Court Opinion

ID: 9702752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:22:38.048293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:41.291144
License: Public Domain

SHEA, Justice (Ret.),
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion presupposes that defendant, by merely granting her adult son permission to live in her house, automatically was conferred with the ability to control his actions. Such a conclusion would render Restatement (Second) Torts § 318(a) (1965) meaningless because the duty to control the conduct of a licensee is imposed only after it is establishéd that the licensor “knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control the [licensee].” The case law that follows demonstrates that mere permission to remain on the land, without more, does not satisfy this burden.
A survey of the history of common law across this country reveals that courts have declined to find a landowner liable for the conduct of another, under neither a theory of landowner liability nor a general duty to control the conduct of others. In Andrade v. Baptiste, 411 Mass. 560, 583 N.E.2d 837, 838 (1992), the plaintiff sought damages for the alleged negligence of a wife in failing to prevent her husband from shooting the plaintiff. The Massachusetts court ruled that the principle that an actor who permitted a third party to use her land had a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the conduct of the third *719party was inapplicable, even though the wife was the owner of the marital home where the gun was kept and she knew that her husband had anger and drinking problems. Id. at 839. It reasoned that “the principles of § 318 presuppose an owner’s ability to control the third persons’s [sic] conduct and stop it if harm to another is likely.” Andrade, 583 N.E.2d at 839. The court declined to find liability because the defendant had “no legal ability, and, therefore, no accompanying duty, to control her husband’s misuse of his own [personal] property.” Id.
In another Massachusetts case, McDonald v. Lavery, 27 Mass.App.Ct. 1108, 534 N.E.2d 1190 (1989), the plaintiff filed an action against the parents of a twenty-seven-year-old who shot the victim while living in the family home. The son was intoxicated during the incident. Id. at 1191. The court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, finding that the parents were not hable for the intentional acts of their adult son. Id. at 1192. Moreover, the court noted that even though the parents knew that their son previously had been violent while intoxicated, there was no evidence that they knew or should have known that he had a propensity for using firearms in a violent manner before the incident here. Id. The court held that “[t]he fortuity of [the son’s] living in [his parents’] home does not create a duty where none otherwise exists; nor does their status as parents, without more, impose on [them] the duty to supervise and control their emancipated adult son.” McDonald, 534 N.E.2d at 1192 (quoting Alioto v. Marnell, 402 Mass. 36, 520 N.E.2d 1284, 1286 (1988)).
The Supreme Court of Connecticut had addressed facts similar to this case in Kaminski v. Town of Fairfield, 216 Conn. 29, 578 A.2d 1048 (1990). In Kaminski, the parents of an adult son who was living in the family home were sued for the assault he committed with an axe. Id. at 1049. The victim was a police officer who was attacked while escorting a crisis team to defendants’ home to evaluate their son’s mental status. The victim argued that “in permitting their adult but schizophrenic son * * * to live with them, [the parents] undertook a custodial relationship that encompassed responsibility for controlling his behavior.” Id. at 1051. However, citing to Restatement (Second) Torts § 319 (1965), the court stated that the duty to control usually was limited to “professional custodians with special competence to control the behavior of those in their charge.” Id. Thus, it reasoned that a parent, “merely by making a home for an adult child who is a mental patient” is not charged with the capacity and duty to control as envisaged in the restatement as a basis for liability. Id. at 1052.
A survey of courts in other jurisdictions reveals the same trend. See Wise v. Superior Court, 222 Cal.App.3d 1008, 272 Cal.Rptr. 222 (1990) (defendant not hable for sniper attack carried out by husband on roof of home because she did not have the ability to control her spouse); Barmore v. Elmore, 83 Ill.App.3d 1056, 38 Ill.Dec. 751, 403 N.E.2d 1355 (1980) (parents not Hable for acts of adult son with known mental illness because defendants did not know or have reason to know son would commit violent act against plaintiff); Whitesides v. Wheeler, 158 Ky. 121, 164 S.W. 335 (Ct. App.1914) (defendant not Hable for acts of her adult son absent proof of past, overt acts of violence); Youngblood v. Schireman, 53 Wash.App. 95, 765 P.2d 1312 (1988) (defendants not Hable for acts by adult son because parents were not “present” during incident under § 318).
