Court Opinion

ID: 9930507
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 00:05:13.996255+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:18:54.347425
License: Public Domain

02/06/2024

                                         DA 23-0414

               IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

                                        2024 MT 22N

IN THE MATTER OF:

T.K.B. and N.Z.B.,

           Youths in Need of Care.

APPEAL FROM:         District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
                     In and For the County of Yellowstone, Cause Nos. DN 21-150
                     and DN 20-219
                     Honorable Michael G. Moses, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

              For Appellant M. B. (Mother):

                     Laura Reed, Attorney at Law, Missoula, Montana

              For Appellant H. E. (Father):

                     Shannon Hathaway, Hathaway Law Group, Missoula, Montana

              For Appellee:

                     Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General,, Bjorn Boyer, Assistant
                     Attorneys General, Helena, Montana

                     Scott Twito, Yellowstone County Attorney, Laura Watson, Deputy County
                     Attorney, Billings, Montana

                                                 Submitted on Briefs: January 17, 2024

                                                            Decided: February 6, 2024

Filed:

                                     ir,-6L-.--if
                     __________________________________________
                                       Clerk
Justice James Jeremiah Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1     Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion, shall not be cited and does not serve

as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s

quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶2     M.B. (Mother) appeals from the Thirteenth Judicial District Court orders

terminating her parental rights to T.K.B. and N.Z.B. H.E. (Father) appeals the order

terminating his parental rights to T.K.B.1 We affirm.

¶3     After nearly three years of reports regarding possible physical neglect, drug use and

violence in the presence of the children, and failure to accommodate the medical needs of

a child born prematurely, the Department of Public Health and Human Services, Child and

Family Services Division (the Department) removed N.Z.B. from Mother’s care on

August 17, 2020. The removal came shortly after N.Z.B.’s infant half sibling, R.E., died

suddenly while in Mother’s care on August 10, 2020.

¶4     On August 24, 2020, in response to reports that N.Z.B. was in danger of abuse or

neglect after the death of R.E., the Department petitioned for Emergency Protective

Services (EPS), Adjudication as a Youth in Need of Care (YINC) and Temporary Legal

Custody (TLC) of N.Z.B. The District Court granted the Petition the following day. On

November 4, 2020, N.Z.B. was adjudicated a YINC by stipulation. A treatment plan for

Mother was approved by the District Court on December 21, 2020.

1
 Father is T.K.B.’s parent only. N.Z.B.’s biological father relinquished his parental rights and is
not a party to this appeal.
                                               2
¶5        While the proceedings involving N.Z.B. were pending, T.K.B. was born. The

Department’s involvement with T.K.B. began immediately after the child’s birth, when

hospital staff expressed concerns regarding Mother’s ability to adequately care for the

child’s particular medical needs. The Department placed T.K.B. into emergency protective

custody on May 18, 2021, but allowed the child to remain with Mother pursuant to a

protection plan regarding T.K.B. signed by Mother the same day. While the proceedings

involving T.K.B. were ongoing, the Department attempted to include Father, who refused

to engage with the Department until October of 2021, when a paternity test confirmed that

he was T.K.B.’s biological father.

¶6        Mother showed signs of progress toward completing her treatment plan until

August 16, 2021, when she was involved in a public altercation with the mother of one of

Father’s other children. Both T.K.B. and N.Z.B. were present at this altercation, as was

Father’s other child. Several days later, Mother was arrested and charged with assault and

assault on a minor; Father’s other child and the child’s mother were named as the victims.2

Before Mother was arrested, she had returned N.Z.B. to his placement and left T.K.B. with

a friend. Upon Mother’s arrest, the Department attempted to locate T.K.B., but was unable

to do so for more than two days. Shelby Goodman, a Child Protection Specialist Supervisor

at the Department, testified that the Department’s efforts to find T.K.B. involved seeking

the assistance of law enforcement, and that law enforcement was about to issue an Amber

alert when T.K.B. was found on the doorstep of Mother’s residence.

2
    Mother pled guilty to these charges, as well as a previous, unrelated assault.
                                                   3
¶7     As a result of Mother’s arrest and the difficulties locating T.K.B., the Department

removed T.K.B. from Mother’s care. The Department was unable to place T.K.B. with

Father because Father was not on T.K.B.’s birth certificate and refused to engage with the

Department without DNA confirmation of paternity, and due to the Department’s concerns

regarding Father’s history of domestic violence.

¶8     After T.K.B.’s removal, the relationship between the Department and both parents

deteriorated and the Department’s concerns regarding both parents’ anger issues

intensified.   Due to safety concerns, the Department began sending two workers to

Mother’s home to investigate Mother’s compliance with the Department’s conditions for

allowing the children back into her home. CPSS Goodman testified that the primary

concern, however, was Mother’s association with unsafe people, especially Father, who

was the subject of a no contact order due to his violence against Mother.

¶9     Upon receiving news of paternity confirmation in October of 2021, Father insisted

that T.K.B. should be placed in his care. Father and his grandmother both yelled at and

threatened CPSS Goodman on the phone when she informed them that T.K.B. could not

be immediately placed with Father. CPSS Goodman reported that both became aggressive,

with one stating “I have pictures of you bitch.”

