Court Opinion

ID: 9953716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 18:02:47.976795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:07:21.211590
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/22/24 P. v. Cain CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                       (Tehama)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C097421

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   (Super. Ct. No. 22CR000493)

           v.

 RAY RAY CAIN,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         A jury found defendant Ray Ray Cain guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code,
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§ 187, subd. (a)), with a true finding of a special circumstance allegation of torture
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)), and fleeing a pursuing peace officer while driving recklessly
(Veh. Code, § 2800.2). In bifurcated proceedings, defendant admitted two prior
convictions (§§ 245, subd. (a)(1), 664/192). The trial court sentenced defendant to an

1        Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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aggregate term of life without the possibility of parole plus five years for the prior serious
felony enhancement. The trial court also imposed fines and fees, including a $10,000
restitution fine. On appeal, defendant contends that the true findings on his prior
convictions must be reversed because the trial court did not advise him of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to confrontation. Defendant also argues that his
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for not objecting to the $10,000 restitution
fine. We disagree with defendant’s claims and will affirm the judgment. We have,
however, noticed a clerical error in the abstract of judgment. The abstract of judgment
reflects a sentence enhancement citing the incorrect enhancement statute. Accordingly,
we will direct the trial court to prepare a corrected abstract of judgment and forward the
corrected abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
                                      BACKGROUND
       Defendant went to J.G.’s apartment, assaulted J.G., choked him, and threw him
down the stairs. Defendant tied J.G.’s feet and tied the other end of the rope to the back
of a motorcycle. When a police officer arrived on the scene, defendant sped away on the
motorcycle with J.G. still tied to the back. Defendant led police officers on a high-speed
chase, dragging J.G. by his ankles through public streets until J.G. slammed into a curb
and the rope snapped.
       The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder and fleeing a pursuing
peace officer’s motor vehicle while driving recklessly. The jury also found true the
special circumstance allegation that the murder was intentional and involved the
infliction of torture (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18)). In bifurcated proceedings, defendant
admitted two prior convictions: (1) attempted voluntary manslaughter (§§ 664/192) in
2008 and (2) assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) in 2007.
       At sentencing, the trial court declined to exercise its discretion to strike any of
defendant’s prior strikes. The trial court sentenced defendant on count one to life without
the possibility of parole for murder with a special circumstance and imposed a five-year

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prior serious felony conviction enhancement. For fleeing a pursuing peace officer as
alleged in count two, the trial court imposed the midterm of two years, doubled to four
years for the prior strike, but stayed the sentence pursuant to section 654. The trial court
also imposed a $10,000 restitution fine.
                                       DISCUSSION
                                              I
                       Prior Conviction Allegations and Admissions
       Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to advise him of his
constitutional rights to confrontation and to remain silent prior to the admission of his
prior convictions. According to defendant, as a result of these inadequate advisements,
the trial court failed to obtain a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent admission of the prior
conviction allegations. The People concede that the trial court did not fully advise
defendant of his rights before his admission but argue that defendant’s admission was
knowing and voluntary based on the totality of the circumstances.
       A. Additional background
       At the beginning of the trial, defendant opted to bifurcate the proceedings on his
prior convictions. During trial, defendant, through counsel, cross-examined five of the
People’s witnesses. After the trial court ruled it would not allow testimony from the only
witness defendant initially intended to call, he had a lengthy discussion with his attorney
and decided to testify. The trial court asked defendant if his attorney had discussed the
advantages and disadvantages of testifying, and defendant confirmed he did. Defendant
confirmed that he still wanted to testify. The trial court told defendant that if he needed
to speak with his attorney during his testimony, he should let the trial court know.
       During defendant’s testimony, he admitted that he had a 2008 conviction for
attempted voluntary manslaughter and two 2007 convictions for assault with a deadly
weapon and that he served over eight years in prison for one of the 2007 convictions. He
also testified that while he was in prison, he pled guilty to assault with a deadly weapon

