Court Opinion

ID: 9387478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-18 06:00:11.482367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:13.660459
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     MARK R. CARTER,                                 DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         CH-0432-16-0400-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,                         DATE: April 17, 2023
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Mark R. Carter, Detroit, Michigan, pro se.

           Chieko Clarke, Esquire, and Josh Hildreth, Esquire, Alexandria, Virginia,
             for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     affirmed his removal based on unacceptable performance under 5 U.S.C.
     chapter 43 and found that he did not prove his affirmative defenses.           For the
     reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review,

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                       2

     VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the case to the regional office for
     further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶2        The appellant filed an appeal challenging his removal from Federal service
     for unacceptable performance pursuant to chapter 43. Initial Appeal File (IAF),
     Tab 1. After a hearing, the administrative judge found that the agency proved the
     unacceptable performance charge by substantial evidence. IAF, Tab 88, Initial
     Decision (ID) at 2-18. The administrative judge also found that the appellant did
     not prove his affirmative defenses of harmful procedural error, race and disability
     discrimination, and violation of the merit system principles found at 5 U.S.C.
     § 2301(b).   ID at 18-43.   Accordingly, the administrative judge affirmed the
     removal. ID at 2, 44.
¶3        The appellant has filed a petition for review, the agency has filed a
     response, and the appellant has filed a reply. Petition for Review (PFR) File,
     Tabs 7, 9-10. The appellant argues the following on review: (1) his production
     critical element is invalid because it was measured by his supervisor’s subjective
     assessment of his work product; (2) his supervisor subjected his work to
     “heightened scrutiny”; (3) the agency committed harmful error; (4) the agency’s
     removal decision is not in accordance with law; (5) he is entitled to the Bruner
     presumption, see Bruner v. Office of Personnel Management, 996 F.2d 290 (Fed.
     Cir. 1993); and (6) the administrative judge abused her discretion by denying his
     motion for sanctions and granting the agency’s motion to compel discovery. PFR
     File, Tab 7.    Although we find the appellant’s arguments do not warrant
     disturbing the initial decision, we must nonetheless remand this appeal for further
     adjudication in light of the recent decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
     Federal Circuit in Santos v. National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
     990 F.3d 1355, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2021), issued after the initial decision in this
     matter.
                                                                                       3

¶4        We first address the appellant’s assertion that his production critical
     element is invalid under 5 U.S.C. § 4302(c)(1) 2 because it was measured by his
     supervisor’s subjective assessment of his work product. PFR File, Tab 7 at 18,
     24-29, Tab 10 at 7-8. We agree with the administrative judge that the appellant’s
     production element is valid because he encumbered a technical position —Patent
     Examiner—that allowed for and required some subjective discretion by his
     supervisor when determining his work quality.          ID at 9-10; see Greer v.
     Department of the Army, 79 M.S.P.R. 477, 483-84 (1998).
¶5        Next, the appellant asserts that his supervisor applied GS-12 to GS-15 level
     performance standards to his GS-11 position and subjected his work to
     “heightened scrutiny.” PFR File, Tab 7 at 24-26, 29-30. However, the agency
     expressly reduced the baseline GS-12 Patent Examiner performance expectations
     by 10% because the appellant encumbered a GS-11 position. IAF, Tab 9 at 43,
     Tab 11 at 9; HT 12:19-13:14.      Similarly, the record evidence shows that the
     agency neither changed nor otherwise increased the appellant’s perfo rmance
     standards during or after his performance improvement plan (PIP), nor did his
     supervisor subject his work to “heightened scrutiny.” ID at 14.
¶6        The appellant continues to assert on review, as he did before the
     administrative judge, that the agency committed the following harmful errors:
     (1) removing him more than 30 days after the expiration of the notice period
     required by 5 U.S.C. § 4303(b)(1)(A), which he argues constitutes an
     unacceptable-performance removal statute of limitations pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
     § 4303(c)(1); (2) failing to extend his oral and written response time by
     60-90 days and failing to tape record his December 11, 2015 oral reply in
     violation of the collective bargaining agreement; and (3) failing to consider his

