Court Opinion

ID: 9529391
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:50:24.682989+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:45.956098
License: Public Domain

OPINION
BROOK, Judge.
Case Summary
Appellants-intervenors James Johnston and Judy Johnston (“Johnstons”) appeal from the trial court’s denial of their motion to vacate Richard Allen Dobeski’s (“Dobeski”) sentence modification.
Facts and Procedural History
Dobeski murdered the Johnstons’ two children in Michigan City, Indiana on August 31, 1964. On October 22, 1965, Dobeski was sentenced to two consecutive life terms of imprisonment for two convictions of murder in the first degree. Pursuant to a sentence modification agreement between Dobeski and the LaPorte County deputy prosecuting attorney in which Dobeski agreed to dismiss his petition for post-conviction relief, the trial court modified Dobeski’s sentence to two consecutive 40-year terms on July 12, 1989. The Johnstons received no official notice of the sentence modification and remained unaware of it until a family friend informed them that a notice of parole hearing for Dobeski had appeared in the Michigan City newspaper. The Johnstons filed a motion to vacate Dobeski’s sentence modification on May 14, 1997. Hearings were held on the motion on June 27,1997 and October 3,1997. Dobeski filed a motion to strike the John-stons’ motion on October 7, 1997. On October 9, 1997, the trial court issued an order granting Dobeski’s motion to strike and declaring the Johnston’s motion null and void, having found that the Johnstons lacked legal standing to file their motion to vacate Dobe-ski’s sentence modification. The Johnstons now appeal.
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 2(B), the attorney general is the representative of the State in this appeal, rather than the LaPorte County prosecuting attorney. The attorney general agrees with the Johnstons that the trial court had no authority to accept Dobe-ski’s sentence modification agreement and that the modification should be vacated.1
*1088Issues
The Johnstons raise one issue on appeal which we restate as two:
(1) Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the Johnstons lacked standing to file their motion to vacate Dobeski’s sentence modification; and
(2) Whether the trial court erred in modifying Dobeski’s sentence.
Discussion and Decision

I. Standing

With respect to the issue of standing, we note that plaintiffs must demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit and must show that they have sustained or were in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the conduct at issue in order to invoke a court’s jurisdiction. Higgins v. Hale, 476 N.E.2d 95, 101 (Ind.1985). Notwithstanding any emotional impact suffered by the Johnstons during these proceedings and their obvious desire to compel the defendant to serve his original sentence, Dobeski correctly asserts that he and the State are the only two parties with legal standing in this case. The State prosecuted Dobeski during the original trial, and both are parties to the sentence modification agreement that is the basis for the Johnstons’ appeal. The Johnstons cite no cases or statutes to support their claim of standing, nor has this Court discovered any authority that would enable them to intervene and mount a legitimate appeal.

