Court Opinion

ID: 9950870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 22:02:46.275324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:04.558011
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/14/24
                      CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

      IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                       FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                               DIVISION TWO

       SAMANTHA WOOD,
       Petitioner and Appellant,
                                            A168463
       v.
       SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY                 (San Francisco County
       SUPERIOR COURT,                      Super. Ct. No.
                                            SCNC2366789)
       Defendant and Respondent.

      Appellant Samantha Wood filed a petition for name change, to change
her name to Candi Bimbo Doll, a name by which she has long been known.
No opposition was filed, and no hearing was held. But a trial judge did some
research and, citing to a California case, a 34-year-old law review article, and
TikTok, filed a 33-line order denying the petition. We conclude that denial
was error, and we reverse.
                               BACKGROUND
      On April 12, 2023, representing herself, appellant Samantha E. Wood
filed a petition for change of name. The petition was on the Judicial Council
Form and sought to change her name to Candi Bimbo Doll, and asserted this
basis for the change: “This is an identity I have pursued well over a decade;
I have already embraced it and taken numerous, permanent steps to secure
it. The name is the last thing left. I promise I know what I’m requesting.”
The petition was signed under penalty of perjury.
      No opposition was filed to the petition. No hearing was held.

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      On July 14, 2023, the trial court entered an order denying the petition,
which order provided in its substantive entirety as follows:
      “Petitioner requests to change her name to ‘Candi Bimbo Doll.’
Petitioner here asserts that she has pursued the identity for well over a
decade, has ‘already embraced it, and taken numerous steps to secure it. The
name is the last thing left.’
      “A person has a common law right to change their name to ‘Candi
Bimbo Doll’ without the necessity of any legal proceeding. (California Code of
Civil Procedure (CCP) 1279.5(a).) A CCP 1276 proceeding to change a
person’s name merely provides a public record of the name change.
(Weathers v. Superior Court (1976) 5[4 C]al.App.3d 286, 288.)
      “However, no person has a statutory right to officially change their
name to a name universally recognized as being offensive. (Lee v. Superior
Court (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 510, 514 [(Lee)].)
      “Although the word ‘bimbo’ has sometimes been used to mean a
prostitute, the Oxford English Dictionary says it’s used now as a derogatory
term for ‘a young woman considered to be sexually attractive but of limited
intelligence.’ The derogatory meaning of bimbo, universally, is an attractive
but stupid young woman; a foolish, stupid, or inept person.
      “The Court is aware of a TikTok trend of the 2020’s, post-covid shut
down, called ‘Bimbofication’ which encourages embracing self-love and
claiming the word ‘bimbo’ as their own. While the perception of ‘bimbo’ may
be changing in the TikTok world, the word itself is perceived as offensive and
seen as a step backward for women empowerment in our culture. Criticisms
such as ‘It’s still degrading and sexist, and now men think they get to call
women that too,’ and ‘Bimbofication and contemporary femininity is deeply

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rooted in consumerism and choice feminism. Attaching a couple of
progressive words to it doesn’t actually make it political.’
      “ ‘One feature of strong insults and epithets is that they tend to shock
those at whom they are directed and others who hear.’ (Greenwalt, Insults
and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech (1990) 42 Rutgers L. Rev. 287,
291.) Such strong reactions may even result in an unwanted negative
physical response against the owner of the name or others around him or her.
      “The judiciary should not lend the Great Seal of the State of California
to aid a person in a ‘social experiment’ who proposes to change their name to
a word or phrase that is determined to be vulgar and offensive. (Lee, supra[,
9 Cal.App.4th at p.] 510.)
      “Therefore, the petition is denied.”
      On August 9, represented by counsel, Wood filed an appeal.
                                 DISCUSSION
      Introduction
      Counsel filed an opening brief on Wood’s behalf. Consistent with the
record below, where there was no opposition to Wood’s petition, no
respondent’s brief was filed. However, our clerk’s office received a letter from
the San Francisco Superior Court that read as follows: “The above-referenced
appellate proceeding has been brought to the attention of the Superior Court
of California, County of San Francisco (the Superior Court). Following a
review of the record on appeal, the Superior Court does not wish to
supplement the analysis and reasoning in the July 14, 2023 order in the
underlying name-change petition proceeding, Petition of Samantha E. Wood
(Superior Court No. CNC-23-557879), and this appellate matter may be
considered submitted based on the record and appellant’s opening brief.”

