Court Opinion

ID: 9930258
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-06 16:11:26.945349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:10:54.036458
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1016-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ROBERT VAN PELT,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Argued December 13, 2023 – Decided February 6, 2024

                   Before Judges Firko and Susswein.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Burlington County, Municipal Appeal No. 5-
                   22.

                   Matthew Whalen Reisig argued the cause for appellant
                   (Reisig Criminal Defense & DWI Law, LLC, attorneys;
                   Michael H. Ross, of counsel; Luke C. Kurzawa, on the
                   brief).

                   Alexis R. Agre, Assistant Prosecutor argued the cause
                   for respondent (LaChia Lyn Bradshaw, Burlington
                   County Prosecutor; Alexis R. Agre, of counsel and on
                   the brief).
PER CURIAM

      Defendant Robert Van Pelt appeals from an October 18, 2022 Law

Division order denying his motion to vacate the guilty plea to driving while

intoxicated (DWI) he entered in Moorestown Municipal Court on December 6,

2017. Defendant contends the municipal court judge did not elicit an adequate

factual basis to support the drunk driving conviction. After carefully reviewing

the record in light of the governing legal principles, we affirm.

      We discern the following facts and procedural history from the record.

On September 27, 2017, defendant was stopped for motor vehicle violations and

charged with: DWI, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50; reckless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96;

careless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97; improper display of license plates, N.J.S.A.

39:3-33; improper lamps or reflectors, N.J.S.A. 39:3-61; consumption of alcohol

in a motor vehicle, N.J.S.A. 39:4-51(a); open container of alcohol in a motor

vehicle, N.J.S.A. 39:4-51(b); possession of controlled dangerous substance in a

motor vehicle, N.J.S.A. 39:4-49.1; possession of marijuana under fifty grams,

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(4); and possession of drug paraphernalia, N.J.S.A. 2C:36-

2.

      On December 6, 2017, defendant appeared with his attorney in the

Moorestown Municipal Court to enter guilty pleas to the charges of DWI and

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                                        2
possession of a marijuana under fifty grams. 1 Pursuant to a plea agreement with

the prosecutor, the remaining charges were dismissed.

        The municipal court judge personally addressed defendant to confirm he

was knowingly and voluntarily waiving his rights and to establish a factual basis

for the guilty plea. The following exchange occurred during the plea colloquy:

              THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask you some questions.
              On September 27th, 2017, were you in North Hanover
              and while in North Hanover did you have in your
              possession a certain amount of marijuana that was
              under [fifty] grams?

              DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.

              THE COURT: And then in addition, on September
              27th, 2017, were you operating a vehicle in North
              Hanover?

              DEFENDANT: Yes, [Y]our Honor.

              THE COURT: And prior to operating that vehicle, had
              you consumed any alcohol?

              DEFENDANT: Yes.

              THE COURT: And what type of alcohol had you
              consumed?

              DEFENDANT: Beer.

              THE COURT: And do you know how many beers you
              had? Were they—

1
    The marijuana guilty plea conviction is not before us in this appeal.
                                                                            A-1016-22
                                         3
DEFENDANT: Four.

THE COURT: —in glasses or were they cans or were
they bottles?

DEFENDANT: They were bottles.

THE COURT: Bottles of beer?

DEFENDANT: Yeah.

THE COURT: But you don't recall how many beers you
had?

DEFENDANT: Four.

THE COURT: At least four or—

DEFENDANT: Four.

THE COURT: —just four?

DEFENDANT: Four.

THE COURT: And then after consuming the alcohol,
you got into your car and operated it, is that correct?

DEFENDANT: Yes, [Y]our Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And in looking at the totality of
the tickets here, the police officer pulled you over
because—

DEFENDANT: For speeding.

THE COURT: —one of more of your lamps that should
be illuminating your license plate was not illuminating
it properly, as well as speeding, is that correct?

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                          4
DEFENDANT: Yeah, that's what he pulled me over for.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. What did you say?

DEFENDANT: Yeah, that's what he pulled me over for.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you have any reason to
believe that he was untruthful?

DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: Okay. And, sir, was anybody in the
vehicle with you?

DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: And do you agree that the consumption
of the alcohol impaired your ability to safely operate
your vehicle and that you did exceed the posted speed
limit?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: But no accident occurred, correct?

DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: Okay. And that's good. All right. And
was there a [blood alcohol content (BAC)]?

MUNICIPAL PROSECTUOR: There was, [j]udge,
.13. I independently confirmed with an Alcotest
calculator it was a true reading. I would submit S-1 [the
Alcotest results]—

THE COURT: Thank you.

