Court Opinion

ID: 9558789
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:16:44.553842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:35.667455
License: Public Domain

*850BROUSSARD, J.
—I respectfully dissent.
It is settled under California law that, in view of the fundamental importance of proper jury instructions to a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial, a trial court in a criminal proceeding has the responsibility to instruct the jury on the general principles of law relevant to the case, including the giving of instructions on lesser included oifenses. (See, e.g., People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 715-716 [112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913].) Although the trial court in this case did not instruct the jury on the elements of the lesser included oifense of second degree murder, the majority conclude that because the court omitted the instruction at the request of defendant’s trial counsel, defendant is barred from objecting to the absence of such an instruction under the “invited error” doctrine.
Past California decisions uniformly establish, however, that the invited error doctrine does not apply when defense counsel has “invited” the error as a result of his or her ignorance or mistaken view of the law (see, e.g., People v. Graham (1969) 71 Cal.2d 303, 319 [78 Cal.Rptr. 217, 455 P.2d 153]), and defendant contends that the record in this case demonstrates that his trial counsel’s actions were the product of just such ignorance or mistake of law. The majority reject the contention on the grounds (1) that the record is ambiguous on whether defense counsel acted under a mistaken view of the applicable principles of law (see maj. opn., ante, pp. 828-830), and (2) that, in any event, because the record indicates “that counsel made a conscious, deliberate tactical choice between having the instruction and not having it,” the invited error doctrine would apply even if the record unambiguously demonstrated that counsel’s tactical decision was based on his ignorance or mistaken view of the law (see maj. opn., ante, p. 831).
As I explain, the majority’s conclusion is untenable on either ground. First, the record in this case clearly demonstrates that defense counsel’s tactical decision to request the omission of a second degree murder instruction was based, at least in substantial part, on a mistaken view of the terms of the applicable death penalty law; to my mind, the majority’s contrary reading of the record strains credulity beyond the breaking point. Second, the majority purport to be following past decisions in concluding that the invited error doctrine applies whenever defense counsel acts for a tactical purpose even if the record explicitly discloses that counsel’s tactical decision was based on a misunderstanding of a fundamental principle of law. A careful review of the governing decisions, however, establishes that in reality the opinion’s conclusion in this regard flies in the face of the settled case law. The opinion provides no principled basis for departure from this controlling precedent.
*851I
Before addressing the two specific points on which the majority opinion relies, it may be helpful to place the issue in perspective by reviewing the basic rationale that underlies the general rule that in a criminal case the trial court has the independent responsibility to instruct the jury on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence, including instructions on lesser included offenses.
In People v. St. Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 533 [83 Cal.Rptr. 166, 463 P.2d 390], this court explained that while, as a matter of litigation strategy, both the prosecution and the defense might conclude in a particular case that it is in their respective interests to present the jury with the all-or-nothing choice of either convicting defendant of a greater charged offense or of acquitting him altogether, the state has an overriding interest in assuring that the defendant is convicted of the appropriate offense. To serve that end, it is essential that the jury be properly instructed not only on the greater offense but also on all lesser included offenses that the evidence could properly support. As the St. Martin court observed: “The state has no interest in a defendant obtaining an acquittal where he is innocent of the primary offense charged but guilty of a necessarily included offense. Nor has the state any legitimate interest in obtaining a conviction of the offense charged where the jury entertains a reasonable doubt of guilt of the charged offense but returns a verdict of guilty of that offense solely because the jury is unwilling to acquit where it is satisfied that the defendant has been guilty of wrongful conduct constituting a necessarily included offense. Likewise, a defendant has no legitimate interest in compelling the jury to adopt an all or nothing approach to the issue of guilt. Our courts are not gambling halls but forums for the discovery of truth.” (St. Martin, supra, 1 Cal.3d 524, 533, italics added.) For this reason, it is well established that a trial court’s “obligation to instruct on lesser included offenses exists even when as a matter of trial tactics a defendant not only fails to request the instruction but expressly objects to its being given.” (People v. Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d 703, 716.)
