Court Opinion

ID: 9902054
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 20:09:09.909082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:43.827610
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Mullins, 2023-Ohio-4230.]

                                       COURT OF APPEALS
                                   COSHOCTON COUNTY, OHIO
                                   FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 STATE OF OHIO                                 JUDGES:
                                               Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
         Plaintiff-Appellee                    Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
                                               Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
 -vs-
                                               Case No. 2023CA0005
 CHRISTOPHER MULLINS

          Defendant-Appellant                  OPINION

 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS:                     Appeal from the Coshocton County Court
                                               of Common Pleas, Case No. 2022 CR
                                               0055

 JUDGMENT:                                     Affirmed

 DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                       November 21, 2023

 APPEARANCES:

 For Plaintiff-Appellee                        For Defendant-Appellant

 BENJAMIN E. HALL                              BRIAN W. BENBOW
 Coshocton County Prosecuting Attorney         265 Sunrise Center Drive
                                               Zanesville, Ohio 43701
 CHRISHANA L. CARROLL
 Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
 318 Chestnut Street
 Coshocton, Ohio 43812
Coshocton County, Case No. 2023CA0005                                                                         2

Hoffman, J.
        {¶1}     Defendant-appellant Christopher Mullins appeals the judgment entered by

the Coshocton County Common Pleas Court convicting him following his pleas of no

contest to aggravated vehicular homicide (R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a),(B)(3)) and vehicular

assault (R.C. 2903.08(A)(2)(b),(C)(2)), sentencing him to an aggregate term of

incarceration of ten to ten and one-half years, and imposing a lifetime driver’s license

suspension. Plaintiff-appellee is the state of Ohio.

                                STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE1

        {¶2}     On October 18, 2021, Deputy Albert Havranek was dispatched to a two-

vehicle accident in Coshocton County. While en route to the scene, the deputy was

advised by dispatch the operator of one of the vehicles fled on foot in an unknown

direction.

        {¶3}     While traveling northbound on County Road 10, a Honda CRV in which

Charlotte and Raymond Goodwill were traveling was struck by a Chevy pickup truck

which crossed the centerline. Raymond Goodwill died of injuries received in the accident.

        {¶4}     Witnesses at the scene did not see the operator of the truck. The driver’s

side airbag on the pickup had deployed and was swabbed for blood. Blood was also

located on the inside door panel of the driver’s door. The plate on the truck was registered

to Inky Twinkles LTD, who reported the vehicle had been stolen.                            A black hooded

sweatshirt was found in the vehicle containing Appellant’s identification.

        {¶5}     Officers used an aerial drone equipped with a flare device to check the area

for a suspect, but were unable to locate any heat signature which would be given off by

1 Because Appellant waived the presentation of facts at his plea hearing, the facts as set forth in this opinion

are from the presentence investigation report (hereinafter “PSI”).
Coshocton County, Case No. 2023CA0005                                                   3

a human. A BOLO was issued to surrounding counties for Appellant. Dispatch attempted

a ping of Appellant’s cell phone, and located the phone near an address in Tuscarawas

County; however, officers were unable to locate Appellant at this address.

       {¶6}   On December 9, 2021, the Bureau of Criminal Investigation (hereinafter

“BCI”) notified the Coshocton County Sheriff’s Department the DNA swab submitted

matched Appellant’s DNA.      BCI requested a further sample to confirm the match.

Appellant was picked up and held in the Coshocton County Justice Center. A warrant

was issued for Appellant’s DNA. BCI subsequently confirmed the blood sample taken

from the pickup truck at the scene of the accident matched Appellant’s DNA.

       {¶7}   Appellant was indicted by the Coshocton County Grand Jury with

aggravated vehicular homicide, vehicular assault, and two counts of failure to stop after

an accident. Appellant entered a plea of no contest to aggravated vehicular homicide

and vehicular assault, and the State entered a nolle prosequi of the two counts of failure

to stop after an accident. The trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of incarceration

of seven to ten and one-half years for aggravated vehicular homicide and to thirty-six

months for vehicular assault, to be served consecutively. The trial court imposed a

lifetime driver’s license suspension for aggravated vehicular homicide. It is from the

January 26, 2023 judgment of the trial court Appellant prosecutes his appeal, assigning

as error:

              I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN

       IMPOSING A SEVEN YEAR SENTENCE FOR A VIOLATION OF

       AGGRAVATED VEHICULAR HOMICIDE WHEN THERE WERE NO
Coshocton County, Case No. 2023CA0005                                                        4

       AGGRAVATING FACTORS IN HOW APPELLANT COMMITTED THE

       OFFENSE. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE

       SENTENCES THAT WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND

       THUS CONTRARY TO LAW.

