Court Opinion

ID: 9955534
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 18:00:44.72536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:04.399521
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                 For the Seventh Circuit
                     ____________________
No. 22-2715
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                   Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                 v.

SHAZARIYAH F. HIBBETT,
                                               Defendant-Appellant.
                     ____________________

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the
           Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.
           No. 3:21-cr-50011-1 — Iain D. Johnston, Judge.
                     ____________________

   ARGUED OCTOBER 24, 2023 — DECIDED MARCH 28, 2024
               ____________________

   Before ROVNER, WOOD, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
   HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. In this appeal, defendant
Shazariyah Hibbett challenges his sentence for being a felon
in possession of a ﬁrearm. Hibbett argues that the district
court erred in applying a two-level enhancement under
United States Sentencing Guideline § 3C1.2 for reckless en-
dangerment during ﬂight. Hibbett’s theory is that he was
merely a passenger in a car that recklessly ﬂed from police
and that he did not induce the driver to ﬂee. We ﬁnd no error.
2                                                          No. 22-2715

The evidence before the district court at Hibbett’s sentencing
hearing—including video recordings of the car’s dramatic
ﬂight from police and statements from the driver that Hibbett
twice directed her to continue ﬂeeing—supported the en-
hancement to his guideline calculation.
    Hibbett also argues, for the ﬁrst time on appeal, that
Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 79.1, which deals with
control of trial exhibits, conﬂicts with Federal Rule of Crimi-
nal Procedure 55. Hibbett urges this court to invalidate Local
Rule 79.1. We decline to do so. Hibbett has not shown how
application of the local rule to his case caused him any harm.
His appeal of a criminal sentence is not the proper forum for
his more general challenge to the local rule. His arguments
against Local Rule 79.1 are better directed to the Advisory
Committee for the Local Rules of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois. We aﬃrm the dis-
trict court’s judgment.
I. Facts and Procedural History
    On October 27, 2020, defendant Shazariyah Hibbett was
riding in the front passenger seat of a car driven by Kenyesha
Holliman. An unmarked police car began following their car,
which police had noticed had unlawfully tinted windows. A
Department of Homeland Security helicopter was also ﬂying
over the area. Both the police squad car and helicopter rec-
orded videos of the key events, and the videos are part of the
record in this appeal. 1

    1 The helicopter was part of a joint effort among the Rockford Police

Department and other law-enforcement agencies.
No. 22-2715                                                   3

    The police activated the emergency lights on their car as
Ms. Holliman was turning right at a stop sign. Almost imme-
diately after the police lights came on, Ms. Holliman’s car
sped away. The police did not try to keep up with the ﬂeeing
car but instead asked the oﬃcers in the helicopter to track it.
Ms. Holliman accelerated rapidly, ran multiple stop signs,
struck a parked vehicle, drove through an open ﬁeld, and
eventually came to a stop in front of a residence after striking
a curb. Ms. Holliman and defendant Hibbett got out of the car
and ﬂed on foot. The helicopter video shows Hibbett drop-
ping an object as he ﬂed from the stopped car. Police later re-
covered the item, a loaded .45 caliber semi-automatic hand-
gun.
    Hibbett was eventually apprehended and indicted under
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as a felon in possession of a ﬁrearm. He
pled guilty. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, Hibbett’s base
oﬀense level was 24 because he had two prior convictions for
crimes of violence or controlled substance oﬀenses. See
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2). The parties agree that the base oﬀense
level was correct. The presentence report recommended a
three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, which
is not disputed.
   The presentence report also recommended a two-level en-
hancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 for reckless endangerment
during ﬂight. Hibbett objected. The reckless endangerment
enhancement made his total oﬀense level 23. With his crimi-
nal history category of V, the advisory guideline range was
84–105 months in prison.
   At the sentencing hearing, Hibbett argued that the reckless
endangerment enhancement should not apply because there
was not suﬃcient evidence that he induced Ms. Holliman to
4                                                 No. 22-2715

ﬂee from police. In particular, he argued that the evidence
that he told Ms. Holliman to “keep going” did not show
whether he gave that instruction before or after they realized
they were being followed by police.
   To support the enhancement, the government introduced
the DHS helicopter video and the police dashboard camera
video. The government had also planned to play a jail call rec-
orded on October 28, 2020 between Ms. Holliman and an un-
identiﬁed person. Technical diﬃculties prevented that record-
ing from being played in the courtroom. The parties agreed
that Special Agent Dan Bergagna from the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, who had listened to the
recording previously, could testify to its contents.
    Agent Bergagna explained that in the recording, Ms. Hol-
liman discussed the events of October 27, 2020, and being
charged with aggravated ﬂeeing to elude as a result. Ms. Hol-
liman said that she had become nervous and afraid when Hib-
bett told her that he believed somebody was following them.
Ms. Holliman explained that she began to speed up and that
Hibbett had a gun on his lap while she was driving the car.
Ms. Holliman also said that once they ﬁnally came to a stop
and exited the car, Hibbett told her to “keep going.”
    The district judge then asked Agent Bergagna a few addi-
tional questions about Ms. Holliman’s recorded jail call.
Agent Bergagna clariﬁed that Ms. Holliman said on the call
that “Mr. Hibbett was explaining to her that he thought that
people were chasing them and he didn’t realize who it was.”
Agent Bergagna also explained that Ms. Holliman said, “she
didn’t know it was the police and Mr. Hibbett told her to ba-
sically keep driving and get away from the people chasing
No. 22-2715                                                     5

them.” Ms. Holliman also said in the jail call that she believed
the police vehicle did not have its lights on.
    The district judge applied the enhancement after ﬁnding
by a preponderance of the evidence that Hibbett induced Ms.
Holliman’s ﬂight. Hibbett was sentenced to 90 months in
prison. This appeal followed.
II. Reckless Endangerment Sentencing Enhancement
   A. Standard of Review
    “We review de novo whether the factual ﬁndings of the dis-
trict court adequately support the imposition of the enhance-
ment.” United States v. Barker, 80 F.4th 827, 834 (7th Cir. 2023),
quoting United States v. Brown, 843 F.3d 738, 742 (7th Cir.
2016). “We review for clear error the district court’s factual
determinations underlying the application of the Guide-
lines….” United States v. Prieto, 85 F.4th 445, 448 (7th Cir.
2023). “A district court need ﬁnd only, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the facts are suﬃcient to support an en-
hancement.” Id. “[W]hen a district court chooses between two
permissible inferences from the evidence, the factual ﬁndings
cannot have been clearly erroneous.” United States v. Cruz-
Rea, 626 F.3d 929, 938 (7th Cir. 2010). “The task on appeal is
not to see whether there is any view of the evidence that might
undercut the district court’s ﬁnding; it is to see whether there
is any evidence in the record to support the ﬁnding.” United
States v. Wade, 114 F.3d 103, 105 (7th Cir. 1997).
   B. Reckless Endangerment During Flight
   Section 3C1.2 states: “If the defendant recklessly created a
substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another
person in the course of ﬂeeing from a law enforcement oﬃcer,
increase by 2 levels.” Application Note 5 to § 3C1.2 explains
6                                                   No. 22-2715

that “the defendant is accountable for the defendant’s own
conduct and for conduct that the defendant aided or abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully
caused.” Therefore, “‘some form of direct or active participa-
tion … is necessary [in order] for’ the enhancement to apply
to a passenger.” United States v. Seals, 813 F.3d 1038, 1046 (7th
Cir. 2016) (footnote removed), quoting United States v.
McCrimon, 788 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 2015). In addition, for
§ 3C1.2 to apply, the defendant must have known he was ﬂee-
ing from law enforcement. See United States v. Hayes, 49 F.3d
178, 183–84 (6th Cir. 1995).
    Here, circumstantial evidence in the record of ﬂight and
inducement supported the district court’s decision to apply
the enhancement. The court found (1) Hibbett knew the police
were following them when the ﬂight started, (2) the ﬂight cre-
ated a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, and
(3) Hibbett induced Ms. Holliman to engage in the ﬂight. All
of these factual ﬁndings were supported by the evidence. We
address each ﬁnding in turn.
       1. Knowledge of Law Enforcement
    The district court explained at sentencing that the police
car dashboard video showed that as soon as the police acti-
vated their emergency lights, the car in which Hibbett was a
passenger “immediately accelerates rapidly at an extremely
high rate of speed.” It was reasonable for the district court to
infer from that timing that Hibbett knew as Ms. Holliman was
ﬂeeing that law enforcement had been following them.
       2. Substantial Risk of Death or Serious Bodily Injury
   The district court then found, based on the video exhibits,
that the car’s ﬂight created a substantial risk of death or
No. 22-2715                                                    7

