Court Opinion

ID: 9912806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-23 00:02:25.268812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:04:54.135800
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/22/23 In re E.H. CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

 In re E.H. et al., Persons                                    B328095
 Coming Under the Juvenile                                     (Los Angeles County
 Court Law.                                                    Super. Ct. No.
                                                               18CCJP06000B, D–H)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY
 SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 M.M.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Gabriela H. Shapiro, Judge Pro Tempore. Affirmed.
      Marissa Coffey, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Kimberly Roura, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      __________________________________________

       In this juvenile dependency appeal, M.M. (father) appeals
the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights to six of
his children. Father raises one issue on appeal. He argues the
juvenile court and the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (Department) failed to comply with
inquiry and notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related California
law. Father seeks a conditional reversal of the juvenile court’s
orders terminating his parental rights and remand directing the
juvenile court and the Department to comply with ICWA.
       As discussed below, we conclude (1) although errors were
made with respect to the Department’s initial duty of inquiry as
to father’s side of the family, those errors were harmless and do
not require remand, and (2) substantial evidence supports the
juvenile court’s ICWA finding as to mother’s side of the family.
Thus, we affirm.
                          BACKGROUND
1.     The Family
       Father moved to the United States in 2006. He met I.M.
(mother) in Indiana and later married her. At some point, they
separated but continued to see each other. The status of their
relationship was unclear. Mother and father have seven children
together, two of whom (twins) were born during the pendency of

                                 2
the underlying proceedings.1 Mother also has one child from a
different relationship (half sibling). Mother, half sibling, and one
of mother and father’s older children are not parties to this
appeal, although each was involved in the proceedings below.
       Father’s parents and most of his siblings live in Guatemala.
Two of his brothers, however, Henry and Boris (paternal uncles),
live in Los Angeles. While the underlying proceedings were
pending, father was at times incarcerated, living with paternal
uncles, or living with a friend.
       Mother has nine siblings, all of whom, along with mother’s
mother (maternal grandmother), live in Indiana. Mother stayed
in contact with maternal grandmother and all her siblings.
Mother has no contact with her father (maternal grandfather).
Mother’s support system included her sister Trina (maternal
aunt) and brother Timothy (maternal uncle).
2.     Brief Case Summary
       Beside his ICWA arguments, father does not challenge the
merits of the juvenile court’s rulings. Consequently, we include
only a brief summary of them and the underlying facts here.
This case began in September 2018, when the Department filed a
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition on behalf of
mother and father’s older children (the twins were not yet born)
and half sibling (petition).2 The petition alleged mother and
father engaged in verbal and physical violence in the children’s
presence, father had been arrested for injuring mother with a

      1 Mother and father have two sets of twins.   In this opinion,
“twins” refers to their two youngest children.
      2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

                                 3
knife and his fists, and father and mother had physically abused
two of their children. In July 2019, after the twins were born, the
Department filed a similar petition on their behalf (twins’
petition). The juvenile court sustained amended petitions as to
the children, all of whom were placed (some individually, some
together) in foster homes.
       On February 23, 2023, well over four years after the
proceedings began, the juvenile court found the children were
adoptable and likely to be adopted. The court terminated
mother’s and father’s parental rights to six of their children. This
appeal followed.
3.     Facts Relevant to ICWA
       a.    Contacts with Relatives
       During the pendency of the proceedings below, in addition
to speaking with mother and father, Department social workers
spoke with paternal uncle Boris, maternal grandmother,
maternal uncle, and maternal aunt (who at various times
expressed interest in having the children placed with her in
Indiana). The last contact the Department had with maternal
aunt was in early 2021, when maternal aunt contacted the
Department to inquire about the case. In March 2022, the
Department attempted to contact maternal aunt, but the phone
number the Department had for her was disconnected. The
Department could not locate her. Of those four relatives
contacted, the Department asked only maternal grandmother
and paternal uncle Boris about potential Indian ancestry.
       By approximately late April 2020, the Department had lost
contact with mother. Almost one year later, in February 2021,
mother stated she was with maternal aunt in Indiana. Despite

