Court Opinion

ID: 9899896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 21:00:29.055682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:53.429267
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 22-4722

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        TAQUAN JONES, a/k/a Ta’quan Ty’rell Jones,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
        Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:21-cr-00388-WO-1)

        Submitted: October 3, 2023                                  Decided: November 16, 2023

        Before QUATTLEBAUM and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit
        Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, John A. Dusenbury, Jr., Assistant
        Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
        Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, United States Attorney,
        Nicole R. DuPré, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
        ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

              Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ta’quan Jones pled guilty to possession of a firearm

        by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(a)(2). * The district court

        sentenced Jones to 72 months’ imprisonment, an upward variance from the 37- to 46-month

        advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. Jones appeals, contending that the sentence is

        greater than necessary to accomplish the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing goals.

              We review criminal sentences for both procedural and substantive reasonableness

        “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Lewis, 18 F.4th 743,

        748 (4th Cir. 2021). When reviewing a sentence for reasonableness, we first must

              ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such
              as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range,
              treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a)
              factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to
              adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any
              deviation from the Guidelines range.

        United States v. Fowler, 948 F.3d 663, 668 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks

        omitted). For a sentence to be procedurally reasonable, “a district court must conduct an

        individualized assessment of the facts and arguments presented and impose an appropriate

        sentence, and it must explain the sentence chosen.” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204,

        212 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] district court’s explanation

              *
                 Section 924(a)(2) was amended and no longer provides the penalty for § 922(g)
        convictions. The new penalty provision in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8) sets forth a statutory
        maximum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment for a § 922(g) offense. See Bipartisan Safer
        Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 117-159, § 12004(c), 136 Stat. 1313, 1329 (2022). The 15-
        year statutory maximum does not apply here, however, because Jones committed his
        offense before the June 25, 2022, amendment of the statute.

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        should provide some indication that the court considered the § 3553(a) factors and applied

        them to the particular defendant.” Id. at 212-13 (cleaned up). In fashioning its sentence,

        the “court must address or consider all non-frivolous reasons presented for imposing a

        different sentence and explain why it has rejected those arguments.” United States v.

        Fowler, 58 F.4th 142, 153 (4th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up).

               We have reviewed the record on appeal and conclude that the district court properly

        calculated Jones’ advisory Guidelines range and committed no other procedural error. We

        therefore conclude that the sentence is procedurally reasonable.

               “If the Court finds no significant procedural error, it then considers the substantive

        reasonableness of the sentence imposed.” United States v. Arbaugh, 951 F.3d 167, 172

        (4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up).      To be substantively reasonable, a sentence must be

        “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy the goals of sentencing. 18 U.S.C.

        § 3553(a). “We will generally find a variance sentence reasonable when the reasons

        justifying the variance are tied to § 3553(a) and are plausible.” United States v. Provance,

        944 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). “However, when

        the variance is a substantial one . . . we must more carefully scrutinize the reasoning

        offered by the district court in support of the sentence. And the farther the court diverges

        from the advisory guideline range, the more compelling the reasons for the divergence must

        be.” Id. at 219-20 (cleaned up). “That said, district courts have extremely broad discretion

        when determining the weight to be given each of the § 3553(a) factors, and the fact that a

        variance sentence deviates, even significantly, from the Guidelines range does not alone

        render it presumptively unreasonable.” Nance, 957 F.3d at 215 (cleaned up). “Instead, we

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        must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a

        whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

               At sentencing, Jones argued for a sentence at the high end of the 37- to 46-month

        advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. Although Jones conceded that he committed the

        instant § 922(g) offense while serving a supervised release term for a prior § 922(g)

        conviction and in the course of a domestic altercation, he maintained that the circumstances

        of the instant offense were mitigated because he refrained from displaying or deploying the

        weapon even though he claimed he was the victim rather than the aggressor. The district

        court observed that it was difficult to determine who the aggressor was in the domestic

        disturbance, but viewed Jones’ forbearance as diminishing the aggravating nature of

        possessing the gun under these circumstances. But the court found that Jones’ argument

        did not diminish the need for deterrence, noting that Jones had previously used a firearm

        while committing robbery and that he had fired a gun at a female in the course of his

        previous § 922(g) offense, demonstrating that he was capable of violence. Additionally,

        the court found nothing to suggest that Jones would not deploy a gun again. Furthermore,

        the court observed that Jones’ 57-month sentence for the earlier § 922(g) conviction had

        not deterred him from possessing a firearm and the fact that he committed the instant

        offense while on supervised release from the earlier conviction was particularly concerning

        to the court.

               Jones also argued that his commitment to full time employment during his term of

        supervised release on the earlier § 922(g) conviction supported a within-Guidelines

        sentence.       In considering Jones’ history and characteristics and the nature and

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        circumstances of his offense, the court acknowledged Jones’ recent work record, but also

        observed that Jones had continued to engage in “extraordinarily dangerous” criminal

        activity.

               Because the facts surrounding the domestic altercation were unclear, the court did

        not consider the incident itself to be an aggravating factor in terms of the circumstances of

        the offense but explained that Jones’ possession of the firearm at that particular time was

        an aggravating factor in terms of the need for deterrence, to promote respect for the law,

        and to protect the public from Jones’ further crimes. In deciding to impose an upward

        variance sentence, the court considered the 37- to 46-month Guidelines range inadequate

        to deter Jones, reiterating that Jones’ previous 57-month sentence had not been sufficient

        to deter him from illegally possessing firearms. The court also found Jones’ base offense

        level did not reflect the seriousness of his offense, given his past use of firearms in the

        course of committing crimes. All of these considerations, the court explained, required a

        significant upward variance from the advisory Guidelines range. In light of the deference

        accorded a district court’s determination that the § 3553(a) factors, as a whole, justify the

        extent of a variance, and considering the totality of the circumstances, as well as the district

        court’s thorough analysis of the § 3553(a) factors, we conclude that the extent of the

        upward variance here is not substantively unreasonable.           See, e.g., United States v.

        Hargrove, 701 F.3d 156, 163-65 (4th Cir. 2012) (affirming variance from 0-to-6-month

        Guidelines range to 60-month sentence); United States v. Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d 359,

        366-67 (4th Cir. 2011) (affirming variance sentence six years greater than Guidelines range

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        because sentence was based on the district court’s examination of relevant § 3553(a)

        factors).

               Accordingly, we affirm Jones’ sentence. We dispense with oral argument because

        the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court

        and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                      AFFIRMED

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