Court Opinion

ID: 9783870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:16:28.581451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:39.704875
License: Public Domain

SCHRODER, J.,
Dissenting:
The victim in this case is only a child, a boy with profound mental disorders and extremely limited communication skills. He suffers from autism, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and bipolar disorder. He was also noted to be mentally retarded and suffering from severe developmental delays as a consequence of the poor parenting he received at the hands of his parents. This disabled child was entirely dependent on his parents.
Under the “care” of his parents, this child with serious disabilities and substantial needs was both physically abused and neglected on multiple occasions. He was found with red welts and bruises all over his body-on his buttocks and thighs, lower back, right ear, face, and upper and lower abdominal area. He was discovered in his parents’ home wearing a urine-soaked pullup diaper, much too small for his size. This disabled child was found to have anal warts of a sexually transmitted nature, the same type of warts that his father had on his penis. After a neighbor reported hearing the child screaming and being whipped by his father, extensive bruising was found on the child’s buttocks. This child has been in and out of foster care and blossomed when away from his parents.
*?The Cabinet brought all the above facts to the trial court, which agreed that the young boy had been physically abused and neglected, but ruled that the termination of rights of the parents who abused and neglected him was not in his best interest.
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court’s application of the law, and despite the deference given in such cases, it reversed and remanded the case back to the trial court with instructions to terminate the parental rights of this child’s biological parents.
As is appropriate, this Court considers termination of parental rights a serious matter, and we accepted discretionary review to insure that termination of the parents’ rights followed due process. Nevertheless, after careful review of the record below, it is clear that the trial court failed to apply the law correctly — a mistake the majority repeats. These errors of law leave a defenseless, disabled young boy vulnerable to the parents who have abused and neglected him, and prevent the Cabinet from attempting to find this child a permanent, loving and stable therapeutic adoptive home.
In this case, the trial court made two of the three prerequisite findings in order to involuntarily terminate the parental rights. It found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the little boy was an abused and neglected child under KRS 625.090(l)(a),2 and it also found the existence of one of the grounds for termination under KRS 625.090(2), namely, that the young boy had been in foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months preceding the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights.3
The final requirement for termination of parental rights under KRS 625.090(l)(b) is a finding that termination would be in the best interest of the child. Pursuant to KRS 625.090(3), the court must consider specific factors in making such a determination.4 Findings 41 through 43 of the *118trial court’s order purport to address whether termination would be in the best interest of the child in this case. In these three findings, constituting only five sentences collectively, the trial court found: (1) no evidence of mental illness of either parent, (2) evidence of abuse “as previously described”,5 and (B) that the “parents have worked at accomplishing a return of the child to their home.”
The trial court clearly, and admittedly, failed to consider all of the factors set forth in KRS 625.090(3)(a)-(f), in contravention of the mandatory language in KRS 625.090(3), which requires that all of the enumerated factors be considered by the trial court in determining the best interests of the child.
First, KRS 625.090(3)(a) requires the court to consider the mental illness of the parent. I would point out a blatant error in the trial court’s findings of fact. In paragraph (41), the court states “there is no evidence of mental illness or mental retardation of either parent.” It is difficult to comprehend the basis of this finding, as the record is replete with evidence of mental illness of the father and mother. The CATS report,6 which was admitted as an exhibit for the Cabinet, reveals that T.B.H. has a history of, and active, anxiety and depressive disorders for which he receives psychotropic medication. Further, T.B.H. recounted a mental health history beginning with treatment in 1986, escalating to a “nervous breakdown” in 1993, requiring inpatient psychiatric hospitalization. There was also evidence that T.B.H. continues to receive outpatient mental health services for “emotional stability” and to “deal with stress.” With respect to D.G.R., the record reveals a mental health history of a psychiatric hospitalization following an overdose. The trial court and the majority chose to ignore the record. Why?
With regard to KRS 625.090(3)(b), the trial court devoted much more of its findings to issues related to whether or not A.H. had regressed in his behavior and life skills than to the prior adjudicated physical abuse and neglect of A.H. and the potential for abuse and neglect in the future. The court briefly acknowledged, “The acts of abuse have been specified above in the juvenile proceeding,” and that the “Cabinet’s efforts with the parents have primarily been aimed at assisting the parents in meeting [A.H.’s] special needs and not in abuse prevention.” Nor did the trial court appear to consider the other acts of abuse or neglect toward other children in the family as directed by KRS 625.090(3)(b).7
The trial court again erred with respect to KRS 625.090(3)(c). KRS 625.090(3)(c) requires the court to consider whether the Cabinet has made reasonable efforts to reunite the child with the parents. The trial court unilaterally (and in contravention of the expressed language of the statute) chose not to consider this factor, stating that it “does not address reasonable efforts of the Cabinet [to reunite the child with the parents]” because it had already determined, without considering this required element, that termination was not in the child’s best interest. However, the *?mandatory language in KRS 625.090(3) requires that all of the factors therein be considered by the trial court in determining the best interests of the child, including whether the Cabinet has made reasonable efforts to reunite the child with the parents under subsection (3)(c). Thus, once more, the trial court erred in failing to consider the required elements before it determined whether termination was in the best interests of A.H.
Further, as to KRS 625.090(3)(d) — the efforts of the parents in making it in the best interest of the child to return to the home — the court found that D.G.R. and T.B.H. had worked with the Cabinet at accomplishing a return of the child to their homé and had consistently expressed the desire to have A.H. back in the home. However, the court did not discuss the likelihood of A.H. being physically abused or neglected again if he was reunified with D.G.R. and T.B.H., which is probably the most significant consideration in this case. The parents have already been given a second chance with A.H. when he was returned home to their care in August 2005. In spite of the case plan’s requirement that the parents not use corporal punishment on the child, T.B.H. admittedly “went too far” and spanked A.H. for acting out, resulting in severe bruising and in another adjudication of physical abuse and A.H.’s second removal from the home.
