Court Opinion

ID: 9855385
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:23:51.358006+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:05.756521
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE HEFFERNAN
(dissenting in part). Because this court is obligated to liberally construe pleadings with a view to "substantial justice" to the parties and because the allegations and inferences in the plaintiffs complaint do not establish that the clerk of circuit court's office acted at the direction of the judge, I would reverse the trial court's dismissal for failure to state a claim against the clerical personnel. Accordingly, I dissent in part.
*510Wisconsin's rules of civil procedure provide for notice pleading. Under sec. 802.02(1)(a), Stats., a party's claim for relief need only contain "[a] short and plain statement of the claim, identifying the transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences out of which the claim arises and showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Our rules also expressly provide that " [a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice." Section 802.02(6), Stats. See also Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 351-52, 294 N.W.2d 473 (1980).
This case arises out of a judgment granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under sec. 802.06(2) (f), Stats. As this court stated in Morgan v. Pennsylvania General Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 731-32, 275 N.W.2d 660 (1979):
The purpose of the complaint is to give notice of the nature of the claim; and, therefore, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to set out in the complaint all the facts which must eventually be proved to recover. [Citation omitted.] The purpose of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is the same as the purpose of the old demurrer — to test the legal sufficiency of the claim. [Citation omitted.] Because the pleadings are to be liberally construed, a claim should be dismissed as legally insufficient only if "it is quite clear that under no conditions can the plaintiff recover." Clausen and Lowe, The New Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure, Chapters 801-803, 59 Marq. L. Rev. 1, 54 (1976). The facts pleaded and all reasonable inferences from the pleadings must be taken as true, but legal conclusions and unreasonable inferences need not be accepted. [Citation omitted.]
Sec. 802.06(2) (f), Stats., on which the motions to dismiss were based, is similar to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A claim should not be dismissed under the Wisconsin rule or the federal *511rule unless it appears to a certainty that no relief can be granted under any set of facts that plaintiff can prove in support of his allegations. [Citations omitted.]
See also American Medical Transport v. Curtis-Universal, 154 Wis. 2d 135, 156, 452 N.W.2d 575 (1990).
As it pertains to the liability of the clerk's office (hereinafter "clerk"), the gist of the plaintiffs complaint is that "the acts and conduct" of the clerk "were performed in a negligent manner resulting in the detention, arrest, and custody of the plaintiff." Although the complaint generally focuses on the clerk's preparation and submission of the warrant to the district attorney's office, the plaintiff in his response brief to the defendant's motion to dismiss clearly suggested, as it also reasonably can be inferred from the complaint, that this negligence involved the clerk's handling and processing of the court's dismissal of criminal charges after the warrant was submitted.
While the majority sets forth the correct law as it regards the quasi-judicial immunity extended to clerical personnel, its application of the law to the facts of this case is erroneous and fails to further the policies and purposes of clerical immunity. To be sure, the majority recognizes that clerks are not absolutely immune from liability when they engage in ministerial acts. It is accepted that "[a] clerk of court who neglects or omits a ministerial task is liable for damages to one injured by the negligence or omission." See Cook v. City of Topeka, 232 Kan. 334, 339, 654 P.2d 953 (1982) (citing 15A Am. Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court, secs. 27, 28, pp. 163-65; 14 C.J.S., Clerks of Court, sec. 53, pp. 1252-53).
The policy behind holding clerks liable for the negligent performance of ministerial tasks is clear. "[T]he threat of possible tort liability does not 'unduly inhibit' *512the clerk in the discharge of his duties" because such clerical duties are not discretionary. See McCray v. State of Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 4-5 (4th Cir. 1972). Immunity is more broadly extended to district attorneys and judges, on the other hand, exactly because potential liability would "skew" or "shade" their decisions and cause them not to exercise their independent judgment. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223-24 (1988); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 (1976). A clerk's mandatory duties are usually set out in state statutes, and consequently a clerk's negligent omission to perform them subjects him or her to liability. See Dalton v. Hysell, 56 Ohio App. 2d 109, 110, 381 N.E.2d 955 (1978). In Wisconsin, a clerk's mandatory duties are set out at secs. 59.39 and 59.395, Stats., and clearly include the proper filing and indexing of all court documents. A negligent omission of such duties in Wisconsin, therefore, should also usually result in liability. Cf. Wisconsin Mortgage & Securities Co. v. Kriesel, 191 Wis. 602, 608, 211 N.W. 795 (1927); Schnur v. Hickcox, 45 Wis. 200, 203 (1878).
