Court Opinion

ID: 9892456
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-23 21:03:43.680606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:07:00.820405
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/23/23 Stage v. Unruly Agency CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 SARAH STAGE,                                                         B320840

           Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and                             (Los Angeles County
           Appellant,                                                 Super. Ct. No. 22STCV06689)

           v.

 UNRULY AGENCY, LLC,

           Defendant, Cross-Complainant
           and Respondent.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Bruce G. Iwasaki, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
      Mills Sadat Dowlat, Camron Dowlatshahi and Brigitte
Mills for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Appellant.
      Grand Park Law Group and Armand J. Jaafari for
Defendant, Cross-complainant and Respondent.
                    ____________________________
       Plaintiff, cross-defendant, and appellant Sarah Stage hired
defendant, cross-complainant, and respondent Unruly Agency,
LLC (Unruly) to manage an account she had on a social media
platform. Their relationship soon soured, with Stage accusing
Unruly of demanding she post sexually explicit content, and
Unruly claiming Stage benefited from its services without
sharing her profits from Unruly’s work on her behalf. Stage sued
Unruly for, among other causes of action, breach of contract,
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
unfair competition.
       Unruly filed a cross-complaint leveling five claims against
Stage. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure1 section 425.16, the
Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (anti-SLAPP)
statute, Stage filed a special motion to strike three of these cross-
claims, to wit, Unruly’s cross-claims for breach of contract, breach
of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional
interference with contractual relations. Stage appeals from the
trial court’s order denying her motion.
       We hold that the anti-SLAPP statute applies to Unruly’s
cross-claim for intentional interference with contractual relations
because it arises from statements Stage made to other models
and social media influencers in connection with an issue under
consideration by a judicial body. The cross-claim thus comes
within the purview of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2). In so
holding, we acknowledge that in the trial court, Stage relied on a
different subdivision of the anti-SLAPP statute—section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(4)—to support her motion. We nonetheless

      1Undesignated statutory citations are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

                                     2
exercise our discretion to consider whether her statements arise
from speech protected by section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2)
because (1) whether Stage’s statements fall within the purview of
the anti-SLAPP statute is an issue of law; (2) on appeal, Stage
fully briefed the issue; and (3) Unruly had the opportunity on
appeal to respond but failed to address that basis for anti-SLAPP
protection at all in its briefing.
       Next, we reject Unruly’s argument that Stage’s statements
constitute commercial speech that is exempt from anti-SLAPP
protection. We also hold that Unruly cannot show a probability
of prevailing on its intentional interference with contractual
relations cross-claim because Stage’s statements are protected by
the litigation privilege. Finally, Stage has abandoned her anti-
SLAPP attack on Unruly’s cross-claims for breach of contract and
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
       We thus reverse the trial court’s order denying Stage’s
motion to strike Unruly’s cross-claim for intentional interference
with contractual relations but affirm the order as to Unruly’s
contract-based cross-claims for breach of contract and breach of
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
      Unruly describes itself as “a boutique marketing company,”
and claims that “[s]ocial media influencers retain Unruly to

      2    Our Factual and Procedural Background is derived in
part from undisputed aspects of the trial court’s ruling and
admissions made by the parties in their filings. (See Baxter v.
State Teachers’ Retirement System (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 340,
349, fn. 2 [utilizing the summary of facts provided in the trial
court’s ruling]; Artal v. Allen (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 273, 275,
fn. 2 [“ ‘[B]riefs and argument . . . are reliable indications of a

                                      3
promote the content their influencers produce, network that
content across multiple internet platforms, build and grow their
brands, and monetize their public appeal.” Stage identifies
herself as “a professional model, actress, and certified personal
trainer who earns a living producing lifestyle content on social
media.”
       In August 2020, Stage and Unruly entered into an
agreement that called for Unruly to manage Stage’s account on a
social media platform called “OnlyFans.” Several months later,
Stage decided to terminate her relationship with Unruly. Stage
asserts that “[w]ithin days of starting their relationship, Unruly
began pressuring [her] to produce vulgar content and effectively
shifted all resources and management away from her when she
refused to cater to [Unruly’s] demands.” Conversely, Unruly
maintains that Stage had asked Unruly to assist her in producing
“highly sexual content . . . .” Unruly further asserts that “Stage
effectively garnered [a] sizeable consumer audience from Unruly’s
services[ and] then migrated them to her own personal website,
which effectively cut-out [Unruly’s] claim to the profits.”
       On February 23, 2022, Stage filed a complaint against
Unruly and its alleged owners (Tara Niknejad and Nicky
Gathrite),3 wherein Stage asserted nine causes of action:
(1) breach of contract, (2) breach of implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, (3) intentional misrepresentation, (4) negligent
misrepresentation, (5) misappropriation of name and likeness,

party’s position on the facts as well as the law, and a reviewing
court may make use of statements therein as admissions against
the party.’ ”].)
      3   Stage and Unruly are the only parties to this appeal.

