Court Opinion

ID: 9692274
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:49:29.983714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:33.772331
License: Public Domain

SCOTT BRISTER, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
In this appeal, appellant Jimmy Belcher once again demonstrates a remarkable ability to prolong a chase. After hijacking a truck by threatening to shoot the driver, *603appellant forced the driver to take him for a ride, and eventually forced him from the truck. The driver called 9-1-1, and a patrol officer spotted the truck and followed appellant to a residential driveway. When the officer attempted to arrest appellant, he jumped back into the truck, sped around the back of the house, and headed out another way. A high-speed chase ensued, ending only when the truck flew off an embankment and into the San Jacinto River. Not one to give up easily, appellant escaped from the truck, and was arrested only after a search involving sixty officers and a police helicopter found him hiding underneath a partially sunken shrimp boat.
At trial, appellant was convicted of aggravated kidnaping and aggravated robbery, and the trial court assessed concurrent thirty-year sentences. Appellant’s appointed counsel filed a timely motion for new trial, obtained a timely hearing, and ably presented appellant’s arguments. At the close of that hearing the trial judge stated:
I have been counting on my fingers and toes here, and I think our 75 days are up on August the 2nd.... I am real troubled regarding the question of [one juror’s eligibility], so I am going to look at some law on that.... So, I want to look at some law about this juror. I want to put everybody on notice what I am thinking with regards to briefing, and I would like to see some. I would welcome others counting the days, but I think our deadline is August the 2nd.
Having the advantage of more fingers and toes, a panel of this Court held the motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law on July 31st, and vacated the trial court’s order. See Tex.R.App. P. 21.8(c); State v. Belcher, Nos. 14-00-01197-CR & 14-00-01198-CR, 2001 WL 806181 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 29, 2001, pet. refd) (not designated for publication).
Undeterred, appellant returns to our court, this time asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. Although last year we held his motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law, by granting a new hearing the court now holds it is not. Because the law does not require us to prolong this chase any further, I respectfully dissent.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The Court grants appellant a second hearing on his new trial motion, finding his appellate counsel ineffective in failing to correct the trial court’s miscalculation of dates. The concern in ineffective assistance cases is whether there has been a breakdown in the adversary process that renders appellant’s conviction unreliable. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, -, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 1850, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002). For several reasons, I do not believe that is so.
First, any mistake in calculating the new trial deadline was made by the judge, not appellant’s counsel. Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to take actions she had no duty to take. See Ex parte Morrow, 952 S.W.2d 530, 536-37 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (holding counsel not ineffective as he had no duty to advise defendant of collateral consequences of guilty plea). A defense attorney may have a duty to file a motion for new trial, see Bryant v. State, 974 S.W.2d 395, 400 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. ref'd) (holding record did not show failure to file motion for new trial meant counsel was ineffective), or to ensure it is timely heard, see Bacey v. State, 990 S.W.2d 319, 333 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1999, no pet.). But no court has ever held that attorneys have a duty to tell the court when to rule. Indeed, counsel cannot require the trial court to rule at all, as *604motions for new trial may be overruled by operation of law. See Tex.R.App. P. 21.8.3
Second, the objectively-reasonable counsel standard includes an element of foreseeability — we cannot fault counsel for failing to foresee the unforeseeable. See, e.g., Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 2667, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986) (holding counsel not ineffective for failing to foresee change in law); Lyon v. State, 885 S.W.2d 506, 521 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1994, pet. ref'd) (rejecting ineffectiveness claim when counsel could not have anticipated rebuttal testimony). At the moment when all attorneys were invited to confirm the jurisdictional deadlines, the trial judge had only indicated she wanted more briefing, not that she intended to grant a new trial.4 Appellant’s argument requires us to assume his counsel should have known that (1) the motion would be granted, and (2) the deadline would not be checked and corrected by anyone (trial judge, court coordinator, or court clerk) or anything (calendar or docketing system) at the courthouse.
Third, this is not a case about a sleeping lawyer. Though all concerned might have been more careful with their math, none were unconscious or totally absent. If we presume prejudice every time we think (in hindsight) a lawyer should have spoken up, we will have to presume a lot.
Finally, appellant must also show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). As discussed below, I do not believe he has made such a showing. We vacated the trial court’s belated order and declared it a “nullity.” Belcher, 2001 WL 306181 at *2. A void order has no legal effect; it cannot affect, impair, or create legal rights. See Ex Parte Seidel, 39 S.W.3d 221, 225 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); Zaragosa v. State, 588 S.W.2d 322, 327 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (treating void order granting a new trial as if it had never been ordered). By relying on that order to establish prejudice, the court has given this “nullity” a decisive effect.
A fair assessment of counsel’s performance requires us “to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. Here, appellant’s counsel timely filed a motion for new trial, timely presented evidence at a hearing, and put the trial court on actual notice of her desire for a ruling. See Carranza v. State, 960 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (establishing requirements of movant in motion for new trial). From this perspective, we cannot presume reasonable counsel should have known that trusting the trial court to make a timely ruling would prove fatal to appellant’s case.
The error here was made by the judge, not counsel. Trial courts must be aware of their own jurisdictional deadlines; if they are not, that error cannot be blamed on counsel. I would not establish a standard that declares every attorney incompetent when a judge miscalculates a deadline. *605Thus, I would overrule appellant’s point one.

The Juror Appellant Knew

In his second issue, appellant argues he is entitled to a new trial because one of the members of the jury lied about knowing him. When a motion for new trial asserting such a claim is overruled (as it was here by operation of law), we review for an abuse of discretion. See Gonzales v. State, 3 S.W.3d 915, 916 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).
As the members of the jury panel assembled for his trial, appellant told his trial counsel he knew one of the jurors. During voir dire, defense counsel asked if anyone knew appellant. The challenged juror did not respond, and no questions of any kind were directed to him on the matter. When neither side struck him, he became the twelfth juror.
While a juror who gives false answers during voir dire may be disqualified, allowing that juror to serve is error only if defense counsel acted diligently, in good faith, with no knowledge of the falsehood. Id. at 916-17. The Court of Criminal Appeals has consistently held there is no error in seating a juror if defense counsel fails to ask specific questions rather than broad ones, or fails to ask follow-up questions after uncovering potential bias. Id. at 917.
Here, appellant concedes he recognized this juror and told his counsel so, both before voir dire and again when the juror was placed on the jury. The juror was neither questioned nor challenged, nor was the matter brought to the trial court’s attention before the remainder of the jury panel was dismissed. Indeed, nothing was said about the matter until the end of the first day of trial, after dismissal of the jury panel, opening statements, and at least an hour of testimony.
Assuming ' appellant and his counsel were truthful in saying they intended all along to strike this juror (though allegedly “one of his best friends”), they do not get an extra peremptory strike merely by claiming they made a mistake. Nor is appellant entitled to a jury made up only of strangers, a condition that may be impossible in smaller communities. I would hold that the denial of the new trial (by operation of law) was not an abuse of discretion.

Conclusion

The law says- — and this Court affirmed in its prior opinion in this case — that motions for new trial are overruled by operation of law 75 days after sentencing. Tex. R.App. P. 21.8(c). By declaring an exception for every lawyer who miscounts, the Court makes that deadline infirm. Thus I respectfully dissent.

. As indicated in the quotation from the record, the trial judge invited counsel to confirm her calculation of the new trial deadline, but in no way did she “request assistance" or rely upon them to do so, as the Court suggests in its opinion.

. The Court’s conclusion that the judge "strongly indicated an intent to rule in [appellant's] favor” is a lot to read into her comment that she was “real troubled” about a question and wanted more research.