Court Opinion

ID: 9963789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 12:02:54.235386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:59.963513
License: Public Domain

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                                     M&T Bank v. Lewis

                      M&T BANK v. ROBERT R. LEWIS
                              (SC 20817)
                      Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,
                            Ecker, Alexander and Dannehy, Js.

                                           Syllabus

         The plaintiff bank sought to foreclose on a mortgage on certain real property
            owned by the defendant after he defaulted on a promissory note secured
            by the mortgage. The mortgage agreement included a provision authoriz-
            ing the plaintiff to purchase force placed insurance coverage for the
            property if the defendant failed to maintain adequate coverage. The
            defendant filed an answer and a counterclaim, and asserted various
            special defenses, including unclean hands and breach of the implied
            covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which were predicated on allega-
            tions relating to the plaintiff’s purchase of force placed flood insurance
            from A Co., an insurance provider. The defendant did not challenge the
            plaintiff’s right to purchase the force placed insurance but alleged that
            the plaintiff was involved in an undisclosed kickback scheme with A
            Co., pursuant to which the plaintiff used A Co. as its exclusive force
            placed insurance provider, and, in exchange, A Co. provided the plaintiff
            with certain rebates, including free or below cost mortgage services.
            The defendant claimed that, instead of passing those rebates on to him,
            the plaintiff charged him more than the cost of purchasing the force
            placed coverage, contrary to both the provisions of the mortgage agree-
            ment and certain representations the plaintiff had made to him. The
            defendant’s answer also included numerous allegations concerning the
            plaintiff’s nationwide kickback scheme with A Co. and its impact on
            borrowers generally. The plaintiff filed a motion to strike the special
            defenses and the counterclaim, which the trial court granted in part. In
            connection with its decision to strike the special defenses of unclean
            hands and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
            the trial court reasoned that the allegations concerning the kickback
            scheme were broad and related to borrowers generally instead of to
            the defendant specifically, and, therefore, the allegations did not arise
            from the making, validity, or enforcement of the specific mortgage at
            issue. The trial court subsequently granted the plaintiff’s motion for
            summary judgment as to liability and rendered judgment of foreclosure
            by sale, from which the defendant appealed. Thereafter, the plaintiff
            moved to dismiss the appeal, claiming that the regulatory approval of the
            premium rate for the flood insurance at issue rendered the defendant’s
            special defenses moot under the federal filed rate doctrine, pursuant to
            which any rate that is approved by the governing regulatory agency is
            per se reasonable and unassailable in judicial proceedings brought by
            ratepayers. Held:
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                                    M&T Bank v. Lewis
       1. The filed rate doctrine, as applied by the federal courts, did not implicate
           this court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and, accordingly, this court
           denied the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the appeal:

          Although one of the rationales for the filed rate doctrine, namely, that
          courts should not undermine agency rate-making authority by upsetting
          approved insurance rates, is connected to the principle of nonjusticiabil-
          ity, the fact that that term sounds jurisdictional did not necessarily
          render the filed rate doctrine a jurisdictional one, and the nonjusticiability
          rationale simply reflects the deference owed to agency expertise and
          the reluctance of courts to second-guess such determinations.

          Moreover, nothing inherent in the nonjusticiability rationale for the filed
          rate doctrine implicates the principles underlying the mootness doctrine,
          there was no support in the case law for the proposition that the applica-
          tion of the filed rate doctrine renders an action moot, and this court
          agreed with the majority of federal courts that have concluded that the
          filed rate doctrine does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction but,
          rather, constitutes a defense on the merits that relates to whether a
          party has failed to state a legally cognizable claim.

          To the extent that the plaintiff argued that the present appeal had been
          rendered moot because the defendant could not prevail as a matter of
          law in light of certain federal court judgments dismissing actions brought
          by the defendant against the plaintiff and A Co., among other parties,
          on the basis of the filed rate doctrine, that argument related to the merits
          of the present appeal and not to this court’s jurisdiction, and this court’s
          acceptance of the plaintiff’s argument would invite parties to interject
          mootness claims whenever there is a basis to challenge the legal suffi-
          ciency of a claim or defense.

          In view of its determination that the filed rate doctrine does not implicate
          subject matter jurisdiction, this court did not need to determine whether
          to adopt that doctrine as a matter of state law.

       2. The trial court improperly struck the defendant’s special defenses of
           unclean hands and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
           fair dealing, and, accordingly, this court reversed the trial court’s judg-
           ment and remanded the case for further proceedings:

          To survive a motion to strike, a special defense to a foreclosure action
          must relate to the making, validity or enforcement of the note or the
          mortgage and otherwise be legally sufficient.

          Contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, the defendant’s answer included
          allegations that related to his specific mortgage, and the broader allega-
          tions therein relating to the plaintiff’s global conduct and borrowers
          generally were necessary to provide context for the allegations that were
          specific to the defendant’s mortgage.
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                                       M&T Bank v. Lewis
             Specifically, the defendant alleged that, pursuant to the mortgage agree-
             ment, the plaintiff purchased from A Co. force placed insurance for his
             property, the plaintiff failed to disclose that it had a financial arrangement
             with A Co. in exchange for an exclusive relationship, the plaintiff repre-
             sented to the defendant that it would charge him only for the cost of
             the insurance but did not pass on to the defendant the rebates it received
             from A Co., resulting in the defendant being charged more than the
             cost of the force placed insurance, the plaintiff’s representations to the
             defendant were false and made to induce him to act to his detriment,
             which he did, and the plaintiff’s false representations undermined the
             validity of the mortgage.

             Moreover, those allegations were sufficiently related to the making, valid-
             ity or enforcement of the mortgage, insofar as the plaintiff’s alleged
             conduct involving the alleged kickback scheme was directly related to
             its enforcement of the provision of the mortgage agreement authorizing
             the plaintiff to purchase force placed insurance, and the alleged effect
             of the plaintiff’s conduct in enforcing that provision, that it wrongfully
             increased the defendant’s overall debt, provided a sufficient nexus to
             the foreclosure action.

             Furthermore, this court has defined the term ‘‘enforcement’’ to encom-
             pass a mortgagee’s conduct during postdefault loan modification negotia-
             tions if the alleged misconduct substantially increases the overall debt
             or impedes a mortgagor from curing the default, and, construing the
             allegations in the present case in the manner most favorable to sustaining
             their legal sufficiency, this court concluded that the defendant sufficiently
             alleged that the plaintiff’s misconduct in carrying out the kickback
             scheme increased the defendant’s overall debt beyond that which was
             necessary to protect the plaintiff’s interest in the property.

