Court Opinion

ID: 9955885
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 18:00:33.372906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:40.509683
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                 ___________

                                       No. 23-2777
                                       __________

                                  ELAINE MICKMAN,
                                             Appellant

                                             v.

                      SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA,
                              In Their Official Capacity
                      ____________________________________

                     On Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
                         (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-23-cv-02047)
                      District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle, III
                      ____________________________________

                    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
                                   March 20, 2024

                Before: KRAUSE, MATEY, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges

                             (Opinion filed: March 29, 2024)
                                     ___________

                                       OPINION *
                                      ___________

       *
        This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
not constitute binding precedent.
PER CURIAM

          Pro se appellant Elaine Mickman filed an action against the Pennsylvania Superior

Court. The District Court granted Mickman’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis,

screened the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and dismissed it without

prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).

Mickman filed a post-judgment motion seeking reconsideration, which the District Court

denied. This timely appeal ensued. For the following reasons, we will affirm. 1

          In her complaint, 2 Mickman alleged numerous violations of her constitutional rights

stemming from the Superior Court’s May 27, 2021 order quashing her appeal from an order

in a child support proceeding. She cited various civil rights statutes, including 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986. 3 Mickman sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary

relief.

          We agree with the District Court that, to the extent Mickman sought injunctive and

monetary relief, her claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which protects a state

or state agency from suit unless Congress has specifically abrogated the state’s immunity,

          We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See G.W. v.
          1

Ringwood Bd. of Educ., 28 F.4th 465, 468 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2022) (noting that a dismissal
without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a final decision under § 1291).
Our review is plenary. See Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 252 (3d
Cir. 2010).
        2
          The District Court adjudicated Mickman’s “Second Amended Complaint.” As she
did in her motion for reconsideration, Mickman notes on appeal that she only filed one
amended complaint. It appears that the amended complaint was filed twice on the docket,
but it was properly considered by the District Court as the operative complaint.
        3
          Mickman also claimed that the Superior Court violated various criminal statutes,
which the District Court properly noted do not give rise to a private cause of action. See
ECF No. 6 at 3 n.4.

                                               2
or the state has waived its own immunity. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,

465 U.S. 89, 99–100 (1984); see also Bowers v. Nat’l Athletic Ass’n, 346 F.3d 402, 417

(3d Cir. 2003) (noting that the issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity can be considered

sua sponte). As part of the state unified judicial system, the Superior Court is an “arm of

the state” entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.               Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail

Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 658 (3d Cir. 1989) (en banc) (recognizing that a state

agency or department is an “arm of the state” when a judgment against it “would have had

essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself”); see

also Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 240 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that

Commonwealth courts are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity).                     Because

Pennsylvania has not waived its immunity from suits in federal court, see Downey v.

Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2020), and the Eleventh

Amendment applies to all of Mickman’s civil rights claims, see ECF No. 6 at 6, the claims

for injunctive and monetary relief were properly dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction. See In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del., Inc., 335 F.3d 243, 249 (3d Cir. 2003)

(noting that “where . . . the Eleventh Amendment precludes a suit, the court in which the

plaintiff filed the action lacks subject matter jurisdiction”).

       Although the Eleventh Amendment does not bar claims for declaratory relief, see

Wheeling & Lake Erie R. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Com. of Pa., 141 F.3d 88, 91 (3d

Cir. 1998), Mickman failed to state a viable federal claim through which she could obtain

that remedy. Finally, we perceive no error in the District Court’s determination that

amendment of the complaint would have been futile, as there are no factual allegations

                                               3
from which we can infer that Mickman could have an actionable claim for relief. See

Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 112–13 (3d Cir. 2002).

      For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

                                           4