Court Opinion

ID: 9493318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:04:51.475768+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:46.553981
License: Public Domain

GAJARSA, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I write separately in this case to emphasize that our decision today necessarily follows from our recent opinion in In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 53 USPQ2d 1769 (Fed.Cir.2000). In Gartside this court held that, while we review questions of law de novo, the substantial evidence standard is appropriate for review of the PTO’s factual findings. See id. at 1315, 203 F.3d 1305, 53 USPQ2d at 1775. Gartside further explained that the pertinent inquiry under the substantial evidence standard is whether a reasonable factfinder could have arrived at the agency’s decision, and that the inquiry requires “taking into account evidence that both justifies and detracts from the agency’s decision.” Id. at 1313, *1372203 F.3d 1305, 53 USPQ2d at 1773 (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 474, 487-88, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951)). The Supreme Court has also explained that the “possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 16 L.Ed.2d 131 (1966).
Under the Court’s decision in Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 119 S.Ct. 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143, 50 USPQ2d 1930 (1999), we must give proper deference to the PTO’s factual determinations. Because of the deference that must be afforded, we cannot, and should not, ever substitute our own factual determinations for those made by the PTO. At the same time, when, as is the case here, the appellate tribunal finds that the PTO did not have substantial evidence to support its determinations, the proper course is to remand to have the PTO reweigh the sufficiency of the evidence in order to reach factual determinations that its expertise deems appropriate.
I offer one additional point. In its review of the Board’s factual determination on corroboration, the majority opinion ignores evidence supporting Brake’s position that was cited by the Board, while placing great emphasis on Singh’s proffered evidence. This failure to distinguish the Board’s supporting evidence runs dangerously close to turning the substantial evidence standard on its head. Perhaps this approach results from the less than clear recitation of the supporting evidence in the Board’s decision. On remand, the Board should keep in mind our admonition in Gechter v. Davidson, 116 F.3d 1454, 1457, 43 USPQ2d 1030, 1033 (Fed.Cir.1997) that “[njecessary findings must be expressed with sufficient particularity to enable our court, without resort to speculation, to understand the reasoning of the Board.” Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1994) (requiring that “[a]ll decisions” in formal adjudications, whether preliminary or final, “include ... findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor, on all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record.” (emphasis added)). A detailed account of the underlying evidence supporting a finding of fact, or the underlying facts supporting a conclusion of law, does more than exert discipline on the Board and expose its reasoning to the light of public scrutiny. It provides this court with a meaningful opportunity to determine whether the Board has strayed from the boundaries of its statutory authority. In this way, both the Board and this court benefit.
In this case, the Board on remand may ultimately reach the same factual determination on the issue of corroboration of Singh’s testimony. Indeed, our decision today in no way forecloses this outcome. If so, a clear recitation of the evidence supporting this determination will only assist this court on appeal in its task of reviewing such a determination under the substantial evidence standard.
With this in mind, I concur in the judgment of the court.