Court Opinion

ID: 9411861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-28 07:09:20.703886+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:15.931558
License: Public Domain

In The

                                 Court of Appeals

                     Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                               __________________

                               NO. 09-21-00124-CV
                               __________________

                      WILLIAM GRIESINGER, Appellant

                                           V.

                  CENTENNIAL WESTWAY PARK, LP,
             D/B/A CENTURY WESTWAY PARK, LP, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

         On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4
                        Harris County, Texas
                      Trial Cause No. 1146893
__________________________________________________________________

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      In this landlord-tenant dispute, Nancy and William Griesinger sued

Centennial Westway Park, LP, d/b/a Century Westway Park, LP (“Century”)

alleging breach of contract, failure to repair, and retaliation.1 Century countersued

the Griesingers for attorney’s fees under the lease. The Griesingers initially filed suit

      1This appeal was transferred to our Court from the Fourteenth District Court

of Appeals as per a docket-equalization order from the Texas Supreme Court in May
2021. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 73.001.
                                         1
in the Justice of the Peace Court, and after a bench trial, the Justice of the Peace

entered a take nothing judgment on the Griesingers’ claims and ordered the

Griesingers to pay Century’s attorneys’ fees.

      The Griesingers appealed de novo to the County Court at Law. The parties

tried the issues to the bench, and following the trial the County Court at Law

rendered judgment for Century, denied the Griesingers’ claims, found that Century

was the “prevailing party” in the dispute, and awarded Century attorneys’ fees.

      William Griesinger appealed, representing himself, pro se. 2 In two issues, he

complains the trial court’s verdict should be set aside because (1) legally and

factually insufficient evidence supports the verdict that William take-nothing on his

claims, and (2) the trial court made errors in ruling on the parties’ objections to the

admission of evidence the trial court admitted during the trial. As discussed below,

we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                 BACKGROUND

      On February 3, 2017, the Griesingers leased an apartment with Century for a

one-year term. On December 23, 2017, the Griesingers renewed the lease through

February 3, 2019 (the “Lease”).

      2Nancy Griesinger has not appealed the trial court’s judgment and is not a

party to this appeal.
                                          2
      The terms of the Lease are undisputed. The Lease contained the following

provision with respect to Century’s responsibilities:

      31. Our Responsibilities.

            31.1 Generally. We’ll act with customary diligence to…

            (d) make all reasonable repairs, subject to your obligation to pay
            for damages for which you’re liable.

            The time, manner, method and means of performing maintenance
            and repairs, including whether or which vendors to use, are
            within our sole discretion.

      The Lease provided for remedies under Texas Property Code Section 92.056

if Century violated their responsibilities in Section 31.1. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann.

§ 92.056.

      The Lease also proscribed certain conduct by the Griesingers as tenants:

      20. Prohibited Conduct. You, your occupants, and your guests may not
      engage in the following activities:

      (a) criminal conduct, regardless of whether arrest or conviction occurs,
      including but not limited to: manufacturing, delivering, or possessing a
      controlled substance or drug paraphernalia; engaging in or threatening
      violence; possessing a weapon prohibited by law; discharging a firearm
      in the apartment community; or, except when allowed by law,
      displaying or possessing a gun, knife, or other weapon in the common
      area, or in a way that may alarm others;

      (b) behaving in a loud or obnoxious manner;

      (c) disturbing or threatening the rights, comfort, health, safety, or
      convenience of others (including our agents and employees) in or near
      the apartment community;

                                         3
      (d) disrupting our business operations…

The Lease further provided for the award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party

in any litigation:

      32.5 Other Remedies . . . A prevailing party may recover reasonable
      attorney’s fees and all other litigation costs from the nonprevailing
      parties, except a party may not recover attorney’s fees and litigation
      costs in connection with a party’s claims seeking personal injury,
      sentimental, exemplary, or punitive damages. We may recover
      attorney’s fees in connection with enforcing our rights under this Lease.

      During the term of the Lease, the Griesingers asked Century’s employees to

repair several items in their apartment. The evidence presented at trial shows various

repair issues arose in the apartment during the term of the Griesingers’ lease.

