Court Opinion

ID: 9494707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:44:25.481216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:33.923177
License: Public Domain

KING, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment:
The issue of how or whether our criminal justice system should utilize technological and scientific improvements in the post-conviction context implicates the balancing of finality-a necessity in our judicial process — with our hallmark commitment to fair and impartial justice. I find myself in agreement with Chief Judge Wilkinson and the panel majority that, except for the broad parameters mandated by the Due Process Clause, such issues are more properly resolved by the legislative process. I also agree that the district court erred in concluding that Harvey’s denial of post-conviction access to the biological evidence relating to his rape conviction contravened the requirements of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and that Harvey’s due process rights were violated by the conduct of the Commonwealth’s Attorney.
I part company, however, with the majority’s conclusion that Harvey’s complaint must be construed as a petition for habeas corpus. To the contrary, under the Supreme Court’s mandate in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), his complaint should be analyzed as it is framed, that is, as a civil action initiated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, the failing of this proceeding is not that it represents a successive petition for habeas corpus on a claim previously adjudicated, but that Harvey is unable to demonstrate that a state actor somehow deprived him of a federally protected right. Therefore, although I agree with our good Chief Judge that the award of relief to Harvey should be reversed, I write separately to explain my rationale.
I.
The proper approach to analyzing Harvey’s claim is to first determine whether it is cognizable under § 1983 or whether, in the alternative, it may only be brought in habeas corpus. If that determination is made in favor of § 1983, we must then decide whether Harvey has sufficiently alleged and demonstrated the requirements of a § 1983 action. Having undertaken this analysis, I view Harvey’s complaint as cognizable under § 1983, but I conclude that he has failed to demonstrate that any *382of his federally protected rights were violated.
The majority, relying on Heck v. Humphrey, has decided that Harvey fails to state a claim under § 1983, and that his action is only cognizable, if at all, as a petition for habeas corpus. It observes that proceedings which, if successful, would necessarily imply the invalidity of a defendant’s conviction or sentence must be brought, pursuant to Heck, in habeas corpus. Ante at 374. The majority therefore concludes that, because Harvey seeks access to the biological evidence to challenge his underlying rape conviction, his claim is not cognizable under § 1983. Ante at 375.
Although the relevant inquiry is whether a § 1983 proceeding explicitly or implicitly attacks the fact or length of a prisoner’s confinement, the Heck decision does not compel the majority’s conclusion. In Heck, the Court affirmed the principle that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 481, 114 S.Ct. 2364. In furtherance of this principle, the Court held that, in any § 1983 action in which a state prisoner seeks damages, “the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Id. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (emphasis added).1 If such a necessary implication exists, then the complaint, according to Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court, “must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. By the same token, Justice Sealia observed that “if the district court determines that the plaintiffs action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.” Id.
In this proceeding, Harvey seeks access to the biological evidence held by the Commonwealth’s Attorney, and his suit, if successful, would merely result in the Commonwealth’s Attorney making the evidence available to him.2 That act alone — providing Harvey with access to the biological evidence relating to his rape conviction— does not, in the words of Justice Sealia, “necessarily imply” the invalidity of Harvey’s conviction or sentence. Id. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364.3 Although Harvey might *383use the evidence, at some future date, to initiate a separate action challenging his conviction, future exculpation is not a necessary implication of Harvey’s claim in this case. Indeed, Harvey’s capable counsel acknowledged at oral argument that state-of-the-art DNA testing often inculpates rather than exculpates, and at other times it simply is inconclusive.4 Thus, it is also possible — and the Commonwealth would say likely — that such testing will provide more conclusive evidence of Harvey’s guilt. Put simply, we do not know whether providing Harvey with access to the evidence would assist or hinder his attempts at exculpation; therefore, his civil action requesting access to the biological evidence does not “necessarily imply” the invalidity of his conviction.
Our good Chief Judge, writing for the majority, maintains that, because Harvey is seeking access to the biological evidence in order to challenge his confinement, his complaint must in fact be considered as an effort to seek habeas corpus relief. Ante at 375. A prisoner’s underlying rationale, however, for bringing his § 1983 suit is not relevant under Heck. The applicable standard is an objective one, and the only relevant question is whether the prisoner’s legal proceeding, if successful, would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (emphasis added). Therefore, even assuming Harvey’s lawsuit is part of a long-term strategy to vacate his conviction, that fact has no bearing on whether his proceeding is cognizable under § 1983, or whether it may only be brought in habeas corpus. The issue, rather, is simply whether the claim made by Harvey would “necessarily imply” that his conviction should be reversed. In this situation, that is plainly not the case, and Harvey may therefore properly proceed under § 1983.
