Court Opinion

ID: 9555098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-10 20:08:31.164849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:14.897146
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/10/23
                       CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

       IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                DIVISION TWO

 In re the Marriage of JENNIE
 HEARN and ROCKFORD HEARN.

 JENNIE (HEARN) HOOKER,
         Respondent,
                                              A162932
 v.
 ROCKFORD HEARN,                              (Marin County
                                              Super. Ct. No. FL1601048)
         Appellant.

       Rockford Hearn appeals from an order awarding his former wife
$25,000 in need-based attorney fees under Family Code section 2030. He
argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for an evidentiary
hearing and in awarding fees without considering the factors specified in the
applicable statutes. He also argues that there is no evidence that he can
comply with the court’s order. We shall affirm.
                FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       On January 7, 2021, Jennie Hooker (Jennie) filed a request for an order
that Rockford Hearn (Rocky) pay a portion of the attorney fees she was
incurring in response to Rocky’s appeals from orders in the underlying
marital dissolution case.1 At that time, two appeals were pending before this

       1 In referring to the parties by their first names, we follow the

convention adopted by the parties in their briefs.

                                         1
court: Rocky’s appeal from the judgment of dissolution (In re Marriage of
Hearn (Aug. 30, 2021, A152323) [nonpub. opn.] (Hearn I)), and his appeal
from a postjudgment order that the trial court made to enforce previous
orders requiring him to pay $15,000 toward Jennie’s attorney fees and divide
his 401(k) plan in half with her, with which Rocky had not complied. (In re
Marriage of Hearn (Aug. 30, 2021, A155957) [nonpub. opn.] (Hearn II).)
A.    Request for Order, Opposition, Reply and Supplemental Opposition
      In her January 2021 request for order, Jennie sought $45,000: $35,000
to pay her appellate attorney for his work in Hearn I, and $10,000 to pay her
trial counsel for work trial counsel had done in connection with the contested
preparation of a settled statement for Hearn I. In support of the request,
Jennie declared that she had been out of work since March 2020 because of
the COVID-19 pandemic, her unemployment benefits had been exhausted,
and she did not work during the week because she was taking care of the
couple’s two children. She stated that her current income came from trust
distributions, which were made at the discretion of the trustee, and that
although she was currently receiving $7,000 per month, she had been advised
that the distribution may be reduced by $1,000 because of reduced income to
the trusts. She stated that her father co-owned her home and was making 10
percent of the mortgage payments. She stated that Rocky was employed full
time as an attorney and they shared the cost of health insurance for the
children through his health plan. And she stated that her income was not
enough to cover the fees and costs arising from Rocky’s appeal, as well as her
living expenses, which amounted to about $8,600 per month as shown on her
income and expense declaration.
      Jennie attached bills from her appellate counsel amounting to almost
$60,000 for his work on Hearn I from August 2017 through November 2020;

                                      2
she declared that she had paid the bill with funds that were a loan from her
father. She also submitted a declaration from her appellate counsel, who
estimated that his fees for the remaining work on Hearn I would be $35,000.
Jennie also attached invoices from her trial counsel for her work in
connection with the settled statement in Hearn I, which amounted to over
$20,000. Jennie stated that she currently owed trial counsel $4,500, having
paid part of the fee from her own assets and with borrowed funds, and
requested a contribution of $10,000 toward those fees from Rocky. She stated
that Rocky was representing himself in the appeals; that she believed he was
“making his best efforts to wear [her] down”; and that his “multiple requests”
for extensions of time caused her added expense. Jennie’s request was set for
a hearing on February 17, 2021.
      On February 4, 2021, Rocky filed a responsive declaration in which he
stated he was currently unemployed and had no income or assets to pay any
portion of Jennie’s fees.2 He further stated that he had been unable to pay
for a family law attorney for himself since 2017; and that Jennie had over $1
million in reported financial assets and “significant trust income.”
      In her reply declaration Jennie stated that although Rocky claimed to
be unemployed, he provided no proof of termination or indication of any
severance. She also stated that he had failed to attach his most recent
paystubs to his income and expense declaration. She stated that Rocky had
told her he expected to be working by March 1 because he needed to work to
pay his expenses, which, according to his income and expense declaration,
were over $8,800 per month. She further stated that her primary asset was
the equity in her home, which was illiquid; that she still had no earned
income; and that she had reduced her expenses. And she reduced her request

