Court Opinion

ID: 9364866
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-20 15:15:36.547683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:40.928406
License: Public Domain

2023 WI 3

                  SUPREME COURT                OF     WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:              2020AP2119-CR

COMPLETE TITLE:        State of Wisconsin,
                                 Plaintiff-Respondent,
                            v.
                       Larry L. Jackson,
                                 Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

                            REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
                            Reported at 399 Wis. 2d 841, 967 N.W.2d 311
                                        (2021 – unpublished)

OPINION FILED:         January 20, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:         September 30, 2022

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:              Circuit
   COUNTY:             Milwaukee
   JUDGE:              Jeffrey A. Wagner

JUSTICES:
DALLET,       J.,    delivered      the    majority   opinion   for   a    unanimous
Court.

NOT PARTICIPATING:
ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate.

ATTORNEYS:

       For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs
filed        by   Frederick    A.    Bechtold     and   Frederick     A.    Bechtold
Attorney at Law, LLC, Minnesota. There was an oral argument by
Frederick A. Bechtold.

       For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by
Eric M. Muellenbach, assistant attorney general, with whom on
the brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an
oral     argument      by     Eric    M.     Muellenbach,   assistant       attorney
general.
    An amicus curiae brief was filed by Melinda A. Swartz and
the Law Office of Melinda Swartz, LLC, Milwaukee, on behalf of
the Wisconsin Association of criminal Defense Lawyers.

                                2
                                                                     2023 WI 3
                                                                     NOTICE
                                                       This opinion is subject to further
                                                       editing and modification.   The final
                                                       version will appear in the bound
                                                       volume of the official reports.
No.       2020AP2119-CR
(L.C. No.    2015CF004698)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                                 :             IN SUPREME COURT

State of Wisconsin,

             Plaintiff-Respondent,
                                                                          FILED
      v.                                                             JAN 20, 2023

Larry L. Jackson,                                                       Sheila T. Reiff
                                                                     Clerk of Supreme Court

             Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

DALLET,     J.,    delivered      the   majority       opinion     for    a   unanimous
Court.

ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate.

      REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.                        Affirmed in

part, reversed in part, and cause remanded.

      ¶1     REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.              A defendant is entitled to

a   Machner1      hearing    if   his   postconviction        motion      sufficiently

alleges ineffective assistance of counsel and the record fails

      1State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App.
1979).    A Machner hearing is "[t]he evidentiary hearing to
evaluate counsel's effectiveness, which includes counsel's
testimony to explain his or her handling of the case." State v.
Balliette, 2011 WI 79, ¶31, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 805 N.W.2d 334.
                                                                          No.     2020AP2119-CR

to conclusively demonstrate that he is not entitled to relief.

See State v. Ruffin, 2022 WI 34, ¶37, 401 Wis. 2d 619, 974

N.W.2d 432.             Although         one        of        Larry      Jackson's        three

postconviction         claims      met    both       of       these     requirements,       the

circuit court2 denied his motion without a hearing and the court

of appeals affirmed.              We affirm in part, reverse in part, and

remand to the circuit court with instructions to hold a Machner

hearing regarding that claim.

                                               I

       ¶2      In 2015, Richard King was shot and killed in front of

a    duplex    on     North    60th      Street     in    Milwaukee.             Jackson    was

subsequently charged with first-degree intentional homicide and

possession of a firearm by a felon.

       ¶3      King and his wife, C.W., lived in the duplex along

with       their    upstairs      neighbors        Gerald       Tucker     and    his     wife,

Tiffany.       The two couples did not get along, and on the day of

the homicide, King was upset with Gerald over some broken glass
he   found     near    his     car.       King      and       his   friend      Andre    Dorsey

confronted         Gerald   and    Tiffany     with       a    gun.      The     tension    was

momentarily         defused,      however,         when       the     Tuckers'    kids     came

outside.           According to Gerald, after getting inside, Tiffany

called their friend Jackson and asked him to come over.                                  Later

on, King confronted Gerald again after he stepped outside to

smoke a cigarette.              Dorsey, who was now standing off to the

       The Honorable Jeffrey A. Wagner of the Milwaukee County
       2

Circuit Court presided.

