Court Opinion

ID: 9941037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 18:12:15.179419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:08.835336
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re B.B.C., 2024-Ohio-588.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE B.B.C.                                   :
                                               :           No. 113213
A Minor Child                                  :

[Appeal by J.R., Father]                       :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 15, 2024

            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                   Juvenile Division
                                Case No. AD-22-905990

                                         Appearances:

                 Patrick S. Lavelle, for appellant.

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

MARY J. BOYLE, P.J.:

                   Appellant-father (“Father”) appeals the decision of the Cuyahoga

County Juvenile Court terminating his parental rights and awarding custody of his

minor son, B.B.C. (d.o.b. 06/01/22), to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children
and Family Services (“CCDCFS”), raising the following two assignments of error for

review:

      Assignment of Error I: The trial court’s award of permanent
      custody to [CCDCFS], despite [CCDCFS]’s failure to make reasonable
      efforts to eliminate the continued removal of the child from his home
      and to return the child to his home, violated state law and [Father]’s
      right to due process of the law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
      Amendment of the United States Constitution and Section 16, Article 1
      of the Ohio Constitution.

      Assignment of Error II: The trial court’s decision to award
      permanent custody to [CCDCFS] was against the manifest weight of the
      evidence.

              For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

              On June 14, 2022, CCDCFS filed a complaint alleging that B.B.C., who

was born 13 days earlier, was an abused and dependent child. Also filed with the

complaint was a motion for predispositional temporary custody of B.B.C. to

CCDCFS. After a hearing held that same day, the juvenile court ordered that B.B.C.

be committed to the emergency temporary custody of CCDCFS.

              On August 31, 2022, CCDCFS amended its complaint. The amended

complaint set forth the following allegations:

      1. On or about June 1, 2022, at [B.B.C.]’s birth, Mother tested positive
      for cocaine, fentanyl, and amphetamines and [B.B.C.] tested positive
      for amphetamines, methamphetamines, benzos, cocaine, and fentanyl.
      [B.B.C.] was prescribed morphine to manage symptoms of withdrawal.

      2. Mother has failed to visit with [B.B.C.] since she left the hospital
      against medical advice.

      3. Mother has a long-standing substance abuse problem which
      prevents her from providing appropriate care for [B.B.C.]. Mother has
      participated in substance abuse treatment but has failed to benefit from
      these services and has failed to maintain sobriety.

      ***

      6. Alleged father, [J.R.], is currently incarcerated after being convicted
      of vandalism, attempted escape, failure to comply, receiving stolen
      property, aggravated possession of drugs, theft and petty theft. * * * He
      is not eligible for release until 2026. He also has pending criminal
      charges of drug possession, failure to comply, and receiving stolen
      property.

      ***

      7. [Father] has not yet established paternity and has been unable to
      support, visit, or communicate with the child due to his incarceration.

(Amended complaint, Aug. 31, 2022.)

               The amended complaint further alleged that B.B.C. has a sibling who

was also a drug-exposed infant, was adjudicated abused and neglected, and is in the

permanent custody of CCDCFS. B.B.C. also has another sibling who was placed in

the care of a relative through a private custody filing in Summit County, due, in part,

to Mother’s substance abuse issues. After an adjudicatory hearing held that same

day, the court adjudicated B.B.C. to be abused and dependent. Father was present

for the hearing and stipulated to the allegations of the amended complaint. Father,

who was incarcerated at the time, was ordered to be transported back to the

correctional facility, and CCDCFS was to obtain Father’s DNA in order to establish

paternity. The court continued the matter for an in-person hearing.

               On October 18, 2022, CCDCFS amended its dispositional request

from permanent custody to temporary custody based on the establishment of

Father’s paternity and the desire to investigate potential placement with relatives.
Father agreed with this motion. The next day, the court held a dispositional hearing,

at which the court heard testimony and accepted evidence. Following the conclusion

of this hearing, the court issued a journal entry on October 20, 2022, placing B.B.C.

in the temporary custody of CCDCFS.

              On February 2, 2023, CCDCFS filed a motion to modify temporary

custody to permanent custody.        The court held a trial on this matter on

September 20, 2023. Mother did not appear at trial. Father appeared by video.

The following evidence was adduced.

