Court Opinion

ID: 4038748
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-09-28 21:59:31.143788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:12.860351
License: Public Domain

ACCEPTED
                                                                            01-14-00788-CV
                                                                  FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                          HOUSTON, TEXAS
                                                                      12/30/2014 2:36:12 PM
                                                                        CHRISTOPHER PRINE
                                                                                     CLERK

                       NO. 01-14-00788-CV
     IN THE FIRST COURT OF APPEALS OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
                                                         FILED IN
                                                  1st COURT OF APPEALS
                                                      HOUSTON, TEXAS
                  IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF M.P.G.    12/30/2014 2:36:12 PM
                                                  CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
                                                           Clerk
                        DONALD GAUCI,
                         APPELLANT,

                               V.

                   KATHRYN WOESSNER GAUCI,
                         APPELLEE.

APPEAL FROM ORDER APPOINTING PERMANENT GUARDIAN OF THE PERSON
        PURSUANT TO TEXAS ESTATES CODE SECTION 1103.001

 CAUSE NO. 430,385, PROBATE COURT NO. 2 OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
             THE HONORABLE MIKE WOOD, PRESIDING

                 APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

                          John L. Dagley (TBN 05310500)
                          Kenneth J. Fair (TBN 24007171)
                          Katie Tipper-McWhorter (TBN 24083974)
                          CAMPBELL HARRISON & DAGLEY L.L.P.
                          4000 Two Houston Center
                          909 Fannin Street, Suite 4000
                          Houston, TX 77010
                          (713) 752-2332 Telephone
                          (713) 752-2330 Facsimile
                          jdagley@chd-law.com
                          kfair@chd-law.com
                          ktipper@chd-law.com

                          ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT DONALD
                          GAUCI

                              -1-
               IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

APPELLANT

Donald Gauci             John L. Dagley
                         Texas Bar No. 05310500
                         Kenneth J. Fair
                         Texas Bar No. 24007171
                         Katie Tipper-McWhorter
                         Texas Bar No. 24083974
                         CAMPBELL HARRISON & DAGLEY L.L.P.
                         Two Houston Center
                         909 Fannin Street, Suite 4000
                         Houston, TX 77010
                         713-752-2332 Telephone
                         713-752-2330 Facsimile
                         jdagley@chd-law.com
                         kfair@chd-law.com
                         ktipper@chd-law.com

APPELLEE

Kathryn Woessner Gauci   Debra E. Hunt
                         MOORE & HUNT
                         P.O. Box 300788
                         Houston, Texas 77230
                         713-522-4282 Telephone
                         713-522-9604 Facsimile
                         debbie@mooreandhunt.com

                             -2-
                                          TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ............................................................ 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................... 3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...................................................................................... 4
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................ 6
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 7
   A. The order imposing guardianship is void and should be reversed for lack
      of jurisdiction. .................................................................................................. 7
      1. The United States and Texas Constitutions require personal service of
         citation on a proposed ward before imposing a guardianship. ..................... 7
      2. Appellee’s argument that the language “notwithstanding any other law”
         contained in Texas Estates Code Section 1103.002 absolves her failure
         to personally serve both the Appellant and the proposed ward is flawed,
         and the guardianship order remains void. .................................................. 10
   B. Texas Estates Code Section 1103.002 only applies where a family court
      has previously declared the proposed ward to be a “disabled child.”
      Because the guardianship was entered without a hearing and M.P.G. was
      never adjudicated a “disabled child” the guardianship order is void. ........... 14
PRAYER .................................................................................................................. 16
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ....................................................................... 17

                                                           -3-
                                         INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES
Autozone, Inc. v. Duenes, 108 S.W.3d 917 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
  2003, no pet.) ..........................................................................................................9
Brady v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 795 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. 1990).....................11
Browning v. Placke, 698 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1985) ..................................................10
Cook v. Cameron, 733 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1987) .....................................................10
Dodd v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 545 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. 1977)...............................10
Holmans v. Transource Polymers, Inc., 914 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. App.—Fort
  Worth 1995, writ denied) .....................................................................................11
In re Allcat Claims Serv., L.P., 356 S.W.3d 455 (Tex. 2011) .................................11
In re Bokeloh, 21 S.W.3d 784 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, orig.
  proceeding) .............................................................................................................9
In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. 2012) ....................................................................8
In re Garza, 126 S.W.3d 268 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, orig.
  proceeding) .............................................................................................................9
In re Guardianship of B.A.G., 794 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
  1990, no writ) .........................................................................................................9
In re Guardianship of Castanon, 2007 WL 700987 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007,
  no pet.) ....................................................................................................................8
In re Guardianship of Erickson, 208 S.W.3d 737 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
  2006, no pet.) ..........................................................................................................9
In re Guardianship of Winn, 372 S.W.3d 291 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no
  pet.) .......................................................................................................................14
In re Mask, 198 S.W.3d 231 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, orig.
  proceeding) .............................................................................................................8
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94
L. Ed. 865 (1950) ...................................................................................................7
Ortiz v. Gutierrez, 792 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989, writ
  dism'd) ..............................................................................................................8, 10
Perry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1980, no writ) .............9
Uvalde Country Club v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 690 S.W.2d 884 (Tex.
  1985) (per curiam) ..................................................................................................8
Werner v. Colwell, 909 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1995) ......................................................9

