Court Opinion

ID: 9897394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:01.719882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:17.680626
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                   May 17 2023, 8:39 am

                                                                        CLERK
                                                                    Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                       Court of Appeals
                                                                         and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT MEGA                              ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
OIL, INC.                                                 James D. Johnson
Charles E. Traylor                                        Chad J. Sullivan
Jeffrey B. Kolb                                           Jackson Kelly PLLC
Kolb Roellgen & Traylor LLP                               Evansville, Indiana
Vincennes, Indiana                                        William C. Illingworth
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT STOLL                              Illingworth Law Group LLC
KEENON OGDEN, PLLC                                        Evansville, Indiana
Robert L. Burkart
Ziemer Stayman Weitzel & Shoulders,
LLP
Evansville, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS JANICE M.
PEGRAM, DONNELLE K. PEGRAM, STACY
A. PEGRAM, PAUL W. PEGRAM, STEVEN J.
PEGRAM, AND TRAVIS J. PEGRAM
Keith Edward Rounder
Evansville, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
CHATTANOOGA OIL & GAS, LLC
David L. Jones
Paul Wallace
Craig Emig
Jones Wallace, LLC
Evansville, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT BRENDA L.
FANCHER, TRUSTEE OF THE LAIR TRUST
Thomas Graham Dycus
Hart Bell, LLC
Vincennes, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-1275 | May 17, 2023                            Page 1 of 21
                                                  IN THE
          COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

      MEGA OIL, INC., an Illinois                               May 17, 2023
      Corporation, et al.,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
      Appellants-Defendants,                                    22A-MI-1275
                                                                Appeal from the Gibson Circuit
              v.                                                Court
                                                                The Honorable Gary J. Schutte, II,
      CITATION 2004                                             Special Judge
      INVESTMENT, LLC, a                                        Trial Court Cause No.
      Delaware Limited Liability                                26C01-1901-MI-56
      Company,
      Appellee-Plaintiff.

                                      Opinion by Judge Brown
                                 Judges Bailey and Weissmann concur.

      Brown, Judge.

[1]   Mega Oil, Inc. (“Mega Oil”), Stoll Keenon Ogden, PLLC, Janice Pegram

      (“Pegram”), Donnelle K. Pegram, Stacy A. Pegram, Paul W. Pegram, Steven J.

      Pegram, Travis J. Pegram, Chattanooga Oil & Gas, LLC, and Brenda L.

      Fancher as Trustee of the Lair Trust (“Lair Trust”) (collectively, the

      “Appellants”) appeal and raise multiple issues which we consolidate and restate

      as whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. We affirm.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-1275 | May 17, 2023                      Page 2 of 21
      Facts and Procedural History

[2]   On August 30, 1937, pursuant to an oil and gas lease (the “Keck Lease”), J.H.

      McClurkin obtained oil and gas rights with respect to approximately 480 acres

      of real property in Gibson County, Indiana, and the lease was recorded on

      November 24, 1937. The Keck Lease stated that it was between J.H.

      McClurkin “hereinafter called lessee” and

              Jno [sic] Keck, widower, Louis D. Keck and Roblye P. Keck, his
              wife, Robt. A. Keck, and Louise Hopkins Keck, his wife; Emily
              Keck-Schrode and Wm. E. Shrode, her husband, and Louis D.
              Keck, Robt. A. Keck and Franck L. Keck, Trustees for Hellen
              Keck Yow, Mt. Vernon of Ind. Hereinafter called lessor
              (whether one or more).

      Appellants’ Appendix Volume V at 112. The property subject to the Keck

      Lease had the following legal description: “S½ Sec. 27-T3S-R14W, E½ NE½

      Sec. 27-T3S-R14W, SW½ NE¼ Sec. 27-T3S-R14W, and W½ SW¼ 26-T3S-

      R14W.” Id. According to the Keck Lease, it would “remain in force for a term

      of ten years from this date, and as long thereafter as oil or gas or either of them

      is produced from said land by lessee.” Id.

