Court Opinion

ID: 9857465
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 14:36:03.507476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:31.912855
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
dissenting.
If this case were likened to a football game, the fans would see an interesting sight indeed. The majority, as referee, picks up and carries the ball a distance sufficient to ensure a victory for the State. To make it more interesting, the majority’s end-run occurs out of bounds! Simply put, the issues addressed by the majority are not properly before this Court and, even if they were, the majority opinion, which is purloined from the dissent below, is so lacking in essential critical reasoning that it evinces nothing more than the shortest route to a desired result.
I.
Following his conviction for possession of a controlled substance, appellant contended: 1) the trial judge erred in overruling an objection to the State’s argument; and, 2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. See, Brief for Appellant, Rankin v. State, 881 S.W.2d 14 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994). The Court of Appeals sustained appellant’s first point of error concerning the State’s argument and reversed. Id. However, the Court failed to address appellant’s sufficiency point.
It is axiomatic that an appellate court must always address challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, even though a reversal may be required on other grounds. Garza v. State, 715 S.W.2d 642, 642 (Tex.Cr.App.1986); Jefcoat v. State, 644 S.W.2d 719, 723 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Horne v. State, 607 S.W.2d 556, 562 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Rains v. State, 604 S.W.2d 118, 120 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Watson v. State, 605 S.W.2d 877, 880-881 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Winn v. State, 871 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1993); Birl v. State, 763 S.W.2d 860, 860 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1988); Scoggan v. State, 736 S.W.2d 239, 240 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1987); *744Scott v. State, 701 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1986); Forte v. State, 686 S.W.2d 744, 754 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1985); Troncosa v. State, 670 S.W.2d 671, 679 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1984); Daniel v. State, 648 S.W.2d 354, 355 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1983); and, Madden v. State, 630 S.W.2d 380, 387 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1982). This is because a successful challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence bars retrial and requires the entry of a judgment of acquittal. Green v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); Graham v. State, 643 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Selman v. State, 663 S.W.2d 838 (Tex.Cr.App.1984); King v. State, 645 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Fuentes v. State, 880 S.W.2d 857, 859 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1994); Elomary v. State, 778 S.W.2d 909, 910 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1989); Birl, 763 S.W.2d at 862; Scoggan, 736 S.W.2d at 240; and, Edison v. State, 630 S.W.2d 696 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1981).1 Because appellate review of a sufficiency point is mandatory, an opinion that does not addréss that point is necessarily obiter dictum.
The majority ignores the Court of Appeals’ failure to address appellant’s sufficiency point and merely remands the case to that Court. In doing so, the majority ignores established precedent which holds that the appropriate action is for this Court to vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for consideration of appellant’s point of error challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. Armstrong v. State, 845 S.W.2d 909, 910 (Tex.Cr.App.1993); Weatherford v. State, 828 S.W.2d 12, 13 (Tex.Cr.App.1992); and, Muniz v. State, 852 S.W.2d 520, 521 (Tex.Cr.App.1993). Thus the majority, in its quest for a desired result, renders an opinion that reverses an opinion which is pure dictum. Accordingly, the majority opinion is also obiter dictum and not entitled to any deference or respect.
II.
Even if this Court could properly reach the jury argument issue, established precedent would require us to affirm. It is a fundamental tenet of our system of jurisprudence that an accused must only be tried for the offense with which he is charged and not for being a criminal generally. Owens v. State, 827 S.W.2d 911, 915 (Tex.Cr.App.1992). A defendant’s trial must, therefore, focus on the accusations made by the State in its pleadings. Lomas v. State, 707 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) (citing Klueppel v. State, 505 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Tex.Cr.App.1974)). And the State may not ask a jury to convict a defendant of an extraneous offense which may have been admitted in evidence. See, Klueppel, 505 S.W.2d at 574; and, Melton v. State, 713 S.W.2d 107 (Tex.Cr.App.1986).
In Ridinger v. State, 174 S.W.2d 319 (Tex.Cr.App.1943), we defined an extraneous offense as “one that is extra, beyond, or foreign to the offense for which the party is on trial.” Id. at 320. Under this definition, if the testimony of appellant’s possession of a controlled substance on the morning of his arrest related to an extraneous offense, the decision of the Court of Appeals is correct and should be affirmed. However, if that testimony did not relate to an extraneous offense, but instead related to the charged offense, the. Court of Appeals erred. For the following three reasons, I believe the testimony of appellant’s possession of the controlled substance on the morning of his arrest related to an extraneous offense.
A.
The Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals reviewed the record in this case and found appellant admitted the commission of an extraneous offense:
*745... When appellant took the stand and admitted possessing cocaine earlier in the morning, an act that would also fit within the terms of the indictment, he was admitting that he committed an extraneous offense; he was not admitting that he committed the offense charged and proved up by the State.
Rankin v. State, 881 S.W.2d 14, 17 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994).2 The majority disagrees with this finding and holds the Court of Appeals “erred.” Ante, 953 S.W.2d at 741. To so hold the majority ignores the policy of deference announced in Arcila v. State, 834 S.W.2d 357, 360 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), where we stated:
... Like this Court, the courts of appeals are duty-bound to uphold the constitution and laws of this State and of the United States. So long as it appears that they have discharged that duty conscientiously by impartial application of pertinent legal doctrine and fair consideration of the evidence, it is our duty in turn to respect their judgments.

