Court Opinion

ID: 9492357
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:39:32.179254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:16.382435
License: Public Domain

WELLFORD, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I am persuaded by our standard of review in this kind of case, which is heavily dependent on factual and credibility findings by the magistrate judge and the district court, that we should affirm.
This case is troubling' — -necessarily so by reason of defendant’s challenges to the integrity and good faith of the state troopers in effectuating the stop of the vehicle, and the subsequent search and seizure of a substantial quantity of contraband found in *710defendant’s vehicle. Like the other judges who have been involved in the trial and in this appeal, I have read the record carefully, and I have reviewed the tape of the happenings during the traffic stop.
It is well-settled that when reviewing the district court’s factual findings, we must “consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.” United States v. Caicedo, 85 F.3d 1184, 1188 (6th Cir.1996); see also United States v. Buchanon, 72 F.3d 1217, 1223 (6th Cir.1995). If one were to ignore this standard in this difficult case, there would be a temptation to arrive at the different result urged upon us by defendant. We, however, must follow the law.
The defendant and his witnesses took issue with the testimony of the trooper who clocked the vehicle in question as exceeding the lawful speed limit, as well as the alleged tip which alerted the troopers to the particular type of vehicle that purportedly was transporting drugs. Furthermore, the defendant contested the circumstances described by the troopers pri- or to the stop, and, most vehemently, the circumstances involved in the use of the trained drug-sniffing canine, Dingo. Moreover, there was some controversy about what happened between troopers Stevens and Baranowski as portrayed on the video tape, and whether they singled out Latinos like the defendant for traffic stops and drug searches. A trier of fact might sincerely and honestly reach different conclusions based on divergent factual determinations in respect to these (and other) controversies mentioned in this case.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the government’s proof as determined by the factual findings of the magistrate judge and the district judge, I conclude that we should affirm. Expert proof was developed in this case which was conflicting as to both the capabilities of Dingo, the canine, which alerted to the contraband in the vehicle, and what transpired on the video tape between the troopers as they approached the type of vehicle they had purportedly been looking for over a several hour stretch. Once again, it was for the trial judge to make the necessary credibility findings on the defendant’s motion to suppress.
Judge Boggs, I believe, properly devoted some attention to the circumstances of the initial stop. It is important to point out, however, that the defendant in his appellate brief at p. 29, concedes that “[he] never challenged the pretextual nature of the stop.” In any event, Trooper Kiefer testified that his radar unit had been calibrated earlier that day and was, in fact, accurate and working properly. There was inadequate proof that Trooper Kiefer was involved in any improper stops of Latinos. The Supreme Court has stated, unanimously, that “[sjubjective motivations play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). Thus, we do not probe into the officer’s state of mind in making the traffic stop, but rather whether probable cause for the stop was demonstrated.
Despite the defendant’s assertions to the contrary, there was substantial evidence admitted to support the proposition that Dingo was a reliable drug-detecting canine. First, Stevens and Dingo were certified in 1990. Thereafter, every two years, Dingo passed his recertification. During that time period, Stevens trained with his dog between 1500 and 2000 hours. Additionally, Stevens produced for the court numerous certificates, recertifications, and commendations which had been earned by Dingo for his reliability. The most recent recertification, prior to the sniff which occurred in this case, was approximately forty days before the event. Moreover, Stevens testified that since 1990, Dingo had alerted accurately between ninety and ninety-three percent of the time. Even Dr. Craig, the defendant’s expert, agreed that a drug-detecting canine with a ninety percent accuracy rate should be considered *711reliable. See United States v. Berry, 90 F.3d 148, 153 (6th Cir.1996). The district court’s finding that Dingo was reliable was not clearly erroneous.
For all of the reasons stated by Judge Boggs and under the appropriate standard of review, I concur in the opinion that we shall AFFIRM.