Court Opinion

ID: 9743021
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:24:15.390775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:38.622694
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE LINN, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority’s finding regarding the “other insurance” clause and would therefore reverse the trial court. The majority has determined that our supreme court’s holding in Glidden v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Association (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 330, 313 N.E.2d 247, compels a finding that the “other insurance” clause is ambiguous and thus ineffective to prevent stacking of the two policies issued to the various members of the Kaufmann family. However, Glidden is distinguishable from the case at bar. Moreover, an examination of our supreme court’s decision in Morelock v. Millers’ Mutual Insurance Association (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 234, 274 N.E.2d 1, reveals an identical factual situation to that in the present case, and accordingly dictates an opposite finding to the one reached by the majority here. The majority has correctly stated that the courts have closely scrutinized insurance clauses under various factual settings, and when an ambiguity arises, courts resolve that ambiguity in favor of the insured. However, the majority has seemingly ignored the fact that excess-escape clauses, such as the one in issue are generally deemed enforceable, and consistently have been held not to offend our public policy despite their frustrating effect. (Morelock v. Millers’ Mutual Insurance Association (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 234, 274 N.E.2d 1; Putnam v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. (1970), 48 Ill. 2d 71, 269 N.E.2d 97; Winkler v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1976), 35 Ill. App. 3d 493, 341 N.E.2d 379.) It is true that this view has put Illinois in fine with a minority of jurisdictions. An attempt has been made by our courts to ameliorate the harsh effect of the “other insurance” clause in certain situations. In Glidden v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Association (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 330, 313 N.E.2d 247, plaintiff had purchased three separate automobile insurance policies for each of his three cars, and had paid separate premiums under each policy for Family Protection Coverage. The Family Protection liability limits were identical in all three policies: *10,000 per person, *20,000 per accident. Each policy also contained an “other insurance” provision which included an “excess-escape” and a “pro-rata”1 clause. Plaintiff’s wife, while a pedestrian, was struck and killed by an uninsured motorist. The insurance company sought to apply the pro-rata2 clause which would have operated to limit the plaintiff’s recovery to one-third under each policy or a total of *10,000 under the three policies. The court rejected defendant’s contention and allowed “stacking” of the three policies for a total coverage of up to *30,000. Under the facts presented in Glidden the court determined that the “other insurance” clause was ambiguous. In applying the standard rule of construction, the court resolved the ambiguity in favor of the insured and against the insurance company. However, the situation in Glidden is readily distinguishable from that in the instant case. Here, as in Glidden, one company issued all the policies. However, unlike Glidden, in the present case, the policies were purchased by different individuals rather than by the same person. The rationale in Glidden is that one person would not have incurred the additional expense in purchasing separate policies had he contemplated that in so doing, he would have limited his recovery under each. Presumably, if that was the expected result, he would have purchased only one policy. This presumption is supported by the language of Squire v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co. (1976), 43 Ill. App. 3d 113, 116, 356 N.E.2d 1121, 1124: “ ° ° ° in the case of a single policy covering more than one car, absent an identical premium charge for all the covered cars, we doubt that the parties would ordinarily contemplate the stacking of coverages for pedestrian accidents, but we think their reasonable expectations would be that the samé limits of liability would apply in the event of any accident, whether the person covered were [sic] in an insured car or an uninsured car or were [sic] a pedestrian, and whether the injury were [sic] caused by an insured motorist or by an uninsured motorist.” While plaintiffs argue that our court’s recent pronouncement in Bertini v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1977), 48 Ill. App. 3d 851, 362 N.E.2d 1355, further demands that we allow “stacking” in the present case, we note that Bertini, like Glidden, involved a single insured who had purchased three separate policies from one insurance company. The majority has concluded that plaintiffs contemplated multiple coverage in purchasing the two policies as a single family of insureds. I do not believe Glidden or Bertini may be extended that far. Plaintiffs are separate insureds, albeit at the time of the collision they were members of the same household.3  Rather, I believe that Morelock v. Millers’ Mutual Insurance Association (1971), 49 Ill. 2d 234, 274 N.E.2d 1, is dispositive of the instant appeal. In Morelock, plaintiff was driving an automobile owned by her father when she was struck by an automobile driven by an uninsured motorist. The plaintiff was the named insured in a policy issued by the defendant, and her father was the named insured in another policy issued by the defendant. Both policies contained identical Family Protection coverage. Plaintiff’s policy contained an excess-escape clause, identical in wording to that in the case at bar. While the court in Morelock held that the Family Protection coverage under the father’s policy covered the accident, it held that the excess-escape provision in plaintiff’s policy was unambiguous and precluded any additional recovery. The majority impliedly distinguishes Morelock on the grounds that although there existed a father-daughter relationship between the insureds in that case, it appeared that the daughter was emancipated. Thus, there was no issue of duplicative payments for the additional coverage from the same household as in the present case. However, the record in the instant case is devoid of any evidence indicating whether or not Daniel was emancipated from his parents. We only know that he resided with his parents at the time of the accident, although he was living apart from them when he purchased the policy. Therefore, I dispute the majority’s suggestion that Morelock is distinguishable on this ground. Since Morelock and Glidden are both viable pronouncements of our Supreme Court (see Winkler v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1976), 35 Ill. App. 3d 493, 341 N.E.2d 379), it is incumbent upon us to apply the one that most closely parallels the factual situation before us. The majority has selected Glidden, when as far as the record before us discloses, Morelock is factually identical and therefore should be followed. Where the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, the court must construe it as written. An insurance policy is no different in this regard than any other contract. (Winkler v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1976), 35 Ill. App. 3d 493, 341 N.E.2d 379.) Despite the harsh effect that “other insurance” clauses have under certain factual settings, neither our courts nor our legislature, has determined that “other insurance” clauses may be ignored when their meaning is clear. While I agree with the majority that the “specific exclusion” present in Justin and Geraldine Kaufmann’s policy is inoperative to bar stacking, it is because the courts have determined that such a provision violates the public policy expressed by our Insurance Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, pars. 755(a), 1054; Doxtater v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1972), 8 Ill. App. 3d 547, 290 N.E.2d 284.) This is not the case with “other insurance” clauses. Since I believe that Morelock rather than Glidden is controlling, it follows that the two policies in this case should not be stacked. The plaintiffs should be limited in their recovery up to the scheduled limits of *10,000 per person and *20,000 per accident under the terms of Daniel’s policy. I would reverse the trial court.   As explained by the court in Putnam v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. (1970), 48 Ill. 2d 71, 76, 269 N.E.2d 97, 99: “The typical pro-rata clause provides that when an insured has other insurance available, the company will be liable only for the proportion of the loss represented by the ratio between its policy limit and the total limits of all available insurance.”    The pro-rata, rather than the excess-escape clause was applicable, since plaintiff’s wife was injured while a pedestrian. The excess-escape clause only applied “[w]ith respect to Bodily Injury to an insured while occupying an automobile * * Glidden v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Association (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 330, 333, 312 N.E.2d 247, 249. (Emphasis supplied.)    I am also cognizant that Glidden involved the construction of a pro-rata, rather than an excess-escape clause but I do not deem that factor to be a persuasive ground for distinction since the rationale of Glidden suggests it would have held the same way under the factual context regardless of the type of clause. See Bertini v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1977), 48 Ill. App. 3d 851, 362 N.E.2d 1355.