Court Opinion

ID: 9857340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 14:30:33.587646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:28.517834
License: Public Domain

DUNAGAN, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I find myself in disagreement with my brethren as to the proper disposition of this appeal.
In my opinion the real issue in this case is one of title to the mineral interests involved. Under the pleadings, the decretal portions of any judgment entered herein, of necessity, would have to resolve the title question.
The appellant is not seeking a judgment merely adjudicating the character of the property, i. e., whether the minerals are community property of the parties or the separate property of the appellee, as he claims, but is seeking an order or judgment requiring “the appellee to execute any and all deeds or other conveyances necessary to vest title in her to an undivided one-half interest in and to all of the undivided mineral interests * * *.”
Even though the pleadings ask for personal relief against appellee (i. e., that he be required to convey one-half the mineral to appellant), nevertheless, any such personal decrees spring from and are entirely dependent upon a prior resolution of the title question. That is, appellant would not be entitled to the conveyance prayed for absent a favorable resolution of the title issue in her favor. There is no escape, therefore, from the conclusion that, in order to give appellant the full relief prayed for, this case requires the determination of title to foreign realty.
It is true that our local courts, when they have jurisdiction of the parties, under certain circumstances, may compel one party to convey foreign realty to another. Holt v. Guerguin, 106 Tex. 185, 163 S.W. 10, 12 (1914). However, the mere fact that a suit which, in the first instance, involves a determination of title to foreign realty, also includes a plea for personal conveyance upon resolution of the title issue does not, ipso facto, convert the suit into an in personam one over which the local court has jurisdiction. To determine whether a suit is in rem or strictly in per-sonam, a critical inquiry is whether or not the suit seeks to create a right in property or merely to enforce it. If the in person-am relief sought depends upon the creation of certain rights in real property, the suit is essentially an in rem proceeding.
*254Likewise, the mere fact that appellant-plaintiff here alleges an equitable title and seeks to enforce it via a personal decree does not mitigate the fact that the asserted right to equitable title and to a conveyance thereon depend upon an initial and prior resolution of the title question; appellant has no equitable title and has no.right to a conveyance absent resolution of the title question in her favor — an issue which the trial court is without jurisdiction to resolve.
With the appellee claiming to be the owner and holder of the title to the entire mineral interests here involved, he should not be subjected to an order or judgment of a court in Texas divesting him of title to one-half of said minerals, which are situated outside the territorial limits of this state, and vesting title in appellant, until an adjudication is had determining the ownership of title thereto. This can only be done in a court of competent jurisdiction in the States of Florida and Alabama, the situs of the property.
It appears to me that the ultimate effect of the majority decision is, in fact, a determination of title to real property situated outside the territorial limits of the State of Texas. A Texas court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the title to lands located in another state. Holt v. Guerguin, supra; Carmichael v. Delta Drilling Co., 243 S.W.2d 458, 460 (Tex.Civ.App., Texarkana, 1951, writ ref.); Moseby v. Burrow, 52 Tex. 396 (1880).
The majority decision, in my opinion, is contrary to the principles of law enunciated in Moseby v. Burrow, supra; Holt v. Guerguin, supra; Boman v. Gibbs, 443 S.W.2d 267 (Tex.Civ.App., Amarillo, 1969, writ ref., n. r. e.); Moor v. Moor, 255 S.W. 231 (Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio, 1900, writ of error denied); Adams v. Adams, 214 S.W.2d 856 (Tex.Civ.App., Waco, 1948, writ ref., n. r. e.); Carmichael v. Delta Drilling Co., supra.
I would affirm the trial court’s judgment.