[3]   It contains the following provisions:

              3rd. To pay lessor for gas produced from any oil well and used
              off the premises or in the manufacture of gasoline or any other
              product a royalty of one-eighth (1/8) of the market value, at the
              mouth of the well, payable monthly at the prevailing market rate.

              If no well be commenced on said land on or before the 30th day
              of August, 1938, this lease shall terminate as to both parties,

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-1275 | May 17, 2023          Page 3 of 21
        unless the lessee shall on or before that day pay or tender to the
        lessor or to the lessor’s credit in the Peoples Bank & Trust Co.
        Bank at Mt. Vernon Ind, or its successors, which shall continue
        as the depository regardless of changes in the ownership of said
        land, the sum of One hundred twenty Dollars, which shall
        operate as a rental and cover the privilege of deferring the
        commencement of a well for twelve months from said date. The
        payment herein referred to may be made in currency, draft, or
        check, at the option of the lessee; and the depositing of such
        currency, draft, or check, in any post office, with sufficient
        postage and properly addressed to the lessor, or said bank, on or
        before said last mentioned date, shall be deemed payment as
        herein provided. In like manner and upon like payments or
        tenders, the commencement of a well may be further deferred for
        like periods of the same number of months successively. And it
        is understood and agreed that the consideration first recited
        herein, the down payment, covers not only the privilege granted
        to the date when said first rental is payable as aforesaid, but also
        the lessee’s option of extending that period as aforesaid, and any
        and all other rights conferred.

                                               *****

        If said lessor owns a less interest in the above described land than
        the entire and undivided fee simple estate therein, then the
        royalties and rentals herein provided for shall be paid the said
        lessor only in the proportion which lessor’s interest bears to the
        whole and undivided fee.

        If the estate of either party hereto is assigned—and the privilege
        of assigning in whole or in part is expressly allowed—the
        coven[a]nts hereof shall extend to their heirs, executors,
        administrators, successors or assigns, but no change in the
        ownership of the land or assignments of rental or royalties shall
        be binding on the lessee until after the lessee has been furnished
        with a written transfer or assignment or a true copy thereof: and
        it is hereby agreed that in the event this lease shall be assigned as
        to a part or as to parts of the above described lands and the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-1275 | May 17, 2023            Page 4 of 21
              assignee or assignees of such part or parts shall fail or make
              default in the payments of the proportionate part of the rentals
              due from him or them, such default shall not operate to defeat or
              affect this lease in so far as it covers a part or parts of said lands
              upon which the said lessee or any assignee thereof shall make
              due payment of said rental, and this lease shall never be forfeited
              for non-payment of any rental due until after at least ten days’
              written notice by registered mail or in person shall have been
              given the lessee.

      Id. at 112-113.

[4]   On August 18, 2009, Pegram, Paul Pegram, Steven Pegram, and Travis

      Pegram, collectively as the single lessor, entered into an Oil and Gas Lease (the

      “Pegram Lease”) with Lair Trust, the lessee, with respect to approximately 143

      acres of property in which Pegram claimed to own an interest. The Pegram

      Lease, recorded on November 30, 2009, includes a legal description of

      approximately 62.7 acres of the property, and this description is a verbatim

      description of the property subject to the Keck Lease as described in the Pegram

      Affidavit. On August 19, 2009, Janice Pegram (“Pegram”) filed an Affidavit

      for the Cancellation of Oil and Gas Lease (“Pegram Affidavit”) in Gibson

      County, which sought to cancel the Keck Lease and stated that “Janice M.

      Pegram, is the owner of an interest in the following described real estate and

      entitled to rentals and royalties payable under the following described oil and

      gas leases,” “[n]o rentals or royalties have been paid to said Owner or received

      by any person, bank, or corporation on behalf of said Owner, for a period of

      more than one (1) year after they have become due,” the “leases has not been

      operated for the production of oil or gas for more than one (1) year, both by
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-1275 | May 17, 2023             Page 5 of 21
      nonproduction of oil or gas and by nondevelopment of said lease,” and

      “[p]ursuant to Indiana Code 32-5-8-1, said Owner does hereby request the

      Recorder to certify upon the face of said Oil and Gas Leases that they are

      Invalid and Void and Canceled of Record.” Appellants’ Appendix Volume II

      at 80-81.

[5]   On August 24, 2009, the Gibson County Recorder stamped the Keck Lease

      “INVALID-VOID (Per. IC. 32-5-8-1).” Appellants’ Appendix Volume V at

      114. On November, 24, 2009, the Indiana Department of Natural Resources

      (“DNR”) approved well permit number 54020 (“Pegram Well #1) for the

      drilling of a new well, located on the land of the Keck Lease, to be operated by

      Ice and Potts Oil Co. on behalf of Mega Oil.

[6]   On April 1, 2010, Noble Energy, Inc. (“Noble”) assigned Citation its “right,

      title, and interest” in the Keck Lease. Id. at 151. On May 25, 2010, a purchase

      agreement executed between Noble and Citation required Citation to pay

      $554,000,000 for assets it would acquire located in Indiana, Illinois, and

      Oklahoma. The purchase agreement stated in part that Citation would acquire

      “the oil and gas leases . . . owned by Seller in the counties set forth in Exhibit

      A-6, including those listed on Exhibit A-l (collectively, the ‘Acquired Leases’)

      and the lands covered thereby . . ., and the production of Hydrocarbons in, on,

      or under the Leased Lands.” Id. at 174.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-1275 | May 17, 2023           Page 6 of 21
[7]   On July 6, 2010, the Lair Trust assigned its interest in the Pegram Lease to

      Mega Oil. On July 28, 2017, Citation became aware of Pegram Well #1 when

      it was listed on the DNR database.

[8]   On January 17, 2019, Citation and Citation Oil and Gas Corp. (“Citation Oil”)

      (together, “Citation Companies”) jointly filed a five-count complaint seeking, in

      part, under Count I a declaratory judgment finding that the Keck Lease is valid,

      Citation is the holder of the Keck Lease, the Pegram Lease is void and invalid,

      the Pegram Affidavit is facially erroneous, Mega Oil’s activities constitute a

      trespass, and ejecting Mega Oil from the property and enjoining them from

      operating within the lands of the Keck Lease. It alleged slander of title and

      willful trespass under the other counts. On November 7, 2019, Mega Oil filed a

      motion for partial summary judgment claiming to be a bona fide purchaser for

      value. On February 19, 2020, Citation Companies filed an amended complaint

      adding as additional defendants Paul W. Pegram, Steven J. Pegram, Donnelle

      K. Pegram, Travis J. Pegram, Stacy A. Pegram, Brenda L. Fancher as trustee of

      Lair Trust, John Runyon, David Elliott, Denise Elliott, Chattanooga Oil &

      Gas, LLC, Lone Oak Energy, LLC, and Bethlehem Oil, LLC. On June 26,

      2020, the trial court held a hearing on Mega Oil’s motion for partial summary

      judgment, which it denied on July 23, 2020. In its July 23, 2020 order, the

      court concluded that “[t]he sole issue raised in Defendant’s Motion for

      Summary Judgment is whether Mega Oil was a bona fide purchaser,” and it

      concluded that Mega Oil was not a bona fide purchaser. Appellants’ Appendix

      Volume III at 158.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-1275 | May 17, 2023          Page 7 of 21
[9]    On May 25, 2021, Citation Companies filed a motion for partial summary

       judgment as to Count I. On September 13, 2021, the court entered an Agreed

       Order of Dismissal as to Citation Oil.

[10]   On April 7, 2022, the court held a hearing on Citation’s motion for partial

       summary judgment. On May 5, 2022, the court issued an Order on Summary

       Judgment, which granted Citation’s motion and stated in part that, “since the

       granting of the Keck Lease, over twenty (20) oil and gas wells have been drilled

       and completed on the Leased Premises,” “Keck well Numbered 76X-26 (Permit

       Number 45319) under the Keck Lease continues to produce oil in paying

       quantities to this day,” the Pegram Affidavit falsely stated the Keck Lease had

       not produced oil or gas for more than one year, “[t]here is no contradictory

       evidence regarding the continuing production of the Keck Lease,” and that,

       absent a valid partial termination, a lease continues to all lands and depths.

