Court Opinion

ID: 9351981
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-04 16:03:04.623231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:40.341811
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                        Opinion filed January 4, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D20-1495
                       Lower Tribunal No. 18-39831
                          ________________

                         GR OPCO, LLC, etc.,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                           Ana Paola Murillo,
                                  Appellee.

     An Appeal from a non-final order from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade
County, David C. Miller, Judge.

     Kelley Legal, and Marissa D. Kelley and Dylan M. Fulop (Ft.
Lauderdale), for appellant.

      Remer & Georges-Pierre, PLLC, and Peter M. Hoogerwoerd, for
appellee.

Before LOGUE, HENDON, and LOBREE, JJ.

     PER CURIAM.

     Ana Paola Murillo filed a complaint against GR OPCO, LLC d/b/a
E11even, alleging claims for a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29

U.S.C. §§ 201, 216, breach of agreement, quantum meruit, and unjust

enrichment. GR OPCO moved to compel arbitration, claiming that Murillo

signed an agreement requiring the parties to arbitrate any and all claims

between them and attaching a copy of the agreement purportedly signed by

Murillo. Murillo countered with a declaration stating that she never signed

an arbitration agreement during her employment with GR OPCO, and

attesting that the signature and IP address on the electronically signed

agreement were not hers. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied

the motion to compel arbitration. GR OPCO now appeals.

      In reviewing a trial court’s order denying a motion to compel arbitration,

our review of factual findings is limited to determining whether they are

supported by competent, substantial evidence. MetroPCS Commc’ns, Inc.

v. Porter, 273 So. 3d 1025, 1027 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018). After careful review,

we conclude that GR OPCO has not demonstrated that the trial court erred

in denying its motion to compel arbitration because substantial competent

evidence in the record supports the trial court’s finding that Murillo did not

sign the arbitration agreement, and therefore, no valid written agreement to

arbitrate exists between the parties.      Specifically, the trial court, who

observed the witnesses as they testified, based its ruling on a credibility

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determination, finding Murillo’s testimony that she did not sign the arbitration

agreement to be both credible and determinative on the issue. Given our

standard of review, we decline to disturb the trial court’s ruling that GR OPCO

is not entitled to arbitrate the dispute. See Cartelli v. Green, 331 So. 3d 839,

841 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (“The test . . . is whether the judgment of the trial

court is supported by competent evidence. Subject to the appellate court’s

right to reject ‘inherently incredible and improbable testimony or evidence,’ it

is not the prerogative of an appellate court, upon a de novo consideration of

the record, to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.” (quoting Shaw

v. Shaw, 334 So. 2d 13, 16 (Fla. 1976))); Demida Miami Gardens, LLC v.

Master Excavators, Inc., 107 So. 3d 1250, 1251 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (“On

this record, we could reverse only by re-weighing the evidence and the

credibility of the witnesses—a function not ascribed to this court.” (quoting G

& G Fashion Design, Inc. v. Garcia, 870 So. 2d 870, 873 (Fla. 3d DCA

2004))); Adkins v. Adkins, 650 So. 2d 61, 62 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (“[I]t is for

the trial court who heard the testimony below, not this court, to evaluate and

weigh credibility of witness testimony and other evidence adduced.”).

      We also discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the

parties’ joint motion for continuance of the evidentiary hearing. See Leal v.

Benitez, 275 So. 3d 774 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019). Affirmed.

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