Court Opinion

ID: 9881146
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 19:04:15.53339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:10.655811
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/29/23 In re Olivia E. CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 In re OLIVIA E., a Person Coming Under the
 Juvenile Court Law.

 KERN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN                                                             F085319
 SERVICES,
                                                                              (Super. Ct. No. JD143876-00)
           Plaintiff and Respondent,

                    v.                                                                    OPINION
 NATHAN E.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Susan M. Gill,
Judge.
         Jesse Frederic Rodriguez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
         Margo A. Raison, County Counsel, and Ana M. Ovando, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
       Appellant Nathan E. (Father) appeals from a November 15, 2022 Kern County
Superior Court dispositional order, which declared his child Olivia E. a dependent of the
juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300, subdivision (b) and
denied his request for placement pursuant to section 361.2. Father argues “there was
insufficient evidence that placing [Olivia] with him would be detrimental to her.”
(Capitalization omitted.) For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the juvenile court’s
detriment finding.
                      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       On September 26, 2022, the Kern County Department of Human Services
(Department) filed a juvenile dependency petition alleging Olivia—then seven years
old—came within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivision (b).
Jessica F. (Mother) was identified as Olivia’s mother and custodial parent. The petition
stated Olivia “has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that [she] will suffer, serious
physical harm or illness” “by the willful or negligent failure of [Mother] to provide the
child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment” and/or “by the inability
of [Mother] to provide regular care for the child due to [Mother]’s mental illness,
developmental disability, or substance abuse.” It specified:

       “The family has been homeless for the past three years. The family was
       residing in one bedroom for three children and two adults.[2] On
       September 22, 2022, the family was found to be sleeping on the floor of the
       residence. The home posed a health and safety hazard with trash, rotting
       food, clothing and miscellaneous items cluttering the home. [Mother]
       could not locate formula for the child’s sibling due to the condition of the
       home. There was drug paraphernalia in the home, as well as two
       methamphetamine glass pipes were found in the bedroom within reach of

       1 Unless otherwise indicated, subsequent statutory citations refer to the Welfare
and Institutions Code.
       2 The adults are Mother and M.L. The three children are Olivia and her two half-
siblings. Mother is the mother of all three children while M.L. is the father of Olivia’s
half-siblings.

                                               2.
       the children. [Mother] does not have a reasonable plan for housing for the
       children. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . . On September 21, 2022, [Mother] used
       methamphetamine. . . .” (Boldface omitted.)
Father was identified as Olivia’s alleged father.
       The detention hearing was initially held on September 27, 2022. Father was not
present. Mother’s counsel made the following offer of proof:

              “Your Honor, if called to testify, [Mother], who’s present in the
       courtroom, would testify as follows. . . .

               “So with regard to Olivia . . . , the biological father is [Father].
       There are no other possible fathers. [¶] [Father] was residing with . . .
       [M]other at the time that she became pregnant. He did reside with her
       during the pregnancy. [¶] He was at the hospital when Olivia was born.
       [¶] He is listed on the birth certificate. He did sign paperwork to be on the
       birth certificate. No one other than . . . [M]other and [Father] and the child
       are listed on the birth certificate. [¶] He has acknowledged being the father
       of the child. He has not denied being the father of the child. [¶] . . .
       [M]other would testify that there is a child support order in Kern and that
       she received some child support up through June 22nd of this year, 2022.
       [¶] [Father] lived with Olivia until she was one year old. [¶] He has spent
       the night with the child, and as I stated before, there are no other possible
       fathers.”
The court accepted the offer of proof. When it inquired about Father’s whereabouts,
Mother’s counsel stated: “[M]other did indicate that [Father] may be in . . . Missouri.”
The court appointed Father’s counsel, who requested and was granted a continuance.
Thereafter, Father’s counsel contacted Father.
       The detention hearing recommenced September 29, 2022. Father—who was not
present—was declared Olivia’s presumed father by the court. The following exchange
then occurred:

               “[FATHER’S COUNSEL]: . . . . I am making a request that the
       child be released to [Father]. I know we’re not prepared to do that today,
       but as there are no allegations and he’s noncustodial, I would ask the
       Department to do that analysis.

              “THE COURT: Okay. Does he intend to stay in Missouri?

                                             3.
                “[FATHER’S COUNSEL]: Yes.

