Court Opinion

ID: 9406221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-30 14:05:55.665061+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:28.043131
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JUNE 23, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                           TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals

                              NO. 2021-CA-1349-MR

MELZENA LULABELL MOORE                                                APPELLANT

                  APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE GREGORY A. LAY, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 20-CR-00103

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                                OPINION
                        REVERSING AND REMANDING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, GOODWINE, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: Melzena Lulabell Moore (Moore) pleaded guilty to

manslaughter in the first degree while under an extreme emotional disturbance and

received a sentence of eighteen (18) years’ imprisonment. When she moved the

trial court for application of the domestic violence exemption to the violent

offender statute, her motion was denied. She now appeals that determination. We

reverse and remand to the trial court as detailed below.
                                      FACTS

             Moore was involved in a romantic relationship with the decedent,

Raymond Jackson (Jackson), beginning in 2017. They resided together and, at

first, their relationship appeared to be happy. Moore testified though, that as time

passed, Jackson became abusive, telling Moore that he “owned” her and beating

her when she did not do what he ordered her to do, which could include providing

sexual services to drug dealers in exchange for crack. When she refused his

commands, he beat her to unconsciousness, tied her to the bed, and allowed the

dealers to rape her.

             Moore, like many victims of domestic violence, would leave Jackson,

only to be convinced to return to him. On one occasion, she left and went to her

mother’s home, but Jackson appeared and promised things would be better if she

would “come home.” And she did go home, again.

             Moore testified that she had managed to leave in May of 2020 and

was at her mother’s home when Jackson asked her to again come home, which she

did. When she arrived, Jackson told her that the night before he had been partying

at his home with several people, including a woman named Brittany. He confessed

to Moore that he had raped Brittany and was planning to do so again that night. He

entreated her to help him kill Brittany so she could not report the rape. He

                                         -2-
instructed Moore that while he was raping Brittany, she should come in the room

and slit Brittany’s throat with a weapon he provided.

             Moore further testified that on this night, she entered the room as

instructed and saw Jackson raping Brittany. Brittany was in severe pain and, after

Moore realized she could not go through with harming Brittany, she sat down on

the bed next to her. Brittany begged Moore to take her place, and Moore agreed.

Jackson began raping Moore instead.

             Once Jackson fell asleep, Brittany and Moore left the home together

and a friend of Brittany’s picked them up. The friend was driving Brittany to the

hospital to receive care for the injuries inflicted by Jackson and Moore asked to be

dropped off. She walked to her cousin’s home. Moore asked her cousin for bullets

and then she walked to her mother’s home and got a gun. She then started walking

back to Jackson’s home.

             According to her testimony at the hearing, Moore didn’t intend to kill

Jackson, just to scare him. However, when she arrived at the home, he asked

where Brittany was and, after learning that Brittany had gone to the hospital, he

became enraged, realizing he was likely going to be charged with rape. He

punched Moore in the face and turned away from her. Moore, fearful that he might

be looking for a weapon, took the gun out and pointed it at him. He advanced

                                         -3-
towards her and grabbed the barrel, pushing her back. She fired. Jackson was

killed.

             In addition to Moore’s testimony at the hearing, Dr. Walter

DeKeseredy, a Ph.D. in sociology and a specialist in domestic violence, provided

expert testimony. In particular, he testified regarding his objective testing of

Moore. The test he performed on her, one created by another expert in domestic

violence at Johns Hopkins, was designed to predict whether the victim was likely

to die due to domestic violence. A score of 18 or higher indicates a likelihood of

such end. Moore scored 31.

             Jackson’s sister also testified. She stated that Jackson had been

diagnosed with schizophrenia and post-traumatic stress disorder and when he did

not take his medicine, he did not function well. She had to take care of paying his

bills and buying his groceries and such. Jackson had previous problems with

neighbors, but his sister denied ever witnessing any violence between her brother

and Moore. An officer investigating the shooting testified that he noticed no

injuries to Moore’s face, despite her contention Jackson had hit her.

