Court Opinion

ID: 9845352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:19:44.627518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:02.079731
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE ADAIR:
Inasmuch as the words “dispose of” are twice used in the power of attorney in the same sentence and in the same connection, — first following the word “sell” and preceding the word “lease,” and next following the words “sell, mortgage, lease,” it is evident that the words “dispose of” and the words “sell” and “lease” are not synonymous, and the only conclusion therefrom is that the words “dispose of” must be interpreted in a broader sense. Compare In re Sattes’ Estate, 59 Mont. 220, 222, 195 Pac. 1033.
The word “dispose” has a larger meaning than “sell;” selling being only one of the methods of disposing of property. Munday v. Britton, 205 Mo. App. 153, 222 S. W. 504, 506. Compare Rider v. Cooney, 94 Mont. 295, 308, 23 Pac. (2d) 261; Hill v. Sumner, 132 U. S. 118,10 S. Ct. 42, 33 L. Ed. 284.
As said by the Supreme Court of the United States in Phelps v. Harris, 101 U. S. 370, 380, 25 L. Ed. 855: “The expression ‘to dispose of’ is very broad, and signifies more than ‘to sell
In American Home Missionary Society v. Wadhams, 10 Barb., N. Y., 597, the word “dispose” was declared to be “sufficiently comprehensive, in its meaning, to include every possible mode of alienation, or disposition of property.” Also see State ex rel. Cross v. Board of Land Commissioners, 50 Wyo. 181, 58 Pac. (2d) 423, rehearing denied 62 Pac. (2d) 516, 517.
In People v. Sidwell, 27 Cal. (2d) 121, 162 Pac. (2d) 913, 916, the defendants Sidwell and Davis delivered to one Moore a con*398tract in writing whereby they agreed to set aside for Moore, 5 per cent of all the production of a prospective oil well in consideration of a loan of $5,000 by Moore for which defendants gave their promissory note for 90 days at 6 per cent and on the completion of the well to apply for a permit to transfer such interest. In holding that by such transaction the stipulated per cent of production was “disposed of” the court said: “ ‘Dispose of’ means, among other things, ‘to fix the condition, employment, etc., of; to direct or assign for a use’ and also ‘To transfer to the control of someone else, as by selling; to alienate; part with; relinquish; bargain away.’ (Webster’s New Int. Diet., 2d ed.) It is apparent that the 5 per cent interest in production of the well was assigned to a specified use by the agreement. It was not transferred to the immediate control of Moore, but it was bargained away; i. e., for an entire consideration of $5,000 the defendants issued their promissory note and agreed that the per cent, if it was ever transferred to any one, was to be transferred to Moore. ’ ’
Rehearing denied December 12, 1950.
So in the instant ease while the clause in the agreement granting lessee the right to purchase the demised mining property did not effect an immediate transfer of the title to the lessee yet it evidences a bargain made that if, within the time and in the manner provided, the lessee should elect to pay the stipulated consideration of $4,000, the title to the mining claim would be transferred to him.
The express authority granted to Ross “to * * * sell or dispose of * * * lease * # * or otherwise transfer” the demised property clothed him with ample power to bargain away and execute the lease and option agreement which is a valid and binding contract the performance whereof may be decreed and compelled in this action. The petition for rehearing is denied and remittitur will issue forthwith.
MR. JUSTICES ANGSTMAN, METCALF and BOTTOMLY, concur.