Court Opinion

ID: 9859320
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 19:41:34.548955+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:18:53.212701
License: Public Domain

GARIBALDI, J.,
dissenting.
I would affirm the Appellate Division and trial court that the evidence of cocaine should not be suppressed because the State Trooper’s conduct falls within the law established under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and *55Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), as a limited search to protect the safety of the State Trooper.
In Terry v. Ohio, a police officer observing unusual conduct of defendant and two other men, and concluding that the men were contemplating a daylight robbery, stopped and frisked them thereby discovering guns. The Court denied defendant’s motion to suppress the revolver seized from him. The Supreme Court held that a police officer could stop and frisk someone who he suspected might be about to commit a crime without probable cause or a warrant. This stop and frisk was sustained because it was no more than a “protective ... search for weapons.” 392 U.S. 1, 29, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 910; see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969).
In Terry, the Court found that:
[Tjhere is no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search (or seize) against the invasion which the search [or seizure] entails. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-535, 536-537, 87 S.Ct. 1727, [1733-1734, 1734-1735] 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). And in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. [392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 905 (1968) (footnote omitted).]
The Court found in the Terry fact situation that the officer’s conduct was reasonable when weighed against the legitimate interest in “crime prevention and detection,” id. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d at 906, and the “need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack possible cause for an arrest.” Id. at 24, 88 S.Ct. at 1881, 20 L.Ed.2d at 907-08. Thus, the Court concluded that if a police officer reasonably believed
that the individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to *56neutralize the threat of physical harm. [Ibid.; 392 U.S. at 25, 88 S.Ct. at 1882, 20 L.Ed.2d at 908],
After Terry, the Supreme Court extended the stop and frisk doctrine to include vehicle stops in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977). In that case, a police officer pulled over defendant’s automobile to issue a traffic summons for an expired license plate. The officer asked defendant to step out of the car, at which time the officer noticed a large bulge under defendant’s sports jacket. Fearing that the bulge might be a weapon, the officer frisked defendant and discovered a .38-caliber revolver.
The Supreme Court first addressed the question whether “the order to get out of the car, issued after the driver was lawfully detained, was reasonable and thus permissible under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 109, 98 S.Ct. at 332, 54 L.Ed.2d at 336. The State argued that the practice of asking the driver to exit the vehicle was adopted to protect the officer since a face-to-face confrontation reduces the likelihood of an assault on the police officer. Id. at 110, 98 S.Ct. at 333, 54 L.Ed.2d at 336. The Court agreed with this reasoning by stating:
We think it too plain for argument that the State’s proffered justification — the safety of the officer — is both legitimate and weighty. “Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties.” And we have specifically recognized the inordinate risk confronting an officer as he approaches a person seated in an automobile. “According to one study, approximately 30% of police shootings occurred when a police officer approached a suspect seated in an automobile. Bristow, Police Officer Shootings — A Tactical Evaluation, 54 J.Crim.LC & PS 93 (1963) — ” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 n. 3, 32 L.Ed.2d 612, 92 S.Ct. 1921 [1924 n. 3] (1972). We are aware that not all these assaults occur when issuing traffic summons, but we have before expressly declined to accept the argument that traffic violations necessarily involve less danger to officers than other types of confrontations. Indeed, it appears “that a significant percentage of murders of police officers occurs when the officers are making traffic stops.” [Id. at 110, 98 S.Ct. at 333, 54 L.Ed.2d at 336-70 (citations omitted).]
Thus, the Court held that the additional intrusion to the driver of the car was “de minimus,” and so police officers may require a driver to exit his car when the motor vehicle has been *57lawfully detained. Id. at 111, 98 S.Ct. at 333, 54 L.Ed.2d at 337. Finally, the Court concluded that once the driver was outside the car, the officer could “stop and frisk” him as a protective search controlled by Terry v. Ohio, id. at 111-12, 98 S.Ct. at 333-34, 54 L.Ed.2d at 337-38.
After Pennsylvania v. Mimms, the Supreme Court decided Michigan v. Long, which I agree with the majority is controlling in this case. In Michigan v. Long, two police officers observed a car traveling erratically and at excessive speed. When the car swerved into a ditch, the officers stopped to investigate and were met by the driver at the rear of the car. The driver “appeared to be under the influence of something” and did not respond to initial request to produce his license and registration. Then, the driver began walking toward the open door of the car, apparently to obtain the registration, and the officers followed him. At this time, the officers saw a hunting knife on the floorboard of the driver’s side of the car. The officers stopped the driver and subjected him to a Terry search, which revealed no weapon. One officer then shined his flashlight into the interior of the vehicle “to search for other weapons.” The officer noticed something under the arm rest on the front seat and entered the vehicle to investigate it. He then saw an open pouch on the front seat and determined that it contained what appeared to be marijuana. The driver was then arrested for possession of marijuana. 463 U.S. at 1035-36, 103 S.Ct. at 3473-74, 77 L.Ed.2d at 1211.
