Court Opinion

ID: 9664710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:26:18.588055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:08.750745
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing
CRAMER, Justice.
At a former day we overruled appellee’s motion to dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. In its motion for rehearing appellee now raises the question of the right and authority of a County Court to extend a term of court and, in particular, the right of the Judge of the County Court at Law No. 1 to extend its September 1950 term beyond its statutory termination. The September term continued until the commencement of the November 1950 term. The November 1950 term began November 6th, which was the first Monday in November. Art. 1970-28, Vernon’s Tex.Civ.St. This contention must be sustained on the authority of 11 Tex.Jur., sec. 74, p. 809; McDonald’s Texas Civil Practice, sec. 1.37, footnote 86; Citizens State Bank, etc., v. Miller, Tex.Civ.App., 115 S.W.2d 1183; Denton County v. Lowrey, Tex.Civ.App., 156 S.W.2d 546.
It appears that although the Legislature has provided for an extension of the term of court by the District Courts of our State by an order complying with the provisions of the statute, they have failed to authorize by statute an extension of the term of the County Court of Dallas County at Law No. 1. In Hamilton v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 134 Tex. 377, 110 S.W.2d 561, the Commission of Appeals held that even the District Court has limited statutory authority to extend its term and that the order itself must come within the express terms of the statute; otherwise even the District Court’s order extending the term would be void. Jurisdiction of this appeal cannot be conferred on this Court except in accordance with the statute. The order extending the September 1950 Term, being without statutory authorization, was void, and appellants’ motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law at the end of the statutory September 1950 Term, which ran until the beginning of the November 1950 Term, to wit, November 6, 1950.
The appeal bond was not filed within 30 days after the September Term ended, but was filed December 18, 1950, some 43 days after the motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law.
We were therefore in error in our former order overruling appellee’s motion to dismiss this appeal. The motion for rehearing is granted and the motion to dismiss is now sustained.
Appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction in this court.