Court Opinion

ID: 9352360
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-05 21:00:37.545968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:01:37.469666
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 21-4187

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        CHRISTOPHER RAEKWON ALLEN MILES,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
        Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:20-cr-00229-WO-1)

        Submitted: October 31, 2022                                       Decided: January 4, 2023

        Before WYNN and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Kathleen A. Gleason, Assistant
        Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
        Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, Acting United States
        Attorney, Mary Ann Courtney, Special Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
        UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Christopher Raekwon Allen Miles appeals the 66-month sentence imposed

        following his guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18

        U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). On appeal, Miles challenges the district court’s imposition

        of a Sentencing Guidelines enhancement for possessing a firearm in connection with

        another felony offense. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (2018).

        He also argues that his sentence, which is above the high end of the advisory Guidelines

        range, is substantively unreasonable. Finding no error, we affirm.

               We review a sentence, “whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the

        Guidelines range,” for reasonableness, applying “a deferential abuse-of-discretion

        standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We first evaluate the sentence

        for significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating the Guidelines range,

        insufficiently considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, or inadequately explaining the

        chosen sentence. United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020). We then

        consider whether the sentence is substantively reasonable; that is, we examine whether the

        sentence is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to “satisf[y] the standards set forth in

        § 3553(a).” United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010).

               When considering a challenge to the district court’s application of the Guidelines,

        we review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear

        error. United States v. Allen, 909 F.3d 671, 677 (4th Cir. 2018). If the district court’s

        factual findings are “plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety,” we “may not

        reverse” for clear error. Butts v. United States, 930 F.3d 234, 238 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal

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        quotation marks omitted). Rather, “[u]nder the clear error standard, we will only reverse

        if left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United

        States v. Savage, 885 F.3d 212, 225 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).

               Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) directs a four-level enhancement if the defendant “used or

        possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense.” USSG

        § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). A firearm is possessed “in connection with” another felony offense “if

        the firearm or ammunition facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating, another felony

        offense.” USSG § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(A); see United States v. Jenkins, 566 F.3d 160, 162

        (4th Cir. 2009). “[T]his standard is not especially burdensome: We will find it satisfied

        when a firearm has some purpose or effect with respect to the other offense, including cases

        where a firearm is present for protection or to embolden the actor.” United States v.

        Bolden, 964 F.3d 283, 287 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). To impose

        the enhancement, a district court must find the underlying facts by a preponderance of the

        evidence; that is, the court must “believe that the existence of [the] fact[s] is more probable

        than [their] nonexistence.” United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 631 (4th Cir. 2010)

        (internal quotation marks omitted).

               Here, the district court found that Miles possessed a firearm in connection with the

        drug trafficking offense of possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Miles concedes

        that the evidence supports that he engaged in a felony drug trafficking offense, but he

        argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that he possessed the firearm in

        connection with that offense. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that there was

        sufficient evidence from which the court could find that it was more likely than not that the

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        firearm emboldened Miles or was present for the protection of his drug trafficking activity.

        Accordingly, the court did not clearly err in imposing the USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)

        sentencing enhancement.

               Turning to Miles’ challenge to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, * a

        sentence is substantively reasonable only if it is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,”

        to satisfy the statutory purposes of sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Accordingly, in

        reviewing a sentence for substantive reasonableness, we consider “the totality of the

        circumstances to determine whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in

        concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” Nance,

        957 F.3d at 212 (internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing a sentence outside the

        Guidelines range, we “may consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due

        deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the

        extent of the variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.

               Miles’ sentence of 66 months’ imprisonment was 15 months above the high end of

        the advisory Guidelines range of 41 to 51 months’ imprisonment. However, the district

        court thoroughly discussed how the § 3553(a) factors justified the sentence imposed,

        reasoning that this variance was necessary to serve the statutory purpose of deterrence

        given Miles’ persistent recidivism, disregard for others’ safety, and overly lenient prior

               *
                Although Miles does not dispute the procedural reasonableness of his sentence on
        grounds other than the USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement, we conclude that the
        sentence is otherwise procedurally reasonable. See United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d
        213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that court must ensure sentence’s procedural
        reasonableness before addressing defendant’s challenge to substantive reasonableness).

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        sentences. The court also emphasized that Miles had fired the illegal firearm into the air

        eight times on one occasion, seriously endangering the public, and that this conduct was

        not incorporated in the calculation of his advisory Guidelines range. In light of the court’s

        thorough explanation, we conclude that Miles’ sentence is substantively reasonable.

               Accordingly, we affirm Miles’ criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument

        because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this

        court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                        AFFIRMED

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