Court Opinion

ID: 9689406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:30:27.630214+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:47.823084
License: Public Domain

White, C.J.,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the initial question in any res ipsa loquitur case is whether it is appropriate to apply the doctrine. However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that, as a matter of law, res ipsa loquitur is not applicable in this particular case.
This court has addressed hospital liability under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine on only two occasions. See, Swierczek v. Lynch, 237 Neb. 469, 466 N.W.2d 512 (1991); McCall v. St. *931Joseph’s Hospital, 184 Neb. 1, 165 N.W.2d 85 (1969). Swierczek is of particular interest in this case. In Swierczek, the plaintiff brought negligence and res ipsa loquitur actions based on nerve injuries she had allegedly suffered as a result of dental surgery. The plaintiff named several doctors, a nurse anesthetist, and a hospital as defendants. At various times throughout the litigation, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court sustained a doctor’s, a nurse’s, and the hospital’s motions for summary judgment. The plaintiff appealed.
According to this court’s analysis in Swierczek, for res ipsa loquitur to apply, the plaintiff is not obligated to prove the exact manner in which he or she was injured or the precise act or event which led to his or her injury. Negligence may be inferred without definite proof “ ‘ “when the general experience and observation of mankind teaches that the result would not be expected without negligence,” ’ ” 237 Neb. at 476, 466 N.W.2d at 517; it is enough to establish that it is within the common knowledge of a layperson that an individual does not enter the hospital to have her teeth pulled and leave the hospital with damage to nerves in her arms and hands without some type of negligence occurring, Swierczek, supra. Reliance on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in such situations raises an inference of negligence which should be allowed to go to the jury if the facts pled in the petition are supported by ample proof.
The proof offered in support of Chism’s action in this case was an affidavit signed by her dentist, Tafoya. To determine whether this affidavit sufficiently supports Chism’s allegations for purposes of defending a summary judgment motion, it is essential to assess the contents of the affidavit submitted by Tafoya.
In general medical malpractice cases, an affidavit submitted by a defendant physician, which states that the defendant did not breach the appropriate standard of care, creates a prima facie case of lack of negligence for purposes of summary judgment. Wagner v. Pope, 247 Neb. 951, 531 N.W.2d 234 (1995). The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to counter the defendant’s evidence with a showing that the defendant had not fol*932lowed the appropriate standard of care. See DeCamp v. Lewis, 231 Neb. 191, 435 N.W.2d 883 (1989). See, also, Smith v. Klebanoff, 84 N.M. 50, 499 P.2d 368 (N.M. App. 1972) (holding that plaintiffs, in order to defeat summary judgment on basis that doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable, had burden of demonstrating that factual dispute existed as to whether incident was one that does not occur in absence of negligence).
In the instant case, the appellees submitted affidavits stating that there was an inherent risk that any patient during surgery and while under general anesthesia will suffer damage to the teeth. The affidavits also stated that the proper standard of care was met. It can be argued in this case that Tafoya’s affidavit refuted these statements. Specifically, Tafoya states that “unless there was [sic] some extraordinary circumstances during surgery, Mrs. Chism should not have received any injuries to her teeth.” In viewing this affidavit in the light most favorable to the nonmoving plaintiff, Chism, a reasonable inference can be drawn that such a statement was made for the purpose of establishing that Chism’s injuries were caused by unusual circumstances and negligence, and not as a result of ordinary circumstances and care. Tafoya’s affidavit sufficiently demonstrated that there is a material question of fact: Were Chism’s injuries the result of negligence?
Since a material question of fact existed, the court could not have concluded as a matter of law that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine did not apply. Therefore, the district court erred in granting the appellees’ motions for summary judgment.