Court Opinion

ID: 9768898
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 13:55:05.555997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:48.846611
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Calvert,
joined by Justices Walker and Norvell and Chief Justice Hickman, dissenting.
An opinion substantially as set out below was adopted and handed down as the opinion of the majority of this court on April 6, 1960, in connection with its judgment affirming the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals. Petitioner’s motion for rehearing was overruled by a reduced majority on October 5, 1960. A majority have now concluded that the judgments of the Court of Civil Appeals and the trial court should be reversed and judgment here rendered for petitioner. My views of the case and concerning a proper decision of the questions in the case remain the same as when they were expressed as the .views of the majority in the attached opinion, and I accordingly now file the opinion as a dissent.
Suits by Mrs. Elizabeth Cotton Andrews as guardian of a designated minor-beneficiary in policies of insurance issued by Pan American Life Insurance Company and Continental Assurance Company on the life of Harrington G. Simmons were consolidated in the trial court. In the suits recovery was sought from the respective defendants of double indemnity or accidental death benefits. Trial was before the court without the aid of a jury and judgment was rendered for the plaintiff. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. 323 S.W. 2d 287.
The wording1 of the relevant provisions of the two policies is substantially the same. Pan American’s policy provides for payment of double the face amount of the policy upon due proof that the death of the insured “occurred in consequence of bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental means.” Continental’s policy provides for an additional payment equal to the face amount of the policy upon due proof that death of the insured “resulted from bodily injuries effected directly and independently of all other causes through external, violent and accidental means.” Under the plain provisions of each of the policies liability for the additional payment attaches if injuries causing death are internal and are revealed by an autopsy, regardless of whether they leave a visible contusion or wound on the outside of the body.
*407The insured died on January 7, 1954. An autopsy revealed that his death was caused by a cerebral arterio-thrombosis (a clot in an artery of the brain). There were no visible contusions or wounds on the outside of the body. We granted writ of error because we were of the opinion that the only injury suffered by the insured, having support in the evidence, which could have caused his death was caused by a psychic trauma, and we wished to review the holding of the Court of Civil Appeals that death from that type of injury was effected solely or directly and independently of all other causes through “external, violent and accidental means.” A brief statement of some of the relevant evidence is in order.
During the early morning hours of Friday, December 4, 1953 there was a fire on the floor of the building where the insured had an accounting office. There is in the record testimony that so far as was known the origin of the fire was accidental; there is no evidence to the contrary. Before the fire the insured, who was then forty-four years of age, was active, athletic, strong and apparently physically sound. He was seen watching the fire by witnesses who testified that he appeared to be nervous, upset and excited. He appeared to be still very nervous and upset on Saturday and borrowed field glasses in an effort to see into his office. On the same day he was observed favoring his right foot. On Sunday the insured was seen making several trips into and out of his office from the top of an adjoining building, over a firewall, carrying wire baskets full of papers, files, etc. On Monday he dropped one end of a desk he was helping to carry into another office and complained that his arm and leg had been “giving him some trouble in the last day or two.” During the interval from about December 8th to December 17th a close friend noted that something1 was bothering the insured physically and that he was not acting, physically or mentally, as he had before the fire. On the 13th he complained to his sister-in-law of a lack of feeling in the right side of his face and of something wrong with his right leg. On the night of the 17th he complained to a friend that he was not feeling well, and he left a dance early. On the 18th he told his friend he was losing the feeling in one leg and foot. The insured forgot to mail reports which should have been mailed by December 10th, was unable to write a check on the 21st, on the same date drove his automobile against a light pole, which he had failed to see, and dropped a cup of coffee at a party. On the 24th the insured visited his sister-in-law, spilled coffee and parts of his dinner, said he had no feeling in the right side of his face or in his right foot, and could not use his arm very well.
*408The insured accompanied his minor daughter to the office of his family doctor, Dr. John L. Dean, Jr., on December 5th, and with “a great deal of emotion” told the doctor that the fire had been very, very serious and that the destruction of his records had him in a jam. During a social visit on the 16th the doctor observed that the insured had a noticeable limp in his right leg and arranged a professional appointment for the 17th. Insured related to the doctor that he had had the limp since a day or two after the fire. Examination revealed an extensive lack of feeling in the right leg and right arm, and an appointment was made with Dr. Abe Hauser, a neurologist, for the 22nd. After examination by Dr. Hauser the insured entered a hospital on the 25th.