       The court concluded summary judgment was proper because:

               a) The Pegrams did not possess the legal authority to lease oil
               and gas that were already under lease based on a review of the
               records in the chain of title and the continuing production on the
               Lease.

               b) The Pegram Affidavit and the Pegram lease were void on
               their face under Indiana law existing before and after those
               documents were executed. Wilson v. Elliot, 589 N.E.2d 259 (Ind.
               Ct. App. 1992)[.]

               c) Mega Oil had actual and constructive notice of the valid Keck
               Lease before it took the assignment of the Pegram Lease.

       Appellants’ Appendix Volume II at 33-34, 37.
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-1275 | May 17, 2023         Page 8 of 21
       Discussion

[11]   This Court reviews an order for summary judgment de novo, applying the same

       standard as the trial court. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014).

       The moving party bears the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that

       there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as

       a matter of law. Manley v. Sherer, 992 N.E.2d 670, 673 (Ind. 2013). Summary

       judgment is improper if the moving party fails to carry its burden, but if it

       succeeds, then the nonmoving party must come forward with evidence

       establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. This Court

       construes all factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and resolves all

       doubts as to the existence of a material issue against the moving party. Id. The

       review of summary judgment is limited to the materials designated to the trial

       court. Siwinski v. Town of Ogden Dunes, 949 N.E.2d 825, 827 (Ind. 2011).

       I.

[12]   The first issue is whether the Keck Lease was validly canceled by the Pegram

       Affidavit pursuant to Ind. Code § 32-23-8-1. Appellants argue that “the

       Recorder voided and canceled the Keck Lease pursuant to the Lease

       Cancellation Statute.” Appellants’ Consolidated Brief at 17 (citing Wilson v.

       Elliott, 589 N.E.2d 259, 262 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)).

[13]   Citation counters that “the Pegram Affidavit and the cancellation of the Keck

       Lease were void ab initio.” Appellee’s Brief at 17. It cites Wilson v. Elliott, for

       the proposition that “[t]he land covered by a lease is deemed a unit and it is the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-1275 | May 17, 2023           Page 9 of 21
nonproduction and nondevelopment of the unit as a whole that supports

cancellation of the lease.” Id. at 18 (citing Wilson, 589 N.E.2d 259, 262 n.3

(Ind. Ct. App. 1992)). According to Citation, “the argument that [a

leaseholder] failed to produce oil or gas from a small portion of the total leased

property—is insufficient to establish that the habendum clause has been

breached and to support a partial cancellation of the Lease.” Id. (citing Meisler

v. Gull Oil, Inc., 848 N.E.2d 1112, 1116 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)). 1 Citation asserts

“the Affidavit of Cancellation was void because it ‘[sought] to partially

terminate the Keck Lease as to only certain lands of the lease.’” Appellee’s

Brief at 18-19 (quoting Appellants’ Appendix Volume II at 36). It claims

Appellants have “not designated evidence of both nonproduction on and

nondevelopment of all the lands within the Keck Lease.” Id. at 17.

1
    In Meisler, the Court observed:
           In general, a habendum clause is the portion of a deed defining “the extent of the ownership in the
           thing granted to be held and enjoyed by the grantee.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 710 (6th ed. 1990).
           More specifically, in the context of oil and gas law, the purpose, operation, and construction of the
           habendum clause in oil and gas leases has been described as follows:
                     “The modern habendum clause, with its short primary term and its
                     ‘thereafter’ provision, is designed to measure the duration of the oil and
                     gas lease by its primary objective, the production of oil or gas. The
                     clause seeks to assure the lessor that the leased premises will be put in
                     production, from which the lessor will be paid a royalty, within the
                     primary term or the lease will terminate, either at the end of the primary
                     term, or if there is then production, thereafter upon the cessation of
                     production. The lessee is assured of a fixed time in which to obtain
                     production and of keeping the lease as long as production continues.”
           Gull Oil’s Br. p. 6 (quoting 3 Williams, Howard R. and Meyers, Charles J., Oil and Gas
           Law § 604 (1985)).
848 N.E.2d at 1114-1115.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-1275 | May 17, 2023                                    Page 10 of 21
[14]   Ind. Code § 32-23-8-1 is titled “Void leases” and provides:

