Court Opinion

ID: 9402732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-16 18:00:41.661123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:02.226848
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-20216       Document: 00516789671             Page: 1      Date Filed: 06/16/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                      United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                       Fifth Circuit

                                    ____________                                     FILED
                                                                                 June 16, 2023
                                     No. 22-20216
                                                                                Lyle W. Cayce
                                    ____________                                     Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                           versus

   Gregory Eugene Baker,

                                             Defendant—Appellant.
                    ______________________________

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Southern District of Texas
                             USDC No. 4:20-CR-612-1
                    ______________________________

   Before Jones, Clement, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Gregory Baker brings this appeal after a jury found him guilty of
   receiving child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1) and
   possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2). The
   evidence against him supports these charges, and his legal challenges are
   foreclosed. Therefore, we AFFIRM.

          _____________________
          *
              Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
   should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set
   forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 22-20216      Document: 00516789671           Page: 2   Date Filed: 06/16/2023

                                     No. 22-20216

                                I. Background
          Officer Bruce Moats was an investigator for the Fort Bend County
   District Attorney. He specializes in forensic computer analysis. During the
   investigation that led to this case, he was assigned to the Houston Metro
   Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force and worked undercover to
   detect child pornography on Freenet, a dark web platform where people can
   share files.
          Freenet is designed to provide anonymity and circumvent censorship.
   To that end, it operates as a “closed-loop” network, meaning that users only
   communicate with other computers that are also on the network. To find and
   download files on Freenet, users need a “check key”—analogous to a URL.
   Users enter a check key into Freenet, and the Freenet program then attempts
   to retrieve the file associated with that check key.
          Freenet conceals the files it stores by disassembling and dispersing
   them. When Freenet stores a file, it first breaks the file into hundreds or
   thousands of different “blocks,” encrypts those blocks, and then saves them
   on devices that use Freenet, such that no single device contains all the blocks
   necessary to reassemble the file. A user whose device stores some of the
   blocks is unaware of their presence, and he or she is not able to determine the
   nature of the file based on the blocks alone.
          Accessing these files requires finding and reassembling them. The
   process begins when a user enters the check key for a particular file into
   Freenet. Then, their computer sends a request for blocks associated with
   that file to the Freenet-using devices to which it is connected. If those
   devices do not have those blocks, they relay the request to other devices.
   Besides the initial user who entered the check key, none of the users whose
   devices are involved in this sequence are aware that their computers are
   relaying these requests; their computers conduct the search passively. The

                                          2
Case: 22-20216      Document: 00516789671           Page: 3    Date Filed: 06/16/2023

                                     No. 22-20216

   request is relayed 17 or 18 times before the search terminates. In some cases,
   Freenet will not be able to assemble the file after the search.
          This process leaves clues as to which device began the search for a
   particular file. To ensure that the search terminates after 17 or 18 relays, each
   request is assigned a different “hops to live (HTL) value.” The request that
   starts the search typically has an HTL value of 18 or 17, and subsequent
   requests will have lower numbers. Because it is far more likely that a request
   with a high HTL value began the search, investigators like Officer Moats will
   disregard suspicious requests with HTL values lower than 17.
          In July 2018, Officer Moats noticed that an IP address geolocated in
   Sugar Land, Texas, had recently sent 13 requests on Freenet using check keys
   known to be associated with child pornography. All 13 requests had HTL
   values of 18 or 17. However, he was not able to determine whether the
   requests had successfully assembled the files, or whether the requestor had
   downloaded them. To verify the content of the files, Officer Moats entered
   the same 13 check keys into Freenet, which successfully assembled 11 out of
   the 13. He confirmed that those 11 files contained child pornography.
          Officer Moats subpoenaed Comcast, which owned and serviced the IP
   address, to learn the identity of the subscriber associated with the address.
   The subpoena response revealed that Gregory Baker—a software engineer
   living in Sugar Land, Texas—was the subscriber. Law enforcement obtained
   a warrant and searched Baker’s home in April 2019. They seized 32 devices
   containing 12,762 images and 380 videos of child pornography during the
   search. Freenet was installed on several of these devices. Most of the child
   pornography had been deleted and moved to unallocated space on the
   devices’ hard drives. Two of the images and one of the videos were identical
   to files that Officer Moats had found when he entered the suspicious check
   keys into Freenet. Additionally, six other files—no longer accessible, but

