Court Opinion

ID: 9807662
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 20:12:15.44273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:50:30.294681
License: Public Domain

DioK, J.,
dissenting : This is a proceeding by a creditor, under G. G. 1\, sec. 266, to subject the property of a judgment-debtor in the hands of a third person, to the payment of a *180judgment debt. The facts presented by the case are substantially as follows:
The judgment-debtor, J. A. J. Askew was much indebted, and desired to free himself from such embarrassment, and he applied to A. J. Holly to borrow money for that purpose.
Holly agreed to furnish two thousand dollars, if Askew and wife, Maria C. Askew, would join in executing'a deed in trust to him, for certain houses and lots, belonging to J. A. J". Askew, to secure the payment of the money loaned.
Maria 0. Askew “absolutely and positively” refused to join in the conveyance, unless she received some compensation for her right oí dower and homestead in the said lands of her husband. It was then agreed, that if she would execute the deed in trust, so as to convey her said interest, she should receive in consideration of her relinquishment of the right oí dower and homestead, the balance of the purchase-money for which said house and lots might be sold, after paying off Holly, the debt secured in the trust. The houses and lots sold for thirty-four hundred dollars, and all the money was paid out in discharging the debts of the husband, except a note of five hundred dollars, which the trustee placed in the hands of Maria C. Askew in accordance with the agreement above stated. All of these transactions were completed before judgment was obtained by the plaintiff, against said J. A. J. Askew, and the object of this proceeding is to subject said note, in the hands of Maria 0. Askew, to the payment of said judgment.
The first question presented, is whether the agreement between the said husband and wife, was founded upon sufficient consideration, to protect the property transferred to the wife, against the claim of creditors.
If she had a contingent right of dower, the contract be-tweeen them by which she received money or other property in consideration of her releasing such right in her husband’s land, if reasonable, and fairly entered into, should he sustained. 2 Scribner on Dower, 8. Ballard v. Briggs, 7 Pickering, 533. Quarles v. Lacy, 4 Mamp. 251.
*181The Act of 1868-69, ch. 93, sec. 63, provides that, “ Every married woman shall be entitled to one-third interest in value of all the lands, tenements and hereditaments whereof her husband is, or may be seized and possessed at any time during coverture,” &c. It was admitted that Askew and wife were married before the passage of said Act, and that she was, at the time of the execution of the deed in trust, entitled to a contingent right of dower in the lands conveyed, unless the said Act is unconstitutional. It is insisted that the Act is un-stitutional as to antecedent marriages, for the reason :
1. It impairs the obligation of the marriage contract.
2. It interferes with the vested right of the husband.
We will proceed in the first place to consider whether the bight of dower proceeds from, and is a part of the marital contract, and then enter into the discussion of other questions involved in the case.
Dower is one of the institutions of society which bascóme down to us from a remote antiquity.
The right of a widow to a certain portion of the lands of her deceased husband for the term of her natural life, was unknown to the laws of the Greeks and Romans, and seems to have originated with the Teutonic races, who had a higher regard for woman than any of the earlier nations. Traces of this custom can be found in the first authentic records of Anglo Saxon history, and is the foundation of dower by particular custom.
The peculiar form of this right, known as dower at common law, is supposed, by an eminent j urist, to have been derived from a Danish law, established by Sweyn, King of Denmark, out of gratitude to the ladies of his realm, who sold their jewels, to ransom him from captivity. Originating thus, in feelings of gratitude, and the early spirit of chivalry, inspired by the self-denying kindness and generosity of woman, dower has always been a favorite of the common law; secured in the earliest charters of English liberty, and recognized with favor *182even in Magna Oarta. It is an estate for life, which the law gives to a widow for her support and maintenance, and as a home for the domestic duties and affections, and it has generally been regarded as a municipal regulation, established, for the benefit of civil society. It is a gift of the law, and the right is not derived from the nuptial contract.
A man may deprive his children and kindred of his estate, by deed or devise, but he cannot dispose of that estate which the law, in its beneficence, gives to the widow. Even if he makes a devise^ to her, in lieu of dower, she may elect, whether she will take the gift of the husband, or the gift of the law, and she may have the value of both estates, ascertained, before she makes her election. In the case of the insolvency of the husband, the common law preserves dower as a tabula in naufragio, to keep the widow from sinking into poverty and distress. So great was the care shown to widows, that centuries ago, the maxim became prevalent “ that the law favors three things : Life, Liberty and Dower.” An instance, of this peculiar favor may be found in the early history of the common law, in dower de la flus ielle, when the widow was endowed of lands, in socage, “ as being the fairest portion of the lands, held by her deceased husband.” This species of dower, has long since passed away, with the military tenures in which it originated, but in most of the States of this country, where the doctrines of feudalism have never prevailed, the same kindly spirit of the law, gives the widow the mansion-house, as being the fairest portion of the estate, for her wants and purposes. When uses were introduced into England, they were not at first recognized by the common law, and were only enforced in the Court of Chancery, which, for a long period was under the control of ecclesiastics, who, in this Court, administered the principles of the civil law; and it was soon held that the dower, in a use, could not be allowed, as it would produce great inconvenience, and such a right was unknown in the system of civil jurisprudence. This doctrine *183has now been abolished in England; and in a large number of the American States, a widow is entitled to dower in an equitable estate by express statutes.
