Court Opinion

ID: 9785631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 22:14:39.250284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:59.794904
License: Public Domain

Judge ROTHENBERG
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority's conclusion that § 19-4-116(4), C.R.8.1999, authorizes a trial court to direct a child's father to reimburse another for past support of the father's children, and that it is within the court's discretion to determine the amount of that support. This is based upon the longstanding principle that parents have a duty to support their children.
*1020However, because I conclude that the trial court's ruling was based on an incorrect premise, I would reverse the judgment and remand for another hearing on the reimbursement issue. That premise-posited by Donald R. Smith at trial, in this appeal, and accepted by the trial court in its order-was that Smith himself owed no duty of support to the children.
Smith does not dispute that he was legally married to the mother when all three children were born, and therefore, was their presumed father. See § 19-4-105(1)(a), C.R.S.1999. It is also undisputed that he was listed as the father on the children's birth certificates; he acted in loco parentis to them during the marriage; he exercised all the rights, duties, and obligations of a father; and because the children viewed him as their father, he was a psychological parent and the nurturing male figure in the children's lives.
Thus, Smith was in all respects a parent to the children until the court declared him otherwise. He had a legal right to their income, if any such existed, and to compensation in the event that they were injured by a tortfeasor. As the presumed father, he also had a legal duty to support and nurture them.
Nevertheless, Smith maintains that once Charles Ames' paternity was established by scientific testing and that Ames was declared to be the biological father by the court, Smith's previous status as the presumed father-with all of its attendant rights and obligations-vanished retroactively. Not only does Smith assert that his duty to support the children became void ab iwifio, he also contends he is entitled to his money back, that is, reimbursement from Ames for all of Smith's expenditures for the children from birth. This issue has major ramifications for Colorado's children, and I respectfully disagree that it should be resolved in this manner.
The Uniform Parentage Act, § 19-4-101, et seq., C.R.S8.1999 (UPA) and Colorado pub-lie policy accord a strong presumption of legitimacy to children born in wedlock. In fact, the right of a presumed father to challenge paternity pursuant to the UPA must be exercised within strict statutory time limits or it is lost, whatever the results of the scientific tests regarding paternity. See § 19-4-107(1)(b), C.R.S.1999 (an action to disestablish paternity of a presumed father cannot be brought later than five years after a child's birth).
Here, even after the dissolution was filed and the trial court had declared Ames to be the biological father, Smith's lengthy relationship with the children gave him standing under the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act to pursue custody or parenting rights of the children. See In re Custody of A.D.C., 969 P.2d 708 (Colo.App.1998) (§ 14-10-128(1)(b), C.R.S.1999 permits the non-parent to commence custody proceeding while the child is in that person's physical custody and § 14-10-128(1)(c), C.R.S.1999, permits the proceeding to be commenced up to six months after physical custody has terminated); In re Marriage of Dureno, 854 P.2d 1352 (Colo.App.1992).
This standing is based on the recognition that one who performs the role of a parent, such as a stepparent, foster parent, grandparent, or other nurturing figure, may become a child's psychological parent and is entitled to certain rights that historically have been conferred only on biological parents. See In re Custody of C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d 246 (Colo.1995)(upholding trial court's determination that it was in child's best interests to remain in custody of psychological parents, rather than to have custody transferred to biological mother).
It is true that following the test results and the court order declaring Ames to be the biological father, Smith's status as the children's presumed father was rebutted, and Smith could ask to be relieved of future obligations with respect to the children. In this respect, the status of a custodian, stepparent, or other similarly situated person differs from that of a biological or adoptive parent because one standing in loco parentis may elect to be relieved of that status and the attendant obligations. See People in Interest of P.D., 41 Colo.App. 109, 580 P.2d 836 (1978); H. Clark, Domestic Relations § 6.2 (1968).
*1021Nevertheless, the fact that Smith asked to be, and was, relieved of future parental obligations did not, in my view, invalidate ab initio the duties arising from his previous legal status. Rather, I conclude that both Smith and Ames owed separate duties of support to the children which arose on their dates of birth. Smith's duty only ended when Ames' status as the biological father was declared, and when Smith's duty was terminated by the court at his request.
In sum, I agree with the majority that once Ames was determined to be the biological father, the trial court had authority under the statute to order him to pay child support "for a time period which occurred prior to the entry of the order establishing paternity." Section 19-4-116(4), C.R.8.1999.
I also agree that the statute gives the court discretion to require Smith to reimburse Ames, based on equitable principles, "the proportion of the expenses already incurred that the court deems just." Section § 19-4-116(4). But, I would hold that this determination may only be made after considering the cireumstances of all three parties who had a duty of support prior to the declaration of paternity: Smith, Ames, and the mother. See § 19-4-116(6), C.R.S.1999 (listing relevant factors to determine amount to be paid by "a parent" for the support of the child). It may not be based on the assumption that Smith's duty of child support was rendered void ab imifio by the court's declaration of Ames' paternity.
For this reason, I would reverse the judgment and remand for reconsideration of the reimbursement order.