Court Opinion

ID: 9900873
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-20 17:08:18.400523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:20.979435
License: Public Domain

J-S41016-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  CHRISTOPHER FINK                             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  KARA E. WHITE                                :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 822 WDA 2023

                Appeal from the Order Entered June 16, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County Civil Division at No(s):
                              No. 2018-3512

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                            FILED: NOVEMBER 20, 2023

       Appellant, Kara E. White (“Mother”), appeals from the order entered

June 16, 2023, denying her petition to modify a custody arrangement with

Christopher Fink (“Father”) regarding the parties’ child, B.K.W. (hereinafter,

the “Child”). We affirm.

       The facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.

        Pursuant to an [o]rder of [c]ourt dated August 25, 2020,
        entered into by agreement of the parties, the parties began
        sharing physical custody of the [Child] in January of 2021[,]
        pursuant to the schedule set forth in the [o]rder, and subject to
        an extremely detailed holiday schedule[,] also set forth in the
        [o]rder.

        [Thereafter, t]he parties agreed to deviate from the schedule
        set forth in the [August 25, 2020 order.] Father [began]
        exercis[ing] physical custody of the [Child] from Tuesday at
        noon to Thursday at noon and every other weekend.

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Trial Court Order and Opinion, 6/16/23, at *1-*2 (unpaginated).

      On July 26, 2022, Mother filed a petition to modify custody, seeking

primary custody of the Child, subject to Father’s periods of partial custody. In

light of Mother’s petition, the trial court directed the guardian ad litem (“GAL”),

Tara Mooney, Esquire (“Attorney Mooney”), to “assume her duties” to “meet

with the parties and the [C]hild, together with any other individuals she

deem[ed] appropriate,” and prepare and file a written report thereafter. Trial

Cout Order, 10/6/22, at *2 (unpaginated). Pursuant to the trial court’s order,

Attorney Mooney filed an updated report on November 15, 2022.

      The parties proceeded to a custody trial on May 30, 2023. On June 16,

2023, the trial court issued an order denying Mother’s petition to modify

custody. Trial Court Order, 6/16/23, at *1 (unpaginated). The trial court,

therefore, directed the parties to “continue to share legal custody of . . .

B.K.W. . . . as that term was previously defined in the [August 25, 2020

order].” Id. The trial court, however, stated that “effective Wednesday, June

28, 2023, the schedule of physical custody will change in that [] Father will

have physical custody of the minor child from Wednesday at 3:00 p.m. to

Friday at 3:00 p.m. and every other weekend.”           Id.   This timely appeal

followed.

      Mother raises the following issues on appeal:

       1. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by
          issuing a final order based on the report of [the GAL], where
          the GAL failed to conduct a proper investigation, failed to
          meet with the [C]hild regularly and where the trial [court]
          had observed the parties for a longer period in court during

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          the pretrial conference and a full day [of trial] than [the] GAL
          [] spent with the parties in three years[?]

       2. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion by
          affording “significant weight” to the conclusions and
          recommendations of the GAL, where [the] GAL only met with
          the [C]hild for 15 minutes in three years during a brief
          conference at the preschool, which also included time spent
          speaking with a preschool teacher and where the GAL’s
          recommendations were primarily based upon unsupported
          assumptions[?]

       3. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and/or
          abused its discretion in failing to engage in a fact-specific
          analysis of the best interest factors, including the weight of
          such factors, and whether the legal conclusions of the court
          were not supported by competent evidence where the
          uncontradicted facts established that it would be in the best
          interest of the [C]hild to modify custody[?]

       4. Whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion
          and/or error of law by denying Mother’s motion to modify
          custody after failing to engage in an analysis of the best
          interest factors, but proceeded to grant Father’s proposed
          changes to custody based upon Father’s testimony that he
          intended to change his work schedule at some point in the
          future[?]

Mother’s Brief at 3-5.

      “Our standard of review over a custody order is for a gross abuse of

discretion.” Yates v. Yates, 963 A.2d 535, 538 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation

omitted). An abuse of discretion will be found if “a trial court, in reaching its

conclusion, overrides or misapplies the law, or exercises judgment which is

manifestly unreasonable, or reaches a conclusion that is the result of

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will as shown by the evidence of record.” Id.