                                                              -4-
Whatley v. Walker, 302 S.W.3d 314 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009,
 no pet.) ....................................................................................................................9
Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1990) ...........................................................8

STATUTES
TEX. ESTATES CODE § 1022.001 ..............................................................................12
TEX. ESTATES CODE § 1022.002 ..............................................................................12
TEX. ESTATES CODE § 1051.103 ................................................................................8
TEX. ESTATES CODE § 1055.051 ................................................................. 13, 14, 15
TEX. ESTATES CODE § 1101.051 ..............................................................................16
TEX. ESTATES CODE § 1101.052 ..............................................................................15
TEX. ESTATES CODE § 1101.101 ..............................................................................16
TEX. ESTATES CODE § 1102.005 ..............................................................................12
TEX. ESTATES CODE § 1103.002 ................................................................. 12, 14, 15
TEX. FAM. CODE § 154.302 ............................................................................... 12, 15
TEX. FAM. CODE § 154.309 ............................................................................... 12, 15
TEX. FAM. CODE § 155.001 ............................................................................... 13, 15
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.021(1) ...............................................................................11

RULES
TEX. R. CIV. P. 124 ...............................................................................................9, 10

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Laudenberg, Bill Analysis of H. B. 585, Judiciary Committee Report
  (Unamended) (2007) ............................................................................................12

                                                             -5-
                      SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
      Appellant argues that the trial court’s order imposing a guardianship on

M.P.G. must be reversed for the following reasons.

      Appellee’s failure to serve M.P.G. (the proposed ward) or Donald Gauci (the

proposed ward’s father) personally with citation violates their constitutional due-

process rights and violates Texas Estates Code Section 1051.103. This defect is

jurisdictional, and Appellee’s failure to strictly comply with the Estates Code’s

service requirements means that the trial court never gained jurisdiction over

M.P.G. or Donald, which renders the guardianship order void. Furthermore,

Appellee’s duty to ensure service of process before the guardianship was imposed

is not altered by the “notwithstanding any other law” language in Texas Estates

Code Section 1103.002; that section cannot eliminate the constitutional due-

process requirement of proper service and notice to the parties interested in the

proposed guardianship.

      Furthermore, the Appellee sought the guardianship, and the trial court

granted it without a hearing, under Chapter 1103 of the Texas Estates Code. A

hearing on a guardianship application is mandatory unless the provisions of

Chapter 1103 are fully satisfied. That chapter creates a streamlined procedure for

imposing a guardianship on a “disabled child,” as adjudicated by a family court in

a suit affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCR). Here, however, M.P.G. was

                                        -6-
never adjudicated to be a “disabled child” in a SAPCR; therefore, Chapter 1103

did not apply, and it was error to impose a guardianship without a hearing.

                                        ARGUMENT
A.       The order imposing guardianship is void and should be reversed for
         lack of jurisdiction.

1.       The United States and Texas Constitutions require personal service of
         citation on a proposed ward before imposing a guardianship.
         A proposed ward must be served with personal citation because a

guardianship directly affects an individual’s liberty interests. The Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution prohibit federal and

state governments from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property

without due process of law. Likewise, Article 1, Section 19 of the Texas

Constitution states, “No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty,

property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the

due course of the law of the land.” These due-process requirements include proper

service of process, as stated by the U.S. Supreme Court:

                An elementary and fundamental requirement of due
                process in any proceeding which is to be accorded
                finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the
                circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
                pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to
                present their objections. … [W]hen notice is a person’s
                due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process.1

1
    Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315, 70 S. Ct. 652, 657, 94 L. Ed.
865 (1950).

                                               -7-
Similarly, the Texas Supreme Court has held that “Personal jurisdiction, a vital

component of a valid judgment, is dependent ‘upon citation issued and served in a

manner provided for by law.’”2 If service is invalid, it is “of no effect” and cannot

establish the trial court's jurisdiction over a party.3 In short, service of process is a

fundamental constitutional right that provides the recipient with due process of law

through adequate notice of legal proceedings that may affect his rights.

