Court Opinion

ID: 9677401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:51:31.182921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:55.804861
License: Public Domain

White, C. J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. As the majority opinion states, the crucial issue is whether section 44-710.14, R. R. S. 1943, governs this case. This provision was last enacted as section 15 of Laws 1957, chapter 188, page 658. The title to this act states that its purpose is, “to prescribe uniform provisions for individual accident and sickness insurance policies, * * * to describe the effect of statements made in the application * * The act consists of 22 sections and repeals about 49 previously existing sections of the statute relating to accident and health insurance. It provides, among other things, that when any policy provision is in conflict with any provisions of the act, that the rights and duties of the insurer, in*662sured, and the beneficiary shall be governed by the provisions of the act. Other provisions are to the same effect. It seems to me that no one could doubt that this act was a comprehensive independent act designed to govern the insurance and liability provisions of accident and health policies. I do not see how the Legislature could have more clearly expressed its intent to comprehensively regulate the subject matter of the act, accident and health policies. What then, is the posture of section 44-358, R. R. S. 1943, enacted in 1913 with relation to section 44-710.14, R. R. S. 1943?
A preexisting statute will be considered as modified, superseded, or repealed by implication insofar as it is in conflict or inconsistent with a subsequently enacted statute, which is complete in itself, and inclusive of the same subject. And where a legislative act is complete in itself, it is adequate, without numerical designation and specific amendment or repeal, to supersede, supplement, or modify earlier acts or parts of acts in conflict with them. The last expression of the legislative will is the law. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. County Board of Dodge County, 148 Neb. 648, 28 N. W. 2d 396; Mogis v Lyman-Richey Sand & Gravel Corp., 189 F. 2d 130, rehearing denied 190 F. 2d 202, certiorari denied 342 U. S. 877, 72 S. Ct. 168, 96 L. Ed. 659; Stoller v. State, 171 Neb. 93, 105 N. W. 2d 852; Consumers Public Power Dist. v. Eldred, 146 Neb. 926, 22 N. W. 2d 188. See, also, Nebraska Digest, Statutes, key numbers 159 and 161 (1). There can be no question that section 44-710.14, R. R. S. 1943, the new statute, prevails.
By its terms, the statute intended to cover the area of the requirements to bar recovery, of a statement that was false and material to the acceptance of the risk. Under the 1913 statute (section 44-358, R. R. S. 1943) the false statement material to the risk must have been made knowingly by the insured with the intent to deceive. Carpenter v. Sun Indemnity Co. (1940), 138 Neb. 552, 293 N. W. 400.
The Legislature is presumed to have had knowledge *663of this requirement when it enacted section 44-710.14, R. R. S. 1943. It did require that the falsity of the statement be material to the acceptance of the risk but there is no requirement that it be made by the insured knowingly with intent to deceive. In my opinion, we have no right to write that requirement into the statute. The statute now says that recovery may be barred if the statement is false and material to the acceptance of the risk. The majority opinion states, in effect, that it may not bar recovery unless knowingly made by the insured with intent to deceive and was material to the acceptance of the risk. This flies in the face of the plain, unambiguous language of the statute itself. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how a statement make knowingly with intent to deceive could relate to the degree of risk incurred by the company in the acceptance of the application. The degree of risk in the acceptance of the application would exist irrespective of whether the false statement was made knowingly with intent to deceive. The Legislature had a right to say that the insurance company had a right to make a determination as to the degree of risk involved based on the true facts irrespective of whether the insured’s statement was knowingly false with intent to deceive.
The undisputed facts in this case are that the insured made false statements material to the acceptance of the risk. He falsely stated in writing that he had not been hospital confined in the past 5 years prior to August 6, 1964, when in fact he had been confined in the Hastings State Hospital for 2 weeks in July 1963, and for over a month from October 28, 1963, to December 2, 1963. He had attempted suicide by slashing his wrists and attempted hanging on or about June 30, 1963, had been treated by doctors in the hospital, had been confined to the Lincoln Veteran’s Hospital within the 5-year period of time, had discussed his hospitalization many times with the plaintiff, his wife, and drank to excess and threatened both of their lives. It is not suggested in the *664majority opinion that these conditions and facts were not material to the acceptance of the risk. The evidence is conclusive that a person with a mental disorder, including hospital confinements, is more prone than the average person to accidents, particularly self-inflicted accidents, and the hazard of self-destruction which could be construed as an accident. The evidence is also conclusive that the insurance company would not have accepted this risk and application if it had known the true facts as to hospitalization and treatment.
Furthermore, even assuming that there is a requirement that the false statements were made knowingly, with intent to deceive, I submit that the evidence meets that test also. Intent is buried in the recesses of a man’s mind. We determine intent from what he says or by his conduct. Can it reasonably be said that the insured did not know the facts or inadvertently overlooked answering these pertinent questions truthfully? The only answer is that the truth was knowingly and fraudulently concealed. How else could the insurance company, absent the presence of the deceased, prove the knowing concealment of the facts, other than in the manner present in this case?
The defendant was entitled to a directed verdict. Can anyone say that the grounds here shown are not reasonable grounds for the insurance company to say that it would not have issued the policy if the insured had truthfully revealed them in his application? If the concealed facts in this case do not affect the acceptance of the risk, then what facts will? If such facts do not affect the acceptance of the risk, then what benefit is there in taking an application requiring disclosures as to health, physical or mental condition, treatment in hospitals, and the like?
Carter, J., joins in this dissent.