Court Opinion

ID: 9401350
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-12 20:05:48.506287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:52.309167
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 220042-U

                                                                                    FIRST DISTRICT,
                                                                                    FIRST DIVISION
                                                                                    June 12, 2023

                                               No. 1-22-0042

     NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
     limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
     ______________________________________________________________________________

                                         IN THE
                             APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
     ______________________________________________________________________________

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,      )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
            Plaintiff-Appellee,                 )     Cook County
                                                )
      v.                                        )     No. 18 CR 08079
                                                )
      ANDREW COFFILL,                           )     Honorable
                                                )     Angela Munari Petrone,
            Defendant-Appellant.                )     Judge Presiding.
     ______________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE COGHLAN delivered the judgment of the court.
            Justices Pucinski and Hyman concurred in the judgment.

                                                 ORDER

¶1           Held: Defendant’s convictions for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child are
                   affirmed where the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and the
                   prosecutor’s remarks in closing arguments did not constitute reversible error.

¶2          Following a jury trial, defendant Andrew Coffill was convicted of predatory criminal

     sexual assault of a child and aggravated criminal sexual abuse for repeatedly engaging in sexual

     conduct with A.A. while she was between the ages of three and eleven. Defendant was sentenced

     to consecutive terms of seven years’ imprisonment for two counts of predatory criminal sexual

     assault of a child and six years’ imprisonment for the remaining three counts of predatory criminal

     sexual assault of a child. Defendant was also sentenced to five concurrent terms of three years’
     No. 1-22-0042

     imprisonment for the counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, to be served consecutively to

     the counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child for a total term of 35 years in the Illinois

     Department of Corrections. On appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to prove him guilty

     beyond a reasonable doubt of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child as alleged in three counts

     of the indictment and the prosecutor made improper remarks during closing arguments. For the

     following reasons, we affirm.

¶3                                            BACKGROUND

¶4          Defendant was charged with multiple counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child

     and aggravated criminal sexual abuse after A.A. reported that he sexually assaulted her repeatedly

     between January 2005 and January 2013.

¶5                                                Pre-Trial

¶6          Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion for a bill of particulars, requesting that the State

     provide the “dates, times, and locations of the alleged occurrences” because the indictment failed

     to “specify with particularity *** [t]he exact dates and times of the occurrences and their durations

     and *** [t]he exact street, address, and any physical description of the locations of the

     occurrences.” In response, the State asserted that the time frame of the alleged acts could not be

     narrowed down and was “within what’s required to charge a case.” The trial court denied

     defendant’s motion and ruled that “the State has given what the law requires.”

¶7                                                Jury Trial

¶8          A.A. testified that she was 19 years old and was born on January 4, 2002. When she was

     two years old, A.A. moved to Chicago with her mother, B.S., father, D.S., younger brother, I.S.,

     and younger sister, S.S. A.A.’s parents divorced when she was in the second grade. Defendant was

     born January 2, 1979, and was a “long-term family friend” that A.A. had known since she moved

     to Chicago. A.A. saw defendant “[e]very day” and he often babysat for A.A. and her siblings.

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¶9            Defendant lived in an apartment near Western Avenue and Devon Avenue. Defendant’s

       bedroom was a converted storage room connected to the kitchen, and defendant’s father stayed in

       a bedroom located through the living room and down a hallway. A.A. and her siblings occasionally

       slept at defendant’s apartment. At first, A.A. slept in defendant’s bed with him, I.S. slept on a bean

       bag in defendant’s room, and S.S. slept on the couch in the living room. Defendant later bought a

       futon to sleep on with A.A. and I.S.

¶ 10          When she was “seven or eight” years old, D.S. moved in with defendant and slept in the

       living room “[o]n and off for about a year.” Defendant would make “a scene” and “make [her] feel

       bad” for wanting to sleep in the room with her father, so A.A. “slept in the room with [defendant].”

¶ 11          A.A. and her siblings spent “[e]very weekend” with defendant while their father was gone.

       After school on Fridays, A.A. and her siblings went to defendant’s apartment and returned home

       on Sundays after he took them to church. When defendant took them shopping, he bought A.A.

       almost “whatever [she] wanted” while her brother and sister did not get as much. A.A. identified

       herself in two photos with defendant, one taken when she was “seven or eight” and another taken

       when she was “[a]round nine or ten.”

