Court Opinion

ID: 9914816
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-03 15:06:01.160946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:45.252333
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                               NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                              APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
       This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
    internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                       SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                       APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                       DOCKET NO. A-0982-22

IN THE MATTER OF THE
EXPUNGEMENT OF CIVIL
COMMITMENT RECORDS OF
S.C.S.
______________________________

                  Argued November 14, 2023 – Decided January 3, 2024

                  Before Judges Enright and Paganelli.

                  On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                  Division, Ocean County, Docket No. L-1083-22.

                  Allan Marain argued the cause for appellant S.C.S.

PER CURIAM

         S.C.S.1 appeals from an October 18, 2022 order denying his petition to

expunge his records pertaining to civil commitments in the Carrier Clinic,

Monmouth Medical Center, Kimball Medical Center, and Riverview Medical

Center. We affirm.

1
  Because the underlying dispute concerns S.C.S.'s application for expungement
of his commitment records, we use initials to preserve his anonymity. R. 1:38-
3(f)(2).
      S.C.S. states that he was "born [in] 1994 . . . [and] admitted to mental

health care facilities in 2008, 2009, 2013, and 2017."       He notes the 2013

"[d]ischarge [s]ummary      . . . asserted as a final diagnosis, 'Axis 1. Bipolar

disorder manic with psychotic features in remission.'" The 2017 "[d]ischarge

[s]ummary [a]ssessment stated '[diagnosis]: unspecified depressive disorder.'"

      S.C.S. seeks expungement for "employment reasons and [because] his

fiancé has a firearm and cannot keep [the firearm] in their residence because of

[his] civil commitment record."

      The judge reviewed: the commitment records; "letters from [S.C.S.]'s

father, fiancé and friend"; a certificate that S.C.S. was an Emergency Medical

Technician; a letter from the United States Department of Justice revealing no

prior arrest; and a complete and thorough application. In addition, the judge

heard testimony from S.C.S. and Sarah DeMarco, Psy.D. (Dr. DeMarco).

      Dr. DeMarco "was qualified to offer opinions pertinent to the application."

The judge noted that "[s]he interviewed [S.C.S.]; . . . administered psychological

testing, Personality Assessment Inventory[;] interviewed [S.C.S.]'s father and

fiancé[;] and reviewed the commitment records from the four institutions . . . ."

The judge found Dr. DeMarco provided a "comprehensive report to the court,"

and that Dr. DeMarco opined:

            It is clear that [S.C.S.] struggled with mental health
            problems as an adolescent, with a few years of stability

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            from 2013-2017 and then a brief period of remerging
            depressive symptoms in 2017 following the death of his
            dogs . . . [.]

            [B]y all accounts, [S.C.S.] appears to have remained
            psychiatrically stable at least until 2017 – 4.5 years ago.
            He has not demonstrated continued mental health
            symptoms or functional impairment, nor has he
            required any mental health treatment since. As such,
            any such problems have certainly substantially
            improved to the extent that they are not present at this
            point, nor have they been in at least 4.5 years, which
            was the time of his last hospitalization, per available
            data. In other words, they are in at least substantial
            remission. Additionally, he is not likely to act in a
            manner dangerous to the public . . . .

            Again, he has not engaged in any mental health
            treatment, nor has he taken psychiatric medication
            since 2017, and by all accounts has been stable since.
            If he, in fact, had a chronic mood disorder (i.e., Bipolar
            Disorder) as indicated in hospital records, it is very
            likely there would have continued to be evidence of
            such in recent years, especially in the absence of any
            psychiatric medication. Moreover, there would likely
            be evidence of functional impairment in other aspects
            of his life. However, to the contrary, he has maintained
            stable and consistent employment over time and has a
            stable intimate relationship.

      However, the judge found Dr. DeMarco's opinion was "not supported by

the substantial evidence in the record of serious and repeated episodes of

[S.C.S.] injuring himself and threatening others, with the last hospitalization

only five years ago." Therefore, the judge gave the doctor's opinion "little

weight." Moreover, noting that a "final determination of dangerousness lies

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with the courts, not the expertise of psychiatrists and psychologists," citing In

re D.C., 146 N.J. 31, 59 (1995), the judge found S.C.S. did not meet the burden

necessary to grant expungement.

