Court Opinion

ID: 9514410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:49:15.611454+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:17.209489
License: Public Domain

GILBERTSON, Justice
(dissenting in part and concurring in part).
[¶ 48.] I respectfully dissent from the majority on issues 1 through 3, and concur on issue 4.1 would uphold Chamley’s conviction.
[¶ 49.] 1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting “prior bad acts” evidence involving Chamley’s alleged sexual misconduct.
[¶ 50.] In order to find that a trial court has abused its discretion, we must find that the trial court’s decision “is not justified by, and clearly against, reason and evidence.” Dakota Cheese v. Taylor, 525 N.W.2d 713, 715 (S.D.1995). Because we cannot substitute our reasoning for the trial court’s, “the question is not whether, had we been the trial judge, we would have admitted the prior bad acts evidence but whether the trial court sitting in this case abused its discretion by doing so.” State v. Moeller, 1996 SD 60, ¶ 141, 548 N.W.2d 465, 496 (Gilbertson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
[¶ 51.] It appears the majority has abandoned this most deferential standard of review for a de novo review of the trial court’s evidentiary decision. See Martha S. Davis, A Basic Guide to Standards of Judicial Review, 33 S.D.Law Rev. 468, 480 (1988) (“[Abuse of discretion] is the most deferential standard of review available with the exception of no review at all.”) While the majority properly states the standard in Barber, supra, it fails to articulate how “a judicial mind, in view of the law and circumstances, could [not] have reasonably reached the same conclusion” as this trial court. Barber, 1996 SD 96 at ¶ 14, 552 N.W.2d at 820.
[¶ 52.] In the instant case, the trial court conducted a 404(b) hearing wherein Cham-ley’s stepdaughter testified and was cross-examined as to the sexual abuse Chamley perpetrated upon her. Afterward, the trial court properly reviewed the 404(b) request by: 1) making a determination as to the relevance of the bad acts evidence to a material issue in the case; 2) identifying the specific exceptions, namely intent and absence of mistake or accident; and, (3) weighing the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect.
[¶ 53.] The majority’s analysis attempts to draw a line between the intent and absence of mistake or accident exceptions to 404(b), and the majority applies a different test to each one. However, in the context of this case, it is a distinction without a difference: whether Chamley touched the girls by mistake or by accident19 is, in effect, whether he touched them without intent for sexual gratification. Thus, both exceptions should be analyzed under the intent exception. Relevance
[¶ 54.] “Evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence is relevant.” SDCL 19-12-1; State v. McDonald, 421 N.W.2d 492, 494 (S.D.1988). One fact that is of consequence to the determination of any action for child sexual contact is the perpetrator’s intent. State v. Champagne, 422 N.W.2d 840, 843 (S.D.1988). The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the perpetrator’s intent was to “arouse or produce sexual gratification” in himself or his victims. Id.; see also, Thibodeau v. State, 298 N.W.2d 818, 819 (S.D.1980) (State must prove every element of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt).
[¶ 55.] In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court determined that the 404(b) evidence was relevant to the material issue of Chamley’s intent. This Court has previously held that prior bad acts are relevant for the purpose of showing intent, *621even when, as here, the defendant has denied the sexual contact ever occurred. State v. Ondricek, 535 N.W.2d 872 (S.D.1995); State v. Christopherson, 482 N.W.2d 298, 302 (S.D.1992); State v. Basker, 468 N.W.2d 413, 416 (S.D.1991); State v. Klein, 444 N.W.2d 16, 19 (S.D.1989); Champagne, 422 N.W.2d at 843; State v. Means, 363 N.W.2d 565, 568 (S.D.1985); cf. State v. White, 538 N.W.2d 237 (S.D.1995) (similarities of subsequent rape of another woman by defendant buttressed essential issue of consent in forcible rape/murder); State v. McGill, 536 N.W.2d 89 (S.D.1995) (defendant’s prior acts were relevant as course of conduct, an element of stalking charge). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the prior bad acts were relevant to the issue of intent.

