Court Opinion

ID: 9796315
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:55:04.920925+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:49:56.487184
License: Public Domain

NUSS, J.,
dissenting: I respectfully dissent. More particularly, I disagree with the majority’s dilution of the constitutional standard articulated in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333, 100 S. Ct. 1708 (1980), and restated in Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 152 L. Ed. 2d 291, 122 S. Ct. 1237 (2002), under the guise of “Kansas good cause” for withdrawing a plea.
*516In my view, we should allow Aguilar to make her own decisions. She has decided to file a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under K.S.A. 22-32I0(d). She acknowledges that because she chose to file her motion before sentencing, the statute requires that she demonstrate good cause. She has chosen to establish the requisite good cause by emphasizing what the majority has identified as the “first Edgar factor”: whether the defendant was represented by competent counsel. 290 Kan. at 511; see State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 30, 36, 127 P.3d 986 (2006).
The majority concedes that Aguilar emphasized the incompetency of her counsel and, more specifically, that she focused on her counsel’s purported conflict of interest arising out of his concurrent representation of Aguilar’s codefendant. Indeed, the majority concludes: “At the hearing on her motion to withdraw plea, there should have been no doubt whatsoever as to the main issue to be addressed: the conflict of interest between the codefendants in a constructive drug possession case and whether it warranted withdrawal of Aguilar’s guilty plea for good cause shown.” 290 Kan. at 515. As a result, the majority devotes virtually all of its analysis to the conflict of interest claim.
The majority also correctly recites the applicable standard: ineffective assistance of counsel based upon conflict of interest requires the defendant to show that the conflict actually affected the adequacy of the representation. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. at 172-73; see also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 348-49. The majority further correctly indicates that this is a “softened,” or lesser, standard than the one necessary for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel purely because of performance. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). The latter standard requires showing that counsel’s performance was deficient. More important, it also requires showing that the deficient performance “prejudiced” the defense, i.e., that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
To this point, I am in agreement with the majority. I leave its company, however, when as a matter of law it refuses to require Aguilar to meet the specific standard articulated in Mickens, which *517she and the State admit she must meet. The majority simply declares that “[i]t is neither logical nor fair to equate the lesser K.S.A. 22-3210(d) good cause standard governing a presentence plea withdrawal motion to the high constitutional burden [of Mickens].” 290 Kan. at 513. Apparently, “good cause” can mean that falling short of Mickens’ standards is nevertheless “good enough.”
One obvious problem with diluting a constitutional standard is determining just how close one must get to it in order to be good enough. Unfortunately, the majority provides us no guidelines for filling the void created by its removal of the Mickens standards. Moreover, when the United States Supreme Court first applied a constitutional standard to a defendant’s request to withdraw a guilty plea based upon ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court warned that approving new grounds for setting aside guilty pleas represents “inroads on the concept of finality [which] undermines confidence in the integrity of our procedures.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203, 106 S. Ct. 366 (1985).
This particular issue — the appropriate standard for addressing a presentence plea withdrawal motion based upon ineffective assistance of counsel due to conflict of interest through concurrent representation- — apparently has not yet arisen in Kansas appellate courts. However, a closely related issue has arisen: the appropriate standard for a presentence plea withdrawal based upon ineffective assistance of counsel due to conflict of interest but not because of concurrent representation. According to the majority, the constitutional standard articulated in Mickens, e.g., a conflict actually affecting the adequacy of the representation, is somewhat in tension with Kansas’ statutoiy standard of “good cause.” As a result, under the majority’s reasoning, these particular Kansas cases necessarily should also be analyzed under a similarly diluted “close enough to Mickens” standard. But they were not. Eveiy defendant was required to meet Mickens.
In State v. Whidden, the Court of Appeals clearly applied the Mickens test to a presentence challenge to a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel due to personal conflict of interest. 2009 WL 1312568, at *3 (Kan. App. 2009) (unpublished opinion). In State v. Adams, this court apparently applied Mickens to the *518claim of ineffective assistance of counsel due to conflict of interest because of successive representation. 284 Kan. 109, 118-125, 158 P.3d 977 (2007). Specifically, in holding that nothing in the record indicated that counsel’s previous representation of a complaining witness “adversely affected” her performance in defending Adams, the court first cited State v. Gleason, 277 Kan. 624, 88 P.3d 218 (2004), an opinion in which we expressly applied the Mickens standard. Adams, 284 Kan. at 125 (citing Gleason, 277 Kan. at 649-52). As a result, the court concluded that Adams had not shown a conflict of interest that required setting aside his presentence nolo contendere plea. 284 Kan. at 125.
