Court Opinion

ID: 9839271
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-12 17:09:13.407656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:33.254255
License: Public Domain

J-S21013-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  WESLEY D. ALEXANDER                          :   No. 1656 MDA 2022

               Appeal from the Order Entered October 24, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-06-CR-0001153-2022

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                       FILED: SEPTEMBER 12, 2023

       The Commonwealth appeals from the trial court’s order suppressing

evidence and granting Wesley D. Alexander’s request for a writ of habeas

corpus.    We reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for proceedings

consistent with this memorandum.

       We begin with a summary of the events giving rise to Appellee’s

charges. On September 6, 2021, Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Nicholas

Fischer was conducting speed enforcement with a radar device on Route 78

westbound in Greenwich Township, Berks County.            Trooper Fischer saw a

silver SUV approach and the radar device indicated the SUV was traveling at

85 miles per hour in a marked 50 mile-per-hour zone. He followed the SUV

and conducted a traffic stop. See N.T. Suppression, 7/27/22, at 7-8.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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      Appellee, the driver of the vehicle, complied and stopped his vehicle.

Trooper Fischer approached, observing Appellee in the driver’s seat and a

woman in the passenger seat, and smelling a strong odor of burnt marijuana

coming from the vehicle.    Id. at 8, 11.    The trooper identified himself to

Appellee, advised him that the reason for the stop was speeding, and asked

him for his driver’s license and registration. Id. at 9-10. Appellee did not

have identification but provided Trooper Fischer with his name and date of

birth. Based upon the marijuana smell, the trooper asked Appellee if he had

smoked recently.      Id. at 10-11.        Appellee responded affirmatively,

acknowledging that he had smoked marijuana at a rest stop approximately

forty-five minutes before he was pulled over. Id. at 11.

      Trooper Fischer returned to his vehicle to run Appellee’s identifying

information through his license check and determined that his driver’s license

was suspended. Id. at 10-11. Suspecting that Appellee may be under the

influence, the trooper returned to Appellee’s vehicle and asked him to exit the

vehicle for field sobriety testing. Id. at 11-13. The tests revealed signs of

impairment.   Id. at 17. Therefore, Trooper Fischer placed Appellee under

arrest for suspicion of driving under the influence (“DUI”), based upon the

speeding, the odor of marijuana, signs of impairment, and his admission to

smoking marijuana forty-five minutes prior to the traffic stop. Id. Following

the arrest, Trooper Fischer transported Appellee to conduct a blood draw.

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       Based on the foregoing, Appellee was charged with three counts of DUI,1

three counts of driving while operating privilege is suspended,2 and exceeding

maximum speed limits. Appellee filed an omnibus pretrial motion for relief,

which included a motion to suppress and a request for issuance of a writ of

habeas corpus.        Particularly, the motion sought to suppress Appellee’s

admission that he had smoked marijuana about forty-five minutes prior to the

traffic stop, as well as the subsequent blood test results, based on the

argument that the purpose of the traffic stop had ended and “Trooper Fischer

unlawfully detained [Appellee] and interrogated him without providing to

[Appellee] a statement of his rights under Miranda.[3]” Omnibus Pre-Trial

Motion, 6/10/22, at ¶¶ 22-25.

       A suppression hearing was held on July 27, 2022, with Trooper Fischer

as the sole witness for the Commonwealth; Appellee did not call any

witnesses.     The Commonwealth additionally introduced the motor vehicle

recording of the traffic stop. The trial court issued its findings of fact and

conclusions of law. The court found that Trooper Fischer did not give Appellee

Miranda warnings before asking if he had smoked marijuana recently, and

that considering totality of the circumstances, “a reasonable person would not
____________________________________________

1 Each of Appellee’s DUI charges pertained to a different subsection and were

graded as third offenses.         See 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(d)(1)(i), 3802(d)(2),
3802(d)(1)(iii).

2 Again, Appellee’s charges in this regard comprised three different
subsections. See 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1543(b)(1)(III), 1543(a), 1543(b)(1)(i).

3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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have felt free to leave nor not answer the trooper’s questions.” Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law, 10/24/22, at 3-4.        Thus, the court granted

Appellee’s suppression motion.    Regarding the habeas corpus petition, the

court granted that as to all charges save speeding because the Commonwealth

did not present evidence of Appellee’s blood test results or the status of his

license suspension at the suppression hearing. Id. at 4-5.

     The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal, certifying therein, in

accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 311(d), that the trial court’s ruling terminated or

substantially handicapped the prosecution. The Commonwealth complied with

the court’s order to file a concise statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

In lieu of a Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court conceded error as to the

premature granting of Appellee’s habeas corpus petition but directed this

Court to its findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its order

granting Appellee’s suppression motion.     See Order, 2/27/23, at 2.        The

Commonwealth presents the following issues for our review:

     A. Did the trial court respectfully err in suppressing statements
        made during a lawful traffic stop supported by reasonable
        suspicion and/or probable cause, as [Appellee] was not in
        custody when the statements were made?

