Court Opinion

ID: 9914017
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 14:08:51.030863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:53.703958
License: Public Domain

J-S32042-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    ANTHONY UVON STARKS                        :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1218 MDA 2022

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 22, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
                          CP-67-CR-0007085-2018

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                         FILED: DECEMBER 28, 2023

       Appellant Anthony Uvon Starks appeals from the order dismissing his

timely first Post-Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition. Appellant argues that

the PCRA court erred in granting the petition to withdraw filed by Anthony

Tambourino, Esq. (PCRA Counsel) pursuant to Turner/Finley2 and in failing

to appoint new PCRA counsel. We affirm.

       This Court previously summarized the relevant facts and procedural

history of this matter as follows:

       On October 25, 2018, Tarsha Eaddy drove from her home in
       Maryland to the King’s Inn Motel in York County, Pennsylvania to
       check on her mother, Edna Pinder (“Decedent”), whom she had
       been unable to contact for several days. Upon her arrival, Eaddy
____________________________________________

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
J-S32042-23

     did not see Decedent’s car—which Decedent never loaned to
     anyone—in the motel’s parking lot. Eaddy entered the motel
     through a side entrance and went upstairs to Decedent’s unit,
     where she knocked on the door. Eaddy could hear the television
     but received no response, so she proceeded to the lobby and
     asked the front desk clerk to unlock Decedent’s door. Upon
     entering the apartment, Eaddy saw numerous pieces of mail on
     the floor. As she proceeded further into the apartment, Eaddy
     saw Decedent in a basket in the corner and began screaming. She
     testified that Decedent was “slumped against the wall, and her
     head was positioned to the side in a very unnatural way. There
     was vomit coming from her mouth and it was very apparent that
     she was not alive.” Eaddy noted that Decedent’s cell phone was
     missing.    Eaddy was aware that Decedent had been in a
     relationship with [Appellant], but [she] believed that relationship
     had ended years earlier.

     Amber Kress, the Decedent’s neighbor, heard Eaddy’s screams
     and went to Decedent’s apartment, where she called 9-1-1. Kress
     testified that she had heard screams coming from Decedent’s
     apartment a few days earlier, between 3:00 and 4:00 in the
     morning, but thought little of it as there was always fighting in the
     building. Kress was familiar with [Appellant] and believed that he
     had been living with Decedent.

     Officer Thomas Ewald of the York City Police Department
     responded to the scene. Upon entering the Decedent’s unit,
     Officer Ewald observed the Decedent lying in a basket with
     apparent blood in her mouth. Realizing she was deceased, Officer
     Ewald called for a supervisor and a coroner. When the coroner
     arrived, Officer Ewald assisted her in moving the body to the floor,
     at which time he observed several puncture marks over the
     Decedent’s left breast/heart area. He also observed blood spatter
     “from the right to the left, where the victim was.” He saw blood
     spatter on the east, west, and north walls of the apartment, as
     well as a bloody handprint on the bed sheets and small smears of
     blood on the wall. Officer Ewald also observed three empty bottles
     of vodka and three containers of prescription medication. Officer
     Ewald stated that the unit’s window, which was over seven feet
     from the bedroom floor, was unopened when he arrived on the
     scene.

     Deputy Coroner Tanya Zech of the York County Coroner’s Office
     was dispatched to the scene. She testified that she observed
     “blood splatter, . . . empty vodka bottles, . . . men’s boxer briefs,

                                     -2-
J-S32042-23

     [and a] baseball cap laying on the floor[,] and personal effects.”
     Deputy Coroner Zech observed the Decedent lying in a basket;
     there was “bloody purge” coming from her mouth and the tips of
     her fingers and toes were dehydrated and blackened, indicating
     that she had been there “for a decent amount of time.” In moving
     the Decedent’s body to the floor to be placed in a body bag,
     Deputy Coroner Zech observed several wounds and lacerations to
     the chest. Having observed those wounds, she ceased her
     assessment and called for detectives, as she believed the
     Decedent’s death to be suspicious.

