Court Opinion

ID: 9454259
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:41:01.999398+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:02.508333
License: Public Domain

FAHY, Senior Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
The rule governing the access of defense counsel to grand jury minutes has developed in cases in which the .minutes contain, the testimony of a witness who later testifies at the trial. Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 86 S.Ct. 1840, 16 L.Ed.2d 973, is now the leading case. It seems pretty clear to me, however, that the rule itself is not restricted to the minutes of such a witness. The right which the rule recognizes is part of an increasingly expansive need for discovery in criminal cases. See, for example, footnote 17 of Dennis, 384 U.S. at 871, 86 S.Ct. 1840. It should include in such a case as the one now before us the minutes of the testimony of a complaining witness, though he did not take the stand at the trial; for the rule should turn on the broad ground of the relevance of the minutes to the proper administration of criminal justice. See Dennis, supra at 870, 86 S.Ct. 1840.
Our decision in Allen v. United States, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 61, 390 F.2d 476, recognizes the broad implications of Dennis. In doing so Allen holds that there must be clear and compelling considerations for denying to the defense access to the minutes — considerations bearing primarily upon whether there is any real need for secrecy. No “particularized need” for access itself is required.
The court points out that in this case there is no compelling reason whatever for secrecy, as evidenced by the willingness of the government to let the jury have access to the minutes; but the court does not find, as I do, need for access. There is - considerable uncertainty and conflict about just what occurred. A definite issue of self defense arose for the jury. This, considered with the circumstance that the man appellant is charged with attacking did not testify at trial, gives rise to need for defense counsel, as he sought, to have access to the grand jury testimony of this man in aid *963of developing the defense through witnesses who did testify.
Aside from reliance upon the absence of Curry at trial, our court, in upholding the trial court’s denial of defense counsel’s request, relies upon its own examination of the Curry testimony before the grand jury. It states such examination discloses no matter of possible assistance to the defense or such inconsistency between Curry’s grand , jury testimony and the evidence of other witnesses at trial as to require further action. This conclusion is reached without defense counsel either at trial or on appeal having had access to the minutes the court relies upon for the conclusion it reaches. This seems to me to be contrary to Dennis, supra at 874-875, 86 S.Ct. at 1851:
Nor is it realistic to assume that the trial court’s judgment as to the utility of material for impeachment or other legitimate purposes, however conscientiously made, would exhaust the possibilities. In our adversary system, it is enough for judges to judge. The determination of what may be useful to the defense can properly and effectively be made only by an advocate.22 The trial judge’s function in this respect is limited to deciding whether a case has been made for production, and to supervise the process: for example, to cause the elimination of extraneous matter and to rule upon applications by the Government for protective orders in unusual situations, such as those involving the Nation’s security or clear-cut dangers to individuals who are identified by the testimony produced. Cf. Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 16(e), as amended in 1966; 18 U.S.C. § 3500(c).
And see Allen v. United States, supra at 479, et seq.
The right to access does not depend upon a showing of inconsistency, certainly not in a case where the witness has not testified. On the issue of self defense Curry’s awareness that appellant believed him to be carrying on an affair with appellant’s wife was relevant. Curry’s grand jury testimony is indicative of such awareness on his part. With this information in his possession from this source defense counsel’s development of appellant’s case could have been aided through the examination and cross examination of those who did testify about what occurred.1 Curry might well have had reason to fear appellant, lending credence to appellant’s claim that Curry first attacked him. My basic position, however, is that since the minutes should have been made available to the defense the manner or degree of their utilization by the defense is not for us to decide.
Since the court affirms I need not resolve the question whether the error I find should lead to reversal or to a remand as in Allen. I only add my hope that trial judges will no longer deny the defense access to grand jury minutes on the erroneous theory that a “particularized need” for them must be shown, rather than generously affording access unless there is the “clearest and most compelling considerations” for not doing so. Nothing whatever of that character here appears.

. See Rosenberg v. United States, 360 U.S. 367, 371 [79 S.Ct. 1231, 1234, 3 L.Ed.2d 1304] ; United States v. Cotter, 60 F.2d 689, 692 (C.A.2d Cir. 1932) (L. Hand, J.) ; United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 636-640 [28 A.L.R.2d 1041] (C.A.2d Cir. 1950) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920 [72 S.Ct. 362, 96 L.Ed. 688].

. This is aside from the additional question whether the minutes were themselves admissible in evidence, if appellant, after examining the testimony, had moved for their admission.