Court Opinion

ID: 9527686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:32:50.264382+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:04.294345
License: Public Domain

*954NAJAM, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. South Eastern is a public utility regulated by the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission ("IURC" or "Commission") pursuant to Indiana Code § 8-1-2-1, et seq. The question presented falls squarely within the primary jurisdiction of the IURC, and it is for the IURC to determine, in the first instance, whether in order "to furnish reasonably adequate service and facilities" a public utility is required to warn its customers when an unexpected interruption in gas service occurs. See IND. CODE § 8-1-2~4. Further, even if the trial court had primary subject matter jurisdiction, South Eastern was entitled to judgment on its motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because South Eastern had no duty to warn the Ingrams as a matter of law.
Primary Jurisdiction
Both the Ingrams and the majority contend that the Ingrams' complaint presents an ordinary negligence claim, a simple action in tort for property damage, and that the elements of duty and reasonable care are common law questions which fall outside of the IURC's primary jurisdiction. The majority reasons that resort to the IURC would be futile and, hence, is not required because the IURC cannot provide the Ingrams with the jury trial to which they are entitled or damages to compensate them for their injury. However, the majority avoids the real issue, which is whether a trial court or the IURC should first determine whether existing IURC rules ensure adequate service to utility customers. I believe that task is committed initially to the IURC for a determination of the reasonableness of IURC policy, followed by action in the trial court consistent with the IURC's determination.1
Throughout these proceedings, the parties have described the event triggering this action as a "reduction in line pressure." The Ingrams do not allege in their complaint that South Eastern caused this reduction in line pressure. Record at 4. The parties also agree in their statements of fact and arguments on appeal that there is no allegation that South Eastern caused the interruption of the Ingrams' gas service. See Appellant's Brief at 3 and Appel-lees' Brief at 1 and 2.
The IURC has previously defined adequate service in this context. An IURC rule provides that "if it can be shown that variations in gas pressure occurring are due to conditions beyond the control of the utility," the utility "shall not be deemed to have violated" the rule that gas pressure shall not vary by more than fifty percent above or below normal pressure. IND.ADMIN.CODE tit. 170, r. 5-1-21(A) and (B) (1992). Thus, the IURC has made a judgment and determined, within the regulatory framework, what constitutes adequate service and what is reasonable utility practice when, as in this case, a customer experiences a reduction in gas line pressure.
When a claim includes issues within the competence of both an administrative agen-ey and the courts, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction provides that the agency should first determine those issues within its regulatory authority. See Shlens v. Egnatz (1987), Ind.App., 508 N.E.2d 44, 46, trans. denied. The test for primary jurisdiction is not whether some parts of the case are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts; rather, the test is whether some parts of the case are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the agency. Indiana Forge and Machine Co. v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co. (1979), Ind.App., 396 N.E.2d 910, 913 (quoting 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 19.07, at 89 (1958)). The primary jurisdiction doctrine applies when a claim is cognizable in a court but adjudication of the claim requires adjudication of issues under a regulatory scheme which are within the special competence and expertise of an administrative body. Hansen v. Norfolk and Western Railway Co. (7th Cir.1982), 689 F.2d 707, 711. Under those cireumstances, the court action is *955not dismissed but suspended pending referral of such issues for determination by the administrative body. Id.
In the seminal decision recognizing the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the Supreme Court noted that a fundamental concern of the doctrine is to promote consistency and uniformity in administrative policy. See Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. (1907), 204 U.S. 426, 440-41, 27 S.Ct. 350, 355, 51 L.Ed. 553, 559. Hence, the primary jurisdiction doe-trine is applied where the reasonableness of administrative standards and practices is at issue. See Massa v. Peabody Coal Co. (S.D.Ind.1988), 698 F.Supp. 1446, 1451. Court deference to administrative expertise is particularly appropriate in regulated industries where a systematic and interrelated body of factfinding and policymaking require uniformity to avoid conflicting commands from the agency and the courts. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr. and William T. Mayton, Administrative Law 424 (1998); Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 188 (1965).
Notice to a customer when an interruption in utility service occurs is a practice or act affecting or relating to that service. Thus, while the Ingrams characterize their claim as a common law negligence action, they actually challenge agency policy concerning the adequacy of utility service provided by South Eastern, a matter which the IURC regulates.2 Subject-matter jurisdiction is controlled by the nature of the claim presented, not by the manner of pleading. Shlens, 508 N.E.2d at 46; Public Service Indiana, Inc. v. Nichols (1986), Ind.App., 494 N.E.2d 349, 353. For purposes of primary jurisdiction analysis, the mere fact that the plaintiff phrases his claim in one manner instead of another does not conclusively determine jurisdiction; the applicability of the primary jurisdiction doctrine does not rely upon the whim of the pleader. United States v. Western Pacific Railroad Co. (1956), 352 U.S. 59, 68-69, 77 S.Ct. 161, 167, 1 L.Ed.2d 126, 135.
