Court Opinion

ID: 9554391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-08 20:05:09.270337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:33:47.101221
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

KHALIF WATSON,                       §
                                     §   No. 410, 2022
     Defendant Below,                §
     Appellant,                      §   Court Below: Superior Court
                                     §   of the State of Delaware
           v.                        §
                                     §   Cr. ID No. 1703002846 A/B (N)
STATE OF DELAWARE,                   §
                                     §
     Appellee.                       §

                        Submitted: May 24, 2023
                        Decided:   August 8, 2023

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices.

Upon appeal from the Superior Court. AFFIRMED.

PATRICK J. COLLINS, Esquire, COLLINS & PRICE, Wilmington, Delaware, for
Appellant Khalif Watson.

ANDREW J. VELLA, Esquire, DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Wilmington, Delaware, for Appellee State of Delaware.
TRAYNOR, Justice:

      At issue in this appeal is the prosecution’s use of Khalif Watson’s prior felony

convictions during cross-examination and in closing argument. The admissibility of

the convictions is not at issue. Instead, Watson contends that his conviction on

weapons and resisting-arrest charges cannot stand because the prosecutor asked him

questions about his prior convictions that he had already answered on direct

examination and then argued—perhaps only implicitly—that those convictions

showed his propensity to possess weapons. Both of those tactics, the appellant

argues, were not only objectionable (though the appellant did not object in real time),

but also amounted to prosecutorial misconduct so clearly prejudicial to his

substantial rights that we should reverse his convictions. We disagree.

      The questions the prosecutor asked on cross-examination, while arguably

objectionable as cumulative, did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct. Neither

did the prosecutor’s closing statement, whether viewed separately or together with

his cross-examination of Watson, suggest that the jury should conclude that

Watson’s prior convictions, both involving firearms, were indicative of his

propensity to possess firearms.       And even if we were to accept Watson’s

characterization of the prosecution’s use of his prior convictions, he has failed to

persuade us that the ensuing error was so clearly prejudicial of his rights as to

                                          2
compromise the fairness and integrity of his trial. Accordingly, we affirm the

judgment of the Superior Court.

                                             I

                                             A

       In the early afternoon hours of March 4, 2017, Officer Christopher White and

Officer Hector Cuadrado of the Wilmington Police Department were driving a fully

marked police cruiser northbound on Washington Street in Wilmington when they

saw Watson walking on the sidewalk.1 Officer White knew that Watson was the

subject of an active capias. As Watson crossed the street, the officers, intending to

conduct a pedestrian stop, pulled the police car into the lane of oncoming traffic.

       The officers, who were trained to identify armed gunmen, observed Watson

as he stopped, took two steps backwards, and “bladed” his body away from them

while touching his right side—a sign that Watson was armed.2 Officer White said,

“Khalif, don’t run.” But Watson, who had two prior felony convictions, ran anyway,

and Officer White chased him on foot. The officers noticed that as Watson ran, he

held one arm close to his body while the other swung freely—another sign that

Watson was carrying a firearm.3

1
  App. to Opening Br. at A136–38.
2
  Id. at A191. Officer White described “blading” as “turning their body and whatever they’re
trying to conceal away from us.” Id. at A143.
3
  Id. at A143–44, A193.
                                             3
       Watson, who had a close-knit family, ran to his sister Rasheda Hinson’s house

on Washington Street. Officer White, however, caught up with Watson before he

could get inside, and the two men crashed through the front door and into the living

room where they struggled on the floor. Watson, lying face down on the floor, kept

his right hand under his torso. Officer White was on top of Watson, shouting, “[g]ive

me your hands, give me your hands, put your hands behind your back.”4 According

to Officer White, Watson then slid a silver handgun across the floor and under the

couch. Meanwhile, Officer Cuadrado entered the home and heard Officer White

say, “he just threw it under the couch.”5 During the struggle, Watson’s sister Omisha

Watson, came downstairs from the second floor and entered the living room.

       According to the officers, Omisha reached under the couch, retrieved the gun,6

and left the house with it. According to several defense witnesses, however, Omisha

had the gun in her hand when she came down the stairs, “stepped over” Watson and

the officers, and then ran out the door with the gun.7 Omisha claimed that she had

found the gun in a barbeque grill behind her house a year earlier and that she had it

in her possession since discovering it.

