Court Opinion

ID: 9404236
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-22 16:09:49.969922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:12.617955
License: Public Domain

J-S10032-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 BRANDON CALLUM                          :
                                         :
                    Appellant            :   No. 1389 EDA 2022

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 9, 2021
           In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
             Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0008254-2017

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and STABILE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                            FILED JUNE 22, 2023

      Appellant, Brandon Callum, appeals from an order denying his petition

for relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

Counsel for Appellant has filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a no-

merit letter in accordance with Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927

(Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988).

We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the order denying

Appellant’s petition.

      The evidence adduced during trial was as follows:

      On April 23, 2017, [Appellant] and co-defendant Clive Foster,
      fatally shot Tahmeer Outlaw (the “decedent”) on the 6900 block
      of Hegerman Street, in the city and county of Philadelphia. Gary
      Martin testified that he was outside of his home on the 6900 block
      of Hegerman Street doing yard work when he saw the decedent
      walk past and then double back and walk in the opposite direction.
      Martin did not know the decedent. Martin then went to the side
      of his house and heard four to five gunshots. He ran out into the
      street and saw the decedent lying in the middle of the street,
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     bleeding from his chest. Martin called the police and waited for
     them to arrive. N.T., 7/16/2018 at 45-52.

     Khadijah Robinson testified that at approximately 4:55 p.m. on
     April 23, 2017, she was standing on her porch on the 6900 block
     of Hegerman Street when she saw a white Honda drive by twice.
     The Honda was occupied by two males who were looking around.
     Her attention was drawn to the vehicle because she thought the
     driver was “cute” and she thought the pair was looking for
     someone. The passenger was wearing a hood pulled up on his
     head and was seated in a fully reclined position. The driver was
     light-skinned with sandy brown hair, wearing a white T-shirt.
     Robinson went inside for a moment, and, upon hearing gunshots,
     ran to the door and saw the white Honda “speeding” down
     Hegerman Street. The next day, Robinson reported what she had
     witnessed to police. Thereafter, she gave a statement to homicide
     detectives and identified [Appellant] from a photo array as the
     driver of the vehicle. Id. at 54-70.

     Angelo Giorno testified that he lives on the 6900 block of
     Hegerman Street. On April 23, 2017, he was sitting outside at
     approximately 5:15 p.m. when he heard multiple gunshots. He
     observed a white Honda “fly by” at a high rate of speed and go
     through a stop sign. He was taken by police to the 6700 block of
     Tulip Street where he positively identified the Honda. N.T.,
     7/17/2018 at 93-107.

     Anthony Giorno testified that he was sitting outside on the 6900
     block of Hegerman Street on the date of the incident. At
     approximately 5:15 p.m., he heard six gunshots and observed a
     four-door white Honda drive by at a high rate of speed and go
     through a stop sign. There were two males in the vehicle. Both
     had hoods up. The driver was light-skinned. Anthony Giorno
     identified a white Honda shortly after the incident.        N.T.,
     7/18/2018 at 54-68.

     Jennifer Van Deursen testified that [Appellant] lived with her on
     the 6900 block of Tulip Street, which is approximately three blocks
     from where this incident occurred. Van Deursen had asked
     [Appellant] to move out of her residence two days before the
     incident due to relationship issues. On the date of the incident,
     she saw [Appellant] earlier in the day standing next to a white
     Honda. At the time of the incident, she heard that there was a
     shooting and went to the scene, but could not get onto Hegerman

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     Street due to police barricades. She walked back to her house
     and found [Appellant] in her living room. Upon seeing her,
     [Appellant] left the house. N.T., 7/16/2018 at 129-35.

     Police Officer [Justin] Hynes testified that on April 23, 2017, he
     was responding to a radio call giving a flash of a shooting involving
     a white Honda on the 6900 block of Hegerman Street. He was
     then notified that an officer was in foot pursuit nearby. He joined
     in the foot pursuit and arrested a male who jumped from a garage.
     That male was the co-defendant, Clive Foster. Id. at 138-44.

     Detective Thorsten Lucke from the Homicide Division testified that
     he recovered video from a private residence located at 6955
     Hegerman Street and from an automotive business located at
     6701 Tulip Street. The videos were played for the jury. The video
     from Hegerman Street show[ed] a white vehicle turn onto
     Hegerman Street at approximately 5:04 p.m. The vehicle [was]
     then seen again turning onto Hegerman behind a young male, who
     is on foot, at approximately 5:13 p.m. The first call to police
     reporting a shooting was at approximately 5:16 p.m. Thereafter,
     at approximately 5:28 p.m., the camera on the 6700 block of Tulip
     Street show[ed] the same white vehicle with a male exiting it and
     running. At approximately 5:34 p.m., that male reappear[ed] on
     the video in the custody of the police. That male [was] the co-
     defendant. Id. at 110-26.