                                          3
Case: 22-20216      Document: 00516789671          Page: 4    Date Filed: 06/16/2023

                                    No. 22-20216

   with titles associated with child pornography—indicated they had been
   downloaded between January and May 2018.
          On November 18, 2020, a grand jury indicted Baker with one count of
   receiving child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1) (on or
   about July 27, 2018, the day the suspicious activity on Freenet came from
   Baker’s IP address) and one count of possessing child pornography in
   violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2) (on or about April 4, 2019, the day of
   the search). The statute of limitations for both offenses is five years.
   18 U.S.C. § 3282. Baker pleaded not guilty.
          At trial, after the government closed, Baker moved for an acquittal
   under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. His attorney
   argued that the government had not shown that Baker received child porn on
   or about July 27, 2018. According to him, “there were no dates associated
   with those files that were found on any of these devices. So there wasn’t any
   evidence that they came as a result of what was going on, any downloads on
   July 2018.” The court asked, “Do I have anything, any document, that show
   [sic] the receipt . . . anytime on or about July of 2018?” Baker’s lawyer
   replied, “No, you don’t.” Later, Baker’s lawyer again stated that “there is
   [sic] no dates associated with whatever files these are.” The court denied
   the motion, acknowledging that the prosecution had no direct evidence of
   receipt in July 2018, but ruling that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient
   to overcome the motion. Baker renewed the motion after the jury retired,
   and the court again denied it.
          The jury found Baker guilty on both counts. The judge sentenced him
   to 90 months’ imprisonment for each offense, to run concurrently for a total
   of 90 months’ imprisonment. Baker appealed.

                                          4
Case: 22-20216        Document: 00516789671          Page: 5    Date Filed: 06/16/2023

                                      No. 22-20216

                                 II. Discussion
          Baker brings three challenges to his conviction. First, he argues that
   there was insufficient evidence that he received child pornography within the
   statute of limitations period. Second, he argues that there was a material
   variance that affected his substantial rights between the evidence presented
   at trial and the dates given in the indictment. Third, he argues that the statute
   of conviction is unconstitutionally vague. Each challenge fails.
                               A. Statute of Limitations
          Baker’s statute of limitations argument is based on a misapprehension
   of the law. In their initial briefs, both parties agreed that the general five-year
   statute of limitations for noncapital offenses found in 18 U.S.C. § 3282(a)
   applies to this case. However, as the government belatedly pointed out in a
   Rule 28(j) letter to this court, there has been no statute of limitations for the
   receipt of child pornography since the Adam Walsh Child Protection and
   Safety Act of 2006. 18 U.S.C. § 3299. Baker makes no attempt to show that
   the child pornography at issue here was received before the passage of the
   Act, and the facts outlined above provide ample support for the opposite
   conclusion. Thus, Baker’s challenge is foreclosed by statute.
                                 B. Material Variance
          When a defendant raises a preserved claim that the evidence
   presented at trial varies from the terms of his indictment, the claim is
   reviewed for harmless error. United States v. Ekanem, 555 F.3d 172, 174 (5th
   Cir. 2009). That means he “must show that the variance was material and
   prejudiced his substantial rights.” Id. However, if the claim is not preserved,
   it is reviewed for plain error. United States v. Perez-Solis, 709 F.3d 453, 465
   (5th Cir. 2013).

