Court Opinion

ID: 9739517
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:16:49.634207+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:12.786536
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE QUINLAN, dissenting: I respectfully disagree Avith the decision of the majority as well as the rationale for its discussion. In my opinion, the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. I believe the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion in limine, and its admission of the testimony regarding the defendant’s gang membership, for the limited purpose of showing the procedure and circumstances leading to the identification of the defendant, was proper. Furthermore, to the extent that the limitation was exceeded by the State, the defendant objected, and the court sustained the objection and properly instructed the jury concerning the limited purpose of the evidence. However, in any event, I am of the opinion that any error that might have occurred here was harmless error under the circumstances, because the evidence of defendant’s guilt was overwhelming. Additionally, I do not find People v. Parrott (1976), 40 Ill. App. 3d 328, 352 N.E.2d 299, or People v. Hairston (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 348, 263 N.E.2d 840, which are relied upon by the majority, to be apposite in this situation. In fact, I believe that both cases can readily be distinguished from the present case. In Parrott, the defendant was charged with knowingly possessing and selling an illegal shotgun. There, the State apparently began its case by introducing the testimony of the arresting officers, who testified concerning a department memorandum which stated that the sale of firearms by gangs was occurring within the city and also included Mr. Parrott’s name and address as part of the memorandum. (Parrott, 40 Ill. App. 3d 328, 352 N.E.2d 299.) It appears quite clear from the opinion that this information was completely irrelevant to the charge of possession and sale of the shotgun involved there. Moreover, the specific basis on which the evidence was excluded by the court there was on the ground that the officer’s testimony was impermissible hearsay, and not because of the gang nature of the testimony. (Parrott, 40 Ill. App. 3d at 330, 352 N.E.2d at 302.) The Parrott court’s observation about the widespread prejudice against street gangs, as noted by the majority here, only occurred later in the Parrott opinion and was merely a secondary reason for the court’s reversal. Furthermore, even then, the Parrott court expressly observed that the reason this information (concerning gangs) was incompetent was because, under the circumstances of that case, as noted above, it was irrelevant to the offenses charged. The court said, “[t]he identity of the alleged buyer of weapons had no relationship to the intent, design or motives of the police officers [in investigating the sale of firearms].” Parrott, 40 Ill. App. 3d at 331, 352 N.E.2d at 303. This is not similar to our case. In the Parrott case, as stated, the evidence concerning gangs was introduced by the testimony of police officers, and, as found by the court there, for the sole purpose of establishing the truth of gang activity and the defendant’s membership in the gang. That was not the case here. In contrast to the reason for introducing the gang evidence in Parrott, the evidence here was introduced initially by the victim, for the purpose of identifying the defendant, and the victim’s statement regarding gangs was merely part of the description of his observations concerning the defendant. In fact, this description subsequently led to the defendant’s identification and arrest. Such descriptive information seems to me most relevant and, under circumstances such as those here, most proper.1 Thus, it was not error for the trial court to allow this evidence, even though it may have been prejudicial to the defendant. As this court noted in People v. Jones (1987), 161 Ill. App. 3d 688, 515 N.E.2d 166, “evidence of gang membership is admissible if there is sufficient proof that it is related to the crime charged *** and need not be excluded merely because it may tend to prejudice the defendant where it is otherwise relevant and admissible.” Jones, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 697, 515 N.E.2d at 171; see also People v. McClendon (1986), 146 Ill. App. 3d 1004, 1009, 497 N.E.2d 849, 852 (where no error was found in the admission of the victim’s testimony that he heard gang slogans being shouted as the defendant struck him and that the defendant was a member of a gang). In addition, I do not find that People v. Hairston (1970), 46 Ill. 2d 348, 263 N.E.2d 840, relied upon by the majority, requires a reversal of this case because of the admission of the “gang related” evidence either. In that case, the court actually found that the evidence of gang membership was properly admitted. The court stated that the evidence introduced permitted, at least, a reasonable inference that there was a common design or performance to do an unlawful act, and then noted that, contrary to the defendant's contentions, where the evidence of gang activity is relevant and otherwise admissible, it is not to be excluded merely because it may also have a tendency to prejudice the accused. (Hairston, 46 Ill. 2d at 372, 263 N.E.2d at 854-55.) That court also found that there was no error in the failure of the trial judge to give a cautionary instruction since, as the court noted, it was the obligation of the defendant to request such an instruction and the defendant had failed to do so. (Hairston, 46 Ill. 2d at 372-73, 263 N.E.2d at 855.) Consequently, the court affirmed the defendant’s conviction there even though no cautionary instruction had been given. In the present case, as in the Jones case discussed previously, the trial court did, however, properly instruct the jury as to the limited purpose of the gang membership testimony. I think it is worthy to note that in Jones, this court concluded that such a limiting instruction was sufficient to protect the defendant from any prejudice. (Jones, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 697, 515 N.E.2d at 171.) Hence, I likewise believe that the trial court’s limiting