Court Opinion

ID: 9963029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 15:01:05.420772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:15.912088
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-8088     Document: 010111037290     Date Filed: 04/24/2024   Page: 1
                                                                FILED
                                                    United States Court of Appeals
                     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS         Tenth Circuit

                           FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          April 24, 2024
                       _________________________________
                                                                       Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                           Clerk of Court
  CHUCK ALLEN HODGE,

           Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                       No. 23-8088
                                                 (D.C. No. 1:23-CV-00195-SWS)
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                 (D. Wyo.)

           Defendant - Appellee.
                       _________________________________

                           ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                       _________________________________

 Before PHILLIPS, BRISCOE, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       Chuck Allen Hodge, a state pretrial detainee proceeding pro se, appeals

 the district court’s order dismissing his complaint for lack of jurisdiction and

 for failure to state a claim. He also seeks leave from us to proceed in forma

 pauperis (IFP) on appeal. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we

 dismiss the appeal as frivolous and deny his motion to proceed IFP.

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has
 determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the
 determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
 The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and
 judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the
 case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
 persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-8088   Document: 010111037290       Date Filed: 04/24/2024   Page: 2

                                  BACKGROUND

       In the district court, Hodge filed a complaint against the United States.

 Though the district court noted that Hodge’s “complaint borders on

 incomprehensible,” the court understood him to advance two claims under the

 Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346: (1) deprivation of access to a law

 library and law books, and (2) sexual assault by artificial intelligence. 1 R. vol.

 1, at 154. Screening the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court

 ruled that it lacked jurisdiction because Hodge’s claims didn’t fit under the

 FTCA, leaving the United States immune. So the court dismissed Hodge’s

 complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and also “for failure to comply

 with [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 8(a)’s pleading requirements.” R. vol. 1,

 at 160. Hodge appealed. 2

       1
         The court also observed that Hodge’s complaint “makes several other
 allegations,” including “that his right to a fair and speedy trial has been
 violated, that he was not read his Miranda rights when he was arrested, and that
 he is being tortured.” R. vol. 1, at 155. The court declined to address these
 allegations because they were “simply too conclusory, vague, and unsupported
 by any facts to satisfy the low hurdle of Rule (8)(a)’s pleading standard.” Id. at
 156. We agree.
       2
         After entering the order dismissing Hodge’s complaint, the district court
 failed to enter a judgment on a separate document, as Federal Rule of Civil
 Procedure 58(a) requires. And because the district court had not yet entered a
 judgment before Hodge filed his notice of appeal, his appeal was premature.
 Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2). But we have decided that this type of prematurity is
 cured by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(7)(B) because “the appellant
 can always decide to waive the separate document requirement and choose to
                                                             (footnote continued)
                                          2
Appellate Case: 23-8088   Document: 010111037290     Date Filed: 04/24/2024   Page: 3

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

       We review de novo the district court’s dismissal on sovereign-immunity

 grounds. Flute v. United States, 808 F.3d 1234, 1239 (10th Cir. 2015).

                                   DISCUSSION

       “The United States and its officers enjoy immunity from suit except in

 instances where the United States has expressly waived that protection.” Id.

 And unless the United States waives its immunity, “the federal courts lack

 jurisdiction to hear claims against it.” San Juan Cnty. v. United States, 754

 F.3d 787, 792 (10th Cir. 2014).

       Under the FTCA, the United States waived its sovereign immunity—and

 consented to be sued—for “torts committed by federal employees.” F.D.I.C. v.

 Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475–76 (1994) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)). The FTCA

 covers claims (1) against the United States; (2) for money damages; (3) due to

 an injury, death, or loss of property; (4) caused by a negligent act by a United

 States employee; (5) who was acting within the scope of his employment;

 (6) “under [the] circumstances where the United States, if a private person,

 would be liable to the claimant.” Id. at 477 (quoting same). Given this, Hodge

 has not stated a claim under the FTCA: Though he purports to sue the United

 States, he has identified no negligent act by a United States employee. Indeed,

 appeal prior to the running of the 150-day cap.” Constein v. United States, 628
 F.3d 1207, 1212 (10th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). Thus, we have jurisdiction over
 Hodge’s appeal.
                                         3
Appellate Case: 23-8088      Document: 010111037290       Date Filed: 04/24/2024   Page: 4

 he is a state detainee being held in a state jail. Thus, the United States is

 immune, and the district court correctly dismissed Hodge’s complaint for lack

 of jurisdiction.

           Likewise, Hodge is not entitled to IFP status. We grant IFP motions when

 appellants show (1) “a financial inability to pay the required filing fees” and

 (2) “the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in

 support of the issues raised on appeal.” Watkins v. Leyba, 543 F.3d 624, 627

 (10th Cir. 2008) (cleaned up). Hodge’s opening brief, which is sparse and

 conclusory, fails to challenge the district court’s ruling on subject-matter

 jurisdiction. We thus conclude that his arguments on appeal are frivolous and

 deny his motion to proceed IFP. See id. Hodge must pay the appellate-filing fee

 immediately. See 10th Cir. R. 3.3.

                                      CONCLUSION

           For all these reasons, we dismiss this appeal as frivolous and deny Hodge IFP

 status.

                                               Entered for the Court

                                               Gregory A. Phillips
                                               Circuit Judge

                                              4