Court Opinion

ID: 9852213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:26:42.04485+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:24.300175
License: Public Domain

CARTER, Justice
(concurring specially).
This is an important case which will weigh heavily on how the executive and legislative branches will hereafter conduct themselves in the business of government. The uncertainties which this case presents is the product of an unwarranted interpretation of the item veto amendment espoused by this court eighteen years ago in State ex rel. Turner v. Iowa State Highway Comm’n, 186 N.W.2d 141, 142 (Iowa 1971).
The opinion in State ex rel. Turner concluded that the item veto authority may be extended to nonappropriation items if the entire bill may somehow be characterized as an appropriations bill. That interpretation has led to two highly undesirable results. First, it serves to extend the scope of the item veto amendment to items which are not appropriations and, consequently, were not intended to be subject to item veto by the framers of the constitutional amendment. Second, as the present controversy shows, the interpretation in State ex rel. Turner does not turn the validity of an item veto on the nature of the vetoed item (which is what the controversy is about), but, rather, on some inexact and arbitrary characterization of the bill in which the vetoed item is contained.
After discussing much authority which was contrary to the position which it ultimately adopted, the court in State ex rel. Turner cited only a discussion from Note, 18 Drake Law Review 245, 250 (1969) in support of its interpretation. The discussion which was quoted in the opinion was as follows:
It would seem probable that should the Iowa Legislature attempt to coerce the Governor into approving a lump sum appropriation by combining purpose and amount, the court would interpret the term “item” liberally to preserve the purpose of the item veto amendment.
If the quoted statement is read within the context of the entire discussion, it does not support the court’s interpretation of the constitutional amendment.
The point which was being made in the law review note was that the combining of an appropriation with a nonfiscal measure would not save the appropriation item from veto. The writer was not suggesting that placing an appropriation item in a bill rendered every item in that bill subject to item veto. Nor was the writer suggesting that the validity of an item veto turned on the characterization of the bill as a whole. Indeed the law review note firmly makes the point that under the weight of authority *486from other jurisdictions the term “item” is to be interpreted as limiting the governor to vetoing only those items which specifically appropriate money and not some general provision of law incorporated in a bill which contains some appropriation items.
Although I applaud the majority opinion for its rejection of the governor’s argument that a single appropriation item in a bill makes all items in that bill subject to item veto, the test which the majority adopts for purposes of the “characterization of the bill” criterion provides no meaningful guidance for future' cases. Reasonable minds will often differ as to whether an entire bill composed of a mixture of fiscal and nonfiscal legislation may be characterized as being predominantly an appropriations bill. Moreover, there is no valid reason to make the character of the bill as a whole the determinative factor in deciding controversies of this type. In order to provide a more meaningful criterion for measuring the scope of the governor's authority, we should abandon the “characterization of the bill” test in favor of a test which focuses on whether the item which is vetoed is itself an appropriation.
Although it is not essential to the rationale under which it decides the case, the majority concludes that the item which was vetoed was an appropriation. Because I find sufficient support for that conclusion, I agree that this case is being correctly decided, although disagreeing with the test which the majority has applied.
NEUMAN, J., joins this specially concurring opinion.