Court Opinion

ID: 9425771
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:15:47.585536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:57.420731
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Douglas,
with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall concur,
dissenting.
I would affirm the judgment below because I am in agreement with the opinion of Chief Judge Haynsworth for a unanimous panel in the Court of Appeals. 483 F. 2d 650.
In Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353, we considered the necessity for appointed counsel on the first appeal as of right, the only issue before us. We did not deal with the appointment of counsel for later levels of discretionary review, either to the higher state courts or to this Court, but we noted that "there can be no equal justice where the kind of an appeal a man enjoys 'depends on the amount of money he has.’ ” Id., at 355.
Chief Judge Haynsworth could find “no logical basis for differentiation between appeals of right and permissive review procedures in the context of the Constitution and the right to counsel.” 483 F. 2d, at 653. More familiar with the functioning of the North Carolina criminal justice system than are we, he concluded that “in the context of constitutional questions arising in criminal prosecutions, permissive review in the state’s highest court may be predictably the most meaningful review the conviction will receive.” Ibid. The North Carolina Court of Appeals, for example, will be constrained in diverging from an earlier opinion of the State Supreme Court, even if *620subsequent developments have rendered the earlier Supreme Court decision suspect. “[T]he state's highest court remains the ultimate arbiter of the rights of its citizens.” Ibid.
Chief Judge Haynsworth also correctly observed that the indigent defendant proceeding without counsel is at a substantial disadvantage relative to wealthy defendants represented by counsel when he is forced to fend for himself in seeking discretionary review from the State Supreme Court or from this Court. It may well not be enough to allege error in the courts below in layman's terms; a more sophisticated approach may be demanded: *
“An indigent defendant is as much in need of the *621assistance of a lawyer in preparing and filing a petition for certiorari as he is in the handling of an appeal as of right. In many appeals, an articulate defendant could file an effective brief by telling his story in simple language without legalisms, but the technical requirements for applications for writs of certiorari are hazards which one untrained in the law could hardly be expected to negotiate.
“ ‘Certiorari proceedings constitute a highly specialized aspect of appellate work. The factors which [a court] deems important in connection with deciding whether to grant certiorari are certainly not within the normal knowledge of an indigent appellant. Boskey, The Right to Counsel in Appellate Proceedings, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 783, 797 (1961) (footnote omitted).’ ” 483 F. 2d, at 653.
Furthermore, the lawyer who handled the first appeal in a case would be familiar with the facts and legal issues involved in the case. It would be a relatively easy matter for the attorney to apply his expertise in filing a petition for discretionary review to a higher court, or to advise his client that such a petition would have no chance of succeeding.
Douglas v. California was grounded on concepts of fairness and equality. The right to seek discretionary review is a substantial one, and one where a lawyer can be of significant assistance to an indigent defendant. It was correctly perceived below that the “same concepts of fairness and equality, which require counsel in a first appeal of right, require counsel in other and subsequent discretionary appeals.” Id., at 655.

An indigent defendant proceeding without the assistance of counsel would be attempting to satisfy one of three statutory standards for review when seeking certiorari from the North Carolina Supreme Court:
“(1) The subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest, or
“(2) The cause involves legal principles of major significance to the jurisprudence of the State, or
“(3) The decision of the Court of Appeals appears likely to be in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court.” N. C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-31 (c) (1969).
It seems likely that only the third would have been explored in a brief on the merits before the Court of Appeals, and the indigent defendant would draw little assistance from that brief in attempting to satisfy either of the first two standards.
Rule 19 of this Court provides some guidelines for the exercise of our certiorari jurisdiction, including decisions by a state court on federal questions not previously decided by this Court; but it may not be enough simply to assert that there was error in the decision of the court below. Cf. Magnum Import Co. v. Coty, 262 U. S. 159, 163. Moreover, this Court is greatly aided by briefs prepared with accuracy, brevity, and clarity in its determination of whether certi-orari should be granted. See Furness, Withy & Co. v. Yang-Tsze Insurance Assn., 242 U. S. 430, 434.