Court Opinion

ID: 9819261
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:21:13.781201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:11:32.046642
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE LEAVITT, dissenting: Both the trial court and the majority affirming here place reliance on Watson v. Watson, 335 Ill. App. 637, 82 N.E.2d 671 (1948). In Watson this court determined that jurisdiction was lacking to hear the fee issue and also that public policy precluded the court from addressing the matter following a voluntary dismissal of the dissolution action. Watson, 335 Ill. App. at 640-41. In Watson it was deemed public policy in favor of marriage forbade continuing hostile litigation when both parties sought to have a divorce suit dismissed. Watson, 335 Ill. App. at 641; see also Anderson v. Steger, 173 Ill. 112, 119-20, 50 N.E. 665 (1898); McCulloch v. Murphy, 45 Ill. 256 (1867). The majority recognizes that with the adoption of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 and the enactment of section 508 of Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Dissolution Act) (750 ILCS 5/508 (West 1996)) a jurisdictional bar to fee petitions in cases such as this is no longer an issue. Simply stated then the issue before' us is whether the trial court should, based on the public policy argument advanced in Watson, decline to exercise its jurisdiction to hear a fee petition after voluntary dismissal of the dissolution action. While the majority of this court now answers the question in the affirmative, I would hold otherwise. Not only have the jurisdictional barriers that once existed vanished, but legislative changes reflected in the Dissolution Act, as well as subsequent decisions of our supreme court, have also, in my opinion, largely undermined the public policy concern voiced in older cases such as Watson. Notably, the Dissolution Act, unlike the statutory scheme that preceded it, expressly permits attorneys representing parties in dissolution proceedings to seek fees from their clients while the dissolution proceedings are still ongoing. See 750 ILCS 5/508(a) (West 1996); Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 394, 667 N.E.2d 91 (1996). Moreover, in seeking fees from a client, an attorney is not limited to the remedies provided under the Dissolution Act, as our supreme court has recently made clear. In Nottage, the supreme court found this court erred in its conclusion that section 508 of the Dissolution Act was the sole means by which an attorney could recover a fee. Nottage, 172 Ill. 2d at 392. It was determined that the present legislative scheme was not designed to exclude bringing a common law contract action for damages. The statutory remedy was in addition to, not exclusive of, any common law right. Nottage, 172 Ill. 2d at 398. Since the jurisdictional bar to a fee petition in cases such as this is long gone and an attorney may now sue his client for fees either during or subsequent to dissolution proceedings, it would seem to me the state’s public policy has shifted away from avoiding — or not recognizing — fee disputes between spouses toward one that guarantees not only a fair process but also a complete and final disposition of the matter, including the payment of fees. This countervailing policy is well recognized and equally as long standing as the one reiterated in Watson. See generally Annotation, Right of Attorney to Continue Divorce or Separation Suit against Wishes of His Client, 92 A.L.R.2d 1009, 1017-20 (1963). In Morrison v. Morrison, 122 N.J. Eq. 233, 193 A. 908 (N.J. Ch. 1937), it was well stated, albeit in somewhat outdated fashion: “In matrimonial cases we regard the wife as the favored suitor, and call upon the husband to pay her suit moneys; otherwise, in many cases the wife would be powerless to assert her legal rights against him. We encourage reputable counsel to represent wives in meritorious cases, upon the implied assurance that they will be compensated for the reasonable value of their services through orders against the husbands. We also applaud and encourage their efforts, as officers of the court, to effect reconciliations where possible. Unless all this is mere platitude, how can we penalize them for doing what we preach to them is their duty? If we do so, how can we expect counsel to be willing to undertake a destitute wife’s case against her husband, no matter how meritorious? Public policy requires that lack of means shall not deprive the wife of the services of a competent solicitor, and it follows that it is contrary to public policy to deny reasonable compensation to such solicitor in proper cases to be paid by the husband ***.” Morrison, 122 N.J. Eq. at 236, 193 A. at 909-10. See, e.g., Frederick v. Frederick, 25 F.2d 733, 734-35 (Colo. 1933). Of course, we recognize that in today’s world neither party to a dissolution action is favored and that either spouse may enjoy the benefit of the present statutory scheme. This same policy pervades the'new “Leveling the Playing Field” amendments to our Dissolution Act. Under section 501(c — 1), a spouse now may receive an award of interim attorney fees while a dissolution case is pending. See 750 ILCS 5/501(c — 1) (West 1996). The very purpose of such interim awards is “to achieve substantial parity in parties’ access to funds for litigation costs.” See 750 ILCS 5/102(5) (West 1996). Clearly, then, encouraging attorneys to take on representation of economically disadvantaged spouses, through the implied assurances that they can “cross the aisle,” if need be, for their fees, is integral to achieving the primary goal of the current Dissolution Act— leveling the playing field in dissolution actions. Thus, an attorney who takes a case such as the present one with an understanding that fees may be sought from the other side should not now find that he cannot collect fees for his work from the party able to pay due to the voluntary dismissal by the petitioning party. On facts identical to those here, the Supreme Court of Colorado refused to sanction similar conduct on the part of the husband: “Frederick [the husband], angry, humiliated his wife with open slanderous charges [by filing for divorce]. In sheer necessity she sought, as she rightly might, the services of counsel. The wife represented, her counsel understood, and the fact was that only from him who had precipitated the breach could compensation be had. The case was of the kind *** in which the husband is customarily required to remunerate counsel employed by his spouse. His conclusion to withdraw the charge against his wife, to be commended, of course, did not operate to discharge his full obligation. He, not his wife, not her counsel, initiated that which gave rise to the reasonable added burden of his folly. The court properly retained control of the case for the purpose appearing. In no manner whatever did such continued control interfere with the reconciliation of the parties.” Frederick, 25 F.2d at 734-35. The public policy supposedly advanced by the majority’s decision is, moreover, entirely speculative on the record before us. There was no evidence before the trial court suggesting the parties to this case were actually in the process of reconciling; respondent flatly denies as much, and the fact that she continues tó (or acquiesces in her attorneys’ efforts to) press the fee contribution issue in an appeal to this court is suggestive of marital deterioration, not reconciliation. As respondent points out, this fact alone distinguishes this case from Watson, where reconciliation was undisputed. See Watson, 335 Ill. App. at 641 (“Public policy forbids that parties to a divorce suit should be kept in a state of hostile litigation when both are seeking to have it dismissed”). (Emphasis added.) Regardless, even if it can be assumed petitioner voluntarily dismissed his petition in this case for the purpose of reconciling, it does not necessarily follow that permitting respondent to go forward with her fee petition here will hinder the reconciliation process. If the alleged reconciliation between these parties is “so insincere and impermanent as to be jeopardized by so trivial a cause [as a fee petition], it is at best unworthy of consideration, and it may well be a mere pretense on the husband’s part, adopted as a means of evading his just obligation.” See Morrison, 122 N.J. Eq. at 235-36, 193 A. at 909. Further, I concur with respondent’s argument that dismissing the fee petition in the domestic relations division does little to assure the parties are free from the continuing hostility of litigation, if the result is that litigation continues — in the form of a common law contract action between respondent and her counsel — to be heard in another corridor of the same courthouse. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.