Court Opinion

ID: 9370848
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-14 20:01:17.617078+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:24.156790
License: Public Domain

United States Tax Court

                          T.C. Memo. 2023-17

CATTAIL HOLDINGS, LLC, CATTAIL HOLDINGS INVESTMENTS,
             LLC, TAX MATTERS PARTNER,
                       Petitioner

                                   v.

            COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
                        Respondent

                              —————

Docket No. 27209-21.                           Filed February 14, 2023.

                              —————

Ronald A. Levitt, Gregory P. Rhodes, Michelle A. Levin, Sarah E. Green,
Sidney W. Jackson IV, and Logan C. Abernathy, for petitioner.

Annie Lee, Matthew A. Cappel, and Julie Ann Fields, for respondent.

                       MEMORANDUM OPINION

      LAUBER, Judge: This case involves a charitable contribution de-
duction claimed by Cattail Holdings, LLC (Cattail), for the donation of
a conservation easement. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS or re-
spondent) issued Cattail a notice of final partnership administrative ad-
justment (FPAA) for 2017 disallowing this deduction and determining
penalties. Petitioner timely petitioned this Court for readjustment of
partnership items.

      Currently before the Court is respondent’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment. Respondent contends that the IRS properly disal-
lowed the deduction because the deed of easement permits surface min-
ing, which would have as its corollary that the conservation purpose is

                           Served 02/14/23
                                           2

[*2] not “protected in perpetuity.” See § 170(h)(5)(A). 1 Separately, re-
spondent contends that the IRS complied with the requirements of sec-
tion 6751(b)(1) by securing timely supervisory approval of all penalties
at issue. We will deny the Motion on the section 170(h)(5)(A) question
but grant it with respect to section 6751(b)(1). 2

                                    Background

       The following facts are derived from the pleadings, the parties’
Motion papers, and the Exhibits and Declarations attached thereto.
They are stated solely for purposes of deciding respondent’s Motion and
not as findings of fact in this case. See Sundstrand Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), aff’d, 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994).

        Cattail is a Delaware limited liability company (LLC) organized
in August 2017. It is treated as a TEFRA partnership for Federal in-
come tax purposes, and petitioner Cattail Holdings Investments, LLC,
is its tax matters partner. 3 Cattail had its principal place of business in
Georgia when the Petition was timely filed. Absent stipulation to the
contrary, appeal of this case would lie to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit. See § 7482(b)(1)(E).

      In September 2016 Dolomite Holdings 251, LLC (Dolomite), ac-
quired a 723-acre tract of land in Chesterfield, Virginia. On November
28, 2017, Dolomite contributed roughly 207 acres of this tract (Property)
to Cattail in exchange for a 100% interest in Cattail. Dolomite subse-
quently sold interests in Cattail to investors.

     In December 2017 Cattail granted an open-space conservation
easement over the Property to the Foothills Land Conservancy

        1 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Internal Reve-

nue Code, Title 26 U.S.C. (Code), in effect at all relevant times, all regulation refer-
ences are to the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 26 (Treas. Reg.), in effect at all
relevant times, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Pro-
cedure.
       2  The FPAA also disallowed a $1,087,819 business expense deduction on the
ground that it was a “nondeductible syndication expense,” see § 709, and lacked sub-
stantiation, see § 162. That adjustment remains at issue. Respondent has also re-
served the right to advance additional theories to support disallowance of the charita-
ble contribution deduction.
       3 Before its repeal, TEFRA (the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of

1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, §§ 401–407, 96 Stat. 324, 648–71) governed the tax treatment
and audit procedures for many partnerships, including Cattail.
                                     3

[*3] (Foothills or grantee), a “qualified organization” for purposes of sec-
tion 170(h)(3). The deed of easement was recorded on December 21,
2017.

        The easement deed states that its interpretation is governed by
Virginia law and recites the parties’ intent that the land “be retained
forever in its undeveloped, natural, scenic, farm land, forested and/or
open land condition.” The deed generally prohibits commercial, indus-
trial, or residential development. But it reserves certain rights to Cat-
tail as grantor, including the rights to engage in forestry and recrea-
tional activities such as hiking, camping, hunting, fishing, and horse-
back riding. In connection with these recreational activities Cattail re-
served the right to build fences, bridges, and trails. Cattail also reserved
the right to construct barns, sheds, and facilities “for the generation of
renewable electrical power.”

