Court Opinion

ID: 9567895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:58:50.262958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:21:50.150147
License: Public Domain

Justice Lake
concurring in result.
It is elementary that a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States interpreting the Constitution of the United States is binding upon this Court and, although we may believe it to be erroneous, we must give it full effect in cases coming before us. It is equally elementary that a decision of a court of last resort, declaring or interpreting a rule of law, is retroactive and applies to all cases thereafter to be decided, irrespective of when they arose, unless the court which rendered that decision declares otherwise. This is more clearly true when there has been no prior conflicting decision by that court. This Court does not have authority to declare a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States non-retroactive. In the silence of that Court on that question a decision by it, interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, gives to that clause the meaning so declared just as if the interpretation had been expressly written into it at the time the Amendment was ratified.
To hold, as the majority opinion does, that Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. - -, 44 L.Ed. 2d 508, declares that the instruction given the jury in the case now before us, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but that we will, nevertheless, refuse to order a new trial is for this Court to deny to this defendant his right under the United States Constitution. I agree that to give Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, retroactive effect and to hold that it declares the instruction in question is contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would be disastrous, for such ruling would require a new trial, not only for this defendant, but for an unknown number, perhaps hundreds, of prisoners now serving sentences for murders of which this Court has held they were lawfully convicted. The practical effect would be to release most of these convicted murders upon society, since loss of witnesses, due to the passage of time, would, in most instances, pre*657vent conviction upon a retrial. This disaster can be averted if the Supreme Court of the United States declares Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, to be non-retroactive, a consummation devoutly to be desired, but this Court has no authority so to declare and, as of this date, the Supreme Court of the United States has not done so.
There is a way, however, whereby this Court can avoid this disastrous result and, in my opinion, should do so. That is to hold, as I believe is correct, that Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, does not declare the instruction given to the jury by the Superior Court in Hankerson’s case a violation of the Due Process Clause. If that be true, Hankerson is not entitled to a new trial and the majority opinion has reached the correct result for the wrong reason.
This is the instruction in question:
“Under our system, when a person is charged with a crime and he pleads not guilty he does not have to prove that he is innocent, he is presumed innocent, and the burden of proof is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty before you can find him guilty.
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“I charge that for you to find the defendant guilty of second degree murder [the crime with which Hankerson was charged and of which he stands convicted], the State must prove two things beyond a reasonable doubt * * * that the defendant intentionally and without justification or excuse and with malice shot Gregory Ashe with a deadly weapon. Malice * * * means that condition of mind which prompts a person to take the life of another intentionally, or to intentionally inflict a wound with a deadly weapon upon another which proximately results in his death without just cause, excuse or justification.
* * *
“In order to reduce the crime from second degree murder to manslaughter, the defendant must prove not beyond a reasonable doubt but simply to your satisfaction that there was no malice on his part. And in order to excuse his act altogether on the grounds of self defense, the defendant must prove not beyond a reasonable doubt but simply to your satisfaction that he acted in self defense.
*658* * *
“So I charge you, Ladies and Gentlemen, if you find from the evidence and beyond a reasonable doibbt that on or about September 29, 1974, the defendant, Johnnie B. Hankerson, intentionally and with malice and without justification or excuse [i.e., not in self defense] shot Gregory Ashe with a deadly weapon, thereby proximately causing Gregory Ashe’s death, nothing else appearing, it would be your duty to return a verdict of guilty of second degree murder. However, if you do not so find, or have a reasonable doubt as to one or more of these things, you will not return a verdict of guilty of second degree murder.” (Emphasis added.)
By this instruction the trial judge put squarely upon the State the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of second degree murder, namely: (1) The defendant shot Ashe; (2) he thereby proximately caused Ashe’s death; (3) he shot Ashe with malice (i.e., intentionally and with a deadly weapon) ; (4) he shot Ashe without justification or excuse (i.e., not in self defense).
Clearly, if this were all that the jury was told, the rule of Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, would be fully satisfied. But, says the majority, this is not all they were told. They were also told that to reduce the offense to manslaughter the defendant must prove to the jury’s satisfaction he did not shoot Ashe with malice, and to excuse the killing entirely on the ground of self defense, the defendant must prove to the jury’s satisfaction that he killed Ashe in self defense, the elements of which were correctly defined.
At first glance it seems inconsistent and contradictory to instruct the jury that the State has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the presence of malice and absence of the justification of self defense and the defendant has the burden of proving to the satisfaction of the jury the absence of malice or the presence of the justification of self defense. This Court has, however, held to the contrary many times, the harmonizing factor lying in the meaning of the term “to the satisfaction of the jury.”
*659In State v. Freeman, 275 N.C. 662, 666, 170 S.E. 2d 461, Justice Sharp, now Chief Justice, speaking for a unanimous Court, said:
“These cases [citations omitted] enunciate and reiterate the rule — established in our law for over one hundred years, State v. Willis, 63 N.C. 26 (1868) — that when the burden rests upon an accused to establish an affirmative defense or to rebut the presumption of malice which the evidence has raised against him, the quantum of proof is to the satisfaction of the jury — not by the greater weight of the evidence nor beyond a reasonable doubt — but simply to the satisfaction of the jury.”
In Stansbury, North Carolina Evidence (Brandis Revision), § 214, it is said that proving the presence of self defense or the absence of malice “to the satisfaction of the jury” does not require a showing “by the greater weight of the evidence.”
If the defendant can satisfy this requirement by less than the “greater weight” of the evidence; that is by less persuasive, less convincing evidence than would be sufficient to tip the scales ever so slightly in his favor, how can it be said that the burden of proof “has been put upon him?” The burden of proof is the burden to persuade the mind, to convince. A burden less than this can only be a burden to establish a reasonable, rational doubt. Thus, there is no inconsistency in telling the jury that, to convict the defendant of second degree murder, the State must prove presence of malice and absence of justification (self defense) beyond a reasonable doubt and, although the State has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, an intentional killing with a deadly weapon, the defendant must be acquitted of that charge if he has satisfied the jury of the absence of malice or the presence of justification (self defense).
Admittedly, the jury cannot be expected to know what this Court has said proof “to the satisfaction of the jury” does not mean. The question is whether the jury could have been misled by what the trial judge told them in his charge in this case. As above stated, he clearly and unequivocally told the jury they must find the defendant not guilty of second degree murder unless the State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt every element of that crime, including the presence of malice and the absence of justification (self defense). In my opinion, the jury which found this defendant guilty of second degree *660murder could not have been confused about this, and the charge of the court, which is a correct statement of the law of this State, did not in any way place upon the defendant a burden of proof forbidden by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as now construed in Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra. I, therefore, concur in the majority’s conclusion that this defendant is not entitled to a new trial.