Court Opinion

ID: 9957781
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-05 14:07:39.229517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:40.127080
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 29, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                          TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals

                             NO. 2023-CA-0583-MR

WILLIAM TRAVIS BOSTON                                               APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
v.             HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER COHRON, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 21-CI-00714

COMMONWEALTH HEALTH
CORPORATION, INC.; AND
BOWLING GREEN-WARREN
COUNTY COMMUNITY HOSPITAL
CORPORATION D/B/A THE MEDICAL
CENTER AT BOWLING GREEN                                              APPELLEES

                                OPINION
                        REVERSING AND REMANDING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, CETRULO, AND JONES, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: William Travis Boston (“Boston”) appeals the May 11,

2023 order of the Warren Circuit Court dismissing, on subject matter jurisdiction

grounds, the premises liability negligence claims he filed against the above-
captioned appellees (hereinafter “Appellees”). Upon review, we reverse and

remand.

                                 BACKGROUND

             On June 7, 2021, Boston filed suit in Warren Circuit Court alleging

Appellees owned, occupied, and maintained a hospital located at 250 Park Street in

Bowling Green, Kentucky; that Appellees therefore owed a duty to regularly

inspect the property for defects and hazards and to correct same; and that

Appellees’ negligent breach of their duties caused him to sustain injuries. As

further detailed in his complaint:

             4. . . . [T]he [Appellees] caused or allowed to exist a
             defective and dangerous condition at the entrance to the
             hospital, in the form of an uneven surface due to a
             dislodged cobblestone; failed to regularly and properly
             inspect the property for such hazards; and failed to warn
             persons lawfully on or about the premises of the hazard
             they knew, or with due diligence should have known, to
             exist.

             5. On June 10, 2020, the Plaintiff, William Travis
             Boston, parked his vehicle in the front of the hospital in
             order to walk through the front entrance when he tripped
             on a raised piece of cobblestone, causing Plaintiff to
             strike the ground and suffer grievous bodily injury.

             6. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence and
             carelessness of the [Appellees], the Plaintiff, William
             Travis Boston, has been caused to incur medical
             expenses, will be caused to incur medical expenses in the
             future, has incurred lost wages, is permanently and
             severely injured, has had his ability to labor and earn
             money in the future permanently impaired, has endured

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             great pain and suffering of body and mind, and will
             endure great pain and suffering of body and mind in the
             future.

             To be sure, Boston received care and treatment at Appellees’ hospital

shortly after sustaining his injuries on June 10, 2020. From the face of his

complaint, however, he only took issue with the injury he sustained from his fall

on Appellees’ premises – not with the care and treatment he received for his injury.

Notwithstanding, Appellees moved to dismiss his suit based on Kentucky Revised

Statute (“KRS”) 411.167, titled: “Certificate of merit for medical malpractice

actions.” (Emphasis added.) In sum, Appellees contended Boston was required to

file either the indicated “certificate of merit” (or a declaration or affidavit averring

that no such certificate was required) contemporaneously with his complaint; and

that Boston’s failure to do so had deprived the circuit court of subject matter

jurisdiction and thus warranted dismissal without prejudice pursuant to Kentucky

Rule of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 12.02(a).

             Upon consideration, the circuit court agreed and granted Appellees’

motion. This appeal followed.

                             STANDARD OF REVIEW

             Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a case is a

question of law, and therefore our review is de novo. Floyd County Bd. of Educ. v.

Ratliff, 955 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1997). Statutory interpretation, the primary focus of

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this appeal, is likewise an issue of law subject to de novo review. See KL & JL

Invs., Inc. v. Lynch, 472 S.W.3d 540 (Ky. App. 2015); Cinelli v. Ward, 997 S.W.2d

474 (Ky. App. 1998).

