Court Opinion

ID: 9840065
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 05:07:43.474882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:19.098096
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                       UNPUBLISHED
                                                                       September 14, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                      No. 364782
                                                                       Wayne Circuit Court
DANTE PARROTT,                                                         LC No. 22-004797-01-FH

               Defendant-Appellee.

Before: LETICA, P.J., and MURRAY and PATEL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       The prosecution appeals by leave granted1 the trial court’s order granting defendant’s
motion to suppress evidence found pursuant to a traffic stop. For the reasons set forth in this
opinion, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

                                        I. BACKGROUND

        This case arises out of the search of defendant’s vehicle following the initiation of a traffic
stop for speeding. During the initial traffic stop, one of the officers observed an open container of
what appeared to be liquor, in plain sight, on the driver’s side floorboard of defendant’s vehicle.
Defendant was the sole occupant of the vehicle. Defendant was asked to exit, and he was detained.
The ensuing vehicle search revealed a loaded handgun underneath the driver’s seat. Defendant
was issued a civil infraction citation for careless driving, MCL 257.626b, and a misdemeanor
citation for possessing an open container of alcohol in a vehicle, MCL 257.624a. Defendant was
subsequently charged with one count of felon in possession of a firearm (felon-in-possession),
MCL 750.224f, one count of felon in possession of ammunition, MCL 750.224f(6), one count of
carrying a concealed weapon (CCW), MCL 750.227, and two counts of possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b.

1
 See People v Parrott, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered March 30, 2023 (Docket
No. 364782).

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        Following the preliminary examination, defendant moved to suppress evidence of the
firearm recovered during the search of his vehicle on Fourth Amendment grounds. Defendant
argued that the officers did not have probable cause to believe that additional open alcohol
containers would be found in his vehicle after the officers identified the liquor bottle on the driver’s
side floorboard. Defendant asserted that none of the officers articulated that they observed any
other alcohol-related items inside of the vehicle. Defendant maintained that the search of his
vehicle was not justified under the automobile or the search incident to arrest exceptions to the
warrant requirement and thus the evidence was the fruit of an unlawful search and should be
suppressed.

        The prosecution argued that the search of defendant’s vehicle was permissible under the
search incident to arrest exception. The prosecution conceded that the officers did not note any
signs of intoxication, but maintained that the officers were authorized to search the vehicle because
defendant was “objectively under arrest,” having been handcuffed and detained for the violation
of MCL 257.624a, which prohibits the transportation or possession of an open alcohol container
within the passenger area of a motor vehicle. The prosecution asserted that the officer who
recovered the firearm had a reasonable belief that additional evidence relevant to the crime might
be found in the vehicle, such as “additional alcohol bottles, empty cups, the now-broken seal for
the bottle, and a plethora of additional related items.” The prosecution further argued that even if
the search of defendant’s vehicle did not fall under the search incident to arrest exception, the
officers would have inevitably discovered the firearm during the ensuing inventory search and thus
the evidence was admissible under the inevitable-discovery doctrine.

         The trial court held a hearing, and ultimately granted the motion to suppress. The court
first noted it was proceeding under the assumption that defendant committed a traffic violation to
justify the initial stop. The court opined, “I can’t presume that it was a search incident to arrest,
because nobody had actually indicated the defendant was under arrest for open alcohol . . . in the
vehicle, at that time. And in fact, the alcohol, the bottle wasn’t even recovered until after the
search begins.” The court further determined that the inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply
either. Based on the facts, the court concluded that exclusion of the evidence was the proper
remedy. The prosecution now appeals.

                                           B. ANALYSIS

        The prosecution argues that the officers were authorized to search defendant’s vehicle
under the automobile exception because the partially full bottle of suspected liquor was in plain
sight and the officers had probable cause to believe that the passenger compartment of the vehicle
might have contained additional contraband, such as other open alcohol containers. We agree.

        We review de novo a trial court’s ultimate decision on a motion to suppress, People v
Moorman, 331 Mich App 481, 484; 952 NW2d 597 (2020), but we review for clear error any
factual findings, People v Elliott, 494 Mich 292, 300; 833 NW2d 284 (2013). “A trial court’s
factual findings are clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm
conviction that the trial court made a mistake.” People v Pippen, 509 Mich 999; 974 NW2d 241
(2022) (cleaned up). Underlying questions of law are reviewed de novo. People v Corr, 287 Mich
App 499, 506; 788 NW2d 860 (2010).

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        The United States and Michigan Constitutions both guarantee a right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. US Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11; Herring v United
States, 555 US 135, 136; 129 S Ct 695; 172 L Ed 2d 496 (2009); People v Slaughter, 489 Mich
302, 310-311; 803 NW2d 171 (2011). The lawfulness of a search or seizure is grounded in its
reasonableness; whether a search is reasonable depends on the totality of the circumstances.
People v Collins, 298 Mich App 458, 467; 828 NW2d 392 (2012). A search without a warrant is
presumptively unreasonable, unless there exists both probable cause and a circumstance
establishing an exception to the warrant requirement. People v Moorman, 331 Mich App 481,
485; 952 NW2d 597 (2020). Generally, evidence obtained during an unconstitutional search is
barred from admission as substantive evidence in criminal proceedings. Moorman, 331 Mich App
at 485.