              CCDCFS became involved with B.B.C. at the time of his birth in June

2022 after he tested positive for various drugs. According to Deja Arthur, an

extended worker in the START Department of CCDCFS (“Arthur”), Mother had not

seen B.B.C. since the hospital. A case plan for Mother was developed in an effort to

promote the permanency plan of reunification. The case plan included services for

substance abuse, mental health, housing, parenting, and naming the child. The last

time Mother had contact with Arthur was in August 2022. Arthur testified that

Mother previously had her parental rights terminated in relation to B.B.C.’s older

sibling.

              B.B.C. has remained in continuous agency custody since the time of

his removal in June 2022. According to Arthur, B.B.C. has been with a maternal

cousin since September 2022 and is strongly bonded with the maternal cousin and

her family. CCDCFS also investigated paternal relatives in an effort to determine if

a less restrictive alternative to permanent custody might be available, but those
efforts were unsuccessful.      Arthur further testified that Father is currently

incarcerated at the Marion Correctional Facility. CCDCFS facilitated some visitation

between B.B.C. and Father at prison, at court, and by video. Father’s case plan

objective included establishing paternity for the child, which he did satisfy. The case

plan contained no other objectives because he was incarcerated at the time of

B.B.C.’s birth and at the time of trial, with an anticipated release date of July 2026.

Arthur testified that she believes that Father loves B.B.C.

               Father testified, acknowledging that his release date from prison is in

July 2026. Father testified that he was in Erie County Jail in Sandusky, Ohio when

B.B.C. was born. He testified that he has tried to improve his situation by completing

mental health and substance abuse classes while incarcerated.

               The guardian ad litem (“GAL”) recommended that the court grant

permanent custody of B.B.C. to CCDCFS. Following closing arguments, the juvenile

court indicated that it would take the matter under advisement. The next day, the

court issued a judgment entry in which it terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental

rights and found by clear and convincing evidence that it is in B.B.C.’s best interest

to be placed in the permanent custody of CCDCFS.

               The court found that reasonable efforts were made for reunification,

such as referring Mother to substance abuse, mental health, parenting, housing

services, and establishing a legal name for B.B.C. The court further found that B.B.C.

has been in agency custody for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period;

B.B.C. cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not
be placed with his parents; Mother has abandoned B.B.C.; B.B.C. is too young to

express his wishes and the GAL recommends permanent custody; B.B.C. has been

in CCDCFS custody since he was 13 days old; and B.B.C. deserves a safe and stable

home environment, which cannot be achieved with either parent because Mother

has had no contact with B.B.C. or CCDCFS in over a year and Father is incarcerated

until 2026. The court approved the permanency plan, which consists of adoption

and ordered one final visit between Father and B.B.C. at the correctional facility.

Father now appeals the court’s judgment.

II. Law and Analysis

      A. Manifest Weight of the Evidence

               We will address the second assignment error first because it discusses

the standard of review on appeal. In this assigned error, Father argues that the

court’s award of permanent custody was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

      1. Standard of Review

               At the outset, we recognize that the right to raise one’s own child is

“an ‘essential’ and ‘basic civil right.’” In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 156, 556

N.E.2d 1169 (1990), quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31

L.Ed.2d 551 (1972). “Parents have a ‘fundamental liberty interest’ in the care,

custody, and management of the child.” Id., quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.

745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). This right, however, is not absolute.

“‘The natural rights of a parent are always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child,

which is the polestar or controlling principle to be observed.’” In re Cunningham,
59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106, 391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979), quoting In re R.J.C., 300 So.2d 54,

58 (Fla.App.1974).

              Father argues that the trial court’s decision to grant permanent

custody of B.B.C. to CCDCFS was against the manifest weight of the evidence

because the record does not support the court’s findings that B.B.C. cannot be placed

with him within a reasonable time or should not be placed with him and that

permanent custody is in B.B.C.’s best interest.

              The Supreme Court of Ohio has recently provided guidance on the

standard of review in permanent custody cases. The Court held:

      [T]he proper appellate standards of review to apply in cases involving
      a juvenile court’s decision under R.C. 2151.414 to award permanent
      custody of a child and to terminate parental rights are the sufficiency-
      of-the-evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standards, as
      appropriate depending on the nature of the arguments presented by
      the parties.

In re Z.C., Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 18. Thus, based on Father’s

argument, we will review this matter under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence

standard.

