Court Opinion

ID: 9963647
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 00:00:49.224982+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:55.512328
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50987      Document: 144-1         Page: 1   Date Filed: 04/25/2024

        United States Court of Appeals
             for the Fifth Circuit
                            ____________
                                                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                          Fifth Circuit
                             No. 22-50987
                            ____________                                FILED
                                                                    April 25, 2024
United States of America,                                          Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                        Clerk
                                                         Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                   versus

Thomas Scott Perkins,

                                        Defendant—Appellant.
               ______________________________

               Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Western District of Texas
                        USDC No. 4:20-CR-388-1
               ______________________________

Before Higginbotham, Smith, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
Jerry E. Smith, Circuit Judge:
      Thomas Perkins was convicted of one count of distributing child
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2) and eight counts of pos-
sessing devices containing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252A(a)(5)(B). Perkins has undeniable mental issues, but the district
court determined him competent to stand trial. He was convicted and sen-
tenced to more than 157 years—a substantial upward variance from the
guideline range.
      Perkins appeals, challenging (1) the competency determination and
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                                  No. 22-50987

(2) the procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm
the conviction but vacate the sentence.

                                       I.
       In 2019, agents detected suspicious activity from an IP address
associated with a house in Fort Stockton, Texas, occupied by Perkins and his
parents. Agents conducted a consensual interview with Perkins’s father at
his place of work. With the consent of the agents, Perkins’s father called his
wife, told her to come to his office, and instructed her to leave the front door
of their house unlocked. When agents arrived to search the house, they
recovered a large cache of child pornography belonging to Perkins. Fortu-
nately, the way that we resolve this appeal does not require us to describe
further the content of Perkins’s collection nor his attitude toward, or alleged
sexual activity with, children.
       Perkins was initially charged in a two-count indictment with posses-
sion and distribution of child pornography. His appointed counsel filed a
motion for mental examination, which was granted. Perkins was evaluated
by psychologist Dr. Lacie Biber, who was employed at FMC Fort Worth, a
Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) facility. During the evaluation, Perkins
stated that he had been diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder and schizo-
phrenia as a teenager and was again diagnosed with schizophrenia during his
hospitalization in 2020. Biber explained that she declined to give a schizo-
phrenia diagnosis because Perkins did not meet the diagnostic criteria, point-
ing to an early diagnosis, rather than in his early to mid-twenties; to the
absence of hallucinations; and to a lack of marked change in functioning in
late adolescence. As for delusions, Biber reported that Perkins’s religious
beliefs about having two angels to guide him through life “appear to be a lit-
eral interpretation of what he learned through his church and that he may
attribute thoughts in his head as messages from these angels that help to com-

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fort him in difficult times.” According to Biber, Perkins was competent, as
he was aware of his charges; appeared to have sufficient factual information
about, and a rational understanding of, court proceedings; and could “reason
through why a defendant would enter a certain defense strategy based on evi-
dence and facts of a case.”
       After a hearing, the magistrate judge (“M.J.”) found Perkins compe-
tent. Based on Biber’s evaluation, the M.J. determined that Perkins was “not
presently suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally
incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and con-
sequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his
defense.”
       A few months later, Perkins filed a motion for a second competency
hearing. In support, he provided a report from a psychologist retained by the
defense, Dr. James Schutte, who noted that Perkins had diagnoses that
included bipolar-type schizoaffective disorder and autism and that Perkins
reported having delusions as well as tactile, auditory, and visual hallucina-
tions. During the examination, Perkins “indicated that he has two angels
who he feels are going to have him suddenly released from jail by influencing
the judge or prosecutor in his case, or by causing evidence against him to
disappear.” According to Schutte, Perkins understood the facts and tech-
nical terms relevant to his case but was unable properly to assist in his defense
or understand the consequences of the criminal charges because “he feels
that he is going be suddenly released from jail by divine intervention.” Per-
kins reported that he had rejected several plea-bargain offers “because he
does not want to sentence himself,” though he also indicated significant
understanding about how plea agreements work. According to Schutte,
       He was able to state that a plea bargain offers a person a lesser
       sentence than if he or she went to trial, and is offered by the
       government in order to avoid going to trial. He reported that a

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       defendant would take a plea bargain to receive a lesser punish-
       ment, and would not take a plea bargain if they do not agree
       with it, or if they want to take their chances at trial.
Nevertheless, Schutte opined that Perkins’s delusions impaired his ability to
work with defense counsel and impacted his ability to appreciate his
predicament.
       The government then moved for another psychological examination.
Perkins was evaluated at FMC Fort Worth by BOP psychologist Dr. Samuel
Browning, who determined that Perkins met “many of the characteristic
criteria associated with [a]utism” and that “such symptoms dominate his
clinical picture.” Browning opined that Perkins did not have a mental disease
that rendered him unable to understand the nature of the charges or the
consequences of the proceeding or to assist in his defense. According to
Browning, Perkins showed a factual and rational understanding of the legal
proceedings, since he was able to discuss the charges and proceedings and
deliberate with counsel about his decision to testify. Browning observed
nothing indicating overt difficulties regarding Perkins’s ability to assist in his
defense and that the evaluation suggested that Perkins could make rational
decisions and assist counsel.
       During that second competency bout, but before the hearing, Perkins
was charged in a second superseding indictment with one count of distribu-
tion of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and eight
counts of possessing devices containing child pornography in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(5)(B). The district court held a competency hearing at
which Schutte and Browning testified about their respective evaluations.
Schutte testified that he had diagnosed Perkins with bipolar-type schizo-
affective disorder, which caused hallucinations and delusions rendering him
incompetent to stand trial. Schutte acknowledged that he disagreed with the
BOP psychologists about whether Perkins had a psychotic condition and

