Court Opinion

ID: 9704999
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:54:18.90957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:07.281864
License: Public Domain

Currie, J.
{dissenting). I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion filed upon the rehearing granted in this case because neither the briefs of counsel, nor anything stated in the new opinion, convince me that our original opinion was erroneous. I would adhere to such original opinion except in the one minor respect hereinafter mentioned.
There is much stated in the new opinion with which I fully concur although disagreeing with the final result determined therein. Before touching upon the area of dissent it would seem advisable to list the matters as to which there is complete agreement. These are:
(1) While the wording on the signs carried by pickets constitutes the exercise of free speech, the physical presence of the pickets makes picketing something more than free speech.
(2) Because picketing does embrace more than free speech, any state has the right to regulate or prohibit the same when carried on with respect to a business, whose labor relations are not subject to federal regulation under the Taft-Hartley Act, if conducted to achieve an unlawful objective; and in exercising such right the state does not violate the provisions of the First and Fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution.
*321n(3) Picketing, which is conducted for the purpose of coercing or inducing an employer in such a business to interfere with the right of his employees to join any labor organization of their own choosing, or to refrain from so doing, is for an unlawful objective in that it violates the provisions of sec. 111.06 (2) (b), Stats.
(4) Where a question of fact is presented on an appeal to this court as to whether peaceful picketing was conducted for an unlawful objective, and no parol testimony had been taken before the trial court but instead the proof in the record consists solely of affidavits or stipulated facts, this court is not concluded by findings of the trial court based upon inferences drawn from such affidavits or stipulated facts but is free to draw its own inferences from such record.
The trial judge in the instant case expressly found “that the purpose of the picketing was to induce the plaintiff’s employees to organize and affiliate with defendant’s [sic].” The request of plaintiff’s counsel for an express finding, that the picketing had been carried on for the purpose of coercing or inducing the plaintiff employer to interfere with the rights of its employees to join or not join the defendant unions, was denied. Plaintiff had expressly pleaded that the picketing violated sec. 111.06 (2) (b), Stats., so that such requested finding was in keeping with such allegation. This court in its original opinion expressly determined that “the testimony would not have supported a finding of the facts constituting a violation of either of the subsections” [sec. 111.06 (2) (a) or 111.06 (2) (b)]. See page 320 of the original opinion.
Plaintiff at no time pleaded that the picketing constituted a violation of sec. 111.06 (2) (a), Stats.,1 a fact which was *321-oagain conceded in plaintiff’s brief on rehearing. Therefore, for the purpose of this appeal, sec. 111.06 (2) (a) should not have been referred to in our original opinion nor is it proper to consider its possible application on the rehearing. Plaintiff’s right to an injunction restraining the picketing must stand or fall on the issue of whether the picketing violated sec. 111.06 (2) (b).
We come now to an analysis of the facts appearing in the record. No demand was ever made by or in behalf of the defendants upon the employer for union recognition or otherwise. The defendant unions had, however, made persistent efforts by personal solicitation to induce plaintiff’s employees to join the defendant unions which efforts failed. These efforts to organize were then followed by the peaceful picketing. The drivers of trucks of other employers refused to cross the picket line to haul plaintiff’s product or to make delivery of materials to plaintiff’s gravel pit, thereby causing damage to the plaintiff.
As pointed out in the majority opinion, the picketing was conducted at a spot out in the country where there was little travel by the public. This permits of the' reasonable inference that the picketing was not for the purpose of disseminating information to the general public. The two remaining conceivable objectives are: (1) To attempt to induce plaintiff’s employees to join the defendant unions; or (2) to coerce the plaintiff employer into taking some affirmative action of a coercive nature to induce its employees to join the defendant unions. It is only if the last of these two alternatives is found to be the purpose of the picketing that an injunction may be entered restraining the picketing because plaintiff so limited the issue by its pleadings and its contentions in the trial court.
The mere fact that some damage resulted to the plaintiff employer from the picketing does not establish that the picketing was for an unlawful purpose. Wisconsin E. R. Board v. Retail Clerks Int. Union (1953), 264 Wis. 189, *321p194, 58 N. W. (2d) 655; Painters & Paperhangers Local v. Rountree Corp. (1952), 194 Va. 148, 154, 72 S. E. (2d) 402, 405. The facts that the defendants prior to the picketing had attempted by personal solicitation to induce the employees to join the defendant unions while no demand whatsoever was ever made upon the plaintiff employer, strongly supports the inference drawn by the learned trial judge that the picketing was for the purpose of inducing some conduct on the part of the employees. This seems to me to be a more reasonable inference than that its objective was to cause the employer to engage in the unlawful activity prohibited by sec. 111.06 (1) (a), Stats.
