Court Opinion

ID: 9404613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-23 16:09:53.823328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:15.740739
License: Public Domain

J-A29028-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 EXPUNGEMENT OF RECORD OF:               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 H.M.J.                                  :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
                                         :
 APPEAL OF: H.M.J.                       :
                                         :
                                         :
                                         :
                                         :   No. 14 WDA 2022

             Appeal from the Order Entered October 14, 2021
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County Civil Division at No(s):
                            No. 10228-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and PELLIGRINI, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                            FILED: JUNE 23, 2023

     Appellant, H.M.J., appeals from the October 14, 2021 order denying her

petition to expunge the record of her involuntary mental health commitment

pursuant to 50 P.S. § 7302. We affirm.

     The facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.         On

November 24, 2019, Appellant arrived at her parents’ residence in Center

Township, Beaver County, Pennsylvania, with her boyfriend. N.T. Hearing,

10/14/21, at 53; see also Appellant’s Petition, 2/16/21, at *1 (unpaginated).

An altercation ensued between Appellant’s boyfriend and Appellant’s parents,

causing the police to be summoned to the residence.         Id.   Thereafter,

Appellant was taken to Heritage Valley Medical Center (“Medical Center”) in

Brighton Township, Beaver County, Pennsylvania, for an evaluation. Id. at

*2. Later, Appellant’s mother arrived at the Medical Center. Id. At that time,

Appellant’s mother requested that Appellant be involuntarily committed. In
J-A29028-22

support of that request, Appellant’s mother claimed that, within the last 30

days, Appellant:

         [j]umped out of a moving vehicle — does [not] care if she gets
         killed or hurt. Started with a toxic abusive relationship
         — leaving at all hours of the night. [J]ust walking down middle
         of the road [three] — [four] times at night. [L]eft college at
         [G]reensburg took an [U]ber until she did [not] have any more
         money and was left [in] downtown Pittsburgh at [2:00 a.m.]
         not having anyway to get anywhere. She tells us over and over
         she does [not] want to be here[, that] she is a disappointment
         and does [not] deserve anything. Campus police were checking
         on her because of her outrage.

Application for Involuntary Emergency Examination & Treatment, 11/24/19,

at Part 1. Dr. Joseph Martibeller evaluated Appellant and observed that she

evidenced “poor insight [and] judgment, [engaged] with dangerous behaviors

recently[, and] stated [a] passive death wish.” Id. at Part VI. Based upon

the foregoing, Dr. Martibeller determined that Appellant needed “inpatient

psychiatric   admission   treatment.”     Id.    Accordingly,   Appellant   was

involuntarily committed to the Medical Center, and was released after 72

hours.

      On February 16, 2021, Appellant filed a petition seeking expungement

of her record of involuntary commitment. In the petition, Appellant averred

that “there were not reasonable grounds to believe that [she] was severely

mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment as required for

commitment.”       Appellant’s Petition, 2/16/21, at *4 (unpaginated).       In

addition, Appellant claimed that “a [Section] 302 commitment was improper

under the circumstances a[s it] was merely utilized as a mechanism to

                                        -2-
J-A29028-22

separate [Appellant] from her boyfriend[, against] whom [Appellant’s] parents

[bore] animosity.” Id. Thus, Appellant asked the trial court to, inter alia,

vacate her involuntary commitment, expunge the records regarding her

involuntary commitment, and “[r]estore [Appellant] any and all of her civil

rights which may have been impaired as a result of her commitment.” Id. at

*5-*6. Although not expressly stated in Appellant’s petition, it is clear that

she sought relief pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(f)(1) and 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 6111.1(g)(2) of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act (“UFA”).

      The trial court held a hearing on Appellant’s petition on October 14,

2021, as Appellant’s petition was opposed by the Pennsylvania State Police

(“PSP”).   At the outset of the hearing, Appellant’s counsel introduced the

Section 302 commitment record into evidence, as well as another medical

record from the Medical Center.    See N.T. Hearing, 10/14/21, at 4-5.     In

addition, Appellant, as well as Appellant’s expert, Dr. Allan Pass, testified.