              II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING A LIFETIME

       DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSION THAT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY

       THE RECORD AND THUS CONTRARY TO LAW.

              III. IT WAS PLAIN ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO IMPOSE

       SENTENCE UNDER THE REAGAN TOKES LAW BECAUSE ITS

       PROVISIONS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL NULLITIES.

                                                  I.

       {¶8}   In his first assignment of error, Appellant first argues the trial court erred in

imposing a minimum sentence of seven years for aggravated vehicular homicide because

there were no aggravating factors present.

       {¶9}   We review felony sentences using the standard of review set forth in R.C.

2953.08. State v. Roberts, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2020 CA 0030, 2020-Ohio-6722, ¶13,

citing State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231. R.C.

2953.08(G)(2) provides we may either increase, reduce, modify, or vacate a sentence

and remand for sentencing where we clearly and convincingly find either the record does

not support the sentencing court's findings under R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D),

2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or 2929.20(l), or the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. Id.,

citing State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659.
Coshocton County, Case No. 2023CA0005                                                       5

       {¶10} When sentencing a defendant, the trial court must consider the purposes

and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and

recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12. State v. Hodges, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99511, 2013-

Ohio-5025, ¶ 7.

       {¶11} “The overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the public from

future crime by the offender and others, to punish the offender, and to promote the

effective rehabilitation of the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court

determines accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state

or local government resources.” R.C. 2929.11(A). To achieve these purposes, the

sentencing court shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the

offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution

to the victim of the offense, the public, or both. Id. Further, the sentence imposed shall be

“commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and

its impact on the victim, and consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes by

similar offenders.” R.C. 2929.11(B).

       {¶12} R.C. 2929.12 lists general factors which must be considered by the trial

court in determining the sentence to be imposed for a felony, and gives detailed criteria

which do not control the court's discretion, but which must be considered for or against

severity or leniency in a particular case. The trial court retains discretion to determine the

most effective way to comply with the purpose and principles of sentencing as set forth in

R.C. 2929.11. R.C. 2929.12.

       {¶13} Nothing in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) permits this Court to independently weigh

the evidence in the record and substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court to
Coshocton County, Case No. 2023CA0005                                                                   6

determine a sentence which best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and R.C.

2929.12. State v. Jones, 1163 Ohio St.3d 242, 69 N.E.3d 649, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 42.

Instead, we may only determine if the sentence is contrary to law.

        {¶14} A sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial

court “considers the principles and purposes of R.C. 2929.11, as well as the factors listed

in R.C. 2929.12, properly imposes post release control, and sentences the defendant

within the permissible statutory range.” State v. Pettorini, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2020 CA

00057, 2021-Ohio-1512, 2021 WL 1714216, ¶¶ 14-16 quoting State v. Dinka, 12th Dist.

Warren Nos. CA2019-03-022 & CA2019-03-026, 2019-Ohio-4209, ¶ 36.

        {¶15} The trial court stated in both the sentencing entry and orally at the

sentencing hearing it had considered the statutory sentencing criteria. The sentence is

within the permissible statutory range.             We find the sentence is not clearly and

convincingly contrary to law, and this Court is not permitted to independently weigh the

statutory factors and substitute our judgment for the trial court. Jones, supra.

        {¶16} Appellant next argues the trial court failed to make the requisite findings for

the imposition of consecutive sentences at the sentencing hearing,2 and further the record

does not support the trial court’s findings.

        {¶17} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) provides:

                (4) If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions

        of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison

        terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is

        necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender

2 At oral argument in this matter, counsel for Appellant conceded the trial court did make the appropriate

findings for imposing consecutive sentences during sentencing.
Coshocton County, Case No. 2023CA0005                                                      7

       and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness

       of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public,

       and if the court also finds any of the following:

              (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses

       while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction

       imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised

       Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.

              (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of

       one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of

       the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single

       prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses

       of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.

              (c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that

       consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime

       by the offender.

       {¶18} The trial court must make the R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings at the sentencing

hearing and incorporate its findings into its sentencing entry, but it has no obligation to

state reasons to support its findings, nor must it recite certain talismanic words or phrases

in order to be considered to have complied. State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-

Ohio-3177, syllabus.

