Court Opinion

ID: 9635372
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:48:53.166183+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:25.871009
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge,
dissenting:
Because the record is inadequate to support summary judgment, I dissent. All parties moved for summary judgment, but the facts of record remain in dispute. Accordingly, summary judgment is inappropriate, and we should reverse and remand.
An employee going to or from work is in the scope of employment under workmen’s compensation law if: (1) the express or implied contract of employment includes such transportation to and from work; (2) the employee does not have a fixed place of work; or (3) the employee is on a special mission for the employer. Davis v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 41 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 262, 398 A.2d 1105 (1979); Schick v. Newspaper Guild of Greater Philadelphia, 25 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 108, 358 A.2d 127 (1976). Here, the record is consistent with either the first or second circumstance. In the mornings, Hall usually left his home to visit customers. On various evenings he also visited customers before returning home. Thus, although he had an office, his commuting was not between home and a fixed place of work, but rather was in furtherance of his employer’s affairs. Similarly, Hall’s employer paid for his business-related gasoline with, a company-supplied credit card. Hall’s deposition does not make clear whether, in practice, this payment included gasoline for commuting. The facts asserted in Hall’s deposition *291suggest, therefore, that Hall’s implied contract of employment included commuting and that he lacked a fixed place of work as relevant to this issue. Either proposition regarding his general contract of employment would render non-dispositive the facts relied upon by the majority that the accident occurred on an exceptional day when Hall was not bringing his sales kit home. The evidence to be gleaned from the correspondence showing the insurers’ conflicting conclusions on scope of employment fails to resolve the doubt. Moreover, the parties entered no stipulation of agreed facts. Thus, the facts are not only incomplete and inconclusive, but based upon oral testimony whose credibility and weight remains to be determined. Nanty-Glo v. American Surety Co., 309 Pa. 236, 163 A. 523 (1932). Because the present is not among the “clearest of cases” which alone merit summary judgment, Amabile v. Auto-Kleen Car Wash, 249 Pa.Superior Ct. 240, 376 A.2d 247 (1977), we should reverse and remand for trial.