Court Opinion

ID: 9850075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:51:53.047686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:31.455159
License: Public Domain

STEWART, Justice
(dissenting):
I submit that the majority opinion is based on a technicality that wholly ignores the substance of what both parties intended in this litigation and the substance of the law. I fail to see any persuasive reason to support the result reached by the majority. The appellant wanted a divorce; she filed for a divorce; all critical issues were adjudicated; and the trial judge resolved all essential factual issues and orally granted a divorce. Counsel prepared findings of fact and conclusions of law *301which are uncontested as far as the significant issues are concerned. Before the trial judge could sign the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the defendant unexpectedly died. The majority nullifies the entire legal proceeding on the sterile formalism that the plaintiff cannot be divorced from a dead man. Thus, the decree, and the property division made in the decree, are held to be void. As a consequence, the appellant inherits a widow’s share of the estate of a man she had divorced for all practical purposes, when, in my view, she should receive only what the trial court awarded in the property settlement, which is all she ever asked from the court. I see no reason why the fortuitous event of death just prior to the signing of findings and conclusions and after a full adjudication in law or equity should produce such a windfall.
The trial court, in its memorandum decision, stated that “[i]n this case the Court ordered that the divorce was final and absolute on the day of the hearing.” Since the interlocutory period had been waived, only two acts, both ministerial in nature, remained to complete the divorce — the signing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law by the judge and the filing of the decree by the court clerk in the judgment book.
The decree of divorce should, I believe, be entered nunc 'pro tunc. A commonly-accepted statement of the rationale justifying entry of an order nunc pro tunc is found in the annotation at 104 A.L.R. 654 (1936), which states:
The general rule ... is that, if the facts justifying the entry of a decree were adjudicated during the lifetime of the parties to a divorce action, so that the decree was rendered or could or should have been rendered thereon immediately, but for some reason was not entered as such on the judgment record, the death of one of the parties to the action subsequently to the rendition thereof, but before it is in fact entered upon the record, does not prevent the entry of a decree nunc pro tunc to take effect as of a time prior to the death of the party.
Id. at 664 (emphasis added). Accord H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations § 13.2 at 384 (1968). See also Annot., 158 A.L.R. 1205, 1209-1210 (1945); Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 648, § 7 (1968).
The majority states that the judgment here was not final because the first of those two acts was not completed — “the judge’s oral announcement was not reduced to a signed written decree” prior to Mark Preece’s death. It is true that in some divorce cases in which a nunc pro tunc order was granted after the intervening death of a spouse, a written decree had been signed by the judge and only the entry of the decree in the judgment book remained. E.g., Berkenfield v. Jacobs, Fla., 83 So.2d 265 (1955). In other cases, however, a nunc pro tunc order was held to be valid even though no written decree had been signed. For example, in Caprita v. Caprita, 145 Ohio St. 5, 60 N.E.2d 483 (1945), at the conclusion of a divorce proceeding, the trial judge announced a decree that entitled the wife to a divorce and a division of the marital estate, but continued the proceedings so that the property might be appraised and properly divided. The husband died before the property division was completed or the decree signed. The Supreme Court of Ohio upheld a decision by the trial court to order the divorce nunc pro tunc, relying on the fact that the trial court had orally announced its decision before the husband died. See also Becker v. King, Fla.App., 307 So.2d 855 (1975).
The instant case is almost four-square with Caprita, and I think the same rule should apply. Where, as here, the parties have fully adjudicated the factual issues, the trial judge has announced the final decision, and the parties have waived the interlocutory period, I see no valid reason whatsoever why a nunc pro tunc decree should not be entered.
The appellant contends that there were still contested issues. Those issues were: (1) the award of attorney’s fees and (2) the property division award of $14,605 to Mark
*302Preece. These issues did not bear in any way on the critical fact — the granting of the divorce — and could have been resolved on appeal if the issues could be appropriately raised. The decree itself was final as to that point. The attorney’s fee issue was a collateral matter not crucial to the disposition of the merits of the case. See Pettit v. Pettit, 60 Ill.App.3d 375, 17 Ill.Dec. 636, 376 N.E.2d 782 (1978). In divorce proceedings, a claim for attorney’s fees is “incidental” to the divorce action. Smith v. Smith, Ala.Civ.App., 365 So.2d 88 (1978); O’Con-nor v. O’Connor, 48 Wis.2d 535, 180 N.W.2d 735 (1970); Sovereign v. Sovereign, 361 Mich. 528, 106 N.W.2d 146 (1960).
The issue the appellant now raises as to the division of property is not a valid reason for reversing the trial court’s nunc pro tunc order. Caprita v. Caprita, supra. That issue was not asserted by the plaintiff as a reason for not formalizing the trial judge’s order. She only relied on it as an issue to be raised on appeal. The appeal could have gone forward with the decedent’s estate substituted as a party.
The trial court wrote in its memorandum decision:
This is an equity proceeding and if there ever [were] a case where equity and justice demand that the property rights remain undisturbed as found by the Court at the hearing, this is the case where it should ....
The facts of this case fully bear out this ruling. Mrs. Preece initiated the divorce action. She and Mr. Preece had been separated for a year. The couple was childless, and she sought a waiver of the usual three-month waiting period so that her divorce from Mark Preece would be accelerated. The trial court’s oral “decree” of divorce was in her favor and accorded her the terms she had sought. The plaintiff accepted the court’s decree, except for the award of attorney’s fees, and the award of $14,605 to Mark Preece, which she claims she intended to appeal. There was no issue as to the remainder of the trial court’s disposition.
Now, due to the unexpected death of Mark Preece, the plaintiff becomes an heir to one-half of his estate, primarily a family farm, which is valued at over $143,000. As his heir, she will receive much more than she would have by way of the divorce decree, even if she had prevailed on the disputed $14,605 property settlement issue. Given these facts, I think that the trial court’s ruling was clearly correct. I agree that if ever equity required a nunc pro tunc order, it does here.
The Legislature has recently enacted a statute that commits broad discretion to trial courts in granting nunc pro tunc orders in domestic relations matters. U.C.A., 1953, § 30-4a-l (1983 Pocket Supp.) reads:
A court having jurisdiction may, upon its finding of good cause and giving of such notice as may be ordered, enter an order Nunc Pro Tunc in a matter relating to marriage, divorce, legal separation or annulment of marriage. [Emphasis added.]
All that need be shown is “good cause.” Surely that standard is met here. I realize that retroactive application of statutes is not favored. But where, as here, the statute is remedial in nature, and does not modify vested rights, it should be so applied. Pilcher v. State, Utah, 663 P.2d 450 (1983); State v. Higgs, Utah, 656 P.2d 998, 1000 (1982); Petty v. Clark, 113 Utah 205, 192 P.2d 589 (1948).