Court Opinion

ID: 9472819
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:11:51.552993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:10.094003
License: Public Domain

GARTH, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I agree that Jo Ann Zepp must be tried anew. I write separately, however, because I am not in accord with the majority’s analysis. Nor can I agree with those portions of the majority opinion which discuss James’ potential criminal liability or which imply his involvement as a criminal co-conspirator (Maj.Op. at 137, 138, 139).
I suggest that the majority’s emphasis on a conflict of interest analysis and on James’ potential criminal complicity is misplaced. The proper focus in analyzing Zepp’s sixth amendment claim should not be on James’ purported conflict of interest which necessarily implicates a speculative criminal complicity and which would require an evidentiary hearing. Rather, the correct focus should be on whether James’ representation of Zepp was adequate and sufficient to satisfy Zepp’s sixth amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel— an analysis, which on this record requires no evidentiary hearing.
I.
Sixth amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are generally divided into two categories, those involving conflict of interest and those involving deficiency in representation. Conflict of interest cases traditionally are concerned with an attorney who represents multiple defendants, where the defendants’ interests may be actually or potentially divergent. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). On the other hand, ineffective assistance of counsel claims generally involve deficiency in representation. These are classically situations in which the attorney is alleged to have been inadequate in the representation of his client. Strickland v. Washington, — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
Here, the majority contends that the “potential” criminal liability of James was responsible for creating a “conflict of interest” between James and Zepp. Underlying the majority’s analysis is its concern that while James was defending Zepp, he was also engaged in an attempt to exculpate himself from criminal liability. However, the record reveals no evidence to suggest that James was criminally liable nor does it disclose that James was concerned with his own vindication.1 I find no basis in the record supporting a conflict of interest between James and Zepp as the majority has characterized it. I do find that the stipulation into which James entered had the result of rendering his performance as counsel to Zepp seriously inadequate to the extent that it prejudiced the fairness of Zepp’s trial. See Uptain v. United States, 692 F.2d 8, 10 (5th Cir.1982). It is only because of this circumstance that I am persuaded that Zepp must be tried anew.
A.
In granting Zepp a new trial, the majority has relied on the fact that James’ interest conflicted with that of Zepp’s because he himself was implicated as a potential suspect or co-conspirator. There is no evidence in the record establishing either the fact of his implication or the conclusion of a conflict of interest. James at no time was ever subject to any criminal charges, investigations, or disciplinary actions as a result of his presence in the house with Zepp at *141the time that the alleged flushing took place. Indeed, the United States Attorney disclaimed any criminal complicity on the part of James (Appellee’s Brief at 39), just as Zepp, although claiming a conflict, denied that James was guilty of any wrongdoing.2
What the record does disclose is that when the police first arrived at Zepp’s house to arrest Williams, and while they were still outside the house, they heard toilets being repeatedly flushed. (App. at 163a, 191a, 206). James was not present at the Zepp house during this period. Only after Williams had been arrested and removed from the house did James first appear. It was at that time that James entered the Zepp house to meet with his client Jo Ann Zepp. Once again it was alleged that the toilets were flushed, and it was this latter flushing that gave rise to the government’s effort to call James as a government witness. That effort eventually resulted in a stipulation being read to the jury that “if Attorney John F. James were called as a witness ... he would testify that during the period of time that he was in [the Zepp house], he [James] did not flush any toilets.” (App. at 202).
The significance of the toilet flushings results from the fact that the police found glassine envelopes containing controlled substances in the septic tank. Yet the record is barren of any evidence as to which or either of these toilet flushings resulted in the deposit of the envelopes in the septic tank. Indeed, the envelopes in the tank could just as easily have been flushed down the toilet at the time of the initial flushing — a flushing that took place before James even appeared in the vicinity of the Zepp house.
Despite this circumstance, the majority opinion completely ignores the initial flushing and makes the unsupportable assertion that “trial counsel had equal access and opportunity while alone in the house with Zepp to flush cocaine down the toilet. It is clear that he was potentially liable for aiding and abetting or encouraging the destruction of evidence.” (Maj.Op. at 136). This faulty premise then leads the majority to conclude that “it is unrealistic for this court to assume that Zepp’s attorney vigorously pursued his client’s best interest entirely free from the influence of his concern to avoid his own incrimination.” (Maj.Op. at 136.)