     York City Police Detective Daniel Craven responded to the scene
     in his capacity as a certified crime technician. After being verbally
     informed that a search warrant had been obtained for the
     premises, he entered the Decedent’s apartment, performed a
     walk-through, and began taking photographs. Detective Craven
     noted that there were blood stains and spatter on the walls, bed
     sheets, and pillow cases. He also observed a black baseball hat,
     a pair of men’s blue boxer shorts, a bag of dirty laundry, and mail
     addressed to [Appellant]. He noted that the window was closed
     with no signs of forced entry. Detective Craven collected several
     items from the scene, including: a change of address form dated
     October 12, 2018, changing [Appellant’s] address to the
     Decedent’s residence at the King’s Inn Motel; mail addressed to
     [Appellant] from the Social Security Administration; two bottles of
     vodka; a cigarette butt; and bed sheets and pillowcases.

     York City Police Detective Christopher Perry served as the lead
     crime scene technician on the case. Shortly after arriving at and
     assessing the scene, Detective Perry left to secure a search
     warrant. After doing so, he returned to the crime scene. He noted
     that the front door to the apartment showed no signs of a break-
     in and that the lock and hinges appeared to be in working order.
     Similarly, the window was closed and locked from the inside and
     showed no signs of tampering. Although there was soil on the
     ground outside the window, there was no evidence inside the
     apartment of soil or any other material that would suggest entry
     through the window. Later that night, Detective Perry learned
     that the Decedent owned a black Chrysler 200, which was not
     present in the parking lot of the motel. He entered the vehicle’s
     information into the National Crime Information Computer
     (“NCIC”) to enable a “stop and hold” to be placed on the vehicle
     in the event it was located. On October 31, 2018, Detective Perry
     was informed that the Decedent’s vehicle had been located in
     Baltimore, Maryland, with [Appellant] behind the wheel. After

                                     -3-
J-S32042-23

     obtaining a warrant to search the car, Detective Perry recovered
     a knife, an unopened bottle of bleach, and a towel from the
     vehicle.

     Doctor Rameen Starling-Roney, a forensic pathologist, performed
     the autopsy on Decedent. He concluded that her body was in a
     state of “mild decomposition” and was past the 12-to-24-hour
     period of rigor mortis. Toxicology analysis revealed the presence
     of diphenhydramine, which is the main ingredient in Benadryl, in
     Decedent’s blood, as well as cocaine and alcohol. Doctor Starling-
     Roney observed eleven stab wounds to the upper-left corner of
     the chest, one stab wound on the level of the left nipple, one stab
     wound to the middle chest, and one stab wound on the left
     forearm—possibly a defensive wound. He testified that the cause
     of death was multiple sharp force injuries and the manner of death
     was homicide.

     Ross Dean, the owner of the King’s Inn Motel, testified that he was
     familiar with Decedent and [Appellant] and believed them to be
     paramours living together at the motel. Dean testified that the
     property had a surveillance system comprised of 16 cameras that
     recorded 24 hours a day. He stated that, during the period of
     October 21 through 25, 2018, the system was working properly,
     but that it would not have been unusual for the time stamps to be
     slightly off. Dean testified that there was a camera positioned
     such that it would have captured anyone entering or leaving
     Decedent’s apartment door.

     Josh Seiple, an employee of a pawn shop in York City called “York
     Buy Sell Trade,” testified that, on October 22, 2018, [Appellant]
     came into the store at 10:03 a.m. and sold a Samsung S7 Edge
     cell phone using a Maryland state identification card issued in
     [Appellant’s] name.

     York City Police Detective Anthony Fetrow subsequently reviewed
     interior video surveillance footage from York Buy Sell Trade and
     observed [Appellant] selling the phone to Seiple at approximately
     10:00 a.m. on October 22, 2018. Detective Fetrow also viewed
     surveillance video from a nearby convenience store showing
     [Appellant] exiting Decedent’s vehicle and walking in the vicinity
     of York Buy Sell Trade at approximately 8:11 a.m. on October 22,
     2018. A second video from the convenience store showed
     [Appellant] walking in the direction of the pawn shop at
     approximately 9:39 a.m. on that same date. A third video shows
     [Appellant] exiting the pawn shop after selling the phone and

                                    -4-
J-S32042-23

     walking toward the driver’s side of Decedent’s vehicle. Detective
     Fetrow also recovered the phone [Appellant] sold to the pawn
     shop and confirmed it as Decedent’s cell phone.

