Court Opinion

ID: 2964846
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:32:04.509253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:02.493889
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

        No. 96-2320

                                     RHODA TANG,

                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,

                                          v.

                 STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, DEPARTMENT OF ELDERLY AFFAIRS
             and MAUREEN MAIGRET and SUSAN SWEET, in their individual and
                                 official capacities,

                               Defendants, Appellants.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

                [Hon. Raymond J. Pettine, Senior U.S. District Judge]
                                          __________________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________

                              Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                   ____________________

                              and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
                                          _____________

                                 ____________________

            Rebecca Tedford Partington,  Assistant Attorney General, with whom
            __________________________
        Jeffrey B. Pine, Attorney General, was on brief for appellants.
        _______________
            Dennis J. Roberts  II with whom Law  Offices of Dennis J.  Roberts
            _____________________           __________________________________
        II was on brief for appellee.
        __

                                 ____________________

                                   August 11, 1997
                                 ____________________

                 BOUDIN, Circuit Judge.   In the district  court, Maureen
                         _____________

            Maigret and Susan  Sweet moved for summary  judgment, arguing

            that Rhoda Tang's  claim against them under 42  U.S.C.   1983

            was barred  by qualified immunity.   The district  court held

            that  factual  disputes precluded  summary  judgment on  this

            issue,  and Maigret  and Sweet  have  taken an  interlocutory

            appeal   to  this  court.    Under  governing  Supreme  Court

            precedent, we are obliged to dismiss the appeal on procedural

            grounds.

                 Tang, an Asian  American, has worked as a  public health

            nutritionist  at  the  Rhode  Island  Department  of  Elderly

            Affairs  since  1974.    In  her  view,  the  Department  has

            discriminated  against  her  for   many  years,  in   various

            respects, primarily on  account of her race.   The history of

            litigation includes a formal administrative charge by Tang of

            employment discrimination and  a settlement of the  matter in

            1987, and Tang's 1989 discharge and 1992 reinstatement, which

            followed union-initiated arbitration.

                 In 1996, Tang filed the present action in district court

            against  the Department,  Maigret  (former  director  of  the

            Department), and Sweet  (then the associate director).   Tang

            charged  that she had  been discriminated against  for racial

            and other  reasons in the  conditions of  her employment  and

            also  had been  subjected to  retaliation on  account  of her

            prior  complaint.   Her claims  were based  on Title  VII, 42

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            U.S.C.     2000e-2 and 3, on 42 U.S.C.     1981 and 1983, and

            on counterpart provisions of Rhode Island law.

                 After some  preliminary skirmishing,  Maigret and  Sweet

            moved  for summary  judgment  as to  the  section 1983  claim

            against them on grounds of qualified immunity.  They conceded

            that there  was a clearly  established right to be  free from

            racial  discrimination.     But,   relying  upon   Harlow  v.
                                                               ______

            Fitzgerald,  457  U.S.  800,  819  (1982),  and  Anderson  v.
            __________                                       ________

            Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,  638-39 (1987), they argued  that an
            _________

            objectively  reasonable  person  would  not  think  that  the

            conduct attributed to them by Tang violated that right.  

                 Some  of  the incidents  cited  by Tang  as  examples of

            racial discrimination or retaliation would strike many people

            as tame  (for example, that  she was given too  many clerical

            tasks); others might be more  serious.  But Maigret and Sweet

            sought  to  narrow  the  focus  by  asserting that  each  was

            directly linked only to one  or two incidents.  Tang answered

            that  factual  issues,  including   the  defendants'  alleged

            discriminatory intent, precluded summary judgment.

                 In October 1996,  the district court filed  a memorandum

            and  order  concluding  that  "the  [individual]  defendants'

            motion for qualified immunity must  be and is hereby deferred

            until completion of the trial  of the plaintiff's case."  The

            court  declined to "detai[l] the allegations the parties have

            made" but  explained: "It suffices  to say that I  agree with

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            plaintiff's counsel that  the vast majority of the  facts are

            in dispute."  This appeal followed.

