Court Opinion

ID: 9594362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:29:21.322475+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:04.116815
License: Public Domain

HODGES, Chief Justice,
dissenting:
I cannot agree with the majority’s affirmation of the trial court’s finding that the attorney fees are reasonable because there was no evidence presented on which to base the finding. Neither can I agree that the OTA has an initial burden of presenting evidence that the fees were unreasonable.
The majority supports its position that the OTA has an initial burden of showing that the fees were unreasonable with a cite to State ex rel. Howard v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm., 614 P.2d 45, 49 n. 5 (Okla.1980). Howard was an original action. The issue there was whether the Attorney General alone could represent the Oklahoma Corporation Commission or whether the Corporation Commission could be represented by in-house counsel. Howard addresses the right of the Corporation Commission to chose its own attorney. There is nothing in Howard which addresses an award of attorney fees or supports the proposition that the opposing party has the initial burden of showing that the fees are unreasonable.
In Burk v. City of Oklahoma City, 598 P.2d 659, 661 (Okla.1979), this Court set out the criteria for evaluating the reasonableness of attorney fees “in the absence of a contract or a statute fixing the amount.” This Court placed the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the fee on the attorney stating: “attorneys in this state should be required to ... offer evidence as to the reasonable value for services performed for different types of legal work.”
Then in Oliver’s Sports Center v. National Standard Insurance Co., 615 P.2d 291 (Okla.1980), this Court applied the criteria set out in Burk to a contingency fee agreement. Once again placing the initial burden of establishing the reasonableness of the fee on the attorney, this Court noted that, in the context of a contingency fee, “attorneys [are] required to ... offer evidence of the reasonable value for the services performed, predicated on the standards within the local legal community.” Id. at 295.
Once again, we addressed the issue in Abel v. Tisdale, 619 P.2d 608 (Okla.1980), on remand 673 P.2d 836 (Okla.1983). In Able, this Court held that, only after the attorney presents evidence of the reasonableness of the fee, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that the fee was excessive. On remand, in Able v. Tisdale, 673 P.2d 836 (Okla.1983), this Court reemphasized that the attorney has the initial burden of establishing the reasonableness of the fee. Id. at 838. This Court further stated that, in establishing the reasonableness of the fee, the trial court should consider the criteria set forth in the Rules of Professional Conduct, Okla.Stat. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3-A, rule 1.5 (1991).1 These *770factors apply whether the fee is contingent or a fixed amount. See Rules of Professional Conduct, Okla.Stat. tit. 5, ch. 1, app. 3-A, rule 1.5 (1991).
Then in Root v. KAMO Electric Cooperative, 699 P.2d 1083, 1093 (Okla.1985), this Court held that the attorney did not have to submit detailed time records to recover attorney fees when the parties had entered into a contingency fee contract. However, the attorney continued to carry the initial burden of establishing the reasonableness of the fees. Id.
These cases demonstrate that it has long been this Court’s position that a trial judge’s award of attorney fees must be based on evidence, the attorney has the initial burden of establishing the reasonableness of the fees, and, then, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that the fees were excessive. In the present case, the record is void of any evidence establishing the reasonableness of the attorney fees. The attorneys did not present any documentation of the work that was expended on the matter. The only witness who testified at the hearing on attorney fees was the pastor of the New Life Pentecostal Church, and he did not testify as to the reasonableness of the fees. ‘ '
Because we have previously held that evidence of the reasonableness of the attorney fees is required, I would remand the matter as this Court did in Abel, 619 P.2d at 612, for the trial court to take evidence and, based on the evidence, determine the reasonableness of the attorney fees.

. Rule 1.5 states:
(a) A lawyer’s fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
*770(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.