Although a trial court’s duty properly to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses thus continues to operate regardless of defense counsel’s desires or requests, the cases have recognized that in some limited circumstances, a defendant may be precluded from objecting on appeal to an instructional error of the trial court that has been “invited” by the defendant’s trial counsel. In People v. Graham, supra, 71 Cal.2d 303—which, as the majority opinion recognizes, has generally been viewed as the “seminal case concerning invited error” (see maj. opn., ante, p. 830 [quoting People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 330 (185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d *852311)])—our court explained, however, why the invited error doctrine is not properly invoked when the error, though “invited” by defense counsel, results from defense counsel’s “neglect or mistake.”
As the Graham court observed: “Witkin has stated that, when the trial court has the duty to instruct, sua sponte, on the rules of law necessarily involved in a case, erroneous instructions are reviewable ‘though invited by the defendant’s own neglect or mistake.’ [Citation.] As the court forcefully stated in People v. Keelin (1955) 136 Cal.App.2d 860, 874 [289 P.2d 520, 56 A.L.R.2d 355]: ‘Nevertheless, error is nonetheless error and is no less operative on deliberations of the jury because the erroneous instruction may have been requested by counsel for the defense. After all, it is the life and liberty of the defendant in a case such as this that is at hazard in the trial and there is a continuing duty upon the part of the trial court to see to it that the jury are properly instructed upon all matters pertinent to their decision of the cause. ’ Accordingly, if defense counsel suggests or accedes to the erroneous instruction because of neglect or mistake we do not find ‘invited error’; only if counsel expresses a deliberate tactical purpose in suggesting, resisting or acceding to an instruction do we deem it to nullify the trial court’s obligation to instruct in the cause.” (Graham, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 319, italics added.)
Subsequent cases have uniformly confirmed that the invited error doctrine may properly be invoked to bar a defendant from challenging an instructional error on appeal only when it is clear “that counsel acted for tactical reasons and not out of ignorance or mistake.” (People v. Wicker-sham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 330 [289 P.2d 520, 56 A.L.R.2d 355]; see, e.g., People v. Bunyard (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1234 [185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311].)
As noted, the majority, in rejecting defendant’s claim that the invited error doctrine cannot properly be invoked here, rely on two grounds: (1) that the record is ambiguous on whether defendant’s trial counsel was in fact operating under a mistaken view of the law when he invited the error in question, and (2) that, in any event, because the record indicates that defense counsel’s decision to forego the instruction was a tactical decision, the invited error doctrine would apply even if the record unambiguously demonstrated that counsel’s tactical decision was based on his ignorance or mistaken view of the law. In my view, neither of the majority’s conclusions can withstand analysis.
II
I turn first to the question whether the record demonstrates that defense counsel was operating under a mistaken view of the law in requesting the trial court not to instruct the jury on second degree murder.
*853As the majority opinion indicates, the record discloses that at trial defense counsel explicitly requested the trial court not to instruct the jury on second degree murder and explained that there was a tactical reason for his request. Defendant maintains, however, that the record also shows that defense counsel’s tactical request was based, at least in substantial part, on counsel’s mistaken understanding of the terms of the applicable death penalty law. As all the parties now recognize, the relevant special-circumstance provision—Penal Code, section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3)—requires a defendant to be convicted of at least one count of first degree murder, as well as one or more additional counts of first or second degree murder, before the special circumstance may be found true. Defendant contends that the record shows that when his trial counsel requested the court not to give a second degree murder instruction defense counsel was under the misimpression that two second degree murder convictions alone would render defendant eligible for the death penalty. Indeed, defendant maintains that the record shows that not only defense counsel, but the prosecutor as well, was laboring under the same misunderstanding of the applicable special-circumstance provision.
