Court Opinion

ID: 9407242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-06 14:05:28.005266+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:36.490627
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13282
SJC-13346

GRACE FABIANO, personal representative,1    vs.    PHILIP MORRIS USA
                         INC. & others.2

   MARY FULLER, personal representative,3 vs.       R.J. REYNOLDS
                   TOBACCO COMPANY & another.4

    Suffolk.   Barnstable.       March 6, 2023. - July 6, 2023.

 Present:   Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt,
                           & Georges, JJ.

Wrongful Death. Negligence, Wrongful death.       Limitations,
     Statute of.

     Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
July 14, 2017.

    A motion to dismiss was heard by Brian A. Davis, J.

     The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for
direct appellate review.

    1   Of the estate of Ralph Fabiano.

    2   Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc.; and Garber Bros., Inc.

    3   Of the estate of John Fuller.

    4   Cumberland Farms, Inc.
                                                                   2

     Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
March 21, 2016.

     A motion for partial judgment on the pleadings was heard by
Thomas J. Perrino, J.

     The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for
direct appellate review.

     Shea T. Moxon, of Florida, for Grace Fabiano.
     Andrew Rainer for Mary Fuller.
     Scott A. Chesin (Elliott M. Davis also present) for Philip
Morris USA Inc. & another.
     Victoria Cuneo Powell, of Georgia (Jason T. Burnette, of
Georgia, also present) for R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company &
another.
     The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:
     Kevin W. Buono for Massachusetts Defense Lawyers
Association.
     Samuel Goldblatt & Kurt M. Mullen for Product Liability
Advisory Council.
     Peter J. Ainsworth, Thomas R. Murphy, Kevin J. Powers,
Elizabeth N. Mulvey, & J. Michael Conley for Massachusetts
Academy of Trial Attorneys.

    LOWY, J.     In GGNSC Admin. Servs., LLC v. Schrader, 484

Mass. 181, 191 (2020) (GGNSC), we held that wrongful death

actions brought under G. L. c. 229, § 2, are derivative of a

decedent's own cause of action for personal injury, and unless

the decedent "could have brought an action for the injuries that

caused [his or her] death," a wrongful death action cannot be

maintained by the personal representative of the decedent's

estate for the benefit of the decedent's statutory

beneficiaries.   The question in these paired cases is whether

this principle yields where the decedent could not have brought
                                                                   3

claims for the injuries that caused his or her death, had the

decedent survived, by reason of the expiration of the statute of

limitations applicable to those claims.

     Grace Fabiano, as personal representative of the estate of

Ralph Fabiano, and Mary Fuller, as personal representative of

the estate of John Fuller5 (collectively, plaintiffs), commenced

these separate actions for wrongful death under G. L. c. 229,

§ 2, alleging breach of warranty, negligence, and conspiracy.

It is undisputed that, if Ralph or John (collectively,

decedents) had survived, they could not have brought direct

claims at the time of their deaths due to the expiration of the

three-year statute of limitations.   The plaintiffs argue,

however, that, because G. L. c. 229, § 2, has its own three-year

statute of limitations for commencement of a wrongful death

action that begins to run on the date of death, the statute of

limitations applicable to personal injury claims, which begins

to run on the date of injury, does not apply to wrongful death

actions.

     In light of the derivative character of wrongful death

claims, for a representative of the decedent's estate to have a

right to bring a wrongful death action, the decedent must have

     5 Because the plaintiffs share their surnames with the
decedents whose estates they represent, we refer to each by
their first name.
                                                                   4

had the continued right to bring a cause of action for the

injuries that caused his or her death.   Where a decedent has

such a right at the time of death, a cause of action for

wrongful death vests in the personal representative of the

decedent's estate, and the three-year statute of limitations for

the wrongful death action begins to run from the date of death.

Where a decedent could not maintain a personal injury action at

the time of death, the representative of the decedent's estate

has no right to bring an action for wrongful death for the

benefit of the beneficiaries.   Thus, the three-year statute of

limitations for wrongful death actions is not implicated.

