Court Opinion

ID: 9796954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:09:09.513876+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:51:50.244669
License: Public Domain

*611McFarland, C.J.,
dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision holding that, once a criminal prosecution has commenced, statements made to an undercover informant surreptitiously acting as an agent for the State are not admissible at trial for any reason, including impeachment of the defendant’s testimony.
Although the United States Supreme Court has not addressed this precise issue, it has repeatedly and consistently allowed the admission of evidence and statements otherwise inadmissible in the prosecution’s case in chief to be used for purposes of impeachment, except where such evidence was obtained by coercion or was otherwise involuntary. The Court determined in those cases that, when the issue is the use of such evidence for impeachment purposes, the deterrence policy supporting exclusion is outweighed by the importance of impeachment to the proper functioning of the truth-finding process.
Moreover, of the jurisdictions that have considered this very issue, all but one have applied the Supreme Court’s balancing analysis to hold that uncounseled incriminating statements deliberately elicited from an accused through a secret informant in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel may, nevertheless, be used to impeach a defendant’s contradictory trial testimony.
The majority rejects the analysis employed in those cases, choosing instead to adopt a per se rule of exclusion that expands exclusion jurisprudence beyond the limits of that ever recognized by the Supreme Court. I believe the majority’s rationale supporting its conclusion is faulty in several respects. First, the majority errs in justifying a per se rule of inadmissibility by finding constitutional significance in the surreptitious nature of the police conduct in this case. It is the deliberate elicitation of uncounseled statements, whether directly by law enforcement officers or secretly through the use of undercover informants, not the surreptitious nature of the government’s conduct, that is the gravamen of a Sixth Amendment violation under Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 12 L. Ed. 2d 246, 84 S. Ct. 1199 (1964), and United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 65 L. Ed. 2d 115, 100 S. Ct. 2183 (1980). Second, the majority misapprehends the role of waiver in the analysis of *612the limited question of whether statements obtained in violation of Massiah/Henry should be admissible only for impeachment. Third, the majority ignores the significance of the voluntary nature of the defendant’s statements in determining the admissibility of those statements for impeachment purposes.
The significance of the surreptitious nature of the police conduct.
The surreptitious nature of the police conduct in this case is the overriding theme upon which the majority justifies the result. Specifically, the majority determines that the balancing analysis employed in the Harris (Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1, 91 S. Ct. 643 [1971]) line of cases does not apply because the defendants in those cases were dealing directly with law enforcement officers, while in this case the defendant was dealing with an undercover informant who obtained his statements surreptitiously. Moreover, the majority characterizes the conduct in this case as “particularly egregious” due to its surreptitious nature. The majority states:
“Unlike Harris, the State did not simply fail to give Ventris Miranda warnings, and, unlike Harvey, the State did not merely interrogate Ventris after his right to counsel had attached. Rather, the State purposely circumvented the requirements for a knowing and voluntary waiver of Ventris’ right to counsel when it recruited Doser to surreptitiously obtain statements from Ventris in his jail cell. Allowing die admission of this testimony as rebuttal evidence would invite the State to engage in clandestine behavior in gathering evidence in violation of our constitutional rights. The purity of justice under our Sixth Amendment’s constitutional right to counsel cannot be polluted by the subversive conduct of deceitful acquisition of evidence.” 285 Kan. at 606-07.
I am concerned that the majority has erred in finding constitutional significance in the fact that police elicited statements through “surreptitious,” “clandestine,” and “deceitful” means. The United States Supreme Court has specifically rejected the notion that the surreptitious nature of the police conduct in eliciting uncounseled statements has any constitutional significance. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 400, 51 L. Ed. 2d 424, 97 S. Ct. 1232 (1977) (“That the incriminating statements were elicited sur*613reptitiously in the Massiah case, and otherwise here, is constitutionally irrelevant.”).