     Detective David Swinney, of the Baltimore County Police
     Department, testified that he is a member of the warrant task
     force assigned to the U.S. Marshals’ fugitive task force. In that
     capacity, he was provided with [Appellant’s] name and a
     description of Decedent’s vehicle, as well as information that
     [Appellant] frequented the area of 25th Street and Greenmount
     Avenue in Baltimore City. On October 31, 2018, Detective
     Swinney and members of the fugitive task force apprehended
     [Appellant] while he was driving Decedent’s vehicle and placed
     him under arrest. During a search incident to arrest, Detective
     Swinney found two credit cards in the Decedent’s name in
     [Appellant’s] front pocket.

     Finally, York City Police Detective Travis Sowers testified that he
     interviewed the Decedent’s family and confirmed that Decedent
     was last heard from at 1:32 a.m. on the morning of October 21,
     2018, via a text message to her sister.         Detective Sowers
     subsequently viewed all surveillance video from King’s Inn Motel,
     beginning from the last time Decedent was known to be alive.
     Detective Sowers testified that there were no gaps in the footage
     and that the relevant portions came from two cameras—Channel
     5, located in the hallway outside Decedent’s apartment, and
     Channel 7, located near an exit of the building near where
     Decedent’s vehicle was parked. Detective Sowers compiled the
     relevant footage on two DVDs, which were admitted as
     Commonwealth Exhibits 65 (Channel 5) and 66 (Channel 7). He
     testified that the time indicated on the video was twenty minutes
     behind actual time and that no one other than Decedent and
     Sowers was ever seen entering Decedent’s apartment.

     Detective Sowers testified that the first video clip, at 11:23 p.m.
     on October 21, 2018, showed [Appellant] and the Decedent
     outside the Decedent’s apartment. [Appellant] had just exited the
     apartment and appeared to be wearing the same jacket he was
     seen in the next morning at the pawn shop. Approximately seven
     minutes later, at 11:30 p.m., [Appellant] was seen re-entering
     Decedent’s apartment. Twenty minutes after that, at 11:50 p.m.,
     Decedent is seen exiting her unit. Thereafter, at 12:11 a.m. on
     October 22, 2018, Decedent is seen returning to her apartment.
     She was never seen alive on video again.

                                    -5-
J-S32042-23

       Approximately one hour after Decedent was last seen entering her
       apartment, at 1:11 a.m., [Appellant] is seen exiting the unit
       alone. Detective Sowers testified that [Appellant] appeared to be
       walking “much faster” than in previous video clips. [Appellant] is
       then captured entering the Decedent’s vehicle and driving away.
       Ten minutes later, at 1:22 a.m., [Appellant] is seen re-entering
       Decedent’s apartment.      Five minutes later, at 1:27 a.m.,
       [Appellant] is captured on video removing a television from
       Decedent’s apartment and placing it in her vehicle at 1:28 a.m.
       He then enters the vehicle and drives away. [Appellant] returns
       approximately fifty minutes later, at 2:12 a.m., and re-enters
       Decedent’s apartment.

       Thereafter, at 5:13 a.m., [Appellant] is captured exiting
       Decedent’s apartment carrying several bags filled with “unknown
       items.” [Appellant] placed some of the bags in Decedent’s vehicle
       before re-entering Decedent’s apartment at 5:15 a.m. At 5:16
       a.m., [Appellant] is captured leaving Decedent’s apartment for the
       final time, carrying several items, including the bleach bottle later
       found in Decedent’s car. Finally, at 5:21 a.m., [Appellant] departs
       in Decedent’s vehicle and does not return. Between the last time
       [Appellant] departed and the time Tarsha Eaddy enters on
       October 25, 2018, no one is ever seen entering or leaving
       Decedent’s apartment.

       [Appellant] was charged with criminal homicide and robbery. On
       November 18, 2019, [Appellant] proceeded to a jury trial before
       the Honorable Gregory M. Snyder on charges of first-, second-,
       and third-degree murder. On November 20, 2019, the jury
       convicted [Appellant] of murder in the first and second degree.
       On December 31, 2019, Judge Snyder sentenced [Appellant] to
       two concurrent terms of life imprisonment without the possibility
       of parole. [Appellant] filed a post-sentence motion,[3] which the
       trial court denied on May 19, 2020. . . .

____________________________________________

3 Ronald W. Jackson, Esq. (Trial Counsel), of the York County Public Defender’s

Office, entered his appearance and represented Appellant at trial and through
post-sentence motions. See Entry of Appearance, 1/11/19; see also Post-
Sent. Mot., 1/10/20.

