Court Opinion

ID: 9943986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 15:43:13.955956+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:54:48.083827
License: Public Domain

Our attention is directed to a misstatement of fact in the foregoing opinion. The defendant Louella Grunke, instead of proceeding in a northeasterly direction on Seventh avenue and then across the intersection to turn north on Margaret street, did approach and enter the intersection while she was traveling north on Margaret street. This factual correction does not necessitate or justify any other revision of the opinion, sinceCatherine's view through the rear window and windshield of theStene car, down Margaret street or Seventh avenue, wasvirtually the same. She testified that she saw no cars approaching on either street.
Plaintiffs strenuously contend that Catherine was not violating the provisions of either § 169.18, subd. 1, or § 169.221, subd. 4(a), when she attempted to ride her bicycle from one side of Margaret street to the other. It is contended that, if Catherine is to be held to be in violation of the state highway act for this movement, then *Page 197 
every person who drives across a street from one alley to the next, or any farmer crossing from his barn to his field across a public highway, or any person coming out of a private driveway who crosses one traffic lane to drive into the other is violating the statute. Plaintiffs cite the following cases to show that such is not the law within this state: Lyford v. Jacob Schmidt Brg. Co. 110 Minn. 158, 124 N.W. 831, and O'Rourke v. Duluth St. Ry. Co. 157 Minn. 187, 195 N.W. 896. These decisions are undoubtedly correct. In the instant case, we have a different situation. The law must be applied to Catherine's entire traffic movement. She approached the intersection while proceeding south on Margaret street. Her destination was a store located to her left on Seventh avenue, which runs northeasterly from the intersection. In making this traffic movement with her bicycle, it was necessary for her, in order to comply with the statute, to propel her bicycle (or for that matter any vehicle that she might have occupied) in a southerly direction on the west side of Margaret street until she reached the intersection, and then after stopping and signaling for a left turn, she should have entered the intersection and turned to her left on Seventh avenue until she came opposite the store to which she was going. Her violation was the same as if she had occupied an automobile and had attempted to cross Margaret street at right angles as part of a traffic movement from Margaret street to the store on Seventh avenue. Traffic regulations are to be applied to a traffic movement in its entirety, and not merely to certain isolated fragments thereof without regard to its general direction, purpose, or destination. If Catherine had wished to avoid coverage by the highway act, she should have dismounted and pushed her bicycle across Margaret street.
Defendants assert that this decision revolutionizes the concept of statutory violation. Apparently this fear stems basically from a misconception of the scope and effect of the words "prima facie." A violation of the road laws results only in a prima facie case of negligence. This court has succinctly stated the force of such a *Page 198 
violation in Wojtowicz v. Belden, 211 Minn. 461, 463,1 N.W.2d 409, 410, where we said:
"True, his conduct, although violation of law, was not negligence per se. But it was prima facie evidence of negligence. So the verdict for defendant was properly directed,in the absence of evidence reasonably tending to show that theconduct of decedent was not negligent." (Italics supplied.)
This principle was reaffirmed in Olson v. D. M. I. R. Ry. Co.213 Minn. 106, 5 N.W.2d 492. In both cases the court found an absence of such evidence. In the present case, we do not find an absence of evidence to negative a prima facie case of contributory negligence.
The applications for reargument are denied.