Court Opinion

ID: 9469940
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:52:33.1902+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:38.375918
License: Public Domain

ARNOLD, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
As an original matter, it would be hard for me to agree with the Court’s construction of the word “claim” in Mo.Ann.Stat. § 408.405. The Court seems to assume for purposes of this case that “claim” includes “an affirmative act” by the holder of a buyer’s note. Ante, p. 65. Surely the Bank’s repossession of the car was an affirmative act. Possibly the word “claim” could be limited to requests for payment or other relief made in some court. But that reading — which the Court does not adopt, ante, p. 65 — would mean that a holder of consumer paper would almost always use self-help rather than going to court, where § 408.405 would clearly apply. It is hard to believe that the Missouri Legislature, in enacting a law to help consumers who have bought defective goods, intended to create such a large incentive for financial institutions to avoid the judicial process.
In addition, the fact that Ms. Taylor did not tell the Bank of her problems with the car seems irrelevant under the statute. She did complain to the seller, and this is all the law requires. Apparently the Legislature expected a seller to inform the assignee of its consumer paper of such claims by buyers of breach of warranty, or perhaps it intended to put the burden on banks to inquire of their assignors whether a debtor had asserted rights within the 90-day statutory period. Either way, Ms. Taylor did all she needed to do under the law, and was therefore in a position, when the Bank purported to exercise its right to retake the property under Paragraph 15 of the security agreement, to claim that the right to possession remained in her because she was not in default.
I cannot wholly agree with the Court’s assertion, ante p. 65 n. 6, that Ms. Taylor made it impossible for the Bank to get in touch with her by changing her phone to an unlisted number and leaving her job without giving a forwarding address. While these actions did make the Bank’s position more difficult and should not be condoned, it was still possible for the Bank to find the car and take it back. I am not convinced that the car’s owner could not have been found as well.
Nevertheless, I reluctantly concur in the judgment. The issue is one of interpretation of a Missouri statute, about which we know a good deal less than the district courts sitting in that State. There is no opinion of a Missouri appellate court contrary to the District Court’s decision, and its construction of the statute, although strained, is not verbally untenable. In this kind of case, we should defer to the decisions of the district courts on questions of state law. My decision to concur is aided by the fact that the author of this Court’s opinion is himself an able and experienced Missouri district judge.