¶ 12          A.A. testified she was “too young to remember” how old she was the first time defendant

       “touched [her] in a way that [she] didn’t like,” but she knew it was before her sixth birthday.

       Defendant gave her a stuffed animal sprayed with his cologne for her sixth birthday and tried to

       touch her vagina over her clothing but was interrupted by another adult. A.A. explained that “by

       then [the touching] was *** a normal routine.” The first time defendant touched A.A., they were

       in his bed while her siblings were watching a movie and defendant touched her “under [her]

       clothes.” A.A. estimated that she was “[a]round four or five” when defendant first touched her.

       Defendant first used his hands to touch A.A.’s breasts, buttocks, and vaginal area, then touched

       “the inside” and “the out” of A.A.’s vagina, over and under her clothes. Defendant and A.A.

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       No. 1-22-0042

       showered together and defendant would “soap [her] up” and touch her chest, buttocks, and vagina.

       Defendant bit A.A.’s breast, but not hard enough to leave a mark. Defendant told her “[i]t was

       because he loved [her] and he wouldn’t do anything to hurt [her].”

¶ 13          Defendant’s conduct progressed to attempting to insert his fingers into A.A.’s vagina.

       When A.A. complained that it hurt, defendant pulled his fingers out but “would try to put his

       fingers in until eventually they fit.” Defendant did this “[a]nywhere he could—his house, [A.A.’s]

       house if [her] parents weren’t home, church, parks.” Specifically, defendant brought A.A. to a

       storage room at North Baptist Church to touch her. This happened “maybe four or five times,” but

       defendant did not progress beyond putting his fingers in her vagina at the church. At the park,

       defendant took A.A. into a “hiding area *** built into the playground,” took her underwear off,

       touched her, and kept her underwear in his pocket. This happened “more than four or five” times.

¶ 14          Defendant performed “oral sex” on A.A. by putting his mouth on her vagina. Defendant

       put his “whole mouth ** his tongue, everything” inside her vagina. A.A. did not recall how old

       she was when this started but stated that it was sometime before defendant began inserting his

       fingers into her vagina. This happened in defendant’s bedroom and in a room in the basement of

       the building. A.A. did not recall how many times this happened.

¶ 15          After defendant was able to force his finger into A.A.’s vagina, he began to “try and stick

       the tip of his penis in.” A.A. was in “fourth or fifth grade” when defendant first tried to put his

       penis in her vagina. They were in defendant’s bedroom while A.A.’s siblings were in the living

       room watching TV. A.A. told him that it hurt, and defendant replied, “[E]ventually it will feel

       good *** just let the process happen because eventually [defendant] would fit.” When defendant

       was unable to force his penis inside A.A.’s vagina, he would rub his penis against her vagina until

       he ejaculated. Defendant ejaculated on A.A.’s body and licked it off her. Defendant repeated this

       “too many times.”

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       No. 1-22-0042

¶ 16          A.A. was “nine or ten” when defendant first put his penis fully inside her vagina. They

       were on the floor of defendant’s living room behind a couch. A.A. felt pain in her vagina and told

       defendant it hurt. After “five or ten minutes,” defendant removed his penis and A.A. noticed blood

       coming from her vagina. Defendant followed A.A. to the shower and washed her off, and she

       began to cry. Defendant put his penis in A.A.’s vagina two more times. Defendant ejaculated inside

       of A.A.’s vagina. When A.A. told defendant she did not want to have intercourse, he hit her with

       a belt and left her naked in the cold. Defendant threatened to “take [A.A.] away from [her] family.”

¶ 17          A.A. also described incidents in which defendant would “force [her] head down onto his

       penis.” Defendant’s penis went into A.A.’s mouth “[a]lmost every time he tried,” though A.A. did

       not remember how old she was at the time. Defendant also grabbed her hand, put it on his penis,

       and moved it “up and down on his penis.”

¶ 18          A.A. was 10 years old the last time defendant put his penis in her vagina. After this, A.A.

       told her mother that she “felt uncomfortable being around him.” Thereafter, her mother “slowly

       stopped *** communication” and defendant ceased visiting their house.