                                     4
(6) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (7) negligent
interference with prospective economic advantage, (8) unfair
competition, and (9) declaratory relief.
       Two days later, Unruly filed a cross-complaint asserting
five causes of action against Stage: (1) breach of contract,
(2) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
(3) intentional misrepresentation, (4) negligent
misrepresentation, and (5) intentional interference with
contractual relations.4 The fifth cross-claim “alleges that Unruly
represents a ‘significant number of influential social media
figures,’ introduced Stage to a number of ‘its models’ through
projects and events, and that Stage ‘intentionally made
fabricated statements about [Unruly] to its models to
intentionally disrupt the economic relationship for [Unruly].’ ”
       Stage moved to strike Unruly’s first, second, and fifth cross-
claims under the anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that these claims
arise out of speech protected by section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4).
In support of her motion, Stage submitted a declaration in which
she claimed to have had conversations with certain models and
influencers Stage believed had worked with Unruly in order to
determine whether they could testify on her behalf.5
       On April 19, 2022, the trial court heard and denied Stage’s
motion because “Stage’s alleged speech and conduct do not
involve a public issue or an issue of public interest” for the

      4  As we explain in footnote 10, post, we identify Unruly’s
fifth cause of action as a claim of intentional interference with
contractual relations even though the pleading does not so style
this cause of action.
      5 We describe Stage’s declaration in further detail in
Discussion, part A.2, post.

                                     5
purpose of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4). The court further
observed, “Although Stage’s declaration alludes to telling other
models about her lawsuit against Unruly, Stage d[id] not argue
that such communications were made in a judicial proceeding, in
connection with an issue under consideration by a legislative,
executive or judicial body, or in a public forum in connection with
an issue of public interest” such that subdivision(e)(1), (e)(2), or
(e)(3) could have applied to her speech. Because the court found
that Stage “failed to meet her threshold burden of showing that
the challenged causes of action arise from protected activity,” the
court did not “consider whether . . . Unruly ha[d] demonstrated a
probability of prevailing on its claims.”
       The trial court also remarked in its April 19, 2022 order
that “Stage’s motion to strike appear[ed] to be frivolous,” and the
court announced its “tentative view . . . that an award of costs
and reasonable attorney’s fees against Stage may be
appropriate.” The court then directed Unruly to file a motion for
attorney fees and costs, and set a briefing schedule and hearing.
       On April 28, 2022, Stage timely appealed the order denying
her special motion to strike.6 On May 3, 2022, the trial court
took the hearing on Unruly’s motion for attorney fees and costs
off calendar “[i]n light of the pending appeal . . . .” Unruly

      6 The grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP motion is an
appealable order. (See § 425.16, subd. (i) [“An order granting or
denying a special motion to strike shall be appealable under
Section 904.1.”]; § 904.1, subd. (a)(13) [“An appeal . . . may be
taken from any of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] From an order
granting or denying a special motion to strike under
Section 425.16.”].)

                                    6
asserts, and Stage does not dispute, that the court “issued a stay
on all matters” after Stage filed her notice of appeal.7

                      APPLICABLE LAW
        The anti-SLAPP statute provides that “[a] cause of action
against a person arising from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under
the United States Constitution or the California Constitution in
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion
to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will
prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
        For the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute, the phrase
“ ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech
under the United States or California Constitution in connection
with a public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral statement or
writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial
proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law,
(2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection
with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative,
executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding
authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing
made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection

      7  (See Rudick v. State Bd. of Optometry (2019)
41 Cal.App.5th 77, 89–90 (Rudick) [concluding that the
appellants made an implicit concession by “failing to respond in
their reply brief to the [respondent’s] argument on th[at] point”];
see also Direct Shopping Network, LLC v. James (2012) 206
Cal.App.4th 1551, 1557, fn. 2 [“An appeal of an order granting or
denying an anti-SLAPP motion stays all further proceedings on
the merits of the affected causes of action.”].)

