Court Opinion

ID: 9743970
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:51:19.419095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:45.576044
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, dissenting: Considering the burden of proof required of the State, preponderance of the evidence, and the standard of review that adheres, i.e., we will not reverse unless the trial court’s findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence, the trial court should be affirmed. It is readily apparent to this court and the parties agree that the “disclosure of the information sought is essential to the protection of the public interest.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 8—907(2).) As the majority points out, the only issue on appeal is whether the State met its burden under the statute “that all other available sources of information have been exhausted.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 8-907(2). Warden does give us the necessary guidance to decide this appeal. In Warden, the supreme court dealt specifically with the provisions of section 8 — 907 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 8—907). With respect to the provision “that all other available sources of information have been exhausted” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 8—907(2)), the supreme court stated: “[Ejvery jurisdiction which has recognized a qualified reporter’s privilege has also required a showing, prior to divestiture, that other sources of information have been exhausted. [Citations.] The extent to which these alternatives must be pursued, however, is not entirely clear, and that question presents the courts with perhaps the most difficult problems in this area. The controlling standard has not been defined uniformly. Depending on the jurisdiction, it must be established that: ‘reasonable efforts’ have been made to obtain the information elsewhere [citations]; proof by a preponderance of the evidence establishes the unavailability of less intrusive sources [citation]; the ‘only practical access to crucial information *** is through the newsman’s sources’ [citation]; ‘possible alternative sources’ have not been exhausted [citation]; ‘reasonably available alternative sources’ have been exhausted [citations]; ‘the party seeking the information has unsuccessfully attempted to obtain other sources less chilling of the First Amendment freedoms’ [citation]; ‘the litigant has exhausted all other means of obtaining the information’ [citation]; the party has ‘attempted to obtain the information from other sources’ [citation]; the material sought is not ‘available from a nonjournalistic source’ [citation]; or that the information ‘is unavailable from any other source’ [citation]. * * * While the phrase ‘available source’ is not easily defined, section 8 — 906 of the Code directs the court, in granting or denying divestiture, to consider ‘the adequacy of the remedy otherwise available, if any, the relevancy of the source, and the possibility of establishing by other means that which it is alleged the source requested will tend to prove’ [citation]. In our judgment, these provisions, when read with section 8— 907, reflect a clear legislative intent to create a standard which balances the reporter’s first amendment rights against the public interest in the information sought and the practical difficulties in obtaining the information elsewhere. Thus, the extent to which an investigation must be carried before the reporter’s privilege should be divested cannot be reduced to any precise formula or definition but must, in view of the competing interests involved, depend on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” (Warden, 104 Ill. 2d at 425-27, 472 N.E.2d at 453-54.) In Warden, Justice Underwood quoted the specially concurring opinion of Justice Powell in Branzburg, stating: “ ‘The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions.’ ” (Warden, 104 Ill. 2d at 427-28, 472 N.E.2d at 454, quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 656, 92 S. Ct. at 2671 (Powell, J., concurring).) ■ Warden then states: “We think it clear that the statute requires more than a showing of inconvenience to the investigator before a reporter can be compelled to disclose his sources ***.” Warden, 104 Ill. 2d at 428-29, 472 N.E.2d at 454. In this case, we need to strike a balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of a citizen to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct. The strong public interest and the practical difficulties that have been met in this investigation mandate disclosure. The majority opinion herein states: “In the present case, the State appears to have contacted all available sources. This record suggests that the police have conducted a thorough and comprehensive investigation, and the only things the State knows about defendant’s sources are that some of them might live in Springfield and none of them will talk to the police.” (226 Ill. App. 3d at 861.) I see no useful purpose to give publicity to criminal acts based upon a privilege and not require disclosure to the prosecution, especially where authorities have made an effort, as the majority points out, to investigate and determine witnesses to this serious case. In my view, the civil cases cited by the majority lend little weight and credence to this case. Public interest in civil cases is certainly different than that inherent in serious criminal cases such as this; in the latter circumstance, the public interest becomes more important. Additionally, as pointed out by the majority, intensive investigation has consumed more than 2,000 hours of investigators’ time and the State had garnered sufficient evidence to charge two suspects with the crimes. The evidence presented to the trial court more than adequately satisfies the requirement that the State prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it has exhausted “all other available sources of information” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 8—907(2)) as defined in Warden. Applying Justice Stewart’s test stated in Branzburg, there is probable cause to believe the defendant has information clearly relevant to a specific violation of law, there is a compelling and overriding interest in the information, and the information cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive of first amendment rights. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 743, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 676, 92 S. Ct. at 2681 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The trial court’s decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. I agree that the scope of the trial court’s order needs to be tailored. The order should be restricted specifically to matters concerning confessions or admissions of individuals involved in the commission of the offense or in aiding or abetting the commission of the offense.