Court Opinion

ID: 9955329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 13:09:41.817932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:33.726380
License: Public Domain

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
ex rel. Taylor v. Montgomery Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-1127.]

                                           NOTICE
      This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
      advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
      promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
      South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
      formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
      the opinion is published.

                          SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-1127
THE STATE EX REL. TAYLOR, APPELLANT, v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY COURT
                             OF COMMON PLEAS, APPELLEE.

  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
   may be cited as State ex rel. Taylor v. Montgomery Cty. Court of Common
                      Pleas, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-1127.]
Prohibition—Petition for writ of prohibition failed because appellant had adequate
        remedy in ordinary course of law and failed to show that trial court had
        patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction over his criminal case—
        Court of appeals’ judgment dismissing petition affirmed.
    (No. 2023-0788—Submitted February 6, 2024—Decided March 28, 2024.)
     APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 29735.
                                   __________________
        Per Curiam.
        {¶ 1} Appellant, Gudonavon J. Taylor, filed a petition for a writ of
prohibition in the Second District Court of Appeals against appellee, the
Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas (“the trial court”). Taylor argued
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that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict him of and sentence him for felony
murder in 2010. The Second District granted the trial court’s motion to dismiss,
and Taylor appealed to this court as of right. We affirm the Second District’s
judgment dismissing Taylor’s petition.
            I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       {¶ 2} Taylor is currently incarcerated at the Trumbull Correctional
Institution. In 2010, he was convicted in the trial court of murder and other crimes.
He was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 41 years to life. On direct appeal
to the Second District, his convictions and sentence were affirmed. State v. Taylor,
2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23990, 2013-Ohio-186 (“Taylor I”). Later, after granting
Taylor’s application to reopen his direct appeal under App.R. 26(B) based on
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the Second District again affirmed his
convictions and sentence. State v. Taylor, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23990, 2014-
Ohio-3647, ¶ 4, 53 (“Taylor II”).
       {¶ 3} In this action, Taylor argues that the trial court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction to convict him on and sentence him for one of his murder counts. The
nature of Taylor’s claim requires a review of the facts underlying his murder
convictions. Taylor relies on the facts as they are set out in Taylor I and Taylor II.
       {¶ 4} In 2007, Taylor shot and killed Jerod Bryson after an argument over
drugs and money. Taylor I at ¶ 6. The evidence at trial established that Taylor shot
Bryson at two separate locations. Taylor II at ¶ 13. He first shot Bryson several
times in front of a house at 116 East Lincoln Street. Id. But Bryson got up and
walked diagonally across the intersection to 238 Warren Street, where he fell down
again. Id. Taylor followed Bryson and shot him several more times at almost point-
blank range. Id. The coroner testified that it was the shots near 238 Warren Street
that killed Bryson. Id.
       {¶ 5} Taylor was indicted and convicted on three counts of murder. Count
One charged him with purposely causing the death of Bryson in violation of R.C.

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2903.02(A). Counts Two and Four charged him with causing the death of Bryson
as a proximate result of committing an offense of violence—felonious assault—in
violation of R.C. 2903.02(B). In addition, in Counts Three and Five, Taylor was
charged with and convicted of felonious assault. Count Three charged Taylor with
knowingly causing physical harm to Bryson by means of a deadly weapon in
violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2). Count Five charged him with knowingly causing
serious physical harm to Bryson in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1). He was also
charged with and convicted of discharging a firearm on or near a prohibited
premises in violation of R.C. 2923.162(A)(3) and of possessing a weapon while
under a disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2).
       {¶ 6} For purposes of sentencing Taylor for the murder, the state elected to
proceed under Count Two (one of the felony-murder counts). Accordingly, the trial
court merged Counts One and Four into Count Two, and it sentenced Taylor to a
prison term of 15 years to life. The state also elected to proceed for purposes of
sentencing under Count Three (felonious assault in violation of R.C.
2903.11(A)(2)), and the trial court merged Count Five into Count Three and
sentenced Taylor to a prison term of eight years for felonious assault. The trial
court sentenced Taylor to ten years for discharging a firearm on or near a prohibited
premises, five years for possessing a weapon while under a disability, and three
years for a firearm specification. The trial court ordered Taylor to serve the
sentences consecutively, for an aggregate prison term of 41 years to life.
       {¶ 7} On direct appeal, Taylor argued that the trial court erred by not
merging the murder and felonious-assault counts for purposes of sentencing.
Taylor II, 2014-Ohio-3647, at ¶ 8. He argued that both offenses were committed
as part of a single course of conduct with a single animus. Id. The court of appeals
disagreed, holding that “there were two separate shootings in two separate
locations.” Id. at ¶ 13. According to the court of appeals, “the felonious assault
occurred and was completed during the first non-fatal round of gunshots in front of

