Court Opinion

ID: 9891194
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-17 19:04:05.02988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:36.731677
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/17/23 Pollock v. Macdonald CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID POLLOCK,                                                       D080710

         Plaintiff and Respondent,

         v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. 37-2018-
                                                                   00063633-CU-FR-NC)
JENNIFER ANN MACDONALD,

         Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Superior Court of San Diego
County, Blaine K. Bowman, Judge. Affirmed.
         Jennifer Macdonald, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
         CL Ludmer and Christopher L. Ludmer, for Plaintiff and Respondent
David Pollock.
         Defendant Jennifer Macdonald appeals from a judgment entered
against her after a jury trial and a post-judgment order denying her motion
for new trial, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and to vacate the
judgment. The jury found in favor of plaintiff David Pollock on his claims for
breach of contract, money had and received, conversion, and unjust
enrichment, and the trial court ruled in Pollock’s favor on his promissory
estoppel claim. We find no error and affirm the judgment.

             FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
A. The Underlying Dispute
      Pollock and Macdonald were an unmarried couple who dated for less
than one year, from approximately November 2017 to September 2018. The
two were never engaged and, according to Pollock, never discussed marriage.
During the relationship, Pollock worked in information technology, splitting
his time between Chicago and San Diego, and Macdonald was a registered
nurse and real estate investor living in San Diego.
      When Pollock and Macdonald began their relationship, Macdonald
already owned one rental income property in Hawaii. She bought a second
property in Hawaii soon after the two started dating. A few months into the
relationship, Macdonald raised the idea of buying a third rental property
together with Pollock, suggesting that the two of them purchase the
penthouse unit that was for sale in the same building as her second rental
property.
      In June 2018, Pollock and Macdonald decided to submit an offer of
$450,000 to jointly purchase the penthouse unit. Around the same time, the
couple discussed the way they would structure their joint investment. They
agreed to each put in half of the purchase amount; that they would split the
revenue from the rental of the property equally; that they would hold onto

1     As we will discuss in more detail, a full day of trial testimony was
omitted from the appellate record in this case. Pollock filed a motion to
augment the record, which we grant only as to the documents that were filed
or lodged with the trial court in this case. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.155(a).) However, the augmented record does not contain the missing trial
testimony. We therefore provide a statement of facts based on the incomplete
record before us.
                                      2
the property for approximately seven to ten years to earn the rental income
from it and allow it to appreciate in value; and that when they eventually
sold the property, they would recoup their initial investment. Pollock
suggested that the title be solely in Macdonald’s name to allow the purchase
to move more quickly, as he was spending much of his time in Chicago and
unavailable much of the time due to work. He therefore thought it logical to
give Macdonald the ability to speak on the couple’s behalf and allow her to
more quickly handle any problems that arose as they moved forward with the
transaction. She ultimately used the name of her trust on the property title
rather than her individual name, which Pollock was fine with.
      The couple agreed that Macdonald would manage the day-to-day affairs
of the property, as she was already familiar with how to do so given her
ownership of other rental properties in Hawaii. They also agreed that
Macdonald would handle any expenses to facilitate the management of the
property and would pay for those expenses out of her portion of the rental
income. In exchange, Macdonald would keep any capital gains from the
eventual sale of the property.
      Pollock and Macdonald agreed to open a joint checking account to hold
all money relating to the penthouse, including any expenses and rental
income. They each put $230,000 into the account to cover their half of the
purchase price ($225,000 each) plus an additional $5,000 each to cover closing
expenses, property taxes, and other initial expenses necessary to complete
the transaction. They agreed that the rental income would be split equally
between the two of them.
      The parties initially used the term “investment” to describe Pollock’s
monetary contribution to the penthouse purchase, but they soon began
describing the money as a “loan” given that Macdonald would be the only one

