Court Opinion

ID: 9930686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 16:02:39.592493+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:25:54.506384
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13909    Document: 23-1     Date Filed: 02/07/2024   Page: 1 of 5

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-13909
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       JIMMY COBB,
                                                   Petitioner-Appellant,
       versus
       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                                  Respondent-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Georgia
                 D.C. Docket Nos. 4:22-cv-00072-CDL-MSH,
                           4:17-cr-00051-CDL-MSH
USCA11 Case: 22-13909         Document: 23-1          Date Filed: 02/07/2024          Page: 2 of 5

       2                          Opinion of the Court                         22-13909

                                ____________________

       Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Jimmy Cobb is currently serving a five-year supervised re-
       lease term, following his 24-month prison sentence for using inter-
       state facilities to transmit information about a minor, in violation
       of 18 U.S.C. § 2425. Proceeding pro se, Cobb appeals the district
       court’s order dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion for lack of ju-
       risdiction on the ground that it was an unauthorized successive mo-
       tion. 1 Cobb previously filed a § 2255 motion that was adjudicated
       on the merits. He did not receive our permission to file a second
       such motion or show that his motion falls into an exception, so the
       district court properly dismissed the instant § 2255 motion for lack
       of jurisdiction. We affirm.
                                            * * *
              As background: Cobb filed his original § 2255 motion in
       2018, and it was denied in full on the merits. Because his original
       motion was an adjudication on the merits, any subsequent § 2255

       1 Cobb did not sign his notice of appeal or obtain a certificate of appealability

       before filing. But we have jurisdiction despite this error because a litigant’s
       failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 11’s signature requirement is non-juris-
       dictional, and a certificate of appealability is not required if the district court
       dismisses a § 2255 motion for lack of jurisdiction. See Becker v. Montgomery, 532
       U.S. 757, 765–66 (2001); Hubbard v. Campbell, 379 F.3d 1245, 1247 (11th Cir.
       2004).
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       22-13909               Opinion of the Court                         3

       motion challenging the same judgment authorizing his confine-
       ment, including the one at issue here, required him to receive our
       permission before filing—unless the motion fell within the “small
       subset of unavailable claims that must not be categorized as succes-
       sive.” Stewart v. United States, 646 F.3d 856, 863 (11th Cir. 2011).
               The district court dismissed Cobb’s motion for lack of juris-
       diction on the ground that Cobb did not obtain our permission to
       file the motion. Cobb then timely filed a document reasserting the
       merits of his motion, which the court construed as a notice of ap-
       peal of the district court’s decision.
              We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a § 2255
       motion as second or successive. McIver v. United States, 307 F.3d
       1327, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002). A successive § 2255 motion requires
       our prior authorization, which may be granted only if the motion
       contains a claim involving newly discovered evidence demonstrat-
       ing factual innocence or a new rule of constitutional law made ret-
       roactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. See 28
       U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(A), 2255(h)(1), (2).
              A motion is successive under § 2244(b) when it is ﬁled after
       a prior motion and challenges the same judgment “authorizing the
       petitioner’s conﬁnement.” Patterson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 849
       F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc). Absent our authoriza-
       tion, the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a successive §
       2255 motion. See Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th
       Cir. 2003).
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       4                         Opinion of the Court                      22-13909

              A numerically successive § 2255 motion, however, does not
       always qualify as “second or successive” within the meaning of §
       2244. See Stewart 646 F.3d at 859. Where the basis for a numerically
       successive motion did not exist before proceedings on the initial
       § 2255 motion concluded, the claim falls within “a small subset of
       unavailable claims that must not be categorized as successive,”
       such as claims based on a defect that did not arise or ripen until
       after the conclusion of the previous petition. Id. at 863. Claims
       that are based on facts that existed at the time of the first habeas
       petition, but were not discovered until later, are still successive. See
       id.
               We liberally construe pro se pleadings. Campbell v. Air Ja.
       Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014). But “issues not briefed
       on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned.” Timson v.
       Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). An appellant “fails to
       adequately brief a claim when he does not plainly and prominently
       raise it.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th
       Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).
              Cobb does not specifically challenge the district court’s rul-
       ing that his motion was (1) second or successive and (2) filed with-
       out our permission. He has therefore abandoned that argument.
       Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal without reach-
       ing the merits. 2

       2 We note that even if we were to consider the merits of Cobb’s argument, the

       result would be the same. He argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling of
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       22-13909                   Opinion of the Court                                  5

                                            * * *
              The district court properly dismissed Cobb’s § 2255 motion
       for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because he did not receive
       our permission to file a successive motion based on newly discov-
       ered evidence or raise any claim based on a defect or fact that did
       not arise or ripen until after the conclusion of the previous motion
       to vacate. Accordingly, we affirm.
               AFFIRMED.

       the statute of limitations period to seek post-conviction relief in federal court
       to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice. His brief asserts that the gov-
       ernment used false testimony and fabricated facts to support his conviction,
       violated his due process rights, and that his counsel was ineffective in advising
       him to enter a guilty plea premised on these false facts. Cobb argued that he
       had acquired “new” evidence that would have allowed a reasonable juror to
       acquit him because it demonstrated his actual innocence. But he admits this
       newly discovered evidence that provides the main basis for his argument was
       available to both parties while his criminal case was ongoing, and they de-
       clined to use it. He pointed to no defect or fact that did not arise or ripen until
       after the conclusion of the previous petition, and therefore, even on the merits
       of his motion, we would affirm the district court’s dismissal.