Court Opinion

ID: 9525864
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:08:59.39383+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:17:19.872770
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE CAMPBELL, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority. While I agree with the majority that this case is controlled by the law established in People v. Frey, 103 Ill. 2d 327, 469 N.E.2d 195, I would conclude that the present case is distinguishable from Frey, and that here, the trial court failed to adequately admonish defendant of his right to a jury trial. In Frey, the defendant was indicted on two counts of reckless homicide and one count of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUD. Frey pleaded not guilty to all charges and a jury trial was scheduled. However, numerous continuances delayed the trial for over one year. Seven months prior to trial, the trial judge entered an order stating that "the defendant’s attorney indicates the defendant will waive a jury trial in this case.” Subsequent continuance orders also indicated bench-trial status, and the record indicated that Frey was present on several occasions when a bench trial was discussed. Thereafter, the parties agreed to try the reckless homicide charges before the DUI charge and stipulated that most of the evidence presented in the first trial could be considered by the trial judge in the subsequent DUI trial. At the first trial, defense counsel announced that defendant was ready to proceed with his bench trial. Frey was acquitted. A bench trial on the DUI charge on the following day resulted in Frey’s conviction and sentence to one year’s probation. Frey, 103 Ill. 2d at 331. On appeal, this court ordered a new trial, finding that the record failed to support a finding that Frey either implicitly or explicitly waived a jury trial on the DUI charge. However, our supreme court reversed, finding that Frey and his counsel had understood seven months prior to trial that his case would be heard without a jury; that Frey was aware of his right to a jury trial and was present when the jury waiver was discussed; and that defense counsel’s willingness to stipulate to the use of evidence presented in the reckless homicide bench trial reflected defense counsel’s intent to try the case before the court. The court further noted that Frey was a "real estate syndicator and developer, and a man of intelligence, experience and considerable education,” and concluded that the jury waiver was made with Frey’s knowledge and consent. Frey, 103 Ill. 2d at 333. _ Here, the record includes a half sheet indicating that each defendant (i.e., "ea deft”) signed jury "waivers.” Nevertheless, at trial, the trial court announced that defendant had knowingly waived his right to a jury trial without giving defendant the opportunity to respond. This is significant, because the trial court then proceeded to specifically admonish codefendant of his right to a jury trial and the consequences of waiver, and to elicit a knowing waiver from codefendant. Meanwhile, the record shows that the defendant and defendant’s counsel remained completely silent. The majority correctly notes that a signed, written waiver alone is not sufficient to demonstrate an understanding jury waiver, and that it takes "but a few minutes of a trial judge’s time” to directly elicit a response from a defendant that he understands his right to a jury trial, and is willing to be tried without a jury. We have before us a record revealing disparate treatment of defendant and codefendant regarding their jury waivers. The record reveals that defendant wrote and signed a jury waiver, but fails to show defendant’s understanding of his waiver in open court. Thus, I believe that the majority has reached the wrong result in concluding that defendant was properly admonished. Although the majority indicates that this court found an understanding waiver under similar facts in People v. Jones, 93 Ill. App. 3d 475, 417 N.E.2d 647, I find Jones distinguishable. Jones preceded Frey and its determination that a waiver made by defense counsel is valid when made in defendant’s presence. Moreover, Jones did not involve a codefendant. In addition, I am not persuaded by the majority’s argument that defendant’s alleged level of "sophistication” alleviated the trial court’s obligation to admonish him in court. The defendant here is not a real estate developer with an advanced education. In addition, People v. Roberts, 263 Ill. App. 3d 348, 636 N.E.2d 86 (1994), is not distinguishable from the present case as indicated by the majority. The Roberts court found that where the record contained only a docket entry of a jury waiver, and no record of affirmative action by a defendant or by defense counsel in a defendant’s presence acknowledging waiver in open court, waiver was invalid. Roberts, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 351-52; see also People v. Evans, 243 Ill. App. 3d 72, 80, 611 N.E.2d 1263 (1993). For these reasons, I would find that defendant was inadequately admonished of his constitutional right to a jury trial and would remand this matter for a new trial.