Court Opinion

ID: 9929031
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-01 17:13:04.632778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:09:08.107819
License: Public Domain

J-A27045-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DAVID WEAVER                                 :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1711 MDA 2022

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 2, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-36-CR-0001552-2017

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                      FILED FEBRUARY 01, 2024

       Appellant, David Weaver, appeals from the December 2, 2022, order

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, which denied

Appellant’s first petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”),

42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, following an evidentiary hearing. In addition to

a counseled appellate brief, Appellant has filed a pro se Application to Remand

for an evidentiary hearing regarding layered claims of ineffectiveness. After

a careful review, we deny Appellant’s Application to Remand and affirm the

PCRA court’s order.

       The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: The

Commonwealth filed an Information charging Appellant with various sex

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A27045-23

crimes involving his minor niece and nephew. On August 29, 2018, Appellant,

who was represented by Christopher Sarno, Esquire, proceeded to a jury trial.

This Court previously summarized the evidence offered at the jury trial as

follows:

           At trial, [Appellant’s] niece testified that when she was
      seven years old, on several occasions, [Appellant] sat next to her
      on the couch, placed his hand down her pants, and rubbed her
      vagina. She described one occasion as follows:
            Q. When you say he was moving his finger in a circular
            motion, like, where on your body was that?
            A. My vagina.
            Q. Do you know if he touched the outside or the inside
            or something else.
            A. Not like inside, but not like, I don’t know how to
            explain it.
            Q. I know this is super hard and awkward. As a 7-
            year-old, it would have looked like almost two bumps
            on your body, is that fair?
            A. Yes.
            Q. Would he have been on top of the bumps or in
            between the bumps or something else?
            A. Like, in between the bumps.
            Q. And he was rubbing in a circular motion?
            A. Yeah.
      N.T., 8/29/18, at 179.
            The Commonwealth also presented the testimony of
      Sergeant Kyle Hosking, who had interviewed [Appellant].
      Sergeant Hosking testified that when he asked [Appellant] about
      the allegations, [Appellant] responded that he did not know why
      the victims would make such allegations, “and that they were
      potentially misconstruing his roughhousing and playing with
      sexual misconduct.” N.T., 8/30/18, at 107. [Appellant] told
      Sergeant Hosking that he had trouble remembering things from
      that period, due to a head injury and frequent heavy drinking. Id.
      at 107-08….[Appellant] told Sergeant Hosking, “I can’t believe I’d

                                    -2-
J-A27045-23

       do something like that,” and repeatedly stated that because he
       could not remember what happened, “anything is possible.” Id.
       at 108, 110.

Commonwealth v. Weaver, No. 767 MDA 2019, at *1-3 (Pa.Super. filed

9/1/20) (unpublished memorandum) (footnote omitted). Appellant did not

testify at trial.

       At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Appellant of aggravated

indecent assault-victim less than 13 years of age, corruption of minors, and

indecent assault1 with regard to his niece; however, the jury found Appellant

not guilty of the charges relating to his nephew. The trial court ordered

Appellant to undergo assessment by the Sex Offender Assessment Board

(“SOAB”) to determine if he is a sexually violent predator (“SVP”) as defined

by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”).2 Appellant

filed a motion to bar the SVP assessment and any registration under SORNA

since his offenses occurred before SORNA’s effective date. Appellant alleged

application of SORNA to his case would be an ex post facto violation.

       The trial court held that the SVP motion was moot because the SOAB

found that Appellant did not meet the requirements. However, the trial court

granted Appellant’s motion as to registration under SORNA. The trial court

determined Appellant was nonetheless subject to lifetime registration under a

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3125(a)(7), 6301(a)(1)(ii), and 3126(a)(7), respectively.

2 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10-9799.42.

                                           -3-
J-A27045-23

prior registration law, Megan’s Law II, and provided Appellant with notification

of his registration requirements under that law. Additionally, the trial court

imposed an aggregate sentence of five years to ten years in prison, and

Appellant filed a timely direct appeal to this Court.

       On appeal, Appellant contended the evidence was insufficient to sustain

his conviction for aggravated indecent assault-victim less than 13 years of

age; the trial court erred in failing to grant Appellant’s request for a mistrial

due to prosecutorial misconduct committed during closing arguments; and the

trial court erred in ordering Appellant to register under Megan’s Law II. This

Court found no merit to Appellant first and second issues; however, we held

the trial court erred in ordering Appellant to register under Megan’s Law II.

Rather, we held SORNA was applicable to Appellant’s case.

