Court Opinion

ID: 9394281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-12 21:03:15.03027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:58.446714
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                         2023 IL App (3d) 210486-U

                                   Order filed May 12, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                   IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                             THIRD DISTRICT

                                                     2023

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                       )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                        )       of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit,
                                                       )       Will County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )
                                                       )       Appeal No. 3-21-0486
             v.                                        )       Circuit No. 20-CF-1854
                                                       )
      MICHAEL SMITH,                                   )       Honorable
                                                       )       Edward A. Burmila, Jr.,
             Defendant-Appellant.                      )       Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE ALBRECHT delivered the judgment of the court.
            Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justice Davenport concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                 ORDER

¶1          Held: (1) The State failed to prove defendant guilty of possession of a stolen vehicle
                  beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) defendant’s conviction for reckless driving
                  violates the one-act, one crime doctrine.

¶2          Defendant, Michael Smith, appeals his convictions for aggravated domestic battery,

     possession of a stolen motor vehicle, interfering with reporting of domestic violence, reckless

     driving, and reckless conduct. Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to show the

     elements of possession of a stolen motor vehicle. He also argues his convictions of reckless
     driving and reckless conduct violate the one-act, one-crime doctrine because those convictions

     are based on the same physical act. The State concedes both issues but contends that it is

     unnecessary to remand this case for resentencing. We affirm in part and vacate in part.

¶3                                          I. BACKGROUND

¶4          On December 3, 2020, the State charged defendant by indictment with aggravated

     domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.3(a-5), (b) (West 2020)), possession of a stolen motor vehicle

     (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1), (b) (West 2020)), domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(2), (b) (West

     2020)), interfering with the reporting of domestic violence (720 ILCS 5/12-3.5(a), (c) (West

     2020)), reckless driving (625 ILCS 5/11-503(a), (b) (West 2020)), and reckless conduct (720

     ILCS 5/12-5(a)(1), (b) (West 2020)). The matter proceeded to a bench trial on June 3, 2021.

¶5          The trial testimony revealed that Debra Rutledge dated defendant and their relationship

     ended in September 2020. Despite their breakup, the two remained friendly. Rutledge and

     defendant worked at the Amazon Fulfillment Center warehouse in Joliet, Illinois. On October 22,

     2020, they carpooled to work in Rutledge’s daughter’s Jeep Cherokee. After their shift ended,

     defendant began questioning Rutledge about a new romantic interest. Rutledge did not respond

     to defendant’s questions. He persisted as the two departed from the Amazon parking lot in the

     Jeep Cherokee. In response to Rutledge’s continued silence, defendant began to choke Rutledge

     around her neck. At trial, Rutledge maintained that the defendant was merely pulling on her

     turtleneck sweater and not choking her. Rutledge, who was driving, circled back to the Amazon

     parking lot so that both parties could “cool down.” Once parked, defendant reinitiated contact

     and began choking Rutledge in efforts to prevent her from leaving the car.

¶6          Upon viewing and hearing the disturbance, a small group of nearby Amazon employees

     gathered. One of these employees, Early Porter, testified that after arriving at the Amazon

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     warehouse for his scheduled night shift, he witnessed defendant and Rutledge arguing in a

     nearby car. Once the argument escalated, Porter heard Rutledge screaming for help. He then

     approached the vehicle. At this time, he observed defendant choking Rutledge. Porter, with the

     assistance of a coworker, confronted defendant and aided Rutledge by pulling her out of the

     driver’s seat and into safety. Rutledge requested one of the bystanders retrieve her car keys.

     Porter then grabbed the driver’s side door and reached into the vehicle. Before he could get to the

     keys, defendant moved to the driver’s seat and sped off. Porter let go of the vehicle, but as a

     result of the defendant driving off, his shoulder collided with a parked vehicle in the warehouse

     parking lot. He endured an injury that eventually required rotator cuff surgery.

¶7          Following the incident, Rutledge filed a domestic violence complaint, a vehicle theft

     form, and spoke with two police officers. She informed one of the officers that defendant

     administered pressure to her neck making it difficult for her to breathe. While Rutledge was still

     at the Amazon warehouse, her daughter drove to her home and informed her that the Jeep

     Cherokee was parked outside. After returning home on the night of October 22, 2020, Rutledge

     confirmed the Jeep Cherokee was parked outside of her residence.

¶8          After the State rested, the defense moved for a directed verdict on all counts. In relation

     to the stolen vehicle charge, the State recognized that defendant drove the vehicle back to

     Rutledge’s home, but noted he was not legally entitled to drive the vehicle. The court denied

     defendant’s motion for a directed verdict and subsequently found him guilty on all counts.

