Court Opinion

ID: 9788858
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:20:48.949509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:43:19.347661
License: Public Domain

BOLGER, Judge,
dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority opinion’s resolution of John Rantala’s double jeopardy claim. But I respectfully dissent from the portion of the opinion addressing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Rantala’s conviction for tampering with a witness. I conclude that the record supports Rantala’s conviction on the charge that he “knowingly induee[d] or attempt[ed] to induce a witness to testify falsely, offer misleading testimony, or unlawfully withhold testimony in an official proceeding.” 1
As noted in the majority opinion, Teri Mischler told Rantala during their second telephone conversation that she had not yet received a subpoena. Rantala then told Mis-chler:
Then you don’t even have to say anything to them. You could just say, “Oh yeah he came in through the window, but” ... just say “yes” or “no” to them. In fact, you could say “well, I don’t even want to pursue this.” And they can’t do anything about it. Then I can go to court [on the additional misdemeanor charges] and I’ll plead guilty to [them] and you’ll be out of it. You won’t have to deal with this anymore. You understand what I want, trying to do here?
Rantala stressed that Mischler should refuse to testify in front of the grand jury because she had not received a subpoena, and that she should just “tell them ‘no, I don’t have anything to say,’ ” and “that way they won’t indict me.” Toward the end of the call, Rantala told Mischler, “if they didn’t subpoena you, you don’t have to say anything. And whatever you do, don’t elaborate on anything. If you’re going to say anything, just say ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ You know what I mean? If you don’t want to answer, say ‘no.’ ”
It is possible that Rantala merely intended to tell Mischler that she was not required to testify without a subpoena and that she should not elaborate if she chose to do so. But in determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we must “view the evidence and the inferences to be drawn from that evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict.”2 Viewed in this light, Rantala’s statements could also be reasonably inter*564preted to mean that, even if Misehler chose to take the stand, she should refuse to answer or simply answer “no” if she did not want to answer a question.
The prosecutor relied on this interpretation of the evidence during her closing argument. She contended that Rantala’s suggestion that Misehler should tell the grand jury, “I don’t even want to pursue this,” amounted to unlawful withholding of testimony. She followed this contention with a legitimate conclusion: “If you haven’t been subpoenaed, you don’t have to appear. But once you appear, whether or not you have a subpoena, you have to testify truthfully.”
We have previously held similar evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction for witness tampering. In Boggess v. State, the sole evidence supporting a conviction was the testimony that the defendant told his wife that instead of answering questions before the grand jury, she should “plead the fifth” or “break down and cry.”3 We concluded that this testimony was sufficient to establish that the defendant was guilty of attempting to induce his wife to “unlawfully withhold evidence in an official proceeding.”4
The same is true in the present case: The jury could have reasonably concluded that Rantala was attempting to persuade Misehler that, if she chose to appear before the grand jury, she should testify in a misleading manner, or illegally withhold testimony. This conclusion would support Rantala’s conviction for witness tampering.

. AS 11.56.540(a)(1).

. Tipikin v. Anchorage, 65 P.3d 899, 901 (Alaska App.2003).

. 783 P.2d 1173, 1181 (Alaska App. 1989).

. id.