Court Opinion

ID: 9547818
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:52:48.720853+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:18:07.965284
License: Public Domain

Utter, J.
(concurring)—I do not disagree with the result reached by the majority but would take this occasion to disavow our so-called appearance of fairness doctrine.
The majority recognizes that fairness is fundamental to any proceeding, requiring impartiality and lack of bias of all decision makers in an adjudicatory situation. It also rejects, as it must, our previous rationale that the appearance of fairness doctrine is triggered by the fact that a hearing is required by statute. (See majority, at 660.)
Our cases reveal two primary components of the appearance of fairness doctrine. We have first imposed certain procedural protections typical of adjudicatory proceedings, see Smith v. Skagit Cy., 75 Wn.2d 715, 453 P.2d 832 (1969) such as cross examination, Chrobuck v. Snohomish Cy., 78 Wn.2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971), findings of fact and con*665clusions, Parkridge v. Seattle, 89 Wn.2d 454, 464, 573 P.2d 359 (1978), and verbatim transcripts, Barrie v. Kitsap Cy., 84 Wn.2d 579, 587, 527 P.2d 1377 (1974), to accompany the statutorily required public hearing. We have also required those who support a rezone to carry the burden of proof. Parkridge, at 461. Second, we have permitted inquiry into the motives and interests of the decision maker. Just as we, as judges, are subject to certain per se rules of disqualification for such things as financial interest and prejudgment bias, see Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(C), we have imposed similar constraints in rezoning decisions that were deemed essentially adjudicatory. Cases in which we have invoked the doctrine because of the financial interest of the decision maker are: Save a Valuable Env't v. Bothell, 89 Wn.2d 862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978); Swift v. Island Cy., 87 Wn.2d 348, 552 P.2d 175 (1976); Narrowsview Preserv. Ass'n v. Tacoma, 84 Wn.2d 416, 526 P.2d 897 (1974); Fleming v. Tacoma, 81 Wn.2d 292, 502 P.2d 327 (1972); Buell v. Bremerton, 80 Wn.2d 518, 495 P.2d 1358 (1972); Chrobuck. See also Byers v. Board of Clallam Cy. Comm'rs, 84 Wn.2d 796, 529 P.2d 823 (1974) (financial interest too attenuated to establish violation of doctrine). Cases in which prejudgment bias was demonstrated are: Swift; Anderson v. Island Cy., 81 Wn.2d 312, 501 P.2d 594 (1972). But see Fleck v. King Cy., 16 Wn. App. 668, 558 P.2d 254 (1977) (disqualification because board members were married without showing of prejudgment bias).
Analogy to the Code of Judicial Conduct is an important guide and limitation on the scope of the appearance of fairness doctrine. A judge should disqualify him or herself when his or her "impartiality might reasonably be questioned", CJC 3(C)(1), where he or she "has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party", CJC 3(C)(1)(a), or if the judge knows he or she has a financial or other interest that "could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding", CJC 3(C)(1)(c). (Italics mine.) A judge must actually be biased and actually have a financial interest for impartiality to be reasonably questioned. Judges, however *666regrettable may be the truth, are not completely insulated from the world. Each judge brings to the bench his or her personality and philosophical disposition toward the world. If objectivity requires more, certainly that is not what we seek in judges. "Proof that a Justice's mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias." Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 835, 34 L. Ed. 2d 50, 93 S. Ct. 7 (1972) (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.).
While a judge may be capable of rendering a fair determination even though he or she has a personal bias or financial interest, we require disqualification to ensure fairness. At the same time, "a party's unilateral perception of an appearance of bias cannot be a ground for disqualification unless we are ready to tolerate a system in which disgruntled or dilatory litigants can wreak havoc with the orderly administration of dispute-resolving tribunals." Andrews v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 28 Cal. 3d 781, 792, 623 P.2d 151, 171 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1981). We must presume that judges are capable of finding adjudicative facts fairly while ignoring incidental influences. If such a presumption cannot be made, the administration of justice is not possible.
In characterizing rezoning and other localized land use decisions as quasi adjudicatory, we have imposed constraints on decision makers in that context similar to those we would impose on judges.3 Concern for fairness should not impose more or less constraints on legislative bodies rendering quasi-adjudicatory decisions.4
*667While I agree with the fairness elements of which our doctrine is comprised, these elements indicate the doctrine's title is misleading. We have used the doctrine to impose procedural protections upon quasi-judicial proceedings of legislative bodies and to make such decision makers subject to the laws of prejudgment bias and pecuniary interest. These requirements are fundamental to the fairness needed for such individualized proceedings. Meeting these requirements establishes fairness, and we need not clothe them in the vague language of the "appearance of fairness".5 To the extent the doctrine has been used to *668afford a speculative and conjectural fairness inquiry that extends beyond these requirements, I would disapprove of it. See Fleck. Such speculation has led to our own doubts about the jurisprudential basis of the doctrine, see Bellevue v. King Cy. Boundary Review Bd., 90 Wn.2d 856, 586 P.2d 470 (1978) (wherein the court in dicta stated the appearance of fairness doctrine is not constitutionally based) and to a general misunderstanding about the doctrine's scope.
The factors previously discussed define fairness and the due process that must be afforded those subject to quasi-judicial individualized land use decisions of legislative bodies. By abandoning the caption "appearance of fairness", this court could establish a fairness inquiry that is rooted jurisprudentially, is a tool to be used by litigants, the court and legislative bodies, and which provides certainty where there has been little in the past. By calling our inquiry "fairness", we remove the confusion inherent with the "appearance of fairness" doctrine.
Dolliver and Dimmick, JJ., concur with Utter, J.

