Court Opinion

ID: 9550178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:30:53.753886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:21.366136
License: Public Domain

DAVISON, Justice
(dissenting).
I am unable to agree with the majority opinion and therefore in dissenting I feel that the case is of sufficient importance that I should express my independent views in the matter.
In my opinion the result of the case should be based on the involved factual situations and in presenting my views it is necessary that the facts be more fully developed.
The two persons essential to the discussion herein, are the juror, Huffaker, and the claim adjuster, Salzman. Huffaker’s employment was that of a fire inspector and Salzman was a claim adjuster for the Employers Casualty Company, which company carried the workman’s compensation coverage on plaintiff’s employer and was also representing that company, with the company’s approval and consent, in his company’s subrogation rights; that in the case at bar, Salzman assisted plaintiff’s counsel in the preparation of the law suit and obtained an expert witness in metallurgy to testify on behalf of plaintiff. Salzman was a very interested person on behalf of the plaintiff.
The evidence discloses the fact that the young son of Huffaker was slightly injured a few days before the beginning of the present trial and that Salzman’s company (Employers) had the liability coverage; the injury was insignificant and Salzman agreed to a settlement of the claim for $40.00; Salzman informed the Huffakers that he would send the settlement papers to the Huffakers for their signatures and that the check for $40.00 would be sent them upon return of the signed papers; at that time Salzman and Huffaker were strangers to each other; the following week the trial involved herein was commenced and Salz-man attended parts of the trial and thereupon discovered that Huffaker was one of the jurors; after learning that Huffaker was a juror Salzman called the Huffaker residence and informed the Huffakers that it would be necessary for him to bring the settlement papers to the Huffaker residence at a time when juror Huffaker was at home; Salzman went to the Huffaker home on Saturday morning (during the progress of the involved trial) when Huffaker was known by Salzman to be at home and by this method was permitted to enter the Huffaker home; that Salzman led Huffaker into discussing the case; Salzman asked Huffaker what he thought about the testimony of a certain expert witness and was informed by Huffaker that he thought he made a good witness and thereupon Salz-*1009man advised Huffaker that he was glad to know that because he (Salzman) was the one who had recommended the witness to plaintiff’s attorneys.
That during the conversation at the Huf-faker home, Salzman informed Huffaker that his company had carried the workman’s compensation for the employer of plaintiff and that plaintiff was being paid compensation by Salzman’s company.
The case involved a large sum of money and the trial consumed approximately ten days. The next day after the verdict was rendered in favor of the defendant, adjuster Salzman found it convenient to advise the attorneys for plaintiff of his conversation with juror Huffaker.
Apparently Huffaker was not influenced by Salzman and his vote was in favor of the defendant.
The trial court heard the testimony of Huffaker and Salzman and made the following statement on denying plaintiff’s motion for new trial:
“The Court: All right. Briefly, I want to say that this case has given the Court and, I think, everybody in the case a great deal of concern by reason of something that happened after the verdict. The adjuster for the compensation insurance company for the plaintiff, that is, for plaintiffs employer, went out to the home of James A. Huffaker, a juror in the case, during the trial and had a conversation with him, which is shown by the affidavit of Stan E. Salzman and the deposition of James A. Huffaker. I am sure that the testimony taken pursuant to the issuance of a citation for indirect contempt of Stan E. Salzman and James A. Huffaker, was taken by the reporter at the time. I have read the affidavits and I have read the deposition and listened to the witnesses testify, and it is my opinion that even though this is a regrettable thing which certainly should have been looked into, as the Court did at the time, I do not believe that the conversation had any effect whatever on the juror, the juror having voted for the defendant rather than voting for the side that he presumably would have been inclined to be for. And, furthermore, according to all of the affidavits and the testimony that was taken, apparently there was no discussion as to how the case should be decided. The only discussion was as disclosd by this record. And I feel that then the question is whether or not the Court has any ground to give a new trial on the facts in the case. I feel that the case was as nearly perfectly tried as you can ordinarily try a case by reason of the efforts of counsel on both sides and also the effort that the Court attempted to put forth in seeing to it that this was a complete and fair trial. I feel that on account of the record in the case, the evidence in the case, taking all the facts into consideration, that the verdict of the jury was correct. I do not believe that you could reach very well any other conclusion other than that reached by the jury. And I have attempted to study this out, and the two points discussed by counsel on the motion for new trial, I do not feel are of any consequence. And for that reason, I want to let the record show the motion for new trial as far as the International Harvester Company is concerned is overruled. (Emphasis supplied)
In my opinion when Salzman went to Huffaker’s home he used the tactics of a door-to-door brush salesman in getting his toe in the door, and his purpose was to prejudice Huffaker in favor of plaintiff’s cause, or in failing in this to lay a predicate for the basis of a new trial. In this connection I feel that I should state that in my opinion the attorneys for plaintiff were completely innocent of the actions of Salz-man and they are entirely above suspicion in the matter.
In my opinion the finding of the trial court that Huffaker was not prejudiced by the conversation with Salzman, and that such conversation did not prejudice the rights of the plaintiff in obtaining a fair and impartial trial, and denying plaintiff’s motion for a new trial did not amount to an abuse of discretion.
*1010The general rule is to the effect that: The granting of or denial of a new trial because of the alleged misconduct of jurors is in the discretion of the trial court and appellate courts will not interfere unless convinced that the discretion has been abused. Stevens v. Depue, 151 Wash. 641, 276 P. 882; Annotation 64 A.L.R.2d, § 14, page 185.