Court Opinion

ID: 9632270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:08:02.876905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:46.397669
License: Public Domain

WARREN, J.,
dissenting.
Because I believe our precedents compel the conclusion that defendant was entitled to have counsel present at the breath test under the facts of this case, I dissent.
After arresting defendant for driving under the influence of intoxicants, a City of Roseburg (City) police officer transported him to the Douglas County Corrections facility for a breath test. While there, defendant called a lawyer, who arrived at the facility within a short time. After consulting with his lawyer, defendant consented to take the test.1 Although he requested that his counsel be present during the test, the officer who operated the test denied that request. Defendant claims that that action deprived him of his right to counsel under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution.2
In State v. Spencer, 305 Or 59, 750 P2d 147 (1988), the Supreme Court determined when a criminal prosecution begins, for purpose of Article I, section 11:
“A person taken into formal custody by the police on a potentially criminal charge is confronted with the full legal power of the state, regardless of whether a formal charge has been filed. Where such custody is complete, neither the lack *325of a selected charge nor the possibility that the police will think better of the entire matter changes the fact that the arrested person is, at that moment, ensnared in a ‘criminal prosecution.’ The evanescent nature of the evidence the police seek to obtain may justify substantially limiting the time in which the person may exercise his or her Article I, section 11, right, but it does not justify doing away with it.
“We hold that, under the right to counsel clause in Article I, section 11, an arrested driver has the right upon request to a reasonable opportunity to obtain legal advice before deciding whether to submit to a breath test.” 305 Or at 74. (Footnote omitted; emphasis supplied.)
Although the Supreme Court did not define the term “formal custody,” it made clear that an arrested person’s right to counsel attaches at least at the point when a breath test is to take place but before a formal charge is filed. See also State v. Foster, 95 Or App 144, 148, 768 P2d 416 (1989).
If an arrested person’s right to counsel attaches before that person submits to a breath test, that right must continue to exist at the time of the test. To conclude otherwise would necessarily result in a system in which the right to counsel arises and then disappears before the “criminal prosecution” ends. Consequently, the question is not whether defendant had a right to counsel at the time of the test —he clearly did. Rather, the issue is whether that right includes a right to have counsel observe the breath test when to do so would not unreasonably interfere with or delay the test.
Oregon precedents have held that the right to counsel includes a right to have counsel present whenever the state brings its investigatory powers to bear against the defendant in the context of a “criminal prosecution.” In State v. Spencer, supra, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the right to counsel during an investigative stage of the criminal prosecution. It quoted State v. Sparklin, 296 Or 85, 92 n 9, 672 P2d 1182 (1983):
“There can be no question that the right to an attorney during the investigative stage is at least as important as the right to counsel during the trial itself. Where once the primary confrontation between state and individual occurred at the trial, now ‘the point at which the individual first confronts the amassed power of the state has moved *326back in the process from trial to the police stage.’ ” 305 Or at 73. (Citation omitted.)
The right to counsel during trial may include merely having counsel present to assure the-fairness of the proceeding. If the right to counsel in the investigative stage is as important as that during the trial itself, then it should also embody a right to have counsel present to assure the fairness of that investigative procedure. That is what the Supreme Court and we have said in a number of prior decisions. In State v. Milek, 82 Or App 88, 91, 727 P2d 164 (1986), we held that the defendant was entitled under Article I, section 11, to have his attorney present during the post-arraignment interrogation, and said:
“Once the right to counsel attaches, an individual ‘is entitled to the benefit of an attorney’s presence, advice and expertise in any situation where the state may glean involuntary and incriminating evidence or statements for use in the prosecution of its cause against [him].’ ” 82 Or App at 91, quoting State v. Sparklin, supra, 296 Or at 93. (Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, in State ex rel Russell v. Jones, 293 Or 312, 317, 647 P2d 904 (1982), the Supreme Court held that the right to counsel attached to a presentence psychiatric interview. It said that, because “circumstances are conceivable where the presence of counsel would be helpful[,] * * * Article I, section 11, and the Sixth Amendment require that counsel may not be barred from attendance at the presentence interview.” 293 Or at 318. (Emphasis supplied.) Likewise, in State v. Lopez, 88 Or App 347, 352, 745 P2d 788 (1987), rev den 306 Or 79 (1988), we followed State ex rel Russell v. Jones, supra, and said that, “[i]f the defendant is represented by counsel, the state must notify the attorney that it wishes to interrogate the defendant, and it must provide the attorney an opportunity to be present.” (Emphasis supplied.)
