Court Opinion

ID: 9383603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-30 19:03:26.229482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:46.707953
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/30/23 Gill v. Royal Ruby, Inc. CA1/3
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

         IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 MANJEET KAUR GILL,
           Cross-Complainant and Appellant,
                                                                              A165206
 v.
 ROYAL RUBY, INC.,                                                            (Alameda County
                                                                              Super. Ct. No. RG17867701)
           Cross-Defendant and Respondent.

         Appellant Manjeet Kaur Gill appeals from the denial of her motion for
leave to file an amended cross-complaint adding her as a party to the action.
We reverse the order of the trial court.
                            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
         In July 2017, plaintiffs Daljit Gill (by and through his guardian ad
litem Jasbir Gill) and Jasbir Gill filed a complaint against Royal Ruby, Inc.
(Royal Ruby), Stevenson Ventures LLC (Stevenson Ventures), and Amritpal
Singh alleging numerous causes of action, such as for negligence, premises
liability, loss of consortium, and battery. In short, plaintiffs alleged that:
Daljit attended a wedding reception in May 2017 for Sukhchain and Manjeet

                                                               1
Gill1 (no relation to plaintiffs) at a property owned and operated by Royal
Ruby and Stevenson Ventures; Royal Ruby and Stevenson Ventures failed to
provide adequate security; and in the venue’s parking lot—also owned and
operated by Royal Ruby and Stevenson Ventures—Daljit was attacked by
other guests, including Amritpal Singh.
      Royal Ruby filed a cross-complaint against Sukhchain seeking
indemnity and alleging that Sukhchain was negligent in selecting and
supervising the guests at his wedding reception.
      In April 2019, Sukhchain and appellant filed a cross-complaint against
Royal Ruby, alleging causes of action for breach of contract, common counts,
intentional misrepresentation, concealment, and promissory fraud. In sum,
the Gills alleged that Royal Ruby failed to provide security as agreed and
paid for, resulting in uninvited guests crashing their wedding reception,
fighting, and ruining their wedding day. The Gills sought roughly $30,000 in
damages, punitive damages, and attorneys fees. Attorney Swapna Anthoor
represented the Gills in filing this cross-complaint, which was not served on
cross-defendant Royal Ruby.
      In May 2019, Anthoor filed a first amended cross-complaint on behalf of
both of the Gills as cross-complainants, alleging the same causes of action but
removing the cause of action for common counts and the request for punitive
damages. Like the previous pleading, the first amended cross-complaint was
not served on Royal Ruby.
      In September 2019, Anthoor filed a second amended cross-complaint
naming only Sukhchain as a cross-complainant. This cross-complaint alleged

1     For the sake of brevity and clarity, we will hereafter refer to Sukhchain
Gill by his first name only. We will refer to his wife, Manjeet Gill, as
appellant, and we will sometimes refer to them collectively as “the Gills.”

                                       2
three causes of action for breach of written contract, implied contractual
indemnity, and unfair business practices (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200). The
second amended cross-complaint was in fact served on cross-defendant Royal
Ruby, which filed an answer to it.
      In April 2021, Anthoor filed substitution of attorney forms indicating
that both Gills were cross-complainants and that they would be representing
themselves. In June 2021, attorney John Kithas filed forms substituting
himself in as the attorney for the Gills. The Gills signed these forms.
      In September 2021, Kithas filed an ex parte application for an order
shortening time for notice and a hearing on a motion seeking leave to file a
third amended cross-complaint on behalf of both Gills. Specifically, the
proposed third amended cross-complaint would add appellant back into the
action as a cross-complainant to the existing causes of action for breach of
contract and unfair business practices, and would allege a new cause of
action on behalf of her and Sukhchain for negligent infliction of emotional
distress and a prayer for punitive damages to that cause of action and the
first cause of action for breach of contract. It would also add a “ ‘tort of
another theory’ ” of recovery to the existing second cause of action for implied
contractual indemnity brought on behalf of Sukhchain alone and would
additionally clarify the contract-related allegations related to both written
and oral contractual terms.
      Royal Ruby opposed the application for an order shortening time, and
the trial court denied it. In the same order, the court re-set the trial date
from October 18, 2021 to April 4, 2022.
      In December 2021, Kithas filed a memorandum on behalf of the Gills in
support of their motion to amend the cross-complaint. Citing Code of Civil