     2
       Until recently, this provision was codified at 5 U.S.C. § 4302(b)(1). See National
     Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 1097(d)(1),
     131 Stat. 1283, 1619 (2017).
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     medical condition prior to his removal. 3 PFR File, Tab 7 at 20-24, 30-37, Tab 10
     at 8-9; IAF, Tab 55, Tab 70 at 2. We agree with the administrative judge, for the
     reasons stated in the initial decision, that the appellant failed to prove harmful
     error, i.e., that any agency error was likely to have caused it to reach a conclusion
     different from the one it would have reached in the absence or cure of the error .
     ID at 18-27; see LeMaster v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 453,
     ¶ 14 (2016); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(r).
¶7         Along the same lines, the appellant contends that the agency lacked the
     legal authority to remove him beyond the 30-day period in 5 U.S.C. § 4303(c)(1)
     and thus his removal was not in accordance with law. PFR File, Tab 7 at 20 -21;
     see 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(2)(C). Even assuming that the appellant timely raised this
     affirmative defense before the administrative judge, we find no basis to disturb
     the initial decision. The “not in accordance with law” defense is directed at the
     decision itself, i.e., was the decision in its entirety in accordance with law? See
     Handy v. U.S. Postal Service, 754 F.2d 335, 337-38 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also
     Stephen v. Department of the Air Force, 47 M.S.P.R. 672, 683-84 (1991)
     (confirming that an appealable action will only be reversed as not in accordance
     with law if there is no legal authority for the agency’s action).           Despite t he
     appellant’s contrary assertions, the agency could lawfully remove him based on
     his unacceptable performance.        5 U.S.C. § 4303(a); 5 C.F.R. §§ 432.102(a),
     432.105. As discussed, the agency’s failure to abide by the 30-day period in
     5 U.S.C. § 4303(c)(1) was not a harmful error. See supra ¶ 6; ID at 18-20; see

     3
       The deciding official was required to consider the appellant’s medical condition once
     he raised it in his written and oral responses to the proposed removal. See 5 C.F.R.
     § 432.105(a)(4)(iv); IAF, Tab 4 at 49-50, Tab 15 at 31-32. The deciding official
     testified that he considered every issue that the appellant raised in his oral response,
     including his medical condition, prior to removing him for unacceptable performance.
     HT 71:25-72:23 (testimony of the deciding official). Aside from his bare assertion to
     the contrary, there is no record evidence to suggest that the deciding official failed to
     consider the appellant’s medical condition.
                                                                                     5

     also Salter v. Department of the Treasury, 92 M.S.P.R. 355, ¶¶ 6-8 (2002) (noting
     that 5 U.S.C. § 4303(c)(1) is a procedural right that is subject to harmful error
     analysis).
¶8          Further, the appellant misinterprets 5 U.S.C. § 4303 and the Board’s case
     law to the extent he asserts that the agency was required to effect his removal
     within 1 year of the commencement of the PIP. PFR File, Tab 7 at 23 -24. This
     argument was considered and rejected by the Board in White v. Department of
     Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 405, ¶¶ 6-7 (2013). In White, the appellant argued
     that the agency’s demotion action was improper because the April 2012 proposal
     notice was not issued until more than a year after the commencement of the PIP
     in February 2011.    Id., ¶ 7.   The Board considered whether the agency had
     complied with the following regulatory provisions: (1) once an employee has
     been afforded a reasonable opportunity to improve, an agency may propose a
     reduction in grade or removal action if the employee’s performance “during or
     following” the PIP is unacceptable in one or more of the critical elements
     involved in the PIP; (2) if an employee who has been placed on a PIP performs
     acceptably for 1 year (starting with the commencement of the PIP), he is entitled
     to a new PIP if his performance again becomes unacceptable; and (3) a proposed
     reduction in grade or removal may be based on instances of unacceptable
     performance that occur within a 1-year period ending on the date of notice of
     proposed action. Id., ¶ 6 (citing 5 C.F.R. § 432.105(a)(1)-(3)). We find that the
     agency has complied with these provisions. The appellant’s performance became
     unacceptable immediately following the PIP in the production critical element,
     which was the subject of the PIP. IAF, Tab 4 at 91-94. The notice of proposed
     removal was issued on November 5, 2015, and the agency pr operly relied on
     instances of unacceptable performance occurring between March 8 and May 30,
     2015, which is within 1 year of the notice of proposed removal. Id. Accordingly,
     the appellant has not shown that the removal decision is not in accordance with
     law.
                                                                                        6

