Court Opinion

ID: 9739261
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:11:22.61534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:11.177436
License: Public Domain

MEYER, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Minn.Stat. § 168.0422 (2002) violates the Minnesota and federal constitutions. Officer Maitland’s stop of Joel Henning, limited as it was to inquiring *387about the validity of his driver’s license, was a reasonable seizure and therefore not prohibited by either the state or federal constitution. This type of stop, authorized by statute, is reasonable because the substantial state interest in safeguarding our roads from drivers who repeatedly drive while impaired, combined with the focused nature of the practice, outweigh the limited intrusion on individual liberty. Aside from whether the balancing test weighs in favor of the seizure’s reasonableness, the statute should be upheld because the owner of the vehicle gave consent to a suspi-cionless stop when he applied for the special plates.
The state has devised a system for impounding license plates as part of its overall scheme of keeping the traveling public safe on the roads. The legislature has passed laws making driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol a crime. Minn. Stat. ch. 169A (2002). Violating these statutes once is a gross misdemeanor, and repeat offenders can be sent to jail for months. Minn.Stat. § 169A.275 (2002). The state will revoke an individual’s license to drive and impound that individual’s license plates during the period of the revocation. Minn.Stat. §§ 169A.54-.60 (2002). Taking away the license plates is a particularly important step in this procedure, because it ensures that individuals who are repeat offenders of our driving laws will not be able to illicitly drive their vehicles unnoticed.
The record establishes that Henning had driven while impaired twice within 5 years. Because of those violations, the state impounded his license plates and revoked his driver’s license as required by statute. MinmStat. §§ 169A.54-.60.1 Then, in order to obtain plates denoted by the prefix WZ, Henning’s father requested these sper cial-issue plates and demonstrated to the court that he owned the vehicle and had a valid license to drive.2
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution, are implicated in this case because “stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of [the constitution], even though the purpose of the stop’ is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). What both constitutions prohibit is “not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.” Elkins, v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960); see also U.S. Const. amend. TV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10; State v. Olson, 271 Minn. 50, 57, 135 N.W.2d 181, 186 (1965). After it has been established that a police practice amounts to a search or seizure, the analysis of what searches and seizures are unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional, involves balancing competing interests. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654, 99 S.Ct. 1391; State v. Larsen, 650 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Minn.2002); Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 185-86 (Minn.1994). The balancing test involves three factors: the gravity of the public concern served by the seizure; the degree to which the seizure advances the public interests; and the severity of the interference with individual liberty. Ascher, 519 N.W.2d at 185 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 *388L.Ed.2d 357 (1979)). The question presented in this case is whether it is.reasonable for a peace officer to stop a driver of a WZ vehicle and inquire about his or her driver’s license without any additional particularized suspicion.
The first factor to weigh in the balance is the gravity of the public concern served by the seizure. The state has a substantial interest in keeping our roads safe. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 658, 99 S.Ct. 1391. As part of its efforts to keep roads safe, the state must grapple with the problem of people who drive under the influence. We have recognized on multiple occasions the seriousness of this problem. See, e.g., Ascher, 519 N.W.2d at 185 (citing the magnitude of the problem with drunk driving and the strong state interest in eradicating it); Heddan v. Dirkswager, 336 N.W.2d 54, 62-63 (Minn.1983) (discussing the relationship ' of drunk driving to tragedy on the highways). Despite the best efforts of legislators and law enforcement, impaired drivers continue to present a very real danger, causing a disproportionate number of traffic deaths each year.3 Thesé accidents exact a tragic cost on the families of the individuals involved and are a drain on the financial resources of the state.4
Even more specifically, the practice of impounding standard plates • and issuing special plates is intended to further the state interest in protecting the public from individuals who repeatedly drive under the influence or without a driver’s license. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) reports that approximately one-third of all drivers arrested or convicted of driving while impaired each year are repeat offenders. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Vehicle & License Plate Sanctions, at www.nhtsa.gov/people/outreaeh/safe sobr/19qp/factsheets/vehiele.html (last visited June 30, 2003). In addition, repeat offenders are “overrepresented in fatal crashes and have a greater relative risk of fatal crash involvement.” Id.5 In addition many second- and third-time convicted DWI offenders are involved in traffic offenses or crashes during their suspension. Id. I conclude that repeat offenders of our laws against driving while impaired pose a serious threat to the safety of other travelers, and the seizure authorized by this statute addresses that threat.
The second factor in the balancing test concerns the efficacy of the stops at issue. The court was presented with no statistics as to how frequently peace officers find legal drivers at the wheel when they stop cars with special-issue plates of this variety. However, a study of Minnesota’s *389plate impoundment system found “a significant decrease in recidivism for violators who had their plates impounded versus violators who did not. Violators whose license plates were impounded by the arresting officer showed a 50 percent decrease in recidivism over a 2-year period (when compared with DWI violators who did not experience impoundment).” Id. The decrease in recidivism suggests that the impoundment scheme is furthering the state’s interest in protecting the public from the unsafe driving habits of repeat offenders. As our WZ plates are a key aspect of ensuring that repeat offenders do not harm the motoring public by driving during their period of revocation, and this statute is narrowly tailored to the population of repeat offenders, it reasonably advances the public interest.
