Court Opinion

ID: 9865580
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 19:04:26.210386+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:30.848433
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/25/23 P. v. Stewart CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F083847
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                                    (Stanislaus Super. Ct.
                    v.                                                               No. CR-21-004088)

 CHARLES RANANDO STEWART, JR.,
                                                                                          OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Ricardo
Cordova, Judge.
         Solomon Wollack, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, and Ian
Whitney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

                                      SEE CONCURRING OPINION
       Defendant and appellant Charles Ranando Stewart, Jr. (defendant), faced multiple
serious charges when he filed a form requesting to represent himself. Defendant initialed
a litany of advisements on the form. However, the trial court did not repeat the
advisements orally. Defendant contends the granting of his own request to represent
himself was prejudicially erroneous. We disagree and affirm.
                                     BACKGROUND
       In an amended information filed August 23, 2021, the Stanislaus County District
Attorney charged defendant with forced oral copulation (count 1; Pen. Code, § 287,
subd. (c)(2)(a)),1 forcible rape (count 2; § 261, subd. (a)(2)), robbery (count 3; § 211),
first degree burglary (count 4; § 459) of an occupied residence (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21)),
two counts of battery upon a spouse or cohabitor (counts 5 and 8; § 273.5, subd. (a)), two
counts of assault likely to produce great bodily injury (counts 6 and 9; § 245,
subd. (a)(4)), stalking (count 7; § 646.9, subd. (a)). The information further alleged that
defendant used a deadly weapon (knife) in the commission of the burglary. (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1).) As to all counts, the information alleged defendant had suffered a prior
serious felony conviction for robbery on February 11, 2011. (§ 667, subd. (d).) As to
counts 1 through 4, the information alleged defendant had suffered a prior serious felony
conviction for robbery on February 11, 2011. (§ 667, subd. (a).)
       A jury convicted defendant on all counts and found the occupied residence
allegation and deadly weapon enhancement to count 4 true. The court later found the
prior conviction allegations true.
       The court sentenced defendant to 12 years in prison for count 2; 12 years on
count 1; two years on count 3; two years eight months on count 4, plus one year for the
weapon enhancement; two years on count 5, a stayed (§ 654) term of two years on

       1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.

                                              2.
count 6; 16 months on count 7; two years on count 8, a stayed (§ 654) term of two years
on count 9. Defendant’s total term is 35 years.
                                         FACTS
       Defendant physically and sexually assaulted S.D., the mother of his child, on
several occasions in late 2020.2
Pretrial Proceedings
       At a hearing on February 9, 2021, the prosecutor informed the court that the victim
had recently told a police detective that defendant had forced her to have sex and orally
copulate him. The prosecutor had not yet made a charging decision with respect to these
allegations.
       The prosecutor said defendant had been offered a plea deal for 14 years that
afternoon. Under the offer, the prosecution would not file charges on the sex allegations.
The following exchange ensued:

              “[Prosecutor 1:] [Defendant’s] exposure would be significantly
       higher than 14 years on this case alone without even factoring into account
       the pending – I’m not going to say pending case. I’m going to say the
       allegations that [defense counsel] received last night in addition to Alameda
       County. I believe his exposure is upwards of – I believe 37 years?

               “[Prosecutor 2:] Yes. About 36.”
       Later in the hearing, defendant made an oral Marsden3 motion. During the
Marsden hearing, defense counsel stated, in defendant’s presence, that defendant faced
over 22 years in prison.
       The court also held a Marsden hearing on February 23, 2021.

       2 The Attorney General omits elaboration of the facts of the underlying crimes and
trial, positing they are immaterial to the sole issue raised on appeal. Because we agree
the trial is not pertinent on the claim of error raised on appeal, and because we do not
reach the issue of prejudice, we will likewise omit those facts.
        3 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.