¶ 19          At some point while her family lived on Wilson Avenue, A.A. and S.S. got into an

       argument about how defendant “treated [A.A.] different.” A.A. told her that it was not “her

       choice.” A.A. told S.S. that defendant touched her but did not go “into detail.” A.A. estimated that

       she was “maybe eight or nine” when she told S.S. A.A. did not tell anyone else about defendant’s

       actions. S.S. told their mother, but A.A. denied it “for years” until S.S. told their high school

       counselor. A.A. later participated in a videotaped interview at the Children’s Advocacy Center

       (“CAC”). She testified that defendant’s conduct occurred when she was between 3 and 11 years

       old.

¶ 20          On cross-examination, A.A. acknowledged that she did not tell the high school counselor

       about what happened and that she told the CAC interviewer that she did not remember the first

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       No. 1-22-0042

       time defendant touched her. Defense counsel asked A.A. about a time where defendant touched

       her “under a bridge.” A.A. explained that the bridge was near Lincolnwood Mall, and that

       defendant would “undress [her] from the bottom down and touch [her], sometimes rub his penis

       against [her] vagina.”

¶ 21          I.S. testified that he was 17 years old and had known defendant his whole life. When they

       were younger, I.S. and his sisters, A.A. and S.S., saw defendant every week. When they stayed at

       defendant’s apartment, I.S. slept on the floor of defendant’s bedroom while A.A. slept in

       defendant’s bed with him. Later, I.S. joined A.A. and defendant on the new futon. One morning

       when he was “around eight, nine,” I.S. woke up on the floor and saw A.A. and defendant standing

       naked by a dresser. I.S. told his mother and she confronted defendant.

¶ 22          One night in 2012, I.S. was walking their dog with defendant, A.A., and S.S. Defendant

       held I.S. back while A.A. and S.S. walked ahead. Defendant asked I.S. “if he should wait for [A.A.]

       to turn 18 or if he should find himself another woman.” I.S. told his parents’ friend, Aloe, about

       defendant’s question. Shortly thereafter, the family’s relationship with defendant changed and I.S.

       had no further contact with defendant.

¶ 23          S.S. testified that she was 18 years old and had known defendant since she was “a few

       months old.” Defendant took S.S. and her siblings to North Baptist Church “[e]very Sunday” when

       they were younger. The siblings stayed at defendant’s apartment “[e]very weekend,” and S.S. slept

       on the couch in the living room while I.S. and A.A. slept in defendant’s bedroom. One night when

       S.S. was “around *** eight through ten years old” and A.A. was 11 or 12, A.A. was awake crying

       and S.S. asked if it was because she missed defendant. A.A. told her not to say his name and that

       defendant had “hurt” her. A.A. asked her not to tell anyone because “she was afraid of getting in

       trouble.”

¶ 24          When S.S. was a freshman in high school, around 14 or 15 years old, she told her counselor

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       No. 1-22-0042

       what A.A. told her about defendant. On cross-examination, she explained that she told the

       counselor because “it was eating [her] up too much, and [she] was too busy *** harming [herself],

       instead of *** facing *** what the actual problem was.”

¶ 25          B.S. testified that her husband, D.S., had known defendant since high school and they

       “reconnected” when the family moved back to town. Defendant would watch the three children at

       his apartment “once a week *** every other weekend sometimes” in order “to give [B.S. and D.S.]

       a break” or when they were working.

¶ 26          B.S.’s relationship with defendant changed in 2012 after an argument around Easter. A.A.

       was ten or eleven years old at the time. B.S. acknowledged that she confronted defendant after I.S.

       told her that he saw defendant naked with A.A. but could not recall when it happened. Defendant

       and A.A. denied the incident. B.S. received a call from A.A. and B.S.’s high school counselor in

       the spring of 2018. B.S. learned that something happened between A.A. and defendant but A.A.

       “didn’t want to talk about it.”

¶ 27          At the end of the trial, the jury found defendant guilty of five counts of predatory criminal

       sexual assault of a child and five counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Defendant was

       sentenced to a total term of 35 years’ imprisonment.

¶ 28                                             ANALYSIS

¶ 29                                     Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 30          Defendant first contends that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt

       of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child as alleged in three counts of the indictment.

       Specifically, defendant argues that the State failed to “establish a general time frame” for counts

       that alleged (1) contact between defendant’s penis and A.A.’s mouth (count 1); (2) contact between

       defendant’s mouth and A.A.’s vagina (count 8); and (3) intrusion of defendant’s finger into A.A.’s

       vagina (count 9).