                “THE COURT: Thank you.”
The court determined a prima facie showing was made that Olivia came within section
300. It ordered Olivia’s removal from Mother’s custody; supervised visits twice a week
between Olivia and Mother; and supervised virtual visits twice a week between Olivia
and Father. Olivia and her two half-siblings—then two years old and one month old,
respectively—were placed in a resource family home in Bakersfield.
       Visits between Olivia and Mother were conducted on September 30th, October
3rd, October 7th, October 10th, October 13th, and October 18th.3
       During the September 30th visit, Olivia told Mother “she loves and misses her”
and Mother “comforted Olivia by hugging her.” Olivia wanted a “ ‘family hug’ ” with
Mother and her half-siblings, whom she called her “baby sister” and “baby brother.”
“This resulted in the family coming together as one to do a family hug . . . .” In general,
Olivia “laughed and giggled” and “appeared to be having fun.” Near the end of the visit,
Olivia “once again requested for a family hug” and “[t]he family got all together to join
in on the hug.”
       During the October 3rd visit, Mother “provided snacks and beverages” for Olivia.
She briefly “allowed for Olivia to hold her baby brother in her arms.” Mother “continued
interacting” with Olivia and tickled her at one point. “At the end of the visit, Olivia
stated that she didn’t want to leave.”
       During the October 7th visit, Mother “gave all her children hugs and welcomed
them.” She also brought snacks and “candy lollypops.” When Olivia “shared that she
lost a tooth,” Mother “comforted her . . . .” Mother “sat around the children and colored
with Olivia.”

       3 Visits scheduled for October 19th and 25th were cancelled. References to dates
are to dates in 2022 unless otherwise stated.

                                                4.
       During the October 10th visit, Mother “was very happy to see her children . . . .”
She brought chicken, juice boxes, and various toys, which “excited” Olivia. Mother and
Olivia “played pretend kitchen and pretend eating . . . .” “The family laughed together
multiple times.” Mother “hugged and tickled her children.” She “continued to re-assure
the children that she loves them but that she ‘needs to do what she needs to do.’ ” Olivia
“said she did not want to leave the visit” and Mother “tried to comfort and told Olivia not
to make it harder for her.”
       During the October 13th visit, Mother brought food, candy, and toys. The family
“all sat around the table and played together.” Mother “explained to Olivia that [Father]
would start virtual calls with [her].” Olivia “smiled and appeared excited to speak with
[Father].” Mother “played pretend kitchen” with Olivia and later painted her nails.
       During the October 18th visit, “[t]he family greeted each other with a hug, a kiss
and said hello.” They “played with the toys in the room, with the building blocks and
with the board games” and later “played ‘tickle monster’ and colored.” Near the end of
the visit, Mother “read a book to the children while the children ate snacks.” They
“exchanged a hug, a kiss, said goodbye and I love you.”
       In early October 2022, Father conversed with Department social workers over the
phone. He provided his address in Missouri and stated he “purchased a house” and
resided with his girlfriend and her three children. Father “worked over the last five years
at a processing plant making car parts” and “last worked about three months ago.” He
“had to stay home with the children” because his girlfriend “[got] a new job,” but he
recently received “a job offer helping raise pigs.” Father’s last contact with Olivia was
around three years ago. He pointed out Mother “always changes her phone number.”
Father “attempted other way[s] to communicate with Olivia but eventually lost contact.”
He “has thought of Olivia often” and expressed a willingness to take custody of her.
Father “denied suffering from any physical, emotional or mental disabilities” and “denied
currently using any type of controlled substances, drugs or alcohol.” He acknowledged

