Court Opinion

ID: 9449779
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:22:18.276461+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:58.654445
License: Public Domain

JOHNSEN, Chief Judge
(concurring).
For purposes of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2, the term “monopoly” is antithetic to the term “competition”. On this basis, it is perhaps possible to contend that only one engaged in business in the field involved, either actually or representatively, so as to have a competitive interest therein, can become a monopolist.1 The effect of this would be that one not thus engaged, so that the object of eliminating competi*778tion as to his situation is not involved, could be subject to the operation of § 2 only on the basis of his having participated in a conspiracy with someone in the business (other persons also might be involved, of course) to help bring about such a monopoly in the field.
Here, as the majority opinion points out, the National Wrestling Alliance was not entitively engaged in the business of booking, promoting or exhibiting wrestling matches. Looking, however, at what I believe the evidence would have permitted it to be found that the nature and purpose of the Alliance really were —a group of bookers, promoters and exhibitors joining together for control and protection; the association not being intended to have any corporate functions as such; and the object of membership being to make their underlying agreement or understanding work — I am not certain but that the Alliance could be regarded as representatively having a competitive interest and a monopoly power as to the wrestling game.
I do not deem it necessary, however, to deal further with this question. There was a lack of focus upon any definite theory on which the Alliance was contended to be a monopolist, so that no intelligible basis was afforded for the Court to submit the question generally and have the jury pass upon it in that manner. On the abstractness of the evidence and the instructions, I agree that the judgment is entitled to be reversed, for the Court’s general submission of the issue.
As to the question of conspiracy to monopolize, the majority opinion recognizes that the Court had a right to submit that issue as it did, and I shall therefore not engage in any further discussion of it.
I concur also in a reversal as to the question of damages, on the ground that the verdict did not respond to the probative aspects and realities of the evidence. The question here is not one of dealing with excessiveness as such, but with the jury’s ignoring of the tangible limitations of the situation.
What was involved was Myers’ alleged loss of earnings as a wrestler and profits as a promoter. As to the latter item, if it stood alone, I should not hesitate too much on whether the $5,000.00 allowed could be said to have some semblance of rational basis on his testimony. On the loss of earnings as a wrestler, however, I am unable to see any semblance of rational basis in his testimony for the $45,000.00 allowed.
From Myers’ own figures, what the situation got down to was not that his earnings had actually diminished, but that he had had to work harder and longer to keep up the amount. On the “gasoline circuit”, with its cheaper and more numerous matches, to which he claimed it was necessary for him to resort because of things done against him, he had to engage in more frequent matches and greater travel in order to keep up his earnings.
He could be allowed damages for the difference in earnings from the kind of matches in which he previously was able to engage and earnings from the kind in which he thereafter had to engage. That difference, however, was not entitled to be viewed on the basis of the greater number of matches in which he was able to and did engage on the “gasoline circuit”, but only on the basis of the number of matches in which he could and would have engaged in the territory from which he claimed to have been excluded. On this basis, I am unable to see how the jury could objectively come forth with a verdict of $45,000.-00 as earnings lost.

. I intend no intimation that I regard such a restrictive concept of the Act as sound.