Court Opinion

ID: 9771397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:42:02.882162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:30.192022
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
This cause is important, not just because it declares that DNA evidence may be found admissible in Texas, but more so because it announces a new standard for determining admissibility of evidence premised upon novel scientific theories or techniques. In announcing the new standard the majority squarely rejects the test in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (C.A.D.C.1923), which this Court has seen fit to invoke, albeit sporadically, over the years. Zani v. State, 758 S.W.2d 233, at 241 (Tex.Cr.App.1988). Certainly the Frye rule is not without problems. See, e.g., Giannelli, P., The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-Century Later, 80 Colum.L.Rev. 1197, 1204-1231 (1980). Nevertheless, I hesitate so readily to relinquish the advantages of “general acceptance in the relevant scientific community” as a substantive standard by which a court can determine reliability, and hence, relevance of a novel scientific theory or technique.
The beginning, middle and end of the majority’s analysis is Tex.R.Cr.Evid., Rule 702. This rule reads:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
I believe the majority opinion errs to premise its argument exclusively on Rule 702.
Admissibility of novel scientific evidence, as with admissibility of any evidence, is first and foremost a question of relevancy. And relevance of novel scientific evidence is a function of its reliability.1 But Rule 702 is not meant to insure the relevance of “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.” Nor, inasmuch as relevance of scientific, etc., knowledge is a function of reliability of the theory or technique espoused, does Rule 702 require that “sci*575entific, technical or other specialized knowledge” be reliable. Tex.R.Cr.Evid., Rules 401 and 402 are the provisions that require reliability, and hence relevancy, of “specialized knowledge.” If such knowledge is not reliable/relevant, it will be inadmissible under Rule 402. That such knowledge must “assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,” it seems to me, means something else entirely. Under Rule 702, even if reliable/relevant, specialized knowledge must either supply or refute, or at least illuminate, an elemental fact (or some evidentiary fact leading to an elemental fact) in a way not readily apparent to a jury of laymen without that knowledge. Whenever it may contribute to a fuller comprehension by the jury of the evidence or the issues involved, “specialized knowledge” is admissible. By implication, specialized knowledge which does not contribute in any degree to a fuller comprehension is inadmissible, even if reliable/relevant.2 My point is this: novel scientific evidence must be “reliable,” if at all, not because otherwise it will not “assist the trier of fact” as required by Rule 702 (although that will probably be true, incidentally, since irrelevant evidence by definition fails to assist the trier of fact); rather, it must be reliable in order to be deemed relevant, under Rules 401 and 402. See note 1, ante.
In any event, I concur with the majority inasmuch as it concludes that admissibility of evidence of or based upon a novel scientific theory or technique is a function of reliability. It must be shown by the proponent of such evidence that the new theory or technique provides a valid test for the probability of the existence, vel non, of a fact of consequence to the determination of the action. Rule 401, supra. What is not “fairly obvious” to me, however, is that “scientific evidence may be shown to be reliable even though not yet generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.” Majority at 573. The majority does not elaborate.
The majority does ask, “How does the proponent of novel scientific evidence prove it to be reliable?” In answering its own question the majority supplies much that is helpful in the way of procedure. I agree that the proponent should be required to show that the theory behind a new scientific procedure is valid; that the technique is a valid application of the theory; and that the proper protocols have been followed in applying the technique in the individual case. I can accept that “all three criteria must be proven to the trial court” as a matter of admissibility of the evidence.3 Although I do not think it is compelled, I agree it is a sound idea to require that the trial court find these criteria have been established by clear and convincing evidence.
When it comes to announce a substantive test by which trial courts can exercise, and appellate courts can review the discretion to admit or exclude novel scientific evidence, the majority opinion is less than satisfactory. It is true the majority expressly makes the extent of acceptance of a new scientific theory or technique a consideration for the trial judge in determining validity. Unlike the Frye rule, however, the majority's test leaves the ultimate decision of validity to the trial court. The majority rejects the Frye rule because under it some evidence based upon presum*576ably “valid” theory and technique will be inadmissible simply because the “relevant scientific community” has not caught up. This seems to me to beg the question of who most properly decides questions of validity of novel scientific theories. The greatest advantage of the Frye test is that it essentially leaves the question of validity of novel theories and techniques to those whose vocation it is to view the world from the perspective of the scientific method, viz: the scientists. Trial judges are ill equipped to make the determination whether a given theory or technique has been sufficiently “tested in the crucible of controlled experimentation and study” that it can accurately be said to gauge the probability of the existence, vel non, of a fact in issue.4 The Frye rule does not require him to make this determination. Instead it requires him to decide whether scientists themselves believe the theory or technique has been sufficiently tested.
The majority worries that evidence that may ultimately be accepted as reliable by the general run of scientists will be lost in the meantime under the Frye rule. The contested evidence may make the difference between conviction and acquittal. It seems to me that a conservative approach is justified, however. Convictions now on the basis of evidence that later proves universally rejected by the scientific community will not only result in injustice, but also make the courts look gullible, even foolish.
