Court Opinion

ID: 9390715
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 14:05:09.099155+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:36.215009
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 21, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals

                              NO. 2021-CA-1513-MR

DARRYL ELLERY                                                         APPELLANT

                 APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE AUDRA J. ECKERLE, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 15-CR-000832

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                 APPELLEE

                                OPINION
                        REVERSING AND REMANDING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; CALDWELL AND JONES, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: Darryl Ellery appeals from the Jefferson Circuit Court’s

order revoking probation. He alleges that the probationary period expired before

the trial court’s revocation and thus the court no longer maintained jurisdiction

over the matter at the time it entered the revocation order. We agree.
                                       FACTS

              On April 12, 2016, Ellery entered a guilty plea to one count of assault

in the second degree. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of five years,

probated for five years on June 2, 2016, by the Jefferson Circuit Court. As a part

of that sentence, Ellery was to pay restitution of $305.14, in monthly payments of

$23.75, Ellery having requested to pay restitution in no more than $25 installments.

The trial court noted on the record that, given its de minimis amount, the total

amount of restitution should easily be paid within the five-year term of probation

but informed Ellery that he would be on probation until the restitution was paid in

full. A separate restitution order, incorporated by reference into the final

judgment, contained language that the period of probation would be “5 years or

until restitution is paid in full.”

              On January 23, 2017, the trial court found probable cause for the

issuance of an arrest warrant for Ellery’s failure to remain compliant with the terms

of his probation. The allegation of non-compliance was that Ellery had failed to

report to his probation officer as instructed and had failed to avail himself of drug

counseling services as directed.

              The warrant was not served until October 28, 2021. A revocation

hearing was scheduled for November 15, 2021, and at that time both Ellery and the

Commonwealth appeared, and both requested a continuance.

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             On November 22, 2021, the parties again appeared for a hearing.

Ellery’s counsel argued that the court had lost jurisdiction over the matter when the

original five-year probationary period had expired in June of 2021, and the

Commonwealth expressed agreement with that position. The court disagreed,

holding that the issuance of the warrant within the five-year period of probation

acted to continue jurisdiction, without any further action on the part of the court

required. Ellery appeals that determination. We reverse the trial court.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             The seminal and determinative issue in this case concerns whether the

issuance of the warrant acted to extend the jurisdiction of the court and, if so, when

that extended jurisdiction ended. “Thus[], the true issue before this Court is

whether the issuance of an arrest warrant tolls the defendant’s probationary period

so as to prevent the automatic discharge enumerated in Kentucky Revised Statute

(KRS) 533.020(4) from applying. This inquiry is a matter of statutory

interpretation, which we review de novo.” Whitcomb v. Commonwealth, 424

S.W.3d 417, 419 (Ky. 2014) (citing Artrip v. Noe, 311 S.W.3d 229, 231 (Ky.

2010)).

                                    ANALYSIS

             Ellery argues that despite his failure to comply with the court’s order

imposing restitution when it granted him probation rather than incarceration, the

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court was without authority to revoke the grant of probation for that failure because

five (5) years had elapsed between the imposition of probation and the court’s

determination to revoke.

             Ellery argues that though a warrant for his arrest was issued

approximately six (6) months following the grant of probation, that warrant did not

act to toll the five (5) year probation period. He argues that the trial court should

have entered an order extending the probation at his first appearance following the

issuance of the warrant, because without doing so, his probation had ended per the

terms of the order imposing the probation.

             Further, Ellery argues that the language in the original order stating

that the period of probation would necessarily be extended past five (5) years

should any restitution remain to be paid was void as there was no finding

additional time was a necessity. Rather, Ellery argues, at the time of imposition,

the trial court noted the small amount of the restitution ordered and stated that

Ellery should have no problem paying off the amount within five (5) years,

expressly finding extension was not necessary.

             Ellery insists that as the trial court did not (1) duly enter an order

extending the probation at his first appearance following execution of the warrant

or (2) include language in the original order indicating that additional time may be

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necessary for completion of the payments of restitution. Therefore, the court was

without jurisdiction to revoke probation at the time it purported to do so.

             The Commonwealth responds first that the language in the original

order extending probation until the restitution was satisfied was effective, despite

the lack of a finding of necessity. Further, the Commonwealth forwards, the

“fugitive tolling doctrine,” an equitable theory of federal law and procedure,

vitiates against finding that Ellery’s probation ended when the warrant was

executed, and the trial court did not extend by duly entered order the term of

probation. The Commonwealth argues that the application of this doctrine extends

the tolling, which began with the issuance of the warrant through the first

appearance following its execution, despite the lack of a duly entered order at

Ellery’s first appearance specifically extending the probation until the revocation

hearing could be held.