¶9          Next, the appellant alleges that he was entitled to the Bruner presumption.
      PFR File, Tab 7 at 34-36; see Bruner, 996 F.2d at 294. The administrative judge
      did not discuss the Bruner presumption in the initial decision. Bruner holds that
      an employee’s removal for physical inability to perform the essential functions of
      his position constitutes prima facie evidence that he is entitled to disability
      retirement, after which the burden shifts to the Office of Personnel Management
      to produce evidence sufficient to find that the applicant is not entitled to
      disability retirement benefits. Bruner, 996 F.2d at 294. Bruner does not apply to
      this appeal because the appellant was removed for unacceptable performance, not
      physical inability to perform the essential functions of his position. ID at 4.
¶10         The appellant further contends that the administrative judge abused her
      discretion by (1) denying his sanctions motion based on the agency’s initial
      failure to include his full written response to the prop osed removal in the agency
      file, and (2) granting the agency’s motion to compel over the appellant’s
      objection that the discovery requests were improperly served by email. PFR File,
      Tab 7 at 19-20, 37-40; IAF, Tabs 42-43. We find no basis to conclude that the
      administrative judge abused her discretion. Although the appellant disagrees with
      the administrative judge’s decision to deny his sanctions motion, he has provided
      no legitimate argument that she abused her discretion, especially considering that
      the agency corrected its inconsequential error within a few days. See Pecard v.
      Department of Agriculture, 115 M.S.P.R. 31, ¶ 15 (2010); IAF, Tab 4 at 53-88,
      Tab 15.    Similarly, although the appellant argues that 5 C.F.R. § 1201.73(a)
      prohibits agencies from serving discovery requests via email, and analogizes to
      Rule 5(b)(2)(E) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we agree with the
      administrative judge that the Board is not bound by the Federal Rules of Civil
      Procedure and looks to them solely for general guidance. IAF, Tab 43; see Social
      Security Administration v. Long, 113 M.S.P.R. 190, ¶ 10 (2010), aff’d, 635 F.3d
      526 (Fed. Cir. 2011); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.72(a).       We find that the administrative
      judge was not bound to follow Rule 5(b)(2)(E) here and she did not abuse her
                                                                                          7

      discretion by requiring the appellant to respond to the agency’s discovery
      requests. See Key v. General Services Administration, 60 M.S.P.R. 66, 68 (1993)
      (stating that an administrative judge has broad discretion in ruling on discovery
      matters).
¶11         In his petition for review, the appellant does not challenge the
      administrative judge’s finding that he failed to prove his race discrimination
      defense.    PFR File, Tab 7, Tab 10 at 9.        In analyzing the appellant’s race
      discrimination claim, the administrative judge identified the legal standard set
      forth in Savage v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 612 (2015), she
      discussed the various methods of direct and circumstantial evidence, and she
      concluded that the appellant did not prove that his race was a motivating factor in
      the removal decision. ID at 27-34. The Board has since overruled Savage to the
      extent it held that the McDonnell Douglas framework is not applicable to Board
      proceedings. Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 25
      (citing McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973)).
      Nonetheless, the outcome of this appeal under Pridgen would be the same as that
      arrived at by the administrative judge. Notably, under Pridgen, to obtain any
      relief, the appellant must still show, at a minimum, that the prohibited
      consideration of race was a motivating factor in the agency’s decision to remove
      him, Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 20-22, and we agree with the administrative
      judge that the appellant failed to make this showing. ID at 27-34. Because the
      appellant failed to prove that race was a motivating factor, he necessaril y failed to
      prove it was a “but-for” cause of his removal. See Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 22.
¶12         The appellant also does not challenge the administrative judge’s finding
      that he failed to prove his disability discrimination defense, including his
                                                                                            8

