Court Opinion

ID: 9392754
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-05 22:03:46.972404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:48.539215
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
             in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                            2023 IL App (3d) 200303-U

                                   Order filed May 5, 2023
     _____________________________________________________________________________

                                                       IN THE

                                      APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                                 THIRD DISTRICT

                                                         2023

      NEXT DOOR STORAGE, LLC, and WOLF       )     Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ROAD STORAGE, LLC,                     )     of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
                                             )     Will County, Illinois,
            Plaintiffs-Appellees and         )
            Cross-Appellants,                )
                                             )
            v.                               )     Appeal No. 3-20-0303
                                             )     Circuit No. 10-L-393
                                             )
      DSW ENTERPRISES, LLC; DANIEL S.        )
      WHEATON; KEITH J. WARPINSKI; and       )
      WHEATLAND STORAGE, INC.,               )
                                             )     Honorable
            Defendants-Appellants and        )     Roger D. Rickmon,
            Cross-Appellees.                 )     Judge, Presiding.
     _____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE DAVENPORT delivered the judgment of the court. 1
            Justices McDade and Brennan concurred in the judgment.
     _____________________________________________________________________________

                                                     ORDER

¶1           Held: The trial court’s determination that plaintiffs failed to prove their damages was
                   against the manifest weight of the evidence. The amount of attorney fees awarded
                   to plaintiffs was reasonable. Plaintiffs are entitled to their reasonable attorney fees

             1
              This case was originally assigned to a different panel, and oral arguments were heard on December
     7, 2021. On December 23, 2022, the case was reassigned to the current panel, which has listened to the oral
     arguments.
                    incurred in relation to this appeal. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
                    with directions.

¶2          This appeal and cross-appeal—the second appeal and cross-appeal in this case (see Next

     Door Storage, LLC, v. DSW Enterprises, LLC, 2019 IL App (3d) 160473-U)—arises out of a

     breach-of-contract claim involving the sale of a storage business and the land upon which it

     operated. We must determine whether the trial court erred, on remand from our prior order, when

     it (1) found plaintiffs, Next Door Storage, LLC, and Wolf Road Storage, LLC, failed to prove their

     breach-of-contract damages; (2) awarded plaintiffs, under an indemnity provision in the parties’

     contract, $410,557.80 in attorney fees; and (3) denied defendants, DSW Enterprises, LLC, Daniel

     S. Wheaton, Keith J. Warpinski, and Wheatland Storage, Inc., fees under a prevailing-party fee-

     shifting provision in the contract. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and

     remand for the trial court to award plaintiffs their reasonable attorney fees incurred in connection

     with this appeal.

¶3                                           I. BACKGROUND

¶4          The litigation in this case was protracted and has produced a record exceeding 4000 pages.

     Though the issues on appeal are limited, we set forth additional facts to provide context to the

     parties’ contentions, borrowing from our prior decision.

¶5                                               A. The Land

¶6          The land at issue is located in unincorporated Will County. It consists of two separate,

     adjacent tracts, each having its own property index number (PIN). The southern tract is

     approximately 5 acres, and the northern tract is approximately 2½ acres. At the time of the sale,

     the southern tract was improved by eight self-storage buildings, a small office building, and 54

     gravel parking spaces for outdoor recreational vehicle (RV) storage. The northern tract was

     unimproved.
                                                       2
¶7            At all pertinent times in this matter, there existed a county lot-coverage ordinance. Under

       the ordinance, impervious lot coverage (i.e., buildings and paved areas, including gravel) is limited

       to 50%. A property owner can obtain an administrative variance from this limit, up to 60%. A

       formal variance, which requires full county board approval, is required to obtain lot coverage

       exceeding 60%.

¶8                          B. Defendants’ Purchase and Development of the Land

¶9            In 1999, Wheaton, a general contractor, and Warpinski, a commercial real estate broker,

       purchased the two tracts and later decided to develop a self-storage facility. In 2000, they engaged

       Geotech, Inc., to develop construction plans. The plans contemplated 11 self-storage buildings,

       driveways, and parking lots on the southern tract and a single 12,000 square foot building and

       parking lot on the northern tract. If completed, the northern and southern tracts would have 23.12%

       and 66.30% lot coverage, respectively. However, the southern tract “borrowed” lot coverage from

       the northern tract, and the tracts combined had approximately 50% lot coverage, as to comply with

       the lot-coverage ordinance.

¶ 10          The county approved the plans, rezoned the land to “I1” (industrial), and issued a special-

       use permit that allowed the operation of a self-storage business on the property. Thereafter, the

       county treated the two tracts as one lot for purposes of zoning, including the lot-coverage

       ordinance. Defendants developed the land but constructed only eight self-storage buildings and a

       separate, small office building on the southern tract, leaving the northern tract unimproved.

       Wheatland began operating the storage business in 2000, after the first buildings were constructed.

       At some point, it began renting gravel parking spaces for outdoor RV storage where the three

       never-built self-storage buildings were laid out in the plans.

                                                         3
¶ 11            In 2004, defendants received notice from the county’s land use department that outdoor

       storage was not permitted on the land. In response, defendants obtained a temporary special-use

       permit allowing outdoor storage, which expired on June 1, 2005. Defendants continued outdoor

       storage after the permit expired but never received any additional notices of violation regarding

       outdoor storage or other aspects of the development.

¶ 12                              C. Defendants’ Sale of the Land to Plaintiffs

¶ 13            Beginning in 2007, Wheaton and Warpinski explored options for further developing or

       selling the property. They engaged Geotech to prepare construction plans for the northern tract. In

       March 2008, Geotech delivered final construction plans to Wheaton and Warpinski. The plans

       contemplated a 27,200 square foot building and parking on the northern tract with 64.32% and

       66.30% lot coverages on the northern and southern tracts, respectively. Combined, the tracts would

       have 65.65% lot coverage, meaning a formal variance would be required to go forward with the

       plans.

¶ 14            Defendants placed a sign on the northern tract, advertising the planned 27,200 square foot

       building, which could be either bought or leased and used as office, retail, or warehouse space.

       But defendants never sought formal approval of the plans. Instead, they marketed the land and

       self- and outdoor-storage business for sale. They listed each tract separately, assigning prices of

       $3.5 million to the southern tract and $700,000 to the northern tract. Warpinski assumed the tracts

       could be sold separately because the tracts had separate PINs. He did not, however, investigate

       potential problems that would arise from separately selling the tracts. At trial, Warpinski said he

       and Wheaton were marketing the property in any way that could generate interest in it.

¶ 15            In September 2008, plaintiffs’ principal, Phil Murphy, and his father, Jack Murphy, took

       interest. According to Phil, all options were on the table—buy both tracts together or either tract

                                                        4
       separately. In an email dated September 1, Warpinski told Phil, “We have built 48000 sq ft with

       room for an additional 32000 sq ft.” At trial, Warpinski explained he arrived at 32,000 square feet

       by totaling the square footage of the buildings that were planned in 2000 but never constructed.

       He did not tell plaintiffs, however, that constructing an additional 32,000 square feet would require

       them to sacrifice some of the lot coverage that was used for outdoor storage.

