Court Opinion

ID: 9819701
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:32:01.789847+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:21.439308
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GORDON, specially concurring: I concur with the ultimate result of the majority’s decision. However, my concurrence rests solely upon the analysis of the substantive issues on their merits. I disagree with the majority, however, and fully align myself with the position of the dissent with respect to defining the scope of review obtainable under section 115—4.1(g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (hereinafter, Code) (725 ILCS 5/115—4.1(g) (West 2000)). Along with the dissent, I cannot find any basis in the language of the statute to narrow its application solely to errors invoking questions of constitutional due process or fundamental fairness. To effect such a statutory alteration would require legislative intervention and a repudiation of our previously established precedents, including our decisions in People v. Williams, 274 Ill. App. 3d 793, 655 N.E.2d 470 (1995), and People v. Stark, 121 Ill. App. 3d 787, 460 N.E.2d 47 (1984), upon which our supreme court relied in People v. Partee, 125 Ill. 2d 24, 34, 530 N.E.2d 460, 464 (1988). The majority, with impressive ingenuity, attempts to harness Par-tee to support its position when, if anything, in the clear light of day, its position is wholly inconsistent with the tenor of Partee. The majority focuses upon the statement in Partee that section 115—4.1(g) analogizes a section 115—4.1(e) motion to “an action for post-conviction relief under section 122 — 1 of the Code.” Partee, 125 Ill. 2d at 35, 530 N.E.2d at 465. The majority attempts to extrapolate that analogy far beyond the limited use for which the analogy was intended in Partee and beyond the permissible range of judicial statutory construction. The majority contends that since a collateral attack by postconviction petition is restricted to matters of constitutional dimensions, so too in comparing section 115—4.1(g) to section 122—1, Partee intended to cloak a section 115—4.1(g) procedure with the same restrictions. This contention by the majority is untenable. A post-conviction petition under section 122—1 is not confined to constitutional issues merely because it constitutes a collateral attack on a judgment, but, rather, it is confined to constitutional issues by the express statutory provisions of its enabling act. The statute that provides for postconviction petitions explicitly limits its availability to “a substantial denial of *** rights under the Constitution of the United States or the State of Illinois or both.” 725 ILCS 5/122—1(a) (West 2000). Section 115—4.1(g) contains no such limitation and the statutory language of that provision does not provide a matrix to warrant or justify imposition of such restrictions by judicial fiat. Viewed in context, the analogy drawn by Partee between section 115—4.1(g) and section 122—1 is to establish that section 115—4.1(g) should be viewed as if it were a collateral attack as under section 122—1 and therefore parallel to Rule 606 without displacing it. As pointed out, there is nothing in the nature of a collateral attack that would limit the scope of such attack to constitutional issues except where, as under section 122—1, the statute expressly articulates and provides for such limitation. To hold otherwise would constitute a usurpation of a legislative prerogative. Ironically, the majority attempts to use Partee to diminish the appellate rights of a fugitive when in fact its manifest thrust is to expand those rights by providing two distinct but parallel routes for obtaining appellate recourse, the first under Supreme Court Rule 606(a) and the second under section 115—4.1(g). As pointed out, the analogy between sections 115—4.1(g) and 122—1 is deployed in Partee to provide a theoretical basis to explain why section 115—4.1(g) should not be construed to supersede and preclude the right of a fugitive to appellate recourse through Supreme Court Rule 606 as well, but does not purport to limit the scope of review under either route. In fact, if anything, the holding and reasoning in Partee militate precisely the opposite conclusion. If, as the majority contends, Partee had considered the scope of review under section 115—4.1(g) to be limited to constitutional issues only, it could have readily pointed out that difference between a so limited section 115—4.1(g) appeal and an unrestricted Rule 606 appeal in response to the contention that the concomitant availability of both gives a fugitive two bites at the same appellate apple. Instead, Partee fields the “two bites at the same apple” contention by pointing out that a fugitive who deploys both appellate routes to file two appeals, one in absentia under Rule 606 and the other upon his return under section 115—4.1(g), would not be permitted