Court Opinion

ID: 9729245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:29:57.319491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:56.424184
License: Public Domain

DIANE S. SYKES, J.
¶ 58. (dissenting). This case suffers from significant analytical confusion. The majority has evaluated the applicability of various ex*743ceptions to public officer immunity without first addressing the question of whether public officer immunity even applies to the claim on which the plaintiff prevailed in this case. This confusion is not entirely the court's fault. The lower courts made the same mistake (except for the concurrence in the court of appeals), and the plaintiffs positions have been inconsistent in the circuit court and on appeal. The briefs in this court were at best incomplete on this subject. But this threshold question must be addressed.
¶ 59. The jury in this case rejected Bicknese's misrepresentation claim. Bicknese prevailed only on her promissory estoppel cause of action. Promissory estoppel is not a tort. Promissory estoppel is a species of contract claim. Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2d 683, 693-94, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1981 & Supp. 2002).
¶ 60. This court first recognized the promissory estoppel cause of action in Hoffman, adopting § 90 of the Restatement (First) of Contracts. Hoffman, 26 Wis. 2d at 696. The language of § 90 of the Restatement (Second) is substantially the same as the first:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90.
¶ 61. This is the language of contract law ("a promise ... is binding"; "enforcement of the promise"; "remedy... for breach may be limited"). Indeed, the *744commentary to the second Restatement says "[a] promise binding under this section is a contractId., § 90, cmt. d (emphasis added).
¶ 62. It is true that in Wisconsin, a promissory estoppel cause of action is not considered the equivalent of a breach of contract action in that the recovery allowed in a promissory estoppel case may not necessarily include full breach of contract damages. Hoffman, 26 Wis. 2d at 698; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90, cmt. d. Nevertheless, there is nothing in Hoffman to indicate that the court was creating a new tort as opposed to recognizing a new contract remedy.1 After all, the court adopted a section from the Restatement of Contracts, and repeatedly cited to contract treatises and articles. Hoffman, 26 Wis. 2d at 694-99. Clearly, the court in Hoffman was filling a gap in the law of contracts, not the law of torts.
¶ 63. Justice Bradley's dissent asserts that "the extent to which public officer immunity applies in contract actions is an unsettled area of law." Justice Bradley's dissent, ¶ 36. I do not agree. In Energy Complexes, Inc. v. Eau Claire County, 152 Wis. 2d 453, 464-65, 449 N.W. 2d 35 (1989), this court held that neither common law nor statutory public officer immu*745nity applies to contract claims. Energy Complexes, 152 Wis. 2d at 456, ("We conclude that neither common-law immunity nor statutory immunity under sec. 893.80(4) bars the lawsuit of Energy Complexes, Inc.").
¶ 64. Energy Complexes involved breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and quantum meruit claims against a county stemming from the conduct of county officials in connection with a construction contract. Energy Complexes, 152 Wis. 2d at 459. This court declared unequivocally that common law and statutory public officer immunity defenses are unavailable in contract claims. Id. at 464.
¶ 65. Justice Bradley's dissent cites Kierstyn v. Racine Unified School District, 228 Wis. 2d 81, 596 N.W.2d 417 (1999), and Major v. County of Milwaukee, 196 Wis. 2d 939, 539 N.W.2d 472 (Ct. App. 1995), as support for the notion that common law or statutory public officer immunity might apply to contract actions. I do not see how this could be so. Kierstyn was a negligence and negligent misrepresentation case; Major involved a misrepresentation claim. Neither involved a contract cause of action, whether breach of contract, promissory estoppel, or otherwise.
¶ 66. Energy Complexes applies here, as the concurrence in the court of appeals noted. Bicknese v. Sutula, No. 00-1825, unpublished slip op., ¶ 27 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2001) (Roggensack, J., concurring). Accordingly, we need not evaluate the various exceptions to public officer immunity because public officer immunity does not apply to promissory estoppel claims, which sound in contract.2 We should not expound upon *746an exception to an immunity defense if the immunity defense is unavailable in the first place.
