Court Opinion

ID: 9716011
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:23:25.857598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:40.777861
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BILANDIC, specially concurring: I agree with the holding that Public Act 89 — 404 is void ab initio. During the pendency of this appeal, the General Assembly enacted a different act, Public Act 90 — 593. Public Act 90 — 593 reenacted the amendment to the insanity defense statute that was originally included in the void act. The parties’ initial briefs did not address the effect of Public Act 90 — 593 on this case. Consequently, this court sua sponte ordered supplemental briefing. We directed the parties to brief the issues of “whether Public Act 90 — 593 applies retroactively to [defendant] and, if so, whether retroactive application of Public Act 90— 593 would violate the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto application of the law.” The parties complied. Defendant maintains that Public Act 90 — 593 does not apply retroactively to him under principles of statutory construction. In the alternative, defendant asserts that retroactive application would result in ex post facto violations. The State does not address whether Public Act 90— 593 applies retroactively to defendant. Nonetheless, the State concedes that retroactive application would violate the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws. The majority opinion determines that the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws prohibit retroactive application of Public Act 90 — 593 to defendant. I would not address the ex post facto issue, for the reasons explained below. Ex post facto literally means after the fact. Black’s Law Dictionary 520 (5th ed. 1979). Both the United States and Illinois Constitutions prohibit the state from enacting an ex post facto law. U.S. Const., art. I, § 10 (providing that “[n]o State shall *** pass any *** ex post facto Law”); Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 16 (providing that “[n]o ex post facto law *** shall be passed”). Essentially, this prohibition means that the legislature cannot change a criminal or penal law, after the fact, to be less favorable to a defendant regarding events that occurred before the change. See generally Carmell v. Texas, No. 98 — 7540 (U.S. May 1, 2000) (discussing meaning of prohibition). It therefore follows that the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws are not implicated unless the legislature is changing a law after the fact. Here, because legislative intent is clear that Public Act 90 — 593 is not to be applied retroactively, there is no reason to conduct an ex post facto analysis. The principle is well established that courts will not consider a constitutional question if the cause can be determined on other grounds. E.g., People ex rel. Waller v. 1990 Ford Bronco, 158 Ill. 2d 460, 464 (1994). Consequently, I would determine this cause solely on the basis that Public Act 90 — 593 does not apply retroactively to defendant. I. Applicable Precedent This case is analogous to People v. Digirolamo, 179 Ill. 2d 24, 50 (1997). There, this court was presented with an issue of whether an amendment to a statute would apply in that appeal. Defendant was convicted of the offense of obstructing justice. The State, however, failed to prove at trial the venue in which the offense occurred. Because venue was an established element of the offense, this failure necessitated reversal of that conviction. After defendant’s trial, the venue statute was amended to remove the necessity of proving venue to obtain a criminal conviction. The State argued that the amended statute should be applied on appeal to sustain defendant’s conviction. Digirolamo, 179 Ill. 2d at 49-50. In resolving this issue, this court in Digirolamo followed a long line of Illinois cases where, in determining whether the amendment applied, we utilized the legislative intent approach and its substantive-procedural distinction. Under this approach, an amendment to a statute is generally construed to apply prospectively and not retroactively, unless the legislature intended a retroactive application of the amendment and the amendment affects only procedure or remedies. Digirolamo, 179 Ill. 2d at 50. Accordingly, this test begins with the presumption that a new statute will not be applied on appeal unless the legislature expressly provides for such application. The language of the amendment at issue showed that the legislature did not intend a retroactive application. Also, the amendment effected a change in more than procedure or remedies. We therefore held that the amendment could not be applied retroactively to defendant, and we reversed his conviction for that offense. Digirolamo, 179 Ill. 2d at 50-52. Given that the amendment was not applied retroactively to defendant, there was no possibility of an ex post facto violation. In the present case, there is no indication that the legislature intended Public Act 90 — 593 to apply retroactively. Also, the statutory amendment at issue affects substantive rights, not procedure or remedies. Therefore, pursuant to Digirolamo, Public Act 90 — 593 cannot be applied retroactively to defendant. This appeal could be resolved on that basis alone. II. Inapplicable Precedent As noted, this case turns on whether the amendment to the insanity defense statute contained in Public Act 90 — 593 may be applied retroactively to defendant. Digirolamo and First of America Trust Co. v. Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d 282 (1996), contain seemingly contradictory statements concerning when to apply an amended statute on appeal. Digirolamo provides that, “[generally, an amendment to a statute will be construed to apply prospectively and not retroactively” unless the legislature intended a retroactive application of the amendment and the amendment affects only procedure or remedies. Digirolamo, 179 Ill. 2d at 50. Armstead states that, with regard to statutory amendments, “a reviewing court should simply apply the law as it exists at the time of the appeal, unless doing so would interfere with a vested right.” Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d at 290. Thus, each of these statements appears to be a generally applicable canon of statutory construction for courts to follow when determining whether an amended statute will be applied on appeal. On their face, the canon in Digirolamo favors prospective application whereas the canon in Armstead favors retroactive application. Although these canons are opposed on their face, there is no conflict between the holdings of Digirolamo and Armstead. Each decision relied on a line of case law that supported its outcome and that followed its pertinent canon of statutory construction. The United States Supreme Court recently observed, “It is not uncommon to find ‘apparent tension’ between different canons of statutory construction. As Professor Llewellyn famously illustrated, many of the traditional canons have equal opposites.” Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 263, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229, 251, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1496 (1994). Therefore, “another canon of unquestionable vitality” useful to remember when faced with this scenario is “the ‘maxim *** that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used.’ ” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 252, 114 S. Ct. at 1497, quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399, 5 L. Ed. 257, 290 (1821). As discussed above, the present appeal is analogous to Digirolamo. Both this case and Digirolamo involved statutory amendments to a criminal statute and potential ex post facto violations. Armstead, on the other hand, is not applicable to this appeal. Unlike the present case, Armstead concerned a statutory amendment to a civil statute that possibly implicated rights vested under our due process clause (Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d 282). See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29-30, 67 L. Ed. 2d 17, 23-24, 101 S. Ct. 960, 964-65 (1981) (explaining that, in addressing whether application of a statutory amendment would violate ex post facto principles, it is not relevant whether the statutory change touches on any vested right). Nevertheless, given the confusion that has resulted from the two canons, I take this opportunity to explain the legal history behind the canons. I then propose that this court adopt a new test for determining when a new or amended statute will be applied on appeal to pending cases. In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229, 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994), the United States Supreme Court similarly was faced with seemingly contradictory canons of statutory construction for determining when a new federal statute will be applied on appeal to pending cases. The Supreme Court successfully reconciled the principles underlying, the two canons into a single test. We should do likewise here. III. Historical Presumption Against the Retroactive Application of Statutes Historically, there has been a presumption against the retroactive application of statutes. Both this court and the United States Supreme Court have discussed this presumption. This court has reviewed the origin and rationale of the presumption as follows. “As a general matter it is clear that prospective application of statutes is to be preferred to retroactive, or retrospective, application. This preference has existed from time out of mind. ‘The doctrine that legislation must be prospective in character is traceable to Coke and Bracton, who recognized it as a rule of construction founded on doctrines of natural law, and it was incorporated into American jurisprudence by the learned jurists Kent and Story.’ (Orlicki v. McCarthy (1954), 4 Ill. 2d 342, 346.) The doctrine has sometimes been treated as a constitutional restraint on legislation, and sometimes as a rule of statutory construction. [Citations.] The preference for prospectivity is founded upon: ‘[the] fundamental principle of jurisprudence that retroactive application of new laws is usually unfair. There is a general consensus that notice or warning of the rule should be given in advance of the actions whose effects are to be judged ***. ***’ 1A A. Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 41.02, at 340-41 (4th ed. 1986). It has thus been our general rule of construction that an amendatory act will be construed as prospective. [Citations.] *** *** Since no statute will violate the Constitution merely because it operates prospectively, prospectivity is to be preferred.” Rivard v. Chicago Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 2, 122 Ill. 2d 303, 308-09 (1988). The United States Supreme Court has also explained the basis for its traditional presumption against the retroactive application of statutes. “The presumption against the retroactive application of new laws is an essential thread in the mantle of protection that the law affords the individual citizen. That presumption ‘is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic.’ [Citation.]” Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 439, 137 L. Ed. 2d 63, 71, 117 S. Ct. 891, 895 (1997). “Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 252, 114 S. Ct. at 1497. “This doctrine finds expression in several provisions of our Constitution. The specific prohibition on ex post facto laws is only one aspect of the broader constitutional protection against arbitrary changes in the law. In both the civil and the criminal context, the Constitution places limits on the sovereign’s ability to use its lawmaking power to modify bargains it has made with its subjects.” Lynce, 519 U.S. at 439-40, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 71, 117 S. Ct. at 895. The Supreme Court has elaborated on the various federal constitutional provisions that possibly may be violated by a retroactive application of new statutes. “ ‘The Ex Post Facto Clause flatly prohibits retroactive application of penal legislation. Article I, § 10, cl. 1, prohibits States from passing another type of retroactive legislation, laws ‘impairing the Obligation of Contracts.’ The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause prevents the Legislature (and other government actors) from depriving private persons of vested property rights except for a ‘public use’ and upon payment of ‘just compensation.’ The prohibitions on ‘Bills of Attainder’ in Art. I, §§ 9-10, prohibit legislatures from singling out disfavored persons and meting out summary punishment for past conduct. [Citation.] The Due Process Clause also protects the interests in fair notice and repose that may be compromised by retroactive legislation ....’ [Citation.]” Lynce, 519 U.S. at 440 n.12, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 71 n.12, 117 S. Ct. at 895 n.12, quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 266, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 253, 114 S. Ct. at 1497. The above list of potential constitutional problems is not exhaustive. For example, both this court and the Supreme Court have concluded that retroactive application of a statute may violate the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 131 L. Ed. 2d 328, 115 S. Ct. 1447 (1995); In re Marriage of Cohn, 93 Ill. 2d 190, 203-04 (1982), As the foregoing discussion shows, a general presumption against the retroactive application of statutes is deeply embedded in our legal history. This presumption initially was rooted in fairness and freedom from arbitrary governmental actions. Later, this presumption was expressed in various constitutional provisions. Consequently, applying statutes prospectively has been the preferred practice because it avoids the myriad constitutional problems that may arise from applying a statute retroactively. IV Historical Exceptions to the Presumption Against the Retroactivity of Statutes For nearly as long as the general presumption against the retroactive application of statutes has existed, jurists have also recognized that the retroactive application of a statute is desirable in certain situations. Hence, legal history records the development of a number of exceptions to the general presumption against retroactivity. The following discussion demonstrates that certain exceptions have long existed to the general presumption against the retroactive application of statutes. This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive. Illinois has, for example, long recognized the exception that a new or amended statute may be applied retroactively on appeal where the legislature intended a retroactive application of the statute and the statute affects only procedure or remedies. See, e.g., People v. Digirolamo, 179 Ill. 2d 24, 50 (1997); Rivard v. Chicago Fire Fighters Union, Local No. 2, 122 Ill. 2d 303, 310 (1988); Orlicki v. McCarthy, 4 Ill. 2d 342, 346 (1954); Theodosis v. Keeshin Motor Express Co., 341 Ill. App. 8 (1950); see also In re Pronger, 118 Ill. 2d 512, 522 (1987) (noting that our General Assembly incorporated part of this exception into the Illinois Statute on Statutes), quoting Orlicki, 4 Ill. 2d at 346, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, ch. 131, par. 4. This court’s decision in Digirolamo illustrates the application of this exception. The United States Supreme Court continues to recognize a principle that is similar in application. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 273-74, 275, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 257, 258, 114 S. Ct. at 1501, 1502 (allowing statutory changes in procedure or in prospective relief to be applied on appeal, but characterizing those changes as not truly retroactive in effect). Another exception found in Illinois law is that a statutory amendment may be applied “retroactively” where the legislature enacted the amendment merely to clarify an existing law that was ambiguous, rather than to change the law. In re Marriage of Cohn, 93 Ill. 2d 190, 202 (1982); see, e.g., Varelis v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 167 Ill. 2d 449, 461-63 (1995); People v. Rink, 97 Ill. 2d 533, 540-41 (1983); People ex rel. Spitzer v. County of La Salle, 20 Ill. 2d 18, 28 (1960). Like the exception discussed above, this exception gives effect to the legislature’s intent in drafting the statute. A third exception long recognized in Illinois law concerns “nonvested rights.” This exception is best understood by discussing its origin. Justice Story, the same learned jurist who has been credited with incorporating into American jurisprudence the general presumption against the retroactive application of statutes, in 1814, wrote Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756 (C.C. N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156). There, sitting on circuit, Justice Story was construing a provision of the New Hampshire Constitution that broadly prohibited all “retrospective” laws. In doing so, he offered what today remains the basic definition of a statutory law that is operating with truly retroactive effect. “Justice Story first rejected the notion that the provision bars only explicitly retroactive legislation, i.e., ‘statutes ... enacted to take effect from a time anterior to their passage.’ [Citation.] Such a construction, he concluded, would be ‘utterly subversive of all the objects’ of the prohibition. [Citation.] Instead, the ban on retrospective legislation embraced ‘all statutes, which, though operating only from their passage, affect vested rights and past transactions.’ [Citations.]” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 268-69, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 254, 14 S. Ct. at 1498-99. Justice Story elaborated: “Upon principle, every statute, which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed retrospective.” Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, 22 F. Cas. at 767. Both this court and the Supreme Court have long utilized Justice Story’s definition of what constitutes a retroactive law. See, e.g., Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 268-70, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 254-55, 114 S. Ct. at 1498-99; First of America Trust Co. v. Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d 282, 290 (1996) (and cases cited therein); Theodosis v. Keeshin Motor Express Co., 341 Ill. App. 8 (1950). Unlike New Hampshire, Illinois has never had an express constitutional prohibition of retrospective laws. See Theodosis, 341 Ill. App. at 12. Nonetheless, our legislature in 1874 set forth a general presumption against statutory retroactivity in our Statute on Statutes (Orlicki v. McCarthy, 4 Ill. 2d 342, 346 (1954), quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, ch. 131, par. 4), which still appears on the books today (see 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 1998)). In the same manner that Justice Story limited the reach of New Hampshire’s constitutional prohibition of “retrospective” laws to only those laws with truly retroactive effect, this court has limited the reach of Illinois’ statutory presumption against retroactive laws to only those laws with truly retroactive effect. This court did this by creating a broad exception to the Statute on Statute’s presumption against statutory retroactivity for “nonvested rights.” See Orlicki, 4 Ill. 2d at 346-48. This “nonvested rights” exception to the general presumption against the retroactive application of statutes remains in Illinois, though, over time, it came to be treated in a line of cases as its own general rule. See Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d at 289-90 (and cases cited therein). Stated as a general rule, or canon, this exception came to provide that “a reviewing court should *** apply the law as it exists at the time of the appeal, unless doing so would interfere with a vested right.” Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d at 290. First of America Trust Co. v. Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d 282 (1996), typifies application of this third exception. In Armstead, this court was presented with an issue of whether an amendment to a statute would apply in that appeal. Plaintiff wanted to register its underground storage tanks pursuant to the Gasoline Storage Act (Act) (430 ILCS 15/0.01 et seq. (West 1992)) so that it would qualify for monies for cleanup. The Act was amended during the appeal. The amendment expressly stated that underground storage tanks taken out of operation before January 2, 1974, could not be registered. It was undisputed that plaintiffs tanks were taken out of operation before that date and, thus, could not be registered if the new amendment applied. Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d at 284-87. The amendment implicated plaintiffs due process rights. In determining whether the amendment would be applied on appeal to the parties’ existing controversy, this court in Armstead defined retroactivity in words nearly identical to those used by Justice Story nearly two centuries before: “The application of an amendment to an existing controversy does not necessarily constitute retroactivity. ‘[I]t is well settled that a statute is not retroactive just because it relates to antecedent events, or because it draws upon antecedent facts for its operation.’ [Citation.] Instead, this court has defined a retroactive change in the law as 1 “one that takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations already past.” ’ [Citation.]” Arm-stead, 171 Ill. 2d at 289-90. The Armstead opinion further stated: “With this understanding of retroactivity, there is little reason to focus on legislative intent. The legislature is without constitutional authority to enact a law that is truly retroactive, in that it impairs vested rights, even if that is its expressed intention. [Citation.] Moreover, where an amendment has no such retroactive impact, there is simply no need to apply further rules of construction to determine legislative intent because the amendment by definition has only prospective application. Thus, a reviewing court should simply apply the law as it exists at the time of the appeal, unless doing so would interfere with a vested right.” Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d at 290. The opinion determined that plaintiff did not have a vested right to register its underground storage tanks under the preamended Act. Since no vested right was at issue, the opinion held that the amended Act would be applied to the appeal. Under the amended Act, plaintiff did not have the right to register its tanks. Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d at 290-93. In reviewing past decisions regarding when a statutory amendment would be applied to an existing controversy on appeal, the opinion stated that the jurisprudence was not consistent. Sometimes this court would apply a “legislative intent approach” to the question, and at other times would apply a “vested rights approach” to the question. Under the vested rights approach, this court did not look at legislative intent. Rather, this court simply applied the law as it exists at the time of the appeal, unless doing so would interfere with a vested right. The opinion defined a “vested right” as an interest that is protected from interference by our due process clause. The opinion then described the vested rights approach as “the better approach.” Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d at 289. There is no doubt that Armstead correctly held that the amended Gasoline Storage Act applied in that appeal. Some jurists, however, have understood the language in Armstead as suggesting a categorical presumption in favor of application of all new rules of law, with the sole exception being that “unless doing so would interfere with a vested right” (Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d at 290). In my view, Armstead was never intended as having a universal application. Rather, Armstead was meant to apply only to those cases raising due process concerns. See Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d at 289 (defining “vested right” as an interest that is protected by our due process clause). It is true, as Armstead intimated, that the legislature lacks the authority to enact a retrospective statute in violation of our due process clause. This truth, though, was never intended to be extended to mean that all other new statutes {i.e., those that do not violate the due process clause if applied retroactively) shall be applied on appeal, regardless of legislative intent. Such an understanding of Armstead would turn the general presumption against the retroactivity of statutes on its head. It would fail to account for the myriad constitutional problems other than due process that may arise from applying a statute retroactively. Finally, it would conflict with the primary rule of statutory construction that, in interpreting a statute, courts are to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. See, e.g., Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990). V Adoption of New Test The United States Supreme Court recently set forth the following test for determining when a new federal statute will be applied on appeal to pending cases. “When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the events in suit, the court’s first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to resort to judicial default rules. When, however, the statute contains no such express command, the court must determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the statute would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not govern ***.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 261-62, 114 S. Ct. at 1505. See also Martin v. Hadix, 521 U.S. 343, 352, 144 L. Ed. 2d 347, 356-57, 119 S. Ct. 1998, 2003 (1999) (restating the same test). In the above test, the Supreme Court has successfully harmonized the legislative intent approach with Justice Story’s definition of a truly retroactive law. First, the test reconfirms the “traditional rule” that “new statutes do not apply retroactively unless Congress expressly states that they do.” (Emphasis in original.) Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 237, 131 L. Ed. 2d 328, 354, 115 S. Ct. 1447, 1461-62 (1995). In reaffirming this principle for the modern era, the Court explained: “The presumption against statutory retroactivity had special force in the era in which courts tended to view legislative interference with property and contract rights circumspectly. In this century, legislation has come to supply the dominant means of legal ordering, and circumspection has given way to greater deference to legislative judgments. [Citations.] But while the constitutional impediments to retroactive civil legislation are now modest, prospectivity remains the appropriate default rule. Because it accords with widely held intuitions about how statutes ordinarily operate, a presumption against retroactivity will generally coincide with legislative and public expectations. Requiring clear intent assures that Congress itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits. Such a requirement allocates to Congress responsibility for fundamental policy judgments concerning the proper temporal reach of statutes, and has the additional virtue of giving legislators a predictable background rule against which to legislate.” (Emphasis in original.) Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 272-73, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 256-57, 114 S. Ct. at 1500-01. Second, the test also continues to adhere to Justice Story’s definition of a retroactive law. The Court explained, “Even absent specific legislative authorization, application of new statutes passed after the events in suit is unquestionably proper in many situations.” (Emphasis added.) Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 273, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 257, 114 S. Ct. at 1501. This means that, where the legislature is silent as to the temporal reach of a statute, a court must proceed to a determination of whether application of the new statute would have a truly retroactive effect. If there is no truly retroactive effect, then application of the new statute on appeal is proper. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 273-74, 275, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 257, 258, 114 S. Ct. at 1501, 1502. As examples of statutory changes that have no truly retroactive effect, the Court mentioned those changes concerning prospective relief and many, but not all, changes to procedural rules. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 273-74, 275 & n.29, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 257, 258 & n.29, 114 S. Ct. at 1501, 1502 & n.29. The Court elaborated further on the subject of retroactivity: “A statute does not operate ‘retrospectively’ merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute’s enactment [citation] or upsets expectations based in prior law. Rather, the court must ask whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment. The conclusion that a particular rule operates ‘retroactively’ comes at the end of a process of judgment concerning the nature and extent of the change in the law and the degree of connection between the operation of the new rule and a relevant past event. Any test for retroactivity will leave room for disagreement in hard cases, and is unlikely to classify the enormous variety of legal changes with perfect philosophical clarity. However, retroactivity is a matter on which judges tend to have ‘sound ... instinct[s],’ [citation] and familiar considerations of fair notice, reasonable reliance, . and settled expectations offer sound guidance.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269-70, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 254-55, 114 S. Ct. at 1499. This court should adopt the Supreme Court’s test for determining when a new or amended statute will be applied on appeal to pending cases. Applying that test to the present case yields the following analysis. First, we must determine whether the General Assembly has expressly prescribed the statute’s proper reach; if the General Assembly has done so, there is no need to resort to judicial default rules. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 128 L. Ed. 2d at 261-62, 114 S. Ct. at 1505. Here, with respect to the insanity provisions at bar, the General Assembly expressly prescribed that they were to take effect over six months after the effective date of the enactment, i.e., on January 1, 1999. See Pub. Act 90 — 593, § 99 (eff. June 19, 1998). Because the General Assembly was clear that it did not intend for a retroactive application of these amendments to the insanity defense statute, our inquiry ends. These amendments, therefore, shall not be applied on retrial. For the above reasons, I agree that defendant is entitled to a new trial in which he must be permitted to assert an insanity defense in accordance with the insanity defense statute as it existed before Public A.ct 89— 404. I would not reach the ex post facto issue.