Court Opinion

ID: 9598988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:13:39.283316+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:26:07.164678
License: Public Domain

WARDEN, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority that the decision of the trial court granting plaintiffs motion for summary judgment must be reversed and the case remanded. However, I disagree with the majority in its conclusion that there is no ambiguity in the contract, either patent or latent. The effect of the majority opinion is to direct the trial court to grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Because I find the contract to be ambiguous, and the case, therefore, presents a jury question, I respectfully concur.
The pertinent portions of the contract are set out in the majority opinion. The majority says that there is no patent ambiguity as to whether the bridge removal includes the barge, because “[t]he barge could not reasonably be included in the contract definition of ‘bridge.’ ” The contract defines “bridge” as:
“A structure, including supports erected over a depression or an obstruction * * * and having a track or passage way for carrying traffic or other moving loads.”
*380Regarding the words “including supports” in the definition of “bridge,” the majority substitutes a conclusion for analysis in saying it is also not a “support.” Websters Third International Dictionary defines the noun “support,” as used in this context, as “one that supports: a supporting means, agency, medium * * It defines the verb “support” as “to hold up or in position: serve as a foundation or prop for: bear the weight or stress of: keep from sinking or falling * * *.” It is arguable that the barge is a supporting means that holds up the removable section of the bridge, bears its weight or, perhaps, keeps it from sinking. The possibility of construing the barge as a support renders the contract ambiguous.
Further, the majority overlooks the fact that the contract for removal includes not only “removal and disposal” of the bridge but of “other matter of man-made or artificial character.” The contract further provides that “objects, things and matters covered under this specification shall be collectively referred to herein as ‘material(s)’ ” and that “[a]ll materials shall become the property of the contractor * * *.” Again, the contract could be interpreted to mean that the barge is “other matter of man-made or artificial character” and as such constitutes “materials” to “become the property of the contractor.” The contract excludes from the removal work “the removal or disposal of things and matter which are designated to remain.” As the majority points out, the contract makes no mention of the barge; the barge was not excluded from the removal work as a thing or matter “designated to remain.” Because the barge was not excluded from materials to be removed and may be argued to be matter of man-made or artificial character and thus material that would become property of the contractor, the contract is ambiguous on the subject of the barge.
As I read it, the contract is patently ambiguous. The ambiguity presents a jury question precluding decision by summary judgment. The majority is in error in finding no ambiguity. I concur with the majority that the case must be reversed and remanded to the trial court, but I do not agree with the conclusion that the terms of the bridge removal contract are not ambiguous as a matter of law.