Court Opinion

ID: 9385670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-07 19:02:40.983192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:03.733681
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/7/23 Moore v. Old Republic Title Co. CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

RONALD MOORE et al.,                                                   B305768

         Plaintiffs and Appellants,                                    (Los Angeles County
                                                                       Super. Ct. No. BC559815)
         v.

OLD REPUBLIC TITLE COMPANY
et al.,

         Defendants and Respondents.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Stephanie M. Bowick, Judge. Affirmed.
      Law Office of Freddie Lee Fletcher and Freddie Fletcher for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
      Garrett & Tully, Ryan C. Squire and Linda R. Echegaray
for Defendants and Respondents.
            __________________________________________
       A mother died intestate leaving two adult children, Ronald
Moore (Moore) and Rosa Lars (Lars), as heirs. After the sale of
the mother’s home, Moore filed a complaint to quiet title against
Lars and others seeking his half of the property. A year later,
Moore, now with two of the former defendants in the first
complaint as coplaintiffs, filed an amended complaint.
Subsequently, the remaining defendants filed a motion to dismiss
the action under Code of Civil Procedure sections 583.310 and
583.360 due to the plaintiffs’ failure to bring the case to trial
within five years.1 The trial court granted the motion. It
concluded that section 583.310 barred the plaintiffs’ claims
because the amended complaint related back to the first
complaint and five years had passed since it was filed. We agree
and affirm.
           FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1.     October 2014 Complaint (First Complaint)
       In October 2014, Moore filed a complaint (first complaint)
to quiet title. The complaint alleged that his mother, Dorothy
Harrison (Harrison), died intestate in December 2010, leaving
himself and his sister, Lars, as heirs to her home (the property).
Moore alleged that upon his mother’s death, the title to the
property vested in himself and Lars through the laws governing
intestate succession.
       The complaint alleged that Harrison’s grandson, Benny
Newton, colluded with his friend Vincent Alva and Alva’s wife,
Nancy Cardenas, a notary, to forge Harrison’s signature on a
quitclaim deed to the property (Deed One), which they backdated
to before Harrison’s death. Moore alleged that forged Deed One

      1All statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

                                 2
purported to quitclaim Harrison’s interests in the property to the
following individuals: Lars (1/4 interest); Moore (1/8 interest);
Benny Newton (3/8 interest); and Dane Moore (1/4 interest).
      The first complaint then alleged that Lars and others
conspired to defraud Moore of his interest in the property by then
forging a second deed (Deed Two) that transferred to Lars all of
the interests in the property, with the intent that Lars would
then sell the property to a company, Verzfco, LLC (Verzfco).
      The complaint alleged that the property was sold to Verzfco
through a conspiracy that included Lars, Verzfco, a title
company, real estate companies, an escrow company, notaries,
and various named individuals and “Doe” defendants associated
with those companies. The complaint alleged that the defendants
shared among them the profits of the sale of the property to
Verzfco for approximately $229,000, which was allegedly below
market value.
      The first complaint names the following individuals as
defendants: Lars, Benny Newton, Dane Moore, Vincent Alva,
Nancy Cardenas, T.B. Sanders, Verzfco, Old Republic Title
Company, Blake Uradomo, Century 21 Allstars Inc., Maxres Inc.,
Joseph Garcia Villaescusa, Pacific Escrow Inc., Sandra
Villaescusa, and 12 “Doe” defendants.
      The first complaint contained only one cause of action
against all the defendants: quiet title. It asserted that Moore
had a one-half title interest because both Deeds One and Two
were forged and thus fraudulent.
2.    November 2015 Complaint (Amended Complaint)
      In November 2015, Moore, now with two of the defendants
from the first complaint as coplaintiffs, Benny Newton and Dane
Moore, filed a first amended complaint. The amended complaint

