Court Opinion

ID: 9363164
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-13 18:57:32.139373+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:30.364626
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION                          FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      OCT 24 2022
                                                                    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                     U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES SHAYLER, an individual,                  No.   21-56130

                Plaintiff-Appellant,           D.C. No.
                                               2:20-cv-10751-GW-GJS
 v.

1310 PCH, LLC, a California Limited            OPINION
Liability Company,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Central District of California
                    George H. Wu, District Judge, Presiding

                           Submitted August 31, 2022 *
                              Pasadena, California

BEFORE: MILAN D. SMITH, JR. and RYAN D. NELSON, CIRCUIT JUDGES,
and GERSHWIN A. DRAIN, ** DISTRICT JUDGE.

                       Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

      *
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      **
             The Honorable Gershwin A. Drain, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.>
                                  SUMMARY ***

                Americans with Disabilities Act / Attorney’s Fees

    The panel affirmed the district court’s order awarding a reduced amount of
attorney’s fees and costs following the district court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of the plaintiff on a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act.

    The plaintiff, a serial ADA litigant, moved for an award of over $34,000 in
attorney’s fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 12205. The district court reduced this
award significantly, finding that factors such as the routine nature of the work
performed by the plaintiff’s attorneys and the lack of meaningful opposition by the
defendants warranted the use of a $300/hour “blended billing rate” for all the work
performed by counsel, as well as a 65% downward multiplier to the total amount of
fees.

   The panel held that the district court provided an adequate “concise but clear
explanation” of the grounds for its decision and did not abuse its broad discretion
because, given the repetitive nature of high-frequency ADA litigation, there was
nothing irrational about the district court’s conclusions that, in effect, much of the
work here could have been performed by junior associates or even paralegals, or that
much of the motion practice in the case was superfluous.

                                    COUNSEL

Anoush Hakimi and Kyle W. Wilson, Law Office of Hakimi & Shahriari, Los
Angeles, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jeffrey C. Bogert, Law Offices of Jeffrey C. Bogert, Los Angeles, California, for
Defendant-Appellee.

   ***
      This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been
prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

      Plaintiff James Shayler, a serial Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

litigant, has sued defendant 1310 PCH LLC (PCH) for violating the ADA and

similar protections under California law. The lawsuit was largely uncontested by

PCH, and resulted in summary judgment in Shayler’s favor on the ADA claim.

After prevailing on the merits, Shayler moved for an award of over $34,000 in

attorney’s fees and costs. The district court reduced this award significantly,

finding that factors such as the routine nature of the work performed by Shayler’s

attorneys and the lack of meaningful opposition by PCH warranted the use of a

$300/hour “blended billing rate” for all the work performed by Shayler’s counsel,

as well as a 65% downward multiplier to the total amount of fees. Ultimately, the

district court awarded just under $10,000 in fees and costs. Shayler appeals,

arguing that this downward reduction was unjustified. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 I.   Serial ADA Litigants

      Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C.

§ 12101 et seq., in order to “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate

for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42

                                          2
U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). “The ADA satisfied the need for meaningful legislation for

the protection of individuals with disabilities; however, one of the unforeseen

consequences of this statute was the widespread abuse taking form due to the

actions of serial ADA plaintiffs.”        Phoebe Joseph, Note, An Argument for

Sanctions Against Serial ADA Plaintiffs, 29 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 193, 195

(2019).

      A private plaintiff suing under the ADA may recover injunctive relief and

attorney’s fees (plus costs), but not monetary damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-

3(a)-(b). Despite this limitation, the ability to recover attorney’s fees has given rise

to a wave of “get-money quick” lawsuits brought by a small number of

professional, serial plaintiffs. Joseph, 29 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y at 196. A

district judge in this circuit has explained the phenomenon like this:

             The scheme is simple: an unscrupulous law firm sends a
             disabled individual to as many businesses as possible, in order
             to have him aggressively seek out any and all violations of the
             ADA. Then, rather than simply informing a business of the
             violations, and attempting to remedy the matter through
             conciliation and voluntary compliance, a lawsuit is filed . . . .
             Faced with the specter of costly litigation and a potentially fatal
             judgment against them, most businesses quickly settle the
             matter.

