Court Opinion

ID: 9487506
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:18:21.13038+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:18.703558
License: Public Domain

BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge, with
whom McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge, and JOHN R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge, join, dissenting.
We dissent. Counsels’ ineffective assistance deprived Foster of the right to testify on his own behalf and prejudiced the outcome of the sentencing proceeding. Thus, the death sentence is flawed.
I. INCOMPETENCE OF COUNSEL
The majority has elected not to discuss the performance component of the Strickland inquiry and instead solely addresses the issue of prejudice. We, however, discuss both components of the ineffectiveness claim and observe that the deficiencies of counsels’ actions throw light on the issue of prejudice, as well as establish that Foster received less than competent representation.
Strickland requires the petitioner to “identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In his habeas petition, Foster contends that his counsels’ failure to properly notify him of his fundamental right to testify during the penalty phase of his capital trial rendered counsels’ conduct constitutionally deficient. The Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge, adopted by the federal district court,1 rejected Foster’s sixth amendment claim for failure to prove prejudice. In addition, the opinion asserted that the record did not support Foster’s claims that he was misled by counsel or that he was ignorant of his right to testify. In this regard, the district court clearly erred as a matter of fact and erred as a matter of law based on the undisputed record.
We briefly, relate the record on this matter. During the Rule 27.26 (now Rule 29.15) post-conviction hearing in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Peter Dunne, Foster’s lead counsel at the penalty phase of his capital trial, in substance admitted not discussing with Foster whether or not Foster should take the stand during the penalty phase. On direct examination by Foster’s counsel, Dunne said, “As I recall it, the subject came up principally about testifying in the guilt phase of the trial. I cannot pressume [sic] discussing his testifying in the penalty phase of the trial.” Post-Conviction Relief Tr. [hereinafter PCR Tr.] Vol. I at 94.
*884During cross-examination by Foster’s attorney, Dunne clarified that general response:
Q Did you tell [Mr. Foster] he could testily in the penalty phase if he chose to do so?
A I don’t recall discussing the penalty of him testifying at the penalty phase.
Q Didn’t it occur to you that his testimony in the penalty phase would allow the jury to have more insight into the man Emmitt Foster was?
A I guess the answer to that is, no.
Q So you didn’t think that could be helpful in terms of it leading to some mitigating evidence?
A I don’t see how it could have been.
PCR Tr. Vol. I at 130.
Similarly, when Foster’s lead counsel during the guilt phase, Bill Aylward, was asked whether he had discussed with Emmitt Foster his ability to testify during the penalty phase, Mr. Aylward could not “recall specifically [whether] we did or not.” PCR Tr. Vol. II at 12. When questioned whether Foster had at any time asked Aylward to allow, him to testify, Aylward responded, “No.” Id. at 13.
During this same hearing Emmitt Foster himself testified on this crucial issue as follows:
Q Did they [Aylward and Dunne] explain to you that if the case were to go into the penalty phase that the jury would then be informed of your prior convictions?
A No, they didn’t.
Q What did they tell you about the penalty phase?
A Nothing in that respect.
Q Did they inform you of whether or not you had the right to testify at that time?
A No, they didn’t.
Q After the ease was submitted to the jury and it returned its verdict did you at any time ask them if you could testify in the penalty phase?
A No, I didn’t have no knowledge that I could testify. So, you know, it never even entered my mind to try to testify I didn’t believe I could.
PCR Tr. Vol. I at 41.
Thus, without dispute in the record, Foster’s lawyers failed to appreciate the importance of having Foster testify during the penalty phase of his capital trial, to advise Foster of his constitutional right to testify in the penalty phase and to recognize the probable benefits deriving from such testimony. The federal district court’s conclusion in this case, that there existed no indication that Foster was misled or ignorant of his right to testify, lacks any support in the record.2
The law recognizes the right of a criminal defendant to testify on his or her own behalf as fundamental and personal, with the privilege of waiver or invocation belonging solely to the defendant. Elr-Tabech v. Hopkins, 997 F.2d 386, 388 (8th Cir.1993); United States v. Bemloehr, 833 F.2d 749, 751 (8th Cir.1987). A defendant’s attorney, however, carries primary responsibility for notifying the defendant of that right. United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1533 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 127, 121 L.Ed.2d 82 (1992). The very “purpose of the constitutional guaranty of a right to counsel is to protect an accused from conviction resulting from his own ignorance of his legal and constitutional rights.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). Foster did not waive his right to testify at the penalty phase, but his attorneys ignored that right and rendered Foster grossly ineffective assistance in that regard. Teague, 953 F.2d at 1534; cf. Bernloehr, 833 F.2d at 752 n. 2 (noting that “cases in which courts have found a denial of a defendant’s right to testify almost invariably involve ineffective assistance of counsel or impermissible actions by the trial judge”).
*885II. PREJUDICE
Counsels’ failure to advise Foster of his right to testify during the penalty phase of his capital trial prevented the jury from considering vital mitigating evidence and thus prejudiced the proceeding.
To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsels’] unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. Beyond considerations of outcome, however, the Strickland inquiry asks whether the “result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, — U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 838, 842, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993).
The majority contends that Foster’s failure in the prior Missouri court proceedings to specify the content of his testimony constitutes a failure to establish prejudice and bars any relief. See Foster, maj. at 877. But that conclusion omits what is obvious in this case on the record before us. In our view, when counsel’s conduct denies the defendant an opportunity to testify on his own behalf and that testimony might make the difference between life and death in the sentencing phase of the trial, a court must examine the whole record for a determination of prejudice or not.3
In this ease, five defense witnesses testified during the penalty phase of the capital trial on Foster’s behalf, four as character witnesses and one as an expert on the deterrent effect of capital punishment.
As the record reflects, three of the four character witnesses spoke about Foster’s very active involvement in the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church to which he belonged. Albert A. Walton, Jr., a friend from church, suggested that Foster involved himself in the church “to reform himself and to live a better life.” Trial Tr. Vol. Ill at 922. Another witness, Reverend Lawrence Davison, testified that Foster participated in various church projects, including the showing of films to children on Saturday afternoons. Id. at 909. A third witness, James Leonard “Mateus” Trimble, characterized Foster as a very close friend and a dedicated member of the church who frequently woke Trimble up on Sunday mornings to ensure that he went to services. Id. at 931-32.
