Court Opinion

ID: 9497028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 16:41:45.71974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:57:57.720258
License: Public Domain

ROGERS, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion except for Part V. In my view, a plain reading of Tennessee’s tree cutting statute, Tennessee Annotated Code § 65-6-132, clearly indicates that the sole purpose of the statute was to prevent trees from falling onto the tracks. I concur not because Mr. Shanklin was within the protected class of the statute, but because the tree cutting statute was nonetheless admissible as evidence because it was relevant, though not *995controlling, on the negligence determination under Tennessee law.
Tennessee Annotated Code § 65-6-132 states:
(a) Every company or person operating a railroad in this state shall cut down all trees standing on its lands which are six (6) or more inches in a diameter two feet (2’) above the ground and of sufficient height to reach the roadbed if they should fall.
(b) A failure to comply with subsection (a) ivill render the company liable for all damages to person or property resulting therefrom; also to a penalty of one hundred dollars ($100), to be recovered on suit brought in the name of any citizen before any tribunal having jurisdiction, one half (1/2) of which shall go to the treasury of the county in which said provisions may have been disregarded, and the other one half (1/2) to the plaintiff.
(emphasis added). Subsection (a) of § 65-6-132 is obviously concerned with trees greater than six inches in diameter falling onto a railroad track. Although the district court believed the diameter requirement set forth in the statute might have indicated that the Tennessee legislature was also concerned with visibility, the diameter requirement is easily explained by the fact that the thicker the trunk, the more likely a derailment would occur if the tree fell.
Because the language of the statute clearly indicates that Mr. Shanklin was not within the class that § 65-6-132 was designed to protect, the statute could not be used as a basis for liability under the statutory tort defined by subsection (b) of § 65-6-132. Similarly, the statute could not be used as a basis for negligence per se under Tennessee law. Under longstanding and consistently applied Tennessee law, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the injured party was “within the class of persons intended to benefit from or be protected by the statute” to recover under a theory of negligence per se. Alex v. Armstrong, 215 Tenn. 276, 385 S.W.2d 110 (1964); Carter v. Redmond, 142 Tenn. 258, 218 S.W. 217, 218 (1920); Harden v. Danek Med., Inc., 985 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998); Traylor v. Coburn, 597 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Tenn.Ct.App.1980); Berry v. Whitworth, 576 S.W.2d 351, 353 (Tenn.Ct.App.1978); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286. Thus, if the district court had instructed the jury that violation of the tree cutting statute required the jury to find negligence on the part of defendant, we would be compelled to reverse.
The district court, however, did not instruct the jury that the Norfolk Southern’s failure to comply with the tree cutting statute constituted negligence per se. Instead, the district court read § 65-6-132(a) to the jury along with three other statutes relating to duties of railroad companies to keep crossing safe and the duties of a motorist when approaching a railroad crossing.1
Tennessee law is not clear on the question of whether a statutory obligation that protects against different harms may nonetheless be considered by a jury as part of its analysis of whether the defendant violated the common law standard of care. While a number of Tennessee tort cases deal with statutes that arguably pro*996tect against different harms, the cases generally involve the question of whether violation of the statute amounts to negligence as a matter of law, not with the question of whether the factfinder could consider the statute for any purpose whatsoever.
Almost eighty-five years ago, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that a statute requiring automobile drivers to stop at railroad crossings was intended to protect against collisions between automobiles and trains, and not to protect against other traffic accidents that happen to occur at a railroad crossing. Carter v. Redmond, 142 Tenn. 258, 218 S.W. 217, 218 (1920). The court concluded not only that the trial judge erred in giving a negligence per se instruction, but that the trial judge also erred in refusing to give a tendered instruction that the “statute had no bearing on the case before them.” Carter appears to support the conclusion that the district court in this case should not have read the tree cutting statute to the jury, but the case is hardly on all fours. Defendant in this case did not tender a limiting instruction, although defendant did object to having the statute read to the jury. More importantly, the ultimate basis for reversal in Carter was the erroneous instruction regarding negligence per se, not the failure to instruct that the statute had no bearing. The Carter court found that the trial court’s error was material because the erroneous negligence per se instruction “practically necessitated a verdict against” defendant. The statement approving the tendered instruction was arguably dictum, inasmuch as the court did not need to reach the materiality of the trial court’s failure to give the tendered instruction.