Although Massiah and Henry involved secret informants, the Sixth Amendment violations in those cases did not hinge on the surreptitious nature of the government’s conduct. Rather, it was the government’s use of secret informants to deliberately elicit incriminating statements from the accused—conduct that is “the functional equivalent of interrogation.” United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. at 277 (Powell, J., concurring). Explaining his understanding of the majority’s holding in Henry, Justice Powell stated:
“[T]he Sixth Amendment is not violated when a passive listening device collects, but does not induce, incriminating comments. [Citation omitted.] Similarly, the mere presence of a jailhouse informant who had been instructed to overhear conversations and to engage a criminal defendant in some conversations would not necessarily be unconstitutional. In such a case, the question would be whether the informant’s actions constituted deliberate and ‘surreptitious interrogado [n]’ of the defendant. If they did not, then there would be no interference with the relationship between client and counsel.
“. . . I could not join the Court’s opinion if it held that the mere presence or incidental conversation of an informant [placed] in a jail cell would violate Massiah. To demonstrate an infringement of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant must show that the government engaged in conduct that, considering all of the circumstances, is the functional equivalent of interrogation. [Citations omitted.]
“Because I understand that the decision today rests on a conclusion that this informant deliberately elicited incriminating information by such conduct, I join the opinion of the Court.” 447 U.S. at 276-77 (Powell, J., concurring).
In Ruhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459, 91 L. Ed. 2d 364, 106 S. Ct. 2616 (1986), the Court had opportunity to address the “passive listener” situation anticipated by Justice Powell. Wilson was arrested for his role in a robbery of a taxi garage in which the night dispatcher was killed. Upon being arrested, Wilson told the police that although he was present when the crimes occurred he was only a witness. After arraignment, Wilson was purposefully placed in a jail cell with an individual who, unbeknownst to Wilson, had made an agreement with the police to listen for statements made by Wilson and report his remarks to police. The informant was instructed not to ask Wilson any questions.
*614Wilson first told the informant the same exculpatory version of events that he had given police at the time of his arrest. The informant responded that his story “didn’t sound too good.” 477 U.S. at 439-40. Later, Wilson changed his story and told the informant that he and two other men had planned and carried out the robbery and had murdered the dispatcher.
At the suppression hearing, the trial court held the statements were admissible. The trial court found that the police had instructed the informant to not ask questions about the crime but to only listen for comments Wilson might make in his presence, and that the informant had followed those instructions. The trial court found that Wilson’s statements were spontaneous and unsolicited and that the informant “ ‘at no time asked any questions with respect to the crime,’ and that he ‘only listened to [Wilson] and made notes regarding what [Wilson] had to say.’ ” 477 U.S. at 440.
The Supreme Court found no Sixth Amendment violation. The Court held that the Sixth Amendment is not violated where an accused makes statements to a jailhouse informant who was placed in close proximity with the accused but who did not take specific action designed to deliberately elicit incriminating statements. 477 U.S. at 459.
In reaching its decision, the Kuhlmann Court examined the Massiah line of cases, and concluded that the primary concern in those cases was the government’s use of techniques that are the equivalent of direct police interrogation:
“[T]he primary concern of the Massiah line of decisions is secret interrogation by investigatory techniques that are the equivalent of direct police interrogation. Since ‘the Sixth Amendment is not violated whenever-by luck or happenstance-the State obtains incriminating statements from the accused after the right to counsel has attached,’ 474 U.S., at 176, citing United States v. Henry, supra, at 276, (Powell, J., concurring), a defendant does not make out a violation of that right simply by showing that an informant, either through prior arrangement or voluntarily, reported his incriminating statements to the police. Rather, the defendant must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks.” Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 459.
After Kuhlmann, it is clear that the surreptitious nature of the police conduct in a Massiah/Henry violation is not the gravamen *615of the Sixth Amendment violation. The Sixth Amendment is not implicated where the police surreptitiously obtain incriminating statements from an accused by placing a secret informant in an accused’s cell for the purpose of obtaining incriminating statements, as long as the informant does not do what the police cannot do directly—deliberately elicit incriminating remarks. Thus, there is no constitutional significance in the fact that the police dealt with Ventris through a secret informant and surreptitiously elicited incriminating statements from him.
