Court Opinion

ID: 9615485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:37:33.327926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:59:59.418246
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I fully concur in Divisions 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the majority opinion. I also agree with the holdings in Division 1 that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s guilty verdicts on the aggravated sexual battery and aggravated sodomy counts, and that the defendant cannot be sentenced for both aggravated child molestation and aggravated sodomy based on the same act. However, I do not agree that the latter two convictions simply merge or that the trial court may choose which one to vacate. Where an act of sodomy is committed against a victim under the age of ten, the only punishable offense is that of aggravated sodomy.
*64The General Assembly recently chose to change the definition of aggravated sodomy so as to include an act which previously constituted aggravated child molestation. Ga. L. 2000, p. 1346, § 1; OCGA §§ 16-6-2 (a), 16-6-4 (c). Commission of sodomy against a child less than ten years old previously was an act of aggravated child molestation, but it is now an act of aggravated sodomy. By making this change, the legislature increased the maximum punishment for an act of sodomy on a victim under the age of ten to life imprisonment. OCGA §§ 16-6-2 (b), 16-6-4 (d) (1). The effect of this was to remove commission of sodomy against a child younger than ten from the definition of “aggravated child molestation” and to redefine “aggravated sodomy” so as to include that specific act.
It is well settled that “a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent. [Cit.]” Vines v. State, 269 Ga. 438, 440 (499 SE2d 630) (1998). We have applied this principle both to sentencing and to classification of crimes. Mann v. State, 273 Ga. 366, 368 (1) (541 SE2d 645) (2001); Vines v. State, supra. See also Norwood v. State, 249 Ga. App. 507, 509 (2) (548 SE2d 478) (2001); Chastain v. State, 231 Ga. App. 225, 228 (4) (498 SE2d 792) (1998) (“ ‘where a crime is penalized by a special law, the general provisions of the penal code are not applicable.’ [Cits.]”); Stovall v. State, 216 Ga. App. 138, 142 (7) (453 SE2d 110) (1995) (the more specific sentencing statute prevailed despite providing a greater punishment). The facts proved in this case clearly show that Johnson committed an act proscribed by the recently amended and more specific code section, the violation of which may carry a greater punishment. Therefore, he was not subject to conviction under the more general aggravated child molestation code section, “there being a specific section covering his offense.” Sharp v. State, 7 Ga. App. 605, 606 (67 SE 699) (1910).
[W]here there is a specific statute covering the offense, and under which the defendant is [subject to a greater punishment], he should be indicted under that specific statute, rather than under the general section of the . . . Code. . . .
Sharp v. State, supra. The aggravated sodomy statute, insofar as sodomy against a ten-year-old victim is concerned, preempts OCGA § 16-6-4 (c), and it would be improper to convict appellant of aggravated child molestation. See Harden v. State, 184 Ga. App. 371, 372 (361 SE2d 696) (1987). If one who commits an act of sodomy against a child under the age of ten were still to be punishable for aggravated child molestation, no amendment to the aggravated sodomy statute would have been required, because the offense would be within the general statute applicable to all cases of aggravated child molesta*65tion. See Stone v. State, 118 Ga. 705, 709 (2) (45 SE 630) (1903); Harden v. State, supra.
Decided December 13, 2002.
Todd M. Johnson, for appellant.
Kermit N. McManus, District Attorney, Stephen E. Spencer, Andrew B. Margolis, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
The primary rule of statutory construction is to construe statutes so as to effectuate the legislative intent. Mikell v. State, 270 Ga. 467, 468 (510 SE2d 523) (1999). The General Assembly was authorized to make a policy determination that, because committing sodomy against a victim under ten years old is a more egregious act than the generally defined offense of aggravated child molestation, that act should be redefined as aggravated sodomy, with its potentially more severe punishment, whereas other acts, including sodomy against a child who is between 10 and 16 years of age, should remain within the definition of aggravated child molestation, with its less severe maximum punishment. See Vines v. State, supra at 440. Indeed, the recent specific amendment to OCGA § 16-6-2 (a) demonstrates that very intent. The uncodified preamble to that amendment states that its purpose is “to provide that sodomy with a person who is less than ten years of age shall constitute the offense of aggravated sodomy. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) Ga. L. 2000, supra at p. 1346. There is no indication that the General Assembly intended that such an act shall also remain punishable as aggravated child molestation.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed as to aggravated sexual battery and aggravated sodomy, but vacated as to aggravated child molestation. Therefore, I dissent to today’s judgment to the extent that it authorizes the trial court to decide which conviction should be vacated.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein and Justice Thompson join in this opinion.