                                 4
efforts to maintain contact, the Department eventually lost
contact with mother altogether.
       b.    Father
       Throughout the proceedings, father indicated he had no
Indian ancestry. Paternal uncle Boris similarly denied Indian
ancestry. At the September 2018 detention hearing regarding
the petition, the juvenile court found it did not have a reason to
know ICWA applied with respect to father’s side of the family.
       c.    Mother
             i.     ICWA Inquiries and Findings as to the
                    Older Children
       In connection with filing the petition in September 2018,
the Department inquired of mother whether the children had
Indian ancestry. For each child, the Department checked a box
indicating, “The child has no known Indian ancestry.” However,
on her “parental notification of Indian status” form (ICWA-020)
filed the next day, mother checked the box indicating she “may
have Indian ancestry,” specifically Cherokee.
       At the September 2018 detention hearing, the juvenile
court asked mother whether any member of her family was
enrolled or registered with a Cherokee tribe. Mother responded,
“No,” but also stated her grandmother (maternal great
grandmother) “was Indian Cherokee.” Mother did not know if
maternal great grandmother was registered. The court ordered
the Department to investigate mother’s claim of potential Indian
ancestry and to file a report, which was to include “the details of
who was interviewed, dates and places of birth of the relatives as
far back as can be ascertained.” The court also ordered the
Department “to notice the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Secretary

                                5
of Interior and the appropriate tribes,” and to submit those
notices, return receipts, and any responses.
       In its November 2018 jurisdiction and disposition report,
the Department stated, “The Indian Child Welfare Act does or
may apply.” The Department noted mother and maternal
grandmother indicated maternal great grandmother (who was no
longer alive) “has Black Indian Cherokee heritage.” Maternal
grandmother “did not know if [the maternal great grandmother]
was a registered member or received any services from the tribe.”
       Also in November 2018, the Department sent ICWA notices
(form ICWA-030) to mother, father, the Bureau of Indian Affairs,
the Department of the Interior, the Cherokee Nation of
Oklahoma, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, and the
United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians (2018 notices).
Those notices included the name, birthdate and birthplace for
each of the older children (the twins were not born yet), mother,
father, maternal grandmother, and maternal great grandmother.
The 2018 notices indicated maternal grandmother and maternal
great grandmother had Black Indian Cherokee heritage, while
mother had “Possible Black Indian Cherokee” heritage. Mother
and maternal grandmother were listed as “Not a member” of a
tribe, and maternal great grandmother was listed as “Unknown”
if she was a member of a tribe or received any services from a
tribe. The notices stated, “Mother reported maternal great
grandmother said ‘there’s a little Cherokee in all of us’ referring
to the maternal family bloodline. Maternal grandmother
reported the details of the family’s Native American heritage
were not discussed with her.” Very limited information was
included regarding maternal grandfather because mother had no
contact with him. The 2018 notices indicated father had no

                                 6
known Indian heritage and his parents and grandparents were
born and lived in Guatemala.
      In December 2018, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians
wrote to the Department, stating the children were “neither
registered nor eligible to register as a member of this tribe” and
each child was “not considered an ‘Indian Child’ in relation to the
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians as defined in 25 U.S.C.,
Section 1903(4).” The tribe would not intervene in the matter.
By late February 2019, the Department had not received
responses from the other two tribes, although they, the
Department of the Interior and Bureau of Indian Affairs each
had received the 2018 notices.
      At the February 26, 2019, disposition hearing as to the
older children, counsel for the Department stated the
Department had received “the ICWA notices back” (referring to
return receipts indicating the 2018 notices were received by their
intended recipients) and “[t]hey are attached to today’s last
minute [report].” At that hearing, the juvenile court found “No
ICWA.” Although that finding is reflected in the reporter’s
transcript for the hearing, it is not reflected in the court’s minute
orders from the hearing. However, mother’s and father’s case
plans state ICWA does not apply, which case plans were
incorporated into the February 26, 2019 minute orders.
             ii.   ICWA Inquiries and Findings as to the
                   Twins
      In connection with the twins’ petition filed in July 2019, the
Department checked the box that the twins “may have Indian
ancestry.” The Department noted mother “declined to state or
sign ICWA form” at the time. The next day, however, mother
submitted an ICWA-020 form, on which she checked the box

