Court Opinion

ID: 9624424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:02:29.691235+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:46.243324
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Moore
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the views expressed in the majority opinion in this case. The findings of the Industrial Commission upon material questions involved were as follows:
“The testimony shows that the claimant was a paint salesman for the respondent employer and that his territory included the town of Sterling, Colorado. The claimant was allowed the usual and ordinary expenses for his car, his hotels, and his meals, and was allowed reasonable expenses to entertain customers. On the Saturday preceding December 3, 1951, claimant went to Sterling, Colorado, for the purpose of calling on the trade and did, on the morning of December 3, 1951, call, on the Platte Valley Lumber Company, where he checked the Platte Valley Lumber Company’s stock of paint with one Mr. Acre, who usually gave claimant orders for paint to restock the Platte Valley Lumber Company’s paint inventory. On December 3, 1951, claimant worked with Mr. Acre in checking the inventory until about noon, when the claimant, Mr. Acre, and Mr. Luft, a truck driver and yardman for the Platte Valley Lumber Company, went on a pheasant hunting trip in the rural area near Sterling, and it was in the course of this *231hunting trip that claimant lost the sight of his right eye by reason of a hunting accident.
“The Referee finds from the evidence that the claimant had on several occasions entertained different persons connected with the Platte Valley Lumber Company and other customers throughout his territory and that on each of these occasions the claimant had included the entertaining expense in his expense account, which had been paid by the respondent employer.
“The Referee further finds that while the vehicle furnished for the hunting expedition on December 3 was owned by one of the Platte Valley Lumber Company employes and that one of the Platte Valley Lumber Company employes selected the ranch on which the hunting was to be done, nevertheless the claimant, by engaging in said hunting trip, was in the course of his employment and furthering his employer’s business by creating good will and friendship among his customers and the employes who had the authority to place orders with the claimant.
“The Referee further finds that the claimant’s practice of hunting pheasants with Platte Valley Lumber Company owners and employes had been in existence for a number of years and was known by the respondent employer’s sales manager in Kansas City and that the expense incurred incident to said hunting trips had in the past been paid by the respondent employer.
“The Referee further finds from the evidence that claimant’s accident arose out of and in the course of his employment and comes within the scope of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and should be compensated for under the terms of the Act.”
There was an abundance of evidence before the commission to support these findings. By reversal of the judgment in this cause we nullify the findings of fact made by the commission, even though all the evidence tends directly to support those findings. We substitute our own appraisal concerning the weight of the evidence, *232and, from the cold printed page, overturn the conclusions of the commission although not one word of evidence was offered by the employer or any other person in contradiction of the statements made by claimant. The refusal of our court to be governed by the findings of fact in this case is indicative of what appears to be a diminishing respect for the adjudication of facts by the trial courts and other fact-finding bodies. Thus the majority opinion does violence to the elemental rule in proceedings on error, that findings of fact are to be accepted by appellate courts in the absence of a clear showing of error.
It cannot be said that the facts as found by the commission do not entitle claimant to the relief sought. Our court has recognized the general rule applied by the commission to the facts of this case. In Skaggs Co. v. Nixon, 101 Colo. 203, 72 P. (2d) 1102, we quoted with approval the following: “Where an employee is doing something which, though not strictly in the line of his obligatory duty, is still doing something incidental to his work, and while doing the same is injured, the accident causing injury may properly be held to arise out of and in the course of employment, and he will be entitled to compensation.” This rule has been applied repeatedly to cases similar to the instant cause.
In the case of Ohlsen v. Dill, 222 Minn. 10, 23 N.W. (2d) 15, compensation was awarded for the death of an employe who was drowned on a fishing trip which had been arranged by said employe with two customers. It was the custom and policy of the company in that case, as in the case at bar, to entertain customers and prospective customers on hunting and fishing trips. In upholding the award of compensation the court said: “We hold that the evidence fairly established here that it was the policy of the company to entertain customers and prospective customers; that decedent was so advised and instructed; that he carried out said instructions and successfully increased the business of the *233company thereby; that at the time of the fatal accident he was engaged in entertaining a customer or a prospective customer of his employer pursuant to such policy and instructions as part of his duties and employment.”
Thus it is clear that, contrary to the statements contained in the majority opinion, the well-established custom of going on hunting trips with the persons who actually gave orders for merchandise to claimant, is entitled to considerable weight in determining whether the accident arose out of and in the course of his employment. To like effect is the opinion in Commercial Casualty Insurance Co. v. Strawn (Texas), 44 S.W. (2d) 805.
The majority' opinion omits any mention of much specific evidence tending strongly to support the findings of the commission, as for instance the following: “Q. Well, treating it from a policy angle, does the company expect you to entertain people such as this customer at, say, Sterling, Colorado? A. Yes, sir, they do. Q. Have you entertained them over a number of years? A. Yes, sir. Q. How many years? A. At least fifteen.
“Q. When had you planned the hunting trip? A. It was planned, the definite plans were made on the Thursday preceding. The third was Monday. Probably Thursday. Q. It would be the 28th of February? [November] A. Yes, somewhere along in there. Q. Or the 29th of November? A. Just about that time, yes. Q. How were those arrangements arrived at? A. I telephoned. Q. Where did you telephone from? A. Denver.
* * *
“Q. And what function does Acre have at the Platte Valley Lumber Company? A. He is the yard boss and usually buyer. Q. Well, did you have any dealings with either of these men in soliciting orders for paint? A. Yes, Mr. Acre usually gives me the order. Q. On how many occasions would that occur, on an average? *234A. Oh, seven or eight times a year. Q. Practically every time?- A. Practically every time.
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“Q. With whom did you go hunting in prior years there of the Platte Valley people? A. I have hunted with Horace for ten or fifteen years, Horace Acre.”
The record establishes conclusively that claimant’s employer approved and encouraged the type of entertainment indulged in by claimant over a period of many years in promoting the good will of the company, and it further appears that the conduct of claimant in handling the account of the Platte Valley Lumber Company had greatly increased the business of his employer.
Mr. Chief Justice Stone concurs in this dissent.