      The Texas Estates Code also requires service of citation, providing that a

sheriff or other officer of the court must personally serve citation on a list of

interested parties including: (1) the proposed ward if he or she is 12 years of age or

older and (2) the proposed ward’s parents.4 “The power of a court to appoint a

guardian is a special power conferred by statute and compliance with the statute is

a condition precedent to the valid exercise of that power and is jurisdictional.”5

Moreover, a proposed ward alleged to be an incompetent person cannot waive

service of citation.6 Chapter 1051 of the Estates Code does not set out optional

2
  In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552, 563 (Tex. 2012) (quoting Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833, 836
   (Tex. 1990)).
3
   Uvalde Country Club v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 690 S.W.2d 884, 885 (Tex. 1985) (per
   curiam).
4
  TEX. ESTATES CODE § 1051.103(a) (emphasis added).
5
  Ortiz v. Gutierrez, 792 S.W.2d 118, 119 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989, writ dism'd).
6
  In re Guardianship of Castanon, 2007 WL 700987, at *2 n. 2 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, no
  pet.); In re Mask, 198 S.W.3d 231, 234 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, orig. proceeding).

                                           -8-
procedures; only through strict compliance with these service requirements is the

probate court’s jurisdiction invoked.7

       This right to notice and due process is so fundamental that a court will not

retain personal jurisdiction over a proposed ward until the citation requirement has

been fulfilled. A judgment or order is void when it is apparent that the court

rendering it lacked jurisdiction of either the parties or the subject matter of the

lawsuit.8 For a trial court to have jurisdiction over a party, the party must be

properly before the court in the pending controversy as authorized by procedural

statutes and rules.9 A trial court does not have jurisdiction to enter a judgment or

order against a respondent unless the record shows proper service of citation on the

respondent.10 A void order has no force or effect and confers no rights; it is a mere

nullity.11 Thus, failure to serve a proposed ward with citation is jurisdictional, and

a court’s subsequent order appointing a guardian without proper service on the

ward is void. 12

7
  In re Guardianship of Erickson, 208 S.W.3d 737, 740 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.);
   In re Guardianship of B.A.G., 794 S.W.2d 510, 511 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1990, no
   writ).
8
  In re Bokeloh, 21 S.W.3d 784, 794 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, orig. proceeding).
9
  Perry v. Ponder, 604 S.W.2d 306, 322 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1980, no writ).
10
    Tex. R. Civ. P. 124; Werner v. Colwell, 909 S.W.2d 866, 869–70 (Tex. 1995); Autozone, Inc.
   v. Duenes, 108 S.W.3d 917, 920 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.).
11
    In re B.A.G., 794 S.W.2d at 511; In re Garza, 126 S.W.3d 268, 271 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
   2003, orig. proceeding).
12
    See Whatley v. Walker, 302 S.W.3d 314, 321 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.)
   (failure to serve citation is jurisdictional, and subsequent order appointing guardian without
   proper service is void).

                                              -9-
          Appellee cannot rely on alleged instructions from the probate court

regarding appropriate service of citation on a proposed ward and his father. Neither

the probate court nor the Texas Estates Code has the power to deprive an

individual of his or her rights to due process in the form of personal service of

citation. It is undisputed that neither M.P.G. (the proposed ward) nor Donald (his

father) were personally served with process on Kathryn Gauci’s application for

guardianship.13 Because neither M.P.G. nor Donald was served with process, the

probate court did not have jurisdiction over them, and any order entered

adjudicating their rights is void.14 The failure to personally serve the proposed

ward, M.P.G., and the proposed ward’s parent, Donald, requires reversal of the

order creating the guardianship.

2.        Appellee’s argument that the language “notwithstanding any other law”
          contained in Texas Estates Code Section 1103.002 absolves her failure to
          personally serve both the Appellant and the proposed ward is flawed, and
          the guardianship order remains void.
          Appellee’s claim that a guardianship can be imposed on M.P.G. without

personal service of citation on M.P.G. and Donald violates their constitutional

rights to due process. Appellee argues, however, that Texas Estates Code Section

13
     See CR 1:126–128.
14
      See TEX. R. CIV. P. 124; Browning v. Placke, 698 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex. 1985); Cook v.
     Cameron, 733 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1987); Dodd v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 545 S.W.2d 766,
     770 (Tex. 1977); Ortiz, 792 S.W.2d at 119.