              The In re Z.C. Court reexplained the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence

standard as follows:

      “When reviewing for manifest weight, the appellate court must weigh
      the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of
      the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the
      evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a
      manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and
      a new trial ordered” [Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-
      Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 20.] “In weighing the evidence, the court
      of appeals must always be mindful of the presumption in favor of the
       finder of fact.” Id. at ¶ 21. “The underlying rationale of giving deference
       to the findings of the trial court rests with the knowledge that the trial
       judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor,
       gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing
       the credibility of the proffered testimony.” Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v.
       Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984). “‘If the
       evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, the reviewing
       court is bound to give it that interpretation which is consistent with the
       verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict and
       judgment.”’ Id. at fn. 3, quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate
       Review, Section 603, at 191-192 (1978).

Id. at ¶ 14.

       2. Permanent Custody — R.C. 2151.414

               R.C. 2151.414 sets forth a two-prong analysis to be applied by a

juvenile court in adjudicating a motion for permanent custody. In re B.P., 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 112332, 2023-Ohio-1377, ¶ 27, citing In re S.C., 2018-Ohio-2523, 115

N.E.3d 813, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.). The first prong authorizes the juvenile court to grant

permanent custody of a child to the public agency if, after a hearing, the court

determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that any of the following factors

apply: (a) the child is not abandoned or orphaned, but the child cannot be placed

with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s

parents; (b) the child is abandoned; (c) the child is orphaned, and there are no

relatives of the child who are able to take permanent custody; (d) the child has been

in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private

child placing agencies for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period; or

(e) the child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents from whose

custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated an abused, neglected, or
dependent child on three separate occasions by any court in this state or another

state. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e).

               The second prong of the analysis requires the juvenile court to

determine, by clear and convincing evidence, that granting permanent custody to

the agency is in the best interest of the child. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1). “‘Clear and

convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere

“preponderance of the evidence,” but not to the extent of such certainty as is

required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal cases, and which will produce in

the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be

established.’” In re Z.C. at ¶ 7, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120

N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

      a. The R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) Factors and R.C. 2151.414(E)

               In the instant case, the juvenile court made the findings under R.C.

2151.414(B)(1)(a) and (b) that B.B.C. could not be placed with either parent within a

reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent and Mother abandoned

B.B.C. In cases where R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) applies, R.C. 2151.414(E) enumerates

several factors for the court to consider. In re D.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111323,

2022-Ohio-2780, ¶ 28, citing In re L.J., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111221, 2022-Ohio-

2278, ¶ 43; see also In re L.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111053, 2022-Ohio-1592,

¶ 47. Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(E), if the court determines, by clear and convincing

evidence, that one or more of the (E)(1)-(16) factors exist, the court shall enter a

finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time
or should not be placed with either parent. The court is only required to find one of

the R.C. 2151.414(E) factors present in order to enter a finding that a child cannot or

should be placed with a parent. In re D.H. at ¶ 29, citing In re L.W., 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 107708, 2019-Ohio-1343.

               Here, the trial court found the presence of several (E) factors, but

Father takes issue with the court’s findings under (E)(1) and (4), which provide in

pertinent part:

      (1) Following the placement of the child outside the child’s home and
      notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the
      agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially
      caused the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed
      continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions
      causing the child to be placed outside the child’s home. In determining
      whether the parents have substantially remedied those conditions, the
      court shall consider parental utilization of medical, psychiatric,
      psychological, and other social and rehabilitative services and material
      resources that were made available to the parents for the purpose of
      changing parental conduct to allow them to resume and maintain
      parental duties.

      ***

      (4) The parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the
      child by failing to regularly support, visit, or communicate with the
      child when able to do so, or by other actions showing an unwillingness
      to provide an adequate permanent home for the child.

R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) and (4).

               Father argues that CCDCFS did not engage in reasonable case

planning and did not make diligent efforts to assist him in remedying the reasons

for B.B.C.’s removal. He contends the court did not have sufficient information to

determine whether CCDCFS had an obligation to prepare a case plan for Father and
give him an opportunity to perform it. While Father challenges the case plan and

efforts under (E)(1), the other factors that the court considered, including Father’s

July 2026 prison release date, (E)(12); Mother’s failure to remedy, (E)(1); lack of

commitment, (E)(4); abandonment, (E)(10); prior termination of parental rights

without evidence of rehabilitation, (E)(11); her unwillingness to provide for B.B.C’s

needs, (E)(14); and her failure to appear for any of the court hearings in the matter,

(E)(16), were relevant in finding that B.B.C. cannot be placed with either parent

within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.

