Court Opinion

ID: 9957927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-05 18:00:55.386877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:32.153669
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 5 2024
                                                                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ADRIAN TORRES TORRES                            No. 23-528
                                                Agency No.
             Petitioner,                        A206-411-137
 v.                                             MEMORANDUM*

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                             Submitted April 3, 2024**
                               Pasadena, California

Before: R. NELSON, VANDYKE, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

      Adrian Torres Torres seeks review of a Board of Immigration Appeals

(“BIA”) decision affirming a decision by an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying

asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) relief.

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

      *      This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **     The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      When reviewing final orders of the BIA, we apply the highly deferential

substantial evidence standard of review. See Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th

742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022). “Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ’s reasoning,

we review both decisions.” Garcia-Martinez v. Sessions, 886 F.3d 1291, 1293 (9th

Cir. 2018). Under the substantial evidence standard, the agency’s “findings of fact

are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to

the contrary.” Ruiz-Colmenares, 25 F.4th at 748 (emphasis in original) (citation

omitted). All questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.

      To begin, Petitioner asks that we hear his case initially en banc to reconsider

this court’s en banc opinion in United States v. Bastide-Hernandez, 39 F.4th 1187

(9th Cir. 2022) (en banc).      He contends that Bastide-Hernandez disregarded

controlling Supreme Court precedent in Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical

Center, 568 U.S. 145, 154–155 (2013), and Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki,

562 U.S. 428, 440–441 (2011). We deny Petitioner’s motion. The en banc court in

Bastide-Hernandez expressly relied on, and cited, both Supreme Court cases

Petitioner mentions. See Bastide-Hernandez, 39 F.4th at 1191–92. There is nothing

in its reasoning to suggest that these precedents were misapplied.          Bastide-

Hernandez is precedent by which this panel is bound, and Petitioner has provided

no reason to reconsider it en banc.
      In its decision, the agency declined to consider a proposed political opinion

basis as a protected ground for Petitioner. Petitioner before us challenges that

refusal.   To be eligible for asylum, an applicant must show a likelihood of

“persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(42)(A). Petitioner asserts he has an anti-cartel political opinion. This

proposed ground, however, was not included in his application for asylum or

withholding of removal. His attorney mentioned it once in passing at a hearing

before the IJ and failed to develop it any further on the record. “It is an applicant’s

burden to establish h[is] claim for relief or protection on the record before the

Immigration Judge.” Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 189, 191 (BIA

2018). This burden requires the applicant to “clearly indicate the exact delineation

of any particular social group(s) to which []he claims to belong.” See id. (citation

and quotation marks omitted). Because Petitioner failed to do so regarding his claim

that he was persecuted as a result of his political opinion, the agency did not err by

not addressing that claim.

      The agency also correctly concluded that Petitioner’s proposed particular

social group (“PSG”) of “Mexicans who oppose the country’s gangs and cartels”

was not cognizable. To be cognizable, a PSG must have three key elements: (1) a

shared immutable characteristic, (2) particularity, and (3) social distinction. See
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014). Substantial evidence

supports the agency’s conclusion that this proposed PSG did not meet the

particularity or social distinction requirements. Nothing in the record suggests that

Mexican society understands this category to be recognized as a distinct faction

within society. The agency also correctly concluded that the term “opposed” in this

context was too vague to meet the particularity element because nothing indicated

what form that opposition might take.

      Substantial evidence, thus, supports the decision to deny asylum and not to

withhold removal. Due to petitioner’s failure to establish either past persecution, or

a well-founded fear of future persecution, the agency’s decision to deny asylum is

supported by substantial evidence. See Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1185–

1189 (9th Cir. 2006). And because asylum has a lower standard than the standard

for withholding of removal, failure to establish eligibility for asylum necessarily

means failure to meet the withholding standard. Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153,

1156 (9th Cir. 2003).

      The agency also did not err in concluding that Petitioner was not entitled to

CAT relief. To obtain such relief, a person must show that it is more likely than not

that upon returning to the country of removal he will be tortured by, or with the

acquiescence of, the government. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). The only evidence

submitted to support Petitioner’s CAT claim was his testimony relating to violence
and crime in Mexico and a country conditions report. This evidence only spoke to

generalized crime and violence in the country. The agency was correct in concluding

that this is not enough to establish CAT eligibility. See Park v. Garland, 72 F.4th

965, 980 (9th Cir. 2023) (“Generalized evidence of violence and crime is insufficient

to establish a likelihood of torture.”).

      Petitioner’s motion for initial hearing en banc (Docket Entry No. 14) is

DENIED. See Fed. R. App. P. 35(a)–(b).

      PETITION DENIED.