Court Opinion

ID: 9880649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-27 23:03:14.913704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:56:19.019519
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/27/23 Wy v. City and County of San Francisco CA1/2
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION TWO

 LISA WY,
           Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                                                        A165368
 v.
 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN                                                 (San Francisco County
 FRANCISCO,                                                             Super. Ct. No. CGC19578843)
           Defendant and Respondent.

         The City and County of San Francisco terminated plaintiff Lisa Wy
from her employment after an investigation found she misused hundreds of
City-provided public transit tokens for her personal benefit. The City
subsequently reinstated Wy after an arbitrator determined Wy should have
been suspended for 60 days without pay, not terminated. Wy then sued the
City for discrimination and other violations of the Fair Employment and
Housing Act (FEHA, Gov. Code, § 12940 et seq.). The City successfully
moved for summary judgment and Wy now appeals. We shall affirm.
                    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.       Wy’s Employment with the City
         Lisa Wy worked as a Senior Clerk Typist for the City’s Human Services
Agency (HSA), Program Integrity and Investigations Program Collections
Unit (Collections Unit). From 2012 until 2017, Wy was responsible for
requesting public transit tokens from HSA’s Fiscal Department and
dispensing them to other Collections Unit employees when they needed them
for work-related travel. In August 2017, a manager in the Collections Unit
determined Wy had made personal use of over 900 tokens. HSA placed Wy
on paid administrative leave while it investigated these allegations. It
concluded that Wy had misappropriated City property by using hundreds of
tokens for her personal benefit in violation of HSA’s policies, mainly to
commute to and from work. Following a Skelly1 hearing, the hearing officer
sustained charges that Wy had misappropriated public funds and
recommended her dismissal. HSA’s executive director agreed with the
recommendation and dismissed Wy. At the time of her dismissal, Wy was 61
years old and had worked for the City for about 20 years.
       A binding arbitration followed. The arbitrator found Wy “used
hundreds of tokens over . . . four years to go to and from work” and there was
“no question” that this was not permitted “under City and Department
policies.” Still, the arbitrator found employees were not specifically
instructed about the use of resources like tokens beyond the written policies.
And there was evidence of a “loose atmosphere” as to these resources, with
several employees using tokens or transit “Fast Passes” to run errands
during the day and for other personal reasons. The arbitrator concluded Wy’s
misconduct warranted a suspension rather than dismissal, and ordered HSA
to return Wy to duty with full seniority minus a 60-day suspension without
pay.
       Thus, Wy returned to work as a Senior Clerk Typist in September
2018, about a year after she was terminated, and was paid her wages and
benefits from the time she had been terminated minus 60 days. HSA placed

       1 Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194.

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Wy in a clerical pool because another employee had been hired in the interim
to perform her duties.
      Meanwhile, in August 2018, Wy had filed an administrative charge
with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) alleging her
dismissal was discrimination based on race, gender, and age. And separately
from the DFEH proceedings, Wy and her union representatives made several
complaints about the duties Wy was asked to perform when she returned to
work, asserted she experienced harassment and retaliation, and claimed
there were issues with her bilingual pay. The City reviewed these allegations
and found no corrective action was warranted. In response to Wy and her
union, the arbitrator told the City in a January 2019 email that HSA should
place Wy in her former position. HSA did so effective February 2019.
B.    Trial Court Proceedings
      Wy filed this lawsuit in August 2019, asserting claims under FEHA for
retaliation, age, gender, and race discrimination, and failure to prevent
harassment and discrimination. She alleged she was terminated “due to her
supervisor’s animus towards the Asian females in the office,” while “non-
Asians and males were not disciplined . . . for using municipal transit passes
or tokens for personal trips.” She alleged that after she returned to work the
City gave her position to a younger worker and assigned Wy different and
changing duties, would not allow her to obtain bilingual pay, and permitted
Wy’s supervisors and co-workers to “heighten scrutiny of her work” and
“subject her to unwanted comments and criticism” without legitimate
business reason.
      The City moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary
adjudication of each of Wy’s claims. The trial court granted the City’s motion,
and entered judgment for the City. As to the retaliation claim, the trial court