       Specifically, we held:

              [Appellant’s] final issue involves his registration as a sex
       offender. By way of background, SORNA took effect on December
       20, 2012, the day Megan’s Law expired.               In 2017, the
       Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that SORNA is punitive in effect,
       and therefore retroactive application of SORNA to an offender
       whose applicable offenses occurred before SORNA’s effective date
       violates the ex post facto clauses. See Commonwealth v.
       Muniz, [640 Pa. 699,] 164 A.3d 1189 (2017). In response, the
       legislature twice amended SORNA in 2018. Relevant here, the
       General Assembly added Subchapter I to the Sentencing Code,
       which it intended to be applied to those offenders who committed
       offenses prior to December 12, 2012, SORNA’s effective date.[3]

____________________________________________

3 As our Supreme Court noted:

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -4-
J-A27045-23

             Following his convictions, [Appellant] argued to the trial
       court that the amendments to SORNA do not pass constitutional
       muster, and his registration under Subchapter I would still be an
       ex post facto violation. The trial court agreed and provided
       [Appellant] notification that he would be subject to registration
       under Megan’s Law. [Appellant] argues this was error, as Megan’s
       Law expired in 2012. He further contends that he should not be
       subject to registration under Subchapter I, as it is punitive, and
       its application would violate the ex post facto clauses of the state
       and federal constitutions.
             We agree that the trial court erred in providing notification
       that, upon [Appellant’s] release from prison, he would be subject
       to registration under Megan’s Law, as it is expired. However,
       [Appellant’s] issue regarding the applicability of SORNA to his case
       has since been settled, as our Supreme Court recently held that
       Subchapter I does not constitute criminal punishment, and its
       application will not support ex post facto claims.              See
       Commonwealth v. Lacombe, 660 Pa. 568, 234 A.3d 602
       (2020).

Weaver, No. 767 MDA 2019, at *11-12 (some citations and footnote omitted)

(footnote added).

____________________________________________

    In Act 10, [the General Assembly] split SORNA, which was
    previously designated in the Sentencing Code as Subchapter H
    into two subchapters. Revised Subchapter H applies to crimes
    committed on or after December 20, 2012, whereas Subchapter I
    applies to crimes committed after April 22, 1996, but before
    December 20, 2012. In essence, Revised Subchapter H retained
    many of the provisions of SORNA, while Subchapter I imposed
    arguably less onerous requirements on those who committed
    offenses prior to December 20, 2012, in an attempt to address
    th[e] [Supreme] Court's conclusion in Muniz that application of
    the original provisions of SORNA to these offenders constituted an
    ex post facto violation.
Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, 659 Pa. 359, 232 A.3d 567, 580-81 (2020).

                                           -5-
J-A27045-23

      Accordingly, on September 1, 2020, this Court vacated and remanded

for the trial court to provide new notification of Appellant’s registration

requirements under Subchapter I of SORNA.            See Weaver, supra.     We

affirmed in all other respects. See id. Appellant did not file a petition for

allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court. On December 7, 2020, Appellant

was advised of his registration requirements under Subchapter I of SORNA.

      Thereafter, on October 1, 2021, represented by new counsel, Todd M.

Moser, Esquire, Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition wherein he averred trial

counsel was ineffective in failing to present character witnesses on Appellant’s

behalf during the jury trial. Specifically, Appellant contended he has “four

available character witnesses who would have testified to [Appellant’s]

reputation in the community for being peaceful and law-abiding.” PCRA

Petition, filed 10/1/21, at 5.

      The Commonwealth filed a response to Appellant’s PCRA petition

indicating   Appellant’s   ineffectiveness   claim    lacked   arguable   merit.

Specifically, the Commonwealth noted Appellant did not provide the identity

of the alleged character witnesses. On November 8, 2021, Appellant filed a

counseled amended PCRA petition wherein he identified four alleged character

witnesses: Barbara Heinly, Gary Heinly, Nina Fisher, and Holly Williams.

      On April 25, 2022, Appellant proceeded to a PCRA evidentiary hearing

at which Appellant’s trial counsel, Attorney Sarno, as well as Barbara Heinly,

Gary Heinly, Holly Williams, Nina Fisher, and Appellant testified.

                                     -6-
J-A27045-23

      Relevantly, Attorney Sarno testified he met “quite often” with Appellant

prior to trial, and they discussed trial strategy. N.T., 4/25/22, at 4. Attorney

Sarno confirmed he and Appellant discussed character witnesses. Id. at 5.

