Court Opinion

ID: 9533185
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:29:14.700049+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:56.417565
License: Public Domain

*298Abrams, J.
(concurring, with whom Nolan, J., joins). As I read the record, the judge’s exclusion of reputation evidence was based on the failure of defense counsel to lay the foundation that would qualify the witness to testify to the defendant’s reputation.1 The judge could reasonably have ruled that the defendant failed to show that the witness’s sources were sufficiently numerous and general to permit the witness to testify to the defendant’s reputation for truthfulness. See Commonwealth v. United Food Corp., 374 Mass. 765, 769 (1978). Compare Commonwealth v. Belton, 352 Mass. 263, 269 (narrow compass of business associations; “single occasion upon which the witnesses heard any report of his character expressed”), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 872 (1967); Commonwealth v. Baxter, 267 Mass. 591, 592-593 (1929) (testimony based on interviews of five-named persons); Commonwealth v. Porter, 237 Mass. 1, 3-4 (1921) (defendant’s reputation discussed exclusively in the family of witness’s father-in-law, who was the defendant’s employer); Commonwealth v. LaPierre, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 871 (1980) (testimony of waitress based on reputation among two other waitresses and a cook). See also P.J. Liacos, Massachusetts Evidence 148-149 (5th ed. 1981).
*299I believe that the judge correctly permitted the defendant to try to lay a foundation for reputation testimony despite the fact that the defendant had not yet testified, and therefore his reputation for truthfulness had not yet been attacked. Where, as in this case, it is clear that the defendant intends to testify, and that the prosecutor will attempt to impeach him through cross-examination, I would not require a judge to wait until after the defendant has been cross-examined to permit a witness to testify to the defendant’s reputation for truthfulness.
I believe that the rules of evidence can and should accommodate the needs of witnesses as well as those of the court and the litigants. I think it to be the better practice to admit such evidence de bene on the assurance that the defendant will testify, and that the Commonwealth will cross-examine him in an effort to impeach the defendant’s credibility. The record reflects that these conditions were met. The rule that the court adheres to would have required the witness to return to court a second time to answer questions concerning the defendant’s reputation for truthfulness. See P J. Liacos, Massachusetts Evidence 166 (5th ed. 1981). In my view this inconvenience to the witness does not serve any valid purpose in the administration of justice.
“The convenience of the jurors, the court, and the witnesses may all be best served by receiving the testimony ‘out of order’ in certain circumstances, subject to an avowal by counsel that such testimony will later be ‘tied in’ ... . [Tjrial judges . . . are in a far better position than are we to know whether, as a matter of the order of presenting witnesses and evidence, testimony from a particular witness may be allowed ‘out of order’ subject to avowal, proffer, and the various other devices employed to avoid wasting the time of the court and the jury with testimony that is irrelevant while at the same time avoiding if possible the necessity for recalling or seriously inconveniencing a witness.” United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 412 n.9 (1980). “Witnesses are the lifeblood of the system. Without them, few wrongdoers would be brought to justice for their acts, nor would there *300be any evidence to present in criminal cases. And yet no consideration is given to their needs or to the inconvenience that having to appear in court may cause them.” L. Katz, Justice Is the Crime 54 (1972). I commend the judge for trying to spare the witness the ordeal of an additional appearance in court.

 The witness testified as follows:
Defense counsel: “How long have you known Mr. Sheline?”
The witness: “Approximately three years.”
Defense counsel: “Where have you known him?”
The witness: “Gloucester.”
Defense counsel: “Do you know his reputation for truth and veracity?”
The prosecutor: “Objection.”
The judge: “The question is asked without proper foundation.”
Defense counsel: “May I try again, Your Honor?”
The judge: “Yes.”
Defense counsel: “You have known Mr. Sheline where?”
The witness: “Gloucester.”
Defense counsel: “In what community in Gloucester, among what sort of people?”
The witness: “In restaurants, down in Bob’s Clam Shack, down at the marina.”
Defense counsel: “Are you aware of the truth and veracity among the individuals in the community?”
The prosecutor: “Objection.”
The judge: “Sustained.”