According to the Griesingers’ Petition, the manner Century handled their request to

repair their mailbox lock and front door threshold are two examples of the slow

manner in which Century typically discharged its obligations under the lease. As to

the mailbox lock, after the Griesingers asked for the lock to be repaired, they alleged

that they notified property management that they were still having a problem with

their mailbox lock. They claimed property management knew about the problem for

over a year, and that as of March 2018, property management was telling them that

someone would look at it, which was never done. On September 3, 2018, the

Griesingers again notified property management about the lock, which was repaired

within a few days. However, property management then claimed that the problem

was not reported until September 3, 2018, which was incorrect, meaning that
                                          4
Century did not act with customary diligence to make reasonable repairs since they

were aware of the problem in March 2018.

      With respect to the front door threshold, the Griesingers’ Petition alleges that

they notified property management that the issue with the front door threshold was

still unresolved on February 5, 2018, because the maintenance team had installed the

wrong size threshold, making it difficult to open the door and creating a fire hazard

that materially affected the Griesingers’ health and safety. The Griesingers further

alleged that on May 26, 2018, William notified property management that the issue

was still unresolved.

      On November 27, 2018, Century served the Griesingers with an “Advance

Notice of Lease Termination at End of Lease Term or Renewal Period.” The

Griesingers’ Petition alleged that Century told them that they did not have a reason

to terminate the lease at the end of the term. On December 13, 2018, the Griesingers’

attorney sent a letter to Century’s attorney stating that the termination appeared to

be retaliatory. On December 20, 2018, Century responded and indicated that the

reason for terminating the Lease by non-renewal was due to William’s abusive

behavior towards Century staff and the Griesingers’ loud and obnoxious behavior.

      The Griesingers sued Century in the Justice of the Peace Court and alleged

three causes of action: (1) breach of contract based on Century entering the leased

premises without leaving written notice of the entry and failing to make reasonable

                                          5
repairs; (2) failure to repair under Section 92.056 of the Texas Property Code for

failing to repair the front door threshold in the leased premises after the Griesingers

provided notice about the condition, which materially affected their health or safety;

and (3) retaliation under Section 92.331 of the Texas Property Code for terminating

the Lease after the Griesingers exercised or attempted to exercise rights or remedies

granted to them under the Lease. See id. §§ 92.056, 92.331. After a bench trial, the

Justice of the Peace Court entered a take nothing judgment on the Griesingers’

claims and ordered them to pay Century’s attorneys’ fees.

       The Griesingers appealed to the County Court at Law, which conducted a

bench trial. William testified that he first requested the mailbox lock to be fixed in

July 2017. However, no work orders for the mailbox request were introduced at trial.

Emails introduced at trial show that Wendy Stull, the portfolio manager for Century,

acknowledged that on March 29, 2018, the mailbox lock issue had not been

addressed, but the emails also show that the mailbox lock was adjusted on the same

day by Rey Valenzuela, the head of maintenance. William testified that the only

outstanding maintenance issue after Valenzuela’s visit was the door. The evidence

also shows that after Century received an email from William on September 3, 2018,

requesting that the lock be fixed, Century replaced the mailbox lock the following

day.

                                          6
      The evidence further showed that William screamed and cursed at Karen

Klein, the assistant property manager, when he came into the office to discuss the

mailbox service request. Klein testified, “He came into my office. He was very upset.

He was yelling at me. His body was leaning over my desk. And – at which point, he

slammed his hands on the desk and stated, Got that.” Klein explained that when he

leaned over her desk, she was in fear for her safety.

      Jill Hauserman, the property manager, witnessed the incident that occurred at

Klein’s desk. Hauserman testified that after hearing loud voices coming from Klein’s

office, she went to her office and saw William leaning over Klein’s desk, “pointing

his finger at her in a very intimidating manner.” Hauserman asked William to leave

the office or she would call security, to which he responded, “You can go ahead and

call the fucking police.” He then left the office and slammed the front door. For his

part, William denied the incident occurred.

