Court Opinion

ID: 9897800
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:25:18.062635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:30.662636
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges AtLee, Friedman and Senior Judge Clements
UNPUBLISHED

              ADRIAN NICHOLAS JEREMIAH SMITH
                                                                               MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.     Record No. 0017-23-1                                           PER CURIAM
                                                                                 SEPTEMBER 19, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                               FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE
                                               John W. Brown, Judge1

                              (Michelle C.F. Derrico, Senior Appellate Attorney; Virginia Indigent
                              Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant.

                              (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Justin B. Hill, Assistant
                              Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting on
                              brief.

                     Upon his guilty pleas, the trial court convicted Adrian Nicholas Jeremiah Smith of grand

              larceny, felony eluding the police, and misdemeanor hit and run. The trial court sentenced Smith to

              a total of 25 years of incarceration and 12 months of imprisonment, with all but 6 years suspended.

              On appeal, Smith contends that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to an active

              term of incarceration of six years. After examining the briefs and record in this case, the panel

              unanimously holds that oral argument is unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly without merit.”

              Code § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a). We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                        BACKGROUND

                     “In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the

              light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.” Gerald v. Commonwealth,

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
                     1
                         The Honorable Rufus A. Banks, Jr. presided over the plea hearing.
295 Va. 469, 472 (2018) (quoting Scott v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 380, 381 (2016)). In doing so,

we discard any of Smith’s conflicting evidence and regard as true all credible evidence favorable to

the Commonwealth and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn from that evidence. Id. at 473.

        At the plea hearing, the trial court conducted a thorough plea colloquy. Smith confirmed

that he fully understood the charges against him and knew the maximum sentences for each charge.

He also stated that he understood that the court was not bound by the sentencing guidelines. He

confirmed that he was entering his guilty pleas freely and voluntarily and that he was, in fact, guilty.

Smith stated that he understood that there were no agreed sentences and that the trial court could

impose any sentences “so long as that period of incarceration does not exceed the maximum period

provided by law.”

        The trial court reviewed the stipulation of evidence signed by Smith and the

Commonwealth. Smith agreed the facts in the stipulation were accurate. The facts demonstrated

that in March 2019, Smith, Jabari Hood, and another male harassed Brandon Francavilla-Harris

through a series of threatening text messages. They demanded that Francavilla-Harris drive them to

a residence “or else they would have something for him.” Francavilla-Harris blocked the number

from which he was receiving the messages, but then continued to get threatening texts from a

different number. The third man told Francavilla-Harris “that he was going to kill him and run up in

his house.”

        On the night of March 29, 2019, Francavilla-Harris stayed at a friend’s house. When he

returned to his residence in the morning, he discovered that it had been burglarized. Electronics,

clothes, and items from the garage were missing.

        Around 2:00 a.m. on March 30, Chesapeake Police Officer Haberkorn was on patrol when

he saw a red Hyundai Elantra speeding out of a neighborhood. He initiated a pursuit and activated

his emergency lights and siren. During the ensuing chase, the car reached speeds up to 130 miles

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per hour. The car drove through an intersection marked by a red light without stopping and

eventually crashed into a fire hydrant. Two men jumped from the car, fled on foot, and were not

apprehended that night. The car was a rental vehicle rented by Smith’s grandmother. Inside the car,

the police found Smith’s cell phone on the driver’s seat. Smith’s fingerprints were in the car, and

his DNA was on a cup inside the vehicle. Finally, the police found all the property stolen from

Francavilla-Harris’s house.

       Before he was arrested in April 2019, Smith had been charged with committing numerous

other felonies, including burglarizing a Norfolk church. At sentencing, Smith proffered that he was

homeless at the time he committed the offenses and had a history of substance abuse and mental

health issues. The sentencing guidelines called for a range between 1 year and 11 months to 4 years

and 11 months. Smith argued for a sentence at the low-end, emphasizing that he already faced a

21-year sentence for the Norfolk offenses, to which he had pleaded guilty. The trial court deviated

above the guidelines and sentenced Smith to an active term of incarceration of six years. The trial

court explained the departure by emphasizing the seriousness of the offenses and Smith’s extensive

continued criminal behavior before his arrest on the Chesapeake charges. Smith appeals.

                                            ANALYSIS

       On appeal, Smith argues that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to an

active term of incarceration of six years. He asserts that the “trial court did not articulate any

consideration of the mitigating evidence in the instant case.” He also asserts that the court “over

emphasized [his] Norfolk offenses.”

       “We review the trial court’s sentence for abuse of discretion.” Scott v. Commonwealth,

58 Va. App. 35, 46 (2011). “[W]hen a statute prescribes a maximum imprisonment penalty and

the sentence does not exceed that maximum, the sentence will not be overturned as being an

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abuse of discretion.” Minh Duy Du v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 555, 564 (2016) (quoting Alston

v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 759, 771-72 (2007)).

       “The sentencing guidelines are advisory only and do not require trial courts to impose

specific sentences.” Runyon v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 573, 577-78 (1999). “[T]he

recommended sentencing ranges contained in these discretionary guidelines are not binding on

the trial judge but, rather, are mere tools to be used by the judge in fixing an appropriate sentence

within the limitations established by the statute governing punishment for the particular crime.”

Luttrell v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 461, 465 (2004). A judge’s failure to follow the

sentencing guidelines “shall not be reviewable on appeal or the basis of any other

post-conviction relief.” Code § 19.2-298.01(F). Accordingly, we may only consider whether the

sentences fell outside the permissible statutory ranges. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 26

Va. App. 620, 626 (1998); Valentine v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 334, 339 (1994). Further, it

was within the trial court’s purview to weigh any mitigating factors Smith presented. Keselica v.

Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 31, 36 (2000). The record affirmatively demonstrates that the trial

court considered all the evidence before it, including Smith’s mitigation evidence.

       The sentences the trial court imposed were within the ranges set by the legislature. See

Code §§ 18.2-10, 18.2-95, and 46.2-817(B). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion, and our task on appeal is complete. See Thomason v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App.

89, 99 (2018).

                                          CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s decision is affirmed.

                                                                                           Affirmed.

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