      2 Subsequent dates are in 2021 unless otherwise stated.

                                       3
for fees, asking the court to order Rocky to contribute to her attorney fees and
costs in the amount of $40,000 (rather than $45,000), to be paid $1,000 per
month starting March or the month after he begins employment with a new
company, whichever is later.
      Rocky filed a supplemental declaration the day before the scheduled
hearing, in which he stated that he had been “unexpectedly discharged” from
his employment on February 2 and that he had received his final paycheck
and his January paystubs after he submitted his responsive declaration. He
attached copies of the final paycheck and recent paystubs.
      At the February 17 hearing, the court continued the hearing to April 7.
Rocky was ordered to file additional information by March 23, including
papers he alluded to during the hearing that had not been filed with the
court, and written confirmation that he was involuntarily terminated and
that he was not receiving any severance pay. The court authorized Jennie to
file a reply.
B.    Further Submissions to the Trial Court
      Rocky filed a second supplemental declaration with attachments that
included a February 17 letter from his employer to him “confirm[ing] that
your employment . . . terminated on 02/02/2021 [and] that you did not
voluntarily resign your position, and that the firm did not provide severance
to you upon separation from employment.” He also attached a notice from
the Employment Development Department stating that he had filed for
unemployment benefits on February 7 and that in his claim he gave the
following reason that he was no longer working for his most recent employer:
“unable to work required hours due to need to care for children due to
COVID-19.” And he attached his most recent tax return, which was for 2019;
his COBRA election notice; and an updated income and expense declaration.

                                       4
      In her reply declaration, filed on April 1, Jennie stated that she was
still unemployed; that she had left her previous job due to concerns for
COVID-19 and a lack of work; that she no longer qualified for unemployment;
that she had received a stimulus payment, and believed that Rocky had also
received one; and that she was training to become a real estate agent.3 She
reported that Rocky had told her that he expected to have a job by April. She
again reduced her request, this time asking the court to order Rocky to pay
her a total of $20,000 toward her fees by means of monthly payments starting
when he secured employment, in amounts of $750 or $500, depending upon
his salary. Jennie also filed points and authorities supporting her fee
request, as well as a supplemental declaration from her trial counsel that
included information about fees Jennie had incurred in February and March
in connection with the appeals, which amounted to over $20,000. Jennie
relied on In re Marriage of Sullivan (1984) 37 Cal.3d 762 (Sullivan) to argue
that the court should make a fee order based on Rocky’s earning capacity,
and that Rocky’s current income, of zero, did not reflect his ability to earn,
which was evidenced by his earnings in 2020.
      On April 5, Rocky filed a third supplemental declaration, in which he
objected to Jennie’s most recent submissions on the grounds that they made
new legal arguments and new requests for orders. He asked that they be
stricken or that the April 7 hearing be continued for him to provide a
“meaningful response and opposition.” And he argued that Jennie’s request
that he make payments over time starting at an unspecified future date was
contrary to applicable statutes.

      3 Jennie stated that she was pursuing a career in real estate sales

because she felt that would provide a “a more stable future course for me,”
compared to her former work as an esthetician.

                                        5
C.    April 7 Hearing and Order Awarding Fees
      At the April 7 hearing, the court confirmed it was aware that the case
“has been hotly contested,” and stated several times that it had read all the
parties’ papers. Rocky argued that Jennie’s most recent declaration
contained “any number of alleg[ation]s, which were both untrue and can be
established as untrue with communications,” and asked that if the court
considered those declarations it continue the hearing “ideally, for an
evidentiary hearing.” He continued, “Specifically, there’s allegations that
imply—I don’t have it in front of me but imply that I am somehow pursuing
this litigation—I believe Jennie said that it was, quote, ‘fun’ for me or
intentionally just to make her—”4 The court pointed out that what Jennie
had said was that he had told her that he enjoyed representing himself.
Rocky responded that wasn’t accurate and there was correspondence over the
past few months in which he tried to convince Jennie to resolve the matter
informally. He concluded that if the court was going to base its order on
Jennie’s allegation, he needed “time to properly respond.”
      Rocky also argued that additional financial information from Jennie
was required to support her request for fees, including tax returns,
confirmation of her unemployment, information regarding her retirement
account, and information about how much she has paid in fees to date and
how she paid for those fees. He said he had requested this information from
Jennie’s counsel in an email in connection with proceedings concerning a
prior fee award; had received no responses; and the court had determined it
was not necessary at that time. And he argued that Sullivan, the case on

      4 Apparently, Rocky was referring to the statement in Jennie’s most

recent declaration that, “Rocky has told me in no uncertain terms he will
continue to fight me because it is easy for him to be his own lawyer and he
enjoys it.”

                                        6
which Jennie had relied in her recent submission, did not support her
request.
      The court took the matter under submission, and later that day issued
a written order. As an initial matter, the court denied the requests in
Rocky’s third supplemental declaration to strike Jennie’s reply submissions
or continue the hearing. The court also denied Rocky’s “request for a
continuance so that he can conduct discovery and, later, an evidentiary
hearing,” which was made for the first time at oral argument, because “this
matter has been so exhaustively briefed that the court finds good cause to
decline to grant the improper request.” The court further stated that it did
not believe that an evidentiary hearing would provide “any information that
could (and should) have been included in the parties’ written submissions.”
      The court then observed that although Jennie’s fee request did not refer
to a particular statutory section, it rested on her alleged need for a fee award
and Rocky’s alleged ability to pay, and was therefore based on Family Code
sections 2030 through 2032.5
      The court reviewed the evidence before it, and found that Jennie had
equity in her home but no significant liquid assets, monthly living expenses
of about $8,600, monthly unearned trust income of $7,000 per month, and
$86,000 in debt, of which $75,000 was owed to Jennie’s father for which no
payments were currently being made. Jennie had recently been receiving
unemployment income in the amount of about $1,700 per month, which she
was no longer receiving but was reapplying for.
      As to Rocky, the court found that he had earned an average of $13,101
per month in 2020, and he was currently unemployed. He was an attorney

      5 Citations to statutes are to the Family Code.   Citations to rules are to
the California Rules of Court.

                                       7
and member in good standing of the state bar, and lived in Belvedere,
California. The court noted an apparent discrepancy between the letter from
Rocky’s employer, which stated that Rocky did not voluntarily resign, and
Rocky’s claim for unemployment, in which Rocky stated that he was no
longer working because he was unable to work required hours because of
COVID-19. The court further noted that Rocky did not disclose his current
employment prospects in view of the fact that schools had reopened, and that
according to Jennie, he had said he expected to be employed by March. Rocky
reported monthly living expenses of about $8,900 and no significant debt.
His current COBRA insurance coverage for himself and the children cost
about $1,000 per month.
      The court found that Rocky was self-represented; had “vigorously
prosecuted this case without the expense of retained counsel”; and had filed
two appeals that were pending. The court found that Jennie had to retain
counsel to represent her at trial and on appeal.
      The court concluded that both Rocky and Jennie had some ability to
contribute to Jennie’s fees and costs. On that basis, the court ordered Rocky
to pay Jennie $25,000 on account of her attorney fees and costs of suit, as
described in her request for order, by paying $2,000 per month beginning on
June 1 until the award was paid in full. The court ordered that any portion
of the award that was not paid when due would bear interest at the statutory
rate. Jennie and her attorneys were to determine how to allocate the award
between her trial and appellate counsel.
      Rocky filed a motion to “vacate, reconsider, modify and/or provide other
relief from” the April 7 order. The motion was denied, and this appeal
followed.