Importantly, PSP objected to various aspects of Dr. Pass’s testimony as

irrelevant to whether there was sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s

Section 302 commitment.      Id. at 11-12. The trial court sustained PSP’s

objection, indicating that it would not consider Dr. Pass’s testimony with

respect to the issue of sufficiency. Id. at 14. The hearing concluded and,

that day, the trial court issued an order denying Appellant’s request for

expungement pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.1(g)(2), holding that sufficient

evidence supported Appellant’s commitment. Id. at 81; see also Trial Court

Order, 10/14/21, at 1, citing In re. Vencil, 152 A.3d 235 (Pa. 2017). The

                                    -3-
J-A29028-22

trial court, however, restored Appellant’s right to possess a firearm pursuant

to 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6105(f)(1). N.T. Hearing, 10/14/21, at 82; see also Trial

Court Order, 10/14/21, at 1. This timely appeal followed.

       Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:1

        1. Whether the [trial] court erred in determining that Appellant
           [] waived her appellate rights for failure to file a timely
           post-trial motion pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 227.1?

        2. Whether the [trial] court erred in denying [Appellant’s]
           petition for expungement of record of involuntary
           commitment because the evidence and information available
           was insufficient to sustain an involuntary commitment under
           the law?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

       In her first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding

that she “waived her appellate rights” because she failed to file a post-trial

motion. Trial Court Order, 11/9/21, at *1 (unpaginated). In particular, the

trial court held that, pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 227.1, Appellant needed to file a

post-trial motion to preserve her appellate claims because the “substance of

the action” was like a trial, necessitating the filing of a post-trial motion. Id.

To support its finding that the “substance” of the instant action was trial-like,

the court cited to the fact that a hearing was held, “during which Appellant

offered exhibits into evidence and examined two witnesses,” and the court

____________________________________________

1 We have reordered Appellant’s appellate issues for ease of discussion and
disposition.

                                           -4-
J-A29028-22

“relied upon the hearing and documentary evidence when it denied Appellant

relief.” Id. at *2.

      Rule 227.1 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in

relevant part, as follows:

       (c) Post-trial motions shall be filed within ten days after

            (1) verdict, discharge of the jury because of inability to
            agree, or nonsuit, in the case of a jury trial; or

            (2) notice of nonsuit or the filing of the decision in the case
            of a trial without jury.

Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(c)(1)-(2). A comment to Rule 227.1, however, states that a

“motion for post-trial relief may not be filed to matters governed exclusively

by the rules of petition practice.” Id., cmt. A “petition” is defined as “any

other application which is designated by local rule, numbered Local Rule

206.1(a), to be governed by Rule 206.1 et seq.” Pa.R.C.P. 206.1(a)(2). In

Beaver County Local Rule 206.1(a)(9), it states that “[a]ny [] application

requesting a [r]ule to [s]how [c]ause under any rule, statute, or case

authority” is “included in the definition of ‘[p]etition.’” Id. Local Rule 206.1

also provides that

       [e]ach petition filed with the [c]ourt shall contain a proposed
       order for the [c]ourt’s consideration. Said proposed order shall
       follow the provisions of Pa.R.C.P. 206.5, with alternative
       provisions in paragraph (d)(4) and (5), so that the [c]ourt may
       determine whether to proceed with depositions or an
       evidentiary hearing on disputed issues of material fact.

Id.

                                      -5-
J-A29028-22

      Herein,   Appellant’s   initial   application   was   entitled   “petition   for

expungement of record of involuntary commitment” and sought relief

pursuant to Sections 6105(f)(1) and 6111.1(g)(2) of the Pennsylvania UFA.

In her prayer for relief, Appellant requested, inter alia, the trial court to:

       Issue a [r]ule upon the [PSP, the] Medical Center, and such
       other agencies as the [c]ourt deems appropriate, to show cause
       why [Appellant] should not be granted the relief requested
       herein; that is, that her commitment should not be vacated and
       her official and unofficial records should not be expunged and
       destroyed.

Appellant’s Petition, 2/16/21, at *5 (unpaginated). Upon receipt of Appellant’s

submission, the trial court issued an order stating, in relevant part, as follows:

       1. A [r]ule is issued upon . . . [PSP] and [the] Medical Center,
          to show cause why [Appellant] is not entitled to the relief
          requested.

       2. [PSP and the Medical Center] shall file an Answer to the
          Petition within [20] days of service[.]

       3. The Petition shall be decided by Pa.R.C.P. 206.7.

Trial Court Order, 2/16/21, at 1 (emphasis added). In compliance with the

trial court’s order, the PSP filed an Answer “in response to the ‘Petition for

Expungement of Record of Involuntary Commitment (Petition),’” disputing

various facts set forth therein. PSP’s Answer, 5/5/21, at *1 (unpaginated).

