Court Opinion

ID: 9860423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:21:38.53218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:22:26.597623
License: Public Domain

*123HANDLER, J.,
dissenting.
In this case the Court reverses what appears to be a well-founded conviction for theft of electrical services from a utility caused by tampering with the utility’s electric meter contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-8a. The defendant is a homeowner and customer of the utility furnishing electrical services. The trial court instructed the jury that it could draw an inference that the defendant, the person with complete control over the meter and “the person to whom electricity is being furnished,” was the person who tampered with the meter. Such an inference, statutorily described as “presumptive evidence,” appears in N.J.S.A. 2C:20-8c and -8d, which proscribe the offenses of meter tampering “with the intent to defraud” the utility. The Court determines, however, that such an inference of meter-tampering is not available as proof of an alleged violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-8a, applicable to the crime of theft of electrical services from a utility. It therefore reverses the Appellate Division, which determined that such a charge was proper and affirmed defendant’s conviction. State v. Dixon, 220 N.J.Super. 550 (1987). Substantially for the reasons fully expressed by Judge Scalera for the Appellate Division, I disagree with the Court’s holding and dissent.
*124I.
In this case, the defendant was charged with theft of services in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-8a. This provides that
a person is guilty of theft if he purposely obtains services which he knows are available only for compensation, by deception or threat, or by false token, slug or other means, including but not limited to mechanical or electronic devices or through fraudulent statements, to avoid payment for the service. (Emphasis added).
The indictment against defendant alleged that he committed theft of services under this statutory section “by deception, tampering, or other means.” Thus, as charged by the indictment, meter tampering constitutes the means defendant is alleged to have used in order to obtain electrical services without payment.
Included as part of the theft-of-services statute are two other provisions delineating the lesser offenses of meter tampering. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-8e describes one of these offenses as follows:
Any person who, without permission and for purposes of obtaining electric current ... in any other manner tampers or interferes with ... meters ... is guilty of a disorderly persons offense.
It further states:
The existence of any of the conditions with reference to meters ... described in this section, is presumptive evidence that the person to whom ... electricity ... is being furnished by or through such meters ... has, with the intent to defraud, created or caused to be created with reference to such meters ... the conditions so existing].] [Ibid.]
The offense of meter tampering is also defined as follows:
Any person who, without permission or authority ... by any ... means whatsoever tampers with any ... meter so that the meter will not measure or record the full amount of electric current supplied to such customer, is guilty of a disorderly persons offense. [N.J.S.A. 2C:20-8d.]
The statute also sets forth the presumption of responsibility for such meter tampering, viz:
The existence of any of the conditions with reference to meters or attachments described in this subsection or in subsection c. is presumptive evidence that the person to whom electricity is at the time being furnished by or through such meters or attachments has, with intent to defraud, created or caused to be created with reference to such meters or attachments, the condition so existing; provided, however, that the presumption shall not apply to any person so *125furnished with electricity for less than 31 days or until there has been at least one meter reading. \Ibid.~]
Thus the statute proscribes two disorderly persons offenses that involve meter tampering: one, 8c, prohibits a person who tampers with a meter in any manner without permission in order to obtain electricity; the other, 8d, prohibits a person who without permission tampers with a meter “by any means whatsoever” so that it does not measure or record the service furnished. The statute also provides an evidentiary presumption: if a meter has been tampered with in any manner or by any means so that it will not accurately measure or record the full amount of electricity furnished, it may be inferred that the customer to whom such electricity is furnished is the person who tampered with the meter.
It cannot be overemphasized that this evidentiary presumption is actually and simply an inference that is available to the jury in determining who may be responsible for meter tampering. The presumption is a form of evidence; it does not alter the elements of the underlying offense or shift the State’s burden of proof. See State v. Curtis, 148 N.J.Super. 235, 240-41 (App.Div.), certif. den., 75 N.J. 22 (1977). Indeed, the trial court’s charge concerning the presumption conformed to this understanding of its purpose and effect. It did not treat “tampering” as another substantive offense that the jury could consider interchangeably with theft of services. Thus, according to this instruction, the jury could, but was not required to, draw such an inference depending on all of the surrounding circumstances in light of the other evidence.
