Court Opinion

ID: 9896560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-13 18:02:30.019871+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:07.864785
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11198    Document: 47-1     Date Filed: 11/13/2023   Page: 1 of 21

                                                   [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-11198
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

        REGINAL L. HOLSTON,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        JACOB J. DAWSON,
        Assistant Warden of Programs,
        WARDEN,
        ANNE OTWELL,
        MARK HARRISS,
        RYAN ENGLISH, et al.,

                                                  Defendants-Appellees.

                          ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-11198

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Middle District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 2:21-cv-00202-SPC-NPM
                            ____________________

        Before LAGOA, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Reginal Holston, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, ap-
        peals the district court’s dismissal of his second amended complaint
        alleging federal and state claims of First Amendment retaliation,
        deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, medical negli-
        gence, violations of due process, false imprisonment, intentional
        infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), conspiracy, and violations
        of Florida’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
        (“RICO”) statute. Although Holston contends on appeal that he
        sufficiently alleged each of the counts against each of the defend-
        ants, the facts he alleged amounted to speculation of violations of
        federal and state law based on his disagreements with the defend-
        ants’ conduct and, thus, he did not plausibly allege that the defend-
        ants violated his rights. In addition, Holston did not comply with
        Florida pre-suit requirements, so his claim of medical negligence
        was barred. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
        his second amended complaint with prejudice.
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        22-11198                    Opinion of the Court                                  3

            I.      FACTUAL           BACKGROUND                &     PROCEDURAL
                    HISTORY
               Holston initially filed a pro se civil rights complaint in Florida
        state court against Ryan English, Colonel Mark Harriss, Nurse
        Anne Otwell, Jacob Dawson, and Derek Snider, who removed the
        case to the federal district court. Those defendants then moved to
        dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, and a magistrate
        judge ordered Holston to either respond to the motion or file an
        amended complaint.
               Holston filed an amended complaint attached three docu-
        ments as exhibits that would later be referenced throughout a sec-
        ond amended complaint and, ultimately, in the district court’s or-
        der dismissing Holston’s case. Two of the documents were recom-
        mendations for Holston to be placed on Close Management
        (“CM”) 1 by nonparties named Smith and Cecilia, which stated that
        Holston was initially placed in CM due to one incident where Hol-
        ston injured an officer’s arm by pulling him into a shower and an-
        other incident where Holston swung a closed fist at another officer.

        1 CM is “the separation of an inmate apart from the general population, for

        reasons of security or the order and effective management of the institution,
        when the inmate, through his or her behavior, has demonstrated an inability
        to live in the general population without abusing the rights and privileges of
        others.” Fla. Admin. Code § 33-601.800(1)(a). There are three levels of CM:
        (1) CMI is the most restrictive single cell housing level; (2) CMII is in the mid-
        dle; and (3) CMIII is the least restrictive. Id. § 33-601.800(1)(b), (2). The Insti-
        tutional Classification Team conducts hearings and makes recommendation,
        which the State Classification Office approves, disapproves, or modifies. Id.
        § 33-601.800(3)(h), (i).
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        4                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11198

        The third exhibit was English’s disciplinary report accusing Hol-
        ston of attempted extortion.
              The district court dismissed Holston’s amended complaint
        without prejudice because Holston had improperly sought to as-
        sert unrelated claims against several defendants. This dismissal
        prompted Holston to file a second amended complaint against
        Dawson, Snider, Nurse Otwell, Colonel Harriss, English, as well as
        Warden Lars Severson and Major A. Scarpati (collectively, the “De-
        fendants”), which is the operative pleading in this case.
                Holston alleged that, in December 2019, he was beaten and
        tortured by officers, which Colonel Harriss authorized and Warden
        Severson concealed. He was served with a notice of a CM recom-
        mendation based on him causing injury to another, and at the In-
        stitutional Classification Team (“ICT”) hearing, ICT recom-
        mended he be placed in CMI. Holston was then served another
        notice but did not appear at the second ICT hearing.
                Thereafter, Holston alleged that was transferred to another
        facility, at which English made it clear that he knew Colonel Har-
        riss from Holston’s previous facility because Colonel Harriss “used
        to be [English’s] sergeant,” and that Holston should expect retalia-
        tion at the new facility. Holston filed a grievance regarding Eng-
        lish’s retaliatory statements and Dawson, who reviewed the griev-
        ance, admitted that Holston was not present at the second ICT
        hearing but denied the grievance. At a six-month CM review hear-
        ing before the ICT, a nonparty named Brock, Major Scarpati, and
        Dawson conspired with Colonel Harriss to ratify the false
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        22-11198               Opinion of the Court                         5

