Court Opinion

ID: 9694930
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:01:09.834089+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:07.088005
License: Public Domain

*113SABERS, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in all respects except that I dissent on the denial of prejudgment interest. SDCL 21-1-13.1 provides in part that “[a]ny person who is entitled to recover damages, whether in the principal action or by counterclaim, cross claim or third-party claim, is entitled to recover interest thereon from the day that the loss or damage occurred[.]” And SDCL 21-35-25 provides:
Title to the property interest specified in the declaration shall vest in the petitioner and the property interest shall be deemed condemned and taken for the use of the petitioner. The right to just compensation for the property interest shall vest in the persons entitled thereto either on the date the decision is rendered at the hearing provided in § 21-35-10.1 or the date the hearing is waived. (Emphasis added.) *
The purpose of the interest statutes is to compensate the Kelleys, as property owners, for the loss of the use of the money for the property taken by law on February 4, 1991 or by stipulation and waiver on June 3,1991. See generally Honomichl v. Modlin, 477 N.W.2d 599 (S.D.1991) (“[T]he purpose of awarding prejudgment interest is to do justice to one who has suffered a loss at the hands of another person. The true principle, which is based on the sense of justice in the business community and our statute, is that he who retains money which he ought to pay another should be charged interest upon it.”)
Judge Kean found, as a matter of law, that the date of the taking was February 4, 1991, and so instructed the jury. The date of the stipulation and waiver of hearing on the necessity of the taking was June 3,1991, which, under SDCL 21-35-25, vested title in the City. As Kelley’s brief persuasively argues, the interest statute, SDCL 21-1-13.1, and the just compensation statute, SDCL 21-35-25, require interest be paid from June 3, 1991, the date the stipulation and waiver of taking was signed and the right to just compensation for the property interest vested in the Kelleys, until judgment, less credit for the deposit. We should reverse and remand for the purpose of properly determining prejudgment interest.

 SDCL 21-35-10.1 provides:
Within thirty days from the date the summons described in § 21-35-9 is served, the defendant may demand a hearing in circuit court on the petitioner's right to take. Failure to make such demand or to consent in writing to the taking, within the thirty-day period, shall constitute a waiver of the right to question the necessity of the taking. The finding of necessity by the plaintiff, unless based upon fraud, bad faith or an abuse of discretion, shall be binding on all persons.