Court Opinion

ID: 9720075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:14:50.721609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:12.858640
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McDADE, dissenting in part and concurring in part: On appeal, defendant argues that she was denied her constitutional right to be confronted by the witnesses against her and that her sentence should be vacated due to an Apprendi violation. The majority has held the defendant’s constitutional argument lacks merit because she did not object to the admission of the lab reports and there were references to a stipulation to the reports in the record. Because I believe that neither the defendant’s failure to object, either personally or by counsel, nor the references in the State’s argument to the stipulation amount to a knowing and voluntary waiver by the defendant of her constitutional rights, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion. In support of her constitutional argument, defendant relies heavily on the supreme court decision in People v. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d 127, 729 N.E.2d 470 (2000). In that decision, which was entered only two weeks before defendant’s trial, the court noted that for there to be a valid waiver of a constitutional right, the waiver must be an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right. The court went on to explain that this required the waiver to be a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent act made by the defendant, with an awareness of the consequences and relevant circumstances. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d at 137, 729 N.E.2d at 476. The McClanahan court considered and rejected the constitutionality of section 115 — 15(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115 — 15 (West 1998)). The supreme court’s focus was whether the statute’s process for the stipulated admission of lab reports as evidence satisfied the constitutional protections of the confrontation clause. Its analysis was grounded in constitutional principles surrounding the right to confront accusers and witnesses. The safeguards of the confrontation clause, as noted by the court, include, but are not limited to, ensuring the reliability of the evidence by subjecting it to rigorous testing during an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact and restraining the prosecution by regulating how it presents the case against the accused. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d 127, 729 N.E.2d 470. The McClanahan court did recognize that parties may stipulate to evidence that is to be presented to the trier of fact. However, that stipulation must be made in a manner that protects the defendant’s rights under the constitution. The court noted that without section 115 — 15 the State would have been required to get a stipulation from the defendant to the admission of the reports. That stipulation would then constitute the defendant’s voluntary and knowing waiver of his or her right to confront the State’s witness. As the majority points out, the McClanahan case had the benefit of a defendant who had objected to the presentation of the reports by the State. In this case, the defendant did not object to the presentation of the lab reports. However, defense counsel’s failure to object cannot operate as an affirmative waiver of the defendant’s constitutional rights under the confrontation clause, as it does not clearly reflect an intentional relinquishment or abandonment by the defendant of a known right. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 16 L. Ed. 2d 314, 86 S. Ct. 1245 (1966). I am aware that this position is contrary to that recently taken by the Fourth District of the Illinois Appellate Court in People v. Avery, 321 Ill. App. 3d 414, 749 N.E.2d 386 (2001); however, for the reasons set out above, I disagree with its analysis. The majority also points out that the record reflects a reference to a stipulation to the evidence by the prosecution in opening statements and closing arguments, in addition to an absence of any objection to the submission of the reports by defense counsel. However, there is no signed stipulation in the record nor is there any admonishment by the trial court to the defendant that by stipulating to the reports she is waiving her constitutional right to confront the State’s witnesses. In the absence of such a written stipulation in the record, or an admonishment by the trial court and affirmative acknowledgment by Ms. Phillips, it cannot be shown that she was aware of her constitutional right and that she knowingly and voluntarily waived it. Based on this analysis, I would reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand this matter for a new trial. The second issue raised by the defendant was whether her four-year sentence should be vacated due to an Apprendi violation. Although under my analysis we would not need to reach this issue because the matter would be remanded for a new trial, I agree with the majority that, under the facts of this case, the amount of the drug possessed by the defendant is a sentencing factor that may be found to exist by judicial fact finding at sentencing.