Court Opinion

ID: 9612084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:04:38.940218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:19.463371
License: Public Domain

Hunstein, Justice,
dissenting.
After Brown was arrested, he gave a statement to the police admitting he shot Jeffery Clarkson but claiming he did so to prevent Clarkson from sexually molesting Brown’s daughter, who was Clark-son’s stepchild. Under OCGA § 24-3-38, “[w]hen an admission is given in evidence by one party, it shall be the right of the other party to have the whole admission and all the conversation connected therewith admitted into evidence.” See also OCGA § 24-2-4 C‘[w]here either party introduces part of a document or record, the opposite party may read so much of the balance as is relevant”).
“The rule of evidence is, that when an admission, conversation or declaration previously made by a party or a witness is pertinent, the side tendering evidence as to the same is at liberty to prove such portion only thereof as is deemed material, and the other side may then bring out the whole of the admission, conversation or declaration, so far as so doing may be essential in order to arrive at the true drift, intent and meaning of what was said on the previous occasion. [Cit.]”
Smalls v. State, 105 Ga. 669, 671 (31 SE 571) (1898). See West v. State, 200 Ga. 566 (1) (37 SE2d 799) (1946).
The majority holds that the trial court did not err by editing out of Brown’s statement to the police everything Brown said regarding why he killed the victim because this motive evidence was “irrelevant and inadmissible.” I disagree. It has been long recognized that “[o]n the trial of one charged with murder, evidence of the defendant’s motive for the homicide is always relevant.” Boone v. State, 145 Ga. 37, 39 (1) (88 SE 558) (1916). “Evidence tending to show motive is always relevant and admissible. [Cits.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Wall v. State, 153 Ga. 309 (1) (112 SE 142) (1922). See also Hunter v. State, 188 Ga. 215, 218 (2) (3 SE2d 729) (1939). Hence, as long as it is estab*606lished that the facts on which the motive is assigned was within the knowledge of the defendant, see Sasser v. State, 129 Ga. 541, 547 (4) (59 SE 255) (1907), this Court has allowed evidence of motive as admissible and relevant to explain the reason why a defendant killed the victim. Great latitude has been granted in the admission of motive evidence even where it is highly prejudicial, such as where the evidence showed the defendant was involved in a satanic cult, see Earnest v. State, 262 Ga. 494 (1) (422 SE2d 188) (1992) or the leader of a KKK-type organization. Mize v. State, 269 Ga. 646 (3) (501 SE2d 219) (1998).
The cases which have stressed the relevancy and admissibility of motive evidence typically involve evidence adduced by the State. However, in light of our recent rulings requiring parity between the prosecution and the defense, I would hold that evidence sought to be introduced on the basis that it may explain why the accused killed the victim must be deemed equally relevant and admissible whether adduced by the State or the defendant in order to maintain a level playing field and thus avoid creating “an imbalance of forces between the accused and his accuser.” Owens v. State, 270 Ga. 199, 201-202 (509 SE2d 905) (1998); Rower v. State, 264 Ga. 323 (5) (443 SE2d 839) (1994).
Stoudemire v. State, 261 Ga. 49 (3) (401 SE2d 482) (1991), cited by the majority in support of its holding that the motive evidence Brown sought to admit was irrelevant and inadmissible, is distinguishable because it was a case in which the State failed utterly to connect the alleged motive evidence to the crime committed by the accused. Compare also Sasser v. State, supra, 129 Ga. at 547 (4) and Horton v. State, 110 Ga. 739 (1) (35 SE 659) (1900) (motive evidence inadmissible where no connection between the killing and the accused’s prior difficulty with the victim can be shown). Contrary to the majority’s position, Brown’s motive evidence cannot be deemed irrelevant and inadmissible on the basis that it did not justify the killing of the victim. The fact that the accused in Earnest was a member of a satanic cult did not justify his killing of the victim there, yet the motive evidence was nevertheless deemed relevant and admissible by this Court. Just as motive evidence adduced by the State is not rendered inadmissible by the fact that it incidentally puts the defendant’s character in issue, id., 262 Ga. at 495 (1), motive evidence adduced by the defendant should not be affected by its failure to constitute a legal justification for the crime. This is particularly true where both the charge to the jury and the prosecution’s statement and argument to the jury can impress upon that body the limited significance of the accused’s motive evidence.
The object of all legal investigation is the discovery of truth. OCGA § 24-1-2. The jury in this case determined Brown’s guilt *607totally oblivious to the reasons why Brown killed Clarkson. That those reasons did not legally vindicate the killing does not justify leaving the jury blindfolded and ignorant. The erroneous omission of this evidence calls into question the fundamental fairness of Brown’s trial, particularly in regard to the editing of Brown’s statement to the police, a redaction which deprived the jury of the context essential for the jury to determine the “true drift, intent and meaning of what was said,” Smalls v. State, supra, 105 Ga. at 671 (1), and which violated the statutory mandate of OCGA § 24-3-38 that a party to an admission may have the whole admission admitted into evidence. Accordingly, because I would hold the trial court committed reversible error by editing this relevant and admissible evidence from Brown’s admission, I must respectfully dissent to the majority’s holding.
Decided February 8, 1999 —
Reconsideration denied March 5,1999.
Fox, Chandler, Homans, Hicks & McKinnon, Robert L. Chandler, Cheryl H. Kelley, for appellant.
Darrell E. Wilson, District Attorney, Lynn M. Akeley-Alderman, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Daniel G. Ashburn, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.