Court Opinion

ID: 9382044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-24 18:01:06.518234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:36.689435
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-40803         Document: 00516688109             Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/24/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                       United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                    FILED
                                                                                March 24, 2023
                                       No. 21-40803                              Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                    Clerk

   Aaron A. Soto,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Ulysses Bautista, in his individual and official capacities as police officer
   and as agent of the City of McAllen; Luis Zuniga, in his individual
   and official capacities as police officer and as agent of the City of
   McAllen,

                                              Defendants—Appellants.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Southern District of Texas
                                USDC No. 7:18-CV-151
                      ______________________________

   Before Smith, Clement, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          This appeal arises out of two City of McAllen police officers’ alleged
   use of excessive force during a 2016 DWI arrest. The district court orally
   denied the officers’ motions for summary judgment, and they separately
   appealed. We DISMISS part of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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   AFFIRM the denial of summary judgment in part and REVERSE and
   REMAND in part.
                                           I. Facts
           While on patrol around 1:00 a.m. on May 13, 2016, Officer Luis Zuniga
   noticed Plaintiff-Appellee Aaron Soto driving the wrong way down a one-way
   street and pulled him over. Zuniga administered a field sobriety test, which
   Soto failed, and then used a portable breathalyzer to assess Soto’s blood
   alcohol concentration. After the test revealed that Soto was intoxicated,
   Zuniga arrested him. Zuniga then handcuffed Soto’s hands behind his back
   and escorted him to the police cruiser.
           As Zuniga attempted to place Soto into the vehicle, a derogatory
   exchange ensued in which Soto insulted Zuniga’s girlfriend, and Zuniga
   criticized Soto’s mother. When Zuniga tried to secure Soto’s seatbelt, Soto
   leaned toward Zuniga and spit. Zuniga immediately reacted by wrapping his
   arms around Soto’s body, pulling him from his seated position, and thrusting
   him face first onto the ground. He then leaned over Soto and asked, “[d]id
   you just spit on me?” as he forcefully dropped his knee onto Soto’s upper
   back. Officer Ulysses Bautista, who was standing nearby, then kicked Soto
   in his midsection, causing him to cry out. Zuniga continued to press his knee
   into Soto’s upper body for several additional minutes as Soto repeatedly
   groaned in pain, exclaiming at one point, “[t]hat hurt.”
           Shortly thereafter, a sergeant arrived with a spit guard and RedMan
   helmet. 1 Despite the fact that Soto’s face was plainly injured, Zuniga and the
   sergeant placed the spit guard over Soto’s mouth and the helmet on his head.

           _____________________
           1
              A RedMan helmet is a “protective helmet” which is “worn by students and
   instructors who are participating in real world defensive tactics training.” It is “designed
   to fit snugly.”

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   After Soto refused medical care at the scene, he was transported to the
   McAllen Police Department jail. Later, Soto was treated at a hospital where
   doctors informed him that he had a hairline fracture on his cheekbone and an
   orbital injury. He was also diagnosed with possible nerve damage and a
   fractured tooth at other doctor’s visits.
           Soto subsequently filed the instant § 1983 suit, alleging that Zuniga
   and Bautista (collectively, the “Officers”) (1) used excessive force in
   violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and (2) were each
   liable as a bystander to the other’s use of force. 2 The Officers each moved
   for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court orally
   denied both motions due to the existence of genuine issues of material fact.
   The Officers each appealed.
           We initially remanded the case to the district court “for the limited
   purpose of specifying what fact disputes exist[ed] as to each defendant.” The
   district court held a hearing in which it attempted to orally clarify which
   genuine issues of material fact formed the basis for its denial of summary
   judgment.      We now consider whether we have jurisdiction over this
   interlocutory appeal in light of that clarification, and, to the extent we do, we
   address the merits of this appeal.
                      II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
           As a threshold matter, we explain our limited jurisdiction over this
   appeal. In considering a denial of summary judgment based on qualified
   immunity, we typically may only review the “material[ity],” but not the

           _____________________
           2
             Soto also originally named the City of McAllen as a defendant, but the City was
   later dismissed. Soto does not appeal that dismissal.