Molski v. Mandarin Touch Rest., 347 F. Supp. 2d 860, 863 (C.D. Cal. 2004)

(cleaned up); see also Rodriguez v. Investco, L.L.C., 305 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1281-

82 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (noting that, in ADA cases, “pre-suit settlements do not vest

                                           3
plaintiffs’ counsel with an entitlement to attorney’s fees,” and that the “current

ADA lawsuit binge is . . . driven by . . . the economics of attorney’s fees”).

      To make matters worse, California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code

§ 51(f), and the California Disabled Persons Act (CDPA), Cal Civ. Code § 54(c),

create private rights of action under state law whenever there has been an ADA

violation, and a plaintiff suing for such a violation can recover monetary damages.

See, e.g., Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 2021) (noting that the “net

practical consequence” of this statutory confluence “is to create a state law cause

of action that permits, for California-based ADA claims, a damages remedy that is

not available under the ADA”); Molski, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 862-63. California has

attempted to limit abusive lawsuits under these statutes by imposing stricter

procedural requirements and higher filing fees on “high-frequency litigant[s]” in

state court.   Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1207 (citing Cal. Civ. P. Code § 425.55).

However, plaintiffs can circumvent the restrictions on high-frequency litigants by

filing their complaints in federal court, asserting federal question jurisdiction over

the ADA claim and supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Id. In

light of this procedural oddity, the number of ADA cases in the Central District of

California (where this case originated) has ballooned from 3 percent of its civil

docket to roughly 20 percent in recent years. Id.

                                          4
       A hallmark of abusive ADA litigation is the use of form complaints

containing a multitude of boilerplate allegations of varying merit. See, e.g., Cal

Civ. P. Code § 425.55(a)(2) (finding that “these lawsuits are frequently filed

against small businesses on the basis of boilerplate complaints, apparently seeking

quick cash settlements rather than correction of the accessibility violation”); Peters

v. Winco Foods, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1040-41 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (noting

plaintiff’s history of filing “form complaints” and “multiplicitous [sic] ‘off the

shelf’ filings of questionable merit”); Joseph, 29 U Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y at 197

(describing “cookie-cutter lawsuits” with “similar or even identical complaints”

(citations omitted)). The ability to file essentially the same complaints over and

over again, combined with the hope of intimidating the defendant into an early

settlement (or of obtaining a default judgment), allows for a quick recovery of

attorney’s fees with relatively minimal difficulty. See, e.g., Molski, 347 F. Supp.

2d at 863 (describing “cottage industry” of ADA litigants filing lawsuits

“requesting damage awards” under state law “that would put many of the targeted

establishments out of business” (citation omitted)); Steven Brother v. Tiger

Partner, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1375 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (describing ADA

“shotgun litigation,” where “the same plaintiffs file hundreds of lawsuits”).

                                          5
II.    Shayler’s Case

       In November 2020, Shayler sued PCH for ADA and Unruh Act violations,

seeking injunctive relief and attorney’s fees as well as monetary damages for the

Unruh Act claim. The gravamen of the complaint was that PCH owned a property

that failed to comply with regulatory requirements regarding accessible parking

spaces. At a scheduling conference early in the case, the district court identified

Shayler as a “high-frequency litigant” as defined in Cal Civ. P. Code § 425.55(b).

The district court later declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the

Unruh Act claim, though Shayler’s amended complaint “[i]nexplicably” continued

to allege it.

       About 8 months into the case, Shayler moved for summary judgment. PCH

filed a notice of non-opposition to the motion, but Shayler filed a reply brief

anyway. The district court granted summary judgment to Shayler on the ADA

claim and awarded injunctive relief, but declined to award damages pursuant to the

Unruh Act based on its earlier jurisdictional ruling.

       Shortly thereafter, Shayler moved for $31,714 in attorney’s fees plus $3,185

in costs, for a total award of $34,899. This was based on the work of four

attorneys with different hourly rates. The district court broke down the attorney’s

fees request as follows:

                                          6
The district court found that both the hourly rates for the attorneys and the time

spent by the attorneys on the case were unreasonable based on the record before it.

