Court Opinion

ID: 9945834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 17:08:09.843589+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:22:14.050685
License: Public Domain

This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in
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          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-39969

HEATHER SANDERS,

      Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR
BERNALILLO COUNTY,

      Defendant-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY
Nancy J. Franchini, District Court Judge

Gilpin Law Firm, LLC
Donald G. Gilpin
Christopher P. Machin
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

Kennedy, Moulton & Wells, P.C.
Deborah D. Wells
Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee

                             MEMORANDUM OPINION

ATTREP, Chief Judge.

{1}   Plaintiff Heather Sanders sued her former employer, Defendant Board of
Commissioners for Bernalillo County (the County), for employment discrimination under
the Human Rights Act (HRA), NMSA 1978, §§ 28-1-1 to -15 (1969, as amended through
2023),1 following the termination of her employment as an emergency communications
officer. Sanders appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the
County on her claims of hostile work environment on the basis of sex2 and wrongful
termination on the basis of sex and in retaliation for reporting discrimination. We affirm.

DISCUSSION

{2}     Because this is an unpublished, memorandum opinion written solely for the
benefit of the parties, and the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural
background of this case, we omit a background section and discuss the facts only as
necessary to our analysis of the issues. “We review the district court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo.” Ulibarri v. N.M. Corr. Acad., 2006-NMSC-009, ¶ 7, 139 N.M. 193,
131 P.3d 43; see id. (providing that “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate when there is
no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law”). We, nonetheless, emphasize that Sanders, as the appellant, bears the burden of
persuading us that the district court erred. See Goodman v. OS Rest. Servs. LLC, 2020-
NMCA-019, ¶ 16, 461 P.3d 906 (“[T]here is a presumption of correctness in the rulings
and decisions of the district court, and the party claiming error must clearly show error.”
(alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)). Taking Sanders’ HRA
claims in turn, we conclude she has not met this burden.

I.      Hostile Work Environment Based on Sex

{3}      Sanders contends she was subjected to a hostile work environment because of
her sex, in violation of the HRA. See § 28-1-7(A) (“It is an unlawful discriminatory
practice for . . . an employer . . . to discriminate in matters of compensation, terms,
conditions or privileges of employment against any person otherwise qualified because
of . . . sex.”). “Hostile environment claims are based on the cumulative effects of
[harassing] acts, and these separate acts constitute a single unlawful employment
practice: the practice of requiring an employee to work in a discriminatory, hostile or
abusive environment.” Ulibarri, 2006-NMSC-009, ¶ 10. Generally, to make out a hostile
work environment claim, an employee must make two basic showings. See Deflon v.
Sawyers, 2006-NMSC-025, ¶ 19, 139 N.M. 637, 137 P.3d 577; see also Nava v. City of
Santa Fe, 2004-NMSC-039, ¶ 6, 136 N.M. 647, 103 P.3d 571 (listing the elements of a
hostile work environment claim). First, an employee must show that they were subjected
to an objectively and subjectively hostile work environment. See Ulibarri, 2006-NMSC-
009, ¶ 12; see also Herald v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.M., 2015-NMCA-104, ¶ 53,
357 P.3d 438 (providing that, to make out a hostile work environment claim, the
harassing conduct must be “so severe and pervasive that the workplace is transformed
into a hostile and abusive environment for the employee” (omission, internal quotation

1Even though some sections of the HRA were amended after the incidents giving rise to Sanders’ claims
occurred, see, e.g., § 28-1-7 (amended 2019, 2020, 2023), we cite the current version of the HRA
throughout this opinion because the amendments are not material to our resolution of the issues in this
case.
2The parties interchangeably refer to “sex” and “gender” when discussing Sanders’ HRA claims.
Throughout this opinion, we exclusively use “sex” to refer to Sanders’ claims.
marks, and citation omitted)). Second, they must show that the harassing conduct
occurred because of their sex. See Nava, 2004-NMSC-039, ¶ 6 (requiring that “the
harassment occurred because of the employee’s sex”); Deflon, 2006-NMSC-025, ¶ 19
(requiring that the alleged conduct “stemmed from a sexual animus” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)).

{4}    In its motion for summary judgment, the County, citing numerous authority,
argued that Sanders failed to establish the alleged harassing conduct occurred because
of her sex. In response, Sanders cited a single case setting out the general legal
standard for sexual harassment under a hostile work environment theory. Sanders
otherwise listed conduct by her trainers and supervisors, including unwelcome
comments of a sexual nature, that she contended amounted to sexual harassment.
Sanders, however, failed to explain, with citation to pertinent authority, why this conduct
stemmed from sexual animus or occurred because of her sex. Based on this
presentation, the district court concluded that Sanders failed to make a showing that the
alleged harassing conduct occurred because of her status as a woman.

