Court Opinion

ID: 9682713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:15:12.657462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:36.760514
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
As the Court points out, one reason we ordered these matters filed and set was in order to consider what bearing, if any, a finding of professional misconduct in representing clients may have in a subsequent postconviction habeas corpus proceeding brought by them pursuant to Article 11.07, V.A.C.C.P. alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. My purpose is to demonstrate why it should have none — generally and in this cause.
Constitutional underpinnings support due process principles that every accused who asserts the right to an attorney is entitled to “the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him” — counsel “giving of effective aid in the preparation and trial of the case,” Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 at 68-71, 53 S.Ct. 55, at 64-65, 77 L.Ed. 158 at 170-172 (1932); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970); Ex parte Duffy, 607 S.W.2d 507, at 513-516 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). This Court continues to use “the standard of ‘reasonably effective assistance of counsel’ to test adequacy of representation afforded an accused,” Ex parte Duffy, supra, at 516. That is, “counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering reasonably effective assistance,” McKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (CA5 1961) as quoted approvingly by the Court in Caraway v. State, 417 S.W.2d 159, 162 (Tex.Cr.App.1967), and reaffirmed in Ex parte Duffy, supra, at 514, n. 14, and at 516, n. 17. The standard is applied to the totality of representation afforded the client by trial counsel in the case at hand, *606Passmore v. State, 617 S.W.2d 682 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Sanchez v. State, 589 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Cude v. State, 588 S.W.2d 895, 896 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), but the “impact” of grievous defaults may make it apparent that an accused did not receive effective assistance of counsel, Weathersby v. State, 627 S.W.2d 729, 730 (Tex.Cr.App.1982) and Cude v. State, supra, at 896. In all of this the goal is to secure and protect due process rights of an accused to a fair trial through aid and assistance of reasonably competent counsel.
On the other hand, the duty of a district grievance committee is “to receive complaints of professional misconduct alleged to have been committed by an attorney ...,” Title 14 App., Article 12, § 11. “Professional misconduct” is misconduct that is specified in DR 1-102, Code of Professional Responsibility,1 and barratry.2 Upon receiving a complaint a grievance committee “shall make such investigation ... as it may deem appropriate under the circumstances,” including hearing testimony it “may require ... to be given under oath,” id., § 12. Concluding its investigation, a committee has a number of options available, id., § 16, one of which is to suspend the license of the offending attorney for a period not to exceed three years, § 16(c); however, actual suspension by a committee may not be imposed without written consent of the accused, Munson v. State, 576 S.W.2d 440 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1978) writ ref’d n.r.e. (In the case at bar trial counsel for applicants confirmed that his was “an agreed suspension.”) Suspension of an attorney is reflected by a judgment entered by a committee upon agreement of the offender. See generally, Galindo v. State, 535 S.W.2d 923 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1976) no writ history.
As originally enacted, the State Bar Act, Article 320a-l, V.A.C.S.,3 had as its purpose the regulation of the practice of law, its design being “to protect the public by eliminating from the legal profession those attorneys morally unfit to enjoy its privileges,” Galindo v. State, supra, at 925. It has been said that a grievance committee is an administrative agency of the Judicial Department, the arm of the Supreme Court in discharging its professional policing duties. State v. Sewell, 487 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Tex.1972); Galindo v. State, supra, at 925. While an agreed judgment entered by a committee may have “the force and effect of a judgment of the District Court of the county of the residence of the accused,” Article 12, § 16(c), the extent of its power seems to be to cause the Clerk of the Supreme Court to strike the name of the attorney from the rolls for the period of suspension, ibid. That done, the judgment becomes functus officio — not much more than a record of historical fact.4
All things considered, it is my best judgment that an ultimate finding by a griev-*607anee committee of professional misconduct in representing his clients has no bearing on the ultimate issue of failure to render effective assistance of counsel raised in a post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to Article 11.07. In the instant cases all we know from the record about the content of the judgment entered by the District 7-A Grievance Committee is what was published in the October 1982 State Bar Journal, and the skimpy testimony of trial counsel to the effect that there was a finding that in representing applicants he failed to spend sufficient time adequately to prepare their cases for trial. Quite aside from that finding by the committee counsel admits that and more. Accordingly, the Court properly gives no weight at all to the reported abstract of judgment of the committee and testimony of counsel concerning its content.
Therefore, I concur in the order of the Court.

. DR 1-102 Misconduct:
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule.
(2) Circumvent a Disciplinary Rule through actions of another.
(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law.”

. V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 38.12.

. Well aware that the State Bar Act was substantially amended by Acts 1979, 66th Leg., ch. 510, p. 1081, effective June 11, 1979, and that on June 19, 1979 the Supreme Court of Texas promulgated an Order, also effective June 11, 1979, we do not at all undertake to interpret and construe Article 320a-l, as thus revised, or the June 19 Order. In this opinion we are treating a grievance committee and its procedures in a general way, and it is not to be considered as an expression of views regarding Article 320a-l, as revised, or the June 19 Order of the Supreme Court.

.Article 320a-l, § 13(b) provides: “Committee records are confidential and are not subject to the open records law.... The final action of a committee resulting in a vote to ... suspend ... shall be made public.... All records shall be forwarded to the general counsel and he shall maintain a permanent record of such actions, which will be public records for statistical purposes but which are subject to the provisions above concerning privacy.”