Court Opinion

ID: 9751470
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:29:32.856514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:47.821466
License: Public Domain

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING STATEMENT BY
OLSON, J.:
I both concur and dissent from the decision rendered by the learned Majority. Because I find that Sherwin-Williams failed to discharge its burden of producing sufficient facts to show that it has properly invoked the attorney-client privilege, I agree that the order requiring production of Joseph Schreck’s memoranda should be affirmed.1 I write separately, however, to express my concern that the Majority has improperly emphasized Mr. Schreck’s reasons for visiting the site of the Custom Design fire as part of its rationale in rejecting Sherwin-Williams’ privilege claim. In my view, the facts and circumstances surrounding the preparation and dissemination of the memoranda should be the sole focus of our privilege inquiry. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, I dissent from this aspect of the Majority’s opinion.
In examining Sherwin-Williams’ claim, the Majority finds that Mr. Schreck’s purpose for visiting the site of the fire arose from his concern about a very large customer. Majority Opinion at 379-80. The Majority then observes that, at the time he visited the site, Mr. Schreck had not been asked to investigate the fire for purposes of litigation. Id. at 379-80. The Majority relies upon these factors in distinguishing this case from the circumstances before the United States Supreme Court in Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981), where that Court rejected a request for disclosure by the Internal Revenue Service of written questionnaires used by Upjohn’s counsel to gather information for an internal probe. Based in part on these distinctions, the Majority concludes that Sher-win-Williams failed to establish that Mr. Schreck’s memoranda were protected by the attorney-client privilege.
I believe that the Majority’s analysis in this respect is mistaken. As the Majority acknowledges, the questionnaires in Upjohn were protected by the attorney-client privilege because they were part of an internal company investigation into an ongoing legal matter, because they were generated for the purpose of securing legal advice, and because they were confidential. See Majority Opinion at 377-78. As the Majority also recognizes, the attorney-client privilege prevents disclosure of communications to an attorney but not the facts that are included within a privileged communication. Id. at 378.
In applying these principles to the facts before us, it is clear that Mr. Schreck’s *381reasons for visiting the site of the fire are irrelevant and need not be considered for purposes of our present inquiry. In Upjohn, the circumstances surrounding the preparation and dissemination of the requested communications were the exclusive focus of the Court’s privilege analysis. Nowhere in the Upjohn decision does the Court consider why or how the Upjohn employees obtained relevant information in its assessment of whether and to what extent the attorney-client privilege should apply to the requested questionnaires. The practical reasons for this approach are obvious: rarely, if ever, will a corporate employee acquire information at the behest of counsel for the company before a claim has been filed.
In the present ease, the Majority concludes, in part, that Sherwin-Williams failed to properly invoke the attorney-client privilege because Mr. Schreck visited the site of the fire to aid a major client and because he was not investigating the fire in preparation for litigation. The record, however, confirms that Sherwin-Williams did not receive notice of a potential claim until after Mr. Schreck conducted his site visit. Prior to that time, counsel for the company had no reason to commence an investigation or to instruct a company employee to begin to collect information in preparation for litigation. The Majority’s effort to consider the reasons underlying Mr. Schreck’s site visit in assessing the privilege status of his memo-randa is unwarranted under Upjohn and unnecessary since the facts gathered during his visit are not protected by the attorney-client privilege. Instead, the focus in determining whether the memoranda are protected by the attorney-client privilege should be the purpose for which Mr. Schreck prepared the memoranda and the facts and circumstances surrounding the preparation and dissemination (i e., were they prepared at the request of counsel; were they prepared as part of counsel’s internal investigation; were they only disseminated to counsel, etc.) Because I cannot agree with this aspect of the Majority’s reasoning, I concur only in the Majority’s conclusion that Sherwin-Williams failed to produce sufficient facts to show that it properly invoked the attorney-client privilege.

. The record is clear that very little is known about Mr. Schreck’s reasons for drafting the memoranda. As the quoted passages of Mr. Schreck’s deposition testimony demonstrate, Mr. Schreck does not recall whether he was instructed to draft the memoranda or who directed him to prepare those materials. See Majority Opinion at 378. In the absence of an affidavit or testimony from counsel for Sherwin-Williams explaining who directed Mr. Schreck to generate the challenged mem-oranda, and for what purpose the memoranda were generated, I believe that the Majority correctly concludes that Sherwin-Williams has failed to meet its burden of showing that the requested materials were privileged.