Court Opinion

ID: 9596695
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:52:15.755656+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:35.871610
License: Public Domain

Judge Wynn
dissenting.
The majority concludes today that child care expenses incurred by a custodial spouse should be taken into account in a finding of dependency in the determination of alimony. I disagree.
In the fifteen years since the Supreme Court in Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 261 S.E.2d 849 (1979), parenthetically indicated that “child custody” may be an “other condition” that the trial court may consider at the time of hearing on an alimony claim, no court in this state has ever interpreted that to mean “child support expenses.” Today, the majority takes that novel step and in doing so inextricably intertwines the determination of alimony dependency with the determination of child support.
In Williams, the Supreme Court listed certain propositions to be considered in the determination of dependency. Among these propositions, the Court stated that trial courts may consider “any other ‘condition’ (such as health and child custody) of each spouse at the time of hearing.” Id. at 183, 261 S.E.2d at 856. Based on this language alone, the majority now concludes that child care expenses must be a factor for the trial court to consider in determining the amount of alimony.
In my opinion the language in Williams should not be confined to equate “child custody” with “child support expenses.” The legislature has enacted separate statutes to govern child support and child custody and in doing so it has attached two different meanings to the terms. See N. C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4 and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.1. Child support involves providing for the financial well-being of the child. In a determination of child support, the court must calculate the expenses incurred for rearing the child. *428See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4. Child custody, on the other hand, involves more than financial responsibility. A parent with physical custody of a child has the responsibility of providing for the spiritual, intellectual, and emotional development of the child. Therefore, in a custody hearing, a court must evaluate several factors in its determination of what is in the best interests of the child. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.2.
Moreover, I disagree with the majority’s statement that “if the trial court must consider child custody as a ‘condition’ which influences the dependency decision . . . financial responsibilities must be weighed . . . .” (emphasis added). First, Williams states only in dicta that the trial court may consider factors such as child custody. Second, the financial responsibilities for child custody is handled by the determination of child support. Third, the award of child custody may be more of a benefit than a detriment for indeed, many parents vigorously seek custody for the benefits of having their child(ren) which means constant companionship and the love and joy that flows from being a parent and having your child with you. In contrast, the noncustodial parents may be deprived of these benefits and often find themselves relegated to the role of a secondary parent with defined visits. That is why child support and child custody are two separate determinations, for while the former is a quantitative financial detriment, the latter is and should be a qualitative benefit to the custodial parent.
While the majority correctly notes that children are a part of “the family unit,” See Williams, 299 N.C. at 183, 261 S.E.2d at 856, the majority also concedes that North Carolina’s alimony statute does not contain express language which specifically allows consideration of the custodial spouse’s caregiving obligations to the minor children. The majority justifies its holding by stating that it is consistent with the “overriding principle” of “fairness” which guides the determination of alimony. However, the result reached today requires the payment of child support expenses under both the child support and alimony orders. This is an unfair result.
Moreover, the result reached in this case today will have monumental implications in the area of family law. The minor child in this case will reach age 18 in 1996. At that point, absent any special exceptions, Mr. Fink’s child support obligation will end. See N. C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.4(c). However, his alimony obligation will continue until Mrs. Fink remarries or dies; thus, Mr. Fink could potentially pay alimony *429under this order based on an improper deviation from the Child Support Guidelines for a time period long after his child support obligation has terminated. Accordingly, if child expenses are considered for purposes of determining permanent alimony, then such a consideration necessitates a redetermination of alimony when each child reaches the age of majority. No such result was ever contemplated by our legislature.
Furthermore, when the trial court included the minor child’s “needs” of $767.00 in its alimony order, this determination had the effect of rendering two child support orders. A child support consent order had already been entered in accordance with the child support guidelines. That order contained a finding that no deviation from the child support guidelines was justified. Increasing Mrs. Fink’s claimed personal needs and expenses by including non-guideline expenses of the minor child resulted in an increase in the amount of child support that Mr. Fink was ordered to pay, although it was denominated “alimony.” As such, it is tantamount to modifying the child support order without a motion to modify having been filed and without any evidence or the required findings to justify a deviation from the guidelines.
Our well settled law requires that a motion be filed and a change of circumstances found before a child support order can be modified. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.7(a) (1987); McGee v. McGee, 118 N.C. App. 19, 26, 453 S.E.2d 531, 536 (1995); Davis v. Risley, 104 N.C. App. 798, 800, 411 S.E.2d 171, 172 (1991); Greer v. Greer, 101 N.C. App. 351, 354, 399 S.E.2d 399, 401 (1991). The changed circumstances must relate to “child-oriented expenses.” Gilmore v. Gilmore, 42 N.C. App. 560, 563, 257 S.E.2d 116, 118 (1979). No such motion was pending. Indeed, the issue had already been resolved with a court order. It is reversible error for the court to deviate from the presumptive child support guidelines without making the required findings. Hall v. Hall, 107 N.C. App. 298, 299-300, 419 S.E.2d 371, 372 (1992). The trial judge must follow the respective applicable statutes in determining alimony and child support. N.C Gen. Stat. §§ 50-16.5(a) and 50-13.4(c); Beall v. Beall, 290 N.C. 669, 673, 228 S.E.2d 407, 410 (1976). In this case, the inclusion of the minor child’s needs in the alimony determination constitutes an abuse of discretion and reversible error.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from Part I of the majority’s opinion.