Court Opinion

ID: 9639090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:04:24.364629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:12.334623
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
DEL SOLE, P.J.:
¶ 1 I dissent. I do not agree that the powers of sheriffs in enforcing the law extend to the actions taken in this case. In my view, those investigatory actions are exclusively the province of police officers, as defined by the General Assembly following Commonwealth v. Leet, 537 Pa. 89, 641 A.2d 299 (1994), when it passed into law a definition of “Police Officer” which specifically includes “the sheriff of a county of the second class and deputy sheriffs of a county of the second class who have successfully completed the requirements of the ... Municipal Police Education and Training Law.”6 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 103. Using the statutory construction canon ex-pressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of sheriffs in second-class counties implies the exclusion of sheriffs in all other counties. I note Allegheny County is the only current second-class county in Pennsylvania. See The Pennsylvania Manual, Vol. 116, December 2003, Section 6-3. Although the notes in the consolidated statutes offer no explanation for this distinction, it is my understanding that the distinction was made because Allegheny County was the only county in which sheriffs were required to undergo training pursuant to the Municipal Police Education and Training Law.
¶ 2 The Majority finds Section 103’s definition irrelevant where the Controlled Substances Act grants powers of enforcement to “law enforcement agencpes]” and not to police officers; however, I can not overlook the legislature’s post-Leei action when considering sheriffs’ powers.7
¶ 3 The Majority appears to agree with the spirit of the legislature’s distinction; its holding limits the proper exercise of identified powers to sheriffs who have been properly trained. I would agree that training is a critical area of inquiry. Leet is instructive in its consideration of the training requirements to properly execute powers granted by common law. The Court noted:
It has been argued that to protect public safety, anyone who enforces the motor vehicle laws should be required to undergo training appropriate to the duties. It is certainly within the proper function of government and in keeping with the realities of the modern world to require adequate training of those who enforce the law with firearms. Policemen, to whom the legislature has given primary responsibility for enforcement of the motor vehicle code, are required by statute to undergo formal training prior to enforcing the law. We deem this requirement to apply equally to sheriffs who enforce motor vehicle laws. Thus a sheriff or deputy sheriff would be required to complete the same type of training that is required of police officers throughout the Commonwealth.
Leet, 641 A.2d at 303 (footnotes omitted).
¶ 4 The Leet court specifically referenced the Municipal Police Officers’ Education and Training Act. The ultimate result in Leet was a remand for determination of whether the sheriff had re*696ceived “appropriate law enforcement training” to enforce the Motor Vehicle Code. Id. In DOT, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Kline, 559 Pa. 646, 741 A.2d 1281 (1999), the Supreme Court explained that, while no specifically defined training is necessary to comply with Leet, a sheriffs training must be of the same type a municipal police officer would receive, particularly on the same subject matter. In Leet and Kline, the subject matter was the Motor Vehicle Code. The Kline court explained that the deputy sheriff had received the same training and courses on the Motor Vehicle Code and DUI as a municipal police cadet, thus satisfying the requirement of Leet.
¶5 Thus, if we were to use Leet to determine a sheriffs power to conduct an investigation like the one in this appeal, we would need to examine what, if any, training is received by sheriffs in the relevant field, namely criminal investigations. We know municipal police officers are trained in this area. See 37 Pa.Code § 203.51(b)(ll). A proper analysis would require findings on the training requirements for both sheriffs and municipal police officers. The Majority relies on the fact that the deputy sheriffs who initiated the investigation in this case may have had municipal police training because they had other jobs as police officers; however, I would find these individuals’ experience is irrelevant in determining sheriffs’ powers in general.
¶ 6 Further, I do not find that the holding in Leet leads to the conclusion reached by the Majority. Leet’s holding is limited to circumstances not present in this case. Justice Flaherty, writing for the Majority, found the common law powers of a sheriff to make warrantless arrests for breaches of the peace committed in the sheriffs presence extended to making arrests for motor vehicle violations committed in the presence of a sheriff.8 In this case, the sheriffs were conducting an investigation, thus looking for a breach of the peace, not witnessing one.
¶ 7 I also find that Commonwealth v. Lockridge, 570 Pa. 510, 810 A.2d 1191 (2002), does not lend support for the Majority’s holding. Unlike in Lockridge, no rules pertaining to the objected-to exercised powers identify law enforcement officers (or sheriffs) as holders of such powers.
¶ 8 Accordingly, while I find the Majority’s reliance on Leet to justify a finding of common law authority for sheriffs to exercise the powers exercised in this case improper and, at a minimum, incomplete, I would find no authority, based on the General Assembly’s post-Leei statutory pronouncement.

. See 37 Pa.Code § 203.1 et seq, MUNICIPAL POLICE OFFICERS’ EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAM.

. I note the Majority does not discuss the definition of the Act’s specified "law enforcement agency” but solely focuses on “law enforcement officer.”

. Commonwealth v. Taylor, 450 Pa.Super. 583, 677 A.2d 846 (1996), cited by the Majority as analogous to this case, also involved a "breach of the peace” committed in the presence of a constable.