Court Opinion

ID: 9468487
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:16:10.521409+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:53.390527
License: Public Domain

HARLINGTON WOOD, Jr., Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Only the introduction into evidence of defendant’s two overage and constitutionally invalid state marijuana convictions by his own counsel concerns me. The majority labels the convictions as “minor,” but I view no felony convictions as minor. I am not prepared to say that the defendant was not prejudiced by what the majority views as an excusable trial tactic of his defense counsel. It was obviously a trial tactic, but a tactic so unjustified, so misguided and so potentially prejudicial that it reflects seriously upon counsel’s competence.
I agree that in proper circumstances it is often a desirable trial tactic for defense counsel to lessen the impact of a defendant’s prior convictions by controlling the manner and time of their revelation to the jury, if revelation is necessary. In the circumstances of this case, however, it can only be attributed to the incompetency of counsel.1 My view does not imply that every possible mistake or misjudgment by counsel made during trial when viewed on Monday morning suggests counsel incompetency.
The government could not have used the ten year old convictions, even if they were still valid, without running afoul of the age limitation in Rule 609(b), Federal Rules of *622Evidence, 28 U.S.C.2 The government argues, however, that when the defendant’s defense is entrapment, as it was here, the government may be permitted to impeach him with evidence of prior felony convictions even though over ten years old. United States v. Townsend, 555 F.2d 152, 159 (7th Cir. 1977). That may be true at times, but Townsend did not involve prior convictions which had been vacated on constitutional grounds as in this case. People v. Meyerowitz, 61 Ill.2d 200, 335 N.E.2d 1 (1972); People v. McCabe, 49 Ill.2d 338, 275 N.E.2d 407 (1971). The government also argues that the defendant’s old invalid convictions nevertheless could have been used if the defendant had attempted to give the jury the false impression that he had never been involved in any criminal activities, or were offered in direct rebuttal of some other false statement of the defendant. Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 482 n. 11, 92 S.Ct. 1014, 1018 n. 11, 31 L.Ed.2d 374 (1972). That is correct, but it does not seem plausible that defendant’s own counsel, at least if competent, would impeach the defendant in advance before he had made some anticipated false statement.
As the majority points out, in an entrapment case the defendant may be subject to a searching inquiry into his own conduct and his predisposition to commit the crime alleged. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451, 53 S.Ct. 210, 216, 77 L.Ed.2d 413 (1932). Applying that rule to the present case, however, it is difficult for me to see how the old and invalid marijuana convictions could show and predisposition to deal currently in stolen government checks.
I also agree with the majority that the government is not restricted to only prior convictions to show predisposition. United States v. Perry, 478 F.2d 1276, 1279 (7th Cir. 1973). In Perry, however, the doors were not opened wide as only the prior but recent narcotic activities of the defendant were admitted to show predisposition to further engage in the sale of narcotics as charged. Nor do the old invalid marijuana convictions in the present case demonstrate the defendant’s general reputation as a dealer in stolen checks.
The majority also calls our attention to Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958), an entrapment case. However, in that case, the Supreme Court held that a nine-year-old narcotic sales conviction and a five-year-old narcotic possession conviction were insufficient to prove disposition to later sell the other narcotics in the conviction under review. Sherman no doubt would have been even an easier case to decide if prior marijuana convictions previously vacated were being offered to show a subsequent predisposition to traffic in stolen checks.
I would not apply the harmless error doctrine to the present case. Plies v. United States, 431 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1970), does not support its use in these circumstances. In Plies the defendant testified about his prior robbery convictions but he was being charged with a new robbery, not some totally unrelated activity. There was no issue in Plies of the ages of the prior convictions nor of their validity. The same is true in Shorter v. United States, 412 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1969). In Shorter the defendant testified about his prior convictions, but only after the court had indicated at a bench conference that it would permit the government to use the convictions for impeachment purposes although the convictions allegedly had been obtained without the defendant having counsel, possibly in violation of the rule in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). *623Faced with that admissibility ruling the defense counsel then as a matter of tactics brought his client’s prior convictions to light before the jury to lessen their impact. There was some reason for counsel’s tactics in that case, but there is none in the present case.
Defense counsel in this case evidenced not only a lack of knowledge of applicable and critical federal rules of evidence, but also a lack of factual and legal knowledge about his own client’s convictions. Prior convictions are much too sensitive and dangerous a matter in a jury trial to be so negligently and incompetently handled by counsel. It may well be that defense counsel satisfactorily handled the balance of the trial, but that does not obscure his incompetence in handling these particularly prejudicial matters. Nothing justified what counsel did. It is true that there was substantial evidence of guilt, but guilt is a conclusion for the jury to reach without being influenced by these old and invalid prior convictions.
Since the jury was made aware that defendant also had some drug background, the jury may well have concluded that not only was defendant from time to time predisposed to criminal activity, but in addition was generally not one of our better citizens. Whatever the merits of the current arguments about the use of marijuana, there is, nevertheless, a strong potential for injecting a special prejudice. The jury should have been concerned only with stolen United States Treasury checks, not marijuana.
As I would reverse and remand for a new and untainted trial, I respectfully dissent.

. I do not mean to imply that defendant’s counsel may not generally be a very competent lawyer, only that on this particular occasion he was not and his client may have suffered with the jury as a result of it.

. Rule 609(b) provides:
Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than 10 years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence.