Court Opinion

ID: 9352945
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-10 16:00:35.766971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:06:06.566829
License: Public Domain

20-1787
     Barrie v. Garland
                                                                               BIA
                                                                       A095 473 987

                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                    SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 10th day of January, two thousand twenty-
 5   three.
 6
 7   PRESENT:
 8            RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
 9            WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
10            EUNICE C. LEE,
11                 Circuit Judges.
12   _____________________________________
13
14   AMADU M. BARRIE,
15            Petitioner,
16
17                       v.                                  20-1787
18                                                           NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21            Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
23
24
25   FOR PETITIONER:                     Justine A. Marous, Marous Law
26                                       Group, P.C., New York, NY.
27
28
 1
 2   FOR RESPONDENT:           Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
 3                             Attorney General; Paul Fiorino ,
 4                             Senior Litigation Counsel; Kevin
 5                             J. Conway, Trial Attorney, Office
 6                             of Immigration Litigation, United
 7                             States Department of Justice,
 8                             Washington, DC.

 9       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

10   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

11   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

12   is DENIED.

13       Petitioner Amadu M. Barrie, a native and citizen of

14   Sierra Leone, seeks review of a May 11, 2020, decision of the

15   BIA denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings to

16   pursue adjustment to lawful permanent resident status based

17   on a pending visa petition filed by his U.S. citizen wife.

18   In re Barrie, No. A095 473 987 (B.I.A. May 11, 2020).      We

19   assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and

20   procedural history.

21       We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for

22   abuse of discretion.   Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d

23   Cir. 2006).   “An abuse of discretion may be found in those

24   circumstances where the Board’s decision provides no rational

25   explanation, inexplicably departs from established policies,

                                   2
 1   is devoid of any reasoning, or contains only summary or

 2   conclusory statements; that is to say, where the Board has

 3   acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner.”                        Kaur v. BIA,

 4   413   F.3d      232,    233–34        (2d    Cir.   2005)     (quotation      marks

 5   omitted).

 6         A   noncitizen          seeking       to   reopen   removal     proceedings

 7   generally may file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days

 8   after the date on which the final administrative decision was

 9   rendered.        8     U.S.C.     § 1229a(c)(7)(A),         (C)(i);     8    C.F.R.

10   § 1003.2(c)(2).          It is undisputed that Barrie’s 2020 motion

11   to reopen was untimely because he filed it more than 12 years

12   after his 2007 removal order.

13         A   movant       who    demonstrates        ineffective    assistance      of

14   counsel may be entitled to equitable tolling of the deadline

15   for a motion to reopen.                 Rashid v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 127,

16   130–31    (2d    Cir.        2008).      Barrie     alleged    that    his    prior

17   attorney was ineffective, principally for failing to file

18   documents in support of his appeal to the BIA or inform him

19   of the outcome of the appeal in time to petition this Court

20   for review.        To qualify for tolling, a movant must — among

21   other things — demonstrate that he “exercised due diligence

                                                  3
 1   during the entire period” to be tolled.         Id. at 132; see also

 2   Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir. 2000).          The movant

 3   must demonstrate diligence during “both the period of time

 4   before the ineffective assistance of counsel was or should

 5   have been discovered and the period from that point until the

 6   motion to reopen is filed.”         Rashid, 533 F.3d at 132; see

 7   also Cekic v. INS, 435 F.3d 167, 170–71 (2d Cir. 2006) (movant

 8   bears burden to establish diligence).              Whether the movant

 9   acted within a reasonable time depends on the circumstances

10   of each case, “namely, whether and when the ineffective

11   assistance    was,   or   should   have    been,    discovered   by   a

12   reasonable person in the situation.”          Jian Hua Wang v. BIA,

13   508 F.3d 710, 715 (2d Cir. 2007) (quotation marks and brackets

14   omitted).

15        The BIA did not err in concluding that Barrie failed to

16   exercise the diligence necessary for equitable tolling. 1             It

17   reasonably found, based on Barrie’s affirmation, that Barrie

18   learned that his former attorney failed to timely inform him

     1 As Barrie’s untimely motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance
     does not meet the requirements for equitable tolling, , we do not reach
     the agency’s alternative finding that Barrie failed to comply with the
     procedural requirements of Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A.
     1988).
                                        4
 1   of the BIA decision ordering his removal shortly after the

 2   time to petition for review of that decision lapsed in 2007.

