Court Opinion

ID: 9948838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 00:02:42.643309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:06.170360
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/7/24 P. v. Osborne CA4/2

                     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
     publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
                               publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                       E080145

 v.                                                                       (Super.Ct.No. INF1801872)

 HEIDI ELIZABETH OSBORNE,                                                 ORDER MODIFYING OPINION

           Defendant and Respondent.                                      [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]

         The petition for rehearing filed by appellant on February 27, 2024, is denied.

The opinion filed in this matter on February 22, 2024, is modified as follows:

         On page 2 of the opinion, the sentence “The Prosecutor contends the trial court

erred because the delay was due to the pandemic, which was an exceptional

circumstance creating good cause for the delay in bringing the case to trial” is deleted

and replaced with the following:

                   The Prosecutor contends the trial court erred because (1) the delay was

         due to the pandemic, which was an exceptional circumstance creating good cause

         for the delay in bringing the case to trial; (2) the victim’s constitutional right to a

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      speedy trial (Cal. Const. art. I, § 28(b)(9)) trumps Penal Code section 1382’s

      dismissal mandate; and (3) the trial court failed to conduct an individualized

      analysis of the case prior to ordering it dismissed.

      On page 5 at the end of the discussion but before the disposition we add the

following two paragraphs:

             The Prosecutor contends the victim’s constitutional right to a speedy trial

      (Cal. Const. art. I, § 28(b)(9)) trumps Penal Code section 1382’s dismissal

      requirement. The victim and defendant both have constitutional rights to a

      speedy trial. (Cal. Const. art. I, §§ 15, cl. 1 & 28(b)(9).) The prosecutor does not

      explain how a court should balance a defendant’s speedy trial right against a

      victim’s speedy trial right; whether a prosecutor has standing to raise a victim’s

      speedy trial right; when a victim’s speedy trial right must be asserted; and against

      whom a victim should raise a violation of their speedy trial right, e.g., the

      prosecutor and/or the court. Accordingly, we deem the issue forfeited due to the

      prosecutor’s failure to adequately support the contention with legal argument and

      legal authority. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.)

             The prosecutor asserts the trial court erred by relying on the trial court’s

      analysis in the Freeman case when dismissing the instant case. The prosecutor

      contends the instant case required an individualized analysis because the victim

      was present and requesting a trial in the instant case. The prosecutor does not

      provide a legal argument as to why a victim’s presence would make a difference

      in a court’s dismissal analysis. It is unclear if the prosecutor is asserting that a

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      victim’s presence should give a case priority. If that is the prosecutor’s assertion,

      then it is unclear who is obligated to give the case priority (the prosecutor, the

      court, etc.) and what happens to cases in which a victim is unavailable, e.g., a

      murder case. Due to the prosecutor’s failure to develop the argument, we deem it

      forfeited. (People v. Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 793.)

      Except for these modifications, the opinion remains unchanged. The

modification does not effect a change in the judgment.

                                                       MILLER
                                                                                           J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ
                              P. J.

MENETREZ
                                 J.

                                            3
Filed 2/22/24 P. v. Osborne CA4/2 (unmodified opinion)

                     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
     publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
                               publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                       E080145

 v.                                                                       (Super.Ct.No. INF1801872)

 HEIDI ELIZABETH OSBORNE,                                                 OPINION

           Defendant and Respondent.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge.

Affirmed.

         Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, and Jesse Male, Deputy District Attorney,

for Plaintiff and Appellant.

         William D. Farber, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Respondent.

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       In June 2019, the Riverside County District Attorney (the Prosecutor) filed an

information charging defendant, Heidi Elizabeth Osborne, with second degree burglary.

(Pen. Code, § 459.) In October 2022, defendant moved to dismiss the case due to her

right to a speedy trial being violated. The trial court granted the motion. The

Prosecutor contends the trial court erred because the delay was due to the pandemic,

which was an exceptional circumstance creating good cause for the delay in bringing

the case to trial. We affirm.

                                PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       In her motion to dismiss, defendant contended, “there are 2,800 backlogged cases

with approximately 18 available trial courtrooms.” Defendant asserted she would “face

years of continuances if the court[ ] . . . allow[ed] continuances indefinitely.” In

opposition, the Prosecutor contended they were ready for trial, but the court lacked an

available trial department. The Prosecutor contended the pandemic, which was an

exceptional circumstance, created the trial delay so the case should be continued—not

dismissed.

