Court Opinion

ID: 9586693
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:14:06.543085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:47.740056
License: Public Domain

Justice MARTIN
dissenting.
Believing as I do that the grant by the legislature to the Chief Justice of the power to appoint the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings violates the constitutional principles of separation of powers, I respectfully dissent.
A few preliminary observations are appropriate:
(1) No federal constitutional issues arise in this appeal. Highland Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 81 L.Ed. 835 (1937).
(2) The Constitution of North Carolina is a limitation of the powers of the General Assembly, not a grant of power to it. Mitchell v. Financing Authority, 273 N.C. 137, 159 S.E. 2d 745 (1968). The General Assembly possesses all political power of the state not prohibited it or delegated to another branch of the government by the constitution. The Office of Governor has no such prerogative powers but is confined to the exercise of the powers conferred upon it by the constitution and statutes.
(3) The General Assembly has the authority to appoint the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings. The Governor’s power of appointment is limited to officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for. N.C. Const, art. Ill, § 5(8). The appointment of the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings is otherwise provided for.
(4) The General Assembly has the power to delegate to another the authority to appoint the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings. Motsinger v. Perryman, 218 N.C. 15, 9 S.E. 2d 511 (1940); Cunningham v. Sprinkle, 124 N.C. 638, 33 S.E. 138 (1899); 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 135, at 439.
*529(5)The General Assembly has the power to delegate to the Attorney General the authority to appoint the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings. The Attorney General is a member of the executive branch of government. The appointment power is not exclusively legislative in nature and may be delegated. The delegation of appointive powers to officers of the executive branch is generally proper. In re Community Association, 300 N.C. 267, 266 S.E. 2d 645 (1980); Adams v. Dept. of N.E.R. and Everett v. Dept. of N.E.R., 295 N.C. 683, 249 S.E. 2d 402 (1978); Jernigan v. State, 279 N.C. 556, 184 S.E. 2d 259 (1971). Upon such delegation, it would be appropriate for the Attorney General to appoint the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings.
I turn now to the question of whether the legislature can constitutionally delegate to the Chief Justice the power to appoint the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings. In my view, the Director is an executive officer and constitutional principles of separation of powers proscribe the Chief Justice from making this appointment.
The statute in question purports to empower the Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court to appoint the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings.
The Director has the following statutory powers and duties:
(1) He is the head of the Office of Administrative Hearings. N.C.G.S. § 7A-751 (1986).
(2) He is the chief administrative law judge. Id.
(3) He shall appoint additional administrative law judges. N.C.G.S. § 7A-753 (1986).
(4) He may designate and assign certain administrative law judges to preside over specific types of contested cases. Id.
(5) He shall take an oath of office. N.C.G.S. § 7A-754 (1986).
(6) He may remove an administrative law judge for just cause. Id.
(7) He can administer oaths in any pending or potential contested case. N.C.G.S. § 7A-756 (1986).
*530(8) He can sign and issue subpoenas to witnesses. Id.
(9) He can apply to a judge of superior court for orders necessary to enforce powers conferred by Article 60 of Chapter 7A of the General Statutes of North Carolina. Id.
(10) He may contract with qualified persons to serve as hearing officers for specific assignments. N.C.G.S. § 7A-757 (1986).
(11) He may, at the request of an agency, provide a hearing officer to preside at hearings of public bodies not otherwise authorized to utilize a hearing officer from the Office of Administrative Hearings. N.C.G.S. § 7A-758 (1986).
(12) He may hear testimony, apply rules of evidence, regulate discovery, issue stays, and make findings of fact and conclusions of law. N.C.G.S. § 150B-33 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
While some of the powers and duties of the Director may properly be described in part as being “quasi-judicial,” they are not unique to the judiciary. They include administering oaths to witnesses, issuing subpoenas, hearing testimony, applying rules of evidence, regulating discovery, issuing stays, making findings of fact and conclusions of law, and recommending decisions. Various executive officers and members of the legislature can perform each of these functions, with the possible exception of regulating discovery.
Legislators in committee hearings subpoena witnesses and documents and administer oaths, N.C.G.S. §§ 120-14, -15 (1986); hear testimony, apply rules of evidence, N.C.G.S. §§ 120-19.1, .2 (1986); apply to judges of superior court for orders necessary to enforce powers of the legislature, N.C.G.S. § 120-19.4(b) (1986).
Agents in the executive branch likewise can exercise these powers. The Employment Security Commission has statutory authority to so do, N.C.G.S. § 96-4 (1985); likewise, the Industrial Commission, N.C.G.S. §§ 97-79, -80 (1985). Consider the myriad of other state commissions and boards, for example, commissions and boards of architects, barbers, certified public accountants, contractors, dentists, morticians, nurses, opticians, pharmacists, *531physicians, real estate brokers, and sanitarians, all of which have the authority to exercise these same powers in various ways.
