Court Opinion

ID: 9721229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:52:44.527067+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:24.131155
License: Public Domain

JENNINGS, Justice,
dissenting.
Regarding negligence liability, Justice Holmes 1 wrote, “The general principle of our law is that loss from accident must lie where it falls, and this principle is not affected by the fact that a human being is the instrument of misfortune.”2 Because the undisputed facts of this case, as a matter of law, preclude appellant’s negligence claim under the theories of respon-deat superior and negligent entrustment, I respectfully dissent.
Corte Adams (Adams), an employee of appellee, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (Goodyear), fell asleep while driving a Goodyear truck, causing the truck to collide head-on with a car driven by appellant, Patrick Mayes (Mayes). In his sole issue, Mayes contends that the trial court erred in granting Goodyear’s motion for summary judgment because “Goodyear failed to prove, as a matter of law, that Corte Adams was not acting within the course and scope of his employment” and “Goodyear was not entitled to Summary Judgment as to claims of negligent en-trustment.”
However, the controlling fact of this case is that, at the time of the collision, sometime after 3:00 a.m., Adams, after having had dinner, “a few beers,” and several hours of sleep at his father’s house, was driving the truck from his father’s house to a convenience store to buy a package of cigarettes for his father.

Respondeat Superior

Mayes sued Goodyear for negligence under the theory of respondeat superior, alleging that Adams was acting within the course and scope of his employment when he caused the truck to collide with Mayes’s car.
As implied by Justice Holmes above, the existence of a legal duty is the threshold requirement in a negligence case. Greater *59Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 528, 525 (Tex.1990). As a general rule, there is no duty to control the conduct of another. Otis Eng’g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex.1983). However, under the theory of respondeat superior, an employer may be held liable for the negligent acts of its employee if the employee’s actions are within the course and scope of their employment. Ginther v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 93 S.W.3d 300, 303 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). In order to meet this exception, the employee’s act “must” be
(1) within the employee’s general authority,
(2) in furtherance of the employer’s business, and
(3) taken to accomplish the object for which the employee was hired.

Id.

In Ginther, a wrongful death case, the Ginthers’ daughter was killed when the car in which she was a passenger collided with a stalled car on a freeway. Id. at 302. The driver of the stalled car was Quincy Howard, Jr., a Domino’s pizza delivery man, who, on the night of the collision, left work at 11:30 p.m., picked up some friends, and was driving them home when his car stalled. Id. at 302-03. The undisputed summary judgment evidence showed that the purpose of Howard’s trip was “strictly personal” and unrelated to his employment with Domino’s. Id. at 303. The court noted that Howard was not acting within the general authority granted to him by Domino’s at the time of the collision, his actions were not in furtherance of Domino’s business, and “the object for which Howard was hired was to deliver pizza— not to drive around with his friends.” Id. 303-04. Because Howard’s actions fell outside the course and scope of his employment, the court held that his alleged negligence could not be attributed to Domino’s under a theory of respondeat superi- or. Id. at 304.
Here, likewise, it is undisputed that Adams’s 3:00 a.m. trip to the convenience store to buy cigarettes for his father— coming after dinner, “a few beers,” and several hours of sleep at his father’s house — was strictly personal. Even assuming that Adams had Goodyear’s authority to use its truck for personal business, Adams’ actions, at the time of the collision, were not in furtherance of Goodyear’s business, and the object for which Adams was hired was to change, fix, and sometimes deliver tires — not to drive to a convenience store to buy cigarettes for his father.
The majority considers Adams’ testimony that Goodyear never “gave [him] any stipulations when or where or how [he] could use [the truck]” sufficient to raise a material fact issue “regarding whether he was acting within the course and scope of his employment, despite being on a personal errand.” However, even assuming that Goodyear placed no restrictions on Adams’ use of the truck, that fact is not probative on the issues of whether Adams’ action, at the time of the collision, was (1) in furtherance of Goodyear’s business and (2) taken to accomplish the object for which Adams was hired — two essential elements of respondeat superior. Id. at 303.
Moreover, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Adams’ receipt of workers’ compensation payments also raises a genuine issue of material fact about whether he was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the collision. This fact is in no way probative on the issues of whether Adams’ action, at the time of the collision, was (1) in furtherance of Goodyear’s business and (2) taken to accomplish the object for which Adams was hired.
*60The undisputed and controlling fact remains that Adams’ 3:00 a.m. trip from his father’s house, after having had dinner, “a few beers,” and several hours of sleep, to the convenience store to buy cigarettes for his father was strictly personal. Because Adams’ strictly personal errand for his father fell outside the course and scope of his employment with Goodyear, I would hold that, as a matter of law, his alleged negligence cannot be attributed to Goodyear under the theory of respondeat superior.

Negligent Entrustment

Mayes also seeks to hold Goodyear liable for Adams’ actions under the theory of negligent entrustment. The basis of responsibility under the doctrine of negligent entrustment is the owner’s own negligence in permitting its motor vehicle to “become a dangerous instrumentality by putting it into a driver’s control with knowledge of the potential danger existing by reason of the incompetence or reckless nature of the driverGreen v. Tex. Elec. Wholesalers, Inc., 651 S.W.2d 4, 6-7 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, writ dism’d by agrmt.) (citing Mundy v. Pirie Slaughter Motor Co., 146 Tex. 314, 206 S.W.2d 587, 590-91 (1947)) (emphasis added).
The well-established elements of an automobile owner’s liability for negligent en-trustment are:
(1) entrustment of a vehicle by the owner;
(2) to an unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless driver;
(3) that the owner knew or should have known to be unlicensed, incompetent, or reckless;
(4) that the driver was negligent on the occasion in question; and
(5) that the driver’s negligence proximately caused the accident.
Schneider v. Esperanza Transmission Co., 744 S.W.2d 595, 596 (Tex.1987). For en-trustment to be a proximate cause, the entrustor should be shown to have been reasonably able to anticipate that an injury would result as a natural and probable result of the entrustment. Id.
In regard to the knowledge element, the majority concludes that Adams’ 66.5 hour workweek prior to the collision “together with the four-hour commute time and Adams’ work and driving schedule on the day before and the day of the accident, is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Goodyear was negligent in entrusting Adams with the truck, particularly when the accident resulted from Adams’ having fallen asleep while driving.”
Again, I respectfully disagree. These facts are not probative as to whether Goodyear knew or should have known that Adams was an incompetent or reckless driver. It does not logically follow that because Adams had a long workweek and commute time that Goodyear knew or should have known that Adams would wake up at 3:00 a.m. and attempt to drive Goodyear’s truck on a personal errand while he was still tired. Because the evidence, favorable to Mayes, does not support a reasonable inference that Goodyear knew or should have known that Adams was likely to commit such an act, I would hold, as a matter of law, that his alleged negligence cannot be attributed to Goodyear under the theory of negligent entrustment.
Conclusion
Accordingly, I would overrule Mayes’s sole issue and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

. The Honorable Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Justice of the United States Supreme Court, 1902-1932.

. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law, p. 94 (Little, Brown & Co. 1949).