Court Opinion

ID: 9577105
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:31:45.067932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:59.164173
License: Public Domain

EDMONDS, J.,
dissenting.
For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in State v. Juarez-Godinez, 135 Or App 591, 900 P2d 1044 (1995), affd 326 Or 1 (1997), the use of Nitro to determine the presence of controlled substances in unit 125 was not a search under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. A “search” under section 9 occurs when a person’s privacy or possessory interest is invaded. State v. Owens, 302 Or 196, 729 P2d 524 (1986). Defendant’s possessory interest in unit 125 was never invaded because at the time of the sniff, Nitro was in an area where defendant had no possessory interest.
*261Also, defendant’s privacy interest in his contents in unit 125 was not invaded by the dog sniff. The odor which the dog smelled had escaped from the confines of unit 125 and was in an area in which defendant held no privacy interest. The dog was in a place where he had a right to be, insofar as defendant was concerned, and “alerted” to what was there to smell. Moreover, the use of a dog under these circumstances did not violate any social or legal norm, unlike the use of a transmitter attached to a vehicle to track its movement, such as occurred in State v. Campbell, 306 Or 157, 759 P2d 1040 (1988). In sum, there is no right to privacy in those things that announce their presence and are exposed to public perception, whether that perception is by sight, sound or smell. State v. Slowikowski, 307 Or 19,761 P2d 1315 (1988); State v. Louis, 296 Or 57, 672 P2d 708 (1983). The majority is wrong when it holds otherwise. For this reason, I dissent.
Riggs and De Muniz, JJ., join in this dissent.