¶10    Mother entered a Phase II treatment plan and Father entered a Phase I treatment

plan, both approved by the District Court, on January 12, 2022. Throughout the following

months, both Mother and Father were largely unresponsive to the Department’s attempts

to address problems with the parents’ anger and living situations. Mother missed at least

                                             4
six visits with the children and Father failed to engage the Department in any capacity or

complete any work on his treatment plan tasks for several months.

¶11    On March 4, 2022, Mother and her attorney met with CPSS Goodman to discuss

steps toward reunification with the children. CPSS Goodman informed Mother that,

among other conditions, she needed to find a reliable living situation, re-engage with

SafeCare programming, consistently show up for visits, and complete anger management.

By April, CPSS Goodman received word that Mother’s living situation had again changed

and that she had been spending a significant amount of time with Father despite the

Department’s repeated concerns about their violent relationship.

¶12    After Mother became pregnant with another child, she reported that her physician

had ordered bed rest and activity restrictions. The Department’s third-party visitation

coordinator sought doctor confirmation of Mother’s medical restrictions so they could

accommodate those restrictions and adapt visitation plans, which Mother never provided.

¶13    The Department petitioned for termination of parental rights as to both children on

June 28, 2022. The petition listed 17 different “reasonable efforts” undertaken by the

Department to avoid placement and reunify the parents and children. The petition listed

the conditions in both parents’ treatment plans, noting Mother had not complied with at

least four of eight tasks and Father had not complied with at least five of eleven tasks

required under their respective plans. The District Court conducted the termination hearing

over the course of five days, after which it granted the Department’s petitions.3

3
 The proceedings below took place under separate cause numbers. Upon Mother’s motion, the
cases were consolidated on appeal.
                                            5
¶14    On appeal of a district court’s parental termination order, the court’s factual findings

are reviewed for clear error and its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo for correctness.

In re M.J., 2013 MT 60, ¶ 16, 369 Mont. 247, 296 P.3d 1197 (citation omitted). The district

court’s “ultimate decision regarding adjudication and disposition” in a parental termination

action is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In re M.J., ¶ 16.

¶15    We reframe the parties’ issues on appeal and address: (1) whether the Department

provided reasonable efforts to reunify the parties and the children;4 (2) whether the District

Court erred in determining the conduct or condition rendering Mother and Father unfit to

parent was unlikely to change within a reasonable time; and (3) whether Mother and Father

received ineffective assistance of counsel.

Reasonable Efforts

¶16    A party seeking to terminate parental rights has the burden to prove by clear and

convincing evidence that: (1) a child has been adjudicated as a YINC; (2) an appropriate,

court-approved treatment plan has not been complied with by the parent or has not been

4
  Mother claims on appeal that the Department failed to comply with §§ 504 and 1557 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and 29 U.S.C. § 794 when it denied Mother’s requests for pregnancy-related
accommodations. The State argues Mother waived her disability accommodation claims by failing
to raise them before the District Court. We have held that “the District Court must consider
accommodation for the parent’s disability in making findings required under Title 41, chapter 3,
MCA, during the pendency of the dependent neglect case.” In re K.L.N., 2021 MT 56, ¶ 25, 403
Mont. 342, 482 P.3d 650 (citation omitted). We further explained that “[b]ecause the statutes
governing dependent neglect cases require individualized treatment plans and reasonable efforts
to provide services that must accommodate the issues facing the parent and child, such as the
parent’s disability, meeting the requirements of the state statutes necessarily requires the
Department to have complied” with those statutes. In re K.L.N., ¶ 26. Because compliance with
the disability accommodation statutes is subsumed within the determination that the Department
engaged in reasonable efforts to reunify Mother and the children, we address Mother’s claims
under that prong of our analysis.
                                               6
successful; and (3) the conduct or condition of the parent rendering them unfit is unlikely

to change within a reasonable time. In re C.M., 2019 MT 227, ¶ 16, 397 Mont. 275, 449

P.3d 806 (citation omitted). While not a separate requirement for termination of parental

rights, the Department must nevertheless provide reasonable efforts to reunify separated

families before the court can conclude the conduct or condition of the parent is unlikely to

change. In re K.L.N., ¶ 18 (citation omitted). “Reasonable efforts require the provision of

services ‘reasonably designed to address the parent’s treatment and other needs precluding

the parent from safely parenting.’” In re K.L.N., ¶ 18 (citation omitted).

¶17    The District Court explained in its order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the

children that:

       Natural mother’s conduct and/or conditions rendering her unfit, unable or
       unwilling to give the children adequate parental care include but are not
       limited to the following: emotional illness, mental illness, mental deficiency
       of the duration or nature as to render her unlikely to care for the ongoing
       physical, mental, or emotional needs of these children within a reasonable
       time.

