Court Opinion

ID: 9605964
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:44:25.891922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:31.296176
License: Public Domain

Carlisle, Judge.
Error is assigned on the final judgment because the same was “contrary to law.” Code (Ann.) § 6-901 *398provides that the bill of exceptions shall specify plainly the decision complained of and the alleged error, and Code § 6-1607 directs that the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals shall not decide any question unless it is made by a specific assignment of error in the bill of exceptions. In construing and applying these Code sections, this court and the Supreme Court have consistently held that no question will be considered by the appellate courts of this State unless the bill of exceptions and the record clearly show that that question was presented to and passed on by the trial court. Hart v. Phenix Insurance Co., 113 Ga. 859, 862 (39 S. E. 304); Pritchett v. Payne, 194 Ga. 84, 86 (1) (20 S. E. 2d 765); Rushing v. Akins, 210 Ga. 450 (1) (80 S. E. 2d 813); Paradies v. Warren Co., 53 Ga. App. 457 (2) (186 S. E. 438); Carpenter v. Lyons, 78 Ga. App. 214 (1) (50 S. E. 2d 850); Nix v. State, 94 Ga. App. 141 (2) (93 S. E. 2d 783). For the rule to be otherwise would be unfair both to the trial judge and to- opposing counsel. As was said in Patterson v. Beck, 133 Ga. 701, 704 (66 S. E. 911), “The decision complained of and the error alleged to exist therein ought to appear plainly. This is fair to the judge whose judgment it is sought to reverse, so that he can make such facts appear, or require such evidence and record to be brought to this court as may be necessary for a proper consideration of the errors complained of. (Civil Code, § 5528). To allow a mere general assignment which, without more, would not direct the attention of the judge to the real question, and then to hunt for something covered up in such generalities as a ground for reversal, would be very much like allowing him to be ambushed. It is fair to the adverse counsel or party, in order that he may know what he must meet in this court. It is fair to this court, in order that there may be clear-cut questions for them to decide, and not an indefinite complaint for them to wander through in the search for questions to determine and errors to reverse. This is not a court of appeals, but a court for the correction of errors; and in order for it to deal with alleged errors intelligently, the questions to be decided should be made to appear.” This rule of law is nonetheless applicable, whether the case be one involving-issues of law and fact, or one involving merely questions of law decided on an agreed statement of facts. Kimball v. Williams, 108 Ga. 812 (33 S. E. 994).
*399Applying these principles to the assignment of error in this case, what question does the mere general exception that the judgment holding the respondent in contempt was contrary to law present for decision? Does the plaintiff in error mean to contend anything more than that the facts specified in the order of the judge are insufficient to constitute a contempt? Does he mean to specify that the order is void for want of some formality in its entry, to wit, the failure to issue a rule nisi or to serve the respondent with notice or afford the respondent an opportunity to be heard; or does he intend to contend that for any of these reasons the court has violated his constitutional rights, or that he has not been afforded due process of law under constitutional guarantees. Peruse the bill of exceptions and the record in this case as we might, it is impossible for this court to ascertain therefrom that any of these contentions were made before the trial judge. Whether it is intended that any such contentions are now made can be ascertained only by reference to the brief of counsel for the plaintiff in error.
Clearly then, the assignment of error in this case is wholly insufficient to raise-any question as to whether the respondent’s constitutional rights have been violated by the proceeding in the trial court or as to whether there was sufficient service or notice or whether he was afforded an opportunity to be heard and to present witnesses in his own behalf. Patterson v. Beck, 133 Ga. 701, 707, supra. Something more than a mere general assignment of error is required to raise any question for consideration by the appellate court as to whether a party’s constitutional rights have been violated by a court proceeding. Hulsey v. Cedartown Textiles, Inc., 208 Ga. 666 (68 S. E. 2d 709); Young v. Cedartown Textiles, Inc., 208 Ga. 667 (68 S. E. 2d 711). These rulings are consistent with the requirement that in order to raise any question as to the constitutionality of an act, it is not only necessary that the particular constitutional provision claimed to have been contravened thereby be pointed out, but that the specific way in which it is violated by the act must be clearly shown. See Harrell v. Cane Grower’s Co-operative Association, 160 Ga. 30 (3) (126 S. E. 531); Hooten v. Holcomb, 177 Ga. 561 (2) (170 S. E. 803); Loque v. Hancock County, 8 Ga. App. 208 (2) (68 S. E. 866). It follows, therefore, that the assignment of error on *400the final judgment in this case is entirely too vague and general to present any question for decision by this court thereon save as to the sufficiency of the facts specified in the order to constitute contempt. See generally in this connection, Cates v. Duncan, 180 Ca. 289 (1) (179 S. E. 121); Vick v. Farmers & Merchants Bank of Coolidge, 209 Ca. 77 (70 S. E. 2d 764).
