Court Opinion

ID: 9720578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:36:44.995085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:51.145695
License: Public Domain

J. H. Gillis, J.
Defendants appeal by leave the circuit court’s order denying defendants’ motion for summary or accelerated judgment.
Plaintiff was employed as a teacher by the Saginaw Board of Education commencing in 1960. After plaintiff refused to comply with an agency shop clause of the collective bargaining agreement, a hearing was held pursuant to the teachers’ tenure act, MCL 38.71 et seq.; MSA 15.1971 et seq. The board discharged plaintiff on July 16, 1968, ruling that his failure to comply with the provision constituted reasonable and just cause for dismissal.
On appeal to the State Tenure Commission plaintiffs discharge was upheld. No further appeal was taken from that decision.
On May 23, 1974, plaintiff commenced the instant suit in circuit court. Defendants moved for *559accelerated and/or summary judgment, arguing res judicata, collateral estoppel and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The trial judge denied the motion and defendants were granted leave to appeal by this Court.
The essential theory of plaintiffs case is that the agency shop provision was invalid and his discharge for failing to comply with it was illegal. He therefore seeks damages for breach of contract.
While a teacher may assert a claim for breach of contract apart from any remedy provided by the teachers’ tenure act, Bruinsma v Wyoming Public Schools, 38 Mich App 745; 197 NW2d 95 (1972), Shippey v Madison District Public Schools, 55 Mich App 663; 223 NW2d 116 (1974), we conclude the operation of a collateral estoppel precludes plaintiff from recovering damages for breach of contract in this case.
Where an issue has been finally decided in one action it cannot be relitigated in a separate action between the same parties. Jones v Chambers, 353 Mich 674; 91 NW2d 889 (1958).
In the proceeding before the State Tenure Commission it was decided that plaintiffs discharge was for just and reasonable cause. In the instant suit plaintiffs theory of recovery is that the agency shop provision was illegal and hence his failure to comply with it was not just and reasonable cause for dismissal. He therefore seeks damages for breach of contract. Plaintiff concedes as much in the conclusion of his brief wherein he states:
"Plaintiff had a valid contract with the Board of Education of Saginaw. He could only be dismissed for reasonable and just cause. He was dismissed for a cause that was neither reasonable and just but, in fact, illegal.
*560"He attempted through the Tenure Commission to get his job back but was unsuccessful. He thereafter sued for damages for a breach of an undeniably valid contract.”
The issue of the validity of plaintiffs discharge has been litigated and decided. Plaintiff cannot now attempt to relitigate it.
Moreover, we see no reason why in the hearing before the State Tenure Commission plaintiff could not have attacked the validity of his dismissal by arguing the contract provision was illegal and hence failure to comply with it was not just and reasonable cause for dismissal. Merely because it involved a question of law did not preclude the State Tenure Commission from ruling upon it. In Long v Board of Education Dist No 1, Fractional, Royal Oak Twp & City of Oak Park, 350 Mich 324; 86 NW2d 275 (1957), the Supreme Court stated that the commission has authority to decide "requisite questions of law”. Where, as here, the sole reason for plaintiffs dismissal was his failure to comply with the agency shop provision, the question of whether that provision was legal was not outside the scope of the commission’s jurisdiction.
In addition, while the Supreme Court has ruled that the State Tenure Commission has no jurisdiction where a discharge is for "concerted strike actions”, Rockwell v Crestwood School District Board of Education, 393 Mich 616, 632; 227 NW2d 736 (1975), the Court in that case also indicated that where a teacher alleges he was discharged for activity protected by PERA he can file a charge with MERC and "such a charge would not preclude a teacher from also defending against the discharge at a teachers’ tenure act hearing on the ground that it was not supported by just and *561reasonable cause”. 393 Mich at 633. Presumably the Court meant the teacher could argue at the tenure act hearing that, because his activity was protected by PERA, MCL 423.201 et seq.; MSA 17.455(1) et seq., the discharge was not for reasonable and just cause.
The same situation is before us now. Plaintiff could have defended against the discharge before the commission on the ground that, because the agency shop provision was illegal, his dismissal was not supported by just and reasonable cause.
We find, therefore, that the issue of the validity of plaintiff’s discharge has been decided by the State Tenure Commission and plaintiff cannot now claim that it was not for just and reasonable cause in a suit for breach of contract.
Of course, in order for collateral estoppel to apply the action must involve the same parties or their privies as were involved in the prior proceeding, Howell v Vito’s Trucking & Excavating Co, 386 Mich 37; 191 NW2d 313 (1971). There are two defendants in the instant case, the Saginaw Board of Education and the Saginaw Education Association. The association was apparently not a party at the tenure act hearing. However, because plaintiff concedes that any liability of the association in the instant suit is dependent upon board liability, we conclude it is appropriate that accelerated judgment be granted to both defendants.
Reversed. No costs, a public question being involved.
Cynar, P.J., concurred.