Court Opinion

ID: 9700209
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:16:18.112134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:05.288458
License: Public Domain

MANDERINO, Justice,
dissenting.
Unfortunately, the majority has failed to grasp the significance and meaning of appellant’s position in this appeal. As a result, the majority addresses itself to issues that áre not even raised by appellants, denies relief as to claims that appellants do not make, applies the wrong constitutional analysis, and reaches the wrong result. I therefore dissent.
Initially, the majority accurately identifies the problem presented by appellants:
“. . . appellants’ basic constitutional claim is that, viewed as a whole, the Pennsylvania system of school financing fails to provide Philadelphia’s public school children with a thorough and efficient education and denies them equal educational opportunity solely because of their residence in the School District of Philadelphia'.” (Emphasis added.)
At p. 363.
Clearly, appellants’ attack is upon the statutory scheme of school financing, and not upon the actions taken by appellees pursuant to that scheme. The majority’s assertion that “[ajppellees . . . have not breached any duty owed to any of the appellants” (p. 365) is therefore irrelevant.
*430Furthermore, the majority’s conclusions that “[t]he School District has no greater duty to provide education for the children of Philadelphia than the Legislature has delegated to it” and that “[i]t would be unreasonable to conclude that a greater duty has been delegated than that which the Legislature, through the statutory funding scheme, has provided the school district the means to fulfill” (p. 365), are flatly contradicted by the pleadings, the allegations of which must be accepted as true for the purposes of this appeal. This is precisely what appellants contend — that the Philadelphia School District is required by both the statutes and constitution of this Commonwealth to provide more than can be provided by the Philadelphia School District pursuant to the present statutory scheme.
This appeal comes before us on the pleadings, hence we accept as true every well-pleaded material fact set forth in appellants’ complaint, as well as all reasonable inferences deducible from those facts. Gekas v. Shapp, 469 Pa. 1, 5, 364 A.2d 691, 693 (1976); Buchanan v. Brentwood Federal Savings and Loan Assn., 457 Pa. 135, 320 A.2d 117 (1974).
Pennsylvania, like many other states, has enacted a statutory system of public school financing whereby the two primary sources of funds for public schools are local taxation and state subsidy. The state subsidy payable to each school district is computed by means of a complex formula in which student enrollment, district spending per student, and the district’s relative wealth are taken into account. Like every other school district in the state, Philadelphia receives state funds which pay part of the cost of the public school program. Appellants do not challenge the state subsidy portion of the financing system, nor do they claim that the subsidy formula is insufficient to compensate for imbalances in local tax bases, or that Philadelphia is discriminated against in any way in the implementation of the subsidy program. Indeed, nowhere do appellants allege that the subsidy portion of the system provides less money for education in Philadelphia, either in total or per child, than any other district in the Commonwealth. Rather, appellants’ *431attack on the Pennsylvania system of financing public school education centers on the distinction which the state’s system makes between the Philadelphia School District and other school districts in the state in the manner in which it raises funds by local taxation.
Under Pennsylvania’s education financing system, the Philadelphia School District is unique in that it alone among all the school districts in the Commonwealth is denied independent power to levy and collect the local taxes necessary to insure that its children receive a thorough education. Only the Philadelphia School District needs to have specific enabling ordinances passed by the municipal governing body, Philadelphia City Council, before it can levy and collect the local taxes its School District considers necessary to provide a minimum level of education. Unlike other school districts in the state, if the total amount of the state subsidy, plus the local taxation, is not sufficient to provide a full educational program, the Philadelphia School District is without a statutory mechanism for raising the additional needed funds, on its own. It needs the approval of another body. No other school district in the state is thus handicapped.
Thus appellants’ amended complaint sought to present two narrowly-stated causes of action: first, it alleged that the statutory classification which distinguishes between the Philadelphia School District and all other state school districts by preventing the Philadelphia School District from levying taxes it considers necessary to finance public education in Philadelphia violates the equal protection clause, Article III, Section 32, of the Pennsylvania Constitution; and second, that the Philadelphia School District’s unique inability to levy taxes deprives Philadelphia School District of the same opportunity to determine locally what funds are necessary to provide a “thorough and efficient” education for Philadelphia school children as is enjoyed by other school districts throughout the state, in violation of Article III, Section 14.