             In addition, the defendant’s answer also alleged that the plaintiff’s con-
             duct related to the validity of the mortgage, as it could be inferred from
             the defendant’s answer that he was claiming that, because the plaintiff
             entered into the mortgage agreement with the kickback scheme in place
             and made certain representations to the defendant that he would be
             charged only for the cost of the force placed insurance, the mortgage
             agreement was invalid.

             There was no merit to the plaintiff’s claim that the defendant’s breach
             of the underlying loan contract barred him from relying on the unclean
             hands doctrine, as a mortgagor who has defaulted on a mortgage is not
             precluded from asserting the special defense of unclean hands, and the
             defendant sufficiently alleged that the plaintiff had engaged in wilful
             conduct that was not equitable, fair or honest.

             The special defense of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
             fair dealing was otherwise legally sufficient, insofar as the defendant
             properly pleaded that the plaintiff’s alleged misrepresentations and kick-
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                                 M&T Bank v. Lewis
         back scheme caused him to pay more than he was obligated to pay and
         more than the plaintiff was entitled to charge, thus interfering with his
         right to receive the benefits of the mortgage agreement by increasing
         his overall debt.

            Argued November 14, 2023—officially released April 30, 2024

                                 Procedural History

         Action to foreclose a mortgage on certain of the
       defendant’s real property, and for other relief, brought
       to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New
       Haven, where the defendant filed an answer, special
       defenses and a counterclaim; thereafter, the court, Hon.
       Anthony V. Avallone, judge trial referee, granted in part
       the plaintiff’s motion to strike the defendant’s special
       defenses and counterclaim; subsequently, the court,
       Cirello, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary
       judgment as to liability only; thereafter, the court,
       Spader, J., rendered judgment of foreclosure by sale,
       and the defendant appealed. Reversed; further pro-
       ceedings.
         Alex Emmons and Kyle Ranieri, law student interns,
       with whom were Jeffrey Gentes and, on the brief, Anika
       Singh Lemar, and Callan Bruzzone, Leah Kazar, Mir-
       iam Pierson, Natasha Reifenberg and Zachary Shelley,
       law student interns, for the appellant (defendant).
         Geoffrey K. Milne, for the appellee (plaintiff).

                                       Opinion

          ROBINSON, C. J. This foreclosure appeal presents
       two questions, namely, (1) whether the administrative
       law filed rate doctrine implicates the trial court’s sub-
       ject matter jurisdiction, and (2) whether allegations of
       impropriety in a mortgagee’s force placement of prop-
       erty insurance arise from the making, validity or enforce-
       ment of the mortgage for purposes of a special defense
       to a foreclosure action. The defendant, Robert R. Lewis,
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                                    M&T Bank v. Lewis

         appeals from the judgment of foreclosure by sale in
                   1

         favor of the plaintiff, M&T Bank. The defendant claims
         that the trial court improperly granted the plaintiff’s
         motion to strike two of the defendant’s special defenses
         arising from the plaintiff’s conduct in its force place-
         ment of flood insurance on the property at issue, alleg-
         ing that the plaintiff has unclean hands and breached
         the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing on
         the ground that those defenses do not arise from the
         making, validity or enforcement of the mortgage. The
         plaintiff contends to the contrary, and also argues that
         the regulatory approval of the premium rate for the prop-
         erty insurance at issue renders the defendant’s special
         defenses moot under the filed rate doctrine. Having
         concluded that the filed rate doctrine does not implicate
         the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, we agree with the
         defendant’s claims with respect to his special defenses.
         Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.
            The record reveals the following undisputed relevant
         facts and procedural background. On July 26, 2010, the
         defendant executed a promissory note to Hudson City
         Savings Bank (Hudson) in exchange for a loan in the
         original principal amount of $384,000. The note was
         secured by a mortgage on the defendant’s real property
         in Branford. Hudson subsequently merged with and into
         the plaintiff, which then became the holder of the note.
         Prior to the defendant’s default, when he failed to pay
         his property taxes, the plaintiff paid them in full and
         thereafter increased the defendant’s monthly payment
         from $3011 to $9640. After the defendant failed to make
         his monthly payment on August 1, 2017, the plaintiff
         notified him in writing of his default. The plaintiff subse-
         quently elected to accelerate the note and foreclose on
         the mortgage. The parties participated in the state’s
           1
             The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to the
         Appellate Court, and this court transferred the appeal to itself pursuant to
         General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
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                                   M&T Bank v. Lewis

       court-supervised foreclosure mediation program but
       were unable to reach an agreement to modify the loan.
       See General Statutes §§ 49-31k through 49-31o.
          The defendant filed an answer to the complaint, a two
       count counterclaim, and five special defenses, namely,
       fraud, breach of the implied covenant of good faith
       and fair dealing, unconscionability, unclean hands, and
       equitable estoppel. With the exception of the special
       defense of equitable estoppel, the defenses were predi-
       cated on allegations relating to the plaintiff’s purchase,
       pursuant to the mortgage agreement, of force placed
       insurance coverage2 after the defendant allowed the
       flood insurance policy on the property to lapse some-
       time in 2017. The defendant conceded that the plaintiff
       was entitled, pursuant to the mortgage agreement, to
       purchase force placed flood insurance for the property.
       In his special defenses, however, the defendant alleged
       that, in the course of exercising its right under the
       mortgage agreement to purchase force placed insur-
       ance, the plaintiff charged him more than the ‘‘cost’’ of
       that insurance. Specifically, the defendant alleged that
       the plaintiff has an exclusive arrangement with Assur-
       ant, Inc. (Assurant), of which the provider in the present
       case, American Security Insurance Company (ASIC), is
       an indirect subsidiary. In exchange for the right to be the
       sole provider of the plaintiff’s force placed insurance
       coverage, ASIC allegedly provides what the defendant
       characterizes as ‘‘kickbacks’’ to the plaintiff. The defen-
       dant alleged that these kickbacks included free or below
       cost mortgage services, reimbursement for incurred
       expenses, and the payment of reinsurance premiums.
       These various practices, the defendant claimed,
       amounted to ‘‘rebate[s]’’ received by the plaintiff from
         2
           ‘‘An insurance policy purchased by a lender upon the lapse of a borrow-
       er’s insurance policy is called a [force placed] insurance policy.’’ (Internal
       quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 994 F. Supp.
       2d 542, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
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         ASIC with respect to the price of the insurance. The
         plaintiff does not deduct the value of these alleged
         kickbacks from the amount it charges borrowers and,
         instead, charges them the ‘‘pre-rebate’’ amount for the
         force placed insurance coverage. The defendant alleged
         that, through this practice, the plaintiff charged the
         defendant more than the ‘‘cost’’ of the force placed
         insurance coverage, contrary to both the provisions of
         the mortgage agreement and the plaintiff’s representa-
         tions—in letters notifying the defendant of its intent to
         force place insurance coverage if the defendant failed
         to cure the lapse in coverage—that it would charge him
         only for the cost of force placed insurance.
            With respect to the defendant’s special defense of
         equitable estoppel, in addition to relying on the allega-
         tions regarding force placed insurance, the defendant
         also alleged that, prior to defaulting on the note, he
         contacted the plaintiff seeking to discuss a modification
         of the agreement that would extend the term of the
         loan at the same interest rate. The plaintiff informed
         the defendant that it could not discuss a modification
         of the loan unless the mortgage was in default. The
         defendant further alleged that, in reliance on that repre-
         sentation by the plaintiff, he defaulted and began to
         seek a modification of the loan. The defendant also
         conceded, however, that he had defaulted because he
         was unable to make his monthly payment of $9640. The
         defendant contended that the plaintiff’s representation
         to him that it could not discuss a modification prior to
         default was false, that the plaintiff reasonably would
         have expected the defendant to rely on that alleged
         misrepresentation, and that he did so to his detriment.
           The trial court, Hon. Anthony V. Avallone, judge trial
         referee, granted the plaintiff’s motion to strike all but
         the special defense of equitable estoppel, insofar as that
         defense rested on allegations that the plaintiff had made
         misrepresentations regarding a modification to the defen-
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                                   M&T Bank v. Lewis

