Court Opinion

ID: 9400198
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-07 17:01:02.700054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:42.923715
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
          FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ILAI KANUTU KOONWAIYOU,                             No. 22-35233
          Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                                      D.C. No.
    v.                                             3:21-cv-05474-
                                                        DGE
ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Secretary of
State; UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,                                  OPINION
             Defendants-Appellees.

         Appeal from the United States District Court
           for the Western District of Washington
         David G. Estudillo, District Judge, Presiding

           Argued and Submitted December 6, 2022
                  San Francisco, California

                        Filed June 7, 2023

    Before: Jacqueline H. Nguyen and Lucy H. Koh, Circuit
        Judges, and Joseph F. Bataillon, District Judge*

                      Opinion by Judge Koh

*
 The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, United States District Judge for the
District of Nebraska, sitting by designation.
2                     KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN

                          SUMMARY**

                           Immigration

    The panel reversed the district court’s grant of the
Government’s motion to dismiss in a case in which Ilai
Kanutu Koonwaiyou sought a declaration that his mother’s
status as a non-citizen national—which she attained after
Koonwaiyou’s birth—qualified him to be a non-citizen
national of the United States, and remanded.
    In 1986, Congress amended the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”) to make individuals born to
only one non-citizen national parent outside the United
States and American Samoa eligible to become “nationals,
but not citizens, of the United States at birth.” 8 U.S.C. §
1408. Prior to 1986, such status extended only to (1) those
born in American Samoa, (2) those born outside the United
States or American Samoa with two non-citizen national
parents, and (3) those found in American Samoa under the
age of five whose parents are unknown.
     The panel explained that Congress has extended
citizenship to individuals born in every United States
territory, except American Samoa, meaning that those with
ties to American Samoa are the only group eligible for non-
citizen national status. The status of an American Samoan
is a hybrid: for example, as non-citizens, they are denied the
right to vote and run for federal or state office outside
American Samoa; but as nationals, they can serve in the

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                   KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN                     3

American military, receive most federal benefits, travel
freely in the United States, and cannot be removed as aliens.
    Koonwaiyou was born in 1967 in Western Samoa to a
Western Samoan father and an American Samoan
mother. His mother is now a non-citizen national, but she
only became eligible under the 1986 amendments and did
not attain her status until after Koonwaiyou was
born. Koonwaiyou sought a declaration that his mother’s
status qualifies him to be a non-citizen national. The district
court held that, under the 1986 amendments, Koonwaiyou’s
mother’s status as a national commenced only on the date it
was conferred and was not retroactive to her date of
birth. The court therefore found Koonwaiyou did not qualify
to be a non-citizen national.
    To answer the narrow question whether Koonwaiyou
qualifies for non-citizen national status, the panel wrote that
it must decide whether those individuals, like Koonwaiyou’s
mother, who qualify under but were born before the 1986
amendments are eligible for the same non-citizen national
status as those born on or after the amendments. The
Government’s position was that the 1986 amendments
should apply only prospectively, such that this non-citizen
national status could only be conferred on those born on or
after the amendments.
   The panel concluded that the text of the 1986
amendments makes clear that Congress intended for the
addition to apply retroactively and to bestow the same status
on those born before, on, or after the date of enactment:
“national[], but not citizen, of the United States at birth.” 8
U.S.C. § 1408. Under this interpretation, the uncodified
provision of the 1986 amendments—which provides that the
amendments “shall apply to persons born before, on, or after
4                  KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN

the date of the enactment” of the amendments—could be
easily harmonized with the text of § 1408, giving every word
in the amendments meaning. The uncodified section also
provided the necessary clear statement regarding
retroactivity.
    The panel observed that the uncodified section clarified
that those qualifying under but born before its enactment do
not automatically become non-citizen nationals; instead,
they attain status only after proving that they meet certain
requirements. However, the panel concluded that it went too
far to conclude, as the Government argued, that this
provision was a subtle attempt by Congress to bestow a
different status on individuals qualifying under but born
before the 1986 amendments. The panel explained that this
interpretation clashes with the text and structure of § 1408:
it would require reading the prefatory “at birth” language out
of § 1408 for one group of individuals.
    The panel further explained that its interpretation is
consistent with similar provisions in the INA, where
Congress specified whether persons achieve status “at birth”
or as of a particular date. The panel also wrote that its
interpretation was consistent with the purpose of the 1986
amendments, which the parties agreed was to expand the
class of American Samoans eligible to become non-citizen
nationals. Finally, the panel explained that the limited
legislative history supported the panel’s view that Congress
aimed to establish equal status for all American Samoans
who qualify for non-citizen national status under § 1408.
    Applying its interpretation, the panel concluded that
Koonwaiyou’s mother’s non-citizen national status extends
back to her birth and, as a result, that Koonwaiyou qualifies
for non-citizen national status too.
                  KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN                  5