Much of the medical testimony is set out in question and answer form in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals. After the insured entered the hospital, Dr. Hauser called in Dr. James A. Greenwood, Jr., a neuro-surgeon, who operated on the insured on Januai-y 4th. Dr. Greenwood testified that a cerebral arterio-thrombosis could result from a congenital condition or that it might be precipitated by emotional stress and strain; that there was surprisingly little arterio-sclerosis in the brain of the insured and that, in his opinion, it was not sufficient to have caused the thrombosis. Dr. Dean testified that, in his opinion, “the thing that set off the chain reaction that produced this condition, was probably psychic trauma;” that “The fire produced the reaction in his mind, which is capable of producing damage to the cells tissue, not only in the brain, but other organs too.” Dr. Edward Darsey, in answer to a hypothetical question, gave it as his opinion that there was a reasonable probability that the emotional or psychic trauma suffered by the insured as a result of the fire was the cause of the thrombosis.
The single point of error before this court asserts that there is in the record no evidence of probative force which will support a recovery of double indemnity or accidental death benefits under the provisions of the policies in suit.
The evidence is overwhelming that the autopsy performed on the body of the insured disclosed that he died from a cerebral arterio-thrombosis. The policy does not require that the "means” causing bodily injury be disclosed by autopsy, only that the bodily injury causing death be disclosed thereby. There can be no question but that the thrombosis was internal and that it was disclosed by an autopsy. The evidence above detailed gives rise to a reasonable inference that the thrombosis occurred on *409the day of the fire and the testimony of Drs. Dean and Darsey that the thrombosis was probably caused by psychic trauma supports, in law, the trial court’s implied finding that psychic trauma did cause the thrombosis and death. Port Terminal Railroad Ass’n. v. Ross, 155 Texas 447, 289 S.W. 2d 220. There is testimony of medical witnesses in the record to the effect that they had never heard of a cerebral arterio-thrombosis being caused by psychic trauma and that they regarded such an occurrence as improbable, but that testimony presented, at most, only a conflict in the evidence. Our jurisprudence has found no better way of resolving conflicts in the testimony of witnesses, even of experts, than through findings by a jury or trial judge. Coxson v. Atlanta Life Ins. Co., 142 Texas 544, 179 S.W. 2d 943.
The difficult question is whether the evidence supports the implied finding of the trial court that the cerebral thrombosis was effected solely or directly and independently of all other causes through external, violent and accidental means. In approaching that question it should be noted at the outset that if death is proximately caused by accidental means it is immaterial that a pre-existing condition of health may have made the body more susceptible to injury; death from injury in that situation, it is held, nevertheless results “solely” or “directly and independently of all other causes” from the injury. Home Benefit Ass’n. of Paris v. Smith, Texas Civ. App., 16 S.W. 2d 357, writ refused; 29A Am. Jur. 351, Sec. 1212. Our inquiry is therefore narrowed to whether the cerebral thrombosis resulting from psychic trauma caused by watching the fire destroy his office and records was effected through “external, violent and accidental means.” The problem is, in reality, more one of determining whether the facts impliedly found by the trial court bring the death of the insured within the terms of the policies than it is of determining whether there is evidence of the existence of the facts. The insured was highly nervous and excited from watching a fire, accidental in origin, destroy his office and business records; the excitement generated a psychic trauma which caused a thrombosis in an artery of his brain from which he died. Was his death effected through external, violent and accidental means? The question divides itself into three parts: Was the means of the insured’s death external? Was it violent? Was it accidental ?
In McGlinchey v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 80 Me. 251, 14 A. 13, 6 Am. St. Rep. 190, a horse driven by the insured and pulling a carriage in which he and two children were riding *410became frightened, nearly collided with other teams, and ran for a considerable distance before being brought under control. The insured became ill immediately and died within an hour. The court accepted the evidence as establishing as a fact that the insured died from a ruptured blood vessel about the heart, and concluded that the rupture was caused by the “extraordinary physical and mental exertion which the deceased put forth to save his children and himself from injury.” So concluding, the court had no difficulty in further concluding that the means of death was violent and accidental and held specifically that death was caused by “external means.” The court then continued:
“The defendants, however, do not agree to this version of the facts. They contend that death was produced purely by fright, and not by the aid of any physical means whatever, and that the means through which death was produced must be considered as internal only. But if it is to be admitted that death was caused through fright, even then we are just as strongly convinced that it was also caused by external means. * * * If the death be laid to fright, it must be because fright produced bodily injury, and the means which produced fright were external.”