       dant’s mortgage agreement. In granting the motion to strike
       as to the remaining defenses and the counterclaim, the
       court focused on the paragraphs in the defendant’s answer
       alleging that the plaintiff’s ‘‘kickback’’ scheme was a
       broad one, targeting ‘‘borrowers,’’ not merely the defen-
       dant. The court reasoned that these broad allegations,
       relating to what it termed the plaintiff’s ‘‘global pur-
       chase of insurance,’’ had ‘‘little or nothing to do with this
       specific case of the defendant’s own failure to maintain
       insurance.’’ Therefore, the court concluded, the defen-
       dant’s allegations did ‘‘not arise from the making, valid-
       ity or enforcement of the specific mortgage at issue in
       this case.’’ (Emphasis added.) The court’s memorandum
       of decision did not discuss the defendant’s more spe-
       cific allegations, namely, that the plaintiff had received
       ‘‘kickbacks’’ from ASIC in connection with the force
       placed insurance coverage provided for the defen-
       dant’s property.
         The trial court, Cirello, J., subsequently granted the
       plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability
       only.3 Following the trial court’s denial of the defen-
       dant’s motion to reargue and reconsider its decision
         3
           In granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court
       rejected the defendant’s special defense of equitable estoppel, concluding
       that he had failed to present any evidence that there existed a genuine issue
       of material fact regarding whether the plaintiff made a false representation
       when it informed him that it could not discuss a loan modification unless
       he was in default. In rejecting the defendant’s contention that the plaintiff
       had made a misrepresentation to him, the court reasoned that the plaintiff
       did not promise the defendant a loan modification if he defaulted. Instead,
       the court found that the plaintiff had informed the defendant that it would
       discuss a loan modification only in the event of a default. The court observed
       that the foreclosure mediation reports indicated that the plaintiff had negoti-
       ated with the defendant in good faith. Finally, relying on the defendant’s
       concession that he was unable to pay the monthly payments, the court
       concluded that the defendant failed to present sufficient evidence that he
       had changed his position or otherwise acted to his detriment in a manner
       that he would not have done but for the plaintiff’s statement. The defendant
       defaulted, the trial court concluded, because he was unable to make the
       payments, not because he relied on the plaintiff’s statement.
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                                     M&T Bank v. Lewis

         granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment,
         the court, Spader, J., rendered a judgment of foreclo-
         sure by sale. This appeal followed.
                                               I
            As a preliminary matter, we address the plaintiff’s
         motion to dismiss this appeal as moot, which the plain-
         tiff filed shortly before oral argument in the present
         case. The plaintiff contends that federal court decisions
         that had dismissed two separate actions brought by
         the defendant—one against the plaintiff and ASIC; see
         Lewis v. M&T Bank, Docket No. 21-933, 2022 WL 775758
         (2d Cir. March 15, 2022); and a second against Assurant
         and ASIC; see Lewis v. Assurant, Inc., Docket No. 3:21-
         cv-01539 (VAB), 2022 WL 4599038 (D. Conn. September
         30, 2022) (second federal action)—render this appeal
         moot.4 Although both federal actions were dismissed
         pursuant to rule 12 (b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
         Procedure for failure to state a claim on which relief
         could be granted, the plaintiff contends that the theory
         pursuant to which those actions were dismissed, the
         filed rate doctrine, implicates our subject matter juris-
         diction. We disagree and conclude that the filed rate
         doctrine, as applied by the federal courts, does not
         affect our subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal.5
           The record reveals the following additional proce-
         dural background relevant to the plaintiff’s motion to
         dismiss this appeal. On April 24, 2020, while the present
         case was pending before the trial court, the defendant
           4
              We note that the plaintiff requested that this court take judicial notice
         of the federal decisions. We may consider the federal decisions without the
         need to rely on the doctrine of judicial notice. It is axiomatic that courts
         routinely consider authority from other jurisdictions without relying on
         judicial notice.
            5
              We observe that this court has not yet had occasion to determine whether
         to adopt the filed rate doctrine as a matter of state law. Because we conclude
         that the doctrine does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction, we do not
         reach the merits of its application in this appeal.
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                            M&T Bank v. Lewis

       filed a complaint against the plaintiff and various sub-
       sidiaries of Assurant, including ASIC, in the United
       States District Court for the District of Connecticut,
       alleging fraud and violations of the Racketeer Influ-
       enced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961
       et seq. See Lewis v. M&T Bank, Docket No. 3:20-CV-
       00552 (JCH), 2021 WL 1056827, *1, *3 (D. Conn. March
       19, 2021) (first federal action). As to the plaintiff only,
       the defendant also alleged in the first federal action
       breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
       dealing, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and a
       violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act,
       General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. Id. The defendant’s
       complaint was predicated on the same theory on which
       he relies in support of his special defenses in the present
       case—that the plaintiff received kickbacks from its
       insurance providers in exchange for using them exclu-
       sively for its force placed insurance coverage, and that
       it retained the kickbacks rather than passing them on
       to the defendant, as required by the mortgage agree-
       ment and subsequent notices provided to the defen-
       dant. Id.
          The plaintiff, as the defendant in the first federal
       action, moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to rule
       12 (b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.,
       *1. The plaintiff contended that the first federal action
       was barred by the ‘‘filed rate doctrine,’’ pursuant to
       which ‘‘any filed rate—that is, one approved by the
       governing regulatory agency—is per se reasonable and
       unassailable in judicial proceedings brought by ratepay-
       ers.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., *5. Finding
       that ASIC had the applicable, approved rates on file
       with the Connecticut Insurance Department when it
       issued the force placed insurance purchased by the
       plaintiff on the defendant’s behalf, the court agreed and
       granted the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the complaint.
       Id., *6–8. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the
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                                       M&T Bank v. Lewis

