Court Opinion

ID: 9649711
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:06:59.377947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:19.880594
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                        Opinion filed August 23, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                              No. 3D23-238
                      Lower Tribunal No. 12-914-A-K
                          ________________

                         Justin August Meyer,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                         The State of Florida,
                                  Appellee.

      An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from
the Circuit Court for Monroe County, Mark H. Jones, Judge.

     Michael Caruso, Federal Public Defender, and Ta’Ronce M. Stowes
and Aimee A. Ferrer, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, for appellant.

      Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Ivy R. Ginsberg, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.

Before LOGUE, C.J., and HENDON and GORDO, JJ.

     LOGUE, C.J.
      Justin August Meyer appeals the circuit court’s denial of his motion to

vacate his conviction and sentence filed under Rule 3.850 of the Florida

Rules of Criminal Procedure. This case raises the issue of whether a circuit

court that accepted a guilty plea and granted a criminal defendant probation

is divested of jurisdiction over the violation of that probation when the

legislature changes the underlying crime from a felony to a misdemeanor.

We hold that under the circumstances presented here, the circuit court was

not divested of jurisdiction. Accordingly, we affirm.

                                 Background

      Meyer was arrested on November 18, 2012, for stealing an iPhone with

a value over $300, but less than $5,000. He was charged with one count of

felony “Grand Theft” in the third degree under sections 812.014(1) & (2)(c),

Florida Statutes. On February 21, 2013, Meyer pled guilty. After accepting

his plea, the circuit court withheld adjudication and imposed probation for 24

months.

      Meyer violated probation three times. After the first and second

instances, the circuit court continued to withhold adjudication of Meyer’s

guilty plea but imposed an extended probationary period. Around December

of 2013, Meyer violated probation for a third time, but evaded arrest for

almost six years. Meyer was finally arrested for his violation on August 22,

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2019. On October 4, 2019, the circuit court revoked his probation,

adjudicated him guilty of violating sections 812.014(1) & (2)(c), and

sentenced him to eight months in jail.

        Prior to Meyer’s conviction, however, the legislature amended section

812.014. The legislature changed the elements of a felony theft to

encompass higher value items, thereby making Meyer’s actions a

misdemeanor. 1 The amendment took effect on October 1, 2019, three days

before Meyer was adjudicated and sentenced. Ch. Law 2019-167, § 36.

1
    The 2012 version of section 812.014 provides:

        (c) It is grand theft of the third degree and a felony of the third
        degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s.
        775.084, if the property stolen is:

        1. Valued at $300 or more, but less than $5,000.

        ...

        (e) Except as provided in paragraph (d), if the property stolen is
        valued at $100 or more, but less than $300, the offender commits
        petit theft of the first degree, punishable as a misdemeanor of the
        first degree, as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

§ 812.014, Fla. Stat. (2012).

The 2019 version of section 812.014 provides:

        (c) It is grand theft of the third degree and a felony of the third
        degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s.
        775.084, if the property stolen is:

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      Thereafter, Meyer moved to vacate his conviction and sentence under

Rule 3.850 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Meyer argued that under

section 775.022, Florida Statutes, because the crime to which he pled guilty

was no longer a felony, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over his case and

his conviction and sentence were void. The circuit court denied his motion.

This appeal timely followed.

                                  Analysis

      We review whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction de novo.

Paul v. State, 233 So. 3d 1181, 1182 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017). Generally, circuit

courts have jurisdiction over felonies and county courts over misdemeanors.

§ 34.01, Fla. Stat. (2019); § 26.012, Fla. Stat. (2019).

      Meyer’s main argument is that section 775.022 provides for the

retroactive application of criminal statutory amendments where a court has

not yet punished a defendant for violating the amended criminal statute.

      1. Valued at $750 or more, but less than $5,000.

      ...

      (e) Except as provided in paragraph (d), if the property stolen is
      valued at $100 or more, but less than $750, the offender commits
      petit theft of the first degree, punishable as a misdemeanor of the
      first degree, as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

§ 812.014, Fla. Stat. (2019).

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Applying the amended section 812.014 retroactively, Meyer argues that the

circuit court lacked jurisdiction to punish a misdemeanor and therefore the

case must be dismissed.

     Section 775.022 reads:

           (3) Except as expressly provided in an act of the
           Legislature or as provided in subsections (4) and (5),
           the reenactment or amendment of a criminal statute
           operates prospectively and does not affect or abate
           any of the following:

           (a) The prior operation of the statute or a prosecution
           or enforcement thereunder.

           (b) A violation of the statute based on any act or
           omission occurring before the effective date of the
           act.

           (c) A prior penalty, prior forfeiture, or prior
           punishment incurred or imposed under the statute.

           (4) If a penalty, forfeiture, or punishment for a
           violation of a criminal statute is reduced by a
           reenactment or an amendment of a criminal statute,
           the penalty, forfeiture, or punishment, if not already
           imposed, must be imposed according to the statute
           as amended.

§ 775.022, Fla. Stat. (2019).

     We believe the key fact here is that the circuit court entered orders of

probation prior to the statutory change. The argument that the circuit court

lost jurisdiction to enforce its probation orders based on the amendment to

section 812.014 conflicts with the statutes expressly granting the court that

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enters an order of probation the jurisdiction to enforce its order. See §

948.06(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2019) (“Whenever within the period of probation . . .

there are reasonable grounds to believe that a probationer . . . has violated

his or her probation . . . any probation officer may arrest . . . such probationer

. . . and return him or her to the court granting such probation[.]”); §

948.06(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2019) (“If probation . . . is revoked, the court shall

adjudge the probationer or offender guilty of the offense charged and proven

or admitted . . . and impose any sentence which it might have originally

imposed before placing the probationer on probation[.]”).

      Because the circuit court had jurisdiction to enter the orders of

probation, the circuit court retained the authority to enforce its orders. To rule

otherwise would effectively nullify the circuit court’s order of probation and

reward the defendant’s violation of the order and six-year evasion of arrest.

See McKendry v. State, 641 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1994) (“[A] specific statute

covering a particular subject area always controls over a statute covering the

same and other subjects in more general terms.”).

      We do not believe our decision conflicts with Dean v. State, 303 So.

3d 257 (Fla. 5th DCA 2020), which held that a circuit court did not have

jurisdiction of a pending information when the legislature changed the

charged crime from a felony to a misdemeanor. Dean did not involve the

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circumstance here where the circuit court had issued orders of probation, the

criminal defendant violated those orders, and the criminal defendant evaded

arrest for six years prior to the statutory change.

      In so holding, we note that the amount of incarceration time imposed

by the circuit court did not exceed the time authorized under the amended

statute. 2

      Affirmed.

      HENDON, J., concurs.

      GORDO, J., concurs in result only.

2
  As mentioned above, Meyer frames his argument entirely as an attack on
the jurisdiction of the circuit court to enter the judgment and sentence at
issue. The only remedy he seeks is to have the judgment and sentence
declared void. A different issue concerns what sentencing limits were
available for the violation of probation due to the change in the underlying
criminal statute. Because Meyer did not raise this issue, we do not reach it.

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