In my view, a fair reading of the record unquestionably confirms defendant’s position. As the majority opinion recognizes, the question of the proper interpretation of the pertinent special-circumstance provision first came up at trial in a discussion between the court and counsel that took place during jury voir dire. Prior to that discussion, the trial court, in remarks to a number of potential jurors, had indicated in passing that at least two first degree murders had to be found in order for the case to go to a penalty phase. Thereafter, outside the presence of the potential jurors, defense counsel undertook to correct the judge with respect to the application of the special circumstance provision. The following colloquy ensued:
“[Defense counsel]: One point that is not very important, but I—just pedanticism drives me to bring it up. It is not required, at least according to the Attorney General’s interpretation of the statute, that somebody be convicted of first degree murder in order to receive the death penalty under special circumstances.
“[The Court]: I stand corrected.
“[Defense counsel]: That is disputed but the Attorney General claims that—
“[The Court]: Doesn’t apply to this case.
“[Defense counsel]:—two second degree murders does it.
*854“[Prosecutor]: I can tell the court that if Mr. Cooper is convicted, at least of the two counts of second degree murder, our position is going to be that we have a penalty phase.
“[The Court]: Oh, I have read about something.
“[Prosecutor]: That is the way the code reads, I believe.
“[Defense counsel]: The code is a tad ambiguous, but that’s certainly the way the Attorney General interprets it.
“[Defense counsel]: I don’t think it is of great moment.
“[The Court]: It doesn’t appear to be in this case.
“[Defense counsel]: But pedanticisum [s/c]—
“[The Court]: I appreciate it. Let’s take the recess.” (Italics added.)
As this passage makes clear, the prosecutor unquestionably was of the view that two second degree murder convictions alone would subject the defendant to the penalty phase, and defense counsel, while suggesting that there was some dispute over the matter, indicated that he understood that this was the Attorney General’s interpretation of the applicable provision. The trial court did not express any disagreement with that interpretation.1
The issue came up again during a discussion between the court, counsel and defendant with regard to defense counsel’s request that the court not instruct the jury on second degree murder. After the trial court had *855expressed the opinion that it “would feel duty bound to give [a second degree murder instruction] because it is always considered to be such an integral part of murder one” and the prosecutor had requested a personal waiver from the defendant if the trial court was not going to give the instruction, the record reflects that the following colloquy occurred as defense counsel elicited the requested waiver from defendant:
“[Defense counsel]: We have discussed between ourselves that the only role that I could see a second degree verdict playing in this particular case is to give a jury a compromise verdict. fl|] I also informed you that as far as the eligibility for the penalty phase in this particular case is concerned, according to the present law as it is interpreted by—at least by most of the courts, it says in the statute that a verdict of second degree is the same as a first degree if you find two second degrees, then we’re into the penalty phase. In order not to encourage a compromise verdict, I believe that it is in your best interest to only give the jury two choices: First degree or nothing. Do you agree to do that?
“[Defendant]: Yes.
“[The Court]: Do you join in the waiver?
“[Defense counsel]: I certainly do.
“[The Court]: All right, I accept it.” (Italics added.)
The majority opinion asserts that while these two passages suggest that defense counsel may have been laboring under a misunderstanding of the law, “the record is not conclusive.” (See maj. opn., ante, p. 829.) In my view, the record, viewed as a whole, is neither ambiguous nor inconclusive. An objective and commonsense reading of defense counsel’s remarks summarizing the advice he had given defendant regarding the second degree murder instruction clearly indicates that defense counsel’s tactical decision to forego a second degree murder instruction was based on his mistaken view that under the applicable special-circumstance provision “a verdict of second degree is the same as first degree,” and that if the jury “find[s] two second degrees, then we’re into the penalty phase.” Although the majority opinion points to the fact that defense counsel was very experienced in death penalty trials, the prosecutor was also experienced and yet the colloquy during voir dire makes it absolutely clear that the prosecutor was operating under the same misunderstanding of the relevant special circumstance as defense counsel. Plainly stated, on this record it simply blinks reality for the majority to maintain that the record does not clearly establish that defense counsel misunderstood the applicable legal principles. *856Particularly when a life hangs in the balance, it is distressing to find the majority opinion adopting such a strained reading of the record.
Ill
After suggesting that the record is inconclusive on whether defense counsel’s tactical decision to forego a second degree murder instruction rested on a misunderstanding of law, the majority go on to conclude that the resolution of that question is, in any event, not determinative of the invited error issue, because so long as the record shows “that counsel made a conscious, deliberate tactical choice between having the instruction and not having it” (see maj. opn., ante, p. 831), as counsel did here, the invited error doctrine applies even if the record also shows that counsel’s tactical choice was based on counsel’s ignorance or mistake of law. In reaching this conclusion, the majority opinion purports to be faithfully applying this court’s past invited error precedents. In my view, a review of the decisions refutes the opinion’s claim.
As discussed above, in People v. Graham, supra, 71 Cal.2d 303—the seminal invited error decision—the court summarized its conclusion in the following terms: “Accordingly, if defense counsel suggests or accedes to the erroneous instruction because of neglect or mistake we do not find ‘invited error’; only if counsel expresses a deliberate tactical purpose in suggesting, resisting or acceding to an instruction do we deem it to nullify the trial court’s obligation to instruct in the cause.” (Id. at p. 319.) As this passage reveals, the Graham decision, in indicating that the invited error doctrine applies when defense counsel “expresses a deliberate tactical purpose in suggesting, resisting or acceding to an instruction,” explicitly contrasted the “tactical purpose” scenario to one in which counsel invites the instructional error “because of neglect or mistake . . . .” Although the Graham decision may not have explicitly so stated, it is clear from the Graham court’s reasoning that when the court referred to a situation in which counsel acts for a “deliberate tactical purpose,” it had in mind a tactical decision that, at least on its face, rests on an accurate, informed understanding of the law, and not a tactical decision that the record explicitly reveals is founded on a mistaken view of the law. Under the Graham court’s reasoning, when the record before the trial court clearly demonstrates that counsel’s action, though tactical, rests on counsel’s ignorance or mistake of law, the error has been invited “because of neglect or mistake” and would not properly constitute invited error.
While this understanding of the Graham decision may have only been implicit in the Graham opinion itself, subsequent decisions of our court have made the point quite explicit. In People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d 216, *857228-229 [207 Cal.Rptr. 549, 689 P.2d 121], for example, after finding that the invited error doctrine was applicable in that case because defense counsel had a deliberate tactical purpose for agreeing to a particular instruction, we went on to state that “[o]/" course, if counsel had done all of these acts in ignorance of the law, there would not be invited error here.” (37 Cal.3d at p. 229, fn. 6, italics added.) Thus, Avalos clearly indicates the court’s understanding that a deliberate, tactical decision which the record reveals was based on defense counsel’s ignorance or mistake of law would not bring the invited error doctrine into play.
Our decision in People v. Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal. 3d 1189, reiterates this understanding. In Bunyard, the defendant, who had been convicted of the first degree murder of a pregnant woman and her fetus, contended on appeal that the trial court had erred in failing to give a second degree murder instruction with, regard to the killing of the fetus. In response to the Attorney General’s assertion that the claim was barred by the invited error doctrine, defendant argued that the record did not disclose whether his trial counsel’s request “was tactically based on an accurate understanding of applicable law, or on the ignorant or mistaken impression that no instruction on second degree murder on an implied-malice theory as to the fetus was appropriate under the facts adduced at trial.” (Id. at pp. 1234-1235, italics added.) Defendant argued that it was reasonable to conclude that “the defense’s request that the jury not be instructed on second degree murder with respect to the fetus was based not on informed tactical considerations, but on ignorance and the mistaken view that no theory of second degree murder was factually applicable to the death of the fetus,” and contended that under such circumstances the invited error doctrine should not be applied. (Id. at p. 1235, italics added.)
