Court Opinion

ID: 9649853
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:11:22.662004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:15.319361
License: Public Domain

Opinion by
Hoffman, J.,
Appellant contends that the evidence derived from information gained during his illegal arrest was the “fruit” of his illegal detention and, therefore, should have been inadmissible at his trial.
On March 20, 1974, the appellant and a companion were driving slowly in appellant’s automobile through a commercial área of Lock Haven, Altoona. Detective Sergeant Eichenlaub of the Lock Haven Police Force noticed the appellant’s automobile and began to follow it on a parallel street. When Officer Eichenlaub lost sight of the car, he drove to the street where appellant had been traveling and found appellant’s vehicle unoccupied. He then commenced a search for the occupants of the car. About a block from the car, the officer noticed the appellant walking down the street in a normal manner. He stopped the appellant, who fully identified himself and answered all questions. During the questioning, Officer Eichenlaub received a radio call that an individual with a firearm had been apprehended in the vicinity. At this time, Officer Eichenlaub did not know whether the individual with the firearm had been in appellant’s automobile, or whether that individual had committed any crime in concert with the appellant. Nevertheless, the appellant was taken into custody and placed under arrest.
The appellant was taken to Lock Haven Police headquarters, where he underwent interrogation for one and one-half hours. In the presence of an officer, the appellant was then permitted to place a telephone call to his father. During the call, appellant told his father to “get rid of the stuff” or to “take care of his things.”1 The officer overheard the telephone conversation, and as a *524result, a police unit was dispatched to appellant’s father’s home. As the police unit arrived at the residence, appellant’s father was driving away. The police stopped his car on the highway, and with his consent, searched the automobile. The search revealed several guns which subsequently proved to be stolen.
Appellant was charged with burglary and receiving stolen goods. On September 16, the appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence, which was denied by the lower court. At appellant’s trial on January 29, 1975, the lower court granted appellant’s demurrer to the charge of burglary but he was found guilty of receiving stolen goods. Appellant’s oral post-trial motions, made immediately after trial, were denied. Appellant was sentenced to three to ten years imprisonment; this appeal followed.
Because appellant’s oral post-trial motions were made after the effective date of Commonwealth v. Blair, 460 Pa. 31, 331 A. 2d 213 (1975), we must determine whether appellant has preserved his arguments for appeal. In Commonwealth v. Blair, supra at 33 n.1, 331 A. 2d at 214 n.1, our Supreme Court stated: “[T]he Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 1123 (a), 19 P.S. Appendix, requires written post-trial motions. The practice in some judicial districts of ignoring the requirements of Rule 1123(a) is condemned. Henceforth, issues not presented in compliance with the rule will not be considered by our trial and appellate courts.” In Commonwealth v. Irwin, 460 Pa. 296, 299, n.3, 333 A. 2d 735, 737, n.3 (1975), our Supreme Court urged “the courts and counsel to adhere to Rule 1123, Pa.R.Crim.P., 19 P.S. Appendix.”
Rule 1123(a) provides: “Within seven (7) days after a finding of guilt, the defendant shall have the right to file written motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment —” Rule 1123(b) on the other hand, provides: “If the defendant agrees on the record, the post-verdict motions may be made orally at the conclusion of the trial ....” *525(Emphasis supplied). In Commonwealth v. Blair, supra, the Court apparently condemned the practice in some judicial districts of making oral post-trial motions at a time other than the conclusion of trial. Since appellant’s post-trial motions were made at the conclusion of trial in accordance with Rule 1123(b), the issues raised are properly before us.
The lower court found, and the Commonwealth now admits, that the appellant’s arrest was illegal. The lower court held, however, that the telephone conversation was sufficiently an act of free will so as to break the nexus between the illegal arrest and the seizure of the guns.
In Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 461 Pa. 407, 413, 336 A. 2d 603, 606 (1975), our Supreme Court noted that in “virtually all of the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ cases which this Court has considered, there have existed only two links in the alleged causal chain, i.e., the initial illegality and the challenged physical or verbal evidence resulting therefrom.” In the present case, however, there are three links: the initial illegal arrest, appellant’s statement on the telephone while under arrest, and the stolen property recovered as a direct result of the statement. We are faced, therefore, with a situation in which the evidence sought to be introduced is derived from information gained during the illegal arrest. This third link, however, does not alter the applicable standards: “what is of critical importance for constitutional purposes is that there exists a real and direct causal connection between appellant’s unlawful arrest [and the evidence derived therefrom].” Commonwealth v. Whitaker, supra at 413, 336 A. 2d at 606. See also, 43 A.L.R. 3d 385.
The seminal case embodying the “fruits of the poisonous tree” doctrine is Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). There, the Supreme Court announced the principles to be applied in determining whether evidence procured after an illegal arrest should be excluded: “We need not hold that all evidence is ‘fruit *526of the poisonous tree’ simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is ‘whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’ ” See also Commonwealth v. Whitaker, supra; Commonwealth v. Richards, 458 Pa. 455, 327 A. 2d 63 (1974); Betrand Appeal, 451 Pa. 381, 303 A. 2d 486 (1973); Commonwealth v. Garvin, 448 Pa. 258, 293 A. 2d 33 (1972); Commonwealth v. Cephas, 447 Pa. 500, 291 A.2d 106 (1972); Commonwealth v. Bishop, 425 Pa. 175, 228 A. 2d 661 (1967). Once it is determined that the evidence was obtained by exploiting the illegality, the exclusionary rule applies.2 Our Supreme Court has often stated that the challenged evidence may be purged of the primary taint only if the Commonwealth proves that it results from an intervening act of free will or if the connection between the arrest and the illegality has become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Richards, supra; Betrand Appeal, supra.
