Court Opinion

ID: 9388599
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 05:04:33.376942+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:21.332229
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

TRIPLE K WEALTH, LLC,                                                UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     April 20, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                    No. 361599
                                                                     Macomb Circuit Court
CITY OF EASTPOINTE MEDICAL MARIHUANA                                 LC No. 2022-001009-AW
FACILITY APPLICATION COMMITTEE,

               Defendant-Appellee.

Before: O’BRIEN, P.J., and MURRAY and LETICA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Plaintiff submitted to defendant a permit application to operate a medical marijuana
provisioning center in Eastpointe. Defendant was tasked with reviewing permit applications, but
denied plaintiff’s application and refused to consider it on the merits, concluding that it was
incomplete. Plaintiff filed the instant action seeking a writ of mandamus compelling defendant to
review plaintiff’s permit application on the merits. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion, and
plaintiff appeals that denial as of right. For the reasons explained in this opinion, we reverse the
trial court’s order dismissing plaintiff’s motion for a writ of mandamus.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

        This case involves the implementation, under the Medical Marihuana Facilities Licensing
Act (MMFLA), MCL 333.27101 et seq., of Eastpointe’s medical marijuana facilities licensing
ordinances. The essential facts are undisputed. This dispute arose after defendant denied
plaintiff’s permit application to operate a medical marijuana provisioning center in Eastpointe
because plaintiff’s permit application failed to include the correct filing fee for its site-plan
application (which was required to be submitted as part of the larger permit application). This, in
defendant’s opinion, rendered plaintiff’s entire permit application materially incomplete.

       Plaintiff filed a complaint for injunctive and mandamus relief, asserting that defendant
unlawfully determined that plaintiff’s permit application was materially incomplete and precluded
from further consideration due to the missing site-plan-application fee. According to plaintiff, the
missing fee was not a material defect but an easily-remedied clerical defect. Plaintiff further

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asserted that defendant’s conclusion of incompleteness was contrary to the plain language of the
applicable ordinances. Accordingly, plaintiff requested a preliminary injunction to enjoin
defendant from continuing to evaluate other permit applications or awarding any permits without
first considering plaintiff’s “properly submitted and complete” permit application. Plaintiff also
requested a writ of mandamus ordering defendant to accept plaintiff’s permit application as
complete and offer an opportunity for plaintiff to incorporate the missing payment information.

       The trial court issued an opinion and order denying plaintiff’s requests for injunctive and
mandamus relief. The trial court reasoned in relevant part that, pursuant to Eastpointe’s
ordinances, plaintiff’s application was not considered “complete” unless all fees were paid. This
appeal followed.

                                  II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        On appeal, plaintiff only challenges the trial court’s denial of its request for a writ of
mandamus. “A trial court’s decision whether to issue a writ of mandamus is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion.” Lansing Sch Educ Ass’n v Lansing Sch Dist Bd of Educ, 293 Mich App 506, 513;
810 NW2d 95 (2011). “A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range
of reasonable and principled outcomes.” Bay City v Bay County Treasurer, 292 Mich App 156,
164; 807 NW2d 892 (2011). “But whether [a party] had a clear legal duty to perform and whether
[the other party] had a clear legal right to the performance of that duty, thereby satisfying the first
two steps in the test for assessing the propriety of a writ of mandamus, are questions of law, which
this Court reviews de novo.” Lansing Sch Educ Ass’n, 293 Mich App at 513. Any underlying
issue of statutory interpretation, including the interpretation of local ordinances, is also reviewed
de novo. Bonner v Brighton, 495 Mich 209, 221-222; 848 NW2d 380 (2014).

                                          III. ANALYSIS

        Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by concluding that its permit application was
materially incomplete due to the missing fee. We conclude that, because the site-plan-application
fee did not factor into a site-plan application’s “completeness” under the applicable ordinances,
defendant and the trial court erred by concluding that the missing fee rendered plaintiff’s permit
application incomplete. We further conclude that plaintiff was entitled to a writ of mandamus
compelling defendant to review plaintiff’s completed permit application on the merits.

