Court Opinion

ID: 9390710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 14:05:04.132259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:36.161761
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 21, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                          TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2022-CA-0216-MR

FAITH HORBACH                                                       APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.               HONORABLE BRIAN C. EDWARDS, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 20-CI-005608

BRIANNA M. FORSYTHE
(N/K/A BRIANNA MICHELLE LYDANNE)
AND HANSON A. LYDANNE                                                APPELLEES

                               OPINION
                 AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING IN PART,
                          AND REMANDING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, DIXON, AND JONES, JUDGES.

JONES, JUDGE: Faith Horbach appeals the Jefferson Circuit Court’s summary

dismissal of strict liability and common law negligence claims she asserted against

the above-captioned appellees stemming from a dog bite incident. For the reasons

discussed below, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further

proceedings.
                          I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                On October 21, 2019, Faith Horbach accepted a request through an

internet application named “Wag!” to walk the appellees’ two dogs, one of which

was a terrier. Horbach arrived at the appellees’ residence in Jefferson County and

went into the basement to get the dogs ready. She had walked the terrier on a prior

occasion without incident. This time, however, as Horbach was getting the terrier

ready for the walk, it bit her on her right hand without warning. Due to her

resulting injury, Horbach received treatment on her hand later that day at Baptist

Health Urgent Center. Her wound also required antibiotics and, eventually,

outpatient surgery in December 2019.

                Horbach thereafter filed suit against the appellees in Jefferson Circuit

Court. In her complaint, she alleged the appellees were liable for her damages

stemming from the dog bite incident based on two legal theories: (1) strict

liability; and (2) negligence.1 Following a period of discovery, the appellees

moved for summary judgment on grounds that, when their terrier injured Horbach,

Horbach qualified as the terrier’s “statutory owner” pursuant to KRS2

1
  Horbach’s complaint asserted the appellees were liable for “premises liability” negligence,
“failure to warn of their dog’s violent propensities” negligence, and “gross” negligence.
2
    Kentucky Revised Statute.

                                               -2-
258.095(5)(b)2.3 by virtue of her contracted-for position as their terrier’s

dogwalker. As a result, pursuant to KRS 258.235(4)4 and their understanding of

this Court’s decision in Jordan v. Lusby, 81 S.W.3d 523 (Ky. App. 2002), the

appellees argued Horbach was consequently prohibited from suing them for any

injuries their terrier may have inflicted upon her.

               In her response, Horbach disagreed with the appellees’ legal analysis.

She also asserted that more time for discovery was required to ascertain whether

the appellees knew or should have known of the terrier’s violent propensities

before the incident. Citing evidence and depositions that discovery had yielded to

that point in the litigation, she argued in relevant part:

               Vet records from Lyndon Animal Clinic show that the
               dog that attacked Faith had suffered from a skin
               condition that the owners did not disclose to Faith for
               which it was prescribed medication. On the day after the
               attack, the owners returned the dog to Lyndon Animal
               Clinic AND reported an “acute mass” on the dog’s right
               ear. Mr. Lydanne denied taking the dog to the vet after
               the attack or knowing of any such problem. On
               September 27, 2019, a few weeks before the bite, the
               dog’s owners took [the terrier] to Lyndon Animal Clinic
               for a “derm exam.” On the day of the attack, the dog was
               prescribed apoquel tablets for the ongoing skin condition.
               In April 2019, the owners sought treatment with the vet
               because the dog “has been licking at the front left paw
3
  KRS 258.095 provides in relevant part: “As used in KRS 258.095 to 258.500, unless the
context requires otherwise: . . . (5) “Owner,” when applied to the proprietorship of a dog,
includes: . . . (b) Every person who: . . . 2. Has the dog in his or her care[.]”
4
 KRS 258.235(4) provides: “Any owner whose dog is found to have caused damage to a
person, livestock, or other property shall be responsible for that damage.”

                                               -3-
             and occasionally limping on the back right leg.” At that
             time, the dog was still prescribed 3.6 mg of apoquel for
             atopy. The Defendant owners have admitted that [the
             terrier] has had multiple prior medical problems,
             including skin allergies and two prior hernias. The
             owners never reported any of these health conditions to
             Faith. These skin problems could have very well caused
             the dog to react in the way it did. The Defendants have
             acknowledged that they have no evidence that Faith did
             anything wrong in connection with this incident.

             ...

             Although the parties have exchanged written discovery
             and submitted to depositions, Faith will need to review
             Brian[n]a Lydanne’s social media accounts, which are set
             to private, to review the posts about her dogs and to
             depose other witnesses named in discovery answers who
             have had interactions with the dog. The Defendant
             owners also have stated that [the terrier] has had his nails
             done and has been to a doggy daycare so review of those
             records may provide relevant information. Further, both
             counsels have attempted to obtain records from Wag[!]
             without success.

             As previously noted, the circuit court granted the appellees’ motion.

This appeal followed. The circuit court’s reasoning behind its summary

disposition of Horbach’s claims, as well as other relevant facts, will be discussed in

the context of our analysis below.

                              II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

             All of Horbach’s allegations of error in this appeal emanate from the

summary dismissal of her claims. In weighing her allegations of error:

                                         -4-
             “The standard of review on appeal of a summary
             judgment is whether the circuit judge correctly found that
             there were no issues as to any material fact and that the
             moving party was entitled to a judgment as a matter of
             law.” Pearson ex rel. Trent v. Nat’l Feeding Systems,
             Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46, 49 (Ky. 2002). Summary judgment
             is only proper when “it would be impossible for the
             respondent to produce any evidence at the trial
             warranting a judgment in his favor.” Steelvest, Inc., v.
             Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky.
             1991). In Steelvest, the word “‘impossible’ is used in a
             practical sense, not in an absolute sense.” Perkins v.
             Hausladen, 828 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Ky. 1992). In ruling
             on a motion for summary judgment, the court is required
             to construe the record “in a light most favorable to the
             party opposing the motion . . . and all doubts are to be
             resolved in his favor.” Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480. A
             party opposing a summary judgment motion cannot rely
             on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the
             movant’s denial of a disputed fact, but must present
             affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly
             supported motion for summary judgment. Id. at 481.

Ryan v. Fast Lane, Inc., 360 S.W.3d 787, 789-90 (Ky. App. 2012). “Appellate

review of a summary judgment involves only legal questions and a determination

of whether a disputed material issue of fact exists. So, we operate under a de novo

standard of review[.]” Phelps v. Bluegrass Hospitality Mgmt., LLC, 630 S.W.3d

623, 627 (Ky. 2021) (citations omitted).

                                     III. ANALYSIS

             Horbach argues the circuit court erred in summarily dismissing her

strict liability and negligence claims based on the appellees’ proffered legal theory.

Alternatively, she argues more time for discovery was required, and the circuit

                                           -5-
court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment prematurely. Before

discussing Horbach’s arguments in any greater depth, it is necessary to begin our

analysis with a review of why the circuit court granted the appellees’ motion. In

the relevant part of its order to that effect, the circuit court began by framing the

parties’ respective arguments:

             Defendants now seek Summary Judgment, arguing that
             Plaintiff was the statutory owner of [the terrier] at the
             time of the incident, and that assumption of the risk is a
             complete defense to the claims asserted. Plaintiff argues
             that she was not the statutory owner of [the terrier] at the
             time of the incident, assumption of the risk is not a
             complete defense in this situation, and summary
             judgment in this case is premature.

Thereafter, the circuit court explained:

                    Two statutes primarily address the ownership issue
             before the Court. KRS 258.235(4) states that “Any
             owner whose dog is found to have caused damage to a
             person . . . shall be responsible for that damage.”
             Providing clarification on the meaning of ‘owner,’ KRS
             258.095(5)(b)(2) states that “Owner, when applied to the
             proprietorship of a dog, includes: (b) Every person who:
             (2) Has the dog in his or her care.” Case law provides
             further guidance on the meaning of ‘owner’ in different
             contexts.