       {¶19} In deciding whether to impose consecutive sentencing, the trial court is to

consider the aggregate term of incarceration which will result from consecutive
Coshocton County, Case No. 2023CA0005                                                       8

sentencing.   State v. Gwynne, 2022-Ohio-4607, 2022 WL 17870605, ¶¶14-15.                   In

Gwynne, the Ohio Supreme Court recently clarified the standard of review this Court is to

use on review of consecutive sentences:

              It is important to understand that the standards referenced above

      have very specific meanings and fall into one of two categories—either a

      standard of review or an evidentiary standard of proof. “Abuse of discretion,”

      “clearly erroneous,” and “substantial evidence” are traditional forms of

      appellate-court deference that are applied to a trial court's decisions. They

      are standards of review that are applied by a reviewing court to certain

      decisions that are made by a fact-finder. They are, in essence, screens

      through which reviewing courts must view the original fact-finder's decision.

      In contrast, “preponderance,” “clear and convincing,” and “beyond a

      reasonable doubt” are evidentiary standards of proof. These standards

      apply to a fact-finder's consideration of the evidence. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)’s

      requirement that appellate courts apply the clear-and-convincing standard

      on review indicates that the legislature did not intend for appellate courts to

      defer to a trial court's findings but to act as a second fact-finder in reviewing

      the trial court's order of consecutive sentences.

              In this role as a finder of fact, the appellate court essentially functions

      in the same way as the trial court when imposing consecutive sentences in

      the first instance. There are three key differences, however. The first

      difference, which is discerned from the language of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), is
Coshocton County, Case No. 2023CA0005                                                9

     that the appellate court is constrained to considering only the findings in

     R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) that the trial court has actually made. In other words, a

     reviewing court cannot determine for itself which of the three permissible

     findings within R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c) might apply to satisfy the third

     required finding for imposing consecutive sentences, as the trial court is

     permitted to do. The second difference involves the standard of proof.

     Whereas the trial court's standard of proof under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) is a

     preponderance of the evidence—i.e., that when considered as a whole, the

     evidence demonstrates that the proposition of fact represented by the

     finding is more likely true, or more probable, than not—an appellate court

     applies a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof. And the third

     difference is the inversion of the ultimate question before the court.

            Whereas the trial court is tasked with determining whether the

     proposition of fact represented by each finding is more likely—or more

     probably—true than not, an appellate court's task is to determine whether it

     has a firm belief or conviction that the proposition of fact represented by

     each finding is not true on consideration of the evidence in the record.

            Thus, when viewed in its proper context, the deference that a trial

     court's consecutive-sentence findings receive comes from the language of

     R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), which imposes a higher evidentiary standard to reverse

     or modify consecutive sentences. It does not stem from any statutory

     requirement that the appellate court defer to the trial court's findings when
Coshocton County, Case No. 2023CA0005                                                  10

       considering whether reversal or modification is appropriate under R.C.

       2953.08(G)(2).

       {¶20} Id. at ¶¶20-22.

       {¶21} The trial court made the requisite findings at the sentencing hearing as

follows:

              In imposing consecutive sentences, the Court finds that consecutive

       service is necessary to protect the public from future crime and to punish

       the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the

       seriousness of the offender’s conduct at to the danger the offender poses

       to the public. Specifically, the Court finds that both of these offenses were

       committed while the defendant was under a community control sanction.

       The Court also finds that the defendant’s history of criminal conduct

       demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the

       public from future crime by the offender.

       {¶22} Sent. Tr. 34.

       {¶23} Before announcing its sentence, the trial court stated on the record at the

sentencing hearing:

              Let me also note that, while Mr. DeLaCruz is correct, that this was

       an accident, there’s no evidence that the defendant intended to harm
Coshocton County, Case No. 2023CA0005                                                11

     anyone that evening when he drove that car. The issue before the Court is

     that, while it was an accident, it caused the death of someone else with

     regard to Count 1. You caused the death of another person. And, as noted

     in the body of the charge, Mr. Mullins, you were driving under a suspension.

     It was a court suspension for a drug charge at the time. You shouldn’t have

     even been driving that vehicle, and I think that’s what Ms. Goodwill was

     expressing at the end of the victim’s statement.

            And then, of course, is Count 2, not to be forgotten, that you caused

     someone serious physical harm.

            There is also the issue of the defendant’s version of the events. But,

     because we did not have a trial here, the Court views the official version as

     set forth in the pre-sentence investigation, and then the Court gets to see

     the defendant’s criminal history.

