Court Opinion

ID: 9945887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 19:00:54.644806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:22:38.377995
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-40700           Document: 27-1         Page: 1      Date Filed: 02/28/2024

          United States Court of Appeals
               for the Fifth Circuit
                                  ____________                    United States Court of Appeals
                                                                           Fifth Circuit

                                                                         FILED
                                   No. 23-40700
                                                                  February 28, 2024
                                 Summary Calendar
                                 ____________                       Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                         Clerk
Jesse A. Reynolds,

                                                                 Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                         versus

Titus County; Titus County Sheriff’s Office; Brian
Lee, Titus County Judge, Individually and in Official Capacity; John
Cobern, Titus County Attorney, Individually and in Official Capacity,

                                           Defendants—Appellees.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Eastern District of Texas
                            USDC No. 5:23-CV-99
                  ______________________________

Before Davis, Ho, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
      Plaintiff-Appellant, Jesse A. Reynolds, proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis (“IFP”), filed a civil rights complaint against Titus County, Titus
County Sheriff’s Office, Titus County Judge Brian Lee, and Titus County
Attorney John Cobern (collectively “Defendants”). The district court

      _____________________
      *
          This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
 Case: 23-40700          Document: 27-1          Page: 2      Date Filed: 02/28/2024

                                      No. 23-40700

dismissed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to
state a claim, as frivolous, and for seeking money damages from defendants
immune from such relief. We AFFIRM.
                                            I.
        On September 26, 2023, Reynolds filed a civil rights complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants conspired to deprive
him of his civil rights, including “his right to bear arms protected by the 2nd
Amendment, his rights to due process . . . , and rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” 1 In particular, Reynolds’s complaint asserts that a
Titus County law enforcement officer violated his Second and Fourth
Amendment rights by falsely arresting him and unlawfully confiscating his
firearm and vehicle. Reynolds further alleges that Titus County Attorney,
John Cobern, filed misdemeanor charges against him with malicious intent
and violated his civil rights by failing to drop these charges due to insufficient
evidence. The complaint also states that Titus County Judge, Brian Lee,
deprived Reynolds of his civil rights in the following ways: (1) ordering a
competency examination of Reynolds in violation of state procedure; (2)
ruling Reynolds incompetent without a trial or the opportunity to present
evidence; and (3) dismissing the charges against Reynolds without notifying
him. Finally, Reynolds’s complaint alleges that Titus County violated his
civil rights given the above violations of its officers and “by creating a false
sense of law & order, and abuse of process by the county court system.” For
relief, Reynolds seeks $92,382,812 in damages.

        _____________________
        1
        In addition to filing his pro se complaint, Reynolds also filed a motion to proceed
IFP. The magistrate judge granted Reynolds’s motion to proceed IFP.

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                                         No. 23-40700

        The magistrate judge recommended the dismissal of Reynolds’s
complaint sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 2 Specifically,
the magistrate judge concluded that Reynolds’s claims against the County
Attorney and Judge are barred by judicial and prosecutorial immunity, his
claims against Titus County and the Titus County Sheriff’s Office are barred
by the statute of limitations, and his alleged claims of damages are frivolous
and implausible. Additionally, the magistrate judge recommended dismissal
with prejudice because permitting Reynolds the opportunity to amend would
be futile given that his claims are barred by the statute of limitations or
immunity. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation, and overruled Reynolds’s objections. 3 Reynolds filed a
timely notice of appeal.
                                              II.
        “We review a determination that a case is frivolous under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) for abuse of discretion.” 4 A complaint is considered
frivolous under this section “if it has no arguable basis in law or in fact.”5
Additionally, we review de novo a district court’s dismissal under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)–(iii) for failure to state a claim or because a complaint
        _____________________
        2
         Section 1915(e)(2)(B) allows a district court to sua sponte dismiss an IFP
complaint if the suit is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may
be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief.”
        3
           The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report in full but noted that
although “the Court does not disagree with the report’s comments about the alleged
damages, the Court finds it unnecessary to address the merits of the accounting for
Plaintiff’s business plans because Plaintiff fails to state a claim because of both immunity
and tolling issues.”
        4
            Newsome v. E.E.O.C., 301 F.3d 227, 231 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (citation
omitted).
        5
            Ruiz v. United States, 160 F.3d 273, 274–75 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).