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explained that, as a result of the hallucinations and delusions, Perkins
believes “that he is actually not in legal jeopardy and that these beings are
going to resolve this case for him.” Given those irrational beliefs, Schutte
opined, Perkins “does not have an ability to understand the consequences
and the nature of these proceedings.” Schutte did not attribute the hallucin-
ations or delusions to religious beliefs and reasoned that Perkins’s beliefs are
more extreme and not congruent with the other members of his church and
therefore “enter the realm of a psychotic condition, namely schizoaffective
disorder.”
       Browning testified that Perkins was competent to stand trial because
he displayed a rational understanding of the charges and the roles of the
judge, jury, prosecutor, and defense counsel. Browning spoke to correctional
officers and health services staff, who said that Perkins had no discipline
difficulties with daily life in jail. As for Perkins’s religious beliefs about, inter
alia, angels, Browning attributed them to autism and literal thinking and
explained that Perkins reasons and describes things in rigid and concrete
terms that others might describe more abstractly.
       On cross-examination, defense counsel read a paragraph from
Schutte’s report about Perkins’s hearing angels who said they would help his
case, and Browning agreed that, without further context, Perkins had prob-
ably described a delusion or a hallucination. Browning clarified that during
his evaluation, Perkins did not appear to be responding to internal stimuli,
such as hearing or seeing angels. In Browning’s view, Perkins’s reluctance
to accept a plea agreement was an unwillingness to admit guilt. Both doctors
agreed that Perkins was not malingering or exaggerating symptoms.
       After the second competency hearing, the district court issued an
order finding that Perkins was competent, as he was “not presently suffering
from a mental disease or defect rendering him incompetent to the extent that

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he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings
against him or to assist properly in his defense.”
       The presentence investigation report (“PSR”) produced a guideline
imprisonment range of 210–40 months. But the sentencing proceedings were
a messy affair. At first, though the court sentenced Perkins to “210 months
as to each count . . . to run consecutively,” it did not appear to think it was
imposing an upward variance, noting, “[t]he Court does not depart from the
recommended sentence,” finding that “the guideline range in this case [was]
fair and reasonable,” and denying Perkins’s motion for a variance. But
toward the end of the sentencing hearing, the court abruptly reversed course
in response to a clarification by defense counsel:
       [THE COURT]: . . . There’s no—[Counselors], with the low
       end of the guidelines having been imposed, is it necessary for
       the Court to upwardly vary for that?
       [PROSECUTION]: . . . Not from the Government. Thank
       you, Judge.
       THE COURT: [Defense counsel?]
       [DEFENSE]: That is an upward variance, Your Honor.
       Again, under chapter 5, consecutive sentences.
       THE COURT: So the Court does vary upward for that pur-
       pose from the low end of the guidelines and run consecutively
       Counts I through IX, each and every count running con-
       secutively . . . .
Ultimately, the court sentenced Perkins to 210 months in prison for each
count and ordered them to run consecutively followed by nine concurrent life
terms of supervised release. That was indeed an upward variance.
       Perkins filed a motion for reconsideration. The court granted that
motion, but out-of-time. The court later appeared to recognize its error and
quipped, “[I]f the sentencing is what it is, and if we are fortunate enough to

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                                         No. 22-50987

have it back again, we’ll take it up then.” Perkins appeals.

                                               II.
           First, we consider Perkins’s challenge to the district court’s finding of
competency.

                                               A.
           When reviewing a district court’s competency determination, our
court often splits its analysis into two steps. First, we ask about the nature of
the defendant’s mental illness, then we ask whether that illness makes the
defendant incompetent. See Bruce v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 1051, 1059 (5th Cir.
1976). 1
           The standard of review is best articulated in United States v. Pervis:
           Our court reviews a district court’s competency determination
           using a species of clear error review. Our task is to take a hard
           look at the facts to determine whether the district court’s com-
           petency finding was clearly arbitrary or unwarranted. Though
           we are to take a hard look at the record, it is not our task, as an
           appellate court, to relitigate the battle of the experts.
937 F.3d 546, 554 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). 2

           _____________________
           1
           The district court did not follow that two-step inquiry here. Though we are in-
clined to believe that that is not a sufficient reason to throw out the competency determin-
ation, Perkins does not even press such an argument. So we make no definitive statement.
We do caution district courts to take care to explain their competency determinations and
to split their analyses into the two steps as laid out in Bruce. See 536 F.2d at 1059. Failure
to do so hinders appellate review. “This appellate review is disadvantaged because the
district court . . . d[id] not disclose the rationale for the [its] conclusion.” Id. at 1062 (foot-
note omitted).
           2
        The government contends that Bruce is wholly inapplicable because of its distinct
procedural posture. But, as Perkins points out, Bruce itself says otherwise. See 536 F.2d at
1058 (“The standard enunciated in United States v. Makris, 535 F.2d 899 (5th Cir. 1976),

