Court Opinion

ID: 9798027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:35:06.375969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:00:36.232799
License: Public Domain

OPALA, J.,
with whom WINCHESTER, V.C. J., joins, .dissenting.
¶ 1 The court affirms the nisi prius imposition of liability upon Mid Century and Farmers Insurance (insurers) for a Christian1 bad-faith tort. I would reverse the trial court’s judgment against these defendants/appellants. The plaintiffs judgment lacks support in competent evidence. The court’s holding has cavalierly removed from the elements of a bad-faith tort the requirement that an insurer’s conduct be shown to have been taken in bad faith. The court has also discarded (or disregarded) the legal distinction between the elements of unreasonableness and those of bad faith. The result produced here today foists liability for the insurer’s mere failure to procure a settlement by means that would confer a benefit only upon a third party rather than upon its own insured. Because the record of the insurer’s actions does not demonstrate bad faith towards the insured, I dissent from the *1114court’s judgment as well ás from its pronouncement.
I
THE ADDUCED PROOF DOES NOT SUPPORT A CLAIM FOR BAD-FAITH REFUSAL TO SETTLE A COVERED LOSS
¶ 2 The trial record is devoid of proof of the insurers’ bad faith either to indemnify or defend their insured. The insurers neither acted in bad faith nor denied a benefit owed their insured under the policy. The requisite elements of the tort in suit were not established. Liability at nisi prius was hence incorrectly imposed.
The Elements of a Bad-Faith Claim
¶ 3 The Christian bad-faith tort2 imposes liability upon an insurer “only where there is a clear showing that the insurer unreasonably, and in bad-faith, withholds payment of the claim of its insured.”3
¶4 The conduct of an insurer must be examined in light of the information known or knowable by the insurer at the time performance under the contract was requested.4 When presented with a claim by its insured, an insurance company must tender prompt payment due under the terms of its policy.5
¶ 5 The elements of a bad-faith claim require that an insurer do not:
(1) Be Unreasonable;
(2) Take action in bad-faith;6
(3) Act to withhold a benefit owed to its insured under the terms of the policy.
The presence of the claim’s requisite elements must be proved and judicially assessed in light of information that was known or knowable to the insurer at the time benefits were alleged to have been tortiously withheld.
The Elements Of A Bad-Faith Tort Claim Must Be Those Which Harm The Insured, Not Another Person
¶ 6 The bad-faith tort was crafted to ameliorate the unequal bargaining power of an insured vis-a-vis the insurer. It injects a public-law element into the contract-based status that governs the parties.7 The duty to act in good faith is derived from the contractual relationship between an insurer and its insured.8 The bad-faith tort is a private-law remedy inuring exclusively to the insured. *1115It serves to vindicate a harm dealt to the insured9 by the insurer’s substandard conduct.
The Trial Court Erred By Not Granting, At The Close Of The Evidence, The Insurer’s Motion For A Directed Verdict
¶ 7 A motion for directed verdict may be sustained only when there is an entire absence of proof on an issue on the claim’s merits or defense and should be denied when there are questions upon material facts or reasonable persons could differ on the choice of inferences to be drawn from the facts in evidence.10 To determine whether a plaintiffs evidence is sufficient to withstand a motion for directed verdict, the trial court must consider as true all evidence favorable to the plaintiff together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn from it, and disregard all conflicting evidence favorable to the mov-ant.11 Only if all the inferences to be drawn from the evidence favor the moving party will a directed verdict withstand appellate scrutiny. We review de novo the denial of insurers’ motion for directed verdict.12
¶ 8 There is here no record evidence that proves a withholding of benefits owed to the insured under the policy. Undisputed proof clearly establishes that payment was tendered to counsel for Ms. Smith (the third-party claimant) on behalf of Badillo (insured). That tender was rejected. Upon judgment against the insured, the insurers once again tendered the policy limits to fulfill their indemnification obligation of the policy. Insured’s attempts to weave a bad-faith claim from the insurers’ withholding of a statement sought from the insured clearly must fail. There is no legal support for that position.
¶ 9 Evidence relating to the state of mind of the third-party’s lawyers’ willingness to settle an unfiled lawsuit is irrelevant to a bad-faith analysis and to forensic insights into the claim. The relevant inquiry must be confined to the state of mind and to the intent of the insurer at the critical time in question.13 Even assuming that the favorable verdict on reasonableness was based in no part on the irrelevant evidence regarding the third party’s state of mind, there is here no evidence that can satisfy the element of insurer’s bad faith.
¶ 10 To establish insurer’s bad faith, the proof must demonstrate that the insurer’s conduct was taken in disregard of the requisite good-faith intent. There is no evidence in this record which shows that Farmers/Mid Century failed to act without an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscien-tious advantage of Badillo.14 Nothing in the *1116record suggests that the actions of the insurers amounted to anything greater than an unreasonable error in judgment.15 No record proof demonstrates that insurers’ failure to produce the insured for a statement was done in a bad-faith effort to avoid or defeat their own liability to Badillo.