¶ 16           Phil frequently visited the tracts as he contemplated the purchase. On one visit, he saw the

       advertisement for the 27,200 square foot building on the northern tract and at the time believed

       defendants intended to construct the building.

¶ 17           On September 3, 2008, Phil and Jack met with Wheaton and Warpinski to discuss the sale

       of the land and business. During the meeting, Phil told Wheaton and Warpinski that buying the

       unimproved northern tract and the southern tract would allow him to “build the property and realize

       *** added value.” Phil intended to expand the self-storage capacity on the tracts and believed

       expandability was critical to the sale price. During the meeting, Wheaton tendered Geotech

       construction plans for the tracts. At trial, the Murphys testified Wheaton tendered the 2008 plans,

       and Wheaton testified he tendered the 2000 plans. According to Phil, defendants used the 2008

       plans to show the Murphys what they could potentially construct on the northern tract and told the

       Murphys the county had already reviewed the 2008 plans and the building was ready for

       construction. Wheaton and Warpinski never told the Murphys about the zoning linkage between

       the tracts. The parties ultimately agreed to a price and signed a short-form agreement for the sale

       of both tracts.

¶ 18           After the meeting, Phil visited the land use department to confirm the tracts’ zoning and

       special uses. The land use department provided Murphy with a “Rider 412,” which confirmed he

       was permitted to maintain a self-storage business on the tracts. Around this time, Phil also

                                                        5
       discovered that defendants owned each tract through separate entities. Defendants indicated this

       was necessary for the county to approve their plans and that common ownership would limit those

       plans. Thus, Phil bought each tract through separate entities, Next Door Storage and Wolf Road

       Storage.

¶ 19                                             D. The Contract

¶ 20           On October 24, 2008, the parties executed a contract for the sale of the land and storage

       business. Under the contract, defendants conveyed to plaintiffs the two tracts, the improvements

       thereon, and the assets of the self- and outdoor-storage business. They agreed to a price of

       $3,859,750 and assigned specific values to certain items: (1) $114,875 for the northern tract,

       (2) $594,875 for the southern tract, (3) $800,000 for the existing buildings, (4) $50,000 for

       restrictive covenants applying to Wheaton, Warpinski, and Wheatland Storage, (5) $127,000 for

       Wheatland’s retail inventory, furniture, fixtures, equipment, and intangible assets, and

       (6) $2,173,000 for Wheatland’s goodwill.

¶ 21           The contract included certain warranties, representations, and covenants made by

       defendants. In section 7.10 of the contract, defendants warranted they “ha[d] not received notice

       of and ha[d] no knowledge of any *** ordinance *** or public or private restriction applicable to

       the [tracts] *** which would in any way limit or impede [plaintiffs’] intended use of the [tracts]

       for self storage facilities.”

¶ 22           Before closing, Wheaton and Warpinski signed an affidavit that was incorporated into the

       contract. In paragraph 12 of affidavit, they represented, “Neither [defendants] nor [their] agent has

       received any notice from any *** governmental authority of any violation of any applicable

       dwelling or building code, or any other law or regulation.”

                                                        6
¶ 23           Defendants also obtained from the county a second Rider 412, which again confirmed the

       current use of the property was permitted. Per the contract, they delivered the Rider 412 to

       plaintiffs at closing.

¶ 24           In mid-November 2008, before the closing, Phil met with Jeffrey Allen, a Geotech

       engineer, to determine what could be built on the northern tract. According to Phil, he brought the

       2008 construction plans he received from Wheaton and Warpinski and his own conceptual plans.

       Allen told Phil the county’s zoning ordinance prohibiting lot coverage exceeding 50% but 60%

       coverage was possible under an administrative variance. At trial, Phil said their discussion was

       limited to the northern tract, but Allen recalled that their discussion concerned the entire property.

       At the end of the meeting, Phil directed Allen to prepare a plan to develop the northern parcel with

       lot coverage not exceeding 60%.

¶ 25           The sale closed on November 18, 2008. The day before, on November 17, plaintiffs

       received from defendants (via the title insurer) a copy of the temporary special-use permit that

       allowed the outdoor storage until June 1, 2005. Plaintiffs did not raise the expiration of the permit

       with defendants before closing. Phil explained that he weighed the permit’s stated expiration date

       against several other pieces of evidence which indicated outdoor storage was still permitted:

       (1) two Rider 412s the county had issued before closing, which stated the parcels could be used

       for outdoor storage and the county would honor that special use; (2) his observations that outdoor

       storage was ongoing at the time of the sale; (3) Wheaton and Warpinski’s sworn statement (in the

       affidavit incorporated into the contract) that the current use of the property was permitted under

       the existing zoning laws; and (4) the title insurer’s agreement to insure issues relating to outdoor

       storage.

¶ 26                                          E. Postclosing Events

                                                         7
¶ 27           In December 2008, Allen provided construction plans for the northern tract, which

       contemplated 60% lot coverage, to Phil. In January 2009, Phil met with Brian Radner, a land

       planner and director of the administration and planning division, at the county land use department.

       Radner told Phil the lot-coverage ordinance prohibited him from developing the northern tract to

       the extent Phil anticipated. Phil became “quite upset” when he learned the tracts were treated as

       one lot for zoning purposes and that additional zoning was necessary to develop the northern tract.

       At trial, Radner recalled that defendants also had discussions with the county about separately

       developing the northern tract. He said defendants’ March 2008 construction plans would violate

       the lot-coverage ordinance without a variance.

¶ 28           In March 2009, plaintiffs applied for a building permit on the northern tract, submitting the

       December 2008 plans. In April 2009, the county denied the application due to lot coverage issues

       and suggested plaintiffs apply for a variance to allow 60% lot coverage. In July 2009, plaintiffs

       sought and, in October 2009, received a variance permitting 80% lot coverage.

¶ 29                                       F. The Amended Complaint

¶ 30           In May 2010, plaintiffs sued defendants and, in October 2010, amended their complaint.

       Plaintiffs alleged defendants made untrue representations that constituted a breach of the contract

       (count I), negligent misrepresentation (count II), and fraud (count III). Specifically, plaintiffs

       asserted, in part, defendants falsely represented (1) outdoor storage was a permitted use on the

       tracts despite the special-use permit’s expiration, and (2) the two tracts were not linked for zoning

       purposes and could be independently developed.

¶ 31           In their affirmative defenses, defendants argued plaintiffs waived their right to recover

       because they knew about the lot-coverage and outdoor-storage issues but nevertheless closed the

       sale.

                                                        8
¶ 32                                     G. Motions for Summary Judgment

¶ 33           After lengthy discovery—during which plaintiffs filed several motions to compel and/or

       for sanctions based on defendants’ failure to provide discovery—in June 2014, plaintiffs and

       defendants each moved for summary judgment. Defendants sought judgment on all counts of the

       amended complaint. Plaintiffs sought a finding that defendants breached the contract. After a

       hearing, the trial court granted in part plaintiffs’ motion and denied defendants’ motion. The court

       determined defendants “breach[ed] the provision of the contract relating to knowledge of zoning

       restrictions and use of the property.”

