Court Opinion

ID: 9756418
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:27:42.251688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:21.775704
License: Public Domain

CUNNINGHAM, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. This Court ignores the unique prerogatives of the prosecutor within our legal framework. In Flynt v. Commonwealth, this Court stated that “it is beyond dispute that the executive branch’s prosecutorial function includes ‘the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury[.]’ ” 105 S.W.3d 415, 424 (Ky.2003), quoting Commonwealth v. McKinney, 594 S.W.2d 884, 888 (Ky.App.1979), in turn quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978). Further, in Hoskins v. Maride, this Court recognized that “an ‘independent’ motion by a prosecutor to dismiss or amend an indictment must be sustained unless clearly contrary to manifest public interest.” 150 S.W.3d 1, 24 (Ky.2004) (citation omitted). In this case, the Commonwealth did not act contrary to the public’s interest in amending the charge. In fact, it amended the charge so as to seek a more severe penalty than would have been available otherwise. Further, the Commonwealth clearly had the authority to seek this combination of charges in the initial indictment.
The language of KRS 189A. 120(1) prevents the prosecutor from agreeing to a request to amend the DUI charge. Fur*527ther, it mandates that the prosecutor oppose a defense motion to amend the charge to a lesser offense. However, the language in KRS 189A. 120 does not expressly prohibit a prosecutor from exercising independent discretion and seeking a more severe penalty under these circumstances. Further, in light of the prosecutor’s authority set out above, such action falls squarely within the authority reserved to the prosecutor. In turn, once the Commonwealth exercises its authority in seeking to prosecute the facts under an offense other than a “fourth or subsequent offense,” the language of KRS 189A.010(5)(d) has no application. Neither do I agree with the majority’s understanding of “agree.” It is clear from its reading that the whole purpose of KRS 189A.020(1) is to prohibit the defendant from procuring a reduced charge through plea negotiations. Otherwise, it would have been a simple matter for the legislature to have written that “a prosecuting attorney shall not move to amend the charge to a lesser offense.... ”
For these reasons, I cannot join the majority opinion.