Court Opinion

ID: 9710708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:15:52.161781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:59.245210
License: Public Domain

RILEY, JUDGE,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. I concur with the majority’s reversal of the trial court’s grant of Appellee retailers’ motion to dismiss City’s public nuisance complaint. I would, however, reverse the trial court’s grant of Appellee manufacturers’ and Appellee distributors’ Motions to dismiss the public nuisance complaint. I would further reverse the trial court’s grant of all Appellees’ motions to dismiss the negligence and product liability claims.

I. Public Nuisance

The majority finds that Appellee manufacturers cannot be liable to City because their conduct is legislatively authorized, and therefore cannot be a public nuisance as a matter of law. I disagree.
The majority notes that, under our common law, legislative authorization of a particular activity acts as a limitation on nuisance liability. The majority then concludes that, because City has not alleged that Appellees violated any “specific statute, ordinance, rule, or regulation with respect to the manufacture, distribution, or sale of handguns,” their conduct is therefore authorized by the legislature.
The majority relies on Sopher v. State, 169 Ind. 177, 81 N.E. 913 (Ind 1907). In that case, our supreme court stated “that which is lawful cannot be regarded in a legal sense as a public nuisance.” Id. at 183, 81 N.E. at 915. But this should not be understood to mean that a company that conducts its lawful business negligently should be free from liability. It is true that the manufacture, distribution, and sale of handguns is regulated at both the Federal and state levels.21 However, “a *390lawful business may be so conducted as to become a nuisance.” Cox v. Schlachter, 147 Ind.App. 530, 262 N.E.2d 550, 554 (1970).
The specific conduct alleged by City in its complaint is not regulated by law. See Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 95 Ohio St.3d 416, 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1143 (2002). City has claimed, inter alia, that Appellees distribute their product in a “willful, deliberate, reckless, and negligent” fashion. (Complaint, ¶ 51.) For the purposes of a motion to dismiss, this court must accept these allegations as true. Lattimore v. Amsler, 758 N.E.2d 568, 570 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). The majority cannot reasonably contend that “willful, deliberate, reckless, and negligent” distribution of firearms is legislatively authorized. Whether Appellees’ distribution practices are in fact negligent is a question for a trier of fact, not for a motion to dismiss. See id.
In my view, a defense of legislative authorization should defeat a public nuisance claim only when the specific conduct complained of is “expressly authorized” or “plainly and necessarily” implied by statute or regulation. City of Frankfort v. Slipher, 88 Ind.App. 356, 162 N.E. 241, 246 (1928). For example, in Sopher, supra, the defendant was convicted of maintaining a public nuisance- — a saloon where he sold liquor. In reversing the conviction, the supreme court explained that Sopher had a license to do the very act that formed the substance of the State’s nuisance complaint, i.e., to operate a saloon and sell liquor. Id. at 922. The conduct complained of was expressly authorized by statute. See City of Frankfort, 162 N.E. at 246. In Howard v. Robinette, 122 Ind. App. 66, 99 N.E.2d 110 (1951), trans. denied, a landowner brought a public nuisance action against a neighboring power plant, arguing that the noise from the plant’s new, larger diesel engine created a public nuisance. This court reversed a judgment.for the landowner, holding that the operation of the plant was necessary for the public good. Id. at 71, 99 N.E .2d 110. The grant of legislative authority reasonably to “extend and improve” the facility as demand required implied authorization to use a series of larger, louder engines to make the improvements. Id. at 73, 99 N.E.2d 110. Applying the City of Frankfort standard to the present case, the Appellees have not shown that the conduct City complains of — negligent and reckless distribution practices creating an illegal secondary market for handguns — is either expressly authorized or plainly and necessarily implied by existing law. The majority finds the issue of legislative authorization dispositive, so it does not address the additional three (3) arguments Appellee manufacturers raise in response to the public nuisance claim. The arguments are as follows:
1) Under Indiana common law, public nuisance requires either an interference with real property or violation of a statute;
2) Appellees had no control over the instrumentality of the nuisance;
3) City failed to plead facts demonstrating that Appellees unreasonably interfered with a public right.
Because I do not believe that legislative authorization requires dismissal of City’s public nuisance claim, I will address each of these arguments in turn.