     In these cases, because the decedents had no right to bring

a cause of action for the injuries that caused their deaths at

the time that they died as a result of the running of the

statute of limitations on the decedents' underlying tort and

breach of warranty claims, the plaintiffs, as personal

representatives of the decedents' estates, had no right to bring

wrongful death actions based on those injuries.6   We affirm the

judgments dismissing those claims.

     6 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted by the
Massachusetts Defense Lawyers Association, the Massachusetts
Academy of Trial Attorneys, and Product Liability Advisory
Council, Inc., in the Fabiano case.
                                                                          5

     Background.    1.   Fabiano case.7   Ralph began smoking

cigarettes at the age of fifteen when he received free samples

of cigarettes, including "L&M" brand cigarettes manufactured by

Philip Morris USA Inc.     Ralph became addicted to smoking and

continued to buy and smoke L&M cigarettes for the next fifty

years.    Ralph regularly purchased L&M cigarettes from Shaw's

Supermarkets, Inc.    In 2004, Ralph was diagnosed with emphysema,

a form of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), caused

by long-term cigarette smoking.     He died of COPD on July 22,

2014.    Just under three years later, on July 14, 2017, Grace, as

personal representative of Ralph's estate, brought this wrongful

death suit against Philip Morris USA Inc. and Shaw's

Supermarkets, Inc. (collectively, Fabiano defendants).8         Grace's

amended complaint asserted wrongful death claims based on breach

of warranty, negligence, and conspiracy.      See G. L. c. 229, § 2.

     2.   Fuller case.    John began smoking "Camel" brand

cigarettes manufactured by R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company at the

age of seventeen and continued to do so for over forty years.

     7 Michael Cuddy was named special representative of the
estate of Ralph Fabiano in the original complaint. Grace was
subsequently appointed as personal representative; she filed an
amended complaint substituting herself for Cuddy. Cuddy is no
longer an active party in the case.

     8 Garber Bros, Inc., was also originally named as a
defendant. The company filed for bankruptcy shortly before the
case was brought, and all actions against it were stayed.
                                                                    6

John frequently purchased Camel cigarettes from Cumberland

Farms, Inc.   In 2012, John was diagnosed with lung cancer caused

by long-term cigarette smoking.   On March 21, 2016, Mary and

John brought a suit against R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company and

Cumberland Farms, Inc.9 (collectively, Fuller defendants),

alleging liability under G. L. c. 93A.    John subsequently died

from lung cancer on November 13, 2016.    On September 11, 2017,

Mary, as personal representative of John's estate, amended the

complaint, adding wrongful death claims based on breach of

warranty, negligence, and conspiracy.10

     3.   Motions disposing of wrongful death claims.    In the

respective cases, the Fabiano defendants moved to dismiss the

amended complaint and the Fuller defendants moved for partial

judgment on the pleadings with respect to the wrongful death

claims.   In each motion, the defendants relied on our decision

in GGNSC, 484 Mass. at 191, to argue that the wrongful death

claims were barred because the statute of limitations had lapsed

on the decedent's underlying claims at the time of the

decedent's death.   See G. L. c. 106, § 2-318 (three-year statute

     9 Garber Bros, Inc., was also named as a defendant in the
Fuller case. The parties, however, stipulated to dismiss the
claim against the company after it declared bankruptcy. See
note 8, supra.

     10Mary also individually asserted a claim of loss of
consortium against all defendants, the dismissal of which she
does not challenge on appeal.
                                                                   7

of limitations for breach of warranty actions); G. L. c. 260,

§ 2A (three-year statute of limitations for tort actions).

    The motions were allowed by different judges in the

Superior Court.   Both judges ruled that, because wrongful death

recovery is derivative of a decedent's own cause of action, the

wrongful death claims were precluded because each decedent could

not have brought claims based on the injuries that caused his

death had he survived.    Grace and Mary both appealed.11    We

allowed their applications for direct appellate review.

    Discussion.    1.    Right to wrongful death recovery.   The

right to recover for wrongful death finds its origin in the

common law.   See Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass. 60, 71 (1972).