      First, while acknowledging the attorneys’ experience, the district court

explained that “these relatively straightforward ADA actions often include

boilerplate filings and rarely involve complex legal issues or any difficult factual

discovery. Plaintiff’s counsel appear to involve two partner-level attorneys for

tasks that could have been performed by paralegals or low level associates at

substantially lower rates and [with] review[] by an attorney.” The district court

then “elect[ed] to join several other courts in the Central District by adopting a

blended rate of $300 [per hour] that is more commensurate with the complexity

level of these ADA cases,” citing other recent district court decisions that have

applied a $300/hour rate to work performed in similar cases.

      Second, the court found that Shayler’s lawyers had “devoted an

unreasonable amount of time on several tasks that should have been done more

efficiently” in light of their experience. For example, the district court found that

spending 9 hours on filing the complaint was “excessive” because Shayler’s

                                         7
counsel “often . . . files nearly identical complaints . . . in scores of ADA cases.”

The district court was also flummoxed by the fact that Shayler’s counsel had spent

17 hours on the unopposed motion for summary judgment, which included 7 hours

expended after PCH had notified the court of its non-opposition.1 After noting

other questionable litigation tactics and reiterating that this was a “straightforward”

ADA case, the district court then noted that roughly two-thirds of the hours

expended by Shayler’s attorneys on the case were accrued after PCH had admitted

fault.

         In light of “the relatively straightforward and repetitive nature of these ADA

actions, the fact that [Shayler]’s counsel recorded most of their hours after [PCH]

admitted fault and sought to minimize cost, and the number of litigation efforts of

counsel which were . . . simply wrong or unnecessary (and which [constitute] a

majority of [Shayler]’s counsel’s efforts),” the district court applied “a downward

65% multiplier to the requests for fees.” Using a blended rate of $300/hour, 75.2

hours of attorney work, and the 65% downward multiplier, the district court

calculated the final award of attorney’s fees as $7,896, which was substantially less

than the $31,185 sought by Shayler. The district court also reduced Shayler’s

1
  The district court indicated that it was “subtracting” hours for time spent on the
complaint and summary judgment motion to arrive at more reasonable time
figures. However, the district court did not expressly indicate how these
subtractions factored into its ultimate calculation, which still used all 75.2 hours
claimed by Shayler as a baseline before applying a 65% downward multiplier, as
explained below.

                                            8
award of costs from $3,185 to $1,955, finding that Shayler’s request to reimburse

costs for a site inspector were unsupported by invoices or a reasonable explanation

of the inspector’s importance to the case. This resulted in a total award of $9,851,

as compared to the $34,899 Shayler had requested. Shayler timely appealed the

award.

                           STANDARD OF REVIEW

      In ADA cases, a prevailing plaintiff may recover “a reasonable attorney’s

fee.” 42 U.S.C. § 12205. A “reasonable attorney’s fee” is initially determined by

the lodestar method, which multiplies an attorney’s reasonable hourly rate by the

number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation, though this amount can be

adjusted upward or downward based on other factors.         Machowski v. 333 N.

Placentia Prop., LLC, 38 F.4th 837, 840-41 (9th Cir. 2022). We review an award

of attorney’s fees under the ADA for abuse of discretion, while reviewing de novo

any legal questions underlying the fee award. Vogel v. Harbor Plaza Ctr., LLC,

893 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 2018).

      “The district court has a great deal of discretion in determining the

reasonableness of the fee and, as a general rule, we defer to its determination,

including its decision regarding the reasonableness of the hours claimed by the

prevailing party.” Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992); see

also Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1211 (9th Cir. 1986),

                                         9
amended, 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The district court is in the best position

to determine in the first instance the number of hours reasonably expended in

furtherance of the successful aspects of a litigation and the amount which would

reasonably compensate the attorney.”). However, a court abuses its discretion

when it fails to identify “the correct legal rule to apply to the relief requested” or

applies the correct rule in a way that is illogical, implausible, or unsupported by the

facts. United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).

