Court Opinion

ID: 9831794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:21:43.931371+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:37.643261
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[5] When appellee showed that O. S. Plummer was the common source, it did not devolve on him to go back of that common source and show authority in him to execute the deeds to the land. We endeavored to show that proof of common source overcame all claims based by appellant upon mere 'possession; but the claim is reiterated in *161the motion for rehearing. Appellant made no effort to show that O. S. Plummer had no power of attorney to sell the land, although that burden rested on him. When appellee proved that he and appellant both claimed title from O. S. Plummer, and that under that source he had the superior title, he had made out a prima facie case and should recover, unless it was shown by appellant that the common source had no title. If such proof had been made, then appellant might invoke possession to protect him against the claims of appellee. As said by the Supreme Court in Rice v. Railway, 87 Tex. 90, 26 S. W. 1047, 47 Am. St. Rep. 72: “Evidence that the defendant claims title under the common grantor is prima facie proof that such grantor had the title at the time he undertook to convey the right which the defendant claims; and this necessarily involves the assumption that he had acquired the title of all previous owners. The rule as to common source means this, if it means anything. The rule is statutory in this state; and to permit a defendant to defeat its operation by showing the naked fact that, previous to the time the grantor undertook to convey, some third party had the title would render it nugatory.”
[6] Appellant failed to show that O. S. Plummer did not have a power of attorney authorizing him to sell the land, and he asks this court to presume that he did not have it. The presumption will be indulged that he did have the power of attorney, in the absence of proof by appellant that he did hot have it. House v. Reavis, 89 Tex. 626, 35 S. W. 1063; Ferguson v. Ricketts, 93 Tex. 565, 57 S. W. 19; Robertson v. Kirby, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 472, 61 S. W. 967. This proposition is statutory, for in article 5266, Sayles’ Statutes, it is provided that it shall not be necessary for the plaintiff to deraign title beyond a common Source, and it was the duty of appellant, and not that of appellee, to prove an outstanding title.
The case of Stephens v. Hix, 38 Tex. 656, which is approved in Simmons Hardware Co. v. Davis, 87 Tex. 146, 27 S. W. 62, squarely meets the contentions of appellant that the possession of the defendant, in an action of trespass to try title, would overcome the rule as to common source. In the Stephens-Hix Case the court said: “It appears that both plaintiff and defendant claim title to the land in controversy through W. C. Philips as a common source; and on the trial the plaintiff introduced in evidence a deed direct from Philips to himself conveying to him the land in controversy. He then proved that the defendant was in possession of the land. We think this evidence clearly sufficient to authorize a judgment for plaintiff, unless the defendant, by his evidence, established the nullity-of plaintiff’s deed, or proved a superior title in himself.” Without proof, appellant assumes that O. S. Plum-mer had no power of attorney from IP. C. Plummer and F. B. Plummer to sell the lands- in controversy, and asks this court to do the same. There is no authority for such assumption.
The motion is overruled.