     Police Officer Jacqueline Davis from the Crime Scene Unit of the
     Philadelphia Police Department testified that on April 23, 2017,
     she was called to investigate a crime scene located on the 6900
     block of Hegerman Street. Additionally, she investigated a white
     Honda Accord located on the 6700 block of Tulip Street. P.O.
     Davis recovered a handgun—a nine-millimeter Smith and
     Wesson—from the glove compartment of the vehicle, four fired
     cartridge casings (“FCCs”) from the passenger front and rear
     seats, a pack of Newport cigarettes, and a social security card and
     a driver’s license in [Appellant]’s name. P.O. Davis swabbed the
     exterior and interior doors and windows of the vehicle for DNA.
     She also swabbed the gun and the Newport cigarette box. P.O.
     Davis lifted fingerprints from various locations outside and inside
     the vehicle. Id. at 147-78.

     Patrick Raytik testified that he is employed as a Forensic Scientist
     with the city of Philadelphia. He examined fingerprint cards
     associated with lifts from a white Honda Accord submitted for this

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     incident. A palm print recovered from the driver-side front door
     of the vehicle and a palm print recovered from the passenger-side
     front door of the vehicle matched [Appellant]. A palm print from
     the passenger-side door matched the co-defendant. A fingerprint
     from the interior passenger-side front door matched the co-
     defendant. A fingerprint from the interior rear-view mirror and a
     fingerprint from the Newport pack matched [Appellant]. Two
     fingerprints from the gun magazine matched [Appellant]. N.T.,
     7/17/2018 at 45-52.

     Counsel stipulated that Rui Fen Kubiak would testify as an expert
     in DNA analysis that she performed DNA analysis on the samples
     recovered from the Honda Accord and found [Appellant]’s DNA on
     the driver-side door exterior. N.T., 7/18/2018 at 14-16.

     Dr. Daniel Brown from the Medical Examiner’s Office testified that
     he performed an autopsy on the decedent. The decedent died
     from a gunshot wound to the chest—the bullet passed through his
     lung and aorta. Dr. Brown recovered a bullet from the decedent’s
     body. N.T., 7/17/2018 at 18-28.

     Police Officer [Raymond] Andrejczak from the Firearms
     Identification Unit of the Philadelphia Police Department testified
     that the FCCs recovered from the Honda Accord matched the
     weapon recovered from the glove box and also matched a bullet
     recovered from the decedent’s body that was turned over from
     the Medical Examiner’s Office. Id. at 79-89.

     Hung Le testified that he is a forensic scientist employed by the
     Philadelphia Police Department. He is qualified as an expert in the
     identification of gunshot residue. Le analyzed clothing recovered
     from the co-defendant and found that his pants and t-shirt were
     positive for gunshot residue. No clothing was analyzed for
     [Appellant].” Id. at 134-39.

     Special Agent Purfield from the Attorney General’s Office testified
     as an expert in digital forensics. Agent Purfield received a phone
     recovered from [Appellant] and downloaded information
     contained within the phone. The call log showed that [Appellant]
     and co-defendant had 231 contacts between March 28, 2017, and
     April 23, 2017. A review of internet searches conducted on the
     phone revealed that there was a search performed on April 24,
     2017, for “shooting last night in Philly.” On April 27, 2017, there
     was a search for “cheap hotels in Horsham/Phila.”; “days inn

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     Phila.”; “days inn/Bensalem”; and “Pa court dockets.” On April
     28, 2017, there was a search for “court dockets Pa.” On April 29,
     2017, there was a search for “Days Inn Bensalem, Pa.”; “cheap
     hotels near me”; and “Roosevelt Inn.” Id. at 115-24.

     Detective Dunlap from the Homicide Division testified that he is
     an expert in cellular site analysis. He analyzed [Appellant]’s
     phone for its location on the date and time of the incident. The
     phone was utilizing a cell tower that covered service to the crime
     scene. Id. at 158-68.

     Police Officer Gary Mercado testified that on May 4, 2017, he
     conducted a routine traffic stop on a white Honda Accord owned
     by a Celeste Stevens. [Appellant] was the driver of that vehicle.
     The officer became aware that [Appellant] was wanted for
     questioning by homicide detectives so [Appellant] was taken to
     Homicide. Id. at 174-81.

     Detective John Keen from the Homicide Division testified that on
     May 6, 2017, he received a fingerprint report that indicated that
     [Appellant]’s fingerprints matched those lifted from the gun
     magazine found in the car. Thereafter, a warrant was issued for
     [Appellant]’s arrest. N.T., 7/18/2018 at 20-37.

