Court Opinion

ID: 9573613
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:57:13.979668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:42:08.388777
License: Public Domain

*479Fletcher, Justice,
dissenting.
As the majority notes, while the present case was pending in this court, the United States Supreme Court decided Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 59 USLW 4574, decided June 3, 1991, reversing and remanding 895 F2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990). Edmonson holds that
a private litigant in a civil case may [not] use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on account of their race . . . [because] the race-based exclusion violates the equal protection rights of the challenged jurors.
Edmonson, 59 USLW at 4575.
As I interpret Edmonson, the United States Supreme Court has determined that the process of jury selection constitutes state action in that the objective of the selection process is determination of representation on a governmental body and “[t]he fact that the government delegates some portion of this power to private litigants does not change the governmental character of the power exercised.” Edmonson, 59 USLW at 4577. Accordingly, the restrictions placed upon the exercise of racially based peremptory jury strikes by the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause would appear to apply to all parties in both civil and criminal cases.5
Based upon the aforesaid interpretation of the holding in Edmonson, I feel compelled to apply that holding to the present case. 6 In so doing, I would find that the trial court erred in denying the state’s motion to have appellees prohibited from using their peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner and would reverse and remand the case to the trial court.
*480Robert H. Revell, Jr., Perry, Walters & Lippitt, Jesse W. Walters, for appellees.
Robert E. Wilson, District Attorney, Beauchamp & Associates, Kermit S. Dorough, Jr., The Garland Firm, Donald F. Samuel, Martin Brothers, John R. Martin, amici curiae.

 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia points out that the majority decision in Edmonson “logically must apply to criminal prosecutions.” Edmonson, 59 USLW at 4582.

 As it seemed apparent that there is no state action involved in an accused’s exercise of his or her peremptory strikes, my initial observation concerning this case was more in line with the majority opinion and with Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion in Edmonson, 59 USLW at 4579-4582. However, it now appears that a determination has been made that the rights of a defendant, whether a private litigant or an accused in a criminal trial, are subservient to the rights of prospective jurors who are not on trial and whose life, liberty, and property are not at stake.