Court Opinion

ID: 9904005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 16:14:29.430091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:00.678617
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                      FIFTH DISTRICT

                                  NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                  FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                  DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

SHANE FLOYD,

            Appellant,

v.                                       Case No. 5D21-2645
                                         LT Case No. 2015-CF-303492-CFDB

STATE OF FLORIDA,

            Appellee.

________________________________/

Opinion filed October 21, 2022

3.850 Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Volusia County,
Sandra C. Upchurch, Judge.

Deana K. Marshall, of Law Office of
Deana K. Marshall, P.A., Riverview,
for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and L. Charlene Matthews,
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona
Beach, for Appellee.

EVANDER, J.
      Shane Floyd appeals the denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal

Procedure 3.850 motion for postconviction relief in which he alleged that his

trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.        We reverse the summary

denial of his third claim, but we otherwise affirm.

      Floyd was convicted of three counts of sexual battery and one count of

lewd and lascivious molestation. The two alleged victims were less than

twelve years of age. Prior to his arrest, Floyd was interviewed by two

detectives regarding the allegations against him. During the interview, the

detectives made several comments vouching for the credibility of the child

victims. Those statements implicitly suggested the detectives’ belief that

Floyd was guilty of the alleged offenses. While the State argued below that

the detectives’ comments elicited probative statements from Floyd about the

reasons the children might make such allegations against him, the detectives

did not elicit any admission of guilt. Notably, Floyd’s trial counsel did not

seek redaction of any of the statements from the recorded interview that was

published to the jury.

      In summarily denying this claim, the trial court found that Floyd’s trial

counsel had made a strategic decision “to keep certain portions of [Floyd’s]

interrogation, at the cost of not redacting other portions of the same

interrogation.” Citing to McMillian v. State, 214 So. 3d 1274, 1286 (Fla.

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2017), the trial court further found that “a jury may hear an interrogating

detective’s statements about a crime when they provoke a relevant response

from the defendant being questioned.” We respectfully disagree with the trial

court’s analysis.

      Generally, an evidentiary hearing is required before concluding that

certain action or inaction by trial counsel was the result of a strategic

decision. Patrick v. State, 246 So. 3d 253, 264 (Fla. 2018); see also Hipley

v. State, 333 So. 3d 1194, 1196–97 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (“Ordinarily, the

‘denial of a claim of ineffective assistance based on a finding that counsel

was engaging in reasonable trial strategy generally should only be made

after an evidentiary hearing.’”). Here, it cannot be determined from the

documents attached to the trial court’s order that trial counsel’s failure to

seek redaction of the detectives’ comments was the result of a strategic

decision.

      Furthermore, although interrogating detectives’ statements can be

understood by a jury to be “techniques” used to secure confessions, see,

e.g., McWatters v. State, 36 So. 3d 613, 638 (Fla. 2010), “[a] witness’s

opinion as to the credibility, guilt, or innocence of the accused is generally

inadmissible, [and] it is especially troublesome when a jury is repeatedly

exposed to an interrogating officer’s opinion regarding the guilt or innocence

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of the accused.” Roundtree v. State, 145 So. 3d 963, 965 (Fla. 4th DCA

2014) (quoting Jackson v. State, 107 So. 3d 328, 339-40 (Fla. 2012)); see

also Page v. State, 733 So. 2d 1079, 1081 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (“It is

especially harmful for a police witness to give his opinion of a [witness’s]

credibility because of the greater weight afforded an officer’s testimony.”).

      Because the trial court did not address the prejudicial effect of the

detectives’ statements, we remand for the trial court to consider the prejudice

prong set forth in Strickland v. U.S., 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). If the record

does not conclusively refute Floyd’s claim that he was prejudiced by his trial

counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance, the trial court shall conduct an

evidentiary hearing on this claim.

      AFFIRMED, in part; REVERSED, in part; REMANDED.

LAMBERT, C.J., and HARRIS, J., concur.

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