Court Opinion

ID: 9600467
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:27:31.972597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:52.658667
License: Public Domain

Dolliver, J.
(dissenting) — The majority overturns the Court of Appeals and in so doing expresses as its belief (a) *912prior to the final entry of the decree any of those involved — the parties, the trial court — could change their minds and (b) no important public purpose would be served by entering a decree nunc pro tunc.
With respect to (a), since, as Hume observed, the future can never be predicted, our expectation that the future will be like the past (e.g., that the sun will rise tomorrow morning) has no basis in reason; it is purely a matter of belief. Hume also asserted, however, that such theoretical skepticism is irrelevant to the practical concerns of daily life. See Hume, "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding", in 35 Great Books of the Western World 451, 469, § 6 — Of Probability (1952). Such is the case here. The record is clear: There was full agreement the final papers — findings, conclusions, and decree — would be signed on Monday. The litigation was over; this court should not now indulge a hypertechnical reluctance but should allow the decree nunc pro tunc to be entered so as "to make the record speak the truth". In re Marriage of Pratt, 32 Wn. App. 665, 668, 649 P.2d 141 (1982).
As to (b), it would seem to me a desirable public policy to prevent the fortuitous receipt of a windfall by one who had no expectation or moral claim to the inheritance. In refusing to do this the majority destroys the legitimate expectation of those who clearly have an expectation and moral right — the children of the decedent. The majority can only bring itself to mention grudgingly the "apparent equities" of the children and the "justice" (majority, at 910-11) of the case. I do not share this aversion to the legitimate expectations and claims of the children.
The power to enter the decree nunc pro tunc exists. See In re Marriage of Pratt, supra; majority, at 909. It should be done. The majority decries a lack of important public purpose. On the contrary, this case presents to the court the very highest of public purposes: to act within established law to serve the broad purposes of the community and bring justice to the litigants.
*913I dissent.
Williams, C.J., and Dimmick, J., concur with Dolliver, J.
Reconsideration denied August 24, 1983.