Court Opinion

ID: 9513463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:36:01.482296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:52.221859
License: Public Domain

NEUMANN, Justice.
[¶ 1] The City of Minot appeals from the trial court’s suppression order. We affirm.
[¶ 2] On March 27, 1999, Senior Patrolman George Saltsman was performing security checks around Cathy’s Cafe and Nola’s Lounge in Minot, North Dakota. Patrolman Saltsman knew Nola’s Lounge, Cathy’s Cafe, and the nearby Moose Club had been burglarized in the past. The last burglary report at Nola’s Lounge was on December 23, 1998, three months earlier.
[¶ 3] At approximately 4:13 a.m., Patrolman Saltsman observed Timothy Johnson turn off Burdick Expressway, enter the parking lot at Nola’s Lounge, drive into a sparsely lit area behind the lounge, and exit the parking lot without stopping. Patrolman Saltsman stopped Johnson approximately three blocks later to ask for identification. Johnson was subsequently charged with DUI.
[¶ 4] On May 21,1999, Johnson moved to suppress evidence gained from the investigatory stop. On June 3, 1999, the trial court granted the motion, concluding the “officer did not articulate any observation of any illegal activity.” The City moved for reconsideration. The trial court denied the City’s motion. The City appeals.
[¶ 5] An appeal of an order granting the suppression of evidence is allowed under N.D.C.C. § 29-28-07(5). Our standard of review is well documented in North Dakota case law.
“ ‘We affirm a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress unless, after resolving conflicting evidence in favor of affirmance, we conclude there is insufficient competent evidence to support the decision, or unless we conclude the decision goes against the manifest weight of the evidence.’ ” State v. Kenner, 1997 ND 1, ¶ 7, 559 N.W.2d 538 (quoting State v. Hawley, 540 N.W.2d 390, 392 (N.D.1995)). This standard of review accords great deference to the trial court’s decision and recognizes the importance of the opportunity to assess the credibility of the witness. The ultimate conclusion of whether the facts *487support a reasonable and articulable suspicion is a fully reviewable question of law. Id.
* * * *
In order to legally stop a moving vehicle for an investigation, an officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion the motorist has violated or is violating the law. Kenner, 1997 ND 1, ¶ 8, 559 N.W.2d 538. This reasonable suspicion standard is less stringent than probable cause, but does require more than a “mere hunch.” See id. at ¶¶ 8, 10; State v. Jesfjeld, 1997 ND 23, ¶ 8, 559 N.W.2d 543. In determining whether an investigative stop is valid, we use an objective standard and look to the totality of the circumstances. State v. Ova, 539 N.W.2d 857, 859 (N.D.1995). Reasonable suspicion to justify a stop exists when “a reasonable person in the officer’s position would be justified by some objective manifestation to suspect potential criminal activity.” Id.
We do not require an officer to isolate single factors which signal a potential violation of the law; but instead, “officers are to assess the situation as it unfolds and, based upon inferences and deductions drawn from their experience and training, make the determination whether all of the circumstances viewed together create a reasonable suspicion of potential criminal activity.” Id. When assessing reasonableness, we consider inferences and deductions an investigating officer would make which may elude a layperson. Kenner, 1997 ND 1, ¶ 8, 559 N.W.2d 538.
City of Fargo v. Ovind, 1998 ND 69, ¶¶ 6, 8-9, 575 N.W.2d 901.
[¶ 6] The City argues the trial court incorrectly applied a probable cause standard instead of a reasonable and artic-ulable suspicion standard. We agree. The trial court applied a probable cause standard by concluding the evidence gained from the investigatory stop should be suppressed because Patrolman Salts-man “did not articulate any observation of any illegal activity.” Observation of an illegal activity constitutes probable cause to arrest, a higher standard than a reasonable suspicion. Kahl v. Director, N.D. Dept. of Transp., 1997 ND 147, ¶ 14, 567 N.W.2d 197.1