The testimony elicited from these witnesses also sought to portray Foster as a responsible man whom people could count on and could trust with their children, their friends and their fellow parishioners. For instance, Reverend Davison testified that Foster had “keys to [his] church, to the door and to [his] upstairs apartment.” Id. at 907. Mr. Trimble chronicled how Foster would always help Trimble move his junk collection in or out of the house. Id. at 934. And Mr. Walton stated that he “trusted [Emmitt Foster] at [his] home with [his] wife and children and friends.” Id. at 922. The fourth witness, Foster’s mother, attempted to present testimony on Foster’s difficult upbringing, but the trial judge prevented the jury from hearing much about Foster’s background by sustaining objections to several aspects of her testimony. Id. at 903-05.
As to the other side of the coin, how did the prosecutor portray Foster as a person deserving to die? The prosecutor dehumanized Foster as, in effect, a non-person, sometimes referring to him as “that,” with comments such as these:
A friend, a friend for a few bucks, some pieces of jewelry. That’s the manner of man they will have us believe we shouldn’t do this. Let him go among the prison population, a prison population where every day other people are locked up for lesser crimes. Guards have to come to work unarmed. You have no right to do that with this man. I submit to you that *886that’s what we mean by deterring him. They, too, the people who have to go to the penitentiary for other crimes which they have committed, have lesser but certain rights, and they have a right not to be exposed to that. And the guards, while they do an unbelieveably courageous job, have a right to some protection. They have a right to that (indicating) not being there, and that’s what we call deterring him.
... They [referring to the victim’s family] had the right to have their son and grandson and brother for the rest of his natural life, until somebody superior to us deemed it time for him to die and not that (indicating).
... It is right that he should be executed. There has been some religious discussion here. The Christians have the Golden Rule. ‘Do unto others what you would have them do unto you.’ Muslims reverse this process, and the Koran says, ‘Do not do unto others what you would have him do unto you.’ And Confucius says, ‘Man should do that which is right, not for hope of reward or for fear of punishment. Man should do what is right, because that is what it means to be a man.’ That is what is the essence of man, and that (indicating) is no man.
Trial Tr. Vol. Ill at 975-77 (emphasis added).
Does this court need a blueprint of knowing Foster’s precise words which had never been spoken to address the issue of prejudice? On this record, the answer is “no.”
The record, however, clearly denotes what Foster needed to do. He stood convicted of capital murder and faced a probable death sentence unless he could show that he deserved to live. His witnesses had spoken to elements of his good character. But without Foster’s corroboration, that testimony gained no support from any affirmation by the person of whom the witnesses had spoken. Without such support of Foster’s character, the other witnesses’ testimony lacked a point of reference, lacked substance and lacked credibility. Regardless of his actual words, just taking the stand after his witnesses had testified would demonstrate Foster as a human and not a “that.”
We need go one step further. Is there prejudice shown? In this case, prejudice is apparent from the record. The prosecutor referred to defendant as a “that.” Foster’s mother was restricted in testifying on her son’s behalf. Further, the evidence shows an equal probability that Foster may not have shot Walker, but that his colleague in the crime, Michael Phillips, may have killed Walker.4 But the uncertainty of who shot Walker could carry no weight in the sentencing without Foster taking the witness stand.
We also know, although the jury did not, that this crime, albeit heinous, had not previously called for the death penalty, as Phillips had received life imprisonment. At least on the record in this case, no distinction exists between the conduct of Phillips and that of Foster. All of these circumstances lead to a logical conclusion of prejudice to Foster flowing from counsels’ deficiency.
Finally, the prejudice from Foster not taking the stand comes across with striking effect in the argument of Foster’s lawyer at the penalty phase:
MR DUNNE: .... As I stand here before you in this court, I must confess to you that I am afraid. I am afraid for myself. I am afraid for Emmitt, that I don’t have the ability to speak for him. That I won’t be able to find the words that must be said now. And most of all, I am afraid that even if I did, you would not be swayed.
Trial Tr. Vol. Ill at 979.
What irony! The lawyer’s ineffective argument was brought about by the lawyer’s own ineffectiveness.
The Supreme Court has made clear the importance of a criminal defendant’s right to testify, stating:
None of these modern innovations [in criminal procedure] lessens the need for *887the defendant, personally, to have the opportunity to present to the court his plea in mitigation. The most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself [before the imposition of a sentence].
Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304, 81 S.Ct. 653, 655, 5 L.Ed.2d 670 (1961). The Court has also observed “the most important witness for the defense in many criminal eases is the defendant himself.” Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 2709, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987).
Foster’s failure to take the stand because of counsels’ incompetence virtually guaranteed the death sentence under the circumstances. Absent counsels’ incompetent waiver of Foster’s right to testify, there exists a reasonable probability the jury would not have recommended the death penalty. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 539, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 2669, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The record in this case unquestionably demonstrates that petitioner’s constitutional claim is meritorious, and that there is a significant risk that he will be put to death because his constitutional rights were violated.” (emphasis in original)).
No claim is made in this proceeding, nor could it cogently be made, that trial strategy entered into the failure of counsel to advise defendant of his right to testify at the penalty phase. Cf. United States v. Norwood, 798 F.2d 1094 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1011, 107 S.Ct. 656, 93 L.Ed.2d 711 (1986).
The majority today seizes upon the fact that there was no showing as to what Foster’s testimony would have been. The critical point, however, is that Foster makes no argument that he had substantive factual testimony to give. What renders the result in this case fundamentally unfair or unreliable is that had Foster testified, his appearance and demeanor, coupled with the mitigating testimony offered on his behalf, could well have caused jurors who entertained genuine doubts and who were troubled by an absence of absolute certainty5 to vote against imposing the death penalty. It was Foster’s only chance to escape the death penalty, but he was deprived of it to his prejudice by inadequate counsel.
III. CONCLUSION
The failure of counsel to recognize the importance of Foster’s testimony, and to advise him of his right to testify during the sentencing phase of the trial so that Foster could and would testify, skewed the adversarial balance in the State’s favor, rendering the sentence of death unreliable and unfair. Cf. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 104 S.Ct. at 2069.
Accordingly, we would reverse the district court’s order denying Foster’s petition for habeas relief and direct the district court to issue a writ of habeas corpus vacating Foster’s death sentence. We would leave to the State of Missouri the choice of having Foster resentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or seeking a new hearing on the penalty phase of this capital murder case.