¶ 11 The insured’s claim attempts to create a new remedial construct utterly foreign to Oklahoma’s bad-faith jurisprudence. The new tort would best be described as cross-pollination of hand-selected elements of an insurer’s good-faith duty to indemnify an insured and of its obligation to defend against claims and to settle them within the limits of the policy.16 Any insurer who fails successfully to settle a covered loss with a third party prior to the commencement of litigation or within the limits of the policy would, under the new construct, be held liable if, in retrospect, its failure could be deemed unreasonable. The new delict would eliminate good-faith element now present in the Christian tort, transfer the benefit of an insurer’s contract obligation to a third party, and utterly remove the demand requirement as a trigger of the insurer’s duty to defend or to settle within the limits of the policy. Under the existing Christian jurisprudence, the insured can prove here no claim either for failure to indemnify or to defend. It is solely through the guise of a clever cross-pollination construct that liability came to be imposed upon the insurers in this suit.
Ill
OKLAHOMA DOES NOT REQUIRE AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURERS TO ASSIST OR COOPERATE WITH THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFFS IN THEIR EFFORTS TO SEARCH FOR ACTORS, OTHER THAN THE INSURED, WHO MAY BE LIABLE TO SUIT
¶ 12 Insurers attempted to indemnify Ba-dillo, and when their attempt was rejected by the third party Badillo was provided a defense. Insurers, who merely refused to produce Badillo for a statement, were held liable here for failure to aid the third-party claimant’s lawyers. Producing Badillo would only have aided the third party in crafting a case against Badillo. There was no expectation Badillo would be exonerated of liability after giving the statement.
¶ 13 The focus of any analysis of an insurer’s offending conduct must concentrate exclusively on the effects that conduct may have had upon the insured. A third party may receive a benefit from an insurer’s conduct only when that benefit is conferred inci*1117dentally as a consequence of an action taken to benefit the insured. Insurers had no duty to aid the third-party claimant if to do so was not absolutely necessary to benefit Badillo. There was no assurance that aiding third-party claimant’s lawyers would have been of benefit to Badillo.17 Liability was incorrectly foisted upon the insurers for failing to aid a third party when that action’s benefit to the insured was not shown to be anything more than a remote possibility.
IV
THE STANDARD OF CARE, WHOSE BREACH GIVES RISE TO AN ACTIONABLE TORT CLAIM AGAINST THE INSURER, CALLS FOR A SHOWING OF WANT OF GOOD FAITH IN HANDLING THE CLAIM
¶ 14 The standard of care whose nonfulfillment will give rise to an insured’s actionable claim against the insurer for bad faith emanates from the latter’s refusal to settle in good faith a covered loss. It falls neither under the common-law18 rubric of a willful delict nor into the category of claims in negligence.19 The bad-faith tort, which is to be regarded as sui generis,20 stands predicated *1118on bad-faith breach of the insurer’s contract-based fundamental duty to protect the insured in good faith against the liability consequences of a policy-covered loss.
¶ 15 Bad-faith21 is statutorily defined by the provisions of 25 O.S.2001 § 9, where its meaning is explained in this language:
Good faith consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through the forms or technicalities of law, together with an absence of all information or belief of facts which would render the transaction unconscientious.
The standard of care for whose breach will arise a bad-faith claim is governed by the words of the quoted statute. It is utterly unnecessary and improper to force the Christian tort into imprisonment within either of the two traditional common-law rubrics for tort liability.22
V
SUMMARY
¶ 16 The court’s holding today expands the bad-faith tort beyond both its contemplated and previously pronounced boundaries. The requirement of “bad faith” now seems to exist solely in the shorthand title of the tort and not as an evidentiary requirement for imposition of liability. Insurers doubtless made an error. A jury found their actions unreasonable. Though deemed unreasonable, the insurers’ actions were not shown to have been taken in bad faith. The court seems to indicate that the insurers were duty-bound to produce Mr. Badillo for a statement. If so, that action would likely have conferred a benefit solely upon the third party. If the step had been taken, the insurers would have ignored the risk of the insured’s criminal prosecution solely for the sake of relieving themselves of potential civil liability. Today’s message stands the bad-faith tort upon its head and leaves the insurance business in a quandary. This is so because the newly added bad-faith tort elements are applied retrospectively against two unsuspecting insurers.
¶ 17 Detrimental impact of unforeshad-owed change in the applicable law must be given prospective effect to protect vanquished litigants against unforeseeable consequences from conduct (or omission) regarded as nonactionable at the time of its occurrence. If today’s pronouncement is to serve as the effective common-law norm for an insurer’s good-faith deportment, its application should be confined, at a minimum, to claims that will arise after the date mandate has issued in this case.23
¶ 18 I shall have no part of the court’s analysis. By application of the precedential standards of yesteryear the insurer’s conduct did not, on this record, amount to bad faith. I must hence recede from the judgment and from the opinion by which it is pronounced.