                                               2
                                                                  No.     2020AP2119-CR

side, saw a man with a medium complexion who he later identified

as Jackson walk up to Gerald.             The two whispered to each other

and then entered the front of the duplex.                 Moments later, Dorsey

heard gunshots and saw King fall to the ground.                      He then saw a

hand with a light complexion pointing a gun through a crack in

the doorway fire two shots in his direction.                  After the shooting

stopped,    C.W.   saw    a    young   African     American    man      with   a   dark

complexion run past her ground floor window.                  She was never able

to positively identify him.

    ¶4      Gerald    was     arrested   as    a    suspect   in     the    homicide.

While he was in custody, he told police that he did not know who

shot King.     Months later, he identified Jackson as the shooter

after   learning     that     police   had    recovered     the    murder      weapon.

That weapon, a .40 caliber Smith and Wesson pistol, belonged to

Jackson's    friend,     Joe    Brown,   and       was   matched     by    ballistics

experts to a bullet and several casings found at the scene.                         At

trial, Brown testified that he loaned the gun to Jackson on the

day of the shooting.             Jackson returned thirty to forty-five
minutes later with rubber gloves and the gun, which had some

bullets missing.         The two men boiled the gloves to destroy any

evidence.     After changing his clothes, Jackson left.                        The two

men met up the next day and Jackson allegedly confessed to being

involved in a shooting, although he did not mention King or the

Tuckers by name.         Brown's friend, Anthony Boone, testified that

he had once seen Jackson at Brown's house standing outside of

the bathroom with what appeared to be a bag of clothes, but gave
conflicting accounts as to when that occurred.
                                         3
                                                                    No.    2020AP2119-CR

      ¶5    Jackson's     defense      at       trial    focused    on    his   alleged

alibi: that he was at his mother's house on the evening of the

homicide.     The only defense witness was Jackson's mother, Carol.

She testified that she remembered the night well, and that she

knew Jackson stayed at her house all night because her alarm

system would have gone off if any of the doors to the house were

opened.

      ¶6    The jury found Jackson guilty of both charges, and he

filed a postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of

counsel.     In it, Jackson contended that his trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to contact two potential alibi witnesses

or   call   them   at   trial.        Those      two    witnesses,       Jackson's   ex-

girlfriend,    JaNikka       Marsh,    and      his     sister,    Crystal      Jackson,

submitted affidavits stating that they were with Jackson the

evening of the homicide, that they were not contacted by trial

counsel, and that they would have testified at trial if they

were called to do so.         We discuss Marsh's and Crystal's specific

factual     claims      in     further           detail     below.           Jackson's
postconviction     motion      also    contended         that     trial   counsel    was

ineffective in two additional respects: for failing to interview

his mother or prepare her to speak to detectives or testify, and

for incorrectly advising Jackson that the law required him to

testify first.

      ¶7    The    circuit     court     denied         Jackson's     postconviction

motion without a hearing.             Regarding trial counsel's failure to

contact Marsh or Crystal, the court discounted their proffered
testimony due to their preexisting relationship with Jackson and
                                            4
                                                                      No.   2020AP2119-CR

concluded      that    he     had     not    sufficiently         alleged     deficient

performance and that the record conclusively demonstrated that

he was not prejudiced.               See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668,    687   (1984)       (setting    forth      the   two   requirements      for    an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, deficient performance

and prejudice).            Additionally, the court held that Jackson's

claim that counsel did not interview Carol or prepare her to

speak to detectives           or testify was conclusory, and that the

record      conclusively      demonstrated        Jackson     was    not    entitled    to

relief on his claim that counsel incorrectly advised him that

the law required him to testify first.                        The court of appeals

affirmed.        See       generally      State    v.     Jackson,       2020AP2119-CR,

unpublished slip op., ¶¶23-29 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2021).

                                            II

       ¶8     When    we    review    a   decision      denying      a   postconviction

motion without a           Machner hearing, we evaluate two issues de

novo.       See Ruffin, 401 Wis. 2d 619, ¶¶27-28.                    First, we assess
whether the motion on its face alleges sufficient material and

non-conclusory facts that, if true, would entitle the defendant

to relief.       See id., ¶27.              Second, we determine whether the

record      conclusively      demonstrates         that    the      defendant   is     not

entitled to relief.            See id., ¶28.            If the defendant's motion

alleges sufficient and non-conclusory facts which would entitle

the defendant to relief and the record does not conclusively

establish otherwise, then the circuit court must hold a Machner
hearing.       See id., ¶¶37-38; see also State v. Sholar, 2018 WI

                                             5
                                                                    No.    2020AP2119-CR

53, ¶50, 381 Wis. 2d 560, 912 N.W.2d 89 (citing State v. Allen,

2004 WI 106, ¶14, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433).                        Conversely,

"[i]f the motion does not raise facts sufficient to entitle the

defendant     to    relief,        or    if       it   presents     only    conclusory

allegations, or if the record conclusively demonstrates that the

defendant is not entitled to relief, the circuit court has the

discretion     to    grant        or     deny      a   hearing."          Ruffin,   401

Wis. 2d 619, ¶28 (citing Allen, 274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶9).

