Court Opinion

ID: 9961487
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 21:00:45.709104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:49.043865
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 22-1964      Doc: 33        Filed: 04/17/2024     Pg: 1 of 9

                                             PUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 22-1964

        RONALD LEE MORGAN,

                            Debtor – Appellant,

                     v.

        DANIEL CLARKSON BRUTON,

                            Trustee – Appellee,

        ROBERT EDMUNDS PRICE,

                            Intervenor.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
        Greensboro. Loretta C. Biggs, District Judge. (1:21-cv-00891-LCB)

        Argued: October 24, 2023                                         Decided: April 17, 2024

        Before HEYTENS and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges, and Elizabeth W. HANES, United
        States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

        Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Hanes wrote the opinion, in which Judge Heytens
        and Judge Benjamin joined.

        ARGUED: Joshua H. Bennett, BENNETT GUTHRIE, PLLC, Winston-Salem, North
        Carolina, for Appellant. Daniel Clarkson Bruton, BELL, DAVIS & PITT, P.A., Winston-
        Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee. Robert Edmunds Price, Jr., ASSISTANT UNITED
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        STATES BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATOR, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
        Intervenor. ON BRIEF: Elizabeth F. Lawson, BENNETT GUTHRIE, PLLC, Winston-
        Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant.

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        ELIZABETH W. HANES, United States District Judge, sitting by designation:

               Ronald Lee Morgan filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in North Carolina. During the

        bankruptcy proceedings, Morgan sought to exempt his home—owned jointly with his wife

        as tenants by the entirety—from the bankruptcy estate to the extent of his outstanding tax

        debt to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). The bankruptcy court disallowed the

        exemption, and Morgan appealed. We affirm.

                                                        I.

               In July 2021, Morgan filed for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. J.A.

        18. Morgan listed his single-family home, in which he had an interest as a tenant by the

        entirety, in his relevant schedule of assets. J.A. 27. Morgan also reported a debt he owed

        to the IRS, which thereafter filed a proof of claim with the bankruptcy court for the

        unsecured debt. J.A. 41, 162–65. Morgan’s wife did not jointly owe the debt to the IRS and

        did not file for bankruptcy. J.A. 18, 27, 47.

               Morgan sought to exempt the home from the bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C.

        § 522(b)(3)(B). J.A. 34. This section allows a debtor to keep his entireties interest outside

        of the bankruptcy estate, thus protecting the property from creditors, “to the extent that

        such interest . . . is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law.” 11 U.S.C.

        § 522(b)(3)(B). The trustee of the bankruptcy estate objected to Morgan’s claim for an

        exemption, arguing that “under state law, particularly in North Carolina, tenancy by the

        entireties property is generally exempt from execution by creditors of only one

        spouse . . . [but] that rule does not apply to tax obligations owing to the United States.”

        J.A. 79. The trustee requested the exemption “be denied with respect to any claim owing

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        to the IRS (and any creditor that is owed money by the Debtor jointly with his non-filing

        spouse).” J.A. 80. After argument on the issue, the bankruptcy court sustained the

        objection, and on appeal, the district court affirmed. J.A. 117–18, 168. Morgan now appeals

        the district court’s ruling, arguing that, in order for his IRS debt to override the entireties

        exemption under § 522(b)(3)(B), the IRS must have obtained a perfected tax lien on the

        property prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition.

                                                       II.

                “In reviewing the judgment of a district court sitting in review of a bankruptcy

        court, [this Court] appl[ies] the same standard of review that was applied by the district

        court.” Copley v. United States, 959 F.3d 118, 121 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Three Sisters

        Partners, L.L.C. v. Harden (In re Shangra-La, Inc.), 167 F.3d 843, 847 (4th Cir. 1999)).

        Accordingly, the Court reviews the bankruptcy court’s legal conclusions de novo and

        factual findings for clear error. Id. (citations omitted).

                                                      III.

               Under federal bankruptcy law, a debtor’s estate generally includes “all legal or

        equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C.

