Court Opinion

ID: 9702473
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:12:43.465213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:37.500473
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing.
On
the following opinion was filed:
Per Curiam.
Appellant and some of the respondents have petitioned for a rehearing, vigorously complaining of the court’s failure to adequately pass upon the jurisdictional question involving the adequacy of the notice of appeal from the orders of the county board of commissioners to the district court. The appeal was taken pursuant to Minn. St. 127.25, which so far as applicable here provides: . .
. “Subdivision 1. Any district or any person aggrieved by final order *379of the county board or final order of the commissioner, or final order of the county superintendent, made pursuant to the provisions of this code, may appeal from such final order to the district court * *
The single notice of appeal names 31 of the petitioners and recites that the “named appellants, and each of them, being aggrieved by each and every one of the above described orders, hereby appeal” on grounds substantially the same as those provided for in the statute.
It has been generally held in court actions that separate judgments, decrees, or orders cannot be brought up for appellate review by one appeal, the objection being that such a proceeding is duplicitous. 4 C. J. S., Appeal and Error, § 37b; Annotation, 36 A. L. R. (2d) 825. In considering this objection, the trial court said:
“I do not believe it was necessary for the appellants to serve a separate Notice of Appeal for each of the orders. While separate petitions are filed in detachment and annexation proceedings, the petitions must be considered together because of the special statutory definition given to the term ‘lands adjoining a school district’ and the petitions are combined for the purposes of hearing as well as for purposes of giving notice of hearing. See M.S.A. § 122.21 Subd. 3. I have no doubt that the county board could well make a combined order on all the petitions. I see no particular objections to the giving of one Notice of Appeal from a group of orders.”
There is authority to the effect that the rule against duplicity is a variable one of practice, “which is not to be extended beyond the purpose of its origin”; and a single appeal may be sustained where the duplicity “does not interfere with orderly appellate procedure, the rights of the appellee are in no way prejudiced or adversely affected, or the several judgments or orders relate to the same matter and are not so foreign to each other that their combination in the same proceeding will cause confusion.” 4 C. J. S., Appeal and Error, § 37b.
The rationale above stated is persuasive here. The 39 petitions were heard together as one matter, in one proceeding. As the district court pointed out, it was necessary to consider the petitions in one proceeding because of the statutory definition of land “adjoining a school dis*380trict” in Minn. St. 122.21, subd. 1. Many of the petitions concerned land which did not directly adjoin the Halstad District and which could be considered for annexation to that district only because of the petitions concerning the intervening land, as provided in § 122.21, subd. 1 (c). The validity of the 39 orders turns upon one issue. There was no conflict of interest among the various petitioners in the appeal to the district court or the appeal to this court. For all practical purposes, the matter was heard as a consolidated proceeding by the board of county commissioners.
Moreover, authority for sustaining the validity of the appeal may be found in § 605.05, as amended by L. 1963, c. 806, § 5, which provides as follows:
“Subdivision 1. The supreme court upon an appeal may reverse, affirm, or modify the judgment or order appealed from, or take any other action as the interests of justice may require.
“Subd. 2. On appeal from an order the supreme court may review any order affecting the order from which the appeal is taken and on appeal from a judgment may review any order involving the merits or affecting the judgment. It may review any other matter as the interests of justice may require.” (Italics supplied.)
Here, the determinative question was whether the county board had any authority to act after the consolidation proceeding had progressed to the point where it took precedence over the detachment proceeding. If the notice of appeal is good as to a single parcel, it is sufficient to vest the court with jurisdiction to pass upon that legal issue. Where, as here, the litigant can accomplish nothing but the creation of interminable litigation, which can end in nothing but the expenditure of public and private money with no hope of final victory for those who furnish the funds with which to carry on the fight, a determination of one appeal may be made so as to result in a decision of the entire case on its merits, and thus declare the law so that there may be an end to useless litigation. Annotation, 36 A. L. R. (2d) 852.
Inasmuch as the consolidation proceeding involved here takes precedence over the detachment proceeding, it must follow that the county board had no authority to act and that all orders it made are a com-*381píete nullity. The orders of the county board, being a nullity, may be collaterally attacked or entirely ignored. The county board in matters of this kind has only that authority which is given to it by the legislature, and here it had no authority to act after the consolidation proceeding had taken precedence over the detachment proceeding.
The petition for a rehearing is denied.