Court Opinion

ID: 9625339
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:37:07.492187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:30.892214
License: Public Domain

Mallery, J.
The trial court sustained defendant’s demurrer. Plaintiff appeals from the judgment of dismissal.
Appellant contends the trial court erred in holding that her action was barred by the three-year statute of limitations. RCW 4.16.080(2) [cf. Rem. Rev. Stat. (Sup.), § 159].
The action is predicated upon the negligence of a physician, who will be referred to herein as if he were the sole *676respondent. On February 1, 1946, he performed operations upon appellant’s gall bladder and hernia. He left a surgical sponge in the hernia incision, which prevented it from healing properly for over seven years. Appellant was treated by respondent several times during the next three and one-half years. On October 2, 1949, the hernia incision broke open and drained continuously thereafter until March 31, 1953, at which time about two inches of gauze came out through the opening. Thereupon, respondent again operated upon appellant and removed the sponge. The incision then healed properly.
Appellant’s action was commenced on July 9, 1953. This was more than three years after the operations on February 1, 1946. Accordingly, appellant is barred from relying upon the negligent act of leaving the sponge in the hernia incision. It is also more than three years after appellant’s last treatment by respondent on October 12, 1949, so that she cannot rely upon the alleged negligent diagnosis and treatment subsequent to the operation.
We have held in malpractice cases that the cause of action accrues at the time of the wrongful act that caused the injury. Cornell v. Edsen, 78 Wash. 662, 139 Pac. 602; Jones v. Gregory, 125 Wash. 46, 215 Pac. 63; Smith v. Berkey, 134 Wash. 348, 235 Pac. 793; and McCoy v. Stevens, 182 Wash. 55, 44 P. (2d) 797. In the McCoy case, supra, this court quoted from Cornell v. Edsen, supra, as follows:
“ ‘But like any other action founded upon a breach of duty imposed either by law or contract, the action arises out of the breach, and the statute of limitations begins to run from the time of the breach and not from the time of its discovery.’ ”
Appellant seeks to avoid the effect of the rule upon the theory that the undiscovered negligence was continuing in nature, thus invoking the rule of Theurer v. Condon, 34 Wn. (2d) 448, 209 P. (2d) 311. In that case, the action based upon the negligent installation of an oil burner, which caused a fire seven years later, was held not to be barred. We said:
*677“The fire hazard' created by appellants’ negligence, was continuous, and, if the fire which resulted in this action was caused by the filling of the tank when the stove was hot, the bar of the statute of limitations, as to respondents’ right of action, did not commence’to run as to damages occasioned by the fire until the date of the fire.” (Italics ours.)
Of course, negligence which does not produce harm is not actionable, and a cause of action cannot accrue until injury has been sustained. To be analogous to the instant case, the fire in thát casé must have started with the negligent act, and continued burning until the cause was discovered. In 34 Am. Jur. 126, Limitation of Actions, § 160, it is said:
.“Where an injury, although slight, is sustained in consequence of the wrongful act of another, and the law affords a remedy therefor, the statute of limitations attaches at once. It is not material that all the damages resulting from the act shall have been sustained at that time, and the running of the statute is not postponed by the fact that the actual or substantial damages do not occur until a later date.”
Appellant contends that the facts of Doran v. Seattle, 24 Wash. 182, 64 Pac. 230, are analogous to those in her case and support her theory of continuing negligence. That action was for trespass and nuisance resulting from the construction of a bulkhead in front of plaintiff’s premises, which damaged plaintiff’s house. The trespass and damage were continuing, and the court so held. An action in trespass is not predicated upon negligence. A continuing trespass is not tantamount to a continuing negligence. The case, therefore, does not establish the principle that every continuing injury implies a continuing negligence, the loose language in the case to the contrary notwithstanding.
Appellant alleged that the discovery of respondent’s negligence was not made until March 31, 1953, when the incision opened and the presence of the gauze was discovered. The injury itself was, of course, known all the while, and the negligent act was not a continuing one. Appellant urges upon us a ruling that the cause of action accrued upon *678the discovery of the negligence rather than the occurrence of the injury. It is not our prerogative so to do. We are concerned here with the interpretation of a statute. We are satisfied that had the legislature intended the principle of discovery to apply to tort cases based on negligence, it would have specifically said so, as it did with regard to discovery in fraud cases.
Appellant abandoned her other assignments of error, and, accordingly, they will not be discussed herein.
The judgment is affirmed.
SCHWELLENBACH, HlLL, ÜAMLEY, DONWORTH, WEAVER, and Olson, JJ., concur.