Court Opinion

ID: 9392313
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-04 17:00:31.244471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:44.768869
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                ______________

                                       No. 22-2345

                                     ______________

                            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

                                             v.

                                     NARESH RANE
                                     a/k/a RAJ RANE,
                                             Appellant
                                     ______________

                     On Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of New Jersey
                            (D.C. No. 3-17-cr-00308-001)
                           District Judge: Zahid N. Quraishi
                                    ______________

                      Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
                                   March 21, 2023
                                  ______________

         Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and McKEE, Circuit Judges.

                              (Opinion Filed: May 4, 2023)
                                   ______________

                                        OPINION *
                                     ______________

*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.

        Rane filed falsified medical records in the District Court. Whether he did so with

the purpose of delaying or diminishing his sentence is of no consequence: his actions are

inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility. Contrary to Rane’s suggestion, the

District Court applied the proper legal standard and correctly considered conduct (a) after

entry of a plea but before sentencing that (b) does not deny guilt of the underlying

offense. Attempting to delay or lessen the consequences of one’s criminal actions

through fraud on the sentencing court, without more, can properly form the basis for

denying an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.

   I.      FACTS

        Naresh Rane owned and operated a business purporting to offer training and

certification in massage therapy. In actuality, the business was a sham, offering falsified

transcripts and certifications, at least in part, to provide cover for prostitution services.

        Rane was indicted for various crimes related to promoting prostitution under

federal law and pleaded guilty to one count of using facilities in interstate commerce to

promote prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3). In his plea agreement, Rane

agreed to a total offense level of 15, including a two-point reduction for acceptance of

responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. The plea agreement noted that this reduction

was contingent upon Rane’s “acceptance of responsibility continu[ing] through the date

of sentencing.” A30. At that time, Rane had admitted guilt and seemingly agreed to

cooperate with the government.

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       This cooperation would be short-lived. Between April 2018 and September 2021,

Rane submitted multiple fabricated documents to the court, purporting to document dire

health conditions that prevented him from proceeding with his sentencing. Rane now

admits that at least some of these documents were false, reflecting conditions he did not

have. 1 Moreover, Rane admits that he submitted these false documents to (a) “delay his

sentencing” and (b) “obtain a more lenient sentence based on his medical conditions.” 2

A62. These documents, at least in part, had their intended effect: the District Court

adjourned Rane’s sentencing numerous times based on the false representations reflected

in the documents.

       Rane’s deception would not go unnoticed forever. When a Probation Officer grew

suspicious of the authenticity of the documents, an investigation began, ultimately

revealing that the documents had been fabricated. As a result, the Probation Office

altered its sentencing recommendation, concluding that Rane no longer merited a

reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Indeed, the Probation Office concluded that

Rane should receive an enhancement for obstruction of justice pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§3C1.1.

       At Rane’s sentencing hearing, the District Court adopted these recommendations,

concluding that “based on the totality of the circumstances” Rane was “not eligible for

1
  It is unclear exactly how many of these documents are false. But all parties agree that at
least some are. We are not compelled to resolve this factual dispute.
2
  The Government does not allege that Rane’s counsel knowingly participated in this
fraud, and the record before us does not suggest that Rane’s counsel was aware that the
documents submitted were false.
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the acceptance of responsibility points [reduction].” A43. The District Court made

particular note of the “time period” in which the fraudulent documents were submitted—

“post-plea prior to sentencing,” A43, during “the time that [Rane] allegedly was taking

responsibility for the offense,” A54,—and the “number of times” Rane acted

fraudulently—amounting to “over three years” of fraudulent conduct. Id.

   II.      JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

         The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. This Court has

jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

         The question before us is whether the District Court “applied the incorrect legal

standard [in] determining whether Mr. Rane’s obstructive conduct disqualified him” from

receiving a sentencing reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Appellant’s Br. at 14.

         This is a question of law, and one that Rane’s counsel preserved before the District

Court. As such, our review is plenary. United States v. Adair, 38 F.4th 341, 355 (3d Cir.

2022).

   III.     DISCUSSION

         The Sentencing Guidelines authorize a sentencing judge to reduce a defendant’s

offense level if the judge finds that “the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of

responsibility for his offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). The defendant bears the burden of

proving entitlement to this reduction. Id.; United States. v. Muhammad, 146 F.3d 161,

167 (3d Cir. 1998). Entry of a guilty plea constitutes “significant evidence of acceptance

of responsibility . . . [, h]owever, this evidence may be outweighed by conduct of the

defendant that is inconsistent with such acceptance.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n. 3.

                                               4
         For example, “[c]onduct resulting in an enhancement under § 3C1.1 (Obstructing

or Impeding the Administration of Justice) ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not

accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct.” U.S.S.G. §3E1.1 cmt. n.4. “There

may, however, be extraordinary cases in which adjustments under both §§ 3C1.1 and

3E1.1 may apply.” Id.

         Rane has failed to show that this is an extraordinary case. Rane lied—

repeatedly—to a federal court in an effort to delay his sentence and receive a lesser

penalty. Having been found out, Rane now admits his deceptive conduct but argues

nonetheless that the District Court erred.

         His legal arguments are to no avail. Rane’s suggestion that the District Court

applied a conflicting “legal standard adopted by [the] Eighth Circuit in United States v.

Honken, 184 F.3d 961, 968 (8th Cir. 1999)” is incorrect. Appellant’s Br. at 16. The

District Court made its determination based on the “totality of the circumstances,” A43,

the same standard cited in United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 199 (3d Cir. 2007)

(citing United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 295 n.2 (3d Cir. 1989)). In evaluating

the “totality of the circumstances,” the District Court looked to several factors set out by

the Eighth Circuit in Honken, including whether (a) the obstruction was “an isolated

incident,” (b) the defendant “voluntarily terminated” the obstruction, (c) the defendant

pleaded guilty, and (d) the defendant aided the prosecution. Honken, 183 F.3d at 968–69.

Looking to these factors is consistent with Lessner’s “totality” based inquiry, not contrary

to it.

                                              5
       Rane’s other legal arguments also fail. Despite Rane’s suggestion to the contrary,

a defendant need not deny guilt or offer a defense to be denied an adjustment for

acceptance of responsibility. Defendants have been denied an adjustment for acceptance

of responsibility for attempting to avoid trial by feigning mental incompetence, United

States v. Batista, 483 F.3d 193, 197–98 (3d Cir. 2007), failing to show remorse, Lessner,

498 F.3d at 200–01; Muhammad, 146 F.3d at 168, encouraging a witness to commit

perjury before a grand jury, McDowell, 888 F.2d at 292–93, and fleeing custody, United

States v. Miller, 77 F.3d 71, 74–75 (4th Cir. 1996). None of these circumstances involve

denying guilt, and yet they all form a valid basis on which to deny an adjustment because

they show a lack of acceptance of responsibility. That the conduct occurred after entry of

a plea similarly posed no barrier to the District Court’s holding. See Lessner, 498 F.3d at

200 (considering conduct at sentencing in evaluating acceptance of responsibility).

       In sum, Rane bore the burden of demonstrating his acceptance of responsibility.

Muhammad, 146 F.3d at 167. He failed to meet that burden when he lied to a federal

court in an attempt to delay and diminish his sentence. The decision below was not in

error, and we will affirm.

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