                                    7
with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition
or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a
public issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e).)
        Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-
pronged procedure. (Litinsky v. Kaplan (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th
970, 979 (Litinsky).) “First, the [movant] must show . . . ‘that the
challenged cause of action is one arising from protected activity’ ”
“ ‘ “by demonstrating that the act underlying the . . . cause fits
[within] one of the categories spelled out in section 425.16,
subdivision (e).” ’ [Citation.] If the [movant] makes that
showing, the burden shifts to the [nonmovant] to ‘demonstrate[ ]
a probability of prevailing on’ the merits of their cause.
[Citation.] ‘Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of
the anti-SLAPP statute . . . is . . . subject to being stricken.’
[Citation.]” (See Bowen v. Lin (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 155, 160
(Bowen).) “In deciding whether the initial ‘arising from’
requirement is met, a court considers ‘the pleadings, and
supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which
the liability or defense is based.’ [Citation.]” (Navellier v. Sletten
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89, quoting § 425.16, subd. (b)(2).)
        If the movant discharges his or her burden vis-à-vis the
first prong, then “the ‘burden shifts to the [nonmovant] to
demonstrate that each challenged claim based on protected
activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated.’
[Citation.] Without resolving evidentiary conflicts, the court
determines ‘whether the [nonmovant’s] showing, if accepted by
the trier of fact, would be sufficient to sustain a favorable
judgment.’ [Citation.] . . . [T]he second step of the anti-SLAPP
process ‘establishes a procedure where the trial court evaluates

                                     8
the merits of the lawsuit using a summary-judgment-like
procedure at an early stage of the litigation.’ [Citation.]”
(Litinsky, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at pp. 979–980.)
      “ ‘We exercise independent judgment in determining
whether, based on our own review of the record, the challenged
claims arise from protected activity.’ [Citation.]” (Li v. Jin
(2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 481, 490.) Likewise, “we independently
review . . . whether the plaintiff has a probability of prevailing on
the merits.” (Summerfield v. Randolph (2011)
201 Cal.App.4th 127, 135.)

                          DISCUSSION
       On appeal, Stage argues that Unruly’s fifth cross-claim
arises from her protected activity under section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(2), and that Unruly cannot establish a probability
of prevailing on this cross-claim because the claim is subject to
the litigation privilege set forth in Civil Code section 47. We
agree with Stage on both points. In so holding, we exercise our
discretion to consider Stage’s argument based on section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(2) even though she did not raise it below, but
instead relied on subdivision (e)(4). Accordingly, we do not
address the parties’ competing contentions regarding whether
Stage’s statements could also be within the purview of
section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4). Additionally, we reject
Unruly’s argument that Stage’s statements constitute
commercial speech exempted from protection of the anti-SLAPP
statute. Lastly, Stage abandoned her appeal of the trial court’s

                                     9
order denying her motion to strike Unruly’s first and second
contractual cross-claims.8

A.    Unruly’s Fifth Cross-Claim Arises From Stage’s
      Protected Activity

      1.    We exercise our discretion to consider Stage’s
            arguments based on section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2)
            even though she failed to raise those arguments below
            because they present pure issues of law, Unruly
            does not assert prejudice or that the arguments are
            unmeritorious, and addressing this question will
            further judicial economy
       In her opening appellate brief, Stage contends Unruly’s
fifth cross-claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(2). Stage acknowledges she did not raise this
argument below but asks us to consider it nonetheless. In its
appellate briefing, Unruly does not address section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(2) on its merits or claim Stage forfeited reliance
on that subdivision by not arguing it below.

      8   In her opening and reply briefs, Stage asks us to “remand
for proceedings consistent with [this] opinion, including a motion
for fees.” (Italics added.) Stage provides no legal authority to
support her request that we instruct the trial court to permit her
to move for attorney fees. Accordingly, we decline to address her
request further. (See Inyo Citizens for Better Planning v. Inyo
County Bd. of Supervisors (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1, 14 [“We do
not serve as ‘backup appellate counsel[.]’ ”].) We express no
opinion on whether Stage may move for attorney fees upon
remand or how the trial court should rule on such a motion.