                   For example, one such case involves a dog
             groomer who was bitten by a dog after she had finished
             grooming it and was carrying it out of the room. Jordan
             v. Lusby, 81 S.W.3d 523 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002). The
             groomer (Jordan) brought suit against Lusby, and
             ultimately the circuit court granted summary judgment in
             favor of Lusby. Id. Jordan appealed, and the Kentucky
             Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit

                                           -6-
court, holding that a dog groomer is considered an
‘owner’ under the statutory definition. Id. The rationale
as to this meaning of ‘owner’ provided was that KRS
258.095 “was designed to expand liability to those parties
who keep dogs such as kennel owners, veterinarians, and
other persons who keep dogs owned by others in their
care.” Id. at 524. Ultimately, owner “does not simply
mean a person with a property interest in the dog, for
reasons of public policy.” Id. Further, the statute
“operates to insulate the legal owner from liability
against another ‘owner’ of the dog.” Id. The Court also
did not see a need to create “a distinction between the
legal owner or a second party owner[.]” Id.

        Other case law supports this interpretation of
owner. Regarding statutory interpretation, “All statutes
of this state shall be liberally construed with a view to
promote their objects and carry out the intent of the
legislature[.]” Benningfield ex rel. Benningfield v.
Zinsmeister, 367 S.W.3d 561, 566 (Ky. 2012). Here,
“because the statute [KRS 258.095(5)] is intended to
expand the class of potentially liable persons, this Court
must read the statute consistently with that purpose.” Id.
In its holding, the Court ultimately found that “Aside
from the actual owner of the dog, the statutory definition
of owner mostly includes persons into whose care the
dog may be committed, either directly or indirectly[.]”
Id. at 569. Pertinent to the current case, “the statute also
allows for liability when the dog is temporarily in a
person’s care[.]” Id.

       Based upon case law, at the time of the biting
incident, Plaintiff was the ‘owner’ of the [terrier] under
the statutory definition found in KRS 258.095(5)(b)(2).
Plaintiff had accepted Defendants’ request through
“Wag!” that she would walk [the terrier], and while she
was getting [the terrier] ready for his walk, he was
ultimately in her care. This is similar to the dog groomer
in Jordan, wherein owner goes beyond an individual who
has a property interest in the dog. Plaintiff was a second

                            -7-
party owner while [the terrier] was in her care, and thus
was a statutory owner at the time of the incident.
Additionally, per statutory interpretation rules, the statute
is intended to extend liability, even when a dog is only
temporarily under someone’s care. Here, [the terrier]
was temporarily under Plaintiff’s care (at least for the
time it would take to get him ready, and to walk him),
therefore Plaintiff’s situation falls under the statute and
she was the ‘owner.’ Therefore, summary judgment is
appropriate as to the question of ownership.

       Plaintiff also argues that assumption of risk is not a
complete defense to this situation. In her argument,
Plaintiff cites to case law involving a discussion of what
to do regarding assumption of risk in Kentucky. Parker
v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586, 592 (Ky. [ ] 1967).
Ultimately, the Court stated that “we are going to abolish
it.” Id. However, there is case law addressing the
specific circumstances involved here that is more
relevant. In the aforementioned Jordan case, the Court
held that “This Court is persuaded . . . that when Jordan
accepted the dog for grooming, she assumed the risk of
being bitten by the dog.” Jordan, [81 S.W.3d] at 524.
Further, “The profession of dog grooming naturally
entails a risk of being bitten by a client’s dog, as do other
professions involving the care of animals[.]” Id. at 525.
Overall, “Common sense dictates that a person who
grooms dogs must be deemed to be aware of the risks
involved in dealing with any dog.” Id. In regard to the
issue of assumption of risk and whether it is a complete
defense, in Jordan, the Court also held that someone
dealing with dogs in such situations “cannot be deemed
to have unreasonably encountered a risk that is inherent
in his or her job. Therefore, this type of assumption of
the risk is not subsumed by comparative fault and, hence
is a complete defense.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

      Here, Plaintiff’s situation is analogous to that of a
dog groomer, as a dog walker is a profession that
involves the care of animals. In walking dogs, there is an

                             -8-
             inherent risk of being bitten by a dog. As stated above,
             using common sense, Plaintiff is deemed to be aware that
             a risk involved in being around and dealing with dogs is
             that a person may be bitten. Overall, assumption of the
             risk applies here, and Plaintiff did assume the risk when
             she accepted the “Wag!” request to take [the terrier] for a
             walk. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate as to
             the question of assumption of the risk.