¶9          Defendant was sentenced on October 8, 2021. Based on his criminal record, defendant

     was subject to a mandatory Class X felony sentence. The court sentenced defendant to ten years’

     imprisonment after confirming that the aggravated domestic battery is a Class X eligible offense.

     The court separately sentenced defendant to a concurrent ten years’ imprisonment based on the

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       possession of a stolen motor vehicle count, after confirming with the State that it was similarly a

       Class X offense. When defendant requested clarification on when he would become eligible for

       parole, the court replied “[w]ell, the one sentence is at 85 percent and the other one is at 50

       percent. So it would be the 85 percent of the sentence that you’d have to serve.” The court also

       merged defendant’s misdemeanor domestic battery conviction with his aggravated domestic

       battery conviction. For the remaining misdemeanors, defendant was sentenced to an additional

       294 days’ imprisonment with credit for days already served. Defendant filed a motion for a new

       trial, or alternatively, a motion to reconsider the sentence, which the court denied.

¶ 10          Defendant timely appealed.

¶ 11                                             II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12          Defendant argues that the State failed to prove him guilty of possession of a stolen motor

       vehicle since it did not prove he had the intent to permanently deprive Rutledge or her daughter

       of the use and benefit of the Jeep Cherokee. Defendant contends the only evidence adduced at

       trial was that defendant returned the vehicle to Rutledge’s home that same day. Further,

       defendant asserts that his conviction for reckless driving violates the one-act, one-crime doctrine,

       as it stems from the same physical act of his more serious reckless conduct conviction.

¶ 13                                     A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 14          A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case requires the reviewing

       court to determine whether, after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,

       any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

       reasonable doubt. People v. Davison, 233 Ill. 2d 30, 43 (2009).

¶ 15          Where, as here, the charging instrument alleges that the defendant possessed the vehicle

       knowing it to have been “ ‘stolen,’ as opposed to *** ‘converted,’ ” the State “must show that a

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       ‘theft’ occurred.” People v. Brand, 2020 IL App (1st) 171728, ¶ 40; People v. Bivens, 156 Ill.

       App. 3d 222, 230 (1987). An essential element of theft is the intent to permanently deprive the

       owner of the use and benefit of the vehicle. Bivens, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 230. Here, to meet its

       burden, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant (1) possessed

       the Jeep Cherokee, (2) was not entitled to possess the vehicle, and (3) knew that the vehicle was

       stolen, i.e., he intended to permanently deprive Rutledge or her daughter of the vehicle’s use and

       benefit. See 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2020). The State concedes it did not establish the

       third element beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree.

¶ 16          Rutledge’s uncontroverted testimony establishes that defendant returned the Jeep

       Cherokee to her residence sometime before 10:00 p.m. on the night of the incident. According to

       Rutledge, her daughter confirmed that the car had been returned while Rutledge was being

       tended to at the Amazon warehouse. Furthermore, the State conceded the car was returned. The

       defendant’s return of the vehicle indicates that he had no intention of permanently depriving

       Rutledge or her daughter of the vehicle’s use and benefit. In sum, even when viewed in the light

       most favorable to the State, we find that the evidence failed to prove defendant’s guilt of

       possession of a stolen motor vehicle beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 17          However, we are unpersuaded by defendant’s contention that this matter requires remand

       for resentencing. Defendant argues that because he was convicted of two serious offenses, it

       stands to reason that the circuit court was influenced by his possession of a stolen motor vehicle

       offense when imposing the penalty for his aggravated domestic battery conviction. The circuit

       court, however, set out a sufficiently distinct factual basis in sentencing defendant on his

       aggravated domestic battery charge. Although defendant’s convictions for aggravated domestic

       battery and possession of a stolen motor vehicle received identical terms of ten years’

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       imprisonment, the record is clear that the court imposed separate sentences for each conviction.

       People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 355 (2001). There is no indication that the possession of a

       stolen motor vehicle conviction had any bearing or influence on defendant’s aggravated domestic

       battery sentence. See id.; People v. Buford, 235 Ill. App. 3d 393, 404 (1992). We therefore

       vacate defendant’s possession of a stolen vehicle conviction and find that remand is unnecessary.

¶ 18                                          B. One-Act, One-Crime

¶ 19           Defendant next argues that his reckless driving and reckless conduct convictions violate

       the one-act, one-crime rule. Specifically, defendant contends both convictions arise from the

       single physical act of driving off with the vehicle that resulted in Porter’s injury, and as such,

       reckless driving should be vacated as the less serious conviction. Defendant concedes he has

       forfeited this issue by failing to raise it in the trial court. However, the parties agree on appeal

       that this issue is reviewable under the second prong of the plain error doctrine. See People v. Lee,

       213 Ill. 2d 218, 226 (2004).

¶ 20           The plain-error doctrine allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error when

       either “(1) the evidence is close, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) the error is

       serious, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” In re Samantha V., 234 Ill. 2d 359, 378

       (2009). “[I]t is well established that a one-act, one-crime violation affects the integrity of the

       judicial process, thus satisfying the second prong of the plain-error test.” Id. at 378-79.