My disagreement with the majority’s analysis stems from the fact that without the slightest evidence that it was James who either flushed controlled substances down the toilet or aided in such activities, the majority makes the unwarranted and speculative assumption that he did so. It must be remembered that the district court never conducted an evidentiary hearing as to what took place during the time in which James and Zepp were in the Zepp house, and that accordingly, we are dealing here with the trial record itself, rather than an evidentiary record directed to issues of either conflict of interest or inadequate representation.3
The record itself sheds little light on what transpired while James and Zepp were in the house. What minimal illumination exists, must be drawn from fragments of the pre-trial proceedings as they relate to the officers’ testimony of “toilet flush-ings,” and the septic tank search.
On January 26, 1983, approximately three weeks prior to the trial, a suppression hearing was held at which the government made known its intention to call James as a witness. At that time, the government indicated that it desired to ask James about his use of the bathroom in the Zepp house on the day that Zepp was arrested (December 18, 1982). James objected because he felt that if he were forced to testify it *142might bar him from “participating when the case is held.” (App. at 112). Indeed, he sought an express ruling that he would not be barred from representing Zepp if he testified. The government then suggested that it would be satisfied with a stipulation. Again, James asked whether the stipulation would “be without prejudice to [his] appearing as counsel.” (App. at 113). The following colloquy then took place:
ATTORNEY JAMES: Well, I would like to say that Mr. Capdeville asked if I would stipulate whether I had used the toilet in that house, and the answer is never.
THE COURT: You will not stipulate?
ATTORNEY JAMES: I will stipulate that I never used the toilet in that house.
* * * * * *
ATTORNEY JAMES: I did not use any of the bathrooms then or ever.
THE COURT: All right; the stipulation: At no time when he was in the house were any of the bathrooms used by him.
ATTORNEY JAMES: I would like to make a further stipulation that at no time I was in the house was the bathroom used.
Would you agree to that?
THE COURT: Now I think we better take a recess to see if you want to testify-
ATTORNEY JAMES: If he doesn’t want to stipulate, I’ll withdraw it.
To the first one, not the second one.
Okay; you won’t stipulate.
THE COURT: Let me now so there will be no misunderstanding on the record understand that Mr. James, that you stipulate that at no time while you were inside the residence at 38 Little Fountain [the Zepp house] was the bathroom used by you.
ATTORNEY JAMES: That is correct, sir; I so stipulate.
(App. 113-115).
For unknown reasons, the second stipulation that James sought to make, to wit: “that at no time I was in the house was the bathroom used”, was never pursued. Therefore, all that can be gleaned from the record respecting James’ alleged criminal complicity is that:
(1) Officers heard toilets flushing before James arrived at the Zepp house;
(2) James arrived at the Zepp house;
(3) Officers claimed to have heard toilets flush while James was in the Zepp house;
(4) James stipulated that he did not flush any toilets;
(5) James offered to stipulate that at no time while he was in the house was the bathroom used;
(6) Three days later a search of the septic tank produced 40 glassine envelopes, 20 of which tested positive for cocaine residue.
It is based on that meager record that the majority opinion discusses James’ conflict of interest in terms of his potential criminal liability and his own desire to avoid criminal complicity. Ignoring the earlier flushings that took place on December 18, 1982 before James arrived at the Zepp house, the majority opinion concludes that, from the evidence of glassine envelopes being found in the septic tank, the presence of James and Zepp in the house, the sounds of an alleged second flushing, and James’ stipulation that he had never flushed the toilet, the jury could have drawn the inference that there was a “50% probability” that James flushed the glas-sine envelopes down the toilet. (Maj.Op. typescript at 30). I suggest that the majority opinion has read the record unfairly in this respect.
The envelopes found in the septic tank could very well have been the result of Williams having disposed of them long before James had even arrived at the Zepp house. We, of course, cannot know what actually took place when James visited the Zepp house, and in the absence of a hearing to develop such a record, that information will remain unknown. What is known, however, is that there were two, not one, alleged sets of toilet flushings and that James admittedly was not present at the time of the first. I cannot be persuaded in *143such a circumstance that, given the equivo-cality of the evidence and record, we should conclude as the majority has, that James’ criminal complicity gave rise to a conflict of interest requiring a new trial for Zepp.
B.