       Paragraph 3 of the deed prohibits any activity on the Property
that would be “inconsistent with the Purpose of th[e] Easement, the Con-
servation Purposes or the Conservation Values herein protected.” Par-
agraph 4(s) similarly provides that Cattail “may not exercise any of its
rights reserved under this Easement in such a manner to adversely im-
pact the Conservation Purposes or Conversation Values of the Prop-
erty.” To ensure that Cattail’s exercise of a reserved right would not
impair any conservation purpose, paragraph 5 requires Cattail to seek
Foothills’ prior consent “[w]henever notice is required pursuant to Par-
agraph 3(d) or Paragraph 4” of the deed. If Foothills did not respond to
such a request within 30 days, Foothills would be deemed to have with-
held its consent and “such withholding shall be deemed to be reasona-
ble.”

      In addition to the deed’s general prohibition against any activity
“inconsistent with the Purpose of th[e] Easement,” paragraph 3 lists nu-
merous specific prohibitions. Of relevance here is paragraph 3(h), which
bars mining activities. It expressly prohibits:

      The exploration for, or development and extraction of, min-
      erals and hydrocarbons by any surface or subsurface min-
      ing method, by drilling, or by any other method, or trans-
      portation of the same via new pipelines or similar facilities,
      that would impair or interfere with the Conservation Pur-
      poses and Conservation Values of the Property in any ma-
      terial respect in the discretion of the Grantee.
                                    4

[*4] Paragraph 3 states that the prohibited uses are “subject to those
reserved rights set forth [in] Paragraph 4.” But paragraph 4 reserves to
Cattail no mining rights of any kind. Apart from paragraph 3(h), which
bars surface and subsurface mining, the deed contains no reference to
mineral exploration, development, or extraction.

       Cattail timely filed Form 1065, U.S. Return of Partnership In-
come, for its 2017 tax year. On that return it claimed a charitable con-
tribution deduction of $40,675,000 for its donation of the easement. In
support of this supposed value Cattail relied on an appraisal prepared
by Dale W. Hayter, Jr.

       The IRS selected Cattail’s 2017 return for examination and as-
signed the case to Revenue Agent (RA) Kendrick Veney. In connection
with the examination Kenneth Baker, an IRS senior appraiser, prepared
an “appraisal review report” that evaluated Mr. Hayter’s appraisal. Mr.
Baker’s report, which RA Veney received in October 2020, concluded
that the fair market value (FMV) of the donated easement was
$3,563,000. Mr. Baker indicated that the “[i]ntended use [of his report]
is for examination of a non-cash charitable contribution.” Nowhere in
his report does Mr. Baker recommend the assertion of any penalty
against Cattail, for valuation misstatement or otherwise.

      In April 2021, as the examination neared completion, RA Veney
recommended assertion against Cattail of the 40% penalty for gross val-
uation misstatement. See § 6662(h). In the alternative, he recom-
mended assertion of a 20% penalty for substantial valuation misstate-
ment, reportable transactions understatement, negligence, and/or sub-
stantial understatement of income tax. See §§ 6662(b)(1)–(3), (c)–(e),
6662A(b).

       RA Veney’s recommendations to this effect were set forth in a pen-
alty consideration lead sheet, a copy of which is attached to respondent’s
Motion. RA Veney’s team manager, Lee Volkmann, digitally signed the
penalty lead sheet on April 26, 2021. Mr. Volkmann verified that he was
the “immediate supervisor . . . of Kendrick Veney, who made the initial
determination to assert the penalties indicated on this form,” and that
Mr. Volkmann “approve[d] that initial determination.” RA Veney has
submitted a declaration under penalty of perjury averring that these
facts are true and accurate.

      On May 21, 2021, RA Veney mailed petitioner a packet of docu-
ments, including Form 5701, Notice of Proposed Adjustment, and Form
                                     5

[*5] 886–A, Explanation of Items, which set forth the proposed adjust-
ments and penalty determinations. Two months later, on July 23, 2021,
the IRS issued petitioner an FPAA, including a Form 886–A, disallowing
the charitable contribution deduction in full and determining penalties.
The FPAA alternatively determined that, if any deduction were allowa-
ble, Cattail had not established the value of the easement. Petitioner
timely petitioned this Court for readjustment of the partnership items.

