Court Opinion

ID: 9625437
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:41:05.76609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:08.673203
License: Public Domain

Fromme, J.,
dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority. The action in the trial court was terminated before the State’s first witness had been fully examined. The dismissal of the action came as a result of a determination by the court that the charge in the information as amended was not specific enough. *256The majority holds that the court’s action in fact amounted to a judgment of acquittal and therefore could not be the basis for an appeal. I do not agree that a judgment of acquittal was entered.
A judgment of acquittal in a criminal trial is a creature of statute. K.S.A. 22-3419 provides:
“(1) The court on motion of a defendant or on its own motion shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more crimes charged in the complaint, indictment or information after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such crime or crimes. If a defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence offered by the prosecution is not granted, the defendant may offer evidence without having reserved the right.” Emphasis supplied.
As is apparent from reading this statute a motion for judgment of acquittal may be entertained “after the evidence on either side is closed.” In the present case the trial court aborted the trial in the middle of the testimony of the first witness for the State.
The basis for the majority opinion contained in Syl. ¶ 1 is the federal case United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97, 57 L.Ed.2d 65, 98 S.Ct. 2187 (1978). In my view, it is taken out of context and is a misleading statement of law when applied to the facts of the present case. It should be noted the trial court in the Scott case entered a judgment of dismissal at the close of all the evidence. On appeal it was held that the action of the trial court in aborting the action at the close of all the evidence was at the request of the defendant who sought to have his trial terminated without submission of his guilt or innocence to the jury. The Scott court held a second trial of the defendant would not offend the double jeopardy clause. In Scott the trial court dismissed the charges on the ground that the defense had been prejudiced by preindictment delay. On appeal the judgment of dismissal entered by the trial court was reversed and the case was remanded for trial. The resolution of factual elements referred to in Scott concerned the trial court’s erroneous determination that the defense had been prejudiced by preindictment delay. This is entirely different from what we have in the present case.
In the Scott decision the United States Supreme Court overruled United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 43 L.Ed.2d 250, 95 S.Ct. 1006 (1975), and changed the previous conception of the protection afforded by the double jeopardy clause. The Scott court held: When a defendant seeks and obtains the termination of proceedings against him during a trial before any finding by *257the court or jury as to guilt or innocence and the trial court’s decision which terminated the case is reversed on appeal no interest protected by the double jeopardy clause is involved. In such case the defendant has not been deprived of his valued right to go to the first jury; only the public has been deprived of its valued right to one complete opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 54 L.Ed.2d 717, 98 S.Ct. 824 (1978).
The trial court in the present case dismissed the action. Defense counsel first argued that the amended information changed the theory of the case. That argument was not sustained by the trial court. It was then stipulated that there were fourteen corporations in the state using the “Bi-Agra Association” name. The defendant then argued the State could not prove ownership of the checks without having the officers of these corporations endorsed as witnesses. The argument was without merit. An officer of the corporation is not the only one who can establish ownership of the checks the corporation receives. The drawer could testify to this. These checks were apparently issued to buy shares of stock in the particular corporation and the drawer surely could testify to which corporation was entitled to receive his or her check. It is also possible that some employee other than an officer of the corporation could establish that his or her corporation was entitled to the proceeds of the checks.
The information was drawn to charge felony theft in violation of K.S.A. 21-3701. The trial court in dismissing the information stated that the original charges were duplicitous. After the amendment the trial court then stated the charges were not specific enough to be defended. I cannot agree with the trial court’s decision. The charge was that defendant had an intention to permanently deprive Bi-Agra Association of the money. Which particular Bi-Agra Association was the owner of a particular check was a matter of proof. If the checks had been made out to John Smith and it was stipulated at the trial there were fourteen John Smiths in Kansas, it would be a matter of proof whether the check belonged to John Smith of Topeka or of Wichita or of Kansas City or of Hutchinson or of some other city. Defendant did not request a bill of particulars.
We turn next to the question of jeopardy. The case was, in my opinion, improperly dismissed by the trial court on motion and *258with the consent of the defendant. K.S.A. 1977 Supp. 21-3108(l)(c) provides:
“(1) A prosecution is barred if the defendant was formerly prosecuted for the same crime, based upon the same facts, if such former prosecution:
“(c) Was terminated without the consent of the defendant after the defendant had been placed in jeopardy, ... A defendant is in jeopardy when he or she is put on trial in a court of competent jurisdiction upon an indictment, information or complaint sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and in the case of trial by jury, when the jury has been impaneled and sworn, or where the case is tried to the court without a jury, when the court has begun to hear evidence.” Emphasis supplied.
As I read the record in this case the trial was aborted by reason of defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges. Therefore the trial was terminated with the consent and at the insistence of the defendant and no interest protected by the double jeopardy clause is invaded. In this case the State should be allowed to appeal and seek reversal of such a midtrial termination of the proceedings in a manner favorable to and at the request of the defendant. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. at 100. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 57 L.Ed.2d 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141 (1978). This is borne out by the following statement taken from Scott:
“We think that in a case such as this the defendant, by deliberately choosing to seek termination of the proceedings against him on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence of the offense of which he is accused, suffers no injury cognizable under the Double Jeopardy Clause if the Government is permitted to appeal from such a ruling of the trial court in favor of the defendant. We do not thereby adopt the doctrine of ‘waiver’ of double jeopardy rejected in Green [Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 2 L.Ed.2d 199, 78 S.Ct. 221 (1957)], supra. Rather, we conclude that the Double Jeopardy Clause, which guards against Government oppression, does not relieve a defendant from the consequences of his voluntary choice. . . .” 437 U.S. at 99.
In summary I would hold the information was sufficient to state a crime under K.S.A. 21-3701. The proceedings were aborted on the motion of defendant and with his consent and further prosecution is not barred because of double jeopardy. Therefore the judgment dismissing the charges against the defendant should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
Miller and McFarland, JJ., join in the foregoing dissenting opinion.