. Christian v. American Home Assurance Company, 1977 OK 141, 577 P.2d 899

. Commonly referred to simply as the bad-faith tort.

. Christian v. American Home Assurance Company, supra note 1, 1977 OK 141, ¶ 26, 577 P.2d at 905; Christian imposes liability upon an insurer who provided disability insurance. The holding in Christian now applies to all insurers. See McCorkle v. Great Atlantic Ins. Co., 1981 OK 128, 637 P.2d 583.

. Buzzard v. McDanel, 1987 OK 28, ¶ 10, 736 P.2d 157, 159.

. There are two narrow exceptions to this rule. First, insurers may withhold immediate payment during a reasonable investigation into the validity or value of the claim. Buzzard v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc., 1991 OK 127, ¶ 14, 824 P.2d 1105, 1109. Second, if there is a dispute about the validity or value of a claim, an insurer may, without subjecting itself to liability, defer payment by resorting to a judicial forum to settle the dispute. Manis v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 1984 OK 25, ¶ 12, 681 P.2d 760, 762. A tort claim also lies for a breach of duty to defend an insured against third-party claims covered by the policy. Wilson v. Gipson, 1988 OK 35, ¶ 26, 753 P.2d 1349, 1356.

. "Bad faith is the antithesis of good faith and our Legislature has told us in statutory language what constitutes good faith. In 25 O.S.1941 § 9, we are told: 'Good faith consists in an honest intention to abstain from talcing any unconscien-tious advantage of another, even through the forms or technicalities of law, together with an absence of all information or belief of facts which would render the transaction unconscien-tious.' ” National Mut. Cas. Co. v. Britt, 1950 OK 159, ¶ 10, 218 P.2d 1039, 1041 (emphasis added). The definition remains in force today at 25 O.S.2001 § 9.

. Christian, supra note 1, 1977 OK 141, ¶ 11, 577 P.2d at 902.

. Absent a contractual or statutory relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in a bad-faith suit, there can be no duty owed and none breached. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Amick, 1984 OK 15, ¶ 14, 680 P.2d 362, 364. The court has created a single exception to its prohibition of third-party suits for bad faith. An action will lie when the third party is the named beneficiary of an insur*1115ance policy. Roach v. Atlas Life Ins. Co., 1989 OK 27, ¶ 8, 769 P.2d 158, 161.

. The tort does not inure to the benefit of one who is not a party to the contract.

. Handy v. City of Lawton, 1992 OK 111, ¶ 8, 835 P.2d 870, 872-3.

