Court Opinion

ID: 9453574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:17:45.228083+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:43.062317
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I am convinced that we are reaching the right result in this case by affirming the order of the Federal Power Commission approving the merger of Central Illinois Electric and Gas Company into Commonwealth Edison Company. I question, however,athe majority’s holding that the petitioners lack standing in this court to challenge the order of the Commission. Simply because the petitioners’ claims of aggrievement are found, upon analysis, to be insufficient to set aside the merger does not, in my opinion, foreclose their standing to challenge the Commission’s order. The question of their standing ought not to be merged with the question of the merit or lack of merit of their claims.
*22Regardless of any specific claims of aggrievement alleged by the petitioners, I believe that as consumers of Edison they have standing to pursue their petition for review. They were allowed to intervene in the proceeding before the Commission, and they participated in the hearings to a limited extent. In allowing intervention, the Commission indicated that such allowance was not to be construed as a “recognition” that the petitioners might be “aggrieved” by any order or orders subsequently issued by the Commission.1 On the other hand, the Commission in this court makes no mention of the issue of petitioners’ standing. (Only Commonwealth Edison raises this issue.2) I recognize that these facts are not determinative of the question of standing. For the right or allowance of intervention by a party in an administrative proceeding is not necessarily tantamount to a right of that party to judicial review as one who is “aggrieved” by the agency action.3 But these circumstances are not without significance; indeed, they lend strength to the statute of petitioners as “parties aggrieved” by the Commission’s order.
The landmark case, FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 60 S.Ct. 693, 84 L.Ed. 869 (1940), initiated a trend which has most recently found expression in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), to broaden the class of parties that have standing to challenge agency action in court.4 I respectfully submit that the majority in the instant ease has veered sharply from that trend. Here, representatives of neither local governing bodies nor other affected groups attempted to obtain a review of the Commission’s approval of the merger. In these circumstances, I believe that private parties, such as these petitioners who are consumers of one of the merged companies, ought to have standing to protect the public interest as “private Attorney Generals.” Cf. Associated Industries Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707, 64 S.Ct. 74, 88 L.Ed. 414 (1943). Otherwise, agency action of significant import might improvidently be foreclosed from the judicial oversight necessary to insure that the proper statutory safeguards and procedures have been followed. Consequently, I would hold that the petitioners have standing as “parties aggrieved,” under 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b) to challenge 'the Commissioner’s order in this court.

. 16 U.S.C. § 825g(a) recognizes the Commission’s power to “admit as a party [in any proceeding before the Commission] * * * any representative of interested consumers or security holders, * *

. After the Commission’s order approving the merger was entered, the petitioners (intervenors) filed a petition for rehearing with the Commission. Under 16 U.S.C. § 825i(a),'the right to petition the Commission for a rehearing is limited to, “Any person, * * * aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission * * Thus the same statutory standard governs the right both to petition the Commission for a rehearing and to petition an appellate court to review Commission action. Although the Commission denied the petition for rehearing, it in no way intimated that the petitioners (interve-nors) failed to satisfy the test of ag-grievement necessary to seek a rehearing. Likewise, Edison did not question the petitioners’ (intervenors’) right to file the rehearing petition. The Commission’s action in this regard dilutes the effect of its disclaimer that the petitioners (in-tervenors) would not be viewed to be aggrieved merely because they were allowed to intervene. Moreover, I have difficulty reconciling Edison’s apparent silence at the time the petitioners (intervenors) sought a rehearing with its attack on their standing in this court.

. Cf. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 Habv.L. Rev. 255, 275 n. 67 (1961); Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 Habv.L.Rev. 721, 753 n. 139 (1968).

. See Jaffe, supra note 3.