Court Opinion

ID: 9522099
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:17:57.94533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:02:18.314809
License: Public Domain

Dooley, J.,
¶ 24. concurring. I concur fully in the Court’s decision. I write only to urge the Legislature to reconsider a decision made in the recent judicial branch restructuring legislation. In making this plea, I am trying to avoid situations where the wording of legislation fails to implement legislative intent such that important policy objectives cannot be reached. It is hard to read our decision in this case without concluding that we have invented a case processing machine so complicated that we cannot easily control its operating rules.
¶ 25. This case is fundamentally about what consequences should result when a young juvenile commits a serious crime but is not charged until he or she becomes an adult. We must hold that the answer is “no consequences” under the applicable statutory language, but that conclusion is reached only through pages of statutory analysis involving two statutory schemes and two trial court decisions reached independently by two different divisions of the superior court. I understand from the Legislature’s statement of purpose accompanying the corrective legislation that it never intended this result:
However, the general assembly never intended the juvenile procedures statutes to be used to permit a person who commits a crime to escape the consequences of that behavior simply by turning 18 before the state has filed charges against the person.
2011, No. 16, § 1. In my opinion, this deviation between legislative language and legislative intent occurred because we have a very complicated system of transferring cases between courts and, despite the best intentions, it is possible that some cases, perversely, will not have a home that comfortably or completely fits the circumstances of the case. In common jargon, these cases fall between the cracks.
¶ 26. Prior to restructuring, juvenile delinquency cases were adjudicated in family court, and criminal cases were adjudicated in district court. If the circumstances of the ease indicated that it should not be adjudicated in the court in which it was filed, the case and its paper file had to be sent from the wrong court to the *342right court, the necessary consequence of having separate first instance courts. Stated simplistically, the overall question was whether the circumstances warranted a juvenile rehabilitation disposition that continued only to adulthood in a confidential proceeding or, alternatively, warranted a criminal sentence in an open proceeding. Over time, the relevant circumstances became more and more complicated.
¶ 27. Restructuring created the opportunity to eliminate some of the complication. Since the family court and district court were merged into the superior court, it became possible to avoid transferring cases between courts and to get to the heart of the matter in one proceeding. Unfortunately, that did not happen in cases like this one because the jurisdictional walls between the components of the new superior court continued and cases must, accordingly, be transferred between divisions of the superior court by the same formal process that existed in the past. Cases continue to fall through the cracks just as they did before.
¶ 28. Thus, we have a situation where in many counties we have one court, with one judge and a unified staff, but the judge has to transfer the case to him or herself in order to match the disposition or sentence to the conduct. As we move to electronic records, even the symbolic physical transfer of the case file will disappear. In larger counties, there may be more than one judge, but the same unnecessary complexity persists despite the fact that each of the judges is a generalist who could adjudicate the whole case. In essence we have a system that is ruled by what hat the judge is wearing, and nothing more. If the judge fails to change hats properly, or no hat is available for the action sought, as here, the purposes of the statutory scheme are frustrated.
¶ 29. We can solve this problem by allowing a case to be filed in the criminal or family division, but then treating the filing point as a doorway into a proceeding that will evaluate the circumstances and determine how best to handle it with all relevant options available. In other words, we could have judges wearing no hats with the ability to conduct the proceeding as if he or she was wearing all possible hats. In viewing case processing this way, we are less likely to create cracks that will frustrate legislative intent and will be able to deal with cases that cross current jurisdictional boundaries as one case.
¶ 30. I urge the Legislature to review the jurisdictional walls between the components of the superior court and remove them *343for cases like this, in order to allow the most expeditious route to a just result.