          judgment of the District Court. Lewis v. M&T Bank,
          supra, 2022 WL 775758, *3.
            In the second federal action the defendant subse-
          quently brought against Assurant and ASIC, he again
          relied on the alleged force placed insurance kickback
          scheme. Relying on the judgment in the first federal action,
          the District Court concluded that the doctrine of claim
          preclusion barred the second federal action.6 Lewis v.
          Assurant, Inc., supra, 2022 WL 4599038, *7–8, *10.
              Although the plaintiff raises its reliance on the federal
          actions and the filed rate doctrine for the first time on
          appeal, we nevertheless address this claim insofar as
          it is well established ‘‘that the question of subject matter
          jurisdiction, because it addresses the basic competency
          of the court, can be raised by any of the parties, or by
          the court sua sponte, at any time . . . .’’ (Emphasis
          added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Peters v.
          Dept. of Social Services, 273 Conn. 434, 441–42, 870 A.2d
          448 (2005). Therefore, because the plaintiff’s motion to
          dismiss alleges an issue of subject matter jurisdiction,
          before proceeding to the merits of the appeal, we first
          must resolve whether we have jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
            6
               At oral argument before this court, the plaintiff’s counsel also suggested
          that the federal judgments bar the special defenses in the present action
          pursuant to either the doctrine of collateral estoppel or res judicata. Although
          those doctrines, if applicable, would prevent the defendant from relitigating
          any barred claims, they do not implicate subject matter jurisdiction, as the
          plaintiff’s counsel conceded during oral argument. Unlike claims implicating
          subject matter jurisdiction, which may be raised at any time; see, e.g., Bank
          of New York Mellon v. Tope, 345 Conn. 662, 677 n.6, 286 A.3d 891 (2022); a
          claim that an action or claim is barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel
          must be raised in the trial court through appropriate pleadings. See, e.g.,
          Labbe v. Pension Commission, 229 Conn. 801, 816, 643 A.2d 1268 (1994)
          (‘‘[r]es judicata does not provide the basis for a judgment of dismissal; it
          is a special defense that is considered after any jurisdictional thresholds
          are passed’’); see also Practice Book § 10-50 (res judicata is special defense
          that ‘‘must be specially pleaded’’). Accordingly, we offer no opinion as to
          whether the defendant’s special defenses would be barred by a properly
          pleaded claim of either res judicata or collateral estoppel.
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                             M&T Bank v. Lewis

       Bank of New York Mellon v. Tope, 345 Conn. 662, 676–77
       and n.6, 286 A.3d 891 (2022) (addressing question of
       subject matter jurisdiction raised for first time on appeal).
          We begin with the principles underlying the mootness
       doctrine. ‘‘It is a [well settled] general rule that the exis-
       tence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to
       appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate
       courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the
       granting of actual relief or from the determination of
       which no practical relief can follow. . . . An actual
       controversy must exist not only at the time the appeal
       is taken, but also throughout the pendency of the
       appeal. . . . When, during the pendency of an appeal,
       events have occurred that preclude an appellate court
       from granting any practical relief through its disposition
       of the merits, a case has become moot.’’ (Internal quota-
       tion marks omitted.) Bornemann v. Connecticut Siting
       Council, 287 Conn. 177, 181–82, 947 A.2d 302 (2008).
         The plaintiff’s jurisdictional claim relies on the filed
       rate doctrine, under which ‘‘any filed rate—that is, one
       approved by the governing regulatory agency—is per
       se reasonable and unassailable in judicial proceedings
       brought by ratepayers. . . . The doctrine is grounded
       on two rationales: first, that courts should not [under-
       mine] agency rate-making authority by upsetting
       approved rates (the principle of nonjusticiability); and,
       second, that litigation should not become a means for
       certain ratepayers to obtain preferential rates (the prin-
       ciple of nondiscrimination).’’ (Citation omitted; internal
       quotation marks omitted.) Rothstein v. Balboa Ins. Co.,
       794 F.3d 256, 261 (2d Cir. 2015).
         Although the term ‘‘justiciability’’ is one that ordi-
       narily is associated with subject matter jurisdiction, the
       mere fact that the term ‘‘nonjusticiability,’’ as used in
       the filed rate doctrine case law, sounds jurisdictional
       does not necessarily render that doctrine a jurisdic-
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                               M&T Bank v. Lewis

