Court Opinion

ID: 9689659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:42:12.989731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:51.135534
License: Public Domain

PEDERSON, Justice,
dissenting.
The present counsel for Filler did not try this case. It was tried to the court without a jury. Every bit of evidence offered during trial was received. Prior counsel then rested and has never requested permission to reopen. Justice Sand has concluded that Filler should again have the opportunity to show that access to his property is not reasonable. Filler’s prior counsel had that opportunity and produced witnesses who testified that access was not reasonable in their *245opinion. The trial judge, being the final judge of credibility, found that access to Filler’s property is reasonable. Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P. applies.
Undoubtedly, present counsel would have used different trial tactics, perhaps different witnesses, and different argument. But it is not our function on appeal to provide an opportunity for a new attorney in the case to substitute new and different theories unless there are unusual circumstances. See Rummel v. Rummel, 265 N.W.2d 230 (N.D.1978). I see no unusual circumstances in this case.
The special findings of fact made by the trial judge were clear and specific and disclose the basis for the conclusions of law and the judgment that was entered. Although I may not have made the same findings of fact as were made by the judge who heard the witnesses if I had been the trial judge, I have read the transcript and from all of the evidence therein, I do not reach a definite and firm conviction that the trial judge made a mistake in any of the findings.
The judgment should be affirmed.