Skoglund, J.,
¶ 31. dissenting. This case asks what should be done with adults who are alleged to have committed felonies when still juveniles. The majority believes the answer is “nothing.” While I agree that the family division lacked jurisdiction and properly dismissed the charges of lewd and lascivious conduct and of sexual assault, I cannot find in the statutes any intent to allow defendants that have committed serious felonies to avoid any consequences by the mere fact that they were under fourteen years of age when they did so. I would hold that a case could be brought in the criminal division of the superior court, to which the Legislature has granted jurisdiction “to try, render judgment, and pass sentence in prosecutions for felonies and misdemeanors.” 4 V.S.A. § 32(a).
¶ 32. Thirty years ago Vermont awoke to a new realization of a child’s capacity for depravity and violence. Wade Willis, age sixteen, beat his pregnant girlfriend in the head with a baseball bat and left her for dead. Later that day he returned, realized she was still alive, and used a shovel to finish what he started. Then he buried her. State v. Willis, 145 Vt. 459, 464, 494 A.2d 108, 110 (1985). A week earlier, in another county, Louis Hamlin, age sixteen, along with his fifteen-year-old companion, grabbed two girls, ages twelve and thirteen, and dragged them into the woods where they shot the girls with BB guns, stomped on them, raped them both vaginally and anally, tortured and stabbed them repeatedly, and left them tied up. One of the girls died from a stab wound that punctured her heart. The other survived. State v. Hamlin, 146 Vt. 97, 99-100, 499 A.2d 45, 47-48 (1985). The Age of Innocence, whether the phrase is applied to the age of the youths or the attitude of the public, was irremediably altered by these events of these two days in May 1981.
¶ 33. Louis Hamlin’s fifteen-year-old companion, who had been an equal participant in the vicious crime and at one point even claimed responsibility for the fatal stabbing, could not be charged in the criminal courts because he was under the age of sixteen. In re Hamlin, 155 Vt. 98, 99-100, 582 A.2d 129, 130 (1990). Juvenile delinquency proceedings were instituted against him. Hamlin, 146 Vt. at 100, 499 A.2d at 48.
¶ 34. The Legislature responded, calling a special session in July 1981 to significantly change Vermont’s juvenile justice laws. The *344law prior to 1981 required any court entertaining a criminal proceeding involving a defendant under the age of sixteen to transfer the matter to juvenile court. 33 V.S.A. § 635(a) (1980). In other words, a judge had no discretion to keep a matter in criminal court if the defendant was under the age of sixteen, no matter how heinous the crime. The Legislature then made numerous revisions to the statutes, including granting discretion to judges to keep fourteen- and fifteen-year-old defendants in criminal court if they were charged with one of eleven serious felonies. Id. § 635(b). State’s attorneys were given discretion in where to file charges for older juveniles. Id. § 635(c). And the juvenile court was given discretion to transfer defendants aged ten through thirteen to criminal court if they were charged with one of the eleven listed serious felonies. Id. § 635a(a).
¶ 35. Then, in 1988, fourteen-year-old Steven Buelow raped and murdered his seven-year-old cousin. He was charged in criminal court and moved to have his case transferred to juvenile court pursuant to the statutes then in place, 33 V.S.A. § 635(b) and § 644(c), which read: “any proceeding concerning a child who is alleged to have committed an act specified in section 635a(a) of this title [the same acts listed now in § 5204(a)] after attaining the age of 14 but not the age of 18. shall originate in district or superior court.”4 Murder, then as now, was included in § 635a(a)’s list of offenses. In State v. Buelow, we wrote, “[accordingly, in situations where a fourteen-to-sixteen-year-old is charged with murder, the criminal court has exclusive original jurisdiction over the matter.” 155 Vt. 537, 540, 587 A.2d 948, 950 (1990).
