Court Opinion

ID: 9838067
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-04 12:07:14.807241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:32.845271
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued August 31, 2023

                                     In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                    For The

                          First District of Texas
                            ————————————
                              NO. 01-22-00848-CV
                           ———————————
 CITY OF HOUSTON AND FIREFIGHTERS’ AND POLICE OFFICERS’
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF HOUSTON, Appellants
                                       V.
                           SHAUN SPANN, Appellee

                   On Appeal from the 113th District Court
                            Harris County, Texas
                      Trial Court Case No. 2021-44036

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Fire fighter Shaun Spann received a disciplinary action and appealed that

decision to the Firefighters’ and Police Officers’ Civil Service Commission of the

City of Houston (“the Commission”). Following a hearing, the Commission upheld
the disciplinary action. Spann appealed the Commission’s decision to the district

court and sought declaratory relief against both the Commission and the City of

Houston (collectively, “Appellants”). Spann and Appellants filed cross motions for

summary judgment. Spann argued that the Commission did not provide him with

fifteen days’ notice of the appeal hearing as required by statute. The trial court

granted Spann’s motion and denied Appellants’ motion.

      In two issues, Appellants argue that (1) the trial court erred in granting

summary judgment for Spann and in denying Appellants’ summary judgment

motion because Spann received fifteen days’ notice of the appeal hearing, as

required by statute and due process; and (2) Appellants should be awarded attorney’s

fees and costs as the prevailing parties.

      We affirm.

                                     Background

      Shaun Spann is a fire fighter for the Houston Fire Department (“HFD”).

Following an incident that occurred in January 2021, HFD officials conducted a

disciplinary investigation. On May 4, 2021, HFD Fire Chief Samuel Peña issued a

written notice suspending Spann for three days without pay for violating a direct

order from a superior officer.

      On May 13, 2021, Spann timely appealed the disciplinary decision to the

Commission. Spann’s hearing before the Commission was originally scheduled for

                                            2
June 22, 2021. A quorum of the Commission was not present, however, so the

hearing could not commence on that date. Spann was then told to appear for a

hearing on June 29, but his representative could not attend on that date, so he

requested a new hearing date. In a notice dated June 28, the Commission notified

Spann that his hearing would be held on July 12.

      Spann filed a written request for continuance. He argued that Local

Government Code section 143.1015 required that he receive fifteen days’ notice of

the date of his appeal hearing. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 143.1015(b). Applying

the computation of time rules found in the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Code

Construction Act in the Government Code, Spann only received fourteen days’

notice of the hearing. Consequently, Spann argued that the Commission’s notice did

not comply with section 143.1015(b). He requested that the Commission “issue a

new hearing date that complies with the legislative mandated notice requirements in

[Local Government Code] Chapter 143.”

      At the hearing on July 12, 2021, the Commission considered Spann’s request

for a continuance. Spann argued that under the provisions for computation of time

in the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Code Construction Act, the day of the act

after which the time period begins to run is not included, but the last day of the time

period is included. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 4; TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.014(a). Under

these rules, June 28—the day the Commission sent the notice of the hearing—did

                                          3
not count in the computation of time, and July 12—the date of the hearing—did.

This, however, only provided Spann with fourteen days’ notice of the hearing.

Because he did not receive the statutorily required fifteen days’ notice of the hearing,

Spann requested “a new hearing date with a 15-day notice.”

      In response, the City of Houston argued that the computation of time rules

found in the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Government Code should not apply.

Instead, both June 28 and July 12 should be included in the time period, which would

mean that the notice sent on June 28 provided fifteen days’ notice of the hearing on

July 12. The City of Houston also argued that granting Spann’s request for a

continuance would cause the Commission to lose jurisdiction because the

Commission only has jurisdiction for sixty days after an aggrieved firefighter files

an appeal of a disciplinary decision and that time period would expire on July 13.

See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 143.1015(a). The Commission denied Spann’s request

for a continuance.

      Following the hearing, the Commission issued a written final order. The

Commission denied Spann’s appeal and upheld the temporary three-day suspension.

      Spann appealed the Commission’s decision to the district court and named

both the Commission and the City of Houston as defendants. In his petition, Spann

alleged that the Commission did not provide him with fifteen days’ notice of the

hearing as required by Local Government Code section 143.1015(b) and the Code

                                           4
Construction Act’s computation of time rules. Instead, he received, at most, fourteen

days’ notice of the hearing. Spann requested that the trial court render declaratory

judgment that (1) the Commission failed to provide the statutorily required notice

before his disciplinary appeal hearing; (2) the Commission’s July 12 final

disciplinary order “is reversed and nullified”; and (3) the Commission must provide

Spann with “15 days notice of his appeal hearing.” Spann also requested that the

court award him attorney’s fees.

