Court Opinion

ID: 9948127
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 16:05:31.795282+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:11.255024
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                 STATE OF FLORIDA
                  _____________________________

                         No. 1D2022-1540
                  _____________________________

DAVID A. CASEY and JOAN
QUINN CASEY,

    Appellants,

    v.

MISTRAL CONDOMINIUM
ASSOCIATION, INC.; DOLPHIN
DEVELOPERS, LLC; PANHANDLE
GETAWAYS, LLC and ELIZABETH
ARROWOOD CARROLL, Trustee of
the Revocable Trust of Elizabeth
Arrowood Carroll 2010,

    Appellees.
                  _____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Walton County.
Jeffrey E. Lewis, Judge.

                          March 6, 2024

WINOKUR, J.

    David and Joan Casey appeal the trial court’s decision to
award summary judgment in favor of Mistral Condominium
Association, Inc. (the Association). For the reasons that follow, we
reverse.
                                  I

     Originally constructed in 1985, the Mistral Condominium is
located on the south side of Highway 30A in Seacrest Beach. The
condominium consists of twenty-four units, with eight units on
each of three floors. Each unit has a north-facing balcony on the
parking lot side and a south-facing balcony with a view of the Gulf
of Mexico. Unlike the north-facing balconies, the south-facing
balconies can only be accessed through the individual
condominium units.

     In 2013, the Association started a painting project for the
exterior of the condominium. As part of that project, the
Association contracted with a company to pressure wash the
exterior. During the cleaning process, the company discovered
wood rot for both the north-facing and south-facing balconies. The
Association then contracted with another company to perform a
“full inspection.” That inspection, completed in 2014, revealed
additional wood rot.

     In late 2015, the Association contracted with a construction
company to conduct repairs. By early 2016, the company repaired
all the north-facing balconies as well as all the south-facing
balconies on the first floor. The company recommended that the
Association repair the south-facing balconies on the second and
third floor and submitted a quote for those repairs. Prior to April
of 2016, however, the Association did not order the recommended
repairs.

    On April 4, 2016, while renting a third-floor Mistral unit,
David Casey leaned against the railing on the south-facing
balcony, causing the railing to collapse. Casey fell three stories to
the sand dunes below. Casey survived the fall, but suffered
significant injuries that required surgery.

    Nearly two years later, the Caseys filed a complaint, alleging
negligence on the part of several entities. 1 Regarding the

    1 Among these entities was the owner of the unit from which

Casey fell. By the time of the summary judgment at issue in this

                                 2
Association, the Caseys claimed that it “owed a duty to Plaintiffs
to exercise a reasonable degree of care in maintaining and
repairing the balcony railings.”

     The parties conducted numerous depositions – to include the
deposition of unit owners, past and present Association presidents,
the Association’s corporate representative, and the owner of the
construction company that conducted the repairs. When asked who
had ultimate responsibility for maintaining the south-facing
balcony railings, all the deponents identified the same entity: the
Association. The Association’s own corporate representative even
testified that the south-facing balconies include “structural”
components that fall under the sole responsibility of the
Association.

    The following table contains the relevant provisions of the
Declaration of Condominium (DOC) at issue in this case:

appeal, the unit owner, along with all defendants other than the
Association, were no longer defendants in the case.

                                3
      Article I                Article VIII              Article VIII
   (“Definition of           (“Maintenance,            (“Maintenance,
 Terms”), Section 12      Repair, Alterations,       Repair, Alterations,
  (“Condominium            and Improvements          and Improvements
       Unit”)               of Condominium            of Condominium
                               Property”),               Property”),
                                Section B                 Section A
                                 (“By the                  (“By the
                              condominium               association”),
                             parcel owner”),            subsection (c)
                              subsection (b)
“The south balcony        “The responsibility        “The      association
or     deck       area    of the condominium         shall       maintain,
adjacent to each          parcel owner shall         repair, and replace
unit, as well as          be as follows... The       at the association’s
when applicable the       unit     floors    and     own expense... All
south deck and stair      interior walls and         portions of the units
area, is also a part of   the      floor     and     (except interior wall
the     condominium       interior wall of any       surfaces)
apartment.”               south            facing    contributing to the
                          balcony, deck or           support       of    the
                          stairs attached to         building,        which
                          the     condominium        portions          shall
                          units      shall     be    include, but are not
                          maintained by the          limited to, common
                          condominium unit           walkways,        stairs,
                          owner thereof at his       the outside walls of
                          own          expense.      the building and
                          Owners may not             load-bearing
                          alter,     cut,     [or]   columns,            but
                          disturb any load           excluding interior
                          bearing wall area          non-bearing walls.
                          within            their    Also included are
                          respective unit.”          walkways,        decks,
                                                     stairs, etc.”

