Court Opinion

ID: 9892952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-25 17:00:43.016255+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:54.160570
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
       FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NICHOLAS DEFIORE; KEITH          No. 21-15261
QUICK; NEIL ROBINSON;
CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS;            D.C. No. 2:20-
SHAWN WHITEHEAD; PAUL            cv-01981-APG
MILLS, Jr.; RENE PEREZ; ROBERT
HERRING; HOUSTON WILLAMS;
ALLEN CAIN; RICHARD                OPINION
LANDRY; WARREN WOODS;
ARNOLD ALEXANDER; DANIEL
MERCANTON; DAVID
WOLDERZAK; JAQUELYN
JOUBERT-YOUNG;
ABDELRAHIM KHAMIS; CURTIS
WATSON; JOSEPH SCOTT;
BABATUNDA DOUGLAS;
DUSTIN BOYLE; ALFREDO LUIS
CRUZ; GEORGE MUNN; TODD
DUPONT; JEROME MUNDY;
BENTON WILLIAMS, Jr.;
EDUARDO ZUNIGA;
CHRISTOPHER WARREN;
CHRISTOPHER FIELDS,

        Plaintiffs-Appellees,

 v.
2                      DEFIORE V. SOC LLC

SOC LLC, DBA SOC Nevada LLC;
SOC-SMG, INC.; DAY &
ZIMMERMANN, INC.,

             Defendants-Appellants.

          Appeal from the United States District Court
                   for the District of Nevada
           Andrew Gordon, District Judge, Presiding

           Argued and Submitted November 8, 2021
                  San Francisco, California

                    Filed October 25, 2023

     Before: Daniel P. Collins and Kenneth K. Lee, Circuit
    Judges, and M. Miller Baker, * International Trade Judge.

                   Opinion by Judge Baker;
                   Dissent by Judge Collins

*
 The Honorable M. Miller Baker, Judge for the United States Court of
International Trade, sitting by designation.
                        DEFIORE V. SOC LLC                          3

                          SUMMARY **

              Federal Officer Removal Statute

    The panel reversed the district court’s order remanding
to state court an action against private contractors providing
war-zone security services to the Department of Defense,
brought by a group of their employees who guarded bases,
equipment, and personnel in Iraq.
    The guards alleged that their working conditions violated
the contractors’ recruiting representations, their employment
contracts, and the Theater Wide Internal Security Services II
(TWISS II) contract between the contractors and the
Department of Defense.
     The panel held that the contractors met the limited
burden imposed by the federal officer removal statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), which permits removal of a civil action
against “any officer (or any person acting under that officer)
of the United States or of any agency thereof . . . for or
relating to any act under color of such office.” To satisfy
this requirement, a removing private entity must show that
(a) it is a “person” within the meaning of the statute; (b) there
is a causal nexus between its actions, taken pursuant to a
federal officer’s directions, and the plaintiff’s claims; and (c)
it can assert a colorable federal defense.
   There was no dispute that the contractors, as
corporations, were “persons” for purposes of § 1442(a)(1).

**
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
4                    DEFIORE V. SOC LLC

    The panel held that the contractors sufficiently pleaded
that there was a causal nexus between their actions and the
guards’ claims. First, the contractors “acted under” a federal
officer because, under common-law agency principles, they
were independent contractors serving as the government’s
agents, rather than acting as non-agent service
providers. The panel concluded that the TWISS II contract’s
subordination of the contractors to U.S. military command
in the performance of their duties in Iraq sufficed to render
them Department of Defense agents. Second, there was a
causal connection between the actions of the contractors as
agents of the government and the guards’ claims because the
actions the contractors took which gave rise to the guards’
claims resulted from their work for the Department of
Defense.
    The panel further held that the contractors sufficiently
alleged a colorable federal defense of compliance with the
federal regulations incorporated into the TWISS II
contract. Agreeing with the Fifth Circuit, the panel held that
the question was not whether the contractors’ asserted
federal defense was meritorious, but whether that defense
was immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining
jurisdiction or was wholly insubstantial and frivolous. The
panel remanded the case to the district court for further
proceedings.
    Dissenting, Judge Collins wrote that the contractors’
removal notice failed to adequately plead a colorable federal
defense because the removal notice did not allege sufficient
facts to support the defense of compliance with the TWISS
II contract’s incorporation of federal regulations, and this
defense applied only to a subset of the guards’
claims. Further, the contractors did not satisfy the causal
nexus requirements because it is not sufficient only to show
                     DEFIORE V. SOC LLC                      5

that a defendant contractor is an “agent” of the Government
and that, absent that contractual relationship, the plaintiff’s
claim would never have arisen.

                         COUNSEL

Scott E. Lerner (argued) and Tara M. Lee, White & Case
LLP, Washington, D.C.; E. Leif Reid, Lewis Roca
Rothgerber Christie LLP, Reno, Nevada; for Defendants-
Appellants.
Scott E. Gizer (argued), Early Sullivan Wright Gizer &
McRae LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Plaintiffs-
Appellees.

                         OPINION

BAKER, International Trade Judge:

    Three private contractors providing war-zone security
services to the Department of Defense (DOD) appeal a
district court order remanding to Nevada state court this suit
brought by a group of their employees who guarded DOD
bases, equipment, and personnel in Iraq. Because the
contractors met the limited burden imposed by the federal
officer removal statute, we hold that the remand was
erroneous. We therefore reverse.
                               I
    The guards’ complaint alleges that the contractors
recruited them “under false promises with respect to the
6                    DEFIORE V. SOC LLC

schedule [they] would work” in Iraq. The complaint also
alleges that the contractors required that the guards “work in
ultra-hazardous conditions in excess of 12 hours per day
without meals or rest periods, seven days per week.”
According to the complaint, these working conditions
violated “not only the [contractors’ recruiting]
representations” and employment contracts, but also the
relevant agreement between DOD and the contractors, the
Theater Wide Internal Security Services II (TWISS II)
contract. The complaint asserts eight state-law claims for
relief, including a claim for breach of the TWISS II contract,
which the guards allege “was expressly for their benefit.”
     Invoking the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442(a)(1), the contractors timely removed this suit to the
district court. Their notice of removal alleges (1) that they
are “persons” for purposes of the statute; (2) that the guards’
claims “are connected or associated with” the contractors’
“official authority” because the contractors were “acting
under federal authority by performing security services
according to United States military directives” and because
the TWISS II contract required the guards to follow “orders
. . . issued by the ‘Combatant Commander, including those
relating to force protection, security, health, [or] safety’ ”;
and (3) that the contractors “expect to [assert] colorable
federal defenses, . . . including their compliance with federal
regulations” incorporated into the TWISS II contract.
Attached to the notice of removal was the guards’ complaint.
   The guards then moved to remand this action to state
court. Ruling from the bench, the district court granted the
motion for two separate and independent reasons.
   First, the district court reasoned that there was no causal
nexus between the guards’ “claims and the defendants’
                        DEFIORE V. SOC LLC                            7

actions that were at the direction of the government” because
the TWISS II contract “delegated to the defendants”
“specific command and control supervision” of the guards,
even though the contract also provided for “some general
oversight by the government.”
    Second, the district court reasoned that even if the
contractors could establish such a nexus, “they cannot assert
a colorable federal defense.” As relevant here, the district
court reasoned that although the contractors “claim they
have to comply with federal regulations and that gives them
a federal defense, . . . the regs that are being cited by the
defendants do not provide a defense to the plaintiffs’ claims
here of fraud or of breach of contract between those two
parties, the plaintiffs and the defendants.” 1
    The contractors timely appealed.
                                  II
    Insofar as such orders are reviewable, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(d), we review de novo a district court’s decision to
remand a case. See Lively v. Wild Oats Mkts., Inc., 456 F.3d
933, 938 (9th Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Garrett,
253 F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Jurisdiction is a question
of law subject to de novo review.”). A remand motion
challenging removal jurisdiction is evaluated the same as a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Leite v. Crane
Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121–22 (9th Cir. 2014). Under that
framework, where the moving party does not contest the