Unbelievably, from a reading of the findings of fact and order, it does not appear that the court considered KRS 625.090(3)(e) at all! This factor required the trial court to consider the physical, emotional, and mental health of the child and the prospects for the improvement of his welfare if termination was ordered, in its determination of this child’s best interests. While the court recognized that A.H. was autistic and that he had behavioral problems, the court did not consider the physical, emotional, and mental well-being of A.H. as a victim of the physical abuse and neglect in this case — which included two adjudications of physical abuse and one adjudication of neglect. This is especially shocking in light of A.H.’s vulnerability to such abuse because his limited communication skills are such that he cannot tell anyone if he is being physically or sexually abused or respond to questions about suspected abuse.
The majority excuses all of the above grievous errors by relying on KRS 625.090(5). Although this provision gives the trial court discretion to refrain from terminating parental rights where the parents prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the child will not continue to be abused or neglected in the future, this analysis is not a substitute for the best-interest finding that the trial court is REQUIRED to make under KRS 625.090(3).
The majority appears to confuse the nature of KRS 625.090(3), by arguing that its elements are not a checklist and are “always subordinate to the best-interest finding that the court is tasked with making.” This sort of circular logic completely ignores the directive of KRS 625.090(3). This section is not “subordinate to the best-interest finding,” but rather it is an express and unambiguous requirement of the best-interest finding.8
The majority’s assumption that the trial court was merely relying on KRS 625.090(5) in finding “what is in the child’s best interest going forward,” is at best, reaching, and at worst, encouragement of a trial court’s abdication of its statutory im*120perative to fully consider the specific elements in its determination of what is in a child’s best interest. KRS 625.090(5) does not absolve the trial court of its imperative to consider all the required elements.
Moreover, in reviewing the specific factors which the trial court was required to, but failed to, consider pursuant to KRS 625.090(3), I note that the application of the law to the facts is reviewed de novo. S.B.B. v. J.W.B., 304 S.W.3d 712, 716 (Ky.App.2010). Sound legal reasoning would hold that a remand in this case is necessary, so that the trial court can reconsider what is in this disabled child’s best interest, examining all the elements that it is mandated to consider pursuant to KRS 625.090(3).
The trial court found that the child in this case was severely autistic, that he is in need of care and assistance 24 hours per day, 7 days per week, and that he suffered from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.9 The trial court took judicial notice of adjudications of the abuse and neglect of this disabled child in three separate instances. The first instance, based on numerous marks found all over the little boy, resulted in the child being removed from his parents in October 2004. During this removal, it was discovered that the child also had anal warts “highly suspicious of sexual abuse.” After a medical examination, these same type of sexually transmitted warts were discovered on his father’s penis. In April 2005, the Caldwell District Court entered an order finding abuse as to the marks on his body and neglect as to the anal warts.10 Nevertheless, the little boy was returned to his parents’ custody in August 2005.11
While in the care of his parents, and in contravention of court order prohibiting corporal punishment, the father admittedly “went too far” in his spanking of the child after he was directed by the mother, in contravention of the court order, to “tap the butt” of the boy when he was acting out. The father whipped the little boy and left four distinct bruises on- his buttocks. A neighbor reported hearing the father screaming at the child and hearing the little boy crying. The explanations reported to authorities by both parents were entirely inconsistent with the injuries the little boy sustained. The little boy was removed from his parents again after this instance of abuse, and a third finding of abuse was entered for the whipping of this disabled little boy.
In contrast to his life while in the custody of his parents, where the record shows that he developed a severe developmental delay caused-not by autism — but by the social isolation imposed on him by his parents and by the failure of his parents to train him in other areas, for the past five and a half years this previously abused and neglected little boy has resided in therapeutic foster care homes and in a psychiatric hospital, where by all accounts, he has started to learn skills such as communicating, walking up stairs, eating with *121a spoon, and showing affection.12 The record reveals, however, that upon returning to the custody of his parents, his progress with respect to these skills and others deteriorated.
The majority did not find clear error in the trial court’s “choosing to believe the witnesses offered by the parents” and argued that it could not say that such testimony was “insufficient to support the trial court’s determination.” I disagree. The trial court appears to have glossed over the uncontradicted, objective evidence of the severity of the of the little boy’s impairments, even after five and a half years of living in therapeutic foster homes, the number and length of time the little boy has been in a foster care setting or a psychiatric hospital, and did not appear to consider the gravity of the instances of child abuse and neglect or the significance of the fact that one of these instances occurred after the little boy was returned to his parents for a 9 or 10 month period in 2005-2006. Likewise, although the trial court mentioned the fact that the little boy acquired a sexually-transmitted disease while in the care of his parents (namely, anal warts), none of the above factors appear to make it into its consideration of “the best interest” of the child. Finally, although the trial court stated cursorily that neither parent had mental health issues, the record dearly shows that each parent has a record of mental health issues, with the father undergoing one or two psychiatric hospitalizations in the past and, as of the most recent records, still endorsing depressive and anxiety symptoms and still being prescribed psychotropic medication. The majority, in its assessment, commits these same errors and omissions.
As it is clear that the trial court failed to conduct the required “best interest of the child” analysis pursuant to KRS 625.090(3), I therefore dissent. As Justices, our duty is to ensure that the trial court has reviewed the statutory considerations and followed the law in its rulings. Because the trial court in this case clearly failed to do so, I would vacate the trial court’s order denying termination, and remand the case to the trial court for corrected findings of fact and analysis as required by the statute. Anything less is not justice for this child.
SCOTT, J., joins.