4
  Id. at A146.
5
  Id. at A148, A195.
6
  Officer White testified that he saw Omisha pick up the gun, but Officer Cuadrado was only
certain that he saw her pick up an “object.” Id. at A148, A185.
7
  Id. at A247, A283 (Watson’s sister, Rasheda, testified that Omisha pulled the gun out of a white
pocketbook and that she had heard of Omisha’s gun but never seen it before.). But see A273
(Watson’s sister, Asha Watson, who was present in the living room, testified that she “did not see
Omisha” at any point during the altercation.).
                                                4
        Officer White, who observed Omisha pick up the gun, chased her outside,

leaving Officer Cuadrado to handle Watson alone. Once outside, Officer White told

Omisha to drop the gun. Omisha, however, attempted to throw the gun under a

parked car; it bounced off a car and landed in the street. Officer White recovered

the gun, which was loaded and detained Omisha. As they walked back towards

Rasheda’s house, Watson, fleeing from the residence, started to run on Washington

Street. Officer White regained custody of Watson approximately 200 feet from the

home.

                                              B

        On April 3, 2017, a grand jury indicted Watson and Omisha, charging Watson

with resisting arrest, carrying a concealed deadly weapon, possession of a firearm

by a person prohibited, and possession of ammunition by a person prohibited, and

Omisha with resisting arrest and hindering prosecution. At an October 2017 final

case review, Watson rejected a plea offer to PFBPP with a State recommendation

for 10 years of unsuspended Level V time, and his case was set for trial. Omisha,

who was then-pregnant, went in a different direction; she pleaded guilty to resisting

arrest and was sentenced. As part of her plea agreement, she signed a statement

agreeing that she ran from police while holding a gun discarded by Watson.8

8
  Id. at A402 (Omisha Watson Plea Agreement) (“The defendant agrees that she did, on March 4,
2017, flee from the police from 2938 N. Washington Street, Wilmington, Delaware, while holding
the gun discarded by Khalif Watson.”).
                                              5
       At Watson’s request, his charges were bifurcated for trial purposes, with the

resisting-arrest and concealed-deadly-weapon charges assigned to an “A” case and

the person-prohibited charges deferred to a “B” case. The “A” case was tried before

a jury, while Watson elected to have a bench trial in the “B” case. The “A” case trial

went first.

                                                  C

       As mentioned earlier, the parties disputed whether Watson ever possessed the

gun in question. At trial, Watson’s defense, told through the testimony of Watson

and his three sisters, was that the gun was exclusively possessed by his sister,

Omisha.9 That narrative was at odds with the State’s account: that Watson possessed

the gun, discarded it during a struggle with the police, and then Omisha attempted

to abscond with it.

       After Watson determined that he would take the stand in his own defense, the

State asked the court whether it could inquire into Watson’s prior person-prohibited

conviction to challenge the credibility of his motive for running from the police.

Conceding that, normally, the State is “limited to asking the defendant the date of

the conviction and what it was for[,]” the State argued that Watson “would have

been aware that he faced serious consequences for possessing a firearm and that it

9
 All three of Watson’s sisters testified that they did not see Watson with the gun and that the couch
sat too low to the ground for the gun to slide underneath it, and two of the sisters also testified that
Omisha had exclusive possession of the gun.
                                                   6
would be an appropriate question which goes to the defendant’s motives and actions

as to why he ran from the police[.]”10 Defense counsel thought such questioning

would be inappropriate and that it was not relevant to the “A” trial. The court ruled

that, “[a]t this point, I’m going to limit [the questioning] to the crime and the date.”

       Defense counsel informed the court, outside the presence of the jury, that he

intended “to ask [Watson] on direct about prior felony convictions [],” and noted his

expectation that the court would give “a limiting instruction to the jury about what

that means.”11 The trial judge, still outside the presence of the jury, read the

instruction he intended to give at the end of trial to counsel’s apparent satisfaction.

We address the substance of this instruction later.

