Court Opinion

ID: 9764313
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:18:50.300544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:55.764233
License: Public Domain

MANDERINO, Justice,
dissenting.
While I agree that the Court Administrator has standing to raise the issue presented here, I cannot agree that these four judgeships should be filled by the elective process rather than by appointment. Section 13 reads as follows:
“§ 13. Election of justices, judges and justices of the peace, vacancies.
(a) Justices, judges and justices of the peace shall be elected at the municipal election next preceding the commencement of their respective terms of office by the electors of the Commonwealth or the respective districts in which they are to serve.
(b) A vacancy in the office of justice, judge or justice of the peace shall be filled by appointment by the Governor. The appointment shall be with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the members elected to the Senate, except in the case of justices of the peace which shall be by a majority. The person so appointed shall serve for an *525initial term ending on the first Monday of January following the next municipal election more than ten months after the vacancy occurs.” Pa.Const. art. V, § 13(a) & (b).
Appellant admits that Section 13(b) applies when a vacancy occurs due to an “unforeseen circumstance,” such as the death of the office holder, voluntary retirement, or removal. Appellant argues, however, that when a vacancy can be foreseen “with certainty,” as is allegedly the case with mandatory retirement at age 70, Section 13(b) does not apply. Appellant would have us read Section 13(b) to say that some vacancies are to be filled pursuant to Section 13(b), but that other vacancies are not to be filled under Section 13(b). In effect, appellant asks us to read into Section 13(b) an exception which is neither explicit nor implicit in the language of Section 13(b). Well settled principles of constitutional interpretation counsel against the reading urged by appellant:
“We turn then to the Constitution. Where in the Constitution ‘the words are plain * * * [they] must be given their common or popular meaning, for in that sense the voters are assumed to have understood them when they adopted the constitution, (citation omitted.)’ ” Breslow Twp. Sch. Dist., 408 Pa. 121, 125, 182 A.2d‘501, 504 (1962). “A constitutional provision is to be interpreted insofar as possible in terms of its spirit and intention — Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General v. Beamish, 309 Pa. 510, 514, 164 A. 615 (1932) — and in its popular sense and as understood by the people who adopted it — Goodwin v. Allegheny County, 182 Pa.Super. 28, 31, 125 A.2d 640 (1956). Our ultimate touchstone, nevertheless, must remain the language of the Constitution itself.” Firing v. Kephart, 466 Pa. 560, 565, 353 A.2d 833, 835-36 (1976).
The word “vacancy,” as used in Section 13(b) applies equally to vacancies which result when an incumbent dies, resigns, retires, or is removed from office. See e. g., Berardocco v. Colden, 469 Pa. 452, 366 A.2d 574 (1976); Firing v. Kephart, 466 Pa. 560, 353 A.2d 833 (1976). Furthermore, in Firing, this Court refused to distinguish mandatory retire*526ment from voluntary retirement, when determining whether a vacancy existed under Section 13(b). We noted there that the framers of Art. V, § 13, believed that death, resignation, involuntary removal from office, and mandatory retirement, would “cause a vacancy to occur . . . and thus enable the governor to appoint a successor for a new ‘initial term’ as defined in Section 13(b).” 466 Pa. at 567, 353 A.2d at 836.
This view previously espoused by our Court is the same as that expressed by one of the delegates on the floor of the Constitutional Convention. No other contrary comments were made at any time during the convention. The delegate commented:
“I think the facts should not be debatable in any way that when a judge dies a vacancy occurs, when a judge resigns, a vacancy occurs, and when he has retired, . . . the vacancy occurs as of a given day.”
Debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1967-68, Vol. II, at 1085-86 (remarks of Delegate Barron) (emphasis added).
Appellant relies heavily on our decision in Berardocco v. Colden, 469 Pa. 452, 366 A.2d 574 (1976). In Berardocco, however, this Court held that a vacancy was not to be filled under Section 13(b) because the normal election process contemplated by Section 13(a) had begun before the vacancy occurred.
Section 13 addresses itself to the question of whether the elective process or appointive process shall operate. It establishes two mutually exclusive methods of selecting judges: election under § 13(a), and appointment under § 13(b). Section 13(a) comes into operation when the term of office is to expire in the normal manner whether that term of office is an elected term or an appointed term. The method of succession involved in Berardocco — the normal expiration of a regular term, preceded by a primary and election in the “municipal election next preceding” — is precisely the situation to which Section 13(a) addresses itself. Berardocco refused to interpret § 13(b) in a manner that *527would cause it to interfere with the operation of Section 13(a).
In Berardocco the regular term of an incumbent judicial officer was due0 to expire, and the regular election process for this position had been duly initiated, when the judge retired prior to completion of his regular term. At that point, Section 13(a) had already become operative. Once the normal election process of 13(a) had been triggered, this Court deemed it too late to invoke Section 13(b) even though the vacancy had occurred less than ten months prior to the next municipal election.
In the case at bar, however, Section 13(a)’s election process had not been triggered by the anticipated end of a regular term. None of the four judges was serving a term which would naturally expire on the first Monday of January as was the case in Berardocco. The fact that the retirement date may be calculated with certainty does not change the character of the opening thereby created. It remains a vacancy to be filled pursuant to Section 13(b).
Appellant’s reliance on this Court’s discussion of the word “term” in Firing v. Kephart, 466 Pa. 560, 353 A.2d 833 (1976), also misconceives the constitutional issue before us. In Firing we observed that the word “term” has no fixed meaning, but that its meaning must be determined by reference to the applicable constitutional scheme. Id. at 565-66, 353 A.2d at 836. Appellant argues that when a judge reaches seventy, his “term” ends, in the same manner as does the term of a younger judge who completes ten years of service.