Although the Bunyard court rejected the defendant’s argument, our decision in Bunyard did not suggest that a defense counsel’s tactical decision to forego an instruction would constitute invited error even if the record clearly revealed that the decision was based on counsel’s ignorance or mistaken view of the law. Instead, we concluded that, contrary to the defendant’s factual assertion, the trial record in that case actually reflected a “well-reasoned, deliberate and informed tactical strategy selected by defense counsel” (Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.3d 1189, 1235, italics added) and, for that reason, the invited error doctrine did apply. In relying on the fact that the record revealed a “well-reasoned, . . . informed tactical strategy,” Bun-yard, like Avalos, confirms the heretofore settled understanding that the invited error doctrine does not apply if the record establishes that an *858instructional error has been invited because of defense counsel’s mistake or neglect.2
The majority opinion turns its back on all of these precedents in holding “that the record must show only that counsel made a conscious, deliberate tactical choice between having the instruction and not having it” (see maj. opn., ante, p. 831), even if the record also reveals that the “conscious, deliberate tactical choice” was based on counsel’s misunderstanding of the law.
Furthermore, in addition to flying in the face of stare decisis, the opinion provides no principled explanation for the distinction that it suggests should be drawn between the different effects of defense counsel’s ignorance or mistake of law. The opinion reaffirms the principle that “[i]f counsel was ignorant of the choice [between having the instruction and not having it], or mistakenly believed the court was not giving it to him, invited error will not be found” (see maj. opn., ante, p. 831), but holds that invited error will be found when counsel’s ignorance or mistake affects his or her tactical decisions on behalf of the defendant. As the Graham decision teaches, the reason that the invited error doctrine has not been applied to situations in which defense counsel has acted out of ignorance or mistake is because of the crucial importance of properjury instructions to a fair trial and because “ ‘[a]fter all, it is the life and liberty of the defendant [rather than defense counsel] . . . that is at hazard.’” (People v. Graham, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 319.) The detrimental effect on the defendant is as great when, as here, the jury is deprived of a proper instruction because counsel’s ignorance of the law leads him or her to make a misinformed tactical decision, as when the jury is denied the instruction because of counsel’s ignorance of the potential availability of the instruction. In either case, as a result of counsel’s misunderstanding of the applicable legal principles, the defendant is denied a trial by a properly instructed jury.
As we have seen, because of the overriding importance of having the jury correctly instructed on the controlling principles of law, California law places an independent responsibility on the trial court to instruct the jury correctly even in the absence of a request for a proper instruction by defense counsel or an objection to an incorrect instruction proposed by the prosecu*859tion or the court. In other areas of trial practice—for example, the failure to object to inadmissible evidence—when a trial court sees that defense counsel has made a tactical decision based on an incorrect understanding of the law, the law does not require the court to intervene to correct counsel’s mistake. But the giving of jury instructions is different; when a defense counsel’s comments on the record demonstrate that the tactical decision to object to a proper instruction is based on counsel’s misunderstanding of the law, the law requires the trial court to step in, so that the jury is not incorrectly instructed on the fundamental principles of law applicable in the case because of defense counsel’s mistake of law. The existing invited error doctrine recognizes the importance of the court’s intervention in such a setting, and I see no justification for repudiating this well-established rule.
Accordingly, I dissent from the majority opinion’s invocation of the invited error doctrine.
IV
There is one other aspect of the majority opinion that is sufficiently troubling to be worthy of mention. In my view the opinion is in error in disapproving a line of California decisions, beginning with People v. Kitt (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 834, 848-850 [148 Cal.Rptr. 447], which holds that the traditional “presumption of prejudice” analysis applies to cases in which the jury is inadvertently or unintentionally exposed to material that has not been introduced into evidence, as well as to cases in which a juror intentionally engages in misconduct. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 835-836.) The majority suggest that the “presumption of prejudice” analysis may properly be applied only to cases involving “true jury misconduct” and not to cases in which a jury has been inadvertently exposed to such material without any misconduct on a juror’s part.