II. Modification of Sentence

Having determined that the Johnstons lacked standing to file their motion to vacate Dobeski’s sentence modification and therefore standing to bring this appeal, this Court would ordinarily be required to dismiss their appeal without further ado. However, the State as a party with standing asserts for the first time on appeal that the trial court lacked authority to accept the sentence modification agreement. A judgment may be void for want of a court’s authority to render the particular judgment, though the court may have had jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties. Beanblossom v. State, 637 N.E.2d 1345, 1349 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied.2, A void judgment can be attacked directly or collaterally at any time. Id. Moreover, “a trial court’s failure to sentence a defendant in accordance with statutory requirements constitutes fundamental error, and may therefore be presented by the State for the first time on appeal.”3 Abron v. State, 591 N.E.2d 634, 638 (Ind.Ct.App.1992), trans. denied.
It may be argued that the issue of Dobeski’s sentence modification would never have been presented to this Court but for the Johnstons’ appeal, for which they can claim no standing. However, “a court of review cannot ignore a fundamental error which is apparent on the face of the record, such as an incorrect sentence.” Kleinrichert v. State, 260 Ind. 537, 543, 297 N.E.2d 822, 826 (1973). To attain the level of fundamental error, “ ‘the error must constitute a clearly *1089blatant violation of basic and elementary principles, and the harm or potential for harm therefrom must be substantial and appear clearly and prospectively.’ ” Turner v. State, 682 N.E.2d 491, 497 (Ind.1997). Fundamental eiTor may encompass illegal sentences in violation of express statutory authority, as the State has alleged in this case. Thompson v. State, 684 N.E.2d 775, 777 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). Although the issue of fundamental error is primarily raised by defendants attacking purportedly illegal sentences, correction of fundamental error is not intended for the advantage of the accused. Moon v. State, 267 Ind. 27, 29, 366 N.E.2d 1168, 1169 (1977). Finally, “[i]t is the duty of appellate courts to bring illegal sentences into compliance ... ‘even if such correction increases the punishment.’ ” Golden v. State, 553 N.E.2d 1219, 1223-1224 (Ind.Ct.App.1990), trans. denied, quoting United States v. Edmonson, 792 F.2d 1492, 1496 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1037, 107 S.Ct. 892, 93 L.Ed.2d 844 (1987).
Returning to the threshold questions of standing and this Court’s ability to address the merits of this appeal, we note that the State would be the proper party to attack the trial court’s sentence modification; in this ease, however, the parents of Dobeski’s victims filed the motion to vacate the modification and appealed the trial court’s nullification thereof for lack of standing. As we noted in Abron, the State ordinarily may appeal only those matters specifically authorized by IND. CODE § 35-38-4-2, but may allege fundamental error regarding an illegal sentence for the first time on appeal. Abron, 591 N.E.2d at 638.4 As a further consideration, this Court has been empowered to review sentences pursuant to Article 7 § 6 of the Indiana Constitution and Ind.App. Rules 17(A)(1) and (3). Nevertheless, “we cannot revise a sentence unless we are left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made which is readily apparent and not subject to reasonable dispute.” Hardebeck v. State, 656 N.E.2d 486, 490 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied. The State has alleged fundamental error that is glaringly apparent on the face of the record, and our disposition of the contested issue substantially affects the rights and interests of both the State and Dobeski as parties with standing currently before this Court; therefore, we assert jurisdiction over the interested parties and the subject matter sua sponte and will address the issue of Dobeski’s sentence modification on the merits.
This Court has traditionally granted trial courts broad discretion in sentencing and has been reluctant to modify a sentence on appeal, “provided it falls within the statutory boundaries and there is no clear evidence of abuse.” Id. IND. CODE § 35-38-1-17 provides one of the very few statutory avenues available to a trial court for reducing or modifying a criminal defendant’s sentence. “After final judgment, a court retains only such continuing jurisdiction as is permitted by the judgment itself or as is given the court by statute or rule.” Beanblossom, 637 N.E.2d at 1347. The statute reads in relevant part as follows:
35-38-1-17 Reduction or suspension of sentence
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(b) If more than three hundred sixty-five (365) days have elapsed since the defendant began serving the sentence and after a hearing at which the convicted person is present, the court may reduce or suspend the sentence, subject to the approval of the prosecuting attorney. The court must give notice of the order to reduce or suspend the sentence under this section to the victim (as defined in IC 35-35-3-1) of the crime for which the defendant is serving the sentence.
(c) The court may suspend a sentence for a felony under this section only if suspension is permitted under IC 35-50-2-2.5
*1090# * Hi # *
(e) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b), the court is not required to conduct a hearing before reducing or suspending a sentence if:
(1) the prosecuting attorney has filed with the court an agreement of the reduction or suspension of the sentence; and
(2) the defendant has filed with the court a waiver of the right to be present when the order to reduce or suspend the sentence is considered.
In both the record and his appellate brief, Dobeski makes the curious argument that the sentence modification agreement he signed with the deputy prosecutor is the “functional equivalent of a plea agreement.” Prosecuting attorneys are granted wide latitude in drafting plea agreements, but those agreements must comply with statutory requirements, specifically IND. CODE § 35-35-3-1 through § 35-35-3-7 and any relevant sentencing provisions. See Badger v. State, 637 N.E.2d 800, 802 (Ind.1994) (“the plea bargaining process is controlled in large measure by statute,” and all parties must follow statutory rules to attain balance of rights “[of victims, defendants, and society at large]” struck by legislature). Dobeski’s so-called “plea agreement” fails to pass statutory muster in several fundamental respects. IND. CODE § 35-35-3-3 provides that a plea agreement must be made by the prosecuting attorney to a court on a felony charge before a defendant enters a plea of guilty: Dobeski was convicted of murder in 1965. Both the trial court and the prosecuting attorney failed to comply with the victim notification requirements of IND. CODE § 35-35-3-2. More importantly, Dobeski’s agreement is illegal under the applicable sentencing statute, which will be discussed in more detail below. As a final consideration, a plea agreement provision waiving a defendant’s right to seek post-conviction relief is void and unenforceable. Majors v. State, 568 N.E.2d 1065, 1067-1068 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), tram, denied.
It is clear that Dobeski’s sentence modification agreement cannot be considered a plea agreement, and we must therefore determine its legitimacy pursuant to IND. CODE § 35-38-1-17. We first note that the court did not comply with subsection (b) of the statute, having failed to give notice to the Johnstons of its order to reduce Dobeski’s sentence. Next, there is no evidence that the court obtained a report from the department of correction concerning Dobeski’s conduct while imprisoned pursuant to IND. CODE § 35—38—1—17(a)(3). Most importantly, the court had no authority to modify Dobeski’s sentence under any sentencing scheme other than that effective in 1964, when Dobeski committed his crimes. Cf. Elkins v. State, 659 N.E.2d 563, 565 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (defendant must be sentenced “in accordance with the statute in force at the time the offense was committed unless an amendment to the statute is effective prior to sentencing and the amendment provides for an ameliorative penalty”).
In 1964, the only sentences authorized for murder in the first degree were death and life imprisonment. IND. CODE § 10-3401 (1956). Furthermore, Pub.L. No. 341 § 150 (1977) expressly provides that the 1977 sentencing statutes do not affect the “rights or liabilities aeerued[,] penalties in-curredf,] or proceedings begun before October 1, 1977.” See Parsley v. State, 273 Ind. 46, 47-48, 401 N.E.2d 1360, 1361 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 862, 101 S.Ct. 166, 66 L.Ed.2d 79 (1980). “A sentence which is contrary to, or violative of, the penalty mandated by the applicable statute is an illegal sentence.” Lockhart v. State, 671 N.E.2d 893, 904 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). As noted above, “a trial court’s failure to sentence a defendant in accordance with statutory requirements constitutes fundamental error.” Abron, 591 N.E.2d at 638. Therefore, the trial court committed fundamental error in modifying Dobeski’s sentence to two consecutive 40-year terms.
Dobeski contends that the modification agreement was signed by “all necessary parties” and “approved and ordered by the trial court,” which served to cloak the agreement in the sanctity of a contract, albeit an illegal one. A contract “made in violation of statute is void and unenforceable.” Sinn v. State, 609 N.E.2d 434, 436 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), *1091trans. denied. As this Court also noted in Sinn,
Moreover, we cannot sanction an illegal sentence simply because it was the product of an agreement. For example, although ludicrous, we would not enforce a sentence of death for jay walking simply because the sentence was the product of a plea agreement. Courts are duty bound to correct illegal sentences.
Id. Similarly, we cannot sanction Dobeski’s illegal sentence modification because it was the product of an agreement.
Conclusion ¡
The trial court’s judgment with respect to the Johnstons’ motion to vacate is affirmed, and the trial court is ordered on remand to vacate Dobeski’s sentence modification agreement and reinstate his original sentence of two consecutive life terms of imprisonment.
Affirmed in part and remanded in part with instructions.
SHARPNACK, C.J., concurs.
SULLIVAN, J., concurs with separate opinion.

