Court Opinion

ID: 9925589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-22 15:00:47.929342+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:07.240791
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13187   Document: 48-1    Date Filed: 01/22/2024   Page: 1 of 3

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]

                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 22-13187
                         ____________________

       ROY STEWART MOORE,
                                                   Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       TIANA LOWE,
       JERRY DUNLEAVY,
       TIMOTHY CARNEY,
       PHILLIP KLEIN,
       BRAD POLUMBO, et al.,

                                                Defendants-Appellees.
USCA11 Case: 22-13187      Document: 48-1       Date Filed: 01/22/2024     Page: 2 of 3

       2                        Order of the Court                   22-13187

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Alabama
                     D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cv-00124-CLM
                           ____________________

       Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
       BY THE COURT:
              This appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. By statute,
       Congress has limited our jurisdiction, at least as a general matter,
       to “final decisions of the district courts[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “To
       constitute a final decision, the district court’s order generally must
       adjudicate all claims against all parties[.]” Jenkins v. Prime Ins. Co.,
       32 F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Corsello v. Lincare, Inc.,
       276 F.3d 1229, 1230 (11th Cir. 2001)).
              In this case, portions of two of Moore’s claims—portions re-
       lated to Counts I and II—survived the defendants’ motion to dis-
       miss. Without citing any specific source of authority, Moore (who
       was proceeding pro se) filed a pleading styled “Plaintiff’s Voluntary
       Dismissal of Remaining Claims,” in which he agreed to dismiss the
       remaining aspects of Counts I and II and asked the district court to
       enter final judgment. The district court construed Moore’s motion
       as one filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2),
       granted it, and directed the clerk to close the case.
            The district court’s reliance on Rule 41(a) was misplaced.
       We have explained that Rule 41(a) may be used to dismiss only
USCA11 Case: 22-13187      Document: 48-1      Date Filed: 01/22/2024     Page: 3 of 3

       22-13187                 Order of the Court                          3

       entire “action[s],” not individual claims. See, e.g., Perry v. Schu-
       macher Grp. of La., 891 F.3d 954, 957–58 (11th Cir. 2018). Had the
       district court instead construed Moore’s pleading as a motion to
       amend his complaint to abandon Counts I and II and invoked Fed-
       eral Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), it could have entered final judg-
       ment, and jurisdiction would have been proper here. See id. (ex-
       plaining that “Rule 15 was designed for situations like this”); accord,
       e.g., GEICO v. Glassco, Inc., 58 F.4th 1338, 1343 (11th Cir. 2023).
              DISMISSED.