Court Opinion

ID: 9379445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-15 18:03:32.878606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:03.754065
License: Public Domain

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                                                     Electronically Filed
                                                     Supreme Court
                                                     SCAP-XX-XXXXXXX
                                                     15-MAR-2023
                                                     07:52 AM
                                                     Dkt. 23 OP
           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAII

                                ---o0o---

               STATE OF HAWAII, Plaintiff-Appellant,

                                    vs.

          RAVEN S. MORTENSEN-YOUNG, Defendant-Appellee.
            (CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CASE NO. 1DTA-21-01297)

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               STATE OF HAWAII, Plaintiff-Appellant,

                                    vs.

               LANCE M. OSHIMA, Defendant-Appellee.
             (CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CASE NO. 1DTA-21-01719)

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               STATE OF HAWAII, Plaintiff-Appellant,

                                    vs.

           MARLIN TORNQUIST TUCKER, Defendant-Appellee.
            (CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CASE NO. 1DTA-21-01463)

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             STATE OF HAWAII, Plaintiff-Appellant,

                                    vs.

                 RYAN D. WOOD, Defendant-Appellee.
             (CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CASE NO. 1DTA-21-01472)

                            SCAP-XX-XXXXXXX
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      APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                             MARCH 15, 2023

     RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, AND EDDINS, JJ.,
                   AND WILSON, J., DISSENTING

                OPINION OF THE COURT BY NAKAYAMA, J.

                           I.    INTRODUCTION

          This case concerns whether Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes

(HRS) § 805-1 and this court’s holding in State v. Thompson, 150

Hawaiʻi 262, 500 P.3d 447 (2021), apply to a complaint used to

charge a defendant with Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence

of an Intoxicant (OVUII) after the defendant was properly

arrested without a warrant.

          In July, August, and October of 2021, Plaintiff-

Appellant the State of Hawaiʻi (the State) charged Defendant-

Appellee Raven S. Mortensen-Young (Mortensen-Young), Defendant-

Appellee Marlin Tornquist Tucker (Tucker), Defendant-Appellee

Ryan D. Wood (Wood), and Defendant-Appellee Lance M. Oshima

(Oshima) by complaint with OVUII in the District Court of the

First Circuit (district court).       On December 28, 2021,

Mortensen-Young, Tucker, Wood, and Oshima (collectively,

Appellees) each filed a “Motion to Dismiss for Defective

Complaint and Improper Arraignment” (Motions to Dismiss),

arguing that “the complaint . . . is not supported by:” (1) “The

complainant’s signature; or” (2) “A declaration submitted in
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lieu of affidavit,” as required by this court’s decision in

Thompson.   The State filed memoranda and supplemental memoranda

in opposition to the Motions to Dismiss.         After holding a

hearing, the district court orally granted Appellees’ Motions to

Dismiss.

            On January 12, 2022, the district court issued a

“Notice of Entry of Judgment and/or Order and Plea/Judgment”

(Notice of Entry of Judgment) granting Appellees’ Motions to

Dismiss.    The district court issued its “Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss for Defective Complaint and Improper Arraignment” (Order

Granting Motions to Dismiss) on January 19, 2022.           The district

court granted Appellees’ Motions to Dismiss without prejudice.

            The State filed a notice of appeal in the Intermediate

Court of Appeals (ICA).     On April 19, 2022, the State timely

filed an application for transfer, which this court granted on

May 6, 2022.   In its opening brief, the State contends, inter

alia, that “[t]he district court erred in concluding that the

charging instruments in these cases were required to comply with

HRS § 805-1 and thus erred in dismissing these charging

instruments on the grounds that they did not comply with that

statute.”   Appellees filed an answering brief disagreeing with

the State’s arguments, and the State filed a reply brief.

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            The State’s argument that the complaints in Appellees’

cases were not required to comply with HRS § 805-1 has merit.

First, this court’s holding in Thompson and the plain language

of HRS § 805-1 establish that HRS § 805-1 applies only to

complaints for a penal summons or an arrest warrant.              Second,

case law interpreting previous versions of HRS § 805-1 confirm

that the statute applies only to complaints for a penal summons

or an arrest warrant.       In addition, the State properly initiated

the criminal proceedings against Appellees pursuant to Hawaiʻi

Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 7.

            Accordingly, we hold that the complaints in Appellees’

cases did not have to comply with HRS § 805-1, and the State

properly initiated the criminal proceedings against Appellees.

Thus, the district court erroneously dismissed without prejudice

the complaints in Appellees’ cases.

                              II.   BACKGROUND

A.    Factual Background

            Appellees were all arrested for OVUII and Appellees

all posted bail.      Appellees were examined and released after

posting bail before 48 hours passed.1

1     It appears that this information only appears in the parties’
briefings, but Appellees do not contest that Appellees were arrested,
examined, and released after posting bail before 48 hours had passed.
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B.    District Court Proceedings2

            On July 23, 2021, the State charged Mortensen-Young by

complaint with the offense of OVUII in violation of HRS § 291E-

61(a)(1).     On August 17, 2021, the State charged Tucker by

complaint with the offense of OVUII in violation of HRS § 291E-

61(a)(1) and/or (a)(3).       On August 19, 2021, the State charged

Wood by complaint with the offense of OVUII in violation of HRS

§ 291E-61(a)(1) and/or (a)(3).         On October 11, 2021, the State

charged Oshima by complaint with the offense of OVUII in

violation of HRS § 291E-61(a)(1) and/or (a)(4).

            The complaints, which largely contained the same

language, provided:

                                      COMPLAINT
                  The undersigned Deputy Prosecuting Attorney of the
            City and County of Honolulu, State of Hawaiʻi charges:
                  On or about [date of offense], in the City and County
            of Honolulu, State of Hawaiʻi, [defendant’s name], did
            intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly operate or assume
            actual physical control of a vehicle upon a public way,
            street, road, or highway while under the influence of
            alcohol in an amount sufficient to impair his normal mental
            faculties or ability to care for himself and guard against
            casualty, thereby committing the offense of Operating a
            Vehicle Under the Influence of an Intoxicant, in violation
            of Section 291E-61(a)(1) [and/or (a)(3) or (a)(4)] of the
            Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes. [Defendant’s name], is subject to
            sentencing in accordance with [Section 291E-61(b)(1) or
            (b)(2)] of the Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes as a [first or
            second] offender. [Definition of “prior conviction” in
            Oshima’s case].
                  I [deputy prosecuting attorney], declare under
            penalty of law that the foregoing is true and correct to
            the best of my knowledge and belief.
                  Dated at Honolulu, Hawaiʻi: [Date of complaint].

