Court Opinion

ID: 9916938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 21:00:44.334782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:10.481584
License: Public Domain

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                                             PUBLISHED

                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 22-1441

        ALYSSA REID,

                            Plaintiff – Appellant,

                     v.

        JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY, a public university; JONATHAN R. ALGER,
        sued in his official and individual capacities; HEATHER COLTMAN, sued in her
        official and individual capacities; ROBERT AGUIRRE, sued in his official and
        individual capacities; AMY M. SIROCKY-MECK, sued in her official and
        individual capacities,

                            Defendants – Appellees,

                     and

        JANE OR JOHN DOES, sued in their official and individual capacities; UNITED
        STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; MIGUEL CARDONA, Secretary of
        U.S. Department of Education, sued in his official capacity,

                            Defendants.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at
        Harrisonburg. Elizabeth Kay Dillon, District Judge. (5:21–cv–00032–EKD)

        Argued: October 27, 2023                                     Decided: January 9, 2024

        Before NIEMEYER, THACKER, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.
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        Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Quattlebaum wrote the opinion, in
        which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Thacker joined.

        ARGUED: Gregory Dolin, UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE SCHOOL OF LAW,
        Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Erika L. Maley, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
        GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Harriet
        Hageman, John J. Vecchione, Markham Chenoweth, NEW CIVIL LIBERTIES
        ALLIANCE, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General,
        Charles H. Slemp, III, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Sandra S. Gregor, Assistant
        Attorney General, Amy E. Hensley, Assistant Attorney General, Andrew N. Ferguson,
        Solicitor General, Lucas W.E. Croslow, Deputy Solicitor General, Annie Chiang, Assistant
        Solicitor General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond,
        Virginia, for Appellees.

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        QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge:

              This appeal requires us to determine, for statute of limitations purposes, the accrual

        point of a plaintiff’s claims that a university violated Title IX’s anti-discrimination

        provisions and her procedural due process rights when handling sexual harassment

        allegations made against her.

              While working as a faculty member at James Madison University in Virginia,

        Alyssa Reid was accused of violating JMU’s Title IX policy against non-consensual

        relationships based on her past relationship with a graduate student. JMU investigated the

        accusation and held a hearing on the matter, leading to a dean’s April 2019 decision that

        Reid violated the policy. Under the same Title IX policy, Reid appealed the dean’s decision

        to JMU’s provost, who denied her appeal in June 2019. In May 2021—over two years after

        the dean’s decision but less than two years after the provost’s denial of her appeal—Reid

        sued JMU and several JMU officials in federal court, raising three due process claims under

        both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Virginia Constitution and a sex discrimination claim under

        Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88. Finding that Reid’s

        claims accrued when the dean made his decision, the district court held that they were

        barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations and granted JMU and its officials’

        motion to dismiss Reid’s complaint.

               On appeal, Reid argues that the district court erred in dismissing her claims as time-

        barred. Reid contends that her claims accrued not when the dean issued his April 2019

        decision, but when the provost denied her appeal in June 2019. Reid thus contends that she

        brought her May 2021 claims within the two-year statute of limitations. For the reasons

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        explained below, we agree. So, we reverse the dismissal of Reid’s claims and remand for

        further proceedings.

                                            I. BACKGROUND

                                              A. Reid’s Claims

               In 2012, Reid began working at JMU’s School of Communication Studies as both

        the Assistant Director of Individual Events and a lecturer. In the former role, Reid helped

        manage the JMU Individual Events Team, the university’s undergraduate speech and

        debate team. In the latter role, she taught undergraduate speech classes. While teaching a

        speech class during her first year at JMU, Reid met then-undergraduate student Kathryn

        Lese. 1 As Reid puts it, the two soon became “best friends.” J.A. 48. Though Lese graduated

        from her undergraduate program in the spring of 2014, she returned to JMU in the fall of

        that same year as a graduate student. In connection with her graduate program, Lese was

        assigned to work with the Individual Events Team, which Reid continued to manage. Reid

        maintained that she had no authority over Lese during this time, asserting that their

        dynamic was one of “colleagues and co-coaches with largely similar responsibilities.” J.A.