1
  Although the contractors’ notice of removal did not expressly invoke
either the political question or derivative sovereign immunity doctrines
as federal defenses, their response to the remand motion did so. The
district court also rejected those defenses.
8                         DEFIORE V. SOC LLC

removal notice’s factual allegations but instead asserts that
those allegations are facially insufficient to invoke federal
jurisdiction, we accept the notice’s factual allegations as true
and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the remover.
Id.
    When the plaintiffs’ motion to remand raises a factual
challenge by “contest[ing] the truth of the [remover’s]
factual allegations, usually by introducing evidence outside
the pleadings,” however, the remover “must support her
jurisdictional allegations with ‘competent proof’ . . . under
the same evidentiary standard that governs in the summary
judgment context.” Id. at 1121 (quoting Hertz Corp. v.
Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 96–97 (2010)). The remover “bears the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
each of the requirements for subject-matter jurisdiction has
been met.” Id. Except when the factual dispute material to
subject-matter jurisdiction is intertwined with an element of
the plaintiff’s claim, the district court may resolve the factual
dispute itself. Id. at 1121–22 & n.3.
    The guards’ motion to remand contests the facial
sufficiency of the contractors’ notice of removal. 2 We

2
  Although the guards requested that the district court take judicial notice
of a separate complaint, arbitration award, an arbitration brief, and an
email produced in discovery during that arbitration, the guards did not
cite or invoke these materials to challenge the notice’s jurisdictional
allegations. In any event, materials of which a district court may take
judicial notice are not considered extrinsic evidence for purposes of
Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) and, by extension, a motion to remand. Cf.
United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A court may
. . . consider certain materials—documents attached to the complaint,
documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of
judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion
for summary judgment.”).
                      DEFIORE V. SOC LLC                      9

therefore accept the notice’s jurisdictional allegations as true
and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
contractors. Leite, 749 F.3d at 1121–22.
                              III
    As relevant here, § 1442(a)(1) permits removal of a civil
action against “any officer (or any person acting under that
officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof . . . for
or relating to any act under color of such office.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442(a)(1) (emphasis added). To satisfy this requirement,
a removing private entity must show that “(a) it is a ‘person’
within the meaning of the statute; (b) there is a causal nexus
between its actions, taken pursuant to a federal officer’s
directions, and plaintiff’s claims; and (c) it can assert a
‘colorable federal defense.’ ” Goncalves ex rel. Goncalves v.
Rady Childs. Hosp. San Diego, 865 F.3d 1237, 1244 (9th
Cir. 2017) (quoting Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445
F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2006)).
    There is no dispute here that the contractors, as
corporations, are “person[s]” for purposes of § 1442(a)(1).
See Guards’ Br. at 10 (acknowledging that the status of the
contractors as persons “is not at issue on appeal”); see also
Goncalves, 865 F.3d at 1244 (holding that corporations are
“person[s]” for purposes of §1442(a)(1)). This case therefore
comes down to the remaining elements: Is there a causal
nexus between the contractors’ relevant actions under a
federal officer and the guards’ claims, and do the contractors
assert a colorable federal defense?
    Before considering these two questions, we note that
courts afford § 1442 a “generous” and “liberal” construction,
interpreting the statute “broadly in favor of removal.”
Durham, 445 F.3d at 1252–53. They do so because the
statute “vindicates . . . the interests of government itself” in
10                   DEFIORE V. SOC LLC

“ ‘preserving its own existence.’ ” Id. at 1252 (quoting
Bradford v. Harding, 284 F.2d 307, 310 (2d Cir. 1960)
(Friendly, J.) (itself quoting Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S.
257, 262 (1879))).
    The Supreme Court has accordingly rejected the notion
that removal through § 1442 is “narrow” or “limited.”
Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 406 (1969). While the
broad language of § 1442 “is not limitless,” the statute still
“must be ‘liberally construed.’” Watson v. Philip Morris
Cos., 551 U.S. 142, 147 (2007) (quoting Colorado v. Symes,
286 U.S. 510, 517 (1932)). Removal rights under § 1442 thus
“are much broader than those under section 1441.” Durham,
445 F.3d at 1253. For example, “suits against federal officers
may be removed despite the nonfederal cast of the
complaint; the federal-question element is met if the defense
depends on federal law.” Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S.
423, 431 (1999). And unlike garden-variety remand orders
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or defects in removal
procedure, which are not appealable, see Kircher v. Putnam
Funds Tr., 547 U.S. 633, 640–41 (2006) (discussing 28
U.S.C. § 1447(d)’s general preclusion of appellate review of
remand orders), when (as here) removal relies on § 1442, a
remand order for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is
appealable. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).
                              A
    With these considerations in mind, we turn to whether
there is a causal nexus between the contractors’ actions and
the guards’ claims. To establish such a nexus, the contractors
“must show: (1) that [they were] ‘acting under’ a federal
officer in performing some ‘act under color of federal
office,’ and (2) that such action is causally connected with
the [guards’] claims against [them].” County of San Mateo
                      DEFIORE V. SOC LLC                       11

v. Chevron Corp., 32 F.4th 733, 755 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing
Goncalves, 865 F.3d at 1244–50), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct.
1797 (2023).
                                1
    As to the first prong, “[f]or a private entity to be ‘acting
under’ a federal officer, the private entity must be involved
in ‘an effort to assist, or to help carry out, the duties or tasks
of the federal superior.’ ” Goncalves, 865 F.3d at 1245
(emphasis in original) (quoting Watson, 551 U.S. at 152).
The “relationship typically involves ‘subjection, guidance,
or control,’ ” in which the private entity helps federal
officers “fulfill . . . basic governmental tasks.” Id. (quoting
Watson, 551 U.S. at 151–53).
    As Watson implies, the relevant statutory language—
“acting under”—is redolent of common-law agency. See
Chevron, 32 F.4th at 756 (“[T]he Court considers whether
the person is acting on behalf of the officer in a manner akin
to an agency relationship.”) (citing Watson, 551 U.S. at 151);
cf. 1 Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 (2006)
(“Restatement (Third)”) (“Agency is the fiduciary
relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’)
manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent
shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the
principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or
otherwise consents so to act.”).
    Watson’s antecedents similarly reiterated that the federal
officer removal statute protects federal officers and their
agents. See, e.g., Davis, 100 U.S. at 263 (the federal
government “can act only through its officers and agents,
and they must act within the States”) (emphasis added);
Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 62 (1890) (same);
Willingham, 395 U.S. at 406 (same); Arizona v. Manypenny,
12                   DEFIORE V. SOC LLC

451 U.S. 232, 241 n.16 (1981) (same); Mesa v. California,
489 U.S. 121, 126 (1989) (same). Watson itself also
observed that the Court’s cases teach that

       the removal statute’s “basic” purpose is to
       protect the Federal Government from the
       interference with its “operations” that would
       ensue were a State able, for example, to
       “arres[t]” and bring “to trial in a State cour[t]
       for an alleged offense against the law of the
       State,” “officers and agents” of the Federal
       Government “acting . . . within the scope of
       their authority.”

Watson, 551 U.S. at 150 (emphasis added and alterations in
original) (quoting Willingham, 395 U.S. at 406).
    We, in turn, have acknowledged that the statute protects
the government’s agents. See, e.g., City & County of
Honolulu v. Sunoco LP, 39 F.4th 1101, 1108 (9th Cir. 2022)
(holding that removing defendants did not act “under” a
federal officer because they “did not serve as government
agents and were not subject to close direction or
supervision”) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct.
1795 (2023); Durham, 445 F.3d at 1253 (“If the federal
government can’t guarantee its agents access to a federal
forum if they are sued or prosecuted, it may have difficulty
finding anyone willing to act on its behalf.”) (emphasis
added). And in Goncalves, we held that third-party
administrators of a federal employee health plan “acted
under” a federal officer when they pursued a subrogation
claim in state court. 865 F.3d at 1247. In so doing, we relied
on “the interconnectedness” between the government and
the administrators in operating and administering the plan,
                      DEFIORE V. SOC LLC                     13