2     The Honorable William M. Domingo presided.

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           Appellees filed Motions to Dismiss on December 28,

2021.   Appellees all argued that “the complaint . . . is not

supported by:” (1) “The complainant’s signature; or” (2) “A

declaration submitted in lieu of affidavit,” as required by this

court’s decision in Thompson.

           The State filed memoranda in opposition to Appellees’

Motions to Dismiss on January 3, 2022.          The State maintained

that the complaints in Appellees’ cases were “made by

declaration” as required by HRPP Rule 47(d) and HRS § 805-1.3

3    HRS § 805-1 (2014) provided:

                 Complaint; form of warrant. When a complaint is made
           to any prosecuting officer of the commission of any
           offense, the prosecuting officer shall examine the
           complainant, shall reduce the substance of the complaint to
           writing, and shall cause the complaint to be subscribed by
           the complainant under oath, which the prosecuting officer
           is hereby authorized to administer, or the complaint shall
           be made by declaration in accordance with the rules of
           court. If the original complaint results from the issuance
           of a traffic summons or a citation in lieu of an arrest
           pursuant to section 803-6, by a police officer, the oath
           may be administered by any police officer whose name has
           been submitted to the prosecuting officer and who has been
           designated by the chief of police to administer the oath,
           or the complaint may be submitted by declaration in
           accordance with the rules of court. Upon presentation of
           the written complaint to the judge in whose circuit the
           offense allegedly has been committed, the judge shall issue
           a warrant, reciting the complaint and requiring the
           sheriff, or other officer to whom it is directed, except as
           provided in section 805-3, to arrest the accused and to
           bring the accused before the judge to be dealt with
           according to law; and in the same warrant the judge may
           require the officer to summon such witnesses as are named
           in the warrant to appear and give evidence at trial. The
           warrant may be in the form established by the usage and
           practice of the issuing court.

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            On January 10 and 11, 2022, the State filed

supplemental memoranda in opposition to Appellees’ Motions to

Dismiss.4   According to the State,

                  The premise for the motion to dismiss the complaint
            pursuant to [Thompson] relies on the proposition that
            [Thompson] applies to all complaints. It does not. It
            only applies to penal summons cases. The language used by
            the Supreme Court makes it clear that the Court did not
            intend to bring about a “sea change” as to how criminal
            complaints are filed when it held in Thompson that the
            State may not request a penal summons using a complaint
            that does not comply with [HRS] § 805-1.

The State maintained that

                  [HRS] § 805-1 deals with arrest warrants. The
            Thompson court extended this section to penal summons cases
            which is reasonable given the reference in [HRS §] 805-1 to
            [HRS §] 805-3 which allows the district judge, in the
            district judge’s discretion, to issue a penal summons. It
            would be absurd to interpret [HRS §] 805-1 which is
            entitled, “Complaint; form of warrant” to a case, such as
            the instant case, in which the defendant had been arrested;
            bail was set; defendant posted bail and was released. In
            these cases, there is no need for the State to request that
            the Court issue an arrest warrant.
                  These warrantless OVUII arrests are authorized by
            [HRS] §§ 803-1; 803-5; 803-6(a) and HRPP 5(a)(2). These
            cases do not come under [HRS] § 805-1 which is captioned,
            “Complaint; form of [warrant].” In OVUII cases, the arrest
            has already occurred and the [S]tate is not requesting an
            arrest warrant (which would be absurd).

            The district court held a hearing on Appellees’

Motions to Dismiss on January 12, 2022.          Counsel for the State

and counsel for Appellees made arguments and the district court

orally granted Appellees’ Motions to Dismiss:

                  THE COURT: All right. [The State], as far as the
            Thompson case though, wasn’t it unequivocal that they
            stated that the -- the complaint was defective because it
            was not compliant with [HRS §] 805-1, is that correct? So
            how can you argue -- at this point if a complaint is

4     The State acknowledged that it did not file a supplemental memorandum
in opposition in Tucker’s case but orally submitted the supplemental argument
during the January 12, 2022 hearing without objection from Tucker’s counsel.
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          defective, then I don’t think anything can, if you want to
          use fruit of the poisonous tree kind of analogy, you can’t
          go further from that if you have a defective complaint.

                [THE STATE]: Our response to that, your honor, would
          be the complaint in Thompson, they asked the State -- they
          asked the court to issue a penal summons, asked for --
          court to -- for some sort of process and that process is
          pursuant to [HRS §] 805-1, and we’re saying the process
          that was used in these cases do not come under [HRS §] 805-
          1. They come under the other statutes that we set forth in
          our supplemental memo.

                . . . .

                THE COURT: Okay. All right. Ready to rule on these
          matters.
                Court finds that all of these cases have the same
          issue regarding the request to dismiss. Based on the
          Thompson case the court finds that all of these cases, the
          complaints are defective as they were not made pursuant to
          [HRS §] 805-1. There is no specific affidavit by the
          complainant in this matter or also a declaration by
          officer. Court also finds that the police officer is not
          someone who can make that complaint effective at this
          point, so they are defective complaints and those cases
          will be dismissed.

Also on January 12, 2022, the district court filed its Notice of

Entry of Judgment.

          On January 19, 2022, the district court issued its

Order Granting Motions to Dismiss.        The district court made the

following relevant finding of fact:

          4. Review of the Hawaii State Judiciary Information
          Management System (JIMS) reveals that no document
          containing the complainant’s signature, or declaration in
          lieu of affidavit, or any other type of Judicial
          Determination of Probable Cause was filed in this matter.

The district court made the following conclusions of law:

          1. On December 10, 2021, in State v. Thompson (SCWC-17-
          0000361), the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the failure of
          the prosecution to submit and file a complaint or
          declaration in lieu of affidavit containing the
          complainant’s signature was fatal and required dismissal of
          the action.

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            2. In Thompson, the supreme court found that the
            prosecution violated HRS § 805-1 when it failed to comply
            with its statutory obligation to perfect its complaint by
            filing a complaint that was neither signed by a complainant
            nor supported by declaration signed by the complainant.

            3. The Court further stated, “The requirements of HRS
            § 805-1 therefore apply to all criminal complaints,
            regardless of whether the State uses the complaint to seek
            a penal summons or an arrest warrant.” “Thus in order to
            comply with HRS § 805-1, the underlying complaint should
            have been subscribed under oath by the complainant or made
            by declaration in lieu of an affidavit in conformity with
            HRPP Rule 47(d).”

            4. The complaint filed in the instant case does not comport
            with the mandates of the holding in Thompson and HRS § 805-
            1.