      Regarding the weather-stripping request for the front door, the evidence

shows that multiple work orders were opened and closed. The first work order was

requested and completed on December 4, 2017. The second work order was

requested on December 6, 2017 and completed on December 7, 2017. The third work

order was requested on December 18, 2017 and completed on January 3, 2018. The

last work order was requested on January 3, 2018 and completed the same day. The

                                         7
December 18, 2017 work order notes that the service request was unable to be

completed that day because of William’s behavior. The work order notes state:

      The reason for the service request for it be incomplete is because the
      office staff and the outside staff had a major problem issue [with] the
      resident himself[.] He was yelling and screaming major bad words then
      he threw a Christmas tree and a bunch of other things outside the front
      of hes [sic] door and downstairs also by the stairway.

      Although Klein did not witness the incident involving the Christmas tree,

Carlos De Hoyos, the maintenance supervisor, told her about it. Klein testified that

Carlos reported that when maintenance went into William’s apartment, William

came home and began cursing and telling them to leave. Klein explained that

maintenance personnel are not expected to follow through with maintenance

requests when they are in fear of their personal safety from a resident and that tenants

can expect repair delays if they do not act in compliance with the Lease. Klein

confirmed that Carlos made the technician notes on the December 18 work order in

the regular course and scope of his employment.

      William testified that he had no knowledge about maintenance personnel

being afraid to enter his apartment. He also denied preventing maintenance

personnel from repairing his door on December 18 and using foul language toward

any of the apartment leasing staff or management personnel. Although William

denied throwing a Christmas tree off his balcony on December 18, he did testify that

                                           8
he disposed of a Christmas tree by cutting it into pieces and throwing the pieces from

the balcony into the courtyard.

      Century presented evidence designed to show it decided not to renew the

Griesingers’ Lease because of the incident involving the Christmas tree, and the

encounters by Century’s staff where William had shouted and intimated Century

employees. On November 27, 2018, Century served the Griesingers with an

“Advance Notice of Lease Termination at End of Lease Term or Renewal Period.”

On February 2, 2021, the trial court issued its Second Modified Final Judgment,

rendering judgment for Century and denying all the Griesingers’ claims.

Additionally, the trial court found that Century is the “prevailing party” in the

dispute as used in Section 32 of the Lease and awarded attorneys’ fees of $17,500.

      The trial court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. As relevant

here, we summarize the findings and conclusion relevant to William’s issues:

   • Plaintiffs submitted multiple repair requests to Defendant, and Defendant
     acted with customary diligence when it sent maintenance staff to address
     repair requests. Work orders admitted as Plaintiffs’ exhibits indicate that
     Defendant customarily addressed the requests within 24 hours after the
     request was filed.

   • In December 2017, Defendant’s maintenance staff repaired the weather
     stripping on Plaintiffs’ door. The repair staff was unable to complete the work
     because the staff had a “major problem” with the “resident himself.” “He was
     yelling and screaming major bad words . . .” Mr. Geisinger yelled at the
     maintenance staff and caused them to leave.

   • In December 2017, Mr. Griesinger dropped his Christmas tree off Plaintiff’s
     balcony, from the second floor to the first floor. The nature of the act posed a
                                        9
      threat to the safety of others, although, fortunately, no one was injured by the
      falling Christmas tree.

   • In January 2018, Mr. Griesinger made Defendant’s assistant property
     manager, Karen Klein fear for her safety and well-being. Ms. Klein testified
     that Mr. Griesinger entered the property management office during regular
     business hours, leaned his body over her desk, slammed his hands on her desk,
     yelled in her face, continued to shout for approximately five minutes, and used
     foul language in speaking with her.

      In its Conclusions of Law, the trial court held that:

   • Defendant has fully performed all of its obligations under the Lease with
     Plaintiffs.

   • Plaintiffs breached their obligations under Section 20 of the Lease.

   • Defendant did not retaliate against Plaintiffs as proscribed in Section 92.333
     of the Texas Property Code.

   • Defendant is not liable to Plaintiffs for failure to repair the Premises pursuant
     to Section 92.056 of the Property Code.

      The Griesingers filed a motion for new trial which was denied by the trial

court. William filed an appeal.

                                    ANALYSIS

      Since William’s second issue complaining that the evidence is legally and

factually insufficient to support the verdict that he take-nothing on his claims is

dispositive, we address it first.

