Court Opinion

ID: 9961652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 14:11:07.841022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:21:15.528046
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Yount, 2024-Ohio-1500.]

                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                        MIAMI COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO                                      :
                                                    :
       Appellee                                     :   C.A. No. 2023-CA-5
                                                    :
 v.                                                 :   Trial Court Case No. 22CR554
                                                    :
 GREGORY C. YOUNT                                   :   (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
                                                    :   Court)
       Appellant                                    :
                                                    :

                                              ...........

                                              OPINION

                                        Rendered on April 19, 2024

                                              ...........

CARLO C. MCGINNIS, Attorney for Appellant

PAUL M. WATKINS, Attorney for Appellee

                                             .............

EPLEY, P.J.

        {¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Gregory C. Yount appeals from his conviction in the

Miami County Court of Common Pleas on his guilty to a single count of felonious assault.

For the reasons that follow, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.

        I.       Facts and Procedural History

        {¶ 2} On November 19, 2022, the victim was staying at the Budget Inn on Archer
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Drive in Troy. Throughout the day, she had been arguing with her ex-boyfriend, Yount,

about whether he could stay in the hotel room too. (He claimed to have paid for it.) She

refused to let him in and, as a result, he sent her a series of threatening text messages,

including several that promised physical harm: “I’m going to kill you”; “If you don’t help

me. I swear * * *, your [sic] done”; “I told you, I’ll end this once and for all. DEAD BITCH”;

“I will f*ck you up today, bet on that.”

       {¶ 3} At some point during the day, Yount gained access to the hotel room and the

two began to argue. He then assaulted the victim, inflicting significant damage to her face,

head, and neck. Instead of rendering aid or calling for medics, Yount left the victim’s

unconscious body in the bathtub and then left the scene. He was later found at another

Miami County hotel, where he was arrested without incident.

       {¶ 4} The victim was taken to a hospital in Troy and treated for fractures to her

skull, jaw, and orbital bone. The damage was so severe that she was then transferred to

a Dayton facility for more specialized care. She ultimately needed multiple surgeries to

repair the injuries. Her victim impact statement indicated that she has plates and screws

holding bones in her face together, that she has partial vision loss in her left eye, and that

the severe concussion she suffered has led to manic episodes that have negatively

affected her personal life.

       {¶ 5} On December 21, 2022, Yount was indicted on one count of felonious

assault, a felony of the second degree. He pleaded guilty as charged on January 24,

2023, and was sentenced to five to seven and a half years in prison on March 7, 2023.

He has filed a timely appeal that raises three assignments of error.
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       II.    Speedy Trial

       {¶ 6} In his first assignment of error, Yount argues that his speedy trial rights were

violated. He believes, as a result, that his case should have been dismissed.

       {¶ 7} The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the

United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution. R.C. 2945.71,

Ohio’s speedy trial statute, “was implemented to incorporate the constitutional protection

of the right to speedy trial.” Brecksville v. Cook, 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 55, 661 N.E.2d 706

(1996). The speedy trial statutes must be strictly construed against the government. Id.

       {¶ 8} R.C. 2945.71 designates specific time requirements for the government to

bring an accused to trial. Under the statute, a felony defendant must be brought to trial

within 270 days of arrest. R.C. 2945.71(C). Each day the accused is held in jail in lieu of

bail is counted as three days. R.C. 2945.71(E). “When multiple charges arise from a

criminal incident and share a common litigation history, pretrial incarceration on multiple

charges constitutes incarceration on the ‘pending charge’ for the purposes of the triple-

count provision of the speedy trial-statute, R.C. 2945.71(E).” State v. Parker, 113 Ohio

St.3d 207, 2007-Ohio-1534, 863 N.E.2d 1032, paragraph one of the syllabus.

Additionally, the day of arrest is not counted when calculating a defendant’s speedy trial

time. State v. Cimpaye, 2022-Ohio-2740, 154 N.E.3d 415, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.).

       {¶ 9} Although an individual is protected by this right, it can be waived. It is well

established that a guilty plea waives the right to challenge a conviction on speedy trial

grounds. Montpelier v. Greeno, 25 Ohio St.3d 170, 495 N.E.2d 581 (1986); State v.

Kelley, 57 Ohio St.3d 127, 130, 566 N.E.2d 658, 661 (1991) (“[W]here an accused has
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entered a plea of guilty he waives his right to raise the denial of his right to a speedy trial

on appeal.”); State v. Hawkins, 2d Dist. Greene No. 1998-CA-6, 1999 WL 197932, *4

(Apr. 9, 1999) (“Because a plea of guilty waives the defendant’s right to trial, it necessarily

also waives any claim that the defendant was denied his statutory and constitutional rights

to a speedy trial.”). This Court, however, has recognized a potential exception – when a

speedy trial claim is raised in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v.

Stivender, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23973, 2011-Ohio-247, ¶ 15.