        § 541(a)(1). The property in the debtor’s estate may be distributed by the trustee to satisfy

        debts. Id. §§ 704(a)(1), 726. Exemptions permit a debtor to exclude certain property from

        the estate and therefore avoid distribution of the property. Relevant to this case, a debtor

        may exempt

               any interest in property in which the debtor had, immediately before the
               commencement of the case, an interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint

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               tenant to the extent that such interest as a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant
               is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy law . . . .

        11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B) (emphasis added). 1 “Applicable nonbankruptcy law” includes

        both state and federal law. Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 758 (1992).

                                                      IV.

               The issue then is whether Morgan’s interest in his home as a tenant by the entirety

        is “exempt from process” under “applicable nonbankruptcy law.” We conclude that it is

        not.

               As an initial matter, there is no dispute that North Carolina law shields Morgan’s

        home from non-joint creditors. Dealer Supply Co. v. Greene, 422 S.E.2d 350, 352 (N.C.

        App. 1992) (“In North Carolina, it is well established that an individual creditor of either a

        husband or a wife has no right to levy upon property held by the couple as tenants by the

        entirety.”); accord L & M Gas Co. v. Leggett, 161 S.E.2d 23, 26 (N.C. 1968); Grabenhofer

        v. Garrett, 131 S.E.2d 675, 677 (N.C. 1963).

               Morgan does not fare as well under federal law. Morgan owed a debt to the IRS.

        Under the Tax Code, “[i]f any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the

               1
                 Application of the § 522(b)(3)(B) exemption may not remove a property from the
        bankruptcy estate entirely. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3) (stating that an exemption is only
        applicable “to the extent” that the relevant property interest is exempt from process
        (emphasis added)); Sumy v. Schlossberg, 777 F.2d 921, 928 (4th Cir. 1985) (“A debtor
        does not lose all benefit of § 522(b)(2)(B) when joint creditors are present, but he does not
        benefit from it to the extent of joint claims.”); see also In re Sefren, 41 B.R. 747, 749
        (Bankr. D. Md. 1984) (stating that the trustee could not “defeat the debtor’s claim of
        entireties exemptions in toto merely because there was one joint, unsecured claim at the
        time of filing” and thus the balance of the property interest was exempt from other
        creditors’ claims).

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        same after demand, the amount . . . shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all

        property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.” 26

        U.S.C. § 6321. In United States v. Craft, the Supreme Court considered whether a federal

        tax lien provided for in § 6321 could attach to a husband’s entireties interest when only the

        husband owed the debt to the IRS. 535 U.S. 274, 276 (2002). The Craft Court found that

        “each tenant [in a tenancy by the entirety] possesses individual rights in the estate sufficient

        to constitute ‘property’ or ‘rights to property’ for the purposes of [a federal tax] lien.” Id.

        In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court recognized that while state law may create

        the legal “fiction” that each tenant in a tenancy by the entirety has no separate interest in

        the property, in substance he has all the “most essential property rights,” even if he does

        not possess the right of unilateral alienation. 2 Id. at 276, 279, 282–85. The Supreme Court

        noted that statutory language authorizing a tax lien is “broad and reveals on its face that

        Congress meant to reach every interest in property that a taxpayer might have.” Id. at 283

        (quoting United States v. Nat’l Bank of Com., 472 U.S. 713, 719–20 (1985)). Accordingly,

               2
                 In Craft, the Supreme Court looked to the relevant state law—in that case, the law
        of Michigan—to determine the property rights a tenant holds in an entireties property.
        Craft, 535 U.S. at 279–82. As in Michigan, tenants by the entirety in North Carolina
        possess the most essential property rights, even if they do not possess the right to
        unilaterally encumber or alienate the property. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 41-58(a) (providing
        that tenants by the entirety “shall have an equal right to the control, use, possession, and
        income from [the] property”); id. § 41-58(b) (providing that “[n]either spouse may bargain,
        sell, lease, mortgage, transfer, convey, sign, pay out, or in any manner encumber any
        property held by them as tenants by the entirety without the written joinder of the other
        spouse”); id. § 41-64(a) (providing a surviving spouse the right to survivorship in a tenancy
        by the entirety upon the death of the other spouse). The Craft Court’s reasoning is equally
        applicable to a North Carolina tenancy by the entirety.