                                       3
on the property title. Macdonald agreed that Pollock’s $230,000 was a loan to
be repaid when the couple sold the property, and she promised before
purchasing the property that she would repay his loan.
      The parties did not put any of these terms or their agreement in
writing. Pollock did not ask Macdonald to sign a promissory note for his loan.
      Though no third parties witnessed any conversations about the couple’s
agreement regarding their joint investment, Macdonald referred to the
money from Pollock as a loan in writing to Pollock and others. In an email to
the property broker in June 2018, Macdonald wrote that Pollock was “going
to lend [her] $200,000, but as the loan” for the purchase of the penthouse. In
another email to Pollock, Macdonald asked him: “Can you take a picture of
one of your bank account that has at [sic] 100,000 - 200,000 with a note you
are loaning me funds[?]”
      Pollock did in fact deposit $230,000 into the parties’ joint checking
account in July 2018. He soon after informed his sister that he had
purchased a rental property in Hawaii as a way to set himself up for
retirement. In a later email exchange between Pollock and Macdonald,
Macdonald referred to the penthouse as “our condo.”
      In September 2018, Pollock told Macdonald that he did not see a future
with her and wanted to break up. Macdonald was very angry and said she
did not want to see or speak to Pollock again. A couple of weeks later, Pollock
approached Macdonald about potentially selling the penthouse to one of his
friends. Macdonald refused, stating that she wanted to stick to the original
plan of keeping the property as a long-term investment for seven to ten years.
At some point after this conversation, Macdonald closed the parties’ joint
bank account.

                                       4
      In October 2018, Pollock suggested to Macdonald that, to simplify
things and make their transactional relationship less stressful, she could pay
him a flat interest amount on the loan in lieu of having to calculate his
portion of the rental income each month. Macdonald texted him to say she
would think about it later.
      In an email the following day, Macdonald stated for the first time that
she thought the $230,000 from Pollock was a gift, because he never asked her
for a promissory note, contract, or property agreement and he had stated that
he did not want his name on anything. She also claimed Pollock never
discussed any terms related to the money. Pollock responded in part:
“I didn’t think you would actually try to steal my money.”
      In September 2019, Macdonald sold the Hawaii penthouse for
$530,000. She did not pay Pollock back his $230,000 loan, nor did she pay
him any of the rent she had received from the penthouse.
B. Trial Court Proceedings
      In December 2018, Pollock filed the initial complaint in this case
alleging causes of action for (1) breach of oral contract, (2) fraudulent
inducement, (3) promissory estoppel, (4) money had and received,
(5) conversion, and (6) unjust enrichment. He sought compensatory,
exemplary, and punitive damages. In April 2019, MacDonald filed a cross-
complaint, though she ultimately dismissed it.
      Trial began on March 17, 2022, proceeded on March 21 and March 22,
and concluded on March 23. On March 21, the second day of trial, Macdonald
did not appear in the courtroom. A courthouse deputy sheriff explained to
the court that in the main lobby of the courthouse that morning, Macdonald
had clenched her chest and leaned against the wall, exhibiting early signs of
a heart attack such as sweating profusely and breathing heavily. The deputy

                                        5
called for medics, who assessed Macdonald and determined that because of
her symptoms and a pre-existing heart condition, she should be taken to the
hospital. The court determined that the trial would proceed for the day, and
the court would get an update from Macdonald the next day to see how she
was feeling. Macdonald’s attorney was present during this exchange and
noted that although Macdonald was a witness, the parties probably would not
get to her testimony that day in any event. He did not object to proceeding in
Macdonald’s absence or request a trial continuance. Pollock was then sworn
in to testify.
      According to the March 22, 2022 trial minute order and partial
transcript, Macdonald again failed to appear in the courtroom on the third
day of trial. The minute order reads: “8:59 a.m. Prior to the start of trial
and outside the presence of the jury, the clerk receives a message from
Jennifer Macdonald. Court and counsel listen to the message. [¶] 9:04 a.m.
Jennifer Macdonald is present on the telephone outside the presence of the
jury. As reported in the notes of the court reporter, Defendant waives her
presence for the remainder of the trial.”
      During the telephone conversation that took place on the record,
Macdonald told the trial court judge that she had spent the night in the
hospital and was undergoing a four-hour cardiology test. The court noted for
the record that Macdonald had a medical emergency and therefore would not
be held in contempt for failing to appear for trial. The court informed
Macdonald that she had the right to testify but was not required to do so and
explained that, with her authorization, the trial could proceed in her absence
with her attorney representing her interests. The court offered several
different options, but Macdonald stated several times that she wished for the
trial to proceed without her. Before hanging up, the court once more

