Court Opinion

ID: 9714449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:37:44.784416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:26.103226
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I agree that we should affirm the decision to permit Country Mutual to select Bleyer as an arbitrator. I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that stacking is not available with respect to coverage associated with the premiums paid for the two pickup trucks under the business auto policy. To reach this conclusion, I think we need look no farther than part VI, paragraph (E)(1), of that policy, which expressly states that the $100,000 limit for bodily injury shown in the declarations for “Each Person” applies “[rjegardless of the number of covered autos.” There is nothing ambiguous about this language, and I see nothing in the remainder of the policy or the facts of this case which would render it ambiguous. Where I must part company with my colleagues is on the question of whether stacking is proper as between the personal vehicle policy and the business auto policy. I would hold that aggregation of coverage under those policies is available to Ruth as well as Halie. As the majority itself acknowledges, the personal policy’s antistacking provision only precludes aggregation of coverage with other Country Mutual vehicle insurance policies “when each policy affords coverage and each is issued to the person seeking to aggregate the coverages.” (156 Ill. 2d at 187.) The appellate court correctly recognized that this limitation is inapplicable here, for each policy was not issued to Ruth. While the personal vehicle policy was issued to her (as well as to John), the declarations page of the business auto policy plainly shows that it was issued in John’s name alone. The majority attempts to avoid this conclusion by invoking the definitions contained in the personal policy. By interpreting those definitions in a literal and narrow fashion, the majority, in effect, elevates Ruth to the status of an additional named insured under the business policy, alongside her husband, John. The problem with this construction is that it directly conflicts with the terms of the business policy itself. From the plain language of that policy, it is manifest that the parties intended only that Ruth be covered, not that she occupy the same status as her husband. This distinction is no mere technical formality, for under the policy, named insureds are the policyholders and, as such, possess qualitatively different rights and obligations (including the obligation to pay premiums) than those who simply enjoy the policy’s protection as insureds. I know of no principle of law authorizing us to work so substantial an alteration in the parties’ contractual relationship. To honor the terms of the agreements, as we must, we should determine the question of whom a policy has been “issued to” by reference to the provisions of that particular policy, and not some other. As I have noted, and as the appellate court held, such an approach yields the conclusion that the business policy was not “issued to” Ruth and that she was therefore not barred from aggregating coverage by the antistacking provision of the personal policy. Goss v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1986), 147 Ill. App. 3d 866. This interpretation is no less reasonable than the one proffered by the majority. Because more than one reasonable interpretation exists, we should acknowledge, at the very least, that the antistacking provision is ambiguous. It is axiomatic that all doubts and ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the insured. (United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co. (1991), 144 Ill. 2d 64, 74.) Accordingly, I would hold that, as an insured under both the personal and business policies, Ruth is entitled to the full coverage afforded by each. On this issue I therefore respectfully dissent. JUSTICE BILANDIC joins in this partial concurrence and partial dissent. APPENDIX [[Image here]]