        48.

               In October 2015, Reid and Lese traveled with the Individual Events Team to a

        speech and debate tournament in New Jersey. During the trip, Reid and Lese drank alcohol

        in Lese’s hotel room, where Lese expressed her romantic feelings for Reid. Reid

               1
                   The parties have chosen not to anonymize Lese’s identity.
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        purportedly changed the subject. According to Reid, Lese pursued her for the next month,

        though both women were in relationships with other people. Reid contends that she resisted

        Lese’s advances until November 2015, when they attended a national conference together

        in Nevada. It was during that trip that, according to Reid, Lese “forcefully kissed” her. J.A.

        50. After the trip, the women broke up with their respective partners and began an exclusive

        relationship.

               Reid contends that she and Lese mutually agreed to keep their relationship quiet to

        avoid impacting the Individual Events Team and generating interdepartmental gossip.

        They continued dating into May 2016, when Lese completed her graduate program. The

        same month, an unknown individual anonymously submitted a Title IX allegation against

        Reid, accusing her of having an inappropriate student-faculty relationship with Lese. Reid

        alleges that she was not made aware of this allegation until JMU notified her that it had

        investigated the accusation and found no wrongdoing under the JMU’s then-existing Title

        IX policy.

               In June 2016, JMU hired Lese as a full-time employee in the JMU Program Board.

        During the summer of 2017, Reid and Lese continued dating and eventually moved in

        together. However, in February 2018, the couple broke up. The break-up was not amicable.

               On December 4, 2018, roughly ten months after the relationship ended, Lese

        emailed JMU’s Title IX Coordinator Amy M. Sirocky-Meck a “Title IX Statement.” J.A.

        184. In it, Lese recalled her relationship with Reid between October 2015 and May 2016,

        when Lese was still a graduate student. Lese alleged that she was initially concerned about

        becoming romantically involved with Reid because Reid “was [her] supervisor,” but Reid

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        told her if they “kept things quiet everything would be fine.” J.A. 184. Lese further alleged

        that, after they began dating, Reid told her not to expose their relationship “out of fear that

        it would have negative consequences professionally.” J.A. 185. Lese asserted that Reid

        continued to instruct her to keep their relationship a secret after Lese graduated in May

        2016, which Lese stated was “problematic and stemmed from the power dynamics of the

        student-to-faculty relationship.” J.A. 185. Lese conveyed that she had since realized Reid

        manipulated her during their relationship.

               Upon receiving Lese’s email, Sirocky-Meck appointed herself the investigating

        Title IX Officer over Lese’s report. Sirocky-Meck then emailed Reid to inform her that she

        had been named a “Respondent in a Formal Complaint of Sexual Misconduct” filed one

        day earlier. 2 J.A. 56. In her email, Sirocky-Meck told Reid that the complaint asserted that

        “you and Ms. Lese were involved in a romantic and sexual relationship beginning Fall

        2015 during the time when Ms. Lese was a graduate assistant with the Individual events

        team that you served as Assistant Director for,” in violation of JMU’s new Title IX policy

        against non-consensual relationships. J.A. 187. 3

               2
                According to Reid, Sirocky-Meck improperly treated Lese’s unsigned Title IX
        Statement as a formal complaint and incorrectly informed her that the Title IX Statement
        was submitted on December 12, 2018.
               3
                  The parties dispute which JMU Title IX policy applied to Lese’s complaint.
        Sirocky-Meck informed Reid that she was accused of violating Policy 1340. But that Title
        IX policy was not enacted until after Lese completed her graduate program and became a
        full-time JMU employee. While Lese was a graduate student, JMU’s governing Title IX
        policy was Policy 1324. Reid alleges that it was Policy 1324 that JMU applied in May 2016
        to determine that Reid’s relationship with Lese was not a concern. The differences in these
        policies are significant. Policy 1324 generally prohibited discrimination and harassment on

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               In early January 2019, JMU placed Reid on paid administrative leave pending its

        investigation. While on leave, Reid applied for an interdepartmental promotion but was

        informed in February 2019 that she was “no longer being considered.” J.A. 191.