¶ 21           Prior to applying plain error, we first determine whether a violation of the one-act, one-

       crime rule occurred. See People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 226 (2000) (“Before invoking the

       plain error exception *** we determine whether any error occurred.”). The one-act, one-crime

       doctrine provides that a defendant may not be convicted of multiple offenses that arise out of the

       same physical act. See People v. Coats, 2018 IL 121926, ¶ 11. Courts employ a two-step analysis

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       to determine whether a violation of the rule has occurred. Id. ¶ 12. First, a court will determine

       whether the conduct at issue consisted of a single physical act or separate acts. Id. Second, a

       court determines whether any of the offenses are lesser included offenses. Id. If two convictions

       are based on the same physical act, the more serious offense will stand and the “less serious

       offense should be vacated.” People v. Artis, 232 Ill. 2d 156, 170 (2009). Whether a defendant’s

       convictions violate the one-act, one-crime rule is reviewed de novo. Coats, 2018 IL 121926, ¶

       12.

¶ 22          Here, the State concedes that defendant’s reckless driving and reckless conduct

       convictions were based upon the single act of driving the Jeep Cherokee while Porter’s body

       remained partially inside the vehicle. Porter’s trial testimony corroborates defendant’s assertion

       he was assisting Rutledge out of the vehicle, Porter reached for Rutledge’s keys, defendant

       assumed position in the driver’s seat, defendant drove away while Porter maintained contact with

       the vehicle, and Porter injured his shoulder as a result. This reckless act gave rise to both

       defendant’s reckless driving and reckless conduct convictions. Consequently, we find that these

       convictions were based on the same physical act, and the lesser of defendant’s convictions must

       be vacated.

¶ 23          To determine which of the two offenses is more serious, we look to the legislative intent

       and the plain language of the statutes. People v. Lee, 213 Ill. 2d 218, 228 (2004). While a

       maximum possible sentence is one indicator of the legislature’s intent as to which offense is

       more serious, it is not the only indicator. People v. Johnson, 237 Ill. 2d 81, 98 (2010). The

       classification of offenses may also be considered. Id. Where the comparative punishments and

       classifications do not indicate which offense is more serious, we consider the mental state

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       required for the offenses and the specificity with which each offense is defined in the statutes. Id.

       at 98-99 (internal citations omitted).

¶ 24          Both reckless driving and reckless conduct offenses, as charged, are Class A

       misdemeanors. Compare 720 ILCS 5/12-5(a)(1), (b) (West 2020), with 625 ILCS 5/11-503(a)(1),

       (b) (West 2020). To be found culpable, both offenses require the same mental state of

       recklessness. The parties suggest that despite an identical classification and mental state, reckless

       conduct is the more serious offense. To meet its burden for the reckless driving conviction, the

       State had to prove the defendant drove with a willful or wanton disregard for Porter’s safety. 625

       ILCS 5/11-503(a)(1) (West 2020). Conversely, based on the indictment, the State was required to

       prove that Porter endured bodily harm for the reckless conduct conviction thereby making it the

       more serious offense. 720 ILCS 5/12-5(a)(1) (West 2020). Although reckless conduct is the more

       general offense, we agree that, as charged, the additional element of bodily harm is a relevant

       consideration in determining the more serious offense. See People v. Lee, 167 Ill. 2d 140, 146

       (1995) (“[T]he degree of harm inflicted is a relevant consideration *** in determining the

       seriousness of a crime[.]”); see also People v. Pearson, 108 Ill. App. 3d 241, 242, 244 (1982)

       (vacating a criminal damage to property conviction and affirming reckless conduct conviction

       based on the same physical act of defendant breaking a glass tavern door that resulted in

       significant injury to the tavernkeeper’s hand); but see City of Chicago v. Hill, 40 Ill. 2d 130, 136

       (1968) (vacating defendants’ disorderly conduct conviction and affirming the willful obstruction

       of traffic conviction, where disorderly conduct was the more general offense).

¶ 25          Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366, we are vested with the authority to enter

       any judgment that ought to have been made. Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 366(a)(5) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994).

       Accordingly, we vacate defendant’s reckless driving conviction.

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¶ 26                                         III. CONCLUSION

¶ 27          For the reasons stated, we vacate defendant’s possession of a stolen motor vehicle and his

       reckless driving convictions and affirm the remaining convictions.

¶ 28          Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

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