                    Another argument by Plaintiff is that summary
             judgment is premature. In Kentucky, summary judgment
             “is proper only after the party opposing the motion has
             been given ample opportunity to complete discovery and
             then fails to offer controverting evidence.” Suter v.
             Mazyck, 226 S.W.3d 837, 841 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007). In
             essence, “It is not necessary to show that the respondent
             has actually completed discovery, but only that
             respondent has had an opportunity to do so.” Hartford
             Ins. Group v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 579
             S.W.2d 628, 630 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). Whether a party
             has had enough time and opportunity “must be
             determined within the context of the individual case”
             with more complex cases requiring more time. Suter,
             [226 S.W.3d] at 842. However, “In the interest of
             judicial efficiency, there is, of course, a limitation on the
             time the parties have to complete discovery[.]” Id. at
             844. For example, in the Jordan case, summary
             judgment was found to be appropriate after a nine (9)
             month discovery period. Jordan, [81 S.W.3d] at 524.

                     Here, the Complaint was filed on September 30,
             2020. Defendants filed their Motion for Summary
             Judgment on August 27, 2021. Per case law, this time
             frame has provided counsel ample opportunity to conduct
             discovery. In sum, summary judgment is not premature
             at this time.

             We now return to Horbach’s appellate arguments, the first of which is

that the circuit court erred in summarily dismissing her strict liability and

                                          -9-
negligence claims based on the appellees’ proffered legal theory. In part, we

agree. Horbach asserted two theories of recovery: (1) strict liability and (2)

negligence. The circuit court’s analysis certainly applies to Horbach’s strict

liability claim; we adopt it in that respect; and we affirm to that extent. However,

none of the circuit court’s analysis applied to Horbach’s negligence claim. And

that is because the statutory interplay that factored prominently into the circuit

court’s analysis – i.e., the interplay between KRS 258.235(4) and KRS 258.095(5)

– is addressed to the concept of strict liability, not negligence. See Maupin v.

Tankersley, 540 S.W.3d 357, 360 (Ky. 2018) (explaining these two provisions,

taken together, mandate that “[a] dog owner is strictly liable for injuries caused

when his dog attacks a person”); see also id. at 359 (“Without KRS 258.235(4) or

its predecessor statutes, common law negligence would govern dog bite cases.”).

Strict liability is not negligence; and one who is not strictly liable is not necessarily

exempt from negligence – which is a point we have recognized at least twice

before in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Paige v. McCord, No. 2017-CA-

000188-MR, 2018 WL 6434518 (Ky. App. Dec. 7, 2018); Cruz v. Henderson, No.

2021-CA-0983-MR, 2022 WL 2898498 (Ky. App. Jul. 22, 2022) (addressing strict

liability claims and common law negligence claims separately and under different

legal standards in the context of dog bite liability).5

5
    We cite these unpublished cases for their illustrative value and not as authority, pursuant to

                                                 -10-
                Indeed, it would defy common sense to hold that KRS 258.095 – a

statute designed to “expand liability”6 for dog owners – could be interpreted as

negating liability for dog owners. Rather, the statute in question was simply

designed to convert part of the liability otherwise contemplated by the common

law into strict liability. See Benningfield ex rel. Benningfield v. Zinsmeister, 367

S.W.3d 561, 566 (Ky. 2012) (emphasis added) (explaining KRS 258.095 was

“clearly part of a scheme to displace or abrogate the common law rule on dog-bite

liability in part to expand liability, presumably to create incentives for various

actors to take steps to reduce the chances of dog bites”).

                As for the “part” of common law that was not abrogated, that much

can be inferred from Jordan. There, the only claim at issue was strict liability, and

apparently for good reason. At common law, a dog owner is not liable absent

knowledge of the dog’s vicious propensities, i.e., the “one free bite” rule. Dykes v.

Alexander, 411 S.W.2d 47 (Ky. 1967), superseded by statute as stated in Maupin

v. Tankersley, 540 S.W.3d 357 (Ky. 2018). In Jordan, we noted that no evidence

demonstrated that the offending dog’s primary owner – not the groomer, who was

statutorily deemed the dog’s secondary owner – had any knowledge of the dog’s

vicious propensities:

Kentucky Rule of Appellate Procedure (RAP) 41(A).
6
    Jordan, 81 S.W.3d at 524.

