Court Opinion

ID: 9494739
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:45:08.445488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:35.036743
License: Public Domain

BOGGS, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The court overturns the sentence of defendant Stubbs because “he was improperly sentenced under § 924(c) when he was charged with and pleaded guilty to a violation of § 924(o).” Supra, page 406. Stubbs’s sentence was well within the statutory maximum for § 924(o). As I explain at some length below, the court’s sentence was a sentence that would have been arrived at by a correct application of the Guidelines. The fact that it used cross references within the Guidelines structure of another Section does not make it any less the sentence prescribed by the Guidelines for § 924(o), albeit by a circuitous route. I therefore respectfully dissent.
Sometime during his library investigations, Stubbs discovered that the statutory term of punishment for 18 U.S.C. § 924(o) does not require a mandatory minimum sentence, or one that is necessarily consecutive. Instead, it provides that a “person who conspires to commit an offense under subsection (e) shall be imprisoned for not more than 20 years.... ” 18 U.S.C. § 924(o) (referring to § 924(c)). As Stubbs points out, although his five-year sentence is well within the statutory maximum of his offense of conviction, his sentence is not mandated by the terms of this particular statutory provision, so he could (he implies) have received a lower term, or perhaps more importantly, one that ran concurrently with the 135 months he received on his other charges.
Under the plain error standard, a reversible error must be one that affects “substantial rights.” See United States v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 544 (6th Cir.2000). With regard to sentencing errors, substantial rights are always affected if a sentence exceeds that authorized by statute for the count of conviction. See ibid. If the sentence absent the error would have been the same as that imposed, substantial rights are not affected. Id. at 545. If the sentence imposed lies within that statutorily authorized, but differs from the sentence absent the error, the effect on substantial rights will depend on the magnitude of the disparity created by the error. See United States v. Barajas-Nunez, 91 F.3d 826, 833 (6th Cir.1996) (finding a plain error when an “incorrect interpretation of the sentencing guidelines” resulted in a “significantly smaller sentence”). As Stubbs’s 60 month consecutive sentence for his § 924(o) charge is clearly within the statutory limits for § 924(o), he is required to show that any error resulted in a substantially different sentence than the one he would have received under the guidelines absent the error. See Page, 232 F.3d at 544 (citing Barajas-Nunez, 91 F.3d at 833, for the proposition that “an error affects substantial rights when the error results in a sentence substantially different than that which would have been imposed absent the error”).

*414
Methods for Determining a Sentence for 18 U.S.C. § 924.(o)