Thus, the district court granted Appellees’ Motions to Dismiss

without prejudice.

C.    The Appeal and Application for Transfer

            On February 10, 2022, the State timely appealed the

district court’s decision to the ICA.5          On April 19, 2022, the

State timely filed an application for transfer, which this court

granted on May 6, 2022.

      1.    Opening Brief

            The State filed an opening brief on June 16, 2022,

challenging the district court’s FOF 4 and COLs 1, 2, 3, and 4.

As relevant here,6 the State contends that the district court

5     Appellees’ appeals were consolidated on April 1, 2022.

6     The State also argues “[a]ssuming arguendo that the charging
instruments in these cases were required to comply with HRS § 805-1, the
district court erred in concluding that HRS § 805-1, as interpreted by
Thompson, requires a ‘declaration in lieu of affidavit containing the
complainant’s signature.’” Because HRS § 805-1 does not apply to the
complaints in Appellees’ cases, this opinion does not address the State’s
argument that the complaints in Appellees’ cases satisfied the requirements
of HRS § 805-1.
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mistakenly concluded that the charging instruments against

Appellees “were required to comply with HRS § 805-1 and thus

erred in dismissing these charging instruments on the grounds

that they did not comply with that statute.”          Citing to

Thompson, 150 Hawaiʻi at 267, 500 P.3d at 452, the State notes

that HRS § 805-1’s requirements “apply regardless of whether the

State uses the complaint to seek a penal summons or an arrest

warrant.”    The State asserts that the charging instruments

against Appellees did not seek a penal summons or an arrest

warrant and thus the charging instruments here are

distinguishable from those in Thompson.

            The State maintains “[i]t appears that the import of

HRS § 805-1 has been substantially unchanged since 1892 when it

was enacted as Chapter LVII, An Act to Reorganize the Judiciary

Department.”    The State further maintains that “[t]he earliest

codified iteration of HRS § 805-1 appears to be Chapter 53 Part

I § 606 of The Penal Law of the Hawaiian Islands, 1897.”            Citing

to Territory v. Sing Kee, 14 Haw. 586, 587-88 (1903), the State

contends there is a difference “between a ‘charge’ which

initiates a criminal trial and a ‘complaint’ in order ‘to enable

the magistrate to determine whether or not there is probable

cause to believe that an offense has been committed by the

accused so as to justify his apprehension.’”          The State asserts

that Sing Kee makes clear a “complaint” under HRS § 805-1 is
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different from a “complaint” under HRPP Rule 7(d), which

“regulates the ‘Nature and Contents’ of a ‘Charge.’”7            The State

maintains that “[a] more accurate title for HRS § 805-1, in

modern parlance would be ‘application for a misdemeanor arrest

warrant.’”    The State contends that a misdemeanor charging

instrument, which does not ask for a penal summons or an arrest

warrant, does not need to comply with HRS § 805-1 pursuant to

Thompson.

            The State maintains that the charging instruments in

these cases need not comply with HRS § 805-1 because Appellees

were all properly arrested without a warrant pursuant to

7    HRPP Rule 7 (2012) provides in relevant part:

                  (a) Use of Indictment, Information, or Complaint.
            The charge against a defendant is an indictment, a
            superseding indictment, an information, or a complaint
            filed in court. . . .

                 . . . .

                  (d) Nature and Contents. The charge shall be a
            plain, concise and definite statement of the essential
            facts constituting the offense charged. . . . A complaint
            shall be signed by the prosecutor. . . .

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HRS §§ 803-58 and 803-6(a).9        According to the State, Appellees

were examined and released “after posting bail before 48 hours

had passed and before the requirement for a probable cause

determination was triggered.”          The State therefore contends that

“the process used in these cases is separate and distinct from

the procedure required in HRS § 805-1.”

           The State argues that the general rule for charges in

HRPP Rule 7(d), and not HRS § 805-1, applies in Appellees’

cases.   The State thus argues that the district court

erroneously dismissed the charging instruments, which complied

8    HRS § 803-5 (2014) provides:

                 By police officer without warrant. (a) A police
           officer or other officer of justice, may, without warrant,
           arrest and detain for examination any person when the
           officer has probable cause to believe that such person has
           committed any offense, whether in the officer’s presence or
           otherwise.
                 (b) For purposes of this section, a police officer
           has probable cause to make an arrest when the facts and
           circumstances within the officer’s knowledge and of which
           the officer has reasonably trustworthy information are
           sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable
           caution in the belief that a crime has been or is being
           committed.

9    HRS § 803-6(a) (2014) provides:

                 Arrest, how made. (a) At or before the time of
           making an arrest, the person shall declare that the person
           is an officer of justice, if such is the case. If the
           person has a warrant the person should show it; or if the
           person makes the arrest without warrant in any of the cases
           in which it is authorized by law, the person should give
           the party arrested clearly to understand for what cause the
           person undertakes to make the arrest, and shall require the
           party arrested to submit to be taken to the police station
           or judge. This done, the arrest is complete.

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with the requirements to initiate a prosecution in these cases

under HRPP Rule 7(d).

      2.    Answering Brief

            Appellees filed an answering brief on August 24, 2022.

As relevant here, Appellees argue that, pursuant to Thompson,

the district court correctly applied HRS § 805-1 to the

complaints against Appellees.         According to Appellees, “[t]he

issue of whether the complaint complies with the requirements of

HRS § 805-1 is distinct from whether a penal summons can be

issued on a defective complaint.”10

            Appellees maintain that the specific issue before this

court in Thompson “was whether the ICA had gravely erred in

holding that compliance with HRPP Rule 7(d) satisfied the

‘declaration in accordance with the rules of court’ requirement

of HRS § 805-1.”      Appellees argue that the State mistakenly

contends that the holding in Thompson “only requires compliance

with HRS § 805-1 in cases where the State seeks a penal summons

or arrest warrant.”       According to Appellees, this court

concluded that HRS § 805-1 requires that a complaint be

subscribed by the complainant or supported by declaration in

lieu of affidavit “to protect the accused’s right to challenge

the veracity of the complainant.”          Appellees note that this

10    In support of their argument, Appellees discuss the proceedings before
the ICA and the family court in Thompson.
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court “went on to hold that a complaint which does not meet the

requirements of HRS § 805-1 is a ‘fatally defective’ complaint.”

Appellees point out that “[b]ecause the complaint was fatally

defective, the supreme court held that it could not support the

issuance of a penal summons.”