¶ 34                                                 H. Bench Trial

¶ 35           The matter proceeded to a bench trial in July 2015. For reasons not apparent in the record,

       the parties proceeded as if the trial court had not entered summary judgment on the issue of breach.

       The parties presented evidence consistent with that discussed above. At the close of plaintiffs’

       case, defendants moved for a directed finding on all counts of plaintiffs’ complaint. The trial court

       ordered the parties to submit written briefs. It later granted defendants’ motion in part, finding in

       defendants’ favor on count I insofar as that claim was based on the expiration of the outdoor-

       storage permit. In addition, the court found in defendants’ favor on counts II and III. Thus, the

       remaining issue to be determined was whether plaintiffs could establish a compensable breach-of-

       contract claim based on the undisclosed zoning linkage between the tracts, which limited the

       potential lot coverage of any development on the northern tract. 2

               2
                 Our discussion of the motion for a directed finding is based on our statement in the Rule 23 order
       in the prior appeal, which the parties do not dispute. Next Door Storage, 2019 IL App (3d) 160473, ¶ 12
       n.1. The record shows the trial court heard arguments on the motion on August 17, 2015, and took the
       matter under advisement, telling the parties it would issue its ruling the next day in open court. The record
       does not contain a report of the proceedings on August 18. Nor does it contain any written indication of the
       court’s ruling. However, on August 19, the court clarified its ruling, confirming that count I remained
       insofar as it was related to the lot-coverage issues and not the outdoor-storage issues.
                                                            9
¶ 36          During trial, the parties also presented the following evidence on the issue of damages.

       Plaintiffs’ theory was that they were entitled to the difference between the contract price and the

       actual fair market value of the land on the date of the contract (October 24, 2008).

¶ 37                                            1. Rodney Tonelli

¶ 38          Rodney Tonelli, plaintiffs’ land-planning expert, reviewed and calculated the lot coverage

       of defendants’ 2000 construction plans, defendants’ March 2008 construction plans, and a survey

       that was prepared in advance of the closing. Tonelli testified that, if the 2000 plans were completed,

       the northern and southern tracts would have 23.12% and 66.30% lot coverage, respectively.

       Combined, the tracts would have 51.92% lot coverage. To receive approval, the southern tract

       could “borrow” lot coverage from the northern tract. Tonelli agreed the 2000 construction plans

       “presumably” complied with the lot-coverage ordinance, because the county had approved them.

¶ 39          Defendants’ March 2008 construction plans contemplated 64.32% and 66.30% lot

       coverage on the northern and southern tracts, respectively. Combined, the tracts would have

       65.65% lot coverage.

¶ 40          The survey showed nothing was ever built on the northern tract, so it had zero lot coverage.

       The southern tract, as improved, had approximately 65.26% lot coverage, and it was borrowing

       coverage from the northern tract. Because defendants did not fully complete the 2000 plans, the

       tracts had a combined lot coverage of less than 50%, as to comply with the ordinance.

¶ 41          Tonelli concluded that the tracts, though separate legal parcels, were treated as one parcel

       for purposes of zoning. Further, the southern tract’s compliance with the lot-coverage ordinance

       depended on limited development of the northern tract. Tonelli agreed it was “probably true” a lay

       person could not discern the tracts were linked for zoning purposes.

¶ 42                                            2. Janet Sallander

                                                        10
¶ 43          Janet Sallander, plaintiffs’ expert real-estate appraiser who specialized in self-storage

       facilities, provided valuation testimony. According to Sallander, an existing self-storage facility’s

       cash flow is the most important factor when evaluating the facility because they are bought for

       their income potential. Thus, “[t]he value of the land by itself [was not] necessarily important,”

       but rather, its ability to generate income.

¶ 44          Phil retained Sallander to provide a retrospective market value of the property as of October

       24, 2008 (the contract date), using four different valuation scenarios that Phil provided, two of

       which are relevant to this appeal. Sallander reviewed information, as of the valuation date,

       concerning the subject property area and the market in general, facilities comparable to the subject

       property, and land values in the area. She also reviewed public information, including the county

       assessor’s records, the zoning records, and the assessor’s and tax records for the comparable sales

       and land sales. Finally, she reviewed information provided to her, including Tonelli’s report, the

       property’s September 2008 rent roll, and an appraisal prepared before the closing by Kent Steele,

       which contained 2008 market data. Sallander valued the property using both a sales-comparison

       approach and an income-capitalization approach. In reaching her ultimate conclusions, she placed

       more weight on the income-capitalization approach, because it is better suited for valuing self-

       storage facilities given its reliance on net operating income, that is, net cash flow after expenses.

       See Black’s Law Dictionary 913 (11th ed. 2019). Sallander prepared a 142-page report detailing

       the bases for her conclusions.

¶ 45          In the first valuation scenario, Sallander valued the property as represented by defendants:

       developable to the extent contemplated in their March 2008 construction plans. Thus, she assumed

       (1) “[t]he RV storage income that was reported and in place as of [October 24, 2008] was legally

       permitted to continue, and (2) the northern tract was “excess land” that “could be sold off

                                                        11
       separately or developed with additional self-storage units or other improvements,” which “could

       have impervious lot coverage of approximately 70,785 square feet” (as calculated by Tonelli).

       Under this scenario, the sales-comparison approach produced a value of $3,850,000, and the

       income-capitalization approach produced a value of $3,750,000. Sallander opined that the value

       of the property was $3,775,000, which was a weighted reconciliation of those values. In reaching

       this conclusion, she valued the northern tract, as excess land, at $560,000. Sallander concluded,

       based on this scenario, the contract price ($3,859,750) was consistent with the market if the land

       was as represented.

¶ 46          In the second valuation scenario, Sallander valued the property as it actually was on the

       date of the contract: developable, per the lot-coverage ordinance, to a combined lot coverage of

       50%. She again assumed the RV storage income was legally permitted to continue. However, she

       assumed the northern tract was “surplus land,” meaning development of additional self-storage

       units or other improvements was “limited [by the lot-coverage ordinance] to a maximum

       impervious coverage of approximately 21,197 square feet.” Sallander arrived at this square footage

       of developable space by dividing the total square footage of the two tracts in half (in accordance

       with the 50% lot-coverage ordinance) and subtracting what had already been built on the southern

       tract. Under this scenario, the sales-comparison approach produced a value of $3,450,000, and the

       income-capitalization approach produced a value of $3,350,000. Sallander opined the value of the

       property was $3,375,000, which again was a weighted reconciliation of those values. In reaching

       this conclusion, she again valued the northern tract, as surplus land, at $150,000.

¶ 47          Sallander explained the difference between the first and second valuation scenarios was in

       how the northern tract was treated. In the first valuation scenario, she treated the northern tract as

       if it were an independent tract, with no relation to the southern tract. In the second valuation

                                                        12
       scenario, she treated the northern tract as if it were linked to the southern tract. In both scenarios,

       Sallander treated the southern tract the same and reached the same value conclusion.

¶ 48          Sallander acknowledged she never considered a valuation scenario in which the northern

       tract alone or the entire property was developed to 60% lot coverage. She did not consider a

       scenario in which the entire property was developed to 80% lot coverage. Nor did she consider the

       value of the property if it was constructed in accordance with defendants’ 2000 construction plans.

