Court Opinion

ID: 9865196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:26:56.493982+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:51.983247
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Walker
dissenting.
I dissent, for the reasons following.
The judgment now under review was rendered upon demurrer to the caveat. The caveat, after averring that the caveator is the adopted daughter of the decedent and testator, specifically refers to the decree of July 14, 1908, *41a copy of "which decree is attached to the caveat as air exhibit. The caveat then avers: ‘ ‘ That the said petitioners (meaning Schmidt and his wife) were permitted to adopt the' said G-eorgie Marguerite Trumbull, your objector herein, and said decree in adoption was entered upon the express promise and condition therein contained, among others, that petitioners and each of them promised not to disinherit said adopted child, and that such promise was and is one of the conditions of said decree. ’ ’
It is then averred that, contrary to the promise, condition and agreement as aforesaid, in said decree of adoption contained, the decedent did by his last will and testament, disinherit the caveator, contrary to her vested and legal rights as an adopted child, and contrary to law, and that such last will is null and void, as against the rights of the caveator, in that it is violative of the legal and vested rights of the caveator, under the decree of adoption, and is in fraud of her rights under that decree, and of her rights as heir at law.
The decree in adoption recites that the matter came on to be heard upon the petition of Schmidt and his wife, for the adoption of the minor child above mentioned, the petitioners appearing in their own proper persons and by their attorney, and, “the court having read said petition, and having examined upon their oaths the said petitioners, and the court being fully satisfied from the testimony submitted herein of the ability of the petitioners to properly rear, educate and maintain said child and their promise not to disinherit said child; which promise is one of the conditions of this decree * * * and it further appearing to the court that consent in writing by Harry J. Trumbull, the father of said child, has heretofore been given to the petitioners herein for the adoption of said child, Georgie Marguerite Trumbull, the said Harry J. Trumbull being the surviving parent of said child, and the court being now fully advised in the premises * *
*42The decretal part of the order reads as follows: “Ordered, adjudged and decreed by the court, that the said minor child heretofore known as Georgie Marguerite Trumbull shall be from this date, to all legal intents'and purposes, the child and legal heir of the petitioners John G. Schmidt and Maggie E. Schmidt, and that the name of said child is hereby changed, altered and declared to be Georgie Marguerite Schmidt, and said child shall be, and is hereby entitled to all the rights and privileges as if to them born in lawful wedlock.”
The statute under which the adoption decree was entered is to be found in sections 526 to 529 inclusive, R. S. 1908. After making provision for notice and the filing of the petition, and for the consent of the natural parents or guardians, the statute in section 528 provides: “When the foregoing provisions are complied with, if the court is satisfied of the ability of the petitioner to bring up and educate the child properly, having reference to the degree and condition of the child’s parents, and the fitness and propriety of such adoption, it shall make an order, setting forth the facts, and declaring that from that date such child, to all legal intents and purposes, is the child of the petitioner, and that its name is thereby changed. ’ ’ Section 529 of the statute, defining the effect of the adoption, is as follows: “The natural parents shall, by such order, be divested of all legal rights and obligations in respect to the child, and the child be free from all legal obligations of obedience and maintenance in respect to them; such child shall be to all intents and purposes the child and legal heir of the person so adopting him or her, entitled to all the rights and privileges, and subject to all the obligations of a child of such person begotten in lawful wedlock; but upon the decease of such person and the subsequent decease of such adopted child without issue, the property of such adopting parent shall descend to his or her next of kin, and not to the next of kin of such adopted child. ’ ’
*43It is not contended by plaintiff in error, and of course could not be successfully contended, that the act of adoption ipso facto deprived the adoptive parent of the right to disinherit the adopted child, by will, in like manner and to the same extent as he might do in the case of Ms own natural child. The contentions of the plaintiff in error, as taken from her brief, depend solely upon the special provisions of the decree now under consideration, and are stated by her counsel as follows: “That the aforesaid provisions in said adoption decree are legal, binding and enforceable, and a final judicial determination by a court of competent jurisdiction; that said promise and agreement having been once judicially ascertained, determined and decreed, the matter of such promise and agreement is res judicata, and cannot again be inquired into, litigated or re-tried; that said decree in adoption having been entered on July 14th, 1908, the same is final, conclusive, and impervious to attack either directly, collaterally or otherwise. ’ ’
These contentions are in harmony with the apparent theory of the caveat. For it seems plain from the caveat that the right claimed by the plaintiff in error is made to rest, not upon contract or agreement, but upon the force and effect of the decree of adoption as a judgment. Plaintiff in error does not aver in her caveat that an agreement not to disinherit her was made between her father Trumbull and the proposed adoptive parents. She does not aver that her father relinquished his right to her custody in consideration of the promise of the adoptive parents not to disinherit her. Indeed, she does not aver any contractual arrangement or understanding between the adoptive parents and any person or party whatever, acting for or on her behalf. If she had made such allegations, and if the adoption proceedings and the decree therein had been relied upon merely to evidence such an agreement and its consummation, then she would have brought herself within the principle announced in the authorities upon which she chiefly relies in this case. *44These are Quinn v. Quinn, 5 S. D. 328, 334, 58 N. W. 808; Bedal v. Johnson, 37 Idaho, 359, 218 Pac. 641, and other cases of similar tenor, some of which are collected in the annotations in 9 A. L. R. 1628.
