Court Opinion

ID: 9518028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:41:06.568554+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:01.113652
License: Public Domain

SCHUDSON, J.
¶ 24. (dissenting). Deciding Marquardt's appeal last year, we recognized the legislative objective of Wis. Stat. § 102.57, and how Milwaukee County's denial of Marquardt's claim for the fifteen percent penalty under the statute defeated that objective:
Extending our analysis in our "quest to identify and give effect to the legislature's intent,"... we travel an easy road, paved by our supreme court many years ago. In Daniels v. Industrial Comm'n, 214 Wis. 2d 649, 6 N.W.2d 640 (1942), the supreme court explained the purpose of Wis. Stat. § 102.57: "The legislative objective is plainly to put upon the employer the duty of providing safety appliances of a certain standard and to penalize those who fail to conform. It is hoped that such a penalty will promote compliance with the regulations." Id. at 651, 6 N.W.2d 640 (emphases added). Obviously, ... permitting the offset to encompass the penalty shifts the payment from the employer to the employee, defeating the statute's clear objective.
Marquardt v. Milwaukee County, 2000 WI App 77, ¶ 16, 234 Wis. 2d 294, 610 N.W.2d 496. Just as obviously, relieving the County of responsibility for Marquardt's attorney's fees also "defeatfs] the statute's clear objective." See id. Thus, I conclude that Marquardt's claim for attorney's fees is encompassed by *797the "private attorney general" doctrine declared in Watkins v. LIRC, 117 Wis. 2d 753, 764, 345 N.W.2d 482 (1984).
¶ 25. By pursuing his correct claim for the fifteen percent penalty, Marquardt produced appellate clarification of Wis. Stat. § 102.57. See Marquardt, 2000 WI App 77 at ¶¶ 3-18. Moreover, by pursuing his claim, Marquardt produced not only the proper application of that statute to his case, but also the statute's meaningful enforcement of a safety statute potentially affecting countless corrections officers and others. See id. In the process, he incurred substantial attorney's fees far exceeding his modest recovery. Paraphrasing the supreme court's comments about the plaintiff in Watkins:
[Marquardt] incurred substantial attorney's fees which, if unreimbursed, would place [him] in a significantly worse economic position than when [he] began [his] suit. It would be contrary to the purposes of [Wis. Stat. § 102.57] if the person whose rights have been vindicated ends up in an economically worse position than when he or she started.
Watkins, 117 Wis. 2d at 764.
¶ 26. Therefore, under the private attorney general doctrine, Marquardt is entitled to recover the attorney's fees he paid "in order to fully enforce and give meaning to the rights created" by Wis. Stat. § 102.57. See id. at 765. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.