Court Opinion

ID: 9632730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:23:40.489274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:58:54.100412
License: Public Domain

BENCH, Presiding Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of the trial court’s finding that the *839police officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. My colleagues nevér explain why the trial court’s finding of a reasonable suspicion in this case is clearly erroneous. Instead, they summarily conclude that the facts do not support a reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity.
One of the guiding legal principles that the trial court must follow in finding a reasonable suspicion is the requirement that it consider the totality of the circumstances facing the officer. State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987). Utah courts have traditionally held that a trial court has broad discretion in making its findings when utilizing a totality of the circumstances approach. State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App.1991); cf. State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 128-29 (Utah 1987) (giving great deference to magistrate’s finding of probable cause based upon totality of circumstances); State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah App.1989) (same). Absent some articulated reasoning as to why the facts relied upon by the trial court do not support a finding of reasonable suspicion as a matter of law, the majority is simply substituting its judgment for that of the trial court. If the clearly erroneous standard were truly applied in this case, the trial court’s finding would be affirmed.
Defendant asserts that the police officer unreasonably seized her when he stopped her car. In essence, her argument is that her conduct was not suspicious enough to justify the stop. In order to stop Sykes, the officer needed only an “articulable suspicion” that she was involved in criminal activity. See State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 238 (5th Cir.1984)). While the officer in this case likely did not have probable cause to arrest Sykes for purchasing drugs before he stopped her, he clearly had articula-ble suspicions of criminal activity that warranted further investigation.1 See State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App.1990) (ability of officer to articulate facts indicates he operated on “articulable suspicion” and not a mere “hunch”). It is readily apparent that the officer in this case was not acting on a mere hunch.
The officer explained that he observed Sykes participating in what objectively appeared to be a drug purchase at a house where drug dealing was suspected. The house was under surveillance because neighbors had reported frequent brief visits to the house, which activity is indicative of drug trafficking. A confidential informant had also provided to the police information regarding the drug activities at the house.2 The officer had personally observed the frequent and short visits of others to the house. He was also personally aware that drugs were available in the area because he had previously made an undercover purchase in the same neighborhood. In the officer’s experience,3 Sykes’s actions of entering the home briefly and then leaving were indicative of a drug purchase. See United States v. Griffin, 909 F.2d 1222, 1223 (8th Cir.1990) (officers had reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle as it left a suspected drug house); United States v. Buchannon, 878 F.2d 1065, 1067 (8th Cir.1989) (a brief visit to a suspected drug house “conformed to the patterns of the *840drug trade”); State v. Biegel, 57 Wash. App. 192, 787 P.2d 577, 578 rev. denied, 115 Wash.2d 1004, 795 P.2d 1156 (1990) (police had reasonable suspicion even though they did not know what occurred inside when defendant made a short visit to a suspected drug house).
When all of these objective, articulable facts, along with their reasonable inferences, are combined, the trial court could rationally find that the officer had an articu-lable suspicion that Sykes stopped at the house in order to purchase drugs. The majority, however,' says this finding is clearly erroneous. It does so without ever explaining why it was unreasonable for the police officer to stop Sykes to inquire about suspected criminal activities at the house. In short, the majority does not set forth any applicable law that precludes the trial court’s finding which appears to have a solid basis in fact and law.
In State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 509 (Utah App.1989), we affirmed a finding of reasonable suspicion ba,sed upon similar circumstances regarding an individual’s suspicious activity in an area where crime was suspected. We held that the defendant’s presence in a “high crime area” alone was insufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion. We nevertheless upheld the trial court’s finding of reasonable suspicion because the officers observed the defendant conducting “a particular type of activity which was ... consistent with criminal activity....” Sykes’s own conduct linked her with the suspected illegal activities at a house under contemporaneous surveillance for drug dealing. The short, frequent visits by others to the house, personally, witnessed by the officer, constituted an outward indication that this probably was a drug house and provided the officer with an objective confirmation of the complaints made by the neighbors. Sykes was therefore not just in an area where the officer knew drugs were available; she entered the very house where drug dealing was suspected, and acted in a particular manner indicating the very criminal conduct under active investigation.
When the totality of the circumstances in the present case is considered, the officer certainly had an articulable reason to suspect that Sykes was involved in criminal activity based on her own actions. Her particular conduct was consistent with a drug purchase at a house under surveillance for drug dealing. The trial court’s finding therefore appears on its face to be perfectly acceptable.
The thrust of the majority’s holding is simply that there might have been an innocent explanation for Sykes’s conduct. The majority speculates that Sykes might have stopped to visit somebody who was not at the house and therefore left quickly. This speculation is legally insufficient to upset the trial court’s finding because it does not preclude a finding of reasonable suspicion. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that experienced officers may be “able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer.” Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, n. 2, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641 n. 2, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). It is well-settled in Utah that a reasonable suspicion may be found even though the defendant’s conduct was consistent with innocent activity. State v. Davis, 821 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1991) (“although there may be a host of other innocent explanations,” the officer had a reasonable suspicion); Menke, 787 P.2d at 541 (defendant’s actions which were consistent with innocent activity were also indicative of shoplifting). A trial court may even make the more demanding finding of probable cause despite the existence of innocent explanations for the conduct. State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 834 (Utah App.1991) (innocent explanations do not preclude finding of probable cause); Holmes, 774 P.2d at 509 (“the law does not require that ‘all innocent explanations for a person’s actions be absent before those actions can provide probable cause for an arrest’ ”) (quoting Wood v. United States, 498 A.2d 1140 (D.C.1985)). These cases clearly establish that a trial court is not precluded, as a matter of law, from finding reasonable suspicion based upon suspicious activity that might otherwise have an innocent explanation.
*841Under the clearly erroneous standard, the majority must show how the trial court was precluded from finding a reasonable suspicion by reviewing the facts relied upon by the officer and explaining why, as a matter of law, it was improper to consider them. See, e.g., Mendoza, 748 P.2d at 183-84. Since the majority has failed to foreclose the possibility of a finding that the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion as a matter of law, it errs in substituting its judgment for that of the trial court. In essence, my colleagues would require that the officer have subjective proof of drug dealing at the house before they would find the officer’s suspicion to be objectively reasonable. Not only does such reasoning ignore the trial court’s proper role, it ignores the well-established rule that “[t]he process does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981).
•Inasmuch as the trial court did not violate any legal principle in finding that the officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion, I would defer to the trial court’s finding. I therefore respectfully dissent.

.The officer could stop Sykes with less than probable cause to arrest her.
The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders.... A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-46, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972).

. Anonymous or confidential tips may be sufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion warranting further investigation. See generally State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254, 1262 (Utah 1983).

. The officer had been a deputy sheriff for over nine years and a member of the narcotics division since 1987. He had received narcotics training from the United States Drug Enforcement Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Los Angeles Police Department narcotics division, and the Utah Division of Police Officer Standards and Training.