Court Opinion

ID: 9618699
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:15:51.553579+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:31.397739
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
“ ‘In determining whether an affidavit sufficiently establishes the probable cause necessary for issuance of a warrant, we employ the totality of the circumstances analysis enunciated in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983), and adopted by (the Georgia Supreme) (C)ourt in State v. Stephens, 252 Ga. 181 (311 SE2d 823) (1984), with the admonition that prudence counsels that Gates be considered as the outer limit of probable cause. Under that analysis, the task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that proba*230ble cause existed. In addition, (the Georgia Supreme) (C)ourt has cautioned attesting officers and magistrates to make every effort to see that supporting affidavits reflect the maximum indication of reliability.’ (Citations, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Gary v. State, 262 Ga. 573, 577 (422 SE2d 426) (1992).” Eaton v. State, 210 Ga. App. 273 (1) (435 SE2d 756).
The majority concludes that the person from whom the affiant received information is a concerned citizen rather than an anonymous tipster because of the affiant’s descriptions of the informant as a property and business owner in good standing in the community and with nothing to gain by providing information. Uncorroborated information from an anonymous tipster is not alone sufficient to base a finding of probable cause. McRae v. State, 204 Ga. App. 234, 235 (1) (418 SE2d 796). In my view the affidavit failed to establish the reliability and veracity of the unidentified informant. I find no support for the affiant’s characterization of the tipster as a “concerned citizen,” or for the majority’s conclusion that the affidavit demonstrates “personal familiarity,” and consequently find no error in the grant of defendants’ motion to suppress evidence. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
In the remarkably similar case of Eaton v. State, 210 Ga. App. 273 (1), supra, the informant was described by the attesting officer as “a ‘concerned citizen’ who had never previously given such information to the police, is mature, regularly employed and without a criminal record.” Nonetheless, in Eaton, the officer admitted at the motion to suppress hearing that he did not know the identity of the informant and that the sole basis of the description of the informant was what the informant himself had told the officer. In the case sub judice there is no evidence concerning the source of the officer’s conclusory statement that the informant was a concerned citizen. Yet Eaton should be seen as holding that such descriptions of informants as are present there and in the case sub judice must be viewed as conclusory when the affidavit contains no information concerning the veracity of the informants. Eaton may not be distinguished by the absence of an admission from the officer in the case sub judice since the test of the sufficiency of the affidavit relates to the time of the issuance of the warrant and does not embrace information later revealed at a motion to suppress hearing. The admissions of the officer in Eaton serve only to highlight the errors which may result from reliance on conclusory affidavits. This court held in Eaton that “no facts were placed before the magistrate from which she could have found that any of the informants were concerned citizens.” In my view, this statement is equally correct in reference to the case sub judice.