Court Opinion

ID: 9959057
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 16:11:09.238106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:24.897025
License: Public Domain

No. 208                April 3, 2024                     693

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

                  STATE OF OREGON,
                  Plaintiff-Respondent,
                            v.
                 ERIC NAKIA RANEY,
                  Defendant-Appellant.
             Washington County Circuit Court
                  19CR79122; A177094

   Oscar Garcia, Judge.
   Argued and submitted August 10, 2023.
   Sara F. Werboff, Deputy Public Defender, argued the
cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Ernest G. Lannet,
Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office of Public
Defense Services.
   Patrick M. Ebbett, Assistant Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F.
Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
  Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, and Mooney, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
   PAGÁN, J.
  Conviction for second-degree assault reversed and remanded;
remanded for resentencing; otherwise affirmed.
694   State v. Raney
Cite as 331 Or App 693 (2024)                                               695

           PAGÁN, J.
         Defendant appeals from a judgment in which he was
convicted of one count of second-degree assault constituting
domestic violence (Count 1) and one count of fourth-degree
assault constituting domestic violence (Count 5).1 Those
charges stem from injuries that the state alleged defendant
caused to D, his then-girlfriend. On appeal, defendant raises
seven assignments of error that we address in the order they
were raised. With respect to the third assignment, we exer-
cise our discretion to review for plain error and conclude
that the trial court plainly erred by not instructing the jury
that it must find a culpable mental state for the physical
injury element of second-degree assault on Count 1. We fur-
ther conclude that, under the circumstances of this case,
that error was not harmless. We thus reverse and remand
Count 1, remand for sentencing, and otherwise affirm.2
         Defendant asserts in his first assignment of error
that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment
of acquittal (MJOA). For purposes of reviewing the denial of
an MJOA, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the state.” State v. Nickles, 299 Or App 561, 562, 451 P3d
624 (2019). The following facts are recited with that stan-
dard in mind. To the extent that we must consider other
facts or view them with a different standard in mind to
address defendant’s other assignments of error, we do so in
conjunction with the analysis of those other assignments.
                                 I.   FACTS
         Defendant and D lived together. In November 2019,
after a night out, D drove defendant home. During the drive,
defendant was intoxicated and argumentative. When they
got to their apartment, D began to park, and defendant
called her a “stupid cunt.” D turned to defendant, swatted
    1
      Defendant was acquitted on Count 2, second-degree assault, and Count 4,
unlawful use of a weapon. The guilty verdict on Count 3, fourth-degree assault,
was merged with the verdict on Count 1.
    2
      We reverse and remand defendant’s conviction on Count 1 and remand the
case for resentencing, which includes entering a new disposition for the count
that was merged into Count 1. See State v. Cockrell, 170 Or App 29, 31, 10 P3d 960
(2000) (reversal of conviction and affirmance of another that had been merged
with it “has the effect of ‘unmerging’ those crimes,” freeing the trial court to
enter judgment and then sentence the defendant on the merged count).
696                                                          State v. Raney

his arm, and said, “I told you to never call me that again.”
Defendant then punched D on the left side of her face with
his right arm.3
        Defendant left the car and went into the apart-
ment; a few minutes later, D followed. Defendant continued
to shout at D as she removed her boots and started to walk
down the carpeted hallway to her bedroom in the back of the
apartment. D recalled walking down the hallway. However,
the next thing she could remember, she was sitting on the
kitchen floor with blood running down her face. D was cry-
ing and in shock; she testified that she told defendant, “I
need help,” to which he responded, “You’re fine[,] there’s
nothing wrong with you.” 4
          D’s 16-year-old daughter, IC, was asleep in her
bedroom but woke up when she heard arguing. IC recalled
hearing D say, “Stop, you’re hurting me,” and then a thud
followed by silence. IC came out of her room and found
D sitting on the kitchen floor, crying. Blood was running
down her face and pooling on the floor where she was sit-
ting. Defendant was standing in the hallway and appeared
“very calm.” D and IC called D’s friend, Saling, and then
called 9-1-1. Saling headed to the apartment and arrived
a few moments before emergency personnel. Saling saw a
lot of blood from an “obvious head injury.” D appeared dis-
oriented. Saling cleaned up much of the blood because she
did not want D’s young son, C, and his friend, A, who were
asleep in the apartment, to see it when they awoke.
         Shortly after, Sherwood Police Officer Chad Brinkman
responded along with medical personal. Brinkman spoke to
defendant and defendant told him that D fell. He also spoke
to D, and she said that her socks were slippery and that she
had slipped. He noted that she was crying and appeared
to be in pain. As a result of her head injury, D went to the
hospital.
        Later that morning, Brinkman and another officer
returned to the apartment because D’s ex-husband wanted