      In an appeal from a bench trial, the trial court’s findings of fact “have the same

force and dignity as a jury’s verdict upon questions.” Anderson v. City of Seven

                                          10
Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991) (citation omitted). The trial court’s

findings of fact are reviewable for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to

support them by the same standards that are applied in reviewing evidence to

supporting a jury’s finding. Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996);

Anderson, 806 S.W.2d at 794. When the trial court’s findings are unchallenged by

complaint on appeal, they are binding on the appellate court unless the contrary is

established as a “matter of law” or there is “no evidence” to support the finding.

McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986); Wade v. Anderson, 602

S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“Unless the

trial court’s findings are challenged by a point of error on appeal, they are binding

upon the appellate court.”).

      Generally, attacks on the sufficiency of the evidence supporting findings of

fact “must be directed at specific findings of fact, rather than at the judgment as a

whole.” Arrellano v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 191 S.W.3d 852, 855 (Tex.

App.―Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (citing Zagorski v. Zagorski, 116 S.W.3d

309, 319 (Tex. App.―Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied)); see also 6 Roy W.

McDonald & Elaine Grafton Carlson, Texas Civil Practice § 18:12 (2d ed. 1998).

Evidence is legally sufficient if it “would enable reasonable and fair-minded people

to reach the verdict under review.” City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827

(Tex. 2005). In evaluating the evidence’s legal sufficiency, “we credit evidence that

                                         11
supports the verdict if reasonable jurors could, and disregard contrary evidence

unless reasonable jurors could not.” Kroger Tex. Ltd. P’ship v. Suberu, 216 S.W.3d

788, 793 (Tex. 2006) (citing City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827); see Am. Interstate

Ins. Co. v. Hinson, 172 S.W.3d 108, 114 (Tex. App.―Beaumont 2005, pet. denied).

      In a bench trial, the trial court acts as the factfinder and is the sole judge of

the credibility of witnesses. See Webb v. Crawley, 590 S.W.3d 570, 578 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont, no pet.); see also City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819. When

conducting a factual sufficiency review, we examine the entire record as to the

findings the appellant is challenging and consider all the evidence admitted in the

trial relevant to the contested finding, and after considering the same evidence the

trial court considered, we may overturn the trial court’s finding only if it is so

contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that the trial court’s conclusion

was clearly wrong and unjust. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W. 3d 237, 242

(Tex. 2001); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).

                              Failure to repair claim

      Texas Property Code Section 92.056 addresses a landlord’s liability and a

tenant’s remedies for failure to repair. Specifically, subsection (b) provides that:

      (b) A landlord is liable to a tenant as provided by this subchapter if:

      (1) the tenant has given the landlord notice to repair or remedy a
          condition by giving that notice to the person to whom or to the place
          where the tenant’s rent is normally paid;

                                         12
      (2) the condition materially affects the physical health or safety of an
          ordinary tenant;

      (3) the tenant has given the landlord a subsequent written notice to
          repair or remedy the condition after a reasonable time to repair or
          remedy the condition following the notice given under Subdivision
          (1) or the tenant has given notice under Subdivision (1) by sending
          that notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, by registered
          mail, or by another form of mail that allows tracking of delivery
          from the United States Postal Service or a private delivery service;

      (4) the landlord has had a reasonable time to repair or remedy the
          condition after the landlord received the tenant’s notice under
          Subdivision (1), and if applicable, the tenant’s subsequent notice
          under Subdivision (3);

      (5) the landlord has not made a diligent effort to repair or remedy the
          condition after the landlord received the tenant’s notice under
          Subdivision (1) and, if applicable, the tenant’s notice under
          Subdivision (3); and

      (6) the tenant was not delinquent in the payment of rent at the time any
          notice required by this subsection was given.

Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 92.056(b).

      On appeal, William must show that the evidence is legally sufficient to

support his claim that Century failed to repair the mailbox lock and the weather

stripping on the door with reasonable diligence and that the mailbox lock and

weather stripping affected his physical health or safety. See id.; Dow Chem. Co., 46

S.W.3d at 241 (explaining that the “matter of law” legal-sufficiency standard applies

when a party challenges an adverse finding on an issue on which he had the burden

of proof). The evidence did not include any work orders for William’s mailbox

                                         13
request, but the evidence did show that on the same day Stull acknowledged that the

mailbox lock issue had not been addressed, Valenzuela adjusted the mailbox lock.

