Court Opinion

ID: 9691100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 20:10:13.519137+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:10.467845
License: Public Domain

Weaver, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). While I agree with the majority to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals in Goff v Bil-Mar Foods, Inc,1 I dissent from the majority’s holding in Dudley v Morrison Industrial Equipment Co, and would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals2 in that case. Further, I write separately to dissent from the following standard established by the majority:
*540[W]here a party claims that the wcac has exceeded its power by reversing the magistrate, meaningful review must begin with the magistrate’s decision, because if competent, material, and substantial evidence based on the whole record supports the magistrate’s decision, the wcac need go no further. If it does, the wcac is exceeding its authority. [Ante at 513 (emphasis added).]
As a result of its adoption of this standard, I find the majority opinion will have the effect of undermining this Court’s decision in Holden v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 257; 484 NW2d 227 (1992), and rendering it virtually useless, increasing the backlog of reviewing courts, and depriving the Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission of its authority to conduct a qualitative, as well as a quantitative, review of the whole record pursuant to MCL 418.861a(13); MSA 17.237(861a)(13).3 Moreover, while I certainly agree that the commission’s review of a magistrate’s decision is less than de novo, I find that the majority’s standard will expand judicial appellate review to an extreme unintended by the Legislature and contrary to the legislative scheme for review of worker’s compensation awards established in MCL 418.861a et seq.; MSA 17.237(861a) et seq4 In effect, the majority’s *541position has appellate courts stepping into the shoes of the commission by conducting a qualitative and quantitative review of the whole record that the Legislature only intended the commission perform. In so doing, the majority, in the name of further explaining this Court’s Holden analysis, has so deviated from Holden as to render that decision virtually useless. Furthermore, the majority opinion impliedly discourages the commission from conducting its statutorily authorized qualitative review of the evidence, which I believe includes assessments regarding the credibility of witnesses under MCL 418.861a(13); MSA 17.237(861a)(13).5
I would find that the commission’s role is more significant than the majority allows and that this Court’s decision in Holden sufficiently describes the appropriate standard of review of the commission by the judiciary. Pursuant to the express language in MCL 418.861a(14); MSA 17.237(861a)(14) reviewing courts have authority to reverse the commission’s findings of fact only where there is fraud or a finding that the *542commission acted without authority, or outside the scope of its powers. Specifically, the judiciary should reverse the commission’s decision only when the commission grossly misapplies the substantial evidence standard in its review of the magistrate. Holden at 269.
Application of the Holden standard to the instant cases allows me to concur with the majority’s affirmance of the Court of Appeals in Goff v Bil-Mar Foods, Inc, but requires that I dissent with respect to the disposition of Dudley v Morrison Industrial Equipment Co. I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals in Dudley, which found that the commission properly reversed the magistrate’s award in that case.
i
In finding that the majority curtails the commission’s authority contrary to the express mandate of the statute, I note the following statutory provisions that define the duties and powers of the commission:
(10) The commission . . . , may adopt, in whole or in part, the order and opinion of the worker’s compensation magistrate as the order and opinion of the commission.
(11) The commission . . . shall review only those specific findings of fact or conclusions of law that the parties have requested be reviewed.
(12) The commission . . . may remand a matter to a worker’s compensation magistrate for purposes of supplying a complete record if it is determined that the record is insufficient for purposes of review.
(13) A review of the evidence pursuant to this section shall include both a qualitative and quantitative analysis of that evidence in order to ensure a full, thorough, and fair review.
(14) The findings of fact made by the commission acting within its powers, in the absence of fraud, shall be *543conclusive. [MCL 418.861a(10)-(14); MSA 17.237(861a)(10)-(14) (emphasis added).]
Clearly, according to the plain language of MCL 418.861a(13); MSA 17.237(861a)(13) the commission is required to conduct a qualitative review of the whole record, which would include making and reviewing the magistrate’s credibility determinations. Accordingly, I would agree with the Court of Appeals in Aaron v Michigan Boiler & Engineering, 185 Mich App 687, 701-702; 462 NW2d 821 (1990), and find:
[E]ven though the appellate commission should give deference to the magistrate regarding credibility issues as to witnesses who appeared live before the magistrate, the appellate commission could disagree with the magistrate’s findings on credibility since its review is both qualitative and quantitative, provided the appellate commission had given deference to the magistrate’s superior position in viewing the witness. [Citation omitted; emphasis added.][6]
In this regard, while the majority opinion cites York v Wayne Co Sheriff’s Dep’t, 219 Mich App 370; 556 NW2d 882 (1996), as an illustration of correct judicial review, and I agree it is, it seems to me that the majority fails to adopt the standard articulated in that *544case. Furthermore, it appears that York points out the difficulties inherent in the position that the majority has now adopted. Indeed, the York Court explained that
judicial review of a WCAC decision is to be of the findings of fact made by the wcac and not the findings of fact made by the magistrate and that the findings of fact made by the wcac are conclusive if there is any competent evidence in the record to support those findings. In particular, the Supreme Court specifically rejected the proposition that the wcac’s application of the substantial evidence test is a question of law subject to review de novo on appeal, allowing reviewing courts to again review the administrative agency’s findings for substantial evidence, because that would make the scope of judicial review identical to that of the wcac itself, contrary to the clear intent of the Legislature.
