Court Opinion

ID: 9684993
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:20:34.210231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:01.593017
License: Public Domain

CANTU, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority opinion does not give due consideration to the express declaration of policy underlying the purposes of the “Texas Open Records Act.”1 Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 6252-17a (Vernon Supp.1982-1983).
*451Unlike the original panel the majority now concedes that appellant fully complied with all the required procedures of sections 7 and 8 of the Act. On original submission, the court’s opinion relied exclusively upon section 3(a)(1) of article 6252-17a to foreclose appellant’s entitlement to the information sought. On rehearing en banc the original draft of the majority opinion (since withdrawn) retreated from the position taken by the original panel and embraced the harmless error doctrine and various other subsections of section 3 of article 6252-17a. Undoubtedly feeling uncomfortable with the harmless error argument the majority now concedes that appellant was entitled to the information sought and should have had access to it. Nevertheless, the majority reasons that mandamus was not an available remedy because appellant had two other remedies which were as effective and complete.
While recognizing that the information sought to be obtained by appellant might conveniently be obtained through the simple expediency of a question asked and an answer permitted, the majority ignores the posture historically taken by the Court of Criminal Appeals to" this approach. See Wragg v. State, 65 Tex.Cr.R. 131, 145 S.W. 342 (1912); Cavitt v. State, 15 Tex.App. 190, 199 (1883).
The irony in this case is that appellant is now faulted for doing exactly what the Court of Criminal Appeals has held he must do in order to obtain the information sought. Redd v. State, 578 S.W.2d 129 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).
In ⅛⅛ alternative the majority suggests that if the doing of a useless thing results in futility, appellant still might resort to a search of the district clerk’s records to discover the information sought.
While it may be true, as the majority now suggests, that the information requested was available through the district clerk’s office, yet that information is not obtainable until the prospective juror’s identity is first learned, which in all cases occurs immediately prior to or simultaneous with voir dire examination. Even then the identity of the prospective juror may be meaningless if the venireman is unable to recall the case he served in, the date of prior service and, the court wherein the case was heard. Indeed, a defense attorney might not be able to be in a position to search the public records until substantial voir dire revealed the necessary facts, if it did, to permit meaningful independent research of available records. Such a task would be next to impossible in counties containing large metropolitan areas and numerous courts and would result in unnecessary delay in the administration of justice.
Just what sensitive memoranda in the district attorney’s juror cards might be revealed is not disclosed by the majority, but it seems to me that such sensitive information, if it does exist, might constitute Brady2 material and might perhaps be discoverable without resort to the “Texas Open Records Act.”
In assuming its new posture the majority concedes that the alternate remedy must be as convenient, as beneficial and as effective -as the remedy of mandamus. Simpson v. Williams Rural High School District, 153 S.W.2d 852 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1941, writ ref’d). Whether the alternate remedies suggested by the majority are more appropriate and effective is debatable. The numerous obstacles advanced by the majority at various stages of the opinion preparation, most now discarded, nevertheless merit passing comments. These obstacles have included sections 3(a)(1); 3(a)(3); 3(a)(8) and 3(a)(ll).
While juror participation in a prior case can perhaps be categorized “information relating to litigation of a criminal or civil nature ... to which the State or political subdivision is, or may be, a party....” Section 3(a)(3), I do not see how that which is a matter of public record by statute, see Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 37.04 (Vernon 1981) (requiring the jurors to state their verdict in open court and the verdicts entered into the minutes), can become inacces*452sible by virtue of what is titled an “Open Records Act.” This exclusion perhaps would be better applied to in camera proceedings and sealed records, etc.
Of even more questionable validity is the proposition that the information sought is protected as “records of law enforcement agencies that deal with the detection and investigation of crime and the internal records and notations of such law enforcement agencies which are maintained for internal use in matters relating to law enforcement.” Section 3(a)(8). But even if the information could be classified as dealing with law enforcement investigations, it would still not be protected from disclosure unless the inquiries concerned the criminal histories of the prospective jurors. Tex. Att’y.Gen. ORD-216 (1978). Even then appellant would be entitled to the information if it contained information relevant to a potential juror’s disqualification. See Tex. Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 35.16 (Vernon 1981).
The items sought by appellant are pure and simple compilations of matters constituting integral information found in public documents. Both the Federal and Texas Constitutions guarantee an accused the right to a public trial by an impartial jury. U.S. Const. Amend. VI; Tex. Const, art. I, § 10; see also Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 1.24 (Vernon 1977). The fact that the act of the jury is reduced to writing in returning a verdict, be it of guilty or acquittal, does not render their act any less public. Undoubtedly any person with time and resources could compile the same information sought to be exempted from disclosure by the State.
It is the express intention of the Act that the manner of voting in public hearings be made public and accessible through the Act. See Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-17a, § 6(4), (12) (Vernon Supp.1982-1983).3 I see no reason to grant the voting record of a particular juror any more sanctity than the verdict of the trial court would merit in a non-jury case. They are both public acts.
Any argument one might put forward for nondisclosure inevitably will serve to point out the very reason why disclosure is mandated. Why should the State be in a better position to more intelligently exercise its peremptory challenges than the accused? It may well be that such information is not required to be kept as a record. However, the fact that there is no statutory duty to compile such information should not serve to prohibit its disclosure once it is compiled.
Section 3(a)(ll) is even less persuasive as an exception to disclosure.4 The very public nature of the information refutes the possibility that it would not be available by law. By specifically naming eighteen exceptions from disclosure, the Legislature expressed its intention to make all other records discoverable. Texas Industrial Accident Board v. Industrial Foundation of the South, 526 S.W.2d 211 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1975), aff’d, 540 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.1968), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931, 97 S.Ct. 1550, 51 L.Ed.2d 774 (1977).
The majority on original submission sought to justify exclusion under 3(a)(8) and I agree that the records are made “to aid the Criminal District Attorney in the preparation of their case and are made by their staff for their aid.”
*453I would add, however, that the records are made likewise for the purpose of giving the State an unfair advantage during jury selection. It is not the making of the record that is offensive to due process nor does appellant object to the compilation of the information. It is the refusal to disclose that is offensive and of which appellant complains.