          tional one. Some federal courts, in fact, have explained
          that the nonjusticiability rationale underlying the doc-
          trine simply reflects the deference owed to agency
          expertise and the reluctance of courts to second-guess
          such determinations. See, e.g., Haskins v. First Ameri-
          can Title Ins. Co., 866 F. Supp. 2d 343, 353 (D.N.J. 2012);
          In re Pennsylvania Title Ins. Antitrust Litigation, 648
          F. Supp. 2d 663, 683 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
            Second, nothing inherent in the nonjusticiability ratio-
          nale for the filed rate doctrine implicates the principles
          underlying the mootness doctrine. Our research has not
          uncovered any instances in which a court has concluded
          that the filed rate doctrine somehow renders an action
          moot. Mootness aside, we acknowledge that at least one
          federal court has concluded that, because the doctrine
          renders a filed rate unassailable as a matter of law, it
          has the jurisdictional effect of depriving plaintiffs of
          standing to challenge a filed rate. In Morales v. Attor-
          neys’ Title Ins. Fund, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 1418, 1429 (S.D.
          Fla 1997), a federal District Court in Florida concluded
          that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a claim chal-
          lenging a filed rate pursuant to the federal Real Estate
          Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et
          seq. (RESPA). The court in Morales reasoned that, as
          long as the rate charged by the mortgagee or mortgage
          servicer does not exceed the filed rate, plaintiffs bring-
          ing such claims have failed to allege an injury in fact
          under RESPA because ‘‘they have no legal right to pay
          anything other than the promulgated rates . . . .’’ Id.
          Therefore, the court concluded, the filed rate doctrine
          deprives such plaintiffs of standing, thus depriving the
          courts of jurisdiction. See id.
            Morales is an outlier. The overwhelming majority of
          courts that have considered the issue, including the
          courts in the Second Circuit, have rejected this reason-
          ing and concluded that the filed rate doctrine does
          not implicate subject matter jurisdiction and, instead,
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       constitutes a defense on the merits. See, e.g., Lyons v.
       Litton Loan Servicing LP, 158 F. Supp. 3d 211, 220–21
       (S.D.N.Y. 2016); Hoover v. HSBC Mortgage Corp.
       (USA), 9 F. Supp. 3d 223, 237 (N.D.N.Y. 2014). We find
       especially persuasive the reasoning of the United States
       District Court for the Southern District of New York in
       its decision in Curtis v. Cenlar FSB, Docket No. 13 Civ.
       3007 (DLC), 2013 WL 5995582 (S.D.N.Y. November 12,
       2013). In Curtis, the court rejected an argument that
       echoed the rationale relied on by the court in Morales,
       namely, that, because plaintiffs who challenge a filed
       rate will lose on the merits, they cannot show that they
       have suffered a cognizable injury, and, therefore, the
       filed rate doctrine deprives them of standing. See id.,
       *2. The flaw in this reasoning, the court explained, is
       that it would ‘‘allow any [r]ule 12 (b) (6) motion to be
       restyled as a [r]ule 12 (b) (1) standing motion. [Although]
       standing and merits questions frequently overlap, stand-
       ing is fundamentally about the propriety of the individ-
       ual litigating a claim irrespective of its legal merits,
       [whereas] a [r]ule 12 (b) (6) inquiry is concerned with
       the legal merits of the claim itself. . . . [In Curtis],
       the defendants [were] not contending that [the plaintiff
       was] the wrong individual to bring these legal claims;
       they [were] arguing that the claims [were] simply not
       legally cognizable.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis in origi-
       nal.) Id.
          We agree with the majority of courts that have con-
       cluded that the filed rate doctrine does not implicate
       standing and, instead, relates to whether a party has
       failed to state a legally cognizable claim. Accordingly,
       even if this court were to adopt the filed rate doctrine as
       a matter of state law, the doctrine would not implicate
       subject matter jurisdiction. Indeed, the plaintiff’s argu-
       ment that the filed rate doctrine renders this appeal
       moot suffers from the same flaw as the rationale in
       support of the position that the filed rate doctrine impli-
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          cates standing. To the extent that the plaintiff argues
                               7

          that the present case is rendered moot because the
          defendant cannot prevail as a matter of law given the
          judgments of the federal courts, which relied on the
          filed rate doctrine to dismiss the defendant’s claims
          pursuant to rule 12 (b) (6); see Lewis v. M&T Bank,
          supra, 2022 WL 775758, *1, *3; this argument relates to
          the merits of the appeal, and not our jurisdiction. As
          the Appellate Court aptly stated in a recent case, ‘‘[e]ven
          the most compelling legal or factual argument that a
          particular claim or cause of action will fail on its merits
          will not support a conclusion that the asserted claim
          or cause of action is moot. This is because the proper
          inquiry with regard to mootness is not whether some
          change in circumstances has occurred after the claim
          or cause of action is asserted that forecloses any chance
          of success on the merits but, rather, whether that
          change would prevent the court from granting any and
          all practical relief even assuming that the proponent is
          able to prevail on the merits, no matter how unlikely.’’
          (Emphasis in original.) 307 White Street Realty, LLC
          v. Beaver Brook Group, LLC, 216 Conn. App. 750, 768,
          286 A.3d 467 (2022); see State v. McElveen, 261 Conn.
          198, 205, 802 A.2d 74 (2002) (‘‘[A] case does not neces-
          sarily become moot by virtue of the fact that . . . due
             7
               During oral argument before this court, the plaintiff’s counsel made the
          conclusory assertion that the filed rate doctrine also renders the defendant’s
          special defenses unripe for judicial review. Our review of decisions dis-
          cussing the filed rate doctrine has failed to reveal any decision holding that
          the filed rate doctrine, without more, implicates the ripeness doctrine. We
          observe that the plaintiff has not claimed that the Connecticut Insurance
          Department’s decision regarding the filed rate is still pending, or in any
          other manner lacks finality, thus rendering the issues in this appeal unripe.
          See, e.g., Francis v. Board of Pardons & Paroles, 338 Conn. 347, 359, 258
          A.3d 71 (2021) (‘‘in determining whether a case is ripe, a . . . court must
          be satisfied that the case before [it] does not present a hypothetical injury
          or a claim contingent [on] some event that has not and indeed may never
          transpire’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). That claim would seem, in
          fact, to be counter to the plaintiff’s reliance on the alleged filed rate with
          the Connecticut Insurance Department.
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       to a change in circumstances, relief from the actual
       injury is unavailable. . . . [A] controversy continues to
       exist, affording the court jurisdiction, if the actual injury
       suffered by the litigant potentially gives rise to a collat-
       eral injury from which the court can grant relief.’’); see
       also CT Freedom Alliance, LLC v. Dept. of Education,
       346 Conn. 1, 27–28, 287 A.3d 557 (2023) (‘‘[w]hen, during
       the pendency of an appeal, events have occurred that
       preclude an appellate court from granting any practical
       relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has
       become moot’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Put
       differently, agreeing with the plaintiff’s argument would
       invite parties to interject mootness claims whenever
       there exists a basis to challenge the legal sufficiency of
       a claim or defense. Because a live controversy remains
       between the parties in state court, notwithstanding the
       decisions of the federal courts in the related cases, this
       appeal is not moot. See, e.g., CT Freedom Alliance, LLC
       v. Dept. of Education, supra, 27–28. Accordingly, we
       deny the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss this appeal.
                                    II
         We next turn to the defendant’s claim that the trial
       court improperly granted in part the plaintiff’s motion
       to strike the defendant’s special defenses of unclean
       hands and breach of the implied covenant of good faith
       and fair dealing on the basis that those defenses, predi-
       cated on the plaintiff’s improprieties in the force place-
       ment of the flood insurance, do not ‘‘arise from the
       making, validity or enforcement’’ of the mortgage. Quot-
       ing U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Blowers, 332 Conn.
       656, 675, 212 A.3d 226 (2019), the defendant contends
       that the special defenses are ‘‘directly and inseparably
       connected . . . to [the] enforcement of the note and
       mortgage’’ and are otherwise legally sufficient. (Internal
       quotation marks omitted.) In response, the plaintiff
       argues that the trial court properly struck the special
       defenses because (1) the special defenses were not
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          related to the making, validity or enforcement of the
          mortgage, (2) the defendant’s breach of the underlying
          loan contract bars him from relying on the doctrine of
          unclean hands, and (3) the defendant failed to plead a
          valid special defense sounding in breach of the implied
          covenant of good faith and fair dealing because he did
          not assert any causal connection between the plaintiff’s
          allegedly bad acts and his default under the terms of
          the note and mortgage.8 We agree with the defendant
          and conclude that the trial court improperly struck the
          special defenses.