                                           -6-
J-S32042-23

Commonwealth v. Starks, 831 MDA 2020, 2021 WL 798905, at *1–4 (Pa.

Super. filed Mar. 2, 2021) (Starks I) (unpublished mem.) (citations and

footnotes omitted, some formatting altered).

       Appellant filed a timely appeal.          After review, this Court affirmed

Appellant’s judgment of sentence for first-degree murder and vacated

Appellant’s sentence for second-degree murder. See id. at *9.4 Our Supreme

Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth

v. Starks, 157 MAL 2021, 258 A.3d 408 (Pa. filed Jul. 7, 2021) (Starks II).

       Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition on September 28, 2021.

The PCRA court appointed PCRA Counsel, who filed a no-merit letter and

petition to withdraw pursuant to Turner/Finley on February 25, 2022. On

June 24, 2022, the PCRA court granted PCRA counsel’s motion to withdraw,

and that same day, it filed a notice of intent to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA

petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. See Order, 6/24/22;

Rule 907 Notice, 6/24/22.

       On July 19, 2022, Appellant filed a pro se response to the PCRA court’s

Rule 907 notice in which he argued for the first time that Trial Counsel was

ineffective for failing to assert that the Commonwealth improperly relied on

hearsay at the preliminary hearing. See Pro Se Response, 7/19/22, at 2-5.

On July 22, 2022, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition, and in
____________________________________________

4 Specifically, although this Court affirmed the first-degree murder count, it

concluded that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Appellant intended
to rob Decedent, and therefore, it vacated Appellant’s conviction for second-
degree murder, based on felony murder. See Starks I, at *9.

                                           -7-
J-S32042-23

its order, it incorporated the rationale set forth in its Rule 907 notice. See

Order, 7/22/22, at 1 (citing Rule 907 Notice, 6/24/22). The PCRA court further

explained that the issue Appellant raised in response to the Rule 907 notice

was meritless because any defect in Appellant’s preliminary hearing was cured

at trial. See id. at 1-2.

       Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.    Both the PCRA court and

Appellant have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.5

       On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues:

       1. Whether it was permissible for the Commonwealth to have
          relied upon solely “hearsay” evidence to establish a prima facie
          case against Appellant during appellant’s preliminary hearing?

____________________________________________

5  On August 23, 2022, the PCRA court directed Appellant to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
within twenty-one days. Accordingly, Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement was
due on or before Tuesday, September 13, 2022. The record reflects that
Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement was filed on the PCRA court docket on
September 20, 2022, and the envelope attached to it was post-marked
September 16, 2022. There is no indication that Appellant presented his Rule
1925(b) statement to prison authorities prior to September 16, 2022.
Therefore, even with the application of the prisoner mailbox rule, Appellant’s
Rule 1925(b) statement was untimely filed.             See Commonwealth v.
DiClaudio, 210 A.3d 1070, 1074 (Pa. Super. 2019) (“[T]he prisoner mailbox
rule provides that a pro se prisoner’s document is deemed filed on the date
he delivers it to prison authorities for mailing.”). However, because the PCRA
court addressed the merits of Appellant’s issues in its Rule 1925(a) opinion,
we conclude that we may proceed with substantive review. See PCRA Ct. Op.,
10/18/22; see also Commonwealth v. Presley, 193 A.3d 436, 441 (Pa.
Super. 2018) (“[I]n criminal cases, remand, not waiver, results from the late
filing of a [Rule 1925(b)] statement, unless the trial court addressed the issues
raised in a late-filed statement. In those circumstances, no remand is
necessary, and this Court may address the merits of issues.”) (citation and
footnote omitted).

                                           -8-
J-S32042-23

     2. Whether it was permissible for [PCRA Counsel] to have
        determined a petition to withdraw as counsel, accompanied
        with written correspondence pursuant to [Turner/Finley] was
        warranted regarding Appellant’s case-matter, notwithstanding
        Appellant having possessed an ineffective assistance of counsel
        claim relative to his trial counsel having failed to file a pre-trial
        petition for writ of habeas corpus predicated upon the
        Commonwealth having relied upon solely “hearsay” evidence
        to establish a prima facie case against Appellant during
        Appellant’s preliminary hearing?

