Court Opinion

ID: 9536019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:53:23.054191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:25.764130
License: Public Domain

MARTONE, Justice,
concurring in the judgment.
I agree there is no preemption here, but not for the narrow reasons upon which the majority bases its decision. I do not believe that Freightliner v. Myrick, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 131 L.Ed.2d 385 (1995), requires us to engage in an implied preemption analysis at all. I would decide this case on an issue left open in Myrick.
*520The majority concludes that there is no preemption because (1) this was not a frontal crash, and (2) Volkswagen chose an option that only mentioned frontal crash protection. It states § 1392(d) preempts “state crash-worthiness standards applicable to a particular aspect of ... vehicle equipment performance ... when there is a federal standard already applicable to that same aspect of performance.” Ante, at 248 (emphasis added). It then finds no preemption because the federal safety standard alleged to preempt plaintiffs claim, Standard 208, S4.1.2.2(b) (“Second Option”), “does not address the performance aspect at issue: ... rollover protection in the present case.” Id. at 243.
But if rollover protection does not apply in this case, it is because the safety option Volkswagen chose—S4.1.2.2(b) (Second Option)—only mentions frontal crash protection. Under Standard 208, S4.1.2.1(c)(l), manufacturers who choose the “First Option” may have to satisfy “the rollover crash protection requirements of S5.3.” Thus, the majority’s preemption analysis hinges upon two fortuitous events: (1) the safety option chosen by the manufacturer, and (2) the type of accident. If the option chosen by the manufacturer addresses the safety requirements for the type of accident that caused the plaintiffs injuries, preemption exists. The majority acknowledges this when it says that the plaintiff in theory is preempted from suing on a state common law tort claim, “which alleges that a defective design failed to protect occupants in front-end accidents.” Ante, at 246.
The majority creates a huge range of preemption and a narrow area of non-preemption. For example, had this been a front-end collision, there would have been preemption. Or had Volkswagen chosen the “First Option,” there might have been preemption even as to this rollover incident. I simply do not believe that the Congress ever intended preemption to depend upon such relatively trivial factual distinctions.
I believe that nothing in Myrick changes the substance of our original opinion. The Supreme Court asked us to reconsider things in light of Myrick, but the only effect Myrick has on our opinion is its statement that “Ci-pollone supports an inference that an express pre-emption clause forecloses implied preemption; it does not establish a rule.” — U.S. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 1488. Therefore, Myrick would require us to reach an implied preemption analysis, “[e]ven if § 1392(d) does not expressly extinguish state tort law.” Id. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 1487. If that is all there were to Myrick, and the case before us, I would agree with the majority. But Myrick did not deal with § 1397(k), the savings clause. The Court characterized § 1392(d) as the express preemption clause and § 1397(k) as the savings clause. Id. at -, 115 S.Ct. at 1486. In its dealing with express and implied preemption, the Court looked only to § 1392(d) and not to § 1397(k). The Court said “[w]e also need not address respondents’ claim that the savings clause, § 1397(k), does not permit a manufacturer to use a federal safety standard to immunize itself from state common-law liability.” Id. at-n. 3, 115 S.Ct. at 1487 n. 3.
Myrick simply stands for the proposition that even where an express preemption clause does not extinguish state tort law, one must nevertheless engage in implied preemption analysis. It does not address whether one must engage in implied preemption analysis where there is a savings clause that expressly addresses the issue. The Court also did not have to reach the argument that the term “standard” in 15 U.S.C. § 1392(d) preempts only state statutes and not the common law. Id.
I would now reach these issues. I conclude, as we did in our original opinion, that standards mean standards and not the common law. I also conclude that the savings clause was calculated to prevent any argument to the contrary. I apply Myrick as follows. If you comply with federal safety standards, you may sell your cars in America. That is a necessary condition for the sale of cars in America. No state can interfere with that. But satisfaction of federal standards to sell cars in America is just that. It does not immunize one from state tort liability. Congress could not have chosen words more calculated to express its intent that compliance with standards does not *521preempt state tort liability than the words it chose in § 1397(k). (“Compliance with any Federal motor vehicle standard ... does not exempt any person from any liability under common law.”).
If we only had the express preemption clause, § 1392(d), I would agree with the majority that Myrick would require an implied preemption analysis. But here we have more. We have a savings clause which obviates the need for any narrow implied preemption analysis. “The text’s the thing.” Bank One Chicago v. Midwest Bank & Tr. Co., — U.S.-,-, 116 S.Ct. 637, 646, 133 L.Ed.2d 635 (1996) (Sealia, J., concurring).