Surely, the majority would not approve the legislature delegating to the Chief Justice the power to appoint the chairman or members of any of these executive agencies.
It is not enough to say that the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings exercises some quasi-judicial powers and therefore this is a sufficient nexus to the judicial branch of government to allow the Chief Justice to make this appointment. Most of the duties and powers of the Director set out above are not quasi-judicial in nature but are purely administrative in character. Although the Director utilizes some quasi-judicial methods of dispute resolution, the issues before the Director and the Office of Administrative Hearings are administrative issues. It is only on appeal before the General Court of Justice that the legality of the actions is resolved. The courts are involved with judicial decisions while the Director and the Office of Administrative Hearings are concerned with administrative decisions.
Of course, it is well recognized that the legislature cannot create a court not authorized by the constitution. N.C. Const, art. IV, § 1. Nor does the legislature purport to do so in this instance; the body created is an administrative agency, a part of the executive branch of government, not a part of the judicial branch. The legislature can delegate to the Chief Justice the power to appoint officers of the judicial branch, for example, Director and Assistant Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts, N.C.G.S. §§ 7A-341, -342 (1986); chief district court judges, N.C.G.S. § 7A-141 (1986); appellate defender, N.C.G.S. § 7A-486.2 (1986); the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, N.C.G.S. § 7A-16 (1986). The clerk of the Supreme Court is appointed by the Supreme Court, N.C.G.S. § 7A-11 (1986), and the clerk of the Court of Appeals by the Court of Appeals, N.C.G.S. § 7A-20 (1986). Senior resident superior court judges appoint their public defenders, N.C.G.S. § 7A-466 (1986), magistrates, N.C.G.S. § 7A-171 (1986), and court reporters, N.C.G.S. § 7A-95 (1986).
The appointments above noted are to offices that are within the judicial branch of government; the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings is within the executive branch of gov*532ernment. Our constitution provides: “The legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other.” N.C. Const, art. I, § 6. This provision must be strictly construed by the Court. State ex rel. Wallace v. Bone and Barkalow v. Harrington, 304 N.C. 591, 286 S.E. 2d 79 (1982). (This opinion contains an excellent exposition on the doctrine of separation of powers.) One of the primary objectives of the doctrine-of separation of powers is to preserve and protect the independence of the judiciary.
The reasoning of the Massachusetts court in Opinion of the Justices, 365 Mass. 639, 309 N.E. 2d 476 (1974), is compelling. The legislature of Massachusetts created an electronic data commission and provided for appointment of two members of the commission by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. In an advisory opinion, the Massachusetts court held that the legislation would be unconstitutional as a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. The court reasoned that although the legislature could delegate the appointive power, it could not confer the power of appointment upon the judicial branch of government with respect to officials not exercising a judicial function or one incidental to the exercise of judicial powers. The people of Massachusetts have removed the judiciary from political influences of every kind. See also Nelson et al. v. City of Miller, 83 S.D. 611, 163 N.W. 2d 533 (1968).
I view the Massachusetts case as applying equally to the present controversy. Our Chief Justice can appoint officers whose duties are closely connected with the judicial work of the Court, for example, the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts, but cannot appoint officers such as the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings, whose work would affect the functioning of the other two branches of government. While the Director’s duties may be in some sense incidental to the function of the courts, it is in reality much broader than that. It is plain that the Director does not exercise judicial powers; the constitution prohibits such. N.C. Const, art. IV, § 1. Likewise, the powers of the Director are not incidental to the exercise of judicial powers by the courts. The actions of the Office of Administrative Hearings create additional legal issues properly to be resolved by the judicial branch, but its actions are not otherwise incidental to the exercise of judicial power by the courts.
*533The article establishing the Office of Administrative Hearings itself states that its purpose is to provide “a source of independent hearing officers . . . [to] thereby prevent the commingling of legislative, executive, and judicial functions in the administrative process.” N.C.G.S. § 7A-750 (1986). By conferring the power to appoint the Director upon the Chief Justice, the legislature has defeated the very purpose of its statute by commingling the legislative and judicial functions.
In summary, I find that the Governor has no authority to appoint the Director of the Office of Administrative Hearings unless it is granted to him by the General Assembly. The General Assembly can delegate the appointment of the Director to another official. In so doing, it must not violate the constitutional principles of separation of powers. Conferring this power of appointment upon the Chief Justice violates the constitutional principles of separation of powers, and that portion of the statute is unconstitutional.
By placing the yoke of this appointive power upon the Chief Justice, the judicial branch has been cast adrift upon uncharted waters amid the rocky shoals of political influence. The genius of the doctrine of separation of powers is to prevent such result.