Court Opinion

ID: 9715540
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:08:08.02554+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:40.838313
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, J.,
dissenting.
While being held by police in Missouri, appellant confessed that he had murdered Best and Briggs in Indiana in separate events. Judge Zaklan, a judge of the Marion Municipal Court, issued two warrants for the arrest of appellant: one on February 4, 1965 for the murder of Briggs and another on February 5, 1965 for the murder of Best. These warrants were lodged by Marion County Sheriff Fields with Missouri officials with the following letter dated February 11, 1965:
Attached is a warrant charging Crawford with First Degree Murder on an unidentified victim, until his confession and our later positive identification proved the vie-tim to be Ambrose Victor Best. This places two (2) warrants in your possession charging Crawford with First Degree Murder from Marion County, Indianapolis, Indiana. We wish to have these warrants to serve as Detainers, until such time Crawford is released to us for trial. We are desirous to obtain Crawford back here to stand trial on each of the two charges, and will certainly expedite when and if it is decided Missouri authorities have disposed of their case.
Records of Marion County Sheriff's office disclose that the warrant issued on February 4, 1965, was for the arrest of appellant for killing Briggs:
February 4 1965, Secured and filed Warrant on subject Charles Lee Crawford in Municipal Court #6, on the charge of First Deg. Murder. (Victim) Louis E. Briggs W/M/37
In 1978, Marion County indicted appellant for the murder of Best and lodged such indictment as a detainer. On October 17, 1973, appellant filed his notice to the prosecuting attorney of Marion County, Indiana, requesting final disposition of the 1973 indictment, specifically naming it, together with "all untried indictments, informations, or complaints on the basis of which detainers have been lodged against me from your state...." A record dated September 27, 1965, made by the warden of the Missouri State Penitentiary discloses the following:
Receipt of yours of February 11, 1965 is acknowledged. * * * Your warrants received. This inmate was assigned to this Penitentiary, effective September 27, 1965. He is serving a Life sentence for Murder in the First Degree.
In 1965, Judge Zaklan, as judge of the Marion Municipal Court, had no jurisdiction to try a murder charge. He did, however, have jurisdiction to act as a committing magistrate in felony cases pursuant to two existing statutes:
When any person has committed a crime in any county ... punishable by ... state's prison, and has fled to any other county, state, territory, or country and ... a grand Jury indictment or affidavit charging said person with said crime has been filed, the judge of the cireuit, ... city court or justice of the peace before whom the said indietment or affidavit is filed, shall issue a warrant for the arrest of said criminal....
Any justice of the peace or city judge, ... on complaint made on oath before him, charging any person with the commission of any felony or misdemeanor, shall issue his warrant for the arrest of such person, and cause him to be brought forthwith, before him for examination or trial.
Burns 9-704; Burns 9-701, respectively. In issuing the two warrants for the arrest of appellant, Judge Zaklan acted under the authority of one of these statutes. Under the first, the warrants would have been issued on the basis of an affidavit charging first degree murder. In 1965, "affidavit" was the name for a charging pleading in a criminal case, and was not simply a factual affidavit. Under the second, the warrants would have *153been issued upon the basis of a complaint which stated a criminal charge, upon which a trial would be possible. Obviously then, a complaint was also a charging pleading and not simply a factual affidavit.
The jurisdiction exercised by Judge Zaklan is explained in State ex rel. Imel v. Municipal Court, 225 Ind. 23, 72 N.E.2d 357 (Ind. 1947). In that case, an affidavit charging Imel with having murdered his stepmother was filed in the Marion Municipal Court, the same court served by Judge Zaklan years later in 1965. This court explained the procedure then operating in the municipal court:
It seems to us, therefore, and we hold that the Municipal Court of Marion County has the jurisdiction and power to act as a committing magistrate in felony cases and, that being true, the Prosecuting Attorney was within established practice in filing an affidavit for the purpose of holding relator for grand jury action, and when that affidavit was filed, even though relator's guilt could not be finally determined in that court, he stood charged with first degree murder and the first step in bringing him to trial would be taken there.
State ex. rel. Imel v. Municipal Court, 225 Ind. 23, 29, 72 N.E.2d 357, 359 (Ind.1947). In the present case, the trial court found that there was no direct evidence that an indictment or information for murder was filed against appellant. Nevertheless, ample evidence of its equivalent is present in the act of issuance by Judge Zaklan, the facial language of the warrant itself, and the records of the sheriff. Is there any doubt that if appellant had been arrested on this warrant, he would have been taken before Judge Zaklan, who would then have examined the evidence of his alleged participation in the murder of Briggs and would have either discharged him or bound him over in custody for grand jury action? I think not. The warrant from Judge Zaklan bespeaks a charge of murder.
Furthermore, as noted in the majority opinion, a charge of murder in Indiana could only be brought by grand jury indietment in 1965. If the majority is correct that a pleading upon which a trial is possible is required. to constitute a detainer under the Agreement, however, then no warrant issued by a committing magistrate for arrest upon an actual affidavit or information charging murder could ever have constituted a valid de-tainer, because there would have been no charging instrument in existence upon which a trial could have been conducted. Clearly, the majority cannot be correct on this point. Such a requirement would simply afford the prosecution the means of avoiding the burdens of the Agreement, while enjoying the benefits of detainers.
The 1965 warrant for the arrest of appellant for the murder of Briggs was issued by Judge Zaklan and if appellant had appeared before Judge Zaklan under arrest pursuant to such warrant, it would have constituted "the first step in the process of bringing him to trial" upon such charge. This is not a warrant standing alone and without a supporting charge. Moreover, the warrant was received by Missouri authorities, was intended by Indiana authorities to be a detainer, operated as a detainer, and continued to do so after the 1973 indictment of appellant for the murder of Best ceased to operate as a detainer, despite the fact that appellant had called for its final disposition in 1978 in his notice to the prosecutor, which identified "all untried ... complaints on the basis of which detainers have been lodged against me from your state." Since the State took no action to finally dispose of that charge within the required 180 days, appellant was entitled to dismissal of that charge and the same charge made later in 1998 in Indiana by indictment, as commanded by the Agreement on Detain-ers. Ind.Code Ann. 35-83-10-4 (West 1986). Thus, I respectfully dissent.
Finally, peculiarities exist in the federal cases found irresistible by the majority that distinguish them from the present case and preclude any fruitful comparison to it. United States v. Bottoms, 755 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir.1985), for instance, involves the question of whether a federal post-escape arrest warrant sent to a state prison constituted a detainer under the Agreement. Bottoms escaped while serving a federal sentence and ended up in state custody. The purpose of the federal warrant was to return Bottoms to federal custody to serve out his sentence. *154By contrast, Judge Zaklan's warrant was intended to procure custody of appellant to face a murder charge. United States v. Hall, 974 F.2d 1201(9th Cir.1992), involves the question of whether a federal telex informing authorities in custody of Hall that . the D.A. had authorized the filing of a complaint, constituted a detainer. There was not even a warrant in that case. Again this is distinguishable from appellant's cireum-stances. A common thread running through these and similar cases is their failure to accord the first sentence of Article 9 of the Agreement its natural force: This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes.