Court Opinion

ID: 7820449
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:52:39.972362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:43.553682
License: Public Domain

Bill Penix, Special Chief Justice. On February 11, 1932, O. F. Plair and L. J. Plair, his wife, conveyed by warranty deed 53.5 acres of land in Bradley County, Arkansas to their daughter, Beulah Slight and “her bodily heirs”. The consideration was $900 to be paid over five years for which a lien was retained. The deed recited: . . . the further consideration and condition that the said Beulah Sligh shall live upon the premises herein conveyed and shall not mortgage, sell or in any way alienate the same. Such conditions to be binding upon and to be observed by grantee herein, and in case of any violation or non-observance of the above condition, then this deed shall be null and void and the said premises shall then and there, and wholly and absolutely revert to the grantors herein, their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns, and no act or omission on the part of any of the later shall be a waiver of the enforcement of such conditions. . . Beulah Sligh and her husband, Phinis W. Sligh lived on the lands until 1941 or 1942 when they moved into the nearby city of Warren. They continued to use the lands for agricultural purposes. In 1966, Beulah Sligh conveyed one acre of the 53.5 acres to her sister-in-law and husband, Mr. and Mrs. Salter. At that time, O. F. Plair suggested to his daughter, Beulah Sligh, that she not sell anymore of the land. The Slighs mortgaged the 53.5 acres and other lands to First Savings and Loan Association in 1970. They executed a second mortgage in 1972 to Pine Bluff Production Credit Association. In 1976, when the Slighs were delinquent on their mortgage payments, First Savings filed this action for foreclosure. The Pine Bluff Production Credit Association, having the second mortgage, was named a defendant. In July, 1976, the father, O. F. Plair, filed his intervention contending the two mortgages were breaches of the conditions of the 1932 deed entitling him to retake possession of the property. During the 44 years from execution of the deed to his daughter to his intervention in this action, O. F. Plair lived near Beulah Sligh in Bradley County and they visited. After Plair’s intervention, Pine Bluff Production Credit Association amended and made as parties defendant the three children of Beulah and Phinis Sligh, Freddie Charles Sligh, Betty Lou Sligh, and Patricia Powell. At the trial, Mr. and Mrs. Sligh and their children, Freddie Charles Sligh, Betty Lou Greenwood and Patricia Powell, all stipulated that Pine Bluff Production Credit Association and First Savings could have judgment foreclosing and terminating any interest these parties might claim in the 53.5 acres. First Savings waived any rights against the 53.5 acres. The Chancellor awarded judgments to the lenders against the Slighs and gave Pine Bluff Production Credit Association “judgment as against Betty Lou Greenwood, Patricia Powell and Freddie Charles Sligh foreclosing and terminating any interest that [they] may claim in and to the 53.5 acre tract. . . ” However, the Court held that Beulah Sligh by the sale or mortgages had committed a forfeiture of a condition subsequent and title to the 53.5 acres thus reverted to O. F. Plair.1  Beulah Sligh violated conditions set out in the deed when she moved from the farm to town 34 years before O. F. Plair intervened in this suit. Again, she acted contrary to the terms of the deed when she sold off an acre ten years before the intervention. Her mortgages in 1970 and 1972 also violated the terms of the deed. The 1932 deed purported to create a fee tail estate with a condition subsequent. O. F. Plair did not declare a breach of condition until 44 years after his deed. This was after other violations of conditions which obviously had been known to him. Regardless of the wording of the deed suggesting that no act or omission on the part of O. F. Plair would be a waiver of enforcement of the conditions, this Court will not allow a reverter to O. F. Plair. Conditions subsequent are not favored and are to be construed most strongly against the grantor to prevent a forfeiture. See cases collected at 26 C.J.S., Deeds, § 141 et seq.; 28 Am. Jur. 2d, Estates, § 166 et seq.; Annot., 39 A.L.R. 2d 1168. The Arkansas Supreme Court has long held that “. . . slight circumstances will often be seized upon to prevent such forfeiture. ” Jeffries v. State for Use of Woodruff County, 216 Ark. 657, 226 S.W. 2d 810 (1950). This Court has further noted that: Any conduct on the part of the party having the right to declare a forfeiture which is calculated to induce the other party to believe that the forfeiture is not to be insisted on will be treated as a waiver. Kampman v. Kampman, 98 Ark. 328, 135 S.W. 905 (1911). See also Terry v. Taylor, 143 Ark. 208, 220 S.W. 42 (1920); Bain v. Parker, 77 Ark. 168, 90 S.W. 1000 (1905). The Court here holds that O. F. Plair did not exercise, but waived, any right of re-entry he might have had. No forfeiture will be ordered where, as here, the deed anticipated more than one condition subsequent and the grantor failed to act within a reasonable time after he could have asserted a forfeiture. Pine Bluff Production Credit Association is entitled to a foreclosure decree of the interest of Beulah Sligh in the 53.5 acres, less the one acre deeded to Mr. and Mrs. Salter. The Sligh’s three children, Freddie Charles Sligh, Betty Lou Greenwood and Patricia Powell having stipulated in open court that Pine Bluff Production Credit Association have judgment foreclosing and terminating any interest they might have in the 53.5 acres, are estopped from asserting any personal interest in the lands in the future. However, the 1932 deed to Beulah Sligh created a fee tail and vested only a life estate in her with a contingent remainder in the heirs of her body. Such remainder interest will not vest until the death of Beulah Sligh. It is possible, but not certain, that such interest will vest in the three children at the death of Beulah Sligh. If one of the three children should predecease Beulah Sligh, then a portion of the contingent remainder could vest in grandchildren who would not be estopped against Pine Bluff Production Credit Association. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 50-405 (Repl. 1971); Fletcher v. Hurdle, 259 Ark. 640, 536 S.W. 2d 109 (1976).2  The lower court is reversed and this case is remanded to the Chancery Court of Bradley County with directions to enter a decree in conformity with this decision. Special Justice John F. Stroud, Jr., joins in the opinion. Fogleman and Byrd, JJ., dissent. Harris, C.J., and Holt, J., not participating.  The sister-in-law and husband, Mr. and Mrs. Salter, who were deeded one acre of the 53.5 acre tract by Beulah Sligh in 1966, were not parties to this action.   We take note of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 50-405.1 (Repl. 1971), which purports to set up a provision for the dissolution of an estate tail by joint undertaking of the grantor, all life tenants and all contingent remaindermen signing. This statute would not apply to the facts above.