Court Opinion

ID: 9552375
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:09:45.609231+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:15.870369
License: Public Domain

ELLETT, Chief Justice
(dissenting):
I agree that the summary judgment was improper. In the first place, a summary judgment can only be granted on a Motion to Dismiss when “matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court.”1 In the second place, the complaint was for a declaratory judgment, and a declaratory judgment can only be had to determine rights, status, or other legal relations under a deed, will, or written contract, or where those rights are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise.2
No matters outside the pleadings were presented to the court and, therefore, there was no authority in the court to treat the Motion to Dismiss as one for summary judgment. The complaint purports to state a claim for declaratory judgment when there is nothing upon which a determination of rights, etc. can be based. There is no deed, will, contract, statute, or municipal ordinance to be interpreted; and the plaintiff has no rights that are, or are likely to be affected by any such documents. Since there can be no declaratory judgment, the court should have granted the Motion to Dismiss.
I cannot agree with the prevailing opinion regarding any asserted rights that plaintiff may have against the defendants. By Article XI, Sec. 6 of the Utah Constitution, municipal corporations are prohibited from selling, leasing, alienating, or disposing of any waterworks, water rights, or *123sources of water supply owned or controlled by them, and all such assets must be preserved, maintained, and operated for supplying its inhabitants with water at reasonable charges.
By statute,3 municipalities shall not be required to furnish water for use, even to its own inhabitants, unless an application therefor is made in writing and signed by the owner of the place to be served. The plaintiffs in this case have not made any application in writing or otherwise for water service, and Salt Lake City has neither agreed to furnish, nor furnished, any water to the plaintiffs or any of them. What the city can do and does is to sell its surplus water to water districts;4 and those districts in turn furnish water to residents who reside within the boundaries of the district.
The fact that Salt Lake County and the various water conservancy districts therein permit their residents to depend upon the surplus water supplied by Salt Lake City is no reason to grant a judgment to these plaintiffs. Such a ruling will require Salt Lake City to continue to furnish them with water when the city no longer has a surplus to sell. It is, and should be, the responsibility of those who undertake to furnish water to their residents to secure water rights in their own names which they may do by purchase, through eminent domain proceedings, or by digging wells. They cannot expect the courts to compel a city to sell water when it has none for sale or when it does not care to sell its surplus, if any it has. The city commissioners are the ones to decide whether the city will or should sell water and that is not, and ought not to be, a matter of concern to the courts.
I would remand this case with directions to the trial court to grant the Motion to Dismiss. No costs should be awarded to either party.

. Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Proc. [Emphasis added],

. 78-33-2, U.C.A., 1953.

. 10-7-10, U.C.A., 1953 as amended.

. 10-8-14, U.C.A., 1953 as amended.