If we test the claim of plaintiff in error by the provisions of the decree of adoption, for the purpose of ascertaining whether that decree is of force to confer upon her an indefeasible right of inheritance from her adopted parent, we must begin with the well settled proposition that in jurisdictions like ours, adoption proceedings are purely statutory, both in their origin and their scope. Graham v. Francis, 83 Colo. 346, 265 Pac. 690.
The statute under which the decree in adoption was entered, and which we have hereinbefore set forth, makes specific provision for the contents of the order of adoption, and specifically defines the legal rights and obligations, including those relating to inheritance, which shall ensue upon the creation of the status of adoption. The statute does not authorize the court to decree that the adoptive parent shall not disinherit the adopted child. Such a provision of a decree of adoption would be nugatory and an unwarranted attempt to augment the burdens and obligations of the adoptive parent beyond those created by the statutory law upon the subject. It would be beyond the jurisdiction of the court, in the statutory adoption proceeding, and it is not pretended that any other proceeding was pending when the decree in question was entered.
But the decree itself does not purport to adjudge that the petitioners for the adoption shall not disinherit the adopted child. The mandatory portions of the order make no mention of any such requirement, but are carefully limited and restricted within the boundaries of the statute. When Schmidt made his will without provision for the plaintiff in error, it cannot be said that he violated any order included within the decree of adoption. Plaintiff in error, however, says that the recital in the decree, of the making of the promise, coupled with the declaration *45of the court that such promise is one of the conditions of the decree, makes it a matter of res judicata, that the promise was made. But to whom was the promise made? And upon what consideration? It is not claimed that it was made to the parent who relinquished the custody of the child. If it was made to the court, the court was not authorized by the statute, under which it was proceeding, to exact such promise, nor to receive such promise as the agent or representative of the child. His authority was limited to determining the propriety and fitness of the adoption, in view of the legal consequences attached to such status by the statute. The discretion which the court was vested with in the matter was to determine whether or not under the circumstances of the case it was fit and proper to enter the decree of adoption. But such discretion did not extend to requiring or acting upon promises or conditions not within the scope of the statute, and which can be effective, if at all, only upon the principles of contract, and as between private contracting parties.
It is finally urged with much force, that since the decedent had the benefit of the adoption decree, in the custody and society of the plaintiff in error, during her minority, the defendant in error, who claims under bim, is estopped as he would be, to question the validity of any part of the decree. But, as appears from what is stated above, the position taken by the defendant in error involves no contradiction of any part of the order made by the court. If the defendant in error is estopped as the representative of the decedent, or as one claiming under him, to impeach the recital relating to the promise not to disinherit, such estoppel could go no further than to the truth of the recital. I can perceive no ground upon which defendant in error or the decedent would be es-topped to question the power or authority of the court to require such a promise, or the validity of such a promise when made. In addition to this, the caveat sets forth no facts upon which an estoppel might be raised. *46There is no claim that the plaintiff in error, or anyone lawfully representing her, has been injured or misled by the recital in the decree. She has had all the benefits, so far as the record shows, which the law attaches to the adoption status. I cannot agree that she appears to be in any position to invoke the doctrine of estoppel against the chosen object of her adoptive father’s bounty. The judgment should be affirmed.
Judgment reversed.