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                                         No. 23-40700

seeks relief from a defendant immune from such suits. 6 Because the district
court here referred to all three sections of § 1915(e)(2)(B) in dismissing
Reynolds’s complaint, we review the issues de novo. 7
        On appeal, Reynolds asserts that the various types of immunity
invoked by the district court are not absolute and are inapplicable in cases
involving a “conspiracy to deprive a person of their civil rights.” Reynolds
further argues that the statute of limitations is tolled for his false arrest claims
against Titus County and the Titus County Sheriff’s Office, and thus the
district court erred in dismissing these claims as time-barred.
        As to Judge Lee, the district court correctly dismissed Reynolds’s
claims pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) based on judicial immunity. Judges
are immune from damages suits for all actions taken in their judicial capacity,
unless such actions are taken in the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” 8
Reynolds does not allege that Judge Lee acted in the absence of jurisdiction
or in a non-judicial capacity. Additionally, Reynolds’s argument that judicial
immunity is inapplicable here because Judge Lee acted in bad faith is without
merit given that judicial immunity “applies even when the judge is accused
of acting maliciously and corruptly.” 9 Accordingly, we find no error in the
district court’s dismissal of Reynolds’s claims against Judge Lee.

        _____________________
        6
          Newsome, 301 F.3d at 231 (stating the standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii));
Perez v. United States, 481 F. App’x 203, 206 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (unpublished)
(stating the standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii)).
        7
            Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
        8
          Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
        9
          Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).

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                                          No. 23-40700

        As to Titus County Attorney, John Cobern, we also conclude the
district court correctly dismissed Reynolds’s claims pursuant to
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) based on prosecutorial immunity. “A prosecutor is
absolutely immune when []he acts in h[is] role as an advocate for the state by
initiating and pursuing prosecution.” 10 Such “[a]bsolute immunity shields
prosecutors even when they initiate prosecution maliciously, wantonly, or
negligently.” 11 As explained by the district court, Reynolds’s assertions that
prosecutorial immunity is inapplicable here because Cobern withheld
evidence, relied on a “fabricated” report by a court-appointed psychologist,
and conspired against Reynolds are all foreclosed by precedent. 12 Thus, we
affirm the dismissal of Reynolds’s claims against John Cobern on grounds of
immunity.
        Finally, Reynolds’s claims against Titus County and the Titus County
Sheriff’s Office are barred by the statute of limitations and therefore were
properly dismissed under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Because there “is no federal
statute of limitations for civil rights actions brought pursuant to § 1983,”
courts must “‘borrow’ the forum state’s general personal injury limitations

        _____________________
        10
          Morgan v. Chapman, 969 F.3d 238, 244 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Beck v. Tex. State
Bd. of Dental Examiners, 204 F.3d 629, 637 (5th Cir. 2000)).
        11
             Id. (citing Rykers v. Alford, 832 F.2d 895, 897 (5th Cir. 1987)).
        12
           See Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 635 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (noting that
a prosecutor’s “suppression of exculpatory evidence is shielded by absolute immunity”
(citations omitted)); Loupe v. O’Bannon, 824 F.3d 534, 539 (5th Cir. 2016) (“A prosecutor
is absolutely immune for initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution, for actions taken
in her role as advocate for the state in the courts, or when her conduct is intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)).

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                                          No. 23-40700

period.” 13 Courts additionally “borrow” the forum state’s equitable tolling
principles. 14
        In Texas, the limitations period for personal injury claims is two
years. 15 Reynolds acknowledges that he waited over six years after his arrest
and over four years after the charges against him were dropped before
bringing the present lawsuit, and he does not dispute the two-year statute of
limitations applies. Instead, he argues that the statute of limitations is tolled
here for two reasons: (1) in conspiracy cases the statute of limitations does
not begin to run until the last overt act, and (2) Judge Lee issued a
“fraudulent order” dismissing Reynolds’s charges. However, Reynolds fails
to explain how either argument provides a basis for tolling his claims against
Titus County and the Titus County Sheriff’s Office under Texas law. 16 We
thus hold that Reynolds’s claims against Titus County and the Titus County
Sheriff’s office are time-barred.
        Based on the foregoing, the district court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.

        _____________________
        13
             Rotella v. Pederson, 144 F.3d 892, 897 (5th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
        14
             Id. (citation omitted).
        15
             Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.003.
        16
           “In Texas, two doctrines . . . may toll limitations (or delay accrual): fraudulent
concealment, or injuries that are both inherently undiscoverable and objectively
verifiable.” Moon v. City of El Paso, 906 F.3d 352, 358–59 (5th Cir. 2018) (citations
omitted).

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