Court Opinion

ID: 9791986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:21:39.677045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:39.997645
License: Public Domain

WARREN, J.,
dissenting.
To recover indemnity, a claimant must prove that both the claimant and the defendant were liable to third party and that, as between the two, the defendant ought to pay. Fulton Ins. v. White Motor Corp., 261 Or 206, 210, 493 P2d 138 (1972). The latter element is met when the claimant’s liability is passive or secondary and the defendant’s liability is active or primary. Although those terms are somewhat obtuse, it is clear that, at the minimum, they require that the basis for the liability of the party seeking indemnity be different from that of the party from whom indemnity is sought. In this case, the majority acknowledges that “the nature of the two lawyers’ negligence was the same.” Because the difference in the attorneys’ liabilities was a difference in degree, not in kind, Jackson was not entitled to be indemnified by Lopez. Accordingly, I dissent.
The majority cites several cases in which indemnity was held appropriate. None is analogous to the present case. The continuing thread through the cases is that, in each, the parties’ liabilities were qualitatively different. For example, in Astoria v. Astoria & Columbia River R. Co., 67 Or 538, 136 P 645 (1913), the railroad was liable for a pedestrian’s injury because it negligently created the unsafe condition; the city was liable only because it failed to discover that the railroad had not built the track safely. Similarly, a retailer may receive indemnity from a manufacturer that actually created a defect in a product when the retainer is liable only because it failed to discover the defect or by operation of law. Smith Radio v. Challenger Equip., 270 Or 322, 527 P2d 711 (1974).
In sharp contrast are the cases in which indemnity was disallowed. For example, in Piehl v. The Dalles General Hospital, 280 Or 613, 571 P2d 149 (1977), the evidence showed that both the doctor and the nurses were independently negligent in leaving a sponge in a surgery patient’s abdomen. Because the nature of their liability was the same, neither could receive indemnity from the other. Similarly, in General Ins. Co. v. P.S. Lord, 258 Or 332, 482 P2d 709 (1971), a contractor was denied indemnity from the subcontractor when both had participated in installing the elevator, even though *400the subcontractor had performed most of the work. Those cases show that, when the parties are joint tortfeasors who breach the same duty to the third party, indemnity is not allowed.
Kennedy et al v. Colt, 216 Or 647, 339 P2d 450 (1959), on which the majority mistakenly relies, is consistent with that rule. The majority distorts the facts of Kennedy in order to fit this case within its holding. The majority states that both parties in Kennedy “were negligent in the same respect.” 100 Or App at 397. That statement is puzzling, given that Kennedy was not a negligence case, the word “negligence” does not appear in the opinion and the court specifically noted that the plaintiffs were not in any way careless. 216 Or at 654. Kennedy was a trespass case. The plaintiffs had purchased timber from the defendant, and the defendant had showed the plaintiffs where the timber was located. After the plaintiffs had cut the timber, they discovered that it was on land not owned by the defendant. The landowner got a judgment against the plaintiffs for trespass, and the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs could recover indemnity from the defendant. Indemnity was available because the plaintiffs had not acted deliberately or carelessly and the defendant had caused the harm by misrepresenting that the land was hers.
In the present case, as the majority acknowledges, “[b]oth attorneys failed in their duty to Scott to commence the action within the time permitted by law.” 100 Or App at 397. Jackson’s liability to Scott was premised on his own negligence. Because the nature of the two lawyers’ negligence was the same, neither is entitled to indemnity from the other. Jackson should not be entitled to a jury decision on the common law indemnity claim that, as between him and Lopez, Lopez should carry the entire burden of their joint negligence.
Joseph, C. J., and Rossman and Deits, JJ., join in this dissent.