Court Opinion

ID: 9702679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:20:57.392597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:40.506092
License: Public Domain

Griffin, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). While I concur in the holding by the majority that plaintiffs are entitled to compensation for the unconstitutional taking of their fast land property,1 I respectfully dissent from part iii(d)(3) of the opinion in which the majority states that plaintiffs are also entitled to compensation for erosion of the beach below the high-water mark, i.e., nonfast property. Because the Court of Claims awarded *209damages for the loss of all property, I would remand to that court for an appropriate determination of damages resulting from the loss of plaintiffs’ fast lands only.
i
As the majority observes, plaintiffs’ property interests at issue fall into two categories: (1) "fast land” property, defined as property "that is 'above the highwater mark of’ the stream, river, or other body of water that abuts the property,”2 and (2) "nonfast” or "subaqueous” property, which includes plaintiffs’ beach, to the extent that it is below the high-water mark of the bay.
While plaintiffs hold legal title to their fast land property, legal title to all subaqueous land in Grand Traverse Bay, including plaintiffs’ nonfast property, is held by the state in trust for the people.3 This trust imposes a duty on the state "to secure to the people their rights of navigation, fishing and fowling.” Collins v Gerhardt, 237 Mich 38, 46; 211 NW 115 (1926). Thus, as the majority correctly observes, "the state may enact certain measures in furtherance of this trust — including the fundamental power to improve the navigability of such waterways on behalf of recreation and commerce. See, e.g., Nedtweg v Wallace (On Rehearing), 237 Mich 14, 24-25; 211 NW 647 (1927) (Sharpe, J., concurring).” Ante at 194.
The fact that title to nonfast property is held by *210the state in trust does not mean the state has unfettered power to use such property; rather, a property owner holds riparian rights to navigable waters that abut the property. However, as the majority recognizes, riparian rights are held "subordinate to the public’s right to navigate and the state’s authority to improve navigation.” Ante at 195. Therefore, "damage[s] to riparian properties arising from navigational improvements are often not compensable takings.” Id.
In determining whether plaintiffs in this case are entitled to compensation for erosion of their nonfast land beach, the majority looks to federal authority and adopts, in part, a standard recently articulated by the .United States Supreme Court in Dolan v City of Tigard, 512 US _; 114 S Ct 2309; 129 L Ed 2d 304 (1994).4 Applying this standard, the majority concludes that plaintiffs are entitled to compensation because "no essential nexus existed between the construction of the boat launch and the utter destruction of plaintiffs’ beach.” Ante at 202. I respectfully disagree because it is clear that Dolan does not control the resolution of this issue in the case at bar.
A
In Dolan, the plaintiff landowner sought a permit from the city to redevelop her business site. The city granted her permit application subject to conditions, i.e., that plaintiff dedicate a portion of *211her property "for improvement of a storm drainage system . . . and that she dedicate an additional 15-foot strip of land ... as a pedestrian/ bicycle pathway.” Dolan, 129 L Ed 2d 313.
Plaintiffs’ challenge to this decision was carried to the Oregon Supreme Court which ruled that the city could impose such conditions. However, on appeal, the United States Supreme Court framed the issue before it as a question left unresolved by its decision in Nollan v California Coastal Comm, 483 US 825; 107 S Ct 3141; 97 L Ed 2d 677 (1987): "[W]hat is the required degree of connection between the exactions imposed by the city and the projected impacts of the proposed development.” Dolan, 129 L Ed 2d 311.
In Dolan, the Supreme Court opined that the conditions imposed by the city satisfied the mandate of Nollan, i.e., that an essential nexus existed between legitimate state interests and the permit conditions exacted by the city. Dolan, 129 L Ed 2d 318. However, the Court concluded that the conditions imposed constituted an uncompensated taking because the degree of exactions did not bear the necessary relationship — a "rough proportionality” — to the projected effect of the plaintiff’s proposed development:
We think a term such as "rough proportionality” best encapsulates what we hold to be the requirement of the Fifth Amendment. No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development. [129 L Ed 2d 320.]
Respectfully, I submit that Dolan does not control the instant case for several reasons. First, Dolan is a land use restriction case, and its analy*212sis is clearly confined to such a context. Dolan does not purport to alter the entire landscape of all taking jurisprudence; rather, it represents an extension of the scrutiny mandated by Nollan in determining the constitutionality of conditions attached by a governmental agency to the granting of a land use permit. That Dolan is inapposite as applied to this case is underscored by the fact that the majority ignores, and does not even apply, the "rough proportionality” prong on which Dolan turned.
Second, and even more important, the property at issue in Dolan was purely private property. In the case before us, title to the nonfast property is held by the state, albeit in trust for the people and subject to the subordinate interests of riparian owners. Compared to the purely private property at stake in Dolan, the state obviously has a much greater interest in the nonfast property at issue in this case.5 Indeed, plaintiffs’ interests here are more akin to the property interests in United States v Rands, 389 US 121; 88 S Ct 265; 19 L Ed 2d 329 (1967).
In Rands, the United States Supreme Court held in a unanimous opinion that a riparian owner’s right of access to navigable waters is not property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment:
[The] power to regulate navigation confers upon the United States a "dominant servitude,” which extends to the entire stream and the stream bed below ordinary high-water mark. The proper exercise of this power is not an invasion of any private property rights . . . for the damage sustained does *213not result from taking property from riparian owners within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment but from the lawful exercise of a power to which the interests of riparian owners have always been subject. Thus, without being constitutionally obligated to pay compensation, the United States may change the course of a navigable stream, or otherwise impair or destroy a riparian owner’s access to navigable waters .... [389 US 123. Citations omitted.]
In my opinion, plaintiffs’ right to compensation under the Fifth Amendment of the federal constitution for the erosion of nonfast property is controlled by Rands, not Dolan. Accordingly, I would hold that plaintiffs are not entitled to compensation under the federal constitution for the erosion of their nonfast beach.6
B
Even if relief is not available under the federal constitution, plaintiffs could still seek compensation under the Michigan Constitution, which also proscribes the taking of private property without just compensation.7
In determining whether the compensable taking of a riparian owner’s right has occurred, this Court in Hilt v Weber, 252 Mich 198, 225; 233 NW 159 (1930), articulated the following standard:
Riparian rights are property, for the taking or *214destruction of which by the State compensation must be made, unless the use has a real and substantial relation to a paramount trust purpose. [Emphasis added.]
The Hilt standard has been relied upon by this Court8 and by our Court of Appeals.9 In addition, Hilt is quoted with approval by the majority. Ante at 192, n 19. I submit that the proper inquiry with respect to the nonfast property interests at issue in this case is whether erection of the jetties by the state had a "real and substantial relation” to the paramount trust purpose of improving navigation. I conclude that this question must be answered in the affirmative.
The state constructed a boat-launch ramp to the north of plaintiffs’ property to provide public access to East Grand Traverse Bay. As the majority notes, the state then erected the jetties, which were necessary "[t]o prevent the buildup of sand on the launch, facilitate boat launching, reduce ice damage to the ramp, and dissipate energy from waves . . . .” Ante at 181. On these facts, the erection of the jetties clearly had "a real and substantial relation” to the improvement of navigation.
This is not a case where the state
impair[ed] or defeated] riparian rights by a grant of land under water[,] . . . cut off the owner’s access to the water by construction of a highway[,] . . . grant[ed] to strangers the right to erect wharves in front of [plaintiffs’] property[,] . . . [or] erect[ed] a bathhouse on the shore to interfere *215with the right of access .... [Hilt, supra at 225-226. Citations omitted.]
The majority’s reliance on Dolan is inconsistent with Rands, and effectively overrules Hilt and its progeny. This exponential leap by the majority is not justified on these facts nor is it supported by any federal or state authority.
Accordingly, I dissent with respect to part iii(d)(3) of the majority opinion.