               Leases for oil and gas that are recorded in Indiana are void:

                        (1) after a period of one (1) year has elapsed since:

                                 (A) the last payment of rentals on the oil and gas
                                 lease as stipulated in the lease or contract; or

                                 (B) operation for oil or gas has ceased, both by the
                                 nonproduction of oil or gas and the
                                 nondevelopment of the lease; and

                        (2) upon the written request of the owner of the land,
                        accompanied by the affidavit of the owner stating that:

                                 (A) no rentals have been paid to or received by the
                                 owner or any person, bank, or corporation in the
                                 owner’s behalf for a period of one (1) year after they
                                 have become due; and

                                 (B) the leases and contracts have not been operated
                                 for the production of oil or gas for one (1) year.

[15]   Ind. Code § 32-23-8-3 is titled “Voiding of cancellation” and provides:

               If, at any time after the cancellation of a lease and contract and
               within the term provided in the lease or contract, the lessee
               submits to the recorder:

                        (1) a receipt or a canceled check, or an affidavit, showing
                        that the rental has been paid; or

                        (2) an affidavit that:

                                 (A) the lease has been operated within a period of
                                 one (1) year before the cancellation, as stipulated in
                                 the lease or contract; and

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-1275 | May 17, 2023                 Page 11 of 21
                                     (B) the affidavit of the lessor provided under this
                                     chapter is false or fraudulent;

                  the cancellation is void, and the recorder shall so certify at the
                  place where the cancellation of the lease and contract has been
                  entered.

[16]   Wilson v. Elliot addressed a situation in which a lessor attempted to partially

       cancel a lease, 60 acres of a 120-acre oil and gas lease. 589 N.E.2d 259 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 1992). The procedure for removing an abandoned oil and gas lease

       was at the time codified in Ind. Code § 32-5-8-1 2, but is now codified in

       substantially similar fashion at Ind. Code § 32-23-8-1, and the Court held:

                  Logically, if the written request incorrectly identifies the land and
                  the lease, the county recorder cannot certify on the appropriate
                  title which lease is null and void. Incorrect certifications destroy
                  the goal of clear and reliable record titles. The trial court did not
                  err, therefore, when it concluded Wilson incorrectly identified
                  both the land and the lease when in his affidavit he sought to
                  have part of the 1965 lease cancelled, but at trial he sought to
                  have part of the 1973 Wilson Lease cancelled. See id. Because
                  filing an adequate affidavit is a condition precedent to having an
                  oil and gas lease rendered void on the record title, and because

       2
           Wilson states that Ind. Code § 32-5-8-1 provided in relevant part:

                  [U]pon the written request of the owner of such lands, accompanied with the affidavit of such
                  owner, stating that no rentals have been paid to or received by such owner or any person, bank or
                  corporation in his behalf for a period of one (1) year after they have become due, and that such
                  leases and contracts have not been operated for the production of oil or gas for one (1) year, the
                  recorder of the county in which such real estate is situated shall certify upon the face of such record
                  that such leases and contracts are invalid and void by reason of nonpayment of rentals and is
                  thereby canceled of record, which request and affidavit shall be recorded in the miscellaneous
                  records of said recorder’s office.

       Wilson, 589 N.E.2d at 262.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-1275 | May 17, 2023                                     Page 12 of 21
               Wilson did not meet this condition, Elliott and Sons’s oil and gas
               leases are still valid.

       Wilson, 589 N.E.2d at 262 (footnote omitted). In a footnote, the Court

       disagreed that the statute provided for the partial cancellation of leases and

       stated that according to such an interpretation:

               lessors would be free to cancel from leases any parcel of land, no
               matter how large or small, provided there was no production or
               development on the specific piece of land for a period of more
               than one year. The land covered by a lease is deemed a unit, and
               it is the nonproduction and nondevelopment of the unit as a
               whole that supports cancellation of the lease.

