Court Opinion

ID: 9890913
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-16 19:08:33.781723+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:22.728833
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re L.D.R.S., 2023-Ohio-3765.]

               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                TRUMBULL COUNTY

IN THE MATTER OF:                              CASE NO. 2023-T-0026

L.D.R.S.
                                               Civil Appeal from the
                                               Court of Common Pleas,
                                               Juvenile Division

                                               Trial Court No. 2017 JC 00024

                                            OPINION

                                    Decided: October 16, 2023
                                Judgment: Reversed and remanded

Michael Georgiadis, 135 Pine Avenue, S.E., Suite 211, Warren, OH 44481 (For
Appellant, Michelle Zadunajsky).

Anthony G. Rossi, III and Brendan J. Keating, Guarnieri & Secrest, PLL, 151 East Market
Street, P.O. Box 4270, Warren, OH 44482 (For Appellee, John K. Snyder).

Carol A. Sopkovich, Martin F. White Co., LPA, 156 Park Avenue, N.E., Warren, OH
44481 (Guardian Ad Litem).

MATT LYNCH, J.

        {¶1}     Appellant, Michelle Zadunajsky, appeals the Judgment Entry of the

Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, terminating her

companionship rights with the minor child, L.D.R.S. For the following reasons, we reverse

the decision of the court below and remand for further proceedings consistent with this

Opinion.

        {¶2}     L.D.R.S. was born on August 20, 2014, to unmarried parents.
         {¶3}   On September 5, 2019, the juvenile court awarded John Snyder, the child’s

natural father and appellee, legal custody. At the same time, Zadunajsky, L.D.R.S.’s

paternal grandmother, was granted companionship rights with the child.

         {¶4}   On December 20, 2021, Snyder filed a Motion for Termination or

Modification of Visitation on the grounds that “the child has now been adopted [by his

stepmother] and there [is] an intact family.”

         {¶5}   On December 16, 2022, a Magistrate’s Decision was issued granting the

Motion for Termination without hearing or the proffering of evidence. The magistrate

ruled:

                Father’s arguments are based in the law as codified in the Ohio
                Revised Code. Paternal Grandmother’s arguments are solely based
                on equitable considerations as to what may be in the best interest of
                (L.D.R.S.). However, given the status of the present law set forth in
                Title 31 of the Ohio Revised Code, once the adoption took place, the
                Paternal Grandmother no longer had standing to seek visitation.
                Once an adoption order has been entered, all grandparent visitation
                rights are terminated. Following the order of adoption, a natural
                grandparent lacks standing to petition for visitation. Further, the
                Family Court has now lost jurisdiction or statutory authority to grant
                visitation to relatives of biological parents whose rights have been
                terminated by an adoption decree. While in the case at bar the
                Movant [sic] is a paternal grandmother and father is the legal
                custodian, there is a case on point that prohibits a court from granting
                visitation to a biological relative following an adoption. In re Adoption
                of Ridenour (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 319, 325, * * *.

                Thus, no case law under the Ohio Revised Code allows a court to
                grant or maintain established visitation once an adoption is granted.
                Laws establishing grandparent visitation are within the province of
                the legislature; however, the legislature has NOT provided for such
                visitation in the case of an adoption. ORC §3107.15 does not allow
                grandparent visitation to survive an adoption.

                This legal reality is very frustrating to the court because the main
                issue should be what is in the best interest of the subject minor child.
                This equitable right does NOT exist under the present law. The
                Paternal Grandmother would only appear to have standing to now

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              seek court-ordered visitation with [L.D.R.S.] upon the death of Father
              or the divorce/dissolution of John and Stephanie Snyder.

       {¶6}   On February 7, 2023, the juvenile court overruled Zadunajsky’s objections

to the Magistrate’s Decision.

       {¶7}   On April 17, 2023, Zadunajsky filed a notice of appeal. On appeal, she

raises the following assignment of error: “Trial Court committed prejudicial error in its

determination that an adoption by the step-mother of the child was a proper basis for

terminating the pre-existing visitation of the paternal grandmother.”

       {¶8}   Issues regarding visitation and companionship are generally reviewed

under an abuse of discretion standard. Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144, 541

N.E.2d 1028 (1989). Issues regarding statutory interpretation, however, are reviewed de

novo. State v. Pariag, 137 Ohio St.3d 81, 2013-Ohio-4010, 998 N.E.2d 401, ¶ 9.

       {¶9}   Zadunajsky was granted companionship with the minor child pursuant to

R.C. 3109.12(A), which provides that “[i]f a child is born to an unmarried woman * * * the

parents of the father * * * may file a complaint requesting that the court grant them

reasonable companionship or visitation rights with the child.”

       {¶10} Pursuant to R.C. 3107.15(A)(1)(a), a final decree of adoption has the

following effects: “Except with respect to a spouse of the petitioner and relatives of the

spouse, to relieve the biological or other legal parents of the adopted person of all parental

rights and responsibilities, and to terminate all legal relationships between the adopted

person and the adopted person’s relatives, including the adopted person’s biological or

other legal parents, so that * * * the adopted person thereafter is a stranger to the adopted

person’s former relatives for all purposes including inheritance and the interpretation or

construction of documents, statutes, and instruments, whether executed before or after

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the adoption is decreed, which do not expressly include the person by name or by some

designation not based on a parent or child or blood relationship.”

