Court Opinion

ID: 9757042
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:15:42.558412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:34.347020
License: Public Domain

VAN der VOORT, Judge,
concurring:
While I agree with most of the discussion and concur in the conclusions reached by the Majority, I differ in my analysis with respect to the appellant’s claims under the provisions of the Crimes Code set forth in 18 Pa.C.S. § 110.1
The appellant claims that the second prosecution is viola-tive of the provisions of subsection (1) of § 110, and the Majority, while concluding that the claim lacks merit, finds that subsection to be applicable to the inquiry presented in *486this case.. In my opinion, however, subsection (2) is unquestionably applicable in the circumstances here present. Subsection (1) applies in the circumstances where the former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction . ”, while subsection (2) is relevant when the “. former prosecution was terminated, after the indictment was found, by an acquittal or by a final order or judgment for the defendant which has not been set aside . . . ”. As noted in the Majority Opinion, a defense demurrer had been sustained at the trial of the first charges against appellant and in my view, this was clearly “a final order or judgment for the defendant” within the meaning of subsection (2). See 19 P.S. § 481.
Subsection (2) bars a subsequent prosecution only when the final order or judgment in the prior prosecution “. . . necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact which must be established for conviction of the second offense”. The record establishes that the initial prosecution of the appellant was for allegedly failing to properly examine patients on nineteen occasions when drugs were dispensed or prescribed, assertedly in violation of 35 P.S. § 780-113(14). However, the later prosecutions, now the subject of this appeal, were based upon claimed failures to observe record keeping and inventory requirements of the law, as set forth in 35 P.S. § 780-113(21) and (28). No determination of fact necessarily made as a result of the discharge of appellant on the initial charges is apparent nor has any been suggested which would result in any inconsistency when conviction resulted upon the second prosecution.
Thus, while I differ from the Majority and find subsection (2) to be applicable in the instant case, I quite agree that the appellant’s contentions under § 110 are devoid of merit. In all other respects, I support the Majority Opinion.
WATKINS, President Judge, and PRICE, J., join in this concurring opinion.

. That statute provides, inter alia :
Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provision of the statutes than a former prosecution or is based on different facts, it is barred by such former prosecution under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction as defined in Section 109 of this title (relating to when prosecution barred by former prosecution for same offense) and the subsequent prosecution is for:
(1) any offense of which the defendant could have been convicted on the first prosecution;
(ii) any offense based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, if such offense was known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the first trial and was within the jurisdiction of a single court unless the court ordered a separate trial of the charge of such offense; or
(iii) the same conduct, unless:
(A) the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not required by the other and the law defining each of such offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or evil; or
(B) the second offense was not consummated when the former trial began.
(2) The former prosecution was terminated, after the indictment was found, by an acquittal or by a final order or judgment for the defendant which has not been set aside, reversed or vacated and which acquittal, final order or judgment necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact which must be established for conviction of the second offense.