The inference which the majority of the court draws from these acts of solicitation of the employees prior to the picketing runs exactly counter to the reasoning of the Missouri court in Bellerive Country Club v. McVey (Mo. 1955), 284 S. W. (2d) 492. In that case, as in the instant case, the plaintiff employer sought to enjoin peaceful picketing on the ground that its objective was to seek to coerce the employer to take action to force its employees into the union doing the picketing, thereby rendering such objective unlawful under Missouri law. About a year prior to the picketing the union contacted the plaintiff country club and asked permission to come upon the club’s property to talk to the employees in. order to induce them to join the union. This request was denied. In the year which ensued between such request and the picketing., the union made no attempt to contact the employees in any way to induce them to join. The picketing was instituted on the opening day of the Western Open Golf Tournament at the club and as a result deliveries of such items as beer and soft drinks were immediately cut off because of the refusal of truck drivers to cross the picket line, and a union orchestra refused to play at a scheduled club dance. One of the reasons advanced by the Missouri court, in holding that the picketing was for an unlawful objective, *321qwas the failure of the union to have undertaken any solicitation of the employees for union membership prior to the picketing. The majority opinion in the instant case, on the other hand, bases its inference of unlawful objective (to cause the plaintiff employer to take action to force its employees into the defendant unions) on the fact that the unions had prior to the picketing solicited the employees for membership but such prior organizing activities had been unsuccessful.
It is elementary that the burden of proving an unlawful purpose in the instant case is upon the plaintiff. 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, p. 1043, sec. 1189, states:
“To establish a theory by circumstantial evidence, the known facts relied upon as a basis for the theory must be of such nature and so related to each other that the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn therefrom is the theory sought to be established. A fact is not proved by circumstances if they are merely consistent with its existence or if other inferences may reasonably be drawn from the facts in evidence.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Applying the above-stated principle to the instant case, I feel that this court should uphold the inference drawn by the trial court, viz.: that the objective of the picketing was for organizational purposes to induce the employees to join the defendant unions.
There is an even more compelling reason why an injunction should not be grounded in this case on any application of the provisions of sec. 111.06 (2) (a), Stats., than the fact that such issue was not raised in the trial court or in this court until the motion for rehearing. Such further reason is that there is a grave doubt as to whether peaceful organizational picketing conducted at a place of employment solely for the purpose of inducing employees to join a union can ever be held to constitute a violation of sec. 111.06 (2) (a). To seek to induce employees to join a union is a lawful objective. In order for this court to hold that peaceful organiza*321rtional picketing may be prohibited as a violation of sec. 111.06 (2) (a), it, therefore, necessarily follows that we would have to find that the means and not the objective was unlawful.
Thus far the United States supreme court has only upheld the right of a state to prohibit peaceful picketing when the picketing was conducted fór an unlawful objective. It has never held that peaceful picketing may be enjoined as an unlawful means to attain a lawful objective. The dismissal by that court of the appeal from the judgment of the Maine court in Pappas v. Stacey (1955), 151 Me. 36, 116 Atl. (2d) 497, cannot be construed as upholding the right of a state to prohibit peaceful organizational picketing. In the Pappas Case, three employees of the plaintiff employer had gone on strike in an attempt to induce the employer to recognize the union and joined in the picketing. This in itself afforded adequate proof that the picketing had the unlawful objective of seeking to cause the employer to take action to coerce his employees into joining the union and the court so held. In addition, the court also held that even if the picketing were solely for organizational purposes it could be enjoined. Thus the decision found that the picketing could be enjoined on two grounds, the first of which had been upheld by prior decisions of the United States supreme court, and the second of which has not been.
The United States supreme court does not consider that an appeal presents a substantial federal question if the issue raised has been directly passed upon in its prior decisions. Stern & Gressman, Supreme Court Practice (2d ed.), p. 81, and Palmer Oil Corp. v. Amerada Corp. (1952), 343 U. S. 390, 72 Sup. Ct. 842, 96 L. Ed. 1022. Such court also will not review a state court judgment based upon two or more grounds, one of which presents no substantial federal question. Stern & Gressman, supra, p. 94, and note in 95 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (1947), 764, entitled *321s“Supreme Court Review of State Court Decisions Involving Multiple Questions.”
Because of the gravity of the problem of whether peaceful organizational picketing may be enjoined as a violation of sec. 111.06 (2) (a), Stats., this court should not pass on such question until the issue has been properly raised in the trial court and the issue has been fully briefed and argued here. Neither was done in the instant case.

 Sec. 111.06 (2) (a), Stats., reads:
(2) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employee individually or in concert with others :
(a) To coerce or intimidate an employee in the enjoyment of his legal rights, including those guaranteed in section 111.04, or to intimidate his family, picket his domicile, or injure the person or property of such employee or his family.