       She agreed that she could have—“[t]he possibilities [were] endless”—but was never asked.

¶ 49          Sallander acknowledged that Kent Steele, before closing, appraised the property at

       $4 million. She did not rely on his valuation in forming her opinion. However, she relied on the

       appraisal insofar as it contained information about the 2008 market, because, at the time of trial,

       i.e., in 2015, she could not access 2008 market information.

¶ 50          At the conclusion of Sallander’s testimony, the court remarked, “very impressive.”

¶ 51                                            3. Michael Rogina

¶ 52          Michael Rogina, an engineer and professional land surveyor, testified as an expert for

       defendants. Before trial, as a discovery sanction, the court limited his testimony to the information

       contained in his written report.

¶ 53          Rogina testified that, after the closing, plaintiffs had obtained a special-use permit allowing

       outdoor storage and had obtained a lot-coverage variance to 80%. Using aerial photographs of the

       property from 2011, he determined plaintiffs ultimately developed the northern parcel to 66% lot

       coverage.

¶ 54                                             4. Joseph Shetina

                                                         13
¶ 55          Joseph Shetina, a licensed real estate broker and appraiser, also testified as an expert for

       defendants. Before trial, as a discovery sanction, the court also limited his testimony to that which

       was contained in his June 4, 2015, letter to defendants’ attorney. That letter read as follows:

                              “I reviewed the mass of data included in the report dated October 24, 2008,

                      with respect to the retrospective valuation of the above captioned property

                      (including land and building comprising Next Door Storage).

                              I do not believe this retrospective valuation fairly represents the 2008

                      market or does it fairly represent the value of this ongoing business as developed

                      in the ensuing years.

                              I do believe the value projected and agreed upon when closed is the correct

                      value (date of closing).”

¶ 56          At trial, Shetina added that the first paragraph’s reference to the “mass of data” meant

       that he reviewed Sallander’s report, the preclosing Steele appraisal, and a retrospective appraisal

       prepared by Steele while the case was pending. Further, he clarified that the second paragraph

       stated he disagreed with Sallander’s conclusions concerning the property’s valuation.

¶ 57                        G. Closing Arguments and The Trial Court’s Judgment

¶ 58          At the close of evidence, the parties submitted written closing arguments. On the issue of

       damages, defendants argued Sallander’s testimony was deficient, because it was based on

       hypotheticals that were not in line with the evidence in the case. Specifically, defendants noted,

       Sallander never considered the value of the property in accord with how the northern tract was

       developed after the sale: to 66% lot coverage. Further, they maintained, awarding plaintiffs

       damages in accord with Sallander’s testimony would provide plaintiffs a windfall, because they

       ultimately achieved more lot coverage than was contemplated in the first valuation scenario.

                                                        14
¶ 59           On January 26, 2016, the trial court entered a written order, finding defendants breached

       the contract insofar as they made untrue representations regarding lot coverage. The trial court

       found, however, plaintiffs failed to prove damages. Specifically, the court rejected plaintiffs’

       theory of damages, which was based on the well-settled rule in cases involving land-sale contracts,

       i.e., that the proper measure of damages is the contract price minus the actual fair market value of

       the property. The court observed plaintiffs ultimately realized their intended use of the property

       when they applied for and were “quickly granted by the [c]ounty” a lot-coverage variance and

       special-use permit for outdoor storage. Thus, the court determined, “the appropriate measure of

       damages would have be [sic] the cost to mitigate those deficiencies.” In other words, defendants

       should be responsible for the costs incurred by plaintiffs to obtain that variance. And though a

       letter stating plaintiffs had expended $44,219 to obtain the variance was admitted into evidence,

       there was no testimony or other evidence (such as invoices) demonstrating what work was required

       to obtain the variance. In ruling, the court made no mention of Sallander’s or Shetina’s credibility

       or the reliability of their testimony. Accordingly, the court entered judgment in favor of defendants.

¶ 60                                        H. Postjudgment Litigation

¶ 61           Plaintiffs filed a postjudgment motion, which, in part, sought their attorney fees under

       section 6.05 of the contract. That section states, in pertinent part,

                               “[Defendants] jointly and severally agree that they will, at all times after the

                       Closing Date, hold harmless and indemnify [plaintiffs] from and against any and

                       all costs, claims, liabilities, expenses, tax liabilities[,] and damages, including

                       reasonable attorney’s fees, arising from *** any breach of the agreements,

                       representations[,] or warranties of [defendants] contained in this Agreement.”

                                                         15
       Plaintiffs asserted, “There is no condition in this provision that [plaintiffs] prevail in the action or

       establish damages.” Because the court found defendants breached the contract, they argued, they

       were entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees.

¶ 62           Defendants petitioned for their attorney fees under section 10.12 of the contract. That

       section states, in pertinent part,

                               “Should either party employ attorneys to enforce any of the provisions

                       hereof, the party losing in any final judgment agrees to pay the prevailing party all

                       reasonable costs, charges[,] and expenses, including reasonable attorneys’ fees,

                       expended or incurred in connection therewith.”

       Defendants contended that, despite their breach, judgment was entered in their favor because

       plaintiffs failed to prove their damages, and, therefore, they were the prevailing party in the

       litigation and entitled to fees.

¶ 63           The court denied both parties’ requests for attorney fees. It reasoned that, because plaintiffs

       proved a breach but failed to prove damages, neither party was a prevailing party under section

       10.12 of the contract. The court did not specifically address plaintiffs’ contention that they were

       entitled to fees, regardless of the litigation’s outcome, under section 6.05 of the contract.

¶ 64                                               I. First Appeal

¶ 65           The parties both appealed from the trial court’s judgment. In their appeal, plaintiffs raised

       two contentions: First, the court applied an improper measure of damages. Plaintiffs maintained

       the proper measure of damages was the contract price minus the fair market value of the land on

       the date of the breach. Second, the court erred when it rejected their request for attorney fees.

       According to plaintiffs, they were entitled to attorney fees under section 6.05 of the contract even

       if they were not the prevailing party under section 10.12.

                                                         16
¶ 66          In their cross-appeal, defendants raised three contentions. First, the trial court’s findings

       that plaintiffs fully performed their duties and defendants breached the contract were against the

       manifest weight of the evidence. Second, they were entitled to judgment under the doctrine of

       waiver, because the evidence showed plaintiffs knew of the lot-coverage issues before closing but

       purchased the land anyway. Third, the court erred when it rejected their request for fees under

       section 10.12 of the contract. On this point, defendants argued that, because the court found

       plaintiffs had not proved damages, they were the prevailing party in the litigation and therefore

       entitled to fees under that section.

¶ 67          With one justice dissenting, we affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with

       directions. We framed the issues as follows: “(1) whether the trial court erred in its findings on

       [plaintiffs’] breach of contract claim and (2) whether the trial court erred by failing to award either

       party attorney fees.” Next Door Storage, 2019 IL App (3d) 160473-U, ¶ 64.