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       No. 1-22-0042

¶ 31           In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “the question is ‘whether, after viewing the

       evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

       the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original) People v.

       McLaurin, 2020 IL 124563, ¶ 22 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). This

       court will not retry the defendant or substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on the weight

       of the evidence or credibility of witnesses. People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. “We will not

       reverse a conviction unless the evidence is so improbable, unsatisfactory, or inconclusive that it

       creates a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt.” People v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 217 (2005).

¶ 32           As charged here, a person commits the offense of predatory criminal sexual assault of a

       child when he is 17 years of age or older and “commits an act of contact, however slight, between

       the sex organ or anus of one person and the part of the body of another for the purpose of sexual

       gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused, or an act of sexual penetration, and *** the

       victim is under 13 years of age.” 720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1). The Criminal Code defines “sexual

       penetration” as “any contact, however slight, between the sex organ or anus of one person and ***

       the sex organ, mouth, or anus of another person, or any intrusion, however slight, of any part of

       the body of one person *** into the sex organ or anus of another person, including but not limited

       to, cunnilingus, fellatio, or anal penetration.” 720 ILCS 5/11-0.1. Evidence is sufficient to support

       a conviction for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child if the victim describes (1) the kind of

       acts committed with sufficient specificity, (2) the number of acts committed with sufficient

       specificity, and (3) the time period the acts occurred generally. People v. Letcher, 386 Ill. App. 3d

       327, 334 (2008).

¶ 33           It is undisputed that defendant was over 17 years old and that A.A. was under 13 years old

       when the charged offenses were committed, and that the conduct alleged in counts 1, 8, and 9,

       constituted predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. The issue is whether the dates charged in

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       No. 1-22-0042

       the indictment are sufficient and supported by the evidence. Our supreme court has recognized

       that “it is often difficult in the prosecution of child sexual abuse cases to pin down the times, dates,

       and places of sexual assaults, particularly when the defendant has engaged in a number of acts

       over a prolonged period of time.” People v. Bishop, 218 Ill. 2d 232, 247 (2006).

¶ 34           In cases involving child sexual abuse, the precise date of an offense “is not an essential

       factor” and the State is not required to prove it. People v. Guerrero, 356 Ill. App. 3d 22, 27 (2005).

       “The inability to remember exact dates and times merely affects the weight to be given the

       testimony and taken alone, does not create reasonable doubt.” People v. Foley, 206 Ill. App. 3d

       709, 815 (1990). In Guerrero, we held that “[a]s long as the crime occurred within the statute of

       limitations and prior to the return of the charging instrument, the State need only provide the

       defendant with the best information it has as to when the offenses occurred.” Guerrero, 356 Ill.

       App. 3d at 27.

¶ 35           Regarding count 1, alleging contact between defendant’s penis and A.A.’s mouth, A.A.

       testified that defendant would “force [her] head down onto his penis.” Defendant did this “[t]oo

       many” times and his penis went into A.A.’s mouth “[a]lmost every time he tried.” A.A. testified

       that she did not remember how old she was at the time. Though not specific to penis-to-mouth

       contact, A.A. testified that “[e]verything [she] described” happened “between sometime after [she]

       turned three and all the way through sometime before [she] turned 11.” A.A. was born on January

       4, 2002, and accordingly the dates charged in the indictment—January 4, 2008, and January 3,

       2013—were reflected in the testimony. While A.A. was unable recall exact dates of the penis-to-

       mouth contact, this alone does not create reasonable doubt. Foley, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 815.

¶ 36           With respect to count 8, alleging contact between defendant’s mouth and A.A.’s vagina,

       A.A. testified that defendant put his “whole mouth ** his tongue, everything” inside her vagina.

       A.A. did not recall how old she was when this began or how many times it happened. However,

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       No. 1-22-0042

       in addition to A.A.’s all-encompassing testimony that the abuse happened between her third and

       eleventh birthdays, A.A. also testified that defendant performed “oral sex” on her at defendant’s

       apartment and before he began inserting his fingers in her vagina. A.A., I.S., S.S. and B.S. all

       testified that the children had ceased visiting defendant’s apartment before A.A. was 11 years old.

¶ 37          Finally, concerning count 9, alleging an intrusion of defendant’s finger into A.A.’s vagina,

       A.A. testified that defendant “put his finger into [her] vagina” at “all” of the houses she lived in

       between ages three and 11. A.A. also testified that defendant put his fingers in her vagina at his

       apartment, at church, under a bridge, and at the park. When A.A. was in “fourth or fifth grade,”

       defendant was able to force his finger entirely into her vagina. He then began attempting to force

       his penis in her vagina.