{5}    On appeal, Sanders does little to demonstrate that the district court’s conclusion
was error. See Premier Tr. of Nev., Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2021-NMCA-004, ¶ 10,
482 P.3d 1261 (“[I]t is the appellant’s burden to demonstrate, by providing well-
supported and clear arguments, that the district court has erred.”). In her appellate
briefing, Sanders—copying her response to the County’s motion for summary judgment
word for word—sets out the same list of alleged harassing conduct by her trainers and
supervisors. As before, Sanders fails to explain, with citation to pertinent authority, why
this conduct stemmed from sexual animus or occurred because of her sex. See Valerio
v. San Mateo Enters., Inc., 2017-NMCA-059, ¶ 45, 400 P.3d 275 (“We assume where
arguments in briefs are unsupported by cited authority, counsel after diligent search,
was unable to find any supporting authority.” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).

{6}     Instead, Sanders cites Nava for the general principle that sex does not have to
be the sole motivating factor to state a valid sexual harassment claim. 2004-NMSC-039,
¶ 8. Be that as it may, Sanders fails to cite authority supporting her contention that the
alleged harassing conduct was based, even in part, on Sanders’ sex. The single case
Sanders cites in support of her argument that the alleged harassing conduct was
motivated by her sex—Cummings v. Koehnen, 556 N.W.2d 586 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996),
aff’d, 568 N.W.2d 418 (Minn. 1997)—is inapposite. Cummings provides that “sexual
harassment” may be shown if “the conduct or communication [is] of a sexual nature.” Id.
at 589. In setting out this standard, the Minnesota Court of Appeals relied on the
statutory definition of “sexual harassment” adopted by the Minnesota Legislature. Id. No
such definition exists within the HRA, and existing New Mexico precedent suggests that
such a definition may not be appropriate under the HRA. See Ulibarri, 2006-NMSC-009,
¶ 12 (explaining that an analogous federal civil rights act is not to be construed as “a
general civility code and requires neither asexuality nor androgyny in the workplace”
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Regardless, Sanders has failed to
explain why this Court should import an out-of-state statutory definition into the HRA,
and we decline to do so today. See State v. Stevenson, 2020-NMCA-005, ¶ 20, 455
P.3d 890 (“We will not address an undeveloped argument or perform [an appellant’s]
research.”).

{7}     Facing the verbatim arguments offered to the district court and being provided no
cogent, well-developed, or well-supported argument why the district court erred in
rejecting such arguments, we have been given no reason to reach a result contrary to
the district court’s and we decline to do so. See Goodman, 2020-NMCA-019, ¶ 16. We
accordingly affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Sanders’ hostile
work environment claim.

II.   Wrongful Termination Based on Sex or in Retaliation for Reporting
      Discrimination

{8}     Next, Sanders argues that she was wrongly terminated on the basis of sex or in
retaliation for reporting discrimination to her employer. See § 28-1-7(A) (prohibiting
employment discrimination on the basis of sex); § 28-1-7(I)(2) (prohibiting retaliation
“against [an employee] who has opposed any unlawful discriminatory practice or has
filed a complaint” under the HRA). Our Supreme Court has recognized that, in cases
like this one, in which direct proof of discrimination is lacking, the “evidentiary
methodology developed in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 . .
. (1973), . . . provide[s] guidance in interpreting the [HRA].” Cates v. Regents of N.M.
Inst. of Mining & Tech., 1998-NMSC-002, ¶ 15, 124 N.M. 633, 954 P.2d 65; see Smith
v. FDC Corp., 1990-NMSC-020, ¶¶ 8-10, 109 N.M. 514, 787 P.2d 433 (recognizing the
McDonnell Douglas test as a useful framework for evaluating HRA claims); see also
Juneau v. Intel Corp., 2006-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 9, 23, 139 N.M. 12, 127 P.3d 548 (applying
the McDonnell Douglas framework in the retaliation context). When asserting
discrimination or retaliation under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the employee
bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. See Cates, 1998-NMSC-002,
¶¶ 15-16. Once a prima facie case is established, “the burden shifts to the employer to
show a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its decision.” Id. If such a reason is
produced, the burden shifts back to the employee to prove that the employer’s reason
was “pretextual or otherwise inadequate.” Garcia v. Hatch Valley Pub. Schs., 2018-
NMSC-020, ¶ 28, 458 P.3d 378 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{9}    In this case, the district court appears to have concluded that Sanders failed to
make a prima facie case for sex discrimination and retaliation, but that even if a prima
facie case was made, the County advanced a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
Sanders’ termination and Sanders failed to establish this reason was pretextual. We
assume for purposes of our analysis that Sanders met her initial burden of establishing
a prima facie case for sex discrimination and retaliation. We thus focus our analysis on
whether the County has advanced a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Sanders’
termination. Concluding the County has made such a showing, we then address
whether Plaintiff has established pretext.
{10} As for the County’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the County asserts that
Sanders’ termination was neither improperly based on her sex nor retaliatory, but rather
was because of her poor job performance. The County explained that, at the time of her
termination, Sanders was a probationary employee in training and that Sanders was
terminated due to her inability to adequately perform her job duties, which put officers’
safety at risk; her repeated arguments with trainers and supervisors; her lack of
improvement over the training period; and the fact that she was given nearly double the
typical training time of other trainees. The County’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason
for Sanders’ termination is supported by considerable evidence in the record—namely,
reports, emails, and complaints made by Sanders’ trainers and supervisors regarding
her behavior and inadequate job performance. From this record, we easily conclude that
the County has met its burden of providing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
Sanders’ termination. See id. ¶¶ 34-36 (concluding that an employer met its burden of
providing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination where the termination
was based on “extensive evidence,” including poor evaluations, incidents stemming
from unsatisfactory workplace performance, and internal complaints).

