Court Opinion

ID: 9408782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-13 17:04:28.938178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:46.741702
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

                    LAUREN GILBERT, Plaintiff/Appellant,

                                         v.

               CITY OF PHOENIX, et al., Defendants/Appellees.
                   _________________________________

                   SUSAN BONNELL, Intervenor/Appellee.

                              No. 1 CA-CV 22-0217
                                FILED 7-13-2023

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                           No. CV2016-007642
                 The Honorable Andrew J. Russell, Judge

                                   AFFIRMED

                                    COUNSEL

Law Office of Richard T. Treon, Gilbert
By Richard T. Treon
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Wieneke Law Group, PLC, Tempe
By Kathleen L. Wieneke, Tara Zoellner
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee City of Phoenix

Scottsdale City Attorney’s Office, Scottsdale
By Lori S. Davis
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee City of Scottsdale
Kent Law, PLC, Tempe
By Jonathan J. Henry
Counsel for Intervenor/Appellee

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

P A T O N, Judge:

¶1           Lauren Gilbert appeals from a superior court order granting
the City of Phoenix’s motion for summary judgment. For the following
reasons, we affirm.

                 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2             We state the facts in a light most favorable to Gilbert, who
appeals from summary judgment. See Lowrey v. Montgomery Kone, Inc., 202
Ariz. 190, 191, ¶ 2 n.1 (App. 2002). In August 2015, Gilbert’s husband, Luke,
called 911 and reported that Gilbert’s father, Marc, was banging on the door
to Gilbert and Luke’s home and screaming that he was going to kill them.
Luke reported that Marc was “deranged,” “delusional,” “need[ed] mental
help,” and was probably on drugs. The 911 operator told Luke that police
officers were on their way to the scene. Luke reiterated that Marc was
mentally unstable.

¶3           While on the phone with Luke, the 911 operator entered
information about the incident into the computer-aided dispatch system
(“CAD”) to transmit to the responding officers. She recorded the type of
emergency with the numeric code for fight.

¶4            Gilbert called her mother, Marc’s ex-wife Marci, to come over
and assist with the situation. Marci arrived before the officers did. Marci
calmed Marc down, convinced him to return to his home several miles
away, and rode with him there in his car. Phoenix police officers
subsequently arrived at Gilbert’s house, and spoke with Gilbert and Luke,
who told them about Marc’s mental health condition and their belief that
Marc had gone off his medication. Eventually the Phoenix police officers
and a Scottsdale police officer went to Marc’s Scottsdale home. As they
attempted to arrest Marc, they engaged in a struggle with him, and he
stopped breathing. Marc was later pronounced dead at the hospital.

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                       GILBERT v. PHOENIX, et al.
                          Decision of the Court

¶5            Gilbert and her brother filed a wrongful death claim against
the City of Phoenix (“the City”) for Marc’s death based on negligent use of
force, and the City moved for summary judgment. Gilbert made no factual
allegation of wrongful conduct by the 911 operator in her original
complaint, nor did she reference the 911 operator in her formal disclosure
statements. But during oral argument on the City’s motion for summary
judgment, Gilbert argued the 911 operator was negligent in failing to
inform responding officers of Marc’s mental condition, which resulted in
an inappropriate police response and ultimately led to his death.

¶6             The superior court found that, despite Gilbert not arguing the
911 operator theory in her notice of claim, complaint, or disclosures, the
City had adequate notice of the claim through Gilbert’s police procedures
expert report disclosure, which Gilbert included with her opposing party
statement of facts filing. The superior court granted summary judgment for
the City except to the extent Gilbert’s claim arose out of “the manner in
which the 911 [operator] handled” the original 911 call.

¶7             The City petitioned the court for leave to file another motion
for summary judgment to address Gilbert’s 911 operator claim, arguing it
had inadequate notice and opportunity to brief the new claim, which
prejudiced it. The superior court granted the City’s motion for leave, and
the City filed a new summary judgment motion.

¶8            Prior to filing her response, Gilbert asked the court to allow
her to conduct further discovery relevant to her 911 operator theory
pursuant to Arizona Civil Rule of Procedure 56(d), even though discovery
had ended over a year earlier. The superior court denied the motion.
Gilbert then filed her response to the City’s motion for summary judgment.

¶9             After considering the motion, response, reply, and oral
arguments, the superior court granted summary judgment for the City,
noting that the evidence did not create a genuine issue of material fact as to
wanton or willful misconduct by the 911 operator as required by Section
12-713. The court also noted that regardless of whether the 911 operator
breached her duty to provide information about Marc’s mental illness to
the responding officers, the officers had actual knowledge of Marc’s mental
illness before approaching him because Gilbert and Luke told them about
it before the officers went to Marc’s house and interacted with him. Gilbert
appeals the summary judgment, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to
Arizona      Revised     Statutes    (“A.R.S.”)    Sections   12-2101(A)(1),
and -120.21(A)(1).

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                        GILBERT v. PHOENIX, et al.
                           Decision of the Court

                               DISCUSSION

¶10           Gilbert contends the evidence shows the 911 operator
breached a professional duty to ascertain Marc’s status as mentally ill and
ensure an appropriate police response. She further argues the evidence
shows that the operator should have foreseen that her alleged breach could
create an unreasonable risk of harm and result in Marc’s death. She also
asserts that any knowledge the responding officers learned about Marc’s
mental health other than from the 911 operator is legally irrelevant to her
claim. The City counters that there was no evidence showing the 911
operator’s conduct was willful and wanton or that her conduct proximately
caused Marc’s death.