Id.

Under Arcila, the Court of Appeals’ determination that appellant admitted committing an extraneous offense should not be disturbed.3
B.
The Record
The record establishes appellant admitted the commission of an extraneous offense. A brief recitation of the facts illustrates this point. On March 8, 1992, police officers responded to a family disturbance call at appellant’s residence. Appellant was arrested for “assault, family violence” and transported to the Hams County Jail where appellant was removed from the patrol vehicle and booked into jail. The vehicle was subsequently searched and cocaine was discovered underneath the rear seat.
On May 15, 1992, a Harris County grand jury indicted appellant for possession of cocaine. Trial began on August 4, 1992. On that day, the State presented its ease-in-chief, including the officer’s testimony concerning the search and discovery of cocaine in the patrol vehicle. After the State rested, appellant and his wife testified in defense. Their testimony established that appellant had a drug problem and was in possession of cocaine prior to his arrest. However, each testified that appellant threw this cocaine down the sink in an effort to quit drugs, and that appellant was not in possession of any cocaine at the time of his arrest and transport to the Harris County Jail. Because the State was not aware of appellant’s earlier possession of cocaine until appellant and his wife testified, the earlier possession could not have been the offense for which appellant was on trial and was, therefore, an extraneous offense.
C.
The State’s Argument
The majority opinion does not refer to the State’s closing argument. However, in that argument the State conceded the possession of the controlled substance on the morning of appellant’s arrest was an extraneous offense. Specifically, the State asked the jury to convict appellant of either possession of the controlled substance found in the patrol car or the cocaine appellant possessed and threw down the sink, prior to his arrest. Because the indictment alleged only one offense and the charge authorized only one conviction, the State, by arguing for an “either/or” conviction, was necessarily asking the jury to convict appellant of an extraneous offense.4
*746III.
A.
The majority loses its way by relying on an erroneous definition of extraneous offense. The majority relies on three court of appeals’ opinions to hold an extraneous offense is “any act of misconduct, whether resulting in prosecution or not, that, is not shown in the charging papers.” Ante, 953 S.W.2d at 741, (emphasis in original) (citing, McDonald v. State, 692 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, pet. ref'd); Gomez v. State, 626 S.W.2d 118, 114 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1981, pet. ref'd); and, Shugart v. State, 796 S.W.2d 288, 294 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1990, pet. ref'd)). However, reliance on these opinions is erroneous because they have no precedential value. Sheffield v. State, 650 S.W.2d 813, 814 (Tex.Cr.App.1983).5
Had the majority followed Ridingeds established definition of an extraneous offense, it would have found the testimony of appellant and his wife related to an extraneous offense. The instant indictment alleged only one possession, namely possession of the cocaine discovered during the search of the patrol car. This is clear because that was the only possession of which the State had knowledge. Indeed, the State’s case-in-chief established that possession and only that possession. The second possession occurred at appellant’s home prior to his arrest. The State did not become aware of the second possession until appellant and his wife testified. This occurred three months after the instant indictment was returned. Even though the second possession was of the same type as that alleged in the indictment, it was nevertheless an extraneous offense because it was not the possession charged in the indictment for which appellant was on trial.
B.
The erroneous definition employed by the majority focuses on the general type or class of offense charged rather than the specific offense alleged in the indictment. According to the majority, so long as the extraneous offense is the type alleged in “the charging papers” it is not an extraneous offense. This reasoning demonstrates a fundamentally flawed understanding of extraneous offenses and due process notice requirements.6
The majority opinion will lead to many extreme consequences. Two such consequences immediately come to mind. First, the majority opinion will dramatically alter our double jeopardy jurisprudence. The State will now be limited to one prosecution for all offenses that are of the same type or class because, under the majority’s rationale, all similar offenses will necessarily have been alleged in “the charging papers.” Consequently, following one prosecution, all other similar prosecutions will be jeopardy barred.
Secondly, the majority opinion will dramatically affect our jurisprudence concerning indictments. Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 21.11 requires an indictment to charge the commission of an offense in “ordinary and concise language in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is meant.” Prior to the majority opinion, an indictment which tracked the statutory language would survive a motion to quash. Olurebi v. State, 870 S.W.2d 58, 62 (Tex.Cr.App.1994); and, Ex parte Porter, 827 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex.Cr.App.1992). *747However, this will no longer be true, especially in possession cases. Because many of those who possess drugs, regularly violate our statutes prohibiting possession of controlled substances, indictments alleging those offenses must now be specific rather than general. Due process will require the State to allege the offense in such a way as to distinguish it from any and all similar offenses the defendant may have committed. This, by necessity, will include allegations of the exact time and precise location of the offense. In light of the majority opinion, the trial judge would have erred in not granting a motion to quash the instant indictment.
IV.
The majority errs in addressing an issue which is not properly before the Court. And compounds the error by reversing the Court of Appeals which correctly found the State erred in asking the jury to convict appellant of an extraneous offense. Because the majority ignores our case law and reverses that judgment, I dissent.
APPENDIX A