MUNICIPAL PROSECUTOR: —in evidence.

                                                            A-1016-22
                           5
THE COURT: Okay. I see that [defense counsel] has
initialed this. I'm going to also initial it with today's
date. And, Mr. Prosecutor, would you mind initialing
this as well, please? So S-1 indicates a .13 percent.
You're going to tell the [c]ourt that you only had four
beers and you ended up with a .13 percent? That's a
high level of alcohol.

DEFENDANT: I haven't eat—I didn't eat at all that day,
[Y]our Honor. I just—

THE COURT: Oh, you hadn't eaten that day—

DEFENDANT: I was—I was going—

THE COURT: —you just were drinking?

DEFENDANT: —actually to go and—

THE COURT: Okay. This was only 6:28—no, 10:24 in
the evening, and you hadn't eaten all day?

DEFENDANT: No.

THE COURT: Okay.         All right.   Then that's more
credible, I believe.

DEFENDANT: I was—

THE COURT: And you are—what?—six-foot tall?

DEFENDANT: Yeah (inaudible).

THE COURT: And you weigh about—what?—145?

DEFENDANT: Yeah, 150.

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                           6
            THE COURT: Okay. All right. Based upon all the
            information provided to this [c]ourt, S-1 as well as the
            testimony of the defendant, I will accept your plea of
            guilty.

      On the marijuana possession conviction, defendant was sentenced to a

$300 fine and all applicable court costs and monetary penalties. On the DWI

conviction,2 defendant was sentenced to a $506 fine, $33 in court costs, $125

DWI surcharge, two days in the Intoxicated Driver Resource Center, $75 Safe

Neighborhoods penalty, $50 Violent Crimes Compensation Board penalty, a

two-year suspension of driving privileges, and a requirement to use an ignition

interlock device for three years.

      On June 2, 2021—roughly four-and-a-half years after pleading guilty—

defendant filed a motion for post-conviction relief (PCR) that was converted

into a motion to vacate his DWI guilty plea. Defendant argued his plea was

accepted with an insufficient factual basis.

      On April 6, 2022, the municipal court judge who took the plea denied

defendant's motion, explaining, "the transcript is clear that the elements of the

[DWI] charge were testified to by the defendant; that he was a person who

2
  This was defendant's third DWI conviction. However, he was sentenced as a
second-time DWI offender because more than ten years elapsed between the
second and third offenses.
                                                                           A-1016-22
                                        7
operated a motor vehicle []; and that he had—and he was influenced or had the

BAC over the per se limits." The judge continued,

            he did admit to drinking beer. He admitted to a number
            of beers and not having had anything to eat that day,
            and the fact that it was already 10:30 at night, so you
            have a long period of a day where there's just no food
            being consumed by the defendant. . . .

Additionally, defendant's prior counsel, "who is state-renowned with respect to

his D[W]I defense work," did not object to the admission of defendant's BAC

reading.

      Defendant appealed the municipal court decision to the Law Division,

which conducted a de novo review. On October 18, 2022, the Law Division

judge denied defendant's motion to vacate the DWI guilty plea, ruling defendant

acknowledged the BAC reading by explaining to the municipal court judge that

he had not eaten all day. The Law Division judge concluded those "admissions

support and acknowledge that [defendant] was aware of his per se violation of

what the alcohol level was."

      This appeal follows. Defendant raises the following contention for our

consideration:

            DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO VACATE HIS
            GUILTY PLEA SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED

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                                      8
            ON DE NOVO REVIEW PREDICATED UPON THE
            MUNICIPAL COURT'S FAILURE TO OBTAIN A
            SUFFICIENT FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE ENTRY
            OF DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA ON DECEMBER
            6, 2017 IN ACCORDANCE WITH R[ULE] 7:6-
            2(A)(l).

      We begin our analysis by acknowledging the governing legal principles.

When a defendant moves to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing, a court may

grant the motion "to correct a manifest injustice." R. 3:21-1; R. 7:6-2(b). In

State v. Taccetta, our Supreme Court stressed the judiciary is obligated "to

minimize the ultimate miscarriage of justice—the conviction of an innocent

person." 200 N.J. 183, 196 (2009). Accordingly, the court rules and case law

make clear "at a plea hearing, a judge must be satisfied that the defendant has

given a factual account that makes him guilty of the crime." State v. Tate, 220

N.J. 393, 405 (2015) (citing R. 3:9-2). Rule 3:9-2 provides a court shall not

accept a guilty plea

            without first questioning the defendant personally,
            under oath or by affirmation, and determining by
            inquiry of the defendant and others, in the court's
            discretion, that there is a factual basis for the plea and
            that the plea is made voluntarily, not as a result of any
            threats or of any promises or inducements not disclosed
            on the record, and with an understanding of the nature
            of the charge and the consequences of the plea.