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found Wy failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. As to the
discrimination claims, the court found the City met its burden to show it
terminated Wy for a legitimate reason and Wy failed to produce substantial
evidence to the contrary. The trial court wrote that “plaintiff argues that
defendant had a lax attitude toward the use of MUNI tokens/passes and
other workers who were not in plaintiff’s class (i.e., elderly, Chinese, and
female) misused MUNI tokens and were not similarly punished,” but the
court concluded that Wy’s evidence failed to create a triable issue of material
fact that discrimination was the real reason for her discipline. First, Wy
failed to show the co-workers were similarly situated: “[u]nlike plaintiff, the
co-workers were not the custodians of the tokens/passes for an agency of [the
City]. Second, many of the cited employees were actually in plaintiff’s
class . . . . Third, there is no evidence that these co-workers abused the
system to the same extent as plaintiff, who used approximately 900 MUNI
tokens for personal use. At most, plaintiff has highlighted bureaucratic
inefficiencies. She has not presented sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to
reasonably conclude that the decisionmaker ([HSA’s executive director])
harbored animus against her because of her race, age, or gender.” Finally,
because the underlying claims failed, Wy’s cause of action for failure to
prevent harassment and discrimination also failed.
      Wy timely appealed.
                                 DISCUSSION
      On appeal, Wy challenges only the summary adjudication on her
discrimination claims. As such, we will not address the merits of Wy’s causes
of action for retaliation and for failure to prevent harassment and
discrimination; Wy has forfeited any challenge to the trial court’s rulings on
those claims by failing to present any reasoned argument about them on

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appeal. (Vitug v. Alameda Point Storage, Inc. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 407,
412 (Vitug).)
A.    Applicable Law and Standard of Review
      1.    Discrimination Claims
      Claims of discrimination under FEHA are subject to the three-stage
burden-shifting test set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411
U.S. 792. The employee bears the initial burden to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination. (Guz v. Bechtel Nat. Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354.)
The employee must show actions by the employer from which one can infer, if
they remain unexplained, that it is more likely than not such acts were based
on a discriminatory criterion. (Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512,
520, fn. 2.) If the employee establishes a prima facie case, a presumption of
discrimination arises and the burden shifts to the employer to show its
actions were motivated by legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. (Ibid.) A
legitimate reason is one that is facially unrelated to prohibited bias, which, if
true, would preclude a finding of discrimination. (Ibid.) If the employer
meets this burden, the employee then must show the employer’s reasons are
simply pretexts for discrimination or produce other evidence of intentional
discrimination. (Ibid.)
      2.    Summary Judgment
      We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, considering all of the
evidence submitted by the parties (except evidence that the court properly
excluded) and the uncontradicted inferences reasonably supported by the
evidence. (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.) In a
discrimination case, if the employer presents evidence either negating an
element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case or showing the adverse employment
action was based on legitimate reasons, it will be entitled to summary

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judgment unless the plaintiff produces substantial evidence raising a rational
inference of discrimination. (Nakai v. Friendship House Assn. of American
Indians, Inc. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 32, 39 (Nakai).) The employee must offer
evidence that the employer’s stated reason was untrue or pretextual, or that
the employer acted with discriminatory animus, or a combination of the two
allowing a reasonable trier of fact to conclude the employer intentionally
discriminated. (Ibid.) The employee cannot merely show the employer’s
decision was wrong, mistaken, or unwise. (Ibid.) Rather, the employee must
demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered reasons that a
reasonable factfinder could rationally deem them unworthy of credence and
hence infer that the employer did not act for the reasons it claims. (Ibid.)
      We exercise our independent judgment to decide whether the material
facts are undisputed. (Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th
243, 253.)2 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff as
the losing party and liberally construe plaintiff’s evidence while strictly
scrutinizing defendant’s, resolving any doubts or ambiguities in plaintiff’s
favor. (Id. at p. 254.) Still, an employee’s subjective beliefs and

      2 It is not enough to state as an aside, without elaboration or analysis,

as Wy does in her short appellate brief, that she “disputed no less than 33 of
the 85 separately-stated Facts not in dispute.” This is not in and of itself an
argument that will defeat summary judgment, and it is not a substitute for
analysis and reasoned argument. It is ultimately for the court to decide
whether facts are material to the issue upon which summary judgment is
granted. (See Pereda v. Atos Jiu Jitsu LLC (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 759, 773
[although plaintiff argues there must be issues of material fact in dispute
because plaintiff disputed 54 out of 63 material facts in the separate
statement, the fact that plaintiff disputes “the vast majority of facts does not
mean that any of those facts is material to the issue upon which summary
judgment was ultimately granted. Here, we have concluded they are not”].)