                                    ANALYSIS

             Boston argues the circuit court erroneously determined KRS 411.167

deprived it of subject matter jurisdiction to resolve his premises liability negligence

claims. We agree. Our analysis begins with the substance of the statute itself,

which provides:

             (1) A claimant commencing any action identified in KRS
             413.140(1)(e), or against a long-term-care facility as
             defined in KRS 216.510 alleging that the long-term-care
             facility failed to provide proper care to one (1) or more
             residents of the facility, shall file a certificate of merit
             with the complaint in the court in which the action is
             commenced.

             (2) “Certificate of merit” means an affidavit or
             declaration that:

                    (a) The claimant has reviewed the facts of
                    the case and has consulted with at least one
                    (1) expert qualified pursuant to the
                    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure and the
                    Kentucky Rules of Evidence who is
                    qualified to give expert testimony as to the
                    standard of care or negligence and who the
                    claimant or his or her counsel reasonably
                    believes is knowledgeable in the relevant
                    issues involved in the particular action, and
                    has concluded on the basis of review and
                    consultation that there is reasonable basis to
                    commence the action;

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      (b) The claimant was unable to obtain the
      consultation required by paragraph (a) of
      this subsection because a limitation of time
      established by KRS Chapter 413 would bar
      the action and that the consultation could not
      reasonably be obtained before that time
      expired. An affidavit or declaration
      executed pursuant to this paragraph shall be
      supplemented by an affidavit or declaration
      pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection
      or paragraph (c) of this subsection within
      sixty (60) days after service of the complaint
      or the suit shall be dismissed unless the
      court grants an extension for good cause; or

      (c) The claimant was unable to obtain the
      consultation required by paragraph (a) of
      this subsection because the claimant or his
      or her counsel had made at least three (3)
      separate good-faith attempts with three (3)
      different experts to obtain a consultation and
      that none of those contacted would agree to
      a consultation; so long as none of those
      contacted gave an opinion that there was no
      reasonable basis to commence the action.

(3) A single certificate of merit is required for an action
even if more than one (1) defendant has been named in
the complaint or is subsequently named.

(4) A certificate of merit is not required where the
claimant intends to rely solely on one (1) or more causes
of action for which expert testimony is not required,
including claims of res ipsa loquitur and lack of informed
consent, in which case the complaint shall be
accompanied by an affidavit or declaration that no cause
of action is asserted for which expert testimony is
required.

                             -5-
(5) If a request by the claimant for the records of the
claimant’s medical treatment by the defendants has been
made and the records have not been produced, the
claimant shall not be required to file a certificate of merit
under this section until ninety (90) days after the records
have been produced. For purposes of this section,
“records” includes but is not limited to paper or
electronic copies of dictations, video recordings, fetal
heart monitor strips, and imaging studies.

(6) The identity and statements of an expert relied upon
in subsection (2) of this section above are not
discoverable, except:

      (a) When a claim is made under subsection
      (2)(c) of this section that the claimant was
      unable to obtain the required consultation
      with an expert, the court, upon the request of
      a defendant made prior to compliance by the
      claimant with this section, may require the
      claimant to divulge to the court, in camera
      and without disclosure by the court to any
      other party, the names of the physicians
      refusing to consult; or

      (b) If any party to an action hereto prevails
      on the basis of the failure of an opposing
      party to offer any competent expert
      testimony, the court may, upon motion, for
      good cause shown compel the opposing
      party or party’s counsel to provide to the
      court the name of any expert consulted and
      any written materials relied upon in
      executing the certificate.

(7) The claimant, in lieu of serving a certificate of merit,
may provide the defendant or defendants with expert
information in the form required by the Kentucky Rules
of Civil Procedure. Nothing in this section requires the

                             -6-
             disclosure of any “consulting” or nontrial expert, except
             as expressly stated in this section.

             In dismissing Boston’s premises liability claims against Appellees, the

circuit court relied entirely upon its understanding of KRS 411.167(1) –

specifically, the statement in that subsection that the “certificate of merit”

requirement applies to “any action identified in KRS 413.140(1)(e)[.]”