               [T]he issuance of a writ of mandamus is proper only where (1) the party
       seeking the writ has a clear legal right to performance of the specific duty sought,
       (2) the defendant has the clear legal duty to perform the act requested, (3) the act is
       ministerial and involves no exercise of discretion or judgment, and (4) no other
       remedy exists, legal or equitable, that might achieve the same result. [Morales v
       Parole Bd, 260 Mich App 29, 41; 676 NW2d 221 (2003).]

“A clear legal duty, like a clear legal right, is one that is inferable as a matter of law from
uncontroverted facts regardless of the difficulty of the legal question to be decided.” Hayes v
Parole Bd, 312 Mich App 774, 782; 886 NW2d 725 (2015). “A ministerial act is one in which the
law prescribes and defines the duty to be performed with such precision and certainty as to leave

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nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment.” Berry v Garrett, 316 Mich App 37, 42; 890
NW2d 882 (2016).

        Eastpointe Ordinance § 50-258 establishes the existence of Medical Marihuana Overlay
Districts “to provide opportunities for the development of certain medical marihuana facilities that
have been granted a permit by the city and have been granted a state license pursuant to the
MMFLA.” To secure such a permit, an applicant must submit to the city clerk various information,
planning documents, and fees, including, as relevant here, a site-plan application. Eastpointe
Ordinance § 10-230(a).1 “A site plan of the location, building and the permitted property must be
submitted for review and approval by the planning commission, in conformance with Article V of
the city’s Zoning Ordinance, Chapter 50.” Eastpointe Ordinance § 10-230(a)(3)(J). Pursuant to
Article V of the city’s Zoning Ordinance, “Site plans shall be forwarded to the planner, engineer
and city department heads and checked for completeness and no plans will be processed unless
they are complete and unless all fees are paid in accordance with the schedule of fees adopted by
the city council.” Eastpointe Ordinance § 50-42(a). Eastpointe Ordinance § 10-230(e) provides
when and under what circumstances permit applications will be reviewed, stating:

               A committee [referring to defendant], consisting of the city manager or
       designee, the director of public safety, and the building official or economic
       development manager, shall approve or deny the permit application within 90 days
       of receipt of the completed application and fees. . . . The city has no obligation to
       process or approve any incomplete permit application; and any times provided
       under this article shall not begin to run until the city receives a complete application,
       as determined by the committee. A determination of a complete application shall
       not prohibit the city from requiring supplemental information.

Finally, as to site-plan applications which must be submitted as part of a permit application,
Eastpointe Ordinance §10-230(a)(3)(J) provides, “An application for site plan approval . . . that is
materially incomplete or would result in a violation of state or local law shall be denied.”

        The trial court held that defendant was required by Eastpointe Ordinance §10-230(a)(3)(J)
to deny plaintiff’s entire permit application because the site-plan application was “materially
incomplete.” To reach this conclusion, the trial court relied on Eastpointe Ordinance §10-
230(a)(3)(J)’s statement that a site plan application must be submitted “in conformance with
Article V of the city’s Zoning Ordinance, Chapter 50,” and Eastpointe Ordinance § 50-42(a)’s
statement that “no plans will be processed unless they are complete and unless all fees are paid in
accordance with the schedule of fees adopted by the city council.” The trial court reasoned that
the language in these ordinances “unambiguously requires the payment of site plan application
fees,” and that any application that did not include such fees was materially incomplete—and thus
“shall be denied” pursuant to Eastpointe Ordinance § 10-230(a)(3)(J)—because “a site plan
application will not be processed if the fee was not paid.” In other words, the trial court reasoned
that plaintiff was required to submit a completed site-plan application as part of its completed

1
 Eastpointe’s ordinances have been amended since the trial court decided this case. This opinion’s
citations are to the pre-amendment ordinances.

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permit application, and because the missing fee rendered plaintiff’s site-plan application materially
incomplete, plaintiff’s entire permit application was likewise materially incomplete.