               During the investigation, Sirocky-Meck invited Reid to identify witnesses who

        could support her version of events. Although JMU’s Title IX policy entitled Reid to

        “timely access to documents and information considered by the hearing panel,” J.A. 173,

        Reid says that the deadline to provide witnesses came before Reid received a copy of Lese’s

        Title IX Statement. As a result, Reid asserts that her witnesses had to provide statements

        before Reid even knew the specific allegations against her. Also, though she subsequently

        received a copy of Lese’s Title IX Statement, well over half of that copy, including the

        factual information about the allegations, was redacted.

               On March 28, 2019, JMU held a hearing on Lese’s allegations. Prior to the hearing,

        Sirocky-Meck informed Reid that neither Reid nor Lese was required to attend the hearing.

        Reid states that Sirocky-Meck also informed her that, if both women attended the hearing,

        Reid would not be permitted to directly question Lese. Instead, Reid would need to direct

        her questions to the chair of the hearing panel, who would vet the questions and, if

        approved, repeat them to Lese. Sirocky-Meck also told Reid that she and Lese were each

        permitted to bring one “support person” to the hearing. J.A. 61. According to Reid,

        the basis of sex or sexual orientation in the employment relationship. Whether a
        relationship violated the policy therefore depended on whether there was conduct that
        discriminated or harassed on the basis of sex or sexual orientation. In contrast, the
        subsequently enacted Policy 1340 effectively made Reid’s past relationship with Lese a
        per se violation, as it identified several ways in which sexual relationships between
        students and faculty would be non-consensual.
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        Sirocky-Meck described the support person’s role as “to provide support to the party they

        are with” and explained that the support person “do[es] not speak for or represent the party

        they are supporting.” J.A. 61. Reid alleges that Sirocky-Meck stated that no one else was

        permitted to attend the hearing, effectively denying her access to legal counsel.

               Reid chose to attend the hearing with her mother as her support person. Lese did not

        attend, though she submitted a letter to be read to the hearing panel. The hearing panel also

        considered unsworn, unsigned statements provided by Lese’s four witnesses, who likewise

        were not in attendance. Reid received copies of these statements prior to the hearing but

        states that they, like Lese’s Title IX Statement, were so heavily redacted that she did not

        know their factual content.

               On April 1, 2019, the hearing panel issued a report finding Reid “responsible” for

        engaging in a non-consensual relationship in violation of the Title IX Policy. J.A. 193. The

        hearing panel recommended that Reid be reprimanded by JMU. The hearing panel

        determined that a reprimand would be sufficient sanction because of the “professional

        consequences that [Reid] ha[d] already suffered due to the complaint” and because Reid

        was “at low risk for repeating the behavior.” J.A. 194. However, the report stated that “[t]he

        AVP [Associate Vice President], Dean, or VP [Vice President] over the Responding Party

        will determine the final outcomes of the case.” J.A. 194. Under JMU’s policy, the panel’s

        finding was then forwarded to Robert Aguirre, the Dean of the College of Arts and Letters.

               On April 30, 2019, Dean Aguirre issued a written decision, titled “Faculty Sexual

        Misconduct Case Dean/Associate Vice President [“AVP”] Written Decision.” which

        Sirocky-Meck emailed to Reid on the same day. J.A. 204. By this time, Reid had already

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        left her employment at JMU, purportedly due to stigma she suffered from Lese’s

        allegations. The decision included a “Findings” section that set forth the “decision of the

        Dean/AVP” that Reid was “RESPONSIBLE” for a “Non-Consensual Relationship.” J.A.

        204. In the “Rationale” subsection, Dean Aguirre recounted the policy’s prohibition against

        non-consensual relationships. J.A. 204. He then stated, “After a thorough review of the

        evidence, which includes statements from the complainant and the respondent as well as

        witness statements, I find for the complainant.” J.A. 204. Dean Aguirre further stated that

        Reid and Lese’s “relationship was inappropriate and its conduct violates the JMU policy.”

