Court Opinion

ID: 9719518
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:55:13.30787+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:24:11.300362
License: Public Domain

Murphy, C. J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part:

The Court holds that the jail officials’ initial confrontation with Whitfield, i.e., when they first accosted him as he emerged from the jail elevator and brought him to the isolation room in an effort to ascertain the whereabouts of *145the gun, constituted a “custodial interrogation” within the contemplation of Miranda; and that absent Miranda warnings Whitfield’s first oral admission that he had knowledge of the weapon, and his subsequent act in retrieving the gun and turning it over to the authorities, was inadmissible in evidence. I do not agree with that conclusion and, therefore, dissent from that part of the majority holding which would exclude this evidence from being introduced upon retrial of the case.
Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1503, 20 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1968), makes clear that the principles of Miranda apply to a custodial interrogation conducted in a prison and that it makes no difference that the interrogators are correctional officials, rather than police officers. I agree that Whitfield’s initial oral statement admitting knowledge of the weapon was made while he was in “custody” in a Miranda sense, i.e., he was deprived or restricted of his normal freedom of action or movement within the jail under pressure of official authority. I do not agree, however that the oral statement made at that initial confrontation was responsive to an “interrogation” within the contemplation of Miranda since the inquiry was not made to elicit evidence of a crime but rather as part of an investigation limited in purpose to the location of a weapon which presented a real threat to the internal security of the prison. An individual may be in custody, but not subjected to an “interrogation” in the Miranda sense, as the majority recognizes. Nothing in Mathis or in Miranda itself supports the majority’s position that any custodial examination that has the potential to lead to an incriminating statement is a Miranda-type interrogation; nor does either of those cases equate an “interrogation” with an inquiry of an inmate concerning suspected breaches of internal prison security, and this is so even though the suspected breach may also, if established, constitute evidence of a crime. In effect, the Court has extended Miranda to foreclose an inquiry concerning the maintenance of internal prison security unless the inmate is first given the full panoply of Miranda warnings, including the admonition that he may refuse to talk to prison authorities about the matter *146and may have a lawyer present with him if any such inquiry is actually conducted.
The majority seemingly recognizes that the concern of the jail authorities in the intitial confrontation with Whitfield was to obtain knowledge of the gun’s location in order to secure the safety of the jail, rather than to elicit admissions for use at a criminal prosecution. In this regard, it should be noted that there was no questioning of Whitfield at that time concerning his alleged escape plan; rather the inquiry was limited and singular in purpose — to locate the gun and thus to reestablish prison security and discipline. In these circumstances, it makes no sense to conclude, as the majority does, that no inquiry may be made of a prisoner without prior Miranda warnings if there , is a possibility that evidence relevant to a criminal prosecution may result. The majority’s conclusion that the State may make the inquiry without giving Miranda warnings but must forego use of that relevant evidence is both an unwarranted extension of Miranda’s holding and a needless price to exact in order to maintain internal prison security and discipline.
The cases supporting the proposition that inquiry of the type and for the singular purpose initially conducted in this case does not constitute “interrogation” within the meaning of Miranda, upon which the Court of Special Appeals relied in its opinion below — but which the majority finds unpersuasive — make good sense to me and are not at variance with the fundamental import of the Miranda decision. Representative of these cases is State v. LaRue, 19 Wash. App. 841, 578 P.2d 66 (1978). In that case, LaRue, a prison inmate, was questioned by a correctional officer in a segregation cell immediately following the stabbing of another inmate with a knife. Miranda warnings were not given. LaRue was asked as to the location of the knife and he gave an incriminating answer. The guard testified that his purpose in questioning LaRue was to locate the weapon and secure the prison, rather than to investigate the stabbing. The court held that Miranda warnings need not be given in these circumstances because the primary purpose of the inquiry was to find and remove a dangerous weapon from the prison *147and not to pursue a criminal investigation, i.e., there was no “interrogation” in the Miranda sense. Similarly, as the Court of Special Appeals said in Hunt v. State, 2 Md. App. 443, 447, 234 A.2d 785 (1967), “interrogation by prison officials with relation to the maintenance of internal security and discipline and to the rules and regulations of the prison, where the thrust and purpose of the interrogation does not relate to the prosecution for any crime, does not fall within the ambit of the Miranda decision.”
