Court Opinion

ID: 9791895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:20:13.203221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:39.272340
License: Public Domain

EDMONDS, J.,
dissenting.
The majority concludes that mother has wilfully neglected her children under ORS 109.324, because she “refused to do the things that could have led the court to remove th[e] restriction [of her visitation rights] — to acknowledge responsibility for her sexual abuse of Benjamin and to obtain sex offender specific treatment.” 104 Or App at 90. By this holding, the majority legislates new meaning into ORS 109.324, which provides, in part:
“If either parent is believed to have wilfully * * * neglected without just and sufficient cause to have provided proper care and maintenance for the child for one year next preceding the filing of the petition for adoption, * * * the consent of the parent at the discretion of the court is not required and, * * * the court shall have authority to proceed [with the adoption] regardless of the objection of such parent. In determining whether the parent has wilfully * * * neglected without just and sufficient cause to provide proper care and maintenance for the child, the court may disregard incidental visitations, communications and contributions.”
The majority’s holding is without precedent. In *91Dunne v. McCashum, 13 Or App 66, 508 P2d 821 (1973), we said:
“Neglect, to be ‘without just and sufficient cause,’ must be ‘intentional, deliberate or wilful.’ Wilcox v. Alexander et ux, 220 Or 509, 515, 349 P2d 862 (1960). That is, the failure to provide support and care must be voluntary and knowing.
“The cases do not precisely delineate the quantum, or type of neglect which will satisfy the statute and obviate the necessity of obtaining the parent’s consent to the adoption. Such an accurate definition is probably impossible.
“Under our statute a petitioner is not required to prove that the respondent parent intended to abandon all parental rights. See, State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Draper, 7 Or App 497, 491 P2d 215 (1971), Sup Ct review denied (1972). The cases focus on certain minimal expressions of concern, which, if present, indicate that the parent has not neglected the child within the meaning of ORS 109.324.
“For example, this court has previously denied adoptions when the objecting parent has frequently visited the child, see Eacret v. Dews, 10 Or App 511, 500 P2d 481, Sup Ct review denied (1972), or where the parent at least knows who is keeping the child, and that the child is receiving adequate care. See, State ex rel Juv. Dept v. Mack, 12 Or App 570, 507 P2d 1161 (1973); Drake v. Drake, 8 Or App 57, 491 P2d 1203 (1971), Sup Ct review denied (1972); Smith v. Green, 4 Or App 533, 480 P2d 437 (1971).” 13 Or App at 70. (First emphasis supplied; second emphasis in original.)
Thus, we have always evaluated the presence or absence of minimal expressions of parental concern in terms of money payments or personal contacts. Chaffin v. Palumbo, 99 Or App 312, 315,781 P2d 1247 (1989). Moreover, as we said in Mead v. Roberts, 74 Or App 238, 242, 702 P2d 1134 (1985):
“The absence of such minimal expressions may be tempered by facts showing that a parent’s financial hardship resulted in the inability to provide monetary support, see State ex rel Juv. Dept. v. Mack, 12 Or App 570, 574, 507 P2d 1161 (1973), or by a showing that lack of visitation resulted from an unwarranted degree of constraint imposed by the custodial parent. See Cramer v. Leistikow, 37 Or App 539, 542-43, 588 P2d 53 (1978).”
Here, in the year preceding the filing of the adoption petition, mother was under no obligation to pay and did not pay any support. However, she knew where her children were *92at all times and that they were receiving excellent care. During that time, she was prohibited by a court order from visiting her children. In November, 1987, she attempted to establish phone contact with the children but was rebuffed by father. One month later, mother moved the court to hold father in contempt for not allowing the telephone calls. The court did not rule on that motion until March, 1988, when it declined to hold father in contempt and granted his motion to modify the decree to forbid any future telephone contact. During that time, mother continued to write to her sons on a monthly basis and regularly inquired of third parties as to their well-being.
