Court Opinion

ID: 6408155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-06-25 11:50:34.249669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:51:16.881987
License: Public Domain

Shaw, C. J.
This is a suit in equity by the surviving partner of the firm of Burleigh & Dyer, established by articles of copartnership, under seal, for the purpose of carrying on the business of distillers. The principal question is one which has arisen in several other cases, and is this ; .whether real estate, purchased by copartners, from partnership funds, to be held, used and occupied for partnership purposes, is to be deemed in all respects real estate, in this Commonwealth, to vest in the partners severally as tenants in common, so that on the decease of either, his share will descend to his heirs, be chargeable with his wife’s dower, and in all respects held and treated as real estate, held by the deceased partner as a tenant in com*575mon ; or, whether it shall be regarded as quasi personal property, so as to be held and appropriated as personal property, first to the liquidation and discharge of the partnership debts, and to the adjustment of the partnership account, and payment of the amount due, if any, to the surviving partner, before it shall go to the widow and heirs of the deceased partner. This is a new question here, and comes now to be decided, for the first time.
There are some principles, bearing upon the result, which seem to be well settled, and may tend to establish the grounds of equity and law, upon which the decision must be made. It is considered as established law, that partnership property must first be applied to the payment of partnership debts, and therefore that an attachment of partnership property for a partnership debt, though subsequent in time, will take precedence of a prior attachment of the same property for the debt of one of the partners. It is also considered, that however extensive the partnership may be, though the partners may hold a large amount and great variety of property, and owe many debts, the real and actual interest of each partner in the partnership stock is the net balance which will be coming to him after payment of all the partnership debts and a just settlement of the account between himself and his partner or partners. 1 Ves. sen. 242.
The time of the dissolution of a partnership fixes the time at which the account is to be taken, in order to ascertain the relative rights of the partners, and their respective shares in the joint fund. The debts may be numerous, and the funds widely dispersed and difficult of collection ; and therefore much time may elapse, before the affairs can be wound up, the debts paid, and the surplus put in a condition to be divided. But whatever time may elapse before the final settlement can be practically made, that settlement, when made, must relate back to the time when the partnership was dissolved, to determine the relative interests of the partners in the fund.
When, therefore, one of the partners dies, which is defacto a dissolution of the partnership, it seems to be the dictate of natural equity, that the separate creditors of the deceased part *576ner, the widow, heirs, legatees, and all others claiming a derivative title to the property of the deceased, and standing on his rights, should take exactly the same measure of justice, as such partner himself would have taken, had the partnership been dissolved in his life-time; and such interest would .be the net balance of the account, as above stated.
Such indeed is the result of the application of th« well known rules of law, when the partnership stock and property consist of personal estate only. And as partnerships were formed mainly for the promotion of mercantile transactions, the stock commonly consisted of cash, merchandize, securities, and other personal property ; and therefore the rules of law, governing that relation, would naturally be framed with more especial reference to that species of property. It is therefore held, that on the decease of one of the partners, as the surviving partner stands chargeable with the whole of the partnership debts, the interest of the partners in the chattels and choses in action shall be deemed so far a joint tenancy, as to enable the surviving partner to take the property by survivorship, for all purpose? of holding and administering the estate, until the effects are re duced to money, and the debts are paid ; though, for the purpose of encouraging trade, it is held that the harsh doctrine of the jus accrescendi, which is an incident of joint tenancy, at the common law, as well in real as in personal estate, shall not apply to such partnership property ; but, on the contrary, when the debts are all paid, the effects of the partnership reduced to money, and the purposes of the partnership accomplished, the surviving partner shall be held to account with the representatives of the deceased for his just share of the partnership funds.
Then the question is, whether there is any thing so peculiar lu the nature and characteristics of real estate, as to prevent these broad principles of equity from applying to it. So long as real estate is governed by the strict rules of the common law, there would be, certainly, great difficulty in shaping the tenure of the legal estate in such form as to accomplish these objects. Should the partners take their conveyance in such mode as to create a joint tenancy, as they still may, though contrary to the *577policy of our law, still it would not accomplish the purposes of the parties; first, because either joint tenant might, at his option, break the joint tenancy and defeat the right of survivor-ship, by an alienation of his estate, or (what would be still more objectionable) the right of survivorship at the common law would give the whole estate to the survivor, without liability to account, and thus wholly defeat the claims of the separate creditors, and of the widow and heirs of the deceased partner.