                                         3
Procedure sections 473, subdivision (a)(1) and 576,2 Kithas contended the
trial court should permit the amendment because prior counsel Anthoor
removed appellant from the second amended cross-complaint without the
Gills’ knowledge or approval. Kithas said he discovered this in August 2021
when Royal Ruby mentioned that appellant was not a party. Accompanying
the memorandum was a declaration from prior counsel, Anthoor, who stated
that she named the Gills as cross-complainants in the original and first
amended cross-complaints. Anthoor explained she did not “caution” either
Sukhchain or appellant that she intended to remove appellant as a cross-
complainant from the second amended cross-complaint; nor did she obtain
permission from either of the Gills to do so.3
      Royal Ruby filed opposition objecting to all of the proposed
amendments. The trial court heard argument on the motion and permitted
the parties to file supplemental briefs, then took the matter under
submission on January 10, 2022. Ultimately, the court denied the request for
leave to add appellant as a cross-complainant, but it granted the requests for
leave to add and modify Sukhchain’s claims, and continued the trial date to
October 2022 to provide time for discovery on the amended claims.
      With regard to appellant, the trial court began by observing that there
was nothing in the record indicating the Gills ever served their original and
first amended cross-complaints on Royal Ruby, and that service was
completed after Anthoor filed the second amended cross-complaint naming
only Sukhchain. Indicating that such filing and service effectively dismissed

2     All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure
unless otherwise indicated.
3    The Gills did not submit declarations of their own in support of this
motion.

                                        4
appellant and her claims against Royal Ruby from the action, the court found
that the statute of limitations had since run on appellant’s claims and that
the relation-back doctrine did not apply “because [appellant] was previously
named as a cross-complainant, and then was removed from the action by way
of amendment.” The court commented there was no indication that counsel
acted unintentionally or by mistake.4
         The trial court also rejected two contentions raised for the first time in
the Gills’ supplemental briefs. First, the court rejected the argument that
because Sukhchain did not seek leave of court to file the second amended
cross-complaint, the case “should be deemed to rest” upon the first amended
cross-complaint which had included appellant as a party. Because the second
amended cross-complaint appeared to be the only pleading actually served on
Royal Ruby, which did not object to it and instead answered it, the court
declined to deem that pleading invalid based on Sukhchain’s last-minute
objection. Second, the court also rejected the argument that appellant should
be permitted to move to intervene. (§ 387.)
         The Gills filed a notice of appeal. Appellant alone filed an opening
brief.
                                    DISCUSSION
         A. Appealability
         Initially, we address the parties’ dispute over the appealability of the
order denying leave to amend as to appellant’s claims. Appellant contends
the order is appealable because it removed her entirely from the action.

4     In its order, the trial court noted that appellant “did not bring the
request to amend under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.” Our review of
appellant’s memorandum in support of her motion indicates the court was
mistaken on this point. In any event, it appears the court did not rely on this
code section as a basis for denying the motion.

                                          5
Royal Ruby contends otherwise because, in its view, appellant was never a
party in the first place since she was not named as a party in the only cross-
complaint ever served on it. As such, Royal Ruby urges, the exception to the
one final judgment rule—i.e., when there are multiple parties and a
judgment is entered as to one party leaving no issues to be determined as to
that party—does not apply.
      Section 904.1, subdivision (a), embodies the one final judgment rule,
which bars an appeal from an interlocutory judgment that “ ‘disposes of fewer
than all of the causes of action framed by the pleadings’ ” and is “ ‘not yet
final, as to any parties between whom another cause of action remains
pending.’ ” (Kurwa v. Kislinger (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1097, 1101.) However,
when there are multiple parties and a judgment is entered as to a party, that
party may appeal if the judgment “leav[es] no issues to be determined”
involving the party. (Buckaloo v. Johnson (1975) 14 Cal.3d 815, 821, fn. 3.)
      “A party is a person named as a party to an action and subjected to the
jurisdiction of the court. [Citations.] A person is not subjected to the
jurisdiction of the court until summons has been served or they have made a
general appearance.” (Moffett v. Barclay (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 980, 982–
983.) “A general appearance occurs where a party, either directly or through
counsel, participates in an action in some manner which recognizes the
authority of the court to proceed. It does not require any formal or technical
act.” (Mansour v. Superior Court (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1750, 1756.)
      Here, it is undisputed that the Gills never served Royal Ruby with the
original and first amended cross-complaints naming appellant as a cross-
complainant. But in filing these cross-complaints with the trial court,
appellant was clearly participating in a manner that recognized the authority
of the court to proceed. (Mikulski v. Mikulski (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 1047, 1049

