Court Opinion

ID: 9903246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:33:37.457845+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:09.314259
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                     FIFTH DISTRICT

                                NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

FLORIDA FARM BUREAU
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY,

           Appellant,

v.                                    Case No. 5D21-3196
                                      LT Case No. 2020-CC-0303

JOHN WORRELL AND
JOYCE WORRELL,

           Appellees.

_______________________________/

Opinion filed April 28, 2023

Appeal from the County Court
for Marion County,
R. James McCune, Judge.

Hinda Klein, of Conroy Simberg,
Hollywood, for Appellant.

Mark A. Nation and Paul W.
Pritchard, of The Nation Law Firm,
Longwood, for Appellees.

SOUD, J.
      Appellant Florida Farm Bureau General Insurance Company appeals

final summary judgment entered against it and in favor of its insureds, John

and Joyce Worrell, for the cost of remediation services to the Worrells’

residence found to be covered by their homeowners insurance policy

through Florida Farm Bureau. We have jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla.

Const.; Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). We affirm.

                                      I.

      Laurance Anton, while intoxicated and apparently injured, wandered

uninvited onto the Worrells’ residential property. After Anton, an individual

who did not reside at the Worrells’ residence and was unrelated to them,

broke into their shed, he left behind blood and what seemed to be feces.

Anton was later found dead outside of a neighboring home. Anton was

determined to have died accidentally from a blunt force injury to his head

resulting from a fall.

      Ultimately, the Worrells contracted with Accident Cleaners and

Restoration to clean their shed. The cleaning company filed a claim for

compensation with Florida Farm Bureau, which denied the claim. Florida

Farm Bureau concluded coverage for the restoration expenses was

excluded by the insurance policy’s pollution exclusion provision.

                                      2
      The Worrells filed suit. The Worrells and Florida Farm Bureau filed

competing motions for summary judgment. Following hearing, the Marion

County Court entered judgment in favor of the Worrells in the amount of

$4,103.85, together with pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, attorney’s

fees, and costs. This appeal followed.

                                      II.

      Florida Farm Bureau argues the trial court erred in its summary

judgment by ruling that the costs of remediation services incurred by the

Worrells were covered by the policy. Specifically, Florida Farm Bureau

argues the claim was excluded by the pollution exclusion of the policy.

Florida Farm Bureau’s argument fails.

                                      A.

      The county court’s summary judgment interpreting the homeowners

insurance policy sub judice presents a question of law subject to de novo

review. See Wash. Nat’l Ins. Corp. v. Ruderman, 117 So. 3d 943, 948 (Fla.

2013) (citation omitted). Where the language of an insurance contract is plain

and unambiguous, we must interpret the policy in accordance with its plain

meaning so as to give effect to the policy as written. Id.

      In determining the plainness or ambiguity of legal text, whether such

text is found in statutes or contracts, Florida courts have recognized the

                                       3
“supremacy-of-text principle,” which means that “[t]he words of a governing

text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in their context, is

what the text means.” Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 308 So. 3d

942, 946–47 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading

Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 56 (2012)). “[T]he plainness or

ambiguity of [legal text] is determined by reference to the language itself, the

specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of

the statute as a whole.” Conage v. United States, 346 So. 3d 594, 598 (Fla.

2022) (citation omitted). 1 Florida courts also are guided by Justice Joseph

Story’s view that “every word employed in [a legal text] is to be expounded

in its plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the context furnishes some

ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it.” Advisory Op. to Governor re

Implementation of Amend. 4, the Voting Restoration Amend., 288 So. 3d

1070, 1078 (Fla. 2020) (quoting Joseph Story, Commentaries on

the Constitution of the United States 157–58 (1833)). Thus, the goal is to

      1
         While many of the cases in Florida law interpreting legal texts involve
interpretation of statutes, these principles of interpretation apply to this
Court’s work when interpreting contracts. See Ruderman, 117 So. 3d at 948
(“[C]ourts should read each policy as a whole, endeavoring to give every
provision its full meaning and operative effect.” (quoting U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v.
J.S.U.B., Inc., 979 So. 2d 871, 877 (Fla. 2007))); see also Sec. First Ins. Co.
v. Vazquez, 336 So. 3d 350, 352 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) (“The guiding principal
[sic] for insurance policy interpretation is that the policy must be read as a
whole, affording words their plain meaning as bargained for by the parties.”).
                                       4
arrive at a “fair reading” of the contract and apply the text to the given facts

before the Court. See Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 33.