                                          -11-
             Jordan does not cite any evidence in the record indicating
             that the dog had actually bitten anyone, nor does she cite
             any evidence in the record indicating that the owner had
             actual knowledge that the dog would bite, beyond a
             statement that the dog “did not like men.” No other
             evidence that the dog had bitten a woman, or in fact any
             other person, is part of the record before us.

Jordan, 81 S.W.3d at 524.

             Furthermore, the two cases from our sister states that we relied upon

in support of our ultimate holding in Jordan – i.e., that assumption of risk negated

the strict liability claim at issue – both indicated that “assumption of risk” would

not be a defense to a common law negligence action between a dog’s primary and

secondary owners. Specifically, in Jordan, 81 S.W.3d at 524, we cited Tschida v.

Berdusco, 462 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. App. 1990), overruled on other grounds in

Anderson v. Christopherson, 816 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. 2012), as support:

             [Minnesota’s] statute’s language defines “owner” to
             include “any person harboring or keeping a dog.” In that
             case, a veterinarian’s assistant sued the proprietary owner
             of the dog, but the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that
             the statute excluded the legal owner from liability to a
             second party owner (terms used by the Minnesota court.)
             We believe the Minnesota court’s reasoning is correct
             and adopt it here; the Kentucky statute, in defining
             “owner” as any person who accepts custody of a dog,
             operates to insulate the legal owner from liability against
             another “owner” of the dog. By becoming an “owner” of
             a dog under our statute one is responsible for injuries
             inflicted by the dog to persons or animals. The statute
             does not make a distinction between the legal owner or a
             second party owner; we see no reason to create one here.

                                         -12-
            However, with respect to a negligence action between a dog’s primary

and secondary owners, the Tschida court held:

                   We interpret the Minnesota dog owners’ liability
            statute to include as an owner a second party who harbors
            or keeps a dog after accepting the delivery of possession
            and control from the legal owner. Where there is no
            negligence by the legal owner, we further interpret the
            statute to exclude liability of the legal owner to the
            second party owner for damages from being attacked or
            injured by the dog. Therefore, we hold that appellants
            are not strictly liable under Minn.Stat. § 347.22 for
            respondent’s injuries resulting from their dog biting her
            while she was performing her job and the dog was in the
            keeping of the veterinarian and respondent, as his
            employee.

Tschida, 462 N.W.2d at 412-13 (emphasis added).

            That same conclusion – that a dog’s primary owner could be liable to

the dog’s secondary owner for common law negligence – was also echoed in

Nelson v. Hall, 211 Cal. Rptr. 668, 165 Cal.App.3d 709 (1985), which we cited in

Jordan, 81 S.W.3d at 525, for the following guidance:

            Lusby cites a California case, Nelson v. Hall, 165
            Cal.App.3d 709, 211 Cal.Rptr. 668 (1985), wherein a
            veterinarian’s assistant was deemed to have assumed the
            risk of being bitten by a dog during the course of the
            dog’s medical treatment. The California court put it
            simply, “[a] veterinary assistant cannot be deemed to
            have unreasonably encountered a risk that is inherent in
            his or her job. Therefore, this type of assumption of the
            risk is not subsumed by comparative fault and, hence is a
            complete defense.” Nelson at 672. We agree with the
            holding in the California case, and apply it to this case.

                                       -13-
             However, with respect to a negligence action between a dog’s primary

and secondary owners, the Nelson court qualified what it stated on page 672 of its

opinion:

             This does not mean dog owners could never be held
             liable for injuries to veterinarians or their assistants. We
             emphasize that the defense of assumption of the risk
             extends only to the danger which the injured person has
             knowingly assumed, i.e., the danger the dog will bite
             while being treated.

                    Moreover, if a dog owner purposefully or
                    negligently conceals a particular known
                    hazard from a veterinarian, he or she would
                    not be relieved of liability, for this would
                    expose the injured person to an unknown
                    risk. (See Lipson v. Superior Court, supra,
                    31 Cal.3d at p. 371, 182 Cal.Rptr. 629, 644
                    P.2d 822.) This question is not before us,
                    since defendants are not accused of
                    negligence or of knowledge of any particular
                    vicious propensities on Amos’ part.