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                                            B.
        “The Constitution does not permit trial of an individual who lacks
mental competency.” Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 170 (2008) (cleaned
up). A defendant is incompetent to stand trial when “presently suffering
from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the
extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the
proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 4241(d). On the other hand, a defendant is competent if he “has sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding” and “a rational as well as factual understanding of the pro-
ceedings against him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per
curiam) (cleaned up). Not all mental illnesses interfere with competency, so
“[a] defendant can be both mentally ill and competent to stand trial.” Mays
v. Stephens, 757 F.3d 211, 216 (5th Cir. 2014).
        “The Government bears the burden of proving that the defendant is
competent.” Pervis, 937 F.3d at 554 (citation omitted). “In evaluating com-
petency, the district court may consider various sources of evidence, includ-
ing, but not limited to, its own observations of the defendant’s demeanor and
behavior; medical testimony; and the observations of other individuals that
have interacted with the defendant.” Id. (cleaned up). We do not “relitigate
the battle of the experts.” Id. at 554.
        With respect to the first part of the competency inquiry, we review the
district court’s findings for “clear error” where the court has incorrectly
resolved conflicting diagnoses. See Bruce, 536 F.2d at 1060. Where “the
overwhelming weight of the medical evidence point[s] to” a condition not

        _____________________
for appellate review is equally applicable to appeals from the district court in habeas pro-
ceedings.” (cleaned up)).

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indicated by the district court, we may reverse its finding. Id. at 1062.
         As to the latter part, special consideration should generally be given to
the opinions of defense counsel. “Although an impaired defendant might be
limited in his ability to assist counsel in demonstrating incompetence, the
defendant’s inability to assist counsel can, in and of itself, constitute proba-
tive evidence of incompetence, and defense counsel will often have the best-
informed view of the defendant’s ability to participate in his defense.” 3

                                               1.
         First, we examine the nature of Perkins’s deficiencies. Before getting
into the meat of the dispute, Perkins convincingly argues (largely based on
the timing of his symptoms) that he is not “malingering,” Pervis, 937 F.3d
at 555–58, or “exaggerating his symptoms,” United States v. Simpson,
645 F.3d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 2011). The government seemingly concedes that
point.
         The parties also do not dispute that Perkins suffers from autism,
though there is some apparent dispute about how significant that autism is.
While the government describes it as “mild,” Perkins explains that it has led
him to struggle to interact with other people; to become unduly frustrated
with tasks; and to struggle to adjust to new situations. For example, as a
teenager, Perkins would “simply forgo showering” when “there was not

         _____________________
         3
          Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 450 (1992); see also Drope, 420 U.S. at 177 n.13
(noting that defense counsel’s “expressed doubt . . . is unquestionably a factor which
should be considered” (cleaned up)). Based on caselaw from other circuits, Perkins sug-
gests that if the district court failed to consider his attorney’s statements, “[t]hat fact alone
supports reversal.” See McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946, 959–61 (10th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1292 (4th Cir. 1995). Our circuit law forecloses such an
extreme view. See United States v. Porter, 907 F.3d 374, 381 n.17 (5th Cir. 2018) (indicating
it is not per se reversible error when a district court fails to consider defense counsel’s
opinion about competency).

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enough to time to complete” his “specific and lengthy shower routine”—
even when that led to “hygiene problems.”
        Though Perkins’s autism diagnosis is relevant to both the competency
and sentencing disputes, his contested schizophrenia diagnoses dominate the
competency dispute. That makes sense. In some circumstances, schizophre-
nia can compel a conclusion of incompetency. See Bruce, 536 F.2d at 1062.
        Perkins points to a long history of schizophrenia, including a diagnosis
at age fourteen; a prescription of anti-psychotics in his youth; his hospitali-
zation for many mental illnesses in his late twenties; 4 and his 2021 schizo-
phrenia diagnosis from Schutte. Perkins also observes that the definition of
schizophrenia encompasses several of his apparent symptoms, including his
various auditory and tactile hallucinations, delusions, and complications such
as suicidal ideation.
        The government principally relies on the testimony of Browning and
Biber, both of whom disagreed with Perkins’s schizophrenia diagnoses. The
defense relies largely on Schutte and the testimony of Perkins’s attorneys.
We address each in turn. 5
        Dr. Biber. As a threshold matter, Perkins obliquely asserts that we
should not consider Biber’s opinion at all. Perkins first objects that the gov-
ernment did not call Biber as a witness or introduce her evaluation as evi-
dence at the competency hearing. As a result, Perkins urges that he was
improperly denied the ability to cross-examine Biber and that her report was
never before the district judge. The government responds that both the M.J.
and Perkins’s own expert relied on Biber’s report. Moreover, Perkins did
        _____________________
        4
            Including another diagnosis of schizophrenia.
        5
          Though we leave discussion of the attorneys’ testimony principally to the second
part of the competency inquiry. See infra part II.B.2.

