Court Opinion

ID: 9874648
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 22:12:44.387744+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:46:51.240840
License: Public Domain

Tufte, Justice,
concurring.
[¶ 21] I concur in the majority’s opinion except as to paragraphs 7 through 9.
[¶22] I respectfully disagree with the majority’s analysis of what are the minimum requirements for a criminal complaint. On appeal, Gray asserts that the complaint in this matter was not in compliance with N.D.R.Crim.P. 3, arguing that “it does not state any facts” and “it is not sufficient to set forth the offense in the words of the statute.” I would conclude that the complaint by which Gray was *491charged does not meet even the low bar set by Rules 3 and 4, N.D.R.Crim.P., but as presented here the error is harmless.
[¶ 23] Gray was charged with disorderly conduct in violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-31-01(l)(h), which provides:
An individual is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person or in reckless disregard of the fact that another person is harassed, annoyed, or alarmed by the individual’s behavior, the individual:
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(h) Engages in harassing conduct by means of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that are intended to adversely affect the safety, security, or privacy of another person.
In its entirety, the body of the complaint reads as follows:
The undersigned complainant, being first duly sworn, says that on or about the 12th day of September, 2015, in said county, the above named defendant, David Brian Gray, did commit the crime of Disorderly Conduct, committed as follows:
The defendant, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person or in reckless disregard of the fact that another person is harassed, annoyed, or alarmed by the defendant’s behavior, the defendant engaged in harassing conduct by means of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that were intended to adversely affect the safety, security, or privacy of another person; specifically, the defendant engaged in such behavior towards Ronda Berg and Terry Berg;
N.D.C.C. 12.1—31—01(l)(h)
12.1-32-01 (6) CLASS B MISDEMEANOR
this contrary to the statute in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of North Dakota.
WHEREFORE, Complainant prays that the Defendant, David Brian Gray, may be arrested and:dealt with according to law.
[¶ 24] “The complaint is a written statement of the essential facts constituting the elements of the offense charged.” N.D.R.Crim.P. 3(a). The complaint itself must state “the essential facts”—that is what Rule 3 says the complaint is. If the complaint is a sworn complaint, it may by itself be sufficient without an affidavit to confirm probable cause for an arrest. State v. Stuart, 544 N.W.2d 158, 160 (N.D. 1996) (analyzing Rule 3(a) to allow but not require sworn testimony or an affidavit in support of a complaint). The complaint must state the facts constituting the offense, and the affidavit, if any, may provide additional support to reach probable cause for issuance of an arrest warrant. “Our rules of procedure require neither an affidavit nor sworn testimony with a sworn complaint, although the magistrate may receive both to help confirm probable cause for the arrest.” Id. The record here and in numerous other criminal appeals shows that probable cause affidavits are frequently lengthy and in many counties are simply a police report attached to an officer’s affidavit confirming the report’s accuracy.
[¶25] The majority relies on State v. Bornhoeft, 2009 ND 138, 770 N.W.2d 270, for the principle that an “affidavit can be read with the complaint to test the sufficiency of the complaint on a motion to dismiss.” Majority, at ¶ 7. An affidavit filed with a complaint may be read with the complaint to determine if there is probable cause to believe an offense has been committed. That an affidavit might supply ad*492ditional facts in support of probable cause does not change Rule 3’s requirement that the complaint itself contain a statement of “the essential facts” of the offense.
[¶26] Like Gray, Bornhoeft was also charged with disorderly conduct. Bornhoeft, 2009 ND 138, ¶ 3, 770 N.W.2d 270. The Bornhoeft complaint “contained a ‘to-wit’ statement referencing Bornhoeft’s yelling of profanities at the deputy.” Id. at ¶ 10 (footnoted omitted). The specific facts alleged in the complaint charging Born-hoeft included “yelling of profanities at the deputy.” Id. The additional facts supplied by the affidavit that lent context to the essential facts alleged in the complaint were that the yelling incident occurred on a residential street at night while Born-hoeft was pointing at the deputy who was about five feet away. Id. at ¶ 13.
[¶ 27] The complaint here simply recited the language of the statute defining the disorderly conduct offense and concluded with “the defendant engaged in such behavior towards Ronda Berg and Terry Berg.” Considering the broad range of conduct potentially within the scope of “intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that were intended to adversely affect the safety, security, or privacy of another person,” it is not enough under Rule 3 for the State to allege a date and victim and say “such behavior” occurred.
[¶ 28] Ultimately, as the majority concludes, Gray’s claim fails because this argument must be raised by pretrial motion. The district court had set a motion deadline and Gray’s motion was not timely. If this defective complaint left Gray uncertain as to what facts supported the State’s charge, he could have filed a N.D.R.Crim.P. 7(f) motion requesting a bill of particulars. See Bornhoeft, 2009 ND 138, ¶ 12, 770 N.W.2d 270. For these reasons and because a complaint can be amended at any time prior to verdict absent a showing defendant’s substantial rights would be prejudiced, I conclude the defect in the complaint is harmless error.
[If 29] Jerod E. Tufte