Court Opinion

ID: 9891819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-19 18:03:51.838958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:00:40.462642
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/19/23 Reynante v. Home Depot U.S.A. CA4/1
                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

                 COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                       DIVISION ONE

                                              STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 CORWIN REYNANTE,                                                             D082218

            Plaintiff and Respondent,

            v.                                                                (Super. Ct. No. CVRI2101570)

 HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC. et al.,

            Defendants and Appellants.

          APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Riverside, Craig G.
Riemer, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
          Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, Evan R. Moses,
Christopher W. Decker, and Kathleen J. Choi for Defendants and Appellants
Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. and The Home Depot, Inc.
          Fisher & Phillips, Kristen Nesbit, and Shaun J. Voigt for Defendant
and Appellant Sunrun, Inc.
          The Graves Firm, Allen Graves, and Jacqueline Treu for Plaintiff and
Respondent Corwin Reynante.
                                       I
                              INTRODUCTION
      Sunrun, Inc. (Sunrun), Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., and The Home Depot,
Inc. (together with Home Depot U.S.A., Home Depot) appeal an order
denying their motion to compel arbitration of Private Attorneys General Act
of 2004 (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.; PAGA) claims filed against them by
putative employee Corwin Reynante. The trial court denied the motion
because the parties’ arbitration agreement has a class and representative
action waiver requiring Reynante to arbitrate his employment-related claims
with the defendants strictly on an individual basis.
      At the time the trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration,
California state law prohibited predispute contractual waivers of an
employee’s right to bring a PAGA claim on behalf of the State in any forum.
(Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348,
382–383 (Iskanian).) It also prohibited predispute agreements to split PAGA
claims into bifurcated proceedings—for example, agreements to arbitrate
Labor Code violations personally suffered by the plaintiff (so-called individual
claims) and to litigate Labor Code violations arising out of events involving
other employees (so-called representative claims) in court. (Id. at p. 383.)
      After the trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration, the
United States Supreme Court issued Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana
(2022) 596 U.S. __, 142 S.Ct. 1906 (Viking River). Viking River upheld the
state law rule prohibiting categorical PAGA waivers, but held the Federal
Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq.; FAA) preempts the state law rule
banning the splitting of PAGA claims into separate fora. In this appeal, we
must decide whether the trial court’s stated basis for denying the motion to
compel arbitration survives in light of Viking River. We conclude it does not.

                                       2
Further, Reynante has not supplied us with a sufficient justification to affirm
the denial order on other grounds.
      However, there are factual disagreements concerning the
circumstances under which the parties executed the arbitration agreement
and the trial court did not render findings on these disputed issues of
contract formation. Thus, we reverse the order denying the motion to compel
arbitration and remand the matter so the trial court may determine, in the
first instance, whether the parties entered into a valid arbitration agreement.
If the court finds the parties entered into an enforceable agreement to
arbitrate, it must compel arbitration of Reynante’s individual PAGA claims
consistent with the opinions expressed herein.
                                       II
                                BACKGROUND
      Sunrun is a company that provides solar panel installation and
maintenance services to residential homeowners. In December 2019, Sunrun
hired Reynante as a retail sales associate. In this capacity, Reynante sold
Sunrun products and services at Home Depot home improvement retail
stores in Hemet and Beaumont.
      When Reynante began working for Sunrun, he was presented with an
electronic employment and arbitration contract (hereafter, the arbitration
agreement). According to Sunrun, Reynante scrolled through the arbitration
agreement and clicked a checkbox next to a signature block at the bottom of
the contract. The signature block was located beneath language stating the
employee read and understood the contract and had an opportunity to discuss
it with legal counsel.
      The arbitration agreement requires Reynante and Sunrun to arbitrate
“any and all” disputes or claims arising out of, relating to, or resulting from

