Court Opinion

ID: 9809640
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:19:27.537518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:51:17.125110
License: Public Domain

BeowN, J.,
dissenting: I am of opinion that .the motion to nonsuit should have been sustained, because upon the plaintiff’s own testimony he is not entitled to recover. The admitted facts are that the plaintiff filed a written application with the defendant for a Plymouth Rock health policy, and in that application he represented that he had not been exposed to any contagious, or infectious disease, and that at the time of the application, nor for a year past, had he had any local or other disease, except as follows: “No .exceptions.”
It is admitted that at the time that the plaintiff filed this application and made this representation he suffered from a disease or infirmity called “Inguinal hernia.” It is a matter of common knowledge that hernia is an infirmity and a disease of which the sufferer is bound to have personal knowledge. When he made out the application for the policy of insurance, in answer to the question, he said he had no disease and no infirmity, and the space where he was expected to write the exception was filled in, “No exceptions.” The defendant company had a right to assume from this application that the plaintiff was in every respect sound.
It is proven by the testimony of plaintiff’s own*experts, as well as the defendant’s, that hernia can only be cured by an operation, and that its tendency is to grow worse and impair the health.
*229Medical boobs declare that 'bernia consists of a profusion, generally of tbe bowels, wbicb has escaped from its natural cavity, and projects through some natural or accidental opening of the walls of the latter; as hernia of the brain, of the bowels, or of the lungs. Hernia of the abdominal viscera is a common disease or infirmity, and is commonly called rupture. The disease of which the plaintiff suffered is called “luguinal hernia” because it is in the region of the inguen or groin.,
I am of. opinion th'at his Honor should have instructed the jury that the disease from which the plaintiff suffered, or the infirmity, whichever it is called, was such as would prevent a recovery in this action, for it is manifestly a physical, unsoundness. It was error to leave the effect of the disease to the jury to determine. It was substantially permitting the jury to act as medical experts and determine whether the defendant should have made such contract. The effect of the hernia in determining the nature of the risk assumed, as well as fixing the rate of the insurance, was a matter solely for the judgment of the insurer before it entered into the contract at all. It had the right to have the facts truthfully disclosed so that its officials' could determine whether the risk was one proper to be taken. It was obviously the intent of the defendant in making inquiries to learn the nature and character of any and all diseases and unsoundness that might exist, so as to decide for itself whéther the plaintiff was a proper subject for insurance. It is not necessary for the plaintiff to have acted fraudulently; it is only necessary to show that he acted erroneously and stated the fact untruly.
While section 4808 of the Revisal of 1905 of North Carolina declares that all statements in an application for insurance are mere representations, and not warranties, and that no representation, unless material or fraudulent, shall prevent a recovery, yet a material misrepresentation will avoid a policy if it is calculated to influence the insurer in making the contract. Gardner v. Ins. Co., 163 N. C., 367; 79 S. E., 806; Fishblate v. Fidelity Co., 140 N. C., 589; 53 S. E., 354.
“Every fact which is untruly stated or wrongfully suppressed in an application for insurance must be regarded as material, if it would influence the insurer into making or refusing to make the contract.”
“A false representation avoids the policy, when material, wholly without reference to its intent, unless otherwise provided by statute.” And we have no statute to the contrary. Fishblate v. Fidelity Co., supra.
“If the company was imposed upon (whether fraudulently or not is immaterial) by such representations, and induced to enter into the contract, assuming that both parties acted- in the utmost- good faith, justice would require that the contract be canceled and the premiums returned.” Alexander v. Ins. Co., 150 N. C., 536; S. E., 432.
*230Under all tbe authorities, tbe suppression of tbe true facts, whether fraudulently or not, avoids the policy. Bryant v. Ins. Co., 147 N. C., 181; Schass v. Ins. Society, 166 N. C., 555; Vance on Insurance, pp. 267-269.
We find a case very similar to this in 42 N. Y. Supplement, 288, Hannah v. Life Assn., quoted in Kerr on Insurance, page 341, in which a warranty against local injury or infirmity is held to be broken if tbe insured at tbe time was suffering from a stricture. While hernia is not a serious illness, it is nevertheless a physical infirmity, an unsoundness, and tbe failure to make it known in tbe application voids tbe policy.
Me. Justice WalkeR concurs in this opinion.