Court Opinion

ID: 9668398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:11:40.218452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:45.189559
License: Public Domain

MURPHY, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the denial of the writ of mandamus. It was improper for the trial court to issue an amended order and thereby grant a new trial based solely on the affidavits of jurors.
In their answer to question no. 2, the jury responded that the difference in the market value of the property before and after the taking of the easement was $136,-250.00. The court accepted this verdict and discharged the jury. However, on May 22, 1991, the Power Company filed a motion for new trial contending that the two questions submitted to the jury were “far too detailed for the ordinary jury to understand.” This motion was supported by the affidavits of five of the six jurors. The Power Company apparently distributed a “form” affidavit to each juror and, thus, the contents of each are nearly identical. The affidavits reveal that, after speaking with the Power Company’s attorney, each juror discovered that “the jury had misunderstood question no. 2”. Further, the affidavits reflect that “it was the unanimous belief of the jury that this question asked the market value of the remainder of the property after the easement was taken” and that “we did not believe that this question asked us to find what damage had been done to the remainder.”
Each affidavit also recites that it was executed “to reflect the unanimous finding of the jury in this case” and four of the five affidavits request the court “to correct this unanimous clerical error in recording the jury verdict.” Each juror states in his or her affidavit that he or she discussed this problem with all the other jurors and all agreed to ask Judge Thoma to grant the Power Company a new trial “in order that justice may be done.”
The next day, Judge Thoma granted the relators motion to enter judgment on the verdict. On July 19, 1991, Judge Thoma issued an order requiring the relators to remit $132,7.50.00 to the Power Company within ten days. In that order, the court stated its opinion “that the jury through a clerical mistake or error misinterpreted the language of jury question number two (2) resulting in a recording error in the verdict.” The court also stated its finding that the jury intended to find damage to the remainder in the amount of $3,500.00 and its conclusion that “the Court in equity cannot permit a judgment to be entered that is in excess of forty (40) times larger than what the jury intended.”
The relators failed to comply with the court’s July 19 order which specifically stated that “if a remittitur ... is not made within that ten day period then this Court will grant [the Power Company’s] motion for new trial.” On August 5, 1991, the court set aside the final judgment and granted the Power Company’s motion for a new trial “in the interest of justice.” On September 9, 1991, the court entered an amended order granting the motion for new trial. In that order, the court specifically declined to grant a new trial on the ground that question no. 2 was multifarious and confusing to the jury. Instead, the court set aside the final judgment based on the jurors’ affidavits and ordered a new trial on the sole ground that the jury misunderstood jury question no. 2.
I recognize that a writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and may issue only to correct a clear abuse of discretion *370or the violation of a duty imposed by law when there is no adequate remedy at law. Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex.1985). However, an order granting a new trial within the court’s period of plenary power is not subject to review by direct appeal. Cummins v. Paisan Const. Co., 682 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex.1984). Judge Thoma’s amended order granting a new trial superseded his previous order granting a new trial. As previously noted, that order was based solely on the affidavits of jurors and granted a new trial on the ground that jurors misinterpreted jury question no. 2.
Further, Tex.R.Civ.Evid. 606(b) and Tex. R.Civ.P. 327(b) prohibit a juror from testifying, by affidavit or otherwise, “as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing him to assent or dissent from the verdict [or indictment or] concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.” The affidavits in the instant case clearly inquired into the mental processes of jurors during their deliberations. See Cortez v. Medical Protective Co. of Fort Wayne, 560 S.W.2d 132, 137 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1977, no writ) (mental processes are indicated when jurors use such words as “I thought,” “I understood,” “I wanted,” “I felt,” “I was convinced,” “The impression I got,” or “I considered”). There was no allegation of outside influence in this case. As such, the affidavits were inadmissible and Judge Thoma abused his discretion in considering them.
Therefore, Judge Thoma abused his discretion in granting a new trial. Accordingly, I would sustain the relators’ points of error and conditionally grant the Writ.