             In turn, KRS 413.140(1)(e) provides: “The following actions shall be

commenced within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued: . . . An action

against a physician, surgeon, dentist, or hospital licensed pursuant to KRS Chapter

216, for negligence or malpractice[.]” (Emphasis added.) Viewing these words in

conjunction, the circuit court reasoned that in any type of “negligence” action

against a person qualified as a physician, surgeon, or dentist, or against a hospital

licensed pursuant to KRS Chapter 216, a plaintiff must provide a certificate of

merit with the complaint (or the affidavit or declaration specified in KRS

411.167(4)) or suffer dismissal.

             Taken to its extreme, the circuit court’s reasoning stands for the

following proposition: If, by way of example, a plaintiff sustains injuries due to an

automobile accident caused by a physician’s negligent driving, or due to a

helicopter crash caused by a dentist’s negligent piloting, or due to the discharge of

a firearm negligently maintained by a surgeon, the plaintiff must, on pain of

dismissal, file a certificate of merit or the aforementioned affidavit or declaration

                                          -7-
when suing any of those individuals. Continuing in this vein, the circuit court

reasoned a certificate of merit, or the affidavit or declaration was required where,

as here, Boston was allegedly injured in a “slip and fall” stemming from a

hospital’s negligent maintenance of its premises; and that because Boston failed to

file one, dismissal was warranted.

             With that said, a court’s interpretation of a statute must not be guided

by a single sentence or word (here, the open-ended word “negligence”

incorporated by reference from an entirely different statute) but must look to the

provisions of the whole statute in question. Democratic Party of Kentucky v.

Graham, 976 S.W.2d 423 (Ky. 1998). And, taken in that context, the circuit

court’s interpretation of KRS 411.167 gives rise to inconsistencies. For example,

the circuit court came to believe the certificate of merit requirement set forth in

KRS 411.167(1) applied to any negligence action against a physician, surgeon, or

dentist, or against a hospital licensed pursuant to KRS Chapter 216. Yet, the same

provision clearly specifies that with respect to “a long-term-care facility as defined

in KRS 216.510,” that requirement only applies to actions “alleging that the long-

term-care facility failed to provide proper care to one (1) or more residents of the

facility[.]” (Emphasis added.) The circuit court offered no rationale for what it

apparently perceived as the statute’s disparate treatment of these classes of

potential defendants.

                                          -8-
             The circuit court’s interpretation is also at odds with KRS 411.167(5),

which provides in relevant part:

             If a request by the claimant for the records of the
             claimant’s medical treatment by the defendants has been
             made and the records have not been produced, the
             claimant shall not be required to file a certificate of merit
             under this section until ninety (90) days after the records
             have been produced.

(Emphasis added.) Under a plain reading of this provision, if the claimant never

received care or medical treatment from the defendants, the claimant is never

required to file a certificate of merit; nor could a claimant be expected to file an

affidavit or declaration to explain why the care or medical treatment the defendants

never rendered required no certificate of merit. Logically, the same would hold

true if “the claimant’s medical treatment by the defendants” was not even at issue

in the claimant’s suit. A different interpretation would lead to absurdity.

             However, it is the title of this legislation that is most dispositive. To

be clear, the title of KRS 411.167 (i.e., “Certificate of merit for medical

malpractice actions”) plays no role in the legal interpretation of the statute. See

KRS 446.140. But the title of the Act from which that statute derived certainly

does. See Wheeler & Clevenger Oil Co., Inc. v. Washburn, 127 S.W.3d 609, 613

(Ky. 2004); Meyers v. Walter, 253 S.W.2d 595, 597 (Ky. 1952) (“This construction

is further supported by the title of the Act[.]”); Fayette County Fiscal Court v.