Another closely related issue has often arisen in Kansas appellate courts: the appropriate standard for a presentence plea withdrawal motion based upon ineffective assistance of counsel due purely to performance. According to the majority, the constitutional standards articulated in Strickland, e.g., deficient performance resulting in actual prejudice to defendant, would be somewhat in conflict with Kansas’ statutory standard of “good cause." As a result, under the majority’s rationale, these particular cases necessarily should also be analyzed under a similarly diluted “close enough to Strickland” standard. But they were not. Every defendant was required to meet Strickland. See, e.g., State v. White, 289 Kan. 279, 285, 211 P.3d 805 (2009); State v. Adams, 284 Kan. 109, 124, 158 P.3d 977 (2007) (in addition to apparently applying Mickens to claim of ineffective assistance of counsel due to conflict of interest, clearly applied Strickland test to defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon performance); State v. Sanchez-Cazares, 276 Kan. 451, 457, 78 P.3d 55 (2003) (applying the Strickland test to a presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea based upon ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Solomon, 257 Kan. 212, 223, 891 P.2d 407 (1995) (same); State v. Lewis, 27 Kan. App. 2d 134, 138, 998 P.2d 1141 (2000) (same); State v. Dunmore, 2010 WL 445699, at *3 (Kan. App. 2010) (unpublished opinion) (same); State v. Burrous, 2007 WL 4374021, at *1 (Kan. App. 2007) (unpublished opinion) (same); State v. Ortega, 2007 WL 2080407, at *3 (Kan. App. 2007) (unpublished opinion) (same); State v. Clark, 2006 WL 2440007, at *3 (Kan. App. 2006) (unpublished opinion) *519(same); State v. Sosa, 2006 WL 1976590, at *3 (Kan. App. 2006) (unpublished opinion) (same).
In short, the majority’s dilution of the Mickens standard directly contradicts the longstanding practice of Kansas appellate courts of applying constitutional standards to resolve Sixth Amendment-based presentence motions to withdraw pleas. This dilution also conflicts with the practice, and case law, of many federal courts.
While the particular issue in the instant case has not yet arisen in Kansas, it has occurred in the federal courts. The case of United States v. Verducci, 384 F. Supp. 2d 495 (D. Mass. 2005), is on point. The Verducci defendant argued that the conflict created by his attorney’s concurrent representation of himself and another was a basis for allowing withdrawal of his guilty plea before sentencing. The court addressed Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d). Similar to the presentencing good cause requirement of K.S.A. 22-3210(d), under the federal rule a defendant may withdraw a plea of guilty before sentence is imposed where “the defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” 384 F. Supp. 2d at 498; Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d); see also State v. Dillon, 242 Kan. 410, 413, 748 P.2d 856 (1988) (noting similarities between 22-3210 and Rule 11). Under Rule 11(e), a guilty plea may be withdrawn after sentencing only on direct appeal or collateral attack.
The Verducci court did not dilute the Mickens standard in its search for “fair and just” reasons permitting presentence withdrawal of the plea. Rather, the court essentially applied the Mick-ens standard, holding that defendant had failed to show the concurrent representation placed him in a more disadvantageous position than he would have occupied had his attorney not represented the other at all. 384 F. Supp. 2d at 499-500. Indeed, it quoted Mickens, stating: “ ‘[Bjefore this court can presume prejudice to the defendant, he must first demonstrate that ‘the conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation.’ ” 384 Supp. 2d at 500 n.2 (citing Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171).
Similarly, in United States v. Cruz-Camacho, the district court addressed defendant’s presentence motion under Rule 11 to withdraw his plea due to ineffective assistance of counsel based upon *520conflict of interest for concurrent representation of defendant and a potential prosecution witness. 682 F. Supp. 2d 193 (D.P.R. 2010). The court did not dilute any constitutional standards but expressly applied Cuyler v. Sullivan and denied the motion. It held that the defendant failed to show that any conflict actually affected his counsel’s representation, i.e., no fair and just reasons were established.
