Court Opinion

ID: 9793355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:46:24.223178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:35.079775
License: Public Domain

ROSE, Justice,
specially concurring.
While I concur in the result reached by the majority, I do not join in that portion of the opinion which holds that proof of diminished capacity does not constitute a defense to specific-intent crimes in Wyoming. Had first-degree arson been, as it now is, a specific-intent crime (majority opinion, 668 P.2d at 642) at the time that the offense was committed, I would hold that the appellant should have been entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of diminished capacity. My position is based upon a review of the case law in this area and this court’s discussion in Peterson v. State, Wyo., 586 P.2d 144 (1978).
As a general rule, most of the courts that have dealt with the issue hold that evidence of a psychiatrically recognized abnormal mental condition is admissible for purposes of proving that a defendant could not or in fact did not entertain the requisite mental state or intent required for the commission of a charged offense. See Annot. 22 A.L. R.3d 1228, 1282. The question which has divided many courts is not the viability of the diminished capacity defense, but whether application of the defense requires the presence of a lesser included offense to the crime charged. In other words, the focus of concern of these courts has been whether the doctrine of diminished capacity can operate as a total defense to a charged crime, thereby resulting in acquittal.
In McCarthy v. State, Del.Supr., 372 A.2d 180 (1977), the defendant had raised the defense of insanity to the charged offenses of first-degree rape and kidnapping. On appeal, he urged that the trial court had erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the concept of “diminished responsibility.” Pri- or to discussing the substantive aspects of defendant’s claim of error, the court said:
“ * * * It is fundamental that the doctrine of diminished responsibility is not intended to supplant the test of mental illness; it is only after a defendant has been determined to be ‘criminally responsible’ for his actions, i.e. legally sane, that the doctrine has been considered applicable to determine the degree of the offense for which he will be held responsible.” 372 A.2d at 182.
The court then went on to hold that the defense of “diminished responsibility” was not available to the appellant since it was inconsistent with the offenses for which he was charged. In the 'court’s opinion the concept of “diminished responsibility” was one of mitigation only and it therefore required that there be some lesser included offense which lacked the specific-intent requirement of the offense charged for the defense to be applicable.
A similar position to that taken in McCarthy v. State, supra, was adopted in State v. Correra, R.I., 430 A.2d 1251 (1981). There, the Rhode Island Supreme Court, in discussing the diminished-capacity doctrine, said:
“The diminished-capacity doctrine recognizes that although an accused was not suffering from a mental disease or defect when the offense was committed sufficient to exonerate him of all criminal responsibility, his mental capacity may have been diminished by intoxication, trauma, or mental disease so that he did *647not possess the specific mental state or intent essential to the particular offense charged. A defendant claiming diminished capacity concedes his responsibility for the act but claims that, in light of his abnormal mental condition, he is less culpable.” 430 A.2d at 1258.
The court also noted that the defense is not intended to act as a complete defense to a crime charged but instead is intended to mitigate the specific intent of a charged offense thereby resulting in a conviction of a lesser included offense. By implication, the holding in this case requires that there be a lesser included offense to the crime charged before the doctrine of diminished capacity is available to raise a question concerning the defendant’s ability to formulate the specific-intent element of the charged offense.
It is apparent from a review of the above-cited cases that the rationale of the rule requiring the presence of a lesser included offense in order to present a diminished-capacity defense arises from a belief that the doctrine was never intended to act as a complete defense but rather only one of mitigation. The distinction drawn is that although insanity can result in a finding of no criminal culpability, the defense of diminished capacity is designed to permit a finding of reduced criminal culpability.
A different conclusion was reached by the California Supreme Court in People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal.3d 318, 149 Cal.Rptr. 265, 583 P.2d 1308 (1978).1 There the court was asked to adopt a position similar to that discussed above, i.e., that the diminished-capacity defense is available only for offenses for which there are lesser included offenses not requiring the requisite specific intent of the charged crime. The court responded to the State’s urging in the following manner:
“We reject the suggestion of amicus that we sustain the trial court by holding that a defense of diminished capacity cannot be raised whenever, owing to the lack of a lesser included offense, it might result in the defendant’s acquittal. A defendant who, because of diminished capacity, does not entertain the specific intent required for a particular crime is entitled to be acquitted of that crime. If he cannot be convicted of a lesser offense and cannot safely be released, the state’s remedy is to institute civil commitment proceedings, not to convict him of a specific intent crime which he did not commit.” (Emphasis added.) 149 Cal.Rptr. at 267, 583 P.2d at 1310.
The court continued:
“Nevertheless, this unanimity of judicial expression reinforces our conclusion that a defense of diminished capacity arising from mental disease or defect extends to all specific intent crimes, whether or not they encompass lesser included offenses. Clearly, if a crime requires specific intent, a defendant who because of mental disease or defect lacks that intent, cannot commit that crime. The presence or absence of a lesser included offense within the charged crime cannot affect the result. The prosecution must prove all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable' doubt; we do not perceive how a defendant who has in his possession evidence which rebuts an element of the crime can logically be denied the right to present that evidence merely because it will result in his acquittal.” 149 Cal.Rptr. at 272, 583 P.2d at 1315.
The California Supreme Court reaffirmed its adoption of the diminished-capacity defense, as defined in People v. Wetmore, supra, in People v. Cruz, 26 Cal.3d 233, 162 Cal.Rptr. 1, 605 P.2d 830 (1980). The court stated simply: “Diminished capacity is a defense to all specific intent crimes.” 162 Cal.Rptr. at 5, 605 P.2d at 834.
