Court Opinion

ID: 9938828
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 19:04:01.680133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:28.216021
License: Public Domain

ON REMANDMENT
On certiorari the Supreme Court determined that we were in error in holding that Coverage D-(2) of the policy was not ambiguous; that before there was coverage the entire automobile must be stolen, and since the entire automobile was not stolen the loss in question was not covered. The cause was remanded to this court for further consideration.
In our original opinion, under the conclusion reached, it was unnecessary to consider the second question presented, i. e., whether liability under Coverage D is limited by the underlined provisions of the policy, as follows:
 "Limits of Liability * * * Coverages D, D-50, F and G. The limit of the company's liability for loss shall not exceed the actual cash value of the property, or if the loss is of a part thereof the actual cash value of such part, at time of loss, nor what it would then cost to repair or replace such property with other of like kind and quality, less depreciation and deductible amount applicable. The limit of liability for loss to all wearing apparel and luggage of one or more persons shall not exceed $200 for each accident."
The word "loss" as it is used in Coverage "D" and related provisions is defined by the policy as follows: *Page 105
 "Loss — wherever used with respect to Coverages D, D-50, F and G means each direct and accidental loss of or damage to (1) an automobile covered by this policy, (2) its equipment or (3) other property insured hereunder."
Counsel for State Farm argues in brief:
 "The original provision under which coverage is sought as now interpreted by the Supreme Court * * * is that the insurer agrees:
 'To pay for loss caused by fire * * * or theft * * * to wearing apparel and luggage * * while such property is in * * * the * * * automobile.'
 "Substituting the policy definition for the word 'loss' in the phrase in question, the insuring agreement reads as follows:
 'To pay for direct and accidental loss caused by fire * * * or theft * * * to wearing apparel and luggage * * * while such property is in * * * the automobile.'
 "Therefore, when the word "loss" is given the meaning prescribed by the policy in the appropriate definition section of the policy, we find that the only loss covered is a 'direct and accidental' loss and that payment for such loss is limited to $200.00."
Appellee's counsel insists that the word "accident" as used in this policy does not mean the same thing as the word "theft" as used in the policy. He points out the following policy provisions labeled "Policy Conditions — Applicable To All Coverages Unless Otherwise Noted."
 "1. Notice of Accident, Occurrence or loss. In the event of an accident, occurrence or loss written notice shall be given by or on behalf of the insured to the company or any of its authorized agents as soon as practicable. Such notice shall contain particulars sufficient to identify the insured, and also reasonably obtainable information respecting the time, place, circumstances of the accident or occurrence, names and addresses of injured persons and available witnesses. In the event of theft, larceny, robbery or pilferage prompt notice also shall be given to the police."
The usual meaning of the word "accident" does not necessarily include theft. As used in the policy its meaning is ambiguous. The familiar principle is that in construing the terms of an insurance policy ambiguities or uncertainties must be resolved in favor of the insured. There was no error in the court's refusal to give the following requested charge:
 "The court charges the jury that the defendant's liability for loss to wearing apparel or luggage is limited under the policy of insurance sued on to $200.00."
Nor in denying the motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict of the jury is excessive.
The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.