Also, in the fall of 1987, mother moved to have a new court-appointed therapist and submitted a list of names to the court for approval. The court ordered a substitute, and in June, 1988, mother submitted to a sex offender evaluation, which concluded that she was “untreatable * * * because her denial, lack of motivation and uncooperativeness.” Nonetheless, it stated that, “[u]nless the [children] expressed no interest in seeing their mother, or their behavior deteriorated significantly following visits, then they should probably be permitted to resume contact. This should not depend on [mother’s] entering therapy.” After the report, mother moved the court to grant her limited, supervised visitation rights. Four days later, father and his new wife filed this petition for adoption.
This case is analogous to Tallman v. Bantsari, 29 Or App 747, 564 P2d 1371 (1977), where the mother refused to comply with visitation requirements in the dissolution judgment. At the father’s behest, the trial court modified the decree to eliminate the requirement that he pay child support. Thereafter, he never paid support and did not visit his children, although he continued “to desire visitation and maintenance of his familiar relationship with his children.” 29 Or App at 749. We affirmed the denial of a petition for adoption, saying:
“Failure to pay support and failure to visit with the children do not necessarily constitute wilful desertion or neglect without just and sufficient cause as contemplated by ORS 109.324. We have so held where the no-support/no-visitation arrangement is induced by the custodial parent, Mahoney v. Linder, 14 Or App 656, 514 P2d 901 (1973), and it is all the *93more true where, as here, the lack of contact between noncustodial parent and children is due to the conduct of the custodial parent and the order of the court over the desires of the noncustodial parent to the contrary.” 29 Or App at 750. (Emphasis supplied.)
The majority also ignores our analysis in DaCosta v. Adams, 67 Or App 84, 677 P2d 65 (1984), where the father had filed a petition for adoption over the protests of the mother. Although the decree of dissolution gave her no visitation rights, she periodically, although irregularly, called her child. She made an unsuccessful attempt to visit her child, after which she filed a petition to modify the decree to provide her visitation rights. A short time later, the father filed the petition for adoption. We said:
“[Mother’s] efforts to enjoy visitation * * * cannot be ignored. From her subsequent effort to establish regular visitation through modification of the dissolution decree, which antedated the filing of the adoption proceedings, we infer a genuine concern for maintaining and strengthening the parent-child bond.” 67 Or App at 88. (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, it is undeniable that mother continues to desire visitation and maintenance of her relationship with her children. As detailed above, she made several attempts to contact her children during the year before the petition was filed. Father, however, prohibited her from talking to the children and obtained a court order that forbade telephone calls and continued in effect a previous order that restricted mother from having any personal contact with the children, unless she were to obtain court-approved counseling.
The majority makes much of the fact that mother did not acknowledge her sexual abuse of Benjamin and obtain sex offender treatment. Mother attempted to obtain treatment that did not require her to admit that she had abused Benjamin. The court declined to approve that treatment program. I agree that mother’s admitting that she had abused Benjamin was an important consideration in structuring visitation rights that were in his best interests, but her failure to do so is not “neglect” within the meaning of ORS 109.324. To the contrary, her attempts to have visitation with her children by vigorously pursuing her legal remedies during the pertinent one-year period meet the statutory test of minimal expressions of concern.
*94There may be salutary ends that the majority seeks to obtain by terminating mother’s rights. There is little emotional support for a mother who sexually abuses her child and then refuses to obtain treatment that will rehabilitate her. More is at stake here. Whether such conduct justifies termination of parental rights is a legislative decision, and we are not authorized to extend the language of the law beyond its natural meaning in order for us to accomplish what we think is a just result. Union Pac. R. R. Co. v. Anderson, 167 Or 687, 697, 120 P2d 578 (1942). As the Supreme Court said in Moody v. Voorhies, 257 Or 105, 111, 475 P2d 579 (1970), we are bound by the language of ORS 109.324 and cannot rearrange parent-child relationships except when the statutory criteria have been met. The failure to obtain sex offender treatment is not' “neglect” under any ordinary meaning of the word.
Non-custodial parents should beware. Under the majority’s holding, if they disagree with or fail to comply with any court ordered obligation, regardless of whether they have endeavored to express minimal concerns about their children in all other available ways, they stand the risk of losing their parental rights. The legislature did not intend that result, and we should not expand ORS 109.324 to achieve it.
Joseph, C. J., and Buttler and Warren, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.