Court Opinion

ID: 9665733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:55:38.720379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:18.233585
License: Public Domain

Levin, J.
(concurring). The Michigan Employment Security Commission contends that a discharge should be treated the same as a “layoff” for an indefinite period for the purpose of determining entitlement to the “back-to-work” payment. The commission relies on its interpretation in its manual in support of its contention:
“For the purpose of the back-to-work payments only, the individual shall be deemed to have been ‘laid off’ by an employing unit if his separation resulted from an action of the employing unit to terminate the employment, provided no disqualification is found by the Commission, such as discharge for inefficiency or for alleged misconduct. Such layoff may also be due to lack of work, a shutdown for vacation purposes, or because of excess inventory, material shortage, model change, taking of inventory, etc. An individual shall NOT be deemed to have been ‘laid off’ by an employing unit if his separation resulted from his own action to terminate employment regardless of his reason for the separation, and regardless of whether or not a disqualification is imposed.” Michigan Employment Security Manual, § 5648.
The commission’s brief does not indicate when its interpretation was added to the manual1 or whether the interpretation has been consistently *650followed by the commission in processing claims or whether, other than this litigation, the interpretation has ever been contested by an employer and, if so, before what tribunal or courts and with what result or whether the interpretation has ever been brought to the attention of the Legislature and, if so, in what manner.
I am convinced that the commission’s extension of the usual meaning of the word “layoff” to include a discharge is inconsistent with the legislative history of the back-to-work payment and I have, therefore, signed Judge Gillis’ opinion which reverses the decision of the circuit court. We thereby reinstate the order of the Michigan Employment Security Appeal Board which reversed the commission’s determination. The commission had found that Bichard W. Foster was entitled to receive the sum of $55 as a back-to-work payment although he had been discharged by his employer. No claim is made that factually Foster was laid off and not discharged.
The back-to-work payment, originally enacted by a 1954 amendment to the employment security act, was designed as an incentive to a laid-off employee to seek temporary employment with “another” employer during the layoff period.2 It was a reward *651for obtaining temporary employment payable to an employee who, it was expected, ultimately would return to tbe employment from which he had been laid off. It is, thus, apparent that as originally enacted the back-to-work payment was not designed to encourage permanently terminated employees to seek new employment and that in using the word “layoff” the Legislature meant to distinguish between laid-off and permanently terminated employees.
In 1967 the back-to-work payment provision was amended to eliminate the requirements that (i) the laid-off employee make an “active search for work” and (ii) that the employment during the layoff period be with an employer other than the employer who laid off the employee. Now it is enough that the employee was laid off for more than three weeks and obtained employment with “any employment unit” (i.e., including re-employment by the employer who laid him off) within thirteen weeks of the last week he worked.* *3
It does seem, as the Commission argues, incongruous to pay the one week back-to-work benefit to an employee who is laid off for more than three weeks and is re-employed by his employer within thirteen weeks even though he is under no obliga*652tion to seek and does not obtain employment during the layoff and to refuse to pay the back-to-work benefit to an employee who is permanently discharged and who seeks and obtains new employment within thirteen weeks. Nevertheless, it appears from the peculiar legislative history of the back-to-work payment that the Legislature has not authorized payment of the back-to-work benefit to all involuntarily terminated employees.
The restructuring of the back-to-work benefit in 1967 so that it can be earned without regard to whether the laid-off employee seeks or obtains employment during the layoff with “another” employer, provided he is laid off for at least three weeks and employed within thirteen weeks by some employer, including by the employer who laid him off, achieved a kind of parity for some laid-off employees unable to obtain temporary employment, who arguably are in greater need of the additional benefit than a laid-off employee who obtains temporary employment.
But this enlargement of those who can obtain the benefit appears to have been a legislative compromise carefully structured to prevent every terminated and laid-off employee from obtaining the back-to-work benefit. Thus, for example, if the layoff does not last three weeks (a not uncommon occurrence) or if the laid-off employee does not return to work or obtain temporary employment within thirteen weeks, he cannot obtain the back-to-work benefit. As the commission concedes in its interpretation, an employee who quits may not earn the back-to-work benefit even if he is not disqualified by the quit from obtaining other employment security benefits.
There is no evidence in the structure or legislative history of the back-to-work provision that *653the continued use in the 1967 amendatory language of the word “layoff” was inadvertent and that it was the real purpose of the Legislature to eliminate the distinction made in the original 1954 act between workmen laid off and those permanently terminated. Without evidence that the use of the word “layoff” was inadvertent and that it was the legislative purpose in enacting the 1967 amendment to allow permanently terminated workmen as well as laid-off workmen to earn the back-to-work payment, we would not be justified in imputing to the Legislature such a purpose because the legislative compromise strikes us as illogical or inequitable. We cannot properly ascribe to the word “layoff” a special meaning without any evidence that a special meaning was intended.
Now that a large number of laid-off employees earn the benefit although they do not seek to obtain temporary employment, it is difficult to justify denial of like treatment to all employees who become unemployed for nondisqualifying reasons. But, unless it is contended and established that the inequity rises to constitutional dimensions, it is beyond our authority to provide parity.

 Since the interpretation is not published in materials readily available, it is somewhat difficult to determine when the interpretation was first enunciated. As best as can be determined, it was in August 1963, some nine years after the enactment of the statutory provision being construed. See MESO Manual, § 5648, print of August 6, 1963.

 The “baek-to-work” payment was added by amendment of § 28(d) of the Employment Security Act. The amendment, enacted by PA 1954, No 197, added the second proviso to § 28(d), viz.:
“(d) Within each benefit year and prior to the first period with respect to which he claims benefits for unemployment in such benefit year, he must have served a waiting period of 1 week of unemployment in which he was eligible for, and entitled to, benefits in all other respects: Provided, That this requirement shall not interrupt the payment of benefits for consecutive weeks of unemployment: Provided, further, That to advance the purpose of this act to compensate unemployed individuals for making an active search for work, benefits shall be paid for an individual’s waiting period week, in accordance with the other provisions of this act, if: (1) the individual has been laid off by his most recent employer indefinitely, or for a definite period of more than 4 weeks, and (2) the individual has accepted and commenced suitable, full-time employment *651with another employer within the first 4 calendar weeks following said lay off.” (Emphasis supplied.)
By amendment adopted in 1965, the figure “4” in clause 2 above was changed to “13”. PA 1965, No 281.
In 1967 the back-to-work provision was transferred to and added as clause 2 of § 27(c) of the act, MCLA § 421.27 (Stat Ann 1970 Cum Supp § 17.529); see Judge Gillis’ opinion for the text of § 27(e)(2).

 Under § 28(1) (a), an employee who is laid off need not register for work in order to be eligible to receive benefits if his employer notifies the Commission in writing that the layoff is temporary and that work is expected to be available for the individual within a declared number of days, not exceeding 45 calendar days from the last day the individual worked. MOLA § 421.28 (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 17.530). This provision was first enacted as an amendment to § 28 of the Employment Security Act by PA 1951, No 251 with a time period of 30 calendar days rather than 45.