Court Opinion

ID: 9745348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:50:18.740845+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:46.743084
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SIMON, also dissenting: While I join Justice Goldenhersh’s disagreement with the majority’s decision to terminate the plaintiff’s obligation to pay maintenance, I believe that the statute requires proof of sexual intercourse and that any change in the meaning of “conjugal basis” as used in the statute must be adopted by the legislature. In 1977, the General Assembly passed the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, par. 101 et seq.). Section 510(b), which was enacted at the time the Act was first passed, required a showing of a conjugal relationship in order to terminate maintenance payments. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 40, par. 510(b).) In 1982, the legislature amended portions of section 510(b) but did not change the conjugal-basis requirement. From 1977 until the amendment of the statute in 1982, the appellate court interpreted section 510(b) on six occasions. (See In re Support of Halford (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 609; Schoenhard v. Schoenhard (1979), 74 Ill. App. 3d 296; In re Marriage of McGowan (1980), 84 Ill. App. 3d 609; In re Marriage of Bramson (1980), 83 Ill. App. 3d 657; In re Marriage of Olson (1981), 98 Ill. App. 3d 316; In re Marriage of Cohenour (1981), 101 Ill. App. 3d 362.) In each of those cases, the appellate court held that the term “conjugal basis” as used in the 1977 version of the statute required a showing of sexual intercourse. The legislature, then, had a clear indication of the court’s interpretation of the meaning of “conjugal basis” when it amended section 510(b) in 1982. Because those amendments did not change the “conjugal basis” requirement, I must conclude that the legislature intended to continue the requirement of sexual intercourse. Otherwise, it would have clarified that portion of the statute along with the other changes it made. This conclusion is dictated by both sound reasoning and principles of statutory interpretation this court has traditionally followed. In Hupp v. Gray (1978), 73 Ill. 2d 78, 85-86, for example, this court said: “[W]e must recognize that a reenacted statute will be given the same construction as that given the prior act, since the legislature is presumed to know the construction which has been given to the statute and, by reenactment, is assumed to have intended for the new statute to have the same effect. (City of Champaign v. City of Champaign Township (1959), 16 Ill. 2d 58.) Thus, an amendatory act is not only to be construed as continuing in effect the unchanged portions thereof (Gaither v. Lager (1954), 2 Ill. 2d 293) but, more significantly, if previously construed terms in the unamended sections are used in the amendment, it is generally concluded that the legislature intended to adopt the prior construction given to these terms. 1A Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction sec. 22.35 (4th ed. 1972).” (See also Froud v. Celotex Corp. (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 324, 336; Stryker v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 507, 512-13; Illinois Power Co. v. City of Jacksonville (1960), 18 Ill. 2d 618, 622; Village of Glencoe v. Hurford (1925), 317 Ill. 203, 217.) The legislature was aware of the court’s interpretation of section 510(b). Its decision to amend 510(b) without changing the requirement of a “conjugal basis” reflects its intent to follow the sexual connotation the word “conjugal” had already been given by appellate court decisions. Because of the legislature’s action after the numerous appellate court interpretations, the majority is incorrect when it construes the statute to mean that sexual intercourse need not be shown. See Hart & Sachs, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 1381-1417 (tent. ed. 1958).