             Thus, the question we must decide is whether the trial court retained

jurisdiction by virtue of the language requiring satisfaction of restitution before

discharge of probation in the original order. And, if not, whether it lost jurisdiction

when it granted the short continuance requested by both parties without

specifically entering an order extending the probation until the hearing the trial

court scheduled for a week later.

                                          -5-
             A. Effectiveness of the language in the original order

             The Commonwealth argues that the original order granting probation

entered by the trial court in 2016 extended the period of probation past five years

because of the incorporation by reference to the restitution order which stated the

term of probation was five years or “until restitution paid in full.” Ellery responds

that because the trial court did not specifically find that extension of the term was

“necessary” it was not effective. We agree with Ellery.

             KRS 533.020(4) requires sentencing courts to set a fixed term of

probation and grants them the authority to extend the initial term beyond a

maximum term of five (5) years upon a finding the extension is necessary.

             (4) The period of probation, probation with an alternative
             sentence, or conditional discharge shall be fixed by the
             court and at any time may be extended or shortened by
             duly entered court order or as modified by the
             Department of Corrections through the application of
             probation program credits under KRS 439.268. Such
             period, with extensions thereof, shall not exceed five (5)
             years, or the time necessary to complete restitution,
             whichever is longer, upon conviction of a felony nor two
             (2) years, or the time necessary to complete restitution,
             whichever is longer, upon conviction of a misdemeanor.
             Upon completion of the probationary period, probation
             with an alternative sentence, or the period of conditional
             discharge, the defendant shall be deemed finally
             discharged, provided no warrant issued by the court is
             pending against him, and probation, probation with an
             alternative sentence, or conditional discharge has not
             been revoked.

Id.

                                          -6-
             Thus, in order for a term of probation to be longer than five (5) years,

there must be a finding that more time is “necessary to complete restitution.”

Language indicating that additional time may be necessary to complete the

payment of restitution must be included in the order. Our Supreme Court has

indicated that the finding of necessity is required.

             [I]t is an essential element of the text that an extension of
             time beyond five years is permissible only when the
             additional time is “necessary to complete restitution.”
             KRS 533.020(4) (emphasis added). By implication, a
             determination of necessity is a prerequisite to any
             extension beyond five years. Because such a factual
             determination falls uniquely within the trial court’s
             purview, it follows that the phrase anticipates that the
             determination of whether additional time beyond five
             years period is necessary must be addressed by the trial
             court as a factual finding either (1) when it initially fixes
             probation at the time of the final judgment, or (2) later, if
             it becomes necessary to extend the probationary period in
             order to assure that the defendant’s restitution obligation
             is satisfied.

Commonwealth v. Wright, 415 S.W.3d 606, 611 (Ky. 2013). Thus, such finding

could be made at imposition of probation if, for example, the amount of restitution

was quite large, with an express indication that more than five (5) years would be

required to pay off a large amount.1

1
      We also note that occasions arise in which the trial court can easily anticipate,
      even before fixing the period of probation, that restitution cannot be fully paid
      within the five-year period provided by the statute. For example, if the amount of
      restitution is very great in comparison to the defendant’s financial resources, it

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             However, here, the trial court specifically remarked that the $305

should easily be paid within five years, and the monthly amount ordered that Ellery

pay toward the restitution would require approximately one year’s worth of

payments for satisfaction of the amount. The court specifically found that it was

not “necessary” that Ellery would need more than five years in which to satisfy the

restitution order. Without a finding that additional time to complete the payment

of restitution was or may be necessary, the term of the probation was limited to

five (5) years per both the clear language of the order and the statute.

             B. Court’s jurisdiction

             We must now analyze whether the court retained jurisdiction past the

execution of the warrant. Indisputably the court retained jurisdiction over the

matter while the warrant went unserved because the warrant itself was issued

during the probationary period; if the court had lost jurisdiction, it would not have

had the authority to issue the warrant.

             A sentence of probation only naturally ends at the end of the term

when it has not been previously revoked and when there is no outstanding warrant

for the probationer’s arrest.

      may be apparent at the time of sentencing that more than five years will be
      necessary to complete restitution.