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not object to the M.J.’s consideration of Biber’s report, nor did he attempt to
call Biber as a witness at the competency hearing. Perkins replies that Biber
was used by the M.J. “for the ‘limited purpose’ of an earlier competency
hearing before a different judge.” He emphasizes that he is not challenging
the earlier determination.
       We have every justification (and perhaps even an obligation) to con-
sider Biber’s diagnosis for several reasons. First, the standard of review for
competency determinations obliges us to take “a hard look at the record.”
Pervis, 937 F.3d at 554. A hard look at the record—a record which includes
the Biber diagnosis—considers every part of the record.
       Perkins provides no caselaw to the contrary. His sole case citation to
United States v. Gray, 421 F.2d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 1970), is inapposite. There,
the government opted not to cross-examine any of the experts whose tes-
timony unanimously supported a finding of incompetency. Id. at 318. The
government later tried to claim that the testimony was insufficient. Id. at 319
n.1. The court held that it would “not penalize [the defendant] for a defici-
ency which was within the prosecution’s capacity to remedy.” Id.
       But in the matter at hand, we find the inverse situation. It was Perkins
who declined to challenge the Biber diagnosis at his competency hearing, and
now he claims that it was insufficient and would have us penalize the govern-
ment for that decision. Gray, if anything, suggests the exact opposite of what
Perkins would have us do.
       Considering Biber’s report strongly militates against characterizing
Perkins’s illness as schizophrenia. Biber was aware of both of Perkins’s
schizophrenia diagnoses, spoke with him about his delusions, and appears to
have observed him over time in a residential setting. The strongest mark
against her report is that it occurred at a different (and earlier) time from the
competency hearing being challenged here.

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        Dr. Browning. Browning also concluded that Perkins’s earlier schizo-
phrenia diagnoses were incorrect. Browning’s report is not, as Perkins sug-
gests, an “outlier opinion.” Indeed, Browning forms part of the 2-1 majority
we examine here. Perkins’s main objection is that Browning did not “explore
Perkins’s delusional beliefs” or “discuss the details of his delusions.” He
also notes that Browning was open to the possibility that the angels were delu-
sions. 6 The government, on the other hand, stresses what it perceives as
Browning’s superior qualifications and his greater opportunity to evaluate
Perkins relative to Schutte.
        Dr. Schutte. Unlike Biber and Browning, Schutte diagnosed Perkins
with schizophrenia. He testified that Perkins was hearing the voices of two
angels that were going to help him win his case by influencing the judge or by
causing evidence to disappear. The government does not attack Schutte’s
report in depth, recognizing that he came to a “different conclusion.” On
the other hand, Perkins attempts to elevate Schutte’s report over

        _____________________
        6
         Though this is not as straightforward as Perkins presents. In cross-examination,
defense counsel read Browning a passage from Schutte’s report describing the “delu-
sions.” The following exchange then occurred:
        Q: This paragraph here and these facts as described—
        A: Uh-huh.
        Q: —does that suggest sort of inspiration or does that suggest a more tan-
        gible object in the room that might be qualified as a delusion?
        A: With no further context, I would say that it sounds probably like a delu-
        sion or a hallucination.
        Note how Browning couches his answer as being “[w]ith no further context.”
Tellingly, Browning reviewed the entirety of Schutte’s report. With that context, he seems
to have come to the opposite conclusion.

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Browning’s. 7
        Perkins’s “delusions.” The symptom at the center of this dispute is
Perkins’s “delusions.” If he had auditory and visual hallucinations of super-
natural beings who he firmly believed would “resolve his legal case for him
by either influencing the mind of [the judge] or the prosecution or causing
evidence to disappear,” Perkins’s competency might seriously be in doubt.
        And Perkins proffers several ways in which what he calls delusions
interfered with his ability to participate in the trial including, inter alia, believ-
ing that he was not in legal jeopardy because he would somehow be delivered,
and his resistance to plea agreements. But Perkins hedged the impact of his
beliefs in his discussions with Browning:
        When asked about the most likely outcome, he remarked,
        “Based on the evidence and that side of the logic, I’d be found
        guilty . . . with my belief in God, I’d gamble that.” He was able
        to articulate a basic understanding of plea bargains, and indi-
        cated he would consult with his attorney and his parents to
        decide whether a plea agreement offer was a good one, though
        he expressed reluctance to accept a plea offer. He displayed no
        influence of psychosis and/or self-defeating motivation as it
        related to his decision-making.
        Moreover, the record contains alternative, medically supported ex-
planations for the “delusions.” Browning testified that he “look[ed] at [the
angels and similar experiences] in the broader context of how he would
describe those types of things that might be commonplace. How would

        _____________________
        7
          The government does point out that “Dr. Schutte assumed that Perkins’[s]
alleged schizophrenia and delusions made him per se incompetent.” That is puzzling, for
the record does not support that proposition. Nor is it particularly relevant, given that we
lean on medical experts in only a limited away when applying a particular diagnosis to a
competency determination. See Bruce, 536 F.2d at 1062.

