Court Opinion

ID: 9670079
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:14:20.24127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:02.320899
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING
PER CURIAM.
On a restudy of the case and the pertinent authorities, the court believes we reached the wrong conclusion with respect to the doctrine of estoppel on original deliverance.
The case involved, inter alia, the question of estoppel. The latest decision involving this doctrine was the case of Mooradian v. Canal Insurance Co., 272 Ala. 373, 130 So.2d 915. Both the case at bar and Mooradian involved exclusions from coverage in automobile liability insurance policies. In Mooradian the policy provided that it did not apply to injury or death to passengers. In the instant case the policy provided that *65coverage did not apply while the insured automobile was used for the towing of a trailer not covered by like insurance in the company. Mooradian held, in line with the practically universal concept, that coverage under the policy could not be enlarged by either waiver or estoppel, since such doctrine can only have a field of operation when the subject matter is within the terms of the contract, such as conditions or forfeiture provisions expressed in the contract.
Since Mooradian is the last of our cases which enunciates the doctrine, for convenience we will quote from that case:
“The unvarying rule is that coverage under an insurance policy cannot be enlarged by waiver or estoppel, since such doctrine can only have a field of operation when the subject matter is within the terms of the contract. Fidelity Phenix Fire Ins. Co. of New York v. Raper, 242 Ala. 440(6), 6 So.2d 513.
“In Home Ins. Co. of New York v. Campbell Motor Co., 227 Ala. 499, 150 So. 486, 489, this court observed:
“ ‘Waiver or estoppel can only have a field of operation when the subject-matter is within the terms of the contract. No one, we assume, would argue that a policy of insurance, which protected one against loss by fire, could be extended or broadened, by the application of the principle of waiver or estoppel, to cover the loss by cyclone. The effect, in such a case, would be to create a new contract, without a new consideration.’
“What appellant seems to seek here is to make a new contract so as to cover bodily injury or death resulting to a passenger in the insured vehicle, when by its terms, it is expressly excluded from the contract. The doctrine of estoppel does not operate to that effect. After a loss accrues, an insurance company may, by its conduct, waive a forfeiture; or by some act before such loss may induce the insured to do or not to do some act which is contrary to the stipulations of the policy, and thereby be estopped from setting up such violation as a forfeiture; but such conduct, though in conflict with the terms of the contract of insurance and .with the knowledge of the insured, and relied upon by him, will not have the effect to broaden such contract so as to cover additional objects of insurance or causes of loss. The passenger hazard exclusion endorsement which was a part of the insurance contract instantly considered relieved the appellee from liability and assuming control of the defense of the insured could not by estoppel enlarge the coverage or obligate the appellee to continue representation in the suit.” (130 So.2d 920)
As stated so many times by our court, one cannot create a primary liability and extend the coverage of a policy by either waiver or estoppel. To create such a primary liability all the elements of a binding contract are essential, including a new consideration. Some of our cases holding to this effect and supporting Mooradian are: Home Insurance Company of New York v. Campbell Motor Company, 227 Ala. 499, 150 So. 486; Protective Life Insurance Co. v. Cole, 239 Ala. 450, 161 So. 818; Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Langford, 234 Ala. 681, 176 Ala. 609; Fidelity-Phenix Fire Insurance Co. v. Raper, 242 Ala. 440, 6 So.2d 513; Jones v. Liberty National Life Insurance Co., 35 Ala.App. 52, 58, 47 So.2d 222; Union Marine & General Insurance Co. v. Holmes, 249 Ala. 294, 31 So.2d 303; Hanover Fire Insurance Co. of N. Y. v. Salter, 254 Ala. 500, 49 So.2d 193; Mutual Savings Life Insurance Co. v. Hall, 254 Ala. 668, 671, 49 So.2d 298; Jersey Insurance Co. v. Roddam, 256 Ala. 634, 56 So.2d 631; Patterson v. Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Society, 38 Ala.App. 328, 84 So.2d 127, cert. denied, 263 Ala. 700, 84 So.2d 130.
The authorities generally are the same, as shown by the text in 113 A.L.R. 858.
See the original opinion by COLEMAN, J., for a better understanding of the facts.
*66This court in pointing out that estoppel could not change or enlarge the coverage of an insurance policy, quoted from Home Insurance Co. v. Campbell in the Mooradian case, supra, to illustrate the principle, stating that no one, we assume, would argue that a policy of insurance, which protected one against loss by fire, could be extended or broadened by the application of the principle of waiver or estoppel, to cover loss by cyclone. The effect of such a case would be to create a new contract without a new consideration.
We hold, therefore, that under facts stated, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover and that the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded.
Application for rehearing granted. Judgment of affirmance set aside. Reversed and remanded.
LIVINGSTON, C. J., and SIMPSON, GOODWYN, MERRILL and HAR-WOOD, JJ., concur.
COLEMAN, J., dissented, adhering to his original opinion.