It appears that the only exception to this general rule of liability for ministerial acts, moreover, is when the clerk acts at the direction or request of the court. See Langen v. Borkowski, 188 Wis. 277, 283-85, 206 N.W. 181 (1925). See also Dellenbach v. Letsinger, 889 F.2d 755, 762-63 (7th Cir. 1989); Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 417-18 (6th Cir. 1988). The policy and purpose behind this rule is equally clear — litigants who are disappointed with the performance of an absolutely immune but culpable judicial officer should not be allowed to vent their frustration on ministerial clerks who are merely following orders. See Scruggs v. Moellering, 870 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1989); Ashbrook v. Hoffman, 617 F.2d 474, 476 *513(7th Cir. 1980). As an Indiana appellate court insightfully noted, however:
[T]he limited immunity given court clerks [when acting at the direction of the court] is probably better described as "derivative" as opposed to "quasi-judicial." It stems from a desire to protect officers of the court who do nothing more than obey court orders for which the issuing judge would be held immune. Such a rationale in no way supports the protection of ministerial officers who are guilty of misfeasance or non-feasance in the undertaking of their duties.
Poole v. Clase, 455 N.E.2d 953, 959-60 (Ind. App. 1983).
In summary, this exception can only be applied where, in addition to acting at the direction of the court, the clerk is not independently negligent.
Applying the foregoing principles of law to the facts of this case as alleged in the plaintiffs complaint, this court cannot rule as a matter of law that the clerk is absolutely immune. The allegations and reasonable inferences therefrom support the plaintiffs claim for negligence. While it is unclear from the plaintiffs claim in what particulars the clerk was negligent and guilty of misfeasance or nonfeasance, the plaintiff, in conformance with the complaint under our rules of pleading, ultimately could prove a "set of facts" to establish negligent clerical acts not at the direction of the court. Morgan, 87 Wis. 2d at 734-35, states: "In addition [to factual allegations in complaint], if any set of facts would support the allegations to make out a legally sufficient claim, these facts must also be considered admitted."
It is well accepted that "a clerk of court may be held liable ... for negligencé or misconduct in issuing a warrant of arrest; for failure properly to docket a judgment; [and] for failure to properly index a judgment." 15A Am.
*514Jur. 2d, Clerks of Court, sec. 28, p. 165 (1976). Again, an exception would only be made, for example, where a clerk issued a warrant at the express direction of the judge. See Foster, 864 F.2d at 417-18. The majority fails to mention, moreover, that numerous state courts have faced very similar factual situations where, due to the alleged negligence of a clerk in not properly recording a dismissal of criminal charges or recalling a warrant after a fine was paid, the plaintiff was falsely arrested. All of these state courts hold a clerk liable and not protected by absolute immunity. The "at the direction of the court" exception clearly has no application in these situations. See generally Annotation, Applicability of Judicial Immunity to Acts of Clerk of Court Under State Law, 34 A.L.R.4th 1186 (1984 and 1990 Supp.).
In Poole v. Clase, 455 N.E.2d 953 (Ind. App. 1983), for example, an Indiana court was faced with a similar motion to dismiss. A warrant for the plaintiffs arrest had been issued after he failed to appear in court. Although the plaintiff then paid his fine and the matter was closed, because the outstanding warrant was never recalled the plaintiff was subsequently arrested. Suit was brought alleging the clerk's and assistant clerk's negligence in failing to recall the arrest warrant. Id. at 955. The court held that such nondiscretionary clerical actions were nonjudicial, ministerial, and not protected by any immunity. It concluded that:
[The clerk's] failure to recall the warrant was not the performance mandated by a protected judicial decision. Instead, according to the complaint, she neglected to execute a judicial decision. Such neglect was nonfeasance of a ministerial act for which she may be held liable, assuming, as we must, that to perform the duty would have been within the scope of her employment.
*515Id. at 960.
In Cook v. City of Topeka, 232 Kan. 334, 654 P.2d 953 (1982), a bench warrant was similarly issued after the plaintiff failed to appear in court to contest a traffic violation. Although the plaintiff thereafter paid the fine, through an omission in the clerk's office the bench warrant was not recalled and the plaintiff was subsequently arrested. After noting that, under Kansas state statute, clerks had a duty to "file and preserve all papers" (see id. at 338), the court reasoned:
The Clerk has no discretion on whether or not to recall a bench warrant after the traffic fine payment is made. The routine recall of a warrant by the municipal court clerk upon payment of the traffic fine is wholly ministerial in nature. Clerical error in failing to do a ministerial act does not convert the activity into a judicial function.
Id. at 339.
Regarding a separate sec. 1983 claim against the clerk apart from the one grounded in negligence, the court also ruled that the clerk's action was not excepted because there was "no indication in the record the clerk did not recall the warrant by virtue of a court order or judicial direction." Id. at 343.
In Dalton v. Hysell, 56 Ohio App. 2d 109, 381 N.E.2d 955 (1978), an Ohio appellate court reversed a trial court's dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim against a clerk who, after the plaintiff had paid a traffic fine, negligently failed to record the payment which led to the plaintiffs subsequent arrest. The court noted that the clerk failed in his statutory duties and that no judicial immunity was applicable because " [t]he Clerk was not carrying out a specific order of the court *516where judicial immunity would protect him from liability for the judicially mandated act." Id. at 111.
