Court Opinion

ID: 9626196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:04:59.97641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:42.053909
License: Public Domain

Ringold, J.
(dissenting) — Even assuming arguendo4 that the trial court has the power to change the child's name for the "best interests of the child," the trial court decision here should be reversed. I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because it misconstrues the rules pertaining to assignment of error and the failure to make findings of fact.
Assignment of Error
The trial court entered the following "finding of fact":
Under RCW 26.26.130, the Court has the authority to change the name of the child in this matter. Accordingly, the Court directs that the last name of the child be changed from Daves to Nastos and further directs that a new birth certificate be issued to reflect that Christopher Nastos is the father of said child.
Daves assigned error to this finding, which is the only finding relating to the name change. The majority holds that *598the assignment of error is insufficient and that Daves should have assigned error to the court's failure to enter a finding that the name change was in the best interests of the child, or challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding. The majority also suggests that Daves erred in failing to assign error to the "implied finding" that the name change was in the best interests of the child. Denying Daves' appeal on such technical procedural grounds violates the spirit of the majority's statement that adherence to formalities is not appropriate where the focus is on the child's best interests. See also RAP 1.2(a) (cases and issues should not be decided on the basis of noncompliance with rules).
The trial court's "finding of fact" is nothing more than a legal conclusion that the court has the authority under RCW 26.26.130 to change the child's name. Conclusions of law denominated as findings of fact are treated as conclusions of law on appeal. State v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 81 Wn.2d 259, 267, 501 P.2d 290 (1972), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 945 (1973). Daves adequately assigned error to the conclusion of law that the court had power to change the child's name. She set out the finding verbatim in the assignment of error section of her brief and discussed the alleged error in the text of the brief. See RAP 10.3(a)(3) and 10.4(c). Assignments of error are intended to direct the appellate court's attention to the alleged error so that the court need not search the record for error. Ford v. Belling-ham-Whatcom Cy. Dist. Bd. of Health, 16 Wn. App. 709, 558 P.2d 821 (1977). The alleged error here was clearly drawn to our attention. Daves properly assigned error and the merits of the appeal should be considered.
Adequacy of the Court's Findings
The trial court is required to enter findings on all material issues and ultimate facts. Daughtry v. Jet Aeration Co., 91 Wn.2d 704, 707, 592 P.2d 631 (1979); Wold v. Wold, 7 Wn. App. 872, 503 P.2d 118 (1972). Findings of fact which are conclusions of law stand only if there are other findings *599of fact sufficient to support them. Miller Lumber Co. v. Holden, 45 Wn.2d 237, 273 P.2d 786 (1954). The trial court finding here is nothing more than "an assertion . . . unsupported by evidence or other findings" and does not adequately support the court's judgment. See Pullman Co. v. State, 65 Wn.2d 860, 864, 400 P.2d 91 (1965). The findings do not fulfill their function of "inform[ing] the appellate court [of] '"what questions were decided by the trial court and the manner in which they were decided . . Daughtry, at 707.
The majority assumes that the trial judge read and understood the law and must be presumed to have found the name change to be in the child's best interests. This presumption is not warranted where, as here, the court failed to make the necessary findings on material issues or even to enter the required conclusion of law that the name change was in the child's best interests. The lack of findings makes it impossible to determine what issues the trial court considered or on what theory the matter was decided. The appellate court should not "second guess" the trial court and assume that the court considered the child's best interests. State v. Kingman, 77 Wn.2d 551, 463 P.2d 638 (1970). As this court has stated: "It is improper for an appellate court to ferret out a material or ultimate finding of fact..." Wold, at 876.
The proper presumption in this case is that a material question of fact on which no finding is made is deemed to be determined against the party with the burden of proof on the issue. McCutcheon v. Brownfield, 2 Wn. App. 348, 467 P.2d 868 (1970). Nastos had the burden of establishing that the name change was in the child's best interest. The absence of a finding on the matter may properly be interpreted as a failure to meet this burden. McCutcheon.
Because the conclusion of law is unsupported by any factual findings, it is not necessary to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence. The agreed report of proceedings provides a sufficient record for this appeal.
*600Exercise of Discretion
A court's determination of the "best interests of a child" requires the exercise of the court's discretion. The decision cannot be an arbitrary determination made by the court simply because it has the power to do so. The court's discretion cannot be exercised in a vacuum without any findings reflecting the factors which were considered by the court in determining whether the change of name would be for the best interests of the child:
Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. State ex rel. Clark v. Hogan, 49 Wn.2d 457, 303 P.2d 290 (1956).
State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971).
Here, there is a complete lack of findings relating to the best interests of the child. Additionally, it is not intuitively obvious that such a change would necessarily benefit the child.5 We do not know what objective criteria, if any, were considered and weighed by the trial court in arriving at its determination. We should find that the court failed to exercise its discretion.
I would modify the decree of paternity entered on October 10, 1983, deleting therefrom the following paragraph: "Ordered, adjudged and decreed that the last name of the child, Alaina Joy Daves, be changed to Alaina Joy Nastos and that a new birth certificate be issued to reflect this
Review granted by Supreme Court March 15, 1985.

By ignoring the issue, the majority cavalierly disposes of Daves' argument that the court, under the Uniform Parentage Act, RCW 26.26, lacks the power to change a child's name.
Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Parentage Act, the Legislature provided for the determination of paternity through filiation proceedings. Former RCW 26.24. Former RCW 26.24.190 provided as follows:
If the mother be a suitable person she shall he awarded the custody and control of said child; . . . Such order and judgment may further provide, in the discretion of the court, that the surname of the accused shall henceforth be the lawful surname of such child.
(Italics mine.) Laws of 1919, ch. 203, § 19. The filiation proceeding was supplanted by the Uniform Parentage Act, RCW 26.26. It will be observed that a similar provision granting authority to the court to change the surname of the child is not included in the Uniform Parentage Act. RCW 26.26. Under the general rule of statutory construction, when a material change is made in a statute, a change in legislative purpose must be presumed. In re Adoption of Jackson, 89 Wn.2d 945, 578 P.2d 33 (1978). Daves' argument that the court lacks authority to order a name change is thus worthy of consideration. In view of my analysis, however, it is unnecessary for me to consider this issue in depth.

The concurring opinion suggests the name change may be in the best interest of the child because it strengthens the child-parent relationship. There is no record or findings supporting this imaginary basis for the trial court's action. It is not the role of this court to supply possible motives or reasons for the trial court's actions. Wold v. Wold, 7 Wn. App. 872, 876, 503 P.2d 118 (1972).