Court Opinion

ID: 9716539
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:43:19.012129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:46.711793
License: Public Domain

HARRELL, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent from the reasoning and conclusion reached in the Majority Opinion, namely, that Montgomery County Code § 32-71 (the “Fortunetelling Ordinance”), which prohibits generally persons from demanding or accepting any remuneration or gratuity for forecasting or foretelling, or pretending to forecast or foretell, the future by cards, palm reading, or any other scheme, practice, or device, represents an unconstitutional restriction upon the Appellant’s, Nick Nefedro’s, right to freedom of speech in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Majority Opinion observes that
the County repeatedly asserts ... that fortunetelling is “inherently fraudulent” and, as a result, should not receive any First Amendment protection. Indeed, the First Amendment does not protect fraudulent statements. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600, 612, 123 S.Ct. 1829, 1836, 155 L.Ed.2d 793, 804 (2003) (“[T]he First Amendment does not shield fraud.”). We are not, however, persuaded that all fortunetelling is fraudulent. While we recognize that some fortunetellers may make *610fraudulent statements, just as some lawyers or journalists may, we see nothing in the record to suggest that fortunetelling always involves fraudulent statements. Indeed, fortunetellers, like magicians or horoscope writers, are able to provide entertainment to their customers or some benefit that does not deceive those who receive their speech.
Maj. Op. at 599, 996 A.2d at 858. The Majority Opinion, in the face of a tide of judicial decisions from other jurisdictions expressing the view that the business of commercial fortunetelling is “inherently fraudulent” and, as such, is not entitled to protection against government restriction, offers a handful of contrary opinions (Maj. op. at 599-600, 996 A.2d at 858-59), endeavors to distinguish the greater body of cases on point (Maj. op. at 599-602, 996 A.2d at 858-60), and hazards an inapt analogy to lawyers and journalists (Maj. op. at 599-600, 996 A.2d at 858-59), the latter of which fails to recognize that, although some lawyers or journalists may make fraudulent statements, the practice of such professions without fraud is attainable. I would affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County and hold that Montgomery County’s election to protect its citizens (and their money and other assets) from for-profit fortunetellers, palmists, card readers, and the like, does not violate Appellant’s constitutional right to free speech.
Long-standing Supreme Court precedent establishes that the guarantees of the First Amendment do not provide insulation from government restriction of speech that is fraudulent. See Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 612, 123 S.Ct. 1829, 1836, 155 L.Ed.2d 793, 804 (2003) (“[T]he First Amendment does not shield fraud.”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1830, 48 L.Ed.2d 346, 364 (1976) (“Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected [by the First Amendment] for its own sake.”); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3007, 41 L.Ed.2d 789, 805 (1974) (“[T]he intentional lie ... belong[s] to that category of utterances which ‘are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be *611derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.’ ” (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031, 1035 (1942))). See also United States Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 255 (4th Cir.2009) (“Punishing fraud, whether it be common law fraud or securities fraud, simply does not violate the First Amendment.”); Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 233 F.3d 981, 992 (7th Cir.2000) (“Laws directly punishing fraudulent speech survive constitutional scrutiny even where applied to pure, fully protected speech.”).
Many jurisdictions deem the business of commercial fortunetelling to be an inherently fraudulent activity. Ballard v. Walker, 772 F.Supp. 1335, 1341 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (“The fortune telling statute, in particular, was designed to protect against ‘a prevailing species of fraud whereby its practitioners, professing occult powers of prognostication, annually bilk a gullible public of many millions of dollars.’ ” (quoting N.Y. Penal Law § 165.35 (McKinney 1988) (practice commentary at p. 254))); Mitchell v. City of Birmingham, 222 Ala. 389, 133 So. 13, 14 (1931) (“So associated with cheats, frauds, imposition upon the credulous and superstition is [the business of fortunetelling] that its absolute prohibition is generally declared to be within the police power of the state, and municipalities to which such power is delegated.”); Bridewell v. City of Bessemer, 35 Ala.App. 337, 46 So.2d 568, 570-71 (1950) (“[T]he business of fortune telling is denominated as a useless calling, and subject to police regulation. This being so, the City ... had the right to so combine its police power and taxing power as to levy a license tax which would discourage, and to all practical purposes prohibit, persons from engaging in the hocus pocus of fortune telling within the limits of its police jurisdiction.”); White v. Adams, 233 Ark. 241, 343 S.W.2d 793, 794 (1961) (“The lawmakers are entitled to believe that no human being has the power of foretelling future events and that therefore fortune telling may be a fraudulent means of preying upon the ignorant, the superstitious, and the gullible. Consequently it has been uniformly held that the state, in the exercise of its *612police power, may constitutionally prohibit fortune telling altogether.”); In re Bartha, 63 Cal.App.3d 584, 134 Cal.Rptr. 39, 43 (1976) (“It is within the police power of the municipality and province of the legislative body to determine that the business of fortunetelling is inherently deceptive and that its regulation or prohibition is required in order to protect the gullible, superstitious, and unwary.”); Fay v. Lambourne, 124 A.D. 245, 108 N.Y.S. 874, 876 (N.Y.App.Div.1908) (“The pretense of occult powers and the ability to answer confidential questions from spiritual aid is as bad as fortune telling and a species of it and is a fraud upon the public.”); Davis v. State of Ohio, 118 Ohio St. 25, 160 N.E. 473, 475 (1928) (“[FJortunetelling and similar crafts are fraudulent practices, and therefore not within the protection afforded to a lawful business.”).
Recognizing the foregoing analyses, Judge Legg of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, in an unpublished memorandum opinion in Mitchell v. Harford County, No. L-01-3998 (D.Md. Sept. 5, 2002), upheld, on summary judgment, the constitutionality of anti-fortunetelling statutes passed by the City of Aberdeen and Harford County that are nearly identical to § 32-7 of the Montgomery County Code.2 In Mitchell, the plaintiff, claiming that she was “a psychic capable of divining the future through the use of Tarot readings, palm readings, and dream analysis,” sought to open a fortunetelling business in Aberdeen. Slip op. at 2. Both the City and the County, however, had ordinances prohibiting persons from engaging in fortunetelling for consideration. Id. at 1-2. Specifically, the City’s statute, which was adopted in 1979, read:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the Incorporated Town of Aberdeen to ask, demand, charge or accept any *613remuneration, gratuity or anything of value for forecasting, foretelling or pretending to forecast or foretell the future of another by cards, palm reading or any other scheme, practice or device.
Id. at 1. Similarly, the Harford County Code provided:
Any person in the county who shall ask, demand, charge or accept any remuneration, gratuity or anything of value for forecasting or foretelling or for pretending to forecast or foretell the future of another, by cards, palmreading or any other scheme, practice of [sic] device, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ...
Id. at 1-2. The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the respective statutes, arguing, inter alia, that they “violate[d] the guarantees of free speech contained in the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.” Id. at 2.
In rejecting the plaintiffs contentions and granting summary judgment in favor of the governmental defendants, Judge Legg stated:
As a general rule, the government may not abridge the public’s right to free speech. The Supreme Court has held, however, that “[u]ntruthful speech, commercial or otherwise” is not protected. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen’s [Citizens ] Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 [96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 846] (1976). In keeping with this principle, courts have deferred to the determinations of municipalities and legislatures that “the business of fortunetelling is inherently deceptive....” In re Bartha, 63 Cal.App.3d 584, 591 [134 Cal.Rptr. 39] (1976). This Court will defer to the legislative finding of the City and Harford County that fortunetelling is inherently deceptive and, therefore, is unprotected speech. Accordingly, Mitchell’s First Amendment claim must fail.
Id. at 3. The District Court observed further that, “[e]ven if fortunetelling were protected speech, the statutes would withstand constitutional scrutiny,” opining:
*614The statutes do not target the speech itself, but instead the noncommunicative act of selling the speech. Thus, United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 [88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672] (1968), provides the applicable legal test for determining the constitutionality of the statutes.[3]
O’Brien establishes a four part test for evaluating the constitutionality of regulations that target noncommunicative acts, but have the incidental effect of suppressing speech. Id. at 377 [88 S.Ct. 1673]. Specifically a statute must:
(i) be within the constitutional power of the government;
(ii) be unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
(iii) further an important or substantial government interest; and
(iv) restrict speech no greater than is necessary to achieve the government interest at stake.