Probative balancing

[¶56.] After making its finding of relevance, the trial court next determined whether the “danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence in view of the availability of other means of proof and the other factors under SDCL 19-12-3 (Rule 403).” White, 538 N.W.2d at 243 (internal citations and quotations omitted). “Prejudice does not mean the damage to the opponent’s case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather, it refers to the unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means.” State v. Iron Shell, 336 N.W.2d 372, 375 (S.D.1983) (quoting 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5215 at 274-75 (1978)).
[¶ 57.] The majority’s finding that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the other acts evidence is fundamentally flawed. SDCL 19-12-3 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
(Emphasis added.)
In other words, stating the law conversely, in deciding to ADMIT the evidence, the judge must find that the probative value is NOT substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The majority misstates the test as: “in assessing admissibility, it is an important factor in determining whether the probative value ... substantially outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice.” By the plain language of SDCL 19-12-3, if the weight of the prejudicial effect and the probative value are the same, the evidence comes in. The probative value never has to outweigh the prejudicial effect for the evidence to come in. See J. Larson, South Dakota Evidence, § 403.1 (1991) (“The party objecting to the admission of evidence has the burden of establishing that the trial concerns expressed in the rule [SDCL 19-12-3, i.e., danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or .undue delay, waste of time, or cumulative evidence] substantially outweigh the probative value.”) By the terms of the statute, in order to keep the evidence out, the danger of unfair prejudice must not only outweigh the probative value, but substantially outweigh it. Lykken v. Class, 1997 SD 29, 561 N.W.2d 302 (S.D. 1997); State v. Rhines, 1996 SD 55, 548 N.W.2d 415 (S.D. 1996); White, 538 N.W.2d 237; Baker Livestock Exchange, Inc. v. Thompson, 520 N.W.2d 263 (S.D. 1994). The majority improperly weighted the probative/prejudicial analysis.
[¶ 58.] One of the factors in the balancing of probative versus prejudicial is remoteness. The majority claims the 404(b) evidence against Chamley is too remote in time. Nonetheless,
[r]emoteness must be considered with other factors, such as reliability and necessity, in determining probative value. The trial court must consider the nature of the offenses, the similarity of occasions and locations as well as the time elapsed between incidents.
State v. Titus, 426 N.W.2d 578, 580 (S.D.1988).
[¶ 59.] This Court in Ondricek noted that sexual abuse cases are, by their very nature, characterized by larger gaps in time between incidents because the abuser may have to set up his opportunities to victimize children, and because it is likely that there are interim *622incidents perpetrated on children who were too frightened or ashamed to report.20 535 N.W.2d at 877. In Ondricek, prior bad acts 20 years prior were deemed not too remote. Id. See also State v. Werner, 482 N.W.2d 286, 289-90 (S.D.1992) (where charged sexual contact occurred from October 1987 to March 1990, testimony indicating prior sexual contact from 1962 to 1990 not too remote); Christopherson, 482 N.W.2d at 302 (testimony regarding molestation which occurred up to seventeen years before trial not too remote). To overturn Chamley’s conviction on such a basis as is advanced by the majority requires the overruling of the long accepted rule to the contrary as set forth in the above case law.21
[¶ 60.] In this instance, Chamley was sentenced to four years in the state penitentiary for his prior conviction.22 Any period of incarceration or court supervision for parole or probation may also affect the time between reported incidents. Moeller, 548 N.W.2d at 505 (Gilbertson, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part)23 (citing State v. Breazeale, 238 Kan. 714, 714 P.2d 1356 (1986)), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 846, 107 S.Ct. 164, 93 L.Ed.2d 102 (1986) (ten years’ time not found to be remote in light of fact defendant spent intervening years in prison); State v. Martin, 118 Idaho 334, 796 P.2d 1007, 1014 (1990) (period of ten and twelve years not found to be remote where defendant was incarcerated nearly the entire period). The reason for this rationale is obvious: it is difficult to molest children while incarcerated in prison. In holding that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the prior acts in large part on the issue of remoteness, the majority is unable to come forth with a single case from this jurisdiction which adopts this rationale. All reported cases cited above are to the contrary.
