Court Opinion

ID: 9583788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:42:06.020798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:11.775767
License: Public Domain

CARTER, Justice
(dissenting).
There is no doubt that this appeal has been taken from an interlocutory ruling of the district court. It is probably also true that this, court would not have granted an application to appeal in advance of final judgment under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 2(a) had that been requested at the time the decision was filed. Nevertheless, I be*601lieve that in the interest of an expeditious disposition of this important child custody case the court should decide this appeal on the merits. Consequently, I would grant permission to appeal at this time under rule 1(d).
In Banco Mortgage Co. v. Steil, 351 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1984), we considered a problem concerning whether our application of rule 1(d) has produced more appeals from interlocutory orders than would have been granted had permission to appeal been sought by the appellant at the outset. We stated in this regard:
Although dismissal of an appeal at this stage is, arguably, economic waste, permitting the appeal to continue adds to the problem of piecemeal litigation and multiple appeals which the finality requirement is designed to prevent.
Banco Mortgage Co., 351 N.W.2d at 786-87. In the present case, however, much more than economic waste is at stake as a result of dismissing the appeal. A decision to dismiss the appeal adversely impacts on the best interests of the children.
Our cases have consistently recognized the principle that the custodial status of children should be fixed as soon as possible after a marriage has been dissolved. Schoonover v. Schoonover, 228 N.W.2d 31, 34 (Iowa 1975); Stouwie v. Stouwie, 222 N.W.2d 435, 438 (Iowa 1974); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 216 N.W.2d 312, 314 (Iowa 1974); Halstead v. Halstead, 259 Iowa 526, 531-33, 144 N.W.2d 861, 863 (1966).
This appeal has been fully briefed and argued and has been submitted to this court for decision. In the process of doing this, several months have passed since the marriage was dissolved. The act of dismissing the appeal at this time will cause a further and inordinate period of delay in settling the child custody issue. That is sufficient reason for exercising our authority under rule 1(d) to hear the appeal on the merits.
NEUMAN and SNELL, JJ., join this dissent.