                                 7
stating, “I have no Indian ancestry as far as I know.” At the
July 16, 2019 detention hearing on the twins’ petition, the court
stated it did not have reason to know the twins were Indian
children, and did not order notice to any Indian tribe or the
Bureau of Indian Affairs. Similarly, in its October 2019 minute
order for the twins’ disposition hearing, the juvenile court stated
“No ICWA.”
             iii. Subsequent ICWA Discussions, Notices,
                   and Findings as to the Children
       In a January 2021 report regarding the three youngest
children, and although the juvenile court had already found
ICWA did not apply, the Department stated the court’s ICWA
findings as to mother were still pending with respect to the older
children. The Department requested the court to make its ICWA
findings. The Department reiterated this request in September
and November 2021 filings.
       In a September 2021 report, the Department stated, “On
07/16/19, the Court found that the Indian Child Welfare Act does
not apply for the minors, [twins]. [¶] Given that the Indian Child
Welfare Act was found not to apply for the minors, [twins,] [t]he
Department respectfully recommends for the Court to find that
the Indian Child Welfare Act does not apply as [to mother] for the
[six older] minors.” The Department repeated this in March and
April 2022 reports.
       At a permanency planning hearing held in March 2022,
counsel for the Department asked the juvenile court to find ICWA
did not apply to the older children. Counsel noted the Cherokee
tribe previously had stated the children were not eligible for
membership and, “subsequently at the disposition hearing [the
court] proceeded as if the case was not ICWA. So I believe it

                                8
appears to have just been an oversight on the part of the court to
not make the formal ICWA findings on the record.” The court
declined to make an ICWA order at that time, however, stating,
“[I]f at the start of a case a member of the family mentions a
Native American tribe, even if the tribe has already responded,
the court and the Department have an obligation to re-notice the
tribe for the .26 hearing, and at the very least, inquire if they
wish to intervene or if there is any additional information, at the
time of the .26.” The court believed that the scheduling of a
permanency planning hearing may “trigger” a tribe that
previously declined to intervene “to determine that they do want
to participate. [¶] . . . I would just assume [sic] have all of this
addressed before proceedings to a .26 hearing, and have the
Department notify the Cherokee Nation.” The court stated, “[I]n
the ICWA statutes, it’s an obligation to re-notice the tribes before
the .26 in every instance when a tribe may be mentioned at an
initial hearing, even if the tribes don’t intervene and ICWA does
not apply, especially where tribes may not have responded to
initial inquiries. Here, we have the Eastern Band responding to
an initial inquiry, but the court is obligated to revisit ICWA at
every .26 hearing. [¶] And, so, perhaps in an attempt to ensure
that the tribe is aware that the case is at a .26 hearing, I would
ask that the Department [inform the tribes] that we are
proceeding with a .26 hearing.” Counsel argued repeat notice
was not required “once . . . the tribe has indicated that the
children are not eligible for membership.”
       Thus, although at the March 2022 hearing the juvenile
court found “[n]o reason to know the ICWA applies,” the court
also ordered the Department “to send notices to the Eastern