Presumably the majority would respond that the trial court can measure the sufficiency of a novel theory or technique to produce relevant evidence by the testimony, in the form of opinion or otherwise, of an expert, admissible under Rule 702, as to its reliability. This testimony itself, however, may be subject to objection under Tex.R.Cr.Evid., Rule 705(c), “unless the party offering the testimony first establishes sufficient underlying facts or data.” But what, in this context, constitutes sufficient underlying facts or data? Is it sufficient that the expert himself believes the new theory has been sufficiently tested by whatever means that scientific method would prescribe in the circumstances? And what is the basis of his opinion of what scientific method would prescribe as an appropriate regimen of testing? Are the underlying facts and data supporting that opinion sufficient under Rule 705(c)? These questions are esoteric to begin with, involving as they do a discipline beyond the training and common experience of the average judge. They are doubly esoteric because they involve new areas of science beyond the common exposure of scientists themselves. Yet the majority is content to let the trial judge measure reliability, and hence relevance of a novel scientific theory by the untested, and potentially untestable opinion of as few as one “expert.”
The majority believes that validity of a novel theory or technique can best be aired in context of the adversarial process. The proponent of evidence presents his expert to champion the cause of admissibility, and then the opponent counters with his own expert to tell the trial court, from the perspective of the scientific method, all the deficiencies in the testing to date that would render the theory or technique questionable. The trial court then makes a reasoned and informed decision. Entertaining the assumption that the trial judge can adequately take the place of the relevant scientific community as the arbiter of acceptability of new theories or techniques, this would seem an appropriate procedure. It certainly has the advantage of not being anti-systemic; that is, ideally, how the adversarial process works. But will the system as it presently exists actually accommodate the level of adversarial testing we almost have to assume is necessary if we are to allow trial court judgments to replace scientific consensus?
In our rules of criminal procedure we have no notice or pre-trial discovery requirements tailored to the use of evidence based upon novel scientific theories or techniques. The first time a defense attorney may see the evidence coming is during voir *577dire of a State’s expert witness pursuant to Rule 705(b). By then it is clearly too late to marshall experts to formulate an opposing opinion (if any) as to the validity of either principle or technique underlying the proffered evidence. Moreover, counsel must obtain “prior court approval” of fees for expert testimony on behalf of an indigent defendant under Article 26.05, Y.A.C.C.P. What is a “reasonable expense” for expert testimony is pre-deter-mined on a county by county basis,5 and may prove woefully inadequate for the kind of time and effort involved in ascertaining reliability of a novel scientific theory or technique. At any rate, without notice of what is coming, counsel for the indigent defendant can hardly obtain “prior court approval” for funds to pay an expert of his own. “Provisions for notice, full discovery, the opportunity to re-examine evidence, and the appointment of defense experts are critical components” of the type of procedure the majority advocates. Giamtelli, supra, at 1245. I doubt we are procedurally equipped to accommodate these needs.
In short, the kind of adversarial testing that would be adequate to replace a Frye standard is simply not likely to occur. Trial judges will instead hear testimony from only one side of the issue, frequently from the representative of a commercial lab somewhere that has a vested interest in having its novel theory or technique held admissible in a court of law.6 These circumstances hardly foster impartial decision making.
Preferable, in my view, would be to impose a substantive requirement on the part of the proponent of scientific evidence that as part of his burden of showing “validity” of both the principle and technique he demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that both have gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community. As a practical matter, since the State is more often the proponent of such evidence, such a requirement will place the onus on the party with the greater resources. Because the question of general acceptance embraces the debate, if any, among scientists themselves as to validity of a novel theory or technique, the trial court is assured of hearing both sides of the argument, as well as the scientific consensus, if any, before ruling.
Not just as a practical matter, but as a legal matter as well, it seems to me the proponent of such evidence should have a burden to show general acceptance in the scientific community. The proponent should have to show such general acceptance in order to establish threshold relevance, and hence admissibility under Rule 402. It is true that ordinarily “the law furnishes no test of relevancy.” See Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, at 391 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (Opinion on rehearing on Court’s own motion). However, that is because ordinarily a trial court determines relevancy by “common observation and experience, and reason[s] from there in deciding whether the proffered evidence has ‘any tendency to make the existence of any fact of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.’ ” Id. As I hope I have made clear already, however, whether a new scientific theory or technique has any such tendency is not within the compass of common observation and experience. Only science in general can have the necessary perspective. And the best evidence of that is, of course, evidence of general acceptance, vel non, in the relevant scientific community.
If the Court is reluctant to impose a Frye-type test within the relevancy provisions of Rules 401 and 402, another possibility would be to incorporate it within Rule 705(c).7 We could rule that as a matter of *578law the proponent of novel scientific evidence “does not have a sufficient basis for his opinion” if the theory or technique he relies on is not generally accepted in the relevant scientific community — that absent such general acceptance, he has not established “sufficient underlying facts or data.” We would not thereby deviate from interpretation of the Federal Rules, since they contain no analogue to our Rule 705(c).
By focusing exclusively on Rule 702, and by refusing to acknowledge the utility of general acceptance in the relevant scientific community, or some improvement thereon, as a substantive standard for trial courts to use in determining reliability, it seems to me, the majority errs. The trial court did rule in this cause that “the DNA testing procedure employed in this case ... is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.” Because the record supports that conclusion, I concur in the result the majority reaches, but do not join its opinion.
BAIRD and OVERSTREET, JJ., join in this opinion.