                                    10
       We acknowledge that “ ‘the failure to preserve a point
below’ ” “ ‘[o]rdinarily’ ” “ ‘constitutes a [forfeiture] of th[at] point.
[Citation.] . . . .’ [Citation.]” (See Meridian Financial Services,
Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 698, third bracketed
insertion added.) “[A]pplication of the forfeiture rule ‘is not
automatic. [Citation.] . . . ’ [Citation.]” (In re D’Anthony D.
(2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 292, 298, fn. 2.) “ ‘When an appellant
raises a question of law, for example, the appellate court can
exercise its discretion to address the issue.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
       We exercise our discretion to consider Stage’s argument
that Unruly’s fifth cross-claim arises from activity protected by
section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2). First, whether this subdivision
applies is a “legal question[ ] which we review independently on
appeal.” (See Gallimore v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co.
(2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1396–1397.) Second, Unruly
does not claim it would suffer any prejudice if we addressed
Stage’s argument; indeed, Unruly ignores this subdivision
altogether in its appellate briefing. Lastly, resolving this
question would not disrupt the trial court proceedings, given that
the court stayed them after Stage filed her notice of appeal.
(Factual & Procedural Background, ante.) In addition,
considering the issue would narrow the claims upon remand and
thus serve judicial economy. (See Disposition, post [instructing
the trial court to issue an order striking Unruly’s fifth cross-
claim]; see also People v. Butler (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1119, 1128
[“[J]udicial economy is a principal rationale of the forfeiture
doctrine.”].)9

      9 In exercising our discretion to decide whether
section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) protects Stage’s statements, we

                                       11
      2.    Unruly’s fifth cross-claim arises from Stage’s
            conversations with other models and influencers
       “At th[e] first step [of the anti-SLAPP analysis], courts are
to ‘consider the elements of the challenged claim and what
actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently
form the basis for liability.’ [Citation.]” (See Bonni v. St. Joseph
Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009 (Bonni).) Accordingly,
our task is to identify which alleged actions undertaken by Stage
give rise to her liability on Unruly’s fifth cross-claim for
intentional interference with contractual relations.10 As
explained below, this cause of action is predicated on discussions
that Stage had with other models and influencers that she
described in her declaration.
       “In order to state a cause of action for intentional
interference with contract, a plaintiff must show: ‘(1) a valid
contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant’s

do not intend any criticism of the trial court’s consideration of
Stage’s motion.
      10  Although the first page of Unruly’s cross-complaint
identifies the fifth cross-claim as “intentional interference with
prospective economic advantage” (boldface & capitalization
omitted), and the body of the cross-complaint labels this cause of
action as “intentional interference with economic relations”
(boldface, underscoring, & some capitalization omitted), Unruly
refers to this cause of action as “intentional interference with
contractual relations” in its respondent’s brief. (Fn. omitted.)
Because Stage does not dispute this point in her reply brief, we
assume for the purposes of this appeal that Unruly’s fifth cross-
claim is a cause of action for intentional interference with
contractual relations. (See Rudick, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 89–90.)

                                    12
knowledge of this contract; (3) defendant’s intentional acts
designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual
relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual
relationship; and (5) resulting damage.’ [Citations.]” (Winchester
Mystery House, LLC v. Global Asylum, Inc. (2012)
210 Cal.App.4th 579, 596.)
       In its cross-complaint, Unruly avers that Stage
“intentionally made fabricated statements about [Unruly] to its
models to intentionally disrupt the economic relationship for
[Unruly].” Unruly acknowledges on appeal that “the cross-
complaint itself fails to specify any particular speech or act of
interference” on Stage’s part.
       The vagueness of Unruly’s pleading, however, does not
preclude Stage from establishing that the cause of action arises
from protected activity. “[W]e do not evaluate the first prong of
the anti-SLAPP test solely through the lens of a plaintiff’s cause
of action.” (Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th
664, 679.) Rather, we may assess “the parties’ evidentiary
submissions” to determine whether they “provide more clarity” as
to the alleged misconduct upon which liability is premised. (See
Wittenberg v. Bornstein (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 303, 315.)
       In her March 23, 2022 declaration, Stage attested, “In the
past several years, I have communicated with other models and
influencers that I believe worked at one point with Unruly. I did
so to gauge whether these models and influencers had
experiences with Unruly that were similar to mine and could
testify in my support.” She further declared, “In certain of those
conversations, I informed such individuals of my experience with
Unruly. I explained that I was unhappy with their services,
including that Unruly made me feel uncomfortable, and that

