Court Opinion

ID: 9778631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:14:14.97951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:12.246342
License: Public Domain

DENTON, Chief Justice.
I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion, but I am unable to agree with the disposition made of several of appellants’ points of error.
After carefully reviewing the record, it is my opinion the facts and circumstances of this case raised the issue of new and independent cause. In the final analysis, this question must be determined from the pleadings and evidence of each individual case. The facts pleaded by the plaintiffs below reveal the relevancy of the act of the flagman in stopping the plaintiffs’ automobile to the negligence alleged to have been committed by the defendant’s truck driver, which allegedly caused the collision. Plaintiffs’ first amended petition alleges: “That at a point in said highway where an unimproved road running in an east and west direction crosses said highway, said repair work was in progress and a flagman signaled the plaintiff Gertrude Pearl Isaacs to stop, that in obedience to said signal the plaintiff Gertrude Pearl Isaacs did stop, and that after said automobile had come to a complete stop, it was-struck with great force and violence froim the rear by the above-mentioned truck-tractor owned by defendant and driven by the employee of the defendant.” Not only did the plaintiffs’ pleadings recognize that am agency other than the acts of the parties-entered into the collision, but this allegation! is supported by the evidence offered by the’ plaintiffs below. The fact issue as to whether some new and independent cause intervened between defendant’s alleged negligent acts and the injuries sustained by plaintiffs was clearly raised. As stated in the majority opinion, when such an issue, is raised, it is reversible error to submit a definition of “proximate cause” which does-not include the element of a new independt-ent cause.
I disagree with the majority opinion in sustaining the points of error dealing' with the statement of the defendant’s driver' made after the collision. The statement attributed to the driver was testified to in rebuttal by both Mr. and Mrs. Isaacs after the driver had denied being at fault in his direct-examination. Both plaintiffs testified that the statement was made to them at the-scene immediately following the collision.. Mr. Isaacs testified as follows: “Well, sir,, he came up to me and he said, T don’t believe it was anybody’s fault’. He stood'there a second or two and he said, ‘Well, I know it was my fault, and if I had had', three feet further back I could have missed' you.’.” Mrs. Isaacs’ testimony corroborated'this testimony. Clearly, the statement was apart of the res gestae and as such is admissible; nor is the statement subject to the-objection it was a conclusion rather than a-statement of fact. The truck driver’s; statement obviously included facts which were directly connected with the collision. Rowe v. Liles (Tex.Civ.App.), 226 S.W.2d 253, (Writ Refused); City of Austin v. Johnson (Tex.Civ.App.), 195 S.W.2d 222, (Refused), (NRE); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Rhodes, (Tex.Civ.App.), 256 S.W.*9252d 448, (NWH); J. H. Robinson Track Lines v. Raymondville Independent School Dist. (Tex.Civ.App.), 237 S.W.2d 359, (NWH). A jury argument which is based on admissible evidence is obviously proper. I would overrule appellants’ points of error Numbers 2 and 3.
 The rule is well settled that when a prior criminal prosecution and a subsequent civil action are based on the same transaction, a plea of guilty by the accused in the criminal action is admissible against him as an admission in the subsequent civil suit. Mooneyhan et ux. v. Benedict (Tex.Civ.App.), 284 S.W.2d 741, (Refused), (NRE); Canales v. Bank of California (Tex.Civ.App.), 316 S.W.2d 314, (Refused), (NRE); Carrick v. Hedrick (Tex.Civ.App.), 351 S.W.2d 659, (NWH). However, for such a plea of guilty to be admissible in the subsequent civil suit, the plea of guilty must be validly entered. Mooneyhan et ux. v. Benedict, supra, and Johnson v. Woods (Tex.Civ.App.), 315 S.W.2d 75, (Refused), (NRE). Therefore, the question to be determined here is whether or not the plea of guilty of appellant’s truck driver was validly entered. Mr. Price, the truck driver, testified on cross-examination as follows:
“Q Mr. Price, is it your thinking and are you telling this jury that you were not at fault in any way in connection with this accident ?
“A I don’t feel like I was at fault, sir.
“Q You feel the accident was wholly the fault of the Isaacs?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q Mr. Price, did you receive a ticket for a traffic violation ?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q By the Highway Patrolman that investigated the accident?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q Was it for following too closely?
“A Yes, sir.
“Q Did you plead guilty to it?
“A I paid the ticket.
“Q You plead guilty to it?
“A I paid the ticket.
“Q Well, you knew when you paid the ticket you were pleading guilty, didn’t you ?
“A I presumed I was, sir.”
Price’s answers to the repeated question as to how he plead were obviously unresponsive. On redirect examination Price explained he was living in Lubbock at the time he paid the ticket in Tahoka; that the fine was $20.50; that the ticket was paid in Tahoka; that it would have cost him more money to defend the case than it would have cost to “pay it off”; and that he did not feel guilty when he paid the ticket. Under the authorities listed above and the evidence presented in this case, I am convinced the plea of guilty was validly entered and conclude the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence. It follows that the jury argument referring to such evidence was not improper.
 In my opinion, the jury argument set out in the majority opinion was not so improper as to amount to a denial of the rights of appellant. The cases cited in the majority opinion were rendered prior to the adoption of the rales of civil procedure and, therefore, are of little value. The rule is now well settled that before a judgment will be reversed because of argument of counsel, the argument must be improper and it must be such as to satisfy the reviewing court that it was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause rendition of an improper judgment in the case. Aultman v. Dallas Railway & Terminal Co., 152 Tex. 509, 260 S.W.2d 596. Even though portions of appellees’ counsel’s argument may be said to have been improper, no objections were made at the time such arguments were made. In my opinion, the arguments were not so improper as to being beyond corree*926tion by means of a timely objection and a proper instruction. In view of the above well-settled rules and the circumstances of this case, I am of the opinion the arguments complained of were not so improper as to require a reversal of the judgment.
The point of error concerning a statement of a prospective juror to the effect, “I have always observed it is easier to make premium payments than to collect a claim.”, is, in my opinion, without merit. The statement was not in response to a question asked by appellees’ attorneys. Under the circumstances, such a statement did not call for a mistrial.
Appellant’s last two points complain of the trial court’s refusal to submit requested special issues and instructions which were calculated to separate and distinguish incapacity and pain and suffering of appel-lees from that caused by pre-existing physical conditions and that caused by the collision in question. The trial court confined and limited appellees’ recovery to those damages suffered as a result of the “accident in question”. This was the correct method of submitting the damage issue. Yellow Cab and Baggage Company v. Mrs. Jewell Green, 154 Tex. 330, 277 S.W.2d 92.
Due to the error of the trial court in failing to include the element of new and independent cause in its definition of “proximate cause” as requested by appellant, I agree that the case should be reversed and remanded.
CHAPMAN, Justice.
I concur in the concurring opinion.