       Id. at 262 n.3.

[17]   In Meisler, the Court saw “no reason to depart from the Wilson analysis,” and

       similarly concluded that “the Meislers’ argument that Gull Oil failed to produce

       oil or gas from the Acreage—a small portion of the total leased property—is

       insufficient to establish that the habendum clause has been breached and to

       support a partial cancellation of the Lease.” 848 N.E.2d at 1116. The Court

       noted that the Meislers argued “that the habendum clause and the Lease are

       divisible and that the clause applies separately to the distinct portions of the

       leased property,” but concluded from the contract’s language that “[t]here is

       simply no support in this unambiguous contractual language for the Meislers’

       argument that Gull Oil has breached this clause if it fails, for a time, to produce

       oil or gas from a portion of the leased property,” and “[a]bsent a contrary

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-1275 | May 17, 2023          Page 13 of 21
       provision in the lease, the habendum clause is unaffected by assignments or

       partial assignments by the lessor or by the lessee.” Id. at 1115.

[18]   Barr v. Sun Exploration Co. interpreted Ind. Code § 32-23-8-1, codified at that

       time as Ind. Code § 32-5-8-1, and a lessor argued that nonproduction of any oil

       from the lessee’s well for a period of fourteen months meant that the lease was

       null and void. 436 N.E.2d 821, 823 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). The Court

       determined that “the clear language of the statute requires both the cessation of

       development and production for there to be a cessation of operations” and that

       “the legislature intended that both the nonproduction of oil and gas and the

       nondevelopment of the lease together be shown to prove a cessation of

       operations for oil and gas.” Id. at 824-825.

[19]   To the extent Mega Oil argues the Pegram Affidavit canceled the Keck Lease,

       the record reveals the Pegram Affidavit stated that Pegram “is the owner of an

       interest in the following described real estate and entitled to rentals and

       royalties payable under the following described oil and gas leases,” and

       included a description of an area of 62.7 acres in which Pegram owned her

       interest, which is less than the total 480 acres of the Keck Lease. Appellants’

       Appendix Volume V at 231. The Pegram Affidavit seeks cancellation of the

       Keck Lease and claims that “[s]aid leases has [sic] not been operated for the

       production of oil or gas for more than one (1) year, both by nonproduction of

       oil or gas and by nondevelopment of said lease,” and asks the Recorder of

       Gibson County “to certify upon the face of said Oil and Gas Leases that they

       are Invalid and Void and Canceled of Record.” Id. at 232. We cannot say the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-1275 | May 17, 2023          Page 14 of 21
       Pegram Affidavit properly described the lands of the Keck Lease, identified

       Pegram as owner of the lands of the lease, or constituted an affidavit adequate

       to cancel the lease. See Wilson, 589 N.E.2d at 262 (the affidavit of cancellation

       did not comply with the cancellation statute “because the affidavit he filed did

       not correctly describe the lease he sought to have forfeited or the land the lease

       covered”).

[20]   Even if the Pegram Affidavit adequately described the lands of the Keck Lease

       and Pegram as the owner, the designated evidence demonstrates continued oil

       production. The trial court’s order found that “since the granting of the Keck

       Lease, over twenty (20) oil and gas wells have been drilled and completed on

       the Leased Premises,” a single well produces in paying quantities to this day,

       “Keck well Numbered 76X-26 (Permit Number 45319) under the Keck Lease

       continues to produce oil,” and “[t]here is no contradictory evidence regarding

       the continuing production of the Keck Lease.” Appellants’ Appendix Volume

       II at 33-34. In his affidavit, Fletcher Ortiz, a Senior Landman for Citation,

       makes multiple statements, including: “[o]perations have been conducted

       continuously on the Keck Lease through the present date”; “over twenty (20)

       oil and gas wells have been drilled and produced on the Keck Lease continuing

       up to the present day,” “[a]s of the date of this affidavit, the Keck Number 76X-

       26 (Permit Number 45319) continues to produce oil in paying quantities from

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-1275 | May 17, 2023         Page 15 of 21
       the Keck Lease”; 3 and “the affiants of the Affidavit for Cancellation of Oil and

       Gas Lease would not, nor were required to receive royalties under the Keck

       lease.” Appellants’ Appendix Volume IV at 6. In his deposition, Ortiz agreed

       that he “would have had involvement with oil and gas leases,” id. at 215, and

       he stated that he “oversee[s] the assets on the land side of multiple states

       including Indiana,” Citation has “an active producing lease called the Keck

       Lease,” “[i]t’s been producing for decades, over 20, 30 years,” and “Mega Oil .

