Court Opinion

ID: 9584853
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:53:16.491758+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:02.370708
License: Public Domain

Judge Martin (Harry C.)
dissenting.
This cause of action arose 1 July 1978 and resulted in a lengthy and important trial in the Superior Court of Wake County. Nevertheless, I am compelled to dissent.
The defendant excepted to the following portion of the charge:
And so I instruct you that you may find that Carolina Power & Light Company, that it may be found to be negligent under the doctrine of corporate negligence; and I instruct you that if you find from the evidence and by its greater weight that the defendant corporation has itself been negligent through its agents, or independent contractors, in failing to promulgate adequate safety rules, or failing to assure proper installation, maintenance and inspection of its electrical lines, poles and apparatus in accord with its duty to exercise the highest degree of care in performing such responsibility; and that such negligence was a proximate cause of Daryl Beck’s death, then you may find that the defendant is liable to the plaintiff under the doctrine of corporate negligence. (Emphasis ours.)
I find this exception to be prejudicial error. Although the particular aspect of the challenged instruction discussed herein is not argued by counsel, I find the error so palpable as to require analysis by this Court. See State v. Booker, 305 N.C. 554 (1982). One of the principal acts of negligence alleged by plaintiff is that defendant did not take proper care in replacing the transformer *388on the pole in 1974. At that time, a new transformer was installed to increase the voltage from 7,200 to 13,200 volts. All the evidence shows that Sumter Brothers, an independent contractor, made this change under a contract with defendant.
This portion of the charge allows the jury to find defendant liable for the acts of an independent contractor. Ordinarily, an independent contractor is not liable for injuries to third parties occurring after the work has been completed and accepted by the owner. Price v. Cotton Co., 226 N.C. 758, 40 S.E. 2d 344 (1946); 26 Am. Jur. 2d Electricity § 54 (1966). It may be otherwise where the work done is so negligently defective as to be imminently dangerous to third persons, provided the contractor knows, or should know, of the dangerous situation created by him, and the owner does not know of the dangerous condition and would not discover it by reasonable inspection. Price, supra; Williams v. Stores Co., Inc., 209 N.C. 591, 184 S.E. 496 (1936).
The facts in this aspect of the case are similar to Texas Traction Co. v. George, 149 S.W. 438 (1912). In Traction Co., George was killed while installing a transformer at Traction’s substation. George worked for a plumbing company that was doing the installation for the benefit of Traction and Stark Grain, Traction’s customer. The court held that the plumbing company was an independent contractor and that Traction, the electric company, was not responsible for its negligence. The court further held that the installation of a transformer was not intrinsically and necessarily dangerous. Likewise, the actions of Sumter Brothers in installing the transformer for defendant were not ultra-hazardous so as to invoke liability upon defendant. Insurance Co. v. Blythe Brothers Co., 260 N.C. 69, 131 S.E. 2d 900 (1963) (blasting); Evans v. Rockingham Homes, Inc., 220 N.C. 253, 17 S.E. 2d 125 (1941) (open ditch); Cole v. Durham, 176 N.C. 289, 97 S.E. 33 (1918) (opening in sidewalk).
Of course, where an electric company owes a direct duty to its patron, the duty cannot be evaded and shifted to an independent contractor. This principle is illustrated in Alabama Power Co. v. Emens, 228 Ala. 466, 153 So. 729 (1934). Alabama Power generated and distributed electricity. In addition, it sold and installed electrical home appliances. It engaged an independent con*389tractor to install a stove in plaintiffs home. A fire resulted from the negligent installation. The court held that where the power company sold and installed the electric appliance in the patron’s home, it could not evade its responsibility to the patron by use of an independent contractor for the installation. The duty was a direct personal obligation from the power company to its patron. See also National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Westgate Const. Co., 227 F. Supp. 835 (D. Del. 1964).
By installing the transformer through its independent contractor, Carolina Power & Light Company was not performing a direct personal duty to the deceased. Therefore, the general rule that there is no vicarious liability for the negligence of an independent contractor applies. Hendricks v. Fay, Inc., 273 N.C. 59, 159 S.E. 2d 362 (1968).
The challenged instruction is also erroneous in that it would allow the jury to find defendant negligent by reason of Sumter Brothers’ failing to promulgate adequate safety rules or failing to assure proper installation, maintenance and inspection of its electrical lines, poles and apparatus. There is no evidence that Sumter Brothers had a duty to promulgate adequate safety rules or to assure proper installation of the electrical facilities. These duties were obligations of the power company. The evidence of negligence as to Sumter Brothers was limited to its actions in the installing of the transformer in 1974.
I also find error in the punitive damage aspect of the case. Defendant excepted to the submission of issues 4A and B to the jury. The issues, and the answers by the jury were as follows:
4. Was Plaintiff’s intestate Daryl Beck killed by:
A. The willful and or (APGJr) wanton negligence of Defendant Carolina Power and Light?
Answer: No
B. The gross negligence of Defendant Carolina Power and Light?
Answer: Yes
The trial court obviously believed that N.C.G.S. 28A-18-2(b)(5) (adopted 1973) (Cum. Supp. 1981) required that issues based upon *390willful or wanton negligence and gross negligence be submitted to the jury. I find this to be error. The pertinent part of the statute reads: “(5) Such punitive damages as the decedent could have recovered had he survived, and punitive damages for wrongfully causing the death of the decedent through maliciousness, willful or wanton injury, or gross negligence.”
