Court Opinion

ID: 9412006
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 18:11:11.665351+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:24.404765
License: Public Domain

J-S18016-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN THE INTEREST OF: B.R., A                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: D.R., FATHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 292 EDA 2023

              Appeal from the Order Entered January 17, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Civil Division at No(s):
                         CP-45-DP-0000038-2022

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                                  FILED JULY 28, 2023

       Appellant, D.R. (“Father”), appeals from the January 17, 2023 orders

entered in the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas that denied Father’s

Motion to Enforce a Subpoena and declined to impose sanctions or attorney’s

fees upon the Monroe County Children and Youth Agency (“the Agency”).

Upon review, we affirm.

       The relevant factual and procedural history is as follows. On April 22,

2022, the Agency received allegations that Father physically abused his

adoptive son, eight-year-old B.R. (“Child”), which prompted the Agency to

obtain emergency custody of Child and place him in foster care pending

investigation of the allegations. On May 4, 2022, the trial court adjudicated

Child dependent and ordered Child to remain in foster care pending the Agency

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S18016-23

and police investigations. Ultimately, the Agency determined the allegations

to be unfounded and the Stroud Area Regional Police Department declined to

press charges. Child returned home on June 23, 2022. On August 26, 2022,

the trial court issued an order for termination of court supervision, discharged

the Agency’s temporary legal and physical custody of Child, and dismissed the

case.

        On August 29, 2022, Father served a subpoena upon the Agency,

ordering the Agency to “provide any and all documents relating to [Child’s]

case including, CAC interview, risk assessments reports, [and] service plans”

within 14 days. Order, 8/29/22.

        On September 7, 2022, Father filed a motion requesting that the trial

court order the Agency to terminate all Agency supervisory services and

provide Father with a copy of the risk assessment report. On September 22,

2022, Father again motioned the court to terminate Agency services, enforce

the subpoena, and sanction the Agency for failure to comply with both the

August 29, 2022 subpoena and the August 26, 2022 order terminating court-

ordered services.

        The trial court held a hearing on both motions.       The court heard

testimony from Father; Shenika Wright, Director of Foster Care for Access

Services foster care agency; and Michael Perez, Agency Supervisor. The trial

court credited Mr. Perez’s testimony that 1) the Agency did not provide risk

assessment reports to families because they were confidential and 2) the

Agency often provides ongoing supervisory services to families after court-

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ordered services are terminated because the Agency policy is to have a case

open for six months even if it is discharged from court. See Trial Ct. Op., filed

3/8/23, at 4, 6. Accordingly, the trial court denied Father’s motions.

      Appellant timely appealed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied

with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

      1. Did the court err when they did not allow [Father] to call the
         Attorney Solicitor as a witness?

      2. Did the court err when they did not order the Agency to comply
         with a court ordered subpoena?

      3. Did the court err when they did not order the Agency to provide
         the risk assessment report?

      4. Did the court err when they did not sanction the Agency for not
         terminating services despite a court order?

      5. Did the court err when they did not order attorney’s fees to
         [Father]?

Father’s Br. at 5 (some capitalization altered).

      Father first avers that the trial court erred when it denied his request to

call the Agency’s counsel, Elizabeth Weekes, Esq., as a witness under cross-

examination during the motions hearing.        Id. at 12.     Father argues that

Attorney Weekes included false averments in her responsive legal pleadings,

and he should have been able to question Attorney Weekes “as to the

inconsistencies of what was written in her pleading, what was testified to at

the hearing, and what was actually happening in regard to the case.” Id. at

14-15. Father failed to preserve this issue.

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      It is axiomatic that to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party

must make a timely and specific objection before the trial court at the earliest

possible stage of the proceedings. In re J.A., 107 A.3d 799, 820 (Pa. Super.

2015). This Court “will not consider a claim which was not called to the trial

court's attention at a time when any error committed could have been

corrected.” Id. (citation omitted).

      As the trial court observed, when the trial court ruled that it was

inappropriate to call opposing party counsel as a witness, “Father’s attorney

did not object to the [c]ourt’s ruling but, rather, proceeded to call a different

witness to testify.” Trial Ct. Op. at 3. Upon review, we agree that Father

failed to object in a timely and specific manner and, thus, failed to preserve

the issue for our review.