    3
      That conduct constituted the fourth-degree assault charged as Count 5.
    4
      That incident constituted Count 1 and Count 3, with the state’s theory being
that defendant pushed D, causing her to hit her head on an unknown surface.
Cite as 331 Or App 693 (2024)                             697

to retrieve C and A who were still asleep at the apartment.
The police briefly spoke with defendant, and that interac-
tion was recorded by police bodycam. The video evidence
showed the police knocking at the door of the residence and,
after defendant answered, explaining that D’s ex-husband
had requested that C and A be delivered to him. The police
also asked defendant about D and the severity of her inju-
ries. Shortly after that encounter, defendant fled the apart-
ment and did not return. Police tried to find defendant but
were unsuccessful. Defendant contacted D by text, Facebook
messenger, and email. In the emails, defendant expressed
regret but did not admit to assaulting D. He also acknowl-
edged that the police were looking for him. In February 2020,
three months after the incident, defendant was arrested.
          D sustained a two-inch-long, crescent-shaped cut to
the top of her head that required 12 staples to close. D tes-
tified that the injury took months to heal and that she suf-
fered from mild headaches, confusion, and delayed speech.
Ongoing pain left D unable to style or wash her hair prop-
erly for several months and required frequent use of Tylenol.
The wound left a scar in D’s scalp where the hair would not
grow.
         The state charged defendant with second- and
fourth-degree assault, among other crimes. During the trial,
the court instructed all witnesses to wear masks as a pre-
caution against COVID-19. The jury found defendant guilty
of second-degree assault (Count 1) and two counts of fourth
degree assault (Counts 3 and 5). The trial court merged the
guilty verdict for Count 3 into Count 1.
                       II. ANALYSIS
        We consider each assignment of error in the order
they were raised.
A. First Assignment of Error—MJOA
         Defendant contends that the trial court erred by
denying defendant’s MJOA on the second-degree assault
charge, Count 1. Specifically, defendant argues that the
state failed to present sufficient evidence of a “serious phys-
ical injury” under ORS 161.015(8), which requires a “serious
698                                             State v. Raney

and protracted disfigurement” or “protracted impairment
of health.” Defendant admits that D’s scar is a protracted
disfigurement, but contends that, under our case law, the
injury was not “serious” because the scar is not prominent.
           We have addressed whether a scar qualifies as a
serious disfigurement in several cases. See State v. Fields,
304 Or App 763, 766-67, 468 P3d 1029 (2020) (compiling
cases that discuss serious disfigurement). However, we have
not established through a single principle whether a scar is
considered a “serious disfigurement” and instead employ a
case-by-case approach. In Fields, we concluded that a scar’s
“ ‘prominence’ is a factor to consider in determining the seri-
ousness of the disfigurement * * * [but] must be considered
along with the totality of the circumstances presented in
each case.” Id. at 765. An injury is considered “prominent”
if it is visible to other people under ordinary circumstances.
Id.
         We disagree with defendant that D’s injury was
not a “serious disfigurement” under the totality of the cir-
cumstances here. D sustained a two-inch crescent-shaped
gash to her scalp. That injury required 12 surgical staples
to close and left behind a visible scar where the hair did not
grow back. From that evidence, a rational factfinder could
conclude that D suffered a serious and protracted disfigure-
ment. That conclusion is consistent with our jurisprudence,
in which we have held that injuries that require multiple
surgical staples to close and that leave behind prominent
scars several inches in diameter are sufficient to constitute
“serious and protracted disfigurement.” See State v. Kinsey,
293 Or App 208, 213-14, 426 P3d 674 (2018) (concluding that
two-inch scalp laceration, closed with five staples was legally
sufficient to support a determination that D suffered a “pro-
tracted disfigurement,” ORS 137.712(6)(c)(C), and therefore,
a “significant physical injury,” ORS 137.712(2)(b)(B)); State v.
Alvarez, 240 Or App 167, 169-71, 246 P3d 26 (2010), rev den,
350 Or 408 (2011) (holding that a scalp injury requiring
four surgical staples and leaving behind a scar visible five
months after an assault was a “protracted disfigurement”
and a “serious physical injury”); Lambert v. Palmateer, 187
Or App 528, 537-38, 69 P3d 725, rev den, 336 Or 125 (2003)
Cite as 331 Or App 693 (2024)                             699

