Court Opinion

ID: 9722597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:41:22.546727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:37.714154
License: Public Domain

CHEZEM, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent. The cireumstantial evidence here supports the inference that the defendant knew of the trial date. Therefore, the trial court properly tried the defendant in absentia.
Of course, the law is clear that "(elven when a defendant does not show up for trial at all, the [trial] court may conclude that the defendant's absence is knowing and voluntary and proceed with the trial when there is evidence that the defendant knew the scheduled date of his trial." Fennell v. State (1986), Ind., 492 N.E.2d 297, 299. Moreover, circumstantial evidence of such knowledge can be sufficient for a court to proceed with a trial of a defendant in absentia. Id.
Here, the defendant was present at the initial hearings when the court set the trial dates; he had knowledge of his first trial and failed to appear; the court issued a bench warrant for his arrest; the trial court warned the defendant that "this is your last chance to show up for trial"; the clerk sent notices of the new trial date to the defendant at the address he had given, which were not returned; the defendant's attorney attempted to contact him by letter and notify him of the trial date; defendant admitted during the sentencing hearing that he was living at the address where the notices were sent at the time of trial; and the defendant did not communicate with his attorney before trial, or advise the court of any change of address. This cireumstan-tial evidence is sufficient to evidence an intent on the part of the defendant to avoid or be absent from the trial. In addition, a reasonable inference from the evidence is that the defendant had knowledge of the new trial date but chose not to appear. His actions were irresponsible and should not be rewarded. Yet that is precisely what the majority has done by reversing this case for a new trial.
Furthermore, the record clearly shows that defendant has a long history of contact with the criminal justice system, having been convicted previously of several *620other crimes. Therefore, he has some knowledge of criminal procedure and the importance of maintaining contact with his counsel and the court. In addition, the defendant's attorney was present at trial, and provided him with a full defense.
We should hold that the defendant's absence constituted a waiver of his right to be present at trial. He failed to appear at his first trial, and made no effort whatsoever to communicate with his counsel or the court with respect to the second trial. This was not the situation presented by either Fennell, or Reel v. State (1991), Ind.App., 567 N.E.2d 845.
I would affirm the trial court.