Court Opinion

ID: 9898118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:28:35.038971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:10.482723
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                      Washington State
                                                                                      Court of Appeals
                                                                                       Division Two

                                                                                      October 31, 2023

       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                            DIVISION II
    In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of                     No. 51684-5-II

    MERT CEM CELEBISOY,

                                  Petitioner.                UNPUBLISHED OPINION

          CRUSER, J. – Mert Cem Celebisoy seeks relief from his 2004 sentence following his

conviction for a first degree murder that he committed when he was 21 years old. In this personal

restraint petition (PRP),1 Celebisoy argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the

sentencing court did not consider mitigating qualities of youth. This PRP is dismissed as time

barred.2

                                                 FACTS

          In 2004, a jury found Celebisoy guilty of first degree murder. Celebisoy committed this

crime when he was 21 years old. In March 2004, the trial court sentenced Celebisoy to a standard-

range sentence.

1
 This is Celebisoy’s third PRP. See Ord. Dismissing Pet., In re Pers. Restraint of Celebisoy, No.
36698-3-II (Wash. Ct. App. May 13, 2008); Ord. Dismissing Pet., In re Pers. Restraint of
Celebisoy, No. 49223-7-II (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2017). This court dismissed Celebisoy’s fourth
PRP in September 2019. Ord. Dismissing Pet., In re Pers. Restraint of Celebisoy, No. 53244-1-II
(Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2019). None of these PRPs address the issue raised in this PRP.
2
 Although this PRP is also successive, we dismiss it rather than transfer it to our supreme court
because it is time barred. In re Pers. Restraint of Turay, 150 Wn.2d 71, 87, 74 P.3d 1194 (2003).
No. 51684-5-II

       We affirmed the conviction in an unpublished opinion. State v. Celebisoy, noted at 131

Wn. App. 1003, 2006 WL 14519 at *16 (2006). This appeal mandated in October 2006.

       Celebisoy filed this PRP on November 27, 2017.3

                                           ANALYSIS

       Generally, “[n]o petition or motion for collateral attack on a judgment and sentence in a

criminal case may be filed more than one year after the judgment becomes final if the judgment

and sentence is valid on its face and was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction.” RCW

10.73.090(1). Because Celebisoy filed this PRP in 2017, well over one year after his judgment and

sentence became final when his direct appeal mandated in 2006, we must first address whether

this PRP is subject to the one-year time bar. RCW 10.73.090(1), (3)(b).

       To overcome the time bar, Celebisoy must show that his judgment and sentence is facially

invalid or not “rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction” or that his claim falls under an

exception to the time bar contained in RCW 10.73.100. RCW 10.73.090(1). Celebisoy does not

contend that his judgment and sentence is facially invalid or that it was not rendered by a court of

competent jurisdiction. Instead, he argues that his claim falls under (1) RCW 10.73.100(1), the

newly discovered evidence time-bar exception, and (2) RCW 10.73.100(6), the significant change

in the law time-bar exception.

                                    I.      RCW 10.73.100(1)

       Celebisoy argues that this PRP is not time barred “because [his claim] is based on newly-

discovered evidence demonstrating the neurological development of a 21-year-old is legally

3
  Celebisoy filed this PRP and a supplemental memorandum of authorities and argument in support
of the PRP as a CrR 7.8 motion in the trial court. The trial court transferred the CrR 7.8 motion to
this court for consideration by this court under CrR 7.8(c)(2).

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No. 51684-5-II

indistinguishable from a literal juvenile in terms of culpability.” Suppl. Br. at 12. This argument

fails.

         To establish the newly discovered evidence time-bar exception, Celebisoy must present

evidence that could not have been discovered before his sentencing by the exercise of due

diligence. In re Pers. Restraint of Kennedy, 200 Wn.2d 1, 13, 513 P.3d 769 (2022). In Kennedy,

our supreme court recognized that the “research and relevant understanding about the

neurodevelopment of those above the age of 18 existed as early as 2003,” a year before Celebisoy’s

sentencing. Id. at 18. Because this evidence was available to Celebisoy prior to his sentencing, he

cannot establish that the newly discovered evidence time-bar exception applies.

         Celebisoy also argues that the science in existence at the time of his sentencing would not

have permitted him to make a convincing argument “that his still maturing brain reduced his

culpability” and that subsequent studies would have better supported such an argument. Suppl. Br.

at 14. But our supreme court has rejected a nearly identical argument in Kennedy. Kennedy, 200

Wn.2d at 18-19 (rejecting Kennedy’s argument that “recent neuroscientific evidence . . . would

have allowed him to make a stronger argument for a mitigated sentence and, in that way, would

probably have changed the court’s discretionary sentencing decision.”). And Celebisoy relies on

the same 2004 article that was addressed in Kennedy for his assertion that the neuroscientific

evidence that existed around the time of his sentencing was not yet well developed. See id. at 15-

16. Under Kennedy, this argument fails. Although Celebisoy disagrees with Kennedy, “[w]e are

bound to follow our Supreme Court’s precedents and have no authority to abolish them.” Gorman

v. Pierce County, 176 Wn. App. 63, 76, 307 P.3d 795 (2013).

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No. 51684-5-II

                                    II.    RCW 10.73.100(6)

       Celebisoy further argues that this PRP was not time barred because State v. O’Dell, 183

Wn.2d 680, 358 P.3d 359 (2015), is a significant, material, retroactive change in the law. But our

supreme court has held that O’Dell is not a significant change in the law. In re Pers. Restraint of

Light-Roth, 191 Wn.2d 328, 334-38, 422 P.3d 444 (2018).

       Celebisoy also argues that this PRP is not time barred because In re Personal Restraint of

Monschke, 197 Wn.2d 305, 482 P.3d 276 (2021), and State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1,

391 P.3d 409 (2017), establish a significant, material, retroactive change in the law. But Houston-

Sconiers is not material to Celebisoy’s claim because it applies only to juvenile offenders and

Celebisoy was not a juvenile offender. Kennedy, 200 Wn.2d at 23 n.5. And Monschke is not

material to Celebisoy’s claim because it applies only to mandatory life sentences, and it only

applies to 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds, and Celebisoy received a discretionary sentence of less than

life and he was 21 years old at the time of his crime. Id. at 23 n.5, 24; In re Pers. Restraint of

Davis, 200 Wn.2d 75, 83-84, 514 P.3d 653 (2022).4 Accordingly, Celebisoy does not demonstrate

that the significant change in the law time-bar exception applies.

       Because Celebisoy does not establish that his PRP is subject to any time-bar exception, it

is untimely. Accordingly, this PRP is dismissed.

4
  Although Celebisoy disagrees with Kennedy and Davis and asserts that they were wrongly
decided, as previously noted, “[w]e are bound to follow our Supreme Court’s precedents and have
no authority to abolish them.” Gorman, 176 Wn. App. at 76.

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No. 51684-5-II

        A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,

it is so ordered.

                                                    CRUSER, J.
 We concur:

 GLASGOW, C.J.

 CHE, J.

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