      We review the trial court's interpretation of the statute governing

expungement of mental health records de novo. State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161,

176 (2010). However, we defer to a motion judge's fact finding because he or

she has the "opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the 'feel' of

the case, which [we] cannot enjoy." In re Civil Commitment of R.F., 217 N.J.

152, 174 (2014) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). Moreover,

as "[t]he factfinder, [the judge] may accept some of [an] expert's testimony and

reject the rest." Torres v. Schripps, Inc., 342 N.J. Super. 419, 430 (App. Div.

2001) (citing Todd v. Sheridan, 268 N.J. Super. 387, 401 (App. Div. 1993)).

"That is, a factfinder is not bound to accept the testimony of an expert witness,

even if it is unrebutted by any other evidence." Id. at 431 (quoting Johnson v.

American Homestead Mortgage Corp., 306 N.J. Super. 429, 438 (App. Div.

1997)). Further, "expert testimony need not be given greater weight than other

evidence nor more weight than it would otherwise deserve in light of common

sense and experience." Id. at 430.

      "Assuming no error of law, we defer to a trial court's exercise of discretion

so long as it was not 'clearly unreasonable in the light of the accompanying and

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surrounding circumstances . . . .'" In re LoBasso, 423 N.J. Super. 475, 496 (App.

Div. 2012) (quoting Smith v. Smith, 17 N.J. Super. 128, 132-33 (App. Div.

1951)).

      Under N.J.S.A. 30:4-80.9:

            [T]he court shall hear evidence as to: the circumstances
            of why the commitment or determination was imposed
            upon the petitioner, the petitioner's mental health
            record and criminal history, and the petitioner's
            reputation in this community. If the court finds that the
            petitioner will not likely act in a manner dangerous to
            the public safety and finds that the grant of relief is not
            contrary to the public interest, the court shall grant such
            relief for which the petitioner has applied and, an order
            directing the clerk of the court to expunge such
            commitment from the records of the court.

      S.C.S. argues the judge abused his discretion in denying expungement

because:   (1) the judge's analysis "misapprehend[ed]" the issues under the

statute; (2) he failed to provide cogent reasons to reject Dr. DeMarco's opinion;

and (3) "[n]o evidence was presented to challenge the reasoned opinion of Dr.

DeMarco . . . ." We are not persuaded.

      The statute requires S.C.S. to satisfy a two-prong test for expungement:

"not likely [to] act in a manner dangerous to the public safety and . . . the grant

of relief is not contrary to the public interest." N.J.S.A. 30:4-80.9; see Matter

of M.D.V., 465 N.J. Super. 194, 197 (App. Div. 2020).             Here, the judge

determined that S.C.S. did not satisfy his burden because "of his record of

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serious and repeated episodes of . . . injuring himself and threatening others,

with the last hospitalization only five years ago."

      S.C.S. argues that the judge's analysis "begs the question" because the

judge "cit[ed] . . . the admissions that he was trying to expunge." However,

S.C.S.'s argument misses the mark. The judge was required to consider the

entirety of S.C.S.'s presentation. Included within the required fact-sensitive

analysis is S.C.S.'s history and his "recent behavior and any recent act or threat."

D.C., 146 N.J. at 42. In conducting his analysis, the judge determined that given

S.C.S.'s "undisputed" "serious and repeated episodes," with the last being within

five years, S.C.S. failed to meet his burden. We find no error in the application

of the statute and find no abuse of discretion in the judge's determination.

      The judge gave "little weight" to Dr. DeMarco's opinion. He determined

the opinion "was not supported by the substantial evidence in the record."

S.C.S.'s arguments -that the judge was required to provide a more detailed

explanation for his weighing of the opinion or should have given the opinion

more weight, considering it was unopposed, are without merit.            The judge

satisfactorily explained his decision and had wide latitude in considering the

expert's opinion. See Torres, 342 N.J. Super. at 430-31. We find no reason to

disturb the judge's determination here.

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      Accordingly, we affirm the October 18, 2022 order denying S.C.S.'s

application under N.J.S.A. 30:4-80.9.

      Therefore, we need not address the denial of S.C.S.'s application under

N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c). We only add that the requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c),

which dictate the situations under which a person may be denied "a permit to

purchase a handgun or a firearms purchaser identification card" are inapplicable

to the requirements for the expungement of civil commitment records under

N.J.S.A. 30:4-80.9.

      Affirmed.

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