¶ 68          On the first issue, we concluded the trial court’s findings as to plaintiffs’ performance and

       defendants’ breach (based on the lot-coverage issue) were not against the manifest weight of the

       evidence. Id. ¶¶ 83-90. Specifically, we found defendants’ conduct—their failure to disclose the

       zoning linkage, despite their knowledge of its effect on future development, while advertising the

       tracts separately and using the noncompliant March 2008 construction plans, which they said had

       been approved, to show plaintiffs what could be built—constituted breaches under section 7.10 of

       the contract and paragraph 12 of the affidavit. Id. Accordingly, we affirmed those findings.

¶ 69          Next, we determined the trial court applied the wrong measure of damages. We observed

       “[i]t is well settled that the measure of damages in an action for breach of a land sale contract is

       the difference between the contract price and the fair market value of the land on the date of the

       breach.” Id. ¶ 94. We wrote the following:

                                                         17
                              “Here, while the trial court reasoned that [plaintiffs] ‘ultimately realized’

                       the intended use of the tracts after a variance was ‘quickly granted’ by Will County,

                       we disagree, as a matter of law, that those facts alter the well-settled measure of

                       damages for breaches of land sale contracts. In light of the nature of the breach at

                       issue in this case, we conclude that damages in the amount of the difference

                       between the contract price and the fair market value of the land on the date of the

                       breach will not provide [plaintiffs] with a windfall. Since the trial court used the

                       incorrect measure of damages, we remand the matter for consideration of whether

                       [plaintiffs], at the bench trial, proved the proper computation of damages.” Id. ¶ 95.

¶ 70          Finally, we addressed the parties’ requests for attorney fees, looking first to section 10.12,

       which required “the party losing in any final judgment *** to pay the prevailing party[’s] ***

       reasonable attorneys’ fees.” We wrote, “[u]nder this section, our reversal on the issue of damages

       could result in an outcome different than that reached by the trial court.” Id. ¶ 98. We explained

       that, if the trial court found plaintiffs proved their damages under the proper measure, the court

       could deem plaintiffs the prevailing party under section 10.12. Id. We also wrote, “[u]ntil the trial

       court has an opportunity to review this issue, questions under section 10.12 are beyond our

       purview.” Id.

¶ 71          We then turned to plaintiffs’ argument that they were entitled to their attorney fees under

       section 6.05 of the contract, which they contended, unlike section 10.12, did not condition an award

       of attorney fees on an award of damages. We agreed, explaining section 6.05 plainly stated that

       reasonable attorney fees were not contingent on plaintiffs’ ability to prove damage or otherwise

       succeed on their claim. Id. ¶ 100. Rather, it stated defendants indemnified plaintiffs’ attorney fees

       “arising from ‘any breach of the agreements, representations[,] or warranties’ in the [contract].”

                                                        18
       Id. Because defendants breached the contract, we concluded, “they must pay [plaintiffs’]

       reasonable attorney fees.” Id. Accordingly, we reversed the court’s determination on plaintiffs’

       request for fees and directed the court “to consider [on remand] whether [plaintiffs] can prove their

       attorney fees and, if so, whether those attorney fees are reasonable.”

¶ 72                                        J. Proceedings on Remand

¶ 73          On remand, plaintiffs moved for entry of judgment and separately petitioned for their

       attorney fees. In their motion, plaintiffs sought damages of $484,750, contending Sallander’s

       testimony established the fair market value of the property as it stood on the date of the sale—i.e.,

       the northern tract’s developability being limited because of its zoning linkage to the southern

       tract—was $3,375,000, which was $484,750 less than what plaintiffs actually paid. In their fee

       petition, plaintiffs sought a total of $442,240.25 of incurred attorney fees and future fees. Plaintiffs

       broke down their request into three categories: (1) those incurred through the end of trial,

       specifically, $347,107.80; (2) those incurred in relation to postjudgment litigation and appeal,

       specifically, $95,132.45; and (3) those incurred in relation to the postremand litigation, in an

       amount to be determined. They also sought a total of $20,280.67 in costs.

¶ 74          Defendants also petitioned for their attorney fees, arguing that, if plaintiffs again failed to

       prove their damages, they were entitled to fees under section 10.12 of the contract. Defendants

       sought fees totaling $205,837.80.

¶ 75          In an oral ruling, the trial court determined plaintiffs failed to prove their damages. The

       court explained it had reviewed its notes and relevant portions of the record, refreshing its

       recollection of the matter. Noting that it had the unique opportunity to hear and observe the

       witnesses and weigh the experts’ testimony against the rest of the evidence presented, the court

                                                         19
       determined plaintiffs failed to establish a difference between the contract price and actual fair

       market value of the properties.

¶ 76           The court then addressed attorney fees. It awarded plaintiffs, under section 6.05 of the

       contract, $410,557.80 in attorney fees and costs, broken down as follows: (1) $347,107.80 incurred

       through the end of trial; (2) $62,250 incurred during the postjudgment and appellate litigation; and

       (3) $1200 in attorney fees incurred during the postremand litigation. 3 The court also awarded

       plaintiffs $20,280.67 in costs. The court said it had looked at plaintiffs’ petition, reviewed each

       time entry that was submitted, and found the fees sought were “eminently reasonable.” With regard

       to the fees incurred through the end of trial, the court remarked it expected “the [fees] to have been

       higher,” but the fees sought were nevertheless reasonable and “necessary to the successful

       prosecution of [the] claim.” The court next addressed the fees relating to the first appeal and found

       the amount “to be in excessive of the amount and work necessary to perfect the appeal,” noting

       there were some entries that were duplicative. Accordingly, the court reduced the fees from

       $95,132.45 to $62,250. Finally, the court denied defendants’ fee petition without explanation.

¶ 77           At the end of the hearing, the court added,

                                “By the way, one last thing. I want to apologize to [the parties’ attorneys]

                       and to the Appellate Court for my failure to specifically state in my original

                       decision that I found there to be no diminution in value of this property due to the

                       breaches. That’s what I believed at the time I tried this case. I weighed Mrs.

                       Sounders’ [sic] testimony and her four hypotheticals and I found each of them to

                       be defective and not consistent with the facts and just not reliable.

               3
                 We note the written order conflicts as to the amount awarded to plaintiffs. The court’s oral ruling
       controls over its written order. Family Amusement of Northern Illinois, Inc. v. Accel Entertainment Gaming,
       LLC, 2018 IL App (2d) 170185, ¶ 23.
                                                            20
                              I contrast that to the testimony of Mr. Shetina who has decades of

                      experience in this county with this area and compared that to my own feelings about

                      this lot, its location, its potential uses and found that his opinion that there was no

                      diminution to be credible and it had a ring of truth to it. It’s consistent with what I

                      was feeling after having heard all these witnesses testify. My opinion is that [Phil]

                      who at the time of closing knew that the lot had a 50 percent coverage issue knew

                      what he was buying and got exactly what he was looking for, a piece of income-

                      producing property, and I didn’t really believe then nor do I believe now after

                      reviewing this and refreshing my recollection that there was any actual diminution

                      in value, so that’s the basis of this ruling.

                              ***. My thinking at the time I rendered this decision was there had been no

                      diminution in value, but [plaintiffs] ought to be able to recover what it cost to get

                      the variance. Unfortunately, there was no evidence as to that. In a way, that’s a

                      mitigation issue. I mean, they could have rescinded. They didn’t. They held on to

                      the property, they got it zoned, and I think they knew all that going into the closing.