        allegations regarding Holston’s physical assault of the officers from
        nonparty Smith’s CM recommendation. Dawson based his retali-
        atory decision to deny the formal grievance on nonparty Cecilia’s
        CM recommendation after Holston engaged in free speech.
               Holston further alleged that, after placing sick call requests,
        Holston visited Nurse Otwell, but she did not take his vital signs,
        argued with him about grievances he filed, and belittled him. He
        alleged that she falsified information in his medical files regarding
        his medical complaints as a form of retaliation.
               Holston further alleged that he received a second CM re-
        view notice that omitted any reference to the attempted extortion,
        and at the ICT review, Dawson, Major Scarpati, and nonparty
        Brock were on the review panel. They colluded against him, along
        with Warden Severson, who denied a grievance Holston submitted
        challenging his continuation in CM without a 90-day review. After
        a second recommendation for reduction to CMIII with a 90-day re-
        view, English, Dawson, and Major Scarpati rejected the 90-day re-
        view with a conspiratorially retaliatory animus.
               Based on the above allegations, Holston asserted 14 counts
        against varying Defendants. These claims included First Amend-
        ment retaliation claims in Counts 1 through 4; an Eighth Amend-
        ment deliberate indifference claim and state law medical negli-
        gence claim in Counts 5 and 11; procedural due process claims
        against in Counts 6 and 7; federal and state false imprisonment
        claims in Counts 8 and 12; an IIED claim in Count 10; 42 U.S.C.
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                   22-11198

        § 1983 conspiracy and common-law civil conspiracy claims in
        Counts 9 and 13; and a Florida RICO claim in Count 14.
                Ultimately, the district court dismissed Holston’s second
        amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. The
        court explained that Holston had already amended his complaint
        twice and that any future attempts to amend would be futile. Hol-
        ston’s appeal followed, in which he challenges the dismissal of each
        of his claims.
            II.   STANDARDS OF REVIEW
               “We review de novo a district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6)
        motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Holland v. Carnival
        Corp., 50 F.4th 1088, 1093 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks
        omitted) (quoting Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1335
        (11th Cir. 2012)). Generally, we must accept as true the allegations
        in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to
        the plaintiff. Id. However, such direction is inapplicable to legal
        conclusions couched as factual allegations. Id.
                To withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
        the complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief
        that is plausible on its face.” Hunt v. Amico Prop., L.P., 814 F.3d 1213,
        1221 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
        Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plau-
        sible on its face when it contains facts that allow the court to draw
        a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged
        misconduct. Id. While we liberally construe pro se pleadings, Tan-
        nenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), the
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        22-11198               Opinion of the Court                         7