                 Although  Tang defends the district court's order on the

            merits, she also says that we have no authority to review the

            district court's order.   The objection, couched  in language

            taken from a recent Supreme  Court case, is that "a defendant

            entitled  to  invoke  a qualified  immunity  defense  may not

            appeal a  district court  summary judgment  order insofar  as

            that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets

            forth a `genuine issue of fact  for trial.'"  See Johnson  v.
                                                          ___ _______

            Jones, 115 S. Ct. 2151, 2159 (1995).
            _____

                 The  Supreme Court  had  earlier  held  in  Mitchell  v.
                                                             ________

            Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530  (1985), that despite the ordinary
            _______

            requirement  of finality, a  denial of qualified  immunity on

            legal grounds is immediately  appealable under the collateral

            order doctrine.  But in Johnson, it narrowed this opportunity
                                    _______

            by  saying that  an  interlocutory appeal  from  a denial  of

            immunity  would not  be permitted  where  the district  court

            found  that a  genuine issue  of  material fact  precluded an

            immediate grant of  qualified immunity.  115 S.  Ct. at 2156-

            58.  Accord Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 842 (1996).
                 ______ _______    _________

                 In  construing these cases,  this court has  spelled out

            what is  implicit in Johnson,  namely, that it does  not help
                                 _______

            the official appealing a denial of immunity to argue that the

            district  court erred in  finding a  material issue  of fact.

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            Diaz  v. Diaz  Martinez, 112  F.3d  1, 4-5  (1st Cir.  1997);
            ____     ______________

            Stella  v. Kelley, 63 F.3d 71, 77-78  (1st Cir. 1995).  True,
            ______     ______

            such  an error can be described as  an error of law.  But, as

            the  Supreme  Court  made  clear,  Johnson's  limitation   on
                                               _______

            immediate  review rests primarily  on a prudential  desire to

            avoid  bringing  evidentiary  disputes to  the  appeals court
                             ___________

            except as  part of a final judgment.   Johnson, 115 S. Ct. at
                                                   _______

            2156-58.

                 In  this case,  the  district  court  did  not  identify

            specific  factual issues  or  explain  its  ruling,  but  its

            reasoning probably  lay along  one or  both of  two different

            lines:  that disputed  incidents trivial in  themselves might

            add up to something  more sinister as part  of a pattern,  or

            that  some of  the  incidents (such  as  the later  withdrawn

            discharge  of Tang in 1989)  might not be  so trivial at all.

            Neither  theory is impossible  in the  abstract.   See, e.g.,
                                                               ___  ____

            Carter v. Rhode Island, 68 F.3d 9, 13 (1st Cir. 1995).
            ______    ____________

                 Whether  the evidence adduced by Tang created a material

            issue of fact under summary judgment standards is a different

            question; to  decide it,  we would have  to describe  in some

            detail  the events  cited by  Tang and  the inferences  as to

            defendants' intent  that might, or  might not, be  drawn from

            the episodes alleged.   But this is the  very type of factual

            dispute  that  Johnson  holds  to  be  premature  so  far  as
                           _______

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            appellate  review is concerned.  Right or wrong, the district

            court's ruling is not subject to immediate appeal.  

                 The defendants counter by saying that  subjective intent

            is irrelevant to  qualified immunity.  They  concede arguendo
                                                                 ________

            each  of the  few incidents  directly  involving them  (e.g.,
                                                                    ____

            Maigret's  allegedly   inadequate  investigation   of  Tang's

            complaint that  another department  employee demanded  to use

            Tang's computer although other machines were available).  But

            drawing upon the Harlow-Anderson objective  test of qualified
                             ______ ________

            immunity, they  say that  no reasonable  person could  regard

            these actions as unlawful discrimination.

                 We  think that  the Harlow-Anderson objective  test does
                                     ______ ________

            not  automatically resolve  a qualified  immunity  defense in

            favor   of  the  defendant  in  a   case  of  alleged  racial

            discrimination or retaliation.   The essence of  such claims,

            or  at least one  standard version, is  that official actions

            that  might  otherwise  be  defended  as   reasonable  become

            illegitimate when taken out of  racial bias or in revenge for

            a prior complaint.   See Alexis v. McDonald's  Restaurants of
                                 ___ ______    __________________________

            Mass., Inc., 67 F.3d 341, 354 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing cases).
            ___________

            To employ a wholly objective test would wipe out many, if not

            most, of these claims.

                 The  objective test focuses on the reasonableness of the

            official's conduct independent of motive.  It is rarely going

            to be manifestly  unreasonable, judged apart from  motive, to

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            assign  particular  tasks  to  an  employee,  move  her  file

            cabinet, alter  her parking  arrangements or  do most  of the

            things  of  which Tang  complains.   But  because  of special

            constitutional  or statutory  protections,  some motives  can
                                                        ____

            convert relatively minor slights into causes of action.   Cf.
                                                                      ___

            Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62,  75 & n.8
            _____    ____________________________

            (1990).

