Court Opinion

ID: 9704436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:35:27.809807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:02.459828
License: Public Domain

J. H. Gillis, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part). Although I agree with my brothers’ decision regarding defendant’s first claim on appeal (inadequate factual basis for the guilty plea), I disagree with their conclusion that the trial court did not err in setting aside its original sentence and resentencing defendant. My brothers apparently read that portion of the Gillespie statement of the general rule that says "authority of the trial judge * * * ceases when * * * the respondent enters upon his imprisonment” to mean that the trial court loses authority to modify a sentence only *534where the defendant has actually been incarcerated. I do not, however, subscribe to that interpretation because case law indicates that the sentencing court’s authority to modify a valid sentence ceases when the court issues its sentencing order. Furthermore, I am not convinced that either the above-quoted or other similar language remains as a part of the general rule.
Early cases deciding the resentencing issue usually stated the general rule in the following terms: a sentencing judge cannot set aside a valid sentence and resentence the defendant after the defendant "has been remanded to jail to await the execution of the sentence”. In re Richards, 150 Mich 421, 426; 114 NW 348 (1907). See also People v Fox, 312 Mich 577; 20 NW2d 732 (1945), People v Chivas, 322 Mich 384; 34 NW2d 22 (1948). In each of those cases, the defendant apparently had been physically incarcerated pursuant to the original sentence prior to resentencing. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Court pointed to that circumstance in announcing the rule. Nevertheless, the fact that the rule against modification of a valid sentence applies where defendant has been incarcerated does not necessarily mean that it does not apply where defendant has not been incarcerated. In fact, the rationale for the above-mentioned cases, which was explained in the earlier case of People v Meservey, 76 Mich 223; 42 NW 1133 (1889),1 suggests that the rule could apply where defendant was not incarcerated before resentencing. Meservey, supra, explained its holding as follows:
"The circuit judge had no power at that time to *535vacate the sentences, because the authority over the prisoners had passed out of his hands by his own order.” 76 Mich at 226.
1 believe that that language negates the concept that physical incarceration of the defendant is a prerequisite to termination of the court’s authority to modify a sentence and indicates, instead, that such authority ceases when the court has merely issued its sentencing order.
Although later cases often cite In re Richards, supra, Fox, supra, and Chivas, supra, many do not, in stating the general rule, include the language about "remanded to jail to await the execution of the sentence”, and do not, in discussing that rule, refer to any incarceration requirement.2 Elliott v Department of Corrections, 343 Mich 681; 73 NW2d 298 (1955), People v Parson, 345 Mich 727; 76 NW2d 805 (1956), In re Lemire, 360 Mich 693; 105 NW2d 37 (1960) [dictum], Moore v Parole Board, 379 Mich 624; 154 NW2d 437 (1967), People v Johnson, 60 Mich App 371; 230 NW2d 438 (1975) [dictum], People v Robert Jackson, 63 Mich App 249; 234 NW2d 471 (1975). This de-emphasis on a requirement that defendant actually be incarcerated leads me to conclude that no such requirement presently exists. Thus, I believe the present rule is that a sentencing judge lacks the power to vacate or modify a validly imposed sentence.
Under that rule, the trial judge in the case at bar erred in vacating defendant’s original sentence *536and imposing a new sentence.3 The trial judge had issued his sentencing order. He not only had announced defendant’s original sentence in open court but also had signed both a written statement of defendant’s sentence and a document entitled "Certified Copy of Record of Sentence to Any Prison”. Furthermore, neither the prosecutor nor the defendant claim that the original sentence is invalid. Consequently, I would set aside the second sentence and reinstate the original sentence.

 In re Richards, 150 Mich 421; 114 NW 348 (1907), People v Fox, 312 Mich 577; 20 NW2d 732 (1945), and People v Chivas, 322 Mich 384; 34 NW2d 22 (1948), relied primarily on People v Meservey, 76 Mich 223; 42 NW 1133 (1889), and People v Kelley, 79 Mich 320; 44 NW 615 (1890), which adopted the Meservey position.

 People v Williams, 65 Mich App 531, 533; 237 NW2d 545 (1975), however, states the general rule as follows: "It is well established that a sentencing court does not have the power or authority to change a validly imposed sentence once a defendant begins serving it.” But, the defendant in that case had served part of the original sentence prior to resentencing. Thus, Williams resembles cases such as In re Richards, Fox and Chivas, and, as I said in the discussion of those cases, the fact that the Court refers to incarceration in announcing the rule does not mean that the rule is inapplicable where there was no incarceration.

 It is possible that the trial court erred even under my brothers’ interpretation of the general rule. The record indicates that defendant was held in the county jail for approximately 2 days prior to resentencing. If that incarceration was pursuant to the originally imposed sentence rather than the bench warrant (a matter that I cannot determine from the record), then the defendant was, prior to resentencing, actually in custody and the trial court, consequently, had lost its authority to vacate or modify the original sentence.