                                               - 10 -
1103.002(a) does not require her to personally serve M.P.G. and Donald because it

contains the language “notwithstanding any other law”.

      This reading of Section 1103.002 is constitutionally infirm and would

require one to assume that the Legislature intended to circumvent the due-process

requirement of service of process, thereby rendering the statute unconstitutional.

But, when possible, courts give statutes a construction consistent with const-

itutional requirements, because the Legislature is presumed to have intended

compliance with state and federal constitutions.15 When a statute lends itself to two

interpretations, one that is reasonable and within the constitution and one that

would render the statute unconstitutional, a court must adopt the interpretation that

protects the statute’s constitutionality.16

      In order to understand the phrase “notwithstanding any other law” in Estates

Code Section 1103.002, one must understand the problem that Chapter 1103 was

intended to rectify. Chapter 1103 was intended to resolve a jurisdictional conflict

that can arise between family courts (usually district courts) and the courts of

original probate jurisdiction (which are county courts, county courts-at-law, or

statutory probate courts, depending on the county). When a child is adjudicated to

be disabled in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCR), the family

15
   TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.021(1); Brady v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 795 S.W.2d 712, 715
   (Tex. 1990); see also In re Allcat Claims Serv., L.P., 356 S.W.3d 455, 468 (Tex. 2011).
16
   Holmans v. Transource Polymers, Inc., 914 S.W.2d 189, 191 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995,
   writ denied).

                                              - 11 -
court can have continuing exclusive jurisdiction over the child past that child’s

18th birthday, and can order support, possession, and access for that child.17

However, in certain circumstances, a guardianship may be required for that child,

and only courts of original probate jurisdiction have the power to impose

guardianships.18 As Appellee cited in her brief, in drafting Chapter 1103, the

Judiciary Committee recognized that “[w]hen a disabled child reaches adult age,

custodial parents must seek a guardianship for continued care of an incapacitated

child, but cannot do so in a family court. Only probate courts have jurisdiction over

adult guardianships. State law prohibits transferring custody cases from family

court to another court’s jurisdiction, even after the child becomes an adult. This

could prevent the appointment of a guardian in an appropriate case.”19

       Chapter 1103, therefore, is used only in a very limited circumstance, where a

family court with continuing exclusive jurisdiction has already determined that the

child is disabled and in need of continuing support into adulthood.20 In an effort to

streamline the guardianship process in these limited situations where significant

litigation has most likely already taken place, a hearing is not required in order to

impose a guardianship.21 Therefore, the language “notwithstanding any other law”

17
   TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 154.302, 154.309.
18
   TEX. ESTATES CODE §§ 1022.001, 1022.002, 1022.005.
19
   Laudenberg, Bill Analysis of H. B. 585, Judiciary Committee Report (Unamended) (2007).
20
   TEX. ESTATES CODE § 1103.002.
21
   Id. § 1103.002(a)(1).

                                            - 12 -
is referring to the traditional requirement that a hearing must be held in order for a

guardianship to be imposed.22

         Furthermore, “notwithstanding any other law” is also a reference to Family

Code Section 155.001, which provides that “a court acquires continuing, exclusive

jurisdiction over the matters provided for by this title in connection with a child on

the rendition of a final order” and that “[i]f a court of this state has acquired

continuing, exclusive jurisdiction, no other court of this state has jurisdiction of a

suit with regard to that child except as provided by this chapter or Chapter 262.”23

Section 1103 remedies the conflict described by the Judiciary Committee, allowing

a probate court to create a guardianship where a family court with continuing

exclusive jurisdiction had already determined the proposed ward to be a disabled

child under the Texas Family Code.

         Appellee’s interpretation of Chapter 1103 is overbroad and would suggest

that a proposed ward’s constitutional due process rights may be infringed upon by

statute. Appellee’s interpretation would strip both Donald and M.P.G. of their

constitutional rights, and allow a guardianship to be imposed without notice or

hearing. The fact remains that without proper service of citation, the trial court

never gained the requisite jurisdiction to impose a guardianship. As a result, this

22
     Id. § 1055.051(a)(2).
23
     TEX. FAM. CODE § 155.001(a), (c).

                                         - 13 -
Court should reverse the trial court’s order and dismiss the guardianship

proceeding for want of jurisdiction.

B.    Texas Estates Code Section 1103.002 only applies where a family court
      has previously declared the proposed ward to be a “disabled child.”
      Because the guardianship was entered without a hearing and M.P.G.
      was never adjudicated a “disabled child” the guardianship order is void.
      In the alternative, the Court should reverse the guardianship order and

remand for a full hearing on Appellee’s guardianship application. Estates Code

Section 1055.051 prohibits a trial court from considering a guardianship

application by submission; instead, a full evidentiary hearing is required. 24 No such

hearing was held in this case.

