Court Opinion

ID: 9362927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 15:09:08.734261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:26.454919
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JANUARY 6, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                    Commonwealth of Kentucky
                               Court of Appeals

                                  NO. 2022-CA-0087-MR

HAROLD TURNER                                                           APPELLANT

                   APPEAL FROM CARLISLE CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE TIMOTHY A. LANGFORD, JUDGE
                          ACTION NO. 20-CR-00050

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                  APPELLEE

                                         OPINION
                                        AFFIRMING

                                       ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; CALDWELL AND GOODWINE,
JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Harold Turner (“Appellant”) appeals from a

judgment of the Carlisle Circuit Court reflecting a jury verdict finding Appellant

guilty of one count each of possession of a handgun by a convicted felon and

persistent felony offender in the first degree.1 He argues that the circuit court erred

in failing to rule that a text message entered into evidence at trial was not properly

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes (“KRS”) 527.040 and 532.080.
authenticated. He also argues that he was entitled to a directed verdict on the

firearm possession charge. He seeks an opinion reversing the judgment, for

dismissal of the indictment, or a new trial. After careful review, we find no error

and affirm the judgment on appeal.

                    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

             On November 12, 2020, deputies of the Carlisle County sheriff’s

department went to a home located at 176 Appletree Street, Arlington, Kentucky,

based on information they received that Appellant – a convicted felon – had

violated his probation. Appellant previously resided at the location with his

girlfriend, Darla McCoy, who rented the house. At the residence, the deputies

made contact with Tamron Lyman, who was an acquaintance of McCoy.

             Lyman allowed deputies to enter the residence to conduct a search.

She also gave Sheriff Will Gilbert her phone so that Gilbert could read her texts.

Gilbert would later testify that he read a text from Appellant to Lyman sent earlier

that day, in which Appellant said, “[c]ops are on the way to the house. Get my gun

and ammo and throw it in the trash.” Gilbert did not seize the phone nor take a

screenshot of the text. He could not recall what time Appellant sent the text, but he

testified that it was sent on the day of the search.

             When deputies searched the residence, they found a 9mm handgun in

a man’s jacket in the bedroom closet used by Appellant. On November 19, 2020, a

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Carlisle County grand jury indicted Appellant on several charges including

possession of a handgun by a convicted felon and persistent felony offender in the

first degree (“PFO”).

             At the jury trial, counsel for Appellant objected when the

Commonwealth asked Sheriff Gilbert about the text he saw on Lyman’s phone.

After a brief bench conference, which could not be heard on the video record,

Judge Langford overruled the objection and allowed Sheriff Gilbert to testify as to

the text he saw on Lyman’s phone.

             At the conclusion of the trial, the court denied Appellant’s motion for

a directed verdict on the possession charge. The jury returned a guilty verdict on

the handgun possession charge and the PFO charge. The court sentenced

Appellant to a total of 10 years in prison, and this appeal followed.

                           STANDARDS OF REVIEW

                             Admission of text message

             We review the trial court’s ruling to admit text messages for abuse of

discretion. Kays v. Commonwealth, 505 S.W.3d 260, 269 (Ky. App. 2016)

(citation and quotation omitted). Abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling was

“arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”

Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).

                                         -3-
                      Appellant’s motion for a directed verdict

             The standard of review on a motion for a directed verdict was set forth

in Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky. 1991), in which the

Kentucky Supreme Court stated:

             On motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw
             all fair and reasonable inferences from the evidence in
             favor of the Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient
             to induce a reasonable juror to believe beyond a
             reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, a directed
             verdict should not be given. For the purpose of ruling on
             the motion, the trial court must assume that the evidence
             for the Commonwealth is true, but reserving to the jury
             questions as to the credibility and weight to be given to
             such testimony.

                     On appellate review, the test of a directed verdict
             is, if under the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly
             unreasonable for a jury to find guilt, only then the
             defendant is entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal.

(Citation omitted.)

             The prosecution must produce more than a “mere scintilla of

evidence” regarding the defendant’s guilt. Id. at 188. However, “[t]he testimony

of even a single witness is sufficient to support a finding of guilt, even when other

witnesses testified to the contrary if, after consideration of all of the evidence, the

finder of fact assigns greater weight to that evidence.” Commonwealth v. Suttles,

80 S.W.3d 424, 426 (Ky. 2002) (citation omitted).

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                         ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS

             Appellant, through counsel, first argues that the Carlisle Circuit Court

erred in failing to rule that the text message at issue was not properly authenticated

and should have been excluded from admission into the evidence. Appellant

argues that though Sheriff Gilbert read the text message purporting to be from

Appellant to Lyman, he did not take a screenshot or picture of the message in order

to offer some tangible proof of its existence or content. The parties agree that

Sheriff Gilbert seized Appellant’s phone, and Appellant asserts that Gilbert could

have produced Appellant’s phone to prove the veracity of Gilbert’s testimony on

this issue. Appellant also notes that the Commonwealth offered no proof of

Lyman’s phone number nor Appellant’s phone number, and that no proper

foundation was made to prove that the evidence was materially unchanged from

the time of the event until its admission.

             Further, Appellant states that neither Gilbert nor Lyman testified as to

the name, profile picture, or other identification linking the message to Lyman.

The focus of Appellant’s argument on this issue is that the message was not

properly authenticated per Kentucky Rules of Evidence (“KRE”) 901, and

therefore Sheriff Gilbert’s testimony as to the message should not have been

entered into evidence. Appellant requests an opinion dismissing the indictment or,

in the alternative, remanding the matter for a new trial.

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              In response, the Commonwealth argues that this matter is not properly

preserved for appellate review. It notes that when Sheriff Gilbert began to testify

about the text message at issue, Appellant’s counsel objected that Gilbert’s

testimony was a violation of the Best Evidence Rule. The Commonwealth asserts

that Appellant cannot now argue that the text message was not properly

authenticated, when the Best Evidence Rule rather than authentication was the

basis for his objection at trial.

