Court Opinion

ID: 9734414
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:34:13.320922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:10.060633
License: Public Domain

AISO, J.
I concur in the opinion of my brother Justice Stephens reversing the judgment below, except for his view that once a defendant in custody has asked for an attorney, the police under no circumstances whatsoever can resume interrogation despite a defendant’s change of mind. In this respect, I concur with my brother Justice Reppy’s concurring opinion, except for the portion which attributes ingenuousness to this contemporary 20-year-old, especially one who represents himself to be 22 years old when convenient for his own illegal purposes.
REPPY, J.
In concurring in reversal, I wish to add some particular observations. Although Miranda1 says that if an arrestee “indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning” (pp. 444-445), it is not clear that this rules, out any reconsideration at all by the arrestee of his own feelings and desires in light of an intervening circumstance no matter what it might be, and. even if it might be the receipt of information from law enforcement of a necessary lapse of considerable time, 15 hours in the instant case, before an attorney can be present to assist him. The concern in Miranda is that there be no improper influence impelling the arrestee to make a statement involuntarily. (P. 461.) It is not felt that in every circumstance inability to *884arrange for requested counsel in a given time is such an improper influence; that it can never be accepted as a basis for retraction of an initial request to have counsel present at a proposed interrogation and for a waiver of the right.2
There are circumstances in the instant case which indicate that the purported delay factor should never have been considered as a valid premise for such a retraction and waiver; that the delay was not inevitable. Alternatively, if it is to be considered that the delay was unavoidable, it is believed that there were coercive elements additional'to the in-custody setting and the substantial delay before the public defender could be present.3
With respect to the first point, it is felt that the police lieutenant did not have all the information he should have •had to guide him in making a decision as to whether he would pursue, and that for this and probably other reasons, he did not adequately and reasonably pursue avenues which would have led to' the securing' of counsel for defendant within a fairly short time.
Defendant was arrested on a Monday at his residence. He was then 20 years old.4 At that time" Sergeant Alexander told his mother that he was in very serious trouble and that she had better get him an attorney. Sergeant Alexander brought defendant to Lieutenant Barclay after defendant had indicated that he wanted an attorney5 at the interrogation which *885the sergeant desired to carry out. The lieutenant asked defendant if he had a private attorney. Defendant replied that he did not have one in mind. His reply did not rule out the fact that his family or close friends would have had reasonably prompt access to a lawyer. Defendant said that his mother might get him one. The lieutenant did not ask defendant if he had access to funds. Defendant had stated that he did not think his mother had funds right now. This remark hardly closed the subject; rather it invited further inquiry. If such an inquiry had been made it would have revealed that defendant was the beneficiary of $2,500 from his deceased father’s estate of which his mother had charge. Most attorneys would have been satisfied to rely on this source of funds and would have been willing to attend an interrogation session in this type of case without a substantial advance retainer or any at all. Lieutenant Barclay did not consider and did not ask defendant his age. If he had heard defendant’s version of his age, he should have been and, no doubt, would have been more concerned about making contact with a private attorney through the mother. The record is silent as to whether Sergeant Alexander advised Lieutenant Barclay of his warning to defendant’s mother that she should get an attorney for 6 If the lieutenant had this information, he might well have, and, of course, should have taken a different approach about contacting defendant’s mother. He could have anticipated that she had been malting efforts to get a lawyer.7 If he acted without this knowledge, it is no excuse because the sergeant’s knowledge is imputable to the police as an entity. As it was, Lieutenant Barclay (although he knew defendant desired an attorney)8 did not call defendant’s mother, nor have Sergeant Alexander call her (which would have been logical because he was the one who had become acquainted with and issued the warning to her) and advise her that he needed the legal services he had recommended right now. He did not indicate to defendant that he (defendant) could call her. He did not even advise defendant that he had the right to make a phone call.9 Lieutenant Barclay testified that it had *886been Ms intention to call a private attorney if defendant had one in mind. He should have carried out his intention to the extent of eallmg or having the sergeant call defendant’s mother.
Assuming, arguendo, that it was not unreasonable for the lieutenant to conclude that defendant was indigent and that the only telephone call to be made was to the public defender’s office, it is noted that the time when Lieutenant Barclay presumably concluded that no call was to be made to bring about contact with private counsel was 5 p.m., or just a few minutes thereafter. There was introduced into evidence a bulletin from the chief of police saymg that the services of the public defender were available between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., and giving the telephone numbers to call during those hours and the names and extension numbers of three deputies, including the chief deputy. Smce calls could be made up to 5.p.m., it is reasonable to conclude that under unusual circumstances the office would send out personnel after that hour. Despite the fact that it was just at or only a few minutes after the terminal hour, Lieutenant Barclay did not call the public defender. Reasonable consideration of the constitutional rights of defendant suggests that such a call should have been made. The lieutenant too readily accepted the nonavailability of the public defender as inevitable. This purported impossibility of obtaining the public defender until the next day should not have been put to defendant at the time and in the manner it was. With the time just at or only fractionally over the authorized limit, the police could not rationally ignore the request for a public defender.10
Enabling a defendant to obtain a lawyer when he requests one must be considered one of the procedural safeguards to secure the privilege against self-incrimination, the use of which must be demonstrated by the prosecution to make statements stemming from custodial interrogation admissible. (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, p. 444.) The showing of the People in the instant case felí short of such demonstration. “[A] heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant- knowingly and intelligently [and freely] waived *887his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to . . . counsel ['citations].” (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, p. 475.) The burden no doubt should be heavier where the right to counsel has been claimed once. The People did not meet their burden of showing that the purported retraction and waiver by defendant in this case was freely made in light of the fact that they were prompted by a factor which should have been avoided. Had either a private attorney or the public defender been contacted, it is probable that the wait would have been less than an hour (not much more at the most), which is far different from the 15 hours which defendant felt he had to wait. Defendant’s decision to retract his request and to be interrogated without an attorney cannot be said to have been an informed change of mind.
In connection with the alternative point, firstly attention is called to the circumstance that the officers were dealing with a 20-year-old man who was not so alert and sophisticated as to post-arrest procedures and constitutional rights but that he failed initially to comprehend what was meant by giving up his rights.11 Secondly it is noted that there was no rebuttal contradiction12 by the officers of defendant’s testimony (as there promptly was as to other parts of it) that when he was advised that an attorney from the public defender’s office could not be present until 8 a.m. the next morning, he asked, “What else can I do?” and was advised, “Well, you know, you can help us out and make it easy on yourself. ’ ’ This, if a fact, was an additional coercive factor of the kind frequently faulted.13 Defendant testified that he was told by the officers that he would not be booked until he gave a statement; that he was sleepy and that the officers kept waking him up. These claims were denied, in effect by the officers and were not *888believed by the trial judge.14 Defendant testified that he still wanted an attorney and did not realize, despite being asked if he had an attorney, that he could have one then. The trial judge could have disbelieved this also. However it is the difficult process of weighing such conflicting impressions and accounts as were given by the officers and defendant in the instant case from which the Miranda court believed the trial judge should be removed. As restated in Ireland, supra, 70 Cal.2d 522, and People v. Fioritto, 68 Cal.2d 714 [68 Cal.Rptr. 817, 441 P.2d 625], a principal objective of Miranda was to “ ‘. . . liberate courts . . . from the difficult and troublesome necessity of adjudicating in each case whether coercive influences’ ” (People v. Ireland, supra, at p. 535) had brought about admissions or confessions.
Finally, the lieutenant abruptly terminated his queries when defendant said that “he did not want to wait that long” and would “like to get this done tonight.” He was quickly satisfied to accept the delay as the sole motive for defendant’s change of mind. What followed was not a spontaneous stream of utterances (which might have been acceptable under People v. Ireland, supra) but a full-fledged interrogation intended to elicit incriminating answers; an interrogation typical of the accusatory stage; the type with which Miranda is concerned. " The fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of . . . counsel, but whether he can be interrogated. ’ ’ (P. 478.)

