Court Opinion

ID: 9751510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:32:39.209805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:49.511430
License: Public Domain

*499Inglis, J.
(dissenting). The crucial question in this case is whether the contract in suit is one which could have been fully performed within a year. If it was such a contract, it clearly was not one within the Statute of Frauds. There was no specific agreement between the parties as to how long the contract was to continue in effect. What their intent was in this regard is a matter of interpretation of the contract.
The contract is executory and bilateral, calling for continuing service as brokers by the plaintiffs and compensation for these services by the defendant. In such situations the great weight of authority is that it is presumed that the parties did not intend to bind themselves in perpetuity. 1 Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed.) p. 101. It is presumed to be their intent, unless the contrary clearly appears, that they will continue to be bound only so long as they are mutually agreeable to being bound. It is therefore held that the contract is terminable at the will of either party and upon reasonable notice to the other. 1 id., p. 104, and cases cited n. 14; 1 id. § 39. This rule of interpretation is. not limited in its application to contracts of employment or contracts for personal service involving special confidence. It controls in the interpretation of contracts for services of all kinds. Dover Copper Mining Co. v. Doenges, 40 Ariz. 349, 357, 12 P. 2d 288; Hess v. Iowa Light, Heat & Power Co., 207 Iowa 820, 826, 221 N. W. 194; Victoria Limestone Co. v. Hinton, 156 Ky. 674, 161 S. W. 1109; Kenderdine Hydro-Carbon Fuel Co. v. Plumb, 182 Pa. 463, 469, 38 A. 480; Stonega Coal & Coke Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 106 Va. 223, 226, 55 S. E. 551. In particular, it has been applied in contracts for services as broker like the contract in this case. Willcox & Gibbs Co. v. Ewing, 141 U. S. 627, 635, 12 S. Ct. 94, 35 L. Ed. 882; Clarkson v. Standard Brass Mfg. Co., 237 Mo. App. *5001018, 1032, 170 S. W. 2d 407; Paisley v. Lucas, 346 Mo. 827, 843, 143 S. W. 2d 262. The interpretation of contracts for the future sale and delivery of commodities is guided by the same principle. Irish v. Dean, 39 Wis. 562, 568; Marble v. Standard Oil Co., 169 Mass. 553, 561, 48 N. E. 783; Echols v. New Orleans, J. & G. N. R. Co., 52 Miss. 610, 613. It has also been applied to the interpretation of other kinds of contracts. Chattanooga R. & C. R. Co. v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co., 44 F. 456, 458; Rosenblatt v. Weinman, 225 Pa. 200, 202, 74 A. 54; Childs v. Columbia, 87 S. C. 566, 572, 70 S. E. 296. The authorities cited in 17 C. J. S. 887, § 398, and in 12 Am. Jur. 861, § 305, to support the quotations thérefrom appearing in the majority opinion to the effect that the presumption is that the parties to such a contract intended that the contract would remain in force until terminated by mutual consent are few in number and represent the minority view.
A distinction is to be noted between a contract such as the one involved here and such contracts as those in suit in McKell v. Chesepeake & O. Ry. Co., 175 F. 321, 99 C. C. A. 109; Pittsburgh, Ft. W. & C. Ry. Co. v. Reno, 123 Ill. 273, 279, 14 N. E. 195; Cohen v. Bartgis Bros. Co., 264 App. Div. 260, 35 N. Y. S. 2d 206, aff’d, 289 N. Y. 846, 47 N. E. 2d 443; Fish Clearing House, Inc. v. Melchor, Armstrong, Dessau Co., 174 Wash. 539, 542, 25 P. 2d 381; Droste v. Harry Atlas Sons, Inc., 145 F. 2d 899. In all of these cases, the consideration, or at least a substantial portion of it, for the promise to perform for an indefinite time had already passed at the time the term of the contract commenced. Under such circumstances it was clear that it could not have been the intention of the parties that the promisor, having already received his consideration for his *501promise, should be privileged to terminate his obligation at his own will.
In the present case, there is nothing in the circumstances attending the making of the contract which tends to overcome the presumption that the parties intended the arrangement agreed upon to continue only so long as was mutually agreeable. Indeed, both the fact that neither party was bound by the contract to expand their or its organization or facilities and the fact that the plaintiff’s compensation was to be measured by each individual order procured tend to fortify that presumption in this case. The contract was, therefore, terminable at the option of either party. Inasmuch as either could terminate the arrangement within a year after it was agreed upon, the contract was not within the Statute of Frauds.