Court Opinion

ID: 9352980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-10 17:07:27.26951+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:06:18.103283
License: Public Domain

J-S42027-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                 :           PENNSYLVANIA
                                                 :
                  v.                             :
                                                 :
                                                 :
    DAVID JOHNSON                                :
                                                 :
                         Appellant               :      No. 699 WDA 2022

               Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 4, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-11-CR-0000864-2015

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                                 FILED: JANUARY 10, 2023

        Appellant, David Johnson, appeals from the May 4, 2022 order entered

in the Court of Common Plea of Cambria County, denying his petition filed

pursuant     to    the   Post   Conviction     Relief   Act   (“PCRA”),   42   Pa.C.S.A.

§§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

        The PCRA court summarized the factual and procedural history as

follows:

        On March 31, 2015, Richland Township [Police] Detective Keirn
        was summoned by the watch commander to the township building
        early in the morning. It was reported that an individual, later
        identified as [Appellant], came to the [police] station and
        indicated that he [] killed his girlfriend inside their Richland
        Township[, Pennsylvania] residence. Detective Keirn interviewed
        [Appellant,] and [Appellant] indicated that he [] smoked crack
        cocaine the previous afternoon on March 30, 2015.           When
        [Appellant’s] girlfriend[] returned home after an evening out with
        friends, [Appellant] demanded she give him her [automated teller
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S42027-22

       machine (“ATM”) personal identification number (“PIN”)] so [] he
       could retrieve money to buy more crack cocaine. [Appellant]
       alleged that he did not want to stab [his girlfriend], he only wished
       to scare her into providing him with the [ATM] PIN[. Appellant]
       claimed that he had been thinking of doing this and [] brought
       duct tape and a knife to be prepared for when [his girlfriend]
       arrived home. A struggle[] ensued when [Appellant] tried to
       secure [his girlfriend] with duct tape so that she would not alert
       authorities while he retrieved the money from the ATM. During
       the struggle, [Appellant] admitted to stabbing [his girlfriend]
       twice in the side of [the] back of her neck. [Appellant] then
       proceeded to [withdraw] money [from his girlfriend’s bank]
       account and purchased more crack cocaine. [Appellant] returned
       home, used the crack cocaine, drank wine, and took a shower
       according to his statement to Detective Keirn.

       [Appellant] was found guilty[, following a bench trial, of the
       following criminal charges: criminal homicide – first degree
       murder (count 1), aggravated assault (count 2), robbery – inflicts
       serious bodily injury (count 3), robbery – threat of immediate
       serious bodily injury (count 4), theft by unlawful taking or
       disposition – moveable property (count 5), access device fraud (4
       counts charged as first-degree misdemeanors, 5 counts charged
       as second-degree misdemeanors) (counts 6 – 14), aggravated
       assault with a deadly weapon (2 counts) (counts 16 and 17),
       simple assault by physical menace (count 21), and abuse of a
       corpse (count 22).1] The bench trial took place from March 9,
       2017[,] to March 15, 2017. [After being found guilty of the
       aforementioned crimes, Appellant] was sentenced on March 16,
       2017[,] to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole [for
       his first-degree murder conviction], plus a consecutive aggregate
       term of incarceration of twenty [] years [and] four [] months to
       forty [] years [and] eight [] months [for the remaining

____________________________________________

1  18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2501(a), 2702(a)(1), 3701(a)(1)(i), 3701(a)(1)(ii),
3921(a), 4106(a)(1)(ii), 2702(a)(4), 2701(a)(3), and 5510, respectively.
Appellant was found not guilty of criminal attempt to commit kidnapping,
aggravated assault by a deadly weapon (1 count), criminal attempt to commit
unlawful restraint, and criminal attempt to commit false imprisonment. 18
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901(a) (kidnapping), 2702(a)(4), 901(a) (unlawful restraint),
and 901(a) (false imprisonment), respectively.

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       convictions.2]    ...   On March 27, 2017, [Appellant] filed
       post-sentence motions that were denied by [the trial court on]
       May 4, 2017. [Appellant] filed [a] notice of appeal [] on May 30,
       2017. [This Court] affirmed the judgment of [sentence on July
       12, 2018, and our Supreme Court] denied [Appellant’s] request
       for allowance to appeal on February 24, 2020.                  [See
       Commonwealth v. Johnson, 2018 WL 3385847 (Pa. Super. filed
       July 12, 2018) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 224
       A.3d 363 (Pa. 2020). Appellant] filed a petition for post-conviction
       collateral relief on February 26, 2021. Appointed counsel for
       [Appellant] filed an amended PCRA petition on June 25, 2021[,
       and] two supplemental [amended] PCRA [petitions] on September
       10, 2021[,] and November 29, 2021[,] respectively.               On
       November 30, 2021[,] a PCRA [evidentiary] hearing was held on
       this matter. The parties were ordered to file memoranda of law
       following the hearing. The Commonwealth filed [its] brief in
       opposition on March 24, 2022[,] and [Appellant] filed his brief in
       support of his PCRA petition[] on March 25, 2022.

