Court Opinion

ID: 9857397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 14:33:21.9928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:09.052790
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, J.,
concurring.
Appellant presented evidence that his emotional development had been impaired as a result of his continuous drug use. According to the testimony of Dr. Degner, *436appellant had the maturity level of a ten year-old child. Intervention specialist Broussard described appellant as a “thirteen year-old child in a 33 year-old body.” Appellant contends evidence of his retarded emotional development constitutes “Penry evidence,”1 and that the jury could not give effect to that evidence within the capital sentencing scheme of Tex.Code Crim. Proc.Ann. art. 37.071. In support of this argument, appellant relies solely upon the United States Constitution and does not seek relief under the Texas Constitution. The majority concludes the evidence did not require a “separate Penry instruction.” Majority opinion pg. 433. For the following reasons I join the majority opinion.
In Graham v. Collins, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 892, 122 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993), the Supreme Court construed Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976), “as holding that the circumstance of youth is given constitutionally adequate consideration” within the punishment issues of art. 37.071. Graham, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 902. Therefore, in light of Graham, the majority correctly concludes appellant’s evidence of emotional youth did not require a separate instruction under the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in Penry.
Although, appellant is presently foreclosed from obtaining relief under the Eighth Amendment, it is not clear what direction the Supreme Court will take on the issue of youth as a mitigating circumstance in a capital context. Hopefully, that question will be resolved when the Supreme Court decides Johnson v. State, 773 S.W.2d 322 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), aff’d on reh’g (No. 69,750 delivered May 27, 1992), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1148, 122 L.Ed.2d 499 (1993).2 Therefore, absent a separate claim under the Texas Constitution, we are bound to follow the Supreme Court’s determination that youth can be given adequate Eighth Amendment consideration within the punishment issues under art. 37.071, until the Supreme Court alters its prior holdings.
With these comments, I join the majority opinion.

. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989).

. The question presented in Johnson is:
Did the Texas capital sentencing statute unconstitutionally preclude the jury from giving full mitigating effect to the petitioner’s youthful age at the time of the offense?