             The trial court entered an order denying the domestic violence

exception to Moore. Though the court found that she was a victim of domestic

violence by Jackson, the court found that she was not being victimized at the time

she shot Jackson, so the court believed the exception could not be applied. The

                                          -4-
court found that because there was no corroboration of Moore’s testimony that

Jackson was subjecting her to violence at the time of the shooting, she was not

entitled to the exception.

             The court also noted that Moore walked voluntarily to the home,

armed with a loaded gun. The court believed that this fact also required it to find

that the exception was not warranted as it had found her actions were motivated by

something other than domestic violence. The court held Moore’s actions thus did

not meet the “with regard to” standard of the statute, which has been interpreted by

this Court and the Kentucky Supreme Court to require some nexus between the

violent behavior and domestic violence.

             We have reviewed the testimony, the arguments of the parties, and the

law. We reverse the trial court and remand this matter for entry of an order finding

Moore is entitled to the exception.

                             STANDARD OF REVIEW

             A trial court must apply a preponderance of the evidence standard in

determining whether a person is a victim of domestic violence for purposes of

Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 439.3401(5). The standard “merely requires that

the evidence believed by the fact-finder be sufficient that the defendant was more

likely than not to have been a victim of domestic violence.” Commonwealth v.

Anderson, 934 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Ky. 1996). As to whether domestic violence had

                                          -5-
a part in the actions of the victim who now stands accused of a crime, the court

must determine if the offense occurred “with regard to the offenses.” The review

of that determination is de novo, as such is a mixed question of law and fact.

                    After thoroughly reviewing the statutes and
             applicable case law, we hold that a two-part standard of
             review akin to that used in the review of a trial court’s
             decision on a suppression motion is the most appropriate
             standard by which appellate courts should review a trial
             court’s determination under KRS 439.3401(5). The trial
             court’s determination of whether the defendant is a
             victim of domestic violence is a factual finding that
             appellate courts should review for clear error. If the trial
             court’s factual findings on this first prong are supported
             by substantial evidence, those factual findings shall be
             deemed conclusive. The second prong, whether the
             domestic violence or abuse endured by the defendant
             occurred “with regard to the offenses” committed by that
             defendant, is a mixed question of law and fact. As such,
             the trial court’s determinations on this prong are
             reviewed de novo.

Commonwealth v. Crowe, 610 S.W.3d 218, 224-25 (Ky. 2020).

                                    ANALYSIS

             Manslaughter in the first degree is a “violent offense” as it is a Class

B felony involving the death of the victim. KRS 439.3401(1)(c). The

consequence of this designation is that anyone convicted of the crime, such as

Appellant, cannot be released on probation or parole until having served at least

85% of the sentence imposed. KRS 439.3401(3)(a).

                                         -6-
             However, subsection (5) of that same statute reads: “This section

shall not apply to a person who has been determined by a court to have been a

victim of domestic violence or abuse subject to KRS 533.060 with regard to the

offenses involving the death of the victim . . . .” Id. (emphasis added).

             KRS 533.060 states:

             (1) When a person has been convicted of an offense or
                 has entered a plea of guilty to an offense classified as
                 a Class A, B, or C felony and the commission of the
                 offense involved the use of a weapon from which a
                 shot or projectile may be discharged that is readily
                 capable of producing death or other serious physical
                 injury, the person shall not be eligible for probation,
                 shock probation, or conditional discharge, except
                 when the person establishes that the person against
                 whom the weapon was used had previously or was
                 then engaged in an act or acts of domestic violence
                 and abuse as defined in KRS 403.720 against either
                 the person convicted or a family member as defined
                 in KRS 403.720 of the person convicted. If the
                 person convicted claims to be exempt from this
                 statute because that person was the victim of domestic
                 violence and abuse as defined in KRS 403.720, the
                 trial judge shall conduct a hearing and make findings
                 to determine the validity of the claim and
                 applicability of this exemption. The findings of the
                 court shall be noted in the final judgment.

