Court Opinion

ID: 9614862
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:29:12.866686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:39.897740
License: Public Domain

O’CONNELL, C. J.,
dissenting.
The majority recites that “The instruction by the trial court was not only contrary to the rule as previously established by decisions of this court, but was inconsistent with much of the previously established law of Oregon relating to hearsay testimony.” That may well be true, but unless this court decides to bind itself by precedent without any further inquiry, this can only be the beginning point for a discussion of the soundness of the position previously taken in our cases. The majority fails to give any satisfactory reasons for perpetuating the rule excluding prior statements of a witness offered to prove the happening of the matters asserted therein.
The majority opinion correctly states the prevailing view. The traditional and majority view in this country has been that any statement not made under oath and not subject to cross-examination is hearsay to the extent that it is introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. The statement is admissible only if it falls within a specific exception to the hearsay rule.① Prior inconsistent statements of a witness who is not a party are not within any exception to the hearsay rule and, therefore, under the traditional view such statements are inadmissible to prove the truth of the contents of the statement.② It is recognized, however, that such statements are ad*493missible for the entirely separate purpose of impeaching the witness’ credibility.
Increasingly, it has been recognized that this distinction is indefensible. Most who have given serious thought to the question have concluded that there is no basis in the policy considerations underlying the hearsay rule for refusing to admit for substantive purposes prior inconsistent statements of a witness present and available for examination.③
McCormick identifies three factors as militating against the use of prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence. Under orthodox analysis, he reports, such evidence is barred because “its value rests on the credit of the declarant, who was not (1) under oath, (2) subject to cross-examination, or (3) in the presence of the trier, when the statement was made” (Emphasis added.)④
McCormick then points out that “[t]he oath is no longer a principal safeguard of * * * trustworthiness”⑤ and notes that sworn statements, such as affidavits, are not admissible. In addition, he disputes the need for contemporaneous cross-examination and view of demeanor.⑥ As to the need for contemporaneous cross-examination, he notes that the only need is to catch the witness before he can “harden and become unyielding” in his lies, but that this will never be the case when the statement at trial is inconsistent with *494the earlier statement. With respect to the need for observing the demeanor of the witness, he agrees with Judge Learned Hand, that:
“* * * If, from all that the jury see of the witness, they conclude that what he says now is not the truth, but what he said before, they are none the less deciding what they see and hear of that person and in court.”⑦
In addition, since “memory hinges on recency,” the statement closest in time to the events to which it relates is likely to be the most accurate.⑧
The major reason for denying admission to out of court statements is the lack of opportunity from cross-examination.⑨ Where, as in the case before us, the out of court declarant is available for cross-examination, this consideration is inapplicable. To exclude such evidence merely because it is an out of court statement and in this sense fits within the definition of hearsay, is to apply a rule without a reason. The test for the admissibility of out of court statements should be whether there is sufficient opportunity for the adversary to put before the jury the facts neces*495sary for it to make a reasonable evaluation of tbe trustworthiness bf the statement. When the declarant is available for cross-examination, the statement may be denied, explained, or modified. The speaker’s first hand knowledge and his ability to observe, recall and relate may all be tested in the same manner as if the original statement had been made in court.⑩
For the foregoing reasons this court should adopt the rule that a statement previously made by a person who is present at the hearing and available for cross-examination with respect to the statement and its subject matter is admissible so long as the statement would be admissible if made by the witness while testifying as a witness.⑪ To the extent that our prior decisions are to the contrary, they should be overruled.
The rule should not be limited to prior inconsistent statements of witnesses, but should be equally applicable to prior consistent statements. The rule should be so extended because all of the reasons for admitting prior inconsistent statements can be advanced for admitting prior consistent statements. Of course, the admissibility of either kind of prior statement is subject to the requirements of relevancy and *496subject to the evidentiary policies aimed at preventing the confusion of the issues or the undue consumption of trial time.
The majority opinion points to two requirements, one or both of which must be satisfied before an exception to the hearsay rule will be recognized: (1) “Some special circumstances to vouch for the trustworthiness of the out-of-court statement, so as to justify dispensing with the need for cross-examination at the time the statement was made” and (2) “Some necessity for the use of the out-of-court statement, usually as a result of the unavailability of the witness * # # »
The first of these requirements calling for cross-examination “at the time the statement was made” is not now acceptable for the reasons explained above.
A little reflection will show that the second requirement has no application to the present case. The majority is saying, in effect, that since certain hearsay exceptions (not all) do not apply unless the declarant is unavailable, we can turn this around and say that if the declarant is available the evidence he would give is not admissible.
The fallacy of this position becomes apparent when it is understood, as McCormick on Evidence, p. 608 points out, that “When unavailability of the declarant is made a condition precedent to admitting his hearsay statement, a rule of preference is in fact being stated.” McCormick goes on to explain:
“* * * His personal presence in court, under oath and subject to cross-examination, would be preferred. If, however, that cannot be had, then his hearsay statement falling within the particular *497hearsay exception, although admittedly inferior, is still to be preferred over doing entirely without evidence from that source. Thus the group of hearsay exceptions where unavailability is required are in a sense second class in comparison with the far larger number of exceptions where availability or unavailability is simply not a factor.” McCormick on Evidence § 258 at p. 608 (2d ed 1972).
Even if the prior inconsistent statement in the present case were regarded as hearsay, it would make no sense to exclude it if the declarant was a witness, but admit it as an exception to the hearsay rule if the declarant was not available.
I would affirm the Court of Appeals.
Bryson, J., joins in this dissent.

 McCormick on Evidence, § 226 (2d ed 1972).

 Id., § 39.

 McCormick, supra § 251; V Wigmore on Evidence, § 1362 (3d ed 1940); ULA, Uniform Rules of Evidence 63 (3) (1965).

 McCormick, supra § 251 at 601.

 Ibid.

 Relied on heavily in State v. Saporen, 205 Minn 358, 362, 285 NW 898, 901 (1939), the leading case supporting the traditional view and cited by petitioner in his brief.

 Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F2d 364, 368 (2d Cir 1925).

 McCormick, supra § 251 at 602.

 Other reasons for substantive inadmissibility of prior out of court statements by witnesses are sometimes raised. Sometimes emphasis is placed on the value of the oath as a guarantee of veracity. See State v. Saporen, 205 Minn 358, 362, 285 NW 898, 901 (1939). But as already observed, it is generally conceded that “the oath is no longer a principal safeguard of trustworthiness.” McCormick on Evidence § 251 at 601 (2d ed 1972). See V Wigmore on Evidence, § 1362 (3d ed 1940); ULA, Uniform Rules of Evidence 63 (3) (1965).
Some also point to the value of jury observation of demeanor at the time the statement is made. Saporen, supra. It is difficult to see how this concern is satisfied when the use is for impeachement rather than proof of the truth of the matter asserted. McCormick, supra at 601.

 The reasons supporting the admissibility of out of court statements of a witness seem no less telling on this score than those supporting the admissibility of extra-judicial admissions of a party opponent, which have always been an exception to the hearsay rule. McCormick, supra § 262 at 628-639.

 This statement of the rule is adapted from ULA, Uniform Rules of Evidence 63 (1) (1965).
It should be noted that with the use of such evidence no longer restricted to impeachment, it would no longer be necessary to call the declarant as a witness before introducing his prior statement, as was done in the present case. Nor would the rules pertaining to impeachment such as the requirement of surprise as a condition for the introduction of the prior inconsistent statement of one’s own witness be applicable.