Court Opinion

ID: 9640081
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:56:56.687248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:26.129872
License: Public Domain

ORDER ON PETITION TO REHEAR
Defendants, Chevco, Inc., d/b/a Curtis Products So. Central, Inc., and Concord Confections, Inc., filed a joint petition to rehear pursuant to Rule 39(a)(l)(2) and (3) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Defendants contend this Court, in vacating the Trial Court’s grant of partial summary judgment as a matter of law to them, did not apply the proper analysis under TenmR.Civ. P. 56 and failed to properly utilize the parties’ stipulations in its analysis.
Citing Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn.1993), and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), Defendants contend that summary judgment is appropriate where the moving party shows the plaintiff has no proof to establish a necessary element of her claim. Defendants argue the Tidal Court correctly found they were entitled to partial summary judgment as a matter of law because they established there were no genuine issues of material fact since the *262Plaintiffs, Carol and Randall Hankins, had no expert medical proof that the gumball at issue caused Plaintiff Carol Hankins’ temporomandibular joint disorder (“TMJ”).
Defendants’ petition to rehear focuses exclusively on proof regarding the causation of Plaintiff Carol Hankins’ TMJ condition itself. It is noteworthy that Defendants, in their petition to rehear, completely disregard the issue of causation of Plaintiff Carol Hankins’ TMJ symptoms, which, from the record before us, arguably arose after the September 12, 1992, gumball incident, and instead focus solely on causation of Plaintiff Carol Hankins’ TMJ itself. In deciding this matter, we, as discussed in our Opinion, found that the pivotal issue was not causation of the TMJ condition itself, but rather was the cause of Plaintiff Carol Hankins’ TMJ becoming symptomatic. Hankins v. Chevco, Inc., 90 S.W.3d 254, 260-61 (Tenn.Ct.App.2002). Relying upon our Supreme Court’s decision in Staples v. CBL & Assoc., 15 S.W.3d 83, 88 (Tenn.2000), and this Court’s decision in Madison v. Love, No. E2000-01692-COA-RM-CV, 2000 WL 1036362, 2000 Tenn.App. LEXIS 495 (Tenn.Ct.App. July 28, 2000), no appl. perm. app. filed, we held that Defendants, to properly support their motion for partial summary judgment, “were required to ‘either affirmatively negate an essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or conclusively establish an affirmative defense.’ ” Id., at 260. We further stated, in pertinent part, as follows:
As discussed, the record does contain testimony from Dr. Smith and Dr. Tipps regarding causation of Plaintiffs TMJ condition itself. While this testimony may well have negated the essential element of causation as to the cause of Plaintiffs TMJ condition, this testimony, at most, only nips at the heels of causation of Plaintiffs TMJ symptoms and does not negate Plaintiffs claim of causation. [Madison v. Love, 2000 WL 1036362, at *2, 2000 TenmApp. LEXIS 495, at *4], According to Madison v. Love, Defendants, to successfully negate Plaintiffs claim of causation as to her TMJ symptoms, would have had to submit admissible expert testimony that Plaintiffs TMJ symptoms were not causally-related to the gumball. [Madison v. Love, 2000 WL 1036362, at *2, 2000 TenmApp. LEXIS 495, at *5].
Id., at 261. Defendants apparently argue that while Staples v. CBL & Assoc. is all right as far “as stating the general law with regard to summary judgments ...,” somehow the clear and specific language of our Supreme Court quoted in our opinion concerning the burden placed on the party moving for summary judgment is not the law in Tennessee. This Court is not at liberty to ignore the specific dictates of our Supreme Court.
After a review of Defendants’ petition to rehear, our Opinion, and applicable law, we hold that a rehearing of this matter is not warranted under Tenn. R.App. P. 39(a) since our Opinion: (1) does not incorrectly state material facts set forth in the record; (2) is not in conflict with a statute, prior decision, or other principle of law; and (3) does not overlook or misapprehend a material fact or proposition of law. Accordingly, Defendants’ petition to rehear is not well-taken.
Defendants’ petition for rehearing is DENIED. Costs related to this petition to rehear are assessed to the Defendants, Chevco, Inc., d/b/a Curtis Products So. Central, Inc., and Concord Confections, Inc.
/s/ D. Michael Swiney D. MICHAEL SWINEY, J.
isl Houston M. Goddard *263HOUSTON M. GODDARD, P. J.
/s/ Herschel P. Franks HERSCHEL P. FRANKS, J.