Court Opinion

ID: 9865594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 19:04:31.534629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:31.064285
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/25/23 Cherry v. Cherry CA1/3
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

    JIMMY CHERRY, JR. et al.,
           Plaintiffs and Respondents,
                                                                        A165369
    v.
    WINDY R. CHERRY,                                                    (San Francisco City & County
                                                                        Case No. CUD-21-668280 and
           Defendant and Appellant.
                                                                        CGC-21-594979)

         At appellant Windy Cherry’s request, the court stayed an unlawful
detainer action against appellant pending resolution of a related matter in
another proceeding. During the pendency of the stay, the court ordered
appellant to post with the court $5,000 per month, reflecting the reasonable
rental value of the property at issue in the unlawful detainer; that order is
the subject of this appeal. We affirm.
                            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Trust
         Appellant Windy Cherry1 is the daughter of Johnny J. Cherry and
Margie Cherry (Johnny J. Cherry and Margie Cherry are collectively referred
to as the Cherrys).

1    In the unlawful detainer proceeding underlying this appeal, appellant
was sued as Windy R. Bryant. In answering the complaint, she appeared as

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      On January 2, 2012, the Cherrys created The Johnny J. and Margie
Cherry Revocable Trust (the Trust). The Cherrys designated themselves the
Trust’s initial trustees, and they designated appellant the first successor
trustee upon their deaths. Appellant was also named a 50% beneficiary
following the deaths of the Cherrys; her sister, Estoria Cherry, was named
the other 50% beneficiary. The trust estate consisted of residential real
property in San Francisco (the Property) as well as three bank accounts. The
Trust gave Estoria the right to reside at the Property and the sole use of one
of the bank accounts for her lifetime.
      Appellant represents that she began residing in the Property around
December 2017 with her father’s permission.
      On May 30, 2019, Margie died.
      In April 2020, Johnny, the surviving spouse, amended the Trust.
Under the amendment, Johnny designated respondents Delphine Cherry and
Jimmy Cherry Jr. (collectively referred to as respondents) as additional co-
trustees of the Trust alongside himself. Appellant was removed as the
successor trustee upon her father’s death, and Delphine and Jimmy were
named in her place. The amendment added a gift of personal property to
Jimmy (“[g]old nugget bracelet, diamond ring, and watch”) and struck the gift
to Estoria of residing in the Property and access to a bank account for her
lifetime. In addition, under the amendment, appellant’s and Estoria’s
beneficial inheritance shares were reduced from 50% to 10% each. The
amendment split the remaining beneficial inheritance shares of the trust
estate to Johnny’s four grandchildren in equal shares.

Windy R. Cherry, noting she was erroneously sued as Windy R. Bryant. To
avoid confusion, we refer to Windy as appellant and other members of the
Cherry family by their first names. No disrespect is intended.

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      In December 2020, Johnny again significantly amended the Trust.
This amendment/restatement reflected the changes that had been made in
April 2020. But it also eliminated appellant’s reduced 10% beneficial
inheritance share in its entirety and expressly indicated that Johnny was
“making no gift or provision to [his] daughter Windy R. Bryant for reasons of
[his] own.” The amendment/restatement directed a 10% beneficial
inheritance share from the trust estate to Delphine.
      On June 6, 2021, Johnny died.
      On or around August 20, 2021, respondents, representing themselves
as successor co-trustees of the Trust and owners of the Property, served
appellant with a 30-day notice to terminate her tenancy-at-will occupancy of
the Property. Appellant did not vacate within 30 days of the notice to quit
and continued to occupy the Property. Three separate lawsuits followed.
Appellant’s Tort Case Against Respondents
      On September 9, 2021, appellant sued respondents as individuals and
as trustees, as well as her sister, for damages in Cherry v. Cherry et al., San
Francisco County Superior Court Case No. CGC-21-594979 (referred to as
appellant’s tort case). In the lawsuit, appellant alleged respondents applied
undue influence on her father to amend the Trust while his health was in
rapid decline. She asserted 15 causes of action against respondents,
including claims for intentional interference with expected inheritance,
conversion, trespass, invasion to right of privacy, breach of fiduciary duty,
and negligence.
Appellant’s Probate Case in Alameda County Superior Court
      Nearly two weeks later, on September 22, 2021, appellant filed another
suit against respondents in Alameda County Superior Court, In re Cherry
Trust, Case No. RP21113488 (referred to as the probate case). In this case,

