Court Opinion

ID: 9751676
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:47:00.0031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:55.709962
License: Public Domain

DUGGAN, J.,
dissenting. In Londonderry School District SAU #12 v. State of New Hampshire, 154 N.H. 153 (2006), we affirmed the decision of the Superior Court (Groff, J.) declaring House Bill (HB) 616, an education funding law, unconstitutional. In response, the legislature passed HB 927, Laws 2007, ch. 270 (Chapter 270), which defines the opportunity for an adequate education and established a Joint Legislative Oversight Committee (Joint Committee) to study the cost of providing the opportunity for an adequate education. We then requested the parties to submit memoranda addressing how we should proceed in light of the new legislation. For the reasons that follow, I would dismiss this appeal without prejudice and remand to the superior court.
On July 1,2005, HB 616 became effective. The purpose of HB 616 was to ensure an equitable education and target aid to communities with low property values. HB 616 established a new education funding formula for municipalities and provided criteria for municipalities to receive local tax capacity aid, targeted per pupil aid, and statewide enhanced education tax capacity aid. The plaintiffs, Londonderry School District SAU #12, Merrimack School District SAU #26 and New Hampshire Communities for Adequate Funding of Education, filed a petition for declaratory relief in this court, requesting that we find HB 616 unconstitutional. We dismissed the action without prejudice after concluding that, “while substantial questions of constitutional law are presented by this case, we believe further factual development is necessary in the superior court before those questions are decided.” The plaintiffs then filed a petition for declaratory judgment in superior court and moved for summary judgment.
The plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment challenged the constitutionality of HB 616 on the grounds that the statute: (1) failed to define, determine the cost of, and ensure delivery of a constitutionally adequate education; (2) required a number of municipalities to fund a constitutionally adequate education through local taxes; (3) all but eliminated so-called “donor communities” and imposed an unreasonable and disproportionate *742tax burden on the property-poor municipalities with respect to funding education; and (4) created a class of former donor communities that retain all revenue they raise through the state-wide enhanced education tax, resulting in a violation of equal protection. The trial court found that the legislature failed to define a constitutionally adequate education, failed to determine the cost of an adequate education, failed to satisfy the requirement of accountability, and created a non-uniform tax rate. The trial court determined that HB 616 was facially unconstitutional and granted the plaintiffs’ motion. See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Accountability), 147 N.H. 499, 505 (2002) (providing four mandates to “define an adequate education, determine the cost, fund it with constitutional taxes, and ensure its delivery through accountability”). The State appealed the trial court’s ruling.
In Londonderry, we affirmed the trial court’s finding that the State failed to define a constitutionally adequate education and stayed the trial court’s remaining findings. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 154 N.H. at 155. We retained jurisdiction of the core definitional issues with the expectation that the political branches would define with specificity the components of a constitutionally adequate education before the end of fiscal year 2007. Id.
In response to Londonderry, the legislature enacted Chapter 270 and created the Joint Committee. On February 1, 2008, the Joint Committee submitted a report to the legislature and the Governor on its findings and recommendations as to the cost of the opportunity for an adequate education. By order dated June 25, 2008, we instructed the parties to file brief memoranda “addressing whether, in light of recent actions of the legislature . . . , this case should be dismissed without prejudice, or remanded to the superior court for further consideration and such further proceedings as it may deem appropriate.”
In response, the State requests that we dismiss this case, arguing any challenge to HB 616 is moot after the enactment of Chapter 270, and that no exception to the mootness doctrine applies. The President of the Senate and Speaker of the House filed a joint amicus memorandum in support of the State. They argue that the passage of Chapter 270 and the work of the Joint Committee have satisfied the legislature’s duty under our prior holding in this case. They further argue that the creation of the Joint Legislative Committee on Fiscal Capacity, Transition Aid and Diseconomies of Scale will satisfy the remaining burden placed upon the State to determine the cost of an adequate education. Because of the progress made and the changes implemented, they argue that the plaintiffs’ case is moot and should be dismissed.
The plaintiffs request that we retain jurisdiction while the Joint Committees and legislature bring the State into full compliance with the four *743mandates. The plaintiffs concede “that the State has fulfilled its obligation to define a constitutionally adequate education.” The plaintiffs further state that with Senate Bill 539, enacted as Laws 2008, chapter 173 (Chapter 173), the State has addressed the second and third mandates comprising the State’s duty to provide an adequate education. The plaintiffs argue, however, that flaws exist in the attempt to comply with the second and third mandates, and further argue that Chapter 173 acknowledges the State’s failure to meet the fourth mandate.
Regarding the second mandate, determining the cost of an adequate education, the plaintiffs argue that Chapter 173 sets an insufficient universal cost of education per pupil. Specifically, they argue that, in determining cost, the legislature factored in unreasonably high student-teacher ratios, low teachers’ salaries, and insufficient funding for special needs students. As to the third mandate, the plaintiffs point out that Chapter 173 “establishes a two-year phase-in period during which municipalities will receive funding tied to the funding they receive in FY 2009.” This, they argue, allows the legislature to carry forward the “constitutionally flawed” statewide distributions authorized in HB 616. The plaintiffs thus propose that we retain jurisdiction and that the plaintiffs, rather than challenge the constitutionality of the new legislation, “will work with the legislature during the 2009 legislative session to meet the State’s constitutional obligation to cost out the opportunity for an adequate education.”
