Court Opinion

ID: 9491659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:19:47.19718+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:52.029506
License: Public Domain

BEEZER, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the opinion of the court affirming convictions on counts 1 through 3 and reversing on count 4.
I respectfully dissent from the court’s opinion which sets aside the jury’s verdict on count 6. I would hold that $43,070 is subject to criminal forfeiture pursuant tó 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1).1 Because Garcia failed to raise the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the forfeiture count before the district court, we review for plain error. “ ‘Plain’ is synonymous with ‘clear’ or, equivalently, .‘obvious.’ ” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). There was no plain error here.
The jury’s determination that the seized $43,070 in cash was subject to forfeiture cannot be said to be plainly erroneous in light of the circumstances under which that cash was found. The location of the cash indicated that it was drag proceeds: the cash was recovered from a brown paper bag in- a storage locker. Garcia rented that locker under a false name, presumably to deceive law enforcement agents and to prevent them from tracing the locker and its contents to him. The bundling of the cash also indicates the cash' was drug proceeds. There were ap*526proximately ten bundles of bills, which were folded in half and wrapped with rubber bands. This manner of folding and wrapping of cash is consistent with the sale of drugs. Indeed, among the $43,070 was $4,300 in prerecorded cash from the June 8 and June 19 methamphetamine transactions. In addition, the fact Garcia had a bank account that he used for his personal financial. dealings indicates that the cash kept in the locker was drug proceeds. Moreover, marijuana packaged for sale was recovered from Garcia's storage locker, and Garcia admitted he sold marijuana.
The search of Garcia’s residence led to the recovery of several items indicating that the cash was the proceeds of the conspiracy. Officers executing the search warrant found a pager (which Garcia admitted was used to contact him in connection with his sales of marijuana), a firearm, keys to the storage locker and a “pay-owe” sheet. The pay-owe sheet was described by a special agent as “[a] white piece of paper with handwritten notations, with the name ‘Dan’ on one side and ‘Isra,’ I-s-r-a, on the other side.” Under both names, there were “various numerals or amounts written,” and other numbers were added to or subtracted from them. The special agent testified that he was familiar with the name of an individual whose name was similar to “Isra,” ie., codefendant Israel Cruz. The special agent also said he was familiar with a person investigated in connection with this case whose first name was “Dan” or “Daniel,” ie., Daniel Leal. The special agent said this paper was consistent with pay-owe sheets. Garcia himself admitted that the pay-owe sheet reflected drug sales to Dan Leal and Israel Cruz.
Although Garcia claimed that the cash was the product of legitimate activities and belonged to family members whose trailer he had sold, the fact Garcia had no documentation corroborating the sources of the cash or the sale of a trailer reflects the implausibility of his explanation. In addition, Garcia’s testimony about the sources of the cash is confusing and contradictory. For example, at one point, Garcia estimated that at least 80 percent of the money came from things other than the sale of marijuana; on cross examination, however, he testified he had “no idea” how much of the money was actually his. He also said that he did not file his income tax return in 1994 and did not know how much money he made from legitimate sources that year. The jury was not obligated to believe Garcia’s garbled testimony concerning the cash accumulation.
Cash seized by the police was held subject to criminal forfeiture under remarkably similar circumstances in United States v. Wojcik, 60 F.3d 431 (8th Cir.1995). Although Wojcik pleaded guilty to distribution of cocaine, he contended the evidence was insufficient to support the forfeiture of $30,577 in cash found at his auto sales business pursuant to § 853(a). Of this cash, $26,705 was found inside a coffee can in the trunk of a car (the keys to which were found in defendant’s pocket). Of the $26,705, $1,050 was recorded cash from an undercover drug purchase. The $30,577 also included $2,907 found inside a cardboard box in defendant’s office; of this $2,907, $1,200 was marked money from another undercover transaction. Id. at 432.
The Eighth Circuit held that the government met its burden of proving that the funds were, or were derived from, proceeds obtained directly or indirectly as a result of Wojcik’s drug violations.2 The government’s *527evidence indicated Wojcik had been involved in previous drug transactions; the money at issue had been stored in cash in unusual locations despite the fact Wojcik had a bank account for his business; and marked cash and recorded cash were found amidst the $30,577. The court rejected Wojcik’s claims that the cash was from his legitimate auto sales business, which was a cash business, and that the recorded and marked money might have been placed with his other money by someone else. Wojcik’s testimony that most of the $26,705 had been discovered in a repossessed car was not credited. Id. at 434.
Similarly, in United States v. Alaniz, 148 F.3d 929 (8th Cir.1998), the court, rejecting defendant’s argument that insufficient evidence linked $2000 in seized cash to the criminal activities of the conspiracy, affirmed the forfeiture pursuant to § 853(a). That cash was found in a jacket in a closet at a drug “safehouse” affiliated with the conspiracy and was “folded in a manner consistent with drug trafficking.” Id. at 934. The closet also contained a letter addressed to defendant, who had been living at the safehouse and using it as a base to distribute drugs. Id. The court held that, based on this evidence, the jury could reasonably find that the money derived from the conspiracy.3 Id. See also United States v. Patel, 131 F.3d 1195, 1200-01 (7th Cir.1997) (affirming forfeiture pursuant to § 853(a)(1) of $120,505 in cash found in a paper bag under defendant’s bed; defendant indicated in tape-recorded statements that it was easy for him to make money selling cocaine, that he sometimes made up to $100,000 per week and that other money recovered by law enforcement authorities was his drug proceeds; district court rejected evidence that the money was derived from legitimate family businesses).
There is another problem with the court’s opinion filed today. On June 8, 1995, the undercover agent paid Cruz $1,800, and of this amount, $1,600 was found in Garcia’s storage locker. On June 19,1995, the undercover agent paid Cruz $3,500, and of this amount, $2,700 was found in the locker. Thus, the undercover agent paid $5,300 in these two transactions, of which $4,300 in prerecorded cash was recovered from defendant’s storage locker. The majority holds that defendant’s proceeds for these two transactions totaled $4,300.
I would hold Garcia hable, at a minimum, for the entire $5,300 paid by the undercover agent. Cash is fungible; the government should not be required to prove that the actual bills found in Garcia’s locker are the same pieces of paper that the undercover agent handed to Cruz.
By absolving Garcia of liability for proceeds obtained by his eoconspirator Cruz, the court, in effect, adopts a rule that there is no joint and several liability for drug proceeds received by eoconspirators. To date, the Ninth Circuit has not addressed this issue, but the courts that have ruled on this question have decided that joint and several liability may be imposed. E.g., United States v. White, 116 F.3d 948, 951 (1st Cir.1997) (“In the context of ‘property obtained’ forfeitures ... several courts of appeals have refused to limit criminal forfeiture to proceeds defendants personally obtained and have held defendants jointly and severally liable for the proceeds obtained by their coconspirators.”); United States v. McHan, 101 F.3d 1027, 1043 (4th Cir.1996) (stating that a § 853(a)(1) forfeiture “is not limited to property that the defendant acquired individually but includes all property that the defendant derived indirectly from those who acted in concert with him in furthering the criminal enterprise”), cert, denied, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 2468, 138 L.Ed.2d 223 (1997); United States v. Benevento, 836 F.2d 129, 130 (2d Cir.1988). *528Similarly, we have recognized that the eases construing the RICO' forfeiture statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1963, are persuasive in construing § 853. E.g., United States v. Bennett, 147 F.3d 912, 914 n. 3 (9th Cir.1998). Other courts have construed § 1963 as providing for joint and several liability of RICO defendants. United States v. Hurley, 63 F.3d 1, 22 (1st Cir.1995); United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1370 (7th Cir.1991); Fleischhauer v. Feltner, 879 F.2d 1290, 1301 (6th Cir.1989); United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1506-08 (11th Cir.1986). In short, Garcia should be held liable for-at a minimum-the $5,300 handed to Cruz.
There was no plain error.
I would affirm the judgment entered upon the jury’s verdict forfeiting $43,070.

