Court Opinion

ID: 9371969
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-17 15:04:09.373638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:31.494007
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 10, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

           Commonwealth of Kentucky
                 Court of Appeals

                    NO. 2021-CA-0176-MR

STUART A. COX                                       APPELLANT

          APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.        HONORABLE A.C. MCKAY CHAUVIN, JUDGE
                 ACTION NO. 16-CR-000838

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                             APPELLEE

AND

                    NO. 2021-CA-0244-MR

STUART A. COX                                       APPELLANT

            APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
v.         HONORABLE STEVE ALAN WILSON, JUDGE
                   ACTION NO. 16-CR-00278

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                             APPELLEE

                         OPINION
                        AFFIRMING
                                          ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, DIXON, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: Stuart Cox appeals from the trial court denials of his

motions pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter “RCr”)

11.42. Having reviewed the record, the briefs of the parties, and the orders of the

Jefferson and Warren Circuit Courts, we affirm.

                                              FACTS

                 In 2016, Cox was indicted for murder and tampering with physical

evidence in the shooting death of his girlfriend, Tracey Brock, in Jefferson County.

Following the crime, he fled and was ultimately captured in Warren County, where

he was indicted for fleeing or evading police and several misdemeanor offenses.

He entered a plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford1 to charges in both counties,

agreeing to serve a total term of twenty-five (25) years’ imprisonment.2

1
    400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 162 (1970).
2
  In No. 16-CR-00278, Cox pleaded guilty in Warren Circuit Court to amended charges of
fleeing or evading police in the first-degree, operating a motor vehicle while under the influence
of intoxicants, first offense, and resisting arrest. The sentences for all three (3) counts ran
concurrent to one another for a total of five (5) years, but ran consecutive to the twenty (20) year
sentence he received in No. 16-CR-000838, the Jefferson Circuit Court case wherein he pleaded
guilty to the amended charge of manslaughter in the first degree and tampering with physical
evidence. He agreed to a seventeen (17) year sentence for the manslaughter count and three (3)
years for the tampering count, to run consecutive to one another for a total of twenty (20) years,
but consecutive to the Warren Circuit charges. Therefore, when the Warren Circuit Court
sentence was ordered to run consecutive to his Jefferson Circuit Court sentence, his total
sentence of imprisonment was twenty-five (25) years.

                                                 -2-
             In 2020, Cox filed motions in both Jefferson and Warren Circuit

Courts pursuant to RCr 11.42 alleging that his appointed counsel rendered

ineffective assistance of counsel in advising him to accept the plea bargains he

entered, which resolved the cases in both counties. Both the Jefferson Circuit

Court and the Warren Circuit Court denied relief without evidentiary hearings. We

affirm.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             The standard of review employed when the voluntariness of a guilty

plea is challenged for the purported lack of effectiveness of counsel is well

established. The trial court must determine whether the guilty plea was entered

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently by considering the totality of the

circumstances. Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 558, 566 (Ky. 2006).

Such an inquiry is fact intensive and is reviewed by the appellate court only for

clear error. Id. In determining whether the voluntariness of the plea was

implicated by deficient performance of counsel, the standard established in

Strickland v. Washington is applied by the reviewing court. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.

Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).

             The Strickland standard sets forth a two-prong test for
             ineffective assistance of counsel:

                   First, the defendant must show that counsel’s
                   performance was deficient. This requires showing
                   that counsel made errors so serious that counsel

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                   was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed
                   by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant
                   must show that the deficient performance
                   prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that
                   counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the
                   defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
                   reliable.

             [Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064]. To
             show prejudice, the

                   defendant must show there is a reasonable
                   probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
                   errors, the result of the proceeding would have
                   been different. A reasonable probability is the
                   probability sufficient to undermine the confidence
                   in the outcome.

             Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 695.

Bowling v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 405, 411-12 (Ky. 2002).

             The second prong of the Strickland analysis concerns the showing of

prejudice, that but for the deficient performance of counsel, the outcome of the

matter would have been more favorable to the Movant. Thus, we need not

question the performance of counsel if we first determine that the Movant cannot

show prejudice.

             The trial court’s inquiry into allegations of ineffective
             assistance of counsel requires the court to determine
             whether counsel’s performance was below professional
             standards and caused the defendant to lose what he
             otherwise would probably have won and whether counsel
             was so thoroughly ineffective that defeat was snatched
             from the hands of probable victory.

                                         -4-
Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d 482, 487 (Ky. 2001) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted) (emphasis added).

             We will employ this standard of review in reviewing each allegation

of ineffective assistance of counsel Cox brings against the two attorneys appointed

in the separate indictments to represent him.