                                            3.
       The court denied the Marsden motion in both instances. At the hearings,
defendant made references to “entrapment.”
       On May 12, 2021, the prosecution filed a complaint charging defendant with oral
copulation by force, rape by force or fear, battery on a spouse or cohabitor, and assault
likely to cause great bodily injury. That case was later consolidated with the original
charges against defendant, eventually resulting in the first amended information
described earlier in the opinion.
Faretta Waiver Form
       On June 11, 2021, defendant filed a Faretta4 waiver that he had filled out with
counsel’s assistance. The form begins, “Fill out this form if you wish to proceed in
propria persona (act as your own attorney).” The form instructs filers to initial the box
for each applicable item “only if you understand and agree with it.” Filers are further
advised to ask the judge if they have any questions about anything on the form.
       Defendant indicated he understood his right to counsel. He understood that if he
represented himself, he would not have a lawyer to assist him in following “all the
technical rules of substantive law, criminal procedure, and evidence,” making pretrial
motions, selecting a jury, making opening statements, cross-examining witnesses,
subpoenaing witnesses, making objections, and representing himself at sentencing if
convicted. Defendant indicated he understood the prosecutor was an experienced trial
attorney, that he would not receive special consideration or assistance from the court, and
that investigating his case would be difficult since he was in custody. Defendant also
indicated he understood that the court was recommending that he not represent himself
and instead accept court-appointed counsel.

       4 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806. In Faretta, the court held defendants
have the right to represent themselves if they “ ‘knowingly and intelligently’ ” waive the
right to counsel. (Id. at p. 835.)

                                              4.
       The form contained the preprinted text, “I understand that I am charged with the
following crime(s):” followed by this handwritten text: “burglary, stalking, DV/w strike
A & D prior, rape, forceful oral copulation, battery on spouse, assault likely to produce
great bodily injury w/A & D priors.” Defendant observes on appeal that six counts
carried strike allegations, which is not fully reflected in this text.
       Defendant indicated he understood that “depending on the stage of my case, [i]f I
ask to give up my pro per status and request counsel to handle my case, the Court may
deny this request and I may have to proceed with trial without an attorney.”
       Defendant indicated on the form that he was 31 years old and did not graduate
from high school. He had not represented himself previously and had no legal education.
       Finally, defendant signed the form to “certify” that he had read, understood, and
considered all the warnings on the form and that he “still” wanted to represent himself.
Faretta Hearing
       A hearing was held on June 11, 2021. At the time, trial was scheduled for
June 22.
       The court warned defendant, “[Y]ou understand you will not receive any special
consideration from the Court? You will need to follow all the evidentiary rules and
procedural rules. [¶] I can tell you I just did a murder trial with an in pro per defendant.
It’s not easy when you are in custody.” Defendant replied, “Not to cut you off. When
you’re talking about a murder trial, that’s neither here nor there. This is my life.”
       The court explained how defendant could go about obtaining an investigator by
filing a request with the clerk’s office.
       The court accepted defendant’s Faretta waiver and relieved the public defender.
Defendant’s now-former counsel represented he would provide the discovery in the case
to defendant. The court advised defendant that any motions in limine would need to be
filed by June 17 to be heard on June 21.

                                               5.
       The minute order for the hearing left blank the checkbox available to reflect that
the Faretta motion had been granted. However, the minute order stated that the public
defender was “relieved” and that defendant would proceed “pro per,” – which was the
relief defendant had requested. The minute order also reflected that defendant was
advised pursuant to Faretta. The minute order contains no other findings.
       Trial did not go forward on June 22 as scheduled. At defendant’s request, the
court appointed advisory counsel for defendant on September 1, 2021.
Motions in Limine
       Defendant moved to dismiss the case for delay in prosecution. During a hearing
on that motion, defendant claimed he could not have a “proper trial to prepare for because
my request to get a laptop or my request to contact my PI is ignored.” Defendant further
claimed he could not hear through the “windows” during his in-custody meetings with his
investigator. Defendant’s investigator also noted that defendant was “shackled up to the
chair so he cannot write notes or use a computer.”
Defendant’s Request to Terminate Self-Representation
       In the middle of trial, defendant said he wanted to subpoena “video from the
burglary.” The court told defendant he was free to do so. Defendant then said he wanted
to terminate his self-representation and have an attorney to do the subpoena. The court
said “not in [the] middle of trial” unless advisory counsel could proceed as trial counsel.
Advisory counsel said he could not take over the case without a continuance. The court
said “[t]hen that’s going to be denied.” The court later observed that they were “probably
80 or 90 percent done with this trial” when defendant made his request. The court said
that if the case went into the foreseeable future, there was a distinct possibility the jurors
would be unable to complete their service resulting in a mistrial. Advisory counsel said it
would take him one or two months to get up to speed and into a position to become trial
counsel. The court did not alter its denial of defendant’s request to terminate self-
representation.

