Court Opinion

ID: 9383530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-30 16:11:12.131651+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:45.908877
License: Public Domain

J-S40030-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    FREDERICK CLEA                             :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1467 EDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 26, 2022
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
              Criminal Division at No: CP-46-CR-0006414-2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                              FILED MARCH 30, 2023

       Appellant, Frederick Clea, appeals from the January 26, 2022 judgment

of sentence imposing two consecutive sentences of life imprisonment for two

counts of first-degree murder.1

       The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history in its

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion:

             [Appellant] intentionally shot and killed his mother-in-law,
       Mekenda Saunders, and his wife, Latiya Clea, on July 25, 2020, in
       the family’s home in Cheltenham Township, Montgomery County.
       The shootings, which occurred in the presence of the Cleas’ then
       10-year-old daughter and then five-year-old son, followed an
       argument between [Appellant] and Latiya Clea over the
       whereabouts of the magazine for [Appellant’s] firearm.

            [Appellant] was charged with two counts of first-degree
       murder, two counts of third-degree murder, and one count of
       possession of an instrument of crime (“PIC”). During pre-trial
____________________________________________

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).
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      proceedings, [Appellant moved for a competency and taint
      hearing for [A.C., the Clea’s ten-year-old daughter].        The
      Honorable William R. Carpenter granted the motion for a
      competency hearing, but denied the request for a taint hearing.
      The matter then proceeded to a trial before the undersigned, with
      [Appellant] stipulating to the competency of A.C.

            This court found [Appellant] guilty of both counts of first-
      degree murder and sentenced him to consecutive terms of life in
      prison without the possibility of parole. [Appellant] filed post-
      sentence motions, which this court denied.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/14/22, at 1-2 (record citations omitted).

      In this timely appeal, Appellant raises two assertions of error:

            1. Did the lower court err in denying [Appellant’s] request
               for a taint hearing where [Appellant] put forth evidence
               that [A.C.] had received information from outside
               sources, namely, the child’s statement during her
               forensic interview that, “[her mother] had apparently
               called the police.”?

            2. Did the lower court err in overruling [Appellant’s]
               objection to improper remarks by the prosecutor in
               closing argument in which the prosecutor improperly
               appealed to the emotions of the factfinder stating
               [Appellant], “took away [the victim’s] chance to see
               those kids grow up, graduate from high school, get
               married, and he took that away from his kids, no mother
               at their graduation … no mother at their wedding, and he
               did that on July 25th of 2020 when he committed first-
               degree murder, not once, but twice.”?

Appellant’s Brief at 3 (brackets in original).

      Appellant first challenges the trial court’s denial of a taint hearing as to

A.C., the daughter of Appellant and Latiya Clea. Pennsylvania law presumes

the competency of witnesses: “Every person is competent to be a witness

except as otherwise provided by statute or these rules.”         Pa.R.E. 601(a).

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Nonetheless, Pennsylvania law requires that child witnesses be examined for

competency as follows:

            There must be (1) such capacity to communicate, including
      as it does both an ability to understand questions and to frame
      and express intelligent answers, (2) mental capacity to observe
      the occurrence itself and the capacity of remembering what it is
      that she is called to testify about and (3) a consciousness of the
      duty to speak the truth.

Commonwealth v. Delbridge, 855 A.2d 27, 39 (Pa. 2003). In Delbridge,

our Supreme Court held that an allegation of taint speaks to the second prong

of the child competency analysis. Id. at 40. Thus, taint may be explored at

a pretrial competency hearing.

            In order to trigger an investigation of competency on the
      issue of taint, the moving party must show some evidence of taint.
      Once some evidence of taint is presented, the competency hearing
      must be expanded to explore this specific question. During the
      hearing the party alleging taint bears the burden of production of
      evidence of taint and the burden of persuasion to show taint by
      clear and convincing evidence.         Pennsylvania has always
      maintained that since competency is the presumption, the moving
      party must carry the burden of overcoming that presumption.

Id.

      We consider the following factors to determine whether a child witness

is incompetent because of taint:

            (1) the age of the child; (2) the existence of a motive hostile
      to the defendant on the part of the child’s primary custodian; (3)
      the possibility that the child’s primary custodian is unusually likely
      to read abuse into normal interaction; (4) whether the child was
      subjected to repeated interviews by various adults in positions of
      authority; (5) whether an interested adult was present during the
      course of any interviews; and (6) the existence of independent
      evidence regarding the interview techniques employed.

