Court Opinion

ID: 9447756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:43:48.945101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:11.035305
License: Public Domain

HASTINGS, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
Plaintiff was arrested in Illinois as a fugitive from justice under proceedings instituted by the State of North Carolina seeking his extradition to that state. In making the arrest, defendant acted under the authority of a Governor’s Warrant of Arrest issued pursuant to the Illinois Uniform Criminal Extradition Act. 2 Ill.Rev.Stats., 1957, ch. 60.
*291Plaintiff contends that since the rendition warrant was invalid on its face, he has been deprived of his liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.
Plaintiff first sought relief by a habeas corpus proceeding in the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois. Following a trial in that court, the writ was quashed; and he was remanded to custody. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed. The People ex rel. v. Lohman, 1959, 17 Ill.2d 78, 160 N.E.2d 792, certiorari denied 361 U.S. 963, 80 S.Ct. 591, 4 L.Ed.2d 544.
Plaintiff then filed the instant habeas corpus proceeding in the district court. It appears that the district court took the case on the facts as shown in the state court record and on briefs submitted by both parties and subsequently quashed the writ. This appeal followed.
The sole question before us is whether an arrest and detention made under a warrant of arrest, invalid on its face, is a deprivation of “liberty” as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, where such invalid warrant is validated by the subsequent introduction of documents in aid of the warrant in a habeas corpus proceeding.
The resolution of this case is made difficult because no one disputes the fact that the rendition warrant is void on. its face. The invalidity arises from the failure of the warrant to “substantially recite the facts necessary to the validity of its issuance,” as required by Section 7 of the Illinois Uniform Extradition Act, supra.
In the Hackler ease, supra, the Supreme Court of Illinois said:
“The provisions in the uniform act relative to the form and contents of the Governor’s warrant are found in section 7 which sets forth that it ‘must substantially recite the facts necessary to the validity of its issuance.’ (Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, chap. 60, par. 24.) This is a codification of the former law that the warrant must recite all jurisdictional facts necessary to its validity.” 17 Ill.2d at page 86, 160 N.E.2d at page 798.
The court concluded:
“In view of the requirements of the statutes, State and Federal, and of the numerous decisions upon the question, we are persuaded that the words ‘commitment, warrant’ as recited in the warrant in question render its validity at least doubtful and, without more appearing, we would hold the relator entitled to discharge.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 17 Ill.2d at page 88, 160 N.E.2d at page 799.
The Supreme Court of Illinois further held that “[a]n examination of the documentary exhibits which were filed with the request for extradition in this case shows that the Governor was fully justified in issuing the rendition warrant.” Id., 17 Ill.2d at pages 88-89, 160 N.E.2d at page 799. The majority opinion of our court follows the holding of the Illinois court.
With deference, I believe the central issue before us has been misconstrued. Plaintiff does not question the authority of the Governor to issue the warrant. He challenges the authority of the arresting officer to make an arrest on the authority of an invalid warrant issued by the Governor.
An arrest pursuant to an invalid warrant is no different in law than an arrest with no warrant at all. To hold that such an arrest can be subsequently validated by retroactive procedures goes beyond the holding of any case brought to our attention. This seems to me to be a clear case of illegally depriving a party of his personal liberty at the time of his arrest.
Further, it is held by the majority and by the Illinois court that because plaintiff *292brought to the attention of the trial court the documents filed with the requisition for extradition, plaintiff is bound by them. The Illinois Supreme Court opinion, quoted by the majority here, states:
“At the hearing the defendant introduced only the rendition warrant. Relator then moved for a discharge on the ground that the warrant was void on its face. After argument by counsel in support of the motion, the trial judge stated that he did not believe the case should be decided on a technicality, and counsel expressed a desire to offer evidence. The court indicated approval and stated that it did not wish to rule on the case piecemeal.” Id., 17 Ill.2d at page 80, 160 N.E.2d at page 794.
Plaintiff then introduced oral and documentary evidence on the question of fugitivity.
Under these circumstances I deem it improper to hold, in effect, that plaintiff has waived his principal contention that the warrant was void on its face.
No one disputes that the Governor of Illinois had authority to issue a rendition warrant in this case. Under the appropriate Illinois statute there was a proper way for this to be done. The Governor, perhaps inadvertently, chose a wrong way to do it. An illegal arrest followed, and plaintiff was thereby detained under an invalid process. To cure such a deprivation of personal liberty by resort to subsequent consideration of evidence showing that the Governor had authority to issue a valid warrant is to do violence to established concepts of due process. On this narrow issue I can find no rational basis for distinguishing the instant arrest from that in a criminal proceeding.
It is my considered judgment that the State of Illinois should proceed in a proper manner as it now appears it may do. I would reverse the judgment of the district court and give opportunity for the State to comply fully with its own statutory requirements.