Court Opinion

ID: 9412322
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-29 17:10:16.60357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:39.475526
License: Public Domain

NUMBER 13-22-00138-CR

                             COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                     CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                         Appellant,

                                               v.

JAMES CLICK,                                                                 Appellee.

                    On appeal from the 36th District Court
                       of San Patricio County, Texas.

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION
                  Before Justices Tijerina, Silva, and Peña
                  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Tijerina

      Appellant the State of Texas appeals the trial court’s granting of appellee James

Click’s motion to quash an indictment. By three issues, the State argues: (1) no exception

to Article 27.08 of the code of criminal procedure applies; (2) manner and means is not

an element of assault; and (3) the indictment provides notice of the offense charged and

is specific to bar future prosecutions. We reverse and remand.
                                    I.     BACKGROUND

       On October 12, 2021, Click was indicted for assault on a public servant, a third-

degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(1). The indictment reads that on or

about August 11, 2021, Click

       did then and there intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause bodily injury
       to [victim] by physical assault, and [Click] did then and there know that the
       said [victim] was then and there a public servant, to-wit: a police officer, and
       that the said [victim] was then and there lawfully discharging an official duty,
       to-wit: bailiff for County Court at Law.

On February 14, 2022, Click filed a “Motion to Quash and Exception to Substance of

Indictment,” arguing that the indictment failed to allege an essential element of the

offense, namely, the manner and means of the bodily injury.

       The trial court held a hearing on March 18, 2022. At the hearing, Click argued that

on its face, the indictment did not give him adequate notice to properly prepare for trial

because he was unable to determine what the essential elements were for the term

“physical assault.” The State countered that in an assault on a public servant case, the

State did not need to list a manner and means or alternative ways of committing an

assault. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the motion to quash, and the State

appealed. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01(a) (“The state is entitled to appeal

an order of a court in a criminal case if the order (1) dismisses an indictment, information,

or complaint or any portion of an indictment, information, or complaint . . . .”).

                     II.     STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW

       The sufficiency of the indictment presents a question of law that we review de

novo. Smith v. State, 309 S.W.3d 10, 13–14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); State v. Barbernell,

                                              2
257 S.W.3d 248, 251–52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We will uphold the trial court’s ruling on

a motion to quash if it is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. See State

v. Rhinehart, 333 S.W.3d 154, 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (applying ordinary rules of

procedural default to a State’s appeal of a trial court’s order quashing the indictment).

       A defendant has the right to fair notice of the specific charged offense. See U.S.

CONST. amend. VI; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10; TEX. CONST. art. V, § 12b; Lawrence v. State,

240 S.W.3d 912, 916 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “The charging instrument must convey

sufficient notice to allow the accused to prepare a defense.” Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d

394, 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). “The offense must be set forth in plain and intelligible

words.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.02(7). Article 21.03 provides that “[e]verything

should be stated in an indictment which is necessary to be proved.” Id. art. 21.03. “The

certainty required in an indictment is such as will enable the accused to plead the

judgment that may be given upon it in bar of any prosecution for the same offense.” Id.

art. 21.04.

       An indictment is sufficient if it

       charges the commission of the offense in ordinary and concise language in
       such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know
       what is meant, and with that degree of certainty that will give the defendant
       notice of the particular offense with which he is charged, and enable the
       court, on conviction, to pronounce the proper judgment.

Id. art. 21.11. “[I]n most cases a charging instrument that tracks the statutory text of an

offense is sufficient to provide a defendant with adequate notice,” but “in some cases, a

charging instrument that tracks the statutory language may be insufficient to provide a

defendant with adequate notice.” State v. Zuniga, 512 S.W.3d 902, 907 (Tex. Crim. App.

                                             3
2017). “For example, a statute which uses an undefined term of indeterminate or variable

meaning requires more specific pleading in order to notify the defendant of the nature of

the charges against him.” Id. A reviewing court first identifies the elements of the offense.

Id. Then, it considers “whether the statutory language is sufficiently descriptive of the

charged offense.” Id.

       Article 27.08 provides that there is no exception to an indictment unless: (1) it does

not appear that an offense was committed by the defendant; (2) it appears from the face

that prosecution is barred by a lapse of time or after the indictment was sought; (3) it

contains a legal defense; and (4) the court has no jurisdiction. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

ANN. art. 27.08.

                                    III.    DISCUSSION

       The State argues that the trial court erred in granting Click’s motion to quash

because: (1) the indictment did not violate Article 27.08 of the code of criminal procedure;

(2) manner and means is not an essential element of assault; and (3) the indictment

provides notice of the offense and is specific enough to bar future prosecutions.

       “The Texas Legislature has defined the crime of assault in Section 22.01 of the

[Texas] Penal Code.” Landrain v. State, 268 S.W.3d 532, 536 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

Subsection (a) of that provision sets out a distinct assault that is relevant to the present

discussion: A person commits an offense if the person “intentionally, knowingly, or

recklessly causes bodily injury to another.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1). “‘[B]odily

injury’ assault is a result-oriented assaultive offense.” Landrian, 268 S.W.3d at 536.

