Court Opinion

ID: 9788781
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:18:13.054526+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:16.680656
License: Public Domain

MANNHEIMER, Judge,
concurring.
The issue in this case is whether Alaska has criminal jurisdiction over an assault that allegedly occurred in May 2001 on a state ferry as it navigated the territorial sea of Canada-that is, as it passed through the twelve-mile-wide band of ocean that lies off the western coast of Canada.
In 2002, the Alaska legislature enacted AS 12.05.020, a statute that asserts Alaska's authority to prosecute any criminal offense "committed on ... a ferry or other watercraft owned or operated by the state, even if the ... ferry ... or watercraft is in ... water outside the state when the offense is alleged to have occurred." 1 But the offense in the present case is alleged to have occurred in May 2001, and the State does not assert that the 2002 statute applies here.
Instead, the State relies on AS 44.08.010(2), a statute passed in 1959 during our first year of statehood.2 This statute declares that the jurisdiction of the State of Alaska "extends to water offshore from the coast of [this] state ... [in] the high seas to the extent that jurisdiction is claimed by the United States of America, or to the extent recognized by the usages and customs of international law or by agreement to which the United States of America or [this] state is a party."
I agree with my colleagues that this statute does not establish Alaska's authority to enforce its criminal laws in the territorial waters of Canada. In fact, as I interpret AS 44.08.010(2), it does not even assert jurisdiction over crimes committed outside the territory of Alaska. I therefore conclude that, *681before the enactment of AS 12.05.020 in 2002, Alaska did not assert eriminal jurisdiction over offenses committed in Canada's territorial sea. (And I express no opinion concerning the effect of AS 12.05.020.)
I am writing separately because I reach this conclusion for reasons somewhat different from the ones described in Judge Stewart's lead opinion and Judge Coats's concurring opinion.
Summary of my position
Under international law, there are several rationales that a nation might properly rely on when asserting extra-territorial jurisdiction over particular people or activities-that is, when that nation seeks to enforce its civil or criminal laws within the geographic territory of another nation. For example, under admiralty law, a nation has the right to enforce its laws onboard any ship flying that nation's flag, regardless of the geographic location of the ship. But all of the rationales for a nation's assertion of extra-territorial jurisdiction depend on the nation's acknowledged interest in the specific people or activities to be regulated.
In contrast, no nation can assert territorial jurisdiction within the boundaries of another nation. That is, no nation has the right to enforce its entire body of civil and criminal law against all people and activities within a geographic area that lies within the recognized borders of another nation.
For reasons explained in more detail below, I conclude that AS 44.03.010 was intended to be an assertion of Alaska's territorial jurisdiction. The statute does not seek to regulate particular people or activities based on their relationship to this state. Rather, the statute asserts Alaska's right to enforce all of its laws within a geographic area. But under international law, no nation can assert territorial jurisdiction over a geographic area that lies within the territory of another nation. Thus, AS 44.08.010 can not properly be interpreted as an assertion of Alaska's jurisdiction over the territorial waters of Canada.
I therefore agree with my colleagues that we must uphold the superior court's decision in this case: the eriminal complaint against Jack must be dismissed because Alaska had no authority to enforce its criminal laws within Canada's territorial sea.
The traditional categorization of pelagic waters under international law
The pelagic waters of the earth have traditionally been divided into three legal categories: the "inland waters" of coastal nations, the "territorial" or "marginal" seas of coastal nations, and the "high seas"-4.e., all areas of the oceans that are not within any nation's inland waters or territorial sea. See United States v. Louisiana (the "Louisiana Boundary Case"), 394 U.S. 11, 21-23, 89 S.Ct. 773, 780-81, 22 L.Ed.2d 44 (1969).
A nation's inland waters comprise any portions of the ocean that are mostly enclosed by that nation's land-for instance, the waters of a narrow-mouthed bay, or a sound or sea passage bounded by a string of barrier islands. Inland waters are considered as much a part of the nation's territory as its land; the nation exercises complete sovereignty over inland waters, to the exclusion of all other sovereigns.3
A nation's territorial sea is the band of ocean within a certain fixed distance seaward from the low-tide line along the nation's coast (or, in some instances, the low-tide line on the seaward side of its barrier islands)4 Within this territorial sea, a nation exercises normal sovereignty with one major exception: it can not forbid passage to peaceful vessels of other nations (known as the right of "innocent passage").5
*682The width of the territorial sea was traditionally three miles,6 but it is now of varying width because many countries claim more than three miles. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNC-LOS) declares the right of coastal nations to assert jurisdiction over a territorial sea of up to twelve miles' width.7 Although neither the United States nor Canada has ratified this treaty,8 the treaty is generally regarded as an accurate expression of the law of nations,9 and both the United States and Canada now claim a twelve-mile territorial sea.10
