Court Opinion

ID: 9772155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:08:55.001915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:42:26.514287
License: Public Domain

PRITCHARD, Presiding Judge,
concurring.
Appellants’ petition is in eight counts. Count I is a general description of the theories upon which appellants relied, and factual allegations thereon. The petition then undertook to describe and plead seven denominated tort causes of action: Count II, a premature call of appellants’ promissory note as a conversion; Count III, for breach of an obligation of good faith under §§ 400.1-203 and 400.1-208, RSMo 1978; Count IV, for wrongful seizure of Rigby’s checks in the checking account as a conversion; Count V, fraud; Count VI, for wrongful setoff by premature exercise as to a note not yet in default and hence liability for wrongful dishonor of checks under § 400.4-402, RSMo 1978; Count VII, violation of a lock-box security agreement provision as a conversion of checks due Rigby deposited therein; and Count VIII, sounding in prima facie tort. The trial court rendered summary judgment against appellants on all eight counts of the petition.
Appellants’ brief treats only three of the pleaded causes of action: Point I, error in granting summary judgment on Count VIII (prima facie tort); Point II, error in granting summary judgment on Count III (breach of the obligation of good faith); and Point III, error in granting summary judgment on Count V (fraud). Nothing is presented in any point as to the propriety of granting summary judgment on Count VI, wrongful setoff of the checking account for a note claimed not to be in default, and hence wrongful dishonor of *549checks under § 400.4-102. More specifically, Count VI pleads; “45. That defendant Boatmen’s Bank and Trust Co. of Kansas City seized all the funds and checks of plaintiff Rigby Corporation on October 25, 1976, before said note matured, and before the close of that business day, and before default in the payment of said note. 46. That the aforesaid seizure by defendant Boatmen’s Bank and Trust Co. of Kansas City was illegal and unlawful and in violation of law and the statutes, including Sections 400.3-506 and 400.4-402, RSMo 1978.”
The dissenting opinion says that allegations of Count I of the petition (that the bank improperly failed to pay checks drawn by Rigby which were received by the bank for payment prior to the maturation of the note; and the bank improperly exercised the right of setoff by refusing payment on the checks) were incorporated by reference into Count III. Count I has no precise allegation of illegality and unlawfulness in the seizure of Rigby’s funds and checks so as to be in violation of law and statutes — §§ 400.3-506 and 400.4-402, supra, encompassed in Count VI. Paragraphs 11 and 12 of Count I speak of the seizure of the checks due Rigby as a conversion a theory of Count IV which is not included in appellants’ brief as a point.
The allegations of Count III concern only the bank’s duty of good faith and honesty, and its tortious breach of that duty on a cause of action. The majority opinion, in response to the briefs, fully treats of the breach of that duty by consideration of the alleged agreement to extend the Rigby note as an acceleration; premature setoff as an acceleration of payment; demands for additional collateral; and breach of §§ 400.1-203 and 400.1-208 duty of good faith as a basis for a cause of action (in themselves). Each of these matters were properly ruled adversely to appellants. There is simply no issue of wrongful setoff or liability for wrongful dishonor of checks contained in Count III. That issue was contained only in Count VI, the ruling upon which is not pursued on this appeal.
Nor is there any issue here of wrongful setoff and dishonor because Rigby’s checks had been posted to its account before the setoff was accomplished, even assuming that such was the fact. Appellants do not present any point that (the record) “certainly does not show by unassailable proof that the checks had not been posted and thus not finally paid” as the dissenting opinion posits.
The dissent proposes an issue which was not briefed to this court, which must confine its review solely to points briefed. Kurtz v. Fischer, 600 S.W.2d 642, 645[1] (Mo.App.1980). The matter alleged in Counts IV and VI, must be deemed to have been abandoned on appeal. Pruellage v. DeSeaton Corporation, 380 S.W.2d 403, 405[3, 4] (Mo.1964); School Dist., etc. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 633 S.W.2d 238, 253[20] (Mo.App.1982), and cases cited. It would be a disservice to and unfair to respondent to take up sua sponte, the matters asserted in the dissenting opinion.
The majority opinion covers all of the points presented by appellants exhaustively and correctly. I fully concur therein.