Court Opinion

ID: 9889589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-10 19:01:05.936365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:19.088603
License: Public Domain

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                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-11731
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        ROBERT DUNN,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 9:20-cr-80085-RKA-1
                           ____________________

        Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
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        2                      Opinion of the Court               22-11731

        HULL, Circuit Judge:
                After entering a conditional guilty plea, Defendant Robert
        Dunn appeals his convictions on four counts related to child
        pornography. At the start of the COVID-19 global pandemic,
        Dunn was arrested on a criminal complaint on March 10, 2020.
        Thereafter, the district court in the Southern District of Florida
        entered a series of pandemic-related administrative orders that,
        inter alia, continued grand jury sessions five times in the ends of
        justice spanning March 26, 2020, to November 16, 2020. Due to
        the pandemic, a grand jury did not formally indict Dunn until
        December 1, 2020.
               On appeal, Dunn argues that the district court erred in
        denying his motion to dismiss his indictment for failure to indict
        him within thirty days from his arrest, as required by the Speedy
        Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). Dunn does not challenge the time
        between indictment and his guilty plea, but only between his arrest
        on March 10 and grand jury indictment on December 1, 2020.
        After careful review of the record and briefs, and with the benefit
        of oral argument, we conclude that the pandemic-related
        continuances in 2020 were not an abuse of discretion and were
        within the ends-of-justice exception to the Speedy Trial Act. We
        affirm the denial of Dunn’s motion to dismiss his indictment.
                         I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
        A. Arrest at Start of COVID-19 Pandemic
              On March 10, 2020, federal agents arrested Dunn on a
        criminal complaint charging he had received and possessed child
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        22-11731               Opinion of the Court                          3

        pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), (a)(4)(B), (b)(1),
        and (b)(2). The same day, Dunn pled not guilty, and a federal
        defender was appointed to represent him. His arraignment was set
        for March 24.
               The next day, on March 11, the World Health Organization
        declared the COVID-19 outbreak a global pandemic. On March
        13, the President of the United States declared a national
        emergency. See Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15337, 15337
        (Mar. 13, 2020).
        B. First Pandemic Administrative Order on March 13
              On March 13, 2020, then-Chief Judge K. Michael Moore of
        the Southern District of Florida entered Administrative Order
        2020-18, the first of many responding to the COVID-19 pandemic.
               Administrative Order 2020-18 found that “the Centers for
        Disease Control and Prevention and other public health authorities
        have advised the taking of precautions to reduce the possibility of
        exposure to the coronavirus and COVID-19 and slow the spread of
        disease.” The order stated it (1) was issued “in order to protect
        public health, and in order to reduce the size of public gatherings
        and reduce unnecessary travel”; (2) continued jury trials until
        March 30, 2020; and (3) continued until further order any trial-
        specific deadlines in criminal cases scheduled to begin before
        March 30, 2020 (the “pandemic order”).
               The March 13 pandemic order also provided that criminal
        matters before magistrate judges shall continue and that grand
        juries shall continue to meet pending further order of the court.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11731

        The pandemic order permitted individual judges presiding over
        criminal proceedings to “take such actions consistent with this
        order as may be lawful and appropriate to ensure the fairness of the
        proceedings and preserve the rights of the parties.”
               The pandemic order also provided that the time period of
        the continuances between March 16 and 30, 2020, were excluded
        from the speedy trial clock under the Speedy Trial Act’s ends-of-
        justice exception in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).
        C. First Magistrate Judge Continuance in Dunn’s Case from
        March 16 to April 6
               After consulting with Dunn’s counsel, the government filed
        an unopposed motion to continue Dunn’s arraignment until April
        6, 2020. The March 16 motion stated that “[d]ue to the unforeseen
        nature of the global coronavirus pandemic, the government and its
        agents will not be able to prepare properly for Grand Jury, or
        confirm that a quorum for Grand Jury will be available, such that
        an Indictment is returned before the arraignment set for March 24,
        2020.” Citing 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), the motion represented
        that the parties agreed “that the ends of justice are served by
        continuing the arraignment and outweigh the best interests of the
        public and the defendant in a speedy trial.”
               The same day, a magistrate judge granted the government’s
        continuance motion in Dunn’s specific case and set Dunn’s
        arraignment to April 6. The magistrate judge’s March 16 pandemic
        order stated: (1) “[i]n light of the current public health emergency,
        the interests of justice require the Court to take additional steps to
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        22-11731                 Opinion of the Court                               5

        protect the health and safety of parties, counsel, and court staff”;
        and (2) they also “require that steps be taken to ensure that counsel
        and clients (particularly incarcerated clients) have meaningful
        consultation.”
                 The magistrate judge’s order expressly referenced the Chief
        Judge’s Administrative Order 2020-18, which also addressed the
        COVID-19 pandemic and need to reduce public gatherings and the
        spread of the disease. It noted that Administrative Order 2020-18
        allowed individual judges presiding over criminal matters to take
        such action consistent with that order and “as may be lawful and
        appropriate to ensure the fairness of the proceedings and preserve
        the rights of the parties.” The magistrate judge’s order excluded
        the time from March 16 to April 6 under the Speedy Trial Act,
        finding the “ends of justice” were served by the continuance and
        outweighed the interests of the parties and the public in a speedy
        trial. 1
        D. Second Criminal Complaint
               On March 19, the government filed a second criminal
        complaint adding charges of: (1) conspiracy to produce and
        production of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
        § 2251(a); and (2) a felony involving a minor committed by a sex
        offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2260A. On March 20, Dunn’s
        arraignment was set for April 6.

        1 The order also reset Dunn’s detention hearing to March 18, 2020.   After his
        March 18 detention hearing, Dunn was ordered detained.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11731

        E. Second Pandemic Administrative Order on March 20
               On March 20, Chief Judge Moore entered Administrative
        Order 2020-21. This second administrative pandemic order was
        issued in conjunction with Administrative Order 2020-18, the first
        pandemic order, and, among other things, continued jury trials
        until April 27, 2020.
              Administrative Order 2020-21 again allowed individual
        judges to enter continuances in criminal proceedings and excluded
        time periods for such continuances under the Speedy Trial Act’s
        ends-of-justice exception. It also incorporated by reference its
        ends-of-justice determination and the “period of exclusion” in
        Administrative Order 2020-18 “as specific finding[s] pursuant to 18
        U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) in the record of each pending case where the
        Speedy Trial Act applies.”
        F. Grand Jury Sessions Continued From March 26 to April 27
                Six days later, on March 26, Chief Judge Moore entered
        Administrative Order 2020-22, which expressly stated that it was
        issued in conjunction with Administrative Order 2020-18 and
        Administrative Order 2020-21, the first and second pandemic
        orders. This time, Administrative Order 2020-22 continued all grand
        jury sessions until April 27 and excluded the time period from March
        16 to April 27 from the speedy trial clock under the ends-of-justice
        exception “pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iii).”
               Among other things, the March 26 pandemic order:
        (1) found that “the ends of justice served by taking this action
        outweigh the interests of the parties and the public in a speedy trial
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        22-11731                Opinion of the Court                            7

        because the continuance of grand jury sessions in this district renders it
        unreasonable to expect the return and filing of an indictment within the
        period set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b)”; and (2) incorporated by
        reference the order and the period of exclusion “as a specific finding
        pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) in the record of each pending
        case where the Speedy Trial Act applies,” citing Zedner v. United
        States, 547 U.S. 489, 506-07 (2006). (Emphasis added.)
        G. Four Subsequent Administrative Orders Collectively
        Continued Grand Jury Sessions Through November 16
                Subsequent Administrative Orders, entered in April, May,
        June and August 2020 contained substantially the same language as
        Administrative Order 2020-22. These Administrative Orders
        extended the continuance of grand jury sessions and excluded the
        continuance period from the speedy trial clock based on an ends-
        of-justice finding.
                Each Administrative Order included express references to
        the first pandemic order in Administrative Order 2020-18 and each
        successive Administrative Order related to the pandemic. Each
        Administrative Order also stated that it was acting “pursuant to 18
        U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iii)” and found that the ends of
        justice outweighed the parties’ and the public’s interest in a speedy
        trial “because the continuance of grand jury sessions in this district
        render[ed] it unreasonable to expect the return and filing of an
        indictment within the period set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b).” Each
        Administrative Order also incorporated by reference the periods of
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11731

        exclusion in the prior Administrative Orders as a specific finding in
        each pending case where the Speedy Trial Act applied.
              As a result of these pandemic-related Administrative Orders,
        no grand jury sessions occurred in the Southern District of Florida
        between March 26, 2020, and November 16, 2020.
        H.     Magistrate Judges Periodically Continue Dunn’s
        Arraignment
               Meanwhile, after Chief Judge Moore continued all grand
        jury sessions, individual magistrate judges presiding over Dunn’s
        criminal proceedings continued his arraignment several times.
                The first, 45-day continuance—from April 6 to April 27—
        was based on the government’s unopposed motion filed on March
        30, 2020. The government’s motion cited Administrative Order
        2020-22 “formally cancelling” grand jury sessions until April 27 and
        stated that “the Government is unable to Indict the above-entitled
        case prior to the currently scheduled arraignment date of April 6,
        2020, nor at least until April 27, 2020.” The government
        represented that the parties agreed that: (1) the ends of justice were
        served by continuing arraignment and outweighed the interest of
        the public and the defendant in a speedy trial; (2) Dunn’s
        arraignment and preliminary hearing should be reset for May 21;
        and (3) the “time should be excluded from the speedy trial period
        in this case.”
              On March 31, 2020, a magistrate judge granted the
        government’s motion and reset Dunn’s arraignment and
        preliminary hearing for May 21 as requested. The magistrate judge
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        22-11731                  Opinion of the Court                              9