        plaintiff’s allegations must be more than mere labels, conclusions,
        or a formulistic recitation of the cause of action, Hunt, 814 F.3d at
        1221. Finally, a district court may consider documents outside the
        four corners of the complaint when such information is central to
        the plaintiff’s claim and the information’s authenticity is undis-
        puted. Maxcess, Inc. v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 433 F.d3 1337, 1340 (11th
        Cir. 2005).
               Generally, a pro se plaintiff must receive at least one oppor-
        tunity to amend the complaint if he might be able to state a claim
        by doing so. Woldeab v. Dekalb Cty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291-
        92 (11th Cir. 2018). However, a district court need not grant leave
        to amend where a more carefully drafted complaint could not state
        a claim. Id. at 1291. Leave to amend would be futile if the amended
        complaint would still fail to state a claim. L.S. ex rel. Hernandez v.
        Peterson, 982 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2020).
           III.    DISCUSSION
                   A. First Amendment Retaliation Claims
               In his second amended complaint, Holston alleged four
        claims of First Amendment retaliation. In Count 1, he contended
        that Nurse Otwell’s alleged false statements in his medical records
        were in retaliation for the grievances he filed regarding the condi-
        tions of his confinement during which he experienced swelling and
        pain in his abdomen and gastrointestinal complications. In
        Count 2, he alleged that Dawson and Major Scarpati kept him in
        CM based on their improper reliance on prison staff reports that
        falsely stated that he assaulted two officers. In Counts 3 and 4,
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11198

        Holston alleged that Dawson, Major Scarpati, and Warden Sev-
        erson failed to conduct a 90-day review of his CM detention in re-
        taliation for filing grievances.
               The First Amendment forbids prison officials from retaliat-
        ing against prisoners for exercising the right of free speech. Smith
        v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2008). To prevail on a First
        Amendment retaliation claim, a prisoner must show: “(1) his
        speech was constitutionally protected; (2) the inmate suffered ad-
        verse action such that the administrator’s allegedly retaliatory con-
        duct would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from engag-
        ing in such speech; and (3) there is a causal relationship between
        the retaliatory action and the protected speech.” Id.
                A prisoner’s complaints to prison administrators about the
        conditions of his confinement are protected speech. Id. Under the
        second element, we employ an objective test which allows for
        “weeding out” those claims for which complained of injuries are
        trivial or are no more than a “de minimis inconvenience in the exer-
        cise of First Amendment rights.” Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247,
        1253 (11th Cir. 2005). Finally, to establish causation the plaintiff
        must show that the defendant was subjectively motivated to disci-
        pline him because of complaints about his conditions of confine-
        ment. Smith, 532 F.3d at 1278.
              Here, the district court properly dismissed with prejudice
        Holston’s Counts 1 through 4. As to Count 1 against Nurse Otwell,
        Holston failed to sufficiently allege that he suffered an adverse ac-
        tion. The note Nurse Otwell wrote did not cause others to deny
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        22-11198                Opinion of the Court                        9

        Holston medical care, as evidenced by Holston’s own allegations.
        Moreover, the note directly related to the ailments Holston com-
        plained of at that time. Thus, Holston failed to establish a causal
        connection between his alleged injuries and Nurse Otwell’s ac-
        tions. Smith, 532 F.3d at 1276.
                To Count 2 against Dawson and Major Scarpati, Holston’s
        claim again failed to establish causation between his alleged injuries
        and the defendants’ actions. Specifically, Holston’s allegations re-
        garding the impact that the reports of other officers had on his
        placement in CMI is entirely speculative and insufficient to support
        a First Amendment retaliation claim. Hunt, 814 F.3d at 1221.
                Finally, to Counts 3 and 4 against Dawson, Major Scarpati,
        and Warden Severson, Holston’s claims do not establish that he
        suffered an adverse action or causation. First, the ICT’s decisions
        were in Holston’s favor because his CM restrictions were reduced.
        Second, as to causation, Holston’s allegations do not support a find-
        ing that the defendants’ decision to offer him a 180-day as opposed
        to 90-day review was motivated by his previous grievances. Any
        attempt to amend these claims would be futile, and we affirm the
        district court’s dismissal of these claims with prejudice.
                   B. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Need Claims
              In Count 5, Holston alleged that Nurse Otwell violated the
        Eighth Amendment by refusing to treat an unspecified “serious
        medical condition” and wrote a note in his records instructing
        other medical personnel to deny him future treatments.
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11198

