Court Opinion

ID: 9734774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:45:36.279246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:51.172963
License: Public Domain

Dissenting .Opinion-
DeBruler, J.
Appellant’s appeal from the denial of his post-conviction petition is based on two separate and distinct contentions: (1) That his..guilty plea was entered into, under coercion because of. alleged abusive treatment in prison, and (2) that it was entered into without adequate knowledge of its consequences' because."appellant was not fully aware of the special sentencing provisions to which his plea exposed him. :; -.
*368The majority opinion has extensively dealt with the first of these issues and I agree with the conclusion reached with respect to it. The opinion does not deal so specifically with the second issue, but apparently the majority has decided either that appellant need not have been aware of the sentencing provisions when he entered his plea or that there exists evidence in the record which creates a reasonable inference that he was aware of the provisions. I cannot agree with this resolution of appellant’s second contention and I therefore dissent.
A defendant’s decision to plead guilty to a criminal charge lodged against him is the most sweeping and encompassing step he may make in our criminal system.
“A plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment.” Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274.
It is estimated that pleas of guilty now account for over 90% of the criminal convictions every year in this country.1 I believe that because of the increasingly widespread use of this method to dispose of the important issues and questions more traditionally and thoroughly treated at trials we must be particularly careful that the plea entered has been done so in accordance with constitutional standards.
“Because of the grave nature of a guilty plea the trial court has a duty to closely scrutinize the situation and be sure that the offered plea is freely and understandingly given____” Brimhall v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 153, 279 N. E. 557, 563; Harshman v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 618, 115 N. E. 2d 501; Campbell v. State (1951), 229 Ind. 198, 96 N. E. 2d 876.
It has long been established that in order for a guilty plea to be. constitutionally valid it must be made, “voluntarily after proper advice and with full understanding of *369consequences" (Emphasisadded.) Machibroda v. U.S. (1962), 368 U.S. 487, 82 S. Ct. 510, 7 L. Ed. 2d 473; Kercheval v. U.S. (1927), 274 U.S. 220, 47 S. Ct. 582, 71 L. Ed. 1009; Brown v. State (1973), 261 Ind. 50, 300 N. E. 2d 83. It is axiomatic that the possible sentences a defendant subjects himself to, through his plea, is contemplated as a “consequence” in the meaning of this constitutional rule. Marvel v. U.S. (1965), 380 U.S. 262, 85 S. Ct. 953, 13 L. Ed. 960 (Per Curiam).
Appellant alleges that he entered his plea on the offense with the belief that the sentencing judge would subsequently hear appellant’s version of the offense, which appellant believed would disclose mitigating circumstances, and that the judge might then sentence him to a lesser sentence than the maximum of which he had been informed. At the post-conviction hearing the court itself inquired of appellant’s understanding of the sentencing procedures which were to be employed after his plea of guilty.
“Q. (By Court) You didn’t understand you were pleading guilty when you were pleading guilty?
A. Yessir, I understood I was pleading guilty but I was pleading guilty and you were to hear, the way I understood it was to hear the evidence. You were to hear my story and you was to hear everyone else’s story and then you would decide whether I would get a life sentence or cut loose or what. That was the understanding that I had.
Q. You knew you were pleading guilty?
A. Yesser, I knew I was pleading guilty.
Q. You understood what a plea of guilty was ?
A. Well I went in front of Mr. Rabb and I pleaded guilty.
Q. You have done it before?
A. I pleaded guilty in front of him and then he heard all the statements and everything and then he sentenced me to five months. .
Q. Well you understood what a plea of guilty was at the time you entered didn’t you?
A. Not according to this I didn’t because I thought that I would get to be heard. I didn’t get to be heard. I , entered a plea and you sent me across the street, you brought me back across the street and you sentenced me *370and sent me to the penitentiary for life.' You didn’t hear one word that I had to say at all other than my pleading guilty.”
Appellant contends .that it was not until after he' was sentenced that.he discovered that there existed certain sentencing provisions for a second degree murder conviction which made a life sentence mandatory. . ...
It is agreed that the penalty for second degree murder at the time appellant was sentenced was a mandatory life term. Burns .§ 10-3404.2 In addition to the murder statute itself, another statute (IC 1971, 35-7-1-1, being Burns § 9-2209) listed second degree murder as one of only a few crimes in this State where the sentencing judge was prohibited from exercising his usual discretion in matters of sentencing; Unlike the judge’s power in most situations the judge under a § 9-2209 conviction had no power to suspend the sentence or parole the defendant; the imposition of a life sentence was mandatory. State ex rel. Palmer v. Cir. Court of Hendricks Co. (1963), 244 Ind. 297, 192 N. E. 2d 625; O’Neil v. State (1939), 216 Ind. 21, 22 N. E. 2d 825.
The initial question, therefore, is whether it was necessary for appellant to be apprised of the somewhat unique sentencing provisions of the 1967 second degree murder statute, by which he was barred from receiving a suspended sentence ánd imposition of a life sentence was statutory ‘mandated, in order to have a complete and full understanding of the sentencing consequences of this plea as required by the Constitution. I believe that it would bé.