        found that the continuance period of April 6 to May 21 was “speedy
        trial excludable in that the ends of justice are served by continuing
        the preliminary hearing/arraignment and outweigh the best
        interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.”
               Dunn’s preliminary hearing was held by videoconference on
        May 20. 2 The magistrate judge concluded the government
        established probable cause as to the offenses set forth in the two
        complaints. However, because there still was no grand jury in
        session and thus no indictment, Dunn was not arraigned at that
        time. During the hearing, the prosecutor advised that: (1) he was
        “waiting for the grand jury to reopen” to seek an indictment; and
        (2) he discussed with Dunn’s defense counsel about “possibly
        proceeding on an information pending a grand jury” but remained
        “in a holding pattern.”
               The magistrate judge responded that Dunn had a right to
        wait and have the case presented to a grand jury when it
        reconvened. The magistrate judge entered an order excluding the
        time from May 20 to July 6 under the Speedy Trial Act “[p]ursuant
        to Administrative Order 2020-24,” which was the most recent
        Administrative Order continuing grand jury sessions to July 6, 2020
        due to the pandemic.
              On July 6, a magistrate judge held a status conference via
        videoconference regarding Dunn’s arraignment. The magistrate

        2 The preliminary hearing was moved from May 21 to May 20 due to “the

        current schedule of availability to see defendants by videoconference.”
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11731

        judge noted that “we still have the COVID-19 pandemic increasing
        situation,” and asked, “where are we on this?” The prosecutor
        agreed to provide Dunn discovery, advised he planned to seek an
        indictment as soon as grand jury sessions resumed, and
        recommended resetting arraignment for one week “after the
        current October resetting.”
              The magistrate judge acknowledged the most recent,
        pandemic-related Administrative Order 2020-41 that continued
        grand jury sessions until October 13, 2020, and excluded that time
        from the speedy trial clock. With the parties’ agreement, the
        magistrate judge concluded he would reset Dunn’s arraignment for
        October 21, 2020, “pursuant to the CARES ACT and the
        administrative orders that have been entered, including 2020-41.”
               The magistrate judge found that it was “necessary in the
        interests of justice” to toll the speedy trial period due to the
        coronavirus pandemic and that the interests of justice “outweigh[]
        any interest of the Defendant or the public in a speedy trial.” The
        magistrate judge also confirmed that Dunn understood “grand
        juries are currently suspended” and were not expected to resume
        until “around October 13, 2020, if all goes well,” at which time the
        government would be able to obtain an indictment. Afterward, the
        magistrate judge reset Dunn’s arraignment for October 21, 2020,
        and reiterated his ends-of-justice findings “as stated on the record.”
              On October 20, 2020, Dunn filed an unopposed motion to
        continue his arraignment for 90 days and to exclude that time from
        the speedy trial calculations. Dunn’s motion explained that his
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        22-11731               Opinion of the Court                       11

        arraignment was “periodically continued, because the coronavirus
        pandemic has prevented grand juries from convening in this
        district” and that “grand jury sessions have still not reconvened,
        and no indictment has been returned.”
               The next day, a magistrate judge granted Dunn’s motion,
        reset his arraignment for January 20, 2021, as Dunn requested, and
        excluded the time period from October 20, 2020, to January 20,
        2021, from the speedy trial calculations “because the ends of justice
        served by this delay outweigh the interests of the defendant and of
        the public in a speedy trial.”
        I. Dunn’s December 1 Indictment
               On October 20, 2020, Chief Judge Moore issued
        Administrative Order 2020-76, which permitted limited grand jury
        sessions to resume on November 16, 2020. That Administrative
        Order stated that “[t]he U.S. Attorney’s Office and Clerk of Court
        have advised that they can safely convene no more than two grand
        jury sessions per week starting that date.”
               On December 1, 2020, a grand jury indicted Dunn on five
        offenses: (1) conspiracy to produce child pornography, in violation
        of 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (a) and (e) (Count 1); (2) production of child
        pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e) (Count 2);
        (3) offense by a registered sex offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
        § 2260A (Count 3); (4) receipt of child pornography, in violation of
        18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and (b)(1) (Count 4); and (5) possession of
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        12                        Opinion of the Court                       22-11731