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appellant challenged the April 2020 and December 2020 amendments to the
Trust as the product of undue influence and elder abuse, and she sought an
order declaring the amendments invalid and removing respondents as co-
trustees.
Respondents’ Unlawful Detainer Case Against Appellant
      On October 29, 2021, respondents, as the alleged owners of the
Property, filed an unlawful detainer complaint against appellant in San
Francisco County Superior Court, Cherry v. Bryant, Case No. CUD-21-668280
(referred to as the unlawful detainer case), to gain possession of the Property.
This complaint alleged that appellant’s right to occupy the Property ended
with her father’s death and that respondents had withdrawn any permission
for her to occupy the property as of August 19, 2021. Respondents requested
damages at a rate of $167 per day beginning on August 20, 2021 and ending
on the date of entry of judgment.
      On November 12, 2021, appellant answered the complaint, denying
respondents’ contentions that they owned the property and asserting she was
the proper owner as trustee of the Trust. She maintained she continued to
have the right to use and occupy the Property. Appellant admitted that she
did not pay rent to respondents but averred she had no obligation to do so.
Motion Underlying Instant Appeal
      On November 22, 2021, in the unlawful detainer case, appellant filed a
motion requesting the following: (1) an order requiring respondents to post an
undertaking; (2) a stay of the unlawful detainer case; (3) a preliminary
injunction; (4) reclassification of the unlawful detainer case; and (5)
consolidation of the unlawful detainer case with her tort case against
respondents.

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      With respect to appellant’s request for a stay of the unlawful detainer
case, she argued that “the furtherance of justice and due process principles
require[d] a stay of this summary proceeding while the complicated issues of
the parties’ rights to legal and beneficial title to the [Property] are resolved in
the civil action [appellant’s tort case] and probate action.” She added, “Once
the related cases are adjudicated, this court can then rule on the parties’
respective rights to possession based on the determinations made in the other
actions.” If the court were not inclined to stay the case, appellant requested
it issue a preliminary injunction. Respondents opposed the motion. With
respect to the stay request, they countered that appellant “should be
required to pay funds for delay of the unlawful detainer trial” under Code of
Civil Procedure section 1170.5.2 Observing that appellant was occupying the
Property as a tenant at will, they acknowledged there was no written lease
agreement for her occupancy and that she paid no rent. They further stated:
“She is depriving the trust owner of possession of the property and
beneficiaries of their rightful inheritance. The reasonable rental rate is
consistent with the value of a single-family home in San Francisco.” They
also noted “[i]t [was] reasonably probable that [they] will prevail in obtaining
possession of the property.” In her reply, appellant responded that she had
not delayed the unlawful detainer trial and respondents’ section 1170.5
request that she pay for the delay was frivolous.
       On April 4, 2022, following a hearing, the trial court granted in part
and denied in part the relief requested in the parties’ various motions. The
court denied the request for an undertaking but granted the request to
consolidate the unlawful detainer case with appellant’s tort case. Relevant to