(concluding that “a two-inch-long, half-inch-wide divot [in
the victim’s forehead]” constituted “serious and protracted
disfigurement” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
        Thus, because D’s injury could be considered a seri-
ous and protracted disfigurement, the trial court did not err
in denying defendant’s MJOA.
B.   Second Assignment of Error—Witnesses Wearing Masks
     While Testifying
         In his second assignment, defendant argues that
the trial court erred by requiring witnesses to wear masks
while testifying. Specifically, defendant contends that the
trial court’s COVID-19 masking and social distancing pre-
cautions violated defendant’s constitutional right to confront
witnesses.
         The Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution both grant criminal defendants the right to
a “face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before
the trier of fact.” Coy v. Iowa, 487 US 1012, 1016, 108 S Ct
2798, 101 L Ed 2d 857 (1988) (discussing federal confron-
tation right under Sixth Amendment to United States
Constitution); State v. Copeland, 353 Or 816, 827-30, 306
P3d 610 (2013) (discussing Oregon confrontation right under
Article I, section 11, of Oregon Constitution). The central
purpose of confrontation is “to ensure the reliability of the
evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to
rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding
before the trier of fact.” Maryland v. Craig, 497 US 836, 845,
110 S Ct 3157, 111 L Ed 2d 666 (1990).
         However, the right to confront witnesses accommo-
dates “important public policy” as long as the four elements of
confrontation—physical presence, oath, cross-examination,
and observation of demeanor by the trier of fact—remain
present. Craig, 497 US at 845-46; cf. Copeland, 353 Or at
822 (recognizing that, although state right “to meet the
witnesses face to face” is “an unqualified statement, to be
sure[,]” the framers did not intend the confrontation rule
to be inflexible); id. at 829-30 (noting that, consistent with
the federal confrontation right, the state confrontation right
700                                             State v. Raney

seeks to prevent the use of ex parte evidence and favors
live witness testimony at trial). Thus, a defendant’s right
to confront witnesses may be satisfied without traditional
face-to-face confrontation at trial where (1) “denial of such
confrontation is necessary to further an important public
policy,” and (2) “the reliability of the testimony is otherwise
assured.” Craig, 497 US at 850.
         Defendant contends that his confrontation rights
were violated because masking may have inhibited the
jury’s ability to assess witness demeanor. Numerous other
state and federal courts have concluded that, due to the sub-
stantial health risks created by the COVID-19 pandemic,
the Confrontation Clause is not violated by having a witness
testify in a criminal proceeding with a mask covering the
nose and mouth. See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 90 F4th
706, 712 (4th Cir 2024) (concluding that the witnesses wear-
ing masks did not, by itself, contravene the Confrontation
Clause because jurors assess credibility not only by facial
expressions, but also by “ ‘the words the witnesses said * * *
how they said them * * * their body language, their pauses,
their mannerisms[,] and all the other intangible factors
that are present in a trial’ ” (quoting Burgess v. Goldstein,
997 F3d 541, 554 (4th Cir 2021))); United States v. James,
No CR-19-08019-001-PCT-DLR, 2020 WL 6081501 at *2
(D Ariz Oct 15, 2020) (concluding that “[b]ecause the cov-
ering of the nose and mouth does not significantly hinder
observation of demeanor, allowing witnesses to testify while
wearing masks does not materially diminish the reliability
of the witnesses’ testimony”); People v. Lopez, 75 Cal App
5th 227, 230, 290 Cal Rptr 3d 383, 384, rev den (2022) (trial
court did not err in denying defendant’s pretrial motion to
remain unmasked during trial and to have witnesses tes-
tify unmasked because masks were “necessary to further
the public policy of ensuring the safety of everyone in the
courtroom during a global pandemic of a highly infectious,
potentially deadly virus”); State v. Cuenca, 171 Idaho 603,
609, 524 P3d 882, 888 (2023) (given necessity of masks to
serve important public interest of protecting health and
safety of those in the courtroom, trial court’s order was suffi-
ciently case-specific, and other aspects of testimony assured
Cite as 331 Or App 693 (2024)                              701

