Court Opinion

ID: 9578988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:50:17.283615+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:07.454908
License: Public Domain

Adams, J.
(dissenting). I agree with Judge Holbrook’s opinion in this case and with Judge J. H. Gillis’ opinion in People v Jackson, 46 Mich App 764; 208 NW2d 526 (1973), that JCR 1969, 11 is fully adequate as to the requirements of procedural due process. However, in a juvenile waiver proceeding, the juvenile is severed from the entire *278class of all other persons under 17 years of age. The basis for the classification of juveniles is age. A juvenile who is waived from his class and placed in a class with adults is subjected to altogether different laws and penalties.
I do not question that certain juveniles can be severed out of the class of all juveniles by proper classification and placed in a class with adult offenders. However, such treatment is not procedure, but rather is a substantive matter. While the Supreme Court might by rule provide for the trial of a juvenile in some other court, under the laws as to juveniles, the Supreme Court cannot make the law, either as to juveniles or adults. This is for the Legislature. See my opinion in People v Fields, 388 Mich 66, 75-77; 199 NW2d 217, 221-222 (1972).
Assuming the probate court had jurisdiction to waive the defendant, I would agree with Judge Holbrook that there was sufficient evidence to support the waiver. I also agree that, in accordance with People v McFarlin, 389 Mich 557; 208 NW2d 504 (1973), the sentencing judge could refer to defendant’s juvenile record in imposing sentence.
I would reverse and remand to the probate court for appropriate proceedings in that court.