Court Opinion

ID: 9713010
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:04:53.754136+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:08.997478
License: Public Domain

*740Danhof, C.J.
(dissenting). I dissent from the majority’s opinion because I disagree with the holding that the Workers’ Compensation Appeál Board (WCAB) erred in finding that plaintiffs disability arose from the subsequent aggravation of the February 13, 1969, accident.
On appeal, findings of fact made by the WCAB are binding if the record discloses any evidence on which such a finding could be based. Kostamo v Marquette Iron Mining Co, 405 Mich 105, 135-136; 274 NW2d 411 (1979); Derwinski v Eureka Tire Co, 407 Mich 469, 481; 286 NW2d 672 (1979). The Supreme Court has also phrased this standard of review in terms of whether there is "any competent evidence” in the record to support the WCAB’s findings. Aquilina v General Motors Corp, 403 Mich 206, 213; 267 NW2d 923 (1978). Reversal is warranted, therefore, only when there is no competent evidence in the record to support the WCAB’s factual findings. This is not the situation in the present case.
While there were some language problems, making the plaintiff’s testimony appear confused at times, his testimony as a whole is clear that while he suffered some pain from the date of the initial injury on, the pain became worse in February, 1970. Plaintiff testified on direct examination that the pain in his leg and back would "come and go” prior to February, 1970, at which time the pain became constant. The continuous pain did not subside before plaintiff had his first surgery. While plaintiff was never completely without pain, he testified that the pain became worse with time. In 1970 the pain became continuous.
Plaintiff testified that he missed approximately ten days of work after the initial injury, then he returned to work at a lighter job, bench welding. *741Although plaintiff was able to sit while performing this work, the job still required him to bend and stoop and use his right foot to operate the welder. After a period of time at this job, plaintiff returned to his usual work as a gun welder. Gun welding required the plaintiff to stand and weld parts onto a 25- to 30-pound automobile seat which plaintiff would pick up from the floor and place on a bench. Dr. Willits, a treating physician at the Pigeon Clinic, testified that it was possible that plaintiff’s employment from the period of the initial injury through February, 1970, caused further degeneration to plaintiff’s back.
While I agree with the majority that the evidence supporting the WCAB’s factual findings was less than overwhelming, I am unable to conclude on this record that there was no competent evidence to support the findings. Reversal is therefore unwarranted on this issue.
Since I would affirm the WCAB’s factual findings, defendant Citizens Insurance Company’s second issue must be addressed. Citizens argues that the WCAB erred in applying the one-year-back rule to limit reimbursement of Citizens by Employers to benefits paid to plaintiff within one year of the petition for determination of rights filed by Citizens. Citizens argues that the one-year-back rule was improperly applied because it was neither raised by Employers before the hearing referee nor briefed by Employers before the WCAB. The one-year-back rule was raised as a defense by Employers in its application for review of claim. Citizens additionally argues that the one-year-back rule applies only to situations where a carrier or employer seeks reimbursement from an employee.
I find Citizens’ initial argument on the one-year-back rule to be correct and therefore do not ad*742dress the merits of the issue of application of the one-year-back rule. The Supreme Court has held that the one-year-back rule, MCL 418.833; MSA 17.237(833), is a defense akin to the statute of limitations and may be waived. Kleinschrodt v General Motors Corp, 402 Mich 381; 263 NW2d 246, reh den 402 Mich 965 (1978). In Kleinschrodt, the defendant did not raise the one-year-back rule before the hearing referee or the WCAB. The WCAB applied the rule sua sponte. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defendants had waived the defense of the one-year-back rule by failing to raise it before the WCAB. Kleinschrodt, supra, p 384.
In Kingery v Ford Motor Co, 116 Mich App 606; 323 NW2d 318 (1982), this Court extended the reasoning employed in Kleinschrodt and held that the WCAB did not err in refusing to apply the "two-year-back” rule, MCL 418.381(2); MSA 17.237(381X2), because the defendant did not raise the defense before the hearing referee. The two-year-back rule is similar to the one-year-back rule in that it precludes benefits prior to two years before an application for initial benefits. Because the one-year-back rule is a defense akin to a statute of limitations defense, Employers’ failure to raise it before the hearing referee precludes its application by the WCAB whether it be by request or sua sponte. In my opinion, the WCAB erred in applying the one-year-back rule to limit the amount that Employers must reimburse Citizens.
I would affirm the WCAB’s factual findings and reverse.