Despite the common-law nature of wrongful death actions, we have

interpreted the wrongful death statute as establishing certain

requirements applicable to such actions, including

    "(a) requiring that damages recoverable for wrongful death
    be based upon the degree of the defendant's culpability;
    (b) prescribing the range of the damages recoverable
    against each defendant; (c) requiring that any action for
    wrongful death be brought by a personal representative on
    behalf of the designated categories of beneficiaries; and
    (d) requiring that the action be commenced within the
    specified period of time, as a limitation upon the remedy
    and not upon the right."

    11 Following the allowance of the Fuller defendants' motion
for judgment on the pleadings, trial commenced on Mary's G. L.
c. 93A claim. After trial, the judge concluded that the c. 93A
claim was time barred. Mary does not challenge that portion of
the judgment on appeal.
                                                                      8

Id.    In determining the parameters of recovery for wrongful

death, we begin first with the language of the statute, and "if

the language does not resolve the question, [we look] to the

common law for guidance."     GGNSC, 484 Mass. at 186-187.

       2.   Derivative nature of wrongful death claims.   In GGNSC,

we were called to determine whether G. L. c. 229, § 2, provided

rights to a decedent's statutory beneficiaries derivative of or

independent from the decedent's own cause of action for the

injuries that caused the decedent's death.     GGNSC, 484 Mass. at

184.    We concluded that wrongful death claims are derivative

based on the language of the wrongful death statute, augmented

by our interpretation of common-law wrongful death actions in

the Commonwealth over time and persuasive authority from other

jurisdictions.    Id. at 184, 187-191.

       In relevant part, G. L. c. 229, § 2 -- as it currently

stands -- provides for wrongful death liability where

       "[a] person who (1) by his negligence causes the death of a
       person, or (2) by willful, wanton or reckless act causes
       the death of a person under such circumstances that the
       deceased could have recovered damages for personal injuries
       if his death had not resulted, . . . or (5) is responsible
       for a breach of warranty arising under [art. 2 of G. L.
       c. 106] which results in injury to a person that causes
       death."

In 1958, the Legislature amended a previous iteration of the

statute by adding the language that, in part, undergirded our

conclusion in GGNSC that wrongful death claims are derivative.
                                                                    9

GGNSC, 484 Mass. at 187-188.   Specifically, the "Legislature

amended G. L. c. 229, § 2, to permit compensation only 'under

such circumstances that the deceased could have recovered

damages for personal injuries if his death had not resulted.'"

Id., quoting St. 1958, c. 238, § 1.

     In GGNSC, we noted that the "under such circumstances"

clause in the statute demonstrated the Legislature's intent to

"expressly tether[] a wrongful death claim to tortious conduct

that caused the decedent's personal injury."12   GGNSC, 484 Mass.

     12At oral argument, counsel for the Fuller defendants
argued for the first time that the Legislature did not intend to
make wrongful death claims derivative when it included the
"under such circumstances" clause in the 1958 version of the
wrongful death statute, but rather included the clause to
capture the categories of circumstances giving rise to wrongful
death enumerated in various sections of the 1949 version of the
statute. St. 1949, c. 427, § 2. The "under such circumstances"
clause, however, was not necessary to fulfill this purpose.
Indeed, the "under such circumstances" language (or a nearly
identical iteration thereof) predated the 1958 version of the
statute. See St. 1883, c. 243. We interpreted that language --
prior to the 1958 amendment -- as creating a right of recovery
derivative of the rights of the deceased. See Dacey v. Old
Colony R.R., 153 Mass. 112, 117 (1891) ("The purpose of the
statute is to permit the administrator to maintain an action for
the death when the intestate could have maintained an action if
he had recovered, and not otherwise. When his action would have
been defeated by the defence of common employment if he had
sued, the action of his administrator will be barred in the same
way in a suit brought on account of his death. This seems the
only reasonable interpretation of the statute"). We presume
that the Legislature was aware of our interpretation of this
language when it included nearly identical language in the 1958
version of the wrongful death statute. See Commonwealth v.
Colturi, 448 Mass. 809, 812 (2007). Thus, we see no reason to
revisit the interpretation we afforded the "under such
circumstances" clause in GGNSC, 484 Mass. at 187-188.
                                                                    10

at 188.   And we concluded specifically that the clause applied

to wrongful death actions caused by willful, wanton, or reckless

conduct, and by negligence.   Id.   But only wrongful death

actions based on negligence were at issue in that case.       Id.