          Appellees maintain that this court’s holding in

Thompson was not limited “to only those instances where the

State seeks a penal summons or arrest warrant.”          Citing to

Thompson, 150 Hawaiʻi at 269, 500 P.3d at 454, Appellees argue

that this court “specifically stated that, ‘HRS § 805-1

unambiguously requires the State to ensure that complaints are

either subscribed under oath by a complainant or accompanied by

a declaration in lieu of an affidavit.’”         Appellees maintain

that this court did not state HRS § 805-1 only applies to a

complaint seeking a penal summons or an arrest warrant.

Appellees contend that “a complaint which is ‘fatally defective’

is not fatally defective only because the State uses such a

complaint to seek an arrest warrant or penal summons.”            In

addition, Appellees argue that since the underlying purpose of

HRS § 805-1 is to protect the accused’s right to challenge the

veracity of the accuser, “it would be nonsensical to allow the

State to choose the situations when this significant right was

protected and when it was not.”       Appellees assert that would

lead to an absurd result and must be rejected.
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      3.    Reply Brief

            The State filed a reply brief on August 25, 2022.               The

State argues that the enactment of HRS § 805-6 in 1949 further

demonstrates “that HRS § 805-1 does not regulate all district

court charging instruments.”          According to the State, the

language of HRS § 805-6 is a recognition by the Hawaiʻi

legislature of the district court’s practices as noted in Sing

Kee and the holding of “Sing Kee that the ‘complaint’ referred

to in HRS § 805-1 is not a charging instrument.”             The State

maintains that “nothing in HRS § 805-6 or any other statute,

court rule or case holding . . . require[s] a charging

instrument that is not a ‘written complaint upon which the

warrant of arrest or summons has been issued’ to be governed in

any way by the requirements of HRS § 805-1.”11

                         III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A.    Statutory Interpretation

            “The interpretation of a statute is a question of law

which this court reviews de novo.”          Thompson, 150 Hawaiʻi at 266,

500 P.3d at 451 (citing State v. Ruggiero, 114 Hawaiʻi 227, 231,

160 P.3d 703, 707 (2007)).

11    The State also reiterates that HRPP Rule 7(d) is applicable to the
charging instruments in Appellees’ cases and notes that Appellees did not
argue the charging instruments failed to comply with HRPP Rule 7(d).
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B.    Interpretation of Court Rules

            “When interpreting rules promulgated by the court,

principles of statutory construction apply.”            Id. at 266, 500

P.3d at 451 (quoting State v. Baron, 80 Hawaiʻi 107, 113, 905

P.2d 613, 619 (1995)).

C.    Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

                  [A] trial court’s findings of fact are subject to the
            clearly erroneous standard of review. A finding of fact is
            clearly erroneous when, despite evidence to support the
            finding, the appellate court is left with a definite and
            firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
                  A conclusion of law is not binding upon an appellate
            court and is freely reviewable for its correctness. This
            court ordinarily reviews conclusions of law under the
            right/wrong standard. Thus, a conclusion of law that is
            supported by the trial court’s findings of fact and that
            reflects an application of the correct rule of law will not
            be overturned. However, a conclusion of law that presents
            mixed questions of fact and law is reviewed under the
            clearly erroneous standard because the court’s conclusions
            are dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each
            individual case.

State v. Rapozo, 123 Hawaiʻi 329, 336, 235 P.3d 325, 332 (2010)

(quoting State v. Gabalis, 83 Hawaiʻi 40, 46, 924 P.2d 534, 540

(1996) (brackets in original)).

D.    Motion to Dismiss

            “A [trial] court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss [a

charge] is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”             Thompson, 150

Hawaiʻi at 266, 500 P.3d at 451 (quoting State v. Akau, 118

Hawaiʻi 44, 51, 185 P.3d 229, 236 (2008)) (brackets in original).

            The trial court abuses its discretion when it clearly
            exceeds the bounds of reason or disregards rules or
            principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment
            of a party litigant. The burden of establishing abuse of
            discretion is on appellant, and a strong showing is
            required to establish it.
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Id. at 266, 500 P.3d at 451 (quoting State v. Wong, 97 Hawaiʻi

512, 517, 40 P.3d 914, 919 (2002)).

                              IV.   DISCUSSION

A.    HRS § 805-1 does not apply to the complaints in Appellees’
      cases.

            The State first argues that the district court

erroneously dismissed the charging instruments against Appellees

based on its incorrect conclusion that those charging

instruments were required to comply with HRS § 805-1.              According

to the State, the charging instruments in Appellees’ cases are

distinguishable from Thompson because the State did not seek a

penal summons or an arrest warrant in Appellees’ cases.

            The State’s argument has merit for the following

reasons.    First, Appellees’ cases are distinguishable from

Thompson, where the State used a complaint to obtain a penal

summons.    Second, the plain language of HRS § 805-1 demonstrates

that the statute applies only to complaints that seek a penal

summons or an arrest warrant.         Third, case law interpreting

previous versions of HRS § 805-1 demonstrate that the statute

applies only to complaints that seek a penal summons or an

arrest warrant.      Thus, as discussed below, there is a difference

between a complaint used to obtain a penal summons or an arrest

warrant and a complaint used to charge a defendant with a

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criminal offense, and HRS § 805-1 applies only to a complaint

used to obtained a penal summons or an arrest warrant.

       1.    The complaints in Appellees’ cases are distinguishable
             from the complaint in Thompson.

             The State maintains that Appellees’ cases are

distinguishable from Thompson because the State did not seek a

penal summons or an arrest warrant in Appellees’ cases.               In

Thompson,12 the State charged Corey Thompson by complaint with

the offense of abuse of family or household member.              150 Hawaiʻi

at 264, 500 P.3d at 449.         The complaint was a single page signed

only by a deputy prosecuting attorney and did not include a

declaration or an affidavit.         Id.    “Based on the complaint, the

clerk of the Family Court of the Third Circuit (family court)

issued a penal summons compelling Thompson to appear in the Kona

district court.”       Id.   In response to the penal summons,

Thompson appeared in family court and filed a motion to dismiss.

Id.    Thompson argued

             that the family court should dismiss the case for three
             reasons. First, the complaint was deficient because it was
             “not by declaration, and it does not contain the required
             sworn affidavit,” as required by HRS § 805-1. Second,
             because the complaint was deficient, the family court
             lacked probable cause to issue the penal summons under
             HRS § 805-3. Third, in the absence of a supporting
             affidavit or declaration, the State could not arraign
             Thompson in compliance with Hawaiʻi Rules of Penal Procedure
             (HRPP) Rule 5(b)(1), which requires the State to give
             Thompson “[a] copy of the complaint, including any
             affidavits in support thereof[.]” (Emphasis omitted).