                                              6.
Trial
        Appellate counsel observes defendant asked no questions of complaining
witnesses, gave no closing argument, and presented no coherent defense.
                                      DISCUSSION
Law
        “ ‘A criminal defendant has a right, under the Sixth Amendment to the federal
Constitution, to conduct his own defense, provided that he knowingly and intelligently
waives his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. [Citations.] A defendant
seeking to represent himself “should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and
his choice is made with eyes open.’ [Citation].” [Citation.] “No particular form of
words is required in admonishing a defendant who seeks to waive counsel and elect self-
representation.” [Citation.] Rather, “the test is whether the record as a whole
demonstrates that the defendant understood the disadvantages of self-representation,
including the risks and complexities of the particular case.” [Citations.] Thus, ‘[a]s long
as the record as a whole shows that the defendant understood the dangers of self-
representation, no particular form of warning is required.’ ” (People v. Burgener (2009)
46 Cal.4th 231, 240–241.)
        “We review a Faretta waiver de novo, examining the entire record to determine
the validity of a defendant’s waiver.” (People v. Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th 722, 735.)
Defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that his waiver of the right to counsel was
invalid. (People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 549.) He also bears the burden
of providing “a record on appeal which affirmatively shows that there was an error
below, and any uncertainty in the record must be resolved against the defendant.” (Ibid.)
Issues as to which the record is silent are resolved in favor of the judgment.5 (Ibid.)

        5 Defendant inverts the burden by arguing that the record fails to show he made a
knowing waiver. Rather, it is defendant’s burden to produce a record affirmatively

                                             7.
Analysis
       Defendant contends that “[w]ithout an on-the-record advisement about the
maximum possible sentence, the record fails to establish that [he] made a knowing and
intelligent decision to waive his right to counsel and elect self-representation.” As
defendant observes, California courts are split on the issue of whether defendants wishing
to represent themselves must always be advised of potential exposure.6 (See People v.
Ruffin (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 536, 544.)

showing he did not make a knowing waiver. (See, e.g., Sullivan, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th
524.)
       6 Defendant urges that we read Iowa v. Tovar (2004) 541 U.S. 77 (Tovar) as
requiring an advisement on the maximum punishment. (See People v. Jackio (2015)
236 Cal.App.4th 445; Arrendondo v. Neven (9th Cir. 2014) 763 F.3d 1122, 1131–1132.)
       Tovar rejected a lower court’s requirement that defendants be advised that if they
represent themselves, (1) they may overlook a defense and (2) will not have an
opportunity to obtain an independent opinion on whether it is wise to plead guilty. Tovar
also observed that constitutional requirements are satisfied when the trial court informs
the defendant of the nature of charges against him, the right to be counseled regarding his
plea, and the range of allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty plea.
(Tovar, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 81.) The parties dispute whether the Supreme Court was
merely identifying one way to satisfy constitutional requirements, or instead was setting a
“floor” which all advisements must meet.
       We reject defendant’s contention that Tovar established an across-the-board
requirement that all defendants be advised of the “range of allowable punishments”
before a waiver can be deemed knowing. While Tovar “affirmed that the constitutional
requirement of a knowing, intelligent waiver ‘is satisfied when the trial court informs the
accused of the nature of the charges against him, of his right to be counseled regarding
his plea, and of the range of allowable punishments attendant upon the entry of a guilty
plea’ [citation], the Supreme Court did not state that courts must give these advisements
in every case.” (People v. Bush (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 457, 470, fn. omitted.) Moreover,
the California Supreme Court has established that it is the defendant’s actual
understanding, not the form of court advisements, that determines whether a waiver was
knowing and valid. (People v. Burgener, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 240–241.) Put
differently, the focus is on what the defendant knew and understood, not on what the
court said.6 (U.S. v. Lopez-Osuna (9th Cir. 2000) 242 F.3d 1191, 1199.)
       Consequently, we turn to whether the absence of such an advisement requires
reversal on the facts of this specific case.

