Court Opinion

ID: 9379496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-15 19:04:14.410478+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:22.552399
License: Public Domain

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                                                               Electronically Filed
                                                               Supreme Court
                                                               SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
                                                               15-MAR-2023
                                                               08:07 AM
                                                               Dkt. 30 OP

               IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI

                                  ---o0o---

                           IN THE INTEREST OF JH

                              SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX

             CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
                   (CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; FC-S NO. 18-00251)

                               MARCH 15, 2023

         RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, AND EDDINS, JJ.;
                       AND WILSON, J., DISSENTING 1

                    OPINION OF THE COURT BY EDDINS, J.

        At the start of this Child Protective Act case, the Family

Court of the First Circuit appointed attorneys for a mother and

father (Parents).       Then, when Parents failed to appear at a

court hearing, the court discharged counsel.           Later, Parents

reappeared, the court reappointed counsel, and the case

1     At the time of this opinion’s publication, Justice Wilson’s dissent is
forthcoming.
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progressed.      After a trial, the family court terminated Parents’

parental rights.

        Because the family court discharged Parents’ counsel before

the case had ended, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA)

ruled that structural error occurred.           It ordered a new trial.

        A family court must timely appoint counsel in parental

rights cases.       Otherwise, structural error will nullify an

outcome adverse to a parent.          But the appointment, discharge,

and reappointment of counsel is different.

        We hold that if the family court appoints counsel at the

onset of a parental rights case, and later there’s a break in

representation due to a parent’s voluntary absence, then there

is no structural error.         As long as a fundamentally fair

procedure ensues and due process is satisfied, the family

court’s decision will stand.

                                       I.

        JH was born in October 2018.        Soon after his birth, the

Department of Human Services (DHS) assumed custody of JH under

the Child Protective Act, Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HRS) §§ 587A-

8 and 587A-9. 2     Then DHS petitioned for temporary foster custody.

2
      At birth, JH tested positive for unprescribed opiates. While
hospitalized in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit at Kapi‘olani Medical Center,
JH was taken into police protective custody. See HRS § 587A-8 (2018):

              (a) A police officer shall assume protective custody of a
              child without a court order and without the consent of the

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      The family court appointed counsel for both parents at the

first hearing on DHS’s petition.

      In July 2019, at a continued hearing, the court ordered

Mother and Father to appear at a further hearing in 20 days.

The court cautioned Parents: if they didn’t appear on that date,

            child’s family, if in the discretion of the police officer,
            the officer determines that:
                  (1) The child is subject to imminent harm while in
            the custody of the child’s family;
            . . . .
                  (4) The child’s parent has subjected the child to
            harm or threatened harm and the parent is likely to flee
            with the child.
            (b) The department shall assume temporary foster custody
            of the child when a police officer has completed the
            transfer of protective custody of the child to the
            department as follows:
            . . . .
                  (2) If the child is or will be admitted to a
            hospital or similar institution, the police officer shall
            immediately complete the transfer of protective custody to
            the department by notifying the department and receiving an
            acknowledgment from the hospital or similar institution
            that it has been informed that the child is under the
            temporary foster custody of the department.

Then, under HRS § 587A-9 (2018), DHS assumed temporary foster custody of JH.

           (a) When the department receives protective custody of a
           child from the police, the department shall:
                 (1) Assume temporary foster custody of the child if,
           in the discretion of the department, the department
           determines that the child is subject to imminent harm while
           in the custody of the child’s family; [and]
           . . . .
                 (5) Within three days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays,
           and holidays:
                       (A) Relinquish temporary foster custody,
                 return the child to the child’s parents, and proceed
                 pursuant to section 587A-11(4), (5), or (6);
                       (B) Secure a voluntary placement agreement
                 from the child’s parents to place the child in foster
                 care, and proceed pursuant to section 587A-11(6) or
                 (8); or
                       (C) File a petition with the court.

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August 14, then the court could order a default judgment, decide

the petition, and award foster custody of JH to DHS.

        Neither parent showed on August 14, 2019.        The court

entered default judgments against Parents, waived their notice

of future hearings, and discharged their counsel effective

August 31, 2019. 3      The court advised counsel that if Parents

contacted them, then counsel could file an ex parte motion to

rescind the discharge order.          The court also ordered the parents

to appear at a periodic review hearing on January 21, 2020.

