Court Opinion

ID: 9846650
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:44:46.496003+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:41.129021
License: Public Domain

*19WYNN, Judge.
“A case is considered moot when a determination is sought on a matter which, when rendered, cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy.”1 Here, Defendant appeals from a Chapter 50C Civil No-Contact Order, effective 7 April 2005 for a period of one year. The appeal was heard before this Court 12 September 2006, almost five months after the order ceased to be effective. For this reason, we find the issue is moot and accordingly dismiss.
The facts of the case were that at an 8 April 2005 hearing on this matter, Plaintiff James Williams testified that on 15 February 2005 Defendant Christopher Vonderau and his wife, along with several people who lived in the neighborhood, came to the edge of Williams’ property, while Vonderau repeatedly demanded Williams come out and face him. Vonderau stated, “[c]ommit some more felonies, sell some more drugs, don’t you have anything better to do.”
At the hearing, Williams and his wife recited, without objection, details of the 15 February incident, where Vonderau stood in front of Williams’ house yelling insults, racial slurs and challenges to confrontation. Williams testified that Vonderau “lived up the street” and would “come down and harass” him and his family. Williams stated, “We’re slowly building the house and they don’t want blacks in their neighborhoods and they keep coming down harassing us.” Mrs. Williams also testified, regarding the conduct of Vonderau and his wife. She stated, “it’s just been horrible. They’ve been stalking and harassing our family for years. ... We definitely need an order for them to stay away. I don’t even know why they wouldn’t want to stay away. Why would they want to keep coming around us.” The Williamses also testified, at length, regarding other incidents of confrontation with Vonderau and his wife.
The trial court heard testimony of a 2004 confrontation between Williams and the Vonderaus’ children. Following a complaint from Mrs. Vonderau; Williams was charged with two counts of assault and communicating threats. Williams was not convicted of either charge. Further testimony indicated that Vonderau later prompted Building Code Enforcement officials to inspect the Williams’ house to determine if the Williamses were occupying the house before a certificate of occupancy had been issued.
*20Following the hearing, the trial court issued a civil no-contact order in favor of Williams which ordered that:
1. The defendant not visit, assault, molest, or otherwise interfere with plaintiff.
2. The defendant cease stalking the plaintiff.
3. The defendant cease harassment of the plaintiff.
4. The defendant not abuse or injure the plaintiff.
5. The defendant not contact the plaintiff by telephone, written communication, or electronic means.
6. The defendant not enter or remain present at the plaintiffs residence, place of employment, or other places listed below at times when the plaintiff is present.
On 18 April 2005, Vonderau filed a Rule 59 motion for a re-hearing. On 8 August 2005, the trial court heard arguments, denied the motion, and on 25 August 2005 entered its judgment. From the trial court’s order denying a re-hearing, Vonderau appealed.
On appeal, Vonderau raises several arguments regarding the validity of the underlying civil no-contact order; however, we must dismiss this matter as moot.
“A case is considered moot when a determination is sought on a matter which, when rendered, cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy.” Lange v. Lange, 357 N.C. 645, 647, 588 S.E.2d 877, 879 (quotation and citation omitted). And, if an issue is determined to be moot at any time during the course of the proceedings, the usual response should be to dismiss the matter. See N.C. Press Assoc. v. Spangler, 87 N.C. App. 169, 170-71, 360 S.E.2d 138, 139 (1987).
Vonderau appeals from the civil no-contact order, taking effect 8 April 2005 and initially effective for a period of one year [R. 13-14]. We note the case was calendared for hearing before this Court 10 September 2006, more than five months after the civil no-contact order ceased to be effective. This raises the possibility that the issues Vonderau raised are moot; if so, this Court should dismiss the matter. See Id. at 171, 360 S.E.2d at 139.
Under Chapter 50C of the North Carolina General Statutes, a civil no-contact order may be renewed without the requirement an unlawful act be committed after entry of the current order.

*21
The court may renew an order, including an order that previously has been renewed, upon a motion by the complainant filed before the expiration of the current order. The court may renew the order for good cause. ... If the motion for extension is uncontested and the complainant seeks no modification of the order, the order may be extended if the complainant’s motion or affidavit states that there has been no material change in relevant circumstances since entry of the order .and states the reason for the requested extension.

N.C. Gen. Stat. 50C-8(c) (2005).
The record before us contains no information the original order has been extended or that an extension has been sought. Absent evidence of an extension, the matter appears to no longer be in controversy. As such, the matter is moot. See State ex rel Rhodes v. Gaskill, 325 N.C. 424, 383 S.E.2d 923 (1989).
We conclude the order from which Vonderau appealed is no longer effective and was not effective at the time the case was heard before this Court. Accordingly, we dismiss Vonderau’s appeal as moot.2
We note that even if this matter was not considered moot, Vonderau only gave notice from the denial of his Rule 59 motion to set aside an underlying order. See Davis v. Davis, 360 N.C. 518, 631 S.E.2d 114 (2006). Notwithstanding the mootness of this appeal, we reviewed Vonderau’s claim for a new trial under Rule 59 and determined that his appeal, even if it was properly before us, is without merit.
*22Dismissed.
Judge HUDSON concurs.
Judge Tyson dissents in a separate opinion.
The judges participated and submitted this opinion for filing prior to 1 January 2007.

. Lange v. Lange, 357 N.C. 645, 647, 588 S.E.2d 877, 879 (citation and quotation omitted).

. This Court has previously addressed appeals past the expiration of the underlying order where the defendant may have suffered collateral legal consequences from the entry of the court order — e.g., Smith v. Smith, 145 N.C. App. 434, 549 S.E.2d 912 (2001) (domestic violence protective order may have been considered in a child custody action involving the defendant) or the stigma attached to a judicial determination that subjects a defendant to a court order is so great the expired court order has continued legal significance — e.g., Wornstaff v. Wornstaff, - N.C. App. -, 634 S.E.2d 567 (2006) (“[A] defendant’s appeal of an expired domestic violence protective order is not moot because of the stigma that is likely to attach to a person judicially determined to have committed [domestic] abuse and the continued legal significance of an appeal of an expired domestic violence protective order.”). Here, the Defendant was under a “no contact order” that has now expired. Surely, we could speculate that any court action could be considered by potential employers as well as anyone else. That, however, is not a collateral legal consequence that merits an exception to the doctrine of mootness.