Court Opinion

ID: 9551731
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:58:18.522643+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:27.653795
License: Public Domain

BURKE, J.
I dissent. It is a cardinal principle of constitutional law that if “ ‘the terms of a statute are by fair and reasonable interpretation capable of a meaning consistent with the requirements of the Constitution, the statute will be given that meaning, rather than another in conflict with the Constitution. [Citations.]’ ” (San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson, 3 Cal.3d 937, 948 [92 Cal.Rptr. 309, 479 P.2d 669] [Tobriner, J.].) Thus, in a recent case involving the constitutionality of a municipal trespass ordinance, we stated that “in order ... to save the constitution*830ality of [the ordinance], we must construe it to encompass both the protection of the property owner’s legitimate interest in preventing physical interference with the business use, disturbances of the peace ... or physical obstruction of the premises ... as well as the preservation of ‘an effective place for the dissemination of ideas.’ [Citation.]” (In re Cox, 3 Cal.3d 205, 223 [90 Cal.Rptr. 24, 474 P.2d 992] [Tobriner, J.].)
In the instant case, the majority opinion facilely ignores the foregoing principles and declares City’s anti-litter ordinance unconstitutional “on its face.” In my view, we must (as in Cox, supra), construe that ordinance to encompass both the legitimate anti-litter objectives of the city and private property owner as well as the preservation of First Amendment rights. As so construed, the ordinance is valid and enforceable.
The majority claim that City’s ordinance constitutes an “extensive interference” with the distribution of “protected” material, instead of being “aimed specifically at those who litter.” To the contrary, properly construed to save its constitutionality, the ordinance is restricted solely to those who litter, for it forbids only that distribution, scattering, etc., which occurs in private yards, grounds, porches, doorsteps, vestibules, hallways, vacant lots or other private property, without the owner’s prior consent. By its terms, the ordinance would permit the direct distribution of “protected” or other material to any householder consenting to receive it, for the ordinance only applies to those “distributions” made “without having first obtained permission . . . .” Thus, nothing in the ordinance would prevent the distributor from announcing his presence and offering his handouts to the householder.
The cases cited by the majority indicate that an ordinance could not properly forbid person-to-person distribution on private property of protected material, such as religious tracts or political pamphlets. (See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 [84 L.Ed. 155, 166, 60 S.Ct. 146]; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145-146 [87 L.Ed. 1313, 1318, 63 S.Ct. 862].) These cases, however, would not bar a municipality from prohibiting the distribution of such material by scattering it on private grounds or leaving it on one’s doorstep where, by its very presence, it could cause a serious litter problem as well as constituting an open invitation to burglary.
But even were we to conclude that these intrusions upon the private householder were justified by some need to afford the distributor of protected materials an uninvited access to private premises, we could nonetheless reasonably construe City’s ordinance as applying only to *831nonprotected, commercial material, thereby saving the constitutionality of the ordinance in its most common application.
The authorities uniformly recognize that commercial soliciting or advertising may be regulated by ordinances of the type involved herein. (Breard v. City of Alexandria, La., 341 U.S. 622, 641-642 [95 L.Ed. 1233, 1247-1248, 71 S.Ct. 920]; Schneider v. State, supra, 308 U.S. 147, 165 [84 L.Ed. 155, 166, 60 S.Ct. 146].) Accordingly, it has been noted that “Ordinances prohibiting the distribution, throwing or casting of handbills, circulars, cards or other advertising matter upon streets and public places have been construed as applying only to commercial and business advertising matter . . . .” (7 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations, § 24.446, at pp. 430-431, citing cases.) City’s ordinance could reasonably be so construed.
The majority accuse City’s ordinance of exhibiting the vice of “over-breadth,” a common form of legislative overreaction to the solution of a problem. Ironically, the majority, by declaring the ordinance invalid on its face without considering the reasonable alternative constructions which I have proposed, have overreacted in a similar manner. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from their opinion.
McComb, J., concurred.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied November 17, 1971. McComb, J., and Burke, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.