Court Opinion

ID: 7887876
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-08 21:44:37.203997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:31:48.558850
License: Public Domain

The opinion of the court was delivered by
Valentine, J.:
This action was commenced originally as an action to quiet title, in which the plaintiff in error was the plaintiff and the defendant in error was the defendant. Service of summons was obtained only by publication. The title was quieted in the plaintiff upon a default on the part of the defendant, and immediately afterward the plaintiff sold and conveyed the land to an innocent purchaser. The judgment was afterward opened under § 77 of the civil code. The defendant answered, setting up that she owned the land, and asking for damages. Judgment was afterward rendered in her favor, and the plaintiff now seeks a reversal thereof in this court. The plaintiff claims the land under a tax deed executed to Charles S. Kenderdine, and through intermediate conveyances down to himself. The defendant claims the land under the original patent issued by the United States to John Bement, and through intermediate conveyances dqwn to herself.
1. Tax deed-insufficient proof of existence. The first question presented to this court for consideration is, whether the tax deed under which the plaintiff claims is valid. He proved his tax deed only by a supposed record copy of the same found in the office of the register of deeds. This copy purports to show that the tax deed was acknowledged before the probate judge of Coffey county, but it does not show that such probate judge ever attached the seal of his office to the acknowledgment. Without this seal, or some showing that the seal had been attached to the acknowledgment, the record of the deed is void, (See Meskimen v. Day, 35 Kas. 46, and the statutes hereafter cited.) And even the deed itself without the *768seal would be no evidence of title, and would probably be void. (See act relating to taxation, §.138; act relating to conveyances, §§ 7,15, 19 and 27, and other sections from 7 to 27; and the act relating to probate courts, § 2.)
There are other questions presented with reference to the tax deed, but as no valid proof was introduced in the court below that any tax deed of any kind was ever executed, it is unnecessary to consider them.
2. Power of attorney-certain facts not proved by recitals. The next question to be considered is, whether the defendant proved by any competent evidence that she had any title to the land. We think that she did not. It is admitted that the title to the land was originally in John Bement, and the defendant, in order to show that the title passed from him to her by a chain of intermediate conveyances, introduced in evidence, among other papers, what purported to be a power of attorney to make a deed, and a deed from heirs of John Bement; but there was no evidence introduced outside of this power of attorney and this deed that tended to prove that John Bement was dead, or that he had any heirs, or who his heirs were if he had any, or that the persons who executed this power of attorney and this deed were his heirs. And certainly, recitals in a power of attorney to make a deed of conveyance of land and in the deed stating that the persons executing the power of attorney and the deed are the heirs of a person who previously owned the 1 ^ land, are not sufficient evidence as against a stranger to these instruments of the death of the supposed ancestor, or that the persons represented to be his heirs are in fact his heirs. (Costello v. Burke, 63 Iowa, 361; same case, 19 N. W. Rep. 247; Potter v. Washburn, 13 Vt. 558; same case, 37 Am. Dec. 615.) There-is no evidence that John Bement himself ever executed any power of attorney, or any deed, or any other instrument affecting his real estate. The foregoing power of attorney, purporting to have been executed by the heirs of John Bement, was executed May 25, 1869, and the above-mentioned deed was executed August 2, 1869, and both were recorded on April 19, 1870; but no *769person ever took or held the possession of the property under either of these instruments; and the final trial in this case, at which both these instruments were introduced in evidence, was had in April, 1887. Evidently neither this power of attorney, nor the deed, nor the record thereof, can be considered as an ancient document, and could not be introduced in evidence or considered under the rules of evidence relating to ancient documents; and evidently there is sufficient evidence in existence to show whether John Bement is dead or not, and if dead, who are his heirs.
There are other questions presented in this case, but with the views we have taken of the questions already discussed, we think it is unnecessary to consider the other questions.
The judgment of the court below will be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.
All the Justices concurring.