2     All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure
unless otherwise stated.

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this appeal, the court also ordered the newly consolidated matter stayed
pending resolution of the probate case in Alameda County. The court further
ordered: “During the pendency of the stay of the [unlawful detainer case,]
moving party [appellant] shall post reasonable rental value in the amount of
$5,000 a month with the Court on the first of each month . . . . ; [appellant]
shall post $2,500 representing fair rental value for the 2 weeks of March 2022
no later than April 1, 2022.” This appeal followed. There is no transcript of
the hearing on appellant’s motion in the appellate record.
                                  DISCUSSION
I.    Applicable Law
      Our review of this appeal is governed by well settled law. “[T]he trial
court’s judgment is presumptively correct, such that error must be
affirmatively demonstrated, and where the record is silent the reviewing
court will indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment.
[Citations.] This means that an appellant must do more than assert error
and leave it to the appellate court to search the record and the law books to
test his claim.” (Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007) 154
Cal.App.4th 547, 556–557.) “Of course this also means that during trial, the
parties must ensure that an adequate record is made of errors by which they
are or may be aggrieved; ordinarily, errors not reflected in the trial record
will not, and indeed cannot, sustain a reversal on appeal.” (Id. at p. 557.)
“[T]he burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record
presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that
justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594,
608–609 (Jameson); Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574 (Ballard) [“It
is well settled, of course, that a party challenging a judgment has the burden

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of showing reversible error by an adequate record.”]; Denham v. Superior
Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
      “A proper record includes a reporter’s transcript or a settled statement
of any hearing leading to the order being challenged on appeal.” (Elena S. v.
Kroutik (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 570, 574.) “Where the appellant fails to
provide an adequate record of the challenged proceedings, we must presume
that the appealed judgment or order is correct, and on that basis, affirm.”
(Jade Fashion & Co., Inc. v. Harkham Industries, Inc. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th
635, 644; Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 609 [“ ‘Failure to provide an
adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [the
appellant].’ ”]; Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295–1296.)
      Section 1170.5 sets forth certain timelines for unlawful detainer trials
and provisions that govern when those trial dates are extended. Section
1170.5, subdivision (a) provides that after a defendant appears under section
1170, a trial of the unlawful detainer action must be held “not later than the
20th day following the date that the request to set the time of trial is made.”
(§ 1170.5, subd. (a).)
      Under section 1170.5, subdivision (b), “[t]he court may extend the
period for trial upon the agreement of all of the parties. No other extension of
the time for trial of an action under this chapter may be granted unless the
court, upon its own motion or on motion of any party, holds a hearing and
renders a decision thereon as specified in subdivision (c).” (§ 1170.5, subd.
(b).) Section 1170.5, subdivision (c) provides: “If trial is not held within the
time specified in this section, the court, upon finding that there is a
reasonable probability that the plaintiff will prevail in the action, shall
determine the amount of damages, if any, to be suffered by the plaintiff by
reason of the extension, and shall issue an order requiring the defendant to

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pay that amount into court as the rent would have otherwise become due and
payable or into an escrow designated by the court for so long as the defendant
remains in possession pending the termination of the action. [¶] The
determination of the amount of the payment shall be based on the plaintiff’s
verified statement of the contract rent for rental payment, any verified
objection thereto filed by the defendant, and the oral or demonstrative
evidence presented at the hearing. The court’s determination of the amount
of damages shall include consideration of any evidence, presented by the
parties, embracing the issue of diminution of value or any set off permitted by
law.” (§ 1170.5, subd. (c).)
II.   Findings under Section 1170.5, subdivision (c)
      As an initial matter, appellant contends that before issuing its order for
her to post $5,000 monthly as the reasonable rental value of the Property, the
trial court failed to make expressly or implicitly the finding required by
section 1170.5, namely, that there was a reasonable possibility that
respondents would prevail in the unlawful detainer case. She further argues
that the evidence she presented to the trial court established she was the one
likely to prevail in the unlawful detainer case.
      We cannot conclude the trial court erroneously failed to make the
requisite or proper findings. As noted, a party challenging a judgment has
the burden of showing reversible error by an adequate record (Ballard, supra,
41 Cal.3d at p. 574), and the party’s failure to provide an adequate record
requires the issue be resolved against the party (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.4th at
p. 609). Here, on March 17, 2022, there was an oral hearing of the proceeding
that resulted in the order appellant is challenging. However, no reporter’s
transcript from that proceeding is in the appellate record. Without a
reporter’s transcript of the hearing or an acceptable substitute, appellant