II.
Having concluded that Harvey’s claim is cognizable under § 1983, I must address whether it passes muster as such an action. Under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate the deprivation of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” by a state actor. It is indisputable that the Commonwealth’s Attorney is a state actor within the meaning of § 1983; therefore, in order for Harvey to prevail, he must demonstrate that his denial of access to the biological evidence relating to his rape conviction deprived him of a federally protected right. Harvey seeks to satisfy this requirement by contending that the denial of access constitutes a violation of his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5
*384A.
Before addressing the merits of Harvey’s allegation that his due process rights have been violated, we must determine whether his § 1983 action is time-barred. The statute of limitations for § 1983 proceedings is borrowed from a state’s general personal injury statute of limitations. Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass’n v. Glendening, 174 F.3d 180, 187 (4th Cir. 1999). In Virginia, the applicable limitations period is two years from the time the cause of action accrues. Va.Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A) (Michie 2000). The determination of when a cause of action accrues, however, is a federal question and, under federal law, a cause of action accrues when “the plaintiff possesses sufficient facts about the harm done to him that reasonable inquiry will reveal his cause of action.” Jersey Heights, 174 F.3d at 187 (quoting Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Correction, 64 F.3d 951, 955 (4th Cir.1995) (en banc)).
We must therefore examine the allegations and the record to assess when Harvey suffered the alleged deprivation of his due process rights, and when Harvey possessed sufficient facts about such deprivation that reasonable inquiry would have revealed his cause of action. Harvey asserts multiple theories for how his denial of access to the biological evidence relating to his rape conviction violated due process. Under several of those theories, he contends that due process requires that he have access to the biological evidence, and, as such, the relevant constitutional harm occurred when Harvey was first denied access by the Commonwealth’s Attorney.
If the mere denial of access is the relevant constitutional harm, then Harvey’s § 1983 claim is likely time-barred. The record reveals that Harvey first began seeking the biological evidence from the Commonwealth’s Attorney between November 1996 and February 1998, and he asserts in his complaint that he was “repeatedly unsuccessful” in his efforts to obtain access prior to making a formal request in February 1998. Complaint at ¶ 34. Harvey also alleged that he had never received a response to his February 1998 request. Id. Therefore, according to Harvey, by the middle of 1998, he had been pursuing access to the biological evidence for well over a year, and he had received no access to the evidence and had met with uncooperative silence from the Commonwealth’s Attorney. If, standing alone, the denial of access to evidence violates due process, then it is likely that, by the middle of 1998, (1) a “constructive” denial had occurred, and (2) Harvey possessed sufficient facts to know that his rights were being violated. Yet Harvey failed to initiate this § 1983 proceeding until July 7, 2000, well over three years after he began seeking the evidence and more than two years after he failed to receive a response to his formal request to the Commonwealth’s Attorney for access. Thus, if the mere denial of access by the Commonwealth’s Attorney is sufficient to violate Harvey’s due proces’s rights, then Harvey’s § 1983 suit is probably time-barred.
*385For one of Harvey’s theories of due process violations, however, the relevant harm is a denial of access to the biological evidence in bad faith, i.e., with the purpose and effect of frustrating Harvey’s exercise of his constitutional rights. Under that theory, before Harvey’s cause of action under § 1983 would accrue, he would need to possess sufficient facts to trigger a reasonable inquiry into whether the denial had been in bad faith. It is unclear from this record whether, assuming that the Commonwealth’s Attorney denied Harvey’s request in bad faith, Harvey possessed sufficient information by July 7, 1998, for his cause of action to accrue. Given that ambiguity, and given the sparseness of the record generally with respect to Harvey’s knowledge of the status of his requests for access, his § 1983 claim cannot be disposed of solely on limitations grounds. I therefore turn to the merits of Harvey’s § 1983 proceeding.
B.