The Supreme Court concluded:
Our past cases indicate then that protection of police and others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger, that roadside encounters between police and suspects are especially hazardous, and that danger may arise from the possible presence of weapons in the area surrounding a suspect. These principles compel our conclusion that the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant” the officer in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons. See Terry, 392 U.S., at 21, 20 L.Ed.2d *58889, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 44 Ohio Ops 2d 383. “(T)he issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Id., at 27, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 44 Ohio Ops 2d 383. [Michigan v. Long, supra, 463 U.S. at 1049-50, 103 S.Ct. at 3480-81, 77 L.Ed.2d at 1219-20],
Applying this analysis of the law to the specific facts in Michigan v. Long, the Court found the search was justified. Additionally, the Court rejected the argument that Long was under police control and could not gain access to weapons in the car:
During any investigative detention, the suspect is “in the control” of the officers in the sense that he “may be briefly detained against his will____” Terry, supra, at 34, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 44 Ohio Ops 2d 383 (White, J., concurring). Just as a Terry suspect on the street may, despite being under the brief control of a police officer, reach into his clothing and retrieve a weapon, so might a Terry suspect in Long’s position break away from police control and retrieve a weapon from his automobile. See United States v. Rainone, 586 F.2d 1132, 1134 (CA7 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 980, 60 L.Ed.2d 239, 99 S.Ct. 1787 (1979). In addition, if the suspect is not placed under arrest, he will be permitted to reenter his automobile, and he will then have access to any weapons inside. United States v. Powless, 546 F.2d 792, 795-796 (CA8), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 910, 51 L.Ed.2d 588, 97 S.Ct. 1185 (1977). Or, as here, the suspect may be permitted to reenter the vehicle before the Terry investigation is over, and again, may have access to weapons. In any event, we stress that a Terry investigation, such as the one that occurred here, involves a police investigation “at close range,” Terry, 392 U.S. at 24, 88 S.Ct. at 1881, when the officer remains particularly vulnerable in part because a full custodial arrest has not been effected, and the officer must make a “quick decision as to how to protect himself and others from possible danger____” Id., at 28, 88 S.Ct. at 1883. In such circumstances, we have not required that officers adopt alternative means to ensure their safety in order to avoid the intrusion involved in a Terry encounter, [Id 463 U.S. at 1051-1052, 103 S.Ct. at 3481-82, 77 L.Ed.2d at 1221-1222 footnote omitted.]
We have long recognized that the dangers facing police officers in making traffic stops are real and continuing. Indeed, the majority starts its opinion with a statement from the Attorney General’s brief that one study shows that of state police officers killed nationwide in the line of duty for a six year period, from 1976 to 1982, “40% of the troopers killed by gunfire were fatally wounded while making traffic stops.” The Attorney General also cites two recent New Jersey roadside encounters between suspects and police that have proved fatal, *59State v. Thomas William Manning, App.Div. Docket No. A-3460-86T5, and State v. Dougals Parsons, App.Div. Docket No. A-83-85T4). There are undoubtedly other such cases. Indeed, the state trooper in this case was previously wounded in a routine motor stop.
Of course, in determining whether the search is constitutional, we balance the safety of law-enforcement officers against privacy interest in one’s car and its contents, and the intrusion of the search. In general, the Supreme Court has found that the fourth amendment does protect automobile searches but that the expectation of privacy with respect to one’s automobile is significantly less than that relating to one’s home or office. As the Supreme Court recently stated:
While the interior of an automobile is not subject to the same expectations of privacy that exist with respect to one’s home, a car’s interior as a whole is nonetheless subject to Fourth Amendment protection from unreasonable intrusions by the police. [New York v. Class, 475 U.S. at 114-15, 106 S.Ct. at 965, 87 L.Ed.2d at 91],
See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662-63, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1400-01, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 673 (1979).
This lesser expectation of privacy for a vehicle has been based on several reasons. An automobile is used for transportation. It has little capacity of escaping public scrutiny. It is a normal occurrences for police officers to stop and examine cars for all sorts of motor vehicle infractions. Moreover, as a practical matter the inherent mobility of a car creates exigent circumstances that the defendant and the evidence may disappear. Thus, the Supreme Court has concluded that an individual has less privacy from government intrusion in a car than in his or her house, and so the government needs a lesser justification to have a valid warrantless search of a vehicle. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania v. Mimms found the “intrusion into the driver’s personal liberty ... by the order to get out of the car” to be “de minimis.” 434 U.S. at 111, 98 S.Ct. at 333, 54 L.Ed.2d at 337.
*60The majority recognizes that Terry v. Ohio and Michigan v. Long control this case. It likewise recognizes the continued and real danger to police officers who make traffic stops. It laments the intricacies and technicalities of the law in this area and the difficulties cops have in the real world in determining whether they are in danger. Nonetheless, it decides, on these facts, that the state trooper in this case did not have reason to fear that the defendants had a hidden weapon in their car.
I disagree and find that the totality of the circumstances compels the conclusion that the state trooper acted as a reasonably prudent police officer for his protection in his limited search of the car. My reasons are best expressed by the trial court in its oral opinion:
The totality of the circumstances here are there are already two motor vehicle violations, the driver is observed reaching into the rear seat, the occupants are at least in that opinion of the officer, unusually nervous. There are repeated furtive looks to the rear of the car, the windows have been — have had something applied that conceals the interior of the car, this is a garment on the back seat, the driver does not produce a valid registration for the vehicle. Let the record reflect that it’s a cotton windbreaker stuffed in the crack of the seat. What did the officer do? The officer asked the occupants to exit the vehicle and move to a position of safety, for both his safety and their safety. Do we reasonably expect an officer to search a vehicle with the occupants in it, I hardly think so, it’s totally irrational. What kind of search did he conduct, did he break anything? No. Did he unlock anything? No. Was there a container? No. Did he dismantle anything or disassemble anything? No. He reached into a crack in the seat. What better place to hide a weapon, I wonder? The belief that can justify a protective search can arise to the level that would justify a patdown of the defendant’s person, Terry v. Ohio. And need not constitute probable cause to search. The search must be limited to those areas of the passenger compartment in which a weapon may be placed or hidden. An obvious one, the crack in the seat.
Since the search was properly instituted, the state trooper conducting the search was not required to ignore any contraband other than weapons that he discovered. Therefore, I find that under the totality of these circumstances, the search made by the state trooper does not offend the constitution and was reasonable.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division.
*61Justices CLIFFORD and POLLOCK concurring in result.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN and STEIN — 6.
For affirmance — Justice GARIBALDI — 1.