[¶ 61.] The rationale of the majority also fails to give any consideration to the nature of the crime and its perpetrator. Contrary to our case law, see Titus, supra, at p. 613, it simply lumps all crimes together and arrives at the totally unsupported conclusion that, “a prior bad act which took place a significant *623time in the past is unlikely to be probative of whether the defendant intended to commit the charged crime.” Such may possibly be said of a 20 year-old burglary. That perpetrator subsequently has the rational voluntary choice as to whether to repeat his criminal acts or abstain. A review of our reported cases shows that crimes of passion which result in homicides also carry low recidivism rates.
[¶ 62.] The same cannot be said of the compulsive behavior of perpetrators of child sexual abuse. The majority ignores the teachings of People in the Interest of J.J., 454 N.W.2d 317, 325 n. 7 (S.D.1990) wherein the J.J. Court concluded, “[i]n fact, several studies suggest that child molesters such as G. and B.C. are not curable and have a high recidivism rates [sic].”(citations omitted). See also Kansas v. Hendricks, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997)24; State v. Cragoe, 514 N.W.2d 396, 398 (S.D.1994) (“defendant is a pedophile whose prognosis for rehabilitation is poor to guarded at best”); State v. Ferguson, 519 N.W.2d 50, 52 (S.D.1994); Delano v. Petteys, 520 N.W.2d 606, 607 (S.D.1994). Chamley’s conviction for the rape of S.Y. as well as his prior oral sexual penetration of A.L. would render him as a perpetrator of criminal pedophilia as now defined by the South Dakota Legislature in SDCL 22-22-30.1.
[¶ 63.] Another factor in balancing probative versus prejudicial is factual similarity. See, Moeller, 548 N.W.2d at 475 (“In allowing bad acts evidence to prove ... specific intent, our cases have routinely focused on two important factors: (1) similar victims, and, (2) similar crimes. See State v. Christopherson, 482 N.W.2d 298, 301-02 (S.D.1992); Werner, 482 N.W.2d at 289-90; State v. Perkins, 444 N.W.2d 34, 38 (S.D.1989); State v. Titus, 426 N.W.2d 578, 580 (S.D.1988); Thomas, 381 N.W.2d at 236-37; State v. Roden, 380 N.W.2d 669 (S.D.1986); State v. Means, 363 N.W.2d 565, 568 (S.D.1985)”). The incidents in the instant ease are similar in that: 1) Chamley had an established and trusted relationship with a victim’s mother; 2) Chamley exposed himself; 3) the touching occurred when the mother was not present; 4) there was digital penetration; 5) the children were girls, between 8 and 9 years old; and, 6) Chamley fondled the breasts of the victims underneath their clothing. Additionally, it appears Chamley has a pattern of exposing himself and waiting to see if the victim(s) tells anyone before trying something bolder. Had the opportunity presented itself, and had not the mother of one of the children been running in and out of the tent (a factor that was not present in the prior sexual contacts), Chamley’s other behaviors of masturbating and oral sex may well have occurred. “[W]hile a purse snatcher can repeat his crime often and almost immediately, a child molester must get children in a situation where he can force his sexual desires upon them.” Christopherson, 482 N.W.2d at 302. Chamley seized an opportunity for gratification when it presented itself, and because he no longer had a live-in victim, the circumstances necessarily did not present the same opportunities as the incidents with his step-daughter; however, there were suffi*624cient similarities in the acts perpetrated for a judicial mind to find the prejudicial effect did not substantially outweigh the probative value.
[¶ 64.] Additionally, in this case, the 404(b) evidence was testimonial. We have always held that the trial court is in the best position to judge testimonial evidence, and this general rule applies also to 404(b) evidence arrived at through testimony. State v. Johnson, 316 N.W.2d 652, 654 (S.D.1982) (quoting United States v. Maestas, 554 F.2d 834, 836 (8th Cir.1977) (“In making that evaluation [probative versus prejudicial], we must give great deference to the [trial] judge, who saw and heard the evidence.”)
[¶ 65.] Another consideration in admission of 404(b) evidence is the availability of other evidence. White, 538 N.W.2d at 243. In the instant case, on the rape charge, there was no semen or other physical evidence to show the rape occurred. This heightens the probative value of the prior bad acts. Id. at 243; Werner, 482 N.W.2d at 290. See also United States v. Ingraham, 832 F.2d 229, 237 (1st Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009, 108 S.Ct. 1738, 100 L.Ed.2d 202 (1988).