In his principal and reply briefs, Stubbs gave no indication of how the court should have “properly” sentenced him, not even mentioning the Sentencing Guidelines, although it was through these that his sentence was determined, as his plea agreement makes clear. These briefs were insufficient to show a sentencing error, because the magnitude of sentencing disparity generated by the claimed error could not be demonstrated. At oral argument, however, Stubbs directed our attention to specific provisions of USSG § 2K2.1 that he feels would have been appropriate. Based on the type of weapons involved, he acknowledged that an offense level of 18 might be warranted, see USSG § 2K2;l(a)(5), and that perhaps a further two-level adjustment (to level 20) might be required for the number of weapons. See USSG § 2K2.1(b)(l)(B). The government contends that Stubbs has been sentenced correctly under the “cross-reference” provisions of USSG § 2K2.1(c) that, through a chain of reasoning discussed below, led to Stubbs receiving the sentence specified for the crime he conspired to commit, § 924(c). See USSG § 2K2.1(c)(l)(A).
Thus, the parties agree that the first step in determining a sentence for § 924(o) is the use of USSG § 2K2.1, and the Guidelines themselves confirm this. See ibid.; USSG App. A (1998 ed.). Unfortunately, unlike several other firearms offenses, § 924(o) is not related to any specific provision within the guideline, and the essence of the parties’ disagreement is about which provision within § 2K2.1 should be applied as the next step. In addition to resolving this question, we must also determine to what extent, if any, the different sentencing methods result in differing sentences.
18 U.S.C. § 924(o), and its precursor, 18 U.S.C. § 924(n), are relatively infrequently employed statutes, which have not been the subject of extensive case law regarding their treatment under the Sentencing Guidelines.1 However, the Tenth Circuit has faced a parallel problem. In United States v. Morehead, 959 F.2d 1489 (10th Cir.1992), one of the defendants was charged under the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, with the predicate offense being § 924(c), a “conspiracy to use or carry firearms during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense.” This led the court initially to attempt to apply USSG § 2X1.1, the conspiracy guideline.2 However, the court noted that “[application of this guideline provides some difficulty[,]” id. at 1509, because rather than specifying an offense level, this guideline eventually leads to the “term of imprisonment required by statute.” The court then looked to the catch-all portions of the conspiracy chapter, USSG § 2X5.1, which instruct the court to use the “most analogous offense guideline,” and led the Tenth Circuit to apply USSG § 2K2.1(a)(7) and base offense level of 12 (which it then *415adjusted). Morehead reflects the difficulties and two approaches to § 924(o) sentencing, with the defendant arguing for use of §§ 2K2.1(a),(b), and the government urging application of § 2K2.1(c)(leading to § 2X1.1 and the statutory sentence for § 924(c)). Although not discussed by the parties, the result in Morehead provides some persuasive support for Stubbs’s position.
The use of § 2K2.1(a),(b) as the next step in sentencing may be reached more directly under the current Guidelines. As an initial matter, a court sentencing under § 924(o) would usually look to the most relevant portion of § 2K2.1, namely § 2K2.1(a)(7). This subsection has no preconditions to its application (“except as provided below”) and thereby represents the appropriate default guideline for offenses governed by § 2K2.1 whose treatment is not otherwise specified. See § 2K2.1, comment, (nn.8, 12). However, as Stubbs acknowledges, he would be governed by § 2K2.1(a)(5), rather than § 2K2.1(a)(7), because his offense involved a weapon listed under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(30).3 This provides a base offense level of 18.
The record indicates that a further enhancement of two levels would then have been required because of the 5 to 7 weapons involved, § 2K2.1(b)(l)(B) (1998), and a four-level enhancement because the weapons were “possessed ... with knowledge, intent or reason to believe that [they] would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense.” § 2K2.1(b)(5). Under the guideline method advocated by the appellant, therefore, an offense level of 24 is indicated. This would have likely resulted in a sentence of between 51 and 63 months in prison.4
