Court Opinion

ID: 9793204
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:44:25.881822+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:55.233384
License: Public Domain

RABINOWITZ, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion. However, as to any violation of Palmer’s constitutional rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) during the initial traffic stop, my analysis differs from that employed by the majority.
Palmer alleges error in the admission of testimony that when he was initially stopped by the police, he was asked how much he had to drink and replied, “five or six beers.” This statement was made prior to any giving of Miranda warnings or any waiver of Palmer’s right to remain silent and not be questioned. The majority concludes, after assuming arguendo a Miranda violation occurred, that the error was harmless because it was merely cumulative, corroborating other evidence sufficient to convict. Violation of Miranda protections is federal constitutional error. As we stated in Rubey v. Fairbanks, 456 P.2d 470 (Alaska 1969), to determine whether a constitutional error is harmless, this “court must be able to declare a belief beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless — that it did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Id. at 477.
In this case, after exhibiting erratic driving behavior, Palmer admits to having drunk “five or six beers.” I think that this admission is of such importance that reasonable doubt exists as to whether it contributed to the verdict. An accused’s statement as to his or her activities carries significant weight with the jury. Admitting to considerable consumption of alcohol in the context of this case amounts to an admission of one of the elements of the *1112charged offense. Thus, since I would find reversible error if Palmer’s Miranda rights were violated it becomes necessary to decide whether the admission in question was uttered under circumstances amounting to custodial interrogation.
In Hunter v. State, 590 P.2d 888, 895 (Alaska 1979), we adopted an objective, reasonable person test for determination of custodial interrogation requiring Miranda warnings. In that case we held that there must be some actual indication of custody, such that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave and break off police questioning. We stated in Hunter that custodial determinations must be made on a ease-by-case basis and outlined three groups of factors which are to be considered when examining a particular factual setting:
At least three groups of facts would be relevant to this determination. The first are those facts intrinsic to the interrogation: when and where it occurred, how long it lasted, how many police were present, what the officers and the defendant said and did, the presence of actual physical restraint on the defendant or things equivalent to actual restraint such as drawn weapons or a guard stationed at the door, and' whether the defendant was being questioned as a suspect or as a witness. Facts pertaining to events before the interrogation are also relevant, especially how the defendant got to the place of questioning — whether he came completely on his own, in response to a police request, or escorted by police officers. Finally, what happened after the interrogation — whether the defendant left freely, was detained or arrested — may assist the court in determining whether the defendant, as a reasonable person, would have felt free to break off the questioning.
Id. at 895 (footnotes omitted). Based upon my study of the record I conclude that Palmer was not in custody at the time he was asked how much he had to drink. The arresting officer testified that the reason that he pulled Palmer’s vehicle over was that it was weaving back and forth and crossing the centerline. Officer Murphy testified that once he effected a traffic stop of Palmer:
I asked him how much he’d had to drink. He stated at that time, five or six beers. I asked him where he’d been, if this was his house, listened to him talk. I believe I asked him to walk a straight line and recite the alphabet for me at the scene. When that was completed, I arrested him for OMVI.
Thus, at the point at which Murphy asked Palmer how much he had been drinking, all the information the officer had was the weaving in Palmer’s driving Murphy had observed. Such a driving pattern could have been caused by any of a number of factors, including the impairment of the driver’s faculties. It was only with additional questioning, observance of Palmer’s demeanor, and Palmer’s performance of the field sobriety tests that Murphy concluded there was sufficient probable cause to arrest Palmer.
Therefore, I conclude that this questioning falls under the on-the-scene questioning exception to the Miranda rule. This court discussed the parameters of that exception in Ripley v. State, 590 P.2d 48 (Alaska 1979), and Pope v. State, 478 P.2d 801 (Alaska 1970). The purpose of the exception is to facilitate the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime. General, on-the-scene questioning to determine whether a crime has been committed does not require Miranda warnings. In Pope v. State, 478 P.2d 801, 805 (Alaska 1971), we articulated several factors considered in determining whether there was an on-the-scene questioning exception:
But .the case at bar is a strong one for applying the “on-the-scene questioning” exception to the Miranda warning requirement. The officer here was presented with a situation of great emergency. A crime of violence had occurred, the victim' was lying on the ground dead. There was more than one person present. Both to protect his own safety and that of others, the officer had to elicit information about what had happened, and about the gun which had obviously been used in the killing.
*1113Although the circumstances surrounding the scene of a violent crime are far different from a traffic stop the general principle is equally applicable. Police should be free to ask questions to determine what has happened. Only then can an officer exercise judgment as to what action to take. Again, each case turns on its particular facts. At some point, the on-the-scene questioning may become a custodial interrogation. See State v. Darnell, 8 Wash.App. 627, 508 P.2d 613, 615 (Wash.App.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112, 94 S.Ct. 842, 38 L.Ed.2d 739; United States v. LeQuire, 424 F.2d 341, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1970).
I conclude that the circumstances in this case did not amount to custodial interrogation. Therefore, I can agree with the majority that there was no error in the admission of Palmer’s statement.