Appellants’ complaint does not ask this court to define “the specific components of a ‘thorough and efficient education’ ” as contended by the majority (p. 366), nor does it ask *432that this Court impose any rigid rules as to how much money each school district must receive, nor do appellants argue that this Court should order that education throughout the Commonwealth must be “inferior” (p. 366-367). Simply stated, appellants’ complaint charges appellees with administering a public school finance system which discriminates against Philadelphia school children because the statutory scheme deprives the Philadelphia School District on its own — and no other school district in the state — of the ability to levy taxes in an amount considered necessary by the School District to provide a thorough and efficient system of education to those children served by it.
School districts, like municipal corporations, have no inherent power to tax. Such power can be delegated by the General Assembly, however, and section 507 of the Public School Code, 24 P.S. § 5-507 (1962), vests in each board of school directors “all the necessary authority and power annually to levy and collect, in the manner herein provided, the necessary taxes required in addition to the annual State appropriation.” It has been the law of this jurisdiction for over 40 years, however, that a general delegation of taxing power to a nonelective body is impermissible. Wilson v. School District of Philadelphia, 328 Pa. 225, 229, 195 A. 90, 94 (1937). The School District of Philadelphia is Pennsylvania’s only school district of the first class, and unlike all other school boards in the state Philadelphia School District’s School Board is appointed. Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, art. III, § 302, as amended 24 P.C.S.A. § 3-302(a) (1978-79 Supp.). The Philadelphia School District is therefore in a different position in regard to the delegation of taxing power than any other school district in the Commonwealth.
The Philadelphia School District’s taxing ability emanates from section 17 of the First Class City Home Rule Act (53 P.S. § 13131) (which empowers the elected municipal government of first class cities to “exercise . . . any and all powers relating to its municipal functions ... to the-full extent that the General Assembly may legislate in reference thereto . . .,” and section 1 of the Act of August 9, 1963, P.L. 640 (as amended, 53 P.S. § 16101). *433Pursuant to this authority, the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, § 12.12-200 et seq., empowers the appointed school board to impose certain taxes, subject to the approval of the elected City Council, on “any persons, transactions, occupations, privileges, subjects, and real and personal property” which are taxable by the city, 53 P.S. § 16101; as well as a net corporate income tax, 53 P.S. § 16111, et seq.; and a tax on liquor sales, 53 P.S. § 16131 et seq. Thus the Philadelphia School District’s ability to collect local funds through taxation is limited by the ability of its appointed school board to convince the elected representatives of the taxpayers that additional expenditures are required.
We do not know from the pleadings in this case why Philadelphia City Council will not, or cannot, levy the taxes needed to generate sufficient funds to satisfy appellants’ alleged needs. The pleadings allege that Philadelphia City Council has not provided the funds considered necessary by the School District, and that the School District has exhausted its power to levy additional taxes of any kind.
Based on these alleged facts, appellants assert that Pennsylvania’s statutorily prescribed system of school financing— containing, as it does, both state subsidy and local taxation elements — fails to comply with the mandate of Article III, § 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and that that system of financing public education denied Philadelphia children equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and under Article III, Section 32 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania.
The content of the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution, and of Article III, Section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, have been said to be the same, and the tasks of the court, when asked to rule on the constitutionality of a statute challenged under either clause are identical. Baltimore and O. R. Co. v. Department of Labor and Industry, 461 Pa. 68, 334 A.2d 636 (1975). Normally, legislative enactments are presumed valid, and will be declared unconstitutional by the courts only, upon a showing that they clearly violate constitutional prohibitions. School Districts of Deer Lakes and Allegheny Valley v. Kane, 463 Pa. 554, *434345 A.2d 658 (1975); Lattanzio v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 461 Pa. 392, 336 A.2d 595 (1975); Tosto v. Pennsylvania Nursing Home Loan Agency, 460 Pa. 1, 331 A.2d 198 (1975). Furthermore, as a general rule, state regulation of economic activity need measure up only to the “rational relation” test: that is, if the legislatively created distinction bears a rational relationship to the advancement of a legitimate state interest, the statute creating that distinction may not be held invalid on equal protection grounds. Id. The question is also sometimes stated as whether the challenged legislation bears a fair and substantial relationship to the objective. In re Estate of Cavill, 459 Pa. 411, 329 A.2d 503 (1974). Moyer v. Philips, 462 Pa. 395, 341 A.2d 441 (1973). Where the state statutory scheme affects fundamental constitutional rights or involves suspect classifications, however, both federal and state courts have recognized that proper equal protection analysis requires more search scrutiny. See, e. g., San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973); Baltimore and O. R. Co., supra, 461 Pa. at 83, 334 A.2d at 643. Therefore if the complained of state action would discriminate by employing suspect classification, the state must demonstrate that such discrimination is necessary to advance a compelling state interest. San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra; Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967); McLaughlan v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 85 S.Ct. 283, 13 L.Ed.2d 222 (1964). Likewise, if the challenged legislative judgment interferes with rights made fundamental by the constitution, the reviewing court will closely scrutinize the enactment to ascertain whether the state has carried its heavy burden justifying the statutory scheme by demonstrating that the enactment has been “structured with ‘precision’, and . . . ‘tailored’ narrowly to serve legitimate objectives and that [the state] has selected the ‘less drastic means’ for effectuating its [compelling] objectives.” San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra, 411 U.S. at 17, 93 S.Ct. at 1288, 36 L.Ed.2d at 33. As stated by the court in San *435Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, the framework for the court’s analysis is as follows:
“[The Court] must decide, first, whether the Texas system of financing public education operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny. If so, the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. If not, the Texas scheme must still be examined to determine whether it rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Id.