    Before trial commenced, the Association filed a motion for
summary judgment. Citing Article I, Section 12, of the DOC, the
Association argued that each south-facing balcony belongs to the
owner of the accompanying unit. See Table, above (“The south
balcony . . . is also a part of the condominium apartment.”).

                                     4
     Citing Article VIII, Section B, subsection (b), the Association
then argued that the unit owner—not the Association—had the
responsibility to maintain the balcony railing attached to each
unit. See Table, above (“The . . . floor and interior wall of any south
facing balcony. . . shall be maintained by the condominium unit
owner thereof at his own expense.”). After asserting that the DOC
terms were unambiguous, the Association characterized all the
deposition testimony—including the testimony of its corporate
representative—as inadmissible parol evidence.

     In response to the Association’s motion, the Caseys raised two
arguments. First, the Caseys argued that the DOC contains a
latent ambiguity regarding ownership of the balcony railings.
According to the Caseys, while Article I, Section 12 states that a
balcony belongs to the unit owner, the DOC does not specify who
owns the balcony railing. Second, the Caseys argued that,
regardless of ownership, the DOC assigned to the Association the
exclusive duty to maintain the balcony railings. Pointing to Article
VIII, Section A, (c), the Caseys asserted that the Association’s
responsibility to maintain “walkways, decks, [and] stairs” includes
the duty to maintain the balcony railings.

     During the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the
Association attempted to distinguish the south-facing balconies on
first floor from the south-facing balconies on the second and third
floor by labeling the former as “decks.” In making this argument,
however, the Association did not explain why, given the phrase
“south balcony or deck” in Article I, Section 12, the Association
repaired the first floor south-facing “decks” but did not repair the
second and third floor south-facing “balconies.” Nor did the
Association address the inconsistent use of the term “deck” in
Article VIII, Section B, subsection (b) and Article VIII, Section A,
subsection (c). The Association simply proclaimed that “the use of
the term deck there is not ambiguous.”

    Even though the Association’s corporate representative
admitted that the balconies contain “structural” elements, the
Association did not address the last sentence of Article VIII,
Section B, subsection (b), which prohibits unit owners from

                                  5
altering, cutting, or disturbing “any load bearing wall area within
their respective unit.”

    Finally, the Association described as “absurd” any attempt to
characterize the balcony railings as exterior walls. In making this
argument, however, the Association never explained the difference
under Article VIII, Section B, subsection (b) between the “interior
wall of any south facing balcony” and the exterior wall of such a
balcony.

     In the order granting the Association’s motion for summary
judgment, the trial court found that the terms that “define the
property of the Association and that of the Condominium Unit are
clear and unambiguous and, therefore, are not subject to the
admission of parol evidence to interpret their meaning.” Citing
Article I, Section 12, the court determined that the balconies and
the balcony railings belong to the unit owner. After quoting Article
VIII, Section B, subsection (b), the court found that the individual
unit owners, rather than the Association, were responsible for
maintaining the balcony railings. Therefore, the court concluded
that the Association owed the Caseys no duty of care to maintain
the railing that gave way and caused him to fall.

                                 II

                           A. Negligence

    The tort of negligence includes four elements: duty; breach;
causation; and damages. See e.g., Limones v. Sch. Dist. of Lee
Cnty., 161 So. 3d 384, 389 (Fla. 2015) (“We have long held that to
succeed on a claim of negligence, a plaintiff must establish the four
elements of duty, breach, proximate causation, and damages.”).
This appeal involves the first element, whether the defendant
owed the plaintiff a legal duty.

     Ordinarily, the first element is a question of law for the trial
court to decide rather than a question of fact reserved for the jury.
See Williams v. Davis, 974 So. 2d 1052, 1057 n.2 (Fla. 2007)
(“[E]stablishing the existence of a duty under our negligence law
is a minimum threshold legal requirement that opens the
courthouse doors to the moving party, and is ultimately a question

                                 6
of law for the court rather than a jury.” (citing McCain v. Fla.
Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500, 501 (Fla. 1992))).

     However, if the plaintiff alleges that a written instrument
establishes the defendant’s duty, and if that instrument contains
an ambiguity as to existence or extent of that duty, then the first
element becomes a question of fact for the jury to decide. See
Friedman v. Virginia Metal Prods. Corp., 56 So. 2d 515, 516 (Fla.
1952) (citing 53 Am.Jur., Sec. 268 on Trials, p. 227, and Wigmore
on Evidence (3d ed), Sec. 2556, p. 523) (“It is a cardinal rule, that
the construction of all written instruments, is a question of law
and belongs to the courts, provided: ‘the language used is clear,
plain, certain, undisputed, unambiguous, unequivocal, and not
subject to conflicting inferences’.”); see also Critchlow v.
Williamson, 450 So. 2d 1153, 1156 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (“However,
if a provision is ambiguous, the matter must be submitted to the
finder of fact.” (citing Hoffman v. Terry, 397 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1981))).