                       COUNSEL

Aaron Korthuis (argued), Matt Adams, and Margot Adams,
Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, Seattle, Washington;
Tim Warden-Hertz, Northwest Immigrant Rights Project,
Tacoma, Washington; for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Lauren E. Fascett (argued), Senior Litigation Counsel;
Alexandra L. Yeatts, Legal Intern; Elianis Perez, Assistant
Director; William C. Peachey, Director, District Court
Section; Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Division; Office of Immigration
Litigation, United States Department of Justice;
Washington, D.C., for Defendants-Appellees.
6                  KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN

                         OPINION

KOH, Circuit Judge:

    In 1986, Congress amended the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”) to make individuals born to
only one non-citizen national parent outside the United
States and American Samoa eligible to become “nationals,
but not citizens, of the United States at birth.” 8 U.S.C. §
1408; see also Pub. L. No. 99-396, § 15, 100 Stat. 837, 842–
43 (1986). Congress made clear that this expanded
eligibility was open to those “born before, on, or after the
date” the amendments were enacted. § 15(b), 100 Stat. at
843. The question we must decide is whether those
qualifying under but born before the 1986 amendments
receive the same national status as those born on or after the
amendments’ enactment. The district court found that they
do not. We find that they do, and reverse.
                              I.
    “All citizens of the United States are also nationals.
However, some nationals are not citizens. Traditionally,
only persons born in territories of the United States were
non-citizen nationals.” Perdomo-Padilla v. Ashcroft, 333
F.3d 964, 967 (9th Cir. 2003). Today, Congress has
extended citizenship to individuals born in every territory,
except American Samoa. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1402
(defining eligibility for citizenship for those born in Puerto
Rico); id. § 1406 (same for those born or living in the U.S.
Virgin Islands); id. § 1407 (same for those born or living in
Guam). Those with ties to American Samoa are the only
group still eligible for non-citizen national status. See id.
§ 1408; see also Perdomo-Padilla, 333 F.3d at 967–68; Sean
Morrison, Foreign in a Domestic Sense: American Samoa
                       KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN                             7

and the Last U.S. Nationals, 41 Hastings Const. L.Q. 71, 84
(2013).
    For the American Samoans who qualify, the status of
non-citizen national is “hybrid.” Cabebe v. Acheson, 183
F.2d 795, 797 (9th Cir. 1950). As non-citizens, “American
Samoans are denied the right to vote, the right to run for
elective federal or state office outside American Samoa, and
the right to serve on federal and state juries.” Fitisemanu v.
United States, 1 F.4th 862, 865 (10th Cir. 2021). They are
also excluded from at least some federal jobs. See Morrison,
supra, at 85. But, as nationals, qualifying American
Samoans can serve in the American military, receive most
federal benefits, and travel freely in the United States. See
Fitisemanu, 1 F.4th at 865; Morrison, supra, at 84. They are
also eligible to use their time in American Samoa to satisfy
some residence and physical presence requirements for
naturalization, see 8 U.S.C. § 1436, and, even if they never
become citizens, they cannot be removed as aliens, see
Hughes v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 752, 756 (9th Cir. 2001).1
     Ilai Kanutu Koonwaiyou (“Koonwaiyou”) seeks non-
citizen national status. Koonwaiyou was born in 1967 in
Western Samoa to a Western Samoan father and an
American Samoan mother. His mother is now a non-citizen
national, but she only became eligible under the 1986
amendments and did not attain her status until years after
Koonwaiyou was born. After the State Department rejected