            I am not going to consider the arguments or allegations that they may

     be whether they are contained in the pre-sentence investigation report or

     whether they were mentioned here that Mr. Mullins fled the scene. Those

     two charges were the subject of the dismissal or nolle prosequi. So we’re

     just looking at the accident itself that caused the death of one person and

     seriously harmed another.

            So, I look at the criminal history as noted. The defendant was under

     a driver’s license suspension and that’s for aggravated possession of drugs

     from Case 2019-CR-070305 out of Tuscarawas County. What is of note is

     that the defendant was also under a community control sanction for that
Coshocton County, Case No. 2023CA0005                                               12

     case, or what we call probation, at the time these offenses were committed.

     He was under felony probation.

            More alarming is the conviction in 2013 for the illegal assembly of

     chemicals for the manufacture of drugs, a felony of the second degree. At

     that time Mr. Mullins was sentenced to serve a five-year term of

     incarceration in a state penal institution.

            I also note that prior to that, in 2005, Mr. Mullins was convicted of

     breaking and entering and possession of drugs, both felonies of the fifth

     degree in Portage County, Ohio. The defendant was placed on probation

     at that time.

            The Court also notes that for the 2019 offense, out of Tuscarawas

     County, the defendant was afforded an opportunity to rehabilitate through a

     drug and alcohol rehabilitation program, known as Cedar Ridge.          The

     defendant had that program made available to him at that time. So the

     defendant was on probation, had been to treatment, and had the two prior

     felony convictions. We’ll make that three if we include the Tuscarawas

     County case.

            So, Mr. Mullins, you come before the Court having previously been

     on probation, having previously been afforded drug and alcohol

     rehabilitation with three prior convictions, and then that night you decided

     to drive while you were under suspension.

     {¶24} Sent. Tr. 30-33.
Coshocton County, Case No. 2023CA0005                                                          13

       {¶25} Upon review of the sentencing transcript and the presentence investigation

filed under seal in this case, we are not “left with a firm belief or conviction that the findings

are not supported by the evidence.” See Gwynne, supra at ¶27. There were two victims

in the instant case, one who died as a result of the vehicle accident, and one who was

seriously injured. Appellant was on probation and under a license suspension at the time

of the incident.     Appellant’s criminal record reflected several felonies and several

opportunities for rehabilitation. We find the trial court did not err in its imposition of

consecutive sentences.

       {¶26} The first assignment of error is overruled.

                                                   II.

       {¶27} In his second assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in

imposing a lifetime driver’s license suspension for aggravated vehicular homicide.

       {¶28} R.C. 2903.06(B)(3) provides that in addition to any other sanctions, the trial

court shall impose a class two suspension of a defendant’s operator’s license following a

conviction of aggravated vehicular homicide. R.C. 4510.02(A)(2) provides a class two

suspension is for a period of three years to life.

       {¶29} The decision of whether to suspend a defendant’s license and whether to

suspend it for the maximum period imposed by statute is within the discretion of the trial

court. See, e.g., State v. Foureman, 68 Ohio App.3d 162, 166, 587 N.E.2d 925, 928 (12th

Dist. Preble1990). The trial court made the following findings concerning its decision to

impose a lifetime license suspension:
Coshocton County, Case No. 2023CA0005                                                       14

              All right. The Court needs to impose a mandatory driver’s license

       suspension. The Court notes, again, that the defendant was driving under

       a drug offense suspension at the time that he committed the offense. The

       Court further notes from the pre-sentence investigation and report that Mr.

       Mullins has a significant driving record, which includes driving under

       Financial Responsibility Act suspension and OVI, as well as flee and allude.

       Therefore, the Court finds that only a lifetime driver’s license suspension is

       appropriate in this matter.

       {¶30} Sent. Tr. 37.

       {¶31} Based on the circumstances of the accident in the instant case, as well as

Appellant’s significant driving record, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

imposing a lifetime suspension. The second assignment of error is overruled.

                                                 III.

       {¶32} In his third assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in

imposing sentence for aggravated vehicular homicide under the Reagan Tokes Act, which

he argues is unconstitutional. The Ohio Supreme Court has found the Reagan Tokes Act

to be constitutional. State v. Hacker, Slip Op. No. 2023-Ohio-2535, 2023 WL 4750237.

The third assignment of error is overruled.
Coshocton County, Case No. 2023CA0005                                         15

      {¶33} The judgment of the Coshocton County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.

By: Hoffman, J.
Gwin, P.J. and
Baldwin, J. concur