Court Opinion

ID: 9498459
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:17:52.646216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:50.567514
License: Public Domain

BROWNING, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holdings that California Vehicle Code § 10851(a) categorically qualifies as an aggravated felony “theft offense” for sentencing, and that Vidal’s conviction in fact qualifies under the modified categorical approach as a predicate conviction for sentence enhancement in this case. Accordingly, I would reverse the district court’s imposition of the enhancement, vacate Vi*1018dal’s sentence, and remand for resentenc-ing.1
A prior conviction categorically qualifies as a predicate offense for sentence enhancement if the full range of conduct covered by the statute of conviction falls within the generic federal-sentencing definition. Chang v. INS, 307 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir.2002); accord Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599-602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990); United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir.2002) (en banc). However, if such a statute is broader than the generic offense, ie., if it criminalizes both conduct that falls within the generic definition and conduct that does not, the statute of conviction cannot qualify categorically for enhancement purposes.2 Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599-602, 110 S.Ct. 2143; Penuliar v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir.2005); Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d at 1211.
Vidal asserts that § 10851(a) is broader than the generic definition of “theft offense” adopted by this court in Corona-Sanchez because, inter alia, it criminalizes aiders and abettors as well as accessories. I agree with the majority’s analysis that Application Note 4 to § 2L1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines is dispositive in this context as to the former.3 However, the majority fails to address adequately the latter, ante at 1017, and in doing so reaches an erroneous conclusion.
In relevant part § 10851(a) states the following are guilty of the public offense it describes: “[a]ny person who drives or takes a vehicle not his or her own ... or any person who is a party or an accessory to or an accomplice in” the same. Cal. Veh.Code § 10851(a). It is long settled that California law no longer recognizes any distinction between principals in the first degree, second degree (aiders and abettors present at the scene), or accessories before the fact (aiders and abettors not present).4 Additionally, California does not include as principals, “accessories,” i.e. formerly, “accessories after the fact.”5
As a result, the language of § 10851(a) extending liability to “an accessory to” the unlawful driving or taking of another’s vehicle can only be understood properly to *1019reach parties who sufficiently and knowingly aid a principal after the commission of the offense.6
Although Application Note 4 to § 2L1.2 extends sentencing liability to aiders and abettors, it does not extend it to accessories.7 Comparing the statute of conviction to the generic predicate offense definition, it is beyond dispute that, by criminalizing accessories, § 10851(a) covers a broader range of conduct than does the Sentencing Guidelines generic “theft offense.”8 As a result, a conviction under § 10851(a) cannot categorically qualify as a “theft offense” for sentence enhancement within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). See Penuliar, 395 F.3d at 1044-45.
Because § 10851(a) fails categorically, we continue with Taylor’s familiar “modified categorical” analysis in which we examine relevant, judicially noticeable documents in the record to determine if they “unequivocally establish[ ]” that the defendant in fact was convicted of, or pled guilty to, the generically defined crime. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d at 1211; accord United States v. Franklin, 235 F.3d 1165, 1170(9th Cir.2000) (listing documents which, for modified categorical analysis, can and cannot “clearly establish” defendant’s conduct).
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion, ante at 1016-1017, that any permissible combination of Vidal’s charging papers, signed plea agreement, and judgment of conviction is capable of “unequivocally,” or even clearly, establishing the nature of the conduct to which Vidal pled guilty.9 Effectively, each merely recites the generic language of § 10851(a).10 We have found previously that this is not enough to survive modified categorical analysis. United States v. Lopez-Montanez, 421 F.3d 926, 932 (9th Cir.2005) (finding a charging document which “simply restates the language of the statute” *1020unable to establish the elements of conviction for purposes of modified categorical analysis); accord Huerta-Guevara v. Ashcroft, 321 F.3d 883, 888 (9th Cir.2003) (“The difficulty is that the conviction’s label only goes so far; the conviction itself must meet the generic definition of theft no matter what the state calls it.”). Merely reciting the language of the statute tells the court no more than would a recitation of the code section-number alone. This is particularly so in this ease given the breadth of activity criminalized by and chargeable under § 10851(a).11
Therefore, because § 10851(a) does not qualify categorically as an aggravated felony “theft offense” for Sentencing Guidelines enhancement, and because the record does not unequivocally establish that Vidal in fact pled guilty to a “theft offense,” I would reverse the 8-level sentence enhancement, vacate Vidal’s sentence, and remand for resentencing.

