Court Opinion

ID: 9583946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:43:14.472834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:06:00.937756
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,,
dissenting.
In Division 2, the majority declares that it “now go[es] a step further and hold[s] that the giving of a ‘use of a deadly weapon’ charge is error, whether or not it is accompanied by an instruction that the jury has discretion to make the inference.” I submit that the Court has not taken only a “step,” but has made a giant unwarranted leap.
*611The trial court gave the following charge:
You may infer that a person of sound mind and discretion intends to accomplish the natural and probable consequences of his intentional acts, and if a person of sound mind and discretion intentionally and without justification uses a deadly weapon in the manner in which the weapon is ordinarily used and thereby causes the death of a human being, you may infer the intent to kill.
(Emphasis supplied.) I do note at the outset that today’s ruling does not purport to affect the introductory, unemphasized portion of this charge. Therefore, the trial courts of this state apparently still may give general instructions on permissive inferences. See Wallace v. Higgs, 262 Ga. 437 (421 SE2d 69) (1992). The majority concludes that only the latter, emphasized language related to the use of a deadly weapon should not be included in the charge. However, the majority does not explain why it finds that portion of the charge to be so egregious. The language certainly cannot be attacked as an erroneous statement of the law, as it correctly states that the jury “may” infer from evidence that “a person of sound mind and discretion” (OCGA §§ 16-2-3, 16-3-2, 16-3-3) who “intentionally and without justification” (OCGA §§ 16-2-1, 16-3-20, 16-3-21) used a weapon to kill another person intended to accomplish that result. The instruction does not suggest that the jury must either find that factual predicate or presume that intent, and it is not unconstitutionally burden-shifting. Mitchell v. State, 271 Ga. 242, 244 (6) (516 SE2d 782) (1999); Wallace v. Higgs, supra. In fact, the charge is simply an application to a specific set of factual circumstances of the general law on permissive inferences contained in the introductory language of the charge which the majority does not disapprove. If a sane defendant intentionally uses a weapon to kill another person other than in self-defense, it logically follows that the trier of fact “may” infer the specific intent to commit the homicide. The specific permissive inference in that particular situation is just as authorized as the general permissive inference that a person of sound mind and discretion intends to accomplish the natural and probable consequences of any of his intentional acts.
I acknowledge that the charge given in this case has been criticized. In Thompson v. State, 257 Ga. 481, 483 (6) (361 SE2d 154) (1987), we held that “it would be desirable to include language reaffirming that it is within the jury’s discretion whether or not it will draw such an inference. . . .” “General charges on intent and circumstantial evidence will ordinarily be sufficient.” Wood v. State, 258 Ga. 598, 599 (2), fn. 2 (373 SE2d 183) (1988). Unlike the majority, how*612ever, I believe that there is a fundamental distinction between an imperfect charge which does not comport with the “better practice” and one which is so deficient as to require the reversal of an otherwise valid conviction. Before today, this Court consistently found that it was not error to charge on the specific permissive inference arising from the intentional use of a deadly weapon, even though the contested instruction did not include additional language reiterating the jury’s discretion to accept or reject that specific inference. Mitchell v. State, supra at 244 (6); Thompson v. State, supra at 483 (6). The majority does not present any viable rationale for departing from the precedent established by those decisions, and it certainly cites no authority for also proscribing, by way of dicta, a charge which does contain that additional principle. We have long recognized that a trial court does not err when it reaffirms that the jury has discretion whether or not it will draw the permissive inference. Clark v. State, 265 Ga. 243, 246 (3) (c) (454 SE2d 492) (1995); Wood v. State, supra at 599 (2). Admittedly, it is disappointing when a trial court fails to follow what this Court has recognized as the better practice. In my opinion, however, such disappointment does not authorize a departure from established precedent. I cannot join the majority’s holding that the charge given in this case was erroneous and that the instruction would still be erroneous even if the trial court had included an additional admonition that the inference was permissive. This case should be controlled by our recent decision in Mitchell v. State, supra at 244 (6), wherein we unanimously held that “the trial court’s charge was in accord with this Court’s holding in Thompson v. State and was not improperly burden-shifting.” Because the majority does not offer any reason for departing from that holding, I dissent.
Decided March 2, 2001
Reconsideration denied April 5, 2001.
Zell & Zell, Rodney S. Zell, for appellant.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Bettieanne C. Hart, Elizabeth A. Baker, Assistant District Attorneys, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in this dissent.