Court Opinion

ID: 9774865
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:36:26.601195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:17.249474
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Judge
(dissenting).
I would reverse this case on the basis of the trial court’s failure to allow the appellant to test the prosecutor’s good faith in impeaching the appellant at the punishment hearing through the use of offenses committed while the appellant was a juvenile.
The record reflects that the appellant’s sister, Dorothy Jean Nash, testified at the punishment hearing concerning the appellant’s reputation in the community. When asked what that reputation was, she replied that “everybody seemed to like him.”
On cross-examination the prosecutor asked Mrs. Nash if she had heard “that on December 19 of 1967 the Defendant was arrested for rape and fondling of a juvenile.” The witness answered, “No.” The appellant then objected and asked that the jury be excused so that the State could show its good faith. The prosecutor indicated that he would be willing to comply with the appellant’s request, and the court overruled the objection.
After the appellant had called his last witness at the punishment hearing, he again asked that the court conduct a hearing to determine whether the prosecutor had acted in good faith in asking the question. In response to the court’s inquiry, and outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor stated that appellant’s arrest record reflected that on December 19, 1967, the appellant “was arrested for rape and fondling a juvenile female and released to juvenile authorities.”
The court then stated: “The Court sees the record and the Court holds that the State’s attorney acted in good faith.” The trial court then denied the appellant’s request that he be allowed to cross-examine the prosecutor concerning his good faith.
In Rivas v. State, 501 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), this Court specifically held that the juvenile record of a witness may not be used to impeach him. In Ruth v. State, 522 S.W.2d 517 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), the prosecutor repeatedly attempted to impeach the defendant at the punishment *13stage through the use of the defendant’s juvenile record. We reversed, holding that the “egregious action by the prosecutor was highly inflammatory and calculated to prejudice the defendant.” Ruth v. State, supra, at 519. See V.T.C.A., Family Code, Sec. 51.13(b).
In Davis v. State, 160 Tex.Cr.R. 138, 140, 268 S.W.2d 152, 153 (1954), this Court held:
“The asking of a question is not always reversible error, but where it is shown, as was done in this case, that the prosecutor knew that the question was improper the matter became a more serious one.”
See also Blankenship v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 94, 289 S.W.2d 240 (1956); Parrish v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 252, 290 S.W.2d 245 (1956); Garcia v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 211, 319 S.W.2d 727 (1959); Robertson v. State, 463 S.W.2d 18 (Tex.Cr.App.1971).
In Davis, the prosecutor, while cross-examining the defendant about his whereabouts after the homicide, asked, “And you got in jail too, didn’t you?” After replying in the affirmative the appellant was asked, “Had to pay a fine for choking an old man?” The jury was retired, and the defendant showed by bill of exception that the special prosecutor knew that the offense was a justice court offense not involving moral turpitude.1
In this case, the trial court prevented the appellant from cross-examining the prosecutor to determine whether the attempted impeachment was in bad faith — that is, whether the prosecutor knew when he asked the question that the appellant was a juvenile at the time of the earlier arrest. The appellant was thus precluded from developing what — under the authority of Rivas, Ruth, and Davis — might have been reversible error.
It is fundamental that a trial court may not deny to an accused the right to present evidence which may reflect reversible error. See Art. 40.09(6)(d)(l), Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. In Miller v. State, 52 Tex.Cr.R. 72, 76, 105 S.W. 502, 505 (1907), this Court said:
“It would seem from what has been stated that appellant used all the diligence possible to have this, as well as other bills prepared and filed during the term of the court, and there was ample time to have done so if proper action had been taken, and that he is deprived of his bill and placed in such an attitude before the court on appeal that he cannot have it considered, and this without his fault. This requires a reversal of this judgment, if there were no other reasons.”
And in White v. State, 135 Tex.Cr.R. 210, 117 S.W.2d 450 (1938), this Court again reversed because of the refusal of the trial judge to allow the defendant to perfect his bill. White had been assessed the death penalty after being convicted of rape. In reversing, this Court said:
“However much we may regret to reverse cases of this character, yet, when the accused has not had a trial according to the laws of the land, it is the duty of this court, under their solemn oath, to see that it is accorded to him.” White v. State, supra, 135 Tex.Cr.R. at 215, 117 S.W.2d at 453.
The appellant in this case, like White and Miller before him, has been deprived of the opportunity to preserve error for review in this Court; he “has not had a trial according to the laws of the land.” White v. State, supra, and cases there cited. Miller v. State, supra; Art. 40.09(6)(d)(l), supra; Cox v. State, 137 Tex.Cr.R. 59, 128 S.W.2d 386 (1939); Kilpatrick v. State, 85 Tex.Cr.R. 172, 211 S.W. 230 (1919). And compare Morris v. State, 411 S.W.2d 730 (Tex.Cr. *14App.1967); Vines v. State, 479 S.W.2d 322 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); and Jones v. State, 496 S.W.2d 566 (Tex.Cr.App.1973).2
The judgment should be reversed.

. An examination of the records of this Court shows what the Davis opinion strongly implies: that the method used to establish the prosecutor’s knowledge was by cross-examination of the prosecutor himself. This Court approved of that method of establishing the prosecutor’s bad faith and reiterated this approval in Blankenship v. State, supra, 163 Tex.Cr.R. at 96, 289 S.W.2d at 241-242, and Robertson v. State, supra, at 20. See also Garcia v. State, supra.

. This Court’s holdings in Fortson v. State, 474 S.W.2d 234 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Walker v. State, 454 S.W.2d 415 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Lee v. State, 470 S.W.2d 664 (Tex.Cr.App. 1971); and Hart v. State, 447 S.W.2d 944 (Tex.Cr.App.1970) are not in point. In Fort-son and Walker, the State was properly allowed to introduce testimony that the defendant’s general reputation for being a peaceful and law abiding citizen was bad; no specific instances of misconduct were alluded to, as was done in the present case.
In Lee, this Court specifically held that “[t]he record does not indicate the questions were asked in bad faith.” Lee, supra, at 665, n. 1. A re-examination of the record of that case reveals that the defendant only questioned the prosecutor’s bad faith, but made no attempt to gain a hearing on the issue outside the jury’s presence.
In Hart, the careful trial court permitted the defendant to attempt to show that the disputed question was asked in bad faith; that this attempt was unsuccessful in Hart’s case can hardly stand as authority for the proposition that the appellant in the present case could not have shown bad faith.