Court Opinion

ID: 9946107
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 09:13:39.407063+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:25.569001
License: Public Domain

In The
                                Court of Appeals
                       Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                       No. 07-23-00243-CR

                             MAX ALLAN MAYO, APPELLANT

                                                  V.

                             THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

                            On Appeal from the 320th District Court
                                    Potter County, Texas
               Trial Court No. 079339-D-CR, Honorable Steven Denny, Presiding

                                       February 26, 2024
                               MEMORANDUM OPINION
                  Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.

       Pursuant to a plea bargain, Appellant, Max Allan Mayo, was placed on deferred

adjudication community supervision for assault family violence for four years.1 Several

years later on the State’s second motion to proceed with adjudication, it alleged Appellant

committed a new offense and failed to successfully complete the Batterers Intervention

Prevention Program (BIPP). A hearing was held on the motion after which the trial court

       1 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(2)(B).
found both allegations true, revoked community supervision, and sentenced Appellant to

ten years’ confinement and assessed a $10,000 fine.2 By two issues, Appellant maintains

(1) the trial court abused its discretion in failing to conduct an “on the record” ability-to-

pay inquiry based on the express requirement of article 42.15 of the Texas Code of

Criminal Procedure and in finding he would have the ability to pay fees and costs at a

later date or at designated intervals and (2) the sentence imposed constitutes cruel and

unusual punishment. We affirm.

        Appellant does not challenge his conviction. Thus, only the facts necessary for

disposition of his two issues will be addressed.

ISSUE ONE—ARTICLE 42.15 AND ABILITY TO PAY FINES AND COSTS

        Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a fine and court

costs without conducting an on-the-record hearing on his ability to pay. He requests a

remand for compliance with the statute. The State contends any error in doing so was

harmless. Based on this Court’s recent decision in Stanberry v. State, No. 07-23-00194-

CR, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 1066, at *6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 9, 2024, no pet. h.)

(mem. op., not designated for publication), a remand is unnecessary as no error occurred.

       2 We note the trial court did not orally pronounce an adjudication of guilt before proceeding to

sentencing. After finding both allegations to be true, the pronouncement was as follows:

        I do revoke your probation and sentence you to ten years confinement in the Texas
        Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division, along with a $10,000 fine.

The failure to pronounce guilt notwithstanding, the trial court’s action in assessing punishment after a
hearing is an implied rendition of guilt and such finding was entered by the written judgment. See Jones v.
State, No. 07-16-00345-CR, 2017 Tex. App. LEXIS 4158, at *2 n.3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 8, 2017, no
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

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      Article 42.15(a-1) regarding fines and costs, amended in 2021 and effective until

January 1, 2025,3 provides as follows:

      Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, during or immediately
      after imposing a sentence in a case in which the defendant entered a plea
      in open court . . . a court shall inquire on the record whether the defendant
      has sufficient resources or income to immediately pay all or part of the fine
      and costs. If the court determines that the defendant does not have
      sufficient resources or income to immediately pay all or part of the fine and
      costs, the court shall determine whether the fine and costs should be: (1)
      subject to Subsection (c), required to be paid at some later date or in a
      specified portion at designated intervals; (2) discharged by performing
      community service . . .; (3) waived in full or in part . . .; or (4) satisfied through
      any combination of methods under Subdivisions (1) – (3).

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.15(a-1) (Emphasis added).4 Section 42.15(a-2)

provides that a defendant may waive the on-the-record inquiry.

      Appellant maintains an on-the-record inquiry is an absolute statutory requirement.

There was no on-the-record inquiry. Neither was there a waiver by Appellant to have

such an inquiry. There is, however, an “Article 42.15 Addendum” in which the trial court

made the following findings:

      The defendant does not presently have sufficient resources or income to
      immediately pay all or part of the fine and costs but will, in the future, have
      the ability to pay the fine and costs at a later date or at designated intervals.

