Court Opinion

ID: 9953730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 18:04:33.20543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:07:20.952672
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 220985-U

                                                                                    FIFTH DIVISION
                                                                                      March 22, 2024

                                            No. 1-22-0985

 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
 limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
 ______________________________________________________________________________

                                     IN THE
                         APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                 FIRST DISTRICT
 ______________________________________________________________________________
 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                           )   Appeal from the
                                                                )   Circuit Court of
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                                  )   Cook County.
                                                                )
     v.                                                         )   No. 18 CR 9494
                                                                )
 TRAVIS WALKER,                                                 )   Honorable
                                                                )   William G. Gamboney,
           Defendant-Appellant.                                 )   Judge Presiding.

           JUSTICE MIKVA delivered the judgment of the court.
           Presiding Justice Mitchell and Justice Lyle concurred in the judgment.

                                              ORDER

¶1        Held: The evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction for aggravated
                driving while under the influence.

¶2        Following a jury trial, defendant Travis Walker was found guilty of aggravated driving

while under the influence (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(4), (d)(1)(H) (West 2018)) and sentenced

to 20 months in prison. On appeal, Mr. Walker contends that (1) the State failed to prove beyond

a reasonable doubt that, at the time he was in control of a vehicle, he was under the influence of

any drug to a degree that rendered him incapable of safely driving; (2) the trial court erred in

admitting his complete medical record from the hospital where he was treated on the day of the
No. 1-22-0985

incident leading to his arrest; and (3) he was denied his constitutional right to confrontation when

the State relied on a certified copy of his driving abstract to prove the aggravating circumstance in

its case.

¶3      The State concedes that it failed to prove Mr. Walker’s guilt of aggravated DUI beyond a

reasonable doubt. As both parties acknowledge, this renders any claim regarding admission of the

medical records moot. But the State argues that the driving abstract was properly admitted and that

this court should “affirm [Mr. Walker]’s conviction for felony driving while license revoked.”

However, as Mr. Walker points out in his reply brief, he was never charged with any crime other

than aggravated DUI, driving while one’s license is revoked is not a lesser included crime of

aggravated DUI, and thus there is no basis for doing anything other than reversing this conviction.

¶4                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶5      Mr. Walker was charged by information with a single count of aggravated DUI (625 ILCS

5/11-501(a)(4), (d)(1)(H) (West 2018)). The State alleged that, on or about January 23, 2018, Mr.

Walker drove or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of

phencyclidine (PCP) and cannabis to a degree that rendered him incapable of safely driving. This

was charged as an aggravated offense based on his having committed this violation while he did

not possess a driver’s license, permit, restricted driving permit, judicial driving permit, or a

monitoring device driving permit.

¶6      At trial, Jeremiah Coriano testified that at about 9:30 p.m. on January 23, 2018, he was

driving his truck on the southbound entrance ramp to I-55 in La Grange when he saw a group of

cars “steering clear” of a gray sport utility vehicle (SUV) in the middle lane. As Mr. Coriano

continued up the ramp, the SUV moved into the left lane without signaling and then crashed into

the concrete barrier between the northbound and southbound lanes. The SUV moved back into the

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No. 1-22-0985

road, continued driving for about 100 feet, hit the barrier a second time, bounced off, and then hit

the barrier a third time and stopped. According to Mr. Coriano, the highway was well-lit and dry,

and the lanes were clearly marked.

¶7     Illinois State Police trooper Edward Kazupski testified that on January 23, 2018, at around

9:30 p.m., he responded to the scene of this accident. There, he saw an SUV on the left shoulder

of the highway, with the driver’s side “crashed up” against the left median. The front and middle

of the driver’s side of the SUV were damaged, the rear passenger side tire was shredded, and pieces

of rubber littered the roadway. Trooper Kazupski also noticed a few hundred feet of scratch marks

on the left median. The SUV was running with a key in the ignition. The driver’s door was against

the median, such that it could not open fully, and the driver was “squeezing out” of the vehicle as

Trooper Kazupski approached on foot. In court, he identified Mr. Walker as the SUV’s driver and

sole occupant.

¶8     Trooper Kazupski asked Mr. Walker whether he was injured and inquired as to what had

happened. Mr. Walker “seemed a little out of sorts.” He was responsive to Trooper Kazupski’s

questions, but Trooper Kazupski had to repeat his questions several times, and Mr. Walker only

gave short answers. At the time, Trooper Kazupski was not focused on conducting a DUI

investigation; rather, he was trying to learn about the circumstances behind the crash. At some

point, Mr. Walker reached around “on the top” of the SUV and said he was looking for its keys.

Shortly thereafter, paramedics arrived on the scene and guided Mr. Walker into an ambulance.

Trooper Kazupski “stayed back” and let the paramedics assess Mr. Walker for injuries. Trooper

Kazupski administered an alcohol/drug influence report and conducted a Law Enforcement

Agencies Data System (LEADS) check and learned Mr. Walker had a suspended driver’s license

that expired in 2006.