Specifically, Attorney Sarno testified as follows on direct examination by

Appellant’s PCRA counsel:

            Q. And did you ask him or explain to him what a character
      witness was?
            A. We did discuss character witnesses.
            Q. What was that discussion?
             A. We discussed possible witnesses a couple of times leading
      up to trial. Now, what happened is that we would be scheduled
      for trial and then it would be continued. So, we did this over a
      course of—it wasn’t exactly right before our actual trial, but we
      did discuss it. We discussed the possibility of anybody who would
      be a character witness and what they would have to say.
           Q. Okay. Do you remember if [Appellant] provided you with
      any names of people?
            A. No, he did not.
            Q. Do you remember whether he said he had anybody he
      could call?
            A. No. So, usually when we met there was more than just
      [Appellant] there, it was his family, so his mother, his wife, his
      father. And I know we discussed character witnesses, and we
      mentioned some people. I don’t know who actually brought up
      any names, but we ultimately settled on the fact that we didn’t
      have anybody that wasn’t—that would be good enough to do it.
            Q. When you say good enough to do it, what do you mean
      by that?
            A. So, most of it was family. And we thought that was
      probably not the best move—I thought that was probably not the
      best move[.] I don’t recall anybody being mentioned outside of
      the family so that’s—mostly it was—I know Cheryl Weaver wanted
      to testify, and we needed her for a fact witness. So, that’s where
      we went with her.

                                     -7-
J-A27045-23

             But as far as other character witnesses outside the family, I
      think they were going to look into it, and I think what happened
      is kind of what happens in these types of cases where you have a
      lot of people who are supportive but when it comes down to will
      they actually testify, they didn’t—they weren’t going to do that.
                                    ***
            Q. Okay. Was it—did you communicate to [Appellant] that
      he needed someone other than family to testify as character
      witnesses?
           A. Normally, I would say to somebody that they need
      somebody other than family and somebody that would have
      known you at that time.
              Q. Known you at which time?
              A. The time in and around the alleged offenses.

Id. at 5-8.

      Attorney Sarno confirmed that character witnesses, who would have

been willing to testify to Appellant’s reputation for being law-abiding and

peaceful, would have been helpful to the defense during trial. Id. at 8.

      Attorney Sarno testified he informed Appellant about jury instructions,

and generally, this would include that, if character witnesses testified, the trial

court would give jury instructions allowing the jury to find Appellant not guilty

if they believed his character witnesses. Id. He noted he asked Appellant

and his family to gather supportive witnesses for the sentencing hearing. Id.

Attorney Sarno confirmed that Holly Williams wrote a letter to the sentencing

judge on behalf of Appellant. Id.

      On cross-examination by the assistant district attorney (“ADA”),

Attorney Sarno testified that, when a defendant and his family provide him

                                       -8-
J-A27045-23

with a list of character witnesses, he will meet with the proposed witnesses to

determine if they would be helpful to the defense. Id. at 9-10. However,

Attorney Sarno specifically testified that, in the instant case, neither Appellant

nor his family provided him with any names of potential character witnesses.

Id. at 10. Specifically, the relevant exchange occurred between the ADA and

Attorney Sarno:

            Q. And you did testify that you discussed trial strategy. Did
      he or his family members offer you any list of potential character
      witnesses to call?
           A. No, my recollection is that they were going to look—think
      about it and come back to me with names. And they never came
      back with character witness names.
           Q. Did they give you an explanation for why they didn’t
      come back with a list of names?
             A. No.
Id.

      Attorney Sarno confirmed that some of Appellant’s family members

indicated they would testify as character witnesses; however, Attorney Sarno

decided not to call the family members during trial. Id. He testified:

      I just think that a jury wouldn’t really believe what a family
      member would say, that their relative is a good person, law-
      abiding, obviously they are there in support. And I just think it’s
      too insular too. It’s not really community reputation. You want
      somebody who knows them within the community, not just
      someone within the family. Typically, I stay away from family
      character witnesses.

Id. at 11.

      Attorney Sarno indicated that several non-family members provided

letters on Appellant’s behalf for purposes of the sentencing hearing.         Id.

                                      -9-
J-A27045-23

However, he specifically confirmed that “none of the people that wrote those

letters made themselves available to testify at trial as character witnesses[.]”

Id.

      Ms. Heinly testified she met Appellant and his wife over six years ago at

church. Id. at 14. She testified that, within the church community, Appellant

has a reputation for being peaceful and law-abiding. Id. She indicated that,

if she had been asked to do so, she would have testified at trial on behalf of

Appellant. Id. at 15. Ms. Heinly acknowledged that she did not know the

dates on which Appellant’s trial was held, but she would have made herself

available. Id.