                                        6
[“by the very act of commencing his action plaintiff submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court and the court thereafter had the power to enter an
effective judgment for or against him in personam”].) As such, appellant
was—at least at one point—a party. And because the trial court’s order
barred appellant from being added back to the cross-complaint as a party,
there were no issues remaining to be decided regarding her. Thus, that order
was appealable. (Cf. Kuperman v. Great Republic Life Ins. Co. (1987) 195
Cal.App.3d 943, 946–947 (Kuperman) [order striking third amended
complaint, which operated to remove a party from the case, left no issues to
be determined as to that removed party and so was appealable]; Mesa
Shopping Center-East, LLC v. O Hill (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 890, 898–899
[order denying request to vacate dismissal “constituted the final
determination of the issues” and was appealable].)
      B. The Order Denying Leave to Add Appellant to the Third
         Amended Cross-Complaint
      Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying her motion for leave
to be added back as a party to the cross-complaint.
      Section 473, subdivision (a)(1), provides: “The court may, in
furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to
amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any
party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any
other respect . . . .” (See also § 576.) “It is well established that ‘California
courts have “a policy of great liberality in allowing amendments at any stage
of the proceeding so as to dispose of cases upon their substantial merits
where the authorization does not prejudice the substantial rights of
others.” ’ ” (Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1154,
1163.)

                                         7
      The question here is whether the trial court abused its discretion in
denying leave to amend on the grounds that: appellant and her claims
against Royal Ruby were “dismissed” from the action; her claims were time-
barred at the time the subject amendments were proposed; and the relation-
back doctrine does not apply when a previously named cross-complainant is
removed from a cross-complaint by way of an amendment.
            1. Appellant’s Omission or “Dismissal” from the Cross-Complaint
      Neither party points to authority squarely on point as to the effect of an
amended complaint or cross-complaint that omits a previously named
plaintiff or cross-complainant, in particular where the original pleading was
never served on a named defendant or cross-defendant but the defendant or
cross-defendant was never dismissed and properly remains a party in the
cross-action. We have found no such authority. That said, there are two
rules that appear to warrant consideration here. First, “ ‘[i]t is well
established that an amendatory pleading supersedes the original one, which
ceases to perform any function as a pleading.’ ” (Foreman & Clark Corp. v.
Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 884.) Second, “an amended complaint which
omits previously named defendants operates as a dismissal of those
defendants without prejudice.” (Boonyarit v. Payless Shoesource, Inc. (2006)
145 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1193; Kuperman, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at p. 947.)
      These particular rules do not directly aid Royal Ruby because there is
no dispute that Royal Ruby was a named cross-defendant in all versions of
the cross-complaint and has never been omitted or dismissed from the cross-
action. The trial court did not focus on this circumstance but instead, relying
on Foreman and Kuperman, determined that the second amended cross-
complaint effectively dismissed appellant as a party from the action because
it did not name her as a cross-complainant. Because appellant was

                                        8
previously named as a cross-complainant, then removed by way of an
amendment, the court determined that “the relation-back doctrine does not
apply.”
      The trial court cited no precedent holding that the relation-back
doctrine is unavailable in the circumstances here, but that is not surprising.
Given the “dearth of statutory and decisional law” regarding the propriety of
an amended complaint that adds a plaintiff after the statute of limitations
has run, the court in Diliberti v. Stage Call Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1468
(Diliberti) opted to apply, in part, “ ‘wrong defendant’ ” authority in denying a
motion to substitute a new “correct plaintiff” in place of a wrongly named
plaintiff after the statute of limitations had run. (See id. at pp. 1470–1471.)
Though Diliberti ruled against the plaintiff in the case before it, the decision
did not flatly hold that the relation-back doctrine has no application when an
omitted plaintiff seeks to be included in an action against a defendant after
the statute of limitations has run. Instead, it appeared to acknowledge that
the relation-back doctrine could be applicable, but not where the new plaintiff
seeks to enforce an independent right. (Id. at p. 1471.) We will address
Diliberti in more detail, post.
      Because the filing of the second amended cross-complaint did not result
in Royal Ruby’s dismissal from the cross-action, and because there appears
no categorical bar to applying the relation-back doctrine, we shall undertake
a more comprehensive analysis of the relation-back doctrine and its potential
applicability here.
            2. The Relation-Back Doctrine
      A statute of limitations serves “to protect defendants from the stale
claims of dilatory plaintiffs. [Citations.] It has as a related purpose to
stimulate plaintiffs to assert fresh claims against defendants in a diligent