The majority finds HabiHty under Restatement (Second) Torts § 318, entitled “Duty of Possessor of Land or Chattels to *720Control Conduct of Licensee,” and found that Gallagher “was a licensee of defendant vis-á-vis [his] use of her property.” This Court has held that a social guest is the equivalent of a family member and thus, is a licensee. Pagliaro v. Pezza, 92 R.I. 110, 118, 167 A.2d 139, 141 (1961). Therefore, members of the family also are licensees. Hone v. Lakeside Swimming Pool & Supply Co., 114 R.I. 394, 396, 333 A.2d 430, 431 (1975).
Although couched in a theory of landowner liability, the majority effectively has created a new cause of action allowing tort liability for parents who fail to control the conduct of their adult offspring. “This Court has long held that the creation of new causes of action should be left to the Legislature.” Ferreira v. Strack, 652 A.2d 965, 968 (R.I.1995). In declining to create social host tort liability, this Court in Fer-reira noted that “[t]he majority of courts in other jurisdictions faced with the question of extending common-law tort liability * * * have deferred to the Legislature. The reasoning for this deferral is their consideration that the question raised is one of broad public policy rather than an interpretation of the common law.” Id. Moreover,
“[t]he imposition of liability upon social hosts * * * has such serious implications that any action taken should be taken by the Legislature after careful investigation, scrutiny, and debate. It is abundantly clear that greater legislative resources and the opportunity for broad public input would more readily enable the Legislature to fashion an appropriate remedy to deal with the scope and severity of this problem.” Id.
Thus, this Court, without the support of the Legislature, should not adopt the principle that a licensor owes a duty to a third person injured by a paranoid schizophrenic who possessed firearms at his or her home. See id. The majority has created strict liability in this licensor-licensee relationship that will have far reaching consequences — particularly in the family setting in which mental illness and firearms are involved.11
The majority correctly states that application of Restatement (Second) Torts § 318 is subject to two conditions: the possessors of the property must (1) know or have reason to know that they have the ability to control the person(s) using their land, and (2) know or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control. However, “[w]here * * * the natural relationship between the parties * * * creates no inference of an ability to control, the actual custodial ability must affirmatively appear.” Wise, 272 Cal.Rptr. at 225 (quoting Megeff v. Doland, 123 Cal.App.3d 251, 176 Cal.Rptr. 467, 472-73 (1981)). Moreover, “[t]he absence of such ability is fatal to a claim of legal responsibility * * *.” Id.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that defendant simply “failed to put her foot down” in allowing her son to maintain firearms on the premises, or that “effecting the removal of the guns was a relatively light and inexpensive one to implement.” In this case, although the jury reasonably may have concluded that defendant’s denial of having any knowledge of the firearms lacked credibility, it does not follow that defendant had the ability or opportunity to exercise control over her son under § 318.
*721In general, this mother, the licensor, had no duty or authority to investigate her licensee son’s mental illness, nor was she competent to make her own assessment of his mental fitness. See Gill v. New York City Housing Authority, 130 A.D.2d 256, 519 N.Y.S.2d 364 (N.Y.App.Div.1987); see also Nieswand v. Cornell University, 692 F.Supp. 1464, 1467 (N.D.N.Y.1988) (reasoning a landowner is not an insurer of safety and “ ‘cannot be held to a duty to take protective measures unless he knows or has reason to know that there is a likelihood of conduct on the part of third persons which would endanger the safety of the visitor’ ”). It is well settled that “psychiatric hospital records are confidential * * * and that the receipt of services for mental disability is not a permissible predicate for depriving a person of any civil right to which he or she is otherwise entitled * * * ” Gill, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 369. In this case, defendant’s son already had reached the age of majority when he received treatment for emotional problems. Thus, defendant was unaware of the type of care her son was given or the extent of his condition. The majority says that “defendant knew or should have known that her son was mentally unfit to own and keep firearms and ammunition at her house.” However,
“[t]he determination as to whether a mentally ill individual is dangerous or will become dangerous is one which is often difficult for even the most highly trained mental health professionals to make reliably. * * * It is, accordingly, not the sort of determination which [li-censors], who possess no special expertise in the field of mental health, should be required to make.” Id. at 370.
The defendant’s sister testified that in the context of her training as a clinical psychologist, she believed her brother was a paranoid schizophrenic. However, the record does not indicate that defendant knew her daughter thought Gallagher was a paranoid schizophrenic; rather they agreed that Gallagher had “emotional problems.” Nonetheless, even if knowledge of the daughter’s assessment was imputed to defendant, in this case defendant did not have the opportunity or authority to control her adult son.