       We disagree with the trial court’s interpretation of the pertinent ordinances, specifically its
conclusion that the missing fee rendered plaintiff’s site-plan application incomplete. “Municipal
ordinances are interpreted and reviewed in the same manner as statutes.” Sau-Tuk Indus, Inc v
Allegan Co, 316 Mich App 122, 136; 892 NW2d 33 (2016). As this Court has explained:

                In reviewing questions of statutory interpretation, we must discern and give
       effect to the Legislature’s intent. To do so, we begin by examining the most reliable
       evidence of that intent, the language of the statute itself. If the language of a statute
       is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be enforced as written and no further
       judicial construction is permitted. [Farris v McKaig, 324 Mich App 349, 353; 920
       NW2d 377 (2018) (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

        As mentioned above, Eastpointe Ordinance § 10-230(a)(3)(J) requires site-plan
applications included as part of a permit application to be submitted “in conformance with Article
V of the city’s Zoning Ordinance, Chapter 50,” and Article V of the city’s Zoning Ordinance
provides in relevant part that no site plans “will be processed unless they are complete and unless
all fees are paid in accordance with the schedule of fees adopted by the city council,” Eastpointe
Ordinance § 50-42(a) (emphasis added). The separate listing of whether a site-plan application is
complete versus whether all fees were paid, separated by “and,” indicates that payment of the site-
plan-application fee is distinct from whether a site-plan application is complete.2 See United States
Fid Ins & Guar Co v Mich Catastrophic Claims Ass’n, 484 Mich 1, 14; 795 NW2d 101 (2009)
(“When the Legislature uses different words, the words are generally intended to connote different
meanings.”); Hudsonville Creamery & Ice Cream Co, LLC v Dep’t of Treasury, 314 Mich App
726, 743; 887 NW2d 641 (2016) (“The word ‘and’ means ‘in addition to.’ ”) (brackets omitted).
While nonpayment of fees may prevent a site plan itself from being “processed” pursuant to the
plain language of Eastpointe Ordinance § 50-42(a), it does not render a submitted site-plan
application—let alone the overarching permit application—“incomplete,” contrary to defendant’s
determination and the trial court’s holding.3

2
 Had the ordinance intended for payment of a site-plan-application fee to factor into the site-plan
application’s completeness, it could have indicated as much by stating, for example, “no plan will
be processed unless complete, including that all fees are paid.”
3
  Plaintiff also makes a plausible argument that defendant overstepped its authority by scrutinizing
the site-plan application for completeness in the first place. Eastpointe Ordinance § 50-42(a)
provides that site plans will be “checked for completeness” by “the planner, engineer and city
department heads”; it says nothing about defendant. While Eastpointe Ordinance § 10-
230(a)(3)(J) states in no uncertain terms that an application for a site plan that is “materially
incomplete” must be denied, it too lacks any indication that defendant is tasked with reviewing the
site-plan application for completeness. There is, in fact, no ordinance explicitly empowering
defendant with authority to review a site-plan application (as opposed to a permit application) for
completeness. That said, there is also a plausible argument that defendant is implicitly empowered

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        The question remains whether plaintiff was entitled to a writ of mandamus, and we readily
conclude that it was. Defendant does not dispute that plaintiff has a clear legal right to have a
completed permit application reviewed on the merits, and either approved or denied. Eastpointe
Ordinance § 10-230(e) states that defendant “shall approve or deny the permit application within
90 days of receipt of the completed application and fees.”4 This ordinance likewise places a clear
legal duty on defendant to perform the act requested—to review the completed permit application
on its merits, and either approve or deny it. The “use of the word ‘shall’ generally indicates a
mandatory directive, not a discretionary act.” Smitter v Thornapple Twp, 494 Mich 121, 136; 833
NW2d 875 (2013).

