Court Opinion

ID: 9917091
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-11 16:08:24.256243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:00:23.057972
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Stamaty, 2024-Ohio-54.]

                                        COURT OF APPEALS
                                     FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO
                                    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO                                :       JUDGES:
                                             :       Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
        Plaintiff-Appellee                   :       Hon. John W. Wise, J.
                                             :       Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
-vs-                                         :
                                             :
HARRY STAMATY                                :       Case No. 23 CA 36
                                             :
        Defendant-Appellant                  :       OPINION

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                             Appeal from the Court of Common
                                                     Pleas, Case No. 2022 CR 253

JUDGMENT:                                         Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part, and
                                                  Remanded

DATE OF JUDGMENT:                                    January 9, 2024

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee                               For Defendant-Appellant

MARK A. BALAZIK                                      CHRISTOPHER BAZELEY
219 West Main Street                                 9200 Montgomery Road
Suite 101                                            Suite 8A
Fairfield County, Case No. 23 CA 36                                                      2

Lancaster, OH 43130                                 Cincinnati, OH 45242

King, J.

       {¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Harry Stamaty appeals the July 11, 2023 judgment of

the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff-Appellee is the state of Ohio.

                        FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       {¶ 2} A recitation of the underlying facts is unnecessary for our resolution of this

appeal. On June 16, 2022 the Fairfield County Grand Jury returned an indictment

charging Stamaty with one count each of rape, a felony of the first degree, aggravated

burglary, a felony of the first degree, violating a protection order, a felony of the third

degree, and domestic violence, a felony of the third degree.

       {¶ 3} Following negotiations with the state, on July 7, 2023, the state dismissed

the rape charge in exchange for Stamaty's pleas of guilty to the remaining charges. During

the plea hearing the trial court advised Stamaty he would be subject to post-release

control (PRC) upon his release from prison, the terms of his post-release control, and the

fact that his post-release control would be mandatory. The trial court further provided

Stamaty with the five required notifications pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law, R.C.

2929.19(B)(2)(c)(i)-(v). Transcript of hearing (T.) 6-9. Stamaty then waived his right to a

separate sentencing hearing and agreed to be sentenced immediately following the trial

court's acceptance of his pleas. T. 12-13. He was subsequently sentenced to an indefinite

prison term of 6-9 years.

       {¶ 4} On October 11, 2023 we granted Stamaty's motion for delayed appeal. The

matter is now before this court for consideration. Stamaty raises two assignments of error

as follow:
Fairfield County, Case No. 23 CA 36                                                      3

                                               I

       {¶ 5} "THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY ADVISE STAMATY OF HIS

RIGHTS UNDER THE REAGAN TOKES ACT AS REQUIRED BY R.C. 2929.19 "

                                               II

       {¶ 6} "THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY IMPOSE POST RELEASE

CONTROL (PRC)."

                                               I

       {¶ 7} In his first assignment of error, Stamaty argues that during sentencing, the

trial court failed to provide him with the required statutory notifications regarding his

indefinite prison term pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B). We disagree.

       {¶ 8} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c)(i-v), when imposing a non-life felony

indefinite prison term, a trial court must notify an offender of all of the following:

              (i) That it is rebuttably presumed that the offender will be released

              from service of the sentence on the expiration of the minimum prison

              term imposed as part of the sentence or on the offender's

              presumptive earned early release date, as defined in section

              2967.271 of the Revised Code, whichever is earlier;

              (ii) That the department of rehabilitation and correction may rebut the

              presumption described in division (B)(2)(c)(i) of this section if, at a
Fairfield County, Case No. 23 CA 36                                                      4

            hearing held under section 2967.271 of the Revised Code, the

            department makes specified determinations regarding the offender's

            conduct while confined, the offender's rehabilitation, the offender's

            threat to society, the offender's restrictive housing, if any, while

            confined, and the offender's security classification;