                                       6
confirmed Macdonald’s decision: “Then we will -- with your consent then,
Ms. Macdonald, I do find that you understand you do have the right to testify
on your own behalf and that you’re giving up that right and that [your
attorney] will represent you during the course of the trial. And that’s correct,
right?” Macdonald responded: “Okay. Yes.”
      Trial then proceeded. According to the minute order, Pollock continued
his testimony, the deposition of witness Gayle D. was read into the record,
excerpts from Macdonald’s deposition were read into the record, and counsel
for each party presented closing argument. The court then instructed the
jury, and the jury began deliberating.
      The next day, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Pollock on his
claims for breach of contract, money had and received, conversion, and unjust
enrichment. The jury found in favor of Macdonald on Pollock’s fraud claim.
The court also ruled in favor of Pollock on his promissory estoppel claim. The
judgment issued by the court stated that Pollock would recover damages in
the amount of $385,023.50 and punitive damages in the amount of $250,000,
for a total recovery of $635,023.50.
      After entry of judgment, Macdonald moved for a new trial, for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, and to vacate the judgment. The trial court
found Macdonald’s motions both procedurally defective and substantively
without merit, and it denied them all. Macdonald timely appealed.
                                 DISCUSSION
                                         I
      We note as an initial matter that Macdonald appears to have forfeited
her arguments on appeal by failing to provide a complete record. As the
Supreme Court has explained, “[i]t is a fundamental principle of appellate
procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct

                                         7
and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record
presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that
justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594,
608–609.) It follows that the appellant has the burden of providing an
adequate record on appeal, and if the record is inadequate for meaningful
review, the decision of the trial court should be affirmed. (Id. at p. 609.) In
other words, “ ‘[f]ailure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires
that the issue be resolved against [the appellant].’ ” (Ibid.; see also Ballard v.
Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574 [declining to consider the merits of the
plaintiff’s cross-appeal where he failed to provide an adequate record].)
      Here, the appellate record is missing a significant portion of the trial
testimony, as it does not contain the reporter’s transcript from March 22,
2022, the third day of a four-day trial that contained only two days’ worth of
testimony. Pollock submitted a request to augment the record that includes a
partial transcript containing the contents of the telephone call that took place
among the court, the parties, and counsel on March 22, but the augmented
record omits testimony from Pollock, the deposition testimony of witness
Gayle D. and Macdonald that was read into the record, and closing
arguments. It is unclear whether Macdonald intended to or did correctly
designate a complete trial transcript, but the fact remains that the record
before us is incomplete.
      Numerous appellate courts have declined to reach the merits of a claim
raised on appeal due to the absence of a reporter’s transcript, and we would
be justified in doing so here. (Foust v. San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011)
198 Cal.App.4th 181, 186–187 (Foust) [concluding that the incomplete record
submitted by the defendant was fatal to the appeal].) It was Macdonald’s
burden as appellant to supply an adequate record from which we could

                                        8
determine whether reversal is appropriate, and she has failed to do so.
Nevertheless, we will exercise our discretion to address the merits of
Macdonald’s claims to the extent permitted by the partial record before us.
                                        II
A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Proceeding with Trial in Macdonald’s
Absence
      Macdonald first contends that she was “forced into waiving her
rights . . . from her hospital bed in the Cardiac Intensive care unit” after
experiencing a medical emergency and that her attorney was therefore
“improperly forced to appear alone” without her. According to Macdonald,
this constituted a denial of a trial continuance and was an abuse of discretion
that deprived her of her due process rights. We disagree.
      A party’s right to be present at trial is not absolute—it may be
expressly or impliedly waived. (People v. Espinoza (2016) 1 Cal.5th 61, 72;
see also Whalen v. Superior Court (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 598, 600–601.) We
conclude that Macdonald waived this right, and nothing in the record
indicates that she was “forced” to do so. To the contrary, Macdonald
expressly and repeatedly confirmed that she wanted the trial to proceed
without her. During the telephone conversation among the parties and the
trial court recorded by the court reporter, the court informed Macdonald that
she had the right to testify but was not required to do so. Macdonald stated
that she thought that “would probably be easier” since she did not know what
would happen next after her cardiology test. The court offered to proceed
with trial for the day and check back in with Macdonald to see if she was able
to appear at trial the following day. Macdonald declined, saying: “You know,
I don’t feel well at all. I don’t really think I would be there in the morning.”
      The court then asked Macdonald to confirm that it was her request that
the trial proceed without her and that her attorney represent her interests in

