Court Opinion

ID: 9691272
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:20:48.598048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:15.092887
License: Public Domain

OlivbR, J.
(dissenting) — I believe the order directing a verdict for defendant at the conclusion of the evidence for plaintiff was erroneous and I respectfully dissent from the decision affirming it.
The majority opinion holds there was no proof defendant’s automobile left the pavement and that “the jury in order to find for plaintiff would have had to infer or presume negligence on defendant’s part * * In so holding the opinion quotes at length from the testimony of Lynes and states it is the only testimony as to defendant’s alleged negligence. This statement may be open to question.
*1300Plaintiff-Koob testified that when the motorcycle was on the shoulder he saw the car coming “and my first impression was it was a woman driving, and my second impression was that she had turned and was headed toward us, directly in our path, and it flashed into my mind that she was turning into us and that she was going to hit us.” The trial court sustained a motion to strike the quoted testimony as opinions and conclusions of the' witness. The language “my impression was”. as used by the witness merely expressed the impression produced upon his mind at the time by his sense perception. It was practically synonymous with, “it appeared to me” or “I perceived” or “I saw.” I believe the onder sustaining the motion to strike was erroneous. However, the testimony is in the record before us and if deemed necessary might be considered for the purpose of this appeal.
Moreover, there was other evidence apparently overlooked by the opinion. Plaintiff testified:
“As I glanced down when we hit the shoulder and as I looked up there was this car coming and I saw it was a woman driver and then I seen that the car was coming for us and that we was headed over the shoulder. And that’s what happened. We were hit. * * * Q. On which shoulder were you, Mr. Koob, when the accident happened? A. We were to the left. * * # It was a wide shoulder. * * * Q. How did you get from the curve in the highway into the accident? A. We were on the shoulder.”
Witness Roach testified:
“Just before the curve they [the motorcycle] went over on the shoulder and the other car appeared about right in the curve and then there was a big cloud of dust between them and this other car. * * * The car turned straight across and nosed into the east ditch. * * * Q. On which side of the road were they when you saw this ? A. It would be my left hand, on the shoulder.”
Immediately following Lynes’ testimony on cross-examination, quoted in the majority opinion, he testified:
“Q. And at that time you were still on the left-hand side of the highway on the parking ? Is that correct ? On the shoul*1301der 1 A. On the shoulder, yes. Q. Had yon attempted to get the motorcycle back on your own side of the highway, the west side of the highway ¶ A. No, definitely not.”
Defendant states in argument: “So far as the record discloses the motorcycle might just as well have veered to its right toward the car and thus caused the collision.” The majority opinion quotes this argument with approval and adopts it as a basis for its decision. I am unable to find anything in the record to support the argument. All the evidence I can find is to the contrary. Even without the testimony of plaintiff and Lynes that the car turned into the motorcycle it would seem the collision upon the shoulder would necessarily indicate the automobile must have gone off the pavement and upon the shoulder. Henee, I would hold that question was one of fact for the jury.
The majority opinion states: “He [Lynes] estimates defendant’s car coming toward him was ‘a little better than three hundred feet’ away when he ‘started to go across the black line onto the left-hand side of the road.’ ”
Based upon this, the opinion states: “When the motorcycle started across in front of her she had to make an immediate decision. Under the record she had approximately three seconds in which to make it.” Although the quotations from Lynes’ testimony are correct, he testified also:
“Q. How far back would you say it was that you pulled over? A. Well, it was eight to twelve hundred feet. Q. You were that far back from the approaching car? A. Yes.”
On a motion for directed verdict the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed. This rule requires that such party be given its benefit, not merely as to some but as to all the evidence. Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff the evidence shows that “when the motorcycle started across in front of her” defendant was eight hundred to twelve hundred feet distant and would have perhaps eight or ten seconds or several times “approximately three seconds” in which to make a decision. And if the motorcycle started across approximately eight or ten seconds before the accident it would seem the discussion and quotation in the majority opinion of “refinements” of two or *1302three seconds would not be appropriate to the evidence in this case.
The majority opinion states that, considering the emergency confronting defendant when the motorcycle started across in front of her “if * * * she mistakenly guessed wrong her decision should not be submitted to the jury as .evidence of negligence.”
The general rule in such eases is thus stated:
“Emergency. The questions whether an emergency' existed, and whether a person who was confronted with a sudden emergency exercised such care as an ordinarily prudent man would have exercised, when confronted with a like emergency, ordinarily are questions of fact for the jury.” 65 C. J. S., Negligence, section 252a, page 1134.
That is the rule in this jurisdiction. Leinen v. Boettger, 241 Iowa 910, 924-926, 44 N.W.2d 73, 81, 82; Cooley v. Killings-worth, 209 Iowa 646, 649, 650; 228 N.W. 880; Sanford v. Nesbit, 234 Iowa 14, 19, 20, 11 N.W.2d 695; Babendure v. Baker, 218 Iowa 31, 33, 34, 253 N.W. 834; Luppes v. Harrison, 239 Iowa 880, 886, 887, 32 N.W.2d 809; Carpenter v. Campbell Auto Co., 159 Iowa 52, 62, 63, 140 N.W. 225; Bletzer v. Wilson, 224 Iowa 884, 889, 890, 276 N.W. 836.
Rich v. Herny, 222 Iowa 465, 269 N.W. 489, and Carsten-sen v. Thomsen, 215 Iowa 427, 245 N.W. 734, cited in the majority opinion are extraordinary Cases in each of which defendant’s vehicle before injuring plaintiff came into a collision with a third automobile, the negligent operation of which was apparently the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury, but whose owner or operator had not been made a party to the suit for damages. There is 'nothing extraordinary about the case at bar which warrants a decision contrary to the general rule. The evidence on behalf of plaintiff indicates the motorcycle was continuing its course upon the dirt shoulder, the two vehicles would not have collided had the automobile remained upon the pavement, and that at the last moment defendant turned it off the pavement and upon the shoulder where it collided with the motorcycle. Furthermore, in the cited cases there was evidence on behalf of the defendants while in this case defendant has *1303offered no explanation or excuse for her conduct in turning her automobile off the pavement and into the motorcycle.
The majority opinion does not consider the question of plaintiff’s contributory negligence. However, it may be said Lynes and plaintiff were not engaged in a joint enterprise, plaintiff was merely a guest who did not direct or have the right to direct the operation of the motorcycle. Therefore, the negligence of Lynes would not be imputed to plaintiff. Wagner v. Kloster, 188 Iowa 174, 175 N.W. 840. Plaintiff was not in a position to properly observe traffic on the road ahead and Lynes was at all times fully cognizant of defendant’s approaching car. Williams v. Kearney, 224 Iowa 1006, 1009, 1010, 278 N.W. 180. Hence, plaintiff’s contributory negligence was a question for the jury. Schwind v. Gibson, 220 Iowa 377, 386, 260 N.W. 853; Bradley v. Interurban Ry. Co., 191 Iowa 1351, 1353, 183 N.W. 493, 494; Albert v. Maher Bros. Trans. Co., 215 Iowa 197, 243 N.W. 561; Carpenter v. Wolfe, 223 Iowa 417, 424, 273 N.W. 169; Johnson v. Overland Transp. Co., 227 Iowa 487, 498, 288 N.W. 601.
Garfield, C.J., and Bliss, J., join in this dissent.