reliability of testimony despite inability to see the mouths of
witnesses).
         In this case, we conclude that the trial court did not
err by requiring testifying witnesses to wear masks under
these circumstances. The trial court’s masking and social
distancing precautions served an important public policy
of preventing the spread of COVID-19 and protecting the
health and safety of those in the courtroom. As explained
above, the primary focus of the confrontation clause is to
protect the reliability of evidence offered by witnesses and
ensure that a defendant and jury have adequate access to
witnesses. State v. Rockafellor, 326 Or App 753, 759-60, 533
P3d 808 (2023). Here, despite the trial court’s precautions,
defendant was still able to confront witnesses and subject
them to cross-examination. The jury was present and able
to assess all aspects of witness demeanor except for the
movements of the nose and mouth. In short, the trial court’s
COVID-19 masking and social distancing precautions
served an important public policy and, to the extent they
affected defendant’s right to confront witnesses, they did not
do so to any unconstitutional degree.
C. Third and Fourth Assignments of Error—Culpable
   Mental State
         In his third and fourth assignments of error, defen-
dant contends that the trial court plainly erred under State
v. Owen, 369 Or 288, 505 P3d 953 (2022), because the court
did not instruct the jury that they were required to find
that defendant acted with a culpable mental state as to the
physical-injury element of second- and fourth-degree assault
in order to convict him.
         In Owen, the Oregon Supreme Court held that, in
assault cases charging a “knowing” mental state, the state
must prove that the defendant knew the assaultive nature
of the defendant’s conduct and that the defendant was at
least criminally negligent as to the risk of the resulting
injury. See 369 Or at 322 (overruling the conclusion in State
v. Barnes, 329 Or 327, 986 P2d 1160 (1999) that no culpa-
ble mental state applied to the result element). The court
further concluded that, although the state must prove that
702                                                           State v. Raney

the defendant was aware of the assaultive nature of their
conduct, the state does not need to prove that the defendant
knew that a physical injury would result. Id. at 320 (adher-
ing to that part of Barnes). In State v. Mckinney/Shiffer, 369
Or 325, 333-34, 505 P3d 946 (2022), the court held that the
trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on a culpable mental
state for the injury element in assault is plain error.
         We may consider an unpreserved error if the error
is plain. Mckinney/Shiffer, 369 Or at 333. “To constitute
plain error, an error must (1) be one of law; (2) be obvious
and not reasonably in dispute; and (3) appear on the face of
the record.” Id. Even if the error is plain, an appellate court
must decide whether to exercise its discretion to consider
the error, and that decision “should be made with utmost
caution.” Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 382,
823 P2d 956 (1991).
         With the above principles in mind, we conclude that
the trial court did not plainly err in failing to instruct the
jury on the negligent risk of injury for fourth-degree assault
(Counts 3 and 5).5 The state alleged that defendant reck-
lessly caused physical injury to D, and unlike “knowingly,”
the state legislature has defined the culpable mental state
   5
       The court instructed the jury on those charges as follows:
       “Count 3, Assault in the Fourth Degree—and this is the count that
   involves witness by a minor child, injury to the top of the head, as alleged.
   Oregon law provides that a person commits the crime of Assault in the Fourth
   Degree in the immediate presence or witnessed by a minor child if the person
   recklessly causes physical injury to another and the assault is committed in
   the immediate presence or witnessed by a minor child.
       “In this case to establish the crime of Assault in the Fourth Degree in
   the immediate presence, witnessed by a minor child, the State must prove
   beyond a reasonable doubt the following elements, that the act occurred on
   or about November 16th, 2019, that [defendant] recklessly caused physical
   injury to [D] and that the assault was committed in the immediate presence
   or was witnessed by [D’s] minor child.
         “* * * * *
       “Count 5, Assault in the Fourth Degree, injury to left side of face, as
   alleged, so Count 5, Oregon law provides that a person commits the crime of
   Assault in the Fourth Degree if the person recklessly causes physical injury
   to another.
       “In this case to establish the crime of Assault in the Fourth Degree, the
   State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following elements, that the
   act occurred on or about November 16th, 2019, that [defendant] recklessly
   caused physical injury to [D].”
Cite as 331 Or App 693 (2024)                                             703