                                        9
her absence. Macdonald answered, “Yes.” The court then reiterated that
Macdonald had other options: “We do have the option of having you testify
remotely if you want, but you’re telling me that you would prefer not to
testify at all. Is that correct?” Macdonald again confirmed that this was
correct. Before ending the telephone call, the court once more confirmed
Macdonald’s decision: “Then we will -- with your consent then,
Ms. Macdonald, I do find that you understand you do have the right to testify
on your own behalf and that you’re giving up that right and that [your
attorney] will represent you during the course of the trial. And that’s correct,
right?” Macdonald responded: “Okay. Yes.” Based on this record, it is clear
that Macdonald expressly waived her right to be present in the courtroom
during her trial.
      Moreover, at no point did Macdonald or her attorney request a trial

continuance based on her alleged medical emergency.2 The single case cited
by Macdonald in support of her argument is therefore inapposite. (See Vann
v. Shilleh (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 192, 195–196 [finding it an abuse of
discretion to deny the defendants’ request for a trial continuance after
attorney withdrew on the eve of trial].) We conclude that the trial court did
not err in proceeding with trial in Macdonald’s absence.
B. Macdonald Was Estopped from Asserting the Statute of Frauds
      Macdonald’s next contention is that no oral contract existed between
her and Pollock, but even if there was, it is unenforceable. She argues that
because the agreement relates to real estate and was to be performed over

2     We also note that the trial court specifically found Macdonald not to be
credible in terms of her purported health condition, concluding that she had
engaged in “antics designed to delay Plaintiff from having his day in court.”

                                      10
the course of seven to ten years, the statute of frauds required their
agreement to be in writing.
      Pollock responds that the statute of frauds does not apply here because
he performed all of his obligations under the parties’ agreement and

Macdonald is estopped from asserting the statute of frauds.3 He further
argues that Macdonald waived the statute of frauds defense by failing to
object to evidence of the contract presented at trial or to request a jury
instruction on the defense, and that even if the jury had found in favor of
Macdonald on the defense, her liability and damages would remain the same
given the jury’s verdict on Pollock’s claims for money had and received,
unjust enrichment, and conversion, and the court’s ruling on his promissory
estoppel claim.
      We agree with Pollock on his first argument and therefore need not
reach the others. Civil Code section 1624 provides that an “agreement that
by terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof” is
invalid unless in writing. (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a)(1).) But even
“[a]ssuming that the agreement in the present case falls within this provision
of the statute of frauds, the finding of the trial court that [Pollock] had fully
performed all of his obligations under the contract operates to remove the bar
of the statute [of frauds].” (Dutton v. Interstate Inv. Corp. (1941) 19 Cal.2d
65, 70; see also Dougherty v. California Kettleman Oil Royalties, Inc. (1937) 9

3      Pollock addresses full performance and equitable estoppel as separate
arguments. Because the principle that one party’s full performance removes
an oral agreement from the statute of frauds is based on principles of
estoppel, we consider the arguments together. (See Monarco v. Lo Greco
(1950) 35 Cal.2d 621, 623–624 [“The doctrine of estoppel to assert the statute
of frauds has been consistently applied by the courts of this state to prevent
fraud that would result from refusal to enforce oral contracts in certain
circumstances.”].)
                                        11
Cal.2d 58, 81 [“complete performance by [plaintiff] . . . clearly create[s] an
estoppel to plead the statute”]; Zakk v. Diesel (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 431, 454
[concluding that plaintiff’s “allegation that he fully performed all of his
obligations under the alleged oral or implied-in-fact contract was sufficient to
take the contract out of the statute of frauds”].)
      Here, the parties orally agreed that they would each pay half of the
purchase amount of the penthouse, split the rental income from the property
equally, and, when they eventually sold the property, recoup their initial
investment, with any additional profit going to Macdonald. Pollock fully
performed his part of the agreement by depositing $230,000 into the parties’
joint checking account in July 2018. We therefore conclude that Macdonald is
estopped from arguing that the parties’ oral contract is barred by the statute
of frauds.
C. The Economic Loss Rule Is Inapplicable
      Macdonald also contends that Pollock’s second through fifth causes of
action—fraudulent inducement, promissory estoppel, money had and
received, and conversion—should have been dismissed because they are
barred by the economic loss rule. According to Macdonald, Pollock failed to
demonstrate that she owed any duty independent of the parties’ contract, and
he therefore may not recover tort damages in what is essentially a breach of
contract case. We are not persuaded.
      The economic loss rule generally prohibits recovery in tort for
negligently inflicted financial harm unaccompanied by physical or property
damage. (Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905, 922–923
(Sheen).) In breach of contract cases, the rule serves to protect the
contractual bargain made by the parties and “ ‘prevents the erosion of

