Court Opinion

ID: 9489867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:26:28.087791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:45.891450
License: Public Domain

SARIS, District Judge,
concurring.
I concur on the ground that Winship Green’s misuse of the union’s trademark in its campaign literature during the union election is not a commercial use of the mark adumbrated by Sections 32 or 43(a) of the Lanham Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125 (1994).
I
The union alleges that Winship Green’s use of its trademark during the election violated Sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
A
Section 32 of the Lanham Act concerns “trademark infringement” and proscribes misuse of another’s registered trademark in commerce “in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.”12 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (1994).
*208B
Section 43(a) provides broader protection, prohibiting “unfair competition” by use of any mark, registered or not. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768, 112 S.Ct. 2753, 2757, 120 L.Ed.2d 615 (1992). Section 43(a) prohibits two types of activities: “false designations of origin,” 15 U.S.C. § 43(a)(1)(A) (“Prong (A)”) and “false descriptions,” 15 U.S.C. § 43(a)(1)(B) (“Prong (B)”).13 See Truck Components, Inc. v. K-H Corp., 776 F.Supp. 405, 409 (N.D.Ill.1991); 3 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and, Unfair Competition § 27.02[3] (3d ed. 1996) (discussing history of the “two prongs” of § 43(a)— § 43(a)(1)(A)) (“trademark infringement”) and § 43(a)(1)(B) (“false advertising”).
Prong (A)14 prohibits false designations of the origin or sponsorship of goods or services. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (1994). Typical claims under prong (A) would involve a new trademark that was confusingly similar to an already established one, or an attempt by a defendant to “palm-off’ its goods as those of a competitor by use of the competitor’s mark. See Truck Components, 776 F.Supp. at 409; McCarthy on Trademarks, supra, at § 27.02[4] (describing these claims as “trademark infringement”).
In contrast, the protection under prong (B) is very different. Following its amendment in 1988, prong (B) creates liability for misrepresentations in commercial advertising or promotion as to the “nature, characteristics, qualities or geographic origin” of another person’s goods or services. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1994); see also Trademark Law Revision Act, Pub.L. 100-667, § 132, 102 Stat. 3946 (1988); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914, 921 (3d Cir.1990) (discussing effect of 1988 amendment to Lanham Act); McCarthy on Trademarks, supra, at § 27.02[4]. The Senate Committee Report accompanying this amendment explained the need for this addition to the Act as follows:
In one important area, however, the courts have refused to apply the section. Based on a 1969 seventh circuit decision, the courts have held that Section 43(a) applies only to misrepresentations about one’s own products and services; it does not extend to misrepresentations about competitor’s products or services. Bernard Food Indus. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279, 163 USPQ [264] 265 (7th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912, 90 S.Ct. 911, 25 L.Ed.2d 92, 164 USPQ 481 (1970). The committee agrees that this effect is illogical on both practical and public policy levels and that the public policy of deterring acts of unfair competition will be served if Section 43(a) is amended to make clear that misrepresentations about another’s products are as actionable as misrepresentations about one’s own.
S.Rep. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577; see also McCarthy on Trademarks, supra, at § 27.02J4] (stating that 1988 amendment codified “two prongs” of § 43(a): “part one *209relating] to ... unregistered trademark, tradename and trade dress infringement claims, and part two relating] to ... false advertising (as well as trade libel) claims”). Thus, prong (B) prohibits misrepresentations about the quality of a defendant’s own goods — even where the misrepresentations do not tend to confuse its goods with those of a competitor or otherwise misstate the origin of the goods — as well as affirmative misrepresentations about another’s products. Truck Components, 776 F.Supp. at 409 (citing In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 473 F.Supp. 393, 408 (N.D.Ill.1979)); see also McCarthy on Trademarks, supra, at § 27.04 (describing elements of prima facie case under prong (B)).
II
I am in agreement with the majority that the origin and sponsorship of the allegedly infringing documents was never in doubt. With respect to section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, prong (A) is inapplicable because there is no evidence, or even contention, that the company used the union’s mark to deceive bargaining unit members as to the affiliation of the company with the union or as to the sponsorship of its services by the union. Quite the contrary.
However, there is evidence that Winship Green used the union’s trademark to misrepresent the characteristics and nature of the union’s services (i.e., the amount of union dues or the purportedly draconian results of failure to pay them), thereby implicating prong (B), governing false descriptions. Cf. Energy Four, Inc. v. Dornier Medical Systems, Inc., 765 F.Supp. 724, 730 (N.D.Ga.1991) (describing cause of action for misrepresentation under Section 43(a)(1)(B) and collecting cases); Brandt Consol., Inc. v. Agrimar Corp., 801 F.Supp. 164, 174 (C.D.Ill.1992) (same); McCarthy on Trademarks, supra, at § 27.04 (same). Because this evidence that the company misrepresented the union’s services may be sufficient for the fact-finder to find confusion as to the “nature, characteristics, [or] qualities” qf the union’s services, I would not allow summary judgment for the company under prong (B) on the ground of a lack of confusion.
Ill
A firm ground for summary judgment, it seems to me, is that the Lanham Act creates no liability because the deception did not occur in connection with commercial sales or advertising, • as required under the Act, but rather in campaign hand-outs.
