Court Opinion

ID: 9544608
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:57:44.488297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:17.102260
License: Public Domain

BUSSEY, Judge,
dissenting:
I cannot agree that the testimony complained of was based on a familiarity acquired for purposes of the criminal prosecution, hence taking it out of 12 O.S.Supp. 1978, § 2901(B)(2). A summary of the evidence reflects that defendant was employed by Santo Dellaria, as a bookkeeper from September 15, 1977, until September 21, 1977. Dellaria identified two checks on his business account which were not written or authorized by him. Based upon his prior knowledge of the defendant’s handwriting, it was his opinion that the checks had been written by defendant. Dellaria testified that he was very familiar with the defendant’s handwriting and the defendant had an unusual backward script which the witness had observed on checks and on the company books. He testified that he recognized the handwriting as being defendant’s when he first observed the checks. He did not study other writings at the request of the police, but merely because of his “good conscience.” Nan Mullins, a bank teller, identified the defendant as the person who cashed the checks at Guaranty National Bank on September 21, 1977.
Other samples of appellant’s signature were consulted on his own purely “reconfirming” his belief. Authentication under section 2901 requires only “evidence sufficient to support a finding.” See section 2901(A). A more stringent standard for judging, as a preliminary matter, when *1276such a showing has been made would not seem to. be required.
Moreover, appellant has not demonstrated prejudice sufficient to warrant reversal, even if the testimony was improper. The testimony complained of was that all the handwriting on the two checks other than the payor’s, or drawer’s, signature, and some initials in the upper right hand corners, was in appellant’s handwriting. [Tr. 133] The same witness testified that the payor’s, or drawer’s signature, purportedly his, was non-genuine and had been forged. The bank teller testified that appellant endorsed one of the checks, one made out to “cash”, on the back, in her presence in an unusual manner: lengthwise, rather than across the corner. An examination of the exhibits reveals that the second check, made out to appellant, was also endorsed in that unusual manner and the signatures endorsed on both checks were appellant’s name. Appellant received the proceeds of both checks. Appellant was charged with Uttering a Forged Instrument, not with the forgeries themselves, and the testimony in question, even if improper, could not have determined the verdict.