Even if it be conceded that the assignment of error is sufficient to present a question as to the violation of the respondent's constitutional rights and as to the denial to him of due process of law, and assuming, but not deciding, that this is such a case as would entitle the contemnor as a matter of right to a hearing before the court (see White v. George, 195 Ga. 465 (2), 23 S. E. 2d 787), the record in this case wholly fails to show that any such question was presented to the trial judge so as to afford him an opportunity to pass on it. A constitutional right may be waived. Code § 102-106. Humphries v. McWhorter, 25 Ga. 37, 39; Bradford v. Mills, 208 Ga. 198 (1) (66 S. E. 2d 58). Accordingly Avhere, as shown by the record in this case, the defendant filed two pleas in bar, the substance of which is set out in the statement of facts, and made no other contention with regard to the legality of the proceeding, he. will be held to have waived any constitutional right to1 a hearing or trial before a jury or guaranteeing any other formality of procedure established for his benefit. See Lamar v. Prosser, 121 Ga. 153 (48 S. E. 977); Hightower v. Hollis, 121 Ga. 159 (2) (48 S. E. 969); Latson v. Wells, 136 Ga. 681 (2b) (71 S. E. 1052). The record in this case fails to show that any question as to the constitutionality of the proceeding or as to the denial of due process of law with regard to the contemnor was raised before the trial judge, and such questions cannot now be raised for the first time before this court, either in the bill of exceptions or in the motion for a rehearing.
. With respect to the other assignment of error in the bill of exceptions complaining of the judgment overruling the two pleas in bar, while that judgment was not a final judgment, it would have been a final judgment had it been rendered as contended by the plaintiff in error, and, therefore, it was subject to a direct exception without regard to the entry of the final judgment adjudicating him to be in contempt. Code (Ann.) § 6-701.. Further*401more, the mere general assignment of error to the overruling of those pleas that such judgment was contrary to law was a sufficient assignment of error to present the question as to the sufficiency of those pleas to this court. Meeks v. Meeks, 5 Ga. App. 394 (2) (63 S. E. 270). This exception was made within 30 days from the date of the judgment overruling those pleas, and, accordingly, this assignment of error is sufficient to prevent dismissal of the writ of error though the assignment of error on the final judgment in the case was not sufficient.
As to the first plea in bar, it is sufficient to say that the judgment of this court on the former appearance of the case here did not adjudicate in any sense as to whether the respondent was guilty of contempt of court as charged by the trial judge in the order of January 23, 1959. As a matter of fact, this court expressly declined to' pass upon that question, holding merely that the order itself was void for want of proper formality in its entry, to wit: the recitation of essential facts to enable this court to pass upon the question of contempt or no contempt. This was not an adjudication of the merits of the case so as to be res judicata as to the merits of the case now before the court. Code § 110-503. Sparks & Hutson v. Fort, 29 Ga. App. 531, 536 (116 S. E. 227).
As to the second contention, that is, that the resentencing of the respondent violated the Constitutional provision prohibiting twice putting his liberty in jeopardy, this is completely and irrefutably answered 'by the ruling and decision of the Supreme Court in the recent case of City of Macon v. Massey, 214 Ga. 589, 590; (1) (106 S. E. 2d 23). In that case the Supreme Court expressly held that the Constitutional provision relied upon by the respondent here does not apply to contempt cases. Under the ruling there, the Constitutional provision here relied on is applicable, only to a crime, but a contempt, whether it be civil or criminal, is not a crime within the purview of Art. I, Sec. I, Par. VIII of the Constitution (Code § 2-108). Accordingly, the second plea in bar is without merit and the judge of the superior court did not err in overruling it.
“Questions of contempt are for the court treated with the contempt; and its decision ought to be final, except, perhaps, in the case in which the decision shows an enormous abuse of the discretion.” Cabot v. Yarborough, 27 Ga. 476. The discretion *402of the judge finding a party in contempt or in refusing to find a party in contempt has been compared to the discretion lodged in the judges of the superior court in granting or refusing injunctions. Howard v. Durand, 36 Ga. 346, 358 (91 Am. Dec. 767). The purpose in punishment for criminal contempt is to preserve the power and vindicate the dignity of the court and to punish for disobedience of the court’s orders. Davis v. Davis, 138 Ga. 8 (1b) (74 S. E. 830); Carson v. Ennis, 146 Ga. 726, 728 (1) (92 S. E. 221, L. R. A. 1917E 650). The contempt in this case is clearly criminal contempt.