Thereafter, the parties conducted discovery, as permitted by the trial court’s

February 16, 2021 order and, on October 14, 2021, the trial court conducted

an evidentiary hearing. See Trial Court Order, 2/16/21, at 1; see also N.T.

Hearing, 10/14/21, at 1-83.

                                        -6-
J-A29028-22

      Upon review, we conclude that this matter was “governed exclusively

by the rules of petition practice” and, as such, Appellant was not permitted to

file a post-trial motion. Pa.R.C.P. 227.1, cmt. First and foremost, Appellant

filed an application seeking relief pursuant to Sections 6105(f)(1) and

6111.1(g)(2) of the Pennsylvania UFA, both of which require an individual to

seek relief through the filing of a petition.   See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(f)(1)

(“Upon application to the court of common pleas under this subsection by an

applicant subject to the prohibitions under subsection (c)(4), the court may

grant such relief as it deems appropriate if the court determines that the

applicant may possess a firearm without risk to the applicant or any other

person.”); 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.1(g)(2) (“A person who is involuntarily

committed pursuant to section 302 of the Mental Health Procedures Act may

petition the court to review the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the

commitment was based.”).       In fact, this Court has previously held that

post-trial motions are not permitted in matters where relief has been

requested pursuant to either Section 6105(f)(1) or Section 6111.1(g)(2). See

In re M.B., 2018 WL 1387082, at *8, n.6 (Pa. Super. Mar. 20, 2018)

(unpublished memorandum) (explaining that the PSP was “not permitted to

file a post-trial motion” because relief was sought pursuant to Section

6111.1(g)(2)).

      Moreover, a review of the record clearly reveals that, from the outset,

the parties and the court treated the matter as one governed by petitions

practice and that this continued through the October 14, 2021 hearing.

                                     -7-
J-A29028-22

Indeed, in Appellant’s initial application, entitled “petition for expungement of

record of involuntary commitment,” Appellant asked the trial court to issue a

rule to show cause. Hence, Appellant’s initial application met the definitional

requirements of a “petition” as set forth in Beaver County Local Rule

206.1(a)(9). Thereafter, in its initial order, the trial court issued a rule to

show cause, specifically directing an “Answer” be filed in response to

Appellant’s “[p]etition,” and further noted that the “[p]etition” would be

decided in accordance with Pa.R.C.P. 206.7. Trial Court Order, 2/16/21, at 1;

see Pa.R.C.P. 206.7 (explaining the procedure after an issuance of a rule to

show cause in petition’s practice). In addition, as permitted by Beaver County

Local Rule 206.1(a), the parties took discovery and, eventually, participated

in an “evidentiary hearing on disputed issues of material fact.” Id. Thus,

Appellant’s decision to “offer exhibits into evidence and examine[] two

witnesses” did not transform the “substance” of the October 14, 2021 hearing

into a trial.   Trial Court Order, 11/9/21, at *1-*2.    To the contrary, such

actions were consistent with Beaver County Local Rule 206.1(a). Based upon

the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court erroneously found that

Appellant waived her appellate issues for failure to file a post-trial motion.

Accordingly, we shall address the merits of Appellant’s claim.

      In her second issue, Appellant contends there was insufficient evidence

to support her involuntary commitment. In particular, Appellant argues that,

during the October 14, 2021 hearing, Dr. Pass demonstrated that

                                      -8-
J-A29028-22

          there was a complete dearth of any independent evidence of
          intent to self-harm in the record, there was a failure of the
          committing physicians to make appropriate inquiries into
          [Appellant’s mother’s] point of reference to the allegations, and
          there was an absence of a direct correlation between
          [Appellant’s] mother’s statement and Appellant’s alleged
          self-harm.

Appellant’s Brief at 24. Accordingly, Appellant asks this Court to reverse the

trial court’s determination and “order the expungement of [her] record of

involuntary commitment pursuant to Section 6111.1(g)(2) of the UFA.” Id.

at 25.

