Court Opinion

ID: 9929498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 20:02:20.704781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:25:04.883633
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/2/24 P. v. Knox CA1/3
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     A167100
 v.                                                                      (Napa County Super. Ct.
 ERNEST LEO KNOX III,                                                    No. 19CR001192)

           Defendant and Appellant.

         Ernest Leo Knox III pled no contest to inflicting corporal injury on a
spouse in Napa County. The trial court sentenced him to four years in
prison, suspended execution of the sentence, and placed him on probation.
Knox committed an offense in Sacramento County; as a result, the court in
Napa County revoked probation and imposed sentence. He now argues the
court erred by denying his request to apply pretrial custody credits related to
his Sacramento offense to his Napa sentence. He also contends the probation
revocation violated his right to due process. We affirm.
                                                  BACKGROUND
         In April 2019 — in Napa County — Knox punched his wife in the head
multiple times and strangled her.1 Officers arrested him later that day. In
June 2019, he pled no contest to corporal injury on a spouse (Napa offense).
(Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a); further undesignated statutory references are

         1 We provide additional facts when discussing Knox’s arguments.

                                                               1
to this code.) In September 2019, the trial court sentenced him to four years
in prison and suspended execution of the sentence pending successful
completion of three years of probation.
      In July 2020 — in Sacramento County and while on probation for the
Napa offense — Knox hit his wife with a heavy drinking glass, causing a five-
inch laceration to her cheek that exposed muscle tissue. In July 2021, the
trial court convicted him of inflicting corporal injury on his spouse
(Sacramento offense), and sentenced him to four years in prison (Sacramento
sentence). (§ 273.5, subd. (a).)
      In September 2020, while criminal proceedings were pending in
Sacramento County, the Napa County Probation Department filed a
probation revocation petition based on Knox’s failure to provide notice of a
change of address (the first petition). The Napa County Superior Court
revoked probation and issued a bench warrant the same day. In October
2021 — four days after arriving at prison to serve his Sacramento sentence —
Knox learned of the warrant. He “request[ed] disposition of untried charges
in accordance with Penal Code (PC) Section 1381.” The court arraigned him
on the first petition in November 2021. In December 2021, the prosecutor
filed a second probation revocation petition (the second petition), this time
based on the Sacramento offense. In March 2022, the prosecution dismissed
the first petition.
      In May 2022, Knox completed his Sacramento sentence. Thereafter, he
remained in custody to face the second petition. In July, the Napa County
Superior Court found the allegations in the second petition true and, on
August 16, it terminated probation, sentenced Knox to prison for one year to
be served consecutively to the Sacramento sentence, and granted him 406
days of credit for time served.

                                        2
      On August 30, 2022, the Department of Corrections notified the Napa
County Superior Court Knox had completed his Sacramento sentence and,
because there was no other active case at the time of the August 16 sentence,
the sentence may have been in error. In January 2023, the court recalled and
vacated the August 16 sentence. It then terminated probation, executed the
sentence imposed in September 2019, recalled the sentence pursuant to
former section 1170.03 and resentenced Knox to three years in prison (the
January sentence). The court credited him with 429 days for time served.
                               DISCUSSION
      Knox contends the Napa County Superior Court erroneously denied
him presentence custody and conduct credit for the time he served for his
Sacramento offense — from the time of his arrest in Sacramento through the
completion of his Sacramento sentence — when it imposed the January
sentence.2 The Attorney General argues — and Knox does not contest —
Knox already completed his January sentence, rendering the issue moot.
(Reygoza v. Superior Court (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 514, 519, fn. 4 [where
defendant does not contest factual assertion in reply, we assume there is no
factual dispute].) We agree with the Attorney General. Since Knox has
already been released, awarding him presentence custody credit would
not ameliorate any prejudicial consequences. (People v. Valencia (2014)
226 Cal.App.4th 326, 329 [where “no prejudicial collateral consequences
would be ameliorated by awarding defendant . . . presentence custody credit,
the issue is moot”].)

      2 Knox asserts — and the Attorney General does not dispute — he

remained in custody through this entire period.
                                      3
      Knox next contends the probation revocation proceedings denied him
due process, unfairly and detrimentally prolonging his time in custody and
limiting the sentencing options available to him. We disagree.
      After filing the first petition in September 2020, the Napa County
Probation Department made no effort to locate Knox. The department knew
he was residing in Sacramento County, regularly visited a person at a
Sacramento location known to his probation officer, and had been reporting
regularly until his Sacramento arrest. But Knox did not learn of the
revocation proceedings until October 2021, when he arrived at prison to
serve his Sacramento sentence. He then immediately sent a section 1381
demand — a request for disposition of any untried charges — to the Napa
County Sheriff. He never informed the probation department of his
Sacramento offense.
      The prosecutor filed the second petition in December 2021,
approximately 17 months after the arrest for the Sacramento offense, five
months after his conviction, and two months after he arrived at prison to
serve his Sacramento sentence. Knox was transferred to the custody of the
Napa County Sheriff in April 2022 to face the petition. After his arrival, the
trial court tried to advance the petition hearing to May, but Knox refused.
The court held the hearing in July and found the Sacramento offense violated
Knox’s probation. Knox admits he never disputed the violation.
      First, relying on People v. Johnson (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 510
(Johnson), Knox argues the probation department had an affirmative duty to
locate him — or at least to try and locate him — and notify him of the first
petition. He claims that had the department made minimal efforts, such as
performing a record check, he could have arranged a concurrent disposition