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      Denial of the Name Change Was Error
      As Wood described in her petition, she has been known as Candi Bimbo
Doll “for well over a decade,” a name the law recognizes, as a person has a
common law right to change his or her name without applying to a court. It
has been said that a person may refer to themselves by any name they like
(In re Forchion (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1284, 1307 (Forchion)), and may do so
without the need for any legal proceeding. (In re Marriage of Banks (1974)
42 Cal.App.3d 631, 637 (Banks).) But using a name does not provide a record
of the change of name or formally change it. That is where the statutory
procedure for a name change comes into play, which procedure was enacted
“in affirmation of [the] common law right and for the purpose of providing for
the establishment of a change of name as a matter of public record.” (Banks,
supra, 42 Cal.App.3d at p. 637, citing In re Ross (1937) 8 Cal.2d 608, 609 and
In re Application of Useldinger (1939) 35 Cal.App.2d 723, 726.)
      Code of Civil Procedure sections 1275 et seq. govern the process by
which an individual can obtain a formal legal name change in California.
Section 1277 provides that once a petition seeking a name change is filed, the
superior court shall make an order setting forth the details of the petition
and direct all persons interested in the matter “to appear before the court at
a time and place specified . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1277, subd. (a)(1).) That
section also directs that notice of the hearing and pending petition be
published in a newspaper of general circulation. (Id., subd. (a)(2)(A).)
Section 1278, subdivision (a)(1) provides that if an objection is filed by any
person, the court may examine “on oath” any persons touching the petition or
application and may order the name change or dismiss the petition as to the
court may seem right and proper. And section 1278, subdivision (a)(2) goes

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on to provide that “If no objection is filed . . . the court may, without hearing,
enter the order that the change of name is granted.”
      As the word “may” indicates, the trial court has some discretion on the
issue, and we review its ruling for abuse of discretion. (Forchion, supra,
198 Cal.App.4th at p. 1304.) And as to how that discretion is to be
exercised—how a court is to rule on a petition for name change—cases have
held that a change of name “may be denied only when there is a showing of
‘substantial reason.’ ” (Banks, supra, 42 Cal.App.3d at p. 638, citing In re
Ross, supra, 8 Cal.2d at p. 610; In re Trower (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 75, 76−77,
disapproved on another ground in In re Marriage of Schiffman (1980) 28
Cal.3d 640, 647; and In re McGehee (1956) 147 Cal.App.2d 25, 26.) As one
court described, there must be “substantial and principled reasons” for
denying a name change. (See In re Arnett (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 654, 661.)
Or as another put it, a person should be able to “adopt any name he or she
chooses [citation] so long as the name is not adopted to defraud or
intentionally confuse.” (Weathers v. Superior Court, supra, 54 Cal.App.3d at
pp. 288−289.)
      None of those descriptions apply here—and the denial was error.
      Two cases from this District are instructive. This first is In re
Application of Useldinger, supra, 35 Cal.App.2d 723, a case from this court.
There, Harold Verne Useldinger petitioned to change his name to James J.
Britt, a name by which he had been known for 14 years, had been married,
had registered the birth of his child, and had conducted tavern businesses.
No objections were filed, but one James Edward Britt appeared at the
hearing and advised the court of his background and experience, especially
one experience when petitioner had put up a sign indicating that a tavern