      Mr. Heinly testified he has known Appellant since May of 2017. Id. at

19. The Heinly family and Appellant’s family got together several times, and

he knows Appellant from church. Id. Mr. Heinly testified Appellant has an

“excellent” reputation, and people in the church have been surprised to hear

“what’s happened.” Id. at 20. He indicated that, if he had been asked, he

would have been willing to testify on behalf of Appellant at trial. Id.

      Ms. Williams testified she has known Appellant for fifteen years, and she

met him through his wife with whom Ms. Williams is “good friends.” Id. at

22.   Ms. Williams used to swim in Appellant’s family’s pool, and she has

interacted with him “often.” Id. She indicated she knows other people in the

community, who also know Appellant, and Appellant has a “reputation for

being peaceful and law-abiding.” Id. at 25. She testified that, had she been

                                     - 10 -
J-A27045-23

asked, she would have been willing to testify on behalf of Appellant during his

trial, and she was available to do so. Id. She noted she submitted a letter in

support of Appellant for the sentencing judge. Id.

      Ms. Fisher testified she has known Appellant for eleven years, and she

met him through his wife. Id. She indicated she saw Appellant at the Lititz

Senior Center, and he was “knowledgeable with computers.” Id. She knows

other people within the community who also know Appellant, and Appellant

has a reputation for being peaceful and law-abiding. Id. She indicated he is

known as a “very loving husband and father.” Id. She testified that, if asked

to do so, she would have been willing to testify on behalf of Appellant at trial.

Id. She noted she submitted a letter for the sentencing judge on behalf of

Appellant. Id.

      Appellant testified he met with Attorney Sarno “more than six” times

prior to trial. Id. at 28. Appellant confirmed Attorney Sarno talked to him

about character witnesses, and Attorney Sarno advised him that the character

witnesses should know him. Id. at 29. Appellant admitted he did not provide

Attorney Sarno with the names of any character witnesses because he “kind

of lost contact with all of the people that [he] knew directly from the past.”

Id. He indicated he “came up empty.” Id.

      Regarding the four witnesses who testified at the PCRA evidentiary

hearing, Appellant indicated he “knew [them] through his wife.”         Id.   He

testified that, had he known they would testify for him, he would have asked

                                     - 11 -
J-A27045-23

Attorney Sarno to call them as character witnesses.         Id. at 29-30.     He

indicated that, had he known that Attorney Sarno “would have taken whoever

[he] could give him,” including his wife’s friends, as character witnesses, he

would have provided the names of the four people, who testified at the PCRA

evidentiary hearing. Id. at 30.

       By opinion and order entered on December 2, 2022, the PCRA court

denied Appellant’s PCRA petition, and this timely, counseled appeal followed.4

       On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue in his “Statement of

the Questions Involved” (verbatim):

       1. Did the PCRA Court err when it denied Defendant’s claim that
          trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call favorable
          character witnesses?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (suggested answer omitted).

____________________________________________

4 We note the trial court filed an order on December 19, 2022, directing
Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, but Appellant did not file a
Rule 1925(b) statement. Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure
1925(b)(3)(iii) provides that a Rule 1925(b) order must contain “both the
place the appellant can serve the Statement in person and the address to
which the appellant can mail the statement.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3)(iii). Where
the trial court’s order directing the filing of the statement does not strictly
comply with the requirement of Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(3)(iii), the order is
unenforceable. See Commonwealth v. Stroud, 298 A.3d 1152 (Pa.Super.
2023).
       In the case sub judice, the trial court’s Rule 1925(b) order was deficient
in that it did not include the information required under subsection
1925(b)(3)(iii). Accordingly, we decline to find waiver for Appellant’s failure
to file a Rule 1925(b) statement. Id. Further, although we could remand for
Appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) statement, and the PCRA court to file a
responsive opinion to address the merits, we find it unnecessary to do so. Id.
The PCRA court set forth its analysis of the issue raised on appeal in its
December 2, 2022, opinion, and thus, our review has not been hampered. Id.

                                          - 12 -
J-A27045-23

      On appeal, Appellant claims trial counsel was ineffective in failing to call

favorable character witnesses to attest at trial to Appellant’s good reputation

in the community for being peaceful and law-abiding. Specifically, Appellant

notes that, during the PCRA evidentiary hearing, “four witnesses testified that

they were willing to offer good character testimony for [Appellant’s] trait of

peacefulness and law abidingness at trial[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 9. Appellant

suggests that trial counsel knew or should have known about the existence of

these four witnesses. Id.