The District Court noted Mother’s recent history of violence against others and her

continued involvement with violent individuals. The District Court also relied on Mother’s

extensive history of missed visits with the children, which culminated in two third-party

family service providers discontinuing services to her; months of delays and missed

appointments for clinical evaluations and treatment; a pattern of conflict with Department

employees; refusal to engage in accommodations such as video visits with the children or

Department-provided bus passes; and unwavering blame of the Department for her own

noncompliance.

                                             7
¶18    The District Court made detailed findings regarding the Department’s efforts in this

case. Testimony established that Mother received significant leniency regarding her

missed visits. The Department allowed T.K.B. to stay in Mother’s care, despite significant

concerns about the unique health complications of a child born prematurely and her ability

to accommodate the child’s needs. The Department continued to engage with Mother

despite repeated conflicts, even after the Department had to transfer the case to CPSS

Goodman and dispatch multiple workers to Mother’s home because of safety concerns.

¶19    Under the parental termination criteria, “a district court must look to a parent’s past

behavior as a predictor of future behavior in determining whether the parent’s conduct or

condition is likely to change within a reasonable time.” In re C.B., 2014 MT 4, ¶ 23, 373

Mont. 204, 316 P.3d 177 (citation omitted). The obligation to engage in efforts to reunify

is not borne only by the Department. See In re C.B., ¶ 23. The District Court did not abuse

its discretion in determining Mother’s conduct or condition was unlikely to change within

a reasonable time, and this determination is supported by the Department’s extensive

efforts over multiple years to equip Mother with the tools needed to care for all her children.

¶20    Father claims the Department failed to engage in reasonable efforts to reunite him

with T.K.B. because of the Department’s purported lack of meaningful communication and

because the Department sought termination so soon after his treatment plan was approved.

The District Court rejected these claims in its termination order, stating “[t]he record is

replete with [Father’s] attitude particularly his threatening attitude toward the Department,

care providers, visitation providers and a refusal by a counselor, after the initial visit, to

                                              8
continue counseling with [Father] because of [Father].” Throughout the proceedings, the

concerns regarding Father’s anger, history of violence against Mother in the presence of

children, and other criminal activity5 persisted without remedy.

¶21    The court also found that, regardless of any communication shortcomings, Father

was aware of and understood his treatment plan by December 1, 2021. Substantial

evidence supports this finding. It is undisputed that, even though Father made progress on

some of his treatment plan tasks, months went by before he even began to engage with the

Department’s services and the treatment plan remained largely incomplete by April 2023,

when the final termination hearing was held. Further, multiple witnesses testified that

Father had not made satisfactory progress in addressing concerns with respect to his ability

to safely parent T.K.B. Regarding concerns over Father’s anger, the District Court noted

that while Father did obtain a domestic violence assessment, he had not followed the

recommendations from that evaluation. The District Court’s determination that, among

other concerns, it was Father’s lack of meaningful engagement and progress toward his

treatment goals, rather than the Department’s, that justified termination finds adequate

support in the record.

5
  At the time of termination, Father was facing a criminal charge for a sexual offense. Regarding
the pending criminal charge, testimony at the hearing was that “[Father] denied exchanging
marijuana for sex, denied sex with the alleged victim, but did report having given marijuana to the
15-year-old girl.”

                                                9
Assistance of counsel

¶22    In termination proceedings, parents have a due process right to effective assistance

of counsel. In re K.B., 2016 MT 73, ¶ 16, 383 Mont. 85, 368 P.3d 722 (citation omitted).

“Whether assistance was effective requires review of counsel’s training, experience, and

advocacy.” In re K.B., ¶ 16 (citation omitted). “Ineffective assistance of counsel requires

reversal only if the parent suffered prejudice.” In re K.B., ¶ 16 (citation omitted).

¶23    Mother claims her counsel was ineffective because of his failure to obtain a separate

anger assessment. Assuming for the sake of argument that Mother’s counsel was deficient

in some way, Mother has failed to demonstrate any prejudice. The anger assessment

performed by Michael Sullivan was neither particularly harsh nor vulnerable to

impeachment based on the corroborating facts in the record. Mother engaged in a pattern

of contemptuous relationships with the Department and its employees, conflicts with

placements, conflicts with cohabitants requiring Mother to change residences frequently,

and physical violence culminating in three misdemeanor assault convictions arising from

two separate incidents in the presence of the children. In light of this record, Mother was

not prejudiced by the lack of a separate anger assessment.

¶24    Father’s claim of ineffective assistance based on his initial attorney’s alleged failure

to adequately communicate with him is similarly unavailing. Father rebuffed any attempts

by the Department to get involved in the case initially. Upon informing Father of the DNA

confirmation of his paternity, Department employees reported anger and threats by Father.

The District Court found that Father refused to return phone calls and text messages from

                                             10
reunification services for nearly six months after he received confirmation of his paternity,

and substantial evidence from testimony at trial supports this finding. Finally, we note that

the District Court’s determination that Father’s conduct or condition rendering him unfit

to parent T.K.B. relied heavily on Father’s lack of engagement and progress with his

treatment plan well after he obtained new counsel.

¶25    We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the

Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of

applicable standards of review.

¶26    Affirmed.

                                                  /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA

We Concur:

/S/ MIKE McGRATH
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR

                                             11