If the record before us supported James’ criminal involvement, I would not fault the majority’s analysis and conclusion. The cases cited in the majority opinion confirm this position, although it is significant that in each of those cases there had been a finding made by the district court that the attorney involved should be disqualified because he was either the target of a grand jury investigation or was under indictment. See United States v. Salinas, 618 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 961, 101 S.Ct. 374, 66 L.Ed.2d 228 (1980); In re Investigation Before February, 1977, Lynchburg Grand Jury, 563 F.2d 652 (4th Cir.1977) (attorneys disqualified because targets of investigation concerning activities in which clients were involved); United States v. Clarkson, 567 F.2d 270 (4th Cir. 1977) (attorney disqualified because under indictment for criminal activities related to client).
I can only assume that in each of these cases where the trial judge was held not to have abused his discretion, there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the district court’s finding that the attorney should be disqualified. In each case the order of disqualification was the subject of an appeal based upon a record developed below. Here, of course, we have no such record. We have only the equivocal scraps of evidence to which I have referred above. No hearing has ever been held. No district court determination has ever been made. No charges have ever been brought.
United States v. Crockett, 506 F.2d 759 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824, 96 S.Ct. 37, 46 L.Ed.2d 40 (1975), a case similar to this one, involved an attorney who had been active in the club where it was alleged illegal gambling had been conducted. He represented one of the defendants who had been charged with conspiracy in the operation of an illegal gambling business. The attorney was subpoenaed to testify at the trial of the defendant. When asked about gambling, the attorney pled the fifth amendment claiming that any evidence given might incriminate him (the attorney). The court of appeals, in holding that the defendant was not prejudiced either by the attorney’s claim of privilege or by the attorney’s subsequent testimony to the effect that gambling had taken place at the club, focused on the fact that neither the attorney’s fear of self-incrimination nor the attorney’s testimony incriminated the defendant. The court went on to comment on the obvious impropriety of the attorney’s failure to withdraw from the case when he realized that he would be testifying as a prosecution witness, but did not analyze the issue in terms of conflict of interest.4
If it were not for the fact that James’ stipulation is facially prejudicial to Zepp’s interest, I would not have agreed with my colleagues to grant Zepp a new trial because I do not believe that James’ purported conflict of interest is substantiated by the record of this case. Indeed, before any conflict of interest analysis could even take place in the circumstances of this case, it is clear that an evidentiary hearing should have been held so as to establish that, at the time James was in the Zepp house, glassine envelopes had yet to be discarded. Yet the majority, overlooking the two sets of flushings that took place, rejects the need for an evidentiary hearing and seeks to support its conflict of interest conclusion on a record that is totally ambiguous in this respect. On the other hand, no such evi-dentiary hearing is required if the analysis proceeds along the lines which I suggest, that of deficient representation, because the record is clear and unequivocal as to *144the content of the stipulation into which James entered.
I do, however, find that by entering into the stipulation, James rendered an inadequate performance as Zepp’s attorney, and in doing so, prejudiced her trial. It is for that reason, as I indicated earlier, that I would reverse Zepp’s conviction. Thus, as I see it, the proper issue which this court should confront is not whether James’ actions constituted a conflict of interest, but whether James denied Zepp her right to effective assistance of counsel when his stipulation was entered into the record at her trial.
II.
In Uptain v. United States, 692 F.2d 8 (5th Cir.1982), the Fifth Circuit directly addressed the issue of an attorney giving evidence against his client. Uptain involved a bail jumping trial in which the government called the defendant's attorney, Kirby, to testify that he had given his client, Uptain, notice of the trial date. Kirby testified that he had sent two letters to his client informing him of the trial date. He also testified that he had discussed the trial setting with Uptain by telephone prior to trial and that his normal procedure would have been to inform his client of the trial date., During the trial, Kirby was cross examined by both Uptain and another attorney whom the court had appointed to represent Uptain during Kirby’s testimony. Kirby made the defense’s closing argument to the jury. Uptain was convicted.
The court analyzed the issue as one involving inadequate representation and concluded that Kirby’s testimony violated Up-tain’s sixth amendment guarantee of the right to counsel. Recognizing the inherent problem of an attorney testifying against his client, the court emphasized that Kirby “could not possibly have been an effective advocate when the aim of his primary argument to the jury should have been to diminish the weight, if not the credibility, of his own testimony.” Id. at 10. The court in Uptain explained that application of the sixth amendment guarantee of the right to counsel “involves an inquiry as to whether counsel's actual performance, considered in light of the totality of circumstances in the case, was seriously inadequate and whether counsel’s inadequacy prejudiced the fairness of his client’s trial.” Id.
