Court Opinion

ID: 9645071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:12:03.165921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:22.743219
License: Public Domain

Davidson, J.,

dissenting:

The majority here states that the "[ajppellant asserts ... that the trial court did not act in the interests of justice when it declined to permit him to withdraw his plea after telling him, 'You still have a right to withdraw your plea, if you care to do so, anytime before the court finally accepts it.’ ”1 It then finds no merit in this contention.
*311The majority initially infers that the trial court’s statement was addressed solely to Pfau and not to Blinken, an inference that is not necessarily supported by the record and which, even if supported by the record, would be irrelevant. The majority then asserts:
"The [trial] court had expressed a desire to review [Pfau’s] records and discuss the nature and extent of Ms. Pfau’s future medical needs. In light of the impact which medical problems may have upon a defendant’s desire to plead guilty, it is understandable why the court, in the exercise of its discretion, might have extended permission to withdraw to Ms. Pfau while not doing so in the case of appellant.”
In so doing, the majority infers that the trial court’s purpose in reviewing Pfau’s medical history was to determine whether her tendered guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and, based upon this inference, further infers that the trial court intended to differentiate between Pfau and Blinken with respect to their right to withdraw their tendered guilty pleas. In my view, the record does not support these inferences. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The record here shows that on 1 November 1979, two cases, one involving Kari Lou Pfau and the other involving Neal Blinken, were simultaneously called for trial. Pfau and Blinken were both then present in the courtroom. At that time, counsel for both indicated that Pfau and Blinken desired to withdraw their previously tendered not guilty pleas. Pfau then tendered guilty pleas to the first five counts of the indictment against her, and Blinken tendered guilty pleas to the first four counts of the indictment against him. The trial court asked both Pfau and Blinken to stand and then described the procedure to be followed in determining whether to accept their tendered pleas. The trial court said:
*312"... I will address the question to both of you and ask Miss Pfau to answer first and then Mr. Blinken to answer second.”
Both Pfau and Blinken were then sworn.
In accordance with the outlined procedure, the trial court questioned Pfau and Blinken about the terms of each of their tendered plea agreements and the waiver of rights required before acceptance of a tendered guilty plea. Thereafter, the following colloquy took place:
"THE COURT: Miss Pfau ... [d]o you understand that if you plead guilty the sentence will be according to the plea agreement, and if not fínally accepted you may withdraw your plea?
MISS PFAU: Yes, I understand.
THE COURT: And you, sir?
MR. BLINKEN: I also understand, Your Honor.” (Emphasis added.)
After finding that Pfau had tendered her plea voluntarily and knowingly, the trial court said:
"That the defendants [sic] pleas are accepted tentatively but not fínally by the Court, provided there is a factual basis for the pleas and the representation made here today concerning the defendant are confirmed by a PSI [Presentence Investigation] report.” (Emphasis added.)
Immediately thereafter, the trial court found that Blinken had tendered his plea voluntarily and knowingly and said:
”That the defendant’s pleas of guilty are tentatively but not finally accepted by the Court provided there is in fact a basis for the pleas and the representations made here today are confirmed by a PSI report as to the defendant.” (Emphasis added.)
*313A single statement of facts was presented to establish the factual basis underlying both tendered pleas, and the trial court found that basis to be adequate with respect to both Pfau and Blinken. In response to a query from the trial court, defense counsel offered representations concerning the personal history and criminal records of both defendants, including Pfau’s medical history, to justify acceptance of both tendered plea agreements. More specifically, the following colloquy then took place:
"THE COURT:... Now, Mr. Sutley, I want you to proffer at this time the representation to justify the Court in accepting this plea agreement.
MR. SUTLEY [Defense Counsel]: ... Neither defendant has a record of criminal conviction in this state or any other state. Miss Pfau, throughout the last year, has suffered from various physical ailments necessitating her hospitalization on several occasions for operations throughout the past year. Nothing terminal. She has been under medical care for a considerable period of time and she is twenty-one years of age, with no record of conviction for either defendant.