                                       8
                                 DISCUSSION
A.    Disentitlement
      After the record was filed, Jennie moved to dismiss the appeal based on
the disentitlement doctrine. We denied the motion without prejudice to
Jennie raising the issue in her appellate brief, which she has done.
      Under the doctrine of disentitlement, an appellate court has the
“ ‘inherent power . . . to dismiss an appeal by a party that refuses to comply
with a lower court order.’ ” (Findleton v. Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians
(2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 736, 756 (Findleton). As our Supreme Court has
explained, “A party to an action cannot, with right or reason, ask the aid and
assistance of a court in hearing his demands while he stands in an attitude of
contempt to legal orders and processes of the courts of this state.”
(MacPherson v. MacPherson (1939) 13 Cal.2d 271, 277 (MacPherson).) The
doctrine may be applied in the absence of a formal judgment of contempt: all
that is required is a party’s willful obstruction of, or failure to comply with,
trial court orders. (Findleton, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 756.) Dismissal
under the disentitlement doctrine is not punishment for contemptuous acts,
but is instead an “equitable tool” that allows an appellate court to induce
compliance with a presumptively valid order, and is not lightly applied.
(Ibid.) The doctrine “must be applied in a manner that takes into account the
equities of the individual case” (People v. Puluc-Sique (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th
894, 901), and it “ ‘is particularly likely to be invoked where the appeal arises
out of the very order (or orders) the party has disobeyed.’ ” (Ironridge Global
IV, Ltd. v. ScripsAmerica, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 259, 265 (Ironridge).)
      Jennie argues that Rocky’s appeal should be dismissed because Rocky
is currently in violation of our orders in Hearn I and Hearn II that he pay her

                                        9
costs on appeal, as well as the attorney fee order that is subject of this
appeal.6
      Rocky concedes that he has not forwarded to Jennie the $1,648.80 in
costs that she was awarded in connection with Hearn I and Hearn II. He
claims that he is entitled to reimbursement from Jennie for amounts he has
advanced to cover their children’s medical expenses, which exceed the costs
Jennie was awarded on appeal. He has also offered to forward payment of
the appellate costs and then independently seek reimbursement of the
medical expenses. Jennie does not deny any of this; she says only that Rocky
has no right to claim an offset that was not allowed by the court.
      As to compliance with the attorney fee order that is challenged in this
appeal, which is of particular importance in our analysis (Ironridge, supra,
238 Cal.App.4th at p. 265), Rocky admits that he has not made any
payments, but argues that he remains unemployed, he is unable to make
payments, and he has not violated the court’s order, which provides that
interest accrues at the statutory rate on unpaid balances. Although Jennie
contends that Rocky is not in compliance with the challenged order, her
contention is undercut by her contention that the order established a
“reasonable payment schedule” that “allows Rocky to defer payment and
merely pay statutory interest.”
      In these circumstances, we do not conclude that Rocky has willfully
obstructed or failed to comply with the trial court orders at issue in this
appeal (Findleton, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 756), and we decline to dismiss
his appeal under the disentitlement doctrine.

      6 We discount Jennie’s argument that dismissal is appropriate in light

of Rocky’s failure to comply with other previous trial court orders, because
Jennie does not claim that Rocky currently “stands in an attitude of
contempt” toward those orders. (MacPherson, supra, 13 Cal.2d at p. 277.)

                                       10
B.    Denial of Request for Evidentiary Hearing
      Rocky argues that the trial court violated section 217 and rule 5.113(b)
by refusing to grant his request for an evidentiary hearing and by failing to
make findings justifying the refusal. He further contends he was prejudiced
by being deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine Jennie regarding her
allegations as to his earning capacity.
      1.     Applicable Law and Standard of Review
      Section 217 provides that as a general matter, in a hearing on motion
brought under the Family Code, “the court shall receive any live, competent
testimony that is relevant and within the scope of the hearing.” (§ 217, subd.
(a).) The court, however, “may make a finding of good cause to refuse to
receive live testimony and shall state its reasons for the finding on the record
or in writing.” (§ 217, subd. (b).) Rule 5.113 sets forth factors for the court to
consider in making a finding of good cause to refuse to receive live testimony
under section 217, including “[w]hether material facts are in controversy,”
“[w]hether live testimony is necessary for the court to assess the credibility of
the parties or other witnesses”; “[t]he right of the parties to question anyone
submitting reports or other information to the court”; and “[a]ny other factor
that is just and equitable.” (Rule 5.113(b).) The court must state its reasons
for a good cause finding on the record or in writing, and “is required to state
only those factors on which the finding of good cause is based.” (Rule
5.113(c).)
      We review the trial court’s determination of good cause for abuse of
discretion. (Laraway v. Sutro & Co., Inc. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 266, 273.)
      2.     Analysis
      We are not persuaded by Rocky’s argument that the findings made by
the trial court in support of its denial of his request for an evidentiary

