Court Opinion

ID: 9849312
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:38:18.010406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:16.740193
License: Public Domain

BECKER, Justice.
I dissent.
In considering the exclusive control test in Division II the majority cites Boyer v. Iowa High School Athletic Association, Iowa, 152 N.W.2d 293. It is submitted that in Boyer, and at least four other cases cited by the majority, the evidence showed no exclusive control in defendant but res ipsa loquitur was applied. The special concurrence in Boyer need not be reiterated here. The authorities cited in the special concurrence reach what I believe to be the better rule, i. e. “The essential question becomes one of whether the probable cause is one which the defendant is under a duty to the plaintiff to anticipate or guard against.”
In this case an 1800 pound pile of sheeting tipped or slid out of position without any apparent cause. The sheeting belonged to defendant subcontractor. True, he ordered it from an independent lumber yard which had it delivered by an independent trucking firm, but certainly when it was delivered, two days before the accident, reasonable minds could conclude defendant had some duties in relation to it.
We should not confuse the building premises with the pile of dry wall. Much is said about defendant’s lack of control of the premises. The premises did not injure plaintiff; 1800 pounds of dry wall sheeting caused the injury. Of course defendant had no control over the premises. He did have control over the sheeting. It was his sheeting, he owned it, it was delivered at his express order. Yet in effect this case says defendant had no duty in relation to the sheeting until his men started to nail it on the wall.
Such a distinction was made in the Boyer case, supra; and in Thompson v. Burke Engineering Sales Company, 252 Iowa 146, 106 N.W.2d 351, 84 A.L.R.2d 689; Weidert v. Monahan Post Legionnaire Club, 243 Iowa 643, 51 N.W.2d 400; Larrabee v. Des Moines Tent & Awning Company, 189 Iowa 319, 178 N.W. 373, 375 and Sutcliffe v. Ft. Dodge Gas and Electric Company, 218 Iowa 1386, 257 N.W. 406. The'majority dispenses with that distinction. It would appear that even if we continue the *470exclusive control test it was met here as it was in the foregoing cited cases.
The language used in Larrabee v. Des Moines Tent & Awning Co., 189 Iowa 319, 325, 178 N.W. 373, 375 seems peculiarly apropos: “Whatever the actual cause of this accident, such cause could be found to be fairly within- the range of Bittle’s supervision and control. The accident was one which would not ordinarily happen. A jury might find that ordinary care on his part would require that he should have inspected the structure before its occupancy, and that he should have guarded its supports against interference, accidental or otherwise, by passers-by. He did not inspect, and did not guard.”
This should be matched to the following colloquy from the record, defendant Rife speaking:
“Q. Well, it’s customary for you to go out and'inspect the material after it’s delivered ? A. Right.
“Q. And you don’t know that you did it on this job? A. I did, but not prior to this Sunday, this accident.
“Q. In any event from Thursday until Sunday you had made no inspection ? A. Not that I can remember.”
II. Since this case is to be retried there is another matter of equal importance. The majority holds that the following specification should not have been submitted: “(1) In creating or allowing to be created a dangerous condition on the premises which the defendant knew, or should have known, to be a dangerous condition to persons rightfully on the property.”
Restatement, Second, Torts § 384, p. 289 (1965) states: “Liability of Persons Creating Artificial Conditions on Land on Behalf of Possessor for Physical Harm Caused While Work Remains in Their Charge. One who on behalf of the possessor of land erects a structure or creates any other condition on the land is subject to the same liability, and enjoys the same freedom from liability, as tnough he were the possessor of the land, for physical harm caused to others upon and outside of the land by the dangerous character of the structure or other condition while the work is in his charge.” See comment d at 290.
The theory1 of the majority holding is that defendant was insulated from liability by the fact an independent contractor delivered the dry wall. The fact the jury could find defendant, in the exercise of ordinary care, had a duty to inspect the material and see that it was properly piled is ignored. Again, the duty in relation to the premises is confused with the duty in relation to the dry wall. The dry wall was delivered on Friday. The injury occurred on Sunday. Defendant knew, or should have known, others were likely to be on the premises before Monday when he planned to use the material. The jury could easily find defendant had a duty in the exercise of reasonable care to inspect his property to see that it was safely and properly stored. (It might also find contra. But that is the jury’s province, not ours.) The fact the independent contractor may have also been negligent does not relieve this defendant from liability. 57 C.J.S. Master and Servant § 609, p. 381 states: “Joint liability. Where the original contractor and the subcontractor have j oint supervision over the construction of the building, and cooperation in its construction is necessary between them, and that part of the construction undertaken by the subcontractor is concurrently and conjointly done with the remaining portion of the work which is under the control of the original contractor, they are jointly liable to persons injured by reason of their negligence.”
Does this court really mean to say as a matter of law defendant here had no duty in connection with the dry wall because it was delivered by an independent contractor and defendant had not bothered to inspect it or exercise any control over it for two days? This seems to be what the majority holds when it says there is no evi*471dence defendant created or allowed to be created a dangerous condition on the premises which defendant knew, or should have known, to be a dangerous condition. Do subcontractors have no duties as to such material until they start nailing it on the wall? As indicated, I would affirm. But if this case is to be retried, it seems to me the first specification of negligence should remain in the case.