        One week before the scheduled periodic review hearing, DHS

moved to terminate Mother and Father’s parental rights.              The

court scheduled this motion on the date of the periodic review

hearing.

        Mother and Father appeared on January 21, 2020.         So did

counsel. 4     Parents requested a trial on DHS’s motion to terminate

parental rights.       Due to COVID-19 concerns and scheduling

conflicts, the court continued the trial date several times.

3       The Honorable Brian A. Costa presided.

4     Parents appeared with their counsel at the periodic review hearing
before the Honorable John C. Bryant. Nothing in the record, however,
reflects that the court reappointed counsel. There is also nothing in the
record – order-wise or otherwise - to reflect that Parents moved to set aside
their default. Instead, the proceedings just resumed as if the court had not
discharged Parents’ attorneys and defaulted Parents. The family court and
all parties - Mother, Father, DHS, and JH’s Guardian Ad Litem - proceeded as
if Parents’ counsel had been reappointed. This opinion likewise treats
Parents’ appearance with their attorneys as a reappointment of counsel.

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        The trial on DHS’s motion to terminate parental rights

began nearly a year later, on January 7, 2021. 5            Trial also

happened on February 4, 2021 and March 30, 2021.                The parents,

represented by counsel, appeared each day of their trial.

        On April 26, 2021, the family court granted DHS’s motion.

The court terminated Mother and Father’s parental rights.                It

awarded DHS permanent custody of JH.           The court made the

necessary findings under HRS § 587A-33(a). 6           It also issued a

termination of parental rights order, letters of permanent

custody, and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

        Parents appealed.     The ICA ordered supplemental briefing.

It asked the parties to brief whether its holding in In the

Interest of J.M. and Z.M., 150 Hawaiʻi 125, 497 P.3d 140 (App.

2021) applied.       That is, does the discharge of counsel during

parental rights proceedings violate a parent’s due process

rights and amount to structural error?

5       The Honorable Andrew T. Park presided over the trial.

6       HRS § 587A-33(a) (2018) reads:

              (a) At a termination of parental rights hearing, the court
              shall determine whether there exists clear and convincing
              evidence that:
                    (1) A child’s parent whose rights are subject to
              termination is not presently willing and able to provide
              the parent’s child with a safe family home, even with the
              assistance of a service plan;
                    (2) It is not reasonably foreseeable that the child’s
              parent whose rights are subject to termination will become
              willing and able to provide the child with a safe family
              home, even with the assistance of a service plan, within a
              reasonable period of time, which shall not exceed two years
              from the child’s date of entry into foster care . . . .

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     The ICA vacated the family court’s parental termination

order and remanded for a new trial.        As with In re J.M., it

found structural error because the court discharged Parents’

counsel before the Child Protective Act proceedings had ended.

     We accepted DHS’s cert application.       DHS argues that there

is no structural error.   DHS maintains that despite the

discharge of Parents’ counsel and the five-month gap in

representation, Parents received a fundamentally fair trial; due

process was satisfied.

                                 II.

     Parents have a substantive liberty interest to parent their

child.   Haw. Const. art. I, § 5.       They have a fundamental right

to care, control, and have custody of their children.       In re

Doe, 99 Hawai‘i 522, 533, 57 P.3d 447, 458 (2002).

     Parents faced with losing their parental rights have a

right to counsel under the Hawai‘i Constitution’s far-reaching

due process clause.   In re T.M., 131 Hawaiʻi 419, 434, 319 P.3d

338, 353 (2014).   An indigent parent’s right to counsel kicks in

when parental rights are substantially affected.       See In re

L.I., 149 Hawai‘i 118, 122, 482 P.3d 1079, 1083 (2021).

     T.M. and L.I. involve the family court’s failure to timely

appoint counsel.   We have not addressed what happens after a

court appoints counsel at the start of Child Protective Act

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(CPA) proceedings and later there’s a gap in representation due

to a parent’s failure to appear in court.

       Here, the ICA ordered a retrial.   Citing T.M., L.I., and In

re J.M., it believed the family court violated Parents’ article

I, section 5 due process right to counsel when it discharged

appointed counsel.    The error is structural, said the ICA.     So

Parents did not have to show that the court’s discharge of

counsel harmed them; the gap in Parents’ legal representation

was enough to vacate the order terminating their parental

rights.    We disagree.