              Our review of the trial court’s decision to grant the
          plaintiff’s motion to strike is plenary. See, e.g., id., 667.
          ‘‘[A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of
          a pleading . . . and, consequently, requires no factual
          findings by the trial court . . . . In ruling on a motion
          to strike, the court must accept as true the facts alleged
          in the special defenses and construe them in the manner
          most favorable to sustaining their legal sufficiency. . . .
          The allegations of the pleading involved are entitled
          to the same favorable construction a trier would be
          required to give in admitting evidence under them and
          if the facts provable under its allegations would support
            8
              The plaintiff contends that the defendant ‘‘abandoned’’ his special
          defenses of unclean hands and breach of the implied covenant of good faith
          and fair dealing by failing to move for reargument, to seek an articulation
          or to replead the special defenses. Without pointing to any deficiencies in
          the record, the plaintiff claims that the defendant’s failure to pursue these
          courses of action has somehow rendered the record inadequate for review.
          We disagree and conclude that the record is adequate for review. To the
          extent that the plaintiff’s argument could be understood to assert that the
          defendant’s claims are unpreserved, we also disagree. The plaintiff has cited
          no authority as support for the general proposition that the failure to replead,
          to seek an articulation or to move for reargument by necessity requires the
          conclusion that an otherwise properly raised claim is unpreserved, and the
          plaintiff did not claim that any specific procedural facts of the present case
          required that conclusion. In fact, during oral argument, the plaintiff’s counsel
          conceded that the failure to replead does not preclude appellate review of
          a grant of a motion to strike.
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       a defense or a cause of action, the motion to strike
       must fail.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
       omitted.) Id., 668.
          To survive a motion to strike, a special defense to a
       foreclosure action must relate to the making, validity
       or enforcement of the note or mortgage and otherwise
       be legally sufficient. Id., 670; see id., 675 (defining scope
       of ‘‘enforcement’’ in ‘‘making, validity or enforcement’’
       test and acknowledging that defenses must ‘‘otherwise
       be legally sufficient’’). In the present case, the trial court
       struck the special defenses of unclean hands and breach
       of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
       on the ground that the defendant’s allegations did not
       relate to ‘‘the specific mortgage at issue in this case.’’
       (Emphasis added.) The court pointed to the defendant’s
       allegations of the plaintiff’s ‘‘global’’ conduct relating
       to an alleged nationwide kickback scheme. For exam-
       ple, the answer alleges that the plaintiff, ASIC and other
       subsidiaries of Assurant have an ‘‘agreement’’ whereby,
       in exchange for the plaintiff’s utilization solely of Assur-
       ant subsidiaries, including ASIC, to provide force placed
       insurance, Assurant and its subsidiaries pay the plaintiff
       ‘‘gratuitous kickbacks that are mischaracterized to bor-
       rowers as legitimate compensation.’’ (Emphasis added.)
       Similarly, the answer also alleges that, ‘‘[d]espite repre-
       sentations to borrowers that they will . . . be charged
       [only] for the cost of insurance coverage, and provisions
       in the mortgage contracts binding them to do so, [the
       plaintiff] charges borrowers the cost of coverage plus
       the amount of the kickbacks; it does not, that is, pass
       these rebates on to the borrower.’’ (Emphasis added.)
       Indeed, twenty-seven paragraphs of the answer are
       devoted solely to laying out these general allegations,
       none of which pertains directly to the defendant’s mort-
       gage. The trial court correctly observed that ‘‘[t]he
       broad scope of the plaintiff’s dealings with insurance
       companies to protect premises whose owners fail to
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          obtain insurance has little or nothing to do with this
          specific case of the defendant’s own failure to maintain
          insurance.’’ (Emphasis added.)
             The defendant contends persuasively, however, that
          these general allegations were necessary to provide
          context for the allegations specific to his mortgage. For
          example, the answer also alleges that (1) through ASIC,
          the plaintiff force placed insurance coverage on the
          defendant’s property in 2017 and 2018, pursuant to sec-
          tion 5 of the mortgage agreement,9 (2) the plaintiff sent
          the defendant four separate notices of its intent to force
          place insurance coverage on the property pursuant to
          the mortgage agreement, and, in each of those notices, it
          represented that the amounts charged to the defendant
          covered the ‘‘ ‘cost of the insurance policy’ ’’ and failed
          to disclose that the defendant would be charged more
             9
               Section 5 of the mortgage agreement provides in relevant part: ‘‘[The]
          [b]orrower shall keep the improvements existing or hereafter erected on
          the [p]roperty insured against loss by fire, hazards included within the term
          ‘extended coverage,’ and any other hazards including, but not limited to,
          earthquakes and floods, for which [the] [l]ender requires insurance. This
          insurance shall be maintained in the amounts (including deductible levels)
          and for the periods that [the] [l]ender requires. What [the] [l]ender requires
          pursuant to the preceding sentences can change during the term of the
          [l]oan. The insurance carrier providing the insurance shall be chosen by [the]
          [b]orrower subject to [the] [l]ender’s right to disapprove [the] [b]orrower’s
          choice, which right shall not be exercised unreasonably. . . . If [the] [b]or-
          rower fails to maintain any of the coverages described above, [the] [l]ender
          may obtain insurance coverage, at [the] [l]ender’s option and [the] [b]orrow-
          er’s expense. [The] [l]ender is under no obligation to purchase any particular
          type or amount of coverage. Therefore, such coverage shall cover [the]
          [l]ender, but might or might not protect [the] [b]orrower, [the] [b]orrower’s
          equity in the [p]roperty, or the contents of the [p]roperty, against any risk,
          hazard or liability and might provide greater or lesser coverage than was
          previously in effect. [The] [b]orrower acknowledges that the cost of the
          insurance coverage so obtained might significantly exceed the cost of insur-
          ance that [the] [b]orrower could have obtained. Any amounts disbursed by
          [the] [l]ender under this [s]ection . . . shall become additional debt of [the]
          [b]orrower secured by this [s]ecurity [i]nstrument. These amounts shall bear
          interest at the [n]ote rate from the date of disbursement and shall be payable,
          with such interest, upon notice from [the] [l]ender to [the] [b]orrower
          requesting payment. . . .’’
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       than the cost, (3) the plaintiff failed to disclose that it
       had an exclusive relationship with ASIC or that it had
       a financial arrangement with ASIC in exchange for that
       exclusive relationship, (4) the plaintiff did not pass on
       to the defendant the rebates it received from ASIC and
       charged the defendant more than the plaintiff’s costs
       for force placing coverage on the defendant’s property,
       (5) the plaintiff’s representations to the defendant were
       false and were made to induce the defendant to act to
       his detriment, and (6) the defendant acted on these alleg-
       edly false representations to his detriment. (Emphasis
       added.) Finally, the defendant alleges in his answer
       that the plaintiff’s false representations undermined the
       validity of the mortgage. Contrary to the trial court’s
       conclusion, therefore, the defendant’s answer included
       allegations of wrongdoing regarding his specific
       mortgage.
          The question remains whether those allegations are
       sufficiently related to the making, validity or enforce-
       ment of the mortgage. We conclude that they are. Put
       simply, the defendant’s answer alleges that, in force
       placing insurance coverage on the property, the plaintiff
       relied on section 5 of the mortgage agreement, which
       authorized it to purchase force placed insurance cover-
       age in the event of the borrower’s failure to maintain
       the proper insurance. See footnote 9 of this opinion.
       By purchasing force placed insurance through ASIC,
       therefore, the plaintiff was enforcing its rights under
       the mortgage agreement. In doing so, the defendant
       alleges, the plaintiff charged the defendant an amount
       greater than the ‘‘cost’’ of the insurance, in violation
       of section 5 of the mortgage agreement, concealed a
       ‘‘kickback’’ agreement that it had with ASIC by which
       the plaintiff received what the defendant characterizes
       as ‘‘rebates’’ in exchange for using ASIC exclusively for
       its force placed insurance coverage, failed to pass on
       those rebates to the defendant, and made misrepresen-
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          tations to the defendant that he would be charged solely
          for the cost of the force placed insurance coverage. All
          of this alleged conduct is directly related to the plain-
          tiff’s reliance on and enforcement of section 5 of the
          mortgage agreement.
             The timing of the plaintiff’s reliance on the mortgage
          agreement to purchase force placed insurance cover-
          age, which occurred after the execution of the mortgage
          documents, does not bring the defendant’s special
          defenses outside of the scope of the making, validity
          or enforcement test. In U.S. Bank National Assn. v.
          Blowers, supra, 332 Conn. 665–75, we, for the first time,
          examined the contours of the making, validity, or enforce-
          ment test. Although we recognized that the test is ‘‘a
          legal creation of uncertain origin,’’ we declined to aban-
          don it. Id., 665; see id., 665–67. We instead defined the
          term ‘‘enforcement’’ to have a broad temporal scope, which
          encompasses a mortgagee’s conduct during postdefault
          loan modification negotiations if the alleged miscon-
          duct substantially increases the overall debt or impedes
          a mortgagor from curing the default. See id., 667, 675.
             Our rationale in Blowers for broadening the temporal
          scope of ‘‘enforcement’’ is relevant in the present
          appeal. We began with the principle that the making,
          validity, or enforcement test does not require mortgag-
          ors ‘‘to meet a more stringent test than that required for
          special defenses and counterclaims in nonforeclosure
          actions. We therefore interpret the test as nothing more
          than a practical application of the standard rules of
          practice that apply to all civil actions to the specific
          context of foreclosure actions.’’ Id., 667. With that in
          mind, we rejected the notion that enforcement of a note
          or mortgage is limited in temporal scope to exclude
          conduct that occurred ‘‘after the origination of the loan,
          after default, and even after the initiation of the foreclo-
          sure action . . . .’’ Id., 672. We noted that, in addition to
          the validity of the note and mortgage, ‘‘[t]he mortgagor’s
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                                    M&T Bank v. Lewis