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cannot meet her burden of showing reversible error. In these circumstances,
we cannot evaluate appellant’s claim of missing findings and must indulge all
inferences to support the order being reviewed and assume the trial court
made all necessary findings to support its order. (Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1342,
1352, fn. 7.)3
       We also disagree with appellant’s contention that she established her
likelihood of prevailing in the unlawful detainer case. This argument is
premised on appellant view’s that the trial court stayed the unlawful
detainer case by way of granting her motion for a preliminary injunction,
which would have required the court to find her likely to prevail on the
merits. Again, absent a reporter’s transcript of the proceeding, we are unable
to evaluate the issue and must resolve it against appellant. Further, based
on the trial court’s written order, which is in the appellate record, it is not
apparent that the court addressed appellant’s request for a preliminary
injunction, let alone granted it. While the court’s order expressly states the
“[m]otion to stay is granted,” it makes no reference to any decision on a
separate or distinct motion for preliminary injunction.
III.   Other Prohibitions Against the Order
       Citing Medford v. Superior Court (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 236 (Medford),
disapproved on another ground in Levine v. Pollack (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th

3      Even if appellant had included the reporter’s transcript from the March
17 proceeding in the appellate record, the absence therein of any findings
regarding respondents’ probability of prevailing in the unlawful detainer case
would likely not result in reversible error. The doctrine of implied findings,
which is a “natural and logical corollary” to the principles of appellate review
set forth above, “requires the appellate court to infer the trial court made all
factual findings necessary to support the judgment.” (Fladeboe v. American
Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58.)

                                         9
129, 136–137, appellant argues that the court’s order requiring her to post
$5,000 monthly amounted to a prohibited prejudgment attachment4 barred
by section 483.010, subdivision (c).5 We disagree.
      In Medford, supra, 140 Cal.App.3d 236, the defendant in an unlawful
detainer action filed an answer, and on October 2, five days before trial
(which was set for October 7), relinquished possession of the disputed
premises. (Id. at p. 238.) When the case came on for trial, the defendant
sought and was granted a continuance to October 12 so that she could file a
cross-complaint against the landlord. (Ibid.) On its own motion, the trial
court imposed the condition that the defendant deposit $3,050 “back rent”
with the court. (Ibid.) The sum represented $950 alleged to be due for the
defendant’s July rent plus $1,050 per month rent for August and September.
(Id. at p. 238, fn. 1.) The court of appeal vacated the condition and held the
trial court abused its discretion in requiring the defendant to deposit into
court “the back rent and accrued damages alleged to be due the landlord as a
condition of filing the cross-complaint or as a condition to continuing the trial

4     According to Black’s Law Dictionary, an attachment is defined as “[t]he
seizing of a person’s property to secure a judgment or to be sold in
satisfaction of a judgment.” (Black’s Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019).) A
prejudgment attachment is “[a]n attachment ordered before a case is
decided.” (Ibid.)

5     Section 483.010 governs actions in which attachments are authorized.
Subdivision (c) states: “If the action is against a defendant who is a natural
person, an attachment may be issued only on a claim which arises out of the
conduct by the defendant of a trade, business, or profession. An attachment
may not be issued on a claim against a defendant who is a natural person if
the claim is based on the sale or lease of property, a license to use property,
the furnishing of services, or the loan of money where the property sold or
leased, or licensed for use, the services furnished, or the money loaned was
used by the defendant primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.”
(§ 483.010, subd. (c).)