“recklessly” to apply to both result and circumstance ele-
ments. ORS 161.085(9); Owen, 369 Or at 297. Here, the trial
court provided the uniform instructions for “recklessly” and
instructed the jury that, to find that defendant had acted
recklessly, it had to find that defendant “disregard[ed] a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that a particular result
will occur” and that the “risk must be of such a nature and
degree that disregarding it constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
observe in the situation.” Based on those instructions, the
jury would have to find that defendant, by engaging in the
assaultive conduct, disregarded a substantial and unjusti-
fiable risk that D would suffer a physical injury. Therefore,
the trial court did not plainly err in failing to give at least
the criminal negligence instruction as to the physical injury
element of fourth-degree assault, because it is not obvious
and beyond dispute that the recklessness instruction that
the court gave was legally incorrect.
         However, regarding the second-degree assault con-
viction (Count 1), we agree with defendant that the trial court
plainly erred by not instructing the jury as to the culpable
mental state of at least criminal negligence for the serious
physical injury element. Specifically, the court plainly erred
by giving an unclear instruction that the jury was to find, as
a single element, that defendant “knowingly caused serious
physical injury.”6 That instruction misstated the burden in
two capacities. First, it did not state that a defendant must
knowingly engage in assaultive conduct. Second, it did not
state that a defendant must be at least criminally negligent
with respect to causing injury.
       Having concluded that the trial court plainly erred,
we must next determine whether the error was harmless.
     6
       The trial court gave the uniform instruction for second-degree assault as
follows:
        “So in Count 1, Assault in the Second Degree, involves injury to the top
   of the head, as alleged, okay?
       “Oregon law provides that a person commits the crime of Assault in the
   Second Degree if the person knowingly causes serious physical injury to
   another. In this case to establish Assault in the Second Degree, the State
   must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following elements, that the act
   occurred on or about November 16th, 2019, and that [defendant] knowingly
   caused serious physical injury to [D].”
704                                            State v. Raney

Owen, 369 Or at 334-35. We may affirm despite instruc-
tional error if an error had little likelihood of affecting the
verdict. State v. Ashkins, 357 Or 642, 660-61, 357 P3d 490
(2015).
        In considering whether instructional error was
harmless, “we consider the instructions ‘as a whole and in
the context of the evidence and record at trial, including
the parties’ theories of the case with respect to the various
charges and defenses at issue.’ ” Owen, 369 Or at 323 (quot-
ing State v. Payne, 366 Or 588, 609, 468 P3d 445 (2020)).
          Criminal negligence requires a finding that the
defendant “fail[ed] to be aware of a substantial and unjusti-
fiable risk that the result will occur” and “[t]he risk must be
of such nature and degree that the failure to be aware of it
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that
a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” ORS
161.085(10). Here, the state theorized that defendant pushed
D, causing her to sustain a head laceration. However, D had
no memory of the push, and other than hearing D say that
defendant pushed her, no witness testified about the push.
Because there was no evidence of the manner of the push or
its force or aggression, it is plausible that a jury might find
that defendant was not aware of a risk that if he pushed D,
she would sustain a head wound.
         Further, even if there was evidence concerning
the nature of the push, it is not a foregone conclusion that
a jury would find that there was a substantial risk that a
solitary push could cause physical injury and that defen-
dant failed to be aware of it, or that this failure was a gross
deviation from the standard of care of a reasonable person.
See McKinney/Shiffer, 369 Or at 335-36 (concluding that
the trial court’s failure to instruct on the culpable mental
state for second-degree assault was not harmless because
it was not clear that a jury would find “that [the] defendant
failed to be aware of a substantial risk that a solitary punch
would cause a serious physical injury, or that that risk was
of such a nature and degree that [the] defendant’s failure
to be aware of it was a gross deviation from the standard of
care that a reasonable person would observe in the situa-
tion” (emphasis in original)).
Cite as 331 Or App 693 (2024)                                                 705

