Court Opinion

ID: 9531026
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:06:30.859086+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:19.455541
License: Public Domain

Judge ROTHENBERG
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in part and dissent in part.
The undisputed facts here show that, after the plaintiff had presented her case at trial, the trial court dismissed all but one of her claims. The court then suggested to counsel that they explore settlement. The parties left the courtroom, and apparently arrived at a settlement. However, since plaintiff was a protected person and a conservator had been appointed, the settlement required the approval of the probate court which had jurisdiction over a different aspect of the case.
Counsel contacted the probate court and was directed to ask the trial court for a “preliminary ruling” as to whether plaintiff’s action against the Naiman defendants was within the scope of the groundless and frivolous statute. This colloquy explains:
Plaintiffs counsel: “Your honor, I am in a position of requesting some further rulings of the court.... Let me explain the reasons....
I have had one telephone conference with [the probate court] ... concerning the settlement proposal which the Naiman defendants made to us....
[The probate court] found, this morning, that the settlement would provide no benefit to the Estate of Belle Nienke but would accrue solely to the benefit of the plaintiff’s counsel. So that, therefore, there was an ethical problem presented in plaintiff’s counsel proceeding further with any settlement discussions. In fact, [the probate court] went further and directed that settlement negotiations go further_ [The probate court] has directed that I try to settle this case this morning. But, [it] has told me that I may not do so unless I first request from this Court certain rulings to eliminate the ethical problem....
For that reason, we request that the Court, rather than waiting till the end of *453this case, that this Court rule on the claims by the Naiman defendants that plaintiff’s counsel have violated Rule 11 in bringing the claims that were asserted in this action and were dismissed yesterday afternoon, and that the Court further rule on the question of whether those claims were groundless and frivolous or vexatious within the meaning of the current statute....
[OJnce there are rulings on those issues, it is the [probate court’s] position that we can go forward and make the settlement offer that [it] has directed us to make.’’ (emphasis added)
The trial court responded by advising counsel that, although some claims “perhaps should have not been brought,” the case was not “substantially frivolous or groundless under § 13-17-101, overall.” (emphasis added) And, although the court expressed its concern about two claims, it stated that it had not “seen any special expenditures in defense of any claims that perhaps should not have been brought....”
Further, the trial court stated that neither of the plaintiffs claims against defendant Bank Western had been groundless or frivolous and that “the case against Bank Western was always much weaker than the case against the Naiman defendants.” (emphasis added)
According to plaintiffs opening brief, based upon the court’s statements and “believing that the issue of attorney fees was no longer material to impact settlement negotiations,” the parties resumed negotiations and settled the case with the approval of the probate court. The final settlement provided for a $24,000 payment to the plaintiff by the Naiman defendants. And, although the Naiman defendants reserved their right to bring a claim for groundless and frivolous litigation against plaintiff’s counsel, plaintiff’s counsel viewed that reservation of rights in the context of the trial court’s “preliminary ruling” in their favor.
Following the settlement, the Naiman defendants moved for and were awarded attorney fees against plaintiff’s attorneys under the groundless and frivolous statute for the claims under the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, § 6-1-101, C.R.S. (1992 Repl.Vol. 2) and the Colorado Organized Crime Control Act, § 18-17-101, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8B).
On appeal, plaintiff’s counsel now contend that the claims brought were not groundless or frivolous. I do not reach the issues of the merits of any particular claim because I conclude that a combination of the law of the case doctrine and general equitable principles prohibit the award of attorney’s fees here.
Under the law of the case doctrine, a trial court must adhere to determinations previously reached by a reviewing court which are peculiarly within its province. That is, the pronouncement of an appellate court on an issue presented to it, and rulings logically necessary to its holding, become the law of the case which must be followed by the trial court on remand. People v. Roybal, 672 P.2d 1003 (Colo.1983).
However, the law of the case doctrine refers not only to the conclusive effect of appellate rulings on remand, but also to the binding force of trial court rulings during later trial court proceedings. Thus, prior relevant rulings made by the trial court in the same case should be followed unless the court, in its discretion, determines that: its former ruling is no longer sound because of changed conditions, People ex rel. Gallagher v. District Court, 666 P.2d 550 (Colo.1983); it needs to correct its previous ruling because of a legal or factual error; there occurs an intervening change in the law; or the court concludes that manifest injustice would result from its original ruling. Verzuh v. Rouse, 660 P.2d 1301 (Colo.App.1982).