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or by force likely to cause great bodily harm for punching and breaking another man’s
jaw.
       After the jury deliberated, but before it announced its verdict, the trial court
informed counsel, “I intend to bring the jury in in a moment and ask what the verdict is.
However, we did discuss prior to that time having your client waive jury on the priors.”
To which defense counsel advised the court, “Sure. I’ve discussed the matter with
[defendant] previously, Your Honor. He’s indicating he’s willing to waive his right to a
jury trial on the issue of priors.” The trial court then informed defendant that he had the
right to have the same jury make a finding on his prior convictions. The trial court
explained that it would be a “little trial . . . just only on that issue.” The trial court stated
that if defendant waived the jury trial, he could still decide whether he wanted a court
trial or if he wanted to admit the prior convictions after the verdict, “but right now, you’re
giving up your right to have the jury decide that.” The trial court then asked defendant if
that was what he wanted to do, and defendant replied, “Yes, Your Honor.” When the
trial court asked defendant whether he’d had enough time to speak with his counsel about
waiving jury trial, defendant replied, “Yes.” Defense counsel joined in the waiver and
the court accepted the waiver as knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
       After the jury announced its verdict, the trial court again asked how defendant
wanted to handle the prior convictions. Defense counsel stated that defendant wanted to
admit the prior convictions. The trial court listed the prior convictions of attempted
voluntary manslaughter in 2008 and assault with a deadly weapon in 2007. Defendant
admitted both prior convictions. The trial court accepted the admissions, again finding
them to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
       B. Analysis
       Prior to accepting a defendant’s admission of a prior conviction, the trial court
“must advise the defendant and obtain waivers of (1) the right to a trial to determine the
fact of the prior conviction, (2) the right to remain silent, and (3) the right to confront

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adverse witnesses. [Citation.] Proper advisement and waivers of these rights in the
record establish a defendant’s voluntary and intelligent admission of the prior
conviction.” (People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 356.) “[I]f the transcript does not
reveal complete advisements and waivers, the reviewing court must examine the record
of ‘the entire proceeding’ to assess whether the defendant's admission of the prior
conviction was intelligent and voluntary in light of the totality of circumstances.” (Id. at
p. 361.) In applying the totality of the circumstances test, “previous experience in the
criminal justice system is relevant to a recidivist’s ‘ “knowledge and sophistication
regarding his [legal] rights.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 365.) A trial court’s “failure to properly advise
a defendant of his or her trial rights is not reversible ‘if the record affirmatively shows
that [the admission] is voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances.’ ”
(People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 179.)
       Here, the trial court advised defendant of his right to have the “same jury decide
whether or not your prior convictions are true. And so we would have essentially
another, like, little trial on that, just only on that issue.” However, the trial court provided
an incomplete advisement when it failed to advise defendant of his right to remain silent
and right to confront witnesses before accepting his admission of his prior convictions.
This was error. (People v. Mosby, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 356.) Accordingly, we must
review the entire record to determine whether defendant’s admission was voluntary and
intelligent. (Id. p. 361.)
       Defendant admitted the prior convictions immediately following a jury trial in
which he exercised not only his right to confront witnesses, but to testify on his own
behalf. Defendant points out that he did not exercise his right to remain silent in the trial
that preceded his waiver, and without complete advisements could not know that he could
invoke such silence. The record belies this contention. Once defense counsel indicated
defendant intended to testify, the trial court asked defendant, “I’m assuming that your
attorney has discussed all the advantages and pitfalls of taking the stand; is that correct?”

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To which defendant replied, “Yes, Your Honor.” The trial court then asked defendant,
“Having taken his advice, you still want to go ahead and take the stand?” To which
defendant replied, “Yes, ma’am.” This colloquy demonstrates defendant’s understanding
that he had a choice whether to testify or not.
       Additionally, defendant’s prior criminal history is also relevant to the question of
whether he knowingly waived his constitutional rights. (People v. Mosby, supra,
33 Cal.4th at p. 356.) Although defendant’s prior convictions were remote, he has
extensive experience in the criminal justice system, including a prior guilty plea for
which he would have received an advisement of his rights to remain silent and confront
witnesses. Thus, the totality of the circumstances show defendant knew he was entitled
to have the jury determine the truth of his prior convictions, he knew he could choose
whether or not to testify in front of that jury, he had just participated in a jury trial where
he, through counsel, had confronted witnesses, and he had prior experience in the
criminal justice system. Thus, we conclude the totality of the circumstances affirmatively
show his admissions to the prior convictions were knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily entered.
                                               II
                              Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
       Defendant contends that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of
counsel by failing to request a reduction of the $10,000 restitution fine based on inability
to pay. Specifically, defendant argues that he did not have the present ability to pay the
fine and lacked a reasonable prospect of having a future ability to pay. Defendant further
asserts that in light of People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, which was decided
over three years before defendant’s sentencing, trial counsel fell below an objective

