Court Opinion

ID: 9538691
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:40:02.151055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:05.539708
License: Public Domain

WILLIAMS, Justice
(concurring specially) :
Assuming for the purpose of discussion that there was no indebtedness created against the developers in favor of the plaintiff-contractor, Metropolitan, it may be that there was no indebtedness due plaintiff by defendants. However, the matter from Phillips, Mechanics’ Liens, quoted in the majority opinion leaves room for the implication of a contract. And our statute, 15 O.S.1961, § 133, provides that an implied contract is one, the existence and terms of which are manifested by conduct.
Further, ordinarily one should not be permitted to unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another. A voluntary acceptance of the benefit of a transaction is equivalent to a consent to all the obligations arising from it so far as the facts are known, or ought to be known, to the person accepting. 15 O.S.1961, § 75.
I am inclined to agree that, as said by the Court in this case, the situation before us here is one of a breach of contract rather than one of the creation of an indebtedness.
I do not agree with the specially concurring opinion that provision in the contract against the filing of any liens prevents the filing of such by the contractor itself. See 15 O.S.1961, §§ 106-175, 427. In Phillips, *975Mechanics’ Liens (2nd Edition) §117 it is said:
“So where a contractor stipulated that no other person or subcontractor should file a lien, it nevertheless did not prevent the contractor from filing a lien to secure himself.” Young v. Lyman, 9 Penn. 449.
This would he especially true here, I believe, if there were no question hut that Metropolitan and the developers had created an indebtedness by their contract and it should he determined that the lien statute did apply.
In Phillips, Mechanics’ Liens (2nd Edition), supra, § 12, it is stated:
“The lien is intended to affect only real estate, and not personal property. It attaches to the land, in consequence of the incorporation of labor and materials in the building erected, which have become part of the land itself.” (Emphasis supplied).
Our lien statute herein concerned, 42 O.S.1961, § 141, refers to improvements and structures etc. placed upon the land and such land.
I make point that there is a question with me whether the lien provided for by our statute would apply in favor of one laying water lines and sewer lines to a property line and not upon it, as against that property.
In Phillips, Mechanics’ Liens, (2nd Edition) supra, § 9, it is said:
“The lien of the mechanic, here treated of, is a remedy in the nature of a charge on land, given by statute to the persons named therein, to secure a priority or preference of payment for the performance of labor or supply of materials to buildings or other improvements, to be enforced against the particular property in which they become incorporated, in the manner and under the limitations therein expressly provided. It is exclusively the creature of statute, deriving its existence only from positive enactment. There can be no lien independent of statute. It does not arise out of, nor is it of the essence of, the contract for labor, nor dependent on the motives which suggest its being enforced. It is a mere incidental accompaniment as a means of enforcing payment, — a remedy given by law, which secures the preference provided for, but which does not exist, however equitable the claim may be, unless the party brings himself within the provisions of the statute, and shows a substantial compliance with all its essential requirements * * ”
In the case of Eastmore v. Bunkley et al., 113 Ga. 637, 39 S.E. 105, Eastmore sued New Cumberland Island Co. to foreclose a contractors lien for a sum alleged to be due for constructing and repairing a certain dam and dock or pier on Cumberland Island. The executors of the estate of Bunk-ley were permitted to intervene and become parties defendant to assert a mortgage. They contended plaintiff had not showed it expended anything on the particular property involved in suit. The Court there said:
“It appears from the record that the plaintiff in error brought action in the lower court to foreclose a mechanic’s lien for building a dam and dock or pier. He claimed a lien upon real estate, with which no connection whatever is shown by the testimony with this property, nor was there any evidence to show that the property upon which he claimed his lien belonged to the defendant company. It is not necessary to decide the question whether or not the construction of improvements on given realty will, in any event, entitle a contractor to a lien on other property of the same owner which may be benefited or enhanced in value by reason of such improvements, for, conceding that such is the case, it is certainly essential that the contractor, in order to maintain his suit for the foreclosure of his lien on the separate realty so benefited, shall clearly identify it by the evidence. Such, as has been seen, was not *976done by the plaintiff in error in this case.”
The Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
I concur specially.