Court Opinion

ID: 9569460
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:13:56.203565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:58:54.344582
License: Public Domain

Thompson, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent as to Division 2 of the majority opinion.
An oral settlement agreement announced in open court must meet all of the requirements of a contract: offer, acceptance, consideration and a meeting of the minds. Blum v. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., 709 F2d 1463 (11th Cir. 1983) (applying Georgia law). Thus, the parties have to agree on essential terms. Bridges v. Bridges, 256 Ga.1 348, 349 (1) (349 SE2d 172) (1986). In my view, the agreement reached by the parties on July 23 met all of the requirements of a contract. It is true that, while the agreement was being put on the record, the parties debated the best way for them to take possession of their personal effects; however, even if it could be said that that dispute centered around an essential term of the contract, the parties settled that dispute before the hearing ended. Thus, the trial court correctly concluded that the parties reached a settlement agreement on July 23, and it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in incorporating that agreement into a final judgment and decree of divorce.
As to Division 1,1 believe that any questions concerning Steele’s *319right to enforce the settlement agreement are premature. Although the trial court ruled that the parties reached a settlement agreement on July 23, it did not grant Steele’s motion to intervene and it did not determine whether Steele could enforce the agreement insofar as it pertained to the payment of his attorney fees. Thus, the trial court simply held the parties to their bargain. It decided no other issues, and neither should this Court.
Decided July 6, 1999.
Christine M. Stadler, for appellant.
Moore, Ingram, Johnson & Steele, Stephen C. Steele, Dean C. Bucci, for appellee.
Davis, Matthews & Quigley, Frank A. DeVincent, amicus curiae.