Court Opinion

ID: 9575868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:18:07.90687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:15.931572
License: Public Domain

Judge MARTIN (Harry C.)
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. From the record it is clear to me that defendants Tate and Friendly Parking Service, Inc. are not aggrieved by the proceedings and judgments of 20 December 1979, and may not appeal therefrom.
The record on appeal reveals:
1. The case was tried at the 22 October 1979 session of the Superior Court of Mecklenburg County.
2. At the commencement of trial, the court severed the defendants’ third-party action for indemnity against Aetna Casualty and Surety Company from the principal action.
3. On 24 October 1979, the verdict of the jury was returned by written answers to issues.
4. Thereafter, during the same session, the defendants proceeded with their crossclaim against Aetna, the court finding that Aetna had issued a policy of insurance that covered the damages recovered by plaintiff in this action and that defendants were entitled to recover from Aetna the amount of the judgment plus costs including counsel fees.
5. Defendants filed motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, separately, for a new trial, filed 24 October 1979.
6. On 20 December 1979, the court entered its order denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to compensatory damages and allowing the judgment notwithstanding the verdict with respect to punitive damages.
*1687. Judgment was filed on 20 December 1979 in favor of plaintiff against defendants for compensatory damages in the amount of $3,000, together with costs.
8. On 20 December 1979, judgment was filed in favor of defendants against Aetna under its policy of insurance, for damages defendants were legally obligated to pay, in the amount of $3,000 plus costs including attorney fees. Attorney fees in the amount of $3,990 were included in the cost bill of $4,030.
9. Plaintiff gave notice of appeal in open court, the appeal entries being dated 20 December 1979.
10. Defendants gave notice of cross-appeal in apt time, on 31 December 1979 (30 December 1979 being a Sunday), “from the Judgment against them entered 20 December 1979, awarding plaintiff, Johnnie F. Carawan, the sum of $3,000.00.”
11. On 23 January 1980, Aetna paid the judgment against it by depositing with the Clerk of Superior Court of Mecklenburg County the sum of $7,030.
12. On 29 January 1980, the attorney of record for defendants received the $7,030 from the clerk of superior court and satisfied and cancelled the judgment against Aetna.
Under the statute, N.C.G.S. 1-271, and the case law of North Carolina, only an aggrieved party can appeal. Coburn v. Timber Corporation, 260 N.C. 173, 132 S.E. 2d 340 (1963). If the order complained of does not adversely affect the substantial rights of appellant, the appeal will be dismissed. Id. The party who is required to suffer the loss under the judgment is the party aggrieved within the meaning of this rule. Coach Co. v. Coach Co., 237 N.C. 697, 76 S.E. 2d 47 (1953). In determining who is the aggrieved party, it is necessary to consider the whole record of the proceedings: the pleadings, issues, facts found, and judgment(s); not simply the judgment itself. Id.
When we apply this principle, it is manifest that defendants here are not aggrieved by these proceedings. Neither of them is required to suffer the loss imposed by the judgment against them. They have already received from Aetna the money to pay this judgment and costs. They are not required to pay the judgment from their own funds. See Blount v. Taft, 29 N.C. App. 626, *169225 S.E. 2d 583 (1976), aff’d, 295 N.C. 472 (1978). It would be a strange procedure indeed to allow defendants to ratify and rely upon the judgment against them for the purpose of securing indemnification from Aetna, and then permit defendants to attack the same judgment upon appeal. It could be argued that if defendants had only secured the judgment against Aetna, they should be allowed to appeal because by so doing they would also be protecting the interests of Aetna. Here, however, defendants have not only secured the judgment against Aetna, but that judgment has been paid by Aetna and defendants have received the proceeds without paying plaintiffs judgment for compensatory damages.
Defendants are not the real parties in interest in seeking appellate review of plaintiffs judgment. Every claim shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. N.C. Gen. Stat. 1A-1, Rule 17(a). A real party in interest is a party who is benefited or injured by the judgment in the case. Parnell v. Insurance Co., 263 N.C. 445, 139 S.E. 2d 723 (1965); Insurance Co. v. Walker, 33 N.C. App. 15, 234 S.E. 2d 206, disc. rev. denied, 293 N.C. 159 (1977). In considering the entire record on appeal, defendants are not the aggrieved real parties in interest and have at most only an incidental interest in the judgment complained of, as they are not injured by plaintiffs judgment. See Insurance Co. v. Ingram, Comr. of Insurance, 288 N.C. 381, 218 S.E. 2d 364 (1975). Aetna, not the defendants, has suffered because of plaintiffs judgment.
