Court Opinion

ID: 9776273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:29:19.673388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:36.465150
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
This Court granted the petition for review in order to determine whether the San Antonio Court of Appeals correctly overruled grounds of error five and six on its finding that under the circumstances shown in the record “no error is presented for review.” Koehler v. State, 653 S.W.2d 617, 622-623 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1983).
A significant aspect of the constitutional principle of due process is implicated here. Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624 (1931), viz:
“It is the essence of a fair trial that reasonable latitude be given the cross-examiner, even though he is unable to *11state to the court what facts a reasonable cross-examination might develop. Prejudice ensues from a denial of the opportunity to place the witness in his proper setting and put the weight of his testimony and his credibility to a test, without which the jury cannot fairly appraise them. [Citations omitted]. To say that prejudice can be established only by showing that the cross-examination, if pursued, would necessarily have brought out facts tending to discredit the testimony in chief, is to deny a substantial right and withdraw one of the safeguards essential to a fair trial. [Citations omitted].” 1
Id., U.S. at 692, S.Ct. at 219. “Erroneous denial of this right to confrontation is ‘constitutional error of the first magnitude and no amount of showing of want of prejudice [will] cure it.’ Davis v. Alaska, 415 [U.S. at 318, 94 S.Ct. at 111; Evans v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 519 S.W.2d 868.” Spain v. State, 585 S.W.2d 705, 710 (Texas Cr.App.1979). Accordingly, the Spain Court held that when the trial court refused to permit defendant to question an adverse witness about a plea bargain, under Alford he is “not required to show that his cross-examination would have affirmatively established the facts sought, ” ibid.
Thus, I agree with Judge Teague that the court of appeals erred in applying against appellant the general rule laid down when cross-examination has merely been “limited;” e.g., Barnett v. State, 615 S.W.2d 220, 222-223 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), cited by the court of appeals.
Accordingly, the court below should not have reached the point of whether appellant had complied with “the alternative method of making informal bills of exception” permitted by Article 40.09, § 6(d)(1), Y.A.C.C.P. Nevertheless, it also erred in its treatment of that matter. First, the court said;
“A bill of exception must be complete within itself and must stand or fall by its own allegations. The bill must plainly set out any error sought to be preserved for review. Garza v. State, 622 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Herrin v. State, 525 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) (Opinion on State’s Motion for Rehearing).” 2
Both authorities cited specifically show that at issue was a purported formal bill of exception provided for in § 6(a) of Article 40.09, supra, rather than an “informal” one.
Next, the court of appeals interprets but two selective portions of remarks made by the trial judge during the hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, and finds that the first may not be construed “as a ruling excluding proffered testimony,” nor the second “as limiting the cross-examination in the present trial of the witness Blackwell.” Ordinarily we should not quibble with a court of appeals about such constructions made by it of portions of the record, but when the problem is of constitutional dimension this Court is fully justified in making an independent determination from its own examination, and to that I now turn.
The colloquy between court and counsel is set out completely in the opinion of the court of appeals and by Judge Teague in his opinion, and need not be reprised here. Suffice to say that upon being informed by the prosecutor that the “problem” was that “from the first trial I know that [appellant’s counsel] will try to get into specific acts of misconduct” and he wanted a hearing, the court interrupted to say, “Let’s have that hearing,” and inquired of appellant, “What is it you want to ask this lady?” Counsel for appellant alluded to “incidents where she had attacked Mr. Koehler in public, throwing drinks at him and tried to attack girls ... in his company and different things of that nature” in or*12der to show that Blackwell “is testifying because she has a motive, she is prejudice,[d]” against appellant. Asked to say what “she [has] done against him,” counsel responded, “She has attacked him publicly ... she has thrown drinks, chairs in public at him.” The trial judge pondered out loud that if he allowed such testimony “we will have an open thing,” and after the prosecutor interrupted to say “This is what happened in the first trial,” the court concluded, “I don’t think it is proper and I will rule it out.”
Section 6(d)(1), supra, provides in pertinent part:
“The court, in its discretion, may alio v an offer of proof in the form of a concise statement by the party offering the same of what the excluded evidence would show, to be made before the reporter out of the presence of the jury as an alternative method of causing the record to show such excluded testimony ... and the same shall be accepted on appeal as establishing what such excluded testimony ... would have consisted of had it been admitted into evidence."
It is at once plain that the trial judge here invited just such an offer of proof, and that counsel for appellant concisely stated testimony of Blackwell would show she had committed acts of violence against appellant and his female companions; later when the judge asked for a statement of what Blackwell had done against appellant, counsel reiterated factually that “she has thrown drinks, chairs in public at him,” and as the judge worried about having “an open thing,” the prosecutor confirmed and verified appellant’s factual statements, and perhaps the concern voiced by the court as well, by telling the judge, “This is what happened in the first trial.” Therefore, the offer of proof concisely states factually what the excluded testimony would show, and the court of appeals should have accepted that method of establishing its content.
While under Alford and Spain, among many other authorities, an offer of proof of motive for her direct testimony and prejudice harbored against appellant by Blackwell was utterly unnecessary, it is in the record; the errors complained of in appellant’s fifth and sixth grounds have been properly presented to the court of appeals for review. See Harris v. State, 642 S.W.2d 471, 479-480 (Tex.Cr.App.1982).
For these reasons, I concur.

. All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.

. It is of little moment, but I note that the Garza opinion alluded to was handed down on rehearing, whereas Herrin is a panel opinion that did not get to rehearing.