Court Opinion

ID: 9450999
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:02:35.297361+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:31.244969
License: Public Domain

DANAHER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
The District Court entered its judgment on December 6, 1961. After this court had affirmed, the District Court entered its further order of April 20, 1964 awarding interest at the rate of 4 per cent from the date of the original judgment “up to, but not exceeding, thirty days after the date of approval of any appropriation act providing for the payment of the judgments.” The total of the awards in the Meyer case was $171,000, allocated among the several *697beneficiaries in the original Meyer judgment, with no one award as great as $100,000. The awards in the Brady case aggregated $249,000 with a single award to Vance Lewman Brady of $175,000 and with lesser amounts payable to other survivors. My colleagues treat the amounts of the individual awards to the respective survivors as though each was the result of a separate “case.” Thus they reverse the District Court’s 1964 order except insofar as they recognize the award to Vance Lewman Brady to be valid since it was in excess of $100,000. I find myself unable to concur in a reversal, our difference having arisen with respect to the construction of 31 U.S.C. § 724a (1965), 70 Stat. 694 (1956), as amended, 75 Stat. 416 (1961).
In that legislation and as here pertinent, Congress appropriated “such sums as may hereafter be necessary” for payment of certain final judgments, as certified by the Comptroller General; it was simply a fiscal “housekeeping” statute, clearly intended to apply only to judgments of less than $100,000. Through such mechanism, Congress sought to provide a procedure whereby some 98 per cent of final judgments rendered against the Government might be satisfied through action by the Comptroller General, with interest thereon to run only from the date of the filing of the transcript of a final judgment in the General Accounting Office to the date of the mandate of affirmance.1
Congress reserved to itself final consideration with respect to the 2 per cent of “final judgments (not in excess of $100,000 * * * in any one case)” which by virtue of the legislation were beyond the power of the Comptroller General to satisfy. Our problem derives from the fact that in No. 18676 the State of Maryland was plaintiff in “one case” for the use of the Meyer claimants. The judgment there amounted to $171,000 broken down into individual awards to separate claimants. In the other case, No. 18677, the State of Maryland was plaintiff for the use of members of the Brady family, with individual awards which total $249,000. There was only one judgment, that of December 6, 1961, with the separate respective apportion-ments to the individual Brady and Meyer claimants.
When the suit for the use of Meyer like that for the Brady survivors was commenced pursuant to Article 67, section 4 of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1957), actions for wrongful death were required to be brought only in the name of the State of Maryland in behalf of various named beneficiaries of the decedent. Even under Maryland’s 1962 amendment of section 4 (Ann.Code of Md., Art. 67, § 4 (Supp.1964)), only one such action will lie. Those who may have a right to become parties but refuse to do so are excluded from bringing a subsequent action on their own account. State of Maryland to Use of Bashe, 72 Md. 140, 19 A. 366, 7 L.R.A. 272 (1890).
Our own Wrongful Death statute2 provides that “[e]very such action shall be brought by and in the name of the personal representative * * * ” of the decedent. This court has expressly held that the “requirement of the statute is in plain and unambiguous language.”3
It is fundamental that an action for wrongful death does not lie unless a statute so provides. Since the “use” plaintiffs are mandatory parties, if they are to sue at all,4 they are bound by the judgment when entered. Conversely the bringing of a single action redounds to the advantage of the alleged tort feasor who thus will be spared the necessity of defending multiple suits. Nothing in Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(a) is to the contrary in respect of the result necessary here; indeed whatever effect may be accorded *698to the Rule in situations where a jurisdictional problem arises, we have expressly held that substantively, the Rule does not modify or repeal the “specification in our statute 5 of the party authorized to bring an action for wrongful death.” 6 (Footnote added.)
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1965) provides that subject to the provisions of ch. 171 which prescribes tort claims procedure, the District Courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States for death caused by the negligence of the Government “under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.”
28 U.S.C. § 2674 provides that the United States shall be liable in tort claims “in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances * * *.”7
The Maryland statute, Article 67, section 4, as amended, supra, is explicit: only “one action shall lie for and in respect of the same subject matter * * * ” 8
Thus, if there were no living members of the use class as named in the Maryland statute, no claim for wrongful death could be made. Obviously, under the federal statutes, supra, no liability would devolve upon the Government.9 Conversely, living members of the classes in whose behalf the action might be maintained are mandatory plaintiffs.10
Thus the Meyer action, like the Brady suit, could have been brought only as it was brought — in accordance with the law of Maryland. It was “one case.” The final judgment exceeded $100,000.11 Therefore the order of the District Court correctly provided for interest to “be computed at the rate of 4 per centum per annum from [December 6, 1961] up to, but not exceeding, thirty days after the date of approval of any appropriation Act providing for payment of the judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 2411(b).
I would affirm.

. Certain additional limitations need not now be mentioned as not pertinent here. We are speaking only of judgments arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act.

. D.C.Code § 16-1202 (1961).

. Harris v. Embrey, 70 App.D.C. 232, 233, 105 F.2d 111, 112 (1939).

. Ibid.

. D.C.Code § 16-1202 (1961) provides that “Every such action shall be brought by and in the name of the personal representative of such deceased person a,

. Paris v. Braden, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 219, 220, 234 F.2d 40, 41 (1956).

. The latter section continues that in any case wherein death was caused, if under “the law of the place where the act or omission complained of occurred” recoverable damages are only punitive in nature, the United States shall be liable for actual or compensatory damages.

. For the history of the Maryland statute, see McKeon v. State, to Use of Conrad, 211 Md. 437, 127 A.2d 635 (1956).

. See State of Maryland, to Use of Burkhardt v. United States, 165 F.2d 869, 871, 1 A.L.R.2d 213 (4 Cir. 1947) ; cf. Young v. United States, 87 U.S.App.D.C. 145, 184 F.2d 587, 21 A.L.R.2d 1458 (1950).

. It is obvious from the record before us that we are not dealing with permissive plaintiffs. Cf. Fed.R.Ctv.P. 20. Those possessing the latter status were involved in the problem considered by the Comptroller General in the Hayashi opinion, 40 Decs-Comp-Gex. 307 (1960), where he ruled that claims, each less than $100,000, of the judgment-creditor children might be processed administratively. That opinion is clearly referable to Rev.L.Hawaii § 246-2 which permits an action for wrongful death to be maintained either by the decedent’s legal representative or by any of the enumerated next of kin. And see United States v. Harue Hayashi, 282 F.2d 599, 605, text and n. 11, 84 A.L.R. 2d 754 (9 Cir. 1960).

. It makes no difference that the judgment was apportioned as was provided in the Maryland statute instead of running nominally in favor of the State of Maryland for the use and benefit of the several individuals entitled to participate. Cf. United States v. South Carolina State Highway Dept., 171 F.2d 893, 897 (4 Cir. 1948).