Court Opinion

ID: 9584938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:54:07.56429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:31.527883
License: Public Domain

Mikell, Judge.
D. K. Merritt, an employee of Georgia Electric Company (“Georgia Electric”) who worked at Cooper Tire & Rubber Company’s manufacturing plant (“Cooper Tire”) pursuant to an independent contractor agreement between Cooper Tire and Georgia Electric, was injured when a transformer fell on his left arm. Merritt sued Cooper Tire, alleging that it was liable for failing to keep the premises safe and vicariously liable for Georgia Electric’s failure to maintain its equipment as required by Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) regulations. The jury awarded Merritt $90,000 for medical expenses; $150,000 for past lost wages; $250,000 for future lost wages; and $750,000 in general damages. In Case No. A04A0811, Cooper Tire appeals the trial court’s denial of its motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, to amend judgment, and for new trial. For reasons that follow, we reverse.1
In reviewing the denial of both a motion for a directed verdict and a motion for j.n.o.v., this Court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and determine whether there is any evidence to support the jury’s verdict.2 Viewed in this light, the evidence shows that in August 1996, Merritt was employed by Georgia Electric as a millwright. Georgia Electric maintains a long-term independent contractor relationship with Cooper Tire; a Georgia Electric maintenance and construction crew has been present at Cooper Tire’s Albany, Dougherty County plant since 1990, performing installation and maintenance on the plant’s electric systems pursuant to a purchase order that is renewed annually. The purchase order provides, in pertinent part, that, “[i]n the performance of work under any Contract, the contractor agrees to comply with all applicable Federal, State, or local laws, rules, regulations, or ordinances. . . . [Contractor agrees to strictly comply with the OSHA Hazard Communications Regulations.” The contract further provides that, “[Georgia Electric’s] services to Cooper [Tire] will be in the form of an independent contractor.”
Merritt was injured on August 25, 1996, while the construction crew was using two Georgia Electric forklifts to raise and install a new transformer. As Merritt crawled underneath the transformer to *17remove wooden crating material, the parking brake of Georgia Electric’s Caterpillar forklift failed and the forklift jumped backward, dropping the transformer. Merritt’s left arm was crushed by the falling transformer.
With respect to the forklift in question, a Caterpillar T-125D, the following evidence was adduced at trial. Georgia Electric purchased the used forklift specifically for use at Cooper Tire’s plant. The forklift was delivered to the plant on January 6, 1996. George Capps, a former employee of Georgia Electric’s forklift maintenance crew, testified that he was not required to keep daily checklists on Georgia Electric’s forklifts as required by OSHA,8 but that he checked the brakes on the subject forklift when it first arrived at the plant. After that initial inspection, however, Capps never checked, fixed, or repaired the parking brake on the forklift. Cooper Tire did not monitor Georgia Electric’s maintenance of its industrial trucks, including its forklifts, or verify whether Georgia Electric was in compliance with OSHA regulations. Gene Ritchie, Cooper Tire’s plant engineer, testified that he never observed or requested copies of a daily checklist generated by Georgia Electric for the subject forklift from January 1996, until Merritt’s injury. Ritchie confirmed that Cooper Tire routinely collects daily forklift checklists from its employees, and that a forklift without an emergency brake could be dangerous depending on its use. Merritt’s evidence showed that the forklift did not have an operable emergency brake. According to a fact witness who inspected the subject forklift, the caliper was “contaminated with grease” and the general condition of the brake pad was “ [bj orderline to bad.” This witness further testified that after he repaired the forklift and tested it, the forklift did not move.
Merritt filed this action against Cooper Tire alleging a failure to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises safe as required by OCGA § 51-3-1 and vicarious liability for the negligence of Georgia Electric pursuant to OCGA § 51-2-5 (4).3
