Court Opinion

ID: 9766935
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:03:37.406892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:27.335212
License: Public Domain

STORCKMAN, Presiding Judge
(concurring) .
I fully concur in the principal opinion by BARRETT, C., but believe there is still another reason why the state should not have been permitted to examine its witness John Boldizs in the manner it did.
When the prosecuting attorney asked the witness, “Was there anything ever said about your killing James Kinne for her”, the question was fully answered when the witness said: “Yes, sir.” The addition of the words “in a joking way” is not responsive to the question and appears to be entirely voluntary on the part of the witness, but there was no motion to strike.
Furthermore, as a general rule, the opinion or conclusion of a witness as to the meaning or effect of words spoken by another person is not admissible. See 23 C.J. S. Criminal Law § 878, p. 462, and State v. Irvin, 324 Mo. 217, 22 S.W.2d 772, 774 [4]. Whether the words were spoken by the defendant and her purpose in doing so were facts for the determination of the jury.
This is not to say that the circumstances under which the words were spoken and the attitude of the declarant at the time may not be fully developed as an aid to the jury in determining whether the words were spoken seriously or in jest. Nor does this opinion undertake to deal with the proper nature and extent of cross- or re-direct examination.
The standards for the impeachment of witnesses and the admission of substantive evidence especially in criminal cases are quite definitely established in this state and have been found quite satisfactory. They are generally in accord with those of other jurisdictions. In my opinion the instant record and circumstances do not present a proper case to vary or depart from these well-established rules