       There is no structural error.

       T.M. and L.I. do not require automatic reversal for

structural error when an indigent parent is not from start to

finish represented by court-appointed counsel in CPA

proceedings.

       First, the ICA blends a failure to timely appoint counsel

and a discharge of counsel.    This case differs from T.M. and

L.I.    In those cases the family court belatedly appointed

counsel for indigent parents.

       In T.M., all parties had counsel throughout the CPA

proceedings.    But not TM’s 15-year old mother.    The court

appointed counsel 19 months after DHS petitioned for temporary

foster custody, about five months before the hearing that

terminated her parental rights.    Without counsel, TM’s mother

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had no legal advocate “to inform her of the limitations of the

guardianship approach and of the possibility that if other

options were pursued, her parental rights would be in jeopardy”;

“advise her of significant deadlines” (like the two-year cutoff

to provide a safe family home); or provide “necessary assistance

to prepare for the . . . termination hearing.”      T.M., 131 Hawai‘i

at 432-33, 319 P.3d at 351-52.    Mother may have kept her

parental rights had the court appointed counsel sooner.      Id. at

433, 319 P.3d at 352.

     T.M. held that courts must appoint counsel to indigent

parents once DHS petitions for custody.     Requiring the family

court to appoint counsel “remove[d] the vagaries of a case-by-

case approach.”   T.M., 131 Hawai‘i at 435, 319 P.3d at 354.     A

right to counsel was established.

     Then in L.I., the court held that the failure to timely

appoint counsel in cases that substantially affect parental

rights is structural error.    There, the family court appointed

counsel three months after it awarded foster custody to DHS, and

eight months after DHS first petitioned for family supervision

of a mother’s then-only child.    L.I., 149 Hawai‘i at 119-20, 123,

482 P.3d at 1080-81, 1084.    The mother should have been

appointed counsel once DHS petitioned for family supervision:

“at that point, parental rights are substantially affected as

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foster custody can be ordered by the court at a subsequent

hearing.”    Id. at 122, 482 P.3d 1083.

     The present case is unlike T.M. and L.I.     The court timely

appointed counsel at the start of the CPA proceedings, right

after DHS petitioned for temporary foster custody of JH.       And

though the family court defaulted Parents and discharged their

attorneys, the court reappointed counsel when Parents

reappeared.

     This is not a case where parents proceeded without counsel.

Rather, because of the child’s best interests, it’s a case that

at times necessarily proceeded without parents.      The right to

counsel is not automatically violated when a beneficiary of that

right voluntarily absents themself from family court

proceedings.

     There is no structural error for another reason.      A

fundamentally fair process may still happen in discharge of

appointed counsel cases.

     Structural errors affect the trial’s entire framework, its

structure.    See State v. Reed, 135 Hawai‘i 381, 386, 351 P.3d

1147, 1152 (2015).    Because a structural error makes the trial

“fundamentally unfair,” the trial is not subject to harmless

error review.    See State v. Loher, 140 Hawai‘i 205, 214, 398 P.3d

794, 803 (2017).    We have identified two features of a

structural error: (1) “certain rights protected by the Hawai‘i

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Constitution are so basic to a fair trial that their

contravention can never be deemed harmless”; and (2) “an error

may be properly considered structural when the impact of the

error on conviction is impossible to reliably assess and when

harmless error review would require the appellate court to

engage in pure speculation.”    Id. at 222, 398 P.3d at 811

(cleaned up).

     Discharge of counsel cases do not present the same problems

that surface when courts do not appoint counsel in the first

place.   If the court does not appoint counsel at the start of

CPA proceedings, then “the harm suffered by parents proceeding

without counsel may not be readily apparent from the record,

especially because without the aid of counsel, it is unlikely

that a case is adequately presented.”     See T.M., 131 at 436, 319

P.3d at 355 (cleaned up).

     A family court’s discharge of counsel, though, does not

necessarily make a trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable

way to decide whether parental rights should terminate.      Cf. In

re RGB, 123 Hawai‘i 1, 25, 229 P.3d, 1066, 1090 (2010) (observing

the failure to timely appoint counsel always calls “the justice

of the [trial] court’s decision . . . into serious question”).

Instead, the trial’s fundamental fairness turns on the case’s

circumstances.