“No attorney shall ever attempt to argue or explain a case, after having been fully heard, and the opinion of the court has been pronounced, on pain of being considered in contempt.” Rule 23 of the Rules of the Superior Courts (Code § 24-3323). Under this rule of court and the foregoing rules of law and under the record in this case, the adjudications of the judge of the superior court in holding the respondent to have been guilty of contempt must be affirmed. As already stated, the judge in effect entered two orders, or adjudications, of contempt, the first containing nine specifications of incidents and the latter specifying three additional incidents under which the judge found the respondent to have been in contempt. If, under the foregoing rules of law, any one of the nine specifications set forth in the first adjudication can be said by this court to authorize the conclusion that the respondent was in contempt, and if any one of the three occurrences set forth in the specifications under the second adjudication can likewise be said to authorize the conclusion that the respondent was guilty of contempt, the judgment must be affirmed. However, for -the benefit of the Bench and Bar, this court has deemed it advisable to quote the material portions of the judge’s order setting forth all twelve specifications as they appear in the record in this case in toto:
“This part 2 of this order and certificate of contempt contains the nine specifications of contempt, numbered 1 through 9, described and cited herein by the court as follows:
“Specification 1. While attorney Garland was cross-examining the witness Mrs. Janice Rothschild and after the court had made rulings and given instructions concerning the matter in question, attorney Garland did continue to argue with and di*403rect remarks to the court about the matter ruled upon as appears in the following report of this occurrence:
“The Court: You need not answer that.
“Mr. Garland: If your Honor lets it in, I want to cross-examine her.
“The Court: If you have anything further, you let me hear it now.
“Mr. Garland: I would have to object to it again.
“The Court: No use repeating anything you have already objected-to. Go ahead.
“Mr. Garland: I will have to make it before the jury.
“The Court: No, you go ahead and make it now, sir, if you wish to make it.
“Mr. Garland: Your Honor, I prefer to make it in front of the jury, because the jury gets the significance of my objection.
“The Court: It appears to the Court, Mr. Garland, that you often prefer to do matters before the jury, but that is in the Court’s discretion, and I will let you object. . .
“Mr. Garland: Your Honor requires me to do it now and refuses to let me object before the jury, is that it? I just ask your Honor to let me make it before the jury.
“The Court: The Court said make it now, sir.
“Specification 2. While further cross-examining Mrs. Janice Rothschild concerning matter to which his previous objection had been overruled by the Court, Attorney Garland, upon an objection being made by the trial solicitor, did interrupt the proceedings with an improper and unnecessary statement that . . I am going to try to make it as obnoxious as I can' and following which attorney Garland in an insolent manner made a series of prejudicial, improper and unnecessary arguments and remarks to- the Court all as appears in the following record of this occurrence:
“Q. (By Mr. Garland) You couldn’t do it if the Court let you, could you?
“A. I could do it, but I would consider it highly undignified and would prefer not to.
“Q. Are you more concerned with your dignity than you are in telling the truth?
“A. No, sir, but I am concerned with dignity of the Court.
“Q. You are?
*404“Mr. Luck: I am going to object to Mr. Garland throwing in these little statements. He is supposed to ask questions and—
“Mr. Garland: I objected to this evidence and I think that I am going to try to make it as obnoxious as I can.
“The 00104: Mr. Sheriff, carry the jury to the jury room.
“ (Whereupon the jury left the court room.)
“The Court: Mr. Garland, stand up while the Court is addressing you. That remark was highly improper, sir. You have your objection in the record to this evidence and if it happens the Court rules against you is no reason in the world for you to make such a statement that you are going to be as obnoxious as you can. . .
“Mr. Garland: I didn’t say I was going, I said I was going to make the testimony as obnoxious. I didn’t intend it that way. You read the record back, Judge. I am tired and I say again to your Honor, I am so tired I can’t stand up and this is the most important cross-examination occurring in this case. I have been here since 9:30 and the imposition this trial has brought on me—I asked your Honor for an adjournment, asked your Honor to again adjourn this Court. I don’t want to cross-examine this woman because I don’t believe a word she says. I think her testimony is false and I am going to do what I can to break her down.
“The Court: If you don’t want to cross-examine, her, then you can stop.
“Mr. Garland: Well, if I did, you will not let me recall her and I am in an awful fix and I appeal in the sense of justice—give me time where I can cross this woman.
“The Court: Mr. Reporter, read the remarks Mr. Garland made before the jury left.
“ (The record was read by the Reporter.)
“The Court: Mr. Garland—
“Mr. Garland: I know I am defending an innocent man and I ask Your Honor for an adjournment until 9:30 in the morning and I am sure Your Honor realizes I wouldn’t make this request of Your Honor—the papers can write what they want to about my disrespect for the Court, your Honor knows it is not so. I asked for an adjournment because I need an adjournment and I want this witness to sleep over her testimony, a witness that would *405forget the word ‘lit/ a witness that would try to test a voice and swear what she did, when the Lord above knows she was told that was Chester Griffin, and she swore it was Chester Griffin’s voice.
