Court Opinion

ID: 9575970
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:19:01.599451+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:52:18.239658
License: Public Domain

KENNARD, J. Dissenting.
Dissenting.—Is
Is the maintenance of an existing park an “improvement” within the meaning of the Landscaping and Lighting Act of 1972 (the Act), Streets and Highways Code section 22500 et seq.?1 Because I conclude that maintenance of preexisting facilities cannot be considered an “improvement” within the meaning of the controlling statute, I respectfully dissent.
Background
The City of Orland initiated proceedings to create a special benefit assessment district under the Act in order to fund certain “improvements.” The improvements were described by the city council as “[mjaintenance and servicing of lights, playground equipment, landscaping, irrigation systems, public restrooms, bleachers and other improvements at [five named city parks].” Determining that the parks benefited each resident in the district equally, the city proposed to assess each parcel $24 per dwelling unit for the 1989-1990 fiscal year. Four owners of residential property in the proposed district sued the city, contending the benefit assessment was invalid under the Act, and in any event it was a special tax that was invalid for failure to receive approval by a two-thirds vote of the electorate, as required by article XIII A, section 4 of the California Constitution. The trial court granted the city’s motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeal affirmed.
Discussion
The Act authorizes creation of benefit assessment districts to finance improvements. Section 22525 provides, in pertinent part: “ ‘Improvement’ *152means one or any combination of the following: fi[] (a) The installation or planting of landscaping. fi[] (b) The installation or construction of statuary, fountains, and other ornamental structures and facilities, fi[] (c) The installation or construction of public lighting facilities .... [1] (d) The installation or construction of any facilities which are appurtenant to any of the foregoing .... fin (e) The installation of park or recreational improvements . . . . [1]. . . fi[] (f) The maintenance or servicing, or both, of any of the foregoing." (Italics added.)
As noted above, the issue is whether maintenance of preexisting facilities can be an “improvement” within the meaning of section 22525. The applicable rules of statutory construction are well settled. The goal of statutory construction is to determine and effectuate legislative intent. (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386 [241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323]; accord, e.g., Altaville Drug Store, Inc. v. Employment Development Department (1988) 44 Cal.3d 231, 238 [242 Cal.Rptr. 732, 746 P.2d 871].) In doing so, we employ a number of canons of statutory construction, which are “aids to ascertaining probable legislative intent.” (Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 521, fn. 10 [183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809].) No single canon of statutory construction is an infallible guide to correct interpretation in all circumstances. But it is proper to begin the task of statutory interpretation by examining the words of a statute, as these are usually the best indicator of the Legislature’s intent. (Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 826 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, 823 P.2d 1216].) If the language is clear, courts should construe a statute according to the usual and ordinary meaning of the words, unless to do so would produce absurd results (Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 485 [208 Cal.Rptr. 724, 691 P.2d 272]), or there is some other compelling reason not to do so (DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 593, 601 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 238, 828 P.2d 140]).
The residents’ argument is straightforward. They contend that the statute “does not authorize assessments for maintenance unless it is maintenance of improvements installed pursuant to the Act.” Although the statute does include “maintenance” as an improvement, it is limited to maintenance of new improvements installed under the Act. That is, under the statute maintenance can be an improvement only if it is “maintenance or servicing, or both, of any of the foregoing.” (§ 22525, subd. (f).) And every “improvement” that falls under “the foregoing” is “installation” of something under the Act.
In my view, this argument is persuasive. As a matter of common usage, “maintenance” is not ordinarily encompassed within the concept of “improvement.” And the statutory language is plain and clear: maintenance is *153only an improvement when it is maintenance of an “improvement” within the meaning of section 22525. The majority’s conclusion that “maintenance and servicing are improvements in their own right and are not dependent upon an installation under the Act” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 139) flatly contradicts the statutory language.
The plain meaning of the statutory language supports the residents’ construction of the statute, and under our cases such plain language should not be lightly cast aside. The majority, however, labels the residents’ argument “strained” and rejects it, giving two reasons.
First, the majority says that the residents’ interpretation of the statute “is clearly at odds with section 22605, which explicitly allows local legislative bodies to flexibly utilize the Act to consolidate into a single assessment district any existing lighting, maintenance or tree planting districts that previously had been formed pursuant to other assessment schemes . . . .” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 139, italics omitted.)
This analysis by the majority makes little sense. Although section 22605 does authorize consolidation of assessment districts, section 22605 has nothing to do with whether maintenance of preexisting facilities is an “improvement” within the statutory language of section 22525.
The majority does not make its analysis on this point explicit, but apparently comes to its conclusion based on the following reasoning: If the city had consolidated the lighting assessment district with another maintenance district under section 22605, there would be no question that maintenance would be assessable. Therefore, we should not distinguish between assessments under different schemes, since assessment districts can always be consolidated.
But saying that the districts could have been consolidated is not the same thing as saying that the districts have been consolidated, which is what section 22605 unmistakably requires. The city did not consolidate the district with another district, and is not entitled to benefit from a legal process it freely chose not to employ.
The second argument set forth in the majority opinion is based on section 22502, which states: “This part provides an alternative procedure for making the improvements herein authorized and shall not apply to or affect any other provisions of this code.” The majority reasons that since the Legislature intended that the Act provide an alternative to other assessment schemes, and since other assessment schemes allow assessments for maintenance *154without regard to whether the thing maintained is new, it follows that it does not matter whether an assessment for maintenance under section 22525 maintains a new improvement. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 140.)
The problem with this argument is that it is circular. Section 22502 states the Act provides “an alternative procedure for making the improvements herein authorized . . . .” (Italics added.) What are the improvements “herein authorized”? They are defined by section 22525, which strictly limits maintenance improvements, as shown above. If the Legislature had intended to authorize under the Act “any improvement that is authorized under any other benefit assessment scheme,” it certainly could have done so. It did not.
The interpretation of the statute proposed by the residents adheres to the meaning of the statutory language itself. Reading the statute in this fashion does not lead to absurd consequences. And the majority has failed to set forth any compelling reason why this commonsense construction should not be followed.
Public parks can provide significant benefits to the communities they serve, enhancing the lives of residents and visitors alike, provided the parks receive sufficient and timely maintenance. This case results from one city’s attempt to establish a reliable and adequate source of funding to maintain its parks. Although the city’s objective is commendable, the means it has chosen is both unnecessary and legally foreclosed. As I said earlier, the city could have consolidated the lighting assessment district with another maintenance district under section 22605, and thereby obtained an adequate source of funds for park maintenance that would have been immune from legal challenge under the Act. By choosing to proceed in a different fashion, the city has invited and received a protracted legal battle, focused on the meaning of section 22525. In construing this statute, our task as judges is not to advance the cause of parks, or to advance any cause, but to interpret and apply the statute in the manner that best effectuates legislative intent. Applying established rules designed to determine legislative intent, I conclude that section 22525 does not authorize assessments to maintain facilities that were not installed under the Act.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.2

All further statutory references are to the Streets and Highways Code unless otherwise indicated.

Because I would resolve this case solely on statutory grounds, I do not address the additional question whether the assessment is subject to the special tax limitations of article XIII A, section 4 of the California Constitution.