This understanding of the presumption’s evidentiary purpose is fully expressed in State v. Curtis, supra. There defendant had been convicted of the disorderly persons offense of tampering with an electric meter, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2A:170-64, the statutory predecessor of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-8d. The defendant challenged the constitutionality of that part of the statute permitting “the existence of certain conditions relating to the electric meter and its wiring to constitute ‘presumptive evi*126dence’ that the person to whom the electricity is furnished has created or caused the creation of the prohibited act with intent to defraud.” 148 N.J.Super. at 237. The language establishing the presumption in N.J.S.A. 2A:170-64 is almost identical to that contained in N.J.S.A. 2C:20-8c and d. The court concluded that the presumption contained therein was in fact constitutional, observing that “[t]he significant test of constitutionality under due process is whether the factual inference permitted by the statute can be said to be a rational one based upon human experience.” 148 N.J.Super. at 238. The court reached the following conclusion regarding the presumption:
In view of the preconditions, to the application of the inference it is our conclusion with substantial assurance that it is more likely than not that the customer participated in the tampering resulting in the failure of the meter to record fully the current supplied to that customer, with the fraudulent intent of depriving the electric utility of the proper compensation for its services. Such an inference is rational when tested by human conduct and experience, for the only person who would usually be motivated to tamper with a meter is the one who would profit financially from such tampering. [Id. at 239-40.]
The question presented is whether the presumption of owner-customer responsibility for utility meter tampering, which is expressly applicable to the disorderly persons offenses of meter tampering with intent to defraud under N.J.S.A. 2C:20-8c and d, is by implication applicable to the crime of theft of the utility’s services under N.J.S.A. 2C:20-8a when such theft is accomplished by means of meter tampering.
The majority acknowledges that “the logic of the situation suggests that the presumption ought to apply as well to the higher degree theft crime. After all, most homeowners do not alter meters for benign purposes.” Ante at 116. It resists the commonsense and logic of this position, however, because it is “not found in the language of the statute.” Ibid. The Court seems to assume that because the presumption is not expressly set forth in the theft-of-service sections, the Legislature intended to exclude it. However, the Court makes too much of the textual location of the statutory presumption, failing to appreciate the Code’s own interpretative rules. These rules make it *127clear that the classification and arrangement of sections, and presumably subsections, are made only for the “purpose of convenience, reference and orderly arrangement” and not for purposes of “legislative construction.” N.J.S.A. 2C:l-lf. Moreover, the Code itself directs that its provisions are to be construed “according to the fair import of their terms” and “to further the general purposes” governing the definition of offenses, which include those that “give fair warning of the nature of the conduct proscribed” and “differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor offenses.” N.J.S.A. 2C:l-2a(4), (5); 2C:l-2c.
As observed by the Appellate Division, these interpretative rules underscore the “court’s responsibility ‘to give harmonizing construction to legislation and to read it so as to give effect to all of its provisions and to the legislators will.’ ” Dixon, 220 N.J.Super. at 557 (quoting State v. Channel Home Centers, 199 N.J.Super. 483, 489 (App.Div.), certif. den., 93 N.J. 253 (1985)). Similarly, the Appellate Division observed that
“[p]ortions of a statute should not be viewed in isolation, but rather in relation to the whole and each part should be so interpreted as to harmonize with the others.” 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law, § 12, p. 61 (14th ed. 1987). Thus, “[w]here a choice must be made between two imperfect interpretations, the view should be selected which more likely accords with the probable legislative intent.” County of Monmouth v. Wissell, 68 N.J. 35, 43 (1975). Indeed, a court may even delete or disregard statutory language when justifiable to fulfill the ascertained legislative intent. Id. at 44. [220 N.J.Super. at 558.]
