Court Opinion

ID: 9663251
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:33:08.043128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:47.073634
License: Public Domain

R. M. Maher, P.J.
(dissenting in part). I concur in the majority’s decision to grant defendant credit for the 63 days he was incarcerated in Indiana while awaiting trial. However, I must respectfully dissent to the majority’s conclusion that defendant is not entitled to an additional 237 days of credit.
In Brinson v Genesee Circuit Judge, 403 Mich 676, 686; 272 NW2d 513 (1978), the Supreme Court indicated that the credit statute "mandates the grant of credit in appropriate circumstances and is to be read to benefit defendants * * * unless the intent of a consecutive sentencing statute would be frustrated by such a reading * *
The record shows that defendant did not receive concurrent sentences largely as a result of the failure or inability of the State of Michigan to secure his return for resentencing. In addition, a grant of credit under these circumstances would not frustrate the policy of a consecutive sentencing statute since defendant could not have received a consecutive sentence for the first offense. MCL 768.7b; MSA 28.1030(2), and Brinson, supra. Finally, since the Indiana court’s intent to impose concurrent sentences will be frustrated if this Court fails to grant credit for defendant’s entire *711period of incarceration, principles of comity require such a sentence reduction. Otherwise, this Court cannot expect other states to accord appropriate deference to the sentencing decisions of our courts.
I believe that the so-called "liberal” view — as expressed in People v Potts, 46 Mich App 538; 208 NW2d 583 (1973), and People v Coyle, 104 Mich App 636; 305 NW2d 275 (1981) — reflects the fairest interpretation of the Legislature’s intent in enacting the credit statute and, therefore, would grant defendant credit for all 300 days spent in an Indiana prison.