The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals recognized this point in United States v. Langer, 41 M.J. 780 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995). In holding that statements obtained through a Massiah violation may be used for impeachment purposes, the court expressly rejected the notion that the fact that the police elicited the statements indirectly through surreptitious means rather than directly and at the station house has any constitutional relevance in determining the admissibility of those statements for impeachment purposes:
“Once formal criminal proceedings begin, police may not debberately elicit statements from an accused without an express waiver of the right to counsel. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 51 L. Ed. 2d 424, 97 S. Ct. 1232 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 12 L. Ed. 2d 246, 84 S. Ct. 1199 (1964); Mil.R.Evid. 305(d)(1)(B). This is true whether the questioning is in a custodial setting and done by persons known by the accused to be police {Williams), or surreptitiously by an undercover agent {Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 88 L. Ed. 2d 481, 106 S. Ct. 477 (1985); Massiah)____
“. . . We see no significant distinction between a Sixth Amendment violation committed in a station house, by pobce officers who have identified themselves to a suspect, and a covert one committed by an undercover agent.” Langer, 41 M.J. at 783-84.
“[T]he soundest of reasons is necessary to warrant the exclusion of evidence otherwise admissible and the creation of another area of privileged testimony. . . . [Additional barriers to the pursuit of truth [should be erected on] solid foundations which decisions of this gravity . . . require.” Massiah, 377 U.S. at 208 (White, J., dissenting). Because the majority’s rationale rests on the unsound characterization of the surreptitious police conduct as an egregious constitutional violation, I dissent.
*616Before moving on, I must note that the State conceded that it violated the Sixth Amendment. In conceding this point in its brief, the State cites State v. McCorgary, 218 Kan. 358, 361-363, 543 P.2d 952 (1975) cert, denied 429 U.S. 867 (1976). In McCorgary, this court held that, because the surreptitious arrangement is the evil at issue, deliberate elicitation is not required to establish a Massiah violation. 218 Kan. at 362. McCorgary, however, predates Kuhlmann and, thus, it is no longer a correct statement of the law. The State’s brief does not cite Kuhlmann but, in fight of that case, I believe there is a legitimate issue as to whether the State’s conduct in this case violated the Sixth Amendment. Under Kuhlmann, merely placing Doser in Ventris’ cell for the purpose of listening for incriminating statements did not violate Ventris’ constitutional right to counsel. Ventris’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated only if the State, through Doser, “took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks.” Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 459. From the record on appeal, it does not appear that Doser crossed that fine.
Doser was approached by Steve Flyback (it appears, but is not clear, that Fryback is a law enforcement officer) and was asked if he would be willing to be placed in Ventris’ cell to listen for and report what he might say. Doser testified that he was specifically told “[j]ust to keep [his] ear open and listen ... to what he had to say.”
The first day Doser was in the cell with Ventris, he was not very talkative. On the second day, Doser told Ventris that he could tell by the look in his eyes that he had something more serious weighing on his mind. Ventris than asked Doser if he could trust him. Doser told Ventris that he could. Ventris asked Doser if what he said would stay in the room between them, and Doser said it would. Ventris then showed Doser a piece of paper which showed he had been arrested as a suspect in a murder. Ventris told Doser he would show him his hand in a little bit. After that, Ventris told Doser that he and his girlfriend Rhonda had gone to rob somebody, but it went sour. He said he shot a man in his head and chest, and that he took his keys, his wallet, $350, and a vehicle.
*617Doser testified that he did not push Ventris for any information and he did not ask him any details. According to Doser, Ventris volunteered information and he simply let Ventris do the talking.
The informant’s conduct in this case is not significantly different from the conduct that was held to not be a violation of the Sixth Amendment in Kuhlmann. Applying Kuhlmann, it would appear at least arguable that Ventris’ statements were not obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment and, thus, they were admissible for all purposes. This issue should not have been conceded. Prosecutors should be mindful that they represent a party to the litigation—the people of the state of Kansas—and are bound by the ethical duty to provide zealous advocacy on behalf of their client. That duty encompasses the obligation to litigate viable dispositive issues with “earnestness and vigor.” Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 79 L. Ed. 1314, 55 S. Ct. 629 (1935) (while a prosecutor is not at liberty to strike foul blows, he may strike hard ones, and “[h]e may prosecute with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should do so.”).
The role of waiver in the analysis of whether statements obtained in violation of Massiah/Henry should be admissible only for impeachment.
