Court Opinion

ID: 9386098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-11 15:00:30.123968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:27.972348
License: Public Domain

20-4163
     Gregorio-Lopez v. Garland
                                                                              BIA
                                                                         Ruehle, IJ
                                                                      A206 003 987
                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                   SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 11th day of April, two thousand twenty-
 5   three.
 6
 7   PRESENT:
 8            RICHARD C. WESLEY,
 9            STEVEN J. MENASHI,
10            EUNICE C. LEE,
11                 Circuit Judges.
12   _____________________________________
13
14   MAINOR MAURICIO GREGORIO-LOPEZ,
15            Petitioner,
16
17                     v.                                   20-4163
18                                                          NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21            Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
23
24   FOR PETITIONER:                    Samuel Iroegbu, Albany, NY.
25
26   FOR RESPONDENT:                    Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
27                                      Attorney General; Mary Jane
28                                      Dandaux, Assistant Director;
 1                                     Nicole J. Thomas-Dorris, Trial
 2                                     Attorney, Office of Immigration
 3                                     Litigation, United States
 4                                     Department of Justice, Washington,
 5                                     DC.

 6       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 7   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

8    ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

9    is DENIED.

10       Petitioner Mainor Mauricio Gregorio-Lopez, a native and

11   citizen of Guatemala, seeks review of a November 30, 2020

12   decision of the BIA affirming a November 20, 2018 decision of

13   an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) that denied his application for

14   asylum,     withholding     of    removal,     and   relief   under   the

15   Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).             In re Mainor Mauricio

16   Gregorio-Lopez, No. A 206 003 987 (B.I.A. Nov. 30, 2020),

17   aff’g No. A 206 003 987 (Immigr. Ct. Buffalo Nov. 20, 2018).

18   We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts

19   and procedural history.

20       We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the

21   BIA, i.e., minus the adverse credibility determination that

22   the BIA did not affirm.          See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of

23   Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005).               The applicable

24   standards     of   review        are    well   established.       “[T]he
                                            2
 1   administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any

 2   reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

 3   contrary.”    8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Thus, “we review the

 4   agency’s decision for substantial evidence and must defer to

 5   the factfinder’s findings based on such relevant evidence as

 6   a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

 7   conclusion. . . . By contrast, we review legal conclusions de

8    novo.” Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2021)

9    (internal quotation marks omitted).

10       Gregorio-Lopez had the burden to establish an objectively

11   reasonable   fear   of       future     persecution      on   account    of   a

12   protected    ground,     here     his       membership   in     his   proposed

13   particular social group of “cooperating witnesses who have

14   assisted     U.S.      law       enforcement.”            See     8     U.S.C.

15   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i);          8     C.F.R.        § 1208.13(b)(1),         (2);

16   Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004).

17   A particular social group must be “socially distinct within

18   the society in question.”             Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d 191,

19   196 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting In re M–E–V–G–, 26 I. & N. Dec.

20   227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014)).              Gregorio-Lopez alleged that he

21   aided U.S. law enforcement by identifying his smuggler, but

                                             3
 1   he presented no evidence that his cooperation with U.S. law

 2   enforcement was publicized in Guatemala, that people in his

 3   community knew that anyone was seeking him out for revealing

 4   his smuggler’s name to U.S. law enforcement, or that anyone

 5   aside from a few individuals in Guatemala knew that he had

 6   cooperated      with   U.S.   law    enforcement    in    identifying    the

 7   smuggler as part of a smuggling operation.                And he presented

 8   no    country    conditions      evidence   about    the     treatment   of

 9   witnesses in Guatemala.             This record does not demonstrate

10   that Guatemalan society perceives witnesses of criminal acts

11   as    a     distinct    group.        See   id.     (“[I]n     determining

12   particularity and social distinction what matters is whether

13   society as a whole views a group as socially distinct, not

14   the   persecutor's      perception.”);      see    also    Ucelo-Gomez   v.

15   Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007) (“When the harm

16   visited upon members of a group is attributable to the

17   incentives presented to ordinary criminals rather than to

18   persecution, the scales are tipped away from considering

19   those people a ‘particular social group’ within the meaning

20   of    the    [Immigration     and    Nationality    Act].”).       Because

21   Gregorio-Lopez did not establish a cognizable social group,

                                           4
 1   he did not meet his burden for asylum and withholding of

 2   removal.     See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(A),

 3   (C).

 4          He also failed to meet his burden for CAT relief.             CAT

 5   relief does not require a nexus to a protected ground, but an

 6   applicant has the burden to show he would “more likely than

 7   not be tortured” and that torture will be “inflicted by or at

 8   the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a

 9   public    official    or   other   person    acting   in   an   official

10   capacity.”    8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1) (version

11   in effect to Jan. 11, 2021).            Gregorio-Lopez testified that

12   the smuggler gave him an accusing look after he identified

13   him to U.S. law enforcement, and four men went to his home in

14   Guatemala once in 2013 and told his domestic partner they

15   would kill him.      The agency reasonably found that this single

16   threat from private actors was not sufficient to establish

17   that Gregorio-Lopez would more likely than not be tortured—

18   that the smuggler would still be looking for him and would be

19   able to find him anywhere in Guatemala—and that the Guatemalan

20   government or public officials would more likely than not

21   acquiesce to that torture.          See Jian Xing Huang v. U.S.

                                         5
1   I.N.S., 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“In

2   the   absence   of   solid   support   in   the   record   .   .   .   [an

3   applicant’s] fear is speculative at best.”).

4         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

5   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

6   stays VACATED.

7                                   FOR THE COURT:
8                                   Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
9                                   Clerk of Court

                                      6