Court Opinion

ID: 9567441
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:53:53.227046+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:36.686979
License: Public Domain

Justice Whichard
dissenting.
By a pure judicial gloss on the anti-deficiency judgment stat- . ute, N.C.G.S. § 45-21.38 (1984), the majority today deprives the plaintiffs of the benefits of a bargain, fairly and properly entered, which violates no established public policy. Neither the express terms of the statute nor its underlying policy requires this result.
As a member of the Court of Appeals, I concurred in the opinion in Reavis v. Ecological Development, Inc., 53 N.C. App. 496, 281 S.E. 2d 78 (1981), which the majority today overrules. In Reavis, a unanimous panel resolved, in favor of the plaintiffs, the identical issue presented here, reasoning as follows:
A deficiency under G.S. 45-21.38 refers to an indebtedness which represents the balance of the original purchase price for the real estate not recovered through foreclosure. The attorneys’ fees and expenses ... do not represent the unrecovered “balance of purchase money for [the] real estate,” G.S. 45-21.38; the fees represent the costs of foreclosing on the property. Moreover, defendants] . . . negotiated with plaintiffs for the purchase of the land and agreed to the provisions in the promissory note providing for the payment of attorneys’ fees and expenses upon default. The defendants] [are] not being held liable for a decline in the property value representing a deficiency; rather, defendant^], as the parties] in default, [are] paying the agreed upon costs of plaintiffs in recovering the depreciated property. The defendants] agreed to this arrangement, and should not now be permitted to escape liability.
Id. at 499, 281 S.E. 2d at 80.
I continue to adhere to the result and reasoning in Reavis. I therefore respectfully dissent.