     Sargent [Kenneth] Rutherford, from the Lansdowne Police
     Department, testified that he was contacted by Philadelphia Police
     on May 24, 2017, and given the possible whereabouts of
     [Appellant] in his jurisdiction. He went to the location and came
     in contact with [Appellant]. However, after a struggle, [Appellant]
     fled and could not be located. Id. at 76-84.

     Detective [Kevin] Judge from the Philadelphia Homicide Division
     testified that [Appellant] was arrested on June 1, 2017, after a
     search of a residence revealed [Appellant] hiding under a pile of
     clothing and blankets. Id. at 88-108.

     Counsel stipulated that Celeste Stevens would testify for the
     defense that [Appellant] is her son and that she is the owner of a
     1999 white Honda Accord which [Appellant] uses. She has known
     the co-defendant for approximately five years as a friend of her
     son. N.T., 7/17/2018, at 111.

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Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 10/11/2018, at 2-7. We also note that following

police investigation after the murder, the Honda was released to Stevens. This

detail explains why Appellant was driving the Honda on May 4, 2017, eleven

days after the murder.

      Prior to Appellant’s trial, codefendant Foster pled guilty to third degree

murder before the same judge who presided over Appellant’s jury trial.

      On July 19, 2018, following a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of

first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, firearms not to be carried

without a license, carrying firearms in public in Philadelphia and possession of

an instrument of crime.        Appellant was sentenced that day to life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole on his convictions for first-

degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Appellant filed a timely

post-sentence motion, which was denied, and a timely appeal to the Superior

Court.   The lone issue raised on direct appeal was whether Appellant’s

sentence for conspiracy of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole

was legal. On January 7, 2020, this Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions but

found that his sentence for conspiracy was illegal. We reduced Appellant’s

sentence on the conspiracy conviction to twenty to forty years’ imprisonment.

In all other respects, we left Appellant’s judgment of sentence intact.

Appellant did not appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

      On September 23, 2020, Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition raising a

series of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.    The court appointed

counsel to represent Appellant.     On May 25, 2021, PCRA counsel filed a

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Finley/Turner “no merit” letter.               On August 11, 2021, the PCRA court

accepted counsel’s no merit letter and issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice of

Intent to Dismiss. On September 9, 2021, the court dismissed Appellant’s

PCRA petition. No appeal was filed.

        On November 9, 2021, Appellant filed a subsequent pro se PCRA petition

requesting reinstatement of his right to appeal nunc pro tunc from the

dismissal of his first PCRA petition. On May 3, 2022, the PCRA court reinstated

Appellant’s appellate rights nunc pro tunc, finding that first PCRA counsel’s

withdrawal was never properly docketed, leaving Appellant unaware that he

was required to file a notice of appeal pro se. The PCRA court appointed new

counsel.

        On May 16, 2022, Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the Superior

Court. On June 27, 2022, PCRA counsel filed a Notice of Intent to File an

Anders1 Brief pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4) in lieu of a Statement of

Matters Complained on Appeal.

        In this Court, counsel for Appellant has filed an application to withdraw

and an Anders brief, asserting that Appellant’s appeal is frivolous and

requesting permission to withdraw from representation. Appellant did not file

any brief in response to counsel’s application to withdraw or the Anders brief.

        We first address counsel’s application to withdraw. In order for PCRA

counsel to withdraw under Turner/Finley in this Court:

____________________________________________

1   Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

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       (1) PCRA counsel must file a no-merit letter that details the nature
       and extent of counsel's review of the record; lists the appellate
       issues; and explains why those issues are meritless.

       (2) PCRA counsel must file an application to withdraw; serve the
       PCRA petitioner with the application and the no-merit letter; and
       advise the petitioner that if the Court grants the motion to
       withdraw, the petitioner can proceed pro se or hire his own lawyer.

       (3) This Court must independently review the record and agree
       that the appeal is meritless.

Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816, 817-18 (Pa. Super. 2011).

       Counsel for Appellant complied with these procedural and substantive

requirements.      Counsel stated in his petition to withdraw that he found

Appellant’s issues to be frivolous after conducting a thorough review of the

record. Petition to Withdraw as Counsel, 10/13/22, at 2-3. Counsel attached

to his petition a copy of the letter he sent to Appellant advising him he could

retain private counsel or proceed pro se. Id. at ex. A. Counsel also provided

Appellant with a copy of the Anders brief2 which summarizes the facts and

procedural history, includes issues that could arguably support Appellant’s

appeal, and explained why the issues are meritless. Accordingly, we turn to

the issues raised in this appeal.

