Court Opinion

ID: 9404875
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-26 17:09:48.974927+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:17.496280
License: Public Domain

J-A07016-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 JAMES SMITH                             :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 115 EDA 2022

    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 15, 2021
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-CR-0001692-2021,
                        CP-51-CR-0002286-2020

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 JAMES SMITH                             :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 116 EDA 2022

    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 15, 2021
 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                    No(s): CP-51-CR-0001692-2021,
                        CP-51-CR-0002286-2020

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                        FILED JUNE 26, 2023

     James Smith appeals from the judgment of sentence following his

convictions for rape of a child, unlawful contact with a minor, corruption of

minors, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child, and aggravated
J-A07016-23

indecent assault of a person less than 13 years of age.1 He challenges the trial

court’s exclusion of a proposed voir dire question and the sufficiency of the

evidence to sustain his conviction for unlawful contact with a minor. We affirm.

       The trial court summarized the facts in this case as follows:2

       Under docket CP-51-CR-0002286-2020, M.B. (born December 3,
       2011) testified to the following facts. M.B. lived with her mother[];
       her grandfather []; her sister, [J.]; and her younger brother, [L.].
       At one point, M.B.’s friend A.G. and A.G.’s mother also lived in the
       same house. [Smith] frequently visited the home. M.B. knew
       [Smith] as a close friend of her mother’s and called him, “Uncle
       James.” [Smith] often took M.B., his son, A.G., and [L.] to the
       park and to the store alone.

       M.B. recalled the first time [Smith] made her feel uncomfortable.
       [Smith] played games with the children, one of which involved
       physically lifting up the kids and throwing them onto the couch.
       When [Smith] lifted M.B. into the air, he did not throw her on the
       couch, but instead touched her vagina. [Smith] repeated this
       pattern of behavior throughout the house.

       On a separate occasion, [Smith] grabbed M.B. from the living
       room and led her into the kitchen. [Smith] laid M.B. on top of a
       freezer and pulled down her pants. [Smith] then took off his pants
       and inserted his penis into her vagina. M.B. testified that she felt
       pain when [Smith] inserted his penis into her vagina, but neither
       M.B. nor [Smith] said anything to each other.

       On several occasions, [Smith] performed oral sex on both M.B.
       and A.G. in the basement of the house. One day, [Smith] followed
       M.B., A.G., [L.], and his children to the basement to watch the
       kids play basketball. M.B. and A.G. sat on a three-to-four-foot-
       high black table. [Smith] approached the young girls and pulled
       down their pants. [Smith] proceeded to take his pants off and
       performed oral sex on both girls. Neither girl[] nor [Smith] spoke
____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3121(c), 6318(a)(1), 6301(a)(1)(ii), 3123(b), and
3125(a)(7), respectively.

2Smith adopted the court’s factual summary for purposes of this appeal. See
Smith’s Br. at 6.

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     to one another. M.B. testified that this happened several times,
     and on one occurrence, [Smith] inserted his penis inside M.B.’s
     vagina. On another occasion, [Smith] inserted his penis into A.G.
     while M.B. sat next to her on the table. M.B. further testified that
     this happened several times.

     [Smith’s] last attempted incident with M.B. occurred on A.G.’s
     eighth birthday. On A.G.’s eighth birthday, M.B.’s mother left the
     house to run errands, leaving M.B., [L.], [J.], and [J.]’s friend
     behind in the house. [Smith] came to the house, picked up M.B.
     and led her upstairs to her mother’s room. [Smith] closed the door
     and tried to pull down M.B.’s pants. M.B. kicked [Smith] away
     from her and told him to stop. M.B. told [Smith] that she was
     going to call her mom to which he replied, “I’ll tell her for you.”
     M.B. went into her room, grabbed her phone, and cried as she
     texted her mother to tell her about [Smith’s] actions.

     Under docket CP-51-CR-000169-2021, A.G. (born March 19,
     2012) testified to the following facts. For some time, A.G. lived. .
     . with her mother, M.B., M.B.’s mother, M.B.’s grandfather, M.B.’s
     sister, and M.B.’s brother. A.G. lived at the house until she turned
     eight years old. A.G. and M.B. are best friends, describing their
     relationship as “like sisters.” While A.G. lived at the house,
     [Smith], who A.G. also identified as “Uncle James,” often visited
     the home. A.G. said [Smith] treated her like his own niece, even
     though [Smith] was not related to her. When [Smith] visited the
     house, he played with A.G. by picking her up in the air and playing
     hide-and-seek with her.

