Court Opinion

ID: 9394225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-12 18:03:28.993187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:21.935719
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/12/23 Adoption of J.D. CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

Adoption of J.D., a Minor.                                     2d Civil No. B323444
                                                             (Super. Ct. No. T000165)
                                                                 (Ventura County)

N.F.,

     Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

C.D.,

     Defendant and Respondent.

      N.F. (Mother) appeals a judgment denying her petition to
declare her daughter J.D. free from the custody and control of
C.D. (Father). (Fam. Code, § 7822.1) The trial court found
Father failed to communicate or visit J.D. for more than one year,
but he rebutted the presumption of abandonment and Mother

         1   All statutory references are to the Family Code.
failed to present clear and convincing evidence that Father
intended to abandon his child. We affirm.
                                FACTS
       Mother and Father are the unmarried parents of J.D., a
teenage girl who was born in 2006. In 2008, they had “shared
joint legal custody” of J.D., and Father had “supervised
visitation” with J.D. Mother has had full legal and physical
custody of J.D. since 2019.
       Z. moved in to live with Mother in 2010. In 2019, Father
filed a request to modify his visitation rights with J.D. to allow
him to have “unsupervised visits.” J.D. wanted the visits to
“remain supervised.” The family court denied Father’s request.
       In 2020, Z. married Mother and became J.D.’s stepfather.
       On November 1, 2021, Mother filed a petition to terminate
Father’s parental rights to J.D. She alleged Father’s last visit
with J.D. was on August 19, 2019. She claimed Father “has not
tried to contact the minor child for more than a year” and this
constitutes an intent to abandon the child.
       On February 22, 2022, the Ventura County Human
Services Agency (HSA) filed a report with the trial court. The
social worker interviewed Mother, the stepfather, and the child.
J.D. told the social worker, “ ‘I want to be adopted, [Z., the
stepfather] is my dad.’ ” HSA did not interview Father. It
recommended that J.D. “be freed to be adopted by the . . .
stepfather.”
       Mother testified Father did not “reach out” to her to ask
how J.D. “was doing.” The last message she received from Father
was in August 2019. Mother did not block Father from texting
J.D. She set up “family counselling,” but Father did not attend
the counselling sessions. From September 2019 “to now,” Father

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did not contact her to set up visits with J.D. Mother wanted
Father’s parental rights with J.D. terminated because he “hasn’t
been present consistently,” he is not “dependable,” and Z. “has
stepped into the father role” for J.D.
       J.D. testified the last time she saw Father was in 2019.
Father “completely dropped off the face of the earth in, like,
2019.” J.D. did not know why he did that. She was not afraid of
Father. She wanted to be adopted by her stepfather. She was
asked, “Do you believe that your father has ever stopped loving
you?” J.D. said, “I really don’t know.” She was asked if she loved
her father. She responded, “I did. I don’t know if I really do
anymore.”
       Father testified he did not intend to abandon J.D. He
consistently visited the child in 2016, 2017, and 2018. Mother
did not inform him of any counselling schedule for J.D. He
stopped contacting the child because she was in the middle of a
conflict between the adults. J.D. wanted to communicate with
him, but Mother and the stepfather did not want her to text him.
Father’s text messages to his child were being blocked. He did
not want the child “to be filled with unnecessary drama” or stress
because of the conflict between the adults. Because the child was
facing pressure from Mother and the stepfather, he did not want
J.D. “to be put in a bad spot.”
       Father felt J.D. needed “a little space,” and the period of no
contact would give her that space. He believed it would be
“temporary,” and, given time, she “was going to come back” to
him. Other factors that prevented him from visiting the child
included the pandemic and the stepfather’s threatening behavior.
       The trial court denied the petition. It found there was a
presumption of abandonment because Father had no contact with