       On October 28, 2022, during the hearing on defendant’s motion, the trial court

explained that it was dismissing the case “for the reasons articulated and reasons [sic] in

People versus Freeman,” which is another trial court case that was dismissed on October

28, 2022. In the Freeman case, the trial court said, “[W]e had no open and available

courtrooms in order to send this case to.”

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       The trial court explained: there were 15 criminal departments in the midst of

trying cases; four civil departments were trying criminal cases; the court had applied for

assistance from the assigned judge program, but no assistance had come; and Riverside

County needs 115 judicial officers, but has funding for only “75 judges and 15

subordinate judicial officers,” and of those, there are “eight current vacancies.” The

trial court determined that the Superior Court of Riverside County is “operating at about

70 percent of [its] assessed need,” and its “deficit of authorized and funded judicial

positions is the second worst in the state, second only to San Bernardino County.”

                                       DISCUSSION

       The Prosecutor contends the trial court erred by dismissing the case because the

pandemic was an exceptional circumstance that permitted the court to exceed speedy

trial deadlines.

       “Under [Penal Code] section 1382, subdivision (a)(2), ‘[t]he presumptive time

period established by state law for bringing a felony case to trial is 60 days from the

date a defendant is arraigned on an information or indictment.’ [Citation.] If a felony

case is not brought to trial within that deadline, the trial court ‘shall order the action to

be dismissed’ unless there is good cause for the delay. [Citation.]

       “Good cause does not exist ‘when the lack of a judge or courtroom available to

timely bring a criminal defendant to trial is fairly and reasonably attributable to the fault

or neglect of the state.’ [Citation.] Court congestion therefore does not constitute good

cause unless it is caused by ‘ “exceptional circumstance[s].” ’ [Citation.] [¶] The trial

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court has ‘broad discretion to determine whether good cause exists to grant a

continuance of the trial.’ [Citation.] We therefore review a trial court’s good-cause

determination for an abuse of discretion.” (People v. Superior Court (Tapia) (2023) 93

Cal.App.5th 394, 402 (Tapia).)

       Tapia concerned the dismissal of a criminal case by the Superior Court of

Riverside County in October 2022, due to the lack of an available courtroom. (Tapia,

supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 400.) In Tapia, this court explained that the Superior Court

of Riverside County is “severely underfunded and understaffed,” and noted its status as

“the second or third most underfunded trial court in California.” (Tapia, supra, 93

Cal.App.5th at pp. 403-404, fn. omitted.) This court denied the Prosecutor’s writ

petition that challenged the dismissal of the case, reasoning, “Given the Superior

Court’s chronic congestion that has existed for nearly two decades and remains

unresolved to this day, [the trial court] reasonably could find that [the petitioner’s] case

could not timely be brought to trial because [the fact that] there was no available judge

was ‘fairly attributable to the state’s failure, over a considerable period of time, to

provide a number of judges sufficient to meet the needs of Riverside County’s rapidly

growing population and caseload—a circumstance fairly attributable to the fault or

neglect of the state.’ ” (Id. at p. 407.) In sum, the lower court reasonably found that the

petitioner’s case could not be tried in a timely manner “simply because there are ‘[n]ot

enough judges.’ ” (Id. at p. 408.) Our Supreme Court denied the Prosecutor’s petition

for review in Tapia on September 27, 2023, S281419.

                                              4
       We follow this court’s decision in Tapia. It was within reason for the trial court

to conclude that in October 2022—two and one-half years after the start of the

pandemic—the Superior Court of Riverside County was doing “everything within its

means to bring criminal cases to trial within [Penal Code] section 1382’s deadline.

Despite its best efforts, the superior court simply does not have enough judges to

adequately tackle its chronic congestion, . . .” (Tapia, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at pp. 407-

408.) Because the delay was due to chronic court congestion, there was no good cause

for failing to bring the case to trial in a timely manner. Thus, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion.

       The Prosecutor argues that the pandemic is an exceptional circumstance creating

good cause for the delay in bringing the case to trial. However, October 2022 was two

and one-half years after the start of the pandemic. While the pandemic was an ongoing

circumstance in October 2022, to describe anything that has been going on for two and

one-half years as “exceptional” would undermine the word “exceptional.” In other

words, anything lasting for two and one-half years tends to become more ordinary than

exceptional. Thus, the trial court reasonably rejected the theory that in October 2022,

the pandemic provided good cause for further delaying defendant’s trial.

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                                    DISPOSITION

     The dismissal order is affirmed.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                  MILLER
                                                           J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ
                            P. J.

MENETREZ
                               J.

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