¶ 36. I agree that the statutes governing delinquency proceedings answer the question of whether the family division had jurisdiction to adjudicate this matter. Under 33 V.S.A. § 5103(a), the family division has “exclusive jurisdiction over all proceedings concerning a child who is or who is alleged to be a delinquent child.” A “child” includes an individual “alleged to have committed ... an act of delinquency after becoming 10 years of age and prior to becoming 18 years of age.” Id. § 5102(2)(C). The family division properly dismissed the lewd and lascivious and sexual assault charges, finding that its jurisdiction was clearly limited to *345children and that defendant was older than eighteen. It also correctly noted it could not transfer jurisdiction that it did not possess to the criminal division. I also agree with the majority that the newly enacted 33 V.S.A. § 5204a does not govern the case before us. The new statute is not a clarification; rather, it creates new law. I then part ways with my colleagues.
¶ 37. While 4 V.S.A. § 33(8) grants the family division “exclusive jurisdiction to hear and dispose of . . . [a]ll juvenile proceedings filed pursuant to chapters 51, 52, and 53 of Title 33, . . . whether the matter originated in the criminal or family division of the superior court,” it cannot be rigidly interpreted as controlling any matter involving a child actor when other statutes establish a parallel jurisdiction in the criminal division. Section 33(8) does not eliminate the statutes governing transfers from other divisions. Moreover, this is no longer a juvenile proceeding. There is no juvenile before the court. Defendant is not a child.
¶ 38. When creating the juvenile justice system, the Legislature gave special attention to eleven (now twelve) serious felonies, one of which is sexual assault. 33 V.S.A. § 5204(a). And, the statutes continue to provide that any proceeding concerning a child after attaining the age of fourteen, but not the age of eighteen, who is alleged to have committed one of the serious felonies “shall originate in district or superior court.” Id. § 5201(c); see infra, n.4. The delinquency procedures provide that a child as young as ten may be treated as an adult if he or she is alleged to have committed one of the serious felonies specified in § 5204(a). 33 V.S.A. §§ 5102(2)(C)(i) and 5204(a). And, if the case was commenced in the family division, it can be transferred to the criminal division when there is probable cause to believe that the child committed one of the listed acts and when “public safety and the interests of the community would not be served by treatment of the child under the provisions of law relating to juvenile courts and delinquent children.” Id. § 5204(c) (emphases added). Obviously the Legislature always understood that some actions, even when done by someone as young as ten years of age, should be handled as a criminal prosecution. Murder, for example, comes to mind.
¶ 39. This view runs counter to the majority’s assumption that it is the age of the perpetrator at the time of the offense that exclusively determines jurisdiction. This view is supported by provisions of 33 V.S.A. § 5203(a), which direct the criminal division *346to transfer to the family division any case filed against a defendant under the age of sixteen at the time of the offense, unless it is one of the offenses specified in § 5204(a).5 Then, § 5203(b) gives the criminal division discretion to transfer a case if the defendant was between the age of fourteen and sixteen at the time an offense specified in § 5204(a) was alleged to have been committed, and, if transferred, “the minor shall thereupon be considered to be subject to this chapter as a child charged with a delinquent act.” (Emphasis added.) However, by the very language used, the jurisdictional choices found in § 5203 only govern cases against minors. It does not address charges against adult defendants. That distinction takes this case out from under the governance of those statutes. Given the statutory structure in place, it is equally reasonable to find that it is the alleged actions of the perpetrator that control the jurisdiction of the criminal division.
¶40. Reading the entire statutory scheme involving criminal jurisdiction in pari materia to ascertain the Legislature’s intent, In re Willey, 2010 VT 93, ¶ 11, 189 Vt. 536, 14 A.3d 954, there is no indication that the Legislature intended to allow adult defendants to completely avoid the results of their actions as a juvenile. Chapter 52 of Title 33 is a comprehensive act governing juvenile delinquency proceedings with the overarching goal of protecting children who are still growing and maturing from the consequences of their actions. See In re G.T., 170 Vt. 507, 532, 758 A.2d 301, 318 (2000) (“[T]he focus of delinquency proceedings in general ... is on protecting children . . . .” (Johnson, J., dissenting)); In re P.M., 156 Vt. 303, 310, 592 A.2d 862, 865 (1991) (“We recognize that the purpose of Vermont’s juvenile provisions is not to punish juvenile offenders, but to . . . provide treatment consistent with the public interest for children who have committed delinquent acts.”); see also 33 V.S.A. § 5101(a) (construing juvenile judicial proceedings chapters “[t]o remove from children committing delinquent acts the taint of criminality and the *347consequences of criminal behavior and to provide supervision, care, and rehabilitation”).