                                        3
Reynante’s employment with Sunrun. It has a class and representative
action waiver that states, “We expressly intend and agree that, to the
maximum extent permitted by law, (1) class, collective, and representative
action procedures shall not be invoked, nor will they apply, in any arbitration
pursuant to this agreement; (2) I will not assert class, collective, or
representative action claims against [Sunrun] in arbitration or any other
forum; and (3) I shall only submit my own individual claims in arbitration
and will not seek to represent the interests of any other person.” Thereafter,
it states, “Notwithstanding the foregoing, I understand that I may bring a

proceeding as a Private Attorney General as permitted by law ....”1
      The arbitration agreement is subject to a severability clause that reads,
“If any provision of this Agreement is held to be invalid or unenforceable for
any reason, the other provisions of this Agreement will remain enforceable
and the invalid or unenforceable provision will be deemed modified so that it
is valid and enforceable to the maximum extent permitted by law.”
      In 2021, Reynante filed a class and representative action complaint
against Sunrun and Home Depot in the Superior Court of California, County
of Riverside. He alleged the defendants failed to notify him and other
employees that workers at their jobsites tested positive for COVID-19. In the
operative third amended complaint, he omitted the class claims and asserted
two PAGA claims against the defendants. The claims sought civil penalties
for violations of Labor Code section 6409.6 and a Cal-OSHA regulation
(former Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 3205, subd. (c)(3)(B)(3)) requiring employers
to give written notice to employees of potential COVID-19 exposure and to

1      The contract language quoted in this paragraph is capitalized and
bolded in the arbitration agreement. The capitalization and bolding in the
arbitration agreement have been omitted here and throughout the remainder
of this opinion.
                                        4
implement written procedures mandating that notice be given to potentially
exposed employees.
      Sunrun moved to compel individual arbitration of the PAGA claims and
to strike the claims to the extent they were representative in nature. It
acknowledged that, under Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th 348, state law
prohibited the enforcement of a predispute waiver of an employee’s right to
bring a PAGA claim as a proxy of the State. However, Sunrun predicted the
Iskanian rule banning categorial PAGA waivers would be overruled or
limited in Viking River, a case that was pending before the United States
Supreme Court. Sunrun asked the court to dismiss or stay the case pending
the completion of individual arbitration or, at minimum, to stay the action

until a decision in Viking River. Home Depot joined Sunrun’s motion.2
      Together with its motion, Sunrun filed a declaration from its Senior
Director of Talent Acquisition, Megan Lessard. She averred that when
Sunrun hired Reynante, new hires were required to create an account with a
third-party recruiting company, “scroll through” an electronic version of the
arbitration contract (which was “opened separately in a window with a scroll
bar”), and click on a checkbox next to a signature block, which generated the
employee’s electronic signature and filled in the contract execution date. She
said that Sunrun’s records showed Reynante electronically signed the

2     Home Depot argued it was entitled to enforce the arbitration
agreement, despite being a nonsignatory to the agreement, because:
(1) Reynante alleged in the operative complaint that Home Depot was an
agent of signatory Sunrun; (2) Reynante’s allegations against Home Depot
were intimately founded in, and intertwined with, the underlying
employment and arbitration agreement, which estopped Reynante from
avoiding his obligation to arbitrate with Home Depot; and (3) Home Depot
was a third-party beneficiary of the arbitration agreement. Reynante has not
challenged these arguments on appeal or, as far as we can discern from the
record, in the trial court.
                                       5
arbitration agreement on December 16, 2019. The Lessard declaration had
two exhibits attached to it: (1) an unsigned copy of the arbitration
agreement; and (2) a printout of Reynante’s personnel file, which allegedly
reflected the date and time his signed arbitration agreement was transmitted
to Sunrun.
      Reynante opposed the motion to compel individual arbitration of his
PAGA claims on several grounds. Of relevance here, he asserted Sunrun
failed to establish the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. In
particular, he argued Lessard was “simply wrong” in claiming he was
required to electronically scroll through the arbitration agreement before he
clicked a checkbox next to its signature block. He asserted he did not
manifest his assent to the arbitration agreement merely by clicking the
checkbox because the agreement contained no “language indicating that
Plaintiff agreed to anything.” (Italics added.) Further, he requested an
opportunity to propound discovery on the defendants concerning whether the
parties formed a valid agreement to arbitrate. In addition to raising these
contract formation arguments, Reynante contended the Iskanian anti-waiver
rule prohibited enforcement of any predispute PAGA waiver.
      Sunrun filed a reply in support of its motion. It argued Reynante
accepted the arbitration agreement by affixing his electronic signature at the
bottom of the contract, which in its opening paragraph said, “I agree to the
terms of this Employee Confidentiality, Inventions Assignment and
Arbitration Agreement (the ‘Agreement’).” Sunrun also reiterated its
assertion that Viking River would soon dictate whether courts may enforce
predispute waivers of an employee’s right to bring a PAGA claim.
      The court denied the motion to compel arbitration in a brief order that
cited Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th 348, but undertook no further analysis and