1
  In addition to the consequences for individuals, there are active debates
about whether non-citizen national status protects “the Samoan way of
life” by insulating communal landownership and other local practices
from constitutional scrutiny. Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 309–
10 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also Fitisemanu, 1 F.4th at 880–81. We are not
asked to address those debates here, and we express no views on them.
8                   KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN

his application for a certificate of non-citizen national status,
Koonwaiyou filed the instant suit, seeking a declaration that
his mother’s status qualifies him to be a non-citizen national.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (conferring jurisdiction for such
actions). The district court held that, under the 1986
amendments, Koonwaiyou’s “mother’s status as a national
of the United States commenced on the date it was conferred
and was not retroactive to her date of birth.” The court
therefore found Koonwaiyou did not qualify to be a non-
citizen national and granted the Government’s motion to
dismiss. Koonwaiyou timely appealed.
                               II.
    We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss
de novo. See Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892,
897 (9th Cir. 2011). The question before us is a narrow one:
whether Koonwaiyou qualifies for non-citizen national
status.   Specifically, we must decide whether those
individuals, like Koonwaiyou’s mother, who qualify under
but were born before the 1986 amendments are eligible for
the same non-citizen national status as those born on or after
the amendments’ date of enactment.
                               A.
   “As always, we begin with the text.” Sw. Airlines Co. v.
Saxon, 142 S. Ct. 1783, 1789 (2022). The 1986 amendments
modified 8 U.S.C. § 1408, the U.S. Code provision that
governs non-citizen national eligibility for those with ties to
American Samoa, which is known in the INA as the
                      KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN                          9

“outlying possessions of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(29).2 Section 1408 reads:

        [T]he following shall be nationals, but not
        citizens, of the United States at birth:
             (1) A person born in an outlying
             possession of the United States on or after
             the date of formal acquisition of such
             possession;
             (2) A person born outside the United
             States and its outlying possessions of
             parents both of whom are nationals, but
             not citizens, of the United States, and
             have had a residence in the United States,
             or one of its outlying possessions prior to
             the birth of such person;
             (3) A person of unknown parentage found
             in an outlying possession of the United
             States while under the age of five years,
             until shown, prior to his attaining the age
             of twenty-one years, not to have been
             born in such outlying possession; and
             (4) A person born outside the United
             States and its outlying possessions of
             parents one of whom is an alien, and the
             other a national, but not a citizen, of the

2
  In the INA, “[t]he term ‘outlying possessions of the United States’”
also includes Swains Island. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(29). Because Swains
Island is “a part of American Samoa” under federal law, we refer to the
“outlying possessions” as American Samoa throughout. 48 U.S.C. §
1662.
10                 KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN

           United States who, prior to the birth of
           such person, was physically present in the
           United States or its outlying possessions
           for a period or periods totaling not less
           than seven years in any continuous period
           of ten years—
              (A) during which the national parent
              was not outside the United States or
              its outlying possessions for a
              continuous period of more than one
              year, and
              (B) at least five years of which were
              after attaining the age of fourteen
              years.
       The proviso of section 1401(g) of this title
       shall apply to the national parent under this
       paragraph in the same manner as it applies to
       the citizen parent under that section.

8 U.S.C. § 1408.
    Stripped of conditions not relevant here, the text of §
1408 is straightforward. The first three subsections extend
non-citizen national status to (1) individuals born in
American Samoa, (2) those born outside the United States or
American Samoa to two non-citizen national parents, and (3)
those found in American Samoa before the age of five whose
parents are unknown. See 8 U.S.C. § 1408(1)–(3). All three
of these subsections originated in the Nationality Act of
1940, were carried over in modified form to the INA, and
have remained largely unchanged since.            Compare
Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, § 204, 54 Stat.
1137, 1139, and Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
                    KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN                    11

Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 308, 66 Stat. 163, 238, with 8 U.S.C.
§ 1408(1)–(3). The fourth subsection, added by the 1986
amendments, expanded eligibility to those persons born
outside the United States or American Samoa to only one
non-citizen national parent. See 8 U.S.C. § 1408(4); Pub. L.
No. 99-396, § 15(a), 100 Stat. 837, 842–43 (1986).
    The structure of § 1408 strongly suggests that individuals
who qualify under any of the four subsections attain the same
status. Section 1408 states that “the following shall be
nationals, but not citizens, of the United States at birth” and
then lists the four subsections without differentiation. To
bestow a prospective status only on those qualifying under
the fourth subsection but born before its enactment, as the
Government argues, we would have to read the phrase “at
birth” out of § 1408 for this subgroup of individuals. Doing
so would violate the well-established canon against
surplusage, which “requires a court, if possible, to give effect
to each word and clause in a statute.” United States v. Lopez,
998 F.3d 431, 440 (9th Cir. 2021). Thus, even though the
fourth subsection was added much later, nothing in § 1408
indicates that any of those who qualify under it attain a
different status. Instead, the structure of § 1408 indicates
that all become “nationals, but not citizens, of the United
States at birth.” 8 U.S.C. § 1408.
    This interpretation is consistent with an uncodified
section of the 1986 amendments. That section reads:

        (b) The amendment [that adds § 1408(4)]
        shall apply to persons born before, on, or after
        the date of the enactment of this Act. In the
        case of a person born before the date of the
        enactment of this Act —
12                 KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN

           (1) the status of a national of the United
           States shall not be considered to be
           conferred upon the person until the date
           the person establishes to the satisfaction
           of the Secretary of State that the person
           meets the requirements of [§1408(4)] of
           the Immigration and Nationality Act, and
           (2) the person shall not be eligible to vote
           in any general election in American
           Samoa earlier than January 1, 1987.

§ 15(b), 100 Stat. at 843. Though not included in the U.S.
Code, this uncodified section is binding law. See U.S. Nat’l
Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439,
448 (1993) (emphasizing that provisions in the Statute at
Large retain the force of law even if they are omitted from
the U.S. Code); see also Stephan v. United States, 319 U.S.
423, 426 (1943) (holding that “the Code cannot prevail over
the Statutes at Large when the two are inconsistent”). As
such, when interpreting the statutory text “as a whole,” we
must consider it. King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215,
221 (1991).
    The uncodified section confirms our interpretation.
First, the uncodified section makes clear that § 1408(4)
applies retroactively. A law is retroactive if “the new
provision attaches new legal consequences to events
completed before its enactment.” Landgraf v. USI Film
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994). Because applying a law
retroactively raises serious concerns about notice, fairness,
and equality, we normally employ a strong presumption
against it. See Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30,
37–38 (2006). But the presumption against retroactivity
only applies if Congress has not “expressly prescribed the
                    KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN                     13

statute’s proper reach.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280. In other
words, where Congress is clear that a new law applies to
actions that took place before its enactment, our judicial
presumption yields to statutory text. See Valiente v. Swift
Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, 54 F.4th 581, 585 (9th Cir. 2022).
      In the uncodified section of the 1986 amendments,
Congress provided the necessary clear statement. The
uncodified section clearly states that “persons born before,
on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act” qualify for
national status under § 1408(4). § 15(b), 100 Stat. at 843.
This language distinguishes the 1986 amendments from
similar statutes that clearly specify Congress’s intent to limit
retroactivity to a particular class of individuals, see Wolf v.
Brownell, 253 F.2d 141, 142 (9th Cir. 1957) (holding that a
law granting citizenship “at birth” was not retroactive to all
individuals when Congress specifically limited its
retroactivity to children born between specified dates to a
specific class of qualifying parents), or contain no clear
statement about their retroactive reach, see Friend v. Holder,
714 F.3d 1349, 1351–52 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that a law
granting citizenship “as of the date of birth” was not
retroactive because it provided no indication that it applied
to those born before its enactment). The Government’s
claim that the presumption against retroactivity still applies
if the 1986 amendments are read to stretch non-citizen
national status back to “birth” for those born before its
enactment is unpersuasive. It conflates an interpretative
question, “the point at which one’s . . . status, if successfully
established, takes effect,” with the retroactivity question,
“whether the statute applies to individuals born before the
. . . Act’s effective date.” Friend, 714 F.3d at 1352. Only
the latter is subject to the presumption against retroactivity,
14                     KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN

which the clear statement in the uncodified section of the
1986 amendments easily overcomes.3
    Second, the uncodified section of the 1986 amendments
clarifies that those qualifying under but born before its
enactment do not automatically become non-citizen
nationals. Instead, they are “considered to be” non-citizen
nationals only after they prove to the Secretary of State that
they were in fact born to a non-citizen national parent who
met the physical presence requirements listed in § 1408(4).
§ 15(b)(1), 100 Stat. at 843. Moreover, the uncodified
section is clear that no matter how quickly people born
before the 1986 amendments applied for national status, they
could not obtain one of the benefits of national status—the
right to vote in elections in American Samoa—until
approximately four months after the 1986 amendments
became law. See § 15(b)(2), 100 Stat. at 843 (indicating that
people born before the amendments were enacted “shall not
be eligible to vote in any general election in American
Samoa earlier than January 1, 1987”). As the Government
emphasizes, no other group who qualifies for non-citizen