      In this vein, Appellant contends trial counsel should have “pushed the

issue” of character witnesses harder with Appellant and his family, and trial

counsel should have forced Appellant to present him with names of favorable

non-family character witnesses.     Id. at 10.    Appellant suggests that trial

counsel’s advice “confused” him as to the people who would be satisfactory

character witnesses. Id.

      Initially, we note our standard of review for an order denying PCRA relief

is limited to whether the record supports the PCRA court’s determination, and

whether that decision is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Sattazahn,

597 Pa. 648, 952 A.2d 640, 652 (2008). “We must accord great deference to

the findings of the PCRA court, and such findings will not be disturbed unless

they have no support in the record.” Commonwealth v. Scassera, 965 A.2d

247, 249 (Pa.Super. 2009) (citation omitted).

                                     - 13 -
J-A27045-23

      As relevant here, a PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when he

proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence

resulted from the “[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in the

circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining

process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken

place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). In reviewing Appellant’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claims, we are mindful that, since there is a presumption

counsel provided effective representation, the defendant bears the burden of

proving ineffectiveness. Commonwealth v. Ali, 608 Pa. 71, 10 A.3d 282

(2010).

      To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must establish

“(1) [the] underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of

conduct pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed to

effectuate his [client’s] interests; and (3) but for counsel’s ineffectiveness,

there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would

have been different.” Id., supra, 10 A.3d at 291 (citations omitted).

            We need not analyze the prongs of an ineffectiveness claim
      in any particular order. Rather, we may discuss first any prong
      that an appellant cannot satisfy under the prevailing law and the
      applicable facts and circumstances of the case. [C]ounsel cannot
      be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 635 Pa. 665, 139 A.3d 1257, 1272 (2016)

(citations omitted). See Commonwealth v. Daniels, 600 Pa. 1, 963 A.2d

409, 419 (2009) (“A failure to satisfy any prong of the ineffectiveness test

                                    - 14 -
J-A27045-23

requires rejection of the claim of ineffectiveness.”) (citation omitted)).    “A

claim has arguable merit where the factual averments, if accurate, could

establish cause for relief.” Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 707

(Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc) (citation omitted).

      Regarding the reasonable basis prong of the ineffective assistance of

counsel test, our Supreme Court has relevantly stated the following:

      When assessing whether counsel had a reasonable basis for his
      act or omission, the question is not whether there were other
      courses of action that counsel could have taken, but whether
      counsel’s decision had any basis reasonably designed to effectuate
      his client’s interest….[T]his cannot be a hindsight evaluation of
      counsel’s performance, but requires an examination of “whether
      counsel made an informed choice, which at the time the decision
      was made reasonably could have been considered to advance and
      protect [the] defendant’s interests.” Our evaluation of counsel’s
      performance is “highly deferential.”

Commonwealth v. Williams, 636 Pa. 105, 141 A.3d 440, 463 (2016)

(citations and quotations omitted).

      Further,

             To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that
      there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
      unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have
      been different. [A] reasonable probability is a probability that is
      sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the
      proceeding.

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 624 Pa. 4, 84 A.3d 294, 311-12 (2014) (citations,

quotation marks, and quotations omitted). See Commonwealth v. Gribble,

580 Pa. 647, 863 A.2d 455, 472 (2004) (“[A] defendant [raising a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel] is required to show actual prejudice; that is,

                                      - 15 -
J-A27045-23

that counsel’s ineffectiveness was of such magnitude that it could have

reasonably had an adverse effect on the outcome of the proceedings.”)

(quotation omitted)).

     Notably, an attorney’s failure to       call certain witnesses is not

ineffectiveness per se. Commonwealth v. Cox, 603 Pa. 223, 983 A.2d 666,

693 (2009).

            To establish ineffectiveness under such a claim, the
     petitioner must establish:
     (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify
     for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known of,
     the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify
     for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of the
     witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair
     trial.

Commonwealth v. Puksar, 597 Pa. 240, 951 A.2d 267, 277 (2008).

