Court Opinion

ID: 9818567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 05:56:02.34019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:45:45.589960
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing

BRIAN QUINN, Chief Justice.
Juan Daniel Cano contends, via a motion for rehearing, that we erred in concluding that he waived his complaint regarding the purported Sixth Amendment violation involving a speedy trial. Allegedly, the claim cannot be waived due to the holding in State v. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d 818 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). We liken the argument being urged as an attempt to graft *534avocados onto a pecan tree, disagree with it, and overrule the motion.
State v. Munoz dealt with whether the accused was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Id. at 821. There, unlike here, the trial court was made aware of the complaint via a motion to dismiss the indictment. State v. Munoz, 960 S.W.2d 191, 195 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1997), rev’d, 991 S.W.2d 818 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). There, unlike here, question arose regarding whether the accused even asked to be tried promptly; here, such a request was made. Furthermore, it was the dispute about the accused’s alleged failure to ask for a prompt trial that gave rise to the passage in Munoz that appellant wants to apply here.
According to the Court of Criminal Appeals in Munoz, the failure to request a prompt trial is not dispositive of a speedy trial claim; rather, it is a factor to be considered when weighing the four Barker criteria used in assessing whether the accused was denied that Sixth Amendment right. State v. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 825. Given that a motion to dismiss based upon the purported denial of a speedy trial had been filed with the trial court there, the Munoz panel had no need to be concerned with one’s compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure BB.l.1 So, we have little basis to extend that opinion and its holding to the arena controlled by Rule 33.1.
Moreover, we question how an appellate court could adequately review a Sixth Amendment complaint like that at bar without it having been first presented to a trial court. As both the United States Supreme Court and our Court of Criminal Appeals require, the gathering of four different categories of information is needed to properly consider the complaint. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, 116-17 (1972) (describing the four categories as: (1) length of the delay, (2) reason for the delay, (3) assertion of the right, and (4) prejudice to the accused.); State v. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 821 (describing the same). One considering the nature of those categories cannot but realize that their content is evidentiary and fact intensive. It would truly be difficult to determine the reasons for and any prejudice arising from the delay without permitting the litigants to present evidence developing those topics. Yet, appellate courts are ill-equipped to conduct such evidentiary hearings.
Simply said, it is both logical and practical to require complaints involving the denial of one’s right to a speedy trial to first be presented to and developed before a judicial body best able to handle eviden-tiary matters. That body is the trial court. Munoz does not suggest otherwise. Nor does any other authority cited by appellant obligate us to ignore the preservation requirements of Rule 33.1. Consequently, we opt not to graft into the latter a principle grown from and applicable to a different body of jurisprudence. See Hucks v. State, 348 S.W.3d 359, 363 (Tex.App.Amarillo 2011, no pet.) (holding that a speedy trial claim cannot be considered for the first time on appeal); Fuller v. State, 224 S.W.3d 823, 826-27 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (holding the same).
Accordingly, the motion for rehearing is denied.

. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 requires a complainant to present his complaint to the trial court as a prerequisite to urging it on appeal. Tex.R.App.P. 33.1(a)(1).