Court Opinion

ID: 9387218
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-16 15:00:28.97996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:12.254520
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30218    Document: 00516713394        Page: 1   Date Filed: 04/14/2023

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                            Fifth Circuit

                                                                          FILED
                                                                      April 14, 2023
                                No. 22-30218
                                                                     Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                          Clerk
   Manuel Adams, Jr.,

                                                         Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                    versus

   City of Harahan,

                                                     Defendant—Appellant.

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                          USDC No. 2:20-CV-2794

   Before Stewart, Dennis, and Southwick, Circuit Judges.
   Carl E. Stewart, Circuit Judge:
         This appeal arises from Manuel Adams’s suit against the City of
   Harahan (“the City”) for its alleged deprivation of his Fourteenth
   Amendment right to due process. Because the district court erroneously
   determined that Adams had a liberty interest in his career in law
   enforcement, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of the City’s Rule
   12(c) motion and DISMISS Adams’s due process claim.
Case: 22-30218         Document: 00516713394               Page: 2       Date Filed: 04/14/2023

                                           No. 22-30218

                                   I.       Background
               A.      Chief Walker’s Disciplinary Charges Against Adams
           Adams ascended the ranks to Captain over an eighteen-year career in
   law enforcement with the Harahan Police Department (“HPD”). He had an
   unblemished disciplinary record during his tenure with HPD. But that
   changed in October 2019, when HPD Chief of Police Robert Walker (“Chief
   Walker”) determined that Adams was guilty of numerous offenses,
   including: (1) Conduct Unbecoming an Officer; (2) Unsatisfactory
   Performance; and (3) False Statement. As a classified civil service employee,
   Adams was entitled to a fifteen-day appeal window of Chief Walker’s
   disciplinary determinations. See La. R. S. § 33:2561.
           Adams exercised his right to appeal a week after Chief Walker’s
   charges. However, Chief Walker emailed the Jefferson Parish District
   Attorney’s office (“JPDA”) to inform it of his disciplinary action against
   Adams before he exercised his right. After communicating with Chief
   Walker, JPDA placed Adams’s name on its witness notification list (the
   “Giglio list”).1 Adams alleges that an officer’s inclusion on the Giglio list is
   effectively a “death knell to a career in law enforcement.” Because the Giglio
   list is at JPDA’s discretion, a successful appeal by Adams would not force
   JPDA to remove his name from the list. Faced with no guaranteed way to get
   his name off of the Giglio list, Adams sued the City.

           1
            JPDA maintains a witness notification list in accordance with Brady v. Maryland,
   373 U.S. 83 (1963) and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). Those cases require
   JPDA to turn over any evidence favorable to the defendant. This includes evidence that the
   accused can use to impeach police officers that the prosecution relies on in building its case.
   Adams avers that his inclusion on the Giglio list labels him as a liar or bad cop, which
   operates as a bar to his continued career in law enforcement.

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                                        No. 22-30218

                            B.      District Court Proceedings
           Adams brought a civil rights suit against the City for violation of his
   procedural due process rights, stigma-plus-infringement, and defamation
   under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He included Louisiana state law claims for
   defamation, invasion of privacy, and negligence. The City moved to dismiss
   his § 1983 claims under Rule 12(c).2
           The district court first examined his procedural due process rights
   claim. It rejected Adams’s assertions that the City unconstitutionally
   violated his property interest because he was afforded due process when he
   exercised his right to appeal Chief Walker’s determinations. It then evaluated
   whether the City violated his liberty interests. Notably, it recognized
   Adams’s “liberty interest in his occupation as a law enforcement officer.” It
   reasoned that the Supreme Court supported its conclusion that Adams has a
   right “to engage in any of the common occupations of life.” Kerry v. Din, 576
   U.S. 86, 94 (2015). It then held that the City violated his right by failing to
   provide him the “opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
   meaningful manner” before reporting his disciplinary charges to JPDA.
   Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
           The district court opined that the due process that the City provided
   Adams was unsatisfactory for at least two reasons: (1) He sufficiently alleged
   that Chief Walker oversaw his disciplinary proceedings and likely had bias
   against him; and (2) he remained deprived of his liberty interest even if his
   appeal was successful. Having established that Adams pleaded facts to
   support that Chief Walker violated his procedural due process rights based

           2
              The City did not challenge Adams’s defamation, invasion-of-privacy, or
   negligence claims in its Rule 12(c) motion. Therefore, those claims are not addressed in
   this opinion.

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   on a deprivation of his liberty interest, it next evaluated whether he could
   sustain this claim against the City.
          The district court allowed Adams’s claim against the City to survive
   the pleading stage. It first reasoned that the municipal liability analysis was
   straightforward because he alleged that Chief Walker acted pursuant to a
   policy, practice, and custom of the City. Accordingly, the City was liable
   because Chief Walker acted as the final policymaker on its behalf. Second, it
   stated that the City was liable even though JPDA put Adams’s name on the
   list because Chief Walker “set in motion a series of events that would
   foreseeably cause the deprivation of [Adams’s] constitutional rights.” Morris
   v. Dearborne, 181 F.3d 657, 672 (5th Cir. 1999). Ultimately, it viewed the case
   as one where Chief Walker contrived an investigation against Adams,
   determined his guilt, and contacted JPDA intending to place his name on the
   Giglio list and end his career in law enforcement. Under that characterization,
   it determined that Adams successfully alleged a Fourteenth Amendment
   violation under § 1983.
          Finally, the district court addressed Adams’s stigma-plus-defamation
   claim. It held that he failed to allege facts demonstrating the “infliction of a
   stigma on the person’s reputation by a state official” plus “an infringement
   of some other interest.” Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 935–36
   (5th Cir. 1995). The district court dismissed this claim but granted him leave
   to amend it.3 The City appealed.
          On appeal, the City argues that the district court erred in determining
   that Adams had a cognizable liberty interest in his occupation as a law
   enforcement officer. It asks us to reverse this determination and dismiss his

          3
            The City does not contest the district court’s decision to allow Adams to amend
   his stigma-plus-defamation claim, so we do not address that claim herein.

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                                        No. 22-30218

   claims. If we determine that Adams has successfully alleged a violation of his
   liberty interest, it argues that we should still dismiss his claim because it
   provided him adequate due process.
                          II.     Standard of Review
          We review “de novo a district court’s ruling on a Rule 12(c) motion
   for judgment on the pleadings.” Q Clothier New Orleans, LLC v. Twin City
   Fire Ins. Co., 29 F.4th 252, 256 (5th Cir. 2022). “The standard for deciding a
   Rule 12(c) motion is the same standard used for deciding motions to dismiss
   pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).” Id. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
   must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
   relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2007).
                                  III. Discussion
                                     A.      Standing
          Adams’s suit against the City raises unavoidable questions about his
   legal standing. Despite neither party nor the district court raising these
   concerns, we are required to address his standing before analyzing the merits
   of his claim. See Lewis v. Hunt, 492 F.3d 565, 568 (5th Cir. 2007) (explaining
   that federal appellate courts must evaluate potential jurisdictional defects,
   even when the parties and the district court fail to raise the issue). Standing
   requires a plaintiff to satisfy three basic elements: injury in fact, causation,
   and redressability. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
   The issue in this case turns on the causation and redressability elements.4

          4
            Adams’s complaint alleges numerous injuries sufficient for standing, including:
   lost wages, opportunity for additional employment, and irreparable damage to his
   reputation.

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          On causation, Adams contends that without Chief Walker’s sham
   investigation, JPDA would never have considered placing him on the Giglio
   list. Because Chief Walker did not directly place him on the list, there are
   concerns about whether a sufficient causal link exists between his placement
   on the list and Chief Walker’s communications with JPDA. See California v.
   Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104, 2117 (2021) (explaining that if “a causal relation
   between injury and challenged action depends upon the decision of an
   independent third party . . . standing is . . . ordinarily substantially more
   difficult to establish”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). But those
   concerns are not a barrier to his claim. The Supreme Court has explained that
   causation is satisfied when the injury results from “the predictable effect of
   Government action on the decisions of third parties.” Dep’t of Com. v. New
   York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2566 (2019). Adams alleges that Chief Walker knew
   that contacting JPDA about his disciplinary charges would lead to his
   placement on the Giglio list. In fact, he asserts that was the primary reason
   for his sham investigation. Thus, his injury stems from the “predictable
   effect” of Chief Walker’s actions and the causal link is sufficiently preserved
   for the purposes of standing. Dept’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2566.
          That leaves redressability, which is best explained by highlighting
   what this lawsuit is not about. Adams did not sue to get his name off the Giglio
   list—nor could he because such relief is impossible to obtain without
   including JPDA as a defendant. Instead, he seeks compensatory and punitive
   damages. A suit for damages is conceivable against the City because Adams
   suffered a quantifiable injury from Chief Walker’s conduct. Indeed, Adams
   satisfies the redressability element even if his injuries result in just nominal
   damages. See Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792, 801–02 (2021) (“[A]
   request for nominal damages satisfies the redressability element of
   standing[.]”). Because Adams sued the proper party and sought relief that
   was within the district court’s power to grant, he had standing. See Lujan,

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   504 U.S. at 560–61. We therefore proceed to the merits of his due process
   claim.
       B.       Adams’s Due Process Claim & Liberty Interest in His Profession
            The primary issue is whether the district court erroneously
   determined that Adams had a liberty interest in his “future employment as a
   law enforcement officer.” Upon concluding that this liberty interest existed,
   the district court held that Adams was deprived of it without adequate due
   process of law. We disagree that such a liberty interest exists and conclude
   that his due process claim fails as a matter of law.
            “The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects against
   deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its
   procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake.”
   Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). Accordingly, to state a claim
   for a due process violation, a plaintiff must allege “(1) the deprivation of a
   protected property or liberty interest, and (2) that the deprivation occurred
   without due process of law.” Holden v. Perkins, 398 F. Supp. 3d 16, 23 (E.D.
   La. 2019) (citing Grimes v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist., 930 F.2d
   441, 444 (5th Cir. 1991)).
            Liberty interests come from two sources: (1) “the Constitution itself,
   by reason of guarantees implicit in the word ‘liberty’”; and (2) “an
   expectation or interest created by state laws or policies.” Id. (citations
   omitted). Despite only providing two sources for discerning liberty interests,
   the Supreme Court has recognized that “[i]n a Constitution for a free people,
   there can be no doubt that the meaning of ‘liberty’ must be broad indeed.”
   Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
            The City argues that the district court created an unprecedented
   liberty interest by recognizing a police officer’s right to a career in law
   enforcement. It avers that the district court’s error is the only reason that

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   Adams’s claim survived the pleading stage. In response, Adams highlights
   the Supreme Court’s decision in Kerry, where the Court purportedly
   recognized that citizens have the right “to engage in any of the common
   occupations of life.” 576 U.S. at 94 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
   399 (1923)). The district court also cited and relied on this language in its
   opinion. After a close review, however, we reject the district court’s
   recognition of Adams’s right to his employment as an officer because it has
   no foundation in Supreme Court or Fifth Circuit precedent.
                           1.     Supreme Court Precedent
          The district court held that “liberty, as protected by the Due Process
   Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, includes the right to engage in any of
   the common occupations of life.” In reaching this conclusion, it relied on the
   Supreme Court’s decisions in Kerry and Meyer. See 576 U.S. at 94; 262 U.S.
   at 399. But neither of these cases provide support for the right that the district
   court presumed existed. We examine each case in turn.
          In Kerry, the Supreme Court considered whether a citizen’s alleged
   liberty interest in her marriage created the right to a review of the denial of
   her immigrant-spouse’s visa application. See 576 U.S. at 88. While not
   central to the issue on appeal, the Court observed that it has “at times
   indulged” the existence of some implied rights, including the right to
   “engage in any of the common occupations of life.” Id. at 94. But it quickly
   explained that these rights were simply passing thoughts in dicta from a now
   century-old case. Id. (“[T]his court is not bound by dicta, especially dicta
   that have been repudiated by the holdings of our subsequent cases.”).
   Ultimately, it concluded that when a liberty interest protected by due process
   is alleged to be grounded in case law, that interest must be based on “the
   actual holding[] of the case[.]” Id. (refusing to recognize a liberty interest
   when the cases relied on “hardly establish[ed]” the asserted right).

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          The district court’s dependance on Meyer is also misplaced. See 262
   U.S. at 399. There, the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a
   schoolteacher for violating a state law that made it unlawful to teach German
   in public schools because of the state’s desire for immigrants to become
   familiar with the English language. See id. at 397–99. The Supreme Court
   reversed the teacher’s conviction, tethering its decision to parents’ right to
   educate their children. Id. at 400 (“His right thus to teach and the right of
   parents to engage him so to instruct their children, we think, are within the
   liberty of the [Fourteenth Amendment].”). To be clear, whether the teacher
   had the right to engage in the profession of teaching was not before the Court.
   Instead, it only considered whether a discrete part of his job—teaching
   German—could be lawfully restricted by Nebraska.
          Here, Adams fails to establish that he has a liberty interest in his
   continued employment in law enforcement that is protected by procedural
   due process. Meyer concerned a teacher’s decision to instruct his students in
   foreign languages. See 262 U.S. at 399. And Kerry was a marriage-based
   immigration dispute over the denial of a visa application. See 576 U.S. at 88.
   Ultimately, Adams relies on cases that “hardly establish” the liberty interest
   that he asserts exists in his pleadings. 576 U.S. at 94. And as previously
   discussed, that the Supreme Court mentioned the potentiality of a right to
   “engage in any of the common occupations of life” in dicta does not aid
   Adams’s argument. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 398. This is especially true where the
   Court has not expressly grappled with and recognized Due Process Clause
   protections for an individual’s chosen vocation. Thus, Adams cannot rely on
   these cases to support his arguments on appeal. Likewise, the district court’s
   reliance on these cases to recognize a novel liberty interest was erroneous.
          We also survey Fifth Circuit precedent in search of the liberty interest
   that Adams asserts in his pleadings. We have never held that an individual
   has a liberty interest in his right to engage in a specific field of employment

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   that is protected by procedural due process. Accordingly, we decline to
   recognize such an interest now.
          In sum, Adams’s alleged liberty interest in his career in law
   enforcement has no basis in Supreme Court or Fifth Circuit precedent.
   Moreover, he does not provide a different constitutional anchor for this
   proposed liberty interest. See Grimes, 930 F.2d at 444. Because he fails to
   state facts supporting the violation of a cognizable liberty interest, he fails to
   plead a due process violation. Furthermore, because he has not alleged due
   process violations of a recognized liberty interest, we decline to address the
   adequacy of the process he received. Accordingly, we dismiss his claim and
   rule in the City’s favor. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
                               IV.     Conclusion
          For the foregoing reasons we REVERSE the district court’s
   judgment and DISMISS Adams’s due process claim against the City.

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