. Fleming v. Baptist General Convention, 1987 OK 54, 742 P.2d 1087, 1091-92; Condo v. Beal, 1967 OK 30, 424 P.2d 48, 51; Orthopedic Clinic v. Hanson, 1966 OK 119, 415 P.2d 991, 995; Sister v. Whitten, 1964 OK 71, 393 P.2d 497, 503; Price v. Smith, 1962 OK 173, 373 P.2d 242, 244.

. Computer Publications, Inc. v. Welton, 2002 OK 50, ¶ 6, 49 P.3d 732; Cities Service Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 1999 OK 14, ¶ 11, 980 P.2d 116, 124.

. A proper inquiry into a potential bad-faith withholding of a benefit must focus upon two questions: (1) whether the insurer’s conduct was unreasonable and (2) whether it was taken in bad faith.

. In fact there is evidence suggesting that, though the insurers’ conduct may have, in retrospect, constituted an error in judgment, that the actions nonetheless amounted to good faith. Testimony of Cynthia Burton, attorney for third party, on direct examination by insurer’s attorney, trial transcript Volume VII, page 131:
Q — When you talked to Mr. Wallis [insurers' agent], he told you that he didn’t think that it is in Mr. Badillo’s best interests to give a statement, right?
A — He kept saying, "I have to defend my client."
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Third-party attorney Burton informed insurers' agent that one purpose of a statement would be to determine if the insured had been drinking before the accident. From the testimony of Howard K. Berry, attorney for third party, on cross-examination by insurers attorney, trial transcript Volume VI, page 79:
Q — [ ... ] Have you ever told me that one of the reasons why someone would not want to produce another person for a statement if there is a possibility of drinking involved and there's someone badly injured and in the hospital is the possibility of criminal prosecution?
*1116A — That sounds like my words
Q — All right. You told me that that would be a legitimate reason not to produce someone for a statement.
A — I think so.

. An error in judgment does not constitute bad faith. Britt, supra note 6, 1950 OK 159 ¶¶ 16-18, 218 P.2d at 1039, citing with approval Georgia Casualty Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S.W.2d 777, 780 (1932)["[T]he most that can be said is that, in refusing to settle, the insurance company committed a mere error of judgment for which it cannot be held liable.”], Mendota Electric Co. v. N.Y. Indemnity Co., 175 Minn. 181, 221 N.W. 61, 62 (1928) ["it takes something more than mere mistake to constitute bad faith. [ ... ] But it takes something more than error of judgment to create liability.”], and Lawson and Nelson Sash and Door Co. v. Associated Indemnity Corp., 204 Minn. 50, 282 N.W. 481, 483 (1938) ["The most that can be said about the whole situation retrospectively is that [Attorney for third party's] judgment was better than that of [Attorney for insurer’s], i.e., it would have been better for all concerned if the proposed settlement had been made effective. But, after all, no mortal has the gift of prophecy.”]

. "The defense duty is measured by the nature and kinds of risks covered by the policy as well as by the reasonable expectations of the insured. An insurer has a duty to defend an insured whenever it ascertains the presence of facts that give rise to the potential of liability under the policy. The insurer’s defense duty is determined on the basis of information gleaned from the petition (and other pleadings), from the insured and from other sources available to the insurer at the time the defense is demanded (or tendered) rather than by the outcome of the third-party action. An insurer ordinarily has no duty to defend an insured absent a reguest to provide a defense, which act serves to trigger the insurer's performance under the contract.” First Bank of Turley v. Fidelity and Deposit Ins. Co. of Maryland, 1996 OK 105, ¶¶ 13-14, 928 P.2d 298, 303-304 (emphasis added).