12    As the State pointed out in its application for transfer, this case
presents “the first opportunity for an appellate court to interpret”
Thompson.
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Id. at 264-65, 500 P.3d at 449-50 (brackets in original).             The

family court concluded that because the complaint was “fatally

defective due to a lack of supporting affidavit as required by

HRS § 805-1, the penal summons was issued upon a faulty

complaint, and the arraignment was improper for failure to

provide Defendant with the supporting affidavit, this case must

be dismissed without prejudice.”         Id. at 265, 500 P.3d at 450.

            On appeal, the State contended, inter alia, “that the

complaint was not defective because it complied with the

requirements identified in HRPP Rule 7(d).”          Id.   The ICA agreed

with Thompson, holding “that ‘Section 805-1 required the

Complaint to be signed by the complainant under oath or made by

declaration in lieu of an affidavit consistent with HRPP Rule

47(d)’” and thus “determined that the complaint against Thompson

did not comply with HRS § 805-1.”        Id. at 266, 500 P.3d at 451.

However, “the ICA decided that a non-compliant complaint could

still be used to initiate and maintain a prosecution by penal

summons.”   Id.

            On certiorari, this court agreed with Thompson’s

argument “that the ICA erred in holding that a complaint used to

seek a penal summons need not satisfy the requirements of HRS

§ 805-1.”   Id. at 267, 500 P.3d at 452.        Looking at the plain

language of HRS § 805-1, this court noted that “Hawaiʻi law

provides for only a single type of criminal complaint regardless
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of whether the complaint is used to initiate proceedings through

an arrest warrant or a penal summons” and determined that HRS

§ 805-1’s “statutory obligations apply regardless of whether the

State uses the complaint to seek a penal summons or an arrest

warrant.”    Id. (emphasis added).        This court further determined

that “once the State provides the district court with a

complaint that complies with HRS § 805-1, only then may the

district court choose to issue a penal summons if certain

requirements are met.”      Id. (citing HRS §§ 805-1, 805-3).           This

court reiterated that “[t]he requirements of HRS § 805-1

therefore apply to all criminal complaints, regardless of

whether the State uses the complaint to seek a penal summons or

an arrest warrant.”      Id. (emphasis added).

            This court noted that “HRS § 805-1 unambiguously

obligates the State to either have a complaint subscribed under

oath by a complainant or make the complaint by declaration in

accordance with the rules of court,” but “the phrase ‘made by

declaration in accordance with the rules of court’ is ambiguous”

because HRS § 805-1 “does not identify the ‘rules of court’ to

which the declaration must conform.”          Id. (citing HRS § 805-1).

This court determined that

                  The legislative history of HRS § 805-1 establishes
            that the legislature intended for complaints “made by
            declaration in accordance with the rules of court” to be
            complaints made or accompanied by declarations in lieu of
            affidavits. When the legislature amended HRS § 805-1 to
            provide prosecutors with the option to make complaints by
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            declaration, the Senate Committee on Judiciary and Labor
            explained that “allowing the use of declarations in lieu of
            affidavits for arrest citations and traffic crime
            complaints is consistent with current rules of court, and
            would not harm the offender’s right to challenge the
            veracity of the officer.” S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1194,
            in 2007 Senate Journal, at 1557-58 (emphasis added).
            Similarly, the judiciary submitted testimony that the
            amendment “would also authorize an alternative form for
            verification of arrest citations and traffic crime
            complaints by allowing the issuing or complaining officer
            to verify the citation or complaint by declaration.
            Declarations in lieu of affidavits are authorized by court
            rules.” Judiciary, Testimony to the Senate Committee on
            Judiciary and Labor on H.B. 1204, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess.
            (Mar. 9, 2007) (Hon. Russel Nagata, District Court, First
            Circuit) (emphasis added); see also Judiciary, Testimony to
            the Senate Committee on Judiciary and Labor on S.B. 1520,
            24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Feb. 26, 2007) (Hon. Corinne
            Watanabe, ICA). Thus, this elaboration that declarations
            in lieu of affidavits were allowed by court rules
            demonstrates that the legislature intended to allow for
            complaints made or accompanied by “declarations in lieu of
            affidavits.”

Id. at 268, 500 P.3d at 453.       This court concluded that “HRPP

Rule 47(d) is the applicable rule of court pertaining to

declarations in lieu of affidavits” and “the underlying

complaint should have been subscribed under oath by the

complainant or made by declaration in lieu of affidavit in

conformity with HRPP Rule 47(d)” to satisfy the requirements of

HRS § 805-1.    Id.

            This court noted that “the ICA acknowledged that the

underlying complaint did not comply with HRS § 805-1’s

requirements” but “held that the district court may issue a

summons on a non-compliant complaint,” reasoning “that the State

did not need to establish probable cause to request a penal

summons.”    Id.   However, this court determined that “by focusing

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on the issue of probable cause, the ICA overlooked the

preliminary question of whether a district court may issue a

penal summons upon a complaint that does not comply with HRS

§ 805-1.   It may not.”     Id.   This court stated

                 The courts must give effect to the State’s statutory
           obligations. As previously discussed, when the text of a
           statute is clear, “the court is bound by the plain, clear
           and unambiguous language of the statute.” [State v. Sylva,
           61 Haw. 385, 387-88, 605 P.2d 496, 498 (1980)]. Again,
           HRS § 805-1 unambiguously requires the State to ensure that
           complaints are either subscribed under oath by a
           complainant or accompanied by a declaration in lieu of an
           affidavit. Supra at 150 Hawaiʻi at 267-68, 500 P.3d at 452-
           53. Given that the legislature recognized the need to
           protect “the offender’s right to challenge the veracity of
           the [accuser],” we cannot say that the State’s failure to
           comply with HRS § 805-1’s requirements constitutes a mere
           formal defect for which dismissal is not warranted under
           HRPP Rule 7(d). S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1194, in 2007
           Senate Journal, at 1557-58. Thus, the courts must hold the
           State to its obligations under HRS § 805-1 before granting
           the State a penal summons. Sylva, 61 Haw. at 387-88, 605
           P.2d at 498.

Id. at 269, 500 P.3d at 454 (footnote omitted) (second brackets

in original).   This court concluded that “the ICA erred in

holding sub silentio that the State need not comply with its

statutory duties.    In turn, the ICA also erred in concluding

that ‘the Complaint was not defective and the penal summons was

properly issued.’”    Id.