Accordingly, we acknowledged that the statute permits wrongful

death recovery based on breach of warranty, but we did not

address explicitly that the "under such circumstances" clause

does not also follow the clause permitting wrongful death

recovery based on breach of warranty.    See id. at 188 n.14.

     The plaintiffs contend that, as a result, in GGNSC, 484

Mass. at 191, we left open the question whether wrongful death

actions based on breach of warranty are derivative.   We did not.

Our conclusion that wrongful death recovery as a whole is

derivative did not rely exclusively on the "under such

circumstances" clause.   Id. at 188-191.   Rather, by looking at

the language and structure of the wrongful death statute, we

discerned the Legislature's intent that any claim brought under

it "remain tied to the decedent's action."    See id. at 187-188

(considering "plain language of the section at issue by

analyzing the statute as a whole").13   In particular, this intent

     13In analyzing whether wrongful death actions under G. L.
c. 229, § 2, based on negligence were derivative, we also
considered that "the elements of our wrongful death action based
on negligence mirror those of an ordinary negligence claim."
GGNSC, 484 Mass. at 188. Notably, the same is true of actions
for wrongful death and claims for personal injury based on
                                                                    11

is demonstrated, in part, by the Legislature affording the

decedent's executor or administrator the exclusive right to

initiate a wrongful death suit under G. L. c. 229, § 2.

Although § 1 of the wrongful death statute identifies the

permissible beneficiaries of a wrongful death suit, the statute

does not permit those beneficiaries to bring suit, demonstrating

that an action for wrongful death belongs to the estate and that

the decedent's beneficiaries do not have a separate assertable

legal right in the decedent's life under the statute.     See

GGNSC, supra; G. L. c. 229, § 1.   This is true of all claims

brought under the wrongful death statue, including those based

on breach of warranty.

    In determining that wrongful death claims are derivative,

we also drew support from "'trend[s] in [our] law against

allowing' claims under G. L. c. 229, § 2, to be independent of

the decedent's own cause of action."   GGNSC, 484 Mass. at 190,

and cases cited.   Further, we joined the majority of States,

which "conclude that where an action for the injuries causing

the decedent's death 'could not have been brought by the

deceased, had he survived, . . . no right of action [for

wrongful death] . . . can vest in the deceased's administrator

or representative for the benefit of the beneficiaries.'"       Id.,

breach of warranty. See Haglund v. Philip Morris Inc., 446
Mass. 741, 743-745 (2006).
                                                                     12

quoting 12 Am. Jur. Trials, Wrongful Death Actions § 16, at 344-

345 (1966).

     3.    Statute of limitations in wrongful death statute.     With

wrongful death liability being derivative, the parties now

disagree over the time at which a wrongful death action may be

brought.     The dispute here arises primarily from the statute of

limitations set forth in G. L. c. 229, § 2, for commencement of

a wrongful death action.     The plaintiffs also rely on prior

amendments to the wrongful death statute to support their

position.

     a.    Language of statute.   Section 2 of G. L. c. 229

provides:    "An action to recover damages under this section

shall be commenced within three years from the date of death

. . . ."14    The plaintiffs contend that this language

unambiguously demonstrates the Legislature's intent to permit a

decedent's representative to bring a wrongful death action

within three years of the decedent's death, regardless of the

date of injury or whether the decedent's claim was time barred

at the time of death.     Their arguments misconstrue the reason

that their claims are barred.

     14The wrongful death statute also contains a discovery rule
permitting an action to be commenced "within three years from
the date when the deceased's executor or administrator knew, or
in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of
the factual basis for a cause of action," G. L. c. 229, § 2,
which is not at issue or applicable in these cases.
                                                                  13

    "A statute of limitations is a limitation on liability that

defines the time period within which a cause of action may be

brought.   A statute of limitations does not create a cause of

action that does not otherwise exist."   Sullivan v. Rich, 71

Mass. App. Ct. 16, 20 (2007).   Although the statute of

limitations in G. L. c. 229, § 2, sets the time period in which

a wrongful death action may be brought, it does not confer an

independent right to bring one.   See Gaudette, 362 Mass. at 71.