 I also agree with the majority that the filtration of sand from a bay which causes the erosion of fast land does not fall within the trespass-nuisance exception to governmental immunity.

 Ante at 181, n 4, citing 26 Am Jur 2d, Eminent Domain, § 192, p 873.

 "[T]he title to submerged lands under the Great Lakes and the straits connecting them, but not the rivers, is in the State of Michigan in trust for the people. . . . [Bartke, Navigability in Michigan in retrospect and prospect, 16 Wayne L R 409, 421 (1970).]” [Ante at 192.]

 [W]e must first determine whether the "essential nexus” exists between the "legitimate state interest” and the permit condition exacted by the city. Nollan [v California Coastal Comm], 483 US [825] 837; 107 S Ct 3141; 97 L Ed 2d 677 [1987], If we find that a nexus exists, we must then decide [whether] the exactions [imposed by the city are "roughly proportional” to] the projected impact of the proposed development. [Dolan, 129 L Ed 2d 317.]

 Because of the significant interest held by the state in the property to which it has legal title, even if the "rough proportionality” test adopted by the majority were to be applied, I would find that the degree of harm is roughly proportional to the navigational improvement effectuated by the state.

 See also 26 Am Jur 2d, Eminent Domain, § 192, p 873 ("[T]he washing away of the banks of a stream by a deflection of the current caused by the erection of piers or other structures in the stream ... is held not to be a taking, but rather an incidental injury, since the owner might protect his lands from injury by piles or a sea wall,” citing Bedford v United States, 192 US 217; 24 S Ct 238; 48 L Ed 414 [1904]).

 Const 1963, art 10, § 2 provides: "Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation therefor being first made or secured in a manner prescribed by law.”

 See Soo Sand & Gravel Co v M Sullivan Dredging Co, 259 Mich 489; 244 NW 138 (1932).

 See Difronzo v Port Sanilac, 166 Mich App 148; 419 NW2d 756 (1988); Grosse Ile Twp v Dunbar & Sullivan Dredging Co, 15 Mich App 556; 167 NW2d 311 (1969).