Court Opinion

ID: 9494462
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:38:22.387379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:25.535687
License: Public Domain

HUG, Circuit Judge,
Dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion concludes that Younger abstention is inappropriate here because that doctrine aims to avoid federal-state conflict and such conflict has been “raging for over ten years” in this case. This broad characterization of Younger overlooks the heart of the doctrine and that the circumstances here fall squarely under the concerns warranting such abstention.
While the majority correctly recognizes that the United States and the state of Nevada have litigated issues involving the Yucca Mountain site for years, this does not render abstention under Younger disingenuous. Younger stresses respect for comity and federalism, not just generally, but specifically in the form of “proper deference to a state’s interest in ongoing proceedings in its own forums, and deference to a state judiciary’s power to consider constitutional claims.” United States v. Ohio, 614 F.2d 101, 104 (6th Cir.1979) (citing Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 97 S.Ct. 1898, 52 L.Ed.2d 513 (1977)). Accordingly, an ongoing controversy here between the federal and state governments does not render Younger inapplicable where a federal court would disrupt the integrity of the state’s judicial system by intervening in mid-process. See Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, 431, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982). Younger “and its progeny espouse a strong federal policy against federal court interference with pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.” Id. Such an intrusion involves more than just a conflict between a state and the federal government as federal intervention in such proceedings “would demonstrate a lack of respect for the State as sovereign.” New Orleans Public Service Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 369, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989). See also Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423, 99 S.Ct. 2371, 60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979) (describing the basic concern addressed under Younger as the threat to our federal sys*710tem posed by displacement of state courts by those of the National Government).
Having concluded that Younger’s policy concerns are implicated, the next question to address is whether Younger applies here. Younger principles apply to pending state administrative proceedings that are judicial in nature and involve important state interests. See Fresh International Corp. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board, 805 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir.1986); Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 433-434, 102 S.Ct. 2515 (concluding that being “judicial in nature” a state bar’s disciplinary proceedings are “of a character to warrant federal-court deference”). The proceeding before the State Engineer was undoubtably judicial in nature, complete with hearings, testimony, motions and a decision written like that of a judicial opinion. The agency proceeding “investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist.” NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 370, 109 S.Ct. 2506 (quoting Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226, 29 S.Ct. 67, 53 L.Ed. 150 (1908)) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Under the three-pronged test established by the Supreme Court, Younger “abstention is appropriate in favor of a state court proceeding if (1) the state proceedings are ongoing; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to raise federal questions.” Fresh International Corp., 805 F.2d at 1357-58 (citing Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515). Accordingly, we should first determine whether the state proceedings had been initiated before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in federal court. Id. at 1358.
The administrative hearing here was initiated, a decision rendered by the agency and an appeal to a state court filed prior to the initiation of the federal action. For Younger purposes, the State’s trial-and-appeals process is treated as a unitary system and, as noted above, for a federal court to intervene in mid-process “would demonstrate a lack of respect for the State as a sovereign.” NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 369, 109 S.Ct. 2506. For the same reason, a party may not seek federal review by terminating the state judicial process prematurely — forgoing the state appeal to attack a trial court’s judgment in federal court. Id. A necessary concomitant of Younger is that a party must exhaust his state appellate remedies before seeking relief in federal court from the judgment of a state judicial tribunal. Id.
Our Court has applied the same principle to processes started in an administrative agency viewing the litigation from agency through courts as a unitary process that should not be disrupted by premature federal intervention. See Fresh International Corp., 805 F.2d 1353 (concluding that state proceedings were ongoing for Younger purposes where agency decision was issued and appeal was taken to the state appellate court as provided by state law).1 Accordingly, federal intervention seems no more permissible at the conclusion of the administrative stage than during it and, thus, the state proceedings here are ongoing as the United States sought relief from the State Engineer’s decision by appeal to state court as required under Nevada law. See Nev.Rev.Stat. 533.450.
