Court Opinion

ID: 9419836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:51:45.878534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:20.857714
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
dissenting.
“Investment contract” is not a term of art; it is a conception dependent upon the circumstances of a particular situation. If this case came before us on a finding authorized by Congress that the facts disclosed an “investment contract” within the general scope of § 2 (1) of the Securities Act, 48 Stat. 74,15 U. S. C. § 77b (1), the Securities and.Exchange Commission’s finding would govern, unless, on the record, it was wholly unsupported. But *302that is not the case before us. Here the ascertainment of the existence of an “investment contract” had to be made independently by the District Court and it found against its existence. 60 F. Supp. 440. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit sustained that finding. 151 F. 2d 714. If respect is to be paid to the wise rule of judicial administration under which this Court does not upset concurrent findings of two lower courts in the ascertainment of facts and the relevant inferences to be drawn from them, this case clearly calls for its application. See Allen v. Trust Company of Georgia, 326 U. S. 630. For the crucial issue in this case turns on whether the contracts for the land and the contracts for the management of the property were in reality separate agreements or merely parts of a single transaction. It is clear from its opinion that the District Court was warranted in its conclusion that the record does not establish the existence of an investment contract:
“. . . the record in this case shows that not a single sale of citrus grove property was made by the Howey Company during the period involved in this suit, except to purchasers who actually inspected the property before purchasing the same. The record further discloses that no purchaser is required to engage the Service Company to care for his property and that of the fifty-one purchasers acquiring property during this period, only forty-two entered into contracts with the Service Company for the care of the property.” 60 F. Supp. at 442.
Simply because other arrangements may have the appearances of this transaction but are employed as an evasion of the Securities Act does not mean that the present contracts were evasive. I find nothing in the Securities Act to indicate that Congress meant to bring every innocent transaction within the scope of the Act simply because a perversion of them is covered by the Act.