Court Opinion

ID: 9673471
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:12:23.363917+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:34.940972
License: Public Domain

Mallett, C.J.
(dissenting).
A
MCR 9.104 provides a general list of acts or omissions that, if committed by an attorney, constitute misconduct and are grounds for discipline whether or not occurring in the course of the attorney-client relationship. Under this rule, violation of a criminal law is misconduct and grounds for discipline. This conduct *174serves as a basis for initiating disciplinary proceedings. However, just because the violation is a basis for discipline, it does not necessarily follow that disciplinary proceedings will be initiated or that professional sanctions must be entered against the attorney.1
When an attorney is convicted of a felony, there is no discretion whether to initiate disciplinary procedures, and the attorney is automatically suspended. MCR 9.120. However, there is a continuum of offenses that might violate the law far short of a felony that may or may not warrant discipline. This is implicit in the rules because they do not specifically address what happens in cases of minor infractions or other nonfelony misconduct. The import of this is that certain conduct, while creating a potential for discipline, simply may not be compelling enough for professional sanctions to be entered. We simply have not established that all misdemeanors are misconduct per se that automatically warrant the application of professional sanctions. In fact, we have stated almost the opposite. In stating that discipline is not to be entered unless it has been decided that it is warranted, we have noted that we could establish a rule providing for automatic suspension upon conviction of a misdemeanor. People v Pubrat, 451 Mich 589, 599; 548 NW2d 595 (1996). However, we have chosen not to do so. Clearly this is illustrative of our belief that certain offenses by themselves may not require professional discipline. Id.
*175Our rules recognize this. MRPC 8.4 implicitly both incorporates and qualifies MCR 9.104. MRPC 8.4 provides that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or violation of the criminal law, where such conduct reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer.” We find that not only does Rule 8.4 implicitly incorporate MCR 9.104, but it limits 9.104’s purview by defining further exactly which kind of misconduct is professional misconduct.2 A violation of the criminal law very well may be misconduct, but it only becomes professional misconduct when it reflects adversely on the lawyer in his capacity as a lawyer. Clearly again, this illustrates that not all misconduct is professional misconduct. We must not forget that there has already been a criminal procedure *176and a sentence entered in these cases. Professional discipline, in addition, may or may not be warranted or necessary.
A professional code of discipline should deter and punish conduct that is of special significance to the profession, but it should not concern itself with other conduct at all. For example, certain actions warranting a professional sanction may not be illegal or unlawful. On the other hand, not every violation of criminal law would justify a professional sanction, for the criminal sanction may be sufficient and the offense may be wholly unrelated to the lawyer’s professional life. Rule 8.4(b) attempts to define, as well as it can in necessarily general terms, this relationship between criminal law violation and violation of professional norms. The objective is to describe a category of crimes, the commission of which specifically reflects a deficiency in the qualities that define a lawyer. The commission of a crime outside this category should not subject a lawyer to professional discipline. [2 Hazard & Hodes, Law of Lawyering (2d ed), § 8.4:101, pp 951-952 (1992 supp).]
The comment to MRPC 8.4 discusses that while an attorney must answer to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should have to answer professionally only for those actions that relate to fitness to practice law. The comment notes further that one incident of misconduct may not reflect on attorney fitness, but a pattern of repeated minor offenses might be indicative of a problem that requires further investigation.3
It is true the rules do not limit discipline only to those offenses that occur within the course of the attorney-client relationship. We have held that an *177attorney may be disciplined for activity unrelated to the practice of law if the conduct is proscribed by our rules or the code. Grievance Administrator v Nickels, 422 Mich 254, 260; 373 NW2d 528 (1985) (an attorney’s promises to reimburse an employee and the subsequent failure to do so is professional misconduct). And we have held that discipline may be necessary for nonprofessional misconduct to maintain the integrity of the profession. Grievance Administrator v Gillis, 402 Mich 286, 291; 262 NW2d 646 (1978) (for failure to file an income tax return). “The rules of professional conduct adopted by this Court evidence a commitment to high standards and behavior beyond reproach. We cannot stress too strongly the responsibility of members of the bar to carry out their activities, both public and private, with circumspection.” In re Grimes, 414 Mich 483, 494; 326 NW2d 380 (1982).
However, we must be veiy cautious. If all violations of the criminal law are potentially sanctionable as professional misconduct, then every infraction will be fair game, whether or not it reflects the attorney’s fitness to practice law. Certainly lawyers should be held to the highest of standards, but we must not apply professional sanctions in an overly formalistic manner. Professional sanctions should be applied only after very careful case-by-case consideration to avoid unfair and unreasonable results.
B
MCR 9.120 allows the Grievance Administrator to file a certified copy of a judgment of conviction with the Attorney Discipline Board, which is conclusive proof of the commission of the criminal offense. This eliminates the need to have a formal evidentiary hear*178ing to determine whether misconduct has occurred. The board then orders the attorney to show cause why discipline should not be entered. The use of the conviction by the Grievance Administrator provides a shortcut around the typical bifurcated procedure. The first phase establishes, in a formal hearing, whether the misconduct occurred. If misconduct is established, a second-phase hearing is held to determine the appropriate level of discipline. This second hearing is not necessarily a separate hearing, but may, in actuality, merely be a continuation of the first.
If conviction is always conclusive regarding misconduct, then the show-cause hearing is really akin to the second phase or disciplinary hearing. The effect of the choice to proceed with a judgment of conviction, rather than the typical hearing, changes the procedure. The judgment of conviction, in effect, takes the place of the initial misconduct hearing. The attorney must then show cause why discipline should not be entered. The choice to proceed with a judgment of conviction is an automatic shortcut or bypass right to a show-cause hearing. What has been created, albeit inadvertently, is really a second procedure based on the choice to proceed with a judgment of conviction. In disabling this panel from dismissing the proceedings, the majority renders the show-cause hearing superfluous. Certainly this is not the intended result of the rules. The hearing panel must have the inherent authority to dismiss after the show-cause hearing if it determines that the attorney has met the requirement of showing why a final order of discipline should not be entered. To interpret this otherwise binds the authority of the panel and renders it irrelevant.
*179The Grievance Administrator argues that because misconduct is established, an order of discipline is required under MCR 9.115(J)(3). This is not so. Even the majority concedes that, while the judgment establishes a finding of misconduct, “[it] is not conclusive proof that discipline must be imposed . . . .” Ante at 161. Clearly, sanctions are not automatically required because after hearing the aggravating or mitigating evidence, the panel’s order may be that no discipline be entered. The majority recognizes this. “[W]e hold that, at the second hearing referred to in MCR 9.115(J)(2), hearing panels have the discretion to issue orders of discipline under MCR 9.115(J)(3) that effectively impose no discipline on respondents.” Ante at 169.
Finally, the Grievance Administrator argues that the dismissal of the proceedings by the hearing panel infringes on the prosecutorial authority of the commission. This argument is without merit. Nothing stands in the way of the commission’s charging or investigatory authority. It has the choice either to initiate a formal investigation that would trigger the more bifurcated procedure, or to proceed with a judgment of conviction. Having opted for the shortcut, the Grievance Administrator must live with the consequences of his choice. Dissatisfied with the result, the administrator now claims the hearing panel was without discretion to dismiss. I disagree. If the administrator wanted the hearing panels to make their decisions on the basis of the totality of circumstances in each case, then perhaps he should have proceeded with a formal investigation and full misconduct hearing. Only this way would all the facts have been before the respective panels. Unfortunately, the administra*180tor’s hands were tied both by the choice to proceed with the convictions and the procedural limitations of the rules.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Mallett, C.J.
Kelly, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 Indeed, as the majority points out, the administrator has great latitude in deciding whether to investigate attorneys for convictions. Ante at 167, n 18.