. I concur in the majority's holding that Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), does not preclude the modified categorical approach of Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), see United States v. Smith, 390 F.3d 661, 666-67 (9th Cir.2004); and that on remand, following United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc), the district court should determine whether the sentence imposed would have been materially different had it known the sentencing guidelines were advisory.

. Although Taylor and Corona-Sanchez counsel that the term "theft offense" should be "read to incorporate different but closely related constructions in modern state statutes,” Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d at 1205 (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 590-91, 110 S.Ct. 2143), such reasoning cannot cure the overbreadth of a state statute which criminalizes categories of conduct which the generic sentencing definition does not. Such a conclusion is plainly inconsistent with Taylor’s primary holding. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599, 602.

. Application Note 4 in this context appears to add to § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C), effectively, the following italicized text: "after ... a conviction for an aggravated felony or aiding and abetting an aggravated felony, increase 8 levels.” See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2L1.2, cmt. n. 4 (2002).

. See Cal. Pen.Code § 31 (Deering 2005); La-Fave, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 13.1(e), at 333-36 (2003). California abolished such distinctions in 1872.

. See, e.g., People v. Mitten, 37 Cal.App.3d 879, 883, 112 Cal.Rptr. 713 (1974) (contrasting California's approach to that of several other states).

. Cal. Veh.Code § 10851(a) became effective in 1997, one hundred and twenty-five years after Cal. Pen.Code § 31 changed the State's approach to the naming of criminal parties. See also, LaFave, supra, § 13.6(a) "Accessory After the Fact”.

. The note in full states: "4. Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracies, and Attempts. _ Prior convictions of offenses counted under subsection (b)(1) include ... the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting, to commit such offenses.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. n. 4 (2002).

. In Corona-Sanchez, this court adopted the Seventh Circuit’s definition of "theft offense.” Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d at 1205("a taking of property or an exercise of control over property without consent with the criminal intent to deprive the owner of rights and benefits of ownership, even if such deprivation is less than total or permanent”). Given Application Note 4 to § 2L1.2, in this context, a "theft offense” includes the commission or attempt to commit, the aiding and abetting of, or the conspiracy to commit such an offense. It plainly does not cover accessorial liability.

. This Court is not permitted to notice for modified categorical analysis facts recited in Vidal’s presentence report. Franklin, 235 F.3d at 1171 (explaining "Taylor and this circuit in our precedents have foreclosed any approach that considers the underlying facts of prior convictions to determine whether a defendant was convicted by a jury or pleaded guilty to a predicate offense”).

. Vidal’s judgment of conviction refers only to "Count 1”; his plea agreement reveals that he pled guilty to "Count 1 10851(a)VC DRIVING A STOLEN VEHICLLE [sic]”; and his charging papers simply recite § 10851(a)'s generic statutory language with the date and Vidal's and another’s names inserted. See Excerpt of Record, at 39, 44, 46. Additionally, the variation in the wording of the charge in Vidal’s charging papers and plea is not insignificant. See infra note 10. Despite the majority's assertion, ante at 1017, the record raises, rather than resolves unequivocally, questions as to the nature of Vidal’s actions.

. California law is clear that § 10851(a) covers a range of conduct in concert with its larceny and joy-riding statutes, and contains distinct, alternate theories of "taking” and merely “driving.” See, e.g., People v. Ivans, 2 Cal.App.4th 1654, 1663, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 66 (1992); People v. Austell, 223 Cal.App.3d 1249, 1251-52, 273 Cal.Rptr. 212 (1990); People v. Donnell, 52 Cal.App.3d 762, 769, 125 Cal.Rptr. 310 (1975). The imprecision of Vidal's charging and plea documents is not insignificant; e.g., under California law, if a charging document "charges a defendant with both driving and taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent, it necessarily charges a violation of both” § 499b (California's "joyriding” statute) and § 10851. Ivans, 2 Cal. App.4th at 1663, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 66. Cal.Penal Code §§ 31, 971 permit an argument that Vidal's charging papers establish he was charged as a principal and not as an accessory. However, because the text of § 10851(a) itself extends liability to accessories, mere reference to general provisions of California's Penal Code cannot unequivocally support such a conclusion.