Court Opinion

ID: 9850084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:52:01.697257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:31.572660
License: Public Domain

WYNN, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority in concluding that this appeal presents the possibility of two trials on the same issue, as well as the major*627ity’s holding to reverse the trial court’s granting of Mr. Heflin’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion on the State’s claim for piercing the corporate veil and to affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the State’s UDTP claim. However, I would reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the State’s claim for civil penalties, and I would affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the State’s claim of civil conspiracy. From those portions of the majority opinion, I therefore respectfully dissent.
I.
First, I disagree with the conclusions of the majority’s analysis as to the issue of the State’s claim for civil penalties against Mr. Heflin, relating to the non-payment of the 2004 escrow fees.
As cited by the majority, our Supreme Court has established the rule that a “new party-defendant” may not be named in the amendment of a complaint, as the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure are “not authority for the relation back of a claim against a new party.” See, e.g., Crossman v. Moore, 341 N.C. 186, 187, 469 S.E.2d 716, 717 (1995). The instant case, however, also involves a claim by the State to pierce the corporate veil of Ridgeway, a claim which we allow to go forward by reversing the trial court’s granting of Mr. Heflin’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
If the State subsequently succeeds on its claim to pierce the corporate veil, Mr. Heflin would not be a new party-defendant, as a jury would therefore have concluded that he is the alter ego of Ridgeway. As such, the lack of his name in the original complaint would essentially be immaterial with respect to the question of notice, the Supreme Court’s primary concern in disallowing the relation-back doctrine as to newly named parties. See id. (“As a matter of course, the original claim cannot give notice of the transactions or occurrences to be proved in the amended pleading to a defendant who is not aware of his status as such when the original claim is filed.”).
I find the reasoning in Strawbridge v. Sugar Mountain Resort, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 472 (W.D.N.C. 2003), to be persuasive and applicable to the case at hand. In Strawbridge, the Western District Court held that the filing of an action against a corporation stopped the limitation period from running with respect to alter egos of the corporation. Id. at 476-77.1 believe this approach to be more consistent with the idea of what an “alter ego” means, in that “the corporate entity will be disregarded and the corporation and the shareholder treated as one and the same person[.]” Henderson v. Security Mortgage & *628Finance Co., Inc., 273 N.C. 253, 260, 160 S.E.2d 39, 44 (1968) (emphasis added).
Thus, I would conclude that the State’s claim for civil penalties, and whether it was filed after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, hinges on whether the State can successfully pierce the corporate veil and establish that Mr. Heflin and Ridgeway are alter egos. Given that this case is before us on review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and we have held that the State can proceed with its claim to pierce the corporate veil, I would likewise reverse the trial court’s order dismissing the State’s claim for civil penalties.
II.
Next, although I agree with the majority that intracorporate immunity should not apply in this case, I do not believe that the State’s complaint alleged sufficient facts to show a civil conspiracy in this case. I would therefore affirm that portion of the trial court’s order that dismissed the State’s claim for civil conspiracy.
To state a claim for civil conspiracy, there must be proof of an agreement between two or more persons to do an unlawful act or a lawful act in an unlawful manner. Dove v. Harvey, 168 N.C. App. 687, 690, 608 S.E.2d 798, 800-01 (2005), disc. review denied, 360 N.C. 289, 628 S.E.2d 249 (2006). Here, the State’s complaint referred only to Defendants “sharfing] an understanding, either expressed or implied, to enter into an agreement^]” Although the State argues that this allegation should be sufficient in light of North Carolina’s adoption of notice pleading, this Court has also noted that “the evidence of the agreement must be sufficient to create more than a suspicion or conjecture in order to justify submission to a jury.” Id. at 690-91, 608 S.E.2d at 801 (citation and quotation omitted). I do not believe the State’s complaint meets this burden.
The State’s complaint includes no factual allegations to support the notion of an agreement or conspiracy among Mr. Heflin, Mr. Edwards, and Mr. White to underprice the cigarettes' for the express purpose of avoiding its statutory obligations to pay into the qualified escrow account. Even were all the facts of the complaint taken as true, its allegations are insufficient to “create more than a suspicion or conjecture” of an actual agreement among the parties; accordingly, they fail to state a claim for civil conspiracy. I would therefore affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the State’s claim for civil conspiracy.