Court Opinion

ID: 9735097
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:01:14.882645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:55.238326
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Van deR Voort, J.:
I respectfully dissent.
In my view, the Commomvealth satisfied its burden of proof and the appellant should not be permitted to file post-trial motions nunc pro tunc. The record shows that appellant was well represented at trial by capable private counsel. The same attorney represented Fry-berger at the post-trial motion stage of this case.
At the PCHA hearing both Fryberger and his trial counsel testified concerning the decision not to file post-trial motions. The appellant (who, incidentally, was a Chief of Police, and presumably well versed in the ways of criminal justice) testified to the following:
(1) He knew he had seven days to file post-trial motions for arrest of judgment or a new trial.
(2) He knew of his need to file an appeal within seven days to test possible mistakes in the trial judge’s rulings or to test the proprieties of the District Attorney’s actions in order to get a new trial.
(8) He did not want to file post-trial motions because he figured he ivould receive a suspended sentence and then try to show perjury by Avitnesses who testified against him (apparently in a collateral post-conviction appeal). Trial counsel testified he discussed the decision not to file post-trial motions with the appellant *133twice within the seven day period following the verdict. He testified further that Fryberger agreed with his conclusion that there were no trial errors which could arguably support successful post-trial motions.
On the basis of the testimony recited above, I find it inconceivable that the Majority would conclude that Fryberger ivas “unaAvare of the consequences of the decision not to file post-trial motions.” If Fryberger hneio he had only seven clays to exercise his right to test the possible errors and improprieties existent in his trial, it defies logic to presume that he did not understand the consequences of his failure to raise such matters Avithin the seven days. Obviously, the fact of knowledge of the seven day limitation by Fryberger compels the conclusion that he kneAV if he delayed beyond seven days, his right to raise such matters Avould be lost. Moreover, the record explicitly shoAvs that this former police official discussed possible trial errors with his privately retained counsel and decided that tactically, it Avould be wiser to attack his conviction in a collateral proceeding.1 I believe it is error to award an appellant “two bites of the apple” Avhen his first tactic fails — I think the principle of waiver still has vitality in our criminal laAV.
While I have already expressed my dissent to the holding of the majority under the facts of the instant case, I feel compelled to note one further matter Avhich has been troublesome to me in this case and several similar appeals. I am concerned with the increasing tendency in our appellate courts to require wha,t might be termed “spoonfeeding” of criminal defendants. The trend in many appellate decisions seems destined to compel a holding some day that every criminal defendant be afforded a full course in criminal law and proce*134dure and one in constitutional law before a conviction may be finalized. The instant case is an example of a situation wherein the holding seems to require that a layman who is a defendant be afforded a similar understanding of all of the intricacies of criminal law to the same extent as that of his privately retained attorney before we will give weight to a conscious decision not to file an appeal. Not only do I think such a situation is wrong, but I believe it belittles the position and integrity of competent defense counsel.
Watkins, P. J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

 When his hopes for a suspended sentence did not materialize, Fryberger appealed the propriety of sentence to our Court.