                                Discussion

I.    Summary Judgment Standard

       The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite litigation and
avoid costly, unnecessary, and time-consuming trials. See FPL Grp.,
Inc. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 73, 74 (2001). We may grant
partial summary judgment regarding an issue as to which there is no
genuine dispute of material fact and a decision may be rendered as a
matter of law. See Rule 121(b); Sundstrand Corp., 98 T.C. at 520. In
deciding whether to grant partial summary judgment, we construe fac-
tual materials and inferences drawn from them in the light most favor-
able to the nonmoving party. Sundstrand Corp., 98 T.C. at 520. Where
the moving party properly makes and supports a motion for summary
judgment, “an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of such party’s pleading” but must set forth specific facts, by af-
fidavit or otherwise, showing that there is a genuine dispute for trial.
Rule 121(d).

II.   Analysis

      A.     “Protected in Perpetuity”

        The Code generally restricts a taxpayer’s charitable contribution
deduction for the donation of “an interest in property which consists of
less than the taxpayer’s entire interest in such property.” § 170(f)(3)(A).
But there is an exception for a “qualified conservation contribution.”
§ 170(f)(3)(B)(iii), (h)(1). For the donation of an easement to be a “qual-
ified conservation contribution,” the conservation purpose must be “pro-
tected in perpetuity.” § 170(h)(1)(C), (5)(A); see TOT Prop. Holdings,
LLC v. Commissioner, 1 F.4th 1354, 1362 (11th Cir. 2021); PBBM-Rose
Hill, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 900 F.3d 193, 201 (5th Cir. 2018).

       Section 170(h)(5)(B)(i) provides that the conservation purpose will
not be treated as protected in perpetuity if “there is a retention of a qual-
ified mineral interest [and] if at any time there may be extraction or
                                           6

[*6] removal of minerals by any surface mining method.” Respondent
contends that the easement deed “permits surface mining” in violation
of this provision. According to respondent, paragraph 3(h) of the deed
endows Cattail with a “contingent right to engage in surface mining,”
subject to Foothills’ approval. Paragraph 3(h) assertedly allows surface
mining unless, “in the discretion of the Grantee,” such activity “would
impair or interfere with the Conservation Purposes and Conservation
values of the Property in any material respect.”

       Respondent’s argument is unconvincing for at least three reasons.
First, section 170(h)(5)(B)(i) applies only “where there is a retention of a
qualified mineral interest.” Respondent can point to no provision of the
easement deed in which Cattail retains the right to exploit any “quali-
fied mineral interest.” See § 170(h)(6)(A). Paragraph 4 of the deed enu-
merates 18 “Reserved Rights” retained by Cattail. These include the
rights (among other things) to engage in the grazing of livestock, conduct
farming operations, cultivate fruit trees, engage in silviculture, con-
struct agricultural outbuildings and utilities, and create facilities for
generation of alternative energy.

       Paragraph 4 reserves to Cattail no right to engage in any mining-
related activity. Mining rights are mentioned in only one paragraph of
the deed, paragraph 3(h). That paragraph expressly prohibits “[t]he ex-
ploration for, or development and extraction of, minerals and hydrocar-
bons by any surface or subsurface mining method, by drilling, or by any
other method.” We do not see how a prohibition against mining can be
interpreted to endow Cattail, sub silentio, with a reserved right to en-
gage in mining. 4

       Second, respondent errs in interpreting paragraph 3(h) to allow
mining “in the discretion of [the] Grantee.” That phrase appears in the
second half of the paragraph, which is addressed, not to the development
or extraction of minerals, but to possible future “transportation of the
same via new pipelines or similar facilities.” Paragraph 3(h) says that
transportation of minerals is likewise prohibited if it would impair

        4 Nor does respondent allege that a party other than Cattail has retained a
qualified mineral interest, i.e., that “ownership of the surface estate and mineral in-
terests has been and remains separated.” § 170(h)(5)(B)(ii). Even if respondent made
that showing, the charitable contribution deduction would not be disallowed if “[t]he
probability of surface mining occurring on such property is so remote as to be negligi-
ble.” Id. That would present a question of fact to be decided “on a case by case basis,”
Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(4)(ii)(A) (flush text), and thus be inappropriate for summary
adjudication.
                                           7

[*7] conservation values “in any material respect in the discretion of
Grantee.”

