Court Opinion

ID: 9466454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:16:13.947654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:44.529580
License: Public Domain

K. K. HALL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I think the Secretary failed to properly analyze the evidence under the principles set forth in Petry v. Califano, 577 F.2d 860 (4th Cir. 1978), particularly with respect to claimant’s ventilatory studies.
Panned spent thirty-two years working in coal mines. This, of course, requires consideration of his claim under 20 C.F.R. § 410.414(b), which creates a presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis “if other evidence demonstrates the existence of a totally disabling chronic respiratory or pulmonary impairment,” unless rebutted by evidence establishing that the miner did not have pneumoconiosis or the impairment did not arise from employment in the coal mines.
The other evidence presented in this case is substantial. Panned and his wife testified that he can neither work nor perform household chores without breathing difficulties. He has a persistent productive cough, sleeps partially sitting up, and experiences frequent shortness of breath. The medical evidence contains both a history and objective findings of lung disease. Dr. Barongan concluded that Panned was totally disabled, listing pneumoconiosis as a reason for the disability. And three of the four ventilatory studies performed on Panned showed qualifying values, while the fourth was extremely close.
The Appeals Council, focusing primarily on the symmetrical contour of Panned’s chest and the absence of rales, rhonchi or expiratory wheezes during physical examination, dismissed with one broad stroke a battery of persuasive evidence of pulmonary impairment. I do not think these findings negate the existence of a disabling pulmonary impairment demonstrated by the other relevant evidence in this case.
I am compelled to protest especially the Secretary’s abuse of the “cooperation” factor in evaluating pulmonary function studies. The Appeals Council rejected three ventilatory studies showing qualifying values. One of these showed “moderate” cooperation by the claimant. Another did not specify cooperation, but was apparently considered by the testing physician to be of sufficient validity to support an impression of “moderate obstructive pulmonary disease,” which could be related to pneumoconiosis. One test showed qualifying values but poor cooperation.
The Secretary apparently takes the position that only studies showing “good” cooperation are valid under 20 C.F.R. § 410.430. The regulation, however, makes no such requirement. It provides, in pertinent part,
A statement shall be made as to the individual’s ability to understand the directions, and cooperate in performing the tests. If the tests cannot be completed *395the reason for such failure should be explained. (emphasis added)
Even if we accept the position that the Secretary is not bound to award benefits under 20 C.F.R. § 410.490(b) based on a timely study showing less than ideal cooperation, there is no justification for depriving such studies of all probative value as “other evidence,” especially where the claimant’s cooperation was obviously acceptable to the testing physician. This is precisely what the Secretary has done in this case, and I think our holdings in Petry, supra, and Arnold v. Secretary, 567 F.2d 258 (4th Cir. 1977) preclude this sort of disregard of highly probative evidence favorable to the claimant.
I respectfully dissent.