Court Opinion

ID: 9671750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:42:50.971934+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:11.816543
License: Public Domain

Archer, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the majority’s conclusion that in an action for malicious prosecution, the underlying action must have been brought "in the name of another” and "without the consent of such person” in order to fall within the provisions of § 2907. The history of MCL 600.2907; MSA 27A.2907 and similar statutes in other jurisdictions involving remedies for such "straw-party” suits, support this conclusion. I also agree that § 2907 was intended to provide a remedy for a particularly egregious type of malicious prosecution.
However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion with respect to suits brought in the name of *292the People of the State of Michigan. Plaintiff contends that he is still entitled to treble damages because the underlying criminal suit in his case was brought in the name of another, i.e., the people. The majority rejects this argument, stating that to do so would turn virtually "every malicious prosecution action filed because of criminal proceedings into a 'straw-party’ suit.” On the other hand, not to do so, on the basis of such reasoning, would bar every plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action from ever being awarded treble damages, no matter how egregious the defendant’s conduct because most, if not all, cases underlying malicious prosecution cases are criminal and are therefore always brought by the people.
Interpretation of the "in the name of another” and "without the consent of such person” language when applying § 2907 is of first impression. Cases interpreting statutes similar to § 2907 have dealt with defamation actions which are rarely, if ever, brought in the name of another. Even where the defamation actions were brought in the name of another, the issue of "consent” determined the outcome of the action.1
In the instant case, the underlying criminal action was brought in the name-of another, to wit: the People of the State of Michigan. It was also *293brought without the consent of the people because the prosecutor was not fully and truthfully informed by S. S. Kresge of all pertinent facts.2 Since S. S. Kresge or agents of S. S. Kresge informed the prosecutor by making false statements, S. S. Kresge or its agents, and not the prosecutor, was the initiator of the criminal prosecution and the proper defendant in the civil action for malicious prosecution. See Renda v Int’l Union, UAW, 366 Mich 58; 114 NW2d 343 (1962). This principle is also stated in 3 Restatement Torts, § 653, and quoted in Renda, supra at 83.
The exercise of the officer’s discretion makes the initiation of the prosecution his own and protects from liability the person whose information or accusation has led the officer to initiate the proceedings.
If, however, the information is known by the giver to be false, an intelligent exercise of the officer’s discretion becomes impossible and a prosecution based thereon is procured by the person giving the false information. [Emphasis added.]
It follows, therefore, that plaintiffs who have been injured by egregious conduct of defendants for malicious prosecution are entitled to treble damages under MCL 600.2907; MSA 27A.2907. I am persuaded that this was the intent of the Legislature. If the underlying action in the malicious prosecution action was brought by the people, the question then becomes whether the action *294was brought with the "consent” of the people. "Consent” will generally mean that the decision on the part of the prosecutor was a knowing, intelligent, and informed decision, free of false assertions by the giver of information. If it is determined there was consent on the part of the people, then the plaintiff will be barred. If no consent is found, then the plaintiff’s case will stand. Using this method would allow treble damages, without "turning virtually every malicious prosecution action filed because of criminal proceedings into a 'straw party’ suit.”

 See Fischer v Maloney, 56 AD2d 884; 392 NYS2d 666 (1977). In Fischer, the president of a cooperative corporation unsuccessfully pursued a defamation action against the plaintiff, Mr. Fischer. Subsequently, Mr. Fischer sued Mr. Maloney, the president, and the members of the board of directors of the cooperative for violation of § 70 of the Civil Rights Laws (the New York statute similar to § 2907) regarding vexatious suits brought in the name of another without permission. The court dismissed plaintiffs action against the members of the board of directors.
In affirming the trial court, the appellate court held that since the previous action was commenced by the president of the cooperative, the plaintiff could not now claim that the suit was commenced without the cooperative’s consent. As such, it could not violate the statute.

 There was evidence that a Kmart security guard refused to confront plaintiff Camaj and testify after plaintiff would not accept a plea and probation at the preliminary examination. There was also a conflict between the security guard’s testimony and that of another Kmart employee regarding plaintiff’s possession of the allegedly stolen sports coat. Defendant Kresge also failed to produce the sports coat for inspection, before the trial, even though ordered by the court to do so. Additionally, three of plaintiff’s witnesses testified that the security guard’s version of the store incident was false.