                                     ANALYSIS

             a. Jefferson County judgment

             Cox impugns the performance of his counsel by attacking the

sufficiency of the evidence against him and alleging counsel overstated the

likelihood of a conviction. However, it is not appropriate to attack the sufficiency

of evidence after the entry of a guilty plea. “Entry of a voluntary, intelligent plea

of guilty has long been held by Kentucky Courts to preclude a post-judgment

challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.” Taylor v. Commonwealth, 724

S.W.2d 223, 225 (Ky. App. 1986).

             The entry of an unconditional guilty plea requires the accused to

acknowledge the accuracy of the facts underlying the indictment.

             A defendant who elects to unconditionally plead guilty
             admits the factual accuracy of the various elements of the
             offenses with which he is charged. By such an
             admission, a convicted appellant forfeits the right to
             protest at some later date that the state could not have
             proven that he committed the crimes to which he pled
             guilty. To permit a convicted defendant to do so would
             result in a double benefit in that defendants who elect to

                                          -5-
                plead guilty would receive the benefit of the plea bargain
                which ordinarily precedes such a plea along with the
                advantage of later challenging the sentence resulting
                from the plea on grounds normally arising in the very
                trial which defendant elected to forego.

Id.

                Cox acknowledged the sufficiency of the evidence against him when

he allocuted before the Jefferson Circuit Court. His discussion with the trial court

of the charges against him and the evidence in support of those charges was an

acknowledgement of the validity of the advice of counsel to enter a plea deal

where he was ensured of a sentence less than the maximum, in this instance, a life

sentence.3 “The colloquy is an affirmative showing, on the record, that a guilty

plea is voluntary and intelligent[.]” Simms v Commonwealth, 354 S.W.3d 141, 144

(Ky. App. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Cox cannot now

decry his plea as unfair simply because he has changed his mind. See

Commonwealth v. Pridham, 394 S.W.3d 867, 885 (Ky. 2012).

                Further, Cox is unable to show prejudice. He faced a possible life

sentence of imprisonment, and through the assistance of counsel in the negotiation

of the plea bargain to manslaughter he secured a sentence of twenty (20) years.

“Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the

court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the

3
    Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 507.020(2).

                                              -6-
circumstances.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485,

176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010). See also Williams v. Commonwealth, 336 S.W.3d 42

(Ky. 2011). “If the prejudice prong . . . were satisfied by the movant simply saying

he would not have taken the deal absent the misadvice, it would be rendered

essentially meaningless. ‘Prejudice’ requires more than a simple self-serving

statement by the movant.” Stiger v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 230, 237 n.3 (Ky.

2012).

             b. Warren County judgment

             Cox entered a guilty plea to the Warren County charges with the

express provision that the sentence he agreed to, five (5) years, would be run

consecutively to the Jefferson County sentence of twenty (20) years for a total term

of imprisonment of twenty-five (25) years. He was finally sentenced in Warren

Circuit Court after being sentenced in Jefferson Circuit Court. The final judgments

of both courts acknowledged that the sentence it was imposing was to run

consecutive to the sentence imposed by the other circuit court.

             Cox alleges that his attorney misadvised him to plead guilty to the

amended charges in Warren and agree to the resultant five (5) year sentence

because as the final judgment in Jefferson Circuit Court had been entered, he was

not bound to pleading guilty in Warren Circuit Court to satisfy the more significant

Jefferson plea agreement.

                                         -7-
             However, when he had previously appeared before the Warren Circuit

Court to enter the plea, he acknowledged during the colloquy that pleading to a

five (5) year sentence in Warren was in his best interest given the more serious

charges, and potential life sentence, he faced in Jefferson. Thus, he acknowledged

that he believed the plea bargain was to his ultimate benefit, even if he might be

agreeing to the maximum sentence to the Warren counts. The record makes it very

clear that the attorneys for both sides in both counties were working cooperatively

to craft plea agreements that were satisfactory to all. Again, a showing of

prejudice requires more than the movant’s self-serving statement. It requires a

showing that rejection of the plea deal entered into would have been a rational

choice. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372, 130 S. Ct. at 1485. Cox has not made that

showing.

                                   CONCLUSION

             Cox avoided the possibility of a life sentence by the entry of his pleas

and received a sentence of twenty-five (25) years. As it is not appropriate to attack

the sufficiency of the evidence after the entry of the plea, it is not possible for him

to reasonably argue that he was prejudiced in any way by pleading guilty and

receiving a sentence of less than the maximum, and considerably less, at that to the

Jefferson County charges involving the death of his girlfriend. As the plea

agreement in Warren County was contemplated by the plea in Jefferson County, it

                                          -8-
was not prejudicial to him to have received the maximum five (5) year sentence to

the charges he faced in Warren County, as he faced a possible life sentence in

Jefferson County, were the plea deals to fail. We affirm.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEFS FOR APPELLEE:

Stuart A. Cox, pro se                     Daniel Cameron
West Liberty, Kentucky                    Attorney General of Kentucky

                                          Christopher Henry
                                          Assistant Attorney General
                                          Frankfort, Kentucky

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