Court Opinion

ID: 9653133
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:39:25.553645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:56.536181
License: Public Domain

SATZ, Judge,
concurring.
With reservation, I concur. My reservation stems solely from the procedural propriety of issuing this writ.
The trial court here denied a motion for summary judgment. The court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the person and, thus, had jurisdiction to make its ruling. If the ruling was erroneous, it can be appealed after final judgment is entered. Therefore, one would think the writ would not lie. Not so. That is not the law in Missouri today and may not have ever been, except, perhaps, during the short life of State ex rel. Morasch v. Kimberlin, 654 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. banc 1983).
Prior to Morasch, the grounds for an appellate court to issue a writ of prohibition were, at best, imprecise. Tuchler, Discretionary Interlocutory Review in Missouri: Judicial Abuse of the Writ? 40 Mo.L.Rev. 577 (1975); Note, The Writ of Prohibition in Missouri, 1972 Wash.U.L.Q. 511. The primary cause of this imprecision, I believe, is our courts’ ambiguous use of the term “jurisdiction” when confronted with an application for the writ. We use “jurisdiction” to mean judicial authority over the subject matter and the person, but we also use it to mean the judicial power to grant specific relief within that authority. Thus, prior to Morasch, our courts issued the writ when the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter or person, e.g., State ex rel. Rolla School District No. 31 v. Northern, 549 S.W.2d 596, 597 (Mo.App.1977); State ex rel. McCarter v. Craig, 328 S.W.2d 589, 592 (Mo. banc 1959), and also when the trial court had such jurisdiction but abused its authority to act — abused its discretion— and, thus, was said to act “in excess of” or “without jurisdiction,” e.g., State ex rel. Albert v. Adams, 540 S.W.2d 26, 31 (Mo. banc 1976); State ex rel. Pulliam v. Swink, 514 S.W.2d 559, 561 (Mo. banc 1974).
In a pristine sense, a trial court without jurisdiction over the subject matter or person has no authority to act, either rightly or wrongly. Therefore, its attempt to act should be prohibited. A trial court that has jurisdiction over the subject matter and person, however, can act, both rightly and wrongly, and its wrong acts — errors of law — can be appealed. Nonetheless, our appellate courts select certain of the latter acts and prohibit the attempts of trial courts to complete these acts. This selection, I believe, is done on an ad hoc basis; our courts selecting those wrongful acts— errors of law — which the courts believe are so egregious they must be stopped.
As I understood Morasch, and apparently as those judges who concurred in the result understood it, see Morasch, 654 S.W.2d 892-94, the majority of the Court, in effect, stated that the writ of prohibition should only be used to review the trial court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter or the person. Morasch, 654 S.W.2d 890-92. See also State ex rel. Hannah v. Seier, 654 S.W.2d 894 (Mo. banc 1983). This, *505however, may have been a misinterpretation of the language used in Morasch.
Subsequent to Morasch, the Court stated the writ could be used not only to review “the question of trial court jurisdiction” but also could be used “in peculiarily limited situations ... in which absolute irreparable harm may come to a litigant....” State ex rel. Richardson v. Randall, 660 S.W.2d 699, 701 (Mo. banc 1983). Moreover, I believe State ex rel. General Electric Co. v. Gaertner, 666 S.W.2d 764 (Mo. banc 1984) implicitly confirms the conclusion that the grounds for issuing the writ are, perhaps, more varied than those suggested by Morasch. In General Electric, the majority of the Court, without mentioning Morasch, quashed a writ on the merits and permitted a trial to proceed on a claim allegedly barred by the statute of limitations. It was in this context that Judge Rendlen made the statement quoted by the majority here, in which he implied the writ should be used to prevent a trial court from “[fjorcing upon a [party] the expense and burdens of trial when the claim is clearly barred....” (Emphasis His). State ex rel. General Electric Co., 666 S.W.2d at 768.
Then, in State ex rel. D.M. v. Hoester, 681 S.W.2d 449 (Mo. banc 1984), the Court defined the meaning and reach of Morasch. More specifically, the Court stated that, in Morasch, “we held that violation of a statutory provision ... does not always constitute an act in excess of its jurisdiction,” Id. at 450 n. 3., and, therefore, for procedural reasons, the preliminary writ there should not have been issued. But, analyzing the trial court’s order then before it, the Court went on to say that this order would violate a statutory privilege restricting “the power of a trial court in the discovery process,” and “it can be said that violation of the statute constitutes an act in excess of jurisdiction.”1 Id. at 450 n. 3.
In its most recent pronouncement, the Court indicated that when an appeal would fail “to afford adequate relief, prohibition [would be] the appropriate remedy to forbear patently unwarranted and expensive litigation, inconvenience and waste of time and talent.” State ex rel. New Liberty Hospital District v. Pratt, 687 S.W.2d 184, 187 (Mo. banc 1985).
In light of these cases, I now believe Morasch made no change in the procedural principles governing the issuance of the writ. An appellate court can use the writ to determine whether the trial court is acting without jurisdiction over the subject matter or the person, e.g., State ex rel. Rolla School District No. 31 v. Northern, supra, whether the trial court, having such jurisdiction, is acting in “excess of its jurisdiction,” e.g., State ex rel. D.M. v. Hoester, supra, whether the trial court’s act will cause irreparable harm, e.g., State ex rel. Richardson v. Randall, supra, or whether a claim is clearly barred, e.g., State ex rel. New Liberty Hospital District v. Pratt, supra, State ex rel. General Electric v. Gaertner, supra, (Rendlen, J., concur*506ring).2 Apparently, this is the understanding of our intermediate appellate courts. For example, none of us have any apparent reservation in determining whether a trial court is acting in “excess of its jurisdiction” in discovery matters, when we believe the trial court is going to commit what we believe to be an egregious error or mistake of law. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dover v. Lewis, 666 S.W.2d 35 (Mo.App.1984) (Western District); State ex rel. Charterbank v. Donegan, 658 S.W.2d 919 (Mo.App.1983) (Southern District); State ex rel. Hamilton v. Dalton, 652 S.W.2d 237 (Mo.App.1983) (Eastern District); State ex rel. Anheuser v. Nolan, 692 S.W.2d 325 (E.D.Mo.App.1985). Our reasons here to issue the preliminary writ and make it absolute are consistent with the foregoing principles and certainly no less compelling.
My reservation, however, stems from my belief that Morasch did not guide us out of our procedural morass. In short, the extraordinary writ of prohibition is being used as the procedural vehicle for an ordinary discretionary appeal of an interlocutory order. I have no quarrel with this use as such. I do not believe our State Constitution necessarily limits the use of the writ to the narrow grounds of jurisdiction over the subject matter or person, nor do I believe ideal appellate review precludes the writ from being used to process discretionary appeals of interlocutory orders. If the writ is to be so used, however, the propriety of this use should be stated explicitly and the grounds for that use should be specifically defined. If the writ should not be so used, the writ can still be maintained as an extraordinary procedural vehicle to question a trial court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter or the person, and the grounds for a discretionary appeal of an interlocutory order can be defined by rule or statute. See Fed.R.App. P. 5; 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1982).
In other circumstances, it may well be true that rules of law are best developed on a case by case basis or are best applied on an ad hoc basis. This is not the case with the extraordinary writ of prohibition. Presently, the practicing bar has difficulty in determining when a preliminary writ will lie, particularly since none of our appellate courts support their denial of a preliminary writ with written reasons. The competent and conscientious lawyer is penalized for being aware of the apparent lack of exact grounds for issuing the writ. Moreover, the practicing bar no longer appears to suffer in quiet desperation but seems to have fallen into cynical resignation. The bar appears to believe the issuance of the preliminary writ is not governed by any fixed objective rules but rather is governed subjectively by the whim and caprice of individual judges. The bar deserves better, and we can do better.
I have no reservation, however, in concurring with the majority opinion on the merits. I agree with its major premise, its consistent logic and its rational conclusion.
Out of a proper concern for the rights of an accused, we have developed a detailed process for accepting a guilty plea to assure the plea is made voluntarily and knowingly, and, as additional protection, particularly for those tried by jury, we have developed an easily understood process for post conviction remedies. To permit plaintiff here to turn these processes in on themselves, as he seeks to do, would ironically mock the system and greatly diminish the trust sensible people have in it.