                                          11
hearing do not constitute good cause and do not reflect consideration of the
factors set forth in rule 5.113(b).
      To begin, the right to live testimony under section 217 may be forfeited,
and the record here arguably shows that Rocky forfeited his right to live
testimony by not asking to testify or to cross-examine Jennie, or anyone else,
in the trial court. (See In re Marriage of Cohen (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 574,
584 [discussing forfeiture of right to live testimony].) In his third
supplemental declaration, filed before the April 7 hearing, Rocky did not ask
to present live testimony. He objected to the April 1 declarations solely on
the ground that they raised new legal issues, and he asked that if the
declarations were to be considered he be allowed to provide a further
response. Nor did Rocky ask for live testimony at the April 7 hearing. In
asking for a continuance followed by an evidentiary hearing, Rocky stated
that he could provide “communications” and “documentation” to refute
Jennie’s purported implication that he was pursuing litigation to harass her.
And he stated that he wanted further documentation from Jennie about her
finances, while conceding that he had not requested the information in
connection with the pending request for order.
      Rocky’s reliance on In re Marriage of Swain (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 830,
does not help him. In Swain, the husband appealed from an order denying
his motion to terminate spousal support. (Id. at p. 832.) At the hearing, he
objected to the wife’s declaration, “raising [his] due process rights and his
right to cross-examine” the wife. (Id. at p. 834.) The trial court nevertheless
relied on the declaration. (Id. at p. 835.) The Court of Appeal reversed,
holding that where “the opposing party seeks to exclude the declaration on
the ground that he or she is unable to cross-examine the declarant . . . the
opposing party’s objection not only seeks to exclude hearsay evidence, but

                                       12
also amounts to an assertion of the party’s right under section 217 to ‘live
competent testimony that is relevant and within the scope of the hearing.’ ”
(Id. at p. 241, italics added.) But here, unlike in Swain, Rocky did not seek to
exclude Jennie’s April 1 submissions on the ground that he needed to cross-
examine her. Instead, he sought to exclude them unless the court would also
consider additional documentary evidence. Rocky simply wanted the
opportunity to produce more documentary evidence for the court to consider.
      Assuming that in requesting an evidentiary hearing Rocky properly
invoked his right to live testimony, we conclude that the trial court made a
sufficient finding of good cause. At the outset of the April 7 hearing, the trial
court stated that it had reviewed the parties’ submissions, and was familiar
with the case and the issues. Against this background, and Rocky’s failure to
ask to present live testimony or cross-examine any witnesses, the trial court
found that the matter had been “so exhaustively briefed” that an evidentiary
hearing would not give the court information that could have, and should
have, been included in the written submissions. Implicit in this finding is the
court’s determination that the material facts were not in controversy (rule
5.113(b)(2)); that live testimony was not necessary for the court to assess the
parties’ credibility (rule 5.113(b)(3)); and that the parties had been given
ample opportunity to present their cases and that the court was in possession
of all the information it required to rule on the request. (Rule 5.113.(b)(6)
[requiring the court to consider “[a]ny other factor that is just and
equitable”].) The court was not required to set forth its conclusions as to all
of the factors listed in rule 5.113(b); it was required only to state the facts
upon which the finding of good cause was based. (Rule 5.113(c).) In these
circumstances, the trial court made the required findings and did not abuse
its discretion in finding good cause. (See In re Marriage of Binette (2018) 24