                      They knew what they were dealing with and knew what they were buying, so that’s

                      the basis of my ruling.”

¶ 78          This appeal and cross-appeal followed.

¶ 79                                              II. ANALYSIS

¶ 80          In their appeal, defendants contend the trial court’s fee award to plaintiff, under section

       6.05, was unreasonable. They also assert the trial court erred by denying their fee petition brought

       under section 10.12 of the contract. In their cross-appeal, plaintiffs contend the trial court erred

       when it found they failed to prove damages. They also ask us to enter an “additional judgment

                                                         21
       against defendants for [plaintiffs’] reasonable attorney’s fees on appeal not exceeding $25,000.”

       We will first address the trial court’s damages determination and then move to attorney fees.

¶ 81                                               A. Damages

¶ 82                     1. The Trial Court Did Not Exceed the Scope of Our Mandate

¶ 83          Plaintiffs initially argue the trial court exceeded the scope of our mandate. According to

       plaintiffs, our order “direct[ed] the [trial] court to examine plaintiffs’ evidence presented at the

       bench trial and nothing more.” But on remand, plaintiffs maintain, the trial court considered

       Shetina’s testimony, finding it to be more credible than Sallander’s testimony, and “factors never

       discussed or considered by Shetina, including the [court’s] own feelings about the lots, plus the

       location [and] potential uses.”

¶ 84          “[A] reviewing court’s mandate vests a trial court with jurisdiction only to take action that

       complies with the reviewing court’s mandate.” McDonald v. Lipov, 2014 IL App (2d) 130401,

       ¶ 44. Stated differently, a trial court on remand lacks authority to exceed the scope of the mandate;

       it must obey the reviewing court’s precise and unambiguous directions. Id. “Furthermore, the

       correctness of the trial court’s action on remand is to be determined from the appellate court’s

       mandate, as opposed to the appellate court opinion.” Id. Of course, if the direction is to proceed in

       conformity with the opinion, the opinion’s content becomes significant. Id. But if the reviewing

       court does not give specific directions, the trial court must examine the opinion to determine what

       further proceedings would be consistent with it. Id. We review de novo whether the trial court

       exceeded our mandate. Quincy School District No. 172 v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations

       Board, 366 Ill. App. 3d 1205, 1208 (2006).

¶ 85          Our mandate in the prior appeal stated the matter was “[a]ffirmed in part, reversed and

       remanded with directions in part.” The mandate did not specify what those directions were.

                                                        22
       Relevant here, our order directed the trial court to consider “whether [plaintiffs], at the bench trial,

       proved the proper computation of damages.”

¶ 86          Plaintiffs’ assertion that we directed the trial court to consider only their evidence reads far

       too much into our order. Our directions placed no limit on the evidence the trial court was to

       consider. The directions—to consider whether “[plaintiffs] *** proved” damages—were merely a

       recognition that it was plaintiffs’ burden to prove damages. See Ollivier v. Alden, 262 Ill. App. 3d

       190, 196 (1994). It is axiomatic that, when determining whether a party has met its burden of proof,

       the court, as finder of fact, must consider all properly admitted evidence. See Illinois Pattern Jury

       Instructions, Civil, No. 21.01 (2011). Thus, the trial court’s consideration of all the evidence

       relating to damages presented at the bench trial did not exceed this court’s mandate. Rather, our

       mandate compelled the trial court to do so.

¶ 87                            2. The Trial Court’s Determination on Damages
                                Was Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence

¶ 88          Plaintiffs next contend the trial court erred when it determined plaintiffs failed to prove

       damages. Specifically, they argue the trial court erred by crediting Shetina’s testimony instead of

       accepting Sallander’s testimony. Relatedly, they assert Sallander’s testimony was uncontradicted,

       and, therefore, the trial court should have accepted her testimony and awarded plaintiffs $484,750.

¶ 89          When reviewing a bench trial, we may not disturb the trial court’s judgment unless it is

       against the manifest weight of the evidence. Battaglia v. 736 N. Clark Corp., 2015 IL App (1st)

       142437, ¶ 23. A judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence when the findings are

       unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence. Id. Under this standard, we may not

       substitute our judgment for that of the trial court “regarding the credibility of the witnesses, the

       weight to be given to evidence, or the inferences to be drawn,” and we will affirm the judgment

       provided the record contains any evidence supporting it. Granville Tower Condominium Ass’n v.
                                                         23
       Escobar, 2022 IL App (1st) 200362, ¶ 27. In other words, “[a] reviewing court will not reverse a

       trial court’s decision merely because different conclusions can be drawn [from the evidence]; an

       opposite conclusion must be clearly evident.” Walker v. Ridgeview Construction Co., 316 Ill. App.

       3d 592, 595 (2000). This deferential standard of review is appropriate “because the trial court is in

       a superior position to determine and weigh the credibility of the witnesses, observe witnesses’

       demeanor, and resolve conflicts in their testimony.” Wade v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 2017 IL

       App (1st) 161765, ¶ 59.

¶ 90          Here, each party presented expert witnesses on the issue of damages. A court measures the

       weight of an expert’s opinion by the reasons given for it and the facts gathered in its support and

       should give little weight when the opinion lacks a factual basis. Temesvary v. Houdek, 301 Ill.

       App. 3d 560, 568 (1998). The weight to be given expert testimony is a matter of the trial court’s

       discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. Id.

¶ 91          Shetina testified he (1) reviewed Sallander’s and Steele’s appraisals; (2) did “not believe

       [Sallander’s] retrospective valuation fairly represent[ed] the 2008 market, nor did it fairly represent

       the value of this ongoing business as developed in the ensuing years; and (3) “believe[d] the value

       projected and agreed upon when closed [was] the correct value” as of the date of closing. Shetina,

       however, never set forth the facts on which he based his opinion. And he never explained why he

       believed Sallander’s appraisal was inaccurate. Given these deficiencies, Shetina’s testimony was

       entitled to little, if any, weight, and the trial court abused its discretion by finding Shetina’s

       testimony more reliable than Sallander’s. Id. at 569.

¶ 92          Given the deficiencies in Shetina’s testimony, Sallander’s valuation testimony was

       essentially unopposed. When a party presents unopposed expert testimony, the trial court is not

       required to find in that party’s favor; “it is still within the province of the [court] to weigh the

                                                         24
       credibility of the expert evidence and to decide the issue.” In re Glenville, 139 Ill. 2d 242, 251

       (1990). But the court may not reject unopposed testimony arbitrarily. Id. The court may disregard

       such testimony only when it is inherently impossible, contradicted by positive testimony or

       circumstances, or the witness has been impeached. Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 215 (1995).

¶ 93          When a plaintiff claims damages, the plaintiff must show he or she sustained damages

       resulting from the defendant’s breach, establish the correct measure of damages, and provide a

       final computation of damages under that measurement. 1472 N. Milwaukee, Ltd. v. Feinerman,

       2013 IL App (1st) 121191, ¶ 16. The correct measure of damages in a land-sale dispute is the

       difference between the contract price and the actual fair market value of the land on the date of the

       breach. Id. Fair market value is the price for which a property would sell under normal

       circumstances, assuming the seller is willing to sell and the buyer is under no compulsion to buy.