                                           III

      ¶9     Jackson's postconviction motion alleges that his trial

counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to investigate or call

alibi witnesses; (2) not interviewing Carol or preparing her to

speak to detectives or testify; and (3) incorrectly advising him

that the law required him to testify first.                         Before analyzing

whether Jackson is entitled to a Machner hearing on any of these

claims, we review some general principles applicable to claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel and Machner hearings.

                                              A

      ¶10    A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel has two

prongs: deficient performance and prejudice.                        See Strickland,

466   U.S.   at    687.      "To       demonstrate      deficient    performance,     a

defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an

objective     standard       of        reasonableness      considering       all    the

circumstances."       State v. Dalton, 2018 WI 85, ¶34, 383 Wis. 2d
147, 914 N.W.2d 120.              In evaluating counsel's performance, we

                                              6
                                                                     No.    2020AP2119-CR

are    highly       deferential        to   counsel's    strategic    decisions,      but

counsel nevertheless "has a duty to reasonably investigate or to

make         a     reasonable          decision        that     renders      particular

investigations           unnecessary."          Id.,    ¶¶34-35    (citing    State    v.

Carter, 2010 WI 40, ¶23, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 782 N.W.2d 695).                             As

for the prejudice prong, a defendant must show "a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's error, the result of the

proceeding would have been different."                        State v. Guerard, 2004

WI 85, ¶43, 273 Wis. 2d 250, 682 N.W.2d 12 (citing Strickland,

466 U.S. at 694).              A "reasonable probability" in this context

means "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome."         Id.

       ¶11       With these general principles in mind, to determine

whether Jackson is entitled to a Machner hearing, we must decide

two questions.            First, does Jackson's motion allege sufficient

material and non-conclusory facts that, if true, would entitle

him to relief?             See Ruffin, 401 Wis. 2d 619, ¶27.                     Because

Jackson's motion alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, that
means he must allege facts that, if true, would satisfy both the

deficient performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland.                             See

Sholar, 381 Wis. 2d 560, ¶50.                   If we answer that first question

in Jackson's favor, we move on to the second and ask——regardless

of     the       sufficiency      of    his     allegations——whether       the   record

conclusively establishes that Jackson is not entitled to relief.

See     id.         In    other        words,    does    the    record     conclusively

demonstrate either that Jackson's counsel's performance was not
deficient or that he was not prejudiced?                          See id.; see also
                                                7
                                                                      No.       2020AP2119-CR

Ruffin, 401 Wis. 2d 619, ¶47.               Jackson is entitled to a Machner

hearing only if we answer both of these questions in his favor.

                                            B

       ¶12    We   begin    with    Jackson's       claim     regarding          two   alibi

witnesses,     his    then-girlfriend           Marsh   and   his     sister       Crystal.

According to Jackson's motion and the attached affidavits, he

gave their names to his attorney but neither were contacted.

Had they been contacted, both Marsh and Crystal stated they

would have testified at trial that Jackson was at his mother's

house at the time of the homicide.

       ¶13    Marsh's      affidavit   states       that      on     the    day     of    the

homicide, Jackson got off work at 4:30 p.m.                        Jackson and Marsh

picked up her children from daycare before 5:00 p.m. and got

dinner.      They arrived at Jackson's mother's home sometime after

5:00   p.m.        After   they    arrived,       Jackson     took    a     shower       while

Marsh, who was not feeling well, laid down for a nap.                             After his

shower, Jackson joined Marsh in bed.                     Marsh slept until 9:30
p.m. when Jackson woke up and the two scrambled to get Marsh to

her job in time for the night shift.

       ¶14    Crystal's affidavit corroborates parts of this account

and provides additional details.                   According to her affidavit,

she was watching television at her mother's house on the evening

of the murder.          When Marsh and Jackson arrived, Marsh was not

feeling well and she and Jackson went to his room so she could

nap.    According to Crystal, the couple stayed in the room until
Jackson      drove   Marsh    to    work.         Both    Marsh's         and     Crystal's

                                            8
                                                                      No.        2020AP2119-CR

affidavits place Jackson at his mother's home at the time King

was killed.

