Court Opinion

ID: 9761020
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:28:35.683193+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:19.711401
License: Public Domain

James R. Cooper, Judge, dissenting. I agree with the majority opinion, with the exception of its holding concerning the appellant’s post:arrest silence. I dissent on that point because I believe that the merits of the appellant’s argument should be addressed and this case should be reversed and remanded. While it is clear that the objection by the appellant’s attorney was too late, I believe that the appellant himself raised an adequate objection. In order to preserve an issue for appeal, a timely objection, made at the first opportunity, must be made. Robinson v. State, 278 Ark. 576, 648 S.W.2d 444 (1983). In the present case, immediately after the first question concerning his silence, the appellant asserted that he had a right not to talk to the police until he had an attorney. An objection must also be made to the trial court with sufficient clarity to give the trial judge a fair opportunity to discern and consider the argument. Abernathy v. State, 278 Ark. 250, 644 S.W.2d 590 (1983). After the first question, the prosecutor continued to question the appellant as to why he did not tell the police that the shooting was an accident. The appellant continued to reply that he “chose his right to remain silent,” and that he did not have to “talk to them.” Although the appellant’s remarks were not artful, a reading of the record makes it plain that the appellant did assert his right to remain silent and did not intend to directly answer the prosecutor’s questions. The issue was placed squarely before the trial court. Furthermore, I believe that the appellant did obtain a ruling to his objection when, after fifteen such questions and answers, the trial court ordered the appellant to give a more responsive answer to the State’s questions. Because we do not have a “plain error” rule in the State, we place upon defendants the heavy burden of requiring an objection before an alleged error will be reviewed. Although I agree with the rule in its general principles; I do not believe that it should be construed so rigidly that this appellant, who valiantly attempted to register his objection while his attorney stood idly by, is summarily denied appellate review of an error which the majority concedes is prejudicial. I am not unmindful of the general rule that a client is bound by the actions his attorney takes at trial. See 7A C.J.S. Attorney and Client, § 208 (1980). However, counsel’s decisions regarding trial strategy may not be binding where there are exceptional circumstances, or evidence of fraud, gross negligence, or incompetence on the part of the attorney. C.J.S., § 208, supra. Clearly the case at bar constitutes exceptional circumstances. The appellant raised the fact that he (had a right to remain silent fifteen times before being ordered by the trial court to be more responsive. The State then asked nine more questions regarding what he told the police before the appellant’s attorney finally objected. The State asked three more questions on this subject and then referred to it again during closing arguments. Given the appellant’s numerous attempts to object to the improper questioning and given the repetitiveness of the State’s questioning, I believe that an exceptional circumstance has arisen in which we should recognize the appellant’s objection for appellate review purposes. Furthermore, I assert that this State has placed a duty on defendants to make their own objections known when counsel has failed to object. It has been said many times that ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, see Orsini v. State, 287 Ark. 456, 701 S.W.2d 114 (1985), and it is unlikely that a defense attorney will object on the basis that his own assistance was ineffective. This leads me to conclude that the defendant himself must take affirmative steps in order to preserve the issue for appeal; by hiring new counsel to file a post-trial motion or to raise the issue himself during trial. This duty to object does not apply only to allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. In Dyas v. State, 260 Ark. 303, 539 S.W.2d 251 (1976), the last names of the trial judge and the prosecutor were the same. On appeal, the appellant asserted that the trial judge should have recused because of his relationship with the prosecutor. In refusing to address the issue because it was not raised on appeal the Supreme Court noted that the attorneys had refused the trial judge’s offer to disqualify himself and that the appellant failed to object. In another case, Irons v. State, 272 Ark. 493, 615 S.W.2d 374 (1981), there was an unreported bench conference immediately following the jury selection. After discussing the fact that the appellant had not demonstrated how he was prejudiced, the court noted that the appellant had not objected below. In both Dyas and Irons, the defense attorneys took actions which the defendant later complained of on appeal. In both cases the Supreme Court mentioned the lack of an objection, and inferred that had the appellant himself objected the alleged error would have been addressed. I maintain that Irons, Dyas and the present case constitute exceptional circumstances in which the appellant himself must register his own objection to preserve the error for appellate review. Where counsel, for whatever reason, fails to object, it is clear that the only way appellate review can be had is to recognize an objection made by the defendant himself. In closing I would note that the majority concedes that the questioning by the State constituted prejudicial error, and with that conclusion I concur. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). To hold otherwise would render the right to remain silent meaningless because the State could, as it did in this case, use the defendant’s post-arrest silence to imply that the defendant was hiding his guilt. I would recognize the appellant’s objections and reverse and remand on the merits of this issue.