The evidence also shows that after receiving William’s September 2018 email

requesting that the lock be fixed, Century replaced the mailbox lock the following

day.

       The evidence further shows that the work orders regarding the weather

stripping, with the exception of the work order entered December 18, 2017, were

completed within one day. The trial court’s finding that William did not establish

his failure to repair claim as a matter of law hinged on the trial court’s conclusion

that the only reason that the December 18, 2017 work order’s completion was

delayed was because of William’s behavior, which consisted of him yelling and

screaming at maintenance staff and dropping a Christmas tree off his balcony, which

posed a threat to the safety of others. Although William complains about

“contradictory testimony” on appeal, the trial court as factfinder determines the

credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, which we do

not disturb on appeal. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819. We conclude that

William failed to establish as a matter of law that Century violated section 92.056

by failing exercise reasonable diligence in responding to his requests for repairs. See

City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 807. We further conclude that the trial court’s findings

that Century acted with customary diligence and was unable to complete work on

                                          14
the weather stripping due to William’s behavior is not so contrary to the

overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. See Dow

Chem. Co., 46 S.W. 3d at 242.

                             Breach of contract claim

      To prevail on a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) a valid

contract exists, (2) the plaintiff performed or tendered performance, (3) the

defendant breached the contract, and (4) the breach damaged the plaintiff. Trahan v.

Fire Ins. Exch., 179 S.W.3d 669, 674 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (citation

omitted). At trial, the only breach the Griesingers pled was Century’s alleged failure

to repair the door and mailbox in violation of section 31.1 of the Lease, which

required Century to act with customary diligence to make all reasonable repairs.

      As discussed above, the evidence allowed the trial court to reasonably

conclude that Century acted with reasonable and customary diligence when it sent

maintenance staff to address repair requests relating to the door. Furthermore, the

Griesingers failed to introduce any work orders pertaining to the mailbox lock, and

the evidence allowed the trial court to reasonably conclude that Century addressed

requests pertaining to the mailbox lock within a reasonable time, and even sent its

head of maintenance to address William’s claims directly. Moreover, the only

evidence of damage introduced by the Griesingers at trial related to moving costs

due to the nonrenewal of the Lease, not a failure to repair.

                                         15
      We conclude that William failed to establish as a matter of law that Century

breached the Lease. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 807. We further conclude the

trial court’s determination that Century fully performed all its obligations under the

Lease is not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly

wrong and unjust. See Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W. 3d at 242.

                                  Retaliation claim

      The Texas Property Code Section 92.331 provides that a landlord may not

retaliate against a tenant by terminating the tenant’s lease because the tenant gives a

landlord a notice to repair or exercise a remedy legally afforded to the tenant. Tex.

Prop. Code Ann. § 92.331(a)(2), (b)(4). A landlord does not retaliate against a tenant

by termination a lease when the tenant, a member of the tenant’s family, or a guest

or invitee of the tenant intentionally damages property on the premises or by word

or conduct threatens the personal safety of the landlord, the landlord’s employees,

or another tenant. Id. § 92.332(b)(2).

      Here, the evidence at trial allowed the trial court to reasonably conclude that

Century did not retaliate against the Griesingers for requesting repairs. Rather, the

evidence at trial authorized the trial court to find that Century decided not to renew

the Lease because William threatened the safety of the landlord’s employees and

other tenants by yelling and cursing at maintenance staff while they were attempting

to repair the weather stripping on the Griesingers’ door; dropping a Christmas tree

                                          16
off his second floor balcony; and placing Klein in fear for her safety and well-being

by slamming his hands on her desk, yelling in her face, and using foul language.

         We conclude that William failed to establish as a matter of law that Century

retaliated against him by terminating the Lease because of the Griesingers’ request

for repairs. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 807. We further conclude the trial

court’s determination that Century did not retaliate against the Griesingers is not so

contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and

unjust. See Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W. 3d at 242. Having concluded the evidence is

sufficient to support the trial court’s verdict that William take nothing on his claims

for breach of contract, failure to repair, and retaliation, we overrule William’s first

issue.