                The Eighth Amendment prohibits a prison official from act-
        ing with deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical
        need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To prevail on an
        Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, a prisoner must
        satisfy an objective and subjective inquiry. Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t
        of Corr., 973 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020). Under the objective
        inquiry, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he had an “objectively
        serious medical need” that had either been diagnosed by a doctor
        as requiring treatment or was so obvious that a lay person would
        readily see the necessity for a doctor’s attention. Id. Under either
        scenario, the medical need must be one that, if it were to be left
        unattended, would pose a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. Un-
        der the subjective prong, the plaintiff must show that the prison
        officials acted with a deliberate indifference to his medical needs,
        which requires the plaintiff to show that the officials “had a subjec-
        tive knowledge of a risk of serious harm,” they ignored that risk,
        and in ignoring the risk, acted with more than gross negligence. Id.
        (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harper v. Lawrence
        Cnty., 592 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2010)).
                “[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diag-
        nosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim
        of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle,
        429 U.S. at 106. Instead, medical treatment only violates the Eighth
        Amendment “when it is so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or ex-
        cessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamen-
        tal fairness.” Keohane v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1266
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        22-11198                Opinion of the Court                          11

        (11th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harris
        v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991)).
                Here, the district court properly dismissed with prejudice
        Count 5. Holston’s second amended complaint failed to allege
        what his “objectively serious medical condition” was at the time he
        saw Nurse Otwell. Hoffer, 973 F.3d at 1270. To the extent Count 5
        is based on Nurse Otwell’s alleged decision not to treat him which
        caused his stomach to swell, none of his allegations suggest the
        swelling was an objectively serious medical need. Finally, Holston
        failed to show that Nurse Otwell was deliberately indifferent to his
        swelling—his initial sick call request never mentioned gastrointes-
        tinal swelling, and when Holston did seek treatment for the condi-
        tion, other medical professionals treated him. Because Holston
        cannot cure these pleading deficiencies, the district court properly
        dismissed this claim with prejudice.
                   C. Medical Negligence Claims
               Holston also alleged that Nurse Otwell negligently failed to
        properly assess him and refer him to a physician. The district court
        interpreted his complaint as raising a state-law medical negligence
        claim and dismissed it for failure to satisfy Florida’s pre-suit require-
        ments.
               Florida courts will read a plaintiff’s negligence claim as a
        claim alleging medical negligence when the claim arises out of the
        failure to render medical services. See Indian River Mem’l Hosp. v.
        Browne, 44 So. 3d 237, 238-39 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (granting
        petitioner’s writ of certiorari and holding that the plaintiff’s
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11198

        complaint for negligence was really a claim for medical negligence
        because the claim arose out of the rendering of or failure to render
        medical care); see also Fla. Stat. § 766.106(1)(a) (defining a claim for
        medical negligence as “a claim, arising out of the rendering of, or
        the failure to render, medical care or services.”).
                To sufficiently allege a medical negligence claim, the plain-
        tiff must allege the following: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff
        a standard of care; (2) the defendant breached that standard; and
        (3) the breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s damages. Holly-
        wood Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Alfred, 82 So. 3d 122, 125 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
        App. 2012) (applying medical malpractice elements to a medical
        negligence claim). In a medical negligence action, the burden is on
        the plaintiff to establish the physician-defendant’s actions breached
        prevailing professional standards of care. Dockswell v. Bethesda
        Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 210 So. 3d 1201, 1206-07 (Fla. 2017) (quoting Fla.
        Stat. § 766.102(1)).
               Importantly, Florida law imposes conditions precedent for
        any lawsuit “arising out of the rendering of, or the failure to render,
        medical care or services,” such as notifying the defendant of the
        intent to initiate litigation and a pre-suit investigation. Fla. Stat.
        § 766.106(1)(a), (2)(a). Before a claimant can bring a medical negli-
        gence claim under Florida law, the claimant must comply with
        these pre-suit requirements. Shands Jacksonville Med. Ctr., Inc. v.
        Pusha, 254 So. 3d 1076, 1081 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2018).
              As an initial matter, the district court properly construed
        Holston’s negligence claim as a claim for medical negligence
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        22-11198               Opinion of the Court                        13