* * *
However, in order for this Court to conclude that the wcac exceeded its reviewing powers because the magistrate’s findings were supported by the requisite substantial evidence on the whole record, this Court would have to engage in the very same kind of review de novo of the magistrate’s findings for substantial evidence that the Supreme Court specifically rejected as inappropriate in Holden, supra. [Id. at 378-380 (citations omitted).][7]
As this quotation points out, not only is the majority’s analysis contrary to the respective statutory roles *545of the commission and judiciary, but its standard is contrary to this Court’s own finding in Holden v Ford Motor Co, supra.8 In that case, we held:
The Legislature, by employing the language of the constitution in stating that the fact finding of the wcac is final subject to limited judicial review, made clear that judicial review by the Court of Appeals or this Court of a wcac decision is to be of the findings of fact made by the wcac and not the findings of fact made by the magistrate. And the findings of fact made by the wcac are conclusive if there is any competent evidence to support them. [Id. at 263 (emphasis added).][9]
*546The standard articulated by the majority in this case bears little resemblance to the Holden standard.10 In fact, it would seem that in its purported attempt to further clarify the Holden standard, this Court has effectively rendered Holden virtually useless.
n
This Court’s failure to exercise restraint in this case will further aggravate the problems the Legislature sought to ameliorate in enacting the 1985 amendments of the act. In Aaron v Michigan Boiler & Engineering, supra, Chief Judge Danhof warned of the potential backlog that would be created if reviewing courts usurped the review of the magistrate accorded the commission in the statute.
There is no reason to think . . . that this savings in appellate time at the administrative level was intended to be at the expense of the Court of Appeals. It is neither necessary nor desirable for this Court to make an independent review of the whole record to determine if the appellate commission erred in finding that the magistrate’s findings of fact were not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record.
* * *
The result of this would be an increase in this Court’s backlog and an increase in the appellate commission’s backlog, neither of which comports with the intention of the Legislature when it adopted § 861a.
*547Although the standard of review employed by the appellate commission is different than the standard of review employed by the appeal board, the reviewing responsibilities of this Court with regard to workers’ compensation cases has not changed. That is, this Court will review the appellate commission’s opinions, as it did the appeal board’s opinions, for errors of law. Section 861a(14), supra. If there is any competent evidence to support an appellate commission finding that the magistrate’s findings of fact were not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record, then this Court will affirm. [Aaron at 706-708.]
In light of Chief Judge Danhof’s wise remarks, I would not expand upon the self-restrained standard established by this Court in Holden and would find that the majority’s holding impedes the statutorily prescribed role of the commission as an administrative appellate entity. Moreover, I maintain that a more expanded role for judicial review can, and indeed should, only be defined by the Legislature.
m
Accordingly, I would find that this Court’s decision in Holden sufficiently describes the standard of review of the magistrate by the commission, and of the commission by a reviewing court as follows:
If it appears on judicial appellate review that the wcac carefully examined the record, was duly cognizant of the deference to be given to the decision of the magistrate, did not “misapprehend or grossly misapply” the substantial evidence standard, and gave an adequate reason grounded in the record for reversing the magistrate, the judicial tendency should be to deny leave to appeal or, if it is granted, to affirm, in recognition that the Legislature provided for administrative appellate review by the seven-member wcac *548of decisions of thirty magistrates, and bestowed on the wcac final fact-finding responsibility subject to constitutionally limited judicial review. [Id. at 269.]
Pursuant to this Holden analysis, I would find that reviewing courts should affirm the commission’s decision when the commission clearly indicates that it was cognizant of the due deference it must accord the magistrate. The commission’s decision should only be altered or reversed by an appellate court if the appellate court can show that the commission grossly misapplied the substantial evidence standard in its review of the magistrate and, in so doing, exceeded its statutory authority. MCL 418.861a(14); MSA 17.237(861a)(14).
IV
When applied to the facts in Dudley, I would find that the Holden analysis requires a determination that the commission did not exceed its authority by rejecting the magistrate’s finding regarding credibility because it was not supported by the requisite substantial evidence standard. MCL 418.861a(3); MSA 17.237(861a)(3). Upon reviewing the record, I concur with the Court of Appeals that
[t]his Court reviews the wcac’s finding to determine if it is supported by competent evidence. We conclude that the wcac’s finding is so supported. Plaintiff’s history of the March 4, 1988 injury was inconsistent. Dr. Schneeberger’s testimony to the effect that plaintiff’s condition was aggravated by the injury was based in large part on the inaccurate history given by plaintiff. Further, the magistrate failed to analyze the impact of plaintiff’s preexisting condition on his alleged disability, in spite of the fact that each physician acknowledged the existence of his degenerative arthritis. The wcac found that given plaintiff’s lack of credibility *549regarding the March 4, 1988 injury, the evidence supported a finding that plaintiff’s condition was related to the aging process. The physicians’ testimony regarding plaintiff’s preexisting condition supported this finding.
Further, competent evidence supported the finding that plaintiff’s condition was related to the aging process rather than to his employment. [Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued June 23, 1995 (Docket No. 168027), slip op at 2.]
I, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion with respect to its holding in Dudley v Morrison Industrial Equipment Co, and would affirm the Court of Appeals affirmance of the commission in that case.
Riley, J., concurred with Weaver, J.
Kelly, J., took no part in the decision of this case.

