Court Opinion

ID: 9626668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:20:52.284555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:31.988417
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting.
I join Justice McDevitt’s dissenting opinion. In addition, I dissent to the majority’s finding that “an ambiguity exists with regard to the underlying purpose behind the [§ 71] payments, and that the need for extrinsic evidence to make such a determination precludes the entry of summary judgment in this case.” Absolutely no facial ambiguity exists in § 9 of the parties’ agreement. Section 9 designated certain payments from Levy to Bondy as § 71 payments, referring to § 71 of the Internal Revenue Code. That code section deals *1000specifically and solely with alimony and separate maintenance payments, and as such the “§ 71 payments” in the agreement must be viewed as alimony or maintenance payments.
The majority correctly states that a contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation. However, the ambiguity must be found within the four corners of the document, unless it contains absurdities or contradictions. Sachan v. Suchan, 106 Idaho 654, 682 P.2d 607 (1984). See also Boesiger v. DeModena, 88 Idaho 337, 399 P.2d 635 (1965) (intent of parties to written agreement is to be ascertained from the language contained therein); McCollum v. Campbell-Simpson Motor Co., 82 Idaho 160, 349 P.2d 986 (1960) (a contract must be construed according to the plain language used by the parties); Wood v. Simonson, 108 Idaho 699, 701 P.2d 319 (Ct.App.1985) (when the language of a contract is clear, the meaning of that contract and the intent of the parties must be determined from the plain meaning of the contract’s own words). Most importantly, the intention of the parties to a contract is determined by what intention is expressed by the language used; the issue is not the intention existing in the minds of the parties. Tapper v. Idaho Irr. Co., 36 Idaho 78, 210 P. 591 (1922).
Here, the majority chooses to ignore the plain and clear language of the parties’ agreement which defines the payments in question as § 71 payments. Further, the majority infers the existence of an ambiguity by reference, in part, to information outside the contract. Because the terms of the agreement are not ambiguous, extrinsic evidence of any purported “underlying purpose” of the payments cannot properly be admitted. This is in contravention of the parol evidence rule, because any extrinsic evidence will necessarily contradict the plain meaning and implications of “§ 71 payments.”
For these reasons, I dissent from the majority opinion.