Court Opinion

ID: 9865335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:32:09.310948+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:29.047044
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Adams
dissenting. I disagree with the majority view of the court for these reasons:
1. The opinion is based upon a false hypothesis. The executive order of the Governor did not purport to remove the respondent, as stated in the opinion, but only that he be “relieved as civil adjutant general of the state of Colorado.” These are two very different matters. Orders relieving officers from their commands, without removing them from the service, are common to army life and are matters of almost every day occurrence in the United States army, without thought of judicial interference. Although the adjutant general be relieved of his command by the commander-in-chief, he still retains his commission as a colonel in the adjutant general’s department of the National Guard of Colorado until he shall have reached the age of sixty-four years.
The distinction between removal from the service and relief from a command is marked. Executive and military authorities, like courts, and even individuals, have certain inherent powers and rights and there is nothing in the statute against the one in question. I should think it strange if there were.
Under an article “Militia,” prepared by Major General Charles Dick, of the Ohio National Guard and United States Senator from Ohio, and Major George C. Lambert, of the Minnesota National Guard, in 27 Cyc. 489, 501, it is said:
*531“The command of the organized militia in the several states devolves upon the governor and the officers commissioned by him. The governor may in the exercise of the discretion vested in him relieve an officer from command.” Citing State v. Jelks, 138 Ala. 115, 35 So. 60; People v. Roe, 51 App. Div. 494, 64 N. Y. Suppl. 642.
In State v. Jelks, supra, it was held that the act of the governor of a state in relieving an officer of the National Guard of his command, did not constitute a removal of the officer from his office within U. S. Rev. Stat. (1878) sec. 1229, U. S. Comp. Stats. (1901), p. 868, providing that no officer in the military or naval service shall in time of peace be dismissed from the service, except on and in pursuance of a sentence of a court martial.
In People v. Roe, supra, it was held that where an order by a commanding officer of the national guard, relieving an officer of a regiment from his command, is approved by the governor, and his application for a reinstatement is denied by the governor, the commanding officer had no authority, without the sanction and approval of the governor, to restore that relieved officer to his command. The court said: “The officer who complains is still an officer as before, and the fact that his command is taken away is the result of a military order of his superior, and he must seek his redress in an appeal to him. Deprivation of command is not a civil injury.”
2. The decision of this court ignores and is contrary to the following words in section 7, page 628, Laws 1921: “* * * Provided, That the commission of each officer of the National Guard of Colorado, shall continue and remain in force and be subject to the same limitations as to tenure of office as the commissions of officers in the United States Army: * * *.”
The above provision is in a section following the parts of the statute quoted in the majority opinion of the court. The statute should be construed together, not separately or in parts, and if there is any inconsistency in the two provisions, the latter should prevail.
*532The adjutant general is the chief of staff. The commission of the chief of staff in the United States army is limited to four years as to his tenure of office as such chief of staff, unless sooner relieved. Barnes Federal Code, sec. 1478, 40 U. S. Stats. 46.
3. Even if the question of the right of the Governor to remove the adjutant general were in issue, I do not agree that it can be done only through the medium of a court martial or efficiency board. I agree with the Chief Justice and also find many other provisions of the Constitutions of the United States and of the state, as well as acts of Congress and army regulations that do not appear to support the opinion of the court.
My objections as above outlined were not suggested in the oral argument or in the briefs of counsel on either side. I think that the members of this court, including myself, should have had the benefit of the views of counsel on both sides concerning these and other matters that appear to me to be vital in the correct determination of a question of such great public importance.
By deciding, and I think, incorrectly deciding, a question not raised by the executive order, and by not deciding or even mentioning the sole question so raised, I fear that the opinion as a whole may be seriously open to its being regarded as obiter dicta.
For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.