Court Opinion

ID: 9365526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-24 14:13:15.574924+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:45.981353
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges Malveaux, Athey and Callins
UNPUBLISHED

              KEVIN O’NEAL ALLEN
                                                                              MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.     Record No. 0787-22-3                                          PER CURIAM
                                                                                 JANUARY 24, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                               FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG
                                              F. Patrick Yeatts, Judge

                               (Matthew L. Pack; M. Pack Law, PLLC, on brief), for appellant.
                               Appellant submitting on brief.

                               (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Mason D. Williams, Assistant
                               Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Following his guilty pleas, the trial court convicted Kevin O’Neal Allen of second-degree

              murder, use of a firearm during the commission of murder, malicious discharge of a firearm in an

              occupied building, and two counts of felony child neglect. The trial court sentenced Allen to a total

              of sixty-three years’ imprisonment, with eighteen years suspended. On appeal, Allen argues that the

              trial court abused its sentencing discretion. After examining the briefs and record, the panel

              unanimously holds that oral argument is unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly without merit.”

              Code § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a).

                                                        BACKGROUND

                     “In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the

              light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.” Poole v. Commonwealth,

              73 Va. App. 357, 360 (2021) (quoting Gerald v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 472 (2018)). In

                     *
                         Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
doing so, we discard any of Allen’s conflicting evidence, and regard as true all credible evidence

favorable to the Commonwealth and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from that

evidence. Gerald, 295 Va. at 473.

        On February 22, 2022, Allen pled guilty to second-degree murder, use of a firearm during

the commission of murder, malicious discharge of a firearm in an occupied building, and two counts

of felony child neglect.1 The Commonwealth proffered that on September 17, 2020, Allen was at

home with Cansas Crotts, the mother of his two children. Allen called the police that night, yelling

that he had shot his wife and that he needed help. At the scene, officers found Crotts unresponsive

with a gunshot wound to her eye, and medics pronounced her dead at the scene. Allen, a military

veteran who was trained in firearms, made several statements to police while detained, suggesting

that Crotts had grabbed the gun from Allen when it went off. Hours before the incident, Crotts’s

mother spoke with Crotts on the phone and heard Allen yelling threats at Crotts, such as “if she tried

to leave him, he would kill her.” According to Crotts’s mother, Allen “said he would kill [Crotts]

five or six times during this conversation.”

        During a plea colloquy, Allen affirmed that, among other things, he understood the

maximum punishment for the offenses and that the court was not required to follow any applicable

sentencing guidelines. Allen also confirmed that he had read and signed a written plea agreement.

He had also read and signed a similar form in which he acknowledged that there was no agreement

as to sentencing and he faced a “maximum of 63 years in the penitentiary.” The trial court accepted

Allen’s pleas as freely, voluntarily, and intelligently made. Based on his pleas, the trial court found

Allen guilty of second-degree murder, use of a firearm during the commission of murder, malicious

discharge of a firearm in an occupied building, and two counts of felony child neglect.

        1
          In exchange for Allen’s guilty pleas, the Commonwealth agreed to reduce the charge of
first-degree murder to second-degree murder.
                                                 -2-
        At the sentencing hearing, Allen testified on his own behalf. Allen acknowledged that he

had two firearms in his home on the day of the incident. Allen explained that on the night in

question, he and Crotts were in bed with their children when they heard a “loud bang.” Allen

leaned over and “got the AK.” Allen then “jumped up” and “that’s when [Crotts] hit the gun and

that’s when it went off.” Allen testified that he did not intentionally injure Crotts.

        The trial court made the presentencing report a part of the record. The presentencing report

noted that the low end of the discretionary sentencing guidelines had been adjusted downward

because Allen accepted responsibility for the crime. The adjusted guideline range was seven years,

one month and fifteen days to twenty-three years and ten months’ imprisonment. Maintaining that

it was an accident, Allen asked the trial court to impose a sentence “toward the lower end of his

guidelines.” The Commonwealth asked the trial court to sentence Allen to the maximum

punishment of sixty-three years’ imprisonment, or “at the very least, a slight upward departure from

the high end” of the guidelines, based on Allen’s actions and the severity of the crime.

        After considering the evidence and argument by counsel, the trial court sentenced Allen to a

total of sixty-three years’ imprisonment, with eighteen years suspended. The trial court found that

the sentencing guidelines were inadequate. The trial court acknowledged that Allen accepted

responsibility for the offenses, but also found that he “then shift[ed] the responsibility to convince

[the trial court] that this was some sort of accident” and noted that “[Allen’s] explanation defi[ed]

the evidence.” The trial court highlighted Allen’s experience with firearms, the violence of Allen’s

actions, as well as the threats Allen made before committing the violent actions. The trial court

cited the need to protect the public and the need to “prevent[] the harm that [Allen] possibly could

do” to others. The trial court ultimately found that Allen committed “a violent, intentional act” and

the discretionary sentencing guidelines were not “appropriate under the facts and circumstances of

                                                  -3-
this case.” The trial court explained its departure from the guidelines by stating that this matter

involved a “very violent murder by a very dangerous individual.”

                                             ANALYSIS

        On appeal, Allen argues that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to an

active term of incarceration of forty-five years. “Criminal sentencing decisions . . . are vested in

the sound discretion of trial judges, not appellate judges.” Minh Duy Du v. Commonwealth, 292

Va. 555, 563 (2016). “A Virginia trial court ‘clearly’ acts within the scope of its sentencing

authority ‘when it chooses a point within the permitted statutory range’ at which to fix

punishment.” Id. at 564 (quoting Alston v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 759, 771 (2007)).

“Consequently, ‘when a statute prescribes a maximum imprisonment penalty and the sentence

does not exceed that maximum, the sentence will not be overturned as being an abuse of

discretion.’” Id. (quoting Alston, 274 Va. at 771-72). Once we have determined that a sentence

was within the statutory limit, appellate review generally comes to an end. Id. at 565.

        The Virginia criminal sentencing guidelines are discretionary, not mandatory. West v.

Dir. of Dep’t of Corr., 273 Va. 56, 65 (2007). They are “merely procedural tools to assist and

guide a judge in the exercise of the judge’s sentencing discretion.” Luttrell v. Commonwealth,

42 Va. App. 461, 468 (2004). Thus, in this case, “the [trial] court was required only to consider

the sentencing guidelines before sentencing [appellant] and to file with the record of the case a

written explanation of any departure from the indicated range of punishment.” West, 273 Va. at

65. See also Code § 19.2-298.01(B).

        Here, the record proves that the trial court considered the guidelines and the

circumstances of the offenses, as well as Allen’s history, conduct, and the need to protect the

public. The trial court acknowledged Allen’s claim that the incident resulted from an accident

but emphasized that the physical and testimonial evidence did not support his claim. After

                                                  -4-
considering all the evidence and explaining its reasoning on the record, the trial court sentenced

Allen within the statutory ranges set by the General Assembly. See Code §§ 18.2-10, 18.2-32,

18.2-53.1, 18.2-279, 18.2-371.1. The trial court considered the guidelines, declined to follow

them, and explained in writing that it deviated from the guidelines because this was a “very

violent murder by a very dangerous individual.” It followed the procedure set out in Code

§ 19.2-298.01(B). Allen’s sentence was “within the statutory range[s], and our task is

complete.” Thomason v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 89, 99 (2018). There was no abuse of

discretion.

                                         CONCLUSION

       The trial court did not abuse its discretion by deviating from the sentencing guidelines

and imposing a sentence within the statutory maximum ranges. Accordingly, the trial court’s

decision is affirmed.

                                                                                          Affirmed.

                                               -5-