Id. at 611. See also Commonwealth v. Adams, 566 S.W.3d 225, 232 (Ky. App. 2018).

                                             -8-
             The plain language of KRS 533.020(4) is clear. For a
             probationer to be “finally discharged” from probation,
             two condition precedents must be satisfied. First, there
             can be no pending warrant against the probationer.
             Secondly, the probation must not have been previously
             revoked. If one of these two conditions exists, then the
             probation will not automatically discharge by operation
             of law. Indeed, this Court very recently stated that the
             presence of either an active warrant or the previous
             revocation of one’s probation will foreclose the
             probationer from being discharged and the period of
             probation will remain open.

Whitcomb, 424 S.W.3d at 419. As there was an unserved warrant, issued during

the term of probation when the court continued to have jurisdiction over the matter

on January 23, 2017, the court retained jurisdiction even though the warrant went

unexecuted on the fifth anniversary of the imposition of probation, or June 2, 2021.

             Therefore, although Appellant’s probationary period was
             to end on February 11, 2005, the period was tolled once
             the trial court issued a warrant for her arrest on March
             20, 2000. Moreover, the warrant was active and pending
             upon her arrest on February 10, 2011. Consequently,
             Appellant failed to meet the requirements of KRS
             533.020(4), thereby precluding an automatic discharge of
             her probation. Given that Appellant’s probationary
             period was still open, the trial court retained jurisdiction
             to conduct a revocation hearing.

Id. at 419-20.

             The final question to be determined, then, is whether the trial court

lost jurisdiction when it did not enter an order specifically continuing probation at

Ellery’s first appearance following his arrest on the warrant. It matters not, in this

                                          -9-
case, whether that first appearance was on October 29, 2021, when there does not

appear to be an appearance before the court but simply entrance of an order setting

the matter for the court’s docket or on November 15, 2021, when the court ordered

the parties to appear. The fact remains there is simply zero indication in the record

before us that the trial court ever extended the probation by duly entered order

once the arrest warrant was executed.

             A trial court has the authority to enter an order extending probation

until the court can hold a revocation hearing without holding a hearing first.

             First, KRS 533.020(4) does not require a court to hold a
             hearing before extending the period of probation.
             Second, although KRS 533.050(2) requires the court to
             hold a hearing before modifying the conditions of
             probation, the length of the probationary period is not a
             statutorily defined condition of probation. “Conditions”
             of probation “shall be such as the court, in its discretion,
             deems reasonably necessary to insure the defendant will
             lead a law-abiding life or to assist him to do so.” KRS
             533.030(1). Such conditions include the avoidance of
             certain persons and places, the requirement to obtain
             suitable employment and to support dependents, payment
             of costs and restitution, submitting to drug and alcohol
             testing, etc. KRS 533.030(2). Because the period of
             probation is not a condition of probation, KRS
             533.050(2) does not mandate a hearing prior to extending
             it.

Commonwealth v. Tapp, 497 S.W.3d 239, 241 (Ky. 2016). A hearing is not

necessary to extend the probation past the execution of the warrant, but per the

clear language of the statute, a duly entered order must be entered. The trial court

                                         -10-
entered no such written order after the warrant was served on Ellery, either in

writing or orally, at the November 15, 2021, appearance of Ellery before the court.

KRS 533.020(4) (“The period of probation, probation with an alternative sentence,

or conditional discharge shall be fixed by the court and at any time may be

extended or shortened by duly entered court order . . . .”).

             Apparently recognizing that the trial court here lost jurisdiction when

it did not enter an order continuing probation until the revocation hearing, the

Commonwealth entreats us to apply the “fugitive tolling doctrine.” The fugitive

tolling doctrine is applied by federal courts interpreting federal law so as not to

allow a fugitive to benefit from his non-compliance and extends the original period

of supervision for the length of time that the fugitive probationer was non-

compliant. Because a sentencing court determines the appropriate length of

supervision needed by the probationer, the doctrine extends the supervision by the

amount of time the probationer was off supervision due to his noncompliance,

theorizing that the probationer was not actually being supervised during the time of

noncompliance.

             While we may agree that the doctrine forwards a compelling public

policy, this Court cannot ignore the Kentucky Constitution’s prohibition against

the usurpation of the powers of another branch – here, the legislative branch –

which crafted and enacted the statutes at play here. The Kentucky Constitution

                                         -11-
expressly articulates what is commonly considered “separation of powers”2 and

Kentucky arguably has amongst the most vibrant separation of powers clauses

contained in a constitution, and is clearly more robust than anything found in the

United States Constitution.

