Court Opinion

ID: 9677650
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:56:42.348498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:57.397862
License: Public Domain

T. M. Burns, J.
(dissenting). Respectfully, I dissent from the majority’s failure to find that the trial judge erred in directing a verdict in favor of defendant J. L. Hudson Company on the negligence count in the plaintiff’s complaint. The basis of the trial judge’s ruling was that a retailer has no duty to inspect goods in a sealed package.
In Shirley v Brackett Products Co, 26 Mich App *354644, 648; 182 NW2d 726 (1970), this Court stated, "As a general rule, a vendor who distributes a product acquired in the open market is not liable for its negligent manufacture”. See also Camden Fire Ins Co v Peterman, 278 Mich 615; 270 NW 807 (1937). Defendants argue that the statement in Shirley implicitly recognizes that the sealed package doctrine exists in Michigan.
However, even if this doctrine once was established in Michigan, it is of doubtful viability at this time. The existing controlling legal principles governing matters of negligence are not artificial ones such as the sealed package doctrine or the now discredited "stop, look and listen doctrine” once used in automobile-railroad collision cases. Rather, as was stated by the Supreme Court in Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425; 254 NW2d 759 (1977), negligent conduct is conduct that involves an unreasonable risk of harm and it is the standard of reasonableness, not some artificial rule, by which a party’s conduct must be judged. Thus, a seller is liable for injuries caused by a defect in a product he sells if he knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known of the existence of the defect in that product. Blanchard v Monical Machinery Co, 84 Mich App 279; 269 NW2d 564 (1978).
The application of the reasonably-prudent-seller standard to retailers displaces any prior rules of law, such as the one asserted by the defendants here. Inasmuch as the question of whether defendant Hudson’s acted as a reasonably prudent seller is one that should have been decided by the trier of fact, the trial judge erred in directing a verdict as to the negligence count of the plaintiffs complaint.
The majority erroneously decides that Melitta *355and Hudson’s are joint and several tortfeasors. This is a question of fact for a jury to determine. See Oakwood Homeowners Ass’n, Inc v Marathon Oil Co, 104 Mich App 689, 692; 305 NW2d 567 (1981). If a finder of fact is able to determine that one tortfeasor has caused one harm and that another has caused a different harm, each is required to respond only for the injury that has been determined to have been caused by him. Maddux v Donaldson, 362 Mich 425; 108 NW2d 33 (1961).
The plaintiffs theory of recovery against Hudson’s is distinct from her theory of recovery against Melitta. Contrary to the deceptive logic of the majority opinion, the plaintiff has been harmed by the trial judge’s ruling because it precluded her from proceeding to a final judgment on the merits of her claim against Hudson’s. She has the right to a judgment against each defendant even if they are jointly liable. Moffit v Endtz, 232 Mich 2; 204 NW 764 (1925). Thus, although the plaintiff is permitted only a single satisfaction for each of the injuries that she sustained, she is entitled to have a jury determine whether the injury caused to her by Melitta can be fairly distinguished from the injury, if any, caused to her by Hudson’s.
With the exception of the foregoing, I concur in the remainder of the majority’s resolution of the issues raised in this appeal.