Court Opinion

ID: 9738112
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:42:56.800505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:03.770213
License: Public Domain

Brown, J.
(concurring). I join fully in the result reached by the majority. It is the conduct of the attorneys in the opening phase of this saga, i.e., those who counseled the executors to reject the Hunts’ bid and those who first encouraged the Vini-oses to attack the outcome of the auction1 which, once again, compels me to comment. Cf. Energy Resources Corp. v. Porter, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 296, 303-304 (1982); Kennedy v. Kennedy, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 559, 564-565 (1985); Petitions of Catholic Charitable Bureau to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 48, 60-61 (1986); Pinkowitz v. Edinburg, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 180, 191 (1986); Edinburg v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 22 Mass. App. Ct. 923, 925-926 (1986).
This case presents a question of offer and acceptance, a subject covered comprehensively in the first-year contracts course in every law school. The correct answer — that the Hunts’ offer was accepted by the executors twenty minutes after they examined the bids — should likewise be apparent to every first-year law student.
The executors’ decision to sell the real estate at auction “with reserve” was eminently sensible; the bid kits were intelligently prepared; all of the bids were submitted in accordance with the instructions; after opening the bids, the executors announced that the high bidders had (literally) “bought the farm.” That should have been the last chapter of this story.2 *635But, instead, a few days later new counsel for one of the unsuccessful bidders (the Vinioses) attempted to undo the result,3 and, by that attempt, caused the executors (and their respective counsel) to doubt the soundness of their course of conduct.4
The best advice for counsel to have given the Vinioses would have been for them to do nothing. See S.J.C. Rule 3:07, Canon 1, DR 1-102(A)(5), 382 Mass. 770 (1981). And the best advice for counsel to have given the executors, when faced with the Vinioses’ late counteroffer, would have been for them (the executors) to do what was minimally honorable — play by the rules of their game. But, as happens all too often when phalanxes of attorneys become involved, improvident advice bred the instant lawsuit, which in turn bred the appeal now before us. This matter has consumed a great deal of court time (at two levels) and, no doubt, has caused the parties to spend a massive amount on legal fees. Compare Energy Resources Corp. v. Porter, 14 Mass. App. Ct. at 304. After all that, this court now pronounces, as did the executors to the Hunts some forty months ago: “Congratulations, you’ve bought the farm.”5
I think double costs of the appeal and substantial counsel fees are certainly warranted here. See Farm Constr. Serv., Inc. v. Robinson, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 955, 956 (1986), and cases cited. The Hunts and their attorneys acted responsibly and should not be penalized.
In fairness, I should mention that counsel for the executors do merit slight commendation for requiring the Vinioses to assume the burden of this litigation, thereby conserving the *636assets of the estate. It is because the Vinieses, and not the estate, would be burdened that I favor double costs pursuant to Mass.R.A.P. 25 and the award of counsel fees.6 Also, I suggest that the probate judge who is requested to approve the executors’ account look very closely at fees and litigation expenses attributable to this matter that may have been unnecessary or generated by improvident judgment.

 None of the lawyers named in the heading to the court’s opinion participated in the giving of that advice and my criticism is not directed against any of them.

 In descriptive vernacular, the agreement was “bullet-proof.”

I pass over the question whether the Vinioses have standing to assert “ ‘the best interests of the estate’ ” (see the majority opinion, ante at 626).

 It is my view that in these circumstances, nothing in Onanian v. Leggat, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 623 (1974), provides justification for such a reversal of position.

 It is no small irony that the executors’ decision to rescind their acceptance of the Hunts’ offer, and eventually to sell the farm to the Vinioses subject to the outcome of this litigation (see the majority opinion at note 5, supra), might actually have benefited the estate. One wonders, however, how much of that additional $100,000 may have been offset by additional legal or executors’ fees chargeable to the estate.

 The decedent desired that much other estate go to eleemosynary activities and causes and not be chewed up in needless litigation.