Court Opinion

ID: 9680435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:31:49.082192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:28.532156
License: Public Domain

ASA M. ROUSE, Special Justice,
dissenting.
Movant’s counsel was right on target when he said that the center of this entire case is the factual issue of whether the Defendant, Thompson, or the victim, Car-man, was the aggressor in the fight.
*82The legal issue presented on this appeal is whether or not a person accused of homicide may, in support of his defense of self-protection, introduce evidence of the victim’s prior convictions for violent crimes when the accused was unaware of the victim’s reputation for violence at the time the accused acted in self-defense.
Thompson cannot introduce evidence that Carman was the aggressor by proof of Car-man’s reputation, however frightful that reputation may have been. Thompson did not know of Carman’s reputation when he shot Carman in self-defense. The law of evidence, clearly stated in Amos v. Commonwealth, Ky., 516 S.W.2d 836 (1974), is that, if Thompson had no prior knowledge of Carman’s reputation, then evidence of that reputation is irrelevant and inadmissible. (This evidentiary rule implausibly ignores the relevance of the reputation evidence on the factual issue of aggressor identity, but addressing that will have to wait for another day.)
The Commonwealth cites Parrish v. Commonwealth, Ky., 581 S.W.2d 560 (1979), but that case furnishes no precedent on the legal issue raised on this appeal because Thompson, unlike the defendant in the Parrish case, had no awareness of the victim’s reputation.
The jury, in this, the Thompson case, had the task of determining the identity of the aggressor. As in accomplishing any other task, at law or otherwise, the right tool is helpful, often essential.
Why not let the jury use a sensible tool (useful evidence) to help it decide the factual question? For example, there have been commissions composed of men of national repute to investigate criminal incidents. Such was not likely to happen in this case involving a homicide in Kentucky, of course. But if independent persons of deliberate and sound judgment were commissioned to investigate this incident and make a determination of whether or not the victim was the aggressor, they would without a doubt want, indeed need, to know if the victim had been convicted of violent crimes in the past.
Can we attribute to this trial jury in Jefferson County any less need for the sensible tool, or any less judgment of how to use it, than we attribute to my hypothetical commission? Of course not.
Other states have shown confidence in the jury’s good sense, and allowed introduction of this most useful evidence of prior convictions, as did the trial judge in this, the Thompson case.
In State v. Miranda, 176 Conn. 107, 405 A.2d 622 (Conn.1978), the defendant’s homicide conviction was set aside because the trial court improperly excluded evidence of the victim’s prior convictions which was offered to show that the victim had initiated the conflict. The Connecticut court held that, when one accused of homicide claims self-defense, he may show the victim’s character for violence by reputation testimony, by opinion testimony, or by evidence of the deceased’s convictions of crimes of violence. The reasoning of the Connecticut court was patently rational when it said, 405 A.2d at page 625 of the opinion:
“... That a homicide victim has a record of violent crime should not come as a surprise to the prosecution. Nor is introduction of the victim’s criminal record likely to confuse the jury and waste time, since the fact of the convictions is beyond dispute and inquiry must necessarily be limited to the time the events occurred and the nature of the conduct for which the victim was convicted.... Most important, such evidence can be highly relevant in helping the jury to determine whether the Defendant’s story of self-defense is truthful.” (Citations omitted). 405 A.2d at 625.
The Connecticut court, continuing its logical explanation for its holding, explained that only the victim’s specific convictions for violent crimes would be admitted into evidence and that the Defendant could not introduce any and all convictions, no matter how petty, how remote in time, or how dissimilar in nature to the facts of the alleged aggression. The Court said that the probative value of the offered evidence *83rested in the sound discretion of the trial court.
In United States v. Burks, 470 F.2d 432 (D.C.Cir., 1972), the Federal Court, in a case similar to this case, held that, where a claim of self-defense was raised, evidence of the victim’s violent character, including evidence of specific violent acts, was admissible.
In Dempsey v. State, 159 Tex.Cr.R. 602, 266 S.W.2d 875 (Tex.Cr.App., 1954), the court reversed the defendant’s homicide conviction and ordered that, upon re-trial, the defendant be permitted to introduce evidence of the victim’s convictions for fighting, aggravated assault and disturbing the peace.
In thinking of “cluttered” trials, eminent domain cases almost automatically come to mind. They are notorious for their collateral issues, prolongment and confusion, all mostly a result of their unique evidentiary rules. Yet their juries consistently deal with it all, march through the evidentiary maze and reach rarely reversed verdicts. It should not be unexpected, therefore, that juries in homicide cases would keep in proper perspective evidence of a victim’s prior convictions. Certainly, it makes no sense at all to deprive these juries (and the defendants) of this common sense tool just because some trial clutter may result.
The trial court was correct in allowing the introduction of the evidence of Car-man’s prior convictions. Neither the Parrish case nor any other case I can find says that the Circuit Judge was wrong and all other sensible considerations compel the conclusion that he was right. This Court should so hold, should affirm the trial court and should reverse the Court of Appeals in this respect.