The majority states that there are two analytical approaches for resolving tire issue of whether inculpatory statements obtained as the result of a Massiah/Henry violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel should be admissible for impeachment. One approach focuses on the importance to the truth seeking function of the adversary process that defendants not be permitted the opportunity to commit perjury without fear of contradiction. That approach, according to the majority, “ignores Henry and the requirement that defendants make a knowing and voluntary waiver of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” 285 Kan. at 605. The other approach, the majority states, requires a knowing and voluntary waiver and is not dependant on preventing the opportunity for perjury. The majority concludes the waiver approach is the more constitutionally sound and, based thereon, holds' that “[wjithout a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel, *618the admission of the defendant’s uncounseled statements to an undercover informant who is secretly acting as a State agent violates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.” 285 Kan. at 606.
The existence of waiver of the right to counsel is a relevant factor in determining whether statements elicited outside of the presence of counsel were obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment and are therefore inadmissible in the prosecution’s case in chief. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463-64, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019 (1938). In a Massiah/Henry violation, waiver of the right to counsel or, more accurately, the lack thereof, is relevant to the determination that the use of an undercover informant to deliberately elicit uncounseled incriminating statements violated the Sixth Amendment and, consequently, in holding that such statements are inadmissible in the prosecution’s case in chief. Specifically, the use of an undercover informant to elicit uncounseled incriminating statements violates the Sixth Amendment because there cannot be a waiver of the right to counsel under those circumstances:
“[T]he concept of a knowing and voluntary waiver of Sixth Amendment rights does not apply in tire context of communications with an undisclosed undercover informant acting for the Government. [Citation omitted.] In that setting, Henry, being unaware that Nichols was a Government agent expressly commissioned to secure evidence, cannot be held to have waived his right to the assistance of counsel.” 447 U.S. at 273.
The absence of waiver of the right to counsel inherent in the undercover informant situation is the pertinent factor underlying the conclusion that surreptitiously ehciting uncounseled incriminating statements violates the Sixth Amendment and the statements are, therefore, inadmissible in the case in chief. In this case, however, we are beyond determining whether there was a Sixth Amendment violation in the first instance. With waiver being the basis for the determination that statements obtained in violation of Massiah/Henry are inadmissible in the prosecution’s case in chief, using the absence of waiver again to determine whether those statements should also be inadmissible for impeachment purposes begs the question, as “the answer in the first context necessarily predetermines the answer in the second context.” State v. Hoeck, *619284 Kan. 441, 461, 163 P.2d 252 (2007) (holding that the “substantial basis” test cannot be used to determine both the validity of the warrant and the applicability of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule because “the answer in the first context necessarily predetermines the answer in the second context”). Accordingly, waiver, or the lack thereof, is simply not relevant to determining the admissibility of surreptitiously elicited statements for impeachment purposes.
The fact that there was a waiver in Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 108 L. Ed. 2d 293, 110 S. Ct. 1176 (1990), does not mean waiver is relevant in determining the admissibility of the defendant’s statements for impeachment under the circumstances of this case. In Harvey, the defendant gave a written waiver of the right to counsel. Of course, as discussed above, there is no waiver in a Massiah violation. The Supreme Court recognized this distinction in Harvey by noting that it was not addressing “the admissibility for impeachment purposes of a voluntary statement obtained in the absence of a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel.” (Emphasis added.) 494 U.S. at 354.
The relevance of the voluntary nature of the statements in determining whether statements obtained in violation of Massiah/Henry should be admissible only for impeachment.
In an analysis fatally linked to the erroneous determination that waiver is relevant to the issue of admissibility for impeachment purposes, the majority holds that the voluntary nature of Ventris’ statements are irrelevant to the issue of admissibility for impeachment:'
“The State seeks to limit our analysis to whether Ventris’ statements to Doser were voluntary. However, the State’s argument misstates the applicable test for Sixth Amendment violations. Voluntariness of the statement is a test for Fifth Amendment violations. See Hass, 420 U.S. at 722. The test for Sixth Amendment violations is whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to counsel. See Harvey, 494 U.S. at 354. Waiver is valid only when it reflects ‘ “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” ’ Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292, 101 L. Ed. 2d 261, 108 S. Ct. 2389 (1988) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. Ed. 1461, 58 S. Ct. 1019 [1938]). In this case, there are no facts to support a finding that Ventris knowingly *620and voluntarily waived his right to counsel even though his statements to Doser may have been voluntary.” (Emphasis added.) 285 Kan. at 606.