I turn now to the third factor, the “nature and quality” of the intrusion on liberty entailed by the seizure. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In this case, we face a situation in which a narrow class of people — individuals driving with WZ plates — can be stopped by an officer for the purpose of ensuring that they are operating the vehicle within the scope allowed them by our state licensing agency. Although potentially aggravating, intimidating, and embarrassing, the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention is brief, just long enough for the officer to ensure the driver has a valid license.6
Having considered the gravity of the public concern presented by repeat offenders of our drunk driving laws, the focused nature of' this statute as part of the state’s enforcement scheme, and the extent of the intrusion involved when an officer asks to see the operator’s license to drive, I conclude this practice is a reasonable seizure and therefore the statute does not violate either the state or federal constitution. I emphasize here that the scope of the seizure authorized by statute is limited; it authorizes the stop of a vehicle in order to determine the validity of the driver’s license. Anything beyond that limited scope, justified by the state’s need to protect the public from individuals who repeatedly drive under the influence, could be unreasonable. See Terry, 892 U.S. at 29, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (noting that “evidence may not be introduced if it was discovered by means of a seizure and search which were not reasonably related in scope to the *390justification for their initiation” and that frisks justified by the protection of police officers and bystanders must be confined to an intrusion designed to discover hidden instruments that could be used in an assault); see also State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415, 418 (Minn.2003) (“the scope and duration of a traffic stop investigation must be limited to the justification for the stop”).
The majority attempts to analogize this case to the unconstitutional police practices at issue in Prouse and Ascher. Those cases are distinguishable in part because the intrusion affected many more people than does the intrusion authorized by Minn.Stat. § 168.0422. In Prouse, the police practice at issue was the arbitrary stop of any car on the road. 440 U.S. at 650, 99 S.Ct. 1391. And in Ascher, the practice at issue was temporary roadblocks used for sobriety tests, which detained all vehicles at a particular intersection. 519 N.W.2d at 184. In both of these cases the practices could potentially impact large populations, limiting the efficacy of the stop.
An additional difference between the instant case and Ascher is that Ascher did not involve a police action authorized by statute. The sobriety checks at issue in Ascher were an attempt by the police to use innovative tools to decrease drunk driving, but there was no statute prescribing the roadblocks. Because the court was faced with the constitutionality of a police practice, not a statute, the court was free to place the burden of proof on the state. Ascher, 519 N.W.2d at 187. In this case a statute is at issue, which shifts the burden of proof. Statutes are presumed constitutional, and the court traditionally uses its power to declare a statute unconstitutional “only when absolutely necessary.” State v. Larsen, 650 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Minn.2002). The party challenging the constitutionality of the statute bears the heavy burden of establishing its invalidity. Heidbreder v. Carton, 645 N.W.2d 355, 372 (Minn.2002). The mere “possibility” that lawful drivers may be repeatedly stopped should not suffice to meet the appellant’s heavy burden of establishing the statute’s invalidity. Nothing in the record before us convinces me it is “absolutely necessary” to strike down this statute.
Even if we were to conclude that the state’s interest in regulating repeat DWI offenders does not outweigh the intrusion on those drivers’ liberty, I would nevertheless conclude that the statute is constitutional because the owner of the vehicle gave consent to a suspicionless stop by applying for the special plates. That consent eliminated Henning’s reasonable expectation of privacy, at least insofar as it included an expectation to be free from an investigative stop to confirm he was a licensed driver. See State v. Perkins, 588 N.W.2d 491, 493 (Minn.1999) (“But even a reasonable expectation of privacy may be waived if a defendant’s conduct, objectively viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances, ‘mandates the conclusion that any expectation of privacy was unreasonable’”) (quoting State v. Tungland, 281 N.W.2d 646, 650 (Minn.1979)) (internal ellipsis omitted).
The majority opinion refuses to imply consent to a suspicionless stop because (1) Henning stated his view that the officer needed a separate reason to stop him, and (2) there was no evidence that Henning was put on notice that the special plates were accepted on the condition that law enforcement could stop the vehicle at any time. But the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy, as a prerequisite to an unlawful search and seizure, depends not merely on the party’s subjective expectations, but also on his or her objective expectations. In re Welfare of B.R.K, 658 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Minn.2003) (“First, we *391must determine whether B.R.K. exhibited an actual subjective expectation of privacy in the home and, second, whether that expectation is reasonable.”). Henning did admit to the officer that he was on notice of the conditions under which the special plates were issued (in fact, he debated with the officer about the appropriate interpretation of those conditions). Henning is charged with notice of the law, and the law expresses those conditions. See State v. Calmes, 632 N.W.2d 641, 648 (Minn.2001).7 Because consent is implied, neither the violator nor the person who applied for special plates has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. The violator cannot rely upon any theoretical expectation of privacy that might be possessed by someone other than the violator or the applicant.
I would hold that MinmStat. § 168.0422 is constitutional, because it authorizes only reasonable seizures of individuals who have continually abused their driving privileges and, alternatively, it authorizes a stop of an individual who has revoked his or her reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. Therefore, I would affirm the court of appeals.
BLATZ, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Meyer.
HANSON, Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Meyer.