[¶ 66.] There was substantial legitimate value in the 404(b) testimony to establish intent and to negate Chamley’s claims that he did not commit the charged acts. The prior abuse was not “some collateral matter admitted for the purpose of prejudice.” Ondricek, 535 N.W.2d at 877.
[¶ 67.] Did the trial court lack “a judicial mind” in view of the law and the facts of this case in arriving at its decision of admissibility? I would submit not. “Another jurist once defined abuse of discretion as shooting at a target. You did not need to hit the bulls-eye but did need to hit the target. I would submit herein the trial court hit the target.” Moeller, 548 N.W.2d at 506 (Gilbertson, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). The trial court properly admitted the 404(b) testimony.
[¶ 68.] 2. Did the trial court err in denying Chamley’s motion to introduce the McDonald’s evidence?
[¶ 69.] The majority has improperly substituted its judgment for that of the trial court in holding that the McDonald’s evidence is “demonstrably false” under State v. Sieler, 397 N.W.2d 89 (S.D.1986). In Sieler, we required that the trial court find a prior sexual abuse allegation is “demonstrably false” before we permit its use to cross-examine a victim for impeachment purposes. 397 N.W.2d at 92.
When using the “demonstrably false” standard, mere denial of the accusation is not enough, [State v.] Kringstad, [353 N.W.2d 302 (N.D.1984) ] supra. It is not enough if the complaints were arguably false, State v. Demos, 94 Wash.2d 733, 619 P.2d 968, 970 (1980). In some instances even a not guilty verdict on an asserted false charge may not be enough to make the prior accusations relevant, State v. Schwartzmiller, 107 Idaho 89, 685 P.2d 830, 833 (1984).
Id. at 92.
[¶ 70.] The majority states that “[t]he fact that the trial court refused to admit the McDonald’s evidence means that W.W.’s credibility was not, in the trial court’s view, sufficiently diminished by the testimony of Mrs. Pena and L.G. to warrant, its admission.” Supra, ¶ 27. Yet in the next breath, in total disregard of our well-established rule that we defer to the trial judge on testimonial evidence and from the pages of a cold appellate record, the majority makes its own judgment that the testimony of Mrs. Pena and L.G. was more credible than that of W.W. and S.Y. See Cowan v. Mervin Mewes, Inc., 1996 SD 40, ¶ 8, 546 N.W.2d 104, 109 (1996) (trial judge is in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony). The majority is clearly substituting its judgment for the trial court’s when it states: “There can be no doubt that the testimony of W.W. and S.Y. was directly contradicted by defense testimony by Mrs. Pena and L.G.” The trial court disagreed: “[A]s I ruled yesterday, there is nothing inconsistent, nor is there any contradiction in [W.W.]’s, Mrs. Pena’s25 or ... [L.G.] ’s testimony, that all three stories are consistent.”
[¶ 71.] The majority takes the next improper step in substituting its judgment for the *625trial court in making its own factual finding that the McDonald’s testimony of W.W. and S.Y. was demonstrably false. We review a trial court’s findings that a prior sex crime allegation was “demonstrably false” under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Blalock, 434 N.W.2d 55 (S.D.1988). “Abuse of discretion means discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against reason and evidence.” Priebe v. Priebe, 1996 SD 136, ¶ 9, 556 N.W.2d 78, 80 (1996). In this case, the majority appears to have substituted its judgment for the trial court under a de novo review of the McDonald’s evidence.26 It therefore supports its ultimate conclusion on a faulty legal foundation not once, but twice. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Chamley failed to prove the McDonald’s testimony was “demonstrably false,” the McDonald’s testimony was not admissible for the purpose of impeaching the victim. It is therefore not necessary to reach the question of whether Chamley would have been prejudiced by its admission.
[¶ 72.] 3. Was Chamley denied his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation?
[¶ 73.] At first blush, it would appear that Chamley was improperly denied his right to self-representation. Clearly, the trial court must recognize that a defendant has just as much right to represent himself as he does to hire or be provided a licensed attorney. State v. Raymond, 1997 SD 59, ¶ 8, 563 N.W.2d 823, 825 (1997). In order to deny a defendant the right to represent himself, there must be a showing that the defendant is not capable or did not make a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. Id. at ¶ 11, 563 N.W.2d at 825. “A defendant is presumed not to have waived his right to counsel unless he can demonstrate to the court that his waiver and request to represent himself is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” Id. at ¶ 9, 563 N.W.2d at 825, (citing Hamilton v. Groose, 28 F.3d 859, 861-2 (8th Cir.1994)).