But we are of opinion, that the object may be accomplished in equity, so as to secure all parties in their just rights, by considering the legal estate as held in trust for the purposes of the partnership ; and since this court has been fully empowered to take cognizance of all implied as well as express trusts, and carry them into effect, there is no difficulty, but on the contrary-great fitness, in adopting the rules of equity on the subject, which have been adopted for the like purpose, in England and in some of our sister States. And it appears to us, that considering the nature of a partnership, and the mutual confidence in each other, which that relation implies, it is not putting a forced construction upon their act and intent, to hold that when property is purchased in the name of the partners, out of partnership funds and for partnership use, though by force of the common law they take the legal estate as tenants in common, yet that each is under a conscientious obligation to hold that legal estate, until the purposes for which it was so purchased are accomplished, and to appropriate it to those purposes, by first applying it to the payment of the partnership debts, for which both his partner and he himself are liable, and until he has come to a just account with his partner. Each has an equitable interest in that portion of the legal estate held by the other, until the debts, obligatory on both, are paid, and his own share of the outlay for partnership stock is restored to him. This mutual equity of the parties is greatly stengthened by the consideration, that the partners may have contributed to the capital stock in unequal proportions, or indeed that one may have advanced the whole. Take the case of a capitalist, who is willing to put in money, but wishes to take no active concern in the conduct of *578business, and a man who has skill, capacity, integrity and industry to make him a most useful active partner, but without property, and they form a partnership. Suppose real estate, necessary to the carrying on of the business of the partnership, should be purchased out of the capital stock, and on partnership account, and a deed taken to them as partners, without any special provisions. Credit is obtained for the firm, as well on the real estate as the other property of the firm. What are the true equitable rights of the partners, as resulting from their presumed intentions, in such real estate ? Is not the share of each to stand pledged to the other, and has not each an equitable lien on the estate, requiring that it shall be held and appropriated, first to pay the joint debts, then to repay the partner who advanced the capital, before it shall be applied to the separate use of either of the partners ? The creditors have an interest, indirectly, in the same appropriation ; not because they have any lien, legal or equitable, (2 Story on Eq. § 1253,) upon the property itself; but on the equitable principle, which determines that the real estate, so held, shall be deemed to constitute part of the fund from which their debts are to be paid, before it can be legally or honestly diverted to the private use of the partners. Suppose this trust is not implied, what would be the condition of the parties, in the case supposed, in the various contingencies which might happen ? Suppose the elder and wealthy partner were to die : The legal estate descends to his heirs, clothed with no trust in favor of the surviving partner : The latter, without property of his own, and relying on the joint fund, which, if made liable, is sufficient for the purpose, is left to pay the whole of the debt, whilst a portion, and perhaps a large portion, of the fund bound for its payment, is withdrawn. Or suppose the younger .partner were to die, and his share of the legal estate should go to his creditors, wife or children, and be withdrawn from the partnership fund ; it would work manifest injustice to him who had furnished the fund from which it was purchased. But treating it as a trust, the rights of all parties will be preserved ; the legal estate will go to those entitled to it, sn aject only to a trust and equitable lien to the surviving part *579ner, by which so much of it shall stand charged as may be necessary to accomplish the purposes for which they purchased it. To this extent, and no further, will it be bound ; and subject to this, all those will take, who are entitled to the property ; namely, the creditors, widow, heirs, and all others standing on the rights of the deceased partner.
It may happen that real estate may be so purchased by partners, and out of partnership funds, in such manner as to preclude such implied trust, and indicate that the parties intended to purchase property to be held by them separately for their separate use; as where there is such an express agreement at the time of the purchase, or a provision in the articles of copartnership, or where the price of such purchase should be charged to the partners respectively, in their several accounts with the firm. This would operate as a division and distribution of so much of the funds, and each would take his share divested of any implied trust. If, in the conveyance, the grantees should be described as tenants in common, it would be a circumstance bearing on the question of intent, though perhaps it might be considered a slight one ; because those words would merely make them tenants in common of the legal estate, which, by operation of law, they would be without them. But, as we have already seen, such legal estate is not at all incompatible with an implied tiust for the partnership.
