Court Opinion

ID: 9458229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:45:57.053651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:40.916734
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
PER CURIAM.
McCormick was the owner of a 160-acre farm in Gallatin County, Illinois. In the years 1965, 1966, and 1967, such land was farmed under an arrangement between McCormick and one Brugger, the details of which are set out in our opinion.
McCormick filed a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) to review a decision of the Secretary denying him insurance benefits on net earnings derived by him from such land, as earnings from self-employment in such years, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. The decision of the District Court was adverse to him. Thereupon, he duly sought review thereof by an appeal to this court, also provided for in § 405(g), supra.
The court handed down its decision on the appeal on April 14, 1972. On May 24, 1972, the appellees filed a petition for rehearing and a suggestion for rehearing in banc.
In the petition for rehearing, counsel for appellees assert that this court in its decision exceeded the scope of its jurisdiction on review and failed to observe well established limitations on the scope of review by the courts of decisions of the Secretary in cases like the instant case. We respectfully disagree, and state that counsel for appellees have wholly misconceived the basis of our decision. We were not unaware that the “findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive” (§ 405(g), supra).
42 U.S.C.A. § 411, in part here material, reads:
“For the purposes of this subchapter—
X X X X X X
“(a) The term ‘net earnings from self-employment’ means the gross income, as computed under chapter 1 of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code of 1939, derived by an individual from any trade or business carried on by such individual, less the deductions allowed under such chapter which are attributable to such trade or business, * * * except that in computing such gross income and deductions * * *
“(1) There shall be excluded rentals from real estate and from personal property leased with the real estate (including such rentals paid in crop shares), * * * except that the preceding provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to any income derived by the owner * * * if (A) such income is derived under an arrangement, between the owner x x x an(j another individual, which provides that such other individual shall produce agricultural * * * commodities * * * on such land, and that there shall be material participation by the owner x x x jn the production or the management of the production of *789such agricultural * * * commodities, * *
The crucial question presented in this case is whether in the years 1965, 1966, and 1967 there was “material participation” by McCormick as “owner * * * in the * * * management of the production of * * * agricultural * * * commodities” on such farm.
After a careful examination of the appendix and the record certified up to the District Court by the Secretary, we reached the conclusion that the Secretary and the District Court erred in their construction of the phrase “material participation by the owner * * * in the * * * management of the production of such agricultural * * * commodities” and laid down requirements to constitute material participation by the owner in the management of production not justified by the language of the statute.
After reaching that conclusion, we stated in the opinion what we thought was required to constitute participation by the owner in the management of production of such agricultural commodities, and we set forth facts reflected by the evidence in the record, which in our judgment was not in anywise contradicted nor impeached.
From the foregoing,, we concluded that under a proper construction of the statute, McCormick, in the years 1965, 1966, and 1967, had materially participated, as owner of the land, in the management of the production of agricultural commodities therefrom.
In accordance with the provisions of § 405(g), supra, we entered a judgment reversing the decision of the Secretary, based on errors of law, and directed that he make an award to McCormick.
The petition for rehearing is denied.