                                       6
made no factual findings. It also denied Sunrun’s request for a stay. Three
weeks later, the United States Supreme Court issued its Viking River

decision, which partially abrogated Iskanian, as discussed below.3
                                       III
                                 DISCUSSION
   A. The Denial Order Cannot be Affirmed Based on the PAGA Waiver
      1. PAGA
      “The Legislature enacted PAGA almost two decades ago in response to
widespread violations of the Labor Code and significant underenforcement of
those laws. [Citations.] Before PAGA’s enactment, tools for enforcing the
Labor Code were limited. Some statutes allowed employees to sue their
employers for damages resulting from Labor Code violations such as unpaid
wages. [Citations.] Other Labor Code violations were punishable only as
criminal misdemeanors, which local prosecutors tended not to prioritize.
[Citation.] Additionally, several statutes provided civil penalties for Labor
Code violations, but only state labor law enforcement agencies could bring an
action for civil penalties and those agencies lacked sufficient enforcement
resources.” (Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1116
(Adolph).)
      “To address these shortcomings, the Legislature enacted PAGA to
create new civil penalties for various Labor Code violations and ‘ “to allow
aggrieved employees, acting as private attorneys general, to recover [those]
penalties.” ’ [Citation.] An employee who brings a PAGA action to recover
civil penalties acts ‘ “as the proxy or agent” ’ of the state. [Citations.] ‘PAGA

3      In a separate noticed motion, the defendants asked the court to stay the
litigation pending a decision in Viking River. The court denied the stay
motion in an order that is not challenged in this appeal.
                                        7
is designed primarily to benefit the general public, not the party bringing the
action.’ [Citation.] Penalties recovered are dedicated largely ‘to public use ...
instead of being awarded entirely to a private plaintiff.’ ” (Adolph, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 1116.)
      “To have standing to bring a PAGA action, a plaintiff must be an
‘aggrieved employee,’ which the statute defines as ‘any person who was
employed by the alleged violator and against whom one or more of the alleged
violations was committed.’ [Citation.] An aggrieved employee becomes
deputized to prosecute Labor Code violations once he or she has complied
with PAGA’s notice requirements. [Citation.] Before filing suit, the
aggrieved employee ‘must notify the employer and the [Labor and Workforce
Development Agency (LWDA)] of the specific labor violations alleged, along
with the facts and theories supporting the claim.’ [Citations.] ‘If the agency
does not investigate, does not issue a citation, or fails to respond to the notice
within 65 days, the employee may sue.’ [Citations.] ‘The notice requirement
allows the relevant state agency “to decide whether to allocate scarce
resources to an investigation” ’ [citation] or instead to deputize the aggrieved
employee to pursue sanctions on the state’s behalf. Once deputized, the
aggrieved employee has authority to ‘seek any civil penalties the state can.’ ”
(Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 1116–1117.) Because the aggrieved
employee may seek any civil penalties the State can, the employee “may seek
penalties not only for the Labor Code violation that affected him or her, but
also for different violations that affected other employees.” (Huff v. Securitas
Security Services USA, Inc. (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 745, 750.)
      2. Iskanian
      In Iskanian, the California Supreme Court considered the viability of a
predispute waiver of an employee’s right to bring a PAGA action on behalf of
the State. The Iskanian court concluded a categorical waiver of the right to
                                        8
bring a PAGA action in any forum violates state law. (Iskanian, supra, 59
Cal.4th at pp. 382–383.) According to Iskanian, a blanket PAGA waiver
“disable[s] one of the primary mechanisms for enforcing the Labor Code” and
“harm[s] the state’s interests in ... receiving the proceeds of civil penalties

used to deter violations,” and thus violates public policy.4 (Id. at p. 383.)
      In the course of reaching this conclusion, the Iskanian court rejected a
claim from the defendant-employer that the parties’ agreement should be
enforced because it “prohibits only representative claims, not individual
PAGA claims for Labor Code violations that an employee suffered.”
(Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 383.) As the Iskanian court explained,
“whether or not an individual claim is permissible under the PAGA, a
prohibition of representative claims frustrates the PAGA’s objectives.” (Id. at
p. 384.) In the wake of Iskanian, California courts, relying in part on the
Iskanian court’s analysis, determined that state law prohibits an employer
from “forc[ing] an employee to split a PAGA claim into ‘individual’ and
‘representative’ components, with each being litigated in a different forum.”
(Perez v. U-Haul Co. of California (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 408, 421.)
      3. Viking River
      In Viking River, issued shortly after the trial court denied the
defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, the United States Supreme Court

