Court Opinion

ID: 9722694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:45:28.798213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:38.802654
License: Public Domain

*1156BAILEY, Judge,
concurring in result.
I concur in the majority's determination that the jury properly convicted Ham of operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a Class C misdemeanor.4 However, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion by instructing the jury that "a [dlefendant's refusal to submit to a chemical test may be considered as evidence of intoxication." Tr. at 145.
Indiana's implied consent 'law, i.e., Indiana Code Section 9-80-6-1, provides that "[a] person who operates a vehicle impliedly consents to submit to the chemical test provisions of this chapter as a condition of operating a vehicle in Indiana." Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 9-30-6-2(d), "[a] person must submit to each chemical test offered by a law enforcement officer in order to comply with the implied consent provisions of this chapter." In addition, Indiana Code Section 9-30-6-8(b) provides that "[alt any proceeding under ... ICG 9-30-5 ..., a person's refusal to submit to a chemical test is admissible into evidence."
In the present case, because Ham was charged with and tried for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, pursuant to Indiana Code Section 9-80-5-2(a), evidence that she refused to consent to a chemical test was clearly admissible at her trial. See Ind.Code § 9-80-6-8(b). However, the question before us is whether the trial court properly instructed the jury that Ham's refusal to submit to the chemical test may be considered as evidence of her intoxication. Although this Court has never addressed the propriety of this particular instruction, we have considered whether the trial court properly instructed the jury that a defendant's refusal to submit to a chemical test may be considered as evidence of the defendant's guilt.
In Hurt v. State, 553 N.E.2d 1243, 1249 (Ind.Ct.App.1990), for example, the defendant challenged the propriety of a jury instruction, which provided that "[a] defendant's refusal to submit to a chemical test may be considered as evidence of the defendant's guilt," on the basis that such instruction was confusing or misleading. Writing on behalf of the majority, Judge Baker noted that "(tlhe use of the word 'guilt,' taken in the context of all the instructions, was not confusing, nor was the instruction otherwise impérmissible." Id. Accordingly, the Hurt court held that the trial court had not abused its discretion by giving the "evidence of guilt" instruction. Id.
Similarly, in Luckhart v. State, 780 N.E.2d 1165, 1168 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), a different panel of this Court held that a jury instruction, which provided that "[the defendant's refusal to submit to a chemical test for intoxication may be considered as evidence of [the defendant's] guilt of driving while intoxicated" was not misleading and, therefore, did not constitute an abuse of discretion. In so holding, however, the Luckhart court cautioned that "[i]t might have been more accurate for the trial court to have instructed the jury that [the defendant's] refusal to take a chemical breath *1157test was evidence of his intoxication rather than evidence of his guilt of the offense of driving while intoxicated, as there is no connection between his refusal to take the test and his operation of a vehicle." Id.
By contrast, in Stoltmann v. State, 793 N.E.2d 275, 280 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), yet another panel of this Court determined that the challenged jury instruction-which provided that "[a] defendant's refusal to submit to a chemical test may be considered as evidence of the defendant's guilt"-was erroneous. In particular, the Stoltmanm court noted that:
While [the defendant's] refusal to take the chemical breath test was admissible into evidence, see Ind.Code § 9-80-6-3(b), the challenged instruction unduly emphasizes its importance. Furthermore, the instruction confuses and misleads the jury by permitting it to infer that the refusal is sufficient to establish all the elements of the offense of operating a vehicle while intoxicated, when, at best, it establishes only that he refused to take the test.
Id.5
The Stolimann court relied upon our supreme court's holding in Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ind.2001), wherein the Court rejected a flight instruction as confusing, placing undue emphasis on certain evidence, and misleading. In Dill, the instruction at issue informed the jury that flight and other actions calculated to hide a crime, though not proof of guilt, are evidence of consciousness of guilt and are circumstances which may be considered by the jury along with other evidence. Id. The Dill court held that:
This instruction is inherently contradictory because it simultaneously informs the jury that a person's flight after the commission of a crime is "not proof of guilt" but yet is "evidence of consciousness of guilt" and "may be consid*1158ered. ..." This flight instruction is confusing.
Flight and related conduct may be considered by a jury in determining a defendant's guilt. However, although evidence of flight may, under appropriate circumstances, be relevant, admissible, and a proper subject for counsel's closing argument, it does not follow that a trial court should give a discrete instruction highlighting such evidence. To the contrary, instructions that unnecessarily emphasize one particular evi-dentiary fact, witness, or phase of the case have long been disapproved. We find no reasonable grounds in this case to justify focusing the jury's attention on the evidence of flight.
Id. The Court further held that the challenged instruction was misleading because:
[It is a matter of common knowledge that men, who are entirely innocent do sometimes fly from the scene of a crime through fear of being apprehended as the guilty parties, or from an unwilling ness to appear as witnesses. Nor is it true as an accepted axiom of criminal law that "the wicked flee when no man pursueth; but the righteous are bold as a lion." Innocent men sometimes hesitate to confront a jury,-not necessarily because they fear that the jury will not protect them, but because they do not wish their names to appear in connection with criminal acts, are humiliated at being obliged to incur the popular odium of an arrest and trial, or because they do not wish to be put to the annoyance or expense of defending themselves.
Id. at 1233 (quoting Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 511, 16 S.Ct. 864, 40 L.Ed. 1051 (1896)).
However, our supreme court's decision in Dill is distinguishable from the case, and instruction, at bar. First, the refusal to consent instruction at issue in the present case is not inherently contradictory; rather, it clearly and unambiguously provides that a defendant's refusal to submit to a chemical test may be considered as evidence of intoxication. Second, while evidence of flight may. only be admitted into evidence under certain cireumstances, evidence of a defendant's refusal to submit to a chemical test is statutorily admissible as evidence at any proceeding under Indiana Code Section 9-80-5.
Further, the refusal to consent instruction is not misleading. Unlike in the flight context, where innocent people may flee from a crime scene for fear of being falsely apprehended or because of an unwillingness to appear as witnesses, it is rare that a defendant exercising his or her driving privileges would have a legitimate reason to refuse to submit to a chemical test for the detection of aleohol in the body-especially where such submission is statutorily mandated. Instead, I believe that a defendant's refusal to submit to a chemical test provides an inference that he or she consumed alcohol within the relevant time frame. As such, the refusal to consent instruction in dispute is not confusing or misleading.
Moreover, the refusal to consent instruction, which was given in this case, does not place undue emphasis on certain evidence. See, e.g., Ludy v. State, 784 N.E.2d 459, 461 (Ind.2003) (noting that instructions that needlessly emphasize a particular witness, evidentiary fact or phase of the case have long been disapproved). Rather, it assists the jury in understanding the relevance of Ham's refusal. The purpose of jury instructions is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts, without misleading the jury, and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict. See Dill, 741 N.E.2d at 1232. Because the refusal to consent instruction in dispute provides guidance to the jury regarding the rela*1159tionship of the law to the facts on an element of the offense, ie., intoxication, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by giving it to the jury.6 See, e.g., Whitney v. State, 750 N.E.2d 342, 344 (Ind.2001) (noting that it is not improper to give an instruction where, as here, the instruction is supported by the evidence in the record, is a proper statement of the law, and it is not covered by other instructions). j
For these reasons, I concur in result with the majority opinion.