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somebody describe faith and their religion if they were speaking in a very con-
crete manner because of autism spectrum disorder?” Browning also testified
that, during his observation of Perkins, that
        [t]here was no indication that he was ever experiencing any
        internal stimuli, that he was hearing these angels, that he was
        seeing things in the room with us, that he was I guess distracted
        by the fact that he had these delusions and . . . in his discussions
        of competency-related matters, he was able to offer not only his
        faith as a reason for making decisions but also some rational
        explanations and understanding of the legal consequences.
        Perkins’s own explanation aligns with Browning’s characterization.
Take the following examples from Schutte’s own report:
        [Perkins] indicates that he hears voices, but feels that they are
        “spiritual voices.” He indicated that he always says that he
        does not experience auditory or visual hallucinations because
        he does not feel that they are “psychological or psychiatric.”
        He indicated that he has two angels, as does everyone else, and
        added that he hears these on a continuous basis.
Belief in the power and real-world presence of supernatural beings is not so
uncommon. 8 Moreover, this court has previously upheld a district court’s
explicit determination that “expressions of religious thoughts” were not
symptoms of a psychotic disorder rendering a defendant incompetent despite
conflicting expert evidence. See United States v. Wix, 416 F. App’x 338, 341
(5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see id. at 341–43.
        The record as a whole. In sum, the evidence here is too split to charac-
terize Perkins’s condition definitively. He may have had diagnoses of schizo-

        _____________________
        8
          See, e.g., U.S. Navy Seals 1–26 v. Biden, 27 F.4th 336, 342 & n.4 (5th Cir. 2022)
(per curiam) (characterizing refusal to get a COVID vaccination because of “divine
instruction not to receive the vaccine” as a “sincerely held religious belief[].”).

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                                       No. 22-50987

phrenia in the past, but “it is typically unusual for someone to be diagnosed
with [s]chizophrenia that early in adolescence.” Perkins also lacked the
“marked change in functioning” during “late adolescence” characteristic of
individuals with that disorder. Two doctors with experience in evaluating
competency examined Perkins at the relevant time and concluded he was
competent to stand trial. One dissented. Taking a hard look at the whole
picture, it’s difficult to see the evidence as anything other than a genuinely
mixed bag. 9

                                             2.
        We turn to the ultimate inquiry: whether Perkins’s mental health ren-
dered him incompetent to stand trial.
        The district court found Perkins competent to stand trial. Recall that
a defendant is incompetent if he “is presently suffering from a mental disease
or defect rendering him . . . unable to understand the nature and conse-
quences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.”
18 U.S.C. § 4241(d). 10
        Perkins presents several examples of his own attorneys’ doubts about
his competence, including, inter alia, their requests for a competency hear-
ing; assertions that he was incapable of assisting counsel; and Perkins’s reli-

        _____________________
        9
          We stress again the need for the district court to bifurcate its competency inquiry.
For this part of the inquiry, we typically apply the ordinary clear-error standard. But since
the district court did not make a finding on the nature of Perkins’s particular illness, there
is nothing to which to apply such a standard. That inconveniences our review. See supra
note 1.
        10
          See also Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402 (cleaned up) (holding that a defendant is compe-
tent when he “has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable
degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual under-
standing of the proceedings against him.”).

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                                      No. 22-50987

ance on otherworldly beings and resistance to beneficial plea agreements. 11
        But Perkins’s own attorneys did not offer an unequivocal declaration
of his incompetency. One conceded that Perkins had “a basic understanding
of the proceedings.” And Perkins himself presented a more cooperative pic-
ture to Browning and Biber. The district court’s conclusion that Perkins is
competent to stand trial was not “clearly arbitrary or unwarranted.” Pervis,
937 F.3d at 554 (citation omitted).
        There are medical experts on both sides of the issue. And a majority
of the experts providing testimony favoring the district court’s finding. We
need not get into the nitty-gritty of whose qualifications are marginally more
impressive or whose point of observation allowed for a keener view. We may
not “relitigate the battle of the experts.” Id. We are not charged with making
those sorts of calls. We are to review for a finding that is “clearly arbitrary
or unwarranted.” United States v. Joseph, 333 F.3d 587, 589 (5th Cir. 2003).
        Whatever Perkins’s mental condition, it is not clearly arbitrary or
unwarranted to say that it did not impact his ability to participate in his
defense in the way that would render him incompetent. Resistance to plea
deals, vague assertions that he was reluctant to help the defense, and strug-
gles in communication are quotidian problems in the world of criminal
defense. As the government points out, the doctors on both sides agreed that
Perkins had some understanding of the proceedings. And the government is
quite right that “even assuming [Perkins’s experiences] were psychotic
delusions, Dr. Schutte never explained how those beliefs rendered Perkins

        _____________________
        11
            Perkins suggests that the district court’s purported failure to consider defense
counsel’s opinions “alone supports reversal.” But that approach, perhaps adopted in other
circuits, is foreclosed by Porter in ours. Nonetheless, it is “unquestionably a factor which
should be considered.” Drope, 420 U.S. at 177 n.13. See supra note 3.

                                            16
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                                      No. 22-50987

unable [to] understand his proceedings or assist his counsel.” 12
        Existing caselaw does not cleanly resolve the inquiry. Bruce is the
closest case on point, for it provides some color as to how we ought to resolve
conflicting diagnoses of schizophrenia. 536 F.2d at 1061. Yet here, unlike in
Bruce, id. at 1061–62, the record does not include more than seven diagnoses
during protracted litigation, where the district court sided with the sole out-
lier. It contains three, and the district court sided with the majority. 13
        Moreover, Bruce is but one example that warrants reversal—it does
not establish what minimum threshold warrants reversal. Perkins’s case is
clearly short of that one example. In Bruce, “the overwhelming weight of the
medical evidence pointed to schizophrenia.” Id. at 1062. That is not so here.
        Since Bruce does not end the inquiry, we lean heavily on the appro-
priate standard of review—a standard that is “a species of clear error
review.” Pervis, 937 F.3d at 554. Where, as here, there is a genuinely mixed
bag of evidence from adept witnesses as to the nature and consequence for
this case of Perkins’s mental illness that does not plainly warrant a determin-
ation one way or the other, we should “[d]efer[] to the district court’s rea-
sonable assessment of [a] complex record” and affirm. Id. at 548. 14