1. Indiana public nuisance law does not require interference with real property or statutory violations

Appellees contend that, under Indiana common law, a public nuisance action requires allegations of either an interference with real property or violation of a statute. Appellees state that every public nuisance decision in Indiana includes at least one of *391these elements. (Brief, of Appellee manufacturers, at 21). This may be so, but we have never held that public nuisance law is limited to these types of actions. See Cincinnati, supra, 768 N.E.2d at 1142. Public nuisance is defined by statute in Indiana: “[w]hatever is (1) injurious to health; (2) indecent; (3) offensive to the senses; or (4) an obstruction to the free use of property; so as essentially to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance, and the subject of an action.” Ind.Code § 32-30-6-6 (emphasis added).
It is clear from the language of the statute that an interference with property is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition of a public nuisance claim. A public nuisance claim requires only an allegation of “an unreasonable interference with a public right.” Sand Creek Partners, L.P. v. Finch, 647 N.E.2d 1149, 1151 (Ind.Ct. App.1995). In determining what constitutes an unreasonable interference, the Sand Creek court stated “We ... require one claiming damages from a public nuisance to demonstrate that the agency as operated has more than a mere tendency to, or increased likelihood of, causing an injury. The alleged nuisance must cause injury as a reasonable and natural result of its operation.” Id. at 1152. The Restatement (Second) of Torts (“Restatement”) includes as unreasonable interferences acts which significantly interfere with public health, safety, peace, comfort, or convenience; conduct that is contrary to statute, ordinance, or regulation; or conduct that is of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent or long-lasting effect upon the public right of which the actor is or should be aware. Restatement § 821B(2).
Again, this court must assume for the purpose of this appeal the truth of the facts City pleads. Whether those facts lead to the conclusion that Appellees have created and maintained an illegal secondary firearms market that causes injury as a natural result of its operation is inappropriate for decision at this early stage of the proceedings.

2. The Appellees maintain control over the instrumentality of the nuisance

Appellees next argue that they cannot be liable for a public nuisance because they had no control over the instrumentality of the nuisance. Because they have no physical control over the handguns at the moment they are used to commit crimes or otherwise injure the citizens of Gary, Ap-pellees argue, they cannot be held liable for a public nuisance. It is true that City does not allege that any of the Appellees controlled the handguns at the moment that harm occurred; however, this argument misses the point of City’s allegations. City has claimed that Appellees wrongfully created, promoted, supported, and supplied an illegitimate secondary market for handguns in Gary. (Complaint, ¶ 69). Thus, City has alleged that Appellees control the creation, promotion, support, and supply of this market. See Cincinnati, supra, 768 N.E.2d at 1143; City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 12 Mass. L.Rptr. 225, 2000 WL 1473568 at *14 (Mass. Superior Ct.2000) (“[t]he ‘instrumentality’ which Plaintiffs allege Defendants controlled is the creation and supply of this secondary market.”).

3. City pled facts alleging that Ap-pellees unreasonably interfered with a public right

Finally, Appellees argue that a public nuisance claim requires allegations of unreasonable interference with a public right. They contend that City has failed to plead facts demonstrating that their interference with a public right was unreasonable. Quoting the Restatement, Appellees argue that unreasonable interference is “intentional or [is] unintentional and otherwise *392actionable under the principles controlling liability for negligent or reckless conduct or for abnormally dangerous activities.” § 821A, cmt. e. Restatement § 825 defines “intentional” interference:
An ... interference with the public right, is intentional if the actor
(a) acts for the purpose of causing it, or
(b) knows that it is resulting or is substantially certain to result from his conduct.
Id. § 825.
While our public nuisance statute does not require a plaintiff to plead intentional or negligent interference with a public right, City has nevertheless alleged facts sufficient to overcome even this heightened standard. For example, City has alleged that Appellees create, support, promote, and supply an illegitimate secondary market for handguns. Complaint, ¶ 69. Furthermore, it has alleged that Appellees knew or should have known that the creation and supply of this market would interfere with the public right of the citizens of Gary to be free from handgun violence. Id. ¶¶ 36, 38, 41 — 43.

