Court Opinion

ID: 9759054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:01:44.541941+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:58.614635
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Judge Palladino:
I respectfully dissent. The doctrine of res judicata cannot bar a subsequent challenge by the Carroll Township Authority (Carroll Authority) to the “reasonable*371ness” of the fees being charged by the Municipal Authority of the City of Monongahela (Monongahela Authority) because 1) Section 4 of the Municipal Authorities Act of 1945, Act of May 2, 1945, P.L. 382, as amended, 53 P.S. §306B(h), grants a statutory right to challenge the reasonableness or uniformity of any rates fixed by the Monongahela Authority; and 2) there is no “identity of the thing sued upon or for”. See Maj. Op. at 3.
In pertinent part, 53 P.S. §306B(h) states:
B. Every Authority is hereby granted, and shall have and may exercise all powers necessary or convenient for the carrying out of the aforesaid purposes, including but without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the following rights and powers:
(h) To fix, alter, charge and collect rates and other charges in the area served by its facilities at reasonable and uniform rates to be determined exclusively by it, for the purpose of providing for the payment of the expenses of the Authority, . . . Provided, . . . any person questioning the reasonableness or uniformity of any rate fixed by any Authority . . . may bring suit against the Authority in the court of common pleas of the county wherein the project is located. . . . The court of common pleas shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine all such questions involving rates or service.
Under 53 P.S. §306B(h), Carroll Authority is granted a statutory right to challenge the reasonableness or uniformity of any rate fixed by the Monongahela Authority. Thus, while the trial court may be correct that Monongahela Authority can pass the counsel and engineering fees through to its customers via the rates it charges, *372the trial court cannot bar a challenge to the “reasonableness” of the rates being charged.
Further, in order for the doctrine of res judicata to apply, the concurrence of the following four conditions must be present: “(1) identity of the thing sued upon or for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the persons and parties to the action; and (4) identity of the capacity or quality of the parties suing or being sued.” Maj. Op. at 3-4. In the case at bar, there is no identity of the thing being sued for.
In Carroll Township Authority v. Municipal Authority of the City of Monongahela, 65 Wash. 192 (C.P. Pa. 1985), the trial court stated:
Essentially, the matter of the legal fees which Monongahela Authority has been compelled to incur is the focus of the dispute. Carroll Authority insists it should not have to pay for the legal expenses of Monongahela Authority. If it prevails in the suit, Carroll Authority asks the court to give it a ‘credit’ against amounts previously paid by Carroll Authority for sewage treatment to the extent that the rates chargeable to Carroll Authority include legal expenses incurred by Monongahela Authority. Basically, Carroll Authority argues: You pay your legal expenses and we pay ours. . . .
... If a party such as an authority is involved in a lawsuit, the party is bound to incur legal expenses. If Monongahela Authority must defend itself against a suit brought by Carroll Authority, its largest customer, then as a matter of necessity Monongahela Authority must increase its charges to all customers, including the customer who has sued it. Additional engineering and legal expenses are inevitable as part of *373operating expenses, particularly when ‘the expenses have resulted from charges incurred in self-defense, Solar Electric Co. v. Pennsylvania PUC, 137 Pa. Superior Ct. 325, 382, 9 A.2d 447, 476 (1939). Probably the issue of substantial counsel fees has not arisen heretofore in that no substantial litigation has forced the Monongahela Authority to increase both its budget and its item for counsel fees. In the pleading which is before the court, Carroll Authority makes a claim or set-off not only for past counsel fees as a credit but also for future expenses, the ultimate effect of which would be to impose upon the ratepayers of Monongahela the legal expenses generated by the instant suit. If the court were to countenance such relief for each lawsuit, the result would be unreasonable and unmanageable.
Since we conclude that counsel fees are a necessary part of the operating expenses of the defendant, Carroll Authority may not assert any claim in the nature of a credit or any claim for future expenses. . . .
Id. at 193-194.
It is obvious from the above quoted language that the challenge by Carroll Authority was to the inclusion of any legal fees of Monongahela Authority in the rates charged to Carroll Authority if the latter was successful in its suit. The import of the holding of the trial court is that such credit or claim must be denied because, if sued, Monongahela Authority must, as a matter of necessity, increase its charges to all customers, including the customer who has sued it.
The case at bar is different. It challenges the “reasonableness” of the amount of attorney fees incurred in 1985 rather than the ability of Monongahela Authority to pass attorney fees through to Carroll Authority.
*374Therefore, because the “identity of the thing sued upon or for”, Maj. Op. at 3, is not the same and because pursuant to 53 RS. §306B(h) Carroll Authority has a statutory right to challenge the “reasonableness” of the rates charged by Monongahela Authority, the subject action is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The majority opinion would preclude any challenge of attorney or engineering fees regardless of how unreasonable. This I cannot countenance.