                                             5.
“he last smoked marijuana about fifteen years ago” and “was arrested for underage
drinking, sometime in 2001.” Father “denied that he has ever been convicted of a crime,”
“denied any domestic violence incidents or cases in his past or current relationship,” and
asserted he was “not currently on probation or parole.”
         Video calls between Olivia and Father were conducted on October 14th, October
17th, October 22nd, and October 24th.
         During the October 14th video call, Olivia stated “she loved and missed [Father]”
and “would be sad if she could not see him.” Father replied “he missed her too” and
“would do what he could to see her.” When Father mentioned he might “get [Olivia]
home with [him]” “if all goes well,” Olivia told him “he would need to buy tickets for her
siblings, because they are family, they stick together.” Upon request, Father “walked
[Olivia] threw [sic] the home showing her his house.” He mentioned he “worked rally
[sic] hard, and was able to get his home.” Olivia “sang a song for [Father] and he told
her that it was pretty.” When Father remarked he “was not good” at singing and would
not let Olivia hear him sing, Olivia stated “she would like it because he is her dad.” At
one point, Father briefly introduced his girlfriend’s children to Olivia. Olivia “asked
[Father] to promise her that [he] will get [her], because [she] miss[es] [him].” Father
“said that he would do what he could.” Later, Olivia said, “ ‘I love seeing you dad.’ ”
Father answered, “ ‘I love seeing you too, and we are going to do this (Visit) on
Monday.’ ” Olivia responded, “ ‘I love you dad.’ ” As the call was ending, the two
“mad[e] funny faces at each other and exchanged I love you[’s].” Throughout the call,
Father and Olivia “kept there [sic] focused [sic] on each other and seemed to enjoy their
time.”
         During the October 17th video call, Father and Olivia “played games and made
different shapes with their hands.” Father commented “that if he was to come to
California to visit that he had hoped they could take a trip to the beach.” He “changed his
background and the camera” and told Olivia “it was magic.” Father “tried helping Olivia

                                             6.
find the background and she found the Emoji’s.” “They began playing with the Emoji.”
Until the end of the call, Father and Olivia “put more emoji’s up and shared in some
laughs . . . .”
        During the October 22nd video call, Father and Olivia conversed about the
weather where Father lived. Olivia said, “ ‘I wish I were there with you.’ ” Father
replied, “I wish you were here also.” The two “played together with the [video call
software’s] emoji features” and “took turns sharing different emoji’s with each other and
described what it meant to them.” Later, Father introduced his girlfriend to Olivia.
Father’s girlfriend “complemented Olivia and said kind words” and “shared emoji’s back
and forth” with her.
        During the October 24th video call, Father told Olivia he “started his new job”
“caring for pigs.” Olivia played with slime she received at school from her teacher. She
“pretended to make slime doughnuts and cookies.” Father “played along . . . .” Olivia
asked if Father’s girlfriend’s daughter “could join the [video] call and play.” Father’s
girlfriend’s daughter “joined the call” and “brought one of her pop it toys to show
Olivia.” Later, Olivia and Father’s girlfriend’s daughter shared their “Barbie’s” and
“pretended to play Barbie’s together.” Father “showed Olivia the play room” and Olivia
“was excited because there was a giant Barbie doll house” and “Barbie accessories.”
Olivia “pretended to be the mommy Barbie” and Father’s girlfriend’s daughter
“pretended to be the children.” Toward the end of the call, Father “told Olivia good-bye
and ‘I love you.’ ” Olivia responded, “ ‘I love you too.’ ”
        On October 27, 2022, during a video call with a Department social worker, Father
stated he “has really enjoyed connecting back with Olivia” and “has enjoyed the time
with her on [the video calls].” When asked whether he “had any plans to come to
California to see Olivia,” Father indicated he did not but “would like to come to see her.”
He added “he could use some help paying for [a] plane ticket.” When asked how he and
his girlfriend would feel if Olivia lived with them, Father asserted he “would love that”

                                             7.
and his girlfriend “is excited to get to know Olivia.” Father reiterated he had no criminal
history and had no substance abuse issues. The social worker advised Department would
“complete the ICPC[4] process, . . . an out of state process for clearance of individuals,
caregivers, and parents.” Father “said he was open [to] the investigation and he was open
to a home assessment.”
       The combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing was held on November 15, 2022.
Father was not present. Counsel for both Mother and Father “submitt[ed] on juris.” The
court found Olivia to be a person described by section 300, subdivision (b). The
following exchange occurred after the court proceeded to the disposition phase:

               “[FATHER’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I understand that the
       Department’s request is to order an ICPC for [Father] in Missouri. In
       reviewing his situation, I would note that [Department’s social study] says
       he’s not currently employed. He is currently employed, that’s why he’s not
       with us today. He has three other children. I think his girlfriend’s three
       living in his home.

              “The visits with Olivia are going quite well. So we are asking that
       placement with [Father] just be ordered today. He is willing to do the
       parenting and neglect class, although, I told him that’s just generally
       something asked of people, but I don’t see any basis of him for needing to
       complete that or any need for supervision. In my reading, Olivia seems
       excited about the possibility of going to live there so that is our request for
       today.

