Court Opinion

ID: 9726420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:48:20.769312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:26.945883
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE TRAPP, specially concurring: The majority opinion has stated the standard of review to be whether or not there was an abuse of discretion in the action of the trial court. One finds that the phrase “abuse of discretion” may be so used as to equally express almost opposite and contrary meanings. New opinions of our courts have discussed the diverse meanings of the phrase. In Keen v. Davis (1969), 108 Ill. App. 2d 55, 63, 246 N.E.2d 467, 471, the court adopted the statement: “[T]hat discretionary judicial action is abused ‘° ° ° when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused only where no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court. If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion.’ ” See also Peek v. United States (9th Cir. 1963), 321 F.2d 934, cert. denied (1964), 376 U.S. 954, 11 L. Ed. 2d 973, 84 S. Ct. 973. Such definition does not adequately state a standard of review which is appropriate in the examination of the decree here at issue. I suggest that “abuse of discretion” as a standard of review is better defined as either a departure or deviation from the rationale of the case law and statutes which amounts to error at law, or is clearly against the evidence in the case. See Hall v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. (1953), 349 Ill. App. 175, 183, 110 N.E.2d 654, 657, revd on other grounds (1955), 5 Ill. 2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77. In the latter context I concur.