Court Opinion

ID: 9384535
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 12:04:56.584224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:54.067660
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

                                   No. COA 22-654

                                 Filed 04 April 2023

Wake County, No. 20-CVD-11594

KATHERINE AIMEE BROSNAN, Plaintiff,

             v.

GEORGE GEOFFREY CRAMER, Defendant.

        Appeal by Defendant from Order entered 8 February 2022 by Judge Anna E.

Worley in District Court, Wake County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 January

2023.

        Parker Bryan Britt Tanner & Jenkins, PLLC, by Amy L. Britt, Stephanie T.
        Jenkins, and Alicia J. Journey, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

        Connell & Gelb, PLLC, by Michelle D. Connell, Raleigh, for Defendant-
        Appellant.

        STADING, Judge.

        George Geoffrey Cramer (“Defendant”) appeals from an order entered 8

February 2022 granting Katherine Aimee Brosnan (“Plaintiff”) postseparation

support. Defendant filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari on 7 October 2022. Plaintiff

filed a Motion to Dismiss Defendant’s Appeal on 17 August 2022. Based on the

foregoing reasons, we grant Defendant’s Petition for Writ Certiorari and deny

Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal. We vacate and remand the Order of the trial

court with instructions consistent with this Opinion.
                                 BROSNAN V. CRAMER

                                  Opinion of the Court

                     I.     Factual and Procedural History

      Defendant and Plaintiff married on 1 November 2008.           Plaintiff filed for

alimony, attorney’s fees, child custody, child support, equitable distribution, and

postseparation support on 15 October 2020.               Defendant filed his answer,

counterclaims, and affirmative defenses on 20 January 2021. Plaintiff filed her reply

on 15 March 2021. Thereafter, on 8 April 2021, Plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary

dismissal specifically stating “[t]he Plaintiff gives notice of voluntary dismissal

without prejudice in this case of her claim for postseparation support as to the

Defendant.”

      Under a separate case number, Defendant filed a complaint seeking absolute

divorce on 19 April 2021 pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-6. Plaintiff accepted service

of the complaint on 27 April 2021.         Plaintiff did not attempt to revive the

postseparation support claim by answering the complaint with a counterclaim or by

any other means prior to the entry of judgment of absolute divorce. In the absence of

a responsive pleading, pursuant to Rule 56 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil

Procedure, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the claim for absolute

divorce on 9 June 2021. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment was granted on

2 July 2021. Twenty days later, on 22 July 2021, Plaintiff filed a motion in the cause

for postseparation support in an effort to reinstate the previously dismissed

postseparation support claim.

      In response to Plaintiff’s Motion in the Cause filed to reestablish a claim for

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                                  BROSNAN V. CRAMER

                                   Opinion of the Court

postseparation support, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss. On 8 February 2022

the trial court denied Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for

postseparation support.     Additionally, the trial court ordered Defendant to pay

monthly postseparation support from 1 December 2021 until “the death of either

party, Plaintiff’s remarriage, Plaintiff’s cohabitation, the dismissal of Plaintiff’s

alimony claim, or the entry of an order resolving Plaintiff’s alimony claim, whichever

occurs first.” The trial court ordered a stay of the postseparation support portion of

the judgment pending disposition of this appeal.

        Defendant filed and served a notice of appeal on 17 February 2022. Plaintiff

filed a motion to dismiss Defendant’s interlocutory appeal on 17 August 2022,

claiming that the appealed order neither affected a substantial right nor fell within

a category permitting immediate appeal. Defendant filed a notice of Rule 60(b)

motion on 7 October 2022, requesting this Court to delay consideration of his appeal

from the trial court’s order until the trial court entered an order indicating how it

would be inclined to rule on the Rule 60 motion were this appeal not pending. This

Court denied Defendant’s request for delayed consideration by order on 20 October

2022. Additionally, Defendant filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari on 7 October

2022.

                                  II.    Jurisdiction

        “An interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an action, which

does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order

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                                   BROSNAN V. CRAMER

                                    Opinion of the Court

to settle and determine the entire controversy.” Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C.

357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950) (citations omitted). Defendant acknowledges the

appeal   of   postseparation   support     based    on     subject-matter   jurisdiction   is

interlocutory. When an appeal is interlocutory, Defendant’s avenues for appellate

review are limited. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-19.1.