id., as an agency was “responsible for the overall
administration of the program while sharing the day-to-day
operating responsibility with . . . the insurance carriers.” Id.
at 1246 (cleaned up and quoting Houston Cmty. Hosp. v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Tex., Inc., 481 F.3d 265, 271
(5th Cir. 2007)). In this scheme, the administrators “serv[ed]
as the government’s agent” in processing claims. Id.
(emphasis added).
    In the district court’s view, this case was more like
Cabalce v. Thomas E. Blanchard & Associates, 797 F.3d
720 (9th Cir. 2015), where we held that an independent
contractor hired by the government to store and dispose of
seized fireworks did not act under a federal officer because
of “the lack of any evidence of the requisite federal control
or supervision over the handling of the seized fireworks.” Id.
at 728. According to the district court, even though the
TWISS II contract provides for “some general oversight by
the government,” it “delegated to the defendants” “specific
command and control supervision” of the guards.
    As we read the cases, the key difference between
Goncalves and Cabalce is a crucial distinction between
independent contractors that are agents and independent
contractors that are instead non-agent service providers.
“[T]he common term ‘independent contractor’ is equivocal
in meaning and confusing in usage because some termed
independent contractors are agents while others are
nonagent service providers.” Restatement (Third) § 1.01
cmt. c (emphasis added); see also United States v. Bonds,
608 F.3d 495, 505 (9th Cir. 2010) (characterizing circuit
precedent as “recognizing that ‘an independent contractor . .
. may be an agent’ in limited circumstances in which he acts
‘subject to the principal’s overall control and direction’ ”)
(quoting Dearborn v. Mar Ship Ops., Inc., 113 F.3d 995, 998
14                       DEFIORE V. SOC LLC

n.3 (9th Cir. 1997)); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 14N
(1958) (“One who contracts to act on behalf of another and
subject to the other’s control except with respect to his
physical conduct is an agent and also an independent
contractor.”) (emphasis added).
    In Goncalves, we held that because of the government’s
overall control of the program, the administrators were the
government’s agents; in Cabalce, because of the
government’s lack of such control, the contractor was a
“nonagent service provider.” Restatement (Third) § 1.01
cmt. c (emphasis added). We therefore only need to ask: Are
the contractors here the government’s common-law agents,
as in Goncalves? If so, that distinguishes this case from
Cabalce.
    The contractors’ notice of removal alleges that they were
“acting under federal authority by performing security
services according to United States military directives.” The
notice also alleges that the “TWISS II contract required all
Contractor personnel . . . to follow orders issued by the
‘Combatant Commander, including those related to force
protection, security, health, [or] safety.’ ” (Alteration in
original.) 3 At argument, the parties agreed that under this and

3
 The TWISS II contract, because it is repeatedly referred to in the notice
of removal and attached complaint, is treated as incorporated into the
notice, just as it would be treated as incorporated into a complaint for
Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) purposes if the guards’ motion to remand
were a motion to dismiss. Cf. Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908 (“Even if a
document is not attached to a complaint, it may be incorporated by
reference into a complaint if the plaintiff refers extensively to the
document or the document forms the basis of the plaintiff’s claim.”).
                        DEFIORE V. SOC LLC                          15

other provisions 4 in the TWISS II contract, a U.S. military
base commander in Iraq had the authority to order the
contractors’ off-duty guards into combat to repel an enemy
attack.
    Under common-law agency principles, the TWISS II
contract’s subordination of the contractors to U.S. military
command in the performance of their duties in Iraq sufficed
to render them DOD agents. See Restatement (Third) § 1.01
(explaining that an agent acts “on the principal’s behalf and
subject to the principal’s control”); see also Hollingsworth
v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 713 (2013) (“An essential element of
agency is the principal’s right to control the agent’s
actions.”) (quoting Restatement (Third) § 1.01, Comment f).
The Combatant Commander controlled the contractors’
actions, as the government’s agents, for fighting the Iraq
War.
    We hold that where the government’s independent
contractor is also an agent under common-law agency
principles as reflected in the Restatement (Third) of Agency,
the contractor “act[s] under” a federal officer for purposes of
§ 1442(a)(1). In so holding, we do not decide whether
“acting under” a federal officer is a status necessarily limited

4
  For example, Paragraph 3.2 of the TWISS II contract provided that
“[t]he contractor shall maintain command and control of their guard
workforce under the general direction of the cognizant [Area Defense
Operations Center]/[Base Defense Operations Center]. The contractor
shift supervisor shall have the means to stay in continual contact with
[Base Defense Operations Center] personnel. The contractor shall
establish command and control procedures to disseminate direction from
the cognizant [Base Defense Operations Center], through the Shift
Supervisor, to the Guard Team Leaders and Guards.” (Emphasis added.)
Under these provisions, on-scene military commanders controlled the
contractors’ security operations in Iraq.
16                     DEFIORE V. SOC LLC

to the government’s common-law agents. Cf. Watson, 551
U.S. at 153–54 (observing that courts have looked to various
considerations to determine whether a private person “act[s]
under” a federal officer for purposes of § 1442(a)(1)). 5
Instead, we merely hold that serving as the government’s
common-law agent satisfies the statute’s “acting under”
requirement.
                                 2
    Next, we must determine whether there is a causal
connection between the actions of the contractors as agents
of the government and the guards’ claims. To satisfy the
causal connection requirement, the contractors “need show
only that the challenged acts ‘occurred because of what they
were asked to do by the Government.’ ” Goncalves, 865 F.3d
at 1245 (emphasis in original) (quoting Isaacson v. Dow
Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 129, 137 (2d Cir. 2008)). “In assessing
whether a causal nexus exists, we credit the defendant’s
theory of the case.” Leite, 749 F.3d at 1124 (citing Jefferson
County, 527 U.S. at 432; Isaacson, 517 F.3d at 137).
     The “hurdle erected by [the causal-connection]
requirement is quite low.” Goncalves, 865 F.3d at 1244
(alteration in original) (quoting Isaacson, 517 F.3d at 137).
“It is enough that [the defendant’s] acts or his presence at the
place in performance of his official duty constitute the basis,
though mistaken or false,” of a plaintiff’s claims. Maryland

5
  The dissent charges that our decision today “contravenes” Watson,
Dissent at 41, but we previously characterized that decision as
“descriptive . . . [of] what the lower courts were doing” rather than
establishing a “certain test” for “acting under” a federal officer.
Goncalves, 865 F.3d at 1245.
                         DEFIORE V. SOC LLC                             17

v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 33 (1926), quoted in Goncalves, 865
F.3d at 1244.
    The contractors therefore only need to show that the
actions they took which gave rise to the guards’ claims
resulted from their work for DOD. See Jefferson County, 527
U.S. at 433 (stating that “[t]he circumstances that gave rise
to the” claim against the federal officer, “not just” the
specific challenged acts of that federal officer, are enough to
establish the “essential nexus” between the activity under
“color of office” and a claim against the officer);
Willingham, 395 U.S. at 409 (“[I]t [is] sufficient for
[removing defendants] to have shown that their relationship
to [the plaintiff] derived solely from their official duties.”);
Isaacson, 517 F.3d at 137–38 (“To show causation,
Defendants must only establish that the act that is the subject
of Plaintiffs’ attack (here, the production of the byproduct
dioxin) occurred while Defendants were performing their
official duties.”) (emphasis in original). 6

6
  We note that in 2011 Congress amended § 1442(a)(1) to allow removal
by federal officers (and persons acting under them) of suits “for or
relating to any act under color of such office . . . .” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442(a)(1); see Removal Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112–
51, § 2(b)(1)(A), 125 Stat. 545. Previously, the statute allowed for
removal of suits “for any act under color of such office.” By so amending
the statute, “Congress broadened federal officer removal to actions, not
just causally connected, but alternatively connected or associated, with
acts under color of federal office.” Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc.,
951 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (emphasis in original); cf.
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (stating
that the “ordinary meaning” of “relating to” “is a broad one—‘to stand
in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring
into association with or connection with’ ”) (quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary 1158 (5th ed. 1979)). We read our “causal nexus” test as
18                        DEFIORE V. SOC LLC

    The notice of removal plainly establishes this: The
contractors’ challenged acts—including allegedly requiring
the guards to work hours beyond the limits set in the TWISS
II contract—occurred while the former discharged their
security duties for the Combatant Commander in the Iraq
War. We therefore hold that a causal nexus exists between
the contractors’ actions as agents of DOD and the guards’
claims. 7 The district court’s finding to the contrary was
consequently in error.