      ¶15     We have little trouble concluding that, if these facts

are   true,      Jackson's      motion       sufficiently        alleges      a    claim    of

ineffective assistance of counsel.                      Indeed, the State does not

dispute that counsel's failure to contact these witnesses or

potentially       call    them     at    trial       would      constitute         deficient

performance.       See also State v. Jenkins, 2014 WI 59, ¶41, 355

Wis. 2d 180, 848 N.W.2d 786 ("[I]n a swearing match between two

sides,    counsel's       failure       to    call      two    useful,      corroborating

witnesses, despite [potential bias as a result of] the family

relationship,        constitutes         deficient            performance."         (quoting

Toliver v. Pollard, 688 F.3d 853, 862 (7th Cir. 2012)) (internal

quotation marks omitted)).                   And Jackson's motion sufficiently

alleges     prejudice     as     well    because         it   explains      that     counsel

failed to investigate Marsh and Crystal at all, let alone call

them at trial.         See Allen, 274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶¶23-24 (explaining

that a post-conviction motion contains sufficient facts when it
alleges "the name of the witness (who), the reason the witness

is important (why, how), and acts that can be proven (what,

where, when)."); see also Washington v. Smith, 219 F.3d 620,

630-35 (7th Cir. 2000) (concluding that counsel's failure to

contact     or    produce       possible       alibi      witnesses      at       trial    was

constitutionally deficient performance and prejudicial).

      ¶16     Rather     than    focus       on   the    sufficiency        of     Jackson's

allegations,       the    State    argues         that    the    record       conclusively
establishes that Jackson was not prejudiced for two reasons.
                                              9
                                                                           No.     2020AP2119-CR

First,       according     to        the    State,        weaknesses       in     Marsh's   and

Crystal's proposed testimony and inconsistencies with Jackson's

mother's       testimony    mean           that    "neither        [witness]       could    have

provided       Jackson    with        an    alibi."          And    second,        "given   the

overwhelming evidence against Jackson, there is no reasonable

probability that the result of the proceedings would have been

different."

       ¶17 As to the weaknesses and inconsistencies in testimony,

the State contends that because Marsh was asleep at the time of

the homicide, "she lacked personal knowledge of where Jackson

was at the time [King] was shot."                          The State also points out

that Marsh's and Crystal's stories differ from Carol's testimony

in two respects.            First, Marsh says she laid down for a nap

before 6:00 p.m., but Carol testified that she had a serious

argument with Marsh around 6:30 p.m.                        Second, Crystal says that

Marsh    and    Jackson     stayed          in    their     room     the    whole     evening,

whereas Carol testified that Jackson came in and out of the

bedroom several times.
       ¶18     The problem with these arguments is that, in assessing

whether a defendant is entitled to a Machner hearing, we must

assume that the factual claims made in support of the motion are

true.         See   State       v.     Love,       2005     WI    116,     ¶37,     n.15,   284

Wis. 2d 111,        700   N.W.2d 62.               That    Marsh     was    asleep     at    the

precise time of the murder or that Crystal's account may have

conflicted with Carol's trial testimony might be reasons for a

jury    to    discount     their       testimony.           But    we    cannot     know,   nor
should we try to predict, how a jury might have weighed Marsh's
                                                  10
                                                                             No.        2020AP2119-CR

and Crystal's credibility.                  See id. at ¶42 ("The general rule is

that      credibility           determinations               are      resolved           by      live

testimony.").        Moreover, had Marsh and Crystal been contacted by

counsel,     counsel       might      have       made    a    different       decision          about

which alibi witness or witnesses to call at trial.                                 In any case,

the jury would have had to determine what weight to give to

their    accounts        and    might          ultimately       have    convicted             Jackson

anyway.      But the failure of trial counsel even to contact Marsh

and Crystal is enough to "undermine [our] confidence in the

outcome."       See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

       ¶19   We also disagree with the State's assertion that the

overwhelming         evidence             of      Jackson's           guilt         conclusively

establishes        that    he       was     not    prejudiced.           See        Ruffin,       401

Wis. 2d 619,        ¶40     (explaining            that       the     record        conclusively

establishes that the defendant is not entitled to relief if it

shows that there is "no reasonable probability that the outcome

would have been different").                    In fact, the State's case was not

so     overwhelming.            The       State's       best       evidence        of     Jackson's
involvement came from witnesses with serious credibility issues.