                Perhaps no state forming a part of the national
                government of the United States has a Constitution
                whose language more emphatically separates and
                perpetuates what might be termed the American tripod
                form of government than does our Constitution, which
                history tells us came from the pen of the great declaimer
                of American independence, Thomas Jefferson, when
                delegates from Kentucky, just after it was admitted to the
                Union, waited upon him, and he penned for them the
                substance of what is now section 28, supra, of our
                Constitution, containing an affirmative prohibition
                against one department exercising powers properly
                belonging to the others, and which without it contained
                only the negative prohibition found in section 27 of that
                instrument, and which was the extent of the separation of
                the powers found in the federal Constitution and in those
                of a number of the states composing the confederated
                Union at that time.

Sibert v. Garrett, 197 Ky. 17, 246 S.W. 455, 457 (1922).

                Not only do we find that our state Constitution forbids us from

adopting the fugitive tolling doctrine, as our General Assembly has clearly opted

not to include such in the statutes related to probation and supervision by the

judicial branch. But we also cannot do so as our Supreme Court did not do so in

2
    KY. CONST. §§ 27, 28.

                                           -12-
the Tapp case. “The Court of Appeals is bound by and shall follow applicable

precedents established in the opinions of the Supreme Court and its predecessor

court.” Kentucky Supreme Court Rules (SCR) 1.030(8)(a).

             In Tapp, the probationer was sentenced to one year of incarceration,

probated for one year, on February 2, 2012. Several violation of supervision

reports were filed and a warrant for Tapp’s arrest was issued on January 28, 2013,

and served on him on January 31, 2013. He appeared before the court on February

7, 2013, and requested the earliest possible date for a revocation hearing, which

was set for February 12, 2013. Tapp argued at that February 12 hearing that the

court had lost jurisdiction and the court disagreed, essentially holding that the

warrant extended the probation until disposition, as did the trial court in the present

case. On discretionary review of this Court’s decision finding that the court lost

jurisdiction over Tapp when it did not enter an order at his February 7, 2013,

appearance following execution of the warrant, the Kentucky Supreme Court held:

             Thus, if the trial court had extended Tapp’s probationary
             period at his first post-arrest appearance on February 7,
             2013, it would have retained jurisdiction to revoke his
             probation at the February 12, 2013, hearing. However,
             because the trial court understandably did not extend
             Tapp’s probationary period at his first post-arrest
             appearance, the court lost that jurisdiction.
Tapp, 497 S.W.3d at 242.

                                         -13-
              We must find that the trial court lost jurisdiction when the parties

appeared before it on November 15, 2021, and it failed to expressly extend Ellery’s

probation until the revocation hearing could be held. This result is not satisfying,

and we agree with the trial court that it seems that Ellery is being rewarded for his

non-compliance, but the statutes and the precedent set by the Kentucky Supreme

Court compels this result.

                                   CONCLUSION

              We hold that the trial court retained jurisdiction over Ellery only until

his appearance before it on November 15, 2021. When the court did not enter an

order extending his probation until the probation revocation hearing, it lost

jurisdiction over Ellery. The language in the original restitution order which

attempted to extend probation past five years if the restitution was not paid within

that period was not effective because there was no finding of necessity, as required

by statute.

              The case law is clear, and we are bound by it.

                      The language of KRS 533.020(4) is clear:
              probation is automatically discharged upon completion of
              a probationary period unless it has been revoked or an
              arrest warrant is pending. If neither condition exists, the
              trial court loses jurisdiction both to revoke and to modify
              the conditions of probation. A warrant remains
              “pending” until the defendant is brought before the court
              at which time, given probable cause to do so, the court
              may extend the probationary period for a reasonable time
              until a revocation hearing can be held. Because Tapp’s

                                          -14-
            probationary period was not extended, the court lost
            jurisdiction to revoke his probation. However, this
            Opinion will give the necessary guidance to the next trial
            court faced with similar circumstances.

Id. The Jefferson Circuit Court is reversed, and this matter is remanded for

proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

            THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS.

            JONES, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                        BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Kate Hatheway                               Daniel Cameron
Louisville, Kentucky                        Attorney General of Kentucky

REPLY BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                  Christopher Henry
                                            Assistant Attorney General
William Ellis Sharp                         Frankfort, Kentucky
Louisville, Kentucky

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