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had changed hands and his interaction with petitioner in that tavern. After
hearing from James Edward Britt, the trial court denied the petition.
      We reversed. We began with discussion of the common law and the
statutory developments, and then discussed the principles in In re Ross,
supra, 8 Cal.2d 608, including its admonition that there must be “some
substantial reason” for denial of a name change. Then, after discussing what
had been put before the court by James Edward Britt, we concluded as
follows:
      “In reversing the order of the trial court, we do not mean to imply that
every petition for change of name must be granted or that the trial court may
deny a petition only upon a showing of actual fraud or the actual invasion of
the legal rights of another. Each case must stand upon its own particular
facts in determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion in
denying the petition. We are of the opinion, however, that as the petitioner
here had constantly used and had been generally known by the adopted name
over a long period of years, it did constitute an abuse of discretion to deny
him a legal record of such change upon the unsubstantial showing made in
opposition to his petition. Until such time as the common-law right to change
one’s name may be abrogated by statute, the courts should encourage rather
than discourage the filing of petitions for change of name [citation] to the end
that such changes may be a matter of public record.” (In re Application of
Useldinger, supra, 35 Cal.App.2d at pp. 726−727.) Here, of course, there was
no opposition—other than by the trial court.
      The second case is Banks, where Janice Christensen Banks petitioned
to change her name to her maiden name. The trial court denied the petition
on the basis that the change could have an adverse effect on their children.

                                        6
After discussing the statutory scheme, our colleagues in Division Four
modified the judgment to reflect the name change, concluding as follows:
      “Under this statutory scheme, a person who has applied to a superior
court for an order changing his [or her] name may obtain an order registering
the change if to the court it ‘may seem right and proper.’ (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1278.) Thus, the trial judge is given discretion just as he is under Civil
Code section 4362 in dissolution proceedings.
      “However, it has been held that a change of name under the Code of
Civil Procedure may be denied only when there is a showing of ‘substantial
reason’ (In re Ross, supra, 8 Cal.2d at p. 610; In re Trower[, supra,] 260
Cal.App.2d [at pp.] 76−77; In re McGehee[, supra,] 147 Cal.App.2d [at p.] 26)
or ‘peculiar circumstances’ (In re Useldinger, supra, 35 Cal.App.2d at p. 726).
In effect the burden of proof rests on the person who would deny the change,
not the person seeking the change.
      “. . . . Just as public policy favors judicial granting of a name change for
correcting the public record, it should also favor the restoration of maiden
name in dissolution proceedings.” (Banks, supra, 42 Cal.App.3d at
pp. 637−638.)
      As quoted above, the trial court noted that the “Oxford English
Dictionary says [Bimbo is] used now as a derogatory term for ‘a young woman
considered to be sexually attractive but of limited intelligence.’ The
derogatory meaning of bimbo, universally, is an attractive but stupid young
woman; a foolish, stupid, or inept person.”
      We pause here to note that while the dictionary definition quoted
seems correct, no support appears for the “foolish, stupid, or inept” person.
But even if there were, we do not understand how “inept,” for example, can be
a basis to reject a name change.

                                        7
      But even if it were, in the very next paragraph the court noted that it
was “aware of a TikTok trend of the 2020’s, post-covid shut down, called
‘Bimbofication’ which encourages embracing self-love and claiming the word
‘bimbo’ as their own”—in other words, a part of a positive trend of women’s
empowerment on TikTok and in our society.
      In a July 2023 column entitled “Greta Gerwig’s Barbie Movie is a
Feminist Bimbo Classic,” a professor at Anglia Ruskin University in the
United Kingdom wrote this: “Gerwig’s take on Barbie is timely. My research
explores the recent feminist reclamation of the ‘bimbo’ figure. On TikTok, the
#Bimbo trend sees feminine-presenting content creators reclaiming the once
derogatory ‘bimbo’ label and aesthetic. Instead of abandoning femininity to
succeed in a patriarchal society, bimbo feminism embraces femininity while
supporting women’s advancement.” (Fletcher, Greta Gerwig’s Barbie Movie is
a Feminist Bimbo Classic, The Conversation (July 19, 2023).) In short, as
best we understand it, Bimbofication is using the once derogatory term as a
means of empowerment, to build a sense of community—as a positive. The
trial court disregarded all that.
      The trial court cited one case in support of its denial, Lee, supra,
9 Cal.App.4th 510, first cited for the proposition that no one has a “statutory
right to officially change their name to a name universally recognized as
being offensive,” and going on to cite Lee at the end of its order for the
proposition that “[t]he judiciary should not lend the Great Seal of the State of
California to aid a person in a ‘social experiment’ who proposes to change
their name to a word or phrase that is determined to be vulgar and
offensive.” Lee is a far cry from the situation here.
      There, Russell Lawrence Lee petitioned to change his name to “Misteri
Nigger,” on the basis the name would further his goals on social justice. The