Gerald Tucker, the primary witness against Jackson, was arrested

as a suspect in the homicide and had the clearest motive to kill

King given their argument earlier that night.                            He told police on

two occasions that he did not know the shooter and even claimed

to    have   not    seen       the    shooting.           He       changed    his        story   and

identified      Jackson        as    the       shooter       after   serving        a     six-month

sentence on a revocation of probation, and only when he learned
the    police      had    found       the      murder        weapon.         This       disclosure
                                                  11
                                                                No.     2020AP2119-CR

resulted in a second probation revocation for obstructing the

investigation.       At trial, he testified that in exchange for his

testimony,    he    hoped    to    reduce      the   15-year   sentence       he   was

serving as a result of that revocation.

    ¶20    Joe     Brown,    who   said     that     Jackson   confessed      to   him

after he returned Brown's gun, was a felon with three prior

criminal convictions facing state and federal charges with a

potential sentence of 15 years to life in prison for possessing

the murder weapon.       At trial, he acknowledged that he too hoped

to minimize his time in prison by testifying against Jackson.

And in exchange for cooperation in Jackson's case, the State

ultimately dismissed the felon in possession of a firearm charge

and federal prosecutors agreed to recommend a reduced sentence

on his federal charge.

    ¶21    Andre Dorsey identified Jackson as the person who went

into the house with Gerald, but he was standing 15 feet away at

the time of the shooting and said that he saw only the shooter's

hand.   Moreover, he described the shooter's hand as having a
light   complexion     but    described        Jackson    as   having     a   medium

complexion.      Dorsey was also a felon with three prior criminal

convictions and on the evening of the homicide a gun was found

in his car.        Although he was arrested, he was not charged as a

felon in possession of a firearm.

    ¶22    The only witnesses who were not potentially involved

in the shooting and whose credibility was not undermined by

prior convictions or other potential criminal exposure were C.W.
and Anthony Boone.       C.W. did not see the shooter.                Instead, she
                                          12
                                                                              No.    2020AP2119-CR

testified that she saw a man with a dark complexion run by the

front window after the shooting, but she did not positively

identify Jackson as that man when shown a photo array.                                             And

although Boone testified that he saw Jackson at Joe                                         Brown's

house, he gave conflicting accounts as to when that occurred.

Given these weaknesses in the State's case, and the existence of

multiple alibi witnesses that were not investigated by defense

counsel, let alone called to testify at trial, the record fails

to   conclusively          establish      that       Jackson       is     not       entitled       to

relief.

       ¶23     In sum, Jackson's motion alleges sufficient material

and non-conclusory facts that, if true, would entitle him to

relief       on    this     claim.           Moreover,        the        record       fails         to

conclusively show that Jackson is not entitled to relief.                                      Had

Marsh    and      Crystal        been   contacted      by    counsel,          they    may     have

testified,         and     the     jury      would     have        had    to        weigh     their

credibility, and perhaps that of Jackson's mother, against the

State's witnesses, many of whom had credibility issues of their
own.         Given       that,     we   cannot       say     the    record          conclusively

demonstrates         that       there   is    no     reasonable          probability          of    a

different outcome.               As a result, the circuit court did not have

discretion to deny Jackson a Machner hearing on this claim.                                    See

Ruffin, 401 Wis. 2d 619, ¶37.

                                               C

       ¶24     Turning      to     Jackson's         claim    that       counsel        did        not
interview         Carol    or     prepare     her     to     speak       to     detectives         or

                                               13
                                                                       No.    2020AP2119-CR

testify, we conclude that Jackson is not entitled to a Machner

hearing.        That is because Jackson's motion is conclusory: it

does not explain how counsel should have prepared her and what,

if   any,   effect        this   might    have     had    on     her     statements      to

detectives or her testimony.                 See Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358,

¶48 (explaining that a postconviction motion is conclusory if it

"fail[s] to allege 'any factual assertions which would allow a

court to meaningfully assess [the defendant's] claim.'" (quoting

State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 316, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996))).

Without     that    information,         Jackson's       motion    fails       to    allege

sufficient      material      and    non-conclusory        facts       that,    if    true,

would constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.                          See id.