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standard of reasonableness by failing to request a reduction and the failure prejudiced
him.2
        The burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel is on the defendant.
(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687.) To prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) counsel’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and
(2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. (Strickland, at pp. 688, 691-692;
People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-218.) To show prejudice, a “defendant
must also show ‘ “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” ’ ” (People v. Torres
(1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 37, 49.) It is not enough to establish prejudice for a defendant to
propose that counsel’s performance had some “conceivable effect” on the outcome;
rather, a defendant must show a reasonable probability of a different result but for
counsel’s errors. (Strickland, at pp. 693-694.) Prejudice must be a demonstrable reality
established based on facts in the record, not simply speculation as to the effect of the
errors or omissions of counsel. (People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 933; People v.
Montoya (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1151.) A reviewing court may reject a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel without addressing both components if a defendant
makes an insufficient showing as to either prong. (Strickland, at p. 697.)
        Because we find that the lack of objection to the restitution fine did not prejudice
defendant, we conclude defendant has not met his burden to demonstrate ineffective
assistance of counsel. As an initial matter, Dueñas held that a restitution fine “must be

2      To the extent defendant complains about the amount of the fine, he failed to object
before the trial court and has forfeited his right to challenge it here. (In re Sheena K.
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880-881 [noting longstanding rule that a constitutional right may
be forfeited in criminal proceedings by “ ‘ “failure to make timely assertion of the right
before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it” ’ ”].)

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stayed unless and until the trial court holds an ability to pay hearing and concludes that
the defendant has the present ability to pay the restitution fine.” (People v. Dueñas,
supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1164.) Our Supreme Court will resolve this question, having
granted review in People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, review granted
November 13, 2019, S257844, which held that due process does not require the trial court
to conduct an ability to pay hearing and ascertain a defendant’s ability to pay before it
imposes restitution fines under section 1202.4. (Kopp, at pp. 96-97.) In the meantime,
we join those authorities that have concluded the principles of due process do not require
determination of a defendant’s present ability to pay before imposing the fines and
assessments at issue in Dueñas and in this proceeding. (People v. Kingston (2019)
41 Cal.App.5th 272, 279-282; People v. Hicks (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 320, 326-329,
review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S258946; People v. Aviles (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1055,
1067-1069; People v. Caceres (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 917, 928-929.) Defendant’s claim
that the failure to object prejudiced him because of the significant impact of Dueñas is
thus without merit.
       Further, the court was entitled to consider defendant’s potential future earnings,
including prison wages and monetary gifts from family and friends, in determining his
ability to pay the restitution fine. (People v. Aviles, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 1077;
People v. DeFrance (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 486, 505 [a defendant sentenced to prison
did not show absolute inability to pay $10,000 restitution fine even though prison wages
would make it difficult for him to pay the fine, it would take a very long time, and the
fine might never be paid].) Defendant was only 38 years old when he was sentenced, and
the record does not reflect any physical or mental impairments that would prevent him
from working during his life sentence in prison. Lastly, in setting the amount above the
statutory minimum, the trial court was required to consider relevant factors including not
only ability to pay but also “the seriousness and gravity of the offense and the
circumstances of its commission.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (d).) The trial court found

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defendant’s crime was of the utmost seriousness and gravity as it noted “the sheer
brutality of the instant crime and the callousness with which it was committed” and stated
that “this community has never experienced such an inhumane and vicious crime.”
       Given the nature of defendant’s crime and his ability to earn prison wages and
receive monetary gifts from family and friends, we conclude there is no reasonable
probability that there would have been a different result but for defense trial counsel’s
lack of objection.
                                             III
                                       Clerical Error
       The trial court imposed the five-year prior serious felony conviction enhancement
under section 667, subdivision (a)(1). However, the abstract of judgment reflects that the
trial court imposed the enhancement under section 667.5, subdivision (a)(1). We direct
the trial court to correct this clerical error. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185
[“Courts may correct clerical errors at any time, and appellate courts . . . that have
properly assumed jurisdiction of cases have ordered correction of abstracts of judgment
that did not accurately reflect the oral judgments of sentencing courts”].)

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                                      DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to prepare a corrected
abstract of judgment reflecting the imposition of the five-year prior serious felony
conviction enhancement pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a)(1) and forward a copy
of the corrected abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.

                                                     /s/
                                                 EARL, P. J.

We concur:

    /s/
KRAUSE, J.

    /s/
WISEMAN, J.*

*      Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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