. The third party might have settled the claim had it received the aid of the insurer through producing the insured, but it would make no guarantee to the insurers that producing the insured would result in a settlement. The determination of whether Badillo would have received the benefit of settlement could have been made only after he was produced for a statement.
From the direct examination of third-party attorney Cynthia Burton by counsel for the insurers. Trial transcript volume VII, page 128-129:
Q — When you were telling Mr. Wallis [insurers' agent] that-requesting a statement from Mr. Badillo before you would advise Ms. Smith to sign a release, you were telling him that there was no assurance that if Mr. Badillo gave a statement, the case would settle, true?
A — No.
Q — It was certainly possible, after talking to Ba-dillo, you were going to pursue the case.
A — It depended on what happened with our conversation with Mr. Badillo as to what we would do.
Q — It was conditional upon the Conversation that you had with Mr. Badillo, right?
A — Correct.
Q — In other words, whether the case would settle depended on what Mr. Badillo told you, right?
A — Yes.
Q — And how he would respond to the questions, right?
A — Yes.
Q — And whether you believed him or not when he gave you the answers, right?
A — Yes.
Cross-examination of Howard Berry, trial lawyer for third party, by insurers' counsel, Trial transcript volume VI, page 76:
Q — My question was meant to be — you used the word assurance earlier, some word or term of art. The bottom line is, you never told Mr. Wallis, nor was it part of your plan that if Mr. Badillo gave a statement, there was a guarantee or assurance that this claim would settle; isn't that true?
A — Correct. There had to be a clearing type of a statement. In other words, he had to give us the information that we needed, which was that he wasn't on the job.
Q — He had to give you the information you needed. You had to believe him.
A — Yeah.

. The common law, also called the unwritten law, was known at its English birth by the Latin name of lex non scripta regni Angliae or consuetu-do Angliae. A body of non-statutoiy law of the kingdom of England and Wales, it originated from custom and judicial decisions. Great Plains Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Dabney, 1993 OK 4, 14 n. 19, 846 P.2d 1088, 1096 (Opala, J., concurring). The common law is distinct from statutory law in that the doctrines of the former are open to judicial repudiation, modification and expansion, while statutes are not so elastic. Deffenbaugh v. Hudson, 1990 OK 37, ¶ 15, 791 P.2d 84, 88.

. Negligence and willful conduct are the traditional common-law rubrics for tort liability. These rubrics are mutually exclusive and governed by distinct standards of care. Graham v. Keuchel, 1993 OK 6, ¶ 49, 847 P.2d 342, 362. The rubrics are not mandatory for all tort liability in Oklahoma. The provisions of 12 O.S.2001 § 2 grant the courts the authority to expand and modify the common law. See Pribram v. Fouts, 1987 OK 29, ¶ 13, 736 P.2d 513, 515. Courts may expand tort law within the confines of either rubric or, as it is the case with the Christian tort, create a new tort independent of and dehors the two traditional common-law rubrics.

. The Christian tort is not a traditional common-law tort. It is a new appendage, and its boundaries are properly set by the judiciary. "The common law, followed in Oklahoma, refers not only to the ancient unwritten law of England, but also to that body of law created and preserved by decisions of courts. The common law is not static, but is a dynamic and growing thing and its rules arise from the application of reason to the changing conditions of society. Flexibility and capacity for growth and adaptation is its peculiar boast and excellence.” McCormack v. Oklahoma Pub. Co., 1980 OK 98, ¶ 7, 613 P.2d 737, 740.

. In contract law, bad faith means virtually the same as reckless indifference does in the law of torts. Bad-faith performance, like harmful actions taken with reckless abandon, are equally serious. duty breaches though the former lead generally to contractual and the latter to delictual liability.

. In Christian, supra note 1, the court was free to create the new tort and place it into one of the traditional rubrics of tort liability. See supra notes 18-20. It did not. The Christian tort is unique to modern-day common law and is properly governed by its own standard of care rather than by one created long ago. "Inherent in the common law is a dynamic principle which allows it to grow and to tailor itself to meet changing needs within the doctrine of stare decisis [.., If this were not so, we must succumb to a rule that a judge should let others ‘long dead and unaware of the problems of the age in which he lives do his thinking for him.’ ” Brigance v. Velvet Dove Restaurant, Inc., 1986 OK 41, ¶ 10, 725 P.2d 300, 303 (quoting Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis.2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105, 110 (1962) (quoting William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 Colum.L.Rev. 735, 736 (1949))).

. See Tibbetts v. Sight n Sound Appliance Centers, Inc., 2003 OK 72, ¶ 31 n. 56, 77 P.3d 1042, 1066 (Opala, V.C.J., dissenting in part). "[Sjince said case [here, Christian ] was the rule of law in this State when the rights of the parties became vested in the instant action, the rule of law announced herein should be prospective only and shall not affect the judgment rendered in the instant action." American-First Title & Trust Company v. Ewing, 1965 OK 98, ¶ 40, 403 P.2d 488, 496.