Nelson, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 673, 165 Cal.App.3d at 715, n.4.

             From what is set forth above, the following point is obvious and

inescapable: one part of the common law that has not been abrogated, or

otherwise converted into strict liability through the interplay between KRS

258.235(4) and KRS 258.095(5), is the part that involves negligence actions

between a dog’s primary and secondary owners. In that context, the potential for

liability still exists, but under the auspices of the common law, not strict liability.

Stated differently, a dog’s secondary owner (i.e., Horbach) may sue the dog’s

                                          -14-
primary owners (i.e., the appellees) if the primary owners had knowledge of the

dog’s vicious propensities, failed to warn the secondary owner, and the secondary

owner is consequently injured. See Dykes, 411 S.W.2d 47.

             In sum, the circuit court incorrectly believed a principle that only

applied to Horbach’s strict liability claims also applied to her common law

negligence claims. Consequently, the circuit court dismissed Horbach’s

negligence claims on that basis; and in doing so, it erred.

             Perhaps in recognition of this fact, the appellees now devote the last

five pages of their twenty-three-page brief before this Court to the proposition that

the evidence of record, such as it is, does not support that they acted negligently in

failing to warn Horbach of any violent propensities their terrier may have had.

This is a stark contrast to the arguments they presented to the circuit court in their

seven-page motion for summary judgment and six-page reply memorandum where,

in the “argument” sections of each filing, their arguments fell under the headings

“When the Incident Occurred, Plaintiff, Faith Horbach, was the Statutory Owner of

the Dog at issue”; “Plaintiff’s Assumption of Risk is a Complete Defense to the

Claims Asserted”; “Plaintiff Voluntarily Accepted the Task of Caring for the Dog

at Issue”; and “No Portion of Jordan v. Lusby Has Been Overturned.” It further

conflicts with their stated reason, as set forth in their reply memorandum, for

opposing Horbach’s request for additional discovery: “[N]one of the remaining

                                         -15-
discovery mentioned will or can have any bearing on Plaintiff’s status as the dog’s

statutory owner. Therefore, Plaintiff has had sufficient opportunity for discovery

and this matter is ripe for summary judgment.”

             To be sure, this Court may affirm the circuit court’s judgment if the

record on appeal discloses any ground on which its judgment could properly have

been made. See Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Ashley, 722 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Ky. 1986)

(citation omitted). However, we lack authority to review issues not raised in or

decided by the trial court. Regional Jail Authority v. Tackett, 770 S.W.2d 225, 228

(Ky. 1989). Here, we find no indication from the substance of the appellees’

circuit court filings, or from the substance of the circuit court’s judgment set forth

above, that the issue of the appellees’ liability for common law negligence was

properly argued or addressed below. Furthermore, we find no indication that the

circuit court premised its decision to curtail further discovery on anything other

than its misapprehension that the interplay between KRS 258.235(4) and KRS

258.095(5) precluded common law negligence actions between a dog’s primary

and secondary owners. Accordingly, we will not alternatively affirm on this point,

but will instead vacate this aspect of the summary judgment and permit the circuit

court to fully consider this point on remand.

             As for Horbach’s remaining contention that she was provided

inadequate time for discovery, our disposition of this case largely moots that

                                         -16-
question. We note, however, that her stated goal of conducting further discovery

was to gather evidence of whether and to what degree the appellees had or should

have had knowledge of the terrier’s alleged vicious propensities – a point that is

squarely at issue under the applicable law relative to her common law negligence

claims, and a point that the circuit court roundly ignored in its analysis. On

remand, and now armed with the applicable law, we have no doubt that the circuit

court will revisit, and exercise its sound discretion to determine, whether

Horbach’s request for additional discovery should be granted.

                                   IV. CONCLUSION

             In light of the foregoing, we affirm the Jefferson Circuit Court’s

disposition of Horbach’s strict liability claims against the appellees; we vacate its

dismissal of her common law negligence claims against the appellees; and we

remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Opinion.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

T. Scott Abell                            Christopher D. Snead
Louisville, Kentucky                      Louisville, Kentucky

                                         -17-