First, as discussed above, for the issue at hand, we are beyond determining whether a Sixth Amendment violation occurred. The relevance of the absence of waiver of the right to counsel inherent in a Massiah/Henry violation has been exhausted and is of no further relevance once the issue becomes admissibility for impeachment purposes'.
Second, the majority errs in holding that voluntariness is irrelevant to the issue of whether the statements are admissible for impeachment purposes. In fact, in refusing to address the very issue at hand, the Supreme Court in Harvey implicitly recognized that even in a situation where there is no waiver of the right to counsel, voluntariness is still relevant to the issue of admissibility for impeachment when it said, “we need not consider the admissibility for impeachment purposes of a voluntary statement obtained in the absence of a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel.” (Emphasis added.) Harvey, 494 U.S. at 354.
Moreover, in Harris, the Court explained that adopting a per se rule of exclusion that fails to take into account the voluntariness of the statements at issue would be “an extravagant extension of the Constitution”:
“If, for example, an accused confessed fully to a homicide and led the police to the body of the victim under circumstances making his confession inadmissible, the petitioner would have us allow that accused to take the stand and blandly deny every fact disclosed to the police or discovered as a ‘fruit’ of his confession, free from confrontation with his prior statements and acts. The voluntariness of the confession would, on this thesis, be totally irrelevant. We reject such an extravagant extension of the Constitution.” Harris, 401 U.S. at 225 n.2.
See also State.v. Boone, 220 Kan. 758, 768, 556 P.2d 864 (1976) (noting, under Harris and Hass, statements inadmissible in case in chief may be used for impeachment where there is no evidence that the statements at issue were coerced or involuntary).
The bottom line is that “the exclusion of rehable and probative evidence for all purposes” is required only when it is the product of coercion. Harvey, 494 U.S. at 351 (citing Hew Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 59 L. Ed. 2d 501, 99 S. Ct. 1292 [1979] [compelled *621incriminating statements inadmissible for impeachment purposes]; Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290, 98 S. Ct. 2408 [1978] [same]); State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098, 1114 (R.1.1992) (in holding that surreptitiously elicited statements obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment under Henry may be used for impeachment, court noted that “[t]he exclusion of rehable and probative evidence for all purposes is not mandated unless it is derived from coerced or involuntary statements”). Thus, voluntariness is the key inquiry in determining the admissibility of statements obtained in violation of Massiah/Henry for purposes of impeachment. United States v. Martin, 974 F. Supp. 677, 679-80(C.D. Ill. 1997) (voluntariness is the key inquiry in determining whether secretly recorded incriminating statements obtained in violation of Massiah may be used for impeachment).
In this case, there is nothing in the record that would indicate that Ventris’ statements to the undercover informant were coerced or were otherwise involuntarily made. Moreover, the district court found that Ventris’ statements to Doser were voluntarily made, and the majority does not hold otherwise.
The balancing analysis.
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the question of whether statements inadmissible as a product of a Massiah/Henry violation may be used for impeachment, in other situations it has consistently allowed illegally obtained evidence and statements of the accused to be admitted for impeachment purposes. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 98 L. Ed. 503, 74 S. Ct. 354 (1954) (allowing physical evidence that is inadmissible in the prosecution’s case in chief because it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to be used to impeach the defendant’s testimony); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (holding that otherwise inadmissible statements obtained from a suspect through custodial interrogation without giving Miranda warnings may be used for impeachment purposes); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722, 43 L. Ed. 2d 570, 95 S. Ct. 1215 (1975) (allowing statements that are inadmissible in the prosecution’s case in chief because they were obtained after a suspect invokes his or her right to counsel pursuant *622to Miranda to be used to impeach the defendant’s testimony); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28, 64 L. Ed. 2d 559, 100 S. Ct. 1912 (1980) (evidence illegally seized without a warrant admissible to impeach defendant’s trial testimony); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (uncounseled statements elicited by police pursuant to an illegally obtained waiver of the right to counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment may be used to impeach the defendant’s testimony if the waiver can be shown to be valid).
The United States Supreme Court’s decisions in the above cases rest on a careful balancing of two competing interests: the deterrence policy behind the exclusionary rule and the detrimental effect on the truth seeking process if constitutional violations can serve as a license to testify falsely free from the risk of confrontation with contradictory evidence.
