Court Opinion

ID: 9895345
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-06 20:03:33.883001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:09.336504
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/6/23 P. v. Alvarado CA2/6

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

 THE PEOPLE,                                                 2d Crim. No. B324554
                                                           (Super. Ct. No. GA063808)
      Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Los Angeles County)

 v.

 JOE ESTRADA ALVARADO,

      Defendant and Appellant.

       Joe Estrada Alvarado, who is serving a prison term for a
first-degree murder he committed in 2005, appeals the summary
denial of his petition for resentencing under former Penal Code1
section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6). Appellant contends the
trial court prejudicially erred in denying the petition without
appointing counsel. We affirm.

         1 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the

Penal Code.
             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       In 2008, a jury found appellant guilty of first-degree
special-circumstance murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd.
(a)(17)), robbery (§ 211), and assault with a deadly weapon, i.e., a
knife (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). The jury also found true allegations
that appellant personally used a deadly weapon in committing
the offenses (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), but found not true an
allegation that his commission of the murder was willful and
premeditated. In a bifurcated proceeding, the court found true
allegations that appellant had suffered two prior convictions or
juvenile adjudications within the meaning of the three strikes
law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and had been
convicted of a serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
       Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of life
without the possibility of parole (LWOP) plus 57 years to life. On
appeal we modified the sentence to LWOP plus 30 years to life,
but otherwise affirmed. (People v. Alvarado (July 26, 2009,
B206555) [nonpub. opn.].) The facts set forth in the appellate
opinion, the reporter’s transcript of the prosecutor’s closing
argument, and the jury instructions unequivocally demonstrate
that appellant was tried and convicted as the actual killer and
sole perpetrator of the murder of Dennis Choi, whom appellant
stabbed to death in the course of a robbery of which appellant
was also the sole perpetrator.2
       Appellant petitioned for resentencing under former section
1170.95 (now section 1172.6) and requested the appointment of

      2 We grant the People’s unopposed request for judicial

notice of the relevant portions of the reporter’s and clerk’s
transcripts in the direct appeal in case number B206555. (Evid.
Code, § 452.)

                                 2
counsel. The court summarily denied the petition without
appointing counsel on the ground that the record of conviction
conclusively established appellant was the actual killer and sole
perpetrator of the murder. In its written order, the court
acknowledged that appellant had filed a facially valid petition.
The court also acknowledged our Supreme Court’s holding in
People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis) that a facially-valid
section 1172.6 petition cannot be summarily denied prior to the
appointment of counsel. The court nevertheless did so, reasoning
that “[a]ppointing counsel for [appellant] and proceeding with
court hearings and a briefing schedule would be a wasteful and
time-consuming exercise in futility” because the record of
conviction unequivocally demonstrated that appellant was tried
and convicted as the actual killer and sole perpetrator of the
murder.
                             DISCUSSION
       Appellant contends the trial court prejudicially erred in
summarily denying his section 1172.6 petition without
appointing counsel and setting the matter for briefing. We agree
that the court erred but deem the error harmless.
       In Lewis, the California Supreme Court held that once a
petitioner files a facially sufficient petition under section 1172.6
and requests appointment of counsel, the trial court must appoint
counsel before conducting any prima facie review. (Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 963 [“petitioners who file a complying petition
requesting counsel are to receive counsel upon the filing of a
compliant petition”]; accord, § 1172.6, subd. (b)(3).) Because
appellant’s section 1172.6 petition is facially sufficient, the trial
court erred by summarily denying the petition prior to appointing
counsel. Lewis expressly rejected the trial court’s assertion in

                                 3
this case that summarily denying appellant’s petition preserved
judicial resources: “Permitting trial courts to summarily deny
relief before the appointment of counsel would not significantly
conserve judicial resources. ‘[E]ven assuming the practice leads
to short-term efficiencies, those savings are a false economy that
shifts work from trial counsel to appellate counsel and from the
trial courts to the appellate courts.’” (Lewis, at pp. 968-969.)
       However, the error compels reversal only if appellant can
show a reasonable probability that his petition would not have
been summarily denied if he had been afforded the assistance of
counsel. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal. 5th at pp. 957-958 [failure to
appoint counsel under § 1172.6, subd. (b)(3) is “state law error
only, tested for prejudice under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d
818”], 974; People v. Hurtado (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 887, 892.)
Appellant fails to meet this standard if the record of his
conviction, which includes the jury instructions, establishes that
he is not entitled to relief as a matter of law. (People v. Daniel
(2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666, 678.)
       Senate Bill 1437, which created section 1172.6, was enacted
to “amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine . . . to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with
the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); § 1172.6, subd. (a)(1).)
Here, the record of appellant’s conviction conclusively establishes
he was tried and convicted of murder not as an accomplice, but
rather as the actual killer and sole perpetrator of the crime.
Appellant is precluded from obtaining relief under section 1172.6
as a matter of law, so the court’s error in summarily denying his

                                  4
petition without appointing counsel was harmless. (See People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 233 [recognizing the defendant
was “not entitled to any relief under section 1172.6” because he
“was the actual killer and the only participant in the killing”]; see
also People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 969 [affirming
summary denial of petition for resentencing where record of
conviction “unequivocally establishe[d]” the defendant was the
sole perpetrator and actual killer].)
                          DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                      CODY, J.

We concur:

      GILBERT, P. J.

      YEGAN, J.

                                  5
                    Jared D. Moses, Judge
             Superior Court County of Los Angeles
               ______________________________

      John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
       Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Seth P. McCutcheon, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.