                                 9
Band of Cherokee Nations Tribe as to the .26 hearing despite
their prior response.”
        In late June 2022, the Department sent by certified mail
ICWA notices (form ICWA-030) on behalf of each child, including
for the first time the twins, to mother, father, the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, the Department of the Interior, and the Eastern
Band of Cherokee Indians (2022 notices). The Department
referred to these as “courtesy ICWA notices for the WIC 366.26
hearing.” These 2022 notices indicated the children may be
eligible for membership in the “Cherokee – Eastern Band of
Cherokee Indians” tribe. Unlike the 2018 notices, however, the
2022 notices did not include information regarding relatives other
than mother and father, and the information related to mother
and father was sparse and outdated. The 2022 notices were not
sent to the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma or to the United
Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians. Based on the 2022
notices, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Nations tribe determined
the children were neither registered nor eligible to register as
members of the tribe.
        In January 2023, the juvenile court continued the
permanency planning hearing again in part so that the
Department could conduct a “full ICWA inquiry.” The court
ordered the Department “to review their case file and provide a
list of all extended family members and relatives that the agency
has had contact with over the course of the case and evidence
that ICWA inquiry was made of all of those individuals. That
evidence should be included with the report submitted for the 26
hearing. [¶] In addition, if [the Department] determines there
are relatives or extended family members who have not yet been

                               10
interviewed, [the Department] is to do so forthwith and comply
with its ongoing ICWA obligations pursuant to CRC 5.481(a)(5).”
       The next month, in February 2023, the Department
reported it left multiple voicemail messages for mother and for
maternal uncle asking them to call back. They did not. The
Department also reported it had attempted to contact maternal
aunt, but her phone number was no longer in service. A
Department social worker spoke with father, who stated he had
no Indian ancestry and “mother had never mentioned having
Indian ancestry or being [a] member of a tribe.” The social
worker also spoke with paternal uncle Boris, who stated he had
no information that the children had Indian ancestry. The
Department did not contact maternal grandmother.
       The permanency planning hearing was held on
February 23, 2023, more than four years after the underlying
proceedings began. At the hearing, the court asked the attorneys
present if they were “in agreement with the [Department’s]
representation that the ICWA inquiry appears to be a complete,
cohesive list of all relatives and their response to ICWA?” Each
attorney was in agreement. The court found “the ICWA inquiry
is complete. The Department has made diligent efforts to
investigate and inquire of all known relativ[es] or non-related
extended family members, and anyone with an interest in the
child.” The court held, “The children are not Indian children, and
the Indian Child Welfare Act does not apply to them.”
                            DISCUSSION
1.     Applicable Law
       ICWA establishes minimum standards courts must follow
before removing an Indian child from his or her family. Under
California law implementing ICWA, the juvenile court and the

                               11
Department “have an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire
whether” a dependent child “is or may be an Indian child.”
(§ 224.2, subd. (a); In re Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870,
883.) For these purposes, an “ ‘Indian child’ ” is a child who (1) is
“a member of an Indian tribe,” or (2) “is eligible for membership
in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an
Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1,
subd. (a) [adopting federal law definition].)
       Under ICWA as implemented in California, “the
Department and juvenile court have ‘three distinct duties.’
[Citations.] The first duty is the initial ‘duty’ of the Department
and the juvenile court ‘to inquire whether [a] child is an Indian
child.’ (§ 224.2, subds. (a) & (b).) The Department discharges
this duty chiefly by ‘asking’ family members ‘whether the child is,
or may be, an Indian child.’ (Id., subd. (b).) This includes
inquiring of not only the child’s parents, but also others,
including but not limited to, ‘extended family members.’[3] (Ibid.)
For its part, the juvenile court is required, ‘[a]t the first
appearance’ in a dependency case, to ‘ask each participant’
‘present’ ‘whether the participant knows or has reason to know
that the child is an Indian child.’ (Id., subd. (c).)” (In re Dezi C.
(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 769, 780, review granted Sept. 21, 2022,
S275578 (Dezi C.).)
       “The second duty is the duty of the Department or the
juvenile court to ‘make further inquiry regarding the possible

      3 “Extended family members” include the dependent child’s
adult “grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-
law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second cousin, or
stepparent.” (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1,
subd. (c) [adopting federal law definition].)