Thus, the violent offender statute “provides leniency for the domestic violence

victim who strikes back at an abuser by removing the ‘violent offender’ status from

the offense and allowing the offender to be eligible for parole as specified in KRS

                                         -7-
439.340.” Holland v. Commonwealth, 192 S.W.3d 433, 436 (Ky. App. 2005)

(citing Shelton v. Commonwealth, 992 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Ky. App. 1998)).

             For the exemption to apply and allow a defendant to be considered for

parole after serving 20% of their sentence, rather than the 85% required of those

who are not entitled to the exception, the Supreme Court has interpreted KRS

439.3401(5) as requiring a defendant prove first that he or she is or has been a

victim of domestic violence. If that burden is met by a preponderance of the

evidence, then the court must determine whether the offense occurred “with regard

to” the domestic violence suffered by the accused.

             In Commonwealth v. Anderson, 934 S.W.2d at 278, the Supreme

Court held that KRS 439.3401(5) “requires that the evidence believed by the fact-

finder be sufficient that the defendant was more likely than not to have been a

victim of domestic violence.” In the instant case, the trial court found that Moore

was a victim of domestic violence. The trial court cited the testimony of Marvin

Johnson as particularly persuasive on this question. Johnson was a friend of both

Moore and Jackson. Johnson lived down the road from Jackson. In 2019, Moore

and Jackson were at Marvin Johnson’s home for a party. At one point, Jackson

became angry at Moore and dragged her by her hair down the hallway. Johnson

intervened and Moore hid in the utility room until Jackson left Johnson’s home.

                                         -8-
            The trial court, however, faced a more difficult determination

concerning the second question before it – whether domestic violence occurred

“with regard to” the offense which the victim of the domestic violence has been

found guilty of. The meaning of the phrase “with regard to” represents an

interpretation of the statutory language in KRS 439.3401(5). The Supreme Court

has held that there must be some nexus between the offense and domestic violence.

                   With regard to the second prong of the test –
            whether domestic violence or abuse endured by a
            defendant occurred “with regard to the offenses”
            committed by that defendant – we have construed the
            statutory text to mean that the domestic violence
            exemption of KRS 439.3401(5) applies only when the
            domestic violence or abuse was “involved” in the offense
            committed by the violent offender. See Springer v.
            Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439, 457 (Ky. 1999). In
            Commonwealth v. Vincent, 70 S.W.3d 422 (Ky. 2002),
            we further explained the evidence must establish “some
            connection or relationship between the domestic violence
            suffered by the defendant and the underlying offense
            committed by the defendant.” Id. at 424. We further
            concluded that “a prior history of domestic violence
            between a violent crime victim and the criminal
            defendant who perpetrated the violent offense does not,
            in and of itself, make the defendant eligible for the parole
            exemption of KRS 439.3401(5).” Id. at 425.

Gaines v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.3d 160, 165 (Ky. 2014).

            There must be “some connection or relationship between the domestic

violence suffered by the defendant and the underlying offense committed by the

defendant.” Commonwealth v. Vincent, 70 S.W.3d 422, 424 (Ky. 2002). In

                                        -9-
Holland, this Court held, “Vincent makes no more requirement than that the

evidence connect the crime and the abuse.” 192 S.W.3d at 438. In that opinion,

we cautioned against an “over-technical reading of the statutes and case law which

do not promote the purpose of the legislative enactment at issue.” Id. at 435.

The Holland Court explained the rationale behind this:

              The General Assembly thus obviously intended to
              provide leniency to (domestic violence) victims who
              could not establish self-defense. The class of defendants
              raising allegations of domestic abuse under these statutes
              [KRS 533.060(1) and KRS 439.3401(5)] ‘is provided
              multiple opportunities to raise the abuse in mitigation of
              their criminal conduct.’ See generally, Sue McClure,
              Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and the Kentucky
              Criminal Justice System: Abuse Excuse or Legitimate
              Mitigation?, 85 Ky. L.J. 169 (1996-1997). We agree that
              these statutes are intended to give domestic violence
              victims additional opportunities to secure leniency
              beyond the defenses they might raise at trial.