[¶ 74.] In the instant ease, however, we must look to the defendant. Chamley is a defrocked attorney and is well acquainted with the legal system. In addition, he has a grudge against the system27 and against this Court in particular. See, In re Chamley, 349 N.W.2d 56 (S.D.1984) (at one point, Chamley tore up his state bar license and mailed pieces to various individuals, including the *626Chief Justice of this Court).28
[II75.] In addition, Chamley has played the other side of this Sixth Amendment issue ■with the Court before. In State v. Chamley, 310 N.W.2d 153 (S.D.1981), Chamley was charged with a misdemeanor assault, and the trial court granted Chamley’s request to represent himself. Following his conviction, Chamley appealed to this Court on the basis that the trial court failed to conduct an adequate on-the-record colloquy to determine if Chamley knowing, intelligently and voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. at 154. We held that he had. Id.
[¶ 76.] As pointed out by the State, in the case now before us, Chamley vacillated between representing himself and having court-appointed counsel. A defendant may not misuse the right to represent himself in order to delay or disrupt his trial. Hamilton, 28 F.3d at 862. The record shows this is precisely what Chamley did. The magistrate noted on the record that at Chamley’s bond hearing, Chamley first stated his court-appointed counsel was not his attorney, then stated she was, and stated again at the hearing she was not. At the preliminary hearing, which had already been continued once at Chamley’s request, Chamley initially stated he wanted his court-appointed attorney, and then dismissed her, stating, “I just decided that I would not allow the preliminary hearing to proceed, and if I had to dismiss her [his court appointed counsel], that’s what I’d have to do to get the proceedings stopped.”29 When asked at the preliminary hearing about the status of his representation, Chamley refused to respond, stating he wanted a hearing on a motion first.30 At trial, despite his earlier protestations that he wanted to represent himself, Chamley waived his right to be present during jury instructions and in fact was not present. The trial court apparently recognized Chamley’s cat-and-mouse game, stating that the court did not want subsequent hearings turned into a “circus or charade.” Not only did the trial court have the opportunity to see and listen to Chamley, it had its seventeen years of experience in dealing with a multitude of criminal defendants upon which to base its decision as to Cham-ley’s real motives.
[¶ 77.] Chamley’s request to represent himself not only was not “unequivocal,” it was intended to create delay and to cause confusion about his self-representation in an attempt to “set up” the trial court for purpose of appeal. This is a clear cut ease of “invited error.”
The doctrine of “invited error” embodies the principle that a party will not be heard to complain on appeal of errors which he himself induced or provoked the court or the opposite party to commit. It has been held that for the doctrine of invited error to apply it is sufficient that the party who on appeal complains of the error has contributed to it.
Taylor Realty Co. v. Haberling, 365 N.W.2d 870 (S.D.1985) (quoting 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 713). We should not permit a defendant to lie in the weeds waiting for an opportunity to ambush the trial court on appeal. Under the circumstances of this *627case, the trial court did not err in refusing to allow Chamley to represent himself.
CONCLUSION
[¶ 78.] Chamley was entitled to a fair trial. I would respectfully submit he got one.
[¶79.] The resolution of this case is as unfortunate as any case this writer has reviewed. We are not dealing with the abuse of money or land, but of the most vulnerable humans in our society, trusting children. Based on the majority decision, W.W. and S.Y., young girls who were found by the veteran trial judge to be credible and truthful and who the jury determined to be victims of sexual abuse, are now found by the majority to have given “demonstrably false” testimony, a/k/a they lied. They will now be put through the horror of a second trial. The majority will authorize W.W. and S.Y. to be forced to be cross-examined concerning previously properly forbidden territory by the very person who was found by the jury to have perpetrated the vicious acts upon them, the pro-se Chamley. Chamley has already attempted to intimidate them by trying to contact the girls personally while this case was pending and later after he was incarcerated, by telephone.
[¶80.] Beyond that, this decision seeks to overturn, or at best ignore, settled case law and strike out on new courses previously rejected by this Court.
[¶ 81.] I would affirm the trial court in all respects.
[¶ 82.] STEELE, C.J., joins this special writing.

