Court Opinion

ID: 9536221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:56:25.434016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:33:29.338150
License: Public Domain

RABINOWITZ, Chief Justice,
concurring.
Although I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the in camera confession was voluntary, I think that additional consideration of the relevant circumstances is appropriate.
The Supreme Court, in Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30, 97 S.Ct. 202, 203, 50 L.Ed.2d 194, 197 (1976), in the context of the facts of that case, stated:
The Court of Appeals reasoned that respondent’s confession was involuntary because it was made “as a result of the plea bargain” and would not have been made “but for the plea bargain.” Id. [Mobley ex rel. Ross v. Meek, 531 F.2d 924], at 926, 927. But causation in that sense has never been the test of voluntar-iness. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749-50, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). The test is whether the confession was “ ‘extracted by any sort of threats or violence, [or] obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, [or] by the exertion of any improper influence.’ ” Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-543, 18 S.Ct. 183, 187, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897); see Brady v. United States, supra, 397 U.S., at 753, 90 S.Ct., at 1471, 25 L.Ed.2d 747. The existence of the bargain may well have entered into respondent’s decision to give a statement, but counsel made it clear to respondent that he could enforce the terms of the plea bargain whether or not he confessed. The confession thus does not appear to have been the result of “ ‘any direct or implied promises’ ” or any coercion on the part of the prosecution, and was not involuntary. Bram v. United States, supra, 168 U.S., at 542-543, 18 S.Ct., at 186-187, 42 L.Ed. 568.
This passage seems to suggest that if any promise did induce the confession, it is involuntary. I agree with the majority that this implication should not be taken literally, and that the facts of each case must be examined closely to determine if the defendant’s will was overborne.
A most useful summary of some of the relevant factors to be considered in making this determination of voluntariness was set forth in United States v. Williams, 447 F.Supp. 631, 636-37 (D.Del.1978):
[A]nalysis of cases discussing the volun-tariness of statements in the context of inducements by prosecuting authorities discloses that the factual nuances referred to above may well be dispositive. A non-exhaustive list of potentially material considerations includes whether: (1) defendant is in custody at the time of the statement, see, e. g. Brady, supra, 397 U.S. at 754, 90 S.Ct. 1463 [at 1472]; Bram, supra, 168 U.S. at 562, 18 S.Ct. 183 [at 194]; Grades [v. Boles], supra, 398 F.2d [409] at 413; Williams v. United States, 328 F.2d 669, 671 (5th Cir. 1964); [United States v.] Harris, supra, 301 F.Supp. [996] at 997; (2) defendant is alone and unrepresented by counsel, see e. g., Brady, 397 U.S. at 754, 90 S.Ct. [at 1472] 1463; Bram, 168 U.S. at 562-63, 18 S.Ct. [at 194] 183; Grades, 398 F.2d at 410 n. 2; Harris, 301 F.Supp. at 997-98; (3) the promise or inducement is initiated by prosecuting officials as opposed to defendant or someone acting on his behalf, see, e. g., Shotwell Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, 352, 83 S.Ct. 448 [455], 9 L.Ed.2d 357 (1963); Bram, *775168 U.S. at 564, 18 S.Ct. 183 [at 195]; Williams v. Brewer, 509 F.2d 227, 237 (8th Cir. 1974) (dissenting opinion); Williams v. United States, supra, 328 F.2d at 672; Hunter, supra, 372 F.Supp. at 302; (4) defendant is aware of his constitutional and other legal rights, see, e. g. Grades, 398 F.2d at 413; Ferrara, supra, 377 F.2d at 18; Williams v. United States, 328 F.2d at 673; [United States v.] Turner, supra, 423 F.Supp. [959] at 961; Hunter, 372 F.Supp. at 298; (5) the potentially incriminating statement is part of an abortive plea bargain, see, e. g., Hutto, supra, 429 U.S. at 29-30, 97 S.Ct. 202 [at 203]; Gunsby v. Wainwright, 552 F.2d 127-28 (5th Cir. 1977); (6) the promises or inducements leading to the statement are fulfilled by prosecuting authorities, see, e. g., United States v. Barker, 542 F.2d 479, 484 n. 10 (8th Cir. 1976); Hunter [v. Swenson, 372 F.Supp. 287, aff’d], 504 F.2d at [1104] 1105; Grades, 398 F.2d at 411-13; Harris, 301 F.Supp. at 998-99; and (7) defendant is subject to protracted interrogation or evidence appears on the record to show that coercion precludes the statement from being knowing and intelligent, see, e. g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-14, 83 S.Ct. 1336 [1342-1343], 10 L.Ed.2d 513 (1963); Bram, 168 U.S. at 561-62, 18 S.Ct. 183 [at 194]; Grades, 398 F.2d at 413; Ferrara, 377 F.2d at 18. This Court need not pass judgment on the validity of each of these individual considerations. Considered as a whole, the distinctions perceived in the case' law lead ineluctably to the conclusion that the totality of circumstances must be examined in order to evaluate the voluntariness of an induced confession; adherence to a per se suppression doctrine is unsatisfactory. [footnote omitted]1
It is in light of relevant factors such as these that the facts of each case must be examined. The majority finds the presence of an attorney and the type of bargain struck sufficient to conclude that Sto-baugh’s will was not overborne. I think the question a difficult one, requiring a more detailed examination of the facts of the case at bar.
The promise in this case is clearly not part of any impermissible conduct on the part of police or prosecution. Stobaugh was not subjected to interrogation or coercive pressure by the police. It was Sto-baugh’s attorney who initiated the bargaining in an attempt to persuade the prosecution to agree to deferred prosecution.2 Sto-baugh was at all times counseled and represented by an experienced criminal trial attorney. Stobaugh was also fully aware of his constitutional rights at the time of the confession. The promises for deferred prosecution was at all times adhered to by the prosecution, and there was no abortive “plea bargain” in this case. No indicia of involuntariness flowed from impermissible actions by the state.
However, several other facts indicate that Stobaugh may not have acted voluntarily. First, it seems that Stobaugh was incarcerated at the time that he was considering the decision whether to accept the offer of deferred prosecution in return for agreeing to enter a drug rehabilitation program and give a confession. At the time of this offense, Stobaugh was on probation from a burglary conviction in Texas for which he had received a ten-year sentence suspended for ten years. A criminal conviction would have violated the terms of his probation while a deferred prosecution would not. He could not have gone to trial without substantial risk that, given his pri- or offenses, he would receive a substantial sentence in Alaska and have the ten-year sentence in Texas imposed. When Sto-baugh talked with his counsel initially *776about deferred prosecution, he did not want to go to a drug rehabilitation program, having had a prior unsuccessful experience with such a program. However, after talking with someone from Future House, he agreed. His counsel had informed Sto-baugh of his opinion that he would have a very poor chance at trial and tried strongly to discourage him from exercising his right to go to trial.
On balancing these competing factors, I agree with the majority that Stobaugh’s confession was voluntary in light of the totality of the circumstances. Despite the spectre of a lengthy period of incarceration if convicted, Stobaugh was carefully counseled by his attorney as to the options available to him and his will does not seem to have been overborne in the particular circumstances.

. See generally Dix, Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit, and the Modem Law of Confessions, 1975 Wash.U.L.Q. 275 (1975).

. See United States v. Williams, 447 F.Supp. 631, 637 n. 13 (D.Del.1978), quoting Lederer, The Law of Confessions — The Voluntariness Doctrine, 74 Mil.L.Rev. 67, 82 (1976) (footnote omitted): “An accused who initiates a bargaining session with authorities by offering a statement in return for some concession will not normally be heard to complain that his statement was involuntary.”