instruction here was sufficient to protect the defendant from any alleged prejudice and, thus, unlike Hairston, any potential prejudice here was offset by the jury instruction. Moreover, I also believe that, in any event, the references here to the defendant’s gang membership, when viewed in context, were minor in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Therefore, in such circumstances, the testimony concerning the gang membership could not be so prejudicial that it would have prevented the jury from rationally evaluating the proper evidence before it. See People v. Portis (1986), 147 Ill. App. 3d 917, 928, 498 N.E.2d 675, 682. Furthermore, I find it is also noteworthy that Professor Graham, in his Handbook on Federal Evidence, in commenting on the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, observes that great inroads upon the prior rule of exclusion of such evidence has taken place under the modern federal rules of evidence. In fact, he notes that the Federal rule permits the introduction of evidence of another crime, wrong or act unless the sole purpose for the offer is to establish the defendant’s propensity for crime. (M. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence §404.5, at 200-10 (2d ed. 1986); see also United States v. Ford (9th Cir. 1980), 632 F.2d 1354, 1375 (where the court there observed that “[the] rule is one of inclusion which admits evidence of other crimes except where that evidence tends to prove only criminal disposition).”) Professor Graham also makes a similar observation in E. Cleary & M. Graham, Handbook of Illinois Evidence section 404.5, at 162-69 (4th ed. 1984), where he again emphasizes that evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is usually admissible where it is offered for any purpose other than to merely show a propensity on the part of the defendant to commit the crime. He further observes there that the decision with respect to the admissibility of such evidence will be overturned only if there exists a clear abuse of discretion. Hence, it would appear that the admission of the gang evidence here was also consistent with the current view of admissibility of such evidence both in the Federal and State courts. Accordingly, I find the reversal of the defendant’s conviction, as the majority’s decision holds, based solely on the admission of the evidence relating to gangs to be unwarranted and unnecessary. I especially find reversal to be unnecessary because, as stated earlier, the evidence of the defendant’s guilt is clear. When there is sufficient and competent evidence establishing a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and there has been no showing that an alleged error was the basis for the jury’s verdict, the error is harmless and reversal is not warranted. (See People v. Johnson (1986), 150 Ill. App. 3d 1075, 1083, 502 N.E.2d 304, 310.) I do not believe that defendant has shown, or could show, that the alleged error here formed the basis for the jury’s verdict. Furthermore, to the extent that the majority suggests that portions of the State’s evidence should be discounted, apparently as not credible because it was inconsistent with normal prosecution procedures, this is not a proper issue to be decided by this court.2 Resolution of factual disputes and the assessment of the credibility is for the jury and will not be overturned on appeal unless the evidence is so unsatisfactory or improbable that a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt remains. (People v. Williams (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 309, 315, 444 N.E.2d 136, 138.) This was not the case here, for, as noted by the majority itself, the defendant did not contend that the evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, any error here was harmless and did not require reversal. For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.   The majority also specifically observed that the State made a point of establishing that neither the victim, Asia, nor his friends were gang members and that this evidence was introduced to remove any stigma from Asia that the State was attempting to place on the defendant by associating him with a gang. This, the majority asserts, in effect destroyed any basis for the State’s contention that the introduction of gang evidence was for any purpose other than to prejudice the defendant. I respectfully disagree with this unsupported assertion by the majority. It seems to me more reasonable that the State’s basis for doing so was to counteract any contention that Asia was lying for purposes of “getting back at” a member of a rival gang, as was the assertion in the Hairston case. See Hairston, 46 Ill. 2d 348, 263 N.E.2d 840.    The majority, however, states that it does not mean that the evidence should be disregarded as not credible, but only that it is weakened, so that in the majority’s view, this evidence was not overwhelming. Respectfully, I do not see the legal significance of this distinction. First, the procedures employed here are not, nor does the majority say they were, improper (i.e., not in conformance with some mandatory standard of conduct), illegal, or unconstitutional, so that their use alone would require a reversal. The procedures were just not the normal procedures or the best procedures available to the State. Second, the question of the weight to be given to the evidence is also a proper function of the jury or trier of fact, and the decision of the trier of fact should not be set aside on appeal unless the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence. (People v. Hermann (1988), 180 Ill. App. 3d 939, 946-47, 536 N.E.2d 706, 711.) Finally, a conviction also should not be set aside simply because the evidence is not overwhelming, but, as observed above in my dissent, should be set aside only where there is a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. (People v. Jaffe (1986), 145 Ill. App. 3d 840, 847, 493 N.E.2d 600, 606.) Moreover, a reasonable doubt arises on appeal only when, after viewing all the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Jimerson (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 12, 43-44, 535 N.E.2d 889, 903.) This was not, as noted by the majority opinion, the situation here.