Court Opinion

ID: 9388769
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 17:01:07.054499+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:22.463315
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          APR 21 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Gilberto Reducindo-Villanueva,                  No. 21-106

              Petitioner,                       Agency No.       A200-154-082

  v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
Merrick B. Garland, U.S. Attorney
General,

              Respondent.

                   On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                       Board of Immigration Appeals

                            Submitted March 13, 2023 **
                               Pasadena, California

Before: PAEZ, CHRISTEN, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge MILLER.

       Gilberto Reducindo Villanueva petitions for review of the Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision affirming the immigration judge’s denial

of his application for cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents, see 8

U.S.C. § 1229b(b), and denying his motion to remand. We hold that we have

jurisdiction to review these claims and deny the petition on the merits.

       *
            This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
       **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      1. Jurisdiction Over Motion. We treat a motion to remand to the

immigration judge for further factual development as a motion to reopen. See

Angov v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2015); Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I. & N.

Dec. 516, 526 (BIA 2015). Ordinarily, we have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s

denial of a motion to reopen as a final order of removal under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(1). Mata v. Lynch, 576 U.S. 143, 147 (2015). Under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), however, we lack jurisdiction to review the denial of a

motion to reopen that seeks to reapply for cancellation of removal on the same

basis upon which an earlier application for the same relief was denied.

Fernandez v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 592, 602–03 (9th Cir. 2006); but see 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(D) (restoring jurisdiction over constitutional questions or questions

of law). But where a motion to reopen “is presenting a basis for relief that was

not previously denied,” we retain jurisdiction. Fernandez, 429 F.3d at 601

(emphasis omitted).1

      Here, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to review the denial of the

motion because Reducindo Villanueva seeks to reapply for cancellation of

removal based on hardship to his U.S. citizen children that is different in kind

from the hardship he presented in his original application. See Garcia v.

1
  The Supreme Court’s decision in Patel v. Garland, 142 S. Ct. 1614 (2022),
does not alter this conclusion. Patel does not address motions to reopen. Patel
eliminates the jurisdictional distinction between discretionary and non-
discretionary determinations, id. at 1622, but does not abrogate the underlying
reasoning in Fernandez.

                                        2                                     21-106
Holder, 621 F.3d 906, 911–12 (9th Cir. 2010); Fernandez, 439 F.3d at 602–03.

At the time of Reducindo Villanueva’s hearing, his two children lived with their

respective mothers. Reducindo Villanueva argued that his children would

suffer from reduced financial support and emotional hardship due to lack of

contact with their father if he were removed. The motion to remand, in contrast,

presented evidence that both children now live with Reducindo Villanueva and

asserted that, after this change in the family’s circumstances, the children would

be forced to accompany their father to Mexico if he were removed. Reducindo

Villanueva argued that, in light of each child’s newly diagnosed developmental

and educational deficits, the children would suffer extreme and unusual

hardship from lack of proper medical and educational resources in Mexico.

Thus, the motion to remand presented an entirely new basis for hardship—lack

of proper medical and educational resources—than the original application,

which asserted hardship based on financial difficulties and separation from their

father.

      2. Denial of the Motion. We review the denial of a motion to reopen for

abuse of discretion. See Cano-Merida v. I.N.S., 311 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir.

2002). Reducindo Villanueva presented three arguments on appeal. None are

meritorious.

      First, the BIA did not fail to consider evidence. The BIA is presumed to

have reviewed the evidence in the absence of an indication to the contrary, see

Larita-Martinez v. I.N.S., 220 F.3d 1092, 1095–96 (9th Cir. 2000), and

                                        3                                    21-106
Reducindo Villanueva has not overcome this presumption. As the BIA

observed, the evidence in the record does not suggest that Reducindo

Villanueva’s younger child was abandoned by his mother, and the BIA was not

required to accept the unsupported assertion in the briefing that both children

would accompany Reducindo Villanueva to Mexico based only on evidence that

they live with him now. Cf. Matter of Ige, 20 I. & N. Dec. 880, 885 (BIA

1994). The BIA’s decision also does not indicate a failure to consider the

evidence of the children’s medical and educational needs, as the BIA implied

that it reviewed the records for both children by stating that “the evidence

submitted with the motion” does not establish that Reducindo Villanueva’s

“qualifying relatives suffer from a serious medical condition or that they will be

precluded from receiving any treatment or counseling . . . in Mexico.”

      Second, although neither the BIA nor the IJ explicitly referred to the

cumulative hardship standard, see Matter of Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467, 472

(BIA 2002), the decision overall indicates that the BIA did not improperly

ignore that standard. The BIA’s discussion of Matter of J-J-G-, 27 I. & N. Dec.