      Moreover, in reviewing a custody order:

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       We must accept findings of the trial court that are supported by
       competent evidence of record, as our role does not include
       making independent factual determinations. In addition, with
       regard to issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we
       must defer to the presiding trial judge who viewed and assessed
       the witnesses first-hand. However, we are not bound by the
       trial court's deductions or inferences from its factual findings.
       Ultimately, the test is whether the trial court's conclusions are
       unreasonable as shown by the evidence of record. We may
       reject the conclusions of the trial court only if they involve an
       error of law, or are unreasonable in light of the sustainable
       findings of the trial court.

       Klos v. Klos, 934 A.2d 724, 728 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation
       omitted). As with any custody matter, the paramount concern
       is the best interests of the children involved. See id.

A.L.B. v. M.D.L., 239 A.3d 142, 147–148 (Pa. Super. 2020).

      In Mother’s first two appellate issues, she argues that the trial court

erroneously “delegat[ed] its judicial power to a non-judicial officer” by giving

“[significant] weight” to Attorney Mooney’s recommendation. Mother’s Brief

at 11 and 14, citing C.W. v. K.A.W., 774 A.2d 745 (Pa. Super. 2001). Mother

claims that the trial court’s error is compounded by the fact that Attorney

Mooney’s recommendation was based upon minimal contact with the Child,

Mother, and Father and, as such, contained “glaring omissions.”        Mother’s

Brief at 14.

      “A [GAL] is appointed by the court to represent a minor child in

particular litigation.   The function of the [GAL] is to represent and protect

unrepresented minors and their interests.” C.W., 774 A.2d at 748-749. “A

guardian is not a judicial or quasi-judicial officer.” Id. at 749. While a trial

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court is permitted to consider the GAL’s recommendations, it is prohibited

from “delegat[ing to the GAL] its judicial powers.” Id.

      Herein, Mother relies on C.W., supra, to support her allegations that

the trial court improperly “delegat[ed] its judicial power to a non-judicial

officer,” the GAL. Mother’s Brief at 14. “The circumstances in C.W., however,

were far different from those in the instant case.” A.L.B., 239 A.3d at 149.

       In C.W., this Court found that the trial court [] improperly
       delegated its judicial duties to the GAL where the trial court:
       declared that the GAL had “taught me my job”; repeatedly
       solicited the GAL's advice on how to rule on certain objections
       during the custody hearing; stated that it gave great weight to
       the GAL's recommendations; and then issued a custody order
       on the same date as the GAL submitted his recommendations
       which closely followed those recommendations.

Id. at 149-150 (internal citations omitted).       Unlike in C.W., there is no

evidence that the trial court solicited Attorney Mooney’s advice with respect

to evidentiary rulings, “nor does [Mother] point to any place in the record

where [s]he believes this to have occurred.” A.L.B., 239 A.3d at 150. In

further contrast to the trial court in C.W., the trial court herein described its

reliance on Attorney Mooney’s recommendation as follows:

       Although not binding on this [c]ourt, the conclusions and
       recommendations of the GAL will be afforded significant weight.

Id. at *8 (unpaginated).      A fair reading of the trial court’s statement

demonstrates that it initially recognized that it was not required to follow

Attorney   Mooney’s    recommendation,      but   nonetheless   considered   her

recommendation to be important to its determination. In so doing, the trial

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court did not “create[] any appearance of impropriety, much less one akin to

that which arose in C.W.” A.L.B., 239 A.3d at 150. Thus, Mother’s claim

lacks merit.

      In Mother’s third issue, she argues that the trial court erred in denying

her petition to modify custody. In particular, Mother claims that trial court

“failed to conduct an analysis of the custody factors.” Mother’s Brief at 18.

Simultaneously, however, Mother argues that the trial court’s analysis of the

relevant custody factors is unsupported by “sufficient reasoning and

competent evidence.” Id. We disagree with both contentions.

      This Court previously explained:

       The Child Custody Act contains two sets of factors the courts
       must consider, depending on the type of action. See 23
       Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)(1)-(16); see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(h).
       Section 5328(a) provides: “In ordering any form of custody, the
       court shall determine the best interest of the child by
       considering all relevant factors, giving weighted consideration
       to those factors which affect the safety of the child, including
       [factors 1 through 16.]” Id. We have held the court must
       conduct a Section 5328(a) analysis when a party seeks to
       modify the type of custody award[ed]. See A.V. v. S.T., 87
       A.3d 818, 824 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2014); see also 23 Pa.C.S.A.
       § 5338 (“Modification of existing order[]”); and[,] see 23
       Pa.C.S.A. § 5323(a) (“Award of custody[]”).

