Court Opinion

ID: 9900423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:12:42.855609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:05.332481
License: Public Domain

No. 325                       June 28, 2023            605

            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                    STATE OF OREGON

                       Steven BELLSHAW,
                   individually and on behalf of
               all other similarly situated persons,
                       Plaintiff-Respondent,
                                 v.
              FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY
                           OF OREGON,
                      an Oregon corporation,
                       Defendant-Appellant.
                Multnomah County Circuit Court
                       15CV16877; A173722

   Judith H. Matarazzo, Judge.
   Argued and submitted January 26, 2022.
   Brad S. Daniels argued the cause for appellant. Also on
the briefs were Timothy W. Snider, Stephen H. Galloway,
and Stoel Rives LLP.
   Nadia H. Dahab argued the cause for respondent. Also
on the brief were David F. Sugerman and Sugerman Law
Office; Tim Quenelle and Tim Quenelle PC; and Amy
Johnson and Law Offices of Amy R. Johnson.
  Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Lagesen, Chief
Judge, and Powers, Judge.*
   ORTEGA, P. J.
   Reversed and remanded.

______________
   * Lagesen, C. J., vice James, J. pro tempore.
606   Bellshaw v. Farmers Ins. Co.
Cite as 326 Or App 605 (2023)                              607

        ORTEGA, P. J.
         This case concerns a class action proceeding against
Farmers Insurance Company for providing insufficient
notices to customers regarding their rights with respect
to choosing an auto repair shop. The trial court found that
the notice in question did not satisfy all of the statutory
requirements, and thus awarded each member of the class
the statutory penalty of $100, for a total award of more than
$26 million. On appeal, defendant raises six assignments of
error. In its first assignment of error, defendant asserts that
the trial court misinterpreted the statute at issue. In its sec-
ond and third assignments of error, defendant argues that
the aggregate statutory penalty violates defendant’s due
process rights. In its fourth and fifth assignments of error,
defendant argues that the trial court erred by certifying a
class that included time-barred claims. In its sixth assign-
ment of error, defendant asserts that the trial court erred by
amending the class parameters after making a decision on
the merits.
          We conclude that the trial court did not err in its
interpretation of the statute. However, we conclude that the
trial court misapplied the statute of limitations analysis,
and the resulting class definition includes claims that are
time-barred, including the claim of the only named class
representative, which requires reversal on the fourth and
fifth assignments of error and remand to the trial court,
and eliminates the need to address the sixth assignment
of error. Given the change in class definition, the aggregate
statutory damages amount will change and must be reas-
sessed; we offer guidance as to how the trial court will need
to resolve the due process issues on remand. We accordingly
reverse and remand for further proceedings.
          I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND
               PROCEDURAL HISTORY
        In 1977, the Oregon Legislature enacted ORS
746.280, which provided that an insurer could “not require
that a particular person make the repairs to the insured’s
motor vehicle as a condition for recovery by the insured
under a motor vehicle liability insurance policy.” ORS
746.280 (1979), amended by Or Laws 2007, ch 506, § 1. The
608                                   Bellshaw v. Farmers Ins. Co.

Legislature also enacted ORS 746.290, which required
insurers to notify their customers of “the provisions of ORS
746.280,” and ORS 746.300, which created a right of action
for “an insured whose insurer violates ORS 746.280 or
746.290.”1 See also Or Laws 1977, ch 785, §§ 2-4.
        In 1993, the Oregon Insurance Division issued
Bulletin 93-3 (1993 Bulletin), which approved specific lan-
guage for insurance companies to use to comply with ORS
746.290. Oregon Insurance Division Bulletin 93-3 (Apr 20,
1993). Defendant began using the language from the 1993
Bulletin in its notices that were sent with all new policies
issued in Oregon (Notice). The Notice stated:
     “OREGON LAW STATES THAT: AN INSURER SHALL
   NOT REQUIRE THAT A PARTICULAR PERSON MAKE
   THE REPAIRS TO THE INSURED’S MOTOR VEHICLE
   AS A CONDITION FOR RECOVERY BY THE INSURED
   UNDER A MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY INSURANCE
   POLICY.”
(Uppercase in original.) It is undisputed that defendant con-
tinued to use the same Notice until after this action was filed.
         In 2007, the legislature passed Senate Bill (SB) 523,
which amended ORS 746.280 to require insurers to meet
specific requirements when recommending a repair shop to
an insured at the time a claim was made following damage
to a vehicle. Or Laws 2007, ch 506, § 1. The original ORS
746.280 became ORS 746.280(1), and the legislature added
three additional provisions, regarding notice of an insured’s
rights at the time a claim was filed before an insurer recom-
mended a repair shop, prohibitions on insurers limiting the
cost of repairs if a customer did not choose a recommended
shop, and additional required notices if a customer did choose
a recommended shop. Id. In amending ORS 746.280, the
legislature did not disturb the ORS 746.290 cross-reference,
which continued to require insurers to notify their custom-
ers of “the provisions of ORS 746.280.”
         In response to SB 523, defendant created new
notices that were sent to customers at the time a claim was

    1
      ORS 746.290 and ORS 746.300 have not been substantively amended since
their enactment in 1977. We therefore cite to the current versions.
Cite as 326 Or App 605 (2023)                                                  609

filed and updated its customer service script to reflect the
changes to ORS 746.280. However, defendant did not update
the Notice that accompanied policies when they were ini-
tially issued. The Department of Consumer and Business
Services (DCBS), the successor to the Oregon Insurance
Division, did not update its 1993 Bulletin guidance to insur-
ance companies until 2015, and continued to approve defen-
dant’s Notice.
         Plaintiff Bellshaw purchased his auto liability
policy from defendant in May 2011. In 2013, he was in an
accident that necessitated repairs. He accepted a recom-
mendation of a repair shop from defendant, believing his
policy would not cover repairs completed by a dealership.
Bellshaw was ultimately dissatisfied with the repairs and
brought a suit against defendant and the other party to the
car accident (who was also insured by defendant). The case
was tried to a jury, which ultimately awarded Bellshaw no
damages.
         Eventually Bellshaw brought the current action
in June 2015, based on the allegation that defendant vio-
lated the notice requirements of ORS 746.290(2).2 After
written discovery and depositions, along with extensive
briefing and arguments, the trial court ruled in January
2018 on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment,
concluding that the Notice provided to each customer did
not comply with the requirements of ORS 746.290(2)(b).
Following further motions and hearings regarding the class
definition and the amount of damages due, the court issued
its general judgment in March 2020. Defendant filed this
appeal.3

    2
      Plaintiff’s first amended complaint sought certification of an additional
“Repair Class” of Oregon consumers who had received repairs through defen-
dant’s recommended “Circle of Dependability” program. The complaint also
included claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. Those claims were dismissed on partial summary judg-
ment, and plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint dropped the allegations related
to the “repair class.” None of those claims are at issue in this appeal.
    3
      Given the extensive briefing and proceedings before the trial court on a
range of issues, the parties correctly agree that each of the assigned errors is pre-
served. The procedural history as it relates to each assignment will be discussed
in further detail in each section below.
610                            Bellshaw v. Farmers Ins. Co.

