Court Opinion

ID: 9851721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:18:39.082816+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:14.011394
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting.
Plaintiff received a verdict for $25,000 actual damages and for $10,000 punitive damages. Each member of this court affirms the verdict as to actual damages, but our only difference is as to whether punitive damages should have been awarded. Thus, punitive damages is the sole question for consideration.
Earlier, the defendant had erected two other quite similar "free-standing walls,” from 16 to 18 feet in height, and both of them had fallen. The defendant was therefore fully aware that walls of this kind and height would not stand, but would fall, and might injure someone in the vicinity. Nevertheless, he built the third wall just as he had built the first two walls.
There was evidence to the effect that each of the three walls was erected completely contrary to sound building practice; that the walls were too long, too tall, and generally were erected in a shoddy, "penny-pinching” attempt to cut corners and save money.
The plaintiff and others remonstrated with defendant and actually pointed out to him that the walls were unstable and should be braced, but defendant *303refused to do anything about it. When the first two walls fell down defendant then gave orders to brace the third wall, which was still standing, but then he gave orders which caused the bracing to be removed.
And then, despite defendant’s knowledge that the first two walls had fallen; despite his knowledge that the third wall was defectively constructed; despite his knowledge that the third wall was in need of being braced, which he at first ordered, and then caused the braces to be removed, defendant’s superintendent directed plaintiff to go to the wall and make certain measurements. The wall, just as had the other two walls, fell and plaintiff was injured.
How could a stronger case for punitive damages have been proven than was done here?
The majority opinion cites Code § 105-2002, which statute authorizes punitive damages if there are aggravating circumstances, either in the act or the intention, and the purpose of the damages is to deter the wrongdoer from repeating the trespass or for plaintiffs wounded feelings.
We now reach the vital question of what quantum of negligence authorizes punitive damages?
In Southern R. Co. v. O’Bryan, 119 Ga. 147 (1) (45 SE 1000), it is held that punitive damages are recoverable if defendant has acted with such an entire want of care as to raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences. Could a stronger case have been proven than the one we have here, showing defendant’s entire want of care and his conscious indifference to consequences? He knew the three walls were built alike, that they were too long and too high. He knew they were defectively erected; that they should have been braced; that two of them had already fallen. Surely defendant was not one bit surprised when he learned the third wall had taken the same action as the first two walls and fallen. He would most likely have been astonished to learn that the third wall had not fallen. And in this conduct he showed an entire want of care and a conscious indifference to consequences. Why did he allow the braces removed when he knew they were necessary to prevent the wall from falling? Why did he build it contrary to sound building *304practice? Why build it too long and too high? When and how was he ever going to learn how to erect a brick wall if falling of the first two walls did not serve to arouse his consciousness?
In American Fidelity &c. Co. v. Farmer, 77 Ga. App. 166 (3b) (48 SE2d 122), it is held that "wilful and intentional conduct is not essential” to the recovery of punitive damages.
Now let us address ourselves to a different principle of law as to punitive damages. A simple act of negligence (not a wilful, wanton, or gross act of negligence), may authorize punitive damages where it is repeated so as to indicate a reckless disregard of the consequences of the act. In 1915, when all railroads were powered by steam engines, burning coal and emitting sparks along the right of way, McElmurray sued C. & W. C. R. Co. as is reported in 16 Ga. App. 504 (85 SE 804). It was there recognized that in the ordinary operation of a railroad steam engine, fires are set out along the right of way and burn the inflammable weeds and dried growth existing there, and that setting out two or three fires in a period of two years might be expected and would not warrant punitive damages. But then the court holds at page 515: "While perhaps no aggravating circumstances would be inferred from the negligent setting out of two or three fires within a period of two years, yet, where the petition alleges ... the negligent setting out of fifteen fires upon the farm of the petitioner at different times within that period, it seems to us that these repeated and continued trespasses might be sufficient for the jury to infer such a reckless disregard by the defendant of the legal rights of the plaintiff, and such a wanton indifference to consequences, as to entitle the plaintiff to recover punitive damages.” (Emphasis supplied.)
And let it be emphasized that the mere setting of fire by a railroad is but simple negligence; the repetition is what makes it take on the character of negligence warranting punitive damages. Of course, setting fires was an almost necessary part of the operation of the old-fashioned steam locomotives; but the building of three defective brick walls, and leaving them unbraced, each one of which fell to the ground, is a far more serious matter *305than setting out fires by a steam locomotive.
In Batson v. Higginbotham, 7 Ga. App. 835 (68 SE 455), and at page 839, in discussing the allowance of punitive damages, the court holds: "It [punitive damages] is always exclusively a question for the jury to determine when such additional damages should be allowed, as well as the amount of such damages.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case we now have before us, the jury awarded punitive damages; there was ample evidence for the award; and it therefore was a question, not for the judges, but for the jury.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
I am authorized to state that Judge Webb joins in this dissent.