E.C.S. v. M.C.S., 256 A.3d 449, 453 (Pa. Super. 2021). The relevant factors

set forth in Section 5328(a) are as follows:

       (a) Factors.--In ordering any form of custody, the court shall
       determine the best interest of the child by considering all
       relevant factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors
       which affect the safety of the child, including the following:

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          (1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit
          frequent and continuing contact between the child and
          another party.

          (2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or
          member of the party's household, whether there is a
          continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party and
          which party can better provide adequate physical
          safeguards and supervision of the child.

          (2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a)
          (relating to consideration of child abuse and involvement
          with protective services).

          (3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf
          of the child.

          (4) The need for stability and continuity in the child's
          education, family life and community life.

          (5) The availability of extended family.

          (6) The child's sibling relationships.

          (7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the
          child's maturity and judgment.

          (8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the
          other parent, except in cases of domestic violence where
          reasonable safety measures are necessary to protect the
          child from harm.

          (9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable,
          consistent and nurturing relationship with the child
          adequate for the child's emotional needs.

          (10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily
          physical, emotional, developmental, educational and
          special needs of the child.

          (11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.

          (12) Each party's availability to care for the child or ability
          to make appropriate child-care arrangements.

          (13) The level of conflict between the parties and the
          willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with one
          another. A party's effort to protect a child from abuse by

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            another party is not evidence of unwillingness or inability
            to cooperate with that party.

            (14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or
            member of a party's household.

            (15) The mental and physical condition of a party or
            member of a party's household.

            (16) Any other relevant factor.

23 Pa. C.S.A. § 5328(a). Importantly, “[a]ll of the factors listed in Section

5328(a) are required to be considered by the trial court when entering a

custody order.” J.R.M. v. J.E.A., 33 A.3d 647, 652 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation

and emphasis omitted).

      A review of the record herein demonstrates that the trial court, in its

June 16, 2023 opinion, articulated the reasons for its decision. In so doing,

the trial court addressed each of the custody factors set forth in Section

5328(a). Moreover, the record supports the trial court’s factual findings and

consideration of the Section 5328(a) factors, and we decline Mother’s

invitation to reweigh the evidence in her favor. See M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63

A.3d 331, 334 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“We must accept findings of the trial court

that are supported by competent evidence of record, as our role does not

include making independent factual determinations. In addition, with regard

to issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we must defer to the

presiding trial judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand.”). We

therefore conclude that no relief is due.

      In her final issue, Mother challenges the trial court’s decision to grant

Father’s proposed changes to the custody agreement. Mother’s Brief at 32-33.

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In particular, Mother claims that the trial court erred in shifting Father’s period

of custody from Tuesday at noon to Thursday at noon and every other

weekend to Wednesday at 3:00 p.m. to Friday at 3:00 p.m. and every other

weekend. Mother argues that the trial court made this change based solely

upon Father’s testimony that he “‘hoped’ to change his work schedule in the

future.” Id. at 33.

       This section of Mother’s brief, however, does not contain any citation to

or discussion of relevant legal principles. Moreover, Mother does not set forth

any argument as to how the trial court erred or why she is entitled to relief.

“We have repeatedly held that failure to develop an argument with citation

to, and analysis of, relevant authority waives the issue on review.”

Commonwealth v. Plante, 914 A.2d 916, 924 (Pa. Super. 2006) (internal

citation omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Tchirkow, 160 A.3d 798,

804 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“When issues are not properly raised and developed

in briefs, when the briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for

review, a court will not consider the merits thereof.”). We therefore conclude

that Mother’s final claim is waived.1

       Order affirmed.
____________________________________________

1 Even if we were to consider the merits of Mother’s claim, no relief is due. A
review of the transcripts of testimony, as well as the trial court’s June 16,
2023 opinion, demonstrates that the trial court noted that Father’s work
schedule “is not ideal for attending to the [Child’s] needs, [but] he does an
admirable job making it work.”        Trial Court Opinion, 6/16/23, at *6
(unpaginated). It is therefore apparent that the trial court based its decision
on Father’s current work schedule, not Father’s testimony expressing an
intention or hope to make a future change.

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DATE: 11/20/2023

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