                                             8.
          Waiver of constitutional rights in the criminal context generally must be a
“ ‘knowing, intelligent ac[t] done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances.’ ” (Tovar, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 81.) At the heart of the dispute before us
is the broader question of what exactly a defendant must know in order for a waiver of a
right to be “intelligent.”
          We begin with the observation that “intelligent” means a general awareness, not
complete, comprehensive knowledge. That is, a defendant need not have complete
knowledge of every consideration bearing on the decision to waive or invoke a right.
Instead, “ ‘the law ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently
aware if the defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it would likely
apply in general in the circumstances – even though the defendant may not know the
specific detailed consequences of invoking it.” (Tovar, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 92.)
Advisements can satisfy the constitutional minimum even where the defendant lacks a
“ ‘full and complete appreciation of all of the consequences flowing from his waiver.’ ”
(Ibid.)
          Applying these principles to the context of a Faretta waiver specifically, we
conclude that a defendant must know the nature of the right to counsel and what he would
be giving up by waiving that right; but does not need to necessarily to know every
specific, detailed consequences that would follow if he waived the right.7
          Under this standard, we conclude defendant’s waiver here was knowing.
Defendant was fully advised of the nature of the right to counsel and what he would be

          7 This is not to say that a defendant cannot or should not be advised of those
specific, detailed consequences. It is only to say that the constitution does not require
them for a waiver to be knowing. We do believe the best approach is to advise a
defendant of the maximum sentence he or she faces before accepting a Faretta waiver.
All we hold is that there is no across-the-board constitutional imperative to hold a Faretta
waiver invalid without such an advisement. (See People v. Bush, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at
p. 473.)

                                                9.
giving up by waiving that right. Specifically, he was advised that if he waived the right
to counsel, he would have to “follow all the technical rules of substantive law, criminal
procedure and evidence” without the assistance of a lawyer; that he would not have help
making pretrial motions, selecting a jury, making an opening statement, cross-examining
witnesses, subpoenaing and presenting witnesses, making objections and motions during
trial, preparing and presenting jury instructions, making final arguments, making post-
trial motions, and representing himself at sentencing; and that it would be difficult to
contact witnesses and investigate his case.
       It is true that defendant was not advised of certain eventualities that might follow
after waiver, such as the specific punishment that could be imposed if the increased risk
of conviction contemplated by a Faretta waiver came to fruition.8 However, as observed
above, a defendant’s lack of full and complete appreciation of all of the consequences
flowing from his waiver does not render the waiver unknowing. Consequently, we agree
with the approach of People v. Bush, supra, 7 Cal.App.5th 457, and reject defendant’s
contention.
Other Advisements
       Defendant argues that even if there is no per se duty to warn about the maximum
sentence, the record still fails to show a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. He
observes that the court’s oral advisements did not include some of those suggested by
cases like People v. Lopez (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 568.
       The court could have done more at the Faretta hearing to reinforce the pitfalls of
self-representation. The trial court did not verbally confirm with defendant that he read

       8 For that matter, defendant was also not advised about how a conviction would
affect his ability to obtain employment (see, e.g., Lab. Code, § 432.7, subd. (m)), his
ability to vote while he is in prison for the conviction(s) (see Elec. Code, § 2101,
subd. (a)), or his ability to enlist in the armed forces (10 U.S.C. § 504(a).) Extending the
logic of defendant’s argument, presumably such advisements should also be required in
every situation.