                                           5
Case: 22-20216        Document: 00516789671        Page: 6   Date Filed: 06/16/2023

                                    No. 22-20216

          Harmless error review applies. Baker argued at trial that the evidence
   varied from the terms of his indictment. Nevertheless, the government
   contends that plain error review should apply because Baker never responded
   to their counterargument that (1) the six files mentioned above had dates
   from the first half of 2018, and (2) those dates did not materially vary from
   the July 27 date charged in the indictment. But this court’s precedent
   establishes that a defendant need only “raise his material variance objection
   at trial” to preserve the claim; he is not obligated to counter the
   prosecution’s counterarguments. United States v. Meza, 701 F.3d 411, 423
   (5th Cir. 2012).
          Regardless of the standard of review, Baker’s variance claim fails.
   “An allegation as to the time of the offense is not an essential element of the
   offense charged in the indictment, and, within reasonable limits, the offense
   need only occur before the return of the indictment and within the statute of
   limitations.” United States v. Valdez, 453 F.3d 252, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2006)
   (brackets and quotation marks omitted). The evidence at trial sufficiently
   proved that Baker received three files containing child pornography from
   Freenet on July 27, 2018. As stated above, all thirteen of the requests from
   Baker’s IP address had HTL values of 17 or 18. Relying on the testimony of
   Officer Moats, the jury could have therefore concluded that there was “a
   high likelihood” that the searches originated with Baker. Combined with the
   fact that three of the files were later discovered on his devices, the evidence
   supports a finding that there was no variance from the dates alleged in the
   indictment.
          The government also showed that Baker received other files
   containing child pornography around the same time. During the search of
   Baker’s home, police seized a hard drive belonging to Baker containing six
   timestamped files. The timestamps indicated the files were downloaded
   between January 12 and May 23, 2018. Each had titles consistent with child

                                         6
Case: 22-20216      Document: 00516789671          Page: 7    Date Filed: 06/16/2023

                                    No. 22-20216

   pornography. A government witness testified that two of these titles were
   recognizable labels for popular series of child pornography. These six files
   from the first half of 2018 were received (1) “before the return of the
   indictment,” (2) “within the statute of limitations,” and (3) “within
   reasonable limits.” Id. Only the third requirement is arguable here, but this
   court has found similar variances to be reasonable. United States v. Girod,
   646 F.3d 304, 316 (5th Cir. 2011) (four months); United States v. Wilson, 116
   F.3d 1066, 1089 (5th Cir.) (five months), rev’d on other grounds by sub nom.
   United States v. Brown, 161 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
          Baker has also failed to show that any variance “prejudiced” or
   “affected” his substantial rights. Ekanem, 555 F.3d at 174; Meza, 701 F.3d at
   423. His prejudice argument hinges on the proposition that it violates the
   Double Jeopardy Clause to convict him for both receiving and possessing the
   same child pornography, “since the possessing provision does not require[]
   proof of any fact that the receiving provision does not.” United States v. Ehle,
   640 F.3d 689, 694 (6th Cir. 2011) (relying on the test set forth in Blockburger
   v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180 (1932)); see also United States v.
   Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 72 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Davenport, 519 F.3d
   940, 947 (9th Cir. 2008). Baker claims that the jury could have relied on the
   government’s evidence regarding any of the roughly 12,000 images and 300
   videos of child pornography to support the possession conviction.
   Therefore, he argues, to exclude the possibility that he is being convicted for
   receiving the same files that he was convicted for possessing, the government
   can only rely on evidence regarding the Freenet files allegedly received on
   July 27.
          This court need not decide the constitutional question because
   Baker’s factual premise is false. His possession indictment was solely for
   child pornography contained on a Fujitsu hard drive, serial number
   K617T8325W0B. The six files from the first half of 2018 were contained on

                                          7
Case: 22-20216      Document: 00516789671           Page: 8    Date Filed: 06/16/2023

                                     No. 22-20216

   a Samsung M.2 hard drive. Therefore, his two convictions rely on separate
   child pornography files, regardless of whether the reception conviction is
   supported by the files from July 27 or the files from the first half of 2018.
                                C. Void for Vagueness
          Baker’s final argument is foreclosed by precedent. He argues that
   there is “no rational difference between the acts of receiving and possessing
   child pornography,” and that therefore the statutes of his conviction are
   unconstitutionally vague. But as he concedes, this court has already ruled
   otherwise in United States v. Ross, 948 F.3d 243, 247 (5th 2020) (“[The]
   claim that possession and receipt are logically inseparable conduct, and that,
   as a result, § 2252A’s criminalizing both invites unconstitutionally arbitrary
   enforcement, is incorrect.”).
                                III. Conclusion
          For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
   AFFIRMED.

                                           8