incorporating the “connected or associated with” standard reflected in
Congress’s 2011 amendment and the Supreme Court’s decisions. See
Goncalves, 865 F.3d at 1244–45.
7
  The dissent contends that we have overlooked “the separate nexus
requirement that a defendant’s challenged actions must have been ‘under
color’ of a federal officer’s office.” Dissent at 42. But no decision of ours
or the Supreme Court—and the dissent cites none—treats the “under
color” requirement as distinct from either the “acting under” or “causal
connection” requirements.
   The dissent further asserts that our analysis “leads to the astonishing
conclusion that a federal contractor’s actions in allegedly fraudulently
recruiting its employees are ‘under color’ of a federal officer’s office,
and that, in taking those fraudulent actions, the federal contractor is
‘acting under’ a federal officer.” Id. at 43. But to so accept the guards’
allegations as true “is to decide the merits of the case.” Jefferson County,
527 U.S. at 432. “Just as requiring a ‘clearly sustainable defense’ rather
than a colorable defense would defeat the purpose of the removal statute,
so would demanding an airtight case on the merits in order to show the
required causal connection.” Id. (citation omitted) (citing Willingham,
395 U.S. at 407). A court must therefore “credit the [removing
defendant’s] theory of the case for purposes” of making “an adequate
threshold showing that the suit is for an act under color of office.” Id.
(cleaned up and emphasis added). As explained below, the contractors’
theory of the case is that sometimes DOD required them to make the
guards work overtime. “[W]hether the challenged act was outside the
                         DEFIORE V. SOC LLC                             19

                                    B
    Finally, we must determine whether the contractors
possess a colorable federal defense. See Goncalves, 865 F.3d
at 1244. The purpose of this requirement is to supply a
federal element under which the defense to the action arises.
Mesa, 489 U.S. at 136. Thus, “the federal-question element
is met if the defense depends on federal law.” Jefferson
County, 527 U.S. at 431. In determining removal jurisdiction
under § 1442(a)(1), the scope of the court’s inquiry is only
whether the defendant advanced a colorable federal defense,
“not whether [the] defense will be successful.” Magnin v.
Teledyne Cont’l Motors, 91 F.3d 1424, 1429 (11th Cir.
1996) (citing Mesa, 489 U.S. at 133). Defendants “need not
win [their] case” before removal. Willingham, 395 U.S. at
406–07. And a removing defendant need not have a
colorable federal defense for every claim; one colorable
federal defense against one asserted claim is enough. Mesa,
489 U.S. at 129.
    The contractors assert three federal defenses:
compliance with federal rules and regulations, derivative
sovereign immunity, and the political question doctrine.
Contractors’ Opening Br. at 23. We need consider only
compliance, where the contractors argue the federal
regulations incorporated into the TWISS II contract provide
a colorable defense. Id. at 43–45. 8

scope of [the contractors’] official duties, or whether it was specifically
directed by the federal Government, is one for the federal—not state—
courts to answer.” Leite, 749 F.3d at 1124 (quoting Isaacson, 517 F.3d
at 138).
8
  Thus, we express no view as to whether the contractors’ failure to assert
their derivative sovereign immunity and political question defenses in
the removal notice waived those defenses.
20                       DEFIORE V. SOC LLC

    When a plaintiff’s alleged injuries arise from conduct of
the defendant acting under federal law and the court is
charged with “the proper interpretation of . . . the statute” to
“determin[e] . . . the scope of [the defendant’s] duties,” then
a “colorable federal defense” exists. Mesa, 489 U.S. at 129–
30 (discussing Cleveland, C., C. & I. R. Co. v. McClung, 119
U.S. 454 (1886)).
    In response to the complaint’s allegations that the
guards’ work hours in Iraq violated their employment
contracts and the TWISS II contract, the contractors’ notice
of removal alleges that Federal Acquisition Regulations
(FAR) incorporated into the latter contract required the
guards to “follow orders issued by the ‘Combatant
Commander, including those relating to force protection,
security, health, [or] safety.’ ” (Quoting 48 C.F.R.
§ 252.225-7040(d)(1)(iv).) The notice further alleges the
defense that “regardless of whether a [guard] is on shift or
not, or has already worked more than 72 hours in a given
week, he or she may have been required (pursuant to the
TWISS II contract and the FAR) to provide assistance for a
variety of reasons at the direction of the relevant military
commander.” 9

9
  The dissent contends that the removal notice failed to identify “any
‘officer . . . of the United States or of any agency thereof’ under whom
Defendants acted.” Dissent at 43 n.6 (ellipsis in original) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)). The notice, however, alleged that the contractors
acted under the direction of “the relevant military commander.” The
local military commander at any given base where the contractors’
employees were deployed is surely an “officer . . . of the United States”
for purposes of the statute. The notice’s more general identification of
DOD also suffices, as in Goncalves we characterized the Office of
Personal Management as “the relevant federal officer.” 865 F.3d at 1245;
                          DEFIORE V. SOC LLC                             21

    On appeal, the contractors supplemented the factual
allegations of their removal notice by pointing (Contractors’
Reply Br. at 8) to a declaration filed in related litigation in
which one of their on-site managers in Iraq stated that DOD
“always prioritized manning posts over all other
requirements, including providing guards with a day off
every week. As a result, guards [at one site] received days
off less frequently than employees at other bases staffed by”
the contractors. Risinger v. SOC LLC, No. 2:12-cv-00063
(D. Nev. Apr. 1, 2019), ECF No. 342-7 ¶ 12 (Declaration of
John Huppee). 10
    The district court held that the contractors’ compliance
defense failed, reasoning that “the regs that are being cited
by the defendants do not provide a defense to the plaintiffs’
claims here of fraud or of breach of contract between those
two parties, the plaintiffs and the defendants.” In so holding,
the district court committed two errors.

see also Saldana v. Glenhaven Healthcare LLC, 27 F.4th 679, 684 (9th
Cir. 2022) (characterizing the statute as allowing removal by any “person
or entity who acts under a federal officer or agency”) (emphasis added).
10
   Although a removal notice “cannot be amended to add a separate basis
for removal jurisdiction after the thirty day period” of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b), ARCO Env’t Remediation, L.L.C. v. Dep’t of Health & Env’t
Quality of Mont., 213 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting
O’Halloran v. Univ. of Wash., 856 F.2d 1375, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988)), “a
defendant may amend” such a notice “after the thirty day window has
closed to correct a ‘defective allegation of jurisdiction,’ ” id. (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1653). The Huppee declaration “clarif[ies] the factual
underpinnings of the previously asserted basis” for removal. Kinetic Sys.,
Inc. v. Fed. Fin. Bank, 895 F. Supp. 2d 983, 994 (N.D. Cal. 2012). We
can take judicial notice of that declaration as a court filing in related
litigation. See Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741,
746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Fed. R. Evid. 201(d).
22                    DEFIORE V. SOC LLC