        child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) and
        (b)(2) (Count 5). 3
                In a thorough December 29, 2020 order, the district court set
        a trial date of April 12, 2021, and found the COVID-19 pandemic
        had made “jury trials unfeasible for the foreseeable future”
        because: (1) local jails were in “lock down”; (2) defense lawyers
        were unable “to meet with their clients, confer with the
        Government, or prepare their cases for trial”; and (3) “millions of
        Americans [had] to quarantine themselves in their homes” or
        “remove themselves only sparingly.”
                Given the COVID-19 pandemic, the district court found
        that: (1) under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7), “the ends of justice served by
        setting the trial date beyond the 70 days contemplated in the
        Speedy Trial Act outweigh the best interests of the public and the
        Defendant in a speedy trial”; (2) “under Section 3161(h)(7)(B)(i),
        failure to extend the trial period would result in a miscarriage of
        justice because a jury trial is unfeasible during this pandemic”; and
        (3) under § 3161(h)(7)(B)(v), “failure to extend the trial period
        would ‘deny counsel for the defendant or the attorney for the
        Government the reasonable time necessary for effective
        preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.’” 4

        3 Dunn’s indictment was obtained from the first available convened grand jury

        for the West Palm Beach division of the Southern District of Florida, where
        Dunn’s case was lodged. Dunn was later arraigned.
        4 Before Dunn pled guilty, the district court entered two more trial orders that

        pushed back Dunn’s trial date due to the pandemic and, after making similar
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        22-11731                  Opinion of the Court                             13

        J. Motion to Dismiss the Indictment
               On January 21, 2021, Dunn filed a motion to dismiss his
        indictment with prejudice based on the eight-month delay between
        his arrest on March 10 and his indictment on December 1, 2020.
        Dunn argued the delay violated the Speedy Trial Act’s thirty-day
        time limit. Dunn challenged various aspects of Chief Judge
        Moore’s pandemic Administrative Orders and the magistrate
        judges’ pandemic continuance orders. 5 The government opposed
        Dunn’s motion.
        K. Denial of Dunn’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment
               In a comprehensive October 1, 2020 order, the district court
        denied Dunn’s motion to dismiss his indictment. The district court
        found that the COVID-19 pandemic had killed hundreds of
        thousands of Americans, forced millions of others to quarantine in
        their homes, and disrupted grand jury operations. The district
        court explained that grand jury proceedings had been “unfeasible”

        findings, excluded that time under the Speedy Trial Act. Dunn did not raise
        any speedy trial issue as to these three post-indictment continuances or
        preserve such an issue for appellate review as part of his conditional guilty
        plea.
        5 Dunn’s motion also argued that the pre-indictment delay violated his Fifth

        and Sixth Amendment rights and that dismissal of his indictment was required
        by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48. However, Dunn did not preserve
        these issues for appeal as part of his conditional plea, and we do not address
        them.
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11731

        under the circumstances and that the delay in indictment was
        necessary “to protect the public from a deadly disease.”
              The district court reviewed in detail the history of the above
        pandemic-related Administrative Orders and the magistrate
        judges’ continuance orders in Dunn’s specific case.
                The district court pointed to its three trial orders extending
        Dunn’s trial date and excluding that time from the speedy trial
        clock. The district court explained its view “that, as a practical
        matter, the Covid-19 pandemic made the process of empaneling
        juries (whether grand or petit) unfeasible and dangerous” and that
        its earlier findings guide its inquiry in ruling on Dunn’s motion.
        The district court concluded that its findings, although made post-
        indictment, were “relevant to [its] analysis” because “they put [the
        court’s] specific ‘findings’ about the feasibility of calling jurors” on
        the record by the time it ruled on Dunn’s motion to dismiss, as
        required by the Supreme Court’s decision in Zedner v. United States,
        547 U.S. 489 (2006).
               The district court concluded that “the district-wide orders in
        this case did include specific ‘on-the-record findings’ that, because
        of the raging pandemic, ‘the ends of justice served by [the
        continuance] outweigh the interests of the parties and the public in
        a speedy trial’” that were “expressly applied . . . to every criminal
        case then pending in our District.” And in any event, the
        magistrate judges who granted the various agreed-upon motions
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        22-11731                  Opinion of the Court                               15

        to continue Dunn’s arraignment also “made specific ends-of-justice
        findings on the record.” (Footnote omitted.) 6
                The district court stated that a “review of those
        proceedings” left “no doubt about the magistrate judges’ reasons
        for granting these continuances,” noting they had cited the
        ongoing pandemic as the justification. Agreeing with the
        magistrate judges’ assessments, the district court stated “the
        continuances were necessary to protect the health and safety of
        lawyers, jurors, and court staff. They were also an important way
        of protecting the rights of the accused—who, given the shutdowns
        at local jails, had no way of meeting (or adequately consulting) with
        their lawyers.”
               The district court observed that “21 separate ends-of-justice
        findings” had been made on the record in Dunn’s case by different
        judges. The district court concluded these “ends of justice”
        findings were “plainly sufficient to satisfy the Speedy Trial Act” and
        to exclude from the speedy trial clock all the time between Dunn’s