        {¶11} We agree with Zadunajsky that, under a plain reading of this statute, none

of the effects described in division (A)(1)(a) apply to Zadunajsky. The opening words of

the statute exempt “a spouse of the petitioner and the relatives of the spouse” from the

effects of a final decree of adoption. Applied to the present case Snyder as spouse of

the adopting stepparent and Zadunajsky as a relative of Snyder are exempt from those

effects. To the extent that the juvenile court terminated Zadunajsky’s companionship

rights in the belief that R.C. 3107.15(A)(1)(a) compelled that result, the court’s decision

is in error.

        {¶12} The juvenile court and Snyder also rely on supreme court precedents to

support the conclusion that the stepparent adoption of L.D.R.S. terminated Zadunajsky’s

companionship as a matter of law. In In re Adoption of Ridenour, 61 Ohio St.3d 319, 574

N.E.2d 1055 (1991), the trial court denied petitions for adoption by foster parents,

following the termination of the biological parents’ rights, “solely because of the difficulties

it would create for grandparent visitation rights.” Id. at 323. Inter alia, the Supreme Court

of Ohio considered the issue of whether Ohio law supports post-adoption visitation by

grandparents in a stranger adoption. The court concluded that “neither the juvenile court,

nor the probate court, may consider the possibility of post-adoption visitation by biological

grandparents following a stranger adoption.” Id. at 325.

        {¶13} The supreme court explained its reasoning, wholly dependent on the

application of R.C. 3107.15(A)(1)(a), as follows:

                      Despite the potential benefits that children may derive from
               relationships with their grandparents, we cannot hold that the state’s
               interest in preserving the extended family overrides its interest in
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Case No. 2023-T-0026
              providing children, who would otherwise become wards of the state,
              with a permanent and stable home. Although there may be cases
              where a child who is adopted by strangers would benefit from
              continued interaction with his biological grandparents, we cannot
              permit such a result unless the legislature modifies R.C. 3107.15.
              R.C. 3107.15 reflects the legislature’s intent to find families for
              children. If preconditions are imposed on the adoptive parent-child
              relationship, or if adoptive parents are forced to agree to share
              parenting responsibilities with people whom they do not know, many
              potential adoptive parents will be deterred from adopting. Moreover,
              even where adoptive parents consent to visitation by biological
              relatives whom they do not know, such an arrangement is bound to
              be stressful for the child, particularly where the parties are not
              favorably disposed toward one another. In the absence of a
              legislative directive, we cannot sanction such a result.
              Consequently, we hold that the juvenile court abused its discretion in
              ordering that visitation with the biological grandparents shall continue
              post-adoption and that the trial judge erred in considering the
              grandparent’s visitation rights in ruling on the adoption petitions.

Id. at 328.

       {¶14} The foregoing demonstrates the inapplicability of Ridenour to the present

case. The biological grandparents in Ridenour were not the relatives of a spouse of the

petitioner, and this distinction is material. In Ridenour, R.C. 3107.15(A)(1)(a) applied to

the grandparents and the result was mandated accordingly without regard to other

considerations. In the present case, R.C. 3107.15(A)(1)(a) does not apply to Zadunajsky

and the result is likewise determined by this fact without further consideration. The

magistrate’s statement that “once an adoption order has been entered, all grandparent

visitation rights are terminated” is not accurate with respect to Zadunajsky inasmuch as

she is the relative of the spouse of the petitioner.

       {¶15} Snyder cites abundant authority in which R.C. 3107.15(A)(1)(a) and

Ridenour apply to divest biological grandparents of their visitation and companionship

rights. Snyder does not cite any case, however, and this court is not aware of such a

case, in which R.C. 3107.15(A)(1)(a) has been applied to the relatives of the
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spouse/biological parent in a stepparent adoption. See In re Martin, 68 Ohio St.3d 250,

626 N.E.2d 82 (1994) (applying Ridenour where putative paternal grandparents sought

visitation following adoption by maternal grandparents); State ex rel. Kaylor v. Bruening,

80 Ohio St.3d 142, 145, 684 N.E.2d 1228 (1997) (“R.C. 3107.15 has been construed to

divest courts of jurisdiction or statutory authority to grant visitation to relatives of biological

parents whose rights have been terminated by an adoption decree”); In re L.K.P., 11th

Dist. Trumbull No. 2014-T-0077, 2017-Ohio-500, ¶ 16 (affirming the judgment that “once

the parent-child relationship between L.K.H. and appellant’s son * * * was severed,

appellant’s visitation rights were severed as a matter of law”); In re L.H., 183 Ohio App.3d

505, 2009-Ohio-3046, 917 N.E.2d 829, ¶ 27 (2d Dist.) (“the effect of R.C. 3107.15(A) is

to deny standing to former relatives of an adopted child to seek visitation”). This being

so, the juvenile court’s termination of Zadunajsky’s companionship rights on the grounds

that she was divested of these rights by virtue of the stepparent adoption of L.D.R.S.

constitutes an abuse of discretion. On remand, the court may consider whether the

continuation of Zadunajsky’s companionship rights is in the best interest of the child in

light of the stepparent adoption.

       {¶16} The sole assignment of error is with merit.

       {¶17} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the juvenile court and

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs to be taxed against

the appellee.

JOHN J. EKLUND, P.J.,

ROBERT J. PATTON, J.,

concur.
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