                                        8
trial court denied the petition, and the Court of Appeal affirmed, beginning
its opinion with the observation that “The proposed surname is commonly
considered to be a racial epithet and has the potential to be a ‘fighting word.’ ”
The court went on to hold that no one has a statutory right to change his or
her name to one universally recognized as offensive (Lee, supra,
9 Cal.App.4th at pp. 513−514), and that “the trial court’s determination that
the proposed surname was vulgar, offensive, and a racial slur [was] a
substantial and principled reason for denial of the motion.” (Id. at p. 515.)
Finally, the court noted that the proposed name here may also constitute
“fighting words,” which the court should not sanction, adding “It matters not
that appellant’s motives may be rooted in a sincere and honest attempt to
remove the sting from the word ‘n[*****]’or that it may only be uttered in the
context of a name. It is the reaction thereto that may cause a breach of the
peace.” (Id. at p. 518.)
      The word causing the rejection in Lee is perhaps the most inflammatory
word in the English language, a word one author described as one that
“wreaked symbolic violence, often accompanied by physical violence.”
(Rahman, The N-Word: Its History and Use in the African-American
Community (2011) Journal of English Linguistics, p. 6.) It is hard to come up
with an adjective adequate to describe a discussion of that word in the same
breath as Bimbo.
      As also noted, the trial court cited the 1990 Rutgers Law Review
article, quoting that “One feature of strong insults and epithets is that they
tend to shock those at whom they are directed and those that hear.”
(Greenwalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech? (1990)
42 Rutgers L.Rev. 287, 291.) That article lists numerous—Wood’s brief says
53—examples of offensive terms. Bimbo is not among them.

                                        9
      In sum and in short, Bimbo is not a fighting word. It is not vulgar.
And according to the trial court’s description of TikTok and the professor’s
comments, it is not necessarily offensive.
      A business search for Bimbo on the California Secretary of State
website reveals that the Secretary lists 17 entities as including the name
Bimbo, some of which are as simple as Bimbo, LLC and Bimbo, Inc., a list of
which we take judicial notice. (See Wood v. Superior Court (2020)
46 Cal.App.5th 562, 580, fn. 2 [taking judicial notice of several pages of
DFEH website, and noting that “[w]hile we may not judicially notice the
truth of any statement in these materials, we may take notice of the fact that
they were made to the public”].) The Secretary of State has no issue with
Bimbo.
      Nor does the California Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). The
DMV instructions state that it will not issue a personalized license plate that
has “sexual connotation” or a “vulgar term or a term of prejudice or hostility.”
We understand the DMV has issued so many personalized license plates in
the name of “Bimbo,” “Bimbo 1,” “Bimbo 25” etc., that new requests are met
with the statement that “the license plate you selected is no longer available.”
      In all of California jurisprudence, including Lee, there are apparently
only five published cases upholding the denial of a name change. The other
four are: In re Weingand (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 289; In re Ritchie (1984)
159 Cal.App.3d 1070; Forchion, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th 1284; and In re
Harris (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 608, all of which cases involve, in one way or
another, confusion. Specifically:
      In re Weingand, supra, 231 Cal.App.2d 289 involved Eugene
Weingand’s petition to change his name to Peter Lorie, on the claimed basis
that his current last name is hard to pronounce, that he is engaged in show

