Court Opinion

ID: 9371176
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-15 17:09:09.515963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:25.933854
License: Public Domain

J-S28041-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
    CORY ALAN HILL                             :
                                               :
                       Appellee                :       No. 574 MDA 2022

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 18, 2022
                 In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
              Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0000373-2018

BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                             FILED FEBRUARY 15, 2023

        Appellant, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, appeals from the order

entered in the Berks County Court of Common Pleas, which granted the Post

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”)1 petition filed by Appellee, Cory Alan Hill. We

affirm.

        The PCRA court’s opinion set forth the relevant procedural history of this

appeal as follows:

           [Appellee] was arrested after fleeing a motor vehicle stop
           after police observed a vehicle with a New Jersey license
           plate tapping its brakes, the officer observed it negotiate a
           traffic circle without using a turn signal, and the officer
           observed an occupant of the vehicle observing police while
           police followed the vehicle.         [Appellee] waived his
           arraignment on January 25, 2018, at which time he was
           represented by [a public defender]. On February 16, 2018,
           [another public defender] entered his appearance on
____________________________________________

1   42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
J-S28041-22

          [Appellee’s] behalf. The time for filing a pretrial suppression
          motion expired on or about March 16, 2018. No pretrial
          motion was filed within that time, nor was there a request
          for an extension. On May 1, 2018, private counsel Gary
          Dorsett entered his appearance on behalf of [Appellee].
          Almost a year later, private attorney Jay Nigrini entered his
          appearance on behalf of [Appellee]. On May 8, 2019,
          Attorney Nigrini filed an omnibus pretrial suppression
          motion on behalf of [Appellee]. The Commonwealth moved
          to quash the pretrial suppression motion due to its
          untimeliness. After a hearing, on June 7, 2019, [the trial
          court] quashed the motion and did not address its merits.

          On August 29, 2019, [Appellee] was convicted following a
          bench trial of one count of persons not to possess firearms,
          one count of possession with intent to deliver cocaine, one
          count of possession of cocaine, one count of possession of a
          small amount of marijuana, one count of possession of drug
          paraphernalia, and one count of resisting arrest or other law
          enforcement. On September 25, 2019, [Appellee] was
          sentenced to five (5) to twenty (20) years for persons not
          to possess firearms followed by three (3) to twenty (20)
          years for possession with intent to deliver cocaine to run
          concurrent with the other remaining counts. No post-
          sentence motions or notice of appeal were filed within the
          time limits.

          On May 15, 2020, [Appellee], pro se, filed a [motion for
          leave to appeal nunc pro tunc, presenting arguments
          sounding in ineffective assistance of counsel.2 The court
          treated Appellant’s filing as a pro se PCRA petition and, o]n
          July 9, 2020, [the PCRA court] appointed [counsel] to assist
          [Appellee] with the preparation and filing of a [PCRA
          petition].

                                       *       *   *

____________________________________________

2  Despite the nature of Appellee’s pro se request for relief, the clerk of courts
mistakenly forwarded the filing to this Court as if it was a notice of appeal.
This Court docketed the filing as a notice of appeal, and Appellee subsequently
filed an application to discontinue the matter. This Court granted Appellee’s
application on September 28, 2020.

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J-S28041-22

         [O]n November 23, 2021, [appointed counsel] asked for his
         appearance to be withdrawn and for new counsel to be
         appointed due to his withdrawal as county appointed PCRA
         counsel.     On December 15, 2021, [the PCRA court]
         appointed [current counsel] to represent [Appellee] and
         entered an order for counsel to prepare and file an amended
         PCRA petition or a “no-merit letter” as appropriate. On
         January 11, 2022, [PCRA counsel] filed an amended [PCRA]
         petition alleging it was ineffective assistance of counsel for
         [Appellee’s] prior counsel to not file a pretrial suppression
         motion or an extension of time to file one before Attorney
         Nigrini entered his appearance and filed it in May 2019. On
         February 15, 2022, a hearing was held to determine
         whether [Appellee] had a colorable claim for ineffective
         assistance of counsel for trial counsel’s failure to file a
         pretrial suppression motion or to request an extension for
         the same prior to Attorney Nigrini’s filing over a year late.
         On March 18, 2022, [the PCRA court] granted the PCRA
         petition.

         On April 13, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a notice of
         appeal to the Superior Court…. A concise statement of
         errors complained of on appeal was filed on April 26, 2022.

(PCRA Court Opinion, filed 5/16/22, at 1-3) (internal footnotes and some

capitalization omitted).

      The Commonwealth now raises two issues on appeal:

         Did the PCRA court err by granting relief as [Appellee] failed
         to prove that his underlying claim is of arguable merit under
         a statutory construction analysis of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3334 as
         the vehicle stop was valid for failing to use a turn signal
         when exiting a traffic circle when turning onto another road?