. In D.M., supra, an adopted daughter sued her father for sexual abuse and sought her father’s medical history from his psychiatrist. Asserting the doctor-patient privilege, under § 491.060(5), RSMo Cum.Supp.1983, the father sought the writ to prohibit the disclosure. The daughter argued that § 210.140, RSMo Cum.Supp.1983 suspended the privilege or made it inapplicable in this case. In agreeing with the daughter and quashing the writ on its merits, the Court explained the procedural grounds for issuing the preliminary writ:
"It should be noted at the outset that prohibition lies in some instances to prevent judicial violation of statutory inhibitions, though in State ex rel. Morasch v. Kimberlin, 654 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. banc 1983), we held that violation of a statutory provision by a trial court does not always constitute an act in excess of its jurisdiction. The court’s order in the instant case would allow discovery of materials privileged under § 491.060(5) RSMo Cum.Supp.1983. Since § 491.060(5) standing alone operates in part to restrict the power of a trial court in the discovery process, see State ex rel. Mehle v. Harper, 643 S.W.2d 643 (Mo.App.1982), it can be said that violation of the statute constitutes an act in excess of jurisdiction. State ex rel. Collins v. Donelson, 557 S.W.2d 707 (Mo.App.1977). See State ex rel. Uregas Service Co., Inc., v. Adams, 262 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. banc 1953).”
State ex rel. D.M. v. Hoester, 681 S.W.2d at 450 n. 3.

. To me, these grounds are separate and distinct but not mutually exclusive.