Court Opinion

ID: 9761557
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:45:43.102342+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:24.442465
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
dissenting:
Appellant asserts that the lower court erred in refusing to dismiss the charges against him because the Commonwealth violated Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(a)(2), 19 P.S.Appendix (1977).1
On March 5, 1976, a complaint was filed against appellant charging him with robbery, burglary, simple assault, and criminal conspiracy. An arrest warrant issued the next day. Appellant, however, was not arrested until August 4, 1976. He was given a preliminary hearing on August 30 and was arraigned on September 13, 1976. On October 15, 1976, a hearing was held on appellant’s motion that the victim should not be allowed to testify at trial because he was mentally incompetent. This motion was denied, and defense motions to suppress the victim’s identification and for a dismissal of the charges under Rule 1100(f) were heard on *217October 18» 1976 (as well as a motion by the Commonwealth to amend the informations). The lower court also denied these defense motions, and the following day the parties proceeded to empanel the jury. Trial was held on October 20 and 21. Appellant was found guilty of robbery but not guilty on the other charges. Post-verdict motions were duly filed and were dismissed by the lower court. This appeal followed.
When appellant presented Ms motion for a dismissal of the charges under Rule 1100(f), he argued that the mandatory period for the commencement of Ms trial began on March 6, the date the arrest warrant issued, and ended on September 6.2 Because Ms trial did not commence within that period, he claimed that he was entitled to a discharge unless it was shown that the Commonwealth had exercised due diligence in prosecuting Ms case. The Commonwealth argued that the mandatory period did not begin until August 4, the date appellant was arrested. Although the lower court did not state explicitly at the hearing why it denied appellant’s motion, it appears clear that the court accepted the Commonwealth’s argument that the period did not begin until August 4. This ruling was, without doubt, erroneous. “[l]n the situation where a complaint is presented to a court and a warrant issued . . . the mandatory period [under Rule 1100(a)] commences running with the presentation.” Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 472 Pa. 558, 559, 372 A.2d 826, 829 (1977). In ruling on appellant’s post-trial motions, however, the lower court did not rely upon August 4 as the date from which the mandatory period commenced to find that appellant’s trial was timely. Instead, the court looked to testimony taken at trial and held that regardless of when the period began to run, appellant was unavailable for trial until the date of Ms arrest, thus automatically extending the period *218during which the Commonwealth was required to try him.3 At trial, appellant testified that he knew several days after the incident that a warrant had been issued for his arrest, and that to avoid the authorities he used an assumed name. Appellant told the jury that he was afraid of being arrested not because he was guilty but because he was afraid that he would be convicted on the basis of his prior record. I believe that the lower court erred in relying on testimony taken at trial to hold that appellant’s trial commenced within the period prescribed by Rule 1100.
The Supreme Court has held that “the Commonwealth has the burden of proving the requisites of Section (d) in order to avail itself of an exclusion and must do so by a preponderance of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Mitchell, supra, 472 Pa. at 564, 372 A.2d at 831. See also Commonwealth v. Wade, 475 Pa. 399, 380 A.2d 782 (1977); Commonwealth v. Clark, 256 Pa.Super. 456, 390 A.2d 192 (1978); Commonwealth v. Long, 258 Pa.Super. 251, 392 A.2d 779 (1978). When a lower court determines that the Commonwealth has met its burden, we will consider on appeal only “the evidence presented by the Commonwealth and so much evidence presented by the defense as, fairly read in the context of the record as a whole, remains uncontradicted.” Commonwealth v. Wade, supra, 475 Pa. at 403, 380 A.2d at 784. See also Commonwealth v. Mitchell, supra; Commonwealth v. Clark, supra.
In the present case, no evidence was presented by either party at the hearing on appellant’s motion, to show that trial was delayed because of appellant’s unavailability. Thus, the Commonwealth did not sustain its burden of proof at the hearing. Having failed to carry its burden of proof at the hearing, the Commonwealth could not properly incorporate subsequent trial testimony into the hearing record to show that it could have met its burden had it chosen to. A trial is *219not designed for the litigation of Rule 1100 issues. Rather, it is the forum used to assess a defendant’s criminal liability. A defendant’s prior unavailability for trial is unrelated to his guilt or innocence, and a trial judge would be remiss if he allowed the parties to litigate before the jury issues crucial to a proper Rule 1100 determination. Here the parties did not attempt to develop Rule 1100 arguments at trial. As noted above, the evidence that the lower court relied on to find that appellant was unavailable for trial had been introduced by appellant to explain why he used an assumed name when he was arrested and why he did not turn himself in when he learned that a warrant was pending for his arrest. The evidence was not developed by the Commonwealth to show that appellant’s efforts to avoid arrest were so successful that he was able to elude the police in spite of their diligent efforts to find him. This difference in purpose for which the evidence was introduced may explain the lower court’s incorrect conception of the test that should have been applied in determining whether appellant was unavailable for trial during the months preceding his arrest. The court held that appellant’s efforts to elude authorities was the equivalent of his unavailability. Yet, it is well-settled that in order for the Commonwealth to enjoy the benefits of Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(d)(1), the crucial issue is not whether a defendant has avoided apprehension, but whether the Commonwealth has shown that the defendant’s “whereabouts were unknown and that due diligence was utilized by the police in attempting to determine his whereabouts.” Commonwealth v. Mitchell, supra, 472 Pa. at 564, 372 A.2d at 831. See also Commonwealth v. Long, supra; Commonwealth v. Kovacs, 250 Pa.Super. 60, 378 A.2d 455 (1977); Commonwealth v. Woodson, 248 Pa.Super. 545, 375 A.2d 375 (1977); Comment to Fa.R.Crim.P. 1100. The lower court ignored entirely the issue of due diligence by the police. Appellant in his brief candidly points out that a police detective testified at trial that within two weeks of the incident he tried to serve the arrest warrant on appellant at his home three times without success. See Appellant’s Brief at 20. But even had the lower court added this *220fact to its opinion, it nevertheless would have been in error in considering any evidence taken at trial to find due diligence. The trial testimony by the detective was not subject to cross-examination by appellant on the issue of due diligence. Nor was appellant entitled to follow the detective’s testimony with his own proof and argument. For all we know, a full hearing might reveal that the police had solid leads as to appellant’s whereabouts, which they failed to pursue. Cf. Commonwealth v. Clark, supra (“Once the Commonwealth knows where the defendant is, it then has the duty to act with due diligence in bringing him to trial.”)