All ocean waters outside any nation's territorial sea were traditionally considered the "high seas"-a geographic area where no nation could lawfully assert territorial sovereignty. This is not to say that nations had absolutely no power to enforce their laws on the high seas. International law recognized a nation's right to assert jurisdiction over specified people, objects, or activities on the high seas for particular purposes. For instance, under admiralty law, a nation can assert sovereignty over the ships flying that nation's flag, wherever those ships might be located on the planet.
But no nation could assert territorial jurisdiction over the high seas. That is, no nation could enact laws to regulate a geographic region of the high seas, nor could a nation enforce its body of laws within a geographic region of the high seas.
This tripartite division of the ocean is no longer as straightforward as it once was. Article 33 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea recognizes the right of nations to declare a "contiguous zone" not exceeding twenty-four miles beyond their coast (i.e., a zone that extends an additional twelve miles beyond the twelve-mile territorial sea allowed by the treaty). Within this zone, a coastal nation exercises limited sovereignty: "the control necessary to ... prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration[,] or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea [and] punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea".
(Again, although neither the United States nor Canada has ratified UNCLOS, both nations have claimed a contiguous zone of twenty-four milese-that is, a zone extending twelve miles beyond their twelve-mile territorial seag).11
*683Moreover, international law now recognizes a country's right to assert economic sovereignty over the ocean up to 200 miles from its shores. Under Articles 56-57 of UNCLOS, a coastal nation may establish an "exclusive economic zone" (an "EEZ") extending up to 200 miles into the ocean. Within this zone, the coastal nation has: "sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or nonliving, of the waters superjacent to the seabed [as well as] the sea-bed and its subsoil." 12 Within a coastal nation's EEZ, the nation is also sovereign for purposes of "the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents[,] and winds," as well as "the protection and preservation of the marine environment." 13
(Again, both the United States and Canada claim 200 mile exclusive economic zones.14)
The creation of exclusive economic zones in the ocean has required a modified definition of "high seas." Currently, under Article 86 of UNCLOS, the term "high seas" means those areas of the ocean that are outside any nation's inland waters, territorial sea, or exclusive economic zone. But the designation "high seas" continues to mean the same thing-a geographic area beyond any nation's territorial jurisdiction. Article 89 of UNCLOS declares, "No State may validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty."
The maritime boundary between the United States and Canada in the North Pacific
As described above, both the United States and Canada claim a twelve-mile territorial sea, an additional twelve-mile contiguous zone, and a 200 mile exclusive economic zone. A question naturally arises with regard to regions such as Puget Sound and Dixon Entrance, where the coasts of the two nations are adjacent and face each other. This question is answered by Articles 15 and 74 of UNCLOS. Article 15 declares:
Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured. The above provision does not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special cireumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance therewith.
Similarly, under Article 74 of UNCLOS, when adjacent nations share a sea border, they are to equitably define their respective exclusive economic zones. ‘
To put geographic reality to the rules enunciated in Articles 15 and 74 of UNC-LOS, the United States and Canada have established an International Boundary Commission to define the exact lines in the ocean that divide our two countries. The descriptions of these lines-given in terms of reference points that are defined to the hundredth of a second of latitude and longitude-are available at the International Boundary Commission's web site: www.internationalboun-darycommission.org/ibeprod.htm# coord (last visited March 24, 2008).
A chart and a data table describing the boundaries of the Alaska region of the United States' exclusive economic zone are available at the web site of the Office of Coast Survey (an agency of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration): http://chartmaker.ned.noaa.gov/esdl/eez.htm (last revised December 9, 2002).
According to this Coast Survey data table, the border of the United States' EEZ heads west through the middle of Dixon Entrance (approximately Latitude 54° 30' North), and *684then it proceeds mostly due west across the Gulf of Alaska. At Longitude 188° 46' West (over 300 miles west of Queen Charlotte Island), it reaches its southernmost point: Latitude 58° 28" North. From there, it angles northward as it continues west, reaching a latitude of 56° 34" North before angling south again as it approaches the Kenai Peninsula and Kodiak Island.
What does AS 44.08.010 mean?
AS 44.03.010 declares that "the jurisdiction of the [State of Alaska] extends to water offshore from the coast of [this] state" as described in the three subsections of the statute:
Subsection (1) of the statute asserts Alaska's jurisdiction over "the marginal sea to its outermost limits[,] as those limits are from time to time defined or recognized by the United States of America by international treaty or otherwise." As explained above, the United States now claims a "marginal sea"-that is, a territorial sea-of twelve miles' width.
Subsection (2) of the statute asserts Alaska's jurisdiction over "the high seas to the extent that jurisdiction is claimed by the United States of America, or to the extent recognized by the usages and customs of international law or by agreement to which the United States of America or [this] state is a party."
Finally, subsection (8) of the statute asserts Alaska's jurisdiction over "(alll submerged land[,] including the subsurface of submerged land, lying under the water mentioned in [subsections (1) and (2) ]".
AS 44.03.010 obviously raises several issues of international law, as well as issues of federal supremacy and pre-emption. But in the present case, the pertinent question is whether this statute asserts Alaska's authority to enforce its criminal laws within the territorial sea of Canada. The State argues that subsection (2) of the statute-the subsection dealing with the high seas-constitutes just such an assertion of jurisdiction.
There is Alaska case law to support the proposition that a state can enforce its erimi-nal jurisdiction outside its territorial waters if the state can show a significant state interest, and if the state's exercise of this jurisdiction does not conflict with federal jurisdiction. See State v. Bundrant15 and Corbin v. State,16 which both involved Alaska's right to enforce its laws within ocean areas lying outside the United States' territorial sea.
But aside from potential conflicts with federal sovereignty, a state's assertion of jurisdiction outside its territorial waters must not conflict with international law and the sovereign rights of another nation. Neither Bun-drant nor Corbin addressed this issue, because neither case involved an attempt to enforce Alaska law in a geographic area lying within the territorial sea of another nation. But that is the issue in this case: whether Alaska can exercise jurisdiction over crimes alleged to have occurred in Canadian territorial waters.
There are two potential legal theories that might justify Alaska's assertion of jurisdiction over such crimes. The first is an admiralty theory: the State of Alaska owns and operates the ferry on which the crime allegedly occurred, so the State could assert the right to enforce its laws on the ferry regardless of where the ferry might be located. The second is a citizenship or residency theory: the State could assert jurisdiction because the victim of the alleged crime is an Alaska resident.
'other nations do. The admiralty theory of jurisdiction might be questioned because Alaska does not "flag" ships the way that the United States and Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has stated that "state regulation [in the area of admiralty] is permissible, absent a clear conflict with the federal law." 17 Thus, as the Ninth Cireuit has recognized, "[the] states may supplement federal admiralty law as applied to matters of local concern, so long as state law does not *685actually conflict with federal law or interfere with the uniform working of the maritime legal system." 18
Given this construction of federal admiralty law, one could argue that the State of Alaska is empowered to assert criminal jurisdiction over people and activities onboard ships that bear a special relation to Alaska-such as the ships described in our new statute, AS 12.05.020 (.e, ferries and other watercraft owned and operated by the State of Alaska).
The second potential theory of jurisdiction-Jjurisdiction based on the residency of the crime viectim-also finds support in the law. See State v. Stepansky, 761 So.2d 1027 (Fla.2000), a case in which the Florida Supreme Court upheld that state's authority to prosecute a burglary and attempted sexual assault committed aboard a Liberian-flagged cruise ship that was located approximately 100 nautical miles from the Florida coast. The prosecution was found to be proper under Florida Statute § 910.006, which asserts that state's "special maritime eriminal jurisdiction" over any crime committed on board a ship when (among other things) the suspect is a citizen or resident of Florida, the victim is a resident of Florida, or the crime occurred during a voyage on which over half of the paid passengers on board the ship originally embarked and plan to finally disembark in Florida.
Thus, there are at least two recognized theories of law that might justify the legislature's recent enactment of AS 12.05.020, the statute that asserts Alaska's jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed onboard state ferries. But the question in this case is whether our pre-existing statute, AS 44.03.010, likewise asserts Alaska's jurisdiction over crimes committed onboard oceangoing vessels in the waters of other countries.
The language of AS 44.08.010, as well as the language of the other statutes that comprise AS 44.08, all indicate that AS 44.08.010 was not intended to be an assertion of special jurisdiction-i. e., not intended to be an assertion of jurisdiction based on a vessel's particular relationship to the State of Alaska, or based on the effect that a particular eriminal act might have on the residents of this state. Rather, AS 44.08.010 was intended to be a straightforward assertion of territorial jurisdiction-i.e., an assertion of the State's jurisdiction to enforce its entire body of law within particular geographic areas.
The first subsection of AS 44.08.010 is clearly an assertion of territorial jurisdiction. Subsection (1) declares that the State of Alaska asserts jurisdiction over the "marginal sea"-i.e., the territorial sea-lying off the coast of Alaska. As explained above, both international law and federal law define the territorial sea as a geographic area. It is the band of ocean extending twelve miles from Alaska's coast, but expressly excluding the territorial sea of Canada.
(There is apparently some dispute as to whether AS 44.08.010(1) asserts jurisdiction over the territorial sea as it currently is defined (i.e., twelve miles wide) or as it was defined when the statute was enacted (ie., three miles wide). There is a group of cases currently pending before this Court-State v. Dupier et al., File Nos. A-8270, 8272, and 8273-in which the State's brief asserts that Alaska's jurisdiction over the territorial sea extends only three miles from our coast. I leave this issue for another day.)
The second subsection of AS 44.03.010 is admittedly more ambiguous. Subsection (2) asserts Alaska's jurisdiction over "the high seas to the extent that jurisdiction is claimed by the United States of America, or to the extent recognized by the usages and customs of international law or by agreement to which the United States of America or [this] state is a party."
The State would have us interpret this language as an assertion of special (as op*686posed to territorial) jurisdiction. In the State's view, the Alaska Legislature enacted this subsection for the purpose of asserting the State of Alaska's jurisdiction over any person or occurrence on the high seas if the United States could claim jurisdiction over that person or occurrence under any provision of federal law, or under "the usages and customs of international law."
But this interpretation of Subsection (2) makes no sense in light of Subsection (8). Subsection (8) of the statute asserts Alaska's jurisdiction over "[all] submerged land[,] including the subsurface of submerged land, lying under the water mentioned in [Subsections (1) and (2) J". This claim of sovereignty over submerged land and its subsoil only makes sense if Subsection (2), like Subsection (1), was intended to refer to a particular geographic area of the world. It seems wildly unlikely that the Alaska Legislature meant to assert Alaska's sovereignty over whatever submerged land happens to lie beneath an ocean-going vessel that carries Alaskan passengers or that operates out of an Alaska port. Moreover, such a claim would be completely contrary to international law.
The State's suggested interpretation of AS 44.03.010(2) is further undercut by the language of its sibling provision, AS 44.03.020. In this statute, the State of Alaska claims not only jurisdiction but ownership "of the water and submerged land deseribed in AS 44.08.010" (unless some other person or entity has a superseding deed). Again, if this statute was intended to assert ownership over whatever submerged land happens to lie beneath an ocean-going vessel that carries Alaskan passengers or that operates out of an Alaska port, such a claim would be inconsistent with admiralty law and inconsistent with other doctrines of special jurisdiction (such as jurisdiction based on citizenship or residency). The statute's claim of ownership makes sense only if AS 44.03.010 was intended to be an assertion of territorial jurisdiction over a geographic area.
This conclusion is additionally bolstered by the language of another sibling provision, AS 44.03.030(1). This statute declares that the jurisdiction claimed in AS 44.03.0110 is not intended to "limit or restrict ... the jurisdiction of [Alaska] over a person or subject inside or outside [this] state that is exercisable by reason of citizenship, residence, or other reason recognized by law." But if the jurisdiction claimed in AS 44.08.0110 is not intended to restrict or limit the jurisdiction that Alaska might claim because of citizenship, residence, or admiralty, it necessarily follows that AS 44.03.010 does not itself constitute a claim of jurisdiction based on citizenship, residence, or admiralty. Rather, it is a claim of territorial jurisdiction.
Thus, AS 44.08.0102) is an assertion of territorial jurisdiction, not an assertion of admiralty jurisdiction or other special jurisdiction. In effect, AS 44.08.010(2) constitutes the State of Alaska's effort to "piggyback" and obtain the benefit of any federal assertion of territorial jurisdiction over a geographic region of the high seas (as that term was understood in 1959).19
*687But it is clear that the United States does not assert territorial jurisdiction over Canada's territorial sea. Thus, AS 44.08.0102) does not assert the State of Alaska's jurisdiction to prosecute a sexual assault committed in Canadian territorial waters, even if the sexual assault is committed against an Alaska resident on a state-operated ferry.
Conclusion
As I indicated before, I intend to express no opinion concerning the legality and effect of AS 12.05.020, the new statute that expressly asserts Alaska's jurisdiction to prosecute all crimes committed on state-operated ferries, regardless of their geographic location. However, I do conclude that AS 44.03.010 does not constitute an assertion of jurisdiction over such crimes.
Because the State of Alaska relies solely on AS 44.08.010(2) as the jurisdictional basis for its prosecution of Jack in the present case, I agree with my colleagues that the State of Alaska has failed to show jurisdiction over this alleged crime, and the superior court properly dismissed this prosecution.

. See SLA 2002, ch. 87, § 1.

. See SLA 1959, ch. 89, § 1.

. United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. at 22, 89 S.Ct. at 780.

. Compare United States v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 93, 112-13, 105 S.Ct. 1074, 1085, 84 L.Ed.2d 73 (1985) (holding that Mississippi Sound, which is bounded by a string of islands, constitutes the inland waters of Mississippi and Louisiana) with United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 161-167, 85 S.Ct. 1401, 1414-1417, 14 L.Ed.2d 296 (1965) (holding that California's inland waters do not extend all the way to Santa Catalina Island).

. United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. at 22-23, 89 S.Ct. at 780-781; United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, 197, 95 S.Ct. 2240, 2250, 45 L.Ed.2d 109 (1975). See also American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. M/V Cape Fear, 967 F.2d 864, 874, *6821992 A.M.C. 2492 (3rd Cir.1992). The right of innocent passage is codified in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), Articles 17-26.

. See United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. at 41, 89 S.Ct. at 791.

. UNCLOS, Article 3. The full text of this treaty is available at the United Nations web site (last visited March 18, 2003):
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agree-ments/ convention_overview_convention.htm

. A listing of all the nations that signed the treaty, and whether their governments have formally ratified the treaty, is available at the United Nations web site (last visited March 18, 2003):
hitp://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/sta-tus2003.pdf

. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law (2nd ed.1994), § 2-2, Vol. 1, p. 23, quoting United States: Proclamation on an Exclusive Economic Zone, 22 I.L.M. 461 (1983).