                                 12
Indian status of the child.’ ([§ 224.2], subd. (e).) This duty of
further inquiry is triggered if the Department or court ‘has
reason to believe that an Indian child is involved’ because the
record contains ‘information . . . suggesting the child is Indian’
(ibid.; [citations]), and, once triggered, obligates the Department
to conduct further interviews to gather information, to contact
the Bureau of Indian Affairs and state department of social
services for assistance, and/or to contact the relevant Indian
tribe(s). (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2).)” (Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 780–781, rev.gr.) This further inquiry must be made “as
soon as practicable.” (§ 224.2, subd. (e).) “Contact” for purposes
of further inquiry does not require the sharing of significant and
detailed information on a child’s grandparents, great-
grandparents, and other direct lineal ancestors. (Compare
§ 224.2, subd. (e) with §§ 224.2, subd. (f), and 224.3,
subd. (a)(5)(C).) However, of course, biographical information
that is accurate and as complete as possible is necessary for the
tribes to make a determination as to a child’s tribal status.
       “The third duty is the duty to notify the relevant Indian
tribe(s). (§ 224.3, subd. (a); 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).) This duty is
triggered if the Department or the court ‘knows or has reason to
know . . . that an Indian child is involved.’ (§ 224.3, subd. (a).)”
(Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 781, rev.gr.) “[T]he duty to
provide notice to Indian tribes applies only when one knows or
has a ‘reason to know . . . an Indian child is involved,’ and only
‘for hearings that may culminate in an order for foster care
placement, termination of parental rights, preadoptive
placement, or adoptive placement.’ (§ 224.3, subd. (a).)” (In re
Austin J., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 884.) For these purposes, a
“reason to know” exists when the juvenile court has been

                                13
informed of any of the following: (1) the child is an Indian child,
(2) the child or parents live on a reservation or in an Alaska
Native village, (3) information indicating that the child is an
Indian child, (4) the child gives the court reason to know he or
she is an Indian child, (5) the child is or has been a ward of a
tribal court, or (6) the child or either parent has an identification
card indicating membership or citizenship in an Indian tribe.
(§ 224.2, subd. (d).) When there is a reason to know an Indian
child is involved, notices must comply with formal statutory
requirements. (§ 224.3, subd. (a).)
2.     Standard of Review
       “ ‘[W]e review the juvenile court’s ICWA findings under the
substantial evidence test, which requires us to determine if
reasonable, credible evidence of solid value supports’ the court’s
ICWA finding.” (Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 777, rev.gr.)
Even if substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s
ICWA findings, we may not reverse unless we find that error was
prejudicial. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Dezi C., supra, 79
Cal.App.5th at p. 777, rev.gr.)
3.     Application
       First, we address ICWA compliance as to father’s side of
the family. We agree with father that the Department did not
satisfy its duty of inquiry. Although the Department spoke with
father and paternal uncle Boris, the Department never contacted
father’s other brother, paternal uncle Henry, with whom paternal
uncle Boris and father for a time lived in Los Angeles. There is
also no indication the Department attempted to contact any of
father’s family members who lived in Guatemala. Thus, the
Department failed to satisfy its initial duty of inquiry as to
father’s side of the family because it did not contact, or even

                                 14
appear to try to contact, extended family members. (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 224.2, subd. (b); 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 224.1, subd. (c).)
       Given this error, we must consider whether it was
prejudicial and requires remand. (Dezi C., supra, 79 Cal.App.5th
at p. 777, rev.gr.) The record below does not contain information
suggesting a reason to believe the children may be “Indian
children” based on father’s ancestry. (Id. at p. 779.) Father
consistently denied Indian heritage. Paternal uncle Boris
similarly denied Indian heritage. Father makes no proffer on
appeal to change this assessment. (Ibid.) Thus, we conclude the
error was harmless and remand is not warranted based on the
inquiry error as to father’s side of the family. (Id. at p. 786.)
       Second, we address ICWA compliance as to mother’s side of
the family. As with father’s family, the Department failed to
contact many of mother’s extended family members. Although
the Department spoke with mother and, early in the proceedings,
with maternal grandmother, as well as with maternal aunt and
uncle, it does not appear the Department contacted or attempted
to contact any of mother’s other siblings. There is no indication
mother’s siblings were difficult to locate. It was reported mother
stayed in touch with her nine siblings and maternal
grandmother, all of whom lived in Indiana. Under the
Department’s initial duty of inquiry, it should have contacted or,
at the least, attempted to contact mother’s extended family
members including, for example, all of her siblings, to ask if the
children may be Indian children. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.2,
subd. (b); 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.1,
subd. (c).) Thus, as with father, the Department failed to satisfy
its initial duty of inquiry with respect to mother.