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No. 1-22-0985

¶9     Illinois State Police trooper Christopher Tor testified that when he arrived at the scene, he

saw an SUV up against the left median wall, which was scraped up with black tire marks. The

SUV was damaged on the left side, its left front tire was flat, and its right rear tire was shredded.

Trooper Kazupski was talking with Mr. Walker, whom Trooper Tor identified in court. Trooper

Tor parked behind Trooper Kazupski and approached the SUV on foot.

¶ 10   Trooper Tor engaged Mr. Walker in conversation, asking him questions. Mr. Walker’s

answers were mumbled and unintelligible. He seemed confused, and Trooper Tor had to ask him

questions several times before he received answers that made sense and that he could understand.

Mr. Walker was not swaying.

¶ 11   Paramedics arrived and escorted Mr. Walker to an ambulance. Trooper Tor entered the

ambulance to get an update on Mr. Walker’s condition. As the paramedics treated Mr. Walker, he

became agitated and combative. The paramedics put a spit hood on Mr. Walker and Trooper Tor

assisted them in placing Mr. Walker in soft restraints. Eventually, Mr. Walker calmed down.

Trooper Tor exited the ambulance, told Trooper Kazupski what had transpired, and directed him

to follow the ambulance to the hospital. Trooper Tor remained at the scene to have the SUV towed.

¶ 12   Nurse Marija Milenkov testified that she treated Mr. Walker in the emergency room at

La Grange Hospital. He had been brought into the emergency room in four-point restraints on a

stretcher and was transferred to a bed without restraints. Ms. Milenkov assessed Mr. Walker for

trauma and did not notice any signs of obvious injuries. She then performed a secondary,

neurological assessment and assessment for function. She noted that Mr. Walker was alert and

oriented, but his pupils were “sluggish.” Per orders of a doctor, she obtained blood and urine

samples and sent them to the hospital laboratory. She continued to treat Mr. Walker and gave him

intravenous fluids. He was not given any medication.

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No. 1-22-0985

¶ 13   Over Mr. Walker’s objection, his 80-page medical record from La Grange Hospital was

admitted into evidence. Ms. Milenkov testified that page 33 contained the results of the testing of

his urine sample. Specifically, the medical record indicated that Mr. Walker’s “urine chemistry”

was “positive” for PCP and cannabis.

¶ 14   The State presented a certified copy of Mr. Walker’s driving abstract, which was admitted

into evidence, without objection. The abstract stated that, on January 23, 2018, a suspension was

in effect for Mr. Walker’s driver’s license. The abstract also indicated that the expiration date on

the license was June 26, 2006.

¶ 15   Mr. Walker made a motion for a directed verdict, which the trial court denied. Mr. Walker

did not testify or present any evidence.

¶ 16   The jury found Mr. Walker guilty of aggravated DUI. Mr. Walker filed a motion for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial, which he later amended.

The trial court denied the motion. The trial court sentenced him to 20 months in prison. Mr. Walker

filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, which the trial court denied.

¶ 17                                    II. JURISDICTION

¶ 18   Mr. Walker’s motion to reconsider his sentence was denied on June 23, 2022, and he timely

filed his notice of appeal that same day. We have jurisdiction over this appeal under article VI,

section 6, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6) and Illinois Supreme Court

Rule 603 (eff. Feb 6, 2013) and Rule 606 (eff. July 1, 2017), governing appeals from final

judgments in criminal cases.

¶ 19                                       III. ANALYSIS

¶ 20   On appeal, Mr. Walker challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction

for aggravated DUI. The Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) defines the offense of DUI as “driv[ing] or

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No. 1-22-0985

be[ing] in actual physical control of any vehicle within this State while: *** under the influence

of any other drug [besides alcohol or an “intoxicating compound”] or combination of drugs to a

degree that renders the person incapable of safely driving.” 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(4) (West 2018).

The offense is elevated to aggravated DUI if, as charged in this case, it was committed “while [the

driver] did not possess a driver’s license or permit or a restricted driving permit or a judicial driving

permit or a monitoring device driving permit.” Id. § 11-501(d)(1)(H).

¶ 21    When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant inquiry is whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). Reversal is justified only where the evidence is “so unsatisfactory,

improbable or implausible” that it raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt (People v.

Slim, 127 Ill. 2d 302, 307 (1989)) or where proof of an element of a crime is wholly lacking (People

v. Sweigart, 2021 IL App (2d) 180543, ¶ 56).

¶ 22    Mr. Walker contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, at the

time he was in control of a vehicle, he was under the influence of any drug to a degree that rendered

him incapable of safely driving. He argues that the State relied on evidence that a urinalysis

screening showed a positive result for PCP and cannabis, which, he asserts, was insufficient by

itself to support his conviction. Noting that he never admitted to being under the influence or

having ingested drugs, he maintains that the State was required to present evidence regarding the

physiological effects of PCP or cannabis, the amount required to produce any significant effect, or

the effects of those substances on a person’s ability to drive safely. In the absence of any such

evidence, he asserts that his conviction must be reversed. The State in this case concedes that

“[w]ithout expert testimony regarding the intoxicating effects of PCP and [cannabis], the evidence

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No. 1-22-0985

at trial was insufficient to sustain a conviction for DUI under Section 501(a)(4) according to

existing jurisprudence.”