In Calhoun v. City of Providence, 120 R.I. 619, 390 A.2d 350 (1978), the plaintiff was similarly arrested even though he had previously paid fines for traffic offenses. A negligence action was brought against the state for a clerk's failure to recall a "capias." Id. at 620. In vacating the trial court's directed verdict, the Rhode Island Supreme Court found liability "because somebody in the employ of the state 'goofed.' " Id. at 633. The court declined to extend the judicial immunity exception because the state was unable to prove "that it was the fault of a judge in failing to recall the capias." Id. at 633. In reinstating the jury verdict, the court concluded:
[T]he jury was well warranted in finding that the lapse which led to this suit occurred in the clerk's office where, because of some bookkeeping slip-up, either the issuance of the capias was never docketed or the recall order was never entered. The clerk, unlike the judge, is not immune to suit because of his failure to perform the ministerial functions imposed upon him by law.
Id. at 633-34.
Without further belaboring the point, it will only be noted that various other state court cases have employed the same analysis in factually similar cases. See e.g., Connell v. Tooele City, 572 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977); Mauro v. Kittitas County, 26 Wash. App. 538, 613 P.2d 195 (1980); cf. Mills v. Ganucheau, 416 So. 2d 361 (La. App. 1982).
As stated above, Ford's complaint was erroneously dismissed by the trial court because there were various circumstances under which the plaintiff could recover. While the facts pleaded by Ford must be taken as true, *517any set of additional facts which would support Ford's negligence claim must also be taken as true. See Morgan, 87 Wis. 2d at 734. The majority's construction of Ford's complaint does "substantial injustice" to the plaintiff and must be rejected. In determining this motion to dismiss for failure to state a negligence claim, this court is not limited to only the specific facts set forth in the complaint. Taking all reasonable inferences from Ford's complaint as true, it becomes readily apparent that this court is possibly faced with a factual scenario not unlike all those faced by the other state courts mentioned above.
First, Ford may, under the allegations of the complaint, prove that the clerk was negligent in carrying out any number of nondiscretionary ministerial duties. As stated above, the clerk's mandatory duties are set out at secs. 59.39 and 59.395, Stats., and include properly filing, docketing, and recording court papers. Ford's entire negligence action revolves around the state's promised dismissal of criminal charges. While Ford did not, in so many words, allege that the misdemeanor charges were in fact dismissed, he states at para. 15 of his complaint that "the matter had long been concluded on July 7, 1986." The reasonable inference from this is that the criminal charge for issuing a worthless check either was, or was supposed to be, dismissed after Ford's attorney reached a plea bargain and entered either a no contest or guilty plea to an amended charged violation and the forfeiture was paid.
Under this reasonable inference, Ford could establish that the clerk, to use the words of the Rhode Island Supreme Court, "goofed" in respect to its record-keeping or filing of the dismissed criminal charges. Ford could prove that the clerk failed to record the dismissal or neglected to fulfill a mandatory duty to notify the dis*518trict attorney of this dismissal prior to the submission of the bench warrant "on or about July 11, 1986.1,1 Ford might also prove that the clerk neglected to notify the district attorney or the court of the dismissal after the bench warrant was issued, thus causing the warrant never to be recalled. To be sure, the facts surrounding the promised dismissal of the misdemeanor and the clerical duties relative to it are unclear. On a motion to dismiss, however, the court does not search for material issues of fact as on summary judgment. The question here is whether under any conceivable set of facts the plaintiff has a sufficient claim for negligence on which relief can be granted.
Second, Ford could likewise establish that the clerk's negligent actions were not done at the request or direction of the court. The majority's assertion that any negligent actions by the clerk prior to the issuance of the bench warrant thereafter became immune "judicial" actions once the judge signed the warrant is without support. See majority op. at 500. The majority's statement that ”[i]t would be beyond the scope of [the clerk's] duties to second-guess the judge's order," (id. at p. 501), implies that the action of the judge was negligent. There is no allegation or reasonable inference that the judge himself was in any way negligent. Ford is not using the clerk as a " 'lightning rod for harassing litigation' aimed at the court." See id. at pp. 497-498. Ford alleges that the clerk's own independent negligence caused him inju*519ries. The clerk's liability does not derive from the court's culpable conduct. If Ford can prove that the clerk failed to fulfill the requisite ministerial duties, then the "at the direction of the court" exception has no application.
Ford's complaint must be liberally construed to do substantial justice. Wisconsin is a notice pleading state. The majority's narrow focus on the specific facts alleged in Ford's complaint is wholly inconsistent with the spirit of the current rules of pleading. A motion to dismiss is not to be treated as a summary judgment based on a single pleading. While Ford's complaint was not especially artful, it alleged that the clerk's negligent conduct resulted in his wrongful arrest. The reasonable inference from this is that the clerk was negligent in discharge of duty — i.e., there was either misfeasance or nonfeasance. This court cannot determine whether the clerk is absolutely immune until discovery is undertaken and all the facts are known. It was error as a matter of law to dismiss the claim against Kenosha county that is predicated upon the alleged negligence of the clerk's office.
For these reasons I dissent to that part of the majority's affirmance of the judgment of the circuit court.
I am authorized to state that Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson joins in this dissent.