Court Opinion

ID: 9595026
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:34:58.776082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:56:24.276614
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent as it is my view that the language of the divorce decree entered on July 23, 1990, between James Fleeman and *100Allyson Fleeman stating that “[t]he parties have no minor children who are the issue of the marriage or the issue of the parties at anytime prior to or after the marriage” is too broad and incidental to resolve the issue of the child’s paternity and that, as a consequence, neither the child nor DHR is barred from challenging James Fleeman’s claim that he is not the father of the minor child. Further, it is my view that any attempt to resolve the child’s paternity in the prior divorce action is a nullity as there is no indication that the minor child was made a party to the prior divorce action or that the child’s interests were protected by a guardian ad litem (or any other party) as mandated by OCGA § 19-7-44 (a).
“ ‘ “[Collateral estoppel . . . only precludes readjudication of an issue already adjudicated between the parties or their privies in a prior action. (Cit.)” (Cit.)’ Stiltjes v. Ridco Exterminating Co., 197 Ga. App. 852 (399 SE2d 708) (1990).” McGuire v. Witcher, 201 Ga. App. 685, 686 (411 SE2d 875).2 In the case sub judice, the final judgment and decree of divorce between James Fleeman and Allyson Fleeman provides that “[t]he parties have no minor children who are the issue of the marriage or the issue of the parties at anytime prior to or after the marriage.” However, the child is not mentioned in the final judgment and decree of divorce and there is no evidence that the child’s paternity was actually tried and determined in the proceedings leading to the parties’ divorce. Nonetheless, the majority cites Macuch v. Pettey, 170 Ga. App. 467, 468 (2), 469 (317 SE2d 262), in support of the view that the prior divorce decree between James Fleeman and Allyson Fleeman constitutes an adjudication of the child’s paternity.
In Macuch v. Pettey, supra, the trial court dismissed a paternity action which had been filed several years after the entry of a final decree of divorce providing for custody and support of the parties’ minor child. On appeal, this court held that the paternity action is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and estoppel by judgment and reasoned that a settlement agreement, which was approved by the trial court and incorporated into the parties’ divorce decree, resolved the issue of paternity by referring to the minor child and providing for the child’s custody and support. Macuch v. Pettey, 170 Ga. App. 467 (1), 468, supra. The case sub judice is distinguishable as the di*101vorce decree between James Fleeman and Allyson Fleeman neither identifies the minor child nor provides for the child’s custody and support. In fact, there is no indication that Allyson Fleeman’s minor child was recognized or that his rights were considered in the proceeding leading to final judgment and decree of divorce entered on July 23, 1990.
Decided March 17, 1993 —
Reconsideration denied March 23, 1993
Charles R. Desiderio, for appellant.
Lindsay A. Tise, Jr., District Attorney, Sherry S. Ellison, Assistant District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, William C. Joy, Senior Assistant Attorney General, William M. Droze, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
“A judgment in a divorce proceeding determining an incidental fact which may be relevant to paternity of a child is not res judicata of such fact as against the child whose paternity is in question. A judgment of divorce, making no provision for any child, rendered in an action in which it was alleged that there was no issue of the marriage, [does] not bind a person claiming to be the child of the husband in the divorce proceedings, where such person was not a party to the divorce proceedings and the issue of his parentage was not actually tried and determined therein.” 27A CJS 613, 614, Divorce, § 266 (b). See English v. English, 119 Ga. App. 570 (168 SE2d 187) and Pike v. Armburst, 117 Ga. App. 756, 757 (2) (161 SE2d 896). In the case sub judice, there is no evidence that the child was a party to the prior divorce action and there is nothing in the record indicating that the issue of the child’s paternity was actually tried and determined therein. Under these circumstances, neither DHR nor the child is bound by the broad and incidental language of the prior divorce decree. Accordingly, I would affirm the denial of James Fleeman’s motion to dismiss and allow DHR to seek resolution of the child’s paternity under OCGA § 19-11-13 and, if successful, recover past and future child support under OCGA §§ 19-11-5 and 19-11-6 (a).
Further, it is my view that any attempt to resolve the minor child’s paternity in the prior divorce action, without making the child a party to the action and without the appointment of a guardian ad litem as required by OCGA § 19-7-44 (a) or without otherwise protecting the child’s interests, is a nullity. See 70 ALR4th 1033.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Pope joins in this dissent.

 The majority states that DHR is privy to the prior divorce action by virtue of assignment of the mother’s child support rights under OCGA § 19-11-6 (a) and cites Allen v. Ga. Dept. of Human Resources, 262 Ga. 521, 524, n. 5 (423 SE2d 383), wherein the Supreme Court states that a “father should be able to raise against DHR whatever claims and defenses he might have had against the mother. . . .” Id. This logic may apply where DHR is only seeking to establish future child support under OCGA § 19-11-6 (a), but I do not believe the same logic applies when DHR is exercising its independent right to establish paternity under OCGA § 19-11-13 as in the case sub judice.