serious bodily injury. The videos show erratic, high-speed
driving through a residential neighborhood, oﬀ-road driving
through a ﬁeld, and collisions with multiple obstacles. The
district court’s factual ﬁnding on this point had ample
support. See United States v. Thomas, 294 F.3d 899, 907 (7th Cir.
2002) (driving at high rate of speed through residential
neighborhood posed danger to bystanders); United States v.
Velasquez, 67 F.3d 650, 655 (7th Cir. 1995) (ﬂight from scene at
high rate of speed on residential street was enough to support
enhancement under § 3C1.2); United States v. Woody, 55 F.3d
1257, 1274 (7th Cir. 1995) (ﬂight from police resulting in a
high-speed chase warranted § 3C1.2 enhancement).
       3. Inducement
   Because Hibbett was not driving the car, the enhancement
could apply only if Hibbett aided or abetted, counseled, com-
manded, induced, procured, or willfully caused Ms. Holli-
man’s reckless driving. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 cmt. n.5. In ﬁnd-
ing that Hibbett induced her to ﬂee, the district court relied
on United States v. Lugman, 130 F.3d 113 (5th Cir. 1997), where
the defendant was also a passenger in a car that ﬂed from law
enforcement oﬃcers at high speed. When the car was being
pulled over by law enforcement, the defendant had told the
driver that he had drugs on his person and that the driver
needed to do something or they were going to jail. That state-
ment was suﬃcient to ﬁnd that the defendant induced the
driver’s reckless ﬂight and that the enhancement should be
applied to the passenger’s guideline calculation. Id. at 116–17.
   Similarly, here, evidence shows that Hibbett told the
driver to “keep driving” once he noticed they were being fol-
lowed by another car. Hibbett did not testify at the sentencing
hearing, but he argues that he gave Ms. Holliman this
8                                                  No. 22-2715

instruction before he knew they were being followed by law
enforcement.
    The record does not indicate clearly whether Hibbett gave
his “keep driving” directive before or after he realized they
were being followed by law enforcement. The PSR stated
simply that Ms. Holliman had been driving the car “while the
defendant had a ﬁrearm on his lap and told her to ‘keep go-
ing.’” This account does not resolve deﬁnitively whether Hib-
bett gave the instruction before or after the police car lights
were activated. Nor does Ms. Holliman’s recorded jail call
shed light on whether Hibbett knew they were being followed
by police when he told her to “keep driving.” She said, cor-
rectly or not, only that she did not know at that time whether
it was police.
    Other evidence, however, supports the district court’s
ﬁnding that Hibbett induced Ms. Holliman to ﬂee the police.
Evidence at the sentencing hearing established clearly that
Hibbett also instructed Ms. Holliman to “keep going” once
they had exited the car and there was no doubt they knew
they were being followed by the police. It is not unreasonable
to infer that Hibbett urged her to ﬂee moments earlier after
the police activated their lights, when she sped away.
    Further, there is no evidence that Ms. Holliman had any
motive of her own for ﬂeeing the police, especially in such a
dangerous way. Hibbett, on the other hand, was sitting with
a gun in his lap. He was a convicted felon whose mere pos-
session of the ﬁrearm was a felony. These facts allow reason-
able inferences both that Hibbett had the ability to control the
driver’s behavior during the ﬂight and that he had a strong
motive to encourage ﬂight from law enforcement. See United
States v. Conley, 131 F.3d 1387, 1391 (10th Cir. 1997)
No. 22-2715                                                     9