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                                        9
       Furthermore, "[a] factual basis for a plea must include either an admission

or the acknowledgment of facts that meet "'the essential elements of the crime.'""

Tate, 220 N.J. at 406 (quoting State in the Int. of T.M., 166 N.J. 319, 333 (2001)

(quoting State v. Sainz, 107 N.J. 283, 293 (1987))). This requirement "is to

'protect a defendant who is in the position of pleading voluntarily with an

understanding of the nature of the charge but without realizing that his conduct

does not actually fall within the charge.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Barboza, 115

N.J.   415,   421   (1989)).     "However,     the   defendant's   admission    or

acknowledgement may be understood in light of all surrounding circumstances."

Sainz, 107 N.J. at 293; see also State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 581 (1992) ("In

determining whether an adequate factual basis exists, the court may consider the

defendant's statements as well as information gleaned from the sur rounding

circumstances.").

       "'The standard of review of a trial court's denial of a motion to vacate a

plea for lack of an adequate factual basis is de novo.'" State v. Urbina, 221 N.J.

509, 528 (2015) (quoting Tate, 220 N.J. at 404). "An appellate court is in the

same position as the trial court in assessing whether the factual admissions

during a plea colloquy satisfy the essential elements of an offense." Tate, 220

N.J. at 404. As a general matter, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is governed

                                                                            A-1016-22
                                       10
by a four-prong test announced in State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 157-58 (2009).

However, "when the issue is solely whether an adequate factual basis supports

a guilty plea, a Slater analysis is unnecessary." Tate, 220 N.J. at 404.

      N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a) defines a DWI offender as "[a] person who operates

a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor . . . or operates

a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08% or more by weight

of alcohol in the defendant's blood. . . ." The DWI offense can be proved by two

methods: proof of the defendant's physical condition and performance during

balance and other sobriety tests (the observational method) or quantitative proof

of the defendant's BAC established by blood or breath testing (the per se

method). See State v. Kashi, 360 N.J. Super. 538, 545 (App. Div. 2003).

      We next apply the legal principles to the present facts, applying a de novo

standard of review.     Defendant argues the municipal court relied on his

admission that "the consumption of the alcohol 'impaired [his] ability to safely

operate [his] vehicle,'" but because "impairment" is not a DWI element, that

admission was insufficient to support a factual basis for his DWI guilty plea.

We disagree. For one thing, defendant's admission of impairment was not the

sole circumstance used to establish a factual basis for the guilty plea. That

admission must be read in conjunction with defendant's acknowledgements

                                                                            A-1016-22
                                       11
regarding the BAC evidence admitted into evidence without objection. It is the

combination of defendant's admission of impairment and his acknowledgement

of the BAC reading that leads us to conclude the municipal court elicited an

adequate factual basis for defendant's guilty plea.

      Specifically, during the plea colloquy, defendant confirmed he drank four

bottles of beer before driving his car. Immediately after the BAC reading was

submitted to the municipal court as S-1, the judge asked defendant: "[y]ou're

going to tell the [c]ourt that you only had four beers and ended up with a .13

percent? That's a high level of alcohol." Defendant did not dispute the high

BAC reading introduced into evidence, but rather responded, "I didn't eat at all

that day."

      We do not hesitate to conclude that by explaining why his BAC reading

was so high, defendant not only acknowledged his awareness of the State's BAC

evidence but also acknowledged the truth and accuracy of that evidence for

purposes of establishing a factual basis for his guilty plea. See Sainz, 107 N.J.

at 293 (stressing a defendant's "admission or acknowledgement may be

understood in light of all surrounding circumstances"); Mitchell, 126 N.J. at

581-82 (a court may consider a defendant's statements in determining whether

an adequate factual basis exists). We thus conclude defendant's answers to the

                                                                           A-1016-22
                                       12
municipal court judge's questions during the plea colloquy, viewed collectively

and in context, constitute an adequate acknowledgment of the facts needed to

prove the essential elements of the DWI offense, thereby satisfying the

requirements set forth in Tate, 220 N.J. at 406, and Rule 3:9-2. Certainly, this

is not a situation where defendant understood the nature of the charge without

"realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge.'" Tate, 220

N.J. at 406.

       In sum, we conclude defendant pled guilty to DWI because he was indeed

guilty of that offense. There is no manifest injustice here requiring reversal and

thus no basis to vacate defendant's knowing and voluntary guilty plea. R. 3:21-

1; R. 7:6-2(b).

      Affirmed.

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