There remains, however, the question originally raised by the majority and now discarded of harmless error. The constitutional rights to counsel and trial by jury carry with them the right of counsel to interrogate the members of the jury panel for the purpose of enabling counsel to exercise intelligently his peremptory challenges. Trevino v. State, 572 S.W.2d 336 (Tex.Cr.App.1978).
Undoubtedly, there also exists a duty as well as a right to discover and investigate facts that will enhance the process of intelligently exercising peremptory challenges.
I, therefore, find no perceptible difference between being deprived of potentially valuable public records and potentially valuable answers to questions designed to reveal possible biases of prospective jurors. In either event, a prohibition would severely impede the intelligent exercise of a valuable right. Cf. Trevino v. State, supra.
Nor do I find the right violated in the instant case any less valuable than that guaranteed by Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 35.11 (Vernon 1966).5 Nothing in the Act requires that appellant show harm or even probable harm as a prerequisite to obtaining the information.
Having shown his entitlement to the information which the State never denied existed, appellant should not be further required to show harm, which in most cases would be an impossible task. If on the other hand, as the State belatedly now claims on appeal, there never existed a jur- or information card on the particular jurors in the venire panel, then the State was bound to disclose nothing.6
The majority opinion offers persuasive reasoning for abrogating the rule prohibiting the interrogation of prospective jurors on the very matter sought to be discovered under the “Act.” This additional method of discovery, although not the subject matter of this appeal were it available to appellarit, would not in my opinion, eliminate the State’s duty to comply with article 6252-17a. It would, however, render the majority opinion’s argument of harmless error more palatable. I do not believe that appellant should be saddled with harmless error because he did not attempt to do what the Court of Criminal Appeals has long held he' cannot do. Wragg v. State, supra; see also Cavitt v. State, supra.
The argument now advanced by the majority is premised upon an illogical postulate that alternate effective remedies exist which abrogate the need to comply with the clear language of the “Act.”
It is said that appellant showed his entitlement to the information and that he should have had the benefit of the information but that the language of the Act may be disregarded because the same information may be gathered through use of self help on the part of appellant. In effect the majority concludes that mandamus under the Act is not available unless the information sought is inaccessible otherwise. The argument, is, I suggest, absurd.
The purpose of the writ of mandamus is to enforce performance of a duty clearly defined by law. Jefferson v. McFaddin, 178 5.W. 714 (Tex.Civ.App.—Galveston 1915, no writ).
Mandamus will not issue unless it is reasonably necessary to the enforcement or establishment of the right that is sought to *454be secured, Simpson v. McDonald, 142 Tex. 444, 179 S.W.2d 239 (1944) and it is not awarded as a matter of right but its issuance rests largely in the sound judicial discretion of the court. Yet a court may not arbitrarily deny the writ. In fact a court is without power to deny the writ to an applicant who brings his case clearly within the established principles. Navarro County v. Tullos, 237 S.W. 982 (Tex.Civ. App.—Dallas 1922, writ ref’d).
I am especially troubled by the majority’s reliance upon appellant’s failure to procure the information from other sources. Either the “Act” means what it says or the “Act” has no meaning at all. Once appellant has shown compliance with the request provisions and failure on the part of the State to comply or seek a ruling from the Attorney General, the items sought to be disclosed are presumed to be public records. Section 7(a). There is no requirement in the Act that the information sought to be procured first be sought from other sources. Such a requirement engrafts upon the statute what the Legislature sought not to include.
Traditionally, the Court of Criminal Appeals has disposed of contentions not unlike appellant’s on the basis of non-abuse of discretion. See Bolden v. State, 634 S.W.2d 710 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Redd v. State, 578 S.W.2d 129 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) Trevino v. State, 572 S.W.2d 336 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Enamus v. State, 526 S.W.2d 806 (Tex.Cr.App.1975).
Although the Court of Criminal Appeals continues to review contentions using the abuse of discretion standard, I fail to see how such a standard may be applicable to a case where a defendant has brought himself within the letter of compliance for disclosure. I, therefore, do not consider Bolden v. State, supra; Trevino v. State, supra; Emanus v. State, supra; or Redd v. State, supra, controlling. In Redd the very question before this court was left unanswered because of failure to comply with the statute’s requisites. I find nothing in the Redd opinion hinting that the defendant would encounter further obstacles should he successfully overcome the initial hurdle.
In the absence of some action by the State to rebut the legal presumption created by the Act there can be no basis for a finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. To the contrary, I would think that an abuse of discretion is shown as a matter of law.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the “Act” does not mean what it says and that the right to relief by mandamus accorded by it requires exhaustion of all other remedies, still the remedies alluded to by the majority are illusive at best.
It has been said that,
Another existing remedy, to prevent resort to mandamus, must be plain, accurate, certain, speedy, and adequate for the relief of the relator ... [it] must not only be adequate in the general sense of the term, but must be specific and appropriate to the particular circumstances of the case; that is, the remedy must afford relief on the very subject matter of the controversy and give the relator the particular right that the law affords him. Moreover, it must be equally as convenient, beneficial, and effective as the remedy by mandamus, and issuance of the writ will not be prevented by the existence of other inaccurate or tedious modes of redress.
37 Tex.Jur.2d Mandamus § 13, pp. 603-604 (1962); see also Seagraves v. Green, 116 Tex. 220, 288 S.W. 417 (1926).
It has been held that a relator will not be deprived of a right to the writ by the fact that he might himself do the acts sought to be compelled. International Water Co. v. El Paso, 51 Tex.Civ.App. 321, 112 S.W. 816 (Tex.Civ.App.1908, writ ref’d).
It would seem that in the absence of a statute specifically providing for inspection of public records the common law would in any event grant such right. Palacios v. Corbett, 172 S.W. 777 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1915, writ ref’d).
In Palacios it was recognized that the common law right of inspection remains although a special statutory right is given. In quoting from Tennessee ex rel Wellford *455v. Williams, 110 Tenn. 549, 75 S.W. 948 (1903) this court stated:
[T]he exercise of such power [of inspection], if prudently and carefully guarded, cannot be otherwise than salutary, because the knowledge that it can be exercised by a citizen and taxpayer, and may be exercised when the public good shall seem, on sound reasons, to demand it, cannot result otherwise than in producing an added sense of responsibility in those who administer the affairs of municipal corporations, and in inducing a greater carefulness in the discharge of the trusts imposed upon them by their fellow citizens under the sanctions of law.
Palacios, supra at 782.
Appellant has shown his entitlement to the information sought and the majority has recognized his right to the information. It should go one step further by holding that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant mandamus relief.
I would grant appellant’s motion for rehearing and reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for a new trial.
CADENA, C.J., joins in dissent.

