Court Opinion

ID: 9380275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-17 19:00:36.060666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:23.943173
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 17 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MINGMEI DING,                                   No.    20-72822

                Petitioner,                     Agency No. A216-269-716

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

                Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                              Submitted March 14, 2023**

Before:      SILVERMAN, SUNG, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

      Mingmei Ding, a native and citizen of China, petitions pro se for review of

the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from an

immigration judge’s decision denying her applications for asylum, withholding of

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the

agency’s factual findings, applying the standards governing adverse credibility

determinations under the REAL ID Act. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039-

40 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny the petition for review.

      Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination

based on Ding’s omission from her credible fear interview that she lost

consciousness while being interrogated, and inconsistencies between her credible

fear interview and testimony regarding the frequency and duration of the

interrogation and when she began practicing Christianity. See id. at 1048 (adverse

credibility determination reasonable under “the totality of circumstances”); see

also Silva-Pereira v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 1176, 1185 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[A]n adverse

credibility determination may be supported by omissions that are not details, but

new allegations that tell a much different—and more compelling—story of

persecution than [the] initial application[.]” (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted)); Singh v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 1081, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 2005) (indicia of

reliability for asylum officer’s notes). Ding’s explanations do not compel a

contrary conclusion. See Li v. Garland, 13 F.4th 954, 960-61 (9th Cir. 2021)

(agency not compelled to accept explanations for discrepancies). Substantial

evidence also supports the agency’s determination that Ding did not present

corroborative evidence that would otherwise establish her eligibility for relief. See

                                          2                                    20-72822
Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2014) (petitioner’s documentary

evidence was insufficient to independently support claim). Thus, in the absence of

credible testimony, Ding’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail. See

Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).

      Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of Ding’s CAT claim

because it was based on the same testimony found not credible, and the record does

not otherwise compel the conclusion that it is more likely than not she would be

tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to

China. See id. at 1157.

      In light of this disposition, we do not reach Ding’s remaining contentions

regarding her eligibility for relief. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538

(9th Cir. 2004) (courts are not required to decide issues unnecessary to the results

they reach).

      We do not consider the materials Ding references in her opening brief that

are not part of the administrative record. See Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 963-64

(9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (court’s review is limited to the administrative record).

      The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues.

      PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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