Court Opinion

ID: 9392381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-04 18:00:22.101334+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:45.649397
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-60324    Document: 00516738221       Page: 1     Date Filed: 05/04/2023

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                           Fifth Circuit

                                                                         FILED
                                                                      May 4, 2023
                               No. 21-60324
                                                                    Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                         Clerk

   Francis Zamaro-Silvero,

                                                                   Petitioner,

                                    versus

   Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                 Respondent.

                     Petition for Review of an Order of
                     the Board of Immigration Appeals
                         Agency No. A216 860 672

                 ON MOTION TO AMEND OR CLARIFY
   Before Smith, Clement, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:
         The respondent’s motion to amend or clarify is GRANTED. The
   opinion, 60 F.4th 914 (5th Cir. Feb. 23, 2023), is WITHDRAWN. The
   following opinion is SUBSTITUTED.
                               * * * * *
   Before Smith, Clement, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Jerry E. Smith, Circuit Judge:
Case: 21-60324         Document: 00516738221              Page: 2       Date Filed: 05/04/2023

                                          No. 21-60324

           Francis Zamaro-Silverio 1 petitions for review of the denial by the
   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) of cancellation of removal and volun-
   tary departure. The BIA held that Zamaro-Silverio had been convicted of a
   crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”) and thus found her ineligible for
   those forms of discretionary relief. Because the BIA did not perform the
   proper analysis, we grant review, vacate, and remand for determination of
   whether Zamaro-Silverio’s conviction was for a CIMT.

                                                I.
           Zamaro-Silverio is a citizen of Mexico. She entered the United States
   illegally in approximately 2000 and has six children. She is married to a U.S.
   citizen, has been continuously employed since 2002, and has paid taxes every
   year since 2003. She is a caretaker to her father, a lawful permanent resident.
   She has many grandchildren in the United States, all of whom are U.S.
   citizens.
           In 2017, Zamaro-Silverio accidentally struck a pedestrian with her car.
   The pedestrian “spun in the air and landed on the pavement,” but Zamaro-
   Silverio fled the scene. In 2018, she entered a guilty plea in state court for a
   third-degree felony per Texas Transportation Code § 550.021 and was sen-
   tenced to five years’ deferred adjudication.
           While Zamaro-Silverio was on deferred adjudication, the Department
   of Homeland Security arrested her and charged her with being present with-
   out admission or parole under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and
   Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). In 2020, Zamaro-Silverio filed
   an application for cancellation of removal with the immigration court; she
   also requested voluntary departure. The Immigration Judge (“I.J.”) denied
   her application, finding her conviction to be for a CIMT that rendered her
   ineligible for cancellation under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).

           1
             Contrary to court records, petitioner has notified us that her name is spelled with
   an ‘i’: ‘Zamaro-Silverio.’

                                                2
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                                    No. 21-60324

          Zamaro-Silverio appealed to the BIA, which affirmed. In her petition
   for review, Zamaro-Silverio contends that her conviction was not for a
   CIMT. Before filing its response brief, the parties filed a joint motion for
   remand, which was denied by the motions panel. Zamaro-Silverio then filed
   a motion to reconsider with the BIA, which also denied the motion. The par-
   ties have filed supplemental briefing asking us to review whether the BIA’s
   denial of the motion for reconsideration was error.

                                         II.
          This court reviews de novo the BIA’s conclusion on whether an offense
   qualifies as a CIMT, but we give Chevron deference to the agency’s interpre-
   tation of the phrase “moral turpitude.” Villegas-Sarabia v. Sessions, 874 F.3d
   871, 877 (5th Cir. 2017). We review decisions of the I.J. only to the extent
   they affect the ruling of the BIA. Zhu v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d 588, 593 (5th Cir.
   2007). If, however, the “the BIA has not spoken on ‘a matter that statutes
   place primarily in agency hands,’ our ordinary rule is to remand to ‘giv[e] the
   BIA the opportunity to address the matter in the first instance in light of its
   own expertise.’” Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517 (2009) (quoting INS v.
   Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16–17 (2002) (per curiam) (alteration in
   original).