                               15
      However, our analysis as to mother’s side of the family does
not stop there. Once mother and maternal grandmother
indicated there might be Cherokee heritage on their side of the
family, there was reason to believe Indian children might be
involved, thus triggering the duty to make further inquiry “as
soon as practicable.” (§ 224.2, subd (e).) Consequently, the
juvenile court and the Department were obligated to make
further inquiries, including of those individuals they had already
contacted, to gather information about mother’s claimed heritage.
Although the Department made some unsuccessful attempts at
further inquiry years after learning of mother’s claimed Indian
heritage, the Department never tried to contact maternal
grandmother again. Additionally, as already noted above, the
Department never contacted the majority of mother’s siblings.
Moreover, it is unclear why the Department waited so long to
attempt further inquiry of maternal family members when it
could and should have done so years earlier.
      Nonetheless, despite these missteps, we conclude the
Department’s 2018 notices were sufficient and adequate contact
for purposes of the Department’s obligation to make further
inquiry after learning of mother’s claimed Indian heritage; i.e.,
after having a reason to believe Indian children may be involved.
The 2018 notices included names, birthdates, birth places, and
addresses. They were received by the tribes and government
agencies. Although information for the twins was not included in
those notices (because they were not yet born), that is
insignificant since it is not claimed that any one of the children is
a member of a tribe. Because the children are all full biological
siblings, if one is eligible to become a member of a tribe, so too
would the others, and vice versa. Moreover, although on appeal

                                 16
father lists various inaccuracies in the 2018 notices, perfection is
not required and the listed inaccuracies were not prejudicial for
purposes of further inquiry. (In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th
558, 570–571.) Because this case never became one in which
there was reason to know an Indian Child was involved, formal
notice to tribes was not required. (Ibid.)
       Additionally, it was not necessary for the Department to re-
notice the tribes or the government agencies prior to the
permanency planning hearing. Because this was not a reason-to-
know case and because the juvenile court previously had
determined ICWA did not apply, the 2022 notices were not
required. (§ 224.3, subd (b).) Thus, the obvious inadequacy of the
2022 notices was immaterial in that those notices were
superfluous. To be clear, the 2022 notices were woefully
insufficient. They included next to zero information, which is
inexplicable given the Department had already compiled and
used much of the family members’ identifying information in the
2018 notices. One wonders why the 2022 notices were even sent.
Nevertheless, the 2022 notices do not detract from the sufficiency
of the 2018 notices, as discussed above.
       Finally, it is significant that, in its response to the 2018
notices, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians declined to
intervene in the case, stating the children were not considered
Indian children. This, coupled with no responses from the other
two noticed tribes and the fact that mother and maternal
grandmother stated they were not members of any tribe,
constitutes substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court’s
finding that ICWA did not apply. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(4); Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 224.1, subd. (a).)

                                17
      In closing, we note the older children have been waiting for
permanency for over five years, and the twins since they were
born. Many of the children have lived most if not all of their lives
outside the care of mother and father. We are confident our
decision aligns with the importance the dependency law rightly
affords to the safety, well-being, and best interests of dependent
children.
                          DISPOSITION
      The juvenile court’s February 23, 2023 orders are affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                           LUI, P.J.
We concur:

      ASHMANN-GERST, J.

      CHAVEZ, J.

                                18