Court Opinion

ID: 9730929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:28:35.260026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:11.216977
License: Public Domain

Jansen, P.J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to enjoin the conduct of defendants as requested by plaintiff. The trial court noted that there was "some question as to what [ordinance] is applicable to this property owner [defendants].” The court, mindful of the health, safety, and welfare of affected citizens, then balanced the legitimate needs of plaintiff and those of a property owner "to be able to do and to conduct business and to have the use of his property.” The court concluded that "there is no immediate and irreparable harm and that, in fact, the *686use of the 300 feet should be allowed. That to do otherwise under the facts and circumstances would constitute [an] abuse of the discretion of the Zoning Board and also the ordinance.”
I first note, as acknowledged by the trial court and the parties, that there exists a dispute concerning whether the planning commission reviewed and approved defendants’ site plan under the "old” 1968 ordinance or under the "new” 1983 ordinance. I am of the opinion that approval was granted pursuant to the old ordinance. This conclusion is supported by the stipulated statement of facts and the minutes of the June 20, 1983, commission meeting, which state that defendants applied for site plan approval under the old ordinance rather than the new ordinance. However, such an opinion is not determinative, because I conclude that defendants’ use of their property, as alleged by plaintiff, is not violative of either the old or the new ordinance.
The rules governing construction of statutes also govern construction of ordinances. Albright v City of Portage, 188 Mich App 342, 350-351, n 7; 470 NW2d 657 (1991); Settles v Detroit City Clerk, 169 Mich App 797, 808; 427 NW2d 188 (1988). A word or phrase in a statute, or in this case an ordinance, is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Nat’l Exposition Co v Detroit, 169 Mich App 25, 29; 425 NW2d 497 (1988). When the language is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is neither required nor permitted. Id. Such an ordinance must be applied, and not interpreted, because it speaks for itself. Id.
As stated in the stipulated statement of facts, the "old” ordinance provided, in pertinent part, that the junkyard be enclosed by an eight-foot obscuring fence and that no property line of the junkyard form the exterior boundary of an M-2 *687district. It is patently clear that the "old” ordinance contains no three-hundred-foot setback requirement. The township represented to defendants, before their initial application for site plan approval on May 16, 1983 (and before the May 27, 1983, effective date of the "new” ordinance), that "the erection of the fence three hundred (300) feet from Griswold Road was required by the applicable ordinance.”
In reliance on this representation, defendants agreed to, and did in fact, erect a fence three hundred feet from Griswold Road. It is clear that in agreeing to construct the fence, defendants relied on the township’s representation that the law required the erection of such a fence. Clearly this was not the case, because the "old” ordinance contained no such requirement. I am of the opinion that defendants were not required to abide by the three-hundred-foot setback requirement pursuant to the "old” ordinance.
Plaintiff points to two additional sections of its ordinance as authority for imposing the three-hundred-foot setback condition on defendants. However, after reviewing these sections, I conclude that they do not grant plaintiff the authority it claims. The first section merely states what the "purpose of Site Plan and Development approval is . . . .” The second section allows the planning commission and township board to "impose such conditions or limitations in granting approval as may, in its judgment, be necessary to fulfill the spirit and purpose of this ordinance.” I am of the opinion that this section is invalid, because it fixes no standard for the appróval or disapproval of a site plan. There exists no reasonable standard for the imposition of such conditions and limitations, except for necessity as determined by the "judgment” of the planning commission and the town*688ship board. See Osius v St Clair Shores, 344 Mich 693, 698; 75 NW2d 25 (1956); Orion Twp v Weber, 83 Mich App 712, 719; 269 NW2d 275 (1978).
Turning to the "new” ordinance, I again conclude that defendants’ use of their property was not in contravention of the ordinance. The "new” ordinance provides, in part, that the usage of property as a junkyard shall not be allowed within three hundred feet of any "residential district,” and the storage area of a junkyard must be obscured from public view and entirely enclosed by an eight-foot obscuring wall.
It is undisputed that the area across the street from defendants’ property is zoned "ag” or "General Agricultural District.” Pursuant to the clear, unambiguous terms of the "new” ordinance, defendants are not subject to the three-hundred-foot setback requirement because their property is not within three-hundred feet of a "residential district.” The language of the ordinance is clear and unambiguous and, therefore, judicial construction . is neither required nor permitted. National Exposition Co, supra. I would apply the ordinance as written. Id.
I also find without merit plaintiffs argument that the general agricultural district is a holding pattern for residential development. Section 400 of the ordinance provides that "[t]he ag General Agricultural District is applicable to those areas of the Township which are not expected to be developed for urban uses in the foreseeable future.” Given the clear, unambiguous character of the "new” ordinance, it is my conclusion that the three-hundred-foot setback requirement is inapplicable to these defendants.
I would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff the injunctive *689relief it sought. Additionally, the trial court’s resolution of this case, given the existing facts, was fair and equitable. I would affirm the order of the lower court.