Court Opinion

ID: 9581257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:13:07.608788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:48.866671
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur completely in Division 1 but find it necessary to qualify my agreement with Division 2.
There is no doubt that the jurors’ investigation during trial, limited though it was, should not have been done. Watkins v. State, 237 Ga. 678, 683-685 (229 SE2d 465) (1976). It confirmed certain facts testified to by the state’s witnesses and cast greater doubt on defendant’s asserted facts in explanation of his presence at the scene. Thus I would not refer to the cursory investigations only as “alleged” juror misconduct, as does the majority. The rule that jurors base their verdict only on evidence presented in the trial of the case should be scrupulously adhered to.
But here it is harmless error because the scene, the fence, the layout of the motel property and its accesses, was thoroughly familiar to at least one juror prior to trial anyway. Thus, a juror’s personal knowledge of the facts in question, which were related but not central to the defense, was available to the jury even without the others’ drive-bys during trial.
Moreover, the juror who testified at the motion for new trial that it contributed to her decision was referring to the personal knowledge *128some jurors had of the scene before the trial as well as to the information gleaned during trial from the drive-bys. This makes the effect of the additional information attenuated at best. Here there is little, if any, probability that prejudice to appellant resulted. Thus I agree that he was not denied a fair trial by what transpired.
Decided May 2, 1986
Rehearing denied May 16, 1986
Henry E. Williams, for appellant.
Hobart M. Hind, District Attorney, for appellee.