Court Opinion

ID: 9373342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:04:19.021803+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:41.059115
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                          MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     CHRISTOPHER S. BARRY,                             DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                          DC-0752-14-0040-B-2

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,                       DATE: October 7, 2022
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Glenn H. Stephens, III, Esquire, Falls Church, Virginia, for the appellant.

           Daniel T. Raposa, Esquire, Deborah Charette, Esquire, Rachel Wiedhaus,
             and Virginia Fritchey, Washington, D.C., for the agency.

                                             BEFORE

                                 Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                   Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                    Tristan L. Leavitt, Member
                               Member Limon recused himself and
                       did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

                                         FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, wh ich
     dismissed his alleged involuntary resignation appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                          2

     Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only when: the initial decision
     contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an
     erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of
     the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either
     the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required
     procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the
     outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available
     that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record
     closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that
     the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting
     the petition for review.     Therefore, we DENY the petiti on for review and
     AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.113(b).

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2         The agency employed the appellant as the Director of its National Offshore
     Training and Learning Center (NOTLC) beginning in September 2011.
     Barry v. Department of the Interior, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-14-0040-I-1,
     Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1. 2     After receiving the final agency decision
     denying his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint, he timely filed an
     October 18, 2013 appeal in which he contended that the agency constructively

     2
       The Board previously remanded this appeal to the regional office for a jurisdictional
     hearing because we found that the appellant had made nonfrivolous allegations that, if
     proven, could establish jurisdiction over his involuntary resignation appeal. Barry v.
     Department of the Interior, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-14-0040-I-1, Remand Order
     (Sept. 5, 2014). The administrative judge dismissed the remanded appeal without
     prejudice to allow the agency to reassign the case to another attorney. Barry v.
     Department of the Interior, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-14-0040-B-1, Remand Initial
     Decision (Feb. 10, 2015). In accordance with the administrative judge ’s instructions,
     the appeal was then automatically refiled. Barry v. Department of the Interior, MSPB
     Docket No. DC-0752-14-0040-B-2, Remand File, Tabs 1, 3.
                                                                                           3

     discharged him, effective June 27, 2012, due to a hostile work environment and
     discrimination based on sex, sexual orientation, and EEO activity. IAF, Tabs 1,
     10. The administrative judge, in an initial decision, dismissed the appeal for lack
     of jurisdiction, and we remanded it to the regional office for a jurisdictional
     hearing because we found that the appellant had made n onfrivolous allegations
     that, if proven, could establish jurisdiction over his involuntary resignation.
     Barry v. Department of the Interior, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-14-0040-I-1,
     Remand Order (Sept. 5, 2014).
¶3         On remand, the administrative judge held a hearing and again dismissed the
     appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the appellant failed to establish that
     the agency coerced his resignation by subjecting him to a hostile work
     environment. Barry v. Department of the Interior, MSPB Docket No. DC-0752-
     14-0040-B-2, Remand File (B-2 RF), Tab 22, Remand Initial Decision (RID)
     at 22. The administrative judge found that the witnesses who testified in support
     of the appellant were credible but that the appellant, despite his “clear, direct, and
     straightforward manner,” was not credible because “key points of his testimony
     [were] either inherently improbable or contradicted by other record evidence.”
     RID at 20.
¶4         For example, the administrative judge found that the coworkers who the
     appellant identified    as    using slurs     involving his sexual orientation       in
     December 2011 provided credible and unrebutted testimony that they did not
     make the alleged slurs and that they were unaware of his sexual orientation until
     after he filed his June 2012 EEO complaint. RID at 7, 20. In finding that the
     appellant’s   allegations    in   this   regard   were   inherently   improbable,   t he
     administrative judge also cited the appellant’s consistent unwillingness to identify
     to his supervisors the coworkers whom he claimed he overheard making the slurs,
     as well as the credible testimony of several employees that they never heard
     anyone do so in their presence. RID at 7, 9-10, 12, 15, 18-20. Similarly, the
     administrative judge found the appellant’s contention that employees had
                                                                                               4