                         B. Parol Evidence

    The Supreme Court of Florida has described the parol
evidence rule as follows:

    “[T]he terms of a valid written contract or instrument
    cannot be varied by a verbal agreement or other extrinsic
    evidence where such agreement was made before or at the
    time of the instrument in question. * * * The rule inhibits
    the use of parol evidence to contradict, vary, defeat, or
    modify a complete and unambiguous written instrument,
    or to charge, add to, or subtract from it, or affect its
    construction.”

J.M. Montgomery Roofing Co. v. Fred Howland, Inc., 98 So. 2d 484,
485–86 (Fla. 1957) (quoting 13 Fla. Jur., Sec. 383, pp. 380–381).

                      C. Summary Judgment

     Florida recently adopted the Federal summary judgment
standard. See In re Amends. to Fla. Rule of Civ. Proc. 1.510, 317
So. 3d 72, 74 (Fla. 2021); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a) (“The summary

                                 7
judgment standard provided for in this rule shall be construed and
applied in accordance with the federal summary judgment
standard.”). Under the federal summary judgment rule, any party
may “put the ball in play” by filing a motion for summary judgment
that identifies a claim or defense that lacks a factual basis. See
Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 1990); see also
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(a) (“A party may move for summary judgment,
identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or
defense—on which summary judgment is sought.”). However, the
moving party must do more than simply attack the strength of the
nonmoving party’s case; it must show “that there is an absence of
evidence to support” a claim or defense raised by the nonmoving
party. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c):

    A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely
    disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to
    particular parts of materials in the record . . . [or] showing
    that the materials cited do not establish the absence or
    presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party
    cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.

See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986) (“[T]he
burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’—that
is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of
evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”); Bedford v. Doe,
880 F.3d 993, 996–97 (8th Cir. 2018) (“[I]f the nonmoving party
must prove X to prevail [at trial], the moving party at summary
judgment can either produce evidence that X is not so or point out
that the nonmoving party lacks the evidence to prove X.”); Webster
v. Chesterfield Cnty. Sch. Bd., 38 F.4th 404, 412 (4th Cir. 2022)
(“[T]he aim of summary judgment is not to determine the exact
strength of a case and dispose of so-called weak cases, but instead
to determine whether a rational jury could find in the plaintiff's
favor such that the case should continue.”).

     Thus, Rule 1.510(c) places an initial burden on the moving
party to “demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact” in a claim or defense raised by the nonmoving party. Celotex,
477 U.S. at 322–23 (citations omitted):

                                  8
    [A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the
    initial responsibility of informing the district court of the
    basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the
    pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
    admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,”
    which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine
    issue of material fact.

See also Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc.,
210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000) (“In order to carry its burden
of production, the moving party must either produce evidence
negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or
defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough
evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of
persuasion at trial.”).

     If the moving party fails to satisfy its initial burden, then the
nonmoving party need not present any evidence in opposition to
the motion for summary judgment. See Id. at 1102–03 (citations
omitted) (“If a moving party fails to carry its initial burden of
production, [then] the nonmoving party has no obligation to
produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would have the
ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. In such a case, the
nonmoving party may defeat the motion for summary judgment
without producing anything.”).

     If, however, the movant satisfies its initial burden, “[t]he
burden then shifts to the nonmovant to establish the existence of
at least one fact issue which is both ‘genuine’ and ‘material.’”
Garside, 895 F.2d at 48 (citations omitted). To satisfy that burden,
the nonmoving party “must present competent evidence that
shows a genuine issue for trial.” Leavitt v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc.,
645 F.3d 484, 496–97 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing Ruiz–Rosa v. Rullán,
485 F.3d 150, 156 (1st Cir. 2007)); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (footnote &
citations omitted) (“When the moving party has carried its burden
under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . [T]he
nonmoving party must come forward with ‘specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”); Hill v. Kia Motors Am.,
Inc., No. 20-5690, 2022 WL 557823, at *24 (6th Cir. Feb. 24, 2022)

                                  9
(Bush, J., dissenting) (“So the question under Rule 56 is not
whether the record somewhere contains a triable issue, but
whether the nonmovants—here, plaintiffs—met their burden and
demonstrated those issues with specific record citations in their
response to [defendant’s] motion for summary judgment.”).

