Court Opinion

ID: 9629989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:56:14.95983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:32:08.743810
License: Public Domain

Fromme, J.,
dissenting. In the majority opinion this court gives lip service to our Code of Professional Responsibility but permits a violation of one of the basic rules guiding every lawyer — integrity and loyalty to his client. (See Haverty v. Haverty, 35 Kan. 438, 11 Pac. 364, and New v. Smith, 86 Kan. 1, 119 Pac. 380.) There is no profession in which so many temptations beset the path of him who is to serve with strict integrity and loyalty. There are pitfalls at every step to be avoided if the integrity and good name of the bar and of the administration of the law are upheld. A lawyer must exercise prudence and self-denial as well as moral courage if he is to maintain the high ethical standards expected of lawyers.
The Utah court in Smoot v. Lund, 13 Utah 2d 168, 369 P. 2d 933 expresses it in these words:
“. . . [A lawyer’s] fiduciary duty is of the highest order and he must not represent interests adverse to those of the client. It is also true that because of his professional responsibility and the confidence and trust which his client may legitimately repose in him, he must adhere to a high standard of honesty, integrity and good faith in dealing with his client. He is not permitted to take advantage of his position or superior knowledge to impose upon the client; nor to conceal facts or law, nor in any way deceive him without being held responsible therefor.” (p. 172.)
The Connecticut court in Grievance Committee v. Rottner, 152 Conn. 59, 203 A. 2d 82, had this to say:
“. . . When a client engages the services of a lawyer in a given piece of business he is entitled to feel that, until that business is finally disposed of in some manner, he has the undivided loyalty of the one upon whom he looks as his advocate and his champion. If, as in this case, he is sued and his home attached by his own attorney, who is representing him in another matter, all feeling of loyalty is necessarily destroyed, and the profession is exposed to the charge that it is interested only in money.” (p. 65.)
In the present case when W. C. Sullivan undertook to have Allen L. Ballinger appointed administrator of the estate of Margaret Seeger, deceased, he did so as attorney for Clyde and Glenn Smith. The relationship between lawyer and client attached when the work was begun and it continued thereafter until the lawyer-client rela*161tionship was terminated. W. C. Sullivan owed to Clyde and Glenn Smith strict integrity and loyalty, not only to them as clients but to their cause. Clyde and Glenn Smith had a right to expect no less than this.
The record before this court clearly shows that Clyde and Glenn Smith attended court on May 15, 1970, believing that their choice of administrator, Allen L. Ballinger, would be appointed and that W. C. Sullivan with strict integrity and loyalty would contend for that cause. They knew nothing about the prior appointment of Lowell F. Hahn as the guardian ad litem or of prior communications between their attorney and the guardian ad litem. On the day of hearing while in open court they first learned the only other attorney in court (Mr. Hahn) objected to the appointment and their attorney seemed to agree with him. It is small wonder under these circumstances that the client, Clyde Smith, at a loss for words, said, “Well, we have got to have an administrator.” The other client, Glenn, said nothing. When Clyde was asked as a witness if he consented to Mr. Sullivan being appointed he answered, “I didn’t approve of it, either way. I was just kind of shocked.”
Under the foregoing circumstances W. C. Sullivan was not a suitable person to discharge the trust. He was bound by the lawyer-client relationship to contend for the appointment of Mr. Ballinger and his clients had a right to expect no less. (See In re Strosnider, 180 Kan. 480, 483, 305 P. 2d 1058 as to dual representation.) The guardian ad litem had no prior right. The court by appointment could not erase the conflict of interest and personal self-interest which W. C. Sullivan had. Only his clients could do this.
The consent which the majority uses to justify their decision is superficial and found to exist in total disregard of the reasons for the rule which disqualifies the attorney. Consent by implication should not be recognized in cases of this kind. The integrity and good name of the bar and of the courts cannot be thus maintained in the eyes of the public. Full disclosure as required in the disciplinary rule is not made when a client and his cause is abandoned in open court during the hearing, and without advance notice, by saying, “I wouldn’t want to serve as administrator unless it was all right with them.”
Full disclosure should require that the alternatives available be explored with the client. In this case adjournment of the hearing should have been requested. The clients should have been advised *162of their right to hire another attorney to prosecute their case if they so desired. They should have been advised that Mr. Sullivan was not suitable as the administrator because of his duty to contend for the appointment of Mr. Ballinger and that only they could remove that unsuitability. The clients should in no case be forced into a consent, implied or otherwise, without an explanation of the exact nature of the conflicting interests which Mr. Sullivan proposed to embrace. They had a right to know and understand the possible effect the conflicting interest would have upon the client-attorney relationship previously existing between them.
There was no full disclosure of interest by W. C. Sullivan in this case. There was no consent by his clients for him to engage in the conflicting interest as the administrator. Therefore he was unsuitable by reason of the conflicting interest to be appointed regardless of whether his appointment was urged by the guardian ad litem, of the sole heir or anyone else. (See Wilson v. Wahl, 182 Kan. 532, 322 P. 2d 804.)
The judgment appointing W. C. Sullivan should be reversed and the case remanded.
Schroeder, J., joins in the foregoing dissent.