Court Opinion

ID: 9727010
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:17:18.824332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:32.857098
License: Public Domain

REYNOSO, J., Dissenting.
The majority impermissibly carves out yet another exception to the cardinal constitutional rule that warrantless searches are per se a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The police, say the majority, may search a residence without a warrant so long as the premises have been previously secured. Since that is not and has never been the law, I dissent.
I respectfully suggest that the majority proceed on a fatally defective view of the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches. We should start with the beginning—the Fourth Amendment. It reads: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The United States Supreme Court has recently had occasion in Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 390 [57 L.Ed.2d 290, 298, 98 S.Ct. 2408] to remind us that “The Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable. . . .’ ” Only a few “specifically established and well-delineated exceptions” (Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 357 [19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585, 88 S.Ct. 507] have been judicially engrafted upon the Fourth Amendment.
The basis for the majority holding that the search was proper easily slips from “exigent circumstance” to “reasonableness.” And, in the final analysis, the majority maintain that the search was not constitutionally *433defective because it was reasonable (and not because the circumstances were exigent).1 The search in question, the majority convincingly argue, was reasonable. It is reasonable for the police to painstakingly search the scene of a serious crime even two hours after the original entry. Who can disagree? Not 1.1 agree there was probable cause to search.
But the reasonableness of the search, as the majority or I would view it, is beside the point. The Constitution proceeds on a suspicion that those in authority will abuse that authority if they face no proper restraints. The restraint which has been placed on the police (and all other officials) by the Constitution is that the reasonableness will be tested on the basis of a warrant and that the warrant will be presented to a magistrate who can rule upon it based on all of the particulars included in that warrant. That is the Constitution. No warrant was here presented. Therefore, the issue before us is not merely whether the search was reasonable but whether such circumstances existed as would come within those very strict limitations when a search can be conducted without a warrant.
I turn, therefore, to the exception which, according to the majority, controls—exigent circumstances. I find no exigency for a search which took place several hours after the crime and after the premises had been secured. It appears to me that even the majority suggest no exigency. Rather, it suggests only a strained extension of a true exigency to now cover a nonexigency. What was to prevent the police from obtaining a search warrant after the premises were secured? Apparently, nothing more than police inconvenience. Inconvenience, in my view, cannot be a reason for failing to follow the clear mandate of the Constitution.
The trial court correctly observed that at the time of the search, which it held to be unlawful, there was no victim and no suspect in the apartment, the site had been secured, and the police had had an opportunity to obtain a search warrant. The trial court properly applied the law and was properly mindful of the protection which the Constitution affords. By today’s ruling, the majority weakened the Constitution and articulate a new rule of law.
A petition for a rehearing was denied June 19, 1979. Reynoso, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Respondent’s petition for a rehearing by the Supreme Court was denied July 19, 1979.

The key phrase by the majority opinion is this: “The constitutionality of a particular search is always a question of reasonableness.” (Maj. opn., ante, p. 430.)