              We will first address the contention that this matter was not preserved

for appellate review. The “Requirement of Original” rule, a.k.a. the “Best

Evidence Rule,” set out at KRE 1002 states that “[t]o prove the content of a

writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is

required, except as otherwise provided in these rules, in other rules adopted by the

Kentucky Supreme Court, or by statute.” “Essentially, this rule requires a party to

introduce the most authentic evidence which is within their power to produce.”

Johnson v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 800, 805 (Ky. App. 2007) (citation

omitted) (emphasis added).

              At trial, Appellant objected to Sheriff Gilbert’s testimony based on the

Best Evidence Rule. Because the Best Evidence Rule and the requirement of

authentication are inextricably intertwined, we conclude that Appellant’s objection

                                          -6-
based on the Best Evidence Rule properly preserved the issue of authentication for

appellate review.

             KRE 901 (“Requirement of authentication or identification”) states,

             (a) General provision. The requirement of authentication
             or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility
             is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding
             that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.

             (b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by
             way of limitation, the following are examples of
             authentication or identification conforming with the
             requirements of this rule:

                    (1) Testimony of witness with knowledge.
                    Testimony that a matter is what it is claimed
                    to be.

             The primary question for our consideration on this issue is whether

Sheriff Gilbert’s testimony authenticated the proffered evidence, i.e., whether its

admissibility was grounded on “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the

matter in question is what its proponent claims.” KRE 901(a). KRE 901(b)(1)

expressly provides that the “[t]estimony of a witness with knowledge” is sufficient

authentication or identification to satisfy KRE 901. Sheriff Gilbert was a “witness

with knowledge” for purposes of KRE 901(b)(1), as he made contact with Lyman

and read – with her consent – a text message on her phone appearing to be from

Appellant. Further, Lyman also testified about the text, stating that Appellant

texted her and asked her to get the gun and hide it.

                                         -7-
             “Authentication of electronic messages is a relatively new topic for

Kentucky courts.” Kays, 505 S.W.3d at 269. Texts must be authenticated before

they can be admitted. Id. That is to say, “the court must be sufficiently convinced

the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Id. (citing KRE 901). The

Commonwealth’s burden on this issue is “slight, requiring only a prima facie

showing.” Id. at 270 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “A trial

court may admit an item so long as it finds sufficient proof has been presented

from which a jury may reasonably deem an item to be what it is proclaimed to be.

While the judge determines admissibility of the item, the jury determines its

authenticity and probative force.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted).

                     Under KRE 901(b), the most common way to
             authenticate an item is through testimony of a witness
             that it is what it is claimed to be. . . . Exercising its
             considerable discretion, a trial court may admit a piece of
             evidence solely on the basis of testimony from a
             knowledgeable person that the item is what it purports to
             be and its condition has been substantially unchanged.
             Furthermore, . . . [a defendant is] free to argue to the jury
             the messages might be incomplete or may have been
             manipulated.

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

             After closely reviewing the record and the law, we conclude that the

testimony of Sheriff Gilbert satisfies the “slight” burden of making a prima facie

showing that the text is what the Commonwealth purports it to be. Id. at 270.

                                          -8-
Further, Sheriff Gilbert’s testimony was bolstered by that of Lyman, who also

testified that the text was what the Commonwealth claimed it to be. This is

sufficient to support its admission, after which the jury determined its authenticity.

Id. We find no error.

             Appellant next argues that the circuit court erred in denying his

motion for a directed verdict on the charge of convicted felon in possession of a

firearm. He argues that the Commonwealth presented no evidence that Appellant

knew the gun was in the jacket nor had any control over it.

             As noted above, on motion for a directed verdict, all fair and

reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the

Commonwealth. Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187. The prosecution must produce

more than a mere scintilla of evidence regarding the defendant’s guilt, id. at 188,

but the testimony of even a single witness can be sufficient to meet this burden.

Suttles, 80 S.W.3d at 426.

             Having determined that Sheriff Gilbert’s testimony regarding the text

message was properly admitted, we conclude that this testimony is more than a

mere scintilla of evidence and was sufficient to overcome Appellant’s motion on

this issue. In addition, testimony was adduced that Appellant lived or used to live

at the residence with McCoy, and that the firearm was found in a man’s jacket in

the closet of the bedroom formerly used by Appellant. While Appellant offered

                                         -9-
evidence that he no longer lived at the residence and the gun was not his, the

question for our consideration is whether, under the evidence as a whole, it was

clearly unreasonable for the jury to find guilt. Benham, 816 S.W.2d at 187. Based

on the testimony of Sheriff Gilbert and Lyman, and in conjunction with the

physical evidence obtained during the search, it was not clearly unreasonable for

the jury to find guilt. Though Appellant did not have physical possession of the

firearm when it was found in the man’s jacket, constructive possession is sufficient

to sustain the charge of firearm possession by a convicted felon. KRS 527.040;

KRS 500.080(16). See also Deboy v. Commonwealth, 214 S.W.3d 926, 930 (Ky.

App. 2007). Accordingly, we find no error in the denial of Appellant’s motion for

a directed verdict.

                                 CONCLUSION

             Sheriff Gilbert’s testimony regarding the text message he read on

Lyman’s phone was properly admitted, and the circuit court did not err in denying

Appellant’s motion for a directed verdict on the charge of possession of a firearm

by a convicted felon. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and sentence of the

Carlisle Circuit Court.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                        -10-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Julia K. Pearson          Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky       Attorney General of Kentucky

                          Rachel A. Wright
                          Assistant Attorney General
                          Frankfort, Kentucky

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