      ¶25    Jackson is likewise not entitled to a Machner hearing

on his claim that his counsel was ineffective when she told him

the circuit court would require him to testify first.                           After the

State rested, Jackson's counsel told the court that Jackson's

mother    and    Jackson     would     testify,     in    that    order.        When    the

circuit     court        questioned    the       order    of     witnesses,         counsel
responded "I know the Court's aware of the logistical issues we

have with him. Let me just talk to him about that, about if it

would be okay if he testifies first."                     Jackson alleges that he

then met with his counsel who told him "that the trial court was

going to require him to testify before any of the other defense

witnesses were called."

      ¶26       Jackson is not entitled to a Machner hearing on this

claim because he has not sufficiently alleged that counsel's
performance        was    deficient.       See    Balliette,       336       Wis. 2d 358,
                                           14
                                                                             No.      2020AP2119-CR

¶63.      Although        Jackson's        motion           alleges     what       counsel     said

regarding the order of witnesses, it fails to demonstrate that

counsel's       statement        "was     incorrect,          much    less      unreasonable."

See Rodriguez v. United States, 286 F.3d 972, 984-85 (7th Cir.

2002) (rejecting           allegations of deficient performance because

the advice of counsel that led the defendant to decide not to

testify      was     neither         incorrect        nor      unreasonable);           see    also

Strickland,        466     U.S.      at    687        (in     order     to     show     deficient

performance, a defendant must allege "that counsel made errors

so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.").                                     All that

Jackson alleges his counsel told him was that the circuit court

would    require         him    to   testify      first.          But    Jackson        does    not

explain      how    that       statement      was      incorrect.            Instead,     Jackson

asserts that the circuit court was required to allow him to

testify in his preferred order under Brooks v. Tennessee, 406

U.S. 605 (1972), because "there were no circumstances in his

case    where      having      the    other      defense       witnesses        testify       first
would have impeded the orderly progress of the trial."

       ¶27    Counsel's statement was not unreasonable because the

circuit      court    would       not     necessarily          have    violated        Brooks    by

requiring Jackson to testify first.                          After all, Brooks held only

that a statute requiring a defendant to testify first or not at

all violated the defendant's constitutional rights.                                 Id. at 612.

And as numerous courts have concluded, Brooks does not restrict

the wide latitude trial courts have in managing the presentation
of   evidence       at    trial      on   a   case-by-case            basis,       including     by
                                                 15
                                                                          No.     2020AP2119-CR

"determin[ing] generally the order in which parties will adduce

proof."       Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 86 (1976); see

also   United       States       v.    Singh,      811    F.2d    758,    762-63      (2d    Cir.

1987); United States v. Leon, 679 F.2d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 1982).

Although Jackson alleges that allowing him to testify in his

preferred order would not have resulted in delay or otherwise

"impeded the orderly progress of the trial," those are not the

only circumstances in which it is permissible for a trial court

to require a defendant to testify first.                          See Singh, 811 F.2d at

762-63 (upholding an order requiring the defendant to testify

first to lay foundation for subsequent testimony).                                 Thus, even

if everything alleged in Jackson's motion is true, it might

still have been permissible for the circuit court to require him

to testify first.           And in that case, counsel's performance would

not have been deficient since her statement would have been

accurate, or at least not unreasonable.                             See Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687-88.            Accordingly, the circuit court was correct to

deny    this        part     of       Jackson's          motion     without       a      Machner
hearing.      Balliette, 336 Wis. 2d 358, ¶63.

                                                  IV

       ¶28    In sum, Jackson is not entitled to a Machner hearing

on    his    claims       that    counsel         was    ineffective      for    failing       to

interview      or     prepare         his    mother      to    speak     to   detectives       or

testify and for incorrectly advising him that the law required

him    to    testify       first.           But   on     his   claim     that    counsel      was
ineffective         for    failing          to    investigate      or     call     two      alibi

                                                  16
                                                                  No.   2020AP2119-CR

witnesses,        his   motion    alleges    sufficient     material      and     non-

conclusory facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief, and

the   record      fails   to     conclusively      establish   that     he   is    not

entitled to relief.            Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse

in part the decision of the court of appeals and remand to the

circuit court with instructions to grant Jackson a hearing on

his alibi-witnesses claim.

      By    the    Court.—The     decision    of    the   court    of   appeals    is

affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the cause is remanded to

the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

      ¶29    PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate.

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    No.   2020AP2119-CR

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