             “THE COURT: Thank you. You know, when I read the report, I
       made a note to myself asking, if [Father] lived in California, would the
       recommendation be for placement of Olivia with him because there could
       be supervision, would it?

              “[DEPARTMENT’S COUNSEL]: Yes. The Department indicated
       yes.

              “THE COURT: So the biggest factor is we need supervision.

       4 “ICPC” refers to the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children (Fam. Code,
§ 7900 et seq.).

                                              8.
             “[DEPARTMENT’S COUNSEL]: Correct.

            “THE COURT: And that’s the only reason that ICPC would be
      necessary because, otherwise, it doesn’t apply.

             “[DEPARTMENT’S COUNSEL]: Correct. [¶] . . . [¶]

             “THE COURT: Okay. [¶] . . . [D]o you want to speak to the
      request?

              “[DEPARTMENT’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, the Department –
      well, the Department’s concern is that while the visits are going well, the
      last time [Father] had previously had contact with Olivia was when she was
      two or three. It’s been quite a few years ago. The Department would like
      to have some supervision prior to the placement. Probably move more
      towards that direction, just feel it’s a bit premature.

              “THE COURT: Thank you. [¶] . . . [A]nything you want to add on
      that issue?

              “[MOTHER’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, we would agree with
      [Department’s counsel]. The child has been with . . . [M]other for most of
      her life and that relationship, while the reports on the visits are nice, it’s not
      yet developed. And so we would concur with [Department’s counsel].

             “THE COURT: Thank you. [¶] . . . [¶]

              “[FATHER’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I would just note, I
      understand the desire for supervision, but I don’t see anything in any of the
      reports that give rise to concern about [F]ather’s ability to care for the child.
      I just don’t think the legal standard is it’s nice to have supervision.

             “THE COURT: Thank you.”
Thereafter, the court pronounced:

             “Based on the evidence before the Court, I’ll make the following
      findings and orders. First of all, with respect to [Father], if I were to place
      Olivia with [Father], I’d be taking her away from her siblings, away from
      [M]other’s ability to reunify, and placing her with a father she’s never lived
      with, and I don’t know if he’s even come out here to visit since the case has
      started. So I think supervision is important to make sure that he is as
      appropriate as he seems to be on paper, and in the interactions that the
      Department has with him, and to make sure that Olivia would be safe there.

                                              9.
       I think that’s appropriate to have supervision, and to have that, we need
       ICPC.

              “The alternative of that is have him have some face-to-face visits
       with her, have some supervision of that, reports on that. Which I say
       because even though we’re at disposition, I don’t know how long ICPC will
       take and I want to make sure we all understand there are alternatives to
       having supervision. But at this point, with no face-to-face visits, and face-
       to-face evaluation even I’m not finding that. I do find it would be
       detrimental to Olivia to place her with her father at this time without
       supervision.”
       The court adjudged Olivia a dependent of the juvenile court pursuant to section
300, subdivision (b) and found—by clear and convincing evidence—there is or would be
a substantial danger to Olivia’s physical health, safety, protection, or physical or
emotional well-being if she were returned home and there are no reasonable means by
which to protect Olivia’s physical health without removal. The court ordered Olivia’s
removal from Mother’s custody; six months of family reunification services for Mother
and Father; counseling for Mother on parenting, child neglect and substance abuse;
counseling for Father on parenting; supervised visits twice a week between Olivia and
Mother; supervised visits twice a week between Olivia and Father; and initiation of ICPC
on Father’s behalf. Pursuant to section 366.21, subdivision (e), a status review hearing
was calendared for May 15, 2023.
                                       DISCUSSION
I.     Section 361.2
       “If a court orders removal of a child pursuant to Section 361,[5] the court shall first
determine whether there is a parent of the child, with whom the child was not residing at
the time that the events or conditions arose that brought the child within the provisions of
Section 300, who desires to assume custody of the child. If that parent requests custody,
the court shall place the child with the parent unless it finds that placement with that

       5 “Section 361 specifies the circumstances which constitute grounds for removal
of a child from his or her home.” (In re Michael D. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1082.)

