Court Opinion

ID: 9844845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:10:10.66349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:45.024087
License: Public Domain

NEELY, Justice
dissenting:
The majority today implies that it is the duty of the sentencing court, before conditioning probation on making restitution, to prove that the probationer will be able to make such restitution. Because I believe the majority has it backwards, I dissent.
The majority today holds that, in order for restitution to be a valid condition of probation, the sentencing court must conduct an inquiry into the probationer’s financial condition and employment prospects and enter into the record at a hearing findings of fact supporting its decision as to the propriety, amount and method of paying restitution. Such action is commanded neither by statute nor by the United States or West Virginia Constitutions.
W.Va.Code 62-12-9 [1983] provides in pertinent part:
In addition, the court may impose, subject to modification at any time, any other conditions which it may deem advisable, including, but not limited to, any of the following: (1) That he shall make restitution or reparation, in whole or in part, immediately or within the period of probation, to any party injured by the crime for which he has been convicted.
There is no requirement that the judge make any inquiry into or findings of fact regarding the probationer’s ability to pay.
Due process requires that a person be provided with notice and a hearing before being deprived of life, liberty or property. The court cites In re D.G.W., 70 N.J. 488, 361 A.2d 513 (1976) for the proposition that:
The [offender] has an obvious “property” interest in his earnings or other income to be paid over in satisfaction of the restitutionary amount. Additionally, he has an obvious “liberty” interest in his continued probationary “freedom” which is subject to termination upon his unjustified refusal to meet the restitutionary condition.
Id. at 502, 361 A.2d at 520-21.
The offender petitioning for probation is given ample notice of the fact that restitution may be imposed as a condition of probation by the statute itself. W.Va.Code 62-12-9 [1983]. Further, the probation hearing, at which restitution is imposed as a condition of probation, provides the offender with an opportunity to explain why he will be unable to make restitution. Moreover, the probation revocation hearing, at which probation may be revoked if the offender has failed to comply with the restitution condition of his probation, provides the probationer with an opportunity to show that the restitution condition of his probation was unreasonable or that his failure to comply with the condition was justified.
*686Probation is not an entitlement. It is a gesture of mercy rendered by a court, often prompted by a belief that the convict can better be rehabilitated by undertaking the responsibilities of an upstanding citizen then by the desocializing rigors of prison life. But probation is not supposed to be a vacation at Club Med. It must be remembered that the probationer has committed a crime against the people of this State for which imprisonment is deemed an appropriate punishment. As such, the convict receiving probation must and should bear certain burdens. Among the burdens that the legislature has seen fit to impose upon the probationer is the duty to make restitution to the victims of his crimes. He should also bear the burden of a presumption that he can obtain employment suitable to discharge that duty.
When a convict is granted probation conditioned on restitution, the court should presume that he will be able to find a minimum wage job and apply his earnings to making reasonable restitution. At his probation hearing, the convict should be entitled to rebut this presumption by showing: (1) that the amount of restitution is improperly calculated; (2) that he cannot reasonably be expected to find minimum wage employment, e.g., that he is seriously disabled or resides in an area afflicted with an unusually high unemployment rate; or (3) that, even should he obtain minimum wage employment, he cannot reasonably be expected to meet the restitution schedule imposed by the court without inflicting undue hardship on himself or his innocent family. A probation hearing at which the convict is permitted to make such a showing does not deny him due process.
Undue hardship on the probationer and undue hardship on his family should be assessed by two different standards. Undue hardship on his innocent family should be found when the family would suffer a significant reduction in its customary lifestyle. However, any person who has committed a crime against innocent victims and has been granted unmerited mercy by being placed on probation should not expect to live well.
Restitution is designed to facilitate the rehabilitation of the probationer. A willingness to make restitution is an indication that the convict desires to be rehabilitated. Obversely, a cavalier attitude toward restitution reflects a cavalier attitude toward rehabilitation. A sentencing judge is perfectly justified in denying a convict probation unless he finds that the convict has a heartfelt desire, born of moral guilt, to mend his errant ways.1