        J.A. 204. Dean Aguirre concluded that “[a] letter of reprimand should be placed in the

        respondent’s file.” J.A. 204. The decision also contained a section titled “Sanction

        Recommendations.” J.A. 205. Using form language, the section provided that “[i]f the

        decision is Responsibility, the Dean/AVP also recommend sanctions,” with sanction

        options listed for the Dean/AVP to select. J.A. 205 (emphasis in original). Dean Aguirre

        marked the “reprimand” option. J.A. 205. In the “Rationale” subsection that followed,

        Dean Aguirre stated, “A letter of reprimand is suggested in light of the respondent’s having

        already left the university for other employment.” J.A. 205. The decision was signed by

        Dean Aguirre.

               In addition to providing Reid with a copy of Dean Aguirre’s written decision,

        Sirocky-Meck’s April 30th email to Reid included a document titled “Sexual Misconduct

        Complaint against a Faculty Member Dean/AVP Decision and Appeal Process and

        Procedures,” which outlined the internal appeals process in JMU’s Title IX policy. J.A.

        207. This document listed May 5, 2019, as the “Deadline for Reporting and Responding

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        Party to submit an appeal of the Dean/AVP’s Decision to the Vice President.” J.A. 207.

        Tracking the language of the Title IX policy, the document stated that “[i]n the absence of

        a timely written appeal, the decision of the respondent’s associate or assistant vice

        president or dean is final.” J.A. 207. However, it explained that either party could appeal

        to the “vice president,” who “shall make a final decision within 5 days after any hearing,

        or if no hearing is granted, within 5 days after the review of the case on the record.” J.A.

        207. The document provided, “The decision of the vice president is final, and may not be

        appealed.” J.A. 207. It identified Heather Coltman, JMU’s Vice President and Provost, as

        the vice president in Reid’s case.

               On May 5, 2019, Reid timely appealed Dean Aguirre’s determination to Provost

        Coltman. On June 19, 2019, Provost Coltman “up[held] the decision of the dean to find

        [Reid] responsible and to place a letter of reprimand in [her] personnel file.” 4 J.A. 200.

               Reid contends that prospective employers that have learned of this negative mark

        on her record at JMU have declined to hire her.

                                             B. Procedural History

               On May 3, 2021, Reid sued JMU, JMU President Jonathan R. Alger, Provost

               4
                 The Title IX policy provided that “the vice president shall make a decision on the
        appeal within 5 days of the final submission.” J.A. 175. But Provost Coltman was out of
        office between May 9 and June 3, 2019. So, she did not make a decision within the five
        days that the policy allotted her.

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        Coltman, Dean Aguirre and Sirocky-Meck (“Defendants”) in federal court. 5 Reid alleged

        three procedural due process violations under § 1983 and the Virginia Constitution, 6 based

        on Defendants’ retroactive application of a non-consensual relationship policy to her, their

        refusal to allow Reid to confront and cross-examine Lese and her witnesses and their failure

        to timely provide Reid with Lese’s complaint and her witnesses’ statements. Reid also

        brought a Title IX discrimination claim. Defendants moved to dismiss Reid’s complaint

        for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim for which relief may be

        granted pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), respectively.

        Concerning the former, Defendants asserted that Reid’s claims were time-barred by the

        uncontested two-year statute of limitations.

               The district court agreed with Defendants. Interpreting the Supreme Court’s

        decision in Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980), the district court

        explained that accrual “turn[s] on when a decision is final and whether any review is

        collateral or is part of a decision-making process that leads to a final decision.” J.A. 225.

        The district court determined that Dean Aguirre’s April 2019 written decision was a final

        decision, making Reid’s appeal to Provost Coltman a collateral review of that decision.

               5
                Reid also brought claims against the Department of Education and the Secretary
        of the Department of Education. Reid does not appeal the district court’s dismissal of those
        claims for lack of standing.
               6
                Our analysis of Reid’s due process claims focuses on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Because
        the due process protections afforded under the Constitution of Virginia are co-extensive
        with those of the federal constitution, the same analysis will apply to” Reid’s due process
        claims to the extent they are simultaneously brought under the Constitution of Virginia.
        See Shivaee v. Commonwealth, 613 S.E.2d 570, 574 (Va. 2005).
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        Accordingly, the district court concluded that Reid’s claims accrued with Dean Aguirre’s

        April 2019 decision, making her May 2021 complaint untimely. It therefore granted

        Defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissed Reid’s claims with prejudice.

