Court Opinion

ID: 9535558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:50:50.056801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:16.968252
License: Public Domain

Pashman, J.
concurring.
I join fully in Judge Halpern’s majority opinion. In recent years, cohabitation between unmarried adults has become an increasingly prevalent phenomenon. To label such conduct as “meretricious” —• that is, as akin to prostitution •— would ignore the realities of today’s society. It is likely true that all such understandings between nonmarital partners involve in some way a mutual sexual relationship or at least contemplate its existence. This, however, does not make their conduct the equivalent of prostitution • — ■ whatever might he one’s view as to its “morality.” Many persons have accepted this type of living arrangement as an alternative to, or a preliminary step en route to, formal marriage. In other instances, such relationships provide the parties with companionship and a means of defraying household expenses, as well as allow each to benefit from any particular skills that the other might possess.
The decision to cohabit without marriage represents each partner’s voluntary choice as to how his or her life should be ordered — a choice with which the State cannot interfere, see State v. Saunders, 75 N. J. 200 (1977). As in the case of any other individuals, these partners remain free to enter into valid and enforceable agreements concerning their earnings and property rights. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, *39018 Cal. 3d 660, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 557 P. 2d 106 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 62 Ill. App. 3d 861, 20 Ill. Dec. 476, 380 N. E. 2d 454 (Ct. App. 1978); Carlson v. Olson, 256 N. W. 2d 249 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1977); Beal v. Beal, 282 Or. 115, 577 P. 2d 507 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
As the majority emphasizes, these agreements may he express or implied. See ante at 384. At bottom, courts must determine the intent or understanding of the parties as to whether, and to what extent, their assets and income are to be divided. This intent may be discerned from their explicit language, as in the present case, or from their conduct and actions interpreted in light of all the surrounding circumstances. Eegardless of the precise manner in which the parties manifest agreement, however, it is their reasonable expectations that must be honored. And the Court may look to a variety of remedies to protect that expectation. See, e. g., Marvin, supra, 18 Cal. 3d at 683, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831, 557 P. 2d at 122-123; Hewitt, supra, 20 Ill. Dec. at 481-482, 380 N. E. 2d at 459-460; Carlson, supra, 256 N. W. 2d at 253-255; Beal, supra, 282 Or. at 121-122, 577 P. 2d at 510.
The question which remains is whether quasi-contractual and equitable remedies should also be available to the parties upon dissolution of their relationship. Most unwed persons who choose to cohabit likely do so “in ignorance of the [financial] consequences of either marriage or non-marriage” and “with absolutely no thought given to the legal consequences of their relationship.” Bruch, “Property Eights of De Eacto Spouses Including Thoughts on the Value of Homemakers’ Services,” 10 Family L. Q. 101, 135 (1976). Consequently, an agreement such as is here present may not exist in the vast majority of cases.
Given this circumstance, it would be unwise to require some form of contract as a prerequisite to relief in the courts. Eather, we should presume “that the parties intend [ed] to deal fairly with each other” upon dissolution of the relationship, Marvin, supra, 18 Cal. 3d at 683, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830, 557 P. 2d at 121, and consequently, in the *391absence of agreement, “employ the doctrine of qucmtum meruit, or equitable remedies such as constructive or resulting trusts” in order to insure that one party has not been unjustly enriched, and the other unjustly impoverished, on account of their dealings, id-, 18 Cal. 3d at 665, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819, 557 P. 2d at 110. See, e. g., Hewitt, supra, 20 Ill. Dec. at 481-482, 380 N. E. 2d at 459-460.
Since such remedies are grounded in equity, their applicability would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. The factors to be weighed by a trial judge would include, as examples only, the duration of the relationship, the amount and types of services rendered by each of the parties, the opportunities foregone by either in entering the living arrangement, and the ability of each to earn a living after the relationship has been dissolved. These remedies may be cumulative or exclusive. Decisions concerning the complexities that might arise upon application of these principles must be determined on a case by case basis.
In the present case, no resort need be had to such remedies inasmuch as an explicit agreement did exist. I therefore concur fully in the majority’s opinion.
For affirmance — Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Mountain, Pashman, Clieeokd, Schkeibek and Handles and Judge Halpekn — 7.
For reversal — None.