       During direct examination, Watson testified that he ran from the police when

the police cruiser approached him on Washington Street, because, as a recent parent,

he felt a powerful desire to see his son. According to Watson, he believed that the

police would take him to jail that day, because he “had an open capias for unpaid

fines[.]”12 Asked why he resisted arrest, Watson also stated that he “was not trying

to go back behind walls.”13

10
   App. to Opening Br. at A239.
11
   Id. at A296–97.
12
   Id. at A306.
13
   Id. at A309.
                                           7
          Then, defense counsel asked Watson about his two prior felony convictions

and whether he had a gun on the day in question, stating in relevant part:

          Q. Were you in possession of a firearm that day?

          A. Not at all, sir, at all, no.

          Q. Mr. Watson, have you previously been convicted of any felony
          charge?

          A. Yes, sir.

          Q. How many times?

          A. Twice, sir.

          Q. When was the first one?

          A. 2010, April 2010.

          Q. What was that charge that you were convicted of?

          A. I pled guilty to a robbery second, sir.

          Q. And when was the second charge?

          A. 2012, sir.

          Q. And what was that charge?

          A. Possession of a firearm, sir.

          Q. Were you in possession of a firearm on March 4, 2017?

          A. No, sir.14

14
     Id. at A308.
                                              8
         No contemporaneous limiting instruction was given by the court.

         On cross-examination, the State reexamined Watson about his two prior

felony convictions, suggesting that the firearm conviction was in 2013, and not 2012,

and then asked him immediately afterwards whether he was in possession of a

firearm on the day in question:

         Q. All right. Now, [defense counsel] asked you, you have two prior
         felony convictions?

         A. Yes, sir[.]

         Q. A robbery second from 2010?

         A. Yes, sir.

         Q. And you testified that your federal felony for possession of a firearm
         charge was from 2012. Would you believe me if I told you that the
         conviction was actually from 2013?

         A. That case, I got arrested in 2012.

         Q. But the sentencing, when the conviction was entered.

         A. I was locked up nine months before I got sentenced. So, I got locked
         up in August, so, yes, it could have been 2013, yes, sir.

         Q. And your testimony today is that you didn’t have a gun on you?

         A. Not at all, [sir], no.15

         Before closing arguments, the State renewed its application to argue in closing

that Watson knew that he was “a person prohibited, prohibited from having a

15
     Id. at A318–19.
                                            9
firearm” and that is why he fled—i.e., that he did not run because of the open capias

and his desire to see his son.16 The inference, the State argued, “goes only to the

credibility of the defendant’s purported reason for having run [from the police].”17

       Ultimately, the court ruled that the State could argue in its closing, without

mentioning Watson’s person prohibited status, that “maybe he ran because he was a

convicted felon.” The following exchange led to the court’s ruling:

       The Court: There’s testimony that he was a felon.

       [Defense counsel]: He was a felon and that he ran. And I suppose you
       can make [a] nexus that, because of a prior conviction, he didn’t want
       to have police contact. But when you leap to the person prohibited
       that’s where you’re going beyond the evidence in this case. . . .
       …
       The Court: You can argue that maybe he ran because he was a convicted
       felon. You cannot take it to he was a person prohibited.

       [State]: I understand the distinction. . . .18
       Watson has not appealed this ruling.

       In its closing argument, the State reviewed and evaluated the relative

credibility of the testimony of each witness. Given that the parties’ narratives were

“completely different,” the State asked the jury to make credibility determinations

16
   The State argued that “[t]he jury is aware of those facts and it goes to the defendant’s credibility
about whether or not why he ran was due to these capiases or because he possessed a firearm.” Id.
at A324–28.
17
   Id. at A325.
18
   Id. at A326–28.
                                                 10
that would make a “harmonious story of it all.”19 The prosecutor argued in relevant

part:

        And, finally, the defendant. You get to evaluate his credibility. He was
        a felon. He said he didn’t have a gun. He’s been convicted of robbery
        in the second degree, and felony possession of firearm before.
        …
        You have two narratives that are completely different . . . What do you
        do? How do you evaluate credibility? Well, jury instructions.
        …
        The jury instructions say that you have to make one harmonious story
        of it all. . . . [T]he State submits to you that the harmonious story to be
        made of this case is that the defendant, who is a felon, was in possession
        of a firearm. The police saw him, he got startled, he didn’t know what
        to do, he ran away, and he got caught tossing that gun.20
        After counsel’s closing arguments, the court gave a limiting jury instruction

regarding the proper use of prior convictions as evidence:

        You may consider evidence that the defendant was previously
        convicted of a crime for the sole purpose of judging the defendant’s
        credibility, or believability. Evidence of a prior conviction does not
        necessarily destroy or damage the defendant’s credibility, and it does
        not mean that the defendant has testified falsely. It is simply one of
        those circumstances that you may consider in weighing the defendant’s
        testimony. You may not consider evidence of the defendant’s prior
        convictions in deciding guilt or innocence. You may only consider
        such evidence in judging the defendant’s credibility.21
        The jury returned guilty verdicts in the “A” case on the resisting arrest and

CCDW charges,22 and after that, the trial judge found Watson guilty on the two

19
   Id. at A343.
20
   Id. at A341–43.
21
   Id. at A384.
22
   Id. at A389–90.
                                            11
person-prohibited charges in the “B” case.23 The Superior Court sentenced Watson

to ten years of unsuspended Level V time, followed by community supervision.

       In this direct appeal, Watson argues that his convictions should be reversed

because of the prosecutor’s misconduct during cross-examination and closing

argument.     More specifically, Watson claims that the prosecutor’s asking of

questions on cross-examination about Watson’s prior convictions after he had

already testified about them on direct examination and the “injecting [of] propensity

evidence” amounted to reversible misconduct on the prosecutor’s part.

                                               II

                                               A

       “Our analysis of whether alleged prosecutorial misconduct warrants a reversal

of a defendant’s conviction begins with whether the issue was fairly presented

below.”24 Here, because Watson failed to object to the alleged misconduct at trial,

we review “only for plain error.”25 But we first engage in a de novo review to

determine whether the prosecutor’s actions rise to the level of misconduct.26 If we

determine that no misconduct occurred, the analysis ends there; only if we find

misconduct would we engage in plain error analysis.27

23
   Id. at A369.
24
   Baker v. State, 906 A.2d 139, 148 (Del. 2006).
25
   Saavedra v. State, 225 A.3d 364, 372 (Del. 2020).
26
   Id.
27
   Id.
                                              12
       For an error to be “plain” under this standard, it “must be so clearly prejudicial

to substantial rights as to jeopardize the very fairness and integrity of the trial.28

Findings of plain error are limited to material defects that are “apparent on the face

of the record[,] . . . basic, serious and fundamental in their character. . . .”29

                                             B

       Although this Court has never stated a precise definition of “prosecutorial

misconduct,”30 we have looked to the American Bar Association standards for the

prosecution function when assessing the propriety of a prosecutor’s trial tactics. Of

relevance here are two such standards. The first, which addresses a prosecutor’s

presentation of evidence, states in pertinent part:

       The prosecutor should not bring to the attention of the trier of fact
       matters that the prosecutor knows to be inadmissible, whether by
       offering or displaying inadmissible evidence, asking legally
       objectionable questions, or making impermissible comments or
       arguments. If the prosecutor is uncertain about the admissibility of
       evidence, the prosecutor should seek and obtain resolution from the
       court before the hearing or trial if possible, and reasonably in advance
       of the time for proffering the evidence before a jury.31
       The second standard implicated by Watson’s claims defines a prosecutor’s

duty when presenting closing argument.

28
   Dutton v. State, 452 A.2d 127 (Del. 1982).
29
   Wainwright v. State, 504 A. 2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986).
30
   See Bunting v. State, 907 A.2d 145, 2006 WL 2587074, at *3 (Del. Sept. 7, 2006) (TABLE)
(“We have not stated an all-inclusive definition of prosecutorial misconduct.”).
31
   Crim. Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function Standard 3–6.6, AM. BAR ASS’N (2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/ProsecutionFunctionFourthEditi
on/ (emphasis added).
                                             13
          In closing argument to a jury (or to a judge sitting as trier of fact), the
          prosecutor should present arguments and a fair summary of the
          evidence that proves the defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The
          prosecutor may argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the
          record, unless the prosecutor knows an inference to be false. . . . The
          prosecutor should not . . . argue inferences that the prosecutor knows
          have no good-faith support in the record. . . . The prosecutor should not
          make arguments calculated to appeal to improper prejudices of the trier
          of fact. The prosecutor should make only those arguments that are
          consistent with the trier’s duty to decide the case on the evidence, and
          should not seek to divert the trier from that duty. . . .32
          As will be developed below, we are not persuaded that the prosecutor crossed

any of the lines drawn by these standards. And even if we were to conclude

otherwise, any missteps did not jeopardize the fairness and integrity of Watson’s

trial.

