Court Opinion

ID: 9404529
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-23 13:07:25.411893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:15.040185
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Terry, 2023-Ohio-2074.]

                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                  FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                       HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 STATE OF OHIO,                             :     APPEAL NO. C-220379
                                                  TRIAL NO. C-22CRB-11475
           Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                            :
     vs.
                                            :
 DONNELL TERRY,                                        O P I N I O N.

           Defendant-Appellant.             :

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: June 23, 2023

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Sean M. Donovan,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Krista Gieske, Assistant
Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BOCK, Judge.

       {¶1}    Defendant-appellant Donnell Terry challenges his conviction for

aggravated menacing, arguing that the evidence at his trial proved that he pointed a

gun at his daughter’s stepgrandfather in self-defense. We disagree and affirm the trial

court’s judgment.

                              I. Facts and Procedure

       {¶2}    Following a dispute with Derrick Jackson on Jackson’s porch, Terry

pointed a handgun at Jackson. Jackson is the stepgrandfather of Terry’s daughter. The

state charged Terry with aggravated menacing in violation of R.C. 2903.21, a first-

degree misdemeanor. Terry claimed that he was acting in self-defense.

       {¶3}    At the bench trial, the state’s case consisted of testimony from Jackson

and Officer Patrick Meyer. According to Jackson, Terry knew he was barred from

visiting Jackson’s house. Jackson recalled that on the morning of the incident, Terry

visited Jackson’s house and was “banging on [the] door [and] continuously ringing the

doorbell.” Terry left but returned to Jackson’s house later in the day. Terry was on the

porch when Jackson opened the door and “told [Terry] to back up and he needed to

leave my property.” According to Jackson, Terry replied, “make me,” before he took

one step back and pointed a handgun at Jackson. Jackson recalled fearing that Terry

would shoot him. As Terry continued to yell, Jackson closed the door and his wife

called the police.

       {¶4}    Officer Meyer responded to the call and spoke with Jackson before

signing warrants for Terry’s arrest. Terry eventually turned himself in and admitted

going to Jackson’s house. Officer Meyer testified that Terry had explained to him that

Jackson was preventing Terry from seeing his daughter and “they got in[to] an

altercation and he just ended up pointing the gun on him.”
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶5}   Terry testified in his defense and presented a different version of events.

Terry recalled having a friend drive him to Jackson’s house to see Terry’s daughter.

According to Terry, he was speaking with his girlfriend, who is Jackson’s stepdaughter,

before she went into Jackson’s house. Terry “knocked on the door to try to get her to

come back outside” when Jackson appeared at the door. Terry testified that he was on

the phone with his friend when Jackson appeared and overheard Terry tell his friend

to “pull up,” which Terry believed Jackson misconstrued as a threat. At this point,

Jackson “got in [Terry’s] face” and the two started arguing. According to Terry, he

recently had surgery to remove a metal rod from his leg. This fact was significant

because Terry testified that Jackson pushed Terry off the porch. Terry feared for his

life and aimed his gun at Jackson.

       {¶6}   The trial court found Terry guilty of aggravated menacing and that Terry

“was not acting in self-defense” and the “[u]se of a deadly weapon was – there’s no

evidence to support that theory.” Specifically, the trial court found that Terry’s “own

statement to police” undercut his alleged fear for his life. The court found that, while

Jackson pushed Terry off Jackson’s porch, there was “no evidence, whatsoever, to

support the contention that defendant reasonably feared for his life.” Further, the

court found Terry at fault for creating the situation because he was on Jackson’s

property, “was told to leave, and refused to do so.”

       {¶7}   The court sentenced Terry to a 180-day term of incarceration and

credited him with one day served. Terry appeals his conviction and raises a single

assignment of error.

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                       OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                                    II. Law and Analysis

        {¶8}     Terry maintains that the manifest weight of the evidence at trial proved

that he used deadly force in self-defense.1 The parties agree that a manifest-weight

argument tests the greater amount of credible evidence offered at trial. State v.

