Court Opinion

ID: 9807392
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:02:53.050746+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:35:42.287469
License: Public Domain

WalkbR, J.,
dissenting from the affirmance of the judgment: It may be well doubted whether the plaintiff has shown that the fund in question did not belong to Gf. II. Miller, who was her husband. It was given to him to be used- in the automobile business, and it would therefore seem that he had the right to deposit it where he pleased and in his own name. The defendant bank offered to show a very good reason for not depositing it in the bank at Belhaven, which was that there was a business rival who was an officer or an employee in that bank, and therefore he placed it in the Bank of Washington. Besides, plaintiff testified that the business was conducted in the name of Gr. H. Miller with her consent. And thus, again, she further testified: “I knew for at least two weeks that he had the money on deposit, in his own name, in the Bank of Washington, and I did not communicate with that bank, and said nothing about it until the 20th or 21st of July,” when she went to the bank with her former attorney to get information about the deposit. She had dealings with the bank after Miller checked out the deposit, and made no complaint to the bank of its action in honoring his check until the latter *163part of December following, when this suit was brought. It also appeared by the testimony of her former attorney that she had ample time to have attached the fund after she came to the bank, and before Miller presented his check against the same, about three hours. The same attorney testified that “The papers had been prepared and were waiting for her to come and sign them, and all that was needed to perfect them was her signature, and the advance payment of costs.” That “they could have been served within half an hour.” The bank extended indulgence to her afterwards on a paper it held against her, and she accepted it without protest or objection at that time or at any subsequent time, until she sued as to the payment of Miller’s check on the deposit.
The jury returned the following verdict:
“1. When defendant bank paid check drawn by Gr. H. Miller, was plaintiff, Minnie Miller, equitable owner of the $800 referred to, as alleged? Answer: Yes.
“2. Did defendant bank, at time it'paid check drawn by Gr. H. Miller for said $800, know that plaintiff, Minnie Miller, claimed to own said fund? Answer: Yes.
“3. Did defendant bank, when it paid said check, know or have reason to believe that plaintiff, Minnie Miller, was proceeding to have same attached ? Answer: Yes.
“4. Did payment of said cheek by said bank cause plaintiff to lose said money? (No answer.)
“5. Is said bank indebted to plaintiff, Minnie Miller, and, if so, in what amount? Answer: Yes; $800, with interest on same from 21 July, 1916 (by the court).
“5%. Did plaintiff, Minnie Miller, before defendant paid out said money, notify said bank that it was her money, and why it was hers, and request said bank to hold it until she could have it attached ? Answer: No.”
It would appear that the answer to issue No. 2 and that to issue No. 51/2 are conflicting, if the defendant was not entitled to a verdict on the issues as they stood. It surely cannot be successfully contended that a bank should hold a fund left with it and refuse to pay a check drawn against the deposit upon a promise to pay cheeks of the depositor, merely because some one enters the bank and claims the fund without any proof of or suggestion as to the nature of the claim, and that is all the first three issues decide. The knowledge of any claim at all may have consisted in no more than information that she would attach the fund. But here she had all of the necessary time, and failed, according to the testimony of the attorney, to act, when the time required was only one-half of an hour. Did not the bank have the right to infer, when Miller presented his check just before the bank’s closing hour for the day — between 1 and 2 o’clock on 21 July, 1915 — that if she really intended to attach *164the fund when she was in the bank earlier in the day, she had abandoned her purpose, and she took no further action until she brought this action? The conduct of the plaintiff, under the circumstances, should estop her to claim that the bank was in default.