              “An interlocutory order may be immediately appealed in
              only two circumstances: (1) when the trial court, pursuant
              to N.C.R. Civ. P. 54(b), enters a final judgment as to one or
              more but fewer than all of the claims or parties and
              certifies that there is no just reason to delay the appeal; or
              (2) when the order deprives the appellant of a substantial
              right that would be lost absent appellate review prior to a
              final determination on the merits.”

Akers v. City of Mount Airy, 175 N.C. App. 777, 779, 625 S.E.2d 145, 146 (2006). In

the present matter, there is not a Rule 54(b) certification on the order for

postseparation support.     Additionally, existing case law has established that a

“postseparation support order is a temporary measure, it is interlocutory, it does not

affect a substantial right, and it is not appealable.” Rowe v. Rowe, 131 N.C. App. 409,

411, 507 S.E.2d 317, 319 (1998).

      However, this Court has the discretion to issue extraordinary writs “to

supervise and control the proceedings of any of the trial courts of the General Court

of Justice” pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-32(c) (2022). “The writ of certiorari may

be issued in appropriate circumstances by either appellate court to permit review of

the judgments and orders of trial tribunals when . . . no right of appeal from an

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                                   BROSNAN V. CRAMER

                                    Opinion of the Court

interlocutory order exists . . . .” N.C. R. App. P. 21. Moreover, “the appellate courts

of this State in their discretion may review an order of the trial court, not otherwise

appealable, when such review will serve the expeditious administration of justice or

some other exigent purpose.” Stanback v. Stanback, 287 N.C. 448, 453, 215 S.E.2d

30, 34 (1975). After careful review of the question presented, we grant Defendant’s

Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

                                    III.    Analysis

      Defendant argues that a recent ruling by this Court in Smith v. Smith, 282

N.C. App. 735, 870 S.E.2d 154 (2022), resolves the issue before us and eliminates the

need consider the current appeal. However, the facts of Smith are distinguishable

from this case in that “[n]o formal claims for postseparation support, alimony, or

equitable distribution were filed until after the judgment of absolute divorce was

entered . . . .” Id. The present dispute diverges factually in that the claim for

postseparation support was filed and voluntarily dismissed by Plaintiff before the

judgement of absolute divorce was entered. Thus, we consider the merits of the

appeal.

      Here, despite Plaintiff’s dismissal of the postseparation support claim prior to

the entry of absolute divorce, the trial court denied Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

and ordered postseparation support on 8 February 2022. The Order specifically

decreed “[b]eginning December 1, 2021 and continuing on the first day of each month

thereafter, Defendant shall pay [a specific amount of] postseparation support to

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                                BROSNAN V. CRAMER

                                  Opinion of the Court

Plaintiff[.]” Furthermore, the trial court held that “[t]he postseparation support

payments are stayed pending appeal of this order.” With respect to the trial court’s

order on postseparation support, we consider the trial court’s findings of fact to be

supported by competent evidence and no further factual development to be required.

See Schloss v. Jamison, 258 N.C. 271, 275, 128 S.E.2d 590, 593 (1962). However,

issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law, fully reviewable under a de

novo standard of review. See In re Summons Issued to Ernst & Young, LLP, 363 N.C.

612, 616, 684 S.E.2d 151, 154 (2009).

      As Defendant correctly points out, “[b]ecause postseparation orders are

interlocutory, there is little case law addressing this very common, independent

claim.” Although no specific case law was cited or referenced, the trial court ordered

postseparation support on 8 February 2022 by finding:

             [C]onsidering the purposes of postseparation support (i.e.,
             to provide temporary support pending the award or denial
             of alimony), the case law surrounding alimony and the
             language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-16.1A(4), postseparation
             support in this action is not foreclosed. N.C. Gen. Stat. §
             50-16.2A clearly states that you can raise postseparation
             support by motion. At the time of the divorce, Plaintiff’s
             alimony claim remained pending, and Defendant was on
             notice that there was a claim for spousal support pending
             in this matter.

And in accordance with the North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure addressing

dismissal of actions, absent a more specific statute, a claim dismissed without

prejudice would normally survive:

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                                 BROSNAN V. CRAMER

                                   Opinion of the Court

             [A]n action or any claim therein may be dismissed by the
             plaintiff without order of court . . . . Unless otherwise stated
             in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is
             without prejudice . . . . If an action commenced within the
             time prescribed therefor, or any claim therein, is dismissed
             without prejudice under this subsection, a new action
             based on the same claim may be commenced within one
             year after such dismissal[.]