The history of the common law shows, that dower was always regarded as a municipal institution, and was not the result of a contract. There were two species of dower allowed by the common law, which, in some respects, were regarded as a part of a marriage contract. A husband ad ostium, eoolosiae, “ after affiance made, and troth plighted,” could endow his wife of a certain portion of his lands, to take effect upon his death. This was a kind of bridal gift, and in the time of Glanville the wife was obliged to accept it, in lieu of dower, but at a later period, according to Littleton, the wife, upon the death of her husband, might .reject the gift and claim the gift of the common law. Dower ex assensu patris, resembled dower ad ostium ecclesiae, and was, when a father seized of an estate in fee, allowed his son at the time of espousals, to endow his wife of a certain portion of such estate. Here then, were three parties to the contract, and the widow, on the death of her husband, might enter at once on the estate assigned, although the father was still living, The widow might also reject this contract dower, and claim dower at common law, of any lands of inheritance, which belonged to the husband during cover-ture. As these species of dower were voidable, at the will of the widow, they have, long since been abolished in England, and were .never in use in this country.
The introduction of uses, and the doctrine that a widow was not dowable of a use, soon gave rise to the practice of making provision for a wife, by an ante-nuptial contract, called join-ture, which was afterwards regulated by the statute of uses, and made a legal satisfaction of dower.
Thus, we see that dower at common law, has always been under the peculiar control of that system of jurisprudence, and this favoring care of widows, has been a marked feature in the institutions of every country, where the common law, has pre*184vailed. This controlling influence of the common law, in modern. times, has made widows favorites, even in Courts of Equity, which in cases of difficulty about the assignment of dower, will exercise their extraordinary jurisdiction for the purpose ot affording adequate relief. — 1 Story Eq. Juris, Ch. 12.
A reference to the law, regulating marriage, will show that the right of dower does not constitute a part of the contract. Marriage, as between the parties, is a personal contract, and, when entered into according to the rites of the country, where the parties are domiciled and the marriage is celebrated, will, by the comity of nations, be regarded as a valid contract in any part of Christendom. According to the general rule, the terms of a contraet, are governed by the lex loci', but this is not the case with marriage, except, as to the validity of the contract and the incidents resulting therefrom, are dependent upon the laws of the matrimonial domicil, and dower arises by the operation of the lex rei sitae. Story on Con. of Laws, 380.
When persons, who are married in a country, where the common law does not prevail, afterwards become citizens of this State the wife will become entitled to dower, according to our law at the time of the husband’s death. The converse of this proposition is equally true; that dower is not a part of the contract of marriage, but, is an estate arising by operation of law, is well settied, both in this country, and in England. Mr. Scribner, in his valuable work on dower, 2 Vol, p. 2, says: the results of the English authorities is thus given by Mr. Park: “ it will be observed, that this estate arises solely by •operation of law, and not by force of any contract, express or implied, between the parties; it is the silent effect of the relation entered into by them, not, as in itself, incidental to the relation, or as implied by the marriage contract, but merely as that contract calls into operation the positive institutions of the municipal law.” In Norwood v. Morrow, 4 Dev. & B., 442, Chief Justice Buffin, in delivering the opinion of the Court, says : “ there is no contract between husband and wife *185for courtesy or dower. The interest the one gets in the property oí the other, the law which gives for the encouragement of matrimony,” “ it is certain, that such as her estate (dower) is, the law mates it without any act of her husband, and against his will. See, also, Rose v. Rose, 63 N. C., 391. Marriage is not only a contract, but, it is an institution coeval with the first existence of the human race. It Avas ordained, and the first marriage ceremony was celebrated in Eden. It is an institution which is essential to the happiness of mankind, and, the preservation of human virtue. Without it, there can be no civilized society, or well regulated municipal government.
Marriage has, therefore, in every enlightened system of government been regulated by law, and must ever remain in some degree, under legislative control. Eor many purposes, marriage is a civil contract, and is so treated in Courts of law, but the legislative power of the government, regards it, as an institution of civil society. The Legislature must necessarily have the authority to attach rights, incidents and duties to this important relation, and modify and enlarge them, as the best interests of society and government may require ; and all legislation on this subject must extend to all mariages, both antecedent and subsequent, in order to be uniform and general, in its operation.
