Court Opinion

ID: 9487735
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:25:00.204704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:27.356612
License: Public Domain

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe the record is incomplete, I must respectfully dissent. Rather than affirm the District Court, I would reverse and remand for the evidentiary hearing requested by petitioner.
Petitioner’s main contention is that the July 26th hearing and the state judge’s calendar entry conform to the usual procedures for accepting guilty pleas in Kentucky juvenile court. Two statements by the juvenile judge would appear to support this contention. First, at the July 26th hearing, the judge explicitly stated that the case would be set for disposition, as opposed to adjudication. Petitioner’s counsel specifically sought to clarify the record, and upon his inquiry, the juvenile judge reiterated that the August 15 hearing would be the disposition hearing and that she was ordering a predisposition report. Although it may be that the court intended to secure a guilty plea at the August 15th hearing before conducting a disposition hearing, that procedure would have required a waiver of the statutory requirement that the two procedures must occur on separate days. K.R.S. § 610.080. The hearings “shall be held on separate days unless the child waives the right to a formal predisposition investigation report and moves that the hearings be held the same day.” Id.
The second statement occurred at the August 29th hearing. Although the judge began that hearing by declaring that the July 26th hearing was not an adjudication, she contradicted her holding near the end of the hearing, when she stated:
In looking at the statute, the Commonwealth must establish certain statutory requirements. One of those is that no prior adjudication hearing has been held, and I know this has been part of Mr. Rich’s objection that one was held on the robbery charge, but for the purposes of making the record clear, my ruling on that is that you can consider [the July 26 hearing] an adjudication hearing for your purposes. You will have that in the record. Obviously there was not one held on the murder charges.
Tr. 8/29/91 at 73-74 (emphasis added).
The majority opinion states that the hearing at which the guilty plea was made does not satisfy the requirement of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). This, of course, assumes that Boykin applies to juvenile court proceedings, an issue not previously addressed by our court. However, assuming that petitioner’s plea was constitutionally deficient, we are confronted with the question of whether its deficiencies render the plea void or merely voidable. If the plea is void, then *1017it is a nullity, and no adjudication occurred. If the plea is merely voidable, then we must ask who has the ability to render it void. Petitioner certainly has that right, but do either the juvenile court or the Kentucky prosecutor share that ability? I would answer that question in the negative.
The constitutional requirements of Boykin and the due process clause exist to protect a criminal defendant from making an uninformed waiver of several important constitutional rights, including the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to confront one’s accusers, and the right to a jury trial.1 Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243, 89 S.Ct. at 1712. They do not protect any rights that accrue to the state. Accordingly, the state and the court should not be able to set petitioner’s plea aside over her objections.
Because the District Court did not hold an evidentiary hearing, petitioner has not had an opportunity to present proofs regarding Kentucky’s procedures. If she is correct, and the judge followed the normal procedures for accepting guilty pleas in Kentucky juvenile court, then it is likely that jeopardy did attach and Kentucky cannot try petitioner as an adult, at least on the robbery charges. If Kentucky ordinarily treats what occurred in this case as a guilty plea, then we should not allow Kentucky to disregard that plea. Accordingly, I would remand this case to the District Court with instructions that an evidentiary hearing be held.

. No right to a jury trial exists in juvenile court, and the court did inform petitioner of her right to confront and cross-examine her accusers. That leaves only the right against self-incrimination, which petitioner had already waived during the police interrogation.