Generally, “when a child reaches 18 years of age he is a major and this majority deprives parents of their legal right to control him.” Mack v. Hopkins, 338 So.2d 961, 962 (La.Ct.App.1976). “When that right of control is lost, a parent may no longer be held responsible * * * [because] vicarious liability * * * for the torts of the child is predicated upon the very control and authority of the parents which has been lost.” Id. at 962-63. The Washington State Supreme Court found that defendants were not liable for the conduct of their adult son under Restatement (Second) Torts § 318. Youngblood, 765 P.2d at 1317-18 (defendants not liable for assault by adult son on girlfriend at defendant’s home). The court determined that the defendants had no duty to protect their son’s girlfriend because they had no reason to know that their son would assault the plaintiff. Furthermore, it ruled that § 318 was inapplicable because the possessor of land must be “present when * * * the activity is being carried on with his permission, and when, therefore, he has not only the ability to control the conduct of the third person * * *, but also the opportunity to do so.” Youngblood, 765 P.2d at 1317-18 (quoting Restatement (Second) Torts § 318, comment b). The court reasoned that defendants were not “present” during the assault because, although they were at home, they already were in bed when their son returned and they did not know his girlfriend was there. Id. Thus, “[n]ot being present and not knowing beforehand of the necessity of *722controlling [their son’s] behavior, they lacked the opportunity to prevent the assault.” Id.
In this case, defendant was not present in the sense contemplated under § 318 when her son shot Volpe. While Gallagher was outside the house with his weapon, defendant was reading the newspaper in the living room, unaware of what would transpire between her son and the neighbor. Moreover, the events unfolded so quickly that defendant lacked the opportunity to intervene. In Vertudazo v. Allstate Insurance Co., 542 So.2d 703 (La.Ct.App.1989), the court declined to find a defendant landowner liable for the murder of plaintiffs son by a licensee at the defendant’s home. The court stated that although defendant was present in the room where the incident took place, defendant’s back was to the assailant and the events occurred very quickly. Id. at 704. “She therefore, had no opportunity to intervene.” Id. Thus, the court ruled:
“The facts do not reflect that * * * .[defendant] knew or should have known that this argument would lead to such violence. Therefore, * * * the criminal attack on Arnold was not reasonably foreseeable and there was, as a matter of law, no breach of any duty owed by the homeowner to the deceased.” Id.
It is well settled that “[t]he duty imposed by law on [a] homeowner does not extend to unforeseeable' or unanticipated criminal acts of a third person.” Id.; See also Alva v. Cook, 49 Cal.App.3d 899, 123 Cal.Rptr. 166, 167 (1975) (“‘the law of torts holds defendant amenable only for injuries to others which to defendant at the time were reasonably foreseeable’ ”). Furthermore, “ ‘[fjoreseeability determines the extent and scope of duty.’ ” Youngblood, 765 P.2d at 1314. Thus, even if defendant in this case knew or had reason to know she had the ability to control her son, she may not be held liable because the incident here was unforeseeable. The majority incorrectly states that the absence of any evidence of past violent behavior on Gallagher’s part did not make the shooting incident unforeseeable. See McDonald, 534 N.E.2d at 1192 (although parents knew their son previously had been violent while intoxicated, there was no evidence that they knew or should have known that he had a propensity for using firearms in a violent manner before the incident here). In Barmore, 38 Ill.Dec. 751, 403 N.E.2d at 1356-57, the plaintiff was stabbed by the defendant homeowner’s adult son, who had a history of mental illness.
“Although they did know that their son had a history of mental problems and had been hospitalized several times, and also that approximately ten years before the present incident their son had been involved in what could be characterized as two or three violent incidents, the length of time which had passed would not give them reason to know that their son would engage in violent behavior in August, 1977. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that plaintiff had previous contact with Thomas, Jr., without incident.” Id. at 1358-59.
The court ruled that defendants owed no duty to the plaintiff because they “did not know or have reason to know” that their son would commit a criminal act against the plaintiff. Id. at 1358.