An IURC rule expressly provides that a public utility does not violate the minimum allowable variations in gas pressure when such variations are due to conditions beyond the control of the utility. See 170 IAC 5-1-21(B). While IURC rules require notice to customers under other circumstances, IURC rules do not require a public utility to provide notice of an unexpected reduction in gas pressure.3 The IURC has *956primary jurisdiction to determine whether its standards ensure adequate service for customers under those circumstances and whether the standards are consistent with IURC policy. In contrast, if the IURC had promulgated a rule requiring notice to customers under these circumstances, a claim challenging the sufficiency of that notice rather than the reasonableness of the practice itself could properly be decided by a trial court or jury applying settled principles of tort law. See Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc. (1976), 426 U.S. 290, 306 n. 14, 96 S.Ct. 1978, 1988 n. 14, 48 L.Ed.2d 643, 656 n. 14; see also Massa, 698 F.Supp. at 1451 (primary jurisdiction doctrine applies where issue challenges reasonable ness of agency standards or practices, not compliance with standards); Citizens Gas and Coke Utility v. Wells (1971), 150 Ind.App. 78, 84, 275 N.E.2d 323, 327 (trial court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear complaint alleging negligent violation of rule requiring written notice to customer before shutting off gas service). The Ingrams' action does not challenge the negligent violation of a rule but the reasonableness of IURC policy which does not require notice to customers when gas service is unexpectedly interrupted. See Nader, 426 U.S. at 305, 96 S.Ct. at 1987, 48 L.Ed.2d at 656. Primary jurisdiction to decide the Ingrams' challenge is vested in the IURC.
I disagree with the majority's contention that the Ingrams' action does not require an informed evaluation of the economics or technology of the industry. See id. The majority's position relies, in part, on the fact that the Ingrams do not couch their complaint in terms of an attack on the validity or application of the IURC tariff. However, a tariff is not an abstraction. Western Pacific, 852 U.S. at 66, T7 S.0t. at 167, 1 LEd.2d at 188. It embodies an analysis of technical cost-allocation and accounting problems which must be solved in setting the tariff initially. Id. "Courts which do not make rates cannot know with exactitude the factors which go into the rate- making process." Id. at 68, 77 S.Ct. at 167, 1 LEd.2d at 183.
A determination that a utility has a duty to warn its customers when an unexpected interruption in service occurs will have a direct impact on the cost of service and the economics of utility rates, which a trial court has no obligation or expertise to consider. The impact on rates which may result from the imposition of tort liability in this context is more than "merely incidental." Nader, 426 U.S. at 300, 96 S.Ct. at 1985, 48 LEd.2d at 652. The majority's opinion has broad ramifications because tort liability under these circumstances could open wide the floodgates of litigation by utility customers whenever an unexpected interruption in utility service results, for example, in the loss of perishables or has an adverse impact on a business operation.
This case also presents the kind of broad policy question which calls for a consistent and uniform rule of general application promulgated by the regulatory authority. Indeed, the need for a uniform IURC policy governing notice to customers in the event of unexpected interruptions in utility service is paramount and weighs heavily in favor of primary jurisdiction in the IURC. When there is no administrative rule or regulation in place which regulates the challenged practice, court action will neither threaten the uniformity of, nor create an inconsistency in, the regulatory framework. See id. at 304, 96 S.Ct. at 1987, 48 L.Ed.2d at 656; Aman & Mayton, supra, at 430 n. 82. Here, however, the IURC has already defined reasonable gas utility practice when reductions in gas pressure occur due to conditions beyond the control of the utility. See 170 IAC 5-1-21. The majority approves a result which may subject utilities such as South Eastern to conflicting commands from our courts and the IURC regarding a utility's duty to notify customers when service is unexpectedly interrupted. The effect is to disrupt the desired goals of uniformity and consistency in the TURC's regulatory framework.
The majority's conclusion that the trial court has jurisdiction to decide the reasonableness of South Eastern's failure to provide the Ingrams with notice enables the *957court "to substitute its judgment for the agency's ... on the reasonableness of any [utility] practice." Nader, 426 U.S. at 299-300, 96 S.Ct. at 1985, 48 L.Ed.2d at 652. The Ingrams are dissatisfied with existing administrative rules which do not require notice when unexpected interruptions in gas service occur. The reasonableness of those rules is a matter within the IURC's primary jurisdiction. See Massa, 698 F.Supp. at 1451.