                                  13
Unruly would not release me from my contract. I also explained
that I was involved in a lawsuit against Unruly.” Stage insisted
she “never suggested, instructed, or attempted to convince any
individual to terminate his or her contract with Unruly.”11
       During the proceedings below, the trial court tacitly
concluded this cause of action is based on the conversations Stage
described in her declaration. Specifically, the trial court
remarked in its ruling that “the alleged harm arises from
personal communications concerning a private business
relationship.” In particular, the court noted Stage had declared
“she told [others she believed were Unruly clients] she personally
felt unhappy and uncomfortable as a client of Unruly, and
wanted to end her contract, but did not urge anyone else to
terminate their contracts.” Furthermore, the court analyzed
whether the conversations Stage described in her declaration
were protected under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4), an
analysis that would have been unnecessary if Unruly’s fifth cause
of action were not predicated on those conversations. (See Bonni,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009.) We presume the court correctly
found that Unruly’s intentional interference claim arises from the
speech identified in Stage’s declaration. (See Association for
Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023) 94
Cal.App.5th 764, 803 [“ ‘[T]he general rule [is] that trial court
rulings are presumed correct.’ ”].)
       Unruly apparently suggests that its fifth cross-claim for
intentional interference with contractual relations is instead
based on some other unspecified alleged misconduct. Upon

      11  Although Unruly filed objections to certain evidence
Stage had submitted in support of her motion, Unruly did not
object to the admissibility of Stage’s declaration.

                                  14
asserting that the conversations identified in Stage’s declaration
“contribute[ ] nothing to any public issue or discourse,” Unruly
states, “Thus, it is implausible for Stage to argue that the
statements she declares to have made is the conduct from which
Unruly’s claim arises from [sic].” Unruly then intimates, without
any further clarification or supporting analysis, that this cause of
action does not “arise from” the events described in Stage’s
declaration because those discussions “merely provide[ ]
evidentiary support or context for the claim,” “[a] claim does not
‘arise from’ protected activity simply because it was filed after, or
because of, protected activity,” and “th[is alleged] protected
activity [does not] ‘supply elements of the challenged claim.’ ”
       “ ‘ “Although it is the appellant’s task to show error, there
is a corresponding obligation on the part of the respondent to aid
the appellate court in sustaining the judgment.” ’ ” (In re D.N.
(2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 741, 767 (D.N.).) Unruly thus has an
obligation to demonstrate that its fifth cause of action is not
based on the conversations Stage referenced in her declaration.
Had Unruly discharged that burden, we potentially would have
had to consider whether only part of Unruly’s cross-claim should
have been stricken. (See Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 1010–
1012 [“[C]ourts should analyze each claim for relief—each act or
set of acts supplying a basis for relief, of which there may be
several in a single pleaded cause of action—to determine whether
the acts are protected . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [T]o the extent any acts
are unprotected, the claims based on those acts will survive.”].)
Because Unruly fails to argue cogently that this cause of action
arises from any other alleged misconduct perpetrated by Stage,
we need not consider this contention further. (See D.N., at p. 767
[holding that a respondent waived an appellate argument by

                                       15
failing to clearly raise that point in its briefing]; cf. Neville v.
Chudacoff (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1259–1261 & fn. 4
(Neville) [analyzing whether a letter constituted protected
activity, even though the cross-complaint did not reference the
correspondence, because the cross-complainant did “not dispute
that his claims against [the cross-defendant] ar[ose] entirely from
the Letter”].)

      3.    Stage’s conversations with other models and
            influencers satisfy section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2)’s
            definition of protected activity
       Section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) provides that an “ ‘act in
furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the
United States or California Constitution in connection with a
public issue’ includes: . . . any written or oral statement or
writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or
review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other
official proceeding authorized by law . . . .” (§ 425.16,
subd. (e)(2).)
       “[A] statement is ‘in connection with’ litigation under
section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) if it relates to the substantive
issues in the litigation and is directed to persons having some
interest in the litigation.” (Neville, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1266.) Furthermore, “[a]lthough one could read the language
of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) to allude to pending litigation
by referring to ‘an issue under consideration or review by a . . .
judicial body,’ our Supreme Court has said, ‘ “[j]ust as
communications preparatory to or in anticipation of the bringing
of an action or other official proceeding are within the protection
of the litigation privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b)
[citation], . . . such statements are equally entitled to the benefits

