Court Opinion

ID: 9352537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-06 20:08:24.278259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:40.949199
License: Public Domain

J-S41020-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    SAMIRA HADI RANDOLPH                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 691 MDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 22, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-22-CR-0002606-2020

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                            FILED: JANUARY 6, 2023

        Samira Hadi Randolph (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of

sentence imposed after a jury convicted her of one count of theft by unlawful

taking and the trial court convicted her of harassment.1 We affirm.

        The trial court recounted the underlying facts as follows:

        Appellant worked for Senior Helpers, a service which provides in-
        home caretakers for elderly individuals. Mary Parise (hereinafter
        “victim” [or “the victim”]) was a client of Senior Helpers, and
        Appellant was one of the caretakers that visited her home on a
        shift basis. On March 8, 2020, Appellant was working a shift in
        the victim’s home when Appellant and victim became involved in
        an altercation, which according to the victim’s testimony,
        culminated in Appellant striking victim on her ears. Although the
        evidence suggests that there were multiple factors contributing to
        the argument, one of the causes of the tension between Appellant
        and victim was a cast iron statue of Aunt Jemima (hereinafter “the
____________________________________________

*   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3921(a) and 2709(a)(1).
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      statue”), which victim had been using as a doorstop. Appellant,
      who is African American, took offense to the statue which, in her
      view, was racist.

      After Appellant left victim’s home that evening, the victim
      reported that various items were missing from her home,
      including a diamond watch, a necklace, several gold nuggets,
      approximately $400 in cash, and the aforementioned statue.
      Victim, with the assistance of her [son], submitted an insurance
      claim for the items, including the statue. The necklace and gold
      nuggets have since been found in victim’s house, but the diamond
      watch, cash, and statue have not been recovered. As for the
      statue, Appellant admitted to removing it from victim’s home.
      Appellant initially told her employer and the police that the victim
      told her to throw the statue away, and, therefore, she (Appellant)
      threw the statue in the garbage at victim’s home on the night of
      March 8, 2022, after the altercation. Later, however, authorities
      discovered that Appellant had taken a picture of the statue on her
      phone.     According to information obtained via geotagging,
      authorities determined that the picture was taken on March 9,
      2022, at 9:50 a.m. at 207 Lincoln Street in Steelton, which is in
      the same block of Steelton where Appellant resides.

      On April 20, 2022, during an interview with police, Appellant was
      confronted with the photograph of the statue that was taken near
      her residence, and at that point, Appellant revised her version of
      events and claimed that she had in fact thrown the statue away
      at her own house instead of victim’s house. During her testimony
      at trial, Appellant claimed that she wanted to take a picture of the
      statue to show her employer, so she tried taking a picture of the
      statue outside of the victim’s house on the night of the incident.
      However, since it was raining heavily, she was unable to get a
      picture and took the statue with her. Appellant stated that she
      was worried about being accused of stealing and being charged
      with a crime if she admitted to taking the statue to her residence,
      and this is what prompted her to initially tell her employer that
      the picture was taken at the victim’s house.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/14/22, at 2-4 (record citations omitted).

      On January 21, 2022, a jury convicted Appellant of the aforementioned

charges but acquitted her of one count each of abuse of care ─ dependent
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person, terroristic threats, simple assault, and intimidation of victim/witness.2

On March 22, 2022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 1-12 months in

prison for theft by unlawful taking and to pay the costs of prosecution for the

harassment charge. The trial court told Appellant it would “consider releasing

her on parole without supervision, after she had served her minimum one (1)-

month sentence of incarceration.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/14/22, at 1.

        Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on April 1, 2022. On April 12,

2022, the trial court denied Appellant’s request for an arrest of judgment and

a new trial but granted her request for parole without supervision as soon as

she paid the costs and restitution owing.        Order of Court, 4/12/22, at 1

(unnumbered). Appellant paid the monies owed and, on April 18, 2022, the

trial court issued an order paroling Appellant without supervision, effective on

April 22, 2022. The instant, timely appeal followed.3

        Appellant raises the following issues:

        A. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING THE
           JURY’S VERDICT WHERE THE COMMONWEALTH FAILED TO
           PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE APPELLANT TOOK THE
           [STATUE] WITHOUT THE OWNER’S CONSENT[?]

        B. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING THE
           JURY’S VERDICT WHICH WENT AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE
           EVIDENCE WHICH ESTABLISHED THE COMPLAINANT GAVE
           THE [STATUE] TO APPELLANT[?]

____________________________________________

2   18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2713.1(a)(1)(ii), 2706(a)(1), 2701(a)(3), and 4952(a)(1).

