Court Opinion

ID: 9925255
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 06:06:20.445189+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:48.829422
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     UNPUBLISHED
                                                                     January 18, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 363845
                                                                     Berrien Circuit Court
JAMES ELLIS, JR.,                                                    LC No. 2021-016148-FH

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: REDFORD, P.J., and RIORDAN and FEENEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        In 2022, defendant pleaded guilty to attempted unarmed robbery, MCL 750.530. The trial
court sentenced defendant to serve 12 to 60 months in prison and ordered that defendant register
as a Tier III sex offender under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), MCL 28.721 et seq.—
pursuant to the recapture provision of MCL 28.723(1)(e)—on the basis of defendant’s 1983 sex-
offense conviction in Illinois. Defendant appeals by leave granted,1 arguing that defendant’s
lifetime registration under SORA: (1) violates the plain language of the statute because defendant
does not reside in Michigan; (2) is unconstitutional ex post facto punishment; and (3) constitutes
cruel or unusual punishment under the Michigan Constitution. We affirm.

        Generally, to preserve an issue for appellant review, a defendant must raise the issue in the
trial court. People v Heft, 299 Mich 69, 78; 829 NW2d 266 (2012). In this case, defendant moved
to correct an “invalid sentence”—in his motion, defendant “object[ed] to lifetime registration
under [SORA] as violating the plain language of the statute, as ex post facto punishment, and as
cruel or unusual punishment in violation of the Michigan Constitution.” Therefore, defendant has
preserved all three issues on appeal. See id.

1
 People v James Ellis, Jr, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 3, 2023
(Docket No. 363845).

                                                -1-
        Constitutional questions are reviewed de novo. People v McCuller, 479 Mich 672, 681;
739 NW2d 563 (2007). “Questions of constitutional and statutory interpretation present questions
of law reviewed de novo.” People v Hall, 499 Mich 446, 452; 884 NW2d 561 (2016).

       First, defendant argues that his lifetime registration under SORA violates the plain
language of the statute because he does not reside in Michigan.

        When “the language of the statute is unambiguous, the plain meaning reflects the
Legislature’s intent and this Court applies the statute as written.” People v Borchard-Ruhland,
460 Mich 278, 284; 597 NW2d 1 (1999). “When construing a statute, the court must presume that
every word has some meaning and should avoid any construction that would render any part of the
statute surplusage or nugatory. If possible, effect should be given to each provision.” Id. at 285
(citation omitted).

         In this case, the trial court found that SORA’s recapture provision—MCL 28.723(1)(e)—
applied to defendant; therefore, defendant was ordered to register as a Tier III sex offender.
Specifically, defendant’s judgment of sentence states that defendant “must register under SORA
tier III.”

      In 2011, SORA was amended pursuant to MCL 28.723, and in 2021, SORA was again
amended pursuant to MCL 28.722. MCL 28.723 provides in relevant part, as follows:

                 (1) . . . [T]he following individuals who are domiciled or temporarily reside
        in this state or who work with or without compensation or are students in this state
        are required to be registered under this act:

                                                * * *

               (e) An individual who was previously convicted of a listed offense for
        which he or she was not required to register under this act, but who is convicted of
        any other felony on or after July 1, 2011.

A “listed offense” is “a tier I, tier II, or tier III offense.” MCL 28.722(i).

        Defendant does not dispute that his 1983 sex-offense conviction fits within the definition
of a Tier III offense. Nor can he dispute that he has been convicted of another felony (attempted
unarmed robbery) after July 1, 2011. See MCL 750.530. Therefore, the language in
Subdivision (e) of MCL 28.723 clearly applies. However, defendant contends that the threshold
language of Subsection (1) of MCL 28.723 does not apply because he does not reside in Michigan.

         At defendant’s arraignment, defense counsel explained that defendant had been living in
South Bend, Indiana, for 15 years. In his motion to correct an invalid sentence, defendant further
clarified that he “is not, nor was he upon the commission of the crime, temporarily residing in
Michigan.” Because defendant is not domiciled or temporarily residing in Michigan, the recapture
provision—MCL 28.723(1)(e)—does not immediately apply to defendant. However, if defendant
domiciles or temporarily resides in Michigan in the future, defendant will need to register pursuant
to his judgment of sentence. See MCL 28.723(1).

                                                  -2-
       We note that MCL 28.723(3) applies to nonresidents and provides as follows:

                A nonresident who is convicted in this state on or after July 1, 2011 of
       committing a listed offense who is not otherwise described in subsection (1) shall
       nevertheless register under this act. However, the continued reporting requirements
       of this act do not apply to the individual while he or she remains a nonresident and
       is not otherwise required to report under this act. The individual shall have his or
       her photograph taken under section 5a.

However, MCL 28.723(3) does not apply to defendant because there is no evidence that he has
committed a listed offense since July 1, 2011.

        Defendant further argues that his lifetime registration under SORA is unconstitutional
ex post facto punishment. We disagree.