     Here, in rejecting Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the

PCRA court relevantly indicated the following:

            [Appellant] seeks relief alleging that trial counsel was
     ineffective for failing to call character witnesses on his behalf.
     Specifically, [Appellant] contends that four character witnesses
     would have testified at trial….[A]ll four witnesses testified at the
     [PCRA] evidentiary hearing.        Each witness testified to their
     relationship with [Appellant], to their understanding of
     [Appellant’s] reputation in the community for being peaceful and
     law-abiding, and that they each would have been willing to testify
     to such at his trial had it been requested.
                                  ***
           [T]he testimony of the four character witnesses at the
     [PCRA] evidentiary hearing satisfies elements (1), (2), and (4) of
     the test for ineffectiveness laid out in [Puksar]. It is in the third
     element, that trial counsel “knew of, or should have known of, the
     existence of the witnesses,” that the contention in this matter lies,

                                    - 16 -
J-A27045-23

     and where, ultimately, [Appellant’s] request for post-conviction
     relief fails.
            It is well settled that the reasonableness of counsel’s
     investigative actions depends upon the information supplied by
     the accused. Commonwealth v. Walker, 540 Pa. 80, 656 A.2d
     90, 98 (1995). At the [PCRA] evidentiary hearing, trial counsel,
     Christopher Sarno, credibly testified that he discussed the need
     for potential character witnesses with [Appellant] and his family
     on multiple occasions leading up to trial. Trial counsel advised
     [Appellant] that a list should be created of people, other than
     family members, who knew [Appellant] at the time of the incident
     and would be willing to testify to his good character. At the
     [PCRA] hearing, trial counsel explained that while he considered
     calling familial character witnesses, he prefers character witnesses
     outside of the accused’s family because he views family members
     as “too insular” and not as representative as one’s reputation in
     the community as non-familial witnesses; therefore, hindering the
     believability of familial character witnesses.
            Despite these discussions and trial counsel’s advice, no such
     list was provided by [Appellant]. Instead, [Appellant] alleges that
     there was confusion as to who he could call as character
     witnesses. Specifically, [Appellant] testified that trial counsel
     instructed him that he could only call character witnesses that he
     knew directly, and [he] had not met through his wife.
     Notwithstanding the inconsistency of [Appellant’s] testimony with
     trial counsel’s testimony as to how he generally advises clients,
     two of his now-presented character witnesses, Mr. and Mrs.
     Heinly, testified that they knew [Appellant directly] and his family
     through church, not through [Appellant’s] wife. Further, the
     remaining two now-presented character witnesses, while
     testifying they had met [Appellant] through his wife, also testified
     to having known and interacted with [Appellant] on numerous
     occasions over a span of eleven and fifteen years, respectively.
     Assuming, arguendo, that trial counsel did instruct [Appellant]
     that character witnesses could not be people whom he had met
     through his wife, such instruction should not have deterred
     [Appellant] from providing Mr. and Mrs. Heinly to trial counsel as
     potential character witnesses. In contrast, assuming, arguendo,
     that trial counsel did not deviate from his normal instruction to
     clients about character witnesses and never gave the “know you
     directly, not through your wife” instruction, [Appellant] should not
     have been deterred from providing all four of the now-presented
     character witnesses as none of them are members of [Appellant’s]

                                    - 17 -
J-A27045-23

      family. In either regard, the failure to provide any of these four
      character witnesses for trial was the failure of [Appellant’s] alone.
             Lastly, [Appellant] argues that trial counsel was ineffective
      for failing to “push the issue” of character witnesses. [Appellant],
      however, failed to provide counsel with the names of potential
      character witnesses. Moreover, trial counsel credibly testified that
      [A]ppellant never provided him with the names of the four
      character witnesses, who appeared at the [PCRA evidentiary]
      hearing, and these witnesses never communicated [to trial
      counsel] they were available for [Appellant]. Our Supreme Court
      has held, “[a]n accused cannot refuse to cooperate with counsel
      in preparation of a particular trial strategy and then argue
      counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to purse that course of action.”
      Commonwealth v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514, 645 A.2d 189, 196
      (1994).

PCRA Court Opinion, filed 12/2/22, at 5-8.

      We agree with the PCRA court’s sound reasoning. Specifically, based on

Attorney Sarno’s testimony, which the PCRA court found credible, Attorney

Sarno communicated with Appellant and his family about the need for

character witnesses.     However, Attorney Sarno established that, despite

requesting a list of character witnesses, neither Appellant nor his family

provided him with a list. In particular, he noted that he was not advised prior

to or during trial that the proffered four character witnesses, who testified

during the PCRA evidentiary hearing, existed or would have been willing to

testify on behalf of Appellant during trial. He simply “had no way of knowing

they were available.” Id. at 8.