                                              10.
or understood the admonitions and warnings contained in the form. Nor did the trial
court mention the potential consequences of a conviction (including the potential
maximum term of imprisonment), explain that the prosecutor was a trained professional,
or explain that defendant would waive claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by
representing himself.
       However, that is not the question presented on review of a claim of Faretta error.
“Even when the trial court has failed to conduct a full and complete inquiry regarding a
defendant’s assertion of the right of self-representation, … courts examine the entire
record to determine whether the invocation of the right of self-representation and waiver
of the right to counsel was knowing and voluntary.” (People v. Marshall (1997)
15 Cal.4th 1, 24.) Thus, it is the voluntariness of defendant’s invocation – not the
completeness of the court’s inquiry – that guides our analysis.
       Here, the entire record demonstrates defendant’s waiver was in fact knowing and
voluntary.
       Most of the advisements defendant contends were missing are reflected in the
written advisement form he filled out. Defendant filled out the form with counsel,
initialed each advisement, and signed the form. These written advisements and
defendant’s acknowledgment of them were sufficient to demonstrate the waiver was
knowing and voluntary.
       For example, defendant argues his waiver was invalid because the trial court never
orally told him that self-representation was unwise. But the form expressly advised him
that it was “the advice and recommendation of the Court that [he] not represent
[himself]” and to instead accept court-appointed counsel. Defendant initialed this
advisement.
       He similarly says the trial court did not orally advise him that representing himself
might cost him a viable defense. But the form advised him that one disadvantage of not
having an attorney is that he would need to follow all the rules of “substantive law,

                                            11.
criminal procedure, and evidence” without the assistance of a lawyer. Similarly, he
would have to make pretrial motions, an opening statement, cross-examine witnesses,
subpoena and present his own witnesses, make appropriate objections and motions during
trial, prepare and present proposed jury instructions, make final argument, and make
posttrial motions without the assistance of an attorney. Defendant initialed both
advisements. By advising defendant that he would be on his own to follow substantive
law and employ all the means of presenting defenses, the form did convey to defendant
that there was a risk he might overlook, improperly pursue, or ineffectively convey his
defense.
       Defendant also says the court never explained he would have to face off against an
experienced prosecutor with legal training. But the form made expressly advised
defendant: “I understand the case against me will be handled by a prosecutor who is an
experienced trial attorney….” Defendant initialed this advisement.
       Next, he contends the court did not orally advise him that he would not receive
special library privileges, that it would be difficult to communicate with his investigator,
and the other difficulties created by his in-custody status. However, the form expressly
advised him:

              “I understand that because of my custodial status, it will be difficult
       for me to contact witnesses and investigate my case. I understand that I
       will have limited access to a telephone, which will make preparations for
       trial more difficult, and that I will be provided no more access to the law
       library than any other pro per inmate.”
       Defendant initialed this advisement.
       He observes the court did not inquire into his education level or familiarity with
legal principles. But the form had a portion for defendant to fill out his education level,
which he did. It also had a portion for defendant to fill out his legal education “if any,”
which defendant left blank.

                                              12.
       Moreover, at defendant’s request, the trial court appointed advisory counsel.
Defendant’s request for advisory counsel suggests that defendant knew that he did not
understand the procedural rules and required support in that respect. The record therefore
compels the conclusion that defendant understood that his lack of a legal education
placed him at a disadvantage in representing himself.
       He complains the court did not advise him of possible defenses to his charges,
especially in light of the confusion he demonstrated by referencing entrapment at prior
hearings. But he offers no authority suggesting the court would be required to provide
defendant such legal advice.
       Defendant insists the written advisements were insufficient and that the absence of
a more robust verbal advisement requires reversal, citing to People v. Ruffin, supra,
12 Cal.App.5th at pp. 548–549, which held:

              “Neither Blair nor Miranda stand for the proposition that when a
       defendant signs a written Faretta waiver form, the court need only conduct
       the kind of perfunctory proceeding that occurred … here, in which the court
       merely advised appellant that self-representation was unwise, and asked
       whether he initialed and signed the form and whether he had any questions.
       Rather, even when a waiver form is completed, the court’s duty remains to
       ensure that the defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel is knowing and
       voluntary. The record as a whole must demonstrate ‘ “ ‘that the defendant
       understood the disadvantages of self-representation, including the risks and
       complexities of the particular case.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)
       While we agree a court has a duty to ensure the defendant’s waiver of the right to
counsel is knowing and voluntary, affirmance is nonetheless proper where the court
accepts a proper advisement form that was initialed and signed by a defendant who was
represented by counsel at the time. Again, the core issue is what the whole record
demonstrates defendant knew and understood. Defendant can come to the requisite
knowledge and understanding through various means – written or oral or both. To
reverse merely because the court did not verbally repeat the written advisements
defendant had just gone over with counsel and initialed would be improper.

                                            13.
Additional Considerations
       As noted above, at the February 9, 2021, hearing in this matter, the prosecutor
summarized the new sex offense charges that would be filed against defendant. A 14-
year offer was made to defendant which would have included the prosecutor’s agreement
not to file the sex offense charges. The prosecutors noted that defendant’s maximum
exposure was 36 or 37 years when considering the original charges and the sex offense
charges. Defendant’s counsel echoed that defendant’s exposure with the new charges
could be as high as 37 years and was “incredibly serious stuff.” Defendant was present
and actively involved in that hearing. Later in the proceedings, the trial court explained
the impact of the prior strike and prior serious felony conviction if defendant were to be
convicted and the priors were to be found true. Defendant’s response gave no indication
that he was surprised at the possible penalty. He commented that “[t]he sentencing part
and the strike being doubled up … [is] the least of [his] concerns.” He simply wanted to
go to trial. These considerations indicate defendant understood the primary consequence
of a conviction – a sentence as great or greater than the sentence imposed.
       The record also makes clear that defendant intended to advance at least three
defenses: first, that the burglary charges was a result of “entrapment” by S.D. by
permitting him to pick up his daughter from her house then claiming that he broke in;
second, that he did not actually choke S.D. which he sought to prove by cross-examining
an eyewitness to the incident; and third, that he could not be convicted of stalking
(presumably because he did not harass or follow S.D. or had not threatened her) because
during the period of the alleged stalking, he and S.D. spent time together with their
family at S.D.’s home and purchased a vehicle together with defendant’s cousin.
Therefore, with respect to potential defenses, the record makes clear that defendant
understood the nature of the charges and potential defenses.
       Further, before trial, defendant made clear that he understood that he was “dealing
with a professional prosecution team.” The record therefore supports the finding that

                                            14.
defendant understood that he faced a disadvantage in representing himself because he
faced an experienced prosecutorial team.
Conclusion
      The record demonstrates that defendant understood the primary dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation and nevertheless sought to represent himself. The
Faretta waiver was therefore knowing and voluntary.
                                    DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                             POOCHIGIAN, Acting P. J.
I CONCUR:

SNAUFFER, J.

                                           15.
FRANSON, J. Concurring.

       I concur with the ultimate conclusion by the majority that the judgment is not
reversible due to an insufficient Faretta1 waiver. However, I write separately to explain
that the trial court’s admonishment was insufficient, and that I would not find a waiver
knowing and intelligent based exclusively on a Faretta waiver form. Nevertheless,
considering the record as a whole, the judgment must be affirmed because defendant was
aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.
       As a threshold matter, Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at page 835, Iowa v. Tovar (2004)
541 U.S. 77, 89, and People v. Burgener (2009) 46 Cal.4th 231, 240–241 (Burgener), all
impose on the trial court a duty and obligation to advise a defendant of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation and to make sure the defendant understands those
dangers and disadvantages.2 The record must establish that a defendant “ ‘knows what
he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’ ” (Faretta, at p. 835.)
       However, “[n]o particular form of words is required in admonishing a defendant
who seeks to waive counsel and elect self-representation; the test is whether the record as
a whole demonstrates that the defendant understood the disadvantages of self-
representation, including the risks and complexities of the particular case.” (People v.
Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1070.) Courts nevertheless have suggested certain
considerations that ought to be discussed with the defendant: that self-representation is

       1 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta).