   First, the district court applied the wrong standard—it
decided the merits of the contractors’ federal defense based
on federal regulations. But for jurisdictional purposes, the
contractors’ federal defense doesn’t have to prevail, it
merely needs to be colorable.
    To determine whether a defense is colorable, we need not
reinvent the jurisprudential wheel. A long-standing body of
law governs whether a claim is colorable for securing federal
question jurisdiction. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682–
83 (1946) (holding that an asserted federal claim triggers
federal question jurisdiction unless the claim “clearly
appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of
obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly
insubstantial and frivolous”). We agree with the Fifth Circuit
and hold that the same standard governs whether a federal
defense alleged in a notice of removal is colorable for
§ 1442(a)(1) purposes. See Latiolais, 951 F.3d at 297.
    Thus, the question the district court should have
addressed was not whether the contractors’ asserted federal
defense was meritorious, but whether that defense was
“immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining
jurisdiction or . . . wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” Bell,
327 U.S. at 682–83. Any federal defense that clears the low
bar of Bell is colorable.
    Second, the district court misapprehended the nature of
the guards’ claims. The guards allege (among other things)
that their excessive work hours violated not only their
employment contracts, but also the TWISS II contract. As
the latter incorporated 48 C.F.R. § 252.225-7040, the
contractors have a colorable defense to the guards’ breach
claim for excessive work hours based on compliance with
this regulation. Cf. Magnin, 91 F.3d at 1428 (“At least part
                     DEFIORE V. SOC LLC                    23

of Smith’s defense is that he acted within the scope of his
federal duties, that what he did was required of him by
federal law, and that he did all federal law required. That
defense raises a federal question, which justifies removal.”).
Thus, we conclude that the contractors’ removal notice, as
supplemented by the declaration of Mr. Huppee, alleged a
colorable federal defense to the guards’ breach of contract
claim based on excessive work hours—that DOD in some
circumstances required those excessive hours.
                     *        *        *
    The allegations of the notice of removal, taken as true
and supplemented by record facts in related litigation of
which we take judicial notice, establish that the contractors
served as DOD’s agents in prosecuting the Iraq War, that the
guards’ claims arise out of the contractors’ performance of
those federal duties, and that the contractors have asserted a
colorable federal defense to at least one of the guards’
claims. Removal was therefore proper. By finding otherwise
and remanding to state court, the district court erred. We
reverse and remand for further proceedings.
   REVERSED AND REMANDED.
24                   DEFIORE V. SOC LLC

COLLINS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

    In reversing the district court’s order remanding this case
to state court, the majority seriously misconstrues the
requirements of the federal officer removal statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), and it misapplies the standards for
pleading that statute’s jurisdictional requirements in a notice
of removal. I respectfully dissent.
                              I
    Plaintiffs are 29 individuals who were employed as
armed guards at U.S. military bases in Iraq by Defendant
SOC, LLC (“SOC”), a private security company operating
under a contract with the U.S. Department of Defense
(“DoD”). SOC is a joint venture of Defendants SOC-SMG,
Inc. (“SMG”) and Day & Zimmerman, Inc. (“D&Z”). All of
the Plaintiffs’ service in Iraq occurred between July 2009
and December 2011, although each individual Plaintiff
worked only for different shorter time periods within that
overall timeframe.
    On October 19, 2019, Plaintiffs filed this action in
Nevada state court, alleging that they had been recruited
“under false promises with respect to the schedule” they
would work. The gravamen of the complaint is that, in
pursuing its contract with DoD, SOC followed a strategy of
“bidding to the man,” meaning that the price of its bid was
based on the “exact number” of guards needed, “without any
allowance for rest days and/or sick or other types of leave.”
As a result, after SOC was awarded the contract, it was
“consistently short of the number of individuals required to
fully man the security checkpoints and posts,” which
required Plaintiffs “to work in excess of 6 days per week and
12 hours per day.” These time demands were allegedly
                     DEFIORE V. SOC LLC                    25

contrary to the assurances made to Plaintiffs before and after
SOC recruited them. The complaint further alleges that
Plaintiffs were required to work in excess of 6 days per week
and 12 hours per day “without meal or rest periods, and
without any overtime compensation.”
    Plaintiffs’ complaint asserts eight state law causes of
action: (1) promissory fraud based on alleged fraud in
inducing Plaintiffs to enter into contracts with SOC;
(2) negligent misrepresentation based on the same
allegations; (3) unjust enrichment based on the alleged
promissory fraud; (4) money had and received based on
SOC’s receipt of excess funds from DoD that should have
been paid to Plaintiffs; (5) breach of SOC’s contracts with
Plaintiffs, which contracts allegedly incorporated portions of
SOC’s contract with DoD; (6) breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in SOC’s contracts
with Plaintiffs; (7) quantum meruit based on the failure to
pay overtime compensation; and (8) unjust enrichment
based on breach of contract. Although the complaint was
brought against SOC, SMG, and D&Z (collectively,
“Defendants”), it contains no specific allegations concerning
SMG or D&Z. Instead, the complaint alleges that each
Defendant is derivatively liable for the acts of the others
under a variety of theories. The complaint seeks damages,
restitution, disgorgement, and punitive damages.
    On October 26, 2020, Defendants removed the case to
federal court under the federal officer removal statute. See
28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Plaintiffs moved to remand the case,
and the district court granted that motion. Defendants timely
appealed.
26                   DEFIORE V. SOC LLC

                              II
    Before turning to whether the district court properly
remanded the case, it is helpful first to review the language
of the relevant removal statute and the caselaw construing it.
The relevant statute under which Defendants removed this
case to federal court provides as follows:

       (a) A civil action or criminal prosecution that
       is commenced in a State court and that is
       against or directed to any of the following
       may be removed by them to the district court
       of the United States for the district and
       division embracing the place wherein it is
       pending:
           (1) The United States or any agency
           thereof or any officer (or any person
           acting under that officer) of the United
           States or of any agency thereof, in an
           official or individual capacity, for or
           relating to any act under color of such
           office or on account of any right, title or
           authority claimed under any Act of
           Congress for the apprehension or
           punishment of criminals or the collection
           of the revenue.

28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).
    On its face, the statute permits removal only of matters
against four specified types of defendants, namely, (1) the
“United States”; (2) an “agency thereof”; (3) an “officer . . .
of the United States or of any agency thereof”; and (4) a
“person” acting under such an officer. Id. Because neither
                      DEFIORE V. SOC LLC                      27

the United States, a federal agency, nor a federal officer has
been named as a defendant in this case, only the latter
category of defendants is at issue here. In the context of
removal by such persons, the statute has been construed as
imposing several requirements for removal, which I will
address in turn.
                               A
      First, as the text of the statute confirms, the state court
suit must be “against or directed to” a “person acting under
that officer,” meaning an “officer . . . of the United States or
of any agency thereof.” 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (emphasis
added). Accordingly, it is not sufficient for a private
“person” invoking this statute simply to assert that he or she
is acting, in some general sense, under the “United States”
or an “agency thereof.” Rather, the defendant must show
that it is acting under a specific officer of the United States
or of one of its agencies. Two crucial features of the text
confirm this point: (1) the phrase “any person acting under
that officer” makes specific reference only to an “officer”
(not the “United States” or an “agency”); and (2) that phrase
is located literally in the middle of the noun phrase “officer
. . . of the United States or of any agency thereof” and
therefore cannot be said to refer to the other two items in
§ 1442(a)(1)’s list (namely, the “United States” and “any
agency thereof”).
    The statutory history of § 1442(a)(1)’s text further
confirms this conclusion. Between the enactment of title 28
of the United States Code in 1948 and the first subsequent
amendment of § 1442 in 1996, § 1442(a)(1) read as follows:

        (a) A civil action or criminal prosecution
        commenced in a State court against any of the
28                   DEFIORE V. SOC LLC

       following persons may be removed by them
       to the district court of the United States for
       the district and division embracing the place
       wherein it is pending:
           (1) Any officer of the United States or any
           agency thereof, or person acting under
           him, for any act under color of such office
           or on account of any right, title or
           authority claimed under any Act of
           Congress for the apprehension or
           punishment of criminals or the collection
           of the revenue.

28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1995). In International Primate
Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educational
Fund, 500 U.S. 72 (1991), the Supreme Court held that the
statute’s reference to “any agency thereof” was an
alternative object in the prepositional phrase “of the United
States or any agency thereof,” so that the statute granted
removal authority only to “[a]ny officer of [1] the United
States or [2] any agency thereof.” The Court expressly
rejected the alternative reading under which the phrase “any
agency thereof” would be construed as an alternative subject
of the entire sentence, so that the removal power would
extend separately to “[a]ny officer of the United States” and
to “any agency thereof.” Id. at 79. Accordingly, the Court
held that the then-current version of § 1442(a)(1) did not
“permit[] removal by federal agencies.” Id. at 76.
    In response to International Primate Protection League,
Congress amended § 1442(a)(1) in 1996 to expressly permit
removal by federal agencies and not merely by federal
officers. See Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142,
148–49 (2007). Using strike-through to show deletions and
                     DEFIORE V. SOC LLC                   29

underlining to show additions, the amendments made by
Congress to § 1442(a)(1) in 1996 were as follows:

       (a) A civil action or criminal prosecution
       commenced in a State court against any of the
       following persons may be removed by them
       to the district court of the United States for
       the district and division embracing the place
       wherein it is pending:
           (1) The United States or any agency
           thereof or any Any officer (or any person
           acting under that officer) of the United
           States or of any agency thereof, or person
           acting under him, sued in an official or
           individual capacity for any act under
           color of such office or on account of any
           right, title or authority claimed under any
           Act of Congress for the apprehension or
           punishment of criminals or the collection
           of the revenue.