                                        9
fashion. [Citations.] Inasmuch as it ‘necessarily fix[es]’ a ‘definite period[] of
time’ [citation], it operates conclusively across the board, and not flexibly on a
case-by-case basis.” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 395.)
Plaintiffs must bring their causes of action within the applicable limitations
period after accrual of their claims. (Id. at p. 397.) Generally, a cause of
action accrues “ ‘when, under the substantive law, the wrongful act is done,’
or the wrongful result occurs, and the consequent ‘liability arises.’ ” (Ibid.)
      In this case, there is no dispute that the Gills’ wedding reception in
May 2017 marked the accrual date of appellant’s proposed claims for breach
of contract, unfair business practices, and negligent infliction of emotional
distress. It is also undisputed that four years was the outermost limitations
period for any of the claims appellant sought to assert. (See §§ 335.1, 337,
339; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17208.) Consequently, at the time the Gills moved
to file the third amended cross-complaint in September 2021, appellant’s
claims were time-barred unless they related back to the original cross-
complaint, which named her as a party. On this score, appellant argues the
trial court erroneously rejected application of the relation-back doctrine
because “the nature of the action remains unchanged.” We first examine the
applicable law.
      “An amended complaint is considered a new action for purposes of the
statute of limitations only if the claims do not ‘relate back’ to an earlier
timely-filed complaint. Under the relation-back doctrine, an amendment
relates back to the original complaint if the amendment (1) rests on the same
general set of facts; (2) involves the same injury; and (3) refers to the same
instrumentality.” (Pointe San Diego Residential Community, L.P. v.
Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 265, 276.)
“The relation-back doctrine typically applies where an amendment identifies

                                        10
a defendant previously named as a Doe defendant [citation] or adds a new
cause of action asserted by the same plaintiff on the same general set of facts.
[Citations.] An amended pleading will also relate back if it makes a mere
technical change in the capacity in which the plaintiff sues on the same cause
of action [citations] or substitutes a plaintiff with standing in place of a
plaintiff who lacks standing. [Citations.] [¶] In contrast, an amended
pleading that adds a new plaintiff will not relate back to the filing of the
original complaint if the new party seeks to enforce an independent right or to
impose greater liability against the defendants.” (San Diego Gas & Electric
Co. v. Superior Court (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1549–1550 (SDG&E),
italics added.)5
      Case law is illustrative. In SDG&E, heirs of soldiers who died in a
helicopter accident involving utility lines sued the utility company. (SDG&E,
supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 1548.) More than two years later, plaintiffs
sought leave to add the widow of one of the deceased soldiers as a plaintiff.
(Ibid.) The trial court permitted the amendment, finding the statute of
limitations did not bar the widow’s claim because the relation-back doctrine
applied, and because the utility company knew of the widow’s existence and

5     Royal Ruby offers no authority holding that a defendant or cross-
defendant must have been served with or have actual knowledge of the
timely complaint or cross-complaint and its allegations for the relation-back
doctrine to apply. For example, it appears unnecessary for an original timely
complaint to have been served on a previously unknown and unnamed Doe
defendant for that defendant to be “regarded as a party from the
commencement of the suit” for purposes of avoiding a statute of limitations
bar. (See Balon v. Drost (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 483, 487.) Indeed, Royal
Ruby did not challenge the timeliness of the third amended cross-complaint’s
proposed amendments to Sukhchain’s cross-claims even though the second
amended cross-complaint was served on Royal Ruby after certain of the
applicable limitation periods had run.