                                              III

          It is unclear to us whether Watson is claiming two separate acts of misconduct,

one by asking repetitive questions during cross examination and the other by making

a propensity argument during summation or whether he sees these two acts as

separate elements of one impermissible tactic. Given this uncertainty, we find it

helpful to analyze the two acts as giving rise to two distinct claims of misconduct

before considering them and their cumulative effect, if any, together.

32
     Id. Standard 3–6.8.
                                              14
                                               A

       We address first Watson’s assertion that the State committed prosecutorial

misconduct when it “reintroduce[ed]” Watson’s prior convictions during cross-

examination. Watson acknowledges that he did not object to the prosecutor’s

questions at trial and that hence this claim is subject to plain-error review.

       Standing alone, the repetition of questions on one occasion during cross-

examination that defense counsel asked Watson on direct examination is not

prosecutorial misconduct. Granted, a timely objection might have been sustained in

accordance with this Court’s holding in Martin v. State.33 In that case, decided

before the adoption of the Delaware Rules of Evidence,34 we noted that “[t]he

tendency to judge on the basis of a bad general record is too strong to encourage

repetition of it.”35 Thus, we ruled that “the State should not be permitted to simply

develop a repetition of what came out [about a defendant’s prior felony convictions]

during direct testimony . . . [unless] the State is prepared to go beyond what was

developed during direct.”36

       But the mere asking of an objectionable question that does not elicit

inadmissible testimony—only arguably repetitious testimony—cannot in fairness be

33
   346 A.2d 158 (Del. 1975).
34
   The State has argued that Martin’s central precept has been supplanted by D.R.E. 609 and the
cases interpreting that rule. Because we have concluded that, even if objectionable, the questions
did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct, we need not address this argument.
35
   Martin, 346 A.2d at 160.
36
   Id.
                                               15
labeled misconduct. The applicable ABA standard, to be sure, cautions prosecutors

not to ask legally objectionable questions, advice all trial counsel should strive to

follow. Yet, under the standard, such questions are not deemed to be misconduct

unless they bring to the jury’s attention “matters that the prosecutor knows to be

inadmissible.”37 Here, such was quite evidently not the case: Watson himself

brought his criminal record to the jury’s attention.

                                               B

         Turning to Watson’s claim that the prosecutor’s closing argument improperly

put propensity evidence before the jury, it bears noting that the claim falls short of

accusing the prosecutor of drawing a crystal-clear line between the evidence and

Watson’s propensity to possess firearms. Instead, Watson colors the prosecutor’s

tactics as an “insinuation of propensity.”38 And to construct his argument that the

prosecutor’s summation improperly injected a propensity argument, Watson focuses

on two seemingly unconnected statements.

         In the first, the prosecutor clearly linked Watson’s prior convictions to the

jury’s role in assessing his credibility: “And finally, the defendant. You get to

evaluate his credibility. He was a felon. He said he didn’t have a gun. He’s been

convicted of robbery in the second degree, and felony possession of a firearm

37
     See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 31, Standard 3–6.6.
38
     Opening Br. at 26.
                                               16
before.”39 In the second, coming three transcript pages later—after discussing the

State’s and Watson’s competing factual narratives and the facts that bear on

credibility findings—the prosecutor argued:

       The jury instructions say that you have to make one harmonious story
       of it all. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the State submits to you that
       the harmonious story to be made of this case is that the defendant, who
       is a felon, was in possession of a firearm. The police saw him, he got
       startled, he didn’t know what to do, he ran away, and he got caught
       tossing that gun.40
       Watson interprets these two statements when conjoined, as delivering the

message “essentially that Mr. Watson, given his propensity for having [a] firearm as

evidenced by his prior conviction was more likely to have a firearm on the date of

his arrest.”41 This, Watson aptly notes, is impermissible under D.R.E. 404(a), which

provides that “[e]vidence of a person’s character or character trait is not admissible

to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the

character or trait.” Likewise, under D.R.E. 404(b), “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong,

or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on

a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.”