     3. Whether it was permissible for the [PCRA] court to have
        determined Appellant’s asserted ineffective assistance of
        counsel claim relative to [Trial Counsel] having failed to file a
        pre-trial petition for writ of habeas corpus predicated upon the
        Commonwealth having relied upon solely “hearsay” evidence
        to establish a prima facie case against Appellant during
        Appellant’s preliminary hearing, which, indeed, was
        meritorious, was moot, on the basis of Appellant having been
        convicted of, inter alia, the criminal offense murder in the first
        degree at the conclusion of his trial by jury?

     4. Whether it was permissible for the [PCRA] court to have
        granted [PCRA Counsel’s petition to withdraw pursuant to
        Turner/Finley] and denied [Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition]
        notwithstanding Appellant having possessed, and asserted an
        ineffective assistance of counsel claim relative to his trial
        counsel having failed to file a pre-trial petition for writ of
        habeas corpus predicated upon the Commonwealth having
        relied upon solely “hearsay” evidence to establish a prima facie
        case against him during his preliminary hearing, which, indeed,
        was meritorious, for the [PCRA] court’s consideration?

     5. Whether it was permissible for the [PCRA] court to have denied
        the request relative to Appellant being provided with a
        competent and effective court-appointed counsel during the
        trial stage of Appellant’s initial [PCRA] proceeding filed by
        Appellant, pro se, notwithstanding Appellant having possessed,
        and asserted an ineffective assistance of counsel claim relative
        to Appellant’s trial counsel having failed to file a pre-trial
        petition for writ of habeas corpus predicated upon the
        Commonwealth having relied upon solely “hearsay” evidence
        to establish a prima facie case against Appellant during
        Appellant’s preliminary hearing, which, indeed, was
        meritorious, for the [PCRA] court’s consideration?

                                      -9-
J-S32042-23

       6. Whether it was permissible for the [PCRA] court to have denied
          the request relative to Appellant being provided with a
          competent and effective court-appointed counsel during the
          appeal stage of Appellant’s initial [PCRA] proceeding filed by
          Appellant, pro se, notwithstanding Appellant having possessed,
          and asserted an ineffective assistance of counsel claim relative
          to his trial counsel having failed to file a pre-trial petition for
          writ of habeas corpus predicated upon the Commonwealth
          having relied upon solely “hearsay” evidence to establish a
          prima facie case against him during his preliminary hearing,
          which, indeed, was meritorious, for the [PCRA] court’s
          consideration?

Appellant’s Brief at 4-5 (some formatting altered).

                         Trial Counsel’s Ineffectiveness

       Appellant’s first five issues involve Trial Counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness

for failing to file a petition for habeas corpus challenging the Commonwealth’s

reliance hearsay at the preliminary hearing.6 See Appellant’s Brief at 19-24.7

Specifically, Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred in granting PCRA

Counsel’s motion to withdraw because Appellant had a meritorious issue

concerning the Commonwealth’s reliance on hearsay at the preliminary

hearing. See id. at 20-24.

       The Commonwealth contends that Appellant’s claim is meritless because

any defect at the preliminary hearing was cured at trial. Commonwealth’s

____________________________________________

6 In the argument section of his brief, Appellant addresses these claims as a

single issue. See Appellant’s Brief at 19-24. Further, because these claims
are interrelated, we address them as a single issue.

7 Apart from the claim concerning Trial Counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness at
the preliminary hearing, Appellant does not challenge the PCRA court’s
disposition of any issues raised in his PCRA petition or the PCRA court’s order
granting PCRA Counsel’s motion to withdraw pursuant to Turner/Finley.

                                          - 10 -
J-S32042-23

Brief at 21.    Alternatively, the Commonwealth argues that at the time of

Appellant’s preliminary hearing on November 26, 2018, relevant legal

authority permitted the Commonwealth to rely on hearsay to establish a prima

facie case, and Trial Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to predict

a change in the law. See id. at 22-23.8

       Our review of an order denying PCRA relief is limited to “whether the

record supports the PCRA court’s determination and whether the PCRA court’s

decision is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4

(Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted).         “[W]e apply a de novo standard of

review to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Mitchell,

105    A.3d    1257,     1265     (Pa.    2014)    (citation   omitted);   see   also
____________________________________________

