Court Opinion

ID: 9580438
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:04:58.874842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:16.929844
License: Public Domain

Hallows, C. J. and Wilkie, J.
(dissenting, in part). We would decide the constitutional question raised and hold the Wisconsin constitution, art. I, sec. 7, providing “In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the *728right to be heard by himself and counsel . . .” extends to all misdemeanors and if an accused misdemeanant is indigent, he has a right to appointed counsel. Under the theory expounded in State ex rel, Offerdahl v. State (1962), 17 Wis. 2d 334, 116 N. W. 2d 809, that “criminal prosecutions” meant only the actual trial, this court while granting counsel to an indigent has consistently not recognized the constitutional basis of the right to such counsel. Sparkman v. State (1965), 27 Wis. 2d 92, 133 N. W. 2d 776; Jones v. State, ante, p. 56, 154 N. W. 2d 278.
We think the Offerdahl construction of the constitution is wrong and should be overruled. For the reasons we stated in Sparkman and in Jones, we think the phrase “In all criminal prosecutions” in the Wisconsin constitution includes all misdemeanors and includes the full scope of the prosecution, not just the determination of the guilt issue. True, in Wisconsin many traffic violations are both crimes under the state law and merely violations under a municipal ordinance. Whether an indigent traffic violator is constitutionally entitled to counsel depends on whether he is charged with a crime or an ordinance violation.
But, on the question of right to counsel we would join with the other jurisdictions cited in the majority opinion and place the granting of counsel to an indigent misde-meanant on constitutional grounds.
The following memorandum was filed April 9, 1968.