[¶ 7] Applying the correct standard, we must determine, as a matter of law, whether Patrolman Saltsman had a reasonable and articulable suspicion Johnson violated, was violating, or was about to violate the law. Kenner, at ¶ 8. “The question is whether a reasonable person in the officer’s position would be justified by some objective manifestation to suspect the defendant was, or was about to be, engaged in unlawful activity.” Id. at ¶ 8.
[¶ 8] The City argues the prior burglary reports in the Nola’s Lounge area justified Patrolman Saltsman to suspect Johnson was, or was about to be, engaged in illegal activity. An area’s reputation for criminal activity is an articula-ble fact on which a police officer may legitimately rely. United States v. Rickus, 737 F.2d 360, 365 (3rd Cir.1984) (considering a residential area recently victimized by as many as twelve unsolved nighttime burglaries). However, an area’s reputation for criminal activity cannot solely support a finding of reasonable suspicion. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979); State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 524 N.E.2d 489, 493-94 (1988) (Wright, J., dissenting) (arguing *488courts would create a “high crime area” exception to the protections extended by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments).
[¶ 9] In Rickus, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals relied on more than the area’s reputation for criminal activity to find the officer possessed a reasonable suspicion the car or its occupants were involved, or about to become involved, in criminal activity. 737 F.2d at 365. The Rickus officer observed the defendants driving in the area and returning thirty minutes later, “traveling through a closed business district at 3:30 in the morning at a speed 15-20 miles per hour below the posted speed limit.” Id. at 362, 365. The defendants “then turned into a residential area that [the officer] knew had recently been victimized by a spate of burglaries, and continued their slow and apparently aimless course for several minutes before being stopped.” Id. at 365. The area’s reputation for criminal activity and the officer’s observations, together, were sufficient to raise a reasonable and articulable suspicion. Id. at 366.
[¶ 10] We have also required more than an officer’s awareness of past burglaries in an area to find a reasonable and articula-ble suspicion the defendant was, or was about to be, engaged in unlawful activity. State v. Robertsdahl, 512 N.W.2d 427, 428 (N.D.1994). In Robertsdahl, the officer observed an unknown vehicle leave a liquor store area fifty minutes after closing time and return to the liquor store after making four corners. Id. at 428. We reasoned these facts and the officer’s awareness of several past burglaries in the area amounted “to no more than a ‘vague hunch’ of illegal activity ... [and] was insufficient to raise a reasonable and artic-ulable suspicion.” Id.
[¶ 11] Here, the facts are more analogous to Robertsdahl than Rickus. At approximately 4:13 a.m., Patrolman Salts-man saw an unknown vehicle enter the Nola’s Lounge parking lot. The vehicle did not slow down or stop in front of or behind the lounge and returned to the public roads. Patrolman Saltsman stopped the vehicle approximately three blocks later without noticing any unusual driving. These facts and Patrolman Salts-man’s awareness of past burglaries in the area amounted to no more than a vague hunch of illegal activity and are legally insufficient to suspect Johnson was, or was about to be, engaged in unlawful activity. See id.
[¶ 12] We conclude, as a matter of law, the information known to Patrolman Salts-man at the time of the investigative stop was insufficient to raise a reasonable and articulable suspicion. We affirm the trial court’s suppression order.
[¶ 13] GERALD W. VANDE WALLE, C.J., DALE V. SANDSTROM, CAROL RONNING KAPSNER, JJ„ concur.

. The trial court may have based this conclusion on an erroneous interpretation of the Ovind case. In Ovind, we listed three situations providing grounds for reasonable suspicion investigative stops:
(1) where the officer relied upon a directive or request for action from another officer;
(2) where the officer received tips from other police officers or informants, which were then corroborated by the officer’s own observations; and (3) where the officer directly observed illegal activity.
City of Fargo v. Ovind, at ¶ 10.
However, we did not limit the grounds providing reasonable suspicion to those three scenarios.