8 At the time of Appellant’s preliminary hearing on November 26, 2018, the

Commonwealth was permitted to rely on hearsay evidence alone to establish
a prima facie case. See Commonwealth v. Ricker, 120 A.3d 349 (Pa.
Super. 2015) (permitting the Commonwealth to establish a prima facie case
based on hearsay alone). Our Supreme Court subsequently disapproved of
the holding in Ricker, and it ruled that while hearsay evidence can be used to
prove any element of a crime at a preliminary hearing, it cannot be the sole
basis for a prima facie case. See Commonwealth v. McClelland, 233 A.3d
717, 721 (Pa. 2020). “It is well-settled that counsel cannot be held ineffective
for failing to anticipate a change in the law.”           Commonwealth v.
Drummond, 285 A.3d 625, 645 (Pa. 2022) (citation omitted). Accordingly,
Appellant’s claim that trial counsel should have challenged the
Commonwealth’s prima facie case based on hearsay alone would have been
facially futile under then-binding case law of Ricker. See Commonwealth
v. Rivera, 255 A.3d 497, 504 n.23 (Pa. Super. 2021) (Rivera I), reversed
on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Rivera, 296 A.3d 1141 (Pa. 2023)
(Rivera II). Therefore, we agree with the Commonwealth’s alternative
argument that Trial Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to predict
a change in the law and be considered ineffective for failing to challenge the
reliance on hearsay alone at the preliminary hearing. See Commonwealth’s
Brief at 21; see also Drummond, 285 A.3d at 645.

                                          - 11 -
J-S32042-23

Commonwealth v. Davis, 262 A.3d 589, 595 (Pa. Super. 2021) (stating that

“[t]his Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if the

record contains any support for those findings” (citation omitted)).

      Moreover, when reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

we are governed by the following standard:

      [T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
      defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
      ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of
      the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process
      that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken
      place. The burden is on the defendant to prove all three of the
      following prongs: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit;
      (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her
      action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of
      counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
      proceedings would have been different.

      We have explained that a claim has arguable merit where the
      factual averments, if accurate, could establish cause for relief.
      Whether the facts rise to the level of arguable merit is a legal
      determination.

      The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable basis for
      his action or inaction is whether no competent counsel would have
      chosen that action or inaction, or, the alternative, not chosen,
      offered a significantly greater potential chance of success.
      Counsel’s decisions will be considered reasonable if they
      effectuated his client’s interests. We do not employ a hindsight
      analysis in comparing trial counsel’s actions with other efforts he
      may have taken.

      Prejudice is established if there is a reasonable probability that,
      but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have
      been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
      to undermine confidence in the outcome.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043-44 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citations omitted and formatting altered).

                                     - 12 -
J-S32042-23

      Further, counsel’s obligations in filing a no-merit letter pursuant to the

mandates of Turner/Finley are as follows:

      The no-merit letter must set forth: 1) the nature and extent of
      counsel’s review of the case; 2) each issue that the petitioner
      wishes to raise on appeal; and 3) counsel’s explanation of why
      each of those issues is meritless. Where PCRA counsel’s no-merit
      letter does not discuss all of the issues that the convicted
      defendant has raised in a first PCRA petition and explain why they
      lack merit, it does not satisfy these mandatory requirements and
      dismissal of the PCRA petition without requiring counsel to file an
      amended PCRA petition or a further, adequate no-merit letter is a
      deprivation of the right to counsel on the PCRA petition.

Commonwealth v. Kelsey, 206 A.3d 1135, 1139 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citations omitted).

      The Turner/Finley decisions provide the manner for post-
      conviction counsel to withdraw from representation. The holdings
      of those cases mandate an independent review of the record by
      competent counsel before a PCRA court or appellate court can
      authorize an attorney’s withdrawal. The necessary independent
      review requires counsel to file a “no-merit” letter detailing the
      nature and extent of his review and list each issue the petitioner
      wishes to have examined, explaining why those issues are
      meritless. The PCRA court, or an appellate court if the no-merit
      letter is filed before it, . . . then must conduct its own independent
      evaluation of the record and agree with counsel that the petition
      is without merit. See Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875,
      876 n.1 (Pa. 2009).

Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1184 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(formatting altered and footnote omitted), abrogated on other grounds by

Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021).

