Court Opinion

ID: 9594638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:31:35.005123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:54.061540
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the affirmance of the trial court’s ruling invalidating the “benefits” ordinance and the trial court’s dismissal of all damages claims. However, upon consideration of the Municipal Home Rule Act of 1965 and the Georgia Constitution of 1983,1 cannot agree with the reversal of the trial court’s ruling invalidating the “registry” ordinance and the affirmance of the trial court’s dismissal of the claims related to the “sexual orientation” ordinances. Accordingly, I concur in Divisions 2 and 4 and dissent to Divisions 1 and 3.
1. The registry ordinance begins with many requirements for recognition as a domestic partnership: living together for at least six months, a mutually interdependent relationship intended to be lifelong, an agreement to be jointly obligated for the necessities of life for *168each other, not married to anyone else, 18 years of age or older, competency to contract, not related by blood closer than would bar marriage, no other domestic partner, filing of a termination of the domestic partnership if any of these facts change, and termination of any prior domestic partnership. The registry ordinance further states that any entity which requires evidence of the existence of a domestic partnership shall accept a Declaration of Domestic Partnership as complete proof, and provides that such declaration is reasonable proof for qualifying for any present or future domestic partner benefits that private corporations or public institutions offer. Another portion of the registry ordinance gives domestic partners jail visitation privileges which are identical to those of a spouse or other immediate family members. Finally, the registry ordinance provides for termination of the domestic partnership by written notice, death or no longer meeting the qualifications for domestic partnership.
The registry ordinance is much more than “merely the mechanism by which the city can identify the residents and employees who may exercise their jail visitation rights because of their declaration as domestic partners.” (Majority opinion, p. 164.) Rather, the City’s exercise of its power to grant jail visitation rights is merely one portion of the much broader registry ordinance. Thus, the registry ordinance is not “incident to the exercise of an independent governmental power.” OCGA § 36-35-6 (b). And, by requiring private entities which recognize domestic partnerships to accept a Declaration of Domestic Partnership as complete proof of the existence of a domestic partnership, the ordinance certainly ((affect[s] the private or civil law governing private or civil relationships. ...” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 36-35-6 (b). Therefore, in my opinion, the registry ordinance violates Georgia’s Home Rule Act.
Furthermore, by defining in detail a new relationship which is very similar to marriage, see OCGA §§ 19-3-1; 19-3-2, and by providing a ready means of proof of that relationship, the registry ordinance is a proscribed “special law relating to the rights or status of private persons. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV (c); Giles v. Gibson, 208 Ga. 850, 851-852 (69 SE2d 774) (1952) (a municipal ordinance is a special law). See also Op. Atty. Gen. 93-26. And, as a special law, the registry ordinance is preempted by this state’s general law of marriage and divorce. Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV (a); OCGA § 36-35-6 (a). Georgia’s law of marriage already provides for “registration” of relationships of the same general type as that defined in the registry ordinance, OCGA § 19-3-30 et seq., and limits such “registration” to couples of opposite sex. The constitutional provision on special laws
*169was intended to insure that once the legislature entered a field by enacting a general law, that field must thereafter be reserved exclusively to general legislation and could not be open to special or local laws. The terms of the constitution do not limit this rule to those fields and subjects which have been completely exhausted by a general law. It embraces every field and subject which has been covered, though superficially, by a general law.
City of Atlanta v. Hudgins, 193 Ga. 618, 623 (1) (19 SE2d 508) (1942). See also Lomax v. Lee, 261 Ga. 575, 579 (3) (408 SE2d 788) (1991).
The registry ordinance does not augment or strengthen the general law of marriage. Compare Grovenstein v. Effingham County, 262 Ga. 45, 47 (1) (414 SE2d 207) (1992). That general law provides that “[m]arriage is encouraged by the law. Every effort to restrain or discourage marriage . . . shall be invalid and void. . . .” OCGA § 19-3-6. The registry ordinance tends to discourage marriage by providing alternative official recognition of a relationship akin to marriage, but without many of the restrictions found in Georgia’s marriage law. See Sims v. Sims, 245 Ga. 680, 682 (5) (266 SE2d 493) (1980). For example, termination of a domestic partnership is far easier to accomplish than is termination of a marriage.