4      In particular, the Iskanian court concluded a waiver of an employee’s
right to assert a PAGA claim violates Civil Code sections 1668 and 3513.
(Iskanian, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 382–383.) Section 1668 provides, “All
contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone
from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or
property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are
against the policy of the law.” Section 3513 states, “Any one may waive the
advantage of a law intended solely for his benefit. But a law established for a
public reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement.”
                                         9
addressed the issue of whether the FAA preempts the rules of state law that

were articulated and applied in the Iskanian decision and its progeny.5
      As the Viking River court explained, PAGA claims are “ ‘representative’
in two distinct ways .... [¶] In the first sense, PAGA actions are
‘representative’ in that they are brought by employees acting as
representatives—that is, as agents or proxies—of the State.” (Viking River,
supra, 596 U.S. at p. __ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1916].) Viewed through this
lens,“ ‘ “every PAGA action is ... representative” ’ and ‘[t]here is no individual
component to a PAGA action,’ [citations], because every PAGA claim is
asserted in a representative capacity.” (Ibid.) However, PAGA claims can
also be considered “ ‘representative’ when they are predicated on code
violations sustained by other employees.” (Ibid.) Such claims are
distinguishable from “individual” PAGA claims, which “refer to claims based
on code violations suffered by the plaintiff.” (Ibid.) In Viking River, the court
used the terms “representative” and “individual” in the second sense and, as
noted at the outset of our opinion, we have endeavored to do the same here.
      According to Viking River, the Iskanian court articulated two rules of
law relating to PAGA. “Iskanian’s principal rule prohibits waivers of
‘representative’ PAGA claims in the first sense. That is, it prevents parties
from waiving representative standing to bring PAGA claims in a judicial or
arbitral forum.” (Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. __ [142 S.Ct. at
p. 1916].) The Viking River court concluded the FAA does not preempt this
rule, which remains good law today. (Id. at pp. __–__ [142 S.Ct. at pp. 1916–
1917]; Adolph, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1117 [“In Iskanian, we held that a

5     The FAA provides that a “written provision in ... a contract ... to settle
by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising ... shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract ....” (9 U.S.C., § 2.)
                                        10
predispute categorical waiver of the right to bring a PAGA action is
unenforceable [citation]—a rule that Viking River left undisturbed”].)
      Iskanian “also adopted a secondary rule that invalidates agreements to
separately arbitrate or litigate ‘individual PAGA claims for Labor Code
violations that an employee suffered,’ on the theory that resolving victim-
specific claims in separate arbitrations does not serve the deterrent purpose
of PAGA.” (Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. __ [142 S.Ct. at pp. 1916–
1917].) Viking River held that Iskanian’s anti-splitting rule, unlike its
prohibition on predispute PAGA waivers, violates the FAA. It “unduly
circumscribes the freedom of parties to determine ‘the issues subject to
arbitration’ and ‘the rules by which they will arbitrate,’ [citation], and does so
in a way that violates the fundamental principle that ‘arbitration is a matter
of consent,’ [citation].” (Id. at p. __ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1923].) “If the parties
agree to arbitrate ‘individual’ PAGA claims based on personally sustained
violations, [the anti-splitting rule] allows the aggrieved employee to abrogate
that agreement after the fact and demand either judicial proceedings or an
arbitral proceeding that exceeds the scope jointly intended by the parties.
The only way for parties to agree to arbitrate one of an employee’s PAGA
claims is to also ‘agree’ to arbitrate all other PAGA claims in the same
arbitral proceeding.” (Id. at p. __ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1924].)
      According to the Viking River court, Iskanian’s anti-splitting rule
effectively “coerce[s] parties into withholding PAGA claims from arbitration.”
(Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. __ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1924].) It does so
because representative PAGA claims permit “plaintiffs to unite a massive
number of claims in a single-package suit.” (Ibid.) However, “ ‘[a]rbitration
is poorly suited to the higher stakes’ of massive-scale disputes of this kind,”
since it lacks the type of “ ‘multilayered review’ ” that is critical for error

