Court Opinion

ID: 9881825
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-04 14:00:46.621241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:12.801652
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13989    Document: 22-1      Date Filed: 10/04/2023   Page: 1 of 11

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-13989
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        REGINALD WOODS,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Alabama
                  D.C. Docket No. 1:97-cr-00159-RDP-GMB-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13989

        Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Reginald Woods, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, ap-
        peals the district court’s denial of his motion for a sentence reduc-
        tion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). On appeal, Woods argues that
        the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion
        because United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) Amend-
        ment 599 applied to his case and lowered his guidelines range. Af-
        ter careful review, we affirm.
                                          I.
               In 1997, a jury convicted Woods of one count of carjacking,
        in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Count 1); four counts of bank rob-
        bery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d) (Counts 2, 4, 6, and 9);
        and four counts of using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence,
        in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (Counts 3, 5, 7, and 10).
              The presentence investigation report (“PSI”) noted that
        Woods used a firearm in relation to the carjacking conviction in
        Count 1 and in relation to the bank robberies in Counts 2, 4, 6, and
        9. The PSI also noted that his convictions in Counts 3, 5, 7, and 10,
        were predicated on his bank robbery convictions in Counts 2, 4, 6,
        and 9. The PSI also noted that his offenses in Counts 1 and 2 oc-
        curred on the same day.
               Using the 1997 Sentencing Guidelines to calculate Woods’s
        guidelines range as to Count 1, the PSI applied a base offense level
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        22-13989               Opinion of the Court                         3

        of 20 under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(a). The PSI added two levels because
        his offense involved a carjacking under § 2B3.1(b), five levels be-
        cause he “brandished, displayed, or possessed” a firearm under §
        2B3.1(b)(2)(C), and one level because the loss was more than
        $10,000 under § 2B3.1(b)(7)(B), which resulted in a subtotal of 28.
        Counts 2, 4, 6, and 9 each received subtotal offense levels of 23, and
        when adjusted for multiple counts, his total offense level was 31.
        The PSI noted that, although a firearm was discharged during
        Counts 2, 4, 6, and 9, a seven-level specific offense enhancement
        under § 2B3.1(b)(2)(A) was unwarranted because Woods had been
        convicted of the firearm offenses in Counts 3, 5, 7, and 10, which
        related to Counts 2, 4, 6, and 9. As to Counts 3, 5, 7, and 10, the
        PSI explained that each offense required a twenty-year sentence, to
        run consecutively to each other and any other terms of imprison-
        ment.
              The district court then sentenced Woods to 1,081 months’
        imprisonment, consisting of 240 months as to each of his § 924(c)
        convictions in Counts 3, 5, 7, and 10, all to run consecutively to one
        another, and 121 months as to each of Counts 1, 2, 4, 6, and 9, all
        to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the sen-
        tences imposed in Counts 3, 5, 7, and 10, followed by 5 years of
        supervised release.
               In July 2022, Woods moved pro se to reduce his sentence un-
        der § 3582(c)(2) based on U.S.S.G. Amendment 599. Woods ar-
        gued that Counts 1 and 2 related to the same course of conduct and
        were part of the same transaction because he committed the
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                  22-13989

        carjacking in preparation for the bank robbery and that, as such, his
        conduct in Count 1 was within the scope of relevant conduct for
        Count 2, so he should not have received a five-level enhancement
        to his guidelines calculation. Woods also argued that his combined
        sentence for his single course of action in Counts 1, 2, and 3, ex-
        ceeded the statutory maximum in 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d) by 61
        months, and any act that raised his sentence beyond the statutory
        maximum was an element that had to be presented to the jury.
        Woods also asserts that he was not a threat to the public because
        he had not had an incident report since 1999 and he was rehabili-
        tated. Soon after, Woods filed a letter to the district court clarifying
        that the relief he sought in his § 3582(c)(2) motion was the removal
        of the five-level guidelines enhancement under Count 1 because he
        committed Counts 1 and 2 in the same course of conduct and was
        convicted of a separate firearm charge in relation to Count 2. He
        also requested that his offense level of 28 be reduced to 23 based on
        the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.
                The government opposed Woods’s motion, arguing that the
        district court did not have the authority to reduce his sentence be-
        cause such a reduction would not be consistent with applicable pol-
        icy statement by the Sentencing Commission. The government
        asserted that Amendment 599 did not change Woods’s sentence
        because the district court was required to sentence Woods to con-
        secutive twenty-year sentences on each of Counts 3, 5, 7, and 10,
        and he also faced a guidelines range of 121 to 151 months on top of
        the consecutive twenty-year terms. The government argued that,
        because the district court only sentenced Woods to the mandatory
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        22-13989               Opinion of the Court                         5