                                        13
Cal.App.5th 1119, 1132 [no error in refusing to receive live testimony where
“[t]he court’s confirmation that it had thoroughly read the record in the case,
along with the absence of any demand for live testimony, sufficiently
indicates that it considered the pertinent factors and found that material
facts were not in controversy and live testimony was unnecessary”].)
      In any event, Rocky fails to show that he was prejudiced by the denial
of his request for an evidentiary hearing. Although he contends on appeal
that he was harmed by being deprived of the ability to cross-examine Jennie
regarding allegations she made in her April 1 declaration, he does not explain
how his cross-examination would have related to the issues on which the trial
court based its fee order. (In re Marriage of Deamon (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th
476, 484 [failure to make good cause finding under section 217 is harmless
where appellant does not show how live testimony would affect the issues on
which the court based its order].)
      Rocky argues that in her April 1 declaration Jennie falsely stated that
the range of his annual income in the last few years of their marriage, which
ended in 2015, was similar to the income reflected on his 2020 year-end
paystub, and that if he had been able to cross-examine her, he would have
refuted her allegations concerning how much he earned in the past. But the
trial court did not base its ruling on how much Rocky earned during the
marriage: to the extent it considered his earning capacity, it based its ruling
on the amount that Rocky earned in 2020, as shown on his paystub, and
Rocky concedes that the figure on the paystub is accurate.
      Rocky also states that in her April 1 declaration Jennie for the first
time provided information regarding her employment, and that he was
prejudiced by not being able to cross-examine Jennie about whether her
unemployment was voluntary, when she expected to become employed, and

                                       14
the income she expects to earn “if/when Jennie begins working as a real
estate agent.” But contrary to Rocky’s assertion, Jennie provided information
about her employment in the January declaration she submitted with her
request for order. There she stated that she had been out of work for almost
a year, that she had collected unemployment, but it had run out, and that she
did not expect to find work until later in the year. She provided further
details in the income and expense declaration she submitted in January with
her request for order: Jennie stated that she returned to school in January
2020 for nursing prerequisites and reduced her work hours; then in March
2020 she lost her job due to COVID-19 and received unemployment benefits
until October 2020; and she planned to reapply for benefits in March if she
was still unable to find work. If Rocky believed that he needed to cross-
examine Jennie about these issues, he could have so informed the trial court
well before the April 7 hearing—including at the February 17 hearing—but
he never did. Nor did he ask to cross-examine her about the issues on April
7. And Rocky does not explain how speculation about what Jennie might
have earned if at some point she began working as a real estate agent would
have had any bearing on the trial court’s decision.
      Finally, Rocky suggests that an evidentiary hearing would have
provided him with an opportunity to oppose two “new/revised requests” made
in Jennie’s April 1 submissions. The “requests” are that the fee award be
based on Rocky’s earning capacity rather than his current income, and that
the fees be paid in monthly installments. In fact, Rocky had the opportunity
to address those issues, and did so. The issue of making payments in
monthly installments was not new: Jennie first raised it in her February 8
declaration, and Rocky eventually addressed the issue in his third
supplemental declaration. And Rocky raised legal arguments concerning the

                                      15
propriety of considering his earning capacity in his third supplemental
declaration and at oral argument. But in any event, as Rocky recognized in
the trial court, his objections to these requests raised issues of law, not
factual issues on which testimony could be brought to bear.
C.    Fee Award
      Rocky argues that in making the fee award, the trial court abused its
discretion by failing to make the findings required by section 2030. He also
argues that the award must be reversed because there is no evidence of his
ability to pay Jennie’s fees.
      1.    Applicable Law and Standard of Review
      Sections 2030 and 2032 authorize the trial court in a dissolution action
to “award fees and costs between the parties based on their relative
circumstances in order to ensure parity of legal representation in the action.”
(In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 974, fn.
omitted (Falcone).) “When a request for attorney’s fees and costs is made, the
court shall make findings on whether an award of attorney’s fees and costs
under this section is appropriate, whether there is a disparity in access to
funds to retain counsel, and whether one party is able to pay for legal
representation of both parties. If the findings demonstrate disparity in
access and ability to pay, the court shall make an order awarding attorney’s
fees and costs.” (§ 2030, subd. (a)(2).) The court must make explicit findings
on the issues listed in section 2030, subdivision (a)(2). (In re Marriage of
Morton (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1050.)
      A fee award is limited to the amount that is “reasonably necessary” to
maintain or defend the proceeding (§ 2030, subd. (a)(1)), and must be “just
and reasonable under the relative circumstances of the respective parties.”
(§ 2032, subd. (a).) In determining what is just and reasonable under the