            II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
          In its first assignment of error, defendant asserts
that the trial court erred as a matter of law by holding that
its Notice did not comply with ORS 746.290(2)(b). Defendant
contends that the trial court’s interpretation of the statu-
tory requirements was incorrect in light of the text, context,
and legislative history of the 2007 amendments. Defendant
further asserts that its Notice was approved by the relevant
agency, and that defendant cannot be found liable for con-
duct that complied with agency direction. Plaintiff argues
that the trial court correctly interpreted the plain text of
the statute, and correctly found that defendant’s Notice was
not in compliance. We agree with plaintiff and conclude the
trial court did not err.
          This issue arose via cross-motions for summary
judgment, but the ultimate question is one of statutory
interpretation. We review for errors of law. McLain v. Maletis
Beverage, 200 Or App 374, 377, 115 P3d 938 (2005) (“When
a grant of summary judgment is the result of a substan-
tive legal conclusion, we review that conclusion for errors
of law.”); see also Bialostosky v. Cummings, 319 Or App 352,
354-56, 511 P3d 31 (2022) (stating the standard of review
where the material facts are uncontested and the outcome
turned on the meaning of the statute). In interpreting a
statute, we rely on our familiar framework laid out in PGE
v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859
P2d 1143 (1993), and State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72,
206 P3d 1042 (2009), by examining the statute’s text in con-
text and considering any relevant legislative history, then,
if necessary, general maxims of statutory construction.
          We begin with the relevant statutes. As noted
above, in 1977, the legislature passed a bill establishing
an insured’s right to choose an auto repair shop follow-
ing an accident. Or Laws 1977, ch 785, § 2. The same bill
also established the requirement for auto repair shops and
insurance companies to inform consumers of their rights
and created the right for consumers to bring a civil action
for actual or statutory damages if the notice requirements
were not met. Or Laws 1977, ch 785, §§ 3, 4, 7. In 2007,
the legislature amended ORS 746.280 to add additional
notice requirements when an insurer gives its customers
Cite as 326 Or App 605 (2023)                                  611

recommendations for which repair shop to use. Or Laws
2007, ch 506 (2007 amendments).
        At the time relevant to the present action, the stat-
utes stated:
       “(1) An insurer may not require that a particular per-
   son make the repairs to the insured’s motor vehicle as a
   condition for recovery by the insured under a motor vehicle
   liability insurance policy.
       “(2) Prior to providing a recommendation that a par-
   ticular person make repairs to the insured’s motor vehi-
   cle, the person adjusting the claim on behalf of the insurer
   shall inform the insured of the rights conferred by subsec-
   tion (1) of this section by communicating in a statement
   substantially similar to the following:
     “OREGON LAW PROHIBITS US FROM REQUIR-
   ING YOU TO GET REPAIRS TO YOUR VEHICLE AT A
   PARTICULAR MOTOR VEHICLE REPAIR SHOP. YOU
   HAVE THE RIGHT TO SELECT THE MOTOR VEHICLE
   REPAIR SHOP OF YOUR CHOICE.
       “(3) If an insured elects to have the motor vehicle
   repaired at a motor vehicle repair shop other than a shop
   recommended by the insurer, the insurer may not limit the
   cost of repairs necessary to return the motor vehicle to a
   preloss condition relative to safety, function and appear-
   ance other than as stated in the policy or as otherwise
   allowed by law.
       “(4) If an insured accepts the insurer’s recommenda-
   tion, the insurer shall provide, electronically or in printed
   form, a statement to the insured within three business
   days after the date of acceptance in substantially the fol-
   lowing form:
      “WE HAVE RECOMMENDED A MOTOR VEHICLE
   REPAIR SHOP. IF YOU AGREE TO USE OUR REC-
   OMMENDED REPAIR SHOP, YOUR VEHICLE WILL
   RECEIVE REPAIRS RETURNING IT TO A PRELOSS
   CONDITION RELATIVE TO SAFETY, FUNCTION AND
   APPEARANCE AT NO ADDITIONAL COST TO YOU
   OTHER THAN AS STATED IN THE INSURANCE POL-
   ICY OR AS OTHERWISE ALLOWED BY LAW.”
ORS 746.280 (uppercase in original).
612                               Bellshaw v. Farmers Ins. Co.

       “(1) An adjuster establishing loss under a motor vehi-
   cle liability insurance policy shall advise the insured of the
   provisions of ORS 746.280.
      “(2) Every motor vehicle liability insurance policy
   issued in this state after December 31, 1977, and any exten-
   sion or renewal after that date of a policy issued before that
   date shall be accompanied by a statement in clear and con-
   spicuous language approved by the director of:
     “(a) The rights and responsibilities of the insured
   when a claim is submitted; and
      “(b) The provisions of ORS 746.280.”
ORS 746.290.
         On summary judgment, the trial court concluded
that “ORS 746.290 as amended requires that the insurer
give notice of all four sections of ORS 746.280. [Defendant’s]
notice contained only the first section of ORS 746.280, which
would have been compliant prior to the 2007 amendment.”
The trial court reviewed the legislative history of the 2007
amendments and acknowledged that “clearly the goal of the
legislation was to add specific requirements that an insurer
must meet when recommending a repair shop to an insured
at the time a claim is made after an accident. In other words,
at the time an insured needed the information.” In response
to defendant’s argument that the legislature actually
intended only to require insurers to inform their insured of
ORS 746.280 as originally enacted, the court took the view
that doing so would be
   “to read into the plain language of the statute what the
   legislature perhaps intended to do, but failed to do. I am
   not prepared to do so. As a matter of law, the statute was
   not followed and the written notice that accompanied its
   motor vehicle policies did not inform policy holders [of all
   four sections of ORS 746.280 as amended].”
On appeal, the parties reiterate the arguments they raised
before the trial court, arguing for varying interpretations of
the statute.
        As an initial matter, defendant argues that ORS
746.290(2) specifically delegates to the director of DCBS the
authority to determine whether a notice is compliant with
Cite as 326 Or App 605 (2023)                                                613