                                     ANALYSIS

      Shayler challenges both the district court’s use of a blended billing rate and

its use of a 65 percent downward multiplier.2 Most of his briefing is directed to

arguing that the district court inadequately explained its reasons for the billing rate

and the multiplier.     That approach is understandable because we have not

categorically foreclosed the use of blended billing rates or downward multipliers,

saying only that these approaches to calculating a fee award must be adequately

explained. See, e.g., Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096, 1111 (9th

2
  Shayler’s opening brief also challenges the district court’s refusal to reimburse
the cost of the site inspector. Specifically, he argues that the district court’s
finding that the need for an inspector was “unnecessary” was “unsupported by the
factual record.” But the district court also denied the reimbursement request
simply because “[Shayler] ha[d] not submitted a bill/invoice from the [inspector].”
Shayler does not dispute this fact or argue that the district court’s reliance on it was
improper. Consequently, any challenge to the reduction in the award of costs is
waived. See, e.g., Brown v. Rawson-Neal Psychiatric Hosp., 840 F.3d 1146, 1148
(9th Cir. 2016).

                                          10
Cir. 2014) (vacating fee award because district court failed to explain why it used a

$325/hour blended billing rate); Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mut. Life Co., 214 F.3d

1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000) (upward and downward multipliers are permissible, but

must be justified).

      Even so, the district court was not required to write the equivalent of a law

review article justifying its fee award; it only had to provide a “concise but clear

explanation” of the grounds for its decision. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,

437 (1983); Jankey v. Poop Deck, 537 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying

this standard in ADA case); see also Gates, 987 F.2d at 1398 (9th Cir. 1992) (a

“concise but clear” explanation requires only enough reasoning to enable

“meaningful appellate review”). It did so in this case.

      To start, Shayler is incorrect to assert that the district court’s use of a

$300/hour blended billing rate “lacked any explanation or justification.” The

district court explained that this was a “straightforward” ADA case with boilerplate

pleadings, minimal legal complexity, and little in the way of difficult fact

discovery. The district court noted that the Department of Justice has compiled

precise standards for complying with the ADA, meaning that attorneys need only

check to see if the defendant’s premises meet these standards. The district court

further explained that, given these circumstances, it was unnecessary to staff the

case with “two partner-level attorneys” billing out at nearly $500/hour for

                                         11
relatively simple tasks. Finally, it indicated that it agreed with three other district

court decisions holding that a $300/hour blended billing rate “is more

commensurate with the complexity level of these ADA cases.” The decisions cited

generally raise points similar to those raised by the district court, namely that serial

ADA litigation does not involve particularly complex work justifying partner-level

billing rates. See Langer v. Kha Dinh Nguyen, No. 8:19-cv-00294-JLS-KES, 2019

WL 7900270, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2019) (justifying $300/hour rate by

explaining that “five attorneys” were not needed to perform “tasks which seem

more suited for paralegals,” and citing the “form nature of the Complaint and the

case more generally”); Machowski v. Jacmar Partners III, No. SACV 21-00135-

CJC (JDEx), 2021 WL 2980223, at *1-2 (C.D. Cal. May 27, 2021) (containing

similar analysis); Jones v. Islam, No. 2:20-cv-11038-JLS-JPR, 2021 WL 3472860,

at *8 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2021) (incorporating by reference similar analysis in

Machowski v. Suite 123 LLC, No. 8:20-cv-02014-JLS-ADS, 2021 WL 6496266

(C.D. Cal. June 10, 2021)).

      The district court’s discussion of the unreasonable amount of hours

expended by Shayler’s attorneys, and why a 65% downward multiplier was

appropriate as a result, was even more detailed. The court identified specific line

items in the billing record and explained why they reflected unnecessary uses of

time by Shayler’s attorneys. For example, the court was not persuaded that it took

                                          12
nine hours to prepare and file a boilerplate complaint, or that it took seventeen

hours to draft an unopposed summary judgment motion. The court also denoted

how Shayler’s attorneys had wasted time on an ex parte subpoena request that was

both untimely and substantively meritless. Finally, the district court explained that

“nearly two-thirds of the recorded fee hours” (in other words, nearly 67% of the

hours) were for work conducted after PCH admitted fault and “agreed to resolve

the identified issues while minimizing expenses.”        Shayler contends that this

admission was just “for show” because PCH “did not . . . reach out to negotiate a

consent decree” or otherwise reach a settlement agreement. However, the district

court’s finding was not that PCH had agreed to a precise settlement, but only that it

had agreed not to contest liability and that it had agreed in principle to resolve the

issues identified by Shayler’s complaint. That finding is supported by the record.