       In our view, Watson’s contention that the prosecution used Watson’s felony

record in service of a propensity argument falls short of the mark. To start with,

39
   App. to Opening Br. at A340–41, quoted in Opening Br. at 29.
40
   Id. at A343.
41
   Opening Br. at 29.
                                             17
Watson tellingly does not point to a single statement in the prosecution’s summation

that could fairly be characterized as misstating the law or explicitly asking the jury

to infer from Watson’s criminal record that he was predisposed to possess firearms.

Moreover, the prosecutor’s reference to Watson’s felony convictions were firmly

embedded in his argument about the competing narratives of the police witnesses

who, on the one hand, placed the firearm in Watson’s hands and Watson’s witnesses,

including himself, who said that the gun was Omisha’s all along. The prosecutor

implored the jury to focus on the discrepancy as “the ultimate issue” for the jury to

decide: “[L]et’s talk about the ultimate issue. Every trial comes down really to one

question. And in this trial, the question is, who do you believe?”42

       The prosecutor then meticulously contrasted the testimony of the police

officers and that of Watson and his family members, noting that they stood in

diametric opposition to each other: “There is no middle ground here.”43 He then

identified the flaws in the defense witnesses’ testimony, especially Omisha’s, which,

according to the prosecutor was motivated by a desire “to get her brother out of

trouble.”44 Indeed, the prosecutor observed how Omisha had “change[d] her story

day-to-day depending on what’s convenient for her and who she needs to get out of

42
   App. to Opening Br. at A337.
43
   Id. at A338.
44
   Id. at A339.
                                         18
trouble.”45 And then, after critiquing the “confused” testimony of other family

members, the prosecutor asked the jury to consider Watson’s credibility, tying it

tightly to Watson’s status as a convicted felon: “[F]inally, the defendant. You get

to evaluate his credibility. He was a felon. He said he didn’t have a gun. He’s

convicted of robbery in the second degree, and felony possession of firearm before.

The two narratives are simply not compatible.”46

         But this was just the beginning of the prosecutor’s discussion of how the jury

should approach its credibility determinations.          Aside from Watson’s felony

convictions—fair game by all accounts on the issue of his credibility—the

prosecutor ticked off the factors that typically bear on a fact-finder’s weighing of a

witness’s credibility: means of knowledge; strength of memory; opportunity for

observation; motivations of the witness; and bias, prejudice, or interest of the

witness.

         Immediately upon concluding this discussion of witness credibility—the

“ultimate issue” in the trial, given the disparate accounts of the critical events

provided by the police and the defense witnesses—the prosecutor ended his opening

summation with the second statement to which Watson now takes offense:

         The jury instructions say that you have to make one harmonious story
         of it all. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, the State submits to you that
         the harmonious story to be made of this case is that the defendant, who

45
     Id.
46
     Id. at A340–41.
                                            19
          is a felon, was in possession of a firearm. The police saw him, he got
          startled, he didn’t know what to do, he ran away, and he got caught
          tossing that gun.47

          This statement sat comfortably with the trial judge’s pre-argument ruling,

which Watson has not challenged on appeal, that the prosecutor was permitted to

argue “that maybe [Watson] ran because he was a convicted felon.”48 And what is

more important, the statement, very simply, does not suggest that the evidence of

Watson’s prior convictions—again, evidence Watson himself introduced in the first

instance—evinced a propensity to possess firearms.

          Nor, in our view, do the statements the prosecutor made in closing viewed

together with the challenged cross-examination questions cross the line drawn by

D.R.E. 404(b). The questions themselves put nothing before the jury that it had not

already heard. And the purport of the prosecution’s closing was that the jury should

not, by adopting the version of events offered by Watson and his family members,

find that the police officers had testified falsely. In this context, it was entirely

proper for the prosecutor to refer to Watson’s felony convictions for the purpose of

attacking his credibility.     The prosecutor’s arguments, as we see them, were

consistent with the jury’s duty to decide the case on the evidence and did not seek to

47
     Id. at A343.
48
     Id. at A328.
                                           20
divert the jury from that duty. Accordingly, we reject Watson’s accusation of

prosecutorial misconduct.