        6 While stating that Dunn could not prospectively waive application of the

        Speedy Trial Act, see Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (2006), the district
        court noted that Dunn never objected to any of the magistrate judges’
        continuances or “suggested that [his defense counsel] acted improperly in
        seeking or consenting to the various continuances.” Because the various
        Administrative Orders and magistrate judges’ orders properly tolled the
        speedy trial clock during the COVID-19 pandemic, we need not discuss or
        evaluate Dunn’s consent to any of them.
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        16                        Opinion of the Court                     22-11731

        arrest and his indictment, except for the first six days, which no
        order had excluded. 7
        J. Conditional Guilty Plea
               In December 2021, Dunn pled guilty to Counts 1, 2, 4, and
        5, in exchange for dismissal of Count 3, pursuant to a plea
        agreement. Dunn’s plea was conditioned on his right to seek
        appellate review of only “the denial of his pro se motion to dismiss
        the indictment . . . as to his statutory speedy trial rights only and to
        no other issue in the order.”
               As part of the plea, Dunn signed a proffer of facts, which he
        stipulated the government could prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
        The factual proffer recounted that in September 2019, the Federal
        Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) began investigating Dunn after
        Google reported that accounts linked to Dunn were being used to
        store child pornography. Dunn, a registered sex offender, was
        convicted in 2014 of traveling to meet a parent to solicit/entice a
        child to commit a sex act and of attempted lewd or lascivious
        battery of a child. Search warrants returned from Google
        confirmed Google’s cyber tips. The FBI then executed a search
        warrant at Dunn’s Florida residence. Dunn’s laptop contained
        dozens of images and at least eight videos of child sexual abuse.

        7 The district court ran the speedy trial clock from Dunn’s March 10 arrest on

        the first criminal complaint containing only two of the four charges to which
        Dunn pled guilty. Because the parties do not contend the second criminal
        complaint containing the other two charges affected the speedy trial clock
        analysis, we do not address that issue.
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        22-11731               Opinion of the Court                       17

        Dunn admitted downloading and distributing child pornography
        over the internet. He also admitted to communicating with a
        woman named Tonya in Colorado and convincing her to take
        pictures of her performing oral sex on her six-year-old son and to
        send them to him.
               The factual proffer further stated that after Dunn’s arrest,
        the FBI arrested Tonya Bagley in Colorado. Through search
        warrants, the FBI found evidence that in November 2019 Dunn and
        Bagley entered into a “master-slave” relationship, and Dunn
        directed Bagley to take and send photographs of her performing
        oral sex on her six-year-old son via Facebook Messenger, which she
        did.
               At the plea hearing, the district court accepted Dunn’s
        conditional guilty plea. At sentencing, 93 victims were identified
        from 163 images of child pornography found on Dunn’s laptop and
        cellphone. The district court imposed a total sentence of 600
        months’ imprisonment, followed by a lifetime of supervised
        release. Dunn was ordered to pay restitution to Bagley’s six-year-
        old son and to five of the victims identified in the child
        pornography images.
                           II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
        A. Standard of Review
               We review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion to
        dismiss based on a violation of the Speedy Trial Act, and for clear
        error its factual determinations as to excludable time. United States
        v. Ammar, 842 F.3d 1203, 1208 (11th Cir. 2016). A district court’s
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        18                        Opinion of the Court                       22-11731

        decision to grant or deny an ends-of-justice continuance under the
        Speedy Trial Act is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United
        States v. Mathis, 96 F.3d 1577, 1579 (11th Cir. 1996).
        B. “Ends-of-Justice” Continuances Under the Speedy Trial Act
               The Speedy Trial Act requires the government to file an
        indictment or information against a defendant within thirty days
        from the date on which the defendant was arrested or served with
        a summons in connection with the charges. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b).
        “If the thirty-day time limit is not met, the Act entitles the
        defendant to the dismissal of the charges contained in the initial
        complaint.” United States v. Mathurin, 690 F.3d 1236, 1239 (11th Cir.
        2012); 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1).
                The Act, however, excludes certain “periods of delay” when
        computing the thirty-day time limit. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h); Zedner,
        547 U.S. at 497. One excluded period of delay is an “ends-of-justice
        continuance,” which is governed by § 3161(h)(7). Zedner, 547 U.S.
        at 498. 8
               Specifically, § 3161(h)(7)(A) “permits a district court to grant
        a continuance and to exclude the resulting delay if the court, after
        considering certain factors, makes on-the-record findings that the
        ends of justice served by granting the continuance outweigh the

