Court Opinion

ID: 9550936
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:45:22.838806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:45.739633
License: Public Domain

Smith, J.
(dissenting): I find myself unable to concur in the opinion of the majority. I shall briefly set down my views. I think the confusion arises from the failure of prosecutors and courts to realize that G. S. 1949, 21-420, deals with two separate fields of criminal law. State v. Custer, 129 Kan. 381, 282 Pac. 1071, states the abstract principles very well. The difficulty lies in applying them to the facts in each case. In the last paragraph of that opinion we said:
“The views which have been expressed will not require any change in the manner of pleading manslaughter. Paradoxical as it may seem, manslaughter committed by act, procurement or culpable negligence, which would be manslaughter at common law, is a statutory crime, and the information may charge killing by unlawful act, or by culpable negligence, stating the facts.”
The section is quoted in the prevailing opinion, so it will not be set out here again. I shall attempt to analyze it, however. We find first “Every other killing of a human being, by the act, procurement or culpable negligence of another.” A killing by an “act” is a killing that happens as the result of the defendant violating a statute enacted for the purpose of protecting life on the highways, something entirely apart from negligence. My position is fortified by the fact that the final phrase is “or culpable negligence.” The violation of a statute enacted for the protection of life on the highways is one thing, driving a car in such a manner as to constitute culpable negligence is another. That is what we meant in State v. Custer, supra, syllabus 2, when we held:
“At common law, when death resulted from negligent conduct in doing a lawful act, it was necessary, in order to constitute manslaughter, that the conduct should be reckless.”
*742One could be guilty of violating G. S. 1949, 8-537, and not have been negligent. G. S. 1949, 8-558d makes such a violation a misdemeanor.
In the first place, the information states that defendant drove his car “unlawfully and feloniously . . . with culpable negligence . . . in a careless and reckless manner and in such a manner as to indicate a wilful, wanton and negligent disregard of the safety of other persons on said highway.” Following State v. Custer, supra, counsel for the state next states in the information the facts constituting the “culpable negligence” and “willful, wanton and negligent disregard of the safety of other persons on said highway” as “driving and continuing to drive” when he was and knew he was “fatigued, sleepy and tired” and while he was in that condition “fell asleep and allowed” his truck “to cross the center line” of the highway, contrary to G. S. 1949, 8-537, where it struck the car in which deceased was riding and as a result deceased was killed. In that opinion we held in syllabus 4:
“If death results from unlawful conduct amounting to misdemeanor denounced by statute for the purpose of protecting human life and safety, and the death would not have resulted except for the unlawful conduct, the killing would be manslaughter at common law.”
Here comes into play G. S. 1949, 8-537, which provides that except for certain exceptions, not now important, an automobile must be driven on the right side of the highway. The information charges that defendant fell asleep and “allowed his vehicle to cross the center line of the highway” into the path of a car driven by deceased. Such language was intended by counsel for the state to be the facts constituting unlawful conduct amounting to misdemeanor denounced by statute for the purpose of protecting human life and safety.
It will be noted the information attempts to describe two different courses of conduct, one based on negligence and the other based on a violation of law. The trouble is that the culpable negligence pleaded is driving while defendant was, and knew he was, fatigued, sleepy and tired. I cannot bring myself to believe that the legislature ever intended such conduct to be of the sort denounced by the many authorities discussing culpable negligence, reviewed in State v. Custer, supra.
If the state intends to try defendant for a violation of G. S. 1949, 8-537, then the information attempts to charge defendant, with conduct amounting to a misdemeanor while he was asleep. I agree *743with the statement in the prevailing opinion that negligence is seldom, if ever, intended. I cannot agree, however, that intention is not a necessary ingredient of the violation of a statute such as G. S. 1949, 8-537.
It is true G.,S. 1949, 8-531, provides:
“Any person who drives any vehicle in such a manner as to indicate either a willful or a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving. . . .”
I cannot agree that driving a car when one knows he is “fatigued, sleepy and tired” should, standing alone, be denominated driving a vehicle in such a manner as to indicate a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of others on the highway.
As to G. S. 1949, 8-529, that section refers to driving a vehicle in negligent disregard of the safety of others, and makes the killing of a person by such conduct negligent homicide. The conduct described in this information, that is, driving a car while defendant knew he was fatigued, sleepy and tired and then falling asleep and allowing the car to cross the center line of the highway is nothing more than mere negligence, or failure to exercise ordinary care. The use of the word “disregard” implies some mental attitude. One cannot read State v. Custer, supra, with the many authorities there cited, without coming to that conclusion.
I realize the force of G. S. 1949, 62-1011, that no information may be quashed for any surplusage or repugnant matter. What is the surplusage matter here? Some of the epithets could have been dispensed with. Suppose the information had charged that defendant with culpable negligence operated a vehicle on the highway in such a manner as to indicate negligent disregard of the safety of other persons on the highway. State v. Custer, supra, in the last paragraph says:
“The information may charge killing by unlawful act, or by culpable negligence, stating the facts.”
Here the prosecutor stated the facts by alleging that the negligent disregard of the safety of others on the highway consisted of driving and continuing to drive when defendant was and knew that he was fatigued, sleepy and tired and while continuing to drive, in said condition fell asleep and allowed the vehicle to cross the center line of the highway.
I cannot bring myself to believe that the foregoing language is mere surplusage. It is language in the information advising the defendant on what the state expected to rely to establish his guilt.
*744Finally the prevailing opinion says:
“When our legislature laid down the rule stated in 8-537, above quoted, and made its violation a penalty, and created the offense of negligent homicide, it no longer left open to defendant as a defense that he negligently permitted himself to get on the other side of the road and cause the death of an approaching driver.”
Applied to the facts in this case the above means if the state proves that defendant’s car was across the center line of the highway, collided with the car in which deceased was riding and deceased was killed, the defendant is guilty, regardless of how defendant’s car got over there. Here again I do not see how one could read State v. Custer, supra, and come to such a conclusion. After his learned and exhaustive discussion of the many authorities, the distinguished jurist, who wrote the opinion of the court in that case, said:
“Turning to the instructions given, and leaving out of consideration the tenth instruction, it is plain that what the lord chief justice of England warned against occurred in this case. Defendant was tried for culpable negligence, and not for manslaughter, and the theory was that if he was simply negligent he would be guilty. To approve the theory would be to strike from the statute the words ‘which would be manslaughter at the common law,’ and the statute may not be so emasculated.
“The result was that defendant may have been convicted, without regard to the circumstances, other than cause of death, because he was driving at more than forty miles per hour. If he was thus violating the speed law, he was committing an unlawful act, made so by statute enacted for the express purpose of protecting life and limb; and if Wood’s death would not have occurred except for the unlawful driving, defendant would be guilty of manslaughter at common law.”
To paraphrase in this case under the prevailing opinion, the defendant may be convicted if his car was across the center line without regard to how it got there. I do not believe the legislature ever intended such a result. Certainly it may not be found in State v. Custer, supra, or State v. Spohr, 171 Kan. 129, 230 P. 2d 1013.
For the above reasons, I dissent from the majority opinion.