The result of this part of the case seems to' us to be this ; that when, by the agreement and understanding of partners, their capital stock and partnership fund consist, in whole or in part, of real estate — inasmuch as it is a well known rule governing the relation of partnership, that neither partner can have an ultimate and beneficial interest in the capital until the debts are paid and the account settled ; that both rely upon such rule and tacitly claim the benefit of it, and expect to be bound by it ; the same rule shall extend to real estate. The same mutual confidence, which governs the relation in other respects, extends to this ; and, therefore, when real estate is purchased as part of the capital, whether by the form of the conveyance ttie legal estate vests in them as joint tenants or tenants in common, it vests in them *580and their respective heirs, clothed with a trust for the partners, in their partnership capacity, so as to secure the beneficial interest to them until the purposes of the partnership are accomplished. It follows, as a necessary consequence, that such partnership real estate cannot be conveyed away and alienated by one of the partners alone, without a breach of such trust; and that such a conveyance would not be valid against the other partner, unless made to one who had no notice, actual or constructive, of the trust. But, if a person knows that a particular real estate is the partnership property of two or more, and he attempts to acquire a title to any part of it from one alone, without the knowledge or consent of the other, there seems to be no hardship in holding that he takes such title at his peril, and on the responsibility of the person with whom he deals.
But we think the same conclusion is well supported by authorities, although there has been some diversity of opinion amongst the earlier cases.
The adjudged cases were so fully examined by the counsel in their arguments, that it is unnecessary to state them in detail. The principles, which have already been suggested as the grounds on which we decide the present case, were applied m Phillips v. Phillips, 1 Mylne & Keen, 649; Broom v. Broom, 3 Mylne & Keen, 443; Sigourney v. Munn, 7 Connect. 11; and Hoxie v. Carr, 1 Sumner, 173. In these cases, all the previous decisions on the subject were carefully considered. See also 3 Kent Com. (4th ed.) 36—39. 1 Story on Eq. §§ 674, 675. 2 ib. § 1207. Collyer on Part. 76. Cary on Part. 27, 28. Houghton v. Houghton, 11 Simons, 491.
It has been supposed that the case of Goodwin v. Richardson, 11 Mass. 469, stands opposed to the decision now made. I do not think it does. That case was decided in 1814, before equity powers existed in this Commonwealth, on the general subject of trusts. It was in terms a question as to the vesting of the real estate ; and the court were bound to decide the case for the defendant, if they found, upon the facts, that the estate in question had vested in the partners, on foreclosure, as tenants in common. Had they decided the other way, they must have decided that *581partners, taking real estate in satisfaction of a partnership debt, by foreclosing a mortgage, would hold the estate as joint tenants, with right of survivorship at law, without liability to account — a principle directly opposed to the St. of 1785, c. 62, respecting joint tenancy; because in that case and at that time the real estate must descend and vest according to the rules of law, and there was no court of equity competent to require the surviving partner to account with the representatives of the deceased party.
In that case, as it happened, both the separate estate and the partnership estate were insolvent, and therefore good justice would have been done, in deciding that the plaintiff should recover for the benefit of the partnership creditors. But the court were deciding upon a rule of law, which must apply to all cases, and they could not have decided that for the plaintiff without holding that all such estate, held by partners, should be deemed joint estate, with a right of survivorship at law, and without liability to account; a rule opposed to the plainest principles of equity, and to the spirit, if not to the letter, of the statute respecting joint tenancy. The court were dealing solely with a question of law, in determining a legal estate, and intimate that a court of equity might make joint real estate applicable, as personal, to the payment of partnership debts. We consider, therefore, that that decision is not opposed to the decision, upon equitable principles, to which we now propose to come.
On the facts of the present case, we are of opinion that the real estate in question was a part of the capital stock purchased out of the partnership funds, for the partnership use, and for the account of the firm. The partners entered into articles, as dis tillers. The business required a large building and fixtures, which they purchased and paid for in part out of the joint funds, and gave notes in the partnership name for the remainder of '.tie price, and the estate was regarded by them as partnership effects. The repairs and improvements were also charged to joint account. These are all decisive indications of joint property.
The plaintiff has received a sum in rents and profits that have accrued since his partner’s death. The defendant, Clark, as administrator of Burleigh, the deceased partner, has sold an undi*582vided half of the property as his, under a license, and with the assent of the plaintiff. The widow joined to release her dower, for a nominal sum. But we cannot perceive that the right of the widow is distinguishable from that of the creditors and heirs of the deceased partner. As far as this estate was held in trust by her deceased husband, she was not entitled to dower. For all beyond that, she will be entitled, because he held it as legal estate, unless she is barred by her release ; of which we give no opinion.
The plaintiff is entitled to a decree charging the amount oí rents and profits in his hands, and so much of the proceeds oi the sale made by the administrator, as will be sufficient to discharge the balance of the partnership account; and the rest of the proceeds will remain in the hands of Clark, the administrator of Burleigh, to be distributed according to law.