       . . took a lease over a portion of the [Keck] lease.” Id. at 231. The designated

       evidence reveals there was continued oil production on the lands of the Keck

       Lease, and the Pegram Affidavit was not adequate to cancel the Keck Lease on

       this additional ground. 4

[21]   Citation argues the trial court erroneously relied on the first summary judgment

       order (“First Order”), issued on July 23, 2020, which addressed Appellants’

       previous motion for summary judgment when it issued its May 5, 2022 Order

       on Summary Judgment. Appellants state that Citation relied on the First Order

       as “law of the case” when it cited conclusions from the First Order in its brief;

       “[i]n entering both the First . . . Order and the Appealed Order, the trial court

       adopted verbatim Citation’s proposed orders”; “the trial court did not scrutinize

       the proposed findings and conclusions before adopting them”; the First Order

       3
         At oral argument, Citation’s counsel noted that “the Keck Number 76X-26” is an error, and the correct well
       that has continued to produce oil, and to which Ortiz meant to refer, is 76X-27.
       4
         We do not render an opinion regarding the extent to which Pegram is entitled to payment pursuant to the
       terms of the Keck Lease.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-1275 | May 17, 2023                              Page 16 of 21
       dealt with only Mega Oil’s bona fide purchaser defense and is not conclusive in

       the current motion; and relying on the First Order kept the trial court from

       considering Appellants’ evidence it designated in response to Citation’s partial

       motion for summary judgment and other objections and motions. Appellants’

       Consolidated Brief at 29.

[22]   “The ‘law of the case’ doctrine designates that an appellate court’s

       determination of a legal issue is binding on both the trial court and the Court of

       Appeals in any subsequent appeal given the same case and substantially the

       same facts.” City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 126 N.E.3d 813, 832 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2019). “The purpose of the doctrine is to minimize unnecessary repeated

       litigation of legal issues once they have been resolved by an appellate

       court. This doctrine is based upon the sound policy that once an issue is

       litigated and decided, that should be the end of the matter.” Id. “Accordingly,

       the law of the case doctrine bars relitigation of all issues decided directly or by

       implication in a prior decision.” Id. “A court has the power to revisit prior

       decisions of its own or of a coordinate court in any circumstance, although as a rule

       courts should be loathe [sic] to do so in the absence of extraordinary

       circumstances such as where the initial decision was clearly erroneous and

       would work manifest injustice.” Id. “The trial court is not a coordinate court

       to this [C]ourt; thus, it has no power to alter an appellate decision.” Id.

[23]   The record reveals that, in its brief supporting its motion for partial summary

       judgment, Citation noted some of the findings of the trial court from the First

       Order and asserted:

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-1275 | May 17, 2023           Page 17 of 21
               Due to these conclusions which are now the law of the cases and
               the undisputed material facts, Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment as
               a matter of law that Mega Oil is operating the Pegram #1
               without legal authority and that Citation is the true holder of the
               oil and gas interests in the Leased Premises.

       Appellants’ Appendix Volume III at 182 (footnote omitted). In footnote five of

       its brief supporting its motion for partial summary judgment, Citation qualified

       its use of the phrase “law of the cases,” stating:

               Plaintiff acknowledges that this Court has the power to revisit its
               prior decision but “as a rule courts should be loathe [sic] to do so
               in the absence of extraordinary circumstances such as where the
               initial decision was clearly erroneous and would work manifest
               injustice.” Such extraordinary circumstances clearly do not
               apply here.

