Court Opinion

ID: 9723839
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:35:07.311604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:52.488200
License: Public Domain

REYNOSO, J.
I concur in the result. The trial court did what it thought best in the context of the present state of the law. It is the state of the law, when viewed from a constitutional perspective, which concerns me.
*331Two principal considerations cause me to concur. First, the trial judge applied the appropriate standard of proof—beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty. That standard of proof is required by the importance of the interest with which we deal—the interest of the father in a continued relation with his children, and the interest of the children in continuing a relationship with the father. (See Meyer v. Nebraska (1922) 262 U.S. 390 [67 L.Ed. 1042, 43 S.Ct. 625, 29 A.L.R. 1446]; Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) 381 U.S. 479 [14 L.Ed.2d 510, 85 S.Ct. 1678]; Alsager v. District Court of Polk Cty., Iowa (S.D.Iowa (1975) 406 F.Supp. 10).) Few interests in life can be more dear. Second, the trial court was well advised by the various parties who had an interest in the outcome of this proceeding. James and his new wife were present and testified. His new wife, a widow of many years acquaintance, is described by exhibits found in the record as a moral and devoted mother. The putative adoptive parents, the grandparents of the children, testified. Children by a previous marriage also appeared as witnesses. The county officials presented their reports. Other witnesses added to the court’s understanding of the father’s strengths and weaknesses. Many exhibits were introduced. However, two very important persons were neither present nor represented—the two children involved. Their interests are so intimately affected that absent controlling authority (see In re Richard E. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 349 [146 Cal.Rptr. 604, 579 P.2d 495]), I would have said the absence was procedurally fatal. Certainly, representation of the children’s interest should be the rule. Nonetheless, on this record I am satisfied the trial court had as good a notion about the children as possible, absent their presence or representation.
The trial court ruled that the entirety of the bundle of rights a father possesses must come to an abrupt end. The children, too, lose all rights to moral and financial support from the father. Yet, the record is replete with evidence that the father had been a good father to all his children. The testimony of the older children showed his interest in being a good father. After his arrest, his first concern was about the children. The diagnostic study and evaluation by the California Department of Corrections fairly summarizes the record: “James [H] is a 40-year-old man who has made a reasonable, conforming adjustment to societal and family responsibilities until involved in the present matter. He is an emotionally rigid, proud man who displayed a strong sense of obligation to family (including father and siblings) and moral responsibility. [1Í] Available collateral information suggests [H] is a totally conforming person until he starts to drink at which time he becomes ag*332gressive, as in the present tragedy. Circumstances of this offense tend to indicate that [H’s] behavior is totally unpredictable when under the influence of alcohol and his insight into this aspect of his personality is extremely limited.” At all times, James was a good worker, a cowboy and ranch hand. He exemplifies in real tragic life, the movie and television ideal of a hard-drinking ranch hand who settles disputes by force.
The decision for the trial court, taking all the above into account, could not have been an easy one. In my view, the case is close. Nonetheless, I cannot say the trial court abused its discretion. James has a serious problem. He is described as a man of narrow mind and strong social and racial prejudices. More seriously in terms of the case at bench, he suffered from a dangerous drinking problem. The case of In re James M. (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 254 [135 Cal.Rptr. 222], was called to the trial court’s attention. There, the father, against whom Civil Code section 232 proceedings were instituted, had knifed his wife to death—21 puncture wounds were found. He was convicted of second degree murder. The record revealed a father who had suffered several suicide attempts and had deep emotional problems. The emotional problems and the crimes involved were more serious than in the case at bench. Yet, the court described the crime as one of passion, pointed to the father’s devotion to the welfare of the children, and affirmed a trial court Civil Code section 232 determination favorable to the father. In the case at bench, James was convicted of manslaughter, not murder, but the killing in the case at bench, unlike James M., was in the presence of the children, a circumstance noted by the James M. court as material on the issue of unfitness. More basic, however, is that the James M. court simply ruled, as noted by the majority, that uxoricide does not as a matter of law form the basis for termination of parental rights. In the case at bench, we rule simply that uxoricide is manifestly an important factor which the trial court may consider together with other factors.
The above summary of the father’s circumstances, in my view, gives rise to this perplexing question: can the present legislative scheme be squared with the constitutional substantive due process rights possessed by father and children? Questions abound: (1) Was it to the best interest of the children to lose the father’s obligation to support them? Need an adoption necessarily mean a loss of that right? (2) Was the father so dangerous that he could not even visit with the children and keep some relationship a live? Need an adoption necessarily terminate all visitation rights? (3) Cannot the children be given the stability they need without *333a breach of other important familial rights? The legislative scheme under which trial judges labor tends to take an all-or-nothing approach to these problems. As the appellate courts face the constitutional issues of familial rights, it is not at all clear that the present legislative approach will pass constitutional muster. We need not face those issues in the case at bench. Because of the alcohol-related dangers, the brutal slaying in the presence of the children, and the children’s need for stability, I cannot say the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in terminating parental rights.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied July 23, 1980.