Court Opinion

ID: 9709176
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:42:00.009023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:46.573588
License: Public Domain

Wenke, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent from the opinion of the majority which primarily holds that the record discloses that appellant was, as a matter of law, guilty of contributory negligence sufficient to defeat any right of recovery he might otherwise have. To me, based on the principle hereinafter set forth, the record as to that issue presents a question of fact for a jury. The principle I refer to is: Where a pedestrian approaches a street at a crosswalk and looks and sees an approaching vehicle on the street he is about to cross but erroneously judges its speed or distance or for some other reason assumes he can proceed with safety, the question of whether or not his conduct in doing so makes him guilty of contributory negligence is usually one for the jury.
In order to present what I consider evidence of a factual question in this regard I shall set forth certain questions asked appellant and his answers thereto. To make these questions and answers clear it will be necessary to set forth a plat of the intersection (exhibit 1 in the record) where the accident happened and certain *557numbers placed thereon by appellant. It follows:

It should be remembered the evidence hereafter quoted is, for the purpose of this appeal, subject to the following principle stated in the majority opinion: “* * * upon a *558motion for a directed verdict at the conclusion of all of the evidence, the motion must be treated as an admission of the truth of all of the material and relevant evidence admitted and all proper inferences to be drawn therefrom.”
In setting forth the testimony it is not necessarily quoted in the order as found in the bill of exceptions but as it relates to the sequence of events as appellant approached and attempted to cross the intersection on the crosswalk. In this respect appellant, Shafeek Farag, testified as follows:
“Q- Now, Mr. Farag, as you came out of the Labor Temple and went up toward the intersection to the north, were you traveling at a rapid pace?
A- What do you mean ‘rapid pace’?
Q- Well, —
A- Ordjinary walking pace.
Q- Wa$ it raining at that time?
A- It was raining.
Q- From the curb up to the center of this street you were just normally walking?
A- Norimal walking.
Q- Now at any time from the time you left the Latjor Temple until you reached the point of impact, did you run?
A- No.j
Q- You have indicated * * * you were going out in the street crossing Q going north at the crosswalk?
A- Yes; sir.
Q- On jthe west side of 11th Street?
A- Yes; sir.
Q- Now when did you first see a car, if you remember?
A- I saw it when I was standing on this curb here (indicating).
Q- Will you please make a number ‘5’ and put a *559circle around it, the number indicating the point on Exhibit 1 where you were when you first saw Mrs. Weldon’s car? (Witness complies.)
Q- * * * Where was Mrs. Weldon’s car when you were at point ‘5’?
A- Somewhere along this street here (indicating).
Q- Well, could you estimate it in car lengths or some other unit?
A- No. I would say it was somewhere in the middle of that block (indicating). That is an approximation.
Q- Would it be fair to say approximately a half block?
A- Approximately.
Q- Now would you with that pencil put a number ‘6’ on Exhibit 1 to show approximately where Mrs. Weldon’s car was when you first saw it?
A- Supposing this is a block (indicating), call this a block. I don’t know how far is a block, but supposing this is a block (indicating), then if the middle of the block would be here (indicating) — of course there are two lanes here (indicating) — then her car was in the middle of the block and it would be ‘6’ here — middle of the block.
Q- Now tell what happened?
A- Then I started crossing the street—
Q- Well, had you stepped into the street before you saw her?
A- No.
Q- You were still up on the sidewalk on 11th Street?
A- Yes.
Q- And you had not reached the curb?
A- No.
Q- How far from the curb were you?
A- A couple of steps.
*560Q- And at that point when you were a couple of steps south of the curb, you saw Mrs. Weldon’s car to your right approximately half a block away?
A- Yes.
Q- Now what other traffic, if any, did you observe on Q Street?
A- There was no other traffic in the street except a car coming after her.
Q- Now was there any traffic on the street west of the intersection and toward your left, as you went up to the sidewalk?
A- No, there was none.
Q- Now, Mr. Farag, I take it that your testimony is that you stepped out into the street — off the curb and onto the street, is that correct?
A- Correct.
Q- And did you watch the Weldon car?
A- I was all the time.
Q- And your testimony is that you proceeded north across the street?
A- Yes.
Q- And did you continuously watch the Weldon car up to the time of the impact?
A- Yes.
Q- You started crossing the street?
A- * * * when I was in the second — in this lane here (indicating)— Is that the inside lane?
Q- Yes.
A- The first after the middle line.
Q- Would you make an approximate circle and number it ‘3’? (Witness complies.)
Q- I believe your testimony is that ‘3’, with a circle around it, represents where you were when Mrs. Weldon’s car was at the beginning of the intersection. Is that correct?
A- Correct.
*561Q- Now you didn’t stop at all at any time before you reached point ‘3’, did you?
A- No.
Q- Now when you were at point ‘3’ you saw, you observed, the Weldon car at that time?
A- Yes.
Q- And at that time you testified she had not entered the intersection on the other side of the street?
A- No, she was about at point ‘7,’ where the place is marked ‘7.’
Q- How far over the center line were you?