        80 years’ imprisonment, any amendment to the guidelines would
        not have changed Woods’s sentence.
               The district court denied Woods’s motion. The district
        court found that Woods was not eligible for a sentence reduction
        under Amendment 599 because it did not apply to Woods’s case.
        The district court noted that, while Woods was convicted under §
        924(c) in Counts 3, 5, 7, and 10 for using a firearm during the com-
        mission of four bank robberies, he was also convicted for the un-
        derlying bank robbery crimes in Counts 2, 4, 6, and 9. The district
        court explained that Woods did not receive a weapons enhance-
        ment for any of the bank robberies and that, instead, he only re-
        ceived a weapons enhancement for his conduct in Count 1, the car-
        jacking. The district court stated that, unlike his bank robbery con-
        victions, Woods was not convicted of a § 924(c) offense for using
        the firearm during the carjacking. Thus, the district court ex-
        plained, his carjacking offense was not an “underlying offense” un-
        der Amendment 599. The district court concluded that Amend-
        ment 599 did not apply to Woods’s case, but even if it did, it would
        not change his sentence. The district court thus denied his §
        3582(c)(2) motion. This appeal ensued.
                                         II.
               We review de novo the district court’s legal conclusions
        about the scope of its authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). United
        States v. Lawson, 686 F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 2012). If
        § 3582(c)(2) applies, we review the district court’s decision to grant
        or deny a sentence reduction only for an abuse of discretion. United
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13989

        States v. Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d 1233, 1238 (11th Cir. 2017). An
        abuse of discretion arises if the district court “applies an incorrect
        legal standard, follows improper procedures in making the deter-
        mination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.”
        United States v. Jordan, 582 F.3d 1239, 1249 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting
        Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1096 (11th Cir.
        2004)).
                                         III.
                A district court may modify a defendant’s term of imprison-
        ment if the defendant was sentenced based on a sentencing range
        that has later been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.
        § 3582(c)(2). The Sentencing Guidelines specify that Amendment
        599 is a covered amendment that permits a district court to modify
        a defendant’s term of imprisonment if the amendment has the ef-
        fect of lowering the defendant’s guidelines range. U.S.S.G.
        § 1B1.10(a), (d). Further, any reduction in sentence must be con-
        sistent with the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements.
        § 3582(c)(2).
               In November 1997, the Sentencing Guidelines stated that,
        when a defendant was convicted under § 924(c), “the term of im-
        prisonment is that required by statute.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4(a) (1997).
        The Application Notes to § 2K2.4 provided that, to avoid double
        counting, when “a sentence under this section is imposed in con-
        junction with a sentence for an underlying offense, any specific of-
        fense characteristic for the possession, use, or discharge of an ex-
        plosive or firearm (e.g., § 2B3.1(b)(2)(A)-(F) (Robbery)) is not to be
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        22-13989              Opinion of the Court                        7

        applied in respect to the guideline for the underlying offense.” Id.
        cmt. n.2. The 1997 Sentencing Guidelines provided for a five-level
        increase if a firearm was possessed during a robbery offense and a
        seven-level increase if a firearm is discharged during the robbery
        offense. Id. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(A), (C).
              In 2000, the Sentencing Commission adopted Amendment
        599, which changed the language in U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4’s Application
        Note. Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d at 1237. After Amendment 599,
        the Application Note to § 2K2.4 provided the following:
              If a sentence under this guideline is imposed in con-
              junction with a sentence for an underlying oﬀense, do
              not apply any speciﬁc oﬀense characteristic for pos-
              session, brandishing, use, or discharge of an explosive
              or ﬁrearm when determining the sentence for the un-
              derlying oﬀense. A sentence under this guideline ac-
              counts for any explosive or weapon enhancement for
              the underlying oﬀense of conviction, including any
              such enhancement that would apply based on con-
              duct for which the defendant is accountable under
              § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct). Do not apply any
              weapon enhancement in the guideline for the under-
              lying oﬀense, for example, if (A) a co-defendant, as
              part of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, pos-
              sessed a ﬁrearm diﬀerent from the one for which the
              defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); or
              (B) in an ongoing drug traﬃcking oﬀense, the defend-
              ant possessed a ﬁrearm other than the one for which
              the defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
              However, if a defendant is convicted of two armed
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                22-13989

              bank robberies, but is convicted under 18 U.S.C.
              § 924(c) in connection with only one of the robberies,
              a weapon enhancement would apply to the bank rob-
              bery which was not the basis for the 18 U.S.C.
              § 924(c) conviction.

