Court Opinion

ID: 9751239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:15:48.960312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:40.320288
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Me. Justice Bell:
The jury returned a verdict for defendant Montague and a verdict for plaintiff against the additional defendant Keller.
The only evidence in the case was that produced bv plaintiff. No matter which Avitness for plaintiff is believed or Avhether all witnesses for plaintiff are be*277lieved, the negligence of the additional defendant was gross and was far greater than the negligence, if any— and I agree with the jury that there was none — of the defendant Montague.
A trial Judge or lower Court has an inherent right to grant a new trial when he is convinced that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence and in such cases an appellate Court will reverse only for a manifest abuse of discretion.
The trial Judge in granting a new trial as to Montague stated: “Montague’s car was proceeding South, on 25th Street. Montague stated that he stopped at the intersection and then proceeded to cross after having looked to his left, the direction in which defendant Keller’s car was proceeding. He said that he did not see the Keller car when he looked, the reason being that it had been obscured by a truck proceeding North on 25th Street * and that the plaintiff’s car came from behind the truck [down Norris Street] and collided with defendant’s car. It is the opinion of the court that Montague’s testimony convicted him of negligence and that therefore the verdict was against the evidence and against the weight of the evidence and a new trial should be granted the plaintiff as to Montague.”
The trial Judge neglected to say (1) that Montague’s car was three-quarters of the way across 25th Street when it collided with plaintiff’s car which came suddenly and without any warning from behind the truck, and (2) that Montague not only stopped at the intersection, but Montague had the right of way. Moreover, the driver of an automobile cannot be held guilty oí negligence as a matter of law because he entered an intersection when his view to the left was obstructed by a vehicle traveling on the same street. Cf. Pelle*278grini v. Coll, 133 Pa. Superior Ct. 294, 2 A. 2d. 491; Rea v. Pittsburgh Railways Company, 344 Pa. 421, 25 A. 2d 730; McGavern v. Pittsburgh Railways Company, 378 Pa. 13, 105 A. 2d 342; Borisoff v. Penn Fruit Company, Inc., 165 Pa. Superior Ct. 572, 69 A. 2d 167; Myers v. Funk, 111 Pa. Superior Ct. 17, 169 A. 400. Furthermore, if a ear which stops at a street intersection has to wait until all the parallel traffic which is going in the opposite direction on the same street passes by, traffic in cities and on popular rural highways will be paralysed.
The trial Judge’s statement that because he believed Montague’s testimony convicted him of negligence the verdict was therefore against the weight of the evidence is a non sequitur and actually is contrary not only to the weight, but in my judgment contrary to all the evidence in the case.
This Court has many times said, as Chief Justice Stern said in Carroll v. Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 436, 84 A. 2d 505: “A new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in testimony or because the trial judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different conclusion: Wilson v. Kallenbach, 332 Pa. 253, 255, 256, 2 A. 2d 727, 728. Neither should it ordinarily be granted on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence where the evidence is conflicting and the jury might have found for either party.” This guiding principle was iterated and repeatedly reiterated by this Court: See, inter alia, Jones v. Williams, 358 Pa. 559, 58 A. 2d 57; Decker v. Kulesza, 369 Pa. 259, 85 A. 2d 413; Devlin v. Piechoski, 374 Pa. 639, 99 A. 2d 346; Martin v. Arnold, 366 Pa. 128, 77 A. 2d 99; Stewart v. Ray, 366 Pa. 134, 76 A. 2d 628.
This Court rarely ever reverses the action of the lower Court when it grants a new trial on the ground *279that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence,* but we have done so whenever we believed the lower Court committed a palpable abuse of discretion: Jones v. Williams, 358 Pa., supra; Decker v. Kulesza, 369 Pa., supra; Martin v. Arnold, 366 Pa., supra; Stewart v. Ray, 366 Pa., supra.
If there ever was a manifest abuse of discretion in a negligence case, this, in my judgment, is it. I would therefore sustain the verdict of the jury and reverse the order granting a new trial as to defendant Montague.

 Italics ours.

 More than any Judge on this Court I have favored sustaining the grant of a new trial by a trial Judge whenever the reason alleged was that it was in the interest of justice or that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. See, for example, my concurring opinion in Bellettiere v. Philadelphia, 367 Pa. 638, 81 A. 2d 857.