               At trial, Father admitted that he has been in prison since B.B.C.’s birth

in June 2022. The evidence revealed that he was serving several concurrent prison

sentences with an expected release date of July 2026. The court found, under

R.C. 2151.414(E)(12), that Father was incarcerated at the time of the filing of the

motion for permanent custody and will not be available for at least 18 months after

the dispositional hearing, noting that Father is “expected to be released in 2026.”

This evidence alone is sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the two-part analysis.

Therefore, we find the record clearly and convincingly supports the juvenile court’s

determination under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) that B.B.C. cannot or should not be

placed with Father within a reasonable time.

               Father also asserts that the court’s finding, under R.C. 2151.44(E)(4),

that B.B.C. cannot or should not be placed with him was against the manifest weight

of the evidence. Father’s argument for this finding consists of one sentence. We

decline to address this portion of his argument because Father fails to support it with
reasons in support of his contention, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and

parts of the record on which he relies. App.R. 12 and 16.

               Having found that the juvenile court properly determined that at least

one of the R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) factors applies by clear and convincing evidence, we

must next determine whether the juvenile court appropriately found by clear and

convincing evidence that granting permanent custody to CCDCFS is in B.B.C.’s best

interest under R.C. 2151.414(D).

      b. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) — Best Interest Determination

               The R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e) factors include (a) the interaction and

interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster

caregivers, and out-of-home providers; (b) the child’s wishes, as expressed directly

by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem; (c) the child’s custodial history;

(d) the child’s need for a legally secured permanent placement and whether that type

of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency;

and (e) whether any of the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7)-(11) apply. A

juvenile court must consider each of the R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) factors when making a

permanent custody determination, but no one factor is given greater weight than the

others. In re Schaefer, 111 Ohio St.3d 498, 2006-Ohio-5513, 857 N.E.2d 532, ¶ 56.

Only one of the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), however, needs to be

resolved in favor of permanent custody. In re D.H., 2022-Ohio-2780, at ¶ 46, citing

In re G.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107512, 2019-Ohio-1533, ¶ 72.
               With regard to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a), the court noted that B.B.C. has

bonded with his caregiver and her family. Given Father’s restrictions, CCDCFS did

facilitate some visitation with B.B.C. and Father at prison, at court, and by video. At

the conclusion of trial, the court acknowledged that it was apparent that Father loves

B.B.C. Despite this, the court still found in favor of permanent custody, and this

finding is supported by clear and convincing evidence.

               R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) requires the court to consider the child’s

wishes as expressed directly or through the child’s GAL. B.B.C. was just over one

year old at the time of trial. The court noted that he is too young to express his

wishes and the GAL recommended permanent custody, stating that permanent

custody was in B.B.C.’s best interest. The court’s finding is supported by clear and

convincing evidence.

               R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c) requires the court to consider the child’s

custodial history, including whether the child has been in placement for 12 or more

months of a consecutive 22-month period. Here, the court noted that B.B.C. has

remained in continuous CCDCFS custody since he was 13 days old (June 2022).

Therefore, B.B.C. had been in agency custody for 12 or more months of a consecutive

22-month period at the time of trial in September 2023. The evidence clearly and

convincingly supports this finding.

               R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) requires the court to consider the child’s need

for a legally secure placement and whether such can be achieved without a grant of

permanent custody. During the pendency of the proceedings, CCDCFS attempted
to identify relatives who might qualify to serve as alternative caregivers for the

children, but these efforts were unsuccessful. The court found that B.B.C. “deserves

a safe and stable [home] environment where his needs can be met and he can thrive.

This cannot be achieved with either parent as mother has had no contact with the

child or Agency in over a year and Father is incarcerated until 2026.” (Judgment

Entry, 09/21/23.) This evidence clearly and convincingly supports the court’s

finding that B.B.C.’s need for secure placement cannot be satisfied by Father, who is

not scheduled to be released from prison for over two and a half years after the

conclusion of trial.

               R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e) requires the trial court to consider whether any

of the factors in sections (E)(7) to (11) apply. Here, the trial court found that Mother

abandoned B.B.C. as set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E)(10) and Mother previously had

her parental rights terminated as set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E)(11).

               Based on the foregoing, we find there is clear and convincing evidence

in the record to support the court’s determination that permanent custody to

CCDCFS is in the child’s best interest. Accordingly, we find that the court’s decision

to grant permanent custody is not against the weight of the evidence as Father

contends.