The case of United States v. Berkeley, 515 F. Supp. 2d 159,162-65 (D.D.C. 2007), aff'd 567 F.3d 703 (D.C. Cir. 2009), is of particular importance. It not only clearly provides the rationale and standards used by the district court — like Verducci and Cruz-Camacho — but also the rationale and standards of the appellate court. There, the district court rejected defendant’s presentence motion under Rule 11 to withdraw his plea due to ineffective assistance of counsel based upon conflict of interest after applying the Cuyler test. 515 F. Supp. 2d at 162-65. It also denied that part of the motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based upon pure performance after applying the Strickland test. 515 F. Supp. 2d at 162-65. The district court held that because defendant failed to meet these constitutional standards, no “fair and just reason” was established to warrant withdrawal of the plea. 515 F. Supp. 2d at 162-65. After applying the two different constitutional standards to the different bases for the motion, the circuit court of appeals affirmed. United States v. Berkeley, 567 F.3d 703, 708-10 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
Berkeley represents the typical approach of the federal circuit courts. They generally require the defendant to meet constitutional standards when they review on direct appeal a district court’s denial of a Sixth Amendment-based presentence motion to withdraw plea. Specifically, they consider whether the Strickland, Cuyler, Mick-ens, or other constitutional standards are met. See, e.g., United States v. Wallace, 276 F.3d 360, 366-67 (7th Cir. 2002) (presentence motion to withdraw plea due to ineffective assistance of counsel based upon conflict of interest was denied by district court and affirmed by the appellate court because defendant had not met the Cuyler standards and therefore had no “fair and just reason” for withdrawal); United States v. Taylor, 139 F.3d 924, 930 (D.C. Cir. *5211998) (Presentence motion to withdraw plea due to ineffective assistance of counsel based upon conflict of interest was denied by district court. Applying Cuyler in its consideration of “fair and just cause” for withdrawal, appellate court remanded for evidentiary hearing to determine if conflict of interest adversely affected performance.); United States v. Fuller, 312 F.3d 287, 291 (7th Cir. 2002) (Presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea due to ineffective assistance of counsel based upon conflict of interest was denied by district court. Appellate court affirmed denial because the defendant could not meet the requirements of Mickens.); United States v. Bailey, 49 Fed. Appx. 755, 756 (9th Cir. 2002) (Presentence motion to withdraw plea due to ineffective assistance of counsel based upon conflict of interest was denied by district court and affirmed by appellate court. Defendant did not meet the Cuyler and Mickens standards and therefore had no “fair and just reason” for withdrawal.); cf. United States v. Davis, 48 Fed. Appx. 809, 811 (2d Cir. 2002).
While some of these appellate decisions in the preceding paragraph do not clearly disclose the exact standards used by the district court, the following cases reveal the constitutional standards utilized by other district courts when reviewing presentence motions to withdraw plea for ineffective assistance of counsel, including for conflict of interest. See United States v. Tolson, 372 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12-14 (D.D.C. 2005) (addressing defendant’s presentence motion under Rule 11 to withdraw plea due to ineffective assistance of counsel based upon conflict of interest using Cuyler test and ineffective assistance of counsel based upon performance using Strickland test); United States v. Berger, 188 F. Supp. 2d 307, 333-35 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (same); United States v. Rivera, 1992 WL 135231, at *8-9 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (unpublished opinion) (same).
Finally, I point to United States v. Graham, 2009 WL 902394 (D. Kan. 2009) (unpublished opinion). There, defendant sought to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing primarily on the basis of the “fifth factor” that courts in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals consider when determining whether “fair and just reason” for withdrawal exists: whether close assistance of counsel was available to the defendant. 2009 WL 902394, at *3. Like the Kansas *522appellate courts mentioned earlier that examined Edgars similar “competence of counsel” factor and applied constitutional standards, the federal court applied Stnckland. The court held that the Strickland standards had not been met and therefore denied the motion. 2009 WL 902394, at *3, *5.
In conclusion, I would follow the guidance, and practice, of Kansas appellate courts. For those defendants filing presentence motions to withdraw their pleas under K.S.A. 22-3210(d) that allege ineffective assistance of counsel due to conflict of interest through concurrent representation, I would require them to meet constitutional standards before concluding they had established “good cause” for withdrawal. This continuation is consistent with the approach of federal courts which operate under a similar requirement, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d), for addressing presentence motions to withdraw pleas. In my view, applying anything less than “full strength” constitutional standards to a defendant’s Constitution-based arguments creates problems.
MCFARLAND, C.J., and LIJCKERT, J., join in the foregoing dissent.