Court Opinion

ID: 9940762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-15 15:06:03.801901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:45:46.957097
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-880

                       NICOLA A. DICIENZO & another1

                                       vs.

                            ANGELA A. PIZZIFERRI.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

        The defendant, Angela Pizziferri, appeals from a

 declaratory judgment of the Land Court stating that the deed

 from Antonietta DiCienzo, trustee of the DiCienzo Realty Trust

 (Trust), to Angela Pizziferri dated November 1, 2016, and

 recorded on July 23, 2018, in the Norfolk County registry of

 deeds, is void and that the Trust holds legal title to the

 subject property.      On appeal, Pizziferri claims that the judge

 erred in granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs, Nicola

 DiCienzo and John Merenda.2        We affirm.

 1   John Merenda.

 2 Pizziferri also claims that the Land Court lacked jurisdiction
 in this matter because trusts are subject to the jurisdiction of
 the Probate and Family Court under G. L. c. 203E, § 204. We
 disagree. Pursuant to G. L. c. 185, § 1 (a), the Land Court has
 exclusive original jurisdiction of "[c]omplaints . . . for the
 confirmation without registration of title to land." Here, the
     Discussion.   We review the allowance of a motion for

summary judgment de novo.   Metcalf v. BSC Group, Inc., 492 Mass.

676, 680 (2023).   "Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the party against whom summary judgment entered,

. . . [s]ummary judgment is appropriate where there is no

material issue of fact in dispute and the moving party is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law" (quotation and citation

omitted).   Id. at 681.

     Here, there are no material facts in dispute.   On October

27, 1992, a certain property in Quincy was conveyed by recorded

deed to Antonietta and Felix DiCienzo,3 as trustees of the Trust.

On the same date, Antonietta and Felix, as trustees, executed

and recorded a declaration of trust, which provided that if all

original trustees (Felix and Antonietta) "shall fail to serve

because of death, resignation or incapacity, there shall serve

as Successor TRUSTEES, in the order named:   NICOLA A. DiCIENZO,

declaratory judgment did not affect the validity or terms of the
Trust itself. Rather, the title of the land was affected, as
the declaratory judgment stated that the recorded deed to
Pizziferri is void and that the Trust holds legal title to the
property by operation of G. L. c. 203E, § 704 (a) (6). This
places this case squarely within the Land Court's exclusive
original jurisdiction. Contrast O'Donnell v. O'Donnell, 74
Mass. App. Ct. 409, 411 (2009) (no exclusive Land Court
jurisdiction where judgment sought would not of its own force
purport to modify title of land).

3 Because Antonietta, Felix, and Nicola DiCienzo all share the
same surname, they will be referred to by their respective first
names for clarity.

                                 2
JOHN MERENDA."   The declaration also named Nicola and Merenda as

beneficiaries of the Trust, pursuant to a schedule of beneficial

interests dated and executed on the same date.   In 2002, Felix

died, leaving Antonietta as sole trustee.

     On August 28, 2013, Pizziferri and Anne Marie Lara, both of

whom were maternal great nieces of Antonietta, filed a petition

in the Probate and Family Court seeking to be appointed as

coguardians for Antonietta, because she "is unable to make

decisions for herself due to her mental incapacity."    The

petition was accompanied by a medical certificate, which

Antonietta's primary care physician completed and signed.     The

certificate stated, among other things, that Antonietta had

progressive Alzheimer's dementia and could not manage financial,

legal, or medical decision making.

     On November 20, 2013, the Probate and Family Court judge

found that the requirements of G. L. c. 190B, § 5-306 (b) (1)-

(8) were met; found that a basis existed for the guardianship;

and issued a decree appointing Lara and Pizziferri as

coguardians of Antonietta.4   Between 2015 and 2018, Lara and

Pizziferri submitted to the Probate and Family Court annual

4 The record reflects that Antonietta was also the subject of a
conservatorship between 2012 and 2016, but the record lacks a
formal decree and order from the Probate and Family Court to
that effect. However, we need not address the impact of the
purported conservatorship on our decision, for the reasons
discussed infra.

                                 3
reports, all of which generally described how Antonietta was not

able to participate in decision making about personal and health

care matters and required the guardianship due to her

progressive Alzheimer's dementia.

    On November 1, 2016, Antonietta executed a quitclaim deed,

which purported to convey the Quincy property on behalf of the

Trust to Pizziferri for the consideration of one dollar.       On

July 14, 2018, Antonietta died; at that time, the guardianship

was still in effect.   Just days later, Pizziferri recorded the

2016 deed from Antonietta in the Norfolk County registry of

deeds.

    Viewing these undisputed material facts in the light most

favorable to Pizziferri, the plaintiffs were entitled to summary

judgment as a matter of law.   Pursuant to G. L. c. 203E, § 704

(a) (6), "[a] vacancy in a trusteeship shall occur if . . . a

guardian or conservator is appointed for an individual serving

as trustee."   Accordingly, once Lara and Pizziferri were

appointed as coguardians of Antonietta, her trusteeship

terminated by operation of law.       The terms of the Trust, itself,

also provided that in the event of Antonietta's incapacity,

which the Probate and Family Court judge found as fact in

                                  4
placing her under a guardianship, Nicola and Merenda shall serve

as successor trustees in the order named.5

     As she was no longer trustee of the Trust, Antonietta

lacked the legal authority to convey the property to Pizziferri

on behalf of the Trust.   Therefore, the deed is void as a matter

of law, and title to the property remains in the Trust.       It is

irrelevant whether Antonietta actually regained mental capacity

during any point during the guardianship, as the mere

appointment of coguardians for Antonietta on November 20, 2013,

operated to effectively terminate her trusteeship and all legal

authority that follows from it.6       It is similarly irrelevant

whether the conveyance was made in good faith.       See Bongaards v.

5 While the record does not reflect that Nicola and Merenda had
accepted the successor trusteeship in accordance with the terms
of the Trust or that a successor trustee was appointed by the
Probate and Family Court, it is a fundamental rule of law that
"a trust shall not be allowed to fail for want of a trustee."
Sells v. Delgado, 186 Mass. 25, 28 (1904). For this reason, as
well as the irrelevance to the issues before the Land Court on
summary judgment of both the plaintiffs' failure to assume their
roles as successor trustees and their alleged actions of abuse
or neglect of Antonietta, we reject Pizziferri's claim that the
Land Court abused its discretion by denying an evidentiary
hearing.

6 For this reason, as well as the fact that Pizziferri attested
to Antonietta's incapacity annually in the Probate and Family
Court and is thus barred by judicial estoppel from asserting the
contrary, see Otis v. Arbella Mut. Ins. Co. 443 Mass. 634, 639-
640 (2005), Pizziferri's claim that the judge erred by relying
on certain reports to determine Antonietta's mental capacity
fails.

                                   5
Millen, 440 Mass. 10, 15 (2003) ("Where, as here, the grantor

has nothing to convey, . . . [t]he purported conveyance is a

nullity, notwithstanding the parties' intent").       Summary

judgment was properly granted to the plaintiffs.7

                                      Judgment affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Meade, Blake &
                                        Desmond, JJ.8),

                                      Assistant Clerk

Entered:    February 15, 2024.

7 Pizziferri had also filed two motions for reconsideration,
although she did not properly appeal the judge's denial of those
motions. Regardless, we would affirm the judge's denial of the
motions for the same reasons expressed herein given that the
motions did not provide any new evidence or legal arguments that
would affect the outcome of this case.

8   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                  6