      Appellants moved for summary judgment. Appellants argued that the

computation of time rules found in the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Code

Construction Act should not be applied to the Commission. Instead, Appellants

argued that the Commission was governed by its “Rules for the Administration of

the Civil Service System in the Fire and Police Departments.” These rules, which

Appellants attached as evidence, provided that the Commission “shall not be bound

by any rules of order, evidence, or procedures in its meetings, hearings, or

investigations, except such rules as it may itself establish . . . .” Appellants argued

that the Commission “interpreted the notice provision for section 143.1015(b) of the

statute to count each day from June 28th through July 12th as 15 days before the

hearing.” Appellants also argued that if the Commission had granted a continuance,

it would have lost jurisdiction over the matter and Spann’s appeal would have been

automatically sustained.

                                          5
      Spann also moved for summary judgment. Spann argued that the

Commission’s notice of the July 12 hearing was dated June 28 and mailed to him on

June 29. Using the computation of time rules found in the Rules of Civil Procedure

and the Code Construction Act, he received no more than fourteen days’ notice of

the hearing, in violation of Local Government Code section 143.1015(b). Spann

argued that the Commission’s denial of his motion for continuance invalidated the

Commission’s order resolving the merits of his disciplinary appeal because the

Commission did not have authority to proceed. Among other evidence, Spann

attached Appellants’ discovery responses to prove the date on which the

Commission mailed the notice to Spann.

      The trial court signed an order granting Spann’s summary judgment motion

on October 13, 2022. In this order, the court declared that:

      (a)    Defendant City of Houston’s Civil Service Commission violated
             TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 143.1015 by failing to provide the
             statutorily mandated 15 days notice before [Spann’s] disciplinary
             appeal hearing.
      (b)    Defendant City of Houston Civil Service Commission’s July 12,
             2021 Final Order is reversed.

The order did not address Spann’s request for attorney’s fees. The court did not sign

an order expressly denying Appellants’ summary judgment motion at this time.

      Spann then filed a motion for final summary judgment. The sole question

presented in this motion was whether Spann was the prevailing party entitled to

                                          6
recover his reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and court costs. Spann

supported this motion with the affidavit of his counsel.

      Appellants filed a notice of interlocutory appeal on November 14, 2022,

before the trial court ruled on Spann’s motion for final summary judgment. On

December 15, 2022, the trial court signed an order granting Spann’s motion for final

summary judgment. This order incorporated the trial court’s October 2022 summary

judgment rulings and awarded Spann approximately $12,000 in trial-level attorney’s

fees and approximately $42,000 in conditional appellate attorney’s fees. This order

denied Appellants’ summary judgment motion and stated that it was final and

appealable.1

1
      After Appellants appealed, Spann filed a motion in this Court to dismiss the appeal.
      Spann argued that this Court lacked appellate jurisdiction because the October 2022
      summary judgment order was not a final judgment and no statutory provision
      authorized an interlocutory appeal from this order because Appellants’ summary
      judgment motion could not be analogized to a plea to the jurisdiction. See TEX. CIV.
      PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(8) (allowing party to appeal from interlocutory
      order granting or denying plea to jurisdiction filed by governmental unit). We may
      treat a case that is appealed before the judgment is final as a prematurely filed appeal
      and permit the defect to be cured. See Fusion Indus., LLC v. Edgardo Madrid &
      Assocs., LLC, 624 S.W.3d 843, 849 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.); TEX. R.
      APP. P. 27.1(a), 27.2. If the trial court signs a final judgment before we dismiss a
      prematurely filed notice of appeal, the jurisdictional defect is cured and we have
      appellate jurisdiction over the case. Fusion Indus., 624 S.W.3d at 849. The notice
      of appeal is deemed filed on the day of the trial court’s final judgment. Id. Here,
      Appellants filed a premature notice of appeal from an unappealable interlocutory
      order. However, the trial court signed a final judgment disposing of all claims and
      all parties on December 15, 2022. The signing of this order cured the jurisdictional
      defect, and Appellants’ prematurely filed notice of appeal is deemed filed on the
      date of the final judgment. See TEX. R. APP. P. 27.1(a); Fusion Indus., 624 S.W.3d
                                             7
                                   Summary Judgment

      In their first issue, Appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting

Spann’s motion for summary judgment and denying their motion for summary

judgment because Spann received fifteen days’ notice of the appeal hearing before

the Commission.

A.    Standard of Review

      A fire fighter may appeal an adverse disciplinary decision by the Commission

to the district court. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 143.015(a). An appeal to the

district court under section 143.015 “is by trial de novo.” Id. § 143.015(b). Courts

have interpreted “trial de novo” in this context to “mean a review under the

substantial evidence rule.” Firemen’s & Policemen’s Civil Serv. Comm’n v.

Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Tex. 1984). This type of “trial de novo” is “a trial

to determine only the issues of whether the agency’s rule is free of the taint of any

illegality and is reasonably supported by substantial evidence.” Id. at 956 (quotations

omitted); Dunbar v. City of Houston, 557 S.W.3d 745, 749 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).

      “[T]he agency itself is the primary fact-finding body, and the question to be

determined by the trial court is strictly one of law.” Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d at 956;

      at 849. We conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction over this case, and we
      therefore deny Spann’s motion to dismiss.
                                          8
Watts v. City of Houston, 126 S.W.3d 97, 104 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003,

no pet.). The trial court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency on

controverted issues of fact. Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d at 956. The reviewing trial court

“is concerned only with the reasonableness of the administrative order, not its

correctness.” Id.

      Under a substantial evidence review, a question of statutory interpretation is

a question of law “and is not entitled to a presumption of validity.” Tex. Dep’t of

Pub. Safety v. Hutcheson, 235 S.W.3d 312, 314 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg 2007, pet. denied); Hightower v. State Comm’r of Educ., 778 S.W.2d 595,

597 (Tex. App.—Austin 1989, no writ). We review issues of statutory construction

de novo. Chambers-Liberty Counties Navigation Dist. v. State, 575 S.W.3d 339, 345

(Tex. 2019); Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Jackson, 76 S.W.3d 103, 106 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (noting, in case involving substantial evidence

standard of review, that appellate issue which is question of law, such as statutory

interpretation, is reviewed de novo). Our objective in construing a statute is to

determine and give effect to the Legislature’s intent, and we begin by examining the

plain meaning of the language used in the statute. Energen Res. Corp. v. Wallace,

642 S.W.3d 502, 509 (Tex. 2022). “A statute’s unambiguous language controls.”

City of Richardson v. Oncor Elec. Delivery Co., 539 S.W.3d 252, 261 (Tex. 2018).

                                         9
      We review a trial court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. Odyssey 2020

Acad., Inc. v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist., 624 S.W.3d 535, 540 (Tex. 2021);

see also Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Struve, 79 S.W.3d 796, 800 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg 2002, pet. denied) (“[W]e review the trial court’s judgment under

a substantial evidence review de novo.”). To prevail on a traditional motion for

summary judgment, the movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact

exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c);

Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Ass’n, 556 S.W.3d 274, 278 (Tex. 2018). When

the parties file cross motions for summary judgment, each party bears the burden of

establishing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tarr, 556 S.W.3d at

278 (quoting City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News, 22 S.W.3d 351, 356 (Tex.

2000)). If the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, the reviewing court

should determine all questions presented and render the judgment the trial court

should have rendered. Id. (quoting City of Garland, 22 S.W.3d at 356).

B.    Whether the Commission Provided the Statutorily Required Fifteen Days’
      Notice of the Appeals Hearing to Spann

      Local Government Code Chapter 143 governs various employment matters

concerning fire fighters and police officers, including classification and

appointment, compensation, and disciplinary actions. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE

§§ 143.001–.403; City of Athens v. MacAvoy, 353 S.W.3d 905, 906–07 (Tex. App.—

Tyler 2011, pet. denied); Watts, 126 S.W.3d at 100. Chapter 143 “outlines the

                                          10
disciplinary process by which a municipality may suspend [a fire fighter] and how

that [fire fighter] may appeal the suspension.” City of DeSoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d

389, 392 (Tex. 2009).

      A fire fighter may appeal specific actions, including disciplinary actions, to

the Commission if the fire fighter files the appeal within 15 days after the date the

action occurred. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 143.1015(a) (providing specific appeal

procedures for municipalities with population greater than 1.5 million); see id.

§ 143.010 (providing general procedures for appeal of disciplinary actions to

commission). The Commission shall render a decision in writing within 60 days after

it received the notice of appeal. Id. § 143.1015(a). If the Commission does not render

a decision in writing within 60 days, the Commission “shall sustain” the fire fighter’s

appeal. Id. “On or before the 15th day before the date the appeal hearing will be held,

the commission shall notify” the fire fighter “of the date on which the commission

will hold the hearing.” Id. § 143.1015(b).

