Court Opinion

ID: 9528492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:41:38.300986+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:19.006418
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(concurring). I concur in Justice Levin’s conclusion that a workers’ compensation redemption agreement constitutes neither an adjudication nor an admission of liability, Solo v Chrysler Corp (On Rehearing), 408 Mich 345, 350; 292 NW2d 438 (1980); White v Weinberger Builders, *434Inc, 397 Mich 23, 34; 242 NW2d 427 (1976), and therefore does not automatically bar a tort action arising from the same injury. I write separately to emphasize that a redemption is in fact a settlement, and therefore the effect to be given a redemption agreement depends on the terms of the agreement itself. See Beardslee v Michigan Claim Services, Inc, 103 Mich App 480, 485; 302 NW2d 896 (1981); Nunley v Practical Home Builders, Inc, 173 Mich App 675, 680-681; 434 NW2d 205 (1988); Hill v Terminix Int’l, Inc, 617 F Supp 1030, 1032 (ED Mich, 1985); Merriweather v Int’l Business Machines, 712 F Supp 556, 562-564 (ED Mich, 1989), aff’d 908 F2d 973 (1990).1 I agree in the instant case that the redemption agreement, by its terms a "full and final settlement of any and all liability the employer might have for weekly Workmen’s Compensation beneñts” (emphasis added), indicates no intent by the parties to settle any liability other than that potentially arising under the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act.
I concur in both the result and reasoning of part iv of the lead opinion.

 This proposition, consistently enunciated in the Michigan Court of Appeals and in federal cases interpreting Michigan law, is not remarkable. Professor Larson states, "A settlement covers only those claims or rights that are specifically mentioned in the agreement.” 3 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation, § 82.51, p 15-1207.