        8 When Zedner was decided in 2006, the Speedy Trial Act’s provision excluding

        ends-of-justice continuances was found at § 3161(h)(8). Zedner, 547 U.S. at 498.
        In 2008, the Act was amended, and the provision was moved to § 3161(h)(7)
        but was otherwise unchanged. Ammar, 842 F.3d at 1206 n.2.
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        22-11731                Opinion of the Court                         19

        public’s and defendant’s interests in a speedy trial.” Id. at 498-99;
        18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). And § 3161(h)(7)(A) states that no such
        period of delay is excludable “unless the court sets forth, in the
        record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding
        that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance
        outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a
        speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).
               In turn, § 3161(h)(7)(B) contains a non-exhaustive list of
        factors a court considers in granting the continuance. 18 U.S.C.
        § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i)-(iv). These factors include whether: (1) the
        failure to grant the continuance “would be likely to make a
        continuation of such proceeding impossible, or result in a
        miscarriage of justice”; (2) the case is so unusual or complex that it
        is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the Speedy
        Trial Act’s time limits; (3) “in a case in which arrest precedes
        indictment, delay in the filing of the indictment is caused because
        the arrest occurs at a time such that it is unreasonable to expect
        return and filing of the indictment” within the Speedy Trial Act’s
        30-day time limit; and (4) the failure to grant a continuance would
        deny the defendant “reasonable time to obtain counsel,” would
        unreasonably deny either party “continuity of counsel,” or would
        deny counsel for either party reasonable time “for effective
        preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.” Id.
               Courts have broad discretion in weighing these factors.
        United States v. Henry, 698 F.2d 1172, 1174 (11th Cir. 1983).
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        20                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11731

                              III. DUNN’S CLAIMS
               After Dunn’s arrest on March 10, the speedy trial clock
        started running on March 11, 2020. See United States v. Skanes, 17
        F.3d 1352, 1353 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding the day the defendant is
        arrested is not counted for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act’s thirty-
        day time limit). If proper, the above ends-of-justice continuances
        tolled the speedy trial clock from March 16 up to Dunn’s
        indictment on December 1, 2020, without interruption. That
        results in no Speedy Trial Act violation.
              On appeal, Dunn challenges these orders in several ways,
        which we address in turn.
        A. Magistrate Judge’s March 16, 2020, Continuance
               Dunn argues that in his March 16, 2020, order, the
        magistrate judge abused his discretion in granting the
        government’s very first motion to continue Dunn’s arraignment
        until April 6, 2020. Dunn contends the magistrate judge
        improperly accepted without further inquiry the government’s
        representations that due to the pandemic it was unable (1) to
        prepare properly for the grand jury or (2) to ensure that a quorum
        of the grand jury would be present. Dunn argues this “directly
        contradict[ed]” Administrative Order 2020-18, which directed
        grand jury sessions and arraignments to continue.
               Contrary to Dunn’s argument, nothing in Administrative
        Order 2020-18 precluded an individual magistrate judge from
        granting a short ends-of-justice continuance due to difficulties
        presented by the pandemic. Instead, Administrative Order 2020-18
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        22-11731               Opinion of the Court                        21

        gave individual judges presiding over criminal proceedings the
        discretion to take “appropriate” additional actions “to ensure the
        fairness of the proceedings and preserve the rights of the parties.”
               Furthermore, the magistrate judge’s continuance order
        cited Administrative Order 2020-18, noted that it gave him this
        discretion, and explained that the “public health emergency”
        required him to take “additional steps to protect the health and
        safety of the parties, counsel, and court staff” and to ensure that
        incarcerated defendants like Dunn were able to have meaningful
        consultation with their counsel.
               And the unopposed motion was providently granted, given
        that within ten days, on March 26, Chief Judge Moore entered
        Administrative Order 2020-22, continuing all grand jury sessions in
        the Southern District until April 27, 2020, due to the pandemic.
        Under the circumstances, Dunn has not shown an abuse of
        discretion.
        B. Dunn’s Speedy Trial Act Claim
              Next, Dunn argues that neither Chief Judge Moore’s
        pandemic-related Administrative Orders nor the magistrate judges’
        pandemic-related continuance orders made sufficient findings
        required by § 3161(h)(7) to exclude the time between March 16 and
        December 1, 2020, from the speedy trial clock in his case.
               As already mentioned, the Speedy Trial Act “requires that
        when a district court grants an ends-of-justice continuance, it must
        set forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its
        reasons for finding that the ends of justice are served and they
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        22                      Opinion of the Court                   22-11731