“The Court: Mr. Solicitor, do you have any other testimony after this witness?
“Mr. Luck: I have several other witnesses.
“Mr. Garland: I want Your Honor to'adjourn until morning. Your Honor can observe my appearance. Mr. Carlos Hopkins has seen me in this court for 37 years and I stayed here two days and tried a case when I had two hours sleep and almost collapsed, and there is something to human endurance. I feel the responsibility to tear this woman’s testimony apart because I don’t believe her and I am in this condition, I ask for an adjournment. I set for an hour waiting for Mr. Luck and he is a young man, but I will try to stay with him. But I am tired and I appeal to Your Honor—
“The Court: Can’t you complete the examination tonight?
“Mr. Garland: No, I just cannot. I have given my life to my profession and nobody has been more sincere than me, I don’t care who he is, and I don’t believe anybody ever lived that tried any more cases than me, and I want to give my client the best I have got, because I believe in him and not to put me through this—•
“The Court: Mr. Garland, you have not been through any more than the rest of us.
“Mr. Garland: I have been through more than any man because the responsibility of mine is greater and almost as great as Your Honor, but you can sit in peace up there when here I recognize and understand is a woman who smiles and snickers now, and swearing anything—
“The Court: That statement is highly improper, Mr. Garland.
“Mr. Garland: Well, the jury is not here.
“The Court: Well, it doesn’t make any difference. You speak of your love for your profession and no man should make such a statement as that.
“Mr. Garland: How could I believe, without a scintilla of evidence that Chester Griffin—■
“The Court: Mr. Garland, do you—
“Mr. Garland: —and that testimony goes to a jury, and I know *406that Your Honor is just as sincere in your ruling as anything in the world, because I know you are devoted to your duty, I know that.
“The Court: Mr. Garland, do you state to1 the Court you cannot finish this cross-examination?
“Mr. Garland: I couldn’t to save my life.
“The Court: Bring in the jury.
“ (The jury returned to the court room and the trial was recessed for the day.)
“Specification 3. While cross-examining the witness L. E. Rogers and after inquiry as to the number of children the witness had, attorney Garland then began an inquiry as to the relevancy of this evidence, attorney Garland did make in the presence of the jury in an insolent and sarcastic manner a seines of highly prejudicial and inflammatory remarks and statements all as appears in the following record of this occurrence:
“Q. (By Mr. Garland) And how old are your children?
“The Court: What is the relevancy of the number of children or ages or anything about the man’s children?
“Mr. Garland: It is this, that this man is afflicted with insanity and suffers from hallucinations and imagination, the father of three idiot children, which I expect to prove by him, and it is an affirmative statement of men of medicine everywhere that no man can have three idiots in succession and be normal—
“Mr. Luck: Just a moment—
“The Court: Mr. Garland—
“Mr. Garland: Your Honor asked me and I answered you.
“The Court: Gentlemen of the jury, these statements made by Mr. Garland are highly improper and the Court instructs you to entirely disregard them and to give them no consideration whatsoever. And, Mr. Garland, the Court will rule that line of testimony out of the case.
“Mr. Garland: All right, sir.
“The Court: That is, with respect to the man’s children. Go ahead.
“Mr. Garland: Let me get your ruling straight, does Your Honor mean I cannot ask him, he said he left his children in 1952. Now the witness has gone before the jury .and depicted himself as an associate of executives and the royalty and he has *407claimed all these positions with the intelligentia and I have proven in contradiction of his statements certain facts, which I will not allude to, but which the jury heard. Every bit of the testimony that Your Honor allowed to go in to this jury is now the subject of controversy and denial on the part of my innocent client whom I represent, George Bright. Now, I respectfully submit, sir, that I want to know what Your Honor’s ruling is, and what I can say? What questions have you ruled out, that they are idiots? Have you ruled that? Can I ask him if he left his wife?
“The Court: There has been no such showing as the statement that you made and the Court has ruled that you need not and cannot ask him any further questions about the children. Now proceed.
“Specification 4. While continuing the cross-examination of witness L. E. Rogers, and after the Court had ruled on the question, attorney Garland continued to argue with the Court and stated in said argument highly prejudicial matter as appears in the following record of this occurrence:
“ (By Mr. Garland) You testified, didn’t you, that you participated in no statements, acquiesced in none, that cast aspersions upon the Jew or the Negro, didn’t you?
“The Court: Just a minute, you have already been over that matter and the Court will rule that question out, the jury has heard what he has already testified to:
“Mr. Garland: We insist on an answer, under our right of cross-examination to that question and submit, sir, that we cannot delve into the guilt of this witness without some latitude.
