Court Opinion

ID: 9719607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:57:09.471707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:37.577423
License: Public Domain

BARNES, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
This Court has the duty to raise and resolve the question of jurisdiction in all cases where there may be any doubt as to its existence. Rocha v. State, 287 Ga. App. 446 (1) (651 SE2d 781) (2007). Because the trial court granted the motion to suppress as a sanction for the State’s dilatory conduct rather than on the substantive ground that the evidence was unlawfully obtained, we are without jurisdiction to hear the State’s interlocutory appeal. Accordingly, we are required to dismiss the appeal, and I dissent from the majority opinion reaching the merits of the trial court’s ruling.
Neither the United States nor the Georgia Constitution grants a *356right of appeal to the State in criminal cases. State v. Martin, 278 Ga. 418, 418-419 (603 SE2d 249) (2004). Rather, the authority of the State to directly appeal an adverse ruling in the criminal context is limited to the instances expressly enumerated in OCGA § 5-7-1. State v. Forehand, 246 Ga. App. 590, 593 (2) (542 SE2d 110) (2000). Moreover, the provisions of OCGA § 5-7-1 must be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the interests of defendants. See Martin, 278 Ga. at 419; Berky v. State, 266 Ga. 28, 30 (463 SE2d 891) (1995).
Under OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (4), the State may appeal directly “[f]rom an order, decision, or judgment suppressing or excluding evidence illegally seized[.]” Notably, OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (4) has been construed to authorize a direct appeal only if the trial court’s exclusion of evidence was based, at least in part, “upon its determination that the [S]tate unlawfully obtained the evidence.” (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Lavell, 214 Ga. App. 525 (448 SE2d 270) (1994). If the exclusion of evidence is solely based upon some other ground, such as the general evidentiary rules of admissibility, a direct appeal by the State is not permitted. See Berky, 266 Ga. at 28-30 (direct appeal not authorized where trial court suppressed the evidence on ground that State failed to lay a foundation for its admission); Lavell, 214 Ga. App. at 525-526 (direct appeal not authorized where trial court suppressed the evidence on ground that it was inadmissible hearsay). See also State v. McKenna, 199 Ga. App. 206, 207 (404 SE2d 278) (1991) (direct appeal not authorized where trial court suppressed the evidence on ground that the Intoximeter test printout had been materially altered); State v. Brown, 185 Ga. App. 701, 702 (365 SE2d 865) (1988) (direct appeal not authorized where trial court suppressed the evidence based upon its interpretation of the express stipulation entered into by the State and defendant). In determining whether a trial court’s order is subject to direct appeal under OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (4), we focus “not upon the terminology used by the court, but upon the substance of the trial court’s action.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Berky, 266 Ga. at 29. Thus, “even though an order is denominated as one of those which is appealable by the State,” an appeal is not authorized if the order is the result of the exclusion of evidence on a ground not specifically enumerated in OCGA § 5-7-1. Id.
Here, the trial court granted Smith’s motion to suppress as a sanction for the State’s dilatory conduct, not on the ground that the photographic and in-court identifications were conducted in a manner that violated the law. The trial court did not hear from any witnesses; did not receive any documentary evidence; and, in fact, never conducted an evidentiary hearing at all. As such, contrary to the majority’s assertion, the trial court cannot be said to have ruled *357on the substantive merits of Smith’s motion. Because the trial court did not exclude the evidence on the ground that the State unlawfully obtained the identification evidence, the State was without authority to pursue a direct appeal under OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) (4), and we are without jurisdiction to hear this appeal. See State v. Evans, 282 Ga. 63, 64 (646 SE2d 77) (2007) (“If the State attempts an appeal outside the ambit of OCGA § 5-7-1 (a), the appellate courts do not have jurisdiction to entertain it.”) (citation omitted).
Decided March 10, 2011.
In concluding that jurisdiction was proper, the majority relies upon State v. Strickman, 253 Ga. 287, 288 (319 SE2d 864) (1984), in which the Supreme Court of Georgia held that OCGA § 5-7-1 should be construed liberally in favor of jurisdiction. Strickman, however, is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s later decisions in Martin and Berky, which held that OCGA § 5-7-1 should be strictly construed against the State.37 The Supreme Court has held that, in light of the repeal of the “full bench” rule, where there is conflict in its decisions on a particular subject, “the more persuasive rule is that which is later in time.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Massey v. Butts County, 281 Ga. 244, 246, n. 2 (637 SE2d 385) (2006). Accordingly, Martin and Berky control over Strickman. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Martin recognized the conflict in its precedent and narrowly construed Strickman as standing for the limited proposition that “the right of appeal provided to the [Sítate in the statute should not be frustrated by the manner in which the defendant names his motion,” a unique circumstance that clearly does not apply to the present case. (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Martin, 278 Ga. at 419.
For these combined reasons, the instant appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In reaching this conclusion, I express neither approval nor disapproval of the trial court’s ruling, and emphasize that public policy questions over whether OCGA § 5-7-1 should be expanded to allow for jurisdiction in a case such as this one are best left to our General Assembly.
*358Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Bettieanne C. Hart, Assistant District Attorney, for appellant.
Arthurlyn Combs-Hixson, for appellee.

 The majority suggests that Berky and Strickman can be distinguished from one another because they involve different subsections of OCGA § 5-7-1 (a). However, neither Supreme Court decision predicates its analysis or bases its reasoning upon a particular subsection of OCGA § 5-7-1 (a); rather, both decisions refer to the statute in general terms in discussing the proper mode of construction. See Berky, 266 Ga. at 30 (“Construing OCGA § 5-7-1 (a) strictly against the State, as we are bound to do. . . .”); Strickman, 253 Ga. at 288 (“[W]e deem the enactment of the appeal statute to he remedial in nature. . . . Being remedial in nature, it should be construed liberally.”). Furthermore, distinguishing Berky from Strickman in the manner suggested by the majority would have the anomalous result of requiring courts to liberally and strictly construe different subsections of the same statute.