Court Opinion

ID: 9735125
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:03:04.09363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:55.533962
License: Public Domain

Liacos, C.J.
(concurring). I write separately to express my disagreement with the court’s conclusion that defense counsel shall be absolutely barred from a pre-Franks in camera proceeding.
Underlying this court’s blanket prohibition of defense counsel from the in camera hearing is the insulting assumption that criminal defense attorneys simply cannot be trusted. I remind the court that many defense attorneys are paid public servants who work for the Committee for Public Counsel Services and that all defense attorneys take the same oath to uphold the laws of the Commonwealth as do their prosecuting brethren. I find disturbing the court’s willingness to assume that defense counsel will be unable to refrain from disclosing to their clients any revelations made during the in camera hearing.
I would allow defense counsel to be present at the in camera proceeding. See United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 724, 729-730 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 910 (1975); In re United States, 565 F.2d 19, 23 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Bell v. Socialist Workers Party, 436 U.S. 962 (1978); United States v. Grisham, 748 F.2d 460, 465 (8th Cir. 1984) (Heaney, J., concurring in part and dissent*527ing in part); Commonwealth v. Miller, 513 Pa. 118, 134-135 (1986); State v. Russell, 580 S.W.2d 793, 794 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). If the motion judge considers it necessary, he could, in his discretion, “place defense counsel under enforceable orders against unwarranted disclosure of the evidence that he has heard.” Anderson, supra at 730.
Because defense counsel’s presence at the in camera hearing would help ensure that the defendant’s interests are adequately represented, the motion judge should be able to invite him to the proceeding. Because I otherwise agree with the result in this case, I concur.