Court Opinion

ID: 9730939
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:28:52.291578+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:11.352831
License: Public Domain

GARRARD, Judge,
concurring.
It may appear at first blush that the majority opinion has merely taken the view that where the review board has premised *1015its decision upon one of the grounds of discharge for good cause enumerated in IC 22-4-15-1, we may not look to a different statutory ground even though the review board’s findings clearly establish its applicability. If that were the case I would feel constrained to dissent. It is not.
As the majority points out, the review board concluded Trigg was discharged for knowing violation of a work rule. However, the findings were inadequate since they do not cover the element of uniform enforcement.
For essentially the same reasons we cannot affirm on the theory that the findings demonstrate a clear violation of the proscription against “unsatisfactory attendance, if the individual cannot show good cause for absences or tardiness.” IC 22-4-15-l(e)(3).
We have said generally that chronic absence without notice and without permission amount to misconduct under this section. Thompson v. Hygrade Food Products Corp. (1965), 137 Ind.App. 591, 210 N.E.2d 388. The review board’s findings are not adequate to enable us to say that definition was met. Indeed the question of uniform enforcement has bearing under paragraph (3). The board could determine that a discharge was not for “unsatisfactory” attendance if no other employees were disciplined although many had worse attendance records than the claimant and otherwise had the same responsibilities.
I therefore concur.