____________________________________________

2 It is well-settled that Anders applies only when counsel seeks to withdraw
from representation on direct appeal, and that Turner/Finley applies when
counsel seeks leave to withdraw from a collateral appeal such as the present
case.    Even so, we will accept counsel’s Anders brief in lieu of a
Turner/Finley no-merit letter, because an Anders brief provides greater
protection to Appellant. Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816, 817 n.2
(Pa. Super. 2011) (accepting Anders brief in lieu of Turner/Finley letter).

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      “On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard of review

requires us to determine whether the ruling of the PCRA court is supported by

the record and free of legal error.” Widgins, 29 A.3d at 819. As this Court

has explained:

      We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in the
      light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. This
      review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence
      of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s ruling if it is
      supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error. This
      Court may affirm a PCRA court’s decision on any grounds if the
      record supports it. Further, we grant great deference to the
      factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those
      findings unless they have no support in the record. However, we
      afford no such deference to its legal conclusions. Where the
      petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de
      novo and our scope of review plenary.

Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012). When a

petitioner asserts an ineffectiveness claim, he is entitled to relief if he pleads

and proves that prior counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). “To prevail on an [ineffectiveness] claim, a PCRA

petitioner must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1)

the underlying legal claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable

basis for acting or failing to act; and (3) the petitioner suffered resulting

prejudice.” Commonwealth v. Reyes-Rodriguez, 111 A.3d 775, 780 (Pa.

Super. 2015) (en banc).     “A petitioner must prove all three factors of the

[ineffectiveness] test, or the claim fails.” Id. A failure to satisfy any one of

the three prongs of the test for ineffectiveness requires rejection of the claim.

Commonwealth v. Cook, 952 A.2d 594, 614 (Pa. 2008). “The burden of

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proving ineffectiveness rests with [the petitioner].”    Commonwealth v.

Chmiel, 889 A.2d 501, 540 (Pa. 2005).

      The Anders brief submitted by Appellant’s attorney raises a single

issue, “Did the PCRA Court err when it dismissed [Appellant’s] PCRA petition

without a hearing as not raising a meritorious claim under the PCRA?” Anders

Brief at 5.   The Anders brief goes on to address the claims of ineffective

assistance raised in Appellant’s pro se PCRA petitions and concludes that they

lack arguable merit. We examine each claim seriatim.

      Appellant claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to properly

consult with him regarding the plea offer.       “Defendants have a Sixth

Amendment right to counsel, a right that extends to the plea-bargaining

process. During plea negotiations defendants are entitled to the effective

assistance of competent counsel.”    Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 132

(2012); Commonwealth v. Marinez, 777 A.2d 1121, 1124 (Pa. Super.

2001). “[A]s a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate

formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions

that may be favorable to the accused.” Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 132

(2012). Moreover, counsel “has a duty to communicate to his client, not only

the details of a plea bargain offer, but also the relative merits of the offer

compared to the defendant’s chances at trial,” Commonwealth v. Napper,

385 A.2d 521, 524 (Pa. Super. 1978), and “the advantages and disadvantages

of accepting or rejecting it.” Commonwealth v. Boyd, 688 A.2d 1172, 1174

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(Pa. 1997). The defendant “cannot make an informed choice without such

assistance from counsel.” Id. The PCRA affords relief where a defendant’s

attorney fails to provide effective representation in the context of plea

negotiations. Napper, 385 A.2d at 524.

      Prior to trial, the Commonwealth put on the record that it conveyed a

plea deal to Appellant of 22½ to 45 years’ imprisonment on the charges of

third-degree murder, conspiracy and firearms offenses. N.T., 7/13/18 at 3-

14. The court conducted a colloquy to ensure that Appellant understood the

details of the offer and was able to make a knowing and intelligent decision.

Id.   The court gave Appellant the opportunity to confer privately with his

attorney during the colloquy.      Id. at 13-14.     Three days later, before

commencing trial, the court conducted a second on-the-record colloquy with

Appellant concerning the offer.       N.T., 7/16/18, at 5-14.       The record

demonstrates that Appellant’s claim that trial counsel failed to adequately

convey a plea offer lacks arguable merit.

      Next, Appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting

to alleged improper and prejudicial statements and questions from the

Commonwealth. Appellant failed, however, to identify the alleged improper

statements or questions, and defense counsel was unable to identify any

improper statements or questions in the record. Accordingly, the PCRA court

properly denied Appellant relief on this claim.

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      Appellant next claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct

an independent investigation of the ballistics evidence.      Appellant fails to

identify what would have been disclosed by an independent investigation of

the ballistic evidence.   The Commonwealth’s expert prepared a report in

advance of trial and testified that cartridge casings recovered in the Honda

owned by Appellant’s mother were fired from a handgun recovered in the

same car immediately after the murder. The expert also testified that a bullet

recovered from the victim’s body was fired from this gun.          Counsel thus

observed that “[i]t is unclear what point, if any, the expert ballistician could

have been challenged on.      Further, the thrust of Appellant’s defense was

misidentification. It is not clear how a challenge to an undisclosed point of

the ballistic evidence would have furthered this unsuccessful defense.”

