Court Opinion

ID: 9955948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 19:03:30.187432+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:41.467038
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (4th) 230426-U
                                                                                    FILED
             NOTICE                                                               March 29, 2024
 This Order was filed under                                                        Carla Bender
 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is              NO. 4-23-0426
                                                                               4th District Appellate
 not precedent except in the                                                         Court, IL
 limited circumstances allowed    IN THE APPELLATE COURT
 under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                           OF ILLINOIS

                                       FOURTH DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                          )      Appeal from the
            Plaintiff-Appellee,                                )      Circuit Court of
            v.                                                 )      Winnebago County
 EMMITT WRIGHT,                                                )      No. 97CF671
            Defendant-Appellant.                               )
                                                               )      Honorable
                                                               )      Joseph G. McGraw,
                                                               )      Judge Presiding.

                JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court.
                Presiding Justice Cavanagh and Justice Turner concurred in the judgment.

                                              ORDER
¶1     Held: The appellate court granted defense counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed
             the trial court’s judgment dismissing defendant’s successive postconviction
             petition.

¶2              In 1998, defendant, Emmitt Wright, was convicted of two counts of first degree

murder and sentenced to natural life imprisonment. In November 2021, he filed a successive

postconviction petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1

et seq. (West 2020)), arguing his sentence of natural life imprisonment for a crime he committed

at the age of 18 violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.

1970, art. I, § 11) and the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const.,

amend. VIII). The State filed a motion to dismiss defendant’s petition, which the trial court
granted. Defendant appealed, and the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) was

appointed to represent him on appeal.

¶3             On appeal, OSAD now moves to withdraw as counsel on the basis it can raise no

colorable argument the trial court erred in dismissing defendant’s successive postconviction

petition. We grant OSAD’s motion and affirm the court’s judgment.

¶4                                       I. BACKGROUND

¶5             In 1998, a jury found defendant guilty of two counts of first degree murder and

the trial court sentenced him to natural life imprisonment. He was 18 years old at the time of the

offenses. Defendant’s convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.

¶6             In April 2001, defendant pro se filed his initial postconviction petition. The trial

court dismissed the petition as frivolous, and its judgment was affirmed on appeal.

¶7             In March 2020, defendant pro se filed a motion for leave to file a successive

postconviction petition and an accompanying petition. He argued his sentence of natural life

imprisonment violated the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution because “the trial

court didn’t have the ability to consider [his] youth, rehabilitative potential, or any other

mitigating factors when imposing his mandatory life sentence.” The court granted defendant

leave to file a successive postconviction petition and appointed counsel.

¶8             On November 24, 2021, defendant filed an amended successive postconviction

petition, which is the subject of the instant appeal. Citing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460

(2012), he argued that his sentence of natural life imprisonment “violates the Proportionate

Penalties Clause of the Illinois Constitution as applied to him, and the Eight [sic] Amendment

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments in the United States Constitution as well.” See

id. at 465 (holding “mandatory life [imprisonment] without parole for those under the age of 18

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at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual

punishments’ ”). The State filed a motion to dismiss defendant’s petition, arguing he failed to

establish cause and prejudice for his failure to bring the claims in his initial postconviction

petition. Defendant filed a response to the State’s motion, in which he argued Miller gave him

cause to bring the constitutional claims because it was not decided until 2012. The trial court

granted the State’s motion on the basis defendant failed to establish cause for his failure to bring

the claims earlier.

¶9             Defendant appealed, and OSAD was appointed to represent him on appeal. OSAD

now moves to withdraw as appellate counsel on the basis it can raise no colorable argument the

trial court erred in dismissing defendant’s successive postconviction petition. We granted

defendant leave to file a response to OSAD’s motion. Defendant filed a response, arguing he

made a substantial showing of a constitutional violation that entitled him to an evidentiary

hearing on his petition. However, he made no argument that he established cause and prejudice

for his failure to bring the claims in an earlier proceeding.

¶ 10                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11           On appeal, OSAD contends it can raise no colorable argument the trial court erred

in dismissing defendant’s successive postconviction petition. Specifically, OSAD contends no

argument can be made defendant established cause for his failure to bring the claims in an earlier

proceeding. “A trial court’s dismissal of a post-conviction petition without an evidentiary

hearing is reviewed de novo.” People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 456 (2002).

¶ 12           The Act provides a remedy for criminal defendants who claim their conviction or

sentence resulted from a substantial denial of their constitutional rights. It generally contemplates

the filing of only one postconviction petition. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2020)) (“Only one

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petition may be filed by a petitioner under this Article without leave of the court.”). Leave of

court to file a successive postconviction petition will be granted only if, in relevant part, the

defendant can satisfy the cause-and-prejudice test. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 460; see 725 ILCS

5/122-1(f) (West 2020) (“Leave of court may be granted only if a petitioner demonstrates cause

for his or her failure to bring the claim in his or her initial post-conviction proceedings and

prejudice results from that failure.”). “Cause,” for purposes of the cause-and-prejudice test, is

shown “by identifying an objective factor that impeded [a defendant’s] ability to raise a specific

claim during [the] initial post-conviction proceedings.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2020).

“Prejudice” can be established by showing the claim at issue “so infected the trial that the

resulting conviction or sentence violated due process.” Id. “Throughout the three-stages in the

postconviction process, the State has the ‘opportunity to seek dismissal of the petition on any

grounds, including the defendant’s failure to prove cause and prejudice for not having raised the

claims in the initial postconviction petition.’ ” People v. Johnson, 2019 IL App (1st) 153204,

¶ 35 (quoting People v. Bailey, 2017 IL 121450, ¶ 26).

¶ 13           Here, we agree with OSAD that no argument can be made the trial court erred in

granting the State’s motion to dismiss defendant’s successive postconviction petition on the basis

he failed to establish cause for not raising the claims in his initial postconviction petition. In

People v. Moore, 2023 IL 126461, our supreme court squarely rejected the claims defendant

raised in his successive postconviction petition. For purposes of the eighth amendment to the

United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII), the Moore court held that because Miller

applies only to juveniles, its holding did not change the law applicable to young adults. Moore,

2023 IL 126461, ¶ 38. “Miller’s unavailability prior to 2012 at best deprived [young adult

offenders] of some helpful support for [their] [eighth amendment] claim, which is insufficient to

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establish cause.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. As for defendant’s claim under the

proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11), our

supreme court has held that “Miller’s announcement of a new substantive rule under the eighth

amendment does not provide cause for a [juvenile offender] to raise a claim under the

proportionate penalties clause.” People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010, ¶ 74. “As Miller does not

directly apply to young adults, it also does not provide cause for a young adult offender to raise a

claim under the proportionate penalties clause.” Moore, 2023 IL 126461, ¶ 40.

¶ 14           Because our supreme court has expressly held that Miller does not provide cause

for a young adult offender such as defendant to challenge his sentence under either the eighth

amendment or the proportionate penalties clause, we agree with OSAD that no argument can be

made the trial court erred in dismissing defendant’s successive postconviction petition. See

Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d at 464 (“The cause-and-prejudice test *** is composed of two

elements, both of which must be met in order for the petitioner to prevail.”).

¶ 15                                     III. CONCLUSION

¶ 16           For the reasons stated, we grant OSAD’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

¶ 17           Affirmed.

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