       2 The majority expressed its disagreement with People v. Ruffin (2017) 12
Cal.App.5th 536 at pages 548–549, regarding whether a trial court must conduct more
than a “perfunctory proceeding” to advise a defendant of the dangers and disadvantages
of self-representation. The majority concludes that a written waiver can be sufficient if
the defendant is represented by counsel at the time of the waiver. I agree with Ruffin
insofar as it requires more than a signed Faretta wavier form to find a waiver of the right
to counsel to be knowing and intelligent.
unwise and usually detrimental; that defendant will not receive special treatment by the
court and will be expected to abide by all procedural and evidentiary rules; that the
prosecutor will be a trained professional; that defendant will not be given additional
library privileges or time to prepare; and that defendant will be waiving appellate claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id. at p. 1070–1071.) Courts have also suggested
“that trial judges inquire into the defendant’s education and familiarity with legal
procedures, suggesting a psychiatric examination in questionable cases.” (Id. at p. 1071.)
Courts have “further suggested probing the defendant’s understanding of the alternative
to self-representation, i.e., the right to counsel, including court-appointed counsel at no
cost to the defendant, and exploring the nature of the proceedings, potential defenses and
potential punishments.” (Id. at p. 1071.)
       “On appeal, we examine de novo the whole record[, including proceedings after
the invocation of the right to self-representation]—not merely the transcript of the
hearing on the Faretta motion itself—to determine the validity of the defendant’s waiver
of the right to counsel.” (People v. Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1070; People v.
Conners (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 443, 454.) We must draw every reasonable inference
against waiver of a right to an attorney. (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 20).
       In this case, the trial court failed its duty to adequately advise defendant of the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.3 Nevertheless, the record reflects that
defendant understood those dangers and disadvantages and defendant therefore did
knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. (Burgener, supra, 46 Cal.4th at
p. 241.)

       3 I would note that the Faretta hearing in this case came in the early days of the
COVID-19 pandemic and was held via video conference while the medium was still new.

                                              2
       Here, the trial court understood its duty.4 At the June 11, 2021 Faretta hearing,
the court told defendant: “My job is to advise you of any pitfalls there may be with
respect to representing yourself. I’m going through the form you signed, and I want to
make sure you understand that.” He later added: “My job is to tell you what you’re
signing. Do you understand that? I want to make sure you know you have to follow the
same rules everybody else does.” However, the court did not review the Faretta form
with defendant.
       Instead, the trial court told defendant (1) he would “not receive any special
consideration from the [c]ourt”; (2) he would “need to follow all the evidentiary rules and
procedural rules”; (3) it was “not easy” to defend himself “while … in custody”; it is
“very difficult”; (4) outbursts in the courtroom would not go well for him; (5) he would
need help obtaining civilian clothing for trial; (6) how to obtain an investigator; (7) he
would have to file motions on his own behalf; and (8) he would “need to figure out what
… remedies” he had if subpoenas were not complied with.
       At no point did the trial court ask defendant if he read or understood the
admonitions and warnings contained in the form. Nor did the trial court mention the
potential consequences of a conviction (including the potential maximum term of
imprisonment), discuss defendant’s potential defenses, explain that the prosecutor was a
trained professional, or explain that defendant would waive claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel by representing himself. Despite the trial court’s failures, reviewing
the record as a whole, I must conclude, as the discussion at pages 13 through 15 of the

       4 Every trial judge in California receives California Judges Benchguides
(Benchguide), prepared by the Center for Judicial Education and Research (CJER) as part
of their ongoing legal education. Benchguide 54: Right to Counsel Issues, first published
in 1998, and periodically revised, addresses Faretta requests, and includes suggested
scripts for the trial court to examine defendants requestioning pro per status. These
scripts, meant to be informal, thorough, and frank, contain each of the admonitions
contained in the subject Faretta waiver form, and more.

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majority opinion demonstrates, that defendant understood the dangers and pitfalls of self-
representation. Therefore, the Faretta waiver was knowing and voluntary. For that
reason, I concur in the judgment.

                                                                     FRANSON, J.

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