Fayette County, 314 Ky. 595, 236 S.W.2d 455 (1950); Ingram’s Adm’r v. Advance

                                          -9-
Motor Co., 283 Ky. 87, 140 S.W.2d 840, 841 (1940) (“We have held frequently

that in the construction of an Act its title is to be read in connection with it.”);

Logsdon v. Howard, 280 Ky. 342, 133 S.W.2d 60, 62 (1939) (“The meticulous

care with which the legislature circumscribed its title to the 1938 act not only

sustains the interpretation we have made of the described situation, but it even goes

so far as to not admit of any other interpretation.”). Additionally, Kentucky’s

Constitution requires that “[n]o law enacted by the General Assembly shall relate

to more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title[.]” KY. CONST. §

51.

             Here, the title of the Act from which KRS 411.167 derived (i.e., 2019

Ky. Acts ch. 180, § 1 (HB 429) (eff. Mar. 27, 2019)), is “AN ACT relating to

medical malpractice.” And medical malpractice – as our Supreme Court held well

before the enactment of this Act – is a subject markedly different from premises

liability negligence. See, e.g., Caniff v. CSX Transp., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 368, 373

(Ky. 2014), explaining:

             [P]ursuant to Kentucky law, in most medical malpractice
             cases, a plaintiff is required to put forth expert medical
             testimony to establish the applicable standard of care, any
             breach that occurred and any resulting injury to the
             plaintiff. The case at bar is not a medical malpractice
             case, or any other type of professional negligence case.
             At its root, this case is a normal “slip and fall” case.

(Internal quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted.)

                                          -10-
             “When in enacting laws the Legislature is presumed to take

cognizance of the Constitution, previously enacted statutes and the common law.”

Young v. Grauman, 278 Ky. 197, 128 S.W.2d 549, 550 (1939). Moreover, “if a

statute is reasonably susceptible to two constructions, one of which renders it

unconstitutional, the court must adopt the construction which sustains the

constitutionality of the statute.” Davidson v. American Freightways, Inc., 25

S.W.3d 94, 96 (Ky. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). With

those principles in mind, it is not reasonable to presume the Legislature intended,

when enacting HB 429, for that law to apply to two subjects, one of which –

premises liability claims – falls well outside the Act’s stated title of “AN ACT

relating to medical malpractice.” Considering what is set forth above, KRS

411.167 only applies to “negligence” actions that could be considered a species of

medical malpractice. A normal slip and fall case, such as the one at bar, does not

qualify as such and is thus not subject to KRS 411.167.

             Notwithstanding, Appellees argue the circuit court’s interpretation of

KRS 411.167 is consistent with binding precedent from this Court. In that regard,

they rely on Evans v. Baptist Health Madisonville, 643 S.W.3d 105 (Ky. App.

2022). The plaintiff in that matter, Evans, alleged:

             [S]he visited the hospital on December 27, 2019. She
             alleged that she sought medical treatment in the
             hospital’s emergency room because she was experiencing
             seizures and that she continued to experience symptoms

                                        -11-
              while in the emergency room. Evans explained that she
              was accompanied to the emergency room by her husband
              and was seated in a wheel-chair so she would not fall.
              Evans alleged that when she asked to visit the restroom,
              hospital staff ordered her to walk there. She alleged that
              as she walked to the restroom, she suffered a seizure, fell
              to the floor, and suffered severe injury. She alleged that
              hospital staff “knew or with any training whatsoever
              would have known [Evans] should not have been
              required to self-ambulate given the symptoms she
              presented.” She alleged that the negligence of hospital
              staff was a substantial factor in causing her injuries.

Id. at 106.

              Ultimately, the trial court dismissed Evans’ negligence suit against the

hospital based on CR 12.02 and this Court affirmed, explaining in relevant part:

              Evans intended to base her cause of action against the
              hospital upon the alleged professional negligence of the
              health care providers involved in her care. Evans alleged
              that despite her symptoms, hospital staff negligently
              instructed her to walk to the restroom, ignoring her
              protests. Evans charged that hospital staff “knew or with
              any training whatsoever would have known [Evans]
              should not have been required to self-ambulate given the
              symptoms she presented.”

