Court Opinion

ID: 9542447
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:34:31.137646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:57.778127
License: Public Domain

Connolly, J.,
concurring.
I concur in the result, but disagree with the majority’s assertion that Torres lacks standing. Torres’ assignment of error essentially asserts that his sentence was excessive because a certain penalty was imposed pursuant to another statute, which statute violated the ex post facto clause. Torres clearly has standing to challenge his sentence, and may have standing to challenge a sentence that is based on a statute that is applied in violation of the ex post facto clause. In the instant case, however, we need not address Torres’ asserted lack of standing. Regardless of whether Torres lacks standing to assert that his sentence was excessive on the ground that it was imposed pursuant to an ex post facto law, a matter we need not decide, I conclude that Torres’ sentence for third degree sexual assault was not excessive. See Bobby v. State, No. A-6212, 1997 WL 777329 (Alaska App. Dec. 19, 1997). The issue of whether the SORA
can constitutionally be applied to [the offender] has no effect on the authority of the State to prosecute [the offender] for . . . sexual assault, no effect on the validity of his conviction, and no effect on the . . . court’s authority to sentence [the offender] for his crime (since registration is not a part of the court’s sentence).
(Emphasis supplied.) Id. at *4.
The operation of the SORA is entirely independent from the sentence imposed upon Torres for third degree sexual assault. As such, any claim that Torres may have concerning the ex post facto clause implications of the SORA should be raised if and when he becomes subject to its provisions, but not on a direct appeal from his underlying sexual assault conviction.
*96Thus, we need not characterize Torres’ assignment of error as a collateral attack, leaving him without standing. Simply put, the application of the SORA to Torres is not part of his sentence for third degree sexual assault. Therefore, Torres’ sentence for third degree sexual assault was not excessive on the asserted grounds, and on that basis, I concur.
Gerrard and Stephan, JJ., join in this concurrence.