Court Opinion

ID: 9703094
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:39:58.514653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:17.838492
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent. I would hold that there was an insufficiency of evidence with regard to appellant’s sanity.
*25The transcript of the trial has been reviewed in its entirety repeatedly over a protracted period of time. The same conclusion resulted on each reading: the jury could not have properly found that the appellant was sane at the time the . crimes in question were committed. Neither the evidence alone, nor that evidence together with the inferences which could reasonably be drawn from it, substantiate such a verdict.
The evidence has been accurately summarized by the majority. The testimony which it synopsizes presents a tragic event. The horror for the victims and their families and the grotesque depths of appellant’s delusion were painful to read and re-read.
This is not often true on an appellate court. The steady parade of human savagery which is presented to us has an inuring effect. Notwithstanding this, the case before us had a special impact.
This strong personal reaction to these events is, of course, quite irrelevant to the judicial function to be performed. It is due to the necessity to disregard this subjective response that the record was reviewed so often and at intervals. For the question is not what the appellate judge would have done had he been a juror in the case. Rather, the question is — with extreme deference to the fact finder— whether the verdict of the fact finder was supported by the evidence. Applying this standard most rigorously, I have come to my stated position.
In doing so, I have been mindful of the need to approach most circumspectly the fact finder’s conclusion. However, it is equally important to remember that a restricted scope of appellate review must never become synonymous with no review at all.1 The review function must be exercised to *26appellant’s benefit when the occasion requires it. Otherwise, we have issues and rights which exist in form but never in fact. This duty of active, actual review coexists in a state of functional tension with the duty to apply a restricted scope of review. Both are essential to the process.
In this type of case it is all too easy to understand how this error could come about. The jury is faced with a horrific and senseless act. They are mindful of stories in the media of persons found not guilty because they are insane'who are subsequently released from mental institutions and then commit another demented criminal act. They are reminded by the prosecutor’s questioning that no one can confidently predict when the appellant “is going to go boom and explode.” Little wonder that a jury may decide to “play it safe” and find one like the appellant guilty.
But, where a jury may derogate its legal duty by doing what it sees as its social duty, the appellate courts cannot so indulge themselves. Our stern duty must be met. Here that duty dictates, as I see it, that the evidence be found insufficient. While respecting those who have come to the opposite conclusion, for myself, I find any other conclusion inconceivable.
If any case ever detailed the actions of an insane mind, surely that case is before this Court today.

. Of course, in no way do I mean to imply that my brother judges on this panel have not also subjected this case to the most careful scrutiny. Indeed, I am confident that quite the opposite is true. I am merely pointing out that an issue type which is frequently a losing one for appellants due to its restricted scope of review, can acquire in a judge’s mind an almost irrebuttable presumption of failure. This is *26an occupational hazard which, I think, all judges should, and most judges do, acknowledge.