Court Opinion

ID: 9519217
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:11:33.750821+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:07.106055
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE STEIGMANN, dissenting: Although the majority has well stated the issue in this case and provided a learned discussion of the applicable case law, I nonetheless disagree with the decision reached and respectfully dissent. In my judgment, the sole purpose of section 13—211 of the Code — which permits a minor to sue within two years after reaching the age of 18 years — is to ensure that a minor’s legal interest is protected until he or she has reached the age of majority, at which point the new adult can look after his or her own interests, as every other adult is expected to do. In other words, by enacting section 13—211 of the Code, the legislature intended to place minors in the same position they would have been in if their legal disability — being underage— did not exist. Under the majority’s interpretation, however, section 13—211 of the Code places minors in a better position than adults under the statute of limitations, rather than merely removing their legal disability. To be specific, had plaintiff here been 18 years and one week old when the accident occurred at Gillespie High School, no one disputes that section 8—101 of the Tort Immunity Act would have required her to bring her lawsuit within one year from the date of her injury. Under the majority’s interpretation, however, if plaintiff had been one week short of her eighteenth birthday when the accident occurred at the high school, section 13—211 of the Code totally trumps section 8—101 of the Tort Immunity Act, giving plaintiff two years from the date she turns 18 years of age in which to bring her cause of action. The legislature could not have intended this result. It is simply inconsistent with the underlying purpose of section 13—211 of the Code, which is to place minors in the same position they would be in if the legal disability did not exist with regard to their ability to file suit. As expressed in the first full sentence in the last paragraph on page 8 of the slip opinion, the majority candidly concedes that the policy reasons which justify placing a minor in a better position under the statute of limitations "are not apparent.” 283 Ill. App. 3d at 879. Nevertheless, the majority apparently believes that other tools of statutory interpretation require the conclusion it has reached. I disagree. The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation, to which all other rules are subordinate, is to give effect to what the legislature intended the statute to achieve. Because I am convinced that the legislature never intended to achieve the result the majority reaches — that of placing a minor in a better position under the statute of limitations than her adult counterpart — I am unwilling to join. As a last matter, the majority’s statement that "courts have traditionally given special consideration to the claims of minors” (283 Ill. App. 3d at 877) seems to be an offshoot of the so-called "Afuscarello doctrine,” which stands for the proposition that a court has a duty to see that the rights of an infant are adequately protected, and is bound to notice substantial irregularities even though objections are not properly presented. Muscarello v. Peterson, 20 Ill. 2d 548, 170 N.E.2d 564 (1960). In Cogan v. KAL Leasing, Inc., 190 Ill. App. 3d 145, 152, 546 N.E.2d 20, 24 (1989), this court held that the 'Muscarello doctrine has continuing validity only in circumstances suggesting either fraud, violation of a fiduciary interest, or ineffective assistance of counsel.” We also added the following: "We conclude that the Muscarello doctrine should be explicitly limited because its unlimited utilization is inconsistent with the rules of evidence and procedure normally applicable to a civil trial. One of the most fundamental rules of procedure is the obligation of the courts to provide neutral judges and juries. Accordingly, we should be very hesitant about permitting, much less requiring, a judge to abandon the judge’s role of neutrality, no matter how worthy the goal. Society has changed considerably since the early 19th century, and procedures are now available to ensure that the rights and interests of minors and incompetents are well protected. The best way for a court to fulfill its duty to protect these rights and interests is to appoint guardians for the minor or incompetent.” Cogan, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 153, 546 N.E.2d at 25. This court’s analysis in Cogan of the Muscarello doctrine should apply equally to the 1926 Walgreen case that the majority cites (283 Ill. App. 3d at 877), suggesting that somehow minors — simply because they are minors — are entitled to better treatment than other civil litigants.