Court Opinion

ID: 9919123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 16:04:32.454946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:48.542925
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                            FOURTH DISTRICT

    UNIVERSAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,
                        Appellant,

                                    v.

             MULAIRE ANDRE and CHARMAINE ANDRE,
                          Appellees.

                            No. 4D2022-2680

                           [January 17, 2024]

   Appeal from the County Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Natasha DePrimo, Ellen Feld, and Kal Evans, Judges;
L.T. Case No. COWE20-009344.

  Kara Rockenbach Link and David A. Noel of Link & Rockenbach, PA,
West Palm Beach, for appellant.

  Garrett S. Elsinger of The Mineo Salcedo Law Firm, P.A., Davie, for
appellees.

GERBER, J.

    The insurer appeals from two county court orders: (1) the predecessor
court’s sua sponte order entering a default against the insurer based on
the insurer’s counsel’s failure to appear for a case management conference
occurring after the insurer had filed its answer and affirmative defenses;
and (2) the second successor court’s order denying the insurer’s amended
motion to set aside the default and a later-entered default judgment as to
liability against the insurer.

   The insurer primarily argues both orders are void because the
predecessor court sua sponte had entered the default against the insurer
without providing the insurer with an opportunity to be heard as to why
the insurer’s counsel failed to appear at the case management conference.
The insurer alternatively argues that the second successor court erred in
denying the insurer’s amended motion to set aside the default and default
judgment because the insurer’s amended motion satisfied the elements of
due diligence, excusable neglect, and a meritorious defense.
   We conclude the insurer’s primary argument and alternative argument
are both meritorious. Therefore, we reverse and remand for the second
successor court to grant the insurer’s amended motion to set aside the
default and default judgment as to liability against the insurer.

   On the insurer’s primary argument, our standard of review is guided
by our opinion in Hendrix v. Department Stores National Bank, 177 So. 3d
288 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015):

         Whether a judgment is void is a question of law reviewed
      de novo. A judgment is void if, in the proceedings leading up
      to the judgment, there is a violation of the due process
      guarantee of notice and an opportunity to be heard. If a
      judgment is void, a party is not required to demonstrate
      excusable neglect or a meritorious defense.

          … [Florida] Rule [of Civil Procedure]1.500(b) provides that
      where, as here, a “party has filed or served any paper in the
      action, that party shall be served with notice of the application
      for default.”

         Florida courts, including this court, have held that where,
      as here, a defendant files substantive papers in the action,
      rule 1.500(b)’s notice requirement also requires a hearing.

Id. at 290 (internal brackets, citations, and some quotation marks
omitted).

   Here, to the extent the predecessor court sua sponte had entered a
default against the insurer due to the insurer’s counsel’s failure to appear
for the case management conference, the insurer was entitled to an
opportunity to be heard as to why the noncompliance was not willful or in
bad faith before the default’s entry. See Int’l Energy Corp. v. Hackett, 687
So. 2d 941, 943 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (“[E]ven if the Uniform [Pre-Trial] Order
had specifically listed default as a possible sanction for noncompliance,
notice and opportunity to be heard must still be given to the defending
party for a determination of whether the noncompliance was willful or in
bad faith.”). Thus, because the predecessor court did not provide the
insurer with an opportunity to be heard, the predecessor court’s default,
and the first successor court’s default judgment, were void for lack of due
process.

   The insurer’s alternative argument, for which we apply an abuse of
discretion standard of review, is equally meritorious, because the insurer’s

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amended motion to set aside the default and default judgment satisfied
the elements of due diligence, excusable neglect, and a meritorious
defense. See Chigurupati v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 132 So. 3d 263, 265
(Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (“[W]e review an order denying a motion to vacate a
default for an abuse of discretion.”); Suntrust Mortg. v. Torrenga, 153 So.
3d 952, 953 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (“A trial court’s determination on a motion
for relief from judgment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”) (citation
omitted); Wolf v. Peter M. Habashy, P.A., 361 So. 3d 379, 381 (Fla. 4th DCA
2023) (“To set aside a default final judgment, the trial court must find
excusable neglect, a meritorious defense, and due diligence in seeking
relief.”).

    First, only five days after the first successor court entered the final
judgment against the insurer, the insurer filed its motion (later amended)
to set aside the default and default judgment, thus satisfying the due
diligence element. Wolf, 361 So. 3d at at 382 (“[A]ppellants filed their
motion within six days of the default final judgment. This shows due
diligence.”).

   Second, the insurer’s amended motion contained its counsel’s sworn
statements establishing that his failure to attend the case management
conference was due to a calendaring error. The insurer’s amended motion
also included the legal assistant’s affidavit, in which she swore that she
inadvertently had not added the case management conference to the
insurer’s counsel’s calendar. These sworn statements satisfied the
excusable neglect element. See Elliott v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, 31 So.
3d 304, 307 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (“Excusable neglect is found ‘where
inaction results from clerical or secretarial error, reasonable
misunderstanding, a system gone awry or any other of the foibles to which
human nature is heir.’” (quoting Somero v. Hendry Gen. Hosp., 467 So. 2d
1103, 1106 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985))).

   Third, it is uncontroverted that before the predecessor court sua sponte
entered the default against the insurer, the insurer had filed its answer
containing facially meritorious defenses, thus satisfying that element.

    We recognize that county courts must manage dockets with hundreds
of insurance cases, some of which are delayed due to counsel’s failure on
both sides to abide by case management orders. Here, however, the entry
of a default and default judgment in a meritoriously-defended action due
to counsel’s excusable neglect unfairly punished the insurer for conduct
in which it did not participate. Thus, we reverse and remand for the
second successor court to grant the insurer’s amended motion to set aside
the default and default judgment as to liability against the insurer.

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  Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

DAMOORGIAN and LEVINE, JJ., concur.

                         *        *         *

  Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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