*527While the “free will” rationale has been applied most often to confessions obtained during an illegal arrest, see e.g., Commonwealth v. Jackson, 459 Pa. 669, 331 A.2d 189 (1975); Betrand Appeal, supra; Commonwealth v. Bishop, supra; it is equally applicable to other statements made during an illegal arrest. See Wong Sun v. United States, supra. In Betrand Appeal, supra at 389, 303 A. 2d at 490, our Supreme Court, quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Craig v. Maroney, 348 F. 2d 22, 29 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1019 (1966), noted two significant factors in determining the causal relationship between an illegal arrest and subsequent confession: “(a) the proximity of an initial illegal custodial act to the procurement of the confession; and (b) the intervention of other circumstances subsequent to an illegal arrest which provide a cause so unrelated to that initial illegality that the acquired evidence may not reasonably be said to have been directly derived from, and thereby tainted by, that illegal arrest.” Cf., Commonwealth v. Jackson, supra at 676 n.6, 331 A. 2d at 192 n.6. In Commonwealth v. Bishop, supra at 183, 228 A. 2d at 666, th Court said that “[b]y ‘sufficiently an act of free will’ an not only was the confession truly voluntary, but ai^j free of any element of coerciveness due to the unlawful arrest.” Neither Miranda warnings alone,3 nor lapse of time in itself,4 dissipates the taint.
*528In the recent case of Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 17 Crim.L.Rep. 3145 (1975), the United States Supreme Court adopted the Bishop standards. After noting that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are in “intimate relation” in that a violation of either compels a person to yield evidence against his will, the Court held that the exclusionary rule was used in Wong Sun to protect Fourth Amendment freedoms: “To the extent that the question whether Toy’s statement was voluntary was considered, it was only to judge whether it ‘was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion.’ .... Thus, even if the statement in this case were found to be voluntary under the Fifth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment issue remains. In order for the causal chain, between the illegal arrest and the statements made subsequent thereto, to be broken, Wong Sun requries not merely that the statement meet the Fifth Amendment standard of voluntariness but that it be ‘sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.’ 371 U.S. at 486. Wong Sun thus mandates consideration of a statement’s admissibility in light of the distinct policies and interests of the Fourth Amendment.” Brown v. Illinois, supra at 3148-3149. The Court then suggested several factors relevant to determining whether the taint had been purged: whether Miranda warnings have been given, the temporal proximity of the arrest and the statement, the presence of intervening circumstances, and particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.
By emphasizing the nature of the official misconduct, the Court held that the point at which the taint will *529dissipate is directly dependent on the nature of the taint (official misconduct) itself.5 The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Powell, discusses in depth the nature of this relationship. Justice Powell notes that the notion of “dissipation of taint” is an attempt to define the point at which the “detrimental consequences of illegal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost” on the legitimate demands of law enforcement. Brown v. Illinois, supra at 3151. According to Justice Powell, the more flagrant the constitutional violation, the more stringent the burden of proof of attenuation: “If, for example, the factors relied on by the police in determining to make the arrest were so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable, or if the evidence clearly suggested that the arrest was effectuated as a pretext for collateral objectives ... I thus would require some demonstrably effective break in the chain of events leading from the illegal arrest to the statement... before the taint can be deemed removed.” Brown v. Illinois, id. In such cases the dual purposes of the exclusionary rule, deterrence and judicial integrity, are best served by excluding the evidence.
In the instant case, it is inconceivable that the arresting officer believed that he had probable cause to arrest. Officer Eichenlaub had been following an automobile for some time on a parallel street. After he lost sight of it, he went to the street on which the automobile was traveling and found the automobile parked and unoccupied. At the time he began his search, all the Officer knew was that there had been two occupants of the automobile. Appellant had been walking at a normal pace when he was stopped, and he *530cooperated fully. As soon as Officer Eichenlaub received a radio call that another individual had been stopped nearby with a firearm, appellant was placed under arrest. At this point the officer had no knowledge that the individual was in any way connected with the appellant or whether any crime had been committed by the pair. Thus the arresting officer knew or should have known that the arrest was without probable cause and unconstitutional. See Commonwealth v. Berrios, 437 Pa. 338, 263 A. 2d 342 (1970); Commonwealth v. Hicks, 434 Pa. 153, 253 A. 2d 276 (1969). Under these circumstances, the exclusionary rule’s two purposes of deterrence and judicial integrity require the exclusion of the fruits of such misconduct unless the Commonwealth demonstrates an effective break in the chain.
While the Commonwealth asserts that the appellant voluntarily and freely made the statement in front of an officer who incidently overheard it, appellant’s conduct during interrogation refutes that argument.6 During his interrogation, the appellant steadfastly refused to confess to the burglary. While it is true that the appellant “voluntarily” made the telephone call, he did not “voluntarily” and freely disclose its contents. Furthermore, appellant’s telephone call was placed a very short time (one and one-half hours) after his initial illegal arrest. The Commonwealth, therefore, has failed to demonstrate that the statement was “sufficiently an act of free will so as to purge the primary taint.” Thus, the statement is inadmissible.
We must now consider whether the guns must be excluded as well. In Wong Sun, the Supreme Court was faced with a similar situation. The Court has determined *531that Toy’s statement concerning Yee’s possession of narcotics was inadmissible as the fruit of the illegal arrest. The Court then had to consider whether the exclusion of the statement required the exclusion of the narcotics found in Yee’s apartment. The Court held that it is “clear that the narcotics were .‘come at by the exploitation of that illegality’ ” and hence inadmissible. The same is true in the instant case: It is clear that the guns were come at by an exploitation of the illegal arrest.
Judgment of sentence is reversed and case remanded for new trial.

