Court Opinion

ID: 9404309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-22 18:00:39.63833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:13.057699
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-50450        Document: 00516795743             Page: 1      Date Filed: 06/22/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                              Fifth Circuit

                                                                                            FILED
                                                                                        June 22, 2023
                                        No. 21-50450                                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                            Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                            versus

   Jeffrey Allan McMaryion,

                                                                  Defendant—Appellant.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Western District of Texas
                              USDC No. 7:13-CR-141-1

   Before Higginbotham, Jones, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
         The prior opinion, United States v. McMaryion, 64 F.4th 257 (5th Cir.
   2023) is withdrawn, and the following opinion is substituted:
         Jeffrey McMaryion, a federal prisoner, appeals the denial of his
   motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). We affirm in
   part and remand in part.

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 21-50450      Document: 00516795743          Page: 2   Date Filed: 06/22/2023

                                    No. 21-50450

                                         I.
          McMaryion pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to
   distribute 280 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine, in violation
   of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A). That offense, combined with
   McMaryion’s extensive criminal history, generated a Guidelines range of 262
   to 327 months in prison. The district court (Junell, J.) sentenced him at the
   bottom of that range to 262 months, plus 12 months for the revocation of a
   previous supervised-release term, for a total prison term of 274 months.
   McMaryion appealed, and we affirmed. See United States v. McMaryion, 583
   F. App’x 399, 401 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
          On November 16, 2020, McMaryion filed a motion for compassionate
   release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). By the time McMaryion filed that
   motion, the case had been transferred to Judge Counts. The Government
   filed an opposition. Then Judge Counts denied the motion as follows: “After
   considering the applicable factors provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the
   applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission, the
   Court DENIES the Defendant’s Motion on its merits.” ROA.631.
          McMaryion again appealed. We review questions of law de novo and
   the ultimate decision to deny compassionate release for abuse of discretion.
   See United States v. Escajeda, 58 F.4th 184, 186 (5th Cir. 2023).
                                         II.
          The First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018), allows
   a prisoner to move for a sentence reduction under certain circumstances. The
   one at issue here is colloquially called “compassionate release.” See United
   States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388, 390–92 (5th Cir. 2021) (describing the
   history of compassionate release). As relevant here, a prisoner can move for
   compassionate release when “extraordinary and compelling reasons
   warrant” a reduction of his sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). As

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   we recently explained, this statutory phrase requires a prisoner to show he
   “face[s] some extraordinarily severe exigency, not foreseeable at the time of
   sentencing, and unique to the life of the prisoner” that leads “irresistibly” to
   the conclusion that this prisoner has a “singular” and “remarkable” need for
   early release. See Escajeda, 58 F.4th at 186.
          McMaryion offers four reasons for his § 3582(c)(1) motion. The first
   three are not cognizable bases for compassionate release. The fourth does not
   have merit.
          First, McMaryion raises substantive challenges to the legality of his
   confinement. Specifically, McMaryion argues that his trial and appellate
   counsel were ineffective and that the Government breached his plea
   agreement. But because these claims are cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
   they are not cognizable under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). See Escajeda, 58 F.4th at
   186–88.
          Second, McMaryion argues that he should get a sentence reduction
   because the First Step Act reduced the statutory minimums applicable to his
   offenses. But Congress did not make those reductions retroactive. And a
   prisoner may not leverage non-retroactive changes in criminal law to support
   a compassionate release motion, because such changes are neither
   extraordinary nor compelling. See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 50 F.4th
   1185, 1198–1200 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (so holding); United States v. McCall, 56
   F.4th 1048, 1065–66 (6th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (same). Rather, “in federal
   sentencing the ordinary practice is to apply new penalties to defendants not
   yet sentenced, while withholding that change from defendants already
   sentenced.” Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 280 (2012) (emphasis
   added). This ordinary practice reflects a “presumption against retroactive
   legislation” that is “deeply rooted in our jurisprudence” and that “embodies
   a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic.” Landgraf v. USI Film

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                                    No. 21-50450

   Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994). We may not usurp the legislative prerogative
   and use 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) to create retroactivity that Congress did not.
   See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) (“It is the
   legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its
   punishment.”).
          Third, McMaryion briefly suggests that an amendment to the United
   States Sentencing Guidelines favors his early release. McMaryion did not
   adequately present this argument to the district court, however, so it is
   forfeited. See Rollins v. Home Depot, 8 F.4th 393, 397–99 (5th Cir. 2021). And
   in any event, changes to the Sentencing Guidelines can give rise to relief
   under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), not § 3582(c)(1). See United States v. Lyons, 25
   F.4th 342, 344–46 (5th Cir. 2022) (describing review of a § 3582(c)(2)
   motion).
          McMaryion’s fourth and final argument is the only one that states a
   possibly cognizable basis for compassionate release—namely, that COVID-
   19 constitutes an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for his release. To
   support this argument, McMaryion suggests that his prior COVID-19
   infection and general ill health place him at greater risk from COVID-19
   relative to the broader population.
          We have said that a late-stage, terminal prognosis can constitute an
   extraordinary and compelling basis for a § 3582(c)(1) motion. See United
   States v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691, 692–93 (5th Cir. 2020). But it is the
   actuality, not the risk, of terminal illness that makes a prisoner’s
   circumstances extraordinary. We have repeatedly denied relief in cases
   where prisoners sought compassionate release due to fear of communicable
   disease, even when those prisoners were in poor health. See United States v.
   Thompson, 984 F.3d 431, 432–34 (5th Cir. 2021) (denying relief to a
   hypertensive stroke survivor concerned by COVID-19); United States v.

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                                     No. 21-50450

   Rodriguez, 27 F.4th 1097, 1098–1100 (denying relief where COVID-19 fearing
   movant suffered from heart failure). Our precedent thus compels denial of
   McMaryion’s motion.
                                          III.
          Separately, McMaryion argues that the district court committed
   procedural error by perfunctorily denying his § 3582(c) motion. In similar
   circumstances, we have remanded “for the district court to explain its
   reasons for denial.” United States v. Guzman, No. 20-51001, 2022 WL
   17538880, at *1 (5th Cir. Dec. 8, 2022). We follow the same course here. “As
   we typically do in such situations, we will retain appellate jurisdiction.” Id. at
   *3.

          AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED.

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                                    No. 21-50450

   Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge, concurring in the result:
          I continue to adhere to my dissent from the initial panel opinion for
   the reasons it stated. See generally United States v. McMaryion, 64 F.4th 257,
   263 (5th Cir. 2023) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). With respect, we cannot
   tiptoe past this reticulated pattern of error. It remains, as does the tomorrow.

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