II. Negligent Distribution and Marketing

The majority also affirms the trial court’s dismissal of City’s claims against all Appellees for negligent distribution and marketing. Applying a three-factor analysis, the majority concludes the Appellees owed no duty to City as a matter of law. I disagree.
The majority finds the relationship between Appellee retailers and City “attenuated” because these retailers “merely sell handguns, some of which eventually make their way into the City.” It finds the relationship between Appellee manufacturers and distributor and City “even more attenuated” because of the chain of distribution alleged by the City. For the majority, the “attenuated” relationship between the parties renders the connection between the harm alleged by City and the conduct of Appellees tenuous and remote. In other words, the majority seems to be saying, City is not a foreseeable plaintiff with respect to the Appellees.
“In determining whether a relationship exists that would impose a duty, we must consider the nature of the relationship, a party’s knowledge, and the circumstances surrounding the relationship.” Downs v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co., 694 N.E.2d 1198, 1203 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) trams, denied. In making these considerations, I examine the City’s complaint, which alleges that Appellees have affirmatively acted to harm City. I find the reasoning of the court in City of Boston persuasive on this issue:
Taking plaintiffs allegations as true, Defendants have engaged in affirmative acts (i.e., creating an illegal, secondary firearms market) by failing to exercise adequate control over the distribution of their firearms. Thus, it is affirmative conduct that is alleged — 'the creation of the illegal, secondary firearms market. The method by which Defendants created this market, it is alleged, is by designing or selling firearms without regard to the likelihood the firearms would be placed in the hands of juveniles, felons or others not permitted to use firearms in Boston. Further, according to the complaint, Defendants did this knowing that the firearms would end up in that market, and, depending upon precisely that result, realizing that Plaintiffs would be harmed. Taken as true, these facts suffice to allege that Defendants conduct unreasonably exposed plaintiffs to a risk of harm. Worded differently, the Plaintiffs were, from Defendants perspective, foreseeable plaintiffs.
*393Id. at *15. See also White v. Smith & Wesson, 97 F.Supp.2d 816, 828-29 (N.D.Ohio 2000) (“[i]t cannot be said, as a matter of law, that Defendants are free from negligence because they do not owe Plaintiffs a duty of care ... In this matter, the question is whether a reasonably prudent gun manufacturer should have anticipated an injury to the Plaintiffs as a probable result of manufacturing, marketing, and distributing a product with an alleged negligent design”); Cincinnati, supra, 768 N.E.2d at 1144-45.
The majority’s analysis, by focusing on the Appellees’ lack of physical proximity to City and the multiple steps in the manufacturers’ chain of distribution, fails to recognize the essential point: the Appellees’ conduct, taken as true, leads naturally and foreseeably to the injuries alleged by City.
I also disagree with the majority’s analysis of the public policy issues at stake in this case. That the citizens of Indiana have a right under our Constitution to own handguns is irrelevant to the City’s claims: the City’s complaint as pleaded does not seek to infringe upon this right; rather, it seeks a civil remedy for specific alleged damages caused by specific defendants. According to the majority, “We must presume that Congress and the General Assembly, as elected representatives of the people, have struck the appropriate balance between the societal costs of handguns and the historical right to bear arms.” However, in enforcing the state’s negligence and public nuisance laws, “Courts are not ‘legislating’ or ‘making or revising rules and regulations.’ ” White, 97 F.Supp.2d at 821. Rather, they are enforcing the power of the state “to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons.” Id. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 2245, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996)). Last year, the city of Gary had the highest per capita murder rate in the nation. A city’s foremost concern is the health and welfare of its citizens. Appellees make and sell a product that is demonstrably devastating to that health and welfare. To claim that public policy weighs against imposing a duty on these Appellees to act with care toward the City is, in my view, unreasonable.

III. Product Liability

The City’s complaint also included product liability claims against Appellee manufacturers for negligent design, and against all Appellees for failure to warn. The trial court dismissed these claims, holding that City sought to aggregate all shootings in Gary, including accidental or criminal ones, as the basis for its product liability claims. According to the trial court, the products liability claims seek to hold Appellees absolutely liable for injuries sustained through any use of firearms in the City.
Contrary to the trial court’s opinion, City’s failure to identify specific injuries caused by specific handguns is not fatal to its products liability claims. Indiana is a notice pleading state. A plaintiff need only plead the operative facts involved in the litigation; the complaint’s allegations must simply be sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice as to why the plaintiff sues. City of Anderson v. Weatherford, 714 N.E.2d 181, 185 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999), trans. denied. See also Cincinnati, 768 N.E.2d at 1145-46 (“Appellant was not required to allege with specificity that particular guns were defective and as a result caused particular injuries.”).
City has alleged that Appellee manufacturers designed guns with inadequate safety features, making them unreasonably dangerous. (Complaint, ¶ 81). Whether the failure to install a safety device renders a product unreasonably dangerous is a question of fact. FMC Corp. v. Brown, 526 N.E.2d 719, 726 (Ind.Ct.App.1988), *394aff'd., 551 N.E.2d 444 (Ind.1990). City has also alleged that all Appellees failed to warn consumers of certain dangers associated with handguns. (Complaint, ¶ 82). Some of these allegations involve dangers that are not open and obvious, such as the risk that a handgun could be fired even with the ammunition magazine removed. A manufacturer or retailer may be liable for selling a product without warning of a latent danger in its design or use. Koske v. Townsend Engineering Co., 551 N.E.2d 437, 440 (Ind.1990).
The City’s allegations, taken as true, are sufficient to overcome the Appellees’ motion to dismiss. I would reverse the dismissal of City’s product liability claims.

. While the Appellees and the majority both claim that the firearm industry is “heavily regulated,” some commentators have disagreed. With respect to distribution practices like those alleged in City's complaint, regulation has been described as “spotty at best.” John G. Culhane and Jean M. Eggen, Defining a Proper Role for Public Nuisance Law in Municipal Suits Against Gun Sellers: Beyond Rhetoric and Expedience. 52 S.C. L. Rev 287, 304 (2001).