                                3
did not add any new named defendants, and reiterated the
following as defendants: Lars, T.B. Sanders, Verzfco, Old
Republic Title Company, Pacific Escrow Inc., Blake Uradomo,
Century 21 Allstars Inc., Maxres Inc., Joseph Garcia Villaescusa,
and Sandra Villaescusa.
        The amended complaint contained a claim for quiet title to
the same property, but added additional causes of action for
ejectment, conversion (rents), money had and received,
conversion (personal property), conspiracy to forge and falsely
acknowledge deed, slander of title and cancellation of cloud on
title, and partition.
        The amended complaint alleges that Deed One transferred
the property from Harrison in the same interests to the same four
individuals as the first complaint: Lars (1/4 interest); Moore (1/8
interest); Benny Newton (3/8 interest); and Dane Moore (1/4
interest). However, unlike the first complaint, the amended
complaint does not allege that Deed One was forged. Instead, it
alleges that Harrison executed this quitclaim deed herself before
she died, but her “drug-addicted children were not told that Mrs.
Harrison had executed the deed.”
        As to Deed Two, the amended compliant again alleges that
Deed Two was forged by Lars with the help of various companies
and individuals associated with them, and purported to grant the
interests from Deed One of Lars, Moore, Benny Newton and Dane
Moore to Lars only.
        Like the first complaint, the amended complaint then
alleges that Lars, Verzfco, and various real estate and title
companies and individuals associated with them conspired to
transfer Lar’s interest in the property to Verzfco at below market
value for $229,000. The amended complaint also alleges that the

                                4
various defendants shared the profits from the sale of the
property to Verzfco.
       The quiet title claim in the amended complaint seeks to
adjudicate the plaintiffs’ interests in the property as written on
Deed One, with the exception that it alleges Lars has lawfully
transferred her original interest in Deed One to Verzfco because
it no longer alleges that Deed One was forged: Verzfco (1/4
interest); Moore (1/8 interest); Benny Newton (3/8 interest); and
Dane Moore (1/4 interest).
       The amended complaint also alleges that Verzfco has
received rents exceeding $2,000 a month from the property and
broke the locks on the property converting the personal property
within it for its own use.
3.     Motion and Trial Court Ruling
       In September 2016 and May 2017 respectively, some of the
defendants were voluntarily dismissed and default was entered
against others. The trial court determined the pleadings were
settled and set a trial date for June 19, 2018.
       On June 19, 2018, the plaintiffs (Moore, Benny Newton,
and Dane Moore) indicated that they were not ready for trial and
also that they wanted a guardian appointed to represent Lars’s
Estate. Trial was rescheduled for May 2019. On the day of the
final status conference, plaintiffs again sought a continuance,
this time by ex parte application due to Lars’s death in June
2018. The court rescheduled the trial to September 2020.
       In December 2019, the remaining defendants, Old Republic
Title Company and its officer and agent Blake Uradomo, and
Verzfco (hereinafter Respondents), moved to dismiss the case
pursuant to the five-year rule in section 583.310.

                                5
       In January 2020, the trial court granted the motion. The
trial court found that the amended complaint related back to the
first complaint, which set the clock ticking on the five-year
period, and that the plaintiffs had not been diligent in bringing
the case to trial. The trial court dismissed the case in its entirety
and gave notice of the dismissal in February 2020.
4.     Appeal
       Ronald Moore, Benny Newton, and Dane Moore
(Appellants) filed a timely appeal in April 2020.
                           DISCUSSION
I.     Applicable Law and Standard of Review
       Under section 583.310, “[a]n action shall be brought to trial
within five years after the action is commenced against the
defendant.” (§ 583.310.) In computing the five years, “there shall
be excluded the time during which any of the following conditions
existed: [¶] (a) The jurisdiction of the court to try the action was
suspended. [¶] (b) Prosecution or trial of the action was stayed
or enjoined. [¶] (c) Bringing the action to trial, for any other
reason, was impossible, impracticable, or futile.” (§ 583.340.)
Dismissal under section 583.310 is “mandatory” unless a
statutory exception applies. (§ 583.360; Martinez v. Landry’s
Restaurants, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 783, 793 [“Dismissal is
mandatory if the requirements of section 583.310 are not met and
an exception provided by statute does not apply”].)
       The issue before us is the application of the relation-back
doctrine to undisputed facts in the context of section 583.310’s
five-year rule, so we review the trial court’s decision de novo.
(Brumley v. FDCC California, Inc. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 312,
318 (Brumley).) While the determination of whether section
583.310 was tolled for impossibility, impracticability, or futility in