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[the residence] located at 116 East Lincoln Street.” Id. The second round of
gunshots, in front of 238 Warren Street, “ultimately brought about Bryson’s death.”
Id. The court of appeals concluded: “[T]he felonious assault was committed
separately from and prior to the murder, and therefore, Taylor was properly
convicted and sentenced for both of those offenses.” Id.
       {¶ 8} In this case, Taylor seeks a writ of prohibition ordering the trial court
to vacate his conviction for felony murder under Count Two on the grounds that
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict and sentence him. He argues that a
conviction for felony murder under R.C. 2903.02(B) requires the commission of a
predicate offense and that the predicate offense be the proximate cause of the
victim’s death. Taylor argues, however, that the felonious assault was not the
proximate cause of Bryson’s death and that the “non-fatal” shooting that constituted
the felonious assault was separate from the shooting that caused Bryson’s death.
He thus argues that the trial court patently and unambiguously lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction to convict and sentence him on Count Two and that his
conviction is void.
       {¶ 9} The Second District granted the trial court’s Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion
to dismiss. Taylor appealed to this court as of right and requests oral argument.
                            II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
                                A. Oral argument
       {¶ 10} Taylor requests oral argument. We deny that request. We have
discretion to grant oral argument in a direct appeal, S.Ct.Prac.R. 17.02(A), and in
exercising that discretion, we consider whether the case involves complex issues, a
matter of great public importance, a substantial constitutional issue, or a conflict
among courts of appeals, Boler v. Hill, 167 Ohio St.3d 557, 2022-Ohio-507, 195
N.E.3d 123, ¶ 14. This case does not involve any of these factors.

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                       B. The trial court’s sui juris argument
        {¶ 11} As an initial matter, the trial court argues that the judgment
dismissing Taylor’s petition should be affirmed because the trial court is not sui
juris and cannot be sued, see Malone v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 45
Ohio St.2d 245, 248, 344 N.E.2d 126 (1976), quoting State ex rel. Cleveland Mun.
Court v. Cleveland City Council, 34 Ohio St.2d 120, 121, 296 N.E.2d 544 (1973)
(“ ‘Absent express statutory authority, a court can neither sue nor be sued in its own
right’ ”). As the trial court acknowledges, however, it did not raise this argument
in the court of appeals. Whether an entity is sui juris and may be sued is a question
of capacity that may be waived. State ex rel. School Choice Ohio, Inc. v. Cincinnati
Pub. School Dist., 147 Ohio St.3d 256, 2016-Ohio-5026, 63 N.E.3d 1183, ¶ 10, fn.
3. The trial court has thus waived this argument.
 C. The trial court’s jurisdiction to convict Taylor of and sentence him for felony
                                       murder
        {¶ 12} We review de novo a decision granting a motion to dismiss under
Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Alford v. Collins-McGregor Operating Co., 152 Ohio St.3d 303,
2018-Ohio-8, 95 N.E.3d 382, ¶ 10. In conducting this review, we accept all factual
allegations in the petition as true, and we will not affirm the dismissal unless it
appears beyond doubt that the nonmoving party can prove no set of facts that would
entitle him to relief. Id.
        {¶ 13} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, Taylor must establish that the
trial court exercised judicial power, that the trial court’s exercise of that power was
unauthorized by law, and that he lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of the law. See State ex rel. Elder v. Camplese, 144 Ohio St.3d 89, 2015-Ohio-
3628, 40 N.E.3d 1138, ¶ 13. However, if the trial court patently and unambiguously
lacked jurisdiction, he need not establish the lack of an adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of the law. Id.

