Court Opinion

ID: 9631332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:34:39.406783+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:52.131885
License: Public Domain

BACA, Justice (dissenting). Unable to agree with the majority opinion, I respectfully dissent. The majority considered four questions on appeal: the judge’s in-chambers communication and eventual dismissal of a juror; the prosecutor’s inquiry into Wilson’s prior military conviction and his use of aliases; the trial court’s alteration of the Uniform Jury Instructions; and the court’s timing of objections to jury instructions. The majority found that each question taken singly was not sufficient to reverse the conviction, but taken together constituted cumulative error and therefore mandated a reversal. The majority found Wilson was “deprived of a fair trial” partly because objections to jury instructions were not made of record before the jury retired to deliberate. The majority then went on to find that the altered Uniform Jury Instruction complained of and the refusal to give an aiding and abetting instruction was not error. As a matter of fact, the majority found that the instruction as altered did not differ materially from the Uniform Jury Instructions and further “it could even be argued that rejection of the instruction on aiding and abetting in conjunction with the court's slight alteration of the instruction on first degree murder was helpful to Wilson.” It is difficult to see how the court “deprived Wilson of a fair trial” notwithstanding the fact that an opportunity to object to these instructions was not afforded until the jury had retired when this court has specifically found that there is no harm and perhaps there is help to the defendant by the giving of these instructions. At the trial below, in the docketing statement, and in the briefs filed in this court there is no complaint about the fact that the judge failed to take objections to jury instructions before submitting them to the jury. Only upon oral argument did this court unearth that fact. Though the procedure was flawed, prejudice to the defendant does not exist. I agree that the better policy is for a trial judge to have a hearing on the record for objections to jury instructions before the jury retires. This is strongly suggested by SCRA 1986, 5-608(D). Under almost all circumstances when a jury has been impaneled, it is best that a trial judge not communicate with a juror except in the presence of counsel and the defendant. In this case, the trial judge communicated with a juror prior to impaneling and several days into the trial as well as receiving three notes from the juror concerning continued service through a religious holiday. In Hovey v. State, 104 N.M. 667, 726 P.2d 344 (1986), this court held that it was inappropriate for a trial judge to communicate with a juror concerning matters that are at issue in the trial. In this case, the trial judge did not communicate with a juror concerning matters at issue in the trial but only tried to deal with matters of scheduling around a religious holiday. The majority specifically did not extend the Hovey rule to cover every situation in which a trial judge communicates with a juror. When defense counsel and defendant were made aware of the fact that the conversations had taken place and the juror was to be excused, no objections were made either as to the conversations, the absence of a record, or the fact that the juror would not continue serving. It is the better practice that all communications between the judge and juror be made a part of the record whether made in the presence of defense counsel and defendant or not. SCRA 1986, 5-610 suggests this procedure. Rule 5-610 by its very language “presence of defense counsel and defendant or not” would, seem to suggest that under certain circumstances defense counsel and the defendant would not be present when conversations are held with jurors. No objections being made below, no showing of prejudice by the conversation, or the excuse of the juror, there is no prejudice to Wilson. A more troubling facet of this case is the revelation of the prior criminal record of Wilson and aliases used by him, along with the gratuitous referral to Wilson as a deserter by the prosecution in closing argument after being warned by the court. The question of Wilson’s prior criminal record, however, was elicited by his own counsel in cross-examination. The court in response to an objection gave a curative instruction that an A.W.O.L. conviction in a military tribunal was equivalent to a misdemeanor and was not a felony conviction. The misuse of this information by the prosecutor in referring to Wilson as a deserter in closing argument was inappropriate. The inquiry by the prosecutor as to various aliases by Wilson by contrast was less objectionable. The referral to the aliases could be explained by inadvertence or innocent response to proper questions. The majority holds that “if prosecutorial misconduct were the only issue before us we would perhaps find, as to this issue, that the scales do not tip in Wilson’s favor on appeal.” I agree this standing alone is not sufficient to tip the scales in Wilson’s favor. Finding no error in the judge’s in-chambers communication and the dismissal of the juror; finding no error in the refusal of the Uniform Jury Instruction and the altering of another jury instruction; finding no error or prejudice to Wilson in the timing of jury instructions objections; and, further, finding prosecutorial misconduct does not tip the scales in Wilson’s favor, I find no cumulative error. I would affirm the conviction.