¶ 67. Sutula and the Board of Regents have argued in the alternative that constitutional sovereign immunity applies, that this requires compliance with the claim procedures of Wis. Stat. § 775.01, and that Bicknese failed to plead or prove compliance with the statute. See Wis. Const, art. TV, § 27; Wis. Stat. § 775.01. Constitutional sovereign immunity is distinct from *747public officer immunity.3 Lodl v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 71, ¶ 22 n.2, 253 Wis. 2d 323, 336, 646 N.W.2d 314.
¶ 68. Constitutional sovereign immunity is a defense to personal jurisdiction:
The concept of sovereign immunity in this state derives from art. W sec. 27 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which provides: The legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in what courts suits may be brought against the state.' From this provision the rule developed that the state cannot be sued without its consent. This immunity is procedural in nature and, if properly raised, deprives the court of personal jurisdiction over the state.
Lister v. Bd. of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282, 291, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976). "There is no question that the board of regents is an arm or agency of the state for sovereign immunity purposes." Walker v. Univ. of Wis. Hosps., 198 Wis. 2d 237, 243, 542 N.W.2d 207 (Ct. App. 1995).
¶ 69. Pursuant to Article iy Section 27 of the constitution, the state has consented to be sued only in the manner provided in Wis. Stat. § 775.01, and com*748pliance with the statute is a condition precedent to suit. See State v. P.G. Miron Const. Co., 181 Wis. 2d 1045, 1053, 512 N.W.2d 499 (1994); Boldt v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 566, 572, 305 N.W.2d 133 (1981).
¶ 70. As noted above, the tort claim against Sutula was rejected by the jury. The promissory estop-pel claim sought to establish and enforce a quasi-contract not between Bicknese and Sutula but between Bicknese and the Board of Regents, based on Sutula's promise.4 This sort of claim is subject to a sovereign immunity defense, which the defendants pleaded in their answer and raised in their summary judgment motion prior to trial. The circuit court inexplicably failed to address it.
¶ 71. Sutula and the Board of Regents preserved and argued this defense on appeal. Having concluded that Sutula is not entitled to public officer immunity because of the presence of a ministerial duty, the majority is obliged to address the sovereign immunity defense. The majority does not explain why it takes no notice of Article IX Section 27 of the constitution and Wis. Stat. § 775.01.
¶ 72. Interestingly, just after the circuit court announced, post-verdict, that it would grant the defendants' motion to dismiss on public officer immunity grounds, counsel for Bicknese argued that the promissory estoppel claim was a contract action, and as such, public officer immunity did not apply. She told the *749court: "the promissory estoppel claim should be treated more as a contract as opposed to a tort. As a contract action, public official immunity does not apply at all. . . it is a contract action, and the action should lie directly then against the board of regents." Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner's Appendix at 22. Bicknese's counsel had earlier argued in opposition to summary judgment that promissory estoppel "is not a tort as that term has been defined by the courts." Plaintiffs Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 23. She maintained this argument in the court of appeals. Plaintiff-Appellant's Court of Appeals Brief at 4-5.
¶ 73. Bicknese's argument in this court, however, was quite different:
Dr. Sutula does suggest that if Dr. Bicknese's promissory estoppel claim sounded in contract, she could not enforce a contract between herself and the UW because of sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity is not an issue here. Dr. Bicknese's promissory estoppel claim did not seek to enforce a contract, but to recover damages resulting from the detrimental reliance induced by Dr. Sutula. This claim sounds in tort, as did her entire complaint.
Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner at 9 n.ll.
¶ 74. Thus, Bicknese has argued that promissory estoppel is both a contract claim (when she wants to avoid a defense based on public officer immunity) and a tort claim (when she wants to avoid a defense based on sovereign immunity). She cannot have it both ways.5 Her first argument is correct, and she has cited no *750authority in support of her second, contradictory argument. Nor has Bicknese responded to the sovereign immunity defense on the merits.
¶ 75. The record reflects that Bicknese has neither pleaded nor proved compliance with Wis. Stat. § 775.01. The promissory estoppel claim is barred by sovereign immunity. I would affirm the court of appeals, although on different grounds.