       The final phrase, “in the discretion of Grantee,” modifies the im-
mediately preceding phrase, “in any material respect.” See Am. Gen.
Fin., Inc. v. Paschen (In re Paschen), 296 F.3d 1203, 1209 (11th Cir.
2002) (applying the rule of last antecedent in statutory construction).
The second half of paragraph 3(h) thus gives Foothills the discretion to
determine whether any impairment of conservation values caused by
transportation of minerals would be “material.” Far from permitting
development or extraction of minerals, this grant of discretionary au-
thority gives Foothills maximum power to prevent any transportation of
existing minerals that it views as problematic.

       Third, respondent’s notion that the deed permits surface mining
with Foothills’ approval strikes us as fanciful. Section 170(h)(5)(B) is
captioned, “No surface mining permitted.” It makes clear that allowing
surface mining would be wholly inconsistent with the easement’s con-
servation purpose. Paragraph 3 of the deed explicitly prohibits “[a]ny
activity or use of the Property inconsistent with the purpose of this Ease-
ment.” In assuming “a contingent right to engage in surface mining,”
respondent thus posits that Foothills might be faithless to its charitable
mission by permitting Cattail to engage in activity explicitly barred by
the statute. That is not a proposition that can plausibly be advanced in
a motion for summary judgment. 5

        B.      Penalty Approval

       Section 6751(b)(1) provides that “[n]o penalty under this title
shall be assessed unless the initial determination of such assessment is
personally approved (in writing) by the immediate supervisor of the in-
dividual making such determination.” In Kroner v. Commissioner, 48
F.4th 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2022), rev’g in part T.C. Memo. 2020-73, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that “the IRS satis-
fies [s]ection 6751(b) so long as a supervisor approves an initial

        5 In any event, if the deed were thought ambiguous as to whether Cattail re-

tained a contingent right to engage in surface mining, this ambiguity would need to be
resolved under principles of Virginia law, which might include parol evidence. See
Morgan Run Partners, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2022-61, 123 T.C.M. (CCH)
1324, 1326; Tuomala v. Regent Univ., 477 S.E.2d 501, 505 (Va. 1996) (“When the lan-
guage of a contract is ambiguous, parol evidence is admissible, not to contradict or vary
contract terms, but to establish the real contract between the parties . . . [and] to de-
termine the intention of the parties.”).
                                     8

[*8] determination of a penalty assessment before [the IRS] assesses
those penalties.” The court interpreted the phrase “initial determina-
tion of [the] assessment” to refer to the “ministerial” process by which
the IRS formally records the tax debt. See id. at 1278. Absent stipula-
tion to the contrary this case is appealable to the Eleventh Circuit, and
we thus follow its precedent. See Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742,
756–57 (1970), aff’d, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971).

       Under a literal application of the standard enunciated in Kroner,
supervisory approval could seemingly be secured at any moment before
actual assessment of the tax. But the Eleventh Circuit left open the
possibility that supervisory approval in some cases might need to be se-
cured sooner, i.e., before the supervisor “has lost the discretion to disap-
prove” the penalty determination. See Kroner v. Commissioner, 48 F.4th
at 1279 n.1; cf. Laidlaw’s Harley Davidson Sales, Inc. v. Commissioner,
29 F.4th 1066, 1074 (9th Cir. 2022) (treating supervisory approval as
timely if secured before the penalty is assessed or “before the relevant
supervisor loses discretion whether to approve the penalty assessment”),
rev’g and remanding 154 T.C. 68 (2020); Chai v. Commissioner, 851 F.3d
190, 220 (2d Cir. 2017) (concluding that supervisory approval must be
obtained at a time when “the supervisor has the discretion to give or
withhold it”), aff’g in part, rev’g in part T.C. Memo. 2015-42.