. Pursuant to the fundamental philosophy of the American constitutional form of representative government which holds to the principle that government is the servant of the people, and not the master of them, it is hereby declared to be the public policy of the State of Texas that all persons are, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, at all times entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of those who represent them as public officials and employees. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created. To that end, the provisions of this Act shall be liberally construed with the view of carrying out the above declaration of public policy.
Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-17a, § 1 (Vernon Supp.1982-1983).
See also section 14(b) and (d):
(b) This Act does not authorize the withholding of information or limit the availability of public records to the public, except as expressly so provided. (d) This Act shall be liberally construed in favor of the granting of any request for information.
Id. at § 14(b), (d).

. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).

. Section 6 provides:
Without limiting the meaning of other sections of this Act, the following categories of information are' specifically made public information:
* ⅜! * Sfc * 4t
(4) the names of every official and the final record of voting on all proceedings in governmental bodies;

(12) final opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, as well as orders made in adjudication of cases; ...
Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-17a, § 6(4), (12) (Vernon Supp.1982-1983).

. Section 3(a)(ll) provides as an exception to disclosure:
inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums- or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than one in litigation with the agency.
Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-17a, § 3(a)(ll) (Vernon Supp.1982-1983).

. A failure to comply with the reshuffling statute when invoked will result in reversal without a showing of harm. Davis v. State, 573 S.W.2d 780 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Como v. State, 557 S.W.2d 93 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Alexander v. State, 523 S.W.2d 720 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Woerner v. State, 523 S.W.2d 717 (Tex.Cr.App. 1975).

. Disclosure of any other juror information would be meaningless to appellant at his trial and would work no harm to the State.