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        the husband’s entireties interest constituted “property and rights to property” to which a

        federal tax lien could properly attach, even though his wife was not personally liable for

        the tax debt. See id. at 283, 288. Because a federal tax lien can attach to one spouse’s

        interest in an entireties property, even when the tax debt is not jointly owed, the property

        is not “exempt from process” under federal nonbankruptcy law if the IRS has the right to

        obtain such a lien.

               Morgan raises two alternative arguments in support of his position that his home

        was “exempt from process.” First, Morgan asserts that the IRS must have actually obtained

        a lien prior to the bankruptcy filing; simply having the right to obtain the lien was

        insufficient. This argument is foreclosed by this Court’s decision in Sumy v. Schlossberg,

        777 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1985). In Sumy, we stated that “the absence of a judgment or lien

        has no bearing on the hypothetical issue of whether the debtor’s interest would be exempt

        from process” under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B). Id. at 928 n.14. While Sumy involved joint

        creditors (i.e., creditors to whom both spouses were obligated), we see no reason to impose

        a different rule here.

               Second, Morgan contends that Craft requires the IRS to perfect a lien against his

        property before he filed for bankruptcy. According to Morgan, Craft’s holding “hinged

        upon the crucial fact that the IRS had completed . . . the legal process of perfecting a lien

        on the tax debtors’ property” by filing a Notice of Federal Tax Lien as provided under 26

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        U.S.C. § 6323(a). 3 Opening Br. at 11. Notice was essential, argues Morgan, because Craft

        addressed whether the tax lien attached to the interest of the spouse who did not owe the

        tax debt. Id. at 10–11. Without such notice in this case, he posits, “the IRS had no interest

        in the Property immediately before [the bankruptcy] filing,” and North Carolina

        law—which protects tenancies by the entirety from creditors of an individual

        tenant—rendered the home “exempt from becoming part of the bankruptcy estate.” Id. at

        8.

               This reading misconstrues Craft. Nothing in Craft limits its holding to instances

        where the IRS has perfected a tax lien against the property. Craft addressed whether a tax

        lien could attach to the interest of the spouse who owed the tax debt, not the spouse who

        did not owe the tax debt. See Craft, 535 U.S. at 278. Indeed, the notice was only relevant

        in Craft to the extent that it was necessary to understand the procedural history of the case,

        in which the husband—after receiving notice of a tax lien from the IRS—purported to

        transfer his interest in the entireties property to his wife, who was not liable for the debt

        and who later tried to sell the property. Craft, 535 U.S. at 276–77. The notice appeared in

        the title search, prompting the wife to file the action to quiet title that gave rise to Craft. Id.

        at 277. Nothing in this procedural background, or elsewhere in Craft, suggests that

        providing notice of the lien was necessary for the IRS to obtain an interest in the property.

               3
                  Section 6323(a) provides that a tax lien “imposed by section 6321 shall not be
        valid as against any purchaser, holder of a security interest, mechanic’s lienor, or judgment
        lien creditor until notice thereof . . . has been filed by the Secretary.” 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a).

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               Finally, to rule otherwise would create perverse incentives by allowing a debtor to

        shield his entireties property from federal tax obligations as long as the debtor files for

        bankruptcy before the IRS issues a demand for the taxes or a Notice of Federal Tax Lien.

        We decline to endorse such a result. Cf. Sumy, 777 F.2d at 925 (noting that under a prior

        version of the Bankruptcy Code, we had repeatedly condemned debtors’ manipulation of

        the timing of bankruptcy proceedings to eliminate joint creditors’ ability to reach entireties

        property); Chippenham Hosp., Inc. v. Bondurant, 716 F.2d 1057, 1058 (4th Cir. 1983)

        (same); Matter of Seats, 537 F.2d 1176, 1179 (4th Cir. 1976) (same).

                                                     V.

               In conclusion, we hold that property owned as a tenancy by the entirety may not be

        exempted from an individual debtor’s bankruptcy estate under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B) to

        the extent of the debtor’s tax debt to the IRS. Accordingly, the judgment of the district

        court is affirmed.

                                                                                         AFFIRMED

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