Court Opinion

ID: 9744735
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:14:29.306243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:21:17.606159
License: Public Domain

DeBruler, J.
I concur both in the conclusion of the majority that appellant was not denied effective assistance of counsel and in the vacation of the armed robbery sentence, but I feel that one further comment is necessary regarding our standards for determining whether representation was sufficiently effective.
This was a case in which appellant was “caught in the act” of an attempted armed robbery, in which he shot and wounded a man. His trial counsel consulted with appellant for a rather brief time, familiarized himself with the State’s case by informal discovery, and attempted to arrange a plea bargain. When appellant rejected the agreement, his attorney proceeded to trial with what might be termed a low profile defense: he called no witnesses, did not attack the admissibility of appellant’s confession, and apparently did not argue at great length. The majority opinion holds that the manner in which the attorney conducted the trial and preparations was the result of his decision as to trial strategy, and that this Court will not speculate as to defense strategies more advantageous than that chosen, citing Blackburn v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 5, 291 N.E.2d 686. This rule has also been stated as holding that we will not substitute our judgment as to preferable trial strategy for counsel’s. Maldonado v. State, (1976) 265 Ind. 492, 355 N.E.2d 843, 850.
Any action or inaction by trial counsel could be viewed as “trial strategy.” Since this Court disclaims any intention of second-guessing trial counsel’s choice of strategy, effective review of the issue of effectiveness of representation could become impossible, and the guarantee of the right of effective assistance of counsel would be farcical. It would seem that if our review of the effectiveness of trial counsel’s efforts is to mean anything, the definition of the “strategy” to which we defer must be limited to situations in which more than one reasonable alternative confronts counsel. Choice between reasonable alternatives is strategy; avoidance of the only *82reasonable alternative, or selection of a patently unreasonable one is a mistake. An isolated mistake, especially if not serious, need not amount to ineffective representation, but should be considered in determining effectiveness.
In this case counsel’s failure to conduct a “vigorous” defense is reasonable because of the danger of antagonizing the jury, which had the power to choose appellant’s armed robbery sentence. Similarly a decision to have appellant testify as to his heroin addiction could well have alienated the jurors rather than obtained their sympathy. In such cases the court’s refusal to second-guess trial counsel’s choice of courses of action is appropriate. This reasonable forebearance from deciding cases on the basis of hindsight should not, however, become a rote rationalization by which this Court declines to safeguard criminal defendants’ rights to even a minimally effective level of assistance of counsel.
Prentice, J., concurs.
Note. — Reported at 860 N.E.2d 825.