Court Opinion

ID: 9662194
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:02:27.044124+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:37.671684
License: Public Domain

E. A. Quinnell, J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part). I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that evidence concerning the stabbing of Beverly Mandoka was properly admitted. I agree with the majority’s resolution of the other issues presented, and the discussion of the 180-day rule contained in this opinion represents the unanimous view of the panel.
I
180-Day Rule
Defendant argues that the trial court lost jurisdiction to try him through delay. At the outset, it should be noted that defendant is not asserting a violation of his constitutional and statutory right to a speedy trial, US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20; MCL 768.1; MSA 28.1024. Defendant’s claim of error is based on the 180-day rule of MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969(1), which requires the state to bring an accused to trial within 180 days after the issuance of a warrant, indictment, information, or complaint on any untried offense, where the accused is an inmate of a penal institution of the state.
Defendant was arrested for the instant offense on July 10, 1980, and a warrant was issued promptly thereafter. Defendant also was charged *409with an assault on his ex-wife, Beverly Mandoka, the date of the offense being charged as July 9, 1980. Defendant was tried and convicted regarding that assault charge, and on December 1, 1980, he was sentenced to the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections. The 180-day period therefore began on December 1, 1980; People v Hill, 402 Mich 272, 280-281; 262 NW2d 641 (1978). Defendant’s trial on the instant charge began March 3, 1981. After ten trial days, a mistrial was declared on March 17, 1981, when the jury in that case could not agree upon a verdict.
On April 28, 1981, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to reduce the charge to second-degree murder. Various portions of the trial transcript were ordered, and the motion was heard on June 1, 1981. On July 9, 1981, the defendant was returned to court and his motions were denied. Trial was then scheduled for July 28, 1981. On July 13, 1981, the prosecution filed some additional motions, and the defendant also filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing, noticed for hearing on July 20; on July 16 the defendant filed a petition for funds for an investigator, also noticed for hearing on July 20.
For reasons not set forth in the record, the trial was not held on July 28 as originally scheduled, but was scheduled as a backup case for the week of August, 18, 1981, and also as a backup case for the week of August 25, 1981. Trial commenced on August 25, 1981, some 161 days after the end of the first trial, and 248 days from the time the 180-day period began to run.
The 180-day rule, however, does not mandate that trial be commenced within that period of time. Rather, it obligates the prosecution to initiate the proceedings promptly and in good faith, *410and thereafter to take good faith action to proceed promptly in readying the case for trial. People v Hendershot, 357 Mich 300, 303-304; 98 NW2d 568 (1959).
There is nothing in the foregoing calendar of events to indicate an absence of good faith on the part of the prosecution as to either requirement. The first trial began well within the 180 days. Thereafter some periods of time are chargeable to the defendant rather than to the prosecution. The first trial itself consumed 14 days. From the time the defendant’s initial motion to dismiss was made on April 28, 1981, and the necessary transcripts were prepared and the motion argued and an order entered, an additional 72 days expired. An additional seven days were required to process defendant’s July, 1981, motions. Thus, there are at least 93 days chargeable to the defendant and not to the prosecution. There is no indication that the delay in commencing the second trial was caused by an intent on the part of the prosecution not to ready the case for trial.
The trial court apparently held that the 180-day statute had not been violated because the second trial was commenced within 180 days after the mistrial had been declared in the first trial. We need not here decide whether that is the correct interpretation of the rule.
II
Similar-Act Evidence
Evidence was introduced at the trial that defendant had lived intermittently with both Brenda Day and his ex-wife, Beverly Mandoka, prior to the date Brenda Day was killed. On the evening preceding and in the early morning hours of July *41110, 1980, defendant and Day had been at a local tavern. Testimony was presented that defendant had reacted in an angry and jealous manner to Brenda Day’s having danced with another man.
Nevertheless, there was also testimony that the two were on very friendly terms when they returned to the apartment house where Brenda Day was staying. Once there, Brenda Day sat in another man’s lap and kissed that man. Testimony was presented which, if believed, would establish that defendant angrily and rudely asked Day to go downstairs so he could talk to her; that in the downstairs area Day was heard to say "Quit, Sidney”; that shortly thereafter Day was found lying in front of the apartment building bleeding. Testimony of other witnesses, if believed, would establish that defendant thereafter but prior to his arrest made statements to other persons, the only reasonable inference from such statements being that he was responsible for stabbing Ms. Day.
Ms. Day died of a single stab wound to the left side of her neck. The autopsy pathologist described the wound as follows:
"There was a laceration through the skin in the left side of the neck which was situated below the earlobe and was between the angle of the mandible, or lower jaw, and the mastoid process of the skull.
