Court Opinion

ID: 9531936
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:16:10.400484+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:37.757327
License: Public Domain

Williams, J.
The dispositive issue in this case is whether the trial judge had authority to place *224defendant, who was convicted of armed robbery, on probation.
I —FACTS
Defendant was found guilty by the court sitting without a jury of robbery armed on July 10, 1969. The court placed defendant on probation for a period of three years, the terms of which required defendant to serve the first six months in the Detroit House of Correction and to pay costs of $240 within a year after his sentence was completed and that he pay restitution in the amount of $100 during the first six months after release from Dehoco. Probation was imposed on August 7, 1969. On October 2, 1970, a warrant for probation violation was issued against defendant.
On April 26, 1972, defendant appeared in recorder’s court for a hearing on violation of probation. The court offered to appoint a lawyer for defendant but he said he did not want a lawyer. The court stated that according to the October 2, 1970 notice of probation violation the defendant had paid only $10 in court costs and nothing in restitution and that the judge had been informed that there was pending against the defendant a new charge of robbery armed in recorder’s court. Defendant had received a copy of this notice of probation violation the day before the hearing.
At the hearing the following exchange took place between the judge and the defendant:
"The Court: You understand what this is all about?
"The Defendant: Not really.
"The Court: I can’t hear you.
"The Defendant: Not really.
"The Court: What is it you do not understand?
"The Defendant: About the costs. The $10.00 costs.
*225"The Court: Don’t you remember when you were before me the last time and you were found guilty of armed robbery?
"The Defendant: Yes.
"The Court: And at that time I placed you on probation. Actually when you are convicted of armed robbery you are really not a candidate for probation. But I placed you on probation and required that you do six months at the Detroit House of Correction. At the same time I ordered that you reimburse the people from whom you had stolen the money. And I also assessed court costs. Now are you telling me now that you didn’t understand any of that?
"The Defendant: Yes, I understood it, but when— when the probation officer told me I could stay over in Lansing, you know, I was sending money by mail, you know. And it was sent.
"The Court: How much did you send?
"The Defendant: I sent two hundred even.
"The Court: Have you got any proof of that?
"The Defendant: Just my wife and my brother.
"The Court: Have you got any money order stubs, anything like that, canceled checks?
"The Defendant: No.
"The Court: Who did you send it by?
"The Defendant: I sent it through the mail.
"The Court: In cash?
"The Defendant: Yes.
"The Court: Well, our records indicate that you paid only $10.00.
"The Defendant: Yeah. That’s what they told me yesterday.
"The Court: So you are in violation of your probation.”
The court found defendant guilty of violating his probation. Probation was revoked and defendant was committed to the State Corrections Commission for a period of not less than 7-1/2 years and not more than 15 years. The Court of Appeals *226denied leave November 24, 1972. We granted leave to appeal on March 15,1973. 389 Mich 776.
II —STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR PLACING DEFENDANT ON PROBATION
The Legislature has given a clear mandate to the trial bench on the granting of probation. MCLA 771.1; MSA 28.1131 provides in part:
"In all prosecutions for crimes or misdemeanors, except murder, treason, and robbery while armed, where the defendant has been found guilty upon verdict or plea, and where it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the defendant is not likely again to engage in an offensive or criminal course of conduct and that the public good does not require that the defendant shall suffer the penalty imposed by law, the court may place the defendant on probation under the charge and supervision of a probation officer.”1 (Emphasis added.)
This Court has recognized that the source of probation authority is legislative:
"The granting of probation in criminal cases is subject to the provisions of chapter 11 of the code of criminal procedure, Act No. 175, Pub. Acts 1927, as amended.” People v Sutton, 322 Mich 104, 108-109; 33 NW2d 681, 683 (1948).
"The authority of the court must be found in the statute.” People v Marks, 340 Mich 495, 498; 65 NW2d 698, 700 (1954).
Therefore the placing of defendant, convicted of armed robbery, on probation in this case was a void act as the judge had no statutory authority to *227do so. Indeed placing defendant on probation was a violation of the legislative mandate. It follows then that defendant could not really have violated his probation because in law that probation and its terms are non-existent. Thus the trial court had no jurisdiction to summon defendant before the court for the revocation of his probation. If the defendant had not been on probation, he would never have come before the court for a violation of the terms of probation which led to the imposition of the sentence.
Since the purported placing of defendant on probation was a nullity, the matter returns to the status quo ante, or with the defendant being ready for sentencing. As a consequence the matter is reversed and remanded to recorder’s court for sentencing.
We hold that the defense employed in this case may be raised only in future cases and in pending cases where defendants timely contested and are presently contesting being placed on probation in violation of MCLA 771.1; MSA 28.1131.
As already noted, the case is reversed and remanded to recorder’s court for sentencing.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Swainson and M. S. Coleman, JJ., concurred with Williams, J.

 Since 1927 PA 175, ch XI the offense of "robbery while armed” has been deemed by the Legislature to be one upon which probation could not be granted.