Id. at 437.

              The trial court held it could not find the required connection or

relationship between the shooting of Jackson and the domestic violence it had

found he perpetrated on Moore. The court cited the lack of any physical evidence

that violence had occurred at the time of the shooting. But such finding is

inapposite of our holdings that there need not be contemporaneous domestic

violence in order to find that there was a connection between the shooting and the

history of domestic violence. We disagree with the trial court’s conclusion.

                                         -10-
             The trial court dismissed the testimony of Dr. DeKeseredy because

Dr. DeKeseredy accepted Moore’s statements to him to be truthful. We find that

his testimony concerning the effects of domestic violence upon its victims to be

relevant and the trial court’s dismissal of all of Dr. DeKeseredy’s testimony led, in

part, to the wrong conclusion. These effects of domestic violence on victims can

and do lead to the type of action taken here by Moore, according to the testimony

of the expert. The defense called him as an expert to testify about a matter of

scientific inquiry, and to dismiss all of his testimony was erroneous.

             Dr. DeKeseredy testified that he had spent his career of over thirty-

five years studying violence against women. He explained that it was not at all

unusual for an abused person to leave and return to their abuser multiple times,

particularly when, like Moore, the abused had been told she would be killed if she

left. He added that women are six times more likely to be killed by their abuser

upon returning to the home, as Moore had the night of the shooting. Dr.

DeKeseredy testified that given the history of abuse between Jackson and Moore,

and the fact she had left several times and had just returned after leaving at the

time of the shooting, she was in danger of being killed by Jackson at the time of

the shooting. The trial court completely disregarded the expert testimony of Dr.

DeKeseredy. We hold that the testimony was relevant and the trial court erred in

                                         -11-
dismissing it. We find it persuasive and that it furthers a finding that the offense

here was a result of domestic violence suffered by Moore.1

              Further, we agree with Moore that it appears that the trial court

conflated the exemption for domestic violence victims from the implications of

being a “violent offender” and the defense of self-protection. The trial court’s

citing the fact that Moore voluntarily returned to the home where she had been

victimized, and finding that the act of returning to a dangerous situation against her

own best interests was motivated by something other than domestic violence,

underscores the necessity for expert opinion concerning the effects of long-term

victimization at the hands of a domestic abuser.

              Those who claim self-protection are not seeking to have an exemption

to the consequences of being considered a “violent offender,” as is Moore. Rather,

if one is found to have acted in self-protection under KRS 503.050 there is no need

for an exception as that person would be guilty of no crime. This was recognized

by this Court in the Holland case, supra. 192 S.W.3d 433. So, while returning to

the scene armed with a gun might be relevant to a determination of whether one

1
  See State v. Jackson, 2020-Ohio-4914, ¶ 63, 160 N.E.3d 454, 467-68 (2020) (“Nevertheless,
expert opinion ‘may not be arbitrarily ignored, and some reason must be objectively present for
ignoring expert opinion testimony.’” (Emphasis sic.) [State v. White, 118 Ohio St. 3d 12, 2008-
Ohio-1623, 885 N.E.2d 905, ¶ 71 (2008)], quoting United States v. Hall, 583 F.2d 1288, 1294
(5th Cir. 1978); State v. Brown, 5 Ohio St. 3d 133, 134-135, 449 N.E.2d 449 (1983) . . . . And
while the trial court as the trier of fact may disregard expert opinion, it may not arbitrarily
exclude, without justification, expert opinions without indicating why the opinions were not
considered.”).