     maligned the NOTLC and were boycotting its programs was without support in
     the record and, in any event, did not constitute working conditions so intolerable
     that a reasonable person in the appellant’s situation would have felt compelled to
     resign. RID at 7, 9-10, 12, 15, 19-20, 23.
¶5          In his petition for review, the appellant contends that the agency’s
     representative intimidated his witnesses and that               agency witnesses lied
     concerning whether the agency would either drop its investigation or pursue
     criminal charges against him if he resigned or stepped down. Remand Petition for
     Review (RPFR) File, Tab 1 at 4, Tab 2. He challenges the agency’s investigation
     into his alleged misconduct and claims that the agency detailed him to work for
     the supervisor about whom he had complained. RPFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5. He
     argues that the administrative judge erroneously bifurcated the hearing and also
     improperly limited it to 1 day, preventing him from introducing testimony
     regarding his medical condition.           Id. at 5.      He further claims that the
     administrative judge improperly denied some of his witnesses and erroneously
     assessed the credibility of the testimony and the weight of the evidence before
     him.   Id. at 5-6.   The agency submits a detailed opposition to the appellant’s
     petition for review, including excerpts from the hearing transcript , and the
     appellant replies in opposition to the agency’s response. RPFR File, Tabs 8-10. 3

     3
       After the record on review closed, the appellant filed five motions for leave to file an
     additional pleading. RPFR File, Tabs 14, 17, 20, 27, 30. The Board’s regulations do
     not provide for pleadings other than a petition for review, a cross petition for review, a
     response to the petition for review or cross petition for review, and a reply to a resp onse
     to a petition for review. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a). For the Board to consider a party’s
     pleading, other than one of those set forth above, the party must describe the nature and
     need for the pleading. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a)(5). If a party wishes to submit a
     pleading after the record is closed, the party must show that the evidence is new, i.e.,
     that it was not readily available before the record closed, and material. 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.114(a)(5), (k). To the extent that the appellant’s motions request to file
     supplemental pleadings to challenge the veracity of testimony in this appeal, RPFR File,
     Tab 14 at 1-2, Tab 20 at 4-5, Tab 30 at 4, we observe that evidence offered merely to
     impeach a witness’s credibility, even if new, is not generally considered material
     evidence. Setevage v. Department of Defense, 77 M.S.P.R. 120, 124 (1997). To the
     extent that the appellant’s motions request to file supplemental arguments concerning
                                                                                             5

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶6         Although the Board has jurisdiction to review an employee’s removal under
     5 U.S.C. §§ 7701 and 7512, its jurisdiction does not extend to an employee’s
     resignation, which is presumed to be voluntary unless he establishes that the
     resignation was involuntary and, therefore, tantamount to a constructive removal.
     See Garcia v. Department of Homeland Security, 437 F.3d 1322, 1324 (Fed. Cir.
     2006) (en banc); see, e.g., Freeborn v. Department of Justice, 119 M.S.P.R. 290,
     ¶ 9 (2013).    The employee bears the burden of proving involuntariness by a
     preponderance of the evidence and must, as a threshold matter, assert
     nonfrivolous allegations that, if proven, would establish the Board ’s jurisdiction.
     See Garcia, 437 F.3d at 1344; see also 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A).
¶7         One means by which an appellant may overcome the presumption of
     voluntariness is by showing that the resignation was obtained by agency
     misinformation or deception. See, e.g., Freeborn, 119 M.S.P.R. 290, ¶ 9. When
     the employee alleges, as here, that the agency took actions that made working
     conditions so intolerable that the employee was driven to an involuntary
     resignation, the Board will find an action involuntary only if the employee
     demonstrates that the employer engaged in a course of action that made working
     conditions so difficult or unpleasant that a reason able person in that employee’s

