Court Opinion

ID: 9608162
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:07:09.065691+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:44.156997
License: Public Domain

Smith, Judge,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. In my view, the very fact that the contract at issue is not a part of the record on appeal, and that it likewise was not made a part of the record below, demonstrates conclusively that the trial court’s sua sponte dismissal was, at best, premature. Even assuming, as did the trial court, that Williams’ bare observation in his answer that “over 7 seven [sic] years is a long time to charge interest on a debt that should not exist” is sufficient to put Georgia Receivables on notice that Williams intended to use a particular statute of limitation defense, this would still not be sufficient to authorize the trial court’s sua sponte dismissal in this case.
The reason a sua sponte dismissal was not authorized here is that *315Georgia Receivables had as yet received no opportunity to respond with particularity to the undisputedly vague “defense” purportedly raised by Williams. As I noted in my special concurrence in Georgia Receivables v. Cheatham, 216 Ga. App. 656 (455 SE2d 375) (1995), “ ‘(t)he purpose of the requirement that affirmative defenses be pleaded is to prevent surprise and to give the opposing party fair notice of what he must meet as a defense.’ [Cit.]” Id. at 658. It seems clear to me that it is never proper for the trial court to dismiss an action sua sponte based on an affirmative defense where there remains any possibility that the plaintiff could yet introduce matters otherwise outside the record that would “meet” that defense.
Decided August 3, 1995.
Frederick J. Hanna & Associates, Frederick J. Hanna, Elizabeth C. Whealler, for appellant.
Michael A. Williams, pro se.
Because Georgia Receivables was given no reasonable opportunity to show that the statute of limitation under OCGA § 11-2-725 (1) does not apply under the facts of this case and that the 20-year statute of limitation for contracts under seal generally should apply,1 I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray and Judge Blackburn join in this dissent.

 It is not enough that the contract may have been under seal, because where the UCC statute of limitation in contracts for sale, OCGA § 11-2-725, does indeed apply, it, and not OCGA § 9-3-23, pertaining to sealed instruments generally, controls. McLean v. Gray, 180 Ga. App. 794, 795 (350 SE2d 815) (1986).