 3   Barrie alleged that he sought the advice of other attorneys

 4   beginning   in   2011;   but,     even    if   those   consultations

 5   established a diligent pursuit of his rights between 2011 and

 6   2020, Barrie offers no justification for his failure to act

 7   between 2007 and 2011.        We have found a lack of diligence

 8   based on substantially shorter periods of inaction.               See

 9   Rashid, 533 F.3d at 132–33 (no diligence where petitioner

10   learned of BIA’s adverse decision, made one phone call to

11   counsel, and then waited 14 months to seek new counsel); Jian

12   Hua Wang, 508 F.3d at 715–16 (upholding denial of reopening

13   where   petitioner   waited     eight    months   after   discovering

14   ineffective assistance to file motion); Cekic, 435 F.3d at

15   171–72 (no diligence where petitioners waited two years after

16   discovering ineffective assistance and submitted no evidence

17   of actions taken); Iavorski, 232 F.3d at 134–35 (no diligence

18   where petitioner waited two years).

19       Absent equitable tolling, Barrie’s motion to reopen to

20   apply to adjust status was untimely.           See Matter of Yauri,

21   25 I. & N. Dec. 103, 105 (B.I.A. 2009) (“emphasiz[ing] that

                                       5
 1   untimely motions to reopen to pursue an application for

 2   adjustment of status . . . do not fall within any of the

 3   statutory or regulatory exceptions to the time limits for

 4   motions to reopen before the Board and will ordinarily be

 5   denied”); In re Velarde-Pacheco, 23 I. & N. Dec. 253, 256

 6   (B.I.A. 2002) (listing timeliness as first requirement of

 7   motion to reopen to adjust status).             Accordingly, his motion

 8   “could only be considered upon exercise of the Agency’s sua

 9   sponte authority” to reopen despite the time limits.                Mahmood

10   v. Holder, 570 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 2009); see also 8 C.F.R.

11   § 1003.2(a) (version in effect until Jan. 14, 2021).                The BIA

12   invokes this authority only in “exceptional situations,” not

13   as   a   “general    cure   for    filing     defects   or   to   otherwise

14   circumvent the regulations, where enforcing them might result

15   in hardship.”       In re J-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 976, 984 (B.I.A.

16   1997).

17          The agency’s decision whether to exercise its sua sponte

18   reopening    authority      is    “entirely    discretionary”      and   not

19   subject to judicial review by this Court.               Ali, 448 F.3d at

20   518.     There is one exception: “where the [BIA] may have

21   declined    to   exercise    its sua sponte       authority because       it

                                           6
 1   misperceived the legal background and thought, incorrectly,

 2   that a reopening would necessarily fail, remand to the [BIA]

 3   for    reconsideration        in     view       of     the   correct      law     is

 4   appropriate.”       Mahmood, 570 F.3d at 469.                Here, the agency

 5   gave two reasons for denying sua sponte reopening: the absence

 6   of    exceptional     circumstances,            and     Barrie’s       failure    to

 7   demonstrate prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status.

 8         Barrie   argues    that       the       agency    failed    to    adequately

 9   consider evidence of hardship to his family, and it overlooked

10   or    gave    insufficient         weight       to     evidence    showing       his

11   eligibility to adjust status, some of which had been filed in

12   support of a prior motion to reopen.                   As to hardship, the BIA

13   acknowledged Barrie’s contention that equities warranted a

14   favorable exercise of discretion, and “we presume that [the

15   agency] has taken into account all of the evidence before

16   [it], unless the record compellingly suggests otherwise.”

17   Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 471 F.3d 315, 336 n.17

18   (2d Cir. 2006).       The BIA is not required to “expressly parse

19   or refute on the record each individual argument or piece of

20   evidence offered by the petitioner.”                   Wei Guang Wang v. BIA,

21   437    F.3d    270,     275     (2d       Cir.       2006) (quotation        marks

                                               7
 1   omitted).     Additionally, the BIA’s sua sponte authority is

 2   generally not a basis to relieve a petitioner of the hardship

 3   of     the   filing    limitations.          See      In    re    G-D-,   22    I.

 4   & N. Dec. 1132, 1133–34 (B.I.A. 1999) (“As a general matter,

 5   [the    BIA] invoke[s]      [its] sua sponte           authority     sparingly,

 6   treating it not as a general remedy for any hardships created

 7   by   enforcement       of   the   time       and     number      limits   in   the

 8   motions regulations, but as an extraordinary remedy reserved

 9   for truly exceptional situations.”).

10          As to his eligibility for relief, Barrie provides no

11   authority for his implicit argument that the BIA was required

12   to consider evidence submitted in support of a prior motion

13   to reopen in adjudicating a later motion.                     Even taking that

14   evidence     into     account,    the       agency    did     not   misperceive

15   Barrie’s eligibility to adjust to lawful permanent resident

16   status because there was no evidence that the visa petition

17   his wife had filed on his behalf had been approved.                            See

18   8 U.S.C.     § 1255(a)      (requiring       an    “immediately       available”

19   immigrant visa for adjustment of status); see also Drax v.

20   Reno, 338 F.3d 98, 113–14 (2d Cir. 2003).

21

                                             8
1       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

2   DENIED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and

3   stays VACATED.

4                               FOR THE COURT:
5                               Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
6                               Clerk of Court

                                  9