                                         11
correction, while “entail[ing] the same ‘risk of “in terrorem” settlements that
class actions entail.’ ” (Ibid.) “As a result, Iskanian’s indivisibility rule
effectively coerces parties to opt for a judicial forum rather than ‘forgo[ing]
the procedural rigor and appellate review of the courts in order to realize the
benefits of private dispute resolution.’ ” (Ibid.)
      After reaching these conclusions, the Viking River court turned to the
facts of the case before it. The case involved an arbitration agreement
requiring an employee (Moriana) to arbitrate virtually all disputes arising
out of her employment with her employer (Viking). (Viking River, supra, 596
U.S. at p. __ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1911].) The arbitration agreement included a
class and representative action waiver prohibiting the parties from bringing
any dispute as a class, collective, or representative PAGA claim, and it stated
that any class, collective, representative, or PAGA action would
presumptively be litigated in court if the waiver was found invalid. (Ibid.) It
also included a severability clause providing that, “if any ‘portion’ of the
waiver remained valid, it would be ‘enforced in arbitration.’ ” (Id. at p. __
[142 S.Ct. at p. 1916].)
      The Viking River court concluded the representative action waiver “was
invalid if construed as a wholesale waiver of PAGA claims,” under Iskanian’s
principal rule. (Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at p. __ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1924].)
But, in light of the severability clause, “Viking was entitled to enforce the
agreement insofar as it mandated arbitration of Moriana’s individual PAGA
claim.” (Id. at p. __ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1925].) Viking was permitted to enforce
the arbitration agreement in this manner—even though it meant Moriana’s
PAGA claim would be divided into individual and non-individual components
in separate fora—because the FAA preempted Iskanian’s anti-splitting rule.
(Id. at p. __ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1917].)

                                         12
      4. Application
      Applying these principles to the arbitration agreement at hand, we
conclude the trial court erred insofar as it invalidated the arbitration
agreement in its entirety, rather than severing the invalid portion of the class
and representative action waiver that prohibited Reynante from asserting a
representative PAGA claim as a proxy of the State in any forum.
      The arbitration agreement requires the parties to resolve “any and all”
claims or disputes arising out of or relating to Reynante’s employment with
Sunrun, subject to a class and representative action waiver that contains
three clauses. The first clause bans “representative action procedures” in
arbitration, while the second clause prohibits “representative action claims”
in any forum. Read in the context of the comprehensive provision channeling
“any and all” employment-related disputes into arbitration, these clauses
violate Iskanian’s principal rule by forbidding employees from pursuing
“representative” claims for violations suffered by other employees in
arbitration or any other forum. The third clause in the waiver compels the
employee to arbitrate his or her “individual claims” and prohibits the
employee from representing the interests of “any other person” in arbitration.
      The question we must decide is whether the invalid clauses in the
waiver may be severed from the remainder of the arbitration agreement. We
conclude they may be severed. Like the arbitration agreement in Viking
River, the arbitration agreement at the heart of this appeal is subject to a
severability clause requiring the enforcement of any valid portion of the
agreement notwithstanding the presence of an invalid or unenforceable
provision. In particular, it is subject to a severability clause that states, “If
any provision of this Agreement is held to be invalid or unenforceable for any
reason, the other provisions of this Agreement will remain enforceable and

                                        13
the invalid or unenforceable provision will be deemed modified so that it is
valid and enforceable to the maximum extent permitted by law.”
      Under Viking River, the portion of the waiver that violates Iskanian’s
principal rule must be severed and the remainder of the arbitration
agreement enforced, including the portion of the waiver requiring Reynante
to arbitrate his individual PAGA claims. (Viking River, supra, 596 U.S. at
p. __ [142 S.Ct. at p. 1925] [“Based on [the severability] clause, Viking was
entitled to enforce the agreement insofar as it mandated arbitration of
Moriana’s individual PAGA claim.”]; see Nickson v. Shemran, Inc. (2023) 90
Cal.App.5th 121, 130 [severing waiver of employee’s right to assert
representative PAGA action from remainder of arbitration agreement]; Gregg
v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 786, 796–801 [severing
arbitration provision prohibiting driver from asserting PAGA claims for
violations suffered by other drivers, but enforcing agreement to arbitrate
driver’s individual PAGA claim] (Gregg); Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 639, 650 [“Viking River demonstrates that an invalid
waiver of representative claims may be severed from the remainder of an
arbitration agreement.”].)
      Our opinion thus far presupposes that the arbitration agreement and
the class and representative action waiver therein apply to PAGA claims like
those Reynante asserted in the operative third amended complaint.
However, in his appellate brief, Reynante argues the arbitration agreement
“exempts” PAGA claims. In support of this assertion, he relies on the
sentence that appears after the class and representative action waiver. That
sentence states, “Notwithstanding the foregoing, I understand that I may
bring a proceeding as a Private Attorney General as permitted by law.”