Mr. Morse, in his treatise on Banks and Banking, Vol. 1 (4 Ed.), says, at the close of section 343, p. 626 : “Notice from the adverse claimant to the bank should not hold the property any longer than would be necessary for said claimant to push his rights directly against the depositor; that if he did so, he should have an order (attachment, garnishee, or injunction) from the court to the bank to retain the deposit until the question was settled, unless bond of indemnity be given; but that if he did not, within a reasonable time after notifying the bank, proceed against the depositor directly, the bank would be released from any obligation to him, and might act as though it had received no notice of his claim.” Upon this authority of a standard text-book (see, also, Zane Banks and Banking par. 134), 1 need not discuss the difference between ■the English and American precedents upon this question. They are somewhat at variance. But, whatever the law may be on this question, I am of the opinion that, upon the verdict, the defendant was entitled to judgment; or, at least, to a new trial. The verdict does not find, under the first three issues, that the bank received any notice from the plaintiff of her claim. From all that appears in those issues and the answers thereto, the notice may have come to the bank in some other way; and as to the third issue, it may be said that the plaintiff was in fact not proceeding to attach the fund. If she threatened to do so, she did not execute her threat or begin to do so, but totally neglected to take any action after she left the bank, according to the testimony of her former attorney, who stated that she could have attached within one-half of an hour, as everything was ready for her signature. How could the bank have notice that something was proceeding to be done, when there was no proceeding, but instead an abandonment of all proceeding, or at least a negligent failure to proceed ? Lucus a non lucendo. This evidence is not controverted. "When no attachment was issued, after such a delay, why could not the bank itself proceed to act upon the belief that the claim was not a valid one and had therefore been withdrawn ? The last issue finds that the plaintiff did not notify the bank of her title to the fund, and why it belonged to her; nor did she request the bank to hold it until she could have attached it, nor does it appear that she offered to indemnify the bank or save it harmless in any way. It is plain that the bank’s position was a very delicate one, and it should not have dishonored Mr. Miller’s check unless it had some reasonable ground to believe that the claim of the plaintiff was a valid one. As it is found by the jury, it had only notice of some kind of claim by Mrs. Miller, but none of its nature; and, *165she having failed to attach or protect her interest, if she had any, within the usual time, or at least a sufficient time, it would follow that the bank should not have dishonored the-check. Mere notice of a claim is not enough to charge the bank with this heavy liability, when the plaintiff could so easily have informed it of the facts in regard to her title, if she had any, and tendered indemnity to save it from loss, which is a most reasonable requirement, but this §he did not do, and the jury have said that the bank “was not even notified that it was her money, and why it was hers, nor did she request the bank to hold the fund until she could attach it.” If she had a claim to the money, then the bank was notified that it was hers, and in this respect the findings on the second and on the last issue are in direct conflict. This is also true as to the third and the last issues. All the information the bank had came from Mrs. Miller. The jury found, in answer to the third issue, that the bank “knew or had reason to believe” that Mrs. Miller was proceeding to attach; and yet, in answer to the last issue, they say that she made no request for the bank to hold the fund until it could be attached.
The verdict, if not in favor of the defendant, will be found, upon a careful interpretation by the light we derive from the circumstances of the case, to be conflicting, or at least so uncertain and confusing as to require a new trial in order to prevent what may be, and no doubt is, a great injustice to the defendant. It has paid the full amount once. Shall it be subjected to a double payment upon such a verdict, when the intention of the jury, if we say the least of it, is not clear? The jury would doubtless have answered the fourth issue “No” if the issue had not been withdrawn and the judge had not given the peremptory instruction to answer the fifth issue “Yes” and inserted the amount. I think the fourth issue should have been submitted to the jury or some similar one. They may have found that her loss, if any, was due to her own negligence in leaving the money in the bank after two weeks knowledge of its deposit there, or that she failed to act with ordinary diligence in attaching the fund; and there are other grounds upon which they could have given an answer favorable to the defendant'.upon such an issue.
I may add that when the jury were informed that the plaintiff claimed a judgment upon their verdict, they addressed the following paper to the court:
“Noeth CaeoliNa — Beaufort County.
In the Superior Court — February Term, 1918.
(Title of cause.)
“To Honobable W. M. Bond, Judge Presiding:
“The undersigned jurors in the above entitled case, since they were discharged by the court, have been informed that the contention is now *166made that their verdict is in favor of the plaintiff. If such contention is made, they respectfully represent to the court that it is contrary to the purpose and conclusion of the jury, who intended to find for the defendant, and acted upon the impression and understanding that issue 4, which they did not answer, and 5%, which they answered ‘No,’ were the vital issues; and if there is any inconsistency in the verdict in- this regard, it does not represent the intention of the jury. R. B. Weston, H. G. Selby, J. S. Hodges, J. H. Woolard, Thad E. Adams, J. F. Thomas, Hilton' C. Bowen, D. D. Harrison, A. T. Windlwy, L. B. Edwards.”
I do not contend that this paper entitled the defendant, in law, to have the verdict set aside, because there is a general rule that a jury may not impeach their own verdict in such a way. But what the jury did is strong evidence in support of my view — that, upon the face of the verdict, their clear intention was to decide in favor of the defendant, because they thought that the answer to the last issue, which was the dominant and controlling one, was decisively in its favor and would entitle the bank to the judgment of the court. Even if the matter is in a state of doubt and uncertainty only, there should be another trial, so that the right of it may clearly appear.