3   Both Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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       C. WEHTHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE
          JURY ON THE ELEMENTS OF THEFT BY UNLAWFUL TAKING BY
          COMMENTING ON THE FACTS OF THE CASE, IN FAVOR OF THE
          COMMONWEALTH, AND BY INSTRUCTING THE JURY TO
          DISREGARD EVIDENCE SURROUNDING THE COMPLAINANT’S
          INSURANCE CLAIMS[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (underlining omitted).

       In her first issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

underlying her conviction for theft by unlawful taking.4 Appellant’s Brief at

10-12.    Appellant argues “the jury did not believe the testimony from the

Commonwealth witnesses,” because they returned a verdict for a value of loss

less than that the Commonwealth sought. Id. at 11. According to Appellant,

the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict, because she testified the

victim consented to her removing the statue. Id.

       When reviewing a sufficiency challenge, we determine “whether the

evidence at trial, and all reasonable inferences derived therefrom, when

viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner,

are sufficient to establish all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Commonwealth v. May, 887 A.2d 750, 753 (Pa. 2005) (citation

omitted). “Further, a conviction may be sustained wholly on circumstantial

evidence, and the trier of fact—while passing on the credibility of the witnesses

and the weight of the evidence—is free to believe all, part, or none of the

____________________________________________

4Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence underlying her
conviction for harassment. Appellant’s Brief at 10-12.
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evidence.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632, 640 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(citation omitted). “In conducting this review, the appellate court may not

weigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for the fact-finder.” Id.

     Here, the trial court concluded:

     A person is guilty of Theft by Unlawful Taking if “[s]he unlawfully
     takes, or exercises unlawful control over, movable property of
     another with intent to deprive him thereof.” Commonwealth v.
     Goins, [8]67 A.2d 526, 528 (Pa. Super. 2004) (quoting 18
     Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a)). Movable property is “property the location
     of which can be changed.” Id. (quoting 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3901). A
     “deprivation” of such property occurs when someone: “(1)
     withhold[s] property of another permanently; or (2) disposes of
     the property so as to make it unlikely that the owner will recover
     it” Id.

     Applying the above standard regarding sufficiency of the evidence
     claims, and considering the elements of Theft by Unlawful Taking,
     there was more than sufficient evidence from which the jury could
     find Appellant guilty of this offense, as it pertains to the Aunt
     Jemima statue.      The evidence, viewed in the light most
     favorable to the Commonwealth, established that Appellant
     undisputedly removed the statue from victim’s home, and
     disposed of it. As for Appellant’s purported defense, it was
     reasonable for the jury to conclude that such removal was not
     authorized by victim. As explained above, while Appellant claimed
     that victim authorized the disposal of the statue, Appellant made
     contradicting statements regarding the statue’s whereabouts
     throughout the course of the investigation, some of which were
     patently false. Moreover, the fact that the statue was reported
     stolen by victim’s family and that victim filed an insurance claim
     for the statue implies that victim did not have an intention to
     dispose of the statue. Taking this into consideration, there was
     clearly sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could
     have determined that the taking of the statue from victim was not
     authorized, and, therefore, was unlawful.

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Trial Court Opinion, 7/14/22, at 6-7 (emphasis added). The record supports

the trial court’s determination, and its legal conclusion is sound.    See id.

Appellant’s first issue merits no relief.

       In her second issue, Appellant challenges the weight of the evidence.

Appellant’s Brief at 13-14.       She contends, “The Commonwealth witnesses’

testimony was riddled with inconsistencies regarding the items taken and the

value associated with those items.” Id. at 13.5

       “A weight of the evidence claim concedes that the evidence is sufficient

to sustain the verdict but seeks a new trial on the grounds that the evidence

was so one-sided or so weighted in favor of acquittal that a guilty verdict

shocks one’s sense of justice.” In re A.G.C., 142 A.3d 102, 109 (Pa. Super.

2016) (citation omitted). “Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of

the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the

verdict is against the weight of the evidence.” Commonwealth. v. Widmer,

744 A.2d 745, 753 (Pa. 2000) (citation omitted).

       Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see
       the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest
       consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial

____________________________________________

5 To the extent Appellant claims inconsistent verdicts, see Appellant’s Brief at
13-14, she waived the claim as she did not raise it in her court-ordered Rule
1925(b) statement. See Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal,
6/21/22, at 1-2 (unnumbered).          See also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii);
Commonwealth v. Given, 244 A.3d 508, 510 (Pa. Super. 2020) (appellant
waived all issues on appeal by failing to raise them in his Rule 1925(b)
statement).
                                     -6-
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      judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination of whether the
      verdict is against the weight of the evidence.

Id. (citation omitted).