I find the majority’s discussion of this point troubling for a number of reasons. To begin with, there is no reason for the majority to reach out and “take on” the Kitt, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d 834, line of decisions in this case, for here there clearly was “true jury misconduct” as the majority opinion uses that term. As the majority’s own discussion of the relevant facts demonstrates (see maj. opn., ante, pp. 833-834), the key fact that triggered the incident in question in this case was the statement during jury deliberations by one of the jurors—Juror LaPage—that she “knew personally that there was supposed to have been a mental problem with Mr. Cooper” (italics added), and not the rather innocuous reference in an exhibit indicating that defendant may have suffered “headaches and hallucinations” sometime in the past. Indeed, with regard to LaPage’s conduct, one of the other jurors indicated, in response to the judge’s questioning, that she thought LaPage *860had said that defendant was a “former mental patient” and that she may possibly have used the word “escaped.” It was these statements by Juror LaPage—introducing facts of which she allegedly had personal knowledge but that had not been admitted into evidence—that precipitated the jury’s inquiry to the judge and that posed the most significant threat of potential prejudice to defendant.
The majority themselves appear to recognize that the statements by Juror LaPage during jury deliberations about facts outside the record of which she assertedly had personal knowledge constituted “true juror misconduct” which must properly be judged under the “presumption of prejudice” standard. (See maj. opn., ante, p. 838.) The majority go on to find that the presumption was clearly rebutted in this case, since the matter was brought to the court’s attention during the deliberations and the court carefully admonished the jury to consider only evidence that had been admitted in court.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the presumption of prejudice was rebutted here. In light of that conclusion, however, there appears to be no reason for the majority to undertake a separate, and much more extensive, analysis with regard to the jury’s consideration of the inadvertantly admitted exhibit which contained a brief reference to “headaches and hallucinations” experienced by defendant some years earlier. If the trial court’s comments and admonitions were sufficient to eliminate any potential prejudice from Juror LaPage’s statements, those comments and admonitions were clearly also sufficient to eliminate any potential problem that the inadvertantly admitted exhibit might have posed. Under these circumstances, there simply is no reason for the majority to reach out to disapprove the line of Court of Appeal decisions emanating from the Kitt decision, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d 834.
Furthermore, on the merits, I believe the majority are in error in suggesting that the “presumption of prejudice” standard applies only to cases involving “true jury misconduct.” Although there may be no “juror misconduct” when, as in the Kitt case, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d 834, a juror is inadvertently exposed to material that has not been admitted into evidence at trial, numerous cases have nonetheless applied the traditional “presumption of prejudice” analysis in such a setting, recognizing that a defendant can be as prejudiced by a juror’s unintentional exposure to such material as by the intentional seeking out of such material by a juror. As the United States Supreme Court explained in Remmer v. United States (1954) 347 U.S. 227, 229 [98 L.Ed.2d 654, 656, 74 S.Ct. 450], a case in which the juror had committed no misconduct but had immediately reported a contact made by a third person: “In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or *861tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial.... The presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish . . . that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant.” (See generally 3 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure (1982) § 554, pp. 248-264 and cases cited.)
Indeed, in proposing to reject this well-established rule, the majority opinion appears inconsistent with two very recent decisions of this court—People v. Holloway (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1098, 1109-1110 [269 Cal.Rptr. 530, 790 P.2d 1327], and People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 950-951 [269 Cal.Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676]—in which we explicitly adopted the “presumption of prejudice” standard set forth in the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice. Standard 8-3.7 of those standards explicitly provides: “On motion of the defendant, a verdict of guilty in any criminal case shall be set aside and a new trial granted whenever, on the basis of competent evidence, the court finds a substantial likelihood that the vote of one or more jurors was influenced by exposure to prejudicial matter relating to the defendant or to the case itself that was not part of the trial record on which the case was submitted to the jury.” (2 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, std. 8-3.7 (2d ed. 1980) p. 8.57, italics added.) Nothing in the standard suggests that it only applies when a juror has intentionally and improperly gained access to such material; the standard recognizes that a defendant may be equally prejudiced by “unintentional” exposure to such materials.