        As to the third requirement—whether the requested act is ministerial—the parties disagree.
“A ministerial act is one for which the law prescribes and defines the duty to be performed with
such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of judgment or discretion.” Hanlin
v Saugatuck Twp, 299 Mich App 233, 248; 829 NW2d 335 (2013). Defendant argues on appeal
that its determination about whether plaintiff’s application was complete was not ministerial
because it required defendant to exercise discretion. While defendant’s argument may be
persuasive in the abstract,5 we agree with plaintiff that, at least as applied to plaintiff’s application,
the requested act is ministerial. Defendant deemed plaintiff’s permit application “incomplete”
solely because plaintiff’s site-plan application was missing a fee. For the reasons explained, the
missing fee did not render plaintiff’s site-plan application “incomplete” based on the plain
language of the pertinent ordinances. With no other stated basis for deeming plaintiff’s permit
application “incomplete,” plaintiff’s application should have been considered “complete.”

to review a site-plan application for completeness given that it is tasked with reviewing permit
applications for completeness, and a site-plan application must be submitted as part of a permit
application. See Eastpointe Ordinance § 10-230(a)(3)(J). We need not resolve this question,
however. For purposes of this opinion, we will assume without deciding that defendant was
empowered to review a site-plan application for completeness.
4
  We acknowledge that Eastpointe Ordinance § 10-230(e) requires defendant to only approve or
deny a completed permit application “within 90 days of receipt of the . . . fees.” Defendant,
however, does not contend—and has never contended—that plaintiff only had a legal right to have
its permit application reviewed after defendant received the required site-plan-related fees. In its
denial letter to plaintiff, defendant stated that plaintiff’s permit application would be given “no
further consideration” because the application was “deemed incomplete” due to the missing fee.
Similarly, defendant on appeal argues only that it had no obligation to process plaintiff’s
“incomplete permit application.” Accordingly, the issue as framed by defendant’s denial of
plaintiff’s permit application and defendant’s subsequent arguments is whether plaintiff’s missing
site-plan-application fee rendered plaintiff’s permit application “incomplete” for purposes of
Eastpointe Ordinance § 10-230(e) (“The city has no obligation to process or approve any
incomplete permit applications[.]”).
5
  While persuasive, we offer no opinion on the merits of defendant’s argument. Eastpointe
Ordinance § 10-230(a) offers a comprehensive list of all the materials that must be included as part
of a permit application, and we offer no opinion on whether defendant must exercise any discretion
when determining whether a listed item is included in an application.

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Defendant’s only duty with respect to a completed permit application is to evaluate the application
on its merits, which is the act that plaintiff is requesting defendant to perform. Considering a
completed permit application on its merits—as opposed to deciding whether to approve or deny
the permit—is clearly a ministerial task that leaves no room for discretion. See Eastpointe
Ordinance § 10-230(e) (stating that defendant “shall approve or deny” a completed permit
application). Thus, as plaintiff contends on appeal, the requested act is ministerial at least as
applied to plaintiff’s application.

        As to the final requirement for mandamus relief—that no other remedy exist—we agree
with plaintiff that a writ of mandamus is the only available remedy to achieve its desired result.
Both the limited number of permits available, as well as defendant’s continuing efforts and
compressed timeline to review the various permit applications, render mandamus relief as the only
vehicle available to remedy defendant’s erroneous denial of plaintiff’s permit application.
Moreover, contrary to defendant’s argument, plaintiff’s alternate request for a preliminary
injunction makes no difference here. Accord Warren City Council v Buffa, 333 Mich App 422,
435-436; 960 NW2d 166 (2020) (“[R]equesting another form of relief does not prove entitlement
to that relief.”). Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction only sought to pause defendant’s
application-review process, while the request for mandamus relief sought an order for defendant
to actually consider plaintiff’s permit application as complete and submit it to a review on the
merits. See id. at 436.

                                       IV. CONCLUSION

        For the reasons explained throughout this opinion, plaintiff was entitled to a writ of
mandamus compelling defendant to review plaintiff’s completed permit application on the merits,
and either approve or deny it. The trial court’s opinion to the contrary is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the trial court to enter an order granting plaintiff’s motion for a writ of mandamus.

        Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.

                                                              /s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
                                                              /s/ Christopher M. Murray
                                                              /s/ Anica Letica

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