 Of course, judges are also subject to challenges based on affidavits claiming prejudice which need not show actual bias. RCW 4.12.050. This limited statutory privilege, which a litigant may exercise only once in a proceeding, is extended to litigants in judicial proceedings where more than one judge is available. Such a safeguard should not be imposed on legislative bodies rendering quasi-judicial decisions. The doctrine of necessity, if nothing else, dictates legislative bodies cannot be made the subject of such preemptive challenges.

 Viewing the appearance of fairness doctrine in this light, some of the incon*667sistencies in our application of the doctrine can be made more understandable. In King Cy. Water Dist. 54 v. King Cy. Boundary Review Bd., 87 Wn.2d 536, 554 P.2d 1060 (1976) we assumed the appearance of fairness doctrine applied to boundary review board proceedings. The board is a manifestation of the Legislature's control over its subdivisions and its functions are administrative. The Legislature has provided elaborate procedural protections for this administrative process, and review of the board's decision was guided under the terms of the statute. RCW 36.93.100, .160. In that context, there was no need to invoke the "appearance of fairness” doctrine to provide the necessary process to be afforded in a legislative context that we consider quasi-judicial. The statute itself made the board's decision quasi-judicial, and provided a comprehensive method of review, which comported with administrative due process. To the extent Bellevue v. King Cy. Boundary Review Bd., 90 Wn.2d 856, 586 P.2d 470 (1978) indicates otherwise, I would change it. The fairness inquiry in that case might well have been appropriate, but the invocation of the "appearance of fairness" was unnecessary where the statute provided the terms of administrative due process.
In Polygon Corp. v. Seattle, 90 Wn.2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978) we held the appearance of fairness doctrine was inapplicable to administrative decisions such as those involving building permit applications. The court held actual partiality was a relevant basis for reversal. As stated here, actual partiality is the basis for reversal under the principles of fairness that apply to quasi-judicial decisions of legislative bodies such as those concerning building permit applications.
Finally, while administrative due process must surely be accorded individuals subject to administrative adjudications such as that reviewed in Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R. v. State Human Rights Comm'n, 87 Wn.2d 802, 557 P.2d 307 (1976), our fairness inquiry here has been wrought in a different context and is only helpful by way of analogy to an understanding of administrative due process. See State ex rel. Beam v. Fulwiler, 76 Wn.2d 313, 456 P.2d 322 (1969).

 This is not to say "fairness" does not include an implicit concern for the "appearance of fairness." By securing procedural safeguards for quasi-judicial decisions such as cross examination, a verbatim transcript, and a ban on improper ex parte contacts, we do not say that without such safeguards the result would *668necessarily be unfair. These safeguards simply insure the best possibility of a fair result. The same is true of a decision maker with financial interest. We cannot say that such a person is incapable of rendering a fair decision, but by requiring his or her disqualification we provide the best possibility that a fair result will ensue. Fairness in quasi-judicial decisions always includes a concern for the appearance of fairness, but it does not include speculative claims of injustice which we as judges would not countenance with respect to our own judicial proceedings.