            (iii) That if, as described in division (B)(2)(c)(ii) of this section, the

            department at the hearing makes the specified determinations and

            rebuts the presumption, the department may maintain the offender's

            incarceration after the expiration of that minimum term or after that

            presumptive earned early release date for the length of time the

            department determines to be reasonable, subject to the limitation

            specified in section 2967.271 of the Revised Code;

            (iv) That the department may make the specified determinations and

            maintain the offender's incarceration under the provisions described

            in divisions (B)(2)(c)(i) and (ii) of this section more than one time,

            subject to the limitation specified in section 2967.271 of the Revised

            Code;

            (v) That if the offender has not been released prior to the expiration

            of the offender's maximum prison term imposed as part of the

            sentence, the offender must be released upon the expiration of that

            term.
Fairfield County, Case No. 23 CA 36                                                      5

      {¶ 9} Our review of the record confirms the trial court properly notified Stamaty

regarding his indefinite sentence during its plea colloquy. T. 7-9. Stamaty then waived his

right to a separate sentencing hearing via a written plea of guilty and waiver. T. 12-13.

The trial court did not repeat the same notifications during the sentencing phase of the

hearing. This court has previously found, however, "[w]hen the trial court provides proper

post-release control notification before accepting the defendant's guilty plea and then

proceeds immediately to sentencing, the plea hearing and the sentencing hearing cannot,

for purposes of the post-release control statutes, reasonably be deemed to have been

conducted separately." State v. Renne, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 2020CA00036, 2021-Ohio-

2648 ¶ 18 citing State v. Dardinger, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-160467, 2017-Ohio-1525, ¶

13; State v. Russell, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 16AP–108, 2016-Ohio-3349, ¶ 9. We find the

same is true regarding the notifications required before imposing an indefinite sentence.

We therefore find Stamaty was properly notified of the appropriate factors regarding his

indefinite sentence.

      {¶ 10} The first assignment of error is overruled.

                                            II

      {¶ 11} In his second assignment of error, Stamaty argues the trial court failed to

advise him of the term of his post-release control and the consequences for violating post-

release control during the sentencing hearing. We agree in part and disagree in part.

      {¶ 12} During sentencing, a trial court must provide an offender with certain

notifications regarding post-release control. Recently, in State v. Bates, 167 Ohio St.3d

197, 2022-Ohio-475, 190 N.E.3d 610, ¶ 11, the Supreme Court of Ohio stated:
Fairfield County, Case No. 23 CA 36                                                        6

              It is established that "a trial court has a statutory duty to provide

              notice of postrelease control at the sentencing hearing." State v.

              Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 23,

              overruled on other grounds by Harper. The trial court must advise

              the offender at the sentencing hearing of the term of supervision,

              whether postrelease control is discretionary or mandatory, and the

              consequences of violating postrelease control. See Grimes, 151

              Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio-2927, 85 N.E.3d 700, at ¶ 11. Among other

              consequences, an offender's violation of a postrelease-control

              sanction or condition may result in the APA imposing a prison term

              on the offender. R.C. 2967.28(F)(3). However, the maximum

              cumulative prison term for all violations under R.C. 2967.28(F)(3)

              "shall not exceed one-half" of the stated prison term originally

              imposed.

       {¶ 13} Our review of the record reveals that during the plea colloquy, Stamaty was

advised of the term of supervision for each count, and that supervision was mandatory

for each count. T. 6-7. As noted in our first assignment of error, when the trial court

proceeds immediately to sentencing, "the plea hearing and the sentencing hearing

cannot, for purposes of the post-release control statutes, reasonably be deemed to have

been conducted separately." Renne, supra. We therefore find Stamaty was properly

advised of the term and mandatory nature of his post-release control. The trial court failed,

however, to advise Stamaty of the consequences for violating post-release control either
Fairfield County, Case No. 23 CA 36                                                       7

during the plea colloquy or during sentencing. Accordingly, we sustain Stamaty's second

assignment of error, reverse the trial court's judgment, and remand for resentencing with

the proper notification of post-release control. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all

other respects.

       {¶ 14} Judgment reversed in part and remanded for resentencing.

By King, J.,

Hoffman, P.J. and

Wise, J. concur.