Court Opinion

ID: 9446967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:22:43.039014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:51.496386
License: Public Domain

CAMERON, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and in part dissenting).
I concur in that portion of the opinion which reverses and remands for trial the third party complaint. But I am unable to go along with my Brethren in affirming the action of the court below in rendering summary judgment in favor of the Government and against appellant. According to the uncontradicted facts set forth in appellant’s answer, its treatment by representatives of the Commodity Credit Corporation was essentially unfair and the judgment against it was not warranted and works a manifest injustice upon it.1
It appears undisputedly from appellant’s answer that it was not furnished with any copy of announcement LD-6 or any amendment thereto and never had access thereto until long after it had resold the dry milk. Moreover, the answer shows without dispute that a duly authorized representative of Commodity called its president on the telephone and advised him that, by recent amendment to its regulations, the resale forming the basis of the judgment against appellant was permitted. I know of no valid reason why appellant could not act upon information given it by the authorized representative of Commodity.2 The nation’s largest merchant must abide the laws of the market place where it chooses to deal and cannot cloak itself in the privileges and immunities of sovereignty which belong to it only when it is engaged in the function of governing.
In my opinion, moreover, “conclusive presumptions,” especially when based only upon informal “announcements” by federal functionaries “deemings”3 and “absolute discretion”4 have no place in the democratic process. Such concomi*86tants of autocracy tend to creep in only as that process edges towards socialism.
The judiciary has not found it difficult to discover or devise means by which to deal with unstinted generosity with communists,5 murderers,6 rapists,7 and dope peddlers.8 The solicitude and the resulting ingenuity thus exhibited should, I think, be shared with the small businesses of this country struggling to survive against heavy bureaucratic odds. From that portion of the opinion I respectfully dissent.

. The so-called summary judgment was based entirely upon the Government’s complaint and exhibits which, to the extent they were controverted by defendant’s answer, could not be accepted as the basis for summary judgment. The contracts sued on mentioned “announcement LD-6,” but did not mention any amendments. The complaint does not allege any authority for said announcement, that appellant had any notice thereof, or that it was published in the Federal Register, or was otherwise rendered binding on these parties. Appellant’s answer set up that said announcement was without legal authority and not binding upon it. The amendment upon which the Government places great reliance was dated August 31, 1954, more than a month after the two contracts of purchase had been made. It shows on its face that it was merely a teletype message and that it was sent to only six of Commodity’s branch offices. Appellant’s answer demanded proof of the C. C. C. domestic sales price of the dry milk in question, and no proof was offered. Without such proof the court had no jurisdiction to render summary judgment. The same is true of the teletype announcement of August 31st whose validity and controlling efficacy are necessary to the summary judgment.

. Witness the language of this Court, used when the Government was trying to repudiate an action by one of its authorized officers: “Whether that decision was right or wrong, the accredited officer of the United States made it,” Eichelberger & Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 5 Cir., 1937, 88 F.2d 874, 875; and see 21 University of Chicago Law Review, p. 687, and the cases there discussed.

. Derivatively, to deem means to doom. Cf. Bowers v. United States, 5 Cir., 1955, 226 F.2d 424, and dissenting opinion pages 429 et seq.

. See last sentence of Note 1 of the majority opinion.

. Cf. Jencks v. United States, 1957, 353 U.S. 657, 77 S.Ct. 1007, 1 L.Ed.2d 1103.

. Cf. United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 5 Cir., 1959, 263 F.2d 71 (see same case Supreme Court of Mississippi, Goldsby v. State, 1955, 226 Miss. 1, 78 So.2d 762, certiorari denied 350 U.S. 925, 76 S.Ct. 216, 100 L.Ed. 809; 226 Miss. 19, 84 So.2d 528, certiorari denied 352 U.S. 944, 77 S.Ct. 266, 1 L.Ed.2d 239; 226 Miss. 30, 91 So.2d 750 ; 5 Cir., 249 F.2d 417; Miss., 102 So.2d 215).

. Cf. Mallory v. United States, 1957, 354 U.S. 449, 77 S.Ct. 1356, 1 L.Ed.2d 1479.

. Cf. Gilmore v. United States, 5 Cir., 1958, 256 F.2d 565.