                                        11
obtained an analysis of her loss of support claim before the limitations period
expired. (Id. at pp. 1548–1549.) The utility company sought writ relief,
prompting the Court of Appeal to examine the specific nature of the widow’s
proposed wrongful death claim and her proposed addition to the previously
filed survivor claim to determine if the relation-back doctrine applied. (Id. at
pp. 1549–1550.)
      With regard to the wrongful death claim, the SDG&E court concluded
the relation-back doctrine did not apply “[b]ecause each wrongful death
claimant must show the nature of his or her loss as a result of the decedent’s
death, [thus] the addition of an omitted heir to a wrongful death action after
expiration of the limitations period as to the omitted heir necessarily inserts
a new cause of action that seeks to enforce an independent right.” (SDG&E,
supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1552–1553.) In rejecting the plaintiff’s
argument that “a perceived lack of prejudice” to the utility company could
justify failure to comply with the limitations period, the SDG&E court held
that “a statute of limitations cannot be excused on the ground of lack of
prejudice.”6 (Id. at p. 1553, italics added.)
      But notably, the SDG&E court concluded the widow was properly
added to the survivor claim because her “untimely addition to this cause of
action tendered no new claims or issues and [did] not seek to enforce an
independent right.” (SDG&E, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 1553.) As the
court explained, the survival statutes do not create a cause of action; rather,

6     Although the SDG&E court found the relation-back doctrine did not
apply to the wrongful death claim, the court remanded to permit the
plaintiffs to file their proposed third amended complaint based on the
plaintiffs’ assertion that they could amend the complaint to allege tolling of
the limitations period. (SDG&E, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 1553.)

                                        12
they merely prevent the abatement of a decedent’s cause of action and
provide for its enforcement by the decedent’s representative.
      In reaching its conclusions, the SDG&E court cited to Bartalo v.
Superior Court (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 526 (Bartalo) and Diliberti, supra, 4
Cal.App.4th 1468, as two cases illustrating the rule that “a new plaintiff will
not relate back to the filing of the original complaint if the new party seeks to
enforce an independent right or to impose greater liability against the
defendants.” (SDG&E, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 1550.)
      In Bartalo, a lone plaintiff sued a defendant after being injured in a car
accident. (Bartalo, supra, 51 Cal.App.3d at p. 528.) More than a year later,
the plaintiff’s husband sought leave to file an amended complaint “naming
[him] as an additional plaintiff and adding a second cause of action for loss of
consortium.” (Ibid.) The trial court permitted the amendment and overruled
the defendant’s demurrer, but the Court of Appeal reversed and ordered the
defendant’s demurrer sustained on statute of limitations grounds. (Id. at
pp. 528, 535.)
      The Bartalo court acknowledged that the rule allowing an amendment
to relate back is “ ‘dependent upon whether recovery is sought on the same
general set of facts as those alleged in the original complaint.’ ” (Bartalo,
supra, 51 Cal.App.3d at p. 533.) Similar to the court in SDG&E, however,
the Bartalo court reasoned that the husband’s loss of consortium claim was “a
wholly different legal liability or obligation.” (Id. at p. 534.) Thus, even
though his claim was derivative in the sense that it would not have arisen
“unless his wife [had] sustained a personal injury,” the court discerned that
the claim was “not for her personal injuries but for the separate and
independent loss he sustained.” (Ibid.)

                                        13
      The Bartalo court ultimately articulated a rule later echoed in SDG&E:
“The general rule governing the permissibility of the bringing in of additional
plaintiffs after the period of the statute of limitations has elapsed, or of the
assertion of the defense of limitations against them, is that where the
additional party plaintiff, joining in a suit brought before the statute of
limitations has run against the original plaintiff, seeks to enforce an
independent right, the amended pleading does not relate back, so as to render
substitution permissible or to preclude the defense of the statute of
limitations.” (Bartalo, supra, 51 Cal.App.3d at p. 533, italics omitted.) The
Bartalo court then provided the following examples illustrating the rule’s
application: “If a husband and wife were both injured in the same accident
and the wife sued but the husband did not, the one-year statute of limitations
would run on husband’s cause of action, and if he tried to sue after the year
had run[,] defendant’s demurrer that the claim was barred would be
sustained. Surely if wife then tried to amend her complaint to include his
cause of action, it would be disallowed.” (Ibid.)
      In Diliberti, two sisters were involved in an auto collision; the sister
who drove was not injured at all, but the passenger sister suffered injuries
and she retained an attorney. That attorney “[a]stonishingly” filed a lawsuit
naming the wrong sister as plaintiff and never mentioned his client in the
body of the complaint. (Diliberti, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1469–1470.) By
the time the complaint was served and answered, the limitations period
elapsed. (Id. at p. 1470.) The trial court denied the attorney’s motion to
amend and substitute the correct sister in as the plaintiff. (Ibid.) The Court
of Appeal affirmed, concluding the relation-back doctrine did not apply
because “after reading the complaint, one would not even know [the

                                        14
passenger sister] existed” and the body of the complaint did not “sound[] as a
claim for a passenger.” (Id. at pp. 1470–1472.)
      With these cases in mind, we determine whether to apply the relation-
back doctrine by examining the specific nature of appellant’s proposed
addition as a party to the previously filed claims for breach of contract and
unfair business practices, as well as the specific nature of the proposed new
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Though leave to amend a
complaint is “ ‘entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court’ ” (Branick
v. Downey Savings & Loan Assn. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 242), the situation
here calls for the application of a legal doctrine to undisputed facts, so we will
undertake a de novo review. (Brumley v. FDCC California, Inc. (2007) 156
Cal.App.4th 312, 318.)
      We conclude the proposed addition of appellant to the previously filed
claim for breach of contract relates back to the original cross-complaint. The
original cross-complaint named appellant as a cross-complainant, and it
contained allegations that Royal Ruby and both of the Gills entered into a
written and oral contract that included a provision for a certain number of
security guards at their wedding reception, which Royal Ruby breached. In
the portion of the cross-complaint setting out the cause of action for breach of
contract, the Gills also alleged the exact amount they paid on the contract,
$30,362.45. The re-addition of appellant as a complainant to the breach of
contract claim implicates the same set of facts and the same injury, and
refers to the same instrumentality, here the breach of the same contract by
Royal Ruby. (See, e.g., Barrington v. A. H. Robins Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 146,
149, 151 [illustrating the meaning of instrumentality].)
      Turning to the proposed addition of appellant to the previously filed
claim for unfair business practices, we again conclude that the proposed

                                        15
amendment relates back to the original cross-complaint. “Business and
Professions Code section 17200 et seq. prohibits unfair competition, including
unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business acts.” (Korea Supply Co. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1143.) In the original cross-
complaint, the Gills pleaded a cause of action for “fraud,” alleging Royal Ruby
made them purchase a “security package” that Royal Ruby knew was
inadequate under a conditional use permit issued by the City of Fremont.
More specifically, under that permit, Royal Ruby allegedly was required to
provide a minimum of 14 licensed security guards for an event the size of the
Gills’ wedding. Not only did Royal Ruby falsely represent that seven security
guards would be enough, it actually provided only two unlicensed security
guards. Relying on the same factual allegations, Sukhchain made an unfair
business practices claim in the second amended cross-complaint, to which
Royal Ruby filed an answer. As is the case with Sukhchain’s claim,
appellant’s unfair business practices claim implicates the same set of facts
and the same injury as alleged in the original cross-complaint, and refers to
the same instrumentality, i.e., Royal Ruby’s alleged unfair and fraudulent act
of misrepresenting how many licensed security guards were needed under
their conditional use permit, and providing only two unlicensed security
guards.
      Finally, we turn to the proposed addition of appellant to the claim for
negligent infliction of emotional distress. Again, we conclude that the
proposed amendment relates back to the original cross-complaint. In the
proposed third amended cross-complaint, both Sukhchain and appellant
would allege that Royal Ruby agreed to provide adequate security at their
wedding reception and undertook a duty to provide due care. Royal Ruby
allegedly breached that duty, and thereby caused the Gills to suffer severe

                                      16
emotional distress. Although the Gills did not specifically allege a cause of
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress in the original cross-
complaint, the two pleadings contain materially similar factual allegations.
As recounted above, the original cross-complaint alleged that Royal Ruby
committed fraud against both appellant and Sukhchain, by either
intentionally or negligently falsely representing that seven security guards
were needed, while knowing this number of security guards was inadequate
under the conditional use permit. These falsehoods, the Gills alleged,
resulted in damages which included their wedding reception being “ruined
and their wedding day . . . permanently associated with a violent assault.”
Reasonably viewed, these prior allegations implicate the same alleged
conduct underlying the proposed claim for negligent infliction of emotion
distress. Indeed, Royal Ruby does not contend the trial court erred in
apparently applying the relation-back doctrine to allow Sukhchain to assert
this proposed claim, and there appears no basis for distinguishing between
Sukhchain and appellant on this point. Because the proposed amendment
involves the same set of facts and the same injury, and refers to the same
instrumentality as in the original cross-complaint—i.e., Royal Ruby allegedly
contracting with the Gills to provide seven security guards despite a
conditional use permit requiring 14 security guards, and then breaching the
agreement by only providing two unlicensed security guards—the relation-
back doctrine applies.
      In addition to the foregoing, it does not appear that adding appellant’s
claims in the third amended cross-complaint would impose greater liability
against the defendants than they would have been exposed to in the original
cross-complaint. In the original cross-complaint, the Gills’ prayer requested:
judgment for costs of suit; any relief that is fair, just and equitable; the

