Court Opinion

ID: 9778854
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:23:10.852912+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:13.750211
License: Public Domain

GRAVES, Justice
(dissenting).
This is a suit for the purchase price of the nine separate shipments of lumber, sold and shipped to Coffield Lumber Company, Inc., appellee, in Rockdale, Texas, by Loes-sin & Herndon, Inc., appellant, of Houston, Texas. Appellant brought this suit' against Coffield Lumber Company, Inc., H. H. Coffield, Marjorie Coffield and C. H. Cof-field, in the District Court of Plarris County, Texas, 127th Judicial District, upon a sworn account, as provided by Rule 185, T.R.C.P.
Coffield ' Lumber Company, Inc., H. H. Coffield, Marjorie Coffield, and C. H. Cof-field filed their pleas of privilege, asserting *799the right to be sued in Milam County, Texas.
Appellant answered with its controverting affidavit, asserting that, as to appellee Coffield Lumber Company, Inc., venue was proper in Harris County, Texas, under the provisions of subdivision 23, Art. 1995, V.A.T.S., because the cause of action, or part thereof, arose in the county of suit.
The pleas of privilege were submitted to the District Court of Harris County, Texas, 127th Judicial District, upon an; agreed stipulation of facts. The trial court sustained the pleas of privilege. Appellant excepted to that ruling, as rendered by the trial court, and perfected this appeal.
The parties hereto further stipulated all the facts, upon which the trial was had below, as set out in the majority opinion.
In support of its ‘appeal, appellant presents a single point of error, as follows: “ * * * the evidence conclusively established that the cause of action of appellant, or a part thereof, arose in the county of suit, and venue was therefore proper under subdivision 23, Art. 1995, V.A.T.S.
.It supports such presentment with the citation of these authorities: Gleason v. Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co., Tex.Civ.App., 214 S.W.2d 640; Highway Ins. Underwriters v. Pyeatt, Tex.Civ.App., 234 S.W.2d 457; Western Wool Commission Co. v. Hart, Tex., 20 S.W. 131; Cuero Cotton Oil & Mfg. Co. v. Feeders’ Supply Co., Tex.Civ.App., 203 S.W. 79; Davis v. Texas Life Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 22 S.W.2d 960; Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Christian, Tex.Civ.App., 64 S.W.2d 363; Ohie Oil Co. v. Varner, Tex.Civ.App., 150 S.W.2d 185; Four States Grocer Co. v. Wicken-don, Tex.Civ.App., 217 S.W: 1103;- Garrett v. International Mill Co., Tex.Civ.App., 223 S.W.2d 67; Waco Mill & Elevator Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 49 Tex.Civ.App. 426, 109 S.W. 224, error refused; 46 Amer.Jur., 245.
In the state of the record presented here, this member of the Court feels that appellant’s single presentment cannot be sustained. Indeed, it is thought that the undisputed face of the record, and appellant’s averments themselves, leave it in no position to recover against appellees, for this controlling reason: In its original petition appellant sued the appellee, a corporation, and H. H. .Coffield, Marjorie Coffield, and C. H. Coffield, alleging, specifically, that the corporation. had been dissolved prior to, appellant’s filing of the suit, and that the individuals just named, that is, “H. H. Cof-field, Marjorie Coffield, and C. H. Coffield,” were sued as trustees for the dissolved corporation — that is, the corporation that had already been dissolved; wherefore, its main suit thus getting down to one against the individuals it sued — if any at all — who admittedly all lived in Milam County. In support of this conclusion, the cases of City Drug Stores v. Hutson, Tex.Civ.App., 121 S.W.2d 428, and Pool v. Joy, Tex.Civ.App., 61 S.W.2d 581, are referred to.
In conclusion, it would seem plain that appellant put itself out of court, in originally so alleging that the appellee, Coffield Lumber Company, Inc., had dissolved before the suit was filed, so that there was no corporate entity left for which the individuals, all of whom it alleged resided' in Milam'County, could be sued as trustees.'
■. For the reasons above-stated this member of the court respectfully dissents from the majority opinion and thinks the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed.