Court Opinion

ID: 9716414
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:38:21.08211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:45.454729
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McDADE, dissenting: In 2004, a different panel of this court unanimously decided the case of People v. Phillips, 352 Ill. App. 3d 867, 817 N.E.2d 566 (2004). In it, we found that in order for a stipulation of evidence by defense counsel to comport with the principle of the defendant’s right to be confronted with adversarial evidence and witnesses, there must be an affirmative showing on the record that the defendant did not object to or dissent from counsel’s decision to stipulate. Phillips, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 871, 817 N.E.2d at 571. The decision in Phillips relied on the supreme court’s decision in People v. Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d 203, 802 N.E.2d 1205 (2003), in which the court held that “counsel in a criminal case may waive his client’s sixth amendment right of confrontation by stipulating to the admission of evidence as long as the defendant does not object to or dissent from his attorney’s decision, and where the decision to stipulate is a matter of legitimate trial tactics or prudent trial strategy.” Campbell, 208 Ill. 2d at 220-21, 802 N.E.2d at 1215. We considered this principle in light of the supreme court’s statement, in People v. McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d 127, 729 N.E.2d 470 (2000), that the “ ‘[wjaiver of a constitutional right is valid only if it is clearly established that there was “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” ’ [Citations.]” and that “[s]uch waivers must not only be voluntary, but must be ‘ “knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” ’ [Citations.]” McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d at 137, 729 N.E.2d at 476. We concluded from this language that there must be some evidence that the defendant understood the right that was being given up by defense counsel’s stipulation. Although Campbell holds that defense counsel may stipulate in the absence of the defendant’s objection, that lack of objection is meaningless if the defendant does not understand the consequences of the stipulation or is not given a reasonable chance to object. McClanahan, as well as the plain language of both the federal and state constitutional confrontation guarantees, makes clear that the right to confront witnesses is a right personal to the defendant. As Campbell illustrates, defense counsel may be authorized to exercise this right on defendant’s behalf. Nevertheless, the right must be knowingly and intelligently waived. Absent any evidence on the record that the defendant was aware of the power of counsel to stipulate or the possible consequences of stipulation, but nevertheless did not object to the stipulation, we could not find that the defendant’s waiver of that right was knowing and intelligent. According to the majority in this case, Phillips was wrongly decided. The majority argues that the decision in Phillips misinterpreted Campbell by requiring affirmative evidence of the defendant’s failure to object to the stipulation. The majority characterizes this as the same rationale rejected by Campbell. I do not agree with this evaluation. Campbell rejected the notion that a defendant must explicitly waive the right to confrontation in order for a stipulation to be constitutionally proper. Phillips is not inconsistent with that holding. Despite the majority’s characterization of the decision, Phillips does not require an explicit waiver of the right to confrontation. What it does require is some affirmative showing on the record that the stipulation and its meaning and possible effects were brought to the attention of the defendant by counsel. As I have already stated, the lack of an objection is meaningless if the defendant does not understand what is going on. It is, then, not accurate to state, as does the majority, that the Phillips decision requires that the defendant explicitly waive his confrontation rights. Rather, it only requires that there be a showing on the record that the defendant had the opportunity and understanding necessary to assert them, if he or she so chose. This is not a conclusion that is contrary to Campbell, as the majority asserts, but rather is the approach that best incorporates the principles of Campbell, Mc-Clanahan, and the constitutional guarantee of the right to confrontation. Therefore, because I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of Phillips and its application of Campbell to this case, I respectfully dissent.