Court Opinion

ID: 9471441
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:32:44.494076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:24.880585
License: Public Domain

GARZA, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. Unlike my brothers of the majority, I refuse to impose my views of what the evidence showed which is opposed to the views of the jury that convicted appellant Turner; the Criminal Court of Appeals of the State of Texas which sustained his conviction, the United States Magistrate and the United States District Judge below. I quote from the unpublished opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Texas by which they affirmed Turner’s conviction in Cause No. 55,349, Harvey Wayne Turner, appellant v. State of Texas, appellee, [unpublished].
After setting out the evidence that was before the jury, the Court of Criminal Appeals of the State of Texas said:
Our review of the evidence must be in the light most favorable to the prosecution. In a circumstantial case that evidence must exclude every reasonable hypothesis except the guilt of the appellant. Easley v. State, 564 S.W,2d 742 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Suff v. State, 531 S.W.2d 814 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). However, all the facts of the case need not directly and independently point to the guilt of appellant; the evidence is' sufficient if the cumulative force of all incriminating circumstances warrants a conclusion of guilt. Easley v. State, supra; Stogsdill v. State, 552 S.W.2d 481 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).
The State’s brief relies upon several specific facts which tie appellant to the crime. These facts concerning appellant include: presence with Crow and Carr, presence at the scene of the crime, left crime scene with Crow and without Carr, separated from Crow the day after the crime and then met him again, left Texas in flight for Colorado shortly after crime, was arrested in same car that he used the night of the murder, and possession of Carr’s property.
As in Easley v. State, supra, each of the facts separately do not directly and independently point to the guilt of appellant. However, taken as a whole, the facts led to only one probable conclusion —appellant’s guilt, at least as a party, in the murder of Carr. Ex parte Prior, 540 S.W.2d 723 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), held that in determining if an accused is a party to the crime, the courts may look to the events before, during and after the commission of the offense. The evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.
Closely related to this claim of insufficiency of the evidence, appellant contends that the State failed to disprove the exculpatory portion of his statement. When the State relies upon a confession to connect a defendant to a crime, they are required to disprove any exculpatory portions of the statement that they introduce. Grady v. State, 466 S.W.2d 770 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Wormley v. State, 366 S.W.2d 565 (Tex.Cr.App.1963). This rule applies only to a statement which constitutes an admission of the crime charged plus an assertion which exculpates the accused. Richards v. State, 511 S.W.2d 5 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Simon v. State, 488 S.W.2d 439 (Tex.Cr.App.1972).
Appellant’s statement does not admit participation in the murder. In it, appellant does not even acknowledge that a murder was committed. Since there was no admission, the State was not bound to disprove that part of appellant’s statement which he introduced.
Complaint is next made concerning the court’s charge to the jury on the law of parties. Turner contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction as a party and that, since there was no evidence to indicate he was a party, the State was not entitled to a charge on the law of parties.
*1005The evidence indicated that either Crow or appellant actually killed Carr. Under these circumstances the State was entitled to have the case submitted with a charge on the law of parties and the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction.
The record before us indicates that the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the decedent Carr was killed either by Crow or Turner. The record also indicates that by the time Turner gave his statement Crow was already dead. The car in which Turner, Crow and decedent Carr were riding in on November the 7th when Crow and Turner left Carr (the Kid) in the old abandoned shack, was in the possession of Turner when he was apprehended. Even though the car belonged to Crow, Turner would have us believe that he and Crow got into an argument and he made Crow get out of his own car.
If we are speculating, as my brethren do, of what inferences can be raised by the evidence in this case, I would imagine that one could infer that Turner not only killed Carr but he also disposed of the witness against him, Crow.
Throughout its opinion the majority recites inferences that could be drawn from the evidence which are not conducive to the finding of Turner guilty of murder either committed by himself or as a party to the murder if Crow in fact committed the murder. I agree with the state when it states in its brief that:
Among the logical inferences that may be drawn are that Petitioner had an opportunity to commit the murder, a motive— robbery — for the murder, a murder was committed either by Petitioner or by Crow with Petitioner’s aid or acquiescence, and Petitioner was conscious of wrongdoing. To the extent that conflicting inferences of the farfetched type Petitioner urges may be drawn, this Court must presume the jury ‘resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.’ Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
Thus, where conflicting inferences may be drawn by the jury from the evidence before them we must presume that they found those inferences which were in favor of the prosecution.
When the Jackson standard is applied to the facts of the instant case it is evident to me that any rational trier of fact could find petitioner guilty as a party to murder beyond a reasonable doubt. I note again that the state trial judge and the jury, the judges of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the United States Magistrate and United States District Judge have all found the evidence sufficient to sustain Turner’s conviction. The Court of Criminal Appeals decision carefully discussed the issue of sufficiency and ruled against Turner’s claims. Although not conclusive, this result is “entitled to great weight.” Jackson v. Virginia, 448 U.S. at 310, 99 S.Ct. at 2791, 61 L.Ed.2d at 576. See also French v. Estelle, 692 F.2d 1021, 1024 (“state court is entitled to our deference”).
Putting myself in the shoes of the trier of fact, the jury in this case, like all the other courts that have passed on this question, I would not say that the evidence was insufficient to sustain Turner’s conviction.