Court Opinion

ID: 9665766
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:56:31.460697+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:18.670619
License: Public Domain

REAVLEY, Justice
(dissenting).
The majority’s narrow construction of the words “being struck by” is not compelled by our opinion in Kahn, where the collision was with a parked automobile. To the contrary, in Kahn (359 S.W.2d 892) we specifically considered a California case, Davilla v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 114 Cal.App. 308, 299 P. 831 (1931), in which recovery was allowed under facts almost identical to those in the present case. In Davilla, the insured, while endeavoring to stop his motorcycle to avoid a collision with an automobile which was stopped in the street ahead of him, was thrown into and against the automobile. We distinguished Kahn from Davilla, saying in part:
“. . . ordinary usage can very well be said to hold that one is struck by an automobile in a situation where the automobile is stationary at the moment of impact, as in Davilla; whereas, such is not true in the case of a parked and passive vehicle, the movement and propulsion of which is not a factor in the collision.”
In the present case, Mrs. Langston’s car was not parked and passive. It was being driven by her in the street at the foot of a hill ahead of Gallup’s motorcycle; her car was temporarily stopped at an intersection preparatory to making a left turn; the accident and the striking would not have occurred except for the fact that Mrs. Langston’s car was being driven, and momentarily stopped, at the street intersection.
The majority now holds, contrary to its language in Kahn, that “ordinary usage,” and the “popular and usual meaning [of words] to the general public,” requires its narrow and restrictive construction. I doubt that such ordinary usage and understanding of the general public- is so restricted, especially that segment of the general public which pays insurance premiums for medical payments resulting “within one year from the date of accident . . .” for bodily injury “caused by accident” under one of the three listed circumstances. (Emphasis supplied.)
Construing all of the words of coverage together, I interpret “being struck by” as meaning the same as “being in collision or accident with.” The strict construction by the majority makes this coverage depend upon the happenstance of the relative positions and vectors of the colliding vehicles. If the non-occupied automobile is stationary, or is far enough into the intersection to be struck instead of do the striking, or is going away at the time of the collision —there is no coverage. This does not seem to be a reasonable effect to give to the terms of the insurance contract. It is a rule that will not wear well, and warrants consideration by the State Board of *252Insurance, since it is responsible for the words of the policy which have been allowed by the majority to restrict its coverage.
DANIEL and SAM D. JOHNSON, JJ., j oin in this dissent.