. At trial, Chamley admitted that he gave the girls rides on his back and shoulders, which is when some of the sexual touching allegedly occurred.

. We would do well to heed the words of Justice Konenkamp cited in Stratmeyer v. Stratmeyer, 567 N.W.2d 220, 222-23 (S.D.1997) (conference):
Imagine being pricked on the arm with a pin. At first, such an intrusion would be disturbing, but with time might seem uneventful. Now imagine the pin carried a dreaded affliction, only discoverable after years of incubation. Such is often the nature of childhood sexual abuse. Many children only realize years later the true significance of the abuse they endured, especially in cases where the molestation occurred at the hands of family members or other trusted individuals. For some children, sexual violation is so traumatic it becomes psychologically self-concealing, if only to preserve sanity.

. The majority errs when it attempts to re-write the text of SDCL 19-12-5 (Fed.R.Evid. 404(b)) by adopting a ten-year consideration that is found in SDCL 19-14 — 13(Fed.R.Evid. 609(b)) but was specifically not included in the text of SDCL 19-12-5. The majority's premise that:
we can discern no reason why age of a prior bad act should warrant any less scrutiny [under SDCL 19-12-5] especially in light of the fact that a prior bad act concerns alleged conduct which someone believes may have occurred, whereas a prior conviction [under SDCL 19-14-12 & 13] involves conduct which has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt to have occurred. Supra at n. 5.
The majority misses the point of statutory construction. The evidentiary rules mean what they say and say what they mean. In addition such an approach as is now advocated by the majority is inconsistent with all of our previous case law in this area, such as Ondricek, Werner and Chris-topherson, supra.
If this were to come to pass, it would render the use of 404(b) evidence more ineffectual for purposes of prosecution of sexual offenders of children. Under SDCL 22-22-1.2, the minimum sentence for a rape of a child under age ten is ten years. The sentence for a second offense of sexual contact is also a minimum of ten years. Id. SDCL 22-22-30.1 sets a minimum sentence for criminal pedophilia at 25 years. Thus, under the rationale adopted by the majority, the more egregious the act, the greater protection from 404(b) application in subsequent prosecutions of sex offenders.

. Chamley had received a suspended sentence, but violated the terms of his release and was returned to the penitentiary to serve out the rest of his sentence.

. In Moeller, the Defendant challenged the admissibility of two prior sexual attacks which occurred in 1973 and 1979. While the majority determined that the prior acts were not properly admissible due to lack of probative value and the prejudice involved, the majority did not base its holding on any favorable determination of Moel-ler’s remoteness claim.