the law, and that the director is the arbiter of compliance,
not the courts.4 Defendant asserts that plaintiff’s action is
an improper collateral attack on an agency action through a
private lawsuit. We disagree. ORS 746.290(2) requires that
insurers provide notice of the provisions of ORS 746.280 in
language “approved by the director[,]” but does not delegate
authority to the director to determine what is necessary to
comply with the statute. The statute lays out the require-
ments for a notice, and there is no discretion delegated to
the director as to those requirements. See SAIF v. Shipley,
326 Or 557, 561, 955 P2d 244 (1998) (“[A]n agency has only
those powers that the legislature grants and cannot exer-
cise authority that it does not have.”).
         The case law cited by defendant all relates to law-
suits brought as collateral challenges to agency actions, in
attempts to bypass administrative remedies or other proper
avenues of review.5 That is not the circumstance here.
Plaintiff is not using a private action to challenge an agency
decision or rule outside of prescribed processes; plaintiff is
exercising the right established by ORS 746.300 to bring

     4
       The statute does not state that “director” means the director of DCBS.
However, every other use of the word “director” in ORS chapter 746 refers to “the
Director of the Department of Consumer and Business Services.”
     5
       Muller v. Dept. of Agriculture, 164 Or App 11, 16-17, 988 P2d 927 (1999)
(plaintiff alleged negligence on the part of the Department of Agriculture in
denying plaintiff’s permit for farm burning, but the court dismissed the case
because the exclusive mechanism for challenging the validity of an agency action
is under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) contested case review proce-
dures); Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Bartz, 142 Or App 433, 436, 921 P2d 419 (1996) (peti-
tion for judicial review of a Workers’ Compensation Board enforcement order was
an impermissible collateral attack on the underlying merits decision that the
employer had not appealed); Chicago & N. W. Tr. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co.,
450 US 311, 324, 332, 101 S Ct 1124, 67 L Ed 2d 258 (1981) (federal law pre-
empted plaintiff’s state law damages claim and prevented plaintiff from bringing
a private suit challenging defendant’s actions, which were approved by a federal
agency’s final decision); Whitney Bank v. New Orleans Bank, 379 US 411, 413-15,
85 S Ct 551, 13 L Ed 2d 386 (1965) (banks could not request injunctive and declar-
atory relief regarding a comptroller’s authority in a separate action while direct
appeals of the action were still pending on administrative and judicial review);
Dave v. Rails to Trails Conservancy, 863 F Supp 1285, 1289-91 (ED Wash 1994),
aff’d, 79 F3d 940 (9th Cir 1996) (action was a challenge to the validity of an
agency decision, not a separate suit, and had to be brought in the circuit court of
appeals, pursuant to the Hobbs Act); Caribou Four Corners, Inc. v. American Oil
Co., 628 F Supp 363, 377 (D Utah 1985) (suit against other oil companies was in
substance a challenge to an agency action and could not be maintained without
exhaustion of administrative remedies).
614                                     Bellshaw v. Farmers Ins. Co.

a private action because an insurer provided insufficient
notice. We conclude that the DCBS approval of the Notice
does not relieve defendant of liability, and we retain author-
ity to interpret the statute.6
         By its plain text, ORS 746.290(2)(b) requires that
relevant insurance policies must be accompanied by a state-
ment of “[t]he provisions of ORS 746.280.” ORS 746.280 con-
tains four sections. Therefore, ORS 746.290(2)(b), on its face,
requires notification of all four sections of ORS 746.280.
          In arguing for a different interpretation, defendant
asserts that the context of the related statutes and their
form when adopted and amended compels a conclusion
that the notice sent at the time of issuance of a policy must
only inform a customer of ORS 746.280(1). We acknowledge
defendant’s argument that a plain reading of the text cre-
ates three different categories of policies and notifications:
those issued after the 2007 amendments took effect, which
required notification at the time the policy was issued of all
four sections of ORS 746.280; those issued between 1978 and
2007, which required notification at the time the policy was
issued of the original ORS 746.280; and policies issued prior
to 1978, which required notification of the provisions of ORS
746.280 upon “any extension or renewal.” Defendant argues
that this absurd result indicates that the 2007 amendments
should not be read to be included in the ORS 746.290(2)(b)
cross-reference, and that customers only needed to be noti-
fied of ORS 746.280(2) through (4) at the time a claim was
filed. While defendant’s argument has some logical appeal,
it does not track with the text of the statute, and it is not
within our authority to rewrite the statute. Cole v. Farmers
Ins. Co., 108 Or App 277, 280, 814 P2d 188 (1991) (“If the leg-
islature has chosen language that creates unexpected and
unintended results, the legislature can amend the statute
to express its actual intent. It is not the function of a court
to insert language that should have been added and ignore
language that should have been omitted.”). In any event,

    6
       Defendant asserts that a party cannot be expected to comply with agency
requirements on one hand and be held liable for doing so on the other. As dis-
cussed further below, approval from DCBS may reduce defendant’s culpability,
but it does not eliminate or resolve the responsibility to comply with the law.
Cite as 326 Or App 605 (2023)                                  615