The Court’s analysis has emphasized “the importance of arriving at the truth in criminal trials, as well as the defendant’s obligation to speak the truth in response to proper questions.” Havens, 446 U.S. at 626. “If a defendant exercises his right to testify on his own behalf, he assumes a reciprocal ‘obligation to speak truthfully and accurately.’ ” Harvey, 494 U.S. at 351 (quoting Harris, 401 U.S. at 225). “It is essential ... to the proper functioning of the adversary system that when a defendant takes the stand, the government be permitted proper and effective cross-examination in an attempt to elicit the truth.” Havens, 446 U.S. at 626-27. The Court has refused to “allow a defendant to ‘turn the illegal method by which evidence in the government’s possession was obtained to his own advantage, and provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths.’ ” Harvey, 494 U.S. at 351 (quoting Harris, 401 U.S. at 224). A defendant should not be permitted to pervert the constitutional shield against having illegally obtained evidence used against him “ ‘into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.’ ” Havens, 446 U.S. at 626 (quoting Harris, 401 U.S. at 226). “[T]here is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government’s disability to challenge his credibility.” Walder, 347 U.S. at 65.
*623The Supreme Court has consistently found that the importance of the impeachment process to the proper functioning of the adversary system outweighs the deterrence policy behind exclusion of illegally obtained evidence:
“The impeachment process here undoubtedly provided valuable aid to the jury in assessing petitioner’s credibility, and the benefits of this process should not be lost, in our view, because of the speculative possibility that impermissible police conduct will be encouraged thereby. Assuming that the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect on proscribed police conduct, sufficient deterrence flows when the evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief.” Harris, 401 U.S. at 225.
See also Havens, 446 U.S. at 627 (“The incremental furthering of [the policy behind exclusion] by forbidding impeachment of the defendant who testifies [is] deemed insufficient to permit or require that false testimony go unchallenged, with the resulting impairment of the integrity of the factfinding goals of the criminal trial.”).
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the question of whether statements inadmissible as a product of a Massiah/Henry violation may be used for impeachment, of the jurisdictions that have addressed this issue, all but one have applied the Supreme Court’s balancing analysis and ruled that such statements may be used for impeachment. See United, States v. McManaman, 606 F.2d 919 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Martin, 974 F. Supp. 677; United States v. Langer, 41 M.J. 780; State v. Mattatall, 603 A.2d 1098; State v. Wilder, 177 W.Va. 435, 352 S.E.2d 723 (1986); but see State v. York, 705 A.2d 692 (Me. 1997).
Illustrative of the rationale employed in those cases is the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s opinion in Mattatall. In that case, the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when a third party, in cooperation with police, allowed police to listen in on telephone conversations with the defendant during which he deliberately elicited incriminating statements from the defendant. In determining whether the defendant’s statements were admissible for impeachment, the court applied the Supreme Court’s balancing approach:
*624“The essence of a criminal trial is its search for the truth. In no way should the exclusionary rules enunciated by the Supreme Court in either Weeks, Miranda, Jackson, Massiah, Henry, or Moulton be perverted by any defendant into a license to commit perjury. The defendant’s obligation to speak truthfully during the trial is absolute and is not lessened in response to violations of the defendant’s constitutional rights. Such voluntary statements, although inadmissible in the state’s case in chief, are properly accessible to the state for impeachment of a defendant’s false or inconsistent testimony. Prior opinions of the Supreme Court, on the issue of impeachment, would indicate that the use of this evidence is not constitutionally prohibited.” Mattatall, 603 A.2d at 1115.
The majority’s decision in this case runs contrary to the weight of authority of other jurisdictions that have considered this issue, and in doing so, expands exclusion jurisprudence beyond the limits of that ever recognized by the Supreme Court. “There is no gainsaying that arriving at the truth is a fundamental goal of our legal system.” Havens, 446 U.S. at 626. Today’s decision seriously undermines the truth finding process of the adversary system by allowing criminal defendants to pervert the shield provided by the Sixth Amendment “to a license to testify inconsistently, or even perjuriously, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances. Hass, 420 U.S. at 722. For these reasons, I dissent.