Court Opinion

ID: 9729678
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:46:19.504531+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:00.483408
License: Public Domain

Souris, J.
(dissenting). By summary reversal of tbe circuit judge’s thoughtful and eminently correct ruling, Mr. Justice Kelly sentences a 57-year-old taxicab driver to tbe penalty of disqualification from receiving unemployment compensation for tbe duration of bis unemployment on the ground that it is misconduct, within the meaning of tbe employment security commission aet,* for a taxicab driver, for whatever reason, to lose bis right to drive a motor vehicle. This result was rejected as ludicrous by tbe referee; it was rejected, likewise, by tbe appeal board, unanimously; finally, notwithstanding failure *214of the employer and the commission even to urge such misconduct disqualification in the circuit court, the circuit judge considered the possibility and also rejected it in the following* language:
“The cases decided by our Supreme Court indicate that for a misconduct disqualification there must be an element of wilfullness and intention to injure or to damage the employer. The cases also make it clear that such malevolent intention must exist at the time of and in connection with work. In this particular case neither of these elements necessary for misconduct disqualification are present. First there does not appear to be any testimony in this case from which it could be found that this man intended to injure his employer. Next, the testimony makes it rather clear that this man lost his license because he failed to pay tickets. There is nothing-in the record which would tend to show that this man lost his job because of some traffic offense that he committed in the course of driving*. He lost his license because he failed to pay tickets. We don’t know whether these tickets are for offenses while he was driving on the job or not. He lost his licence for failure to pay the tickets. This failure is something* that did not occur on the job or necessarily have close connection with the job. The burden of proving* disqualification for misconduct is upon the person urging it. Here, there is no evidence tending to show that the improper conduct occurred on the job or in some close relationship to it. Therefore, we do not have a situation which may be described as being ‘connected with work’ within the meaning of the statute.”
Notwithstanding the unanimous rejection of such a result by the referee, by the appeal board members and by the circuit judge, Justice Kelly invokes the harsh sanction of disqualification for misconduct. And he does so without so much as a description (from the record, of course) of what he calls the “ac*215tions defendant Clay deliberately committed # * * that resulted in his losing his driver’s license” and that, in Justice Kelly’s view, constitute statutory misconduct. This is what I find in the record, — all of the evidence pertinent to the “actions defendant Clay deliberately committed”:
“Q. What happened that you couldn’t work after April 18th?
“A. For the simple reason I was arrested, you know, and the police officers taken me to jail; and then I had a friend that lent me the money, loaned me the money to pay up the back tickets that I owed.
“Q. When were you arrested; after the 18th?
“A. Yes, sir, after that.
“Q. You were held in the county jail?
“A. I was held there for about 2 hours.
“Q. How much did you pay off?
“A. I paid off $35.
“Q. You paid off 35 ?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. What happened then? How much did you owe altogether?
“A. Well, that’s what they told me in the court that’s all I owed. Come to find out 2 or 3 weeks later they sent me another notice, said I owed 2 more tickets. I didn’t understand that.
“Q. When they arrested you and you paid off the $35, did they give you back your license?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. They held your license?
“A. Well, the license had expired for 3 days. I was driving on a permit until the license became valid. You know what I mean. It takes 3 weeks for your license to become valid.
“Q. To reinstate you. How much more did they claim you owe?
“A. They said I didn’t owe any more. That’s why they let me loose.
*216“Q. Well, I mean after. You stated you got a letter.
“A. Yes, sir, I got a letter stating I owe 2 more tickets. I think that’s why they’re holding the license.
“Q. How much more do you owe?
“A. Well, 1 was a moving violation. I think it come to about $5—
“Q. And how much was the other one?
“A. The other one was $3. One’s behind. That run around, was about $15.
“Q. Did you try to straighten this thing out?
“A. Well, I can’t. I haven’t earned any money since I got in bad with the police on those tickets.
“Q. So the only thing that held you up was your lack of a chauffeur’s license?
“A. Yes, but the only thing, I was supposed to have a hearing on the 12th to go before a referee, just like I am here.
“Q. This month or next month?
“A. Oh, September. I don’t know how I’m going to come out, but the lady told me at the desk that I might be able to receive some kind of a permit for 14 or 15 days.
“Q. How many points did you have against you?
“A. They told me it was 13 points.
“Q. Why didn’t you get an attorney?
“A. Well, that’s the trouble: There is such a little bit of money to be made driving a cab I didn’t have the money for an attorney. * * *
“Q. Your license was revoked until August of 1962; is that correct?
“A. Yes, sir. That’s as close as I can get to it, sir.
“Q. And you have an appeal with the appeal board at the secretary of State’s office?
“A. Yes, sir, I’ve got an appeal with them.
“Mr. Stewart: Well, that’s about the size of it. I mean, if he had a license — ■
*217“The Referee (interposing): Would you have work for him if he gets his license hack?
“Mr. Stewart: Yes, if he has a license, I’m pretty sure that Mr. Phillips will — ”
If the foregoing evidence brings this case within the meaning of misconduct as defined by this Court in Cassar v. Employment Security Commission, 343 Mich 380, Justice Kelly or 1 of his concurring brothers should say so. Per contra, if by what this Court does today a new definition of statutory misconduct is intended to be announced, it should not be done sub silentio. For me, either result would be absurd.
The appeal board ruled:
“It is held that the claimant was separated from employment under nondisqualifying circumstances and no disqualification is imposed under either section 29 (1) (a) (1) or (2) of the act.
“It is further held that the claimant was available for work of a character which he is qualified to perform by past experience or training and of a character generally similar to work for which he has previously received wages and no ineligibility is imposed within the meaning of section 28(c) of the act.”
The circuit judge affirmed and so should we, there being competent evidence to support the board’s findings of fact and its conclusions of law being sound. For unanimous elaboration of the circuit court’s, and our, properly limited role in review of such administrative decisions, see Wickey v. Employment Security Commission, 369 Mich 487, 489-493, 499, and 500.
Kavanagh, C. J., concurred with Souris, J.
Black, J., concurred in result.

 CLS 1961, §§ 421.28, 421.29 (Stat Ann 1960 Eev §§ 17.530, 17.531).