    In short, the nonmoving party must identify a disputed fact
that could affect the outcome of trial. See Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986):

    [T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute
    between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
    supported motion for summary judgment; the
    requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material
    fact. . . . Only disputes over facts that might affect the
    outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly
    preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual
    disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be
    counted.

See also Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1168–69 (7th Cir.
2013) (citations omitted):

    The nonmovant need not depose her own witnesses or
    produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at
    trial, but she must “go beyond the pleadings” (e.g.,
    produce      affidavits,    depositions,     answers     to
    interrogatories, or admissions on file) to demonstrate that
    there is evidence “upon which a jury could properly
    proceed to find a verdict” in her favor.

     If the nonmoving party fails to make that showing, then the
trial court should award summary judgment in favor of the moving
party. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.150(e). If, however, the nonmoving party
does demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact, then the trial
court should deny the motion. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.150(e).

                                 10
                                 III

     In this case, the Association put the ball in play by asserting
in a motion for summary judgment that, under the unambiguous
terms of the DOC, it owed the Caseys no duty of care to maintain
the rotted balcony railing that gave way. Satisfying its initial
burden under Rule 1.510(c), the Association identified the
following deficiency in the Caseys’ negligence claim: Article I,
Section 12, of the DOC states that the owner of the condominium
unit also owns the balcony; therefore, under Article VIII, Section
B, subsection (b), only the owner of the unit owed the Caseys a duty
of care to maintain the balcony railing. 2

     The burden then shifted to the Caseys. They pointed to Article
VIII, Section A, (c), of the DOC and argued that, regardless of
ownership, the Association had a duty to maintain all the balcony
railings. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586; Garside, 895 F.2d at 48.
This showing satisfied the Caseys burden as the nonmoving party,

     With their response to the Association’s motion for summary
judgment, the Caseys presented a reasonable interpretation of the
DOC that, under Florida substantive law, created a genuine
dispute as to a material fact. See Fecteau v. Se. Bank, N.A., 585 So.
2d 1005, 1007 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (“When there are two
reasonable interpretations, summary judgment is inappropriate
because there is a genuine issue of material fact.”); accord In re
Color Tile Inc., 475 F.3d 508, 515–16 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Given two
conflicting but reasonable interpretations, a contract will be
viewed as ambiguous at [the] early stage [of summary
judgment].”). Accordingly, the trial court committed reversible
error when it granted summary judgment in favor of the
Association. See Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Steve Hull
Chevrolet, Inc., 513 So. 2d 218, 219 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (“Where
the terms of [a] written instrument are disputed and reasonably
susceptible to more than one construction, an issue of fact is
presented as to the parties’ intent which cannot properly be
resolved by summary judgment.” (citing Langner v. Charles A.

    2 Even if we were to find that the Association did not meet its

initial burden, the result here would be the same: reversal.

                                 11
Binger, Inc., 503 So. 2d 1362, 1363 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987))); accord
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Texas Meridian Res. Expl. Inc., 180 F.3d 664,
669 (5th Cir. 1999) (“In the context of contract interpretation, only
when there is a choice of reasonable interpretations of the contract
is there a material fact issue concerning the parties’ intent that
would preclude summary judgment.”).

     Finally, the trial court erroneously rejected the deposition
testimony as parol evidence. Because the deponents testified about
their actions and their understanding of the DOC well after
execution of the written instrument, their testimony does not fall
under the scope of the parol evidence rule. See The Race, Inc. v.
Lake & River Recreational Properties, Inc., 573 So. 2d 409, 410–11
(Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (citations omitted) (“[T]he parol evidence rule
is of course directed against verbal agreements between the
parties to a written contract, made before or at the time of the
execution of the contract, but it does not prohibit the admission of
a subsequent oral agreement that alters, modifies, or changes the
former existing agreement between the parties.”); see also Pavolini
v. Williams, 915 So. 2d 251, 254 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (“The parol
evidence rule applies to verbal agreements between the parties to
a written contract which are made before or at the time of
execution of the contract. It does not apply to the admission of
subsequent oral agreements that alter, modify, or change the
former existing agreement between the parties.”).

     For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court’s decision
to grant summary judgment in favor of the Association; and, we
remand for the trial court to continue proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

    REVERSED and REMANDED.

B.L. THOMAS and LONG, JJ., concur.

                                 12
                 _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

Dana C. Matthews and C. Stephen Tatum of Matthews & Jones,
Destin; and Darren W. Penn and John D. Hadden of Penn Law,
LLC, Atlanta, GA, pro hac vice, for Appellants.

Scott A. Cole and Francesca M. Stein of Cole, Scott & Kissane,
P.A., Miami; Mark D. Tinker of Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A, Tampa;
and D. Grayson Miller of Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., Pensacola,
for Appellee Mistral Condominium Association, Inc.

                               13