4 Cooper Tire moved for summary judgment, arguing that Merritt’s claims were not viable. The trial court denied the motion but certified its order for immediate review. This Court denied Cooper Tire’s application for interlocutory review and the case was tried before a jury. At the close of Merritt’s evidence, Cooper Tire moved for a directed verdict on both claims, which the trial court denied. As noted above, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Merritt and the trial court entered judgment in Merritt’s favor for *18$1,240,000. Cooper Tire then moved for j.n.o.v., a new trial, and to amend judgment, which the trial court denied. Cooper Tire appeals.
1. In two enumerations of error, Cooper Tire argues that the trial court erred in denying its motions for j.n.o.v., a new trial, and to amend judgment for three reasons: (1) Cooper Tire has no common law duty to safeguard Georgia Electric’s employees; (2) the evidence does not support a claim under OCGA § 51-3-1 or § 51-2-5 (4); and (3) it is immune from tort liability under the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, OCGA § 34-9-1 et seq. We agree with Cooper Tire that the evidence does not support a claim under OCGA § 51-3-1 or § 51-2-5 (4) and, therefore, reverse the trial court’s judgment.
(a) Relying on Murphy v. Blue Bird Body Co.,5 Cooper Tire argues that Merritt’s claim under OCGA § 51-3-1 fails because it does not involve a defective condition in the premises. In Murphy, the plaintiff, an employee of an independent contractor, was injured on the defendant’s premises while using the defendant’s forklift. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed, arguing that the defendant breached its duty to plaintiff to keep the premises safe. We rejected this argument, reasoning that (1) there was no evidence that the premises were unsafe, and (2) the forklift “was not a part of the premises or a fixture thereto.”6 In the case at bar, as in Murphy, the forklift was not a part of the premises. Moreover, premises liability cases cited by the dissent for the proposition that Cooper Tire owed Merritt a duty to inspect and maintain the forklift are inapposite. In Johnson v. Clark,7 for example, a concrete safety pole that should have been bolted to the ground fell on a painting contractor’s employee, and issues of fact existed as to the property owner’s knowledge of the dangerous condition. In Towles v. Cox,8 an employee of a dry cleaning store was injured when she opened the back door of the store and a jackhammer, which had been propped against the back wall by a plumber’s employee, fell against her leg.
Salient facts distinguish Johnson and Towles from the case sub judice. First, the allegedly dangerous instrumentality, the forklift, was owned and operated by Merritt’s employer, Georgia Electric, and not by Cooper Tire. Moreover, the evidence shows that it had a hidden defect. In Towles, the injury occurred because the jackhammer was *19placed in an unexpected location, not because it malfunctioned or was negligently maintained.
Under OCGA § 51-3-1, an owner or occupier is liable to invitees for “failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises . . . safe.”9 However, “a property owner is not an insurer of the safety of its invitees. The mere showing of the occurrence of an injury does not create a presumption of negligence.”10 Rather, the true basis of an owner’s liability is the owner’s superior knowledge of the defect or hazard.11 In this case, Merritt presented no evidence that Cooper Tire had actual or constructive knowledge of a defect in the forklift.12
To agree with the dissent would change and expand the holding in Towles and would overrule by implication our decision in Murphy. Imposing premises liability on Cooper Tire in the case at bar would create a precedent requiring the owners or occupiers of land to maintain, and to inspect for hidden defects, all vehicles, and perhaps all tools, by whomever owned, which happen to be found on the premises. We are not willing to make such a drastic change to existing law.
(b) At trial, Merritt claimed that Cooper Tire was liable for Georgia Electric’s violation of OSHA under OCGA § 51-2-5 (4). In a pretrial order, the trial court ruled that
[t]he applicable OSHA regulations are not admissible for the purpose of establishing that [Cooper Tire] has a direct duty or standard of care to plaintiff either to maintain [or] service . . . Georgia Electric’s forklifts or to safeguard against injuries resulting from improper or defective maintenance *20because [Merritt] was not at the time of injury an “employee” of [Cooper Tire].
(Emphasis in original.) The trial court further ruled that
[Cooper Tire] is statutorily liable under OCGA § 51-2-5 (4) if . . . the evidence shows that . . . Georgia Electric was negligent and the wrongful act of its contractor is a violation of a duty imposed by statute. Therefore, the applicable OSHA regulations are relevant and admissible to establish what Georgia Electric’s duty of care was to [Merritt]. If the evidence establishes a violation of that standard, the violation . . . [is] imputed to [Cooper Tire] under OCGA § 51-2-5 (4).