. Section 853(a) provides in part that:
Any person convicted of a violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter punishable by imprisonment for more than one year shall forfeit to the United States, irrespective of any provision of State law—
(1) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation;
(2) any of the person’s property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such violation; ...
21 U.S.C. § 853(a).

. Although the Eighth Circuit did not engage in any statutory analysis of the distinctions between § 853(a)(1) and § 853(a)(2), it is clear that the commingled funds were forfeited pursuant to § 853(a)(1), not § 853(a)(2). The Wojcik court stated:
[D]efendant argues that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support the district court’s forfeiture of the $30,577 cash found at defendant’s place of business, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(a). Following the evi-dentiary hearing, the district court found that the government had met its burden of proving that the funds were, or were derived from, proceeds obtained directly or indirectly as a result of defendant's drug trafficking violations. ... Upon review, we consider whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the seized cash constituted or was derived from defendant’s drug trafficking violations.
Wojcik, 60 F.3d at 434 (emphasis added). The emphasized language is virtually identical to that of § 853(a)(1), and there is no discussion in *527Wojcik relating to commission or facilitation, see § 853(a)(2).

. Although the Alaniz court did' not specify whether the cash was forfeited pursuant to § 853(a)(1) or § 853(a)(2), the court cited to Wo-jcik, which is a § 853(a)(1) case. Also, the Alaniz court held that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably find that "the money resulted from the criminal conspiracy.” 148 F.3d at 934. This language is logically consistent with § 853(a)(1) (concerning property constituting or derived from any proceeds obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of a drug violation) but not with § 853(a)(2) (concerning any property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit or facilitate the commission of a drug violation).