THE COURT: And I want ... a very complete report on her health and operations.
Now as I understand it Mr. Blinken has no previous adult criminal record?
MR. SUTLEY: That is correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And he is thirty-five and she is twenty-one. How long have they been living together?
MR. SUTLEY: Five years.
MISS PFAU: Four years.
MR. SUTLEY: They are presently engaged, Your Honor, to be married.
*314THE COURT: Anything else?
MR. SUTLEY: No, Your Honor.”
Subsequently, the trial court summarized the terms of Blinken’s tendered plea agreement and then the terms of Pfau’s tendered plea agreement. Thereafter, the trial court said:
"I want Miss Pfau to make sure she hears everything I am saying. You still have a right to withdraw your plea, if you care to do so, anytime before the Court finally accepts it.
Do you fully understand that, Miss Pfau?
MISS PFAU: Yes.
THE COURT: So, as I have indicated, the Court is accepting these tentatively, but not finally, provided the representations made here today are confírmed by a PSI report as to each defendant.” (Emphasis added.)
In discharging the jury, the trial court explained the terms of Blinken’s and Pfau’s tendered plea agreements and then said:
"The Court accepted this on representation, tentatively accepted this, on representations that neither of the parties have had any previous criminal record.
So this is why we don’t need your services any further today, because the Court has taken these plea agreements and guilty pleas, tentatively, subject to confirmation by investigation by the Division of Parole and Probation, which we call a presentence investigation report, which is usually very thoroughly done, in which their background is *315checked out, in which their criminal record, if any, is thoroughly checked, and today we have very sophisticated criminal information systems where convictions are recorded both by the FBI and our own Maryland Criminal Information System.
So it is taken tentatively subject to the fact that the representations made to the Court today as to their background, the medical history of Miss Pfau are confírmed by that report....” (Emphasis added.)
In my view, the record establishes that the trial court’s statement that, "You still have a right to withdraw your plea, if you care to do so, anytime before the court finally accepts it,” was addressed to Blinken as well as to Pfau. Moreover, even if the statement was addressed solely to Pfau, I would conclude, based on the record, that Blinken had the right to withdraw his tendered plea.
The procedures utilized in this proceeding indicate that the trial court did not intend to differentiate between Pfau and Blinken with respect to their right to withdraw their tendered pleas. Blinken and Pfau were defendants in a consolidated proceeding. They were both represented by the same counsel and were both present when their guilty pleas were tendered. The trial court recognized that the terms of the individual plea agreements were integrally interrelated because Pfau’s probation was an inducement to and a condition of Blinken’s plea agreement. The procedure established by the trial court was to address a single question to both Blinken and Pfau and to have Pfau answer first and Blinken answer second. This procedure was followed when the trial court questioned Pfau and Blinken with respect to the terms of their tendered plea agreements and the waiver of rights required for acceptance of a guilty plea. A single statement of facts was presented to establish the factual basis underlying both tendered pleas and the trial court found that basis to be adequate with respect to both. Representations justifying the trial court in accepting each of the tendered plea agreements were presented by counsel in a single statement.
*316More important, the trial court initially told both Blinken and Pfau that "if not finally accepted you may withdraw your plea.” Thus, it expressly stated that Blinken as well as Pfau had the right to withdraw their tendered pleas until finally accepted. The trial court then told them individually that their tendered pleas were "accepted tentatively but not finally by the Court.” Thus, the trial court made it clear that the consequence of the tentative acceptance of their tendered pleas was that both had the right to withdraw them until finally accepted. After emphasizing that it wanted Pfau to hear what it was saying, the trial court reiterated that:
"You still have a right to withdraw your plea, if you care to do so, anytime before the Court finally accepts it.”
When viewed in the context of this proceeding, the trial court’s concern that Pfau hear what it was saying does not necessarily support an inference that the statement was addressed solely to Pfau.