“The Court: Mr. Garland, there has been no1 showing that this witness is guilty of anything and that statement is highly improper, sir, and I instruct you not to make statements of that sort during the trial of the case.
“Mr. Garland: If Your Honor please, the witness testified that he was trembling and haggard—
“The Court: Just a minute, the Court has. heard all of the witness’ testimony, the jury has heard all of the witness’ testimony, and the Court has ruled that last question out. If you want to examine him further, go ahead.
*408“Mr. Garland: Yes, I want to examine him, I will pass on to another subject.
“The Court: Go ahead.
“Specification 5. While the witness Jimmy DeVore was being cross-examined by attorney Garland, attorney Garland began arguing with the witness and when instructed by the Court about this matter, argued with the Court in an insulting and derogatory manner as appears in the following record of this occurrence:
“Q. (By Mr. Garland) What was your bond?
“A. When I went in jail?
"Q. You heard the question.
“A. I didn’t hear it.
“The Court: Mr. Garland, please don’t start that again, the Court will instruct the witness and you just examine him.
“Mr. Garland: His demeanor on the stand is a question for the jury and I asked that in order that the jury might observe him— and when Your Honor makes these statements and rules, then you destroy the right of the jury to determine the demeanor. The question was asked audibly and I waited and I want to ask him again. May I now?
“Specification 6. While further cross-examining the witness DeVore about his interest in a reward, attorney Garland was contemptuous of the Court and our entire judicial system and showed this contempt by waving about the court room in an arrogant and contemptuous manner a large roll of what appeared to be money, and by making contemptuous remarks and arguments such as to provoke loud outbursts of laughter from the audience in a crowded court room. This said conduct on the part of attorney Garland was improper and unnecessary, and occurred after the Court had ruled on the matter as appears in the following record of this occurrence:
“Q. (By Mr. Garland) You don’t know how much the reward money was, do you?
“A. No, sir.
“Q. You have made no inquiry of it?
“A. No, sir.
, “Q. You have got none of it?
“A. And I don’t want none of it.
*409“Q. And wouldn’t have any of it if it was offered you?
“A. Absolutely not.
“Q. Because you don’t need it?
“A. Well, I don’t want it.
“Q. If I were to- give you several hundred dollars and tell you that you had done a good job in these hours of labor that you worked for the benefit of society and the law, would you accept it?
“The Court: I rule that question out, Mr. Garland.
“Mr. Garland: Well, maybe your Honor saved me $200.
“The Court: Mr. Garland, that remark was highly improper, sir.
“Mr. Garland: Well, I have got him on cross-examination and I have a right to a thorough and sifting cross-examination, to ask him double-barreled questions, to propound to him things that he would do and I submit that if Your Honor had not interrupted me, he would have taken the money in the presence of this jury—
“The Court: Just a minute. Ladies and gentlemen in the court room, this is a public trial and you are welcome to be here, but you will have to maintain order or I will have to clear the court room. I am not going to' have that sort of conduct during this trial. The court room is now a show and Mr. Garland’s conduct is not supposed to1 be a show.
“Mr. Garland, that last remark was highly improper and I instruct you, sir, to cease making that sort of remark in court.
“Mr. Garland: May I proceed?
“The Court: If you have any further question, you may.
“Specification 7. While further cross-examining witness DeYore about his place of residence, attorney Garland after objections by the solicitor and in response to an inquiry from the Court, made a highly prejudicial and contemptuous remark to the Court as appears in the following record of this occurrence:
“A. I worked for the dirt mover, too, that was Seco Contractors.
“Q. Well, before you went to Miami, where did you live—■ Where did' you live in Miami while you were down there?
“The Court: Haven’t you gone into the witness’ past history?
“Mr. Garland: No, sir, I have not even started.
“The Court: Well, why is it material, sir?
*410“Mr. Garland: To show he is a roving drifter, show his inability to stay with his family and his wife, show he is going around living with other women, show he has no responsibility. It goes to his credibility and since he has been advised of it now by the Court’s inquiry, it ds going to be most difficult for me to set it up.
“The Court: Well, Mr. Garland, that is not a proper way to impeach a witness, and while you have a right to identify the witness, you don’t have a right to go into everything he ever did or said or where he ever lived—even if you contend it might concern his credibility.
“Mr. Garland: Didn’t Your Honor hear him say he lived in one house fifteen years? That is what he testified.
“The Court: I heard his testimony.
“Mr. Garland: I can show it is not so.
“The Court: The Court heard his testimony.
“Mr. Garland: That is what I was trying to do. I would like to be allowed the right of cross-examining him as to where he lived, where his wife was, when he was living with one of his girl friends—•
“The Court: The Court will rule all of that out. You can go ahead to something else.