As noted, the majority believes that aside from the textual location of the presumption, its plain language renders it inapplicable to theft-of-services offenses. However, the language of the presumption does not dictate the conclusion drawn by the Court. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-8e expresses the presumption as follows: “the existence of any of the conditions with reference to meters, pipes, conduits or attachments described in this section” is presumptive evidence of customer tampering. The reference to “this section” functions only to describe the presumption: the “conditions” that give rise to the presumption are those specified in the “section.” Those “conditions” relate *128to tampering with a meter in any way. When these conditions exist they constitute presumptive evidence that the customer did the tampering with the intent to defraud the utility. In short, the reference to “section” specifies the existence of the presumption, not its application; it does not indicate which offenses—meter tampering, theft of services, or any other kind of theft—are subject to the presumption.
In addition, the State argues that the use of the word “section” was meant to refer to all of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-8, the theft offenses as well as the meter tampering offenses. This surely is a fair reading of the language. The State points out that the Legislature made some slight amendments in the predecessor disorderly-persons law, N.J.S.A. 2A:170-6 (repealed 1979), changing the reference to “subsection” in carrying it over into N.J.S.A. 2C:20-8d. The State suggests the Legislature obviously intended that the term “subsection” refer to the particular subsection, (a), (b), (c), or (d), and “section” refer to the entire statute. It would follow then that the presumption applies to all theft offenses of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-8. The Appellate Division agreed:
Our reading of the statute is further buttressed by the fact that the prior Title 2A versions of subsections (c) and (d) both employed the phrase, “described in this section” when referring to the applicability of the statutory presumption. See N.J.S.A. 2A:170-63 (repealed in 1979, now subsection (d)). However, when these two sections were transferred into the Code and became subsections of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-8, only the language in subsection (d) was changed. In particular, the language “in this section” was changed to “in this subsection or in subsection (c).” Thus, it may be argued that the Legislature was conscious and aware of the fact that its use of the word, “subsection” referred to the individual paragraphs of the statute and the word, “section” referred to the entire statute in question. [220 N.J.Super. at 558-59 (footnotes omitted).]
The Court’s interpretation does not further the sense of the statute or coincide with the Legislature’s intent in adopting the presumption. As the Curtis court stressed, the 1938 amendment, which created the presumption, was adopted in recognition “of the practical impossibility of proving by direct evidence the actual participation of the consumer in the illegal activity.” 148 N.J.Super. at 240. Thus, as a matter of common sense, *129consistency, and logic, it is anomalous to apply the presumption to the offense of meter tampering done solely to defraud a utility company (subsection (c)), while refusing to apply it to meter tampering done for personal gain (subsection (a)). The incongruity arises because the need for such a presumption or inference applies equally to both offenses, that is, to overcome the “practical impossibility” of proving by direct evidence the actual participation of a consumer in tampering with a utility meter, an impossibility that obtains to the same degree to both offenses. The difficulty the Legislature sought to alleviate by adopting the presumption, namely, the difficulty of proving that the consumer tampered with the meter, will naturally arise in any prosecution that alleges theft of electrical services by means of meter tampering. Unless courts are permitted to consider the presumption, it will be virtually impossible to obtain convictions in such cases. See, e.g., State v. Insabella, 190 N.J.Super. 544, 553 (App.Div.1983).
The majority emphasizes that subsections (a) and (c) of N.J.S. A. 2C:20-8 are distinct provisions and designate distinct crimes and offenses. Ante at 114-17. Yet, as the majority also accurately points out, the Code created, under N.J.S.A. 2C:20-8, “a generic crime of theft of services and defined services to include labor, professional service, transportation, telephone or other public service, accommodation in hotels, restaurants, and so forth.” Ante at 114. Moreover, it is evident that meter tampering, though a disorderly persons offense, could readily be considered a lesser included offense of theft of services by means of meter tampering. See, e.g., State v. Saulnier, 63 N.J. 199 (1973). This is particularly true with respect to the offenses contained under Chapter 20 of the Penal Code. See State v. Talley, 94 N.J. 385 (1983).
