Court Opinion

ID: 9741828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:02:39.251526+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:26.547297
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE GREEN, specially concurring: I concur in the decision of the majority to accept the appeal and to vacate or reverse the portion of the order of supervision requiring the placement of the advertisement in the newspaper. I agree with the analysis of the majority on the question of whether we have jurisdiction on appeal. I also agree with the majority that the condition of supervision goes beyond that envisioned by the General Assembly for the disposition of supervision. However, I do not share the concern of the majority that the requirement placed upon the defendant is too severe for the conduct she committed or likely to cause permanent damage to her mental health. Where, as here, a defendant is charged with driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 11 — 501) and then, unlike here, is convicted and sentenced to conditional discharge, probation, periodic imprisonment or imprisonment', the driver’s license of that defendant is revoked. On the other hand, where, as here, that defendant is placed on supervision, no judgment is entered until the completion of the supervision, and, if that, completion is successful, the charges are dismissed. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, pars. 1005 — 6—3.1(d), (e).) As no judgment of conviction is then entered, no revocation of that defendant’s driver’s license results. Thus, since no imprisonment can be imposed as a condition of supervision and no driver’s license revocation results, the impact of a disposition of supervision is as slight as can be imposed upon an offender. The record here indicates the trial court recognized that supervision should not be imposed unless the defendant is “not likely to commit further crimes” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 6—1(c)(1)) and that the impact of a disposition to supervision is usually very mild. The court was apparently worried that persons charged with driving under the influence of intoxicants, who would otherwise be good candidates for supervision, might, nevertheless, commit another offense unless greater impact was placed upon the condition of their supervision. Accordingly, here, and perhaps, in other cases, the court stated a willingness to put that defendant on supervision if that defendant would comply with the embarrassing condition of publishing the described advertisement. The defendant agreed to accept such a condition of supervision here. The offense of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 11 — 501) is a serious one which has caused much carnage. The record here indicated that the defendant drove at a time when she had a blood-alcohol content of over 0.15, which is an indication of a high degree of intoxication. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 95V2, par. 11 — 501.2.) She inflicted no injury on anyone while driving in that condition, but that fortunate result is mostly fortuitous. I do not consider the condition to be too harsh for the conduct involved here. Similarly, I do not share the concern of the majority that the condition may impose serious or permanent harm to the defendant. Professionals in the behavioral science are often in disagreement over the rehabilitative potential of various types of criminal sanctions, but no treatise or article is cited to indicate the ridicule which the defendant might receive may have lasting harm. Any commission of conduct which involves a serious crime is likely to generate publicity and usually most of the people from whom an offender seeks respect learn of the offender’s misconduct anyway. One of the issues upon which behavioral scientists find agreement is on that of imprisonment. They generally agree that, regardless of whether imprisonment, must otherwise be imposed, little rehabilitation is likely to result from imprisonment. Holding an offender up to ridicule has an impact upon the offender that does not have the disadvantages of imprisonment or the financial detriment to the offender or the offender’s family of a substantial fine. I deem it to be likely that a condition such as that imposed here might be quite rehabilitative and instructive, particularly to people who do not have general criminal tendencies and who would be embarrassed by the publicity. My problem with the instant questioned condition of supervision is that it is far more drastic than any of those specifically authorized under section 5 — 6—3.1(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 6—3.1(c).) I fear that to uphold the condition imposed here would encourage other courts to impose other unusual, dramatic conditions, and the proliferation of these types of conditions would cause problems of a greater magnitude than their propensity to rehabilitate. Accordingly, I would fairly strictly limit the unspecified type of reasonable conditions of supervision that can be imposed and let those conditions similar to that imposed here await legislative study and definition.