The Lanham Act protects only against certain commercial uses of trademarks. Section 32 governs the use of a registered mark “in commerce ... in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services.” 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l)(a) (1994). Section 43(a) is likewise limited to uses of marks “in commerce,” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1994), which the Act defines as using or displaying a mark in the sale or advertising of goods or services,15 see 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). And, section 43(a)(1)(B) limits misrepresentation claims to those eases involving “commercial advertising or promotion.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (1994).
While there is no appellate ease directly on point, trial courts have rejected efforts to extend the Lanham Act to cases where the defendant is not using or displaying the trademark in the sale, distribution or advertising of its goods or services. See Lucas-film Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F.Supp. 931, 934 n. 2 (D.D.C.1985) (rejecting the claim that advertising companies could be held liable for using the trade name “Star Wars” in the political debate over a national policy because the trademark laws only reach activities in which a trademark is used in connec*210tion with selling or advertising services of commercial or noncommercial defendants); Stop the Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Comm., 489 F.Supp. 1112, 1124 (S.D.N.Y.1980) (expressing serious doubts as to whether the Lanham Act applies to the deceptive use of the Olympic trademark by a group opposing the conversion of Olympic facilities into a prison, in part because “there is no suggestion that the alleged deception was in connection with any goods or services”); Reddy Communications, Inc. v. Environmental Action Found., 477 F.Supp. 936, 946 (D.D.C.1979) (rejecting claim that an environmental group’s caricature of an energy industry service mark violated the Lanham Act where the company failed to prove that the environmental group used the service mark to “identify or promote” the sale of its publications); see generally L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc. 811 F.2d 26, 32 (1st Cir.1987) (holding under a state anti-dilution state that a parody was not a commercial use of plaintiffs mark because the publisher “did not use Bean’s mark to identify or market goods or services to consumers”), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1013, 107 S.Ct. 3254, 97 L.Ed.2d 753 (1987).
Nonetheless, some forms of union-related activity may constitute commercial sale or advertising that is protected under the Act. See, e.g., Brack Van Houten Holding, Inc. v. Save Brach’s Coalition for Chicago, 856 F.Supp. 472, 475-476 (N.D.Ill.1994) (finding Lanham Act protection applicable where union used company logo in connection with the sale and distribution of its buttons and stickers and solicitation of donations to support the coalition’s opposition to a plant closing and was likely to cause confusion as to the company’s affiliation with, or approval of, defendant’s proposals); Marriott Corp. v. Great Am. Serv. Trades Council, AFL-CIO, 552 F.2d 176, 179 (7th Cir.1977) (rejecting the union’s contention that the National Labor Relations Board had exclusive jurisdiction over an action for trademark infringement arising under the Lanham Act where the union allegedly used the company’s trademark in advertisements which suggested an affiliation between the company and the union in advertising its services to prospective employees). However, such commercial activity is simply not present here.
Accordingly, the union’s limited property right, under the Lanham Act against commercial misuse of its trademark is not implicated in this case. See generally Lucasfilm Ltd., 622 F.Supp. at 933 (“It is well established that the property right conferred by a trademark is very limited.”). While the union rightfully complains about the company’s unfair tactics, it must find its federal remedy for deceptive campaign literature under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141 et seq. (1994). See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 60, 86 S.Ct. 657, 662, 15 L.Ed.2d 582 (1966) (permitting libel action under state law for defamatory statements published during a union organization campaign and discussing authority of the National Labor Relations Board to set aside elections where “a material fact has been misrepresented in the representation campaign; opportunity for reply has been lacking; and the misrepresentation has had an impact on the free choice of the employees participating in the election”).
Because the Court reaches the same conclusion for somewhat different reasons, I join in its judgment.

. Section 32 of the Lanham Act, as amended, states in pertinent part:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant—
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection *208with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive ...
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided....
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994).

. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, as amended, states in pertinent part:
§ 1125. False designations of origin and false descriptions forbidden
(a) Civil action. (1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods and services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which' — •
(A) is likely to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities.
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994) (emphasis in original).

. In 1992 Congress redesignated paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 43(a) as subparagraphs (A) and (B). See Oct. 27, 1992, Pub.L. 102-542, § 3(c), 106 Stat. 3568.

. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 states in pertinent part:
The term "use in commerce" means the bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark. For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be deemed to be in use in commerce—
sk -k * * * *
(2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services are rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered in more than one State or in the United States and a foreign country and the person rendering the services is engaged in commerce in connection with the services.