Moreover, the trial court’s statement, even if addressed solely to Pfau, was completely consistent with its previous statements, clearly addressed to both, that established that Blinken as well as Pfau had the right to withdraw their tendered pleas. In addition, when the trial court made the statement, it did not express an intent to differentiate between Pfau and Blinken with respect to their right to withdraw their tendered pleas. Under these circumstances, even if it is assumed that the trial court’s statement was addressed solely to Pfau, it must be regarded as nothing more than a reiteration, with respect to Pfau, of the trial court’s previous statement, clearly addressed to both, that their tendered pleas could be withdrawn until finally accepted. It cannot be regarded as having any impact whatsoever on Blinken’s previously established right to withdraw his tendered plea.
Immediately after making the statement, the trial court, clearly addressing both Pfau and Blinken, repeated that it was "accepting these [pleas] tentatively, but not finally.” Thus, the trial court, having previously made it clear that *317the consequence of the tentative acceptance of their tendered pleas was that both had the right to withdraw them, reinforced the fact that both their tendered pleas could be withdrawn.
In my view, the trial court expressly indicated that Blinken as well as Pfau had the right to withdraw their tendered pleas. Under the circumstances here, the majority’s assertion that the trial court’s statement was addressed solely to Pfau and not to Blinken is irrelevant.
Finally, on two occasions, the trial court expressly told both defendants that it was accepting their tendered plea agreements and guilty pleas tentatively, but not finally, provided their representations concerning their personal histories were confirmed by a PSI report. In discharging the jury, the trial court expressly said that both plea agreements and guilty pleas were
"taken tentatively subject to the fact that the representations made to the Court today as to their background, the medical history of Miss Pfau are confirmed by that report....” (Emphasis added.)
In addition, the trial court expressly found that both Pfau’s and Blinken’s guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary.
Under these circumstances, the trial court’s sole purpose in seeking a presentence report, including Pfau’s medical history, was to confirm the representations which had been made concerning Pfau’s and Blinken’s criminal records and Pfau’s medical history in order to determine whether to accept the tendered plea agreements which, in the case of Pfau, provided for probation rather than imprisonment, partly because she was allegedly ill. Indeed, having previously found Pfau’s tendered plea to be knowing and voluntary, the trial court’s purpose could not have been to determine the impact which her "medical problems [might] have upon [her] desire to plead guilty.” Accordingly, the majority’s inference that the trial court wanted Pfau’s medical records to determine her desire to plead guilty is unsupported by the record.
*318In sum, in my view, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court intended to differentiate between Pfau and Blinken with respect to their right to withdraw their tendered pleas. There was nothing in the procedures utilized by the trial court to indicate an intent to differentiate between them. There was no difference in the purpose for which the trial court sought the presentence investigation report, including Pfau’s medical history. Most important, the trial court expressly stated to both Pfau and Blinken that they could both withdraw their tendered pleas until finally accepted. In the absence of any inconsistent statement or indication to the contrary, I can only conclude that this record establishes that the trial court made an express commitment to Blinken that he had the right to withdraw his tendered plea until it was accepted.
The record here establishes that Blinken asked to withdraw his tendered plea before it was finally accepted. The trial court denied Blinken’s request. In so doing, the trial court failed to honor its express commitment to Blinken. This constituted an abuse of discretion. In my view, fundamental fairness requires reversal.
Judges Digges and Eldridge authorize me to say that they concur in the views herein expressed.

. As stated in the appellant’s brief, this contention is as follows:
"The trial court, which had tentatively, but not finally, accepted Appellant’s tendered guilty plea pending outcome of a pre-sentence investigation report, abused its discretion by prohibiting Appellant from withdrawing the tendered plea prior to the trial court’s final acceptance after telling Appellant he would be allowed to withdraw the plea anytime before the trial court finally accepted it.”
*311Based on the record, it is my view, as will be set forth in this dissenting opinion, that the appellant relies on statements of the trial court, other than that quoted by the majority, to show that the trial court told him he would be allowed to withdraw his tendered plea until it was finally accepted.