In regulating this institution, the common law declares that the effect of a marriage shall be to vest in the husband certain rights as to the wife’s personal property in possession, the rents and profits of her real estate, and her chattels real and choses in action; and in consideration of these benefits, he is required to take care of his wife, and if he is able, supply her with such things as may be necessary to her comfort in her condition in society. Immediately upon marriage, these rights become vested, and for most purposes, are protected in this State by the Constitution, and cannot generally be divested by subsequent legislation. These rights arise out of the marriage contract, not by any express agreement between the par*186ties, but they are the result of positive law adopted by the legislative authority for the regulation of the marriage relation, as an institution of society. Logan v. Simmons, 1 Dev. 1 B., 13. There are certain incidents of marriage, as cur-tesy and dower, which do not arise from contract, as we have already seen and they only become vested rights upon the happening of certain contingencies. By a positive rule of law, curtesy becomes a vested right, upon the birth of issue capable of inheriting the estate of the wife, and dower does not become a vested right until the death of the husband.
As long as these incidents, created by law, remain in their inchoate condition, the Legislature may modify or enlarge them at will, as such action will not violate the contract of marriage, or, any vested right resulting therefrom. Cooley, C. L., 361. Moore v. City of N. Y., 4 Seld. 110, 4 Wheaton, 500.
We will now consider -whether the Act of the Legislature extending the former statute-dower to the common-law right of dower, and applying it to antecedent marriages interferes with the vested rights of the husband, in his lands, within the meaning of our State Constitution.
If the Act has this effect, he alone, has the right to complain unless creditors or purchasers may have acquired some prior vested right. In the case before us it is not necessary to discuss the latter proposition.
Inchoate dower is a quasi incumbrance on the estate of the husband, and somewhat restricts his power of alienation, but this right of the wife, is a mere personal capacity, to take an estate upon a certain contingency, and is not a vested right which disseizes him of his freehold, or deprives him of his property within the meaning of the Constitution. This right of the wife takes effect prospectively — at the time of his death — and has only a contingent retroactive influence. A husband is under a legal and moral obligation to furnish adequate maintenance for his wife during his life, and the *187Legislature may, as a general municipal regulation, carrying out the moral obligations oí marriage, make suitable provision for her support and comfort after bis death. I readily admit that the Legislature, cannot arbitrarily take the property of one person and give it to another for individual advantage, and that the private property of a citizen cannot be taken for ordinary public uses without just compensation; as for roads, public buildings, railroads, &c., as such uses, although public in their nature, are necessarily limited in their operation, and do not confer equal benefits upon all the people. .But the paramount principle, which lies at the foundation of all government is, that the general public good is the supreme law, and individual rights and interests, must at all times yield to its control. All men enter society, with the implied understanding, that the sovereign power is unlimited in regulating some of the great fundamental principles of the social compact, when its action is calculated to promote and secure the well-being of the State.
The Legislature has the power of taxation necessary to support the government, of passing general laws as to the devolution and transfer of property, of regulating remedies in the Courts, of abolishing imprisonment for debt, of passing statutes of limitation, of making homestead and personal property exemptions, and other similar remedial legislation. The right of alienation by deed and devise was conferred by statute, and such statutes may be modified or enlarged, when the exigencies of society, may require such alteration. In all such cases of the exercise of the powers of sovereignty, the maxim is, privatum incommodvm publico bono pensatur.
Surely, there has never been a time in the history of this country, more appropriate than the present, for a liberal exercise of the remedial powers of legislation for the general public good. Hill v. Kesler, 63 N. C., 437.
Marriage is an institution of civil society, and, the principles regulating it, form an essential part of the general public *188laws of every civilized community; and it would be a veiy narrow view, in times like those through which we have passed, to regard it merely as an individual agreement, governed entirely, by the strict technical rules of ordinary contracts. Marriage, in the contemplation of legislative power, is not a contract, but a status. Parties can not have a vested right of property in a domestic relation, therefore, the legislative act under consideration, does not come under condemnation, as, depriving parties of rights contrary to the law of the land. Cooley, 311.
The question of the legislative power upon this subject, has frequently been discussed in the Courts, and has given rise to considerable conflict in judicial opinion, but, I think the weight of authority, reason and justice are in lavor of the legislative power. Even, if we admit, that there is a reasonable doubt upon the subject, that doubt ought to be solved in favor of the legislative action.
The Legislature in a free government is the direct representative of the people, and as such, may exercise all the powers of sovereignty except so far as it is restrained by plain and express constitutional limitation, and, I think the judicial branch of the government, ought not to declare a statute void, or restrict its operations, except in a clear case of an excess of legislative authority, or where it tends to the manifest detriment of the public good. In the matter before us, I think the legislative action ought to be sustained to its full extent, as, it but restores a time-honored custom of the common law, which is hallowed by the veneration of centuries, and, is the law now existing in at least three-fourths of the governments, which are controlled, by the descendants, of, the anglo-saxon race.
I cannot concur in the opinion of a majority of the Court.
Justice RodmaN concurs with me in this opinion.
Per Curiam. Error, to be certified.