Court Opinion

ID: 9715749
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:13:30.433268+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:37.819230
License: Public Domain

FLAHERTY, Justice,
dissenting.
Appellant’s sole contention is that the jury’s second written message to the court was susceptible to an interpretation that the jury unanimously possessed reasonable doubt as to appellant’s guilt, and that it was error to have granted a mistrial without first clarifying the jury’s intended meaning. Specifically, the jury’s statement that “it is the unanimous opinion and decision of this jury that the information as presented by both defense counsel and the Assistant District Attorney is insufficient” entitled appellant to the requested instruction that a verdict of not guilty should be entered if the jury unanimously agreed that the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.1
I believe that the trial court properly denied the requested instruction, but that the declaration of a mistrial was not warranted. Although appellant merely argues that the pronouncement of the jury, expressed in the second written message to the court, is susceptible to the interpretation that the jurors unanimously regarded appellant as not guilty, it is clear that the message can be interpreted in no other way than to indicate that appellant was found not guilty. The jury’s statement that “it is the unanimous opinion and *510decision of this jury that the information as presented by ... the Assistant District Attorney is insufficient” (emphasis added) is susceptible only to the interpretation that the jury unanimously decided that the prosecution did not satisfy its burden of proof. Although the jury did not expressly label its “decision” a “verdict,” it did, nevertheless, decide the question that it had been called upon to decide: whether the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Had the jury merely announced, without elaboration, that it had been unable to reach a verdict, declaration of a mistrial would have been in order. In the present case, however, the jury went much further than to decline to announce what it regarded as an express “verdict”. Rather, by setting forth a decision upon the fundamental issue in the criminal trial, i.e., sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence, the jury, in effect, found appellant not guilty. The fact that the jury also regarded the evidence presented by defense counsel as insufficient is of no significance, since the defense in a criminal proceeding, having the benefit of the presumption of innocence, has no affirmative duty to present evidence of innocence.
After announcement of the jury’s decision that the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of proof, issuance by the court of a further instruction to the jury to secure an express “verdict” would have created a risk that the jury, given the opportunity to deliberate once again, might return a verdict of guilt. This, after the jury’s in effect having declared appellant not guilty, would in itself have exposed appellant to double jeopardy.
Irrespective of the reasons that may have resulted in the jury’s being at an impasse to reach what the jury regarded as a unanimous “verdict”, it did effectively determine the inadequacy of the Commonwealth’s evidence to prove guilt, a determination which was the exact equivalent of a verdict of not guilty. Thus, having once been found not guilty of the instant charges, appellant would suffer a violation of his *511Fifth Amendment rights were he again to be placed in jeopardy by once more being tried upon the same charges.
O’BRIEN, C. J., and ROBERTS, J., join this dissenting opinion.

. Prior to the jury’s initial commencement of deliberations, the court did instruct as to the meaning of reasonable doubt, the need for a unanimous verdict, and the burden of proof.