                                             -12-
could properly have been found to have acted in self-protection, such action is not

instructive in determining if a person was a victim of domestic violence or acted

“with regard to” domestic violence when she committed the act for which she

presently stands accused. See Baker v. Commonwealth, 677 S.W.2d 876, 880-81

(Ky. 1984) (Leibson, J., concurring), overruled on other grounds by Shannon v.

Commonwealth, 767 S.W.2d 548 (Ky. 1988).2

               In Holland, the accused had set fire to her abuser while he napped in a

recliner and was not actively abusing her. She claimed both self-protection as an

absolute defense to the crimes with which she was charged, as well as seeking the

exception to being considered a “violent offender” after the jury was not persuaded

by the self-protection claim. The trial court denied her the application of the

exception, even after finding she was a victim of domestic violence, as the trial

court did in the present case. This Court reversed that holding.

               Appellant argues that she clearly showed that she was a
               victim of domestic violence and the court took judicial
               notice of that. Furthermore, she testified at trial that L.J.
               was abusing her when she set fire to him. The
               Commonwealth argues that the trial court properly ruled
               against the exception since the jury did not acquit
               appellant on her self-protection defense. As the amicus
               brief aptly points out, however, defendants who are
2
 “If anything, the accused was delusional, but self-protection depends on a belief, reasonable or
unreasonable, that self-protection is necessary at the time, and the appellant’s delusions (if any)
were not with regard to the need for immediate self-protection but with regard to future self-
protection. Therefore the accused was not entitled under the facts of this case to an instruction
on self-protection, nor to an instruction on reckless homicide in the event the jury believed he
acted in self-protection, but recklessly.” 667 S.W.2d at 880-81 (Leibson, J., concurring).

                                               -13-
              acquitted have no need of the probation and parole
              exclusions afforded to domestic violence victims by the
              General Assembly. The General Assembly thus
              obviously intended to provide leniency to victims who
              could not establish self-defense. The class of defendants
              raising allegations of domestic abuse under these statutes
              “is provided multiple opportunities to raise the abuse in
              mitigation of their criminal conduct.” See generally, Sue
              McClure, Note, The Battered Woman Syndrome and the
              Kentucky Criminal Justice System: Abuse Excuse or
              Legitimate Mitigation?, 85 Ky. L.J. 169 (1996-1997).
              We agree that these statutes are intended to give domestic
              violence victims additional opportunities to secure
              leniency beyond the defenses they might raise at trial.
              Thus, the jury verdict is not conclusive of the inquiry of
              whether a defendant can establish that she was a victim
              of domestic violence.

192 S.W.3d at 437.

              Further, in this case, the trial court also failed to note that it accepted a

plea to manslaughter in the first degree under an extreme emotional disturbance.3

3
 Extreme emotional disturbance is a successor to the “old common law concept of ‘heat of
passion[.]’” Driver v. Commonwealth, 361 S.W.3d 877, 887 (Ky. 2012). It is defined as

              a temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to
              overcome one’s judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from the
              impelling force of the extreme emotional disturbance rather than from evil
              or malicious purposes. It is not a mental disease in itself, and an enraged,
              inflamed, or disturbed emotional state does not constitute an extreme
              emotional disturbance unless there is a reasonable explanation or excuse
              therefor, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the
              viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation under circumstances as
              defendant believed them to be.

              McClellan [v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 464, 468-69 (Ky. 1986).]

Hargroves v. Commonwealth, 615 S.W.3d 1, 6-7 (Ky. 2021).

                                              -14-
The trigger for the emotional disturbance in this case could only be domestic

violence.4 Either Moore was triggered when she was again victimized at Jackson’s

hands or she was not. But having held that she was suffering from an extreme

emotional disturbance at the time of the shooting, with domestic violence being the

only possible trigger, the trial court’s holding that she was not entitled to the

exemption as a victim of domestic violence cannot be logically explained.