           This court further concluded that “HRS § 805-1 does

not distinguish between complaints for penal summons and

complaints for arrest warrants” and the ICA erroneously held

“that the State need not comply with its statutory obligations

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simply because it sought a penal summons.”         Id. at 270, 500 P.3d

at 455 (emphasis added).

          Appellees’ cases are distinguishable from Thompson,

where the State sought a penal summons by complaint.            Id. at

264, 500 P.3d at 449.     Here, in contrast, the State only used

the complaints in Appellees’ cases to charge Appellees with the

offense of OVUII.    In other words, the State did not use the

complaints in Appellees’ cases to seek a penal summons or an

arrest warrant because Appellees were already arrested and had

posted bail when the State filed the complaints charging

Appellees with OVUII.     Thus, the complaints in Appellees’ cases

are distinguishable from the complaint in Thompson because there

is a difference between a complaint used to charge a defendant

with a criminal offense and a complaint used to obtain a penal

summons or an arrest warrant.

          Appellees contend this “court specifically stated

that, ‘HRS § 805-1 unambiguously requires the State to ensure

that complaints are either subscribed under oath by a

complainant or accompanied by a declaration in lieu of an

affidavit.’”   However, when this court stated that “HRS § 805-1

unambiguously requires the State to ensure that complaints are

either subscribed under oath by a complainant or accompanied by

a declaration in lieu of an affidavit,” Thompson, 150 Hawaiʻi at

269, 500 P.3d at 454 (citing Thompson, 150 Hawaiʻi at 267-68, 500
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P.3d at 452-53), this court cited to an earlier section of the

Thompson opinion, which states that “[t]he requirements of HRS

§ 805-1 therefore apply to all criminal complaints, regardless

of whether the State uses the complaint to seek a penal summons

or an arrest warrant.”       Id. at 267, 500 P.3d at 452 (emphasis

added).    The issue in Thompson specifically involved a complaint

that sought a penal summons.        Moreover, this court did not hold

that all complaints must satisfy the requirements of HRS § 805-

1.   Thus, this court’s holding in Thompson was limited to

complaints seeking a penal summons or an arrest warrant.

            Appellees also maintain that HRS § 805-1 requires “a

complaint be either subscribed by the complainant or support[ed]

by declaration in lieu of affidavit” in order “to protect the

accused’s right to challenge the veracity of the complainant.”

Appellees contend that:

            The bottom line is a complaint which is “fatally defective”
            is not fatally defective only because the State uses such a
            complaint to seek an arrest warrant or penal summons.
            Under such reasoning, the State would be given the
            unwarranted discretion to decide when a complaint would
            require to be subscribed to by the complainant or supported
            by declaration. As the Legislature had decided that the
            underlying purpose of imposing the requirements of HRS
            § 805-1 was to protect the accused right to challenge the
            veracity of the accuser ([Thompson, 150 Hawaiʻi] at 269, 500
            P.3d at 454 (citing S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No 1194, in 2007
            Senate Journal at 1557-58)), it would be nonsensical to
            allow the State to choose the situations when this
            significant right was protected and when it was not. Such
            an interpretation which leads to an absurd result must be
            rejected. See e.g. Moranz v. Harbor Mall, LLC, 150 Hawaiʻi
            387, 398, 502 P.3d 488, 499 (2022) (citing Alvarado v.
            Kiewit Pacific Co., 92 Hawaiʻi [515], 517, 993 P.2d 549, 551
            (2000)[)] (quoting Frank v. Hawaii Planning Mill Found., 88
            Hawaiʻi 140, 144, 963 P.2d 349, 353 (1998) (holding that the

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          appellate court is bound to construe statutes to avoid
          absurd results and a statutory interpretation that is
          “‘rational, sensible[,] and practicable . . . is preferred
          to one which is unreasonable[,] impracticable . . .
          inconsisten[t], contradict[ory], and illogical[].’”)

(First brackets added.).

          Appellees mistakenly contend that limiting Thompson to

only complaints for a penal summons or an arrest warrant would

lead to an absurd result.      As an initial matter, Appellees

erroneously argue that this court “concluded that the

requirement that a complaint be either subscribed by the

complainant or support[ed] by declaration in lieu of affidavit

was to protect the accused’s right to challenge the veracity of

the complainant.”    Rather, this court stated:

          When the legislature amended HRS § 805-1 to provide
          prosecutors with the option to make complaints by
          declaration, the Senate Committee on Judiciary and Labor
          explained that “allowing the use of declarations in lieu of
          affidavits for arrest citations and traffic crime
          complaints is consistent with current rules of court, and
          would not harm the offender’s right to challenge the
          veracity of the officer.” S. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1194,
          in 2007 Senate Journal, at 1557-58 (emphasis added).

Thompson, 150 Hawaiʻi at 268, 500 P.3d at 453 (emphasis added).

As stated in Thompson, this court did not conclude that the

purpose of HRS § 805-1’s requirement that a complaint be

subscribed by the complainant or supported by declaration in

lieu of affidavit was to protect the accused’s right to

challenge the veracity of the complainant.         Instead, this court

noted that “allowing the use of declarations in lieu of

affidavits for arrest citations and traffic crime

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complaints . . . , would not harm the offender’s right to

challenge the veracity of the officer.”         Id. (emphasis added).

While this court stated that HRS § 805-1’s requirements “would

not harm” a defendant’s right to challenge the veracity of the

complainant, that does not mean the purpose of HRS § 805-1 is to

protect that same right.      Thus, Appellees’ arguments regarding

their ability to challenge the veracity of the complainant lacks

merit.

    2.    The plain language of HRS § 805-1 demonstrates that
          the statute does not apply to the complaints in
          Appellees’ cases.

          The plain language of HRS § 805-1 demonstrates that

the statute applies only to complaints seeking a penal summons

or an arrest warrant.     “It is well-established that ‘when [a

statute’s] language is plain and unmistakable[,] the court is

bound by the plain, clear and unambiguous language of the

statute.’”   Id. at 267, 500 P.3d at 452 (quoting Sylva, 61 Haw.

at 387-88, 605 P.2d at 498) (brackets in original).           As applied

to Appellees’ cases, HRS § 805-1 provided:

                Complaint; form of warrant. When a complaint is made
          to any prosecuting officer of the commission of any
          offense, the prosecuting officer shall examine the
          complainant, shall reduce the substance of the complaint to
          writing, and shall cause the complaint to be subscribed by
          the complainant under oath, which the prosecuting officer
          is hereby authorized to administer, or the complaint shall
          be made by declaration in accordance with the rules of
          court. If the original complaint results from the issuance
          of a traffic summons or a citation in lieu of an arrest
          pursuant to section 803-6, by a police officer, the oath
          may be administered by any police officer whose name has
          been submitted to the prosecuting officer and who has been

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           designated by the chief of police to administer the oath,
           or the complaint may be submitted by declaration in
           accordance with the rules of court. Upon presentation of
           the written complaint to the judge in whose circuit the
           offense allegedly has been committed, the judge shall issue
           a warrant, reciting the complaint and requiring the
           sheriff, or other officer to whom it is directed, except as
           provided in section 805-3, to arrest the accused and to
           bring the accused before the judge to be dealt with
           according to law; and in the same warrant the judge may
           require the officer to summon such witnesses as are named
           in the warrant to appear and give evidence at trial. The
           warrant may be in the form established by the usage and
           practice of the issuing court.