See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-317, § 206(a)(2), 110 Stat. 3847, 3850 (1996)
(alterations added). These changes confirm that, while
Congress expressly added “[t]he United States” or “any
agency thereof” as entities entitled to removal, the coverage
of private “persons” allowed to remove cases remained
limited to only those persons acting under an “officer”—and
not the “United States” or “any agency thereof.” The point
had been clear in the pre-1996 version of the statute: that
version stated expressly that the removal power extended
only to an “officer of the United States or any agency
thereof, or person acting under him” (i.e., the officer). See
30                       DEFIORE V. SOC LLC

Int’l Primate Prot. League, 500 U.S. at 79 n.5 (quoting the
relevant portion of the then-applicable version of § 1442(a)).
Had Congress intended the phrase “acting under” to extend
to all three federal entities with removal authority (i.e., the
“United States”; “any agency thereof”; or “any officer”), it
could have left the phrase “person acting under him” where
it was and changed “under him” to “under any of them.”
Instead, it moved the phrase “person acting under” into the
very middle of the noun phrase “officer . . . of the United
States or of any agency thereof”; it added “of” before “any
agency thereof” in that noun phrase (thereby expressly
adopting International Primate Protection League’s
construction of that specific phrase); and it changed “him”
to “that officer.”
    Accordingly, private “persons,” including corporations,
may remove a suit only if they show that they were “acting
under” an “officer . . . of the United States or of any agency
thereof.” 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (emphasis added). In
Watson, the Court addressed the further question of what
must be shown to establish that a person was “acting under”
a federal officer. 1 There, the Court held that “acting under”

1
  At the outset of its opinion, the Court in Watson noted that the text
confirms that the statute requires a showing that the person was “‘acting
under’ an ‘officer’ of the United States,” see Watson, 551 U.S. at 145
(emphasis in original), but it later more loosely stated that the statute
“permits removal” if the person “was ‘acting under’ any ‘agency’ or
‘officer’ of the United States,” id. at 147 (emphasis added). The looser
language is presumably due to the fact that no party had raised the
distinction, the Court did not discuss it, and it was of no consequence to
the outcome of the case. Watson therefore cannot be understood as
having spoken to this issue and as having reached an opposite
conclusion. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Avail Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157,
170 (2004) (“Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought
                          DEFIORE V. SOC LLC                              31

a federal officer, for purposes of § 1442(a)(1), means (1) that
the defendant was operating under the “subjection, guidance,
or control” of a federal officer; and (2) that the defendant
was involved in “an effort to assist, or to help carry out, the
duties or tasks of the federal superior.” 551 U.S. at 151–52
(citation and emphasis omitted).
                                     B
    In addition to limiting the “persons” who may invoke its
removal authority, § 1442(a)(1) also limits the type of state
court “cases” that such persons may remove. Specifically,
the case must be “against or directed to” the person and must
be “[1] for or relating to any act under color of such office
or [2] on account of any right, title or authority claimed
under any Act of Congress for the apprehension or
punishment of criminals or the collection of the revenue.”
28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Only the first of these clauses is at
issue here. That clause, in turn, requires a court to consider
what conduct counts as “any act under color of such office”
and what suits count as ones “for or relating” to such acts.

to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as
having been so decided as to constitute precedents.” (citation omitted)).
The same is true of the Ninth Circuit cases cited by the majority that in
some places have used similarly loose language without any awareness
of this specific issue of statutory construction. See Opin. at 20 n.9 (citing
Saldana v. Glenhaven Healthcare LLC, 27 F.4th 679, 684 (9th Cir. 2022)
(assuming, without discussion, that acting under a “federal officer or
agency” is sufficient), and Goncalves ex rel. Goncalves v. Rady
Children’s Hosp. San Diego, 865 F.3d 1237, 1245 (9th Cir. 2017)
(assuming, without discussion, that an agency can qualify as an
“officer”)). And as explained above, the statutory language, as a
grammatical matter, simply cannot bear the reading that a person “acting
under” an “agency,” but not under an “officer,” may remove a case under
§ 1442(a)(1).
32                       DEFIORE V. SOC LLC

    The requirement that the case involve, not just a “person
acting under” a federal officer, but also an “act under color
of such office,” confirms that the particular “acts” involved
in the suit must have a sufficient “causal connection” to the
“asserted official authority.” Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker, 527
U.S. 423, 431 (1999) (citations omitted); 2 see also Medical
Dev. Int’l v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 585 F.3d
1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The requirement of ‘any act
under color of such office’ has been construed as requiring a
causal connection between the charged conduct and the
official authority.” (citation omitted)). Moreover, because
“such office” clearly refers back to the federal “officer”
under whom the defendant is “acting,” it follows that the
“act[s]” involved must be “under color” of that officer’s
office. In addition, the phrase “act under color of such
office” has long been construed as imposing a requirement
that the “removal must be predicated on the allegation of a
colorable federal defense” with respect to those acts. Mesa
v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 129 (1989) (emphasis added)
(adopting this construction in light of longstanding
precedent and in order to avoid the constitutional question
whether, in the absence of such a colorable defense, federal
question jurisdiction would exist under Article III).

2
  Jefferson County reached this conclusion in the context of the separate
paragraph of § 1442 that allows removal of suits against “[a]ny officer
of the courts of the United States, for or relating to any act under color
of office or in the performance of his duties.” 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(3).
But Jefferson County made clear that this nearly identically worded
requirement was the same under the two paragraphs, because the Court
explicitly construed this requirement in § 1442(a)(3) by drawing upon
cases discussing the same requirement in § 1442(a)(1). See 527 U.S. at
431 (citing Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 409 (1969)).
                          DEFIORE V. SOC LLC                              33

    The further requirement that the case be one “for or
relating to” acts under “color of office” means that the
defendant must also show an adequate “causal nexus
between [defendant’s] actions, taken pursuant to a federal
officer’s directions, and plaintiff’s claims.” Goncalves ex
rel. Goncalves v. Rady Children’s Hosp. San Diego, 865
F.3d 1237, 1244 (9th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added) (citation
omitted). In other words, it is not enough to identify acts by
the defendant that were taken “under color” of a federal
officer’s office if those acts bear no relation to the plaintiff’s
claims about wrongful conduct. As we have noted, the
burden to show a causal connection between the defendant’s
under-color-of-office acts and the plaintiffs’ claims is “quite
low,” id. (quoting Isaacson v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 129,
137 (2d Cir. 2008)). That is unsurprising, because it is
almost tautological that a defendant’s wrongful acts will be
connected to the plaintiff’s claims. 3 In such situations, the
Supreme Court has described the applicable burden as
requiring a showing that the suit “has arisen out of the acts
done by [the defendant] under color of federal authority.”
Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 33 (1926) (emphasis added).