. Joel Henning's plates were impounded under Minn.Stat. § 168.042 (1998), which is now repealed, but carried the same substantive provisions as sections 169A.54-.60.

. Other circumstances for issuance include when the violator himself has a limited license to perform essential tasks. See Minn. Stat. §§ 168.041, subd. 6; 169A.60, subd. 13; 171.30 (2002).

. In 2001, there were 226 alcohol-related traffic fatalities in Minnesota, which constituted 40% of all traffic deaths in that year. Mothers Against Drunk Driving, State-by-State Traffic Fatalities — 2001, at http:// www.madd.org/stats/0,1056,4809,00.html (last visited June 30, 2003)¿

. It is estimated that the average alcohol-related fatality costs the State bf Minnesota $3.5 million. Public Services Research Institute, Impaired Driving in .Minnesota, at www.nhtsa.gov/peopIe/iniury/alcohol/MN.htm (last visited June 30, 2003). Using the number of .traffic deaths reported in, note 3, alcohol-related fatalities cost Minnesota an estimated $791 million in the year 2001.

.Interestingly, the NHTSA includes among its recommendations for strengthening states’ license plate sanctions that states allowing special-issue plates "incorporate a provision that permits officers to stop the vehicle for the sole purpose of checking whether the driver is operating the vehicle while their license is under suspension.” National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Vehicle & License Plate Sanctions, at www.nhtsa.gov/people/out-reacb/safesobr/19qp/factsheets/vehicle.html (last visited June 30, 2003). Minnesota is one of three states that issue special license plates as part of its efforts to monitor repeat offenders. Id.

. The majority describes the statute as subjecting legitimate motorists "to the possibility of being stopped by every law enforcement officer they encounter.” The facts of this case do not establish that the actual government intrusion is unnecessarily invasive; there is no indication that other members of Hen-ning’s family were harassed while driving. In this case, Henning was the individual whose license had been revoked after he was caught driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs twice within 5 years. And Henning was the individual behind the wheel when Mait-land stopped the car after noticing the special plates. Regardless, I would defer that concern for another day and only decide the constitutionality of Minn.Stat. § 168.0422 as applied to the facts before us. See, e.g., Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 716 (Minn.1999) (finding .predatory offender registration statute constitutional as applied to appellant); State v. Chambers, 589 N.W.2d 466, 480 (Minn.1999) (finding life sentence without possibility of release, as applied to appellant, constitutional); Wheeler v. City of Wayzata, 533 N.W.2d 405, 407 (Minn.1995) (finding Wayzata’s zoning ordinance "not constitutionally invalid as applied here”). As applied to these facts, issues concerning the statute’s .breadth do not take on constitutional significance. The majority also expresses concern that the statute might authorize a suspicion-less stop of a qualified driver who was not a party to the original revocation. I would also defer that concern to another day because the facts before us involve a driver whose violation caused the original revocation.

. It is not clear whether the majority is of the view that the legislature could never condition the issuance of special plates on the applicant's consent to suspicionless searches or only that the legislature did not do so with sufficient clarity here. I do not read the majority opinion as foreclosing further efforts by the legislature to make the applicant’s consent more explicit.