Anders Brief at 41. We agree, and we conclude that this claim lacks arguable

merit.

      Next, Appellant claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a

motion to suppress an identification made by a Commonwealth witness,

Khadijah Robinson.    According to Appellant, Robinson revealed during her

testimony that she initially identified Appellant because police officials showed

her Appellant’s photograph alone instead of in a photo array. We agree with

counsel for Appellant that this claim lacks arguable merit.

      “[W]here an assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel is based upon

the failure to pursue a suppression motion, proof of the merit of the underlying

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suppression claim is necessary to establish the merit of the ineffective

assistance of counsel claim.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903, 909

(Pa. Super. 2008). Appellant must also establish that there was no reasonable

basis for not pursuing the suppression claim and that if the evidence had been

suppressed, there is a reasonable probability the verdict would have been

more favorable.” Commonwealth v. Arch, 654 A.2d 1141, 1143 (Pa. Super.

1995).

      Robinson testified that at approximately 4:55 p.m. on April 23, 2017,

she was standing on her porch on the 6900 block of Hegerman Street when

she saw a white Honda drive by twice. The Honda was occupied by two males

who were looking around. Her attention was drawn to the vehicle because

she thought the driver was “cute” and she thought the pair was looking for

someone. The passenger was wearing a hood pulled up on his head and was

seated in a fully reclined position. The driver was light-skinned with sandy

brown hair, wearing a white T-shirt. Robinson went inside for a moment, and,

upon hearing gunshots, ran to the door and saw the white Honda “speeding”

down Hegerman Street. The next day, Robinson reported her observations to

police. Thereafter, she gave a statement to homicide detectives and identified

Appellant from a photo array as the driver of the vehicle. N.T., 7/16/18, at

54-70.

      A detective showed Robinson an array of six photographs. Exhibit C-20

(photo array). The detective did not know which individual in the array was

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the suspect. N.T., 7/18/18, at 31 (detective’s testimony). Each photograph

was of a black male of similar age with relatively short-cropped hair, facial

hair, and no visible facial tattoos or significant scars. Exhibit C-20. The height

and weight of the men in the photos was unknown because the photos only

showed their heads. Id. Appellant failed to demonstrate that the detective

posed leading or suggestive questions to Robinson that tainted the

identification procedure.

      Photo arrays are not unduly suggestive if the suspect’s picture does not

stand out more than the others, and all of the people depicted exhibit similar

facial characteristics. Commonwealth v. Fulmore, 25 A.3d 340, 346 (Pa.

Super. 2011). The photo array in this case satisfies these standards. There

is no evidence that the detective who showed Robinson the photo array did

anything leading or suggestive.      Nor is there any evidence that supports

Appellant’s claim that his photograph was the only photo showed to Robinson.

Thus, Appellant’s claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to move

to suppress the photo identification lacks arguable merit.

      Next, Appellant claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to object

to vouching by the prosecutor in closing arguments for the truthfulness of

Commonwealth      witnesses.     “Improper     bolstering   or   vouching   for   a

government witness occurs where the prosecutor assures the jury that the

witness is credible, and such assurance is based on either the prosecutor's

personal knowledge or other information not contained in the record.”

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Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 30 A.3d 1111, 1180 (Pa. 2011). Vouching can

occur    when     the   prosecutor   “elicit[s]   improper   comments     from   a

Commonwealth witness” on a witness’s credibility.            Commonwealth v.

Tedford, 960 A.2d 1, 32 (Pa. 2008).

        In this case, Appellant failed to identify any instance where the

prosecutor argued that a witness was credible based on the prosecutor’s

personal knowledge or on information not within the record. Accordingly, we

agree with counsel that Appellant’s claim lacks arguable merit.

        Next, Appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting

to the medical examiner’s testimony regarding the decedent’s pain and

suffering. The record demonstrates that the medical examiner never testified

to the decedent’s pain and suffering. N.T., 7/17/2018 at 9–35. The expert

merely testified about the cause of death, manner of death, and recovery of

a bullet which was later analyzed by an expert ballistician. Id. Accordingly,

we agree with counsel that Appellant’s claim lacks arguable merit.

        Next, Appellant claimed that trial counsel was ineffective for not

objecting to the Commonwealth’s line of questioning during re-direct

examination of the Commonwealth’s fingerprint comparison expert. Appellant

claimed that the line of questioning improperly shifted the burden of proof on

Appellant.

