Court Opinion

ID: 9456786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:02:22.308415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:06.200337
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
I dissent from the majority’s determination that the order from which Build of Buffalo Inc. has appealed is an interlocutory order refusing an injunction, appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a) (1).1 This holding conflicts with a recent decision by another panel of this court, McMillan v. Board of Education, 430 F.2d 1145 (2 Cir. 1970),2 and involves a needless extension of appellate jurisdiction over an order that exhibits none of the potential harm to the litigants which § 1292(a) (1) was designed to alleviate.
This appeal is another example of the not infrequent tendency of counsel to be inattentive to important questions of appellate jurisdiction. Alart Associates, Inc. v. Aptaker, 402 F.2d 779 (2 Cir. 1968). Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules *291of Civil Procedure3 cannot be the source of jurisdiction over this appeal, as its requirements have not been met,4 and an order dismissing an action as to some but not all the defendants, at least where the defendants are jointly liable, is not a final order appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 in the absence of compliance with Rule 54(b).5 McMillan v. Board of Education, supra; Davis v. National Mortgage Corp., 320 F.2d 90 (2 Cir. 1963); Jackson v. Hart, 435 F.2d 1293 (3 Cir. 1970); Tracy v. Robbins, 373 F.2d 13 (4 Cir. 1967); Feist v. McGee, 433 F.2d 1015 (9 Cir. 1970); Hamman v. United States, 399 F.2d 673 (9 Cir. 1968); 9 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 110.09 at 125-129. Thus, the sole question of appealability is the one identified by the majority, whether the district court’s dismissal as to the Mayor, Chief of Police and Department of Human Relations of the City of Buffalo constitutes an interlocutory order denying an injunction within the meaning of the interlocutory appeals statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1).
The majority asserts that the appeal-ability of the present order is settled by General Electric Co. v. Marvel Rare Metals Co., 287 U.S. 430, 53 S.Ct. 202, 77 L.Ed. 408 (1932), where the Supreme Court held that an order dismissing a counterclaim for injunctive relief against a single plaintiff, was appealable as an interlocutory order denying an injunction. Accord, Berlin v. E. C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822, 85 S.Ct. 46, 13 L.Ed.2d 33 (1964); Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 325 F.2d 822 (2 Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 944, 84 S.Ct. 800, 11 L.Ed.2d 767 (1964); Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871, 77 S.Ct. 96, 1 L.Ed.2d 76 (1956); Telechron, Inc. v. Parissi, 197 F.2d 757 (2 Cir. 1952); Cutting Room Appliances Corp. v. Empire Cutting Machine Co., Inc., 186 F.2d 997 (2 Cir. 1951); Rains v. Cascade Industries, Inc., 402 F.2d 241 (3 Cir. 1968); Simmonds Aerocessories Ltd. v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 257 F.2d 485 (3 Cir. 1958). The reliance on Marvel, however, overlooks the important fact that the present appeal is not from an order completely disposing of a claim for injunctive relief but is merely an appeal from an order dismissing a single cause of action as to some of the defendants.
The question whether the policies behind § 1292(a) (1) require different treatment for a dismissal of some defendants as opposed to a complete dismissal of a cause of action or claim for relief in a multiple-claim case is not of recent vintage. In United States v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co., 276 F.2d 525 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, Tri-Continental Financial Corp. v. United States, 362 U.S. 961, 964, 80 S.Ct. 877, 4 L.Ed.2d 876 (1960), the United States, in behalf of the Interstate Commerce Com*292mission, brought an action against the New Haven seeking a declaration that an agreement for the repurchase of preferred shares between the railroad and certain banking groups was invalid and an injunction against performance of the agreement. The district court entered summary judgment for the New Haven. We reversed. A few weeks later, however, we reconsidered the reversal in light of a suggestion that we lacked jurisdiction over the Government’s appeal. At that time we also considered an appeal involving an action by the stockholders of the New Haven claiming, inter alia, that the agreement between the New Haven and the banking group was invalid and seeking an injunction against the performance of the agreement. The complaint was in ten counts, and counts five, six and seven set forth three theories in support of the claim for injunctive relief against performance of the agreement. The district court entered an order pursuant to Rule 54(b) dismissing count six of the complaint and an appeal was taken. We held that Rule 54(b) was improperly invoked because the action was not final, due to the fact that other theories of liability remained open, but that the order was appealable under § 1292(a) (1) as an order refusing an injunction. 276 F.2d at 545. The contention that there was no refusal of an injunction because other grounds for granting the injunction remained undetermined was rejected,6 and we cited as authority earlier decisions holding that in a suit for injunctive relief an order denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was an order refusing an injunction under § 1292(a) (1) even though the plaintiff might later prevail at trial. Federal Glass Co. v. Loshin, 217 F.2d 936 (2 Cir. 1954); Raylite Electric Corp. v. Noma Electric Corp., 170 F.2d 914 (2 Cir. 1948). We stated that the appealability of the order in the stockholders’ suit followed a fortiori from Telechron, Inc. v. Parissi, supra, where an order striking those portions of a complaint seeking injunctive relief based on unfair competition was held appealable under § 1292(a) (1) even though a claim for injunctive relief under the patent laws remained undetermined.