       Id. (citation omitted). The trial court’s Order on Summary Judgment does not

       contain the phrase “law of the case” or otherwise state that it considered the

       First Order to be the law of the case. The trial court determined that Mega Oil

       was not a bona fide purchaser, and in its order granting Citation’s motion for

       summary judgment, the court found “[t]he issue raised in Defendant’s Motion

       for Summary Judgment is whether the Keck Lease is valid and the validity of

       the subsequent Pegram Lease.” Appellants’ Appendix Volume V at 36. We

       cannot say the trial court adopted its First Order as law of the case for its order

       on Citation’s motion for summary judgment.

[24]   To the extent Appellants assert the trial court “did not scrutinize the proposed

       findings and conclusions before adopting them,” they cite Kitchell v. Franklin, 26

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-1275 | May 17, 2023          Page 18 of 21
N.E.3d 1050 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Appellants’ Consolidated Brief at 29. In

Kitchell, this Court noted:

                 The trial court made these findings by accepting verbatim
                 Whitsell-Sherman’s proposed findings of fact. This
                 practice weakens our confidence as an appellate court that
                 the findings are the result of considered judgment by the
                 trial court. Prowell v. State, 741 N.E.2d 704, 708-09 (Ind.
                 2001). Here, the adoption of the proposed findings was not by an
                 entry that recited the findings. Rather, it was by a one-line order
                 reciting in relevant part, “Findings of fact and conclusions of law
                 approved as per order.” This practice leaves us with an even
                 lower level of confidence that all findings reflect the
                 independent evaluation by the trial court.

        [Cook v. Whitsell-Sherman, 796 N.E.2d 271, 273 n.1 (Ind. 2003).]
        As seen from the above-quoted text, Cook does not stand for the
        proposition that findings of fact and conclusions of law adopted
        verbatim are inherently suspect; instead, the case calls attention
        to the fact that the trial court in that case merely “approved as per
        order” the party’s submitted findings and conclusions. See id.

26 N.E.3d at 1057. The Court continued, stating:

        It is not uncommon for a trial court to enter findings that are
        verbatim reproductions of submissions by the prevailing party.
        The trial courts of this state are faced with an enormous volume
        of cases and few have the law clerks and other resources that
        would be available in a more perfect world to help craft more
        elegant trial court findings and legal reasoning. We recognize
        that the need to keep the docket moving is properly a high
        priority of our trial bench. For this reason, we do not prohibit
        the practice of adopting a party’s proposed findings. But when
        this occurs, there is an inevitable erosion of the confidence of an

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-1275 | May 17, 2023                  Page 19 of 21
               appellate court that the findings reflect the considered judgment
               of the trial court.

       Id. at 1057-1058 (citing Prowell, 741 N.E.2d at 708-709). The Court stated

       further that “we by no means encourage the wholesale adoption of a party’s

       proposed findings and conclusions, [but] the critical inquiry is whether such

       findings, as adopted by the court, are clearly erroneous,” and the Court

       declined “to find that the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in

       this case are inherently suspect because they are verbatim reproductions” of a

       party’s submission. Id. at 1058 (citing In re Marriage of Nickels, 834 N.E.2d 1091,

       1096 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)).

[25]   The record reveals that Citation’s brief in support of its motion for summary

       judgment stated that “Facts 1-19, 23-24, and 26 are all findings of fact adopted

       by this Court in its [First Order].” Appellants’ Appendix Volume III at 177. It

       appears the trial court adopted Citation’s proposed order verbatim. See

       Appellants’ Appendix Volume VI at 115-121. The court’s Order on Summary

       Judgment differs from the First Order’s findings of fact numbers 15, 26-27, its

       conclusions of law numbers 7-11, and in the inclusion of a section titled,

       “Judgment.” Appellants’ Appendix Volume II at 38. We cannot say the

       findings are clearly erroneous, the court erroneously relied on the First Order,

       or that it did not scrutinize the proposed findings and conclusions before

       adopting them.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-1275 | May 17, 2023            Page 20 of 21
[26]   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court.

[27]   Affirmed.

       Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-1275 | May 17, 2023   Page 21 of 21