Court Opinion

ID: 9669359
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:53:42.421192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:14.034348
License: Public Domain

*130Kelly, J.
(dissenting). The trial court did not err in entering the following order:
“It is hereby ordered that defendant Mack Wayne Smith be and he is hereby dismissed as a party defendant in the above entitled cause, without prejudice, however, to the plaintiff to proceed in a proper manner against defendant Mack Wayne Smith.”
No case allowing joinder involving facts similar to the present case has been called to my attention and the efforts of the writer of this dissent to find a similar case have been in vain.
Justice Smith, writing for reversal, cites only two recent decisions, namely: Meier v. Holt (1956), 347 Mich 430, and Maddux v. Donaldson (1961), 362 Mich 425 (100 ALR2d 1). These cases are not a precedent for the reversal of this case.
In Meier v. Holt, supra, plaintiffs’ and defendant Caswell’s cars collided in a head-on collision pushing plaintiffs’ car crosswise of the highway where it was struck by defendant Holt’s car about one-half minute later.
The majority opinion of this Court reversed the trial court’s judgment against both defendants “jointly and severally” holding (p 447) that we would continue to adhere to the rule previously established1 which held that the second tort-feasor is liable only for the injuries caused by his negligence.
Maddux v. Donaldson, supra, was labeled by this Court as a “multiple or chain vehicular collision,” “a chain collision,” where plaintiff “was struck again almost immediately.”
Justice Black concurring with the majority opinion called attention to the fact that the settled rule in Michigan2 was being abandoned and a new rule *131was being established to the effect that where a trier of fact cannot determine the amount of damages each defendant had inflicted upon plaintiff, then both defendants can be held jointly and severally liable for the entire damages sustained which are not allocable.
The minority opinion (3 signatures) called attention that to adopt the new rule would not only constitute a departure and abandonment of the rule consistently recognized in Michigan, but, also, the general rule of other States, by quoting 15 Am Jur, Damages, § 13, p 404, that:
“A defendant is liable only to the extent to which his acts have caused the injury complained of, and it follows that separate wrongs done by independent agents cannot be joined together to increase the responsibility of one of the wrongdoers, notwithstanding any difficulty there may be in determining what part of the injury or loss was the result of the acts or omissions of the defendant, and what part was the result of other causes.”
A review of the cases “involving successive impacts by different motor vehicles” due to appear in 100 ALR.2d 163 discloses two important facts: (1) No case is cited which could be used as a precedent to sustain a reversal of the trial court in the instant case; and (2) It establishes that Michigan’s “Maddux rule” is contra to that existing in the other States.
Plaintiff’s declaration did not claim, and, in fact, clearly showed that the acts of each defendant were definitely separated from the acts of the other both by time and space; that there was no concert of action; that there was no simultaneous wrongful acts that put in motion the agency which together caused *132the single injury; in fact, that they did not in any way unite in a wrongful act.
After listing six reasons why each defendant was guilty of negligence, plaintiff concluded his declaration by the simple statement: “Both collisions caused the following injuries: * * and evidently bases his right to joinder on the presumption that all that is necessary is to aver in the declaration that two widely separated collisions caused what plaintiff declares-to be a single injury and also to state that he would have difficulty proving which defendant caused whát part of the injury unless he was allowed to join them in one action.
When G-CR 1963, 206.1 was adopted we were not contemplating joining defendants who were charged with negligence in two accidents, occurring in different parts of the city, nine hours apart.
■ This rule followed Maddux, where Mr. Justice Talbot Smith, in his majority opinion, stated (p 427) : “Once again we consider the problem of damages when the car in which plaintiffs are riding is struck first by one automobile and then, almost simultaneously, by another,” and at page 428, that: “This is one of the most baffling of our current legal problems, critical because of the extensive use of expressways upon which large numbers of cars travel at high speeds in close proximity to one another,” and, again, at page 430, he refers to “the liability of automobile owners in what are known as ‘chain collisions’ on today’s highways.”
Justice Black’s concurring opinion states (p 449):
“With advent of modern motor transit and traffic, the courts of the States are regularly confronted with a new and progressively vexing problem, that of instructing juries properly when a provenly innocent plaintiff is shown as having been injured in the *133course of multiple or chain vehicular collisions caused by 2 or more negligent motorists.”
Both Maddux and Meier considered wrongdoers participating in the infliction of a single, indivisible injury with almost simultaneous impact of defendants’ cars with plaintiff’s vehicle.
As one who did not subscribe to the majority opinion in Maddux, I dissent to the present opinions that would extend the rule beyond chain collision cases to include all cases irrespective of how far the accidents are separated by time or space, and I agree with the trial court that GrCB, 1963, 206.1 did not contemplate permitting joinder under facts such as exist in this case.
Such joinder will not promote the convenient administration of justice. Some of the problems it will create are commented upon in the trial court’s opinion denying joinder when he stated:
“The trial would in the opinion of the court he most confusing to a jury not only as to the need to keep the facts of the two collisions in mind, hut also as to a double set of instructions and as to the question of which injuries, if any, were caused by the respective collisions.”
And, also, in Justice Carr’s dissenting opinion in Maddux v. Donaldson, where he stated (p 444):
. “The application of such theory would obviously result in relieving a plaintiff bringing action against two or more successive tort-feasors of the duty of proving his case against each in order to he entitled to recover damages therefrom. . Under ordinary circumstances at least a plaintiff might consider that a joint and several judgment against both or all of the defendants would he preferable to separate recoveries against them based on evidence. This might well result in forcing' a defendant to assume the bur*134den of showing liability of one of his codefendants in order to avoid a judgment against himself.”
Both opinions herein admit that this Court gave to the trial court the right to decide whether joinder was proper, but that this right was exercised by the court prematurely, as evidenced by Justice Smith’s statement that: “If after further proceedings before trial, it should appear necessary to prevent prejudice, or if it should appear to be in furtherance of the convenient administration of justice, the trial court may, within its sound discretion, order separate trials as permitted in G-CR 1963, 505.2,” and the following from Justice Black’s opinion that: “By court rule plaintiff had a right to join both defendants. Whether his claims against the two defendants should be tried together or separately is primarily for the trial court. The question is not before us now.”
Appellant did not raise this point, nor did he contend there was anything further to present to the court prior to its ruling upon defendants’ motion to dismiss.
The declaration fully advised the court as to just how plaintiff claimed the two accidents occurred and, also, the reasons why the defendants were guilty of negligence.
Plaintiff in his brief stresses the fact that the bill of particulars in unusual detail set forth plaintiff’s claims of injury after each accident, including the fact that there was no medical examination between accidents.
The court was justified in concluding that if joinder was allowed there only remained a decision on the facts as to whether the evidence sustained plaintiff’s claims. In fact, if this Court reverses the trial court it is difficult to understand how we are *135allowing the court any discretion between now and trial.
Tbe trial court did not err in entering the order set forth above.
The order of dismissal should be affirmed. Costs to appellees.
Dethmers, J., concurred with Kelly, J.

 Frye v. City of Detroit, 256 Mich 466; DeWitt v. Gerard, 274 Mich 299.

 Albrecht v. St. Hedwig’s Roman Catholic Benevolent Society, 205 Mich 395; Frye v. City of Detroit, 256 Mich 466; DeWitt v. *131Gerard, 274 Mich 299; DeWitt v. Gerard, 281 Mich 676; Meier v. Holt, 347 Mich 430.

 Referred to in Justice Black’s concurring opinion.