     the Board’s interpretation of a case decided before the close of the record below, RPFR
     File, Tab 17, such arguments are not new. Cf. Clay v. Department of the Army, 123
     M.S.P.R. 245, ¶ 6 (2016) (stating that the Board generally will not consider an
     argument raised for the first time in a petition for review absent a showing that it is
     based on new and material evidence not previously available despite the party’s due
     diligence).    Concerning the appellant’s motion to supplement his petition with
     allegations of a hostile work environment, although the appellant’s motion to
     supplement his petition for review describes “continued harassment” by the responsible
     agency official and “continued bullying and threatening activity” by the agency’s
     Office of the Solicitor, because this is an involuntary resignation appeal, to be relevant
     any such activity must have occurred before the resignation that is the subject of the
     appeal, which occurred not only before the close of the record but before the filing of
     the appeal. RPFR File, Tab 27 at 4-5. We accordingly DENY the appellant’s motions
     for failure to satisfy the criteria for additional filings on review beyond those provided
     for in the Board’s regulations. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a)(5), (k).
                                                                                         6

     position would have felt compelled to resign. See, e.g., Vitale v. Department of
     Veterans Affairs, 107 M.S.P.R. 501, ¶ 20 (2007). To rebut the presumption of
     voluntariness, an employee must show that: (1) the agency effectively imposed
     the terms of his resignation; (2) the employee had no realistic alternative but to
     resign; and (3) the employee’s resignation was the result of improper acts by the
     agency. See, e.g., Shoaf v. Department of Agriculture, 260 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed.
     Cir. 2001) (citing Fruhauf Southwest Garment Co. v. United States, 111 F. Supp.
     945, 951 (Ct. Cl. 1953)); Staats v. U.S. Postal Service, 99 F.3d 1120, 1124 (Fed.
     Cir. 1996).   The Board addresses allegations of discrimination and reprisal in
     connection with an alleged involuntary resignation only insofar as those
     allegations relate to the issue of voluntariness. Vitale, 107 M.S.P.R. 501, ¶ 20.
¶8        We agree with the administrative judge that the appellant failed to establish
     jurisdiction over his involuntary resignation appeal. RID at 22 -25. Although the
     administrative judge wrote that the appellant failed to allege that his resignation
     was the product of agency misinformation, RID at 22, the initial decision cites his
     testimony that his supervisor told him that if he resigned there would be no
     criminal charges filed against him, and the investigation would go away, RID at
     8, 14, 21. Nevertheless, we agree with the administrative judge that the appellant
     failed to establish that his resignation was procured by agency misinformation or
     deception because the record shows that the appellant’s supervisor acted quickly
     to disabuse the appellant of his mistaken impression that the agency offered to
     drop the allegations against him if he stepped down as Director of the NOTLC.
     RID at 21-22; B-1 RF, Tab 18 at 63; see Shoaf, 260 F.3d at 1341. The Board
     must defer to an administrative judge’s credibility determinations when they are
     based, explicitly or implicitly, on observing the demeanor of witnesses testifying
     at a hearing; the Board may overturn such determinations only when it has
     “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so.      Haebe v. Department of Justice,
     288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002) . The administrative judge found that the
     appellant’s testimony regarding this episode was not credible, and the appellant
                                                                                        7

