Court Opinion

ID: 9621103
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:51:47.489915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:04:03.130242
License: Public Domain

Dissenting opinion by
Justice GRAVES.
Concurring with Justice Wintersheimer’s well-reasoned dissent, I write separately to respectfully examine the majority’s conclusions regarding the directed verdict for wanton murder, considering the reality that defendants take the victim as they find him. Justice Wintersheimer’s dissent establishes a firm foundation for the jury’s verdict, and common knowledge regarding heart attacks, supported by medical studies, buttresses that foundation. The evidence presented at trial concerning Appellant’s course of conduct the entire time she was with the victim provided the jury with ample opportunity to reach the conclusion overturned by the majority today.
Wanton murder, as defined by KRS 507.020, requires wanton conduct with respect to both the result and the circumstances, manifesting an extreme indifference to human life. Cook v. Commonwealth, 129 S.W.3d 351, 362-363 (Ky.2004). Wanton conduct resulting in homicide, unaccompanied by extreme indifference to human life, supports a conviction of second-degree manslaughter under KRS 507.040, rather than wanton murder — a distinction necessarily left to the trier of fact. Id.
Even ignoring Appellant’s full course of conduct, and examining only her order to Jean as the majority does, a jury could reasonably convict Appellant for wanton murder. Several factors contribute to the wantonness of Appellant’s conduct. The definition of “wantonly” found in KRS 501.020(3), as cited by the majority, and wanton conduct should be considered in the context of the common law of torts and the “thin skull” or “eggshell plaintiff’ rule. This longstanding rule of tort law illustrates that although a result may be improbable, a certain element of liability remains. Thomas A. Street explains the principle in his THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY: A PRESENTATION OF THE THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON LAW, 457 (1906),
And if my neighbor, having an unusually thin skull, though his appearance does not so indicate, is thrown upon his head and suffers great damage, can I claim to have my liability limited to the damage which would have been suffered by a man with a normal skull?
We should bear in mind this rule and the relative improbability of a resulting homicide, when exploring the circumstances surrounding wanton conduct. Thus, whenever a criminal defendant engages in conduct affecting a victim’s bodily integrity, courts should take into account that such conduct may demonstrate an indifference to human life, even where death is not the most probable result. Al*835though the offender must be “aware of and consciously disregard an unjustifiable risk” under KRS 501.020(3), the “thin skull” rule may be understood in this context to mean that some risks are never justifiable. The “eggshell plaintiff’ rule in this context recognizes that the jury may believe a defendant was aware of risk simply because, however improbable, the risk could never be justified. In a case such as this one, for example, although Appellant may not have personally been aware of Mr. Russell’s heart problems, it may be unjustifiable for her to claim that she was unaware that an 87-year-old man, when subjected to severe stress and a physical attack, could suffer cardiovascular failure or other severe injury.
The majority correctly explains that on a motion by the defendant for a directed verdict, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and then determine whether the evidence could convince a juror of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority then relates a course of events from which a juror could reasonably find from the evidence in favor of the Commonwealth. First, Appellant directed Jean Crittendon to remove Mr. Russell’s keys from his pocket. When Ms. Crittendon followed Appellant’s instructions, the victim turned white and his breathing changed. Once Jean had the keys, Appellant asked her to wait outside in the car, leaving Appellant and the victim alone in the house. Jean explained that she left the house undisturbed, and the victim without any external injuries. From this version of the facts, the majority concedes that it is reasonable to infer that Appellant disrupted the house and caused the victim to have a heart attack. Nonetheless, the majority then holds, without explanation, that, “To find Appellant guilty of wanton murder, the jury was required to conclude that Appellant acted wantonly in ordering Jean to take Mr. Russell’s keys.” But Appellant’s order to take the victim’s keys only began her course of conduct.
According to the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute, about 1.1 million Americans suffer from heart attacks each year, of which about 460,000 are fatal. (www.nhlbi.nih.gov/actintime/aha/aha.htm). If, as the majority explains, it is fair to infer that Appellant disrupted the house after the victim’s heart attack, then what prevents the jury from considering that conduct wanton? The National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute also explains that treating a victim of a heart attack quickly can save his life and limit damage to the heart. From Appellant’s inferred actions after the victim’s heart attack, including jerking the phone from the wall and physically injuring Mr. Russell as he lay helpless, the jury could have reasonably found an extreme indifference to human life. Having only considered Appellant’s command to Jean, the majority ignores what the jury most likely considered Appellant’s assessment of the value of human life, based on her reasonably inferred actions when she was alone with a man who required immediate medical attention.
In this case, Appellant ordered her friend to assault an 87-year-old man. The majority draws attention to Mr. Russell’s ability to chop wood days before the murder, but fails to explain why Appellant should have been aware of this fact and believed that Mr. Russell was healthy. Nevertheless, the majority’s attempt to convince only leads to the conclusion that a reasonable person would have had doubts about Mr. Russell’s health. Mr. Russell may have been a healthy 87-year-old man, but the jury could also have believed that any attack upon an octogenarian would manifest an extreme indifference to human *836life. Mr. Russell’s heart attack, while improbable, was more likely than it would have been twenty or thirty years ago. Calling to mind the “thin skull” rule, the jury may have believed that ordering someone to attack an 87-year-old man presents an unjustifiable risk of death, even if the risk were improbable.
The existence of the tort rule supports submitting the question to the finder of fact, especially in light of Appellant’s actions after the victim’s heart attack, which clearly manifested an extreme indifference to human life. The jury found against Appellant and I join Justice Wintersheimer in affirming the jury’s conclusion.
SCOTT, and WINTERSHEIMER, J.J., join this dissent.