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between his two offenses with more credit for time served. This argument
fails.
         In Johnson, the defendant — a probationer whose imposition of
sentence had been suspended on his first offense before he was committed
to prison for a second offense — argued the trial court lacked jurisdiction
to revoke probation on the first offense because the speedy or expedited
sentencing requirements of sections 1203.2a and 1381 had not been
met. (Johnson, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at p. 512; People v. Hall (1997)
59 Cal.App.4th 972, 985–986.) Section 1203.2a offers “speedy sentencing
procedures for probationers incarcerated for another offense.” (People v.
Wagner (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1039, 1050.) “It provides one set of procedures for
probation with the imposition of sentence suspended and other procedures for
probation with the execution of sentence suspended.”3 (Ibid.) Similarly,
section 1381 provides expedited sentencing procedures for a defendant who
“ ‘has been convicted,’ ” “ ‘sentenced[,]’ ” and “ ‘entered upon the term of
imprisonment’ ” in one case and “ ‘there is pending . . . any [other] criminal
proceeding wherein the defendant remains to be sentenced.’ ” (Wagner,
at p. 1049, italics and brackets added, original italics omitted.) “[C]ases have
interpreted section 1381 as requiring authorities to notify prisoners of
pending proceedings so that they may invoke their right to request prompt
disposition of those pending proceedings.” (Hall, at p. 985.) The Johnson
court “decided that notification of charges under section 1381 should

         3 A trial court may grant probation by either suspending imposition of

sentence, or by imposing the sentence and suspending its execution. (People
v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 932.) When a court imposes sentence but
suspends its execution — as the Napa County Superior Court did here — a
sentence has been imposed, and the court must order execution of the
originally imposed sentence if it revokes probation. (People v. Howard (1997)
16 Cal.4th 1081, 1087–1088.)
                                         5
similarly apply to an unsentenced probationer under section 1203.2a.” (Hall,
at p. 985.)
      But here the duty in Johnson does not apply. (People v. Hall, supra,
59 Cal.App.4th at p. 985.) Unlike in Johnson, Knox had already been
sentenced for the Napa offense, and the execution of that sentence had
merely been suspended. (Johnson, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at p. 512.)
Although a probationer whose imposition of sentence has been suspended
“may request prompt sentencing for the pending case, a probationer . . . who
has already been sentenced but who has had the execution of that sentence
suspended[] has no right under section 1203.2a to make such a request for
sentencing.” (Hall, at p. 985, italics added.) “Therefore, the notice which was
required in Johnson in order to effectuate the probationer’s right to request
sentencing is unnecessary where that sentencing has already taken place.”
(Ibid.)
      More importantly, even if Johnson did apply, Knox did receive timely
notice of both probation revocation proceedings. Sections 1203.2a and 1381
only apply where defendants have already been “incarcerated” or begun a
“ ‘term of imprisonment’ ” for their second offense, not where a defendant is
in custody awaiting trial on a second offense. (People v. Wagner, supra,
45 Cal.4th at pp. 1049–1050.) For example, in Johnson, the probation
department failed to notify the defendant of probation revocation proceedings
while he was serving his second prison sentence. (Johnson, supra,
195 Cal.App.3d at p. 512.) Here, Knox received notice of the first petition
when he began his Sacramento sentence. He admits he learned of the
petition within four days of arriving at prison, and he promptly made a
section 1381 demand. He does not contend he received delayed notice of the
second petition.

                                       6
      Second, he argues the prosecution impermissibly delayed bringing the
second petition, thus denying him due process. We disagree.
      Although delay in criminal prosecution before the accused is arrested
or the complaint is filed may constitute a denial of due process, probation
revocation is not a criminal prosecution. (Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S.
778, 781–782; People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 107; People v. Cambitsis
(1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 141, 144.) “[T]he full panoply of rights accorded a
defendant in a criminal trial are not required in . . . probation revocation
hearings.” (Cambitsis, at p. 144.) Due process requires only that the
revocation hearing be held within a reasonable time after a probationer has
been taken into custody. (Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 488;
Scarpelli, at p. 782.)
      Here, Knox received a hearing on the second petition within three
months of being taken into custody on the petition. The trial court held the
hearing in July 2022, after Knox was transferred to Napa in April. Moreover,
the court tried to advance the hearing to May, but Knox refused. Lastly,
Knox admits he never disputed he violated probation. Therefore the delay, if
any, did not prejudice Knox in defending against the petition. (In re La Croix
(1974) 12 Cal.3d 146, 154 [a delay in a revocation hearing is not a violation of
due process where it appears that no unfairness resulted].)
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

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                                _________________________
                                RODRÍGUEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
FUJISAKI, Acting P. J.

_________________________
PETROU, J.

A167100

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