                      A review of our opinion in Chamis v. Ashland
              Hospital Corporation, 532 S.W.3d 652 (Ky. App. 2017),
              is instructive. In Chamis, we considered whether expert
              testimony was needed to establish a hospital’s standard
              of care, its breach of the standard of care, and the
              resulting injury where the plaintiff alleged that hospital
              staff negligently allowed her decedent to fall from a bed.
              In our analysis, we accepted the hospital’s position that
              the matter was not a “slip and fall” case but rather a
              medical malpractice case due to the nature of the claims
              – negligence and failure to meet the standard of care. Id.

                                         -12-
              at 656. We agreed that expert testimony was required to
              establish the degree of care and skill expected and that
              the patient had fallen because hospital staff breached the
              standard of care. Id. at 657. In dicta, we noted that
              determining whether the patient should have ambulated
              only with the assistance of two persons was an exercise
              in professional judgment. Id. Where the plaintiff alleged
              that staff members were negligent by failing to take
              reasonable steps to protect the patient, we specifically
              held that the matter was not an ordinary negligence case.
              Id.

                     Regardless of whether we conclude that Evans’s
              action against Baptist Health is one for ordinary
              negligence or one for malpractice, the circuit court did
              not err by concluding that the provisions of KRS 411.167
              applied. In an action against a hospital for negligence or
              malpractice, KRS 411.167(1) requires the filing of a
              certificate of merit. On the other hand, even if we were
              to conclude that Evans’s complaint stated a cause of
              action for ordinary negligence (for which expert
              testimony would not be required), the provisions of KRS
              411.167(4) would nonetheless still apply. KRS
              411.167(4) requires the complaint to be accompanied by
              an “affidavit or declaration that no cause of action is
              asserted for which expert testimony is required.” No
              such affidavit or declaration was filed in the trial court.

Id. at 108.

              Arguing that Evans is analogous to the case at bar, the Appellees seize

upon our use of the phrases, “slip and fall,” “ordinary negligence,” and

“professional negligence” set forth above, but they ignore the obvious point that

distinguishes these cases. In Evans, regardless of whether the hospital’s alleged

“negligence” could have been classified as “ordinary” or “professional,” the

                                         -13-
claimant’s “slip and fall” injury stemmed not from a hazard on the hospital’s

premises as here, but from the hospital’s care and treatment of the claimant: Evans

was allegedly injured due to the hospital staff’s exercise (or lack of exercise) of

either common-sense or professional judgment regarding her medical condition – a

quintessential example of medical malpractice or its subspecies, medical

negligence. Accordingly, Appellees’ attempt to analogize Evans to this case lacks

merit.

             As a final matter, Boston notes he filed a CR 11 motion for sanctions

against Appellees for what he regarded as Appellees’ frivolous motion to dismiss

his negligence claims based upon KRS 411.167; that the circuit court denied his

motion in light of how it disposed of this matter; and he asserts that “[a]ccordingly,

the Circuit Court should consider [his] motion for sanctions after final judgment.”

However, Boston’s two-sentence statement to this effect stops short of asking this

Court to review whether Appellees’ underlying arguments – which succeeded

below – should have been considered frivolous. To the extent Boston is arguing he

is entitled to reassert his CR 11 motion and that the circuit court is entitled to

revisit it, nothing in this Opinion should be construed as any prohibition in that

regard.

                                          -14-
                                CONCLUSION

            Considering the foregoing, we REVERSE the May 11, 2023 order of

the Warren Circuit Court dismissing Boston’s negligence claims against Appellees,

and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                   BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

Mat A. Slechter                         Aaron D. Smith
Louisville, Kentucky                    E. Kenly Ames
                                        Bowling Green, Kentucky

                                        Jonathan B. Blick
                                        Bowling Green, Kentucky

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