Court Opinion

ID: 9625551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:44:17.929745+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:50.222352
License: Public Domain

RAPER, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in the result. I concur in the reasons for the result set out except for that portion of the opinion of Justice Rose which would abrogate governmental immunity, to which I dissent.
My dissent does not go to it being a decision on an issue unnecessary to a disposition of the case. We cannot freeze ourselves into such a position that when change is essential for judicial progress to fit into the advancement and changing needs of society along with an enlightened jurisprudence, the opportunity should not be avoided but ought to be seized, as long as the issue rests within the framework of the case before the court for consideration.
My dissent does go to the basic concept of governmental immunity and the reasons for its long support in this state and court. I do not believe in any fiction that the sovereign can do no wrong. Our state government is made up solely of agents of all the citizens within the geographical boundaries of Wyoming. The citizens ought to decide the question of whether and, if so, how its government should reimburse one of their fellow citizens for an injury caused by an agent of their government— within the scope of his employment, of course. The agents do the wrong, not the sovereign, and we must accept the human frailties of mistake, imprudent error of judgment and carelessness. Should the State, in its role as principal, be liable for the wrongs of its agents within the usual doctrines of the law of agency with relation to torts? What I am saying is that the legislature of this great state, acting in its capacity representative of the people, should have a first adequate opportunity to establish a plan of compensation to the injured in such a situation.
The legislature gives attention to the aged, the infirm, the sick and the unfortunate, disabled through no fault of any agent of the State. Failure of a legislature to provide for the righting of wrongs caused in the course of governmental oper*434ations has motivated many of the courts of this country in their desire to do justice to abolish the concept of governmental immunity and place government in the same status as the private corporation and citizen in that regard and compelled attention to this other area of human misfortune.
Our legislature has not been entirely unmindful of its protective role and has moved to authorize insurance to cover the injured to the limits of the policy purchased. This court has approved that course in Collins v. Memorial Hospital of Sheridan County, Wyo.1974, 521 P.2d 1339, and has abrogated governmental immunity to the extent of policy limits. The legislature took the initiative, as I think it ought to here. Insurance may not be enough. In Awe v. University of Wyoming, Wyo.1975, 534 P.2d 97, 106, was a gentle suggestion of the desirability of the legislature adopting a “uniform system of handling state tort liability.” It was there further observed that: “Whatever that branch does, consideration must be given to the economics of insurance premiums versus appropriated funds.” It may be more feasible to divert insurance premiums into a state-administered tort liability fund. I think we must take judicial notice of the battle raging in other areas; insurance may not be the cure-all to cover liability .and may be getting priced out of the business under its heavy exposure.
It is not the duty nor the function of this or any court to tell a legislature how to perform its legislative function. The strength of Justice Rose’s opinion, though I disagree that we should allow it, should be a warning that legislative action may be well-advised. It is preferable to start with a sound plan, such as only an example, the Federal Tort Claims Act, than for this court to say, “do it,” in the absence of any machinery to place an ordered change into sensible effect. Some supreme courts in judicially abrogating governmental immunity have given prospective effect to their decisions — have set up a deadline but this sort of command should be avoided if at all possible, to prevent upsetting the sensitive balance between the three branches of government — legislative, executive and judicial.
I have another reason for dissenting. I do not believe that within this case we have the whole story. I want to hear the positions, arguments and supporting data of the State, counties, school boards, municipalities, hospital boards and other political subdivisions that would be affected by such an unrelenting sweep as Justice Rose would take. All those concerned should be heard. A case should be before this court in a setting permitting such a coverage, through not only the litigants involved but amicus curiae, representing other interests as well. Until that time, I do not feel equipped to give the question my truly considered attention.
I would not want to be a part of such a shock by a bolt out of the blue. This dissenting opinion must not be construed to be either favoring or opposing abrogation of governmental immunity but is designed only to point up the problem.