. Indiana Code Section 9-30-5-2 provides that "a person who operates a vehicle while intoxicated commits a Class C misdemeanor." Indiana Code Section 9-13-2-86 defines "intoxicated" as:
under the influence of:
(1) alcohol;
(2) a controlled substance (as defined in IC 35-48-1); '
(3) a drug other than alcohol or a controlled substance; or _
(4) a combination of alcohol, controlled substances, or drugs;
so that there is an impaired condition of thought and action and the loss of normal control of a person's faculties.

. I disagree that a defendant's refusal to submit to a chemical test only establishes that he or she refused to take the test. Police officers may not ask everybody to submit to a chemical test. Rather, the provisions of the Implied Consent law only apply where the officer has probable cause to believe that a person has committed an offense such as operating a vehicle while intoxicated. See Ind.Code § 9-30-6-2(a) see also Dalton v. State, 773 N.E.2d 332, 334 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied. A law enforcement officer has probable cause to offer a chemical test where the officer has knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that the crime of operating a vehicle while intoxicated las been committed. Gibson v. State, 518 N.E.2d 1132, 1136 (Ind.Ct.App.1988), trans. denied.
In the present case, the evidence reveals that Officer Hatfield saw Ham drive her car left of center approximately four times and noticed that she was not wearing a seatbelt. When Officer Hatfield initiated a traffic stop, he smelled "an odor of intoxicating beverages" emanating from Ham's vehicle. Tr. at 72. Ham "fumbled through [her purse] for a short time" before producing her driver's license and, when Officer Hatfield asked her to get out of the vehicle, she stumbled and "almost fell back to the vehicle." Id. Subsequently, Ham refused to take a preliminary breath test, failed the "horizontal gaze and nystag-mus test," and refused to participate in any other field sobriety test. Tr. at 75. Officer Hatfield also noticed that Ham's eyes were glassy and bloodshot and her speech was broken and slurred. The fact that Ham smelled strongly of alcohol, standing alone, provided Officer Hatfield with sufficient probable cause to at least offer her a chemical test. See, e.g., Dalton, 773 N.E.2d at 334; see also Jellison v. State, 656 N.E.2d 532, 534 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (noting that probable cause requires only the probability that criminal activity had occurred). Moreover, the totality of the circumstances presented here provided Officer Hatfield with sufficient evidence that Ham may have operated her vehicle while under the influence of some type of a controlled substance. See, eg., id. Thus, because Officer Hatfield had probablé cause to offer the chemical test, Ham's refusal to submit to such test constituted a violation of the Implied Consent law.

. It is important to note that the trial court's final instructions also instructed the jury that Ham is presumed to be innocent and that to overcome the presumption of innocence, the State was required to prove Ham guilty of "every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt." Tr. at 145. The trial court's instructions further informed the jury that it was the exclusive judge of the evidence, including the weight given to each item of evidence. Id.