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/4/22, at 2-4 (extraneous capitalization omitted). The

PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition on May 4, 2022. This appeal followed.3

       Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

____________________________________________

2 The trial court sentenced Appellant to 9 to 18 years’ incarceration on count
3, with the sentence to run concurrently to count 1. Appellant was sentenced
to 16 to 32 months’ incarceration on count 5, with the sentence to run
consecutively to counts 1 and 3. On counts 6 through 14, the trial court
sentenced Appellant to 1 to 2 years’ incarceration at each count with each
sentence to run consecutively to the sentence imposed on the prior count.
Appellant was also sentenced to 1 to 2 years’ incarceration on count 22, with
that sentence to run consecutively to count 14. The trial court imposed no
further sentence on counts 2, 4, 16, 17, and 21. Appellant was also given
credit for time served towards his sentence imposed on count 1.

3 On June 23, 2022, Appellant filed his concise statement of errors complained
of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On July 8, 2022, the PCRA court
filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion, relying on its May 4, 2022 opinion denying the
PCRA petition.

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      Whether the PCRA court erred[ or ]abused its discretion by failing
      to find trial counsel ineffective for failing to take action to suppress
      [Appellant’s] statement made to [the] police?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

      In addressing Appellant’s issue, we are mindful of our well-settled

standard and scope of review of an order denying a PCRA petition. Proper

appellate review of a PCRA court’s denial of a petition is limited to the

examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the

record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988,

992 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s findings will not

be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.”

Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations

omitted). “This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court,

and we will not disturb those findings merely because the record could support

a contrary holding.”      Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 140

(Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). In contrast, we review the PCRA court’s

legal conclusions de novo.      Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20

(Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc), appeal denied, 101 A.3d 785 (Pa. 2014).

      Appellant’s issue raises a claim alleging that trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance. Appellant’s Brief at 8-15. “It is well-established that

counsel is presumed effective[.]” Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d 121,

132 (Pa. 2012), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-691

(1984). To plead and prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “a

petitioner must establish: (1) that the underlying issue has arguable merit;

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(2) counsel's actions lacked an objective[ly] reasonable basis; and (3) actual

prejudice resulted from counsel's act or failure to act.” Commonwealth v.

Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 706 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc), appeal denied, 93

A.3d 463 (Pa. 2014).     “A claim of ineffectiveness will be denied if the

petitioner's evidence fails to meet any of these prongs.” Commonwealth v.

Martin, 5 A.3d 177, 183 (Pa. 2010). “In determining whether counsel's action

was reasonable, we do not question whether there were other more logical

courses of action which counsel could have pursued[.        R]ather, we must

examine   whether    counsel's   decision[]   had   any    reasonable    basis.”

Commonwealth v. Washington, 927 A.2d 586, 594 (Pa. 2007).

     Our inquiry ceases and counsel's assistance is deemed
     constitutionally effective once we are able to conclude that the
     particular course chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis
     designed to effectuate his[, or her,] client's interests. The test is
     not whether other alternatives were more reasonable, employing
     a hindsight evaluation of the record.          Although weigh the
     alternatives we must, the balance tips in favor of a finding of
     effective assistance as soon as it is determined that trial counsel's
     decision had any reasonable basis.

Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527 A.2d 973, 975 (Pa. 1987).              A petitioner

establishes prejudice when he or she demonstrates “that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's [acts or omissions], the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966

A.2d 523, 533 (Pa. 2009).

     Appellant alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a

motion to suppress the statement Appellant provided to the police “mere

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hours after the [incident], indicating his involvement in the death of the

victim.” Appellant’s Brief at 11. Appellant contends that at the time he made

the statement to the police, he “was under the influence of crack cocaine and

most likely alcohol.” Id. Appellant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective

for failing “to seek to suppress his statement[] on the basis he could not

[knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive] his Miranda rights to counsel

and to remain silent because of his level of intoxication[.”4] Id. at 13 (case

citation formatting corrected). Appellant argues,

        [trial counsel’s] reasoning for not moving to [] suppress [the]
        statement is understandable[] but was not reasonable at [the
        pre-trial phase of] the proceedings. [Trial counsel] asserted
        [Appellant’s] statement was needed because it contained
        elements of [the] preferred defense, the use of intoxicants for
        diminished capacity, and the fact that it showed remorse for the
        crime. However, [trial counsel] agreed that diminished capacity
        was only a partial defense - it would lower the degree of murder
        from first [degree] to third [degree], if accepted by the factfinder.
        Nonetheless, if [trial counsel] was successful in suppressing [the]
        statement, and any evidence that was obtained based upon that
        statement, [trial counsel] very well could have obtained a
        complete exoneration, or even a dismissal of the charges at a
        habeas corpus proceeding.

