Court Opinion

ID: 9727345
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:31:27.181755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:36.487725
License: Public Domain

GRODIN, J.
I concur in the result and I agree generally with the rationale stated by my colleagues; I write separately to emphasize a distinction which seems to me relevant. Murgia v. Municipal Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 286 [124 Cal.Rptr. 204, 540 P.2d 44], teaches that law enforcement agencies are no more immune from the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or from its counterpart in the California Constitution, than other agencies of government (id., at 294); and that while they must be allowed broad discretion in deciding when and where to prosecute, that discretion may not be used in invidiously discriminatory ways. (Id., at 296-297.) It follows from this, I think, that where it is shown that a particular law is being enforced in an apparently discriminatory fashion, i.e., in such a fashion as to give rise to the inference in the absence of explanation that the enforcement pattern offends the equal protection principle, then a “prima facie” case exists in the sense that the law enforcement agency must then come forward with an explanation so that the court is in a position to determine whether the claim of discrimination has merit. (See, generally, Givelber, The Application of Equal Protection Principles to Selective *735Enforcement of the Criminal Law (1973) Ill. L.Forum 88; 2 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (2d ed. 1978) ch. 9.) Petitioners have not reached that point. Rather, what they seek is discovery in order to prove prosecutorial discrimination. Considerations of economy and efficiency require that a claim for discovery in such a context be accompanied by some prima facie showing of the discrimination alleged to exist (Bortin v. Superior Court (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 873 [135 Cal.Rptr. 30]); and I agree that on this record such a showing has not been made.