Court Opinion

ID: 9847552
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:02:10.99997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:20.110292
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
As I do not agree that the special procedure adopted by the juvenile court was violative of due process, or that the Sixth Amendment is directly applicable (other than as required by due process) to proceedings in juvenile court, I respectfully dissent.
First, I would hold appellants’ reliance upon the Sixth Amendment to be misplaced. Generally, the Sixth Amendment applies to criminal prosecutions. “[T]he juvenile court proceeding has not yet been held to be a ‘criminal prosecution,’ within the meaning and reach of the Sixth Amendment.” McKeiver v. Pa., 403 U. S. 528, 541 (91 SC 1976, 29 LE2d 647).
Also, while appellants enumerate as error the procedure which *382the juvenile court set up for the taking of testimony from M. S., most of their argument is addressed to their lack of access to the children during the weeks prior to the hearing on the petition to terminate parental rights. See in this regard In the Interest of L. L. W., 141 Ga. App. 32 (232 SE2d 378). This court has no jurisdiction to consider grounds which, though argued, are not enumerated as error. Sunn v. Trophy Marine, Inc., 176 Ga. App. 68, 69 (2) (334 SE2d 884).
Appellants contend that the procedure for taking testimony from M. S. was fundamentally unfair in that the questioning was conducted by parties who had prejudged this case. This argument is predicated upon the testimony of the guardian ad litem that she was of the opinion that appellants’ parental rights should be terminated and the testimony of the guardian ad litem’s attorney that she believed M. S.’s statement that she had been sexually abused.
I find it quite understandable that the guardian ad litem and her attorney, both of whom were aware of significant portions of the evidence which would be presented at the hearing of this case, would form some personal opinion in regard thereto. However, I can find nothing in the record to suggest that the personal opinions of these two individuals were in any way reflected in the testimony of M. S. Indeed, the procedure formulated by the juvenile court afforded no opportunity for such to occur. The guardian ad litem was silent during the testimony of M. S., apparently present only to provide emotional support for the child during the stress of giving testimony. The attorney for the guardian ad litem questioned M. S. first. Appellants’ counsel was free to object to any perceived misconduct of the attorney for the guardian ad litem during her questioning of M. S. No objections of this nature were made. Counsel for the appellant mother had no questions for M. S. The attorney for the appellant father then conducted his cross-examination of M. S. through the procedure directed by the juvenile court. The attorney for the guardian ad litem repeated the questions of the attorney for the appellant father verbatim to M. S. Had the guardian ad litem failed to comply with the juvenile court’s directions in this regard or injected any personal prejudices, the appellant father’s attorney was free to object. No objection of this nature was made.
“[Identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. [Cit.]” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (96 SC 893, 47 LE2d 18).
*383Decided March 21, 1986.
J. Richardson Brannon, for appellants.
David A. Fox, for appellee.
Our society is increasingly facing the pervasiveness of child abuse. As more cases involving child abuse, both civil and criminal, reach the courts, we are confronted with the reality that often the abused child’s testimony is essential if the truth is to be presented. Thus arises a strong State interest in eliciting the abused child’s testimony. At the same time, we must avoid again abusing the child in order to obtain that testimony or depriving any party of constitutional rights. Nor should we lose sight of the gravity of the underlying controversy in the case sub judice, termination of parental rights. See in this regard Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745 (102 SC 1388, 71 LE2d 599). Under the circumstances of the case sub judice, balancing the interest of the State in obtaining the testimony of M. S. against the interest of appellants in a more conventional procedure and considering my perception that the procedure adopted by the juvenile court is no less probable to elicit truthful testimony, I find no deprivation of due process in the procedure adopted for taking the testimony of M. S.