. Finding no. 30

. Finding no. 31. The findings above, that the child was previously adjudged to be an abused and neglected child under KRS 625.090(l)(a), and that the child had been in foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months under KRS 625.090(2)0, apply equally with respect to both the father and the mother of the child in question, despite the majority's assertion that the evidence did not support terminating the mother’s rights. To be clear, a parent need not administer the blows in order to be held legally responsible for abuse or neglect. Furthermore, in one of the adjudged instances of abuse, the mother acknowledged that she instigating the abuse by directing the father to "tap the butt” of the little boy because he was acting up. The father whipped the little boy, which left four distinct bruises on the little boy’s buttocks.

. These factors are: (a) Mental illness as defined by KRS 202A.011(9), or mental retardation as defined by KRS 202B.010(9) of the parent as certified by a qualified mental health professional, which renders the parent consistently unable to care for the immediate and ongoing physical or psychological needs of the child for extended periods of time; (b) Acts of abuse or neglect as defined in KRS 600.020(1) toward any child in the family; (c) If the child has been placed with the cabinet, whether the cabinet has, prior to the filing of the petition made reasonable efforts as defined in KRS 620.020 to reunite the child with the parents unless one or more of the circumstances enumerated in KRS 610.127 for not requiring reasonable efforts have been substantiated in a written finding by the District Court; (d) The efforts and adjustments the parent has made in his circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the child’s best interest to return him to his home within a reasonable period of time, considering the age of the child; (e) The physical, emotional, and mental health of the child and the prospects for the improvement of the child's welfare if termination is ordered; and (f) The payment or the failure to pay a reasonable portion of substitute physical care and maintenance if financially able to do so.

. Apparently identified in findings numbered 15 through 19 of the trial court’s decision.

. University of Kentucky Child and Adolescent Trauma Treatment Center.

. Although the trial court took judicial notice of the prior adjudication of neglect against the father in the case as it related to an older half-sibling of the little boy in this case, it did not address them within the assessment of the child's best interest. The record also reveals that the mother's parental rights to her older child were also terminated.

. KRS 625.090(3) provides, in part, “In determining the best interest of the child and the existence of a ground for termination, the Circuit Court shall consider the following factors ...” (emphasis added).

. Findings nos. 2 and 8.

. Despite the evidence that both the little boy and his father shared the same type of sexually transmitted disease and that the little boy's disease manifested on the edge of his anus, and despite the fact that three medical doctors agreed that, especially given the little boys handicaps, this was evidence of sexual abuse, the trial court apparently deferred to a letter from the father's primary care physician that, although highly unlikely, sexually transmitted warts could be transmitted through contact with the same wash cloth or towel. Thus, it found that sexual abuse was unsubstantiated and entered a finding of neglect as to both parents.

.Findings nos. 15-17.

. Findings nos. 18-19, 31.