         Did the PCRA court err by granting relief as [Appellee] failed
         to show that “but for” the inaction of original counsel that
         he was prejudiced by the failure to file a suppression motion
         where there is no reasonable probability the results would
         have been different as under Pennsylvania law a failure to
         use a turn signal when exiting a traffic circle violates 75
         Pa.C.S.A. § 3334 when turning onto another road?

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(Commonwealth’s Brief at 10).

     “Our standard of review of [an] order granting or denying relief under

the PCRA calls upon us to determine whether the determination of the PCRA

court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error.”

Commonwealth v. Parker, 249 A.3d 590, 594 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191-92 (Pa.Super. 2013)). “The

PCRA court’s factual findings are binding if the record supports them, and we

review the court’s legal conclusions de novo.” Commonwealth v. Prater,

256 A.3d 1274, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 268 A.3d

386 (2021).

     Regarding questions of statutory interpretation:

        Statutory interpretation is a question of law, therefore our
        standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is
        plenary. In all matters involving statutory interpretation,
        we apply the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1501
        et seq., which provides that the object of interpretation and
        construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the
        intention of the General Assembly.

        Generally, a statute’s plain language provides the best
        indication of legislative intent. We will only look beyond the
        plain language of the statute when words are unclear or
        ambiguous, or the plain meaning would lead to a result that
        is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable.
        Therefore, when ascertaining the meaning of a statute, if
        the language is clear, we give the words their plain and
        ordinary meaning.

Commonwealth v. Watts, 283 A.3d 1252, 1255-56 (Pa.Super. 2022)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

     The Commonwealth’s issues are related, and we address them together.

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The Commonwealth acknowledges that the state police conducted the

underlying motor vehicle stop based upon the driver’s failure to use a turn

signal, and the trooper “needed probable cause to effectuate the stop.”

(Commonwealth’s Brief at 18). The Commonwealth also asserts that Trooper

Erik Sinwich provided the justification for the stop during the bench trial, when

he testified that he observed the vehicle at issue exit a traffic circle while using

a “quick, partial signal.” (Id. 19) (quoting N.T. Trial, 8/27/19, at 24). The

Commonwealth asserts that Section 3334 of the Motor Vehicle Code mandates

the use of turn signals under certain circumstances, and “[t]he question then

becomes whether … the use of a turn signal is required when exiting a traffic

[circle] and whether … the ‘quick, partial signal’ was enough” to satisfy the

statute. (Id.)

      The Commonwealth concedes that it “was unable to find any case law

by the Pennsylvania appellate courts on the issue of the use of turn signals

when exiting a traffic circle.” (Id.) Therefore, the Commonwealth contends

that this Court must engage in statutory interpretation. Based upon the plain

meaning of the statutory language, coupled with the definition of a traffic circle

from the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation’s driver’s manual, the

Commonwealth maintains that exiting a traffic circle amounts to a “turn” that

requires an appropriate signal. (See id. at 21). The Commonwealth posits

that the “quick, partial signal” utilized by the driver did not comply with

Section 3334, and there was no arguable merit to Appellee’s claim that prior

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counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the vehicle stop in a timely

suppression motion.

      Regarding the prejudice prong of the test for ineffective assistance, the

Commonwealth argues that the PCRA court did not make “a firm ruling that a

turn signal is not required when exiting a traffic circle.” (Id. at 24). Absent

such a finding, the Commonwealth reasons that there was not a “reasonable

probability that the outcome would have been different,” and Appellee could

not satisfy the prejudice prong. (Id.) The Commonwealth concludes that the

PCRA court erred in granting relief, and this Court must reverse the PCRA

court’s order. We disagree.

      “Counsel   is   presumed   to   have   rendered   effective   assistance.”

Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 231 A.3d 855, 871 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal

denied, ___ Pa. ___, 242 A.3d 908 (2020).

         [T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
         defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
         ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances
         of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining
         process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence
         could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant to
         prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying
         claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no
         reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction;
         and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is
         a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
         proceedings would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa.Super. 2019),

appeal denied, 654 Pa. 568, 216 A.3d 1029 (2019) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted).     The failure to satisfy any prong of the test for

                                      -6-
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ineffectiveness will cause the claim to fail. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 612

Pa. 333, 30 A.3d 1111 (2011).

      “The threshold inquiry in ineffectiveness claims is whether the

issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis

for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit[.]” Commonwealth

v. Smith, 167 A.3d 782, 788 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal denied, 645 Pa. 175,

179 A.3d 6 (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514, 524,

645 A.2d 189, 194 (1994)). “Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing

to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.” Commonwealth v. Poplawski,

852 A.2d 323, 327 (Pa.Super. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. Geathers,

847 A.2d 730, 733 (Pa.Super. 2004)).

      “Once this threshold is met we apply the ‘reasonable basis’ test to

determine whether counsel’s chosen course was designed to effectuate his

client’s interests.”   Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1012

(Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting Pierce, supra at 524, 645 A.2d at 194-95).