It is apparent to me that our focus too must be on the question of whether James in this case inadequately represented Zepp when he entered into a stipulation which implicated her defense. If, as I suggest, our analysis must follow that employed in Uptain, then the dual test of Strickland v. Washington, — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) is implicated. In Strickland, the Supreme Court required that two predicate determinations must be made before a court can decide that a defendant has been denied effective assist- ' anee of counsel. First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient; and second, the defendant must demonstrate that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 104 S.Ct. at 2064.
Zepp clearly satisfies the deficiency prong of the Strickland analysis. In Strickland the Court explained that an attorney’s performance is deficient if it is unreasonable under “prevailing professional norms.” 104 S.Ct. at 2065. The prevailing rules of trial advocacy, as set forth in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, require an attorney to withdraw as counsel when it appears that his testimony might be prejudicial to his client. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-102 (B), see also United States v. Crockett, supra, at 760-61. James unquestionably had a duty to withdraw, and upon his failure to do so, his continued defense of Zepp cannot be regarded as other than deficient.
Strickland also holds that where the defendant alleges a deficiency in attorney performance, the defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 104 S.Ct. at 2068. In this case, not only was Zepp prejudiced *145by the fact that James testified against her by his stipulation, but the record indicates that James also denied Zepp the benefit of the exculpatory evidence contained in his proposed stipulation. While negotiating the language of the stipulation read to the jury, James also proposed to stipulate that at no time while he was in the house was the bathroom used.5 James, however, withdrew the second stipulation. The record does not disclose why the proposed stipulation was withdrawn. If the jury had not been convinced that the police had heard a second series of toilet flushings, and had James testified or stipulated that the bathroom had not been used while he was in the house, the jury’s verdict may well have been different.6 If, however, we consider the scenario at time of trial with the stipulation that was given by James, i.e., that it was only James who had not used the bathroom, the prejudice to Zepp is apparent.
In my opinion, James’ stipulation, inadvertent or otherwise, constitutes evidence from which the jury could have inferred that Zepp was guilty of possession of cocaine (Count III) and/or destruction of evidence (Count V). This is sufficient in my judgment to require that a new trial be ordered under the circumstances of this case where there was little other evidence to link Zepp to these charges. Here, as in Uptain, supra, I conclude that there was ineffective assistance of counsel, because James’ performance was “seriously inadequate” and the “inadequacy” prejudiced the fairness of Zepp’s trial. See Uptain, 692 F.2d at 10.
III.
I have gone to some length, however, to question the majority’s conflict-of-interest analysis because I do not believe that on a record such as this one, it is appropriate to accuse attorney James of incriminating his own client to save himself from charges of criminal complicity. The professional and personal consequences of such labeling can be dire, and as I have pointed out, I think the present record cannot support any such conclusion.
Indeed my reading of the testimony of the suppression hearing where James’ stipulation first evolved, indicates to me that it was more a thoughtless than a calculated stipulation to which James had agreed. A fair reading of that testimony indicates to me that James’ sole endeavor at that time was not to curry the government’s favor or seek to prevent the government from looking- to him as a co-conspirator or as a potential criminal defendant, but was rather to remain as Zepp’s counsel in the case. Regardless of James’ intention, however, the effect was, in my opinion, so prejudicial to Zepp’s case that her conviction must be set aside. Yet, in granting her a new trial, I do not think we should strain to find a conflict of interest where none appears.
This is particularly so when there is a ready analysis to test the kind of problem that has been presented to us. I refer, of course, to the concept of inadequate or deficient assistance of counsel. To me, *146James’ action should be judged not according to whether he had some hypothetical or speculative motive to avoid criminal liability, but whether his performance was deficient or inadequate, and if so, whether prejudice resulted to his client. That is, whether it is reasonably probable that absent James’ actions — actions about which no speculation is needed7 because they are clearly reflected in the record — a different outcome of Zepp’s trial would have resulted. I am satisfied that it would have.
It is for that reason, and that reason alone, and because the record supports such an analysis, that I would reverse Zepp’s conviction.