Significant for the present appeal is the fact that, writing for the panel, Judge Friendly distinguished a series of cases, involving fact patterns the same as that presented by this appeal, in which we denied jurisdiction. Goldlawr v. Heiman, 273 F.2d 729 (2 Cir. 1959); John & Sals Automotive Service Inc. v. Jones Beach State Parkway Authority, 267 F.2d 862 (2 Cir. 1959); Cott Beverage Corp. v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, 243 F.2d 795 (2 Cir. 1957); Porter v. American Distilling Co., Inc., 157 F.2d 1012 (2 Cir. 1946); Studer v. Moore, 153 F.2d 902 (2 Cir. 1946). Although those cases are distinguishable because the applicability of § 1292(a) (1) was not argued, Judge Friendly indicated that a result reached in a multiple-defendant case was not controlling in a multiple-claim case. 276 F.2d at 546.
Judge Clark dissented from a denial of an Application for a Rehearing in banc, 276 F.2d at 549, and he argued that before § 1292(a) (1) could be invoked, the order must completely dispose of a claim for relief or cause of action7 and not dispose merely of one theory in support of the requested relief. Disagreeing sharply with Judge Friendly on the applicability of Goldlawr et al., supra, Judge Clark argued that the effect of the majority’s decision was to overrule those cases, 276 F.2d at 551, because under the majority’s reasoning jurisdiction *293over them should have been sustained under § 1292(a) (1), presumably on the ground that the failure to dispose completely of a claim for relief is not fatal to § 1292(a) (1) jurisdiction.
To the extent that the New Haven case does, as Judge Clark thought, stand for a general disregard of the requirement that the order completely dispose of a claim for relief before it is appealable under § 1292(a) (1), the continued vitality of that holding is rendered doubtful by our overruling of the proposition upon which Judge Friendly placed primary reliance. In Chappell & Co. v. Frankel, 367 F.2d 197 (2 Cir. 1966) (en banc), we overruled Federal Glass Co. v. Loshin, supra, and Raylite Electric Corp. v. No-ma Electric Corp., supra, and held that a denial of plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in an action seeking injunctive relief is not appealable under § 1292(a) (1). Specifically referring to the New Haven case, among others, we stated, “as our result here is inconsistent with the result reached in the above cases we are reversing the rule set forth therein * * * ” 367 F.2d at 200. See also Quirke v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co., 367 F.2d 864 (2 Cir. 1966).
Moreover, whatever life still remains in the rule established in the New Haven case must be interpreted in light of McMillan v. Board of Education, supra, in which another panel of this court, Judge Friendly writing the opinion, reached a result in conflict with that announced here by the majority. There, a civil rights action was brought against (1) the Board of Education of New York City, (2) the City’s Superintendent of Schools, (3) the City’s Director of Education for the Physically Handicapped, (4) the New York State Department of Education and (5) the State Commissioner of Education, on behalf of three handicapped children, to declare unconstitutional the $2000 per pupil limitation on amounts to be spent for the private teaching of brain-damaged children, § 4407, New York Education Law, McKinney’s Consol.Laws, c. 16. The complaint requested temporary and permanent injunctions to prohibit the State defendants from enforcing the limitation and injunctions requiring the three City defendants to provide adequate classes for handicapped pupils. The district court declined plaintiffs’ request for a three-judge district court on the ground that the constitutional claim against the State defendants was insubstantial and dismissed the action as to them. As is the case in the present appeal, no order was entered pursuant to Rule 54(b). The court held that § 1292(a) (1) did not provide jurisdiction over the appeal, as the appeal was not an interlocutory order, and that because a Rule 54(b) order was not entered, the order was not final due to the continued pendency of the action against the City defendants. 430 F.2d at 1148. The court did assume jurisdiction, however, to review the order as one denying a three-judge court.
I am not persuaded that the characterization of the order in McMillan as non-interlocutory is sound,8 but the result there reached is not consistent with the majority’s herein. If no jurisdiction existed over the appeal in McMillan where the severance of the State defendants precluded any possibility of having the State statute establishing the $2000 limitation declared unconstitutional, then clearly, jurisdiction must be denied over the present appeal. Compelling policy reasons support such a result.
