Court Opinion

ID: 9947337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 17:01:55.822066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:21.946284
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10910   Document: 23-1    Date Filed: 03/04/2024   Page: 1 of 9

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 23-10910
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       BRIAN SCOTT CULVER,
                                                   Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       SHANNON WITHERS, et al.,

                                                          Defendants,

       FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS,

                                                 Defendant-Appellee.

                         ____________________
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       2                     Opinion of the Court                 23-10910

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 5:18-cv-00160-TKW-HTC
                          ____________________

       Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Brian Culver, a federal prisoner currently incarcerated at
       Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Marianna, appeals the Dis-
       trict Court’s dismissal for mootness of his pro se amended com-
       plaint, which alleged that FCI Marianna prison staﬀ conﬁscated
       from Culver certain family photographs. He also challenges the
       District Court’s denial of his motion to amend this complaint and
       motion for summary judgment. For the reasons below, we aﬃrm.
                                 I. Background
              Brian Culver is serving a 720-month sentence at FCI Mari-
       anna for producing child pornography. See United States v. Culver,
       598 F.3d 740, 746 (11th Cir. 2010). In July 2018, he ﬁled an amended
       complaint against the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). Culver al-
       leged that Marianna’s Sex Oﬀender Management Program imple-
       mented an unconstitutional policy that banned sex oﬀender in-
       mates from possessing photos of children unless the images de-
       picted the inmate’s biological or adopted child. In 2017, pursuant
       to this policy, Marianna allegedly conﬁscated from Culver family
       vacation photographs containing images of Culver’s minor neph-
       ews.
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       23-10910               Opinion of the Court                         3

               The District Court dismissed Culver’s pro se amended com-
       plaint, and Culver appealed to this Court. We reversed in part the
       dismissal, holding that the amended complaint stated a plausible
       as-applied First Amendment challenge to the policy, which, if suc-
       cessful, would merit injunctive relief. See Culver v. Withers, No. 19-
       15160, 2022 WL 2972835, *2 (11th Cir. July 27, 2022) (per curiam).
             After remanding the case for further proceedings, the BOP
       voluntarily terminated and replaced the policy Culver complained
       was unconstitutional with a new policy. The new policy, signed
       into eﬀect in October 2022, allowed inmates to “possess photo-
       graphs of juveniles who are identiﬁed as a family member, and who
       are not identiﬁed as a victim, per their [presentence investigation
       report] or other available legal documentation.” Consequently, the
       BOP moved to dismiss Culver’s claim for mootness.
               Culver opposed the BOP’s motion, asserting that the case
       was not moot because the newly revised policy still imposed what
       he characterized as a “blanket ban” on photographs. He contended
       that the requirements of Article III were met because this dispute
       was capable of repetition, yet evading review and he anticipated a
       likelihood of violating the policy again. Additionally, Culver ar-
       gued that under the doctrine of voluntary cessation, the BOP’s vol-
       untary removal of the policy did not deprive the District Court of
       its jurisdiction to hear the case. Subsequently, Culver sought per-
       mission to supplement the amended complaint, citing the BOP’s
       “unforeseen actions,” and also moved for summary judgment.
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10910

               A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation
       that the case be dismissed without prejudice as moot. The magis-
       trate judge clariﬁed that the feature of the initial policy that Culver
       challenged—the prohibition on photos of minor relatives beyond
       children and grandchildren—had been “substantially altered” by
       the new policy. Furthermore, the magistrate judge determined
       that the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to
       mootness did not apply, as there was no reasonable expectation that
       the same controversy would reoccur. Emphasizing that Culver’s
       sole claim before the District Court pertained to being denied ac-
       cess to family photos, the magistrate judge asserted that this claim
       had been rendered moot by the BOP’s policy revisions. According
       to the magistrate judge, Culver now argued a diﬀerent, hypothet-
       ical controversy related to his inability to possess photos of nonfa-
       milial minors. Additionally, the magistrate judge recommended
       denying Culver’s request to amend his complaint to include claims
       related to the new policy because he had not administratively ex-
       hausted his challenges to the new policy.
               Over Culver’s objections, the District Court adopted the
       magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and found that
       Culver had obtained the relief he sought through the new policy,
       rendering his claim moot. The District Court explained that chal-
       lenging the new policy would require Culver to exhaust his admin-
       istrative remedies and then ﬁle a new suit. Accordingly, the District
       Court dismissed the case as moot and denied all pending motions.
       Culver timely appealed to this Court.
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       23-10910                 Opinion of the Court                            5

                                   II. Discussion
              On appeal, Culver argues that the termination of the ﬁrst
       policy did not moot his case because two legal issues remain con-
       cerning the new policy: ﬁrst, whether the new policy violates his
       constitutional right to communicate with his family and friends;
       and second, whether the new policy is supported by a valid peno-
       logical interest. Likewise, Culver contends that he is likely to suﬀer
       the same injury again because the new policy still bans a majority
       of his photographs of family and friends. Finally, Culver argues
       that the BOP’s issuance of the new policy was merely a tactic to
       avoid litigation and that there is a reasonable expectation that the
       BOP will reenact the ﬁrst policy.
               “Whether a case is moot is a question of law that we review
       de novo.” Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, P.A., 505 F.3d 1173, 1182
       (11th Cir. 2007). As a federal court, Article III of the U.S. Constitu-
       tion limits our jurisdiction to “cases” and “controversies.” Christian
       Coal. of Fla., Inc. v. United States, 662 F.3d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir. 2011).
       “[T]here are ‘three strands of justiciability doctrine—standing,
       ripeness, and mootness—that go to the heart of the Article III case
       or controversy requirement.’” Id. (quoting Harrel v. The Fla. Bar,
       608 F.3d 1241, 1247 (11th Cir. 2010)). Concerning the third strand,
       the Supreme Court has explicitly stated that “a federal court has no
       authority ‘to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract prop-
       ositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot aﬀect
       the matter in issue in the case before it.’” Church of Scientology of
       Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (quoting Mills v. Green,
       159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)). An issue is considered moot when it no
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                   23-10910