                                             10.
parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being
of the child.” (§ 361.2, subd. (a).) “The term ‘ “custody” ’ as used in section 361.2,
refers to the parent’s ‘right to make decisions pertaining to the child’ and to have ‘legal
possession of the child.’ [Citation.]” (In re Noe F. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 358, 368.)
On the other hand, “ ‘ “[p]lacement” ’ refers to ‘where the child shall live during the
dependency proceeding.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.; see In re Austin P. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th
1124, 1131 (Austin) [“[T]he words ‘place’ and ‘placement’ in section 361.2, subdivision
(a) connote a temporary arrangement that necessarily involves the ongoing supervision of
the juvenile court.”].) “If the court places the child with the noncustodial parent, the
court may terminate its jurisdiction over the child [citation], maintain jurisdiction pending
a home visit [citation], or maintain jurisdiction with court supervision [citation].” (In re
Liam L. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1081, citing § 361.2, subd. (b)(1)-(3).) “In
examining section 361.2, subdivisions (a) and (b), it is clear that the Legislature
envisioned a two-step process: under subdivision (a), the court examines whether it
would be detrimental to temporarily place a child with the nonoffending noncustodial
parent; under subdivision (b), the court decides whether that placement should be
permanent and whether the court’s jurisdiction should be terminated.” (Austin, supra,
118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1131.)
       “In summary, when a nonoffending noncustodial parent requests custody under
section 361.2, subdivision (a), he or she is requesting sole legal and physical custody of a
child. However, the court may not immediately grant that parent sole legal and physical
custody. The court must first determine whether it would be detrimental to the child to
temporarily place the child in that parent’s physical custody. If there is no showing of
detriment, the court must order the [social services a]gency to temporarily place the child
with the nonoffending noncustodial parent. The court then decides whether there is a
need for ongoing supervision. If there is no such need, the court terminates jurisdiction
and grants that parent sole legal and physical custody. If there is a need for ongoing

                                             11.
supervision, the court is to continue its jurisdiction.” (Austin, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1134-1135.)
       “A detriment evaluation requires that the court weigh all relevant factors to
determine if the child will suffer net harm.” (In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th
1412, 1425 (Luke).) “Only clear and convincing evidence can establish the necessary
detriment.” (In re A.C. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 38, 43.) “Clear and convincing evidence
requires a high probability, such that the evidence is so clear as to leave no substantial
doubt.” (Luke, supra, at p. 1426; see Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 998
(O.B.) [“The standard of proof known as clear and convincing evidence demands a
degree of certainty greater than that involved with the preponderance standard, but less
than what is required by the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”].) “When the
parent [requesting custody] is competent, the standard of detriment is very high.” (In re
Patrick S. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1263 (Patrick); see In re John M. (2006) 141
Cal.App.4th 1564, 1569 (John) [§ 361.2, subd. (a) evinces a legislative preference for
placement with a nonoffending noncustodial parent].)
II.    Standard of review
       “We review a court’s dispositional order for substantial evidence.” (In re K.B.
(2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 972, 979 (K.B.); see O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1006
[“Substantial evidence is evidence that is ‘of ponderable legal significance,’ ‘reasonable
in nature, credible, and of solid value,’ and ‘ “substantial” proof of the essentials which
the law requires in a particular case.’ ”].) “[A]ppellate review of the sufficiency of the
evidence in support of a finding requiring clear and convincing proof must account for
the level of confidence this standard demands. . . . [W]hen reviewing a finding that a fact
has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before the appellate court
is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable
fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true. Consistent with
well-established principles governing review for sufficiency of the evidence, in making

                                             12.
this assessment the appellate court must view the record in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party below and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated
the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable
inferences from the evidence.” (O.B., supra, at pp. 995-996; accord, In re V.L. (2020) 54
Cal.App.5th 147, 155.) “Thus, in order to succeed on appeal, [the appellant] must
demonstrate that there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the
court’s order.” (K.B., supra, at p. 979.)
III.   Analysis
       We conclude there is no substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact
could have found it highly probable Olivia would suffer detriment if she were placed with
Father.
       At the outset, though we view the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile
court’s order, said record shows Father “is a competent, caring and stable parent.”
(Patrick, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 1263.) He is a homeowner, lives with his
girlfriend and her three children, and is involved in those children’s upbringing. Father
previously worked at an automotive parts plant and recently obtained a job raising pigs.
He admitted he was arrested for underage drinking over two decades ago but otherwise
denied having “ever been convicted of a crime” or being “on probation or parole.” (See
ibid. [the father lacked criminal history].) He “denied any domestic violence incidents or
cases in his past or current relationship.” (See ibid. [“no referrals to child welfare
services”].) Father acknowledged “he last smoked marijuana about fifteen years ago” but
otherwise “denied currently using any type of controlled substances, drugs or alcohol.”
He also “denied suffering from any physical, emotional or mental disabilities.” (See ibid.
[“no indication of substance abuse or mental illness”].) Although Father only lived with
Olivia until she was one year old and last contacted her approximately three years before
dependency proceedings commenced, he continued to pay child support. (See ibid.
[“[The father] paid child support every month for 11 years without knowing where his

