Court Opinion

ID: 6561389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-20 19:15:51.638979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:56:33.228453
License: Public Domain

Helm, J.
(dissenting). Construing the averments of the complaint filed in this case, under established principles of law and rules of pleading, I am of the opinion that plaintiff ought not to recover upon them. To my mind the complaint must be regarded as showing that when plaintiff procured the renewal of the policy he had knowledge of Barton’s impaired physical condition, and that such impairment was the result of intemperance. Having been in no way deceived, misled or imposed upon, he cannot be heard to say that he was ignorant of the clause in the policy avoiding the contract upon this ground. The legal inference from the averment made on the subject is that the death of Barton, ten weeks after the policy was renewed, resulted from Barton’s impaired health and intemperate habits, existing at the time of such renewal.
If these conclusions be legitimately drawn, they show an attempt on the part of plaintiff to indemnify himself through a policy of insurance which he must be held to have known ought not to issue. The fact that Johnson had knowledge of the assured’s impaired physical condition, coupled with the principle that insurance companies are bound by the knowledge of their officers and agents, does not answer my objection. Assuming that no distinction should be made between the mutual and the old line companies in this respect, I do not believe that Johnson’s knowledge amounted to a waiver of the condition in question. In the first place this is not a case where the waiver of a condition in the contract subsequent to its execution is claimed to have occurred. On the contrary, reliance is placed upon the proposition that the condition, though inserted by the parties, was waived at the inception of the contract. And, secondly, the doctrine of waiver, predicated upon the knowledge of offi.*304cers or agents, is recognized for the purpose of protecting innocent third persons dealing with insurance companies. It ought to have no application where the other contracting party is acting in bad faith. The law does not wholly ignore the rights and interests of innocent members and stockholders in these corporations; and I take it that, if an officer or agent and an outside party conspire to perpetrate a fraud upon the company, the courts will not lend their aid to its consummation. The fraud appearing in this case upon the face of the complaint, it was unnecessary, in my judgment, to plead it by answer. The demurrer sufficiently presented the issue. I do not say that, in fact, plaintiff actually intended to perpetrate a fraud upon the company. He may have been ignorant of the intemperance clause in the policy, as he asserts. He may also have been ignorant of the fact that insurance companies do not knowingly accept risks upon parties who are so low with disease that death is only a question of a few days or weeks at the utmost. What I assert is that the law, under the facts disclosed by his complaint, does not permit him to plead or rely upon his ignorance in these respects.
For the foregoing reasons I feel constrained to dissent from the conclusion reached by a majority of the court.
I think the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.

Beversed.