Court Opinion

ID: 9692207
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:47:17.329738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:33.164693
License: Public Domain

Justice LaVECCHIA,
concurring.
I concur fully in Justice Long’s opinion. I write only to add the following. This matter comes to us on a dissent in the Appellate Division that concluded that “the absence of appropriate due process safeguards requires a reversal” of the trial court. New Jersey Div. of Youth and Family Sens. v. A.R.G., 361 N.J.Super. 46, 87, 824 A.2d 213 (App.Div.2003) (Eichen, J.A.D., dissenting). I cannot agree with the dissent’s characterization of the proceedings below. This Court has recognized on numerous occasions that “[d]ue process is a flexible [concept].” H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 175 N.J. 309, 321, 815 A.2d 405 (2003) (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). I do not find in the circumstances of this matter a constitutional violation in respect of defendant’s notice and opportunity to be heard.
Briefly, this case concerns DYFS’s prompt response to undisputed evidence of a child’s beating. DYFS effected an emergency removal of defendant’s three children and filed a complaint for custody, accompanied by an order to show cause. The order to show cause detailed the abuse that supported the children’s removal and the reason that efforts to prevent placement by DYFS were not reasonably available, namely, an imminent danger to the children’s life, safety or health. The court set a hearing date one month later on the order to show cause.
*288Defendant, who had been charged criminally concerning the abuse and was incarcerated, was brought to court and served personally with the complaint and order to show cause. When defendant stated that he would be representing himself, the trial court urged otherwise because of “the seriousness of [plaintiffs] allegations and the possibility that [defendant] could lose his children.” Ante at 273, 845 A.2d 111. Accordingly, defendant retained counsel for the criminal proceedings and this matter. Two days prior to the return date, defendant received a letter in which DYFS elaborated on the specifics of its request to the court. DYFS asked to be relieved under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.3(a) of the obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunify the children with defendant because of the risk of harm to the children described by the order to show cause. Based on the timing of that letter, defendant contended at oral argument before the Appellate Division that DYFS provided him with inadequate two-day notice in violation of his right to due process. In my view, that does not fairly describe all that took place.
Defendant had notice of what would be at stake at the hearing on the order to show cause. He was told in writing and by the judge in open court that his custody rights could be affected substantially based on the assertion of imminent danger to the children. Nonetheless, at the hearing defendant chose to put on no defense other than to rely “upon his penitence.” A.R.G., supra, 361 N.J.Super. at 80, 824 A.2d 213. The trial court repeatedly asked defendant’s counsel if she would prefer to have an adjournment. She denied those offers.1 Counsel acknowledged on the record that she understood that DYFS was requesting a determination pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.3(a) that reasonable efforts to reunify defendant with the children would not be *289required. Only after she made those acknowledgments did the court proceed. Following the court’s determination in favor of DYFS, defendant sought reconsideration. However, counsel did not argue that there was evidence that she was prevented from presenting, nor did she tell us, when asked to do so, how she would have defended differently. In sum, this record does not suggest a denial of due process, but rather reflects a calculated decision by counsel about how to represent defendant in this matter.2 I agree with the Appellate Division majority that there was no constitutional due process deprivation in these circumstances.
Justice VERNIERO joins in this opinion.
For affirmance in part; modify in part and remandment— Chief Justice PORITZ, and Justices LONG, VERNIERO, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, ALBIN and WALLACE — 7.
Opposed — None.

 For example, the following colloquy occurred at the June 26 hearing:
THE COURT: All right. Now we have to get to the second question. Ms. Redd is seeking a[de]termination that no [reasonable efforts to reunify]— be — be offered, and based upon that you have the right to a hearing. MS. PAPADOPOULOS: Yes, I do.
THE COURT: Are you ready to proceed right now?
*289MS. PAPADOPOULOS: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: Ms. Papadopoulos, are you ready to have a fact-finding hearing today?
MS. PAPADOPOULOS: Your Honor, if the Court is ready, I’m certainly ready.
THE COURT: Do you wish to have a fact-finding hearing?
MS. PAPADOPOULOS: Yes.

 This case stands in contrast, for example, to H.E.S., supra, 175 N.J. at 324, 815 A.2d 405, where the defendant received the domestic violence complaint against him only one day prior to the return date and the defendant requested but was refused an adjournment.