Court Opinion

ID: 9623718
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:41:40.26207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:52:57.886089
License: Public Domain

Dimmick, J.
(concurring) — I concur with the majority. Reversal is appropriate under the circumstances of this case, in which the trial court made a legal error as to the competence and availability of child witnesses. Justice Dol-liver's concurring opinion touches on issues that concern me, but does not reach all of them. While I agree with the majority's interpretation of the statute to conform with the federal and state constitutions, I would reverse solely on the basis of misinterpretation of the law on competency. In addition, I write to emphasize the distinction between the present and past competence of a child witness.
The statute in conformity with the confrontation clause dictates that a witness testify at trial unless unavailable. RCW 9A.44.120. A witness is unavailable only when the prosecutor has made a good faith effort to secure his presence. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 20 L. Ed. 2d 255, 88 S. *182Ct. 1318 (1968). See also State v. Smith, 85 Wn.2d 840, 851, 540 P.2d 424 (1975) (unavailability must be certain to excuse nonproduction of a witness).
The trial court and the parties erred in determining unavailability of the child witnesses on the basis of statutory incompetence. The judge had not examined the children and determined them to be incompetent. That is, he had not found them "incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts, respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly." RCW 5.60.050. Had he found them incompetent, however, the children would have been unavailable as witnesses.4 This is not to say, however, that a determination of incompetency at the time of trial necessarily indicates that a child was incompetent at the time of making the hearsay statement.
I consider this to be the significance of the new statute RCW 9A.44.120. In effect, the trial judge faced with a child victim of sexual misconduct must make two separate determinations: First, is the child competent to take the stand as a witness? (If he is competent, then he must testify.) Second, was there sufficient indicia of reliability surrounding the child's out-of-court statement to admit it as evidence?
In this respect, I find the majority's opinion lacks clarity. It could be misconstrued as implying that present incompetence presumes incompetence or unreliability at the time the statement was made. But one does not necessarily follow from the other. Young children present special problems as witnesses because of their short memories and possible traumatic reaction as victims. The statute has been written to recognize the possible validity of a child's earlier statements (not unlike the hearsay exceptions allowed for excited utterances or present sense impressions).
Reliability may be indicated by the spontaneity of the out-of-court statement, a recitation of acts generally unknown to children, or other circumstances surrounding the statement. A finding of incompetence at time of trial *183would not invalidate an out-of-court statement by a child which had the mark of reliability at the time it was made.
The accused is protected by the law's requirements that the hearsay statement be examined in a special hearing to determine its reliability. Additionally, the accused will have the opportunity to challenge the circumstances in which the statement was made, the possible motives of the recountal of the statement, and, finally, to confront any child witness determined to be competent to testify.
I would reverse on the basis of the faulty legal premise of incompetency leading to a faulty conclusion of unavailability. I form no conclusion as to the evidence of the children's reliability on retrial.

On this issue, I agree with Justice Dolliver's interpretation of ER 804.