       In People v Klinesmith, 342 Mich App 39; 993 NW2d 21 (2022), lv app held in abeyance
___ Mich ___; 986 NW2d 597 (2023),2 this Court directly addressed whether SORA registration
under MCL 28.723(1)(e) violates the prohibition against ex post facto punishment. In Klinesmith,
this Court concluded that the conviction that subjected the defendant to registration under SORA
was an operating while intoxicated (OWI) conviction in 2017, not his prior 1983 conviction for
attempted criminal sexual conduct; therefore, SORA registration did not violate the ex post facto
clauses of the state or federal constitutions. Id. at 44.

       Klinesmith relied on the language used in People v Betts, 507 Mich 527, 521; 968 NW2d
497 (2021), in which the Michigan Supreme Court reasoned and concluded as follows:

               Having determined that severability and revival are inappropriate tools to
       remedy the constitutional violation in this case, we are constrained to hold that the
       2011 SORA may not be retroactively applied to registrants whose criminal acts
       subjecting them to registration occurred before the enactment of the 2011 SORA
       amendments.

                                              * * *

               We hold that the 2011 SORA, when applied to registrants whose criminal
       acts predated the enactment of the 2011 SORA amendments, violates the
       constitutional prohibition on ex post facto laws. As applied to [the defendant],
       because the crime subjecting him to registration [second-degree criminal sexual
       conduct] occurred in 1993, we order that his instant conviction of failure to register
       as a sex offender be vacated. [Id.]

2
 Klinesmith is being held in abeyance pending a decision in People v Lymon, 342 Mich App 46,
61-62, 81; 993 NW2d 24 (2022), lv gtd 511 Mich 860; 983 NW2d 82 (2023).

                                                -3-
Subsequently, in Klinesmith, 342 Mich App at 43-45, this Court concluded as follows:

                In light of [the language used in Betts], we must reject defendant’s
         suggestion in his supplemental brief that in Betts the “entire 2011 SORA
         amendatory Act was overturned . . . .” Rather, the holding in Betts is much
         narrower, providing only that the act cannot be applied retroactively to those
         individuals “whose criminal acts subjecting them to registration occurred before
         the enactment of the 2011 SORA amendments.”

                 This leads us to the question of which criminal act subjected defendant to
         the registration requirement: his 1983 criminal-sexual-conduct conviction or his
         2017 conviction of OWI, third offense.

                                                * * *

                 While the decision in Betts may have affected other portions of the Tucker[3]
         decision and those portions are no longer valid, we find nothing in Betts that
         disturbs the conclusion in Tucker that the recapture provision of SORA attached
         legal consequences to defendant’s subsequent conviction, not to his original
         conviction. Accordingly, defendant in this case was subject to the recapture
         provision on the basis of his 2017 offenses. Simply put, had defendant not
         committed a new felony, he would remain free from the requirements of SORA.

                 For these reasons, we conclude, as did the trial court, that defendant remains
         subject to compliance with SORA.

        In this case, similar to the defendant in Klinesmith, the recapture provision of SORA
attached legal consequences to defendant’s 2022—attempted unarmed robbery—conviction, not
his original 1983 sex-offense conviction, and “had defendant not committed a new felony, he
would remain free from the requirements of SORA.” Id. at 44. Because we are constrained by
Klinesmith, Supra, we find no ex post facto punishment here.

      Defendant further argues that lifetime registration under SORA constitutes cruel or unusual
punishment under the Michigan Constitution. We disagree.

       The Michigan Constitution prohibits cruel or unusual punishment; whereas, the United
States Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. People v Lymon, 342 Mich App 46,
61-62, 81; 993 NW2d 24 (2022) lv gtd 511 Mich 860; 983 NW2d 82 (2023)4. Therefore, “[i]f a

3
    People v Tucker, 312 Mich App 645; 879 NW2d 906 (2015).
4
  The parties shall address whether requiring a defendant to register as a sex offender under the
Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), MCL 28.721 et seq., as amended by 2020 PA 295,
effective March 24, 2021 (the 2021 SORA), for a non-sexual crime, such as unlawful
imprisonment of a minor, constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under Const. 1963, art. 1, § 16
or cruel and unusual punishment under U.S. Const., Am. VIII.

                                                  -4-
punishment passes muster under the state constitution, then it necessarily passes muster under the
federal constitution.” People v Benton, 294 Mich App 191, 204; 817 NW2d 599 (2011) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). This Court has stated as follows:

       To determine whether a punishment is cruel or unusual, courts assess whether it is
       “unjustifiably disproportionate” to the offense committed by considering four
       factors: (1) the harshness of the penalty compared to the gravity of the offense,
       (2) the penalty imposed for the offense compared to penalties imposed for other
       offenses in Michigan, (3) the penalty imposed for the offense in Michigan
       compared to the penalty imposed for the same offense in other states, and
       (4) whether the penalty imposed advances the goal of rehabilitation. [Lymon, 342
       Mich App at 44 (citation omitted).]