¶ 41. However, the protections of the juvenile justice system are designed for children, not adults. The majority emphasizes the young age of the defendant when the acts alleged were committed and discusses the goal of juvenile proceedings to protect and rehabilitate youth in trouble. It posits that the policy behind the juvenile justice system takes into account that a child who commits a felony offense is still a child and “his culpability must be viewed in light of his age.” Ante, ¶ 19. I agree, especially in a case where the allegation is sexual assault by a thirteen-year-old. However, there is nothing to preclude a defendant charged with committing a sexual assault when he was thirteen from moving to dismiss a charge against him, arguing, for example, that, due to his tender years, the State will be unable to prove the requisite intent to satisfy the elements of the offense. See Northern Sec. Ins. Co. v. Perron, 172 Vt. 204, 215, 777 A.2d 151, 159 (2001) (explaining that it is “improper to [automatically] infer an intent to injure in cases where a minor sexually abuses another minor”). Questions that surround juvenile adjudications — brain development, emotional maturity, and impulse control — do not disappear when raised by a defendant charged with an act committed while a child. Moreover, failing to allow a prosecution to go forward removes any ability of the State to offer rehabilitative services to a man who, as a child, allegedly committed a felonious act of sexual assault, leaving him untreated.
¶ 42. Further support for this position is found in the statutes governing youthful offenders. 33 V.S.A. §§ 5281-5288. By its terms, § 5281 contemplates criminal charges being brought against a child the age of ten in the criminal division. It reads: “A motion may be filed in the criminal division . . . requesting that a defendant under 18 years of age in a criminal proceeding who had attained the age of 10 but not the age of 18 at the time the offense is alleged to have been committed be treated as a youthful offender.” Id. § 5281(a). If the motion is granted, the case can be transferred to the family division. Id. § 5281(b). Obviously, some criminal charges against ten-year-olds are filed in the criminal division. With such statutory provisions in place, I cannot think the Legislature ever intended to leave a thirteen-year-old unaccountable for murder, arson resulting in death, assault and robbery with a dangerous weapon, or kidnapping. Public protec*348tion requires that former children who committed very serious felonies be accountable in a court of law. I would much prefer a court evaluate legislatively designated criminal behavior and impose any necessary rehabilitative restrictions rather than letting a calendar decide the outcome.
¶ 43. While the provisions of newly enacted 33 V.S.A. § 5204a cannot be applied in this case, I find the expression of legislative intent found in the preamble to Act 16 to be instructive: “[T]he general assembly never intended the juvenile procedures statutes to be used to permit a person who commits a crime to escape the consequences of that behavior simply by turning 18 before the state has filed charges against the person.” 2011, No. 16, § 1. That expression of intent strongly suggests that the criminal division has always had jurisdiction over a case involving the crimes enumerated in § 5204(a) when the offender is now an adult.
¶ 44. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Reiber joins this dissent.

 I believe the choice of courts reflects the older system of hearing most felony charges punishable by life in prison in the superior courts, while leaving lesser criminal charges in the districts courts. 4 V.S.A. §§ 114, 439 (1972). This older reality is still reflected in the current version of 33 V.S.A. § 5201(c).

 Thus, the criminal division properly recognized the clear statutory mandate to transfer the L&L charge to the family division because defendant was under sixteen at the time of the alleged lewd and lascivious conduct and L&L is not one of the twelve serious crimes enumerated in 33 V.S.A. § 5204(a). As a final consideration of the L&L charges, I note that the statutory scheme creates a de facto statute of limitations on unlisted crimes in certain situations.