Court Opinion

ID: 9702814
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:24:58.390002+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:41.760758
License: Public Domain

CADY, J.
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Our role in an appeal is to resolve the issues presented in the case based on the facts and the governing jurisprudence. The majority steps out from its well-defined appellate role and, instead, engages in rulemaking. I would decide the case based on the issue presented and affirm the district court.
The district court in this case denied Folkerts’ request to be absent from the deposition of the victim until the lawyers completed all questions pertaining to the description of the assailant. Folkerts objected to her presence at the deposition based on due-process grounds, and the issue presented was whether Folkerts had a right under the Due Process Clause to be absent from the deposition. The district court determined she did not, and we are presented with the same question in this interlocutory appeal.
We have previously held that a defendant does not have a right to be absent from a deposition. State v. Davis, 259 N.W.2d 812, 813 (Iowa 1977); State v. Holderness, 301 N.W.2d 733, 738 (Iowa 1981); see also State v. Randle, 603 N.W.2d 91, 93 (Iowa 1999) (holding “a defendant is not vested with a right to be absent from trial”). Additionally, our rules of criminal procedure require the *767presence of a defendant at all critical stages of the proceedings, which may include a deposition. See Iowa R.Crim. P. 2.27(1) (stating defendant “shall be personally present at every stage of the trial” except as provided in the rule); see also State v. Turner, 345 N.W.2d 552, 559 (Iowa Ct.App.1983) (“We hold that a deposition where testimony is taken for introduction at trial is a stage of trial within the meaning of rule 25(1) [now 2.27(1)].” (citing United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821 (8th Cir.1979); United States v. Provencio, 554 F.2d 361, 363 (9th Cir.1977); State v. Sanchez, 130 Ariz. 295, 635 P.2d 1217, 1221 (Ct.App.1981); State v. Basiliere, 353 So.2d 820, 821-23 (Fla.1977); State v. Hooks, 202 Kan. 68, 446 P.2d 770, 772 (1968); State v. Collins, 265 Md. 70, 288 A.2d 163 (1972); State v. Barela, 86 N.M. 104, 519 P.2d 1185 (Ct.App.1974))). But see Otteson v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 443 N.W.2d 726, 728 (Iowa 1989) (holding if a deposition is taken for discovery only — not for use at trial, the deposition is not a “stage of trial” for which the defendant must be present). This rule exists both for the benefit of the defendant and the State. See Davis, 259 N.W.2d at 813 (“The State has the obligation in a criminal case to prove the identity of the individual who committed the crime and to do so beyond a reasonable doubt. The State is entitled to have the accused present so that the witness can look into his face and answer whether he is or is not the man.”); Van Hoff v. State, 447 N.W.2d 665, 674 (Iowa Ct.App.1989) (“One of the more important purposes of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 25(1) [now 2.27(1)] is to protect the defendant’s constitutional right of confrontation in presenting evidence from which the trier of fact determines guilt.” (Citations omitted.)).
More importantly, our United States Supreme Court has held that the linchpin of due process in the area of eyewitness identification procedures is reliability of the identification, and the Court has categorically rejected a per se rule — the approach adopted by the majority in this case — that would require a specific procedure to be followed or that would forbid the use of a particular procedure. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 2253, 53 L.Ed.2d 140, 154 (1977). Instead, due process relies on a case-by-case approach based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. (“These include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation. Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself.”).
Consequently, our jurisprudence instructs that the Due Process Clause does not aid Folkerts in her claim to be absent from the eyewitness’s deposition until she can show that her presence would necessarily taint the identification process and make it unreliable. Only then would a per se rule allowing defendants to absent themselves from a witness’s deposition be appropriate. The problem in this case is that Folkerts produced no such evidence, nor made any effort to produce such evidence. Instead, she asked for a per se rule, previously rejected by Supreme Court precedent. See id. Folkerts failed to show that her attorney, through artful questioning or other means, would be unable to elicit reliable responses from the deponent concerning the identification. For example, there is no requirement in the law that a defendant must sit in full view of the deponent so as to render answers to questions about physical appearance so suggestive as to make the procedure unreliable and turn it into a waste of *768judicial time. See State v. Williams, 166 Ariz. 132, 800 P.2d 1240, 1246 (1987) (noting the deponent need not necessarily be told who is the defendant). There are myriad ways an attorney could help ensure the questioning would render reliable answers. Furthermore, defense counsel failed to identify the types of questions he wants to ask the deponent to determine the reliability of the deponent’s prior identification, and explain how the answers would be unreliable if the defendant were present. Finally, at trial, defense “ ‘[cjounsel can both cross-examine the identification witnesses and argue in summation as to factors causing doubts as to the accuracy of the identification including reference to both any suggestibility in the identification procedure and any countervailing testimony such as alibi.’ ” Manson, 432 U.S. at 113 n. 14, 97 S.Ct. at 2252 n. 14, 53 L.Ed.2d at 153 n. 14 (quoting Clemons v. United States, 408 F.2d 1230, 1251 (D.C.Cir.1968) (Leventhal, J., concurring)).
The majority disavows our established jurisprudence, sidesteps the barren record in this case, and draws upon a psychological study about mistaken eyewitness identification to formulate a new per se rule. This is not the way courts operate. We disavow laws or rules when they violate the Constitution, not when we do not like them. A procedure exists under our law to adopt new rules of criminal procedure, and we should rely upon that process to change our rules if change is warranted. In the meantime, defendants must rely upon the Constitution, as we should, to challenge the specific procedures based upon the specific facts and circumstances.
The district court properly decided the issue in this case. I would affirm the district court. The rule adopted by the majority is improper, unnecessary, and impractical.
LARSON, J., joins this dissent.