I cannot agree that in this instance the holding in Nickols is dispositive. In Nick-ols, we considered whether the IURC had jurisdiction over an action in which a dairy herd was injured by stray voltage from a power company's lines and concluded that a plaintiff raising a common law negligence claim need not first seek relief from the Commission. NMichols, 494 N.E.2d at 8354. However, as we noted in Michols, "the issues presented by the Nichols' claim only remotely dealt with questions of adequate service as contemplated by IND.CODE 8-1-2-54. There was no question that service was provided, it was at an adequate level and quantity and the rates were appropriate." Id. Instead, Nichols involved the utility's failure to warn its customers of the potential for a stray voltage problem and its placement of an unsafe product in the stream of commerce, questions which are governed by traditional concepts of negligence and strict liability. Id. Here, the Ingrams contend that South Eastern failed to provide adequate service in that South Eastern had the duty to take whatever steps were necessary both to restore adequate service and to warn its customers of the interruption in service to prevent damage to life and property. See Appel-lees' Brief at 1 and 8.
The majority finds further support in the principle from Mickols that the trial court has original subject matter jurisdiction over the Ingrams' action because the IURC cannot afford them complete relief. See Nick-ols, 494 N.E.2d at 858. The majority contends that to require the Ingrams to seek relief from the IURC would be futile because the IURC can exercise only administrative or legislative powers, has no judicial powers and cannot award the Ingrams a money judgment. See id. However, when we have previously applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, we have declared that a claim for damages cannot cireumvent the IURC's primary jurisdiction to pass upon a specific utility practice. In Indiana Bell Telephone Co. v. Friedland (1978), 175 Ind.App. 622, 373 N.E.2d 344, trans. denied, cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916, 99 S.Ct. 1233, 59 LEd.2d 465 we held that even though the Public Service Commission, IURC's predecessor, had no authority to render a money judgment, before a plaintiff can bring a claim for damages, the Commission must have first determined that the conduct or acts which gave rise to the complaint were "unlawful." See id. 175 Ind.App. at 685, 878 N.E.2d at 852. The proper procedure for attacks against the practices and services of a public utility is first to seek a determination from the Commission whether those practices and services are adequate before instituting an action in the trial court for damages. Id. Judicial review of that determination may be obtained as provided in Indiana Code § 8-1-8-1. Id.
The Ingrams cannot divest the IURC of its statutory jurisdiction and the intended procedure for obtaining relief merely by claiming money damages. The Ingrams' claim challenges the adequacy of South Eastern's utility service and the reasonableness of an IURC rule or practice. Accordingly, the Ingrams' complaint must yield to the IURC's primary jurisdiction.
Failure to State a Claim
I dissent for a second reason. If, as the majority holds, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction, then South Eastern was entitled to judgment on its motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because South Eastern had no duty to warn as a matter of law. See Ind.Trial Rule 12(B)(6). In a negligence action, whether a duty exists is a question of law. Webb v. Jarvis (1991), Ind., 575 N.E.2d 992, 995. Among the relevant considerations in making that determination are the relationship between the parties, the reasonable foreseeability of *958harm to the person injured, and public poli-ey concerns. Id. The question whether the law imposes a duty begins with an analysis of the relationship between the parties. Id.
Here, the relationship is a contractual relationship between a public utility and its customer. The customer is entitled to adequate service, as defined and administered by the IURC under rules and regulations which have the effect of law. See Whitley County Rural Electric Membership Corp. v. Lippincott (1986), Ind.App., 493 N.E.2d 1323, 1327. Nevertheless, even where service is adequate, unexpected interruptions in utility service occur from time to time without warning and are usually caused by equipment failure or adverse weather conditions. While improvements in technology have reduced the frequency and duration of such interruptions, occasional interruptions are inherent in utility service, and customers expect them.
When such interruptions occur they often affect thousands of customers. As a practical matter, customers usually have actual, often immediate, knowledge that an interruption in utility service has occurred, and in such cases notice is obviously not required. This case presents a more narrow question, namely, whether a public utility has a duty to warn those customers who might not know or have the means at hand to learn promptly that an interruption in service has occurred.
The Ingrams' claim presupposes that South Eastern had a duty to warn and assumes, as a matter of law, that the customer's interest in having uninterrupted utility service is entitled to protection against the utility's conduct in not warning the customer of an unexpected interruption in service. See Gariup Construction Co. v. Foster (1988), Ind., 519 N.E.2d 1224, 1227. However, customers do not have a legitimate expectation that utilities will notify them under these circumstances. I do not believe that reasonable persons would recognize or agree that a duty to warn exists or that a utility should bear the loss for each of its customers arising from a failure to warn. See id.
