Court Opinion

ID: 9669774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:09:15.363884+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:00.252417
License: Public Domain

FINE, J.
(dissenting). As framed by the majority opinion, this appeal presents one narrow issue: Whether PBC Productions has demonstrated that it is entitled to summary judgment because of the so-called "baseball rule" adopted by Powless v. Milwaukee County, 6 Wis. 2d 78, 94 N.W.2d 187 (1959). In my view, it has not. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Powless held that a spectator at a baseball game who chooses to sit in an area that is not protected from batted balls may not recover if struck by a batted ball. Id., 6 Wis. 2d at 83-86, 94 N.W.2d at 190-191. The *422plaintiff in Powless was denied recovery because "[s]he made no effort to obtain a seat behind the back-stop screen although she knew that seats in that area are available." Id., 6 Wis. 2d at 83, 94 N.W.2d at 190.
If applicable, the "baseball rule" would defeat Moulas's claims. It is therefore an affirmative defense, see Rule 802.06, Stats. PBC Productions thus has the burden of proof on whether the "baseball rule" applies. See Estate of Anderson, 147 Wis. 2d 83, 88, 432 N.W.2d 923, 926 (Ct. App. 1988) (defendant has burden of proving facts that would defeat plaintiffs claim).
Affidavits submitted by Andrea Moulas raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 1) she tried to protect herself by sitting in a seat that she believed was safely screened from flying pucks; and, if so, 2) whether that belief was reasonable. These affidavits assert:
• Moulas was sitting in season seats purchased by her brother.
• Moulas's brother purchased those seats "to be as close as possible to the plastic screen surrounding the rink."
• Moulas's brother "thought that it was not possible for a puck to hit a person sitting in [his] season seats."
• It was Moulas's "understanding" that her brother selected the seats "in the second row behind the screen so that users of the season tickets would not be in danger of being hit by a flying puck."
• At the time she was hit by the puck, Moulas was sitting in "the second row of seats immediately behind the 8 foot high plastic screen along the side of the ice rink" "for protection from any hockey puck that might be hit out of the rink."
*423• Moulas's "head was below the top of the screen" when the puck hit her.
• At the time she was hit by the puck, Moulas "felt totally secure from the possibility of being hit by a puck leaving the rink."
• According to Moulas's brother, "[k]nowing where the puck started its exit from the rink and where it hit [Moulas], it is obvious that the puck just barely cleared the 8 foot high screen and then arced down to hit [Moulas]."1
We must view these sworn averments in a light most favorably to the plaintiff. See DeRuyter v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 200 Wis. 2d 349, 359, 546 N.W.2d 534, 539 (Ct. App. 1996). Thus read, they support Mou-las's contention that she, unlike the plaintiff in Powless, made an "effort to obtain a seat behind the [safety] screen." See Powless, 6 Wis. 2d at 83, 94 N.W.2d at 190. Thus, at this stage of the proceedings the "baseball rule" does not bar her claims, although, of course, the jury should be instructed on that defense.
I would reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment, and remand for trial.

 This opinion admissible under Rule 907.01, Stats.