        outweigh other interests.” Zedner, 547 U.S. at 506 (alteration
        adopted) (quotation marks omitted). If a district court does not
        make the required “on-the-record findings,” then the period of the
        continuance cannot be excluded from the speedy trial clock. Id. at
        507; Ammar, 842 F.3d at 1210.
               As to Chief Judge Moore’s Administrative Orders, Dunn
        argues that even in a pandemic, “all-inclusive blanket
        continuances” applied to every pending case in the district are not
        “case-specific” and therefore cannot satisfy § 3161(h)(7)’s
        requirements for purposes of the five continuances in his case. See
        Zedner, 547 U.S. at 499 (stating that the Speedy Trial Act’s ends-of-
        justice provision “gives the district court discretion—within limits
        and subject to specific procedures—to accommodate limited delays
        for case-specific needs”).
                The government points out that our sister circuits have held
        that the national public health emergency caused by the global
        COVID-19 pandemic provided sufficient justification for a district
        court’s district-wide blanket order temporarily continuing jury
        trials during this pandemic and excluding that time under the
        Speedy Trial Act’s ends-of-justice exception. See United States v.
        Keith, 61 F.4th 839, 844, 851 (10th Cir. 2023) (jury trials); United
        States v. Leveke, 38 F.4th 662, 670 (8th Cir. 2022) (same), cert. denied,
        143 S. Ct. 286 (2022); United States v. Olsen, 21 F.4th 1036, 1049 (9th
        Cir. 2022) (same), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2716 (2022); United States v.
        Roush, No. 21-3820, 2021 WL 6689969, *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 2021)
        (same), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1187 (2022).
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        22-11731               Opinion of the Court                        23

               In this regard, the Ninth Circuit has observed that the
        pandemic had the “same widespread effects on courts and parties
        alike,” and “[i]n such unusual cases, a district court’s specific
        findings may properly concern generally applicable
        circumstances.” See United States v. Orozco-Barron, 72 F.4th 945,
        956, 958 (9th Cir. 2023) (“In such instances, the reasons for granting
        the ends of justice continuance must still be based upon specific
        factual circumstances justified in the record, but need not be
        particularized to an individual defendant.” (quotation marks
        omitted)). The government argues that under the unique situation
        of the deadly 2020 COVID-19 pandemic, there was no need for
        additional orders by the magistrate judges in specific cases because
        the widespread pandemic applied to courts and parties alike.
              In Dunn’s case, however, we need not reach or decide the
        question of whether the district-wide Administrative Orders here
        were sufficient for ends-of-justice purposes under the Speedy Trial
        Act. This is because the magistrate judges’ continuances entered
        in Dunn’s specific case were sufficient.
                Here, the record establishes that all five magistrate judge
        continuances were granted due to health and safety concerns and
        restrictions arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. The first, the
        March 16 order continuing Dunn’s arraignment from March 24 to
        April 6, was entered just days after the global pandemic was
        declared a national emergency. The order explained that because
        of “the current public health emergency” the continuance was
        required “to protect the health and safety of parties, counsel, and
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        24                      Opinion of the Court                   22-11731

        court staff” and “to ensure that . . . clients (particularly incarcerated
        clients),” like Dunn, “have meaningful consultation.” The order
        cited Chief Judge Moore’s first pandemic Administrative Order
        2020-18 and also made its own explicit ends-of-justice finding.
               Moreover, the record is clear that in Dunn’s case the parties
        sought, and the magistrate judges granted, periodic continuances
        of his specific arraignment because Chief Judge Moore had
        continued grand jury sessions to protect public health and reduce
        the exposure to, and spread of, COVID-19 through large public
        gatherings. Indeed, three of the four magistrate judge orders
        continuing Dunn’s arraignment due to the unavailability of a grand
        jury (March 31, 2020, July 6, 2020, and October 20, 2020) also
        included an explicit finding that the ends of justice served by the
        continuance outweighed the interests of Dunn and the public in a
        speedy trial. One order (May 20, 2020) did expressly refer to Chief
        Judge Moore’s then-latest Administrative Order 2020-24
        continuing grand jury sessions due to the pandemic, which had
        made an express ends-of-justice finding, and that May 20, 2020,
        order in effect incorporated that ends-of-justice finding into Dunn’s
        specific case.
               The fact that all grand jury sessions in the Southern District
        were temporarily continued due to the COVID-19 pandemic
        provided sufficient justification to continue temporarily Dunn’s
        arraignment. And, under the COVID-19 pandemic circumstances,
        the magistrate judges were not required to make more case-
        specific, ends-of-justice findings, beyond the COVID-19 pandemic-
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        22-11731               Opinion of the Court                       25