                 An unresolved  tension  exists  between  such  specific-

            intent  torts  and  the  objective Harlow-Anderson  qualified
                                               ______ ________

            immunity test.1   That test was designed to  meet, not claims

            of  racial  bias  or  retaliation,  but  rather   ill-founded

            allegations  that an official action was "malicious" or taken

            "in  bad  faith"--characterizations that  defeated  qualified

            immunity at common law.   Prosser and Keeton on Torts    132,
                                      ___________________________

            at 1059-62 (5th ed. 1984).  In all events, the circuit courts

            have almost uniformly  refused to apply a  strictly objective

            test of qualified  immunity in racial and  retaliation cases.

            See Broderick v. Roache, 996 F.2d 1294, 1298 (1st Cir. 1993);
            _____________    ______

            Crawford-El, 93 F.3d at 817 (citing cases). 
            ___________

                 The  defendants  strongly  suggest that  the  failure to

            allow an appeal now, in a  case like this one, will  undercut

            the protection that qualified immunity is supposed to give to

                                
            ____________________

                 1The Supreme Court may clarify matters next fall when it
            confronts a qualified immunity defense offered to a charge of
            retaliatory  motive.   Crawford-El v.  Britton,  93 F.3d  813
                                   ___________     _______
            (D.C. Cir. 1996)  (en banc), cert. granted,  65 U.S.L.W. 3817
                                         _____________
            (1997).

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            a  government official  in  a  weak case  not  only to  avoid
                                    ________________

            liability  but to  avoid trial  itself.   Of course,  nothing

            prevents  a district court from granting summary judgment for

            the defendants where proof of  a racial or retaliatory motive

            is very  thin.  But  this does not help  government officials

            seeking an early  exit where the  district court thinks  that

            factual issues remain, for, in that event, Johnson still bars
                                                       _______

            an immediate appeal.

                 Johnson involved a factual dispute  about what occurred,
                 _______

            not an issue of motive,  and its full implications for motive

            cases may not have been  entirely apparent.  See Johnson, 115
                                                         ___ _______

            S. Ct.  at  2154, 2158.    Given the  policies  set forth  in

            Harlow, 457  U.S. at 817-18,  and Anderson, 483 U.S.  at 641,
            ______                            ________

            officials arguably  do need  some special  protection against

            charges  of improper motive, which  are easily made and which

            may be supported simply by an alleged remark of the defendant

            made when  only the plaintiff  was present.  The  problem for

            officials facing such lawsuits is very real.

                 In a few circuits, it appears that courts have responded

            by  squeezing   Johnson  a   bit  and  effectively   granting
                            _______

            interlocutory review  of denials of qualified  immunity based

            on  alleged factual disputes  about intent; but  this circuit

            and  a number  of others  have resisted  that course.2   More

                                
            ____________________

                 2Compare  Walker  v.  Schwalbe, 112  F.3d  1127, 1131-32
                  _______  ______      ________
            (11th Cir. 1997) and Blue v.  Koren, 72 F.3d 1075, 1083-84  &
                             ___ ____     _____
            n.6  (2d Cir.  1995) (exercising  pendent jurisdiction)  with
                                                                     ____

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            inventively,  the District  of  Columbia  Circuit, which  had

            developed  a  heightened pleading  standard  for  such motive

            claims, recently  abandoned it in favor of  imposing a "clear

            and  convincing evidence" standard of proof.  Crawford-El, 93
                                                          ___________

            F.3d at 818, 823.

                 Because  the  Supreme  Court   has  granted  review   in

            Crawford-El,  an answer to  the quandary may  be forthcoming,
            ___________

            but we need not hazard our  own guess about the outcome.   In

            the  present case,  Maigret and  Sweet  did not  ask for  any

            special  evidentiary  standard  to be  used  in  the district

            court--but  merely   for  summary   judgment  granting   them

            qualified immunity.  The district court denied it because  of

            a  perceived factual dispute,  and under Johnson  that ruling
                                                     _______

            cannot be reviewed on interlocutory appeal.

                 Appeal dismissed. 
                 ________________

                                
            ____________________

            Berdec a-P rez  v. Zayas-Green, 111  F.3d 183, 184  (1st Cir.
            ______________     ___________
            1995) and  Chateaubriand v.  Gaspard, 97  F.3d 1218,  1223-24
                  ___  _____________     _______
            (9th Cir. 1996) and Shinault v. Cleveland County Bd., 82 F.3d
                            ___ ________    ____________________
            367, 370-71  (10th Cir. 1996),  cert. denied, 117 S.  Ct. 740
                                            ____________
            (1997).

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