         The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable
         basis for his action or inaction is whether no competent
         counsel would have chosen that action or inaction, or, the
         alternative, not chosen, offered a significantly greater
         potential chance of success. Counsel’s decisions will be
         considered reasonable if they effectuated his client’s
         interests.   We do not employ a hindsight analysis in
         comparing trial counsel’s actions with other efforts he may
         have taken.

Commonwealth v. King, 259 A.3d 511, 520 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting

Sandusky, supra at 1043-44).

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      “To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceedings would have been different. [A] reasonable probability is a

probability that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the

proceeding.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 624 Pa. 4, 33-34, 84 A.3d 294, 312

(2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).            “[A] criminal

defendant alleging prejudice must show that counsel’s errors were so serious

as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”

Hopkins, supra at 876 (quoting Commonwealth v. Chambers, 570 Pa. 3,

22, 807 A.2d 872, 883 (2002)).

      Additionally, the Motor Vehicle Code requires the use of turn signals as

follows:

           § 3334. Turning movements and required signals

               (a) General rule.—Upon a roadway no person shall
           turn a vehicle or move from one traffic lane to another or
           enter the traffic stream from a parked position unless and
           until the movement can be made with reasonable safety nor
           without giving an appropriate signal in the manner provided
           in this section.

              (b) Signals on turning and starting.—At speeds of
           less than 35 miles per hour, an appropriate signal of
           intention to turn right or left shall be given continuously
           during not less than the last 100 feet traveled by the vehicle
           before turning. The signal shall be given during not less
           than the last 300 feet at speeds in excess of 35 miles per
           hour. The signal shall also be given prior to entry of the
           vehicle into the traffic stream from a parked position.

              (c) Limitations on use of certain signals.—The
           signals required on vehicles by section 3335(b) (relating to

                                       -8-
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           signals by hand and arm or signal lamps) shall not be
           flashed on one side only on a disabled vehicle, flashed as a
           courtesy or “do pass” signal to operators of other vehicles
           approaching from the rear, nor be flashed on one side only
           of a parked vehicle except as may be necessary for
           compliance with this section.

              (d) Discontinuing turn signals.—Turn signals shall
           be discontinued immediately after completing the turn or
           movement from one traffic lane to another traffic lane.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3334.      “For a stop based on the observed violation of the

Vehicle Code or otherwise non-investigable offense, an officer must have

probable cause to make a constitutional vehicle stop.” Commonwealth v.

Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1019 (Pa.Super. 2017).

      Instantly, Trooper Sinwich testified at trial regarding his observations

that prompted the vehicle stop. On December 31, 2017, at approximately

12:40 p.m., Trooper Sinwich was on patrol when he saw a black Ford Focus

traveling northbound on Museum Road. The trooper followed the Ford, which

was “excessively braking even with no other vehicles around, no vehicles in

front.” (N.T. Trial at 23). The trooper also “observed three occupants in that

vehicle, and the rear occupant behind the driver’s seat[, Appellee,] was

intently watching me through the rearview mirror.” (Id.)

      Trooper Sinwich followed the vehicle through an intersection with Penn

Avenue, at which point the vehicle approached a traffic circle leading to West

Reading. (See id. at 24). Trooper Sinwich described what happened next as

follows:

                                      -9-
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          I observed the vehicle not signal entering the traffic circle[3]
          and proceed around to the right, almost completely around
          the circle, and exit onto what is the one, two, third right
          onto Reading Avenue with just a quick partial signal.

(Id.) After the vehicle exited the traffic circle, Trooper Sinwich conducted a

traffic stop.    The remainder of the record confirms that Trooper Sinwich

stopped the vehicle based upon its failure to use a turn signal. See Affidavit

of Probable Cause, dated 12/31/17, at 1 (stating trooper conducted traffic

stop “for vehicle code violation VC 3334 Turning Movements and Required

Signals”).

       In light of this testimony, Appellee’s PCRA petition argued that “there is

no clear authority requiring a driver to use a turn signal during the negotiation

of a traffic circle.”    (Amended PCRA Petition, filed 1/11/22, at 4).       PCRA

counsel expanded on this argument at the PCRA hearing as follows:

          That car that [Appellee] was a passenger in had not changed
          roads but simply been on one road, entered the roundabout
          and continued on the same road after going around half of
          the roundabout.