                While it may be true that the Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure

do not require that a trial court ensure that there is a factual basis before accepting

a guilty plea,5 the fact that the trial court accepted the plea to manslaughter under

an extreme emotional disturbance, along with the trial court’s tacit

acknowledgement that Moore was a victim of domestic violence by Jackson,

should certainly be considered by this Court. We find that the trial court’s

4
  To prove adequately extreme emotional disturbance, a defendant must offer evidence that he
“suffered a temporary state of mind so enraged, inflamed, or disturbed as to overcome one’s
judgment, and to cause one to act uncontrollably from an impelling force of the extreme
emotional disturbance rather than from evil or malicious purposes.” McClellan, 715 S.W.2d at
468-69. Extreme emotional disturbance may have its roots in the common law concept of heat
of passion, but it long ago outgrew the stricture of that historic principle. Our jurisprudence now
recognizes that “it is possible for any event, or even words, to arouse extreme mental or
emotional disturbance.” Holland, 466 S.W.3d at 503-04. While what constitutes the triggering
event may be broadly construed, its impact on the defendant is not. The event must be so
dramatic as to render the mind temporarily uncontrollable and provoke “an explosion of
violence.” Luna v. Commonwealth, 460 S.W.3d 851, 883 (Ky. 2015).

5
    “Notably, Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.08, which governs pleas, does not
expressly contain that requirement that a trial court ascertain a factual basis before accepting a
guilty plea.” Chapman v. Commonwealth, 265 S.W.3d 156, 183 (Ky. 2007), as corrected (Dec.
27, 2007), as modified on denial of reh’g (Aug. 21, 2008).

                                               -15-
acceptance of the plea to manslaughter under extreme emotional disturbance, along

with the trial court’s finding that Moore was a victim of domestic violence by

Jackson, renders erroneous his refusal to find that, as a matter of law, the exception

to the violent offender sentencing should be applied in Moore’s case. In exercising

de novo review, we reverse the trial court on the second prong and hold that the

trial court correctly found that Moore was a victim of domestic violence by a

preponderance of the evidence, but incorrectly held that her actions were not the

result of the domestic violence she suffered.

                                   CONCLUSION

             We hold that the trial court erred when, after finding that Moore was a

victim of domestic violence, it did not find that the shooting of her abuser was

“with regard to” the abuse she had suffered. The court erred when it failed to give

any credence to the expert testimony of a sociologist with over thirty-five years of

study in violence against women. The court also erred in first accepting a plea to

manslaughter in the first degree under an extreme emotional disturbance and then

in finding that the shooting was not “with regard to” that same trigger, to wit,

domestic violence. We reverse with instructions to enter an order finding Moore is

entitled to the exclusion in KRS 439.3401(5) for victims of domestic violence from

the parole restrictions for violent offenders.

             GOODWINE, JUDGE, CONCURS.

                                          -16-
        MCNEILL, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY AND FILES
SEPARATE OPINION.

             MCNEILL, JUDGE, CONCURRING IN RESULT ONLY: The

majority correctly concludes that the domestic violence exemption to the violent

offender statute applies. Although we arrive at the same destination, I do so by a

different path. Therefore, I must respectfully concur in result only.

             The relevant facts at issue here are: 1) Jackson subjected Moore to

mental, emotional, and physical abuse; 2) on one particularly odious occasion

detailed by the majority, Moore – and another of Jackson’s victims – managed to

obtain reprieve; and 3) during an attendant encounter, Moore shot and killed

Jackson. The proximity and preponderance of these events is sufficient to arrive at

our destination without detour. See Commonwealth v. Crowe, 610 S.W.3d 218,

226-27 (Ky. 2020).

             Therefore, I concur in result only.

                                        -17-
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
FOR APPELLANT:
                             Daniel Cameron
Aaron Reed Baker             Attorney General of Kentucky
Frankfort, Kentucky
                             Kristin L. Conder
                             Assistant Attorney General
                             Frankfort, Kentucky

                             ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
                             APPELLEE:

                             Kristin L. Conder
                             Frankfort, Kentucky

                           -18-