¶ 23   The Code does not provide for a “generic” offense of DUI. People v. Workman, 312 Ill.

App. 3d 305, 310 (2000). Rather, the State must prove that the specific drug identified in a charge

has “some intoxicating effect.” Id. Because observations of alcohol consumption are a part of a

typical adult experience, a layperson may testify to a person’s alcohol intoxication. Id.; see also

People v. Phillips, 2015 IL App (1st) 131147, ¶ 18 (the testimony of a single, credible police

officer may alone sustain a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol). However, to

form an opinion that a defendant was under the influence of a substance other than alcohol, a

witness, including a police officer, must have relevant skills, experience, or training to render such

an opinion. Ciborowski, 2016 IL App (1st) 143352, ¶ 79; Workman, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 310. When

an officer provides such testimony, his or her experience and training in the detection of controlled

substances must be taken into account. People v. Gocmen, 2018 IL 122388, ¶ 31. If no qualified

witness provides competent evidence regarding the nature and effect of the drug alleged in a

particular case, and the defendant has not admitted to taking that drug and being under its influence,

then the “lack of competent testimony may create a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt,

absent other sufficiently incriminating evidence.” Workman, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 311.

¶ 24   We agree with the parties that this conviction cannot stand. Mr. Walker never admitted to

consuming PCP or cannabis or to being under the influence of those substances. The urinalysis

results, standing alone, were insufficient to prove that Mr. Walker was incapable of safely driving

due to the influence of PCP and cannabis. See Ciborowski, 2016 IL App (1st) 143352, ¶ 113 (“[i]t

is not enough for the State to show drug use by the defendant”).

¶ 25   Ms. Milenkov’s testimony established only that Mr. Walker’s urinalysis indicated a

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No. 1-22-0985

positive result for PCP and cannabis. As such, her testimony was no more informative than the

urinalysis results themselves. Ms. Milenkov did not know what amounts of PCP and cannabis were

detected or when they would have been consumed. Her testimony did not shed light on the question

of whether Mr. Walker, at the time he was driving, was under the influence of drugs to a degree

that rendered him unable to do so safely.

¶ 26   Neither Trooper Kazupski nor Trooper Tor testified as to having any significant experience

or expertise in detecting whether a person was driving under the influence of drugs and whether

that person was influenced by a drug to such a degree that it prevented him from driving safely.

See Workman, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 311 (“when there is no competent evidence by a qualified witness

regarding the nature and effect of the drug alleged to have been ingested and the defendant has not

admitted to taking the drug and being under the influence, this lack of competent testimony may

create a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt”).

¶ 27   Nothing in the record indicates that either trooper was knowledgeable about the

physiological effects of PCP or cannabis, what amount of consumption would produce any

significant effect, or how use of the substances would affect a person’s ability to drive safely. Put

simply, they did not display a level of expertise that would be necessary to sustain the charge

against Mr. Walker. See id. at 311-12; see also People v. Trotter, 2021 IL App (3d) 180726-U, ¶ 40

(finding that the appellate court could not rely on a witness’s occupation as a trooper to infer that

she also possessed training and qualifications necessary to render an opinion regarding the effects

of a drug on the ability to drive); Ill. S. Ct. R. 23(e)(1) (eff. Feb. 1, 2023) (nonprecedential orders

entered under Rule 23(b) may be cited for persuasive purposes).

¶ 28   In sum, the evidence presented by the State lacked a qualified opinion regarding the nature

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No. 1-22-0985

and effect of PCP and cannabis. Where Mr. Walker did not admit to taking PCP or cannabis or to

being under their influence, this lack of competent testimony created a reasonable doubt as to his

guilt. See Workman, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 311. Accordingly, we reverse Mr. Walker’s conviction for

aggravated DUI. This holding moots any claims regarding the admissibility of the medical reports

from the La Grange Hospital or the driving abstract.

¶ 29   The State in its response brief argues vigorously that the driving abstract was admissible

and that we should affirm Mr. Walker’s conviction for driving without a driver’s license. However,

Mr. Walker was never charged with or convicted of that offense. The State does not argue that

driving while one’s license revoked is a lesser-included offense of aggravated DUI, and our

supreme court has expressly held that it is not. People v. Nunez, 236 Ill. 2d 488, 496, 499 (2010).

In this case, the lack of a driver’s license was simply the aggravating circumstance charged in the

DUI conviction, which the parties agree must be reversed. There is no basis on which we could,

as the State suggests, “affirm [Mr. Walker]’s conviction” for driving without a license in this case.

¶ 30                                    IV. CONCLUSION

¶ 31   For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

¶ 32   Reversed.

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