Court Opinion

ID: 9520321
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:36:20.825353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:46:00.692388
License: Public Domain

*964OPINION ON REHEARING
(October 6, 1998)
RATLIFF, Senior Judge.
In our previoulsy published ipinion in the case, Hagerman v. Copeland, No. 18A04-9612-CV-519 (Ind.Ct.App. June 25, 1998), we declined to address the issue of whether the trial court properly admitted evidence of subsequent remedial measures taken be Hager-man after Anthony Copeland’s accident. We did not decide the issue because substantially the same evidence was contained on the deposition of William Tomich, a co-worker of Anthony’s. Although the entire deposition was contained in the record as submitted by Hagerman, with some lines struck by the trial court, the portion we referred to was not actually read to the jury. We now address this issue on the merits.
Indiana Evidence Rule 407 specifically authorizes the admission of evidence of a subsequent remedial measure when offered for a purpose other than proving negligence. Utley v. Healy, 663 N.E.2d 229, 238 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied. Such evidence is admissible to show the defendant’s ownership or control of the premises when that issue is in genuine dispute. Welch v. Railroad Crossing, Inc., 488 N.E.2d 383, 392 (Ind.Ct.App.1986).
The question of which entity had control over the opening through which Anthony fell was a principal issue in this litigation. This dispute was central to the trial court’s order denying Sater Electric Co.’s motion for summary judgment. In that order, the trial court found that “[ujnder their separate prime contracts with BSU, Hagerman and Sater retained control over their respective portions of the work.” (R. 2234). The trial court then concluded: “The work area surrounding the hole through which Mr. Copeland fell was either the contractual responsibility of Hagerman or of Sater on the day of the accident.” (R. 2236). It was this “material question of fact that require[d] denial” of summary judgment for Sater. Id.
This question was no less contested at trial. During their opening statement, Hag-erman alleged that Sater Electric “opened the holes, the holes were there’s [sic]. Once the holes were covered, the holes belonged to Sater.” (R.4115).
The evidence indicating that Hagerman covered the openings after the accident was offered to show not only that Hagerman had (‘nnt.rnl nf th p nnprnn crq wtipn thpv wpvp í>vp-ated, but also at the time of the accident. Because this evidence was relevant to issues other than negligence, it was properly admitted. The trial court did not err.
Petition for Rehearing granted to amend our opinion and denied in all other respects.
HOFFMAN, J., and STATON, J., concur.