      The Legislature adopted the Code Construction Act—Government Code

Chapter 311—to provide rules that “are meant to describe and clarify common

situations in order to guide the preparation and construction of codes.” TEX. GOV’T

CODE § 311.003. The Code Construction Act applies to “each code enacted by the

60th or a subsequent legislature as part of the state’s continuing statutory revision

program” and “each amendment, repeal, revision, and reenactment of a code or code

                                          11
provision by the 60th or a subsequent legislature.” Id. § 311.002(1)–(2). Local

Government Code section 1.002 provides that the Code Construction Act “applies

to the construction of each provision in this code except as otherwise expressly

provided by this code.” TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 1.002.

      The Code Construction Act includes a provision specifically relating to the

computation of time. Under Government Code section 311.014:

      (a)    In computing a period of days, the first day is excluded and the
             last day is included.
      (b)    If the last day of any period is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal
             holiday, the period is extended to include the next day that is not
             a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. . . .

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.014(a)–(b). Rule of Civil Procedure 4 contains a similar

provision. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 4 (“In computing any period of time prescribed or

allowed by these rules, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the

act, event, or default after which the designated period of time begins to run is not

to be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is

a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday . . . .”).

      Local Government Code section 143.1015 does not contain a provision

concerning how to compute time for the purpose of its notice requirement. We

therefore agree with Spann that Government Code section 311.014 applies to the

construction of Local Government Code section 143.1015(b). See TEX. LOC. GOV’T

CODE § 1.002; Onwuteaka v. Cohen, 846 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Tex. App.—Houston

                                           12
[1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (concluding that because section of Property Code at

issue did not have express provision governing computation of time for notice

requirement, section 311.014(a) of Code Construction Act applied).

      Under section 143.1015(b), the Commission was required to notify Spann

“[o]n or before the 15th day before the date the appeal hearing will be held” of “the

date on which the commission will hold the hearing.” TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE

§ 143.1015(b). The Commission notified Spann on June 28 that the appeal hearing

would be held on July 12.2 Using Government Code section 311.014 to compute

time, the first day, June 28, is excluded. The counting of days thus began on June

29. Fifteen days after June 29 is July 13, the day after Spann’s appeal hearing before

the Commission. We conclude that Spann did not receive the statutorily mandated

fifteen days’ notice of “the date on which the commission will hold the [appeal]

hearing.” See id.

      Appellants argue that Spann received more than fifteen days’ notice because

Spann “does not consider the additional days of notice he previously received for his

earlier hearing dates.” Appellants, however, cite no authority to support its argument

2
      Spann argues that the Commission admitted in its discovery responses that it did not
      mail notice to him until June 29. That same discovery response stated that the
      Commission provided notice by email to Spann’s representatives on June 28. Local
      Government Code section 143.1015(b) does not specify the manner in which the
      Commission is to provide notice of an appeal hearing to a fire fighter. However,
      regardless of which date is used as the starting point of this notice period, Spann did
      not receive fifteen days’ notice as required by statute.
                                            13
that these days can be considered, and the language of section 143.1015(b) suggests

otherwise. That section states: “On or before the 15th day before the date the appeal

hearing will be held, the commission shall notify the fire fighter . . . of the date on

which the commission will hold the hearing.” Id. (emphasis added). Notice to Spann

that his hearing before the Commission would be held on June 22 or June 29 is not

notice that the hearing would be held on July 12, the date on which a quorum of the

Commission was present and Spann’s hearing was actually held. We conclude that

the days of notice for the prior hearing settings cannot be considered in determining

whether Spann received fifteen days’ notice of the July 12 hearing date.

      Appellants further argue that because Spann’s appeal hearing had been set for

two earlier dates and he had been ready to proceed on one of those dates (June 22),

he “was not deprived of an adequate opportunity to prepare.” Section 143.1015(b),

however, does not contain a requirement that the fire fighter demonstrate prejudice

if he did not receive fifteen days’ notice of the hearing. The plain language of the

statute states only that “[o]n or before the 15th day before the date the appeal hearing

will be held, the commission shall notify the fire fighter . . . of the date on which the

commission will hold the hearing.” Id. Spann did not receive notice that the appeal

hearing would be held on July 12 “on or before the 15th day before” that date. He

was not required to demonstrate that receiving only fourteen days’ notice of the

hearing date prejudiced his ability to prepare for the hearing.

