Court Opinion

ID: 9701028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:59:38.270861+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:17.468861
License: Public Domain

Prescott, J.,
filed the following dissenting opinion, in which Bruñe, C. J., concurred.
I do not wish anyone to think that I disagree with the principles of law as they are so clearly enunciated by Judge Horney in his brilliant majority opinion. It is the treatment of the facts and their effect that prevent my concurrence. These facts, as related in the majority opinion, seem clearly to demonstrate that the parties had begun, and were conducting, negotiations having as their object a renewal of the lease — both sides, legitimately, attempting to obtain advantageous terms.1 The appellant and its predecessors had leased *129the property since 1947; the original lease had been extended three successive terms by written agreements; the tenant wrote the appellee’s attorney as early as December 8, 1955, concerning the lease; and verbal and written negotiations before March 20, 1956, the expiration date of the lease, followed. Three days after the expiration date, the tenant wrote to the landlord the first letter quoted in the majority opinion. In it, the tenant specifically stated that the parties were negotiating for a new lease and offered to continue on the previous rental basis from month to month until such time as the 'negotiations were successful or broke down. A check for one month’s rent was enclosed. Within a week, the landlord’s attorney replied. The letter did not deny that negotiations were being conducted by the parties; nor did it make any claim that the tenant was holding over under a lease imposed by law for a year. On the contrary, it explicitly stated the check was accepted for the current month’s rent and then went on to say, the landlord “desires me to inform you that she is not willing for you to continue on a month to month basis, but she will rent year to year.” It is extremely difficult to comprehend how the tenant could “continue” on a month to month basis, if it never occupied that status, as the majority opinion holds. It was not until April 16, 1956, that any claim was made that the tenant was holding over under a new lease imposed by law. The tenant took the position, which seems proper especially when its letter so stated, that, upon the acceptance of its check for one month’s rent, it became a tenant from month to month, and, in order to terminate this tenancy, it must give the landlord thirty days’ notice, which it did. This made the expiration date May 20, 1956. The rent was paid in full until that time, and the tenant properly vacated the premises by that date. The above facts seem to make it clear the tenant was not only remaining in possession of the property with the tacit, but the express, consent of the landlord. She was anxious, as she had done before, to obtain a written lease for a year upon favorable terms. The *130dilapidated condition of the property rendered it particularly desirable for her to lease to someone in such a business as that conducted by the appellant. For these reasons, I think the appellant should have prevailed.
Judge Bruñe has authorized me to say he concurs in this opinion.

. It is conceded by everyone that if negotiations are being carried on between a landlord and a tenant looking forward to a new lease between the parties, a tenant who remains in the property pending the outcome of the negotiations with the express or tacit *129consent of the landlord does not afford the landlord an opportunity to treat the remaining as a lease for a year.