         Our Supreme Court recently explained:

          The legislature enacted Pennsylvania's Mental Health
          Procedures Act (MHPA), 50 P.S. §§ 7101-7503, to establish
          procedures “to assure the availability of adequate treatment to
          persons who are mentally ill.” 50 P.S. § 7102. The MHPA's
          provisions “shall be interpreted in conformity with the principles
          of due process to make voluntary and involuntary treatment
          available where the need is great and its absence could result
          in serious harm to the mentally ill person or to others.” Id.
          One treatment option the MHPA governs is involuntary
          emergency examination and treatment, commonly referred to
          as a “302 commitment.” See 50 P.S. § 7302. Section 302 of
          the MHPA provides that an involuntary emergency examination
          of a person may occur upon a physician's certification. 50 P.S.
          § 7302(b). If the examining physician determines “that the
          person is severely mentally disabled and in need of emergency
          treatment, treatment shall be begun immediately” and may
          continue for up to 120 hours. 50 P.S. § 7302(b), (d); see also
          50 P.S. § 7301(a) (providing a person who is “severely mentally
          disabled and in need of treatment” may be subject to
          “involuntary emergency examination and treatment”).
                                         ***

          The Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995 (UFA), 18
          Pa.C.S. §§ 6101- 6128, makes it unlawful for a person who has
          been involuntarily committed under Section 302 to “possess,
          use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture” a firearm or to

                                        -9-
J-A29028-22

      obtain a license to conduct any of those activities. 18 Pa.C.S.
      § 6105(a)(1), (c)(4). However, the UFA provides two ways for
      the subject of a 302 commitment to obtain relief from the
      Section 6105(a)(1) firearm restrictions. The one at issue in this
      case is a court-ordered expungement of the 302 commitment
      record under Section 6111.1(g)(2), which provides:

          (g) Review by court.—

                                    ***

                 (2) A person who is involuntarily committed pursuant
                 to section 302 of the Mental Health Procedures Act
                 may petition the court to review the sufficiency of the
                 evidence upon which the commitment was based. If
                 the court determines that the evidence upon which
                 the involuntary commitment was based was
                 insufficient, the court shall order that the record of
                 the commitment submitted to the Pennsylvania
                 State Police be expunged. A petition filed under this
                 subsection shall toll the 60-day period set forth
                 under section 6105(a)(2).

                                    ***

      18 Pa.C.S. § 6111.1(g)(2).[fn*2]

      This Court clarified the appropriate review of a Section
      6111.1(g)(2) petition to expunge a 302 commitment record
      based on the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 302
      commitment in [Vencil, supra]:

          [U]nder section 6111.1(g)(2), a challenge to the
          sufficiency of the evidence to support a 302 commitment
          presents a pure question of law, and the court's sole
          concern is whether, based on the findings recorded by the
          physician and the information he or she relied upon in
          arriving at those findings, the precise, legislatively-defined
          prerequisites for a 302 commitment have been satisfied
          and are supported by a preponderance of the evidence.
          We emphasize that the trial court's review is limited to the
          findings recorded by the physician and the information he
          or she relied upon in arriving at those findings, and
          requires deference to the physician, as the original
          factfinder, as the physician examined and evaluated the
          individual in the first instance, was able to observe his or

                                   - 10 -
J-A29028-22

            her demeanor, and has particularized training, knowledge
            and experience regarding whether a 302 commitment is
            medically necessary.

       Vencil, 152 A.3d at 246 (rejecting de novo review subject to
       clear and convincing burden of proof for Section 6111.1(g)(2)
       petitions).

       [fn*2] The second means for the subject of a 302 commitment
       to obtain relief from the Section 6105(a)(1) firearms
       restrictions is to petition the trial court to grant relief based on
       a finding that “the applicant may possess a firearm without risk
       to the applicant or any other person.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(f)(1).

In re B.W., 250 A.3d 1163, 1165–1167 (Pa. 2021) (parallel citations and

some footnotes omitted) (footnotes in original).

      “An individual is severely mentally disabled if, as a result of mental

illness, his capacity . . . to care for his own personal needs is so lessened that

he poses a clear and present danger of harm . . . to [herself].”     Vencil, 152

A.3d at 237, quoting 50 P.S. § 7301(a). An individual is a “clear and present

danger” if, within the past 30 days:

       (i) the person has acted in such manner as to evidence that he
       would be unable, without care, supervision and the continued
       assistance of others, to satisfy his need for nourishment,
       personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety,
       and that there is a reasonable probability that death, serious
       bodily injury or serious physical debilitation would ensue within
       30 days unless adequate treatment were afforded under this
       act[.]

