Court Opinion

ID: 9710877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:19:29.158684+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:00.711481
License: Public Domain

Danhof, C. J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. The facts of this case are complex. The parties engaged in multifarious—and sometimes admittedly devious—business dealings over the course of about a year and a half, and it would serve little purpose to recount the details of these dealings and the various litigations they have spawned. Suffice it to say that this is one of them, and that after hearing nine days of testimony by numerous witnesses and viewing the sixty-odd exhibits introduced below, the trial judge concluded that "Mr. Mazur [plaintiff] has told too many different versions in the past and is unworthy of belief on the material issues involved in this case, and hence, this Court concludes that Mr. Mazur was never an owner of any of the Car Parts. Companies, and further, whatever degree of involvement had existed, he relinquished when he obtained and was paid the sums of $5,540.07 and $2,500.00 by the Car Parts companies”. The trial judge thought that "[t]he determining factor in deciding the issue of whether Marvin Mazur was a stockholder or had any proprietory [sic] interests in any of the corporations listed as defendants, was the issue of credibility”. With that statement I cannot agree. I would say that the question is really whose testimony—Mazur’s or Blendea’s—is less incredible, since the testimony of each is fraught with inconsistencies and contradictions.
I cannot vote for reversal on the ground that the trial judge’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous, for the reason that the trial judge’s findings of fact are incomplete; without further elaboration of them, there are no specific findings that can be declared erroneous. I agree with the majority that the trial judge’s conclusion that plaintiffs testi*474mony was not credible cannot, standing alone, be said to be clearly erroneous. The important point is that there was very strong circumstantial, documentary, and testimonial evidence corroborating plaintiff’s claim of stock ownership to which the trial judge made no reference in his opinion. In the absence of any attempt by the trial judge to reconcile the mass of evidence tending to corroborate plaintiffs testimony, his conclusion that Mazur’s testimony is not to be believed is deficient under GCR 1963, 517.1.
Apparently my brothers are willing to assume that the trial judge’s conclusory statement that plaintiff’s testimony is not to be believed is an umbrella; I deem it a parachute. Such a conclusory finding should not be regarded as constituting "minimal compliance” with GCR 1963, 517.1. In Ray v Mason County Drain Commissioner, 393 Mich 294, 302; 224 NW2d 883 (1975), the Court said, "What is required under GCR 1963, 517 will vary somewhat with the type of case and nature of the fact questions involved, but at the very least GCR 1963, 517 demands that the court’s findings be sufficiently detailed to give an indication of the factual basis for the judge’s conclusion. ” Although the rule requires only "pertinent findings and conclusions upon the contested matters without over elaboration of detail or particularization of facts”, it does require the trial judge who presided over a nine-day trial to provide the reviewing Court with some indication of his judgment as to the credibility of. the principal exhibits, particularly when our review is de novo upon the entire record. How are we to perform our reviewing function when we are provided with no clear indication of the view taken by the trial judge of the bulk of the testimony and exhibits adduced below? In Braidwood v Harmon, 31 Mich App 49, 59; 187 NW2d 559 (1971), we said, "To properly *475perform our reviewing function we need to know the path the trial judge takes through the conflicting evidence.” See McClary v Wagoner, 16 Mich App 326, 328; 167 NW2d 800 (1969). In Johnson v Wynn, 38 Mich App 302, 304-305; 196 NW2d 313 (1972), Judge (now Justice) Levin observed that "[c]lear and complete findings by the trial judge are essential to enable us properly to exercise and not exceed our powers of review” and that "[w]e must know what a decision means before the duty becomes ours to say whether it is right or wrong”. See Nicpon v Nicpon, 9 Mich App 373, 378; 157 NW2d 464 (1968). Because of the sheer volume of the testimony and exhibits tending to corroborate plaintiff’s testimony this case cannot be said to turn solely upon Mazur’s credibility as a witness. This is in contrast to Johnson v Wynn, supra, in which there were only two principal witnesses and one document bearing a signature of disputed validity. Therefore the trial judge’s conclusory finding that plaintiff’s testimony was not credible should not be viewed as constituting minimal compliance with GCR 1963, 517.1. Cf. Commercial Construction Co v Elsman Enterprises, Inc, 22 Mich App 238, 240; 177 NW2d 447 (1970). The instant case is more readily classed as one in which "[t]here were contested issues of fact not resolved by the opinion”. Maynard v Dorner, 53 Mich App 568, 574; 220 NW2d 161 (1974). Here, as in Powell v Collias, 59 Mich App 709, 716; 229 NW2d 897 (1975): "The conclusions drawn by the trial judge * * * leave room for too many inferences. It is not readily apparent how the underlying disputed facts were finally resolved.”
I would remand with a direction that the trial judge enter a supplemental opinion outlining his view of the evidence in sufficient detail to permit us to exercise meaningfully our power of de novo review.