       All of the penalties at issue in this case were approved by Mr.
Volkmann on April 26, 2021. Respondent has supplied a copy of the
penalty consideration lead sheet, which Mr. Volkmann digitally signed
as RA Veney’s “immediate supervisor.” RA Veney has supplied a decla-
ration confirming that Mr. Volkmann supervised him during the Cattail
examination. We accordingly conclude that Mr. Volkmann was RA
Veney’s “immediate supervisor” within the meaning of section
6751(b)(1). See Sand Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 157 T.C. 136, 142 (2021)
(holding that the “immediate supervisor” is the person who supervises
the agent’s substantive work on an examination).

      The Notice of Proposed Adjustment was mailed to petitioner on
May 21, 2021, and the FPAA was issued on July 23, 2021. As of April
26, 2021, therefore, the IRS examination remained at a stage where Mr.
Volkmann had discretion to approve or disapprove the penalty determi-
nations. See Kroner v. Commissioner, 48 F.4th at 1279 n.1. Therefore,
under a reading of Kroner most favorable to petitioner, the IRS complied
with section 6751(b)(1) so long as Mr. Volkmann was the appropriate
person to supply such approval.
                                    9

[*9] Petitioner advances two arguments, the gist of which is that Mr.
Volkmann was not the right person to approve the penalties. First, with
respect to the reportable transaction understatement penalty imposed
by section 6662A(a) and (b), petitioner asserts that it was not RA Veney
but “higher-level officials within the IRS” who made the “initial deter-
mination of [the penalty] assessment.” See § 6751(b)(1). That is suppos-
edly so because, in 2017, the IRS issued a public notice advising that
participants in syndicated easement transactions risked certain penal-
ties. See I.R.S. Notice 2017-10, 2017-4 I.R.B. 544, 546. And the IRS
subsequently advised that, in examining easement transactions based
on inflated valuations, “[e]very available enforcement option will be con-
sidered, including civil penalties.” I.R.S. News Release IR-2019-182
(Nov. 12, 2019).

       On the basis of these public announcements, petitioner hypothe-
sizes that “[t]he decision to assert penalties in all transactions falling
under Notice 2017-10 was made by higher-level officials within the IRS
sometime in 2019.” From that premise petitioner concludes that, as of
April 26, 2021, RA Veney had no discretion whether to recommend as-
sertion of the section 6662A(a) penalty against Cattail and that Mr.
Volkmann had no discretion whether to approve it. Rather, in peti-
tioner’s view, approval needed to have been secured back in 2019 from
the “immediate supervisor” of the “higher-level IRS officials,” whoever
that person might be thought to have been.

      We are not persuaded. Notice 2017-10 informed the public that
taxpayers participating in certain transactions risked certain penalties.
And the 2019 news release informed the public that all available en-
forcement options, including civil penalties, “will be considered.” Nei-
ther pronouncement determined any penalties against any taxpayer
within the meaning of section 6751(b)(1).

       As we have held, the “initial determination of [a penalty] assess-
ment” is a formal action by the Examination Division directed to a par-
ticular taxpayer. See Belair Woods, LLC v. Commissioner, 154 T.C. 1,
15 (2020) (holding that an “initial determination” is embodied in the doc-
ument by which the IRS “formally notifies the taxpayer . . . [of its] une-
quivocal decision to assert penalties”); Frost v. Commissioner, 154 T.C.
23, 32 (2020) (ruling that supervisory approval must be secured “before
the first formal communication to the taxpayer of penalties”). Our in-
quiry thus turns on the timeliness of penalty approval vis-a-vis “the tax-
payer against whom the penalties are being asserted.” Excelsior Aggre-
gates, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2021-125, at *16.
                                   10

[*10] We have previously ruled that IRS announcements to the public
at large, including Notice 2017-10 and related news releases, cannot
constitute “the initial determination of [a penalty] assessment” because
such announcements are not directed to a specific taxpayer whose re-
turn is under IRS examination. See Pickens Decorative Stone, LLC v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2022-22, 123 T.C.M. (CCH) 1127, 1129–30
(citing Frost, 154 T.C. at 32). The “initial determination of [a penalty]
assessment” occurs when the IRS makes “an unequivocal decision to as-
sert penalties.” See Belair Woods, 154 T.C. at 15. The IRS could not
have made an unequivocal decision to assert penalties against Cattail
before reviewing its return to determine whether an “understatement”
existed. See Thompson v. Commissioner, 155 T.C. 87, 92 (2020). That
determination could not have been made “sometime in 2019” because
the IRS examination of Cattail’s return did not conclude until mid-2021.

