Court Opinion

ID: 9537293
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:15:26.59701+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:23.029708
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE ERICKSON
delivered the opinion of the Court.
John Edward Walker was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to the penitentiary. He has appealed his conviction to this Court. The conduct of the district attorney, in our opinion, requires us to reverse and to order a new trial.
After withholding evidence favorable to the defendant, the district attorney magnified his error in his argument to the jury. He argued to the jury that the defense had failed to produce the gun which the defendant alleged the deceased victim had used in the gunfight that preceded his death. The argument was improper, because the prosecution not only had the decedent’s gun in their possession, but also had a ballistics test which proved that the defendant had been shot with the decedent’s gun.
An analysis of the facts establishes the essential relationship of the evidence which was withheld to the defense. The defendant arrived at the Kapre Lounge at approximately 10:00 p.m. on New Year’s Day, and some forty-five minutes later, James Galbreath came in with his friend, Howard *187Felzien. Shortly thereafter, the defendant and Galbreath entered into an argument which ended when the defendant fatally shot Galbreath. Both Galbreath and the defendant were taken to the hospital for treatment of the wounds which they suffered in the gunfight. At the hospital, a .25 caliber bullet was removed from the wound in the defendant’s foot and was given to the police. The police already had the decedent’s gun in their possession. Ballistics tests confirm that the decedent’s gun fired the bullet that was removed from the defendant’s foot.
The defendant claimed that he shot Galbreath in self-defense after Galbreath shot him with his .25 caliber automatic pistol. The prosecution’s case attempted to negate self-defense and to show that the decedent was, in fact, unarmed.
The prosecution’s evidence consisted primarily of the testimony of the barmaid and evidence developed in the cross-examination of Felzien. The barmaid said she saw only one gun and that gun was in the hands of the defendant. She also testified that Galbreath had both hands in his pockets at the time that he was shot. Her story was corroborated by Felzien, who said that he did not see the deceased with a gun. The record reflects thirteen occasions when witnesses testified that they had not seen the decedent with a gun. The sole testimony that supported the defense claim that the decedent was armed came from the defendant and Joe Johnson. In his closing argument, the district attorney inferred that both the defendant and Johnson had offered peijured testimony when they said that the decedent was armed and had fired at the defendant before he was shot. The district attorney, during his closing argument, also alluded to the fact that the defendant had failed to produce the gun which he claimed Galbreath had used. The closing argument of the district attorney, in effect, denied that Galbreath was armed and tended to mislead the jury.
In short, self-defense was the crucial issue in the case, and the inability of the defendant to produce the gun which he claimed the decedent had fired at him effectively discredited *188his testimony. Moreover, the district attorney attempted to buttress his position by eliciting testimony to show that the deceased was unarmed and to negate the defense claim of self-defense.
The district attorney’s opening statement suggested that there would be evidence which would indicate that the defendant was shot after he fatally wounded the deceased. When the evidence which the district attorney alluded to in his opening statement failed to materialize to corroborate the district attorney’s opening statement, an argument was made by the district attorney that capitalized on the missing evidence. The district attorney argued that the offense report which the defendant made, which set out the defendant’s version of the gun battle, was false and was made by the defendant to escape the charges which the district attorney made. The ballistics expert who made the tests- and had possession of the gun was endorsed as a witness by the district attorney but was not called.
The only justification which is offered for the conduct of the district attorney is that neither the defense nor the accused made demand for the production of the gun or the ballistics test. Judge Sobeloff, a former Solicitor General and now Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit, had this to say in dealing with the same defense in an all but identical case:
“It is no answer that Barbee’s attorney failed to ask for the results of the tests. While the diligent defense counsel might have learned about the police reports, this is too speculative a consideration to outweigh any unfairness that actually resulted at the trial. He may not have known that tests were made. Indeed he may have been misled into thinking that the tests, if made, supported the state’s theory and were adverse to his client, and that otherwise the State’s Attorney would not have produced the gun in court.
“This is not a case where defense counsel merely made a wrong tactical calculation; it is a case where the inference strongly projected by the state’s evidence might have been destroyed by other evidence in its possession but which the police concealed from the court, from defense counsel, and *189perhaps also from the State’s Attorney. In guaging the nondisclosure in terms of due process, the focus must be on the essential fairness of the procedure and not on the astuteness of either counsel.” Barbee v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964).
See also, United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968), Annot., Withholding Evidence — By Prosecution, 34 A.L.R.3d 16; State v. Turner, 92 Ariz. 214, 375 P.2d 567 (1962).
We set out guidelines for the prosecution in Cheatwood v. People, 164 Colo. 334, 435 P.2d 402 (1967), and said:
“Clearly it is the duty of both the prosecution and the courts to see that no known evidence in the possession of the People which might tend to prove a defendant’s innocence is withheld from the defense before or during trial. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967). Evidence which might be helpful to a defendant and which is suppressed by the police or the prosecution or which is ignored by • a trial court when presented to it, results in a denial of due process of law just as surely as would, for example, the knowing use of perjured testimony. See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed.2d 791 (1934). The reason for this was well stated by Mr. Justice Fortas when he said in his Addendum to Giles, supra, that ‘A criminal trial is not a game in which the State’s function is to outwit and entrap its quarry. The State’s pursuit is justice, not a victim.’ ”
The suppression of evidence favorable to the defendant, coupled with the district attorney’s unfair and misleading closing argument, constituted a deprivation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const, amend. XIV. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972); Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 87 S.Ct. 793, 17 L.Ed.2d 737 (1967); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). A demand for evidence which is unknown to the defendant is not a prerequisite to the right to the production of favorable *190evidence. United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1964).
The district attorney, in his overzealous effort to convict, prevented the defendant from having a fair trial. A prosecutor’s duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict. American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice Relating to The Prosecution Function and The Defense Function, The Prosecution Function § 1.1 “ [ W] hile he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate méans to bring about a just one.” Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935).
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
MR. JUSTICE GROVES specially concurs.
MR. JUSTICE KELLEY dissents.