        related one, in order to comply with § 3161(h)(7)(A) and exclude
        the time from Dunn’s speedy trial clock. That is especially so here,
        where the administrative orders stated that grand juries were not
        able to meet because of health and safety concerns stemming from
        the pandemic, and that was the reason why Dunn was not indicted.
               Dunn also contends the magistrate judge’s orders did not
        provide indicia that the § 3161(h)(7)(B)’s factors were considered.
        But the Speedy Trial Act requires the court to put on the record
        only “its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the
        granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the
        public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C.
        § 3161(h)(7)(A) While the Speedy Trial Act also requires a court to
        “consider” § 3161(h)(7)(B)’s factors before granting an ends-of-
        justice continuance, it does not require the district court to do so
        on the record. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B). It is not necessary for
        the court to incant specific phrases from the Speedy Trial Act or to
        consider each of the statutory factors on the record so long as the
        court provides sufficient justification for granting the ends-of-
        justice continuance. See Orozco-Barron, 72 F.4th at 956-57.
               Moreover, the district court is not limited to considering the
        statutory factors. See id. § 3161(h)(7)(B) (providing that a judge
        shall consider the statutory factors “among others”). In a public
        health emergency affecting court operations such as the COVID-
        19 pandemic, a court properly considers the health and safety of
        the public, court personnel, the parties, and counsel.
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        26                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11731

                Here, as to the magistrate judge’s first March 16 pandemic
        continuance, the government’s motion stated that due to the
        unforeseen nature of the pandemic, prosecutors could not prepare
        properly for the grand jury or even guarantee a quorum to convene
        a grand jury by Dunn’s March 24 arraignment. The magistrate
        judge’s order further stated that the continuance was necessary to
        ensure that Dunn, who was incarcerated, could meaningfully
        consult with his counsel given the pandemic. These on-the-record
        reasons for the ends-of-justice continuance implicate two statutory
        factors—whether the failure to grant the continuance (1) would
        likely “result in a miscarriage of justice” or (2) “would deny counsel
        for the defendant or the attorney for the Government the
        reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into
        account the exercise of due diligence.” See id. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(i),
        (iv). And, as we already explained, the magistrate judge was not
        required to expressly consider each statutory factor in its order or
        recite specific language from the statute. After all, not every
        statutory factor will be relevant to the circumstances warranting
        the continuance. Instead, it is sufficient if the record shows, as it
        does here, that the magistrate judge considered the pertinent
        factors.
              As to the remaining continuances in Dunn’s case, each was
        sought and granted because Chief Judge Moore’s pandemic-related
        Administrative Orders temporarily continued grand jury sessions.
        Those Administrative Orders, in turn, explicitly cited 18 U.S.C.
        § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iii), the most salient statutory factor under the
        circumstances—whether “in a case in which arrest precedes
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        22-11731                Opinion of the Court                         27

        indictment,” such as in Dunn’s case, the “delay in the filing of the
        indictment is caused because the arrest occurs at a time such that it
        is unreasonable to expect return and filing of the indictment within
        the period specified in section 3161(b).” See id. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iii).
        Reading the five magistrate judges’ orders in Dunn’s specific case
        in the context of the record and the Administrative Orders, we
        conclude § 3161(h)(7)’s requirements to consider the statutory
        factors and make an ends-of-justice finding on the record were
        satisfied with respect to the continuances in Dunn’s case.
        C. District Court’s Order
                As an alternative and independent ground, we also take time
        to point out that the district court’s comprehensive order—
        denying Dunn’s motion to dismiss his indictment—was alone
        sufficient to toll the speedy trial clock. See Zedner, 547 U.S. at 506-
        07 (providing that, while the best practice is to make
        contemporaneous ends-of-justice findings, a district court may put
        its ends-of-justice findings on the record at the latest when it “rules
        on a defendant’s motion to dismiss under § 3162(a)(2)”); Ammar,
        842 F.3d at 1207 (“[W]e look to see whether the district court
        considered the relevant factors and placed its ends-of-justice
        findings on the record . . . at the latest, by the time it ruled on [the
        defendant’s] motion to dismiss for a speedy trial violation.”).
               The district court’s excellent order explained in detail why
        public health concerns due to the COVID-19 pandemic made it
        necessary for Chief Judge Moore to continue grand jury sessions in
        the Southern District and therefore for the magistrate judges to
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        28                    Opinion of the Court                 22-11731

        continue Dunn’s arraignment. The district court found that “the
        Covid-19 pandemic made the process of empaneling juries
        (whether grand or petit)” not just unfeasible but also “dangerous,”
        and made it difficult for defense counsel to meet with clients held
        in jails that were locked down. The district court expressly agreed
        with the magistrate judges’ contemporaneous findings that the
        ends of justice served by the continuances during the deadly
        pandemic outweighed the best interests of the public and Dunn in
        a speedy trial. We readily conclude that the district court’s order
        denying Dunn’s motion to dismiss the indictment more than
        satisfied § 3161(h)(7)’s requirements to consider the statutory
        factors and to make an ends-of-justice finding on the record.
                               IV. CONCLUSION
                Because the government filed Dunn’s indictment within the
        Speedy Trial Act’s thirty-day time limit in 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), the
        district court properly denied Dunn’s motion to dismiss the
        indictment. Accordingly, we affirm Dunn’s convictions.
              AFFIRMED.