Court Opinion

ID: 9494146
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:30:40.167664+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:14.851937
License: Public Domain

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in parts I, II, III, and V of the court’s opinion.
I respectfully dissent from part IV of the court’s opinion as I believe that it improperly characterizes Walke’s symptoms of fatigue, heart palpitations, and dizziness brought on by work-related stress as a mental illness. The court relies on Brewer v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co., 921 F.2d 150 (8th Cir.1990), Stauch v. Unisys Corp., 24 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir.1994), and Lynd v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., 94 F.3d 979 (5th Cir.1996), but they all involve symptoms far different from Walke’s. The symptoms in those cases fall within the ordinary meaning of mental or nervous disorders. As we noted in Brewer, the ordinary meaning of a disease is what a lay person concludes from knowing the symptoms: “[Ijllnesses whose primary symptoms are depression, mood swings and unusual behavior are commonly characterized as mental illnesses.... ” 921 F.2d at 154. In contrast, Walke’s illness has primary symptoms that are commonly characterized as physical illness.
The district court’s order stated that there was no evidence that Walke’s disability related to a nervous or mental condition. Rather, the evidence indicated tachycardia, defined as a rapid beating of the heart. While tachycardia may be exacerbated or induced by stress, there was no evidence showing it to be a mental condition. The medications prescribed for Walke’s condition are Atenolol, a medication for hypertension, and Calan, a medication for angina, arrhythmia, and essential hypertension.
I agree with the findings and conclusions of the district court on this issue, and I bebeve that the conclusion reached in part IV of the court’s opinion today cannot be sustained on the record before us.