Court Opinion

ID: 9958069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-06 21:00:25.796181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:44.368948
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4656      Doc: 19         Filed: 04/05/2024     Pg: 1 of 4

                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                                No. 23-4656

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        TAYLOR WOMACK,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at
        Charleston. Irene C. Berger, District Judge. (2:23-cr-00012-1)

        Submitted: February 27, 2024                                          Decided: April 5, 2024

        Before NIEMEYER and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Wesley P. Page, Federal Public Defender, Emily L. Szopinski, Assistant
        Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, Appellate Counsel, OFFICE OF THE
        FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. William S.
        Thompson, United States Attorney, Jonathan T. Storage, Assistant United States Attorney,
        OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for
        Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4656      Doc: 19          Filed: 04/05/2024     Pg: 2 of 4

        PER CURIAM:

               Taylor Womack entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a

        felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), reserving his right to appeal

        the district court’s denial of his suppression motion. On appeal, Womack argues that the

        district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized following a frisk of

        his person. We affirm.

               “When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we review factual

        findings for clear error and legal determinations de novo,” and we “construe the evidence

        in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.” United States v. Lull, 824 F.3d 109,

        114-15 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]n officer may stop and

        briefly detain a person when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person

        has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Coleman, 18

        F.4th 131, 136 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To establish reasonable

        suspicion, an officer must have a minimal level of objective justification, meaning that [he]

        must be able to articulate more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch

        of criminal activity.” United States v. Gist-Davis, 41 F.4th 259, 264 (4th Cir. 2022)

        (internal quotation marks omitted). Once an officer performs a valid stop, “[he] may

        conduct a protective frisk of the person for weapons,” if the officer has reasonable

        suspicion that the person stopped “may be armed and presently dangerous.” Id. (internal

        quotation marks omitted). “The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual

        is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be

                                                      2
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4656          Doc: 19         Filed: 04/05/2024   Pg: 3 of 4

        warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Terry, 392 U.S. at

        27.

                 Courts assess the legality of a Terry* stop and frisk under “the totality of the

        circumstances, giving due weight to common sense judgments reached by officers in light

        of their experience and training.” Gist-Davis, 41 F.4th at 264 (internal quotation marks

        omitted). “Judicial review of the evidence offered to demonstrate reasonable suspicion

        must be commonsensical, focused on the evidence as a whole, and cognizant of both

        context and the particular experience of officers charged with the ongoing tasks of law

        enforcement.” United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 337 (4th Cir. 2008). “[M]ultiple

        factors may be taken together to create a reasonable suspicion even where each factor,

        taken alone, would be insufficient.” United States v. George, 732 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir.

        2013).

                 We conclude that the district court did not err in finding that the officer had

        reasonable suspicion that Womack was armed and dangerous. Womack does not dispute

        that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop him. And his actions at the time of the

        stop—particularly his continuing to “mess with” his waistband when instructed not to do

        so—gave the officer reason to believe that Womack had a weapon tucked into his pants.

        Under the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable for the officer, after validly

        stopping Womack, to perform a Terry frisk to ensure the officer’s safety. Therefore, the

        officer’s pat down search of Womack was valid under the Fourth Amendment.

                 *
                     Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

                                                         3
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4656      Doc: 19         Filed: 04/05/2024      Pg: 4 of 4

               Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument

        because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

        court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                        AFFIRMED

                                                     4