Court Opinion

ID: 9576371
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:23:44.759906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:29.490280
License: Public Domain

CARLEY, Presiding Justice,
concurring.
Although I concur fully in the majority opinion, I write sepa*23rately in order to explain briefly why the trial court correctly considered the motion to “open” and “set aside” the “default judgment” pursuant to the standards set forth in OCGA § 9-11-55 (b) for opening a default, rather than those contained in OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) for setting aside a judgment. Section 55 (b) applies “[a]t any time before final judgment. . . .” The trial court’s order granting the motion for “default judgment,” among other things, contemplated the future selection of an auction company and stated that “[a]ny sale of real estate realized as a result of an auction shall be subject to the review of the Court and shall not be final until such sale is confirmed by the Court.” Despite the trial court’s use of the language “default judgment,” that order clearly did not dispose of the entire controversy and, thus, did not constitute a final judgment as contemplated by § 55 (b). Griffin v. Rutland, 259 Ga. App. 846, 847-848 (2) (578 SE2d 540) (2003); Rapid Taxi Co. v. Broughton, 244 Ga. App. 427, 428 (1) (535 SE2d 780) (2000); Cryomedics v. Smith, 180 Ga. App. 336 (349 SE2d 223) (1986). Compare Lassiter Properties v. Gresham, 258 Ga. 500, 501 (1) (371 SE2d 650) (1988).
Decided March 22, 2010
Reconsideration denied April 9, 2010.
Christopher J. McFadden, for appellant.
Flint, Connolly & Walker, Douglas H. Flint, Lawrence O. C. Anderson, for appellee.