While the Court’s holding that fright alone would be an external means of death is obviously dictum, we regard it as sound and accordingly hold in the instant case that the death of the insured was effected through external means. The means of death may be external although it acts only internally. 29A Am. Jur. 310, Insurance, Sec. 1165. It is unnecessary to predicate liability under the policy provisions that the physical force which causes death should spend itself against the exterior of the body. In Hanna v. Rio Grande Nat. Life Ins. Co., Texas Civ. App., 181 S.W. 2d 908, 911, writ refused, we approved the following quotation from Vance on Insurance, 2nd. Ed., Sec. 258, page 879: “Thus, poison taken into the system, and operating entirely internally, is nevertheless an external cause, as is the water which causes death by drowning, and g-as which causes asphyxiation.” In writing their policies petitioners recognized that death could result from external means although the injury causing death was only internal by providing for liability when death was shown by autopsy to have resulted from internal injury although there was no visible contusion or wound on the outside of the body.
We also hold that death of the insured was effected through violent means. “The term ‘violent’ * * * signifies merely that a physical force, however slight, is efficient in producing the *411injury.” 45 C.J.S. 784, Insurance, Sec. 754. An unnatural death effected through accidental means imports violence. American Accident Co. v. Reigart, 94 Ky. 547, 23 S.W. 191, 21 L.R.A. 651; 29A Am. Jur. 310, Insurance, Sec. 1165. In keeping with that theory we approved in Hanna, supra, the further statement from Vance, as follows: “Likewise, the term ‘violent,’ as applied to causes of accidental injury, means merely that the cause is efficient in producing a harmful result. It is not necessary that it shall be violent in the sense of breaking tissues or otherwise physically and visibly affecting the body.” The “violent” force of a psychic trauma and its “violent” effect in causing physical bodily injury is settled by our decision in Bailey v. American General Ins. Co., 154 Texas 430, 279 S.W. 2d 315.
There remains the question of whether the death of the insured was effected through “accidental” means. There is great confusion and conflict in the decided cases with respect to whether death in particular fact situations was produced by accidental means. The confusion is caused, largely, by efforts of courts of various jurisdictions to distinguish between “accidental death” and death from “accidental means,” see 166 A.L.R. 469-479, and was forecast by Mr. Justice Cardozo in a dissenting opinion in Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491, 78 L. Ed. 934, 54 S. Ct. 461, 90 A.L.R. 1382, in which he said the attempted distinction would “plunge this branch of the law into a Serbonian Bog.” The courts of many jurisdictions have rejected or repudiated any such distinction. 166 A.L.R. 472. But however that may be, this Court recognized in Bryant v. Continental Casualty Co., 107 Texas 582, 182 S.W. 673, L.R.A. 1916E, 945, that a distinction does exist, and the distinction has been observed, at least in theory, in later decisions by this Court. See International Travelers’ Ass’n. v. Francis, 119 Texas 1, 23 S.W. 2d 282; International Travelers’ Ass’n. v. Marshall, 131 Texas 258, 114 S.W. 2d 851.
The difficulty in applying the rule when the distinction is observed is no better illustrated than by comparing the Bryant and Landress cases, supra. In Bryant this Court recognized the distinction and, in applying it, held that death of an insured from sunstroke suffered while walking on the streets of Houston was effected through accidental means. In Landress the Supreme Court of the United States also recognized the distinction but, in applying it, held that death of an insured from sunstroke suffered while playing golf was not effected through accidental means. Now, obviously, the location of the insured (upon the street or on the golf course) when the sunstroke occurred is *412no sound basis- for the differing holdings, as neither is the activity (walking in the pursuit of business or walking in the pursuit of pleasure) in which the insured was engaged. Moreover, both courts purported to apply the same rule; that is, both courts recognized that it was not enough to predicate recovery that death accidentally resulted from voluntary exposure to the sun’s rays, but that it was necessary that death should have resulted from “accidental means.” Both courts reasoned that death from voluntary exposure to the sun’s rays is accidental in that it is unusual, unanticipated, unexpected and extraordinary. This Court reasoned that the word “means” as employed in the term “accidental means” is synonymous with “cause,” and that since it is not usual or expected that exposure to the sun’s rays will cause death it must follow that the cause, or “means,” of death was accidental. The Supreme Court of the United States reasoned that the “external means” producing the insured’s death was the rays of the sun and found no allegation of anything in the sun’s rays which was unexpected or unforeseen.
The decided cases involving facts analogous to the facts in the instant case are few and are not greatly enlightening or entirely satisfactory as precedents. The only cases in which the problem is discussed which our research has discovered, other than McGlinchey v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., supra, are International Travelers’ Ass’n. v. Branum, Texas Civ. App., 169 S.W. 389; Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Campbell, Tenn. App., 79 S.W. 2d 292, and Pierce v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 7 Wash. 2d 151, 109 P 2d 322.