¶11            The superior court “shall grant summary judgment if the
moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ariz. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute does not exist over a claim when “the facts
produced in support of [it] have so little probative value . . . that reasonable
people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of
the claim . . . .” See Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 309 (1990). When
reviewing a grant for summary judgment, “[w]e determine de novo
whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the trial court
erred in applying the law.” Armenta v. City of Casa Grande, 205 Ariz. 367,
369, ¶ 5 (App. 2003).

¶12            The City challenges the propriety of Gilbert’s reliance in her
brief on citations to expert declarations dated November 4 and 13, 2019, that
were filed with earlier motions and not cited to or filed with the briefing for
the summary judgment motion that is the subject of this appeal. The City
contends that because none of Gilbert’s filings in opposition to the
summary judgment motion referenced the November 4 and 13
declarations, those declarations were not before or considered by the
superior court.

¶13            Courts have reached different conclusions as to whether trial
or appellate courts “must perform an independent search of the record for
facts not presented by a party opposing summary judgment.” See Tilley v.
Delci, 220 Ariz. 233, 237 n.4 (App. 2009) (collecting cases). Although we
recognize that our supreme court and this Court have held that courts
should not be required to “search[] the record to attempt to discover facts
which establish or defeat the [summary judgment] motion, Mast v. Standard
Oil Co. of Cal., 140 Ariz. 1, 2 (1984), we opt to consider them here for two
reasons. First, Gilbert brought the November 4 and 13, 2019, declarations

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                        GILBERT v. PHOENIX, et al.
                           Decision of the Court

to our attention so no independent search of the record was required, and
second, the discovery of any issue of disputed fact in the record precludes
a grant of summary judgment. See Elson Dev. Co. v. Ariz. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,
99 Ariz. 217, 220 (1965) (noting summary judgment is granted erroneously
if an examination of the entire record finds any issue of disputed fact
“which could, if true, affect the final judgment”); Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a)
(requiring a showing of no genuine dispute as to any material fact for
summary judgment). And the declarations are part of the record on appeal.

¶14            As relevant here, Section 12-713 immunizes 911 operators and
the public entities who employ them from civil liability for deaths resulting
from the good-faith discharge of duties “except in the cases of wanton or
wilful misconduct.” Arizona courts generally treat “willful or wanton
misconduct” and “gross negligence” the same. Williams v. Thude, 188 Ariz.
257, 259 (1997). This Court has explained that a party is grossly negligent
when she acts or fails to act when she knows or reasonably should know
that the act or failure to act creates an unreasonable risk of harm to another
and has a high probability of resulting in substantial harm. See Luchanski v.
Congrove, 193 Ariz. 176, 180, ¶ 19 (App. 1998); see also Rev. Ariz. Jury Instr.
(“RAJI”) (Civil) Negligence 10 (7th ed. 2020) (suggesting a simplified
formulation of the standard). The parties here agree that gross and not
mere negligence is the standard for determining “wanton or wilful
misconduct” under Section 12-713.

¶15           Gilbert contends that the superior court “failed to consider the
only competent evidence concerning the duties and responsibilities of a 911
[operator]” as provided by her expert, including the expert’s opinion of the
operator’s “professional obligation” to properly designate the nature of the
call as a mental health call in the CAD. She provides three pages of her
expert’s opinions to support her claim that the superior court “ignored”
how the operator’s conduct breached a duty of care and caused Marc’s
death.

¶16           As to the possible breach of duty, the superior court expressly
recognized that the operator may have breached her duty of care when the
court found that her conduct “may have constituted negligence.” See
Gipson v. Kasey, 214 Ariz. 141, 143, ¶ 9 (2007) (including “breach of duty” as
an element of negligence). But the court concluded that evidence
suggesting the operator breached a duty of care does not inherently support
an inference that the operator knew or should have known that her conduct
created an unreasonable risk of harm or involved a high probability that
substantial harm would result, both of which are essential elements of gross
negligence. See Luchanski, 193 Ariz. at 180, ¶ 19.

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                        GILBERT v. PHOENIX, et al.
                           Decision of the Court

¶17              Gilbert addresses those distinctive requirements for gross
negligence, as separate from ordinary negligence, only once in her opening
brief when she states that the 911 operator “necessarily would have had to
realize her . . . [conduct] would create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm”
but points to no evidence to put the fact of this “necessary realization” into
dispute. Gilbert claims the 911 operator should have realized that risk
involved a high probability of substantial harm “because police training
teaches that mentally ill people must be approached in a peaceful, non-
confrontational way.” She specifically cites to portions of her police
procedure expert’s declaration in which he quotes a news article and a City
publication, which briefly mention “Mental-Health-Crisis Reforms”
“apparently directed primarily to training officers” who “picked up
citizens” with court orders related to mental illness, “mental-health
awareness training for 1,300 patrol officers,” and police responsibility for
“de-escalating residents who are a threat . . . .” But Gilbert does not explain,
and we do not see, how her evidence suggests the 911 operator here knew
or should have known that her conduct created an unreasonable risk of
harm or involved a high probability of substantial harm. Gilbert’s evidence
relates only to police procedures generally.

¶18           As part of its ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the
superior court found that, regardless of the dispatcher’s actions, the
responding police officers had actual notice of Marc’s mental state before
they confronted him because Luke and Gilbert told them Marc suffered
from mental illness when they arrived on scene to their home. Gilbert
challenges this finding on appeal as legally irrelevant to the 911 operator’s
breach of duty. Because we agree with the superior court that there was no
genuine issue of material fact in dispute regarding whether the 911
operator’s conduct amounted to “wanton or willful misconduct” required
for gross negligence, we need not reach Gilbert’s argument that the officers’
prior knowledge of Marc’s mental illness was legally irrelevant to the 911
operator’s breach of duty.

                               CONCLUSION

¶19           We affirm.

                           AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                           FILED: AA

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