Stubbs’s position appears to be that our inquiry should end after consideration of § 2K2.1(a) and (b), and that we should not proceed to consider whether the cross-reference provisions of § 2K2.1(c) should apply. In relevant part, this section provides that if a defendant: “possessed ... a firearm ... with knowledge or intent that it would be used or possessed in connection with another offense, apply ... § 2Xl.l(Attempt, Solicitation or Conspiracy) in respect to that other offense, if the resulting offense level is greater than that determined above.... ” USSG § 2K2.1(c)(l); but see USSG § 2K2.1, comment, (n. 18) (stating that as “used in subsections ... (c)(1), ‘another felony offense’ and ‘another offense’ refer to offenses other than explosives or firearms possession or trafficking offenses”).5
The government, by contrast with appellant, urges us to begin with § 2K2.1(c), and it appears that the government’s sentencing theory reflects how Stubbs was actually sentenced. Under USSG *416§ 2Xl.l(a), the base offense level for a § 924(o) charge would be the “base offense level from the guideline for the substantive offense....” The substantive offense here is § 924(c)(1), which is governed by USSG § 2K2.4. Without engaging in the foregoing analysis, it was § 2K2.4 that the presentence report applied to determine Stubbs’s sentence, and at the time of sentencing, all parties appear to have assumed that § 2K2.4 governed Stubbs’s sentencing for firearms conspiracy.
When arrived at through means of § 2X1.1(a), as the government now acknowledges was the case, (Gov’t Br. at 14), the use of § 2K2.4 presents an interpretive challenge.6 See Morehead, 959 F.2d at 1509. § 2K2.4 (1998) provides that if “the defendant ... was convicted under ... § 924(c) ... the term of imprisonment is that required by statute.” This guideline does not fulfill § 2X1. l’s implied promise of an offense level, and the sentencing court is sent back to Title 18, which provides the mandatory and consecutive 60-month sentence (as a minimum).
My judgment is that both parties are giving half of the sentencing story, and ignoring the interdependence of the cross-reference provision with other portions of § 2K2.1. The cross reference, § 2K2.1(c), is conditional: one is to use the sentence produced by the cross-reference only if the “resulting offense level is greater than that determined above.” The government’s position of beginning with § 2K2.1(c) results in neither an offense level “determined above” (in the earlier portions of § 2K2.1) nor a “resulting offense level,” making the required calculation perforce rather difficult. Under the government’s position, § 2K2.4 would be used to sentence all defendants convicted of § 924(o), which would make the Commission’s assignment of guideline § 2K2.1 to § 924(o) completely superfluous, and the Congressional provision of different statutory penalties for § 924(o) and § 924(c) also largely superfluous. I would therefore not find the automatic use of the cross-reference provisions to be consistent with the intent of Congress or the Sentencing Guidelines.
Stubbs, however, has convinced the court to take an equally incorrect position that never allows the use of the cross-reference. The firearms guidelines provide two roughly parallel ways to punish the instrumental use of firearms in other criminal conduct, § 2K2.1(b)(5) and § 2K2.1(c). These use similar (although not identical) language and standards to describe the necessary level of association, and frequently both will be applicable as sentencing alternatives. Each of the parties urges their preferred method, but the guidelines indicate that both methods are to be employed and the results then compared. Because only one method was considered by the court, and it was presented to Stubbs as inevitable, a legal error in interpreting the Guidelines appears to have occurred. However, it remains to be *417determined whether Stubbs in fact was subject to a sentence different from that which he would have received under a correct application the Guidelines.