        because the claim arose out of Nurse Otwell’s rendering of, or al-
        leged failure to render, medical care. Indian River Mem’l Hosp., 44
        So. 3d at 238-39. Thus, Holston had to comply with Florida’s pre-
        suit requirements to properly bring this claim. In his second
        amended complaint, Holston merely stated that all conditions
        precedent had been satisfied which is a legal conclusion not entitled
        to a presumption of truth. Holland, 50 F.4th at 1093. He otherwise
        made no representation in his second amended complaint that he
        satisfied Florida’s pre-suit requirements for medical negligence
        claims.
                Even if Holston had satisfied Florida’s pre-suit requirements,
        he still failed to allege a causal connection between his gastrointes-
        tinal issues and any action on Nurse Otwell’s part. Moreover, he
        did not show that Nurse Otwell proximately caused his gastroin-
        testinal problems, nor can Nurse Otwell’s note in Holston’s medi-
        cal records be read as a directive to future health care providers to
        not provide Holston future treatment. Thus, he has failed to satisfy
        the third element of a medical negligence claim. The district court
        properly dismissed this claim with prejudice as well.
                   D. Procedural Due Process Claims
              In Counts 6 and 7, Holston brought procedural due process
        claims against Dawson and Colonel Harriss. To Count 6 against
        Dawson, Holston alleged that Dawson improperly denied the
        grievance Holston filed related to his CM detention, a decision
        which, at least in part, was based on evidence Holston disputed. In
        Count 7 against Colonel Harriss, he alleged that Harriss violated
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        14                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11198

        his due process rights by rehearing Holston’s grievance without
        Holston present.
                To assert a procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C.
        § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) a deprivation of a constitution-
        ally-protected liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and
        (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.” Grayden v. Rhodes, 345
        F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Cryder v. Oxendine, 24 F.3d
        175, 177 (11th Cir. 1994)). Incarcerated individuals have “no con-
        stitutionally-protected liberty interest in access to” a prisoner inter-
        nal grievance procedure. Bingham v. Thomas, 645 F.3d 1171, 1177
        (11th Cir. 2011).
               However, a prisoner has a protected liberty interest that
        would entitle him to procedural due process protections in two cir-
        cumstances. Jacoby v. Baldwin Cnty., 835 F.3d 1338, 1347 (11th Cir.
        2016). First, he is entitled to “procedural due process when an in-
        creased restraint ‘exceeds his sentence in such an unexpected man-
        ner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its
        own force.’” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515
        U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). Second, he is entitled to “procedural due pro-
        cess when a change in his conditions of confinement ‘imposes atyp-
        ical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordi-
        nary incidents of prison life.’” Id. (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484)).
        Thus, incarcerated individuals have a due process right to a hearing
        prior to being punished for violating prison rules if “the punish-
        ment is demonstrably harsher than the ordinary conditions of
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        22-11198               Opinion of the Court                        15

        prison life. This is because these inmates are already subject to pun-
        ishment on account of their convictions and sentences.” Id.
               However, the Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell recog-
        nized that a state statute could create a liberty interest, separate
        from the Due Process Clause, where a statutory provision provided
        for a shortened prison sentence based on good time credits which
        were revocable if the prisoner was found guilty of serious miscon-
        duct. 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974). Florida law provides inmates with
        the possibility to receive ten days of gain time for each month of
        the sentence as a means of encouraging satisfactory behavior and
        gain-time may be forfeited when the person violates the rules of
        the Department of Corrections. Fla. Stat. § 944.275(4)(a), (5).
               When a constitutionally-protected liberty interest exists for
        a disciplinary hearing in a prison, the prison must give the pris-
        oner: “(1) advance written notice of the charges; (2) a written state-
        ment of the reasons for the disciplinary action taken; and (3) the
        opportunity to call witnesses and present evidence ‘when permit-
        ting him to do so [would] not be unduly hazardous to institutional
        safety or correctional goals.’” Jacoby, 835 F.3d at 1350 (quoting
        Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-66).
               Here, the district court properly dismissed with prejudice
        Counts 6 and 7. As an initial matter, Holston has not established
        that his placement in CM impacted his ability to receive gain-time,
        and it has not been established that the hearings before the ICT
        implicate procedural due process protections, meaning Counts 6
        and 7 were properly dismissed for that reason. Nevertheless, as to
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        16                     Opinion of the Court                22-11198

