Court Opinion

ID: 9893419
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-26 21:05:51.608677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:20.567549
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 221560-U
                                 Order filed: October 26, 2023

                                                                              FIRST DISTRICT
                                                                            FOURTH DIVISION

                              Nos. 1-22-1560 & 1-22-1561 (cons.)

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                    IN THE
                        APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                           FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,           )          Appeal from the
                                                )          Circuit Court of
       Plaintiff-Appellee,                      )          Cook County.
                                                )
 v.                                             )          No. 20 CR 10489
                                                )
 LEALLEN SMITH,                                 )          Honorable
                                                )          Joseph M. Claps,
       Defendant-Appellant.                     )          Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

       PRESIDING JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court.
       Justices Hoffman and Martin concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1     Held: We affirm the trial court’s judgment revoking defendant’s probation.

¶2     Defendant LeAllen Smith appeals from the trial court’s revocation of his probation, and its

imposition of an aggregate sentence of four years and three months imprisonment. On appeal,

defendant contends that the trial court deprived him of due process where its improper

admonishments to defendant’s sole witness caused her to change her testimony prejudicing the

outcome of the revocation of probation proceeding. We affirm.

¶3     In 2021, defendant, in a negotiated plea, pleaded guilty to burglarizing a vehicle belonging

to Jose Gomez and to felony resisting arrest in exchange for the State’s recommendation of

concurrent sentences of two years’ probation. The trial court accepted the plea and imposed the
Nos. 1-22-1560 & 1-22-1561 (cons.)

recommended sentence. As conditions of his probation, defendant was to report by phone to the

probation department monthly, refrain from possessing a firearm or any other dangerous weapons,

and avoid contact with Gomez.

¶4     In January 2022, the State filed a petition for violation of probation alleging that defendant

had failed to report to the probation department. At the bond hearing on the violation, a probation

officer, testified that defendant had failed to report by phone for four months, but he had been

using the wrong phone number. Since correcting the phone number, defendant had been in

compliance. However, the State was granted leave to file a supplemental petition for violation of

probation alleging that defendant had “committed aggravated assault with a firearm.”

¶5     Thereafter, on March 31, the court held a hearing on the supplemental petition. To begin,

the trial court, at the request of the State, took judicial notice of “the probation.” Additionally, the

State clarified that the supplemental petition arose out of a February 26, 2022 incident involving

Gomez. The State called Gomez as its sole witness and defendant called only Niesha Amerson.

¶6     Gomez testified that, on February 26, around 1:00 a.m., he received a phone call from

Amerson, his girlfriend. Amerson asked him to pick her up from her house, where she was having

an argument with defendant. Gomez picked up Amerson in his car, and as they were returning to

his house, Gomez saw defendant’s vehicle driving in the area. Gomez parked and defendant drove

closer. Gomez went to his house and tried to unlock the door. Defendant exited his car and

confronted Gomez about Amerson “using him just for babysitting the kids.” Gomez called 911.

Defendant returned to his vehicle, rolled down his window, pointed a gun at Gomez, and stated

“I’m going to kill y’all.” As a result, Gomez was placed in fear of receiving a battery. When the

police arrived, defendant was gone. On cross-examination, Gomez responded in the affirmative

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Nos. 1-22-1560 & 1-22-1561 (cons.)

that, on February 26, Amerson was in his car on the passenger’s side. Gomez further testified that

it was dark outside, but there was a light in front of his house.

¶7     Amerson, on direct examination, testified that Gomez has been a friend for several years.

She denied being in Gomez’s vehicle on February 26. On cross-examination by the State, Amerson

explained that she and defendant are “partners,” meaning they co-parent their child and are on

speaking terms. When asked whether, prior to being with Gomez on February 26, she had an

argument with defendant, she stated that it was a disagreement, not an argument. She denied calling

Gomez for a ride, being in Gomez’s car, and being near his house on that day. She denied providing

her information to a police officer at the scene. In response to the State asking whether she “[had]

a romantic relationship with [Gomez],” she stated “Not right now.” The trial court asked, “How

about on February 26th?” and she responded that they have not been in a romantic relationship

since 2021.

¶8     At this point in Amerson’s testimony, the following discussion occurred:

               “THE COURT: Stop right there for a second. Stop right there.

               Is there a public defender in the – in the courtroom?

               MS. COOPER [(ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY)]: Ms. Jones is here as well

       as Mr. Moore.

               THE COURT: Okay. Good. So here, before you finish testifying, would you like

       to speak to an attorney?

               THE WITNESS: Yeah. Should I?

               THE COURT: Because what I’m telling you is there are two things going on here,

       you have sworn an oath. If I find that you are perjuring yourself, perjury is a felony. I could

       also not rely on the State’s Attorney to bring perjury charges against you, I can find you in

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Nos. 1-22-1560 & 1-22-1561 (cons.)

       indirect criminal contempt for lying on the stand, which means that I could sentence you

       to custody of the sheriff for up to six months unless I decide I want to do more than that,

       in which case you would have the right to a trial by jury and then I could sentence you to

       anything. There is no maximum. So before you finish your testimony, would you like to

       speak to an attorney?

               THE WITNESS: I don’t understand nothing that you said.

               THE COURT: Before you finish your testimony, would you like to speak to an

       attorney?

               THE WITNESS: Sure.

               THE COURT: The choice is yours. I’m just telling you the possible outcomes.

               THE WITNESS: Okay.

               THE COURT: So would you like to?

               THE WITNESS: Yes.”

The court took a recess.

¶9     When the proceedings reconvened, the trial court asked Amerson if she had an opportunity

to talk to an attorney. She responded “Yes, I did.” The court asked if she needed more time to talk

to the attorney, to which she responded, no. The court inquired as to whether she wanted to

continue to testify and she responded, “Yes.”

¶ 10   The State then continued its cross-examination of Amerson. She testified that, on February

26, she had an argument with defendant and called Gomez. Thereafter she was with Gomez, in his

vehicle and about to go into his house when she observed defendant drive by Gomez’s house. She

did not make eye contact with defendant and did not hear or see the interaction between Gomez

and defendant because at that point, she was “almost already inside” of Gomez’s house. She further

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Nos. 1-22-1560 & 1-22-1561 (cons.)

testified that defendant did not make a threat and did not produce a gun. Amerson acknowledged,

however, that defendant and Gomez probably “crossed words.” She did not recall what time of

day this incident occurred. She did provide her driver’s license to the officers at the scene. Amerson

heard that defendant was incarcerated and called defendant’s attorney but not the police or the

State’s Attorney.

¶ 11   On redirect examination by defendant, Amerson testified that the police officers did not

ask her questions at the scene. She would not lie on defendant or Gomez’s behalf. In response to

defendant’s counsel asking “Are you telling the truth here today?”, she responded “Yes, I am.” On

recross-examination, Amerson testified that the truth was that “I was there.”

¶ 12   Thereafter, the court questioned Amerson:

               “THE COURT: Okay. Who came up with this idea that you weren’t there? Who

       told you to say that?

               THE WITNESS: Nobody told me to say that.

               THE COURT: You did that all on your own?

               THE WITNESS: To answer your question if I did it on my own, I was not sure

       what to say and I –

               THE COURT: You weren’t sure whether you should tell the truth under oath?

                                                     ***

               THE WITNESS: I’m instructed that I need to tell the truth, yes.”

¶ 13   At the close of evidence, the State argued that Gomez’s testimony was credible and that

Amerson had lied on the stand and her testimony was self-serving. Defendant argued that Amerson

was not impeached with respect to defendant not having a gun and not having made a threat.

¶ 14   The trial court in its oral ruling, stated:

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               “So as it applies to this woman’s testimony, in the best of worlds, she didn’t say

       there was a threat, she didn’t say there wasn’t a gun. She claims she didn’t hear what they

       were saying and didn’t see a gun. That’s apples and oranges. That’s if she was credible at

       all. She has zero credibility except for the part where she admits that, yeah, oh, yeah, I was

       there and I gave my identification to the police. That’s pretty much it.

               Clearly, the State has proven its – made its burden in this violation. There’s a

       finding of violation of probation. Probation is hereby revoked. Bond’s revoked both

       matters.”

¶ 15   On May 2, 2022, defendant filed a motion for a new hearing, arguing that the trial court

erred when it interrupted Amerson’s testimony and admonished her regarding perjury causing

Amerson to change her testimony. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced defendant to

two years and nine months for burglary, consecutive to 19 months for resisting arrest, for an

aggregate sentence of four years and three months. Defendant filed a motion to reduce his sentence,

which was denied on September 22, 2022.

¶ 16   On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court, in revoking his probation, deprived him of

due process where its admonishments were improper and caused Amerson, his sole witness, to

change her testimony, prejudicing the outcome of the proceeding.

¶ 17   As an initial matter, the State argues that defendant forfeited this issue by failing to

contemporaneously object to the trial court’s admonishments. Generally, to preserve an issue for

review, “[b]oth a trial objection and a written post-trial motion raising the issue are required for

alleged errors that could have been raised during trial.” (Emphasis omitted.) People v. Enoch, 122

Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988); see also People v. Turner, 233 Ill. App. 3d 449, 452 (1992) (extending the

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Nos. 1-22-1560 & 1-22-1561 (cons.)

holding of Enoch to probation hearings). Defendant acknowledges his failure to preserve the issue

but asserts that we may review this issue under several grounds.

¶ 18   First, defendant, citing People v. Sprinkle, 27 Ill. 2d 398 (1963), argues that forfeiture is

less rigidly applied when the conduct of the trial court is at issue. In Sprinkle, our Supreme Court

held that a less rigid application of the forfeiture rule “should prevail where the basis for the

objection is the conduct of the trial judge.” Id. at 401. Where a jury is not present, such as in a

bench trial, this rule should be applied

       “when counsel has been effectively prevented from objecting because it would have ‘fallen

       on deaf ears.’ [Citation.] But our supreme court has also called for applying this exception

       only in extraordinary circumstances, such as when a trial judge makes inappropriate

       remarks to a jury [citation] or relies on social commentary, rather than evidence, in

       sentencing a defendant to death [citation]. [Citation.] And [t]hat we have seldom applied

       Sprinkle to noncapital cases further underscores the importance of uniform application of

       the forfeiture rule except in the most compelling of situations.” [Citation.] (Internal

       quotation marks omitted.) People v. Evans, 2017 IL App (1st) 150091, ¶ 21.

¶ 19   Here, the trial court’s admonishments were made in a revocation of probation hearing, a

noncapital case and not in the presence of a jury. There is no indication that the court prevented

defendant’s counsel from asserting an objection to the admonishments or would have turned a deaf

ear to an objection. We find no compelling reason, under Sprinkle, to relax the forfeiture rule here.

¶ 20   Defendant next argues, citing Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 190, that because the issue raised is a

constitutional one, we should grant review under the constitutional issue exception. However, the

exception only covers “ ‘constitutional issues that were properly raised at trial’ [citation], and

where defendant’s only omission was ‘merely *** fail[ing] to raise it in a posttrial motion.’ ”

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Nos. 1-22-1560 & 1-22-1561 (cons.)

(Emphasis in original.) People v. Burnett, 2015 IL App (1st) 133610, ¶ 79 (quoting People v.

Cregan, 2014 IL 113600, ¶¶ 16-18). Because defendant failed to object to the admonishments at

the hearing, the constitutional issues exception is not available to defendant.

¶ 21   Finally, defendant argues that we should consider the issue as plain error. Under the plain

error doctrine, we may review errors that have not been preserved for review where those errors

affect substantial rights. See People v. Cox, 197 Ill. App. 3d 239, 242 (1990) (invoking the plain

error doctrine where defendant alleged a violation of his due process rights during a probation

hearing). The plain error doctrine allows us to remedy a “clear and obvious error” in two instances,

(1) where the evidence in the case is so closely balanced, the error alone threatened to tip the scales

of justice against defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error; or (2) where the error was

so serious, defendant was denied his substantial rights, thus denied a fair trial. People v.

Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007). The burden of persuasion lies with the defendant. Id. The

first step under either prong is determining whether an error occurred. People v. Eppinger, 2013

IL 114121, ¶ 19.

¶ 22   A defendant in a probation revocation proceeding is entitled to “minimum requirements”

of due process. People v. Hall, 198 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (2001) (defendant responding to a petition to

revoke probation is entitled to fewer rights than a defendant facing trial). These requirements are

satisfied if defendant is given notice of the alleged violations and has the opportunity to be heard,

to present evidence and confront witnesses, and to be represented by counsel. Cox, 197 Ill. App.

3d at 243. We review de novo whether a defendant’s due process rights have been violated. People

v. Tolliver, 2021 IL App (1st) 190129, ¶ 41 (citing Hall, 198 Ill. 2d at 177).

¶ 23   A trial court has discretion to admonish a witness about their right to counsel and the

consequences of lying under oath. See People v. King, 154 Ill. 2d 217 (1993) and Webb v. Texas,

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409 U.S. 95 (1972). If a trial court chooses to admonish the witness itself instead of appointing

counsel, “it must walk the fine line” between advising and threatening the witness. People v.

Morley, 255 Ill. App. 3d 589, 597 (1994). A trial court violates defendant’s right to present

witnesses in his or her own defense where its admonishments are improper and influence a defense

witness not to testify, which prejudices the outcome of the trial. King, 154 Ill. 2d at 224-25 (citing

Webb, 409 U.S. at 98).

¶ 24   Improper admonishments include those which are “unnecessarily strong” or “threatening”

and result in preventing the witness from making a free and voluntary choice of testifying. Id. A

defendant suffers greater harm if their sole witness is improperly prevented from testifying. King,

154 Ill. 2d at 225-26. A trial court’s admonishments are proper “if they are made outside the

presence of the jury [citation] they are neutral, and if the judge gives the witness additional time

to decide whether to testify as well as to consult with counsel [citation].” People v. Vaughn, 354

Ill. App. 3d 917, 926 (2004). Admonishments are also proper if they inform the witness of the

applicable law and are not intimidating or threatening. People v. Davis, 88 Ill. App. 3d 265, 270

(1980). The specific facts and circumstances of each case must be considered in making this

determination. King, 154 Ill. 2d at 225.

¶ 25   Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, we find that the trial court’s

admonishments were not improper. Amerson initially testified that, on February 26, she did not

call Gomez, did not ask him for a ride, was not present at his house and did not provide information

to the police at the scene. She denied they were in a romantic relationship at that time. Having

heard this testimony, the trial court, first determined that there was a public defender present in the

courtroom. The court then informed Amerson of the applicable law and possible outcomes of lying

under oath. The court gave her the choice to speak with an attorney prior to continuing her

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testimony. Amerson, after not understanding the comments from the trial court, accepted the

opportunity to speak with a lawyer and the court took a recess. When the hearing recommenced,

the court allowed the resumption of her testimony only after confirming that she had spoken to the

public defender, did not need additional time, and wished to continue to testify.

¶ 26   The circumstances here are distinguishable from those in the cases cited by defendant,

Webb and King. Instead, we find that the trial court’s admonishments were more similar to those

in Davis, as they were informative and not intimidating or threatening.

¶ 27   In Webb, 409 U.S. at 95, the trial court, on its own initiative, admonished the defense’s

sole witness, who was already in the penitentiary. Specifically, the trial court stated:

               “Now you have been called down as a witness in this case by the Defendant. It is

       the Court’s duty to admonish you that you don’t have to testify, that anything you say can

       and will be used against you. If you take the witness stand and lie under oath, the Court

       will personally see that your case goes to the grand jury and you will be indicted for perjury

       and the liklihood [sic] is that you would get convicted of perjury and that it would be

       stacked onto what you have already got, so that is the matter you have got to make up your

       mind on. If you get on the witness stand and lie, it is probably going to mean several years

       and at least more time that you are going to have to serve. It will also be held against you

       in the penitentiary when you’re up for parole and the Court wants you to thoroughly

       understand the chances you’re taking by getting on that witness stand under oath. You may

       tell the truth and if you do, that is all right, but if you lie you can get into real trouble. The

       court wants you to know that. You don’t owe anybody anything to testify and it must be

       done freely and voluntarily and with the thorough understanding that you know the hazard

       you are taking.” Id. at 95–96.

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¶ 28   After these admonishments, the witness refused to testify. The Supreme Court held that the

admonishments were threatening and “effectively drove [the] witness off the stand, and thus

deprived the petitioner of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 98.

¶ 29   In King, 154 Ill.2d at 217, the trial court admonished the codefendant prior to testifying at

defendant’s trial. The codefendant had pleaded guilty to the armed robbery at issue, but had not

yet been sentenced to the recommended eight years’ imprisonment. Id. The court stated:

       “I just wanted you to know that if you do testify and you testify in a manner that I believe

       is perjurious, which would be not the truth, I would, on my own motion, vacate the plea of

       guilty. You’d then be as if the plea had never taken place. And we’d probably have to have

       a trial in connection with that matter.

              However, if you testified in this matter and testify in what I believe is a truthful

       manner, I would not vacate that plea and I would allow you then to be sentenced to the 8

       years that we previously agreed upon.

                                                 ***

              “[Defense counsel] is going to call you as a witness on behalf of the-of the

       defendant. You have a right to testify if you wish to. You also have a right, because you

       still are in jeopardy, so to speak, some things can happen to you which could effect [sic]

       your freedom, et. cetera [sic], because you have not been convicted. You have a right to

       exercise your Fifty [sic] Amendment right and not testify for fear that what ever you might

       testify to could be used against you. I have to tell you that.

              And I also would like to know if you’re going to testify on behalf of [the defendant]

       or are you going to assert your right as your counsel has advised you to?” Id. at 222.

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Following these admonishments, the codefendant did not testify. Id. at 217. The court found that

the admonishments were improper as the trial court misstated the facts and forced the witness to

choose between not testifying and taking the chance that the judge would withdraw his offer of

eight years’ imprisonment. Id. at 225.

¶ 30   In Davis, 88 Ill.App.3d at 269 the trial court declared two State witnesses to be hostile, and

then warned them that if their answers were substantially different on a material point from prior

sworn testimony, they could be charged with perjury or contempt of court. The trial court further

explained:

               “[I am] not telling you what you have to testify to, but I am telling you right now if

       your answers differ substantially from this prior trial, the State's Attorney could bring a

       charge of purgery [sic]. * * *

               I do not mean to intimidate you, I mean to warn you of the consequences of what

       will happen if you do not answer the questions the same as the other trial because that, you

       see, would place two inconsistent statements under oath, do you understand what I mean?

               And this is a textbook definition of purgery [sic] that was explained to you. I am

       not even going to bring the charge, the State’s Attorney would make that decision and

       another judge hear it, but I am warning you for your own benefit as an individual who is

       testifying here that you could be subjected to a criminal prosecution if your answers differ

       substantially.” Id. at 269-70.

This court, distinguishing the admonishments in Webb, held that the trial court’s admonishments

“did not intimidate the witnesses but merely informed them of the applicable law.” Id. at 270.

¶ 31   Unlike the witnesses in both Webb and King, Amerson did not refuse to testify after the

admonishments and speaking with an attorney, but instead voluntarily retook the stand and

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continued with her testimony. Further, the admonishments here, as in Davis, were not threatening

or “unnecessarily strong.” Rather, the admonishments informed Amerson of the possible

consequences of not telling the truth after swearing an oath. The court also gave her the opportunity

to speak with an attorney, which she did. The court reiterated that it was her “choice” and it was

informing her of the “possible outcomes.”

¶ 32   Even if the trial court’s admonishments could be considered improper, we find no

reversible error where the record does not demonstrate that it was the trial court’s admonishments

that “influenced” or “intimidated” Amerson into changing her testimony. See People v. Blalock,

239 Ill. App. 3d 830, 836-37 (1993) (finding no reversible error where the trial court’s

“inappropriate” admonishments had little persuasive effect on the witness, but allowed additional

time to make an informed decision). As previously discussed, after Amerson indicated that she

had not understood the admonishments, the trial court provided her with an opportunity to speak

with an attorney. After a recess, Amerson resumed her testimony after confirming both that she

had spoken to an attorney and did not need any more time. The record demonstrates that Amerson

made a voluntary and informed decision to change her testimony and admit that she was at

Gomez’s house on February 26.

¶ 33   Therefore, no reversible error occurred, and we need not review defendant’s argument

under plain error. See People v. Bailey 409 Ill. App. 3d 574, 588 (2011).

¶ 34   For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the trial court’s decision revoking defendant’s

probation.

¶ 35   Affirmed.

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