Comparison of Sentencing Methods Pursuant to USSG § 2K2.1(c)(l)(A)

It has often been noted that mandatory minimum statutes are “structurally and functionally at odds with sentencing guidelines[,]” necessarily creating “incongruities” that the federal courts and the Sentencing Commission are required to reconcile as best they can. Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 291, 116 S.Ct. 763, 133 L.Ed.2d 709 (1996) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Burke, 237 F.3d 741, 745 n. 2 (6th Cir.2001). In Stubbs’s case, the use of the cross-reference will, pursuant to § 2K2.4, add 60 months to his sentence rather than produce an offense level. In order to fulfill the mandate of § 2K2.1(c)(l)(a), the sentencing court must somehow compare the use of the mandatory consecutive sentence with an offense level (according to our calculation) of 24. There are two ways to make this comparison: (1) to “translate” the 60-month consecutive sentence into an offense level and make the comparison, or (2) to consider that the 60-month consecutive sentence, when added to defendant’s other sentences, generates a guideline range, and compare this aggregate range with the aggregate guideline range generated by direct application of § 2K2.1(a)(b) and any appropriate grouping rules from USSG §§ 3D1.1-5.
Neither method of comparison is without some risk of “incongruous” results. Superficially, we would be comparing like measures if we used the aggregate guideline ranges that would determine the defendant’s total punishment under the different approaches. However, the Guidelines forbid this method. General provisions govern a “reference to another guideline ... applied only if it results in the greater offense level. In such case, the greater offense level means the greater Chapter Two offense level, except as otherwise' expressly provided.” USSG § lB1.5(d) (emphasis added). Grouping and aggregation rules arise from Chapter Three and Chapter Five, rather than the offense-specific measures provided in Chapter Two. A little reflection reveals that, however convenient such comparison might be in this case, it would often lead to endless convolutions in sentencing, as the sentencing court deviated from the stepwise method of sentence determination, see § 1B1.1, in favor of moving back and forth between the possible total sentences and their components.7
As a practical matter, a 60-month consecutive sentence is largely incommensurable with an offense level of 24, because the comparative severity of the sentences depends on the existence and magnitude of other counts for the consecutive sentence and on the CHC for the offense level sentence.8 However, the CHC and the *418interaction with other counts cannot be considered, pursuant to § 1B1.5, at this stage of the analysis. Even when considered in isolation, as I would hold it must be, the comparison remains problematic, as the relevant quantities involve a range of 51-63 months with an intermediate fixed point of 60 months.9 On the one hand, the range offers Stubbs the potential of a lower sentence, and it is a statistical fact that the lower range of the guidelines is used with greater frequency. See United States Sentencing Commission, 1999 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics 60 (1999). On the other hand, it exposes him to greater potential punishment without the need to justify an upward departure.
Perhaps the most logical resolution would be to compare the midpoint of the offense level range under CHC I (in effect ignoring the defendant’s criminal history, which is assessed under Chapter Four rather than Chapter Two) with the cross-referenced mandatory sentence. The sentencing court would compare 57 months with 60 months and would apply the cross-reference. Cf. United States v. Flennory, 145 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir.1998) (approving of conclusion “that USSG § 2K2.1(c)(l)(A) would apply if its application resulted in a greater sentence than the subsection (b)(5) enhancement”). This resolution accords at least with the intended function of the cross-reference, in that a defendant’s sentence for an inchoate crime would be controlled by the substantive offense in most circumstances, save for when the defendant’s accumulation of firearms was so egregious in itself that it becomes more serious than a routine charge of using firearms in narcotics trafficking. Nonetheless, I would not resolve this difficult problem, because it is irrelevant from the standpoint of plain error whether an offense level of 24 (or any other alternative offense level one might calculate) “exceeds” in some sense a 60-month consecutive sentence.
If the 60-month consecutive sentence is deemed to exceed the offense level calculated pursuant to §§ 2K2.1(a)-(b), then the cross-reference was correctly applied and Stubbs was sentenced correctly. If the offense level sentence is deemed to equal or exceed the mandatory minimum sentence, then although his incorrect 60-month sentence would technically be a windfall in relation to the “greater” proper sentence, the guideline sentence could have been combined with his other offenses, resulting in a lower total punishment of between 135 to 168 months.10 This result is paradoxical, of course, because a more serious firearms conspiracy (involving convicted felons, automatic weapons, and a large arsenal) would be punished less severely than a less serious form of the same offense. However, if the cross-reference were inapplicable, Stubbs’s sentence of 195 months would nevertheless *419be outside the range provided by a proper reading of the Guidelines.
Nevertheless, the Guidelines specifically provide for circumstances where a “mandatory consecutive sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 844(h), § 924(c), or § 929(a), produces a total maximum penalty that is less than the maximum of the guideline range that would have resulted had there not been a count of conviction” under these statutes. USSG § 2K2.4, comment, (n.2). “In such a case, an upward departure may be warranted so that the conviction ... does not result in a decrease in the total punishment.” Ibid. This evinces a clear intent by the Commission that the complex interaction between mandatory mínimums and guideline provisions not result in disproportionate sentencing, and that in order to cure an atypical case where application of the guidelines would lead to such a sentence, an upward departure is appropriate to assure proportionality. Therefore, even if the offense level sentence were deemed greater than the sentence using the 60 months consecutive provision-the only way Stubbs may show an error— the sentence Stubbs hypothetically would have received would have been subject to an upward departure so that it would not be less than the sentence received by an otherwise similarly-situated defendant who committed a less serious § 924(o) offense.
I would not hold that an upward departure has occurred, as it is the burden of the defendant to show that a plain error has occurred, and Stubbs has not shown that the cross-reference was inapplicable and that a 195-month sentence would have required an upward departure. Under the specific facts of this case, where the only “plain” matter is that the applicable guideline is “plainly” ambiguous, there is no clarification we can attempt in the approach to sentencing under § 924(o) that can offer Stubbs any relief. Stubbs’s plea agreement specifically contemplated the use of the 60-month consecutive sentence for § 924(o). As the discussion above indicates, Stubbs was not misadvised when he was told this was a valid potential sentence for his offense. It was indeed the most likely sentence, and neither he nor the court has shown that he was prejudiced by accepting it or that he would have received a lesser sentence under the Guidelines absent the sentencing method of which he complains. In fact, defendants who did receive a lesser sentence by avoiding the cross-reference would normally be denied the benefit of this reduction through an upward departure. In the absence of prejudice, Stubbs can no more satisfy the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), than he can the plain error standard.
I would hold that the use of a 60-month consecutive sentence based on § 924(o) is not plainly erroneous, and affirm Stubbs’s sentence. I therefore respectfully dissent.