                                      B.

      The Florida Farm Bureau homeowners insurance policy provides in

pertinent part:

            SECTION I – PERILS INSURED AGAINST

            Coverage A – Dwelling and Coverage B – Other
            Structures

            We insure against risk of direct loss to property
            described in Coverages A and B only if that loss is a
            physical loss to property. We do not insure, however,
            for loss: …

            2. Caused by: …

            e. Any of the following: …

            (5) Discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release
            or escape of pollutants unless the discharge,
            dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape is
            itself caused by a Peril Insured Against under
            Coverage C of this policy.

            Pollutants means any solid, liquid, gaseous or
            thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke,
            vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and
            waste. Waste includes materials to be recycled,
            reconditioned or reclaimed[.]

                                       5
      This exclusion provision within the policy is plain and unambiguous.2

Certain of the words—“pollutants” and “waste”—are specifically defined. The

remaining material words are clear and have a commonly understood

meaning. The words are clear both within the immediate context of the

provision and the context of the policy more broadly.

      Substantially identical language previously has been declared plain

and unambiguous by the Florida Supreme Court. See Deni Assocs. of Fla.,

Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. 1998). While

      2
        The Worrells argue blood is not excluded by the policy, based in part
on the rule of construction known as ejusdem generis. This rule of
construction provides that we construe an ambiguous general term in legal
text by considering the specific things that follow and those things of the
same kind, class or nature as the specific things identified. However,
ejusdem generis is applicable only when contractual language is ambiguous
and must be construed by the court. See State v. Hobbs, 974 So. 2d 1119,
1121 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (“Ejusdem generis should only come into play
when it is necessary to construe an ambiguous statute, not to create an
ambiguity in a clearly worded statute.”); see also Pottsburg Utils., Inc. v.
Daugharty, 309 So. 2d 199, 201 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) (“[Ejusdem generis] is
applicable, however, only where there is some inconsistency or ambiguity in
the contract and the meaning of the general provision is doubtful and
requires clarification.”); Grover Com. Enters., Inc. v. Aspen Ins. UK, Ltd., 202
So. 3d 877 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). The same is true for the broader maxim
noscitur a sociis, from which ejusdem generis arises. See Russell Motor Car
Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 520 (1923) (“‘Noscitur a sociis’ is a well-
established and useful rule of construction, where words are of obscure or
doubtful meaning, and then, but only then, its aid may be sought to remove
the obscurity or doubt by reference to the associated words.”). There is no
such ambiguity here.
                                       6
Deni involved the accidental spillage of ammonia from a blueprint machine,

this same language applied to the facts before us is equally unambiguous.

      A fair reading of the exclusion provision leads us to conclude that the

blood left at the Worrells’ residence by Anton’s unlawful entrance onto their

property is not a “Pollutant” as defined by the policy’s exclusion provision—

that is, blood is not “any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or

contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals

and waste.” Indeed, blood is materially different from any of the substances

listed to illustrate that which constitutes a “pollutant.” Further, blood does not

meet the definition of “waste,” as blood plainly is not a material to be

“recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed.”

      Since we have determined blood is not a pollutant that would be

excluded from the policy’s coverage—and that, as a result, the policy covers

the restoration services secured by the Worrells—it is unnecessary to reach

the same question as to the fecal matter. The fecal matter, at most, is a

concurrent cause of loss to the Worrells. The policy does not contain any

language limiting the concurrent cause doctrine’s application to the pollution

exclusion provision. 3 Thus, the concurrent cause doctrine provides for

      3
        Such a limitation is often referred to as an “anti-concurring cause
clause.”
                                        7
coverage of the entire loss. “The [concurrent cause doctrine] provides that

coverage may exist where an insured risk constitutes a concurrent cause of

the loss even when it is not the prime or efficient cause.” Sebo v. Am. Home

Assurance Co., 208 So. 3d 694, 698 (Fla. 2016).

                                    III.

     Accordingly, the trial court properly entered final summary judgment

against Florida Farm Bureau and in favor of the Worrells.

     AFFIRMED.

     It is so ordered.

JAY, J., concurs.
LAMBERT, C.J., concurs in result only, without opinion.

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