3
   It is notable that, despite relying on the presumption against
retroactivity, the Government is silent on the second step of the well-
established retroactivity test. See Valiente, 54 F.4th at 585 (summarizing
“two-step test”). Under that step, if Congress has not provided a clear
statement about a statute’s reach, we must decide if “the . . . statute
‘would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party’s
liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to
transactions already completed’” when applied retroactively. Tyson v.
Holder, 670 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Landgraf, 511
U.S. at 280). These considerations actually support our interpretation:
the 1986 amendments when applied retroactively enhance rights, do not
increase liability for past conduct, and impose new duties only on those
who choose to become non-citizen nationals.
                    KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN                     15

national status under § 1408 is subject to this kind of
certification regime or conferral delay.
    But it goes too far to conclude, as the Government
argues, that this portion of the amendments was a subtle
attempt by Congress to bestow a different status on
individuals qualifying under but born before the 1986
amendments’ enactment. That interpretation clashes with
the text and structure of § 1408: as already described, it
would require us to read the prefatory “at birth” language out
of § 1408 for one group of individuals. To be sure, “[t]he
canon against surplusage is not an absolute rule,” and such a
reading might be required if there were no other way to
reasonably parse the statute’s text. Marx v. Gen. Revenue
Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 385 (2013). Here, though, the codified
and uncodified portions of the 1986 amendments can easily
be harmonized. Congress created a scheme where all those
eligible under § 1408(4) receive the same status, but those
born before the amendments’ enactment are required to
prove their eligibility before their status is “considered to be
conferred upon” them. § 15(b)(1), 100 Stat. at 843. In other
words, the 1986 amendments can be read to give every word
meaning if we understand the uncodified provisions as
establishing a procedure for those born before the enactment
of the 1986 amendments to attain the same status of
“national[], but not citizen[], of the United States at birth” as
everyone else who qualifies under § 1408.
16                    KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN

                                  B.
     This interpretation of the 1986 amendments is confirmed
by looking to other indicia of meaning.4 We start with
similar sections in the INA. See Cheneau v. Garland, 997
F.3d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (“As part of our
statutory analysis, ‘[w]e also look to similar provisions
within the statute as a whole and the language of related or
similar statutes to aid in interpretation.’” (quoting United
States v. LKAV, 712 F.3d 436, 440 (9th Cir. 2013))). Time
and again in analogous provisions, Congress specified
whether persons achieve their status “at birth” or as of a
particular date. Section 1401, for example, lists eight
categories of persons, all of whom “shall be nationals and
citizens of the United States at birth.” 8 U.S.C. § 1401
(emphasis added). Section 1402, in contrast, makes clear
that individuals born in Puerto Rico on or after April 11,
1899 but before January 13, 1941 cannot become “citizens
of the United States at birth,” but only “citizens of the United
States as of January 13, 1941.” Id. § 1402. Indeed, in its
treatment of individuals born in the past or current territories
of Puerto Rico, id., Alaska, id. § 1404, Hawaii, id. § 1405,

4
  The Government claims that the State Department’s Foreign Affairs
Manual corroborates its prospective-only interpretation. See 8 U.S.
Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual § 308.9-5(e). We have
previously held that the Foreign Affairs Manual is not entitled to
deference. See Scales v. I.N.S., 232 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 2000)
(citing Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)).
Consistent with our prior finding, there is no indication that the State
Department arrived at its interpretation of § 1408 after engaging in any
of the careful processes associated with the traditional modes of
administrative law. See id. We cannot even rely on the Manual for its
persuasive value: it offers only “conclusory statements . . . with no
analysis,” providing no reasoning to support its reading of § 1408.
NLRB. v. SW Gen., Inc., 580 U.S. 288, 308 (2017).
                    KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN                    17