                                           14
      Additionally, Appellants argue that the Rules of Civil Procedure, including

the computation of time provision found in Rule 4, do not apply to proceedings

before the Commission. Even if Appellants are correct, Government Code section

311.014, which has analogous computation rules, does apply. See id. § 1.002

(providing that Code Construction Act “applies to the construction of each provision

in this code except as otherwise expressly provided by this code”).

      Appellants further argue that even if section 311.014 is applicable, we should

reverse because the Code Construction Act has “a broader perspective.” Appellants

point to section 311.021’s five presumptions relating to the enactment of a statute,

including presumptions that “a just and reasonable result is intended” and “public

interest is favored over any private interest.” See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.021(3),

(5). Appellants argue that these presumptions weigh in their favor here because the

Commission would have lost jurisdiction over Spann’s appeal on July 13 if Spann is

correct. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 143.1015(a) (“If the commission does not

render a decision in writing within 60 days after the date it receives notice of the

appeal, the commission shall sustain the fire fighter’s . . . appeal.”).

      The statutory presumptions in favor of a “just and reasonable result” and the

“public interest” have never been interpreted to be automatic win provisions for

governmental entities, or as excuses for disregarding the Legislature’s chosen notice

timeframe. Nor does statutory compliance in this instance result in an unfair windfall

                                           15
to Spann. As Spann points out, the delay in holding the hearing on July 12 was not

his fault. It is undisputed that Spann’s appeal hearing was originally scheduled for

June 22, a date well within the time period for the Commission to act, but the hearing

could not be held because the Commission did not have a quorum. The Commission

attempted to reschedule the hearing for June 29, but Spann’s representative could

not attend on that date. See id. § 143.010(c) (“In each hearing, appeal, or review of

any kind in which the commission performs an adjudicatory function, the affected

fire fighter . . . is entitled to be represented by counsel or a person the fire

fighter . . . chooses.”). Upon hearing that Spann’s representative could not attend on

June 29, the Commission could have immediately sent notice of a hearing set for

July 12, and that notice would have been timely. However, the Commission waited

until June 28 to send notice of a hearing on July 12, but by this point, Spann could

not receive fifteen days’ notice of the hearing date.

      Finally, Appellants argue that the Commission “has its own rules for both

evidence and procedure.” Citing the Commission’s “Rules for the Administration of

the Civil Service System in the Fire and Police Departments,” Appellants argue that

the Commission is not “bound by any rules of order, evidence, or procedures in its

meetings, hearings, or investigations, except such rules as it may itself

establish . . . .” Appellants contend that because the Commission is not bound by the

Rules of Civil Procedure, it may permissibly interpret section 143.1015(b)’s notice

                                          16
provision as including both the first day of the time period—June 28—and the last

day of the time period—July 12—which would make the notice sent on June 28

timely under the statute.

      This argument runs afoul of Government Code section 311.014. When

applying the computation rules set out in that statute, June 28 would not be included

in the period of days. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.014(a). Appellants cite no

authority holding that the City of Houston or the Commission may ignore this statute

enacted by the Legislature and instead apply a different computation rule. Indeed,

the Texas Constitution prohibits home-rule municipalities, like the City of Houston,

from enacting any charter or ordinance that is “inconsistent with the Constitution of

the State, or of the general laws enacted by the Legislature of this State.” TEX.

CONST. art. XI, § 5; Talley v. City of Killeen, 418 S.W.3d 205, 207 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2013, pet. denied); see City of Houston v. Bates, 406 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tex.

2013) (“An ordinance of a home-rule city that attempts to regulate a subject matter

preempted by a state statute is unenforceable to the extent it conflicts with the state

statute.”) (quotations omitted).

      We conclude that Spann did not receive fifteen days’ notice of the appeal

hearing before the Commission on July 12, as required by Local Government Code

section 143.1015(b). See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 143.1015(b). The Commission’s

decision is therefore not “free of the taint of any illegality.” See Brinkmeyer, 662

                                          17
S.W.2d at 956. We hold that the trial court did not err by granting Spann’s motion

for summary judgment and denying Appellants’ motion for summary judgment.

      We overrule Appellants’ first issue.3

                                      Conclusion

      We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                April L. Farris
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Guerra and Farris.

3
      Because we hold that the trial court did not err by granting Spann’s motion for
      summary judgment and denying Appellants’ motion, Appellants are not the
      prevailing parties and are not entitled to attorney’s fees. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE
      § 143.015(c) (providing that in appeal of Commission decision to district court,
      court may award reasonable attorney’s fees to prevailing party and assess court costs
      against non-prevailing party). We overrule Appellants’ second issue.
                                           18