in the second appeal to relitigate issues already subsumed in the earlier appeal under the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, waiver and law of the case. See Partee, 125 Ill. 2d at 36-37. This would in and of itself denote that appeals under both provisions would otherwise share the same breadth and scope, except that when a Rule 606 appeal is first deployed a second appeal under section 115— 4.1(g) would be bound by determinations made in the earlier appeal. Moreover, the fallacy in the majority’s interpretation of Partee is further reflected in the fact that Partee upholds the rule that although an appeal may be taken by a fugitive in absentia under Supreme Court Rule 606, the appellate court is not compelled to hear it while the appellant remains a fugitive. In that regard, Partee states “[w]e adhere to the century-old rule that an appellate court has the discretionary power to refuse to hear a fugitive’s appeal unless and until the fugitive returns to the [court’s] jurisdiction. (People v. Estep (1952), 413 Ill. 437 [,109 N.E.2d 762]; McGowan v. People (1882), 104 Ill. 100.)” Partee, 125 Ill. 2d at 37, 530 N.E.2d at 466. Under Estep and McGowan upon which Partee relies, the appellate court may refuse to hear the appeal while the appellant remains a fugitive and may dismiss such an appeal if the fugitive does not physically appear within a reasonable time. See Estep, 413 Ill. at 440-41, 109 N.E.2d at 764-65; McGowan 104 Ill. 100. If the majority in this case were correct in its reading of Partee, then instead of two bites at the appellate apple, a fugitive could be left with far less than a single bite, since as a fugitive his Rule 606 appeal could be dismissed and what would remain to the fugitive would be a limited appeal under section 115 — 4.1(g) restricted solely to constitutional issues. Thus, the support that the majority seeks to draw from the decision in Partee is illusory and inconsistent with what Partee actually sets forth. I further note that the policy concerns that apparently trigger the majority’s effort to narrowly confine the scope of the section 115—4.1(g) appeal are less than compelling. The seemingly undue largess extended to a fugitive by availing him of two avenues of appeal is temporized by the fact already noted that an appeal under Rule 606 may be rejected at the appellate court’s discretion if the appellant chooses to remain a fugitive. On the other hand, if a Rule 606 appeal is allowed to go forward, it would preclude a second appeal of those issues subsumed in his earlier appeal under the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, waiver and law of the case. See Partee, 125 Ill. 2d at 36-37, 530 N.E.2d at 465-66. Moreover, whatever advantage the fugitive may receive to facilitate his right to appeal is countervailed by the fact that he could be tried in absentia in the first instance, notwithstanding the incursion of a defendant’s otherwise inherent right to be present at his trial. This too was articulated in Partee noting the existence “of a complex series of tradeoffs [in the legislation involved here] designed to balance the defendant’s right to be present at trial, the State’s interest in the expeditious administration of justice, and our traditional distrust of trials in absentia.” Partee, 125 Ill. 2d at 40, 530 N.E.2d at 467. See Williams, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 795. Accordingly, I can find no encouragement in Partee to warrant abandonment and repudiation of our previous decisions in Williams, Stark, People v. Pontillo, 267 Ill. App. 3d 27, 640 N.E.2d 990 (1994), and People v. Manikowski, 288 Ill. App. 3d 157, 679 N.E.2d 840 (1997), which are discussed extensively in the dissent. In each of these cases, we held that the scope of review under section 115 — 4.1(g) was unfettered and coextensive with the review generally available under Supreme Court Rule 606. A look at Manikowski is of particular interest. As pointed out by the dissent, the court in Manikowski specifically contrasted the scope of review under section 115—4.1(g) with the scope of review in a postconviction proceeding under section 122—1 of the Code, stating “[p]ostconviction petitions must demonstrate a process flawed by error of constitutional magnitude. Such petitions do not subject trial error to judicial review. A section 115—4.1(e) motion, however, opens the entire underlying judgment and sentence to further scrutiny. See 725 ILCS 5/115—4.1(g) (West 1992); People v. Partee, 125 Ill. 2d 24, 530 N.E.2d 460 (1988).” Manikowski, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 161, 679 N.E.2d at 843. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, I must align myself with the dissent with regard to the procedural issue pertaining to the scope of review. However, as indicated, I concur with the majority in its ultimate affirmance based upon its analysis of the merit of the substantive issues.