In contrast, in Teal v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 728 F.2d 799 (6th Cir.1984) (applying Tennessee law), we reviewed a district court judgment in a case in which the district court had refused to give a negligence per se charge, but nonetheless informed the jury that the regulation in question “may be considered ... as some evidence ... of the (appropriate) standard of care.” In Teal an employee of an independent contractor was injured by a ladder that allegedly did not conform to federal OSHA regulations. While permitting the jury to consider the OSHA regulation as some evidence of the appropriate standard of care, the district court refused to instruct the jury on negligence per se. On plaintiffs appeal, we reversed, holding that because the OSHA regulation was indeed intended to protect the employees of independent contractors, the district court was required to give a negligence per se instruction. Our opinion, however, did not criticize at all the district court’s apparent conclusion that a regulation not intended to protect a plaintiff could nonetheless be considered as some evidence of the appropriate standard of care.
In the absence of clear Tennessee authority, we must make our best estimation of how the Tennessee Supreme Court would rule on the question of whether the Tennessee tree cutting statute could be admitted as some evidence of negligence, even though the jury could not consider it as a basis for negligence per se. Two considerations lead me to the conclusion that the answer to this question is yes.
First, the Restatement of Torts would clearly answer the question yes. Comment g to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286 states:
The fact that a legislative enactment requires a particular act to be done for the protection of the interests of a particular class of individuals does not preclude the possibility that the failure to do such an act may be negligence at common law toward other classes of persons. It also does not preclude the *997possibility that, in a proper case, the requirements of the statute may be considered as evidence bearing on the reasonableness of the actor’s conduct.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286 cmt. g (emphasis added); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286 cmt. f (“The fact that a legislative enactment requires a particular act to be done for the protection of the interests of a particular class of individuals does not preclude the possibility that the doing of such an act may be negligence at common law toward other classes of persons.”).
Second, it is consistent with general principles of American tort law to permit the jury to consider the Tennessee statute as some evidence of negligence. When a jury makes a negligence determination, its determination can be likened, using the famous “Hand formula,” to a balancing of the burden on the defendant in acting more carefully against the probability of harm multiplied by the magnitude of harm if the defendant does not so act. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.1947) (Hand, J.). In evaluating how burdensome it was to the defendant railroad to cut down the trees in question to avoid the possibility of harm to persons like Shanklin, it is relevant for the jury to know that the railroad was required to cut down the trees anyway for an entirely different purpose. Thus it makes sense, at least in the context of the instant case, for the jury to be aware of legal requirements that directly affect the balance that the jury is conceptually required to make in determining whether defendant has been negligent.
I would therefore hold that the district court in this case did not err in reading the tree cutting statute to the jury. It would of course have been preferable for the court to have stated clearly to the jury that a violation of the statute did not necessarily mean that defendant was negligent. It would also have been better for the district court to have explained that the jury could take into account the defendant’s legal obligation to minimize the risk of limbs obstructing the tracks, only as part of its evaluation of whether the defendant acted reasonably in not increasing the sight-distance for oncoming trains.
Moreover, even if it was not appropriate for the district court to read § 65-6-132 to the jury, the error was in any event harmless, again because the jury was not instructed that violation of the tree cutting statute would constitute negligence per se. Compare Carter, 218 S.W. at 217-19. As jurisdiction for this case is based on diversity of citizenship, “federal law governs our standard of review for determining whether a jury instruction is prejudicial.” Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 166 (6th Cir.1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Teal, 728 F.2d at 801. The Sixth Circuit has stated that it
will reverse a jury’s verdict on the basis of improper instructions only when the instructions, when viewed as a whole, are confusing, misleading, and prejudicial. Federal courts generally presume the jury will follow the instructions correctly as given. We will not reverse a decision on the basis of an erroneous jury instruction where the error is harmless.
Barnes v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 201 F.3d 815, 822 (6th Cir.2000).
Although the jury was shown several dissections of trees during trial, the lack of a negligence per se instruction with regard to § 65-6-132 indicates that the jury only considered the violation of the statute as evidence of Norfolk Southern’s negligence. Throughout the trial the plaintiff presented a considerable amount of other evidence as to Norfolk Southern’s duty and its breach of that duty. Thus, the simple *998reading of the tree cutting statute during the jury instruction, even if erroneous, was harmless.

. The district court did specify that the violation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 65-12-108, which relates to precautions for railroad crossings such as signs and whistles, is considered negligence per se under Tennessee Code Annotated § 65-12-109. However, the district court did not instruct that a violation of the tree cutting statute constituted negligence per se.