               Therefore, the second assignment of error is overruled.

      B. Reasonable Efforts at Reunification

               In the first assignment of error, Father argues that the juvenile court

failed to make adequate findings relating to CCDCFS’s reasonable efforts to reunify
him with B.B.C. Father contends that the juvenile court failed to make the findings

of fact required by R.C. 2151.419.

              We have previously addressed this issue, where we explained:

      R.C. 2151.419 requires the court to determine whether the public
      children services agency that filed the complaint in the case has made
      reasonable efforts to make it possible for the child to return safely
      home. However, that statute applies only to hearings held pursuant
      R.C. 2151.28, division (E) of R.C. 2151.31, R.C. 2151.314, R.C. 2151.33 or
      R.C. 2151.353. The motion for permanent custody in this case was filed
      pursuant to R.C. 2151.413.          Therefore, the reasonable efforts
      demonstration is not required in the instant permanent custody
      analysis.

In re C.N., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81813, 2003-Ohio-2048, ¶ 37, citing In re

Llewellyn, 5th Dist. Fairfield Nos. 02CA10, 02CA11 and 02CA12, 2003-Ohio-1102.

See also In re B.P., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112332, 2023-Ohio-1377, ¶ 19; In re I.A.-

W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111217, 2022-Ohio-1766, ¶ 17 (juvenile court is not

required to make a reasonable-efforts determination when it was ruling on a motion

for permanent custody); In re Baby Boy M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 91312, 2008-

Ohio-5271, ¶ 41 (same).

              Father concedes existing precedent from this court holds that

reasonable-efforts findings are not required in permanent custody cases, but argues

that this court’s precedent misinterprets the law. However, in In re C.F., 113 Ohio

St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, 862 N.E.2d 816, the Ohio Supreme Court also held that

a juvenile court is not required to make a reasonable-efforts determination when

ruling on a motion for permanent custody. The In re C.F. Court explained:
      By its terms, R.C. 2151.419 applies only at hearings held pursuant to
      R.C. 2151.28, 2151.31(E), 2151.314, 2151.33 or 2151.353.            See
      R.C. 2151.419(A)(1). These sections involve adjudicatory, emergency,
      detention, and temporary-disposition hearings, and dispositional
      hearings for abused, neglected, or dependent children, all of which
      occur prior to a decision transferring permanent custody to the state.
      The statute makes no reference to a hearing on a motion for permanent
      custody. Therefore, “[b]y its plain terms, the statute does not apply to
      motions for permanent custody brought pursuant to R.C. 2151.413, or
      to hearings held on such motions pursuant to R.C. 2151.414.” [In re
      A.C., 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2004-05-041, 2004-Ohio-5531], ¶ 30.

      This does not mean that the agency is relieved of the duty to make
      reasonable efforts. At various stages of the child-custody proceeding,
      the agency may be required under other statutes to prove that it has
      made reasonable efforts toward family reunification. To the extent that
      the trial court relies on R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) at a permanency hearing,
      the court must examine the “reasonable case planning and diligent
      efforts by the agency to assist the parents” when considering whether
      the child cannot or should not be placed with the parent within a
      reasonable time. However, the procedures in R.C. 2151.414 do not
      mandate that the court make a determination whether reasonable
      efforts have been made in every R.C. 2151.413 motion for permanent
      custody.

      Therefore, we hold that R.C. 2151.419(A)(1) does not apply in a hearing
      on a motion for permanent custody filed pursuant to R.C. 2151.413.
      However, except for some narrowly defined statutory exceptions, the
      state must still make reasonable efforts to reunify the family during the
      child-custody proceedings prior to the termination of parental rights.
      If the agency has not established that reasonable efforts have been
      made prior to the hearing on a motion for permanent custody, then it
      must demonstrate such efforts at that time.

Id. at ¶ 41-43.

                  In this case, the juvenile court previously determined that CCDCFS

had made reasonable efforts to prevent removal of B.B.C. from the home when it

granted predispositional temporary custody to CCDCFS. In a journal entry dated

June 14, 2022, the juvenile court found, in relevant part:
      The Court further finds that the Agency made reasonable efforts to
      prevent the removal of the child from the home, to eliminate the
      continued removal of the child from the home, or to make it possible
      for the child to return home.

      The relevant services provided by the Agency to the family of the child
      and the reasons those services did not prevent the removal of the child
      from the home or enable the child to return home are as follows: drug
      and alcohol, parenting plan, mental health, which mother was evasive
      to.

