Court Opinion

ID: 9695669
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:26:55.888692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:15.692990
License: Public Domain

CERCONE, Judge,
dissenting:
The following excerpts from the case of Commonwealth v. Stafford, 450 Pa. 252, 299 A.2d 590 (1973) support appellant’s contention that the prosecutor’s comment concerning appellant’s silence at the time of his arrest was prejudicial error:
“The Fifth Amendment protects the accused’s right to remain silent and it is of no moment that in the instant case the appellant remained silent at the time of his arrest. To allow comment on his silence at the time of arrest would also make the assertion of his privilege costly. . . . That the appellant himself brought his silence, at the time of his arrest, to the *55jury’s attention does not justify the prosecutor’s grasping the opportunity to suggest that the appellant’s guilt be inferred from his silence at that time.” 450 Pa. at 263, 299 A.2d at 596.
In Stafford the prosecutor’s comment was as follows:
“And then you’ve heard, this defendant at about 9:10, he’s arrested, 9:00 o’clock he’s arrested, brought down to the District Attorney’s office, advised of his rights ; where were you, what did you do, he doesn’t have to say a word, nothing. He can sit there in complete silence on his constitutional rights, and that’s what he does. And you’ve heard from his own mouth that that’s what he’s done, up until yesterday ... up until yesterday. You weigh that, in your deliberations. And you heard the contents, in essence, of this statement.” 450 Pa. at 262, 299 A.2d at 595.
The Commonwealth does not contend, nor would I find, that the comment in the instant case was any less prejudicial than was the comment in Stafford. However, the Commonwealth argues that Stafford is distinguishable because the prosecutor’s reference to appellant’s silence in the instant case was used specifically to contradict appellant’s claim that he was fleeing the premises in order to find the police. While this might have been the use intended by the prosecutor, the comment nevertheless implied to the jury that appellant’s silence at the time of his arrest was evidence of his guilt. In my view, this violates the holding in Stafford and thus requires reversal. See also Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 230 Pa.Super. 420, 326 A.2d 474 (1974).
HOFFMAN and SPAETH, JJ., join in this dissent.