A breath test, like any of those investigatory procedures, pits the arrested person against the power of the state. The result of a breath test is often the critical evidence showing whether the arrested person is legally intoxicated. Unlike the taking of fingerprints or hair samples, the process of administering a breath test allows for subjective manipulations by the testing officer. The officer may order the arrested *327person to blow harder than required, or the officer may lean on the machine. Either procedure may result in an increase of the reading. Counsel’s presence and expertise will assure the fairness of the administering procedure, the accuracy of the test result, and ultimately, a fair trial. Consequently, I would conclude that the right to counsel includes a right to have counsel observe a breath test.
The majority concludes that this view is contrary to State v. Gardner, 52 Or App 663, 629 P2d 412, rev den 291 Or 419 (1981), and State v. Trenary, 114 Or App 608, 836 P2d 739, aff’d on other grounds 316 Or 172,850 P2d 356 (1993). It is not. In Gardner, we held that a defendant did not have the right to have counsel present during the administration of a breath test, because the test was not a “critical stage” of the proceeding to which the right to counsel attaches. 52 Or App at 666. Gardner was decided before Spencer and is premised on the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. 52 Or App at 665, 668. The Spencer court rejected the “critical stage” test as too limited for Article I, section 11, purposes, and concluded that the right to counsel attaches even before the breath test itself. Consequently, the rationale offered in Gardner is inapplicable to an Article I, section 11 analysis. In Trenary, relying on Gardner, we assumed, without discussion, that the “[defendant did not have the right to have his lawyer present during the breath test.” 114 Or at 613. That statement is merely dictum, because the question there was whether the defendant was denied the right to call an attorney, not whether he had a right to have the attorney present. 114 Or at 614.
City contends that Spencer should not be extended to hold that the right to counsel includes a right to have counsel present during a breath test. It argues that, if we so hold, “few tests will be completed within the period of time contemplated by Spencer.'” City’s concern that few breath tests will be completed is unwarranted.
By concluding that the right to counsel includes a right to have counsel present at the breath test, I would not be holding that police must wait until counsel is present before administering the test. If an arrested driver has a reasonable opportunity to consult a lawyer, but takes unreasonable time to consult or makes unreasonable demands that counsel be *328present during the breath test, the driver’s actions are a refusal to submit to the test, rather than an exercise of the right to counsel. State v. Spencer, supra, 305 Or at 75; Moore v. MVD, 293 Or 715, 723, 652 P2d 794 (1982).3 For example, in Anderson v. MVD, 116 Or App 179, 181, 840 P2d 1328 (1992), we held that an arrested driver’s insistence for more than 15 minutes that he be taken home to get his glasses in order to read a warning form provided by the police amounted to a refusal and that he was not denied a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel. See also Blackman v. MVD, 90 Or App 408, 752 P2d 1241, rev den 306 Or 660 (1988).
Furthermore, just as the right to seek advice about taking a breath test can be limited by the needs of police to conduct the test properly and timely, the right to have counsel present during the breath test must also be exercised reasonably, for “[t]he control of the testing procedure must remain with the officer and not with the arrested person or his counsel.” Luth v. MVD, 87 Or App 137, 142, 741 P2d 897 (1987).
I believe that under Article I, section 11, the state cannot summarily exclude an arrested driver’s counsel from observing the breath test, unless the test would be unreasonably delayed or interfered with by counsel’s presence.
At the suppression hearing, City did not offer any evidence to explain why defendant’s counsel was excluded.4 The trial court made no findings on that issue and we have nothingbefore us to show that there was a sufficient reason to justify the exclusion. The breath test result should have been suppressed.
I dissent.
Durham, J., joins in this dissent.

 It is undisputed that defendant was afforded a reasonable opportunity to consult his counsel before submitting to the breath test.

 Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution provides, in part:
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right * * * to be heard by himself and counsel!.]”

 In both cases, the Supreme Court noted that 15 minutes generally would be an adequate time for an arrested driver to contact a lawyer. State v. Spencer, supra, 305 Or at 75 n 5; State v. Moore, supra, 293 Or at 723.

 At the suppression hearing, counsel for City told the trial court that the county corrections department had a policy excluding counsel from observing a breath test. Counsel’s unsworn statement is not evidence. State v. Norman, 114 Or App 395,398 n 3,835 P2d 146 (1992). In any event, assuming there was such apolicy, it does not justify the exclusion.