Court Opinion

ID: 9716671
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:47:37.884946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:47.757187
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE QUINN, dissenting: The majority holds that the trial court’s decision to admit the evidence of the Melamed armed robbery was an abuse of discretion. In doing so, the majority has found that the trial court’s decision was “arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable [or that] no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” People v. Ilgen, 145 Ill. 2d at 364. The trial court’s decision was not an abuse of discretion; it was correct. As the majority points out, in People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 53 (1995), our supreme court held that proof of other crimes may be properly admitted to establish modus operandi to bolster the State’s proof of identity. As noted in the Robinson opinion, the similarities between the case being tried and the two cases used to show modus operandi were as follows. That case on trial involved an attack on 56-year-old Lily Barber, which occurred on March 16, 1990, in the Chatham neighborhood. As Barber exited her car in her garage she was confronted by a man wearing a mask. A struggle ensued during which Barber pulled off the mask and the man displayed a knife and took her wallet. The man forced her to lie on the ground and pull down her pants and threatened to have sex with her. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 59. In the first case admitted to show modus operandi, Elouise Law testified that on March 23, 1990, as she exited her garage in the Chatham area, someone hit her, knocking her down. The assailant grabbed her purse and ran away. Law testified that she could not identify her assailant. Her credit cards were recovered from a woman who testified that she had gotten them from Robinson. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 60-61. In the second case admitted to show modus operandi, Louise Collins testified that in 1977 she was approached by a man with a knife in the vestibule of her building in the Chatham neighborhood. The man took her purse, forced her to remove her clothing and get on the floor. Collins then described how she escaped by stabbing the man with his own knife. Collins also testified that she identified the defendant as her attacker during a lineup that took place on January 20, 1978. Collins identified defendant as her attacker in open court during the trial of defendant for the armed robbery of Lily Barber. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 61. Defendant was incarcerated for all but two years between the attack on Collins and the armed robbery of Barber. The facts presented by the armed robberies of Rosenbloom and Melamed in the current case are much more similar than those in the Robinson case. The armed robberies were two days apart, during the afternoon or early evening. They took place within one block of each other (one at Sangamon and Van Burén and one on Peoria at Van Burén). In both cases, the offender approached the middle-aged white male victim from behind, the offender got in front of the victim, displayed a handgun, used the same expletive when demanding the victim’s wallet and took the whole wallet rather than just the currency. In both cases the offender fled westbound on Van Burén and then northbound from the scene. Defendant was identified by both Rosenbloom and Melamed in lineups and in open court as the offender. The majority asserts that “[t]he probative value of Melamed’s testimony was reduced because of the strength of the case against defendant.” 303 Ill. App. 3d at 732. Curiously, the majority also asserts “the possibility of prejudice was greater because defendant argued mistaken identity and attempted to provide an innocent explanation for the physical evidence linking him to the crime.” 303 Ill. App. 3d at 732. Defendant’s counsel asserted in her opening argument that defendant had roommates and the jury would hear testimony concerning them. During the defense case, defendant and his landlord both testified that defendant occasionally had roommates who fit defendant’s general description and who had access to defendant’s car. Defense counsel argued that the foreign currency taken during the armed robbery of Rosenbloom was actually recovered from defendant’s car, not from defendant. During closing argument, defense counsel argued that, since defendant’s roommates had access to the car described by Rosenbloom, one of them must have committed the armed robbery. The evidence of the armed robbery of Melamed was properly used to rebut this evidence and the inferences arising from it. In People v. Tellez, 235 Ill. App. 3d 542 (1992), this court held that a trial court may allow proof of other crimes evidence in the State’s case in chief to rebut evidence that the trial court is aware the defense intends to use. People v. Tellez, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 554-55. As was true in the Robinson and Tellez cases, the trial court here allowed the State to present the proof of other crimes only after the parties briefed and argued the issue. In announcing its finding, the trial court cited our supreme court’s holdings in People v. Jones, 156 Ill. 2d 225 (1993), and People v. Kokoraleis, 132 Ill. 2d 235 (1989), both of which dealt with modus operandi evidence. As already pointed out, the facts of the two incidents admitted in the case sub judice were much more similar than those in People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 53 (1995). I believe that the majority’s holding in this case is symptomatic of a serious problem resulting from inconsistent appellate decisions addressing the issue of the admissibility of other crimes evidence. The reviewing court correctly states that the determination of admissibility of evidence is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal unless it is an abuse of discretion, citing People v. Ilgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 364 (1991). However, the reviewing court then reverses the trial court because it would have come to a different conclusion as to the admissibility of the evidence. This occurs so frequently that I believe that our courts of review have failed to provide any reasonable guidance on this issue to the trial courts. The majority’s holding demonstrates that when the trial courts of this state allow proof of other crimes in any case for any reason, they do so at their peril.