. These holdings have been codified at Tex. R.App.P. 90(a) which provides in part:
The court of appeals shall hand down a written opinion which shall be as brief as practicable but which shall address every issue raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal.
Id. Rule 90 requires the court of appeals to address every point of error which directs their attention to any error about which appellant complains. This clearly includes sufficiency challenges because, as noted above, if successful a judgment of acquittal is required.

. All emphasis is supplied unless otherwise indicated.

. The majority’s holding that the Court of Appeals erred only serves to affirm what I stated in Mireles v. State, 901 S.W.2d 458, 462 (Tex.Cr.App.1995) (Baird, J., concurring): "... Arcila has become nothing more than a disingenuous attempt by a majority of this Court to provide one-sided relief to the State.” After today, there can he no doubt that Arcila has been overruled sub silentio.

.Obviously this argument was persuasive because four of the jurors filed affidavits stating:
I served on the jury panel of the trial of James Rankin. I based my verdict on statements made by the prosecuting attorney. The prosecuting attorney told those of us on the jury that we could find the defendant James *746Rankin guilty because he admitted on the witness stand that he possessed a controlled substance earlier that day. I would not have voted guilty had the prosecutor not told us this. I was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed a controlled substance in the back of the police car as the prosecution alleged.

. Clearly, the majority did not engage in any independent research or analysis of this issue. The majority opinion is nothing more than a restatement of the dissent in the Court of Appeals. Rankin, 881 S.W.2d at 14 (Duggan, Mira-bal, Wilson and Hedges, JJ., dissenting). See, appendix A. However, the dissent is not cited in the majority opinion. Such plagiarism is shameful and serves only to embarrass this Court.

. Judge Meyers’ concept of extraneous offenses and due process notice requirements is even more flawed than that of the majority. Judge Meyers' separate concurring opinion is based solely on Thomason v. State, 892 S.W.2d 8 (Tex.Cr.App.1994), a case which has absolutely no relevance to the issues presented in the instant case.