      The defendant shall pay all of the fine and costs to District Clerk/County
      Clerk or its designee upon release on parole or completion of his/her
      sentence. If the defendant is unable to pay all of the fines and costs upon
      release, the defendant shall, upon release, appear before the District
      Clerk/County Clerk or its designee and make arrangements to pay the fine
      and costs at designated intervals.

      3 See Act of May 8, 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., ch. 106, § 1, 2021 Tex. Gen. Laws 202.

      4 “On-the-record” language was added to the statute effective September 1, 2021.

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Although no on-the-record inquiry was made, the record shows the trial court determined

Appellant did not have sufficient resources or income to pay all or part of his fine and

costs. See Stanberry, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 1066, at *6 (citing Sloan v. State, 676

S.W.3d 240, 242 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2023, no pet.)). See also Cruz v. State, No. 14-21-

00454-CR, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 2987, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 4,

2023, pet. granted) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding defendant’s

ability-to-pay inquiry is “fundamental to the proper functioning of our adjudicatory

system”). Cf. Gates v. State, No. 02-23-00004-CR, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 1014, at *11–

12 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 8, 2024, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (finding the failure to have an on-the-record inquiry harmless). The court in

Sloan found the trial court must have determined the defendant did not have the

resources or income to pay immediately and deferred payment until his release. Sloan,

676 S.W.3d at 242. Issue one is overruled.

ISSUE TWO—CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

       At his plea hearing, Appellant was admonished of the range of punishment for

assault family violence if he were to violate his community supervision and be found guilty

at a later date. At the motion to proceed hearing, the trial court imposed the maximum

sentence. Appellant contends doing so was cruel and unusual punishment.

       Generally, punishment within the statutory range is not excessive, cruel, or unusual

under the Eighth Amendment and will not be disturbed on appeal. State v. Simpson, 488

S.W.3d 318, 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 320, 323–

24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). To avoid procedural default on a complaint of cruel and

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unusual punishment, a defendant must first raise the issue in the trial court when sentence

is pronounced or, if there was no opportunity to object, in a motion for new trial. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1). See also Burt v. State, 396 S.W.3d 574, 577 (Tex. Crim. App.

2013); Hardeman v. State, 1 S.W.3d 689, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Roach v. State,

No. 07-23-00102-CR, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 5327, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo July 20,

2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

       In the underlying case, Appellant did not object to his sentence in the trial court.

He first raised the issue in his motion for new trial alleging punishment was

“disproportionate to the underlying case and the allegations in the subsequent Motions to

Proceeds [sic].”

       After pronouncing sentence, the trial court advised Appellant of his right to appeal

and wished him good luck. The record does not show there was no opportunity to object

at trial, and Appellant did not allege in his motion for new trial that he was denied an

opportunity to object when sentence was imposed. Thus, raising the issue for the first

time in his motion for new trial was not the earliest opportunity to do so. He failed to

preserve his complaint of a disproportionate sentence for appellate review. See Martinez

v. State, No. 03-20-00187-CR, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 7066, at *15 (Tex. App.—Austin

Aug. 26, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).        Issue two is

overruled.

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                               REFORMATION OF JUDGMENT

       We note the trial court’s Judgment Adjudicating Guilt reflects a clerical error. The

summary portion under “Plea to Motion to Adjudicate” shows Appellant entered a plea of

“true” while the record of the hearing shows Appellant pleaded “not true.”

       This Court has the power to modify the judgment of the court below to make the

record speak the truth when we have the necessary information to do so. TEX. R. APP. P.

43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Appellate courts

have the power to reform whatever the trial court could have corrected by a judgment

nunc pro tunc where the evidence necessary to correct the judgment appears in the

record. Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). The

power to reform a judgment is “not dependent upon the request of any party, nor does it

turn on the question of whether a party has or has not objected in the trial court.” Id. at

529–30. Thus, we modify the trial court’s Judgment Adjudicating Guilt to reflect a plea of

“not true” under “Plea to Motion to Adjudicate.”

                                       CONCLUSION

       As modified, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                         Alex Yarbrough
                                                             Justice

Do not publish.

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