                                       14
        According to Reynante, this sentence unambiguously allows an
employee like himself to litigate a representative PAGA claim for Labor Code
violations suffered by other employees in court. The defendants assert the
sentence after the class and representative action waiver can, at the very
least, reasonably be construed to mean that an employee may arbitrate an
individual PAGA claim for violations he or she personally suffered, despite
the class and representative action waiver.
        “ ‘ “Under California law, ordinary rules of contract interpretation
apply to arbitration agreements.... ‘ “The fundamental goal of contractual
interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties....” ’ ” ’ ”
(Western Bagel Co., Inc. v. Superior Court (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 649, 662
(Western Bagel).) “Under California law, the first step in analyzing the
meaning of a contract is to determine whether the language is ambiguous—
that is, reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning.” (Eminence
Healthcare, Inc. v. Centuri Health Ventures, LLC (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 869,
879.)
        Applying principles of contract interpretation, we conclude the
contractual language on which Reynante relies does not clearly “exempt”
PAGA claims from the scope of the arbitration agreement. “The word
‘proceeding’ can take on ‘different meanings in different contexts,’ ”
(Mountain Air Enterprises, LLC v. Sundowner Towers, LLC (2017) 3 Cal.5th
744, 754), but it is not necessarily synonymous with a “lawsuit in court,” and
it is capacious enough to encompass arbitration. (See Evid. Code, § 901
[“ ‘Proceeding’ means any action, hearing, investigation, inquest, or inquiry ...
conducted by a[n] ... arbitrator”].) Further, the language says nothing about
the type of claims an employee may assert in such a “proceeding” while
serving as a private attorney general—e.g., representative PAGA claims,

                                         15
individual PAGA claims, or both. (See Piplack v. In-N-Out Burgers (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 1281, 1288 (Piplack) [“every PAGA action is properly understood
as a combination of two claims: an ‘individual’ claim, arising from the Labor
Code violations suffered by the plaintiff or plaintiffs themselves, and a
‘representative’ claim, arising from violations suffered by other employees”].)
      Given this lack of specificity, it is, at the very least, reasonable to
conclude the parties intended the contractual language at issue to mean that
an employee may pursue an individual PAGA claim in arbitration, despite
the preceding waiver of the employee’s right to bring a representative action,
and consistent with the third clause of the waiver permitting the employee to
submit his “individual claims in arbitration.” That reading is harmonious
with the arbitration agreement’s expansive requirement that the parties
must arbitrate “any and all” claims or disputes arising out of Reynante’s
employment with Sunrun. By contrast, Reynante’s interpretation of the
contractual language at issue stands in tension with this broad mandate.
“The whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give effect to every
part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other.”
(Civ. Code, § 1641; see Gregg, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 798–800 [rejecting
driver’s claim he could litigate individual PAGA claim under provision
stating, “ ‘any representative action brought under PAGA on behalf of others
must be litigated in a civil court,’ ” because that claim “overlook[ed]” the
arbitration agreement’s mandate that the driver must arbitrate all “ ‘disputes
arising out of or related to [his] relationship with [Uber]’ ”].)
      In short, Reynante wishes us to interpret the arbitration agreement as
if it stated, “Notwithstanding the foregoing, I understand that I may bring a
proceeding in court as a Private Attorney General in order to assert
representative PAGA claims for Labor Code violations experienced by other

                                        16
employees.” However, it does not contain this language or anything similar to
it. “The court does not have the power to create for the parties a contract
which they did not make, and it cannot insert in the contract language which
one of the parties now wishes were there.” (Levi Strauss & Co. v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1479, 1486.)
      Further, to the extent the contractual language is ambiguous, the
ambiguity concerns the scope of the arbitration agreement. It is well-
established that, “in applying general state-law principles of contract
interpretation to the interpretation of an arbitration agreement within the
scope of the Act, [citation], due regard must be given to the federal policy
favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause
itself resolved in favor of arbitration.” (Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v.
Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University (1989) 489 U.S. 468,
475–476; Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Corp.
(1983) 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 [“The [FAA] establishes that, as a matter of federal
law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved
in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the
contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability.”]; see also Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th
233, 247 [“under state law as under federal law, when the allocation of a
matter to arbitration or the courts is uncertain, we resolve all doubts in favor
of arbitration”]; Cruise v. Kroger Co. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 390, 397 [“ ‘ “In
California, the general rule is that arbitration should be upheld unless it can
be said with assurance that an arbitration clause is not susceptible to an

