Court Opinion

ID: 9660402
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:12:35.782906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:19.196189
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.
¶ 37. {dissenting). This case is not a close call. Despite that, the majority accedes to the discretionary call of the circuit court. They do this without benefit of review of the single most determinative factor in Judge Perlich's decision: his conversation with Dr. Krummel regarding the medical records of the alleged victim. The judge, in refusing to turn over the records to the defendant, relied heavily on his conversation with Dr. Krummel. Unfortunately, we are unable to review that conversation and what it revealed. We are forced to depend on the judge's memory of that conversation. It was not recorded.
¶ 38. The significance of Dr. Krummel's statements was profound. I conclude that Judge Perlich's failure to record his conversation with Dr. Krummel was plain error. See State v. Sonnenberg, 117 Wis. 2d *393159, 177, 344 N.W.2d 159 (1984). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 39. After an in camera review of E.H.'s records, Judge Perlich concluded that he was not competent to make a determination of materiality. He advised the parties that he would like to discuss E.H.'s records with Dr. Krummel, commenting that he would make a record of "some sort" of the conversation. The parties agreed. Defense counsel submitted a list of questions for Judge Perlich to ask Dr. Krummel.
¶ 40. After his conversation with Dr. Krummel, Judge Perlich summarized the conversation for the parties and concluded that the information in E.H.'s records was not relevant. The only thing available for appellate review is Judge Perlich's summary of that conversation.
¶ 41. Judges are human, therefore fallible. Although we have the utmost respect for Judge Perlich and other circuit court judges, it is incumbent upon us to recognize the fallibility of human memory. Just last month, in State v. Ramos, 211 Wis. 2d 12, 564 N.W.2d 328 (1997), this court reviewed a record that revealed that a judge erred in recalling the words of a juror. During voir dire, the prospective juror had stated that she did not think she could be fair to the defendant. Moments later, the judge concluded that she had stated that she could be fair. We reviewed the record. The judge erred. The error would not have been revealed nor corrected without benefit of a recorded transcript.
¶ 42. Ramos was a relatively simple case. The case before us today is much more complex. Solberg claims that E.H.'s psychological and medical records will reveal that she has an impaired ability to perceive and relate the truth. R.60:2. He also claims that E.H. *394has a history of reporting sexual abuse by men with whom she has had a consensual sexual relationship.
¶ 43. In determining whether E.H.'s medical and psychological records had any independent probative value, Judge Perlich was called upon to review and analyze pages and pages of medical and psychological notes and reports. He then questioned Dr. Krummel about the records, asking his own questions, and questions submitted by the defense. Finally, he summarized this conversation for the parties:
First of all, counsel, I did have a conversation with the doctor. I'd like to put on the record what we discussed.
I did ask him all of the questions that [defense counsel] had asked me to ask in her November 19th letter. I'll try and summarize this as succinctly as possible what was discussed.
In essence, she was experiencing a flashback, which means that a person is re-experiencing a past event.
At times she would report a past sexual assault of a particular person — or by a particular person, and she reported that particular person. There was no triggering event, although he did indicate that it's possible that sexual contact could trigger a flashback. It's speculative, but not out of the realm of possibility.
The part that I found most important was Question Number 8, that is, How would this affect the patient's perception of reality? And in the doctor's opinion, she would know reality at all times. She would be able to identify the flashback, identify that it was a flashback, and recognized it as such. During that time she would perceive reality at all times. She would be kind of anxious and upset and would *395curl up into a ball and would report that she was having a flashback. She would be given support and perhaps medication, and it would pass in a short time, perhaps half an hour.
As to Question Number 10 and 11, he couldn't say, that is, Is it possible that the patient believed that she said no out loud and really didn't? No opinions regarding some of the other questions, speculative at best.
Number 16, it's possible that a person might not know that she was experiencing a flashback. Another person, a third person, might not know that she was experiencing a flashback, but she would know.
So, as I see it, she knew full well when she was having a flashback. She was able to tell reality from the flashback.
I don't see anything, with that explanation, in. her prior medical records that in any way helps or assists the defense.. . .1 see nothing that requires disclosure.
R.64:2-5. This summary of Dr. Krummel's explanation of E.H.'s condition, at the very least, fails to explain evidence in the alleged victim's medical records that E.H. did not always perceive reality.
¶ 44. Notes from her counselor reveal a very troubled past, some of it coterminous with her relationship with the defendant. The sealed medical records reveal serious mental health issues including the "flashback" information that had been revealed to the defense before the trial. While I do not wish to disclose, in the context of this opinion, the contents of those records, they point to mental health problems, including disassociation from reality, that very well may have been required to be disclosed to the defense under Shif-*396fra, depending on the specific answers of the doctor during his private interview with the judge. Much seems irreconcilable with what the judge related regarding his conversation with Dr. Krummel.
¶ 45. Dr. Krummel's explanation of the medical records is of great importance to this case. E.H. is the sole complaining witness. Solberg does not deny having anal intercourse with her on the date in question; his only defense against her accusation is consent. Essentially, this is a case of "he said/she said"; Solberg claims that E.H. consented, and E.H. claims that she did not consent. Yet, the sealed record reveals that E.H. has experienced whole tracts of time without connection to reality, and that she has experienced auditory flashbacks to episodes of sexual abuse. Without some explanation on the record from Dr. Krummel, it is exceedingly difficult to conclude other than that the flashbacks and "lost time" episodes are relevant and material, and that the circuit court erred in denying Solberg access to them.
¶ 46. Adequate review of this record compels a review of that conversation in its entirety, not a judge's recollection of it. We need a transcript. There is none. We have none to review.
¶ 47. I would hold that in this case, given the profound significance of that conversation, it was plain error to fail to have it recorded.
¶ 48. We cannot do justice to this case without it. A serious miscarriage of justice might be present here, and as a court we have no way of determining that without a complete record. I dissent.