      In the alternative petitioner suggests that, at least with respect
to the valuation misstatement penalties, it was Mr. Baker, not RA
Veney, who made the “initial determination of [the penalty] assess-
ment.” See § 6751(b)(1). Mr. Baker, an IRS senior appraiser, prepared
an “appraisal review report” that evaluated the appraisal submitted
with Cattail’s return. Mr. Baker’s report, which RA Veney received in
October 2020, concluded that the FMV of the donated easement was
$3,563,000.

       Petitioner asserts that respondent has produced “no evidence to
show that Agent Veney made an independent determination or was per-
mitted not to assert valuation penalties” following receipt of Mr. Baker’s
report. If Mr. Baker in fact made the “initial determination of [the pen-
alty] assessment,” see § 6751(b)(1), his supervisor, not RA Veney’s su-
pervisor, would supposedly have been the proper person to consider pen-
alty approval. Petitioner contends that uncertainty on this point creates
a genuine dispute of material fact, thus precluding summary judgment.

       Again we disagree. Nowhere in his report does Mr. Baker recom-
mend the assertion of any penalty against Cattail, for valuation mis-
statement or otherwise. His limited role was to review Cattail’s ap-
praisal and provide his evaluation of it to RA Veney for the latter’s use
in the “examination of a non-cash charitable contribution.” RA Veney
was free to disagree with any aspect of Mr. Baker’s report, including his
methodology, his comparable transactions, and his bottomline conclu-
sion.
                                    11

[*11] In-house IRS appraisers do not have the authority to “determine”
penalties; they simply offer an opinion as to value. During an IRS ex-
amination it is the duty of a revenue agent to determine penalties, tak-
ing into account (among other things) the value of the property contrib-
uted and possible defenses the taxpayer may have. The word “determi-
nation” has “an established meaning in the tax context and denotes a
communication with a high degree of concreteness and formality.”
Belair Woods, 154 T.C. at 15. An “initial determination” thus signifies
a “consequential moment” of IRS action. Ibid. (quoting Chai v. Commis-
sioner, 851 F.3d at 221). A preliminary recommendation offered by an
appraiser to a revenue agent is simply not a “determination” within the
meaning of section 6751(b)(1).

       Even if Mr. Volkmann is “the immediate supervisor” for section
6751(b)(1) purposes, petitioner urges that Mr. Volkmann in effect was
bound by Mr. Baker’s report and did not make an independent assess-
ment as to whether penalties should apply. But here petitioner misap-
prehends the statutory requirements: Section 6751(b) is captioned “Ap-
proval of Assessment,” not “Explanation of Assessment.” See Pickens
Decorative Stone, 123 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1130. As we have said before:
“The written supervisory approval requirement . . . requires just that:
written supervisory approval.” Ibid. (quoting Raifman v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2018-101, 116 T.C.M. (CCH) 13, 28). We have repeatedly
rejected any suggestion that a penalty approval form or other document
must “demonstrate the depth or comprehensiveness of the supervisor’s
review.” Belair Woods, 154 T.C. at 17. We do not second-guess the ex-
tent of the RA’s or the supervisor’s deliberations about whether penal-
ties should be imposed. We confine our search to seeking evidence of
written supervisory approval. See Raifman, 116 T.C.M. (CCH) at 27–
28.

       In this case it is undisputed that RA Veney prepared the penalty
consideration lead sheet, recommending assertion of all the penalties at
issue, and that Mr. Volkmann, his immediate supervisor, timely signed
this form on April 26, 2021. Petitioner has offered no evidence to con-
trovert these facts. See Rule 121(d) (providing that a party opposing
summary judgment may not rely on “mere allegations or denials” but
“must set forth specific facts,” including facts established “by affidavits
or declarations”); Frost, 154 T.C. at 35. There being no genuine dispute
of material fact on these points, we will grant respondent’s Motion with
respect to penalty approval.
                                  12

[*12] To reflect the foregoing,

      An order will be issued granting in part and denying in part re-
spondent’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.