¶ 38          In arguing that the State failed to establish “a general time frame” for each of the three

       offenses, defendant relies on People v. Letcher, 386 Ill. App. 3d 327, 336 (2008). In Letcher, the

       defendant was charged with numerous counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child,

       including “six specific counts of penile penetration.” Id. at 328, 336. “Before [the victim] was

       asked if incidents occurred more than five times, she made a general reference to ‘touching’ in

       ‘unavailable places,’ including her breasts, and there were no specific questions about

       penetration.” Id. at 336. We held that those circumstances alone were not enough to establish the

       defendant’s guilt for the “six specific counts of penile penetration” beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

       at 335-36.

¶ 39          In contrast, the charges in this case contain a single count of three forms of predatory

       criminal sexual assault of a child. Each of the counts alleges that the offenses occurred between

       January 4, 2007, or January 4, 2008, and January 3, 2013. A.A. explicitly testified to repeated

       conduct supporting each allegation. Although A.A. was unable to recall the exact dates of each

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       No. 1-22-0042

       occurrence of abuse, defendant was charged with only a single instance of each form of contact or

       penetration at issue.

¶ 40          The time frames for each offense, as identified by A.A. and reasonably inferred from other

       evidence, were sufficiently specific. A.A.’s credibility regarding when and how often these

       incidents occurred was for the jury to weigh and resolve. The fact that A.A. was unable to provide

       specific dates is not fatally detrimental as victims of repeated abuse are typically “unable to furnish

       many specific details, dates, or distinguishing characteristics as to individual acts or assaults.”

       Letcher, 386 Ill. App. 3d at 333. Taken in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was

       sufficient to sustain defendant’s convictions.

¶ 41                                           Closing Argument

¶ 42          Defendant argues that the prosecutor made “misstatements of the evidence” that “filled in

       the gaps in A.A.’s testimony” and “improperly bolstered the State’s case.”

¶ 43          Although defendant acknowledges this claim was not preserved for appeal, he seeks review

       under the plain error doctrine or as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Pursuant to

       Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), defendant must show that his counsel’s

       representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that “there is a reasonable

       probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

       been different.” Id. at 688, 694. Counsel is not ineffective for failing to preserve meritless issues.

       People v. Coleman, 158 Ill. 2d 319, 349 (1994).

¶ 44           The plain error doctrine permits a reviewing court to consider an unpreserved error when

       a clear or obvious error occurred and either (1) “the evidence is so closely balanced that the error

       alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of

       the error,” or (2) “that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and

       challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” People

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       v. Piatowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007). Under either prong, the burden of persuasion rests with

       the defendant. People v. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d 166, 190 (2010).

¶ 45          The State “is afforded a great deal of latitude in presenting closing argument and is entitled

       to argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence.” People v. Moore, 358 Ill. App. 3d 683, 693

       (2005). While argument cannot be based on a misstatement of the evidence, a single “prosecutorial

       misstatement does not necessarily deprive a defendant of a fair trial” unless the remark results in

       “ ‘substantial prejudice to the defendant and constitutes a material factor in his conviction.’ ”

       People v. Jackson, 2012 IL App (1st) 102035, ¶ 18 (quoting People v. Brooks, 345 Ill. App. 3d

       945, 951 (2004)).

¶ 46          Defendant contends that three comments made by the State during closing argument “filled

       in the *** gaps in A.A.’s testimony with facts not presented at trial.” We find that the arguments

       were properly based on the evidence and not unduly prejudicial.

¶ 47          First, the State argued:

              “[A.A.] told you that [defendant] would insert his finger into her vagina ***. She also told

              you about the park, that [defendant] would take her to the park and there was a hidden area

              where he would take her and he would remove her underwear and put his fingers on her

              vagina.” (Emphasis added).

¶ 48          This comment accurately reflected A.A.’s testimony that defendant touched her vagina

       “[a]nywhere he could – his house, my house if my parents weren’t home, church, parks.”

       (Emphasis added). At the park, defendant took A.A. into a “hiding area *** built into the

       playground,” took her underwear off, touched her, and kept her underwear in his pocket. A.A.

       explained that defendant “would just touch. He never inserted his fingers” at the park. The

       prosecutor’s comment was based on the evidence at trial.

