Court Opinion

ID: 9497553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:53:48.054156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:15.586418
License: Public Domain

PAEZ, Circuit Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the majority’s decision to remand Lanza’s asylum claim, because it is impossible to discern whether the BIA’s final order dismissing Lanza’s appeal from the Immigration Judge’s decision was based on untimeliness, and therefore outside of our jurisdiction, or based on the merits of her claim and suitable for review. I agree, in this procedural context, that we should remand to the BIA to specify the *937basis for its decision so that we may deters mine whether we have jurisdiction over Lanza’s asylum claim.
I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority’s decision to reach the merits of Lanza’s withholding of removal and Convention Against Torture (CAT) claims. Because the asylum- and withholding claims are factually interrelated and,because, in my view, it is best to avoid piecemeal resolution of Lanza’s several claims, I would remand all of her claims to the BIA.
Our jurisdiction to determine whether we have jurisdiction in a particular case is well-established and provides a sufficient basis for our remand order. See, e.g., United States v. Ventre, 338 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir.2003). A determination of whether we have jurisdiction in this case simply requires further information as to the reason behind the BIA’s affirmance. See Gelman v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir.2002) (asserting jurisdiction for the limited purpose of remanding to the BIA to inform the court’s analysis of whether it had jurisdiction). Our decision to remand here is supported by our practice in other contexts to remand to the BIA for clarification or to address an issue in the, first instance. See, e.g., Li v. Ashcroft, 356 F.3d 1153, 1161 (9th Cir.2004) (en banc); Arrozal v. INS, 159 F.3d 429, 433 (9th Cir.1998); Mattis v. INS, 774 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir.1985).
Further, our decision is consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Zhu v. Ashcroft. 382 F.3d 521 (5th Cir.2004). There, the court, when confronted with the same jurisdictional question that we face here, remanded Zhu’s entire case to the BIA for clarification of the basis for its affirmance of the Immigration Judge’s denial of Zhu’s asylum claim. Id. at 527. See also Haoud v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 201, 205-06 (1st Cir.2003) (remanding the BIA’s streamlined decision when the basis for its decision was unclear). In brief, I would ground our decision to remand on our authority to determine whether we have jurisdiction over Lanza’s asylum claim. This approach, in my view, goes to the heart of the jurisdictional dilemma created by the BIA’s affirmance without opinion.
The majority compares our position in reviewing orders of the BIA to the Supreme, Court’s role in reviewing state court decisions on constitutional grounds. The adequate and independent state ground doctrine, however, is inappropriate to this context and is driven by different concerns, as the majority points out. I do not believe the majority’s extended analogy illuminates our decision here and I therefore decline to join it.
Finally, I dissent from the majority’s disposition of Lanza’s withholding of removal and CAT claims. We should avoid resolution of issues on the merits until the jurisdictional issue is resolved. The majority’s determination of Lanza’s withholding claim involves essentially the same analysis as would a decision on her asylum claim; they should therefore be determined concurrently. Although Lanza’s CAT claim employs a different analytical framework, it parallels her asylum and withholding claims and I would similarly decline to reach the merits of that claim until the BIA provides an explanation for its affirmance.
For the reasons above, I would grant the petition and remand to the BIA for clarification of the basis for its decision to affirm the Immigration Judge’s denial of Lanza’s asylum claim.