Court Opinion

ID: 9676336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:22:05.983304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:47.789345
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting). The majority concludes that the conversation transmitted over the cordless telephone in this case is neither a “wire” nor an “oral” communication protected under the Wisconsin Electronic Surveillance Control statute, sec. 968.27, Stats. 1985-86, and that therefore no search warrant was needed.
I recognize that this case is of limited significance because the Wisconsin statute has been amended and the FCC has adopted new rules regarding cordless phones. Nonetheless I write to state my disagreement with the majority’s interpretation of the statute. The statute has been amended to exclude the radio portion of a cordless telephone communication from the statutory definition of wire communication. The FCC now requires cordless telephones to bear the legend: “Privacy of communications may not be ensured when using this phone.” Thus it seems unlikely that a person using a cordless telephone can claim that the communication is an oral communication; it would be difficult to show that an expectation of privacy is justified. These developments do not, however, affect this case.
I conclude that the majority’s definitions of “wire communication” and “oral communication” are at odds with the words of the statute and the legislative intent. Therefore, I dissent.
*107The majority opinion’s interpretation of the definition of “wire communication” is not, I conclude, consistent with the words of the statute. Because the phone communications intercepted in this case were “made ... in part through the use of facilities ... furnished or operated by any person engaged as a public utility ...," majority opinion at pages 98-99, they clearly fall within the statutory definition of "wire communication.” See Note, State v. DeLaurier: Privacy Rights and Cordless Telephones — The Fourth Amendment is Put on Hold, 19 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1087, 1093-94 (1986); Note, The Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by Eavesdropping on Cordless Telephones, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 323, 338-339 (1986); Note, Title III Protection for Wireless Telephones, 1985 U. Ill. L. Rev. 143, 154.
The majority opinion’s definition of “wire communication” is also contrary to legislative intent. The opinion of the court of appeals correctly observes that, in drafting the statute, the legislature focused on the twin purposes of protecting the citizens’ need for effective law enforcement and the citizens’ need for privacy of written and oral communication. 142 Wis. 2d 562, 568, 419 N.W.2d 259 (Ct. App. 1987). The legislature accomplished these dual purposes by adopting a broad definition of wire communication and by requiring prior court authorization. See analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau, 1969 Assembly Bill 860 and Attorney General Robert Warren’s analysis of Assembly Bill 860 (1969). The majority’s interpretation does not give effect to the legislature’s dual purposes and thwarts the legislative means designed to accomplish these purposes.
The majority opinion concludes that the defendant’s communications were not “oral communications” under the statute because “objectively there *108could be no reasonable expectation of privacy,” majority opinion at page 105. I find this conclusion unpersuasive and unsubstantiated. This record supports the conclusion that the defendant’s expectation that the communication was not subject to interception was justified. The FCC concluded that “[apparently, most customers who use [cordless] phones are unaware that... a signal transmitted through space can be received by an unintended listener. A number of consumers are surprised and concerned about this feature of cordless phones.” 48 Fed. Reg. 4788, 4791 (1983). Furthermore, the owner’s manual in this case did not expressly inform the reader that the telephone was a radio communication or that the conversation could be monitored by other persons. The manual is at defendant’s brief, appendix, pp. 102-108. Indeed I believe that the more reasonable inference to be drawn from the manual is that the privacy of a phone conversation could be maintained.
For the reasons set forth, I dissent.