     B. Did the trial court respectfully err in granting the request for a
        writ of habeas corpus without permitting the Commonwealth to
        appeal from the adverse suppression ruling?

Commonwealth’s brief at 4.

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      We first address the Commonwealth’s claim that the trial court erred in

suppressing statements made during the traffic stop.              We review this

challenge under the following standard of review:

      We review trial court suppression orders to determine whether the
      factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal
      conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. We are bound by
      the suppression court’s factual findings so long as they are
      supported by the record.        In reviewing an appeal by the
      Commonwealth of a suppression order, we may consider only the
      evidence from the defendant’s witnesses along with the
      Commonwealth’s evidence which remains uncontroverted. Our
      scope of review of suppression court factual findings is limited to
      the suppression hearing record. We, however, are not bound by
      a suppression court’s conclusions of law; rather, when reviewing
      questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope
      of review is plenary.

Commonwealth v. Young, 287 A.3d 907, 915-16 (Pa.Super. 2022) (citation

omitted).

      Here, there is no dispute as to the legality of the initial stop or the court’s

factual findings as to what happened thereafter. Rather, the dispute centers

around the trial court’s conclusion of law that the totality of the circumstances

established Appellee was in custody at the time Trooper Fischer inquired about

smoking marijuana, thereby mandating that he first give Miranda warnings,

which he did not. Specifically, the Commonwealth argues that “[b]ecause this

traffic stop was the classic investigative detention on a public highway, this

interaction did not rise to the level of a custodial detention for Miranda

purposes.” Commonwealth’s brief at 11.          Accordingly, we are tasked with

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deciding a legal question de novo based upon acceptance of the trial court’s

factual findings. Young, supra at 915-16.

      With that in mind, we set forth the following legal principles. “[T]here

are three levels of interaction between the police and citizens: (1) a mere

encounter, (2) an investigative detention, and (3) a custodial detention.”

Commonwealth v. Spence, 290 A.3d 301, 314 (Pa.Super. 2023) (citation

omitted).

      A mere encounter can be any formal or informal interaction
      between an officer and a citizen, but will normally be an inquiry
      by the officer of a citizen. The hallmark of this interaction is that
      it carries no official compulsion to stop or respond.

      In contrast, an investigative detention, by implication, carries an
      official compulsion to stop and respond, but the detention is
      temporary, unless it results in the formation of probable cause for
      arrest, and does not possess the coercive conditions consistent
      with a formal arrest. Since this interaction has elements of official
      compulsion it requires reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity.
      In further contrast, a custodial detention occurs when the nature,
      duration and conditions of an investigative detention become so
      coercive as to be, practically speaking, the functional equivalent
      of an arrest.

Id. (cleaned up).

      It is well established that Miranda warnings are only required for

custodial detentions, which are third-level interactions. See id. Additionally,

motor vehicle stops are generally considered investigative detentions, or

second-level interactions. See id. During traffic stops, “the officer may ask

the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to

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try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions.” Id.

(cleaned up). Police officers may even go as far as handcuffing individuals

during an investigative detention for safety reasons without automatically

escalating that interaction into a custodial detention. See id.

      An investigative detention rises to the level of a custodial detention

when it “involves such coercive conditions as to constitute the functional

equivalent of an arrest.” Id. (cleaned up). Numerous factors are considered

by the court to determine the level of the encounter:

      [T]he cause for the detention, the detention’s length, the
      detention’s location, whether the suspect was transported against
      his or her will, whether physical restraints were used, whether the
      police used or threatened force, and the character of the
      investigative methods used to confirm or dispel the suspicions of
      the police.

Id. (cleaned up).

      Here, the initial stop was based upon a speeding violation. It is well-

settled that when “a vehicle is stopped for speeding, the officer must possess

probable cause to stop the vehicle.     This is so because when a vehicle is

stopped, nothing more can be determined as to the speed of the vehicle when

it was observed while traveling upon a highway.” Commonwealth v. Salter,

121 A.3d 987, 993 (Pa.Super. 2015). Appellee was clocked at driving eighty-

five miles per hour in a fifty-mile-per-hour zone, in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.

§ 3362(a)(3).   Thus, Trooper Fischer had probable cause to believe that

Appellee had violated a section of the Vehicle Code and, as noted above,

nobody contests the legality of the initial stop. See Spence, supra at 312

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(“The police have probable cause where the facts and circumstances within

the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution

in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.”).

