Court Opinion

ID: 9860007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:06:42.709993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:11:44.763124
License: Public Domain

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Prentice, J.
Although I agree that the judgment must be reversed, I do not agree that the words from Bram v. United States, 18 S.Ct. 183, that a confession, in order to be admissible must not be “* * * obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, * * *” may be applied literally and with such rigor as indicated by Justice DeBruler. Neither do I agree, however, as indicated by Chief Justice Givan in his dissent, that the State may induce a confession by representations as to the sentence that will be imposed in exchange. There appears to be some confusion of the standards by which we judge the validity of guilty pleas with those by which we judge the voluntariness of confessions.
We have a controlling statute in this state, the constitutionality of which does not appear to have been challenged. Unless and until it is held to have constitutional infirmities, it should be accorded full faith and credit.
*323“The confession of a defendant made under inducement, with all the circumstances, may be given in evidence against him, except when made under the influence of fear produced by threats or by intimidation or undue influences; but a confession made under inducement is not sufficient to warrant a conviction without corroborating evidence. Acts 1905, ch. 169, §239, Burns 35-1-31-5.” (Emphasis added)
The issue in this case is, therefore, not whether the defendant’s initial confessions and subsequent incriminating statements were induced but rather, whether they were induced by “undue influences.” Although the determination must, of necessity, be made retrospectively, it must, nevertheless, be made in the light of the circumstances as they were at the time given and not in view of subsequent developments, which were then unknown.
The written confessions were found by the trial judge to be inadmissible — undoubtedly because they were unduly influenced. The officer who took them freely acknowledged that they were given in exchange for a commitment from the State for a ten year sentence as opposed to a life term. Such inducement was improper because the State lacked the authority to fulfil its commitment, such being the exclusive province of the trial judge. True, under our present case law the parties could bargain for a guilty plea, subject to the approval of the court. Neither party, however, is bound by the bargain, unless and until it is exposed to the judge; and he alone may give it viability. If he disapproves it, it is not admissible in evidence by either party.
The record does not disclose why the plea bargain aborted, but it is immaterial; as the State was impotent. It could do no more than to make a recommendation to the court. Had the State merely agreed to make such a recommendation in return for the confessions, a commitment that it could deliver and thus had a right to give, and if all the other circumstances evidenced a free and knowing choice by the defendants, their confessions would have been admissible under the statute. Here, however, they clearly were unduly influenced by a *324promise which the State could not perform. As such, it was a false representation.
The conversation between the defendants and the deputy on the day following the giving of the confessions obviously were part and parcel of the same guilty plea negotiations. That the statements made therein were then voluntary and not obtained by trickery or false or misleading statements given in the same conversation is immaterial. They were, nevertheless, part of an on-going transaction which, although it may have been undertaken in good faith by the State was, nevertheless, tainted by an improper inducement. As such, they should have been excluded from evidence.