Court Opinion

ID: 9763517
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:48:22.077106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:45.501130
License: Public Domain

HEDGES, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. Courts have held appellants to strict compliance with Tex.R.App.P. 40(b)(1):
[which] is a restrictive rule. It regulates the extent of the grounds upon which a defendant can appeal. The method of regulation is the nature of the notice filed by a defendant. If he wished to appeal a matter which is nonjurisdietional in nature or occurred prior to the entry of his plea, then he must conform to the requirements of the statute and include within his notice what the grounds of appeal are and the fact that he has received the permission of the trial court to appeal those matters.
Jones v. State, 796 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex.Crim.App.1990).
*454This Court has followed Jones in holding the language of rule 40(b)(1) to be “unequivocally mandatory.” Moreno v. State, 866 S.W.2d 660, 661 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no pet.). In a very recent case, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a “ ‘general’ notice of appeal is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on a Court of Appeals to review a trial court’s ruling on a pretrial suppression motion in an appeal from a conviction based on a negotiated plea bargain.” Davis v. State, 870 S.W.2d 43, 46 (Tex.Crim.App.1994).
The notice of appeal in this ease states that appellant filed “this written notice of appeal of said conviction to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 40(b)(1).” It does not state, however, that the trial court granted permission to appeal, or specify that the matters were raised by written motion and ruled on before trial. Nor does the record show that the trial court entered an order granting appellant permission to appeal.1 Therefore, appellant has failed to comply with the requirements of rule 40(b)(1).
I would dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

. In Riley v. State, 825 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), the trial court entered an order that granted the defendant permission to appeal the denial of a motion to suppress evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the notice of appeal and the trial court’s order together substantially complied with the requirements of rule 40(b)(1). There is no such order in the record of the present case. A plea bargain agreement, as asserted by the majority, is not an "order” of the court as required by Riley and TexR.App.P. 40(b)(1).