3
  The issue is more difficult in cases, such as Goncalves, that involve
atypical procedural contexts in which a state proceeding is directed to
the removing entity even though that entity has not been named as a
defendant in the traditional sense. See Goncalves, 865 F.3d at 1250
(holding that an ancillary proceeding to expunge a removing party’s lien
was covered by § 1442(a)(1)). As Goncalves noted, Congress amended
§ 1442(a)(1) in 2011 by, inter alia, adding the phrase “or relating to” to
the relevant clause, so that removal is authorized if the state court suit is
one “for or relating to any act under color of such office.” See Removal
Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-51, § 2(b)(2), 125 Stat. 545,
545 (2011) (emphasis added); see also Goncalves, 865 F.3d at 1250.
This amendment confirms that the removing party need not be a formal
defendant in order to establish the requisite connection.
34                   DEFIORE V. SOC LLC

As the Court stated in Watson, the question in the context of
an ordinary lawsuit is whether the removing defendant, “in
carrying out the ‘act[s]’ that are the subject of the
[plaintiff’s] complaint[,] was ‘acting under’” a federal
officer. 551 U.S. at 147 (emphasis added).
                             III
    Having set forth the general standards governing
removal under § 1442(a)(1), I next consider whether
Defendants’ notice of removal sufficiently established that
those statutory requirements were met.
    “To remove a case from a state court to a federal court, a
defendant must file in the federal forum a notice of removal
‘containing a short and plain statement of the grounds for
removal.’” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens,
574 U.S. 81, 83 (2014) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a)).
Because that “short and plain statement” requirement of the
removal statute “tracks the general pleading requirement
stated in Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,”
the same pleading standards applicable to complaints under
Rule 8 also apply to the jurisdictional allegations in a notice
of removal. Id. at 87. Accordingly, the removal notice
“must allege facts, not mere legal conclusions, in compliance
with the pleading standards established in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).” Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d
1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014). Where, as here, the plaintiffs’
motion to remand facially challenges the removal notice’s
jurisdictional allegations and does not rely on an evidentiary
showing, the remand motion is resolved by assessing
whether the jurisdictional allegations in the removal notice
meet the pleading standards that would be applied in
                          DEFIORE V. SOC LLC                             35

deciding a “motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” 4 Id. In
my view, Defendants’ notice of removal was deficient for
the simple reason that it wholly fails to allege sufficient facts
to support a colorable federal defense.
      In finding that all of the jurisdictional requirements of
§ 1442(a)(1) have been met, the majority relies on only one
asserted defense against one subset of Plaintiffs’ claims.
Specifically, the majority focuses on Plaintiffs’ fifth cause
of action, for breach of contract, which alleges that
Plaintiffs’ contracts with SOC incorporated the requirement,
in SOC’s underlying contract with DoD (the “TWISS II
contract”), that Plaintiffs not work more than 12 hours per
day or 72 hours per week. See Opin. at 19–20. As to
Plaintiffs’ claim that these time limits were violated, the
majority holds, Defendants have adequately shown that they
have a colorable defense based on the TWISS II contract’s
incorporation of the general requirement that SOC “shall
comply with, and shall ensure that its [relevant] personnel
. . . are familiar with, and comply with, all applicable . . .
[o]rders, directives, and instructions issued by the
Combatant Commander, including those relating to force
protection, security, health, safety, or relations and
interaction with local nationals.” 48 C.F.R. § 252.225-
7040(d)(1)(iv). According to the majority, this provision
gave combatant commanders authority, if warranted under
the circumstances, to direct that a specific person remain on
duty even though he or she had already completed 12 hours

4
  By contrast, if a plaintiff’s remand motion presents a “factual”
challenge that relies upon an evidentiary showing, the district court, after
appropriate proceedings (which may include discovery), may itself
resolve any factual disputes concerning the jurisdictional questions,
except to the extent that those factual issues are intertwined with the
merits of the suit. Leite, 749 F.3d at 1121–22.
36                    DEFIORE V. SOC LLC

that day or 72 hours for that week. See Opin. at 22–23. Such
an order, the majority posits, would override those time
limits and would provide a colorable defense to any
contractual claim by the affected employee.
     The problem with the majority’s reliance on this very
narrow theory is that the removal notice wholly fails to
allege sufficient facts to support it. All that the notice says
on this point is that, “regardless of whether [an employee] is
on shift or not, or has already worked more than 72 hours in
a given week, he or she may have been required . . . to
provide assistance for a variety of reasons at the direction of
the relevant military commander” (emphasis added). The
notice thus never even contends that such an order was ever
actually given, nor does it plead any facts that would support
such a contention; the possibility is left as purely speculative
and theoretical. That plainly falls far short of what Iqbal
requires. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (stating, in the context
of pleading a cause of action, “[w]here a complaint pleads
facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability,
it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility
of entitlement to relief’” (citation omitted)).           Here,
Defendants’ removal notice not only failed to plead facts
more than “merely consistent with” their the-commander-
told-me-to defense, it pleaded no facts in support of that
defense at all.
    The majority does not contest that the removal notice
was deficient on this score. Instead, the majority asserts that
certain additional factual contentions included in
Defendants’ reply brief should be construed as reflecting a
request to amend, under 28 U.S.C. § 1653, the removal
notice’s defective jurisdictional allegations. See Opin. at 21
n.10. But even assuming arguendo that such an amendment
under § 1653 would be appropriate in this context, the
                         DEFIORE V. SOC LLC                           37

proffered additional factual allegations fall short. These
further allegations merely assert that, even though DoD “was
aware of the challenge surrounding recruiting and retaining
guards,” DoD “prioritized manning posts over all other
requirements.” Those meager facts do not plausibly
establish a colorable federal defense. Everyday difficulties
in supplying an adequate number of guards (due to the
systemic shortfalls caused by Defendants’ alleged “bidding
to the man” approach to the TWISS II contract) cannot
colorably be defended on the ground that the ordinary
staffing requirements amounted to an “order” that overrides
the applicable time limits. That much is clear from the
TWISS II contract’s express imposition of a general duty on
SOC to “manage [its] work force in a manner that does not
require any guard or guard team leader to work any longer
than one 12 hour shift per 24 hour period and not more than
72 hours per week.” That is, the systemic failure to have
sufficient personnel available to supply the necessary staff
without SOC requiring excess overtime is not a defense to
the breach-of-contract claim; it is itself a breach. As a result,
the defense posited in the removal notice could only
conceivably apply if a commander gave a direct order, on a
specific occasion, that a particular guard must stay on duty
past the applicable time limit. The notice and the additional
proffer are utterly bereft of any factual allegations that could
support such a conclusion. 5

5
  Nor does the removal notice (or the proffer) plead any facts that could
colorably support any other defense to Plaintiffs’ contract-based claims.
Indeed, the notice does not even mention the other alternative defenses—
derivative sovereign immunity and the political question doctrine—that
Defendants have asserted in their opening brief on appeal. To the extent
that I can fathom how Defendants think that these doctrines could apply
38                       DEFIORE V. SOC LLC

    Beyond this very narrow (and wholly unsupported)
defense to the subset of Plaintiffs’ claims that are contract-
based, the majority does not contend that Defendants have
raised a colorable federal defense to any of Plaintiffs’ other
claims. And for good reason: any such contention would be
simply frivolous. Plaintiffs’ claims for promissory fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, and related ancillary relief rest
on the premise that Defendants engaged in a fraudulent
practice of (1) “bidding to the man” by presenting DoD with
an artificially low bid that Defendants knew would require
excess overtime; and (2) concealing this inevitability of
excess overtime from Plaintiffs in their recruiting pitches.
Quite obviously, no federal officer ordered the employers to
low-bid the Government; the bid was made to DoD, not the
other way around. Nor does the removal notice dare to make
the absurd suggestion that DoD authorized Defendants to
make fraudulent recruiting pitches to Plaintiffs. The only
remaining category of claims asserted in the complaint
involves allegations that Plaintiffs are owed certain monies
in connection with uncompensated overtime. Defendants, of
course, do not allege that any federal officer directed them
not to pay the guards the compensation due to them for
services rendered.
    Accordingly, the removal notice wholly fails to allege a
colorable federal defense to Plaintiffs’ claims. As a result,
the requirements of § 1442(a)(1) were not met, and the
motion to remand was properly granted.

here, they rest on the same theory that a commander ordered them to
engage in the alleged wrongful conduct. Given the lack of any sufficient
factual allegations to support such a contention, those defenses likewise
necessarily fail.
                     DEFIORE V. SOC LLC                     39