                                           III.
        We now address the sentence. Because we vacate it for lack of proce-

        _____________________
        12
          Though again “[a]t this stage, expert testimony is not so important, although the
psychiatrist’s ‘inexpert’ opinion can be a factor in the court’s independent decision.”
Bruce, 536 F.2d at 1062.
        13
          That, of course, excludes the diagnoses from Perkins’s youth that are not raised
in-depth by either party.
        14
          We set aside any question of what might constitute a clearly arbitrary deter-
mination. Cf., e.g., supra note 1.

                                            17
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                                       No. 22-50987

dural reasonableness, we do not reach its substantive reasonableness.

                                             A.
        The parties dispute whether Perkins properly preserved his objection
at sentencing. The government avers that he “did not contemporaneously
object to the court’s explanation of its sentence or request further
explanation.”
        Perkins responds that our caselaw considers preserved errors identi-
fied in motions for reconsideration after sentencing hearings. 15 He points to
his filing a Rule 35 motion to correct or reconsider his sentence. See Fed.
R. Crim. P. 35(a). That motion maintained that the court “did not appear
to articulate the basis for the substantial variance elevating a Guidelines sen-
tence of roughly 22 years to an effective life sentence.”
        At oral argument, the government responded to Perkins’s reply-brief
argument with two new lines of attack: (1) that Perkins’s objection was “not
something that Rule 35 could have remedied” and (2) that “Rule 35 is not
meant to preserve error after the sentencing hearing.” Those objections are
foreclosed by Watkins. See 450 F.3d at 185. There, we determined that
defendants had properly preserved error where they “first raised their Sixth
Amendment claim in a timely [Rule] 35(a) motion, after the district court had
orally pronounced the defendants’ sentences.” Id. 16

        _____________________
        15
            See United States v. Watkins, 450 F.3d 184, 185 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); see
also, e.g., United States v. Hatley, 717 F. App’x 457 (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (“Although
he did not contemporaneously object, Hatley preserved this error by filing a post-
sentencing motion for reconsideration.”).
        16
          Watkins in turn referenced United States v. Burling, 420 F.3d 745 (8th Cir. 2005),
in which an intervening development in the law made the error sufficiently clear, id. at 748–
49. See Watkins, 450 F.3d at 185. But Burling worked hard to minimize the distinction
between the intervening case and its predecessors. See 420 F.3d at 748.

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                                  No. 22-50987

       The government tries to distinguish Watkins by pointing to United
States v. Henderson, 646 F.3d 223 (5th Cir. 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 568
U.S. 266 (2013). In Henderson, we clarified that “Watkins does not control”
unless “the error [is] clear.” Id. at 224 (emphasis added). We continued
that, for preservation purposes, “a sentencing error is clear under Rule 35(a)
only if it is not the result of the exercise of the court’s discretion with regard
to the application of the sentencing guidelines.” Id. at 225 (cleaned up). So
Rule 35(a) “extends only to those cases in which an obvious error or mistake
has occurred in the sentence, that is, errors which would almost certainly
result in a remand of the case to the trial court for further action.” Id.
(cleaned up). Consequently, an error is not clear “when there is no binding
precedent on a question on which there is a circuit split.” Id.
       Here, the error as to sentencing procedure was egregious and clear.
So Rule 35 was an appropriate vehicle to preserve error, and Perkins’s objec-
tion was “sufficiently specific to alert the district court to the nature of the
alleged error and to provide an opportunity for correction.” United States v.
Rodriguez-Leos, 953 F.3d 320, 324 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v.
Neal, 578 F.3d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 2009)). Perkins’s objection is preserved.

                                       B.
       Perkins attacks the procedural reasonableness of his sentence on the
ground that “the court never explained its 137-year variance from the Guide-
lines range.” Therefore, United States v. Jones, 75 F.4th 502 (5th Cir. 2023),
articulates the appropriate standard of review:
       If the district court committed a significant procedural error,
       this [c]ourt must remand unless the error was harmless. Signif-
       icant procedural errors include:
              (1) failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the
              applicable Guidelines range; (2) treating the Guidelines
              as mandatory; (3) failing to consider the 18 U.S.C.

                                       19
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                                        No. 22-50987