(Emphasis added.)

           The first sentence of HRS § 805-1 discusses the

requirements of a complaint and states:

           When a complaint is made to any prosecuting officer of the
           commission of any offense, the prosecuting officer shall
           examine the complainant, shall reduce the substance of the
           complaint to writing, and shall cause the complaint to be
           subscribed by the complainant under oath, which the
           prosecuting officer is hereby authorized to administer, or
           the complaint shall be made by declaration in accordance
           with the rules of court.

Although the first sentence of HRS § 805-1 does not state the

statute applies only to complaints for a penal summons or an

arrest warrant, the third sentence of HRS § 805-1 states:

           Upon presentation of the written complaint to the judge in
           whose circuit the offense allegedly has been committed, the
           judge shall issue a warrant, reciting the complaint and
           requiring the sheriff, or other officer to whom it is
           directed, except as provided in section 805-3, to arrest
           the accused and to bring the accused before the judge to be
           dealt with according to law . . . .

The third sentence of HRS § 805-1 makes clear that the statute

applies to complaints for an arrest warrant, and Thompson makes

clear that the statute also applies to complaints for a penal

summons.   However, based on the plain language of HRS § 805-1

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and Thompson, the requirements of HRS § 805-1 do not apply to

complaints used to charge a defendant who has already been

arrested.    Thus, the plain language of HRS § 805-1 establishes

that the complaints in Appellees’ cases did not have to satisfy

the requirements of HRS § 805-1.

    3.      Case law interpreting past versions of HRS § 805-1
            demonstrate that HRS § 805-1 applies only to
            complaints for a penal summons or an arrest warrant.

            This court’s precedent confirms what Thompson and the

plain language of HRS § 805-1 demonstrate:         HRS § 805-1 applies

only to complaints for a penal summons or an arrest warrant.                In

other words, there is a difference between a complaint for a

penal summons or an arrest warrant, and a complaint used to

charge a defendant who has already been arrested.

            As the State points out, “[i]t appears that the import

of HRS § 805-1 has been substantially unchanged since 1892 when

it was enacted as Chapter LVII, An Act to Reorganize the

Judiciary Department.”     The State also points out that “[t]he

earliest codified iteration of HRS § 805-1 appears to be Chapter

53 Part I § 606 of The Penal Laws of the Hawaiian Islands,

1897.”      Citing to Sing Kee, 14 Haw. at 586-88, the State

maintains there is a difference “between a ‘charge’ which

initiates a criminal trial and a ‘complaint’ in order ‘to enable

the magistrate to determine whether or not there is probable

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cause to believe that an offense has been committed by the

accused so as to justify his apprehension.’”

          The State correctly asserts that Sing Kee demonstrates

there is a difference between a complaint for a penal summons or

an arrest warrant and a complaint used to initiate a criminal

trial.   In Sing Kee, the defendant was convicted “of the offense

of selling spirituous liquor without a license."           14 Haw. at

586.   The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the proceedings

because (1) the District Magistrate lacked jurisdiction, (2) the

complaint upon which defendant was arrested and tried did not

sufficiently state any cause, and (3) contrary to law, the

complaint did not state a direct and positive offense, but was

sworn to on information and belief.        Id. at 586-87.     The Supreme

Court of the Territory of Hawaiʻi stated:

                These objections to the affidavit, so far as they
          bear upon the question of the jurisdiction of the District
          Court, need not be passed upon, for even if the warrant was
          improperly or illegally issued by reason of its being based
          upon an affidavit insufficient in form or in substance, the
          District Court nevertheless had jurisdiction. The evidence
          shows that when the offense was committed police officers
          were present, about fifty feet away from the spot, in a
          store, where the liquor was handed over, and saw such
          delivery, and that they immediately rushed in and arrested
          the defendant. Under these circumstances an arrest without
          a warrant was legal. See section 545 and 547, Penal Laws.
                The contention that the “complaint upon which the
          defendant *** was tried does not sufficiently state any
          cause,” would seem to be based upon a misconception of the
          true function of the affidavit or so-called complaint. The
          sole function of the complaint, as provided for by section
          606 of the Penal Laws, is to support the issuance of the
          warrant or, in other words, to enable the magistrate to
          determine whether or not there is probable cause to believe
          that an offense has been committed by the accused so as to
          justify his apprehension. The complaint referred to in
          that section is not the charge upon which the defendant is
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          tried, although it is a statement in substance, and may
          also be in exact language, of the offense to be set forth
          in the charge subsequently entered against the defendant in
          Court. The charge itself is, under the practice prevailing
          in the District Courts, entered orally by the prosecuting
          officer upon the defendant’s appearance and noted by the
          magistrate in his record, and it is upon the charge as thus
          entered that the trial is had. The precise form of the
          charge entered against this defendant in the District Court
          of Koloa, is not disclosed by the record before us, nor
          does it appear that any objection was made on the ground of
          its insufficiency, although the defendant was present and
          represented by counsel. We cannot assume, under these
          circumstances, that the charge as entered did not state an
          offense.

Id. at 587-88 (emphasis added).

          The Sing Kee court thus distinguished between a

complaint against a defendant “to enable the magistrate to

determine whether or not there is probable cause to believe that

an offense has been committed by the accused so as to justify

his apprehension” and a complaint where the defendant is charged

with a criminal offense.      Similar to the complaint referred to

“by section 606 of the Penal Laws,” the complaint referred to in

HRS § 805-1 “is not the charge upon which the defendant is

tried.”   Sing Kee, 14 Haw. at 587-88.          Instead, under HRS § 805-

1, “[t]he sole function of the complaint . . . , is to support

the issuance of the warrant[.]”.         Id.

