Court Opinion

ID: 9928268
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 15:02:49.332358+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:52:14.565553
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                 STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                        No. 1D2021-3609
                 _____________________________

MARQUICE EMANULE NOLAN,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.
Coleman Lee Robinson, Judge.

                        January 31, 2024

RAY, J.

     Marquice Emanule Nolan was sentenced to fifteen years in
prison after he pleaded no contest to violating his sexual offender
probation. On appeal, he asserts that he should have been
sentenced to no more than six years in prison as a youthful
offender because the State alleged only technical violations of
supervision. We disagree. Nolan entered a plea to allegations that
constitute the commission of at least one criminal act. The trial
court correctly concluded that Nolan committed a substantive
violation, and thus it was not limited by the six-year sentencing
cap that applies to technical violations.
                                 I

     In 2018, Nolan pleaded no contest to one count of lewd or
lascivious battery of a victim under sixteen years old. He was
sentenced under the Florida Youthful Offender Act to two years in
prison followed by four years of sexual offender probation.

      A few years later, Nolan’s probation officer filed a probation
violation affidavit, alleging that Nolan had violated two special
conditions of probation. In short, the affidavit alleged a violation
of special conditions nineteen and thirty for having unsupervised
contact with a minor and accessing the internet without approval.
According to the violation report, law enforcement responded to a
call from a concerned citizen who found Nolan wearing nothing but
boxer shorts while in bed with a fourteen-year-old girl. The girl
stated under oath that she and Nolan had been kissing, and that
if they had not been interrupted, it likely would have gone further.
She stated that Nolan had repeatedly asked her for sex, had
brought condoms to her house, came to her bus stop in the
mornings, and talked to her on Instagram.

    Nolan entered a plea of no contest to violating the terms of his
probation. During the hearing, the trial court asked Nolan,

    Do you understand that because these are not technical
    violations that you would be looking at up to the statutory
    maximum? . . . You’re looking at up to 15 years in state
    prison and under the guidelines it’s going to recommend
    at least 111.6 months, unless I find a reason to depart
    from that. Do you understand all that?

Nolan responded that he understood. The trial court revoked
probation and sentenced Nolan to fifteen years in prison with
credit for time served.

     Nolan later moved to correct a sentencing error under Florida
Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b). He argued that since his
violations were technical, he should be resentenced under the six-
year statutory maximum for youthful offenders. He relied on the
Florida Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Meeks, which
explained that a “substantive violation” under the Youthful
Offender Act “refers exclusively to a violation premised on the

                                 2
commission of a separate criminal act.” 789 So. 2d 982, 989 (Fla.
2001).

     In response, the State contended that Nolan’s violations were
not merely technical. It argued that the facts to which Nolan
entered a plea implicitly established the basis for several criminal
offenses, including solicitation of a minor for sexual conduct in
violation of section 847.0135(3), Florida Statutes; lewd or
lascivious conduct in violation of section 800.04(6), Florida
Statutes; and attempted lewd or lascivious battery in violation of
section 800.04(4), Florida Statutes. The trial court denied the
motion, adding that the allegations also constituted traveling to
meet a minor in violation of section 847.0135(4), Florida Statutes.

     Nolan moved for rehearing. He argued that his violations were
technical because he was not charged with a violation of condition
five, which required him to “live without violating any law.” The
court denied the motion for rehearing, and this appeal followed.

                                 II

     Under the Youthful Offender Act, a trial court may sentence
certain individuals between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one
as youthful offenders, which limits the combined total period of
incarceration and probation to six years. § 958.04(1), (2)(c), Fla.
Stat. (2017). If a youthful offender violates the terms of probation
or community control, there is a six-year sentencing cap for a
technical violation, but no such limit for a substantive violation:

    A violation or alleged violation of probation or the terms
    of a community control program shall subject the
    youthful offender to the provisions of s. 948.06. However,
    no youthful offender shall be committed to the custody of
    the department for a substantive violation for a period
    longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for
    which he or she was found guilty, with credit for time
    served while incarcerated, or for a technical or
    nonsubstantive violation for a period longer than 6 years
    or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the
    offense for which he or she was found guilty, whichever is
    less, with credit for time served while incarcerated.

                                 3
§ 958.14, Fla. Stat. (2017).

     As mentioned earlier, a “substantive violation,” as the phrase
is used in section 958.14, “refers exclusively to a violation premised
on the commission of a separate criminal act.” Meeks, 789 So. 2d
at 989 (answering a certified question on the definition of
“substantive violation”).

     According to Nolan, the trial court erred in finding a
substantive violation of probation because the State’s probation
violation affidavit failed to allege a violation of condition five,
which required him to live without violating the law. He cites cases
that stand for the general proposition that a defendant cannot be
found in violation of a particular condition of probation unless the
State alleged a violation of that condition. See N.L. v. State, 825
So. 2d 509, 510 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (“It is error for a trial court to
revoke probation even for a conceded violation when the
probationer has been charged with a different violation
altogether.”); Richardson v. State, 694 So. 2d 147, 147 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1997) (“[R]evocation of a defendant’s probation based on a
violation not alleged in the charging document is a deprivation of
the right to due process of law.”).

     Here, however, Nolan’s probation was not revoked based on a
violation not alleged in the probation violation affidavit. It is
undisputed that Nolan violated his probation; he did not contest
that he had unsupervised contact with a minor and used the
internet without approval. And he was on notice that these
violations were based on conduct that would constitute separate
criminal acts. In fact, he even acknowledged during the revocation
hearing that he understood his plea encompassed non-technical
violations. Thus, there was no due process violation, nor was one
even argued by Nolan. See Robinson v. State, 702 So. 2d 1346, 1347
(Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (rejecting defendant’s argument that his
violations of probation were only technical given that he admitted
using marijuana and testing positive for marijuana in connection
with his probation revocation).

    In a similar context, the State need not charge and convict a
defendant of a new crime to establish a substantive violation of
youthful offender probation, so long as the commission of a

                                  4
separate criminal offense is alleged and shown during revocation
proceedings. St. Cyr v. State, 106 So. 3d 487, 489 (Fla. 4th DCA
2013) (concluding that the defendant “need not have been charged
or convicted of the new offense constituting the substantive
violation in order for a court to sentence a youthful offender in
excess of the six-year cap”), disapproved of on other grounds by
Eustache v. State, 248 So. 3d 1097, 1102 n.3 (Fla. 2018); Christian
v. State, 84 So. 3d 437, 439 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (finding a violation
of probation was substantive, despite the State not charging or
convicting the defendant of any new crime, where the defendant
admitted to drug use during revocation proceedings), disapproved
of on other grounds by Eustache, 248 So. 3d at 1102.

                                 III

     In sum, we reject Nolan’s argument that the State must allege
a violation of standard condition five in its violation of probation
affidavit for the court to find a substantive violation based on the
facts and circumstances before it. For these reasons, we affirm.

ROWE and WINOKUR, JJ., concur.

                  _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Joel Arnold, Assistant
Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Damaris E. Reynolds,
Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

                                 5