       rights and liabilities’’ also depend ‘‘on the amount of
       the debt.’’ Id., 674. We concluded, therefore, that ‘‘allega-
       tions that the mortgagee has engaged in conduct that
       wrongfully and substantially increased the mortgagor’s
       overall indebtedness, caused the mortgagor to incur
       costs that impeded the mortgagor from curing the
       default, or reneged [on] modifications are the types of
       misconduct that are directly and inseparably connected
       . . . to enforcement of the note and mortgage.’’ (Cita-
       tion omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 675.
          The alleged effect of the plaintiff’s conduct in enforc-
       ing section 5 of the mortgage agreement—that it wrong-
       fully increased the defendant’s overall debt—provides a
       sufficient nexus to the foreclosure action. The plaintiff’s
       contractual right to purchase force placed insurance
       coverage allows the plaintiff to secure its interests by
       ensuring that the property is insured against damage
       when a homeowner has allowed coverage to lapse. The
       connection between that contractual right and the fore-
       closure action itself is neither necessary nor immedi-
       ately obvious. Nevertheless, our rationale in Blowers
       clarifies the connection of that right to this foreclosure
       action in light of the defendant’s allegations. Specifi-
       cally, the defendant alleges that the plaintiff, by engag-
       ing in its undisclosed kickback scheme with ASIC,
       charged the defendant more than the cost of its pur-
       chase of force placed insurance coverage. Construing
       the defendant’s allegations in the manner most favor-
       able to sustaining their legal sufficiency, we conclude
       that the defendant has sufficiently alleged that the plain-
       tiff’s misconduct increased his overall debt beyond that
       which was necessary to protect the plaintiff’s interest
       in the property.10 Therefore, we conclude that the defen-
         10
            We recognize that the defendant’s allegations do not claim specifically
       that the plaintiff’s misconduct ‘‘substantially’’ increased his overall indebted-
       ness, or offer any precise statement of the additional charges he incurred
       above and beyond the plaintiff’s actual costs. See U.S. Bank National Associ-
       ation v. Blowers, supra, 332 Conn. 672. That information—the difference
       between what the plaintiff’s actual costs were and what the plaintiff charged
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          dant’s allegations in support of the special defenses are
          sufficiently connected to the enforcement of the
          mortgage.
              The answer also alleges a connection to the validity of
          the mortgage. The defendant alleges that the plaintiff’s
          ‘‘fraudulent representations directly [undermine] the
          validity of the mortgage documents.’’ A reasonable
          inference from this allegation, read together with the
          defendant’s broader allegations in the answer claiming
          that the plaintiff’s kickback scheme was ongoing and
          on a broad scale, is that the defendant contends that,
          because the plaintiff entered into the mortgage agree-
          ment with the alleged scheme in place, along with its
          accompanying misrepresentations, the mortgage agree-
          ment is invalid. Without offering any opinion on the
          ultimate merits of this theory, we conclude that the
          defendant has alleged that the plaintiff’s conduct relates
          to the validity of the mortgage.
             In addition to alleging a sufficient connection to the
          mortgage or note, each special defense must otherwise
          be legally sufficient. The plaintiff claims that, because
          the defendant breached the underlying loan contract—
          that is, because the defendant defaulted—he is barred
          from relying on the doctrine of unclean hands. We
          disagree.
            ‘‘[A]n action to foreclose a mortgage is an equitable
          proceeding. . . . It is a fundamental principle of equity
          jurisprudence that for a [plaintiff] to show that he is
          the defendant, and the ratio of that amount to the total amount of indebted-
          ness, and the resulting ‘‘substantiality’’ of the increase in debt—would be
          in the hands of the plaintiff and would be subject to discovery. Accordingly,
          we decline to conclude that the defendant’s special defenses lack a sufficient
          nexus to the mortgage on the basis of the omission of the word ‘‘substan-
          tially.’’ See, e.g., Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn.
          523, 536, 51 A.3d 367 (2012) (‘‘[t]he modern trend, which is followed in
          Connecticut, is to construe pleadings broadly and realistically, rather than
          narrowly and technically’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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       entitled to the benefit of equity he must establish that
       he comes into court with clean hands. . . . The clean
       hands doctrine is applied not for the protection of the
       parties but for the protection of the court. . . . It is
       applied not by way of punishment but on [the basis of]
       considerations that make for the advancement of right
       and justice. . . . The doctrine of unclean hands
       expresses the principle that [when] a plaintiff seeks
       equitable relief, he must show that his conduct has been
       fair, equitable and honest as to the particular contro-
       versy in issue. . . . Unless the plaintiff’s conduct is of
       such a character as to be condemned and pronounced
       wrongful by honest and fair-minded people, the doc-
       trine of unclean hands does not apply.’’ (Citations omit-
       ted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Thompson v.
       Orcutt, 257 Conn. 301, 310, 777 A.2d 670 (2001). ‘‘The
       doctrine generally applies [only] to the particular trans-
       action under consideration, for the court will not go
       outside the case for the purpose of examining the con-
       duct of the [plaintiff] in other matters or questioning
       his general character for fair dealing. The wrong must
       . . . be in regard to the matter in litigation. . . .
       [Although] an obligation [may] be indirectly connected
       with an illegal transaction, it will not thereby be barred
       from enforcement, if the plaintiff does not require the
       aid of the illegal transaction to make out his case.’’
       (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 310–11.
         A mortgagor who has defaulted on a mortgage is not
       precluded from asserting the special defense of unclean
       hands. See, e.g., U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Blowers,
       supra, 332 Conn. 658, 678 (reversing judgment granting
       motion to strike special defense of unclean hands with
       respect to mortgagor’s alleged misconduct during post-
       default modification negotiations); U.S. Bank National
       Assn. v. Eichten, 184 Conn. App. 727, 746–50, 196 A.3d
       328 (2018) (question of material fact existed as to whether
       mortgagee had unclean hands when claimed miscon-
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          duct occurred postdefault). Accordingly, we reject the
          plaintiff’s claim that the defendant in the present case
          is barred from relying on the doctrine of unclean hands
          and proceed to consider whether he sufficiently alleged
          the doctrine as a special defense.
             In support of his defense of unclean hands, the defen-
          dant alleges that the plaintiff misrepresented that he
          would be charged solely for the cost of purchasing
          force placed insurance coverage as part of the plaintiff’s
          alleged kickback scheme, in which it retained rebates
          that should have been passed on to the defendant. Tak-
          ing these allegations as true, we conclude that the defen-
          dant has alleged wilful conduct that is not equitable,
          fair or honest. Additionally, as we already explained,
          the defendant’s allegations are directly connected to
          the plaintiff’s enforcement of the mortgage. This type of
          misconduct falls squarely within the doctrine of unclean
          hands. See, e.g., Thompson v. Orcutt, supra, 257 Conn.
          310–14 (defendant in foreclosure action could rely on
          doctrine of unclean hands, when plaintiff had made
          intentional misrepresentations in bankruptcy proceed-
          ings that prompted bankruptcy court to abandon sub-
          ject mortgage as asset of bankruptcy estate, thus
          permitting foreclosure action to proceed).
            As to the special defense of breach of the implied
          covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the plaintiff
          contends that this defense is legally insufficient because
          the defendant failed to plead any causal connection
          between the plaintiff’s alleged bad acts and his default
          under the terms of the note and mortgage. Because we
          have concluded that the defendant’s answer alleges that
          the plaintiff’s misconduct increased his overall indebt-
          edness, we conclude that he has properly alleged the
          special defense of breach of the implied covenant of
          good faith and fair dealing.
             ‘‘[I]t is axiomatic that the . . . duty of good faith and
          fair dealing is a covenant implied into a contract or a
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                            M&T Bank v. Lewis

