Court Opinion

ID: 9568858
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:08:04.021299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:10:58.475019
License: Public Domain

Baker, X,
dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s finding that this record establishes that the prosecutor has been shown or is presumed to be guilty of racial discrimination or misconduct that required the trial court to sustain appellant’s motion for mistrial based upon the prosecutor’s peremptory strike of a black female juror.
The majority declares that, “To establish a prima facie case [requiring a race-neutral explanation for using the peremptory strike], a *52defendant must first show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to remove members of the defendant’s race from the jury pool.... Second, a defendant may rely on the fact that peremptory challenges permit ‘those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate.’ ... Third, a defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor acted to exclude members of the jury because of their race.” I concur with those legal propositions; however, I would hold that, as asserted by the prosecutor, “taking into account [of] the entire totality of the circumstances that this ... issue shouldn’t have been raised.”
In response to the argument that striking a black female juror required a race-neutral explanation, the prosecutor expressed indignation at the charge that race was a factor in his strike, and in fact noted that, “in this particular setting being a black male myself... I am offended by the whole inquiry and... I think that taking into account... the . .. totality of the circumstances that this whole issue shouldn’t have been raised.” The prosecutor is clearly explaining that as “a black male [him]self,” he did not consider the juror’s race as his reason for striking her. I cannot join in an opinion that states, as the majority does, that this prosecutor is one of those who is of a mind to discriminate against blacks or that, as the opinion infers, is guilty of “invidious discrimination.”
I would hold that under the totality of the circumstances shown by this record, the trial court did not err when it overruled appellant’s motion for a mistrial.