Court Opinion

ID: 9931301
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 19:01:26.852687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:06.204220
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 8 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LOVEPREET SINGH,                                No. 22-2085
                                                Agency No.
             Petitioner,                        A206-445-723
 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                           Submitted February 5, 2024**
                             San Francisco, California

Before: R. NELSON, FORREST, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

       Petitioner Lovepreet Singh, a citizen of India, seeks review of the Board of

Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Singh also

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
alleges the BIA abused its discretion in rejecting his ineffective assistance of counsel

claim. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and we deny the petition.

      1.     Asylum and Withholding of Removal. To succeed on his asylum claim,

Singh must prove that he “is unable or unwilling to return to his home country

because of a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of race, religion,

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Udo v.

Garland, 32 F.4th 1198, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). A petitioner may

establish a well-founded fear of future persecution by proving past persecution, or

by demonstrating that he has a subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable fear

of future persecution. Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028–29 (9th Cir.

2019). A petitioner alleging past persecution, “has the burden of establishing that (1)

his treatment rises to the level of persecution; (2) the persecution was on account of

one or more protected grounds; and (3) the persecution was committed by the

government, or by forces that the government was unable or unwilling to control.”

Flores Molina v. Garland, 37 F.4th 626, 633 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).

      In August 2013, Indian police officers entered Singh’s family home and

arrested his father in front of the family. Singh believes the arrest occurred because

his father had attended a separatist Shiromani Akali Dal (Amritsar) Mann Party rally

the previous day. Singh’s brother repeatedly visited the police station to look for

their father and then disappeared himself in November 2013. The following month,

                                         2                                    22-2085
armed police came to the family home asking about Singh’s father and brother,

accused the men of being terrorists, slapped Singh, and called his father a “Khalistani

dog.”

        Singh’s encounters with police in India do not compel a conclusion of past

persecution. While violence against an applicant’s family may support a claim for

asylum, see Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112, 1120 (9th Cir. 2004), Singh could

only speculate whether the police might be involved in his family members’

disappearances. Moreover, Singh did not personally witness any physical harm to

his family members.

        As for his remaining claims of injury, police officers slapped Singh one time,

and he did not suffer significant injury or seek medical treatment. See Aden v.

Wilkinson, 989 F.3d 1073, 1083 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[A] one-off, minor physical assault

followed by a life of unrestrained religious practice or political expression may not

compel the conclusion that a person has suffered persecution . . . .”); Sharma v.

Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1061 (9th Cir. 2021) (“The first, and often a significant

consideration, is whether the petitioner was subject to ‘significant physical

violence,’ and, relatedly, whether he suffered serious injuries that required medical

treatment.” (citation omitted)).

        Singh must establish a subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable well-

founded fear of future persecution. Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1029. Singh did

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not satisfy the objective prong of this test because he cannot point to “credible,

direct, and specific evidence in the record of facts that would support a reasonable

fear of persecution.” Rusak v. Holder, 734 F.3d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting

Duarte de Guinac v. INS, 179 F.3d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999)). And because Singh

is unable to establish a reasonable possibility of future persecution, as required for

asylum, he “necessarily fails to satisfy the more stringent [more likely than not to

suffer future persecution] standard for withholding of removal.” Silva v. Garland,

993 F.3d 705, 719 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Mansour v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 667, 673

(9th Cir. 2004)).

       2.     CAT Protection. To qualify for CAT protection, a petitioner must show

it is “more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed

country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). Because Singh failed to demonstrate

a likelihood of persecution, he necessarily cannot demonstrate a likelihood of

torture, which is a more extreme form of mistreatment. See Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1067

(“Because the BIA could reasonably conclude that [petitioner’s] past harm did not

rise to the level of persecution, it necessarily falls short of the definition of torture.”).

       3.     Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. “The right to effective assistance of

counsel in immigration proceedings stems from the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee

of due process.” Salazar-Gonzalez v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 917, 921 (9th Cir. 2015); see

also Ortiz v. INS, 179 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Ineffective assistance of

                                            4                                      22-2085
counsel in a deportation proceeding is a denial of due process under the Fifth

Amendment if the proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that the alien was

prevented from reasonably presenting his case.” (citation omitted)). To prevail on an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must make two showings.

First, the petitioner must show that his counsel’s conduct was “egregious,” rendering

the proceeding “so fundamentally unfair that [petitioner] was prevented from

reasonably presenting his case.” Hernandez-Ortiz v. Garland, 32 F.4th 794, 801 (9th

Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). This court has typically found “egregious”

circumstances where “counsel’s conduct effectively prevented the petitioner from

pursuing relief.” Id. at 802. Second, the petitioner must show “substantial prejudice,”

meaning that counsel’s deficient performance affected the outcome of the

proceedings. Id. at 801 (citation omitted); see also Lin v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 1014,

1024 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Castillo–Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 527 (9th Cir.

2000)).

      Singh cannot show that his counsel’s conduct was “so fundamentally unfair

that [he] was prevented from reasonably presenting his case” and that counsel’s

performance was so inadequate that it likely affected the outcome of the

proceedings. Hernandez-Ortiz, 32 F.4th at 802. Counsel’s failure to articulate

Singh’s membership in his family as a particular social group did not affect the

outcome of his claims for relief because Singh cannot establish persecution or that

                                         5                                   22-2085
the alleged persecution was on account of his familial ties, foreclosing the possibility

that his family membership could have been the basis for a successful claim. See

Lkhagvasuren v. Lynch, 849 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 2016). This deficiency

undermines his claims for relief and establishes that he was not prejudiced by his

former attorney’s failure to articulate family membership as a basis for Singh’s

claims for relief.

      PETITION DENIED.

                                         6                                    22-2085