Court Opinion

ID: 9747515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:18:57.205122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:24.241315
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
1 must dissent from today’s majority decision which misinterprets the United States Supreme Court’s recent and controlling pronouncements in Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S. Ct. 1999 (1970).
*211Coleman reversed an Alabama murder conviction because of the lack of counsel at a defendant’s “preliminary hearing.” The Court found that proceeding to be a “critical stage” in the prosecution at which he was entitled to counsel as a matter of constitutional right. Under Alabama law, the accused was not required to plead or to advance any defenses at his preliminary hearing, and Alabama law prohibited the prosecution’s use of anything that occurred at the uncounseled hearing. The Court nevertheless discerned a substantial potential for prejudice flowing from the absence of counsel.
“First, the lawyer’s skilled examination and cross-examination of witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses in the State’s case, that may lead the magistrate to refuse to bind the accused over. Second, in any event, the skilled interrogation of witnesses by an experienced lawyer can fashion a vital impeachment tool for use in cross-examination of the State’s witnesses at the trial, or preserve testimony favorable to the accused of a witness who does not appear at the trial. Third, trained counsel can more effectively discover the case the State has against his client and make possible the preparation of a proper defense to meet that case at the trial. Fourth, counsel can also be influential at the preliminary hearing in making effective arguments for the accused on such matters as the necessity for an early psychiatric examination or bail.” 399 U.S. at 9, 90 S. Ct. at 2003.
In the present case appellant was taken without counsel before a judge of the Juvenile Division of the Municipal Court who certified the case over to the district attorney for prosecution. The nature and purpose of this proceeding is characterized by the majority as follows: "If, at the hearing in the juvenile court, a prima facie case of murder is made out against a juvenile, then the court must hold the accused for prosecu*212tion in the court of oyer and terminer, . . (emphasis added). There is no record available of appellant’s certification hearing. However, as he toas certified over for prosecution, we must assume that that hearing revealed a prima facie case of his guilt, i.e., that incriminating evidence of some sort was introduced against him. That necessarily being the case, all of the reasons enumerated in Colemam, concerning the constitutional requirement of counsel apply to the certification hearing involved here, and it follows that the absence of counsel at that hearing rendered it constitutionally deficient.
Indeed, the majority admits as much, citing Coleman and stating that “[a]s to the contention that due process was violated by the absence of counsel at the certification hearing, there is no doubt but that the United States Supreme Court recently ruled that the assistance of counsel at such a hearing is constitutionally mandated.” The majority holds, however, that Coleman is prospective only. I find this conclusion untenable. The Supreme Court has previously accorded retroactive treatment to the right of representation by counsel at trial, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792 (1963), on appeal, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S. Ct. 814 (1963), at sentencing, Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S. Ct. 254 (1967), and at preliminary proceedings in which the rights of an accused might be adversely affected, White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 83 S. Ct. 1050 (1963) ; Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S. Ct. 157 (1961). See, respectively, Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202, 84 S. Ct. 702 (1964); Smith v. Crouse, 378 U.S. 584, 84 S. Ct. 1929 (1964) ; McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2, 89 S. Ct. 32 (1968); Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5, 89 S. Ct. 35 (1968). The decision in Coleman was a direct extension of White v. Maryland, supra, and Hamilton v. Alabama, supra. Inasmuch as these two *213decisions were held retroactive, I fail to understand how the majority can suggest a different treatment for Coleman.
Accordingly, I would remand appellant’s case, as was done in Coleman, for a determination whether the unconstitutional certification hearing was harmless error. Chapman v. California, 388 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1987). However, as appellant’s conviction rests upon his plea of guilty, the only question to be determined upon remand would be whether the invalid hearing rendered his guilty plea either unintelligent or involuntary.