Court Opinion

ID: 9670379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:19:41.660273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:04.159203
License: Public Domain

Riley, C.J.
(dissenting). The foundation of the majority opinion is a rather limited view of the purpose underlying representative designations of Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board members. The majority finds that interest designations do not require an agency relationship between board members and their constituency, but are designed to insure a board which reflects members who are "typical of the professionals active in various aspects of workers’ compensation law.” Ante, p 616. Thus, the majority concludes that the interest designations are intended to provide only a diversity of viewpoints and experience among board members. Ante, pp 614-616.
I agree with the majority that a board member’s designation does not create an agency relationship between the member and the interest group represented. If that were the case, the board members would be required to act in all circumstances in such a manner as to further the interests of their constituency. Of course, that is not the case as board members are not bound by their interest designations and, in fact, often vote contrary to their specific designation.
By focusing on, and overstating, what the interest designation is not — an agency relationship— the majority obscures what the designation does reflect — knowledge, experience, interest, and alignment with the particular group being represented. This is not to imply that members of one interest designation cannot judge the merits of a case *632brought by a member of the other interest group. However, in so judging, it is clear that a board member will use past experience and alignments in reaching a decision regarding a case. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that a board member’s knowledge and experience may tip the balance in some cases and that that slant will be in favor of the board member’s interest designation.
As a result, even if I agreed with the majority regarding the limited nature of a board member’s representational interest, which I do not,1 I would find a due process violation where the panel is not balanced. In Vayiar v Vic Tanny Int’l, 114 Mich App 388, 392; 313 NW2d 286 (1982), the Court held that due process is violated where "a majority of a decision-making panel is strongly identified and aligned with one of the parties (but not the other) . . . .” Thus, the Court decided that a three-member wcab panel (under the former act) comprised of two employee representatives and one employer representative was violative of due process. Because employee representatives are, "by definition, identified and aligned with the interests of employees who appear before the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board” the defendant em*633ployer was denied an impartial decisionmaker. Id. at 392.
The Vayiar Court was influenced by the fact that providing an alternative procedure — one member from each interest designation — would impose no greater fiscal or administrative burden on the state:
Where an alternative procedure posing a much smaller risk of prejudice by a decision-maker will impose no greater administrative burden on the state, it should not be necessary to prove that erroneous deprivations are likely under the present procedure, but only that the present procedure poses a substantial risk of bias in the decision-maker. We find that the defendants have made such a showing; consequently, they are entitled to a new hearing before the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board. [Id. at 393.]
The Court in Williams v Chrysler Corp, 159 Mich App 8; 406 NW2d 222 (1987), addressed a due process challenge to a panel comprised precisely the same as the panel in this case. The Williams Court recognized that Vayiar was somewhat factually distinguishable but that the rationale underlying Vayiar applied. Id. at 19.
[W]e agree that employee representatives are, by definition, aligned and identified with employee interests. . . . [W]e hold that, even though the employee representative does not constitute a majority of the wcab panel but, in fact, is only one-half of it, Chrysler was nonetheless denied its right to a fair and impartial hearing because it must be presumed that the employee representative was already aligned with plaintiff’s position. We believe that the fact that an employer representative would be added to the panel in the event of a tie vote between one member already aligned with plaintiff and a neutral member is insufficient *634to overcome the initial partiality inherent in the original two-member wcab panel. We further note that it would impose no greater financial burden on the state to provide an alternative decision-making procedure which would greatly reduce the risk of prejudice: namely, providing for two-member panels composed of either one employee and one employer representative or two general-public representatives. ... In either case, a split may be resolved by a general public representative. [Id.]
I agree with the decision in Williams. I would vacate the opinion of the wcab and remand this case to be decided by a wcab panel comprised of one employee and one employer representative or two general public representatives.
Griffin, J., concurred with Riley, C.J.

 That the Legislature intended a stronger representational relationship than that expressed by the majority is indicated by the legislative history of the workers’ compensation act which evidences that the Legislature regards unbalanced panels to be unfair. Prior to 1980, hearing panels were assigned randomly without taking into account interest designations of the members, the result of which was that some panels were comprised of a majority of members of either particular interest group (though not necessarüy solely of members of one interest designation, as stated by the majority. See ante, p 608-609). These unbalanced panels resulted in several constitutional challenges. See ante, p 609, n 14. However, in 1980, the Legislature amended the act to require that the panels include one member from each interest designation. 1980 PA 357, § 261(2). The majority notes this revision, ante, p 609, then blithely proceeds to ignore the obvious implication — that being a legislative acknowledgment that unbalanced panels are not particularly fair.