Court Opinion

ID: 9397676
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-25 21:02:28.16787+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:26.871570
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 21-4577

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        ROGER BRYANT LOCKLEAR,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
        Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:19-cr-00191-D-1)

        Argued: December 6, 2022                                          Decided: May 24, 2023

        Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, and John A. GIBNEY, Jr.,
        Senior District Judge, sitting by designation.

        Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ARGUED: Jennifer Claire Leisten, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
        Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Kristine L. Fritz, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
        ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: G. Alan DuBois, Federal
        Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North
        Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon,
        Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
        Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               On January 28, 2020, Roger Locklear pled guilty to one count of possessing a

        firearm as a felon. The district court sentenced Locklear to 115 months’ imprisonment and

        three years of supervised release. On appeal, Locklear challenges the district court’s

        imposition of a special supervised release condition that allows for warrantless searches of

        his computer and other electronic devices. For the following reasons, we vacate that

        special condition “as procedurally unreasonable and remand to the district court for further

        explanation.” United States v. McMiller, 954 F.3d 670, 677 (4th Cir. 2020).

                                                       I.

               Locklear appeals the district court’s imposition of the computer search condition as

        unreasonable. Because he did not object to this condition at sentencing, we review for

        plain error. United States v. Elbaz, 52 F.4th 593, 611–12 & n.18 (4th Cir. 2022).

                                                      A.

               “District courts have ‘broad latitude’ to impose discretionary conditions of

        supervised release. But when they do, they have a duty to explain why.” United States v.

        Boyd, 5 F.4th 550, 557 (4th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d),

        district courts “may only impose conditions that (1) are ‘reasonably related’ to the goals of

        deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation; (2) affect ‘no greater deprivation of liberty

        than is reasonably necessary’ to achieve those goals; and (3) are ‘consistent with any

        pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.’” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C.

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        § 3583(d)). Importantly, “[u]nless a court adequately explains its reasons for imposing

        certain conditions, we can’t judge whether the § 3583(d) factors have been met.” Id.

               The requirement that a district court “provide ‘an individualized assessment’ based

        on the facts before the court,” “appl[ies] equally to any special conditions of supervised

        release.” United States v. Lewis, 958 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 2020) (quoting Gall v. United

        States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)). And “[i]n all cases, . . . the explanation must at least be

        sufficient ‘to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair

        sentencing.’” McMiller, 954 F.3d at 676 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50). “Failure to provide

        such an explanation constitutes procedural error.” Id.

               Here, the district court explained why it was imposing four special conditions of

        supervised release in one sentence:

               You shall comply with the following special conditions which the Court
               imposes based on statutory requirements and the nature of the offense of
               conviction, including your history of substance abuse, [and] the need for
               rehabilitation in order to supervise you adequately[.]

        J.A. 100. Locklear challenges this explanation as inadequate for imposing the condition

        requiring him to:

               submit to a search, at any time, with or without a warrant, and by any law
               enforcement or probation officer, of the defendant’s person and any property,
               house, residence, vehicle, papers, computer, other electronic communication
               or data storage devices or media, and effects upon reasonable suspicion
               concerning a violation of a condition of supervised release or unlawful
               conduct by the defendant, or by any probation officer in the lawful discharge
               of the officer’s supervision functions.

        J.A. 109. Locklear appeals this entire condition, but he focuses his challenge on the

        requirement that he submit to warrantless searches of his “computer, other electronic

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        communication or data storage devices or media, and effects.” Id. ∗ Accordingly, we also

        focus on that portion of the condition and hold that the district court’s barebones reasoning

        precludes our “meaningful appellate review” of its imposition, resulting in procedural

        error. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.

               Critically, in its single, conclusory sentence of reasoning, the district court failed to

        explain why the computer search condition is appropriate for Locklear. That is, its generic

        reference to the “statutory requirements,” “the nature of the offense,” and “the need for

        rehabilitation” could be used in sentencing any criminal defendant, regardless of that

        defendant’s offense, personal characteristics, or history. J.A. 100. For that very reason,

        we have stated that “the district court cannot fulfill its duty [to explain the imposition of

        supervised release conditions] by generally referring to the legal standards in § 3553(a) and

        § 3583(d).” United States v. Arbaugh, 951 F.3d 167, 179 (4th Cir. 2020). Rather, it must

        “explain what facts led to its decision to impose the . . . special conditions on this

        defendant.” Id. (emphasis added).        The district court’s failure to do so renders its

        boilerplate explanation for imposing the computer search condition on Locklear

        tantamount to no explanation at all.

