Court Opinion

ID: 9773831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:00:28.281798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:58.353384
License: Public Domain

KAROHL, Judge,
dissenting.
Infringement of a right against self-incrimination protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, Article I Section 19 of the Missouri Constitution, Section 546.270 RSMo 1994 and Missouri Supreme Court Rule 27.05(a) is nothing less than plain error when the state makes a certain, indirect reference to defendant’s failure to testify in closing argument. The state argued only two people know what happened, but only the prosecuting witness testified. The argument can have only one meaning, the defendant failed to testify. It is an indirect but certain reference to a prohibited and protected subject.
There is no reasonable justification for an argument which violates a right protected by four sources and serves no purpose except the denial of a fair trial. In fact, the prosecutor twice referred to the obvious circumstance that only two persons had personal knowledge of the facts and only one testified. That made the argument a certain, indirect reference to defendant’s failure to testify. There was no need to tell the jury an obvious fact, given the charges, that two persons “know what happened.”
Our Supreme Court has never held a certain, indirect reference to a defendant’s failure to testify is not plain error. The majority opinion cites State v. Wood, 719 S.W.2d 756 (Mo. banc 1986) and refers to a case cited in Wood, State v. Shields, 391 S.W.2d 909 (Mo.1965). In Shields, defendant was charged with robbery first degree. After his arrest he made three statements to a police officer which constituted an admission. The Supreme Court said, “[t]his court has said that if counsel for the state in fact, either directly or indirectly, refers to the defendant’s failure to testify he is entitled to a new trial.” Id. at 912. It held that an argument regarding defendant’s statements to the police officer was, in essence, an argument of the evidence before the jury in a ease where the court concluded the matter of reference was preserved error. In fact, the argument was the jury could consider the credibility instruction in appraising the degree of culpability admitted by defendant’s statements which were in evidence as admissions. The facts and the issue in Shields are not decisive to the present contention that the argument indirectly, but certainly, referred to the testimony which the jury did not hear because the defendant did not testify.
The majority opinion also relies on State v. Wood, 719 S.W.2d 756 (Mo. banc 1986). The charge in Wood was similar to the charge in the present case, sodomy. The prosecutor in opening statement and closing argument argued in “effect that only the victim and defendant were present at the scene of the offense and that the victim was going to tell the truth.” Id. at 759. The claim of error was not preserved by timely objection or in the motion for new trial. The Supreme Court did not hold that the issue was not reviewable as a matter of plain error. Rather, it reviewed for plain error and found “here the brief remark was a curt statement meshed as a part of protracted discussions in opening statement concerning the fact that a number of witnesses would be called and various persons would testify as to several aspects of the case. A similar remark in the prosecutor’s argument to the jury makes *143clear that the objectionable remarks, if indeed they were objectionable, do not rise to the level of manifest injustice requiring reversal under the plain error doctrine.” The court analyzed defendant’s closing argument. Defense counsel opened the door by arguing defendant “has told the court he wouldn’t do it” and the victim “in this case is completely uncorroborated. There wasn’t anybody that got on that witness stand and verified anything that she said. Now the Prosecutor said there are only two people there.” The court noted the objecttonal argument of the prosecutor was in rebuttal to defendant’s attack on the character of the prosecuting witness. The court found the prosecutor’s indirect reference was not improper because in rebuttal there was no “calculated intent” to magnify defendant’s decision not to testify. In the present case the statements were not made in rebuttal and, unfortunately, were not “curt statements meshed as a part” of other not objectionable matters. Here, the repeated references served only as certain, indirect references to defendant’s failure to testify and deny the accusations.
Both Wood and Shields leave open the availability of plain error review for a certain, indirect reference to defendant’s failure to testify.
The majority opinion also relies on State v. Clark, 913 S.W.2d 399 (Mo.App. W.D.1996), an opinion of the Western District of this court. In Clark, defendant made the original reference to the subject. He referred to his statement before the jury in the form of a television recording as “testimony.” In rebuttal, after defendant’s right was waived, the prosecutor referred to the same “evidence.” Clark was rightly decided. But the argument and the circumstances in Clark are not authoritative for excusing the argument in the present case.
We have recognized both direct and indirect references are forbidden, State v. Horne, 691 S.W.2d 402, 405 (Mo.App.1985) [application for transfer denied] and that such arguments which “infringe upon defendant’s right against self incrimination” are reviewable as matters of plain error. Id. Indirect, uncertain references are not matters of plain error. We have approved an argument that the state’s evidence is “uncontradicted” only where there are witnesses, other than defendant and not unfavorable to defendant, who could have been, but were not called as witnesses. State v. Brittain, 895 S.W.2d 295 (Mo.App.1995). The key issue is whether the indirect reference is certain or uncertain. The result in Brittain would be just the opposite if the only available witness .to give contradictory testimony was the defendant. Certainty or uncertainty depends on knowledge of the jury, derived from the facts in evidence, that available, uncalled witnesses other than defendant could have rebutted or contradicted state’s witnesses.
This dissent is based only on the self-incrimination issue. If the argument was an “uncertain” reference then the majority opinion would be a unanimous opinion. But, the indirect references were not uncertain; they had only one reasonable meaning. The argument connected two persons with knowledge and one as the only testifying witness. This was not an argument that “the witness told you she was alone with defendant when he committed the charged acts.” That would have been entirely proper as an argument based on the evidence. That was not the argument.
In Clark, the court decided the argument was not objectionable. Because it was not objectionable, the failure to object could not be found ineffective assistance of counsel. Here, the argument was a matter of plain error and was subject to a timely objection which counsel failed to make. The Rule 29.15 issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in a case where the objection would have had merit, as opposed to Clark where it did not have merit, should be the subject of an evi-dentiary hearing.
Courts are charged with the duty of protecting a constitutional right protected by two constitutions, statute, and rule. The unnecessary argument in the present case reinforced credibility of the prosecuting witness and infringed on defendant’s right against self-incrimination. Prosecution and conviction of the guilty is a necessary function of government to protect the public. But an argument which violates the four protections of a right serves to deny due process and *144undermines confidence in the conviction. An argument which actually infringes on a right by reference to a prohibited subject and is not based on the evidence, particularly when it was unnecessary, denies due process and fair trial.
I am forced to dissent on both the direct appeal and the Rule 29.15 appeal.