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the child for more than one year. (§ 7822.) But Father “rebutted
the presumption.” “The facts of this case do not clearly and
convincingly demonstrate that Father intended to abandon
[J.D.].”
                            DISCUSSION
                      Denying Mother’s Petition
       Section 7822, subdivision (a)(3), provides, in relevant part,
“A proceeding under this part may be brought if . . . : . . . One
parent has left the child in the care and custody of the other
parent for a period of one year without any provision for the
child’s support, or without communication from the parent, with
the intent on the part of the parent to abandon the child.”
“Accordingly, a section 7822 proceeding to terminate parental
rights is appropriate ‘where three main elements are met: (1) the
child must have been left with another; (2) without provision for
support or without communication from the parent for the
statutory period; and (3) with the intent on the part of the parent
to abandon the child.’ ” (In re Aubrey T. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th
316, 326, italics added.) “A trial court’s finding of abandonment
must ‘be supported by clear and convincing evidence.’ ” (Ibid.)
“On appeal, the reviewing court examines the entire record to
determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the
trial court’s findings.” (Ibid.)
       The involuntary termination of the parent-child
relationship “by state action must be viewed as a drastic remedy
which should be resorted to only in extreme cases of neglect or
abandonment.” (In re T.M.R. (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 694, 703,
italics added.) Where the parent did not contact the child within
the statutory period, but he or she did not intend to abandon the
child, termination of the parent’s parental rights is not

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appropriate. (Ibid.; In re Aubrey T., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at
p. 326.)
       “The failure to provide identification, failure to provide
support, or failure to communicate is presumptive evidence of the
intent to abandon.” (§ 7822, subd. (b).) But “the presumptive
evidence may be overcome by opposing evidence and the question
of intent to abandon is a question of fact to be decided by the trial
court.” (In re Bisenius (1959) 173 Cal.App.2d 518, 522-523, italics
added.) The presumption may be rebutted by evidence showing
the parent did not intend to abandon the child, valid reasons
existed for not making contact, there was interference with the
parent-child relationship by third parties, and the court may
consider evidence showing the relationship the parent had
developed with the child, or other factors. (In re Aubrey T.,
supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 329; In re H.D. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th
42, 53; In re E.M. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 828, 841; In re Allison
H. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 154, 161; In re Jack H. (1980) 106
Cal.App.3d 257, 265.)
                        Substantial Evidence
       Mother contends the evidence is not sufficient to support
the trial court’s findings. We disagree.
       Mother cites the evidence she produced and claims it shows
Father abandoned the child. But the issue is not whether some
evidence supports appellant, it is only whether substantial
evidence supports the judgment. (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150
Cal.App.3d 870, 874.)
       In deciding the sufficiency of the evidence, we must draw
all reasonable inferences from the record in support of the
judgment. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011-
1012.) Mother claims Father’s testimony was not credible and

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the trial court erred by relying on it. But we do not decide the
credibility of the witnesses; that is a matter exclusively decided
by the trial court. (Lenk v. Total-Western, Inc. (2001) 89
Cal.App.4th 959, 968.) She claims the weight of the evidence she
presented supports the granting of her petition. But we do not
reweigh the evidence. The trial court exclusively decides the
weight to be given to the evidence and it resolves evidentiary
conflicts. (Muzquiz v. City of Emeryville (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th
1106, 1121.) “The testimony of one witness may be sufficient, as
against any number of witnesses testifying to the contrary, for
the proof of a fact in a civil case.” (Zinn v. Ex-Cell-O Corp. (1957)
148 Cal.App.2d 56, 70-71; see also In re Marriage of Slivka (1986)
183 Cal.App.3d 159, 163.)
       Father’s testimony supported findings that he did not
intend to abandon J.D. during the one-year period and that he
had developed a substantial relationship with her. He said he
“never stopped trying to be part of her life.” He bought her gifts
“this year and last year.” He bought Christmas and birthday
gifts for her. In 2016, 2017, and 2018, he saw J.D. “several times
a month.” He saw her at “soccer practices” and “softball
practices.” He would try “to make every practice.” His visits
involved substantial time. They would last “four to six hours.”
He financially supported this child by making “regular and
consistent payments for child support.” (In re E.M., supra, 228
Cal.App.4th at p. 840.)
       Text messages between Father and J.D. supported his
claim that he had developed a substantial relationship with her.
The trial court found Father and J.D. “had exchanged loving and
appropriate text messages, and there was no indication that
[J.D.] was uncomfortable with her father or that she was