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   “genuine[ness],” of those factual disputes identified by the district court.
   Joseph ex. rel. Est. of Joseph v. Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 331 (5th Cir. 2020).
           We normally may not—as the Officers repeatedly urge—accept the
   defendants’ version of facts the district court deemed “disputed.” Rather,
   in this posture, we must accept the district court’s determination that certain
   factual disputes exist and, in determining whether they are material, resolve
   the disputes in the plaintiff’s favor. Walsh v. Hodge, 975 F.3d 475, 481 (5th
   Cir. 2020).
           There is, however, one exception to this general rule implicated here.
   When “there is video evidence that ‘blatantly contradict[s]’” certain factual
   allegations, we do “not adopt the plaintiffs’ version of the facts.” Craig v.
   Martin, 49 F.4th 404, 409 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
   372, 380–81 (2007)). Rather, we “view those facts ‘in the light depicted by
   the videotape.’” Id. at 409 (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 381).
                               III. Excessive Force Claims
           We begin by considering Soto’s excessive force claims. On remand,
   the district court identified the following factual disputes precluding
   summary judgment for the Officers as to these claims: As to Zuniga, the
   court concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding
   (1) whether Soto spit on Zuniga, and (2) whether Soto resisted arrest before
   Zuniga placed him into the squad car. As to Bautista, it determined a genuine
   issue of material fact existed regarding whether Soto was resisting arrest
   when Bautista kicked him. 3

           _____________________
           3
             The district court also suggested that genuine issues of material fact existed as to
   whether the force used to restrain Soto was reasonably necessary, whether Zuniga violated
   clearly established law, and whether Bautista’s use of force was objectively reasonable.

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           As a preliminary matter, we address whether the video recordings of
   the encounter undermine any of these determinations. 4 See Martin, 49 F.4th
   at 409. First, while the video evidence does not definitively demonstrate that
   Soto intended to spit on Zuniga, it does conclusively record Soto making a
   spitting gesture and the noise of him spitting towards Zuniga. Accordingly,
   the district court erred in concluding that there was a genuine issue of
   material fact as to whether Soto actually spit (whether directly at Zuniga or
   randomly).
           However, we agree with the district court that the video evidence is
   inconclusive as to whether Soto resisted or evaded arrest either before Zuniga
   thrust him to the ground or prior to Bautista’s kick. Accordingly, to the
   extent the Officers ask us to further “second-guess” the genuineness of these
   factual disputes, their appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Joseph, 981
   F.3d at 335. We may, however, review whether these remaining genuine
   issues of fact are “material” when construed in Soto’s favor. Id.
           “We review the materiality of fact issues de novo.” Melton v. Phillips,
   875 F.3d 256, 261 (5th Cir. 2017) (en banc). To assess whether a genuine
   factual dispute is material, “we take [Soto’s] version of the facts as true and
   view those facts through the lens of qualified immunity.” Cunningham v.
   Castloo, 983 F.3d 185, 190 (5th Cir. 2020). If the Officers “would still be
   entitled to qualified immunity under this view of the facts, then any disputed

           _____________________
   However, these are issues of law—not fact—and are properly resolved by the court on
   summary judgment. See, e.g., Mangieri v. Clifton, 29 F.3d 1012, 1015-16 (5th Cir. 1994).
           4
            Two videos depict the interactions between the Officers and Soto: one recording
   the scene in front of Zuniga’s dashboard, which captured the initial stop and Zuniga’s
   administration of the field sobriety test; and another recording the back of the squad car,
   showing aspects of the Officers’ challenged applications of force. Because only the latter
   video undermines disputed facts identified by the district court, the phrase “video
   evidence” refers to it exclusively.

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   facts are not material, the district court’s denial of summary judgment was
   improper,” and reversal is warranted. Id.
           To determine if the Officers would be entitled to qualified immunity
   based on Soto’s version of the remaining disputed facts, we ask two
   questions: (1) whether the Officers’ actions “violated a constitutional right,”
   and (2) “whether the right was clearly established.” Id. at 190–91 (internal
   quotation marks and citation omitted).
       A. Violation of a Constitutional Right
           We begin by addressing the first question—that is, if we assume Soto
   did not resist or evade arrest, did the Officers violate Soto’s constitutional
   right to be free from excessive force?
           To establish an excessive force claim, Soto must show that he
   “suffer[ed] an injury that result[ed] directly and only from a clearly excessive
   and objectively unreasonable use of force.” Joseph, 981 F.3d at 332. “In
   determining whether the use of force was clearly excessive and clearly
   unreasonable, we evaluate each officer’s actions separately, to the extent
   possible.” Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 628 (5th Cir. 2012).
   Accordingly, we begin with Soto’s claim that Zuniga used excessive force
   when he forcefully thrust Soto face first onto the ground and dropped his
   knee onto his upper body.
           Soto has submitted evidence showing that he suffered several injuries
   as a direct result of Zuniga’s conduct, including a hairline fracture, broken
   tooth, (possible) nerve damage, 5 and an orbital injury. Therefore, the

