Court Opinion

ID: 9561538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:11:29.636391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:52.533505
License: Public Domain

Whitman, Judge,
concurring specially. 1. I concur in Division 1 of the opinion.
2. Division 2 of the opinion deals with enumeration of error No. 1 and refers to Bracewell v. State, 10 Ga. App. 830 (74 SE 440). This case involved an accusation of the offense of affray and not for the offense of assault and battery. These are separate and distinct offenses, the offense of affray being that defined and punishable under Code § 26-5303. Moreover, the Bracewell case, decided when the Court of Appeals consisted of three judges, was a decision by only two of the judges, the third judge not participating therein for the reason that the ease was argued before he came to the bench as the successor of a judge who had resigned therefrom. As indicated in the opinion, the trial court did charge the jury in respect of the use of opprobrious words as requested, which has relation to the offense of assault and battery, with which the defendant was charged in the accusation and for which he was tried.
3. Enumeration of error No. 2 deals with the payment by the defendant of expenses incurred by the victim as a condition to the suspension of sentence therein set forth. The sentence was not one of probation, but of suspension, and the sentence was imposed on July 28, 1969.
Code Ann. § 27-2706 originally provided as follows: “In all criminal cases in which the defendant shall be found guilty or in which a plea of guilty shall be entered, and the trial judge after imposing sentence shall further provide that the execution of such sentence shall be suspended, such provision shall have the effect of placing such defendant on probation as provided in Sections 27-2702 to 27-2705.” (Emphasis supplied).
By the Statewide Probation Act, approved February 8, 1956, *234Code Ann. § 27-2706, above referred to, was repealed, and by Section 13 of the Act of 1956 it was provided that if a sentence shall by suspended, such provision shall have the effect of placing the defendant on probation. However, by Act approved March 31, 1965 (Code Ann. § 27-2714, the law was changed, and by the Act of 1965 it is provided as follows: “In all criminal cases in which the defendant shall be found guilty, or in which a plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere shall be entered, and the trial judge after imposing sentence shall further provide that the execution of such sentence shall be suspended, such provision shall not have the effect of placing such defendant on probation as provided in this law [ §§ 27-2702 through 27-2723].” (Emphasis supplied).
Accordingly, it is my view that the portion of the suspended sentence imposing the condition as to payment of expenses was not appropriate or proper. However, the remedy available to the defendant in respect of the inclusion in the sentence of the condition for the suspension on payment of the expenses incurred by the victim was that of a motion during the term in arrest of the sentence to the extent of the imposition of such condition. It does not appear from the record that any such motion was made in the trial court during the term or otherwise, nor does it appear that any question as to the legality of the imposition of such condition was raised in or passed on by the trial court. Therefore, the imposition of this condition will not be considered or passed on here. In this connection see Pippin v. State, 172 Ga. 224 (157 SE 185), which pursuant to a certified question was followed in Pippin v. State, 43 Ga. App. 16 (157 SE 913).
I concur in afiirming the judgment of the trial court.