Next, we must consider whether there is a sufficiently important state interest that would be affected by the federal action so as to warrant Younger abstention. Id. at 1358. The Supreme Court has cited with approval other courts’ decisions that have *711held important state interests to exist in a broad range of circumstances including teacher tenure termination proceedings, and police officer disciplinary proceedings for making false statements. See id. at 1359-60 (referencing Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 106 S.Ct. 2718, 91 L.Ed.2d 512 (1986)). Nevada has a substantial interest in carrying out its regulatory process for water permit applications without federal intervention, particularly where the placement of a nuclear waste repository in the state is involved.
While a claim that a state law is preempted by a federal law certainly factors into our consideration of whether a state’s interest is substantial to invoke Younger, merely raising preemption does not automatically render Younger abstention inappropriate unless preemption is readily apparent. Id. at 1361. Preemption is not readily apparent in this case because the DOE seeks permits for activities not yet authorized by Congress under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (“NWPA”).
We have previously held that Congress preempted N.R.S. § 459.910 with regard to the characterization study and evaluation of the Yucca Mountain site. State of Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir.1990). Thus, the State Engineer is clearly prohibited from denying water permits based on N.R.S. § 459.910 for this evaluation and study period. However, Congress has not yet acted to authorize the construction and operation of a permanent facility at Yucca Mountain. That will take an additional congressional act after the State of Nevada has had an opportunity to protest as provided under the NWPA. We have no way of knowing when or if that congressional act will occur or what it would provide.
The application made by the DOE is a combined application which seeks to obtain water not only for the continuation of the evaluation period, but also for the operation and construction of the facility. The State Engineer denied this combined application, in part because it requested permits for such acts which are not yet authorized under the NWPA. Were the DOE simply to seek an extension of the water permits for the continued evaluation of the site, then the State Engineer could not refuse to extend the permits on the grounds that N.R.S. 459.910 prohibits them. See id. (holding that for that aspect, N.R.S. 459.910 is preempted). Accordingly, preemption is not readily apparent in this case as the DOE’s combined applications seek permits for conduct not yet authorized by Congress. I reach what I find a logical and compelling conclusion: an Act which Congress has not yet passed cannot preempt state law or state agency decisions. The DOE could clearly present a revised application limiting its request to activities authorized under the NWPA.
Finally, we must consider whether the United States will have an adequate opportunity to raise its preemption claim in the state proceedings. Fresh International Corp., 805 F.2d at 1362. Nevada law provides that any aggrieved party seek review of the State Engineer’s decision by appeal which “shall be initiated” in the court of the county in which the matters affected are situated. Nev.Rev.Stat. 533.450(1). Similar to the statute providing for state court appeal from the administrative decision in Fresh International Corp., the Nevada statute contains no restrictions on the court’s power to hear questions of constitutionality or preemption. See id. While the proceedings are “informal and summary,” appeals from the district court may be taken to the supreme court in the same manner as other civil cases. Nev.Rev.Stat. 533.450(2) & (8). So long as the United States may raise its federal claims in state court review of the administrative proceeding, this prong is satisfied. Id. (citing Dayton, 106 S.Ct. at 2724).
*712The circumstances here satisfy all three prongs for Younger abstention. I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the interests of Younger would not be served by abstention where, as here, there exists a history of conflict and friction between state and federal government on this issue. I believe the facts here fit squarely under the policy to invoke Younger to avoid the federal court’s disruption of the integrity of the state’s judiciary process by “intervening in mid-process” and demonstrating a “lack of respect for the State as sovereign” in order to address a preemption claim based on the speculation of an Act that Congress has not yet passed. NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 369, 109 S.Ct. 2506. Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s decision to abstain.2

. NOPSI did not disturb this precedent as there the Supreme Court assumed without deciding that such application was correct. 491 U.S. at 368, 109 S.Ct. 2506.

. While the district court relied on other abstention doctrines and not Younger, we 'may affirm on any ground that has support in the record. Keyser v. Sacramento City Unified School District, 238 F.3d 1132, 1139 (9th Cir.2001).