The right to bring a wrongful death action, being derivative, is

"dependent on the continuance of a right in the decedent to

maintain an action for his injury up to the time of his death"

(citation omitted).   GGNSC, 484 Mass. at 185, 190-191.

    Where a decedent had no right on the date of his or her

death to bring suit for the injury that caused his or her death,

no cause of action for wrongful death based on the death-causing

injury ever vests in the decedent's representative for the

benefit of the beneficiaries.   GGNSC, 484 Mass. at 190-191.

Because a cause of action for wrongful death never comes into

existence for the decedent's representative, it never accrues,

and the three-year statute of limitations designated by the

Legislature for wrongful death actions is never triggered.     See

McGuinness v. Cotter, 412 Mass. 617, 621 (1992), quoting Klein

v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 702 (1982) ("A statute of

limitations is a procedural measure which 'normally governs the
                                                                     14

time within which legal proceedings must be commenced after the

cause of action accrues'"); Doe No. 4 v. Levine, 77 Mass. App.

Ct. 117, 119 (2010), quoting Black's Law Dictionary 23 (9th ed.

2009) ("'Accrue' means '[t]o come into existence as an

enforceable claim or right'").      Thus, it is not the statute of

limitations for wrongful death that bars the plaintiffs' claims,

but the absence of any claim vested in them because the

decedents were unable to bring claims for their injuries at the

time of their deaths.

    b.      Statutory amendments.   Previous amendments to G. L.

c. 229, § 2, are inapposite and do not support the plaintiffs'

position.    Prior to 1981, the wrongful death statute, in

addition to providing a time period in which a cause of action

must be commenced, also provided that "[n]o recovery shall be

had . . . for a death which does not occur within two years

after the injury which caused the death."      G. L. c. 229, § 2, as

amended through St. 1979, c. 164, § 1.      In 1981, the Legislature

amended the statute by striking out the latter sentence limiting

recovery.    St. 1981, c. 493, § 1.    While the plaintiffs contend

that by doing so the Legislature clearly intended the statute of

limitations for wrongful death claims to be unaffected by the

date of the decedent's injury, the 1981 amendment did not

address the statute of limitations for wrongful death.       Nor did
                                                                  15

it have any impact on the derivative nature of the cause of

action.

    The amendment that the plaintiffs rely on left undisturbed

the three-year limitations period for commencement of an action

for wrongful death.   See G. L. c. 229, § 2, as amended through

St. 1981, c. 493, § 1.   The sentence that the amendment deleted

operated as a bar to recovery for wrongful death, regardless of

when a cause of action accrued or whether a complaint was filed

within the limitations period.   In that regard, the deleted

provision resembled a statute of repose.   See Bridgwood v. A.J.

Wood Constr., Inc., 480 Mass. 349, 352 (2018) ("A statute of

repose eliminates a cause of action at a specified time,

regardless of whether an injury has occurred or a cause of

action has accrued as of that date").

    The plaintiffs conflate these differing concepts.   Each of

these three particulars -- whether there is a cause of action

that has accrued, whether the limitations period has run (or

begun to run), and whether any statutory restrictions bar

recovery -- is separate and distinct from the others.   The

following example illustrates the distinction.   Suppose a

decedent was injured two and one-half years before dying from

that injury.   The applicable statute of limitations for her

personal injury claim would not have run at the time of her

death (six months remained on the claim), and so long as her
                                                                  16

claim was otherwise viable, a cause of action for wrongful death

would then vest in her representative upon her death.     The

wrongful death action having fallen to the representative, the

statute of limitations would accordingly begin to run for that

action on the date of death and would run for three years.

However, prior to 1981, no recovery would be permitted for such

an action under G. L. c. 229, § 2, as amended through St. 1979,

c. 164, § 1, because the decedent died more than two years after

the injury that caused her death.