The liability of the Mayor, the Chief of Police and the Department of Human Relations of Buffalo is derivative of the liability of the individual police officers. *294Dismissing the action as to these three defendants did not affect the action as to the remaining defendants, and no argument has been presented that the dismissal affected the quality of the relief prayed for by the plaintiffs. As such, the present appeal is distinguishable from those cases, like Marvel, sustaining jurisdiction over the dismissal of a separate action for injunctive relief in a multiple claim case, because there the district court’s determination operated as a complete adjudication of the claim. The order was properly characterized, therefore, as a denial of injunctive relief, because the court’s action completely foreclosed that avenue of relief. Here, however, the order merely held that if any injunctive relief is ultimately obtained, it may not run against the appellees herein.
Moreover, an important policy consideration points up the difference between the multiple-claim and multiple-defendant case, because, in the latter, where the liability of the defendants is derivative and joint, the adjudication of piecemeal appeals involving some but not all the defendants may operate to determine issues common to all the defendants without a corresponding opportunity for all the defendants to participate in that determination. Zangardi v. Tobriner, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 350, 330 F.2d 224 (1964); Robbin v. American University, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 351, 330 F.2d 225 (1964). Under these circumstances it is unwise to stretch the meaning of § 1292(a) (1) to include as the denial of an injunction an order which merely holds that the requested injunctive relief may not run against some of the defendants.9 Rather, jurisdiction should be denied unless it can be shown that for all practical purposes the dismissal of these defendants effectively terminates the litigation or that it fully nullifies any potential injunctive relief by contracting the scope of the injunctive relief originally sought. Spangler v. United States, 415 F.2d 1242 (9 Cir. 1969). Both approaches are familiar analytical concepts; the former has been utilized in this Circuit to determine whether the dismissal of the class action aspect of a complaint is appealable under the collateral order doctrine,10 Caceres v. International Air Transportation Association, 422 F.2d 141 (2 Cir. 1970); City of New York v. International Pipe and Ceramics Corp., 410 F.2d 295 (2 Cir. 1969); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2 Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035, 87 S.Ct. 1487, 18 L.Ed.2d 598 (1967); Weingartner v. Union Oil Company of California, 431 F.2d 26 (9 Cir. 1970), and the latter has been utilized by the Fourth Circuit to determine whether the same question is appealable under § 1292 (a) (1) as a denial of injunctive relief. Brunson v. Board of Trustees, 311 F.2d 107 (4 Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 933, 83 S.Ct. 1538, 10 L.Ed.2d 690 (1963); see Note, Interlocutory Appeal From Orders Striking Class Action Allegations, 70 Colum.L.Rev. 1292, 1297 (1970). Such an approach to the question of the appealability of orders like the one before us would provide the needed flexibility to deny jurisdiction where the order, as in this case, will not cause serious injury to the plaintiffs by effectively terminating the action but would, on the other hand, deprive the remaining defendants of the opportunity to be heard on issues that may work a collateral estoppel effect against them. Zangardi v. Tobriner, supra; Robbin v. *295American University, supra. In Tracy v. Robbins, supra, the Fourth Circuit apparently adopted this test, and in Spangler v. United States, supra, the Ninth Circuit also made use of it.
It is clear, however, that the district court’s dismissal as to the appellees herein did not sound the “death knell” of the action. The action remained pending as to the individual police officers, and complete relief could have been had against them.
In their supplemental papers, appellants argue that the district court’s subsequent action as to the individual officers disposes of the uncertainty surrounding our jurisdiction over the appeal and makes it clear that jurisdiction may be based on Rule 54(b). As stated earlier, however, the district court made no attempt to enter the order in accordance with Rule 54(b), and the subsequent action is of no moment in determining whether § 1292(a) (1) provides jurisdiction. In its latest order, the district court severed the organizational plaintiffs as not properly representative and dismissed the class action aspect of the complaint, letting stand the actions by individual plaintiffs against the individual officers for violations of their civil rights.11 This order itself presents serious questions of appealability, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jaequelin, supra, and no coherent argument has been presented that explains how this subsequent order can affect the appealability of the order now before us.
I would dismiss the appeal for lack of statutory jurisdiction.

. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1) provides:
“(a) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts * * * granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court;”

. Accord, Tracy v. Robbins, infra. Contra, Bowling Machines, Inc. v. First National Bank, 283 F.2d 39 (1 Cir. 1960). See Berry v. Housing & Home Finance Agency, 340 F.2d 939, 940 n. 1 (2 Cir. 1965), assuming without deciding that this type of order is appealable.

. Rule 54(b), F.R.Civ.P., provides:
“When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.”

. Judge Henderson’s order neither expressly directs entry of judgment nor expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.

. In Davis v. National Mortgage Corp., supra, an appeal from an entry of default judgment against some but not all jointly liable defendants was dismissed for lack of compliance with Rule 54(b). The opinion expressly left open the question whether Rule 54(b) permits the entry of final judgment against some but not all defendants whose liability is joint.

. The rejection of this argument apparently disregards the emphasis of at least one commentator that in a multiple claim case an order of the district court that fully adjudicates a claim for injunctive relief is appealable under § 1292(a) (1). 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 54.30 [2] at 232-234.

. Judge Clark defined the claim for relief or cause of action in terms of the “operative facts giving rise to an enforceable right, and not * * * legal theories. * * * ” 276 F.2d at 550. Under Judge Clark’s analysis, Telechron, Inc. v. Parissi, supra, involved two separate claims for injunctive relief. Id. at 551.

. The fact that the action remains undetermined ns to other defendants would appear to render the order no less interlocutory than the pendency of other undetermined claims renders an order completely disposing of one claim for injunctive relief. The latter order is consistently treated as an interlocutory order. 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 54.30 [2], at 234.

. Because § 1292(a) (1) provides a limited exception to the general policy against piecemeal appeals as expressed by the rule that only final orders of the district courts are subject to review, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, it should be construed with some strictness. Switzerland Cheese Association, Inc. v. E. Horne’s Market, Inc., 351 F.2d 552 (1 Cir. 1965), aff’d, 385 U.S. 23, 87 S.Ct. 193, 17 L.Ed.2d 23 (1966). See also Goldstein v. Cox, 396 U.S. 471, 478, 90 S.Ct. 671, 24 L.Ed.2d 663 (1970).

. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949).

. Judge Henderson's second order, entered on January 22, 1971, does, however, point up the undesirability of reviewing, at this stage, the earlier order, because in the last paragraph of the order he indicates that the individual plaintiffs are now free to prosecute individual actions against the individual officers and their responsible superiors. As there was no opinion written as to the first order, this latter determination suggests that the motion to dismiss as against the Mayor, Chief of Police and Department of Human Relations was granted as to the class action aspect of the complaint alone, not for failure to state a claim as the order purports to do. The unraveling of such confusion as exists would better await a time when the posture of the case before this court permits a treatment of the entire case.