Court Opinion

ID: 9714309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:35:08.77828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:25.177335
License: Public Domain

YETKA, Justice
(dissenting).
The statute authorizes an award of costs and attorneys’ fees where the trial court dismisses the proceeding due to the failure of the condemnor to pay the award within the required time or where the proceeding is “discontinued by the petitioner.” The question before the court, therefore, in*854volves interpretation of the clause “discontinued by the petitioners.” Does the statute intend to allow attorneys’ fees only where there is a voluntary discontinuance or does it also apply where the discontinuance is a result of a court determination that condemnation shall not lie under the Environmental Rights Act?
The statute in question has been in force in substantially the same form since 1905. Until very recent times, the power of eminent domain and the manner of its exercise lay almost entirely with the discretion of the condemnor. Since the property owner could not object to the location of a particular improvement, virtually the only objection which could be raised was that no valid public purpose was being served.
As we held in both Bryson I and Bryson II, however, the rules have been greatly changed by the passage of the Environmental Rights Act in the early 1970’s. We cannot conceive of the legislature intending to allow attorneys’ fees in a situation where the condemnor itself determined it made a mistake and dismissed the condemnation proceedings and yet not to allow attorneys’ fees in a proceeding where the court holds that the governmental body cannot condemn the land because of the legislature’s direction to protect the state’s natural resources.
Respondents cite our case of State v. Nelson, 267 Minn. 70, 125 N.W.2d 166 (1963) for the proposition that the statute does not contemplate attorneys’ fees for a court-ordered dismissal. Nelson is distinguishable on two grounds. First, the court in that case found that the condemnation action would not in fact be abandoned but would very likely be recommenced. We said:
Appellant here argues that the statute should not be literally construed to limit attorneys’ fees to those cases where the state has itself dismissed the proceedings. It is appellant’s contention that the purpose of the statute is frustrated where the state fails to pursue a condemnation but refuses to dismiss because of its potential liability for attorneys’ fees. While there would be force in this argument if the record compelled a finding that these proceedings had actually been abandoned, the evidence is all to the contrary. Although it is clear there have been delays, it is equally obvious that the state intends to go forward as expeditiously as possible.
267 Minn, at 73-74, 125 N.W.2d at 168. In this case, there is no way that the County of Freeborn can continue or recommence the condemnation proceedings against the appellant’s land.
Secondly, the Nelson case was decided a decade before the Environmental Rights Act was even passed. I therefore accept the interpretation of the statute which makes common sense and hold that attorneys’ fees and costs are collectible both in the situation of a voluntary dismissal of a condemnation proceedings by the condemnor and in the case where a court has held that condemnation will not lie. I also have in mind our recent case ordering the state to provide counsel for the indigent in paternity cases where the county attorney brings the proceedings on behalf of the state. In that case, we relied upon our supervisory power to insure the fair administration of justice. Hepfel v. Bashaw, 279 N.W.2d 342, 348 (Minn.1979).