the differences may be hard to justify, but they do not qual-
ify as absurd. Interpreting ORS 746.290(2)(b) as requiring
notice at the time a policy is issued (or renewed, for policies
issued prior to 1978), in addition to providing such notice at
the time a claim is submitted, is consistent with the goal of
informing customers of their rights.
        Our interpretation is consistent with ORS 174.060,
which states:
       “When one statute refers to another, either by gen-
   eral or by specific reference or designation, the reference
   shall extend to and include, in addition to the statute to
   which reference was made, amendments thereto and stat-
   utes enacted expressly in lieu thereof unless a contrary
   intent is expressed specifically or unless the amendment
   to, or statute enacted in lieu of, the statute referred to is
   substantially different in the nature of its essential pro-
   visions from what the statute to which reference was
   made was when the statute making the reference was
   enacted.”
By this standard, the ORS 746.290(2)(b) cross-reference
to ORS 746.280 includes all provisions of ORS 746.280
as amended, not just ORS 746.280 as originally enacted.
Defendant encourages us to disregard ORS 174.060,
asserting that the intent of the legislature was clear that
the 2007 amendments were not supposed to extend to the
ORS 746.290(2)(b) notice requirements, and arguing that
the 2007 amendments are substantially different from the
original provision cross-referenced by ORS 746.290(2)(b).
We disagree on both points. There was no expressed intent
from the legislature to limit the cross-reference only to the
original text of ORS 746.280, which would have been sim-
ple to accomplish by amending the cross-reference to read,
“The provisions of ORS 746.280(1).” Furthermore, the 2007
amendments are not substantially different from the orig-
inal text. They all concern a consumer’s right to notice of
their rights as related to automobile insurance policies and
the selection of a repair shop, and we cannot conclude that
the amended ORS 746.280 is “substantially different in the
nature of its essential provisions” from its form when ORS
746.290(2)(b) was enacted. Defendant has not identified any
case where Oregon appellate courts have declined to apply
616                                        Bellshaw v. Farmers Ins. Co.

ORS 174.060, and we have been unable to locate any such
cases.7
         Finally, as further context for the textual interpre-
tation, defendant argues that if the 2007 amendments were
intended to change the entire notice regime of the original
statute, then ORS 746.285 would have been amended as
well, to provide customers with notice in the location and
at the time they were most likely to need the information—
namely, at the repair shop. We conclude that this argument
does not shed any significant light on the construction of
the interplay between ORS 746.280 and ORS 746.290(2)(b),
because, as discussed below, there is no indication that the
entire notice regime was intended to change.
         Defendant additionally asserts that the legislative
histories of the original bill and the 2007 amendments indi-
cate that ORS 746.290(2)(b)’s cross-reference to ORS 746.280
was only intended to extend to ORS 746.280(1), which was
the only section that existed at the time the cross-reference
was created. However, “a party seeking to overcome seem-
ingly plain and unambiguous text with legislative history
has a difficult task before it.” Gaines, 346 Or at 172. We
agree with defendant that the committee hearings and pub-
lic testimony regarding the 2007 amendments indicate that
the purpose of the change was to provide consumers with
additional notice of their rights at the time they most needed
the information, namely, when they were in need of a repair
shop for their vehicle.8 However, our role is to ascertain and

    7
      The only case that refers to ORS 174.060 without applying it is State v.
Charlesworth/Parks, 151 Or App 100, 107, 951 P2d 153 (1997), rev den, 327 Or
82 (1998), which held that “ORS 174.060 does not apply to the interpretation of
statutes that refer to non-Oregon law.” That case is not applicable here.
    8
      See, e.g., Audio Recording, House Committee on Consumer Protection, SB
523 A, May 21, 2007, at 23:43-1:09:00 (comments of Rep Suzanne Bonamici; Rep
Donna Nelson; Rep Chuck Riley; Jim Marr, Oregonians for Safe Auto Repair;
Darrell Fuller, NW Automotive Trades Association), https://sos.oregon.gov/
archives/Pages/records/legislative-minutes-2007.aspx (accessed Mar 22, 2023)
(discussing the importance of providing consumers with information at the
time they need to have their car repaired). Other discussions indicated that the
amendments were not intended to change the notice requirements at the time a
policy was issued:
          “[Representative Bonamici:] I am trying to figure out the timing here.
    * * * Prior to providing a recommendation, the notice is given. So it’s not given
    to everybody? Or is it given to everybody?
Cite as 326 Or App 605 (2023)                                                    617

declare what is contained in a statute, “not to insert what
has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted[.]” ORS
174.010. We therefore cannot contravene the express lan-
guage of the statute simply because the final text does not
precisely track the intended purpose.
         We therefore conclude that ORS 746.290(2)(b)
requires insurers to provide notice of all of the provisions of
ORS 746.280 when a relevant policy is issued. Defendant’s
Notice did not contain information regarding all four sec-
tions of ORS 746.280. The trial court did not err in granting
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
                  III. CLASS DEFINITION
         Defendant’s fourth through sixth assignments of
error relate to the trial court’s expansion of the class param-
eters. Defendant argues that the expansion was improper
because the resulting class includes claims that are time-
barred, including the claim of the only representative plain-
tiff, Bellshaw. Defendant also asserts that amending the
class definition after a decision on the merits violated ORCP
32 C(1). We agree that the final class definition includes
claims that are time-barred. We therefore remand with
direction to restore the class to the parameters set by the
April 2017 order.9
          “[Mr. Miller:] * * * It’s your first contact with whoever is adjusting the
     accident. And at that statement, prior to them communicating that—of
     whether they have a program or not—they have to inform that person of
     their rights. And so the first contact with—the first thing you do is call the
     1-800 number. You’re on the phone and the first thing they would have to do
     is essentially inform you of—of their rights as an insured.
          “* * * * *
          “[Representative Bonamici:] * * * But the notice on the first page doesn’t
     go to everybody. It only goes to the people when the insurance company is
     going to make a recommendation, correct? So not everybody gets the first
     notice?
          “[Mr. Miller:] I believe so, yes.”
Id. at 01:01:55 (comments of Rep Bonamici, Shawn Miller). See also Audio Recording,
Senate Committee on Commerce, SB 523 A, Apr 30, 2007, at 0:45:04 (comments of
Chair Sen Floyd Prozanski), https://sos.oregon.gov/archives/Pages/records/legislative-
minutes-2007.aspx (accessed Mar 22, 2023) (“So it’s our intention that the dash-
ones are for the individual or unit that’s actually doing the adjusting of the claim on
behalf of the insurer, not the insurer or the agent that maybe sold it, but the person
or unit that would be doing the negotiations for the fix.”).
     9
       This resolution makes a decision on the sixth assignment of error
unnecessary.
618                                     Bellshaw v. Farmers Ins. Co.