          In addition, here, it appears that police officers

witnessed Appellees committing the offense of OVUII given that

Appellees were all arrested for OVUII.           Appellees do not contend

that they were improperly arrested.            Thus, as in Sing Kee,

Appellees were properly arrested without a warrant and the State

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did not use a complaint to request a penal summons or an arrest

warrant.

            Furthermore, in Territory v. Mix, the Supreme Court of

the Territory of Hawaiʻi interpreted “Section 10770, Revised Laws

of Hawaii 1945,” which “prescribes the manner in which a

defendant shall be brought within the jurisdiction of the trial

court.”    41 Haw. 163, 164 (1955).        Because HRS § 805-1 largely

retains Section 10770’s language,13 HRS § 805-1 likely follows

its predecessor to address how a defendant is “brought within

the jurisdiction of the trial court.”          Id. at 164.     The Supreme

Court of the Territory of Hawaiʻi noted that Section 10770,

Revised Laws of Hawaii 1945 “mandates two prerequisites to the

issuance of a valid warrant of arrest[.]”           Id. at 165 (emphasis

added).    Similarly, in Territory v. Williams, 41 Haw. 348, 355

(1956), the Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawaiʻi stated that

13    Section 10770, Revised Laws of Hawaii 1945 provided:

                  “***Complaint; form of warrant. Upon complaint made
            to any prosecuting officer of the commission of any
            offense, he shall examine the complainant, shall reduce the
            substance of the complaint to writing and cause the same to
            be subscribed by the complainant under oath, which he is
            hereby authorized to administer. Upon presentation of the
            written complaint to the magistrate within whose district
            the offense is alleged to have been committed such
            magistrate shall issue his warrant, reciting the complaint
            and requiring the high sheriff, or other officer to whom it
            is directed (except as provided in the next succeeding
            section), forthwith to arrest the accused and bring him
            before the magistrate to be dealt with according to
            law***.”

Mix, 41 Haw. at 164-65.
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“section 10770, Revised Laws of Hawaii 1945, provides only for

the issuance of a complaint as the basis of a warrant of

arrest.”    (Emphasis added.)      Thus, as in Sing Kee, the

predecessor to HRS § 805-1 as interpreted by the Mix court and

the Williams court was limited to complaints for an arrest

warrant.

B.    The State properly initiated the criminal proceedings
      against Appellees.

      1.    Appellees were properly arrested and released after
            posting bail.

            The State maintains that, pursuant to HRS §§ 803-5 and

803-6, Appellees were all properly arrested without a warrant.

            HRS § 803-5 (2014) provides:

                  By police officer without warrant. (a) A police
            officer or other officer of justice, may, without warrant,
            arrest and detain for examination any person when the
            officer has probable cause to believe that such person has
            committed any offense, whether in the officer’s presence or
            otherwise.
                  (b) For purposes of this section, a police officer
            has probable cause to make an arrest when the facts and
            circumstances within the officer’s knowledge and of which
            the officer has reasonably trustworthy information are
            sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable
            caution in the belief that a crime has been or is being
            committed.

            HRS § 803-6(a) (2014) provides:

                  Arrest, how made. (a) At or before the time of
            making an arrest, the person shall declare that the person
            is an officer of justice, if such is the case. If the
            person has a warrant the person should show it; or if the
            person makes the arrest without warrant in any of the cases
            in which it is authorized by law, the person should give
            the party arrested clearly to understand for what cause the
            person undertakes to make the arrest, and shall require the
            party arrested to submit to be taken to the police station
            or judge. This done, the arrest is complete.

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          Here, according to the State, Appellees were all

examined and “released after posting bail before 48 hours had

passed and before the requirement for a probable cause

determination was triggered.”       Appellees do not contest that

they were arrested, examined, and released after posting bail

before 48 hours passed.     Appellees also do not argue that they

were improperly arrested.      Thus, it appears that Appellees were

properly arrested without a warrant.

          Although Appellees were properly arrested pursuant to

HRS §§ 803-5 and 803-6(a), the issue remains whether the State

properly initiated the criminal proceedings against Appellees by

charging Appellees via complaint.

    2.    The State properly initiated the criminal proceedings
          against Appellees under HRPP Rule 7.

          Given that the State did not use the complaints

against Appellees to seek a penal summons or an arrest warrant,

the State correctly asserts that “the general rule for charges

in HRPP Rule 7(d) applies” to Appellees cases.          As relevant

here, HRPP Rule 7 (2012) provides:

                (a) Use of Indictment, Information, or Complaint.
          The charge against a defendant is an indictment, a
          superseding indictment, an information, or a complaint
          filed in court. . . .

                . . . .

                (d) Nature and Contents. The charge shall be a
          plain, concise and definite statement of the essential
          facts constituting the offense charged. . . . A complaint
          shall be signed by the prosecutor. . . .

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          Here, the State charged Appellees by complaint with

the offense of OVUII pursuant to HRPP Rule 7(d).           As the State

points out:

                The charging instruments in these cases are signed by
          the deputy prosecuting attorney and comply in every respect
          with HRPP Rule 7(d). Nothing in HRPP Rule 7(d) requires
          that a charging instrument in a misdemeanor case be signed
          by anyone other than a prosecutor. Nor does HRPP Rule 7(d)
          require that anything should have been subscribed under
          oath or made by declaration in lieu of an affidavit by
          anyone. Nor does any constitutional provision, statute or
          rule of court require that any misdemeanor charging
          instrument by itself be subject to a probable cause
          determination. Consequently, under HRPP Rule 7(d) these
          charging instruments fulfill the necessary requirements to
          initiate a prosecution for the offenses named within them
          and the district court erred in dismissing these charging
          instruments.

The State correctly notes that the charging instruments in

Appellees’ cases comply with HRPP Rule 7(d).          Moreover,

Appellees do not contend the charging instruments failed to

comply with HRPP Rule 7(d).      Thus, the charging instruments in

Appellees’ cases were sufficient to initiate a prosecution under

HRPP Rule 7(d).    In turn, the district court erroneously

dismissed without prejudice the charging instruments in

Appellees’ cases.

                            V.    CONCLUSION

          For the foregoing reasons, we hold that HRS § 805-1

applies only to complaints for a penal summons or an arrest

warrant, and the district court improperly dismissed without

prejudice the complaints charging Appellees with OVUII.

                                    34
   *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER ***

Accordingly, the district court’s January 12, 2022 Notice of

Entry of Judgment is reversed.

Brian Vincent                            /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
for appellant
                                         /s/ Paula A. Nakayama
Alen M. Kaneshiro
                                         /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
for appellees
                                         /s/ Todd W. Eddins

                                    35