Court Opinion

ID: 9693545
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:49:29.91324+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:48.358111
License: Public Domain

MARKELL, Bankruptcy Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
This case requires us to determine what Congress intended in 1994 when it exempted “criminal fines” from the chapter 13 discharge. Specifically, we must decide whether that phrase covers court-ordered and statutorily authorized reimbursement of costs related to prosecuting a debtor for a federal crime.
The majority spends a great deal of time and analysis essentially holding that the rehabilitative and redemptive goals of bankruptcy require a narrow construction of “criminal fines.” I think it is more likely that Congress intended that bankruptcy courts construe the term in the Bankruptcy Code in the same way that other courts construe it in the Criminal Code.
As noted in Collier on Bankruptcy: “To determine whether a particular fine is dis-chargeable under section 1328(a)(3), an examination of applicable criminal law will often be necessary.” 8 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 1328.02[3][j] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th ed. rev.2008). See also Bova v. St. Vincent DePaul Corp. (In re Bova), 276 B.R. 726, 731-32 (1st Cir.BAP2002) (examining Illinois and California criminal law to determine whether civil enforcement of restitution judgment affected the judgment’s status as criminal restitution).
If that proposition is accepted, United States v. Gering, 716 F.2d 615, 626 (9th Cir.1983); United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961, 970 (9th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040, 97 S.Ct. 737, 50 L.Ed.2d 751 (1977); and United States v. Ducharme, 505 F.2d 691, 692 (9th Cir.1974) (per curiam) demonstrate that, in this circuit, costs of reimbursement count as criminal fines.10
Although reasonable minds might differ, I think treating reimbursement costs as criminal fines within § 1328(a)(3) is a more *721natural reading of that section, and, given the history behind the 1994 amendment that added “criminal fíne” to § 1328(a)(3), the reading that Congress likely intended. I therefore dissent.

. The majority cites Gering in an attempt to distinguish Ducharme. One cannot quibble with the quotations used by the majority; they are accurate. But the context is off. Gering dealt with whether costs could be imposed under 28 U.S.C. § 1918(b) if the text of the statute setting for the substantive crime did not refer to costs. Distinguishing Ducharme on the basis that it did not construe § 1918(b), the circuit held that "unless the statute under which a defendant is convicted provides otherwise, a district court may in its discretion impose costs of prosecution under section 1918(b) on non-indigent defendants.” Gering at 626. With all due respect to the majority, that holding does nothing to Duc-harme’s and Taxe’s indications that, for sentencing purposes, costs of prosecution are treated as criminal fines.