        On direct examination, the expert testified that he determined that

fingerprints found on the murder vehicle and a loaded magazine in that car

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were Appellant’s by comparing these fingerprints to fingerprints collected from

Appellant while in custody. N.T. 7/17/2018, at 41–52. On cross examination,

defense counsel asked whether another examiner verified the expert’s

determinations.   The expert answered that another examiner performs his

own comparison of the fingerprints and verifies the original determination if

he agrees with the determination. Defense counsel questioned the credibility

of this process because the verifying examiner can see the original expert’s

report and determination.    Id. at 53–58.     On re-direct examination, the

Commonwealth asked whether defense counsel ever asked to look at the

fingerprints to do his own comparison. Id. at 61. The expert answered “no.”

Id.

      A fundamental requirement of due process is that no one may be

convicted of an offense unless each element has been proved beyond a

reasonable doubt.   In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362-63 (1970).           After

Winship, “it is clear that the burden of proving an essential element of the

crime may not be shifted to the defendant.” Commonwealth v. McNeil, 337

A.2d 840, 843 (Pa. 1975).

      Appellant’s Anders brief argues that the prosecutor’s questions on

redirect examination shifted the burden of proof to Appellant by suggesting

that he had the burden of demanding and testing the fingerprints himself.

Nevertheless, the brief continues, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this

issue because of his inability to establish prejudice.    The Commonwealth

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responds that it did not shift the burden of proof but simply rebutted defense

counsel’s challenge to the integrity of the testing process.

          We need not examine whether this claim has arguable merit, because

we agree with Appellant’s counsel that Appellant cannot establish prejudice

from the prosecutor’s redirect examination. Cook, 952 A.2d at 614 (failure

to satisfy any one of the three prongs of ineffectiveness test requires rejection

of claim). The trial court instructed the jury in its opening and closing charge

that the burden of proof in Appellant’s trial is always on the Commonwealth

and never on Appellant. N.T., 7/16/18 at 20; N.T., 7/19/18 at 68-69. The

jury is presumed to have followed these instructions. Commonwealth v.

Flor, 998 A.2d 606, 632 (Pa. 2010) (jury is presumed to follow court’s

instructions).      Furthermore, the evidence summarized above, including

testimony from multiple eyewitnesses, videotape evidence, ballistics evidence

and Appellant’s conduct after the shooting overwhelmingly demonstrates his

guilt.     An objection during the expert’s testimony to the Commonwealth’s

redirect examination would not have changed the outcome. Accordingly, we

agree with counsel for Appellant that this claim did not entitle Appellant to

relief.

          Next, Appellant claimed that defense counsel was ineffective for failing

to object to the testimony of the Commonwealth’s cell phone experts as

speculative. This claim lacks arguable merit.

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        Detective Dunlap, one of the Commonwealth’s cell phone experts,

testified that he had been trained by the FBI to determine the area a phone

was in when it was making a text or phone call, otherwise known as historical

cell site analysis. Cell site analysis looks at the cell phone tower and which

cardinal direction of the tower a cell phone connected with to make a text or

call.   Because towers are within one mile of each other and cell phones

generally connect with the closest tower they can, cell site analysis can place

individuals within a one- or two-square mile area. The detective testified to

his qualifications, which included a 24-hour course in 2007, 2010, and 2012,

an advanced 36-hour course in 2014, 160 hours of training in 2015, and week-

long trainings in 2016 and 2018. As a result of his course performance, he

was accepted into the FBI’s Cellular Analysis Survey Team. He has testified

over thirty times in two years, including for the defense.      Based on these

qualifications, the trial court accepted the detective as an expert in historical

cell site analysis.   N.T., 7/17/2018, at 143–53.    The detective went on to

testify that Appellant’s phone connected to the cell tower closest to the murder

scene 2,000 times in the six weeks before and after the killing. The detective

noted that the tower also covered the area in which Appellant’s home was

located.

        Special Agent Joseph Purfield, the Commonwealth’s second cell phone

expert, performs digital forensics on cell phones for the Pennsylvania Office of

Attorney General to extract stored information. He holds a certification to use

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a special program to extract information from Appellant’s phone, and he has

extracted information from hundreds if not thousands of phones. He also has

testified about a half dozen times as an expert. Id. at 112–15. Agent Purfield

testified to the internet search history and communications on Appellant’s cell

phone before and after the shooting.

      We agree with Appellant’s counsel that nothing about these two experts’

testimony was speculative or outside of their expertise.            Accordingly,

Appellant’s objection to trial counsel’s failure to object to their testimony

lacked arguable merit.

      Next, Appellant contends that defense counsel was ineffective for failing

to object, on grounds of hearsay, when Detective Keen testified that

codefendant Clive Foster’s nickname was Kris.          We agree with Appellant’s

counsel that this claim fails for lack of prejudice.

