Court Opinion

ID: 9771225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:37:26.825416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:27.185968
License: Public Domain

HOLSTEIN, Judge,
concurring in result.
The majority is mistaken in its statement that plaintiffs’ cause of action is a product of legislative creation. The plaintiffs’ action is unquestionably a common law cause of ae*883tion. In addition, such cause of action is rooted in a fundamental right recognized by our state constitution.
If any aspect of this case is a legislative creation, it is not the plaintiffs’ cause of action for negligence, but the defense of sovereign immunity. Whether the doctrine of governmental tort immunity is part of the common law of Missouri is debatable. The origins of the doctrine are shrouded in the mists of time. Missouri adopted the English common law as it existed in the year 1607. § 1.010, RSMo 1986. The first reported case in which the doctrine of sovereign immunity was applied was Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng.Rep. 369 (1788). That case purports to rely on “Brooke’s Abridgments,” apparently published in 1573. The accuracy of the authority for the doctrine is suspect.
Even assuming the doctrine of sovereign immunity was created by the pre-1607 cases, the common law has never been static. By adopting the common law, we have adopted a system of “elementary rules and general judicial declarations of principles which are continually expanding with the progress of society, adapting themselves to the gradual changes of trade, commerce, arts, inventions, and the exigencies and usages of the country.” State ex rel. Schlueter Mfg. Co. v. Beck, 337 Mo. 839, 847, 85 S.W.2d 1026, 1029-30 (banc 1935). The principle that a rule of law will not be expanded beyond the reasons justifying its adoption has given the common law a dynamic quality. While the common law is constant, it is not, and has never been, inflexible. Thus, by 1977, this Court, along with twenty-nine other states and the District of Columbia, following general common law principles, rejected sovereign tort immunity. Jones v. State Highway Comm’n, 557 S.W.2d 225, 227 (Mo. banc 1977).
Regardless of when the courts of England originally recognized a doctrine of sovereign immunity, the foundations of the doctrine were never supported by sound reason. The most frequent justification for the doctrine of sovereign immunity was that “the king can do no wrong.” In an enlightened democratic society which has in the last fifty years witnessed the most outrageous inhumanity committed by sovereigns, such statement can only be considered a laughable anachronism. The other justification is the one alluded to by the majority in its determination that a “rational basis” exists for the statute. This rationale is often referred to as that of “public inconvenience.” It holds that it is preferable for innocent and injured parties to bear the burdens of disability and impoverishment than for the government, whose culpable employees inflicted the damage, to bear a risk. Where risk pooling through insurance or otherwise is available, the potential risk to the public coffers is minimal. Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Education, 453 Pa. 584, 596, 305 A.2d 877, 883 (1973). As of the time of the adoption of §§ 537.600 and 537.610, RSMo 1986, the reasons for sovereign tort immunity had been thoroughly discredited. Thus, the Missouri courts at that point in time no longer recognized the vitality of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
The plaintiffs right of action descends from the common law which, worded as simply as possible, holds that one who acts negligently must pay for damages arising from the wrong. The question becomes whether the Richardsons being denied a claim interferes with a fundamental right.
Not all fundamental rights are itemized in the United States Constitution. Our state constitution speaks eloquently regarding what the citizens of this state consider fundamental:
[A]ll persons have a natural right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness and the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry ... that to give security to these things is the principle office of government, and that when government does not confer this security, it fails in its chief design, (emphasis added.)
Mo. Const, art. I, § 2. When a person is deprived of the right to future employment or is denied the enjoyment of otherwise good health due directly to the negligence of public officials, the government action involved has denied the injured person “the pursuit of happiness and the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry.” In addition, the consti*884tution continues regarding the role of the courts in such matters:
That the courts of justice shall be open to every person, and certain remedy afforded for every injury to person, property or character, and that right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay, (emphasis added.)
Mo. Const art. I, § 1⅛. To hold that the legislature may deny a judicial remedy to a person who, through the misconduct of a public official, has been denied the right to the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry, is to reduce the above provisions of the constitution to quaint 19th century rhetoric.
In Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hospital, 832 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. banc 1992), we held that caps on noneconomic damages did not violate the “certain remedy” provisions of the constitution. However, the state here is not merely placing a cap on noneconomic damages, the cap placed here is clearly on economic damages. Thus, the holding in Adams should not be an obstacle to breathing meaning into the above provisions of the constitution.
Neither does Winston v. Reorganized School Dist. R-2, 636 S.W.2d 324 (Mo. banc 1982), relied on by the majority, create an impediment to giving force to Mo. Const, art. I, §§ 2 and 14. In Winston, the Court concluded that there was no suspect classification. Winston did not consider whether Mo. Const, art. I, §§ 2 and 14, created a fundamental right to be free from disabling injury inflicted by a governmental employee.
This Court recently held in Heins Implement Co. v. Mo. Hwy. & Transportation Comm’n, et al., 859 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. banc 1993), that a negligently constructed bridge which flooded the property of an adjacent landowner subjected the state to damages caused by the flooding. It is paradoxical to say that one whose land is damaged by the negligent conduct of the public officials has a fundamental right to recover for such damages, but one who incurs medical expenses, loss of employment and other economic damages due to negligent conduct by public offi- ■ cials does not have a fundamental right to recover for such losses.
I believe that the plaintiffs’ right to recover their economic loss for a wrong perpetrated by public officials in the course of their duties is a fundamental right found in the Missouri Constitution. For that reason, I am unwilling to join in the majority’s implicit conclusion that this statute does not touch on a fundamental right. When the legislature chooses to grant the state government immunity from tort liability for economic damages, the statute should be subject to strict scrutiny and require a compelling state interest to support its constitutionality. At the same time, it is possible that economic interests of the state may prove to be compelling under the circumstances of a particular case. However, I would make clear that the sovereign granting itself unreasonably broad immunity from liability for economic damages would be an exercise of gross governmental hubris which, I believe, the constitution will not tolerate.
The plaintiffs in this case have not clearly segregated the economic from noneconomic damages assessed by the jury. The state may limit liability for noneconomic loss. In addition, the arguments I have noted based on the provisions of Missouri Constitution article I, §§ 2 and 14, were not adequately raised in the trial court or in the brief. For those reasons, I concur in the result of the majority opinion, but with the reservations stated above.