 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued April 12, 1995 (Docket No. 175556).

 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued June 23, 1995 (Docket No. 168027).

 MCL 418.861a(13); MSA 17.237(861a)(13) provides:
A review of the evidence pursuant to this section shall include both a qualitative and quantitative analysis of that evidence in order to ensure a full, thorough, and fair review.

 Under the majority’s holding a claimant can obtain judicial review merely by asserting that the commission did not act within “its powers,” in which case, the appellate court will assume the reviewing function of the commission under MCL 418.861a(13); MSA 17.237(861a)(13), a provision that the statute did not intend apply to any appellate court. Instead, the statute clearly requires that an appellate court affirm the judgment of the commission absent fraud or a finding that the commission acted without authority. MCL 418.861a(14); MSA 17.237(861a)(14).

 MCL 418.861a(13); MSA 17.237(861a)(13) provides:
A review of the evidence pursuant to this section shall include both a qualitative and quantitative analysis of that evidence in order to ensure a full, thorough, and fair review.
The implication that the commission should not make credibility determinations contrary to the magistrates’ assessments stems from the majority’s disposition of these two cases, Goff and Dudley. In Goff where the magistrate specifically found the claimant to be incredible, this Court found “the findings of the magistrate could not be conclusive .... Consequently, the WCAC correctly determined that it was not bound by the magistrate’s decision.” Ante at 527-528.
Whereas, in Dudley, where the magistrate found plaintiff credible, this Court found that the commission acted beyond the scope of its authority by conducting a qualitative review of the whole record that resulted in finding claimant’s testimony to be inconsistent and unreliable.

 Regarding credibility assessments in Aaron v Michigan Boiler & Engineering, supra at 701, the Court points out:
MERC v Detroit Symphony Orchestra [393 Mich 116; 223 NW2d 283 (1974)] involved credibility issues and deference to the trial examiner who heard the testimony firsthand. In most workers’ compensation cases, the expert testimony is by deposition so the magistrate does not see and hear the expert witnesses. Therefore, the appellate commission could reasonably conclude that a magistrate’s decision based on expert testimony given by way of deposition was not entitled to any deference with regard to credibility since both the magistrate and the appellate commission reviewed a written record of the expert witness’ testimony.

 The Aaron Court also found that
it is inconsistent to view current statutory provisions that give the appellate commission less reviewing power than the appeal board had as somehow increasing the scope of review of the Court of Appeals. Actually, the decrease in power at the administrative review level constitutes less, not more, reason to expand this Court’s reviewing authority. [Id. at 706.]

 In Holden, this Court acknowledged the differing respective roles of the appellate administrative review and the appellate reviewing courts. The Holden majority clearly noted that the
substantial evidence standard provides for administrative appellate review more deferential to the hearing officer’s decision than de novo review, but for more searching review by the WCAC than judicial review under the “any evidence standard.” The constitution provides for such limited judicial review:
“Findings of fact in workmen’s compensation proceedings shall be conclusive in the absence of fraud unless otherwise provided by law. [Const 1963, art 6, § 28.]” [Holden at 261-262.]

 This Court’s holding in Holden was based, in part, on the following persuasive reasoning:
[S]ome latitude must be given the WCAC, should it find that the magistrate's findings of fact are not supported by “competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record," if there is to be any effective appellate review, administrative or judicial, at all. And that if the appellate courts were not to allow such latitude to the WCAC, they would find that they were increasingly called upon to perform the appellate reviewing function so that there would be effective appellate review at some level.
Due deference should be given to the administrative expertise of the WCAC, as well as . . . the magistrate. Recognition that a WCAC panel brings to the table the administrative expertise of more than one person may, depending on the factual or legal issue, be appropriate. [Id. at 268 (emphasis added).]

 This is evident when one considers the four-part guide this Court established in Holden to explain the standard for reviewing commission decisions established in that case. That four-part guide included the provision that the commission did not “misapprehend or grossly misapply” the substantial evidence standard. Id. at 269.