"The small space between the angle of the mandible or lower jawbone and [the] styloid process of the skull contains three blood vessels that are major. There is the external carotid artery, the internal carotid artery, and the internal carotid vein. There is barely any other room in that space available other than those three structures and it was my conclusion that one or more of them had been severed by the wound, and any one of them being severed would cause severe blood loss, and *412it was my conclusion that death was due to [exsanguination], or severance, of one or more of those vessels.”
Over defense objections, Beverly Mandoka was permitted to testify that on July 9, 1980, the defendant had stabbed her on the left side of the neck; noteworthy is her additional testimony that the defendant also inflicted cut wounds to her shoulder, her left hand, and two wounds on her breast.
The admissibility of such evidence is governed now by MRE 404(b):
"(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material * * *.”
People v Golochowicz, 413 Mich 298; 319 NW2d 518 (1982), was decided after the defendant’s see" ond trial. Having the benefit of the analysis found in Golochowicz, I would conclude that the trial court committed reversible error in permitting the testimony of Beverly Mandoka. See also People v Betancourt, 120 Mich App 58; 327 NW2d 390 (1982), and People v Urbin, 121 Mich App 274; 328 NW2d 361 (1982). Golochowicz, citing approvingly People v Wilkins, 82 Mich App 260; 266 NW2d 781 (1978), establishes that the rule allowing proof of similar acts is an exception to the general rule that such evidence is not admissible. Before such evidence becomes admissible, four preliminary considerations must each be satisfied. At 413 Mich *413309, the Supreme Court identified the factors as follows:
"(1) there must be substantial evidence that the defendant actually perpetrated the bad act sought to be introduced; (2) there must be some special quality or circumstance of the bad act tending to prove the defendant’s identity or the motive, intent, absence of mistake or accident, scheme, plan or system in doing the act and, in light of the slightly different language of MRE 404(b) we add, opportunity, preparation and knowledge; (3) one or more of these factors must be material to the determination of the defendant’s guilt of the charged offense; and (4) the probative value of the evidence sought to be introduced must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”
The testimony of Ms. Mandoka constitutes substantial evidence that defendant actually perpetrated the assault on her. However, when asked at trial to specify the material factors as the basis for admission of similar-acts evidence, the trial prosecutor responded with a " 'shotgun’ fusillade”, a type of response criticized by the Supreme Court in Golochowicz at 413 Mich 315. On brief in this Court, the prosecution has sinned at least partially in this regard. The following appears in the prosecutor’s brief:
"Evidence of defendant’s assault on Beverly Mandoka hours earlier was properly introduced to establish motive, opportunity, intent, scheme or plan, identity of the assailant, and lack of accident. The evidence was particularly probative in light of defendant’s argument that the victim was injured as a result of her own fall or was stabbed by others.”
This type of argument, of course, is not helpful to either a trial or appellate court in determining the admissibility of similar-act evidence.
*414None of the factors on which the prosecution relies is material except for identity. There was no special quality or circumstance of the Mandoka assault tending to show a motive for defendant to stab Day. The two crimes arguably involved similar motives, but such a similarity merely suggests that defendant’s character was such that he was likely to commit such crimes, precisely what MRE 404(b) forbids.
The prosecution explains "opportunity” by saying that the Mandoka assault showed that defendant possessed a knife. However, Mandoka was unable to give any description whatever of the knife used against her. Because knives áre ordinary household objects readily accessible to nearly everyone, the probative value of evidence that defendant possessed a knife of unknown description on the day before Day was stabbed was virtually worthless.
The prosecution offers no explanation of how the Mandoka assault tends to show intent or how intent is material. The references by the prosecution and the majority to a "scheme or plan” are inexplicable. There is no evidence whatever to suggest that defendant committed these crimes as part of some scheme or plan to stab his women friends in their necks.
The prosecution explains "lack of accident” by pointing to argument by defendant’s counsel that Day’s wound could have been caused by accidentally falling down a flight of stairs onto a sliver of wood or glass. The statute which governed admission of such evidence at the time of trial and before the rule took effect, MCL 768.27; MSA 28.1050, expressly limited use of such evidence to showing lack of accident on the part of defendant. I do not believe MRE 404(b) was intended to change this aspect of the law.
*415In Golochowicz, supra, pp 324-326, the Court emphasized the necessity for extreme caution in admitting similar-act evidence to show identity:
"[T]his case presents the classic example as to why trial courts should be
" 'stricter in applying [the] standards of relevancy when the ultimate purpose of the [evidence] is to prove identity or the doing by the accused of the criminal act charged than they are when the evidence is offered on the ultimate issue of knowledge, intent or other state of mind.’ McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), § 190, p 452.