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bringing the case to trial is ordinarily reviewed for an abuse of
discretion, the question of the applicability of section 583.340 to
undisputed facts is a legal question subject to de novo review.
(Ibid.; Tanguilig v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2018) 22
Cal.App.5th 313, 324 (Tanguilig).)
II.    The Five-year Rule Bars Plaintiff’s Claims Because
       the Amended Complaint Relates Back to the First
       Complaint
       Generally, the “ ‘[c]ommencement’ of an action for purposes
of section 583.310 . . . is firmly established as the date of filing of
the initial complaint.” (Brumley, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at
p. 318, citing Kowalski v. Cohen (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 977, 980;
see also Tanguilig, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 322.) Where an
amended complaint alleges new causes of action that do not
“relate back” to the first complaint, then the “commencement” of
the action for purposes of section 583.310 is the filing date of the
amended complaint. (Tanguilig, at pp. 322–323; see also
Brumley, at pp. 320–322.) Courts apply the “relation-back
doctrine” to determine whether the first or the amended
complaint commences the five-year period in section 583.10.
(Brumley, at p. 320.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show how
the newly added claims do not relate back to the original
complaint, so that the five-year period with respect to these
claims should be deemed to begin when the amended complaint is
filed. (Fidelity National Home Warranty Co. Cases (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 812, 856–857.)
       Here, Appellants argue that the action commenced when
they filed the amended complaint on November 12, 2015, because
it does not relate back to the first complaint. Respondents
counter that the amended complaint relates back to the first

                                  7
complaint, so the action commenced on October 3, 2014.
Appellants concede that if the amended complaint relates back to
the first complaint, then their case is barred by section 583.310.
       For the relation-back doctrine to apply, the amended
complaint must “(1) rest on the same general set of facts,
(2) involve the same injury, and (3) refer to the same
instrumentality, as the original one.” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co.
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 409, italics omitted (Norgart).) We analyze
each element of this test in turn.
       A.    The complaints rest on the same general set of
             facts.
       To relate back to the first complaint, the amended
complaint must rest on the same “general set of facts.” (Norgart,
supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 409, italics omitted.) Even where a new
cause of action “add[s] a significant new dimension to the
lawsuit,” the amended complaint relates back if the recovery
sought is on the same general set of facts. (Grudt v. City of Los
Angeles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 575, 583–584 (Grudt).) The relation-back
doctrine “will not apply if . . . ‘the plaintiff seeks by amendment
to recover upon a set of facts entirely unrelated to those pleaded
in the original complaint.’ ” (Pointe San Diego Residential
Community, L.P. v. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP
(2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 265, 277 (Pointe San Diego).)
       Here, the gravamen of both pleadings is an action to quiet
title. “A quiet title action is a statutory action that seeks to
declare the rights of the parties in realty.” (Robin v. Crowell
(2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 727, 740 (Robin).) Both pleadings allege a
succession of deeds that purported to transfer the property to
Verzfco through forgery. Both pleadings seek to adjudicate the
interests in the property of Ronald Moore, Benny Newton, Dane

                                8
Moore, Rosa Lars, and Verzfco. Both complaints allege that Rosa
Lars and Ronald Moore held equal shares of the property after
their mother’s death, but then Lars transferred the title to the
entire property to Verzfco through forgery at below market value.
       On appeal, Appellants argue that the ejectment cause of
action in the amended complaint rests on a different set of
general facts than those alleged in the first complaint. We
disagree. Both the claim for ejectment and the claim for quiet
title rest on the allegations that the plaintiffs have been denied
ownership, and thus possession of the property from which they
were allegedly unlawfully ejected, due to forgery of Deed Two by
Lars and her conspiracy to sell the property to Verzfco at below
market value. The addition of a new cause of action for
ejectment, even if it added a “significant new dimension” to this
case, does not change that the two complaints rest on the same
general set of facts. (Grudt, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 583–584.)
       B.     The complaints involve the same injury.
       To relate back, the amended complaint must also involve
the “same injury” as that alleged in the first complaint. (Norgart,
supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 409, italics omitted.) Here, the amended
complaint, like the first complaint, alleges the loss of title to the
property through forgery as the injury.
       Appellants argue that the amended complaint alleges a
new injury because it asserts new causes of action for loss of
possession of the real property and loss of personal property.
They argue that possession is a different kind of “primary right”
than title interest in a property, so the injury is distinct. Courts
have rejected this approach. We do not look to the newly alleged
causes of action in an amended complaint and whether they seek
to vindicate different legal rights than those causes of action in