       contractual relationship. . . . In other words, every
       contract carries an implied duty requiring that neither
       party do anything that will injure the right of the other
       to receive the benefits of the agreement. . . . The cove-
       nant of good faith and fair dealing presupposes that the
       terms and purpose of the contract are agreed [on] by
       the parties and that what is in dispute is a party’s discre-
       tionary application or interpretation of a contract term.
       . . . To constitute a breach of [the implied covenant
       of good faith and fair dealing], the acts by which a
       defendant allegedly impedes the plaintiff’s right to receive
       benefits that he or she reasonably expected to receive
       under the contract must have been taken in bad faith.’’
       (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Renaissance Man-
       agement Co. v. Connecticut Housing Finance Author-
       ity, 281 Conn. 227, 240, 915 A.2d 290 (2007).
          In order to properly allege a special defense predi-
       cated on breach of the implied covenant of good faith
       and fair dealing, the defendant had to plead that the
       plaintiff’s alleged misrepresentations interfered with his
       right to receive the benefits of the agreement. This he
       has done by alleging that the plaintiff’s kickback scheme
       wrongfully resulted in the defendant’s payment of more
       than he was obligated to pay and more than the plaintiff
       was entitled to charge him, pursuant to the mortgage
       agreement. Although he did not plead that the plaintiff’s
       misconduct caused him to default, he did allege, as
       we have explained, that it increased his overall debt.
       Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court improp-
       erly struck the special defenses.
         The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
       for further proceedings according to law.
         In this opinion the other justices concurred.