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uncorroborated declarations do not create a genuine issue of fact. (Foroudi v.
Aerospace Corporation (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 992, 1007–1008.) The employee
must present nonspeculative evidence showing an actual causal link between
prohibited motivation by decisionmakers and the adverse action. (Id. at
p. 1008.) The stronger the employer’s showing of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason, the stronger the employee’s evidence must be in
order to create a reasonable inference of a discriminatory motive. (Ibid.)
B.    Analysis
      We will assume for the sake of argument that Wy met her initial
burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, shifting the burden
to the City to demonstrate it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
Wy’s termination. We easily conclude the City met this burden by presenting
undisputed evidence that Wy was terminated after an investigation
concluded that over a period of years she had misappropriated hundreds of
public transit tokens for her personal use, in violation of HSA’s policies, an
allegation she did not deny. We next turn to Wy’s burden to offer substantial
evidence that the City’s justification was a pretext or that would otherwise
allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude the City impermissibly
discriminated against her. (Nakai, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 39.) This
burden Wy has not met.
      Wy contends that she identified “numerous non-Chinese, and male co-
workers who received no discipline” for their personal use of Fast Passes and
tokens. An employer’s more favorable treatment of employees similarly
situated to the plaintiff in all relevant ways, but outside her protected class,
may show discriminatory intent. (Gupta v. Trustees of California State
University (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 510, 519–520.) But weak comparator
evidence alone does not overcome an employer’s evidence of a legitimate

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reason for its decision. (Id. at p. 521.) Here, there is no evidence the co-
workers Wy identified were similarly situated. One used tokens every other
week to get coffee for a workplace “coffee club.” Another used tokens
“occasionally” to go to the farmers market. Two others reportedly used Fast
Passes to commute — but the arbitrator observed these were “of lesser value”
than tokens, and Wy cites no evidence that Fast Pass use resulted in similar
financial loss to the City as her misuse of tokens. As the trial court
concluded, “there is no evidence that [Wy’s] co-workers abused the system to
the same extent” as her personal use of hundreds of tokens.
      Wy also contends that the City’s failure to investigate others who
misused tokens or Fast Passes or supervisors who failed to prevent misuse
was a departure from “policy” and thus evinced pretext. But Wy does not
establish what the City’s “policy” was in this regard. Wy points to snippets of
deposition testimony by the executive director of HSA that he would have
investigated (or called for investigation of) any such misconduct that came to
his attention. However, he went on to testify that the other misconduct
raised by Wy at the deposition did not come to his attention. In short, Wy
failed to present evidence that by investigating her misappropriation of
hundreds of tokens over a multi-year period, the City was departing from its
usual policy or procedure.
      In another argument concerning pretext, Wy claims in her brief on
appeal that two specific City employees accused of fraud were permitted to
retire to avoid termination. But she cites no evidence in the record to support
this assertion or to show these individuals were similarly situated to her. Wy
does not develop this argument in any meaningful way, and we will not do so
for her. (Doe v. McLaughlin (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 640, 654.) Wy thus failed

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to meet her burden on a pretext theory — the only theory she raises in her
brief on appeal.3
      Finally, Wy makes various complaints about how she has been treated
since returning to work. But her appellate brief does not include citations to
the record, supporting authorities, or any reasoned argument addressed to
these points. To the extent Wy contends these events are relevant to her
discrimination claims, such argument is thus forfeited. (Vitug, supra, 187
Cal.App.4th at p. 412.)
      In sum, Wy’s evidence was insufficient to withstand the City’s motion
for summary judgment.
                               DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on
appeal.

      3 As we have noted, the trial court also found that Wy failed to meet her

burden on an animus theory. Wy does not challenge this ruling on appeal.

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                                            _________________________
                                            Miller, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Richman, Acting P.J.

_________________________
Markman, J.*

A165368, Wy v. City and County of San Francisco

      * Judge of the Alameda Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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