    By contrast, in these cases, because the decedents both

died over three years after the injuries that caused their

deaths, by virtue of the running of the underlying statute of

limitations, they had no right to bring personal injury claims

for those injuries at the time that they died.   Thus, no right

of wrongful death ever fell to their representatives.    While,

given the timing of their deaths, the pre-1981 restriction on

recovery would have also precluded their representatives'

wrongful death actions, the elimination of the pre-1981

restriction -– which functioned as a statute of repose -- in no

way created a right in the decedents' representatives to bring a

wrongful death action that did not otherwise exist.     The statute

of limitations for wrongful death was therefore never implicated

in these cases.
                                                                   17

    The plaintiffs contend that our conclusion creates a rule

that a decedent's death must occur within three years of the

injury that caused it, and that this conclusion cannot be

reconciled with the 1981 amendment eliminating any bar to

recovery tied to the date of injury.   But the particular reason

why a decedent's personal injury claim is precluded at the time

of death –- here, the expiration of the statute of limitations

on the decedents' personal injury claims -- is not our focus

when determining whether a wrongful death action exists.

Rather, because a wrongful death claim is derivative, the same

outcome would result regardless of the reason that the

decedent's own claims were barred, whether it be because of an

arbitration agreement, a release from liability, or, as is the

circumstance in these cases, the statute of limitations.

    4.   Other jurisdictions.   Of the jurisdictions where

wrongful death liability is derivative, the vast majority that

have weighed in on this issue agree that, if the decedent's

underlying personal injury claim is barred by the statute of

limitations at the time of death, no right of wrongful death is

created in the representative of the decedent's estate for the

benefit of the beneficiaries.   See, e.g., Curtis v. Quality

Floors, Inc., 653 So. 2d 963, 964 (Ala. 1995) ("if a decedent's

cause of action is time-barred at his or her death, then the

decedent's personal representative cannot bring a wrongful death
                                                                   18

action"); Drake v. St. Francis Hosp., 560 A.2d 1059, 1062-1063

(Del. 1989) ("[wrongful death statute] imposes a condition

precedent to the accrual of a wrongful death cause of action

. . . , i.e., the decedent's ability to have maintained an

action and recovered damages, if death had not ensued.   [Where]

the decedent's medical malpractice action was time barred

. . . , no cause of action for wrongful death ever 'accrued' in

his survivors"); Mason v. Gerin Corp., 231 Kan. 718, 725 (1982)

("where the injured party could not have brought an action for

his personal injuries because the statute of limitations had run

against his claim prior to his death, a wrongful death action

cannot be maintained"); Estate of Stokes v. Pee Dee Family

Physicians, L.L.P., 389 S.C. 343, 349 (2010) ("a claim under

[the wrongful death statute] lies in the decedent's estate only

when the decedent possessed the right of recovery at his death.

. . . [T]he wrongful death statute of limitations does not serve

to revive a previously barred claim"); Russell v. Ingersoll-Rand

Co., 841 S.W.2d 343, 348-349 (Tex. 1992) ("if a decedent may not

maintain suit because of some defense -- release, res judicata,

limitations, etc. -- which may be properly interposed by

defendants, there is no wrongful death action to accrue.     The

action is not barred by limitations before it accrues; it never

accrues because the decedent could not maintain an action at his

death"); Edwards v. Fogarty, 962 P.2d 879, 883 (Wyo. 1998)
                                                                  19

("Where the statute of limitations has run on the underlying

cause of action and the injured party does not have a viable

claim at the time of his death, a wrongful death action by his

survivors is also barred").15

     The jurisdictions that permit wrongful death recovery

despite the expiration of the statute of limitations on the

decedent's underlying personal injury claims "tend to interpret

their wrongful death statute . . . as creating a new and

independent cause of action," see Mummert v. Alizadeh, 435 Md.

207, 224-225 (2013), and cases cited, or at least have been

unclear about the derivative nature of wrongful death liability.

For example, Colorado, to which the plaintiffs point for

support, has treated wrongful death actions as derivative in

some sense, see Stamp v. Vail Corp., 172 P.3d 437, 447 (2017),

but also has described such actions as "separate and distinct

from a cause of action the deceased could have maintained had he

survived," Allen v. Pacheco, 71 P.3d 375, 379 (Colo. 2003),

cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1212 (2004) (arbitration agreement

     15See also Estate of Hull v. Union Pac. R.R., 355 Ark. 547,
553 (2004); Toombs v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 833 So. 2d 109,
115-117 (Fla. 2002); Wyness v. Armstrong World Indus., 131 Ill.
2d 403, 408 (1989); Ogden v. Berry, 572 A.2d 1082, 1083-1084
(Me. 1990); Dunn v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 332 N.C. 129,
132-134 (1992); Deggs v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd., 186 Wash. 2d 716,
732 (2016).
                                                                  20

covered wrongful death action because of language in agreement,

rather than derivative nature of action).