“Specification 8. While further cross-examining Jimmy De-Vore about an exhibit, attorney Garland did make highly prejudicial and contemptuous remarks in the presence of the jury and did refuse to cease arguing when asked by the Court to do so as appears in the following record of this occurrence:
“Q. Now, look at this. It so* happens that there is a plan, now will you say that is the plan he drew—
“Mr. Luck: I would like to' have that identified.
“Q. (By Mr. Garland) I hand you Exhibit D-14, and this might put my client in the electric chair, you read that—■
“Mr. Luck: I object to that question and side remark.
“Mr. Garland: I have the right to- make—
“The Court: You don’t have the right to make such remarks as that, sir.
“ (By Mr. Garland) That is not a side remark, that is a question.
“The Court: The Court will rule that out.
*411“Mr. Garland: Then I won’t pursue that, but I ask him this. Q. I hand you a plan, because evidently I don’t know what I am doing and it may put my client in jail for life—
“The Court: That statement is highly improper, sir, and there is no reason for you to make—■
“Mr. Garland: It is cross-examination.
“The Court: Well, Mr. Garland, you have the right to cross-examine this witness about matters that are relevant, but not just to make any sort of statement because it is cross-examination.
“Mr. Garland: Well, now, may it please Your Honor, I have him on cross-examination and I am trying to get him to identify this paper.
“The Court: Just cease talking, sir—
“Mr. Garland: And Your Honor has ruled it out—
“The Court: Mr. Garland, just have a seat. The Court will rule out the last question and the statement that you made to the witness in connection with the statement. If you want to examine him further, you may do so.
“Mr. Garland: I want to examine him and I have the right to cross-examine him and I am going to try to cross-examine him within the purview of the statute.
“Specification 9. While further cross-examining the witness DeVore, attorney Garland did make further insolent remarks to the Court after being instructed by the Court not to stand too close to the witness as appears in the following record of this occurrence:
“Q. Did he ever draw a plan in the jail and flush it down the toilet?
“Mr. Luck: May I ask that the witness not be exposed to the face of Mr. Garland at such close contact?
“Mr. Garland: What is the matter with my face? My face is not contagious.
“The Court: Mr. Garland, continue your examination, sir, and don’t stand quite so close to the witness, sir.
“Mr. Garland: Well, I will get a piece of paper and my arms are just this long, and it is impossible for me to come up here and reach him with these little short arms.
“The Court: Hand him the paper and step back and ask him the question.
*412“This court certifies that each of the foregoing specifications of conduct of attorney Garland numbered one through nine and appearing in this Part 2 of this order occurred in the manner and circumstances cited therein, that each occurred during the trial of George Michael Bright referred to in Part 1 of this order, that each occurred in open court in the presence and hearing of this court, and that all of the said actions and conduct were heard or observed by this court, and that each and all of the said actions and conduct of attorney Garland were calculated to and did impede, impair and interfere with the lawful and orderly procedure of the trial then in progress, and this court did at the end of the Bright trial on January 23, 1959, consider and adjudge said Reuben A. Garland to be in contempt of court for the conduct cited in each of these nine specifications, and this court does now consider and adjudge attorney Reuben A. Garland to be in contempt of court for his conduct in each and all of said nine specifications appearing in this Part 2 of this order and certificate of contempt, and it is ordered and adjudged that the said Reuben A. Garland be confined in the jail of Fulton County for a period of twenty (20) days as punishment for the aforesaid contempt referred to in this Part 2 of this order and certificate of contempt.
“Part 3. Part 3 of this order and certificate of contempt contains the three specifications of contempt numbered 10, 11, and 12 described and cited herein by the court as follows:
“Specification 10. While cross-examining the witness R. E. Little as to whether Little had previously tried George Bright, attorney Garland argued with the witness and when the Court attempted to stop this argument, attorney Garland argued with the Court and then apologized to the Court in a contemptuous and sarcastic tone as appears in the following record of this occurrence :
“A. Tried who?
“Q. The defendant, George Bright, that is who I am talking about.
“A. Yes, sir, he was tried in Recorder’s Court.
“Q. Well, you know what I am talking about—
“The Court: That statement is improper—
“Mr. Garland: Don’t Your Honor think he knew who I was talking about?
*413“The Court: That statement was improper.
“Mr. Garland: Well, I am so sorry, Your Honor, if Your Honor thinks so-, I am so sorry.
“The Court: Go ahead, sir.
“The Court certifies that the above apology was spoken by attorney Garland in a low, slow voice and with a sarcastic and derisive tone that evidenced in the strongest manner contempt for the Court.
“A few minutes later, while further cross-examining the witness Little,' after the Court had ruled on a matter, attorney Garland remarked to the Court, ‘Oh, have you?’ in the same voice and sarcastic tone as evidenced in the contemptuous apology above referred to. This appears in the following record of this occurrence:
“Mr. Garland: May I ask him if he hasn’t studied law?