 This court has said that "the basis of promissory estoppel is akin to the contractual basis for reformation." Ahnapee & W. Ry. Co. v. Challoner, 34 Wis. 2d 134, 145, 148 N.W.2d 646 (1967). In Mackenzie v. Miller Brewing Co., 2001 WI 23, ¶ 25, 241 Wis. 2d 700, 722-23, 623 N.W.2d 739, this court commented on a cause of action that the plaintiff there might have asserted had the facts been more favorable: "Similarly, there might be a cause of action sounding in contract under promissory estoppel.... A cause of action for promissory estoppel in the employment context, like a contract cause of action based on an employee handbook, is in accordance with Wisconsin contract law."

 It is technically true, as the majority states, that "[njeither party petitioned this court for a determination of whether promissory estoppel should be treated the same as a contract *746with respect to public officer immunity." Majority op., ¶ 13 n.2. However, both the plaintiffs petition for review and the defendants' response to the petition for review raised and discussed the issue of whether, assuming that promissory estoppel is a contract claim, public officer immunity applies. See, e.g., Petition for Review at 18 ("Since immunity does not apply to contract actions, there is no need for the ministerial duty exception to abrogate governmental immunity."); Response to Petition for Review at 19 ("[P]etitioner argues that a promissory estoppel claim is really a contract theory, and points out that immunity does not shield government officials from breach of contract actions."). The parties also debated the tort/contract alternatives in their briefs. The issue is properly before the court and should not be sidestepped. "Once a case is properly before us, it is this court's obligation to resolve the issues presented regardless of the court's original reason for accepting the case." State v. Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d 388, 410 n.15, 424 N.W.2d 672 (1988) (quoting State v. Strege, 116 Wis. 2d 477, 492, 343 N.W.2d 100 (1984)). However, because the majority has specifically declined to address this threshold question, majority op., ¶ 13 n.2, this case should not be read to mean that public officer immunity now applies to contract actions or that Energy Complexes, Inc. v. Eau Claire County, 152 Wis. 2d 453, 449 N.W.2d 35 (1989), has been overruled sub silentio.

 Public officer immunity, whether state or municipal, derives from the common law. Lodl v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 71, ¶¶ 22-24, 253 Wis. 2d 323, 336, 646 N.W.2d 314. Public officer immunity was partially abrogated by this court in Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 37, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962). However, Holytz specifically retained immunity for the discretionary acts of public officers; discretionary act immunity for municipal public officers was subsequently codified in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4). Lodl, 253 Wis. 2d at 336, ¶ 22. "Immunity for public officers and employees, both state and municipal, is based largely upon public policy considerations that spring from the interest in protecting the public purse and a preference for political rather than judicial redress for the actions of public officers." Id. at ¶ 23.

 As Judge Roggensack noted in her concurrence in the court of appeals, Bicknese was not seeking to be employed by Sutula but, rather, by the university, so "if the court were to create an equitable contract of employment under a promissory estoppel theory, it could not create it between Bicknese and Sutula." Bicknese v. Sutula, No. 00-1825, unpublished slip op., ¶ 27 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 2001) (Roggensack, J., concurring).

 "The equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel, as traditionally applied in this state, is intended to protect against a litigant playing fast and loose with the courts by asserting inconsistent positions. The doctrine precludes a party from asserting a position in a legal proceeding and then subsequently asserting *750an inconsistent position." State v. Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 337, 347, 548 N.W.2d 817 (1996) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Historically, this doctrine, when applied to inconsistent positions taken within the same case, is known as the "mend the hold" doctrine, see, Harbor Ins. v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357, 362-65 (7th Cir. 1990), although this terminology has not previously been used in Wisconsin. That the majority declines to address the threshold issue of whether promissory estoppel sounds in contract, and neglects to address the sovereign immunity defense, only serves to reward this sort of game-playing.