Court Opinion

ID: 9864508
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 13:38:42.603793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:14:31.176415
License: Public Domain

rehearing. Referring to the finding quoted in the opinion to *346the effect that as a part of the transaction relating to the exchange of bills of sale by the parties the “plaintiff stated to said defendant Wood that said sheep would not be segregated or separated until a sale or partition of said ranch,” petitioners say: “In view of the foregoing finding it is evident that the refusal on the part of plaintiff to execute a new lease upon or just prior to the expiration of the old lease did not take the case out of the requirements laid down in subdivision 2, section 1161, of the Code of Civil Procedure.” The finding referred to is of a mere evidentiary fact, not responsive to any issue in the ease. It does not appear that the defendants consented to or that the parties agreed upon such postponement of the segregation and separation of the sheep until a sale or partition of the ranch. It was within the exclusive province of the trial court to determine whether such evidentiary fact, together with the presumption relied upon by the defendants, or .the evidence to the contrary was of the greater weight.
Petitioners contend .that the evidence is insufficient to overcome such presumption. In a case originating prior to the enactment of section 1945 of the Civil Code, relating to the presumption arising from the possession of the tenant and the receipt of rent by the lessor after the expiration of the term of a lease, the parties to a lease for years had a conversation about the future occupation of the premises, after the end of the term, but no other lease was executed. The tenant continued in possession, paying the same rent as before. He testified that he “refused to make a new lease.” The court instructed the jury that if they found the facts as stated herein the' lessee became a tenant from year to year. In reversing the judgment the Supreme Court said: “We think that the conversation of the parties, had after the expiration of the lease for years, and their disagreement as to the term during which the defendant was thereafter to remain, should have gone to the jury for the purpose of ascertaining how or for what term the tenant was thereafter to hold. ... If, as here, the evidence offered on the part of the defendant went to show that he had expressly refused to accept a term of one year, that fact would tend to overthrow and destroy the mere presumption drawn from the subsequent payment of rent—that he was to continue to hold thereafter for the space of one year,” (Skaggs v. *347Elkus, 45 Cal. 154, 160; Underhill on Landlord and Tenant, sec. 98; 35 C. J. 1031.)
In construing a statute relating to leases o£ agricultural lands, similar to the provisions of section 1161 upon which appellants rely, it is said: “The meáning of that article is simply this: That, if both parties to the lease remain silent and inactive for the space of one month after the expiration of the lease, they shall both be presumed to have acquiesced in, and tacitly consented to, a renewal of the lease for another year. It has no application whatever when either party has clearly announced his intention not to renew the lease on the same terms or for a full year, for the purpose of the law is not to force a contract upon parties unwilling to contract, but merely to establish a rule of evidence, or presumption, as to their intention in the premises.” (Ashton Realty Co. v. Prowell, 165 La. 328 [115 South. 579].)
After a landlord has expressly refused to renew a lease and has refused to accept rent tendered at the expiration of the term thereof to be applied on a new term, it certainly cannot be held, as a matter of law, that the tenant is thereafter, in the language of section 1161, “holding by permission of the landlord.”
Rehearing denied.