                                               II. ANALYSIS

               On appeal, Reid argues that the district court erred in determining that her claims

        were untimely and, for that reason, dismissing her complaint against Defendants for lack

        of subject matter jurisdiction. As an initial matter, the parties frame the statute of

        limitations issue as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil

        Procedure 12(b)(1). It is not entirely clear whether the district court followed the parties in

        construing the issue to be one of subject matter jurisdiction. For example, the court’s

        dismissal of Reid’s claims with prejudice—which would be improper if based on a lack of

        subject matter jurisdiction rather than failure to state a claim, see S. Walk at Broadlands

        Homeowner’s Ass’n v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 185 (4th Cir. 2013)

        (explaining that dismissal for “any . . . defect in subject matter jurisdiction . . . must be one

        without prejudice”)—may indicate it considered the issue to concern whether Reid

        plausibly stated a claim for which relief may be granted under Rule 12(b)(6). If so, the

        district court got it right. See United States v. Kivanc, 714 F.3d 782, 789 (4th Cir. 2013). If

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        not, we reorient the statute of limitations issue to its proper analytical framework—whether

        Reid failed to state a plausible claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6). 7

               There is no dispute that Reid’s due process and Title IX claims are subject to the

        two-year statute of limitations provided by Virginia’s personal injury cause of action.

        Indeed, § 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations, so § 1983 claims are governed by

        “the statute of limitations from the most analogous state-law cause of action.” Owens v.

        Baltimore City State’s Att’ys Off., 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014). In this case, that is

        Virginia’s cause of action for personal injury. See Lewis v. Richmond City Police Dep’t,

        947 F.2d 733, 735 (4th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that § 1983 claim was governed by

        Virginia’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury); see also Va. Code § 8.01-

        243(A). And while we have not previously addressed this issue in a published opinion,

        “every circuit to consider the issue has held that Title IX . . . borrows the relevant state’s

        statute of limitations for personal injury.” See Wilmink v. Kanawha Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 214

        F. App’x 294, 296 n.3 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Stanley v. Trs. of Cal. State Univ., 433 F.3d

        1129, 1134 (9th Cir. 2006)). With no argument to the contrary, we consider this two-year

        statute of limitations applicable to Reid’s Title IX claim, as well.

               Having filed her complaint on May 3, 2021, Reid’s claims are only timely if they

        accrued on or after May 3, 2019. The question we must answer, then, is when did Reid’s

        claims accrue?

               7
                  Because the district court dismissed Reid’s claims with prejudice, we have
        jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a dismissal for failure to state a claim de
        novo. Pressley v. Tupperware Long Term Disability Plan, 553 F.3d 334, 336 (4th Cir.
        2009).
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                      A. Reid’s Claims Accrued When JMU Made a Final Decision

               Although state law determines the length of the limitation period, accrual of § 1983

        claims and Title IX claims is governed by federal law. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,

        388 (2007); Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Tr. Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal.,

        522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997). 8 Under federal law’s “standard rule” of accrual, which is

        informed by common-law tort principles, a plaintiff’s claim accrues when she has a

        “complete and present cause of action.” See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (quoting Bay Area

        Laundry, 522 U.S. at 201). In other words, “a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff

        possesses sufficient facts about the harm done to [her] that reasonable inquiry will reveal

        [her] cause of action.” Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951, 955 (4th Cir.

        1995) (citing United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122–24 (1979)).