                                        16
circumstances, section 2032, subdivision (b), directs the court to consider the
circumstances listed in section 4320, which include the parties’ earning
capacity (§ 4320, subds. (a), (c)), as well as a catch-all that encompasses
“[a]ny other factors the court determines are just and equitable.”7 (§ 4320,
subd. (n).) Section 2032 further provides that the fact that a party requesting
a fee award has resources to pay the party’s own fees does not bar an order
that the other party pay all or part of the fees requested, and that “[f]inancial
resources are only one factor for the court to consider in determining how to
apportion the overall cost of the litigation equitably between the parties
under their relative circumstances.” (§ 2032, subd. (b).) Among other things,
the court may consider the party’s litigation tactics in making an award
under section 2030. (Falcone, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 975.)
      “ ‘On appeal, we review an attorney fee award under section 2030 for
an abuse of discretion.’ [Citation.] . . . [Citation.] Applying the abuse of
discretion standard, we consider de novo any questions of law raised on
appeal but will uphold any findings of fact supported by substantial evidence.
[Citation.] The trial court’s order ‘will be overturned only if, considering all
the evidence viewed most favorably in support of its order, no judge could
reasonably make the order made.’ ” (In re Marriage of Smith (2015) 242
Cal.App.4th 529, 532.)
      2.    Analysis
      We are not persuaded by Rocky’s argument that the trial court failed to
make the required findings to support a need-based fee award. The court
found that Jennie had monthly income of about $7,000 per month and

      7 Section 4320 sets forth the factors to be considered by the court in

ordering spousal support. The trial court is not required to expressly address
the section 4320 factors. (In re Marriage of Diamond (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th
595, 602-603.)

                                        17
expenses of about $8,600, and that Rocky, who had average monthly income
of about $13,000 and expenses of about $8,800 in 2020, was currently
unemployed. However, Rocky was a member in good standing of the state
bar and was looking for new employment. The court also found that Rocky
was “vigorously” representing himself without incurring the expense of
retaining counsel, and that Jennie had to retain counsel “at the going rate” to
represent her in the trial court and in responding to Rocky’s appeals. These
are explicit findings that an award of fees to Jennie under section 2030 is
appropriate, because Rocky’s income in 2020 was considerably higher than
Jennie’s; her expenses exceeded her income; and although Rocky’s and
Jennie’s expenses were otherwise comparable, Rocky had access to legal
representation without paying attorney fees and Jennie did not. (§ 2030,
subd. (a)(2).) The court did not require Rocky to pay all of Jennie’s fees and
costs: rather, the court found that Rocky was able to pay for the legal
representation of both parties insofar as he paid nothing for his own
representation and had the ability to contribute the fees and costs that
Jennie outlined in her request for order. (Ibid.) Thus, the court made the
findings required by statute, and on the basis of these findings, the court
ordered Rocky to pay $25,000 toward Jennie’s fees and costs.
      Rocky complains that the trial court did not make findings as to the
“amount of fees Jennie has paid to date, how she paid for them and where the
funds came from,” or as to Jennie’s employment prospects, but he cites
nothing to suggest that the trial court was required to make explicit findings
on these points. Rocky does not dispute the extensive evidence that Jennie
provided as to the fees she had incurred in connection with Rocky’s appeals
through March 2021 (amounting to over $100,000), and the amounts that she
had paid toward those fees (approximately $75,000), and how she had made

