Court Opinion

ID: 9543567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:46:36.763719+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:36.454108
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK, Justice
(dissenting).
The constitutional standard regarding multiple representation which we delineated in Jackson v. Auger, 239 N.W.2d 180, 183 (Iowa 1976), was derived from Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 71, 75-76, 62 S.Ct. 457, 465, 467-68, 86 L.Ed. 680, 700-02 (1942). In Jackson, we said:
*188The burden is upon the defendant to demonstrate a substantial possibility that the situation of dual representation created a conflict between his interests and the interests of the other person or persons represented. Actual prejudice need not be shown. '
239 N.W.2d at 183.
The Glasser standard was recently reiterated in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). The Court said:
Glasser established that unconstitutional multiple representation is never harmless error. Once the Court concluded that Glasser’s lawyer had an actual conflict of interest, it refused “to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice” attributable to the conflict. The conflict itself demonstrated a denial of “[t]he right to have the effective assistance of counsel.. . . ” Thus, a defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief.... But until a defendant shows that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests, he has not established the constitutional predicate for his claim of, ineffective assistance.
Id. at 349-50, 100 S.Ct. at 1719, 64 L.Ed.2d at 347. In the present case, the court has rested its denial of postconviction relief on a finding of no prejudice. I am unable to reconcile this holding with the principle that prejudice need not be demonstrated to obtain relief.
The sole question is whether Cosgrove showed that Vinyard actively represented conflicting interests. I believe the testimony of attorney Vinyard was sufficient alone to satisfy this burden.
According to ABA Standards, The Defense Function § 6.2(c) (1971), it is “unprofessional conduct for a lawyer to seek or accept concessions favorable to one client by any agreement which is detrimental to the legitimate interests of any other client.” The conduct is unprofessional because, as the commentary makes clear, the lawyer has a conflict of interest in that situation: “Regardless of the motivation for the proposal and whether it originates with the defense attorney or the prosecutor, such conduct plainly violates the lawyer’s fundamental duty of undivided loyalty to each client.” The standard is based on the principle in Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-105(C): “A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by his representation of another client....”
Vinyard’s testimony may be summarized as follows. He first represented Cosgrove on the armed robbery charge. Cosgrove denied the charge and told Vinyard he had an alibi. Vinyard then commenced his representation of Steele on an unrelated concealed weapons charge. The police told Vinyard they wished to question Steele about the armed robbery. Vinyard went to Cosgrove. Without telling Cosgrove he represented Steele, he informed Cosgrove that the police wanted to talk to Steele about the robbery. He asked Vinyard what Steele “might be expected to say.” Cos-grove continued to deny involvement in the robbery. Vinyard then went to Steele and asked him to tell him what he knew about the robbery. Steele told him “briefly what he had seen.” Vinyard then told the police what Steele told him. The police then offered not to prosecute Steele on the robbery charge if Steele would give them a statement concerning his knowledge of that event. Vinyard accepted the offer. Steele then gave his statement implicating Cos-grove in the robbery.
Vinyard expressly accepted a concession favorable to Steele at the expense of the interests of Cosgrove. He actively represented conflicting interests. Cosgrove thus established the constitutional predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. I would reverse the postconviction court on that basis.
UHLENHOPP and LARSON, JJ., join this dissent.