                                         III.
          Zamaro-Silverio asks us to consider whether her conviction is for a
   CIMT. If it is, she is automatically ineligible for cancellation of removal or
   voluntary departure. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). If it is not, the I.J.
   should determine, in the first instance, whether she is entitled to such discre-
   tionary relief.
          Zamaro-Silverio was convicted under Texas Transportation Code
   § 550.021, which states,
          (a) The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident that re-

                                          3
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                                    No. 21-60324

          sults or is reasonably likely to result in injury to or death of a
          person shall:
          (1) immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or
          as close to the scene as possible;
          (2) immediately return to the scene of the accident if the vehi-
          cle is not stopped at the scene of the accident;
          (3) immediately determine whether a person is involved in the
          accident, and if a person is involved in the accident, whether
          that person requires aid; and
          (4) remain at the scene of the accident until the operator com-
          plies with the requirements of Section 550.023.
   Section 550.023 defines the requirements of subsection (4). It requires the
   operator of a vehicle to
          (1) give the operator’s name and address, the registration num-
          ber of the vehicle the operator was driving, and the name of the
          operator’s motor vehicle liability insurer to any person injured
          or the operator or occupant of or person attending a vehicle in-
          volved in the collision;
          (2) if requested and available, show the operator’s driver’s li-
          cense to a person described by Subdivision (1); and
          (3) provide any person injured in the accident reasonable assis-
          tance, including transporting or making arrangements for
          transporting the person to a physician or hospital for medical
          treatment if it is apparent that treatment is necessary, or if the
          injured person requests the transportation.
   Tex. Transp. Code § 550.023.
          Section 550.021 (Zamaro-Silverio’s statute of conviction) “includes
   alternative means of commission.” Garcia-Maldonado v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d
   284, 289 (5th Cir. 2007). To determine whether a conviction is for a CIMT
   under such a statute, courts apply the “categorical approach.” Villegas-
   Sarabia, 874 F.3d at 877. In the Fifth Circuit, that requires us first to deter-

                                          4
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                                         No. 21-60324

   mine the “minimum conduct” that would reasonably lead to a conviction
   under the statute. Id. We then ask whether that minimum conduct is a
   CIMT, not whether the alien’s actual conduct is a CIMT. In other words,
   we “focus[] on the inherent nature of the crime, as defined in the stat-
   ute . . . rather than the circumstances surrounding the particular transgres-
   sion.” Id. (quoting Amouzadeh v. Winfrey, 467 F.3d 451, 455 (5th Cir. 2006)
   (second alteration in original)).
           But that has not always been the analysis. Before Mathis v. United
   States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016), the Fifth Circuit used the “modified categorical
   approach.” See Gomez-Perez v. Lynch, 829 F.3d 323, 326–28 (5th Cir. 2016).
   If a statute prohibited two distinct means of accomplishing a crime, the court
   would “look to the alien’s record of conviction.”                  Garcia-Maldonado,
   491 F.3d at 288 (citing Smalley v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 332, 336 (5th Cir. 2003)).
   The question was whether that conduct was considered a CIMT.
           Before Mathis was decided, our court considered whether a defendant
   who had violated a prior version of the Texas statute had committed a
   CIMT. 2 Garcia-Maldonado, 491 F.3d at 287–88. The court first determined
   that the statute could be violated by a showing of either “failure to share
   information” or “failure to . . . render aid.” Id. at 288–89 (citing Sheldon v.
   State, 100 S.W.3d 497, 504 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, pet. ref’d)). Applying
   the (now outdated) modified categorical approach, the court looked at the
   actual underlying conviction and noted that the alien in that case had been
   convicted of failing to render aid. Id. at 289. It then held that the failure to
   render aid was a CIMT. Id. at 290.
           The BIA found that Garcia-Maldonado controlled the outcome for

           2
            The main difference between the statutes is that the current § 550.021(3) was not
   included. That does not affect the analysis.

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                                       No. 21-60324

   Zamaro-Silverio. But in the wake of Mathis, that analysis is incorrect. The
   proper focus is now on the minimum conduct prohibited by the statute, not
   on Zamaro-Silverio’s particular actions.
          The minimum conduct that can trigger liability under Zamaro-
   Silverio’s statute of conviction is the failure to remain at the scene of the acci-
   dent and provide one’s name and other information. See Tex. Transp.
   Code § 550.021(a)(4). Thus, Zamaro-Silverio’s deportability hinges on
   whether failure to share information is a CIMT. Villegas-Sarabia, 874 F.3d
   at 877. Garcia-Maldonado does not reach this question, and, similarly, the
   BIA did not answer it. Given that “our ordinary rule is to remand to ‘giv[e]
   the BIA the opportunity to address the matter in the first instance in light of
   its own expertise,’” we go no further. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 517 (quoting
   Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. at 17) (alteration in original). 3
          Therefore, the petition for review is GRANTED. We VACATE
   and REMAND to the BIA with instruction to determine whether the failure
   to share information under § 550.021(a)(4) is a CIMT.

          3
             Because we vacate and remand, we do not reach the remaining issues presented
   in the petition for review.

                                             6