      The guardianship order in this case was entered under Estates Code Section

1103.002, which applies only to guardianship proceedings where the proposed

ward has previously been declared a “disabled child” in a SAPCR. As noted in the

previous section, in the narrow circumstance where a family court retains

jurisdiction over a disabled child after reaching adulthood, the Estates Code

provides a method of creating a guardianship without the need for a hearing.25

Section 1103.002(a) explicitly states that a guardian may be appointed without

hearing only when (1) “the applicant is a person who was appointed conservator of

a disabled child,” and (2) “the proposed ward is an incapacitated adult with respect

24
   TEX. ESTATES CODE § 1055.051; In re Guardianship of Winn, 372 S.W.3d 291, 301 (Tex.
   App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.).
25
   TEX. ESTATES CODE § 1103.002.

                                         - 14 -
to whom another court obtained continuing, exclusive jurisdiction in a suit

affecting the parent child relationship when the person was a child.”26

       The phrase “disabled child” is a term of art used in the Texas Family Code.27

In order for the family court to determine whether a child is a “disabled child,” the

court must make specific factual findings.28 If those findings are made, the family

court can order the disabled child’s parents to support the child, and can allocate

possession and access between the parents, after the child’s 18th birthday.29

Moreover, the family court retains continuing exclusive jurisdiction over the child

and the parents to modify or enforce its orders.30

       In this case, M.P.G. was never found to be a “disabled child” by the 309th

Judicial District Court.31 Consequently, Kathryn Gauci was never “appointed

conservator of a disabled child,” and thus she could not take advantage of the

streamlined guardianship procedures provided in Section 1103.002 of the Estates

Code. Instead, she was required by statute to have a hearing on her guardianship

application, for which the proposed ward was entitled to request a jury. 32 During

that hearing, the trial court would have had to make certain inquiries and
26
   Id. § 1103.002(a) (emphasis added).
27
   TEX. FAM. CODE § 154.302.
28
   Id.
29
   Id. §§ 154.302, 154.309.
30
   Id. § 155.001.
31
   CR 1:9-68.
32
   TEX. ESTATES CODE §§ 1055.051(a)(2) (application for guardianship cannot be considered on
   submission), 1101.052 (proposed ward entitled to jury trial on request).

                                           - 15 -
evidentiary findings before imposing a guardianship.33 None of this ever

occurred.34

         Since the procedures provided in the Texas Estates Code for imposing a

guardianship were not followed, the Order Appointing Permanent Guardian of the

Person Pursuant to Texas Estates Code Section 1103.001 was error. Consequently,

the order must be reversed.

                                          PRAYER
         For the foregoing reasons, Appellant asks the Court to reverse the Order

Appointing Permanent Guardian of the Person Pursuant to Texas Estates Code

Section 1103.01 entered on June 24, 2014, and to dismiss this case for lack of

jurisdiction, or in the alternative, remand this case to the trial court for further

proceedings.

33
     Id. §§ 1101.051, 1101.101.
34
     RR 1:4; see generally CR 1:126–28.

                                           - 16 -
                                           Respectfully submitted,

                                           John L. Dagley
                                           State Bar No. 05310050
                                           jdagley@chd-law.com
                                           Kenneth J. Fair
                                           State Bar No. 24007171
                                           kfair@chd-law.com
                                           Katie Tipper-McWhorter
                                           State Bar No. 24083974
                                           ktipper@chd-law.com
                                           4000 Two Houston Center
                                           909 Fannin Street, Suite 4000
                                           Houston, TX 77010
                                           (713) 752-2332 Telephone
                                           (713) 752-2330 Facsimile

                                          ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
                                          DONALD GAUCI

                     CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
       I certify that this document was produced on a computer using Microsoft
Word 2007 in 14-point Times New Roman and contains 2,142 words, as
determined by the program’s word-count function, excluding the sections of the
document listed in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1). The aggregate of
all briefs filed by Appellant in this case total 5,089 words.

                                          Kenneth J. Fair

                                      - 17 -
                       CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

      This is to certify that a true and correct copy of this document has been
served on the following counsel on December 30, 2014, as required by the Texas
Rules of Appellate Procedure, including by electronic mail.

Debra E. Hunt
MOORE & HUNT
P.O. Box 300788
Houston, Texas 77230
Phone: 713-522-4282
Fax: 713-522-9604
Email: debbie@mooreandhunt.com

                                         Kenneth J. Fair

                                     - 18 -