                                       18
those payments through her own assets and funds borrowed from her father.
Rocky does not argue that the fees Jennie incurred were excessive or
unreasonable. And he does not dispute that Jennie provided evidence that
she had received unemployment benefits, which had expired; that she was
planning to reapply for them; and although she was currently unemployed
she was studying for the real estate sales agent exam and was training to
become a realtor’s assistant. Nothing in the record suggests that the trial
court failed to consider the evidence before it. To the contrary, the court
stated numerous times that it had reviewed the extensive submissions from
both parties.
      Nor are we persuaded by Rocky’s arguments that the trial court’s
finding that he had ability to pay a portion of Jennie’s fees is not supported
by substantial evidence.
      Rocky argues that compliance with the court’s order is impossible even
if we assume that the trial court correctly found that his prospective monthly
income is the same as his average monthly income from 2020. The argument
rests on Rocky’s calculation that, even with a gross monthly income of over
$13,000, his monthly “disposable income” would be only about $825, and his
assumption that any fee award would have to be paid from such “disposable
income.” He concludes that his disposable income does not allow for monthly
payments to Jennie of $2,000 to cover her attorney fees. Rocky’s calculation
has no basis in the law. He relies on the legal principle stated in Johnson v.
Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 68, that “[t]he key financial factor in
the [child support] guideline formula is net disposable income,” while
disregarding the immediately following citation in that case to section 4059 of
the Family Code, which specifies how disposable income is to be calculated
from gross income. (Johnson at p. 75.) Assuming for purposes of this appeal

                                       19
that a fee award must be paid from net disposable income, Rocky’s argument
is meritless because his calculation of his disposable income bears no
resemblance to the formula set out in section 4059. In calculating his
disposable income, Rocky deducts from his gross income his self-reported
monthly expenses, including his expenses for rent, groceries, and
transportation. But section 4059 provides that as a general matter, in
calculating net disposable income, the only deductions from gross income are
the party’s state and federal income tax liability, FICA contributions,
mandatory retirement deductions, health insurance premiums, child support,
and job related expenses. (§ 4059.)
      To the extent Rocky argues that his being unemployed and therefore
lacking current income precludes a finding that he has ability to pay Jennie’s
fees, he downplays the evidence of his earning capacity. (See Sullivan, supra,
37 Cal.3d at p. 768 [in assessing ability to pay the court “may consider all the
evidence concerning the parties’ income, assets and abilities”].) There was
evidence that Rocky earned over $155,000 in salary and bonus as an attorney
in 2020; that he was a member of the bar in good standing; and that shortly
after he lost his job in February 2021 he told Jennie that he was working
with a recruiter and expected to be employed by March. This is not a case
like In re Marriage of Pollard (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 535, which Rocky cites for
the proposition that it is error to award attorney fees where evidence
supports need but not the other party’s ability to pay. (Id. at p. 539.) In
Pollard, both parties were “legitimately on welfare” and “impecunious” and
there “was no showing of any reasonable expectation of relief from this
condition.” (Ibid.) Here, in contrast, although Rocky is temporarily without
earned income, there is evidence from his qualifications and history of
employment, his statement that he expected to be employed in spring 2021,

                                       20
and the fact that he was working with a recruiter, to support a reasonable
expectation that he will again be gainfully employed as an attorney. The
expectation is further supported by Rocky’s evidence that his application for
unemployment benefits arose from his inability to “work required hours due
to need to care for children due to COVID-19,” and the court’s finding that
schools had since reopened.
      In sum, Rocky has not shown that the trial court failed to make the
required findings to support its award of fees. Nor has he shown that the fee
award is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we do not reach
his arguments concerning prejudice.
                               DISPOSITION
      The challenged order is affirmed. Respondent shall recover her costs
on appeal.

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                                            _________________________
                                            Miller, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Stewart, P.J.

_________________________
Markman, J.*

A162932, Hearn v. Hearn

      * Judge of the Alameda Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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Court: Marin County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Verna A. Adams

Rockford M. Hearn, In Pro Per, for Appellant

Mah Wei Law, Sharon F. Mah for Respondent

A162932, Hearn v. Hearn

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