In upholding the educational financing system used by the state of Texas, the United States Supreme Court, in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra, said,
“. . . the key to discovering whether education is ‘fundamental’ is not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether education is as important as the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942).
Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.” (Footnotes omitted.)
411 U.S. at 33-34, 93 S.Ct. at 1297, 36 L.Ed.2d at 43-44.
Implicit in this conclusion is its converse — that had the right to a public education been afforded explicit or implicit *436protection by the federal constitution, it would have been a “fundamental” right, and any legislation interfering with that right would be required to withstand strict judicial scrutiny.
“[Sjtrict scrutiny means that the State’s system is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity, that the State rather than the complainants must carry a ‘heavy burden of justification,’ that the State must demonstrate that its educational system has been structured with ‘precision,’ and is ‘tailored’ narrowly to serve legitimate objectives and that it has selected the ‘less drastic means’ for effectuating its objectives, . . . ” (Footnote omitted.)
Id. at 16-17, 93 S.Ct. at 1288, 36 L.Ed.2d at 33.
The Pennsylvania system of financing public education impinges upon Philadelphia’s children’s constitutionally mandated right to a “thorough” public education, a right explicitly recognized and protected by Article III, Section 14 of the constitution of this Commonwealth. Because appellants’ petition alleges that the statutory financing scheme interferes with that constitutional right, it must be closely scrutinized to ascertain whether the alleged discrimination may be justified by “a showing of a compelling state interest, incapable of achievement in some less restrictive fashion . . .” Commonwealth v. Bethea, 474 Pa. 571, 379 A.2d 102, 104—5 (1977). The majority therefore errs when it concludes that because the public education financing scheme passes constitutional muster simply because it is “reasonably related” to the maintenance and support of the state’s public education system, (p. 367).
As has already been pointed out, Article III, Section 14 of Pennsylvania’s Constitution gives explicit protection to the right to a public education. That provision states,
“The General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of public education to serve the needs of the Commonwealth.”
As has also been noted earlier in this opinion, the analysis to be applied to an alleged violation of the equal protection *437of the laws guaranteed by Article III, Section 32 of our constitution is identical to that employed in federal equal protection questions. While not compelling on the state constitutional issue, we find the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra, dispositive of the instant case. Because the right to a public education is constitutionally recognized in Pennsylvania, any state action interfering with that right must be closely examined before it can be said to pass constitutional muster. Such state action will not be entitled to the usual presumption of validity, but rather, the Commonwealth must establish that its interference with that right is compelled by some legitimate state interest, and that the interference is the least drastic means of accomplishing that objective. Appellants in this case allege that the Pennsylvania School financing system interferes with the right of the children of Philadelphia to a public education equal to that of other children in the state. At this procedural state of the litigation, that allegation must be accepted as true. It is therefore incumbent upon the Commonwealth to meet its burden. By sustaining appellees’ demurrer, the trial court failed in its duties to put the Commonwealth to that test. Whether discrimination alleged by appellants is such that it violates appellants’ constitutional rights is a question that cannot be answered at this stage of the proceedings. If, after a hearing, appellants can establish that the Philadelphia School District is the only district where those directly charged with administration of the educational program are not those given the authority to raise the necessary funds, and if it can be. established that that distinction prejudices Philadelphia school children’s education in violation of the constitution, some relief may be appropriate. It would be premature at this time to consider what that relief might be.
The order of the Commonwealth Court, affirming the trial court’s dismissal of appellants’ complaint, should be vacated, and the matter should be remanded for further proceedings.
NIX, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.