Section 22.01(b)(1) of the penal code then defines the crime of assault on a public

                                             4
servant: the person (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly (2) causes bodily injury to

public servant; (3) while the public servant was lawfully discharging an official duty. TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a), (b)(1).

A.     Article 27.08

       The trial court found that an exception to the indictment under Article 27.08

warranted the quashing of the indictment, namely, the indictment lacked specificity

because there was no manner and means of the bodily injury. However, Article 27.08

contains no such requirements. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 27.08. An exception

exists only if it does not appear that an offense was committed by the defendant; it

appears from the face that prosecution is barred by a lapse of time or after the indictment

was sought; it contains a legal defense; or the court has no jurisdiction. See id.

       On its face, the indictment here alleged that Click “intentionally, knowingly, or

recklessly” caused “bodily injury” when the victim “was a public servant” that was “lawfully

discharging his duties as a public servant.” Thus, it apprised Click that he allegedly

committed the crime of assault on a public servant as it alleged each essential element

of assault of a public servant. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(1). Next, on its face,

it does not appear that the prosecution is barred by a lapse of time or contain a legal

defense or that the court lacks jurisdiction. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 27.08.

Therefore, no exception to Article 27.08 applies. See id. Moreover, in Click’s motion to

quash, at the motion to quash hearing, and on appeal, Click did not argue that any

exception under Article 27.08 existed. 1 Therefore, the trial court’s finding that the

       1 Instead, Click states it was his “mistake in not rewording the Court[’]s Order after the hearing on

                                                    5
indictment violated Article 27.08 was erroneous. See id.

B.     “Manner and Means”

       Next, the trial court found that the indictment failed to allege an essential element

of the offense, “namely manner and means of the bodily injury.” However, the Court of

Criminal Appeals has rejected the argument that an indictment for committing an assault

requires a manner and means: “The gravamen of this result-oriented offense is causing

bodily injury,” and “[t]he precise act or nature of conduct in this result-oriented offense is

inconsequential.” Landrain, 268 S.W.3d at 537 (internal quotations omitted). Instead,

“[w]hat matters is that the conduct (whatever it may be) is done with the required

culpability to effect the result the Legislature has specified.” Id. Thus, exactly how the

assault was committed has no bearing on the essential elements of the crime, as the jury

need not “unanimously find that [Click] committed that crime in one specific way or even

with one specific act.” Id. at 535.

       Similarly, in Stukes, the trial court quashed the defendant’s indictment for

continuous family violence for the lack of a manner and means. State v. Stukes, 490

S.W.3d 571, 573 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). The court of appeals

held that “an indictment for assault causing bodily injury . . . need not allege the manner

and means of the assault because the statute does not define the manner or means of

commission in alternative ways.” Id. at 576. Therefore, the trial court erred by requiring

that the indictment allege a manner and means. Id. at 577.

March 18, 2022.”

                                              6
C.     Notice and Specificity

       Next, without reference to any legal authority, the trial court found that the

indictment did not contain elements of the offense charged, failed to fully inform Click of

the charge against him, and failed to enable him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar

of future prosecutions for the same offense. As previously stated, the elements for assault

on a public servant are (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly (2) causes bodily injury

to public servant (3) while the public servant was lawfully discharging an official duty. TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(1). “[A] statute which uses an undefined term of

indeterminate or variable meaning requires more specific pleading in order to notify the

defendant of the nature of the charges against him.” Zuniga, 512 S.W.3d at 907. But here,

the statute does not contain an undefined term. “Bodily injury” is defined as “physical pain,

illness, or any impairment of physical condition,” and the term “public servant” is also

defined in the statute. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(8), (41). Accordingly, we find the

indictment here contains the elements of the offense charged as set out in the statute,

informs Click of the charge against him, namely assault on a public servant, and enables

him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions from the charge of

assault on a public servant. See United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102, 108

(2007); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.11.

       Nevertheless, the Stukes court held that “[e]ven if the language of an indictment

does not provide notice that is constitutionally sufficient to allow the defendant to prepare

a defense, no harm is shown if the defendant receives notice of the State’s theory by

other means.” Id. at 576–577. Here, Click asserted that he had been provided and

                                              7
reviewed various affidavits “describ[ing] the bodily injury by physical assault.” Thus, even

assuming that the language in the indictment did not provide him with sufficient notice,

Click received notice of the State’s theory by other means, and therefore, he is not

harmed. See id. Accordingly, we sustain all three of the State’s issues.

                                   IV.     CONCLUSION

       We reverse the trial court’s order and remand for proceedings consistent with this

memorandum opinion.

                                                                      JAIME TIJERINA
                                                                      Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the
27th day of July, 2023.

                                             8