          My basic assertion is … that it’s not at all clear from reading
          either the statutes regarding turning devices or the statute
          regarding roundabouts that it’s necessary to use a turn
          signal when proceeding down a particular roadway that
          happens to have a roundabout in the middle of it.[4]
____________________________________________

3In its brief, the Commonwealth does not argue that the failure to signal when
entering the circle constituted a violation of Section 3334.

4 To the extent counsel referred to a statue regarding roundabouts, we note
that the parties use the terms “roundabout” and “traffic circle”
interchangeably. Further, the Motor Vehicle Code governs the right-of-way
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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(N.T. PCRA Hearing, 2/15/22, at 5).

       The PCRA court reviewed these claims and agreed that “[t]here has been

no clear authority established in this Commonwealth as to whether a driver is

required to use a turn signal during the negotiation of a traffic circle.” (PCRA

Court Opinion at 4).           Consequently, the court engaged in statutory

interpretation, and it reviewed case law from other jurisdictions with similar

statutory provisions. Based upon this analysis, the PCRA court found that

Appellee was entitled to relief:

          [L]ooking at other jurisdictions, there are numerous states
          where a turn signal is not required when navigating a
          roundabout because the statute for use of turn signals is too
          ambiguous to require the use of turn signals in a
          roundabout.

          As there is no clear authority in the Commonwealth
          requiring the use of turn signals when navigating a
          roundabout, there was a basis for previous counsel to file a
          timely pretrial suppression motion for all evidence gathered
          [as] a result of the traffic stop for failure to use a turn signal.

                                       *       *    *

          [The PCRA court also] finds that [Appellee] has shown
          prejudice due to counsel’s failure to file a pretrial
          suppression motion timely or to request an extension of
          time to file a pretrial motion.

(PCRA Court Opinion at 5-6) (internal citations omitted).

____________________________________________

for vehicles negotiating traffic circles. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3321(b) (stating
that traffic in traffic circle shall have right-of-way). The statute, however,
does not mention the use of turn signals in conjunction with driving through
a traffic circle.

                                           - 11 -
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      Our review of the relevant case law from other jurisdictions confirms the

PCRA court’s findings. See Noble v. State, 357 P.3d 1201, 1206 (Alaska

App. 2015) (stating turn signal statute was formulated before state began

constructing roundabouts; while statute requires motorists to signal at least

100 feet before turning, it was unclear whether entering or exiting roundabout

constituted turn; court declined to “stretch” language of statute governing

turn signals to make it apply to roundabouts); State v. Davis, 143 N.E.3d

343, 347 (Ind.App. 2020) (holding defendant did not violate turn signal

statute when he did not signal upon exiting roundabout; any assumption that

statute specifically applied to roundabouts fails to withstand scrutiny when

considering “reality and logistics” of roundabouts); People v. McBride, 490

P.3d 810 (Colo.App. 2020), reversed in part on other grounds, 511 P.3d 613

(Colo. 2022) (explaining turn signal statute did not apply to entering or exiting

roundabouts; while statute requires motorists to signal not less than 100 feet

before turning in urban or metropolitan areas, entrances and exits of

roundabouts are often less than 100 feet apart).

      Here, the PCRA court carefully evaluated Section 3334, and we cannot

say that the court committed legal error in its interpretation of the statute.

See Parker, supra. Thus, we agree that Appellee demonstrated the arguable

merit of his claim that prior counsel should have filed a timely suppression

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motion challenging the vehicle stop on this basis.5       See Smith, supra;

Poplawski, supra.          Further, the PCRA court properly determined that

Appellee suffered prejudice due to prior counsel’s failure to pursue this claim

in a timely suppression motion. See Spotz, supra. Accordingly, we affirm

the order granting PCRA relief in favor of Appellee.

       Order affirmed.

       Judge Olson joins this memorandum.

       Judge McLaughlin files a dissenting memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/15/2023

____________________________________________

5 We also emphasize that the Commonwealth’s argument is limited to its
assertion that “an individual exiting from a traffic circle must use an
appropriate signal when turning or moving from one lane to another under
Pennsylvania law.” (Commonwealth’s Brief at 14). Consequently, the
Commonwealth contends that the subject vehicle’s “quick, partial signal” upon
exiting the traffic circle was inadequate under Section 3334. Assuming
without deciding that Section 3334 mandates the use of a turn signal upon
exiting a traffic circle, our review reveals that the record is silent regarding
the approximate speed of the subject vehicle and the distance traveled
between the start of the turn signal and the vehicle’s exit from the traffic
circle. Likewise, the Commonwealth’s brief is devoid of such specifics. (See
Commonwealth’s Brief at 21-22). Absent more, we cannot conclude that the
“quick, partial signal” was inappropriate under the circumstances. Thus, this
is an alternative argument that Appellee’s prior counsel could have raised in
a timely filed suppression motion.

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