           _____________________
           5
              Soto testified that a neurologist told him he might have nerve damage on the side
   of his cheekbone, but the doctor couldn’t say for sure. However, Soto contends that ever
   since the incident he has felt a tingling sensation on the side of his cheekbone during certain
   activities.

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   primary issue is whether, under Soto’s version of the disputed facts, Zuniga
   nonetheless acted reasonably. Several factors guide this inquiry, including
   “(1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether [Soto] posed an immediate
   threat to the safety of officers or others, and (3) whether [Soto] was actively
   resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Joseph, 981 F.3d at
   332 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).
          Our analysis of the first and third Graham factors is straightforward.
   Soto was arrested for drunk driving, which is undoubtedly a serious crime.
   Therefore, the first factor weighs in favor of Zuniga’s reasonableness.
   However, we’ve already concluded that we must assume Soto was not
   resisting or evading arrest, so the third factor cuts strongly against Zuniga’s
   reasonableness.
          The only remaining factor to assess, then, is whether Soto “posed an
   immediate threat” to Zuniga. See Joseph, 981 F.3d at 332. We conclude that
   he did not. It’s undisputed that Soto was unarmed. Additionally, prior to
   Zuniga’s removing Soto from the car, he was seated in the backseat with his
   hands restrained behind his back. These facts strongly suggest Zuniga was
   not at risk of harm, and, therefore, his substantial use of force was
   unreasonable.
          Indeed, this conclusion is consistent with our case law. It is axiomatic
   under our precedents that applying violent force to an unarmed person who
   is “restrained and subdued” violates the Constitution. See Bush v. Strain,
   513 F.3d 492, 502 (5th Cir. 2008) (concluding officer was not entitled to
   qualified immunity when officer “forcefully slammed [the plaintiff’s] face
   into a nearby vehicle during her arrest” when she was handcuffed and
   subdued). This is true even when evidence establishes that the plaintiff acted
   disrespectfully toward the defendant-officer or engaged in passive resistance.
   See, e.g., Newman v. Guedry, 703 F.3d 757, 762–63 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding

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   that officers were not entitled to qualified immunity when they used a taser
   and nightstick on individual who did not actively resist but made an “off-
   color joke”).
          Zuniga, however, urges that Soto’s conduct wasn’t merely
   disrespectful. Rather, per Zuniga, Soto’s spitting threatened his safety by
   putting him at risk of contracting “a communicable disease.” Yet, we are
   unconvinced that spitting a single time poses more than a de minimis risk to
   an officer’s safety. To be sure, it’s possible that Zuniga could’ve caught a
   virus from Soto. But given that Soto showed no signs of sickness, and this
   incident predated the COVID-19 pandemic, that risk seems very low.
   Moreover, Zuniga’s own behavior belies his contention that he was afraid of
   catching an illness. After Soto spit, Zuniga wrapped himself around Soto,
   thrust him to the ground, and later leaned over and “wipe[d] [Soto’s] face
   with his arm.” This seems like an excellent way to contract a virus—not avoid
   one.
          But even if Soto’s spitting had posed a non-negligible threat to his
   safety, it still wouldn’t have warranted Zuniga’s response. While our
   precedents recognize that sometimes “officers may need to use physical
   force to effectuate a suspect’s compliance,” they nonetheless require officers
   to “assess the relationship between the need and the amount of force used.”
   Newman, 703 F.3d at 763 (alterations adopted)(internal quotation marks and
   citation omitted). Zuniga’s actions suggest he made no such calculation.
   Slamming an arrestee to the ground hard enough to break his bones is simply
   not a proportional response to being spit at. Neither, for that matter, is
   repeatedly dropping one’s knees on a prone suspect’s spine when he is
   handcuffed and compliant.
          Moreover, Zuniga’s use of force was not only inappropriately
   violent—it was also too immediate. Zuniga did not implement any other