 We disagree with the majority that the “rules have different scopes and intents.” Ante at 165. But we note that if the rules appear to conflict, the rules of statutory construction compel the conclusion that MRPC 8.4 limits MCR 9.104. It is hornbook law that “[statutes which may appear to conflict are to be read together and reconciled, if possible.” People v Bewersdorf, 438 Mich 55, 68; 475 NW2d 231 (1991). Further, we note that
[statutes that relate to the same subject or share a common purpose . . . are in pari materia and must be read together as one law. If the statutes lend themselves to a construction that avoids conflict, that construction should control. When two statutes conflict, and one is specific to the subject matter while the other is only generally applicable, the specific statute prevails. [Brown v Manistee Co Rd Comm, 204 Mich App 574, 577; 516 NW2d 121 (1994), rev’d on other grounds 452 Mich 354; 550 NW2d 215 (1996).]
Because the two rules in the case at bar relate to the same subject matter, we believe our conclusion best reconciles and harmonizes them. This also avoids rendering any part of the rules nugatory. And, certainly, MRPC 8.4 is the more specific, because it recognizes which violations of the criminal law will warrant professional discipline. Therefore, it prevails over the more general rule.

 This is certainly true in the case of respondent Howell, who had two drunk-driving convictions, the second occurring while she was on probation for the first. The fact that she violated her probation may indicate a certain lack of respect for the law as well as other serious problems.