        Count 6 against Dawson, to the extent Holston’s claim involves the
        CM hearing, to which he was procedurally entitled under Wolff, his
        claim fails because he does not allege that the CM hearing itself was
        procedurally inadequate. Additionally, to the extent Holston con-
        tests Dawson’s denial of his grievance, the denial was not so atypi-
        cal or harsh as to entitle Holston to heightened due process protec-
        tions. Bingham, 645 F.3d at 1177.
               As to Count 7 against Colonel Harriss, Holston’s claim was
        based on an ICT hearing where the ICT met to correct a typo-
        graphical error, not to worsen Holston’s conditions of confine-
        ment. Thus, Holston failed to allege a protected liberty interest
        based on either increased restraint or a change in confinement con-
        ditions at stake at the hearing where the ICT met to merely correct
        a typographical error. Jacoby, 835 F.3d at 1347. Because any at-
        tempt to amend these claims would also be futile, the district court
        properly dismissed this claim with prejudice.
                  E. False Imprisonment Claims
               Next, Holston alleged two counts of false imprisonment
        against Colonel Harriss, Dawson, English, Warden Severson, and
        Major Scarpati, based on his placement in CM.
               A claim of false imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “re-
        quires a showing of common law false imprisonment and a due
        process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Campbell v.
        Johnson, 586 F.3d 835, 840 (11th Cir. 2009). A valid conviction de-
        prives a criminal defendant “of his liberty to the extent that the
        State may confine him and subject him to the rules of its prison
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        22-11198                Opinion of the Court                         17

        system so long as the conditions of confinement do not otherwise
        violate the Constitution.” Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224
        (1976).
                Under Florida law, a “plaintiff must establish four elements
        to prevail on a false imprisonment claim: (1) the unlawful deten-
        tion and deprivation of liberty of a person; (2) against that person’s
        will; (3) without legal authority or color of authority; and (4) which
        is unreasonable and unwarranted under the circumstances.” City
        of Boca Raton v. Basso, 242 So. 3d 1141, 1143 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
        2018) (quotation marks omitted). A lawful detention cannot be
        considered false imprisonment. Johnson v. Barnes & Noble
        Booksellers, Inc., 437 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 2006).
                Here, Holston is clearly confined within the Florida prison
        system due to a valid criminal conviction, the prison officials have
        authority to place Holston within CM, and Holston has established
        no separate violation related to his CM detention. Thus, the dis-
        trict court properly dismissed with prejudice Counts 8 and 12.
                   F. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims
                In Count 10, Holston alleged that Colonel Harriss, Dawson,
        English, Major Scarpati, Nurse Otwell, and Warden Severson in-
        flicted intentional emotional distress by denying him medical care
        and recommending that he be housed in CM. The district court
        dismissed this claim because Holston’s claims failed to allege
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        18                         Opinion of the Court                         22-11198

        outrageous conduct under Florida law, and it alternatively con-
        cluded that his claim was barred pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). 2
               Under Florida law, to state a claim for intentional infliction
        of emotional distress, the plaintiff must allege: “(1) deliberate or
        reckless infliction of mental suffering; (2) outrageous conduct;
        (3) the conduct caused the emotional distress; and (4) the distress
        was severe.” Thomas v. Hosp. Bd. Of Dirs., 41 So. 3d 246, 256 (Fla.
        2d Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
        Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Steadman, 968 So. 2d 592, 594 (Fla. 2d Dist.
        Ct. App. 2007)). Outrageous conduct is behavior that is “so outra-
        geous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
        possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
        utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Byrd v. BT Foods, Inc.,
        948 So. 2d 921, 928 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Allen v.
        Walker, 810 So. 2d 1090, 1091 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
               Here, the district court properly dismissed with prejudice
        this count. Notwithstanding the district court’s alternative ruling
        regarding the applicability of § 1997e(e), the dismissal was proper
        because Holston failed to allege any kind of “outrageous conduct.”
        Accepting Holston’s allegations as true, none of the Defendants’