                                  9
the original complaint. Rather, we examine whether the various
causes of action stem from the same actual injury. (Grudt, supra,
2 Cal.3d at pp. 583–584; Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2008) 163
Cal.App.4th 1157, 1199 (Amaral), quoting Lamont v. Wolfe (1983)
142 Cal.App.3d 375, 378 (Lamont) [“ ‘it is the sameness of the
facts rather than the rights or obligations arising from the facts
that is determinative’ ”].)
       Here, both complaints allege loss of the title to the property
through forgery as the injury—a loss from which the additional
possessory losses alleged in the amended complaint stem.
Appellants seek damages for loss of possession and conversion
(rental income) in the same proportions as they allege their
respective title interests. That the amended complaint alleges
additional losses resulting from the fraudulent loss of title does
not mean it pleads a different injury for purposes of the
relation-back doctrine. (See Pointe San Diego, supra, 195
Cal.App.4th at pp. 276–278 [rejecting argument that payment of
attorney fees to a second attorney to rectify legal malpractice by
the first attorney was a separate injury from the original
malpractice injury of economic loss].)
       Appellants do not cite any relevant legal authority to
support their claim that loss of possession of the property is a
sufficiently distinct injury from the loss of the title of the
property such that the amended complaint does not relate back.
In cases where courts find that the injuries in the two complaints
are distinct, they involve significantly dissimilar, independent
claims that could be brought as separate actions. (See, e.g.,
Brumley, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at pp. 320–321, 324 [wrongful
death claim and loss of consortium claims by survivors of the

                                 10
deceased did not relate back to personal injury claim filed by the
deceased and could have been brought as a separate lawsuit].)
       Here, the two complaints allege the same injury of loss of
the title to the property through fraud based on forgery.
       C.     The complaints refer to the same
              instrumentality.
       Finally, to relate back, the two complaints must also “refer
to the same instrumentality.” (Norgart, supra, 21 Cal.4th at
p. 409, italics omitted.) The term “instrumentality” refers to the
accident or misconduct that caused the injury. For example,
negligent medical treatment and a failure to warn of the dangers
of taking a drug are separate “accidents” from a defective medical
device. (Barrington v. A. H. Robins Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 146, 152;
see also Coronet Manufacturing Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 90
Cal.App.3d 342, 347 [electrocution by lamp is different
instrumentality than electrocution by hairdryer].)
       In this case, the instrumentality is the same in both
complaints. Both complaints allege that the loss of title, and thus
loss of the possession of the property and its contents, was caused
by forgery that resulted in the title being wrongfully transferred
to Verzfco. Appellants’ assertion that the quiet title claim in the
first complaint arose from different misconduct than the claim for
ejectment in the amended complaint is without merit. Appellants
claim that the quiet title action derives from alleged misconduct
by Benny Newton in forging Harrison’s signature on Deed One
and misconduct by Rosa Lars of forging the signatures of Ronald
Moore, Dane Moore, and Benny Newton on Deed Two, whereas
the misconduct in the ejectment claim in the amended complaint
is Verzfco’s “ousting” of Ronald Moore, Dane Moore, and Benny
Newton from their possession of the home. But the same

                                11
instrumentality of forged deeds alleged in both complaints is
what caused the primary injury of the loss of title interest to
Verzfco, without which the plaintiffs would never have been
ejected by Verzfco. (Cf. Smeltzley v. Nicholson Mfg. Co. (1977) 18
Cal.3d 932, 940 [where employee was injured by a machine at
work and the first complaint alleged the employer maintained an
unsafe working environment and amended complaint alleged the
machine’s manufacturer made a defective machine, the machine
was the instrumentality in both complaints].) Minor differences
in the allegations as to who forged which deed is not dispositive.
(See Pointe San Diego, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 278 [both
complaints referred to the same instrumentality of “professional
negligence” even though the first complaint did not “detail” the
negligence that caused the injury and the second complaint did].)
      We conclude that both complaints alleged the same
instrumentality.
      D.     Changing two defendants to plaintiffs, and
             adding an ejectment cause of action, did not
             deprive the other defendants of notice.
      Appellants argue that because they added two of the former
defendants as plaintiffs and an ejectment claim to the amended
complaint, the amended complaint cannot relate back to the first
complaint because there was a lack of notice to the defendants of
the new plaintiffs and cause of action.
      Appellants confuse the purpose of the relation-back
doctrine in the context of the statute of limitations with its
purpose here. In considering the relation-back doctrine in the
context of the running of the statute of limitations, courts
consider whether the original pleading placed defendants on
notice of the claims in the amended complaint so that they could