      It was during the effectuation of this initial stop that the trooper smelled

a strong odor of burnt marijuana emanating from the vehicle. We have held

that “if there is a legitimate stop for a traffic violation[,] additional suspicion

may arise before the initial stop’s purpose has been fulfilled[ and,] then,

detention   may    be   permissible    to   investigate   the   new   suspicions.”

Commonwealth v. Wright, 224 A.3d 1104, 1109 (Pa.Super. 2019) (cleaned

up). Thus, the question before us is whether the continued stop constituted

an investigatory detention supported by reasonable suspicion, or a custodial

detention triggering Appellee’s Miranda rights and rendering his response to

the trooper’s question suppressible.

      The trial court concluded that at the time Trooper Fischer asked Appellee

whether he had smoked marijuana recently, Appellee was subject to a

custodial detention and, therefore, Trooper Fischer was required to first

provide Appellee Miranda warnings. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, 10/24/22, at 4. The court came to this conclusion after it found that a

reasonable person would not have felt free to leave or refuse to answer the

trooper’s questions.    Id.   For the reasons that follow, we disagree and

conclude that additional suspicion arose before the conclusion of the initial

stop, which permitted the continued stop as an investigative detention to

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which no Miranda rights attached, and it did not evolve into a custodial

detention prior to the trooper’s questioning.

      The strong odor of burnt marijuana, in conjunction with Appellee’s

speeding, provided the trooper with reasonable suspicion that another crime

was occurring, namely, DUI. As part of his investigation into this potential

crime, he was permitted to ask questions to attempt to confirm or dispel his

suspicions. See Spence, supra at 314; Commonwealth v. Dabney, 274

A.3d 1283, 1286, 1292-93 (Pa.Super. 2022) (holding officer had reasonable

suspicion to conduct field sobriety tests and probable cause to arrest for DUI

where Dabney, the driver, was stopped for speeding, the officer smelled a

strong odor of marijuana from within the vehicle, after asking the occupants

to exit the vehicle the officer observed flakes of suspected marijuana in the

vehicle and located suspected marijuana in the trunk, Dabney’s eyes were red

and dilated, and field sobriety tests indicated he may be impaired). Thus, the

trooper’s question did not transform this encounter into a custodial detention.

      Although Appellee may not have felt free to leave, as concluded by the

trial court, “custodial detention involves something more than mere exercise

of control over the suspect’s freedom of movement.” Spence, supra at 316

(citation omitted). Appellee was not physically restrained, placed in custody,

or transported from the scene before Trooper Fischer’s question. Nor did the

trooper display weapons or threaten force to obtain Appellee’s compliance.

Simply stated, there is no evidence that coercive conditions were present to

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escalate the continuation of the traffic stop to a custodial detention. As a

result, Miranda warnings were not required to be issued by Trooper Fischer

before he asked Appellee if he had recently smoked marijuana. Accordingly,

we reverse the decision of the trial court on this issue.

       Next, we address the Commonwealth’s claim that the trial court erred

in granting Appellee’s request for a writ of habeas corpus without first allowing

the Commonwealth to appeal the suppression ruling. See Commonwealth’s

brief at 12. Generally, this Court “will review a grant or denial of a petition

for writ of habeas corpus for abuse of discretion, but for questions of law, our

standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.”

Commonwealth v. Merced, 265 A.3d 786, 792 (Pa.Super. 2021) (cleaned

up).

       Here, the trial court found, after suppressing Appellee’s admission of

marijuana use and all evidence flowing thereafter, that “the Commonwealth

failed to present evidence of [Appellee’s] blood test results or evidence that

[Appellee’s] driver’s license was suspended.” Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law, 10/24/22, at 4-5. Therefore, the court granted Appellee’s request for

a writ of habeas corpus. Notably, Appellee only petitioned for a writ of habeas

corpus as to his DUI charges. Nonetheless, the court dismissed all charges

except speeding. The counts for driving while license was suspended were

not before the court on the petition and the Commonwealth had no reason to

enter evidence in that regard at the suppression hearing. Thus, the trial court

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erred in dismissing those charges and we reverse the order in that regard. As

for the DUI counts, given our reversal of the court’s decision to grant

Appellee’s motion to suppress, we vacate the order granting the petition for a

writ of habeas corpus and remand for the court to consider Appellee’s request

without suppressing any evidence.

      Based on the foregoing, we reverse the order granting Appellee’s motion

to suppress, reverse the order granting Appellee’s petition for a writ of habeas

corpus as to the driving while license was suspended charges, vacate the order

granting Appellee’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus as to the DUI charges,

and remand for proceedings consistent with this memorandum.

      Order reversed in part and vacated in part. Case remanded for further

proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/12/2023

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