                                        17
interpretation covering the asserted dispute.” ’ ”].) These principles require

us to construe the arbitration agreement to encompass PAGA claims.6
      In sum, we interpret the parties’ arbitration agreement—which broadly
requires arbitration of “any and all” claims and disputes arising out of or
relating to Reynante’s employment with Sunrun—as encompassing the
PAGA claims Reynante asserts in the operative third amended complaint.
The agreement has a waiver that precludes Reynante from asserting
representative PAGA claims in arbitration or in any other forum—a waiver
that runs afoul of Iskanian’s principal holding, which remains good law.
However, in light of the severability clause applicable to the arbitration
agreement, the invalid waiver may be severed from the agreement and
Reynante’s individual PAGA claim ought to be compelled into arbitration.

6     Reynante urges us to apply the interpretive rule of contra proferentem
(“against the drafter”) to construe any ambiguity against the defendants
because one of the defendants, Sunrun, drafted the arbitration agreement.
We decline this invitation. “The rule applies ‘only as a last resort’ when the
meaning of a provision remains ambiguous after exhausting the ordinary
methods of interpretation.” (Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela (2019) 139 S.Ct.
1407, 1417 (Lamps Plus).) It provides a tie-breaking “default rule based on
public policy considerations; ‘it can scarcely be said to be designed to
ascertain the meanings attached by the parties.’ ” (Ibid.)
      We need not apply the tiebreaker here, as “the FAA provides the
default rule for resolving ... [any] ambiguities in [the] arbitration
agreement[]”—“ambiguities about the scope of an arbitration agreement must
be resolved in favor of arbitration.” (Lamps Plus, supra, 139 S.Ct. at p. 1418
[FAA preempted use of the contra proferentem to construe ambiguous
language in arbitration agreement to permit class arbitration]; see also
Western Bagel, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at pp. 654–655, 663–666 [declining to
apply contra proferentem to construe ambiguity in arbitration agreement and
instead “employ[ing] the FAA’s default rule that any ambiguities about the
scope of an arbitration agreement must be resolved in favor of arbitration”].)
                                       18
   B. The Denial Order Cannot be Affirmed for Alternative Reasons
      1. The Arbitration Agreement Compels Arbitration of Any and All
         Disputes Arising out of the Parties’ Employment Relationship
      In addition to the arguments just discussed, which mainly concern the
class and representative action waiver, Reynante claims the court properly
denied the motion to compel arbitration because the arbitration agreement
requires the parties to arbitrate disputes between themselves arising out of
the parties’ employment relationship, but a PAGA action is not a dispute
between an employer and an employee. Rather, it is a dispute between an
employer and an absent principal—the State. (Arias v. Superior Court (2009)
46 Cal.4th 969, 986 [a plaintiff brings a PAGA claim “as the proxy or agent of
the state’s labor law enforcement agencies”].) We are not convinced.
      As Reynante notes, the arbitration agreement defines the scope of
arbitrable matters to include employment-related disputes between the
employer and the employee (“The Company and I agree to arbitrate before a
neutral arbitrator any and all controversies, claims, or disputes between us ...
arising out of, relating to, or resulting from my employment or relationship
with the company or the termination of my employment or relationship with
the company ....”). But its reach is not so limited. On the contrary, it
elsewhere requires the parties to submit to arbitration any and all disputes
arising out of or relating to Reynante’s employment with Sunrun, without
specifying the parties to whom such disputes “belong,” or otherwise limiting
arbitration to disputes between Reynante and Sunrun. The agreement
states, “Disputes that we agree to arbitrate, and for which we thereby agree
to waive any right to a trial by jury, include any and all existing or future
disputes or claims arising out of or relating to [Reynante’s] recruitment,
employment, or separation from employment ....” (Italics added.)