      Here, as noted previously, Appellant did not raise trial counsel’s

ineffectiveness at the preliminary hearing in his PCRA petition.        Although

                                     - 13 -
J-S32042-23

Appellant raised the issue in response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice,

Appellant did not seek to amend his PCRA petition to include that claim. See

Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1084-85 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating

that “a petitioner must request leave to amend his petition in his Rule 907

response to raise new trial counsel ineffectiveness claims”).

       Generally, claims raised in an unauthorized supplement to a PCRA

petition are subject to waiver. Commonwealth v. Reid, 99 A.3d 427, 437

(Pa. 2014).     However, the PCRA court can “implicitly” permit an informal

amendment where it does not strike the supplemental filing, and it considers

the   supplemental       claim    prior   to   disposing   of   the   PCRA   petition.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491, 503 (Pa. Super. 2016); see also

Commonwealth v. Boyd, 835 A.2d 812, 816 (Pa. Super. 2003) (holding that

“by permitting Appellant to file a supplement, and in considering the

supplement, the PCRA court effectively allowed Appellant to amend his

petition to include those issues presented in the supplement”). Because the

PCRA court addressed Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim in its Rule 1925(a)

opinion and did not strike Appellant’s filing, we conclude that the PCRA court

implicitly permitted Appellant to amend his PCRA petition to include this claim.

See Brown, 141 A.3d at 503. Accordingly, we decline to find waiver. 9 See

id.; Boyd, 835 A.2d at 816.

____________________________________________

9 In Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), our Supreme
Court held: “[A] PCRA petitioner may, after a PCRA court denies relief, and
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                          - 14 -
J-S32042-23

       In addressing this issue, the PCRA court incorporated by reference its

rationale from the July 22, 2022 order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition. See

PCRA Ct. Op., 10/18/22, at 1-2 (citing Order, 7/22/22). Specifically, the PCRA

court explained:

       [Appellant] is now claiming in his response that counsel was
       ineffective for failing to file a pre-trial habeas corpus petition
       based on his claim that the Commonwealth relied on hearsay
       evidence at the preliminary hearing to establish a prima facie
       case, citing to Commonwealth v. McClelland, 233 A.3d 717 (Pa.
       2020). This contention is without merit. In McClelland, the
       Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Commonwealth may
       not establish a prima facie case against a defendant relying on
       hearsay alone. However, “the Supreme Court did not intend to
       extend McClelland’s holding to cases such as this one, where the
       complained-of defect in the preliminary hearing is subsequently
       cured at trial.” [(Rivera I)]. “Once [the defendant] has gone to
       trial and been found guilty of the crime, any effect in the
       preliminary hearing is rendered immaterial[.]” Commonwealth
       v. Tyler, 587 A.2d 326, 328 (Pa. Super. 1991). In the instant
       case, [Appellant’s] trial cured any defect that may have occurred
       at the preliminary hearing. As [Appellant’s] contention is without
       arguable merit, it fails to meet the first prong of the
       ineffectiveness standard.

Order, 7/22/22, at 1-2.

____________________________________________

after obtaining new counsel or acting pro se, raise claims of PCRA counsel’s
ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so, even if on appeal.” Id. at 401
(footnote omitted and emphasis added). Herein, Appellant challenges Trial
Counsel’s representation, and Appellant has not claimed PCRA Counsel’s
ineffectiveness nor asserted a layered claim of ineffectiveness. Accordingly,
the holding from Bradley is not applicable. See id; see also, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Crumbley, 270 A.3d 1171, 1175 (Pa. Super. 2022)
(explaining that pursuant to Bradley, “layered claims of ineffective PCRA
counsel may now be raised for the first time on appeal if that is the earliest
practical opportunity to do so.”).

                                          - 15 -
J-S32042-23

       After review, we agree with the PCRA court that Appellant’s claim

regarding trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness at the preliminary hearing

lacks arguable merit. The record reflects that after the preliminary hearing,

Appellant’s case proceeded to trial, and the jury found him guilty of murder.

See N.T., Trial, 11/20/19, at 3-4; Sentencing Order, 12/31/19. Any defect in

the preliminary hearing was rendered immaterial by the guilty verdict. See

Rivera I, 296         A.3d at     504; Tyler, 587   A.2d at 328;      see also

Commonwealth v. Rouse, 1392 EDA 2022, 2023 WL 3431251, at *11 (Pa.