      The Commonwealth introduced evidence that Appellant’s phone had

numerous communications with “Kris”. Foster was arrested fleeing from the

vehicle used to commit the murder, and his fingerprints were found on the

vehicle. Although Foster did not testify during trial, Detective Keen testified

that Foster told him that his nickname was Kris. The Anders brief asserts

that Detective Keen’s testimony was hearsay but that it did not prejudice

Appellant. We agree. Other evidence established that Foster was known as

Kris and was a close friend of Appellant. The parties stipulated that Appellant’s

mother would testify that she knew Foster as “Kris”, she knew Kris for four to

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five years, and she knew Kris to be a friend of Appellant.        Further, other

evidence showed that Appellant was the shooter irrespective of Foster’s

identity. Multiple people saw a white Honda circling the area at the time of

the shooting with two men inside who appeared to be looking for someone.

Khadijah Robinson identified the driver from a photo array as Appellant.

Multiple people also saw the white Honda speed away after the shooting,

speeding through a stop sign. The vehicle used in the murder belonged to

Appellant’s   mother   and   contained   the   murder   weapon.      Appellant’s

fingerprints were found on the car and on a magazine. Appellant’s search

history after the shooting showed that he was searching for news articles and

court details about the shooting and for temporary locations to stay. Thus,

Appellant cannot show by a reasonable probability that the outcome of trial

would have been different had Detective Keen’s testimony about “Kris” not

been admitted. See Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 451-52 (Pa.

2014) (court assumed there was arguable merit to claim that defense counsel

was ineffective for failing to object to admission of canine DNA evidence in

murder and arson prosecution, where this evidence tended to link defendant’s

dog and thus defendant to threatening note found by defendant’s girlfriend;

even so, no PCRA relief warranted because there was other extensive evidence

of defendant’s preparatory activities prior to fire and other evidence

suggesting his connection to threatening note).

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      Next, Appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting

to Detective Keen’s testimony that he showed a picture of codefendant Foster

to Commonwealth witness Robinson after Foster’s arrest. The record shows

that Detective Keen testified that he did not show a photo of Foster to

Robinson. N.T., 7/18/2018, at 38, 48. Therefore, this claim lacks arguable

merit.

      Next, Appellant claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to

file a recusal motion after the trial judge heard highly prejudicial testimony

from codefendant Foster that Appellant was the shooter in Outlaw’s death.

Prior to trial, the same judge who presided over Appellant’s jury trial accepted

Foster’s guilty plea to third degree murder. During his plea, Foster claimed

that Appellant was the shooter. Appellant argued in his pro se PCRA petition

that the judge should have recused herself, citing Commonwealth v.

Stevenson, 829 A.2d 701 (Pa. Super. 2003); Commonwealth v. Conti, 345

A.2d 238 (Pa. Super. 1975); and Commonwealth v. Bryant, 476 A.2d 422

(Pa. Super. 1984). None of these decisions are on point.

      In Stevenson, a judge who was the target of an active FBI

investigations told the Commonwealth and defense that they should consider

asking for him to recuse himself as a result of the ongoing investigation and

the   judge’s   strong   personal   feelings   about   the   same.   When    the

Commonwealth filed a motion for recusal, the court denied it. This Court held

that denial of the recusal motion was error in view of his statement to the

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parties. Id., 829 A.2d at 705. In the present case, there is no evidence that

the trial judge was the subject of an investigation which affected her

impartiality.

      In Conti, the defendant was tried by a judge sitting without a jury.

During trial, the Commonwealth's chief witness testified that the defendant

pled guilty to the crimes during preliminary hearing. The defendant testified

in his own defense, thus making his credibility of paramount importance.

Because the judge who learned of the defendant's own guilty plea was also

the trier of fact in a case in which there was not overwhelming evidence of

guilt, this Court held that the trial court should have granted a recusal under

these circumstances. Id., 345 A.2d at 245-46. In the present case, while the

trial judge knew that the co-defendant pled guilty (and inculpated Appellant

during the plea), the judge did not sit as the trier of fact. A jury determined

guilt or innocence and was unaware of the co-defendant’s statements to the

trial judge.

      In Bryant, the defendant was found guilty by three different juries in

three different trials, all conducted before the same trial judge. During an in

camera conference regarding one of the matters, the trial judge allegedly

stated that (1) in order to generate preelection publicity for himself, the date

for the sentencing hearing in the defendant’s first case would be changed from

November 8 to November 5, the day immediately preceding the election in

which the judge was a candidate, and (2) that he would give the maximum

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possible   sentences   to   the   defendant    in   both   cases.   Under   these

circumstances, we held that the court should have granted defense counsel’s

motion seeking recusal of the judge at the sentencing hearing. Id., 476 A.2d

at 425-26. There was no evidence that the trial court in the present case

allowed the knowledge of the codefendant’s plea to influence the sentence

imposed.    In fact, the trial court sentenced Appellant to the mandatory

minimum sentence and ordered all other sentences to be served concurrently.