A. Procedural Background
         The trial court originally certified the class in
December 2016, finding that the requirements of ORCP 32 A
were satisfied and that a class action was superior to other
available methods of adjudication, pursuant to ORCP 32 B.
The court determined that the class consisted of “Oregon
consumers who, between June 29, 2012 and the first date of
notice of pendency of this class action, were insured under an
Oregon automobile insurance policy issued by [defendant].”10
         In February 2017, defendant filed a motion to
amend the class definition to exclude class members whose
claims were time-barred. Defendant argued that, given its
interpretation of the relevant statute, the class should be
amended to include only those class members who had a pol-
icy issued during the relevant three-year period. Defendant
further argued that such a change in the class definition
would exclude the class representative, Bellshaw, and with-
out an alternative class representative, the class should be
decertified.
         The trial court granted defendant’s motion to amend
the class definition, but denied the motion to decertify.11 The
trial court stated:
       “By its plain terms, ORS 746.290(2)(b) provides that
   insurers must include an appropriate statutory notice with
   (1) ‘every motor vehicle liability insurance policy issued in
   this state after December 31, 1977,’ and (2) ‘any extension
   or renewal after that date of a policy issued before that
   date.’ The 2007 amendments to ORS 746.280 impose addi-
   tional specific requirements that insurers must meet when
   adjusting an insured’s claim post loss, but do not change
   the plain language concerning the notice required in
   ORS 746.290(2). The Court determines that, [defendant’s]

    10
       Excluded from the class were “officers and directors of Farmers Insurance
Company of Oregon, attorneys for the class, any judge or juror who sits on this
case, and any person who previously settled or adjudicated a claim against
Farmers involving a claim of violation of ORS 746.290.” Those exclusions
remained consistent through the various amendments to the class and will not
be repeated throughout this opinion.
    11
       That decision was made prior to the court’s ruling on summary judgment
discussed in the previous section of this opinion.
Cite as 326 Or App 605 (2023)                                                  619

    proposed class definition is appropriate.[12] However, if as
    Plaintiff contends the notice provided in 2011 was not ade-
    quate, the class may well be much larger and that will
    need to be determined at a later stage in this litigation.[13]
    Defendant’s Statute of Limitation assumes the notice pro-
    vided was in fact adequate and thus the statute is trig-
    gered by the date the appropriate notice was given. If the
    notice was not adequate, the claim will not accrue until
    appropriate notice is given.”
The court further noted that different statutes of limita-
tions could apply to different claims, “one for those who were
issued policies between June 29, 2012 and November 30,
2016, for those whose claims arise based on ORS 746.290,
and [one] for those whose claims arise as a result of ORS
746.280, two years, or shortly thereafter, from the date of an
auto accident.” The court found Bellshaw was not disquali-
fied from serving as class representative because his claim
for actual damages accrued at the time of his automobile
accident fell into the second category and was timely.14 The
court therefore denied defendant’s motion to decertify the
class.
         Following the trial court’s ruling the following
year on the parties’ summary judgment motions, plaintiff
moved to amend the class definition again, requesting that
the court restore the class to its original larger definition of
individuals who were insured under a policy during the rel-
evant period. Defendant objected, arguing that expansion
of the class after a decision on the merits violated ORCP
32 C(1) and reasserting its arguments about time-barred
claims and the statute of limitations. The trial court granted

     12
        The order does not contain the text of defendant’s proposed class definition.
In its motion to amend the class, defendant requested the following class defini-
tion: “Oregon consumers who, between June 29, 2012 and November 30, 2016,
were issued an Oregon automobile insurance policy by Farmers.” Defendant and
plaintiff agreed to cut the class period off at November 30, 2016, which was the
end of the month in which the trial court originally granted class certification.
     13
        Based on the discussion at the hearing on the motion to amend the class,
the court’s rationale appears to be based on a continuing tort theory that if an
insufficient notice were sent out, the insurer would have a continuing duty to
provide an adequate notice at least once.
     14
        It appears that Bellshaw did not continue to pursue his claim for actual
damages. The parties do not make any arguments in their briefing before us
related to that claim.
620                                     Bellshaw v. Farmers Ins. Co.

plaintiff’s motion and certified the following class: “Oregon
consumers who, between June 29, 2012 and November 30,
2016, were insureds under an Oregon automobile insurance
policy issued by [defendant] after January 1, 2008.” In its
accompanying letter opinion, the trial court recounted its
decision from April 2017 when it adopted defendant’s pro-
posed class, noting its prior acknowledgement that the class
definition could change depending on the result of further
litigation, and stating: “The Court has now determined the
notice was not in compliance with the plain wording of the
statute and thus the class must now be extended to the one
originally proposed by the plaintiff. Since the class repre-
sentative’s claim did not accrue in 2011, his penalty claim is
not time-barred.”
        On appeal, defendant renews its arguments that
the expansion of the class was improper.15
B.    Analysis
        We review class certification for abuse of discretion,
but we review legal issues underlying the decision, such
as the statute of limitations, for legal error. Delgado v. Del
Monte Fresh Produce, N. A., Inc., 260 Or App 480, 493, 317
P3d 419, rev den, 355 Or 380 (2014).
         The parties do not dispute that the class claims
under ORS 746.300 are subject to a three-year statute of
limitations, pursuant to ORS 12.100(2).16 ORS 12.010 pro-
vides that “[a]ctions shall only be commenced within the
periods prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action
shall have accrued[.]” A cause of action accrues “when an
action may be maintained thereon” or “whenever one person
may sue another.” Griffin v. Tri-Met, 318 Or 500, 506, 870
P2d 808 (1994) (quoting Berry v. Branner, 245 Or 307, 312,
421 P2d 996 (1966)); see also U.S. Nat’l Bank v. Davies, 274
Or 663, 666-67, 548 P2d 966 (1976) (“ ‘In the best-known
definition [a cause of action] consists of every fact which it
would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed,
    15
       Neither party reasserts on appeal the trial court’s rationale for either
change in the class definition.
    16
       “An action upon a statute for penalty or forfeiture, where the action is
given to the party aggrieved * * * shall be commenced within three years.” ORS
12.100(2).
Cite as 326 Or App 605 (2023)                                                621

