Court Opinion

ID: 9724540
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:00:41.955486+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:02.191815
License: Public Domain

COMPTON, J.
I concur in the decision of the majority to require specific findings by the trial court on the question of whether the defendant in fact suffered any prejudice from the delay. However, I feel compelled to expand on the reasoning contained in the majority opinion.
Of the four prongs of the Barker and Jones test, it would appear that the two most crucial ones are those of (1) the reason for the delay, and (2) the prejudice to the defendant. In the instant case, we are not dealing *104with a deliberate delay by which the prosecution affirmatively sought to gain some advantage over the defendant. As the majority clearly points out this was a pure case of inadvertence on the part of the record keeping personnel of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. In such a situation it would seem that the court should not indulge in a presumption that the defendant was prejudiced but should undertake to make an actual determination of whether prejudice in fact exists.
The defendant’s showing at the original hearing was very thin indeed. He does not allege in his affidavit that he - ever had the actual ability to locate the so-called missing witnesses. For example, as to Mary Thurmond, his statement was only that her last known residence was in San Francisco, California, in June or July of 1971, and as to Jesse, that she resided in the “Venice-Crenshaw area in the City of Los Angeles on or about April of 1971.” Assuming that that could be construed as a claim on the part of defendant that he could have located these people in those broad, rather well inhabited, areas of this state as of the date set forth in the affidavit, defendant has made no showing that as of October 1971, when he ceased to be a fugitive from justice, he had any ability at that point in time to locate the so-called missing witnesses. Defendant simply failed to make any showing that the delay from October 1971 to August of 1972, affected his ability to locate the missing witnesses.
Concerning the alleged missing witness Phil Dawson, defendant’s affidavit is completely silent on the issue of whether he ever at any time knew where to locate Phil Dawson.
Furthermore, the value of this latter witness is marginal. According to the defendant’s allegations, all that Dawson could testify to is that in an alleged conversation with the victim of the robbery in July of 1971; the victim failed to mention the subject of the robbery.
In summation then, the defendant’s attempt at showing prejudice did not come close to establishing that his inability to locate the missing witnesses was in any way affected by the 10-month delay between October 1971 and August 1972.
Finally, I believe that the trial judge properly applied the rule that “but for the defendant’s misconduct in becoming a fugitive from justice, the delay would never have occurred.” However, I think the majority is quite correct i <i directing that the trial judge support his conclusion in that regard by specific findings concerning the credibility of the defendant and the specific facts underlying that, conclusion., t,
A petition for a rehearing was denied July 23, 1973, and petitioner’s application for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied August 22, 1973.