                               Evidentiary Complaints

         In his second issue, William makes eight complaints on what he characterizes

as “improper argument.” Because six of his complaints were not preserved for

appeal, we only address the two evidentiary complaints that were preserved.

         William complains that the trial court improperly sustained defense counsel’s

objections to his testimony. William’s attorney asked him a question that called for

a “yes or no” response for whether work orders had been resolved. William then

launched into a narrative response regarding how the apartment complex’s workflow

system should have been designed. Century’s counsel objected that William was

                                          17
testifying on matters that went beyond William’s personal knowledge. The trial court

sustained the objection.

      “Evidentiary rulings are ‘committed to the trial court’s sound discretion.’”

Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 43 (Tex. 1998) (quoting

City of Brownsville v. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d 750, 753 (Tex. 1995)). “A trial court

abuses its discretion when it rules ‘without regard for any guiding rules or

principles.’” Id. (quoting Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d at 754). “An appellate court must

uphold the trial court’s evidentiary ruling if there is any legitimate basis for the

ruling.” Id. We will reverse an evidentiary ruling only if it probably caused the

rendition of an improper judgment. Id.; Tex. R. App. P. 44.1.

      William’s testimony did not establish that he was qualified to offer an opinion

regarding the apartment complex’s workflow system or that he had any personal

experience or knowledge regarding the design of the apartment complex’s workflow

system such that he was capable of expressing an opinion about how the system

should have been designed. See Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 151 (Tex. 1996)

(citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Inc. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 558

(Tex. 1995)); Health Care Serv. Corp. v. E. Tex. Med. Ctr., 495 S.W.3d 333, 338

(Tex. App.—Tyler 2016, no pet.); see also Tex. R. Evid. 701 (“Opinion Testimony

by Lay Witnesses”), Tex. R. Evid. 702 (“Testimony by Expert Witnesses”). Nor did

his testimony establish that he held an opinion that would have assisted the factfinder

                                          18
in understanding the evidence or determining a fact at issue. See Broders, 924

S.W.2d at 151; Health Care Serv. Corp., 495 S.W.3d at 338; see also Tex. R. Evid.

701, 702. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by sustaining

Century’s objection to William’s narrative response regarding how the apartment

complex’s workflow system should have been designed. See Malone, 972 S.W.2d at

43.

      William also complains about the admission into evidence of a letter from

Century notifying them they had violated the terms of their lease. Century’s counsel

moved to admit a copy of the letter to impeach Nancy Griesinger’s testimony that

she had not previously received the letter notifying her that she had violated the

lease. After reviewing the letter, the Griesingers’ counsel did not object to Nancy

testifying about the circumstances of the letter, and the trial court admitted the letter

for the purpose of impeachment. Nancy testified that she did not violate her previous

lease and that after she got an attorney, her landlord “backed off because I did

absolutely nothing wrong.” The trial court explained to Nancy that she had earlier

denied receiving a letter notifying her that she had violated the lease, explaining that

Century’s counsel was showing her the letter for the purpose of impeachment.

      After Nancy admitted receiving the letter, which notified the Griesingers’ that

they were in violation of the terms of their lease, Century’s counsel moved to strike

Nancy’s prior testimony arguing the contradiction showed she willingly provided

                                           19
false testimony. The Griesingers’ counsel argued that only the testimony about not

receiving the letter should be struck, and he further argued it was irrelevant and

unrelated to the case. The trial court denied Century’s request to strike Nancy’s

testimony and admitted the letter.

      A party may attack a witness’s credibility with impeachment evidence. See

Tex. R. Evid. 607. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court had a legitimate basis to

admit the letter and that no abuse of discretion occurred. See id.; Malone, 972 S.W.2d

at 43. We overrule William’s second issue. Having overruled both of William’s

issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

      AFFIRMED.

                                              _________________________
                                                W. SCOTT GOLEMON
                                                     Chief Justice

Submitted on November 4, 2022
Opinion Delivered July 27, 2023

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Wright, JJ.

                                         20