in order to support his right to judgment. When these facts
have occurred * * *, a cause of action is said to accrue to
the plaintiff because he can then prosecute an action effec-
tively.’ ” (Quoting M. Franks (England) Limitation of Actions
11 (1959).)).
        Defendant asserts that each individual plaintiff’s
claim accrued when the plaintiff received a deficient notice
at the time the policy was issued, and therefore anyone
whose policy was issued more than three years prior to the
commencement of this action has no viable claim. Plaintiff
argues that defendant’s unlawful conduct was ongoing,
because each customer was entitled to the relevant disclo-
sures, and each time a policy was renewed or extended with-
out providing the proper notice, a new claim accrued.
         We agree with defendant, with respect to anyone
whose policy was issued after December 31, 1977. ORS
746.290(2) states that “[e]very motor vehicle liability insur-
ance policy issued in this state after December 31, 1977, * * *
shall be accompanied by a statement in clear and conspicu-
ous language approved by the director of * * * the provisions
of ORS 746.280.” (Emphasis added.) At the time those pol-
icies were issued without a sufficient accompanying state-
ment of the provisions of ORS 746.280, an action could have
been maintained under ORS 746.300. Therefore, the claims
for statutory damages accrued at the time the policy was
issued, and the statute of limitations began to run at that
point.17 An individual who was insured during the three
years prior to the initiation of this action on June 29, 2015,
but whose policy was issued prior to June 29, 2012, does
not have a timely claim.18 The class definition is therefore
    17
       We note that this analysis only applies to claims for statutory damages. A
claim for actual damages would be analyzed differently in terms of accrual and
the statute of limitations.
    18
       We acknowledge the other category of policies addressed in ORS 746.290,
those issued prior to December 31, 1977. Those policies are subject to notice of
the provisions of ORS 746.280 upon any extension or renewal. Any such exten-
sion or renewal of a policy issued before December 31, 1977, that occurred after
January 1, 2008, and did not contain the required rights notification would con-
stitute a violation of the notice requirements of ORS 746.290(2)(b), thus mark-
ing the accrual of a cause of action. The parties did not address the possibil-
ity of a different class definition for customers who were first issued a policy
prior to 1978. Given the above description of the legislative history and intent of
the 2007 amendments, it is possible that the disparate application of the notice
622                                     Bellshaw v. Farmers Ins. Co.

improperly broad, and the class contains individuals whose
claims are time-barred.
         Plaintiff argues the class definition was correct
because defendant’s unlawful conduct was ongoing, and
thus a claim accrued each time defendant extended or
renewed any policy without providing a compliant notice.
Plaintiff relies on the 1993 Bulletin, which encouraged com-
pliance with the 1977 statute by directing insurers that “[i]f
you have not yet complied with ORS 746.290(2), you must
enclose the insert with a full cycle of renewals to ensure that
all insureds have received the notice of prohibition at least
once.” Oregon Insurance Division Bulletin 93-3 (Apr 20,
1993). However, this guidance, issued more than a decade
prior to the 2007 amendments, does not change the stat-
utory requirement that notice be given only at the time a
policy is issued, for policies issued after 1977. The Bulletin
guidance did not create an obligation for insurers to renotify
each customer of the provisions of ORS 746.280 every time a
policy that was issued after 1977 was extended or renewed.
          Furthermore, the facts of this case do not support
plaintiff’s theory of a continuing harm. Oregon case law has
held that a continuing-tort doctrine applies to the accrual
of a claim when there is a series of incidents that individu-
ally do not support a claim, but as a whole are “a systemic
pattern of conduct that led to a specific injury.” Barrington
v. Sandberg, 164 Or App 292, 297-98, 991 P2d 1071 (1999)
(holding the repeated physical abuse of a cadet by a supe-
rior officer did not result in a claim for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress until the cadet first disclosed all
of the conduct to a friend and became severely emotionally
distressed). The Supreme Court has explained that “at the
heart of the continuing tort idea is the concept that recov-
ery is for the cumulative effect of wrongful behavior, not for
discrete elements of that conduct.” Davis v. Bostick, 282 Or
667, 671-72, 580 P2d 544 (1978); see also, BoardMaster Corp.

requirements to policies issued at different times was a drafting oversight. The
possibility of an individual having purchased an auto liability insurance pol-
icy prior to 1978 and continuously renewing it until 2012 strikes us as remote.
However, if on remand any potential class member is identified who had such a
policy, further amendment to the class parameters to include such an individual
may be warranted.
Cite as 326 Or App 605 (2023)                                                   623

v. Jackson County, 224 Or App 533, 552-53, 198 P3d 454
(2008) (utility company letter that prompted the disconnec-
tion of power was the discrete, harm-producing act that trig-
gered the accrual of the action and began the running of the
statute of limitations, and the failure to reconnect the power
did not constitute a continuing tort). The conduct at issue
here, namely, defendant failing to provide the appropriate
notices at the time a policy was issued, was a discrete act,
and no continuing harm tolled the statute of limitations.
         We turn now to the class representative, Bellshaw.
Bellshaw purchased his auto liability insurance policy in
2011. Plaintiff argues that Bellshaw’s claim remains timely
based on his August 2013 collision and defendant’s failure
“to fulfill its obligations under ORS 746.290(2)(b)” at that
time. However, the obligation under ORS 746.290(2)(b)
attaches at the time a policy is issued, not at the time a
claim is made under the policy. When the class definition
is amended to include only those individuals whose policies
were issued on or after June 29, 2012, Bellshaw will no lon-
ger be a class member.19
                      IV. DUE PROCESS
         In its second and third assignments of error, defen-
dant challenges the aggregate monetary award as a violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution.20 Defendant argues that it did not
receive fair notice that its conduct was in violation of the
law, because it followed DCBS guidance, and the agency
approved its Notice. Defendant further argues that the trial
court erred in failing to strike or reduce the ultimate pen-
alty as excessive to the point of constituting a violation of
due process.

    19
       To the extent that Bellshaw asserted other claims relating to the existence
of defendant’s Circle of Dependability program or defendant’s policies constitut-
ing a violation of anti-steering laws, the general judgment that is before us on
appeal does not address those claims, and awards Bellshaw the same $100 stat-
utory penalty as the other members of the class based on defendant’s violation of
ORS 746.290(2)(b). The parties do not raise any arguments regarding the addi-
tional relief claimed in the second amended complaint. Whether any other claims
by Bellshaw remain to be resolved is an issue for the trial court to determine on
remand.
    20
       “No state shall * * * deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law[.]” US Const, Amend XIV.
624                             Bellshaw v. Farmers Ins. Co.

