Court Opinion

ID: 9881647
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-03 16:12:49.272023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:14:01.440921
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

       IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO G.D.

                              No. 1 CA-JV 23-0079
                                FILED 10-3-2023

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                              No. JD527909
                  The Honorable Julie Ann Mata, Judge

                                   AFFIRMED

                                    COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa
By Suzanne W. Sanchez
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Emily M. Stokes
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

Maricopa County Public Advocate, Phoenix
By Katherine Badrick
Counsel for Appellee G.D.
            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO G.D.
                        Decision of the Court

                        MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.

C A T L E T T, Judge:

¶1            Julianne W. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her
parental rights to G.D. (“Child”). Mother argues that the Department of
Child Safety (“DCS”) failed to diligently provide reunification services. We
affirm.

             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2             Mother gave birth to Child in 2019. Two years later, DCS
received a report alleging Mother and Child’s father exposed Child to
domestic violence, including physical fighting involving or around Child.
DCS removed Child from the home, placed Child with a foster family, and
filed a petition alleging Mother was unwilling and unable to provide proper
and effective parental care. The juvenile court determined Child was
dependent and prepared a family reunification plan.

¶3            Shortly thereafter, DCS referred Child to a behavioral-health
provider.      The provider observed that Child struggled with
communication, knowing only two or three words, was aggressive toward
other children, and had trouble with speech in general. Child also lacked
appropriate sleep—possibly rooted in trauma from often awaking to his
parents fighting.

¶4            DCS continued to implement services to better Child’s
environment and behavior and reunify the family. These services included
substance abuse treatment, drug testing, a psychiatric evaluation, domestic-
violence treatment, a parenting-education program, and supervised
visitation. DCS noted in May 2022 that Mother was “resistant to [DCS]’s
intervention,” rejected consistent drug testing, was erratic and hostile, and
lacked overall engagement as to many of the services provided. Mother
tested positive for THC and methamphetamine in 2021 and had not tested
since, despite multiple requests from DCS.

¶5          DCS provided case management services to the family. The
case manager met with Mother, sent a service letter, helped with domestic

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            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO G.D.
                        Decision of the Court

violence direct referrals, and followed up monthly. DCS offered domestic
violence counseling, but Mother did not engage. DCS held team decision-
making meetings, involving all stakeholders, to identify impediments and
issues and develop a service plan to remedy them. Mother attended the
initial meeting but none thereafter. Lastly, a psychological consultation
was recommended, requiring a period of sobriety. The consultation was
not conducted because Mother failed to demonstrate such sobriety. To help
alleviate barriers to attending services, DCS offered transportation services
to Mother upon request.

¶6             DCS provided supervised visitation. Mother regularly
visited Child, despite often “arriving under the influence and acting erratic,
paranoid, and aggressive.” Sometimes she would not appear at all. Once,
she threatened to break the kneecaps of a case aide. Other times, Mother
played roughly with Child and had to be redirected from doing so. She also
provided him with junk food during visits. These interactions led Child to
return to his foster home dysregulated.

¶7             Child’s post-visit dysregulation increased around June 2022.
For example, he was abusive with animals around the foster home. Child
also inflicted harm on himself and threw tantrums. After visits with
Mother, Child had heightened emotions—he threw small furniture and
food, kicked items until they broke, and aggressively pushed other
children. Before a visit with Mother in late 2022, Child expressed to DCS
that he did not want to see Mother and that “mommy scares [him].” When
DSC told Child he did not have to visit Mother, his behavior improved
significantly.

¶8            Because of Child’s behavior, DCS consulted a psychologist,
who concluded that there was significant concern of further emotional
harm to Child if visits with Mother continued. The psychologist
“recommended that visits [be] temporarily paused while [Mother]
engage[s] in individual services to prepare for re-initiating visits” and until
she demonstrated sobriety to the extent that she could continue substance
abuse treatment and renew visits.

¶9            With this recommendation, DCS moved in January 2023 to
suspend visitation. After reviewing the motion and supporting materials,
the juvenile court suspended visitation until such time as “DCS [could]
implement clinically supervised parenting time . . . left to the discretion of
DCS.” The court stated that the issue of visitation would be revisited the
following month at the termination trial.

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            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO G.D.
                        Decision of the Court

¶10           The juvenile court held a termination trial on February 14.
During the trial, the court concluded that, “given the evidence and the
testimony that’s been presented today, the court is going to deny the motion
to reconsider [the court’s decision to suspend visitation].”

¶11           The juvenile court subsequently terminated Mother’s
parental rights on two grounds—substance abuse and out-of-home
placement. The court determined that DCS had made diligent efforts in
providing reunification services and reunification would have been likely
had Mother completed those programs. The court found that it was in
Child’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights because Child
“would have permanency in a substance abuse, domestic violence free
home.”

¶12           Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. See A.R.S. §
8-235(A).