      Accordingly, we agree with the PCRA court that Appellant “has failed to

prove that counsel knew of, or should have known of, the existence of the four

character witnesses.” Id. We agree with the PCRA court that Appellant has

                                     - 18 -
J-A27045-23

“failed to satisfy the ineffectiveness test laid out in [Puksar] while

simultaneously proving that counsel had a ‘reasonable strategic basis’ for not

calling the now-presented character witnesses at trial-he was unaware of their

existence.” PCRA Court Opinion, filed 12/2/22, at 8 (citation omitted).

Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his ineffective assistance of

counsel claim.

       However, this does not end our inquiry in this case since Appellant has

filed a pro se Application to Remand for an evidentiary hearing. Specifically,

in his Application to Remand, Appellant contends PCRA counsel was ineffective

in failing to raise various claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness.5

____________________________________________

5 Appellant’s assertions—that PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to raise

issues     regarding     trial  counsel’s    ineffectiveness—presents    layered
ineffectiveness claims. “Where a petitioner alleges multiple layers of
ineffectiveness, he is required to plead and prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, each of the three prongs of ineffectiveness relevant to each layer of
representation.” Commonwealth v. Parrish, ___ Pa. ___, 273 A.3d 989,
1003 n.11 (2022). “In determining a layered claim of ineffectiveness, the
critical inquiry is whether the first attorney that the defendant asserts was
ineffective did, in fact, render ineffective assistance of counsel. If that
attorney was effective, then subsequent counsel cannot be deemed ineffective
for failing to raise the underlying issue.” Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d
1260, 1270 (Pa.Super. 2010).
       Relevantly, in Commonwealth v. Bradley, ___ Pa. ___, 261 A.3d 381
(2021), our Supreme Court held that a PCRA petitioner may “after a PCRA
court denies relief, and after obtaining new counsel or acting pro se, raise
claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at the first opportunity to do so, even
if on appeal.” Id. at 401. The Bradley Court provided:
       In some instances, the record before the appellate court will be
       sufficient to allow for disposition of any newly-raised
       ineffectiveness claims. However, in other cases, the appellate
       court may need to remand to the PCRA court for further
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                          - 19 -
J-A27045-23

       First, Appellant contends that, after this Court remanded on direct

appeal for the application of SORNA, trial counsel should have raised the issue

before the trial court of whether the application of SORNA violated the ex post

facto clause. He further contends PCRA counsel should have raised this claim

of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in the PCRA petition. However, given that on

direct appeal this Court held that such application would not violate the ex

post facto clause, there is no arguable merit to this claim.      See Weaver,

supra. See also Stewart, 84 A.3d at 707 (“A claim has arguable merit where

the factual averments, if accurate, could establish cause for relief.”) (citation

omitted)). Thus, neither trial counsel nor PCRA counsel may be found

ineffective on this basis. See Burkett, supra.

       Next, Appellant contends that, since he was subject to Revised

Subchapter H of SORNA, trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge

whether Revised Subchapter H violated the separation of powers doctrine

and/or created an irrebuttable presumption implicating his right to reputation

protected by the Pennsylvania Constitution. He contends PCRA counsel was

____________________________________________

      development of the record and for the PCRA court to consider such
      claims as an initial matter….[W]here there are material facts at
      issue concerning claims challenging counsel’s stewardship and
      relief is not plainly unavailable as a matter of law, the remand
      should be afforded.
Id. at 402 (internal citations, quotations, footnote, and brackets omitted).
      In the case sub judice, as discussed in depth infra, Appellant has failed
to demonstrate that his ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel claims merit a
remand.

                                          - 20 -
J-A27045-23

ineffective in failing to raise this issue of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in his

PCRA petition.    However, given that on direct appeal this Court held that

Subchapter I of SORNA was applicable to Appellant, and there is no indication

Appellant was subject to Revised Subchapter H on remand, we find no

arguable merit to this claim. See Weaver, supra. Thus, neither trial counsel

nor PCRA counsel may be found ineffective on this basis. See also Burkett,

supra.

      Additionally, Appellant suggests trial counsel was ineffective in failing to

call an expert witness to testify that Appellant has a mental infirmity from a

prior head injury. Further, he alleges PCRA counsel was ineffective in failing

to raise this issue of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in the PCRA petition.

However, as indicated supra:

             To establish ineffectiveness under such a claim, the
      petitioner must establish:
      (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify
      for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known of,
      the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify
      for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of the
      witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair
      trial.

Puksar, supra, 951 A.2d at 277.

      Here, Appellant baldly claims trial counsel was ineffective since “he did

not procure [an] expert witness,” who would have testified about Appellant’s

alleged mental infirmity.       Appellant’s Application, filed 7/5/23, at 20.