                                    16
of section 425.16.” ’ [Citations.] This position reflects that ‘courts
have adopted “a fairly expansive view of what constitutes
litigation-related activities within the scope of section 425.16.”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.] Accordingly, although litigation may not
have commenced, if a statement ‘concern[s] the subject of the
dispute’ and is made ‘in anticipation of litigation “contemplated
in good faith and under serious consideration” ’ [citation] then the
statement may be petitioning activity protected by
section 425.16.” (Neville, at p. 1268.)
         As we noted in Discussion, part A.2, ante, Stage attested
that “[i]n the past several years” predating her March 23, 2022
declaration, she “communicated with other models and
influencers that [she] believe[d] worked at one point with
Unruly. . . . to gauge whether these models and influencers . . .
could testify in [her] support.” Stage further attested that “[i]n
certain of those conversations, . . . [she] explained that . . . Unruly
made [her] feel uncomfortable, . . . Unruly would not release [her]
from [her] contract,” and she “was involved in a lawsuit against
Unruly.”
        Although Unruly intimates in its briefing that Stage’s
declaration testimony is not credible, Unruly does not contest
Stage’s claim that she spoke with these models and influencers to
determine whether they could offer testimony in support of her
lawsuit, nor does Unruly direct us to any contrary evidence on
this point. (See also D.N., supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 767 [noting
that the respondent has a duty to “ ‘ “ ‘assist the [appellate] court’
” ’ ” in “ ‘ “sustaining the judgment” ’ ”].) Instead, Unruly argues
that because Stage “admit[ted]” in her declaration that she spoke
with “Unruly’s other clients to determine whether they ‘could
testify in [her] support[,]’ ” Stage’s conduct did not “further the

                                     17
public conversation of an issue of public interest,” meaning it is
not protected by section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4).12
       We further observe that Stage’s declaration is consistent
with the legal theories asserted in her complaint. Recall Stage
declared that she communicated with these other models and
influencers to determine whether they “had experiences with
Unruly that were similar to [hers] . . . .” Regarding Stage’s
experiences with Unruly, she alleged in her complaint that
Unruly “pressure[d] [her] to post sexually explicit content”
“despite her repeated and unambiguous instructions otherwise,”
Unruly “displayed clear favoritism towards the women who were
willing to pose nude and produce more sexual content,” and
“Unruly . . . captioned photos of [Stage] with sexually explicit
language that insinuated that [she] would send nude private
messages to customers and engage in sexual acts with them . . . .”
(Boldface & capitalization omitted from the first quotation.)
Stage also averred that Unruly’s “conduct constitutes a
continuing and ongoing unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent activity
prohibited by the Unfair Competition Law” that “justifies the
issuance of an injunction, restitution, and other equitable
relief pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 17203.”
(Italics added.) In connection with her intentional and negligent
misrepresentation causes of action, Stage claimed that although
Unruly “represented to [her] that [it] would protect her interests,”
Unruly “sought only to exploit [Stage] for maximum commercial

      12  We observe that Unruly’s argument has no bearing on
whether section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) applies. (See Vergos v.
McNeal (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1395 [“Subdivision (e)(1)
and (2) of section 425.16 does not require the defendant to show a
public issue or issue of public interest.”].)

                                   18
gain by forcing her to post sexually explicit content, as [Unruly]
had done with other women.” (Italics added.) Thus, it appears
that Stage had spoken with individuals who were potential
witnesses vis-à-vis her intentional misrepresentation, negligent
misrepresentation, and unfair competition law causes of action.13
      Under these circumstances, we conclude that Stage had
conversations with models and influencers concerning the subject
of her dispute with Unruly and in anticipation of litigation that
she seriously considered and contemplated in good faith.
Accordingly, Unruly’s fifth cross-claim arises from activity
protected by section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2).14 (See Neville,
supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1268; cf. id. at pp. 1258–1262, 1267–
1270 [holding that subd. (e)(2) applied to a letter drafted by a
lawyer on behalf of his client that: (1) contained the client’s
allegations against the client’s former employee and (2) was sent
to potential witnesses prior to the commencement of the client’s
lawsuit against the former employee].)

      13  We express no opinion as to the merits of Stage’s causes
of action against Unruly.
      14  In Stage’s opening brief, she suggests that some of the
conversations at issue occurred “after the filing of her
lawsuit . . . .” Her declaration does not clarify, however, whether
she spoke to any of the models or influencers in the month
between her filing of the complaint and the date she executed her
declaration. In any event, such conversations would likewise fall
within the scope of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2). (See
Neville, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1270 [observing that
subd. (e)(2) “has been held to protect statements . . . made ‘in
connection with’ pending or anticipated litigation,” italics
added].)