In International Travelers’ Ass’n. v. Branum, the Court of Civil Appeals held that death from apoplexy — the bursting of a blood vessel in the brain — caused by the excitement of witnessing a man burned to death in an accidental fire, or by a fall produced by the excitement, or by both, was an accidental death and a death caused by accidental means. The judgment, of the Court of Civil Appeals was reversed on other grounds by this Court without discussion of the problem. See 109 Texas 543, 212 S.W. 630. In Robinson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., Texas Com. App., 276 S.W. 900, the court cited the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals in Branum as a basis for recognizing that there is a distinction between death from apoplexy produced by natural causes or “apoplexy as that term is commonly understood,” and death from apoplexy produced by external, violent and accidental means
*413In Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Campbell, a Tennessee Court of Appeals, an intermediate appellate court, interpreted the evidence as establishing that death of an insured from a cerebral hemorrhage was caused by a combination of a pre-existing condition of blood vessels in the brain and “mental shock” from running an automobile against a child, and held that death did not result “solely and exclusively” from either cause. The court went on to say by way of dictum that even if the pre-existing disease did not contribute to cause the death it was “of the opinion * * * that a purely ‘mental shock’ due to excitement or ‘mental disturbance’ * * * is not a bodily injury within the contemplation of the insurance contracts * * The case is of doubtful precedential value even in Tennessee. See Nat. Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Follett, 168 Tenn. 647, 80 S.W. 2d 92; North American Ins. Co. v. Ellison, 267 S.W. 2d 115.
Perhaps most closely analogous is Pierce v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. Suit was on two accident policies which provided for weekly payments as indemnity “Against Bodily Injury sustained * * * solely through accidental means * * *.” The evidence established that the insured became badly frightened and “slammed on the brakes” and suffered a cerebral hemorrhage when it appeared that a collision between his automobile and another was inevitable. There was medical testimony that the hemorrhage was caused by a ruptured blood vessel and that “the precipitating cause of the rupture was a combination of the fright and the sudden physical effort then exerted” by the insured. The Supreme Court of Washington stated that one of the questions it was called upon to answer was “whether or not fright, or mental shock, unaccompanied by physical impact, is sufficient to constitute ‘accidental means’ within the purport of that term as used in the policies.” The Court answered the question in the affirmative and upheld a Recovery by the insured.
Other cases which are not squarely in point but which are cited by petitioners as persuasive to their point of view are International Travelers’ Ass’n. v. Ross, Texas Com. App., 292 S.W. 193 (Death from rupture of a blood vessel in the brain caused by straining while vomiting held to be caused solely by sickness and not by accidental means) ; Radcliffe v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co., Texas Civ. App., 298 S.W. 2d 213, writ refused, n.r.e (Death from suffocation caused by entry into the lungs of regurgitated or vomited contents of the stomach held to be caused by neither external nor accidental means) ; Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Douglass, 5th Cir., 215 F. 2d 201 (Death from ruptured aorta caused by strain of lift*414ing a crate of grapefruit held not to be caused by accidental means).
Other cases which are not squarely in point but which are persuasive to respondent’s point of view are Pledger v. Business Men’s Accident Ass’n. of Texas, Texas Com. App., 228 S.W. 110 (Death was from rupture of heart vessels caused by lifting bales of cotton. The hazard insured against was “accidental death” rather than death caused by “accidental means.” It was held that the death was an “accidental death” because it was caused by “accidental means”) ; Ft. Worth Mut. Benev. Ass’n. of Texas v. Miller, Texas Civ. App., 280 S.W. 338 writ dismissed (Death from a ruptured artery in the brain caused by pushing an automobile held to be caused by “accidental means only”) ; Home Ben. Ass’n. of Paris, Texas, v. Smith, Texas Civ. App., 16 S.W. 2d 357, writ refused (Death from ruptured blood vessel caused by cranking an automobile held to be “caused by an accident”); Garrett v. International Travelers’ Ass’n., Texas Civ. App., 14 S.W. 2d 944. no writ history, (Death from carbunclar infection caused by rubbing or picking pimple on nose held to be from “external, violent and accidental means”) ; International Travelers’ Ass’n. v. Yates, Texas Com. App., 29 S.W. 2d 980 (Death from administration of gas as anesthetic held to be through “accidental means”) ; International Travelers As’sn. v. Francis, 119 Texas 1, 23 S.W. 2d 282 (Death from infection following" extraction of a tooth held to be caused “solely and exclusively by external, violent and accidental means”); International Travelers’ Ass’n. v. Bettis, Texas Civ. App., 52 S.W. 2d 1059, writ refused, (Death from blood poisoning from accidental cut on finger held to be caused by “external, violent and accidental means”) ; International Travelers’ Ass’n. v. Marshall, Texas Civ. App., 94 S.W. 2d 558, reversed on other grounds but holding approved, 131 Texas 258, 114 S.W. 2d 851 (Death from peritonitis caused by fall against a tractor wheel held to be caused through “accidental means”) ; Hanna v. Rio Grande Nat. Life Ins. Co., Texas Civ. App., 181 S.W. 2d 908, writ refused, (Death from voluntary taking of a prescribed number of sulfanilamide tablets held to be caused by “external, violent and accidental means”) ; Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of California v. Schlakzug, 143 Texas 264, 183 S.W. 2d 709, (Death from infection caused by plucking hair from nostril held effected through “external, violent and accidental means,” and also that the infection occurred through “an accidental cut or wound” made by intentionally plucking the hair.)
It is said above that this Court has observed in theory in *415a number of cases a distinction between accidental death and death caused by accidental means. The later cases indicate, however, that the distinction is observed more in theory than it is in fact. In Francis, supra, it was held that extraction of the tooth was the means of the infection which followed and caused death. Now, obviously, extraction of the tooth was deliberate and not accidental, but death from extraction of the tooth was nevertheless held to be produced by accidental means because the extraction of the tooth had the unexpected and unforseen, and thus accidental, effect of introducing pythogenic organisms into the blood stream. In support of its holding the Court quoted extensively from Cooley’s Briefs on Insurance, 2nd Ed., Vol. 6, p. 5234, in part as follows: “* * * an effect which is not the natural or probable consequence of the means which produced it, an effect which does not ordinarily follow and cannot be reasonably anticipated from the use of such means, an effect which the actor did not intend to produce and which he cannot be charged with the design of producing, is produced by accidental means. * * *” The Court laid particular stress upon the fact that a vis major or act of God was so connected with the extraction of the tooth as to become part and parcel of that act; thus, it was said, the means, although voluntary, took color from the unknown and fatal factor and became accidental. In the course of its opinion the court disclaimed any intention of departing from the rule of the Bryant case.
We refused writ of error in Hanna, supra, thereby making the opinion in that case as authoritative as our own. In that case the Court of Civil Appeals analyzed the Francis opinion at length and said it did not regard that case and Bryant as conflicting, but the court added that if there was conflict Francis was later and should be regarded as authoritative. It also recognized that Francis committed this jurisdiction to “the more liberal rule” that if the death which follows a given voluntary act is such as follows in an unusual and unexpected way the death is produced by accidental means. In support of its conclusion the court cited and quoted with approval from Taylor v. New York Life Ins. Co., 176 Minn. 171, 222 N.W. 912, 60 A.L.R. 959, in which death resulted from administration of a local anesthetic to which the insured’s body was hypersensitive. The Minnesota Court held that death was produced by accidental means and said: “* * the weight of authority is to the effect that the term ‘accidental’ is equally descriptive of means which produce effects which are not their natural and probable consequences, as it is of means which are wholly unexpected.” To the same effect, see Seaboard Life Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 134 *416Texas 165, 132 S.W. 2d 393, and Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schlakzug, 143 Texas 264, 183 S.W. 2d 709.
From the cases reviewed it clearly appears that the distinction once generally recognized between “accidental death” and “death produced by accidental means,” as those terms are used in insurance contracts, no longer exists in this state. Now to apply the rule as it has been evolved to the facts of this case.
It is of no consequence whether the fire was accidental in origin or otherwise. The fire was not the means of the insured’s death. The psychic trauma which resulted from viewing the fire was the means or cause of his death. The viewing of the fire was no accident; it was voluntary and deliberate. But the viewing of the fire produced a wholly unexpected, unusual and unforeseen catastrophe — a clot in an artery of the brain. And even if we may say that the reaction of extreme excitement flowing from witnessing the destruction of his office and records was not unusual, we are yet compelled to say, on the basis of petitioners’ own medical testimony as well as from common knowledge, that the generation of a cerebral arterio-thrombosis from the excitement was an unusual and unforeseen result. It cannot be a logical distinction between the drowningi and asphyxiation cases and this case that whereas the external and violent force in those cases entered the body through the nose or the mouth and caused death by injury to other organs of the body the external and violent force in this case entered the body through the eyes and caused death by injury to the brain. We therefore hold that the death of the insured, under the evidence adduced in this case, was effected or produced by accidental means.
The motion for rehearing filed herein by petitioner should be overruled and the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals should be affirmed.
Opinion delivered November 23, 1960.
Rehearing overruled December 31, 1960.