Court Opinion

ID: 9550297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:33:42.169792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:21.760599
License: Public Domain

DOOLIN, Justice,
concurring specially:
Although I strongly support the result reached by the majority, I feel the majority opinion rests precariously upon the thin edge of a tenuous conclusion, namely that the state is not a creditor.
43A O.S.1971 § 111,1 in my opinion makes the state a creditor. To hold that § 111 does not mean what it says in the plain, native vernacular leaves the law bewildered and confusing to the bar and public.
Various state as well as federal courts have dealt with problems concerning funds acquired from the Veterans’ Administration *327and administered by the Veterans’ Administration with conflicting results. In In re Bemowski’s Guardianship, 3 Wis.2d 133, 88 N.W.2d 22 (1958); In re Lewis’ Estate, 287 Mich. 179, 283 N.W. 21 (1938); Auditor General v. Olezniezak, 302 Mich. 336, 4 N.W.2d 679 (1942); and State v. Bean, 159 Me. 455, 195 A.2d 68 (1963), these courts held funds in hands of executor are not exempt from claims of state, as state is not a creditor under § 3101.
To the same effect, see Savoid v. District of Columbia, 110 U.S.App.D.C. 39, 288 F.2d 851 (D.C. Cir. 1961). A like result is reached in State v. Monaco, 81 N.J.Super. 448, 195 A.2d 910 (1963) and in, In re Buxton’s Estate, 246 Wis. 97, 16 N.W.2d 399 (1944). Monaco and Buxton hold pension money loses its exempt status upon the death of a veteran. Other courts have held that the exemption is lost as to investments made from such funds by a guardian, Carrier v. Bryant, 306 U.S. 545, 59 S.Ct. 707, 83 L.Ed. 976 (1939). See also Trotter v. Tennessee, 290 U.S. 354, 54 S.Ct. 138, 78 L.Ed. 358 (1933). The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in, In re Chojnacki’s Estate, 397 Pa. 596, 156 A.2d 812 (1959) arrives at an opposite conclusion finding that each entity, state or federal, is supreme in its area and that a state may not recover from the United States for hospital care furnished a veteran it owed him as an eligible citizen.
Some of the cases cited in the last paragraph are brought against living veterans filed against their guardians. Some are against the estates of deceased veterans for services rendered in state mental hospitals before death. Still other distinctions may be made, for some of these cases are brought under sections of the Veterans’ code other than § 3101 or its predecessor, 38 U.S.C. § 454a, such as 38 U.S.C. § 3203.
I would not attempt to clarify or sort out the preceding eases, nor do I believe them to be exhaustive of the many problems present in this area. To me, they indicate the complexity of the question and that honest differences, theories and approaches yield conflicting results. So be it.
I am persuaded the exemption granted in § 3101 does not ordinarily survive the veteran and would follow the reasoning of In re Buxton’s Estate, supra, and State v. Monaco, supra.
The United States Supreme Court in Pagel v. Pagel, 291 U.S. 473, 54 S.Ct. 497, 78 L.Ed. 921 (1934) when dealing with insurance benefits due under WWI contracts held the exemption from creditors contained therein did not survive the death of the veteran and designated beneficiary. The case dealt with funds due under a “war risk insurance” contract. I am not unmindful of the differences between the contractual nature of the rights and benefits existing in and under “war risk insurance” matters which have been issued and paid for by the veteran and pension gratuities paid by the United States Government to veterans such as presented in the instant case. Suffice to say, I believe logic demands both types of funds lose their exempt status on the death of the veteran or designated beneficiary, as the case may be. I would refuse to exempt one and free the other from valid claims of creditors.
The majority limits recovery by the state to funds received after the appointment of a guardian,2 which seems to ignore the source and status of the funds. We know from the stipulation that all funds in deceased incompetent’s estate were derived from gratuities paid by the Veterans’ Administration. The status and source is the same. I do not see a significant reason for the distinction imposed by the majority in this case when we know the incompetent had no other funds to protect from depletion until a veterans’ award was made.
Since the case is remanded, I would instruct the trial court to give the defendant (executor) the right to refile his answer or to amend his answer striking from consideration the affirmative defense of 38 U.S.C. § 3101. I feel constrained, however, in the *328interest of “finality of judgment” to opine the state’s cause of action is not barred by a Statute of Limitation; see 43A O.S. 1971 § 111.3 Section 111 creates an exception to the provision found in 58 O.S. 1971 § 340.4 Section 111 is an enactment assuring the state of sovereign immunity in this area.5
I am authorized to state that WILLIAMS and BARNES, JJ., concur in the views herein expressed.

. A patient . at an institution [defined in 43A O.S.1971 § 3(j) as any hospital to have the care, treatment or custody of a mentally ill or mentally retarded person] . within the department is liable for his care and treatment. The claim of the State for such care and treatment shall constitute a valid indebtedness.

. See also 31 O.S. 1971 § 7 which seems to make such pension money exempt from levy, execution and attachment.

. 43A O.S. 1971 § 111:
. . . [The] claim of the state for such care and treatment shall constitute a valid indebtedness [not] . barred by any statute of limitation. .

. 58 O.S. 1971 § 340: No claim must be allowed ... by the judge, which is barred by the statute of limitation. .

.See State ex rel. Central State Griffin Memorial Hospital v. Reed, 493 P.2d 815 (Okl.1972) where we have recognized the rationale of the state’s claim to sovereign immunity but stated the state was subject to the nonclaim statute, 58 O.S. 1971 § 333.