                                             13.
son was.”].) “When he learned of [Olivia]’s whereabouts, [he] immediately came
forward and requested placement . . . .” (Ibid.) Father—who resides in Missouri—
participated in four scheduled video calls with Olivia, all of which exhibited positive
interactions between the two. (See ibid. [the father “visited and contacted his son
whenever possible”].)
       In denying placement with Father, the juvenile court reasoned: (1) placement
would “tak[e] [Olivia] away from her siblings”; (2) placement would take Olivia “away
from [M]other’s ability to reunify”; (3) Olivia has “never lived with” Father before;
(4) Father has not “come out here [to California] to visit since the case has started” and
there have been “no face-to-face visits”; and (5) supervision via the ICPC is needed “to
make sure [Father] is as appropriate as he seems to be on paper” and “make sure that
Olivia would be safe there.” These justifications do not support the detriment finding.
       “[A] court is authorized to evaluate the appropriateness of keeping siblings
together, and to consider sibling relationships as one factor, among many, when
determining detriment for purposes of its placement decisions.” (Luke, supra, 107
Cal.App.4th at p. 1422.) The record does show affectionate displays by Olivia toward
her two younger half-siblings (a toddler and a baby) during Mother’s visits. In addition,
during her initial video visit with Father, Olivia told him “he would need to buy tickets
for [her and] her siblings” to go to Missouri “because they are family, they stick
together.” These deeds and words alone, however, do not sufficiently demonstrate Olivia
is so “extremely bonded” with her half-siblings (id. at p. 1426) and her relationship with
them is so “much closer than in normal sibling relationships” (id. at p. 1427) that she
would suffer emotional harm if she were separated from them. (Cf. id. at p. 1426 [the
child “cried and became depressed” at the prospect of being separated from his custodial
parent and siblings].)
       Next, the court claims placement with Father would take Olivia “away from
[M]other’s ability to reunify . . . .” While we recognize there is “a preference towards

                                            14.
parental reunification” (Luke, supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1425), nothing in the record
indicates “a move would prevent [Mother] from reunifying” (John, supra, 141
Cal.App.4th at p. 1570). As mentioned, after a placement is made pursuant to section
361.2, the court still has discretion to order reunification services to the formerly
custodial parent (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(3); In re Karla C. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1236,
1244) or terminate dependency jurisdiction (§ 361.2, subd. (b)(1); K.B., supra, 239
Cal.App.4th at p. 981).
       As for Olivia having “never lived with” Father before,6 this factor is not
determinative. (See In re C.M. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1403 [“[N]either
[the child]’s wish to remain . . . in the only home she had ever known, nor the alleged
lack of an established relationship with [the] father, was sufficient to constitute
substantial evidence of the high level of detriment required under section 361.2[,
subdivision ](a).”].)7
       The court’s emphasis on Father not “com[ing] out here [to California] to visit
since the case has started” and the lack of in-person visits seemingly discounts the
practical reality of maintaining relationships across state lines. The record indicates
Father—during the time he became aware of dependency proceedings and reconnected
with Olivia via video calls—was a stay-at-home parental figure for his girlfriend’s
children due to his girlfriend’s new job and in the process of finding and procuring a new
job himself. (Cf. In re Solomon B. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 69, 75, fn. 4 [ongoing health

       6 Technically speaking, according to Mother’s offer of proof at the detention
hearing, Father lived with Olivia “until she was one year old.”
       7 We point out the record shows Olivia consistently expressed her love for and her
desire to be with Father and appeared to get along with Father’s girlfriend and her
children, even playing dolls with one of them during a video call. (See Patrick, supra,
218 Cal.App.4th at p. 1265 [“[T]he court should have placed greater weight on the long-
term benefits [the child] would gain from becoming an integrated member of a family
that included a father, stepmother, brother and sister.”].)

