Court Opinion

ID: 9397019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-24 14:03:37.780422+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:20.805079
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 301
                   ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                       DIVISION I
                                      No. CV-22-166

 JOHN WESLEY HALL JR. AND ALISON Opinion Delivered May 24, 2023
 HALL, HUSBAND AND WIFE
                      APPELLANTS APPEAL FROM THE CLEBURNE
                                 COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
 V.                              [NO. 12CV-11-190]

 ARKANSAS STATE HIGHWAY        HONORABLE HOLLY MEYER,
 COMMISSION                    JUDGE
                      APPELLEE
                               REVERSED AND REMANDED

                           N. MARK KLAPPENBACH, Judge

       Appellants John Wesley Hall Jr. and Alison Hall bring this appeal from the order of

the Cleburne County Circuit Court dismissing with prejudice their counterclaim against the

Arkansas State Highway Commission.           We previously remanded this appeal for

supplementation of the record. See Hall v. Ark. State Highway Comm’n, 2023 Ark. App. 152.

Appellants have now supplemented the record, and we reverse and remand.

       In 2011, the Commission filed an eminent-domain action against appellants seeking

title to 0.16 acres of property in Cleburne County. The case was eventually set for trial in

November 2021. On October 13, 2021, appellants filed a counterclaim for declaratory

judgment, seeking a declaration of their rights to an implied easement of pedestrian ingress

and egress over property south of the condemned 0.16 acres. The Commission filed a
motion to dismiss the counterclaim alleging, in part, that the counterclaim was time-barred

pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a)(1) due to appellants’ failure to plead the

claim within thirty days after service of the summons. On October 25, 2021, the circuit

court entered an order dismissing the counterclaim with prejudice upon finding it untimely

under Rule 12(a)(1).

       Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the filing was not untimely

because their counterclaim was permissive and was based on facts that arose in 2021, ten

years after the filing of the eminent-domain action. Appellants alternatively argued that the

court should modify its order of dismissal to a dismissal without prejudice. At a hearing on

their motion to reconsider, appellants argued that it was not their intent for the counterclaim

to be heard at the upcoming eminent-domain trial and that it was essentially a separate issue

that could be tried later. The circuit court denied the motion for reconsideration. A jury

trial was held on the Commission’s complaint to determine the amount of just

compensation to be awarded to appellants for the taking of their property. Appellants were

awarded judgment of $35,675 plus interest. Appellants now appeal from the court’s orders

dismissing their counterclaim and denying their motion for reconsideration.

       The standard of review on accepting or rejecting pleadings is abuse of discretion.

Nameloc, Inc. v. Jack, Lyon & Jones, P.A., 362 Ark. 175, 208 S.W.3d 129 (2005). Appellants

argue that their counterclaim was a permissive counterclaim that was timely and properly

brought pursuant to Rules 13 and 15 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. Contrary to

the Commission’s claim that the counterclaim matured as early as 1975, appellants argue

                                              2
that the counterclaim matured in 2021, and they could not foresee the need to file the

counterclaim in 2011 when they filed their answer. Appellants argue that the Commission

never complained of any delay, and there was no intent to delay the eminent-domain trial.

        When a pleader fails to assert a counterclaim, he shall be entitled to assert such

counterclaim by amended or supplemental pleading subject to the requirements and

conditions of Rule 15. Ark. R. Civ. P. 13(e). A claim that either matured or was acquired

by the pleader after filing his pleading shall be presented as a counterclaim by supplemental

pleading, provided that if such counterclaim matures or is acquired after all issues are joined,

it may be asserted by the pleader in a separate action. Ark. R. Civ. P. 13(d). With the

exception of pleading the defenses mentioned in Rule 12(h)(1), a party may amend his

pleadings at any time without leave of the court. Ark. R. Civ. P. 15(a). A party may at any

time without leave of court file a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or

occurrences or events that have happened since the date of the pleading sought to be

supplemented. Ark. R. Civ. P. 15(d). Where, however, upon motion of an opposing party,

the court determines that prejudice would result or the disposition of the cause would be

unduly delayed because of the filing of an amendment or a supplemental pleading, the court

may strike such amended pleading or grant a continuance of the proceeding. Ark. R. Civ.

P. 15(a), (d).

        Here, the circuit court did not find that prejudice or undue delay would result from

the filing of the counterclaim. Instead, it found that the counterclaim was “untimely under

Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1).” Rule 12(a)(1) provides as follows:

                                               3
       A defendant shall file his or her answer within 30 days after the service of summons
       and complaint upon him or her. A defendant served by warning order under Rule
       4(g)(3) or (4) shall file an answer within 30 days from the date of first publication or
       posting of the warning order. A defendant incarcerated in any jail, penitentiary, or
       other correctional facility in this state shall file an answer within 60 days after service.
       A party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim or counterclaim against him or
       her shall file an answer or reply thereto within 30 days after service upon the party.
       The court may, upon motion of a party, extend the time for filing any responsive
       pleading.

Accordingly, the court apparently agreed with the Commission’s argument that appellants

were required to file the counterclaim within thirty days after the service of the summons

and complaint.

       Rule 12(a)(1) addresses only the filing of answers, not counterclaims. In Allison v.

Long, 336 Ark. 432, 985 S.W.2d 314 (1999), the appellant argued that a compulsory

counterclaim must be filed with the defendant’s answer. The supreme court made clear that

a compulsory counterclaim does not have to be filed with the defendant’s answer; instead, it

is compulsory in the sense that it must be raised within the pending action. The argument

that a counterclaim must be filed within thirty days ignores the plain provision of Rule 13(e),

which enables a pleader to assert his counterclaim by amended or supplemental pleading

subject to the requirements of Rule 15. Allison, supra.

       A counterclaim may be found to be untimely under Rule 15 if prejudice or undue

delay would result. See Nameloc, supra (holding that there was no abuse of discretion in

striking a counterclaim filed thirty-three minutes before trial began based on the opposing

party’s claim of prejudice). Here, however, the circuit court’s finding that appellants’

counterclaim was untimely pursuant to Rule 12(a)(1) is wrong. Whether the counterclaim

                                                4
existed at the time appellants filed their answer, as contended by the Commission, or

whether it was acquired thereafter, as argued by appellants, Rule 13 permits its filing beyond

the thirty days appellants had to file their answer. Accordingly, we reverse and remand. On

a final note, pending before the court is the Commission’s motion to strike portions of

appellants’ brief, alleging that appellants have improperly raised several issues that are not

before this court. Because these issues are not addressed in this opinion and do not prejudice

the Commission or affect the outcome of this appeal, the motion to strike is moot. See State

Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Ledbetter, 355 Ark. 28, 129 S.W.3d 815 (2003).

       Reversed and remanded.

       GLADWIN and GRUBER, JJ., agree.

       John Wesley Hall, for appellants.

       M. Todd Elder and Kelsey Bateman, for appellee.

                                              5