Court Opinion

ID: 9785932
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 22:48:34.67326+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:36.213136
License: Public Domain

Luckert, J.,
concurring: Although I agree with the majority’s conclusion to reverse the summary denial of Laymon’s K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 60-1507 motion, I would remand to the district court for a hearing on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
The majority concludes that remand is unnecessary because this court is capable of conclusively determining that Laymon’s appellate lawyer did not employ a “plausible” strategy in failing to pursue the McAdam line of argument. This conclusion is reached in two steps. First, the majority considers a rationale for the defense counsel’s conduct which is posited by the State: that the attorney was avoiding a “shotgun” approach to argument. Because of the brevity of the brief, the majority concludes “it is certain avoidance of a ‘shotgun’ approach was not a factor.” Second, the majority could “discern no other plausible strategy in the approach of Laymon’s ADO lawyer on direct appeal.”
I agree with the first conclusion. However, I dissent from the portion of the majority opinion relating to the second step of the analysis. The appellate level is not the appropriate level for the act of discernment to occur. The only person who can accurately state whether there was a conscious strategy employed and, if so, the nature of that strategy is the attorney involved. Evidence of what may or may not have been considered should be presented in the district court, not at the appellate level with the State and this court attempting to read the mind of the attorney and playing Monday morning quarterback.
To do otherwise runs the risk that this court has not considered viable strategies or issues. For example, the majority does not discuss the possibility that in this case the defense attorney made the strategic decision to zealously seek the lowest penalty which could be imposed upon his client—a misdemeanor—rather than focus upon the alternative McAdam argument which, even if successful, *446would result in a felony conviction. The attorney may have formed the opinion that raising the McAdam issue in passing was sufficient to preserve the argument. In retrospect we know this opinion, if formed, was incorrect. However, our precedent instructs that tire conduct must be “viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” Graham v. State, 263 Kan. 742, 754, 952 P.2d 1266 (1998). Perhaps other strategies were considered. We should not engage in this guessing game.
McFarland, C.J., joins the foregoing concurring opinion.