Id.

The statutes clearly satisfy the first three requirements. First, it is within the constitutional power of the government to regulate fortunetelling. Second, the purpose of the statutes is to prevent fraud, not to suppress fortunetelling altogether. Preventing fraud is an important government interest. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306 [60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213] (1940). Thus, the crucial question is whether the statutes restrict more speech than is necessary to prevent fraud.
Anti-fortunetelling statutes are designed to prevent “ ‘a prevailing species of fraud whereby its practitioners, professing occult powers of prognostication, annually bilk a gullible public of many millions of dollars! ” Ballard v. *615Walker, 772 F.Supp. 1335, 1341 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (quoting N.Y. Penal Law §§ 165.35 (McKinney 1988) (practice commentary at p. 254)). Courts have held that it is within the police power of the state to enact such regulations, and court should defer to legislative determinations that the “regulation or prohibition [of fortune-telling] is required in order to protect the gullible, superstitious, and unwary.” In re Bartha, 63 Cal.App.3d at 591 [134 Cal.Rptr. 39].
[The plaintiff] argues that the statutes could be amended to prohibit fraudulent fortunetelling for consideration, as opposed to prohibiting all fortunetelling for consideration. Presumably such a statute would make it illegal for any fortuneteller to represent an ability to see the future if they did not genuinely believe that they did, indeed, possess such an ability. [The plaintiff] has submitted an affidavit attesting to the sincerity of her belief in her ability to divine the future.
The sincerity of [the plaintiffs] beliefs is immaterial. Neither she nor anyone else can foretell the future. The law does not permit the sale of a bogus cancer remedy, for example, simply because the seller wholeheartedly believes in the efficacy of the product. The sincerity of the seller’s belief does not turn a worthless product or service into a valuable one. The state is empowered to protect the public, especially the most gullible and unsophisticated members of the public, by banning the sale of valueless products and services.
It must be remembered that the statutes do not ban fortunetellers from telling fortunes. The practitioner may claim to have occult powers so long as she does not charge for her services. Moreover, the fortuneteller may charge a fee so long as she does not claim to have occult powers she lacks. Fortunetelling as entertainment is entirely legal and not banned by the statutes. Accordingly, the statutes do not violate the First Amendment.
Id. at 3-5.
Although the District Court’s decision in Mitchell is not binding upon this Court for at least a couple of reasons, it is, *616in my view, sufficiently persuasive as to move me to conclude that affirmance of the judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County is the correct outcome in the present case. The Fortunetelling Ordinance contained in the Montgomery County Code is, in essence, identical to the provisions upheld against First Amendment challenge by the District Court in its decision in Mitchell. By limiting its application to what many jurisdictions have concluded to be the inherently fraudulent business of fortunetelling for remuneration, rather than preventing all fortunetelling, the ordinance restricts no more speech than is necessary to further the County’s expressed and significant interest in preventing fraud from being perpetrated upon its citizens. The Majority opinion, deeming itself more insightful about the nature of commercial fortunetelling than the largely factual assessment of the Montgomery County government, substitutes its judgment for that of the legislative body. I, on the other hand, would hold that § 32-7 of the Montgomery County Code does not restrict impermissibly Appellant’s First Amendment rights.

. Montgomery County Code, § 32-7, entitled ‘'Fortunetelling,” provides:
Every person who shall demand or accept any remuneration or gratuity for forecasting or foretelling or for pretending to forecast or foretell the future by cards, palm reading or any other scheme, practice or device shall be subject to punishment for a class B violation as set forth in section 1-19 of chapter 1 of the County Code; and in any warrant for a violation of the above provisions, it shall be sufficient to allege that the defendant forecast or foretold or pretended to forecast or foretell the future by a certain scheme, practice or device without setting forth the particular scheme, practice or device employed; provided, that this section shall not apply to any benefit performance or part thereof conducted pursuant to section 30-4 of this Code.
Montgomery County Code, § 32-7 (2004).

. Lest anyone presume hypocrisy (in light of Maryland Rule 1-104(b) regarding the prohibition of general citation of unreported opinions) on my part for relying here on an unreported opinion of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, I hasten to note that Rule 1-104(b) applies solely to the citation of unreported opinions of the Court of Appeals and Court of Special Appeals and then only to parties offering same to either Maryland appellate courts.

. In a footnote, Judge Legg observed that "[t]he statutes ban fortunetelling for consideration, not fortunetelling itself, nor the advertising of fortunetelling services. The speech at issue here is, therefore, 'speech for profit,’ as opposed to 'commercial speech.' " Id. at 4 n. 3 (citing Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 3036, 106 L.Ed.2d 388, 405 (1989)) ("While these examples consist of speech for a profit, they do not consist of speech that proposes a commercial transaction, which is what defines commercial speech....”).