                                       19
      As our earlier analysis suggests, a PAGA action is a dispute arising out
of an employee’s relationship with his or her employer. (Viking River, supra,
596 U.S. at p. __, fn. 4 [142 S.Ct. at p. 1919, fn. 4].) “The contractual
relationship between the parties is a but-for cause of any justiciable legal
controversy between the parties under PAGA, and ‘arising out of’ language
normally refers to a causal relationship.” (Ibid.; see Khalatian v. Prime Time
Shuttle, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 651, 659 [“The language ‘arising out of or
relating to’ as used in the parties’ arbitration provision is generally
considered a broad provision.”].) That is certainly true here, as Reynante
maintains that he is an aggrieved employee with standing to pursue his
claims because, by virtue of his employment by the defendants, he suffered
violations of a statute and an executive regulation requiring the defendants
to give him notice of possible COVID-19 exposure.
      Because the arbitration agreement broadly requires the parties to
submit “any and all” disputes arising out of or relating to Reynante’s
employment, and the PAGA claims asserted in the operative complaint fall
within this scope of claims, we reject Reynante’s argument that we should
affirm the denial order based solely on the fact Reynante will be acting as a
state proxy while prosecuting his PAGA claims against the defendants.
      2. Factual Disputes Exist Concerning Contract Formation
      Reynante also urges us to affirm the denial order on grounds that the
parties never formed an agreement to arbitrate their employment-related
disputes. The defendants argue the matter should be remanded because the
issue of contract formation presents disputed factual issues that must be
resolved in the first instance by the trial court, which did not render any
findings about whether the parties entered into an agreement to arbitrate.
We agree with the defendants that remand is the proper course.

                                        20
      “ ‘The right to arbitration depends upon contract; a petition to compel
arbitration is simply a suit in equity seeking specific performance of that
contract.’ ” (City of Vista v. Sutro & Co. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 401, 407.) “[A]
court, before granting a petition to compel arbitration, must determine the
factual issue of ‘the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement.’ ”
(Toal v. Tardif (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1208, 1219.) “Whether the parties
formed a valid agreement to arbitrate is determined under general California
contract law.” (Vista, at p. 407.) “ ‘The petitioner [seeking arbitration] bears
the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by a
preponderance of the evidence, while a party opposing the petition bears the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to
its defense. [Citation.] The trial court sits as the trier of fact, weighing all
the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, and any oral
testimony the court may receive at its discretion, to reach a final
determination.’ ” (Ramos v. Westlake Services LLC (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th
674, 685–686; see Vista, at p. 407 [“when ruling on a petition to compel
arbitration, the superior court may consider evidence on factual issues such
as contract formation”].)
      Here, the parties provide conflicting accounts of the circumstances
under which the arbitration agreement was presented to Reynante. Relying
on the declaration submitted by Lessard, Sunrun’s Senior Director of Talent
Acquisition, the defendants claim Reynante was required to click open an
electronic version of the arbitration agreement, physically scroll to the bottom
of the contract, and click a checkbox field next to a signature block, which
generated an electronic signature and date on the contract.
      Reynante disputes the defendants’ description of “the way in which the
arbitration agreement was presented to [him].” This claim echoes fact-laden

                                        21
arguments he made in the proceedings below, where he contended Lessard
was “simply wrong” when she stated he was required to physically scroll
through the arbitration agreement before he accepted it. He claimed his
personnel file (an exhibit to the Lessard declaration) indicated he
electronically signed multiple onboarding documents simultaneously, which
“directly contradicted” the defendants’ assertion he was “required to scroll
through each document before clicking to accept.” Further, he asked for a
chance to propound discovery requests pertaining to contract formation.
      Given the parties’ disputes concerning the circumstances of contract
formation, we remand the matter for the trial court to determine whether the

parties entered into an enforceable agreement to arbitrate.7 (See Piplack,
supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1290 [remanding matter for trial court to resolve
disputes relating to formation and disaffirmance of arbitration agreement];
accord Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1146
[remanding matter for trial court to conduct “fact-specific inquiry” of
circumstances under which arbitration agreement was formed].)

7     On appeal, Reynante argues that the trial court should not dismiss his
representative PAGA claims if it compels arbitration of his individual PAGA
claims. We do not address this issue, which is both premature and
unnecessary to the disposition of this appeal.
                                       22
                                      IV
                               DISPOSITION
      The order denying the motion to compel arbitration is reversed. The
matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinions
expressed herein. The trial court may, in its discretion, consider any requests
by the parties to submit further evidence on any disputed factual issues.

                                                          McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DO, J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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