Court Opinion

ID: 9653246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:41:54.345533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:57.295541
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION
FINCH, Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent with respect to the holding in the principal opinion on Count I.
The trial court dismissed Count I of plaintiffs’ petition by sustaining a motion *299which alleged that said Count I failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The parties are in agreement that the trial court acted on the theory that said count on its face pleaded an oral contract falling within the provisions of § 432.020, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S.
The statute of frauds is made an affirmative defense by Supreme Court Rule 55.10, V.A.M.R. The burden is not on a plaintiff under § 432.020 to plead facts to avoid the application of that section. It is possible, on motion for summary judgment, to dispose of a case on the basis of the statute of frauds where the statute has been pleaded and sufficient proof to show its applicability is supplied by affidavit or otherwise. Brooks v. Cooksey, Mo., 427 S.W.2d 498. However, the mere allegation in the petition that the contract relied upon was oral does not call for dismissal of the petition under the provisions of § 432.020.1 Consequently, I do not consider that it was proper to dismiss Count I on the basis of § 432.020 where the statute had not been affirmatively pleaded and no proof was presented to the court to establish that plaintiffs’ cause of action was barred under said statutory section.
I express no opinion as to whether plaintiff can recover on Count I or as to whether the count might properly be dismissed on a motion for summary judgment after the statute of frauds is pleaded and after affidavits or other proof have been supplied. I merely would hold that Count I was not subject to dismissal on a motion to dismiss on the theory that the count failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. I would reverse the action of the trial court in dismissing Count I and would remand it to the trial court for further proceedings.
With respect to the action of the trial court in dismissing Counts II and III of plantiffs’ petition, I am dubitante.