When a probationer fails to comply with the restitution condition of his probation, due process requires that a hearing be held before his probation is revoked. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). At that hearing, the court should presume that the petitioner has wilfully and contumaciously failed to make restitution. The probationer should then have the opportunity to show that, despite good faith and arduous, unflagging effort, he was unable to comply with the restitution schedule. If the probationer is unable to make this showing, the sentencing court may, and usually should, remand the probationer to prison.
Probation conditioned on restitution is profitable for all parties concerned. It is profitable for the victim because he recoups his losses. It is profitable for the convict because he is not confined to prison. And it is profitable for the state because it costs money to keep a man in prison. Yet the scheme created by the majority will often make probation conditioned on restitution less attractive to a sentencing court. By interposing procedural requirements making the imposition and enforcement of a restitution condition more difficult, the majority invites a sentencing court to follow the path of least resistance, viz., sending the convict to prison. The result is that everyone — the victim, the convict and the state — loses.
*687There is no better example of the infelicitous nature of the majority’s scheme than the facts of the case before us. On 12 April 1984, the Marshall County Circuit Court placed petitioner on probation for a period of one year. At that time the court informed the petitioner that a condition of his probation would be that he make restitution to the victims of his crimes in the amount of $986.03. Petitioner was present and represented by counsel at the hearing granting him probation. At no time during the hearing, nor at any time thereafter, did the petitioner or his counsel object to $986.03 as being an incorrect assessment of the loss suffered by the victims of his crimes. Nor did the petitioner or his counsel indicate that petitioner would be unable to make restitution in that amount without undue hardship to himself.2 Indeed, counsel for the petitioner represented to the court that the petitioner had a job prospect in Gallipolis, Ohio, where he would be permitted to live with his sister and her husband.
On 12 April 1984, petitioner’s probation officer informed him that restitution was to be made in monthly payments of slightly over one hundred dollars. Nowhere does the record reflect that petitioner raised any objection to this payment schedule. Supervision of petitioner was transferred to Ohio, where he took up residence with his sister.
While living in Gallipolis, Mr. Fox worked at two jobs. As of 20 September 1984, he had earned a net pay of approximately $1,300.00. As of 12 October 1984, he had yet to make any of his monthly restitution payments.
At the probation revocation hearing, petitioner and his counsel failed to submit any evidence of his expenses during the probation period. His sister, Mrs. Jody Blankenship, testified that petitioner had paid her a total of $35.00 during the entire time he had resided with her. Petitioner’s sister further testified that petitioner’s father had purchased for him a truck, for which she had given petitioner a set of tires. Although Mrs. Blankenship speculated that petitioner may have spent $30.00 in auto insurance and other money on clothing and miscellaneous items, no evidence of these expenditures was offered to the court by the petitioner. Counsel for the petitioner intimated that petitioner had spent a substantial sum of money on repairs to his truck. However, no proof of these expenses was offered. Nor was there any evidence submitted to indicate that petitioner required the use of the truck in order to travel to and from his place of employment.
In short, then, Mr. Fox was employed and earning money, living virtually rent-free with his sister, and unhampered by accident, illness, or unforeseen financial disaster. Yet over the course of five months during which he earned approximately $1300.00, he paid not one cent of the restitution imposed by the court as a condition of his probation. At the probation revocation hearing Mr. Fox made virtually no effort to justify such a flagrant refusal to comply with the terms of his probation. The majority holds, however, that the circuit court may not revoke Mr. Fox’s probation because, before imposing the restitution condition, it did not engage in a highly speculative and resource-consuming inquiry into Mr. Fox’s financial prospects and enter findings of “fact” into the record. As a result, Mr. Fox will continue to walk among us, availing himself of all of the privileges of freedom while neglecting his duty to make restitution. And he may continue to do so until the circuit court can generate enough red tape to prove to the majority what is already obvious.
I am authorized to say that Justice BROTHERTON joins me in this dissent.

. I do not mean to imply that anyone should be denied probation when poverty, disability or other circumstances beyond his control make it impossible for him to make restitution. I say only that a convict whose "inability" to pay stems from sloth or an obdurate nature may and should be denied probation.

. Mr. Fox has no dependents.