Court Opinion

ID: 9626050
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:00:33.384818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:20.200808
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Day
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The showing before this court is:
1. That the defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere without advice of counsel;
2. That prior to the imposition of sentence he was afforded counsel for the first time, who advised him that he should change his plea;
3. That appointed counsel filed motions to withdraw the plea and enter a plea of not guilty and motion for admission to bail;
4. That all motions were denied and that sentence was imposed upon the defendant for a term of 18 months to 5 years;
5. That a motion for new trial was filed and denied.
In view of the trial court’s unfavorable action and the sanction conferred upon it by this court, of what use to the defendant was the appointment of counsel? The reason that the constitutional guarantees of right to trial by jury and right to counsel are secured to a defendant under the Federal and State constitutions is to afford him an opportunity to demonstrate under proper evidence that the facts do not, in law, amount to a crime.
.The statute, under which Maes was charged, (C.R.S, *577’53, 43-1-1), omitting those portions not pertinent here, provides:
“Any man who shall willfully neglect, fail or refuse tto provide reasonable support * * * shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary * * * unless it shall appear that owing to physical incapacity or other good cause he is unable to furnish the support * *
Since' variable elements of the crime are willful neglect, failure or refusal to provide reasonable support, excepting physical incapacity or other good cause, the result of the majority clearly flies in the teeth of reason as well as justice.
The only admission that Maes has made of record, other than the plea of nolo contendere, warrants perusal and reads' as follows:
“In 1961, I gave my wife $120.00. I was living with her at that time. She had me thrown in jail and when I got out I had my Parole transferred to Pueblo. I was unemployed at this time because I had been in an accident. I could not pay her anything. I found a job at a hospital and started paying her $10.00 a week for six months. I stopped making payments in February 1962 because I was in the hospital, and when the police came up to serve me the papers I read them but they were not delivered to me. I left the same night and came back to Denver. One year later, they picked me up in Pueblo for Non-Support. In the event I am granted probation, I am willing to make regular payments.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Interspersed through the probation report and the report of the psychiatrist appointed to examine Maes are recitals of circumstances which, if pieced together and proper dates supplied, may be a complete defense to a criminal charge for non-support. Despite the fact that the doctor labels defendant’s statements as “convenient,” the defendant, nevertheless, is entitled under the law, to "have his credibility determined by a jury.
*578The period during which defendant is charged with non-support is from April 1, 1962, to April 22, 1963. Defendant’s statement to the probation officer was that he was supporting his wife with payments of $10.00 a week until he went into the hospital. What caused him to become hospitalized and the length of his stay at the hospital has not been revealed to the court; and furthermore, no attempt has been made, so far as we can determine from the record, to ascertain the exact dates and duration of his confinement. There is a statement in the record that this defendant was stricken with hepatitis in 1962. When he was first stricken, whether it resulted in his confinement at home or any other illuminating factors pertaining to his disability could be, and probably would be, properly developed by proper evidence presented to a jury. It is clearly demonstrated by the doctor’s report that the hepatitis confined him to the Veterans Hospital, in Albuquerque, New Mexico, for the last four months during the period for which he is charged with non-support, namely, January, February, March and April of 1963. There is a statement in the probation report that the defendant was in an accident in 1961; but the psychiatrist’s report says the accident occurred in 1962. No effort was made on the part of those reporting to the court to reconcile these dates. Defendant’s counsel, in asking for a change of plea and for a trial, may have competent clarifying evidence on these dates. There is a claim of brain damage, which may well be substantiated by medical proof. There is a claim of headaches and loss of memory which were downgraded by a psychiatrist, but which defense counsel, with the aid of court-appointed medical help, may be able to develop more fully. There is a report from the Colorado Department of Rehabilitation in the record which states: “His inability to obtain full time employment [is] because of either a brain damage or a need for psychiatric treatments. Final diagnosis is expected within two weeks. At that time a determination will be made re*579garding eligibility for vocational rehabilitation services.” Defense counsel could well have determined that he could develop this evidence to illustrate that there is, in fact, disability; that it has existed since the time of the accident in 1961 or 1962, and has been a continuing factor in the unemployment of this defendant.
Another cogent reason appears for disapproving the court’s refusal to permit the defendant to change his plea. The Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that the court shall not accept a plea of guilty without: “(1) determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge, and (2) explaining fully to the defendant his right to trial by jury, his right to counsel, and the possible penalty provided by statute for the offense charged.” The record of the arraignment proceedings shows that the court explained No. 2 above concerning trial and counsel, but he did not explain No. 1, to-wit: “nature of the charge.” True this was not a guilty plea, but in law it has the same effect as one. Young v. People, 53 Colo. 251, 125 Pac. 117; Meier v. People, 133 Colo. 338, 296 P.2d 232. We cannot be sure from this record that the nature of this plea, as well as the nature of the charge, was explained to him. For all that appears here, he may well have believed that mere non-payment was sufficient to support the charge; and that since he did not deny non-payment of support, he could not contest the charge.
Another factor which may have influenced the decision is that after entering the plea of nolo contendere the defendant “fled the jurisdiction and his bond was forfeited.” The record shows that after the entry of his plea of nolo contendere and prior to his hearing on probation on September 12, 1963, he was treated in a Pueblo clinic where an electroencephalogram was performed to determine whether he had brain damage. What the results of that examination were or what they revealed was never presented to the court. The record shows that during the last three months of the time that he was “an *580alleged fugitive” he was a patient at the State Hospital at Pue'blo. Whether the illness which confined him to the State Hospital can be related back to cover the period in April, 1962, as well as to the attack of hépatitis in January, 1963, was never revealed to the court. Possibly, it may be a basis for a meritorious defense.
In my view it sufficiently appears that the failure to support may not be willful, but may be due to disability, and that it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny this defendant effective use of counsel. If the change of plea were allowed, and thereafter on the trial of the case there was a finding of guilt under all of the circumstances, then substantial justice would be done, and no harm would result to the defendant. If the.trial would result in his acquittal, even more so the ends of justice would be served and counsel’s opinion that the plea of nolo contendere should not have been entered would be vindicated. Denial to this defendant of his right to a trial is, in fact, a denial of his right to counsel as well.
Mr. Justice Pringle joins in this dissent.