A.    Procedural Background
         The parties initially addressed this issue in their
briefing on the cross-motions for summary judgment. In its
January 2018 letter opinion granting summary judgment
to plaintiff on the merits of defendant’s violation of ORS
746.290(2)(b), the court deferred ruling on the due process
issue and requested further arguments on that specific
point.
         Defendant subsequently filed a motion to strike
the statutory penalties, on the basis of a due process vio-
lation. Briefing from both parties raised additional issues,
including regarding a jury trial on certain claims, defen-
dant’s motion to decertify the class, and plaintiff’s motion to
amend the class. In April 2019, the court granted plaintiff’s
motion to expand the class, and in the same order noted that
it was persuaded that a reduction in statutory penalties was
warranted, but that it was deferring ruling on defendant’s
due process argument until after class notice was provided
to the newly expanded class.
         The court subsequently held a two-day trial on the
due process arguments. In June 2019, the court issued its
Opinion, Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law on the
issue, finding that the statutory penalty of $100 per claim
did not violate the Due Process Clause as applied to the facts
in the case.
B.    Analysis
         Given our ruling on the class parameters, a com-
plete ruling as to the due process issues is not appropriate
in this posture. However, because we conclude that the trial
court’s resolution of the issues was erroneous in part, we
address the issues given that they will require resolution on
remand.
         Whether an award constitutes a violation of due
process is a question of law. St. Louis, I. Mt. & So. Ry. Co.
v. Williams, 251 US 63, 40 S Ct 71, 64 L Ed 2d 139 (1919);
Wakefield v. ViSalus, Inc., 51 F4th 1109, 1120 (9th Cir 2022),
cert den, ___ US ___, ___ S Ct ___, ___ L Ed 2d ___, WL
2959423 (2023).
Cite as 326 Or App 605 (2023)                            625

    1. Notice
         Defendant argues that the imposition of more than
$26 million in statutory penalties violates its procedural due
process rights because at all times it was in compliance with
agency guidance from DCBS and the language included in
its Notice was approved by the director, as required by the
statute. Defendant asserts that it did not have fair notice
that the 2007 amendments to ORS 746.280 changed the
notice requirements, subject to a $100 fine per customer,
because the agency continued to approve its notices even
after the amendments went into effect. Plaintiff asserts
that the agency’s mistake in approving defendant’s insuf-
ficient notice does not shield defendant from liability. We
agree with plaintiff.
         Due process requires fair notice of the law and of
the severity of the penalty that may be imposed. Goddard v.
Farmers Ins. Co., 344 Or 232, 251, 179 P3d 645 (2008). In the
wake of the 2007 amendments to ORS 746.280, defendant
implemented new policies and procedures for claims process-
ing to comply with the new notice requirements at the time
a claim was filed; however, it made no changes to the notices
provided pursuant to ORS 746.290(2)(b). As was found by
the trial court, defendant was aware of the 2007 amend-
ments and “consciously ignored its exposure to [the] penalty
for years.” DCBS’s guidance in “Form 440-3615 - Standards
for Motor Vehicle Forms Filing” instructs insurers that the
checklist standards are summaries only, and “review of the
entire statute or rule may be necessary.” The fact that defen-
dant and DCBS misinterpreted the extent of the impact of
the amendments does not relieve defendant of responsibility
for complying with the law. See, e.g., Tidewater Barge Lines,
Inc. v. EQC, 159 Or App 296, 304-05, 974 P2d 807 (1999),
appeal dismissed, 330 Or 253 (2000) (holding that statutory
procedural information was “a matter of statute and thus
of public knowledge,” the agency did not have authority to
bind the government to a different procedure, and the agen-
cy’s provision of incorrect information was not a violation of
due process demanding equitable estoppel). We further note
that ORS 746.300 does not relieve from liability an insurer
who follows the guidance of the agency.
626                                     Bellshaw v. Farmers Ins. Co.

         In support of its argument, defendant points to
numerous federal cases where courts nullified agency action
when the agencies changed their interpretation of a stat-
ute and then took enforcement action against an entity that
was in compliance with the earlier policy. However, those
cases do not offer guidance for the situation in this case. No
agency action was taken against defendant, and no agency
changed its policy interpretation without providing notice.21
Therefore, the cases defendant cites are not analogous to
the situation before us. Rather, this is a matter of statutory
interpretation clarifying the meaning of the law, something
this and other courts engage in regularly.
         We conclude that defendant had fair notice of the
law and DCBS’s approval of the language contained in the
Notice does not render the award of statutory penalties a
violation of defendant’s due process rights.
      2. Constitutionality of the amount of statutory damages
         Defendant additionally asserts that, under federal
case law, the aggregate statutory penalty of over $26 mil-
lion is grossly excessive, and thus constitutes an arbitrary
deprivation of property, in violation of due process. Plaintiff
argues that defendant’s argument applies federal case law
that relates only to punitive damages, and not statutory
damages, and that, under the appropriate framework, the
aggregate award is not a violation of due process.
          As an initial matter, we recognize that, with the
amendment of the class definition as discussed above, the
final aggregate award will be significantly reduced, based
on the narrowing of the class parameters and the exclusion
of more than 150,000 present members of the class. Any spe-
cific assessment of the constitutionality of the $26 million
award would be dicta. However, defendant initially chal-
lenged the penalty as a due process violation when the class
parameters included only 96,436 individuals. Therefore, the
issue is likely to arise on remand, and we provide the follow-
ing analysis as guidance for the trial court to implement on
remand. See, e.g., Westwood Construction Co. v. Hallmark

    21
       This action is not a challenge to any rulemaking or other administrative
actions under the APA.
Cite as 326 Or App 605 (2023)                                                   627

