Court Opinion

ID: 9947147
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-02 21:00:46.893597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:48.550081
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 23-4134

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        DEAN TERRY,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
        Charlotte. Kenneth D. Bell, District Judge. (3:22-cr-00123-KDB-DCK-1)

        Submitted: February 14, 2024                                      Decided: March 1, 2024

        Before THACKER and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit
        Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: John G. Baker, Federal Public Defender, Melissa S. Baldwin, Assistant
        Federal Public Defender, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH
        CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Dena J. King, United States
        Attorney, Anthony J. Enright, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
        UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Dean Terry pleaded guilty without a plea agreement to a single count of possession

        of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Based on his

        relevant conduct and criminal history, Terry received a base offense level enhancement for

        having two prior felony convictions for controlled substance offenses, and his Sentencing

        Guidelines range amounted to 100 to 120 months’ imprisonment. Terry objected to his

        base offense level enhancement. Citing the Second Circuit’s decision in United States v.

        Gibson, 55 F.4th 153 (2d Cir. 2022), aff’d on reh’g, 60 F.4th 720 (2d Cir. 2023), he argued

        that his predicate New York state convictions for third-degree sale and attempted sale of a

        controlled substance should not qualify as controlled substance offenses under the

        Guidelines because the relevant New York statute criminalizes more drugs than appear on

        the federal Controlled Substances Act schedules. The district court overruled Terry’s

        objection, noting that Gibson directly conflicts with our decision in United States v. Ward,

        972 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 2020). Finding that Terry’s New York state convictions did qualify

        as controlled substance offenses, the court sentenced him to 108 months’ imprisonment, in

        the middle of the applicable Guidelines range. On appeal, Terry asserts that his sentence

        is procedurally unreasonable because the court failed to address his arguments for a lower

        sentence. He further contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the

        court relied on an improper rationale to impose a disparate sentence. We affirm.

               “We review the reasonableness of a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) using an

        abuse-of-discretion standard, regardless of ‘whether [the sentence is] inside, just outside,

        or significantly outside the Guidelines range.’” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212

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        (4th Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41

        (2007)). We are obliged to first “evaluate procedural reasonableness, determining whether

        the district court committed any procedural error, such as improperly calculating the

        Guidelines range, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, or failing to adequately explain

        the chosen sentence.” Id. (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). “[T]he district court must address

        or consider all non-frivolous reasons presented for imposing a different sentence and

        explain why [it] has rejected those arguments. Importantly, in a routine case, where the

        district court imposes a within-Guidelines sentence, the explanation need not be elaborate

        or lengthy.” United States v. Fowler, 58 F.4th 142, 153 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation

        marks and citation omitted). “[D]istrict courts have extremely broad discretion when

        determining the weight to be given each of the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Jeffery,

        631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir. 2011). And “[w]hen a district court has fully addressed the

        defendant’s central thesis during sentencing, it need not address separately each supporting

        data point marshalled for a downward variance.” Fowler, 58 F.4th at 153-54 (internal

        quotation marks omitted).

               “If . . . the district court has not committed procedural error,” we then “assess the

        substantive reasonableness of the sentence.”      Nance, 957 F.3d at 212.       Substantive

        reasonableness review “takes into account the totality of the circumstances to determine

        whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose

        satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Any

        sentence that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively

        reasonable. Such a presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is

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        unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” United States v.

        Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).

               Upon review, we conclude that the sentence is both procedurally and substantively

        reasonable. Terry argued for a lower sentence based on the alleged disparity in sentences

        under the Second Circuit’s and Fourth Circuit’s differing interpretations of the Guidelines.

        After listening to both parties’ arguments, the district court explicitly discussed how Ward

        bound the court regarding Terry’s base offense level enhancement for prior controlled

        substance offenses and considered any resulting sentencing disparity in its analysis along

        with the other § 3553(a) factors. The court thus “considered the parties’ arguments and

        ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v.

        United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). Therefore, we discern no error in the court’s

        explanation for Terry’s sentence.      We are satisfied that the sentence is otherwise

        procedurally reasonable. See United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 2019).

        And while Terry argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable, he fails to rebut

        the presumption of reasonableness accorded his within-Guidelines sentence.

               Accordingly, because Terry’s sentence is both procedurally and substantively

        reasonable, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

        contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would

        not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                       AFFIRMED

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