808, 811 (BIA 2020), is appropriate because that case reiterated the cumulative

hardship standard while holding that when, as here, “a claim is based on the

health of a qualifying relative,” the applicant must show the seriousness of the

condition and unavailability of adequate medical care in the country of removal.

Id. at 811.

      Third, the BIA provided a reasoned explanation for its decision. See

                                        4                                      21-106
Movsisian v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005). Although

Reducindo Villanueva argues the BIA abused its discretion by merely stating

that the “evidence submitted with the motion does not establish that his

qualifying relatives suffer from a serious medical condition,” this argument

fails. Given the record presented and the reasons for denying the motion, the

BIA’s statement was “sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that [the

BIA] has heard and thought and not merely reacted.” Agonafer v. Sessions, 859

F.3d 1198, 1206 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). Thus, the BIA provided a

reasoned explanation for its decision. See id. (noting the BIA is required to

“consider the issues raised,” not to “write an exegesis on every contention”

(citation omitted)).

      We therefore conclude that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in

denying Reducindo Villanueva’s motion to reopen. For the same reasons, we

conclude the BIA did not violate due process in its denial of the motion to

remand. See Su Hwa She v. Holder, 629 F.3d 958, 963 (9th Cir. 2010),

superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Ming Dai v. Sessions, 884

F.3d 858, 868 n.8 (9th Cir. 2018).

      3. Equal Protection Claim. Reducindo Villanueva argues that the

disparate hardship standards for cancellation of removal for nonpermanent

residents under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) and special rule cancellation for

NACARA applicants, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.66(b)(4), violate the Equal

Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments.

                                        5                                       21-106
We have jurisdiction to address this claim as a constitutional question under 8

U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Contrary to the government’s contention, Reducindo

Villanueva was not required to exhaust this argument before the BIA because

the agency does not have jurisdiction to resolve constitutional challenges to the

INA. See Garcia-Ramirez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 935, 938 (9th Cir. 2005).

      Nevertheless, Reducindo Villanueva’s equal protection challenge is

squarely foreclosed by precedent. This court has held that limitations by

country of origin on the availability of NACARA special rule cancellation of

removal do not violate equal protection. See Jimenez-Angeles v. Ashcroft, 291

F.3d 594, 602–03 (9th Cir. 2002); Ram v. INS, 243 F.3d 510, 517 (9th Cir.

2001).

      PETITION DENIED.

                                        6                                    21-106
                                                                            FILED
                                                                            APR 21 2023
Reducindo-Villanueva v. Garland, No. 21-106
                                                                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
MILLER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

      I join part 3 of the disposition because I agree that Reducindo-Villanueva’s

equal protection challenge lacks merit. But I do not agree that we have jurisdiction

over Reducindo-Villanueva’s challenge to the denial of his motion to remand, and

I would dismiss the petition for review to the extent that it challenges that denial.

      The Board denied the motion to remand because it determined that “the

evidence presented with the motion [was] insufficient to demonstrate that the

decision in this case would likely change”—or, in other words, that even with

further proceedings, Reducindo-Villanueva would be unable to demonstrate

“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” warranting a grant of cancellation of

removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. Congress has provided that “no court shall have

jurisdiction to review . . . any judgment regarding the granting of relief under”

section 1229b. Id. § 1252(a)(2)(B). In Patel v. Garland, the Supreme Court held

that this jurisdiction-stripping provision “encompasses not just ‘the granting of

relief’ but also any judgment relating to the granting of relief” under section

1229b. 142 S. Ct. 1614, 1622 (2022). The Board’s hardship assessment is a

judgment relating to the ultimate decision whether to grant cancellation of

removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). We therefore lack jurisdiction to review

it.

                                           1
      Even our pre-Patel precedent directs the same result. In Fernandez v.

Gonzales, we held that we may not review the denial of a motion to reopen

proceedings for cancellation of removal unless “the evidence submitted addresses a

hardship ground so distinct from that considered previously as to make the

motion . . . a request for new relief.” 439 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir. 2006). In rejecting

Reducindo-Villanueva’s application, the immigration judge considered the

hardship to his children that would result from reduced contact with their father as

well as a claim that one of his children has learning difficulties. The motion to

remand adds that his children now live with him and have been diagnosed with

learning and developmental disorders. This additional evidence of hardship to his

children is “not so different in kind” from the evidence that was considered before

as to create “a request for new relief.” Id.

      Reducindo-Villanueva also purports to assert a due-process challenge to the

denial of his motion, but his arguments merely dispute the Board’s discretionary

hardship assessment. He cannot circumvent the jurisdictional bar in section

1252(a)(2)(B) by “cloaking an abuse of discretion argument in constitutional

garb.” Martinez v. Clark, 36 F.4th 1219, 1230 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Torres-

Aguilar v. INS, 246 F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 2001)).

                                           2