"As a general rule, if the evidence of the accused’s identity as the perpetrator of the crime in question is strong or essentially uncontroverted, there is no need for evidence of other crimes to prove identity, which evidence is only circumstantial at best. On the other hand, if evidence of the identity of the criminal actor is weak or tenous, revelation that he has committed an unrelated similar crime may, by reason of its tendency to distract the jury from the identification issue, tempt it to compromise or ignore that critical element of the case while focusing on the clearer proof of the defendant’s other misconduct. The dangerous result may well be, and indeed is likely to be, the jury’s conclusion that whatever the strength of the identification evidence in the case, the defendant is demonstrably a bad person and should be imprisoned anyway.
"It is, at least in part, for those reasons that the trial court, when similar-acts evidence is offered to prove identity, should insist upon a showing of a high degree of similarity in the manner in which the crime in issue and the other crimes were committed. We regard the requirement to be a heavy burden upon the prosecution to show that the manner in which the crime charged and the other crimes were committed was marked with special characteristics so uncommon, peculiar and distinctive as to lead compellingly to the conclusion that all were the handiwork of the defendant because all bore his distinctive style or 'touch’.
"Even where evidence of that distinctiveness is produced, a trial court should be especially alert to the *416paramount consideration that ruling on the admission of such evidence is more a matter of a careful weighing process in the exercise of discretion than the mechanical application of a rule. The overriding policy is to protect the accused from unfair prejudice. That policy can be carried out only if the trial court is alertly sensitive to the need to balance the probative value of the proffered evidence against its prejudicial impact by weighing the likelihood that, as Professor McCormick put it, the jury will 'be roused by the evidence to overmastering hostility’.” (Footnote omitted; emphasis in original.)
See also People v Major, 407 Mich 394, 398-399; 285 NW2d 660 (1979):
"It is the distinguishing characteristics which constitute the acts as similar within the meaning of MCL 768.27 and MRE 404(b), not the fact that all constitute the same crime or are violative of the same statute. The distinguishing, peculiar or special characteristics which are common to the acts and thus personalize them are said to be the defendant’s 'signature’ which identifies him as the perpetrator”.
The evidence in this case fails to demonstrate that high degree of similarity between the charged crime and the prior bad act, and further, the similarities present are not particularly distinctive. Jealously among lovers is an extremely common motive for violence. Knives are common household utensils and also are extremely common weapons. The neck is a vulnerable part of the anatomy and a common site for a knife wound. Wounds inflicted by a right-handed assailant to a face-to-face victim would in all probability be on the victim’s left side.
If both victims had received an identical stab wound to the very precise location required to *417cause the death of Brenda Day, similarity would be enhanced. However, Mandoka’s testimony showed that, in contrast to the single serious wound received by Day, she received five relatively superficial wounds, only one of which was inflicted on the same region of the body as the wound received by Day. The majority misstates the record by claiming that defendant stabbed both Day and Mandoka just below the ear. Mandoka merely testified that defendant stabbed her in the left side of her neck. She pointed out the precise spot to the jury, but, of course, the record does not show where she pointed. However, comparison of the testimony of the pathologist who examined Day with the testimony of Mandoka shows that Mandoka could not have been stabbed in the same spot as Day. The pathologist testified that Day was stabbed in a small space between the lower jaw bone and the styloid process of the skull which contains three major blood vessels, the external carotid artery, the internal carotid artery, and the internal jugular vein. These three vessels pass through such a confined space that it is inconceivable that a stabbing there could miss all three. According to the pathologist, if one of the arteries in that space were severed, death would result in a very few minutes unless the victim received immediate medical treatment. If only the vein was severed, death would result within 20 or 30 minutes. Mandoka’s testimony revealed no life-threatening injury. The ambulance which took her to the hospital was delayed and came only in response to a second call. Mandoka was treated and released the same night. Because Mandoka’s wound was not remotely comparable in severity to that received by Day, she could not have been stabbed in the same spot as Day.
Because the two crimes did not have "distin*418guishing, peculiar or special” characteristics in common as required by Major, I would not hesitate to say that the trial judge abused his discretion by finding that Mandoka assault sufficiently similar to the Day stabbing, even under the extraordinarily severe standard for determining when an abuse of discretion occurs stated in People v Talley, 410 Mich 378, 387; 301 NW2d 809 (1981). Compare Golochowicz, supra, p 322. However, even if no abuse of discretion was presented, I would hold that the evidence of the Mandoka assault was so unfairly prejudicial when weighed against its limited and tenuous probative value that its admission denied defendant a fair trial. See Golochowicz at 413 Mich 323.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial at which this evidence would not be admitted.