Court Opinion

ID: 9474953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:13:12.349811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:25.318376
License: Public Domain

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur fully in the court’s order. I write separately only to clarify the task the district judge faces on remand.
Given our disposition of this case, we do not reach the question of the propriety of the fees award. In particular, we express no view regarding the appropriate standard to be applied in awarding attorney’s fees as a condition of a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal where the underlying suit is a Title VII action. Ordinarily the decision to award attorney’s fees under Rule 41(a)(2) is a matter within the trial court’s discretion, and the normal rules governing a court’s exercise of its discretion are applicable. See Sams v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 625 F.2d 273, 277 (9th Cir.1980). However, the United States Supreme Court has severely circumscribed the discretion of courts to award attorney’s fees in Title VII cases. Because Congress intended to encourage the vigorous enforcement of Title VII’s provisions by making it easier to bring a Title VII action, see, e.g., Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 420, 422, 98 S.Ct. 694, 699, 700, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978), and because a Title VII plaintiff “is the chosen instrument of Congress” to enforce equal employment opportunities, “ ‘a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority,’ ” id. 434 U.S. at 418, 98 S.Ct. at 699 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 966, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968) (per curiam)), the Court has concluded that a prevailing Title VII plaintiff should be awarded attorney’s fees in “all but very unusual circumstances,” Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2370, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975); see also Dosier v. Miami Valley Broadcasting Corp., 656 F.2d 1295, 1301 (9th Cir.1981), but that a “prevailing defendant may be awarded counsel fees only when the plaintiffs’ underlying claim is ‘frivolous, unreasonable or groundless,’ ” Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 762, 100 S.Ct. 2455, 2462, 65 L.Ed.2d 488 (1980) (quoting Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422, 98 S.Ct. at 701); see also Boatowners and Tenants Association v. Port of Seattle, 716 F.2d 669, 674 (9th Cir.1983). Upon remand for a new ruling on Lau’s motion, the district court must decide whether the *932Rule 41(a)(2) standard or the Title VII standard is appropriate here.
We also do not reach the question whether, if a fees award is appropriate at all in this case, an award in the amount of $12,-000 is justified. That award represented all or nearly all of the costs and attorney’s fees expended by the School District in defending the claim. The district court did not explain how it reached its award, nor did it determine whether any of the School District’s work product produced in this case would be useful in future litigation involving Lau. See GAF Corp. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 665 F.2d 364, 365, 369-70 (D.C.Cir.1981). Where a plaintiff is granted a voluntary dismissal without prejudice to pursue a related action against the defendant in another forum, the defendant is not entitled to reimbursement of costs and legal fees incurred in preparing work product that may be useful in the continuing litigation. McLaughlin v. Cheshire, 676 F.2d 855, 856-57 (D.C.Cir.1982); GAF Corp., 665 F.2d at 369; 5 Moore’s Federal Practice 11 41.06, at 41-78.