      fails to identify sufficient reasons on review for us to revisit the administrative
      judge’s well-explained conclusions. RID at 21.
¶9         We also agree with the administrative judge that the appellant failed to
      show that the agency imposed the terms of his resignation. RID at 22 -23; see
      Shoaf, 260 F.3d at 1341. The administrative judge found that the record instead
      reflected that the appellant dictated the terms of his resignation in a series
      of email messages in May and June 2012 in which he defended his tenure as
      Director of the NOTLC and reiterated his contentions of a hostile work
      environment. B-1 RF, Tab 10 at 130-32. Moreover, the administrative judge
      correctly notes that the evidence shows that the appellant not only selected the
      date of his resignation but that he also subsequently changed it, announcing in his
      June 22, 2012 email that he would resign effective immediately rather than wait
      until June 30, 2012, as he had notified the agency in May. Id.; RID at 22-23.
¶10        We further agree with the administrative judge that the appellant failed to
      show that a reasonable person in his position would have no realistic alternative
      but to resign. RID at 23-24. The appellant could have continued to pursue his
      EEO matter or waited for the outcome of the agency’s investigation into whether
      he had created a hostile working environment for some of his subordinates at the
      NOTLC, but he decided to resign instead.      To be sure, the appellant does not
      describe circumstances that are easy to abide, and, although the agency had not
      proposed an adverse action, one certainly could have resulted from the
      circumstances presented. Nevertheless, the fact that an employee is faced with
      the unpleasant choice of either resigning or opposing a potential removal action
      does not rebut the presumed voluntariness of his ultimate choice of resignation .
      Schultz v. United States Navy, 810 F.2d 1133, 1136-37 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
      Moreover, the administrative judge specifically based his determination on the
      testimony before him, and the appellant identifies no sufficiently sound reason in
      his petition for review to discount the administrative judge’s well-explained,
                                                                                        8

      demeanor-based credibility determinations.      RID at 23-24; Haebe, 288 F.3d
      at 1301.
¶11        We also agree with the administrative judge that the appellant failed to
      show that his resignation was the result of improper acts by the agency. RID
      at 24-25.   Although the appellant complains on review about the agency’s
      investigation into a subordinate’s claim that he fostered a hostile work
      environment, RPFR File, Tab 1 at 4-6, the administrative judge considered the
      agency’s reasons for conducting the investigation and did not find it was
      improper or unjustified, RID at 13, 16-18. The appellant also failed to show that
      the agency promised him that it would drop the investigation if he stepped down ,
      and as the administrative judge observed, the f irst instance of any discussion of
      resignation came from the appellant himself, not the agency. RID at 24; B-1 RF,
      Tab 10 at 130-32.     Further, regarding this claim, the record reflects that the
      administrative judge considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate
      inferences, and made reasoned conclusions on the issue of credibility. ID at 3-5;
      see, e.g., Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 105-06 (1997) (finding
      no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findings when she considered the
      evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned
      conclusions); Broughton v. Department of Health & Human Services, 33 M.S.P.R.
      357, 359 (1987) (same).
¶12        As for the appellant’s contention on review that the agency’s representative
      intimidated his witnesses, the appellant fails to identify any evidence in support
      of his assertion. RPFR File, Tab 1 at 4. Moreover, the record does not reflect
      that the appellant raised this argument below. The record similarly reflects that
      the appellant failed to object below to the administrative judge’s denial of some
      of his requested witnesses. See, e.g., Tarpley v. U.S. Postal Service, 37 M.S.P.R.
      579, 581 (1988) (finding that the appellant’s failure to timely object to rulings on
      witnesses precludes his doing so on petition for review). The appellant also fails
      to support his contention that certain witnesses lied under oath and therefore
                                                                                            9

      fails to provide sufficient reason for us to revisit the administrative judge’s
      demeanor-based credibility findings concerning those witnesses. RID at 19-21;
      see Haebe, 288 F.3d at 1301. Regarding the bifurcation of the hearing and the
      administrative judge’s decision to limit the hearing to 1 day, such decisions are
      committed to the considerable discretion of the administrative judge , and
      bifurcation is an appropriate means of adjudication in cases like this where the
      issue of jurisdiction is dispositive.     See, e.g., Stein-Verbit v. Department of
      Commerce, 72 M.S.P.R. 332, 339-40 (1996). The appellant fails to show that the
      administrative judge abused his considerable discretion in this regard.
¶13         Accordingly, we affirm the initial decision finding that the appellant failed
      to establish jurisdiction over his involuntary resignation appeal.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 4
            You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.              5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
      Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
      Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
      appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
      statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
      jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
      immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
      filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
      limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
            Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
      below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

      4
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                       10

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review    of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so , you may obtain
                                                                                11

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).          If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013
                                                                                     12

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Boar d’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 5   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:

5
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                              13

                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                            /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.