Id. at 14.

        In denying Appellant’s petition, the PCRA court stated,

        Trial counsel[’s] trial strategies and trial tactics cannot be viewed
        in hindsight. The [PCRA] court finds that [Appellant’s] ineffective
        assistance of counsel claim fails the second prong of the test, that
        counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for action or inaction.
        The [PCRA] court further finds that trial counsel had a reasonable
____________________________________________

4   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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      strategic basis for [the] trial tactics. Trial counsel testified at the
      PCRA [evidentiary] hearing that [counsel] had an objectively
      reasonable basis for not filing a motion to suppress [Appellant’s]
      confession[.]

      [T]rial counsel discussed [the] strategic reasoning as to why
      [counsel] would not file a suppression motion[] and believed that
      [Appellant] understood these reasons during each of [the]
      discussions. [T]rial counsel testified that, at the preliminary
      hearing, trial counsel learned that when [Appellant] turned
      himself in to the Richland [Township] police, prior to making the
      statements [Appellant] wished to suppress, that [Appellant]
      appeared perfectly sober, did not have an odor of alcohol, and did
      not appear under the influence of any drugs or alcohol to the police
      officers.   Trial counsel ultimately decided to formulate a
      diminished capacity defense based upon [Appellant’s] statements
      made to [the] police in an attempt to reduce the [first-degree]
      murder [] charge to [third – degree] murder. Further, trial
      counsel believed that the statements as to [Appellant’s]
      mind-frame and intent would be useful in the penalty-phase
      proceeding if that point was reached.

PCRA Court Opinion, 5/4/22, at 7-8 (extraneous capitalization omitted,

paragraph sequence modified).

      At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that she and co-counsel

discussed the issue of Appellant’s statements to the police and whether to

pursue a motion to suppress those statements with Appellant. N.T., 11/30/21,

at 9-10. Trial counsel was “fully convinced” that Appellant understood the

reasons why she did not seek to suppress the statements and that Appellant

“entirely agreed” with that decision. Id. at 10. In explaining the rationale for

electing to forgo suppression of the statements, trial counsel explained,

      First of all, the statements that [Appellant] gave were, when we
      looked at them, the phrase that I recall[, and that] we discussed
      [] with [Appellant,] was[ “]be careful what you ask for.[” T]he
      reason for that was[,] contained within both statements were

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     defenses in two trials. [W]hen I say two trials[, I mean,] we were
     facing both a guilt phase [trial] and a second phase, which would
     be the death penalty. So as far as the guilt phase, [] contained
     within [the statements] is a – both a description of his use of crack
     cocaine and intoxicants and also his description that he did not
     intend – he did not intend to kill the young lady. It was his intent
     to simply obtain her [PIN], which, you know, we maintained is a
     misdemeanor. So[,] there was no intent to kill her, no intent to
     commit murder, [only] intent to get her [PIN] to obtain money for
     his – to obtain crack cocaine. [T]here was, I believe, descriptions
     of use of alcohol[,] and I don’t recall if there was a description of
     use of crack cocaine before that. But, you know, certainly use of
     alcohol, which was basically our defense, which was diminished
     capacity in order to try and reduce the [charge of m]urder in the
     first degree down to murder in the third degree.

     Also, and certainly very important, possibly taking priority, was
     the fact that the statement, both statements, were defenses in
     the death penalty [phase] in several ways.

     First of all, both [] statements showed remorse, showed sorrow,
     showed how sorry he was for what he had done, and [that] is a
     mitigating circumstance[. T]he fact that he had gone to the police
     and turned himself in was also a mitigating circumstance. And[,]
     again showed how sorry he was for what he had done. If we
     move[d] to suppress [the statements], we – to me if we couldn’t
     use [the statements] at the guilt phase, we certainly wouldn’t be
     able to use [the statements] at the death penalty phase, or if we
     tried to [use the statements at the death penalty phase, we would]
     certainly have an argument about it[] from the Commonwealth
     and also, you know, at that time[,] thinking we would be having
     a jury trial, [seeking to suppress the statements] would backfire
     in our faces if [a] jury hears, what do you mean, he confessed? I
     mean, that[,] I think[,] would be an insult to the jury and certainly
     backfire in our faces.

