Court Opinion

ID: 9754405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:59:04.678453+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:40.355708
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge SMITH-RIBNER.
This case involves nothing less than a totally illegal home invasion perpetrated by the police, which the majority sanctions by upholding a suspension of Lesa Norn-hold’s driving privileges for her refusal to submit to chemical testing. Therefore, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that this case is no different from others where the legality of an arrest has been held to be irrelevant to whether the Department of Transportation (Department) met its burden in a chemical testing refusal case. The Department asserts that nothing occurred here that should shock the conscience of the Court, but I vehemently disagree.
The Department stresses in its brief certain findings made by the trial court that were consistent with the testimony of Trooper Michael Connelly and on some points inconsistent with that of Nornhold, the driver whose license was suspended, and of Shane Yanscyoc, her passenger. The following recitation of facts is in accordance with Trooper Connelly’s testimony or with points on which there was no disagreement. Trooper Connelly testified that around 1:15 a.m. he observed the car driven by Nornhold make a turn on to Orange Street without signaling; that it traveled on the left side of Orange Street, which is a two-lane, unmarked roadway, with no other traffic on the road, and that it then made a left turn on to a one-way street and parked near the end, on the left side, where parking was permitted on both sides. Trooper Connelly never activated his overhead lights, and Nornhold was not pulled over by the police. Trooper Con-nelly pulled alongside the parked vehicle, and when he did so the passenger door of Nornhold’s vehicle opened and made contact with the rear wheel well of the police vehicle, resulting in very minor damage, which Trooper Connelly agreed was a “scratch” that could be buffed out. Trooper Connelly discussed the incident with Vanscyoc.
Trooper Connelly testified that during that discussion Nornhold got out of the vehicle and walked across the street to her house and opened the door with a key and entered. He stated that the other trooper called to Nornhold to stop, guessing it was five or six times, but she ignored him and *66went into the residence. According to Trooper Connelly’s testimony, therefore, the troopers made no other effort to stop and question Nornhold before she entered her house. The trial court accepted Trooper Connelly’s statement that shortly thereafter he knocked on the door. Norn-hold answered, and Trooper Connelly advised her that he needed to see her driver’s license, owner’s card and insurance card. He testified that Nornhold screamed at him that he did not need to see those cards and attempted to close the door in his face. Trooper Connelly testified that he stopped the door from closing, that Nornhold retreated into her house and that he followed her.
Trooper Connelly stated that Nornhold profanely told him to leave her house but that he attempted to explain to her that her car had been involved in an accident and that she was required to produce those cards. He testified that she attempted to go upstairs in her home, but he followed her until he caught her halfway up the stairs, grabbed her and then escorted her down the stairs. According to the trooper, his purpose in knocking on the door was “[t]o obtain her driver’s information for the purpose of accident investigation.” N.T. at 32. He stated that he told her why he needed the information after he stopped her slamming the door in his face and followed her into the house, thus indicating that he did not announce his identity and authority and purpose when he knocked. Id. When Trooper Connelly grabbed Nornhold on the stairs she fell. Id. at 33. When he restrained her he came close to her and smelled alcohol on her breath, and he decided at that point that she might be intoxicated and that he should begin an investigation for DUI. Id. at 34. After some searching, Nornhold found her purse and produced her driver’s license. Trooper Connelly escorted her out to her car to retrieve the registration and insurance cards. He then conducted field sobriety tests and placed Nornhold under arrest. At the State Police barracks Trooper Connelly recorded Norn-hold’s responses to attempts to administer breath tests as refusals.
The Department relies on Department of Transportation v. Wysocki, 517 Pa. 175, 535 A.2d 77 (1987), and its progeny. In Wysocki a driver sought to challenge his suspension for refusal to submit to chemical testing by challenging the constitutionality of the roadblock that led to his arrest. The Supreme Court held that the Department’s authority to suspend a driver’s license, conferred by the law known as the Implied Consent Law, Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code, as amended, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547, was not conditioned on the validity of the arrest that gave rise to the request for the breathalyzer test and that the only fact necessary to the administrative determination was the driver’s refusal to comply with the breathalyzer request after being taken into custody.
- In my view, what occurred in this case was so outrageous and so shockingly at odds with all accepted rules of law relating to searches and seizures and arrests in the home as to render these circumstances qualitatively different from an ordinary situation where a challenge is raised to some aspect of an arrest. First, I note that Trooper Connelly offered no legal rationale to support his admittedly forcible entry into Nornhold’s home when he prevented her from closing the door and acted contrary to her express direction not to enter her house. He stated that his object was to secure driver’s and automobile information from her in regard to the “accident” he was investigating, but he did not explain why he was privileged to enter her house against her wishes and without a warrant.
*67Section 6308 of the Vehicle Code, as amended, 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308, provides in Subsection (b) that whenever a police officer is engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers or has reasonable suspicion that a violation of the Vehicle Code is occurring or has occurred, he or she may stop a vehicle upon request or signal to check the vehicle’s registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine number or the driver’s license or to secure such other information as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the Vehicle Code. This provision authorizes stopping a vehicle on the road and checking information, but that is not what happened in this case. Here although the trooper claimed to have witnessed violations, he chose not to stop the car, and Nornhold arrived safely home and parked and entered her house. Nothing in Section 6308(b) authorizes forcible, warrant-less entry into a person’s home to check the specified information.
Similarly, Sections 3743 and 3744 of the Vehicle Code, as amended, 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3743 and 3744, require the driver of a motor vehicle that is involved in an accident resulting only in damage to a vehicle or other property that is driven or attended by another person to remain at the scene and to provide his or her name, address, registration number of the vehicle and upon request to exhibit his or her driver’s license and insurance information to the person attending the vehicle or to any police officer at the scene investigating the accident. Nothing in these substantive provisions, however, states or implies that all normal rules regarding searches are simply abrogated if a police officer seeks this particular information.
The Supreme Court reviewed the law relating to a warrantless entry of a residence in Commonwealth v. Roland, 535 Pa. 595, 599-600, 637 A.2d 269, 270-271 (1994) (citations omitted):
In a private home, “searches and seizures without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.... ” Absent probable cause and exigent circumstances, the entry of a home without a warrant is prohibited under the Fourth Amendment. In determining whether exigent circumstances exist, a number of factors are to be considered. As stated in Commonwealth v. Wagner, 486 Pa. 548, 557, 406 A.2d 1026, 1031 (1979),
Among the factors to be considered are: (1) the gravity of the offense, (2) whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed, (3) whether there is above and beyond a clear showing of probable cause, (4) whether there is strong reason to believe that the suspect is within the premises being entered, (5) whether there is a likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended, (6) whether the entry was peaceable, and (7) the time of the entry, i.e., whether it was made at night. These factors are to be balanced against one another in determining whether the warrantless intrusion was justified.
Other factors may also be taken into account, such as whether there is hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, a likelihood that evidence will be destroyed if police take the time to obtain a warrant, or a danger to police or other persons inside or outside the dwelling. Nevertheless, “police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests.”
As stated in Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. [740] at 750-53, 104 S.Ct. [2091] at 2098-99, 80 L.Ed.2d [732] at 743-45,
Before agents of the government may invade the sanctity of the home, the *68burden is on the government to demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all war-rantless home entries.
[I]t is difficult to conceive of a war-rantless home arrest that would not be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the underlying offense is extremely minor.
... [Application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense ... has been committed.
The Department argues that exigent circumstances demanded that Trooper Con-nelly remain in the residence to convert his investigation from one involving damage to the patrol car to one involving possible DUI, because blood alcohol content dissipates. I note that this argument does not even claim that exigent circumstances justified the initial forcible, war-rantless entry. According to the trooper’s own testimony he was doing nothing more than seeking information regarding the accident investigation when he went to the door and when he entered, and he formed the intent to investigate for DUI after that. He was not investigating any crime, and the “accident” involved was a scratch to a wheel well. Even assuming that Trooper Connelly was investigating for DUI when he knocked, the Department has suggested nothing more than that it would be difficult to obtain a timely warrant under the circumstances, not that it would be impossible.
That the entry was forcible is beyond dispute. Remarkably, the Department asserts that Trooper Connelly did nothing shocking: “He. did not break down the door and he did not do anything worse once inside than to ask Nornhold to find her driver’s license, vehicle registration and insurance card.” Brief of Appellant at 33. This is contrary to the trooper’s testimony that when Nornold attempted to slam the door in his face, “I stopped the door from that, and as she retreated into the house, I followed her in.” N.T. at 8. Thus, but for his forcibly preventing it, Nornhold would have closed the door. Further, once inside, he rejected repeated orders from Nornhold for him to get out of her house, and when she tried to go up the stairs he pursued her and grabbed her, causing her to fall, and then escorted her back downstairs. As a uniformed state trooper, Trooper Connelly in all likelihood was armed during this encounter, and in view of the normal considerations regarding warrantless entry into a residence discussed in Roland, which principles must be applied by one entrusted with the authority of a state trooper, there is no question that Trooper Connelly’s unjustified actions went beyond the merely unreasonable and into the realm of the shocking.
I recognize that in cases such as Wy-socki, with its challenge to the constitutionality of a roadblock, and Menosky v. Commonwealth, 121 Pa.Cmwlth. 464, 550 A.2d 1372 (1988), where a son led police into the house of the owner of a van that struck a pole, the courts have held that a lawful arrest is not a prerequisite to a valid license suspension proceeding. Nevertheless, I believe that even the court that decided Wysocki would not grant tacit approval to the utterly outrageous conduct of the State Trooper in this particular case and would hold that such conduct may not form the basis for any legitimate request for testing. The conduct of the police in this case should not be endorsed by any court. Therefore, I dissent.