       Id. The use of fair market value is rooted in the principle “that a damage award should place the

       nonbreaching party into the position he would have been in had the contract been performed” but

       not give the nonbreaching party a windfall. Id. ¶ 17.

¶ 94          “Damages should be based on some measurable criteria and not based on guess,

       speculation[,] or conjecture.” Id. Absolute certainty is not required; rather, the plaintiff need only

       establish a reasonable basis for computing the damages. Kirkpatrick v. Strosberg, 385 Ill. App. 3d

       119, 130 (2008).

¶ 95          Here, plaintiffs’ expert witness, Sallander, was not impeached and her testimony was

       neither inherently impossible nor contradicted by positive testimony or circumstances. Indeed, she

       established a reasonable basis for computing a difference between the contract price and the

       property’s actual fair market value. The critical component of Sallander’s testimony was her

       testimony concerning the second valuation scenario. Under that scenario, Sallander valued the

                                                        25
       property using assumptions reflecting the actual state of the property. That is, Sallander assumed

       the outdoor storage could continue. She also assumed the northern and southern tracts were linked

       under the zoning ordinance and could not be sold off or developed separately. Based on the

       understanding that the entire property could not be developed beyond 50% lot coverage, she

       determined the northern tract’s development was limited to 21,197 square feet of lot coverage.

       Sallander’s assumptions under this scenario were indisputably consistent with the facts that existed

       at the time of the sale. Indeed, the outdoor storage never ceased (despite it not being permitted),

       and the two lots were linked for zoning purposes, which, without a variance, limited the

       marketability and developability of the unimproved northern tract. Ultimately, Sallander opined

       that the actual fair market value of the property, in light of the limitations on the northern tract,

       was $3,375,000.

¶ 96          Sallander’s first valuation scenario was relevant to establish the contract price of

       $3,859,750 was consistent with the market if the property had been as represented by defendants.

       Under this scenario, she valued the property using the lot coverage defendants represented, via

       their March 2008 construction plans, was possible on the northern tract. This scenario is consistent

       with the nature of the breach in this case. Defendants knew of the zoning linkage between the two

       tracts and its impact on future development yet failed to disclose it. Instead, they separately

       advertised the tracts and compounded their nondisclosure by tendering noncompliant construction

       plans to prospective buyers, whom they knew were looking to expand the property. See Next Door

       Storage, 2019 IL App (3d) 160473, ¶¶ 83-90.

¶ 97          Defendants nevertheless argue that we should affirm the trial court’s judgment because

       Sallander’s testimony was deficient in three respects and, therefore, the trial court could properly

                                                        26
        reject it. We note that defendants did not probe these purported deficiencies on cross-examination

        or argue them to the trial court.

¶ 98           Defendants’ first challenge to Sallander’s testimony is that, in the contract, the parties

        assigned specific values to items transferred in the sale. Defendants maintain plaintiffs were

        entitled to the difference between the contract price and the actual value of the land involved in

        the transaction, but Sallander based her value opinions on the value of the land and the operating

        business. Thus, defendants assert, Sallander’s valuation began from an improper starting point—

        the value of the land and business—and conflated a business valuation with a real estate appraisal.

¶ 99           We disagree. Defendants’ argument overlooks the fact that the business and land in this

        case were inextricably linked. Indeed, given the nonportable nature of a self- and outdoor-storage

        business, the business would have little value without the land upon which it sits.

¶ 100          Moreover, defendants’ argument overlooks a critical point of Sallander’s testimony. In

        both relevant valuation scenarios, Sallander treated the southern tract the same and reached

        identical valuation conclusions for that tract (under both valuation approaches). Her ultimate

        conclusion on the difference in value was the product of how the unimproved northern tract, that

        is, vacant land, was treated. Indeed, she concluded the northern tract had a value of $560,000 under

        the first valuation scenario and only $150,000 under the second.

¶ 101          We acknowledge the parties, in the contract, assigned to the northern tract a specific value

        of $114,875, which is lower than Sallander’s conclusion for that tract under either scenario.

        However, we do not believe this undermines her conclusion that the northern tract had less value

        under the second scenario than it did under the first. All other things being equal, a buyer motivated

        to expand and maximize cash flow from the property, like plaintiffs, would undoubtedly pay more

                                                         27
        for a parcel that could be expanded to 70,785 square feet than one that could be expanded to 21,197

        square feet.

¶ 102          Defendants’ second challenge to Sallander’s testimony is that her first and second valuation

        scenarios failed to account for the income received from the outdoor RV storage that never

        stopped, despite its illegality. The record flatly rebuts this contention. In both valuation scenarios,

        Sallander assumed “[t]he RV storage income that was reported and in place as of [October 24,

        2008] was legally permitted to continue.”

¶ 103          Defendants’ final challenge to Sallander’s testimony is that she failed to account for the

        possibility of rezoning. In support, they rely on the general rule in condemnation proceedings

        which permits the fact finder to consider the probability of rezoning when determining just

        compensation, provided there is sufficient evidence on the issue. See Department of Public Works

        and Buildings v. Association of Franciscan Fathers, 69 Ill. 2d 308, 315 (1977). Defendants have

        provided us with no citation of authority extending this principle to cases involving a breach of a

        land-sale contract. But even assuming this principle extends to the case at bar, we reject

        defendants’ argument.

¶ 104          “As a general rule, the probability of rezoning or other governmental relief is admissible if

        the prospect is sufficiently likely so as to have an appreciable influence upon present market

        value.” Lake County Forest Preserve District v. Petersen, 93 Ill. App. 3d 731, 734 (1981). “The

        test is considered satisfied in rezoning cases when the evidence shows rigid zoning requirements

        have been relaxed by municipal authorities which indicated a degree of flexibility.” (Internal

        quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 734-35.

¶ 105          Defendants rely on the evidence which showed the property was eventually rezoned to

        allow lot coverage of up to 80%. The fatal flaw in defendants’ argument is that this evidence does

                                                          28
        not reflect the mindset of either party or the flexibility of the zoning requirements when they were

        negotiating the sale. See id. at 734 (the rationale underlying the rule allowing this evidence is that

        the fact finder should consider what private parties would consider when negotiating the sale).

¶ 106          In its original judgment, the court never mentioned the experts’ testimony, Sallander’s or

        Shetina’s credibility, or the reliability of their testimony. Rather, it found plaintiffs sought the

        wrong measure of damages because they ultimately achieved the zoning they desired. Nearly four

        years later, the trial court for the first time said it found Sallander’s testimony was unreliable

        because it was not based on evidence, without identifying what in her testimony it believed was

        deficient. And for the first time, the court said it found Shetina’s testimony more credible on the

        ultimate issue to be decided—that the fair market value of the real estate was not diminished as a

        result of the zoning linkage—even though Shetina never set forth a factual basis for his opinion or

        explained why he came to that conclusion.