                                       10
business, and that associates have called him by that name for approximately
one year. Peter Lorre, the movie actor, appeared at the hearing, and along
with other witnesses, testified against the name change. Lorre testified he
had been an actor for 42 years and appeared in 150 motion pictures and was
working in television. The Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of the petition
on the basis that the name would “confuse the public” and “directly affect the
commercial and professional value of the services and performances of Peter
Lorre.” (Id. at p. 294.)
      In re Ritchie, supra, 159 Cal.App.3d 1070 involved petitioner’s attempt
to change his name from Thomas Boyd Ritchie III to “III,” pronounced
“three.” Ritchie’s petition alleged that approximately six years prior to his
petition, he began using III as his name for the sake of convenience, that he
kept using the name because it gave him a greater sense of personal identity,
and that his friends, peers, and business associates knew him as III.
It further alleged that an official recordation of his new name was essential
in order to obtain credit cards and documents such as a driver’s license from
agencies and financial institutions. The petition was denied on the grounds
that the proposed change to a numeral did not constitute a name change
within the meaning of the law, and that the new name was “inherently
confusing.” (Id. at pp. 1071−1072.) The Court of Appeal affirmed, noting in
part that in light of the modern trend toward high technology and data
necessary by computers, “it is not unreasonable to conclude that the usage of
numbers for designating or describing persons might cause inherent
confusion in public records which, in turn, may well facilitate deception or
fraud of individuals, institutions or the public as a whole.” (Id. at p. 1074.)
      In Forchion, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th 1284, the trial court held that
petitioner, a marijuana advocate with a national reputation, could not change

                                       11
his name to “NJ weedman.com,” the name of his website, including the
“.com.” The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that “domain names were
created for use on the Internet and should be limited to assisting a user in
finding a desired Web site. The court reasoned that petitioner could lose the
use of the Web site by failing to make periodic registration payments or by
breaching the registration agreement, in which event the Web site name
could be registered to someone else, and, at the same time, petitioner could
keep his new personal name, resulting in confusion. But even if petitioner
maintained the website, the name “might be so similar to another Web site
name or trademark that the multiple usage would create confusion.” (Id. at
pp. 1287, 1312.)
        In re Harris, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th 608 involved Andre Pierre Harris’s
petition to change his name to “:Minko: Yona-Gvinge: El-Bey®.” The trial
court denied the petition because Harris had outstanding warrants, a denial
the Court of Appeal affirmed. (Id. at pp. 610, 611, 613.)
        Confusion. Confusion. Confusion. Confusion. There is no confusion
here.
        As noted above, we review the trial court’s decision for abuse of
discretion. As to what that entails, we addressed the subject at some length
in People v. Jacobs (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 728, noting among other things
that “ ‘ “ ‘The discretion of a trial judge is not a whimsical, uncontrolled
power, but a legal discretion, which is subject to the limitations of legal
principles governing the subject of its action, . . .’ ” The scope of discretion
always resides in the particular law being applied, i.e., in the “legal principles
governing the subject of [the] action . . . .” Action that transgresses the
confines of the applicable principles of law is outside the scope of discretion
and we call such action an “abuse” of discretion. [Citation.]’ . . . [¶] [T]he

                                        12
‘legal principles that govern the subject of discretionary action vary greatly
with context. [Citation.] They are derived from the common law or statutes
under which discretion is conferred.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Jacobs, supra,
156 Cal.App.4th at p. 737; accord, People v. Williams (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th
990, 1000−1001.) As our Supreme Court distilled it in Sargon Enterprises,
Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773, “the
court’s discretion is not unlimited,” but rather “must be exercised within the
confines of the applicable legal principles.”
      As shown above, that law provides that “public policy favors granting a
name change” and courts should “encourage rather than discourage” it. The
trial court did not even mention these, or other governing principles, and
essentially turned the law on its head. Moreover, there must be “substantial
and principled reasons” for denying a name change. No such reason is
present here.
                                DISPOSITION
      The order denying the petition to change name is reversed, and the
matter is remanded to the trial court to enter a new order granting the
petition.

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                                  _________________________
                                  Richman, J.

We concur:

_________________________
Stewart, P. J.

_________________________
Miller, J.

Wood v. San Francisco County Superior Court (A168463)

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Trial Court:                     San Francisco County
                                 Superior Court;

Trial Judge:                     Honorable Gail Dekreon;

Attorney for Petitioner and      Law Office of James Reilly,
Appellant, Samantha Wood:        James Reilly;

Attorney for Defendant and       Superior Court of California,
Respondent, Superior Court of    County of San Francisco,
California, County of San        Stella Pantazis, Managing
Francisco:                       Attorney and General
                                 Counsel.

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