Court Opinion

ID: 9603037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:02:46.850906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:08.108535
License: Public Domain

Miller, Justice,
concurring:
While I concur in the result reached in this case, I have some misgiving with regard to the first syllabus point. Also, because of the paucity of cases by this Court discussing the law on bail since the 1965 amendments to our bail statute, it seems to me that we have missed an opportunity to provide some guidelines to the trial *418courts who are faced daily with this difficult and important task.
There are two separate aspects to the question of bail. The first centers on the legal question of the right to bail. The second is concerned with the amount of bail. Both aspects are ultimately controlled by the provisions of Article III, Section 5 of the West Virginia Constitition, which provides: “[E]xcessive bail shall not be required, ...” Identical language is found in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
This is the view of Justice Douglas, acting in chambers in Carlisle v. Landon, 97 L. Ed. 1642, 73 S. Ct. 1179 (1953):
“There is a constitutional question that lurks in every bail case. The Eighth Amendment provides that ‘excessive bail’ shall not be required. That means, as Mr. Justice Burton suggested in the Carlson Case (342 US, at p 569), that a person may not be capriciously held. Requirement of bail in an amount that staggers the imagination is obviously a denial of bail. It is the unreasoned denial of bail that the Constitution condemns. The discretion to hold without bail is not absolute. If it were, we would have our own model of the police state which looms on the international horizon as mankind’s greatest modern threat. Under our constitutional system the power to hold without bail is subject to judicial review. There must be an informed reason for the detention.” (97 L. Ed. at 1645]
There is no question that the Legislature in 1965 saw fit to substantially enlarge the statutory right to bail. The case of State v. Bouchelle, 134 W. Va. 34, 61 S.E.2d 232 (1949), traces the history of the statutory provisions surrounding bail in this State up to that time, and they remained the same until the 1965 revision, which are found in W. Va. Code, 62-1C-1, et seq.
Among the changes made in the 1965 revision of the bail statute was the abolishment of the requirement for showing of “good cause” in order to be entitled to bail. *419The right to bail was made absolute for offenses not punishable by death or life imprisonment. W. Va. Code, 62-1C-1(a).
The Legislature also liberalized the requirements for security on bail W. Va. Code, 62-1C-2, including the right to have the defendant released on his own recognizance regardless of whether the offense is a felony or misdemeanor. W. Va. Code, 62-1C-4.
The entire tenor of the 1965 revision to the bail statute accords with a modern trend to favor where possible the granting of bail. This policy has perhaps been best summarized in the American Bar Association’s Standards Relating to Pretrial Release (1968), Section 1.1:
“The law favors the release of defendants pending determination of guilt or innocence. Deprivation of liberty pending trial is harsh and oppressive in that it subjects persons whose guilt has not yet been judicially established to economic and psychological hardship, interferes with their ability to defend themselves and, in many cases, deprives their families of support. Moreover, the maintenance of jailed defendants and their families represents major public expense.”
In State ex rel. Ghiz v. Johnson, 155 W. Va. 186, 183 S.E.2d 703 (1971), this Court recognized the liberal changes made to the bail statute, in particular the mandatory right to have bail set before conviction under W. Va. Code, 62-1C-1(1), where the crime carries a punishment of less than life imprisonment.1 The first syllabus *420in the majority opinion, I believe, inadvertantly suggests that a trial court is vested with discretion in determining the right to bail in all criminal proceedings.
Clearly, this is not the holding of Ghiz, nor does our bail statute permit such interpretation in cases involving crimes whose penalty is less than life imprisonment. W. Va. Code, 62-1C-1(a).
The first syllabus by the majority just, of course, be read in the context of the facts of this case. This case does not involve the right to bail, since the trial court had set bail, but turned solely on the question of whether the amount set was excessive.
It is also my view that the majority opinion does not make clear the fact that there is a difference in the statutory right to bail before conviction as distinguished from after conviction.
W. Va. Code, 62-1C-1(a) and (b), makes a clear distinction in these two areas. The right to bail before conviction is absolute as to those offenses which carry a penalty of less than life imprisonment and the court’s discretion is limited to considering the amount of bond.
In cases involving bail prior to conviction for offenses involving life imprisonment and in all cases involving bail after conviction, the court has discretion in determining the right to bail and the amount of bail. This discretion is reviewable pursuant to the excessive bail prohibition of Article III, Section 5 of our Constitution.
As to the second aspect of bail, which is the amount to be set, there are now statutory guidelines prescribed. W. Va. Code, 62-1C-3, sets the following standards:
“The amount of bail shall be fixed by the court or justice with consideration given to the seriousness of the offense charged, the previous criminal record of the defendant, his financial ability, and the probability of his appearance. When two or more charges are filed or are pending against the same person at or about the same time, the bail given may be made to include all offenses charged against the defendant.”
*421It is to be noted that the statute, in addition to setting general guidelines to be considered on determining the amount of bail, also permits the court to cumulate different charges under one bail bond.
Certainly the trial court, in considering the amount of bail to be set, is not limited solely to the statutory standards set out above, but has the inherent power, mandated by the constitutional requirement that excessive bail not be set, to inquire into all areas that are deemed relevant. In this connection, the general rule for factors to be considered in determining the amount is set forth in 8 Am. Jur. 2d Bail and Recognizance § 71:
“It has been stated that the factors to be taken into consideration in determining the amount of bail are; (1) ability of the accused to give bail, (2) nature of the offense, (3) penalty for the offense charged, (4) character and reputation of the accused, (5) health of the accused, (6) character and strength of the evidence, (7) probability of the accused appearing at trial, (8) forfeiture of other bonds, and (9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested. That the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases should also be considered.”
I recognize that it is generally the rule that the right and the amount of bail after conviction are less liberally extended than in the pre-trial stage. 8 Am. Jur. 2d Bail and Recognizance § 33. Nevertheless, I agree with the majority that in this case there was clear abuse of discretion in setting the bail at $25,000 when the jury found the defendant guilty of assault and battery. The initial bond was $5,000 on a charge of felonious assault with a deadly weapon. The defendant demonstrated no conduct during the criminal proceeding that would warrant the court’s conclusion that the bail amount should be raised. In fact, with the jury’s finding of assault and battery, the court could well have reduced the bond.
I am authorized to state that Justice Harshbarger joins with me in this concurring opinion.

 I, also, find myself at odds with the Ghiz case, which involved the discretionary right to bail before conviction. It mistakenly elevates two criteria as the key considerations, namely the likelihood that the accused will appear and the possibility that he will commit other crimes. Traditionally, the central inquiry where bail is discretionary is whether the accused if admitted to bail will appear at the required hearings in the criminal proceeding. All of the authorities cited in Ghiz demonstrate this. See also, 8 Am. Jur. 2d Bail §39, et seq. To give primacy to the probability of the commission of other crimes if released on bail is unwarranted unless statutorily mandated, such as found in 18 U.S.C.A. §3148. It is a factor to be considered along with all others.