               Starting with Reid’s Title IX employment discrimination claim, we have not

        previously determined when such a claim is “complete and present.” But generally

        speaking, Title IX employment discrimination claims are subject to the same analysis as

        employment discrimination claims brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

        Preston v. Virginia ex rel. New River Cmty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 1994)

        (recognizing that “most courts that have addressed the question have indicated that Title

               8
                 “[T]he accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law that is
        not resolved by reference to state law. . . . Aspects of § 1983 which are not governed by
        reference to state law are governed by federal rules conforming in general to common-law
        tort principles.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (emphasis in original). The
        same is true of Title IX claims. Cf. Blanck v. McKeen, 707 F.2d 817, 819 (4th Cir. 1983)
        (finding “that the district court correctly determined that the time when a [federal] cause of
        action accrues is governed by federal, not state, law”).
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        VII principles should be applied to Title IX actions, at least insofar as those actions raise

        employment discrimination claims” and agreeing that “Title VII, and the judicial

        interpretations of it, provide a persuasive body of standards to which we may look in

        shaping the contours of a private right of action under Title IX”). We see no reason why

        that would not be the case for determining when a Title IX employment discrimination

        claim accrues. And fortunately, the Supreme Court addressed the timeliness of a Title VII

        employment discrimination claim in Ricks.

               There, a college’s tenure committee declined to recommend Ricks, a faculty

        member from Liberia, for tenure. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 252. About a year later, the committee

        reconsidered Ricks for tenure but affirmed its prior recommendation. Id. The following

        month, the college’s faculty senate and board of trustees each voted to deny tenure to Ricks.

        Id. Ricks then filed a grievance with the board of trustees’ grievance committee. Id. A few

        months later, the board of trustees sent Ricks a letter related to the ongoing grievance

        process, characterizing its decision to deny him tenure as its “official position.” Id. at 253

        & n.2. The grievance committee ultimately denied Ricks’ grievance. Id. at 254. Within

        three years of the grievance committee’s decision but more than three years after both the

        board of trustees’ decision and grievance-related letter, Ricks sued the college for national

        origin discrimination in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Ricks, 449 U.S. at 254.

        Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that Ricks’ claims were time-barred.

               The Supreme Court determined that the applicable three-year statute of limitations

        began to run “at the time the tenure decision was made and communicated to Ricks.” Id. at

        258. And despite Ricks’ insistence that accrual occurred when his grievance was denied,

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        the Court held that the tenure decision had been made and communicated to Ricks “no later

        than” when the board of trustees sent Ricks the grievance-related letter recognizing the

        denial of tenure as its “official position.” Id. at 261–62. In so doing, the Court reasoned,

        the board “had made clear . . . that it had formally rejected Ricks’ tenure bid.” Id. at 261.

        As for the college’s grievance process, the Supreme Court explained that “entertaining a

        grievance complaining of the tenure decision does not suggest that the earlier decision was

        in any respect tentative. The grievance procedure, by its nature, is a remedy for a prior

        decision, not an opportunity to influence that decision before it is made.” Id. (emphasis in

        original). Thus, the Supreme Court stated that “the pendency of a grievance, or some other

        method of collateral review of an employment decision, does not toll the running of the

        limitations periods.” Id. (citing Elec. Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229

        (1976)).

               We hold Ricks’ test for when a Title VII employment discrimination claim accrues

        applies to Title IX employment discrimination claims. And that means that Reid did not

        have a complete and present cause of action for Title IX discrimination against Defendants

        until JMU made clear its official position that Reid violated university policy. See id. at

        261–62; see also Doe v. Oberlin Coll., 60 F.4th 345, 356 (6th Cir. 2023) (determining that

        a student’s Title IX claim was not ripe when filed before any “certainty about what action

        [her college] would take on [her] retaliation claim” brought under the college’s Title IX

        policy). Ricks suggests that JMU’s official position is its non-“tentative”—that is, final—

        decision in Reid’s Title IX proceedings. See 449 U.S. at 261.

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               As for her § 1983 procedural due process claims, Reid asserts that they also accrued

        when JMU made clear its final decision in her Title IX proceedings. However, Defendants

        disagree, insisting that because Reid takes issue with alleged wrongful acts during the

        investigation and hearing, she “was aware of all the facts underlying her causes of action

        no later than April 2019, when Dean Aguirre issued a decision finding that Reid had

        violated University policy.” Resp. Br. at 17. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Reed

        v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230 (2023), provides helpful guidance on this dispute.