     Also[,] the statement was going to be used by all three [defense]
     experts that we hired and [the experts] relied upon [the
     statements] in their reports and in their analysis and reports that
     they were hired to do. []

     Mr. Vey was the pathologist[] that we hired[,] and he relied on
     that, the statement, and referred to it in his report. And Dr.
     Guzzardi was hired for the diminished capacity defense. He also
     relied on the statements in his report. If we move to suppress

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      [the statements], then we[,] they can’t testify – they can’t rely on
      the statements, they can’t testify about it and their testimony is
      useless[,] if it’s even admissible. As far as Dr. Wettstein, he also
      used the statement and again, because they helped [Appellant],
      okay, they were not a negative effect. Dr. Wettstein also used
      [the statements] and he was[] to be used [as a witness] in the
      penalty phase, the death penalty phase. And same thing, it was
      a mitigating circumstance and for the heavy drug usage, [et
      cetera.] So[,] for the same idea these were [Appellant’s] voice,
      okay, in his own defense, particularly in the death penalty phase
      both through experts and without him necessarily having to testify
      himself.

Id. at 10-12. Trial counsel was asked, “if you had moved for suppression and

were successful, couldn’t you then have called [Appellant] to the stand to

testify to those mitigating circumstances or drug and alcohol use at trial?” In

response, trial counsel explained that calling Appellant to testify was not an

option because it would “have opened [Appellant] up to cross-examination

then in front of the judge or jury.” Id. at 14.

      On cross-examination, trial counsel stated that, in her opinion, knowing

that Appellant had illegal substances in his system at the time he made the

statements to the police did not cause her to “call into question the validity”

of his waiving his Miranda rights because, as a defense expert explained,

Appellant had a high tolerance level for drug use, and his use of crack cocaine

would have “sharpened” or heightened his senses. Id. at 40-41. Based upon

the expert’s opinion as to the effects illegal substances may have had on

Appellant at the time he made the statements, trial counsel found it difficult

to argue that the waiver of the Miranda rights was invalid. Id. at 41.

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      Appellant recalled discussions with trial counsel about the possibility of

filing a motion to suppress his statements to the police. Appellant confirmed

that trial counsel explained, as summarized supra, that seeking to suppress

the statements was not a good idea. Id. at 68. When asked if he discussed

the possibility of filing a motion to suppress the statement with trial counsel,

Appellant responded, “I had mentioned [to trial counsel] that I would possibly

like to take that avenue, as far as suppression of [the] statement[s.]” Id. at

67-68.

      Upon review, we concur with the PCRA court that trial counsel had an

objectively reasonable and strategic basis for not pursuing a motion to

suppress the statements Appellant made to the police shortly after the

incident.   As trial counsel explained, based upon the defense expert’s

assessment and report, she believed that a motion to suppress the statements

on the ground Appellant did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive

his Miranda rights would not have been successful. Moreover, trial counsel

articulated that the statements served a strategic purpose in both the guilt

phase, as well as the death penalty phase, of the case. Trial counsel further

explained that use of the statements supported the diminished capacity

defense during the guilt phase of the trial and demonstrated, inter alia,

remorse, a mitigating circumstance, during the penalty phase.

      Furthermore, although Appellant now states that he wanted trial counsel

to pursue suppression of the statements given to the police, Appellant admits

that, during the pre-trial phase of the case, he was informed of the use of the

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statements in support of the diminished capacity defense.          Id. at 62-63.

During the pre-trial phase of the case, Appellant sought to remove trial

counsel on the grounds of irreconcilable differences surrounding plea

negotiations and alleged statements trial counsel made to Appellant regarding

his refusal to accept the Commonwealth’s plea offer. Id. at 63-67. Appellant

testified that trial counsel’s miscommunication of the sentence length included

within a plea offer, along with statements trial counsel made about Appellant’s

disinclination to accept a plea deal, “built more of a sense of mistrust” in trial

counsel.   Id. at 67.   When asked if there were “any other issues in [trial

counsel’s] representation that[] caused conflict, caused a [loss] of trust,

between you and [trial counsel,]” Appellant responded in the negative.

Appellant did not raise trial counsel’s failure to pursue suppression of the

statements Appellant made to the police as a reason to seek removal of trial

counsel, despite Appellant’s claim that he “would possibly like” trial counsel to

pursue such a motion.

      We concur with the PCRA court, and the record supports, that trial

counsel had an objectively reasonable basis for not pursuing a motion to

suppress Appellant’s statements. As such, Appellant failed to plead and prove

a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.      Pierce, 527 A.2d at 975.

Consequently, we affirm the PCRA court’s denial of Appellant’s petition.

      Order affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 01/10/2023

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