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974].

In People v. Hamilton, 268 Cal.App.2d 393 [74 Cal.Rptr. 29], the problem was not one of time lapse before requested counsel could be present. The officers, after defendant stated he wanted an attorney, in effect, continued to urge him to talk by calling to his attention that he (the defendant) had come there to clear another party and to admit some burglaries.

Miramda v. Arizona, supra, characterizes the in-custody setting as a factor operating to overcome free choice (p. 457). However Miranda concedes that its coercive aspect is not so strong but that, despite it, there can be a voluntary waiver of rights. (Pp. 444, 470, 475.) Official representation that requested counsel cannot be obtained for a substantial period of time adds an element of pressure of some sort, especially with respect to an arrestee wanting to give a statement. As indicated, I am not prepared to say that a retraction of a request for counsel can never be considered freely made under this combination of factors.

Information from a driver’s license in possession of defendant gave his age as 22. However, it is not clear that either Sergeant Alexander or Lieutenant Barclay had digested .this information and relied on it. Defendant admitted that his license so read, but was positive in his testimony that he was 20 at the time of his arrest. Unquestionably he so would have advised the officers if he had been asked.

There was in this request no differentiation between a private attorney and one from the public defender’s office. The sergeant had not specifically mentioned the public defender, although he had advised defendant he could have an attorney appointed if he had no funds.

These circumstances bring the instant case close to that of People v. Ireland, 70 Cal.2d 522 [75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580],

In Johnson, supra, (p. 474) the knowledge of the officers that the defendant’s wife and mother were endeavoring to get a lawyer for him was listed as a significant factor.

This was stressed as significant in Johnson, supra.

Compare Johnson, supra, wherein a telephone call to defendant’s mother-in-law was allowed, but police failed to ask if the defendant *886wanted an attorney. Advising of the right to make a telephone call is not required as a separate item unconnected with a specific request for counsel; but it assumes more significant proportions in that framework.

Compare the following language in Miranda, supra (at p. 472) : . the authorities cannot rationally ignore or deny . . . [an arrestee's] request [for counsel] on the basis that the individual does not have or cannot afford a retained attorney.”

"Question. All right. Do you understand your rights?
“Answer. Yes.
“Question. Do you wish to give up your rights and make a statement?
“Answer. I don’t understand you.”

Johnson, supra, warns that " [it] is the duty of the reviewing court to examine the uncontradicted facts in order to determine independently whether a confession was voluntary” (p. 476); this duty apparently prevails even though the trial judge might not have believed the assertion despite it being uncontradieted.

In Johnson, supra, the police stress was that no one would believe a denial of the offense and that it would show malice. (P. 478.) Miranda, supra, refers to the technique of conceding the right to counsel or to be silent but pointing out the incriminating aspect of exercising the right. (Pp. 453-454.) See footnote number 2 for what the police stress was in Samilton, supra.

However, the denials by the lieutenant and the sergeant that defendant was told that he would not be booked until he gaye a statement are cast into some doubt by the following excerpt from the sergeant’s testimony:
‘ ‘ Q. Then you didn’t intend to book him until after his statement was made?
“A. That’s true.”
Compare thé unrebutted assertion in Johnson, supra, (at p. 476) that the police would not treat the defendant’s body rash until his statement was completed.