Court Opinion

ID: 9475779
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:37:54.529234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:55.713609
License: Public Domain

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,
concurring separately.
Although I agree that Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Bivens, 757 F.2d 781 (6th Cir.1985), compels our reversal of the Board’s award of attorney’s fees, I believe that Bivens was wrongly decided.
The Black Lung Disability Trust Fund must, in some circumstances, pay attorney’s fees as if it were an employer of a claimant under the Black Lung Benefits Act. Id. at 785. Under the Act, an employer is liable for attorney’s fees when
the employer or carrier declines to pay any compensation on or before the thirtieth day after receiving written notice of a claim for compensation having been filed from the deputy commissioner, on the ground that there is no liability for compensation within the provisions of this chapter, and the person seeking benefits shall thereafter have utilized the services of an attorney at law in the successful prosecution of his claim____
33 U.S.C. § 928(a) (1982) (emphasis added). This court noted in Bivens that the regulations change the wording of the statute by requiring a “written notice of its liability ” to be received by an employer. 757 F.2d at 788 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 725.367 (1986)) (emphasis in original). The court then held that such a notice of liability could not be sent until there had been an initial finding or preliminary determination of disability. Id. 788 However, the regulations governing the identification and notification of a responsible operator do not support this definition of a notice of liability:
Such notification shall include a copy of the claimant’s claim form and a copy of all documentary evidence pertaining to the claim obtained by the deputy commissioner, if any, and the initial findings of the deputy commissioner, if any.
20 C.F.R. § 725.412(b) (1986) (emphasis added). Thus, a notice of liability can set forth either an employer’s responsibility for any potential benefits to be awarded or an employer’s responsibility for benefits already determined actually to be due.
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit in Director, Office Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Simmons, 706 F.2d 481 (4th Cir.1983), held that the Trust Fund receives its notice of liability when it receives notice of its “potential liability” for black lung benefits via the filing of a claim with the Department of Labor. Id. at 484-85. This interpretation of the Act and its regulations was the same as that adopted by the Benefits Review Board in Yokley v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 3 Black Lung Rep. 1-230 (1981), and Belcher v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 3 Black Lung Rep. 1-250 (1981).
While it may seem counterintuitive to hold that the Trust Fund’s notice of its potential liability constitutes the notice of liability set forth in the regulations, such a definition of a notice of liability is more consistent with the wording of the attorney’s fees statute than the definition given *104in Bivens. If the word “liable” in the regulations means “subject to appropriation or attachment,” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 687 (1986), the regulations’ notice of liability appears to be very different from the notice of claim set forth in the statute. But if “liable” simply means “responsible,” id., then a notice of liability would be fairly similar to a notice of claim.
Furthermore, to require an initial determination of liability before the thirty days begin to run would allow the Director to delay assessment of a claim indefinitely, since no attorney’s fees can be awarded before evaluation of the Department’s liability for the claim. As the Fourth Circuit has noted, to allow the Director such “absolute discretion to decide when the Department would be liable for attorney fees to a claimant____could result in a complete erosion of 33 U.S.G. § 928(a), or at least create an impermissible conflict. It could potentially burden the claimant by a much greater delay than is possible where an actual employer is liable.” 706 F.2d at 485-86.
Altogether, the regulations’ use of the term “notice of liability” is unfortunate since it leads legally trained minds to assume that the notice should include a finding that the employer or Trust Fund must pay the claimant. I believe that the language and purpose of the attorney’s fees statute is better served by requiring only that the notice indicate that the employer or Trust Fund will be responsible if the claimant is entitled to benefits. Nevertheless, because this court must meet en banc to overrule a previous panel’s decision, I must concur with the majority’s conclusion since it is consistent with the Bivens panel’s definition of a notice of liability.