The perilous position of the bank is shown by the two following cases: “It is clearly against public policy to permit a bank that has received money from a depositor, credited him therewith upon the books, and thereby entered into an implied contract to honor his checks, to allege that the money belongs to some one else. This may be done by an attaching creditor or by the true owner of the fund; but the bank -is estopped by its own act.” Lockhaven First National Bank v. Mason, 95 Pa. St., 113. “It requires neither argument nor authority to show that when a bank refuses the check of its depositor, drawn against funds, and pays the money over to a third party, it does so at its peril, and must assume the burden of proof to show not only that the money in question did not belong to the plaintiff (depositor), but also that it did not belong to the parties to whom the bank paid it.” Patterson v. Marine National Bank, 130 Pa. St., 419.
The English rule is flatly against the plaintiff’s right to recover, even upon the phase of this case most favorable to her, and this Court has never adopted or followed any other rule. It is the safer one and favors the free handling of commercial paper, and stabilizes the confidence of depositors in their banks. Any other rule would, in many cases, work injustice, and is not necessary for the protection of the claimant, who can easily save himself by prudent and prompt action in enjoining the bank or attaching the fund, or by enjoining the bank and making the *167depositor a party, so tbat tbe controversy can be tried out, tbe respective claims adjusted, and tbe true owner of tbe fund ascertained, without subjecting tbe bank to a double liability.
The evidence is even stronger for defendant than we have so far stated it. Tbe plaintiff admitted not only tbat her husband bad told her, two weeks before' tbe cheek was paid, that be bad deposited tbe money in the Washington bank to bis own credit, but she further said: “I saw tbe bank book on our desk, where we kept tbe business papers at tbe store. Miller bad told me tbat be bad deposited it to bis personal credit, and tbe bank book showed it. I had access to the bank book.” She told tbe cashier of tbe bank tbat “she bad given her husband this money to go into tbe automobile business.” She and her attorney, on tbe day they were in tbe bank making inquiry about Miller’s deposits, asked tbe cashier, Mr. Eoss, if Miller bad any money there, and be replied tbat be bad no right to divulge tbe confidential affairs of tbe bank or to tell anything about deposits, save to the depositor or bis authorized representative, which was entirely proper, but be added -that there was a legal way of getting tbe information. His conduct immediately afterwards, in discounting her paper and tbe accommodation be gave, showed clearly tbat be felt kindly towards her and was not trying to favor her husband as against her. Something has been said about tbe difficulty of Mrs. Miller’s securing a bond for tbe attachment. Tbe attorney testified tbat be bad agreed to sign tbe bond and that she was to go to tbe bank, discount her note, and pay tbe small amount of advance fees for tbe attachment. Tbe bank did discount her note, she had tbe money to pay tbe fees, and tbe bond and other papers were ready for her. She bad nothing to do then but to sign tbe papers, as tbe attorney stated. But she did not go back to his' office until too late. Tbe bank was not in default, therefore, but tbe attachment was not issued because of her own delay. If she bad returned to bis office, as she promised to do, she would have saved her money, if, upon the facts, it really belonged to her instead of her husband.
I also am of tbe opinion tbat tbe court erred in excluding tbe proposed testimony as to why G-. H. Miller bad deposited tbe money in tbe Bank of Washington instead of tbe Bank of Belbaven, tbe reason given being tbat there was a business rival in tbe Belbaven bank who would learn of bis business secrets. Tbe fact that be placed tbe money in tbe Bank of Washington has been used against tbe defendant as a suspicious circumstance, and it was entitled to have this evidence admitted to rebut any prejudicial inference tbat might be drawn from it.
Tbe cases cited in tbe opinions for affirmance are-not in point, because tbe facts upon which they were decided are not tbe same as those to be *168found in this record. It will not be denied that, under certain circumstances, a bank many be held liable for paying money to the depositor upon his check, but we have no such case here; and, besides, upon the face of the verdict, especially when the latter is construed in connection with the evidence and the charge, the jury clearly intended to decide with the defendant, or there is so much doubt about the matter that it would be just to order another trial.
I have confined my discussion of this case strictly to the law, as is proper for me to do, and have therefore made no reference to extraneous matters, with which I am not concerned. They are not judicial questions, and are entirely foreign to the matter presented for our decision.