        2 On appeal, Nurse Otwell continues argue that Count 10 is procedurally

        barred under § 1997e(e). However, we will not reach this issue because we
        affirm the district court's dismissal on other grounds supported by the record.
        See Marrache v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., 17 F.4th 1084, 1097 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding
        that this Court may affirm a district court decision for any reason supported
        by the record).
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        actions can be interpreted as “extreme” or as going “beyond all pos-
        sible bounds of decency” to be considered “atrocious.” Id.
                   G. Federal & State Conspiracy Claims
              In Counts 9 and 13, Holston alleged that Colonel Harriss,
        Dawson, English, Major Scarpati, Nurse Otwell, and Warden Sev-
        erson conspired against him to violate his Eighth, Fourth, and
        Fourteenth Amendment rights.
               To adequately state a claim for a conspiracy under § 1983,
        the “plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendants reached an under-
        standing or agreement that they would deny the plaintiff one of his
        constitutional rights; and (2) the conspiracy resulted in an actual
        denial of one of his constitutional rights.” Weiland v. Palm Beach
        Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1327 (11th Cir. 2015).
                Under Florida law, there is no freestanding cause of action
        for a civil conspiracy. Tejera v. Lincoln Lending Servs., LLC, 271 So.
        3d 97, 103 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2019). Thus, to state a claim for
        a civil conspiracy, the “plaintiff must allege and underlying inde-
        pendent tort. The conspiracy is merely the vehicle by which the
        underlying tort was committed.” Id. Where the counts regarding
        the goals of the conspiracy fail, the conspiracy count must also fail.
        Palm Beach Cnty. Health Care Dist. v. Prof’l Med. Educ., Inc., 13 So. 3d
        1090, 1096 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2009). Here, the district court
        properly dismissed with prejudice these counts because, as ex-
        plained above, his underlying constitutional and state law tort
        claims already fail.
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        20                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11198

                  H. Florida RICO Claims
               Finally, Holston asserted a Florida RICO claim against Daw-
        son, Snider, Major Scarpati, and Warden Severson, accusing them
        of seven distinct wrongdoings: (1) not serving him coffee for 372
        days; (2) imposing restrictions on other inmates “for any or no rea-
        son at all,” depriving them of the use of their property; (3) conceal-
        ing inmate violence; (4) falsely reporting that Holston attempted to
        extort English; (5) encouraging Smith to falsify Holston’s CM rec-
        ommendation; (6) relying on a false CM report in a CM recommen-
        dation; and (7) including false information in a CM recommenda-
        tion.
                To sufficiently allege a Florida RICO claim, which is ana-
        lyzed under the same standards as federal RICO claims, the plaintiff
        must plead “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern
        (4) of racketeering activity.” Omnipol, A.S. v. Multinational Def.
        Servs., LLC, 32 F.4th 1298, 1308 (11th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation
        marks and citation omitted). An “enterprise” is any individual or
        group of individuals associated in fact. Fla. Stat. § 895.02(5). Com-
        mitting a “racketeering activity” means someone is committing, at-
        tempting to commit, conspiring to commit, or soliciting, coercing,
        or intimidating another person into committing the crimes out-
        lined in the statute. Fla. Stat. § 895.02(8)(a).
             Here, the district court properly dismissed with prejudice
        Count 14 because he failed to allege facts supporting the conclusion
        that Dawson, Snider, Major Scarpati, or Warden Severson
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        22-11198                   Opinion of the Court                                 21

        participated in any behavior that would qualify as racketeering ac-
        tivity under Florida law.
            IV.     CONCLUSION
               For the reasons outlined above, we AFFIRM the district
        court’s dismissal with prejudice of Holston’s second amended
        complaint. 3

        3 Holston also moved this Court for leave to file a single copy of his reply brief,

        which is GRANTED.