                                       12
contract doctrines by the use of tort law to work around them.’ ” (Id. at
p. 923.)
      But not all tort claims for monetary loss between contractual parties
are barred by the economic loss rule. (Sheen, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 923.)
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that tort damages are available in
breach of contract cases where “the breach is accompanied by a traditional
common law tort, such as fraud or conversion,” the means used to breach the
contract are tortious, or a party intentionally breaches the contract with the
intent or knowledge that the “breach will cause severe, unmitigable harm in
the form of mental anguish, personal hardship, or substantial consequential
damages.” (Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th
979, 990, internal quotation marks omitted (Robinson); Erlich v. Menezes
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 543, 553–554 (Erlich).) As the Court has explained,
“[f]ocusing on intentional conduct gives substance to the proposition that a
breach of contract is tortious only when some independent duty arising from
tort law is violated.” (Robinson, at p. 990; Erlich, at p. 554.)
      Applying these principles to the causes of action Macdonald contends
are barred, we find the economic loss rule inapplicable. First, although
Macdonald appears to include Pollock’s fraudulent inducement claim in her
argument, the jury actually found in favor of Macdonald on that cause of
action, so it is not at issue on appeal. Second, two of the claims about which
Macdonald complains—promissory estoppel and money had and received—
sound in contract rather than tort, as they are based upon breach of a
promise. (Utility Audit Co., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th
950, 958.) The economic loss rule therefore does not apply to these claims.
      As for Pollock’s conversion claim, the Supreme Court has made clear
that tort damages are recoverable by a party to a breached contract where

                                        13
the breach is accompanied by conversion. (Robinson, supra, 34 Cal.4th at
p. 990; Erlich, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 553.) This makes sense, as the many
reasons for adhering to the distinction between contract and tort remedies
have no bearing on a claim for conversion, which is a strict liability tort
arising independent of the contract. (See Welco Electronics, Inc. v. Mora
(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 202, 208–209.) The jury here found that the evidence
was sufficient to establish liability for conversion. Macdonald does not argue
otherwise. We therefore conclude that the economic loss rule does not bar
Pollock from recovering tort damages.
D. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Awarding Punitive Damages
      Macdonald’s final argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in
allowing Pollock to recover punitive damages in the absence of sufficient
evidence of her financial condition. We reject this argument. As we have
explained, “the cardinal rule of appellate review [is] that a judgment or order
of the trial court is presumed correct and prejudicial error must be
affirmatively shown.” (Foust, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 187.) Without a
complete reporter’s transcript, we cannot undertake a meaningful review of
Macdonald’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to support an
award of punitive damages, because we do not have record of precisely what
evidence was presented to the jury. (See ibid.) We must therefore presume
that the trial court correctly determined that sufficient evidence supported
the jury’s award of punitive damages.
      Moreover, an attack on the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal
without a fair statement of the evidence presented at trial is not entitled to
consideration. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246.)
Appellants who challenge the trial court’s decision based upon the absence of
substantial evidence are required to set forth all the material evidence on the

                                        14
issue—not merely their own evidence, as Macdonald did here. “Unless this is
done the error is deemed waived.” (Ibid.) Macdonald is not exempt from this
rule merely because she is representing herself in propria persona on appeal.
Her claims of insufficiency of the evidence are unsupported by citation to the
reporter’s transcript, and her recitation of facts fails to discuss all evidence
material to her contentions. We therefore find that Macdonald has waived
her sufficiency of the evidence argument on appeal.
                                   DISPOSITION
      The judgment and post-judgment order are affirmed. Pollock is
entitled to his costs on appeal.

                                                                 BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

CASTILLO, J.

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