Court Opinion

ID: 9766757
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:58:05.657262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:25.808109
License: Public Domain

Opinion on the Merits

Appellees sued in trespass to try title to recover certain lands situated in San Jacin-to County, and other counties in the State. Appellant duly filed her plea of privilege to be sued in Williamson County, and her counsel delivered a copy of the plea to ap-pellees’ counsel on March 23, 1970, the same date the plea was filed with the District Clerk. Appellees did not file their controverting plea until April 21, 1970. The trial court overruled appellant’s motion to strike the' controverting plea and entered judgment overruling the plea of privilege.
In overruling the motion to strike the controverting plea, the trial court included the following language in the order:
“[The court] finds that such motion is not well taken for the reason that said plaintiffs filed their plea controverting defendant’s plea of privilege in time in that defendant filed her plea of privilege on March 23, 1970, and plaintiffs had until ten days after appearance day, the beginning of the next term of court, in which to file their controverting affidavit and plaintiffs filed their plea controverting defendant’s plea of privilege prior to such * * * ”
In the same order, the trial court overruled the plea of privilege, from which action this appeal is taken.
The trial court erred in overruling the plea of privilege since the controverting plea was not filed within ten days after the filing of the plea of privilege as provided in Rule 86. Our decision is controlled by Bell v. Jasper Lumber Corporation, 287 S.W.2d 746, 747 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont, 1956, error dism.), wherein Chief Justice Murray, speaking for this court, held that amended Rule 86 now in effect required the filing of the controverting affidavit within ten days after the plaintiff’s attorney received a copy of the plea of privilege. And, further, when no controverting affidavit was filed within the ten-day period, the district court “was without jurisdiction to enter any order other than” one transferring the cause. Accord: Farr v. Weeden, 308 S.W.2d 74, 75 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco, 1957, no writ); Rogers v. Barbee, 359 S.W.2d 101, 103 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston, 1962, no writ).
While appellees’ suit was brought in the nature of a trespass to try title action, such does not alter the result which we reach. The provisions of Subdivision 14, Article 1995, relate to venue, and are not jurisdictional; and, relating to venue or privilege only, may be waived. Tunstill v. Scott, 138 Tex. 425, 160 S.W. 65, 69 (1945). The failure to file the controverting affidavit within the ten-day period required by Rule 86 was a waiver of the privilege. Bell v. Jasper Lumber Corporation, supra.
The trial court having committed error in overruling the plea of privilege, the judgment below is reversed and the cause is now remanded with instructions to enter an order sustaining the appellant’s plea of *224privilege and transferring the cause to the District Court of Williamson County, Texas. Rogers v. Barbee, supra.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.