. As I read the record, the concern that was expressed by James did not involve any potential criminal liability or any attempt on his part to escape it. His only concern was that he not be required to step aside as Zepp’s attorney. "If I am forced to go to the stand, I want it with the explicit situation [sic] that I will not be barred from participating when the case is held . . . .” (App. at 112).
Whatever may be said of James’ insensitivity to this circumstance of appearing as counsel while in effect testifying against his client, it is a far cry from suggesting that James himself was criminally liable or possibly implicated as a co-conspirator with Zepp or other associates.

. Zepp’s brief concedes that "there is no evidence of wrongdoing by James . . . .” (Appellant’s brief at 31).

. Normal procedure in both classes of cases is to order an evidentiary hearing so that the facts with respect to inadequate representation or conflict of interest may be developed. See United States v. Swinehart, 617 F.2d 336 (3d Cir. 1980); United States v. Rad-O-Lite of Philadelphia, Inc., 612 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1979).

. Indeed, a later Fifth Circuit case in commenting on Crockett, analyzed the relevant sixth amendment issue in terms of adequacy of representation; see Uptain v. United States, 692 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1982) discussed in text following.

. THE COURT: All right; the stipulation: At no time when he was in the house were any of the bathrooms used by him.
ATTORNEY JAMES: I would like to make a further stipulation that at no time I was in the house was the bathroom used.
Would you agree to that?
THE COURT: Now I think we better take a recess to see if you want to testify.
ATTORNEY JAMES: If he doesn’t want to stipulate, I'll withdraw it.
To the first one, not the second one.
Okay; you won’t stipulate.
THE COURT: Let me now so there will be no misunderstanding on the record understand that Mr. James, that you stipulate that at no time while you were inside the residence at 38 Little Fountain was the bathroom used by you.
ATTORNEY JAMES: That is correct, sir; I so stipulate.
(App. at 114-115) (emphasis added).

. I do not suggest that James should have been both a witness and trial counsel even where his testimony may have been exculpatory. I point out only that if the true fact was that neither James nor Zepp flushed the toilet while only the two of them were in the house, and James’ testimony could establish that fact, that testimony should not have been denied to Zepp in favor of her continued representation by James.

. We need not speculate about James’ performance on the part of Zepp because the stipulation into which James entered is not challenged and appears in full in the suppression hearing to which both the majority opinion and I have referred.