      The trial court addressed this claim in its opinion, citing relevant law and

concluded the claim lacked merit:

      In the instant matter, the jury’s verdict of guilty was not so
      contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. Based
      on the evidence presented in this case, Appellant’s main defense
      to the Theft charge, as it pertains to the statue, was that victim
      gave her permission to throw the statue away.             However,
      Appellant’s statements in this regard were both self-contradictory
      and contradicted by the testimony and evidence presented by the
      Commonwealth’s witnesses.

      First, Appellant, throughout the course of this case, made
      contradictory and untrue statements regarding her purported
      disposal of the statue. Appellant initially told her employer and
      the police that victim had given her permission to dispose of the
      statue and that she (Appellant) disposed of the statue at victim’s
      residence on the night of their altercation. However, Appellant
      was later confronted with evidence that the statue had been
      present at her own residence the day after, proving that her first
      statement regarding the statue’s disposal was false. At that point,
      Appellant changed her story to claim that she took the statue with
      her and threw it away somewhere else because it was raining
      outside of victim’s house on the night of the incident, and she was
      unable to take a picture of the statue at victim’s home. She
      attempted to explain that her first untrue account was prompted
      by a fear of being charged with stealing.

            Second, Appellant’s claim that victim authorized the
      disposal of the statue is clearly contradicted by evidence
      presented by the Commonwealth. Of particular gravity, the victim
      and her family reported the statue as a missing item when they
      contacted the authorities, and, furthermore, the victim submitted
      an insurance claim for the statue.       Considering that victim
      attempted to recover the statue following its disappearance, it
      would be illogical to infer that victim authorized the statue’s
      disposal, as Appellant claims. Taking this into consideration, and
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      in light of the glaring inconsistencies and falsehoods in Appellant’s
      statements regarding the statue, it was reasonable for the jury to
      conclude that the weight of the evidence supported a finding that
      Appellant was in fact not authorized to dispose of the Aunt Jemima
      statue. Therefore, Appellant’s claim that the jury’s finding of guilt
      was against the weight of the evidence is without merit.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/14/22, at 4-6.       The trial court’s determination is

supported by the evidence, and we discern no abuse of discretion or error.

See id. Accordingly, Appellant’s second claim lacks merit.

      In her third issue, Appellant maintains: “The trial court erred while

instructing the jury on the elements of theft not to consider issues involved in

the insurance claim filed by Appellant[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 9; see id. at 14-

22. Appellant has waived this claim.

      The standard governing our review of a challenge to jury instructions is

as follows:

      When reviewing a challenge to part of a jury instruction, we must
      review the jury charge as a whole to determine if it is fair and
      complete. A trial court has wide discretion in phrasing its jury
      instructions, and can choose its own words as long as the law is
      clearly, adequately, and accurately presented to the jury for its
      consideration. The trial court commits an abuse of discretion only
      when there is an inaccurate statement of the law.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 954 A.2d 1194, 1198 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation

omitted).

      This Court has stated:

      In order to preserve a claim that a jury instruction was
      erroneously given, the [a]ppellant must have objected to the
      charge at trial. See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 318
      n.18 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted); Pa.R.A.P. 302(b) (“A general
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         exception to the charge to the jury will not preserve an issue for
         appeal. Specific exception shall be taken to the language or
         omission complained of.”); Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(B) (“No portions of
         the charge nor omissions from the charge may be assigned as
         error, unless specific objections are made thereto before the jury
         retires to deliberate.”). As our Supreme Court has explained:

               The pertinent rules, therefore, require a specific
               objection to the charge or an exception to the trial
               court’s ruling on a proposed point to preserve an issue
               involving a jury instruction.

         Commonwealth v. Pressley, 584 Pa. 624, 887 A.2d 220, 224
         (Pa.   2005)     (footnotes  and     citations  omitted); see
         Commonwealth v. Garang, 9 A.3d 237, 244-245 (Pa. Super.
         2010) (citations omitted); Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d
         162, 178 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted).

Commonwealth v. Parker, 104 A.3d 17, 29 (Pa. Super. 2014).

         Here, Appellant did not request a specific charge on theft by unlawful

taking, and she lodged no objection to the trial court’s charge.         See N.T.,

1/20/22, at 86 (trial court noting, “there’s nothing terribly unusual” about

Appellant’s proposed points for charge); N.T., 1/21/22, at 273-90. Moreover,

at the conclusion of its charge, the trial court asked counsel “whether there

are any exceptions to the charge or failure of the charge on a material point.”

N.T., 1/21/22, at 291. Appellant’s counsel replied, “No, Your Honor.” Id.

Thus, Appellant waived any challenge to the jury charge. Parker, 104 A.3d

at 29.

         For the reasons discussed above, Appellant’s issues are either without

merit or waived. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

         Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 01/06/2023

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