. This Court commends the attorney general for recognizing the trial court's lack of authority to accept Dobeski’s sentence modification, even though the modification agreement was sane-*1088tioned by the State’s representative at the trial court level. Representatives of the State, whatever their status, must remain vigilant to ensure that officers of the court do not exceed their statutory authority, which the attorney general has done in this case.

. At this point, we wish to note the important differences between "void” and “voidable” judgments:
The distinction between a void and voidable judgment is no mere semantic quibble. 'A void judgment is one that, from its inception, is a complete nullity and without legal effect ’ 46 AmJur.2d Judgments § 31 (1994). By contrast, a voidable judgment 'is not a nullity, and is capable of confirmation or ratification. Until superseded, reversed, or vacated it is binding, enforceable, and has all the ordinary attributes and consequences of a valid judgment.’ 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 30 (1994).
Stidham v. Whelchel, 698 N.E.2d 1152, 1154 (Ind.1998). In the instant case, the trial court’s lack of authority to accept Dobeski's sentence modification agreement rendered its judgment void and therefore subject to direct or collateral attack at any time. See Beanblossom, 637 N.E.2d at 1349.

. Our use of the term "fundamental error” in this instance refers strictly to "gross error which offends our concept of criminal justice,” not to its more prevalent modern usage concerning "denial of fundamental due process." See Turner v. State, 682 N.E.2d 491, 497 (Ind.1997).

. Ind. Appellate Rule 17(A)(2) provides that "[a]ppellate review of sentences under this rule may not be initiated by the State.” In Abron, we specifically stated that Ind. Appellate Rule 17(A)(2) does not apply in cases of fundamental error in sentencing, "regardless how the matter comes to our attention.” Abron, 591 N.E.2d 634, 638, n. 6. Similarly, the State is not required to file a’ motion to correct erroneous sentence pursuant to IND. CODE § 35-38-1-15 in cases of fundamental error. Id. at 638.

. IND. CODE § 35-50-2-2(b)(4)(A) lists murder among those crimes for which a court may suspend “only that part of the sentence that is in excess of the minimum sentence.”