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Commonwealth v. Judd, 897 A.2d 1224, 1229 (Pa. Super. 2006), appeal

denied, 912 A.2d 891 (Pa. 2006).

      The resolution of a taint challenge is within the discretion of the trial

court. Delbridge, 855 A.2d at 41. On appeal, we look to the totality of the

circumstances to determine whether the moving party has produced evidence

of taint. Id. The Delbridge Court remanded for a new competency hearing

because the victims underwent repeated interviews by adults, including a

district attorney, state police, and a doctor, and there was evidence to support

an inference that the defendant was “vilified” during the interview process.

Id.

      Appellant relies primarily on two cases in support of his argument. In

J.K. v. Dep’t of Humans Svcs., 178 A.3d 933 (Pa. Commw. 2018), the

petition sought review of the refusal to remove an indicated report of child

abuse from the child abuse registry.       There, the child testified that the

petitioner did “inappropriate things,” including touching her “private spot” and

having her touch his “private spot,” but she could not remember when or how

old she was when the events occurred. Id. at 935-36. The child’s mother

later stated that the first question she asked child was whether the petitioner

“inappropriately touched” her. Id. at 936. A child psychologist, testifying on

behalf of the petitioner, opined that the mother’s use of the word

“inappropriate” suggested to the child what to say. Id. One month after the

child’s mother made the accusation of abuse, the child spoke to a forensic

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interviewer who told the child she was a “hero” for testifying about the “wrong”

things the petitioner did. Id.

      On appeal, the Commonwealth Court held that the child’s testimony was

tainted. The Commonwealth Court noted that the child was seven years old

when she first made her allegations and thus susceptible to adult influence.

Id. at 943. Further, she had difficulty recalling the events she described. Id.

She was unable to recall any sexual contact at her competency hearing prior

to the preliminary hearing. Id. At the hearing before an Administrative Law

Judge six months later, she recalled sexual contact but not when it occurred

or how old she was. Id. Further, the mother was in a contentious custody

battle with petitioner over another child, and mother had made apparently

unfounded accusations of sexual abuse against others. Id. at 945. The J.K.

Court held that the child’s testimony should have been dismissed as

incompetent. Id.

      Appellant also relies on Commonwealth v. Davis, 939 A.2d 905 (Pa.

Super. 2007), wherein a father was accused of the sexual abuse of his nine-

year-old child. The child’s first interview consisted of leading questions, and

the child testified at the competency hearing that he could not remember the

incident.   Id. at 906.   For those reasons, the trial court found the child

incompetent to testify and the Commonwealth appealed. The record revealed

that the first interviewer began by saying, “I know this is tough. I know dad

has done some things that weren’t appropriate and that’s what we’re going to

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talk to you about.” Id. at 908. At the taint hearing, the child could recall

nothing. Id. at 910. In affirming the trial court, the Davis panel wrote:

             The problems with the testimony are twofold: first, [the
      child’s] independent recollection of the incident was extremely
      limited; and second, the suggestive technique and content of the
      interviews provided clear and convincing evidence that [the
      child’s] later recollections were tainted and product of coercion,
      not of his own memory.

Id.

      Instantly, Appellant cites A.C.’s age (10), and the fact that “[w]hile

[A.C.] recounted the details of the shootings, she also stated that, “I don’t

know how but apparently my mom’s phone called the police.”             Appellant’s

Brief at 13. According to Appellant, this statement alone was sufficient to

create the need for a taint hearing because it suggests that A.C. was

describing facts she learned from others. Id. We disagree and conclude that

J.K. and Davis are easily distinguishable.

      In J.K., the record indicated that the child’s first interview on the alleged

abuse was with her mother.        The mother had a motive to fabricate the

allegations and had possibly done so before. The child’s allegations mimicked

the mother’s phraseology in the use of the world “inappropriate.” The child’s

own memory of the alleged abuse was spotty at best.            Finally, a forensic

interviewer praised the child for coming forward with the allegations. None of

these things happened in the present case.

      In Davis, a police interviewer drew the allegations out of the child with

leading and suggestive questions, including an opening statement about how

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the father had done something bad. On the stand at the taint hearing, the

witness had no recollection of the alleged abuse. Again, none of these things

happened in the present case.