                                                C

       Even if we were to accept Watson’s claim that the references to his prior

felony convictions were designed to plant a seed in the jurors’ minds that Watson

was predisposed to possess firearms, he has not shown plain error. Said another

way, the prosecutor’s cross-examination of Watson and closing argument were not

so clearly prejudicial to Watson’s substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and

integrity of his trial.

       To determine whether prosecutorial misconduct is clearly prejudicial to a

defendant’s substantial rights, this Court weighs three factors: (1) the closeness of

the case, (2) the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and (3) the steps taken

to mitigate the effects of the error. This is known as the Hughes test after our 1981

decision of the same name.49 As former Chief Justice Steele observed in Baker v.

State, “[t]he factors in the Hughes test are not conjunctive and do not have the same

impact in every case:         for example, one factor may outweigh the other two.

Moreover, we apply the test itself in a contextual, case-by-case, and fact-sensitive

manner.”50

49
  Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559 (Del 1981).
50
  Baker, 906 A.2d at 149. We also noted that where misconduct does not warrant reversal under
the Wainwright plain-error standard, we then apply an additional analytical step in accordance with
                                                21
       If the prosecutor’s approach to cross-examination and closing argument were

as characterized by Watson, we grant that the issues affected by the error were

central to the jury’s consideration of Watson’s guilt. The principal issue under the

concealed-deadly-weapon charge was whether Watson possessed the firearm found

by the police. If the jury were likely, by virtue of the prosecution’s tactics, to have

considered the evidence of Watson’s prior convictions to be probative of whether he

possessed a firearm on the date of his arrest, that consideration would have directly

affected the issue of Watson’s possession. Thus, the second Hughes factor would

appear to weigh in Watson’s favor.

       But the other two factors point emphatically in the other direction. As to the

third Hughes factor—the steps taken to mitigate the error—the trial court instructed

the jury that it was permitted to consider evidence of Watson’s prior convictions but

“for the sole purpose of judging [his] credibility, or believability.”51 The court

emphasized this limitation by explicitly telling the jury that it was not permitted to

consider the convictions as evidence of guilt or innocence, then repeated that the

jury “may only consider such evidence in judging the defendant’s credibility.”52

Hunter v. State, 815 A.2d 730 (Del. 2002). Under the Hunter analysis, we consider whether the
misconduct was part of a persistent pattern reflecting a prosecutorial disregard for previous
admonitions. Watson has not argued that a Hunter analysis is appropriate in this case.
51
   App. to Opening Br. at A384 (emphasis added).
52
   Id.
                                             22
       Watson attempts to discredit the efficacy of the court’s jury instruction, noting

that it was not given contemporaneously with the (now hypothetically considered)

error. He also claims that the error was so egregious that it fits within the category

of plainly inadmissible and prejudicial evidence that a jury cannot “unhear and

unthink.”53      In our view, Watson’s opinion of the jury’s ability to abide by the

court’s instruction in this instance is unduly distrustful of the jurors’ fidelity to their

oath; it ignores the general rule that a reviewing court usually presumes that jurors

follow the trial court’s instructions.54 Moreover, we find Watson’s portrayal of the

gravity of the purported error to be overwrought. The third Hughes factor does not

involve a search for steps taken to eliminate the error, only to mitigate it. The court’s

instruction did that here.

       We turn then to the closeness of the case. Watson, pointing to “the divergent

testimony of the witnesses”55 and the absence of forensic evidence connecting him

to the firearm, believes that his was a close case. Once again, we disagree with

Watson.     Both Officer White and Officer Cuadrado testified that, upon their

approach, Watson “bladed” in a manner suggestive of an effort to conceal an object

53
   Reply Br. at 7 (quoting Phillips v. State, 154 A.3d 1146, 1162 (Del. 2017) (Strine, C.J.,
concurring)).
54
   Baker, 906 A.2d at 155 (recognizing that this Court “customarily presume[s] that the jury
followed the trial judge’s [general] instruction,” but also that “at some point our judgment about
the prejudicial nature of the improper conduct will overcome these presumptions.”).
55
   Opening Br. at 30.
                                               23
from their vision. Both officers observed that Watson was holding one arm close to

his body as he fled.