      In short, the decisions cited in Appellant’s pro se petition are inapposite.

The fact that the trial court heard Foster’s guilty plea is of no moment, since

a jury decided Appellant’s case instead of the court, and since there is no

indication that Foster’s plea influenced the length of Appellant’s sentence.

Appellant’s claim lacks arguable merit.

      Next, Appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not filing a

motion to dismiss his charge for carrying a firearm without a license.         He

argued that the Commonwealth never introduced evidence that he was not

licensed to carry a firearm. The record reflects, however, that the parties

stipulated that defendant was not licensed to carry a firearm. N.T., 7/18/2018

at 114. Thus, this claim lacks arguable merit.

      Next, Appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

conduct an investigation, and that an investigation of the Commonwealth

witnesses would have revealed that each witness was led or coached to lie

about what they saw in order to get a conviction. Appellant’s argument is

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essentially a re-litigation of the facts of the case and witness credibility for

which he offers no evidence to substantiate his claims. Commonwealth v.

Hall, 867 A.2d 619, 630 (Pa. Super. 2005) (petitioner must identify

documents and evidence showing facts warranting relief). Accordingly, we

agree with Appellant’s counsel that this claim lacks arguable merit.

      Next, Appellant claims that trial counsel should have objected to

testimony that Appellant was in possession of the murder weapon (11/9/2021

PCRA Petition, 18–20). Appellant failed to articulate any legal basis on which

counsel could object. The Commonwealth relied on circumstantial evidence

that Appellant had been in possession of the murder weapon: Appellant’s

fingerprints were on the murder vehicle, Appellant was sighted in the murder

vehicle, Appellant’s fingerprints were on the magazine associated with the

murder weapon. Indeed, all of this evidence was properly admitted through

eyewitness and expert testimony.       Accordingly, we agree with Appellant’s

counsel that this claim lacks arguable merit.

      Next, Appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file

a motion to suppress the evidence of his fingerprints on the magazine of the

murder weapon. His argument is merely that there was insufficient evidence

to sustain the inference that he actually possessed and used the murder

weapon. Because Appellant failed to allege that the evidence was obtained in

violation of his rights, there is no merit to his claim that the fingerprint

evidence should have been suppressed.          See Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H) (“[t]he

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defendant’s attorney . . . may make a motion to the court to suppress any

evidence alleged to have been obtained in violation of the defendant’s rights”);

Commonwealth v. Wallace, 42 A.3d 1040, 1047–48 (Pa. 2012) (same).

Accordingly, we agree with Appellant’s counsel that this claim lacks arguable

merit.

      Next, Appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating

that Appellant was in possession of a gun. The record reflects that defense

counsel made no stipulation. Counsel only stipulated that Appellant did not

have a license to carry a gun. Accordingly, we agree with Appellant’s counsel

that this claim lacks arguable merit.

      Appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for allowing the

admission of evidence about codefendant Foster, because Foster’s case “was

not related in any way to evidence linking [Appellant] to the killing of” the

victim. PCRA Petition, 11/9/2021, at 22–24. Appellant failed to identify any

legal basis on which the evidence was improper.             Evidence of Foster’s

involvement was relevant because he and Appellant were charged with

conspiracy and worked together to kill the victim. Accordingly, we agree with

Appellant’s counsel that this claim lacks arguable merit.

      Next, Appellant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file

a motion to dismiss all charges against him because the evidence was

insufficient. We agree with Appellant’s counsel that this claim has no arguable

merit. Appellant and his passenger were the only men in the area other than

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the victim. The murder weapon had Appellant’s fingerprints on the magazine.

The fired cartridge casings found in the car were consistent with the driver,

Appellant, being the shooter. These facts, along with the other substantial

evidence discussed above, was sufficient to show that Appellant intentionally

killed the victim.

      Finally, Appellant claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal

to the Supreme Court on direct appeal. Appellant raised only one claim in this

Honorable Court on direct appeal, a challenge to the legality of the sentence

imposed for conspiracy. This Court agreed with Appellant and granted him

relief on that claim by reducing the sentence for conspiracy from life

imprisonment without parole to twenty to forty years of incarceration.

Because Appellant obtained relief on the only claim raised in this Court, there

was nothing to gain through an appeal to the Supreme Court. Accordingly,

we agree with Appellant’s counsel that this claim lacked arguable merit.

      For these reasons, we agree with Appellant’s counsel that Appellant is

not entitled to relief. We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the

order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition.

      Motion to withdraw as counsel granted. Order affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/22/2023

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