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date to allow time for filing and responding to the cross-complaint.” (Id. at p.
239.) The court noted that such a requirement had the same effect as a
prejudgment attachment prohibited against residential tenants by section
483.010. (Ibid.) The court also reasoned that a requirement for back rent
and accrued damages could not be justified on the ground that it protected
the landlord from delays because the tenant had surrendered possession of
the property. (Id. at p. 240.) Nor could the payments be justified on the
ground that they protected the landlord from delays flowing from the
initiation of the unlawful detainer case to a cross-complaint, explaining that
such back rent payments bore “no rational relation to protecting the landlord
from delays incident to the filing of the cross-complaint.” (Ibid.)
      The Medford court further stated that its holding was supported by the
recently enacted section 1170.5. (Medford, supra, 140 Cal.App.3d at p. 241.)
The court found the public policy expressed in section 1170.5 instructive,
noting the provision limited “the amount that the court can require to be
deposited to prospective damages the landlord may suffer as the result of
granting a continuance of the trial date to a tenant in possession. . . . [T]his
section does not authorize the trial court to require deposit of rent or
damages as a condition of granting a continuance. This evidences that the
Legislature, as well as the California Supreme Court, deems landlords to be
sufficiently protected from litigation delays by the deposit of future damages.
Deposit of past rent or other alleged damages is neither justified nor
authorized under this latest legislative enactment.” (Medford, at p. 241,
emphasis added.)
      Medford does not aid appellant. Factually, it is distinguishable because
the payments ordered there were premised on “back rent,” whereas that is
not the case here. The trial court’s order clearly imposed on appellant the

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$5,000 per month payment obligation “during the pendency of the stay” of the
unlawful detainer case, underscoring that it was based on prospective
damages tied to the future delay of the unlawful detainer proceeding
resulting from appellant’s requested stay. Further, the court’s order aligns
with the public policy behind section 1170.5, as expressed in Medford. If it is
determined that respondents are properly co-trustees and owners of the
Property, the amount ordered by the court is limited to an amount they
would suffer in future damages from litigation delays in the unlawful
detainer case because of the stay. It is not tied to any pre-litigation loss
claimed by respondents.
      Appellant also argues that section 1170.5, requiring a tenant in
possession to “to pay that amount into court as the rent would have otherwise
become due and payable” (§ 1170.5, subd. (c)), is inapplicable because it
requires an underlying rental agreement; she also asserts fair market rent is
an impermissible substitute when no such agreement exists. Appellant
provides no relevant authority for her construction of section 1170.5. The
case she cites, Green v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, was decided
eight years before section 1170.5 was enacted and neither discusses nor bears
on the meaning of the statute. (See generally id.; § 1170.5 [added by
Stats.1982, ch. 1620, p. 6483, effective Jan 1, 1983].) In addition, section
1170.5, subdivision (c) authorizes the court to determine the amount of
payment based on contract rent for rental payment, objections thereto, and
oral or demonstrative evidence presented at the hearing. (§ 1170.5, subd. (c).)
The statute expressly allows the court to consider “any evidence, presented by
the parties, embracing the issue of diminution of value or any set off
permitted by law.” (Ibid., emphasis added.) These broad provisions indicate
that contract rent is not determinative or the sole factor in or basis for the

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prospective damages calculation, nor do they suggest a prohibition against
fair market rent considerations to the extent evidence of fair market rent is
presented to the court.
IV.   The $5,000 Reasonable Rent Value Calculation
      Finally, appellant argues that even had the court made the requisite
finding there was a reasonable probability respondents would prevail in the
action, the order requiring her to pay $5,000 monthly “would have to be
reversed . . . because the amount was not based on a ‘verified statement of
contract rent for rental payment, any verified objection thereto . . .’ or any
‘oral or demonstrative evidence presented at the hearing.’ ” Under the
authorities discussed above, without a record of what transpired at the
hearing, including what evidence or arguments may have been presented
there, we have no basis to evaluate appellant’s factual assertions or question
the trial court’s determination of the payment amount and must assume it
correct.
                                  DISPOSITION
       The order is affirmed. The parties are to bear their own costs on
appeal.

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                                        _________________________
                                        Petrou, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Tucher, P.J.

_________________________
Fujisaki, J.

A165369/Cherry et al., v. Cherry

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