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   strategy to address Soto’s spitting before employing physical force. See
   Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 167–68 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
   Indeed, he “immediately resort[ed] to force without any attempt to de-
   escalate the [] situation.” Joseph, 981 F.3d at 334 (quotation omitted). Such
   conduct does not amount to the “measured and ascending actions” required
   by our caselaw. See Poole, 691 F.3d at 629. Rather, it reflects an impulsive,
   violent response to perceived disrespect. Therefore, we conclude that on
   these facts, Zuniga’s use of force was “clearly excessive.” 6 See Deville, 567
   F.3d at 167.
           Based on the prior analysis, it’s also clear that Bautista acted
   unreasonably by kicking Soto in the side. The district court concluded that
   it was undisputed that this conduct contributed to Soto’s injuries.
   Additionally, as explained above, our precedents are clear that using
   objectively unreasonable force on a restrained, compliant individual violates
   the Fourth Amendment. Bush, 513 F.3d at 501. Therefore, given the
   assumption that Soto wasn’t resisting arrest, we conclude that Bautista also
   violated Soto’s right to be free from excessive force.
       B. Clearly Established Law
           We now turn to the second prong of the qualified immunity inquiry.
   Notwithstanding the prior analysis, Zuniga and Bautista are still “entitled to
   qualified immunity unless” Soto demonstrated that the right in question was
   “clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Plumhoff v.
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           6
             Zuniga and Bautista also emphasize that Soto was drunk, and therefore he was
   more likely to behave unpredictably. While Soto’s intoxication is a relevant factor, it is not
   dispositive in light of the evidence that Soto was handcuffed and subdued during the
   relevant events, and therefore, “[n]o reasonable officer could conclude [he] posed an
   immediate threat” to the Officers’ safety. See Cooper v. Brown, 844 F.3d 517, 522–24 (5th
   Cir. 2016) (holding that an officer inflicted excessive force during a DUI arrest by declining
   to release his police dog’s bite until after he had handcuffed the suspect).

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   Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 778 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citation
   omitted). A right is clearly established only if it is “sufficiently clear that
   every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates
   that right.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (per curiam) (quotation
   omitted). In making this determination, the Supreme Court and this court
   have indicated that we may consult “controlling authority” or a robust
   “consensus of cases of persuasive authority.” 7 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S.
   603, 617 (1999); Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371–72 (5th Cir. 2011) (en
   banc) (same).
           In his opening brief, Soto cites several cases which he claims “clearly
   establish” that the Officers’ actions were objectively unreasonable. 8 Our
   survey of the law indicates that as of May 13, 2016, at least two of these—
   Ramirez v. Martinez, 716 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 2013), and Deville, 567 F.3d 156
   (5th Cir. 2009)—provided “fair warning” to any reasonable officer that it
   was unconstitutional to thrust Soto to the ground (after already arresting and
   handcuffing him), drop a knee on his upper spine, and kick him. In fact, based
   on Soto’s version of the facts, the Officers’ conduct was less justifiable than
   the conduct found to violate clearly established law in Ramirez and Deville.
           In Ramirez, we held that a reasonable jury could conclude that the
   defendant-officer violated clearly established law by tasing a handcuffed
   individual who had merely passively resisted arrest. 716 F.3d at 378. We

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           7
             We have suggested that such “persuasive authority” includes precedent from
   other circuit courts, Swanson, 659 F.3d at 372 & n.26 (indicating that a consensus of cases
   from other circuit courts is sufficient, so long as the circuits are in agreement), but likely
   not unpublished cases, Garcia v. Blevins, 957 F.3d 596, 601 (5th Cir. 2020) (stating that a
   case relied on by the plaintiff “is unpublished” and so “cannot clearly establish the law”).
           8
             Doss v. Helpenstell, 626 F. App’x 453 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished);
   Ramirez v. Martinez, 716 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 2013); Newman, 703 F.3d at 757; Deville, 567
   F.3d at 156; Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730 (2000).

