Court Opinion

ID: 9919233
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 19:02:20.738309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:33.783307
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/17/24 P. v. Medinilla CA2/6

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 THE PEOPLE,                                                  2d Crim. No. B321160
                                                             (Super. Ct. No. 1259550)
      Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Santa Barbara County)

 v.

 BRYAN STEVEN MEDINILLA,

      Defendant and Appellant.

       Bryan Steven Medinilla appeals the summary denial of his
petition for resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.6. He
contends the trial court erred in concluding the jury’s finding that
he personally used a weapon in committing murder (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1)) rendered him ineligible for resentencing as a matter
of law. The People concede the issue. We will reverse and

         1 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the

Penal Code.
remand with directions to issue an order to show cause and to
hold an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).)
            FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
                   Original Murder Conviction
      Appellant, Ruben Mize, Raul Diaz, and other members of
Santa Barbara’s Eastside gang drove into the territory of the
rival Westside gang in July of 2007. They spotted three
“Westsiders” walking on the sidewalk: Lorenzo Carachure, Noe
Carachure, and Rogelio Hernandez. Appellant and the other
“Eastsiders” jumped out of the truck to confront them. The two
groups yelled their affiliations and exchanged gang signs.
Witnesses saw appellant and others converge on Lorenzo.3 Diaz
struck Lorenzo in the head with a carjack, knocking him to the
ground. Mize threw a bicycle on top him. Mize then pulled out a
knife and stabbed Lorenzo twice in the neck and once in the
abdomen. Appellant stabbed him in the chest or stomach.
Lorenzo later died from the neck wounds.
      A jury found appellant and Mize guilty of first-degree
murder (§ 187).4 Diaz and another defendant were found guilty

      2 The facts are derived from our opinion affirming

Medinilla’s conviction on direct appeal. (People v. Nava (Jan. 8,
2014, B233532 [nonpub. opn.].) We include these facts for
narrative purposes and do not rely upon them to determine
appellant’s eligibility for resentencing. (People v. Flores (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 974, 988.)

      3We refer to Lorenzo and Noe by their first names to avoid
confusion. No disrespect is intended.

      4 Appellants and his codefendants were juveniles when the

crimes were committed and were charged as adults pursuant to
former Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (d).

                                 2
of second-degree murder. The jury also found true allegations
that appellant and Mize personally used a deadly weapon in
committing the murder (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). Appellant
received an aggregate term of 26 years to life in state prison. We
affirmed his conviction in 2014.
                       Petition for Resentencing
       Appellant petitioned for resentencing under former section
1170.95 (now section 1172.6) in 2021. The trial court initially
denied the petition without appointing counsel. (People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis).) The court later stayed the denial
order and appointed counsel. The People opposed the petition,
arguing the evidence at trial was sufficient to support a finding
that appellant was the actual killer or a major participant in the
offense. In response, appellant argued the jury was instructed on
the now-disapproved natural and probable consequences theory
of aider and abettor liability. There was nothing in the record of
conviction to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury did
not base [its] verdict” on this instruction.
       The trial court summarily denied the petition before
holding an evidentiary hearing. It reasoned: “Based on the fact
that [appellant] was convicted of murder and the personal use of
a deadly or dangerous weapon during the commission of the
murder was found to be true, this Court finds that [appellant] is
ineligible for relief under Penal Code Section 1170.95 because he
was the ‘actual killer’ and, at the very least, a ‘major
participant.’”
                             DISCUSSION
       Appellant contends the trial court erred when it concluded
the jury’s “true” finding on the use of a deadly weapon allegation

                                3
rendered him ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. The
People concede the issue.
        Senate Bill 1437 eliminated the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as a basis for convicting a defendant of
murder. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708
(Strong); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957; People v. Gentile
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843, 847-848 (Gentile).) Malice may
no longer be imputed solely on a defendant’s participation in a
crime. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) SB 1437 also limited the scope of the
felony-murder rule. The revised felony-murder statute requires
proving: (1) defendant was the actual killer; (2) if not the actual
killer, they assisted in the commission of the murder with the
intent to kill; or (3) they were “a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human
life.” (§ 189, subd. (e); Strong, at p. 708.)
        Those convicted of felony murder or murder under a
natural and probable consequences theory may petition to vacate
their conviction and seek resentencing under the revised laws.
(§ 1172.6.) The trial court must appoint counsel if a petition
contains all required information. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3).) The
court then determines after briefing whether the petitioner has
made a prima facie showing for relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) It
may summarily deny or dismiss the petition without a hearing
“‘[i]f the petition and record in the case establish conclusively
that the defendant is ineligible for relief.’” (People v. Curiel
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 450.)5 If the petitioner makes this showing