                                             15.
risks and travel restrictions due to COVID-19 pandemic].) He also told a Department
social worker “he could use some help paying for [a] plane ticket.” That Father did not
drop everything and travel to California between September 29, 2022 (the date he was
declared Olivia’s presumed father) and November 15, 2022 (the date of the combined
jurisdiction/disposition hearing)—a period of about one-and-a-half months—should not
militate against placement.
       Finally, we address the court’s final justification: supervision via the ICPC is
needed “to make sure [Father] is as appropriate as he seems to be on paper” and “make
sure that Olivia would be safe there.” Notably, an exchange between the court and
Department’s counsel during the disposition phase of the combined
jurisdiction/disposition hearing revealed Department would have recommended
placement with Father had he lived in California because “there could be supervision
. . . .” Because Father resides in Missouri, however, the court and Department’s counsel
agreed “ICPC would be necessary . . . .”
       To the extent the court relied upon the necessity of supervision to rationalize
denial of placement, the court puts the proverbial cart before the horse. As discussed, the
Legislature “envisioned a two-step process” when it enacted section 361.2. (Austin,
supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1131.) “The court must first determine whether it would be
detrimental to the child to temporarily place the child in [the nonoffending noncustodial]
parent’s physical custody. If there is no showing of detriment, the court must order the
[social services a]gency to temporarily place the child with the nonoffending
noncustodial parent. The court then decides whether there is a need for ongoing
supervision.” (Id. at p. 1135, italics added; see § 361.2, subds. (a)-(b).) “If there is a
need for ongoing supervision, the court is to continue its jurisdiction.” (Austin, supra, at
p. 1135.)
       To the extent the court believed ICPC monitoring was a prerequisite for
placement, it was mistaken. (Patrick, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 1264; John, supra,

                                              16.
141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1575.) “The ICPC governs conditions for out-of-state ‘placement
in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption.’ ” (John, supra, at p. 1573,
quoting Fam. Code, § 7901, art. 3, subds. (a), (b).) “Placement with an out-of-state
parent need not follow ICPC procedure, as is plain from the statutory language.” (John,
supra, at p. 1573.)
       It appears the court was reluctant to place Olivia with Father because he was “ ‘to
some degree, . . . an unknown entity’ . . . .” (John, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1568.) If
the court believed the information at its disposal was deficient, its initiation of ICPC
makes sense. “While . . . ICPC compliance is not required for an out-of-state placement
with a parent, nothing in the ICPC prevents the use of an ICPC evaluation as a means of
gathering information before placing a child with such a parent.” (Id. at p. 1572.) A
court can also explore alternative means of investigating the nonoffending noncustodial
parent. (Ibid.; see, e.g., Patrick, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 1264 [ordering the father
“to comply with services, regularly communicate with [social services a]gency and make
[the child] available to the social worker”].) However, instead of denying Father’s
request for placement, “the court should have . . . continue[d] the hearing,[8] leaving
[Olivia] in h[er] temporary placement [at the resource family home] for the period of time
necessary to gather information about [Father].” (John, supra, at p. 1572.) Because
Father “is a parent, the appropriate investigation is a basic one, less rigorous than the
investigation necessary for placement with a more distant relative . . . .” (Id. at p. 1573.)
While his “geographical distance from [California] necessitates a greater effort to garner
information, it should not subject him to greater scrutiny.” (Ibid.)9

       8 The record does not show counsel requested a continuance at the combined
jurisdiction/disposition hearing. (See § 352, subd. (a)(1).) Nonetheless, the court has
authority to continue a hearing on its own motion upon a showing of good cause. (See In
re Elizabeth R. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1774, 1798.)
       9 Father does not raise any issues concerning ICPC monitoring.

                                             17.
                                     DISPOSITION
       The detriment finding is reversed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court
with directions to hold a new dispositional hearing on the issue of placement under
section 361.2, subdivision (a). At said hearing, the court may order Department to obtain
information about the suitability of Father’s home, either through the ICPC process or by
alternative means. The court shall make its placement decision after receiving any
information it deems necessary and evaluating the criteria in section 361.2 in a manner
consistent with this opinion. (John, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1576.) Nothing in this
opinion should be construed to prevent the court from considering new evidence or
changed circumstances that may have arisen during the pendency of this appeal.
(Patrick, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1265-1266.) In all other respects, the
dispositional order is affirmed.

                                                                    DETJEN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

PEÑA, J.

MEEHAN, J.

                                           18.