Court Opinion

ID: 9414816
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 17:00:33.394881+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:07.145591
License: Public Domain

PRECEDENTIAL

         UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
              FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                   ___________

                       No. 23-1257
                       __________

             UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

                            v.

                PATRICK SHAKNITZ,
                            Appellant
        ____________________________________

      On Appeal from the United States District Court
          for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
                (D.C. No. 2-20-cr-00359-001)
       District Judge: Honorable Wendy Beetlestone
       ____________________________________

   Submitted on Appellant’s Motion for Summary Action
    Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
                       June 1, 2023

 Before: KRAUSE, PORTER and CHUNG, Circuit Judges

              (Opinion filed: August 2, 2023)

Michelle Rotella
Office of the United States Attorney
615 Chestnut Street
Suite 1250
Philadelphia, PA 19106
       Counsel for Appellee

Robert Epstein
Federal Community Defender Office for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania
601 Walnut Street
Suite 540 West
Philadelphia, PA 19106
       Counsel for Appellant
                       ___________

                         OPINION
                        ___________

PER CURIAM

       Appellant Patrick Shaknitz (“Shaknitz”) filed an
unopposed Motion for Summary Remand based on our recent
decision in United States v. Santos Diaz, 66 F.4th 435 (3d Cir.
2023). We will grant the Motion, vacate the sentence, and
remand to the District Court for resentencing.

       Shaknitz pleaded guilty to three counts of distribution
and attempted distribution of child pornography, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(1), (b)(1), and one count of possession
of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(4),
(b)(1). Shaknitz was sentenced to a 170-month term of
imprisonment and a five-year term of supervised release.
During sentencing, the District Court orally imposed a

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condition on Shaknitz’s incarceration, limiting his contact with
his five-year-old son to telephone only. In its written
judgment, the District Court did not include its own
previously-announced imposition of the condition; rather, the
District Court recommended that the Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”) impose the telephone-only condition. The judgment
did not state that the recommendation superseded the District
Court’s oral pronouncement.

       Shaknitz timely appealed.

       The District Court’s oral imposition of the telephone-
only condition conflicts with this Court’s holding in Diaz that
a sentencing court lacks “inherent authority to impose a no-
contact order during [a defendant’s] incarceration term.” 66
F.4th at 446. Because a District Court’s oral pronouncement
has controlling effect, and because it is unclear whether the
judgment was intended by the District Court to replace its
mandate with a recommendation, we must vacate Shaknitz’s
sentence. See United States v. Chamser, 952 F.2d 50, 52 n.2
(3d Cir. 1991) (“[I]n the event of a conflict between the oral
pronouncement [of a sentence] and the judgment, the former
… control[s].”); 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.

       Though we held in Diaz that a District Court does not
have inherent authority to impose no-contact orders as a
condition of a defendant’s incarceration, we also noted that “a
District Court has the authority to make recommendations to
the BOP about [a defendant’s] conditions of
confinement.” Diaz, 66 F.4th at 447. We reiterate here that
Diaz did not disturb the authority of sentencing courts to
recommend to the BOP that defendants’ contact with others be

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limited where necessary and appropriate.1 To the extent the
District Court intended to make a recommendation to the BOP,
that portion of the District Court’s judgment does not
contravene the holding in Diaz, and we leave to the District
Court on remand whether to renew its recommendation.

       For the foregoing reasons, the Motion is granted, and
we will vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing by the
District Court in accordance with Diaz.

1
 Nor does Diaz preclude any interested party from seeking a
no-contact order through other appropriate processes such as
protection orders.

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