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     Third, there’s no structural error in discharge of counsel

cases because a bright-line rule – discharge of indigent

parents’ counsel at any stage constitutes structural error

requiring vacatur – is inflexible.    It ignores when, how long,

and the reason parents’ counsel were discharged.      And it pays no

attention to whether the proceedings were fundamentally fair.

     There is still another problem with a structural error

approach to cases involving discharged counsel.      Automatic

reversal and retrial cause friction with the key statutory time

frame parents must meet to provide a safe family home.      See HRS

§ 587A-33(a).   Parents have two years from a child’s entry into

foster custody to become willing and able to provide a safe

family home.    This two-year deadline gives parents a reasonable

time to provide a safe family home.    And it advances the child’s

interests in a prompt and permanent resolution of their custody

status.   RGB, 123 Hawai‘i at 26, 229 P.3d at 1091.

     Throughout a CPA case, family courts must protect a

parent’s fundamental right to parent their child.      But if the

outcome of any break in counsel is vacatur and remand, then the

time it takes to permanently place a child drags on.      A parent’s

choice not to appear in court or maintain contact with counsel

should not undermine a child’s interests in permanency.      See

RGB, 123 Hawai‘i at 26, 229 P.3d at 1091 (finding that “it is in

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the child’s best interest and overall well being to limit the

potential for years of litigation and instability”).

        Parents sometimes fail to show up in court.           When a parent

inexcusably fails to appear in court, family courts often

invoke Hawai‘i Family Court Rules (HFCR) Rule 55(b). 7             The

parties neither question nor discuss this apparent first circuit

norm. 8    We stress that rule 55(b) should be used sparingly.              And

because parents have a fundamental right to parent their

children, family courts should freely find good cause to set

aside a default when a parent resurfaces and re-engages in the

case. 9

        Until then, however, it is a reasonable exercise of

discretion for the family court to discharge counsel.               After

7       HFCR Rule 55(b) reads:

              In a contested or uncontested action, where it appears from
              the record and by testimony (or by affidavit or declaration
              in an uncontested matrimonial action) that the adverse
              party has been duly served with the complaint or
              dispositive motion, and the adverse party has failed to
              appear or otherwise defend as provided by these rules, the
              court may grant an entry of default and proceed with a
              proof hearing, when a hearing is required, and enter a
              default judgment.

8     JH’s Guardian Ad Litem represented that “[t]he common procedure when a
parent fails to appear without good cause is for them to be defaulted, for
their counsel to be discharged if parents do not make contact within a
certain period of time, and for counsel to be re-appointed if parents do
reappear in the case, although the court’s ruling often depends on the
circumstances of the parents’ non-appearance.”

9     In some cases, a court cannot freely set aside a parent’s default
without undermining a child’s best interests and the CPA. For instance, if a
parental rights case nears its end, then a court may use its discretion -
after it provides a parent a fair process - to refuse a parent’s request to
set aside a default.

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all, what’s an attorney to do?    If a parent chooses not to

appear in court or decides not to communicate with counsel, then

counsel is hard-pressed to understand the parent’s present

objectives, and is challenged to provide sound, ethical

representation.   See State v. Wilson, 144 Hawai‘i 454, 463, 445

P.3d 35, 44 (2019) (explaining that “counsel has a duty to

consult with the defendant before making strategic decisions

when it is feasible and appropriate to do so”); Hawai‘i Rules of

Professional Conduct (HRPC) Rule 1.2 (providing “a lawyer shall

abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of

representation, and . . . shall consult with the client as to

the means by which the objectives are to be pursued”).

     An advisement or colloquy may help.     We believe it is

useful for family courts to advise parents at the beginning of

Child Protective Act proceedings about the risks and

consequences of their failure to appear and the importance of

maintaining meaningful communication with counsel.      See State v.

Kaulia, 128 Hawai‘i 479, 493, 291 P.3d 377, 391 (2013) (noting

“the best way to ensure a defendant’s constitutional rights are

protected is for the defendant to be informed of the nature of

the right and the consequences of waiving that right”).

                                 III.

     If there is no structural error after a family court

discharges counsel in CPA proceedings, then how does an

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appellate court determine whether the case satisfied due

process?

     The court assesses the proceedings to see if they were

fundamentally fair.

     This inquiry examines whether a parent received a

fundamentally fair process under the circumstances of the case.