National Education Association-New Hampshire(NEA-NH) filed an amicus brief memorandum in support of the plaintiffs. NEA-NH argues that the State has only reached the midpoint in fulfilling its responsibilities under Londonderry, and that dismissal of this case would frustrate further progress. In particular, NEA-NH argues that the student-teacher ratio is miscalculated, and that too few provisions are made for classroom aides, substitute teachers, and school administrators. NEA-NH also challenges the adequacy of funding for food services and pre-kindergarten programs. As such, the NEA-NH requests that we retain jurisdiction over the matter until the State fulfills its remaining obligations.
The State, in its memorandum, addresses some of the factual issues raised by the plaintiffs. The State points out that the legislature heard the evidence presented and considered information from its own experts in determining the appropriate teachers’ salaries. The State further argues that student-teacher ratios are acceptable because they “are those enacted in the State’s school approval standards,” and that the legislature, in its formulation, specifically took into consideration special needs students. As to differentiated aid, “the [Joint] Committee found that its ranges for additional aid for students with special needs exceed those of any other state.” The State maintains that the universal cost per pupil also includes *744“technology, instructional materials and supplies, teacher professional development, facilities operation and maintenance, and transportation,” and “many of these amounts are the same or higher than those used by other states.” The State argues that “it is apparent that there would need to be in-depth fact-finding before [the plaintiffs] could prove their assertions that these legislative decisions do not meet constitutional muster.” Such a claim, the State argues, must be brought through a new suit challenging the constitutionality of the recent legislation.
Initially, I will address the majority’s decision that this case is moot. The doctrine of mootness is designed to avoid deciding issues that “have become academic or dead.” Sullivan v. Town of Hampton Bd. of Selectmen, 153 N.H. 690, 692 (2006); Petition of Brooks, 140 N.H. 813, 816 (1996). It is well-established that “[m]ootness is not subject to rigid rules, but is a matter of convenience and discretion.” Royer v. State Dep’t of Employment Sec., 118 N.H. 673, 675 (1978). Thus, “[a] decision upon the merits may be justified where there is a pressing public interest involved, or future litigation may be avoided.” Sullivan, 153 N.H. at 692. This is a disjunctive standard, and I rely here upon the public interest prong.
There is a pressing public interest when there are “substantial social costs stemming from continued uncertainty in the law.” Proctor v. Butler, 117 N.H. 927, 930-31 (1977) (quotation omitted); see Bleiler v. Chief, Dover Police Dep’t, 155 N.H. 693, 695 (2007) (sufficient public interest in determination of whether petitioner’s concealed weapons permit had been properly revoked warranted resolution of legal issues, even though petitioner’s permit had expired); Bio Energy, LLC v. Town of Hopkinton, 153 N.H. 145, 150 (2005) (pressing public interest in issues arising out of the use of construction and demolition woodchips as a fuel source in facility even though moratorium in place on the disposal of construction and demolition waste by incineration); Sullivan, 153 N.H. at 692-93 (sufficient public interest in resolution of town budget to forgo mootness concerns and address issues presented, even though town was halfway through its fiscal year).
The issue of financing public education in New Hampshire has received much state-wide attention since 1992. Although early debates resulted in the Claremont decisions, see Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Accountability), 147 N.H. 499 (2002); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Statewide Property Tax Phase-In), 144 N.H. 210 (1999); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Motion for Extension of Deadlines), 143 N.H. 154 (1998); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont II), 142 N.H. 462 (1997); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor (Claremont I), 138 N.H. 183 (1993), the issue is far from settled. There is no question that the funding of public education can have substantial social costs. No party to this case would *745dispute the fact that the education of New Hampshire children has wide-reaching consequences; they instead dispute whether the legislature has fulfilled its constitutional obligation to provide an adequate education. Considering the substantial social costs involved in funding an adequate education and the history surrounding this debate in New Hampshire, I find sufficient public interest in resolving the now perennial issue of whether the State has fulfilled its duty to provide New Hampshire children a constitutionally adequate education. I thus disagree that this case is moot.
I next address whether we should retain jurisdiction of this case. I remain cognizant that it is the role of the political branches to define the substantive content of a constitutionally adequate education. “[W]e were not appointed to establish education policy, nor to determine the proper way to finance its implementation,” Claremont II, 142 N.H. at 475. However, it is our responsibility to “uphold and implement the New Hampshire Constitution.” Id.
Although the plaintiffs concede that the legislature has fulfilled its obligation to define and determine the cost of an adequate education, the parties’ memoranda show considerable factual disagreement as to the remaining obligations. The Joint Committee held eighteen meetings and heard testimony from the public, educators, administrators, education stakeholders, and state as well as national education policy and finance professionals. Following the Joint Committee’s report of its findings and recommendations, the plaintiffs disputed the base numbers used to determine the universal cost per pupil as well as the construction of the formula, used to reach that figure. The submitted memoranda demonstrate disagreement over, for example, student-teacher ratios, teachers’ salaries, and who makes up necessary personnel. These are fact-driven disputes that are normally decided by a trial court. I agree with the Chief Justice that there exist other unresolved issues as to whether the legislature has complied with the mandate to provide a constitutionally adequate education, but these issues should be resolved in the first instance by the superior court. I, therefore, would dismiss this appeal without prejudice and remand to the superior court.