(Emphasis in original.) Cooper Tire contends that Merritt’s claim under OCGA § 51-2-5 (4) fails because Cooper Tire did not have a statutory duty to maintain the forklift and/or to ensure Georgia Electric’s proper maintenance of the forklift. Merritt contends that Cooper Tire is liable under OCGA § 51-2-5 (4) because his injury resulted from Georgia Electric’s violation of OSHA. We agree with Cooper Tire.
As a general rule, an employer is not liable for the torts of its independent contractor.13 Under an exception to this rule, however, “an employer is liable for the negligence of an independent contractor who is performing the employer’s nondelegable statutory duty.”14 The exception applies only where a statutory duty of the employer has been breached. Georgia Electric had a statutory duty to comply with OSHA regulations concerning the forklift in question. However, neither the dissent nor the parties’ briefs have cited us to any statutory or case authority requiring a factory owner, such as Cooper Tire, to assure that all contractors comply with OSHA regulations. As Merritt has failed to prove that Cooper Tire had a statutory duty to maintain Georgia Electric’s forklifts and/or to ensure that Georgia Electric properly maintained its own equipment, the trial court erred *21in entering judgment in favor of Merritt on this claim.15
The dissent argues that if Cooper Tire contractually agreed to maintain the forklift, the failure to perform said duty would trigger the exception to the rule that the employer is not held liable for the torts of an independent contractor, in this case Georgia Electric.16 Pretermitting whether Merritt was on the maintenance crew or the construction crew, neither the contract governing the maintenance crew nor the contract governing the construction crew required Cooper Tire to maintain Georgia Electric’s forklift. The contract governing the maintenance crew provides as follows:
OWNER [(Cooper Tire)] shall ensure that all equipment supplied by OWNER or by third parties shall meet OSHA specifications at the time it is made available to CONTRACTOR [(Georgia Electric)]. CONTRACTOR agrees to ensure that the equipment meets OSHA specifications subsequent to the supply by OWNER.
Therefore, the responsibility had shifted to Georgia Electric to ensure that the equipment met OSHA requirements. The contract further provides: “The cost of maintaining and repairing equipment, including the cost of spare parts, which are to be supplied by OWNER or for equipment provided by third parties shall be for OWNER’S account.” Thus, Cooper Tire would have borne the cost of any necessary repairs identified by Georgia Electric’s inspection of the forklift.
The contract governing the construction crew is a purchase order which is silent concerning the furnishing and maintenance of equipment. The evidence in the record is that the forklift in question was neither supplied nor maintained by Cooper Tire. Neither Merritt nor the dissent has pointed to any contractual provision which required Cooper Tire to maintain the forklift that caused Merritt’s injury.
The dissent argues that the “safety plan” established a standard of care and that Cooper Tire breached that standard by failing to force Georgia Electric to comply with the plan. The “safety plan,” which was the subject of a motion in limine, was apparently the “regulations governing outside contractors,” which were incorporated into both *22contracts. These regulations required the contractor, Georgia Electric, to strictly comply with OSHA regulations. The OSHA regulations required daily inspection of the brakes and a daily checklist confirming the inspection.
Assuming that the “safety plan” did establish a standard of care, we nonetheless find in the record no evidence of any contractual duty on the part of Cooper Tire to ensure that Georgia Electric complied with the “safety plan.” The absence of such a contractual duty from the “safety plan” and from both contracts may have been the reason that Merritt expressly abandoned during the trial his cause of action based on the contractual duty exception to the rule that employers are not liable for the torts of their independent contractors. This claim cannot be resurrected on appeal. While we certainly sympathize with Merritt for his grievous injuries, the law dictates that his sole remedy lies in workers’ compensation.
For these reasons, the trial court should have directed a verdict in favor of Cooper Tire and erred in denying its motion for j.n.o.v. Upon remand, the trial court is directed to enter a j.n.o.v. in favor of Cooper Tire.
2. The enumerations of error in Merritt’s cross-appeal, Case No. A04A0812, are moot in view of our rulings in Case No. A04A0811.

Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction in Case No. A04A0811. Case No. A04A0812 dismissed as moot.

Blackburn, P. J., Andrews, P. J., Ruffin, P. J., Eldridge and Adams, JJ., concur. Barnes, J., dissents.

 In Case No. A04A0812, Merritt challenges the trial court’s rulings on two motions in limine filed by Cooper Tire. In light of our holding in Case No. A04A0811, we need not reach the merits of Merritt’s cross-appeal.

 Ga. Power Co. v. Irvin, 267 Ga. 760, 762 (1) (482 SE2d 362) (1997).

 Under OSHA regulations, Georgia Electric was required to conduct daily examinations of all industrial trucks, including forklifts, and to remove from service any industrial truck not in a safe operating condition.

 Merritt also alleged a violation of OCGA § 51-2-5 (3), but he withdrew that claim during the trial.

 207 Ga. App. 853 (429 SE2d 530) (1993).

 Id. at 857 (3).

 233 Ga. App. 508 (504 SE2d 536) (1998).

 181 Ga. App. 194 (351 SE2d 718) (1986).

 See Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268 Ga. 735, 740 (1) (493 SE2d 403) (1997) (“[wjhile not an insurer of the invitee’s safety, the owner/occupier is required to exercise ordinary care to protect the invitee from unreasonable risks of harm of which the owner/occupier has superior knowledge”) (citation omitted); Wimpey v. Otts, 207 Ga. App. 40, 42 (427 SE2d 34) (1993) (“[a]n owner... is liable in damages to invitees for injuries causedby his... failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises safe.... The true ground of premises liability is the landowner’s superior knowledge of the perilous condition and the danger therefrom to persons coming upon the property; it is when the perilous condition is known to the owner and not known to the person injured that a recovery is permitted.”) (citations omitted).

 (Citation omitted.) Nicholson v. Pike Nurseries, 229 Ga. App. 540-541 (1) (494 SE2d 214) (1997) . See also Haskins v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, 230 Ga. App. 350, 351 (496 SE2d 471) (1998) .

 Wingo v. Harrison, 268 Ga. App. 156,159 (601 SE2d 507) (2004); Hudson v. Santangelo, 228 Ga. App. 768,772 (2) (492 SE2d 673) (1997);Apostol-Athanasiou v. White, 176 Ga. App. 178, 179 (335 SE2d 442) (1985).

 See, e.g., Herrin v. Peeches Neighborhood Grill & Bar, 235 Ga. App. 528, 532 (1) (509 SE2d 103) (1998). The dissent’s argument that constructive knowledge can be inferred because the maintenance departments of Cooper Tire and Georgia Electric were “right next to each other” is not persuasive.

 OCGA § 51-2-4. See, e.g., Neiman-Marcus Group v. Dufour, 268 Ga. App. 104, 105 (1) (601 SE2d 375) (2004); Brown v. Who’s Three, 217 Ga. App. 131, 134 (1) (457 SE2d 186) (1995); Loudermilk Enterprises v. Hurtig, 214 Ga. App. 746, 747 (449 SE2d 141) (1994) (physical precedent only).

 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Jacobs v. Thomson Oak Flooring, 250 Ga. App. 56, 61 (5) (550 SE2d 465) (2001). See OCGA§ 51-2-5 (4); Dept. of Veterans Svcs. v. Robinson, 244 Ga. App. 878, 880 (536 SE2d 6Í7) (2000); Perry v. Soil Remediation, 221 Ga. App. 386, 388 (2) (471 SE2d 320) (1996); Loudermilk, supra at 749.

 See Loudermilk, supra. Compare Kroger Co. v. Strickland, 248 Ga. App. 613, 615 (1) (a) (548 SE2d 375) (2001) (upholding verdict in favor of invitee “[a]s the duty imposed on owner/occupiers to ‘exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe’ is statutory, [plaintifflemployer] may he held liable for the negligence of the independent contractor hired to clean its floors if such negligence rendered the premises and approaches unsafe”) (footnotes omitted); Johnson v. Clark, supra at 510 (reversing grant of summary judgment to owner on same grounds).

 See OCGA§ 51-2-5 (3).