Court Opinion

ID: 9752719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:30:36.146947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:21.261336
License: Public Domain

KELLY, Associate Judge,
dissenting in part:
I cannot agree with those sections of the majority opinion which affirm the two counts of armed robbery (from Williams a rifle, calculator, and car; from Rowe a rifle and calculator) and the two counts of felony murder while armed.
On the one hand, in reversing the two counts of kidnaping while armed with intent to steal and the two counts of kidnap-ing while armed with intent to assault, a decision in which I concur, we find that
In the instant case the government has not introduced either direct or circumstantial evidence that the taking of Williams and Rowe from one place to another was against their will. Morton’s gas station, although only partially closed for the night, was locked, the lights were turned off and there was no sign of a struggle there. Nor was there any indication of a struggle in Williams’ car or any evidence that Rowe and Williams left the station other than voluntarily.... [Ante at 624.]
On the other hand, the majority finds sufficient circumstantial evidence of armed robbery because, “Taking into account the circumstances already described surrounding the deaths of the two victims, we note that the two men were the only employees on duty at the gas station on the night of December 4,1977. Some time that evening the station was locked, and the keys to it were found with Rowe. There is no evidence that someone broke into it after it was locked.” Ante at 624. It then surmises a jury could infer that the calculator and rifle were taken from the possession of Rowe and Williams. This, plus Morton’s attempted abduction, amounts to “clear evidence, amid violent circumstances, of a corpus delecti.” Ante at 624. I do not agree. To me, given all the circumstantial evidence the majority can identify, no reasonable juror could infer beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant feloniously carried away the items alleged to have been stolen with force and violence, much less by force of arms.
The attempt to apply an ancient inference, possession of recently stolen property,1 to support the robbery convictions fails in two respects. First, the theory appears for the first time in the majority opinion; it was not relied upon by the government and the jury was not told of it. Second, the inference is not permissible to prove an armed robbery; rather it permits an inference of identity of the person who committed a proven robbery. White v. United States, D.C.App., 300 A.2d 716 (1973); Pendergrast v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 20, 31, 416 F.2d 776, 787, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 926, 89 S.Ct. 1782, 23 L.Ed.2d 243 (1969). Accordingly, I would reverse the convictions for armed robbery.
Absent the armed robbery convictions, the felony murder convictions must fail as well. Even if I am mistaken in my view that there was insufficient evidence of armed robbery, however, the felony murder conviction as to Rowe, who was killed at least five hours after the robbery took place, cannot be supported. The principal circumstance cited by the majority to link appellant to a robbery is the kidnaping of Morton in Williams’ car. Rowe was not present in the car.2 The evidence, suggesting as it does only that Rowe was killed long after the alleged robbery took place, *628does not support a felony-murder conviction based on an underlying robbery conviction. The case cited by the majority to say that robbery is a continuing offense deals with the immediate pursuit of a felony suspect.3 It is not on point; it cannot apply to the circumstances of this case.
Giving the aiding and abetting instruction, in my analysis of the case, is also suspect. I do not discuss the issue since my judgment is that the error, if any, was harmless. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946).

. No one was ever seen in possession of the calculator.

. The government’s suggestion that the jury could thus infer that Rowe was in the trunk of the car does not merit discussion.

. Clark v. United States, D.C.App., 418 A.2d 1059 (1980). See also Coleman v. United States, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 210, 295 F.2d 555 (1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 813, 82 S.Ct. 689, 7 L.Ed.2d 613 (1962); Carter v. United States, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 40, 223 F.2d 332 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 949, 76 S.Ct. 324, 100 L.Ed. 827 (1956).