Closely allied with the line of cases represented by LaRue and Hunt are those which hold that Miranda does not foreclose recognition of a limited exception to its rules of custodial interrogation in order to meet emergencies seriously affecting the safety of human life where the intent in making the inquiry and taking the statement is nonprosecutorial at the time. See e.g. United States v. Castellana, 500 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1975); People v. Riddle, 83 Cal. App. 3d 563, 148 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 937, 99 S. Ct. 1283, 59 L. Ed. 2d 496 (1979); People v. Dean, 38 Cal. App. 3d 875, 114 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1974). The lives and safety of many individuals within a prison are placed in serious jeopardy by the presence of a gun within the institution particularly where, as here, the gun is thought to be associated with an escape plan.1 As Chief Judge Gilbert so cogently observed for the intermediate appellate court in this case (Whitfield v. State, 42 Md. App. at 125-126, 128):
"Unequivocally, knowledge by prison or jail officials of a gun’s being in the hands of an inmate creates an emergency with which they must cope immediately. The situation demands prompt and drastic action. The gun’s presence in the penal institution is a 'bell ringer’ that an escape attempt is imminent, with the strong possibility that one or more homicides may occur. It behooves the officials *148to move with alacrity to locate the weapon and confiscate it in order to protect their own lives, the lives of the prison populace, visitors who might be in the institution at the time, and the public generally.”
“. . . The questioning of Whitfield was not an interrogation, looking toward prosecution, but an on-the-scene investigation for a deadly weapon which presented a threat to the security of the jail. State v. LaRue, supra. Moreover, a fair reading of the record discloses that the correctional officers were preoccupied more so with the recovery of the gun, whether there were other guns inside the jail, and the details of the escape attempt, than with the apprehension and punishment of Whitfield.”
“We hold that where, as here, correctional officers of a penal institution are informed of the existence of a weapon cached within the institution’s confines and, consequently, presenting the possibility of an imminent breach of security or a volatile situation, a questioning of a person reasonably likely to have knowledge of the weapon’s whereabouts so as to aid the officials in removing the weapon from the institution, or which questioning is designed to secure the safety of the prison population, is permissible. Incriminating statements made by any party involved in the immediate scope of the investigation may, within the sound discretion of the trial judge, be admitted in evidence even though the declarant was not afforded proper Miranda warnings before questioning.
“We are not to be understood as sanctioning a carte blanc, sans Miranda interrogation by correctional officials of prison inmates. Prisoners do not surrender all of their constitutional rights when *149they enter a penal institution. Miranda is normally applicable to them as well as to the general populace. Only the most unusual explosive circumstances will excuse Miranda compliance.”
To hold that Miranda precepts were violated at Whitfield’s first custodial confrontation with jail officials, and that the incriminatory evidence that flowed from that session was inadmissible in evidence, is to lose sight of overriding institutional needs and objectives, and unnecessarily, and unwisely, to weaken the control of prison officials over the maintenance of prison security and discipline. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S. Ct. 1551, 47 L. Ed. 2d 810 (1976), declining to hold that the strictures of Miranda were applicable in non-criminal prison disciplinary proceedings. I do, however, fully agree with the Court that the second confrontation between Whitfield and the jail authorities, i.e., that which occurred after the gun had been retrieved and prison security reestablished, constituted a custodial interrogation squarely within the contemplation of Miranda and that oral statements obtained at that time from Whitfield were not properly admissible in evidence, since the Miranda warnings admittedly were not given to him prior to the interrogation.
Judge Smith authorizes me to say that he concurs in the views here expressed.

. In this case, testimony revealed that the pistol was an integral part in an escape plan which was scheduled for Sunday, July 5, only a short time after the prison authorities located the gun. The plan was to r‘get the drop” on a guard armed with a shot gun down by the gate on the ground level. Once the inmates had his gun, they intended to “make their way” out of the gate and over a small wall.