Appellant has not identified any expert, who was willing to testify as Appellant

                                      - 21 -
J-A27045-23

now desires. Simply put, he has not proffered that such a witness existed,

was available to testify for the defense, or was willing to testify for the

defense. Accordingly, neither trial counsel nor PCRA counsel may be deemed

ineffective on this basis. Burkett, supra.

      Furthermore, Appellant claims trial counsel was ineffective in failing to

investigate whether an expert witness would confirm that Appellant had

suffered a previous head injury. He claims PCRA counsel was ineffective in

failing to raise this issue in the PCRA petition. However, we conclude Appellant

has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced in this regard.

      Specifically, during trial, Detective Hosking admitted that, during the

police interview, Appellant informed him he had a previous brain injury. N.T.,

8/30/18, at 107-10.    Further, Appellant’s mother testified at length about

Appellant suffering a head injury when he was seventeen years old after he

fell from a cliff. Id. at 191-94. She testified about the changes she has seen

in Appellant since his injury. Id. Moreover, Appellant’s wife informed the jury

that Appellant had suffered a brain injury, which mentally and physically

affects his life every day. Id. at 164-66.

      Accordingly, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced

since an expert’s testimony that Appellant suffered a head injury when he was

seventeen years old would have been merely cumulative of the evidence

offered by the detective, Appellant’s mother, and Appellant’s wife.        See

Spotz, supra (setting forth the standard for actual prejudice). Accordingly,

                                     - 22 -
J-A27045-23

neither trial counsel nor PCRA counsel may be deemed ineffective on this

basis. Burkett, supra.

      Moreover, Appellant suggests trial counsel should have investigated

whether an expert would have “better explained the effects of [Appellant’s]

traumatic brain injury on his ability to formulate a knowing response to police

questioning….[since Appellant’s] issues made him more likely to be coerced.”

Appellant’s Application, filed 7/5/23, at 16, 29. He suggests PCRA counsel

was ineffective in failing to raise this issue in the PCRA petition.

      However, notably, in his Application to Remand, regarding his claim

counsel was ineffective in failing to perform “the proper investigation into

interviewing and procuring [an] expert witness,” Appellant admits he

“probably cannot meet the prejudice prong.” Id. at 31. In any event, we

note that, during trial, Detective Hosking admitted Appellant informed him

during the interview that he did not remember much about the time at issue

due to, inter alia, his previous head injury.     N.T., 8/30/18, at 107.     Also,

Detective Hosking specifically testified Appellant did not admit to the sexual

allegations. Id. Accordingly, we conclude Appellant has failed to demonstrate

he was prejudiced. See Spotz, supra (setting forth the standard for actual

prejudice).   Consequently, neither trial counsel nor PCRA counsel may be

deemed ineffective on this basis. Burkett, supra.

      Moreover, Appellant baldly contends that trial counsel should have

called into question the credibility of Detective Hosking.             He contends

                                      - 23 -
J-A27045-23

Detective Hosking has been “investigated for nefarious activity while

employed by the department that was swept under the rug[.]” Appellant’s

Application, filed 7/5/23, at 25. He further claims PCRA counsel should have

presented this claim in the PCRA petition.

       This bald assertion does not warrant further review.       In any event,

Appellant admits that the alleged “nefarious activity” occurred after

Appellant’s trial, and it is unrelated to Appellant’s case.    Id.   Simply put,

Appellant has failed to demonstrate how trial counsel was ineffective in failing

to question Detective Hosking about events, which allegedly occurred after

and unrelated to Appellant’s trial. See Ali, supra. Thus, PCRA counsel may

not be deemed ineffective on this basis. Burkett, supra.

       For all of the foregoing reasons, we deny Appellant’s Application to

Remand, which he filed on July 5, 2023.6 Furthermore, we affirm the PCRA

court’s December 2, 2022, order, which denied Appellant’s PCRA petition.

       Application to Remand DENIED; Order AFFIRMED.

____________________________________________

6 Moreover, we note Appellant filed with this Court an application to exceed

the word limit as it applies to his Application to Remand. Therein, he requests
we consider all of the arguments presented in his Application to Remand.
Inasmuch as we have considered all of the arguments, we grant Appellant’s
application to exceed the word limit; however, as indicated supra, we find
Appellant is not entitled to relief as to the claims raised in his Application to
Remand.

                                          - 24 -
J-A27045-23

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 02/01/2024

                           - 25 -