Court Opinion

ID: 9427562
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:21:11.752607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:08.043002
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice White,
concurring.
The Court rejects the claim that the measure of compensation in this case is the cost of substitute facilities rather than the fair market value of the taken property, here camps owned by a private, nonprofit corporation. I am in full agreement. The substitute-facilities doctrine is unrelated to fair market value and does not depend on whether fair market value is readily ascertainable; rather, it unabashedly demands additional compensation over and above market value in order to allow the replacement of the condemned facility.1 In those cases where it has been applied, primarily where public facilities have been condemned, the basic premise is that the con-demnee is under some obligation to continue the functions performed on the taken property.2 But I do not understand *518how a duty to replace the condemned facility justifies paying more than market value. Obviously, replacing the old with a new facility will cost more than the value of the old, but the new facility itself will be more valuable and last longer.3 This is true with respect to condemnation of any facility, whether or not there is an obligation to reproduce it, and I had not understood the Just Compensation Clause to guarantee subsidies to either private or public projects. Similarly, if more demanding building codes or other regulations will enhance the cost of replacement, it is reasonable to assume that compliance itself will be of some benefit to the owner and hence need not be financed by the condemnor.
It may be that a condemnee’s obligation to continue the function performed on the condemned property and hence to replace the facility taken will result in loss of value in that the condemnee does not have the option of investing his fair-market-value award in a project that will provide the con-demnee with greater net benefits than would replacement of the taken facility. But the existing law imposing the obligation presumably embodies the policy judgment that alternative projects, from which the condemnee might or might not derive more benefits, should not be made available to the condemnee. Even if some incremental loss due to legal constraints on the obligated condemnee’s options is thus imposed, it is sheer speculation to assume that this loss will be equal to the full increase in cost of the facility to be reproduced or replaced. It seems to me that the argument for enhanced compensation to the obligated condemnee is nothing more than a particularized submission that the award should exceed *519fair market value because of the unique uses to which the property has been put by the condemnee or because of the unique value the property has for it.
I thus agree with the Court that the Just Compensation Clause does not require payment of the cost of a substitute facility where the condemnee is a private organization, even if it could be said that such an owner is in some sense obligated to replace the property4 or that the public has a stake in the continuance of the function that is being conducted on the taken property.5 I also have substantial doubt that the Clause should be any differently construed and applied where public property is condemned, whether or not the function conducted on the property must be continued at another location.6 That issue, however, is not before the Court and is expressly put aside for another day.

 See 576 F. 2d 983, 991 (CA3 1978), quoted ante, at 510 n. 4; United States v. Streets, Alleys & Public Ways in Stoutsville, 531 F. 2d 882 (CA8 1976); United States v. Certain Property in Borough of Manhattan, 403 F. 2d 800 (CA2 1968); United States v. Certain Land in Borough of Brooklyn, 346 F. 2d 690 (CA2 1965); United States v. Board of Education of Mineral County, 253 F. 2d 760 (CA4 1958); National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Eminent Domain Code, §1004 (b).

 See, e. g., United States v. Certain Land in Borough of Brooklyn, supra, at 694; 576 F. 2d, at 992-995.

 The substitute-facilities measure applied by the Court of Appeals in this case appears to contemplate payment of reproduction costs, not replacement costs, see id., at 999, and n. 2 (Stern, J., concurring); 506 F. 2d 796, 799-800 (CA3 1974). As noted in United States v. Certain Property in Borough of Manhattan, supra, at 804, courts applying the substitute-facilities measure have taken different positions regarding whether depreciation should be deducted from the cost of a new facility.

 The Court states that respondent “is under no legal or factual obligation to replace the camps. . . .” Ante, at 515. Although respondent, which is subject to the Pennsylvania Nonprofit Corporation Act of 1972, 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. §7549 (1975), apparently is not legally obliged to replace its camps, other private, nonprofit enterprises may be under a legal obligation — imposed by their own articles of incorporation, by the terms under which gifts are made to them, or directly by state law — to continue financing of certain facilities or functions. Indeed, private organizations operated for profit may be under contractual or other legal obligation to replace a condemned facility.

 For purposes of deciding whether an obligation to replace requires a condemnation award greater than market value, it is seemingly irrelevant to whom the benefits of ownership may be said to accrue, be this the “public” or private entities.

 Of course, even if this is the proper interpretation of the Just Compensation Clause, Congress could enact legislation providing for compensation under the substitute-facilities approach in those situations in which the United States condemns public property.