“The Court: That is not relevant or material. I just ruled on it, sir. Go ahead.
“Mr. Garland: Oh, have you?
“Specification 11. While further cross-examining the witness R. E. Little, attorney Garland did begin a colloquy with the witness Little and when instructed by the Court to proceed to relevant matter, attorney Garland did make an insolent and sarcastic remark to the Court. Upon the Court instructing attorney Garland to stand before the bar of the Court, attorney Garland stood before the bar, at which time the Court began addressing him. While being addressed by the Court, attorney Garland turned away and started to leave the bar, and upon being instructed by the Court to remain standing before the bar, said Garland did interrupt the Court in a loud, insolent and abusive voice and tone, and did refuse again and again to- cease arguing or talking with the Court in violation of the Court’s request to do so, and the said Garland did proceed to' complete his contemptuous arguments and remarks in direct violation of the Court’s repeated request to cease talking, all as appears in the following record of this occurrence:
“The Court: That colloquy has no part in the trial. Go ahead and examine him about relevant matter.
“Mr. Garland: His attitude on the stand, his hesitancy, his refusal to answer when I am examining him—
*414“The Court: Don’t make that statement or argument to the Court. You gO' ahead with the questions, sir.
“Mr. Garland: Yes, I am, just as rapidly as my feeble brain will permit.
“The Court: Mr. Sheriff, carry the jury to> the juiy room.
“ (Whereupon the jury left the court room.)
“The Court: Mr. Garland, you stand before the bar, again, please.
"Mr. Garland: Yes, sir.
“The Court: This is the third time, sir, that this Court has had to instruct you with reference to following the Court’s, instructions. Now, when the Court gives you instructions in this case, the Court expects you to- follow them. The Court does not expect you to make contemptuous replies and answers or explanations as to what you are going to do. The Court just wants you to move along in the trial in an orderly manner, and the Court will take up these matters with you at the conclusion of this trial, and you are going to be held responsible for your conduct during the trial of this case. Now, it is not necessary for you—■ Mr. Garland, you continue to stand there.
“Mr. Garland: I am standing there, Your Honor, and I am doing all I can, I merely said I would proceed as rapidly as my feeble brain would permit. I just answered Your Honor’s question, that is all on earth I did. The witness—
“The Court: Mr. Garland, will you cease talking sir?
“Mr. Garland: If Your Honor wants to hold me in contempt, hold me in contempt, I can’t help it, but I can’t try this case when the witness don’t answer and when Your Honor corrects me about it all the time. I have got him on cross-examination and I said—
“The Court: Mr. Garland, will you cease talking?
“Mr. Garland: And I want Your Honor to' know I am not in contempt of court, and Your Honor should not so adjudge me, but I am not going to try this case under fear of it. I have done what I thought was right for my client, and I want Your Honor to understand it before you make up your mind you are going to adjudge me in contempt of court.
“The Court: Mr. Garland, the Court will consider that mat*415ter at the conclusion of this trial. The Court has asked you on numerous occasions to cease your argument with the Court, and not make explanations as to what you intend to- do-, but to move along with the trial and do what you think is proper and don’t state to the Court what you are going to do and don’t make pretended disrespectful apologies to the Court.
“Mr. Garland: I have not apologized.
“The Court: We will take a ten minute recess.
“Specification 12. At a later time while attorney Garland [was] still cross-examining the witness Little, the Court, after objection from the trial solicitor, instructed attorney Garland not to stand in front of the solicitor. At this time attorney Garland did make contemptuous remarks to the Court in a sarcastic and mocking manner as appears in the following record of this occurrence:
“Mr. Luck: May I ask Mr. Garland not to stand in front of me when he is questioning the witness, so I might also participate in the trial?
“The Court: Mr. Garland, don’t stand in front of the solicitor while you are asking your questions, sir, and go ahead.
“Mr. Garland: I had forgotten he was in the court room.
“Mr. Luck: I resent that statement.
“The Court: That statement, Mr. Garland is highly improper.
“Mr. Garland: What I meant to- say, I didn’t know I was standing in front of the gentleman.
“The Court: Well, go- ahead, gentlemen.
