Court Opinion

ID: 9706710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:50:11.928043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:24.638577
License: Public Domain

Griffin, P.J.
(concurring). I write separately to express my disagreement with Michigan’s anachronistic doctrine of common-law arbitration that allows the unilateral revocation of common-law arbitration contracts.
An excellent discussion of common-law arbitration is contained in EE Tripp Excavating Contractor, Inc v Jackson Co, 60 Mich App 221, 243-245; 230 NW2d 556 (1975), wherein it is noted that historically contracts for arbitration were disfavored. Arbitration contracts were deemed to be against public policy because they operated to oust the courts of their traditional jurisdiction. For this reason, the courts modified normal contract principles to allow a party to unilaterally revoke a contract to arbitrate at any time before the rendering of an arbitration award.
As noted by our Court in Tripp, supra at 246-247, the public policy arguments of a century ago are no longer credible in today’s world:
The heavily case-loaded courts are no longer jealous of their jurisdiction. Where the parties, by a fair agreement, have adopted a speedy and inexpensive means by which to have their disagreements adjusted, we see no public policy reasons for the courts to stand in their way. On the contrary we have a clear expression of public policy in the legislative enactments which provide for statutory arbitration.
In the sixteen years since the Tripp decision, courts throughout the country have continued to *351recognize that modern public policy no longer disfavors enforcing arbitration agreements. See Anne Arundel Co v Fraternal Order of Anne Arundel Detention Officers, 313 Md 98, 103-110; 543 A2d 841 (1988) (quoting Tripp, supra), Pettinaro Construction Co, Inc v Harry C Partridge, Jr, & Sons, Inc, 408 A2d 957 (Del Ch, 1979), and LH Lacy Co v City of Lubbock, 559 SW2d 348, 352 (Tex, 1977).
Although the policy of unilateral revocation of common-law arbitration contracts is outdated and unsound, such a rule of law has been well established in Michigan since Chippewa Lumber Co v Phenix Ins Co, 80 Mich 116; 44 NW 1055 (1890). While one could argue that the statements in Chippewa Lumber Co were mere dicta, the doctrine is too firmly entrenched to be overruled by this intermediate appellate court. I, however, urge the Supreme Court to do so.
In all other respects, I agree with the majority.