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 41(a)(1) (2022).

      However, the text of the statute entitled “The effects of absolute divorce”

speaks more directly to the issue presented to this Court:

             A divorce obtained pursuant to G.S. 50-5.1 or G.S. 50-6
             shall not affect the rights of either spouse with respect to
             any action for alimony or postseparation support pending
             at the time the judgment for divorce is granted.
             Furthermore, a judgment of absolute divorce shall not
             impair or destroy the right of a spouse to receive alimony
             or postseparation support or affect any other rights
             provided for such spouse under any judgment or decree of
             a court rendered before or at the time of the judgment of
             absolute divorce.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-11(c) (2022) (emphasis added).

Similarly, the language contained in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-19 (2022) addresses the

“[m]aintenance of certain actions[,]” including claims of postseparation support. It

states that “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 13(a), any action

described in subdivision (a)(1) through (a)(5), of this section that is filed as an

independent, separate action may be prosecuted during the pendency of an action for

divorce under G.S. 50-5.1 or G.S. 50-6. Id. (emphasis added).

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                                 BROSNAN V. CRAMER

                                  Opinion of the Court

      This case presents a conflict between a generally applicable provision of the

North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and the more specific sections of Chapter 50

of the North Carolina General Statutes. To resolve such contradictions, our appellate

courts have consistently applied a canon of statutory construction known as generalia

specialibus non derogant.     “North Carolina’s appellate courts have repeatedly

recognized that ‘[w]here one of two statutes might apply to the same situation, the

statute which deals more directly and specifically with the situation controls over the

statute of more general applicability.’” Perry v. GRP Fin. Servs. Corp., 196 N.C. App.

41, 49, 674 S.E.2d 780, 785 (2009) (citation omitted). Accordingly, since N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 50-11(c) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-19 specifically address the voluntarily

dismissed claim at issue in this case, the language in those statutes are controlling.

      Having settled the appropriate controlling statutory authority, we must now

consider the text of those statutes and determine its application in this particular

setting. This Court must review the words chosen by the General Assembly to ensure

that both the purpose and the intent of the legislation are effectuated. See Electric

Supply Co. v. Swain Electrical Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656, 403 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1991).

When the language used is clear and unambiguous, this Court must refrain from

judicial construction and accord words undefined in the statute their plain and

definite meaning. Utilities Comm. v. Edmisten, Atty. General, 291 N.C. 451, 466, 232

S.E.2d 184, 193 (1977). An application of the aforementioned principle requires

consideration of the plain meaning of the words used in the more controlling statutes.

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                                BROSNAN V. CRAMER

                                    Opinion of the Court

Specifically, we are charged with acknowledging the plain meaning of the statutory

language “postseparation support pending at the time the judgment for divorce is

granted” in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-11(c) (2022) (emphasis added) and “action may be

prosecuted during the pendency of an action for divorce” in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-19

(2022) (emphasis added).

      Merriam-Webster defines “pending” as “not yet decided; being in continuance.”

Pending, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (11th ed. 2003). The use of “pending” and

“pendency” indicates that the General Assembly was referring to claims that remain

active at the time a judgment for divorce is granted.      “It is presumed that the

legislature intended each portion of [a statute] to be given full effect and did not

intend any provision to be mere surplusage.” Porsh Builders, Inc. v. Winston-Salem,

302 N.C. 550, 556, 276 S.E.2d 443, 447 (1981). The General Assembly’s use of the

words “pending” and “pendency” in both statutes is not coincidental, nor is it mere

surplusage.   Here, Plaintiff’s claim for postseparation support was voluntarily

dismissed and not reinstated before the judgment for divorce was granted, so it could

not have been pending. Consequently, the trial court was divested of subject-matter

jurisdiction to enter an order awarding postseparation support. For these reasons,

we conclude the trial court erred in denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

claim for postseparation support.

                                 III.     Conclusion

      Since the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to award Plaintiff

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                               BROSNAN V. CRAMER

                                 Opinion of the Court

postseparation support, the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss. As such, we vacate the trial court’s Order and remand with instructions to

grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

      VACATED AND REMANDED.

      Judges GORE and RIGGS concur.

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