. The opinion in the district court relied substantially on the Missouri State Court of Appeals decision affirming the state circuit court's denial of Foster’s post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Foster v. State, 748 S.W.2d 903 (Mo.Ct.App.1988).

. As we have previously observed in the vacated panel opinion, counsels' rationale for advising Foster not to testify at the guilt phase as not beneficial to Foster disappeared at the penalty phase. The adoption of that rationale by the state and federal courts as to the penalty phase was faulty and clearly erroneous. Foster v. Delo, II F.3d 1451, 1456 (8th Cir.1993); id. at 1459-60 (Gibson, J., concurring).

. Cf. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 705, 104 S.Ct. at 2074.
[A] failure to consider relevant aspects of a defendant’s character and background creates such an unacceptable risk that the death penalty was unconstitutionally imposed that, even in cases where the matter was not raised below, the “interests of justice” may impose on reviewing courts "a duty to remand [the] case for resentencing.”
Id. (emphasis added) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117, n. *, 119, 102 S.Ct. 869, 878, n. * 879, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).

. As ballistics disclosed, a separate gun provided the fatal gunshot wounds to Walker than the gun used to shoot and grievously wound Keys. See Foster, 11 F.3d at 1453. A 50% probability exists that Phillips shot Walker with his gun.

. Such absence of certainty has been referred to as whimsical doubt. See Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 247-48 (8th Cir.1985) (en banc) (Gibson, J., dissenting), rev'A sub nom., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986); Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 579-82 (5th Cir.1981), modified on other grounds, 671 F.2d 858 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882, 103 S.Ct. 181, 74 L.Ed.2d 148 (1982); see also Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 181, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 1769, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986); Smith v. Wainright, 741 F.2d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1087, 1088, 105 S.Ct. 1853, 1855, 85 L.Ed.2d 150, 151 (1985).