. Following the decision of the Supreme Court in Bailey, 516 U.S. at 144, 116 S.Ct. 501, which heightened the requirements to show violation of § 924(c), § 924(o) may have become a more attractive charging alternative that could largely avoid the strictures of Bailey if a conspiracy could be shown. With the modification of § 924(c) in response to Bailey, the prosecutorial incentive to use § 924(o) may have waned.

. Although it was not the case in 1992 when Morehead was decided, currently those charged under § 371 are governed at least initially by § 2K2.1 when the predicate offense is § 924(c). See USSG App. A. This effectively treats § 371 when the predicate offense is § 924(c) identically with § 924(o) when the predicate offense is § 924(c), as seems appropriate.

. The Norinco AK-47 Stubbs admitted to possessing provides the clearest basis for the use of this guideline. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(30)(A)(i).

. The plea agreement did not stipulate to a criminal history category (CHC) for Stubbs. The presentence report for Stubbs reveals a recommendation of CHC III. However, he was sentenced by the district court as if he was in CHC I. Therefore, we will assume that this category would have been used to determine the sentence for § 924(o), had a putatively mandatory sentence not been applied.

.This commentary does not appear to apply to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), at least as it existed prior to amendment, as this punished the carrying and use of firearms rather than merely firearms possession or trafficking. The note does not stop the use of the cross-reference for all “firearms offenses" but a limited subset of these, from which former § 924(c) is logically excluded. This interpretation is in accord with § 924(c)'s coverage in a separate section of the Guidelines.

. Although not discussed by the government in this case, it may be noted that there is an alternative method that would result in the application of the § 2K2.4 guideline to a § 924(o) conviction. Under USSG § IB 1.2, there is a limited exception to the rule that the statutory index in Appendix A will be used to determine the initial guideline. When a plea agreement "specifically establishes facts that prove a more serious offense or offenses than the offense or offenses of conviction, the court is to apply the guideline most applicable to the more serious offense....” USSG § 1B1.2, comment, (n.l) (1998) (explaining that the exception prevents the necessity of calculations that "unduly complicate the sentencing process”). Arguably, Stubbs’s admissions in his agreement establish that an actual § 924(c) violation had occurred, meaning that even if an interpretive error occurred, Stubbs’s sentence would have been the same, and he can therefore show no plain error.

. In order to minimize confusion (to the extent that is possible) I would note that the cross-reference comparison is quite a different analysis from the one made in determining whether a defendant’s substantial rights are violated, or whether an upward departure is warranted. For these latter purposes the evaluation of aggregate punishment is appropriate. See § 1B 1.1 (providing that the determination of the guideline range in § IB 1.1(g) is to occur before consideration of departures in § lBl.l(i), but after consideration of cross-references in § 1B1.1 (b)).

. For instance a CHC of VI, combined with an offense level of 24, generates a guideline range of 100-125 months in prison, potential*418ly more than double a 60-month sentence taken from § 2K2.4.

. In the most recent version of guidelines, it is made clear that the statutorily-derived minimum sentence is the guideline sentence, and anything above the minimum "is an upward departure.” USSG § 2K2.4, comment, (n.l) (Nov.2001).

. If we assume an offense level of 24, under USSG § 3D1.4(b), another count with an offense level of 24 would raise the aggregate offense level to 33 (use of offense level 32 was contemplated by the plea agreement for Stubbs’s other charges). Offense level 24 is between "5 to 8 levels less serious" than the highest offense level charged and would result in an increase of one offense level through the addition of one-half Unit. This produces a guideline range of 135-168 months, which is less than, and non-overlapping with, a range produced by offense level 32 with 60 months consecutive, which would be 181-211 months.