Court Opinion

ID: 9639171
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:06:50.767003+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:13.566105
License: Public Domain

WICKERSHAM, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
The defendant-appellee, David A. Goodman, was charged by Criminal Information filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, Criminal Division, at No. CC8204435A with eleven (11) counts of Possession of Prohibited Offensive Weapons, one (1) count of Theft of Services and one (1) count of Possession of Device for Theft of Telecommunications Services. The prohibited offensive *437weapons in question were: a Rossi double barrel sawed-off shotgun; a Ruger AC-556 and AC-556K automatic rifle; a water-cooled machine gun, caliber 30-06; a M-60 machine gun; a Heckler & Koch G-3, caliber 308 (7.62 MM) automatic weapon; a Heckler & Koch MP5K, caliber 9MM automatic weapon; three (3) UZ1 9MM caliber automatic weapons; a Heckler & Koch MP55D, caliber 9 MM automatic weapon; and a Colt M-16AL caliber .223, an automatic rifle.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that suppression was inappropriate in the instant case and that, therefore, the lower court erred in granting appellee’s motion to suppress all intercepted wire communications, all articles seized pursuant to the search of his office/residence, and all statements made to the officers conducting the search. I disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that the Attorney General had neither the authority to investigate appellee under the Commonwealth Attorneys Act, 71 P.S. § 732-206, nor a reasonable belief to prosecute appellee under the corrupt organizations statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 911.
The Commonwealth argues, inter alia, in its brief:
“The court below erred in suppressing evidence seized during searches conducted in appellee’s office/residence by agents of the Attorney General. At the time the searches were conducted, the Attorney General had a reasonable belief that based on the information available to him, the appellee was engaged in activity which merited an investigation by the Attorney General under 71 Pa.C.S.A. § 732-205(a)(2) (relating to corrupt organizations) and 71 Pa.C.S.A. § 732-206(b) (relating to investigating grand juries). The Commonwealth further maintains that the investigatory power of the Attorney General, as provided by 71 Pa.C.S.A. § 732-206, must necessarily be broader than his prosecuto-rial power (71 Pa.C.S.A. § 732-205) in order that it be determined whether an activity constitutes one of the eight areas that the Attorney General is directed to prosecute.
*438“The Attorney General had a reasonable belief, based on the information available to him, that appellee was engaged in activities that the Attorney General was required to investigate and prosecute under 71 Pa.C.S.A. § 732-205(a)(2) (relating to corrupt organizations) and 71 Pa.C.S.A. § 732-206(b) (relating to investigating grand juries).3 (3 While it may be argued that § 732-205 of the Act should not be read to limit the areas in which the Attorney General may prosecute, accepting such an interpretation is not necessary to decide the present case. Instead, the court need only determine that the Attorney General was acting within the scope of the investigative powers conferred upon him by the Act.) Based on the information provided by a Bell employee, the Attorney General was aware of the strong possibility that the blue boxes were being transported between counties. Certainly, Attorney Claus was correct in his initial determination that movement of the illegal devices from county to county would be a crime best suited for investigation by the Attorney General who, unlike a county district attorney, has statewide jurisdiction.4 (4 71 Pa.C.S.A. § 732-205(a) provides, in part, that: ‘The Attorney General shall have power to prosecute in any county criminal court the following cases ... ’ (emphasis added).) The applicable satute [sic], 71 Pa.C.S.A. § 732-206(b) states:
The Attorney General shall convene and conduct investigating grand juries as provided in the act of November 22, 1978 (P.L. 1148, No. 271), known as the ‘Investigating Grand Jury Act.’
It is evident that the word ‘shall’ denotes the mandatory nature of that responsibility. See generally Zimmerman v. O’Bannon, 497 Pa. 551, 442 A.2d 674 (1982).
“This reading of the Act is further strengthened by 71 Pa.C.S.A. § 732-206(a) ‘The Attorney General shall have the power to investigate any criminal offense which he has the power to prosecute. The decision to initiate a prosecution under § 732-205 will arise where the attorney general is made aware of facts that justify his commencement of a prosecution. Normally, information first brought to the *439attorney general’s attention will be an insufficient basis upon which to render a decision to prosecute. Instead, initial facts will require further investigation to determine whether an activity arises to a crime that warrants prosecution by the attorney general, under § 732-205. The failure to prosecute would not, by itself, serve as an indication that the investigation was unwarranted. Rather, the dispositive question is whether the facts known to the attorney general would justify his decision to investigate. In this context, the court below noted at the suppression hearing:
[Wjhen you get into the area of what he can prosecute, you are in a much more confined area than where you are in the area of what you can investigate. Because it doesn’t take a Rhodes Scholar to realize you can’t know whether you are in the area of a prosecution until at least you do some investigation.’
(ST Vol. II, 49)
The court went on to note that one ‘can’t apply it [the Act] with hindsight.’ (ST Vol. II, 51)
“The Commonwealth submits that the Attorney General dealt with this very problem in executing the search warrants herein. Based on the information known to him the attorney general after consulting with the office of the district attorney made a reasonable determination that ap-pellee was engaged in conduct which would fall within the areas he was required to prosecute under 71 Pa.C.S.A. § 732-205 and hence he was under a duty to investigate further. Not only did the attorney general have information indicating activities ripe for grand jury investigation under § 732-206(b), but he had evidence on which to base a reasonable belief that the appellee’s activities were in furtherance of a corrupt organization which the attorney general is required to prosecute as provided in § 732-205(a)(2). See also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 911(e).
“The attorney general had information, prior to execution of the search warrants, that appellee was engaged in a *440pattern of racketeering and that the profits gained from these activities were used in furtherance of a legitimate enterprise — a law office. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 991(b), (h). Specifically, appellee, by repeatedly using the blue box on April 15 through April 16 conducted a pattern of activity; namely, theft of services. This criminal activity is explicitly covered by § 911 at (h)(1)(i) ‘Chapter 39 (relating to theft and related offenses’). The attorney general acting as a reasonable public agency with investigative powers, had reason to surmise that appellee used the profits from this unlawful activity to further a legitimate enterprise, in this case a law practice. It is important to note that the Bell recording devices revealed that appellee, in answering his phone, identified himself as ‘Attorney Goodman.’ Mr. Claus testified that it was under this interpretation of § 911 that he determined an investigation by the attorney general was necessary. The Commonwealth maintains that given the evidence known to the attorney general prior to the issuance of the search warrants, that belief was well-founded in the applicable law. To hold otherwise, you require the attorney general to not investigate an activity unless his initial contact with the activity would lead him to determine, with complete certainty, that the matter should be prosecuted by his office. Common-sense dictates that when initial facts indicate that an activity may involve a crime subject to the attorney general’s prosecuting powers, the attorney general should enter into further investigation of those facts. Ensuring a broader scope of power for investigation under the Act, is of primary importance to the attorney general since his area of prosecutorial responsibility involves highly complex areas of criminal activity that would involve the sifting of many disparate elements.”
Brief for Appellant at 11 and 14-18.
I agree and accordingly dissent to the first part of the majority’s opinion.