     A.G. remembered that [Smith] started to do things that made her
     feel uncomfortable and that she did not understand. These things
     took place in the basement of the house, in M.B.’s grandfather’s
     room, and M.B.’s mother’s room. In the living room, [Smith] threw
     A.G. into the air and performed oral sex on her. This happened
     several times.

     On another occasion, A.G. recalled being in the basement
     watching the other children play basketball. While both girls sat
     on his lap, [Smith] touched their vaginas, and penetrated A.G.’s
     vagina with his finger. A.G. remembered another time when
     [Smith] told her to get onto the black table, where she laid down
     on her stomach. [Smith] then pulled A.G.’s pants down and
     performed anal sex on her. During another time in the basement,
     [Smith] asked and tried to put his penis into A.G.’s mouth.

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      A.G. testified that she saw [Smith] also do these things to M.B.
      More than once, A.G. saw [Smith] insert his penis into M.B.’s
      vagina while M.B. laid on her back on the basement table. A.G.
      also testified that [Smith] tried to make M.B. perform oral sex on
      him. [Smith] took his penis out of his pants and “would just show
      it.” [Smith] then told M.B. to lick his penis.

      On A.G.’s eighth birthday, A.G. and her mother went to M.B.’s
      house where they saw police outside. After going inside of the
      house, A.G.’s mother came back to the car and asked A.G.
      whether [Smith] touched her. A.G. answered “yes.”

Trial Court Opinion, filed June 1, 2022, at 1-4 (citations to trial transcript and

footnote omitted).

      Prior to trial, Smith submitted proposed voir dire questions to the trial

court, including the question, “Are you more likely to believe the testimony of

a child alleging sexual abuse because you do not believe a child could lie about

sexual abuse?” The Commonwealth objected to that question. N.T., 6/22/21,

at 9. The trial court agreed with the Commonwealth and excluded that

question from jury selection. Id. at 10.

      After a jury trial, Smith was convicted of the above-referenced offenses.

He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 30 to 60 years’ incarceration

followed by 10 years’ probation. This appeal followed.

      Smith raises the following two issues:

      1. Did not the trial court deprive [Smith] of his right to a fair and
         impartial jury by refusing to ask prospective jurors on voir dire
         whether they believed a child could lie about being sexually
         abused, which prevented [Smith] from potentially uncovering
         prejudicial biases or fixed opinions that would have disqualified
         jurors from serving?

      2. Was not the evidence insufficient to convict [Smith] of both
         counts of 18 Pa.C.S.[A] § 6318, unlawful contact with a minor,
         where there was no evidence that he had any contact or

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         communication with the two children as contemplated by the
         statute?

Smith’s Br. at 3.

      First, Smith argues that the trial court’s exclusion of his proposed voir

dire question violated his right to a fair and impartial jury. Smith’s Br. at 13.

He notes that the Commonwealth’s entire case hinged on M.B. and A.G.’s

testimony, which was uncorroborated by physical or medical evidence. Id. at

10. Therefore, he argues that the jury’s verdict would necessarily rest on its

evaluation of the victims’ credibility. Id. Smith contends that he had the right

to explore whether any prospective jurors had a preconceived belief that a

child would not lie about being sexually abused. Id. at 14-15. He emphasizes

that allegations of child sexual abuse, such as those in this case, may carry

significant emotional impact which may make a juror incapable of rendering a

fair verdict. Id. at 14. Smith further argues that certain jurors may be

predisposed to credit a child victim’s testimony simply because of the victim’s

young age. Id. He thus maintains that the court erred by failing to pose his

proposed question or make a comparable inquiry. Id. at 20.

      The purpose of voir dire is to aid the empaneling of a “competent, fair,

impartial, and unprejudiced jury[.]” Commonwealth v. Holt, 273 A.3d 514,

546 (Pa. 2022) (citation omitted). “The decision on whether or not counsel

may propose their own questions of potential jurors during voir dire is a matter

left solely within the discretion of the trial court.” Commonwealth v.