As the majority states, gross negligence is not defined in the statute, although the statute has a section of definitions. By failing to define gross negligence for the purpose of the statute, the legislature obviously intended to adopt the meaning of gross negligence established by our Supreme Court. In addressing the question of gross negligence as a basis for punitive damages, the Court held:
References to gross negligence as a basis for recovery of punitive damages may be found in our decisions . . . When an injury is caused by negligence, any attempt to differentiate variations from slight to gross is fraught with maximum difficulty. . . .
An analysis of our decisions impels the conclusion that this Court, in references to gross negligence, has used that term in the sense of wanton conduct. Negligence, a failure to use due care, be it slight or extreme, connotes inadvertence. Wantonness, on the other hand, connotes intentional wrongdoing. Where malicious or wilful injury is not involved, wanton conduct must be alleged and shown to warrant the recovery of punitive damages. Conduct is wanton when in conscious and intentional disregard of and indifference to the rights and safety of others. . . .
True, decisions in other jurisdictions are somewhat divergent in the statement of the applicable rule. The divergence is greater in the application to specific factual situations.
Hinson v. Dawson, 244 N.C. 23, 27-28, 92 S.E. 2d 393, 396-97 (1956).
Thus, in 1956 our Court clearly established that with respect to punitive damages, gross negligence and wanton conduct are synonymous. This holding by our Court has been consistently followed in an unbroken procession of cases. Newton v. Insurance Co., 291 N.C. 105, 229 S.E. 2d 297 (1976); Brewer v. Harris, 279 *391N.C. 288, 182 S.E. 2d 345 (1971); Van Leuven v. Motor Lines, 261 N.C. 539, 135 S.E. 2d 640 (1964); Rubber Co. v. Distributors, 253 N.C. 459, 117 S.E. 2d 479 (1960); Jenkins v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 244 N.C. 560, 94 S.E. 2d 577 (1956); Robinson v. Duszynski, 36 N.C. App. 103, 243 S.E. 2d 148 (1978); Siders v. Gibbs, 31 N.C. App. 481, 229 S.E. 2d 811 (1976); Brake v. Harper, 8 N.C. App. 327, 174 S.E. 2d 74, cert. denied, 276 N.C. 727 (1970); McAdams v. Blue, 3 N.C. App. 169, 164 S.E. 2d 490 (1968).
The principle is well stated by this Court, speaking through Judge Robert M. Martin, in Duszynski, supra:
Our courts have generally held that punitive damages are recoverable where the tortious conduct which causes the injury is accompanied by an element of aggravation, as when the wrong is done wilfully or under circumstances of rudeness or oppression, or in a manner evincing a wanton and reckless disregard of the plaintiffs rights. ... In cases where plaintiffs action was grounded on negligence, our courts have referred to gross negligence as the basis for recovery of punitive damages, using that term in the sense of wanton conduct. Hinson v. Dawson, 244 N.C. 23, 92 S.E. 2d 393 (1956). In Hinson, the Court explained that “[c]onduct is wanton when in conscious and intentional disregard of and indifference to the rights and safety of others.”
36 N.C. App. at 106, 243 S.E. 2d at 150. It is to be noted that Duszynski was a wrongful death case in which the issue of punitive damages was controlled by N.C.G.S. 28A-18-2(b)(5), as in the case sub judice.
The majority relies upon Clott v. Greyhound Lines, 9 N.C. App. 604, 177 S.E. 2d 438 (1970), rev’d, 278 N.C. 378, 180 S.E. 2d 102 (1971), a bailment case, in which the Court of Appeals stated: “Our Supreme Court has defined gross negligence as ‘something less than willful and wanton conduct.’ Smith v. Stepp, 257 N.C. 422, 125 S.E. 2d 903 (1962).” 9 N.C. App. at 609, 177 S.E. 2d at 441. While it is true that Smith v. Stepp does contain the quoted language, it must be understood that our Supreme Court was stating the law of the Commonwealth of Virginia, not the law of North Carolina. Smith involved an automobile accident that occurred in Virginia, but the lawsuit was tried in North Carolina. The Court was concerned with the application of Virginia’s guest *392passenger statute which required a finding of gross negligence to support recovery. The Court cited as authority for the quoted statement the Virginia case of Thomas v. Snow, 162 Va. 654, 174 S.E. 837 (1934). Furthermore, the Clott opinion by this Court was reversed by the Supreme Court. Although Duszynski did not cite or refer to Clott, it was decided subsequent to Clott and, by implication, removes any vestigial authority of Clott in this regard. The Clott decision cannot be taken as authority that the quoted statement is the law of North Carolina. Rather, Hinson v. Dawson, supra, remains the law of North Carolina.
This position with respect to punitive damages is also consistent with the philosophy expressed in Hinson that “[W]e are not disposed to expand the doctrine beyond the limits established by authoritative decisions of this Court.” 244 N.C. at 27, 92 S.E. 2d at 396.
Although it can be argued that under the law of Hinson the jury, by finding in its answer to issue 4A no willful or wanton conduct on the part of defendant, has foreclosed the issue of punitive damages, it is submitted that a more just result is to allow a new trial on that issue. The submission of issues 4A and B resulted in a misapplication of the law with respect to punitive damages. Only one issue should be submitted to the jury with respect to a basis for allowing punitive damages.
I vote for a new trial on all issues consistent with this opinion.