               In Reed, the Supreme Court considered the timeliness of a § 1983 procedural due

        process claim brought by an inmate in Texas. Id. at 232. Several years after his conviction

        for murder, the inmate moved in state trial court to conduct DNA testing on several pieces

        of evidence pursuant to Texas’ post-conviction DNA testing law. Id. at 233. The state trial

        court denied the inmate’s motion. Id. The state criminal appellate court affirmed the denial

        and later denied the inmate’s motion for rehearing. Id. Less than two years after the denial

        of his motion for rehearing, the inmate brought a § 1983 claim against Texas in federal

        court, alleging that the state’s post-conviction DNA testing law failed to provide procedural

        due process. Id. The district court dismissed the inmate’s complaint, and the Fifth Circuit

        Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis that the inmate’s § 1983 claim was untimely under

        the applicable two-year statute of limitations. Id. at 233–34. The Fifth Circuit explained

        that the inmate’s § 1983 claim accrued when the state trial court denied his motion over

        two years earlier. Id. at 234. However, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the

        inmate’s “§ 1983 claim was complete and the statute of limitations began to run when the

        state litigation ended—when the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied [his] motion for

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        rehearing.” Id. at 236. The Supreme Court reasoned:

               The soundness of that straightforward conclusion is “reinforced by the
               consequences that would follow” from a contrary approach. If the statute of
               limitations for a § 1983 suit like [the inmate]’s began to run after a state trial
               court’s denial of a plaintiff’s motion for DNA testing (or even after the appeal
               before the plaintiff’s rehearing proceedings), the plaintiff would likely
               continue to pursue relief in the state system and simultaneously file a
               protective federal § 1983 suit challenging that ongoing state process. That
               parallel litigation would “run counter to core principles of federalism,
               comity, consistency, and judicial economy.” We see no good reason for such
               senseless duplication.

        Id. at 236–37 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court further noted that “[i]f any due

        process flaws lurk in the DNA testing law, the state appellate process may cure those flaws,

        thereby rendering a federal § 1983 suit unnecessary.” Id. at 237.

               We find Reed instructive. Had Reid attempted to bring her § 1983 claims before

        JMU reached a final determination in her Title IX proceedings—whenever that point

        was—her claims would have been premature. Defendants could have cured the due process

        errors that Reid alleges, “thereby rendering a federal §1983 suit unnecessary.” See id. Like

        the inmate in Reed who did not have a complete § 1983 claim until his state court

        proceedings ended, we find that Reid did not have a complete § 1983 claim until her Title

        IX proceedings ended—that is, when JMU reached a final determination in her case.

               With this understanding, whether both Reid’s Title IX and due process claims are

        timely depends on when JMU reached a final decision in Reid’s Title IX proceedings. So,

        we must now determine when that occurred.

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         B. JMU Did Not Reach a Final Decision Until Provost Coltman Denied Reid’s Appeal

               Taken together, Ricks and Reed suggest that JMU reached a final decision in Reid’s

        Title IX proceedings whenever it made clear its official position that concluded those

        proceedings. See Ricks, 449 U.S. at 261–62; Reed, 598 U.S. at 236. While Defendants

        contend that Dean Aguirre’s April 2019 decision that Reid had violated Policy 1340 was

        “clearly an official finding,” Resp. Br. at 25, Reid disagrees. Reid asserts that Dean

        Aguirre’s decision did not make clear that it was the official position of the University, as

        it lacked indications of finality. Reid also contends that the explicit language of JMU’s

        Title IX policy indicated that Provost Coltman’s decision, not Dean Aguirre’s, was JMU’s

        final determination in her Title IX proceedings.

               Based on this record, JMU did not make clear that Dean Aguirre’s decision was its

        official position. To be sure, parts of his written decision suggested finality. For example,

        Dean Aguirre stated, “After a thorough review of the evidence, which includes statements

        from the complainant and the respondent as well as witness statements, I find for the

        complainant.” J.A. 204. He also stated that Reid and Lese’s “relationship was inappropriate

        and its conduct violates the JMU policy” and that “[a] letter of reprimand should be placed

        in the respondent’s file.” J.A. 204. And he made these findings in a document titled, in part,

        “Written Decision,” which itself might suggest finality. J.A. 204. But read in its entirety,

        the written decision is more preliminary than final. For example, the written decision

        identified Dean Aguirre’s selection of a reprimand as a “Sanction Recommendation[].”