In contending that he had been deprived of his due process rights, Harvey offered multiple theories on how the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s denial of access violated due process. Specifically, Harvey asserted that the denial of access violated the rule of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and interfered with his right of meaningful access to the court system. In addition, he contended in a more general fashion that the denial of access contravened the requirements of Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51,109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988), and that it abridged substantive due process. Although the district court granted summary judgment in Harvey’s favor solely on the basis of his Brady claim, this Court has “consistently recognized that, even [if] we disagree with the reasoning of the district court, we may affirm the result on different grounds if fully supported by the record.” Brewster of Lynchburg, Inc. v. Dial Corp., 33 F.3d 355, 361 n. 3 (4th Cir.1994). Therefore, I will address each of these theories in turn.
1.
The district court identified and found a due process deprivation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Harvey v. Horan, No. Civ.A. 00-1123-A, 2001 WL 419142 at *5 (E.D.Va. Apr.16, 2001) (“The court finds that, pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), the plaintiff has a due process right of access to the DNA evidence and to conduct DNA testing upon the biological evidence, as such evidence could constitute material exculpatory evidence.”). On this point, I agree with Judge Wilkinson: Harvey’s denial of access to the biological evidence after his conviction and sentencing, standing alone, fails to contravene Brady. Ante at 378. As the majority points out, there is no allegation that Harvey did not receive a fair trial in the courts of Virginia in 1990. Id. There is also no contention that the Commonwealth denied Harvey access to Brady material during his prosecution. As such, the Brady rule has no application to Harvey’s claim in this case.6
2.
Given that the Brady rule is not applicable, I next evaluate Harvey’s contention that his denial of access to the biological *386evidence relating to his rape conviction violates his right of access to the courts. Harvey asserts that the denial of access by the Commonwealth’s Attorney prevented him from bringing future actions to challenge his conviction, such as a clemency application or another petition for habeas corpus relief, and thereby blocked him from obtaining any relief in the court system; therefore, Harvey maintains that the denial of access contravened his constitutional right of access to the court system under the Due Process Clause.
It is well established that due process requires government officials to permit prisoners “adequate, effective, and meaningful” access to the court system to litigate post-conviction legal issues, such as habeas corpus and civil rights actions. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485-86, 89 S.Ct. 747, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969). As such, the government must ensure that prisoners have the substantive ability to take advantage of post-conviction .legal options, i.e., the ability to file the requisite legal papers is insufficient. The Court has also observed, however, that a state has no affirmative duty to “enable the prisoner to discover grievances, and to litigate effectively once in court.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996). Thus, although a state must provide prisoners with meaningful access to the legal system, it is not obligated to maximize the prisoner’s chances of prevailing in his post-conviction action.
Under Lewis, the mere fact that the Commonwealth’s Attorney denied Harvey access to the biological evidence is insufficient to abridge Harvey’s right of access to the courts. Even without access to the evidence, Harvey is fully capable of taking advantage of post-conviction legal options such as habeas corpus and clemency. He has made no allegation that he lacks an adequate library or other legal resources such that he is unable to effectively initiate a post-conviction proceeding. Harvey’s contention is essentially that he needs access to the biological evidence to increase his chance of success in any future clemency application or habeas corpus proceeding he might initiate; however, under Lewis, the Commonwealth’s Attorney has no obligation to help Harvey bolster any such future legal efforts. Id. at 354, 116 S.Ct. 2174. Thus, the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s denial of access to Harvey did not infringe upon Harvey’s constitutional right of access to the court system.
3.
Harvey also generally contends that his denial of access to the biological evidence violated due process because it contravened the requirements of Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). The Supreme Court held in Youngblood that the prosecution violates the Due Process Clause if it fails to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence in bad faith, even though such material is outside the scope of Brady v. Maryland. Id. at 58, 109 S.Ct. 333. Harvey contends that “under Youngblood, blocking access to existing evidence whose potential exculpatory value is self-evident is no different than, in bad faith, destroying it,” and therefore the denial of access violated his due process rights. Appellee’s Br. at 9.
As an initial matter, Youngblood, like Brady, addresses the prosecution’s constitutional duty prior to conviction, and thus fundamentally concerns a criminal defendant’s due process right to a fair trial. Harvey’s reliance on Youngblood, however, is not entirely misplaced, because Young-*387blood also implicates a broader due process concern. Government agents should not actively impede an attempt to exercise a constitutional right in bad faith, i.e., with the intended purpose of preventing an individual from exercising the right. In fact, Judge Wilkinson explained this point with clarity in his opinion in Jean v. Collins, 221 F.3d 656 (4th Cir.2000).