                 § 3553(a) factors; (4) determining a sentence based on
                 clearly erroneous facts; or (5) failing . . . adequately [to]
                 explain the chosen sentence, including an explanation for
                 any deviation from the Guidelines range.[ 17]
        Thus, we review whether the district court failed adequately to ex-
plain the chosen sentence. If so, we remand, unless that error was harmless.
        Both sides agree that the district court imposed an upward variance.
See United States v. Douglas, 910 F.3d 804, 808 (5th Cir. 2018). So, the
question is whether the court violated its obligation to “explain [its] conclu-
sion that an unusually lenient or an unusually harsh sentence is appropriate
in a particular case with sufficient justifications.” 18 That explanation must
be sufficient “to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the
perception of fair sentencing.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.
        Our caselaw paints a detailed picture of what that does—and does
not—look like. Checking “four supporting § 3553(a) factors” in the “State-
ment of Reasons” form and explaining that the court “opted . . . for an above-
guidelines sentence driven by the § 3553(a) factors” is enough. United States
v. Conlan, 786 F.3d 380, 394–95 (5th Cir. 2015). So is an explanation that the
variance is based on “prior similar drug conduct mentioned in the PSR.”
United States v. Rhine, 637 F.3d 525, 527 (5th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). 19 So
        _____________________
        17
          Jones, 75 F.4th at 510–11 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see United States
v. Gomez, 905 F.3d 347, 351 (5th Cir. 2018).
        18
          Gall, 552 U.S. at 46; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) (“The court, at the time of sen-
tencing, shall state in open court . . . the specific reason for [an upward variance] . . . .”).
        19
           The government takes a broader proposition in Rhine out of context. It contends
that we evaluate procedural reasonableness “in light of the proceeding as a whole, including
the facts revealed in the PSR.” Rhine, 637 F.3d at 529. But taking things “in light of the
proceedings as a whole” does not absolve the district court of its responsibility to give a
specific reason for an upward variance. Indeed, in Rhine, the district court specifically ref-
erenced the facts in the PSR in justifying its upward departure. See id. at 527.

                                              20
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                                  No. 22-50987

too is a statement of reasons that
       explained that the court took into consideration the need to
       deter future criminal conduct and the need to protect the pub-
       lic, in light of the defendant’s history of assaultive and sexually
       assaultive behavior, and noted that the sentence was based on
       (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and history and
       characteristics of the defendant, (2) the need to adequately
       deter criminal conduct, and (3) the need to protect the public
       from further crimes.
United States v. Fraga, 704 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 2013) (cleaned up).
Finally, a statement that “the court has considered the arguments made
earlier and as well as the information in the report” can be enough, depending
on the content of the sentencing record. United States v. Bonilla, 524 F.3d
647, 657 (5th Cir. 2008), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Reyes-
Contreras, 910 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc).
       On the other hand, “a single passing reference to § 3553(a)” and an
indication that the variance was “based upon the government motion for
upward departure” do not suffice. United States v. Chon, 713 F.3d 812, 823–
24 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). Nor does “a bare recitation of the Guide-
line’s calculation” that “does not mention a defendant’s arguments.”
United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 363 (5th Cir. 2009)
(cleaned up).    Nor an explanation “based . . . on § 3553(a)(2)(A)” that
merely “discussed what [the defendant’s] sentence might have been” for a
related, but uncharged, crime—and that failed to “address [his] argument
regarding the factors under § 3553(a)(1).” United States v. Bostic, 970 F.3d
607, 611–12 (5th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).
       The situation here plainly falls into the latter camp. The court initially
claimed that it did not “depart from the recommended sentence” but, after
clarifying with the defense, said it was “vary[ing] upward . . . from the low

                                       21
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                                     No. 22-50987

end of the guidelines.” 20 Before that clarification, the court said it took note
of the § 3553(a) “sentencing factors . . . in arriving at a reasonable sentence.”
It proceeded immediately to say that “[it] found the guidelines range in this
case to be fair and reasonable.” In its Statement of Reasons, the court
checked only one box for its reason for a variance, “Other.” And next to
“Other” it wrote “all reasons stated in open court.”
        The government marshals two lines of defense to Perkins’s claim.
First, it gives an exhaustive list of what the district court did do:
        The court informed the parties that it had the discretion to run
        the sentences for Perkins’ child-pornography counts concur-
        rently or consecutively. It read Perkins’ pleadings, listened to
        his extensive arguments for a sentence below the guidelines
        range, and asked the government to address one of those argu-
        ments. The court then expressly denied Perkins’ motion for
        downward variance, finding it was not justified by the sentenc-
        ing factors in § 3553.
Assume arguendo that all of that is true. It is still insufficient. Crucially absent
is the one failing that Perkins points out here: an explanation with specific
reasons why an upward variance was justified.
        Second, the government reiterates its reasoning from its motion for an
upward variance, the § 3553(a) factors, and the reasons stated at sentencing.
But that motion was not even characterized as one for an above-guideline
sentence. And the government admits that “the sentencing transcript . . .
does not contain specific fact findings for running the sentences consecu-
tively.” The government’s post-hoc rationalization of the variance is fore-
closed by the text of § 3553(c)(2), which provides that “[t]he court, at the time

        _____________________
        20
           Of course, the district court did in fact impose an upward variance beyond the
guideline range of 210–40 months. See Douglas, 910 F.3d at 808.