        In Lymon, this Court addressed whether registration under SORA is cruel or unusual
punishment for a crime that lacks a sexual component and is not sexual in nature—the defendant
in Lymon was convicted of two “heinous—but not sexual” counts of unlawful imprisonment of a
minor that occurred in 2014. Id. This Court concluded that requiring the defendant to register
under SORA was “cruel or unusual punishment because it [was] unjustifiably disproportionate to
the offense committed.” Id. at 88-89. This Court reasoned as follows:

       [T]here is nothing to suggest that the danger [the defendant] poses to the public is
       related to a sexual offense, nor is there anything to suggest that he will commit a
       sexual offense in the future. He is not a sexual predator. And, to the extent that he
       needs rehabilitation, labeling him as a sex offender does not serve any rehabilitation
       goals related to his actual offense. [Id. at 88.]

        In this case, defendant notes that although he believes that Klinesmith was wrongfully
decided, Klinesmith determined that the recapture provision of SORA attached legal consequences
to defendant’s nonsexual subsequent conviction of attempted unarmed robbery, not his original
1983 sex-offense conviction. See Klinesmith, 342 Mich App at 44-45. Therefore, defendant
argues that for the reasons outlined in Lymon, it is cruel or unusual punishment to require defendant
to register on the basis of his nonsexual offense. Defendant’s argument lacks merit. In Lymon,
342 Mich App at 88, this Court reasoned that the defendant was not a sexual predator, and that
there was nothing to suggest that the defendant would commit a sexual offense in the future.
However, the facts in this case are different from Lymon because defendant was convicted of a
sexual offense in 1983. Therefore, there are facts to suggest that defendant may commit a sexual
offense in the future.

        Nevertheless, in Lymon, this Court determined that “requiring an individual to comply with
the 2021 SORA imposes a criminal punishment on a registrant.” Id. at 81. Therefore, we will
examine the four prongs used to assess whether requiring defendant to register under SORA is
cruel or unusual punishment.

       Regarding the harshness of mandatory lifetime registration compared to the gravity of the
offense—the trial court stated that defendant was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct

                                                -5-
(CSC-I) for “an attempt to penetrate with a weapon being involved . . . . It could also be, I would
suggest, an assault with intent to commit sexual penetration.” As a Tier III offender, defendant
must register under SORA for the rest of his life. See MCL 28.725(13). Defendant argues that
“[a]ny validated risk assessment would likely score [him] at a very low risk of reoffending
sexually, given his age and the near 40 years that have passed since his Illinois sex offense, with
no other sex offenses committed in those decades.” However, registration was statutorily
mandated for defendant; it was not a discretionary provision under the sentencing guidelines.
“Legislatively mandated sentences are presumptively proportional and presumptively valid, and a
proportionate sentence is not cruel or unusual.” People v Jarrell, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___
NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket No. 356070); slip op at 11 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Therefore, although a lifetime registration requirement may be harsh, it is not unduly harsh
considering the gravity of defendant’s crime compared with the severity of the statutory
punishment for this offense.

        Regarding the penalty imposed for the offense compared to penalties imposed for other
offenses in Michigan, in Jarrell, this Court determined that the defendant’s “mandatory lifetime
sex offender registration [was] not unduly harsh as compared to penalties imposed for other
offenses in Michigan.” Id. The Jarrell Court reasoned as follows: “Mandatory punishment
provisions are not uncommon, particularly for CSC-I convictions. For instance, depending on the
age of the offender and victim, a CSC-I conviction may involve a mandatory 25-year minimum
sentence or a mandatory life sentence.” Id. (citations omitted). Therefore, mandatory lifetime
registration is not disproportionately harsh compared to other penalties imposed in Michigan.

      Regarding the penalty imposed for the offense in Michigan compared to the penalty
imposed for the same offense in other states, in Jarrell, this Court stated as follows:

       [M]andatory lifetime sex offender registration is not unique to Michigan. Many
       states have a tiered system for sex offender registration, with lifetime registration
       reserved for the most heinous perpetrators of sexual assault.7

       7
         See Collateral Consequences Resource Center, 50-State Comparison: Relief from
       Sex Offense Registration Obligations, available at <https://ccresourcecenter.org
       /state-restoration-profiles/50-state-comparison-relief-from-sex-offender
       registration-obligations/> (accessed November 10, 2022) (comparing sex offense
       registration requirements across the states). [Id.]

       Regarding whether mandatory lifetime registration advances the goal of rehabilitation, the
Michigan Supreme Court concluded that there is a “growing body of research” that supports the
argument that “sex-offender registries have dubious efficacy in achieving their professed goals of
decreasing recidivism.” Betts, 507 Mich at 560-562. Even though lifetime registration under
SORA may not advance the goal of rehabilitation, the three other factors strongly support that the
punishment is neither cruel nor unusual as applied to defendant’s CSC-I conviction. See, e.g.,

                                               -6-
Jarrell, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 11. Therefore, mandatory lifetime registration under
SORA is not cruel or unusual punishment as applied to defendant.

       Affirmed.

                                                         /s/ James Robert Redford
                                                         /s/ Michael J. Riordan
                                                         /s/ Kathleen A. Feeney

                                             -7-