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       {¶ 14} Taylor argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict and
sentence him on Count Two (felony murder) because he could not have committed
a predicate offense that was the proximate cause of his victim’s death.          See
generally State v. Nolan, 141 Ohio St.3d 454, 2014-Ohio-4800, 25 N.E.3d 1016,
¶ 8-9 (conviction for felony murder requires that a person intend to commit a
predicate offense that is the proximate cause of another’s death). Because Count
Two was the murder count that his other murder counts were merged into, he argues
that his sentence for murder should be “arrested.” Taylor, however, could have
raised his arguments on direct appeal, which constitutes an adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of the law. See, e.g., State ex rel. Olmstead v. Forsthoefel, 163
Ohio St.3d 25, 2020-Ohio-4951, 167 N.E.3d 944, ¶ 7 (an appeal is an adequate
remedy to raise sentencing merger errors); State ex rel. Nickleson v. Mayberry, 131
Ohio St.3d 416, 2012-Ohio-1300, 965 N.E.2d 1000, ¶ 2 (an appeal is an adequate
remedy to challenge the sufficiency of an indictment or the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting a conviction). Thus, to be entitled to a writ of prohibition,
Taylor must show that the trial court patently and unambiguously lacked
jurisdiction to convict and sentence him on Count Two.
       {¶ 15} “[W]hen we have found that a court of common pleas patently and
unambiguously lacks jurisdiction, it is almost always because a statute explicitly
removed that jurisdiction.” Ohio High School Athletic Assn. v. Ruehlman, 157 Ohio
St.3d 296, 2019-Ohio-2845, 136 N.E.3d 436, ¶ 9. “Subject-matter jurisdiction
refers to the constitutional or statutory power of a court to adjudicate a particular
class or type of case.” State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159
N.E.3d 248, ¶ 23.
       {¶ 16} Here, the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to convict Taylor
of and sentence him for murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B). See Curtis v.
Bunting, 149 Ohio St.3d 123, 2016-Ohio-7431, 73 N.E.3d 474, ¶ 8; see also R.C.
2931.03 (“The court of common pleas has original jurisdiction of all crimes and

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offenses, except in cases of minor offenses the exclusive jurisdiction of which is
vested in courts inferior to the court of common pleas”). Even if Taylor is correct
that he could not have committed a predicate offense necessary for a conviction on
Count Two, any error the trial court made in relation to that count would have been
an error in the exercise of its subject-matter jurisdiction. See Harper at ¶ 26 (once
a court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter of an action and the parties to
it, the decision on any question arising thereafter in the action is but the exercise of
jurisdiction). In other words, even if true, Taylor’s claims would not show that the
trial court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to convict him of and
sentence him for felony murder under Count Two.
        {¶ 17} Because the trial court did not patently and unambiguously lack
jurisdiction to convict and sentence Taylor, he is not entitled to a writ of prohibition.
                                III. CONCLUSION
        {¶ 18} Taylor has not shown that the trial court patently and unambiguously
lacked jurisdiction to convict him of and sentence him for felony murder. Thus, he
is not entitled to a writ of prohibition. We therefore affirm the Second District
Court of Appeals’ judgment dismissing Taylor’s petition. We also deny Taylor’s
request for oral argument.
                                                                   Judgment affirmed.
        KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, BRUNNER,
and DETERS, JJ., concur.
                                 _________________
        Gudonavon J. Taylor, pro se.
        Mathias H. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and
Thomas J. Brodbeck, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
                                 _________________

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