50 P.S. § 7301(b)(2)(i). Importantly, if subsection 7301(b)(2)(i) applies, “no

demonstration of an overt act is necessary to involuntarily commit the

individual under Section 303 of the [MHPA].” In re S.B., 777 A.2d 454, 459

(Pa. Super. 2000).

                                       - 11 -
J-A29028-22

      Herein, the trial court explained its rationale for denying Appellant’s

expungement request during the October 14, 2021 hearing. Initially, the trial

court highlighted the circumstances leading up to Appellant’s involuntary

commitment, including the altercation between her boyfriend and parents, as

well as Mother’s statement set forth within the Section 302 commitment

application. Then, the court noted that, following Mother’s application, the

physician on duty, Dr. Martibeller, evaluated Appellant and found “that her

behaviors were a danger to herself” necessitating commitment pursuant to 50

P.S. § 7301(b)(2)(i).    N.T. Hearing, 10/14/21, at 80.       Finally, the court

reviewed Dr. Pass’s testimony. At the outset, the court stated it found Dr.

Pass to be credible with respect to his testimony that Appellant “did not suffer,

at least currently, from any type of . . . psychopathology.” Id. The court

noted, however, that Dr. Pass admitted that

       a skilled clinician would be able to determine whether a 302
       would be necessary, and that he further agreed that a
       face-to-face evaluation is important so that there [is] a
       determination of whether there was lying or untruthfulness, and
       that the behaviors like walking down the [middle of a] road . .
       . [and] jumping out of a car would pose a threat of harm, and
       that statements such as I do[ not] care and I do[ not] deserve
       anything are evidence of a depressed [mental state].

Id. at 81. Accordingly, the court stated:

       I find that [Appellant’s] request for expungement pursuant to
       [Section] 6111.1(g)(2) is denied. Upon review of the [c]ourt
       by a preponderance of the evidence, I find that the commitment
       of [Appellant] was made to be sufficient, and I was relying on
       the requirements of the Vencil case. Unfortunately, I have to
       look at it through, through that scope. I know that [is] not what
       [Appellant] wanted to hear.

                                     - 12 -
J-A29028-22

Id.

      Upon review, we preliminarily note that the trial court properly

disregarded Dr. Pass’s expert testimony with respect to his assessment of

whether there was sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s Section 302

commitment. Indeed, as clearly stated in Vencil, Dr. Pass’s testimony was

utterly irrelevant to this inquiry at the October 14, 2021 hearing, as well as

on appeal.    See Vencil, 152 A.3d at 239, n.3 and 246; (confining its

“statement of the case to the facts and findings as recorded by the physician

who evaluated Vencil . . . because any other evidence or information is

irrelevant for purposes of a [S]ection 6111.1(g)(2) review”); see also B.W.,

250 A.3d at 1169, n.3 (explaining that B.W. and his girlfriend’s testimony was

“irrelevant to a Section 6111.1(g)(2) review under Vencil” and would not be

considered by the court).

      Moreover, we conclude that the trial court correctly determined that,

based upon the information provided to the Dr. Martibeller, as well as Dr.

Martibeller’s evaluation, there was sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s

involuntary commitment.     Indeed, Mother’s statement demonstrated that,

within the last 30 days, Appellant jumped out of a moving vehicle, walked

down the middle of a road at night, and was in an abusive relationship.

Application for Involuntary Emergency Examination & Treatment, 11/24/19,

at Part 1. Hence, Mother’s statement showed that Appellant engaged in risky

behavior, demonstrated disregard for her personal safety, and exhibited

behavior that could result in death or serious bodily injury.    See 50 P.S.

                                    - 13 -
J-A29028-22

§ 7301(b)(2)(i). In addition, Dr. Martibeller personally evaluated Appellant

and concluded that she demonstrated “poor insight [and] judgment” as well

as a “passive death wish” necessitating “inpatient psychiatric admission

treatment.” Application for Involuntary Emergency Examination & Treatment,

11/24/19, at Part VI.     In essence, Dr. Martibeller identified, based on his

interview and Appellant’s Section 302 commitment application, a call for

professional supervision and psychiatric treatment to address Appellant’s need

for self-protection and diminish an established probability that Appellant’s

behavior would lead to her death or serious bodily injury. The trial court, as

required, viewed this finding in a light most favorable to the physician and, in

so doing, concluded that there was sufficient evidence that Appellant was

“severally mentally disabled” pursuant to Section 7301(b)(2)(i). We discern

no abuse of discretion in making such a determination.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/23/2023

                                     - 14 -