Inns, 182 Or App 624, 639, 50 P3d 238, rev den, 335 Or 42,
57 P3d 581 (2002) (“Because the issue is likely to arise on
remand regardless of which party prevails, we reach and
resolve it.”).
         The standards for assessing the constitutionality of
a statutory award are set forth in Williams.22 The Court held
that a statutory penalty is to be considered “with due regard
for the interests of the public, the numberless opportunities
for committing the offense, and the need for securing uni-
form adherence to [the law].” Williams, 251 US at 67. The
Court also acknowledged the “wide latitude of discretion”
that states possess and the important government pow-
ers inherent in the legislature, holding that a legislatively
enacted statutory penalty will only transcend due process
“where the penalty prescribed is so severe and oppressive
as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously
unreasonable.” Id. at 66-67.
        Williams only assessed the due process impli-
cations of an individual statutory penalty. Id. at 64. In a
recent case from the Ninth Circuit, that court extended
Williams and held that due process concerns may limit
aggregate statutory damage awards in a class action, under
extreme circumstances. Wakefield, 51 F4th at 1121.23 The
court discussed the rationale behind extending Williams
to aggregated awards, analogizing to punitive damages
cases, and noting that “where statutory damages no longer
     22
        Defendant primarily relies on BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517
US 559, 116 S Ct 1589, 134 L Ed 2d 809 (1996), in arguing that the total award
violated due process. However, Gore and the cases following it relate to puni-
tive damages, and not statutory damages. In its Memorandum of Additional
Authorities, defendant asserts that a recent Ninth Circuit case, Wakefield, 51
F4th 1109, directly relates to these assignments of error. Wakefield makes clear
that Williams is applicable to the assessment of statutory damages, not Gore.
Wakefield, 51 F4th at 1120-21.
     23
        At least one other circuit court has held the same. See Golan v. FreeEats.com,
Inc., 930 F3d 950, 962-63 (8th Cir 2019) (reviewing an aggregate $1.6 billion
award of individual $500 penalties in a class action for due process under
Williams). Another court has indicated the possibility of aggregate statutory
damages violating due process. See Parker v. Time Warner Entertainment Co.,
L.P., 331 F3d 13, 22 (2d Cir 2003) (indicating in dicta that the aggregation of stat-
utory damages could distort the purpose of statutory damages and class action
suits, inducing unfair settlements, and that in a “sufficiently serious case” a due
process challenge could be used “to nullify that effect and reduce the aggregate
damage award”).
628                               Bellshaw v. Farmers Ins. Co.

serve purely compensatory or deterrence goals, consider-
ation of an award’s reasonableness and proportionality to
the violation and injury takes on heightened constitutional
importance.” Id. at 1122-23. The court went on to discuss
a number of factors that can contribute to the assessment
of whether an aggregate award is constitutional, including
considering “the magnitude of the aggregated award in rela-
tion to the statute’s goals of compensation, deterrence, and
punishment and to the proscribed conduct.” Id. at 1123. The
parties agree that Wakefield is relevant to this case and do
not dispute that the aggregate award is subject to a due pro-
cess analysis. Though we are not bound by federal circuit
court case law, absent any argument to the contrary we are
persuaded that the rationale set forth in Wakefield is appli-
cable in this matter.
         In reviewing the trial court’s ruling on this issue,
it is not clear to us whether or how the court considered
the aggregate award. Though the arguments from defen-
dant below focused on the total amount awarded, and the
trial court purported to consider the due process implica-
tions of the $100 statutory penalty “as applied” in the mat-
ter, portions of the trial court’s rationale suggest that it did
not believe it had the authority to alter the final aggregate
award:
       “The penalty contained in ORS 746.300 is clear. The
   code is to be liberally construed to protect the consumer.
   There is no ambiguity and the court’s role is to enforce the
   penalty. The courts, in the construction of the statutes, are
   simply to ascertain and declare what the text and substance
   of the law is. ORS 174.010. The courts may not rewrite the
   law even if the legislature is suspected of error. The Court
   cannot rewrite ORS 746.300 to read ‘actual damages or a
   penalty to be set by the court but not to exceed $100.’ If
   the legislature had meant for the Court to have discretion,
   it would have said so. The legislature did not provide the
   court with a range of judicial discretion. They certainly
   could have provided for judicial review as they did in ORS
   31.730, in reviewing jury awards of punitive damages, but
   they did not. There is very little case law dealing with stat-
   utory penalties and while I earlier indicated that I believed
   a reduction may be warranted, it would have been better
   stated that under [Scharfstein v. BP West Coast Products,
Cite as 326 Or App 605 (2023)                                              629

    LLC, 292 Or App 69, 423 P3d 757, rev den, 363 Or 815
    (2018), cert dismissed, 140 S Ct 16, 204 L Ed 2d 1170 (2019)],
    a due process hearing was warranted given the facts of this
    case.

       “Certainly, there would be no question that a $100.00
    penalty paid to a single claimant is not severe. The legis-
    lators had the opportunity to increase the penalty in 2007
    when the law was amended and elected not to do so. The
    penalty only becomes severe when viewed in the light of
    a large class. Changes in the Class Action Statutes have
    made this case and others like it possible and thus there is
    a need to review the statutory penalties in light of larger
    class actions. Other courts have rejected the argument that
    aggregation automatically creates a Due Process problem
    and I agree.”

The court went on in its conclusions of law to state, “The
legislature provided the court with no discretion to reduce
the $100 statutory liquidated damages penalty contained in
ORS 746.300 and for that reason the court awards the legis-
latively determined penalty of $100 without reduction.” The
court also found that “[a]ny proper analysis under either
Gore or Williams also supports that the $100 statutory pen-
alty does not violate due process.”
         From the court’s opinion, it is unclear how it
applied the Williams analysis to the aggregate award. We
note that the trial court made several findings of fact that
would appear to weigh in defendant’s favor when analyz-
ing the award under Williams and Wakefield, including
that defendant did not intend to violate ORS 746.290(2)(b),
defendant did not act reprehensibly, defendant’s conduct did
not involve intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, and plain-
tiff submitted no evidence demonstrating any harm to any
class member resulting from the noncompliant notices.24
The trial court further concluded that defendant’s violation
was a technical one and noted that defendant relied on lan-
guage approved by DCBS and that DCBS had taken no civil
enforcement actions against defendant or any other insur-
ers in connection with the notice violation.

    24
       Indeed, it is likely that many of the class members, like plaintiff, never
read the Notice.
630                           Bellshaw v. Farmers Ins. Co.

         On remand, the trial court shall reassess the con-
stitutionality of the aggregate statutory penalties awarded,
using the framework set forth in Williams and as further
explained in Wakefield.
                    V. CONCLUSION
        We conclude that defendant’s Notice did not comply
with the requirements of ORS 746.290(2)(b). The trial court
erred in expanding the class to include claims that were
time barred. The aggregate statutory penalty award, once
recalculated on remand, should be assessed for whether its
imposition complies with due process.
        Reversed and remanded.