. The United States extended its territorial sea from 3 miles to 12 miles in 1988. See Presidential Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed. Register 777 (1988) (discussed in In re Air Crash Off Long Island, New York, on July 17, 1996, 209 F.3d 200, 212-13 (2nd Cir.2000). Although the United States has not ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 1988 presidential proclamation incorporates the provisions of UNCLOS pertaining to other nations' right of innocent passage through territorial waters and through international straits. The proclamation states that these matters are to be "determined in accordance with international law, as reflected in the applicable provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea."
Canada extended its territorial sea from 3 miles to 12 miles in 1996. See Oceans Act, S.C., part 1, ch. 31, § 4 (1996) (Can.) (cited in In re Air Crash Disaster Near Peggy's Cove, Nova Scotia on September 2, 1998, 210 F.Supp.2d 570, 572 (E.D.Pa.2002)).

. United States: Presidential Proclamation of September 2, 1999 (No. 7219), 64 Fed.Reg. 48701 (1999).
Canada: See the web site of the Canadian Oceans Directorate (last visited March 18, 2003: http://www.pac.dfo-mpo.ge.ca/oceans/OceansAct/ OAPart1 .htm

. UNCLOS, Article 56.

. Id.

. United States: Presidential Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Register 10605 (1983).
Canada: See the web site of the Canadian Oceans Directorate (last visited March 18, 2003): http://www.pac.dfo-mpo.ge.ca/oceans/OceansAct/ OAPart1 htm

. 546 P.2d 530 (Alaska 1976).

. 672 P.2d 156 (Alaska App.1983).

. Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 341, 93 S.Ct. 1590, 1600, 36 L.Ed.2d 280 (1973).

. Pacific Merchant Shipping Ass'n v. Aubry, 918 F.2d 1409, 1422 (9th Cir.1990). See, eg., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 160, 172-73, 98 S.Ct 988, 995, 1001-02, 55 L.Ed.2d 179 (1978) (upholding Washington state laws that required larger ocean-going vessels to take on a state-licensed pilot when entering Puget Sound and to be escorted by a tug boat while in the Sound). See also Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law (2nd ed.1994), § 2-5, Vol. 1, pp. 26-27.

. In 1959, when AS 44.03 was enacted, the "high seas" began at the seaward edge of the territorial sea. One might argue that, because the United States now claims a contiguous zone of twenty-four miles (i.e., a zone that extends for several miles into the "high seas" as that term was understood in 1959), the State of Alaska-pursuant to AS 44.03.010(2)-also asserts jurisdiction over this contiguous zone. (This is only arguable, because the presidential proclamation that established the contiguous zone expressly declares that "[njothing in this proclamation ... amends existing Federal or State law.")
But for purposes of resolving the present case, even if the United States' claim of a twenty-four mile contiguous zone were interpreted as working an extension of Alaska's jurisdiction under AS 44.03.010(2), it would not extend Alaska's jurisdiction into Canadian territorial waters-because the presidential proclamation that established the contiguous zone expressly states that, although "the contiguous zone of the United States extends to 24 nautical miles from the [coastal] baselines of the United States," the United States disavows any claim that its contiguous zone extends "within the territorial sea of another nation."
Similarly, although the United States now claims a 200 mile exclusive economic zone in the Pacific Ocean, that zone does not include the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of other nations. In particular, it does not include the territorial sea and exclusive economic zone of Canada. Moreover, within this zone, the United States claims only the economic sovereignty described in Articles 56-57 of UNCLOS-not comprehensive civil and criminal sovereignty. Thus, even if the State of Alaska's sovereignty *687over the high seas was conceivably extended when the United States government proclaimed this country's exclusive economic zone, this limited sovereignty would not include the authority to enforce Alaska's criminal laws in the territorial waters of Canada.