Although the majority do not specifically discuss the numerous cases which have applied the “presumption of prejudice” standard to situations in which no juror has been guilty of “true misconduct,” the majority appear to suggest that a distinction should be drawn between “outside influences on the jury through no fault of its own” (see maj. opn., ante, p. 836, fn. 12, majority’s italics) and improper influences from sources that are “internal” to the judicial process. But the appropriate distinction is not between the “outside” or “internal” source of the “influence,” but rather, as standard 8-3.7 of the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice indicates, whether the matter to which the jury has been exposed has been or has not been admitted into evidence at the trial. Although the majority assert that “[w]hen . . . a jury innocently considers evidence it was inadvertently given . . . [t]he situation is the same as any in which the court erroneously admits evidence” (see maj. opn., ante, p. 836), that simply is not so with regard to material that has not been admitted into evidence at the trial. When evidence is admitted at trial, the opposing party and counsel will be aware that the jury may consider the evidence and will have the opportunity to point out any deficiencies in the evidence or to introduce other evidence to rebut the admitted evidence; even if an appellate court *862later determines that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence, the opposing party will at least have had the opportunity to attempt to rebut the evidence at trial. When, however, as in Kitt, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d 834, and in most of the cases which have followed Kitt (see, e.g., People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 846 [183 Cal.Rptr. 817, 647 P.2d 93]; People v. Boyd (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 577, 584-586 [157 Cal.Rptr. 293]), the jury is inadvertently given material that has not been admitted into evidence, all of the procedural checks of the trial process are absent. In that context, it is appropriate to apply the “presumption of prejudice” standard even though no juror may have been guilty of “true misconduct.” Thus, I think the majority is in error in broadly disapproving the Kitt decision and all of its progeny.
Finally, there is an additional reason why the majority’s disapproval of the entire Kitt, supra, 83 Cal.App.3d 834, line of cases is gratuitous and inappropriate. Unlike Kitt and most of the cases which have followed Kitt, in the present case the exhibit containing the reference to defendant’s “headaches and hallucinations” had in fact been admitted into evidence at the trial, albeit inadvertently. Although one prior Court of Appeal decision has extended Kitf s analysis to such a situation (see People v. Hill (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 937, 942 [168 Cal.Rptr. 272]), I agree with the majority’s conclusion that, in such a setting, the presumption of prejudice should not apply. This is so, however, not because there has been no “true juror misconduct,” but simply because inasmuch as the evidence was admitted at trial, albeit inadvertently, defendant and his counsel at least had the opportunity to respond to the evidence.
In sum, since it is clear that the trial court’s timely admonition to the jury obviated any possible prejudice from the entire incident, it is difficult to understand why the majority has chosen to go out of its way to disapprove a well-established line of cases.
Mosk, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied June 26, 1991. Mosk, J., and Broussard, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 Although the record does not explicitly reveal the source of the prosecutor’s and defense counsel’s misunderstanding, it appears likely that both counsel focused solely on the terms of Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3), which provides, as a special circumstance, that: “(3) The defendant has in this proceeding been convicted of more than one offense of murder in the first or second degree.”
Both counsel apparently overlooked the fact that the earlier portion of Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (a) specifically provides: “(a) The penalty for a defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree shall be death or confinement in state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole in any case in which one or more of the following special circumstances has been charged and specially found under section 190.4, to be true: [[[]... []J] (3) The defendant has in this proceeding been convicted of more than one offense of murder in the first or second degree.”
Read in its entirety, it is clear that the special circumstance provided by Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3), applies only to a defendant who (1) has been found guilty of at least one count of first degree murder and (2) “has in this proceeding been convicted of more than one offense of murder in the first or second degree.” The majority acknowledge that this is the correct intepretation of the provision and do not suggest that there is any ambiguity in the statutory language.

 If the record does not affirmatively disclose that defense counsel has made a tactical decision on the basis of a misunderstanding of the applicable law, the trial court could properly assume that defense counsel was aware of the relevant legal principles and had made the tactical decision on the basis of a correct understanding of the law. It is only when the record explicitly demonstrates that defense counsel’s tactical decision rested on a misunderstanding of the pertinent legal principles that a tactical decision cannot properly bring into play the invited error doctrine.