        In this case, it is undisputed that the search of defendant's vehicle was conducted without
a search warrant. When a warrantless search is contested, the prosecution bears the burden “to
establish an exception to the warrant requirement[.]” People v Cartwright, 454 Mich 550, 561;
563 NW2d 208 (1997). “While many warrantless searches are unreasonable pursuant to the
warrant requirement, the United States Supreme Court has articulated several instances in which
warrantless searches are reasonable.” Slaughter, 489 Mich at 311 (citation omitted). One
exception is the plain-view doctrine, which “allows police officers to seize, without a warrant,
items in plain view if the officers are lawfully in a position from which they view the item, and if
the item’s incriminating character is immediately apparent.” People v Champion, 452 Mich 92,
101; 549 NW2d 849 (1996). And “information gleaned as a result of observation of an object in
plain or open sight can form the basis of probable cause or reasonable suspicion to proceed
further.” People v Barbee, 325 Mich App 1, 8; 923 NW2d 601 (2018), citing Texas v Brown, 460
US 730, 738 n 4; 103 S Ct 1535; 75 L Ed 2d 502 (1983) (“The information obtained as a result of
observation of an object in plain sight may be the basis for probable cause or reasonable suspicion
of illegal activity.”).

         Another well-established exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement is the
automobile exception, under which “the police may search a motor vehicle without the necessity
of first obtaining a warrant if probable cause to support the search exists.” People v Kazmierczak,
461 Mich 411, 418-419; 605 NW2d 667 (2000). See also Pennsylvania v Labron, 518 US 938,
940; 116 S Ct 2485; 135 L Ed 2d 1031 (1996) (“If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists
to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the vehicle
without more.”).“If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the
search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.”
United States v Ross, 456 US 798, 825; 102 S Ct 2157; 72 L Ed 2d 572 (1982) (emphasis added).
“[C]ontraband goods concealed and illegally transported in an automobile or other vehicle may be
searched for without a warrant,” and when liquor is involved, the “measure of legality” is whether
the police have “probable cause for believing that the automobile . . . has contraband liquor therein
which is being illegally transported.” Carroll v United States, 267 US 132, 153-156; 45 S Ct 280;
69 L Ed 543 (1925).

        Probable cause exists when “there is a ‘substantial basis’ for inferring a ‘fair probability’
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Kazmierczak, 461
Mich at 417-418 n 4 (citation omitted). Probable cause is determined by considering the “totality-
of-the-circumstances” and making “a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the

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circumstances . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found
in a particular place.” Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213, 238; 103 S Ct 2317; 76 L Ed 2d 527 (1983).
See also Kazmierczak, 461 Mich at 423 n 11 (“Probable cause is traditionally determined on the
basis of the totality of the circumstances.”) (citing Gates, 462 US at 238). “[P]robable cause is a
fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not
readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Gates, 462 US at 232. Regardless
of the subjective beliefs of the police officers, the probable-cause determination is an objective
inquiry. Ross, 456 US at 808.

        In this case, the prosecution argues that the officers had probable cause to believe defendant
violated MCL 257.624a(1)2, a misdemeanor offense, based on their observation of an open bottle
of liquor on the driver’s side floorboard, and were consequently permitted to search the vehicle for
additional evidence of open or uncapped containers of alcohol or other intoxicants. We agree.

         The evidentiary record indicates that defendant was initially seized for speeding and
swerving erratically. During the subsequent traffic stop, the officers observed a partially full glass
bottle, in plain sight, on the driver’s side floorboard. The bottle was the shape and design of a
traditional liquor container, and held a clear liquid. Based on this evidence in plain view, the
officers had probable cause to believe that defendant may have been driving unlawfully with an
open alcohol container, in violation of MCL 257.624a(1). After observing the suspected open
liquor bottle, the officers also had probable cause to suspect that the passenger compartment might
contain additional contraband such as other open alcohol containers—particularly in those areas
of the compartment within defendant’s reach. The firearm was recovered underneath the driver’s
seat, which was close to the open liquor bottle, and in an area that would have been easily
accessible to defendant. Under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had probable cause
to justify the warrantless search under the driver’s seat pursuant to the automobile exception. See
Ross, 456 US at 823, 825; Carroll, 267 US at 153-159. Accordingly, the trial court erred by
granting the motion to suppress.

       Reversed and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                              /s/ Anica Letica
                                                              /s/ Christopher M. Murray
                                                              /s/ Sima G. Patel

2
 MCL 257.624a(1) states, in pertinent part, that “ . . .a person who is an operator or occupant shall
not transport or possess alcoholic liquor in a container that is open or uncapped or upon which the
seal is broken within the passenger area of a vehicle upon a highway, or within the passenger area
of a moving vehicle in any place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor
vehicles, including an area designated for the parking of vehicles, in this state.”

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