       {¶ 10} In this case, Yount pleaded guilty on January 24, 2023. Unless the

ineffectiveness of his counsel prevented him from making his plea in a voluntary manner,

his guilty plea waived his right to a speedy trial. Yount does not argue ineffective

assistance of counsel in his brief, and a review of the plea form and transcript indicates

that his plea was made in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary manner. We conclude,

therefore, that he has waived any speedy trial claim. Yount’s first assignment of error is

overruled.

       III.   Double Jeopardy

       {¶ 11} In his second assignment of error, Yount claims that his “right to be free

from double jeopardy was violated because his felonious assault (F2) and domestic

violence (M1) charges constituted allied offenses of similar import; because he suffered

multiple punishments in successive separate proceedings; and because he was twice

placed in jeopardy for the same conduct.” Appellant’s Brief at 23.

       {¶ 12} The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution declares that

no person shall “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb,”
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and similarly, Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall

be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.” The protections given by the Ohio and

United States Constitutions are coextensive. State v. Martello, 97 Ohio St.3d 398, 2002-

Ohio-6661, 780 N.E.2d 250, ¶ 7.

       {¶ 13} In practice, “[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three abuses:

(1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) a second prosecution

for the same offense after conviction, and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense.”

State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892, ¶ 10.

       {¶ 14} In this case, our record includes evidence of only one crime – felonious

assault. There is no mention of a first-degree misdemeanor domestic violence. Looking

outside the record, however, there appears to have been a misdemeanor domestic

violence charge that was dismissed before Yount was arraigned on felonious assault in

this case. Even if we took judicial notice of that case, we would find that there would not

be a double jeopardy problem because there was not a second prosecution after acquittal

or conviction and there were not multiple punishments for the same crime. In other words,

the domestic violence charge did not exist in this case, and there is no evidence – inside

or outside the record – that Yount was ever acquitted, convicted, or punished for it.

       {¶ 15} The second assignment of error is overruled.

       IV.    Sentencing

       {¶ 16} Yount’s third assignment of error contends that he did not receive a “lawful

sentencing hearing” because the State reversed its “implied agreement” to defer to the

court for sentencing.
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      {¶ 17} A plea agreement constitutes a contract between the State and a defendant

and is subject to the law of contracts. State v. Liskany, 2011-Ohio-4456, 964 N.E.2d 1073,

¶ 190 (2d Dist.). If one side violates a term of the agreement, the other party can pursue

appropriate remedies, including recission of the agreement. Id. In most cases, though, a

plea agreement is not binding on the court and the decision of whether to accept it rests

with the trial judge. Id. According to Crim.R. 11(F), the plea agreement must be stated on

the record in open court.

      {¶ 18} In the case at bar, Yount has failed to direct us to anything in the record that

would indicate the State agreed to remain silent at sentencing. In fact, the transcript

definitively shows the opposite: there was no agreement for the State to do anything at

all. Yount was pleading to the indictment.

      COURT:        All right. This matter comes on for a Change of Plea. [Defense

      Counsel] are there any plea bargains that need to be placed on the record?

      DEFENSE COUNSEL:             No, Your Honor.

      COURT:        Defendant is pleading as charged?

      DEFENSE COUNSEL:             Yes, Ma’am.

      COURT:        And that’s your understanding, [Prosecutor]?

      PROSECUTOR:           That is, Your Honor.

      ***

      COURT:        [Speaking to Yount] Has anybody promised you anything in

      exchange for your plea of guilt, other what’s been – well just that you’re pleading

      as charged, as you’ve – with no consideration?
                                                                                           -7-

       YOUNT:         No, Ma’am.

Plea Tr. at 2 and 5. Likewise, an examination of the plea form reveals no agreement that

the State would remain silent at sentencing or defer to the court. Therefore, there is no

evidence of a breach of the plea agreement.

       {¶ 19} Finally, Yount argues that the facts did not support his five to seven and a

half year sentence.

       {¶ 20} When reviewing felony sentences, we must apply the standard of review

set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G). Under that statute, an appellate court may increase, reduce,

or modify a sentence, or vacate it altogether and remand for resentencing, if it “clearly

and convincingly finds either (1) the record does not support certain specified findings or

(2) that the sentence imposed is contrary to law.” State v. Worthen, 2d Dist. Montgomery

No. 29043, 2021-Ohio-2788, ¶ 13.

       {¶ 21} According to the Ohio Supreme Court, we may not independently “weigh

the evidence in the record and substitute [our] judgment for that of the trial court

concerning the sentence that best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.”

State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, ¶ 42. The inquiry

is simply whether the sentence is contrary to law. A sentence is contrary to law when it

falls outside the statutory range for the offense or if the sentencing court does not consider

R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. State v. Dorsey, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28747, 2021-Ohio-

76, ¶ 18.

       {¶ 22} Here, Yount’s sentence was clearly within the statutory range for felonies of

the second degree, and the trial court noted at disposition and in the judgment entry that
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it had considered the principles and purposes of sentencing and the seriousness and

recidivism factors found in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. Yount’s sentence is not

contrary to law.   The third assignment of error is overruled.

       V.     Conclusion

       {¶ 23} The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.

                                   .............

TUCKER, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.