Apart from the common law, whether and when a utility has a duty to warn its customers is controlled by administrative rule. I do not find, and neither the parties nor the majority have directed me to, any notice requirement in any applicable statute or IURC rule.4 To the contrary, the IURC has determined as a matter of law, by rule, that utility service is adequate when, as in this case, a reduction in gas pressure exceeding allowable variations is due to conditions beyond the control of the utility. See 170 IAC 5-1-21(B). An IURC rule issued pursuant to a legislative grant of authority to regulate the provision of utility service has the effect of law. See Lippincott, 493 N.E.2d at 1827 (applying principle to administrative rule promulgated by the Public Service Commission, IURC's predecessor). That grant of authority to the IURC is exclusive, and a trial court cannot create new or different rules or standards requiring notice, where the IURC has already determined by rule that service is adequate and that a utility is not responsible for variations in gas pressure due to conditions beyond its control. See id. The IURC rule is not mere evidence but is controlling. See id.
As previously noted, the Ingrams did not allege in their complaint that the interruption in utility service was caused by any act or omission of South Eastern, and both parties agree that is not an issue. See Record at 4; Appellant's Brief at 3 and Appellees' Brief at 1 at 2. Given IURC rules in effect at the time the Ingrams experienced a reduction in gas pressure, South Eastern had no duty as a matter of law to give the Ingrams notice of the inter*959ruption in order to furnish reasonably adequate service.
Whether we apply a common law or administrative law analysis, there is no legal duty to warn. In the absence of a legal duty the Ingrams have failed to state a claim.
Conclusion
In sum, I believe that South Eastern was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Further, the Ingrams failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Under either theory, South Eastern's motion for a judgment on the pleadings should have been granted.

. Any party who brings a complaint before the IURC and is dissatisfied with the Commission's final decision may appeal that decision directly to this court for judicial review, pursuant to Indiana Code § 8-1-3-1.

. Our legislature has specifically granted the IURC the power to regulate matters addressing the adequacy of service: "The Commission shall establish reasonable rules and regulations to govern the relation between public utilities and any or all classes of its customers." IND.CODE § 8-1-2-34.5(a). Further,
"Upon a complaint made against any public utility by any mercantile, agricultural or manufacturing society by any body politic or municipal organization or by ten (10) persons, firms, corporations or associations, or ten (10) complainants of all or any of the aforementioned classes, or by any public utility, that any of the rates, tolls, charges or schedules or any joint rate or rates in which such petitioner is directly interested are in any respect unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory, or that any regulation, measurement, practice or act whatsoever affecting or relating to the service of any public utility, or any service in connection therewith, is in any respect unreasonable, unsafe, insufficient or unjustly discriminatory, or that any service is inadequate or can not be obtained, the [CJom-mission shall proceed, with or without notice, to make such investigation as it may deem necessary or convenient. But no order affecting said rates, tolls, charges, schedules, regulations, measurements, practice or act, complained of, shall be entered by the [CJlommission without a formal hearing."
IND.CODE § 8-1-2-54 (emphases added). Following an investigation of a complaint made against a utility, the Commission is authorized to issue orders correcting any unreasonable, insufficient or inadequate practice or service. See IND.CODE § 8-1-2-69. As the majority correctly observes, inherent in that grant of authority is the implicit power to do that which is necessary to effectuate the regulatory scheme. See Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Citizens Action Coalition (1989), Ind., 548 N.E.2d 153, 158, cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1137, 106 S.Ct. 2239, 90 L.Ed.2d 687.

. Unlike electric and water utilities, the IURC does not require gas utilities to provide customers with notice even when the utility intentionally interrupts gas service. Compare IND.ADMIN.CODE tit. 170, r. 5-1-23 (gas utilities) (1992) with IND.ADMIN.CODE tit. 170, r. 4-1-23 (1992) (electric utilities) and IND.ADMIN.CODE tit. 170, r. 6-1-22 (1992) (water utilities) (utilities shall notify, "so far as possible," those customers most seriously affected by an *956intentional interruption in service in advance of that interruption).

. In contrast, Indiana Code § 8-1-2-122 requires notice of termination of residential electric or gas service, and Indiana Administrative Code, title 170, rule 4-1-23 (1992), requires notice of planned interruptions of electric utility service. The single IURC rule addressing interruption of gas service only requires utilities to maintain records and file reports of such interruptions. See IND.ADMIN.CODE tit. 170, r. 5-1-23 (1992). There are no IURC rules which require notice to gas utility customers of unintentional interruptions of service.