Court Opinion

ID: 9739282
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:11:38.95942+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:11.331574
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE CHAPMAN, dissenting: I do not necessarily disagree with the majority’s result, and in fact, I agree with many of their criticisms of the parental-immunity doctrine and a good deal of their analysis of the bases (or lack thereof) of it. I dissent, however, because I think that the supreme court has made its position on parental tort immunity known to date and that we are required to follow it. Although the Illinois Supreme Court has not decided a case in which the question of parent-child tort immunity for negligent torts was directly at issue, the court’s adoption of the rule is implicit in the holdings of several of the cases to which the majority refers. I find it of particular significance that in two of those decisions Justice Goldenhersh, deviating from the majority, protested the court’s repeated assumption that a parent is not liable for injuries to his child absent willful and wanton misconduct. He pointed out that the court has never decided the question of parental tort immunity in a negligence context. (See Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 165, 179, 347 N.E.2d at 705, 712 (Goldenhersh, J. dissenting); Tanari v. School Directors of District No. 502 (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 630, 640, 373 N.E.2d 5, 9 (Goldenhersh, J., concurring).) In light of Justice Goldenhersh’s statements and the language of Nudd, I cannot agree that the supreme court majority was unaware that it was imputing to Nudd an adoption of the rule in this State that children may not maintain actions against their parents for mere negligence. Nudd v. Matsoukas (1956), 7 Ill. 2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525; Mroczynski v. McGrath (1966), 34 Ill. 2d 451, 216 N.E.2d 137; Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 165, 347 N.E.2d 705; Tanari v. School Directors of District No. 502 (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 630, 373 N.E.2d 5; Gerrity v. Beatty (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 47, 373 N.E.2d 1323; Thomas v. Chicago Board of Education (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 165, 395 N.E.2d 538; Stallman v. Youngquist (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 267, 531 N.E.2d 355. In reviewing the state of the parental-tort-immunity doctrine, one finds that the districts in Illinois have continually precluded children from maintaining negligence actions against their parents because of the parental-tort-immunity doctrine adopted by the supreme court. However, each of the districts has recognized exceptions to the rule. (See Eisele v. Tenuta (1st Dist. 1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 799, 404 N.E.2d 349; Edgington v. Edgington (3d Dist. 1990), 193 Ill. App. 3d 104, 549 N.E.2d 942.) In one instance the court permitted minors to maintain a cause of action against their deceased mother’s estate for negligence because the policy of maintaining the family relationship underlying the tort-immunity doctrine could not apply where the parent was deceased. (Johnson v. Myers (2d Dist. 1966), 2 Ill. App. 3d 844, 277 N.E.2d 778.) Another exception allows a negligence claim if the minor’s injuries arose “outside of the family relationship.” Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Turner (2d Dist. 1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 234, 238, 403 N.E.2d 1256; Cummings v. Jackson (4th Dist. 1978), 57 Ill. App. 3d 68, 372 N.E.2d 1127; see also Hogan v. Hogan (5th Dist. 1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 104, 435 N.E.2d 770. As the majority point out, other States have relaxed or completely abolished the parental-tort-immunity doctrine. Various commentators have noted the trend toward abolishing the parental-tort-immunity doctrine. (See Rooney & Rooney, Parental Tort Immunity: Spare the Liability, Spoil the Parent, 25 New Eng. L. Rev. 1161 (1991); McLeod, Jilani v. Jilani: The Erosion of the Parental Tort Immunity Doctrine in Texas, 28 Hous. L. Rev. 717 (1991); Wingerter, Parent-Child Tort Immunity, 50 La. L. Rev. 1131 (1990); Fularczyk, Parent-Child Immunity After Carey v. Meijer, Inc., 35 Wayne L. Rev. 153 (1988); Atchison, Ard v. Ard: Limiting the Parent-Child Immunity Doctrine, 44 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 977 (1983); Grimm, Tort — Parental Immunity — Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wash. 2d 411, 610 P.2d 891 (1980), 56 Wash. L. Rev. 319 (1981).) Because of the exceptions that have been carved by the districts within Illinois, the apparent trend toward partial abrogation or complete abolishment of the doctrine, and the analysis set forth in the majority opinion, the supreme court may want to reexamine the parental-tort-immunity doctrine. My disagreement with the majority is based on what they say the supreme court says on the issue which obviously differs from my interpretation of the supreme court rulings. I would affirm the decision of the trial court.