(“Appellants both had guns and the driver did not, support-
ing the conclusion that Appellants had the ability to control
the driver’s behavior during the chase”). On these facts, the
district court could use its common sense to ﬁnd it was more
likely than not that Hibbett induced Ms. Holliman to ﬂee law
enforcement. See Cruz-Rea, 626 F.3d at 938 (“when a district
court chooses between two permissible inferences from the
evidence, the factual ﬁndings cannot have been clearly erro-
neous”). The district court did not err by applying the two-
level enhancement for reckless endangerment.
III. Local Rule 79.1
   The defense, for the ﬁrst time on appeal, challenges North-
ern District of Illinois Local Rule 79.1, which states in relevant
part:
       Records of the Court
       (a) Retention of Exhibits. Exhibits shall be re-
       tained by the attorney producing them unless
       the court orders them deposited with the clerk.
       In proceedings before a master or other like of-
       ﬁcer, the oﬃcer may elect to include exhibits
       with the report.
       (b) Availability of Exhibits. Exhibits retained by
       counsel are subject to orders of the court. Upon
       request, counsel shall make the exhibits or cop-
       ies thereof available to any other party to enable
       that party to designate or prepare the record on
       appeal.
The defense argues that this rule is inconsistent with Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 55, which instructs: “The clerk of
the district court must keep records of criminal proceedings
10                                                  No. 22-2715

in the form prescribed by the Director of the Administrative
Oﬃce of the United States Courts. The clerk must enter in the
records every court order or judgment and the date of entry.”
The defense theory is that any exhibits relied upon by a court
in rendering its decision are judicial records and therefore
must be retained by the clerk of the district court, not by the
parties.
   In this case, the DHS helicopter video and the police dash-
board camera video were shared with the defendant’s trial
counsel, the probation oﬃce, and the district court ahead of
the defendant’s sentencing hearing. The district judge relied
upon these exhibits during the sentencing. However, the ex-
hibits were never ﬁled nor ordered to be ﬁled on the docket,
and thus were not in the possession of the clerk’s oﬃce.
    The defendant’s appellate counsel, who did not represent
him in the district court, requested the video exhibits from the
clerk of the Northern District of Illinois. The clerk’s oﬃce told
counsel to request the exhibits from the government because,
under Local Rule 79.1, the exhibits were maintained by the
parties and not the clerk’s oﬃce. The government provided
the video exhibits to the defendant’s appellate counsel
promptly upon his request. The government also ﬁled a mo-
tion in the district court to supplement the record on appeal
with the video exhibits, and that motion was granted. The ex-
hibits are properly before this court on appeal.
    Local federal court rules may not conﬂict with federal law
or the Federal Rules of Procedure. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a). We
are not as conﬁdent as defense counsel that Local Rule 79.1
conﬂicts with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 55. For one
thing, fourteen other district courts around the country have
similar local rules. See Gov’t Appendix 60–65. Additionally,
No. 22-2715                                                   11

the advisory committee notes to Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 11 seem to endorse the practice of the Northern
District of Illinois:
       The custody of exhibits is often the subject of lo-
       cal rules. Some of them require that documen-
       tary exhibits must be deposited with the clerk.
       See Local Rule 13 of the Eastern District of Vir-
       ginia. Others leave exhibits with counsel, sub-
       ject to order of the court. See Local Rule 33 of the
       Northern District of Illinois [predecessor to cur-
       rent Local Rule 79.1]. If under local rules the
       custody of exhibits is left with counsel, the dis-
       trict court should make adequate provision for
       their preservation during the time during which
       an appeal may be taken, the prompt deposit
       with the clerk of such as under Rule 11(b) are to
       be transmitted to the court of appeals, and the
       availability of others in the event that the court
       of appeals should require their transmission.
Keeping in mind that physical exhibits in criminal cases can
include weapons, ammunition, explosives, drugs, cash, and
child pornography, such exhibits may well be safer in the cus-
tody and control of the prosecution, at least in routine situa-
tions.
    But in any event, this appeal is not the appropriate forum
to address the defense’s concerns with Local Rule 79.1, at least
in the absence of a plausible argument that the rule caused
him harm. Instead, the defense’s concerns should be directed
to the Advisory Committee for the Local Rules of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. That
12                                             No. 22-2715

body has the power to review proposals to amend local rules
and to recommend changes to the judges of the court.
     The judgment of the district court is
                                               AFFIRMED.