Firing simply does not call for the result sought by the appellant. Because a mandatorily retired judge’s term ends at age seventy does not mean that a regular elective term under Section 13(a) then begins — it does mean, however, that a regular appointive term, under Section 13(b) commences. The majority’s adoption of appellant’s argument frustrates the intent of Section 13, that judges’ terms begin on the first Monday of January following a municipal elec*528tion year, each term being preceded by either a regular elective term or a regular appointed term.
I recognize, as this Court did in Firing, that the word “term” has no fixed or absolute meaning,0 and that its meaning in a particular instance can only be determined by reference to the applicable constitutional or statutory scheme. As established in that case, the term of an incumbent expires upon retirement, thereby creating a vacancy in the regular term of the office. This does not mean, of course, that the term of the office expires upon retirement. The length of a regularly elected term, or of a regularly appointed term, attaches to the office itself — it is not a condition personal to the office holder. The regular term expires by operation of law; the holder’s retirement, however, creates a vacancy.
Adopting appellant’s view, which necessarily applies to all vacancies that are foreseeable, may lead to absurd results. For example, because 1977 is a “municipal election” year, and because the next “municipal election” year does not occur until 1979, (1978 being a “general election” year) see Pa.Const. Art. 7, Sections 2 and 3, all “vacancies” that are certain to occur between now and ten months before the municipal election in 1979 are to be filled at the “next preceding municipal election.” Elections would have to be held in 1977, not only for foreseeable vacancies which will occur during 1978, but also for those which will occur in 1979 more than ten months prior to the municipal election of that year. An election will have to be held in 1977 for all judicial offices wherein the incumbent would be mandatorily retired up until ten months before the municipal election in 1979. For example, if one were to reach mandatory retirement age on January 1 of 1979, or in July of 1978, or February 1978, the “next preceding municipal election” would be the municipal election of 1977, just as is the case for mandatory retirements occurring in 1977. The absurdity of this interpretation is obvious: at the municipal election in 1977, the people will be electing judges some of whom will take office in 1978, some of whom will of necessity have to wait until as *529late -as 1979 to take office. Such a result simply could not have been intended.
Unless the Governor’s appointment power is totally eliminated in a situation of mandatory retirement, any appointment would be for a period of time less than that prescribed by our Constitution. This cannot be the result intended by the framers of our Constitution. On the contrary, as we noted in Berardocco, supra :
“The framers of the Judiciary Article recognized, however, that in order to insure an efficient court system the vacancy which results when an elected incumbent dies, resigns, retires, or is removed should not remain unfilled until a new judicial officer could be duly elected.” (Emphasis added.)
366 A.2d at 576.
If the Governor is to fill the vacancy by appointment, such an appointment must comply with the requirements of our Constitution — an appointment for an initial term ending on the first Monday of January following the next municipal election more than ten months after the vacancy occurs.
Under the result of the majority some appointments by the Governor would be for less than ten months. Appointments could range from a period of one day to ten months. Appointments for short periods will be difficult to fill and some judicial offices will remain vacant because of the difficulty of finding appointees. Appointments for less than ten months were not contemplated when the Constitution was written.
The importance of the initial term was also discussed in the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention during which Delegate Ruth observed:
“I have supplied 10 months instead of three or more months, the reason being that in the judiciary this was discussed rather thoroughly — at least, this area — that any appointive judge should at least be on the bench 10 months and should run in a primary election in addition to the general election. If he only had to serve 3 months on *530the bench, he could get in in July and then run in the general election.”
Debates, Vol. II, at 1014.
The majority has in effect rewritten Section 13. The exception which the majority has carved out of Section 13(b), when there has been no election machinery triggered under Section 13(a), is one which is not in accord with the constitutional scheme for the election and appointment of judges provided by Section 13.
If the governor’s appointment power is totally eliminated when a retirement vacancy occurs, other untoward consequences could flow from today’s decision. Although the majority is silent on the matter, if the elected judge is to assume office immediately upon the occurrence of the retirement vacancy, judges could be commencing their terms on any day of the year. If a retirement vacancy occurred, for example, on February 1, would the elected judge, elected in the preceding municipal year, commence his term on February 2? If he did, he would also finish his term in February since under the Constitution the elected term is ten years. Eventually, we could have terms commencing on every day of the 365-day year rather than on the first Monday of January. See art. V, § 13(b), § 13(e). See also 17 P.S. § 9 (1962). If, on the other hand, a judge elected at the preceding municipal election is not to begin his term until the first Monday in January, there will be a hiatus during which either the judicial office will remain unfilled or an appointed term less than that provided for in section 13(b) will occur. A person elected might have to continue practicing law for a period of time which could be more than a year after being elected a judge. Such a situation would not be a desirable one. See Reed v. Sloan, 475 Pa. 570, 381 A.2d 421 (filed December 1, 1977).
To conclude that the four judicial vacancies should not be subject to the electoral process at this time is not to restrict the right of the people to elect judges of their choice. As this Court stated in Rogers v. Tucker, 443 Pa. 509, 517, 279 A.2d 9, 14 (1971):
*531“We do not deny the right of the people to elect a Judge of their choice, we merely fixed, in accordance with the Constitution, the time of election when the people shall exercise their choice.” (Emphasis added.)
443 Pa. at 517, 279 A.2d at 14.
Filling the vacancies before us under Section 13(b) does not undermine the election rights of the people; the appointment is only for the “initial term” — regular appointed term — of Section 13(b), after which the office would be filled by the elective process of Section 13(a). The majority’s result, premised on the view that the Election Code favors elected officials over appointed ones, ignores the unambiguous provisions of Section 13(b) and consequently perverts the constitutional scheme for filling judicial vacancies. I respectfully dissent.
NIX, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.