        J.A. 205. Dean Aguirre even stated, “A letter of reprimand is suggested in light of the

        respondent’s having already left the university for other employment.” J.A. 205 (emphasis

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        added). 9   The   decision’s   characterization   of   a   reprimand      as   a   “suggested”

        “recommendation[]” does not support its finality.

               Still, Defendants contend that Dean Aguirre’s written decision was “clearly” JMU’s

        final determination because the panel report upon which Dean Aguirre made his decision

        expressly stated that the Dean’s decision would “determine the final outcome[] of the

        case.” See Resp. Br. at 25–26 n.5. But, as Reid notes, that is not an accurate account of the

        report’s language. The recommendation stated that “[t]he AVP, Dean, or VP over the

        Responding Party will determine the final outcomes of the case.” J.A. 194 (emphasis

        added). There is no dispute that Provost Coltman was the “VP over the Responding Party”

        in Reid’s case. Additionally, though Defendants recognize that Provost Coltman’s June

        2019 decision upheld “the dean’s final decision,” see J.A. 200, Provost Coltman’s after-

        the-fact description of Dean Aguirre’s written decision as “final” did not make the finality

        of the Dean’s decision clear when it was first communicated to Reid in April 2019.

               What’s more, the language of JMU’s policy concerning the internal appeals process

        undermines the argument for the finality of Dean Aguirre’s decision in this case. As noted

               9
                  To this point, Defendants contend that Reid never internally appealed Dean
        Aguirre’s written decision to the extent it recommended a specific sanction. They state that
        Reid only internally appealed Dean Aguirre’s responsibility finding. Defendants therefore
        suggest that the “Sanction Recommendations” portion of Dean Aguirre’s written decision
        is irrelevant to our inquiry into JMU’s official position. But, to the extent Reid appealed
        Dean Aguirre’s finding that she was responsible for a non-consensual relationship, she
        necessarily challenged his recommendation of any sanctions based on that finding.
        Moreover, Dean Aguirre’s finding of responsibility and recommended sanction were
        located within the same three-page written decision. For purposes of determining whether
        that written decision made clear any official position of JMU, we decline to ignore some
        sections in favor of others.
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        above, Reid was provided with a document outlining the Title IX policy’s internal appeal

        process at the same time she received Dean Aguirre’s written decision. That document

        informed Reid that, under the policy, she had five days to appeal Dean Aguirre’s written

        decision to Provost Coltman. Lifting language from the policy, the document stated, “In

        the absence of a timely written appeal, the decision of the respondent’s . . . dean is final.”

        J.A. 207. But, if a timely appeal was submitted to the appropriate vice president, the

        document explained that the vice president “shall make a final decision within 5 days” and

        that her decision “is final, and may not be appealed.” J.A. 207. In other words, JMU’s own

        language reveals that Dean Aguirre’s April 2019 written decision was not “final” if Reid

        filed a timely appeal. And it is undisputed that she did.

               Dean Aguirre’s April 2019 written decision did not make clear JMU’s official

        position concluding Reid’s Title IX proceedings. See Ricks, 449 U.S. at 259–62; Reed, 598

        U.S. at 236. Rather, JMU’s official position was made clear to Reid when Provost Coltman

        denied her appeal with a “final,” non-appealable decision in June 2019. 10 To hold otherwise

        would be to ignore the plain language of JMU’s own Title IX policy that it applied to Reid.

        Based on this determination, we find that Reid’s May 2021 due process and Title IX claims

        are not barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations, as her claims had not yet

        accrued in May 2019.

               10
                 The Sixth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in determining when a dismissed
        medical student’s due process claims against his former medical school accrued. See
        Endres v. Ne. Oh. Med. Univ., 938 F.3d 281, 296 (6th Cir. 2019) (holding that the student’s
        due process claims did not accrue until he learned of “a final, non-appealable decision
        recommending his dismissal”).
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                                          III. CONCLUSION

              For these reasons, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of Reid’s due process and

        Title IX claims against Defendants and remand for further proceedings.

                                                                  REVERSED AND REMANDED

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