Court Opinion

ID: 9473769
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:38:57.91549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:43.256234
License: Public Domain

HUG, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the majority opinion but add these additional thoughts.
There is a distinction between offering a defendant the services of counsel to conduct his defense and offering the counsel’s assistance to a defendant who wishes to conduct his own defense. A defendant has the sixth amendment right under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) to refuse the former and to elect to conduct his own defense. In doing so, he may be offered the assistance of counsel in a variety of ways — for pretrial preparation and during trial. This assistance of counsel to a confined defendant would provide an adequate access to the resources necessary for him to conduct his defense.
The Supreme Court in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977) addressed the question of what constituted meaningful access to the courts by a prisoner seeking collateral relief. Surely no less than those minimum requirements must be afforded to a defendant who is initially defending himself against criminal charges. In conducting his own defense, counsel’s assistance would meet these requirements because it would provide access to the outside world and a law library through counsel. However, if a defendant is only offered the services of an attorney to conduct his defense and if he refuses that assistance and is offered no other assistance from counsel, then the defendant must be assured of alternate, adequate access to the resources necessary to conduct his defense through other means.
In this case, other means were authorized by the district court, but not allowed to the defendant. As the majority opinion points out, this deprived the defendant of a reasonable opportunity to conduct his defense. He was not offered counsel’s assistance to help him prepare and conduct his own defense.
The case of United States v. Wilson, 690 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir.1982) is consistent with this analysis because the defendant in that case was afforded adequate legal assistance from counsel. In United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358 (4th Cir.1978), it appears that the defendant rejected the assistance of counsel in conducting his own defense. Id. at 1360. Thus, Chatman, as *1448construed, is also consistent with this analysis.
In summary, a defendant in jail is constitutionally entitled to conduct his own defense. If he elects to do so by rejecting the services of an attorney to conduct his defénse, he cannot be confined to his jail simply to look at the four walls and appear on the day of trial to defend himself. He must be afforded reasonable access to resources, and providing a counsel’s assistance in conducting his own defense is one way of accomplishing this. Other reasonable alternatives consistent with jail or prison management can be utilized. The defendant does not have the right to dictate the alternative chosen so long as a reasonable one is afforded. However, the rejection of an attorney to conduct his defense cannot be considered as a waiver of the reasonable access to the resources necessary to defend himself. To do so would render Faretta meaningless to a confined defendant.