Court Opinion

ID: 9609969
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:34:20.734326+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:55.089629
License: Public Domain

SCHROEDER, Justice,
specially concurs.
Instruction No. 14 states the following:
In order for the Defendant to be guilty of COUNT III — POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE, the State must prove each of the following:
1. On or about July 4,1995,
2. in the State of Idaho,
3. the Defendant, CHRISTOPHER AVON TUCKER, possessed Methamphetamine, and
4. the Defendant knew or should have known that it was either Methamphetamine or a controlled substance.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the Defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the Defendant guilty.
Under Idaho law Methamphetamine is a controlled substance.
A person has possession of something if the person knows of its presence and has physical control of it, or has the power and intention to control it. More than one person can be in possession of something if each knows of its presence and has the power and intention to control it.
The language in subpart 4. “should have known that it was either Methamphetamine or a controlled substance” is inappropriate. The instruction would allow conviction of a person who possessed a controlled substance but who did not know the nature of the substance. It is clear that if one possesses a controlled substance different from the one he or she thought but believed it to be a controlled substance, that person is guilty of possession of whatever controlled substance it turns out to be. However, if a person possesses a controlled substance in the mistaken belief that it is a different substance that is in fact legal to possess, there is no violation of the law. The instruction as written imposes a negligence standard on conduct rather than the standard of criminal intent.
The problem arises from several eases. The manual on Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions includes a reference to State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 866 P.2d 181 (1993). However, Fox did not involve a mistake of fact. It involved a mistake of law. Fox knew he possessed ephedrine, but he did not know that it was illegal. The mistake of law was not a defense. Subsequently, in State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 945 P.2d 1 (1997), this Court recited the “should have known” portion of the instruction. However, the text of the opinion acknowledges that the lack of knowledge of the nature of the substance would be a defense:
Fox is distinguishable from the present case, for Lamphere’s defense was that he did not know the nature of the residue in the vial that he possessed, not, as in Fox, that he did not know the illegal nature of the substance he possessed.
In light of the above, we hold that W.P.’s testimony was relevant to the issue of knowledge of what the substance was, an element of the offense of possession of a controlled substance. W.P.’s testimony could have corroborated L.P.’s testimony that she thought the vial was her daughter’s and that she was having Lamphere check into what was in it. The testimony would also have corroborated Lamphere’s testimony that he did not know what the vial’s contents were. Testimony regarding Lamphere’s non-ownership of the vial would bolster his contention that he did not know what the vial’s contents were. Accordingly, the district court erred in excluding W.P.’s testimony as irrelevant.
*179The instruction as given in this case and as contained in the Instruetion Manual, would allow conviction under these circumstances: A person has a good faith belief that he is in possession of a packet of sugar. The substance is in fact cocaine. The jury could return a verdict of guilty, finding that the individual actually believed that he was in possession of sugar, but the jury thinks he should have known it was cocaine or another controlled substance. That would run directly contrary to Idaho Code Section 18-201 which provides the following:
Persons Capable of Committing Crimes.— All persons are capable of committing crimes, except those belonging to the following classes:
1.Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged under an ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves any criminal intent.
If a person possesses a substance that he actually believes is a legal substance, he is not guilty of possession of a controlled substance, even if a jury could conclude that he should have known better.
This issue was not raised on appeal and, under the circumstances of this case, does not provide the defendant with relief. However, it is worthy of note to avoid the appearance that this instruction is sanctioned and to avoid repetition of the error in the future.