. In Hendricks the United States Supreme Court upheld a Kansas statute which authorized commitment of a pedophile after the pedophile had served his prison sentence for sex crimes as not violative of due process, double jeopardy or the ex post facto clause. In so doing, the Court relied upon the following statutory findings of the Kansas Legislature:
''[A] small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators exist who do not have a mental disease or defect that renders them appropriate for involuntary treatment pursuant to the [general involuntary civil commitment statute].... In contrast to persons appropriate for civil commitment under the [general involuntary civil commitment statute], sexually violent predators generally have antisocial personality features which are unamena-ble to existing mental illness treatment modali-
ties and those features render them likely to engage in sexually violent behavior. The legislature further finds that sexually violent predators' likelihood of engaging in repeat acts of predatory sexual violence is high. The existing involuntary commitment procedure ... is inadequate to address the risk these sexually violent predators pose to society. The legislature further finds that the prognosis for rehabilitating sexually violent predators in a prison setting is poor, the treatment needs of its population are very long term and the treatment modalities for this population are veiy different than the traditional treatment modalities for people appropriate for commitment under the [generally involuntary civil commitment statute].” Kan.Stat.Ann. § 59-29a01 (1994).
65 USLW at 4565.

. The record does not show the trial court erred. In testimony before this trial judge, Mrs. *625Pena admitted the only time she could account for Chamley’s whereabouts is during the brief moment that S.Y. approached her in the order line and identified Chamley. Mrs. Pena testified that when he was pointed out to her, Chamley immediately got up and went toward the exit, but she did not see him leave because the exit was out of her line of sight and her back was turned. At the time, Mrs. Pena and another teacher had been at the McDonald's for 10 to 15 minutes and were supervising 46 third-graders who were in various stages of ordering and eating lunch. S.Y. and W.W. had already received their food and were eating, seated behind a condiment stand that blocked Mrs. Pena's view of them. Mrs. Pena could not see the rest room from where she was standing. The trial court could find there was no conflict: Mrs. Pena admitted all the incidents complained of could have occurred without her seeing them.

. While the majority claims that the trial court "did not specifically rule on whether W.W.’s McDonald’s accusation was demonstrably false[.]” The trial transcript indicates otherwise:
Court: "Now you’re talking about an allegation of a prior accusation being demonstrably false, and what she did in McDonald’s purportedly rules [sic] was said before demonstrably false; is that right.... Okay. Having reviewed the case [Sieler, supra], I don't feel it's applicable. There is nothing here that would make the allegations demonstrably false.”

. At his bond reduction hearing, Chamley frequently interrupted and argued with the magistrate; said he didn't know why he bothered talking to the magistrate, because it was like talking to a "dead wall”; accused the magistrate of being prejudiced; and, asked the magistrate if he wanted Chamley to "beg" him for a bond reduction. When the magistrate threatened to have Chamley removed from the courtroom and have his court-appointed counsel finish the hearing, Chamley responded. “She’s not my counsel, and don’t you say she is my counsel and don’t you imply for a moment that you can charge me.”
At the preliminary hearing, he told the same magistrate: "if you proceed, I think it will be at your jeopardy, not at my jeopardy." At his trial, the prosecutors reported to the court that Cham-ley had commented loud enough for them to hear, "I'm facing life. You guys are facing death.” Chamley responded that he never meant it to threaten the prosecutor.

. None of the current members of this Court were on the Supreme Court bench at the time of the 1984 appeal.

. Once the court refused to continue the hearing, and stated the hearing would proceed with Chamley's counsel representing him, Chamley stated, "If that is the case, I demand she withdraw from the case and not represent me.” Chamley's request to represent himself can hardly be characterized as "unequivocal” when he thus places a condition on her removal. In addition, the court determined that Chamley was using his request to proceed pro se as a way of delaying the hearing and intimidating the young children who were the witnesses/victims. When given the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses himself, Chamley refused, at one point saying, "I’m not going to acknowledge this as a preliminary hearing in any way, your Honor.”

.The motion, which requested a new preliminary hearing, had not been filed, nor was it provided to the state. The trial court did not foreclose Chamley from representing himself at this stage, stating: "Mr. Chamley, here’s the way it stacks up. You can either represent yourself, you can hire your own attorney, or you're entitled to court-appointed counsel.” The court scheduled a hearing on Chamley's motion to be held within two weeks, but Chamley nonetheless demanded the issue be taken up immediately, stating it would solve the problem of his representation because the motion showed his attorney was incompetent.