These special sentencing provisions. have a direct affect on appellant’s right to parole and a possible suspension of sentence. Appellant’s post-conviction testimony, indicates that at least part of his decision to enter his plea, and thereby waive several significant rights, was grounded on the mistaken belief that the judge was empowered to sentence him to.less *371than themaximum..' This belief-was postered/by ?his-; previous: pleas, "of.¿guilty after, which .he apparently, had.:,been, afforded an;opportunity.to-.explain, .his .version' of.the. offense which;, he, .felt, resulted,in .a- less- severe sentence,- It could-. also be argued that the judge’s use .of the term “maximum ¿penalty’’. When.informing the appellant of the senten.ce; he.cOuld receive might-. enforce, however , unintentionally;.' appellant’s ; ..belief that there did indeed exist a minimum sentence ,or at .least an alternative to the “maximum’.’ about...which ,he had been informed.. Appellant entered his plea with, the.,.expectation that the.ijudge ivould, exercise discretion, in .sentencing... In, ¿nder’jfor appellant, to make, a fully,, infórmed. choice, on the decision, to’plead guilty he,should have been .informed that the judge had.no. such.discretion.
;:.:; The principle that a-full Understanding of -the. consequences-requires that-a defendant - should.;be fully unformed.-.of .all-relevant rfacts .concerning the. possible, sentences.- .he-..,may receive upon his-plea .has received -wide..-'recognition;/.The Indiana.-General Assembly- in its past session ..enacted, the Indiana;Code of Criminal Procedure-which ,s,ets -out-the type of. information-which a defendant must-be aware of;in order for.his. plea of guilty to be properly accepted... At §3-of, that Code it requires the, defendant to be informed of “the. maximum possible sentences-andminimum.-senten.Ces.of the qffen.se. charged and of any possible , increased sentences by ..reason of the ¡.fact of a prior conviction or' convictions, and of any possibility of the imposition of' consecutive sentences.’’ P, L, 325, Art: 4.f, § 3 (dj Ih addition the.'. ÁBAStandard’s relating to pleas."of...guilty’require ’that á'defendant be:advised .of the máximum, possible sentence oii the charge,, and the “mandatory, minimum .sentence”, .if ..any,. ptandq,rds,, .Pleas, pf. Guilty,§;íi(c).;. " ...V;.\
. ¿I want'-to emphasize thatmy -position. here; does .not require that a,defendant seeking, to enter- a plea-.of guilty -to- a -charge must be.tpld of .-the-exact sentence a judgewauld impose-upon him-,jf ..the plea -was accepted,-.- Norr;does- it mean that' a de.*372fendant who had been properly and fully informed of the possible sentences which could be imposed on him should be allowed to withdraw his plea merely because he was disappointed in the severity of the sentence he was ultimately given. It merely recognizes that in order for a plea to be made with knowledge of its consequences a defendant should be made aware of the “range of sentences” to which the plea exposes him.
Moreover this does not require that an accused need be informed prior to the acceptance of his guilty plea about every conceivable collateral effect the conviction entered on the plea might have. See Bye v. U.S. (2d Cir., 1970), 435 F. 2d 177. However when there exists a condition imposed by a statute such as here which has a direct and definite consequence on a disposition of a defendant’s plea I believe he must be apprised of it in order that he be allowed to exercise an informed choice on his decision to waive the important constitutional rights afforded to him. Bye v. U.S., supra; Jenkins v. U.S. (10th Cir., 1970), 420 F. 2d 433; Berry v. U.S. (3rd Cir., 1969), 412 F. 2d 189; Durant v. U.S. (1st Cir., 1969), 410 F. 2d 689; Munich v. U.S. (9th Cir., 1964), 337 F. 2d 356. The knowledge of the mandatory nature of this sentence is as necessary to a full understanding of the consequences as is the knowledge of the maximum sentence iself.
The extent of the guilty plea transcript set out in the majority opinion is impressive in bulk and it is beyond question that the trial judge properly informed appellant of his right to trial by a jury, his right to remain silent at the trial if he so desired, his right to cross examine the State’s witnesses, his right to call witnesses and introduce evidence on his own behalf, his right to appeal an unfavorable decision and his right to have counsel throughout the course of these proceedings. However, I do not believe that compliance with some, or even most, of the requirements for a constitutionally valid guilty plea should excuse us from requiring compliance with all of them, and a ¡full understanding of the sentence to which *373a plea will expose a defendant is clearly constitutionally necessary.
Furthermore, I cannot agree with the apparent implication in the majority opinion that the testimony of appellant’s trial attorney to the effect that, “he had never pleaded a person guilty to a charge of murder without first informing him that the court had no power to suspend a murder conviction” can be sufficient to show that appellant was indeed aware of the unique sentencing provisions. That same attorney also testified in conjunction with appellant’s particular case that he could not remember what he told appellant, and that he honestly could not tell whether appellant was aware of the mandatory sentence when he entered his plea. The broad generalization of the first statement, which apparently pertains to every guilty plea proceeding this attorney ever appeared in, cannot reasonably be construed to establish what is specifically denied in the later testimony directed to appellant’s particular plea proceeding. Campbell v. State, supra.
Since I believe a full understanding of the sentencing consequences of his plea is required for a constitutionally valid plea, and since appellant has presented a prima facie case establishing that he was not so informed, which the State has failed to reasonably rebut, I would, vote to reverse the judgment of the trial court.
Prentice, J., concurs.
Note. — Reported in 303 N. E. 2d 645.

. Erickson, “The Finality of a Plea of Guilty”, 48 N. Dame Lawyer 835 (1973).

. In 1969 the Indiana General Assembly amended the statute to provide an alternative sentence of 15-25 years.