Section 2 (A) of the registry ordinance, quoted in the majority opinion, denies that it creates legal rights or duties, “except those which specifically refer to Domestic Partnership.” (Emphasis supplied.) Section 2 (A) also disclaims any creation of a marital relationship and any attempt to alter or affect Georgia laws regulating any private or civil relationships. However, semantics cannot save an ordinance which violates the constitutional provision on special laws.
This provision of the constitution would be nullified if by play upon words and definitions the courts should hold valid a special law when there existed at the time of its enactment a general law covering the same subject-matter.
City of Atlanta v. Hudgins, supra at 623 (1). If in fact the ordinance does not purport to alter or affect Georgia law regulating private or civil relationships, it would seem unnecessary to expressly provide, in Section 7, that any person may seek enforcement of the ordinance in law or equity in the “State Court of Fulton County or the Superior Court of Fulton County (or the appropriate courts in DeKalb County for residents of the City of Atlanta in DeKalb County).” Those courts are, of course, state courts of record and of general jurisdiction.
Crooke v. Gilden, 262 Ga. 122 (414 SE2d 645) (1992) is in no way *170relevant to this case. In Crooke, this court upheld the validity of a real estate contract providing for mutual contribution toward improvement of the real estate and sharing of expenses and assets. No official status of the kind contemplated by the registry ordinance was at issue in Crooke.
2. The sexual orientation ordinances prohibit discrimination, because of sexual orientation, on the part of the City, many alcoholic beverage licensees, and drivers of vehicles for hire. The ordinances also require affirmative action on the part of the City, “to promote the full realization of equal employment opportunity through a positive, continuing program in each department and agency of the City government.” Ordinance 86-0-0308, § 1.
Georgia law, like federal law, recognizes and protects certain classifications of people from discrimination. Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. II (state equal protection), Par. IV (religious discrimination in holding public office or trust); OCGA §§ 34-1-2 (age discrimination in employment); 34-5-1 et seq. (sex discrimination in employment); 34-6A-1 et seq. (discrimination against handicapped in employment). By these general laws, Georgia has clearly entered the field of anti-discrimination law, yet has not included a person’s sexual orientation among the proscribed bases of discrimination. Therefore, the sexual orientation ordinances, like the registry ordinance, are preempted by the general law of this state. See City of Atlanta v. Hudg-ins, supra at 623 (1). See also Under 21 v. New York, 482 NE2d 1, 6 (N.Y. 1985); Delaney v. Superior Fast Freight, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33, 37-38 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1993).
The sexual orientation ordinances neither augment nor strengthen general anti-discrimination law. Compare Grovenstein v. Effingham County, supra at 47 (1). To the contrary, general anti-discrimination law is diluted by expansion of the number of protected classes which public or private entities are required to consider.
The majority relies on the powers given to municipal corporations by OCGA § 36-34-2. While this statute may authorize ordinances prohibiting discrimination against a class protected by federal or state law, it does not authorize the expansion of protected classes. OCGA § 36-34-2 does not and cannot give a municipal corporation the power to enact an ordinance in violation of the constitutional provision on special laws, Ga. Const, of 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV (a). City of Atlanta v. Myers, 240 Ga. 261, 263-264 (2) (240 SE2d 60) (1977). The Fair Employment Practices Act of 1978, also relied upon by the majority, prohibits employment discrimination by the State because of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, handicap, or age. OCGA §§ 45-19-22; 45-19-29. I agree that a municipality may pass a law on the same subject matter which is not inconsistent with the State’s version. OCGA § 45-19-21 (c). In my opinion, however, an or*171dinance which protects more classes than does the Fair Employment Practices Act is inconsistent with the Act. However, even if the sexual orientation ordinances were consistent with the Fair Employment Practices Act, the other provisions of general law enumerated above, which apply to the City and private employers as well as the State, preempt the sexual orientation ordinances.
Decided March 14, 1995.

Joe M. Harris, Jr., Kendric E. Smith, Renata D. Turner, Robin

J. Shahar, Clifford E. Hardwick IV, for appellants. Bird & Associates, Wendell R. Bird, David J. Myers, G. Stephen
Parker, Joshua R. Kenyon, for appellees. Harry H. Harkins, Jr., J. Patrick McCrary, amici curiae.
The registry ordinance creates a parallel institution to marriage, and the sexual orientation ordinances expand the classes of people protected from discrimination by state and federal law. Thus, in enacting these ordinances, the City exceeded its authority under the Georgia Constitution and under Georgia’s Home Rule Act.