      5 Appellant and the People waived oral argument in this

appeal and we submitted the cause on November 9, 2023. The
Supreme Court decided People v. Curiel two weeks later. We

                                4
for relief the court must hold an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c) & (d)(1).) The People bear the burden at the hearing “to
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of
murder” under the revised laws. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
       The trial court relied on the jury’s finding that appellant
personally used a deadly or dangerous weapon to conclude he was
either the actual killer or a “major participant” in the offense. A
“finding of personal use,” however, “[does] not in itself prove [a]
defendant was the actual killer” or perpetrator. (People v. Jones
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1120.) For instance, “[i]f two robbers
display guns to intimidate robbery victims and one shoots and
kills a victim, both robbers could be found to have personally
used a gun in the robbery and the felony murder, even though
only one is the actual killer.” (Ibid.) The trial court erred to the
extent it found the jury’s “true” finding alone justified denying
appellant’s petition as a matter of law without a hearing.
       It was also error to conclude appellant was ineligible for
relief because he was a “major participant” in the offense under
section 189, subdivision (e)(3). While the record contained
evidence that appellant was among those who attacked Lorenzo –
including testimony that he stabbed Lorenzo after Mize – he was
neither tried nor convicted by the jury on a theory of felony
murder. However robust the court believed the evidence at trial
against appellant, the record did not “establish conclusively” that
he was the actual killer or sole perpetrator. (See, e.g., People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 233 [summary denial of
resentencing petition was proper where defendant “was the

vacated the submission and requested supplemental briefing
from the parties on the effect of Curiel, if any, on this case. We
read and consider the parties’ briefs.

                                 5
actual killer and the only participant in the killing”]; Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972 [“a trial court should not engage in
‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion’” at prima facie stage of section 1172.6 proceedings].)
As the People concede: “the record does not foreclose the
possibility that appellant could have been convicted under a
natural and probable consequences theory of aiding and
abetting.” As such, we reverse and remand the case with
directions to issue an order to show cause and hold an
evidentiary hearing. (People v. Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th 698;
Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) We need not address
appellant’s remaining claims.6
                            DISPOSITION
       The order summarily denying appellant’s Penal Code
section 1172.6 petition for resentencing is reversed. On remand,
the trial court is directed to issue an order to show cause and
conduct further proceedings in accordance with Penal Code
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(1).
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                     CODY, J.

I concur:

      GILBERT, P. J.

      6 Appellant also filed a habeas petition contending he is

entitled to relief pursuant to People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th
155. We deny the petition as untimely in a separate order.

                                 6
YEGAN, J., CONCURRING:
       There is no way to “sugar coat” this. The result reached by
the majority, compelled by precedent, is ridiculous. For the
reasons stated in People v. Arreguin (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 58, 63-
64, I concur under compulsion of California Supreme Court
authority. Appellant checked the box that said he cannot
presently be convicted of murder. This is false. (Pen. Code,
§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).) Notwithstanding instructional error, at
the very least, appellant can only be described as a direct aider
and abettor. (People v. Gentile (2020)10 Cal.5th 830, 848; People
v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1252.)
       According to the majority opinion, appellant directly
participated in a planned knife attack on a rival gang member.
He actually used his knife to stab the decedent in the stomach.
The majority recite that it was the co-defendant’s
contemporaneous stabbing the decedent in the neck that was the
fatal blow. This is not determinative. Does anyone actually
believe that appellant did not intend to kill the decedent? Does
anyone actually believe that he did not directly aid his co-
defendant who stabbed the decedent in the neck?
       In denying the motion for resentencing, the trial court said:
“Based on the fact that [appellant] was convicted of murder and
the personal use of [a] deadly . . . weapon during the commission
of the murder was found to be true, this Court finds that
[appellant] is ineligible for relief under [Penal Code section]
1170.95 because he was the . . . ‘actual killer’ . . . and, at the very
least, a . . . ‘major participant.’” This is sound reasoning and
consistent with common sense. Does the Legislature and/or the
California Supreme Court contemplate that a defendant, in this
circumstance, is to be treated with leniency? I once again ask
that the Supreme Court to adopt a harmless error analysis for
these types of cases. This case is going nowhere upon reversal.
But it is going somewhere when he loses in superior court!
Where? The Court of Appeal again. (See People v. Ruiz (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 1068, 1082-1083, (conc. opn. of Yegan, J.).)
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                            YEGAN, J.

                               2
                Clifford R. Anderson, III, Judge
            Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
               ______________________________

      Sylvia W. Beckham, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
       Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Nikhil Cooper, Deputy Attorney General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.