                                   19
B.    Unruly Fails To Demonstrate That Section 425.17,
      Subdivision (c)’s Commercial Speech Exemption
      Applies
       “The Legislature enacted section 425.17 in response to a
‘disturbing abuse’ of section 425.16. [Citation.] Subdivision (c) of
section 425.17 ‘enumerate[s] circumstances where the special
motion to strike screening mechanism is unavailable.’
[Citation.]” (Demetriades v. Yelp, Inc. (2014)
228 Cal.App.4th 294, 308 (Demetriades).)
       Section 425.17, subdivision (c) provides in pertinent part:
“Section 425.16 does not apply to any cause of action brought
against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or
leasing goods or services . . . arising from any statement or
conduct by that person if both of the following conditions exist:
[¶] (1) The statement or conduct consists of representations of
fact about that person’s or a business competitor’s business
operations, goods, or services, that is made for the purpose of
obtaining approval for, promoting, or securing sales or leases of,
or commercial transactions in, the person’s goods or services, or
the statement or conduct was made in the course of delivering the
person’s goods or services. [¶] (2) The intended audience is an
actual or potential buyer or customer, or a person likely to repeat
the statement to, or otherwise influence, an actual or potential
buyer or customer . . . .” (§ 425.17, subd. (c).)
       Courts refer to section 425.17, subdivision (c) as “the
commercial speech exemption to the anti-SLAPP statute . . . .”
(See, e.g., Demetriades, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 298, fn.
omitted.) “Under the two-pronged test of section 425.16, whether
a section 425.17 exemption applies is a first prong
determination.” (Demetriades, at p. 308.) “The burden of proof as

                                   20
to the applicability of section 425.17’s commercial speech
exemption falls on the party seeking the benefit of it . . . .
[Citation.] As a statutory exception to section 425.16,
section 425.17 must be narrowly construed.” (Neurelis, Inc. v.
Aquestive Therapeutics, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 769, 786.)
       Unruly argues that “Stage’s statement[s] ‘regarding
Unruly’s business practices’ [are] unprotected commercial speech”
for the purpose of section 425.17, subdivision (c). (Boldface,
underscoring, & some capitalization omitted.) In particular,
Unruly asserts Stage “spoke with other clients of Unruly in
relation to [Unruly’s] business service . . . .” Unruly further
alleges that Stage has “creat[ed] her own website that hosts
content similar to that of [her OnlyFans account].” It appears
Unruly also claims that “[o]n or around the same time that
Stage” decided to no longer work with Unruly, “so did [a] friend”
of hers who was an Unruly client. Unruly maintains that
although it “has not had the benefit of engaging in discovery to
determine whether any model from Unruly has also been posted
on Stage’s website, there is, at least[,] a reasonable suspicion that
one or more may.”
       Although Unruly’s argument regarding the commercial
speech exemption is not altogether clear, Unruly seems to be
arguing that it is a “business competitor” of Stage, given that
Unruly complains that Stage made statements to Unruly’s clients
concerning Unruly’s business practices, and not statements
regarding her own business enterprise. (See also Rivera v. First
DataBank, Inc. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 709, 717–718 [noting that
an essential element of the commercial speech exemption is that
“ ‘the cause of action arises from a statement or conduct by [a]
person consisting of representations of fact about that person’s or

                                    21
a business competitor’s business operations, goods, or services[,]’ ”
italics added].) Yet, Unruly supports this theory with only its
belief that Stage “may” compete with Unruly by posting its
former clients’ content on her website. Because Unruly has not
supported its invocation of the commercial speech exemption with
evidence demonstrating that Stage and Unruly are business
competitors, Unruly is not entitled to the benefit of that
exemption. (See id. at p. 718 [holding that evidence must be
presented to support a claim that the exemption applies, and that
“a mere allegation does not suffice”].)
       Further, we do not consider Unruly’s assertion on appeal
that it lacked the opportunity to conduct discovery relevant to the
commercial speech exemption. Although section 425.16,
subdivision (g) provides that “[a]ll discovery proceedings in the
action shall be stayed upon the filing of a notice of motion” under
the anti-SLAPP statute, it further provides that “[t]he court, on
noticed motion and for good cause shown, may order that
specified discovery be conducted notwithstanding this
subdivision.” (See § 425.16, subd. (g).) If Unruly believed it
needed discovery concerning the potential applicability of
section 425.17, subdivision (c), Unruly should have asked the
trial court for permission to take such discovery. Because Unruly
does not claim it ever made that request, Unruly cannot now
complain of its inability to do so. (Burke, Cal. Practice Guide:
Anti-SLAPP Litigation (The Rutter Group 2022) § 2:63 [“If a
plaintiff believes that he or she needs discovery to oppose an anti-
SLAPP motion, Civ. Proc. Code 425.16, subd.(g), expressly
requires the filing of a noticed motion. [Citations.] The plaintiff
may not simply oppose the anti-SLAPP motion by insisting that
discovery is needed.”].)