Paolello, 665 A.2d 439, 451 (Pa. 1995). The trial court’s decision “will not be

reversed on appeal absent palpable error.” Holt, 273 A.3d at 547. “[V]oir dire

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is not to be used to attempt to ascertain a prospective juror’s present

impressions or attitudes.” Commonwealth v. Ritter, 615 A.2d 442, 447

(Pa.Super. 1992) (citation omitted). Nor may attorneys use it “to ascertain

the effectiveness of potential trial strategies.” Paolello, 665 A.2d at 451.

      Here, the trial court found that the proposed voir dire question was

improperly intended to gain insight into the juror’s present impressions about

how they would weigh M.B. and A.G.’s testimony. Trial Ct. Op. at 10-11. The

court found that because it gave prospective jurors a proper instruction during

voir dire on how to evaluate witness credibility, no error occurred from its

refusal to allow Smith’s proposed question. Id. at 11.

      The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Smith’s proposed

question. The question wholly involved the victims’ credibility, was essentially

argumentative, and impermissibly sought to gauge jurors’ receptiveness to

possible defense strategies. See Ritter, 615 A.2d at 447; Paolello, 665 A.2d

at 451. Moreover, the court’s other questions and statements to potential

jurors adequately addressed concerns about prospective jurors’ ability to be

impartial. The court informed the members of the panel that they would be

asked to determine if witnesses were “telling the truth, lying or simply

mistaken.” N.T., 6/22/21, at 15. It explained that they would do so

“considering what were their opportunities to see, hear or understand a

particular fact or incident and determine if a witness is credible,” and that they

were to do so using “the same standard for everyone, regardless of a person’s

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status of what they do for a living.” Id.3 It then advised them that Smith was

charged with sexually abusing two children between the ages of six and eight

and asked if they could be fair and impartial considering the nature of the

charges. Id. at 20-22. Smith offers no authority mandating that courts ask

prospective jurors whether they believe a victim of a particular category of

crime could lie, and we are aware of none. Instead, he cites cases upholding

challenges to the denial of voir dire questions relating to potentially

controversial social issues, such as racial and law enforcement prejudice, tort

reform, and sexual orientation, that could affect jurors’ overall ability to be

impartial. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding

Smith’s question from voir dire.

        Smith next argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his

conviction for unlawful contact with a minor under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6318.4

____________________________________________

3   The court stated:

        You will be asked to evaluate the credibility of the testimony of
        witnesses as to their truthfulness and accuracy. In other words,
        you will determine if they’re telling the truth, lying or simply
        mistaken.

        You will do this considering what were their opportunities to see,
        hear or understand a particular fact or incident and determine if a
        witness is credible[. Y]ou are to use the same standard for
        everyone, regardless of a person’s status of what they do for a
        living.

N.T., 6/22/21, at 15.

4 Smith does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his
remaining convictions. See Smith’s Br. at 20.

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Smith’s Br. at 20. He maintains that the statute “punishes communications

aimed at enticing a minor to engage in sexual acts” and he “communicated

nothing to the [victims] for the purpose of luring them or enticing them

sexually before he abused them repeatedly.” Id. at 11. Smith argues the only

times he uttered any words to M.B. and A.G. “were after he had already

sexually assaulted each of them multiple times.” Id. at 21. He states that the

crime of unlawful contact with a minor “is complete at the time of the

communication and is distinct from subsequent sexual assaults or attempts.”

Id. at 11-12. Otherwise, according to Smith, the statute results in virtually

every individual who sexually assaults a child being automatically guilty of the

additional crime of unlawful conduct with a minor. Id. at 25.

      Our standard of review when reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of

the evidence is de novo, while “our scope of review is limited to considering

the evidence of record, and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom,

viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict

winner.” Commonwealth v. Rushing, 99 A.3d 416, 420-21 (Pa. 2014).

“Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict when it establishes

each material element of the crime charged and the commission thereof by

the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744

A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000). The trier of fact is free to believe, all, part, or none

of   the   evidence   presented   when    making    credibility   determinations.

Commonwealth v. Beasley, 138 A.3d 39, 45 (Pa.Super. 2016). “[T]his

Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder, and where

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the record contains support for the convictions, they may not be disturbed.”

Commonwealth v. Smith, 146 A.3d 257, 261 (Pa.Super. 2016).

