Court Opinion

ID: 9862300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 01:06:20.209016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:25:00.117026
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE BUCKLEY, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the decision of my colleagues because I believe the statute in question violates the establishment clause of the first amendment. The present case raises the issue of whether government may dictate the terms of a collective bargaining agreement through legislative enactment for the avowed purpose of ensuring that members of a particular religious sect or sects will be permitted to bury their dead in accordance with their prescribed rituals. Such governmental action designed to accommodate the needs of a particular religious minority must, of necessity, run afoul of the central purpose of the establishment clause — the purpose of ensuring governmental neutrality in matters of religion. Gillette v. United States (1971), 401 U.S. 437, 450-51, 28 L. Ed. 2d 168, 180-81, 91 S. Ct. 828, 836. The majority improperly relies on Lynch v. Donnelly (1984), 465 U.S. 668, 79 L. Ed. 2d 604, 104 S. Ct. 1355, for the proposition that “statutes which confer benefits or give special recognition to religion in general or to one faith are not invalidated merely on that basis.” (127 Ill. App. 3d at 455.) Lynch concerned an establishment clause challenge to the erection of a Christmas display by the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, which featured a nativity scene or creche. In upholding the right of the city to include a creche in its Christmas display, the Supreme Court noted: “The Court has made it abundantly clear, however, that ‘not every law that confers an “indirect,” “remote,” or “incidental” benefit upon [religion] is, for that reason alone, constitutionally invalid.’ [Citations.] Here, whatever benefit to one faith or religion or to all religions, is indirect, remote, and incidental; display of the creche is no more an advancement or endorsement of religion than the Congressional and Executive recognition of the origins of the Holiday itself as ‘Christ’s Mass,’ or the exhibition of literally hundreds of religious paintings in governmentally supported museums.” (465 U.S. 668, 683, 79 L. Ed. 2d 604, 616, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1364.) Thus, the Supreme Court recognized that government action which confers only “indirect,” “remote,” or “incidental” benefits on a given religion may still be constitutionally permissible under the establishment clause. The instant statute inserts the power and authority of the State of Illinois into the collective bargaining process for the direct and explicit benefit of a given religious minority. Surely, such action cannot be properly characterized as “incidentally,” “remotely,” or “indirectly” benefitting religion. Accordingly, Lynch is not controlling. Prior Supreme Court decisions forbidding governmental favoritism toward the adherents of any sect or religious organization require invalidation of this statute. Abington School District v. Schempp (1963), 374 U.S. 203, 216, 10 L. Ed. 2d 844, 854, 83 S. Ct. 1560, 1567-68; Engel v. Vitale (1962), 370 U.S. 421, 430-31, 8 L. Ed. 2d 601, 607-08, 82 S. Ct. 1261, 1266-67; Everson v. Board of Education (1947), 330 U.S. 1,15-16, 91 L. Ed. 711, 723, 67 S. Ct. 504, 511. I also disagree with the majority’s assertion that the “act in question has a valid secular purpose” because it was designed to eliminate discrimination and to accommodate religious belief. (127 Ill. App. 3d at 456.) The case relied upon by the majority in support of this conclusion, Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806, AFL-CIO (7th Cir. 1981), 643 E2d 445, involved an establishment clause challenge to section 701(j) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 U.S.C. §2000e(j) (1982)). Section 701© forbids both employers and unions from discriminating against any individual because of his religious affiliation and requires both to make reasonable accommodation for an employee’s religiously motivated conduct or to show that to do so would work an undue hardship. In upholding section 7010") the Federal court found a valid secular purpose, explicitly noting that: “Application of Section 7010) does not, as defendants contend, have a primary effect of advancing the interests of religionists over non-religionists or the beliefs of one sect over those of another.” (643 F.2d 445, 454.) and further that: “The fact that some religions may have more or different kinds of religiously dictated observances than other religions does not invalidate a law that applies to all faiths equally.” (643 F.2d 445, 455.) The court concluded that since section 701© required accommodation for all religiously motivated conduct, it promoted only the “principle of supremacy of conscience” and was therefore compatible with the establishment clause. (643 F.2d 445, 454-55.) In the present case, the Act in question does not require accommodation for all, but only for a few; it does not promote the “principle of supremacy of conscience” but only promotes the beliefs of certain religious groups. Accordingly, the majority’s reliance on Nottelson in attempting to articulate a secular purpose is misplaced. Undoubtedly, our General Assembly acted with the best of motives in attempting to accommodate the religious beliefs of a group long subjected to so much discrimination. However, the flaw in the instant statute does not lie in the good intentions of its authors but in its effects. In a pluralistic society, religious minorities of all persuasions are invariably hindered in the observance of their religions because they do not share the same customs and beliefs as those in the majority. Restaurants and grocery stores may not observe food preparation and storage restrictions required by many minority religions, religious holidays may not coincide with those of the majority and, as the present case demonstrates, customs common to the majority may frustrate a minority religion’s burial requirements. Remedial State action which is neutral and undertaken to permit greater accommodation for all religious beliefs addresses itself to these inherent problems and does not violate the establishment clause, for no particular religion is being advanced or inhibited by government. Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806, AFL-CIO (7th Cir. 1981), 643 F.2d 445, 454-55. However, where government departs from this evenhanded approach and attempts to tailor its laws in order to permit an accommodation for a particular religious group, the question necessarily arises why one group has been accommodated and not another. As the competing demands of other religious minorities for special accommodation arise, the State will inevitably be cast in the role of picking and choosing which minority religions are to receive favored treatment and which are not. The notion that such a spectacle represents a proper function of government is rejected by the establishment clause and the cases construing it. (Abington School District v. Schempp (1963), 374 U.S. 203, 216, 10 L. Ed. 2d 844, 854, 83 S. Ct. 1560, 1567-68; Engel v. Vitale (1962), 370 U.S. 421, 430-31, 8 L. Ed. 2d 601, 607-08, 82 S. Ct. 1261, 1266-67; Everson v. Board of Education (1947), 330 U.S. 1, 15-16, 91 L. Ed. 711, 723, 67 S. Ct. 504, 511.) Accordingly, I would hold that the instant statute is violative of the establishment clause and would reverse the judgment of the trial court.