. There was some dispute over the appellant’s exact words. The officer who overheard the conversation testified that the appellant had stated “get rid of the stuff.” Appellant’s father, on the other hand, testified that his son had said “take care of my things.”

. The United States Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 666 (1961) extensively discussed the rationale of the exclusionary rule: “ [T]he purpose of the exclusionary rule ‘is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it.’ Elkins v. United States, supra, 364 U.S. at page 217, 80 S. Ct. at page 1444.” Further citing Elkins v. United States, supra, the Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio, supra at 659 stated: “[TJhere is another consideration.— the imperative of judicial integrity ... The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, ... its own existence. As Mr. Justice BRANDEIS, dissenting, said in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485, 48 S. Ct. 564, 575, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928): ‘Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example ... If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.’ ”

. The Court in Betrand Appeal, supra at 391-392, 303 A. 2d at 491, stated that “ ‘such a ... [result] would practically eviscerate the prophylactic effect of the exclusionary rule. Moreover, if a mere showing that a confession during a period of unlawful detention was “voluntary” were sufficient to establish its admissibility, Wong Sun would be an empty promise ...’ ” The United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Illinois, infra, noted that if Miranda warnings alone were held to attenuate the taint, arrests made without probable cause would be encouraged by the knowledge that evidence derived therefrom might be made admissible at trial by the simple expedient of giving Miranda warnings.

. In Commonwealth v. Jackson, supra, the Court noted that if *528lapse of time in and of itself were enough, the Commonwealth could indiscriminately arrest an individual, wait a set time, and then interrogate him certain that any voluntary confession would be admissible.

. See A.L.I. Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, Art. 150, at 46 et seq. and Commentary thereon, at 375 et seq. (Proposed Official Draft, 1975).

. While the Commonwealth asserts that the officer incidently overheard the telephone conversation, it is more likely that the officer purposely listened to it. The officer was not only able to repeat appellant’s telephone conversation, but was also able to repeat the telephone number that appellant placed his collect call to.