A- Well, I was— I would say I was about the middle of the lane.
Q- And which lane?
A- Her lane. The lane in which her car was.
Q- That would be the inside lane for westbound traffic on Q Street?
A- Correct.
Q- Then is No. 3 supposed to represent approximately the middle of that lane?
A- Approximately so.
Q- Now what do you mean by ‘the beginning of the intersection’?
A- Somewhere here (indicating).
Q- Now would you take—
A- Do you want me to write ‘7’ here?
Q- Would you put a ‘7’ with a circle around it? (Witness complies.)
Q- Is that correct that that ‘7’ is intended to represent the position of Mrs. Weldon’s car at the time you were at what you have—
A- In her lane.
Q- (Continuing with the question) indicated as ‘3’ on this Exhibit 1?
A- Correct.
Q- That ‘7’ you have placed on Exhibit 1 to represent the position of Mrs. Weldon’s car when *562you were at point ‘3’ on Exhibit 1? Would that be the front end of her car?
A- What?
Q- The front end of her car?
A- What do you mean by ‘front end of her car’?
Q- Well, the front of her car had proceeded up to point ‘7’?
A- Yes.
Q- Now, in your own words, tell what happened about that time.
A- Well, about that time I was hit by the other car— the car that was coming from this direction (indicating).
Q- You have later learned that was Mrs. Weldon’s car and she was driving?
A- Yes, sir.
Q- Would you indicate with the number ‘4’ approximately, if you know, where the car hit you at the intersection in the street there?
A- What do you mean by that exactly?
Q- Well, did you go further than ‘3’? You indicated you saw the car there.
A- Well, I would say I was somewhere around— well, here (indicating).
Q- Mark that with a ‘4’.
A- ‘4’.
Q- Now, Mr. Farag, is it correct that point ‘4’ which you have placed on Exhibit 1, I believe you testified that that is where Mrs. Weldon’s car struck you? Is that correct?
A- Approximately.
Q- You had taken— Is this right, you had taken a few steps further north?
A- Yes, a few steps — a few speedy steps.
Q- To the north?
A- To the north.
Q- When you got in the middle of the street or a little beyond it?
*563A- Yes.
Q- You have used the term, in describing your going from point ‘3’ to point ‘4’ on Exhibit 1 as a few speedy steps. Is that correct?
A- More than the usual pace that I was walking.
Q- When you used the term ‘speedy steps,’ would that be the same as running?
A- No.
Q- I think you stated you saw the defendant’s car coming right towards you. Is that what you said?
A- Yes, sir.
Q- You took a few, is that the best—
A- I wouldn’t be able to estimate how many.
Q- And the circle and number ‘4’, or the circle around number ‘4’, you placed that on there to represent the point of impact?
A- Correct.
Q- And that is a few speedy steps north of the point ‘3’, which is the middle of the lane in which she was traveling?
A- Correct.
Q- She maintained a straight course?
A- She maintained a straight course, but I wouldn’t state that she was exactly in the lane. She could have been a little off the lane or on the line, or it could be that way, because the street was wet.”
If a jury believes this testimony, which it would have a right to do, it is my opinion appellant would not be guilty of any negligence which contributed to his injury sufficient to defeat any right to recover which he -might otherwise have. I realize there is evidence to the contrary, including that of Charles Floyd Pidgeon who was driving a car east on Q Street and observed the manner in which appellant started across Q Street; that of Louis Plisek who was following appellee west on Q Street while driving a truck and who saw appellee’s *564car hit appellant; that of police officer Arthur A. Walker who talked with appellant that night at the hospital and who testified as to how appellant told him the accident happened; and that of appellee herself, including where the damage to her car occurred. All of this presents a very different picture as to the manner in which and where the appellant crossed the street and where the accident happened. In my judgment the final decision as to who was telling the truth in this respect is one of fact for a jury and not one of law for this court.
The majority opinion also infers the evidence does not disclose a situation from which a jury could find that appellee was guilty of negligence. First, in my judgment, section 39-751, R. R. S. 1943, has no application to the factual situation here presented. However, I think section 701(c) of Ordinance 5699 of the City of Lincoln does. It provides: “Right of Way. (c) Pedestrians. The driver of any vehicle upon a street within the city shall yield the right of way to a pedestrian crossing such street within any crosswalk; provided, however, at intersections where traffic is regulated by a traffic officer or an automatic traffic signal, the pedestrian, to be entitled to the right of way, must be proceeding in accordance with the directions of such traffic officer or automatic traffic signal regulating the movement of traffic at such intersection.”
It was stipulated no officer was directing'traffic at this intersection at the time of accident nor was the intersection controlled by an automatic traffic signal. It was therefore appellee’s duty to yield the right-of-way to appellant if a jury believed his testimony as to how and where he was crossing the street and appellee cannot excuse herself by saying, as she did, that she did not see him through the space cleared on her windshield by the wipers until she struck him. She was duty bound to look and see what was in plain sight. Under this situation it is my opinion it was a question for a jury to determine whether or not she maintained a proper look*565out and, if not, whether such failure caused her not to observe appellant until it was too late to avoid hitting him.