Court Opinion

ID: 9723158
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:04:16.989239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:45.168808
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE QUINN, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. The majority rely upon People v. Gonzalez, 326 Ill. App. 3d 629 (2001), which held that leaving the word “or” between the five factors listed in No. 3.15 of the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal (3d ed. 1992), “misstated the law, was confusing and denied defendant the right to a fair trial.” Gonzalez, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 635. In reaching this conclusion, the Gonzalez court relied upon the “User’s Guide” to the fourth edition of the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal (2000): “IPI Fourth employs two conjunctive forms. The word ‘and’ is used to indicate additional required language. The word ‘or’ is used to separate possible alternatives. A bracketed ‘or’ (‘[or]’) is used when the user must choose between alternative paragraphs or propositions that may be given as part of the instruction when more than one alternative is applicable.” Gonzalez, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 639. I would note that, contrary to the Gonzalez court’s characterization of this comment, this comment does not instruct the trial courts to strike the word “or” from IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.15. The Gonzalez court continued: “The phrase preceding the five factors, stating that ‘all facts and circumstances in evidence’ are to be considered, does not obviate the erroneous wording of the jury instruction. While an attorney may be able to resolve the court’s instruction to ‘consider all the facts and circumstances in evidence’ with its use of the term ‘or’ between each factor, we doubt that an ordinary person acting as a juror could do the same.” Gonzalez, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 640. Finally, the Gonzalez court pointed out that the prosecutor in that case highlighted the word “or” when reading the instruction during his closing argument. This was not done in this case. The First District of the Appellate Court has recently addressed Gonzalez in three cases. None of these cases have found that leaving the word “or” between the factors listed in IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.15-required reversal. The majority distinguish the first of these cases, People v. Furdge, 332 Ill. App. 3d 1019 (2002). In People v. Mercado, 333 Ill. App. 3d 994 (2002), decided the day after oral argument in this case, the court considered the identical issue before us and before Gonzalez. The court found that any error in the jury instructions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In doing so, the court pointed out “the first sentence of the instruction as well as all of the applicable cases clearly state that all five factors are to be considered and are not mutually exclusive.” (Emphasis in original.) Mercado, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 999. The court then looked at the committee note attached to IPI Criminal 3d No. 3.15, which was in effect at the time of trial. It instructed the user that “[t]he bracketed numbers are present solely for the guidance of court and counsel and should not be included in the instruction submitted to the jury.” IPI Criminal 3d No. 3.15, Committee Note. The court continued, “we agree with defendant that the word ‘or’ placed in brackets was also designed solely for the guidance of the court and counsel and not to be included in the instruction to the jury.” Mercado, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 999. I would point out that no authority is cited for the proposition that the bracketed “or” should not have been included in the instruction. Indeed, if the IPI Committee wished to do so, they could have said so, as they did with the “bracketed numbers.” In the instant case, the trial court followed the comments to the letter and left out the “bracketed numbers.” In rejecting defendant’s argument, the Mercado court found it significant that the prosecutor in that case did not highlight the use of the word “or” in the instruction. The Mercado court held: “Defendant’s failure to object to this instruction at trial or raise the issue in a posttrial motion amounts to a waiver of the issue.” Mercado, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 999-1000. In People v. Brookins, 333 Ill. App. 3d 1076 (2002), the court also considered this identical issue. In Brookins, a single eyewitness observed the defendant enter a backyard and then a home across the alley from the eyewitness’ third-floor apartment. It was late at night but there was an alley light nearby. The witness testified that she observed the defendant walking through the victim’s home. She said there was sufficient light coming from the street through the front windows of the home. The police took the defendant into custody in the alley and the witness identified the defendant in a showup at that time. The jury was instructed in the exact manner as the jury in this case. Unlike here, the prosecutor commented during closing argument, “ ‘Now, they (the five factors) are all separated, you can consider them as separate.’ ” Brookins, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 1082. The appellate court relied upon the holding in Gonzalez and held that “the trial court here erred in giving a version of IPI Criminal 3d No. 3.15 using the word ‘or’ between each of the five factors.” Brookins, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 1083. The court found that the evidence of the defendant’s gufit was not closely balanced. The court then said “we find that even if the trial court had given the proper instruction, and expressly instructed the jury to consider all five factors, the outcome of the trial would have been the same.” Brookins, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 1084. I believe that the holdings in Furdge, Mercado and Brookins support affirming defendant’s conviction. Verner saw the defendant in broad daylight when he was three feet from her when he entered her bedroom. She testified that she focused on his face and yelled at him. She called 911 and gave the dispatcher a description of the burglar. Within three minutes of this call, Verner identified defendant as the burglar in a showup. Defendant presented an alibi defense that he was next door to the victim’s home at the time of the burglary. While defendant worked next door, he was using a pry bar and was wearing gloves similar to those found at the point of the forced entry into Verner’s home. Based on the evidence in this case, it is clear that submitting the proper instructions to the jury would not have yielded a different result. People v. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d 301, 323 (1998). People v. Kirchner, 194 Ill. 2d 502, 557 (2000). Consequently, I would affirm defendant’s conviction on this basis. I would also affirm defendant’s conviction because the instruction given was correct. The instruction given in the instant case mirrored exactly No. 3.15 as found in IPI Criminal 3d. The instruction also complied with the comments to IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.15, which required the court to leave out the bracketed number of the factors listed. As pointed out previously in this dissent, the “User’s Guide” to the IPI Criminal does not say that the bracketed “[or]” should be deleted from the instruction given to the jury, nor do the comments to IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.15. Indeed, the only section of the IPI which supports defendant’s theory that it is error to leave in the bracketed “[or]” between the factors in IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.15 is the sample set of instructions No. 27.02 of the IPI Criminal 3d. Supreme Court Rule 451(a) requires trial courts to use the applicable IPI Criminal instruction unless the court determines that the instruction does not accurately state the law. Our supreme court has recognized that the committee notes for the IPI may not always be clear and may even be wrong. In People v. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d 301 (1998), the trial court tendered IPI Criminal 3d No. 5.03A (Supp. 1995). On appeal, defendant asserted that this was reversible error as the committee notes to IPI Criminal 3d No. 5.03A (Supp. 1995) directed that it should only be given in the context of a felony murder case involving an alleged accomplice. The supreme court disagreed. “[T]he committee’s directive limiting use of the instruction to a particular fact pattern conflicts with a fundamental rule of law. As stated in Ramey, ‘[a]n individual instruction should not be judged in artificial isolation; rather, the instruction should be examined in light of the overall charge.’ [People v.] Ramey, 151 Ill. 2d [498,] 537 [(1992)]. If all of the instructions, read together, completely and fairly state the law governing disposition of the case, no error occurs in instructing the jury. This is true even when the instruction complained of is, alone, superfluous or misleading. People v. Weaver, 18 Ill. 2d 108, 116 (1959); People v. Marsh, 403 Ill. 81, 94 (1949).” People v. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d at 328-29. Finally, if it is not erroneous for a trial court to disregard a committee note that does not accurately state the law, it should not be erroneous for a trial court to follow a committee note that does accurately state the law (as in this case). I would affirm this case based on the principle of waiver. Supreme Court Rule 451(c) provides, in pertinent part, “substantial defects are not waived by failure to make timely objections thereto if the interests of justice require.” 134 Ill. 2d R. 451(c). Instructions on the burden of proof and the elements of the offense fall within the category of instructions to which the concept of waiver will not be employed to bar reversal. People v. Gengler, 251 Ill. App. 3d 213, 219 (1993), citing People v. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d 133, 171 (1992). In People v. Britz, 123 Ill. 2d 446 (1988), our supreme court rejected defendant’s claim on appeal that his death sentence should be reversed where the jury signed verdict forms based on improper instructions that the defendant’s conduct encompassed three separate statutory factors where in fact only one statutory aggravating factor existed. “This court finds, however, that defendant has waived the issue on appeal because he did not make any objection to the improper instructions and the verdict forms at the instruction conference or in his post-trial motions. (People v. Kubat (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 437, 492[, 447 N.E.2d 247]; People v. Foster (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 365, 380[, 392 N.E.2d 6].) This court will only notice those errors which deprive defendant of his constitutional rights and will only correct ‘grave’ errors where there is a factually close case and fundamental fairness requires that the jury be properly instructed. (Kubat, 94 Ill. 2d at 492.) Furthermore, the circuit court is under no obligation to give instructions not requested by counsel. It is trial counsel’s burden of preparing and presenting jury instructions. (94 Ill. 2d at 486.) In this case, this court does not find in the record that it should refuse to apply the waiver rule. This court does not find any error in the jury instructions in which the interests of justice require otherwise. 107 Ill. 2d R. 451(c).” Britz, 123 Ill. 2d at 475. IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.15 does not address the burden of proof or the elements of the charged offense; consequently, waiver may be applied. People v. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d at 171. In light of the holding in Britz, it cannot seriously be argued that leaving the word “or” in the instruction in this case is a “grave” error requiring reversal in the “interests of justice.” For the above reasons, I believe that People v. Gonzalez, 326 Ill. App. 3d 629, was wrongly decided and I would not follow it. Even if I believed Gonzalez to be correctly decided, I would follow the holdings in. Furdge, Mercado and Brookins and I would find any error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.