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   noted that the fact that the plaintiff had pulled his arm away when officers
   initially attempted to restrain him was “insufficient” to show that he posed
   “an immediate threat to the safety of the officers.” Id. We further explained
   that though we “ha[d] not addressed a fact pattern precisely on point,” we
   had previously “held that use of certain force after an arrestee has been
   restrained and handcuffed is excessive and unreasonable.” Id. Additionally,
   we distinguished another case, Poole, 691 F.3d at 626, on the grounds that
   there, “the use of a taser was not excessive” as “the arrestee was resisting
   arrest and the officers ceased use of the taser once the arrestee was handcuffed and
   subdued.” Ramirez, 716 F.3d at 378 (emphasis added).
           Here, as in Ramirez, both officers applied force while Soto was
   “restrained and handcuffed.” Id. In fact, based on Soto’s version of the
   facts, Soto was more obedient than the Ramirez plaintiff—the video does not
   conclusively demonstrate that Soto made any attempt to evade arrest.
   Moreover, Soto’s spitting—like the Ramirez plaintiff’s shouting—was
   disrespectful, but plainly did not “pose[] an immediate threat” to the
   Officers’ safety (at least pre-pandemic). Id.
          In Deville, we similarly concluded that an officer was not entitled to
   qualified immunity when he used substantial force in response to the
   plaintiff’s mere “passive resistance.” 567 F.3d at 169. We emphasized that
   based on the plaintiff’s evidence, the officer “engaged in very little, if any
   negotiation” before “quickly resort[ing]” to force. Id. We also highlighted
   the paucity of evidence suggesting that the plaintiff planned to flee or
   otherwise resist arrest. Id.
          Like the plaintiff in Deville, Soto was either confined inside the police
   cruiser or held down on the ground during the relevant events. In fact,
   Soto—unlike the Deville plaintiff—was handcuffed when the Officers
   applied force. Additionally, while Soto was undoubtedly crass, there is no

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   evidence he tried to physically harm the Officers or flee the scene. Yet, like
   the officer in Deville, Zuniga and Bautista “quickly resorted” to physical
   force without providing Soto with any meaningful opportunity to correct his
   disrespectful behavior. Id. at 168. Zuniga thrust Soto out of the car without
   so much as asking him to stop spitting, and Bautista kicked Soto mere
   moments later. In fact, the central facts of this case—which took place within
   fifteen seconds—evince an even quicker resort to substantial force than in
   Deville. 9
               In sum, based on the video evidence and assuming Soto’s version of
   the facts, the Officers’ use of force was “disproportionate to the situation, in
   violation of the Fourth Amendment and the clearly established law.” Joseph,
   981 F.3d at 342. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying the
   Officers’ motions for summary judgment as to the excessive force claims.
                                IV. Bystander Liability
           Finally, we address the district court’s denial of summary judgment
   as to Soto’s bystander liability claims. Under our precedents, to establish
   bystander liability, a plaintiff must show that (1) another officer was engaged
   in the use of excessive force, and (2) the observing officer had “a reasonable
   opportunity to realize the excessive nature of the force and to intervene to
   stop it.” Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 919 (5th Cir. 1995). We’ve already
   concluded that Soto has produced sufficient evidence to preclude summary
   judgment for the Officers as to the first prong.

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           9
             By way of contrast, Griggs v. Brewer, 841 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 2016), provides a
   helpful counterexample. There, we held that the defendant-officer did not violate clearly
   established law when he performed a “takedown maneuver” on an intoxicated arrestee and
   subsequently punched him in the head. Id. at 311, 316. Notably, however, in Griggs, the
   officer employed the “takedown” after Griggs attempted to “lurch[]” away—before he was
   handcuffed or otherwise restrained. Id. at 311, 313.

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          However, we conclude that the video evidence conclusively
   demonstrates that (1) Bautista could not have reacted quickly enough to
   prevent Zuniga from thrusting Soto to the ground or dropping his knee on
   Soto’s neck, and, in turn, (2) Zuniga could not have prevented Bautista from
   kicking Soto. Thus, even assuming that both Zuniga and Bautista used
   excessive force, they each lacked a “reasonable opportunity” to prevent each
   other’s unconstitutional conduct. See id. Therefore, the district court erred
   in denying the Officers’ motions for summary judgment on these claims.
                                  V. Conclusion
          For the foregoing reasons, we DISMISS the appeal as to the
   Officers’ challenges to the genuineness of the factual disputes identified by
   the district court due to lack of jurisdiction. With respect to the parts of the
   appeal addressing questions of law, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial
   of summary judgment as to Soto’s excessive force claims. We REVERSE
   the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to Soto’s bystander claims
   and REMAND for entry of summary judgment in favor of Officers Zuniga
   and Bautista and for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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