      Appellant has produced no evidence of leading suggestive, questions,

and no evidence that any witness planted any ideas in A.C.’s head. To the

contrary, A.C.—an eyewitness to the murders—gave a clear account of the

murders in her interview only hours after they occurred. Appellant does not

suggest that the interviewer used leading questions or any other suggestive

technique. Appellant fails to explain how a suggestion of taint arose from

A.C.’s knowledge that the initial call to police came from her deceased

mother’s cell phone. His argument entirely ignores the relevant factors set

forth in Judd. We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of

Appellant’s request for a taint hearing.

      Next, Appellant argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct in

appealing to the emotions of the factfinder. We note at the outset that the

factfinder here was a judge, and not a jury. “[T]he trial court, sitting as the

trier of fact, is presumed to know the law, ignore prejudicial statements, and

disregard inadmissible evidence.”     Commonwealth v. Konias, 136 A.3d

1014, 1022 (Pa. Super. 2016), 145 A.3d 724 (Pa. 2016). The trial court stated

in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion that portion of the prosecutor’s closing

argument presently in dispute did not factor into the court’s verdict. Trial

Court Opinion, 7/14/22, at 5. Appellant’s argument fails for this reason alone.

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      In any event, Appellant has failed to make out a claim of prosecutorial

misconduct. “Our standard of review for a claim of prosecutorial misconduct

is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Commonwealth

v. Harris, 884 A.2d 920, 927 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 928 A.2d

1289 (Pa. 2007).

             In considering this claim, our attention is focused on
      whether the defendant was deprived of a fair trial, not a perfect
      one. Not every unwise remark on a prosecutor’s part constitutes
      reversible error. Indeed, the test is a relatively stringent one.
      Generally speaking, a prosecutor’s comments do not constitute
      reversible error unless the unavoidable effect of such comments
      would be to prejudice the jury, forming in their minds fixed bias
      and hostility toward [Appellant] so that they could not weight the
      evidence objectively and render a true verdict. Prosecutorial
      misconduct, however, will not be found where comments were
      based on evidence or proper inferences therefrom or were only
      oratorical flair. In order to evaluate whether comments were
      improper, we must look to the context in which they were made.
      Finally, when a trial court finds that a prosecutor's comments were
      inappropriate, they may be appropriately cured by a cautionary
      instruction to the jury.

Id.

      Here, the prosecutor argued, over Appellant’s timely objection, that

“[Appellant] took away [the victims’] chance to see those kids grow up,

graduate from high school, get married, and he took that way from his kids,

no mother at their graduation […] no mother at their wedding, and he did that

on July 25th of 2020 when he committed first-degree murder not once, but

twice.” N.T. Trial, 1/26/22, at 23.

      Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 860 A.2d 102, 117

(Pa. 2004), in which our Supreme Court vacated a death sentence because

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the prosecutor, in closing argument, asked the jury to “send a message to

people on the street and people in prisons” with its verdict. “The prosecutor’s

improper comments effectively invited jurors to ignore their sworn duty to

decide the matter exclusively upon the facts presented concerning the

weighing of specific statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” Id.

      Appellant also cites Commonwealth v. LaCava, 666 A.2d 221 (Pa.

1995), where the prosecutor’s closing argument referenced the detrimental

impact of drugs on society:

             Can you imagine being one of the decent people on Fairhill
      Street who has to live there very day? I mean, we kept hearing
      the defense about how the neighborhood has changed. Sure it’s
      changed. It's changed because of people like him. They are the
      ones who wreck the neighborhood. They are the ones who wreck
      the Fairhill Streets and the Butler Streets and all the other streets.
      It's the drug dealer who wrecks it. Can you imagine trying to live
      on Fairhill Street and you are sitting there in your home and you
      want your kids to go out and play but you know they can't go out
      and play because the cars are lined up and down the block from
      people who want to buy drugs[.]

Id. at 236.   The LaCava Court concluded that the prosecutor committed

misconduct because the “sole purpose of the prosecutor’s comments was to

attempt to turn the jury's sentencing of appellant into a plebiscite on drugs

and drug dealers and their destructive effect on society.” Id. at 237.

      The instant case is distinguishable. The prosecutor’s argument arose

from inferences drawn from the fact established at trial. It is a fact that Latiya

Clea and Mekenda Saunders will be absent from the lives of A.C. and her

younger brother. And in highlighting that fact, the prosecutor did not invite

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the factfinder to send a message to society or make the verdict a referendum

on the deleterious effects of drug dealing, as was the case in DeJesus and

LaCava. We discern no error in the trial court’s refusal to award a new trial

based on prosecutorial misconduct in the closing argument.

     Because we have found no merit to either of Appellant’s assertions of

error, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/30/2023

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