     Under Colorado's reasoning, so long as a decedent, at some

point, had the right to maintain a cause of action for the

decedent's personal injuries, the condition precedent to having

a wrongful death action is satisfied, even if the decedent could

not have maintained such an action as of the date of death.     See

Rowell v. Clifford, 976 P.2d 363, 364-365 (Colo. App. 1998)

(recognizing interpretation of wrongful death statute differs

from other jurisdictions).   West Virginia, which has similarly

been unclear about whether it considers wrongful death liability

to be derivative, follows the same approach.   See Stonerise

Healthcare, LLC vs. Oates, W. Va. Sup. Ct. App., No. 19-0215

(June 16, 2020) (Workman, J., dissenting) (lack of clarity in

West Virginia whether wrongful death recovery is derivative).

But see Davis v. Foley, 193 W. Va. 595, 600 (1995) ("a wrongful

death action [is] a derivative claim"); Hoover's Adm'x v.

Chesapeake & O. Ry., 46 W. Va. 268, 270 (1899) ("if the

character of injury is such that the injured party could have at

any time maintained a suit in relation thereto, his

administrator could sue after his death," even where statute of

limitations for decedent's claims expired before death).16

     16To the extent that the parties on both sides rely on
cases from Mississippi and Connecticut to support their
                                                                  21

     In GGNSC, 484 Mass. 190-191, we were unequivocal that, in

Massachusetts, we follow the majority rule that wrongful death

liability is derivative.   Accordingly, we follow the majority

approach precluding recovery for wrongful death where the

statute of limitations on the decedent's underlying claims ran

before the decedent's death.17

positions, their reliance is misplaced. Both jurisdictions
treat wrongful death actions differently from how we do. In
Mississippi, for instance, where a wrongful death action is
based on personal injury to the decedent, as opposed to injuries
that the decedent's death caused to others, such as a loss of
consortium claim, the wrongful death action must be brought
within the statute of limitations associated with the underlying
personal injury claim. Caves v. Yarbrough, 991 So. 2d 142, 148-
150 (Miss. 2008). In Connecticut, similarly, where the basis of
a wrongful death action is a statutory action that did not exist
at common law, the wrongful death action is subject to the
statute of limitations associated with the underlying statutory
action, rather than the statute of limitations set out in the
wrongful death statute. Harvey v. Department of Correction, 337
Conn. 291, 298-300 (2020).

     By contrast, as we have stated, our conclusion is not that
wrongful death actions must be brought within the time permitted
by the statute of limitations for the underlying claim. Rather,
we conclude merely that the statute of limitations for the
underlying claim must not have expired at the time of the
decedent's death. In other words, the claim must be viable at
the time of the decedent's death for a wrongful death cause of
action to exist. If such an action exists, the statute of
limitations for wrongful death actions -- not the statute of
limitations for the underlying claim -- governs when a wrongful
death action may be brought.

     17While the plaintiffs argue that our conclusion produces
fundamental unfairness by forcing those suffering from life-
threating illnesses to make the untenable choice of filing suit
while they are suffering from the illness or forfeiting their
heirs' right to recovery in the event that the statute of
limitations runs before their death, our decision in no way
                                                                22

     Conclusion.   We affirm the judgments in both cases

dismissing the plaintiffs' wrongful death claims.18

                                    So ordered.

changes what has long been true of persons suffering from
serious injuries. Once those injuries are knowable, plaintiffs
must assert their rights within a specified period of time or
lose their ability to recover for their injuries. See Klein,
386 Mass. at 702. Because the right to recover for wrongful
death is derivative of a decedent's right to recover for his or
her injuries, if the decedent, during his or her life, loses or
otherwise forfeits the ability to recover, no right to recover
exists in his or her beneficiaries.

     18The requests for costs by both Grace and Philip Morris
USA Inc. are denied.