Court Opinion

ID: 9618225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:09:05.074237+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:54:37.441048
License: Public Domain

VAN HOOMISSEN, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that C & W is mistaken in relying on Nielsen v. St. Paul Companies, 283 Or 277, 583 P2d 545 (1978). In rejecting C & W’s contentions, the majority reads the holding in Nielsen so narrowly that it comes close to extinguishing it.
In Nielsen, the underlying complaint had alleged that St. Paul’s insured had intentionally and wrongfully entered the plaintiffs vehicle and residence in order to repossess a grandfather clock and in doing so had struck plaintiff on her arms. St. Paul contended that the complaint alleged intentional infliction of harm, which was not covered because the harm was not caused by an “occurrence.”1
The court rejected St. Paul’s argument, stating that to relieve an insurer from defense of an action,
“[i]t is not sufficient that the insured’s intentional, albeit unlawful, acts have resulted in unintended harm; the acts must have been committed for the purpose of inflicting the injury and harm before [the] policy provision excluding intentional harm applies.” Nielsen v. St. Paul Companies, supra, 283 Or at 281. (Emphasis supplied).
Looking to the complaint, the court observed:
“There are no allegations * * * from which it must be concluded that the insured * * * intentionally inflicted physical injury or emotional harm upon [the plaintiff].”
Therefore, the court concluded that St. Paul had a duty to defend.
However, the Nielsen court did note that an insurer may be relieved even where intent to injure was not alleged in the complaint, when that intent would arise by necessary implication. “There are some intentional acts the nature of which is such that it must necessarily be concluded that there was an intention to injure.” Nielsen v. St. Paul Companies, supra. Deceit, the majority here states conclusorily, is such an act. 88 Or App at 255. I fail to see how the deceit alleged here *257implies more than an intent to deceive plaintiff so that he would rely on the misrepresentations and enter the franchise agreement. The economic harm intended here is no different than the economic harm caused to plaintiff in Nielsen by the conversion of her clock.
The unspoken premise of the majority’s argument is that deceit is a tort and that tort law would hold C & W liable for any intended or unintended harm caused by the tortfeasor. However, this is not a tort case. We are interpreting a contract which states that injury “expected [or] intended from the standpoint of the insured” is outside the policy’s coverage.
There is no allegation in the underlying complaint that the alleged mental anguish and pain was caused intentionally. The tortious nature of deceit is not enough to create a necessary inference that mental anguish and pain were intended. In construing this contract, in the words of Nielsen, it is not “significant that the alleged acts of the insured were unlawful. Mere unlawfulness of the act does not raise any necessary implication that it was the actor’s intent to injure.” 283 Or at 281.
I would hold that the complaint alleges mental anguish and pain caused by an occurrence, that mental anguish and pain is bodily injury2 and that Atlantic has a duty to defend.
Richardson, Warden, and Rossman, JJ., join in this dissent.

 The policy language regarding coverage construed in Nielsen is identical to the policy language concerned in this case. See 88 Or App at 253.

 See e.g., Bloodworth v. Carroll, 455 So 2d 1197, 1205 (La App 1984); Pacific Mortg. & Ins. Group v. Wienecke, 50 Md App 128, 436 A2d 493 (1981); NPS Corp v. Insurance Co. of North America, 213 NJ Super 547, 517 A2d 1211 (1986).