Of course the bad faith manipulation of evidence on the part of the police cannot be countenanced. Constitutional absolution for the concealment, doctoring, or destruction of evidence would fail to protect the innocent, fail to assist the apprehension of the guilty, and fail to safeguard the judicial process as one ultimately committed to the ascertainment of truth.
Id. at 663. In essence, the concept of due process requires that the government treat its citizens in an evenhanded and neutral manner; thus the targeting of specific individuals with the purpose of frustrating the exercise of their lawful rights contradicts the basic premise of the constitutional guarantee.
Thus, given that prisoners possess a right of effective access to the court system, a governmental decision to deny access to evidence with the intent — and with the effect — of preventing a prisoner from exercising his right of effective access to the court system would violate due process. Cf. Swekel v. City of River Rouge, 119 F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th Cir.1997) (concluding that police cover-up of evidence which prevented plaintiff from filing § 1983 suit against government officials violated plaintiffs constitutional right of access to court system); Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1261 (7th Cir.1984) (holding that constitutional right of access is violated when police deny plaintiffs information necessary for them to seek redress). To permit a state official to target a particular prisoner and to deliberately frustrate that prisoner’s ability to take advantage of post-conviction legal options contravenes the essence of fair and impartial procedural justice.
Therefore, in order for Harvey to prevail on his § 1983 claim, he must demonstrate that the Commonwealth’s Attorney denied him access to the biological evidence in bad faith, i.e., it deliberately blocked his access to the evidence in order to impede his ability to take advantage of available post-conviction legal procedures. In the circumstances presented, Harvey cannot prevail on this claim. He has made no allegation of bad faith on the part of the Commonwealth or its representatives, and he has presented no evidence of any bad faith. As such, Harvey has failed to demonstrate that the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s conduct violated his due process rights.
4.
Finally, Harvey contends that the conduct of the Commonwealth’s Attorney violated his due process rights because the denial of access to the biological evidence contravened substantive due process. As the majority observes, Harvey indicated at oral argument that this Court should employ the three-part balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), to craft a due process right of access to biological evidence for the purpose of DNA testing. Ante at 377. Harvey asserts that, given a prisoner’s substantial interest in proving his innocence and the minor administrative burden to the state in providing access, we should find such a due process right.
Harvey’s reliance on Mathews is misplaced. The Court in Mathews promulgated the three-part test as a means of evaluating the constitutional adequacy of administrative procedures used to deprive *388an individual of a “liberty” or “property interest. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 331-35, 96 S.Ct. 893. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, observed that “[procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 331, 96 S.Ct. 893. He also noted, however, that “ ‘[d]ue process,’ unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances,” and he consequently recognized that different administrative proceedings could use very different procedures and nonetheless be constitutionally sufficient. Id. at 334, 96 S.Ct. 893 (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961)). Justice Powell therefore established the three-part test as a procedure for analyzing whether a governmental decision-making process complied with constitutional constraints. Id. at 334-35, 96 S.Ct. 893.
Thus the balancing test of Mathews is only relevant when the government is depriving an individual of a “liberty” or “property” interest. Harvey must therefore possess such an interest in accessing or possessing the biological evidence relating to his rape conviction before the principles of Mathews come into play. Harvey, however, has no such interest. He has no post-conviction legal right to access or discover the evidence relating to his rape conviction, and he certainly has no property interest in such evidence. As such, the Mathews test is not applicable to Harvey’s situation.7
C.
Harvey therefore is unable to demonstrate that the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s denial of access, under any of his theories, violated his due process rights. As such, Harvey has failed to demonstrate that his federally protected rights were violated, and his § 1983 proceeding must fail.
III.
Our criminal justice system is not infallible, and it has occasionally convicted an innocent person. Although technological and scientific advances may well enable our legal system to make more precise judgments of guilt or innocence, the blanket application of such developments to previously concluded proceedings raises difficult questions concerning finality. An appropriate balance must therefore be struck between accuracy and finality, and the integrity and efficiency of our judicial system must be preserved.
Regardless of where I would strike such a balance, it is not, as I have stated, our role to decide the issue here. Our task is to ensure that the Commonwealth's Attorney has not, in this case, violated Harvey’s federally protected rights — and he has not done so.