                               DISCUSSION

¶13            Mother appeals termination of her parental rights, arguing
DCS failed to provide sufficient reunification services. Mother argues the
juvenile court unlawfully suspended parent-child visitation, thereby
impacting reunification. We “will affirm a severance order unless it is
clearly erroneous.” Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 151 ¶ 18
(2018). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the
juvenile court’s ruling and will not disturb a factual finding unless there is
no reasonable evidence to support it. Adrian E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 239
Ariz. 240, 241 ¶ 2 (App. 2016); Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207
Ariz. 43, 47 ¶ 8 (App. 2004).

I.     Challenge of Suspension Order

¶14            Mother challenges the juvenile court’s order suspending her
visitation rights with Child. DCS claims that Mother cannot challenge that
order because it is not a final, appealable order. Typically, an order that
substantially limits a parent’s ability to have any contact with their child is
a final, appealable order. See Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JD-5312, 178
Ariz. 372, 374–75 (App. 1994). The Arizona Rules of Procedure for the
Juvenile Court state, for example, that an order terminating visitation is
appealable by an aggrieved party. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 601(b)(2)(E). But the
Rules do not address a temporary suspension of visitation. See Ariz. R.P.
Juv. Ct. 601(b).

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            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO G.D.
                        Decision of the Court

¶15            We need not decide whether an order suspending visitation
is a final, appealable order. After a judicial severance of parental rights, as
occurred here, any parental right of association is entirely terminated. See
JD-5312, 178 Ariz. at 374–75. The issue of Mother’s visitation rights, as a
stand-alone issue, is therefore moot. See A.R.S. § 8-539 (“An order
terminating the parent-child relationship shall divest the parent and the
child of all legal rights, privileges, duties and obligations with respect to
each other[.]”). We do, however, consider the suspension of visitation
rights in the context of the live issue Mother raises on appeal—whether the
juvenile court abused its discretion in concluding that DCS had provided
Mother with diligent reunification services.

II.    Diligent Reunification Services

¶16           Mother appeals from the juvenile court’s finding that DCS
provided diligent reunification services. Specifically, Mother points to the
juvenile court’s suspension of her visitation rights with Child.

¶17           DCS has an affirmative duty to make all reasonable efforts to
preserve the family relationship by providing parents “the time and
opportunity to participate in programs designed to help [them] become an
effective parent.” Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 231, 235 ¶ 14
(App. 2011). Arizona law requires DCS to make diligent efforts to “preserve
the family by providing all rehabilitative services reasonably necessary to
rectify the conditions that led to the child’s removal.” Michael M. v. Ariz.
Dep’t Econ. Sec., 202 Ariz. 198, 200 ¶ 9 (App. 2002). DCS is not required,
however, to provide “every conceivable service,” nor is it “required to
provide services that are futile” or have no “reasonable prospect of
success.” Christina G., 227 Ariz. at 235 ¶ 15 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).

¶18            Visitation is a reunification service. Francisco F. v. Ariz. Dep’t
Econ. Sec., 228 Ariz. 379, 381 ¶ 8 (App. 2011). A parent’s right to visitation
should only be denied under “extraordinary circumstances”—namely,
when visitation seriously endangers a child’s physical, mental, moral, or
emotional health. See JD-5312, 178 Ariz. at 375; see also A.R.S. § 25-411(J).

¶19           Even if suspending visitation rights a month prior to a
termination hearing could result in a finding that overall reunification
services were insufficient, the juvenile court did not err in finding sufficient
services here. To begin, the record demonstrates that DCS provided Mother
with the time and opportunity to participate in several programs to help
her become an effective parent, spanning roughly two years. These

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            IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO G.D.
                        Decision of the Court

programs included substance abuse treatment, drug testing, a psychiatric
evaluation, domestic-violence treatment, and a parenting-education
program. Mother, however, lacked overall engagement in the services
provided. Mother does not adequately explain how suspending her
visitation rights a few weeks prior to termination resulted in a failure on
DCS’s part when Mother persistently failed to take advantage of other
services at the heart of DCS’s reunification efforts, particularly those aimed
at assisting her with substance abuse and domestic violence.

¶20            Moreover, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
suspending Mother’s visitation rights. See JD-5312, 178 Ariz. at 375–76
(applying an abuse of discretion standard). The juvenile court’s decision
hinged on specific testimony that Child suffered adverse emotional and
behavioral consequences after visitation with Mother. According to the
psychological consultation, without suspension there was a likelihood of
further emotional harm to Child. The juvenile court found, after
suspension in January 2023, the Child’s “concerning behaviors subsided.”
Sufficient evidence supported the juvenile court’s endangerment finding
and the resulting suspension of visitation. See id. (explaining that the
juvenile court is in the “most favorable position to determine what is best
for the [child]”).

¶21            Mother also asserts that the court did not conduct an
evidentiary hearing on the issue of visitation and suggests one is required
upon request. Mother, however, agreed during a status conference in
January 2023 that the juvenile court could address the visitation issue
during the termination hearing in February 2023. The juvenile court then
heard evidence about visitation during the termination trial. It was only
after hearing such evidence that the juvenile court denied Mother’s motion
to reconsider the suspension of visitation. The court did not err in resolving
the visitation issue in this manner.

                              CONCLUSION

¶22           We affirm the juvenile court’s judgment terminating Mother’s
parental rights.

                          AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                          FILED: AA

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