. If the proponent of evidence of a novel scientific theory or technique cannot show it establishes or refutes, tends to establish or refute, or at least makes “more or less probable” "the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action,” then it is not relevant under Rule 401, and is therefore inadmissible under Rule 402. If a novel scientific theory or technique does not prove to be a valid test for the probability of the existence, vel non, of a fact in issue — if, in this sense, it is not "reliable” — then it will not generate “relevant" evidence.

. Whether proffered evidence of specialized knowledge will in fact add to the jury's comprehension is, of course, a matter of the discretion of the trial court, which discretion is abused only where he finds evidence is admissible even though it contributes to the jury’s comprehension not at all. Cf. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, at 387 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (Opinion on rehearing on Court’s own motion) (trial court has discretion in deciding whether evidence has relevance beyond "character conformity,” but no discretion to admit evidence which has no relevance beyond "character conformity”).

. I accept this as a matter of policy-generated interpolation. I do not believe that Tex.R.Cr. Evid., Rule 104(a) substantively dictates what is a "preliminary question concerning the ... admissibility of evidence,” but only requires that whatever is determined to be a preliminary question of admissibility be decided in camera. We could just as easily hold that the question whether proper protocol was followed in the particular case is a question of weight rather than admissibility.

. Giannelli, supra, at 1249, quoting People v. Collins, 94 Misc.2d 704, 709-710, 405 N.Y.S.2d 365, 369 (Sup.Ct.1978).

. Prior to amendment by Acts 1987, 70th Leg., ch. 979, p. 3323, § 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1987, Article 26.05, Sec. 1(d) set a limit of $500.00 on fees for appointed experts.

. Indeed, a perfect example of this latter proposition is to be found in the context of DNA identification evidence. See generally Neufeld & Colman, When Science Takes the Witness Stand, Scientific American, Vol. 262, No. 5, p. 46 (May 1990).

.Rule 705(c), reads:
*578"If the court determines that the expert does not have a sufficient basis for his opinion, the opinion is inadmissible unless the party offering the testimony first establishes sufficient underlying facts or data.”