       longer presents a live controversy for which the court can provide
       meaningful relief. Christian Coal. of Fla., Inc., 662 F.3d at 1189.
              An exception to mootness is the doctrine of voluntary ces-
       sation. Bankshot Billiards, Inc. v. City of Ocala, 634 F.3d 1340, 1351
       (11th Cir. 2011). A defendant’s voluntary cessation of a challenged
       practice does not moot a case when there is a reasonable expecta-
       tion that the defendant will resume the conduct after the suit is dis-
       missed. Id. The party asserting mootness generally must show that
       the challenged conduct cannot be reasonably expected to restart.
       Id. Government actors, however, receive a rebuttable presumption
       that their challenged behavior will not recur. Id. To avoid dismissal
       as moot in those cases, the plaintiﬀ must show some reasonable
       basis to believe that the policy will be reinstated if the suit is termi-
       nated. Id. at 1351–52.
                Another exception to the mootness doctrine applies to cases
       that are “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” S. Pac. Terminal
       Co. v. Interstate Com. Comm’n, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911). Such a case
       exists when “(1) the challenged action [i]s in its duration too short
       to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there
       [i]s a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party w[ill]
       be subjected to the same action again.” Weinstein v. Bradford,
       423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975) (per curiam). “The remote possibility that
       an event might recur is not enough to overcome mootness, and
       even a likely recurrence is insuﬃcient if there would be ample op-
       portunity for review at that time.” Al Najjar v. Ashcroft,
       273 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
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       23-10910               Opinion of the Court                          7

              Culver’s case is now moot, and no exceptions apply. In his
       operative complaint, Culver alleged that he suﬀered harm through
       the conﬁscation of photos of his nephews. This alleged injury was
       remedied upon the BOP’s termination of the ﬁrst Policy and im-
       plementation of the new policy, which allowed him to regain pos-
       session of the conﬁscated photos. Consequently, there is no ongo-
       ing case or controversy for the District Court to adjudicate, and any
       decision about the ﬁrst policy would constitute an unconstitutional
       advisory opinion.
               Furthermore, the voluntary cessation exception to moot-
       ness is inapplicable. Culver has not rebutted the presumption that
       the BOP’s challenge will not recur, as he has failed to provide a rea-
       sonable basis for believing that the ﬁrst policy would be reinstated
       after the conclusion of the lawsuit. This is also not a case that is
       “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” With the implementa-
       tion of the new policy, Culver can now possess the photos that
       were previously conﬁscated, and there is no reasonable expectation
       the same controversy will recur. Any challenge to the new policy
       would be grounded in a distinct and separate controversy.
              Culver also asserts that the District Court erred by denying
       his request to amend his complaint. He argues that amendment is
       justiﬁed in light of the BOP’s “unforeseen actions,” presumably re-
       ferring to the removal of the ﬁrst policy. Our review of a District
       Court’s denial of a motion to amend a complaint is for abuse of
       discretion. Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1319 (11th Cir.
       1999).
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       8                          Opinion of the Court                       23-10910

               Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), if a re-
       sponsive pleading has been ﬁled, a party may amend its complaint
       only with leave of court or with written consent of the adverse
       party. Leave to amend should be liberally granted when necessary
       in the interest of justice, but futility is a valid basis for denying such
       a request. Burger King, 169 F.3d at 1319; Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The
       denial of leave to amend is deemed justiﬁed by futility when the
       amended complaint remains subject to dismissal. Burger King,
       169 F.3d at 1320.
              Here, we agree with the District Court’s decision to reject
       Culver’s request for leave to amend his complaint. According to
       42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to
       prison conditions under . . . Federal law, by a prisoner conﬁned in
       any jail, prison, or other correction facility until such administrative
       remedies as are available are exhausted.” As Culver did not fulﬁll
       this requirement, the denial of his attempt to introduce a claim re-
       lated to the new policy was appropriately characterized as futile. 1

       1 In the District Court, Culver contended that Marianna had made its admin-

       istrative procedures unavailable to him. Prisoners do not have to exhaust
       grievance procedures that are not capable of use. Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632,
       642 (2016). Moreover, while this Court reads briefs filed by pro se litigants
       liberally, any issues not briefed on appeal are abandoned. See Timson v.
       Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). An issue is not con-
       sidered briefed on appeal when it is not specifically and clearly identified by a
       party in its opening brief. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324,
       1330 (11th Cir. 2004). Even with a generous and liberal interpretation of Cul-
       ver’s opening brief, he has not asserted the argument that administrative
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       23-10910                 Opinion of the Court                             9

              Finally, Culver argues that the District Court should have
       granted him summary judgment, despite the termination of the
       ﬁrst policy, because the new policy still imposed a “blanket ban” on
       photographs and lacked a connection to any penological interest.
       He has also moved to expand the record. In light of our determi-
       nation that Culver’s case is moot, we aﬃrm the denial of his mo-
       tion for summary judgment and deny his motion to expand the rec-
       ord.
              AFFIRMED.

       procedures were unavailable to him, and therefore he has abandoned that par-
       ticular argument.