Under the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants may, as third-party plaintiffs, commence an action against Aetna for indemnity before judgment has been entered against them. N.C. Gen. Stat. 1A-1, Rule 14. In proving their claim against Aetna, defendants must show that plaintiff has recovered a judgment against them which they are legally obligated to pay or have paid. Heath v. Board of Commissioners, 292 N.C. 369, 233 S.E. 2d 889 (1977). Rule 14 provides “ ‘a mechanism for disposing of multiple claims arising from a single set of facts in one action expeditiously and economically.’ ” Heath, supra, at 376, 233 S.E. 2d at 893. Defendants would frustrate the salutary purposes of the rule if they were allowed to proceed against Aetna for indemnification and then challenge plaintiffs judgment against them by appeal. The Court in Heath held that the indemnitee must pay *170the judgment against it before it could collect from the indem-nitor in a Rule 14 proceeding. Evidently this was for the precise purpose of preventing what defendants have done in this case. Defendants have not paid the judgment against them, yet they have proceeded against Aetna and collected and received the proceeds. By so doing, they have acquiesced in the judgment against themselves and admitted its validity. Defendants have ratified and acquiesced in plaintiffs judgment against them. See Moore v. Insurance Co., 266 N.C. 440, 146 S.E. 2d 492 (1966). They cannot now appeal. Rice v. McAdams, 149 N.C. 29, 62 S.E. 774 (1908).
Defendants allege that if plaintiff is entitled to recover against them, they are entitled to recover such amount from Aetna under their contract of insurance. The court, in its judgment against Aetna, found that Aetna by its contract of insurance agreed to pay to defendants such damages which they (defendants) “shall become legally obligated to pay.” The court further held Aetna was liable to defendants in the amount of plaintiffs verdict against them, together with costs. Defendants could not win their case against Aetna unless they proved that they were legally obligated to pay plaintiff the amount of the verdict. The court found that defendants carried this burden and no appeal was taken from this judgment; it is the law of the case that defendants are legally obligated to pay plaintiff the amount of the verdict.
By proceeding against Aetna as stated, defendants established the validity of plaintiffs judgment against them, and that question is now moot. This Court will not hear and decide a moot question. Kendrick v. Cain, 272 N.C. 719, 159 S.E. 2d 33 (1968). In Kendrick, we find:
“A party who accepts an award or legal advantage under an order, judgment, or decree ordinarily waives his right to any such review of the adjudication as may again put in issue his right to the benefit which he has accepted. This is so even though the judgment, decree, or order may have been generally unfavorable to the appellant.”
272 N.C. at 722, 159 S.E. 2d at 35. Defendants, by proceeding against Aetna, securing a judgment, and accepting the benefits of that judgment, have waived their rights to review the adjudication of plaintiffs claim against defendants. Appellate review *171would allow defendants to again put into issue their right to the benefit which they have already accepted. Defendants have, by their actions against Aetna, validated plaintiffs judgment and waived their rights to challenge that judgment upon appeal. Plaintiffs claim against defendants does not involve matters of public interest so as to exclude it from the general rule denying appellate review of moot questions. See Leak v. High Point City Council, 25 N.C. App. 394, 213 S.E. 2d 386 (1975).
The majority opinion reaches the anomalous result of ordering a new trial on plaintiffs claim against defendants, for which defendants have already received indemnification. There is no guarantee that the case will ever be retried. Parties die, move, and lose interest in legal proceedings. If by such happenstance defendants were allowed to keep their recovery from Aetna, they would be profiting from their own wrong. Surely the law is not so foolish as to provide a vehicle for such eventuality.
I agree with the majority in holding that the trial court committed error in granting defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict with respect to the award of punitive damages. The majority opinion reverses that order, and in that I concur. Therefore, in my opinion, defendants’ appeal should be dismissed, see Boone v. Boone, 27 N.C. App. 153, 218 S.E. 2d 221 (1975), and the cause remanded to the superior court for entry of judgment awarding plaintiff $12,000 punitive damages.