The majority’s point would be more telling were we dealing with prior law according to which crimes against property were distinct, and a defendant charged with one theft offense could not be convicted of another. See, e.g., State v. Harrison, 149 N.J.Super. 220 (App.Div.), certif. den., 75 N.J. 525 (1977). *130When the Legislature adopted the Code, however, it consolidated all theft offenses. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(a), provides:
Conduct denominated theft in this chapter constitutes a single offense, but each episode or transaction may be the subject of a separate prosecution and conviction. A ckarge of theft may be supported by evidence that it was committed in any manner that would be theft under this chapter, notwithstanding the specification of a different manner in the indictment or accusation, subject only to the power of the court to ensure fair trial by granting a bill of particulars, discovery, a continuance, or other appropriate relief where the conduct of the defense would be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or by surprise. N.J.S.A. 2C:20-2(a). (Emphasis added)
Thus, applying the language of this provision to this case, the “charge of theft” under 8a “may be supported by evidence that it was committed in any manner that would be [a theft offense] under [8d].” The presumption, being no more than an inference, is clearly “evidence,” and, because it is expressly available to prove the offense of meter tampering, under one provision of section 8, it is also available to support the charge of theft of services under another provision of section 8, by proving that such theft “was committed in a [particular] manner,” i.e., by meter tampering.
Such an application would effectuate the legislative scheme behind the enactment of N.J.S.A. 20:20-8. The Appellate Division noted that “the Criminal Law Revision Committee sought to consolidate under chapter 20 a number of so-called property crimes that had been separately treated in a large number of statutes under Title 2A.” Dixon, supra, 220 N.J.Super. at 555. Among those property crimes that the Commission sought to consolidate under chapter 20 were the crimes of “obtaining property by false pretenses,” contrary to N.J.S.A. 2A:111-1, and “fraudulent tampering” with electric, water, or gas meters, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2A:170-63 and 64. Ibid, (citing II Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission: Commentary at 216-20 (1971)). The court further noted that
with respect to the category described, as “Theft of Services,” the Commission proposed only what eventually were passed as [subsections] a. and b. of N.J.S.A. 2C:20~8. I Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision *131Commission: Report and Penal Code (1971). Before passage, however, the Legislature specifically appended to this statute as [subsections] c. and d., what had previously been treated in N.J.S.A. 2A:170-63 and 64 as disorderly persons offenses. State v. Insabella, 190 N.J.Super. 544, 548 (App.Div.1983). Those statutes were independent of one another under Title 2A and each included the statutory presumption here in issue as a result of a legislative amendment in 1938. State v. Curtis, 148 N.J.Super. 235, 240-41 (App.Div.1977), certif. den., 75 N.J. 22. [Id. at 555-56.]
The Legislature established that all theft offenses are conceptually related notwithstanding differing elements and degrees of culpability. In effect, the Code codifies for all theft offenses the common-law doctrine that a defendant may be found guilty of a lesser offense included in a greater offense charged in the indictment; it statutorily categorizes such offenses as lesser included even though technically their elements may differ. State v. Talley, supra, 94 N.J. at 391 (by virtue of consolidation of theft offenses statute, defendant charged with robbery is on notice that- any conduct denominated as theft is within the four corners of a robbery indictment). We thus recognized in Talley that when a defendant is indicted for one manner of theft under Chapter 8, he or she is on notice that the prosecution may prove a theft offense by a different manner under a different provision of Chapter 8. Ibid. It surely follows that if a defendant is indicted for one manner of theft under Chapter 8, the prosecution may prove a theft offense by the same manner, albeit found under a different provision of Chapter 8. As Talley strongly suggests, in either situation, the defendant must still answer to the ultimate crime of theft.
II.
I subscribe to Judge Scalera’s perception that the Legislature in the enactment of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-8 undertook to deal comprehensively “with the problems of theft and tampering with equipment relating to services supplied by public utilities, whether occasioned through meter tampering or otherwise.” 220 N.J.Super. at 558. I am persuaded, as were the courts below, “that it was clearly the legislative intent to apply the *132statutory presumptions whenever a person was prosecuted for theft of services under N.J.S.A. 2C:20-8,” and that the requisite evidence of meter tampering was produced to trigger its application in this case. Ibid.
For these reasons I would affirm the judgment below. Accordingly, I dissent.
Justices POLLOCK and GARIBALDI join in this opinion.
For reversal and remandment—Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, O’HERN and STEIN—4.
For affirmance—Justices HANDLER, POLLOCK and GARIBALDI—3.