Super. filed May 12, 2023) (unpublished mem.) (concluding that despite the

holding in McClelland, any defect in the defendant’s preliminary hearing was

cured at trial).10 As such, Trial Counsel’s failure to file a petition for habeas

corpus regarding the Commonwealth’s reliance on hearsay at the preliminary

hearing was immaterial, and Trial Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for

failing to raise this claim. See Commonwealth v. Monaco, 869 A.2d 1026,

1031 (Pa. Super. 2005) (holding that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective

for failing to raise a meritless a claim). Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled

to relief.

       Further, Appellant did not challenge the PCRA court’s order granting

PCRA counsel’s motion to withdraw or the order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA

petition on any basis other than the allegation that Trial Counsel was

____________________________________________

10 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating that this Court may cite to non-precedential

decisions filed after May 1, 2019 for their persuasive value).

                                          - 16 -
J-S32042-23

ineffective for failing to challenge the Commonwealth’s reliance on hearsay at

the preliminary hearing. Because we conclude that this issue is meritless,

Appellant has presented no basis upon which to disturb the PCRA court’s order

granting PCRA Counsel’s motion to withdraw or dismissing the PCRA petition.

See Rykard, 55 A.3d at 1184. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief.

See id.

                           Appointment of Counsel

      In his remaining issue, Appellant argues that he had a right to counsel

in litigating his PCRA and PCRA appeal.         Appellant’s Brief at 25.    Further,

Appellant asserts that the PCRA court erred when it denied Appellant’s request

to appoint new counsel. See id. at 31.

      The Commonwealth contends that because PCRA Counsel was permitted

to withdraw pursuant to Turner/Finley, Appellant was no longer entitled to

appointed counsel. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 24.

      Upon review, we conclude that Appellant’s argument presents two

separate issues: (1) Appellant’s right to counsel under the PCRA; and (2) the

PCRA court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for the appointment of new

counsel.

      An indigent PCRA petitioner has a rule-based right to the appointment

of counsel in litigating his first PCRA petition, and, generally, this right includes

representation in an appeal from the disposition of a first PCRA petition. See

Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C); (F)(2). However,

                                       - 17 -
J-S32042-23

       when counsel has been appointed to represent a petitioner in
       post-conviction proceedings as a matter of right under the rules
       of criminal procedure and when that right has been fully vindicated
       by counsel being permitted to withdraw under [Turner/Finley]
       new counsel shall not be appointed and the petitioner, or
       appellant, must thereafter look to his or her own resources for
       whatever further proceedings there might be.

Commonwealth v. Maple, 559 A.2d 953, 956 (Pa. Super. 1989) (emphasis

added; footnote omitted).

       Here, the only challenge Appellant preserved relative to the order

granting PCRA Counsel’s petition to withdraw under Turner/Finley was

Appellant’s assertion that Trial Counsel was ineffective at the preliminary

hearing. See Pro Se Response to Rule 907 Notice. In light of our conclusion

that there is no merit to this claim, Appellant has presented no basis upon

which to disturb the PCRA court’s ruling on PCRA Counsel’s motion to withdraw

pursuant to Turner/Finley. Indeed, there were no meritorious issues, and

“once the [PCRA] court permits PCRA counsel to withdraw after filing a

Turner/Finley ‘no-merit’ letter, an appellant is no longer entitled to the

appointment of counsel on appeal.”      Commonwealth v. Shaw, 217 A.3d

265, 268 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2019); see also Rykard, 55 A.3d at 1183, n.1

(explaining that if PCRA counsel is permitted to withdraw pursuant to

Turner/Finley, new counsel shall not be appointed, and the appellant must

look to his own resources for future proceedings). Accordingly, Appellant was

not entitled to counsel. See Shaw, 217 A.3d at 268 n.3; Maple, 559 A.2d at

956.

                                     - 18 -
J-S32042-23

     With respect to the PCRA court’s denial of Appellant’s request for the

appointment of new PCRA counsel, we conclude that there was no error

because Appellant was not entitled to the appointment of counsel after PCRA

Counsel was permitted to withdraw. See Shaw, 217 A.3d at 268 n.3; Maple,

559 A.2d at 956.

     On this record, we conclude that Appellant is not entitled to relief. For

these reasons, we affirm the order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition.

     Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 12/28/2023

                                   - 19 -