              If the . . . weapon that was possessed, brandished,
              used, or discharged in the course of the underlying
              oﬀense also results in a conviction that would subject
              the defendant to an enhancement under . . .
              § 2K2.1(b)(5) (pertaining to possession of any ﬁrearm
              or ammunition in connection with another felony of-
              fense), do not apply that enhancement.

        U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 cmt. n.2; accord United States v. Brown, 332 F.3d
        1341, 1344–45 (11th Cir. 2003). “The purpose of Amendment 599 is
        ‘to clarify under what circumstances defendants sentenced for vio-
        lations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) may receive weapon enhancements
        contained in the guidelines for those other offenses.’” United States
        v. Armstrong, 347 F.3d 905, 908 n.4 (11th Cir. 2003) (alteration
        adopted) (quoting U.S.S.C. Guidelines Manual Supp. to App. C. at
        70).
               In United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065 (11th Cir. 2001), we
        vacated and remanded sentences with the five-level firearm en-
        hancement under § 2B3.2 based on a co-conspirator’s conduct. Id.
        at 1109. There, we stated that, under Amendment 599 and § 2K2.4,
        “relevant conduct cannot be used to enhance the offense level of
        the underlying offense.” Id. at 1107. In that case, the relevant con-
        duct related to a “jointly undertaken criminal activity” and
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        22-13989               Opinion of the Court                          9

        included “all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in
        furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.” Id. We
        held that “the district court could not enhance the offense level for
        the Hobbs Act conspiracy, substantive Hobbs Act violations, and
        carjacking convictions of one appellant based on the fact that a co-
        appellant brandished or possessed a weapon.” Id.
               Additionally, in interpreting Amendment 599, we have held
        that the amendment “was promulgated in order to prevent ‘double
        counting’ for firearms use in any one criminal event. Thus, Amend-
        ment 599 allows for weapon enhancements for all robberies except
        for the one robbery that served as the basis for [the defendant’s] §
        924(c) conviction.” United States v. Pringle, 350 F.3d 1172, 1180 (11th
        Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original). In Pringle, we affirmed the district
        court’s denial of Pringle’s § 3582(c)(2) motion. Id. at 1180–81. In
        doing, we explained that Pringle only received a weapons enhance-
        ment for the robberies that did not serve as predicate offenses for
        his § 924(c) convictions. Thus, Amendment 599 and Diaz did not
        impact his sentence. Id. We also distinguished Pringle’s case from
        that of Diaz and explained that, in Diaz, we “struck down a five-
        level weapons enhancement applied to Hobbs Act and carjacking
        convictions” because the district court enhanced the defendant’s
        sentence based on relevant conduct—his codefendant’s possession
        of a weapon during the commission of the crimes. Id. And we
        explained that, for purposes of Amendment 599, “relevant con-
        duct” includes “reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of every
        co-conspirator.” Id. at 1179 n.10.
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 22-13989

               Further, in United States v. Vautier, 144 F.3d 756 (11th Cir.
        1998), we held that, before a district court may reduce a defendant’s
        sentence under § 3582(c)(2) pursuant to a retroactive Sentencing
        Guidelines amendment, it must address the sentencing factors in
        § 3553(a) and whether a reduced sentence would be consistent with
        the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements. Id. at 759. We
        explained that § 3582(c)(2) and the Sentencing Guidelines required
        that the district court take two steps before granting a motion to
        reduce; first, it must “substitute the amended guideline range for
        the originally applied guideline range and determine what sentence
        it would have imposed.” Id. at 760. Second, the court “must con-
        sider the factors listed in § 3553(a) and determine whether or not
        to reduce the defendant’s original sentence.” Id.
               Here, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
        discretion when it denied Woods’s § 3582(c)(2) motion because
        Amendment 599 did not lower his guidelines range. Woods’s con-
        viction for carjacking in Count 1 did not serve as a predicate offense
        for any of his § 924(c) convictions. Thus, the weapons enhance-
        ment applied to Count 1 did not constitute “double counting” un-
        der Amendment 599, and Amendment 599 did not reduce Woods’s
        Guidelines range.
                We also conclude that Woods’s reliance on Vautier and his
        arguments about the § 3553(a) factors are misplaced. Indeed, the
        district court was not required to move on to the second step—i.e.,
        determining whether to reduce his sentence—after it found that
        Amendment 599 did not change his guidelines range.
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        22-13989              Opinion of the Court                     11

             Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Woods’s
        motion.
              AFFIRMED.