Court Opinion

ID: 9724903
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:19:45.806275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:07.756730
License: Public Domain

HANING, J.
I respectfully dissent. The right of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution contemplates a face-to-face con*1269frontation. (Ohio v. Roberts (1980) 448 U.S. 56, 63-64 [65 L.Ed.2d 597, 605-606, 100 S.Ct. 2531]; California v. Green (1970) 399 U.S. 149, 157, 158 [26 L.Ed.2d 489, 496, 497, 90 S.Ct. 1930]; People v. Chavez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 334, 349-351 [161 Cal.Rptr. 762, 605 P.2d 401].) It is obvious that without this confrontation the corollary right of cross-examination would be meaningless. How does one cross-examine a document?
As the majority correctly states, the right of confrontation and cross-examination extends to the preliminary hearing. (Jones v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 660 [94 Cal.Rptr. 289, 483 P.2d 1241]; Jennings v. Superior Court (1967) 66 Cal.2d 867 [59 Cal.Rptr. 440, 428 P.2d 304].) Penal Code section 865 also provides that “[t]he witnesses [at the preliminary hearing] must be examined in the presence of the defendant, and may be cross-examined in his behalf.” Since these rights have their basis in the federal and state Constitutions, I disagree that the statutory enactment of Penal Code section 872, can assume precedence. I have read the decisions cited by the majority, but interpret them differently. This is not a case involving the admission of a statement which, in itself, is an exception to the hearsay rule, and which precedent also recognizes as an exception to the right of confrontation. It is not a case involving prior testimony given under oath and subject to full cross-examination on the prior occasion—we are not dealing with an unavailable witness.
We are dealing with first instance testimony—the direct testimony of the victim of an alleged crime—a victim who has not been shown to be unavailable to appear and testify. I am unaware of any existing decision which permits the prosecution to introduce the testimony of the alleged victim by written statement, if the victim is alive and available to testify. The majority notes that due process is a flexible concept, but I doubt that it stretches this far.
The majority reasons that defendant can avoid the operation of the statute and secure his right of confrontation by merely notifying the prosecutor that he wants the witness present. However, this is not what the statutes says. I agree that we are required to interpret the statute so as to uphold its constitutionality, if possible (Pryor v. Municipal Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 238, 253-255 [158 Cal.Rptr. 330, 599 P.2d 636]; Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 229-230 [110 Cal.Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224]), but we are not licensed to rewrite it. It states, in part, that “[iff the defendant makes reasonable efforts to secure the attendance of the witness but is unsuccessful in securing his or her attendance, the court shall grant a short continuance at the request of the defendant and shall require the prosecuting attorney to present the witness for cross-examination . . . .” (Pen. Code, § 872, subd. (c), italics added.) My experience leads me to the *1270conclusion that most trial courts interpret “reasonable efforts” to secure the attendance of a witness to mean that the witness has been placed under subpoena or court order to appear, or that counsel has exerted reasonable diligence to subpoena the witness. (See, e.g., Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure, Trial, § 284; People v. St. Germain (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 507 [187 Cal.Rptr. 915]; People v. Masters (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 509 [185 Cal.Rptr. 134].) If the Legislature intended the phrase “reasonable efforts” to mean simply a phone call to the district attorney, why did it not say so? The obvious answer is that they meant something more. Since similar language appears in other statutes (see Evid. Code, § 240, subd. (a)(5): “reasonable diligence;” see also Pen. Code, § 1050, subd. (b) et seq., for requirements to obtain a continuance in a criminal proceeding), we may assume the Legislature was aware of existing law when it enacted Penal Code section 872. (Bailey v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 970, 977 [140 Cal.Rptr. 669, 568 P.2d 394].)
As a general rule, the defendant is not required to lighten the prosecution’s burden by being forced to produce the evidence the state is relying upon to convict him. (See, e.g., People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 50 [177 Cal.Rptr. 458, 634 P.2d 534, 23 A.L.R.4th 776]; Allen v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 520, 524-525 [134 Cal.Rptr. 774, 557 P.2d 65]; Prudhomme v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 320, 326-327 [85 Cal.Rptr. 129, 466 P.2d 673].) Although these cases deal primarily with Fifth Amendment rights and discovery, the principle remains that the prosecution has the burden of establishing probable cause.
In summary, I conclude the statute is unconstitutional on its face unless we judicially rewrite it, and that we are not permitted to do. One of the primary purposes of the preliminary hearing is to weed out groundless and unprovable charges in order, inter alia, to save the time and expense of trial for both sides.1 (People v. Terry (1962) 57 Cal.2d 538, 554 [21 Cal.Rptr. 185, 370 P.2d 985]; People v. Elliot (1960) 54 Cal.2d 498, 504 [6 Cal.Rptr. 753, 354 P.2d 225].) In order to do so the magistrate must be able to make an informed and reasoned decision based upon the evidence. This requires a decision on the credibility of the witnesses. The affidavit contemplated by Penal Code section 872 does not provide the court with much upon which to base a decision on credibility. Furthermore, the affidavit system of litigation poses some very real problems. For instance, the statute permits the *1271drafter of the affidavit to include only that information which he feels is necessary for a holding. While such an affidavit may be technically correct, it may also eliminate a wealth of information which affects the fact finding process. Whether the exclusion of such information is deliberate or inadvertent, the result is the same—a complete statement of the facts is suppressed.
Cross-examination has been described as “the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.” (5 Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn rev.ed 1974) § 1367, p. 32; In re Miguel L. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 100, 107-108 [185 Cal.Rptr. 120, 649 P.2d 703]; People v. Fries (1979) 24 Cal.3d 222, 231 [155 Cal.Rptr. 194, 594 P.2d 19].) It is guaranteed by the Constitution and denied by the statute under consideration. The bottom line for reviewing any statute is that it must pass constitutional muster, and this one does not. For that reason, I would affirm the order of dismissal.
Respondents’ petitions for review by the Supreme Court were denied May 31, 1985.

I presume one of the purposes of this statute was to save time and expense at the preliminary hearing. The expeditious processing of criminal cases is commendable, and required by statute. (Pen. Code, § 1050.) However, given the number of cases that are diposed of at the preliminary hearing (see 1984 Judicial Council Annual Report to the Governor), Penal Code section 872 may well be false economy. The time and expense of a jury trial greatly exceeds that of a preliminary hearing.