      disparate treatment and failure to accommodate claims. 4 PFR File, Tab 7, Tab 10
      at 9.    Nevertheless, we clarify the administrative judge’s analysis of the
      appellant’s disparate treatment claim. The appellant alleged discrimination based
      on postherpetic neuralgia, i.e., post-shingles nerve pain, which began in
      mid-May 2015, before the May 30, 2015 completion of the first post-PIP
      maintenance period. IAF, Tab 55 at 33-35, Tab 70 at 7; HT 241:14-24 (testimony
      of the appellant). Assuming without deciding that the appellant’s postherpetic
      neuralgia constitutes a disability as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 12102, he has not
      provided any evidence to show that his disability was a motivating factor in the
      agency’s decision to remove him for unacceptable performan ce.               E.g., IAF,
      Tab 15 at 31-32, Tab 55, Tab 80; HT 71:25-72:20, 84:5-11 (testimony of the
      appellant); see Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶¶ 40-42 (explaining that, when
      disability   discrimination   is   a   motivating     factor,   injunctive   or   other
      forward-looking relief is available and, to obtain full relief, an appellant must
      show that disability discrimination is a but-for cause of the personnel action).
      Aside from timing, there is no evidence to suggest that the deciding official
      considered the appellant’s disability, rather than his unacceptable performance, as
      a factor when deciding to remove him. Because the appellant failed to prove his
      disability was a motivating factor, he necessarily failed to prove that it was a
      “but-for” cause of his removal. See Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 42. Accordingly,
      we affirm the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to prove his
      disparate treatment disability discrimination defense. ID at 37 -42.
¶13           Notwithstanding, we must remand this appeal in light of recent case law to
      make findings as to the appellant’s performance prior to the implementation of
      the PIP. When the initial decision was issued, the Board’s case law stated that, in

      4
        As a Federal employee, the appellant’s claim of disability discrimination arises under
      the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which incorporates the standards under the Americans
      with Disabilities Act, as amended. See Pridgen, 2022 MSPB 31, ¶ 35.
                                                                                       9

      an appeal of a performance-based removal under chapter 43, the agency was
      required to prove the following by substantial evidence: (1) OPM approved its
      performance appraisal system and any significant changes thereto; (2) the agency
      communicated to the appellant the performance standards and critical elements of
      his position; (3) his performance standards were valid under 5 U.S.C.
      § 4302(c)(1); (4) the agency warned him of the inadequacies of his performance
      during the appraisal period and gave him an adequate opportunity to demonst rate
      acceptable performance; and (5) after an adequate improvement period, his
      performance remained unacceptable in at least one critical element.          Lee v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 11, ¶ 13. The administrative judge
      analyzed each of these elements in turn and found that the agency met its burden
      by substantial evidence. ID at 5-18. We agree with those findings. However,
      while this case was pending on review, the Federal Circuit recognized for the first
      time that an agency must prove an additional element to support an adverse action
      under chapter 43. Santos, 990 F.3d at 1360-61. Specifically, the agency “must
      justify institution of a PIP” by proving the employee’s performance was
      unacceptable before the PIP. Id.; Lee, 2022 MSPB 11, ¶ 14. The holding applies
      to all pending cases, regardless of when the events took place. Lee, 2022 MSPB
      11, ¶ 16.
¶14         Although the record contains some evidence as to the appellant’s pre-PIP
      performance, the parties were not on notice as to this element and, accordingly,
      we must remand the appeal to give the parties the opportunity to present
      additional evidence as to whether the appellant’s performance was unacceptable
      in one or more critical elements prior to the issuance of the PIP. Id., ¶¶ 15-17.
      On remand, the administrative judge shall accept argument and evidence on this
      issue, and shall hold a supplemental hearing, if appropr iate. The administrative
      judge shall then issue a new decision consistent with Santos.      See id.   If the
      agency makes the additional showing required under Santos on remand, the
      administrative judge may incorporate the prior findings on the other elements of
                                                                                        10

      the agency’s case and the appellant’s affirmative defenses in the remand initial
      decision. See id. However, regardless of whether the agency meets its burden, if
      the argument or evidence on remand regarding the appellant’s pre -PIP
      performance affects the administrative judge’s analysis of the appellant’s
      affirmative defenses, the administrative judge should address such argument or
      evidence in the remand initial decision.     See Spithaler v. Office of Personnel
      Management, 1 M.S.P.R. 587, 589 (1980) (explaining that an initial decision must
      identify all material issues of fact and law, summarize the evidence, resolve
      issues of credibility, and include the administrative judge’s conclusions of law
      and his legal reasoning, as well as the authorities on which that reasoning rests).

                                            ORDER
¶15         For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
      for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                                Jennifer Everling
                                                Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.