                                        17
contract price of $30,362; attorney fees according to proof; and punitive
damages. With regard to the fraud claim made in the original cross-
complaint, to which the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress
relates back, the Gills did not allege a specific damages amount but they
instead indicated the lack of security ruined their wedding reception and now
their wedding day is associated with a violent assault. The proposed third
amended complaint asked in essence for the same relief as requested in the
original cross-complaint, such as the contract price of $30,362; attorney fees;
and other legal and equitable relief as the court deems just and proper
“including recovery for emotional distress suffered by [the Gills] and the
imposition of punitive damages.” Because appellant was a named cross-
complainant in the original cross-complaint, damages for her alleged
emotional distress were already part of the relief the Gills requested.
      Because SDG&E, Bartalo, and Diliberti were not cited in the moving
papers, and neither was Balon (see ante, fn. 5), we asked for supplemental
briefing to give the parties an opportunity to address their potential impact
on this case.
      Rather than address or distinguish these decisions, Royal Ruby
contends the relation-back doctrine cannot apply in this case because “there
is no tolling or relation back for a Cross-Complaint filed by one named
defendant against another, even if it relates to facts pleaded in the
Complaint.” In support of its position, Royal Ruby cites several cases holding
that, while the filing of a complaint suspends or tolls the statute of
limitations as to causes of action that may be raised by a defendant against
the plaintiff arising out of the same facts in the complaint,7 such filing does

7     The principle underlying this rule is that, by filing the complaint, a
plaintiff is waiving the statute of limitations and permitting the defendant to
make all proper defenses to the causes of action pleaded. (Western Pipe &

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not toll the statute of limitations for parties who file cross-actions against
codefendants or new parties. (E.g., Boyer v. Jensen (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th
62, 69–70; Trindade v. Superior Court (1973) 29 Cal.App.3d 857, 859–860;
Western Pipe & Steel, supra, 63 Cal.App.2d at p. 31.)
      Royal Ruby’s contention and cases are off the mark. Appellant is not
arguing that the applicable limitation periods were tolled by the filing of the
original complaint by Daljit and Jasbir Gill. Rather, appellant contends her
proposed claims relate back to her own original or first amended cross-
complaint against Royal Ruby, which has always been a party to the cross-
action. At bottom, Royal Ruby provides no legal or logical reason why a
proposed amended cross-complaint cannot relate back to an original cross-
complaint, where both the cross-complainant and the cross-defendant at issue
were parties to the original cross-complaint and recovery is sought on the
same general set of facts as those alleged in the original cross-complaint. On
this point, we note that a cross-complaint is, procedurally, a “separate
pleading” instituting its own action (Security Pacific National Bank v. Adamo
(1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 492, 496), and there is case law generally applying the
relation-back doctrine to relate an amended cross-complaint back to an
original cross-complaint. (See, e.g., Olsen v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1965)
237 Cal.App.2d 737, 739–742.)8

Steel Co. v. Tuolumne Gold Dredging Corp. (1944) 63 Cal.App.2d 21, 31
(Western Pipe & Steel).)
8      Royal Ruby’s supplemental briefing also continues to urge that
appellant was never a party, even while simultaneously arguing she was
“then removed as a party” by the second amended cross-complaint. Royal
Ruby still cites no authority in support of this proposition, which we have
rejected above.

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         In sum, we conclude appellant’s claims relate back to the Gills’ original
cross-complaint and that the trial court erred in holding otherwise. In
closing, we emphasize that we have reviewed the allegations of the original
cross-complaint and the proposed third amended cross-complaint solely to
determine the applicability of the relation-back doctrine, and we express no
opinion as to the factual or legal merits of the causes of action and prayers for
relief in those cross-complaints.
                                                  DISPOSITION
         The order denying leave to amend the cross-complaint to add appellant
and her claims is reversed. The matter is remanded for further proceedings
not inconsistent with this opinion. Each side shall bear its own costs on
appeal.

                                                     FUJISAKI, J.

WE CONCUR:

TUCHER, P.J.

RODRÍGUEZ, J.

Manjeet Kaur Gill v. Royal Ruby, Inc. (A165206)

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