       Officer White’s testimony about what happened after he caught up with and

was wrestling with Watson on the living room floor was vivid:

       While . . . I’m . . . struggling with him to get his hands behind his back,
       in one motion, he’s actually laying prone, so his stomach is down, his
       hand’s underneath –his left hand is free, he rotates his body underneath
       me. So he actually spins, and while he does that, his right hand comes
       out under the left side and I see a silver color firearm slide from his
       right hand underneath the couch . . . .56
Officer White then described how, while he “continue[ed] to struggle” with Watson,

“[Watson’s] sister, Omisha, comes actually past us, reaches under the couch,

retrieves the firearm [he] just saw Khalif throw, and runs out the front door and slams

the door behind her.”57 Officer Cuadrado also confirmed that he saw Omisha reach

under the couch, grab an object, and run out of the house. And when Officer White

was chasing Omisha down Washington Street, commanding her to “drop the gun,”

he saw her “try[] to throw the gun under a car.”58 Officer White picked up the loaded

firearm and soon after that took Omisha into custody. Omisha herself in her written

plea agreement admitted that “she did, on March 4, 2017, flee from the police from

56
   App. to Opening Br. at A146–47.
57
   Id. at A148.
58
   Id. at A149.
                                           24
2938 N. Washington Street, Wilmington, Delaware, while holding the gun discarded

by Khalif Watson.”59

       Admittedly, Watson called witnesses who gainsaid the officers’ testimony.

He himself took the stand and denied having a firearm that day, claiming to have run

from the police—in a normal manner—because he was aware of the outstanding

capias and expected to go to jail if caught. Omisha testified that she carried the

firearm from the second floor and out the door of Rasheda’s Washington Street

residence. In Watson’s telling, “Omisha testified that she had the firearm all along,

in a white bookbag.”60 But Watson’s other sister, Asha, who stood only feet away

as Officer White struggled on the floor with Watson, denied even seeing Omisha, let

alone carrying a gun down the stairs. Asha testified that she “didn’t pay attention,”

because her focus was “mainly on the officer and [her] brother.”61

       We disagree with Watson’s contention that, because the State and the defense

offered “divergent testimony,” leaving the jury “to decide which cohort of witnesses

was more credible,” this was a close case. In essence, the defense was asking the

jury to find that Officers White and Cuadrado fabricated their eyewitness testimony,

a class D felony under the Delaware Criminal Code,62 this despite Watson’s status

59
   Id. at A402.
60
   Id. at A278–79.
61
   Id.
62
   Under 11 Del. C. § 1223, “[a] person is guilty of perjury in the first degree when the person
swears falsely and when the false statement consists of testimony and is material to the action,
                                              25
as a convicted felon and obvious self-interest, Omisha’s written acknowledgement

of Watson’s guilt, and Asha’s odd account—seemingly inconsistent with

Omisha’s—that she never even saw Omisha during the incident. It was reasonably

predictable that the jury would make short work of this defense and return guilty

verdicts.

       In sum, the Hughes factors militate against a finding of plain error.

                                                IV

       Through the years, this Court has cautioned prosecutors, in light of their

obligation “to seek justice within the bounds of the law, not merely to convict,”63 to

take care when addressing juries, lest their argument be misleading, inflammatory,

and prejudicial. Our decision today should not be seen as relaxing the standards to

which we hold prosecutors as the public’s representatives in the administration of

criminal justice. To the contrary, we re-affirm that it is, in the memorable words of

Justice Southerland nearly a century ago “as much [a prosecutor’s] duty to refrain

from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use

every legitimate means to bring about a just one.”64 A prosecutor “may strike hard

blows [but] he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.”65 We discern no foul blows in

proceeding or matter in which it is made.” Perjury in the first degree is a class D felony, carrying
up to eight years in prison.
63
   See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 31, Standard 3–1.2.
64
   Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
65
   Id.
                                                26
the prosecution’s conduct in this case. We therefore affirm the Superior Court’s

judgment.

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