¶ 107          We acknowledge the standard of review requires us to afford deference to the trial court’s

        determinations as to credibility and the weight to be given to evidence, as well as its ultimate

        judgment in a bench trial, given its unique opportunity to view the witnesses and observe their

        demeanor. See Wade, 2017 IL App (1st) 161765, ¶ 59. But, as noted above, Sallander’s essentially

        unopposed testimony was consistent with the facts presented, and the court’s credibility findings

        were made long after the trial’s conclusion. Under these circumstances, we conclude the trial court

        arbitrarily rejected Sallander’s testimony (which it had described earlier as “very impressive”),

        and its determination that plaintiffs failed to prove damages was against the manifest weight of the

        evidence. Accordingly, we reverse this portion of the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 108          We decline, however, to remand the matter to the trial court for it to award damages to

        plaintiffs. Because the record clearly establishes the right to and amount of damages, we exercise

                                                         29
        our authority under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5) (eff. Feb. 1, 1994) and enter judgment

        in favor of plaintiffs in the amount of $484,750 ($3,859,750 (contract price) - $3,375,000 (fair

        market value) = $484,750).

¶ 109                                            B. Attorney Fees

¶ 110          In their appeal, defendants challenge the trial court’s attorney fee determination.

        Specifically, they contend the trial court erred by denying their fee petition, because plaintiffs

        failed to prove damages and, as a result, they were entitled to attorney fees as the prevailing party

        under section 10.12 of the contract. They also contend the trial court’s fee award—which

        essentially awarded plaintiffs all the fees they sought—was unreasonable, because the award was

        not limited to the fees plaintiffs incurred to prove a breach per section 6.05 of the contract.

        Additionally, they argue the fees were unreasonable because plaintiff could have proved

        defendants’ breach by simply asking the court to take judicial notice of the county ordinances.

¶ 111          Given our determination that plaintiffs, in fact, proved their damages, we need not

        determine whether defendants were entitled to fees as the prevailing parties under section 10.12 of

        the contract. Our determination on the issue of damages means that plaintiffs were the prevailing

        parties under that section and, accordingly, were entitled to “all reasonable costs, charges[,] and

        expenses, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, expended or incurred in connection” with this

        litigation. Moreover, our determination on the issue of damages obviates the need to address

        defendants’ argument that plaintiffs were entitled, under section 6.05 of the contract, only to those

        fees incurred in proving the breach. Thus, our review is limited to whether the trial court’s fee

        award was reasonable.

¶ 112          The determination of whether attorney fees are reasonable is a matter for the trial court’s

        discretion. McHenry Savings Bank v. Autoworks of Wauconda, Inc., 399 Ill. App. 3d 104, 113

                                                         30
        (2010). When making this determination, a court should consider “the nature of the case, the

        novelty and difficulty of the case, the skill and standing of the attorneys, the degree of

        responsibility required, the usual and customary charges in the community for similar work, and

        the connection between the case and the fees charged.” Id. We will not disturb a fee award unless

        the trial court has abused its discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when no reasonable

        person would adopt the trial court’s view. Bangaly v. Baggiani, 2014 IL App (1st) 123760, ¶ 126.

¶ 113          In their fee petition, plaintiffs sought $442,240.25 in incurred attorney fees and future fees,

        categorizing their request as follows: (1) $347,107.80 incurred through trial, (2) $95,132.45

        incurred in relation to postjudgment litigation and the first appeal, and (3) an indeterminate amount

        incurred in relation to the postappeal litigation. They attached to their petition a log of all the

        attorney fees incurred and expended on the case, which set forth the attorney who performed the

        work, the time expended, the rate charged, and a detailed description of the work performed. They

        also attached an affidavit from their attorney, who averred that the entries on the log were made

        contemporaneously with the work performed, the hours worked were “appropriate and

        commensurate with the demands of this case,” the fees incurred were “reasonable and appropriate

        and, further, [were] commensurate with the experience of the attorneys working on the file,” and

        the hourly rates charged were “typical for this type of work in Will County.”

¶ 114          The record shows that the trial court considered the applicable factors, meticulously

        reviewed each time entry on the log attached to plaintiffs’ fee petition, and carefully exercised its

        discretion in finding the fees sought by plaintiff were “eminently reasonable.” With respect to the

        first category—the fees incurred through trial—the court found the fees reasonable and necessary

        to the successful prosecution of the claim and, in fact, “expect[ed] the charges to have been

        higher.” With respect to the second category—the fees incurred in relation to the postjudgment

                                                         31
        litigation and appeal—the court found the fees exceeded the “amount and work necessary to

        perfect the appeal,” noting that some of the work performed was duplicative. Accordingly, the

        court reduced the fees sought from $95,132.45 to $62,250. With respect to the third category—the

        fees incurred in relation to the postremand litigation—the court awarded plaintiffs $1200, which

        it determined by multiplying four hours of attorney time (for preparing the fee petition) by a rate

        of $300 per hour.

¶ 115          Defendants nevertheless argue the fees incurred by plaintiffs were not reasonable. They

        assert “[p]roving that the written warranties were in conflict with public ordinances [was], quite

        frankly, a routine legal undertaking which [did] not require the expenditure of over 1,200 hours of

        lawyer time.” They maintain plaintiffs could have proved their breach by asking the trial court to

        take judicial notice of the applicable zoning on the property and compare it to the written

        warranties and representations in the contract.

¶ 116          We disagree that proving plaintiffs’ claim was a routine legal undertaking. This was a

        complex case. We further disagree that plaintiffs’ attorneys expended an unreasonable amount of

        time on it. At the time the trial court awarded plaintiffs their fees, the litigation had been pending

        for more than 10 years. Defendants at all times disputed their liability on the claim and denied they

        breached the contract or made inaccurate representations in the incorporated affidavit. They

        unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment on all counts of plaintiffs’ amended complaint, and

        the matter proceeded to an eight-day trial, at which 13 witnesses, 4 of whom were experts, testified

        and over 1000 pages in exhibits were admitted. Moreover, the record shows the significant delay

        in this case was caused in part by defendants’ dilatory discovery practice, which required plaintiffs

        to file several motions to compel, resulted in orders limiting their experts’ testimony, and

        needlessly increased litigation costs.

                                                          32
¶ 117          Given the record before us, we agree with the trial court’s findings that the fees sought by

        plaintiffs were “eminently reasonable.” Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its

        discretion by awarding plaintiffs $410,557.80 in attorney fees.

¶ 118                          C. Plaintiffs’ Request for Attorney Fees Relating to This Appeal

¶ 119          As a final matter, plaintiffs ask us to award them attorney fees that they incurred in relation

        to this appeal. We agree that plaintiffs are entitled, under section 10.12 of the contract, to their

        reasonable attorney fees incurred in connection with this appeal. See Erlenbush v. Largent, 353

        Ill. App. 3d 949, 953 (2004). However, because the amount of fees on appeal are more properly

        determined upon a petition and hearing in the trial court, we decline their request. See id. Instead,

        we remand the matter to the trial court to determine the amount of the fees reasonably incurred in

        connection with this appeal.

¶ 120                                           III. CONCLUSION

¶ 121          For the reasons stated, we reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of the circuit court

        of Will County, and we remand the matter for the trial court to award plaintiffs their reasonable

        attorney fees incurred in connection with this appeal.

¶ 122          Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded with directions.

                                                         33