              Thereafter, Father appeared with counsel for an adjudicatory hearing

in August 2022. At that time, Father stipulated to the allegations of the complaint,

as amended, and B.B.C. was adjudged abused and dependent. The matter was

continued for an in-person disposition in October 2022. Father appeared again with

counsel and stipulated to the amended disposition after which B.B.C. was ordered

to be placed in the temporary custody of CCDCFS. Within the dispositional entry,

which was journalized on October 19, 2022, the court included the following

findings:

      The Court further finds that the reasonable efforts were made to
      prevent the removal of the child from the home, or to return the child
      to the home and finalize a permanency plan, to wit: reunification.
      Relevant services provided to the family include: The Mother was
      referred for Mental Health, Substance Abuse, Housing and Parenting
      Services. The Father established paternity.

              None of these findings were ever challenged by way of objection or

appeal. Therefore, because the juvenile court made reasonable-efforts findings

during the pendency of this case before the permanent-custody proceedings, the

requirements of R.C. 2151.419 were satisfied. Moreover, the court also made the
following reasonable-efforts findings in the judgment entry granting CCDCFS’s

motion for permanent custody:

      The Court further finds that reasonable efforts were made to prevent
      the removal of the child from the home, or to return the child to the
      home and finalize a permanency plan, to wit: reunification. Relevant
      services provided to the family include: For Mother, Substance Abuse,
      Mental Health, Housing, Parenting and to establish a legal name for
      the Child. The Father is incarcerated until 2026.

      ***

      Following the placement of the child outside the child’s home and
      nothwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the
      agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially
      caused the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed
      continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions
      causing the child to be placed outside the home.

(Judgment Entry, Sept. 21, 2023.)

               Based on the foregoing, not only did the juvenile court comply with

the requirements of R.C. 2151.419 in its journal entries granting temporary custody,

it also made reasonable-efforts findings in its final judgment entry granting

permanent custody of B.B.C. to CCDCFS even though it was not required to do so.

See In re B.P. at ¶ 22.

               Father further argues that CCDCFS failed to develop a case plan for

him to assist with reunification efforts.     He concedes, however, that he was

incarcerated on the date of trial and is scheduled to be incarcerated until 2026.

               In In re J.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108003, 2019-Ohio-1783, we

stated:   “Ohio courts have held that [the R.C. 2151.419 requirement to make

reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the child from the child’s home]
generally does not require the agency to make unreasonable efforts to attempt

reunification with an incarcerated parent.” Id. at ¶ 15, citing In re Da.B., 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 105866, 2018-Ohio-689, ¶ 38, citing In re C.B.C., 4th Dist. Lawrence

Nos. 15CA18 and 15CA19, 2016-Ohio-916 (“[A]ttempting reunification with such an

incarcerated parent would be an unreasonable effort because of the obvious fact that

the incarcerated parent lives in a prison; there is no possibility of reunifying the

parent and child while the parent is imprisoned. The statute requires reasonable

efforts, not unreasonable ones.” Id. at ¶ 83.). In In re J.W., the father was not

included on the case plan because he was incarcerated before the permanent custody

case was initiated and would remain incarcerated for more than 18 months after the

dispositional hearing. Id. Similarly, in this case, Father testified that he was in Erie

County Jail in June 2022 when B.B.C. was born and that he has been incarcerated

since then. Father testified that his current release date is July 2026, which is nearly

two years after the permanent custody hearing.

               In light of the foregoing, we find that CCDCFS was not required to

make efforts that were unreasonable in light of the fact that Father is incarcerated

until July 2026.

               Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.

III. Conclusion

               There is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support the

juvenile court’s determination that permanent custody to CCDCFS is in B.B.C.’s best

interest. Accordingly, the court’s decision to grant permanent custody is not against
the manifest weight of the evidence. Furthermore, the juvenile court complied with

the requirements of R.C. 2151.419 in its journal entries granting temporary custody

and made reasonable-efforts findings in its final judgment entry granting

permanent custody of B.B.C. to CCDCFS. Lastly, the R.C. 2151.419 requirement to

make reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the child from the child’s home

generally does not require CCDCFS to make unreasonable efforts to attempt

reunification with an incarcerated parent.

              Accordingly, judgment is affirmed.

      Costs are waived.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

_______________________________
MARY J. BOYLE, PRESIDING JUDGE

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., and
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR