Court Opinion

ID: 9405998
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-29 16:10:11.954235+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:25.742426
License: Public Domain

J-A26016-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                 :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                  :
                                                 :
                v.                               :
                                                 :
    CHRISTOPHER WILLIAM POPICHAK,                :
                                                 :
                       Appellant                 :       No. 2387 EDA 2021

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 22, 2021
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
             Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0002162-2020

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                                     FILED JUNE 29, 2023

        Appellant, Christopher William Popichak, appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered in the Chester County Court of Common Pleas, following his

open guilty plea to burglary.1 We affirm.

        The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.

The Commonwealth charged Appellant with burglary, criminal trespass, and

theft by unlawful taking in connection with the theft of various items from the

property of Joseph and Rosalie Ilene Hemler (“Victims”).               A jury trial

commenced on August 24, 2021.                  Prior to the commencement of trial,

Appellant expressed dissatisfaction with his attorney and requested a

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a).
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continuance to obtain new representation.        The court denied Appellant’s

request, finding that Appellant’s issues with his attorney were based on

counsel’s refusal to file frivolous motions that Appellant asked him to file. On

the first day of trial, Victims testified by video. Mrs. Hemler, who was 77 years

old at the time of trial, testified that Appellant’s grandmother was one of her

best friends and because of this connection, Mr. Hemler hired Appellant to do

work on their property when Appellant was having difficulty finding a job. Mr.

Hemler, who was 80 years old at the time of trial, testified that Appellant

worked for him on and off for a few months, doing yard work and clearing out

stockpiled tools and spare parts that had accumulated on his property from

his years of working as a mechanic and electrician. The spare supplies were

kept in Mr. Hemler’s shop, which was located in a separate structure from

their residence. The shop was generally kept locked but was always open

when Appellant came to work so that he could access tools and supplies to do

his work. Appellant did not do any work inside the house except one instance

when he helped move a piece of furniture down the stairs. Victims did not

give Appellant permission to enter their residence freely and Appellant always

knocked on the door before entering. Victims gave Appellant permission to

use the bathroom that was located right inside the entrance to the house from

the garage but Appellant always informed Mr. Hemler prior to doing so.

      On April 6, 2020, Mr. Hemler asked Appellant to come to the property

to help him tear down an old generator in order to dispose of it. Shortly after

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lunch, Mr. Hemler got a call and needed to leave the property to run an errand.

Prior to leaving, Mr. Hemler showed Appellant which parts to remove from the

generator and instructed Appellant to continue working while he was gone.

Mr. Hemler expected that the work would take Appellant the whole day and

into the next day. Approximately 20 to 30 minutes after he left, Mr. Hemler

received a call from Appellant stating that he completed the work. Mr. Hemler

told Appellant that additional panels needed to be removed from the generator

and instructed him to continue working.

      Mrs. Hemler testified that on the afternoon of April 6, 2020, she was

working on a puzzle in a room on the second floor of her house when Appellant

unexpectedly entered the room.      She found his presence upstairs strange

because she did not hear him knock and did not permit him to enter the house.

However, she did not ask him to leave because he was her friend’s grandson.

Appellant informed her that he finished the work that Mr. Hemler gave him

and asked if there was anything else for him to do. She told him that he could

leave if he had completed his work. Appellant asked Mrs. Hemler if there was

a bathroom on the second floor. After Mrs. Helmer told Appellant where the

bathroom was located, Appellant was out of her line of sight on the second

floor for several minutes before he left.   Victims’ bedroom and their son’s

bedroom was located on the second floor and the doors to the bedrooms were

typically kept shut.

      Mr. Hemler testified that he returned to his property at approximately

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5:30 P.M. that evening and Appellant was not present on the property. Mr.

Hemler checked on the generator that Appellant was asked to work on and

noted that Appellant did not remove any parts from the generator except some

copper bars and copper wires. The next morning, Appellant texted Mr. Hemler

that he was sick. The following day, Appellant arrived at the property and Mr.

Hemler asked him to do some light yard work because it was expected to rain.

      While Appellant was on the property on April 8, 2020, Victims’ son, Todd

Hemler, returned home after being away for a few days and noticed that the

coin jar in his room was missing. He checked the house and noticed that the

larger coin jar located in Mr. Helmer’s downstairs office was also missing.

Victims confirmed that Appellant was the only other individual who had

entered the house recently.     Victims called the police and Appellant was

questioned by the officers. Appellant left the property after being questioned

and returned later in the day.     Appellant walked up to Mr. Hemler and

attempted to give Mr. Hemler an envelope containing $900.00.         Appellant

stated that he did not steal anything but wanted Mr. Hemler to have the

money.   Mr. Hemler testified that he refused to accept the envelope and

immediately informed the police about the encounter.         Additionally, the

Commonwealth admitted into evidence a property receipt from a scrapyard

and Mr. Hemler identified items on the receipt which were from his shop, taken

without his knowledge or permission.

      After the first day of trial, Appellant had a phone conversation with his

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grandmother from prison, which was recorded. In the conversation, Appellant

told his grandmother to state on the witness stand that Appellant was locked

up for 13 months without bail for a crime he did not commit in order to cause

a mistrial. When his grandmother stated that she would not do so, Appellant

said he would take matters into his own hands. The next morning, prior to

the commencement of the second day of testimony, the Commonwealth

informed Appellant of their knowledge of this phone call and sent troopers to

interview Appellant’s grandmother about the conversation.            After some

negotiations, Appellant agreed to enter an open guilty plea to burglary and

the Commonwealth agreed not to seek a minimum sentence above the bottom

of the standard guideline sentencing range, which was 48 months’

imprisonment.

      The court conducted a colloquy with Appellant regarding his open guilty

plea to ensure that his plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent. The court

explained to Appellant that although the Commonwealth agreed not to seek a

minimum sentence higher than 48 months, the court was not bound by the

Commonwealth’s      position.    Appellant   indicated   that   he   understood.

Additionally, the court specifically asked Appellant if he was satisfied with his

attorney’s representation in his plea negotiation considering his prior claim of

dissatisfaction with his counsel. Appellant indicated that he was satisfied with

counsel’s representation, had time to discuss his plea with counsel, and had

no questions about the rights he was giving up by entering a guilty plea.

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Satisfied that Appellant’s plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, the

court accepted Appellant’s open guilty plea on August 25, 2021, and ordered

a pre-sentence investigation(“PSI”) report.

        Appellant filed a pro se motion to withdraw guilty plea on September 3,

2021.     Appellant retained new counsel, who entered his appearance on

September 7, 2021, and filed a counseled motion to withdraw the guilty plea

on September 16, 2021. The court held a hearing on the motion on October

1, 2021.     Appellant testified that he was innocent of the crime and felt

pressured to plead guilty because his prior counsel was not properly prepared

to defend him at trial and failed to pursue viable defenses.               The

Commonwealth introduced the transcript of the phone conversation Appellant

had with his grandmother regarding Appellant’s attempt to cause a mistrial as

evidence that Appellant made a knowing, voluntary and intelligent decision to

plead guilty after being confronted with the weight of the evidence against

him.    The Commonwealth further argued that it would be prejudiced by

Appellant’s withdrawal of the guilty plea because a full day of testimony had

already taken place in front of a jury prior to Appellant’s plea. On October 7,

2021, the court denied Appellant’s pre-sentence motion to withdraw the guilty

plea.

        On October 22, 2021, the court conducted a sentencing hearing. The

Commonwealth refrained from making any sentencing recommendation, and

the court sentenced Appellant to an aggravated range sentence of six to

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fifteen years of incarceration. On October 26, 2021, Appellant filed a motion

for reconsideration of sentence and a second motion to withdraw the guilty

plea. Appellant filed a third motion to withdraw the guilty plea on October 28,

2021. The court denied all three motions on November 8, 2021. Appellant

filed a timely notice of appeal on November 17, 2021.         The court ordered

Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained

of on appeal on November 19, 2021, and Appellant timely complied on

December 3, 2021.

      Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

         1) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to allow
         Appellant to withdraw his plea of guilty to the charge of
         burglary prior to sentencing, when there was no real
         prejudice to the Commonwealth, Appellant asserted his
         innocence, and there were viable defenses to the charges
         against him?

         2) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to allow
         Appellant to withdraw his plea of guilty to the charge of
         burglary after sentencing, when the court sentenced
         Appellant to a much higher sentence than the sentence that
         the Commonwealth agreed to recommend at the time of the
         open plea?

         3) Did the court abuse its discretion in issuing an excessive
         sentence of six to fifteen years of incarceration on the
         charge of burglary, which is above the standard sentencing
         range and fails to consider Appellant’s rehabilitative needs
         and the needs of his elderly grandparents who rely on
         Appellant for care?

(Appellant’s Brief at 14-17) (re-worded for clarity).

      In his first issue on appeal, Appellant alleges that he is innocent in this

matter and only entered a guilty plea to burglary because his original trial

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counsel was unprepared for trial.     Appellant asserts that he attempted to

obtain new counsel prior to the commencement of trial because trial counsel

did not properly evaluate and pursue viable defenses to the charge of

burglary. Appellant argues that he had permission to be on Victims’ property

and there were other individuals who had access to the property who had a

history of stealing items from Victims. Appellant further contends that there

was no real prejudice to the Commonwealth to granting the pre-sentence

motion to withdraw his guilty plea because the only testimony that was

presented prior to the entry of the plea was the pre-recorded video testimony

of Victims.   Appellant submits that he established a plausible assertion of

innocence and there was no substantial prejudice to the Commonwealth.

Appellant concludes that under these circumstances, the court abused its

discretion in refusing to allow Appellant to withdraw his guilty plea prior to

sentencing, and this Court should vacate the judgment of sentence and

remand for further proceedings. We disagree.

      Our review of the denial of a pre-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty

plea implicates the following principles:

         [W]e recognize that at “any time before the imposition of
         sentence, the court may, in its discretion, permit, upon
         motion of the defendant, or direct sua sponte, the
         withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and the
         substitution of a plea of not guilty.” Pa.R.Crim.P 591(A).
         The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently clarified the
         standard of review for considering a trial court’s decision
         regarding a defendant’s pre-sentence motion to withdraw a
         guilty plea:

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            Trial courts have discretion in determining whether a
            withdrawal request will be granted; such discretion is
            to be administered liberally in favor of the accused;
            and any demonstration by a defendant of a fair-and-
            just reason will suffice to support a grant, unless
            withdrawal would work substantial prejudice to the
            Commonwealth.

         Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 631 Pa. 692, [704,] 115
         A.3d 1284, 1285, 1291-92 (2015) (holding there is no per
         se rule regarding pre-sentence request to withdraw a plea,
         and bare assertion of innocence is not a sufficient reason to
         require a court to grant such request). We will disturb a
         trial court’s decision on a request to withdraw a guilty plea
         only if we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.
         Commonwealth v. Gordy, 73 A.3d 620, 624 (Pa.Super.
         2013)[, appeal denied, 624 Pa. 687, 87 A.3d 318 (2014)].

Commonwealth v. Davis, 191 A.3d 883, 888-89 (Pa.Super. 2018), appeal

denied, 650 Pa. 308, 200 A.3d 2 (2019).

         [A] defendant’s innocence claim must be at least plausible
         to demonstrate, in and of itself, a fair and just reason for
         presentence withdrawal of a plea. More broadly, the proper
         inquiry on consideration of such a withdrawal motion is
         whether the accused has made some colorable
         demonstration, under the circumstances, such that
         permitting withdrawal of the plea would promote fairness
         and justice.

Carrasquillo, supra at 705-06, 115 A.3d at 1292 (internal citation omitted).

(explaining that court should consider plausibility and sincerity of defendant’s

assertion of innocence, as well as circumstances surrounding pre-sentence

motion to withdraw plea, including motivation and timing of request). “[B]oth

the timing and the nature of the innocence claim, along with the relationship

of that claim to the strength of the government’s evidence, are relevant.”

Commonwealth v. Islas, 156 A.3d 1185, 1190 (Pa.Super. 2017).

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     Additionally, a defendant’s failure to establish a plausible claim of

innocence renders unnecessary a consideration of whether pre-sentence

withdrawal    of   the   guilty   plea   would   substantially   prejudice    the

Commonwealth.      Carrasqullio, supra at 706 n.9, 115 A.3d at 1293 n.9

(declining to address prejudice to Commonwealth, because defendant failed

to assert plausible claim of innocence); Commonwealth v. Hvizda, 632 Pa.

3, 9, 116 A.3d 1103, 1107 (2015) (holding pre-sentence request to withdraw

plea failed where defendant made only bare assertion of innocence).

     Instantly, the trial court set forth its reasons for denying Appellant’s pre-

sentence motion to withdraw the guilty plea as follows:

        In this case, a full day of trial on this matter had already
        occurred when [Appellant] decided to accept a plea. The
        jury was present and waiting for the second day of the trial
        to begin. Approximately half of the Commonwealth’s case
        was already completed, and the Commonwealth was ready
        to proceed with the rest of the trial.         All remaining
        Commonwealth witnesses were in the courthouse waiting
        for their turn to testify. It was clear that the case against
        [Appellant] was very strong.         The evidence included
        videotaped trial testimony of the victims, video from the
        scrap metal place where [Appellant] sold the items he stole
        from the Hemlers, and testimony showing that [Appellant]
        attempted to pay back $900 to the Hemlers.               The
        Commonwealth also had videotaped evidence of [Appellant]
        at a Coinstar machine on the day the coins were stolen from
        the Hemlers in which he cashed in over $500 worth of coins,
        which is the amount the Hemlers estimated were in the coin-
        filled containers that were stolen from their house. Phone
        records further showed that [Appellant] was in the area of
        the Coinstar machine on April 6, 2020, and was in the area
        of the scrap metal place the following day. Based on the
        overwhelming evidence against [Appellant], it was clear that
        he would be convicted of the crimes charged.

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         In order to avoid the inevitable, and to negotiate the
         maximum amount of time that he would spend in prison,
         [Appellant] decided to accept a plea. Prior to accepting the
         plea, [Appellant] testified that he was satisfied with the
         services provided to him by his attorney and that he did, in
         fact, commit the crime to which he was pleading guilty.

                                   *     *      *

         The court … notes that prior to trial commencing,
         [Appellant] expressed some dissatisfaction with his
         attorney. The court believes that his trial counsel would not
         file meritless motions requested by [Appellant], leading to
         some of his dissatisfaction. The court further believes that
         [Appellant] was alleging dissatisfaction with his attorney in
         order to delay trial. [Appellant] and his attorney were given
         time to talk and afterward, [Appellant] decided to continue
         working with his attorney. He testified that he was satisfied
         with his attorney when he entered into his plea.

                                   *     *      *

         The court believes that [Appellant]’s attempt to withdraw
         his guilty plea is a tactic he is using to delay the inevitable….
         It is clear that [Appellant] was going to do anything he could
         in order to delay the trial of this matter. A blaring example
         of this is documented in a prison phone call with his
         grandmother after the first day of trial…. He was trying to
         intentionally cause a mistrial after the court denied his
         attempt to fire his attorney the morning of his trial. When
         his grandmother refused to go along with his plan, he
         decided to plead guilty. While [Appellant] is attempting to
         claim that he is innocent of the charges against him, the
         court finds his testimony completely not credible, especially
         in light of the strong evidence against him and his repeated
         attempts to delay trial at any cost. The court believes that
         [Appellant] accepted a plea with the intention of
         withdrawing it later so that he could delay having a jury
         deliberate on the charges against him.

(Trial Court Order and Opinion, filed 10/7/21, at 2-4).

      We agree with the court’s analysis.           Appellant’s assertions that trial

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counsel was unprepared and failed to pursue viable defenses are belied by the

record. Trial counsel vigorously cross-examined Victims regarding whether

Appellant had permission to enter their residence, inquiring whether Appellant

was permitted to enter freely to use the bathroom and whether Mrs. Hemler

asked Appellant to leave when she discovered him inside the house.

Additionally, trial counsel’s questions resulted in admissions from Victims that

they believed that their grandson and Todd’s girlfriend’s son had taken items

from their property on prior occasions. The record clearly demonstrates that

trial counsel was pursuing the very defenses that Appellant now claims support

his assertion of innocence.

      Nevertheless, as the trial court properly noted, the evidence against

Appellant was overwhelming. Victims consistently testified that although they

asked Appellant to work on the property, they did not give him permission to

enter the residence without invitation.       Additionally, Victims testified that

neither their grandson nor Todd’s girlfriend’s son was on their property at the

time that the money jars went missing. Further, the Commonwealth had video

footage and cell phone records that connected Appellant to the sale of the

missing items from Victims’ home. Based on the strength of the evidence

against Appellant, we agree with the court that Appellant failed to demonstrate

a plausible claim of innocence. See Carrasquillo, supra; Islas, supra.

      Additionally, the court did not find Appellant’s claim of innocence

credible in light of the circumstances surrounding Appellant’s request to

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withdraw his plea.     Appellant implored the court to postpone trial by

requesting new counsel on the morning that trial was set to begin. When the

court refused to do so, Appellant asked his grandmother to make statements

on the stand to cause a mistrial. When his grandmother refused to do so and

Appellant was confronted by the Commonwealth with evidence of his recorded

phone call, Appellant entered into a guilty plea that he subsequently

attempted to withdraw. On this record, we discern no error in the court’s

determination that Appellant failed to demonstrate a fair and just reason to

withdraw his guilty plea because his claims of innocence were insincere and

motivated by a desire to delay court proceedings. See Carrasquillo, supra;

Davis, supra; Islas, supra. Appellant’s failure to establish a plausible claim

of innocence renders unnecessary a consideration of a prejudice analysis. See

Carrasquillo, supra, supra.     Therefore, Appellant’s first issue on appeal

merits no relief.

      In his second issue on appeal, Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth

agreed at the time of the guilty plea that it would not recommend a sentence

longer than 48 months’ imprisonment. Appellant argues that the court was

either required to abide by the sentence recommendation or allow Appellant

to withdraw his plea. Appellant contends that the fact that Appellant entered

an open plea rather than a negotiated plea is a “distinction without a

difference” and the court should be bound by the sentence recommendation

of the Commonwealth.     Appellant avers that the guilty plea colloquy that

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Appellant signed “clearly says that if the judge does not accept the

recommendation, the plea can be withdrawn.”         (Appellant’s Brief at 69).

Appellant concludes that the court abused its discretion by refusing to permit

Appellant to withdraw his plea when it imposed a longer sentence than the

Commonwealth agreed to recommend. We disagree.

      This Court has explained:

         [P]ost-sentence motions for withdrawal [of a guilty plea] are
         subject to higher scrutiny [than pre-sentence motions to
         withdraw a plea] since courts strive to discourage entry of
         guilty pleas as sentence-testing devices. A defendant must
         demonstrate that manifest injustice would result if the court
         were to deny his post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty
         plea. Manifest injustice may be established if the plea was
         not tendered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

Commonwealth v. Kehr, 180 A.3d 754, 756-57 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation

omitted).

      Pennsylvania law presumes a defendant who entered a guilty plea was

aware of what he was doing and bears the burden of proving otherwise.

Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517 (Pa.Super. 2003). A defendant

who decides to plead guilty is bound by the statements he makes while under

oath, “and he may not later assert grounds for withdrawing the plea which

contradict the statements he made at his plea colloquy.” Id. at 523. “Our

law does not require that a defendant be totally pleased with the outcome of

his decision to plead guilty, only that his decision be voluntary, knowing and

intelligent.” Id. at 524.

      Here, at the outset we note that Appellant’s written guilty plea colloquy

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makes clear that Appellant was entering an open guilty plea and not a

negotiated plea agreement. In other words, there was no agreement by the

parties as to the sentence in this case. Rather, the Commonwealth’s only

agreement was that it would “not ask for time above the bottom of the

standard guideline range-48 months.” (Guilty Plea Colloquy, filed 8/25/21, at

3). Appellant seems to misinterpret this provision of his guilty plea as the

Commonwealth agreeing to recommend a minimum sentence of no longer

than   48   months’   imprisonment.       Nevertheless,    the   fact   that   the

Commonwealth agreed not to seek a minimum sentence above 48 months’

imprisonment, is not the same as the Commonwealth asking the court to

impose a minimum sentence of no greater than 48 months’ imprisonment or

even recommending a minimum sentence of 48 months’ imprisonment. The

Commonwealth stood by its position not to seek a minimum sentence greater

than 48 months’ imprisonment. In fact, the Commonwealth ultimately stood

silent regarding any sentencing recommendation. As Appellant’s argument is

largely predicated on this misinterpretation, he is not entitled to relief on his

second issue on appeal.

       Further, the written plea colloquy states that “[i]n pronouncing

sentence, the court must consider, BUT IS NOT BOUND BY, the guidelines

issued by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing.”               (Guilty Plea

Colloquy, filed 8/25/21, at 8) (capitalization in original). At the plea hearing,

the court ensured that Appellant understood this provision:

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         The Court: Do you understand the guidelines are what they
         sound like, they’re suggestions to the judge of what the
         sentence should be?

         [Appellant]: Yes.

         The Court: And if I want to sentence above what the
         suggestion is or I want to sentence below what the
         suggestion is, I listen to the arguments of counsel, but I just
         explain what I’m doing. Okay?

         [Appellant]: Yes.

(N.T. Plea Hearing, 8/25/21, at 5).

      Thus, Appellant acknowledged that the court had sentencing discretion

in this case and was not bound by the arguments of counsel or the sentencing

guidelines. The record discloses that Appellant made a voluntary, knowing

and intelligent decision to enter an open guilty plea. See Pollard, supra.

Accordingly, Appellant’s claim that the court abused its discretion in denying

his post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea is meritless. See Kehr,

supra.

      In his third issue, Appellant argues that the sentence of 6 to 15 years

of incarceration is excessive as it greatly exceeds the standard sentencing

range, which is 48 to 60 months’ incarceration in this case. Appellant asserts

that the court failed to adequately state its reasons for exceeding the standard

guidelines. Appellant contends that the court failed to consider Appellant’s

rehabilitative needs.   Appellant claims the court ignored mitigating factors

such as the care Appellant provides for his elderly grandparents, and

Appellant’s willingness to seek psychological help and pursue vocational

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education. Appellant concludes the court abused its discretion by imposing

an excessive sentence that did not properly weigh Appellant’s rehabilitative

needs or consider mitigating factors, and this Court should vacate and remand

for resentencing. We disagree.

      As presented, Appellant’s claim challenges the discretionary aspects of

sentencing. See Commonwealth v. Clarke, 70 A.3d 1281 (Pa.Super. 2013),

appeal denied, 624 Pa. 671, 85 A.3d 481 (2014) (stating contention that court

focused solely on serious nature of crime without adequately considering

protection of public or defendant’s rehabilitative needs concerns court’s

sentencing discretion); Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 949 (Pa.Super.

2002) (stating claim that sentence is manifestly excessive challenges

discretionary aspects of sentencing); Commonwealth v. Cruz-Centeno,

668 A.2d 536 (Pa.Super. 1995), appeal denied, 544 Pa. 653, 676 A.2d 1195

(1996) (explaining claim that court did not consider mitigating factors

challenges discretionary aspects of sentencing).

      “Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an

appellant to an appeal as of right.” Commonwealth v. Phillips, 946 A.2d

103, 112 (Pa.Super. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1264, 129 S.Ct. 2450, 174

L.Ed.2d 240 (2009). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary aspects of

sentencing issue:

         [W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
         appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P
         902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved
         at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify

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         sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s
         brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether
         there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed
         from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42
         Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal

denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006) (quoting Commonwealth v.

Hyland, 875 A.2d 1175, 1183 (Pa.Super. 2005)).

      When appealing the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant

must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by including in his brief a separate concise

statement demonstrating a substantial question as to the appropriateness of

the sentence under the Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 571

Pa. 419, 812 A.2d 617 (2002); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). “The requirement that an

appellant separately set forth the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal

furthers the purpose evident in the Sentencing Code as a whole of limiting any

challenges to the trial court’s evaluation of the multitude of factors impinging

on the sentencing decision to exceptional cases.” Phillips, supra at 112

(emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

      “The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.”       Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830

A.2d 1013, 1018 (Pa.Super. 2003). “A substantial question exists only when

the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s

actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing

Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing

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process.” Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 768 (Pa.Super. 2015)

(en banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.3d 526, 533 (Pa.Super.

2011)).

      “[A]n excessive sentence claim—in conjunction with an assertion that

the court failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a substantial question.”

Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal

denied, 629 Pa. 636, 105 A.3d 736 (2014). See also Commonwealth v.

Trimble, 615 A.2d 48 (Pa.Super. 1992) (holding defendant’s claim that court

failed to consider factors set forth under Section 9721(b) and focused solely

on seriousness of defendant’s offense raised substantial question).          A

substantial question also exists where an appellant alleges the court imposed

a sentence outside of the guidelines without specifying sufficient reasons.

Commonwealth v. Holiday, 954 A.2d 6 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied,

601 Pa. 694, 972 A.2d 520 (2009)

      This Court reviews discretionary sentencing challenges based on the

following standard:

          Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
          sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on
          appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. An abuse of
          discretion is more than just an error in judgment and, on
          appeal, the trial court will not be found to have abused its
          discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment
          exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
          partiality, bias or ill-will.

