Court Opinion

ID: 9602601
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:57:27.463431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:08:28.556759
License: Public Domain

Hunstein, Justice,
dissenting.
Because the majority opinion denies the right to a jury trial guaranteed by Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XI (a) of the Constitution of Georgia of *2791983,1 must respectfully dissent. The majority concludes the General Assembly was authorized to provide for trial without a jury in OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (5) because drug forfeiture proceedings did not exist prior to the adoption of the first Georgia Constitution. Believing that the right to a jury trial includes statutory proceedings of a similar nature that have arisen since the adoption of our Constitution, I would reverse the trial court.
As the majority notes, it is well established that in civil actions at law, “the right to trial by jury exists only where the right existed prior to the adoption of the first Georgia Constitution [in 1798], [Cits.] The 1983 Georgia Constitution and OCGA § 9-11-38 assure that this right shall remain inviolate.” Hill v. Levenson, 259 Ga. 395 (1) (383 SE2d 110) (1989). In short, jury trials are available in proceedings that have a common law basis. This is in contradistinction to equity cases where the “ ‘right of a trial by jury is not constitutional, but statutory; and a legislative restriction thereof . . . would be constitutional. (Cits.)’ ” Williams v. Overstreet, 230 Ga. 112, 115 (III) (195 SE2d 906) (1973). Although no Georgia appellate decisions predate the 1798 Constitution, an exhaustive review of English and American practice prior to 1791 was undertaken by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F2d 453 (7th Cir. 1980). The inescapable conclusion it reached was that jury trials of in rem actions were recognized “at common law as the established mode of determining the propriety of statutory forfeitures on land for breach of statutory prohibitions.” Id. at 466. Thus, contrary to the majority result, we should not examine whether the specific remedy existed at common law, but whether the nature of the action existed at that time.
Although no Georgia authorities have addressed whether a party has a constitutional right to a jury trial in a civil condemnation proceeding in rem, it has been held in a majority of other jurisdictions which have addressed this issue that a right to trial by jury exists in similar forfeiture proceedings. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. One (1) 1984 Z-28 Camaro Coupe, 610 A2d 36 (Pa. 1992); Medlock v. 1985 Ford F-150 Pick Up, 417 SE2d 85 (SC 1992); Abrams v. One 1987 Chevrolet Corvette, 555 NYS2d 503 (1990); In re Forfeiture of 1978 Chevrolet Van, 493 S2d 433 (Fla. 1986); Commonwealth v. One 1972 Chevrolet Van, 431 NE2d 209 (Mass. 1982); Matter of Vergari v. Marcus, 257 NE2d 652 (NY 1970). But cf. In re Forfeiture of $1,159,420, 486 NW2d 326, 337 (XII) (Mich. App. 1992) (forfeiture action is equitable in nature, thus no right to jury trial exists); State v. Morris, 405 SE2d 351 (N.C. App. 1991).
Contrary to the majority’s contention, this is not a question of the breadth of the State Constitution. Rather it is a question of the parallel drawn between statutory proceedings known at common law *280and proceedings as they exist today. Although the drug of choice may vary with the times, no common sense distinction exists between the underlying nature of forfeitures before 1798 and the proceedings under OCGA § 16-13-49. This conclusion is consistent with legislative treatment of other forfeiture proceedings in Georgia pursuant to which trial by jury was and is required. See OCGA § 16-12-32 (f) (gambling devices) in which proceedings in the superior court “shall proceed as other civil cases in said court”; former Ga. Code Ann. § 58-207 (alcoholic beverages) which provided prior to its repeal (Ga. L. 1980, pp. 1573, 1652) that where a defense to the forfeiture of a vehicle used to convey alcohol was raised in a county, city or superior court “the case shall proceed as other civil cases in said court”; see also Grant v. State, 74 Ga. App. 493 (40 SE2d 406) (1946) (jury trial had in vehicle condemnation proceeding).
Decided June 14, 1993
Reconsideration denied July 15, 1993.
Virgil L. Brown & Associates, Virgil L. Brown, Patricia A. But-taro, for appellant.
Robert E. Keller, District Attorney, Tracy G. Gladden, Assistant District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Gary D. Bergman, for appellee.
I would therefore conclude that OCGA § 16-13-49 (o) (5), which provides for a trial without a jury, violates the right to jury trial. I recognize that this approach would add to the caseload of our state court system. However, I must agree with United States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, supra at 468, that “in any event, mere inconvenience would be insufficient reason for denying a traditional and substantial constitutional right. [Cits.]”
I am authorized to state that Justice Benham and Justice Sears-Collins join in this dissent.