         Thus, for the above reasons, the error was not harm-
less. Additionally, after considering the factors set forth in
Ailes,7 we conclude that it is appropriate to exercise our dis-
cretion to review the plain error and correct it, based on
the gravity of the error and the ends of justice. We addition-
ally note that we have exercised our discretion to correct a
similar error in the past. See State v. Hatchell, 322 Or App
309, 315-16, 519 P3d 563 (2022). We therefore reverse and
remand the second-degree assault conviction on Count 1.
D. Fifth and Sixth Assignments of Error—Police Bodycam
   Footage
         At trial, the prosecutor moved to admit into evi-
dence bodycam footage from a police officer who spoke to
defendant at his residence a few hours after the incident.
The state argued that, among other things, it showed defen-
dant’s “distracted” demeanor and “explain[ed] why [defen-
dant] fled at that time.” The court allowed the evidence to be
admitted, ruling that it was relevant to the state’s case and
was not unduly prejudicial. In his fifth and sixth assign-
ments of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred
in admitting that footage because the evidence was not rel-
evant to any issue in the case and was unduly prejudicial,
and that the state’s relevancy argument depended on an
impermissible character inference.
         Whether evidence is relevant is reviewed as a mat-
ter of law. State v. Titus, 328 Or 475, 481, 982 P2d 1133
(1999). A trial court’s decision to admit evidence over an
objection that its probative value is outweighed by its prej-
udicial effect is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Knight, 343 Or 469, 484, 173 P3d 1210 (2007).
         In this case, the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in determining that the probative value of the evi-
dence was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair
    7
      In deciding whether to exercise discretion to review a plain error, Ailes
directed courts to consider factors such as:
    “the competing interests of the parties; the nature of the case; the gravity of
    the error; the ends of justice in the particular case; how the error came to the
    court’s attention; and whether the policies behind the general rule requiring
    preservation of error have been served in the case in another way[.]”
312 Or at 382 n 6.
706                                                          State v. Raney

prejudice under OEC 403.8 It is well-settled that evidence of
a person’s flight is admissible as relevant to show conscious-
ness of guilt. See State v. Barr, 62 Or App 46, 51, 660 P2d
169 (1983) (evidence that defendant fled the state after being
released on bail was admissible as evidence of guilt). Here,
the video—in which defendant can be seen nervously engag-
ing with the police—permits the inference that defendant
realized that he was in trouble. It thus provided relevant
context for his decision to flee shortly thereafter. Further,
to the extent that defendant’s slightly strained interaction
with police was prejudicial because it presented him, as he
argues on appeal, as a “hostile” and “uncooperative” per-
son, defendant could have requested a limiting instruction.
See State v. Terry, 309 Or App 459, 465, 482 P3d 105 (2021)
(“The evidence, although potentially inflammatory, could be
addressed through a limiting instruction.”). However, he did
not do so. We thus conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by admitting into evidence bodycam footage of
defendant talking with police.
          Because we reverse and remand on defendant’s third
assignment of error, we do not need to resolve defendant’s
seventh assignment of error, which contends that the trial
court erred by imposing a 70-month sentence on Count 1.
See, e.g., State v. Colgrove, 308 Or App 441, 446, 480 P3d
1026 (2021) (not reaching additional claims because the case
already was being remanded for resentencing).
       Conviction for second-degree assault reversed and
remanded; remanded for resentencing; otherwise affirmed.

   8
       OEC 403 provides:
       “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
   substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
   issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay or needless
   presentation of cumulative evidence.”