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). In a manifest-weight

challenge, we “ ‘consider[] the credibility of witnesses and determine[] whether in

resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created

such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new

trial ordered.’ ” Id., quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717

(1st Dist.1983).

        {¶9}     To succeed on a self-defense claim involving the use of deadly force, a

defendant must show “(1) the defendant was not at fault in creating the situation giving

rise to the affray; (2) the defendant had a bona fide belief that [he] was in imminent

danger of death or great bodily harm and that [his] only means of escape from such a

danger was in the use of such force; and (3) the defendant did not violate any duty to

retreat or avoid the danger.” State v. Smith, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190507, 2020-

Ohio-4976, ¶ 48, citing State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 24, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002).

Failing to establish “ ‘any one of these elements’ ” is fatal to a self-defense claim.

(Emphasis in original). State v. Williford, 49 Ohio St.3d 247, 249, 551 N.E.2d 1279

(1990), quoting State v. Jackson, 22 Ohio St.3d 281, 284, 490 N.E.2d 893 (1986); see

1The trial court and both parties on appeal analyze Terry’s self-defense claim under the test for self-
defense in cases involving the use of deadly force. It is clear that shooting a firearm at a person
constitutes deadly force. See State v. Neal, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210166, 2022-Ohio-1290, ¶ 21;
see also State v. Barker, 2022-Ohio-3756, 199 N.E.3d 626, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.); State v. Sarge, 5th Dist.
Knox No. 21CA000014, 2021-Ohio-4379, ¶ 29; State v. Warren, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29455,
2020-Ohio-6990, ¶ 22. But it is less clear whether brandishing or pointing a firearm at another
person constitutes deadly force. See R.C. 2901.01(A)(2). Because the parties have not briefed this
issue, we assume for the sake of argument that aiming a firearm at Jackson constituted deadly force.
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Smith at ¶ 48. In other words, when the evidence at trial tends to support a self-defense

claim, the state must disprove at least one element beyond a reasonable doubt. State

v. Gibson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220283, 2023-Ohio-1640, ¶ 10, quoting Smith at

¶ 49, citing R.C. 2901.05(B)(1). Often, self-defense claims turn on issues of credibility.

State v. Walker, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109328, 2021-Ohio-2037, ¶ 13. On appeal,

Terry’s arguments focus on the fault and fear elements of his self-defense claim.

       {¶10} Beginning with the fear element, the evidence must show an honest,

subjective belief of imminent danger of great bodily harm, and that the fear was

objectively reasonable. Smith at ¶ 56, citing State v. Williams, 9th Dist. Summit No.

29444, 2020-Ohio-3269, ¶ 29, citing State v. Thomas, 77 Ohio St.3d 323, 326, 673

N.E.2d 1339 (1997). This element is both subjective and objective. Id. Put differently,

“a defendant’s belief must be objectively reasonable under the circumstances and that

belief must be honestly held by the defendant.” Id., citing Williams at ¶ 29, citing

Thomas at 331.

       {¶11} A subjective belief of imminent danger means that “ ‘ “a defendant must

demonstrate that he acted out of fear, or he felt that his life was threatened.” ’ ” State

v. Blair, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28904, 2021-Ohio-3370, ¶ 11, quoting State v.

Brown, 2017-Ohio-7424, 96 N.E.3d 1128, ¶ 24 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Crawford,

2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22314, 2008-Ohio-4008, ¶ 26.

       {¶12} Terry argues that his testimony established that he held a subjective fear

of imminent danger of great bodily harm. The trial court found that Terry’s statement

to police that he pointed the gun at Jackson because “he wanted to see the child and

he wasn’t allowed to be over there, he got angry about it” undercut his argument that

he had a subjective belief of imminent danger.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶13} Terry testified that he was recovering from leg surgery at the time, and

that fact, combined with Jackson’s shove, created a subjective fear of bodily harm.