{11} The burden thus shifted to Sanders to show that the County’s reason was
pretextual. See id. ¶ 28. Both below and on appeal, Sanders relies exclusively on the
testimony of Carly Huffman, the supervisory coordinator for the emergency
communications department at the County, as proof of pretext. Specifically, Plaintiff
cites Huffman’s view that Sanders should not have been terminated because, according
to Huffman, Sanders did not receive adequate training, the reports describing Sanders’
deficient job performance were not always accurate, Sanders had good explanations for
her trainers’ complaints about her job performance, and Sanders was not
argumentative. Plaintiff contends Huffman’s beliefs are enough to raise a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the County’s stated reasons were pretextual.

{12} In response, the County points out that it is undisputed that the emergency
communications department director, Vernon Thompson, was solely responsible for the
decision to terminate Sanders.3 This is relevant to determining whether Sanders has
established pretext because, according to the County, “the Court must examine the
facts as they appear to the person making the [termination] decision.” In support, the
County, as it did before the district court, relies on various cases from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. See Ocana v. Am. Furniture Co., 2004-NMSC-
018, ¶ 23, 135 N.M. 539, 91 P.3d 58 (providing that, “when considering claims under
the [HRA], [our courts] may look at federal civil rights adjudication for guidance”).
Among other authorities, the County cites Conroy v. Vilsack, 707 F.3d 1163 (10th Cir.
2013). In that case, the federal appellate court explained, “In assaying the employer’s
[nondiscriminatory] explanation, we examine the facts as they appear to the person
making the decision.” Id. at 1174 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

3In her deposition, Huffman acknowledged that the director is always the final decision-maker when it
comes to termination decisions. And while Huffman testified that she did not agree with the decision to
terminate Sanders, she conceded the irrelevance of her personal beliefs, stating, “[I]t doesn’t matter what
I believe, personally. When you have documentation upon documentation upon documentation that cites
all of the key concerns, that is very difficult to argue with.”
Because Thompson was the sole decision-maker in terminating Sanders, Huffman’s
beliefs, according to the County, “are immaterial and irrelevant” in assessing whether
Sanders established pretext. Further, the County argues that, because Sanders has
made no argument, nor cited any evidence, establishing that Thompson’s stated
reasons for terminating Sanders were pretextual, Sanders has failed to establish
pretext.

{13} In her reply brief, Sanders does not discuss the federal authority cited by the
County or even suggest that the legal principles advanced by the County, as outlined
above, are erroneous. And in view of the County’s unrefuted legal standard, Sanders
makes no contention that Huffman’s beliefs were known to Thompson4 or are otherwise
relevant to the determination of whether Sanders has established pretext. See Elane
Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 70, 309 P.3d 53 (providing that an
appellate court will not guess at what a party’s argument might be or develop a party’s
arguments for them). In fact, Sanders, in her reply brief, advances no responsive
argument and fails even to mention pretext. See Vanderlugt v. Vanderlugt, 2018-NMCA-
073, ¶ 49, 429 P.3d 1269 (holding that an issue may be deemed conceded where the
reply brief was silent regarding an argument raised in the answer brief). Suffice it to say,
Sanders does nothing to persuade us that the pretext arguments advanced by the
County, and presumably relied on by the district court, are incorrect.5 See Goodman,
2020-NMCA-019, ¶ 16. We accordingly affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on Sanders’ wrongful termination and retaliation claims.

CONCLUSION

{14}    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

{15}    IT IS SO ORDERED.

JENNIFER L. ATTREP, Chief Judge

WE CONCUR:

J. MILES HANISEE, Judge

JANE B. YOHALEM, Judge

4Thompson affirmed in his affidavit that “Huffman did not indicate to [him] that she was of the opinion that
. . . Sanders should continue with her training as a[n e]mergency [c]ommunications [o]perator.”
5We emphasize that our affirmance should not be viewed as an acceptance of the County’s view on
pretext. Instead, we affirm because Sanders does not persuade us of error.