Court Opinion

ID: 9364928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-20 18:00:34.703895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:41.412943
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JAN 20 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SAMUEL HOWARD,                                  No.    10-99003

                Petitioner-Appellant,           D.C. No.
                                                2:93-cv-01209-LRH-LRL
 v.

RENEE BAKER, Warden, Director of                MEMORANDUM*
Nevada Department of Corrections,

                Respondent-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Nevada
                    Larry R. Hicks, District Judge, Presiding

                      Argued and Submitted January 9, 2023
                              Pasadena, California

Before: WATFORD, FRIEDLAND, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

      Samuel Howard appeals from the district court’s denial of his pre-

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act habeas petition. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2253, and we affirm. We decline Howard’s

request to expand the certificate of appealability (“COA”).

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      1.     The district court rejected, but certified for appeal, Howard’s claim

that his lack of communication with and distrust in his attorneys from the public

defender’s office amounted to a constructive denial of counsel based on an

irreconcilable conflict. In rejecting Howard’s claim, the district court found that

the alleged conflict “was one of Howard’s own making” and that Howard’s

“refusal to cooperate with counsel was unreasonable.”1 These findings were not

clearly erroneous given the record. See Crittenden v. Chappell, 804 F.3d 998,

1006 (9th Cir. 2015).

      Howard’s refusal to cooperate with counsel began before most of the facts

giving rise to the alleged distrust occurred. Howard’s counsel complied with the

court’s orders that prohibited any attorneys in the public defender’s office with

personal conflicts to be involved in the case. And the record supports that Howard

selectively chose when to cooperate with his counsel. Based on these

circumstances, the district court could reasonably conclude that Howard

manufactured the alleged conflict.

1
  We also note that the Nevada Supreme Court stated that the facts did not
“objectively justify Howard’s distrust of his attorney.” Howard v. State, 729 P.2d
1341, 1342 (Nev. 1986) (per curiam). Howard argues that such statement was not
a factual finding subject to deference. See Burton v. Davis, 816 F.3d 1132, 1140 &
n.4 (9th Cir. 2016). We need not decide whether the Nevada Supreme Court’s
statement was a factual finding given the district court’s clear factual findings.

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      Because the district court reasonably found that the alleged conflict was of

Howard’s own making, Howard was not constructively denied counsel. Daniels v.

Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181, 1197–98 (9th Cir. 2005). Instead, the dispositive

question is: “Did counsel provide constitutionally adequate counsel according to

the standards established in Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)]?”

Michaels v. Davis, 51 F.4th 904, 939 (9th Cir. 2022). As Howard makes no

argument that his attorneys were constitutionally inadequate, we affirm the district

court’s denial of this claim.

      2.     The district court also rejected, but certified for appeal, Howard’s

claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the premeditation

instruction, which failed to define deliberation as a distinct element of first-degree

murder.2 Howard’s claim fails because, even assuming this was an error on

counsel’s part, Howard cannot show the required Strickland prejudice: “that there

is a reasonable probability that, but for [the error], the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

2
 The precise issue before the district court was whether Martinez v. Ryan, 566
U.S. 1 (2012), excused the procedural default of this trial-level ineffective
assistance claim. Instead of conducting a strict Martinez analysis, the district court
determined that the ineffective assistance claim failed on the merits under
Strickland. Because we agree, and because a successful Martinez claim requires a
showing of a reasonable probability that the ineffective assistance claim would
have succeeded under Strickland, Howard necessarily cannot satisfy Martinez. See
Runningeagle v. Ryan, 825 F.3d 970, 982–83 (9th Cir. 2016).

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      There is no reasonable probability that the result would have been different

had the court provided a separate deliberation instruction, as the record makes clear

that the jury convicted Howard under the alternative felony murder theory. See

Riley v. McDaniel, 786 F.3d 719, 726 (9th Cir. 2015) (an instructional error can be

considered harmless if the court is “reasonably certain that the jury did convict him

based on the valid felony murder theory” (cleaned up) (quoting Babb v. Lozowsky,

719 F.3d 1019, 1035 (9th Cir. 2013), overruled on other grounds by White v.

Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 421 (2014))).

      The evidence that Howard killed the victim during a robbery was

overwhelming. Indeed, it was so strong that the prosecutor focused almost

exclusively on the felony murder theory during closing. The jury also returned a

special verdict during the penalty phase that found the “murder was committed

while the defendant was engaged in the commission of any robbery.”3 Given the

record, we are reasonably certain that the jury convicted Howard under the felony

murder theory. Thus, Howard’s ineffective assistance claim fails for lack of

prejudice.

3
  Although the Nevada Supreme Court held that this finding could not be used as
an aggravating circumstance supporting Howard’s death sentence, see Howard v.
State, No. 57469, 2014 WL 3784121, at *6 (Nev. July 30, 2014), it still supports
that the jury convicted him under the felony murder theory. The Nevada Supreme
Court has since vacated Howard’s death sentence. See Howard v. State, 495 P.3d
88 (Nev. 2021).

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        3.    Howard seeks to expand the COA to include two uncertified issues:

(1) whether the premeditation instruction was unconstitutional; and (2) whether

Martinez excuses the procedural default of his claim that counsel was ineffective

for failing to challenge Howard’s competency to stand trial. See 9th Cir. R. 22-

1(e).

        As to the first uncertified issue, the district court determined in 2008 that the

claim was procedurally barred from review. Even so, Howard contends that we

can consider the merits of the claim because the Nevada Supreme Court addressed

the merits in an intervening 2014 decision. See Howard, 2014 WL 3784121. We

disagree. Even were we to construe part of the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision

as a merits determination, the court separately determined that the claim was

barred under state procedural rules. Id. at *1–2. For that reason, we are barred

from considering the claim. See Loveland v. Hatcher, 231 F.3d 640, 643–44 (9th

Cir. 2000).

        We also decline to expand the COA to include the second uncertified issue.

As the district court correctly determined, even if counsel erred by failing to

challenge Howard’s competency, Howard cannot establish the requisite Strickland

prejudice. No reasonable jurist would find that conclusion debatable given

Howard’s failure to produce any persuasive evidence that he would have been

                                            5
found incompetent to stand trial. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000).

      AFFIRMED.

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