In Howard v. Wood Bros. Homes, Inc., 835 P.2d 556, 558 (Colo.App.1992), this court reviewed the law of the case doctrine and stated:
[Sjubject to exceptions not pertinent here, a determinative decision on an issue of law made at one stage of the case becomes binding precedent to be fol*454lowed in successive stages of the same litigation.
In Governor’s Ranch Professional Center, Ltd. v. Mercy of Colorado Inc., 793 P.2d 648, (Colo.App.1990), this court ruled that the trial court had misapplied the law of the case doctrine by relying upon its factual findings from a preliminary injunction hearing to dispose of the action on the merits. There, we distinguished between dispositive rulings and preliminary rulings which occur before counsel have had a full and fair opportunity to present their cases:
The party moving for a preliminary injunction has no obligation to present his entire case in the hearing ... [or] the incentive to develop his case as thoroughly as during trial. 793 P.2d at 651
Here, the trial court’s ruling, although labelled as a “preliminary” ruling, was in fact a dispositive ruling issued after the plaintiff had fully presented her case and had rested, and after the trial court had heard argument and had ruled upon the Naiman defendants’ motion to dismiss. Perhaps most importantly, the ruling was issued by the trial court at the request of plaintiff’s counsel. And, counsel was ordered by the probate court to elicit such a ruling before settling the plaintiff’s case.
Unlike the situation in Governor’s Ranch, supra, here, neither party presented any additional evidence to the court regarding the frivolous and groundless issues. Rather, after the settlement, the defendants submitted a written motion accompanied by a brief which was followed by plaintiff’s brief opposing the award of attorney’s fees. Neither party showed the court any changed conditions, any change in the law, or any earlier misperception by the trial court as to the relevant facts or law.
In summary, I find nothing in the record suggesting the trial court’s original finding that the case was not groundless and frivolous was unsound because of changed circumstances, or that a manifest injustice resulted from that ruling. To the contrary, the trial court’s redetermination of the groundless and frivolous issue occurred after plaintiff, her counsel, and the probate court had acted in reliance upon it.
I recognize that the majority has not addressed the issue I consider dispositive because it was not properly raised. I disagree and conclude that the issue is sufficiently important to warrant our consideration.
Nor was this issue overlooked by the trial court. In granting the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees, the trial court obviously recognized the problem created by its earlier ruling because the trial court’s order states:
The Court is aware of its findings on the date settlement was being proposed. The Court made the finding that the case was not frivolously brought overall under the standards of § 13-17-101, et seq. (original emphasis).
Apart from the law of the case doctrine, it appears to me inequitable to assess attorney fees under these circumstances. In different factual contexts, our supreme court has held that counsel’s reasonable reliance upon a court’s ruling, albeit an erroneous ruling, justifies a relaxation of otherwise mandatory rules. The underpinning of these decisions, as I read them, is that it is unfair to penalize counsel for their good faith reliance upon the statements and rulings of a trial court, even when the court is wrong. See Converse v. Zinke, 635 P.2d 882 (Colo.1981) (trial court’s statement on the record that 15 days rather than 10 days are allowed for filing post-judgment motions constitutes a “unique circumstances” exception to the mandatory language for timing of motions under C.R.C.P. 6(b)); Tyler v. Adams County Department of Social Services, 697 P.2d 29 (Colo.1985) (counsel’s failure to perfect an appeal in reliance upon trial court’s erroneous statement that a motion for a new trial was unnecessary constituted excusable neglect justifying relief under C.R.C.P. 60.); World Wide Construction Service, Inc. v. Chapman, 683 P.2d 1198, (Colo.1984) (where complainant in action before Colorado Civil Rights Commission waived issuance of an order requiring reinstatement based upon Commission counsel and *455Commission’s reasonable reliance upon court of appeals decision, case remanded to allow complainant to request reinstatement because court considered it “unfair and unduly formalistic to deny complainant relief.’’ 683 P.2d at 1201).
For these reasons, I conclude that the law of the case doctrine combined with considerations of equity and fairness required the trial court, under these unusual circumstances, to adhere to its original ruling finding the plaintiff’s claims not groundless and frivolous and that the failure to do so was error. Therefore, I agree with that portion of the judgment in which the majority reverses the award of attorney’s fees, albeit for different reasons, and I dissent from that portion of the judgment upholding attorney’s fees. In view of this, I need not address the merits of the majority opinion regarding the alleged ground-lessness or frivolousness of the claims.