      These considered explanations make this case very unlike Camacho v.

Bridgeport Financial, Inc., 523 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 1980), which Shayler relies on

heavily. Camacho held that the district court abused its discretion by using a

$200/hour blended billing rate because, “when the district court held that it would

be unreasonable on the facts of this case to award the full hourly rates requested by

[the plaintiff’s] attorneys, the court did not identify which facts led to this

conclusion.” Id. at 980. Moreover, the court failed to “indicate why an hourly rate

of $200 was in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by

                                         13
lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Id. (citation

and internal quotations omitted). In stark contrast, the district court here gave

specific reasons for its decision to use a $300/hour blended rate, and cited other fee

awards in the same court that used this same rate in other repeat-player ADA cases.

      Shayler also suggests it was improper for the district court to rely on other

court decisions employing a $300/hour rate in ADA cases, citing Moreno v. City of

Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2008).3 That is an inapt comparison. In

Moreno, we admonished a district court for effectively “adopting a court-wide

policy . . . of ‘holding the line’ on fees” in civil rights cases at a fixed rate of

$250/hour. Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1115. Moreno explained that while “[d]istrict

judges can certainly consider the fees awarded by other judges in the same locality

in similar cases,” a judge cannot rely on past practice to refuse to use a higher

hourly rate for a lodestar calculation in light of changed “economic conditions in

the district.” Id. (“If the lodestar leads to an hourly rate that is higher than past

practice, the court must award that rate without regard to any contrary practice.”).

But the cases cited by the district court in support of its $300/hour rate—all from

the Central District of California—were relatively recent (two 2021 decisions, and

3
  Shayler also makes the questionable argument that the district court erred in
relying on these decisions because they were not subject to judicial notice and it is
impermissible for the district court to rely on its own independent research. This
argument is waived because it was not presented in Shayler’s opening brief. See,
e.g., Brown, 840 F.3d at 1148.

                                         14
one was from 2019), whereas the rate used by the district court in Moreno

“apparently hadn’t changed for 10 years.” Id. More fundamentally, the district

court was not simply “holding the line” on fee awards based solely on a de facto

court-wide policy; its choice of a $300/hour blended billing rate was largely based

on its finding that this was a run-of-the-mill repeat-player ADA case lacking in

legal, factual, or procedural complexity. And Moreno itself indicates that it was

not wrong for the district court to consider “the fees awarded by other judges in the

same locality in similar cases” as additional support for its decision. Id.

      Finally, the district court’s concerns about the lack of complexity with

respect to the legal, factual, and procedural issues in this case, as well as its

reliance on the use of $300/hour rates in similar cases, track the factors that a court

is supposed to consider in calculating a fee award. See, e.g., Carter v. Caleb Brett

LLC, 757 F.3d 866, 869 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Quesada v. Thomason, 850 F.2d

537, 539 n.1 (9th Cir.1988)) (listing twelve factors, including “the time and labor

required,” “the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved,” “the skill

requisite to perform the legal service properly,” and “awards in similar cases”).

Shayler’s opening brief does not dispute the district court’s finding that he is a

high-frequency ADA litigant, nor does it provide any explanation as to why his

case involved more complex issues than the cases relied upon by the district court.

                                          15
      In sum, while Shayler may be dissatisfied with the district court’s

explanations, they are sufficient to undergird its fee award under Ninth Circuit

precedent. At bottom, this was a simple, relatively uncontested case. Given the

repetitive nature of high-frequency ADA litigation, there was nothing irrational

about the district court’s conclusions that, in effect, much of the work here could

have been performed by junior associates or even paralegals, or that much of the

motion practice in the case was superfluous. Consequently, the district court did

not abuse its broad discretion, particularly in light of the Central District of

California’s considerable experience with these kinds of cases. See Hinkson, 585

F.3d at 1261 (district court abuses its discretion only when its conclusions are

illogical, implausible, or unsupported by the facts); Gates, 987 F.2d at 1398 (abuse

of discretion standard is highly deferential in the context of fee awards).

                                  CONCLUSION

      For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

                                          16