Court Opinion

ID: 9552571
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:13:10.608251+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:28:12.080904
License: Public Domain

*472DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice,
dissenting:
¶ 26 The end of the majority opinion’s extensive analysis is a refusal to invalidate the issuance of personalized license plates containing an acknowledged racial epithet. This court should hold that the Tax Commission violated its own administrative rule, and we should also invalidate the issuance of the plates outright instead of remanding the matter to the Tax Commission. For these reasons, I dissent.
¶ 27 The majority addresses whether the Commission’s action violated its own administrative rule and correctly finds that it did. In declaring that the Tax Commission violated its own administrative rule, the majority applies an objective “reasonable person” standard to which the Commission must adhere when determining whether a term carries “any” connotation that is derogatory, vulgar, profane, or obscene. Rule 873-22M-34 mandates:
B. Pursuant to Section 41-la-411(2), the division may not issue personalized license plates in the following formats:
1. Combination of letters, words, or numbers with any connotation that is vulgar, derogatory, profane, or obscene.
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4. Combinations of letters, words, or numbers that express contempt, ridicule, or superiority of a race, religion, deity, ethnic heritage, gender, or political affiliation.
Utah Admin. Code R873-22M-34 (1995).
¶ 28 The rule clearly states that “any connotation” that is derogatory, obscene, profane, or vulgar is strictly prohibited. Id. Nevertheless, the majority gratuitously, and with no analytical support, declares that “[rjelying upon the opinion of any one person or group in determining whether a term carries a prohibited connotation is not a reasonable application of either section 41-la-411 or rule 873-22M-34.” ¶ 15 (emphasis added). While the majority correctly holds that the “personal opinion” of the Tax Commissioners is not the appropriate standard of review, it also asserts that the “opinion” of the petitioners should not count either. ¶ 15. Unfortunately, the majority chooses to ignore the fact that while the Tax Commissioners apparently did rely upon their personal opinions in deciding this issue, the petitioners introduced far more than mere opinion as to the- term’s offensiveness into evidence. The majority ignores (a) the dictionary definitions of the term; (b) the historical roots of the term as explained by texts and articles; (c) the actions taken by universities and city councils nationwide; and (d) the expert testimony of educators and clinical psychiatrists. The majority dismisses all of this evidence as nothing more than “opinion.”
¶ 29 I do not understand exactly what evidence the majority would require to demonstrate that a derogatory and obscene racial slur is more than just the “opinion” of, its targets and is in fact offensive. Certainly, in my mind, petitioners proved far more than just their personal opinion. The facts, ignored by the majority, are that in 1755, the British Crown offered a bounty for the scalps of Native American men, women, and children living in the New England colonies.. See George Russell, American Indian Digest: Contemporan-y Demography of the American Indian Í2-13 (1995 ed.). As stated plainly in the affidavit of a clinical psychologist:
To demonstrate that there had been a kill, soldiers were required to skin the body of the Native American and bring in the “red skin.” “Redskin” is in particular a horrifying reminder of what amounted to genocide of many of the Native American people. They are acutely aware of its meaning.
Thus, the Washington Redskins football team (and the would-be owners of the personalized Utah license plates at issue here) utilize the name and symbol of the genocidal practice of paying white soldiers a bounty for the bloody skins of murdered Native Americans.
¶ 30 Furthermore, petitioners have cited numerous studies, affidavits, articles, and personal testimony of Native Americans who are deeply offended by the use of the term.
¶ 31 In addition, the majority fails to consider the current trend, clearly documented by petitioners, away from the cartoonish and derogatory use of the image of Native Ameri*473cans as mascots. Saint John’s University has in recent years changed the name of its mascot from “Redmen” to “Red Storm.” Sioux City, Iowa, has recently ceased using the name “Soos” for its minor league baseball team. The Washington Redskins have been under fire for years to change the name of its football team. On March 5, 1992, the Washington Post editorialized against the continued use of the name “Redskins” for the Washington, D.C., football team: “That the usage is common and innocently repeated out of habit makes it no less of an insensitive or insulting ■ remark to those who are on the receiving end. We can do better.” The Redskin Issue, Wash. Post, March 5, 1992, at A20. Moreover, the District of Columbia City Council has passed a resolution asking the Washington Redskins to change its team name to “a name that is not offensive to Native Americans or any other minority group.” Because the team is privately owned, of course, it can take any name it wishes and ignore editorials and public opinion generally. However, it strikes me as disrespectful and presumptuous for chis court to discount every piece of testimony and evidence from Native American citizens. The Tax Commission ought not to have done so, and the majority errs in following suit.
¶ 32 Finally and conclusively, the majority fails to address the telling, and in my mind determinative, argument that the definition of “redskin” in the dictionary mirrors almost exactly the dictionary definition of the counterpart term for another racial minority — the “n” word. “The term ‘Redskin’ has been defined by Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary as ‘American Indian — usually taken to be offensive.’ ” Kimberly A. Pace, The Washington Redskins Case and the Doctrine of Disparagement: How Politically Correct Must a Trademark Be?, 22 Pepp. L.Rev. 7, 51 (1994) (quoting Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 987 (9th ed.1990)). Similarly, “the term [the ‘n’ word] is defined by this same dictionary as ‘Negro — usually taken to be offensive.’ ” Id. at n. 278. No court in this country would approve legislative enactment allowing the use of such a destructive epithet as the “n” word on a license plate. Notwithstanding this equivalence in the dictionary — an objective source indeed— the majority remands this case to the Tax Commission for further consideration. I would reverse the Tax Commission and immediately revoke the personalized plates at issue.
¶ 33 Based on the foregoing objections, I do not approve of the objective reasonable person standard enunciated in the majority opinion. Rather, I would hold that the objections and evidence offered by those offended should prevail. I certainly agree that the personal opinions of the Tax Commissioners are of no import, particularly after their ruling, as reported in the Salt Lake Tribune, holding that the terms “TAXLAND,” “TAX2MAX,” and “MINWAGE” were too offensive and derogatory to allow display on personalized license plates. See License Plates 2MAKETAX Folks See Red, Salt Lake Tribune, June 3, 1998, at Bl. However, I do not agree that the opinions and compelling evidence put forward by the Native American petitioners do not provide sufficient basis to reverse the Tax Commission.
¶ 34 Petitioners introduced overwhelming evidence showing that the term “redskin” is derogatory and profane, that it expresses contempt and ridicule, and that it references the historical domination of a defined class of persons based on race and ethnic heritage. This evidence demonstrates conclusively that the Tax Commission violated its own rule. By ignoring evidence and by establishing an arbitrary reasonable person standard, the majority misses the mark imposed by rule 873-22M-34.
¶ 35 It is to be hoped that one day all offensive and derogatory language, speech, and symbols predicated on race will be completely eradicated from our culture. In the meantime, public officials have the obligation to ensure that they are not used with the imprimatur of the State.
¶ 36 Justice STEWART concurs in Associate Chief Justice DURHAM’S dissenting opinion.