Other jurisdictions have followed the rationale expressed by the court in People v. Wetmore, supra. In Hensel v. State, Alaska, 604 P.2d 222 (1979), the Supreme Court of Alaska concluded that the doctrine of diminished capacity is applicable to any crime requiring specific intent as an essential element and the use of such defense does not require the presence of so-called *648lesser included offenses. The plain reasoning of the court was that the doctrine of diminished capacity was intended to operate as a defense to any specific-intent crime. This view was also followed in State v. Jacoby, Iowa, 260 N.W.2d 828 (1977), and recently in State v. Hines, 187 Conn. 199, 445 A.2d 314 (1982). There the Supreme Court of Connecticut stated:
“ * * * The state urges that this principle [diminished capacity] be confined to murder cases, but we see no reason not to apply it in any case where a specific intent is an essential element of the crime involved, including the assault charged in this case. * * * Such evidence is admitted not for the purpose of exempting a defendant from criminal responsibility, but as bearing upon the question of whether he possessed, at the time he committed the act, the necessary specific intent, the proof of which was required to obtain a conviction.” 445 A.2d at 317.
The Supreme Court of Colorado has gone so far as to suggest that the defense of diminished capacity is available to negate even the mens rea requirement for a nonspecific-intent crime. In Hendershott v. People, Colo., 653 P.2d 385, cert. denied — U.S. —, 103 S.Ct. 1232, 75 L.Ed.2d 466 (1982), the defendant had been convicted of committing a third-degree assault (a general-intent crime) and he challenged the refusal of the court to permit his raising of a defense of diminished capacity. In holding for the appellant the court noted the following:
“ * * * A rule precluding the defendant from contesting the culpability element of the charge would render the prosecution’s evidence on that issue uncontesta-ble as a matter of law, in derogation of the presumption of innocense and the constitutional requirement of prosecutorial proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 653 P.2d at 391.
The court also rejected the State’s policy arguments concerning the problem of acquitting mentally abnormal defendants, with the following analysis:
“The People’s last policy argument is that the protection of the community justifies the exclusion of mental impairment evidence in nonspecific intent crimes. .The logic of the People’s argument is that, notwithstanding the lack of mens rea for the commission of a criminal offense, mentally disturbed persons should not be completely set at liberty upon their acquittal. As we see it, the solution of the problem posed by the People does not lie in barring the admission of mental impairment evidence to negate the requisite culpability for the crime charged, but rather in providing for the confinement and treatment of persons who are mentally ill and pose a danger to themselves or others. See People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal.3d 318, 583 P.2d 1308, 149 Cal.Rptr. 265 (1978); Wesson, Mens Rea and the Colorado Criminal Code, 52 U.Colo.L.Rev. 167, 200 (1981).” 653 P.2d at 395.
Finally, the opinion makes reference to an important distinction between the concept of diminished capacity because of a recognized abnormal mental condition and a defense of lack of capacity based on voluntary intoxication. The distinction is an obvious one because, as here, the appellant was claiming to suffer from an uncontrollable, involuntary mental condition, whereas in the intoxication situation the impaired mental state was caused by defendant’s own voluntary ingestion of intoxicants.
Although this court has never specifically dealt with the question of when and in what circumstances an accused can present evidence of an abnormal mental condition not amounting to legal insanity as a defense to a given criminal charge, we recognized the defense of diminished capacity in Peterson v. State, supra. There we said that diminished capacity:
“ ‘ * * * includes any psychiatrically recognized abnormal mental condition, other than intoxication produced by the use of alcohol or drugs, including subnormal intelligence, but which does not constitute legal insanity under any definition of legal insanity.’ (Emphasis added.)
*649“[Citing 22 A.L.R.3d at 1231.] Such a concept recognizes not only that a mental disease or defect not arising to the level of legal insanity may be sufficient to negate the existence of a specific crime element, People v. Welborn, 1967, 257 Cal.App.2d 513, 65 Cal.Rptr. 8, it as well exposes the illogic of the ‘all or nothing’ assumption underlying numerous judicial decisions — that a person is either wholly ‘sane’ and therefore fully answerable for all his actions, or ‘insane’ and not answerable at all. Commonwealth v. Walzack, 1976, 468 Pa. 210, 360 A.2d 914, 918.” 586 P.2d at 152.
The Peterson court distinguished between diminished capacity and intoxication in the context of negating criminal intent and concluded that the case before it was concerned with voluntary intoxication allegedly aggravated involuntarily by chemical substances. Hence, the concept of diminished capacity, a defense separate and apart from the defense of intoxication, was not applicable. 586 P.2d at 152-153.
It is apparent that the well-reasoned cases, including Peterson v. State, supra, stand for the proposition that the doctrine of diminished capacity is a relevant and provable defense to crimes involving specific intent. Clearly, if a crime requires a specific intent, a defendant who lacks the mental capacity necessary to form that intent cannot commit that crime.
The majority say that “[t]he mental element necessary for commission of a crime has now been established by the legislature,” and “[i]f the legislature had intended additional defenses, it would have said so.” 668 P.2d at 644. In fact, the legislature has indirectly established the defense of diminished capacity by determining that before a defendant can be convicted of certain crimes a specified mental element must be proven beyond a' reasonable doubt. Examples of such crimes include first-degree arson, which now requires proof of “intent to destroy or damage an occupied structure,” § 6-3-101(a), W.S.1977, and burglary, which requires “intent to commit larceny or a felony,” § 6-3-301(a), W.S. 1977. It would be redundant for the legislature to pass an additional statute to the effect that diminished capacity which precludes the formation of the requisite intent is a defense to specific-intent crimes.
I would hold, as do the majority of courts, that the defense of diminished capacity is available, where the defendant has pled not guilty by reason of mental illness or defect under Rule 15(a), W.R.Cr.P., to negate the element of specific intent for any crime in Wyoming requiring such proof.

. The defendant had been charged with burglary.