Terry recalled that after Jackson’s shove, he “flew” and “was unstable” and “felt fear

for my life, so I pulled my gun out on him.” But we cannot ignore the evidence in the

record that undermines the existence of a subjective fear of bodily harm. First, there

is conflicting evidence that Jackson even pushed Terry. Jackson testified that Terry

stepped back before Terry pointed his gun at Jackson. And Officer Meyer testified that

Terry failed to mention that Jackson had pushed him before Terry drew his gun.

Second, there is evidence that Terry acted out of anger, not fear. Officer Meyer testified

that Terry explained that he pointed a gun at Jackson because “he wanted to see the

child and he wasn’t allowed to be over there, he got angry about it.” In the end, Terry’s

subjective belief of imminent danger hinges on which accounts are more credible.

       {¶14} A manifest-weight review requires this court to consider the witnesses’

credibility. Williams, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29444, 2020-Ohio-3269, at ¶ 32. But the

trial court was “in the best position to take into account the inconsistencies in the

evidence, as well as the demeanor and manner of the witnesses, and to determine

which witnesses are more credible.” State v. Zafar, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-255,

2020-Ohio-3341, ¶ 51, quoting State v. Favor, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-215,

2008-Ohio-5371, ¶ 10. Terry’s testimony was incongruous with both Jackson’s and

Meyer’s, which undermines his credibility as a witness. Plus, there is evidence that

Terry pointed the gun at Jackson out of anger, not fear. It follows that the trial court’s

determination regarding Terry’s subjective fear was not against the manifest weight of

the evidence.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶15} Even if we were to find that Terry held an honest belief of imminent

danger, he has not demonstrated that his alleged belief was reasonable under the

circumstances. The trial court found that there was no evidence that the only means

of escape for Terry was the use of such force. Indeed, the use of deadly force in self-

defense must be reasonably proportionate—self-defense “ ‘is not available unless the

defendant shows that the force used to repel the danger was not more than the

situation reasonably demanded.’ ” State v. Johnson, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-08-1325,

2009-Ohio-3500, ¶ 12. Thus, Terry’s use of a gun must have been reasonably

necessary to repel Jackson’s attack. State v. Reyes-Figueroa, 2020-Ohio-4460, 158

N.E.3d 939, ¶ 27 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Hendrickson, 4th Dist. Athens No.

08CA12, 2009-Ohio-4416, ¶ 23, citing Williford, 49 Ohio St.3d at 249, 551 N.E.2d

1279. When defendant’s force “ ‘is so disproportionate that it shows an “unreasonable

purpose to injure,” the defense of self-defense is unavailable.’ ” State v. Waller, 4th

Dist. Scioto Nos. 15CA3683 and 15CA3684, 2016-Ohio-3077, ¶ 26, quoting State v.

Macklin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94482, 2011-Ohio-87, ¶ 27, quoting State v.

Speakman, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 00CA035, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1489 (Mar. 27,

2001). The trial court found that Jackson had told Terry to leave and, if Terry’s

testimony is believed, shoved him off Jackson’s porch. These facts do not give rise to

an objectively reasonable fear that great bodily harm was imminent. Instead, it shows

that Jackson wanted Terry off his property. It is objectively unreasonable to conclude

that being driven off a porch constitutes imminent danger of great bodily harm. Terry’s

use of a gun was disproportionate to what the situation reasonably demanded and

cannot be justified through a claim of self-defense.

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                      OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶16} Because the state needs to disprove only one element to refute a claim

of self-defense, Terry’s fault arguments are moot. See Gibson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No.

C-220283, 2023-Ohio-1640, at ¶ 15. Ultimately, we cannot say that the trial court’s

rejection of Terry’s self-defense claim created a manifest miscarriage of justice

requiring a reversal of Terry’s conviction. We overrule the single assignment of error.

                                     III. Conclusion

       {¶17} We overrule Terry’s sole assignment of error and affirm his conviction.

                                                                      Judgment affirmed.

BERGERON, P.J., and WINKLER, J., concur.

Please note:

               The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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