Court Opinion

ID: 9470601
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:10:42.280261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:59.596585
License: Public Domain

CONTIE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The majority’s decision articulates the due process requirements regarding the summary removal of children, who are already in the state’s temporary legal custody, from their natural parents. I believe that the district court, and this court, should have abstained from deciding the constitutional questions presented in this case under the Pullman abstention doctrine.
Under certain limited circumstances, a federal district court should abstain from deciding constitutional issues arising from construction of state law. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941). Pullman abstention should only be applied if: (1) the case touches a sensitive area of public policy which federal courts should not enter unless absolutely necessary; (2) application of state law may avoid the need for constitutional adjudication; and (3) the state law in question has not been conclusively interpreted by the state courts. Manney v. Cabell, 654 F.2d 1280, 1283 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000, 102 S.Ct. 1630, 71 L.Ed.2d 866 (1982).
I believe that all three elements are satisfied in the present case. The field of family relations is so clearly within the state’s domain that federal courts should be hesitant to enter unless absolutely necessary. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1403, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting); United States v. Ya-zell, 382 U.S. 341, 352, 86 S.Ct. 500, 506, 16 L.Ed.2d 404 (1966).
The second and third elements are also satisfied. In this case, a conclusive interpretation of O.R.C. § 2151.4121 may have obviated the need for deciding the minimal requirements of due process. No such conclusive interpretation of O.R.C. § 2151.412 has been given by the state courts. Adopted as a part of a comprehensive statute dealing with the custody of children, O.R.C. § 2151.412 provides for a written judicially-approved, comprehensive plan to reunify children in the state’s temporary legal custody with their natural parents. I believe that requiring the parties in this case to comply with the requirements of O.R.C. § 2151.412 could provide the answers to the two major issues in this case without resort to the federal courts.
The first issue is whether Ohio’s general welfare of the child standard for removal is too vague to comport with due process. The complaint is that a parent in the.position of Mary Doe does not know what action she must take or avoid to keep custody of her child. This problem is squarely addressed in the Ohio statute. The comprehensive reunification plan required by O.R.C. § 2151.412 must state “[t]he actions that the parents are required to take to adjust their conduct or conditions so that the child will no longer be without adequate parental care.” O.R.C. § 2151.412(D)(2). Thus, the Ohio legislature has given content to the arguably vague welfare of the child standard. A parent in Mary Doe’s position would have a written statement, approved by a judge, stating exactly what she would have to do or not do to ensure that her child would not be taken from her. Since application of O.R.C. § 2151.412 would likely *993avoid the necessity of a constitutional determination of vagueness, abstention would be proper.
The second, and more difficult, issue in this case is what process is due before a child is removed.2 Who determines whether Mary Doe has adjusted her conduct in accordance with the reunification plan? What sort of notice and hearing is to be provided? While O.R.C. § 2151.412 does not provide any definitive answers, I believe that state courts should have the first opportunity to decide questions related to the application of the statute. Ohio courts may well provide for greater protection than is constitutionally required, thus obviating the need for resorting to the federal courts. For example, state courts may require judicial participation in the removal decision, except in cases where exigent circumstances are involved, since the written reunification plan must be judicially approved.
I fully realize that the majority’s decision only states the minimum due process requirements3 and that Ohio’s courts may still interpret the Ohio statute more expansively. The real danger of the majority’s holding is that it may inhibit the state’s creativity in dealing with a difficult social issue which is squarely in the state’s domain. Santosky, 102 S.Ct. at 1441 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Abstention is not synonymous with abdication. I only propose that the parties first be required to proceed in the state courts so that the state’s statute could be applied and interpreted. In the process, the need for a constitutional adjudication by the federal courts could be avoided. Even if it were not, the federal courts would then be able to decide the constitutional issues on the basis of a fully-developed record and with a definitive interpretation of state law. Accordingly, I would remand this case to the district court with instructions to abstain until such time as the parties have complied with O.R.C. § 2151.412 and that statute has been conclusively interpreted by the courts of Ohio.

. O.R.C. § 2151.412 did not become effective until October 24, 1980, which was three months after Jane Doe had been removed and two months prior to the filing of this lawsuit. Inasmuch as the statute is remedial in nature and the plaintiffs seek only injunctive relief, Ohio’s usual bar against retroactive application of a statute should not apply here.

. If the district court had abstained and required the plaintiffs and defendants to comply with the requirements of O.R.C. § 2151.412, the second issue would only arise if, and when, a child was removed. I believe that implementation of the statute’s requirement for a written reunification plan would reduce the number of removals due to the more certain standard for removal.

. Inasmuch as I would remand the case with instruction to the district court to abstain, I express no view on the due process requirements adopted by the majority.