Court Opinion

ID: 9543171
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:42:51.47814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:49.727913
License: Public Domain

ROSE, Justice
(dissenting).
In this case, American Granby Company, State Stove and Manufacturing Company, and Billings Pipe and Pump Supply Company were dismissed on summary judgment for the reason that the court determined *53that it did not have jurisdiction over the defendants because service was not effected. The orders for summary judgment did not contain the appeal-permitting language of Rule 54(b), W.R.C.P., (pertaining to judgment upon multiple claims or involving multiple parties), which language is as follows :
“ . . . . there is no just reason for delay . . . .” (pertaining to the appellate procedure)
We have held in various cases that if the order comes within the rule of 54(b), the aforesaid language must appear in'the order, if the party or parties against whom the summary order is granted are to be permitted an appeal before the remaining litigants have had the issues determined as to them. See Reeves v. Harris, Wyo., 380 P.2d 769, 770; Wheatland Irrigation District v. Two Bar-Muleshoe Water Co., Wyo., 431 P.2d 257, 259; Spriggs v. Pioneer Carissa Gold Mines, Inc., Wyo., 453 P.2d 400, 401; Ambariantz v. Cunningham, Wyo., 460 P.2d 216, 217; and finally Whitehouse v. Stack, Wyo., 458 P.2d 100.
In the last mentioned case is was said: “. . . It is too well settled to require discussion that there can be no appeal from a judgment against one of multiple parties or from the adjudication of one of multiple claims without an express determination by the trial court as to lack of just reason for delay. Not only are the provisions of Rule 54(b), W.R.C.P., clear, but this court has spoken repeatedly on the subject.” [Emphasis supplied]
So far as I am concerned, this is the settled holding of this court with respect to Rule 54(b), W.R.C.P.
The problem here arises, however, out of the question of whether or not the rulings of the court on the motions are “final judgments]” within the concept of Rule 54(b). If they are not “final judgment^]” then of course 54(b) does not apply. I say this for the reason that 54(b) concerns itself with an “entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties . . . .” [Emphasis supplied]
Rule 54(a) is the definitions section and defines a judgment as contemplated by the rule, which definition is as follows:
“A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties in action. A direction of a court or judge, made or entered in writing, and not included in a judgment, is an order.” [Emphasis supplied] (I emphasize the word "order” because that word is used in Rule 72 in the context of what is a “final order” from which an appeal can • be taken.) [Emphasis supplied]
Therefore the question becomes one of whether or not these rulings of the court attained the dignity of “final judgments] thus requiring the appeal-permitting language of Rule 54(b). This must be decided on the basis of whether or not they are “final determination^] of the rights of the parties.” (54(a)) If these orders of dismissal do not finally determine the rights of the parties they are final “order[s]” and not “judgment[s]” within the contemplation of Rule 54.
The definition for judgment which says that a judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties finds its genesis in Gramm v. Fisher, 3 Wyo. 595, 29 P. 377, where this court in 1891 said:
. . A judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action; . . . ” (§ 2657, Revised Statutes of Wyoming 1887 [S.L. 1886, ch. 60, § 317. R.S.O., 5310])
This rule was reiterated in 1968 in Wyoming State Treasurer v. Neizwaag, Wyo., 444 P.2d 327, 329, where we restated the rule of Gramm v. Fisher, supra, and said:
“. . . Such statutory definition was readopted by Rule 72(a), . . . .”
Is a rule of the court granting a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the long-arm statute did not constitute service and give the court jurisdiction a:
*54“final determination of the rights of the parties in action;”? (Rule 54(a)) [Emphasis supplied]
In 46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments, § 1, p. 313, entitled, “Generally; definitions.”, it is said:
“A judgment is the law’s last word in a judicial controversy. ... It may be defined as the court’s official and final consideration and determination of the respective rights and obligations of the parties, as those rights and obligations presently exist, upon matters submitted to the court in an action or proceeding.”
In § 3 of the- same text, page 315, the distinction is made between judgments and orders, where the text says:
“ . . . . To distinguish a judgment from an order, the test is not its designation, hut whether it is a final adjudication of the cause, or a ruling on a motion, preliminary or collateral to the final adjudication. . . . ” [Emphasis supplied]
In 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 5, pp. 29-30, under the heading, “Distinguished from Rules and Orders,” it is said:
“As a general rule, judgments are to be distinguished from orders or rules; one does not include the other. ... As distinguished from a judgment, an order is the mandate or determination of the court on some subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an action, not disposing of the merits, but adjudicating a preliminary point or directing some step in the proceedings; . . . . A judgment, on the other hand, is the determination of the court on the issue presented by the pleadings which ascertains and fixes absolutely and finally the rights of the parties in the particular suit with relation to the subject matter in litigation, and puts an end to the suit. The disinguishing characteristic of a jdugment is that it is final, while that of an order, when it relates to proceeding in an action, is that it is interlocutory, ....
“. . . An order or rule ordinarily is not founded on the whole record in the case, but is granted on a special application to the court called a ‘motion;’ the determination of such motion is an order, not a judgment. A special proceeding regularly terminates in a final order, not a judgment, although the final order in a special proceeding is in effect a judgment and is sometimes referred to as such." [Emphasis supplied]
Under the above Wyoming authority and general text authority, as well as the actual wording of Rule 54(a), I would suggest that the order based upon the motion for summary judgment bottomed in the concept that the court did not have jurisdiction because of the long-arm statute, is an “order” and not a “judgment” and cannot be a “final judgment” under Rule 54(b). If this is true, the contention made by the movant to the effect that the court’s findings and “order” do not contain an express determination that there is no reason for delay — becomes irrelevant and immaterial to any issue involved here and cannot formulate the grounds for a dismissal.
It seems even more clear that the court’s rulings are not “final judgments]” when contemplated in the light of Rule 72. Rule 72 has to do with appeals and sets out what a “final order” is from which an appeal may be taken to this court.
Rule72(a) says:
“ ‘Final Order’ Defined. A final order is: (1) an order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order in effect determines the action and prevents ajudgment; . . . .”
I would suggest that the rulings of the court on the motions in question here come clearly within the definition section of Rule 72(a), i. e., that these rulings are orders affecting a substantial right and they have determined the action and they have prevented a judgment. Therefore, they are appealable under the rule. The rulings, on the other hand, are not final de*55terminations by the court of the issues presented by the pleadings.
Rule 72(c), under the heading, “Review by Supreme Court,” provides:
“A judgment rendered or final order made by the district court may be reversed in whole or in part, vacated or modified by the supreme court for errors appearing on the record.” [Emphasis supplied]
I suggest that the majority opinion simply does not distinguish between a “judgment” as defined in Rule 54(a), W.R.C.P., and an “order” as conceived under the law above cited and Rule 72(a), W.R.C.P.
To designate a court’s “order” a “summary judgment” doesn’t make it a “judgment” under the above rules and cited law.
For the above reasons, it is my opinion that the rulings of the lower court are properly “order[s],” under Rule 72(a), and are not final “judgments]”, under Rule 54; that the authorities cited in the majority opinion are generally inapplicable to the issue here and, therefore, the motion for dismissal of the appeal should be denied.
McCLINTOCK, J., concurring in dissent.