Commonwealth v. McNabb, 819 A.2d 54, 55 (Pa.Super. 2003) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Hess, 745 A.2d 29, 30-31 (Pa.Super. 2000)).

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      “[A] court is required to consider the particular circumstances of the

offense and the character of the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804

A.2d 1, 10 (Pa.Super. 2002), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1148, 125 S. Ct. 2984,

162 L.Ed.2d 902 (2005).        “In particular, the court should refer to the

defendant’s prior criminal record, his age, personal characteristics and his

potential for rehabilitation.” Id. If the sentencing court has the benefit of a

PSI report, the law presumes the court was aware of the relevant information

regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along

with any mitigating factors.     Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A.2d 362

(Pa.Super. 2005).

      When considering the propriety of imposing an aggravated range

sentence, this Court has observed:

         [T]he guidelines were implemented to create greater
         consistency and rationality in sentencing. The guidelines
         accomplish the above purposes by providing a normal for
         comparison, i.e., the standard range of punishment, for the
         panoply of crimes found in the crimes code and by providing
         a scale of progressively greater punishment as the gravity
         of the offense increases….

         The provision of a “norm” also strongly implies that
         deviation from the norm should be correlated with facts
         about the crime that also deviate from the norm for the
         offense, or facts relating to the offender’s character or
         criminal history that deviates from the norm and must be
         regarded as not within the guidelines contemplation. Given
         this predicate, simply indicating that an offense is a serious,
         heinous or grave offense misplaces the proper focus. The
         focus should not be upon the seriousness, heinousness or
         egregiousness of the offense generally speaking, but, rather
         upon how the present case deviates from what might be

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J-A26016-22

          regarded as a “typical” or “normal” case of the offense under
          consideration.

          An aggravated range sentence … will thus be justified to the
          extent that the individual circumstances of [an appellant’s]
          case are atypical of the crime for which [he] was convicted,
          such that a more severe punishment is appropriate.

Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 843, 848 (Pa.Super. 2006) (internal

citation omitted).

      Instantly, Appellant raised his sentencing issue in a timely post-

sentence motion, timely notice of appeal, and in his Rule 2119(f) statement.

Further, Appellant’s assertion that the sentence was manifestly excessive in

conjunction with his claim that the court failed to weigh his rehabilitative needs

and/or consider mitigating factors raises a substantial question. See Raven,

supra; Trimble, supra. Appellant’s claim that the court also failed to set

forth adequate reasons for imposition of the aggravated-range sentence also

raises a substantial question for our review.           See Holiday, supra.

Accordingly, we proceed to address the merits of Appellant’s sentencing

claims.

      Here, the court had the benefit of a PSI report, defense counsel’s

arguments, and statements from Appellant and his grandmother                   at

sentencing.   Thus, we can presume that the court was fully aware of and

considered mitigating factors such as Appellant’s role in caring for his

grandparents and his expressed willingness to seek psychological help and

vocational education. See Tirado, supra. Further, contrary to Appellant’s

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J-A26016-22

assertion, the court provided an on-the-record statement of reasons why it

imposed a sentence in the aggravated range of the sentencing guidelines. The

court noted Appellant’s extensive criminal history which included multiple prior

convictions for burglary.     Appellant was on parole for a prior burglary

conviction at the time that he committed the instant offense and has a history

of repeated probation and parole violations. Appellant also attempted to have

his grandmother cause a mistrial in this case, demonstrating a disregard for

the judicial process and an unwillingness to take accountability for his actions.

The court additionally considered the impact Appellant’s actions had on his

elderly victims who gave Appellant a job at their property at the request of a

close friend. Mrs. Hemler stated that she was devastated at the loss of her

friendship   with   Appellant’s   grandmother   following   this   incident,   and

Appellant’s actions destroyed Victims’ sense of security.     The court further

noted that Appellant failed to express any remorse for his actions, declining

to address Victims when given the opportunity to do so.               The record

demonstrates that the court considered Appellant’s rehabilitative needs but

determined that his potential for rehabilitation was low and outweighed by the

need to protect the public based on his criminal record, repeated violations of

probation and parole, and lack of remorse towards the elderly victims. On

this record, we discern no abuse of discretion in court’s determination that a

sentence in the aggravated range was appropriate.           See Fullin, supra;

McNabb, supra.        Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his

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J-A26016-22

challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentencing, and we affirm.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 6/29/2023

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