Court Opinion

ID: 9672519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:56:19.246252+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:16.759847
License: Public Domain

OSBORN, Chief Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in part and respectfully dissent in part.
There can be no question that the ripeness doctrine, when properly raised, will prohibit the trial of issues such as are raised in this case. I concur with the majority opinion that there can be no trial on the merits where an administrative decision is not final and the case in effect is not ripe for trial of the issues in dispute.
My dissent concerns when and how that issue must be raised. In this ease, there was nothing pending before any administrative board or commission at the time this case was tried. There was a procedure whereby a request could be made for a variance or change in administrative zoning orders. Any change in prior zoning provisions would necessarily change the use which could be made of the land in question. At the time of trial, the Appellees did not have pending any request for a variance. The Appellants in their answer alleged that the Appellees had not exhausted its administrative remedies. It did not file a plea in abatement which if granted would have avoided a trial at a time when it was contended the case was not ripe for trial on the merits.
The issue was raised again in a Motion for Summary Judgment. This is not an *402appeal from the granting of such a motion, and the issues raised in a summary judgment hearing may not be raised again after a trial on the merits based upon the summary judgment order. Ackermann v. Vordenbaum, 403 S.W.2d 362 (Tex.1966); Note, Appeal and Error: Reviewability of Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment After Trial on Merits, 16 Okla. L.Rev. 335 (1963).
The ripeness doctrine was again raised in a Motion for Directed Verdict filed at the close of the Plaintiffs’ case. The motion was overruled and another motion was not presented at the close of all the evidence. This resulted in the issues raised by the motion being waived for appellate review unless raised in some other manner. On this issue, the cases are legion. Jacobini v. Hall, 719 S.W.2d 396 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Shindler v. Marr & Associates, 695 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Montgomery Ward & Company v. Garza, 660 S.W.2d 619 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1983, no writ); Texas Steel Company v. Douglas, 533 S.W.2d 111 (Tex.Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1976, writ ref’d. n.r.e.); Horizon Properties Corporation v. Martinez, 513 S.W.2d 264 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1974, writ ref’d n.r.e.); 3 R. McDonald, Texas Civil Practice § 11.26 (1983).
If the ripeness doctrine is a jurisdictional issue, then this Court should not rely upon a Motion for Instructed Verdict or Motion for Summary Judgment as the basis for the issue having been raised. We should, sua sponte, determine that the court is without jurisdiction and dismiss the case. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company v. City of Kountze, 543 S.W.2d 871 (Tex.Civ. App.—Beaumont 1976, no writ). That apparently is what the court has done without saying so.
I conclude, admittedly without a great deal of supporting authority, that the ripeness doctrine is not jurisdictional and is an issue that must be properly raised in the trial court or it is waived. In MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 106 S.Ct. 2561, 91 L.Ed.2d 285 (1986), the issue was raised in the trial court by a demurrer to the complaint. We have abolished the demurrer in Texas. I concluded that the issue should have been raised by a plea in abatement, and absent some procedure which properly raised the issue in the trial court, the ripeness doctrine was waived and should not be the basis for a reversal, sua sponte, after the case has been tried on the merits. Therefore, I dissent.