In this case, there was no evidence or allegation that Gallagher invoked fear and intimidation in the neighborhood, and plaintiffs conceded that Gallagher’s previous contacts with Volpe were normal. There was no allegation of any violence by Gallagher. Notably, there was no evidence that Gallagher ever discharged a firearm from the time that he obtained treatment for his mental illness. Nonetheless, even if plaintiffs had alleged that *723Gallagher was considered as “a man of unsound mind, dangerous, and with homicidal tendencies,” this evidence alone would not be competent. Whitesides, 164 S.W. at 336. “The only purpose such testimony could serve would be to charge ap-pellee with the duty of exercising unusual measures of restraint over her son, and testimony as to how other people regarded his mental condition was not competent for that purpose.” Id. Moreover, Gallagher’s history of treatment for mental problems is alone not sufficient to infer that Gallagher had dangerous propensities. “[0]nce a patient has been discharged from a psychiatric institution with appropriate aftercare provisions * * * the presumption must be that the problem which caused the hospitalization has been treated and that the individual no longer poses a danger to himself or others.” Gill, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 369.
Thus, “[t]he fact that [a licensee] eventually became dangerous does not mean that he was always dangerous or that his impending dangerousness was reasonably foreseeable by defendant.” Gill, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 368; see also id. at 371 (“Although mental illness quite properly [was not] * * * a ground for the termination of a tenancy by defendant, if it were, it is to be expected that the basis for defendant’s action would be the tenant’s actual misconduct, not his or her condition or propensities.”). Thus, only overt acts of violence would put defendant sufficiently on notice of Gallagher’s violent propensities and make the incident in this case foreseeable. Whitesides, 164 S.W. at 335 (A mother was not hable for the actions of her adult son who was adjudicated insane because “there [was] no proof in the record that she knew that he had the weapon, nor [was] there any proof that she knowingly permitted it to remain in a place accessible to him.”).
Finally, the societal consequences of the majority’s ruling are quite troubling. The parents of adult, troubled offspring who have no place to go but their parent’s home are exposed to liability as never before. Courts have held that “[i]t would be unjust and morally wrong and against public policy to discourage humane and natural relationships between members of a family who are sensitive to and generous in the treatment of less fortunate members of their family.” Alva, 123 Cal.Rptr. at 170. Parents are now faced with a weighty decision. Either they must reject their troubled children whose actions they are expected to control, or else face harsh legal consequences even in the absence of any previous incidents. Furthermore, “by arbitrarily requiring a [licensor] to assume responsibility for the unprecedented acts of a mentally ill [licensee] over which the [licensor] has no control, we do little to prevent the sort of harm suffered by plaintiff.” Gill, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 372. Psychiatric patients would be forced to fend for themselves on the streets. Consequently, “[n]o one will be safer for this.” Id.
At present the Rhode Island mental health statute, G.L.1956 chapter 5 of title 40.1, makes the involuntary commitment of a mentally-ill person extremely difficult. There must be a showing by clear and convincing evidence that such a person constitutes an imminent danger to himself or others. Section 40.1 — 5—8(j). In the absence of a history of overt violent conduct, such a commitment would be impossible. Therefore, the parent of an adult son or daughter has the Hobson’s choice of allowing the offspring to live in the parent’s home with all the attendant possibilities of liability or reject the parent’s offspring without alternative resources from the community to give this person a secure residential environment.
*724Thus, the procedural safeguards surrounding involuntary commitment even further attenuates any attempt by a parent to control or seek community assistance to control adult sons or daughters who manifest symptoms of mental illness.
The tragic death of Mr. Volpe was devastating. “But, however much we may wish to see the plaintiff[s] made whole, that is not an end that can be achieved in accordance with the law of negligence.” Gill, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 372. Not only was the incident here unforeseeable as a matter of law, there was no duty on the defendant’s part under either a licensor-licensee relationship or a family relationship. “To relax and, indeed, completely ignore these principles in the present case in order to achieve a superficially ‘happy’ result, not only distorts the law of negligence, it creates havoc * * *” with the family relationship and generally subjects the licensee “to a degree of scrutiny about his private affairs and insecurity about his living accommodation that is intolerable.” Id.
■ For the foregoing reasons I would deny the plaintiffs’ appeal of the trial justice’s order granting a motion for a new trial.

. I decline to address the majority’s suggestion that the storage of firearms by a paranoid schizophrenic amounted to an ultra-hazardous activity necessitating imposition of strict liability because the majority's comments on that issue were dicta. Suffice it to say that I disagree that there was an ultra-hazardous activity in this case.