      The crime of unlawful contact with a minor is defined, in relevant part,

as intentional contact with a minor “for the purpose of engaging in” certain

prohibited activity:

      (a) Offense defined.--A person commits an offense if he is
      intentionally in contact with a minor, or a law enforcement officer
      acting in the performance of his duties who has assumed the
      identity of a minor, for the purpose of engaging in an activity
      prohibited under any of the following, and either the person
      initiating the contact or the person being contacted is within this
      Commonwealth:

         (1) Any of the offenses enumerated in Chapter 31 (relating
         to sexual offenses).

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6318(a)(1).

      The statute defines “contacts” as “[d]irect or indirect contact or

communication by any means”:

      Direct or indirect contact or communication by any means,
      method or device, including contact or communication in person
      or through an agent or agency, through any print medium, the
      mails, a common carrier or communication common carrier, any
      electronic communication system and any telecommunications,
      wire, computer or radio communications device or system.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6318(c).

      The “contact” element can be satisfied by communication, either verbal

or non-verbal, and the statute does not require that events occur in any

particular sequence. That is, the “contact” may occur before, at the beginning

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of, or during other conduct, so long as it is “for the purpose of engaging in”

an enumerated offense:

      [T]he crime of [u]nlawful [c]ontact with a [m]inor focuses on
      communication, verbal or non-verbal, and does not depend upon
      the timing of the communication. Thus, it matters not whether the
      communication occurred at the outset of or contemporaneously
      with the contact; once the communicative message is relayed to
      a minor, the crime of unlawful contact is complete. Thus, the
      statute is best understood as “unlawful communication with a
      minor,” for by its plain terms, it prohibits communication with a
      minor for the purpose of carrying out certain sex acts.

Commonwealth v. Davis, 225 A.3d 582, 587 (Pa.Super. 2019) (emphasis

in original) (internal citation omitted).

      Here, the court found the evidence was sufficient to sustain Smith’s

conviction for unlawful contact with a minor as to M.B. It determined that

Smith instructing M.B. to perform oral sex on him, physically taking M.B. to

another room to perform sexual acts on her, taking her clothes off, and taking

his clothes off constituted verbal and non-verbal communications for the

specific purpose of engaging in sexual conduct with a child. Trial Ct. Op. at 9.

Similarly, the court found the evidence was sufficient to support Smith’s

conviction for unlawful contact with a minor as to A.G. Id. A.G. testified that

Smith told her to lay on a table on her stomach and then he anally raped her.

Id. Smith also instructed A.G. to perform oral sex on him. Id. The court found

that Smith’s “commands were verbal precursors to illicit sexual acts with

A.G.[,]” and his “actions clearly demonstrate[d] the type of communication

and contact covered under the statute.” Id.

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       Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

as verdict winner, we find that the evidence was sufficient to prove that Smith

communicated with the victims both verbally and physically for the purpose

of engaging in illegal sexual activities. By his own admission in his appellate

brief, Smith asked both M.B. and A.G. to perform oral sex on him and told A.G

to lay on a table immediately before sexually assaulting her. See Smith’s Br.

at   21.   These     statements      demonstrate   the   type   of   communication

contemplated by the statute.

       Smith’s argument that application of Section 6318 results in virtually

every individual who sexually assaults a child being automatically guilty of the

additional crime of unlawful conduct with a minor is erroneous. This Court has

held that evidence that a defendant engaged in sexual contact with a minor,

by itself, is insufficient to support an unlawful contact with a minor conviction.

See Commonwealth v. Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73, 80 (Pa.Super. 2005)

(vacating unlawful contact with a minor conviction as to minor who testified

only that defendant came into her room and touched her breasts and buttocks

without saying anything).5 Rather, to sustain a conviction under Section 6318,

the defendant must have been in some contact or communication with the

victim for the purpose of engaging in specified prohibited conduct. Here, the

____________________________________________

5 See also Commonwealth v. Letham, No. 1259 WDA 2020, 2022 WL
122460, at *4 (Pa.Super. filed January 13, 2022) (unpublished mem.)
(vacating unlawful contact with a minor conviction where evidence was that
defendant came into a room where minor was standing and immediately
grabbed her breasts without saying anything or positioning her in anyway).

                                          - 11 -
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evidence established Smith communicated with M.B. and A.G. for the purpose

of sexually assaulting them. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to prove

the “contact” element of the crime of unlawful contact with a minor. Smith’s

sufficiency claim fails.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/26/2023

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