Court Opinion

ID: 9581627
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:16:54.51764+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:08.385189
License: Public Domain

Pannell, Judge,
dissenting. I feel compelled to dissent in view of the ruling in Brown v. Anderson, 186 Ga. 220 (1) (197 SE 761), because that case answers all of the arguments of the majority about the so-called inequities and injustices of the situation and also answers the majority claim that their holding jorevents a minor defendant from “sandbagging” the plaintiff, and because the changes made by the Civil Practice Act have created no changes in the substantive law or the procedure which would make the ruling in Brown v. Anderson inapplicable here. The ruling in that case is as follows: “While under the Code, § 3-115, a suit commenced and prosecuted by an infant alone is not void, and the defect of want of a guardian or next friend, being amendable, is cured by verdict, yet under § 37-1003, in suits against persons not sui juris, they must appear either by guardian or next friend or guardian ad litem appointed by the court; and under § 81-212, before a minor shall be considered a party to a proceeding against him, there must have been service, return of service, and an order taken appointing a guardian ad litem, with an agreement by such guardian ad litem to serve. Waivers or estoppels not ordinarily being imputable against infants, except an estoppel in pais based on fraud and deceit by an infant who has reached an age of discretion when fraud can be imputed against him (Jones v. Cooner, 137 Ga. 681, 683 (74 SE 51); Irwin v. Morell, Dudley (Ga.), 72, 76; Whittington v. Wright, 9 Ga. 23 (4), 28; Clemons v. Olshine, 54 Ga. App. 290, 293 (187 SE 711), and cit.), the mere filing of an answer and participation by an infant in legal proceedings or a trial, in his own behalf or through an attorney at law employed by him, would not operate as an estoppel or legal waiver of statutory requirements. Nor would a recital in the answer of the infant that it was filed through his guardian create such an estoppel or otherwise bind the infant, where under the undisputed evi*431dence the guardian did not employ the attorney, and the statement was made without knowledge of the guardian or the infant. Where, as in this case, there was no compliance with the statutory requirements, a judgment against the infant would be subject to be set aside. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Lanham, 124 Ga. 859, 860 (53 SE 395); Nicholson v. Wilborn, 13 Ga. 467 (3); Douglas v. Johnson, 130 Ga. 472 (2) (60 SE 1041); Taliaferro v. Calhoun, 137 Ga. 417, 420 (73 SE 675); Miller v. Luckey, 132 Ga. 581, 582 (64 SE 658); Spooner v. Spooner, 178 Ga. 105 (2), 110 (172 SE 5).” (Emphasis supplied.)
Let us examine the status of the law before the Brown v. Anderson ruling was applied. Code § 81-212, as it stood under the Brown v. Anderson case, required the appointment of a guardian ad litem for a minor, which guardian shall consent to serve, and that the petition and process be served upon the minor. This Code section was repealed for certain purposes by Section 40 (a) of the amendment to the Civil Practice Act approved March 30, 1967 (Ga. L. 1967, pp. 226, 244). Section 4 (d) (3) requires that service be made by delivering a copy of the suit and summons “[i]f against a minor, to such minor, personally, and also to his father or his mother or his guardian or his duly appointed guardian ad litem.” Section 17 (c) of the Civil Practice Act provides that: “Whenever an infant or incompetent person has a representative, such as a general guardian, committee, conservator, or other like fiduciary, the representative may sue or defend on behalf of the infant or incompetent person. If an infant or incompetent person does not have a duly appointed representative, he may sue by his next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise represented in an action or shall make such other order as it deems proper for the protection of the infant or incompetent person.” It is apparent that there is no substantial difference in the requirements of the old and the new law. The phrase in the last sentence of Section 17 (c) “not otherwise represented” refers to representation by a general guardian, committee, conservator or other like fiduciary as stated in the first sentence and is very similar to the language of old Code § 81-212.
*432It is argued that Section 9 (a) of the Civil Practice Act requires a defendant who is a minor to raise the issue as to the capacity in which he is sued. The Act apparently places this burden upon every person without expressly referring to minors as such. The same was true under the law prior to the Civil Practice Act. Code § 81-307 provided: “Under a denial of the allegations in the plaintiff’s petition, no other defense is admissible except such as disproves the plaintiff’s cause of action; all other matters in satisfaction or avoidance must be specially pleaded.” This section is just as all inclusive as Section 9 (a) of the Civil Practice Act (Code Ann. § 81A-109 (a)) and apparently includes minors. It is obvious therefore that Subsection 9 (a) of the Civil Practice Act has made no changes requiring the abandonment of principles set forth in Brown v. Anderson, supra, that is, that a minor cannot waive his right to be served and made a party in the manner prescribed by law. The majority opinion ignores this principle which is just as applicable now as it was when Brown v. Anderson was decided. I do not deem it amiss to point out at this point that no fraud has been practiced by the minors. They have not obscured or deliberately hidden the fact that they were infants as was done in Roebuck v. Payne, 109 Ga. App. 525 (1) (136 SE2d 399). On the contrary, the plaintiffs well knew of their infancy and continued the prosecution of this case and tried the same with full knowledge of the minority of the defendants and with full knowledge that they were not properly made parties to the case under the requirements of the Civil Practice Act and with full knowledge that the judge, in the alternative, had made no “such order as he deems proper for the protection of the infants” under Section 17 (c) of the Civil Practice Act. Such alternative order, if made, is one which must be made prior to the trial and an order made subsequently thereto by overruling a motion to vacate the judgment cannot be considered as meeting the requirements of the Act. No such alternative order was ever made. In fact, the trial court, upon motion contained in plaintiff’s petition alleging the minority of the defendants, had done the contrary as he had issued a rule nisi to show cause why a guardian ad litem should not be appointed.
*433I therefore reach the conclusion that where it unequivocally appears that the plaintiff had knowledge of the defendants’ minority, the action of the defendants, represented by an attorney, in defending the action, neither constitutes a waiver of their right to plead their minority by way of a motion to set aside the verdict and judgment rendered against them, nor does it constitute a fraud upon the plaintiff, who had full knowledge of and pleaded their minority. In my opinion, the trial court erred in refusing to set aside the verdict and judgment against the defendants.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Felton and Judges Eberhardt and Deen, concur in this dissent.