                               12
“prepare a fair defense.” (Lamont, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d at
p. 380; see also Pointe San Diego, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at
p. 279.) In contrast, the purpose of the five-year rule is to protect
defendants against a plaintiff’s lack of diligence. (See Gaines v.
Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1081, 1104–
1105; see also Jordan v. Superstar Sandcars (2010) 182
Cal.App.4th 1416, 1420 [“ ‘ “The critical factor is whether the
plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in prosecuting its
case” ’ ”], quoting Moss v. Stockdale, Peckham & Werner (1996) 47
Cal.App.4th 494, 502.) Where, as here, the plaintiffs did not
bring the case to trial within five years, the need for sufficient
notice to prepare an adequate defense is arguably less critical.
       Regardless, Respondents have not asserted prejudice due to
lack of notice, and the additional causes of action in the amended
complaint all stem from the alleged forgery leading to loss of title
in the first complaint. Respondents’ defensive position has not
been significantly changed by the amended complaint: The issue
they must prepare to defend is still whether Verzfco had rightful
title to the property based on the theory that some documents
were forged in the chain of deeds.
       The simple fact of the addition of two new plaintiffs in the
amended complaint also does not change our conclusion. An
amended complaint with a new plaintiff can relate back as long
as the operative facts are the same. (Hutcheson v. Superior Court
(2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 932, 940; American Western Banker v.
Price Waterhouse (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 39, 49; Pasadena
Hospital Assn., Ltd. v. Superior Court (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d
1031, 1037.)

                                 13
      Accordingly, the addition of the two new plaintiffs and the
ejectment claim does not change our conclusion that the amended
complaint relates back to the first complaint.
      E.     The addition of the new plaintiffs’ ejectment
             claims and monetary damages for ejectment
             does not prevent the amended complaint from
             relating back to the first complaint.
      Appellants also argue that the amended complaint cannot
relate back to the first complaint because the two new plaintiffs
seek to enforce their independent rights to damages for ejectment
from the property and thus impose greater liability on
Respondents.
      This claim lacks merit. The addition of new damages in an
amended complaint does not prevent the amended complaint
from relating back to the first complaint as long as the damages
result from “the same operative facts—i.e., the same misconduct
and the same injury—previously complained of.” (Amaral, supra,
163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1200, citing Walton v. Guinn (1986) 187
Cal.App.3d 1354, 1362.)
      Moreover, the new plaintiffs’ claims for ejectment are not
independent claims, but rather claims that relate back to the first
quiet title action. For the reasons above, the ejectment cause of
action relates back to the first complaint because it is based on
the same general set of facts, the same injury, and the same
instrumentality. The new plaintiffs’ claims for damages from loss
of possession of the property cannot be resolved without a
determination of their respective title interests in the property.
(See Brumley, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at pp. 320–321 [a claim is
independent for purposes of the relation-back doctrine when it
could have been brought as a separate lawsuit].) A quiet title

                                14
action seeks to determine the respective rights of all parties to a
single property’s title. (Robin, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 740;
see also Chao Fu, Inc. v. Chen (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 48, 58.)
Therefore, Appellants’ reliance on the loss of consortium and
wrongful death line of cases is misplaced. These claims
compensate the heir for his or her own independent pecuniary
losses for the particular loss of the decedent to each individual
claimant. Courts have therefore found such claims independent
to each heir. (See, e.g., Bartalo v. Superior Court (1975) 51
Cal.App.3d 526, 533 [“[C]laim to a loss of consortium is a wholly
different legal liability or obligation [than the decedent’s personal
injury action]. The elements of loss of society, affection and
sexual companionship are personal to him”]; San Diego Gas &
Electric Co. v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1552–
1553 [wrongful death action is one of “ ‘personal injury to the
heir’ ”], quoting Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140
Cal.App.4th 1256, 1264.)
       In sum, the addition of damages and the ejectment claim in
the amended complaint relate back to the first complaint because
they are both based on the same operative facts as the first
complaint.

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                          DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to
recover their costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                        LUI, P. J.
We concur:

     ASHMANN-GERST, J.

     HOFFSTADT, J.

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