and the Virgin Islands, id. § 1406, Congress carefully
shifted—often in the same section—between providing
citizenship “at birth” and as of a particular date.
     It is significant, then, that § 1408 includes no equivalent
temporal toggle. “[W]here Congress includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another . .
. it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally
and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Nken
v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 430 (2009) (quoting INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987)). Here, the
surrounding code provisions make clear that Congress knew
how to include the prospective-only language that the
Government would have us read into the 1986 amendments.
It also confirms that Congress chose, instead, to make non-
citizen national status uniformly begin “at birth” in § 1408.
     Next, we turn to the purpose of the 1986 amendments.
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344
(2011) (relying on purpose “readily apparent from [statute’s]
text”). The parties agree that Congress enacted the 1986
amendments to expand the class of American Samoans
eligible to become non-citizen nationals to include those
born outside the United States to only one non-citizen
national parent. By making this statute retroactive, Congress
indicated a further intent to eliminate, once and for all, the
gap in eligibility for people born abroad to a single non-
citizen national parent. See § 15(b), 100 Stat. at 843; see
also Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 267–68 (describing one
“legitimate purpose[]” of retroactive legislation as “giv[ing]
comprehensive effect to a new law Congress considers
salutary”).
   The Government’s preferred interpretation, though,
would have the amendments perpetuate the very problem the
18                 KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN

statute was designed to solve. It would deny non-citizen
national status to individuals, like Koonwaiyou, born abroad
to a person recognized under law as a national, thereby
continuing to block access to non-citizen national status to a
subgroup of individuals Congress enacted the 1986
amendments to help. We find it implausible, to say the least,
that Congress hid a second-class non-citizen national status
within a statute explicitly expanding eligibility for American
Samoans to become non-citizen nationals.
    More than that, the Government’s interpretation would
split the status of families like Koonwaiyou’s in two:
children born before a parent claimed non-citizen national
status would never be eligible, while those born after would
qualify and could pass their status to their children. Absent
any apparent reason for such a division within the same
family, that consequence would contravene not just
congressional purpose, but also common sense. See
Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 179 (2014)
(emphasizing that “‘structure, history, and purpose’ . . . not
to mention common sense” all play a role in statutory
interpretation (quoting Maracich v. Spears, 570 U.S. 48, 76
(2013))).
    Finally, we consider the legislative history. Where, as
here, a statute’s text makes us sure of its meaning, we need
not look to legislative history to confirm our reading. See
Hughes, 255 F.3d at 759–60. We note, though, that nothing
in the legislative history supports the Government’s
prospective-only interpretation.       For example, when
members of Congress discussed the uncodified section of the
1986 amendments, they did not treat it as a temporal limit on
non-citizen national status. Instead, supporters treated this
section as a procedural hurdle, repeatedly urging the
Secretary of State to be sensitive to the record-gathering
                    KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN                      19

difficulties of those born before 1986. See, e.g., 132 Cong.
Rec. H18619 (Aug. 1, 1986) (statement of Rep. Udall)
(“Many of the individuals who would qualify for U.S.
nationality under this provision are older and desirable
records may not exist to substantiate the residency of their
parents. In these cases, officials of the Department of State
should . . . use liberal discretion . . . to qualify every
individual who can reasonably be presumed to be eligible.”);
id. at H18624 (statement of Mr. Sunia, non-voting
representative from American Samoa) (describing need for
“the Secretary of State to understand the circumstances of an
applicant who will have to supply proof of his or her parent’s
. . . residence so many decades ago”). Indeed, if anything,
the limited legislative history supports our view that
Congress aimed to establish equal status for all American
Samoans who qualify for non-citizen national status under §
1408. See id. at H18619 (statement of Rep. Udall) (“This
provision would enable these residents of American Samoa
to take their place with other members of their
community.”).
                               III.
    At bottom, the Government’s strained statutory
construction and nullification of key words in the statute
result in the creation of second-class non-citizen national
status for those qualifying under but born before the
amendments and differential treatment of their children
based on whether the children were born before or after their
parent obtained the non-citizen national status. All this in a
statute that was explicitly intended to retroactively expand,
rather than restrict, eligibility for non-citizen national status.
    We reject the Government’s interpretation in favor of the
plain meaning of the 1986 amendments. The text of the
20                 KOONWAIYOU V. BLINKEN

amendments makes clear that Congress intended for it to
apply retroactively and to bestow the same status on those
born before, on, or after the date of enactment: “national[],
but not citizen, of the United States at birth.” 8 U.S.C. §
1408. Under our interpretation, the uncodified procedural
provision of the 1986 amendments can be easily harmonized
with the long-standing text of § 1408, giving every word in
the 1986 amendments meaning. Our interpretation is also
consistent with similar provisions in the INA, with the
statute’s purpose, and with the available legislative history.
Our interpretation leads us to conclude that Koonwaiyou’s
mother’s non-citizen national status extends back to her birth
and, as a result, that he qualifies for non-citizen national
status too.
   The judgment of the district court is reversed, and we
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
     REVERSED.