                                           22
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                                         No. 22-50987

of sentencing, shall state in open court . . . the specific reason for [an upward
variance] . . . .” (emphasis added). The court neither adopted the govern-
ment’s reasons 21 nor stated any independent reasons in open court. All it did
was reference § 3553 in passing. That is not enough. Chon, 713 F.3d at 824.
        The government’s best case in response is Bonilla, 524 F.3d at 657.
There, our court found a statement that “the court has considered the argu-
ments made earlier and as well as the information in the report” to be an
adequate explanation. Id. But Bonilla is inapposite for two reasons.
        First, though in this case the court did review and adopt the PSR, that
report did not recommend a variance. In fact, it quite explicitly indicated that
it “had not identified any factors that would warrant a departure from the
applicable sentencing guidelines range.” So, the PSR cannot provide the rea-
sons that we seek. And there is no such reference to any “arguments made
earlier” justifying the imposition of a variance. By contrast, the district court
in Bonilla referenced both the report and the “arguments made earlier”
“[i]mmediately before imposing [the] sentence.” Id.
        The district court did not even appear to think it was imposing an
upward variance until the very end of the hearing when defense counsel
clarified. At first the court ruled that it “d[id] not depart from the recom-
mended sentence,” found that “the guideline range in this case [was] fair and
reasonable,” and denied Perkins’s motion for a downward variance. 22 Then,

        _____________________
        21
           Even if the district court did reference the government’s reasoning, that alone is
not always enough to provide an adequate explanation. See Chon, 713 F.3d at 824 (“Con-
sidering the district court’s single passing reference to the § 3553(a) factors and lack of any
explanation for the upward departure, besides the indication on the statement of reasons that it
was based on the government’s motion for an upward departure, the district court committed
procedural error.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
        22
             The district court docket also notes that the court did formally grant a motion as

                                               23
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                                      No. 22-50987

only a few pages later, it shifted gears dramatically:
        [THE COURT]: . . . There’s no—[Counselors], with the low
        end of the guidelines having been imposed, is it necessary for
        the Court to upwardly vary for that?
        [PROSECUTION]: . . . Not from the Government. Thank
        you, Judge.
        THE COURT: [Defense counsel?]
        [DEFENSE]: That is an upward variance, Your Honor.
        Again, under chapter 5, consecutive sentences.
        THE COURT: So the Court does vary upward for that pur-
        pose from the low end of the guidelines and run consecutively
        Counts I through IX, each and every count running consec-
        utively. . . .
The court did not expressly reference detailed material to justify its actions
as in Bonilla. It may have been somewhat uncertain as to what its actions
were.
        Second, even absent those distinctions, Bonilla would not control.
Bonilla noted that the reasons provided were “minimally sufficient” in the
context of a 41-month non-guidelines sentence. 524 F.3d at 657. The magni-
tude of the sentence impacts what counts as an adequate explanation. 23
Therefore, we hesitate to say that what is minimally sufficient for a 41-month

        _____________________
to a variance. But the mere act of granting a variance does not equate to adoption of the
government’s position in full. Nor does it serve as an adequate explanation itself. That
would obviate the need ever to provide an independent explanation.
        23
           See Gall, 552 U.S. at 50 (“We find it uncontroversial that a major departure
should be supported by a more significant justification than a minor one.”); United States
v. Smith, 440 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir. 2006) (“The farther a sentence varies from the appli-
cable Guideline sentence, the more compelling the justification based on factors in sec-
tion 3553(a) must be.”).

                                            24
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                                      No. 22-50987

sentence is also sufficient for a 137-year sentence. What is good for the goose,
is good for the gander—but not necessarily a pterodactyl. 24
        The government also cites Conlan and Rhine. As noted above, those
are readily distinct. The court in Conlan at least checked several § 3553 fac-
tors on its statement of reasons. 786 F.3d at 394–95. Here, there was none.
And the court in Rhine articulated a far more extensive explanation of its
reasoning than the one given here. Not to mention the variance in those cases
was far less than what we have at hand now. 25
        We do not consider the court’s granting Perkins’s motion for recon-
sideration, where it noted that it was “considering an upward departure
because of the nature, circumstances, and seriousness of [his] offense.” That
order seems to have been out-of-time, so the court likely lacked jurisdiction
to issue it. See McClure v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 2003)
(explaining when a district court can modify a sentence). Moreover, an order
granting Perkins’s motion—issued well after the sentence and indicating
only a leaning to depart upward—can hardly be construed as a sufficient

        _____________________
        24
           The government also cites United States v. Key, 599 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 2010),
which is an application of Bonilla, in which the court “explicitly adopted” the “govern-
ment’s sentencing argument.” Key, 599 F.3d at 474. Key is distinct from this case for the
same reasons as Bonilla. Though the sentence in Key was greater than Bonilla, it is still
nearly an order of magnitude smaller than the one here and substantially less of a departure
from the guidelines (both proportionally and absolutely). See id. at 471–72 (noting a 46-to-
57-month guideline range and a 216-month sentence).
        25
          Perkins also notes that Conlan, Rhine, and Fraga involved much smaller upward
variances. That’s right. Compared to the 1,650-month upward variance here, variances of
9 months, Fraga, 704 F.3d at 437, 147 months, Rhine, 637 F.3d at 535, and less than
96 months, Conlan, 786 F.3d at 394, are trivial. As noted above, the extent of the variance
has meaningful implications for what constitutes an adequate explanation. See supra
note 23 and accompanying text.

                                            25
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                                      No. 22-50987

justification for the court’s original sentence. 26
                                      * * * * *
        Thus, the district court erred, conscientiously realized that error, and
now expects that the case will come back after this appeal. 27 We AFFIRM
Perkins’s conviction, VACATE his sentence, and REMAND for resen-
tencing. We express no view on the sentence that the district court should
announce on remand.

        _____________________
        26
          Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2) (“The court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in
open court . . . the specific reason for [an upward variance] . . . .” (emphasis added)).
        27
          “[I]f the sentencing is what it is, and if we are fortunate enough to have it back
again, we’ll take it up then.”

                                            26