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reluctant to communicate with him.” Because J.D. told Father
that she wanted to spend more time with him, he filed a
modification of visitation motion to have unsupervised visits with
her.
       But Father was surprised because of J.D.’s sudden change
of attitude when she told a mediator that she wanted the visits to
remain supervised. Father said Mother and J.D.’s stepfather had
pressured her to change her attitude about him.
       Father testified there were factors that prevented him from
having more visits with J.D. J.D. lived with Mother and her
stepfather. On one occasion the stepfather displayed a “concealed
firearm” that Father took as a threat to his safety. Father was
“intimidated” by the stepfather’s threatening conduct. Despite
this, he still tried to “communicate directly with [J.D.].” The
pandemic also interfered with his ability to visit J.D. He lost his
job and had to care for an elderly person.
       Father was concerned about the impact on J.D. of
contacting her at her home. (In re Aubrey T., supra, 48
Cal.App.5th at p. 329 [a parent’s reasons for not contacting the
child may constitute evidence to rebut the statutory presumption
of abandonment].) Here, Father said the child was in the middle
of a conflict between Mother and stepfather on one hand, and
Father’s attempts to contact her on the other.
       Father testified J.D. wanted to communicate more with
him, but Mother and stepfather did not want her to text him. His
text messages to the child were being blocked. J.D. told him that
she “gets in trouble” for calling him “without asking” permission.
During his calls with her, J.D. would hide the phone to prevent
Mother and stepfather from knowing that she was talking with
him. She was “being heavily influenced at her home life.” Father

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did not want her “to be filled with unnecessary drama” or stress
because of this pressure from the adults. He felt stopping contact
with the child for a temporary period would give her “a little
space” that she needed to be free from the stress of this conflict.
Father believed the child wanted this temporary cessation of
contact. He said, “I was waiting for her to reach out.” “I just
thought that’s what [J.D.] wanted.” He did not realize that not
contacting her to give her “space” would lead to terminating his
parental rights, and he did not want that result.
       “Great deference must be given to the trial court’s
adjudication of the facts . . . .” (In re Marriage of Condon (1998)
62 Cal.App.4th 533, 549, italics added.) The court may consider
the parent’s subjective “good faith” belief in deciding whether the
parent’s actions were reasonable. (In re Jack H., supra, 106
Cal.App.3d at pp. 264-265.) Here, the court could reasonably find
that Father did not intend to abandon his child; that his lack of
contact was not due to neglect or disinterest, but was instead
motivated by his concern about the pressure his child faced at
home and other factors that do not support an abandonment
finding. (In re Aubrey T., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 329.)
                          The HSA Report
       Mother contends the trial court “ignored” the HSA report
where a social worker described J.D.’s wishes and concluded that
the child should “be freed to be adopted” by her stepfather. But
the court did not ignore this report. It found the HSA “report
adequately reports the child’s wishes.”
       The trial court was not bound by the agency’s
recommendation. (In re Armando L. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 606,
615; In re Miguel E. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 521, 548.) Moreover,
this report was premature and incomplete. The HSA made its

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recommendation without interviewing Father. It made its
recommendation based only on “the interviews conducted with”
Mother and J.D. It did not have the benefit of Father’s testimony
at the hearing. The court could consider the unfairness of HSA
reaching such a conclusion without considering the facts
presented by Father.
       Mother notes that the report indicates that J.D. wanted to
be adopted by her stepfather. But the “issue herein was whether
there was an abandonment of the child. The child’s wishes . . .
were immaterial upon that issue.” (In re Welch (1951) 108
Cal.App.2d 466, 474.) Those wishes do not come into play until
after the court finds the parent intended to abandon the child.
(In re Baby Boy S. (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 925, 933; In re Cattalini
(1946) 72 Cal.App.2d 662, 671.)
       We have reviewed Mother’s remaining contentions and we
conclude she has not shown grounds for reversal.
                           DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded in
favor of the respondent.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                    GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:

             YEGAN, J.              BALTODANO, J.

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                      Tari L. Cody, Judge

               Superior Court County of Ventura

                ______________________________

      Norris Legal Group, Gina S. Berry and Cameron T. Norris
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Respondent.

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