      In his next two issues, Father contends that the trial court erred when

it did not order the Agency to comply with his subpoena and provide the risk

assessment report to him. Father’s Br. at 15. To support his argument, Father

cites boilerplate caselaw and Rules of Civil Procedure regarding subpoenas

generally, without explaining whether he is entitled to this document pursuant

to the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6388, the Child Protective Services

Law (“CPSL”), 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6388, or the Rules of Juvenile Court

Procedure (“Juvenile Rules”), Pa.R.J.C.P. 1100-1800, which contain special

provisions regarding subpoenas and/or the confidentiality of documents in

cases regarding children. For example, our Supreme Court has explained that

the CPSL mandates the confidentiality of information of child abuse reports

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and related information, “with the release of information provided only to

certain listed entities in specifically defined circumstances.” J.F. v. Dep't of

Human Servs., 245 A.3d 658, 670 (Pa. 2021) (citing Pa.C.S. § 6340(a)).

      It is well-settled that the argument portion of an appellate brief must be

developed with citation to the record and relevant authority. Pa.R.A.P

2119(a)-(c). As this Court has made clear, we “will not act as counsel[.]”

Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007). “We shall

not develop an argument for an appellant, nor shall we scour the record to

find evidence to support an argument[.]”      Milby v. Pote, 189 A.3d 1065,

1079 (Pa. Super. 2018). Moreover, it is not the role of this Court to develop

an appellant’s argument where the brief provides mere cursory legal

discussion. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 925 (Pa. 2009).

Finally, when defects in a brief impede our ability to conduct meaningful

appellate review, we may find certain issues to be waived. Hardy, 918 A.2d

at 771.

      Father’s failure to discuss the interplay between his requested

documents, the Juvenile Act, the CPSL, and the Juvenile Rules fatally hampers

our ability to provide meaningful appellate review of this issue. In his brief to

this Court, Father fails to explain what a risk assessment report is, whether it

is confidential, whether an exception applies, and whether a subpoena is the

appropriate legal mechanism to view a risk assessment report. Without more,

this Court is unable to effectuate meaningful appellate review. Accordingly,

these issues are waived.

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      In his final two issues, Father avers that the trial court erred when it

failed to order to the Agency to pay Father’s attorney’s fees. Father’s Br. At

18. Father argues that the trial court should have sanctioned the Agency for

acting in bad faith when the Agency failed to provide Father with requested

documents and “deliberately and blatantly forc[ed] [Father] to comply with

their home visits and services after the [t]rial [c]ourt issued an order

terminating such.” Id. at 22-23.

      “We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny attorney’s fees for

an abuse of discretion.” Morgan v. Morgan, 193 A.3d 999, 1007 (Pa. Super.

2018). Further, “a party to an action may be awarded counsel fees when

another party engages in dilatory, obdurate, or vexatious conduct during the

pendency of a matter.” Id. (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 2503(7)).

      Instantly, the trial court found that the Agency did not violate the August

26, 2022 order which stated “court-ordered services from [the Agency] are

no longer needed.” Order, 8/26/22.       The trial court credited Mr. Perez’s

testimony that the Agency provides county services that do not require court-

involvement and the Agency’s process is to have a case open for six months

following the triggering incident regardless of court-involvement. Trial Ct. Op.

at 5-6 (citing N.T. Hearing, 1/3/23, at 27-29). The trial court concluded that

the Agency did, in fact, cease court-ordered services and continued to offer

county services.   Id. at 6.   Further, the trial court found that the Agency

complied with the August 29, 2022 subpoena to the extent that it could by

providing all non-confidential documents in its possession to Father.

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      The trial court opined, “we found the Agency complied with the [o]rder

of August 26, 2022 in ceasing court-ordered services and also in releasing the

only [] documents it was permitted to that were requested in the subpoena.

Thus, we determined it to be inappropriate to award attorney’s fees to Father

under these circumstances.”    Trial Ct. Op. at 7.   Upon review, the record

supports the trial courts findings that the Agency did not engage in dilatory,

obdurate, or vexatious conduct and, therefore, it was not appropriate to

impose attorney’s fees.

      In conclusion, Father’s first three claims are waived. In addition, the

trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Father’s request for

attorney’s fees.

      Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/28/2023

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