Court Opinion

ID: 9560964
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:00:26.388802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:25.672519
License: Public Domain

Carley, Chief Judge.
Appellant was indicted for theft by receiving, in that he “did retain stolen property, to-wit: One (1) 1978 Chevrolet Nova . . . which he knew and should have known was stolen; said property not having been retained with intent to restore it to the owner. . . .” Having been tried before a jury and found guilty, he appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence that were entered by the trial court on the jury’s guilty verdict.
1. Appellant enumerates only the general grounds. His sole contention is that there was insufficient evidence to authorize a finding that he possessed the automobile with the requisite guilty knowledge that it was stolen. We find that a rational trior of fact could reasonably have found from the evidence adduced at trial proof beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had the requisite guilty knowledge and that he was, therefore, guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of theft by receiving stolen property. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. In support of his enumeration of the general grounds, appellant neither cites Dyer v. State, 150 Ga. App. 760 (258 SE2d 620) (1979) nor otherwise urges that a fatal variance exists because the State’s evidence showed his commission of theft by taking rather than theft by receiving. Nevertheless, we are compelled to address this issue because the dissent has chosen to raise it.
In the instant case, appellant brought out on the cross-examination of the victim’s girl friend that she did not see anyone take the car keys. On redirect, the State then elicited her testimony that she had, however, seen appellant leave the victim’s bedroom and then get into the victim’s car. Until two days before trial, she told no one, not even the victim or the police, what she had seen. Moreover, she never actually saw appellant drive away. Accordingly, there was no uncontra-dicted evidence which demanded a finding that appellant was the thief. “The facts in the instant case are[, therefore,] distinguishable from those in Dyer v. State, . . . , supra, as the [S]tate did not produce conclusive evidence, as in Dyer, that [appellant] committed theft by taking . . . [G]uilt of either theft by taking or receiving could be inferred. ‘ “In a theft by receiving stolen property case, where the principal thief is unknown, there is no burden on the [S]tate of proving that such thief was not the defendant.” [Cit.]’ [Cit.]” Duke v. State, 153 Ga. App. 204, 205 (264 SE2d 721) (1980). See also Poole v. *326State, 144 Ga. App. 228, 229 (1) (240 SE2d 775) (1977) (eyewitness testimony that defendant was the thief). “[T]he jury would have been authorized to find the existence of each fact necessary to sustain a conviction of [theft by receiving]. . . . [Any] contention that there was a variance between the [SJtate’s allegations and proof . . . misses the point that the fatal variance doctrine merely is concerned with proof introduced in support of allegations and is not concerned with the findings the jury may make after having heard the evidence. [Cit.]” Oglesby v. State, 243 Ga. 690, 692 (3) (256 SE2d 371) (1979).
Moreover, even if there were a variance, it would not be so material as to be fatal. The crimes of theft by taking and theft by receiving are mutually exclusive. Sosbee v. State, 155 Ga. App. 196, 197 (270 SE2d 367) (1980). “On convicting [appellant] of the charge that he knowingly received the stolen [automobile], the [jury] necessarily determined that the [taking] had been committed by someone other than [appellant]. The [S]tate [would be] collaterally estopped from prosecuting [appellant] for [theft by taking] and attempting to reliti-gate and disprove that determined fact.” (Emphasis in original.) Clark v. State, 144 Ga. App. 69, 70 (240 SE2d 270) (1977). Accordingly, in holding that a conviction of theft by receiving would not bar a subsequent prosecution for theft by taking, Dyer v. State, supra at 162, is incorrect and it is hereby overruled.

Judgment affirmed.

Banke, P. J., Birdsong, Pope and Benham, JJ., concur. Deen, P. J., McMurray, P. J., Sognier, and Beasley, JJ., dissent.