Court Opinion

ID: 9488538
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:48:12.280583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:56.836289
License: Public Domain

MOTZ, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The statute that Turpin and Smith were convicted of violating provides criminal penalties for
Whoever willfully or maliciously injures or destroys any ... cable, line, ... or other means of communication, operated or controlled by the United States, or used or intended to be used for military or civil defense functions of the United States....
18 U.S.C. § 1362. In assessing whether Turpin and Smith violated this statute, it is important to keep in mind precisely what they did and what they did not do. They did not steal copper wire or any other “means of communication operated or controlled by the United States.” Nor did they steal copper wire or any other “means of communication” that was itself “used or intended to be used for military or civil defense functions of the United States.” The copper wire that Turpin and Smith were charged with stealing belonged to and was “operated or controlled by” CSX Railroad, a private company. Moreover, as the government concedes, this privately owned and controlled copper wire was “used as [part of] an internal telephone system for the railroad, for emergencies and other needed communication related to the running of the trains.” Brief of Appellee at 5 (emphasis added). Because CSX shipped military materials for a defense contractor, the majority concludes that theft of the copper wire used in the railroad’s internal tele*1214phone system violated § 1362. I disagree and so dissent.
The plain language of the statute does not address the question before us. True, the statute applies not only to “means of communication operated or controlled by the United States” but also to those “used or intended to be used for military or civil defense functions of the United States.” The statute, however, does not state, or imply, that “means of communication” used by a private company for its own internal communications are used for “military or civil defense functions of the United States” just because the private company transports goods for another private company which in turn uses those goods for “military or civil defense functions of the United States.” It seems to me that if the wire at issue here is held to be used “for military or civil defense functions of the United States,” then that term is no limitation at all. Virtually every existing communication system is used in some way that ultimately contributes to “military or civil defense functions of the United States.” I cannot believe that Congress intended the statute to have such a broad sweep. Moreover, the fact that the scope of § 1362 “has never been addressed by any court” suggests that, at least to date, law enforcement officers have similarly concluded that such a construction of the statute was not intended by Congress.
In holding to the contrary, the majority relies on cases interpreting the Sabotage Acts, 18 U.S.C. § 2153 and § 2155. Although those statutes do, as the majority notes, “share with § 1362 the common purpose of protecting facilities related to national defense,” their language is, as the majority concedes, “broader” than that employed in § 1362. Indeed, it seems to me that the language of the Sabotage Acts is so different from that of § 1362 as to make ease law interpreting the Sabotage Acts of little assistance here. Section 2155 requires proof of specific “intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 2155. Without such proof, there can be no violation of § 2155. See United States v. Johnson, 15 M.J. 676 (A.F.C.M.R.1983) (finding evidence insufficient to prove violation of § 2155 because defendant was only shown to be angry and upset and not to have a desire to harm national defense). Although § 2153 does not require proof of specific intent, it does require proof that the defendant had “reason to believe that his act may injure, interfere with, or obstruct the United States” and it only applies “when the United States is at war, or in times of national emergency.” 18 U.S.C. § 2153.
In contrast, the statute at issue here, § 1362, contains no requirement that specific intent or “belief’ be proved; nor is the reach of § 1362 confined to times of war or national emergency. Accordingly, there does not seem to me any reason to conclude that the broad reading given § 2153 and § 2155 should similarly be given § 1362. Rather, in reading the three statutes together one is left with the conclusion that when Congress, in enacting § 2153 and § 2155, painted with a broad brush — in defining “war utilities” or “national-defense utilities” — it was careful to limit liability in another way — by requiring proof of “belief’ or specific intent and by confining liability to times of war or national emergency. Because none of the limitations contained in the Sabotage Acts are incorporated in § 1362, I cannot conclude that the broad interpretation given the Sabotage Acts is equally applicable to § 1362.
Nor do I believe that the legislative history of § 1362 supports a contrary conclusion. The Report of the House Judiciary Committee accompanying the 1961 amendment to § 1362 makes it clear that the purpose of the amendment extending the statutory prohibition against destruction of communication systems “operated or controlled by the United States” to those “used for military or civil defense functions” was to preserve the national security. H.R.Rep. No. 965, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2997, 2998; S.Rep. No. 458, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). Thus the Report begins -with the statement:
The extent to which the internal security of the United States is dependent upon secure, positive, and instantaneous communications can best be understood by a brief reflection on the speed with which this *1215Nation must alert her people and her defenses if supersonic missiles with atomic warheads are ever launched against her shores.... Our defense and retaliatory-forces are only as good as the means we have for alerting those forces.
1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2998. The Report continues in this vein, clearly emphasizing the necessity of preserving the country’s communications systems to protect the national security. Id. at 2998-3001. The Report repeatedly focuses on the importance of “commercial communications systems,” systems “supplied by commercial companies,” “commercial communications facilities,” “commercial carriers,” “commercial facilities,” “regular commercial systems,” and “commercial companies.” Id. at 2998-3000.
Nothing in the Report suggests that § 1362, as amended, is to be applied to a private (non-commercial) communication system that is used exclusively by its owner, for the owner’s private purposes, just because those private purposes tangentially relate to “military or civil defense functions of the United States.” Rather, the Report concludes with language that strongly suggests that the 1961 amendment is to be limited to commercial systems:
This bill proposes to amend existing law to protect those portions of the facilities of commercial carriers which are used or intended to be used for military or civil defense functions of the United States.
Id. at 3000 (emphasis added). The CSX copper wire at issue here was part of a private company’s “internal telephone system” and so was obviously not a portion of the facility of a commercial communication carrier. The legislative history of the 1961 amendment to § 1362 suggests that the amendment was never intended to make the theft of such wire a federal crime.
Where, as here, the “text, structure, and history” of a criminal statute fail to establish that “the Government’s position is unambiguously correct,” the Supreme Court has directed that the “rule of lenity” be applied and the ambiguity be resolved in the defendant’s favor. United States v. Granderson, — U.S. -, -, 114 S.Ct. 1259, 1267, 127 L.Ed.2d 611 (1994). This “ ‘time-honored interpretative guideline’ serves to ensure both that there is fair warning of the boundaries of criminal conduct and that legislatures, not courts, define criminal liability.” Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158, 110 S.Ct. 997, 1002, 108 L.Ed.2d 132 (1990) (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 2089, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985)). Thus, to the extent § 1362 is ambiguous, I would resolve that ambiguity in favor of Turpin and Smith “unless and until Congress plainly states that we have misconstrued its intent.” Id. at 168, 110 S.Ct. at 1007.
Turpin and Smith may well have been guilty of larceny, but in my view they did not violate § 1362. I would reverse.