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       No. 1-22-0042

¶ 49          Defendant argues that the prosecutor’s comment came “in support of the [predatory

       criminal sexual assault] count of finger insertion” but A.A. never testified that defendant put his

       fingers in her vagina at the park, and potentially confused the jury. Defendant was charged with a

       single count of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child based on intrusion of defendant’s finger

       into A.A.’s vagina. This was supported by A.A.’s testimony that defendant inserted his fingers in

       her vagina while they were at her house, at church, and in the basement of his apartment building.

       The prosecutor’s comments properly distinguished between defendant putting his finger “on” her

       vagina while in the hidden area of the park and putting his finger “into” A.A.’s vagina.

¶ 50          Next, the State argued:

              “[A.A.] told you that on more than one occasion [defendant] would go to her, he would try

              to put his penis in her mouth, that his penis would go in her mouth and that this happened

              over that span of time, his house, her house, her different houses, wherever he could.”

              (Emphasis added).

¶ 51          While A.A. did not specify exactly where this conduct occurred, she testified that it

       happened “[t]oo many” times during the time she spent with defendant. A.A. was with defendant

       at her family’s house, defendant’s house, and other locations including parks, bridges, and church.

       Additionally, throughout her testimony, A.A. repeated that defendant abused her “[a]nywhere he

       could” and “whenever he could.” The prosecutor’s argument was properly based on the evidence.

¶ 52          Last, the State argued: “The next act is [defendant]’s mouth and [A.A.]’s vagina. ***

       [A.A.] told you that he did it wherever he could, in the shower, most of the time in his bedroom,

       in his bed where he had her sleep with him, in the basement.” (Emphasis added). A.A. testified

       that defendant put his “whole mouth ** his tongue, everything” inside her vagina while they were

       in his bedroom and in a room in the basement of the building. A.A. also testified that defendant

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       put his mouth on her breast while they showered together. This argument was also properly based

       on the evidence.

¶ 53          Even assuming arguendo that the prosecutor’s remarks were improper, the trial court

       admonished the jury that “[w]hat the attorneys say during closing arguments is not evidence and

       should not be considered by you as evidence” and that “[n]either opening statements nor closing

       arguments are evidence and any statement or argument made by an attorney which is not based

       upon evidence should be disregarded.” As the court provided “sufficient instructions to preempt

       consideration of potentially improper comments as evidence” (People v. Moody, 2016 IL App (1st)

       130071, ¶ 79), we cannot say that the prosecutor’s remarks affected the outcome of the trial.

¶ 54          Defendant also argues that the State improperly defined reasonable doubt during closing

       argument. “Attempts to explain the reasonable doubt standard have been disfavored by the courts

       because ‘no matter how well-intentioned, the attempt may distort the standard to the prejudice of

       the defendant.’ ” People v. Burney, 2011 IL App. (4th) 100343, ¶ 67 (quoting People v. Keene,

       169 Ill.2d 1, 25 (1995)). However, “both the prosecutor and defense counsel are entitled to discuss

       ‘reasonable doubt and to present his or her view of the evidence [presented] and to suggest whether

       the evidence supports reasonable doubt.’ ” Moody, 2016 IL App (1st) 130071, ¶ 61.

¶ 55          In this case, the prosecutor remarked in rebuttal, “It’s our burden to prove this case beyond

       a reasonable doubt. *** It’s not beyond all doubt or a shadow of a doubt.” (Emphasis added). We

       have repeatedly held that this exact statement is not an improper attempt to define reasonable

       doubt. See, e.g., Moody, 2016 IL App (1st) 130071, ¶¶ 63-64; People v. McGee, 2015 IL App (1st)

       130367, ¶¶ 59-60; People v. Sullivan, 2014 IL App (3d) 120312, ¶¶ 24, 30. Accordingly, this

       remark did not diminish the prosecution’s burden of proof and was not error.

¶ 56          We find that the challenged remarks were not so improper or so prejudicial that justice was

       denied or that the jury’s verdict may have resulted therefrom. See People v. Jackson, 2020 IL

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       124112, ¶ 88. Therefore, defendant is not entitled to review of his claim under principles of plain

       error or as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶ 57                                            CONCLUSION

¶ 58          For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 59          Affirmed.

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