                              IV
     Because I conclude that Defendants’ removal notice
failed to adequately plead a colorable federal defense, it is,
strictly speaking, unnecessary for me to address whether
Defendants’ notice sufficiently established the other
jurisdictional requirements of § 1442(a)(1). But what the
majority says on that score is so troublingly wrong that I
cannot overlook it. Effectively, the majority holds that any
federal contractor who qualifies as an “agent” of the
Government in some general sense may remove any case to
federal court in which that contractor has a colorable federal
defense. That is not the law.
    As I explained earlier, § 1442(a)(1) imposes two distinct
nexus requirements, which we recently summarized as
follows: “To demonstrate a causal nexus, the private person
must show: (1) that the person [a] was ‘acting under’ a
federal officer [b] in performing some ‘act under color of
federal office,’ and (2) that such action is causally connected
with the plaintiff’s claims against it.” County of San Mateo
v. Chevron Corp., 32 F.4th 733, 755 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation
omitted). The majority says that these requirements are
satisfied merely by showing that the defendant contractor is
an “agent” of the Government and that, absent that
contractual relationship, the plaintiff’s claim would never
have arisen. See Opin. at 10–18. This represents a
substantial dilution of the burden required to justify removal
under § 1442(a)(1).
    According to the majority, an “overall” “subordination”
of a contractor to federal authority makes that contractor the
Government’s “agent” in the performance of its duties under
the contract and suffices to show that the contractor is
“acting under” a federal “officer” for purposes of
40                    DEFIORE V. SOC LLC

§ 1442(a)(1). See Opin. at 14–15. But this analysis
overlooks an important feature of agency law as well as the
further requirements of § 1442(a)(1).
    The majority seems to think that overall supervision
renders the contractor the Government’s agent for all
purposes, but that is not how agency law works. “Aspects
of an overall relationship may constitute agency and entail
its legal consequences while other aspects do not.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. b (AM. L.
INST. 2006). Principals may, for instance, convey authority
to agents to act for either general or particular purposes. See,
e.g., Schimmelpennich v. Bayard, 26 U.S. 264, 283 (1828)
(noting the familiar principle that an agent “ha[s] no general
authority to personate the [principal] in all respects
whatever; but was an agent appointed for particular
purposes, with limited powers, calculated to sub serve those
purposes”). The majority cites no authority that would
support its “overall control” test, under which Defendants’
subjection to overall “U.S. military command” apparently
suffices to render them agents of DoD for all purposes. See
Opin. at 13–16. The majority is therefore wrong in
suggesting that every action Defendants took in connection
with their contract automatically qualifies as “acting under”
a federal officer.
    This same point is underscored by § 1442(a)(1)’s
additional requirement that the particular “act[s]” at issue
must have been performed “under color” of the federal
officer’s office. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (emphasis added).
As I noted earlier, we recently held in Chevron that the
causal nexus requirement imposes a burden to show “(1) that
the person [a] was ‘acting under’ a federal officer [b] in
performing some ‘act under color of federal office,’ and
(2) that such action is causally connected with the plaintiff’s
                      DEFIORE V. SOC LLC                      41

claims against it.” Chevron, 32 F.4th at 755. In the
majority’s view, however, element (1)(b) in the above
quotation adds nothing and is simply duplicative of the
statute’s other requirements. See Opin. at 18 n.7. According
to the majority, merely being a Government agent, without
more, suffices to establish that all of the actions of that agent
are “under color” of the office of a federal officer. That
sweeping proposition is inconsistent with basic principles of
agency law and with common sense.                  As Chevron
recognizes, the plain text of § 1442(a)(1) imposes two
separate requirements on this score, and the majority has no
authority to simply airbrush one of them out of the statute.
     Moreover, by wrongly eliminating this crucial element
of the required nexus between the acts and the federal
officer’s office, the majority also contravenes the Supreme
Court’s decision in Watson. Although the Court there
framed its discussion as whether, in taking the specific acts
at issue, the defendants were “acting under” a federal officer,
the various factors the Court identified in making that
determination necessarily apply to whether a defendant’s
relevant acts were “under color” of the federal officer’s
authority. 551 U.S. at 151–52. That is why neither Watson
nor Chevron stated that agency alone is sufficient to satisfy
§ 1442(a)(1). On the contrary, in determining whether a
sufficient nexus with a federal officer has been shown, we
said in Chevron that “[a]mong other things, [we] consider[]
whether the person is acting on behalf of the officer in a
manner akin to an agency relationship.” Chevron, 32 F.4th
at 756 (emphasis added). The additional factors to be
considered, beyond agency, include: (1) “whether the person
is subject to the officer’s close direction”; (2) “whether the
private person is assisting the federal officer in fulfilling
‘basic governmental tasks’ that ‘the Government itself
42                   DEFIORE V. SOC LLC

would have had to perform’”; and (3) “whether the private
person’s activity is so closely related to the government’s
implementation of its federal duties that the private person
faces ‘a significant risk of state-court “prejudice.”’” Id. at
756–57 (quoting Watson, 551 U.S. at 153–54). The majority
acknowledges that this multi-factor analysis is required by
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Watson, but the majority
then effectively declines to follow it. See Opin. at 15–16 &
n.5. The majority attempts to reconcile its disregard of
Watson by suggesting that Watson’s additional factors only
apply if the defendant is not an agent of the Government.
See Opin. at 15–16. But that is not a fair reading of the
opinions in Watson or Chevron and, as I have explained, that
reading rests on flawed substantive premises concerning
agency law and the requirements of § 1442(a)(1).
    Building on all of these errors, the majority then
announces that the only remaining nexus requirement is to
show that “the challenged acts occurred because of what
they were asked to do by the Government.” Opin. at 16
(quoting Goncalves, 865 F.3d at 1245 (further quotation
marks and citation omitted)). But this nexus requirement
pertains to the relationship between the removing party’s
challenged actions and the plaintiff’s claims. See Goncalves,
865 F.3d at 1245; see also Chevron, 32 F.4th at 755. That
does not suffice to establish the separate nexus requirement
that a defendant’s challenged actions must have been “under
color” of a federal officer’s office. Any suggestion that that
requirement is satisfied by a showing of mere but-for
causation—i.e., that the acts never would have occurred
absent the Government contract—is absurd. Under that
theory, a contractor who defrauds the Government itself
would be said to be acting “under color” of a federal officer’s
                          DEFIORE V. SOC LLC                             43

office. 6 And in this case, the majority’s analysis leads to the
astonishing conclusion that a federal contractor’s actions in
allegedly fraudulently recruiting its employees are “under
color” of a federal officer’s office, and that, in taking those
fraudulent actions, the federal contractor is “acting under” a
federal officer. This is all quite wrong. 7
    Finally, the implications of the majority’s errors are
significant. Under today’s opinion, it is difficult to see how

6
  In addition, there is the further problem that, except for pointing to the
“Combatant Commander” in Defendants’ (inadequately pleaded)
contract-based defense, the removal notice never identifies any “officer
. . . of the United States or of any agency thereof” under whom
Defendants acted. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Instead, Defendants’
removal notice only more vaguely asserted that Defendants had been
“acting under federal authority by performing security services
according to United States military directives.” The majority says that
that is enough, see Opin. at 20 n.9, but that is wrong. See supra section
II(A).
7
  The majority claims that the approach I have set forth improperly takes
the guards’ view of the merits of the case, in contravention of Jefferson
County’s statement that we must “credit” the removing party’s “theory
of the case” for purposes of the jurisdictional inquiry. See Opin. at 18
n.7 (quoting 527 U.S. at 432). But what we must credit under Jefferson
County (at least in a facial challenge) is the removal notice’s well-
pleaded allegations supporting the asserted “colorable federal defense”
and the claimed “‘causal connection’ between the charged conduct and
asserted official authority.” 527 U.S. at 431–32 (emphasis added)
(citation omitted). Nothing in Jefferson County requires us, in assessing
jurisdiction, to go further and to assume (as the majority apparently
would have it) that the “charged conduct” never even occurred. Here,
Defendants have not pleaded any facts sufficient to establish that their
alleged conduct of lying to prospective recruits was taken “under color”
of a federal officer’s office (nor have they pleaded any colorable federal
defense to that charged conduct). Yet, under the majority’s but-for-
causation test, such fraudulent recruitment counts as having been taken
“under color” of a federal officer’s office. That makes no sense.
44                     DEFIORE V. SOC LLC

any significant federal contractor with a colorable federal
defense would not qualify for federal officer removal under
§ 1442. So long as a private federal contractor is subject to
“overall” federal supervision by an agency or an officer and
has a non-frivolous federal defense, it may leapfrog directly
into federal court when faced with, say, an ordinary state-
law employment dispute with its employees, a tort suit for
negligence, or a contract dispute with a subcontractor. That
is not the law.
     I respectfully dissent.