               This case is thus on all fours with Arbaugh, wherein we determined “that the district

        court committed reversible procedural error by failing to explain why it imposed . . . four

               ∗
                 Locklear challenges this condition as both procedurally and substantively
        unreasonable. Because we find that the procedural inadequacy of the district court’s
        imposition of the computer search condition precludes “meaningful appellate review” of
        the condition, Lewis, 958 F.3d at 243, we express no view on the substantive
        reasonableness of the condition.
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        computer-related special conditions” of supervised release, including a condition allowing

        for warrantless searches of the defendant’s “computers, telephone, and personal computing

        devices.” 951 F.3d at 178 n.3, 179. In that case, the defendant was convicted for engaging

        in illicit sexual conduct with a minor in a foreign country. Id. at 170. There, as here, “the

        district court ordered [the defendant] to comply with these special conditions, but it did not

        explain why it was imposing them.” Id. at 178. Consequently, the Court found itself

        “constrained by [our] precedent to conclude” that the district court’s silence “violated [the

        defendant’s] rights” and precluded our review of “the reasonableness of the challenged

        special conditions.” Id. at 178–79 (citing Ross, 912 F.3d at 746).

                                                       B.

               Given our decision in Arbaugh, it is clear that the district court’s failure to explain

        the computer search condition was not only error, but plain error. “To establish plain error,

        [Locklear] must show that an error occurred, that it was plain, and that it affected his

        substantial rights.” McMiller, 954 F.3d at 674. Moreover, “we will exercise our discretion

        to correct the error only if it ‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of

        judicial proceedings.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Lockhart, 947 F.3d 187, 191 (4th Cir.

        2020) (en banc)). In numerous cases, this Court has found that a court’s procedural error in

        imposing supervised release conditions has amounted to “reversible plain error.” Id. at 676;

        see also United States v. Worley, 685 F.3d 404, 407 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Ross,

        912 F.3d 740, 746 (4th Cir. 2019); United States v. Hendricks, 795 F. App’x 209, 210 (4th

        Cir. 2020) (unpublished). The facts of this case compel the same conclusion.

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               For an error to be “plain,” it must be “clear under current law.” United States v.

        Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). Because Arbaugh demonstrates that a court cannot impose

        a supervised release condition prescribing warrantless searches of a defendant’s computers

        without explanation, the district court’s error in doing so below was plain. That conclusion

        is only bolstered by our repeated articulation of the general rule that “a sentencing court’s

        duty to provide an explanation for the sentence imposed also requires that the court explain

        any special conditions of supervised release.” McMiller, 954 F.3d at 676.

               Locklear also meets the remaining requirements for establishing reversible plain

        error. This Court has held that because “[a] defendant’s right to know ‘why he faces special

        conditions that will forever modify the course of his life’ is substantial,” “when a court’s

        explanation for such special conditions is so lacking that it deprives the defendant of

        meaningful appellate review, that error necessarily affects the defendant’s substantial

        rights.” Id. at 677 (citation omitted). Locklear has a right to know why he faces a special

        condition that will alter his daily life. We recognized as much in Worley, when we

        concluded that a district court “plainly erred in imposing” conditions on a defendant’s three-

        year term of supervised release that would severely restrict his association with minors “in

        the absence of any explanation” because “conditions that interfere with a defendant’s

        constitutional liberties . . . must be adequately explained.” 685 F.3d at 408. And “because

        an adequate explanation is also necessary ‘to promote the perception of fair sentencing,’ . . .

        the absence of such an explanation ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public

        reputation of judicial proceedings.’” McMiller, 954 F.3d at 677 (citations omitted).

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               Having determined that the district court’s procedural error rises to the level of plain

        error, we vacate Locklear’s sentence with respect to the computer search condition and

        remand for the district court “to provide an individualized assessment of its reasons.”

        Arbaugh, 951 F.3d at 179. We again express no view on the underlying merits of the

        condition at issue.

                                                                      VACATED AND REMANDED

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