Court Opinion

ID: 9796168
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:50:55.496088+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:48:43.937752
License: Public Domain

LUMPKIN, Vice-Presiding Judge:
Concurring in Results.
¶ 1 I concur in,the affirmance of the judgment and sentence however I write separately to address certain statements concerning our standard of review.
¶ 2 It is well established that the extent and scope of cross examination is left to the discretion of the trial court. Scott v. State, *8511995 OK CR 14, ¶28, 891 P.2d 1283, 1294. This Court will not disturb the trial court’s decision absent clear abuse resulting in manifest prejudice to the defendant. Id. See also Davis v. State, 2004 OK CR 36, ¶30, 103 P.3d 70, 79; Williams v. State, 2001 OK CR 9, ¶94, 22 P.3d 702, 724, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1092, 122 S.Ct. 836, 151 L.Ed.2d 716 (2002); Reeves v. State, 1991 OK CR 101, ¶30, 818 P.2d 495, 501; Jackson v. City of Oklahoma, 1984 OK CR 57, ¶5, 678 P.2d 725, 726; Locke v. State, 1976 OK CR 227, ¶22, 554 P.2d 847, 850. By the plain language of Scott, it does not set out a standard of de novo review where the limitations directly implicate the 6th Amendment right of confrontation. 1995 OK CR 14, ¶19, 891 P.2d at 1292. This Court has not carved out an exception to the general rule for allegations of confrontation clause violations.1
¶ 3 Further, regarding Appellant’s claimed violation of his right to counsel, the Court has improperly interpreted Griffith v. State, 1987 OK CR 38, 734 P.2d 303. I will agree that recently this Court has held that mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo. Davis v. State, 2005 OK CR 21, ¶7, 123 P.3d 243, 246.2
¶ 4 However, the Court’s interpretation that Griffith provides we review for “clear error” sets out a standard of review inconsistent with our jurisprudence. In Bartell v. State, 1994 OK CR 59, 881 P.2d 92 and Simpson v. State, 1994 OK CR 40, 876 B.2d 690, we addressed the scope of review on appeal when an objection has not been preserved during the trial. In Simpson, our review of this Court’s jurisprudence showed there were two types of errors raised on appeal — those that had not been raised in the trial court and those that had been raised. As to those claims of error which had not been raised, we said: “[f]ailure to object with specificity to errors alleged to have occurred at trial, thus giving the trial court an opportunity to cure the error during the course of trial, waives that error for appellate review unless the error constitutes fundamental error, i.e. plain error.” As to errors raised which had been raised before the trial court, we stated: “[ejrror preserved by timely objection during the course of trial, together with plain error reviewed for the first time on appeal, will be analyzed to determine if the error requires reversal or whether the error was harmless.” 1994 OK CR 40, ¶2, 876 P.2d at 693. All non-constitutional errors and all but three specific constitutional violations are subject to review for harmless error. 1994 OK CR 40, ¶36, 876 P.2d at 702. See also Bartell, 1994 OK CR 59, ¶¶15-20, 881 P.2d at 97-100.
¶ 5 “Clear error” is a term which has not been used in our jurisprudence. However, when this Court has reviewed a trial court’s action for abuse of discretion, we always defer to the trial court’s ruling unless it is “clearly erroneous”. That standard of review is distinctly different from this “term of art”. The meaning of the term and the standard of review it employs is not clear from this opinion. Prior case law has shown that deviations from the historic language of our jurisprudence confuses rather than clarifies the law. Oklahoma has a distinct state jurisprudence in reviewing claims of error on appeal. We do not need to alter or “federalize” what has been developed and employed effectively over the last 100 years.

. In Scott, this Court did state that its finding of harmless error was made "after an independent examination of the entire record”. 1995 OK CR 14, ¶27, 891 P.2d at 1293. However, that does not establish this Court’s review was a de novo review.

. I accede to this finding based on stare decisis. Davis cited to Hanes v. State, 1998 OK CR 74, 973 P.2d 330. In Hanes, I dissented writing that our jurisprudence reveals this Court has previously reviewed mixed questions of law and fact based upon an abuse of discretion standard, asking whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by the record. See e.g. Harris v. State, 97 Okla.Crim. 259, 261 P.2d 909, 915 (1953) (Lumpkin, J„ dissent) 1998 OK CR 74, ¶4, 973 P.2d at 338.