We hold that a family court’s discharge of counsel during

proceedings that substantially affect parental rights only

violates a parent’s right to counsel if that discharge deprives

the parent of a fundamentally fair process.

     Due process and fundamental fairness intertwine.      To

satisfy article I, section 5, a judicial proceeding has to be

fundamentally fair.   See RGB, 123 Hawai‘i at 25, 229 P.3d at 1090

(explaining that with ineffective assistance of counsel claims

in CPA proceedings, courts should determine “whether it appears

that the parents received a fundamentally fair trial whose facts

demonstrate an accurate determination.”); State v. Uchima, 147

Hawai‘i 64, 76 n.14, 464 P.3d 852, 864 n.14 (2020) (explaining

that article I, section 5 requires “standards necessary to

ensure that judicial proceedings are fundamentally fair”)

(cleaned up)); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty.,

N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981) (finding that due process

“expresses the requirement of ‘fundamental fairness’”).

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       Parents must receive “a fair procedure” before they lose

their parental rights.    In re Doe, 99 Hawai‘i at 533, 57 P.3d at

458.    The due process floor entails “notice and an opportunity

to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”

Id.    A fair procedure, though, is more than just notice and an

opportunity to be heard.

       Due process is versatile.   Context shapes the process that

is due.    See Mauna Kea Anaina Hou v. Bd. of Land & Nat. Res.,

136 Hawai‘i 376, 389, 363 P.3d 224, 237 (2015) (holding the due

process is “flexible and depend[s] on many factors”); Sandy

Beach Def. Fund v. City Council of City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 70

Haw. 361, 378, 773 P.2d 250, 261 (1989) (holding that “due

process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as

the particular situation demands” (cleaned up)).      Due process’s

versatility means that the discharge of counsel in CPA

proceedings “must be viewed in the broader context of . . . the

family court proceeding” as a whole.     See RGB, 123 Hawai‘i at 27,

229 P.3d at 1092.

       There is no violation of a parent’s due process right to

counsel when a family court discharges and later reappoints

counsel, and the case, viewed in its entire context, establishes

that the parent received a fundamentally fair trial and the

family court accurately determined that parental rights should

terminate.     See id. at 25, 229 P.3d at 1090.

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                                 IV.

     Here, Parents received a fair procedure.     They were

appointed counsel at the onset of the CPA proceedings and had a

meaningful opportunity to participate in their case with the aid

of counsel.

     Parents benefitted from the assistance of court-appointed

counsel.   Once the proceedings were underway, counsel

represented them for 22 of 27 months.     The court discharged

Parents’ attorneys and defaulted Parents only after they

inexcusably failed to appear at a court hearing.      But when they

did appear in court, so did counsel.

     Parents’ ability to present their case was not materially

impacted by the five-month gap in legal representation.       No

hearings happened after the court discharged counsel.      And when

Parents reappeared on January 21, 2020 at the periodic review

hearing, counsel appeared beside them.     From then on, counsel

represented Parents until the close of the trial on April 26,

2021, a trial that lasted three days and spanned three months.

     On the final day of trial, before the family court

terminated Mother and Father’s parental rights, it confirmed

compliance with the key Child Protective Act criterion: parents

received the assistance of a service plan and “a reasonable

period of time” to provide their child a safe family home.         See

HRS § 587A-33(a)(2).

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     The family court ruled that DHS proved by clear and

convincing evidence that parental rights should terminate.       See

HRS § 587A-33(a)(1), (2).    The record shows that substantial

evidence supports the family court’s HRS § 587A-33(a)

termination of parental rights findings.

     Due process was satisfied.     Parents received a fair

procedure before the family court terminated their parental

rights.    See In re Doe, 99 Hawai‘i at 533, 57 P.3d at 458.

                                  V.

     We reverse the ICA’s judgment on appeal filed on March 2,

2022.     The Family Court’s April 28, 2021 Order Terminating

Parental Rights is affirmed.

Kelly M. Kersten                       /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
(Abigail S. Dunn Apana, Julio
                                       /s/ Paula A. Nakayama
Cesar Herrera, Patrick A.
Pascual, Regina Anne M. Shimada        /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
on the briefs)
                                       /s/ Todd W. Eddins
for petitioner Department of
Human Services

Emily E.M. Hills
for Guardian Ad Litem

Clint K. Hamada and Herbert Y.
Hamada
for Father

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