                                    22
C.    Unruly Cannot Establish a Probability of Prevailing
      on Its Fifth Cross-Claim
       We now turn to whether there is a probability of Unruly
prevailing on its intentional interference with contractual
relations cross-claim. (Litinsky, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 979–980; § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) “To defeat an anti-SLAPP
motion” at this stage, Unruly “must overcome any substantive
defenses that exist.” (See Trinity Risk Management, LLC v.
Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th
995, 1006.) “Civil Code section 47 provides, in relevant part: ‘A
privileged publication or broadcast is one made: [¶] . . . [¶] . . . In
any . . . judicial proceeding, [and/or] in any other official
proceeding authorized by law . . . .’ ” (Trinity Risk Management,
LLC, at p. 1006, quoting Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b).)
       “Th[is] privilege has ‘an expansive reach’ [citation] and
applies to claims such as interference with contractual relations
[citation], interference with prospective economic relations
[citation], and fraud [citation]. It attaches well before the parties
enter the courtroom, covering ‘ “preliminary conversations and
interviews” related to contemplated action’ and other ‘ “steps
taken prior” to judicial proceedings.’ [Citation.] [¶] The
litigation privilege bars liability for ‘any communication (1) made
in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other
participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the
litigation; and (4) that ha[s] some connection or logical relation to
the action.’ [Citation.] . . . Whether the privilege shields [a
party’s] actions is a question of law subject to our independent
review. [Citation.] ‘Any doubt about whether the privilege
applies is resolved in favor of applying it.’ [Citation.]” (Bowen,
supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.)

                                     23
       Although the trial court did not reach the second step of the
anti-SLAPP analysis, “[w]e have the authority to decide the issue
ourselves” and we choose to do so. (See Santa Clara Waste Water
Co. v. County of Ventura Environmental Health Division (2017)
17 Cal.App.5th 1082, 1090–1091.) Even though Stage asserted
the litigation privilege in her opening brief, Unruly did not
respond to that contention in its appellate brief, let alone claim
that it would be prejudiced if we addressed the issue in the first
instance. Accordingly, we now address that issue.
       All four elements of the litigation privilege apply to Stage’s
statements. As we explained in Discussion, part A.3, ante, Stage
communicated with persons she believed had been Unruly models
and influencers to determine whether they could offer testimony
supporting her suit against Unruly. Put differently, Unruly’s
cross-claim seeks to impose liability on Stage for her
“ ‘ “preliminary conversations and interviews” related to
contemplated action’ . . . . [Citation.]” (See Bowen, supra,
80 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) Consequently, Stage is “ ‘absolutely
immune from tort liability [in accordance with] the [litigation]
privilege’ set forth in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b).” (See
Bowen, at p. 165, first bracketed insertion added; see also Bonni
v. St. Joseph Health System (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 288, 301
[observing that “[t]here is some overlap between the litigation
privilege and the anti-SLAPP statute”].)

D.    Stage Abandoned Her Appeal of the Denial of Her
      Motion To Strike Unruly’s First and Second Cross-
      Claims
      In addition to Unruly’s fifth cross-claim, Stage moved to
strike Unruly’s first cross-claim for breach of contract and its
second for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair

                                    24
dealing. In her appellate briefing, Stage does not argue the trial
court erred in denying her motion as to Unruly’s first and second
cross-claims. Accordingly, Stage has abandoned her appeal as to
the trial court’s denial of her anti-SLAPP challenge to these
cross-claims. (See Reyes v. Kosha (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 451, 466,
fn. 6 [“[Our review] is limited to issues which have been
adequately raised and supported in [an appellant’s] brief.
[Citations.] Issues not raised in an appellant’s brief are deemed
waived or abandoned.”].)

                         DISPOSITION
       We reverse the trial court’s April 19, 2022 order insofar as
the trial court denied appellant Sarah Stage’s special motion to
strike respondent Unruly Agency, LLC’s (Unruly’s) fifth cross-
claim. We affirm the trial court’s order to the extent the court
denied Stage’s motion to strike Unruly’s first and second cross-
claims. The matter is remanded to the trial court with
instructions to (1) enter a new order granting Stage’s motion to
strike Unruly’s fifth cross-claim, and (2) conduct further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. The parties shall bear
their own costs on appeal.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                           BENDIX, J.

We concur:

      ROTHSCHILD, P. J.                    CHANEY, J.

                                    25