for a jury. Imagine an expert qualified in basketball’s
shooting mechanics who, without further elucidation, opines simply that they know
what good shooting form looks like and that Steph Curry has it. That would seem
                                         16

      While we agree with Allen at a generic level that “battle[s] of the experts”

typically present records “in which the factfinder must decide the victor,” Mendes-

Silva v. United States, 980 F.2d 1482, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1993), this was simply not a

battle. It was a one-sided affair where the experts collectively did not support

Allen’s claim of causation, and Wade himself struck no blows for Allen’s cause.

Wade’s testimony on its own terms could not support a finding that red ink is what

caused Allen’s payment to go undelivered. That distinguishes this case from the

authorities, like Mendes-Silva, that Allen relies upon. Id. (explaining that expert’s

opinion raised genuine issue of material fact sufficient to survive summary judgment

where it “was based on far more than a leap of faith”).

      There is nothing else in the record that lends any meaningful support to

Allen’s claim that the red ink caused the failed delivery either. While Allen stresses

to be enough for a jury to credit that opinion—provided of course that the expert was
truly well qualified and did not overtly contradict themselves—and that would be
true even if the expert offered a less conventional opinion, like that Wilt
Chamberlain’s underhanded free throws were also an example of good shooting
form. The problem for Wade, and ultimately for Allen, is that Wade’s own
explanations undermined his conclusory assertion that red ink was to blame. When
he explained that one would expect mail addressed in black ink to go undelivered
through simple human error “less than 2 percent” of the time while the odds of mail
addressed in red ink going undelivered were “very remote,” his assertion that red ink
was the most likely culprit was not only unexplained, but at odds with the remainder
of his testimony so that a jury could not reasonably credit it on its own terms.
                                            17

that the District shifted to using black ink in response to her attorney notifying the

District that she intended to sue in relation to its use of red ink, that change in practice

does not support an inference that the use of red ink caused Allen’s envelope to go

undelivered. It is just as readily explained by the District’s aversion to potential

lawsuits, even if they are ultimately unmeritorious.

       We agree that the District was entitled to summary judgment on Allen’s

individual claim. And because Allen has no viable claim of her own, she likewise

cannot bring a claim on behalf of a class, so we need not further consider her

challenges to the trial court’s denial of class certification. Ford, 908 A.2d at 80.

                                            III.

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

                                           So ordered.