As the majority notes, however, the consideration of appellant’s Rule 1100 claim does not end here. Although the lower court did not consider whether appellant’s motion for dismissal of the charges under Rule 1100 was timely, there is no question that we may raise that issue sua sponte. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 479 Pa. 609, 613 n.4, 388 A.2d 1361, 1364 n.4 (1978). Rule 1100(f) limits the time within which a defendant may apply for an order dismissing the charges against him to “any time before trial.” In determining whether a defendant has made his motion prior to trial, we may refer to the explanatory comments to Rule 1100(f). Commonwealth v. Lamonna, 473 Pa. 248, 259, 373 A.2d 1355, 1360 (1977) (concurring opinion by EAGEN, C. J.); Commonwealth v. Perkins, 473 Pa. 116, 373 A.2d 1076 (1977); Commonwealth v. Byrd, 250 Pa.Super. 250, 378 A.2d 921 (1977); Commonwealth v. Wharton, 250 Pa.Super. 25, 378 A.2d 434 (1977). The Comment provides:
It is not intended that preliminary calendar calls should constitute commencement of a trial. A trial commences when the trial judge determines that the parties are present and directs them to proceed to voir dire, or to opening argument, or to the hearing of any motions which had been reserved for the time of trial, or to the taking of testimony or to some other such first step in the trial.
We have held that if a defendant fails to present a Rule 1100(f) motion before the hearing of motions reserved for the time of trial, he loses his Rule 1100 rights. Common*221wealth v. Weber, 256 Pa.Super. 249, 253-254, 389 A.2d 1107, 1110 (1978). We have also held that “a hearing on a motion will mark the commencement of trial under Rule 1100 only if (1) the accused is adequately warned that the hearing has been reserved until the time of trial and (2) the hearing actually leads directly into the guilt-determining process.” Commonwealth v. Dozier, 258 Pa.Super. 367, 371-372, 392 A.2d 837, 840 (1978). Accord: Commonwealth v. Brown, 264 Pa.Super. 127, 399 A.2d 699 (1979).
In the present case, the record fails to show that appellant’s motions were explicitly reserved for the time of trial. However, because this case arose in Philadelphia, an argument might be made that the hearing on appellant’s suppression motion constituted the commencement of trial because of the local rules promulgated by the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. Phila.R.Crim.P. 600IV provides:
Pretrial suppression applications for suppression of identification evidence in major and homicide cases shall be listed for hearing in the same courtroom and on the same date as the major or homicide case is scheduled for trial.
See also Phila.R.Crim.P. 605. We have conjectured in the past that “[pjerhaps, under some circumstances, the Commonwealth might persuasively assert that this Rule provides a defendant with adequate notice that trial, for purposes of Rule 1100, will commence with his suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v. Dozier, supra 258 Pa.Super. at 372, 392 A.2d at 840. Here, however, there is nothing in the record to enable me to say with any certainty that the Rule provided appellant with such notice. Accordingly, I cannot deem that appellant’s Rule 1100(f) motion was untimely.4
Finally, as the majority notes, appellant’s motion was presented orally to the court. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(f) implies *222that motions to dismiss under the Rule should be in writing. See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 306, which requires all pre-trial motions to be in writing. This court has split in the past over the question of whether a defendant may preserve his Rule 1100 rights through an oral motion. See Commonwealth v. Webb, 254 Pa.Super. 429, 386 A.2d 25 (court split 3-3). To date, the Supreme Court has yet to resolve the issue. See Commonwealth v. Martin, supra 479 Pa. at 613 n. 3, 388 A.2d at 1363 n.3. I believe, however, that under the circumstances of this case, appellant preserved his rights by raising his motion orally before the commencement of trial. The purpose of requiring a written application is to inform the Commonwealth and the court of the specific contentions a defendant intends to raise so that a focused response and decision may follow. That purpose was not frustrated in the present case by the oral nature of appellant’s motion. Appellant argued that the mandatory period under the Rule began on March 6, and that his trial was untimely unless it was shown that the Commonwealth had been diligent in bringing him to trial. The Commonwealth responded with the plausible, but since discredited, argument that the mandatory period did not begin until the date of appellant’s arrest and preliminary arraignment. The lower court was persuaded by the Commonwealth’s argument, and evidently believed that the issue had been framed and argued clearly enough so that it could decide the issue itself instead of referring appellant’s motion to the Calendar Judge as required under the local rules of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas.5
*223Since the purpose of a written application has been satisfied in the present case, it is not apparent to me why we should hold that appellant waived his Rule 1100 rights by raising his motion orally, rather than holding that the Commonwealth waived its rights under the Rule by failing to object to the oral nature of appellant’s motion at the time it was made. Had the Commonwealth made a timely objection, appellant would have had the opportunity to perfect his application before the commencement of trial. We would work an injustice by allowing the Commonwealth to assert after trial, that is, after appellant can no longer cure the defect, that appellant waived his rights by presenting his motion orally when the Commonwealth consented to the form of the motion at the time it was made. I should not allow the Commonwealth to lull defendants into believing that they have preserved their rights except in situations where the integrity of our own judicial processes has been infringed by non-compliance with the rules. Here appellant’s motion and the subsequent argument by the parties were fully transcribed for the record. The record shows that the Rule 1100 issue was clearly framed, argued, and decided by the lower court. The Commonwealth had the chance to present a proper objection at the time appellant made his motion. It failed to do so, and instead argued against the motion on the merits. In these circumstances I should not hold sua sponte that appellant’s Rule 1100 rights have been forfeited because appellant made his motion orally rather than in writing. See Commonwealth v. Webb, supra (HOFFMAN, J., Opinion in Support of Reversal).
Because the lower court concluded at the hearing that the period in Rule 1100(a)(2) did not commence until August 4, the Commonwealth and the lower court did not pursue the inquiry into whether the Commonwealth used due diligence in bringing appellant to trial. Since we are without a fully developed record on this issue, I should vacate appellant’s judgment of sentence and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on appellant’s Rule 1100 claim.
HOFFMAN, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. in addition to arguing that his Rule 1100 rights were violated, appellant argues that the lower court abused its discretion in ruling that the victim was mentally competent to testify, and that the court erred in refusing appellant’s motions for a continuance of the trial and for a voir dire of a juror who appeared confused when polled by the court for his vote. Because of my view of the Rule 1100 issue, I do not consider the merits of these arguments.

o Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(a)(2) provides: “Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant after June 30, 1974 shall commence no later than one hundred eighty (180) days from the date on which the complaint is filed.”
One hundred eighty days from March 6 is September not September 6 as appellant asserted at the hearing.

. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(d)(1) which provides:
In determining the period for commencement of trial, there shall be excluded therefrom such period of delay at any stage of the proceedings as results from:
(1) the unavailability of the defendant or his attorney . . ..

. Of course, appellant’s motion was not untimely because it did not comport with Pa.R Crim.P. 305, which required, before its amendment in 1977, that pre-trial applications for relief be submitted no later than ten days prior to trial. The requirement of Pa.R.Crim.P. 305 was “implicitly superseded for purposes of Rule 1100 by section (f) of the latter rule.” Commonwealth v. Lamonna, supra, 473 Pa. at 255 n.8, 373 A.2d at 1358 n.8.

. Phila.R.Crim.P. 620 provides:
(A) Rule 1100 petitions for Felony Jury and Homicide cases are to be filed in the appropriate calendar room and will be listed for hearings by the Calendar Judge. Where the defendant presents an oral motion for dismissal before the Trial Judge, the matter shall be referred immediately to the Calendar Judge for disposition.
* * * * * *
(E) Hearings on defense petitions for dismissal or for Commonwealth petitions for extensions of time under Rule 1100 or Rule 6013 are to be held only by the appropriate Calendar Judges or by a Judge specifically designated for such purpose.