“This court certifies that each of the foregoing specifications of the conduct of Reuben A. Garland numbered 10, 11, and 12 and appearing in this Part 3 of this order occurred under the manner and circumstances recited therein, that each occurred during the trial of George Michael Bright referred to in Part 1 o-f this order, that each occurred in open court in the presence and hearing of this court, and that all of said actions and conduct were heard or observed by this court, and that each and all of the said actions and conduct of attorney Garland were calculated to and did impede, impair and interfere with the lawful and orderly procedure of the trial then in progress, and this court did at the end of the Bright trial on January 23, 1959, consider and *416adjudge said Reuben A. Garland to be in contempt of court for the conduct cited in each of these three specifications and this court does now consider and adjudge attorney Reuben A. Garland to be in contempt of court for each and all of these specifications appearing in this Part 3 of this order and certificate of contempt, and it is hereby ordered and adjudged that said attorney Reuben A. Garland be confined in the jail of Fulton County for a period of twenty (20) days as punishment for the aforesaid contempt referred to in this Part 3 of this order and certificate of contempt. This court certifies that the occurrence cited in the three specifications contained in Part 3 of this order and citation for contempt are separate and distinct from the occurrences cited in the nine specifications referred to in Part 2 of this order, and the confinement ordered in this Part 3 of this order and certificate of contempt shall be served upon the completion and termination of confinement that may be served in accordance with Part 2 of this said order and certificate of contempt.”
It is the judgment of this court that each and every one of the occurrences set forth in these portions of the judge’s order constituted a direct criminal contempt in violation of the Rules of Superior Court as contained in Code § 24-3323 quoted above. If any doubt exists that the tone of voice or manner of speech used by counsel may be taken into consideration by the, court in adjudging him in contempt, this court would hasten to lay such doubt at rest. As was said by Judge MacIntyre in his special concurrence on motion for rehearing in the case of White v. State of Georgia, 71 Ga. App. 512, 516 (31 S. E. 2d 78) in quoting from 1 Bailey on Habeas Corpus, p. 213, “ ‘Contempt may consist in manner and tone as well as by affirmative act of speech. A court may be insulted by the most innocent words uttered in a peculiar manner or tone. Words used may or may not be contemptuous according to the manner in which they were spoken. The court to which the language is addressed is necessarily, in such a case, the judge in this respect, and its conclusion once formed is conclusive upon every other court.’ ”
While this court recognizes, of course, that in proper cases counsel has the right to state for the sake of the record what he *417expects to prove on cross-examination of a witness or to state his purpose in asking a particular question in order to make a record so that any question as to the propriety of the judge’s ruling may be preserved for appellate review, this right does not extend so far as to permit counsel to argue and remonstrate with the court or to insist that he has a right to do something or to pursue a line of questioning after the trial judge has ruled against his contentions. Each of the specifications set out by the judge and quoted above at least shows a clear violation of these fundamental principles, and this court expressly holds that any one of the specifications would have authorized the adjudication of contempt entered thereon. See 17 C. J. S. 33, Contempt, § 25.
Plaintiff in error has requested leave to amend his bill of exceptions to more explicitly assign error on the final judgment in two particulars: (1) to except to the final judgment on the ground that the court abused his discretion in holding him in contempt in that the conduct specified did not constitute contempt; and, (2) to except to the final judgment on the ground that he was deprived of his Constitutional rights of a rale nisi and hearing. Since the court has passed on the first point as having been raised by the original assignment of error, an amendment to the bill of exceptions would be superfluous. As to the second proposed amendment the record does not show that that contemnor made the point before the judge or that he did not waive a nisi and hearing. A bill of exceptions cannot be amended in this court to assign error on rulings of the trial court except in accordance with the record made under the judge’s original certificate. Accordingly, the motion to amend the bill of exceptions is denied.
This case was originally considered by this court at a time when the court consisted of six judges. Before the case was first disposed of Judge Quillian resigned in order to accept appointment to the Supreme Court, and Judge Bell was appointed in his place. Judge Bell declined to participate in the consideration of the case, and the case was originally affirmed in a 5-judge decision, with Judge Townsend and Judge Nichols dissenting from the majority opinion. The plaintiff in error made a motion for a rehearing contending, among other things, that he was entitled *418to have his case considered by six judges. This court, without passing upon that contention beyond merely conceding that for the sake of argument it was meritorious, granted a rehearing in order to afford an opportunity for the selection of a sixth judge. Pending disposition of that motion, Judge Frankum took his seat on the bench pursuant to the provisions of the act approved March 3, 1960 (Ga. L. 1960, p. 158). The case, therefore, has been considered on motion for a rehearing by seven judges, Judge A. M. Anderson, from the Macon Judicial Circuit, having been selected as the, sixth judge in place of Judge Bell, and the foregoing opinion has been substituted for that originally filed by the court.

Judgment affirmed.

Felton, C. J., Gardner, P. J., Frankum and Anderson, JJ., concur. Townsend and Nichols, JJ., dissent.

Bell, Judge,
did not participate in the decision. Although not disqualified by operation of law under Code (Ann.) § 24-102, he concluded that he should not take part in the determination of the action because of opinions expressed by him on the issues prior to his becoming a member of the court.