. As the majority observes, Heck only dealt with a § 1983 suit for damages. Ante at 375. There is no reason, however, to believe that the principles of Heck are so limited, and I agree with the majority that the Heck rationale is also applicable to § 1983 proceedings by a prisoner seeking injunctive relief that would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence. Ante at 375. See also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648-49, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997) (leaving question unresolved).

. The specific relief requested by Harvey in his complaint is:
Equitable relief, in the form of the search for and release of all biological evidence, including the rape kit and reference sam-pies of [Harvey's co-defendant] Steve Lawrence as well as the panty hose and the maroon shirt collected in connection with the rape for which [Harvey] was convicted....
Complaint at ¶ A.

.Examining conventional dictionary definitions clarifies the stringent nature of the Heck test. “Necessarily" means "of necessity" or “inevitably”; thus, a successful lawsuit by Harvey will "necessarily imply” the invalidity of his conviction only if it "inevitably” mandates such a conclusion. See Webster's II New College Dictionary 731 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1995). Put simply, if there is any conceivable way in which Harvey can succeed in this lawsuit and not impair the validity of his *383conviction, then a successful prosecution of Harvey’s claim does not "necessarily imply" the invalidity of his conviction.

. This point, i.e., that STR DNA testing of biological evidence does not always result in future exculpation, is amply demonstrated by results obtained pursuant to the new Virginia statute, cited approvingly by the majority, that provides prisoners post-conviction access to DNA testing. See Va.Code Ann. §§ 19.2-327.1 to 327.6 (Michie Supp.2001). Reportedly, the first post-conviction DNA testing accomplished under the statute, performed for a prisoner serving 42 years for rape, was incon-elusive, and it failed to assist the prisoner in establishing his innocence. Brooke A. Masters, DNA Test Fails to Vindicate Virginia Inmate, Wash. Post, November 28, 2001, at B08.

. In his complaint, Harvey also alleged violations of his Sixth Amendment rights under the Compulsory Process Clause and the Confrontation Clause and his Eighth Amendment rights under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. The district court, however, in denying the Commonwealth’s Attorney's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), implicitly found these *384claims to be without merit. The Commonwealth's Attorney moved to dismiss Harvey's claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), asserting that Harvey had failed to allege a deprivation of a federally protected right. The district court denied that motion solely on the ground that Harvey’s allegation that he had been denied access to the biological evidence "states a claim of denial of due process." Harvey v. Horan, 119 F.Supp.2d 581, 584 (E.D.Va. 2000). The district court therefore implicitly determined that Harvey failed to state a claim with respect to his other allegations of constitutional deprivation. Harvey has not appealed that ruling, and we need not further address his alternative theories.

. Moreover, under the second prong of the Brady rule, the prosecution is only required to disclose evidence that is favorable to the defendant. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. It is not now known whether the biological evidence being sought by Harvey would be favorable or unfavorable to him. As such, even if Harvey had been denied access to the evidence during his trial, the Brady rule would not have applied.

. As for Harvey’s more general contention that denying him access to the biological evidence violates substantive due process, it may be that the significant interest of our constitutional system in ensuring justice requires, under the Due Process Clause, that prisoners enjoy access to evidence for the purpose of DNA testing. That, however, in my view, is not an issue within our bailiwick; if any such right exists, it must be recognized by judges of a higher pay grade than those of this Court.